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
Bollens, Scott

Publication Date

2013

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Peacebuilding

Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpcb20>

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To cite this article: Scott Bollens (2013): Bounding cities as a means of managing conflict:
Sarajevo, Beirut and Jerusalem, Peacebuilding, 1:2, 186-206

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.783263>

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Bounding cities as a means of managing conflict: Sarajevo, Beirut and Jerusalem

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(Received 1 November 2012; final version received 29 January 2013)

This article investigates state and international manipulation of political ethnic geographies in politically contested cities and examines the consequences of such territorial projects for longer-term peacebuilding. I explore Sarajevo, Beirut and Jerusalem. In each case, there has been the constricting, or bounding, of urban territory in pursuit of inter-group stability and violence reduction. Bounding of urban space takes several forms – municipal boundary drawing, sectarian power-sharing and physical wall building – with each accepting ethno-national group differences and reinforcing them geographically. These actions, whether undertaken by international negotiators, through local elite agreements, or through unilateral fiat, are consequential in terms of urban peacebuilding. Sarajevo ethnic circumscription creates a new externalised sectarian urban node and territorial hardening of competing identity groups. The Beirut urban area is debilitated by the loss of place-based political voice for a demographically ascending sectarian group. Manipulation of Jerusalem's political geography creates Palestinian displacement, material disadvantage and political disillusionment. In each case, ethnic identity is concretised as a means of managing conflict, leaving the urban area handicapped as a place of pluralism and interaction. Bounding cities as a means of managing conflict constrains the potential for ethnic peace.

Keywords: conflict management; cities; nationalism; borders/boundaries; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Lebanon; Israel; Palestine

Introduction

This article examines bounding and bordering techniques used by national and international actors to operationalise security and stability in inter-group conflict environments. It explores the impact of such measures on the prospects for building peace at the urban level. Positioning cities as key, but understudied, political and spatial locations for the advancement of peace in divided societies, the article connects the goals and actions of supra-urban actors to the urban sphere and foregrounds sub-national spaces as important conduits that can distort and complicate goals of national stability and security. The article exposes how the political geography of ethnic conflict is expressed not only in the demarcation of national boundaries, but also in urban territorial dimensions that impact interactions between groups in everyday life. I argue that the manipulation of urban political ethnic geographies by national and international actors aimed at promoting stability and security can have contrary effects, inhibiting the local foundations of peacebuilding needed for long-term normalisation and stability of divided countries. Examining three different

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cities where different policies of division have been introduced (borders, constitution and wall) and over a range of different periods (1930s to the present), I examine how the common knee-jerk reaction in situations of ethno-national conflicts to divide or separate populations is faulty and not in the interests of the urban populations involved. Short-term planning and alleviations of violence through separation and bounding harms the long-term capacity of cities and divided societies to encourage pluralistic activities and attitudes.

The three cases explored – Sarajevo, Beirut and Jerusalem – are capital cities of demographic and political significance. Existing on the fault-line between groups in conflict, each is a key political and spatial location for negotiating rights and citizenship.¹ They are characterised by intergroup proximity and urban economies dependent on multi-ethnic contacts. They are important channels through which aggrieved populations can exercise protest and become a direct threat to the state. They are flashpoints for tension between antagonistic ethnic groups seeking greater autonomy and acknowledgement of group rights. Each has hosted prolonged and traumatic periods of overt violence and war. Because they each exist at a territorial interface between Muslim and non-Muslim populations, how these cities are governed has significant ramifications for the relationship between Islamic and non-Islamic countries in the world at large.

Such characteristics mean these cities have important potential roles in advancing, or retarding, national peacebuilding in unsettled societies. Cities are not necessarily passive reflectors of larger ethno-national conflict, but may introduce processes of their own that intensify or ameliorate inter-group conflict. National and religious conflict is worked out, and modulated, in urban space.² ‘A product of both hegemonic and subordinate cultures’, the city is also ‘the site for their production’.³ Important factors underlying whether a city constitutes an arena for long-term peacebuilding would appear to be whether there is sharing of urban space, everyday interactions across the group divide and the ability for new cross-ethnic political coalitions to form. This is consistent with Lefebvre’s sense that rights are created as much through everyday urban social practices built on unrestricted flows and involving places of encounter, than they are created through formal means.⁴ Only in such pluralistic human environments can there be a consciousness of shared experience and a decision making that recognises multiple identity groups and their rights.⁵ Or, as described by Sack, it enables people ‘to see beyond their own partiality and to be held responsible for this larger domain’.⁶

The prospects for such an urban peacebuilding must be grounded, however, in the realities of its state institutional context. The degree to which actions in a city are able to foster a pluralistic environment or not can be enabled, or restrained, through the laws, regulations and actions of state and international actors. As such, those studying and working in the local peacebuilding field need to understand how actions by supra-urban

¹Diane E. Davis and Nora Libertun de Duren, *Cities and Sovereignty: Identity Politics in Urban Spaces* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011).

²Roger Friedland and Richard Hecht, *To Rule Jerusalem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

³John Agnew, John Mercer, and David Sopher, *The City in Cultural Context* (Winchester, MA: Allen & Urwin, 1984), 7–8.

⁴Henri Lefebvre, ‘The Right to the City’, in *Writings on Cities* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 147–59.

⁵Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

⁶Robert Sack, *Homo Geographicus: A Framework for Action, Awareness, and Moral Concern* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 257.

actors affect a city's spatial, human and political geographies and thus the opportunities or blockages that are present for peacebuilding across ethnic divides. The promise of the city as a place of peacebuilding can be significantly shaped by actions initiated by those beyond the urban area. In order to challenge the standard thinking that ethno-national divisions in cities merely reflect those of states, we must understand how state constraints on urban functioning are constructed and recognise that they are contingent, and then find ways of energising possibilities rooted in the urban experience to increase inter-group tolerance and co-existence.

External manipulation of urban space

Investigations of conflict management by political science scholars focus on national-level political and legal arrangements and mechanisms that may diffuse or moderate conflict.⁷ They typically de-emphasise applications to city governance and management and view micro-political, or smaller scale, forms of conflict management in urban areas – such as economic, spatial and community relations policies – as subordinate and derivative of larger macro-political objectives. Scholars in geography, meanwhile, provide insight into the spatial and territorial aspects and dynamics of urban divisions and space through such concepts as territoriality, spatial justice, bordering and bounding, segregation and geographies of exclusion and the processes of urban partition.⁸

Political science and geographic investigations have described how third parties – usually colonial – have promoted partition and bounding for the purposes of ethnic group conflict management (for example, in Ireland, India, Cyprus and Palestine).⁹ Theoretically, Lefebvre has asserted that political power creates fragmentation of space (segregation and separation) as a means to control it.¹⁰ However, with few exceptions, cities have tended to be left out in such considerations of state partitioning; attention is infrequently paid to how state and international actions have manipulated political-territorial dynamics in urban areas.¹¹ Graham describes an 'almost complete dominance of

⁷See, for example, Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully, *Multinational Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, 'Regulating Nations and Ethnic Communities', in *Nationalism and Rationality*, ed. A. Breton et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 245–89; Ian Lustick, 'Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalisation vs. Control', *World Politics* 31 (1979): 325–44; Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).

⁸Robert Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (London: Edward Arnold, 1973); David M. Smith, *Geography and Social Justice* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Anssi Paasi, 'Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse: The Finnish-Russian Border', *Regional Studies* 33, no. 7 (1999): 669–80; Reece Jones, 'Categories, Borders and Boundaries', *Progress in Human Geography* 33, no. 2 (2009): 174–88; David Sibley, *Geographies of Exclusion: Society and Difference in the West* (London: Routledge, 1995); Jon Calame and Esther Charlesworth, *Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009).

⁹Radha Kumar, *Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition* (London: Verso, 1997).

¹⁰Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1974 [1991]), 321.

¹¹A.C. Hepburn, *Contested Cities in the Modern West* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); Neil Brenner, *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Hepburn provides a historical analysis of how states and international actors have addressed problems of contested cities. On another front, Brenner emphasises how economic spaces at the urban and state levels are being transformed due to capitalist globalisation, considering at times how bordering and territoriality can be impacted by national and supranational actions.

national, rather than sub-national, spaces and politics within International Relations and Political Science'.¹² He asserts the need for an 'urban geopolitics' that would connect the larger national to the specifically local. In a similar vein, Anderson calls for historically situating cities in the space and time of state-building and nation-building, noting that many troubled cities arose at the peripheries of empires.¹³ The limited analytical efforts to connect the supra-urban to the local are notable because, as Marcuse and van Kempen highlight, 'the agency of the state, and those who control it, have always been critical factors in the shaping, and particularly the partitioning, of cities'.¹⁴

One important advance in understanding how the larger politics of national interests becomes translated onto the urban landscape argues that state political rationalities and conceptualisations influence how urban policy constitutes spaces.¹⁵ Urban policy interventions are guided by particular ways that the state imagines space; it matters greatly whether supra-urban interventions are premised upon an interactionist mode of inter-group relations or seek instead to reinforce self-contained areas with rigid boundaries. State governance is based on a particular regime of spatial conceptualisation that partitions the whole into parts and thus defines what is considered in or out, visible or invisible, and central or peripheral. In terms of urban policy, one fundamental element of this state enterprise is the formation of physical and political boundaries in the urban area which establishes the spatial-territorial context of city governance.¹⁶

Cities exist as crucial geopolitical sites today because of their location along ethnic and sectarian interface areas regionally and nationally. Cities are strategic ethnic hinges. Historically, ethnically contested and troubled cities arose at times because they were often situated near ethnic cleavages of religion and language.¹⁷ Contested cities typically are located on the fault line between cultures – whether they be religious differences, those between modernising societies and traditional cultures, between individual-based and community-based economies and ethics, between democracy and more authoritarian traditions, or between old colonial legacies and indigenous populations.

Location of the cities along ethnic interfaces, however, is not a sufficient explanation for why political conflict is generated. Most cities in ethnic interface areas are not contested or troubled.¹⁸ At this point, then, we must turn to other factors that generate contention and conflict. Anderson goes back historically and looks at how the actions of colonialists during the end-game of their empire building left certain cities with antagonistic indigenous populations extremely hard to be self-governed. In this article, I examine actions that have been taken by state and international actors which have

¹²Stephen Graham, ed., *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 24.

¹³James Anderson, 'From Empires to Ethno-National Conflicts: A Framework for Studying. "Divided Cities" in "Contested States" – Part 1', working paper no. 1. Divided Cities/ Contested States Working Paper Series (2008). Conflict in Cities and the Contested State, www.conflictincities.org.

¹⁴Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen, eds., *Of States and Cities: The Partitioning of Urban Space* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4.

¹⁵Mastafa Dikec, *Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics, and Urban Policy* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007).

¹⁶Other means of national state shaping of urban government capacity, not the focus here, include the degree of independent revenue-raising, expenditure and policymaking powers granted by states to local units.

¹⁷Anderson, 'From Empires to Ethno-National Conflicts'.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

manipulated political and territorial geographies in cities and I investigate the likely impacts generated by these manipulations.

Bordering and bounding

In examining the influence of state and international actions on urban space and territory, the process by which borders and boundaries are created and maintained becomes of primary importance. State and international regulation of urban territory through bounding and bordering usually takes place as a means towards some other end.¹⁹ These ends include the assertion of political power, subjugation of the 'other', protection of group identity, creation and maintenance of difference and distance, enhancement of group security, protection from perceived threat and the seeking of post-war stability in inter-group relations. Whether the goal being pursued is benign or belligerent, involvement by a supra-urban agent in spatial bordering brings to the fore the constructed nature of territory as a social or political artefact.

Boundaries exist not merely as static lines, but manifest themselves in numerous social practices (including economic, cultural, administrative and political) and gain meanings which ultimately are reproduced in local everyday life.²⁰ Actions that create boundaries and borders can produce, express and reproduce territorial control over a geographic area. Legislative and policy actions can seek through territorial means to reify power and enforce control in the urban area.²¹ For example, territorial control strategies amid ethnic tension can manipulate jurisdictional boundaries to incorporate or exclude politically particular ethnic residents.²² Less visible than physical territorial bordering, but also consequential, is the establishment of intra-state administrative borders demarcating electoral districts. These borders, along with the electoral rules that accompany them, can be designed to stabilise inter-group relations or to provide advantage to one group over another.

The demarcation of boundaries commonly has tangible, visible dimensions, but also has symbolic and psychological aspects because territorial bounding is linked to the construction and maintenance of national identities.²³ Boundaries create social categories and set apart social groups. Categories as created through bordering do not simply imitate and represent the world but simultaneously create it and limit it.²⁴ By including some and excluding others, boundary-drawing is part of the politics and processes of identity-formation; people and groups construct their identities at least in part through the construction of place and place attachment.²⁵ To the extent that ethnic/sectarian identities are socially constructed rather than primordial, as Brubaker argues, walls and boundaries that create 'us–them', 'included–

¹⁹David Delaney, *Territory: A Short Introduction* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).

²⁰Paasi, 'Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse'.

²¹Sack, *Human Territoriality*.

²²John Coakley, 'Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict', in *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. John Coakley (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 1–22.

²³David Newman, 'The Geopolitics of Peacemaking in Israel–Palestine', *Political Geography* 21 (2002): 629–46.

²⁴Jones, 'Categories, Borders and Boundaries'.

²⁵Y-Fu Tuan, *Segmented Worlds and Self: Group Life and Individual Consciousness* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Paul C. Adams, Steven Hoelscher, and Karen E. Till, 'Place in Context: Rethinking Humanist Geographies', in *Textures of Place: Exploring Humanist Geographies*, ed. Paul C. Adams, Steven Hoelscher, and Karen E. Till (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), xiii–xxxiii.

excluded', 'inside–outside' dichotomies are certainly part of this social construction process.²⁶ Boundaries can demarcate exclusive national spaces and thus substantiate group narratives constructed around national identities and threats.

The ability of borders and boundaries to acknowledge and consolidate ethnic group identity has been a feature utilised in power-sharing agreements aimed at stabilising politically fractured countries. Power-sharing structures will commonly use territorial measures to assure some form of group self-government (through the granting of territorial autonomy) or group representation (through the drawing of electoral district boundaries).²⁷ These reform strategies aim to provide each group, most importantly those in the numerical minority, with a measure of state power and offer ethnic groups better prospects of preserving their culture.²⁸

Sarajevo, Beirut and Jerusalem

These cities are 'polarised' where two or more ethnically conscious groups – divided by religion, language and/or culture and perceived history – coexist in a situation where neither group is willing to concede supremacy to the other.²⁹ Ethnic identity and nationalism combine to create pressures for group rights, autonomy or even territorial separation. Political control of such cities can become contested as nationalists push to create a political system that expresses and protects their distinctive group characteristics.

I examine three cases where supra-urban actors have manipulated urban physical and political space in polarised urban areas, in each case for the purposes of stabilising inflammatory relations between identity groups. I examine (1) the forms and initiators of these manipulations, and (2) how these actions impact opportunities at the urban level for peacebuilding and co-existence. I will describe in each case how the city is impacted in terms of the distribution of ethnic groups within its corpus or in terms of who has rights to the city as a place to live and where they are able to express their political voice. Research sources include secondary published materials, on-site field research lasting from one to three months and 80 semi-structured interviews in Sarajevo, Beirut and Jerusalem with political leaders, urban planners, architects, community representatives and academic experts.

The manipulation by supra-urban agents of physical and social space in these cities has been accomplished in the study cities through three means – border, constitution and wall.

²⁶Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

²⁷Phillip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

²⁸Yash Ghai, 'The Structure of the State: Federalism and Autonomy', in *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*, ed. Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998), 155–68; Kumar, *Divide and Fall?*

²⁹Works on divided cities include Hepburn, *Contested Cities in the Modern West*, note 11; Calame and Charlesworth, *Divided Cities*; Scott A. Bollens, *City and Soul in Divided Societies* (London: Routledge, 2012); Michael Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Frederick W. Boal, 'Segregating and Mixing: Space and Residence in Belfast', in *Integration and Division: Geographical Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Problem*, ed. Frederick W. Boal and J. Neville Douglas (London: Academic Press, 1982), 249–80; Frank Gaffikin and Mike Morrissey, eds., *Planning in Divided Cities: Collaborative Shaping of Contested Space* (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011); Anderson, 'From Empires to Ethno-National Conflicts'; Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002); Wendy Pullan, 'Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities', *Journal of Architecture* 18, no. 1 (2011): 15–35.

I will describe: (1) the demarcation of new post-war political boundaries and its effect on the sustainability of a mixed ethnic population in the city of Sarajevo; (2) the electoral geography and rules of constitutional power sharing in Lebanon and how they have impacted place-based political voice in the Beirut urban region; and (3) the building of the Israeli separation wall and its effects on Arab Jerusalem and the prospects for a broader Israeli-Palestinian peace. The supra-urban actors impacting upon the urban arena are different across the three cases. In Sarajevo, new borders were derived from an international treaty. In Beirut, constitutional divisions depend upon a decades-old elite-level compromise agreement between the nation's confessional groups. In Jerusalem, there is a unilateral state-imposed wall.

Sarajevo: borders and stability

The Sarajevo case illustrates how ethnic circumscription through an internationally drawn border has created a sectarian territorial hardening of competing identity groups that is anathema to peacebuilding goals pertaining to cross-group tolerance.

Forms of manipulation

The Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) just outside Sarajevo city boundaries has no checkpoints, no partitions or obstructions of any type. The sign stating entrance into Republika Srpska and the Cyrillic written alphabet evident on the Republika Srpska side of the boundary does distinguish one side from the other. But, with those exceptions, the boundary line demarcating political territory – the core prize fought for by the antagonists for over four years – is indeed not explicit and easily missed by someone from the outside. The political boundary created through brutal war that is within Sarajevo's urban sphere lacks a physical or intimidating presence; however, it is a line of psychological separation having significant consequences for Bosnia's future viability as a governable state.

Diplomatic agreements that ended the Bosnian War of 1992–95 largely accommodated war-time goals of belligerent parties for division of the country. The Dayton Accord and other negotiated agreements created ethnically delineated political regions as a way to stop war and to provide some inter-ethnic stability that might help to steer Bosnia politically through the substantial transitional uncertainty to come. In Bosnia and specifically the city of Sarajevo, however, these diplomatic peacemaking efforts likely created conditions that will handicap the emergence of a genuine multicultural democracy.

Sarajevo today is a frontier city – an urban interstice – between opposing political territories. Post-war borders contain and quarter it within one of the two autonomous territories of the Bosnian state, weakening the city's ability to stitch together what war has torn apart. The IEBL boundaries between the Dayton-created Croat-Muslim Federation and Republika Srpska entities are drawn just outside the city's south-eastern urban neighbourhoods. The City and urban area of Sarajevo today is of markedly less ethnic diversity than before the war. Almost 100,000 Serbs who resided in the urban area of Sarajevo before the war have left.³⁰ Today's population in the urban area is about 80% Bosniak Muslim and only about 12% Bosnian Serb, compared to about 50% and 30%,

³⁰Sarajevo Canton Government, 'Canton webpage' (2004), <http://www.ks.gov.ba> (accessed February 26, 2005); Federation (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Ministry of Displaced Persons and Refugees, *Plan for Arrival and Repatriation into Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation Territory* (Sarajevo: Author, April 2003).

respectively, before the war.³¹ Sarajevo, a target during the war, was for Bosniak (Muslim) and Bosnian Serb political leaders a prize to hang onto after the war, and for the international community, an ideal of multiculturalism to uphold. Multiple pressures acted at cross-purposes, in the end producing new city and sub-national boundaries and a resident population of strong Muslim majority.

The Dayton peace accord of December 1995 stopped the fighting but set off processes that unravelled Sarajevo as a multicultural space within a fractured state. Near the end of the fighting, Serbian leader Milosevic conceded parts of the city and portions of surrounding hills, transferring to Muslim control those territories that were keys to Muslim-Serb fighting in Sarajevo and which had been under Serb control since the start of the siege.³² In the 'reunification' of Sarajevo that ensued, there was the transfer over a three-month period of the districts and suburbs of Grbavica, Ilidza, Hadzici, Vogosca and Ilijas – home to about 60,000 Bosnian Serbs – to the city of Sarajevo within the Federation. Although able to stay in the urban area throughout the war, this planned transfer awakened fear of intimidation and retribution on the part of Sarajevo Serbs, leading to a mass exodus in early 1996 of some 62,000 Sarajevo Serbs from inside what would soon be the Dayton borders of Sarajevo city and its suburbs.³³ The result is an increasingly mono-ethnic city. One observer states ironically, 'Sarajevo, which had so proudly resisted ethnic divide during the war and occupation, was being driven to it by reunification under the peace agreement.'³⁴

'Reunification' of the post-war city was an endeavour to support the multicultural fabric of Sarajevo, yet this 'reunification' was not an ethnically balanced proposition because the Serbs to be reunified within the city would need, under Dayton, to be simultaneously incorporated into the Muslim-Croat Federation. This psychological factor spawned the substantial out-movement of Bosnian Serb population from the transferred districts and suburbs to nearby Serb Republic land and to other places in that republic. If, instead, the 'reunified' city would have been a spatially expansive district that spanned both Federation and Serb Republic entity boundaries and had a special jurisdictional designation to facilitate cross-sectarian power sharing (a 'D.C. Sarajevo' or a 'corpus separatum' designation such as proposed for Jerusalem in 1947), 'reunification' of the city may have occurred without the Serbian migration that diluted the city's multiculturalism. Residing in post-war Sarajevo would then have been a decision with lesser ethnic-sectarian meaning.

Impacts

The Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) created just outside Sarajevo city boundaries is a line of psychological separation and it has already influenced – and will continue to do so in the future – where people live and how and where they choose to interact. The location of the IEBL was an explicit factor considered by Serbian households when they left Sarajevo city after the war. Many displaced households relocated not far from their

³¹Fran Markowitz, *Sarajevo: A Bosnian Kaleidoscope* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2010).

³²Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

³³Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *More Population Displacement in 1996* (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, 1996).

³⁴Kumar, *Divide and Fall?*, 114.

original homes, but consciously chose to cross the IEBL and stay there – ‘displaces were moving aware of those lines and zones’.³⁵ In this way, the abstract IEBL was becoming real and taking on a life of its own – the reification of a politically potent ethnic boundary. Today, living outside the city borders and functionally disconnected from the urban system, ‘those on the Serb Republic side do not have a future under division’.³⁶ Soon after the war, the area became known as ‘Serb Sarajevo’, indicating a psychological and territorial claim to that part of the former city that will likely strengthen over time. Basically a small rural village before the war, East (‘Serb’) Sarajevo is now recipient of significant investment from the Bosnian Serb government to turn it into a fuller city.³⁷ The intent of Bosnian Serb officials ‘is for these areas and these people to be separated’.³⁸ Institutional development in East Sarajevo began during war and since has strengthened sectarian-territorial identity; for example, Republika Srpska founded the University of East Sarajevo in 1992 and it now has 15,000 students in 40 disciplines.³⁹

The redrawing of political space during Bosnia’s post-war transition has significant implications for future Bosniak-Serb-Croat relations. Due to Sarajevo’s physical location at the juncture of interspersed pre-war ethnic geographies, a Sarajevo of special government status and genuine multicultural and shared power could have assisted over the long term to rebuild centripetal forces necessary for societal reconstruction. Instead, there has been the drawing of post-war political geographies in ways that accept and will continue to reinforce centrifugal forces and separate futures. Because ethnic difference has been accommodated and reinforced through the drawing of political boundaries in the Sarajevo urban region, Bosnia lacks the local foundational level of democracy upon which to build.

When deciding on the spatial scale of political organisation and decision-making, Sibley asserts, ‘spatial boundaries are in part moral boundaries’.⁴⁰ And, morally, there are strong reasons for allowing Bosniaks to be in political control of Sarajevo. After all, Muslims were the explicit target in the city for almost four years and clearly the war’s victims. In this view, the fact that the Sarajevo urban setting today is primarily controlled by Bosniak Muslims is a moral outcome of an immoral war. The international community – with its emphasis on human rights protection – is empathetic to such a moral claim. However, there exists another type of claim on the city – one that utilises its unique ability to extend moral boundaries and spatial relationships in ways to counter the tribalism and sectarianism that destroy common responsibility.⁴¹ In this perspective, there exist no winners and losers – no aggressors and victims – and the demarcation of post-war city

³⁵Morris Power (Sarajevo Economic Region Development Agency, formerly with Reconstruction and Return Task Force, Office of the High Representative), interview with author, November 22, 2003.

³⁶Muhidin Hamamdžić (Mayor, City of Sarajevo), interview with author, November 20, 2003.

³⁷Gerd Wochein (Project Manager and Architect, Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo), interview with author, November 20, 2003.

³⁸Said Jamaković (Director, Sarajevo Canton Institute of Development Planning), interview with author, November 19, 2003.

³⁹University website, <http://www.ues.rs.ba/en/univerzitet> (accessed November 13, 2011).

⁴⁰Sibley, *Geographies of Exclusion*, 14.

⁴¹Joan Tronto, *Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care* (London: Routledge, 1993); David M. Smith, *Moral Geographies: Ethics in a World of Difference* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).

space focuses on the urban setting as an essential platform and organising framework for rebuilding the multicultural basis of a traumatised society. Diplomatic agreements to end the Bosnian war failed in this respect. Rather than seeking to resurrect and perpetuate the pluralistic qualities of the city, they eroded those urban capacities essential for the building of peace over time.

The continuation of an ethnically sorted Sarajevo and Bosnia in the future is consistent with the political self-interests of both Federation and Republic entities and the nationalist parties that have controlled their destinies. Some argue that the international community may be complicit because post-war demographic sorting can produce greater inter-group stability than more volatile mixing of populations.⁴² One source suggests that the international community, while publicly maintaining support for the re-integration of the country, was accepting the ethnic sorting of Bosnia as a means towards stability.⁴³ In the short term, indeed, ethnic sorting may well create some normalcy of daily life and heighten urban and group security.⁴⁴ There exist strong human and political impulses towards ethnic consolidation after the trauma of war. Although morally repugnant because it accepts the goals of the war-makers, acceptance of segregated groups may over the next decade aid social stability due to its ethnic consolidation effect.

However, ethnic consolidation will likely impose enormous costs in the longer term on Bosnia's degree of multiethnic tolerance. Any legitimisation of partition and sorting for the sake of inter-ethnic stability likely facilitates in the longer term increased inter-group rigidity, lack of interaction and tolerance and greater ability of external and internal forces to radicalise populations.⁴⁵ As ethnic identities become territorially entrenched, opportunities for cross-group compromises necessary for the success of a larger public interest become increasingly difficult. Indeed, when these ethnically defined boundaries were used in early elections, ethnic hard-liners and war-profiteers were more successful in connecting with their respective populations' raw post-war feelings of threat and mistrust.⁴⁶ These 'forces for separation', once elected, activated policy agendas aimed at cementing the country's ethnic containerisation. The absence of opportunities for inter-ethnic integration 'risks leaving a frustrated, hate-filled and despairing population ... and abandoning entirely the concept of multi-ethnicity in Bosnia'.⁴⁷ In the end, the partitioning of political space to accommodate ethnic difference and the sacrifice of Sarajevo is more likely to suspend and prolong Bosnia's ethnic conflict than to solve it.

Beirut: constitution and shared power

The Beirut case illuminates how constitutional and electoral rules established to hold in check deep sectarian conflict debilitate place-based political voice for a demographically ascending sectarian group.

⁴²Kumar, *Divide and Fall?*

⁴³Identity of interviewee withheld by request.

⁴⁴Javier Mier (Criminal Institutions and Prosecutorial Reform Unit, Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo), interview with author, November 21, 2003.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Jaume Saura (Member, 1996 Elections Monitoring Team, Mostar; and Professor of International Law, University of Barcelona), interview with author, May 20, 2004; Mier, interview.

⁴⁷International Crisis Group, *Minority Return or Mass Relocation*, ICG Bosnia Project, Report No. 33, 14 May, 55 pages (Brussels: ICG, 1998).

Forms of manipulation

The Beirut story is not one of how sub-national political borders (such as in Bosnia) or physical walls (as we will see in the Jerusalem case) separate and segregate ethnic/nationalist groups. Rather, in the Lebanese case, it is constitutional design and political elite agreements that have entrenched sectarian power. The lines and boundaries in Lebanon are not lines on a map, but boundary lines that classify and demarcate different religious-sectarian identities for the purpose of allocating electoral representation. These boundaries of identification and ethnic coding become spatialised when 'place of origin' voting requirements ossify a geographic distribution of these ethnic groups that existed 80 years ago.

Whereas political borders and walls are strongly physical, constitutional power sharing is notable because of its lack of physical presence. Yet, underlying this constitutional allocation of shared power across sectarian groups is a less tangible set of electoral rules that locks in and fossilises local place-based political rights and expression and spatially entrenches geographic-sectarian identity. The Beirut example uncovers how boundaries can manifest themselves and be reproduced in administrative-managerial practices, gaining power as they shape local everyday life.⁴⁸

The Lebanese system of political 'confessionalism' allocates political power among the various confessional and sectarian communities according to each community's percentage of the overall population. This shared political power system was established in order to politically stabilise Lebanon and it has now lasted 85 years. Article 24 of the 1926 Constitution mandated the distribution of offices on the basis of confessionalism as an interim measure and officially recognised 18 confessions, including Maronites, Orthodox Christians, Druze, Shiite and Sunni Muslims. The Lebanese National Accord signed after independence in 1943 specified how the distribution of elected offices was to be allocated. It used the national census of 1932 to assign political positions and shares of parliamentary seats to each religious group. Because no census has been conducted since, the Accord effectively locked in place shares of political power. Prior to 1990, the ratio of Parliament representation stood at 6:5 (Christians: Muslims). At the end of the 1975–90 civil war, this ratio was adjusted in the 1989 Ta'if Agreement (Charter of Lebanese National Reconciliation) to grant equal representation to followers of the two religions.

'Beirut is always the focus', states one observer, 'it hosts a matrix of multiple interests, and conflicts take place at complex matrices'.⁴⁹ The capital city of Beirut has through the decades been a central locus of power in Lebanon. Powers that represent the dominant and driving forces of the country have usually been physically present in the capital and able to shape directions of city development and welfare policies. Municipal politicians have usually been appendages of larger national parties, and political sectarianism at national level penetrates into municipal governance. Although municipal power sharing in Beirut is not required like at the national level, the same 50/50 representation formula has been used voluntarily at the municipal level.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Paasi, 'Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse'; Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States – Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank–Gaza* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

⁴⁹Rachel Chamoun (Professor and Director, Urban Planning Institute, School of Architecture and Design, Lebanese American University, Byblos), interview with author, October 8, 2010.

⁵⁰Nasser Yassin (Assistant Professor, Faculty of Health Sciences, American University of Beirut), interview with author, October 12, 2010.

The partitioned years of the civil war created an indelible legacy of a west Beirut that is primarily Muslim and an east Beirut that is mostly Christian. However, the old east–west ‘green line’ today has decreasing salience as regional political alignments change. Rather, due to the breakdown in the Lebanese Sunni–Shiite political coalition since the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, it is the territorial interfaces between Sunni and Shiite populations within Beirut municipality that are gaining salience as actual and potential trouble-spots. ‘The divisions in Beirut since the war are not so much re-emerging as before as they are intensifying and taking on new forms’, observes one interviewee.⁵¹ Sectarian demarcation lines are substantially more complicated now compared to civil war ethnic geographies.⁵² At certain times there has been discussion of possibly subdividing Beirut municipality into three sectarian areas – Christian, Sunni and Shia – but this idea has not advanced. Political support for the pro-western 14 March alliance (Sunnis and most Christians) is much more likely to come from voters in Beirut city⁵³ than from Beirut suburbs or outside Greater Beirut. In Beirut suburbs and outside Greater Beirut, support is greater for the more anti-western ‘8 March’ alliance (Shiites and a minority of Christians).

Impacts

In the early decades of power sharing, confessionalism was successful in accommodating diversity amid Beirut’s multi-denominationalism.⁵⁴ Each confessional group came to reside in neighbourhoods around its respective religious institutions, community centres and schools. Personal status laws such as marriage, divorce and inheritance were confessionally based; public jobs, public services and electoral seats and districts were confessionally allocated.

Over time, however, particularly in Beirut city and its suburbs, spatial and demographic fluidity and change have run up against the static traditional power sharing arrangements of the Lebanese system, resulting in group grievances rather than accommodation.⁵⁵ The 1975–90 war was partially due to the inability of this rigid consociational political system to adapt to demographic changes in Lebanon and Beirut, in particular Muslim challenges to the then Christian advantage enshrined in the Lebanese constitution. Even with Ta’if modification in 1989 of power allocation in the country (to 50/50%), Muslims likely remain under-represented. Most estimates of national religious affiliations now assume a Muslim majority, with roughly 20% Sunnis, 35% Shiite, 40% Maronites, Orthodox and other Christians, and 5% Druze.⁵⁶ The US Central Intelligence Agency estimates that almost 60% of the Lebanese population is now Muslim; about 39%

⁵¹ Mona Fawaz (Assistant Professor of Architecture and Design, American University of Beirut), interview with author, October 7, 2010.

⁵² Layla Al-Zubaidi (Director, Middle East Office, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Beirut), interview with author, October 19, 2010.

⁵³ Imad Salamey and Paul Tabar, ‘Consociational Democracy and Urban Sustainability: Transforming the Confessional Divides in Beirut’, *Ethnopolitics* 7, nos 2/3 (2008): 239–63.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Samir Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

⁵⁶ Kathrin Hockel, ‘Beyond Beirut: Why Reconstruction in Lebanon did not Contribute to State Making and Stability’. Occasional Paper No. 4, Crisis States Research Centre (London School of Economics and Political Science, July 2007).

Christian.⁵⁷ Voter information for the 2005 national parliament indicated that 59% of voters were Muslim and 41% were Christian and minorities; nevertheless, both Christians and Muslims received 64 seats in the national parliament under the system of confessionalism.⁵⁸ In Beirut, at the time of the 1932 census, the city was predominantly inhabited by Christians (with a slight majority) and Sunni Muslims. Since then, the Muslim proportion of the city population has likely increased with in-migration and Christian migration to the West; demographers have traced significant shifts in several neighbourhoods from Christian to Muslim.⁵⁹

It is in Beirut city and urban area where the inflexibility of the confessional power-sharing system has been most at odds with demographic realities on the ground. Most notably, the substantial numbers of Shiite Muslims who migrated to Beirut's southern suburbs during the 1950s and 1960s and more recently during the 1975–90 civil war have been met with systematic political and economic exclusion.⁶⁰ This is so because voting in Parliamentary and municipal elections is based not on place of residence but on place of origin at the time of Lebanese independence. In so called 'ancestral voting', voters commonly register and vote in ancestral villages and not in their place of residence.⁶¹ Only about 20% of the inhabitants of Beirut's suburbs today can vote in their current localities.⁶² A vast majority of suburban residents thus have no political channel where they live through which to express their voice. Instead, most inhabitants in suburban areas must vote in villages and remote areas outside of Beirut that have historically been in homogeneous sectarian homelands. This means that voters who reside in mixed religious neighbourhoods in Beirut or its suburbs have often been influenced to vote for sectarian candidates running from their villages and hometowns of origin.⁶³ According to one source, while Beirut suburbs contain an estimated 27% of the national population, they have less than 5% of national Parliament representation.⁶⁴ Ancestral voting also leads to a profound lack of accountability for those leaders who are elected from high growth areas and districts; this is especially noticeable in municipal elections.⁶⁵

The rigidity within Lebanon's governing and electoral requirements restricts the ability of demographic change to spawn urban cross-confessional political coalitions. Electoral outcomes in the Beirut urban area could potentially be more mixed and cross-ethnic than in non-urban, rural-based electoral districts to the extent that common urban issues unite residents across the sectarian divide. Such a new urban politics in Beirut, however, is thwarted and rigidified into the 'static consociational edifice' of the Lebanese

⁵⁷CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 'World Factbook', www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed May 13, 2009).

⁵⁸Lebanese Ministry of Interior data, reported in Salamey and Tabar, 'Consociational Democracy'.

⁵⁹Youssef Duwayhe, 'Comprehensive Survey Study of Lebanese and Demographic Distribution' (Arabic), *Annahar*, Beirut, November 13, 2006.

⁶⁰The population in the suburbs south of Beirut now approximates, and may exceed, that of Beirut municipality.

⁶¹Mona Yacoubian, *Lebanon's Parliamentary Elections: Anticipating Opportunities and Challenges*, Working Paper (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009).

⁶²Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto, 2007).

⁶³I. Fuad Khuri, *From Village to Suburb: Order and Change in Greater Beirut* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

⁶⁴Choghig Kasparian, *La Population Libanaise et se Caracteristiques* (Beirut: University of Saint Joseph, 2003).

⁶⁵Yacoubian, *Lebanon's Parliamentary Elections*.

system.⁶⁶ Ancestral voting prevents the emergence of such an urban politics and, instead, embalms village-based purified sectarian outcomes. Political structures reflect and reinforce sectarian fragmentation rather than opening up new spaces of discourse and interaction.⁶⁷

The inflexible power-sharing allocation of power spatially across Lebanon is not able to accommodate the hybridisation of changing urban communities. Many inhabitants of the city of Beirut and its suburbs are non-voting residents and have been subjugated to systematic political exclusion from local government through power-sharing's 'permanent confessional gerrymandering'.⁶⁸ Consequently, urbanisation is spawning group grievances rather than helping to moderate inter-group conflict. This suppression of urban political representation is particularly inflammatory and conflict-provoking because it disproportionately hurts the Shiite community residing in Beirut city and suburbs, of which a strong percentage holds allegiance to, and is mobilisable by, the militant-political Hezbollah organisation.

Efforts aimed at restructuring urban electoral districts have significant political consequences and thus become intermingled with sectarianism and broader political interests. Urban and national sectarian politics intersect. Hezbollah, with its strong suburban and politically marginalised Shia base, has led the campaign for 'political inclusion' and is more in favour of expanding urban electoral districts to include suburbs and reconfiguring electoral districts to reflect contemporary sectarian demography. In contrast, the Sunni-led Future Current Party and the Druze Progressive Social Party have called for the 'defence of the city' and preservation of the status quo favourable to them. Sectarianism has emerged as a crucial mobilising agent in the struggle for urban reform or preservation.⁶⁹

The institutional basis of de facto continued separation of sectarian populations along historical patterns of settlement contributes to a Lebanon that provides no alternative to young people other than adherence to sectarianism.⁷⁰ 'Sectarian language is being translated uncritically down through the generations', observes one analyst.⁷¹ At the local level, the obscure political architecture of sectarian identity fragments and debilitates the urban system as a functioning polity, resulting in a set of ethnic sub-systems operating without a centre.⁷²

Even though power sharing in Lebanon was to be a transitional mechanism towards a non-sectarian democracy, the reality has been that sectarianism has become more firmly rooted over time. Consociationalism and power sharing in Lebanon, asserts a United Nations report, have created a state 'imprisoned by legal scaffolding that organizes society on a sectarian basis, unable to intervene or control its movement'.⁷³ It concludes, 'the price

⁶⁶Salamey and Tabar, 'Consociational Democracy', 246.

⁶⁷There are exceptions to this rule – since Shia voters in several Christian-majority electoral districts they have been able to leverage support from some Christian factions under Lebanon's quota-based power-sharing formula.

⁶⁸Salamey and Tabar, 'Consociational Democracy', 249.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Samir Khalaf (Professor of Sociology, American University of Beirut), interview with author, October 21, 2010.

⁷¹Maya Yahya (Regional Adviser, Social Policy, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), United Nations, Beirut), interview with author, October 15, 2010.

⁷²Jihad Farah (Advanced Doctoral Student, Department of Urbanism, Lebanese University), interview with author, October 19, 2010.

⁷³United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Toward a Citizen's State: Lebanon 2008–2009 National Human Development Report* (Beirut: UNDP, 2009), 163.

of recognizing the country's divisions was to remain a prisoner of them'. There is resistance to the strengthening of the state by all sectarian groups because they perceive any strengthening as weakening of their group interests.⁷⁴ Many reforms are viewed as not viable; for example, if ancestral voting was changed to voting in place of residence, 'there would be war'.⁷⁵ This is so because the growing Shiite Muslim community would then be able to shape the political fate of many historically Christian districts. The same elements that restrict and distort democracy (consociationalism, ancestral voting) are also likely key to holding Lebanon together, albeit in a fragile and volatile sense. The city of Beirut is a key pressure point in this arrangement, where the electoral system has been a particularly poor match for the substantial spatial and demographic changes that are reshaping the urban area.

Jerusalem: wall and security

Israeli manipulation of Jerusalem's political geography over the past 45 years, most conspicuously in the form of a separation wall under construction since 2003, has created Palestinian displacement, material disadvantage and political disillusionment. The urban region today is one of stark and visible inequalities and lessened overt violence since the building of the barrier separating Israel and the West Bank. Jerusalem is now segregated, fragmented and severely handicapped as a place of pluralism and interaction.

Forms of manipulation

The Israeli 'separation wall' when completed will consist of a planned 436 miles dividing Israel proper (and more) from the West Bank. The partition is characterised by 25 foot concrete slabs, electronic fences, barbed wire, radar, cameras, deep trenches, observation posts and patrol roads.⁷⁶ With about 60% of it completed as of 2011, only 15% of the wall's length is on the 'green line' that politically demarcates the Israeli state from the West Bank; the remainder is or will be east of the green line and absorbing portions of the West Bank. Nearly 10% of the internationally disputed West Bank territory (including East Jerusalem) is to be de facto attached to Israel by putting it west of the wall.⁷⁷ The wall's placement is estimated to absorb about 85% of the Jewish settlers currently living in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.⁷⁸ In the Jerusalem urban region specifically, the wall will be over 40 miles long and more than 97% of its route does not follow the 'green line'.⁷⁹

The political and functional reconfiguration and aggrandisement of Jerusalem through today's construction of the separation wall continues a decades-long Israeli endeavour to control politically the Jerusalem urban area through bordering and urban development. Indeed, the wall is the 'concretisation' of unilateral policy asserted by Israel since 1967

⁷⁴Yahya, interview.

⁷⁵Confidential interview.

⁷⁶Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2007).

⁷⁷United Nations, Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, *Barrier Update* (East Jerusalem: OCHAOPT, 2011).

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹International Peace and Co-operation Center, *The Wall – Fragmenting the Palestinian Fabric in Jerusalem* (Jerusalem: IPCC, 2007).

that has included a sequence of projects aimed at territorial manipulation and design. Four main threads of Jerusalem unilateralism have been: (1) municipal boundary re-drawing in 1967 and 1968; (2) substantial development of Jewish neighbourhoods on disputed east Jerusalem land since 1968; (3) establishment of security checkpoints and mobility restrictions for Palestinians starting in 1993; and now (4) separation wall construction starting in 2003. A site of demographic, physical and political competition, almost 800,000 individuals now live within the Israeli-defined municipal borders of the city, approximately 65% Jewish and 35% non-Arab.⁸⁰

Municipal boundary re-drawing was instrumental in Israel's project of Jerusalem's political 'unification' under Israeli rule. The three-fold territorial expansion (from 37 square kilometres to 110) by the Israeli government of the municipal borders of Jerusalem soon after the 1967 war created a political-geographic container within which there has been *construction of large Jewish neighbourhoods* on land politically claimed by Palestinians. Municipal boundary re-drawing had three major effects: (1) inclusion; (2) exclusion; and (3) legitimisation. First, because the new borders encompassed 'maximum land with minimal population' the municipal annexation of large swaths of acreage provided a large land supply for subsequent Israeli development of Jewish neighbourhoods.⁸¹ 'From the very first, all major development represented politically and strategically motivated planning', acknowledges a long-time city planner.⁸² As of 2009, there were over 195,000 Jewish residents living in these disputed parts of the urban area annexed into the Israeli municipality in 1968; this is about 43% of all residents living in annexed areas.⁸³ Second, in re-drawing the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, where it was possible to exclude Arab populations from the greatly expanded new 'Jerusalem', Israel did so. The new border was intentionally drawn to exclude several Arab nodes of population well within the urban sphere. Third, by extending municipal borders, Israel provided the grounds whereby they argue that contentious growth and development issues in the region are of municipal, not international, concern. Today, a common legitimisation of Israeli development plans in east Jerusalem (and in the suburbs) asserts that they are being done to accommodate 'natural urban growth'.

Important goals of Israeli actions in the Jerusalem urban area since 1967 pertain to Israeli *unification*, or political control, of the city and the assurance of *security* to Jewish people collectively. Two operational forms of security are evident. 'Military' security focuses on the defensibility of the urban system and concentrates on the location and expansion of military installations. Meanwhile, 'political' security has guided urban development and planning policies.⁸⁴ This type of security – associated with political control – is increased through government actions that cement the demographic dominance of Jews in Jerusalem so that, in the eyes of Israeli policymakers, the chances that political control will be wrested away from Israel is decreased. New large developments built in

⁸⁰Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies, *Statistical Abstract of Jerusalem* (Jerusalem: JIIS, 2009/10).

⁸¹Benjamin Hyman (Director, Department of Local Planning, Israel Ministry of the Interior), interview with author, November 9, 1994.

⁸²Israel Kimhi (City planner, Municipality of Jerusalem (1963–86)), interview with author, October 28, 1994.

⁸³Maya Choshen and Michal Korach, *Jerusalem: Facts and Trends 2009–2010* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2010).

⁸⁴Arie Shachar (Director, Institute of Urban and Regional Studies, Leon Safdie Professor of Geography, Hebrew University, Mt Scopus), interview with author, October 19, 1994.

strategic locations throughout the urban region create a ‘critical mass’ of Jewish population that increases Jewish feelings of safety and confidence.⁸⁵

Restrictions on Palestinian mobility began in 1993 with the creation of an integrated system of checkpoints between Jerusalem and the West Bank. There have been 14 permanently staffed Israeli checkpoints in Jerusalem district along the city borders that monitor and restrict Arab/Palestinian mobility.⁸⁶ These checkpoints were built to increase security for Jerusalem residents by thwarting perpetrators of violent acts from entering Jerusalem. Arab ‘permanent residents’ of Jerusalem carry blue (Israeli) identification (ID) cards that allow travel throughout Israel. However, in accordance with the Israeli ‘centre of life’ policy instituted in 1996, these residency permits can be revoked if ‘links’ to the city are not maintained. Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip must carry orange ID cards and are subject to substantial restrictions when attempting to enter Israel sovereign territory and Arab east Jerusalem. Arabs deemed by Israel to be security threats are barred outright from entering Israel and issued green ID cards.

Impacts

The contemporary construction of the Israeli *separation wall* is the continuation of Israel’s projects aimed at the manipulation of territory and political geography and the restriction of mobility and functional connections across contested borders. What Israel sought through municipal border re-drawing in 1967/68 it is now doing through concrete wall building, a type of concrete gerrymandering of demographic and political presence. The wall is a physical manifestation of the separatist checkpoint policy begun in the early 1990s.

Through the tactical placement of the separation wall in the urban region, Israel is partitioning from the city (1) certain Arab neighbourhoods currently within the Israeli-defined municipal borders who are now on the ‘West Bank’ side of the barrier, and (2) Palestinian suburbs functionally connected to the Jerusalem urban system, while at the same time (3) de facto annexing into the city three large Jewish residential blocs built on occupied Palestinian territory east, north and south of municipal borders. The wall will functionally sever from the city (by placing them east of the wall or being enclosed by the wall) about 55,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites who presently live within municipal Jerusalem and another estimated 145,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites with historic ties to the urban centre who are presently living in suburbs adjacent to the Jerusalem municipal border.⁸⁷

The separation wall is being built around Jerusalem to ensure and consolidate Israel’s hold on the city, fragmenting Palestinian life and forcing many Palestinians to emigrate. For Israelis, the separation wall has broad public support and is associated with considerably lesser amounts of Palestinian violence in Jerusalem and other Israeli cities. For Palestinians, a 2004 survey of over 1200 adults in the Jerusalem

⁸⁵Yehonathan Golani (Director, Planning Administration, Israel Ministry of the Interior), interview with author, December 27, 1994.

⁸⁶B’Tselem (The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), ‘Restrictions on Movement: Information on Checkpoints and Roadblocks’, 2008, http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/statistics.asp (accessed 18 December 2012).

⁸⁷United Nations, *Barrier Update*.

urban region found widespread negative impacts of the wall.⁸⁸ These include: 35% of respondents report experiencing negative economic effects due to the wall; nearly 60% experience medium or high difficulty in obtaining basic health or education services due to the wall; and over 46% say the wall separates them from immediate family.

Arab villages have gone through radical upheavals in price of land, residence and travel. The ‘re-topology’ of Jerusalem caused by the separation wall constitutes both a substantial relocation and loss of value away from Palestinian individuals and economy.⁸⁹ Israel’s policies of separation and exclusion are ‘leading to a “warehousing” of Palestinian residents in the city and the abandonment of neighbourhoods’.⁹⁰ Such walled separation is also producing a hardening of political attitudes. More than 95% of Palestinians surveyed say that the wall will deteriorate the political environment and escalate conflict. And Palestinian leaders appear to have become during this time more resistant to a two-state solution that they believed in for years, amid a visceral and deep disillusionment with the peace process.⁹¹

Israeli officials and policymakers respond to criticism of the wall by pointing out it is being built for security reasons. At this level of argument, the wall is logical. Palestinian suicide and other bombing attacks against Israelis are down since the construction of the separation wall began. From 2000–2004, there were 132 such attacks in Israel killing 502 individuals; from 2005 to December 2011, there have been 18 attacks killing 59 individuals.⁹² In the Jerusalem urban region, there has been relative calm since construction of the wall began, with only three attacks since the start of 2005. Yet, the wall does not address (indeed it submerges) the question of why Palestinian violence occurs. Israel has been effective in displacing discussion of core issues to symptomatic ones; the wall is ‘solving’ the Palestinian violence ‘symptom’ while bypassing core issues of Palestinian sovereignty and political claims in Jerusalem and the West Bank. An increasingly bounded, unequal and walled Jerusalem does not appear as a viable means towards a broader Israel-Palestinian peace.

Cities as strategic ethnic hinges

Cities such as Sarajevo, Beirut and Jerusalem can be conceptualised as hinges connecting different ethno-national geographic-tectonic plates. Frontiers that used to characterise territorial peripheries increasingly are now within the city – demarcating

⁸⁸Robert D. Brooks et al., ‘An IPCC Survey of Jerusalemite Perceptions of the Impact of the Wall on Everyday Life’, in *The Wall – Fragmenting the Palestinian Fabric in Jerusalem*, ed. International Peace and Co-operation Center (Jerusalem: IPCC, 2007), 139–50.

⁸⁹H.V. Savitch and Yaakov Garb, ‘Terror, Barriers, and the Changing Topography of Jerusalem’, *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 26 (2006): 152–73.

⁹⁰Mick Dumper and Wendy Pullan, *Jerusalem: The Cost of Failure*, Briefing Paper (London: Chatham House/ Royal Institute of International Affairs, February 2010), 1.

⁹¹International Crisis Group, ‘Tipping Point? Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy’, *ICG Middle East Report* No. 95, 26 April 2010.

⁹²Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel since the Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993)’ 2011, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism> (accessed December 7, 2012). An Israeli human rights organisation reports 6552 Palestinian deaths caused by Israeli security forces or civilians from 2000–2011 – B’Tselem (The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), ‘Fatalities’, 2011, <http://www.old.btselem.org/statistics/english/Casualties.asp> (accessed December 6, 2012).

interface zones of contention and violence.⁹³ How these cities at the ethnic hinges are organised institutionally and structured territorially – and the activity patterns that these factors either enable or impede – have important impacts on inter-group relations over time. There is desiccation of the hinge – a hardening that sticks the hinge in place – if there is partition, boundary gerrymandering or freezing of electoral change. In each of the cases explored here, we see hardening of the urban hinge and the city handicapped as a place of interaction and cross-group pluralism. In Sarajevo and Beirut, there is a mutually negotiated strategy to compartmentalise territory as a means towards stability in inter-group relations. For Jerusalem, there is the hegemonic effort to unilaterally control territory in order to enhance security for an advantaged population. In each case, ethno-national group differences are accommodated and reinforced geographically. This entrenchment of ethnic geography has consequences for long-term urban peacebuilding.

In contrast, the urban hinge becomes lubricated to the extent a city's organisation and structure promote multicultural encounters at the everyday level, porosity in urban activity patterns, inclusive and fair political representation and urban and regional economies dependent on multi-ethnic contacts. Urban operationalisation of stability and security in a contested city seeks to enact a set of policies and physical interventions to lessen inter-group conflict and violence. Yet, there is not a single self-evident operationalisation of the goals of urban stability and security. Security and stability goals do not articulate clear-cut urban methods and techniques needed to achieve them. Stability does not require, by definition, walls and boundaries. Rather than bounding and constricting, an alternative strategy towards a more genuine stability might be one that seeks co-existent accommodation of contending groups and cross-community bridge building. In the cases explored here, these alternatives would include efforts to preserve Sarajevo as a special district of cross-sectarian governance, modify electoral rules in Lebanon so they better reflect demographic dynamics on the ground in the Beirut area and reverse decades of Israeli hegemonic manipulation of urban space and life in the Jerusalem region. Such alternative actions would pursue an urban stability and security built on sustainable co-existence rather than constructed through the more conventional means of military might and walled and divided territories.⁹⁴

In Sarajevo, Beirut and Jerusalem, the bounding of urban space in the name of political stability and security takes several forms and runs the gamut from blatantly physical manifestations to virtual lines on a map to invisible electoral demarcations and rules. Partitions and physical borders within the urban area (Jerusalem and Sarajevo) are assuredly the most visible and direct ways of minimising inter-group contact and cementing differences. Beyond this, however, there exist less transparent but nonetheless important constraints put upon normal urban functioning, such as the rigidification of the electoral geography of an urban area in a way that concretises sectarian identity (Beirut). Theoretically, these cases illuminate how demarcations and boundaries are consequential for inter-group relations not just at the level of the national state but also when they occur

⁹³Pullan, 'Frontier Urbanism'.

⁹⁴Counter (positive) examples to the three case studies in this article are the polarised cities of Barcelona, Montreal and Brussels. Not without difficulties and constant challenges, these urban areas have through political organisation and leadership effectively channelled most group-based conflicts into political processes in which there is the opportunity for compromise and constructive change. Bollens, *City and Soul in Divided Societies*.

at micro-territorial, municipal levels and when they are embedded in everyday practices such as electoral geographies and rules.

Israel's armed and enforced wall and political borders stand out in terms of ferocity in contrast to the municipal demarcation of Sarajevo's city limits and Beirut's obscure electoral architecture. However, even when political boundaries are subtly imprinted onto the landscape (indicated solely by simple sign markers as in the case of Sarajevo) and thus do not have the visibility of armed and protected borders, they can constitute in an ethnically charged region a substantial compartmentalising and separating of material and social space. Further, less visible electoral rules and geographies, such as in the Lebanese case, can embed within them an 'architecture of enmity' that obstructs local democratic expression in the neighbourhoods and localities where people reside.⁹⁵

That the supra-urban actions impacting upon the case study cities are diverse in nature (international treaty, elite agreement, unilateral state action) exhibits the wide constellation of possibilities when polities and states are deeply fragmented. Further, we are looking at different periods of division: Sarajevo's location vis-à-vis Bosnia internal boundaries was established in 1995; the constitutional divisions of Beirut refer back to 1932 demographic realities; and the construction of Jerusalem's separation wall began in 2003 (with other Israeli unilateral actions aimed at Jerusalem's control dating back to 1967). Despite these differences in supra-urban agents and in the timing of such interventions, this analysis finds an important similarity in objectives – each supra-urban method manipulates the physical and social space of cities in efforts to securitise or stabilise the city and country.

Despite these goals of state and international actors to securitise or stabilise an ethnic environment, the bounding and distorting of urban ethnic geography has negative consequences for long-term urban peacebuilding. Formerly multicultural Sarajevo becomes ethnically compartmentalised and a new 'Serb Sarajevo' on the city's flanks arises in response. The Beirut urban area suffers from a severe loss of place-based political voice for the country's politically emerging Shiite Muslim population. The contested Jerusalem urban area is unilaterally re-bordered, fortified and now walled to the detriment of its Palestinian population, both in terms of their daily living conditions and their faith in the prospects for peace. In each case, ethnic identity becomes concretised and reified, and the urban area is handicapped as place of pluralism, difference and interaction. The ability of a city to act as a catalyst towards co-existence and peace in a troubled state has been constrained by national or international political actions and rules. Constitutional strait-jacketing, border gerrymandering and wall construction problematise inter-ethnic relationships and stifle potential for urban co-existence to grow over time.

The pursuit of security, conflict management and stability in these cases paradoxically cripples one of the few social arenas where longer-term building of inter-group co-existence could take place. Compartmentalisation and segregation of ethnic groups may in the short term alleviate conflict but does little to contribute to longer-term normalisation. Ethnically fragmented local government structures, whether created by unilateral wall building or negotiated boundary drawing, will likely harden antagonisms between sectarian groups and cement inter-group economic, religious and psychological differences. Electoral systems unable to reflect urban in-migration, meanwhile, obstruct the ability of

⁹⁵Louise Amoore, 'Algorithmic War: Everyday Geographies of the War on Terror', *Antipode* 41, no. 1 (2009): 49–69.

urban change to shake up moribund power-sharing structures. Promotion or acceptance of bounded and ethnically demarcated space in the urban area as a workable foundation for short-term inter-group stability should come to terms with the long-term costs of this accommodation.

Sarajevo, Beirut and Jerusalem are central to broader debates about urbanism, democracy and cultural diversity. In a world that is increasingly urban, cities are emerging as strategic sites of state and international management and are primary indicators of how states handle conflict, inequality and perceived threat. The three cases explored here contain lessons for many other urban areas in the world which are experiencing ethnic fracturing owing to demographics, cultural radicalisation and migration. In many of these cities, public authorities need to change how they address urban cultural diversity and cleavage. That the three case study cities each include fault-lines between proximate Muslim and non-Muslim populations adds to the salience of this study for wider international tensions in the world today. Considerations of how a city is organised and structured amid cultural cleavage – and the impacts of these actions – are important not just to politically contested cities but to many of the mega-urban regions throughout the world today where massive informal and slum populations exist in a condition largely unregulated by the state. In such exploding cities, where there exists a de facto partition between visible, regulated populations and invisible, unregulated populations, there may well be increased efforts by their host states to restrict or bound cities – through boundary drawing, physical partitions or electoral freezing – in the name of regulating inter-group conflict derived from ethnic differences or disparities in income and life opportunities. This study has highlighted the negative consequences of attempting to contain conflict through such bounding devices.

Notes on contributor

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