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Author

Collier, D

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Trajectory of a Concept: "Corporatism" in the Study of Latin American Politics

David Collier

BEGINNING IN THE 1970s, "corporatism" came to be a major focus of attention in research on Latin America.¹ Analysts employed the concept to refer both to a pattern of interest group politics that is monopolistic, hierarchically ordered, and structured by the state and to a broader cultural and ideological tradition of the region that they viewed as patrimonial and statist. The concept commanded great attention, as it seemed to provide a valuable analytical tool for scholars concerned with the authoritarian regimes emerging in Latin America during this period. In addition, the understanding of political relationships suggested by this concept appeared to offer a useful alternative, or at least an important supplement, to pluralist models widely used in the United States. Hence, corporatism has been subject to much theoretical debate, and the concept has been applied in many empirical studies.

In this chapter I explore the trajectory of corporatism as a concept in the Latin American field. The analysis is based on the premise that scholars should occasionally step back and take stock of the major concepts with which they work. In any area of research, new concepts may initially be embraced with great enthusiasm, and, at times, with unrealistic expectations about the degree of insight they will provide. Subsequently, these concepts may be relegated to the domain of outmoded ideas, sometimes with considerable loss of learning and neglect of accumulated insight. In the face of this potential problem, it is useful periodically to assess the evolution of concepts and attempt a codification of what has been accomplished.

In the first two sections of this chapter, I focus on the body of literature that treated corporatism as a form of interest group politics. The initial section explores the overall contribution of the concept and the shared empirical understanding of corporatism that emerged. The second section considers refinements introduced in the literature. These refinements include efforts to situate corporatism both in relation to the overarching concepts of which it may be seen as a specific type and also in relation to parallel concepts, such as clientelism, concertation, consociationalism, pluralism, monism, and syndicalism. Attention then turns to the more fine grained understanding achieved through identifying subtypes and elaborating dimensions of corporatism. It appears that once the initial insight introduced by the concept became familiar, the further analytic contribution came, in important measure, from refinements that provided sharper differentiation of corporatism as a distinctive political phenomenon. This section concludes by distinguishing between “conceptual stretching,” a traditional concern in the field of comparative analysis, and “theoretical stretching,” arguing that both issues arose in the literature on corporatism.

The next section examines the debate generated by the thesis—identified above all with Howard J. Wiarda—that corporatism in twentieth-century Latin America can be seen as deriving from an Iberic-Latin historical tradition of hierarchical, statist authority relations. This literature focused not only on twentieth-century structures of group politics but also on this longer political tradition. This thesis commanded wide interest, in part because it advanced a type of cultural explanation that ran against some of the main intellectual currents in the Latin American field. The result was a debate that, as is suggested below, remains in important respects unresolved.

A concluding section discusses what may be called the “normalization” of the concept of corporatism and the partial erosion of corporative practices that has occurred recently in many Latin American countries. Corporatism remains a useful concept that refers to important political phenomena, but it is less central both to scholarly debates and to day-to-day politics than it was two decades ago. □

EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT: CORPORATIVE FORMS OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS

The concept of corporatism began to attract wide attention in the Latin American field in the first half of the 1970s.² Earlier writers such as Robert J. Alexander and Charles W. Anderson had previously made passing reference to the corporative character of state-group relations.³ Likewise,

authors such as Richard M. Morse had described a Latin American tradition of hierarchical, state-centric authority relations that has much in common with some conceptions of corporatism, although Morse did not use this label.⁴ However, it was Philippe C. Schmitter who first placed corporatism more centrally on the intellectual agenda with his book *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*. He explored the corporative policies toward interest groups introduced in Brazil under Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s and 1940s, focusing on the elaborate system that emerged for creating, structuring, subsidizing, and controlling these groups. Although the Vargas administration fell in 1945, Schmitter argued that the corporative policies of that period had “struck deeper roots” and that corporatism had become a fundamental feature of Brazilian interest politics.⁵ Anyone attempting to analyze the Brazilian political system needed to come to grips with this legacy.

Corporatism soon became a common theme in the Latin American field.⁶ As scholars attempted to deal analytically with the wave of military regimes that began in the 1960s, the concept offered a valuable new perspective for understanding the authoritarian political relationships that seemed so prevalent in the region. Within this framework, analysts focused attention very centrally on monopolistic, hierarchically structured patterns of interest group politics. These patterns were generally the product of a strong state role in sponsoring the formation of groups, granting them a monopoly of representation, shaping their internal organization, controlling or at least influencing their demand making, and channeling their interaction with public institutions and with one another. Through such initiatives, actors within the state sought to “harmonize” relations among groups, classes, and sectors, although this harmony was often founded on a strong bias in favor of some groups and against others.

Scholars who studied group politics from the perspective of corporatism addressed the misgivings shared by many analysts about employing a pluralist perspective, which emphasized the free competition of autonomously organized groups.⁷ Periodic expressions of pluralism are unquestionably an important feature of Latin American politics: for instance, the efforts, initiated “from below,” to constitute or reconstitute social and political groups and to organize new efforts at protest and demand making. Yet the central role of the state in structuring group politics has been reflected in the recurring tendency over many decades for new groups and new demands to be subordinated to state-regulated networks of group representation and state-established frameworks for demand making. By calling attention to this tendency toward subordination and state regulation, the concept of corporatism yielded new insight.

Definition and Conceptualization of Corporatism

Within the literature on corporative patterns of interest group politics, a basic set of shared understandings emerged. In terms of formal definitions, the most widely cited was that of Schmitter:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.⁸

Other scholars had their own, slightly different, "checklist" definitions.⁹ Notwithstanding some differences in emphasis, a rough consensus developed regarding the constellation of attributes within the sphere of group politics on which attention should focus. These attributes can be organized under three broad headings, with specific corporative provisions fitting under each: (a) The *structuring* of representation, involving the official recognition of groups, which are organized into well-defined functional categories and enjoy a monopoly of representation within their respective categories; (b) the *subsidy* of groups, which can occur through direct state subvention and, especially in the case of labor unions, through mechanisms that provide for compulsory membership and that facilitate dues collection; and (c) state *control* over leadership, demand making, finances, and internal governance.¹⁰

A broader conceptual understanding of the relationship among these three sets of defining attributes also emerged in the literature. Philippe Schmitter and Alfred Stepan suggested that the advantages bestowed by both structuring and subsidy are granted "in exchange for" the acceptance of state control.¹¹ Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, in a related argument, maintained that corporatist political relationships entail an interaction between "inducements" and "constraints." Structuring and subsidy represent organizational benefits (inducements) for the groups and their leaders, in exchange for which they accept the controls (constraints) associated with corporatism.¹² Obviously, in order for a genuine exchange to occur, the state must be actively involved in seeking to control, or at least to strongly influence, the groups. Yet the groups must also have some degree of autonomy so that their leaders have a margin of choice in accepting the initiatives of the state.

Stepan, in his analysis of this power relationship between groups and the state, argued that the possibility of an imbalance in the relationship

constitutes a "generic predicament" of corporatism.¹³ On the one hand, power may shift toward the *state* to such a degree that corporatism is simply transformed into a system of state domination of groups. On the other hand, power may shift toward the *groups* to such a degree that central coordination, an essential attribute of corporatism, is lost or is fundamentally weakened. Thus, the two underlying components of corporatism are in opposition. Not surprisingly, there is no inherently "correct" balance between these components. However, if an imbalance reaches either extreme, it is reasonable to ask whether one is still in the presence of corporatism. This issue will prove important in discussing subtypes of corporatism below.

Shared Empirical Understanding

Along with this conceptualization of corporative forms of group politics, one also finds in the literature a shared empirical understanding of corporatism in Latin America. Obviously, further insights emerged as more research was carried out, yet a significant degree of common understanding may be identified that had emerged roughly by the time of the publication in 1977 of James M. Malloy's *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*. Key elements of this understanding are outlined here, several of which are drawn from chapters in that book.

First, although many specific corporative provisions have been found in Latin America, the literature did not presume the existence of full-blown corporative systems. No country provided for well-institutionalized mediation among labor, business, and the state at the pinnacle of the corporative system, although the region has seen unsuccessful attempts to establish such mediation and scholars have identified some partial approximations.¹⁴ Even Brazil, with its elaborately developed corporative system, did not allow for an overarching labor confederation. Consequently, Kenneth P. Erickson described the corporative system for organized labor in Brazil as a "truncated pyramid,"¹⁵ and at this peak level, actors in the state sought to control worker politics not through corporative mechanisms for channeling worker organization but through the noncorporative mechanism of *preventing* such organization. A quite different departure from a full corporative model was found in cases where a political party, closely linked to a corporatively organized labor movement, was banned from the political arena. This pattern was, for example, a fundamental feature of Argentine and Peruvian politics in the late 1950s and 1960s.

Another feature that might be viewed as an element of a full-blown classical model of corporatism in Latin America, nonpeak organizations that combined labor and business, was rare indeed. One of the few

instances in which such organizations appeared was in Peru in the post-1968 period. The Peruvian government established "industrial communities" in which workers were to play an important role in the management of enterprises, thus creating a "classless corporative structure."¹⁶ Yet the initiative failed, and this form of organization has not been a significant feature of Latin American corporatism.

A second part of the shared empirical understanding was the recognition among scholars who analyzed corporatism within the general framework of the defining attributes discussed above that such a large set of attributes would not always be present in any particular instance. Schmitter's book on Brazil, which played a central role in stimulating scholarly interest in this phenomenon, was based on an extreme case. Scholars did not necessarily assume that other Latin American countries had as fully developed a corporative system as Brazil. Thus, in relation to the multitrait definitions like those discussed above, it was recognized that these traits were present to different degrees and in different combinations. Collier and Collier suggested that this recognition helps to avoid "an excessively narrow conception of corporatism as a phenomenon that is either present or absent, and views it instead as a dimension (or, potentially, a set of dimensions ...) along which cases may be arrayed."¹⁷

The experience with corporatism was heterogeneous in other respects as well. For example, particular features of corporatism could be implemented in very different ways. In the sphere of labor unions, compulsory membership and monopoly of representation were sometimes established directly. But sometimes they were established indirectly, through complex provisions that provided partial approximations. Further, although these provisions were typically established by law, not surprisingly, major variations emerged in actual practice.¹⁸ Finally, at an early point scholars observed that major differences in the corporative structuring of groups sometimes emerged in different geographic regions within a given country.¹⁹

A third element in the shared understanding was emphasized in Guillermo O'Donnell's analysis of the "segmentary" character of corporatism, involving its differing meaning and consequences for distinct social classes. He argued that in Latin America, the role of corporative structures in shaping worker organizations, as opposed to business organizations, is far more direct and coercive.²⁰ In addition, elaborating on an observation made earlier by Schmitter,²¹ O'Donnell argued that business interests can often exercise informal power both inside and outside the state to such a degree that corporative structures may be far less constraining for them than for the working class.²² Other authors in the Malloy volume, dealing with Mexico and Colombia, reached the same conclusion.²³ Concerning this distinction, it is important to note that the

corporative structuring of worker organizations encompassed not only workers in the urban sector but also, in some important cases, peasants.²⁴

Although the corporative structuring of business politics is very important in some time periods and in some countries, corporatism in Latin America has, in general, been less central to understanding business politics than worker politics. Indeed, labor law in most countries consists, in important measure, of a complex network of provisions for structuring, subsidizing, and controlling the labor movement. In that sense, state-labor relations in Latin America have been markedly corporative for many decades.²⁵ Consequently, a substantial part of research on corporatism has centered on the implications of corporatism for organized labor. It seems likely that corporatism would not have been viewed as such an important phenomenon were it not for the obvious importance of corporative provisions for the functioning of the labor movement.

Finally, along with the recognition of the incomplete character of the corporative structuring of group politics, one finds the insistence that its incomplete character was to be expected. Linn Hamberg warned against confusing "the master plans of political organizers and would-be institution builders" with the reality of day-to-day politics, and she pointed to the long history in Latin America of noncompliance with the law and with mandates of the state.²⁶ Douglas Chalmers and Alberto Ciria likewise emphasized that major changes in regime, such as those associated with the implementation of corporatism, have far less impact than is sometimes believed. Features of the national political regime and the structure of political groups, which may initially seem to be crucial attributes of a country's politics, are often soon eroded.²⁷

Correspondingly, a significant degree of caution was reflected in many, though certainly not all, of the early analyses of corporatism. At the time of the rapid spread of scholarly interest in this topic, for example, perhaps the most dramatic new corporative policies in the region were those of the post-1968 military government in Peru. Yet, in an analysis initially written at the height of the military reforms, Malloy insisted that "there is no guarantee that the Peruvian military will continue in the corporatist direction or that it will be successful in imposing a new system of [corporative] political economy in Peru."²⁸

At certain points, however, the warnings ran in the other direction, against the problem of *underestimating* the impact of corporatism. Schmitter referred to this when he observed that scholars who analyzed pluralism and democracy in Brazil between 1945 and 1964 were at times insufficiently attentive to the legacy of the corporatist experience of the 1930s and 1940s.²⁹ Whereas some scholars interpreted the post-1964 military regime in Brazil as a "fundamental restructuring of the polity,"³⁰

Schmitter disagreed and saw the post-1964 experience as "restorationist," in that it was marked by attempts to further consolidate earlier corporative structures.³¹

Latin America has not experienced corporatism in its full-blown, classical form, yet corporatism has been a central feature of group politics in specific sectors, time periods, and countries. The shared scholarly recognition of this centrality accounts for the concept's ongoing importance in the literature. □

REFINEMENT AND DIFFERENTIATION OF THE CONCEPT

Looking beyond this basic formulation, one finds a series of refinements and modifications that played an important role in the evolving literature on corporatism. To explore these innovations it is useful to employ the traditional notion of a hierarchy of concepts.³² Such hierarchies play a powerful role in framing our thinking, and a self-conscious understanding of how conceptual innovations occur at different levels in these hierarchies can provide valuable insights into the way concepts evolve. In the initial phase of this literature, for example, the concept of corporatism was viewed as one type in relation to the overarching concept of systems of "interest representation"; and, in turn, "state corporatism" was seen as a subtype in relation to the concept of corporatism. The three levels in this hierarchy are examined in turn.

Refinements in the Overarching Concept

Some of the innovations that emerged in discussions of corporatism concerned the overarching concept, of which corporatism is a particular type. One of these refinements arose from a clearer recognition of what is entailed in a corporative, as opposed to pluralist, form of group politics. Schmitter had initially defined corporatism as a mode of *interest representation*. However, corporatively structured groups in Latin America do not simply represent actors in society. Rather, they often stand in an intermediate position between society and the state, since corporative structuring may cause them to become in part creatures of the state. Consequently, Schmitter suggested that the distinctive meaning of corporatism was better captured by broadening the overarching concept and referring to modes of *interest intermediation*.³³

Another innovation at the level of the overarching concept derived from the increasing use in the 1980s of the term "concertation," which partially overlapped with the standard meaning of corporatism. A characteristic definition treated concertation as "a mechanism for establishing


policy alternatives, encompassing the participation of labor and capital, based on sustained cooperation between these actors and the government."³⁴ Thus, concertation entailed the overarching process of forming social pacts and shaping public policy at the pinnacle of organized labor, organized business, and the state, which traditionally had been viewed as one major facet of corporatism, the other being the organization and structuring of the groups themselves. Schmitter suggested it might have been appropriate to label the structuring of groups as "corporatism₁," and this overarching process of mediation as "corporatism₂."³⁵

Instead, Schmitter accommodated the new usage of concertation by proposing a narrower meaning of corporatism that excluded this overarching process of mediation.³⁶ In this more limited conception, corporatism remained a principal subtype of *interest intermediation*, another being pluralism. As shown in Figure 6.1, concertation was understood as a subtype of *policy formation*, another principal subtype being pressure politics. Here again, the concept of corporatism was refined by modifying the overarching concept of which it is a component. In this instance, the modification was accomplished by differentiating two separate hierarchies of concepts.

Situating Corporatism Vis-à-vis Related Concepts

Scholars who sought to elucidate the meaning of corporatism also clarified its meaning in relation to other concepts that are likewise concerned with alternative forms of exchange and accommodation. Differences among these concepts characteristically involved contrasts in the *institutional site* of the political relationships specified by the concept. This issue was central, for example, to the distinction between corporatism and clientelism. Robert R. Kaufman suggested that both concepts entail "rela-

FIGURE 6.1 Effort to Accommodate Discussion of "Concertation" Leads to Differentiation of Overarching Concept into Two Components



tionships of domination and subordination," but with regard to the institutional site, corporatism is a mode of authority relations among groups, whereas clientelism is a mode of authority relations among individuals. This difference in institutional site is closely associated with a difference in form. Whereas corporatism tends to be more legalistic and bureaucratic, clientelism is personalistic and often more fluid.³⁷

The issue of institutional site also arose in the comparison of corporatism and consociationalism. Jonathan Hartlyn argued that both are modes of conflict limitation that commonly emerge as an elite response to a perceived crisis, that both seek to establish a noncompetitive process of decisionmaking, and that "in both there is a tension between elite accords and the ability of these elites to carry along their mass following."³⁸ However, with corporatism these arrangements encompass interest groups, whereas with consociationalism they commonly encompass political parties.

Another important issue, given that corporatism is one type in relation to the overarching concept of interest intermediation, was the identification of other types. This issue was addressed in Schmitter's typology of group politics, which was organized around distinctions concerning the *degree of competitiveness* and the *locus of power*.³⁹ Building on his own definition of corporatism (characterized by a noncompetitive system of groups that are subject to substantial state control), Schmitter constructed parallel definitions of *pluralism* (characterized by the free and competitive formation of groups that are subject to little external control), *monism* (a noncompetitive mode in which groups are dominated by a single party),⁴⁰ and *syndicalism* (based on noncompetitive, unregulated, nonhierarchically organized groups characterized by autonomy and self governance). Schmitter thus situated the debate in a much larger comparative and historical framework of alternative types of group intermediation.

Subtypes and Dimensions of Corporatism

When a concept is first introduced, it may produce a sense of discovery as it gives scholars new analytic leverage. The initial enthusiasm can soon fade, however, and the generation of further insight often depends on the introduction of refinements in the concept. This refinement occurred as scholars delineated subtypes and dimensions of corporatism. Variations in the *locus of power* were crucial in this differentiation, just as they were in the discussion above of contrasting types of interest intermediation.

Differences in the locus of power were central, for example, in Schmitter's distinction between "state" and "societal" corporatism (Table 6.1).⁴¹ Both are forms of group politics that tend to be monopolistic, and they are

TABLE 6.1 Subtypes and Dimensions: Differentiating in Terms of the Locus of Power

<i>Subtypes</i>	<i>Political Relationships</i>
State versus societal	Noncompetitive political relationships are created and often imposed by the state versus noncompetitive relationships created by the groups.
Privatizing versus statizing	Groups penetrate and privatize a sector of the state versus state penetrates and controls groups.
Inclusionary versus exclusionary	State elite are more dependent on support or acquiescence of corporatized groups versus lesser or no dependence on their support or acquiescence.
Inducements versus constraints	Inducements are used by the state to win cooperation of groups versus direct control over groups.

structurally similar in many ways. Yet the former is created and often imposed by the state, and, in important respects, it reflects the control of the state over the corporatized groups. By contrast, societal corporatism emerges as the groups themselves construct monopolistic, hierarchically structured channels of representation. Through this process, some groups defeat or absorb other groups with little or no interference from the state. The subtypes of state and societal corporatism emerged as a fundamental distinction in the literature, and in the field of West European studies they were paralleled by Gerhard Lehmbruch's distinction between authoritarian and liberal corporatism.⁴²

A somewhat different contrast was underscored in Guillermo O'Donnell's subtypes of statizing and privatizing corporatism. Statizing corporatism entails the penetration of groups by the state, whereas in the case of privatizing corporatism the groups penetrate the state, thereby placing certain arenas of the state and of policymaking under private control. The difference between O'Donnell's conception of privatizing corporatism and Schmitter's conception of societal corporatism can be seen in the fact that a given group that functioned in the framework of societal corporatism could fail to privatize an area of the state in which it had a special interest. Thus, O'Donnell's privatizing corporatism involves the penetration of selected areas of policy and of state bureaucracy by groups that function in the framework of Schmitter's version of societal corporatism. Given the dramatically different power relationships involved in statiz-

ing and privatizing corporatism, O'Donnell described corporatism as "bifrontal."⁴³

A further distinction concerning the locus of power pointed to variability in the significance of corporatism for the working class. O'Donnell had earlier defined as "inclusionary" those political systems in which policymakers use the resources of the state to mobilize the working class and deliberately enhance its political power, or in which policymakers at least accommodate themselves to preexisting levels of worker mobilization and political power. This pattern contrasted with "exclusionary" systems, in which state policy is used to demobilize the working class and its organizations and to reduce its power.⁴⁴ Stepan used this distinction to generate subtypes of corporatism. On the one hand, the more pro-labor variant of inclusionary corporatism, associated with mobilization of workers, granting of major benefits, and increased political leverage for labor, was found, for example, in Argentina under Perón in the 1940s. On the other hand, the more antilabor variant of exclusionary corporatism, associated with the demobilization of labor and the deliberate curtailment of its political leverage, occurred under the post-1964 military government in Brazil.⁴⁵ Thus, again, what appeared to be similar structures could have decidedly different political consequences.

The analysis of underlying dimensions of inducements and constraints, noted briefly above, pushed the differentiation of corporatism still further. Collier and Collier suggested that in these different contexts, corporative *structures* themselves are not necessarily the same. It is evident that all the traits identified in standard definitions of corporatism are not always present and that in different contexts they are present in different combinations. Depending on the goals and power resources of both the policymakers who initiate corporatism and the groups toward which their policies are directed, different patterns of inducements and constraints emerge. These patterns shift over time within the framework of an ongoing exchange, shaped by the changing goals and power capabilities of the relevant actors. This perspective underlined the interactive and changing character of corporatism. With regard to the contrast between inclusionary and exclusionary corporatism, Collier and Collier found that the more pro-labor variant of corporatism provides substantial inducements and more limited constraints; whereas the more antilabor variant links the inducements to more extensive constraints. Thus, corporatism takes different forms in different contexts.⁴⁶

A Further Look at the Subtypes

To gain insight into the meaning of these subtypes in relation to the overarching concept of corporatism, it is useful to discuss briefly the alterna-


tive ways in which subtypes of concepts may be formed. It turns out that the generic predicament that underlies corporatism has an important influence on the kind of subtypes it generates.

In what may be called the "classical" mode of forming subtypes, the subtype is identified by the attributes of the overarching concept, *plus* additional attributes.⁴⁷ This involves the traditional idea of defining concepts by "genus and difference" (*genus et differentia*).⁴⁸ Thus one identifies an initial category and then establishes additional differentiating characteristics that distinguish the subtype. In set-theoretic terms, the subtype is nested within the overarching category. As Figure 6.2 shows, for example, bureaucratic authoritarianism is conventionally understood as a specific form of authoritarianism that has additional attributes that define the subtype, prominent among which is a bureaucratic, technocratic style of policymaking.⁴⁹

A contrasting mode of forming subtypes may be called "radial."⁵⁰ Here the attributes that define a subtype are not introduced *in addition* to those of the overarching concept, but are *extracted from among them*. Thus, from the set of attributes associated with the overarching concept, one or more are isolated in the process of defining the subtype. To the extent that different subtypes isolate distinctive subsets of attributes, one can understand them as forming "radial" extensions. Because subtypes created in this way "leave behind" other attributes in the overarching concept, an interesting tension arises: Although they *are* subtypes of the overarching concept, they may lack key characteristics of that concept, so that some observers might argue that they are no longer really "instances" of it.

An example of a radial subtype is found in O'Donnell's recent discussion of "delegative democracy."⁵¹ Although this form of regime maintains fully competitive elections, it exhibits a high degree of presidential dominance that overrides traditional checks and balances and "horizontal accountability" within the state. Such a subtype, rather than unambiguously being a case of democracy (as bureaucratic authoritarianism is unambiguously a case of authoritarianism), lacks what are often understood to be key features of democracy. As shown in Figure 6.2, delegative democracy therefore follows the radial pattern of being potentially less democratic than the overarching category of democracy.

The subtypes of corporatism exhibit a similar radial pattern, because in each of them one major facet of corporatism is accentuated and the other is attenuated, reflecting the generic predicament discussed above. Under societal corporatism, the component of state control is attenuated and the autonomy of groups increases, whereas under state corporatism, and especially exclusionary state corporatism, power shifts strongly toward the side of the state. In addition, with reference to organized



labor, those benefits that are provided may to a greater degree be extended to union leaders who cooperate with the state. Hence the crucial idea that corporatism entails policy toward interest groups *as organizations* may become less important. A parallel pattern appears in the case of O'Donnell's statizing and privatizing corporatism. With regard to privatizing corporatism, he emphasized that the state still seeks to exercise control, but its control is unquestionably attenuated.⁵² In the interaction between inducements and constraints, the same pattern emerges: Accentuating one of these dimensions necessarily shifts the balance between them.

A concomitant of this radial pattern is that the subtypes of corporatism may at times be seen as having less in common with the overarching concept than they do with a neighboring concept. For example, exclusionary state corporatism might, as described above, more accurately be seen as a system for the *co-optation* of labor leaders. Similarly, O'Donnell's privatizing corporatism may have more in common with Theodore J. Lowi's concept of *interest group liberalism* than it does with the overall notion of corporatism.⁵³ To the extent that corporatism evolves to become a system of pure constraints and virtually no inducements, it might be viewed as a system of *repression*.⁵⁴ Finally, a parallel issue arose in the literature on European corporatism, where it has been claimed that societal corporatism is more similar to *pluralism* than it is to other forms of corporatism.⁵⁵

What difference does it make that the subtypes of corporatism follow a radial pattern? One important implication concerns the long-standing problem of "conceptual stretching" identified more than two decades ago by Giovanni Sartori. In some phases of the literature on corporatism, scholars became concerned that the concept was applied too broadly. Yet interestingly, the solution to this problem was not to "climb a ladder of abstraction" and move toward more general, overarching concepts, as would have been suggested by Sartori's classical framework,⁵⁶ but rather to generate subtypes of corporatism. This was an appropriate response because radial subtypes can potentially be applied to cases to which the fit of the overarching concept is questionable. Thus, forming radial subtypes can serve as a means of avoiding conceptual stretching.⁵⁷

At the same time, this very flexibility sometimes led to the problems just discussed: The subtypes of corporatism occasionally seemed conceptually closer to other concepts such as co-optation, repression, interest group liberalism, or pluralism than they were to corporatism. Though conceptual stretching was often avoided through the use of a radial subtype, it must be asked whether scholars were still really making use of this larger framework of understanding surrounding the concept of corporatism or whether this larger framework became less relevant to some of the subtypes.

This concern suggests the need to distinguish between *conceptual* stretching and *theoretical* stretching. Conceptual stretching is a mismatch between the concept and the case to which it is applied, in the sense that attributes associated with the concept are not present in the case. For example, if a scholar classifies a regime as bureaucratic authoritarian, even though it lacks a technocratic policymaking style, then conceptual stretching has occurred.

With theoretical stretching, the issue is not that the specific attributes associated with the concept do not *match* the case, but rather that the larger set of insights associated with the concept may not *illuminate* the case. Thus, in the choice between using the label "privatizing corporatism," as opposed to "interest group liberalism," the issue is whether one wishes to evoke the overall insights associated with the concept of corporatism, or with the concept of liberalism. To the extent that the insights associated with corporatism are less relevant to understanding the cases under consideration, then theoretical stretching may have occurred.

A final resolution of these issues of conceptual and theoretical stretching can be difficult to achieve, depending as they do on the analytical tastes of the authors who address any given topic. Yet, short of a definitive resolution, it is invaluable when examining the evolution of radial concepts such as corporatism to be alert to the problem of these two kinds of stretching. □

A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATISM

Along with this focus on group politics, the literature on corporatism in Latin America also included a debate over cultural approaches. This debate posed both the descriptive question of how broadly the term should be applied and the explanatory question of why corporatism emerged and persisted in Latin America. These questions were raised very centrally by Wiarda, and this perspective has also been explored, in different ways, by Newton, Erickson, Schwartzman, and Stepan, as well as by Morse and Anderson.⁵⁸

Although Wiarda applied the concept of corporatism to the analysis of group politics, he also argued that the concept should be used more broadly in a general framework for the study of Latin America. He suggested that "the 'corporative framework' ... refers to a system in which the political culture and institutions reflect a historic hierarchical, authoritarian, and organic view of man, society, and polity." In this system, "the government directs and controls all associations ... and it is the 'general will' and the power of the state that prevail over particular interests." These traits are seen as so deeply ingrained that the region is "virtually inherently corporative."⁵⁹ Thus the concept of corporatism became, at the

same time, a description of these political and cultural patterns and an explanation for them.

Wiarda maintained that the durability of these patterns of authority derive from the fact that "the Iberic-Latin nations were largely bypassed by the great revolutions associated with the making of the modern world." As a consequence, at least as of the early 1970s, "one still finds powerful echoes and manifestations of the earlier corporative-organic framework in virtually all contemporary regimes and institutions in Latin American and in their underlying political-cultural foundations." In describing these patterns, Wiarda evoked Charles Anderson's metaphor of Latin American politics as a "living museum" in which older institutions and traditions persist alongside newer political forms.⁶⁰

The hypothesis that a strong historical tradition of state-centric, hierarchical authority relations is an important force in shaping Latin American politics reflects a well-established approach to the study of the region. Yet Wiarda's analysis of this tradition in relation to the concept of corporatism raised concern among other scholars who wrote about this concept. Schmitter sharply criticized this type of cultural approach. He questioned the plausibility of the claim that the cultural version of corporatism, as an underlying proclivity in Latin American politics, periodically reasserts itself to reshape state-group relations, thereby counteracting the influence of other political traditions, such as liberalism. He suggested that this account would seem to imply that "political culture is a sort of 'spigot variable' which gets turned on every once in a while to produce a different system of functional representation. ..."⁶¹

Schmitter also maintained that if one uses "corporatism" to refer to ideology, the phenomena thereby encompassed are so heterogeneous that it is not helpful to employ the label. Schmitter noted the "extraordinary variety of theorists, ideologues and activists that have advocated it [i.e., corporatism] for widely divergent motives, interests and reasons," and argued that "there is simply too much normative variety and behavioral hypocrisy in the use of the corporatist *ideological* label to make it a useful operational instrument for comparative analysis."⁶²

O'Donnell likewise expressed concern about Wiarda's approach, arguing that the problem of achieving adequate theory in the field of development cannot be addressed by "elevating concepts that refer to authentic and important problems (e.g., corporatism ...) to the category of smuggled substitutes for a general theory, in the sense that they could by themselves describe and explain the fundamental characteristics and trends of the case being analyzed." He suggested that "the problem is the result of an unwarranted jump in the level of analysis, which has ... the important consequence of freezing perception around what the exaggerated central concept postulates as the society's alpha and omega."⁶³ In

this sense, O'Donnell might be seen as raising the objection that Wiarda had engaged in conceptual stretching.

It may well be the case that in this part of the literature, the label of corporatism was applied too broadly, and carrying out causal analysis based on cultural factors is difficult. Yet three points of caution are in order with reference to these critiques.

First, it is no easy matter to assess a mode of explanation in which the influence of an underlying factor, such as a cultural proclivity, is hypothesized to be periodically deflected by other forces, only to be reasserted at a later point. Yet such a pattern can occur. What is called for is not the dismissal of such a pattern of causation as involving a spigot variable but rather an effort to find a mode of analysis that can plausibly evaluate hypotheses about such patterns; in particular, one that can yield insight into the mechanisms through which such patterns are "reproduced." Long-term cultural explanations seem perennially to get caught between appearing to account for too much and appearing to account for too little, and neither the Latin American field, nor perhaps any other field, has made much progress in systematically evaluating them.⁶⁴

Second, in response to Schmitter's complaint that using corporatism to refer to ideology places under one label phenomena that are extremely heterogeneous, one could argue that this same charge can be leveled against the use of the label to refer to group politics. As argued above, corporative forms of group politics are likewise heterogeneous in terms of the power relationships they entail. Such heterogeneity does not obviate the value of the concept; it simply points to the need for refinement, of precisely the kind that was illustrated above in the discussion of subtypes.

Finally, Stepan suggested a constructive alternative to simply dismissing this approach. Any confusion that derives from applying the concept to culture and ideology can be addressed by a shift in terminology. He proposed the use of separate labels for (1) the corporative structuring of groups, which is an outcome that analysts often wish to explain, as opposed to (2) the normative, ideological tradition, which may be part of the explanation of this corporative structuring. Stepan thus distinguished between corporatism and "organic statism." Like many authors, he treated corporatism as "a particular set of policies and institutional arrangements for structuring interest representation." By contrast, he viewed "organic statism" as a normative and ideological approach to politics that favors a statist, hierarchical mode of political organization.⁶⁵ Stepan thereby incorporated an ideological/culturalist perspective in his analysis, yet he avoided applying the label of corporatism so broadly.

Notwithstanding the critiques of O'Donnell and Schmitter and this modification proposed by Stepan, the label "corporatism" continues to

be employed in the Latin American field to refer to longer-term political, cultural, and ideological patterns. Further, it merits emphasis that this usage seems to generate little confusion. One still finds references to corporatism as the basis for a "political philosophy," as a "tradition," and as a set of "ideals" upon which policy may be based.⁶⁶ Employing the concept to refer to this longer tradition remains a comprehensible usage, and it hardly seems appropriate to ban it from the field. At the same time, for a great many scholars this does not remain the principal usage, and the final section of this chapter focuses on the application of the concept to interest group politics. □

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: NORMALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT AND PARTIAL EROSION OF CORPORATISM

In recent years, the Latin American field has seen a significant decline in scholarly interest in corporatism, due to a "normalization" of the concept, a changing assessment of its importance, and a partial erosion of the phenomenon itself. With regard to normalization, it has been observed that, after an initial phase of intellectual excitement sometimes generated by a new concept, it commonly becomes "part of our general stock of theoretical concepts."⁶⁷ This process has occurred in the case of corporatism, which, as Wiarda has emphasized, now sparks less scholarly excitement due in part to the very familiarity of the concept and of the phenomena to which it refers.⁶⁸ Thus in the second half of the 1980s and in the 1990s the concept has commanded less attention in the Latin American field. In a few studies, the issues it raises remain a major theme.⁶⁹ In many other instances, the term is used with little or no elaboration to refer to the patterns of group politics discussed above.⁷⁰ Corporatism is treated as a familiar topic, not as a subject of special analytical interest.

The concept may also receive less attention because, as noted above, attempts to establish structured political mediation at the pinnacle of labor, business, and the state, which had previously been labeled as corporative, more recently came to be called concertation, or sometimes "social pacts." These attempts remain an important feature of Latin American politics; they are simply given a different label.

The concept of corporatism is also less prominent in the literature because the phenomena to which it refers are, in significant respects, perceived as less important. For example, in the 1980s scholars were confronted with dramatic episodes of democratization. Although some interest groups played a key role in the early phase of democratic openings, it has been argued that beyond this early phase political parties became a far more important force in the effort to organize new forms of

democratic politics. Hence the sectors that had been among the most central in debates on corporatism have been seen as playing a less critical political role.⁷¹

Another aspect of the perceived decline in the importance of corporatism concerns the recent experience of the South American countries that had earlier generated some of the most extensive discussions of this topic. In the 1980s and early 1990s these countries experienced a greater degree of political stability that might earlier have been hypothesized to be a potential outcome of corporatism.⁷² In fact, this stability has derived from other sources, including the deflation of developmental expectations that resulted from the economic crises of this period, particularly the debt crisis; the collapse of socialist models of development in other parts of the world; and the related erosion or reorientation of the political left. Further, in the countries that experienced bureaucratic authoritarianism (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), an increased appreciation of democracy that grew out of the experience with authoritarian rule also played a critical role. For scholars concerned with the study of these patterns of stability and instability, these new forces, rather than corporatism, became the salient focus in the search for explanations.

Finally, basic changes have been occurring in public policies vis-à-vis interest group politics. Whereas in the 1960s and early 1970s some of the most important initiatives of national states in Latin America were conspicuously corporative, some of the most interesting subsequent initiatives have been conspicuously noncorporative. One example is found in the second half of the 1980s in Peru. An important consequence of the policies of the post-1968 Velasco government had been to accelerate the erosion of traditional ties between organized labor and the Peruvian APRA Party. Subsequently, when APRA won the presidency in 1985, one of its political options was to employ new corporative initiatives in an attempt to regain influence in the labor movement. Yet President Alan García's efforts at support mobilization took a different direction, focusing, to an important degree, on the informal sector. This may in part have been a political response to the erosion of the formal sector within the economy and hence to the diminished political payoff of creating or renewing corporative links within the formal sector.

Another example is found in Chile, which prior to 1973 had a highly corporative system of industrial relations. The post-1973 military government, after first dealing with the labor movement through severe repression, later pursued policies that combined less extensive repression with a more pluralistic framework for trade unions that abandoned many corporative provisions familiar from earlier Chilean labor law. In 1990, the new civilian government in Chile restored some of these provisions, but

a return to the traditional Chilean system of highly corporative labor law seemed unlikely.

More broadly, Hector E. Schamis, in his examination of the experiences with bureaucratic authoritarianism, has observed that whereas the cases in the 1960s (Brazil and Argentina) saw an important use of corporative structuring of labor, those of the 1970s (Chile, Argentina after 1976, and Uruguay) did not.⁷³ It appears that traditional corporative structures were seen by military rulers as inadequate for containing the far higher levels of popular mobilization in the 1970s, and hence labor policies were based on repression rather than on corporatism. In addition, Schamis argues that corporatism, even exclusionary state corporatism, is incompatible with the new market-oriented economic policies that call for a reduced state role in regulating the economy and social groups. Relatedly, for some proponents of the market-oriented growth strategies, state initiatives that defend the classic notion of the "right of combination" of workers are seen as interfering with the free market. Strong labor movements are viewed as introducing distortions in labor costs, which can adversely affect economic growth;⁷⁴ hence, various forms of state protection for unions have been modified and weakened.

Taking these trends all together, it might be argued that Latin America's experience with corporatism in the twentieth century will prove to have been a delimited historical episode.⁷⁵ This episode began with major periods of reform, state-building, and expansion of the state's role in the economy, which were launched, with varying timing among countries, during the first five decades of this century. Recent processes of liberalization and marketization are, and are intended to be, a profound break with this earlier statist tradition, and to a significant degree they are also a break with the corporative elements of this tradition.

Yet, just as the emergence of corporatism occurred with divergent timing and at a variegated pace in these countries, so its displacement by alternative patterns of state-group relations will occur in an uneven and variegated manner. Historical shifts of this magnitude rarely take place uniformly across countries, and the politics of the end of the twentieth century revolves in part around how, and how quickly, this shift is occurring. Corporative provisions remain central features of the legal structure and informal practice of group politics in Latin America. For example, despite important changes, in many countries substantial continuity is found in labor law, in the functioning of labor ministries, and in the actions of other state agencies involved in industrial relations. The most striking case of the persistence of corporative relationships is certainly Mexico. In the face of repeated crises and challenges since the late 1960s, and notwithstanding important shifts in the relation between the party

and the labor movement, the traditional corporative features of the Mexican system remained, at least until the end of 1994, a fundamental feature of national politics.

Further, Schmitter has argued that although interest groups may in some respects have been eclipsed during critical phases of the transition to democracy, they play a central role in influencing what *kind* of democracy is established. Schmitter conceptualizes democracy as being made up of five "partial regimes," three of which—the "concertation regime," the "pressure regime," and the "representation regime"—are hypothesized to be critically influenced by the character of interest groups and their interaction with one another and with the state. If this hypothesis is correct, a detailed knowledge of the structure of interest intermediation, with its various corporative, noncorporative, or postcorporative features, remains critical to the larger understanding of national political regimes.⁷⁶

Finally, even if specific corporative provisions have been eroded in many contexts, concepts from the literature on corporatism continue to be relevant to the perennial issue of how new social groups and social movements relate to the state. Whether one is concerned with workplace organizations, neighborhood associations, women's groups, or other dimensions of associability, the interaction of these groups with the state remains crucial. The interplay between state initiatives that constitute inducements and those that impose constraints on groups is crucial to this interaction. Likewise, the strategic choices made by the leaders of old and new groups in the face of these inducements and constraints—through which they establish varying degrees and forms of involvement with, or independence from, the state—are still a central feature of group politics.

Apart from these substantive conclusions, a methodological observation may also be made. It is a common lament that conceptual debates in the social sciences are confused and unproductive. In the face of this problem, the systematic application of ideas about hierarchies of concepts, generic predicaments, classical versus radial subtypes, and the contrast between conceptual stretching and theoretical stretching can make a valuable contribution. Given the continuing need to understand the different forms and variants of corporatism found in Latin America, this effort to reduce confusion and build productive insight remains an important task. □

NOTES

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assistance. Insightful comments were provided by other contributors to this volume, by students in the fall 1993 and spring 1994 political science/comparative methodology seminars at Berkeley, and by Ruth Berins Collier, Ernst Haas, Peter Houtzager, Peter Kingstone, Deborah L. Norden, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Mina Silberberg.

1. In the literature on corporatism in Europe, the term neocorporatism has been adopted to avoid the negative connotation that can derive from the identification of corporatism with fascism. This issue also has arisen in the Latin American field, but it has not been a major concern; consequently, "neocorporatism" has not been widely used and is not employed in this chapter. For valuable discussions of the relation of corporatism to fascism as well as the role of the concept of corporatism in the broader literature on comparative politics, see Douglas A. Chalmers, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics," in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *New Directions in Comparative Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); and Philippe Schmitter, "Corporatism," in Joel Krieger, ed., *Oxford Companion to Politics of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

2. For a summary of the scope of interest in the Latin American field and elsewhere, see Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. xi–xii.

3. Robert J. Alexander, *Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), p. 59; and Charles W. Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing of Restless Nations* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 55.

4. Richard M. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in Louis Hartz, ed., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), p. 176.

5. Philippe C. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 127.

6. Important statements included those by Julio Cotler, "Bases del corporativismo en el Perú," *Sociedad y Política* 1, no. 2 (October 1972): 312; Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics* 25, no. 2 (January 1973): 206–235; Philippe C. Schmitter, "The 'Portugalization' of Brazil?" in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); a special issue of *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (1974), edited by Frederick B. Pike, devoted to "The New Corporatism: Social and Political Structures in the Iberian World"; James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Kenneth Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "Inducements Versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 4 (December 1979): 967–987; and Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development*. Although Wiarda was centrally concerned with a longer historical and cultural tradition of hierarchical authority relations in Latin America, he also analyzed corporative patterns of interest group politics. For example, see Wiarda, "Corporative Origins of the Iberian and Latin

American Labor Relations Systems," in Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development*.

7. This pluralist framework was certainly more familiar to Latin Americanists within the U.S. academic community; consequently, the concept of corporatism probably commanded more attention and was seen as a more important innovation within that community. At the same time, Latin American scholars also made important contributions to the debate on corporatism.

8. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (January 1974): 93–94.

9. See, for example, James M. Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern," p. 4; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," p. 49; Robert R. Kaufman, "Corporatism, Clientelism, and Partisan Conflict: A Study of Seven Latin American Countries," p. 111; David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, "Who Does What, To Whom, and How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism," p. 493; all in Malloy, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism*. See also Stepan, *The State and Society*, p. 46.

10. Adapted from Collier and Collier, "Who Does What, To Whom, and How," p. 493.

11. For Schmitter, see the definition quoted above. Stepan used the expression "in return for" (*The State and Society*, p. 46).

12. Collier and Collier, "Inducements Versus Constraints."

13. On pages 296 and 301–316 in *The State and Society*, Stepan uses the label "generic predicament." On page 43 he refers to "inherent predicament."

14. See Evelyn P. Stevens, "Mexico's PRI: The Institutionalization of Corporatism?" in Malloy, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism*, p. 253.

15. Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State*, p. 42. See also Kenneth S. Mericle, "Corporatist Control of the Working Class: Authoritarian Brazil Since 1964," in Malloy, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism*, p. 307. It may be added that overarching confederations did emerge in the early 1960s and also beginning in the late 1970s.

16. David Chaplin, "The Revolutionary Challenge and Peruvian Militarism," in David Chaplin, ed., *Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporative Revolution* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976), pp. 19 and 22.

17. Collier and Collier, "Who Does What, to Whom, and How," p. 493.

18. Collier and Collier, "Who Does What, to Whom, and How," pp. 495 and 502.

19. George I. Oclander, "Córdoba, May 1969: Modernization, Grass-Roots Demands, and Political Stability," in Alberto Ciria et al., *New Perspectives on Modern Argentina* (Latin American Studies Working Papers, Center for Latin American Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1972).

20. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," p. 49.

21. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change*, 162.

22. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," pp. 71 and 73.

23. John F. H. Purcell and Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Mexican Business and Public Policy," p. 194, and John J. Bailey, "Pluralist and Corporatist Dimensions of Interest Representation in Colombia," pp. 282–283, both in Malloy, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism*. The comparative literature on business associations is, unfortunately, far more limited than that on labor unions, and a full comparative

documentation of this contrast is lacking. A highly promising collaborative project, "Business Peak Associations and Social Change in Latin America," directed by Francisco Durand, promises to shed new light on these issues.

24. The relevance of corporatism for peasant organizations was discussed in two chapters in the Malloy volume: Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Corporative Strategies in the Dominican Republic: The Politics of Peasant Movements"; and Stevens, "Mexico's PRI," pp. 232–233. At least in Peru, corporatism was relevant to workers not only through its role in relation to organized labor, but also in relation to squatter settlements. See David Collier, *Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 120, and Henry A. Dietz, "Bureaucratic Demand-Making and Clientelistic Participation in Peru," in Malloy, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism*.

25. Collier and Collier, "Who Does What, to Whom, and How," pp. 494–495. The major exception to this pattern is Uruguay, where the organization of labor unions remained highly pluralistic. For an extended analysis of this case, see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), esp. chaps. 5 and 6.

26. Linn A. Hammergren, "Corporatism in Latin American Politics: A Reexamination of the 'Unique' Tradition," *Comparative Politics* 9, no. 4 (July 1977): 444, 449.

27. Douglas A. Chalmers, "The Politicized State in Latin America," in Malloy, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism*, pp. 28–29; and Alberto Ciria, "Old Wine in New Bottles? Corporatism in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 13, no. 3 (1978): 210.

28. James M. Malloy, "Authoritarianism, Corporatism, and Mobilization in Peru," *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (January 1974): 84.

29. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change*, pp. 127–128.

30. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Stepan, *Authoritarian Brazil*, p. 142.

31. Schmitter, "The 'Portugalization' of Brazil?" pp. 185–186.

32. For discussions of the different forms such hierarchies can take, see George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), chaps. 1 and 6; and David Collier and James M. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 4 (December 1993): 845–855.

33. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation," in Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 35–36, note 1.

34. Liliana De Riz, Marcelo Cavarozzi, and Jorge Feldman, *Concertación, estado, y sindicatos en la Argentina contemporánea* (Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, Estudios CEDES, 1987), p. 7 (translation by the author).

35. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May be Going," in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 262–263.

36. It merits note that this change has an important implication for the issue of the pejorative identification of corporatism with fascism, raised above in note 1. In these revised definitions, the elements of corporatism most conspicuously identified with the fascist state, that is, overarching mechanisms of mediation, are explicitly excluded.

37. Kaufman, "Corporatism, Clientelism, and Partisan Conflict," p. 113.

38. Jonathan Hartlyn, *The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 244; see also p. 3.

39. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" pp. 96–98. The following discussion adopts Schmitter's revised usage in which he refers to systems of interest intermediation rather than interest representation ("Modes of Interest Intermediation," p. 64, note 1, and pp. 65–66).

40. Given this definition, the Mexican system might be characterized as monist. However, in the literature on Mexico and in comparative writing that includes the Mexican case, it is generally referred to as corporatist.

41. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" pp. 102–105.

42. See Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict, and the New Corporatism" (paper presented at the International Political Science Association Round Table on Political Integration, Jerusalem, 1974 [subsequently published in Schmitter and Lehmbruch, *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation*]), and Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government," *Comparative Political Studies* 10, no. 1 (April 1977): 91–126.

43. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," p. 48 and pp. 64–77. O'Donnell actually refers to the "privatist" element of corporatism (p. 74), or to the "privatization" of some institutional arenas of the state (p. 64). For the sake of clarity, the term privatizing is used here.

44. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Politics of Modernization Series, no. 9 (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1973), chap. 2.

45. Stepan, *The State and Society*, chap. 3.

46. Collier and Collier, "Inducements Versus Constraints."

47. See again, Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, chap. 6, and Collier and Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited," p. 846.

48. See Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1934), pp. 235–236, and Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, *Introduction to Logic*, 9th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 189–191.

49. David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 4. For a standard baseline in discussions of authoritarianism and its subtypes, see Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems* (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1975).

50. Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, chap. 6; and Collier and Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited," pp. 848–852. The question of *why* particular concepts generate radial as opposed to classical subtypes remains to be addressed.

51. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 55–69.

52. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," p. 49.

53. Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 68–85.

54. Collier and Collier, "Inducements Versus Constraints," pp. 974 and 979.

55. See Ross M. Martin, "Pluralism and the New Corporatism," *Political Studies* 41 (1983): 86–102 (see esp. pp. 98–102). Martin, like most writers on Europe, uses the term "liberal corporatism" instead of "societal corporatism."

56. Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (December 1970): 1034.

57. See Collier and Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited," pp. 848–852.

58. Although Morse and Anderson were part of this larger discussion, they did not directly center their analysis around the concept of corporatism. See Ronald C. Newton, "Natural Corporatism and the Passing of Populism in South America," *Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (January 1974): 34–51; Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State*; Simon Schwartzman, "Back to Weber: Corporatism and Patrimonialism in the Seventies," in Malloy, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism*; Stepan, *The State and Society*; Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America"; and Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change*. Louis Hartz's bold analysis in *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964) places these studies of Latin America in a larger comparative perspective.

59. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change," pp. 222–223. See also his "Corporative Origins of the Iberian and Latin American Labor Relations Systems," in Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development*.

60. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change," pp. 209, 213, and 214.

61. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" p. 90.

62. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" pp. 87 and 89.

63. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review* 13, no. 1 (1978): 4.

64. For an innovative effort to evaluate such explanations in another context, see Robert D. Putnam (with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti), *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). On the other hand, see Robert W. Jackman and Ross Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture?" (unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis).

65. Stepan, *The State and Society*, p. 46; see also chap. 1.

66. Brian H. Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 82, David Rock, *Argentina 1516–1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 185, and Joel Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State and the Rise of Perón, 1930–1945* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1990), p. 69.

67. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 3.

68. Howard J. Wiarda, "Concepts and Models in Comparative Politics: Political Development Reconsidered and Its Alternatives," in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds., *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 41.

69. Corporatism remains a major theme in Paul G. Buchanan, "State Corporatism in Argentina: Labor Administration Under Perón and Onganía," *Latin American Research Review* 20, no. 1 (1985): 61–95; Carlos H. Waisman, *Reversal of Development in Argentina* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Neil Harvey, "Peasant Strategies and Corporatism in Chiapas," in Joe Foweraker and Ann L. Craig, eds., *Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990); Jeffrey W. Rubin, "Popular Mobilization and the Myth of State Corporatism," in Foweraker and Craig, *Popular Movements*. Sharon Phillips Collazos, *Labor and Politics in Panama: The Torrijos Years* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), focuses very centrally on themes raised in the literature on corporatism but without emphasizing the label.

70. See, for example, David Rock, *Argentina 1516–1982*; Ben Ross Schneider, *Politics Within the State: Elite Bureaucrats and Industrial Policy in Authoritarian Brazil* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp. 245–257; Ann L. Craig, "Institutional Contexts and Popular Strategies," in Foweraker and Craig, *Popular Movements*, pp. 276–277; and the chapters by Ellner, Carr, and Moreira Alves, all in Barry Carr and Steve Ellner, eds., *The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

71. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 57–59; and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Interest Systems and the Consolidation of Democracies," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992), pp. 163–166.

72. Compared to the period prior to the coups and military regimes that extended from the 1960s into the 1980s, the scope of opposition movements and political crises in the postmilitary period in much of South America has been far more limited. Interestingly, the greatest instability—in Peru and Colombia—has occurred outside the domain of labor-business-state relations in the modern formal sector, on which discussions of corporatism have generally focused.

73. Hector E. Schamis, "Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 2 (January 1991): 201–220.

74. Alejandro Foxley, *Latin American Experiments in Neo-Conservative Economics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 193–194.

75. These themes are discussed in Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, chap. 8; and Marcelo Cavarozzi, "Beyond Transitions to Democracy in Latin America," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24, pt. 3 (October 1992): 665–684.

76. Schmitter, "Interest Systems," pp. 166–175.