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The Defeat of Assimilation and the Rise of Colonialism on the Fort Belknap Reservation, 1873–1925

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In analyzing White-Native American relations over the past two centuries, most historians recognize that the government implemented various methods to extinguish the Indians' title to the land. However, once the military actions against the tribes ended in the 1880s, many researchers conclude their study of American Indian policy and imply that the era of coerced land cessions stopped with the disappearance of the frontier. To them, assimilation characterized the period from the 1887 General Allotment Act to the 1930s "Indian New Deal" and the previous century's use of force led to acculturative goals. These are misleading conclusions.

Assimilation was not representative of the entire period from 1887–1930, and force continued to play an important role in White-Indian relationships. Congress emphasized acculturation between 1887 and 1895, but, once the optimism that the Indians would quickly join White society faded, officials again turned to coercion to acquire the remaining tribal resources. As a result, from 1900–1925, the Indians lost control of much of their property and witnessed the near termination of their reservations. As in the past, promoting White progress at the expense of tribal lands became the primary thrust of American Indian policy.

In his dissertation, *Beyond Savagery*[1], Frederick Hoxie examines

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this shift in Indian-White relations. His discussion served as a model for this paper's investigation of federal Indian strategy. The events on the Fort Belknap Reservation from 1873–1925 substantiate Hoxie's conclusions and demonstrate that this change in the government's Indian policy greatly affected the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines' economy and their status in the American political system.

Throughout the nineteenth century assimilation and force constituted the foundations of American Indian policy. In their efforts to "civilize" the Native Americans the Whites sent missionaries to the various reservations in order to teach Anglo values to the Indians. When the tribes hesitated in receiving emissaries or balked at selling the land that the settlers desired, the United States turned to military coercion, treaties and other forceful means to acquire the coveted territory and to promote national expansion at the expense of Indian resources.[2]

After military activities ended in the 1880s, assimilation became the dominant factor in determining American Indian policy for the next decade. In implementing the 1887 General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) Congressmen once again sought to acculturate the Indians. By dividing the reservations into 160 acre plots for farming, reformers hoped that an agricultural existence would quickly instill important American values such as individualism and private property into the Indians' value systems and would serve as a basis for the Native Americans' entry into White society.[3]

However, false assumptions undermined the Whites' optimism of rapid acculturation. These reformers did not understand the diversity and the complexity present in all Indian cultures. To apply a single solution such as the Dawes Act to a variety of tribal social systems that have evolved over thousands of years was unrealistic. To insist upon agriculture as an economic foundation on the arid Plains doomed the policy to failure. The activities of the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines on the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana illustrated the failures of the General Allotment Act and demonstrated the frustration in the humanitarians' desires for quick assimilation.

In the 17th century the Assiniboines and the Gros Ventres lived on the Southern Canadian Plains. With the introduction of the horse and the gun in the 1750s, some bands of both tribes began

to rely upon the bison as the foundation of their economy. As the bison population declined throughout the 1800s, these Indians moved to the Northern Montana region to hunt the remaining herds. As the Whites encroached upon the tribes' lands military conflicts erupted and the settlers forced the Indians to survive on an ever decreasing land base. Finally in 1873 the tribes agreed to reside on the Fort Belknap Reserve, a small tract of land on the Milk River.[4]

From 1873–1888 the reserve's agents made few attempts to teach White values to the Indians. During this period supervisor W.L. Lincoln encouraged some farming, but the tribes, still relying upon the buffalo for food, clothing and shelter, ignored the agent's pleas. By 1884 cultivation consisted of only 350 acres. Instead of imitating Anglo customs, most of the Indians adhered to traditional values. The people continued to practice horse raids, Sun Dances, purification ceremonies and bison hunting. To demonstrate their freedom from the superintendent's control most bands camped long distances from the reservation's headquarters. As a result the chief maintained his leadership status while Lincoln exerted little authority over the Indians.[5]

This apparent independence from White authority and acculturative demands suddenly ended with the local extinction of the bison in 1884. During the winter of that year many Gros Ventres and Assiniboines starved or froze to death. Since these conditions compelled the tribes to rely increasingly upon federal rations for survival, most of the Indians moved closer to the agency headquarters. Consequently, as a few White settlers migrated into nearby Chaton County, they noticed that the tribes were not using all of the land. These ranchers started to pressure the government to reduce the size of the Fort Belknap Reserve.[6]

As a result of Indians' desire for a new economic base and the Westerners' demands for tribal land, the federal government negotiated the 1888 Agreement with the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines. The accord pleased the local Whites for it reduced the size of the reserve by one-half. Nevertheless, the emphasis upon assimilation represented the primary significance of this agreement.[7]

In addition to supplying the tribes with " . . . agricultural and mechanical equipment,"[8] it also appropriated money for the construction of irrigation ditches, schools and a wood mill. The agents

hoped that these facilities would teach agricultural practices, encourage farming and foster tribal exploitation of their natural resources. Federal authorities were optimistic that the Indians would soon be prepared for land allotment and for the development of a self-sufficient economy.[9] In his annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs agent Lincoln stated that "the time has come to put these Indians on to certain tracts of land, 160 acres to each, or more, if necessary, and there keep them, allowing them to mix more with the Whites. In that way lies their more rapid advances in civilized ways."[10]

However, within five years, the agents' optimism for rapid acculturation changed to pessimism. Despite the development of an irrigation network and the agricultural education supplied by St. Paul's Mission, most of the people preferred stockraising to farming. Not only was this occupation more suitable to the climate of the arid West, but cattle raising provided an economic foundation that fostered traditional practices. Most of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine men perceived farming as a woman's duty. Therefore, by tending stock, the men upheld the traditional values in the division of labor. Also, in 1893, agent Robe commented that many Indians continued to practice polygamy, did not speak English and stole horses. By 1895 the superintendent realized that most Native Americans were not assimilating into the White culture.[11]

Agents throughout the reservation system noticed the Indians' reluctance to assimilate. This perception supported the changing attitudes of many Eastern reformers and anthropologists who viewed the Native Americans' adoption of White values as a time-consuming process or an impossible objective. Therefore, the assimilation fervor of the late 1880s began to die in the mid-1890s and the desire to promote Western progress became the determining factor in Indian-White relations. By 1900 force once again dominated American Indian policy.

This shift in attitudes toward acculturation reflected the political, social and scientific moods of the Progressive Era from 1900–1920. During the period economic growth constituted the primary concern for most Americans, especially for those in the less developed Southern and Western regions. In order to achieve this desired growth all sections of the economy needed to work toward this goal. But to many Whites minorities who refused to

join the "superior" culture blocked the country's attempts at progress. Thus Anglos required that Blacks, Chinese and other ethnic and racial groups conform to the dominant culture or accept inferior positions in society.[12]

As a result of this ideology, belief in White racial superiority increased during the first two decades of the twentieth century. A 1917 Congressional act significantly decreased immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe. Jim Crow laws reduced Blacks to third class citizenship and Orientals were prevented from obtaining equality. Finally Congressmen began to evaluate the Indians' part in the nation's political and economic systems.[13]

Progressive politicians emphasized scientific analysis as the solution to political and economic problems. To these leaders efficiency in all sections of American life facilitated progress, and the scientific community provided the expertise necessary for a productive government. Since officials relied upon deductive evidence in deciding social issues, anthropological theories began to play a role in determining United States Indian policy.[14]

Federal officials' pessimistic perception of Native American assimilation primarily resulted from the changing attitudes of anthropologists. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, most social scientists thought that the Indians would quickly integrate into society. The failure of rapid acculturation precipitated a new philosophy among the leading experts. These scientists perceived that a large gap existed between Indian and White ideologies. Even though the investigators did not agree on the cause of this dichotomy, most of them concurred that the tribes' racial handicaps prevented the Indians from assimilating. W.J. McGee, head of the Bureau of American Ethnology, believed that the Indians would never learn "the arts of civilization." Madison Grant, a leading social scientist, contended that the "inferior qualities" of the Native Americans would soon "corrupt" the White culture. The anthropologist, William Henry Holmes, stated that the Indians would become extinct in the future but progress would continue if the tribes did not "inhibit development." Generally the scientific community doubted that the Indians would ever join the White society.[15]

The failure of rapid assimilation also disappointed the Eastern humanitarians. Some reformers abandoned their previous attempts at surrounding the reservations with White communities.

The proximity of settlers obviously did not encourage the Indians to accept American values readily. In order to retain the principles of acculturation and to adhere to the popular desires for economic progress, many Easterners advocated local White ownership of the reservation resources. Not only would this action spur financial development but the increased contact with society would further coerce the Indians into acquiring White ideals.[16]

These changing perceptions had a profound effect upon American Indian policy. Since Progressive politicians emphasized a "scientific" approach to the solution of social problems, most leaders accepted the anthropologists' conclusions of the Indians' inability to acculturate rapidly. Consequently officials perceived that governmental intervention did not facilitate integration and continued federal activism in assimilation was wasteful and inefficient. Instead administrators agreed with the humanitarian contention that local White ownership of tribal resources represented the best civilizing influence for the tribes.

Besides reflecting anthropological and reformative concerns, this declining activism also supported the popular wishes for economic progress. To the Westerners the Indians blocked expansion within the region. The railroads such as the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific wanted to move further West but reservation lands prevented this expansion. From 1900–1920 the population of most Western states doubled or tripled. Consequently local governments demanded that national officials open the reservations for settlement in order to fulfill the Whites' desires for more land. As in other areas of the country sectional Whites complained that a minority group hindered financial development. Due to the disillusionment with assimilation and the commitment to promoting growth, the federal government's role in American Indian policy shifted from encouraging tribal integration to advocating Western advancement.[17]

The promotion of regional progress was the primary purpose in allowing the Whites to control the reservations' resources. Indian civil rights and Americanization became secondary to the fostering of Western growth. From 1880–1920 the Indians lost control of over 60% of their land. Allotment accounted for only a minority of this decline, while the government's leasing and selling policies explained the largest decreases. Progressive politicians no longer placed importance upon an Indian farming his

property. Instead the use of the area for local expansion constituted the new ideal in Indian policy.[18]

The court decision of *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock* further demonstrated the government's commitment to progress at the expense of tribal resource rights. In their interpretation of the case, the Supreme Court judges stated that Congress had complete control over the Indians' lives. Instead of the President, Congressmen now decided when an Indian could cede his land. Therefore the leasing process became more susceptible to Western political pressure. Legislators used the *Lone Wolf* decision to open reservations for White settlement. The allotment process increased as the Devil's Lake, Flathead, Wind River, Uintah, Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Reservations experienced land divisions and alienations. Many Indians objected to severalty and leasing, but politicians ignored these pleas and forced the Native Americans to accept resource losses. As a result American Indian policy no longer upheld citizenship and acculturation but emphasized the White control of reservation development.[19]

The Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines experienced the effects of the government's shifting emphasis away from assimilation and toward White control of tribal resources. Even though the 1888 Agreement ceded one half of the former Fort Belknap Reserve to local settlers, Montanans continued to demand more land. Due to the shortage of good grazing tracts in other areas of the state, ranchers began to migrate into Northern Montana in order to use the grasslands along the Missouri and Milk Rivers. In the late 1880s the Great Northern Railroad began to construct a line through this section. Not only did the railroad need land but its arrival induced more Whites to move into the region in order to ship their goods to the Eastern markets. As a result of this large immigration into the Northern sector federal officials encouraged White ownership of the reservations' resources to fulfill Western desires and to promote national economic growth.[20]

Because of the federal administrators' emphasis upon local White control of tribal property, the BIA agents on the Fort Belknap reservation no longer stressed a self-reliant Indian economy as they had in the past. Agent William R. Logan's beliefs reflected this attitude. In his October 24, 1907 letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Francis E. Leupp, Logan noted that he was encouraging the Indians to work in the reservation fields for the

White sugar beet owners. He also wrote in 1908 that he was attempting to lure capital investments in White businesses on the reservation. He proclaimed that these capital developments were " . . . probably the greatest enterprise undertaken by a half savage people."[21] The agent also favored leasing all surplus tribal lands. Thus, the reservation became a focal point for White financial growth while the Indians retained a minority of the resources and labored for the local settlers. By 1925 the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines lost most of their timber, minerals, water and land to White lessees and buyers.[22]

The southwest portion of the reservation contained 32,000 acres of timbered land. Before 1890 the Indians utilized this wood to build houses and to heat their homes. Since this region was mostly arid and barren, the settlers began illegally to use the wood products. In an 1892 letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, agent A.O. Simmons complained that local Whites stole thousands of feet of lumber every year. However, in adhering to their policy of less federal intervention, officials asked state authorities to punish these criminals. The sheriff did nothing to stop these thefts, for most Whites sympathized with the trespassers' need for adequate timber.[23]

The loss of tribal timber continued throughout the 1900s. By 1915 agent E.B. Meritt allowed White businesses and settlers on the reservation to use the timber free of charge. This directive precipitated a tremendous impact upon the tribal wood supply over the next five years. Finally in 1920 the Indians lost all control of this important resource when the superintendent allotted the remaining timbered lands and then leased them to the local Whites.[24]

The fate of the Indians' timber supply paralleled that of the tribal mineral deposits. In an 1896 agreement with the tribes federal negotiators purchased "from these Indians . . . a strip of land known as the mineral belt of the reservation . . . The price paid was $300,000, and the quantity sold was a strip about seven miles long, by from two to four miles wide."[25] In addition to this cession of valuable land the tribes soon lost control of a large coal area that agent William R. Logan discovered in 1903. Logan decided that the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines were not knowledgeable enough of Anglo practices to mine this source. Therefore he initiated a policy that others later followed to sell or to lease these reserves to White businesses. For the next two

decades reservation enterprises used the coal for heating and industrial processing. In 1920 agent Symons rented the coal to Charles N. Damon who sold the mineral to the Indians. Also Damon allowed the local White settlers to exploit the ore and take their findings off tribal land without paying revenues to the Indians. By 1925 the Indians no longer managed their coal.[26]

Besides promoting local ownership of timber and minerals, the federal government also condoned White control of the reservation's water supply. The Milk River, which forms the northern boundary of the Fort Belknap Reservation, was the major source of tribal water. Before 1900 the Indians had built an irrigation system that supplied water to their ranches and farms. However Whites who settled upstream from the reservation began to use the water from the Milk River in order to grow hay and to support their livestock industry. In addition the agents encouraged many businesses to move onto the reservation. These immigrants also utilized the local water supply.[27]

By 1900 many cattlemen such as Henry Winters and some recently organized towns were consuming large amounts of the area's water. Downstream users such as the Fort Belknap Indians did not complain about these increased appropriations, for the Milk River contained enough water for all parties. Nevertheless droughts began to occur in 1900 and the usually abundant water supply decreased.[28]

In 1905 White appropriations cut off all the flow of the Milk River to the reservation. The Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines faced a devastating situation. Agent Logan stated:

> So far this Spring we have had no water in our ditch whatever. Our meadows are now rapidly parching up. The Indians have planted large crops and a great deal of grain. All this will be lost unless some radical action is taken at once to make the settlers above the Reservation respect our rights. To the Indians it either means good crops this fall, or starvation this winter.[29]

In order to prevent a complete financial collapse Logan petitioned District Attorney General Carl Rasch to bring suit against the White ranchers upstream and to force them into allowing a downstream flow.[30]

In the historic 1908 Supreme Court case of *Winters v United*

States Chief Justice Joseph McKenna stated that the Assiniboines and the Gros Ventres had priority rights to the Milk River. As he noted:

> The Indians had command of the lands and the waters—command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, "and grazing roving herds of stock" or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this [in the 1888 agreement]? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate? . . . It would be extreme to believe that . . . Congress destroyed the reservation and took from the Indians the consideration of their grant, leaving them a barren waste—took from them the means of continuing their old habits, yet did not leave them the power to change to new ones.[31]

Even though no specific clause of the agreement defined these rights, the Indians realized that the land was worthless without water. When the tribes ceded some of their ancestral land to the United States, they obviously did not intend to relinquish all of their water. Thus the court ruled that the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines had first rights to the Milk River and ordered the ranchers to allow a downstream flow that would fulfill the tribes' needs.[32]

Despite these provisions, the Assiniboines and the Gros Ventres did not immediately realize the complete potential of their claims. Western pressure in Congress and the continued national emphasis on local White control of reservation development shaped the administrators' attitudes toward the *Winters* decision. Federal officials used the Winters guarantee of reservation water to induce more White businessmen and settlers into leasing or buying tribal lands. As a result a court decision which supposedly upheld tribal water rights in reality promoted White ownership of the Indians' resources.

The activities of the Bureau of Reclamation reflected this federal Indian policy. In 1909 the agency assumed jurisdiction over the reservation's Milk River Irrigation Project. Money for increasing the canal's size and lengths came from the Indian Service funds, yet the agency funnelled most of the additional water to off-reservation ranches. As agent Logan declared:

> In some cases I think a careful investigation will show that the irrigation of the Indian lands is a secondary consideration in the calculations of the Reclamation Service, and it will be found that the canals are to be extended beyond the reservation boundary and the waters used on other lands . . . this means a much increased cost, and if this cost is paid from Indian Service money . . . , then someone other than the Indians will reap the benefit.[33]

The Fort Belknap Indians paid for a larger irrigation system that benefitted White landowners throughout Northern Montana.[34]

In addition to receiving no added advantages from the Bureau of Reclamation projects, the tribes also consumed less water due to the large influx of Whites on the reservation. The agents used the easily accessible canal system to induce many businesses and cattlemen to lease or buy Indian lands. With the promise of sufficient water and cheap property, superintendent Logan rented thousands of acres of irrigated land to the Amalgamated Sugar Company, W.B. French of Harlem, Montana, H.H. Nelson, David Eccles, Henry H. Rolapp and Matthew S. Browning for the growing of sugar beets. By 1915 the Matador Cattle Company grazed over 15,000 cattle, approximately five times the combined size of the Indians' herds. The only stipulation attached to most of these leases was the requirement of the Whites to irrigate the land.[35]

Due to these leasing practices, the Assiniboines and the Gros Ventres slowly lost control of most of their water. By 1920, twelve years after the *Winters* doctrine supposedly protected Indian water rights, non-Indians controlled 58% of the irrigated areas on the Fort Belknap Reservation. Consequently the decade long drought that struck Northern Montana starting in 1915 crippled the tribes' economy.[36]

In addition to water land represented a valuable resource that the Indians lost during this period. As on many other Plains reservations, Whites used allotment as a tool to gain control of large sections of tribal land, but this method accounted for less than half of the land alienation during this period. Instead the agents' leasing and selling practices resulted in White control of considerable areas of the reserves.

Even though the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines welcomed

land divisions at first, the tribes increasingly resisted allotment from 1895–1920. Due to the large number of deaths from starvation during the winter of 1884, most Indians favored land cessions and severalty in order to receive federal monies for food, clothing and shelter. Agent Lincoln reported that the "Indians are . . . anxious for it [a reduction of the reservation] if they can be assured of a moderate and fair compensation."[37] However, when stockraising and farming production increased in the 1890s, the Indians denounced allotment. The 1896 Agreement supports this observation. Before signing this pact the Indians demanded a stipulation be included that directed the government not to divide the tribal lands.[38]

Despite continued tribal resistance in 1920, Congressmen passed House Bill 3783 and forced the Fort Belknap Indians to accept allotment. In his February 7, 1920 letter to the Commissioner, agent Symons noted that the Indians denounced the bill and objected to many of the stipulations that reflected the federal government's promotion of White ownership of tribal resources. Some of the law's points included no twenty-five year protection period, continuation of White leases made in the past, and initial allotments to the missions and townsites before Native American apportionment. The agents soon rented or sold large tracts of prime irrigable land along the Milk River. In his letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, agent Marshall stated that "there will be no trouble in leasing this land [Milk River Area] as all lies within a short distance from shipping points. I have already received a number of inquiries for leasing this land . . . "[39] As a result of allotment the Indians lost much of their valuable land.[40]

Besides the alienation of land through severalty, agents allowed businesses to utilize most of the reservation resources for White economic development. In 1907 agent Logan offered inexpensive land, labor and irrigation services to any enterprise that operated on tribal land. Within one year the Amalgamated Sugar Company signed an agreement with the superintendent to lease 5,000 acres of land for ten years. Logan wrote that:

> Last year we succeeded in inducing parties affiliated with the Amalgamated Sugar Company to enter into a contract to erect upon the borders of the reservation a large refinery for the purpose of handling the output of beets from a tract of 5,000 acres to be cultivated

> by the Indians of the reservation. At the present time we are busily engaged in plowing land and getting ready for the 1909 crop.[41]

By 1909 the agent increased the maximum rented land to 20,000 acres for $2.85 per acre. Rent on other beet leases was one-tenth the price of the crop. Soon the corporation erected a sugar refinery and in 1921 another manufacturer opened a flour mill. These businesses demonstrated the government's attempts in promoting Western progress at the expense of tribal resources.[42]

The leasing of grazing land represented the most severe impact upon tribal resources. Prior to 1900 stockraising was the foundation of the Indians' economy. Nevertheless agent Logan began to rent large areas of grasslands to White corporate ranches.[43]

The activities of the Matador Cattle Company of Trinidad, Colorado illustrated the disastrous effects that leasing exerted upon the tribal economy. In his 1915 annual report agent Meritt stated that the White lessees grazed over 18,000 head of cattle and that the Colorado enterprise accounted for 13,884 of these animals. Later superintendent Meritt concluded that "the cattle belonging to the latter Company [Matador] are very detrimental to the running of the tribal herd."[44] The Indians' stock suffered greatly as they decreased from an 1898 high of 4,750 head to a low of 1,860 in 1915. To exacerbate these conditions, administrators allowed Whites to use tribal grazing lands. As a result of the loss of timber, minerals, water and land, the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines' economy disintegrated and the Whites controlled a majority of the resources and the financial development upon the reservation.[45]

Assimilationists before 1895 desired to foster a financially independent agricultural Indian community. Due to the government's increased emphasis upon White control of tribal reserves, the Indians no longer owned the tools necessary to achieve economic freedom. Instead of self-sufficient farmers or stockraisers, many of the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines worked for substandard wages for the sugar beet owners, flour mill operators, local cattle ranchers and the agents. Whites occupied all of the skilled, higher salary positions such as district farmer, his assistant, irrigation bosses and teachers. Thus the Indians' labor became one of the many resources exploited by a local White population.[46]

Traditionally, assimilation and force have comprised the roots

of American Indian policy. These methods did not change when military activities essentially halted in the 1880s. After the optimism for acculturation declined in the 1890s Whites once again implemented various methods of force to extinguish the Indians' titles to the land and to utilize tribal resources in the promotion of the nation's growth.

Considering the natural limitations of the arid Plains, the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines initially possessed a relatively abundant supply of resources on the reservation. Nevertheless between 1895 and 1925 the tribes lost control of a vast majority of their timber and minerals. Even though the *Winters* Doctrine set a national legal precedent and would become the cornerstone of Indian water rights, this court decision did not prevent non-Indians from controlling a majority of the Fort Belknap tribes' water. By leasing and selling tribal lands the BIA agents transferred large tracts from Indian to White ownership and supervision. The once successful tribal stockherding industry could not withstand the enormous loss of land and water and it began to wilt during the droughts of the early twentieth century and to crumble during the 1920s agricultural depression. By 1925 Whites controlled most of the resources and had reduced the Gros Ventres and the Assiniboines to colonial subjects who managed only a minority of their property.

Even though the emphasis and goals of American Indian policy have changed several times since 1925, non-Indians today continue to desire tribal resources, especially water. As previous events on the Fort Belknap Reservation indicate, no White organization, including the federal government, will preserve the Indians' interests. Only through self-determination can Native Americans retain their property and determine their future.

NOTES

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6. David Rodnick, "The Fort Belknap Assiniboine of Montana," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1938), p. 4; Lincoln to Price, May 26, 1884, Box 17; Lincoln to John D.C. Atkins, August 5, 1885, Box 17.

7. Rodnick, "The Fort Belknap Assiniboine," pp. 6–7; Edward E. Barry, Jr., "From Buffalo to Beef: Assimilation on the Ft. Belknap Reservation," *Montana Magazine* 26, no. 1 (January 1976):41; *United States Statutes at Large,* 25:113–133 (1888).

8. U.S. Statutes at Large, 25:113–133 (1888).

9. Lincoln to Atkins, August 5, 1885, Box 17; David Rodnick, pp. 4–6; Fields to Atkins, August 16, 1887, Box 17.

10. Lincoln to Atkins, August 18, 1886, Box 17.

11. Robe to Daniel M. Browning, August 11, 1893, Box 18; A.O. Simmons to Thomas Jefferson Morgan, August 1892, Box 18.

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21. William R. Logan to Francis E. Leupp, July 25, 1908, Box 21.

22. Logan to Leupp, October 24, 1907, Box 21; Logan to Robert Grosvenor Valentine, August 31, 1910, Box 21.

23. Simmons to Morgan, March 28, 1892, Box 18.

24. Meritt to Cato Sells, 1915 Annual Report, Box 300; Meritt to Sells, July 8, 1915, Box 23; Symons to Sells, February 7, 1920, Box 27.

25. Luke C. Hays to Daniel M. Browning, August 8, 1896, Box 18.

26. *U.S. Statutes at Large,* 29:350–353 (1896); Logan to William A. Jones, August 4, 1903, Box 20; Logan to Francis Ellington Leupp, August 15, 1907, Box 21; Meritt to Sells, July 8, 1915, Box 23; Symons to Sells, July 28, 1920, Box 27; Symons to Charles Henry Burke, October 21, 1921, Box 27; Meritt to Sells, July 18, 1916, Box 30.

27. Hays to Browning, August 8, 1896, Box 18; Hays to Jones, August 7, 1899, Box 19; Logan to Leupp, September 1, 1905, Box 20; A.E. Cummings to Hays, April 25, 1898, Irrigation Program Records, Box 359.

28. "United States v. Mose Anderson et al.: The Ninth Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Montana," (July 12, 1905 and March 4, 1906), Ninth Circuit Court Papers, Box 6659, District Court Records, Record Group 21, Federal Archives and Records Center (Seattle, Washington); Norris Hundley, Jr., "The 'Winters' Decision and Indian Water Rights: A Mystery Reexamined," in *Western Historical Quarterly* 13, No. 1 (January 1982):19–22.

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30. Logan to Leupp, September 1, 1905, Box 20; Logan to Carl Rasch, June 18, June 25, July 11, 1905, Box 57; Logan to Cyrus C. Bobb, July 12, 1905, Box 57.

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33. Logan to Valentine, November 17, 1909, Box 21.

34. Ibid.

35. Logan to Leupp, October 24, 1907, July 25, 1908, Box 22; Logan to Valentine, July 28, 1909, Box 22; Logan to W.B. French, September 28, 1905, Box 57; Report on the Agricultural Lease of Tribal Lands for Sugar Beet Culture, January 22 and December 9, 1908, February 26, 1909, Box 365; Miller to Cato Sells, August 25, 1914, Box 23; Meritt to Sells, August 4, 1915, Box 24.

36. Fred Hoxie, p. 483.

37. Lincoln to Atkins, August 5, 1885, Box 17.

38. Hays to Browning, August 8, 1896, Box 18.

39. J.T. Marshall to Burke, February 17, 1922, Box 27.

40. Symons to Sells, February 7, 1920, February 25, 1920, Box 27; Marshall to Burke, 1924 Annual Report, Box 301; Edward E. Barry, p. 47; David Rodnick, p.20.

41. Logan to Leupp, July 25, 1908, Box 21.

42. Logan to Leupp, August 10, 1907, October 24, 1907, Box 21; Records Relating to the Sugar Beet Program, 1906–1909, Box 365, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, Federal Archives and Records Center (Seattle, Washington); David Rodnick, p. 15.

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44. Meritt to Sells, April 25, 1916, Box 30.

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