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Diverse Democracies: Citizenship Beliefs and Political Participation Across Three Geopolitical Regions

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Introduction

Scholars may disagree regarding the specifics of how much and in what ways citizens should be active in their democratic systems of governance, but in general, a participatory public is seen as crucial for democratic responsiveness and as an intrinsic democratic good (Arendt 1958; Lijphart 1997; Verba 1996). However this says nothing about whether or how much average citizens view participation as an important part of citizenship in particular, or what other aspects might be important in general. Even less is known about how beliefs about the meaning of citizenship are tied to actual behaviors. Discussions of democracy, citizenship, and political participation are often forwarded with little consideration of how they are viewed by citizens themselves or how such relationships might vary across different democracies. While democracy has emerged as the most popular form of government for a variety of reasons, it is important to remember that democratic forms and practices vary a great deal within and across nations. Thus, discussion in public arena among democratic nations on how to help other nations “build democracy” or “foster democratic citizenship” would benefit from knowing what citizenship actually means to the democratic public and how such meanings relate to political behavior and differ cross-nationally.

In this paper, we take advantage of the 2004 round of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) that simultaneously questions both meanings and practices of citizenship across an array of democratic nations to study the link between respondents’ ideas of their role as citizens and the link between these beliefs and political behavior. Even though political theorists have examined the qualities of “good citizenship” in depth, empirical political and social scientists have produced only a handful of studies – focusing on West European countries and the US – that analyze the public’s understanding of this concept (Almond and Verba 1963; Conover, Searing, and Crewe 2004; Dalton 2008; Denters, Gabriel, and Torcal 2007; Theiss-Morse 1993), but none to our knowledge have investigated the link between beliefs about citizenship and different modes of political behavior across different types of democracies in such detail. We argue that understanding beliefs about citizenship and the relationship of these beliefs to different types of political practices leads to a more complete picture of democracy and adds to our understanding of the process of democratization.

In sum, this paper asks three questions. First, *are there differences in beliefs about “good citizenship” and levels of political participation across distinct geopolitical democratic regions* (Eastern Europe, Western Europe and Western non-European democracies)? Second, *what is the extent to which beliefs about “good citizenship” are linked to political participation across regions?* Third, *does the relationship between beliefs about “good citizenship” political participation differ across regions?* To address these questions we utilize data from the 2004 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) for 26 democratic nations/regions, grouped into three geopolitical regions: Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Western non-European states.¹ Our research represents a unique contribution to studies of citizenship for several reasons: first, we consider direct evidence for links between beliefs and behavior among the general public, second, we focus on a wide range of measures of both beliefs about good citizenship and forms of political participation, third, we consider such relationships over a broad array of democracies, and fourth, we pull from several sources of prior theory including public opinion, political behavior, democratic theory, and sociological and political institutionalism.

In the next section, we present a review of the literature and discuss the potential effect of the political history and context of the three regions on beliefs about citizenship, political participation and the link between both. We then describe our data and measurements, and answer our first research question looking levels of participation and support for differing conceptions of citizenship in the three regions. Briefly, our findings indicate large regional differences in political activism but not the more institutionalized forms of participation, and in beliefs about civic duty and political aspects of “good citizenship.” The Western non-Europeans generally show the highest levels of participation and focus on the civic duty and political components of citizenship. We then turn to our second and third research questions and study the link between beliefs about citizenship and political participation and find that this relationship varies markedly across region and type of participation. In particular, beliefs about citizenship as a civic duty dampen participation more among the Westerners than the Eastern Europeans, and beliefs about the importance of political responsibilities boost participation more among the Westerners than Easterners. Differences in the relationships between regions are most stark in relation to political activism. We discuss these results and reflect on their societal implications in the conclusion.

Democratic Cornerstones: Beliefs and Participation

Democratic theory has long debated whether and to what ends citizens are effective participants within democratic systems of governance, and what implications such participation has for the meaning of democracy (see review in Urbinati and Warren 2008). Regardless, both participation in the political system and holding beliefs congruent with democratic citizenship are seen as key elements of a functioning democracy. First, democratic responsiveness depends on citizen participation and is an intrinsic democratic good (Arendt 1958; Lijphart 1997; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Verba 1996). Second, the beliefs and values citizens imbue participation with impact and reflect their role as self-authorized “citizen representatives” in a democracy (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Lipset 1996; Warren 2001; Warren 2008). In other words, citizens can frame their role as a direct participant in government, with or without the cooperation and indirect influence of elected representatives.

Thus, while the importance of each is clear from previous research, how a diverse set of beliefs about citizenship may be related to an increasingly diverse set of citizenship participation remains unclear. Before elaborating upon the implications from existing theory as to this relationship, we now briefly turn to definitions of both political participation and citizenship beliefs.

Political Participation

To understand political participation, studies have often focused on voting which has historically been considered as the key democratic participatory citizenship right. With a vote, citizens have a direct voice in their government, and theoretically this suggests governments must consider the needs of all citizens of the nation. Though voting is central to democracy, it is increasingly seen as giving an incomplete picture of participation (Saward 2006; Warren 2008). Regardless of whether they vote, studies show that citizens find a variety of participatory outlets as, if not more, compelling (see also Dalton 2006). Given the wide and increasing variety of models of participation in democratic societies, such issues suggest the need to distinguish electoral participation from other types of political behavior.

Recalling some efforts early in participation research, (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978), some scholars (Dalton 2006; Inglehart 1997) have recently underlined the need to incorporate less institutionalized or less electorally-oriented forms of engagement. With citizens in Western industrialized nations becoming more highly educated, technologically sophisticated, and policy and issue oriented, citizens are seeking out new ways of engaging with government and politics that reflect such skills and goals (Abbe, Goodliffe, Herrnson, and Patterson 2003; Dalton 2008; DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman, and Robinson 2001; Dolan 2001). The meaning of political participation can benefit from a broader definition of active citizen engagement. Thus, throughout the paper we use the term ‘political participation’ to refer to a broad array of both more and less institutionalized actions. Institutional forms of participation include voting and political party membership which may even be legal requirements in some democracies (Lijphart 1997). Less institutionalized forms of political participation refer to actions such as internet participation, attending rallies, writing letters, voting, signing petitions, etc. Such political activism (Urbinati and Warren 2008) blurs the boundaries between civil and political engagement, and provides forms of participation that may both compete with and complement electoral participation (Saward 2006). “Citizen representative” proliferate claims for representation and may capture opinions and voices that fall through the cracks of conventional politics (Fung 2003; Warren 2008).

Beliefs about “Good Citizenship”

Underlying participation are assumed to be a “shared set of expectations about the citizen’s role in politics” (Dalton 2008: 78). In a stable democracy citizens need to be engaged, and it is expected that their beliefs about citizenship will frame such actions as a meaningful part of democratic citizenship (Dahl 1997; Erikson and Tedin 2004; Lipset 1996). Thus researchers argue the importance of understanding public meanings of citizenship (Dalton 2008), yet studies of citizens’ own conceptualizations of “good citizenship” have been largely neglected despite the

prominence of this topic among a variety of scholars (Lister 2003; Marshall 1950; Roelofs 1957; Sandel 1998; Young 2000).

Both within and across democracies, citizens may have different ideas about what it entails to be a “good” democratic citizen (Inglehart 2008; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). To provide a theoretical framework that will allow us to explore these patterns, we borrow from the extensive theoretical and more limited empirical research that exists, and discuss expectations of “good citizenship” as falling along three principal themes commonly reiterated in the literature (Dalton 2008; Janoski 1998a; Lister 2003; Marshall 1950). First, citizens may consider *political activity* as a crucial element of citizenship. Often this inclines a focus on participation in fair elections that select government officials, but as mentioned above, non-electoral forms can also be included. A second emphasis is a commitment to *civic duty* and social order when describing citizenship, which would highlight the importance of abiding by laws, accepting state authority and paying taxes. Finally, discourses surrounding the *social responsibilities* of citizenship are also prevalent. Increasingly in post-industrial societies, responsibilities such as caring for others and maintaining a clean and safe environment are discussed as citizenship duties. This reflects a related trend emphasizing tolerance and accommodating the needs and interests of different groups (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Janoski 1998b). In sum, citizenship beliefs are multidimensional and citizens will vary in their perceived importance of the different dimensions.

Linking Beliefs about “Good Citizenship” and Political Participation

Establishing a theoretical link between beliefs and participation is less straightforward. The majority of prior research and theory linking beliefs or values to participation has focused on voting, and in particular on how such beliefs shape vote choice within the United States (Abramowitz 1995; Brooks 2000; Brooks, Manza, and Bolzendahl 2003; Erikson and Tedin 2004). Nevertheless, such theories may be usefully extended to consider relationships between varying beliefs about “good citizenship” and varying forms of participation.

Two streams of theory on voting behavior suggest that beliefs about citizenship may have little relationship to actual participation once relevant socialization and group membership factors are controlled for. Social psychological approaches emphasize the subjective identities voters obtain based on lived experience, whereas social structural approaches emphasize the shared interest of group members based on their objective place in the system of stratification (Brooks, Manza, and Bolzendahl 2003). In either case, values are a function of socialization experiences and memberships, and only have a weak, if any, independent influence. In contrast to social psychological and social structural approaches, political cultural approaches stress that beliefs and values have an independent effect on behavior (Inglehart 2008; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Lipset 1996). Both childhood socialization and continuing interaction with various social institutions work to stabilize and diffuse beliefs which may have enduring effects on behavior.

Beyond debates about whether beliefs about “good citizenship” will matter for political participation, prior theory provides little guidance in *how* these should relate across differing measures of both beliefs and behavior. Yet, based on the earlier discussion of democratic theories of representation, we offer some tentative expectations. First, we expect that beliefs about the importance of political citizenship will be most influential for political participation. In particular, the most institutionalized forms of participation might be expected to be most heavily

dependent on the perceived importance of political citizenship. If citizens conceptualize voting as a duty similar to obeying the law and paying taxes, civic duty may also be expected to influence the most institutionalized forms of participation such as electoral participation. Second, beliefs about citizenship as a set of social responsibilities are likely less tied to institutional forms, as those who believe social responsibilities are highly important may find voting and party membership to be a relatively ineffective means of transmitting such priorities. In contrast, political activism may be most important to those who prioritize social responsibilities, as this is a more direct means of conveying opinion, such as boycotting a product based on concerns over global economic policy, or joining an internet forum to rally support on a social issue. In this case, the importance of civic duty-based citizenship may decrease the likelihood of activism, and politically motivated citizenship may be agnostic in its relationship to activism. In sum, not all beliefs regarding “good citizenship” encourage similar behavior.

Institutional Legacies: Beliefs and Participation Across Three Geopolitical Regions

Even among a sample of regions considered democracies, citizenship beliefs and political participation are formed and take place in a certain political context with differing histories, cultural heritages, political cultures, and economic systems, which likely influences citizens’ beliefs about their role in a democratic system and their actual behavior. Indeed, some prior research has examined the extent to which national social, political and economic contexts impact views of democracy and citizen engagement (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Though not focusing explicitly on citizens’ beliefs about citizenship and political behavior, this previous research provides a good basis for viewing differences across regions from the standpoint of institutional theory, and thus parsing democratic regions according to important historical, political, and economic contexts. We expect differences in the link between citizenship beliefs and political participation according to the length of institutionalized democracy, the historical and cultural context of political participation, and also because the opportunities for citizens in previously authoritarian systems to translate their beliefs were limited. We focus on three geopolitical regions: Eastern and Western European nations, and Western non-European nations. We refer to the three regions as *geopolitical* in order to reflect the influence of both geographical and political dimensions of difference.

In general, the nations in our geopolitical regions share many similar institutional influences, which allow us to group them in meaningful ways, and also shape our expectations for how they should differ. To understand why geopolitical regions may differ in how beliefs relate to participation, we rely on insights from institutional theory, both in its sociological and political formulation. We view institutions as “emergent, ‘higher-order’ factors above the individual level, constraining or constituting the interests and political participation of actors” (Amenta and Ramsey forthcoming) in ways that do not require continuing collective mobilization or authoritative intervention (Clemens and Cook 1999). Notably, the sociological and political variants of institutionalism focus on different aspects of institutions. Political institutionalism theorizes a policy feedback effect which focuses on the ways in which macro-level political institutions shape politics and political actors, in turn, constrained actors influence states and policies, and thus the process continues (Amenta and Ramsey forthcoming; Skocpol 1992). Such approaches are common in historical institutional studies, and are linked to the

growth of state-centered scholarship, which shows that state institutions might be configured differently for a number of reasons, including uneven processes of political, economic, bureaucratic, and intellectual development (Amenta, Bonastia, and Caren 2001; Skocpol and Amenta 1986). Sociological institutionalists, in comparison, bring in “cognitive scripts, moral templates and symbolic systems that may reside at the supra-state or supra-organizational level” (Amenta and Ramsey forthcoming). Distinctions between institutional and cultural influences on political developments are discarded, and explanations focus on cultural institutions common to political actors. These are cognitive or normative constructs that define the possible and acceptable forms of political organization, policy goals, and instruments for attaining those goals (Hall and Taylor 1996). Building on insights from both political and sociological institutionalism, we argue that it is both differences among macro-political institutions and cultural institutions that shape regional variation in the link between citizenship beliefs and political participation.

Below we outline some of the general differences between the regions, and then turn to an outline of specific expectations regarding the relationship between beliefs about “good citizenship” and political participation across the regions, informed by these institutional concerns.

Geographic, Political and Cultural Divergences

Geographically, the three groups can be distinguished in clear ways. The Eastern and Western European nations are both located in Europe, but occupy different regions of the continent, which may also divide cultural practices and traditions. The Western non-European nations are not all in geographical proximity, but share a variety of geographical similarities. With the exception of New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and the United States are all larger as a single nation than either of the two European regions as a whole, and even New Zealand is much larger than many of the European nations. Relative to their size, these nations are much less densely populated than most European nations, and all have native populations that occupy a unique place in the political landscape.

Politically and culturally, the differences between these geopolitical regions are stark. All of the Eastern European nations have a shared history of communism as a political and economic system, though all are currently democracies. A competitive political party system exists but not always stably, and communist parties continue to do well in elections. Also, on average, these formerly communist nations’ economic structures still differ from those of Western nations with high levels of unemployment and a lower GDP per capita (Heinen 1997; IMF 2008). Inglehart (2008) has associated this lower level of economic development with a predominance of materialists within the Eastern European region, and with citizens from Eastern European countries more oriented towards more traditional values than self-expressive values.

The Western non-European nations have a shared cultural history as primarily British colonies, originally settled by Anglo-Saxon and Western European immigrants, and a shared English language. Their political and economic systems matured with the ascendancy of theories of liberal individualism and free market capitalism. They remain among the most market-oriented of the advanced industrialized democracies. These nations lack a history of feudalism, and have a relatively less-developed sense of (state-sponsored) social responsibility across classes and groups. Finally, these four countries score high on Inglehart’s (2008) scale of post-

materialism, indicating that citizens within these countries attach high value on individual freedom and self-expression.

Even though Western Europe includes a wide variety of countries, a history of feudalism, backed by notions of Christian charity, has provided a fairly solid foundation for the support of social welfare states across these nations. While communism never became very popular, socialism gained more ground, and many Social Democratic parties flourished during the previous century. Due to a history of guilds, feudalism, and interventions from the Catholic and Protestant churches, these states have been more strongly influenced by corporatist arrangements, giving business and unions more power in governance (Norris and Davis 2003: 3). These nations also share a recent history in efforts to form a community, politically, economically and socially, by the creating of first the European Community and later expanding this to the European Union, of which today some Eastern European nations are members.

Linking Beliefs and Behavior across the Geopolitical Regions

Having framed the broad theoretical basis for our regional differences, here we introduce our expectations with respect to beliefs about “good citizenship,” political participation, and the relationship between both in more detail for the three geopolitical regions.

Eastern Europe. Whatever eagerness there was to vote in the societies that emerged from state socialism in Eastern Europe after 1989 has apparently dissipated. Eastern Europe is characterized by low levels of political participation, which is often blamed on the communist experience (Howard 2002; Hutcheson and Korosteleva 2006; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). Communism meant that the only choice of political identification was identification with “*the [Communist] party*” (Rose and Makkai 1995), and the electorate was more an object of politics than an active political subject (Wolchik 1992). Involvement in protest activities was not possible and more generally autonomous non-state activities were supplanted and subverted by forcing their citizens to join and participate in mandatory, state-controlled organizations (Howard 2002; Kluegel and Mason 1999). Hence, the new regimes that arose after the collapse of communism have challenged people to re-learn political and civic attitudes and behavior (Mishler and Rose 2002), especially less institutional forms of participation.

Research confirms a lingering negative valence to participation. Völker and Flap (2001) found that former GDR citizens still suspect and eschew organizational life, and Howard (2002) shows that large majorities of citizens throughout post-communist Europe have a common sense of mistrust of organizations due to their negative experience with state-run organizations during the communist period. Combined with materialist values (Inglehart 2008), Eastern European residents may attach more importance to maintaining order in the country than freedom of speech and participation in governmental decision making.

Additionally, even if they believe “good citizenship” entails a variety of political, civic and social aspects, their distrust in organizations may discourage them from translating beliefs into actual behavior. Having lived under a regime where ideology was often disconnected from practice, the values surrounding “good citizenship” may be less “normative” to behavior. Continuing higher levels of institutional instability may exacerbate and/or maintain a rift between values and action (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007). Finally, opportunities to participate in non-state political activities where restricted by the authoritarian regime, thus this

region lags in the development of less institutional forms of participation such as signing petitions or contacting the media, effectively limiting the outlets for translating values into practice.

Western Non-European Nations. The Western non-European democracies grew under the general umbrella of liberal individualism and localism. Government has tended to be federal with extensive powers granted to sub-national districts, and recent research has documented trends especially in Australia and New Zealand toward greater neoliberalism, a current that has always been strong in the U.S. and Canada (Boston 1999; Roper 1991; Shaver 1999). Inglehart (2008) shows that the four countries we include in this geopolitical region of Western non-European states generally score high on the post-materialist value scale – values correlated with more unconventional and elite-challenging types of political participation (Inglehart 1990).

The United States has been known for its vivid and rich civil society and high number of civic engagement among its citizens compared to the European public.² Recently however, a number of scholars have noted a declining level of civic engagement in the U.S. (Macedo 2005; Putnam 2000), which has been blamed on a growing individualism in American thinking and behavior (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton 1985). Voter turnout has decreased over the last decades, and even though voter turnout is generally low, U.S. citizens are more likely to be involved in political actions and voluntary associations than European citizens (Howard 2006), and the United States leads in membership in and unpaid work for voluntary organizations (Lipset 1996). Though more limited, evidence for Canada, Australia and New Zealand suggests similar patterns (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Australia has mandatory voter registration, and tends to have relatively higher voter turnout, but similar problems with political disengagement more broadly (Battin 2008). New Zealand had a reputation for high voter participation, but declining turnout over the last decades (McVey and Vowles 2005; Vowles 2002). Despite declining trends in voter turnout, Canadian reports indicate engagement in civil society and volunteerism remains very high³, and Canadians are more active than most Western European citizens (Lipset 1996). Overall, these nations place more emphasis on individuality and disdain for authority suggesting of the regions they are the most drawn to individualistic types of citizenship behavior and support of beliefs that define citizenship in political terms rather than terms of mutual social responsibilities or as law-abiding and state-authority elements (Lipset 1996; Searing, Conover, and Crewe 2003).

In terms of the relationship between values and participation, we expect to find more direct links between a set of beliefs and related behavior. The liberal democratic political environment and the possibilities to participate actively in different types of political activities offer citizens many possibilities to translate their beliefs in actual behavior.

Western European Nations. Research comparing West Europeans to Americans suggests the latter tend to participate more due to “the rejection of a powerful central state and of a church establishment” (Lipset 1996: 67). Traditionally, Western European nations have had a history of state organizations or state-financed churches handling many communal functions. Eventually, the official control fell primarily under the state and varying forms and levels of a larger, universalistic welfare system. Thus Western Europeans can rely more on the state for a variety of functions that fall under the purview of civic or private organizations in the Western non-European geopolitical region. However, like Western non-Europe, most West European nations have had stable democracies for much longer than the Eastern Europeans, and as a geopolitical region, nations share many similar political characteristics such as proportional representation and parliamentary systems.

Given the institutionalized nature of citizenship, we expect Western European respondents will be less engaged in non-institutional political activities than Western non-European citizens, though more likely than the Eastern European citizens. However, given the more fully developed social welfare discourse within Western Europe, it is possible that this discourse will be mirrored in citizens' ideas about "good citizenship." Finally, given the long history of democracy, we anticipate a greater connection between citizenship beliefs and behavior among Western Europeans than in Eastern Europe.

Research Expectations

Based on previous findings and theoretical insights, our hypotheses on geopolitical differences in citizenship beliefs, political participation and the relationship between both are:

- (1) With respect to *citizenship beliefs*, we expect Eastern Europeans to less strident ideas about what "good citizenship" entails as compared to respondents in the Western regions, and thus, to see all possible aspects of "good citizenship" as less important. Further, a history of communism may have imparted continuing tolerance of state control and state authority, suggesting respondents in Eastern Europe will focus primarily on the civic duty element of "good citizenship" (e.g. obeying laws). Among Western respondents, we expect to see more emphasis on the political component among the non-Europeans and social responsibilities among the Europeans.
- (2) Regarding *political participation*, we expect Eastern Europeans to have the lowest levels of participation, and particularly so in less institutional types of political engagement. The Western non-Europeans are anticipated to show the highest levels of political participation, particularly in more activist types of political participation.
- (3) As regards the *relationship between beliefs and behavior*, in general, we expect political beliefs to link most closely to all forms of participation, while civic duty beliefs will matter more in regard to institutional forms of participation, and social citizenship beliefs for political activism. In terms of regional differences, we predict relationships to be weakest among Eastern Europeans. We expect stronger links between beliefs and political participation among respondents in both Western regions, though the direction (positive or negative) of the relationship may differ across the different types of beliefs and participation (as described above).

Data and Measures

We utilize data from the 2004 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) module on Citizenship. The ISSP is a cross-national collaboration of surveys, each of which is fielded by a scientific organization within the member nation. Detailed information about the sampling procedures and any deviations are available in the study report (Scholz, Harkness, and Faaß 2008). We look at respondents in Western European, Western non-European and Eastern European countries. The Western European countries (or regions) are: Austria, Flanders,⁴ France, Western Germany⁵, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, and Ireland. Australia, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand form the group of Western non-European countries. The Eastern European region

includes respondents from: Eastern Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia. Our sample thus includes a total of 26 countries/regions. The final sample size is 27,449.⁶ Before turning to the analyses, in the next sections we describe all dependent and independent variables.

Dependent Variables: Political Participation

To assess political participation, we consider both institutional and less institutional types of participation. The types of participation we call institutional are membership in a political party and voting. We refer to them as such because voting and party membership can be framed as an institutionalized (and necessary) part of the electoral system (Janoski 1998a). In the ISSP survey, *political party membership* is measured according to four levels of engagement: (1) never been a member; (2) used to be a member; (3) passive member; (4) active member. However, the majority of respondents report having never been a member, and once we ran predicted probabilities for all levels of this variable we found the majority of the variation lay between those who have never been a member and all else, thus we collapse this in a binary variable where zero is never a member and one is some kind of membership, past or present.⁷ The measure for *electoral participation* asked respondents if they voted in the last election, with possible responses of yes or no.⁸ Missing values for both were dropped listwise.

To measure less institutionalized types of political engagement we use ISSP items asking respondents if they have done a variety of forms of political actions. While accepted actions in most democracies, none are institutional features of the electoral system. Seven types of political actions are examined with possible responses of: (1) have not done it and would never do it; (2) have not done it but might do it; (3) have done it in the more distant past; (4) have done it in the past year. The different types of participation are: sign a petition; take part in demonstration; attend political meeting or rally; contact a politician; donate money or raise funds; contact media; join an internet political forum. These different items load on one scale, referred to as *political activism* ($\alpha=.79$; see Appendix Table B for further analyses). All scales are coded such that higher values indicate more engagement and have been recoded to start at zero. To preserve the greatest amount of information, responses were summed and divided by the number of possible responses, with values dropped only for respondents who are missing on more than four of the individual items. The resulting scale is continuous within range of individual items (0-3).

Independent Variables

The main focus in this article is examining the strength of the relationship between *beliefs about "good citizenship"* and actual citizenship behavior. To measure these beliefs, we focus on a variety of measures asking respondents how they believe a "good citizen" should behave, starting with the phrase: "To be a good citizen, how important is it for a person to..." The following eight items are listed (scored from 1 if considered extremely unimportant to 7 if considered extremely important): never try to evade taxes; obey laws; try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions; help people in your country who are worse off than yourself; help people in the world who are worse off than yourself; always vote in elections; be active in social and political associations; keep a watch on the actions of government.

A principle component factor analysis confirms our theoretical decision to parse citizenship beliefs into three categories (Appendix Table B). A scale of beliefs about *political citizenship* ($\alpha=.66$) assesses how important respondents believe it is for good citizens to ‘always vote in elections,’ be ‘active in social and political associations,’ and ‘keep a watch on the actions of government.’ A scale of beliefs regarding *civic duty citizenship* ($\alpha=.71$) is made up of items conveying the importance that one ‘never try to evade taxes’ and ‘always obey laws.’ Finally, a scale of beliefs on *social citizenship* ($\alpha=.73$) assesses how important respondents believe it is for good citizens to ‘try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions,’ ‘help people in your country who are worse off than yourself,’ and ‘help people in the world who are worse off than yourself.’ All scales were recoded to start at zero. Also, as with the political activism scale, the responses were summed and divided by the number of possible responses, with values dropped only for respondents who are missing on all of the individual items. The resulting scale is continuous corresponding to the range of individual items (0-6).

We control for a variety of socio-economic characteristics that have traditionally been related to political participation, dropping missing listwise. *Gender* is measured as a dichotomous variable, with men coded as 0 and 1 for female respondents. *Age* is a continuous control variable. We also introduced a squared value for age to control for life-course related, non-linearities in the effect. *Employment status* is represented by three categories: full-time employment, part-time employment and those not in the labor force. The latter category includes unemployed, and also care workers, students, retired, and disabled people. *Occupation* has been operationalized on the basis of the 1988 International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) and is represented here by four groups: (1) managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals, (2) clerks, service workers, shop and market sales workers, and armed forces, (3) skilled agriculture workers, craft workers, and plant and machine operators, assemblers, elementary occupations, and (4) no occupation.⁹

Education is measured as a dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual has attained a university degree.¹⁰ *Marital status* is coded into three categories: (1) respondents who are married, are living together as married or who are widowed, (2) respondents who are divorced or separated, and (3) respondents who are single and have never been married. The *place of residence* is based on the respondents’ own self-assessment of their community: 0 for rural and 1 for urban. We control for *religious denomination* according to four categories: no religious denomination, Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Other religion. *Religious attendance* is a continuous variable ranging from (0) never to (7) several time a week.

In addition to demographic variables, we also introduce four attitudinal variables that have been found to be important corollaries of democratic values and participation: political trust, political efficacy, social trust, and political ideology. Our indicator of *political trust* asks if ‘most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right.’ *Political efficacy* is measured as an additive scale of two items ($\alpha=.74$): ‘people like me don’t have any say about what the government does,’ and ‘I don’t think the government cares much what people like me think.’ Individual items were assessed on Likert-type scales ranging from 1 to 5, though the scale was recoded to begin at zero and items were coded such that higher scores represent more political efficacy. Values were deleted if responses were missing for both questions. One question is used to measure *social trust*: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ The possible answers range from (1) ‘People can almost always be trusted’ to (4) ‘You almost always can’t be too careful in dealing with people.’ All answers have been reversed so that higher values refer to

more trust, and recoded to start at zero. Finally, *political ideology* is measured based on an item derived by the ISSP research team from country-specific questions about political party affiliation, political ideology and/or both. Given the high number of missing values on this item (e.g., all are missing in Flanders and 37% in Austria), the variable was recoded into four categories: left, right, center and ‘other.’ The ‘other’ category comprises all the missing, those with no party affiliation and those who say some other party.¹¹ Descriptive statistics for all of the demographic and attitudinal control items as well as tests investigating differences between the geopolitical regions considered in our analyses can be found in Appendix Table A.

Analytical Strategy

In the analyses below we examine the link between beliefs about “good citizenship” and different types of political participation across three geopolitical regions. The scale of political activism is analyzed using OLS regression, and binary logistic regressions are used to investigate political party membership and voting behavior. Notably, the coefficients do not convey the substantive size of an estimated coefficient, thus we present t-scores rather than standard errors with all coefficients. Because we are primarily interested in two issues: regional differences and the effect of citizenship beliefs, we exclude controls from the tables, though they were present in the regressions. In every model, we utilized robust standard errors clustered by nation.

For tests of significant differences across linear regression models we use a Chow test (i.e., our activism outcome) by running models as seemingly unrelated regressions and testing resultant coefficients. Due to the probabilistic and non-linear nature of logistic regressions and the fact that differences in the estimated coefficients tell us nothing about the differences in the underlying impact of a variable (x) on differing groups, we establish significant differences by examining plots of the predicted probabilities for a given coefficient across all levels of the independent variable (Figures 1-3) (Allison 1999; Long 2007).¹² Where differences are found to be significant/substantive, evidence for such a conclusion is discussed in the text below. All statistics were run with the statistical program Stata version 10.1.

Geopolitical Regional Differences in Levels of Participation and Citizenship Beliefs

Given our interest in how levels of participation are related to beliefs about citizenship across the geopolitical regions and how these are related to beliefs about citizenship, we begin by examining differences in levels of both types of measures across the three regions (Appendix Tables C and D offer country specific means and standard deviations for all dependent variables). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for each scale of political participation and citizenship beliefs and indicates whether the differences in mean levels across the regions are significant based on single item regressions at the $p=.05$ level. We also present tests for the sub-items of our different scales.

Table 1. Means/proportions (standard deviations) for measures of political participation and citizenship beliefs and tests for significant differences across geopolitical regions

	Range	Eastern Europe	Western Europe	Western Non-Europe	Regional Regressions		
					E.E. vs. W.E.	E.E. vs. W. N-E.	W.E. vs. W. N-E.
Political Participation							
Political activism scale	0-3	.62 (.58)	1.08 (.60)	1.22 (.60)	*	*	*
- Signed a petition	0-3	.91 (1.00)	1.75 (.98)	2.22 (.88)	*	*	*
- Took part in a demonstration	0-3	.62 (.82)	1.06 (.97)	.95 (.88)	*	*	--
- Donated money or raised funds	0-3	.85 (1.05)	1.54 (1.16)	1.54 (1.15)	*	*	--
- Contacted a politician	0-3	.57 (.81)	.98 (.90)	1.39 (.98)	*	*	*
- Joined an internet forum	0-3	.31 (.63)	.43 (.68)	.44 (.69)	*	*	--
- Contacted the media	0-3	.42 (.68)	.73 (.82)	.82 (.84)	*	*	*
- Attended political mtg. or rally	0-3	.71 (.89)	1.03 (.95)	1.13 (.96)	*	*	--
Political party membership	0/1	.16 (.36)	.18 (.38)	.28 (.45)	--	--	--
Voted in last Election [†]	0/1	.69 (.46)	.83 (.37)	.85 (.35)	*/-- ^a	--	--
Citizenship Beliefs							
Civic duty citizenship scale	0-6	5.03 (1.19)	4.91 (1.20)	5.34 (.99)	--	*	*
- Never try to evade taxes	0-6	4.91 (1.44)	4.83 (1.48)	5.25 (1.28)	--	*	*
- Always obey the law	0-6	5.16 (1.22)	5.00 (1.23)	5.42 (.99)	--	*	*
Political citizenship scale	0-6	3.52 (1.43)	4.10 (1.23)	4.51 (1.13)	*	*	*
- Vote in elections	0-6	4.19 (1.85)	4.85 (1.56)	5.18 (1.43)	*	*	*
- Keep a watch on government	0-6	3.75 (1.79)	4.40 (1.49)	5.00 (1.30)	*	*	*
- Be active in associations	0-6	2.60 (1.82)	3.03 (1.74)	3.30 (1.70)	*	*	--

(continued on next page)

(Table 1 continued)

Social citizenship scale	0-6	4.13 (1.29)	4.48 (1.15)	4.44 (1.15)	--/* ^b	--/* ^c	--
- Understand opinions of others	0-6	4.36 (1.50)	4.76 (1.27)	4.86 (1.33)	*	*	--
- Help less privileged in r's country	0-6	4.35 (1.48)	4.60 (1.35)	4.76 (1.33)	--	--	--
- Help less privileged in world	0-6	3.67 (1.74)	4.08 (1.62)	3.69 (1.73)	--	--	--
Observations		7,116	15,399	4,935			

* $p < .05$ in regressions with robust standard errors clustered by nation † Observations for voting variable are 6,682; 13,549; 4,797 respectively;

^a Non-significant when controls are included; ^b $p = .10$ with controls; ^c $p < .05$ with controls; Source: ISSP 2004

Looking at the measures political participation, we find significant differences between the geopolitical regions. Eastern Europeans participate less than Western Europeans for all measures of political participation but party membership, and less than all Western non-Europeans with the exception of party membership and voting. As we anticipated, residents of formerly communist states show lower levels of political engagement, and particularly with regard to less institutional forms such as those in our activism scale. The regional differences remain significant in models (not shown here) controlling for all socioeconomic and attitudinal influences (including citizenship beliefs). Also in line with our expectations, Western non-European respondents have the highest overall participation on the political activism scale, though analyses of the sub-items suggest this is largely due to a greater propensity to sign petitions, and contact politicians or the media directly. Furthermore, this difference in political activism between Western respondents disappears once controls are included (analysis now shown). Respondents from the non-European states do not differ from Western European respondents with respect to party membership and electoral participation (see also Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001).¹³ Notably, the gap found in regard to voting between Eastern and Western Europeans is mediated when controls are included. Thus the geopolitical regions differ only slightly in regard to institutional forms of participation. The main difference is in behavior as “citizen representatives” (Warren 2008) in direct activism, where Eastern Europeans are significantly less engaged.

We observe significant differences regarding beliefs about “good citizenship.” Perhaps surprisingly Western non-Europeans have the highest average commitment to a civic duty-based definition of citizenship. Their commitment is significantly greater than that of the Eastern or Western Europeans who do not significantly differ. These results remain even when controls are included (analysis not shown here). The history of communism does not seem to have resulted in a particular support for ideas on civic duty as an important element of citizenship, though they may still relate such beliefs to participation in different ways. Starker geopolitical differences appear in regard to political definitions of citizenship. Again, Western non-Europeans indicate the strongest belief in these political responsibilities, Western Europeans significantly less than Western non-Europeans, but Eastern Europeans significantly the least. All differences remain despite the inclusion of controls (analysis not shown here). Finally, the results do not support our expectation that Western Europeans would believe most strongly in social responsibilities as key to “good citizenship” given their cultural background of socialism. The citizens of the three geopolitical regions do not differ significantly from one another with respect to the social responsibilities as a component of “good citizenship.” However, in models that control for relevant socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics, the difference between Eastern Europeans and Western Non-Europeans is marginally significant ($p=.10$) and the gap between Eastern and Western Europeans becomes significant, in each case suggesting that Eastern Europeans assign less importance to these social responsibility aspects of citizenship.

In sum, there are clear differences between the geopolitical regions in regard to political activism, but not institutional forms of participation. Despite some similarities in engagement, the three regions do not assign the same importance to civic duty, political and social aspects of citizenship, suggesting that even when these respondents participate in the same political activity, they may do so based on different beliefs. We explore this further below.

Testing Citizenship Beliefs and Political Participation Across Geopolitical Regions

Having illustrated the regional differences of the main variables of our research (beliefs about citizenship and political participation) and thus having answered our first research question, we now turn to our second and third research questions and present the multivariate analyses investigating the link between citizenship beliefs and political behavior in the three geopolitical regions.

Table 2. Regionally specific regression results for beliefs about “good citizenship” (and relevant controls) on political activism, political party membership and voting behavior across geopolitical regions

	Geopolitical Regions					
	Eastern Europe		Western Europe		Western Non-Europe	
(1) Political Activism^a	β	<i>se</i>	β	<i>Se</i>	β	<i>Se</i>
Civic duty citizenship	-.04*	(.01)	-.07*	(.01)	-.11*	(.01)
Political citizenship	.04*	(.01)	.10*	(.01)	.13*	(.01)
Social citizenship	.05*	(.01)	.05*	(.01)	.04*	(.01)
Constant	.61	(.09)	.53	(.08)	.59	(.21)
R-squared	.20		.25		.22	
Observations	7,116		15,398		4,935	
(2) Political Party Member^b	β	<i>t</i>	β	<i>t</i>	β	<i>t</i>
Civic duty citizenship	-.14*	(-3.80)	-.15*	(-6.26)	-.09*	(-2.91)
Political citizenship	.19*	(4.09)	.44*	(12.77)	.37*	(10.61)
Social citizenship	-.01	(-.24)	-.07*	(-2.34)	-.08*	(-2.57)
Constant	-5.70	(-10.11)	-4.84	(-13.12)	-3.17	(5.53)
Pseudo R-squared	.17		.10		.12	
Observations	7,116		15,398		4,935	
(3) Voting Behavior^{b,c}	β	<i>t</i>	β	<i>t</i>	β	<i>t</i>
Civic duty citizenship	-.02	(-.46)	-.07 [†]	(-1.80)	-.20*	(-6.87)
Political citizenship	.28*	(9.53)	.44*	(7.73)	.40*	(5.27)
Social citizenship	-.03	(-.38)	-.12*	(-2.06)	-.21*	(-2.13)
Constant	-1.94	(-2.98)	-2.95	(-5.23)	-3.88	(-5.45)
Pseudo R-squared	.22		.27		.25	
Observations	6,682		13,548		4,797	

* $p < .05$ [†] $p < .10$; Source: ISSP 2004

^a Ordinary Least Squares Regression; ^b Binary Logistic Regressions; ^c Excluding Australia strengthens the relationship of political and social citizenship to voting.

Notes: Shaded cells indicate all effects are significantly different across regions. Robust standard errors clustered by nation in parentheses. Regional comparisons presented at right-hand side. All models control for political efficacy, social and political trust, age and age-squared, gender, marital status, education, employment status, occupation, urban residence, church attendance, religious affiliation, and political ideology but are excluded her for simplicity of presentation.

Our first model examines levels of political activism and finds that all three dimensions of beliefs about “good citizenship” are significant and operate similarly across the three geopolitical regions: civic duty beliefs about citizenship are negatively related to political activism, whereas support for political and social components of citizenship is positively linked to political activism. This underlines our expectation of the variation in the effects of different components of citizenship on political participation. As expected, civic duty importance is least important for engaging in political activism, however social citizenship importance is not more important than political citizenship beliefs. Especially for those in the Western regions, political citizenship beliefs matter the most. Further tests confirm that these relationships often differ between the geopolitical regions.

These differences between all regions are indicated by shaded cells in Table 2, since these linear coefficients may be directly tested. Specifically, though civic duty beliefs dampen political activism in the three regions, this negative relationship is significantly strongest among Western non-Europeans and weakest among Eastern Europeans, as seen in the predicted values presented in Figure 1 (holding all other variables at their means). So in line with our expectations, the link between beliefs and behavior is weakest among Eastern Europeans. Turning to beliefs about political citizenship, we find again that the relationship between beliefs and behavior is weakest among East Europeans, while West non-Europeans have the strongest positive relationship. Figure 1 highlights the growth of these disparities across the degree of importance assigned to the importance of political citizenship. Looking at the role of social citizenship beliefs, we find little evidence for a difference in their relationship to political action across the regions. However, despite this lack of significant difference in slopes, Figure 1 shows the consistently weaker relationship between beliefs about “good” citizenship and activism among Eastern Europeans.

The relationships between beliefs about good citizenship and political party membership within each geopolitical region are tested in model 2. Overall, support for civic duty and social responsibilities as components of “good citizenship” are negatively related to political party membership whereas the link between a focus on political components of citizenship and party membership is positive. As expected, within each region, political citizenship beliefs have the strongest relationship to party involvement as seen in the larger t-scores.




Figure 1. Predicted values for the relationship between citizenship beliefs and political activism behavior for the three geopolitical regions

In order to examine whether the relationships between beliefs and party involvement differed significantly between regions, we turn to plots of the predicted probabilities in Figure 2. These indicate that a few of the effects differ strongly across the regions. Holding all other variables at their means, there is a stronger negative relationship between civic duty beliefs about good citizenship and being involved in a political party among Eastern Europeans than among Western Non-Europeans, such that at the highest level of citizen duty importance, Eastern Europeans are predicted to be less likely to be involved in a political party than Western Non-Europeans. Whereas membership of a political party – or more precisely *the* political party – was considered as a civic duty and often associated with political and material advantages during the communist regime (Gerber 2000), beliefs about civic duties do not seem to influence political party membership in Eastern European regions nowadays. A similar negative pattern is found in among Western Europeans, thus in both cases indicating that civic duty norms matter more among Europeans in terms of framing political party activity than in the Western non-European region.

The relationship between beliefs about the importance of political citizenship and party involvement shown in Figure 2 is, much weaker among Eastern Europeans as compared to those in both Western regions (holding all other variables at their means). Especially with regard to Western Non-Europeans, there is a considerable uptick in predicted involvement at the highest perceived importance of political citizenship beliefs. The more moderate linear increase among Eastern Europeans leaves them lagging behind their Western counterparts. As a highly institutionalized part of the former communist regimes, political party membership may have developed a different meaning for Eastern European respondents, whereas the Western respondents see greater connections between political citizenship and party membership. Finally, there is weak evidence for differences in the effect of social citizenship importance that is not apparent from the logistic coefficients in Table 2. Those in both European regions show a bit more of a decline in the predicted probability of being involved in a political party, though it should be recalled that the regions did not differ in the likelihood of party membership or believing social citizenship was important in the binary models of Table 1.




Figure 2. Predicted values for the relationship between citizenship beliefs and political party involvement for the three geopolitical regions

These results generally support our expectations. The greater impact of civic duty citizenship beliefs among East Europeans confirms the legacy of having been an authoritarian political regime. However, this stronger negative relationship indicates that perhaps Eastern Europeans who place less importance on the authoritarian aspects of citizenship are getting more involved in politics and political parties, which would bode well for democratic development in this region. Nevertheless, members of the two Western regions are more likely to link political citizenship to party membership – a relationship that would be anticipated by convention theories of democratic citizenship. Thus, while the influence of authoritarianism may be waning, a concomitant stronger focus on conventional political citizenship lags.

Lastly, we turn to results for voting behavior in Table 2. As with political party membership, and in line with our expectations, beliefs about the importance of social citizenship are negatively related to voting, whereas the link between political citizenship and voting is positive in the three regions. The weak and negative relationship of civic duty importance is somewhat counter to expectations, especially among Western Non-European respondents. Clearly, respondents do not equate voting with other beliefs about citizenship as a civic duty. As with party involvement, political citizenship beliefs are the strongest among the citizenship beliefs as determinants of voting within each nation. But again, plots of the predicted probabilities of voting based on the full range of citizenship beliefs indicate substantive differences between the regions. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 3, with all other variables held at their mean.

Whereas the Western Non-Europeans are highly unlikely to combine strong beliefs in civic duty citizenship with voting, this negative relationship is much weaker among Eastern Europeans, and somewhat weaker among Western Europeans. Seeing citizenship as a civic duty has almost no effect on Eastern European's lower probability of voting, while for the Western regions, only as the importance of civic duties reach their height, do they fall to Eastern European probabilities of voting. However, the differential impact of political citizenship beliefs is far more apparent. Western Europeans are highly likely to link political citizenship to voting, and much more so than East Europeans. As seen in Figure 3, this is partly because at low levels of political citizenship importance, Western Europeans have a quite lower probability of voting, though at the highest levels of political citizenship importance Western Europeans have the highest predicted probability of having voted. The relationship between political citizenship beliefs is also stronger among East Europeans than Western Non-Europeans, and though East Europeans have lower predicted probabilities of having voted at low levels of political citizenship importance, at high levels, their predicted probability of having voted is as high as or higher than that of Western Non-Europeans. Beliefs about the importance of social citizenship have very little impact on the predicted probability of having voting among Eastern Europeans, while the negative relationship is a bit stronger among Western Europeans. Clearly, the relationship is strongest among Western Non-Europeans, however. At low levels of the perceived importance of social citizenship, Western Non-Europeans are the most likely to have voted, but at high levels, they are by far the least likely.




Figure 3. Predicted probabilities for the relationship between citizenship beliefs and voting behavior for the three geopolitical regions

These results provide mixed support for our expectations that relationships between citizenship beliefs and voting would be weakest among East Europeans. In regard to civic duty and social citizenship beliefs, there is little relationship among East Europeans, and the strongest relationship among Western Non-Europeans. In comparison, the link between the importance of political citizenship and having voted is stronger among East and West Europeans than Western Non-Europeans. This may indicate that Western Non-Europeans based decisions on whether to vote on a wider array of considerations, while those in the European regions see this as more strictly a responsibility of a good ‘political citizen.’

Conclusion

Democracy is more prevalent than ever before, but as the democratic system of governance has spread, diversity in the meaning and practices of this system has grown. Specifically, variations in citizenship represent viable and meaningful differences in core aspects of democracy (Theiss-Morse 1993). For example, democracy depends on a participatory public, but where and how much this should or does occur remains a matter for debate. Furthermore, what citizens consider as important for being a “good citizen” may vary across different political cultures, but has been understudied. Understanding citizens’ beliefs about citizenship may become increasingly crucial as democracy takes root in non-European or non-Western societies. Yet, little research has considered citizens’ beliefs about “good citizenship” and no research has – to the best of our knowledge – linked these beliefs to political behavior. Therefore, in this paper, we considered citizens’ beliefs about good citizenship, different types of political behavior and the link between the two across three geopolitical regions. The theoretical considerations undergirding this analysis pull from democratic theory, theories on voting behavior, and both sociological and political institutionalism.

In regard to our original research questions, we find that beliefs about “good citizenship” are multidimensional in character and in their relationship to various forms of political participation. As theories of political culture would suggest, beliefs and values have an independent relationship to political engagement, net of a variety of socioeconomic and attitudinal controls. To further explore this, we asked to what extent relationships differed between geopolitical regions. From institutional theories, we expected that respondents’ experiences with differing political, economic and cultural institutional histories would shape their approach to citizenship and participation in unique ways. Our results largely confirm such expectations.

Regarding the mean levels of political participation and beliefs about “good citizenship”, the region’s respondents differed most strongly in relation to political citizenship importance and political activism, and not at all in regard to social citizenship importance and political party membership. Western non-Europeans put a surprising emphasis on civic duty, while Eastern European lagged in reported voting behavior. Our multivariate analyses which tested the link between beliefs about “good citizenship” and political participation show that the perceived importance of political citizenship was most important for all forms of engagement, but beliefs about the importance of social citizenship were strong determinants of political activism. Otherwise, greater investment in social citizenship was irrelevant or negatively related to institutional forms of participation. Placing importance on citizenship as a civic duty dampened

engagement, though least so in relation to voting, which is sometimes conceptualized in media and literature as a “democratic duty.”

The relationship between citizenship beliefs and political activism was strongly marked by geopolitical regional differences. The far weaker negative relationship between civic duty and political citizenship beliefs and activism in Eastern Europe may reflect the lingering association influence of communism, where political actions were all civic duties. However, all of the regions are similar in the positive relationship of social citizenship importance to activism. Western non-Europeans reject civic duty beliefs as a basis of activism and embrace political citizenship beliefs more strongly, and this may reflect the highly developed notions of individualism in these liberal, market-oriented democracies (McCloskey 1984; O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999).

Among the institutionalized forms of participation, party membership and voting, differences were less stark, but nevertheless compelling. Though Eastern Europeans may not have disassociated civic duty beliefs from activism, there evidence they have moved away from linking such beliefs to party involvement - a pattern which Western Europeans share. Western non-Europeans tend to link the two more weakly, though still negatively. More dramatically, respondents in both Western regions depend much more strongly on political citizenship beliefs than do those in Eastern Europe. Social citizenship beliefs, to the extent that they are seen as contradictory to institutional engagement, matter more among the Europeans and West Europeans in particular. Voting presented a bit more of a surprise. Civic duty beliefs are largely irrelevant, but political citizenship importance matters most for the European respondents, while social citizenship beliefs matter most for the non-European respondents. However, it should be noted that the very high probability of having voted among respondents in this region precludes large changes in probability, and results are strengthened somewhat by excluding Australians, who have mandatory voting.

This regional variation, both in beliefs about citizenship and political behaviour, as well as in the strength of relationship between both, highlights the theoretical significance of considering Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Western Non-European nations as different entities. Even though the three regions are democracies in which participatory citizens are crucial for the well-functioning of society, their particular political and cultural backgrounds and histories seem to play a role in the citizens' definitions of “good citizenship” and their political behaviour. Dividing the nations into such broad groups fit the theoretical and empirical goals, though we look forward to future research that will further investigate cross-national patterns.

Along these lines we question prevalent references in some of this literature to citizenship “norms.” Theoretically, if we define norms as “shared conceptions of appropriate or expected action” (Cancian 1975: 1), differences in the belief/behavior linkage patterns across regions indicate beliefs about “good citizenship” might be better viewed as culturally specific values or attitudes. While some beliefs did appear to be normative across the regions, such as the positive link between social citizenship and political activism, the more common finding of variation suggests this is often not the case. Modes of participation may not be competing forms of representation (Saward 2006), per se, but our findings indicate they are based on competing notions of good citizenship. Given that the largest differences found were in regard to political activism, and such activism is increasingly seen as the frontier of representation (Dalton 2008; Urbinati and Warren 2008), more work should be done to understand implications for democratic outcomes. Such insights may help in understanding democratic transitions in other nations or regions. For example, the development of democratic citizenship in nations in the Middle East or

Africa may depend on justifications and systems of meaning that differ from those in North American or Europe, while still successfully upholding free and fair elections (Fallon 2003; Read 2007). Also, our research has shown that even though citizens of newer democracies have well-developed ideas about “good citizenship,” their relationship to behavior lags. Indeed, we found the link between beliefs and participation to be generally weaker in the newly developed Eastern European region than in the other two regions. Ultimately, this suggests that simply learning democratic beliefs about good citizenship is not sufficient. Beliefs matter, but how and where these beliefs are mobilized may be as crucial.

Appendix Table A. Means/Proportions (standard deviations) for Demographic and Attitudinal Control Variables

	Range	Eastern Europe	Western Europe	Western Non-Europe	Significance Tests		
					E.E. vs. W.E.	E.E. vs. W. N-E.	W.E. vs. W. N-E.
Female (<i>ref: male</i>)	0/1	.56 (.50)	.51 (.50)	.53 (.50)	*		
University degree (<i>ref: less than degree</i>)	0/1	.12 (.33)	.15 (.36)	.25 (.43)		*	*
Age	18-97	46.53 (17.19)	47.17 (16.65)	49.34 (16.43)			
Employment status (<i>ref: not in l.f.</i>)							
Full time employment	0/1	.46 (.50)	.48 (.50)	.48 (.50)			
Part-time employment	0/1	.04 (.19)	.11 (.31)	.16 (.36)	*	*	*
Occupation (<i>ref: nilf/no occ.</i>)							
Managers, professionals and technicians	0/1	.29 (.46)	.38 (.49)	.45 (.50)	*	*	
Clerks and service workers	0/1	.19 (.39)	.24 (.43)	.20 (.40)	*		
Agriculture, craft, and elementary	0/1	.42 (.49)	.29 (.46)	.21 (.41)	*	*	*
Marital status (<i>ref: never married</i>)							
Married, living together as, or widowed	0/1	.69 (.46)	.67 (.47)	.71 (.45)			
Divorced or separated	0/1	.09 (.29)	.09 (.28)	.11 (.31)			
Urban residence (<i>ref: all else</i>)	0/1	.34 (.47)	.25 (.43)	.29 (.45)			
Religious denomination (<i>ref: no affil.</i>)							
Roman Catholic	0/1	.48 (.50)	.44 (.50)	.25 (.43)			
Protestant	0/1	.10 (.30)	.31 (.46)	.43 (.50)	*	*	
Other Christian	0/1	.15 (.35)	.03 (.17)	.04 (.21)			
Other religion	0/1	.01 (.12)	.02 (.13)	.06 (.23)			*
Religious attendance	0-7	2.49 (2.24)	2.23 (2.15)	2.64 (2.43)		*	
Political efficacy	0-4	1.07 (.96)	1.66 (1.10)	1.68 (1.09)	*	*	
Political trust	0-4	1.51 (.99)	1.89 (1.01)	1.96 (1.02)	*	*	
Social trust	0-3	1.19 (.72)	1.50 (.71)	1.50 (.66)	*	*	

(continued on next page)

(Appendix Table A continued)

Political ideology (<i>ref: center party</i>)					
Left party	0/1	.22 (.42)	.30 (.46)	.27 (.44)	
Right party	0/1	.19 (.39)	.23 (.42)	.30 (.46)	*
'Other'/no party	0/1	.46 (.50)	.32 (.47)	.21 (.41)	*
Observations ^a		7, 116	15, 399	4, 935	

^a Observations based on political activism and political party membership models

Source: ISSP 2004

* Significant at $p < .05$ in regressions with robust standard errors clustered by nation

Appendix Table B. Rotated Principle-Components Factors Scores and Cronbach's Alpha Scores for Scales of Political Activity and Citizenship Beliefs

	Pooled Sample	Eastern Europe	Western Europe	Western Non-Europe
Political activity scale (α)	(.79)	(.81)	(.75)	(.76)
- Signed a petition	.63	.62	.56	.52
- Took part in a demonstration	.66	.73	.60	.68
- Donated money or raised funds	.62	.65	.55	.61
- Contacted a politician	.73	.74	.70	.70
- Joined an internet forum	.59	.59	.62	.57
- Contacted the media	.71	.73	.71	.67
- Attended political meeting or rally	.73	.75	.72	.74
Eigenvalue	3.14	3.32	2.87	2.90
Civic duty citizenship norms (α)	(.71)	(.73)	(.71)	(.64)
- Never try to evade taxes	.85	.86	.85	.84
- Always obey the law	.86	.85	.86	.85
Eigenvalue	1.63	1.75	1.61	1.54
Political duty citizenship norms (α)	(.66)	(.68)	(.63)	(.61)
- Vote in elections	.73	.68	.73	.72
- Keep a watch on government	.78	.76	.77	.76
- Be active in associations	.69	.77	.65	.67
Eigenvalue	1.81	1.77	1.73	1.74
Social duty citizenship norms (α)	(.73)	(.75)	(.72)	(.67)
- Understand opinions of others	.56	.61	.56	.51
- Help less privileged in r's country	.85	.87	.85	.84
- Help less privileged in world	.86	.85	.86	.85
Eigenvalue	1.96	2.01	1.98	1.87

Source: ISSP 2004

Appendix Table C. Descriptive Statistics for Political Activism Scores by Nation

Nations	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Western Non-European					
Australia	1,572	1.13	.57	0	3.0
Canada	773	1.31	.55	0	3.0
New Zealand	1,169	1.30	.57	0	3.0
United States	1,421	1.18	.64	0	3.0
Western European					
Austria	856	1.19	.62	0	3.0
Denmark	990	1.20	.56	0	3.0
Finland	880	.99	.58	0	2.7
Flanders	1,216	.96	.57	0	3.0
France	963	1.22	.60	0	3.0
Great Britain	733	.94	.55	0	3.0
Ireland	926	.96	.59	0	3.0
Netherlands	1,446	1.13	.63	0	3.0
Norway	1,167	1.22	.60	0	3.0
Portugal	1,434	1.02	.51	0	3.0
Spain	2,079	.98	.61	0	3.0
Sweden	970	1.14	.57	0	3.0
Switzerland	1,004	1.06	.61	0	3.0
West Germany	735	1.13	.62	0	2.9
Eastern European					
Bulgaria	870	.49	.52	0	2.7
Czech Republic	1,098	.56	.54	0	2.7
East Germany	369	1.17	.64	0	2.7
Hungary	921	.35	.47	0	2.7
Latvia	899	.81	.56	0	2.7
Poland	1,172	.47	.51	0	2.7
Slovak Republic	861	.88	.56	0	3.0
Slovenia	926	.70	.58	0	3.0

Source: ISSP 2004

Appendix Table D. Descriptive Statistics for Electoral Participation and Party Membership by Nation

Nations	<u>Voted (0/1)</u>			<u>Party Involvement (0/1)</u>		
	N	Proportion	Std. Dev.	N	Proportion	Std. Dev.
Western Non-Europe						
Australia	1,560	.98	.16	1,572	.11	.31
Canada	781	.91	.28	773	.35	.48
New Zealand	1,044	.92	.27	1,169	.22	.41
United States	1,412	.64	.48	1,421	.47	.50
Western Europe						
Austria	670	.82	.39	856	.25	.43
Denmark	997	.91	.29	990	.19	.39
Finland	902	.80	.40	880	.21	.41
Flanders	--	--	--	1,216	.17	.38
France	995	.86	.35	963	.13	.34
Great Britain	753	.73	.44	733	.17	.38
Ireland	928	.84	.37	926	.15	.35
Netherlands	1,467	.93	.25	1,446	.20	.40
Norway	1,107	.87	.33	1,167	.34	.47
Portugal	1,418	.74	.44	1,434	.10	.30
Spain	1,762	.83	.37	2,079	.11	.31
Sweden	981	.91	.28	970	.24	.43
Switzerland	896	.61	.49	1,004	.15	.36
West Germany	673	.90	.30	735	.08	.28
Eastern Europe						
Bulgaria	867	.71	.45	870	.25	.43
Czech Republic	1,108	.43	.50	1,098	.20	.40
East Germany	362	.86	.34	369	.18	.38
Hungary	922	.81	.39	921	.07	.26
Latvia	740	.70	.46	899	.14	.35
Poland	1,126	.68	.47	1,172	.09	.29
Slovak Republic	839	.81	.39	861	.22	.42
Slovenia	718	.75	.44	926	.15	.36

Source: ISSP 2004

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Endnotes

¹ The sample includes 23 nations as a whole, and two nations measured as regions. In Austria, Australia, the Czech Republic, Spain and Flanders the sample refers to citizens of the nation. In all other nations the sample was random and may include non-citizens. The data do not provide a way of controlling for citizenship of the nation of interview, and we avoid referring to respondents as citizens, per se.

² Civic engagement refers to both participation directly related to politics, such as voting and attending party meeting and participation in community affairs through formal and informal associations (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady, 1995).

³ Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/>

⁴ The ISSP only includes data for the Belgian Dutch-speaking region Flanders. Flanders was also excluded from the analysis on voting, since the question on voting behavior was not included in the Flemish survey.

⁵ Though West and East Germany were reunited at the time of this survey, we are interested in the experience of communism and consider the regions separately.

⁶ Due to high numbers of missing values on voting, and the fact the item was not asked in Flanders, missing were dropped separately for this item, with a final N of 25,027.

⁷ Results are consistent with ordinal logistic regressions, further indicating that the ordinal model mainly explained this dichotomous relationship. Ordinal logistic results and predicted probabilities available upon request.

⁸ Because Australia has compulsory voting, all voting models were run excluding it. This did not change any of the findings (other than strengthening some already significant relationships), thus Australia remains in the sample

⁹ Due to a very large number of missing values on income, it was not possible to include this measure, however, occupation may be a more useful concept overall given that it taps into differential earnings groups, and latent aspects of social class (Abbott 1993). A more complex coding of occupation breaking it down into more categories provides the same results.

¹⁰ Previous research suggests that most of the variation in educational attainment arises between high school completion and decisions to enter postsecondary education (Kam and Palmer 2008).

¹¹ While neither the measure nor the coding is ideal, it does allow some control for political ideology. Notably, excluding this measure does not affect the findings for political activism or party membership, and its inclusion strengthens findings for regional voting differences.

¹² Though commonly utilized, Chow-type tests of the equality of coefficients across groups in logistic models are inappropriate because they confound the magnitude of the effect for each region with group differences in residual variation (Allison 1999). However, because predicted probabilities across regions are unaffected by the confounding of the slope coefficients and variance of the errors (Long 2007), we focus on predicted probabilities for each model to examine regional differences in the effects of citizenship beliefs.

¹³ High levels of voting in Table 1 are likely distorted by over-reporting of voting behavior, a common problem with survey data, which has been found to over-estimate the importance of independent variables such as education, partisanship, and religion (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy 2001). However, given that we control for these characteristics, are focused on the relationship of citizenship beliefs net of such characteristics, and are interested in relative differences between geopolitical regions, this issue is less crucial to our study. Yet, the possibility remains that the regional differences we find may be due to different propensities to over-report electoral participation.