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Exploring the Decision-Making Process in Relation to Legitimacy Assignment

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DEDICATION

To my father and mother, my life partner, and my daughters:

This work of years.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Exploring the Decision-Making Process
in Relation to Legitimacy Assignment

by

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University of California, Riverside, September 2012
Dr. Robert A. Hanneman, Chairperson

The effects of social pressures on decision-making about the issue of legitimacy, or whether to allow a social expectation to control one's actions, are not well understood. Prior research suggests that there are three domains of social pressure to comply with social expectations – self-, group-, and institution-oriented. After reconciling existing literature on the two possible logics of legitimation, through demonstrating that the logic of habitus (routinized experience and habitual behavior) rather than praxis (active, cost-benefit analysis) accounts for object salience, this research proposes that social pressures differentially trigger associated cognitive frames within the social actor, and that these frames guide the actor's subsequent decisions.

In addition to explaining how differential pressures guide decision-making, these three domains give insight into the original emergence of the process of legitimation, by uncovering the underlying mechanisms of how social actors'

decisions are affected by increasing social complexity and diversification. This is important to the study of legitimacy, as most micro-social examinations of the topic have failed to recognize the importance of keying and cognitive framing of experiences, as well as social-environmental pressures, when making decisions about what is legitimate and thus binding upon one's actions.

This research builds on previous work in legitimacy theory, identity theory, and framing, as well as findings in moral and cognitive psychology, to combine the concept of the cognitive frame with the concepts of salience and activation from identity theory. Its methodology draws on previous theoretical and empirical findings on the rationales people use to legitimate social objects.

Through the use of a modified spontaneous trait inference methodology, this research finds that the salience of the social pressures embodied in social objects to an actor's specific concerns prompts activation of an associated cognitive frame, which in turn shapes the justification for legitimation of the social object. Additionally, this research demonstrates that respondents differentially prioritize frames when prompted with a multi-domain stimulus. Finally, this research shows that compared to outside stimuli and frame activation, most demographic characteristics are less effective at explaining frame activation and decision-making.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

WHY LEGITIMACY?

At its roots, the study of legitimacy asks the question: What causes people to comply with social standards? In studies of law, social theory, and criminology, the question of what drives individuals to comply with social standards is a nearly constant underlying theme. From Durkheim's examination of how the breach of social facts labels the breacher as deviant (Durkheim 1938), to Weber's typologies of legitimate domination (Weber 1968d), through classical and modern examinations of the many reasons why human beings comply with law and other social standards (Agnew 2006; Altemeyer 2006; Beccaria 2006; Cornish and Clarke 2006; Cullen and Agnew 2006; Dornbusch and Scott 1975; Garfinkel 1967; Habermas 1975; Haidt and Graham 2007; Hirschi 2006; Howe and Loftus 1996; Hyde 1983; Levi and Sacks 2007; Milgram 1963; Pardo 2000; Paternoster and Bachman 2001; Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, and Loughran 2011; Spelman 1995; Stafford and Warr 2006; Sutherland and Cressey [1960] 2003) (Tyler 2006b; Tyler and Rasinkski 1991), legitimacy is undeniably an important issue in the social sciences. Understanding how actors comply with the unspoken rules of social interaction is a major focus of the work of Garfinkel and Goffman and many other social psychologists (Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1959). Understanding why criminals do not comply and how to control their noncompliance is a central focus of the entire school of criminology (Agnew 2006; Beccaria 2006; Casper, Tyler, and Fisher

1988; Cullen and Agnew 2006; Hirschi 2006; Paternoster and Bachman 2001; Piquero and Bouffard 2007; Stafford and Warr 2006; Sunstein, Schkade, and Kahneman 2000; Sutherland and Cressey [1960] 2003; Yu 1994). And, of course, the school of legitimacy theory strains to understand how legitimacy, as a social pressure, functions to keep actors compliant and institutional power empowered (Anderson 2005; Barker 1990; Bukovansky 2002; Coicaud 2002; Dembour 2000; Dornbusch and Scott 1975; Freedman 1978; Grafstein 1981; Habermas 1975; Hegtvedt 2006; Hyde 1983; Jacobsen 1999; Levi and Sacks 2007; Lind and Tyler 1988; Manicas 1988; McKay 1998; Pardo 2000; Sanford 2008; Sniderman 1996; Tyler 2002; Tyler 2006a; Tyler 2006b; Tyler and Rasinkski 1991; Tyler and Rasinski 1991; Valadez 2001; Weber 1968a; Weber 1968d; Zelditch 2001; Zelditch 2006). Indeed, an entire book could be written just as an attempt to summarize these many works. However, to demonstrate the importance of legitimacy as an underlying concept in any attempt to explain compliance by social actors, three examples from this extensive list of citations will serve.

First, Weber's initial work on the typologies of legitimate authority and legitimate domination (Weber 1968a; Weber 1968b; Weber 1968c; Weber 1968d) often functions as a jumping-off point for examinations of legitimation at the macro level. Whether one agrees with Weber's typology or finds it lacking (Grafstein 1981; Hyde 1983; Willer 1967), this work is often the first source for researchers' examinations of political legitimacy, the legitimacy of power, and the legitimacy of law, especially in the macro sense.

Habermas' work on legitimation crises attempts to explain how the legitimation of authority, and specifically economic authority, is directly affected by how long "the opposition of interests can be kept latent and integrated" (Habermas 1975: s.451). His examination of the issue includes Weberian ideas of legitimate authority, as well as discussion of the ways in which legitimation of an economic system is tied to cultural economic ideologies, and how those ideologies can create problems for continual system integration. His contention is not that these problems cause economic disintegration, however, so much as that they cause problems for the identity of the entire society – a much larger threat. The difficulties he examines for system legitimation in this work draw on Marxist ideas of capitalist exchange as well. He finds that the class structure of a society, especially a capitalist society, is "the source of the legitimation deficit" (Habermas 1975: s1034) and, as such, cannot be repaired simply by force of institutional will. He finds that "a legitimation crisis […] must be based on a motivation crisis" (Habermas 1975) or the disconnect between state-declared motives and the motivations for action provided by the socio-cultural system. This examination of the rise and fall of power is intimately tied to an analysis of what legitimation is and its functions within macro-structures and systems such as economics and culture.

Finally, Zelditch's examination of the legitimation of power stands as an example of the legitimacy school's attempts to explain the function of legitimacy in a social system. While admitting that current legitimacy theory is "largely a theory of the consequences […] of legitimacy" (Zelditch 2006) Zelditch also attempts to find

causes or conditions for legitimation of an authority, and identifies four: "(1) there is general consensus on the norms, values, beliefs, purposes, practices or procedures […]; (2) any benefits to which it appeals are either in the common interest or can be made universal; (3) any beliefs to which it appeals are believed to be matters of objective fact; and (4) the values, norms beliefs purposes, practices or procedures to which it appeals are consonant with the nature, conditions, and consequences of the structure of authority they are supposed to legitimate" (Zelditch 2006). This finding helps us understand why actors will legitimate authorities, and is central to at least one of the three domains of legitimacy identified later in this dissertation.

However, the presence of legitimacy in social research is often assumed and rarely tested. When a political system falls apart, we say that its subject actors no longer consider it legitimate. When an economy crashes, we see concerns about popular opinion of its viability, which can lead to legitimacy crises such as runs on banks and stock market failures as actors lose faith in the legitimacy of the economy. Legitimacy is usually assessed by actors' reactions to its absence, and most research on legitimacy focuses on how it functions or disappears, not where it came from in the first place.

For example, identifying three major functions of legitimate systems and how their failure to function in that manner increases the likelihood of de-legitimation among actors is a common task of many works in political sociology. These functions can be summed up as: the system produces what it is intended to produce; the system is grounded in the social norms governing that type of system; and the

system at least gives the impression of subject actors having some kind of a voice. These characteristics of system legitimacy have been variously and collectively discovered and discussed in work spanning political history, political science, psychology, sociology and economics (Anderson 2005; Barker 1990; Bukovansky 2002; Coicaud 2002; Ellsworth and Ross 1983; Finnemore and Toope 2001; Freedman 1978; Friedman 1994; Kane 2001; Lehman 1992; Manicas 1988; McKay 1998). But these analyses largely focus on how legitimacy operates once it exists, not how it comes into existence in the first place.

Legitimacy is also assumed to shape interactions and processes within systems and can supposedly make or break social actors' acceptance of system dictates. An illegitimate system is doomed to failure and usually resorts to force in order to achieve its goals, while legitimate systems remain secure, stable and dependable for social actors, producing the expected product and serving the needs of their subject populations. Zelditch (2006:77) has speculated that without legitimacy, no social system can function. Indeed, Zelditch goes so far as to say that while legitimacy is not a fundamental process of society, it is a central auxiliary process without which no other system can function for long. For example, the economy cannot function without some kind of legitimate agreement of the exchange rate of pigs to chickens, whether that legitimate agreement is formed in a barter system of five chickens for one pig, or in a monetary system that values a chicken at twenty dollars and a pig at one hundred. Likewise, politics cannot function without legitimate structures and processes that manage and control

resources and power. One can think of many social institutions that, without legitimacy, would founder and collapse. But, Zelditch asks, where does legitimacy come from? More specifically, is there "in fact just one set of principles that [govern] legitimacy" or are the principles specific to the context (Zelditch 2001)? Zelditch leaves this as an open question for investigation – one this dissertation is intended to answer.

The study of legitimacy spans all fields. We have societal legitimacy standards in science, in art, in law, in medicine, in politics, and in every major and minor institution and group. Legitimacy is, among other things, an agreement among social actors that particular social objects will be considered binding upon our actions as groups as well as individuals. Finding that obedience to a certain social norm is in the best interests of the group is often a strong motivator for treating that norm as legitimate. Understanding legitimacy and how it operates should allow us to determine which social expectations actors will comply with, and which ones they will not. However, our understanding of how actors come to the decision to comply is sadly lacking.

In the field of law and society, legitimacy comes into play in any research that examines the relationships and processes within and between institutions within law, society, or both. There are several sub-institutions within law, for example: the judiciary, law enforcement, governmental lawmaking bodies, and so forth. Legitimacy is thought to have a direct effect on how well these institutions function and interact with one another. It is also assumed that legitimacy has a direct and

constraining effect upon small-group interactions within these institutions – for example, jury deliberations, or strategic planning on the part of attorneys or police task forces. Without standards for what is legitimate and what is not, law would devolve into a free-for-all; there would be no way to ensure that the decisions made by juries, judges, etc. would be generally accepted by subject actors of the legal system. However, these are still largely assumptions, since little if any investigation has been made into how legitimacy affects actor decisions.

One assumption often made in research on law, specifically on public perceptions of the law and how it functions, is that the public understands both the definition and the function of 'law' in the same way the researcher does. Quite a bit of research has been performed concerning the perception of law in terms of outcomes or processes fairness (Tyler 2006b), procedural legitimacy (Tyler and Rasinkski 1991), or the appropriateness or inappropriateness of imposed sanctions (Ellsworth and Ross 1983); (O'Neil, Patry, and Penrod 2004); (Sandys and McGarrell 1995); (Spelman 1995) – but there is a lack of research investigating how people assign legitimacy to law (or other social institutions) in the first place. Research on perceptions of legal outcomes tends to be theoretically framed in an assumption that all people arrive at their understanding and assignment of legitimacy in the same way, whether value-based or instrumental (Hegtvedt 2006:46-48; Tyler 2006b), and that it has no real effect on research results. This assumption ignores the effect of the process used by an actor to make decisions when assessing

legitimacy, and assumes that all actors understand similar situations in the same way and thus use the same decision-making process in these situations.

So although legitimacy is broadly understood as a main reason why actors comply with the law, and how it functions in society once it is assigned is more or less understood as well, how it is assigned in the first place is not well-understood. This can be critical to research into law and society because if we impose our own definitions or understandings of legitimacy assignment, rather than discovering the actual process, we may miss crucial components that can fundamentally change our understanding of the legitimation process.

Therefore, the research problems that this dissertation is intended to resolve are the following: How does one define legitimacy at the actor level? What is the logic(s) by which it is assigned, withheld, or withdrawn from social objects? What are the pressures that cause it to be assigned, withheld, or withdrawn? Finally, will knowing how legitimacy operates at the actor level help us investigate its origins as well as its functions? Current literature has difficulty answering these questions adequately.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

Purpose and Background

The intended purpose of this dissertation is to test and support theories about how social actors make decisions about issues of legitimacy previously developed in my master's examination paper of 2008. The overall goal is to lay theoretical,

conceptual, and empirical groundwork for a research program intended to develop and apply a general theory of the processes of legitimacy development and assignment across all levels of society. To begin the foundation for this research program, reconciling existing theories of legitimacy assignment is the ultimate goal of this dissertation. This particular work draws upon numerous sources both for theory and for methodology.

Theoretically, this research builds on theories of legitimacy developed by Weber (Weber 1968d), Habermas (Habermas 1975), and Zelditch (Zelditch 2001; Zelditch 2006), as well as empirical work in legitimacy by Tyler (Tyler 2006b) and McKay (McKay 1998). It further draws on theories and empirical studies in moral psychology, cognitive linguistics, political science, and social psychology by Lasky (Lasky 2000), Haidt and Graham (Haidt 2008; Haidt and Graham 2007), Altemeyer (Altemeyer 2006), Bargh and Pratto (Bargh and Pratto 1986), Minsky (Minsky 1975), Lakoff (Lakoff 2002; Lakoff 2004), Achen and Bartels (Achen and Bartels 2006), Goffman (Goffman 1974) and Garfinkel (Garfinkel 1967), and other scholars in the fields of decision-making, sociolinguistics, political sociology, and justice studies. To demonstrate the existence of the self-interest and institutional domains, this research draws on work in deterrence theory and its empirical applications as well, especially as regards the issue of celerity, or promptness of consequence (Agnew 2006; Ainslie 1975; Aquino and Freeman 2009; Loewenstein and Lerner 2003; Luhmann, Ishida, and Hajcak 2011; Paternoster and Bachman 2001; Piquero,

Paternoster, Pogarsky, and Loughran 2011; Platt and Huettel 2008; Yu 1994) (Cullen and Agnew 2006).

Methodologically, this research draws on theoretical and empirical work on identity theory by Stets (Stets 2003; Stets 2010), Stryker (Stryker 1980), Lapsley and Narvaez (Lapsley and Narvaez 2004), Howard and Renfrow (Howard and Renfrow 2003), Aquino and Freeman (Aquino and Freeman 2009), and Lasky (Lasky 2000). This theory draws on identity theory not for specific findings about identity but rather for a framework explaining the mechanics of how cognitive framing works. It draws on moral psychology for some of its methodology, specifically the spontaneous trait inference methodology. It also draws on legitimacy theory as one possible focus of decision-making, and the literature on framing (both sociological and that of cognitive psychology and linguistics) to explain how frames shape decisions.

Research Problem

This research is intended to explore two main problems: the various social pressures that lead social actors to assign, withhold, or withdraw legitimacy from various social objects, and the origin of these social pressures through social actors' attempts to simplify the world such that decisions about legitimacy are automatic and routinized, rather than requiring reason and analysis.

The existing literature on legitimacy tends to treat it as either an *a priori* quality of social objects (examining its function rather than its origin), or as a

decision actors have made (but without examining the ways and reasons which affect that decision). Additionally, much literature in sociology more generally tends to assign causation of decisions to demographic variables such as age, race, gender and religious affiliation. While it may seem logical to say that men decide one way and women another, or blacks and whites do not reach the same conclusions because of their racial differences, this is an essentialist argument which reduces thinking actors to demographic automatons, and is thus not satisfying.

What has been missed in the literature is, first, a reconciliation of these two disparate ways of viewing legitimacy, and second, that the ways in which it is assigned and the pressures to assign it may create differential outcomes in decisions about legitimacy. Current literature has not adequately explored either of these points, and these research results may call some of that literature into question if it turns out that how a decision is made and why a decision is made affects the ultimate outcome of that decision.

Overview of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 begins with an overview of existing theories and literature on legitimacy, with special attention paid to reconciling the two disparate ideas about how to view and understand the topic, namely "legitimacy as a decision about social objects" or "legitimacy as a quality of social objects". This reconciliation involves an examination of the reasons why there are two disparate definitions of legitimacy, and resolves them by showing that these two definitions are actually two different

logics of legitimation activated by the social pressures of novelty and complexity. This chapter will also devote some time to a response to Hyde, whose critique of legitimacy studies in the sociology of law asserts, first, that legitimacy does not exist, and that theories about it do not adequately account for the effect of substantive qualities of social objects on the actor's decisions (Hyde 1983). The response establishes that legitimacy does exist and is not explainable solely by habit or self-interest, thus rejecting Hyde. However, the theory later presented also establishes that legitimation is indeed dependent on the substantive content of the social objects confronting a social actor, supporting Hyde.

Once this reconciliation is accomplished and Hyde is answered, Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical foundation for the origins of legitimation through the logic of habitus and the evolution of three domains of pressures, by which actors judge and rationalize their decisions about social objects' legitimacy through associated cognitive frames. The three-domain typology is elaborated through four dimensions of pressures that social actors experience, and a discussion of the possible dynamics of these pressures that shift activation of actors' cognitive frames from one domain's associated frame to the next. This chapter concludes with the presentation of research questions and their associated hypotheses.

In Chapter 4, we turn to a discussion of research design and methods, beginning with the development of the tools necessary to test and understand the processes by which individuals are prompted to think in certain ways about social objects and how these ways of thinking control their subsequent decisions about

those social objects. This discussion will include the rationale for the development of each tool and its relationship to the overall research questions, as well as presenting reliability and validity tests for each of these tools. Chapter 4 closes with a summary description of the research design.

Chapter 5 describes the data collection procedures, hypothesis testing and results of these tests, demonstrating that nearly all hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 are supported by data.

Finally, Chapter 6 provides a discussion of these results and implications both for current and future research in the areas of decision-making, law, legitimacy, and other major social institutions.

The theory could be expanded beyond explaining decisions about legitimation to explaining decisions, period, but this dissertation will confine itself to the question of how actors make decisions about legitimacy, what social pressures prompt a difference in their choice of decision logics, and how these social pressures emerge from domains of salient needs.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

DEFINING AND ASSIGNING LEGITIMACY

Two definitions of legitimacy currently exist in the literature. One defines legitimacy as active, deliberate decisions to comply, and the other defines legitimacy as the perceived obligation to obey. The first type is rooted in Weber's analysis of legitimate social orders, and the other in Durkheim's social facts as well as more modern views of legitimacy. Both will be discussed in the following pages.

Weber never gives a strict definition of legitimacy as a thing in itself, but only as a characteristic of various types of legitimate order. However, reading between the lines of his typologies of legitimate authorities and legitimate domination yields a few phrases which, taken together, gives a reasonable overview of Weber's view of legitimacy. For example, the "legal" social order is supposedly legitimate because its legitimacy "derives from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties" (Weber 1968c: 36). Later in this section of *Economy and Society*, Weber footnotes that "so far as it is not derived merely from fear or from motives of expediency, a willingness to submit to an order imposed by one man or a small group always implies a belief in the legitimate authority […] of the source imposing it" (Weber 1968c: 37).

From these two phrases we can summarize Weber's view of legitimacy as follows: (1) Not derived from fear or outside force; (2) not derived from motives of

expediency, and (3) voluntary compliance with the dictates of the legitimate thing on the part of the social actor.

What Weber means by "motives of expediency" is not clear, but in his definitions of the three pure types of legitimate domination, no mention is made of incentives such as monetary gain to ensure obedience on the part of the deciding social actor. Indeed, in all three cases of legitimate domination, legitimacy claims rest on either belief or devotion: a belief in the legality of rules (rational grounds), devotion to traditions (traditional grounds) or devotion to an individual who is seen as sacred or exemplary (charismatic grounds) (Weber 1968c: 215). Material issues do not seem to enter into this analysis.

On the other hand, Weber's definition of legitimacy in this work is limited to the analysis of the relationships of authority and domination, not to all possible things that could be considered legitimate. For example, the relationship of a man to his physical needs can be legitimated or de-legitimated in the sense that he complies with the need (hunger, thirst, sleep) or resists it, thus denying it the ability to bind his actions for at least some time. Similarly, the relationship of a woman to her family is not always a relationship of domination and authority, and so we must understand this relationship's legitimacy outside these boundaries as well. Even when authority and domination are not active, the family relationship is still legitimated.

Therefore, we might reasonably view the Weberian definition of legitimacy as a thing in itself, rather than a definitional trait of authority or domination, to be a

social actor's active assessment of a social object and its attached properties as binding or constraining that actor's actions or behaviors in some way, without an overtly coercive element. We might further label this view as *legitimacy through praxis*. Praxis, or the ancient Greek term for "practice," in this sense means deliberate action through application of the practical side of a theory or idea. Marx alluded to praxis in his *Theses on Feuerbach* when he indicated that theory and philosophy were not enough to understand the world; that the goal was to enact change (Marx and Engels 1998: 574). As used here, praxis also has a sense of Giddens' "discursive consciousness," or "all those forms of recall which the actor is able to express verbally" (Giddens 1984: 49), although there is more to praxis than simple discourse or discussion. *Legitimacy through praxis* is that which we treat as legitimate because we have actively, deliberately decided to do so.

The other main view of legitimacy is that it is a perceived obligation to obey or comply with some social object (often the law, an institutional dictate or a community norm) – which we might term *legitimacy through habitus*. Habitus, which is Bourdieu's term for a "system of dispositions" that "ensures the active presence of past experiences" and "tend to guarantee the 'correctness of practices' and their constancy over time" (Bourdieu 1980: 54), seems to be an appropriate term for the idea that legitimacy is simply something automatic, rather than discursive or deliberated. Giddens' idea of "practical consciousness," or "the things which actors know tacitly about how to 'go on' in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression" (Giddens 1984), is similar to

this interpretation of the word habitus. *Legitimacy through habitus* is simply that which we treat as legitimate because it has always been legitimate. We allow it to bind our actions without conscious deliberation.

When we look at these two definitions, we can see that depending on the initial definition one uses, the literature treats legitimacy as either a quality attributed to objects without conscious thought, or as a decision to allow some object to have a constraining effect on one's decisions, but not both. What is missed here is that legitimacy is both habitus *and* praxis. The operation of legitimacy depends upon an actor both deciding that some object is binding on his actions, and his continuing experience of that object, based upon that decision.

A social object cannot be considered legitimate without a decision by one or more social actors to treat it as such. Once the decision is made, the social actor perceives the world through the lens of that decision and treats the object he has legitimated as legitimate and thus binding on his future actions. The simple process of legitimation is as follows: The social actor *assigns* legitimacy by making an active decision to allow some social object to control his behavior (praxis). From that point forward, his *experience* of that social object is that it is legitimate and binding on his actions, and he responds to it in that way without new deliberation (habitus).

This means that legitimacy is not just a static condition, but an ongoing process. Social actors are continually assessing their environments and making decisions about what will control them and what will not. Many of these legitimacy decisions do not seem to be conscious or deliberate; we are socialized to treat social

institutions and relationships as legitimate from early childhood. It may seem faintly ridiculous to say that legitimacy is an ongoing process when we are so heavily socialized to accept the legitimacy of our social systems from birth onward. But even a five-year-old may decide that his parents' dictates are legitimate, but his grandmother's are not. Although we might call this "disobedience," it is also a legitimacy assessment – a decision to treat Mother and Father as legitimate but relegate Grandmother to the legitimacy dustbin.

As another example, what else is the classic struggle between parents and teenagers, if not for the primacy of their legitimacy decisions and perceptions? Parents often have trouble allowing their adolescent children to become true adults, because it means giving up their unilateral control of the relationship and allowing the nearly-adult child to control it, at least to some extent. Parents learning to respect their teenager's decisions are also going through a process of legitimacy assignment – one that involves allowing the teen's choices to be, to some extent, binding on the parents as well.

It is this researcher's opinion that all decisions involve legitimacy assignment, and thus any study of legitimacy must be, at least in part, a study of decision-making. Every social conflict centers on the legitimacy of the claims made. Every social change is powered by decisions about what will be treated as legitimate in the future and what needs to be relegated to the past. From the micro-level decisions about the food we eat, the clothing we wear, or the jobs we choose to the macro-level social forces of identity, ideals, and ideology, we are continually assessing and

assigning legitimacy to the social objects and social facts we must deal with every day. Every decision involves, on some level, the fundamental legitimacy question: "Will I allow this social thing to bind or control my future actions in some way?" If yes, we have legitimated the thing; if no, we have de-legitimated it.

When we practice legitimacy as praxis, we are making active decisions; when we practice legitimacy as habitus, we are not. However, in both ways, we are assigning legitimacy to a social object.

One of the most interesting ways to examine legitimacy as habitus is Durkheim's consideration of the social fact. Durkheim's definition of a social fact is that it "is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognized in its turn either by the existence of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every individual effort that tends to violate it" (Durkheim 1938: 10). However, he also clarifies that social facts are discovered precisely because we are sanctioned when we resist them, but that we rarely resist them because we scarcely notice them unless they are resisted (Durkheim 1938: 2).

Social facts, then, are those things that are nearly background noise. We might use the Giddensian idea of practical consciousness to explain social facts: we know them, and we are aware of them, but cannot articulate them (Giddens 1984: 49). We "just know". As such, Durkheim's social facts seem to fall squarely into the idea of legitimacy as habitus – that which we don't think about but simply comply with. If

we don't comply, it gets noticed; depending on the importance of the social fact, our noncompliance might get us laughed at, mocked, shunned, or imprisoned.

Durkheim's contention that we will be sanctioned if we do not conform to the social facts of our own societies (Durkheim 1938: 10) seems to contradict the Weberian idea that we make conscious decisions to comply with social expectations, as defined above. If we do not normally notice social facts, how can we have granted them legitimacy through an active decision? If challenging the legitimacy of a social fact is the only way we discover it, and if this challenge brings down the hammer of social sanction on our heads, why would we do it at all? Why not just conform?

This seems reasonable on its face. However, if everyone mindlessly conformed to the status quo and never assessed its legitimacy, social change would never occur. Social change does occur; therefore, people must challenge the status quo, at least in part by assessing its legitimacy and finding it lacking. Most social change has occurred precisely because certain individual social actors have challenged the status quo, by stating their decision to de-legitimate the social objects and social facts that form it. Luther's 95 theses nailed to the church door was a statement of his decision that the church was no longer legitimate (Luther 1883); the Declaration of Independence was a statement to King George III that his governing was no longer legitimate to the American colonies; Martin Luther King Jr.'s famous "I Have A Dream" speech was the quintessential statement of a decision that America's racist attitudes were no longer legitimate to modern American blacks (King Jr. 1998). This process of social change by legitimation of new social facts and de-legitimation of

old ones is going on all around us, all the time. The perception of legitimacy waxes and wanes as more or fewer people decide to allow the social object to control their actions, and at some tipping point, a legitimacy crisis occurs.

This is why Weber seems to contend that legitimacy must involve voluntary decisions on the part of the actor, and not coercion. Although we may decide outwardly to comply with social standards, if we disagree with them inwardly then we have not truly granted those social standards legitimacy in the Weberian sense. Dornbusch and Scott go into some detail about this separation between the internal world of the social actor and the outward behavior of the social actor. We may comply (what Dornbusch and Scott term *validity*), but if we do not agree – if we have not decided that the binding force of a social object has merit (what Dornbusch and Scott term *propriety*) (Dornbusch and Scott 1975) – then no true legitimacy assignment has taken place. Both habitus and praxis must be part of legitimacy assignment for the social object to maintain its legitimacy for any length of time; those who chafe under what they perceive as an illegitimate system that is forced upon them will, eventually, challenge that system with the decision to openly de-legitimate it.

This does not mean that socialization into accepting the legitimacy of our social environment is a series of continuous *conscious* decisions. At some point, legitimating objects becomes habitual. We are used to it, we do not question it, and we have already made the decision (or been socialized into the decision) that it is valid to let that object control us. Classical institutionalism, including Weber, seems

to assume the continuous rational/conscious choice, but new institutional theory, including Garfinkel's ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967) and Rowan and Meyer's view of institutionalization as a legitimacy claim rather than as an attempt at efficiency (Meyer and Rowan 1977), makes a strong case that if something seems normal or taken-for-granted, we are far more likely to comply without further consideration.

Even though we are socialized to accept a good deal of our society's definition of "legitimate," this does not mean that we are always automatically obligated by other people's decisions about what will bind our actions. We may outwardly acquiesce to others' demands that we treat an object as legitimate, but whether or not the object is legitimate to us is a decision and perception located entirely within the social actor, not society.

This means that just as there are two aspects of legitimacy – habitus and praxis – there are two ways of assigning it. One is through socialized habit, which creates the perceived *obligation* to obey or comply. The dictates of the agents of socialization – parents, community, law, and institutions – do much of the deciding for the social actor, so that he simply complies. This is what Dornbusch and Scott call *validity* (Dornbusch and Scott 1975: 38-39). When persons reach a point at which they *notice* the taken-for-granted, however – which is usually the point at which the taken-for-granted begins to interfere with their own needs or create intense pressures – the *propriety* type of legitimacy begins to govern legitimacy assignment (Dornbusch and Scott 1975: 38-39), and the actor begins to judge

legitimacy against his own needs first, rather than those of the community or the institution. We might say that legitimacy as praxis, demanding non-coerced decisions, is the *propriety* type, while legitimacy as habitus, accepting the coercive aspect of social pressures and socialization to create an obligation to conform or comply (and what is obligation, if not a coercive element?) is the *validity* type.

Since we must be socialized into most legitimacy as habitus, and since we make decisions about what is legitimate through praxis only when our own needs are not being met, this raises the question about which came first: habitus, or praxis? Hyde has also raised an additional objection along these lines: his contention is that there is no legitimacy – that what we call 'legitimacy' is entirely a function of either habit or self-interest (Hyde 1983). The next section of this chapter responds to both of these issues, employing the answer to the first to assist in answering the second. First, however, we must briefly discuss the theoretical framing of this dissertation in order to locate the relevant literature properly within the following discussion.

ORIGINS OF LEGITIMACY

Since there are two logics of assigning legitimacy, one might assume that there are two domains of pressures to assign legitimacy as well. However, previous research (Sanford 2008) has demonstrated the existence of three domains of pressures to legitimate or de-legitimate. This research shows that these domains of pressures seem to have originated through an evolutionary process. From the

decision by one individual to treat a social object as legitimate, to the agreement among social actors to do the same, legitimacy evolves from the self-interested individual decision to the normative group agreement and finally to the institutional status. Per Zelditch, all legitimate institutions must be grounded in previously-accepted (that is to say, legitimate) norms (Zelditch 2001); these norms originally evolve from negotiated agreements among individual social actors.

These negotiated agreements, and their evolution into informal social norms about group behavior and institutional structures that impose formal controls upon all members of society, create three different *domains of salient pressures*, defined by levels of four types of pressures the actor experiences to legitimate any given social object. These domains include the *self-oriented domain*, where individual negotiations take place about short-term individual needs like personal physical safety, health, money, self-concept, self-esteem, and interpersonal interaction for the social actor, and those same needs of people the actor perceives as part of himself (such as his children or her family) take place; the *group-oriented domain*, where the normative standards created through these interpersonal interactions are used to evaluate and control the legitimacy of individual and group behaviors and interactions; and the *institution-oriented domain*, where hard-and-fast rules and authorities impose a standard of legitimacy that is at least nominally rooted in normative standards. The four dimensions of pressure which are definitional traits of the domains include *salience,* or the relationship of the social object and the consequences of a decision to legitimate that object to the actor's material and

nonmaterial concerns; *timeframe,* or the time it will take for the consequences of that decision to occur and resolve; *social space,* or the particular network-tie involvement an actor finds himself within when the social object presents itself; and finally *agent of consequence*, which concerns the agent that will impose the consequences of the decision on the social actor. A more in-depth discussion of these domains and their dimensions will be performed in Chapter 3, but this brief overview is necessary in order to properly perform the literature review.

This research rests on three areas within the literature: theories of legitimacy, theories of cognitive framing, and identity theory. The first and second areas are relevant to the development of the research questions presented here; the third is relevant to methodology. This chapter will discuss each area of the literature as it applies to the questions at hand within this research.

THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY

Finding Legitimacy in Existing Literature

It is important to note that if legitimacy means the decision to treat an object as binding upon one's actions, and if that decision means complying with the dictates of that object, then any study of legitimacy is also a study of the motivations for compliance. This means that the literature review cannot be confined only to the standard legitimacy literature, but must go beyond it to other literature that discusses compliance, both on the micro side in cognitive and moral psychology, and on the macro side in deterrence theory.

While this is a departure from the standard legitimacy literature, which deals exclusively with legitimacy through habitus, this dissertation must first deal with the original motivations for legitimacy assignment and so must go beyond that treatment. In a way, the standard legitimacy literature's objection to this treatment of the topic is the opposite of Hyde's objection. As we will see, Hyde treats legitimacy solely as behavior (either from analytical and reasoned praxis, or as habitual and routinized habitus). The standard legitimacy literature treats it solely as an experience of the qualities of a social object (the effects of habitus, rather than the behaviors involved in habitus). To understand its origins and its functions, however, we must treat it as both a behavior and an experience, and this makes any literature that discusses reasons for compliance with any social object relevant to this discussion.

To reconcile legitimacy through praxis with legitimacy through habitus, we must first get an overview of the literature on each.

Literature on Legitimacy Through Praxis

Weber was one of the first sociologists to discuss legitimacy. Most of his work focused on detailing ideal types of legitimate authority and domination, rather than discussing their dynamics. However, an examination of his definition of legitimacy as a quality of authority or domination can be summarized as that which requires the consent of actors without coercive force involved (Weber 1968b:46-47). This definition centers within the social actor as an active decision to grant or withhold

legitimacy. A legitimate social object's ability to constrain or control behavior is therefore, under this definition, contingent upon the non-coerciveness of and voluntary agreement of the actor to its constraints. From this initial work, we will define legitimacy through praxis as *a social actor's active assessment of a social object and its attached properties as binding or constraining that actor's actions or behaviors in some way, without an overtly coercive element.*

Literature on deterrence also defines compliance (and hence, legitimation) as praxis. Deterrence theory has roots in several schools of criminological thought, most notably the classical school of Beccaria, and defines deterrence as what occurs "when someone refrains from committing a crime because he or she fears the certainty, swiftness (celerity) and severity of formal legal punishment" (Paternoster and Bachman 2001). Deterrence is further divided into general and specific deterrence in this literature, with general deterrence aimed at those who have not yet deviated and specific deterrence aimed at those who have. The death penalty is an example of general deterrence. Its existence is expected to cause those who might otherwise commit crimes that carry it to consider the cost of such action and refrain from engaging in it. Conversely, in specific deterrence, punishment applied to the offender is expected to cause him to consider costs he has already experienced and refrain from incurring them again by avoiding the actions that caused them the first time. In both cases, however, the goal is to make the costs of deviance so high that the offender will choose not to offend.

As a theory of criminal control, deterrence has been popular in the United States since the 1970s, inspired in part by the work of certain economists who argue for the rational-actor theory of human nature (Cullen and Agnew 2006). Rational-actor theory assumes a social actor who freely chooses his or her decisions based on perceived and actual costs and benefits to himself or herself alone. Thus, deterrence theory is rooted in the idea that the actor chooses his actions with rational forethought and consideration of the consequences, or that he assigns legitimacy as praxis.

The economics literature also considers the human being a rational actor. This is demonstrated most clearly in the economic theory of discounting, which states that most social actors will opt for a smaller reward now than a larger reward later (Ainslie 1975), placing less weight on outcomes that are delayed – a phenomenon referred to as "positive time discounting" (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). This tendency in humans to place more weight on outcomes that happen sooner will be critical to one of the domains of legitimacy to be discussed later, but it is also important to note that any theory treating the social actor as rational is, by definition, treating his decisions to comply with the demands of social objects as rational, and therefore consciously enacted (praxis) rather than unconscious (habitus).

For Habermas, norms are not considered valid or legitimate simply because they are norms – like all human ideas, they are open to question and revision, because there have to be outside reasons (rational reasons) for them to be

considered legitimate (Habermas 1975:103-105). This questioning and revising might also be considered legitimacy as praxis.

Weber's initial distinction that legitimacy is the decision to treat a social object as binding upon one's actions fits with the rational-actor notion of evaluation of cost and benefit to the actor in both deterrence and discounting theory. This is the support in the literature for the idea of legitimacy as praxis, or what Dornbusch and Scott label *propriety*.

Literature on Legitimacy Through Habitus

The other standard definition of legitimacy in the literature is that legitimacy is a deeply held sense of obligation to comply with social objects and their dictates, which this dissertation terms legitimacy as habitus. This is not considered a decision on the part of the social actor. Instead, it is understood as something that is socialized into or imposed upon him. The legitimacy literature includes numerous examples of this characterization of legitimacy as habitus.

Weber's exploration of legitimate power and legitimate domination in his classic work *Economy and Society* was one of the first discussions of this topic. He identifies three ideal types of legitimate authority and four ideal types of legitimate domination (also called "bases of legitimacy"). In three of the four cases, these are identical: legal-rational, charismatic/affectual, and traditional. Legal-rational authority derives from law and rationality; traditional authority from tradition; and charismatic (or affectual) authority from the personal charismatic power of an

individual leader, "newly revealed or exemplary" (Weber 1968c: 215). An additional form of legitimate domination, not included in Weber's analysis of forms of legitimate authority, is named "value-rational," which is the rational use of and adherence to absolute values, rather than law. Each of these ideal types defines legitimacy as an established quality of authority or domination (power) – that is, as the experience, or habitus, involving the social objects in question. Legitimacy assignment, at this point, has already taken place.

Additionally, for Weber, a legitimate system is grounded in the already-accepted norms, which govern what will be considered legitimate or non-legitimate. His theory acknowledges the conflict claim that power is both the main source of legitimacy claims, whether that power is traditional, rational, or charismatic, and that it is most often the social object needing to be legitimated (Weber 1968c). Weber also states that a judgment of legitimacy by the social actor is expressed by his compliance with the authority in question (Weber 1968c). Weber further states that if an authority has no basis in already accepted norms, it has no legitimacy with social actors, and thus no power to influence social life (outside of brute force) (Weber 1968:46-47).

This initial literature leads to the idea of legitimacy as an experience, or established quality, of social objects – what we are terming legitimacy as habitus. Therefore, this paper will define legitimacy as habitus as *a social actor's routinized experience of a social object and its attached properties as binding or constraining that actor's actions or behaviors in some way, without an overtly coercive element*.

When looking at the question of legitimacy in large systems, Lehman draws a distinction between legitimacy (compliance of social actors) and viability (the ability of the system to perform its functions) (Lehman 1992). Most other authors looking at large systems, and specifically political systems, denote three main goals or conditions for a legitimate system: Production of expected output of the system, groundedness in the social normative structure that applies to the system, and (at minimum) perception of having a voice or input into the system on the part of subject actors (McKay 1998), (Kane 2001), (Bukovansky 2002), (Finnemore and Toope 2001). It could be argued that these conditions are the qualities generating the experience, or habitus, of legitimacy. As long as they continue to work and actors can continue to depend upon them, the system is legitimate. If they fail, the system is de-legitimated.

Coser's contribution to this macro-level analysis is his observation that internal conflicts within a system are only dangerous to its legitimacy if the norms of the contending parties differ widely; this supports Weber's point as well, that legitimacy is founded in norms, and without shared norms among subject actors, legitimacy will disappear (Coser 1964: 205). Indirectly threatened sanctions also shore up legitimacy, however, by forcing Dornbusch and Scott's *validity,* or the social pressure to conform to norms and legitimate authorities, even if one would decide differently without those social pressures (Dornbusch and Scott 1975:38). Since norms are largely experienced, rather than decided upon, this also supports the idea of legitimacy as habitus in the literature.

This social pressure to conform often comes about through claims to the legality or rightness of the authority in question. However, as Habermas observes, this does not interfere with legitimacy, because the system itself must be considered already legitimate in order for people to use legality as a basis for legitimacy claims. A system cannot be made legitimate simply because it declares itself so – it must already have some sort of worth or value to its subject actors before its legitimacy can be enshrined in legal pronouncements, and it must happen in that order: norms first, pronouncements second (Habermas 1975). Once again we see legitimacy defined not just as a decision, but as an already-established quality of the objects used to legitimate other objects.

Zelditch draws on Dornbusch and Scott, as well as Habermas and Weber, to demonstrate that the controlling factor in the stability of systems is *validity*, or group adherence, which overrules and negates much in the way of individual efforts to change or reform systems (2006). Once again, this is legitimacy considered as a quality of objects already in place.

Tom Tyler's body of work focuses on procedural justice in the court system and its legitimacy. His theories of procedural justice focus mainly on the concept of "fairness," and specifically fairness of procedures rather than outcomes. His findings, drawn primarily from survey research, indicate that whether or not respondents perceive an outcome as fair, several things lend themselves to a greater assessment of fairness (and, by Tyler's extension, legitimacy) by defendants and their loved ones of procedures in the court system, including the perception of

having a voice in the proceedings (Tyler 1984). Tyler's work speaks to validity assignment as well, as he grounds his work heavily in normative standards such as "fairness," which is centered on community expectations and beliefs about what is right and fair – what Weber might call "value-rational."

In all of these theories, legitimacy is described as an already-existing experience and understanding of social objects, mainly through normative judgments and occasionally through functional production. This is the support in the literature for the idea of legitimacy as habitus.

Reconciling Legitimacy Through Praxis and Legitimacy Through Habitus

To reconcile these two logics of legitimation, we must look at literature on how decisions are made. Certainly, a decision made actively and with some thought (praxis) is not the same as a decision made through a routinized, semi-to-unconscious process. As an example of this, Achen and Bartels find that when people choose a position on some political topic, they tend to end up where they wanted to (Achen and Bartels 2006:44), returning to the point from which they started and creating a tautology. Individuals, when asked about their perceptions of some political outcome, will answer not according to their perception of the outcome in isolation, but according to its relationships to the particular source or sources on which they base their reasoning. In other words, they rationalize, rather than reason. This looks like what we have been defining as "legitimacy through habitus."

Rationalizing is when the brain gauges a situation against what is already known and justifies a decision based on that information, rather than the evidence

at hand. Rational decisions, on the other hand, occur when a person actively engages with evidence at hand and makes a logical, reasoned, evidence-based decision. This then raises two questions: First, when do people use rational analysis, or what we have called "legitimacy through praxis," to make decisions? Second, when they rationalize instead ("legitimacy through habitus"), what drives this method of decision-making?

Praxis: The Response to Novelty

Actors who rationalize are using already-known situations to deal with complex but similar situations. Actors who are rational, then, must be dealing with unknown or new situations that they have not dealt with before. An unfamiliar situation creates an anomic condition for the social actor, and no frame is available until he creates one through experiencing and dealing with the new situation at least once. Although frames are general in that they fall into three general categories – self-needs, group-needs, and institution needs – a situation that an actor has never encountered before must first be categorized before it can be dealt with. The process of categorizing it is part of the rational, analytical logic of praxis.

There are three situations that might demand a praxis response. In all cases, these situations are those in which the rules or properties of a social object are unclear. This is also known as an anomic condition. The first type of anomic condition is when a novel social object with an attached novel rule-set presents itself to the actor. The second type is when a known rule-set about a known social object is somehow breached or broken in ways that make organizing and

understanding the situation impossible. The final type is when two rule-sets about a known social object clash or conflict, as in culture shock situations. A discussion of the ways in which these types of situations are demonstrated through the examples of literature defining legitimacy as praxis follows.

The first type of anomic condition that triggers praxis is the completely novel social object and attached rule-set. This situation is defined through much of the literature on the establishment of new states or the attempt to maintain and increase their legitimacy. McKay's discussion of the Communist Party's attempt to create legitimacy for itself in East Germany serves as an excellent example of this phenomenon (McKay 1998). The East German population was subject to the continuous attempts by the Communist Party to tie Communist ideology to German history, but without much success. The East Germans, confronted with an entirely new rule-set (Communist ideology) that was represented to them as an old one (namely, German culture) acted "as if" the Communists were correct on the surface, just as Dornbusch and Scott define "propriety" (Dornbusch and Scott 1975), and on the surface, East Germans appeared to accept this. However, East Germany's failed attempts to legitimate itself demonstrate that this was merely lip service on the part of the East German people. Their true and continued attempts to free themselves from the unwanted Communist regime were not habitual behaviors, but rather stemmed from ongoing praxis decisions to de-legitimate that state and restore the original, traditional German state. The new rule-sets that were imposed by the Communist Party were ultimately a failure, and East Germany's search for

legitimacy ended right around the time that the Berlin Wall fell and Germany headed toward reunification.

An example of the second type of anomic effect that triggers praxis is demonstrated in Garfinkel's discussion of breaching experiments, specifically his experiment involving students who, on arriving home, treated their parents as if they were their landlords for fifteen to twenty minutes. This breach of a known rule-set (family interaction dynamics) had a remarkable effect on the parents, as they cast about for some reason to explain why their child was behaving so oddly. Not knowing how to process the situation, they were forced into attempts to deliberately analyze it instead, to find some explanation (Garfinkel 1967). This demonstrates the anomic condition caused when a known rule-set about a known social object ceases to function in expected ways, as well as the praxis reaction to this kind of condition.

The last type of praxis-triggering anomic effect is when two rule-sets collide. This is similar to Garfinkel's parents-as-landlord situation; if the person breaching had actually believed they were a renter and the parents were landlords, they would have had a different rule-set about the same known social situation, and the collision would have engendered an anomic reaction not just in the parents but the renter/child as well. Garfinkel's results in this and other breaching studies confirm that any time a person's expectations of a situation are breached, anomie results (Garfinkel 1967).

HABITUS: THE RESPONSE TO THE KNOWN

Conversely, in non-anomic situations, where rules are known and social objects are familiar, habitus is the more likely method of achieving decision-making. Human beings can certainly be rational, but most of our rational mind is reserved for situations in which we must make complex decisions about new situations. In a review of the operations of the human mind and brain in decision-making, Lehrer describes the differences in our preferences for rational decision-making versus emotional decision-making:

> "[T]he conventional wisdom about decision-making has got it exactly backward. It is the easy problems – the mundane math problems of daily life – that are best suited to the conscious [rational] brain. These simple decisions won't overwhelm the prefrontal cortex. In fact, they are so simple that they tend to trip up the emotions, which don't know how to compare prices or compute the odds of a poker hand […] Complex problems, on the other hand, require the processing powers of the emotional [non-rational] brain, the supercomputer of the mind" (Lehrer 2009)

This leads to the conclusion that we are biologically hard-wired to decide complex questions (especially questions that have non-rational components) using our non-rational brain. That is, as the situation becomes more complex, we are programmed to look for simpler solutions that do not require the arduous cognitive task of thinking and reasoning, which explains why we rationalize.

It is also of note that Lehrer specifies that simple problems are the ones best suited to praxis. We must, however, specify what Lehrer means by "simple." Math problems are enormously complex for some folks, but we still cannot solve them through cognitive frames. Citing Dijiksterhuis and making an oblique reference to

Miller (Miller 1956), Lehrer states that the reasoning brain (or praxis) "can consciously process somewhere between five and nine pieces of information at any given moment" (Lehrer 2009:243). This means that as situations get beyond that five-to-nine range, a frame (or habitus) will kick in instead.

Lehrer admits that there is no research determining exactly the point at which 'simple' and 'complex' divide up for most human beings (Lehrer 2009:243). However, it is rare that human beings will encounter situations that have more than nine pieces of truly new information at one time. In most situations, humans have at least some bedrocks of familiarity to draw upon, especially language and the presence of known others such as family or friends.

Lehrer also demonstrates that "novel problems […] require reason," and makes a compelling argument for the idea that our gut feelings (or frames) only work when they are "rooted in experience" rather than "haphazard impulses" (Lehrer 2009:245). This makes logical sense. Frames are no good in novel situations, as frames are logically rooted in past experience with similar or identical social objects and their rule-sets. Praxis, then, is intimately tied to the active, rational decision about novel objects, and habitus is just as intimately tied to the routinized, habitual experience of social objects and the decisions that emerge from that experience.

Habitus emerges when we have to deal with a complex, but relatively known environment of things that demand our attention and decisions. Known or not, we still don't have the ability to reason things out when our attention is full beyond that

five-to-nine limit. Overwhelmed, our non-rational mind assesses the situation and activates a cognitive frame to help us make decisions about that which is stressful but reasonably known. The frame, by definition, produces a simpler solution, as we do not have to think out every single aspect of the situation but only arrive at a solution. So although praxis works well for simple questions, habitus actually gives us simpler answers, reducing uncertainty more quickly and allowing us to reach a satisfactory explanation or understanding of the situation. Praxis, on the other hand, starts with simpler questions and usually gives us more complicated and nuanced answers. While both satisfy the need to address the stressors that we are dealing with, praxis "takes longer and costs more" compared to habitus.

Humans do not use rational decision-making all the time because we are biologically programmed to reduce complexity, and rational decision-making is relatively complex compared to non-rational decision-making. When a social actor is under multiple known pressures, it is almost certain that legitimacy will come from habitus, not from praxis. It is only in the face of novelty, or the unknown, when we must resort to the more difficult logic of praxis. Table 1 demonstrates this relationship between novelty and complexity and the use of these two logics.

Table 1 - Pressures Affecting Mobilization of Logics

Logic	**Habitus**	**Praxis**
Pressure		
Novelty	Decreasing	Increasing
Complexity	Increasing	Decreasing

At this time we will apply the dichotomy between habitus and praxis to discuss Hyde's concerns, and conclude this section of the literature review with a reconciliation of these two logics.

Answering Hyde: Demonstrating Legitimacy as Separate From Habit or Self-Interest

The literature defines legitimacy both as a process or decision (praxis), and as a perception or static condition (habitus). This issue has now been reconciled. Unfortunately, in the literature, there is also a disagreement about the existence of legitimacy. Some scholars, such as Hyde, even deny that legitimacy exists, instead crediting the behaviors normally cited as examples of legitimation attribution to habit, self-interest, or force, and claiming that obedience to law (i.e. legitimacy attribution) is entirely based on the substantive content of the law in question, rather than its status (Hyde 1983:3-5, 29). Specifically, Hyde asks, "Does a belief in legitimacy or sense of obligation shape behavior, or is behavior just as well explained through custom and self-interest? Are orders characterized by a high belief in legitimacy more stable than orders where this belief is nonexistent?" (Hyde 1983:2)

As discussed previously, Dornbusch and Scott make the case that there are two logics of assigning legitimacy – *validity,* or a perceived obligation to obey even though one may disagree with the particular requirements of the social object, and *propriety* – the active decision to comply with some social object's constraints on one's behavior (Dornbusch and Scott 1975:38). This research expands these two

logics to the logics of habitus (encompassing validity) and praxis (encompassing propriety). When we examine these two logics of legitimacy assignment in the context of Hyde's objection, we can see that habit/custom seem quite similar to habitus, and self-interest seems quite similar to praxis. But regardless of the fact that these two logics seem to overlap with Hyde's stated ideas about why people obey law, Hyde's point remains unanswered. Does legitimacy actually exist?

In order to answer this question, we must determine whether Hyde is talking about legitimacy through praxis, or through habitus. It appears that he considers these synonymous. However, the framing of his questions makes it clear that he is asking about how to explain *behavior*, since both habitual actions and self-interested actions are behaviors, not qualities of objects. Therefore, Hyde seems to be talking only about legitimacy through praxis.

However, "praxis" refers only to reasoned behavior, not to routinized behavior. Legitimacy through habitus covers any action taken in a routine manner. Legitimacy through praxis covers only those decisions and behaviors that are deliberate and analytical – i.e. reason, rather than rationalization. This means that Hyde is speaking of behaviors based in both praxis and habitus, and finds that they eliminate any need for legitimacy to exist at all.

It cannot be denied that the reasons people assign legitimacy are based in either habit (socialized behavior) or self-interest (active, conscious behavior). Hyde is correct on this point. However, when it comes to legitimacy as a *quality of objects*, rather than a *behavior,* Hyde fails to see that this quality is not composed only of

habitual and self-interested decisions, but a synergy between decisions and habitus that cannot be explained either by habit or by self-interest. Certainly, at times actors assign legitimacy and conform based on self-interest, and at other times they assign legitimacy and conform based on custom. However, the conformity, regardless of how it is assigned, demonstrates an ongoing legitimation of the social object to which they are conforming – an experience of that object as legitimate. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between the definition of legitimacy as the actor's *motives for legitimating* (a central topic of this dissertation) and the definition of legitimacy as a *status or quality of social objects*.

Hyde's contention that legitimacy does not exist seems bound to the idea that legitimacy is only a behavior or decision – legiti*mation*, not legiti*macy*. If that were the case, he would be correct; as a behavior, legitimacy is assigned through habit and self-interest. However, legitimacy is also an ongoing experience of the qualities of social objects, and one of the best demonstrations in the literature of legitimacy as habitus lies with Durkheim's discussion of anomie – broadly defined as the condition of loss or absence of norms (Durkheim 1951). When defined as habitus, legitimacy is a normative quality of objects as experienced by the actor – dependable, real, and constraining – and the actor's habitual responses to that normative quality. If that normative quality disappears through de-legitimation, it creates an anomic condition.

As stated previously, legitimacy is often measured in current literature not by its *presence*, but by its *absence*. Its absence creates an anomic condition for social

actors, especially if they were not expecting the de-legitimation process to occur. Anomie often causes actions that cannot be explained through habit or self-interest. As an example, the sudden de-legitimation of the stock market in 1929 drove several stockbrokers and investors to take their own lives (Doak, Asperheim, and Sandmann 2008). The loss of legitimacy of the stock market went beyond their self-interested actions and their conformity to custom or norms, as did their reactions to it. They did not act out of mere self-interest or custom in this case: when they saw it crash, it quite literally destroyed them.

While it could be argued that their suicides were simply to escape the instrumental consequences of their actions – that is, escaping trial and prison for their escapades – it is unlikely that all of them committed suicide for solely that reason. Embedded as they were in a culture of stockbrokers and investors, their habitus, or experience of the world of stock-market social facts, depended on the norm that investors created: *put money into the market, receive more money back*. This condition held for quite some time, as investors cheerfully put money into the market and received massive gains in return. All was well. The stockbrokers' interactions with their clients, guided by the norm of "*put money in, get more back*," created a habitus that was not just individual but group-centered. Everyone in the community of the stock market operated on the basis of that norm.

When the norm changed, the stockbrokers did not recognize it at first. The investors were the ones who changed the norm.[1] As returns began to decrease, investors began to pull their money from the market in the reasonable fear that they would lose it all. By the time the stockbrokers noticed the run on the market as more and more investors pulled their money out, it was too late. The culture of the stock market was badly damaged because the norm it had depended on was no longer operating. In fact, it had been replaced by an entirely new norm: "*market is nonresponsive; pull money out*."

Investors and stockbrokers who were deeply embedded in the stockbroker-investor culture – that is, those who had strong ties to mentors, old boys' clubs, personal wealth and old-money connections – most likely weathered this financial storm better than those working independently, without a lot of connection to other brokers. The ones who were relatively isolated already were most likely to commit Durkheim's anomic suicide, which occurs when the rules are not apparent and no guidelines exist to govern one's choices (Durkheim 1951). Without the support of a community that could reassure itself that the status quo would return and all would be well, the rules gone, and the anger of the clientele whose money and trust they

[1] It might be interesting to investigate the changes of norms and the anomic conditions these changes create in terms of who changed the norm and who experienced anomic conditions from the change. It seems that when these anomic conditions are created, the persons who were active in changing the norm do not experience anomie; only those who were not aware of the change until it had occurred seem to become anomic. While the investors probably experienced an anomic condition due to the norm of "money comes out when I put money in" changing, they were able to adapt to that norm and create a response to it by removing their money, where the stockbrokers assumed that the original norm would continue and were thus much harder-hit with the loss of legitimacy that resulted.

had so ineptly lost, these unfortunate gentlemen threw themselves from windows and off the tops of buildings.

Therefore, it could reasonably be argued that anomie is the *visible effect of de-legitimation*, with its subsequent consequences. Their actions could not be explained by either custom or self-interest; it is not a custom in our society that those who are about to be held accountable for their irresponsible actions take their own lives to escape it (although some do take this route for this reason), and self-interest would actually dictate that staying alive is always the more important goal for any social actor. The only possible explanation is that the loss of legitimacy of their operations (and the subsequent loss of face, or personal legitimacy, in their dealings with others), or the loss of their habitus and understood way of life, affected them so strongly that suicide seemed the only option.

If de-legitimation affects people so strongly that they are willing to take their lives due to it, we must say that legitimacy is not just the product of self-interest or custom, but rather the synergy of these two things that create the ongoing social expectations that people will generally obey law, social custom, or other standards set not by themselves but by everyone in society acting in concert. This answers Hyde's objections about habit and self-interest. While habit and self-interest may explain the creation of legitimacy, and even its operation, it cannot explain the responses of social actors to its disappearance.

Hyde also raises the issue of the substantive content of the thing being legitimated as a necessary part of legitimation (Hyde 1983: 9). Although Weber did

not address this issue (a sore point for Hyde), it is reasonable to attempt to answer this question as well. In the theory presented in this dissertation, the substantive content of the thing being legitimated is central to the process of legitimation. It acts as a trigger for the use of a particular domain of legitimation, as well as a trigger for the use of one of the two logics of legitimation proposed by Dornbusch and Scott (Dornbusch and Scott 1975: 39). This will be elaborated in Chapter 3.

Reconciling Praxis and Habitus

Praxis inevitably leads to habitus. Once a praxis reaction occurs, the situation is no longer novel, but known, which means that any time after that point when the actor encounters that situation or social object, they will be operating from the habitus standpoint. These known situations and objects group into three domains, which govern the rationalizations actors give for habitus-based decisions. These three domains will be discussed in the theory section of the following chapter.

It is also time to set a scope condition on the remainder of the research in this work. As it is not empirically possible to determine ahead of time what situations each social actor will find novel, since simply asking if someone has dealt with a certain situation or object will create the novelty effect if they have not, empirical testing of the operation of legitimacy through praxis will be left as an open question for further research. From this point forward, this dissertation will examine legitimacy through habitus only.

DOMAINS OF PRESSURES IN THE LITERATURE

Having shown that legitimacy is perceived both as a decision and as a perception in the literature, having answered Hyde's concerns about the existence of legitimacy and the effect of substantive effects upon its assignment, and having reconciled the relationship between praxis and habitus, we now turn to the task of demonstrating the existence of three domains of pressures to legitimate within existing literature. Two schools of thought adequately define the group-oriented and institution-oriented domains; deterrence literature defines the institution-oriented, while the standard legitimacy literature defines the group-oriented. The self-oriented domain is supported in the literature through the discussion of celerity, and is not as well understood as the other two, but it is critical to a complete understanding of the processes of legitimation.

Each domain deals with a certain set of salient pressures that carry consequences for the social actor if not addressed. In broad terms, the institution-oriented domain deals with the consequences of institutional dictates, laws, rules, and authorities that are impersonal and formalized. The group-oriented domain deals with the consequences of group expectations, norms, and values that are personal and informal in their application. Finally, the self-oriented domain deals with consequences that are individualized for the social actor, dealing with concerns such as money, health, physical safety, self-concept, self-esteem, and bodily integrity. While each domain has additional dimensions that define their operations,

this broad overview will be sufficient to locate the literature dealing with each domain.

Knowing that legitimation, or the decision to comply, is based in decisions about the consequences of the thing being legitimated is, to some extent, a departure from the standard legitimacy literature. Some theorists in the legitimacy literature reject this characterization of legitimation as a reversion to a simple cost-benefit assessment, with no normative judgment involved. The main issue for these theorists seems to be: Why bother analyzing legitimacy as a normative obligation if it simply boils down to habit, self-interest, or coercion, as in Hyde's objections?

However, as already discussed, legitimacy is a function of habit and self-interest through the synergistic product of them working together. Without legitimacy, we cannot explain the effects of de-legitimation, which are easily and often seen and go beyond habit and self-interest. Certainly, once legitimacy is *established* for a social actor, it often becomes a normative, habitual obligation and no longer a decision. But this research is focused not on how legitimacy operates once it is established, but how it becomes established in the first place. This research, then, expands our understanding of legitimacy beyond the solely normative view in the legitimacy literature. It demands that we recognize the action of pressures beyond the normative in the original formation of the decision and subsequent perception that a social object is binding upon our actions and demands compliance from us. This should demonstrate that any pressure to comply (apart

from brute force) is by definition a pressure to legitimate the object creating the pressure in the first place. This understanding is critical to any further analysis.

The next section of this chapter will briefly explore the pressures associated with each domain as they are already represented in the literature. Specific dimensions and operations of each domain, however, will be discussed in the theory chapter that follows.

Institution-Oriented Pressures to Comply and Legitimate

The literature on deterrence is the logical place to start when looking for institution-oriented pressures to comply. From Beccaria's initial insistence that rules be regular, transparent, and universally applicable so that social actors could make rational decisions to comply (Beccaria 2006) through modern deterrence theorists' continued reliance on the rational-actor model (Clarke and Cornish 2001; Cornish and Clarke 2006; Cullen and Agnew 2006; Paternoster and Bachman 2001; Stafford and Warr 2006; Williams and Hawkins 1986), deterrence emphasizes institutional consequences that the actor will suffer if he does not grant legitimacy to law through his compliance with it.

Weber also demonstrates institution-oriented pressures to comply and legitimate through his definitions of legal-rational and charismatic authority (Weber 1968d). Legal-rational authority is defined as that which rests on rules defined by rational actors and which have rational consequences. Charismatic authority is the authority of (usually) a single individual who acts as an authority figure, defining

rules and expectations for his followers. In both of these cases, the pressure to comply and legitimate is from an institution, whether that institution is the legal system, the bureaucratic rules of an organization, or the dictates of an accepted authority figure, and the pressures to comply carry institutionally-imposed consequences for noncompliance.

Components of institution-oriented pressure also appear in network theory literature, specifically in the concept of affiliational ties. Breiger's concept of a tie that is not directly to a person but to an institution (Breiger 1974) is relevant here as well; if one feels tied or connected to an institution, its dictates and expectations become more relevant to oneself and one is more likely to want to comply with them. Therefore, the presence of affiliational ties also seems to be an operating factor in the literature on institution-oriented pressures to comply.

Group-Oriented Pressures to Comply and Legitimate

Weber is the original source of group-oriented pressures to comply and legitimate within the literature, with the other two ideal types of legitimate authority: traditional and value-rational. In both these types, the group imposes norms and expectations on the social actor through socialization, communication, and other social processes, and he is expected to feel a deep sense of obligation to either comply with these normative standards or be branded deviant. While the consequences for noncompliance are not as severe or as certain as those imposed by an institution, they are usually severe enough to guarantee compliance.

Additional sources of group-oriented pressures to comply in the literature include Durkheim's concept of the social fact, which, when breached, labels the breacher as a deviant (Durkheim 1938: 10). (It is also interesting to note that this breach sometimes labels the breacher as illegitimate to the community – "not one of us," or a stranger, and thus subject to further penalties or consequences.) Zelditch's observation that institutional legitimacy rises from and is embedded in group-created norms, and that compliance with these norms can be enforced by the community even when the social actor does not personally agree with them (thus drawing on Dornbusch and Scott's validity component) further indicates the literature's recognition of group-oriented pressures on social actors to legitimate and comply with social norms (Zelditch 2001).

In micro literature, Garfinkel's breaching experiments make a strong case that legitimacy of interactions is based upon norms about how those interactions should be conducted, and that noncompliance with those norms causes an anomic condition, as discussed earlier – thus creating a legitimacy crisis for the micro-interaction in question (Garfinkel 1967). Goffman's work on the presentation of self also deals with legitimation of group-defined roles through support of face and line and through expectation of support for one's own face and line, thereby creating a reciprocal need for legitimation of one another's role presentations and situational definitions (Goffman 1959).

Tyler's work is also based in group-oriented components such as fairness of procedure. Although it could be argued that fairness is simply a rational-actor

evaluation of appropriate distribution of resources to actors based upon their participation or effort, fairness in the sense that Tyler seems to use it is more a normative quality, and thus supports the idea of group pressures to comply (Tyler 1984; Tyler 2006b).

Finally, it can be argued that the presence of strong network ties to other actors creates group-oriented pressures. Granovetter's observations that we tend to experience strong-tie situations with those who are like us, while not experiencing strong-tie situations to those who are different from us (Granovetter 1983), suggests that the strong ties to our groups will matter more and create more pressure to comply and legitimate, rather than deviate, from group-oriented pressures and expectations.

Self-Oriented Pressures to Comply and Legitimate

For Weber, the origin of legitimacy is with the decisions of the original social actor, and as such falls into the self-oriented domain. In network theory, weak ties seem to most often support individual decision-making without consideration of other actors (Granovetter 1973) – another self-oriented component.

Deterrence literature also gives us insight into the importance of individual decision-making, but mainly by its absence from the deterrence literature in terms of individual consequences. Unlike institutional and group consequences, self-oriented consequences are rarely imposed by an agentic source such as a group or

institution. Additionally, self-oriented consequences are often the consequences that will occur if the actor does *not* act, as opposed to those that will occur if he does.

Finding the self-oriented domain of pressure in the literature is difficult, but not impossible. The celerity literature, a subset of the deterrence literature, focuses largely on law-breakers and the relative paucity of evidence that time to consequence, or promptness, matters in deterrence. Howe and Loftus, for example, note that "celerity has been [...] largely discounted and assumed irrelevant to the subjective representation of punishment" (Howe and Loftus 1996). However, it has been demonstrated in other literature on offenders that many of them are responding to short-term, immediate pressures that, while causing them to deviate from institutional and group standards, satisfy immediate needs that would not otherwise be satisfied (Agnew 2006).

Operational definitions of consequence in the literature tend to ignore this particular type of consequence. There are two problems with this mistake in operationalization; it ignores a type of consequence that is certainly salient for the social actor, and it ignores the time dimension that makes those consequences more salient than normative or institutional consequences. A discussion of these flaws in the literature, as well as a proposed resolution using empirical evidence, follows.

A body of literature on deterrence focuses on three possible pressures that reduce deviance and recidivism: certainty of consequences, severity of consequences, and celerity of consequences (with consequences specifically operationalized as sanctions imposed by groups or institutions). Most literature

finds that celerity, or temporal proximity of sanction, have shown that it is largely irrelevant to how often an actor offends (Howe and Loftus 1996; Nagin and Pogarsky 2001; Yu 1994). However, these studies may be comparing apples to oranges for two reasons.

First, there may be a "tipping point" in the time dimension, beyond which it does not matter how quickly or how slowly the hammer falls. It may be that only at the immediate point of deviation does celerity matter, and that there is no significant difference between a penalty that happens a day after the offense or twelve days or years after. Piquero and his colleagues state that "the [Beccarian] school of thought assumes that individuals should be more strongly deterred by swifter punishments" (Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, and Loughran 2011:354), but almost no literature examines this empirically.

Recent empirical literature that discusses celerity does not even have a uniform operational definition of the concept. Definitions range from immediate imposition of penalties (Legge Jr. and Park 1994), to periods between 6 and 24 months (Howe and Loftus 1996) or 0 to 45 weeks (Yu 1994), to periods as long as seven years (Howe and Loftus 1996). Piquero and his colleagues demonstrate that "swifter sanctions yield a larger deterrent effect that diminishes rapidly over time as the sanction is delayed farther in the future" (Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, and Loughran 2011:354), and Legge and Park confirm this with their finding that immediate imposition of penalties accounts for about 18% of the effectiveness of deterrence policies (Legge Jr. and Park 1994). Therefore, celerity may be a much

shorter-term, but not necessarily weaker, effect than the current literature discusses, perhaps measured only in minutes or hours, rather than days or weeks. Loughran and his colleagues call for additional research into the effects of celerity of punishment (Loughran, Pogarsky, Piquero, and Paternoster 2011).

Second, most discussions of celerity have focused only on the institutional or group sanction – the punishment – as the consequence. This leaves out an important additional consequence; namely, the consequence the actor will suffer if the immediate pressure is not resolved. Indeed, when these immediate, self-oriented pressures are taken into account, it becomes obvious that most offenders are participating in a tug-of-war against immediate consequences versus long-term consequences, usually defaulting to action that enables them to avoid the immediate consequence. Agnew's recent work on offender "storylines" to explain criminal behavior suggests that most of the pressures offenders identify for offending are tied to immediate consequences such as: a need for money, a dispute needing resolution or the need to save face, and situational pressure to offend (Agnew 2006), rather than the dictates of institutions or community norms. Absent other factors, it is logical to expect that an actor will act to relieve these pressures by doing whatever is necessary, even if that means breaking institutional laws or group dictates. This aspect of celerity of consequence seems largely absent in the literature, although Hirschi's social bonding theory suggests that social bonds act as controls on the impulse to relieve immediate pressures (Hirschi 2006).

This concept of a domain of immediate, self-oriented pressures suggests that only specific (immediate) deterrence will be effective in controlling deviance. Despite Nagin and Pogarsky's arguments against specific deterrence, specifically that "pavlovian conditioning" should not apply to human beings because "human beings have a greater cognitive capacity," and that "classical conditioning provides an insufficient basis for a celerity effect" (Nagin and Pogarsky 2001), Miller's findings that even the human brain can only deal with so many pieces of information at any one time (Miller 1956) force us to consider the possibility that human cognition is only operant under certain conditions.

Data collected in a pilot study by Sanford about law-makers' motivations for making laws (Sanford 2008) combined with Agnew's findings about law breakers' motivations for breaking them (Agnew 2006) demonstrates that, in addition to the relatively long-term dimensions of pressures at the group and institutional levels, an immediate dimension of pressure must be considered as a strong motivator for both legitimation and de-legitimation.

Knowing that both law-makers and law-breakers respond to short-term pressures, the next question is: Why is it that the short-term pressures, whose consequences seem to be less severe, have so much more weight for many actors than long-term consequences, which tend to be far harsher and of longer duration?

One answer may lie in George Miller's observation that the mind can only cope with about seven disparate pieces of information at any given time (Miller 1956). If one is dealing with threats to one's health, life, money, and physical safety, much of

the “processing space” available is already taken up and unavailable for logical, rational assessment of the long-term consequences of action.

Another answer may lie in the “discounting effect” which has been well-studied in economics; namely, that a person offered a reward now or the same reward later will tend to opt for the reward now (Green and Myerson 2004). In the same literature, it has also been shown that a person offered a small reward now or a larger reward later will tend to opt for the smaller reward now (a phenomenon known as “hyperbolic discounting”) (Luhmann, Ishida, and Hajcak 2011). This indicates that short-term rewards are more “real” to an actor than long-term rewards. It is reasonable to suppose that, in like manner, short-term consequences are more “real” to an actor than long-term consequences. Short-term pressures must be accounted for and attended to first, and thus should have a far greater effect on behavior. Loewenstein and Lerner have also shown that loss, or perceived loss, motivates motion to prevent the loss far more than perceived gain (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003).

This literature thus establishes that there is a third domain of pressure, the self-oriented domain, to legitimate or de-legitimate (that is, to comply or deviate) with social objects. While not well-recognized in the literature, it is discernible when these various observations are tied together.

The final part of this chapter will discuss research that allows us to investigate human decision-making in the face of various pressures, and moves us to a discussion of the overall theory and its implications for future research.

LITERATURE ON DECISION-MAKING

Apart from Tyler, there does not seem to be much literature tying human decisions to legitimation on the micro level. However, human decision-making always happens at the micro level, so one might say that the propriety component of legitimation must be taken into account in any micro-level discussion of legitimacy. We can draw on Tyler's work again for this component, in that fairness may not be evaluated only by community standards but also by its impact on the individual actor. Fairness can easily be evaluated by the comparison of one person's cost and benefit to another person's cost and benefit; if these are unequal and the inequality is unfavorable to the person making the legitimacy assessment, it seems more likely that a judgment of unfairness and thus illegitimacy will be assigned.

What Tyler's work, and the work of micro-theorists in legitimacy generally, is missing is the concept of the actor's cognitive frame when assigning legitimacy. By not understanding the approach an actor takes to making his decision about legitimacy assessment, the current literature is missing a vital and perhaps game-changing component that should be measured and addressed in any discussion of legitimacy assignment by subject actors.

One way in which micro-theorists in sociology often discuss decision-making by social actors is the idea of the cognitive frame, or the actor's specific understanding of the situation. This concept in the literature, and its operations, are discussed in the following section of this chapter.

COGNITIVE FRAMING AND IDENTITY THEORY

Defining the Cognitive Frame

Goffman, Garfinkel, and many other authors in the field of social psychology challenge the idea that all people understand a situation in the same way. At best, a shared understanding of a situation is constructed and may generally be the same, but differ in its specifics, as Garfinkel discovered during his breaching experiments (Garfinkel 1967:30) and as Goffman demonstrates in his work on the presentation of self (Goffman 1959:9). Goffman defines this understanding of the situation as a "frame," and in other literature in psychology and social psychology the concept is often expanded to "cognitive frame." Goffman's definition of a "primary frame" is something that "render[s] what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something meaningful" (Goffman 1974:21), which seems to be the definition of "cognitive frame" generally used in social psychology.

This concept of the cognitive frame is crucial to understanding a social actor's decisions – about legitimacy or anything else – and too much of the current work in micro-analysis of legitimacy assumes a single and common cognitive frame across all social actors. This appears to be a serious error, because if we do not understand the cognitive frame guiding a social actor's decision, we have not really understood their perception of the outcome. We have only understood *that* they made a decision and *what* that decision was, not *how* they arrived at it or *why* they decided the way they did. Unless we are satisfied with a behaviorist approach to the problem, we cannot treat the actor's cognitive frame as a black box. The particular

cognitive frame that an actor uses to understand and assess a situation is not a controlled factor in social research, and this uncontrolled factor may bias research results.

The reasons that cognitive frames exist will be discussed in Chapter 3, during the development of the overall theory. But knowing that cognitive frames exist, it is important to understand the mechanisms by which they function in the human mind. Identity theory gives us an analogous way of observing and measuring cognitive framing. The final section of this chapter will discuss the relevant sections of identity theory and its applicability to cognitive framing.

Identity Theory

The work of Stets (Stets 2003; Stets 2010), Stryker (1980), Lapsley and Narvaez (2004), Howard and Renfrow (2003), Aquino and Freeman (2009), Lasky (Lasky 2000), and Bargh and Pratto (1986) sets up the framework for a better understanding of cognitive framing, by examining identity activation in the context of social cues and priming. One might consider their various discoveries as support for the overall idea of cognitive "framing," defined by Minsky as "a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to a child's birthday party. Attached to each frame are several kinds of information. Some of this information is about how to use the frame. Some is about what one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these expectations

are not confirmed" (Minsky 1975:2). The use of frames as the basis for legitimation decisions is crucial to the theory being tested in this research.

An identity is, at its core, a set of meanings (Stets 2010:389). One might conceive of this as either a set of meanings defined by the individual, by society, or both. In either case, Howard and Renfrow's concept of "schema" in the moral psychology literature works well as a way to define the concept of an identity as intended by this research. Schema are "theories that shape how people view and use information." Howard and Renfrow cite DiMaggio (1997) to define this term, saying that schemas are "both abstract cognitive structures that represent organized knowledge about a concept or stimulus as well as mechanisms used in information processing" (Howard and Renfrow 2003:263).

Defining an identity as a schema in this way allows us to look at identity as an actor's working definition of how a particular role, and situations affecting that role, should work. While Howard and Renfrow define several different types of schema (role schema, person schema), just as Stets and Stryker define several different types of identities (role identity, person identity), schema and identities are all, at their core, tools for categorizing and organizing sets of meanings. Therefore, the particular *type* of identity or schema is irrelevant for this research; the important thing is that they are all cognitive tools that work in the same way and for similar purposes. Furthermore, when we compare Stets and Stryker's definitions of identity with Howard and Renfrow's definition of schema and Minsky's definition of a cognitive frame, we can see that all three of them fit this same overall definition. The

concepts of identity and schema in the identity theory and moral psychology literature, then, will be considered a specific category of the more general concept "*cognitive frame*," as used by the actor to make sense of a situation by using information contained within the frame, and these frames will be categorized by their correspondence to the three types of legitimation rationales.

Identity activation is a second and important concept supported by the literature. An identity means nothing if it is not activated. Activation means that it is present in the working memory of the actor and thus shaping the way he is viewing the world at that particular moment (Markus and Kunda 1986:858). Some identities are activated through contextual cues, while others are "on" all the time. According to empirical studies done by Bargh and Pratto, if a construct (by which this research means a frame) is "chronically accessible," it is more activated than a less-chronically accessible identity. Contextual priming can also activate identities, and there is an additive effect on social-information processing when an actor is both experiencing "chronicity" and "priming." Finally, the more often a frame is used and experienced within a context (that is, the more "chronically accessible" it is), the more likely it is to be used for interpreting what is happening (Bargh and Pratto 1986:307). Again analogizing identities to frames, the findings in the identity-theory literature will be applied to the activation of frames in this research.

A final concept from identity theory is important to this work. This is the idea of an *identity salience hierarchy* (Stets 2003:106; Stryker 1980:61). In an identity salience hierarchy, positively valued identities are more commonly activated and

expressed, while negatively valued identities are less commonly activated or expressed. Negative and positive values come about due to verification or non-verification of the congruence of one's identity presentation with an identity standard – i.e. someone who perceives himself as efficient will be non-verified by someone else responding to him as inefficient. According to Stets, this non-verification should lead to a change in behavior as the actor strives to align his presentation with his standard for the given identity (Stets 2010:106).

It follows logically that a person also strives for non-verification of negatively valued identities and that these negatively valued identities are not expressed unless there is no other choice. Given that people strive for verification of positively valued identities, it follows that they will practice and express these identities more often in pursuit of a more perfect congruence with the standard. This means that they are activating the identity and its associated meanings far more often than not, making it more "chronically accessible" in the words of Bargh and Pratto. Thus, this research hypothesizes that more salient cognitive frames should be activated more often as the actor seeks to verify positively valued frames and avoid verification of negatively valued frames. This research further hypothesizes that, just as activated identities predict behavior, activated frames should predict an actor's choice of legitimation rationales. Again, taking identity as a single type of cognitive frame, the findings in this literature will be applied to cognitive frames, and the presence of a *cognitive frame salience hierarchy* will be analogized from the identity theory literature and its findings. The reason this is important is because the salience of a

particular cognitive frame to an actor should be part of what governs choices of legitimation rationales.

It is not necessary to do further investigation to determine how cognitive frames work because this work has already been done in identity theory, covering sense-making, categorizing, meaning-making, and the relative importance of certain frames to others. This overview of the relevant concepts in identity theory is presented to assist the reader in understanding similar concepts and their function with regards to cognitive framing.

In the discussion of theory that follows, this dissertation will expand upon the idea that habitus guides decisions about legitimacy, moving along the axis of the three domains based on the relative intensity of social pressures salient to particular domains. It will discuss the emergence of cognitive frames as a reaction to increasing social complexity, the domains of decision-making that result from this complexity, the dimensions of these domains, and how this knowledge informs the overall theory presented in this dissertation.

CHAPTER 3: THEORY – THE EFFECT OF FRAMES ON DECISION-MAKING

It is important to understand that any decision is automatically a decision to legitimate an object, expectation, or behavior on the part of the social actor. Decision and legitimation/de-legitimation are essentially synonymous terms in this work and should be understood as such. To decide is to legitimate or de-legitimate; to de-legitimate or legitimate is to decide. Therefore, an investigation of decision-making is inherently an investigation of the processes of legitimation and de-legitimation.

Classical sociological, criminological, and economic interpretations of decision-making assume a rational, reasoning actor who decides through conscious evaluation. This type, or logic, of decision-making is termed *praxis* in this research. Research in cognitive and social psychology, however, suggests the use of cognitive frames as guidelines or justifications for decision-making, a logic of decision-making termed *habitus* in this research. The use of cognitive frames further suggests that the process of decision-making is neither as conscious nor as deliberate as previous interpretations led us to believe. Achen and Bartels' finding that people making decisions about political issues do not reason but rationalize (Achen and Bartels 2006) suggest the use of a cognitive frame to allow the social actor to evaluate a situation against previously-known information and make a decision guided by the previous information.

The theory presented in the following pages rests upon three sets of typologies that bear on decision outcomes. The first typology is the logic of decision-making used by the social actor. As already discussed in some detail in the literature review, the two logics identified in present literature include praxis, or the active and deliberate decision, and habitus, the routinized or semiconscious decision. Praxis logic is activated by novel situations, while habitus logic is activated by known situations. Praxis creates frames for the actor to use in habitus decisions later.

The second typology is the three domains of salient pressure: the self-oriented domain, the group-oriented domain, and the institution-oriented domain. These domains emerge from actors' original praxis-based actions about novel situations. These decisions create norms that allow the use of habitus to deal with known situations in a routine fashion. These norms can be categorized into three domains that deal with particular types of consequences for noncompliance. The self-oriented norms have consequences that are individualized and immediate. The group-oriented norms have consequences that are group-centered and take longer to occur and resolve. Institution-oriented norms have consequences that are institution-centered, take the longest to occur, and may never resolve. Once established, objects located in each domain generate pressures on the actor to legitimate or de-legitimate their various demands.

The last typology is the set of four dimensions that preferentially activate domain-associated frames within a social actor. These dimensions directly affect

whether an actor will be legitimating on the basis of the self, the group, or the institution by varying the amount and types of pressures the actor experiences when confronted with a salient social object. These pressures begin with the salience of the object, which activates domain-related frames. The remaining three dimensions of timeframe, social space, and agents of consequence then determine whether the more-concrete frame of self needs, the middle-ground frame of group issues, or the abstract frame of institutional dictates will take precedence. The preferential activation of these four dimensions determines the hierarchy of decision-making when multiple domains are in play for a social actor.

These findings about the irrationality of the social actor's decision-making process contradict judicial assumptions about how juries come to decisions and scientific assumptions about rational thinking. Literature discussing legitimation through habitus further suggests that when habitus is in play, the actor is using an already-formed cognitive frame to make sense of the situation since reasoning is not occurring. This chapter will discuss in detail the emergence of three domains of salient pressure from the original praxis response to new situations, and how these domains of salient pressure are the source of the cognitive frames that guide rationalized actions and decisions, through the mobilization of the four dimensions to arrive at the frame that ultimately guides the decision made.

INITIAL LOGIC: HABITUS, OR PRAXIS?

To briefly recap the discussion in the literature review section that reconciled habitus and praxis: praxis occurs during novel conditions, while habitus occurs during known conditions. The first mobilization in a decision process involves assessing the situation as known or unknown. Unknown conditions include entirely novel, never-before-encountered conditions, as well as conditions where the expected situation is breached or uncertain. In these conditions, praxis (active deliberation) will take place.

Praxis decisions can only happen once for a social actor about any situation. Once he has performed praxis for a novel situation, the very act of having done so makes the situation no longer novel, and from that point forward, the logic of habitus draws upon what he already knows about that situation the next time it is encountered. Figure 1 demonstrates this process.

As shown in Figure 1, the actor must first notice a social object (that is, it must be salient). Once the object is noticed, the next question is whether the rule-set of the social object is known or unknown. If it is known, an additional question in the same step is whether the rule-set is operating as expected. Either an unknown rule-set or a known rule-set operating in an unknown way will lead the actor to use praxis in order to understand the novel situation, and his decision about the social object will be guided by his active deliberation. However, if the rule-set of the social object is both known and operating as expected, the actor will use habitus, or

already-known information, to evaluate the situation, which then mediates the decision he makes about the social object in question.

Figure 1: The Praxis/Habitus Process



When actual reasoning (rather than rationalization) is required, the rational brain is good at these kinds of decisions, but *only as long as no emotional or irrational components are involved to complicate matters*. Lehrer finds that when we become overwhelmed with too much information, our working memory (where rational deliberation takes place) goes offline (Lehrer 2009). Even self-oriented salient objects can trigger emotional and irrational components of a situation, and

these components tend to create complexity beyond what the working memory can deal with. At this point, the self-oriented frame is activated, and simplifies the decision-making process.[2]

This leads us to a discussion of the relationship of the two logics to the emergence of the three domains, which is the topic of the next section.

FROM PRAXIS TO HABITUS: THREE DOMAINS OF SALIENT PRESSURE

Research performed in 2008 demonstrated that people have three domains of differential pressure to make decisions, by which they justify or rationalize their decisions (Sanford 2008) as discussed by Achen and Bartels. The existence of these domains implies that they emerged as a natural consequence of the drive to simplify complex pressures in the environment into manageable bases for habitus decision-making.

The function of praxis in dealing with novel situations leading to habitus for dealing with known situations does not *create* the domains. Rather, the domains

[2] An additional possibility is that we are socialized to make decisions based on certain frames that are acceptable to our larger culture. The existing research examined mostly Western populations, which place a strong emphasis on individualism, self-esteem, rationality, scientific reasoning, and individual problem-solving. These results might be different in a culture that is largely communitarian, or in a culture that emphasizes value- or rule-based reasoning over individual cognition, calculation and rationality. It would be interesting to see if these patterns of prevalence in decision types were reversed in a communitarian society such as China or Japan. Yet another possibility is that in a more homogeneous culture we should expect to find a higher prevalence of institution- and/or group-oriented decision-making because everyone shares the same values, and so self-oriented praxis negotiation, such as that engaged in by courts when they look at new evidence, is not needed as much to sort out differences between individuals. In a more heterogeneous culture there is less group- and institution-oriented guidance about decision-making due to a plethora of value-sets and the need to negotiate some common pathway between and among them, as in the West. While both of these are possibilities, they may be subordinate to the general idea of this theory that one's experiences – including socialization – shape one's cognitive frames and thus one's decision-making choices.

emerge as a consequence of increasing complexity in the social environment, through increases in population size, technological development, and diversity (among many others). Each time a novel situation occurs, praxis is the social actor's response. Once praxis has been utilized, the situation is no longer novel and can then be addressed as a known condition through habitus.

As society continues to diversify and become more complex, actors are confronted with more and more complex situations. Fortunately, since society also tends to routinize the more-complex challenges that humans face through bureaucratization, habitus works well to deal with these challenges. Human social evolution to deal with pressures on the self, on and from the group, and on and from the institutions that humans have ties to leads to the emergence of three domains. These domains then prompt the use of associated frames to make decisions about salient pressures within those domains.

This section of this chapter will look first at the three domains as typologies, and then discuss their emergence through human social evolutionary processes.

In research performed in 2008, Sanford determined the existence of three domains of justification for decisions. The first, and the most commonly reported by respondents, encompasses decisions rationalized against the standard of harm avoidance or loss aversion on an individual level, so it would include immediate needs for safety, food, shelter, hydration, self-esteem, and survival. I named this domain the *self-oriented* domain. The second most common domain measured the situation in question against a set of group-centered ideas or needs, including

belonging, values, norms, and reputation – what I term the *group-oriented* domain. The third and least common was an appeal to an authority or a discrete set of rules to justify the decision – which I term the *institution-oriented* domain.

The self-oriented domain appears to be concerned mainly with issues that have immediate or short-term consequences; that is, the effects will be felt (or in many cases, avoided) nearly immediately when the decision is made. The group-oriented domain seems to be concerned mainly with issues that have informal, but longer-term and group-imposed, consequences when decisions are made about them. Finally, decisions within the institution-oriented domain often carry formal, long-term, and relatively severe consequences. As an example, self-oriented issues carry effects like hunger/satiation, loss of face/maintenance of face, loss of money/protection or gain of money, etc. Group-oriented issues are associated with effects such as shunning, shaming, disconnection from the group, or other informal but group-imposed consequences. The effects of institution-oriented issues are usually such formal and long-term consequences as jail time, fines, and in extreme cases capital punishment. Just as each domain deals with issues that are increasingly more abstract and thus removed from the social actor by a cognitive space, so do the consequences of these issues become increasingly more formalized, longer-term, and severe.

Although one might think that the self-oriented domain is the domain in which truly rational thought and analysis (or legitimacy through praxis) occurs, use of the self-oriented frame is not the same as being a rational actor. Once a frame is

activated, praxis is nonexistent, because the frame is what allows an actor to simplify, routinize, and rationalize their decisions. Although we normally assume a rational actor when making decisions about immediate needs such as hunger, thirst, money, and safety (and indeed, praxis assumes a rational, not a rationalizing, actor), praxis is an active, analytical, deliberate way of assessing pressures and making decisions. It would seem logical that if intensity and complexity of pressures activate cognitive frames, then the praxis logic of legitimating is rare and seldom used. Even when a social actor must make decisions about self-oriented issues, those self-oriented issues almost always trigger a self-oriented frame that is designed to reduce complexity in the environment and simplify decision-making. Only completely novel objects and issues trigger the logic of praxis.

The existence of these three domains of rationalizing demonstrates that human beings have other ways than simple cost-benefit analysis to justify their decisions, and that in fact they rarely engage in such an analysis because frame activation precludes it. One of the theoretical reasons proposed for these domains was that as human beings have to deal with more complexity, they want to simplify things wherever possible. Part of the reason is that the more complex a situation is, the more unpredictable it is, and thus the more risky it is (or, at least, is perceived to be). It is generally known that humans are risk-averse, so this is a big motivator for reducing complexity. By simplifying one-on-one instrumental negotiations into group norms, and then further codifying those fuzzy group norms into hard-and-fast

rules and authorities, human beings continually simplify complex situations into manageable cognitive frames.

When humans deal with others only in small groups such as hunter-gatherer bands, the more cumbersome and time-consuming method of praxis negotiation to agree on standards of behavior is possible, because there are relatively few people to interact and make agreements with. The social space is, at best, on the group-oriented level, and the other factors such as novelty and complexity are usually relatively low in these small-group environments, which means the brain is not overwhelmed by complexity. However, once each person in the group has agreed with each other person in the group "I won't hit you if you won't hit me," a norm evolves from those negotiations: *People in our group don't hit each other.*

The existence of the norm simplifies the negotiation process – it becomes "Nice people don't hit each other," rather than requiring a negotiation every time the situation arises where someone might hit someone else. Since everyone in the group (at least, hypothetically) is socialized into and thus agrees to the norm, social pressure can come into play to enforce it. The offender is shamed and/or ostracized to correct violations of norms. However, since norms are fuzzy, rather than absolute, the size of the group matters for how well this kind of social pressure will work against normative deviance. When there are only a relatively small number of people in the group, there is probably consensus on the meaning of the norm, and a unified force can be brought to bear against a deviant.

However, even that process eventually becomes too complex, as the group grows in size. Since normative standards are not set in stone, each sub-group within the group may develop a differing interpretation of what, exactly, the norm means or what severity of response a deviation might require. At some point, it is simply too complex to organize the entire group against the offending individual, since different sub-groups within the overall group differ on what the norm means. One finding on social group size, sometimes called 'Dunbar's number,' suggests that the upper limit of an individual's capacity for strong ties, or personal knowledge of others, may be around 150 persons (Hill and Dunbar 2003). Any larger, and it is less likely that group pressure will work as an effective social control on deviance and noncompliance, since group pressure for compliance operates through strong ties.

Thus, an institution emerges from the norms, codifies them as hard-and-fast rules, and begins enforcing them with the authority given by those very norms. This makes decision-making even simpler for the social actor. Now, instead of having to negotiate with every person in her environment on an individual level, or call on a social norm and hope that most people in the group will agree with her interpretation of it and exert normative pressure against the offender, all she has to do is call on the authority and its rule-enforcers to solve the problem.

Habitus interpretations of legitimacy depend on this model of the emergence of three domains of pressures. At all points beyond the initial, novel situation, social actors are using frames, based on already-known information about a situation, to make decisions about that situation. In all cases, a frame is used to make and justify

the decision, which means that habitus is the logic used in all cases. This may be why Zelditch finds that validity (habitus) is the controlling influence on legitimacy (Zelditch 2006). The social actor rarely acts rationally in a complex environment. His actions and decisions are nearly always guided by habitus – by the cognitive frame.

The next section of this chapter defines in more detail how this process of frame creation occurs, through research in cognitive psychology.

FRAME CREATION THROUGH COMPLEXITY REDUCTION

One of Lehrer's findings about the biological operation of the human brain is that when situations become overly complex, we are biologically wired to go with our feelings or subconscious, instead (Lehrer 2009). However, if biology were all there was to our decision-making methodology, we would never be able to change the basis of our decisions, even if that basis became maladaptive. As human beings are adaptive organisms, there must be some social and/or cognitive mechanism that has not been recognized, which shapes the emotional brain's patterns, guides these rationalizations of decisions already made, and yet allows for adaptation in the face of new circumstances. I argue in this research that this shaping, guiding, and adaptive mechanism in human cognition is the *cognitive frame*, or rationale for creating meaning and organization within a social environment. These frames are, in a sense, the lenses through which actors assess social objects and which reduce complexity in decision-making.

Increasing complexity in the environment leads human beings to seek to reduce that complexity wherever possible. Lehrer, quoting Herbert Simon, says "a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention" (Lehrer 2009:158). This could explain why, in the face of complexity, we resort to frames rather than rational thought. As discussed earlier both in the literature review section on celerity and in the discussion of the differences between praxis and habitus, George Miller demonstrated in 1956 that the average human brain can only store five to nine "chunks" of information in the working memory at any given time. The more "chunks" we have to deal with at once, the less attention we have available to bring to the subject at hand. However, the human brain can take a set of related "bits" of information and "chunk" them together to reduce complexity (1956:15). For example, trying to remember nine separate and unrelated digits is difficult, but chunking them into the relational pattern of a Social Security number (XXX-XX-XXXX)[3] allows them to be recalled far more easily and reduces the amount of attention space they take up. This finding both supports the conclusion that humans are biologically wired to reduce complexity wherever possible, and also may give us a clue as to how cognitive frames are created – through the chunking process, which seeks to reduce complexity.

Sociology has thousands of examples of this kind of complexity reduction. From the use of stereotypes to judge situations to the labeling of deviants in order to

[3] Even a simple relational pattern like a phone number or a Social Security number could be considered a cognitive frame, making meaning out of otherwise meaningless information.

set guidelines about further interaction with them, through racial, ethnic, and gender designations and laws that set generalized standards for specific human behaviors, human beings are continually attempting to make life less complex and more manageable. Creation of frames (or schema, or identities, or guidelines) are simply a natural human response to overwhelming complexity.

The next section of this chapter will discuss the mobilization of these frames when single- and multiple-domain situations present themselves.

FRAME MOBILIZATION THROUGH DIMENSIONS OF PRESSURES

Once frames are created through the chunking process of complexity reduction, the next question is how they are mobilized. If a social object generates pressure in only one domain, it is reasonable to think that it will activate an associated frame and guide a decision. The man who is hungry will find food. The woman who is driving will remember the traffic laws and abide by them. The child who has annoyed his friends will remember to avoid the behavior that caused the annoyance and his subsequent, if temporary, disconnection from the group.

However, some social objects generate pressures in more than one area. For example, the need to eat (self pressure) may conflict with group prohibitions, such as dietary guidelines, about what is appropriate to eat (group pressure) or institutional dictates about what is permitted to eat (institutional pressure). The question is, which of these domains will predominate for the hungry person on a diet who has a weigh-in at Weight Watchers the next morning, or for the hungry

person from a culture having to deal with a culture where their preferred food is considered off-limits or not even food? We can imagine this issue for Cambodians having to adjust to the fact that Americans do not consider dog an appropriate food, or Americans having to adjust to the fact that East India does not see cows as food. In this case, pressures are felt from at least two of the three domains; how does the actor prioritize one over another to justify his decision?

In our intensely complex modern world, it stands to reason that a more complex environment would lead to pressures for the mobilization of cognitive frames that allow simpler decision-making. A number of things can make a cognitive environment more complex. These include:

Salience: the domain-specific kinds of consequences the actor will experience from making or avoiding the decision;

Timeframe: how fast the consequence of deciding or not deciding will occur (*onset)* and how long it will last *(duration/resolution);*

Social Space: the relative embeddedness of the actor in social networks, including the strength (*intensity*) and number (*density*) of ties involved; and

Agent of Consequence: the source of, or the agent imposing, the consequence for the decision.

These dimensions define the domains in question, thereby defining the particular cognitive frame activated within the actor as an attempt to simplify the pressures created by these dimensions into something manageable. Table 2 goes into more detail about the specific characteristics of each dimension of these

domains. If Lehrer's and Sanford's findings are correct, then changes in levels of these dimensions should create a need within individual social actors for complexity reduction, risk reduction, and an increase in predictability. These dimensions may affect the social actor at any or all of the three levels of self-, group-, or institution-oriented concerns, depending on their intensity.

Table 2 - Domains of Pressures and Their Dimensions

Domain	Self-Oriented	Group-Oriented	Institution-Oriented
Dimension			
Salience	Material: consequences to body, money, physical safety, health Nonmaterial: consequences to identity, self-perception, ego	Material: consequences to material goods obtained from community connections Nonmaterial: consequences to community ties, perceptions, and expectations of actor	Material: consequences to body, money, freedom Nonmaterial: consequences to institutional labels, connections, relative treatment of actor
Timeframe	Immediate onset/near-immediate resolution	Delayed onset/extended resolution	Very delayed onset/may never resolve
Social Space	Weak/no ties – low density and low intensity	Strong ties – high density and high intensity	Affiliational ties – low density but high intensity
Agent of Consequence	No agent, or the self	Group as agent of consequence	Institution as agent of consequence

One of the surprising results that had not been predicted by theory during Sanford's 2008 research was the Guttman scaling of decision domains. Self-oriented decision-making appeared the most often, with group- and finally institution-oriented domains appearing less and least often, respectively. Originally, the hypothesis was that there would be specific groups of people who tended to reason in one way and one way only. Instead, all subjects tended to use all domains, but preferentially tended towards the self-oriented domain.

In the light of Lehrer's and Miller's findings, we can see that most decisions that human beings make on a self-oriented level tend to be simple, snap, and routinized – that is, decisions through habitus – and the most common kind of decisions needed on a general basis, rarely having any emotional or strenuous analytic thought component involved. Part of the reason for this is that most of these self-oriented decisions have near-immediate consequences, and we do not have time to engage in long-term analysis about them. Driving is largely an emotionless and routine exercise, as is walking; most decisions involve how to avoid obstacles and how to get to point B from point A in a timely and efficient fashion. Even working in an office or factory environment rarely has a deep-thought or heavily emotional component, at least where most routinized work is concerned (although office politics can push a person out of self-oriented and into group- or institution-oriented reasoning).

From the pattern of the Guttman scaling in the 2008 results, it initially appeared that as the actor's working memory gets more occupied with more information, the actor should also be likely to move more and more towards group-oriented and then institution-oriented justifications for his decisions due to a preference for simpler situations and simpler decision-making. Additionally, it seemed that the more complex the social environment (whether brought on by the target of the decision itself, the context in which the actor is situated, or both), the more likely that an actor's working memory is going to be over-occupied and a cognitive frame activated as a result. Some environments and situations are more

cognitively challenging and quickly overwhelm the ability to perform emotionless, self-oriented reasoning. The complexity of the salient pressures in the social environment should pressure people into cognitive efficiency through the use of a cognitive frame, or what we have been calling *legitimacy through habitus.*

However, this initial understanding also assumed that praxis is the "normal" method of reasoning about self-oriented pressures, and habitus the "normal" reasoning about more-abstract group and institution-oriented pressures. This does not now appear to be the case. The question is how do we prioritize a particular domain's demands over others in a complex environment, or even the demands of a single domain if there is more than one pressure from that domain?

This leads to the discussion of the four dimensions of pressure associated with the three domains. The next section of this chapter will discuss frame prioritization through differential levels of pressure of these dimensions and their predicted outcomes for the social actor.

Step 1: Salience

Some investigations of cognitive framing have already been performed, although they were not labeled as such. These investigations give insight into the four dimensions that define each domain as their relative intensities increase or decrease. The first that will be discussed here relates to salience.

The first of the four dimensions of pressure must be salience. If the object is not salient, the actor does not need to make a decision about it. Therefore, the actor

must first notice the object because it is salient to consequences he may experience through the decision he makes. In this model, noticing a salient object activates a related cognitive frame.

One interesting study by Lasky investigated the "chronic" personality (or what this research might call the most-often-activated frame) and the effects on decision-making in his dissertation, *Chronic Accessibility of Virtue-Trait Inferences: A Social-Cognitive Approach to the Moral Personality* from Ball State University (Lasky 2000). This work gives us insight into the first of the four dimensions, *salience*, or the types of consequences the actor faces within each domain that activate frames corresponding to that domain.

In this work, Lasky postulates a "high chronic" moral personality and a "low chronic" moral personality. These fit into the same categories as the "group-oriented" reasoner and the "self-oriented" reasoner, respectively. Moral chronics/group-oriented reasoners base assessments, evaluations, decisions, etc. upon moral or value-laden criteria. As previously discussed, morals and values (norms) are associated with group-centered thinking. Meanwhile, non-chronics/self-oriented reasoners base assessments, evaluations, decisions, etc. upon what Lasky calls "semantic"[4] and economic criteria. Lasky is not clear as to whether

[4] For Lasky, and others working in the field of moral psychology, "semantic" apparently means "having no moral content." For example, for his statement "The plumber always meets his obligations and keeps his word," the "moral" cue word was "responsible," but the "semantic" cue word was "pipes." Similarly, for his statement "The accountant assists others with no expectation of a reward," the "moral" cue word was "kind," but the "semantic" cue word was "numbers." This demonstrates that Lasky's designation "semantic" could also mean "concrete," rather than abstract. He does not use the word in its usual linguistic, meaning-connected sense.

the non-chronics in his study use praxis or habitus for their reasoning, but as it is unlikely that the study identified completely new situations for his respondents, it is safe to assume that these chronics were responding, through habitus, with a self-oriented frame to the initial assessments Lasky used to divide them into chronics and non-chronics.

Another interesting work relating to salience is Altemeyer's discovery of the authoritarian personality, which does not base its assessments, evaluations, decisions, etc. upon either moral or instrumental criteria but upon rules and authorities (Altemeyer 2006). This matches at least the non-material pressures within the salience dimension of the third proposed category of the "institution-oriented" reasoner.

Lasky and Altemeyer's work is in the realm of psychology, and thus might be dismissed by most sociologists. However, as sociologists, we hold that personalities are formed by socialization (social pressure), and are not inborn (Garfinkel 2008; Goffman 1959; Mead 1967). Altemeyer and Lasky have both demonstrated that these personality traits can be brought to the forefront by "cueing" them, and that for people who are indoctrinated or socialized to be moral chronics (Lasky) or authoritarians (Altemeyer), these traits can be so pervasive as to be constant unless deterred or derailed by direct suggestion or prompting, as in Lasky's findings.

This researcher postulates that these direct suggestions or promptings need not be overt or intentional, and that these promptings as well as the creation of these "chronics" of different types through socialization and experiences are the

sociological factors that have been overlooked in understanding decision-making. Deeply socialized habit does explain many of the frames that people hold; socialization "primes" them to view the world a certain way, creating Lasky's "chronics." It stands to reason that a person who is primed to perceive the world a certain way will be even more likely to perceive it that way when cues which are associated with that frame are provided.

Altemeyer and Milgram have both shown the presence of an authority to have a direct effect on the authoritarian response of authoritarian personalities (Altemeyer 2006; Milgram 1963); the presence of a moral cue has been shown by Lasky to have a direct effect on spontaneous trait inference by moral chronics, and the presence of a concrete cue has been shown by Lasky to have a direct effect on spontaneous trait inference by concrete chronics (Lasky 2000). This demonstrates the dimension of *salience* as a defining trait of the three domains.

Since these studies have also shown that the presence of an *opposing* cue (concrete cue for moral chronics, and moral cue for concrete chronics) to a large extent negates the chronic frame (Lasky 2000), this research will assume that even those subjects who are "chronics" will respond to salient outside prompts which steer them to think in a different manner than their accustomed manner of thinking, and that there is no need to differentiate between chronics and non-chronics since prompts have already been shown to move individuals in particular directions.

This research leads us to two important points. The first is that an object whose pressures are related to a particular domain activates the associated frame

for that domain. For example, social objects that contain self-oriented pressures alone are far more likely to activate self-oriented frames, while objects containing group-oriented pressures alone activate group-oriented frames, and objects containing institution-oriented pressures by themselves activate institution-oriented frames.

The second point, however, is that these single-pressure situations are relatively rare. Almost always, the actor is dealing with situations that have at least two and usually all three domain pressures active. So how does he prioritize? Since Lasky's work shows that environmental prompts do move actors in different directions (Lasky 2000), the question now becomes: *which prompts, and what directions?*

Step 2: Timeframe

From other work already discussed, it is logical to believe that the first of the remaining dimensions that should have an effect on frame prioritization is the relative immediacy, or *timeframe*, of the pressures the actor is experiencing. All else being equal, more-immediate consequences tend to 'drown out' other, longer-term consequences. Discounting theory explains some of this phenomenon. The "discounting effect" which has been well-studied in economics demonstrates that a person offered a reward now or the same reward later will tend to opt for the reward now (Green and Myerson 2004). In the same literature, it has also been shown that a person offered a small reward now or a larger reward later will tend to

opt for the smaller reward now, a phenomenon known as "hyperbolic discounting" (Luhmann, Ishida, and Hajcak 2011). This indicates that short-term rewards are more "real" to an actor than long-term rewards. It is reasonable to suppose that, in like manner, short-term consequences are more "real" to an actor than long-term consequences. Short-term pressures must be accounted for and attended to first, and thus should have a far greater effect on behavior. Loewenstein and Lerner have also shown that loss, or perceived loss, motivates motion to prevent the loss far more than perceived gain (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). Finally, at least one examination of immediate imposition of punishments shows that swiftness to consequence (celerity) can become an overriding issue for social actors (Yu 1994).

This leads us to the logical conclusion that any social objects that contain self-oriented pressures, whether singly or in combination with others, are far more likely to activate self-oriented frames, due to the relative intensity of short-term needs and their attached consequences versus long-term needs and their attached consequences. When intense self-oriented pressure floods the working memory, it makes it impossible to pay attention to anything but the immediate needs and consequences of these pressures. Long-term thinking goes completely out the window. Conversely, when an actor is under intense group- and institution-oriented pressure, but low self-oriented pressure, the long-term effects of group- and institution-oriented consequences become more "real" to the social actor and thus demand his attention-space.

However, there are times when actors, despite facing high levels of self-oriented pressure, will still decide based on longer-term needs such as group acceptance or staying on the good side of an institution. The remaining two dimensions of *social space* and *agents of consequence* explain this shift.

Step 3: Social Space and Agents of Consequence

According to Lapsley and Narvaez, citing Lapsley and Lasky (2001), the importance of a particular cognitive frame to an actor should vary contextually in other ways as well, because although some individuals ("moral chronics") will react within their preferred cognitive frames without prompting, there is an additive effect when a prompt is provided (Lapsley and Narvaez 2004:203). This suggests that in an institutional context such as the workplace, group-oriented cognitive frames, such as value systems, may exert a weaker constraining influence on a social actor's behavior than they would in a group-oriented context such as the social actor's family. Institutional contexts would include any context where an accepted or legitimate authority is present (where the judgment of "accepted or legitimate" is located within the social actor), such as the workplace when the boss is present, or the church when the pastor is present. This suggests that social context should also have an effect on the type of legitimation method used, and identifies the third dimension of pressure, which is defined in this research as *social space.* Social space is the relative embeddedness of the actor in terms of ties to others or to institutions:

the self-oriented domain has weak or no ties, the group-oriented domain has strong ties, and the institution-oriented domain has affiliational ties.

The fact that survey subjects in Sanford's 2008 study (Sanford 2008) used more than one frame at a time in many circumstances implies that these frames may be used simultaneously, but the Guttman scalability represented in the original survey results suggests that this occurs in a hierarchical manner. Although more than one domain of salient concerns may exist in a social object, the Guttman scalability might suggest that one method of legitimacy assignment should "trump" or predominate over another method. (Sanford 2008). The Guttman scalability, however, could suggest either that the trumping occurs through more-abstract domains trumping more-concrete, or vice-versa.

A motivation exists for defaulting to the more-abstract or simpler option: the consequences for the decisions are greater for the social actor at each successive level. At the self level, the actor has only his own instrumental concerns to worry about, not social ostracism or institutional consequences. At the group level, informal sanctioning comes into play as well as its attendant informal consequences of normative stigma, up to and including ostracism. At the institutional level, formal sanctions, with their attendant formal consequences that necessarily carry group stigmas and self-focused penalties, are the harshest and the ones the actor is most likely to want to address; ignoring the consequences of a decision at this level carries the most danger for the actor.

However, there is the additional issue of immediacy of consequence to consider. The Guttman scalability also indicated that people respond more in an instrumental fashion than any other, which suggests that concrete needs usually take precedence over abstract issues. Furthermore, previous research already discussed indicates that people tend to pay attention to immediate pressures first and long-term pressures afterward, especially when they are dealing with multiple pressures at once (Agnew 2006; Lehrer 2009; Miller 1956; Sanford 2012). Indeed, the scalability could indicate a hierarchy that predominantly focuses on concrete (and thus more-immediate) needs, treating more abstract issues as secondary.

Certainly, it is not unreasonable to imagine a situation where immediacy is not a factor. If there are no immediate needs for the social actor such as hunger, thirst, shelter, clothing, and physical safety, the more-abstract pressures of the group or institutional domain may predominate. But how do we determine which way the actor will move along the spectrum of the three domains? The mechanism by which one trumps the other and establishes a hierarchy from most-concrete to most-abstract, or vice-versa, seems to be governed by the interaction of the last two dimensions of the domains: *social space* and *agent of consequence*.

Social space is determined by the network ties the actor is experiencing at that moment. If he is experiencing no ties, he is in the self-oriented domain. However, if he experiences strong ties to his group members or affiliational ties to an institution, he is no longer located in the self-oriented domain but the group or institutional domain. What moves an actor to one domain or another in social space is the

presence or absence of agents of consequence – that is, the source of consequences and the agent that imposes those consequences. In a group-oriented situation, the agent of consequence is other group members; in an institution-oriented situation, the agent of consequence is a representative of the institution. To use the example referenced earlier, a dieter who is alone may be more likely to 'cheat,' but if he is constantly in contact with and reminded of the existence of his dieting group (such as Weight Watchers) he is more likely to assess situations in the context of that group's values. Similarly, a person who does not perceive himself as observed may be more likely to break the law by shoplifting or speeding, but the presence of a security guard or a police officer serves to remind him of his institutional affiliational tie, and thus deters deviant behavior.

When a representative or representatives of a group or an institution that the actor has ties to is present, as an agent of consequence, the actor is reminded of those longer-term consequences. The presence of a group representative, or agent of consequence, increases both the salience of the longer-term consequence and makes it seem more immediate to the social actor because the agent's presence is immediate, rather than removed in time. This activates the dimension of *social space* for the actor; if reminders of the ties an actor has to groups or institutions are present, especially agents that can impose group or institutional consequences, this may mitigate or negate the presence of immediate pressures. The idea of "peer pressure," or the presence of an authority figure as already shown in the Milgram

and Altemeyer experiments, demonstrates the operation of the dimension of agent of consequence (Altemeyer 2006; Milgram 1963).

Figure 2 demonstrates the order of operations for this process. If an actor is confronted with a multiple-domain triggering social object (one that is known), the first question is, again: is the object salient? If it is not, no decision is needed. If it is, then the second question is whether an agent of consequence is present. If no, then immediate pressures will take priority and the decision will be rationalized based upon those pressures. If yes, then the social space associated with the agent of consequence is activated, the pressures associated with that domain will take priority, and the decision is rationalized based on those pressures instead.

Figure 2: Operation of Dimensions



DISCUSSION – HOW THE TYPOLOGIES FIT TOGETHER

Sanford's findings about domains of pressures, as well as Lehrer's findings about how the human brain makes decisions in the face of complexity, fly in the face of the common assumptions about decision-making – and about legitimacy. Two of these assumptions are questioned by these findings: the relationship of complexity to decision-making logic, and the assumption that longer-term and more-severe

pressures will have more effect than shorter-term and less-severe pressures on curtailing deviance and increasing legitimacy.

First, we tend to assume that more complex problems *must* demand more rational thought and interpretation, while simple decisions do not – but in reality, it's the other way around (Lehrer 2009). There seems to be an inverse relationship between complexity of problems or the environment and simplicity of problem-solving methods demonstrated in this research. This complexity can manifest either as community pressures to comply, or as individual needs that must be addressed first. Additionally, understanding that the relationship between rational and non-rational decision-making is based upon whether the situation is novel or known explains and reconciles the disconnect between the two definitions of legitimacy (praxis and habitus) in the literature.

Secondly, understanding how multiple-pressure situations are resolved depends upon the knowledge of the four dimensions that compose each domain. *Salience*, or the substantive content of the pressures, activates domains and frames, but *timeframe* is the first of the remaining three dimensions that, absent pressures from the other two, will move an actor towards the self-oriented end of the spectrum, prioritizing immediate needs over community or institutional expectations. However, when an agent of consequence appears and triggers a related social space, the actor must now prioritize community needs or institutional dictates over his own self-oriented need, because the presence of the agent of

consequence makes those higher-level needs more immediate and salient than they had been previously.

The typologies fit together thusly: Whether an object is known or unknown triggers the first typology of logic. If the object is unknown, the logic is praxis and a deliberate decision about a novel object. If the object is known, the logic is habitus and involves the use of a cognitive frame to make a routinized decision about a known object. If the logic is habitus, the next question is which of three domains the actor feels pressure from. The dimension generating that pressure is known as salience – whether the actor will experience consequences from his decision about the social object. Once the actor has determined the object is salient, the next question is how quickly the consequence will occur, which is determined by the second dimension of timeframe. In a situation where multiple domain-specific pressures are present in the object, the next question becomes whether those higher-level domains are activated, or remain dormant in the face of immediate consequences. If an agent of consequence is not present, the frame related to the most-immediate pressure present is activated. If an agent of consequence is present and activates a higher-level social space in the actor, however, the frame related to the pressures of the domain that is related to the agent of consequence is activated instead. Finally, the activated frame guides decision-making about the triggering object.

In order to understand decision-making, then, we need to understand how cognitive frames affect the decision-making process: how they are activated, how

they are used, and how they shape decisions. But how do we analyze cognitive frames? Although we could embark on a research program to discover various cognitive frames and how they are formed, it turns out that this is not necessary. As discussed in the literature review, the research on this has already been done within identity theory. An identity, after all, is simply a particular way of organizing and attaching meaning to formerly meaningless social objects and contexts, so it is a specific example of the more general concept "cognitive frame." Therefore, it is reasonable to take identity theory research on identity salience, identity activation, and identity salience hierarchy, and apply the already-discovered properties and dynamics directly to the analysis of cognitive frames.

Knowing that legitimation involves three domains of pressures by which actors rationalize their decisions and which activate cognitive frames, and that each domain is composed of four dimensions of pressures that act to differentially prioritize these frames to guide decisions, allows us to understand the circumstances under which each domain-related frame is mobilized to rationalize the assignment or withdrawal of legitimacy. From this point forward, this research will focus on whether certain kinds of pressures activate frames and, subsequently, produce justifications that match those frames for the decision in question, or whether decision-making has no relationship to activated frames.

This dissertation defines legitimacy as a social actor's perception and/or assessment of a social object and its attached properties as binding or constraining that actor's actions or behaviors in some way, but without an overtly coercive

element. Sanford's work (Sanford 2008) is centrally applicable to the question of how legitimacy might be related to a given social situation. The findings demonstrate, in addition to what has already been outlined above, that the existence of three levels of rationales for legitimation implies three domains of legitimacy: self-oriented, group-oriented, and institution-oriented. At the micro level, people assign legitimacy to social objects, events, and things by rationalizing against a set of domains (Sanford 2008) using one of two methods (Dornbusch and Scott 1975).

However, the two methods, or logics, of legitimation seem intimately tied to the types of pressures that social actors face in a given situation, and more specifically, whether those pressures are novel or known. Legitimation through habitus, or routinized rationalization, is common across all three domains. Legitimation through praxis, on the other hand, seems relatively rare. In fact, any time that a cognitive frame is activated, praxis no longer applies; through habitus, the frame is controlling the decision-making.

Legitimation through praxis, or active analysis, seems to occur only in anomic conditions, either when new rules are presented to the actor for the first time, or when the standard rules of society are broken, or when one set of rules conflicts with another set and the actor must make an active evaluation of the situation. For example, in Garfinkel's breaching experiment where his students were asked to go home and behave as boarders to their parents for fifteen minutes, two rule-sets were in play. The unknowing parents were operating in the "family member" rule-set, while the students acted in the "economic relationship" rule-set. This breach

forced the parents out of their habitus-activated, group-oriented "family" frame and into an active, analytical praxis, attempting to reason out the causes for their children's inexplicable behavior (Garfinkel 1967). This is one example of the particular kinds of anomic pressures that will engender legitimation through praxis.

Drawing on the examples in the literature review, we can see that praxis operates when people are unsure of the rules and must either establish them or reinforce them in almost all examples given. From Weber's original definition that legitimation is an active choice to obey without being coerced (Weber 1968d), it seems reasonable that non-habitual legitimation of orders and authorities primarily occurs when the orders are new and the rule-sets are still not firm for the social actor. For example, a political regime change may cause many social actors to watch and wait, obeying on the surface but perhaps not granting legitimacy until they see that the new system is performing to produce what it is supposed to produce, resting in the established norms for that kind of system, and permitting actors at least the illusion of a voice in its proceedings, before they grant it legitimacy. Once it demonstrates these qualities, it receives habitus legitimacy from its subject actors.

Beccarian deterrence also depends heavily on the active legitimator, demonstrated through Beccaria's idea that knowing the rules will reduce deviance (Paternoster and Bachman 2001). Since deviance is also an act of de-legitimation, and since legitimacy through praxis occurs through active analysis and evaluation, it stands to reason that knowing the rules and being able to depend on their stability goes a long way towards giving an actor the tools to make an active decision to

legitimate. It further stands to reason that the first time an actor is confronted with rules, he will not simply obey them but actively assess them to make sure he is willing to allow himself to be bound by them.

Similarly, rational-actor theory demonstrates a somewhat anomic condition in the legitimating actor. Knowing that actors will place more weight and value on a small reward received immediately versus the same reward or even a larger reward later demonstrates that an active evaluation goes on when legitimating a reward. In a time-discounting situation, the actor is presented with new rules: reward immediately, or reward (either identical or better) later? This is not a "normal" situation that most actors have developed a habitus frame for, so it is an anomic condition, and it requires the actor to expend energy making an active decision about which is better. Therefore, praxis is the legitimating logic here.

Finally, Garfinkel's work gives us several examples of the anomic situation in close-up through his various work with breaching experiments, which regularly broke or contradicted the expected rule-sets for his experimental subjects and forced the use of praxis to try to make sense of the situation again (Garfinkel 1967). Indeed, it seems fair to say that the work on praxis legitimation is already empirically supported by Garfinkel's work on breaching.

Conversely, much of the literature already discussed involving legitimation through habitus demonstrates that habitus is active in known situations to which the actor has become accustomed. From Weber's discussion of the normatively based forms of legitimate authority and domination (Weber 1968d) to Coser's

discussion of the few times when systems may have legitimacy problems due to conflicting norms (Coser 1964), to Habermas' discussion of how norms must be already legitimate to subject social actors before institutions can be legitimated with them (Habermas 1975) and Zelditch's validation of Dornbusch and Scott's validity component as the controlling factor in system stability (and therefore legitimacy) (Dornbusch and Scott 1975);(Zelditch 2006), most of the literature in the legitimacy-through-habitus section of the literature review points to legitimacy being granted through experiences that have already happened and socialization that has already taken place.

One of the aims of this dissertation is to demonstrate how social actors justify a decision to legitimate or de-legitimate, and speculates that the methods should correlate with the specific pressures created by an actor's concerns in particular domains of legitimacy. The literature demonstrates that the sources of legitimacy assessment are rooted both in the behavior or quality of the thing being evaluated (Kane 2001:16) and the cognitive frame of the actor evaluating it (Lehman 1992:141). Both conditions are necessary for understanding an actor's assessment of legitimacy, but so far, most attempts to analyze legitimacy assessment have taken place not by understanding the cognitive frame of the actor but only by assessing the actor's behavioral response to the social object being so assessed. This overlooks the fact that acquiescence is not the whole story. One may obey or acquiesce, but still not be convinced of the legitimacy of a rule or other constraining social influence. Even in this case, however, compliance is a habitus decision unless the

rule or constraining social influence is truly novel, since needs emanating from the three domains demand attention and, if a praxis decision not to comply would put those needs at risk, the decision will fall under habitus.

The emergence of three domains of salient pressures occurs through repeated use of praxis to deal with novel situations and social objects. This results in the establishment of norms and, eventually, institutions and their associated consequences for the social actor about situations that are now known factors. From the point of the unknown becoming the known, the logic of legitimation is habitus, or the routinized decision. This is the method mobilized when known pressures in the social environment become salient to the social actor. In the unusual event that the actor is confronted with a novel pressure, he resorts to praxis; but if it is a known pressure, he will use habitus, or the use of cognitive frames, to make his decision.

After the actor notices the salient pressure, the first question is whether or not it is a single-domain or a multiple-domain pressure. If a single-domain pressure, that domain's frame should be activated and used to guide the decision. But in a multiple-domain situation, the actor must now find a way to prioritize which domain is most important. The three remaining dimensions of the domains guide this process, starting with the timeframe dimension. If the actor is experiencing a high level of timeframe (where 'high' means 'more immediate onset,') he is initially more likely to prioritize the self-oriented pressure against other pressures. However, if an agent of consequence is present and perceived by the social actor, the

actor's frame priority should shift to the domain defined by the social space related to the agent of consequence, and that frame should guide the actor's decision.

Thus, the unexamined factors in previous research on decision-making about legitimacy include how and whether social pressures lead to the activation of cognitive frames; whether those activated frames guide the choice of a decision-making rationale; and whether there is a hierarchy effect on choice of rationale because of the dimensions that trigger initial frame activation (thus possibly affecting outcomes).

The final section of this chapter states research question and hypotheses.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

There are two logics of decision-making. However, actors rarely make decisions based on a rational-actor method (here labeled praxis). Due to the complexity of the social environment, habitus (routinized) decisions are far more likely. The increasing complexity of society led to the emergence of three domains of salient pressures for social actors: self-oriented, group-oriented, and institution-oriented. The process of simplifying the complex social pressures created by known objects associated with these domains leads to the creation of cognitive frames that allow actors to rationalize decisions through habitus rather than spend time reasoning them out through praxis, thus saving time and cognitive energy for the social actor.

The presence of salient social objects creates cognitive pressures on social actors by increasing the complexity of the social environment for the social actor. The relative salience of a social object is based in the perceived relative risk or consequences affecting the actor's interests by decisions related to that social object. Once an object is determined to be salient, the immediacy of its consequences for the social actor will take priority unless the actor is confronted with agents of consequence who activate domain-related social spaces, thus forcing the actor to prioritize the needs of the group or the institution over his own self-related needs.

The theory suggests three groups that have relevant effects within the theoretical path: *social objects*, which serve as creators of cognitive pressure to legitimate, and include social expectations and contexts; *salient domains*, which are the three domains previously defined; and *salient pressures* – the dimensions specific to domains and logics of decision-making, which are triggered by associated pressures in the environment, and which take up mental "processing space" as in Miller's definition of working memory.

Social objects can include social expectations such as laws, rules, taboos, mores, and consequences; people; and situations. Salient pressures include two groups – domain-specific and logic-specific.

Logic-specific pressures include *novelty*, or how unfamiliar or unpredictable the social object is, and *complexity*, or how many and how variable the current social objects creating salient pressure are for the actor. Higher levels of novelty will engender a praxis response, while higher levels of complexity will engender a

habitus response. Only rarely is an actor going to deal with situations that are both completely novel and extremely complex, and in that case it is expected that praxis will be the logic mobilized to deal with the situation.

Domain-specific pressures include *salience,* or the material and non-material pressures that are relevant to each domain; *timeframe,* which is composed of the two factors of *onset* of consequence (how fast it happens after the decision or lack of decision), and *duration/resolution* of consequence (how long the consequence will last); *social space,* or the tie types experienced by the actor in each of the three domains; and *agents of consequence,* or members/representatives of groups and institutions that the actor belongs to or has ties to.

Finally, the three domains of legitimacy correspond within the actor to *salient domains* – salient concerns that are either triggered or affected by cognitive pressures. This includes the *self-oriented*, which is perceived by the social actor as having an effect on, or triggering an effect of, personal physical integrity, economic integrity, and individual needs; the *group-oriented*, which is perceived by the social actor as having an effect on, or triggering an effect of, personal and group norms, values, identities, connections, and customs which are important to the actor; and the *institution-oriented*, which is perceived by the social actor as having an effect on, or triggering an effect of, rules, authorities, ideologies, institutions, etc. which are important to the actor. It is important to note that these salient domains correspond to associated, identically-named cognitive frames.

There are several questions this research will answer. The overall question of the proposed research program is whether we can determine which actors will legitimate in which ways, and if there is any differential outcome when a different domain triggers a certain active frame or when actors are confronted with multiple-stimulus domains. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, there are several component questions that must be initially dealt with.

First, can we show that as social pressures increase in the environment, the objects generating them have a frame-activating effect on the actor? Second, can we show that the activated frame guides decision-making? Third, can we show a hierarchy effect prioritizing one frame over another in a multi-stimulus environment? Finally, how does a frame compare to demographic characteristics in terms of predicting decision outcomes? These questions generated the following hypotheses:

H1: As the salience of a social object relative to an actor's self-, group-, or institution-oriented concerns increases, the activation of a corresponding cognitive frame should become more likely.

H2: As salient cognitive frames are activated, rationales for assigning legitimacy should be more likely to correlate with the activated frame.

H3: In a multi-stimulus environment, activated frames should match the domain with the highest immediacy of consequence to the social actor.

H4: In a multi-stimulus environment, the presence of an agent of consequence should cause the actor's activated frame to match the domain represented by the agent of consequence.

H5: Salient social pressures should predict activated frames better than ascribed or achieved (i.e., demographic) characteristics of the actor, and

H6: Cognitive frames should have a greater effect on rationale choice than ascribed or achieved characteristics of the social actor.

The next chapter will discuss the methodology used to develop the survey tools used to test each of these hypotheses, the data-collection processes used to create these tools, the creation of the tools through Thurstone judging, and the results of reliability and validity tests of these tools.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND TOOL CREATION

If social objects activate frames and frames guide decisions, then the instruments for testing the relationship between these phenomena must include a frame-stimulating tool, a frame-activation confirmation tool, some kind of decision prompt, and a decision-rationale testing tool.

Vignettes are the ideal tool for frame stimulation and decision-testing as they put the respondent into a position where they must interact, at least in a thought experiment, with pressures in an environment. Since part of this research is testing whether nonspecific pressures will activate frames as well as when respondents are directed to pay attention to the specific pressures, a vignette is a good tool in which to present nonspecific pressures as part of an overall scenario.

For ideas about testing the activation of frames, we first looked to identity theory. Although the concepts of identity activation have existed in identity theory for some time, it appears that in such research, it is simply assumed that an identity is activated by certain prompts. This is simply not sure enough for testing the activation of frames. Logically, however, a frame must cause certain ideas and concepts to be more appealing or salient than others, and if the actor shows a preference for these ideas and concepts after a frame is activated, then it should be a measureable effect. The tool that makes the most sense in this case is a simple list of ideas or concepts, which the respondent is asked to rank order on the basis of most

appealing or most relevant to least appealing or least relevant. The rank-ordering of stimulus-related concepts and ideas as higher than others should function as indication of an activated frame.

Finally, since a decision-testing tool is testing both the strength of agreement with a proposed decision and the rationale or rationales for that agreement, a Likert-scaled set of questions regarding whether an actor agrees with the decision presented in a vignette prompt and which domain-related factors were the strongest influences on the decision should help us determine whether frame activation then guides decisions.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research followed a survey design using two independent samples drawn from the American adult population with access to the Internet. (Data collection procedure, demographic data, and other information about these samples will be discussed in Chapter 5, Data Collection and Hypothesis Testing.) Each sample was presented with vignettes designed to trigger the three domains and four dimensions within the reader, along with demographics questions. Apart from that, the two samples differed greatly in the tools that were used in each survey. Further details of each survey procedure are discussed after the tool creation section of this chapter.

Since this research is testing new ideas, tools had to be newly developed for the survey tools used with the final survey population. To determine words and

situations that seemed to correlate with the domains, initial informational data was drawn from both the undergraduate population of UC Riverside undergraduate and American adult respondents from snowball samples taken on the Internet. After these data were cleaned up and organized (procedures will be described in more detail below), seven graduate students in UCR's social sciences departments served as volunteer Thurstone judges to categorize the words and situations by the domains. Finally, tools were developed from the categorized words and situations in order to test the hypotheses that dealt with frame activation, frame relationships to decisions, and the movement of frames relative to multiple-stimulus environments.

These tools included a Stimulus Vignette List to provide domain-specific stimuli for the respondents, which was intended to activate frames; a Connotations List composed of words and a Prompts List composed of situations that were judged relevant to the domains. These two tools were intended to detect frame activation. Finally, a Vignette List tool, based on the Stimulus Vignette List, was developed to test decision-making and frame movement.

TOOL CREATION

If the first step in the decision-making process is that social objects activate cognitive frames, and the second step is determining the rationale for a decision, we must first develop tools to test frame activation and determine decision rationales. This first step relates directly to supporting or disproving H1, which states that as the salience of a social object relative to an actor's domain-specific concerns

increases, activation of a cognitive frame correlating with that domain should be more likely, and H2, which states that as frames are activated, they guide decision rationales. In order to design this tool, however, domain-specific words and ideas had to be identified first.

This chapter first describes the initial data collection from undergraduates at UC Riverside and the adult population of the United States to determine words and situations that seemed relevant to the domains. Following that, the chapter provides details about the development of the Connotations List (of domain-related words) and the Prompts List (of domain-related decision-making activities) from these data, through Thurstone ranking of the items gathered. Reliability and validity tests of these tools are discussed in this section as well.

Once the initial data collection section is completed, the chapter then turns to a discussion of the development of vignettes for the Stimulus Vignette Tool and the two Vignette Lists used to measure and understand decision-making. A discussion of vignette reliability and validity is included in this section.

After tool creation discussion is completed, the chapter gives a description of the structures of each survey used in data collection for hypothesis testing, leading into the next chapter where these topics are discussed.

Initial Data Collection: Words and Situations

The two lists containing words and situations were the Connotations List and the Prompts List. As each one involved a different set of initial data collection methods, it is best to discuss them in their separate sections below.

It is important to note that three groups were involved in three sets of data collection. In the discussions that follow, the term "original respondents" denotes the persons who responded to the first set of surveys and provided words and situations to be used in tool creation. The "Thurstone judges" are seven graduate student volunteers who responded to the second set of surveys which listed the words and situations collected from the original respondents, and who had the task of ranking each of the collected words and situations based on how well they matched the definitional traits of the domains. These first two sets of respondents were provided with the characteristics of the domains, although not the labels for them, during these data-collection exercises. Finally, the "first sample" and "second sample" refer to the last group of respondents, who were given two surveys composed of the constructed tools, and from whom hypothesis-testing data was collected. In the discussions that follow in this chapter and the next, these terms will be used to denote where the data in question is coming from during tool construction and hypothesis testing.

Connotations List Construction, Reliability, and Validity

The Connotations List was intended to provide the researcher with a sense of descriptive words that most people would associate with the three identified domains. By collecting a number of words that seemed to the original respondents to be identified with the domains, and having the Thurstone judges rank-order them in terms of their correlation to the provided domain categories, it was hoped that this exercise would produce a list of words that could be used both as a frame-activation test tool and as building blocks for other tools to use with the first and second sample.

The Connotations List was initially created from survey information asking the original respondents to list words describing decisions they had to make about the three domains. The prompt was substantially the same for each domain, with the exception of the particular topics the original respondent should consider, as follows:

This study has to do with the sort of words we associate with different decisions we make. For example, if you thought about money you might also think of the word "profitable." If you heard the word "police" you might think "legal." Please take as much time as you need to respond to the following three questions with as many descriptive words for the given subject as you can.

1. *What descriptive words come to mind when you think of decisions you must make involving your physical body, your health, your money, or*

your property? Please list as many words that you associate with this kind of issue as you can.

2. *What descriptive words come to mind when you think of decisions you must make involving values, morals, and social expectations? Please list as many words that you associate with this kind of issue as you can.*
3. *What descriptive words come to mind when you think of decisions you must make involving rules, regulations, and laws? Please list as many words that you associate with this kind of issue as you can.*

For the original respondents, two separate tool-building surveys were conducted, with identical text and material – one of persons on the Internet and one of undergraduate sociology students at UC Riverside. Of the 65 persons who began the surveys, 49 completed them, for a response rate of 75.4%. Response rates were better with the student survey than the snowball-sampled survey; only 4 of the 38 student respondents did not complete their survey, while 12 of 27 snowball-sampled did not complete theirs.

The results generated approximately 400 words. Despite instructions to give only descriptive words (i.e. adjectives and adverbs), many respondents also wrote down nouns, verbs and phrases. Where possible, these were converted to descriptive words. The list was then culled to remove synonyms, leaving a total of 180 words.

Seven volunteer graduate students acting as Thurstone judges then participated in a rating exercise to rate the list of 180 words on the three domains of

self- (physical, medical, economic/financial, or basic survival needs and issues), group- (morals, ethics, community standards, informal expectations, values, or norms), and institution-oriented (institutional standards, written rules and laws, formal expectations and guidelines) on a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 meaning "does not apply to these issues at all," 4 meaning "applies to these issues exactly 50% of the time," and 7 meaning "applies to these issues 100% of the time," where the "issues" were longer descriptions of the domains. The descriptions given to the Thurstone judges for each domain were described with the words above in parentheses. The domain label was not included in the descriptions that the Thurstone judges viewed.

The original goal was to acquire 10 words that were unique to each domain for use in the Connotations List tool. However, many of the rated words appeared at least once in two or more domains. These words were removed. As a result, the domain with the smallest number of unique words, the institution-oriented domain, was used to set the standard for the length of the other two lists.

The list was then sorted in Excel by the raw count of Thurstone ratings above 4 that each word received for each domain in turn, to find words that ranked above 4 for only one domain. The unique word list was smallest for the institution-oriented domain, with a total of only six words. The ratings for each of the words on the self- and group-oriented lists were then included so that the remaining words could also be sorted based on the highest to lowest raw count of ratings above 4, to determine the top six words for each of the other lists.

Table 3 - Ranking of Connotations List Words

Self-oriented	% > 4	Group-oriented	% > 4	Institution-oriented	% > 4
Physical	100.0%	Believed	85.7%	Orderly	71.4%
Costly	85.7%	Parental	71.4%	Punitive	71.4%
Expensive	85.7%	Pressured	71.4%	Active	57.1%
Required	85.7%	Religious	71.4%	Onerous	57.1%
Useful	85.7%	Aware	57.1%	Precise	57.1%
Critical	71.4%	Controversial	57.1%	Procedural	57.1%

Table 3 shows the 18 words that comprise the initial Connotations List tool prior to reliability testing. The percentage of rankings each word received that was greater than 4 is shown in this table. A list of all the words collected and their Thurstone rankings is provided in Appendix 1.

Validity and reliability testing on this list, unfortunately, did not produce the desired results. It should be noted that although the survey tools collected data that was almost entirely Likert-scaled, the individual items on sub-lists were not considered indicators of the same dimension within a domain, but simply of the domain, so no inter-item correlation was expected. Since all statistical reliability tests (Cronbach's alpha, ordinal alpha, etc.) assume that inter-item correlation is expected, these reliability tests were inappropriate for these tools.

The Connotations List is a typology, not an index or a scale. As such, reliability for each individual item in each sub-list was assessed using one-way ANOVA against the stimulus group variable, to gauge its statistical significance and correlation with the original stimulus provided to the respondent. This measure reports how likely it

is that the response would be by chance. If a response is rarely by chance, this indicates repeatability of results, which is the overarching task of reliability testing.

The initial Connotations List was composed of eighteen items, six for each domain. Respondents in the first and second sample were asked to rank-order the items from 1 to 18 based upon how important the items felt to them, after viewing the Stimulus Vignette into which they had been randomly sorted.

As the Connotations List items were rank-ordered from 1 to 18 in a forced-ranking procedure, the results for each item can be considered interval data. After the data for each item on the Connotations List was reverse coded to indicate increasing strength of response by numeric value, frequencies were run on each item to ensure that they were within the assumptions of interval data. Each distribution was approximately normal. Based on the statistical rule of thumb that any distribution with a kurtosis and skewness value within ±2 is close enough to normal to be treated as interval data, it was determined that each item could be treated as interval data. These results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4 – Distribution Results of Connotations List Items

Item	Mean	Median	Skew	Kurtosis
Item 1 Self-Oriented	8.7	8.0	.116	-1.182
Item 2 Self-Oriented	13.13	15.0	-.778	-.668
Item 3 Self-Oriented	12.17	14.00	-.964	-.270
Item 4 Self-Oriented	10.34	11.0	-.190	-.870
Item 5 Self-Oriented	8.49	8.0	.205	-1.099
Item 6 Self-Oriented	13.12	14.0	-.800	-.242
Item 1 Group-Oriented	9.06	9.0	.073	-1.185
Item 2 Group-Oriented	7.27	6.0	.585	-.842
Item 3 Group-Oriented	12.49	14.0	-.714	-.664
Item 4 Group-Oriented	6.57	5.0	.754	-.877

Item	Mean	Median	Skew	Kurtosis
Item 5 Group-Oriented	11.20	11.0	-.369	-.492
Item 6 Group-Oriented	8.42	8.0	.287	-.995
Item 1 Institution-Oriented	9.08	9.0	.103	-1.028
Item 2 Institution-Oriented	9.25	9.0	.088	-1.366
Item 3 Institution-Oriented	7.60	7.0	.365	-.817
Item 4 Institution-Oriented	8.22	8.0	.201	-.866
Item 5 Institution-Oriented	9.55	10.0	.026	-1.029
Item 6 Institution-Oriented	9.63	10.0	-.074	-1.189

One-way ANOVA was then performed on the relationship between the Stimulus Group variable (three levels, independent groups) and the Connotations List reverse-coded items to determine which, if any, items had a significant relationship with the Stimulus Group.

Five items on the reverse-coded Connotations List were found to have a significant ($p<.05$) relationship with the Stimulus Group variable. This result is shown in Table 5.

Table 5 – Significant One-Way ANOVA Results, Connotations List Items

Item	Significance Level
Item 3 Self-Oriented	.007
Item 5 Self-Oriented	.013
Item 1 Group-Oriented	.046
Item 1 Institution-Oriented	.014
Item 6 Institution-Oriented	.005

In order to construct a Connotations List frame-activation indicator tool, the statistically significant item in each group with the smallest significance score was used to construct a Connotations List Frame Activation Score. The scores from Item 3 Self-Oriented, Item 1 Group-Oriented, and Item 6 Institution-Oriented were

compared to create a new variable labeled "Connotations List Active Frame Recoded," with three possible values. Those respondents scoring higher on Item 3 Self-Oriented were coded as 1, Self-Oriented. Those respondents scoring highest on Item 1 Group-Oriented were coded as 2, Group-Oriented. Finally, those respondents scoring highest on Item 6, Institution-Oriented were coded as 3, Institution-Oriented. Respondents with identical scores on two items were coded system-missing. This created a tool that could be compared to the original Stimulus Group categorization, via crosstab, to support or reject H1.

Since the Connotations list is a typology, not an index, and only one item per list was used, there is no possibility of checking inter-item correlation, so internal reliability for this tool is a moot point. To test external reliability, bivariate correlations were run between the respondent's Stimulus Group categorization and the activated frame as indicated by the Connotations List. These correlations were significant (α=.05; p=.006, Pearson Correlation=.220), indicating that the Connotations List is an appropriate and externally reliable tool to measure activation of frames.

The validity of the Connotations list was first demonstrated by its origins in Thurstone rating. This demonstrates both face and content validity in that the Thurstone judges agreed on the connotations of each item as judged against an outside standard (the domains). This face and content validity also justifies the use of the Connotations List items as building blocks for the Prompts List and the Activities List. Finally, the Connotations List demonstrates significant correlation

between the stimulus group and the activated frame outcome, demonstrating predictive validity.

Prompts List Construction, Reliability, and Validity

Like the Connotations List, the Prompts List is essential to giving this researcher a sense of the decision-making situations that most people would associate with the three identified domains. By collecting a number of situations that seemed to the original respondents to be identified with the domains, and having the Thurstone judges rank-order them in terms of their correlation to the provided domain categories, it was hoped that this exercise would produce a list of situations that could be used both as a frame-activation test tool and as building blocks for other tools.

The Prompts List was initially created from two identical tool-building surveys administered to different populations: snowball-sampled random persons on the Internet, and undergraduate students at UC Riverside. Only 4 undergraduate students responded to this survey and only 1 completed it, while of the 23 random persons who started this survey, only 11 completed it. This gave a total of 12 usable responses out of 27, or a completion rate of about 44%. While this is not a statistically desirable sample, it allowed the researcher to gather qualitative descriptions of 33 different situations in which original respondents had faced decisions, and to summarize these situations into a Prompts List. The original situation responses are provided in Appendix 2.

These surveys asked original respondents to give a qualitative description of a time when they had had to make a decision about issues within one of the domains. It also asked what was most important to them for each of these decisions, and for demographic information.

The domain descriptions were given as follows (the domain label was not included in the descriptions shown to respondents):

1. Self: describe a decision you needed to make within the last six months that involved your health, property, physical safety, or money.

2. Group: describe a decision you needed to make within the last six months that involved a moral situation or a value system that is important to you.

3. Institution: describe a decision you needed to make within the last six months that involved an authority figure, written rules, or institutional regulations.

The responses to this survey were then summarized into either-or sets of statements, such as "Whether or not to use a treatment that is not medically approved for a medical condition" or "Whether to follow one's dream career, or train for a more pragmatic career." These either-or statements were based on the various decision-making situations that original respondents had provided, and created mainly to get at the general idea of the decision, rather than the specifics provided by the original respondents.

After summarizing into the either-or decision list provided in Appendix 3, the Prompts List was then presented to the seven Thurstone judges for identical rating as the Connotations List words had been presented. The original goal was to obtain

three prompts that strongly represented each domain (nine total). The three top-rated prompts in each category all scored either 4 (57.1%) or 5 (71.4%) in the number of ratings over 4 they received from the Thurstone judges. These prompts were then converted into statements that respondents could agree or disagree with, following Lasky (Lasky 2000).

As the Prompt List items were rank-ordered from 1 to 9 in a forced-ranking procedure, the results of the first sample for each item can be considered interval data. After the data for each item on the Prompts List was reverse coded to indicate increasing strength of response by numeric value, frequencies were run on each item to ensure that they were within the assumptions of interval data. Each distribution was approximately normal. Based on the statistical rule of thumb that any distribution with a kurtosis and skewness value within ±2 is close enough to normal to be treated as interval data, it was determined that each item could be treated as interval data. This data is shown in Table 6.

Table 6 - Distribution Results of Prompts List Items

Item	Mean	Median	Skew	Kurtosis
Item 1 Self-Oriented	5.48	6.0	-.226	-1.095
Item 2 Self-Oriented	6.94	8.0	-1.030	-.053
Item 3 Self-Oriented	4.54	5.0	.137	-1.305
Item 1 Group-Oriented	5.65	6.0	-.371	-1.088
Item 2 Group-Oriented	3.35	3.0	.693	-.567
Item 3 Group-Oriented	4.23	4.0	.218	-1.037
Item 1 Institution-Oriented	5.15	5.0	-.086	-1.247
Item 2 Institution-Oriented	4.77	5.0	.035	-1.024
Item 3 Institution-Oriented	5.60	6.0	-.186	-.942

One-way ANOVA was then performed on the relationship between the Stimulus Group (three levels, independent groups) and the Prompts List reverse-coded items to determine which, if any, items had a significant relationship with the Stimulus Group.

Six items on the reverse-coded Prompts List were found to have a significant ($p<.05$) relationship with the Stimulus Group variable. This result is shown in Table 7.

Table 7 – One-Way ANOVA Results, Prompts List Items

Item	Significance Level
Item 2 Self-Oriented	.004
Item 3 Self-Oriented	.000
Item 1 Group-Oriented	.000
Item 2 Group-Oriented	.031
Item 1 Institution-Oriented	.004
Item 2 Institution-Oriented	.000

In order to construct a Prompts List frame-activation indicator tool, the statistically significant items in each group were used to construct a Prompts List Frame Activation Score from data collected from the first sample. Scores in each sub-list were summed and these scores compared to create a new variable, the "Prompts List Active Frame Recoded," with three possible values. Those respondents scoring highest on the Self-Oriented sub-list were coded as 1, Self-Oriented. Those respondents scoring highest on the Group-Oriented sub-list were coded as 2, Group-Oriented. Finally, those respondents scoring highest on the Institution-Oriented sub-list were coded as 3, Institution-Oriented. Respondents with identical scores on two lists were coded system-missing. This created a tool

that could be compared to the original Stimulus Group variable via crosstab to support or reject H1.

Like the Connotations List, the Prompts List is composed of items that measure multiple dimensions within a domain, and as such, inter-item correlation is not expected. Since all measurements of internal statistical reliability, except statistical significance, rely on inter-item correlation, no such test was considered appropriate.

To test external reliability, the variable produced by summing the statistically significant scores from the first sample on each sub-list and reporting the highest-rated sub-list, was compared to the Stimulus Group variable in bivariate correlations. These correlations were significant (α=.05; p=.000, Pearson Correlation=.428), indicating that the Prompts List is an appropriate and reliable tool to measure activation of frames.

The validity of the Prompts List is first demonstrated by its origins in Thurstone ratings. This demonstrates both face and content validity in that the Thurstone judges agreed on the connotations of each item as judged against an outside standard (the domains). Additionally, its inclusion of words from the Connotations List lends additional weight to face and content validity. Finally, the Prompts List demonstrates significant correlation between the stimulus group and the activated frame outcome, demonstrating predictive validity. The full Prompts List follows below.

Self-Oriented Sub-List:

To be healthy, it is important to listen to and follow a doctor's recommendations.
Having to pay for food and shelter always outweighs the cost of not paying a debt.
The most important issue when purchasing something is how expensive it is.

Group-Oriented Sub-List:

Even family members should be made aware of their inappropriate behavior against others.
Those who use controversial words should expect to be shamed for them.
It is best not to pressure other people about their interpersonal problems at work.

Institution-Oriented Sub-List:

Lying on a government form makes it more likely you'll get caught and punished.
You must follow orderly procedures to fight a traffic ticket.
To get a professional license, you must be precise about what you say on the exam.

The survey respondents in the first sample were directed to rank-order these statements from 1 to 9 in order of what they felt was most relevant to the situation they have been asked to imagine (the original prompt). Following Lasky, trait inference methodology suggests that respondents directly prompted to make inferences will do so, and those who are not prompted to make inferences will not (Lasky 2000). The Prompts List tested whether an indirect prompt also leads to trait inferences (and thus an activated related cognitive frame) as well as a directed prompt does. The "traits" in these statements are the domains already discussed. If the Prompts List is successful at determining an activated frame, we should see respondents rating the instrumental statements as most relevant when presented with an instrumental scenario, the institutional statements as most relevant when presented with an institutional scenario, etc.

The nine statements derived from the decisions that the original respondents had to make were designed to have triggers corresponding with the domains in question. For example, "To be physically healthy, it is important to listen to and follow a doctor's recommendations" has the instrumental trigger word *physically*, from the Connotations List, embedded in the statement. Similarly, the statement "Those who use controversial words should expect to be shamed for them" contains the normative trigger word *controversial*. Each statement was designed to carry a trigger word from the Connotations list, and each statement refers to a situation that the Thurstone judges categorized as strongly reflecting a particular domain, so this tool was expected to be particularly useful for identifying activated frames.

Frame Prediction – Tool Choice

It was hoped that both the Prompts List and the Connotations List would give similar results in terms of frame prediction. However, it seems that the Prompts List's full statements were more meaningful to the first sample's respondents than the relatively context-free list of words on the Connotations List, and thus demonstrated the active frame far better than the Connotations List.

When a chi-square comparison was run using the Stimulus Group as the independent variable and the two frame-prediction tools of the Prompts List and Connotations List as dependent variables, the Prompts List gave very strong predictability of activated frames across groups. In all three cases, the stimulus group correlated with the activated frame at a rate of better than 50%, and in the

cases of instrumental and institutional prompts, better than 70%. This result was significant at $p<0.000$. Cramer's V for this outcome (.419) shows that the Prompts List explains 41.9% of the variability in activated frames.

Results for the Connotations List were not as good as those for the Prompts List. Variability of activated frames was greater across groups, and the Institutional group was not predictable at all with this tool. Although this result was likewise significant at $p=0.003$, it was determined that the Prompts List serves as a more robust indicator of the activated frame, and was used as the basis for hypothesis testing of H1. As a result of this outcome, the Connotations List tool was discarded and the Prompts List used as the indicator for frame activation. However, the Connotations List words were still used to increase validity of the tools used for other tests.

Vignette Tool Construction

A vignette is, at its base, a story about some situation of interest. Vignettes are often used to ask questions such as "In this situation, what choices would you make?" or "in this situation, what seems to be most important?" Vignettes "allow the presentation of a scenario in a concrete, detailed, context-specific, and standardized way," and their deep contextual nature is actually an advantage in determining respondent answers in a context-dependent situation (Torres 2009). Certainly the argument put forward in this dissertation depends on legitimation being context-dependent. The design of a vignette, especially in the particular

emphasis on parts of a scenario, is critical to eliciting the desired information from the respondent.

Vignettes are considered appropriate for studying "understandings, perceptions and preferences" (Torres 2009). Since a frame is a perception and an understanding, it was felt that vignettes would work well to stimulate frames, by describing situations containing various social pressures to respondents in the first and second sample, and then gauging their reactions to these pressures through other tools.

Although Torres cautions that vignettes are not generally considered appropriate for predicting behavior based on the perceptions or preferences so elicited (Torres 2009), other work using vignettes seems to demonstrate reasonable predictability of behavior based upon the responses to vignettes. For example, in a study of alcohol users in an alcohol treatment program, O'Connor and her colleagues tested the validity of a vignette model through a confidence rating measure of four points, similar to a Guttman scale. This tool measured participants' agreement or disagreement with overt statements about whether varying kinds of alcohol-related behavior described in a series of vignettes was problematic or not. These responses were then separated into three scores of "response bias" (false positives for non-problematic use, negatives for problematic use, and a combined score). The resulting scores were tested against the probability of participants dropping out of the alcohol treatment program and a positive relationship was determined (those who were most likely to drop out of the program were not as successful at detecting

problematic alcohol use in vignettes). This was determined to be a successful test of validity of the vignette tool (O'Connor, Davies, Heffernan, and Eijk 2003).

It may be that the method used by O'Connor and her colleagues, that is, the use of a rating scale, may be the important or deciding factor in the success of the vignette tool used to predict dropout rates from the alcohol-treatment program. Much of what Torres describes appears to be the collection of qualitative responses to vignettes presented to respondents, and the difference in type of response collected (open-ended versus closed-ended) may be the actual deciding factor in whether the vignette can be considered "reliable" or "valid."

Stimulus Vignette Construction, Validity and Reliability

Four Stimulus Vignettes were constructed based around the main salient pressures in each domain. The first three were domain-specific, while the fourth was a combination of the first three, providing all three stimuli. These vignettes follow below.

Stimulus 1 (Self)

> *You are laid off from your job through no fault of your own. You have no savings. You have bills to pay and, because the economy is in a slump, you are unlikely to find a job. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next."*

The four dimensions of the self-oriented domain are represented in this vignette. First, the salient pressures are self-oriented: money and immediate needs.

The timeframe of those pressures is more or less immediate in its onset. The social space is a weak-/no-tie situation and individualized. Finally, there are no agents of consequence present to trigger a strong-tie or affiliational-tie situation in the actor.

Stimulus 2 (Group)

> *People that you care about very much are avoiding you, or have actively told you that they are angry with you or disappointed in you. When you ask why, you are told that your behavior has been unacceptable and that you must change it in order for their feelings to change. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next."*

The four dimensions of the group-oriented domain are represented in this vignette. The salient pressures are loss of community esteem and connections. In terms of timeframe, they are relatively longer in both their onset and their duration. The social space is one of strong ties, and the other people mentioned in the vignette function as agents of consequence to activate that social space for the actor.

Stimulus 3 (Institution)

> *You are arrested and charged with a misdemeanor crime. The penalty could be up to two years in jail. It is likely that you will be found guilty. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next."*

The four dimensions of the institution-oriented domain are represented in this vignette. The salient pressures are loss of freedom and the social stigma or label that will result from the institutional consequences the actor faces in this vignette. In

terms of timeframe, the length of both onset and duration of the consequences the actor is facing are implied to be quite long – two years, plus whatever time it takes for the actor to reach trial. Although implied rather than overt, the words "arrested" and "charged" imply the presence of institutional agents of consequence, which should create the affiliational-tie social space of the institution-oriented domain for the actor.

Stimulus 4 (Mixed)

> *You are arrested and charged with a misdemeanor crime. The penalty could be up to two years in jail. It is likely that you will be found guilty. People you care about are avoiding you, or have actively told you they are angry with you or disappointed in you because of the criminal accusation you are facing. As a result of the arrest, you lose your job. You have no savings. You have bills to pay and, because of the arrest, you are unlikely to find a job even if you go free. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next."*

This vignette combines the pressures presented in all the others. If the separate vignettes are shown to trigger various salient domain-specific frames, this vignette should also, but the question here will be which frames are triggered most often and which least often. It was used to see what frames would activate in this situation, and whether frame activation in multi-stimulus situations was consistent or variable.

Validity and reliability testing for vignettes is not conducted in the same way as for Likert-scaled tools. Instead of inter-item correlations, validity of tools is largely dependent on face and content validity. The validity of the Stimulus Vignettes rests in their construction from already-validated tools demonstrating face and content reliability. As H1 is supported using this tool, this also demonstrates predictive validity of the tool.

Reliability of the Stimulus Vignettes is tied to whether the particular vignette elicits a matching frame activation as measured by the Prompts List. That is, if a Stimulus Vignette with self-oriented prompts elicits a higher likelihood of self-oriented frame activation, this demonstrates reliability of the Stimulus Vignette. This test of reliability is thus tied to the results of hypothesis tests using the Prompts List, specifically the hypothesis test of H1. H1 was supported (see Hypothesis Testing), so this tool's reliability is also supported.

Vignette List 1 Construction, Reliability and Validity

Vignette List 1 was originally intended to determine if the originally activated frame guided decisions in subsequent (different) decision opportunities. Unfortunately, the order of presentation of this tool relative to the original Stimulus Vignette tool and the Prompt List frame-activation check made the results meaningless to test durability of frames across different decisions (the original goal). However, the results of two of the three vignettes in Vignette List 1 do demonstrate prioritization of frames in multiple-stimulus situations. The second

and third vignettes in this list were designed to provide multiple stimuli to first-sample respondents and see what they prioritized or found most important when making a decision about the situation they were given.

The first stimulus, Vignette 2, was designed to present self- and group-oriented pressures and see which one guided the decision the actor made. It is important to note that at this point, it was known that situations do reliably trigger frames due to the results of hypothesis testing of H1. The interjection of a frame-activation test tool between vignette and decision, however, would create the possibility of the frame-activation test tool creating the frame, rather than the vignette creating the frame. Once the results of H1 showed that situations do activate frames reliably, it could be taken 'as read' that a properly structured situation correlating to domain-specific dimensions of pressure would activate the frame in question.

Vignette List 1, Vignette 2 (Self- and Group-Oriented Pressures)

1. *Assume that you are visiting your parents for dinner, but you have accidentally left your wallet or pocketbook at home. As a result, you do not have your money or credit cards with you. You are hungry and need to eat, but your parents have prepared a dish you don't really like and would not normally eat. However, if you don't eat it, their feelings will be hurt. How likely is it that you will eat the food they offer you?*

Not at all likely	Not very likely	Somewhat likely	Very likely	Extremely Likely

2. Which of these issues most influenced your decision?

___ *My hunger*

___ *My parents' feelings*

___ *Other (please specify)*

This vignette was designed to tap into both the basic self-oriented salient need to satisfy hunger and see if the group-oriented salient need for parental acceptance trumps it. A tool that was ultimately discarded had shown that eating something you don't like is a group-oriented pressure (will you eat something you dislike in order to please the people you are with?), which was the basis of this vignette's group pressure. The timeframe of this vignette has both immediate consequences (hunger) and longer-term possible consequences (parental rejection and loss of strong-tie connection). Parents, acting as agents of consequence, trigger the strong-tie group-oriented social space.

Vignette List 1, Vignette 3 (All Domains)

1. *Assume that you are alone in an unfamiliar city for a vacation, and you are sightseeing. You are about a mile away from your lodgings. You are hungry and need to eat, but you have accidentally left your wallet or pocketbook behind. As a result, you do not have your money or credit cards with you. There is an open-air farmer's market on the street you are walking through, and a fruit stand that seems to be unattended. There are crowds milling around. You have seen a police officer in the area earlier, but*

at the moment you don't see him. How likely is it that you will take a piece of fruit from the unattended stand?

Not at all likely	Not very likely	Somewhat likely	Very likely	Extremely Likely

2. *Which of these issues most influenced your decision?*

__*My hunger*

__*The presence of other people*

__*The possible presence of the police*

__*Other (please specify)*

This vignette was designed to contain salient stimuli from all three domains: the self-oriented need to eat, the group-oriented pressure to behave or conform, and the presence of the institution-oriented domain in the form of the police. This vignette still carries some characteristics of the self-oriented domain: a timeframe of immediate onset of consequence and material consequences to the social actor's person. However, it also carries characteristics of the group-oriented domain: salient non-material consequences of norm violation from the crowds in the marketplace, specifically labeling as a deviant if caught. Finally, it carries the most characteristics of the institution-oriented domain: material and non-material threat of consequences – loss of freedom, labeling as a deviant - from an institution (due to the police); an impersonal and formal agent of imposition of those consequences (again, the police); a long time frame of onset of consequence, and an affiliational-tie situation (to the institution of law enforcement).

Since Vignette List 1 items contain multiple stimuli across multiple domains, the reliability of the tool as a predictive measure is not the issue. This tool is not designed to predict a given decision, but rather to see which of several decisions the actor might make, given multiple stimuli. The only reliability test that can be performed on this tool is whether its results are statistically significant, that is, not by chance.

The validity of Vignette List 1 is based on the same face and content validity as other tools in this research.

Vignette List 2 Construction, Reliability and Validity

When the first data draw using Vignette List 1 made it clear that the presence of a stranger in its first vignette was ruining the ability to treat it as a weak-tie, instrumental-only situation, as well as the fact that the activated frame needed to be tested against the situation that originally activated it in order to properly demonstrate that frames guided decisions, a second set of vignettes, based as closely as possible on the first three Stimulus Vignettes, were devised to test the relationship of frames to decisions, as well as address the issue with Vignette 1 in the first vignette list. A second sample was used to test decision-making in response to frame activation.

Vignette 1 of Vignette List 2 was designed to tap into solely self-oriented concerns, especially financial needs and self-worth.

Please spend a few minutes considering the following scenario:

1. You are laid off from your job through no fault of your own. You have no savings. You have bills to pay and, because the economy is in a slump, you are unlikely to find a job. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next."

2. About a month after you lose your job, you are offered another job. Compared to your previous job, this job offers lower pay and no benefits. How likely is it that you will take this job?

Not at all likely	Not very likely	Somewhat likely	Very likely	Extremely Likely

3. Please rate each of these possible reasons for your decision, based on how important each reason was for your decision. You may use each ranking more than once.

	Not important	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important	Extremely important
My financial situation					
My self-worth					
My friends' opinion					
My reputation in my c ommunity					
Written rules and laws					
Formal authorities that have power over me					

Vignette 2 of Vignette List 2 was designed to tap into group-oriented concerns and triggers, especially strong ties and community values.

1. *Please spend a few moments considering this scenario:*

People that you care about very much are avoiding you, or have actively told you they are angry with you or disappointed in you. When you ask why, you are told that your behavior has been unacceptable and that you must change it in order for their feelings to change. (Assume that the behavior in question is one that violates a value many of your close friends and family members share, but which you consider unimportant.) Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next."

2. *After several weeks of the situation described in the previous page, one of the people who has been most angry with you approaches you. They tell you that if you apologize to each person who is offended and make amends for your behavior, you will be accepted back into the group. How likely is it that you will apologize and make amends?*

Not at all likely	Not very likely	Somewhat likely	Very likely	Extremely Likely

3. *Please rate each of these possible reasons for your decision, based on how important each reason was for your decision. You may use each ranking more than once.*

	Not important	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important	Extremely important
My financial situation					
My self-worth					
My friends' opinion					
My reputation in my c ommunity					
Written rules and laws					

	Not important	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important	Extremely important
Formal authorities that have power over me					

Vignette 3 of Vignette List 2 was designed to trigger institution-oriented concerns, especially the consequences emanating from authorities and laws.

1. *Please consider the following scenario:*

   You are arrested and charged with a misdemeanor crime. The penalty could be up to two years in jail. It is likely that you will be found guilty. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "next."

2. *When you go up for trial, the public defender comes to you with a plea agreement. In the agreement, you will be placed on probation for two years. You will have to check in with a probation officer on a weekly basis. There are other restrictions to your freedom as conditions of the probation, including loss of your passport, loss of your right to have firearms or other weapons in your home (including kitchen knives), and loss of your right to vote for the length of your probation. You will also have a criminal record for the rest of your life. In return, you will not spend time in jail. How likely is it that you will take the plea bargain?*

Not at all likely	Not very likely	Somewhat likely	Very likely	Extremely Likely

3. *Please rate each of these possible reasons for your decision, based on how important each reason was for your decision. You may use each ranking more than once.*

	Not important	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important	Extremely important
My financial situation					
My self-worth					
My friends' opinion					
My reputation in my c ommunity					
Written rules and laws					
Formal authorities that have power over me					

For Vignette List 2, the issues were very clearly demarcated. Making the expected decision (to comply) and giving the expected, domain-associated reasons would validate the effect of framing on decision-making. It was expected that respondents to Vignette 1 in Vignette List 2 would indicate they would take the job, and that their reasoning would be for financial and possibly self-worth considerations. For Vignette 2, it was expected that respondents would indicate they would apologize, and that their friends' opinion and their reputation in the community would be the main reasons why. For Vignette 3, it was expected that respondents would take the plea bargain and indicate that laws and authorities would be the main reasons why.

This goes back to Achen and Bartel's finding that people rationalize, rather than reason. The logic behind Vignette List 2's measurements is as follows: People are sensitized to frames by outside stimuli whose relevance to particular domain-specific issues causes those frames to activate. Those frames then guide their decisions, more or less unconsciously. However, if we ask immediately after a decision, "Why did you do that?" the frame is still in force, and the things it causes

the respondent to be sensitive to will seem to be the logical justifications for the decision. Therefore, it does not matter that it is a rationalization; it stems from the original active frame that guided the decision, so we can trust that the rationalized response matches the activated frame.

To test reliability of the second Vignette List tool, the second sample datafile was split into two groups (n=85) and means tests (t-test, independent groups) were performed on the seven Likert items (likelihood of compliance, financial reasons, self-worth reasons, friends' opinion, community reputation, rules and laws, and formal authorities) to see if means were similar and not statistically significant across groups. If they were similar, this would indicate that the samples were drawn from the same population and thus verify external reliability of the tool. All means were calculated from a five-point Likert scale. These data are shown in Table 8.

Table 8 – T-Tests of Non-Significance of Means, Vignette List 2

	Means	
Subsample	**1**	**2**
Vignette List 2, Instrumental Prompt		
Likelihood of Expected Decision	3.77	3.90
Financial Reason	4.32	4.58
Self-Worth Reason	3.63	3.29
*Friends' Opinion Reason**	2.03	1.61
*Community Reputation Reason**	2.40	1.87
Written Laws and Rules Reason	2.80	2.39
Formal Authorities Reason	2.63	2.35
Vignette List 2, Normative Prompt		
Likelihood of Expected Decision	3.16	3/40
Financial Reason	1.92	1.52
Self-Worth Reason	3.84	3.72
Friends' Opinion Reason	3.29	3.28
Community Reputation Reason	3.44	3.12
Written Laws and Rules Reason	3.35	3.20

	Means	
Subsample	**1**	**2**
Formal Authorities Reason	2.92	2.64
Vignette List 2, Institutional Prompt		
Likelihood of Expected Decision	3.06	2.88
Financial Reason	3.14	2.82
Self-Worth Reason	3.89	3.94
Friends' Opinion Reason	3.09	2.94
Community Reputation Reason	3.34	3.24
Written Laws and Rules Reason	3.38	3.27
Formal Authorities Reason	3.11	3.03
*. Difference is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed).		

As the T-test to compare independent-samples means assigns significance in the event that the means are different, the fact that the means are not significantly different in all but two cases indicates that the samples came from the same population, thus indicating external reliability. Even in those two cases, the difference between means was less than 1, which means that the difference, despite being statistically significant, is negligible in its real-world effects (the difference is between "not very likely" and "somewhat likely" in both cases.

Validity of this tool is drawn from its construction from already-validated tools demonstrating face and content reliability. The results of testing H2 also demonstrate that it has predictive validity.

Now that the tools used in the survey have been adequately described and validity/reliability testing has been completed, a discussion of the two survey designs is the logical next step.

Research Design: Survey 1

The first step in the research design is to determine whether salient stimuli activate frames. The first survey was geared largely towards accomplishing that goal. Additionally, this survey allowed testing of prioritization of frames under multiple stimuli.

The first survey tested the activation of frames from salient stimuli, the prioritization of domains over other domains, and collected demographics information. This group is called the "first sample" in this research. The first sample was presented a survey tool composed of the following usable tools (tools that were included in the survey design but later found to be unusable are omitted from this discussion due to irrelevance).

The first-sample respondents were initially presented with a randomization page to sort them into one of four stimuli in the Stimulus Vignette tool. Following that, the Connotations List and Prompts List were presented in random order (sometimes the respondent saw the Connotations List first, and sometimes the Prompts List was first). All vignettes in Vignette List 1 were then presented to all respondents. Finally, demographics information was collected including race, age, gender, education level, income level, and religious affiliation.

This sample was used to test reliability and validity of the Stimulus Vignette Tool, Prompts List Tool, and Connotations List tool. It was also used for testing H1 (situations activate frames), H3 and H4 (priority of domains in multi-stimulus

situations) and H5 (whether demographics predict frame activation better than situations).

Research Design: Survey 2

Once the activation of a frame is determined, the next step is to determine whether a subsequent decision is associated with the activated frame. Two caveats should be noted here. First, if a group has already been given a frame-activation categorization test following a stimulus, this will pre-empt using that same group to determine decision-making, since the frame-activation categorization test will prime them to pay more attention to the objects on the test. Second, the decision test needs to be carefully constructed, such that an indication of greater agreement would indicate that the respondent is more likely to make the expected decision by the activated frame.

The second survey tested the relationship of activated frames to decisions and collected demographics information. This group is called the "second sample" in this research. The second sample was presented a survey tool composed of the following usable tools.

Second-sample respondents were first presented with a randomization page to sort them into one of three vignettes on Vignette List 2. Since these vignettes were substantially the same as the Stimulus Vignettes, this served the purpose of activating the associated frame. They were then presented with the appropriate

vignette from Vignette List 2, and then demographics information including race, gender, age, income level, education level, and religious affiliation was collected.

This sample was used to test reliability and validity of Vignette List 2. It was also used for testing H2 (frames guide decision) and H6 (frames predict decisions better than demographics do).

Copies of both surveys are provided in Appendix 4.

The next chapter details data collection procedures using these two surveys. Demographics data and other basic information is presented, followed by hypothesis testing and results.

CHAPTER 5: DATA COLLECTION AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING

This chapter will detail data-collection procedures, measurement levels and demographic information about the data in each sample, and hypothesis testing with these data. The structure of the chapter will be straightforward: data collection procedures and demographics are discussed and presented first. This is followed by sections that deal with restatements of each hypothesis, followed by a brief discussion of the appropriate test for the measurement levels collected and then the results of these tests. Discussion of the results will be pended to the final chapter.

COLLECTION PROCEDURES

Once the tools were developed, two surveys were developed from them. The first was used to test H1, that situations activate frames; H3 and H4, which deal with prioritization of frames under multi-domain pressures; and H5, the relationship of demographics to activation of frames. The second was used to test H2, that frames guide decisions; and H5, the relationship of demographics to decision rationales.

Two independent samples were required so that the use of the Prompt List tool to determine frame activation did not contaminate determination of decision-making and its guidance by a frame. Inserting the Prompt List tool between the stimulus and the decision might have alerted respondents that something about the Prompt List was considered relevant to their decision and contaminated the results. By using independent samples, the first to test whether situations activated frames

and the second to see whether situations known to activate frames then guided decisions, this problem was avoided.

In March and April of 2012, two random samples of 159 and 176 American adults with access to the Internet were purchased from SurveyMonkey.com. SurveyMonkey's data collection procedures and privacy policy (see Appendix 5) guarantee privacy of results except in the case of a subpoena. It also allows more than the originally purchased number of respondents to respond once the original paid-for amount is reached, as more respondents may respond to the recruiting emails than 150. It was felt that this was a reasonable way to achieve a representative sample of American adults with access to the Internet in a relatively short amount of time.

The demographics of each sample are as follows.

Sample 1

Sample 1 resulted in 159 respondents. The modal race category was white (79.2%), median age 50-59 years old (29.5%), modal gender category female (54.1%), modal religion category Christian (60.4%), modal education level bachelor's degree (33.3%) and modal income group $50,001-$75,000 (20.8%).

Table 9 - Sample 1, Age Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-29	17	10.7	10.7	10.7
	30-39	19	11.9	11.9	22.6
	40-49	33	20.8	20.8	43.4
	50-59	47	29.6	29.6	73.0
	60-69	32	20.1	20.1	93.1
	70-79	6	3.8	3.8	96.9
	80 and above	3	1.9	1.9	98.7
	No answer	2	1.3	1.3	100.0
	Total	159	100.0	100.00	

Table 10 - Sample 1, Race/Ethnicity Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	White	126	79.2	79.2	79.2
	Black	7	4.4	4.4	83.6
	Asian	2	1.3	1.3	84.9
	Latino	11	6.9	6.9	91.8
	Native American	2	1.3	1.3	93.1
	Pacific Islander	1	.6	.6	93.7
	Two or more races	5	3.1	3.1	96.9
	Other/No Answer	5	3.1	3.1	100.0
	Total	159	100.0	100.0	

Table 11 - Sample 1, Gender Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	68	42.8	42.8	42.8
	Female	86	54.1	54.1	96.9
	Other	2	1.3	1.3	98.1
	No Answer	3	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	159	100.0	100.0	

Table 12 - Sample 1, Religion Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Christian	93	58.5	58.5	58.5
	Jewish	4	2.5	2.5	61.0
	Other Religion	12	7.5	7.5	68.6
	Agnostic	7	4.4	4.4	73.0
	Atheist	5	3.1	3.1	76.1
	No Answer	38	23.9	23.9	100.0
	Total	159	100.0	100.0	

Table 13 - Sample 1, Education Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	LT high school	1	.6	.6	.6
	High school graduate	13	8.2	8.2	8.8
	Some college	30	18.9	18.9	27.7
	Associate's degree	16	10.1	10.1	37.7
	Bachelor's degree	53	33.3	33.3	71.1
	Master's degree	25	15.7	15.7	86.8
	Doctoral/professional	19	11.9	11.9	98.7
	No answer	2	1.3	1.3	100.0
	Total	159	100.0	100.0	

Table 14 - Sample 1, Income Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than $20,000	8	5.0	5.0	5.0
	$20,001-$35,000	17	10.7	10.7	15.7
	$35,001-$50,000	21	13.2	13.2	28.9
	$50,001-$75,000	33	20.8	20.8	49.7
	$75,001-$90,000	30	18.9	18.9	68.6
	$90,001-$105,000	18	11.3	11.3	79.9
	Over $105,000	30	18.9	18.9	98.7
	No answer	2	1.3	1.3	100.0
	Total	159	100.0	100.0	

Sample 2

Sample 2 produced 190 respondents, with a valid N between 176 and 178 respondents. The modal race category was white (88.6%), median age 60-69 years old (26.7%), modal gender category male (65.8%), modal religion category Christian (55.3%), modal education level bachelor's degree (38.3%) and modal income group $105,000 and over (30.3%).

Some cautions should be noted here. Median age was nearly identical across age groups 50-59 (25.6%) and 60-69 (26.7%). Income groups were also represented well in other categories (the four tiers below the modal category were all between 20 and 27 respondents in each category, from $35,001-$105,000).

Table 15 - Sample 2, Age Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-29	15	7.9	8.5	8.5
	30-39	19	10.0	10.8	19.3
	40-49	34	17.9	19.3	38.6
	50-59	45	23.7	25.6	64.2
	60-69	47	24.7	26.7	90.9
	70-79	16	8.4	9.1	100.0
	Total	176	92.6	100.0	
Missing	System	14	7.4		
Total		190	100.0		

Table 16 - Sample 2, Race/Ethnicity Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	White	156	82.1	87.6	87.6
	Black	7	3.7	3.9	91.5
	Asian	2	1.1	1.1	92.6
	Latino	4	2.1	2.2	94.8

	Native American	1	1.1	1.1	94.9
	Pacific Islander	1	1.1	1.1	96.0
	Two or more races	7	3.7	3.9	99.9
	Total	178	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	12	6.3		
Total		190	100.0		

Table 17 - Sample 2, Gender Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	125	65.8	70.2	70.2
	Female	53	27.9	29.8	100.0
	Total	178	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	12	6.3		
Total		190	100.0		

Table 18 - Sample 2, Religion Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Christian	105	55.3	55.3	55.3
	Jewish	9	4.7	4.7	60.0
	Other Religion	3	1.6	1.6	61.6
	Agnostic	6	3.2	3.2	64.7
	Atheist	4	2.1	2.1	66.8
	No Answer	63	33.2	33.2	100.0
	Total	190	100.0	100.0	

Table 19 - Sample 2, Education Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High school graduate	14	7.4	8.0	8.0
	Some college	32	16.8	18.2	26.1
	Associate's degree	20	10.5	11.4	37.5

	Bachelor's degree	67	35.3	38.1	75.6
	Master's degree	27	14.2	15.3	90.9
	Doctoral/professional	16	8.4	9.1	100.0
	Total	176	92.6	100.0	
Missing	System	14	7.4		
Total		190	100.0		

Table 20 - Sample 2, Income Breakdown

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than $20,000	10	5.3	5.7	5.7
	$20,001-$35,000	18	9.5	10.3	16.0
	$35,001-$50,000	20	10.5	11.4	27.4
	$50,001-$75,000	25	13.2	14.3	41.7
	$75,001-$90,000	22	11.6	12.6	54.3
	$90,001-$105,000	27	14.2	15.4	69.7
	Over $105,000	53	27.9	30.3	100.0
	Total	175	92.1	100.0	
Missing	System	15	7.9		
Total		190	100.0		

The results from the two samples do vary slightly. Comparisons of each group's results to the US population as recorded in the 2010 Census and the 2010 General Social Survey are presented below.

Table 21 - Samples and GSS/Census Comparisons, Age

Age	Sample 1	Sample 2	Census/ GSS*	Average Both Samples	Range of Samples	Difference of Census and Average
18-29	10.7%	8.5%	15.0%	9.6%	2.2%	5.4%
30-39	11.9%	10.8%	18.1%	11.4%	1.1%	6.8%
40-49	20.8%	19.3%	18.4%	20.1%	1.5%	-1.7%
50-59	29.6%	25.6%	18.8%	27.6%	4.0%	-8.8%
60-69	20.1%	26.7%	14.2%	23.4%	6.6%	-9.2%
70-79	3.8%	9.1%	9.2%	6.5%	5.3%	2.8%

Age	Sample 1	Sample 2	Census/ GSS*	Average Both Samples	Range of Samples	Difference of Census and Average
80-89	1.9%	0.0%	6.3%	1.0%	1.9%	5.4%
No Answer	1.3%	0.0%	N/A	0.7%	1.3%	

*Approximated from Census 2012 data; results not identical as Census 2012 splits at 5-year intervals at the 5-year markers (20, 25, 30).

Compared to the general US population, the average of these two samples skews slightly older (8.8% more between 50 and 59 years old, 9.2% more between 60 and 69 years old). The other differences are within 5 to 7 percent of the US population and so should not significantly impact research results.

Table 22 - Samples and GSS/Census Comparisons, Race/Ethnicity

Race and Ethnicity	Sample 1	Sample 2	Census/ GSS	Average Both Samples	Range of Samples	Difference of Census and Average
White	79.2%	87.6%	72.4%	83.4%	-8.4%	-11.0%
Black	4.4%	3.9%	12.6%	4.2%	0.5%	8.5%
Asian	1.3%	1.1%	4.8%	1.2%	0.2%	3.6%
Latino	6.9%	2.2%	7.6%	4.6%	4.7%	3.1%
Native American	1.3%	0.5%	0.9%	0.9%	-0.8%	0.0%
Pacific Islander	0.6%	0.5%	0.2%	0.6%	-0.1%	-0.4%
Two or more races	3.1%	3.9%	N/A	3.5%	-0.8%	NA
Other/No Answer	3.1%	0.0%	1.5%	1.6%	3.1%	NA

Compared to the general US population, the average of these two samples skews much more white (11% greater) and slightly less black (8.5% less) than the Census results on race and ethnicity.

Table 23 - Samples and GSS/Census Comparisons, Gender

Gender	Sample 1	Sample 2	Census/ GSS	Average Both Samples	Range of Samples	Difference of Census and Average
Male	42.8%	70.2%	49.2%	56.5%	-27.4%	-7.3%
Female	54.1%	29.8%	50.8%	42.0%	24.3%	8.9%
Other	1.3%	0.0%	N/A	0.7%	1.3%	NA
No Answer	1.9%	0.0%	N/A	1.0%	1.9%	NA

Compared to the general US population, the average of these two samples skews slightly more male (7.3%) and less female (8.9%) than the Census results on gender.

Table 24 - Samples and GSS/Census Comparisons, Religion

Religion	Sample 1	Sample 2	Census/ GSS	Average Both Samples	Range of Samples	Difference of Census and Average
Christian	58.5%	55.3%	85.8%	56.9%	3.2%	28.9%
Jewish	2.5%	4.7%	2.0%	3.6%	-2.2%	-1.6%
Other Religious ID	7.5%	1.6%	2.5%	4.6%	5.9%	-2.1%
Agnostic	4.4%	3.2%	4.9%*	3.8%	1.2%	NA
Atheist	3.1%	2.1%	4.9%*	2.6%	-1.0%	NA
No Answer	23.9%	33.2%	N/A	28.6%	9.3%	NA

*Approximated from GSS 2010 data; Atheist and Agnostic are combined as one category in GSS data

Compared to the general US population, the average of the two samples skews significantly less Christian than GSS results on religion. This may be a factor in research results.

Table 25 - Samples and GSS/Census Comparisons, Education

Education	Sample 1	Sample 2	Census/ GSS	Average Both Samples	Range of Samples	Difference of Census and Average
Less than HS	0.6%	0.0%	14.4%	0.3%	0.6%	14.1%
HS Graduate	8.2%	8.0%	28.5%	8.1%	0.2%	20.4%
Some College	18.9%	18.2%	14.5%	18.6%	0.7%	-4.1%

Associate's	10.1%	11.4%	14.5%	10.8%	-1.3%	3.8%
Bachelor's	33.3%	38.1%	17.7%	35.7%	4.8%	-18.0%
Master's	15.7%	15.3%	5.2%*	15.5%	-0.4%	14.1%
Doctoral or Professional	11.9%	9.1%	5.2%*	10.5%	2.8%	N/A
No Answer	1.3%	0.0%	N/A	0.7%	1.3%	N/A

*Approximated from Census 2010 data; Master's and Doctoral are combined in Census data

Compared to the general US population, education levels in the average of these two samples skews significantly lower on high school graduates (20.4% lower), master's degree holders (14.1% lower), and those who have not completed high school (14.1% lower) than the Census 2010 results. Conversely, it skews significantly higher on bachelor's degree holders (18.1% higher). Differences from the US population on doctoral level degrees could not be determined with available data. This may be a factor in research results as well.

Table 26 - Samples and GSS/Census Comparisons, Income

Income	Sample 1	Sample 2	Census/ GSS*	Average Both Samples	Range of Samples	Difference of Census and Average
Less than $20,000	5.0%	5.7%	19.2%	5.4%	-0.7%	13.9%
$20,001-$35,000	10.7%	10.3%	16.6%	10.5%	0.4%	6.1%
$35,001-$50,000	13.2%	11.4%	14.2%	12.3%	1.8%	1.9%
$50,001-$75,000	20.8%	14.3%	18.3%	17.6%	6.5%	0.8%
$75,001-$90,000	18.9%	12.6%	7.1%	15.8%	-6.3%	-8.7%
$90,001-$105,000	11.3%	15.4%	5.9%	13.4%	4.1%	-7.5%
Over $105,000	18.9%	30.3%	18.7%	24.6%	-11.4%	-5.9%
No Answer	1.3%	N/A	N/A	1.3%	N/A	N/A

*Approximated from Census 2012 data; results not identical as Census 2012 splits at $10,000 intervals at the $5,000 ($15,000; $25,000, etc.).

Compared to the general US population, the sample skews significantly lower on low-income (under $20,000) respondents (13.9% lower) while skewing slightly higher on upper-middle-class respondents ($75,000-$105,000 range) at between 7.5% and 8.7% higher than the general population.

While these demographics do skew from the general United States population in almost every case, this skew is not expected to be either statistically or theoretically significant, as demographics are not hypothesized to have a significant effect on either frame activation or decision-making outcomes. Any differences that appear in the hypothesis tests will be discussed in the final chapter of this dissertation.

At this point, we turn to a discussion of each hypothesis test and its outcomes.

HYPOTHESIS 1

Hypothesis 1 is intended to test whether or not a frame is activated by indirect stimuli. Indirect stimuli mean stimuli that the respondent is not directly told to notice. Unlike Lasky's experiment, which guided respondents to think about certain aspects of situations to see if those aspects would trigger a particular way of thinking (Lasky 2000), this experiment aims to see if indirect prompts can also trigger a particular way of thinking (a cognitive frame).

Hypothesis 1 states: *As the salience of a social object relative to an actor's self-, group-, or institution-oriented concerns increases, the activation of a corresponding cognitive frame should become more likely*.

This test was performed using the first data set, through a chi-square examination of the relationship between the stimulus group as the independent variable and the Prompt List score as the dependent variable. The Stimulus Group coded whether the respondent was sorted randomly into a self-oriented situation, a group-oriented situation, or an institution-oriented situation. The Prompt List score coded which frame was activated based on the Prompt List tool. Both variables were considered nominal. This test was performed using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure to minimize the impact of low cell counts.

Table 21 - Hypothesis Test for H1: Stimulus to Activated Frame

	Stimulus Group			
Activated Frame per Prompt Index	*Self*	*Group*	*Institution*	Total
Self	71.2	22.2	23.5	100.0
Group	16.4	55.6	5.9	100.0
Institution	12.3	22.2	70.6	100.0
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	

	Value		df	Monte Carlo 1-sided Significance
Pearson Chi-Square	42.820[a]		4	.000[b]
N of Valid Cases	108			
Pearson Chi-Square	42.820[a]		4	.000[b]
N of Valid Cases	108			

	Value		df	Monte Carlo 1-sided Significance
Pearson Chi-Square	42.820[a]		4	.000[b]
N of Valid Cases	108			
Nominal by Nominal		Phi	.630	.000[c]
		Cramer's V	.445	.000[c]
N of Valid Cases			108	

a. 4 cells (44.4% have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.62.
b. Based on 10,000 sampled tables with starting seed 2000000.
c. Based on 10,000 sampled tables with starting seed 2000000.

When respondents were given a self-oriented stimulus, their activated frame was self-oriented 71.2% of the time. 55.6% of group-prompted respondents demonstrated a group-oriented frame. Finally, 70.6% of institutionally prompted respondents demonstrated an institutional frame. This finding demonstrates that the majority of the time, an indirect stimulus caused activation of a corresponding frame in the respondent for each stimulus. This finding is statistically significant (x^2=42.820, df 4, α=.05, p=.000) and explains about 44.5% of the variability in activated frames (Cramer's V =.445). H1 is thus supported.

So, indirect stimuli activate particular frames. But what, if anything, does this mean for decision-making? Hypothesis 2 deals with this question.

HYPOTHESIS 2

Hypothesis 2 states: A*s salient cognitive frames are activated, rationales for assigning legitimacy should be more likely to correlate with the activated frame*.

Hypothesis 2 deals with whether an activated frame, once activated, then guides decision-making. This test required collection of a second, independent data set, due to the fact that testing for the activation of a frame would bring respondents' attention to the items in the frame in ways that could compromise further responses dealing with that frame. A second dataset was collected to test the hypothesis that activated frames guide decision-making. In this dataset, the Vignette List 2 was used to determine, first, whether an actor's decisions were the predicted decision based on the vignette he or she was exposed to; and second, whether the

rationales given for the decision matched the domain for the vignette he or she was exposed to.

The vignettes in Vignette List 2 were substantially identical to the vignettes in the Stimulus Vignette tool used in H1 to detect whether frames were activated by situations. As we know from the successful test of H1 that situations do activate frames, activation of a frame in a respondent with these same situations could now be taken "as read." Once the same situations were presented to the respondents, they were asked to indicate how likely they would be to make the decision we would predict from that stimulus. For example, if the respondent was given the instrumental stimulus of having lost a job, they were then asked how likely they would be to make the instrumental decision of taking another but for lower pay and no benefits. If the respondent indicated agreement with the proposed decision (to take the job), this was taken as an initial indicator that their decision correlated with the instrumental stimulus and frame. This is called the "Likert decision response" in the following discussion.

Following the Likert decision response to comply with or reject the frame-appropriate decision presented, the respondent was then asked to rate various pressures (financial situation, self-worth, community reputation, written laws and authorities, etc.) as reasons for their decision on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "not very likely" and 5 being "extremely likely." This gave insight into the rationale the actor felt was the reason or reasons for the decision he or she had just made. These are called the "Likert decision rationales" in the following discussion.

Using the Vignette List 2 tool, a two-step chi-square examination of the relationship between the independent variable of the prompted frame and the Likert decision response was performed. First, chi-square was performed on the relationship between each prompt type in the vignette presented to the respondent (prompt type) and its corresponding Likert decision response, to determine counts in each Likert decision response within a given prompt type. Once this was accomplished, a dataset consisting of the type of prompt given, the strength of the Likert decision response, and the counts for each combination was created and chi-square performed on the nominal-by-ordinal relationship of PROMPT to LIKERT, weighted by COUNTS. This test was performed using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure to minimize the impact of low cell counts.

The test in each case was to present a decision that corresponded to the prompt and determine whether the respondent agreed with that decision. In this test, frame activation was assumed based on the successful results of the H1 test. Results are discussed below.

Table 22 - Hypothesis Test for H2: Stimulus Group to Likert Decision Response

	Stimulus Group			
Likert Decision Response	*Self*	*Group*	*Institution*	Percent of Respondents
Not at all likely	0.0	2.0	11.8	5.0
Not very likely	8.1	22.0	23.5	17.8
Somewhat likely	30.6	30.0	20.8	30.6
Very likely	30.6	38.0	20.4	30.0
Extremely likely	30.6	8.0	10.3	16.7
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Value	df	Monte Carlo 1-sided Significance	

Pearson Chi-Square	42.820[a]	4	.000[b]
N of Valid Cases	108		
Pearson Chi-Square	28.492[a]	8	.000[b]
N of Valid Cases	180		
	Value	df	Monte Carlo 1-sided Significance
Pearson Chi-Square	42.820[a]	4	.000[b]
N of Valid Cases	108		
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.398	.000[c]
	Cramer's V	.281	.000[c]
N of Valid Cases		180	

a. 3 cells (20.0% have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.50.
b. Based on 10,000 sampled tables with starting seed 205597102.
c. Based on 10,000 sampled tables with starting seed 205597102.

Respondents who were self-prompted showed an increasing likelihood to agree with the self-oriented decision presented to them, with over 90% of respondents located in the "somewhat likely" and higher categories. Group-prompted respondents showed about 76% likelihood (contained in "somewhat likely" and higher categories) to agree with the group-oriented decision presented to them, and institution-prompted respondents showed about 63.5% likelihood (contained in "somewhat likely" and higher categories) to agree with the institution-oriented decision presented to them. This finding is statistically significant (x^2=28.492, df 8, α=.05, p=.000) and explains about 28.1% of the variability in decision-making (Cramer's V = .281).

In the H1 test, the lowest matching prompt-to-frame response rate was located in the normative prompt intersection with the normative frame. In the H2 test, a slight degrading of the responses to frame activation and subsequent

decisions can be seen across frame types. As the frame type moves up on the abstraction hierarchy from self to group to institution, the response rate decreases. This opens the questions of the next two hypotheses, which attempt to determine how an actor prioritizes a situation in which he is presented with multiple domain stressors.

HYPOTHESES 3 AND 4

Hypotheses 3 and 4 deal with the prioritization of frames when an actor is presented with multiple stimuli. Two results in the data allow us to get an idea of how this process works.

To refresh: The theory states that prioritization of frames is a function of prioritization of dimensions of pressure within the domains. First, salience activates the domain and frame. But what if there are multiple salient objects in the situation? How does an actor further prioritize these objects and the associated decisions to legitimate or de-legitimate?

Hypothesis 3 states: *In a multi-stimulus environment, activated frames should match the domain with the highest immediacy of consequence to the social actor.* That is, if an actor experiences multiple pressures at once, the one with the consequences that are closest in time should be the ones he pays attention to first. This is the *timeframe* dimension at work.

However, since the most-immediate pressures an actor normally faces will be self-oriented, this is most likely to take place only when the actor's dimension of

social space is not activated by the presence of an *agent of consequence*; that is, a member of the actor's strong-tie group or a representative of an institution to which the actor has affiliational ties. If this is the case, then H4 should predominate. Hypothesis 4 states: In a multi-stimulus environment, the presence of an agent of consequence should cause the actor's activated frame to match the domain represented by the agent of consequence.

Several results from both surveys lend support to each of these hypotheses. First, however, it would be instructive to discuss a result that, while it cannot be tested for statistical significance, gives initial insights into the splitting of frames among actors when exposed to a multi-stimulus environment.

An additional comparison performed during the H1 test was to present the respondent with a situation in which all three situations from the first three vignettes in the Stimulus Vignette tool were combined into one vignette with all three stimuli involved. The proportions across groups are shown below. It should be noted that when this chi-square was run including this prompt with the other three stimulus prompts, the chi-square for the overall table was statistically significant at $p<.000$, so these results should be considered generally dependable. While this finding does not in itself support either H3 or H4, it is interesting in that it demonstrates that not all actors respond to multi-stimulus situations in the same way.

Table 25 - Multi-Stimulus Prompt Responses

	Multi-Stimulus Prompt	Total
Activated Frame per Prompt Index		
Self	31.2	31.2
Group	18.8	18.8
Institution	50.0	50.0
Totals	100.00	

Another interesting thing about this result is that it contradicts current neoinstitutionalist theory regarding isomorphism, which states that when an actor does not know what to do, his most likely response will be to "follow the crowd," or imitate others' behavior (Haveman 1993). In this model, neoinstitutionalist theory would predict that group frame activation would be more likely than other types of frames in a multi-stimulus situation. However, the multidimensional finding seems to contradict this. Those exposed to multidimensional pressures broke in one of two main ways: self-oriented (~31% of respondents) or institution-oriented (~50% of respondents). Only ~19% of respondents responded with group frame activation, which would have been the predicted direction for the majority under neoinstitutionalist theory. It seems that people who are under stress tend to default either to what the rules say or to their own personal, immediate needs. Group pressures, in this case, seem to be salient to actors only about 19% of the time.

Knowing that not all actors seem to react in the same way to multiple stimuli, two results from the data can be used to test H3 and H4. H3 states that if the actor is alone and under immediate pressures among others, the immediate pressures will take priority. H4 states that the moment an agent of consequence appears on the

scene, the actor's immediate needs no longer matter as much, and a group or institution frame should be activated and predominate.

The initial results in H2, where actors who had been given a particular stimulus, is instructive in testing H3. Those given only a self-oriented prompt responded to it over 90% of the time, as shown in Table 24 (see page 155). This particular situation – a situation where the only person's needs were that of the actor, and where no group or institutional ties were present – is good for supporting H3. Actors in a no-tie environment will look out for their own needs first. Although this situation was not a multi-stimulus situation, it is the only one in which the most-immediate pressure is the one that can happen without an agent of consequence, as in H4. It might be interesting to pursue this further and gather data in which actors are confronted with multiple stimuli but no other people (for example, challenges to their value system during a time of immediate pressure) to see if their value system is prioritized even when alone. However, this result at least demonstrates that actors in a no-tie environment will respond to the immediate pressure 90% of the time.

Combined with the multi-stimulus proportions in Table 27 (see page 158), this seems to indicate that at least 30% of the time, actors respond to a multi-stimulus environment by addressing immediate pressures first. This is the support for H3.

H4 states that the presence of an agent of consequence (which activates social space) will cause the actor to pay more attention to pressures that exist in those

domains rather than the immediate, self-oriented domain. Two results from Vignette List 1 help demonstrate this result.

The second and third vignettes in the Vignette List 1 tool put the actor into situations where more than one stimulus was present. In Vignette 2 of List 1, the stimuli were the actor's hunger (self-oriented) and the actor's parents' approval (group-oriented). In Vignette 3 of the same list, the stimuli were the actor's hunger (self-oriented), the approval or disapproval of other people in the area (group-oriented), and the presence of a police officer (institution-oriented). In both cases, the actor was asked how likely it was that he would satisfy his hunger (immediate need). The Likert-scaled response to that question was then tested in a chi-square crosstab against the reason given for the Likert-scaled response. The reasons could be "my hunger" in both cases, "my parents' feelings" or "the presence of other people," depending on the vignette, and in the third vignette, "the possible presence of the police." The respondents were also given an opportunity to enter a reason of their own as a qualitative response. These responses were coded based on whether the response was in reference to the self, the group, or the institution ("stealing is wrong," a qualitative response often given for the third vignette, was considered a response to the law and coded as such). The responses to each vignette are shown below.

Table 26 - Test of H4: Frame Priorities With Agent of Consequence, Test 1

	Vignette 2 (Self and Group Stimuli)		
Likert Decision Response	*Self Reason Given For Decision*	*Group Reason Given For Decision*	Percent of Respondents

Not at all likely	13.3	0.0	2.5
Not very likely	30.0	5.4	10.1
Somewhat likely	20.0	20.2	20.1
Very likely	12.5	46.5	41.5
Extremely likely	16.7	27.9	25.8
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Value	df	Sig.
Pearson Chi-Square	37.120[a]	4	.000
N of Valid Cases	159		
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Tau-C	.269	.001
	Gamma	.547	.001
	Spearman	.314	.001
N of Valid Cases		159	

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .75.

In this example where the respondent was confronted with an agent of consequence in the form of his parents, scores for a group-oriented rationale for a decision increase as the likelihood of agreement with the expected decision increases (in this case, to eat food one does not like because one's parents are offering it), while scores in the self-oriented domain tend towards refusal of the expected decision (to refuse the offered food because it is not palatable). This finding is statistically significant (x^2=37.120, df 4, α=.05, p=.000) and explains about 31.4% of the variability in decision-making when an actor is confronted with multiple stressors (Spearman's rho=.314).

Table 27 - Test of H4: Frame Priorities With Agent of Consequence, Test 2

	Stimulus Group			
Likert Decision Response	*Self Reason Given For Decision*	*Group Reason Given For Decision*	*Institution Reason Given For Decision*	Percent of Respondents

Not at all likely	78.7	83.0	83.1	81.8
Not very likely	10.6	11.3	15.3	12.6
Somewhat likely	2.1	3.8	1.7	2.5
Very likely	4.3	1.9	0.0	1.9
Extremely likely	4.3	0.0	0.0	1.3
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

		Value	df	Sig.
	Pearson Chi-Square	8.415[a]	8	.394[b]
	N of Valid Cases	180		

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Tau-c	-.038	.463
	Gamma	-.120	.001
	Spearman	-.060	.001
N of Valid Cases		159	

Interestingly, in this case (where the question was how likely it would be that the respondent would steal a piece of fruit from an open-air marketplace to deal with hunger if there were crowds and the possibility of a police officer nearby), although the responses were still overwhelmingly what we would expect in the presence of an authority figure or other persons, the responses are very similar across groups. It may be that the stigma against stealing is so ingrained that it does not need an agent of consequence to activate it but is always there for social actors. Perhaps the temptation is what activates the group or institution frame that prohibits the deviant behavior to satisfy the individual need. However, since these results were not statistically significant (p=.463), it is possible that this vignette was poorly written relative to the other, which did yield significant results. Even so, the first hypothesis test supports the idea that given multiple stimuli where an agent of

consequence is present, actors will tend to move upward on the hierarchy to a frame correlating to the agent of consequence.

HYPOTHESES 5 AND 6

Hypotheses 5 and 6 assessed whether frames are rooted in the situation and if decisions are rooted in frame, or if demographic characteristics explain either or both better. Hypothesis 5 tested the idea that outside stimuli predict frame activation better than demographic characteristics, while Hypothesis 6 tested the idea that activated frames predict decision-making better than demographic characteristics. Much social science depends heavily on the idea that demographic characteristics somehow govern decision-making. This could suggest that this may be overlooking the critical component of the cognitive frame. It is also possible that frames have some grounding in demographic characteristics, so that test was carried out as well.

Hypothesis 5 states: *Activated frames predict decision-making better than ascribed or achieved characteristics,* while Hypothesis 6 states: *Cognitive frames should have a greater effect on rationale choice than ascribed or achieved characteristics of the social actor.*

Two tests were required: the correlation, if any, of demographic characteristics to frame activation, and the correlation, if any, of demographic characteristics to decision making. Demographic characteristics including race, age

cohort, religious affiliation, education levels, income levels, and gender were collected in both data sets.

H5: Testing Relationships of Demographic Characteristics to Activated Frames

In all cases, a chi-square analysis using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure based on 10,000 samples, to eliminate small cell count problems, was performed on each bivariate relationship between the demographic characteristic and the activated frame. Since the activated frame is a nominal measure, nominal measurements were necessary in all cases.

Age to Activated Frame

The results of the crosstab using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure based on 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of age by activated frame. This association, using Fisher's Exact Test as a nominal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=.594). This demonstrates that age cohort has no predictive relationship to activated frames. This finding supports H5.

Table 28 - Age to Activated Frame, Chi-Square

	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.631[a]
Fisher's Exact Test	.594

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 2000000.

Race to Activated Frame

The results of the crosstab using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure based on 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of race by activated frame.

This association, using Fisher's Exact Test as a nominal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=.902). This demonstrates that race has no predictive relationship to activated frames. This finding supports H5.

Table 29 - Race to Activated Frame, Chi-Square

	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.867[a]
Fisher's Exact Test	.902

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 112562564.

Gender to Activated Frame

The results of the crosstab using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure based on 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of gender by activated frame. This association, using Fisher's Exact Test as a nominal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=.577). This demonstrates that gender has no predictive relationship to activated frames. This finding supports H5.

Table 30 - Gender to Activated Frame, Chi-Square

	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.625[a]
Fisher's Exact Test	.577

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 562334227.

Education to Activated Frame

The results of the crosstab using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure based on 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of education by activated frame. This association, using Fisher's Exact Test as a nominal-by-ordinal indicator,

was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=.052). However, as this was a two-tailed test, the actual significance level was p=.026, and thus significant at the chosen alpha level.

Table 31 - Education to Activated Frame, Chi-Square

	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.053[a]
Fisher's Exact Test	.052

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1487459085.

This finding, while it partially rejects H5, also calls for more research into the effects of education on cognitive framing and the possible outcomes seen as a result. However, even though education did predict frame activation, it still does not do it as well as the stimulus provided in the environment. Cramer's V for stimuli activating frames was .419, while Cramer's V for education activating frames was only .284. Therefore, H5 is supported in that the activation of frames is still better predicted by other than demographic characteristics.

Table 32 - Education by Activated Frame, Strength of Explanation

		Value	Monte Carlo Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.401[a]	.053
	Cramer's V	.284[a]	.053
N of Valid Cases	140		

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1487459085.

Table 33 Education by Activated Frame Results

	Highest Degree Earned								
Activated Frame per Prompt List	**LT HS**	**HS**	**SC**	**AA**	**BA**	**MA**	**Doc**	**N/A**	**Total**
Self-Oriented	100.0	11.1	50.0	42.9	60.0	44.0	58.8	0.0	50.0
Group-Oriented	0.0	11.1	17.9	14.3	26.7	20.0	23.5	0.0	20.7
Institution-Oriented	0.0	77.8	32.1	42.9	13.3	36.0	17.6	100.0	29.3
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Income to Activated Frame

The results of the crosstab using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure based on 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of income levels by activated frame. This association, using Fisher's Exact Test as a nominal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=.352). This demonstrates that income level has no predictive relationship to activated frames. This finding supports H5.

Table 34 - Income by Activated Frame, Chi-Square

	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.352[a]
Fisher's Exact Test	.337

Religion to Activated Frame

The results of the crosstab using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure based on 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of religion by activated frame. This association, using Fisher's Exact Test as a nominal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=.924). This demonstrates that religion has no predictive relationship to activated frames. This finding supports H5.

Table 35 - Religion by Activated Frame, Chi-Square

	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.897[a]
Fisher's Exact Test	.924

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 508741944.

H6: Testing Relationships of Demographic Characteristics to Decisions

Original categories often had so many low expected counts that their chi-square results could not be trusted. To compensate for the low-cell-count issue, bootstrapping procedures were used on all tests of correlation and association. Chi-square for each nominal demographic characteristic (race, gender, and religious affiliation) was performed with the demographic characteristic as the independent variable and the dependent variable from H2 that designated how the respondent decided their response to the situation as the dependent variable. To deal with small cell counts, a Monte Carlo procedure based on 10,000 sampled tables was employed. Bivariate correlations using gamma were performed for each ordinal demographic characteristic (age cohort, education levels, and income levels) with the demographic characteristic as the independent variable and the dependent variable from H2 designating how the respondent decided their response to the situation as the dependent variable.

The ideal situation for supporting H6 would be if none of the comparisons with demographic characteristics and prompt response show statistical significance. Failing that, H6 would still be supported if the explanatory strength of the demographic is smaller than that of the activated frame (Cramer's V=.281).

Age by Decision

The results of the crosstab using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure based on 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of age by prompt response. This association, using gamma correlation as an ordinal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=.209). This demonstrates that age cohort has no predictive relationship to the decision made. This finding supports H6.

Table 36 - Age by Decision, Bivariate Correlation

		Monte Carlo .Sig
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's Tau-b	.209[a]
	Gamma	.209[a]
	Spearman	.210[a]

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 2000000.

Race by Decision

The results of chi-square using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure with 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of race by prompt response. This association, using Fisher's Exact Test as a nominal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=.212). This demonstrates that race has no predictive relationship to the decision made. This finding supports H6.

Table 37 - Race by Decision, Chi-Square

	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.465[a]
Fisher's Exact Test	.212

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 624387341.

Education by Decision

The results of a crosstab comparision using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure with 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of education

level by prompt response. This association, using gamma as an ordinal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant ((α=.05, p=.976). This demonstrates that education has no predictive relationship to the decision made. This finding supports H6.

Table 38 - Education by Decision, Bivariate Correlation

		Monte Carlo .Sig
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's Tau-b	.976[a]
	Gamma	.976[a]
	Spearman	.980[a]

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1535910591.

Income by Decision

The results of a crosstab comparison using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure with 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of income level by prompt response. This association, using gamma as an ordinal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=.430). This demonstrates that income has no predictive relationship to the decision made. This finding supports H6.

Table 39 - Income by Decision, Bivariate Correlation

		Monte Carlo .Sig
Ordinal by Ordinal	Kendall's Tau-b	.430[a]
	Gamma	.430[a]
	Spearman	.438[a]

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1556559737.

Gender by Decision

The results of chi-square using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure with 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of gender by prompt response. This association, using Pearson's correlation coefficient as a nominal-by-ordinal indicator, was nonsignificant (α=.05, p=..524). This demonstrates that

gender has no predictive relationship to the decision made. This finding supports H6.

Table 40 - Gender by Decision, Chi-Square

	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.524[a]
Fisher's Exact Test	.566[a]

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 484067124.

Religion by Decision

The results of chi-square using a Monte Carlo bootstrap procedure with 10,000 samples were employed to test the relationship of religion by prompt response. This association, using Fisher's Exact Test as a nominal-by-ordinal indicator, was statistically significant (α=.05, p=.041). This demonstrates that religion does have a predictive relationship to the decision made and rejects H6.

However, as with all prior findings, the explanatory power of this finding is not as robust as that of H2. Cramer's V for this test is .206, well below the H2 Cramer's V value of .281. Therefore, H6 is still supported by these results.

Table 41 - Religion by Decision, Chi-Square

	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.041[a]
Fisher's Exact Test	.009[a]

a. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 126474071.

Table 42 - Religion by Activated Frame

	Religion						
Activated Frame per Prompt List	**Christian**	**Jewish**	**Other**	**Agnostic**	**Atheist**	**No Answer**	**Total**
Not at all	7.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	4.7

likely							
Not very likely	16.2	22.2	0.0	16.7	50.0	15.9	16.8
Somewhat likely	31.4	22.2	66.7	33.3	25.0	23.8	28.9
Very likely	30.5	44.4	0.0	33.3	0.0	25.4	28.4
Extremely likely	14.3	11.1	33.3	16.7	0.0	19.0	15.8
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Seven years ago, I discovered that not everyone understands the law as a statement of consequences for action. Some understand it as a statement of values. Others simply see it as an authority that cannot be questioned. From that first question – how do people understand the law? – I followed my curiosity into the question of how people legitimate the law, and then how they legitimate, period. I found most of the explanatory literature on the topic either unsatisfying, or in the right church, but the wrong pew. While reading about how legitimate systems work opened up new avenues for research and understanding, I wanted to know about individuals and how they decided something was legitimate in the first place.

Eventually my work to figure out that position led me to cognitive psychology, and from there to neuropsychology. I began to understand how human beings had fundamental, almost unconscious rule-sets about their behavior and the behavior of others, and how irrationally angry they became when those rule-sets were breached, as in Garfinkel's famous experiments. But as a sociologist, what finally brought it together for me was when I realized that the explanations lay not just in the personality or psychology of the people I was studying, but in the social pressures that they must deal with and manage every day. As it became clear that the same people often managed social pressures very differently, the idea of framing appeared as a natural next step in explaining individuals and their decisions about legitimacy.

This dissertation on the operation of frames and their impact on decision-making about legitimacy is my entry point into the larger field of legitimation and criminology, into understanding why people choose to obey some laws and not others, into understanding why people choose to criminalize some things but legalize others and assume that still others will simply be stopped by their attached social stigma. It is my attempt to answer not just the research questions posed at the beginning of this work, some 190 pages ago, but also the overarching questions of how people make decisions and Zelditch's open question of where legitimacy comes from in the first place. I believe that both of these questions have been answered with the work that precedes this chapter.

The original research questions about whether social pressures increasing in the environment cause the activation of a related cognitive frame and whether those frames then guide decision-making have been answered through the tests of hypotheses 1 and 2. Between the results of these two supported hypotheses, we can now say definitively that frames exist and that they are highly sensitive to social pressures – so much so that they are extremely volatile from decision to decision – and that these frames, more often than not, guide the actor to make decisions that correlate with the pressures he experienced that activated the frame in the first place.

This also may shed further light on Achen and Bartels' findings about rationalization, and in fact may cast their findings in a new light. Normally, we view "rationalization" as "justification after the fact," and we may even see it as making

excuses. This is often how it is used in social science. But the findings of hypotheses 1 and 2 may give a different explanation for what Achen and Bartels labeled "rationalization."

Consider that frames operate almost unconsciously, and at best semiconsciously. They are reactions to the known and understood. They are also like sunglasses that make certain things more noticeable while masking things that are not as important in that moment. We are not aware of the frame being activated. We are simply aware of what looks important to us in the moment. As a result, when we make decisions while a particular frame is active, we may not consciously know why we made the decision, but if asked, the salient pressures that the frame has already caused us to notice and take into account will seem the logical, plausible explanations for the decision we made – and in fact, it will be the case, because those salient pressures are the reason we actually did make the decision.

This is not the same thing as rationalization. Rationalization is the active, conscious attempt to justify or excuse by giving an account of why we did something. Dictionary.com defines *rationalization* as the act of ascribing our own behaviors "to causes that superficially seem reasonable and valid but that actually are unrelated to the true, possibly unconscious and often less creditable or agreeable causes." In other words, we rationalize because we want to make our actions look less bad, not because we unconsciously made a decision due to salient pressures that we unconsciously noticed.

A frame is not something we choose to activate. It activates entirely on the basis of known objects in our environment that may carry consequences. Therefore, it cannot be the rational-actor rationalization that attempts to excuse our behavior. Quite to the contrary – when a person in an activated frame is asked why he did something, the things he names will be the things that caused his decision to go the way it did. This is not rationalization. It is habitus.

The original research question about prioritization of frames has also been partially answered with the results of H3 and H4. Finding that a person alone will pay attention to his own immediate needs over 90 percent of the time, but will prioritize the needs of the group or the institution when an agent of the group or institution is present, says something important about the social nature of decision-making. While the conflicting results from the two tests of H4 show the need for more work in this area, the finding that social ties matter in decision-making about what expectations and pressures are legitimate (that is, which ones will bind our behaviors and which ones will be rejected) is applicable to diverse fields of study, not just within law but outside it. Studies of crime and justice, of politics, of social movements, and perhaps even sudden large group reactions may be explainable through the use of these findings.

To elaborate on this claim: Jury and justice studies, for example, are as much about the social dynamics of the jury room or the courtroom as they are about the evidence. Consider a jury composed of ten persons who look at the evidence through praxis – the method of decision-making that deals with the novel and

unknown – and two persons whose group frames are active. This can lead to serious problems both in the courtroom and in the jury room. The group-oriented jurors may look less at the evidence and more at the strong ties they have either to other jurors or to the court personnel or even the defendant. Kerr and his colleagues note that "the similarity-lenience hypothesis seems to be widely accepted by attorneys as a valid rule of thumb" (Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, and Weathers 1995). As a hypothesis for jury selection, it seems to be largely successful in producing lighter sentences for defendants, and this may be due to the operation of group-oriented frames on the part of jurors who perceive the defendant as similar to themselves. Across the board, "jurors are often less punitive when defendants are similar" (Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, and Weathers 1995). By having people on the jury who see the defendant as "someone like me," the defense increases the chance of them also ignoring the evidence in favor of their strong group ties to the defendant (Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, and Weathers 1995; Miller, Maskaly, Green, and Peoples 2011) (Demuth and Steffensmeier 2004; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998).

Simply having a member of one's group in a place where one notices that person seems to be enough to activate a group-oriented frame. This makes it far less likely that the juror can operate under praxis and look at the novel evidence without coloring it with group-oriented biases. Conversely, it is not an accident that black defendants tend to get harsher sentences for the same crimes that white defendants commit (Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, and Weathers 1995; Miller, Maskaly, Green, and Peoples 2011; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998). Jurors tend to see black

defendants as "not part of my group." Indeed, Steffensmeier and his colleagues make a strong case for the idea that jurors see young black male defendants as the most sentence-worthy (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer 1998); this may be in part because the composition of most juries skews white and upper-class (Fukurai and Butler 1993-1994), and as a result, the young black male defendant is seen as part of the outgroup and thus more harshly judged. (It is plausible that the presence of an agent of consequence of an outgroup should also activate a group-oriented frame, much like a more-rapid punishment will activate a self-oriented frame in the same way a more-rapid reward will. More research into this phenomenon is certainly needed.)

These results also have applications in the field of criminology. First, they seem to support Hirschi's contention that more-socialized individuals are less likely to deviate (Hirschi 2006), or as legitimacy researchers might put it, are more likely to legitimate. Knowing that group-oriented frames are more likely to control behavior in a group situation explains why so many deviants who come from broken homes, "bad" neighborhoods, and other backgrounds where social bonding is relatively scarce commit more crimes than those who come from strong families and "good" neighborhoods; the frame that is probably most often active for these young people is the self-oriented frame. It also explains why people are more likely to be deviant when in groups than alone, even into adulthood (Erickson and Jensen 1977). Feldman discusses how group norms are those that are more likely to increase group survival; if a deviant group wants to survive, it is best served by

having its members conform to its deviant norms (Feldman 1984). Activation of group frames is thus critical to the survival of groups.

Subcultural theory can also draw support from these findings as we see that those who have few social bonds at home will seek them out elsewhere, and for many juveniles living in poverty, those bonds will be found in gangs and other criminal enterprises. The group-oriented frame of gangs is just as strong for gang members as the group-oriented frame of a church is for church members. The activation and subconscious operation of frames may be the reason why.

This naturally leads into the application of these findings to social movements and large sudden group behaviors, such as riots. Being around those who seem to be "like" you activates the associated frame and guides your behavior towards the needs of the group. If the need of the group is an idealistic value such as freedom, democracy, income equality, or other issues that have repeatedly surfaced in social movements over the years, the creation and activation of group frames may be part of the reason for their success or failure. The "true believer" phenomenon may be as much the activation of group frames guiding behavior as it is the personal allegiance to a belief system. It is no accident that those who are the fiercest "true believers" are isolated from other groups and deeply embedded in a web of strong ties to others in their movement. Hoffer's assertion that the "true believer" needs the purpose and self-worth of group membership more than they need the group norms to be true (Hoffer 1951:13) is supported by these findings of group-centered frame activation.

Finally, the research question regarding whether demographic characteristics are a factor in decision-making and whether they explain decisions as well as frame activation has been definitively answered by the results of H5 and H6. With very few exceptions, demographics do not bear the same relationship to decisions as framing does; nor do demographics bear the same relationship to frame activation as situational pressures do. While a deeper investigation of the relationship of demographics to frame *creation* may bear fruit in later research, this relationship was outside the scope of the current work.

These findings call into question research that predicates decision-making behavior on demographic characteristics. Of special interest in this case is the journalistic reporting of the Proposition 8 outcome in California in 2008. Reports from CBS News and the Los Angeles Times made quite a splash in reporting that 70% of all black voters voted for Proposition 8, the California initiative to ban same-sex marriages as a state constitutional provision. A CBSNews.com article dated November 7, 2008, "Why Proposition 8 Won in California" (Kim 2008) pointed to exit poll information that 70 percent of blacks, 52 percent of Latinos and 48 percent of Asians voted for Proposition 8. While exit poll information is inherently unreliable due to its snowball-sampling method, the issue in this case is that voting behavior is being attributed directly to demographic characteristics. The results of H5 and H6 demonstrate that this is clearly incorrect, a superficial analysis of a deeper issue. While it may be that demographics control the initial creation of frames, and while this is an open question for future research, the attribution of

behavior to demographic characteristics is called into serious question by these results.

The results show that the initial research questions have been answered. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were supported, and Hypotheses 5 and 6 were partially supported, while Hypothesis 4 was partially supported and partially rejected.

The first question of this research was whether we could demonstrate which actors will legitimate in which ways, and if we could determine whether differential methods of legitimation would lead to differential decision outcomes. The results of this research show that actors sensitized to particular frames are more likely to make decisions that are in correspondence with the needs of those domains. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the decision outcomes are differential, and as stated in the research questions, this is an open topic for future of this research program.

Although most hypotheses were fully supported, it is important to discuss the issues surrounding the contradictory findings for H4, and the several incidences of frame or decision prediction by demographics in H5 and H6.

First, H4 predicted that in a multi-stimulus environment, agents of consequence would force a more-abstract frame to activate within the actor and thus control his decisions. The first test, involving a multi-stimulus environment that included self-oriented and group-oriented stimuli, showed definitively that this was the case. However, the second test, that included stimuli from all three

environments, was statistically nonsignificant and thus its results were questionable.

There are several possible reasons why the second test did not succeed. Its question was geared towards whether the respondent would participate in a minor act of deviance (de-legitimation of institutional and group expectations) to satisfy a self-oriented need, hunger. The demographics of the sample may play a role in this; it skews both older and wealthier than the United States population, and as such may be less likely to see immediate needs as pressing. Older and wealthier people tend to be more deeply embedded in groups than younger and poorer people, and this may play a role in the high levels of resistance to the deviant act both in the group-oriented and the institution-oriented responses.

Another reason why the second test may not have succeeded is that the question may have seemed trivial to some respondents. Several of the qualitative responses for "other" reasons for not deviating were along the lines of "why bother when I'm only a mile away from my lodgings?" or "I can take a little hunger; it's not that big of a deal to me." This tends to indicate that the question presented to the respondents may not have seemed either realistic or important. This stands in contrast to the multi-stimulus responses tested as part of H2, when institutional and self-oriented concerns split approximately equally. The question in that case was a much more serious and non-trivial issue of either accepting a plea bargain for a crime already committed, or going to jail, and respondents responded accordingly.

However, the first question, designed as it was to present a conflict between personal preferences and group approval, shows that when a social actor is involved in a group setting, the group's expectations and needs become more important than the individual's.

Some limitations of this research as executed should be noted here. First, the test samples were too small to allow for robust interval-ratio analysis of the results. The test samples were also skewed in several demographic characteristics, and in some cases this skew may have an impact on research results, especially in the case of age, race, and gender composition of the sample. The differences across demographic groups in construction of the survey tools may have also had some effect on outcomes, although it is logical to argue that the use of habitus in decision-making increases as one ages, and so the somewhat older age of the test sample should not be terribly relevant to the effectiveness of the tool created with a somewhat younger tool-creation sample.

The vignette tools also had some limitations and issues. One was the poor design of the first vignette in Vignette List 1. This tool should probably be redesigned to create a completely self-oriented first vignette. Additionally, the fourth vignette in the Stimulus Vignettes tool could be rewritten in several ways to change the order of the multiple stimuli, to see if that has an additional effect that was not captured in this dissertation.

One direction in which further research on frame prioritization could proceed is by testing respondents in situations that have two salient triggers (group and self,

as in the first test of H4; group and institution; self and institution) and then administering the Prompts List to see which frames were activated. Since it is now understood that frames are activated by outside sources and that frames guide decision-making, this is certainly an area in which further, more detailed research can be conducted. Now that the tools have been constructed, tested, and validated, the procedures to undertake such research will be far less cumbersome.

Another direction for further research in this area would be research in which the actor's group or valued institution is characterized as deviant or under attack, and see what happens to legitimacy assignment in those circumstances. If a social actor perceives that his group or valued institution is perceived as deviant by the wider society, what might this do to his legitimation decisions about the conflicting demands imposed by his group versus the wider society on his behavior?

With regards to the few places in which prediction of frame activation or of decision making showed significant results with demographics as the independent variable, it is first important to note that although these did show predictive value, they did not predict as well as the activated frame or the situational pressures in either case, showing lower Cramer's V values than the stimulus group or the activated frame in both cases. Still, it is important to discuss why these two demographic variables, education and religion, showed any predictive ability at all and how this might play into future examinations of the relationship between demographics and decision-making.

In the tests of hypothesis 5, education showed a controlling influence on frame activation. It is not surprising that education might play a part in the activation of frames. Frames are, after all, ways of making sense of the world. Education changes our cognition and thus our perception of things that are important in our worlds, so it is not surprising that the ideologies installed by the process of education would have an effect on what a social actor finds important and salient in his or her environment. It is also worth noting that this demographic characteristic has an element of choice involved.

The pattern of responses across each education level differs across frame groups. Those who had not graduated from high school were located entirely in the self-oriented group at 100%. High school graduates were much more likely to have an institution-oriented frame at 78.8%, with only 11.1% in either of the other categories. Those with college educations through the associate's degree were split between self-oriented and institutional framing (50% for those without an associate's degree and 42.9% for those with one were in the self-oriented group, while 32.1% and 42.9% were located in the institution-oriented group, respectively), with a small percentage located in the group-oriented frame (17.9% and 14.3%, respectively). Bachelors' degree holders showed the highest likelihood of self-oriented thinking at 60%, with decreasing numbers as the activated frame moved up the levels of abstraction from group-oriented (26.7%) to institutional (13.3%). Those with master's degrees had responses at 44% self-oriented, 20% group-oriented, and 36% institutional. Finally, those with doctoral or professional

degrees were almost as likely as bachelor's degree holders to be located in the self-oriented realm at 58.5%, with 23.5% and 17.6% in group-oriented and institutional groups, respectively.

These data show that education, especially higher education, has a much greater impact on respondents to move towards more self-oriented thinking. The most abstract framing across education levels was demonstrated among those who had only a high school diploma. This is certainly an open question for further research both on frame creation and frame activation. However, the overall results of the tests of demographics to frame activation shows that demographics rarely, if ever, have an actual effect on this phenomenon.

With regard to hypothesis 6, religion showed a controlling influence on decision-making. The results of the religion by decision table can be summed up as follows: Those who follow traditional Western religions (Christianity and Judaism) and agnostics had an approximate Gaussian distribution of responses within groups, with the largest number of responses at "somewhat likely" and decreasing in either direction from that point. Responses of members of other religions, which included Buddhist, Hindu, and those who identified as spiritual but not religious, were not normally distributed. Instead, almost 100% of this group indicated compliance with the expected decision at "somewhat likely" or higher. The distribution of atheist responses was likewise not normally distributed, with almost all of the responses pooling below the midpoint of the Likert scale. No atheists indicated that compliance was either "very likely" or "extremely likely," with 50% of them

indicating “not very likely” and the remainder distributed to the two points above and below that point on the Likert scale.

This result indicates that despite the expectation that religion will predict compliance with expected decisions, prediction of decisions through religion is not as cut-and-dried as it seems. Those who follow Western religions as well as agnostics are equally likely to comply as not comply, while non-Western religious groups seem more likely. Of course, the relative paucity of representatives of these religions in the sample also casts doubt on the statistical reliability of this finding, as does the weakness implied by the low expected cell count percentages. Although a Monte Carlo procedure creates additional robustness, it would be instructive to perform this research again with a larger sample in the future.

Overall, demographics are simply not an adequate method of determining how a social actor will decide. None of the demographics except religion were successful at predicting the decision made, and even religion does not predict the decision made as well as the activated frame. This is an important finding as it means that we cannot depend solely on demographic characteristics to predict decision-making. With the exceptions of education serving as a predictor of activated frame, and religion serving as a predictor of compliance with the frame-predicted decision, none of the demographic variables examined in this study held up against the strength of activated frames as a predictor of decisions. Even then, these two exceptions were not as good a predictor of frames and decisions as the three sets of stimuli were of frames or the frames themselves were of decisions. This is an

important finding as it draws attention to the fact that why a person makes a decision matters as much, if not more, as the fact that a decision was made.

This research also showed that as salient social pressures increase in the environment, the objects generating them become more salient to the social actor, thus having an effect on activation of cognitive frames. If these pressures were not salient, we would not see the activation of frames; as we do see frames activated and no other explanatory variable (demographics) explains it, we must conclude that the pressures activated those frames.

This research was also successful in demonstrating that these activated frames then guide decisions for social actors between 55 and 70 percent of the time, depending on the frame. This is an important finding and should be investigated in terms of its impact not just in law and criminology, but in other social institutions such as education, the arts, science, politics and economics. This finding shows that social pressures can have an enormous impact on social actors' decision-making. While this may not seem to be a large social issue, imagine what happens when a juror, or a police officer, or even a voter acts not on logic and reason (praxis), but on the pressures of needs and desires that seem significant to him at that time. This is an important finding for many branches of social research, especially law and society, criminology, and social psychology.

Overall, the main questions of this research were answered, and in the affirmative. An additional finding is that this may explain where legitimacy and legitimation originally come from – a question raised by Zelditch in 2006 (Zelditch

2006) which may now be answered. As theorized, the source of legitimacy is originally in concrete needs being met. Later, after those needs are met reliably, sanctions against violating those needs become normative strictures into which actors are socialized and trained. Finally, the need to institutionalize and regularize sanctions arises from the inability of larger groups to effectively sanction deviants, thus creating institutional structures grounded in the norms, and legitimated by them. The combination of habit and self-interest create the quality that we call "legitimacy," and which Dornbusch and Scott label "validity," or legitimacy as a perception – but legitimacy always starts as an active decision on the part of the social actor to meet his or her concrete needs.

This means that legitimacy theorists need to take the self-interested social actor into account when evaluating changes in legitimacy of social objects, institutions, and groups – especially when de-legitimation processes begin to occur. By identifying the concrete needs that are not being met for social actors, legitimacy theory may be better able to define and predict legitimation crises, as well as better evaluate them.

This also means that deterrence theory needs to take immediate, concrete needs into account when designing effective deterrents for deviance. If the deterrent cannot be effectively noticed if concrete, immediate needs are not met, then any policy initiatives which implement greater punishments, longer sentences, and more draconian measures are not only doomed to fail, but they may strip the legitimacy of the enforcing institution away as concrete needs of involved actors fall

by the wayside. The only way that institutional deterrence may actually work is if an officer or some other representative of the institution is present and reminding the actor of the greater consequences for deviance. Simply having laws in place will probably not accomplish much with any population.

Human beings are not quite as rational as the "rational actors" envisioned by economics. When push comes to shove, actors act not to maximize their benefit but only to minimize their costs. Humans are self-interested in their actions, but only to the boundaries of minimizing and avoiding costs. We might say that humans are irrational rational actors – irrational in that they act only to protect themselves, with no rational thought involved, but rational in that they act to deal with the most immediate need so that they can survive another minute, hour or day.

These findings can easily be applied to a number of other institutions, as already mentioned. An examination of the effects of cognitive framing in the workplace, in education, in other areas of law, in politics and in economics could be fairly easily undertaken with the tools created in this research. Examinations of the student loan crisis, the housing crisis, and many political divides – all are possible with this new set of research tools.

This research demonstrated that the cognitive frame, the mindset, of a social actor is a powerful force in research on decision-making of any kind. It demonstrates that we do not understand decision-making nearly as well as we thought we did. The cognitive frame must be taken into account in future research as well as reexaminations of past research. Any research that assumes the cognitive

frames of respondent actors to be identical across the group must now be considered suspect and open to reexamination with new data. Only with this new understanding of how human actors make decisions under social pressures can we truly begin to explain the failure of deterrence, the inexplicability of legitimation, and the many new avenues of exploration that are now open for social research.

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APPENDIX 1: WORD RANKINGS FOR CONNOTATIONS LIST

The following is a complete list of words with raw and percentage rankings in each domain, which were used to create the Connotations List.

Word	Institution Count over 4	Self Count over 4	Group Count over 4	Percentage of Institutional Count over 4	Percentage of Self Count over 4	Percentage of Group Count Over 4
Acceptable	4	6	5	57.1%	85.7%	71.4%
Active	4	2	2	57.1%	28.6%	28.6%
Administrative	7	4	4	100.0%	57.1%	57.1%
Affordable	1	4	0	14.3%	57.1%	0.0%
Annoying	3	3	3	42.9%	42.9%	42.9%
Attractive	0	1	1	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
Aware	1	3	4	14.3%	42.9%	57.1%
Bad	0	3	1	0.0%	42.9%	14.3%
Believed	2	1	6	28.6%	14.3%	85.7%
Boring	2	2	0	28.6%	28.6%	0.0%
Brave	1	1	0	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%
Bureaucratic	7	5	4	100.0%	71.4%	57.1%
Careful	3	3	1	42.9%	42.9%	14.3%
Certain	3	2	3	42.9%	28.6%	42.9%
Cheap	0	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Classy	0	0	1	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Comfortable	0	3	0	0.0%	42.9%	0.0%
Competitive	1	4	0	14.3%	57.1%	0.0%
Complex	4	6	7	57.1%	85.7%	100.0%
Consistent	2	3	2	28.6%	42.9%	28.6%
Controversial	1	3	4	14.3%	42.9%	57.1%

Word	Institution Count over 4	Self Count over 4	Group Count over 4	Percentage of Institutional Count over 4	Percentage of Self Count over 4	Percentage of Group Count Over 4
Corrupt	3	4	3	42.9%	57.1%	42.9%
Costly	3	6	2	42.9%	85.7%	28.6%
Cowardly	0	0	1	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Criminal	2	0	2	28.6%	0.0%	28.6%
Critical	2	5	3	28.6%	71.4%	42.9%
Decent	0	1	3	0.0%	14.3%	42.9%
Deceptive	1	2	2	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%
Defiant	0	1	0	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%
Deviant	3	0	1	42.9%	0.0%	14.3%
Difficult	2	3	1	28.6%	42.9%	14.3%
Dutiful	1	1	3	14.3%	14.3%	42.9%
Earned	0	2	0	0.0%	28.6%	0.0%
Educated	1	3	2	14.3%	42.9%	28.6%
Effective	1	3	3	14.3%	42.9%	42.9%
Ethical	2	4	4	28.6%	57.1%	57.1%
Evil	0	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Expensive	2	6	1	28.6%	85.7%	14.3%
Fair	1	1	0	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%
Familial	0	2	3	0.0%	28.6%	42.9%
Financial	2	3	1	28.6%	42.9%	14.3%
Foolish	0	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Fraudulent	1	0	1	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%
Frightening	1	2	1	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%
Frugal	0	2	1	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%
Frustrated	1	3	1	14.3%	42.9%	14.3%
Fun	0	0	1	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Goal-oriented	6	5	5	85.7%	71.4%	71.4%
Good	0	2	2	0.0%	28.6%	28.6%
Gracious	0	1	1	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
Greedy	3	1	3	42.9%	14.3%	42.9%
Guilty	1	1	1	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%

Word	Institution Count over 4	Self Count over 4	Group Count over 4	Percentage of Institutional Count over 4	Percentage of Self Count over 4	Percentage of Group Count Over 4
Happy	0	1	1	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
Hard	2	2	0	28.6%	28.6%	0.0%
Healthy	1	4	1	14.3%	57.1%	14.3%
Helpful	1	2	3	14.3%	28.6%	42.9%
Hindering	2	2	3	28.6%	28.6%	42.9%
Honest	0	0	1	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Humble	0	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Ill-conceived	2	2	3	28.6%	28.6%	42.9%
Illegal	1	0	2	14.3%	0.0%	28.6%
Immoral	1	0	3	14.3%	0.0%	42.9%
Impermissible	3	0	2	42.9%	0.0%	28.6%
Important	3	7	5	42.9%	100.0%	71.4%
Impressive	0	2	0	0.0%	28.6%	0.0%
Incorrect	0	1	2	0.0%	14.3%	28.6%
Independent	0	2	1	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%
Ineffective	3	2	1	42.9%	28.6%	14.3%
Intelligent	0	2	1	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%
Intentional	4	5	3	57.1%	71.4%	42.9%
Interesting	1	2	2	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%
Judgmental	1	1	4	14.3%	14.3%	57.1%
Just	1	0	1	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%
Justified	1	2	3	14.3%	28.6%	42.9%
Kind	0	1	1	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
Lacking	2	3	3	28.6%	42.9%	42.9%
Legal	5	2	4	71.4%	28.6%	57.1%
Legitimate	4	4	3	57.1%	57.1%	42.9%
Limited	2	2	3	28.6%	28.6%	42.9%
Loyal	0	1	1	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
Maintainable	3	3	2	42.9%	42.9%	28.6%
Manipulative	4	3	4	57.1%	42.9%	57.1%
Medical	2	5	1	28.6%	71.4%	14.3%

Word	Institution Count over 4	Self Count over 4	Group Count over 4	Percentage of Institutional Count over 4	Percentage of Self Count over 4	Percentage of Group Count Over 4
Misguided	2	0	2	28.6%	0.0%	28.6%
Moral	1	1	4	14.3%	14.3%	57.1%
Naïve	1	0	3	14.3%	0.0%	42.9%
Neat	0	1	0	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%
Necessary	4	7	4	57.1%	100.0%	57.1%
Negative	2	0	2	28.6%	0.0%	28.6%
Nice	0	0	0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Noble	0	2	1	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%
Non-judgmental	2	1	1	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%
Nonconforming	1	1	2	14.3%	14.3%	28.6%
Obedient	5	1	4	71.4%	14.3%	57.1%
Onerous	4	3	2	57.1%	42.9%	28.6%
Optimistic	1	2	2	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%
Orderly	5	1	3	71.4%	14.3%	42.9%
Owned	2	2	2	28.6%	28.6%	28.6%
Paid	2	3	1	28.6%	42.9%	14.3%
Painful	0	3	0	0.0%	42.9%	0.0%
Parental	2	2	5	28.6%	28.6%	71.4%
Peaceful	0	1	1	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
Permissible	2	2	4	28.6%	28.6%	57.1%
Personal	1	6	4	14.3%	85.7%	57.1%
Physical	0	7	1	0.0%	100.0%	14.3%
Planned	4	6	6	57.1%	85.7%	85.7%
Polite	0	0	2	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%
Political	6	4	5	85.7%	57.1%	71.4%
Positive	2	1	2	28.6%	14.3%	28.6%
Powerful	5	2	6	71.4%	28.6%	85.7%
Practical	4	5	3	57.1%	71.4%	42.9%
Precise	4	2	1	57.1%	28.6%	14.3%
Pressured	2	2	5	28.6%	28.6%	71.4%
Preventative	2	4	2	28.6%	57.1%	28.6%

Word	Institution Count over 4	Self Count over 4	Group Count over 4	Percentage of Institutional Count over 4	Percentage of Self Count over 4	Percentage of Group Count Over 4
Principled	1	0	2	14.3%	0.0%	28.6%
Private	1	2	3	14.3%	28.6%	42.9%
Procedural	4	2	3	57.1%	28.6%	42.9%
Profitable	2	5	1	28.6%	71.4%	14.3%
Proper	1	2	4	14.3%	28.6%	57.1%
Protective	1	2	2	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%
Proud	0	1	3	0.0%	14.3%	42.9%
Punitive	5	0	2	71.4%	0.0%	28.6%
Pure	0	0	1	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Questionable	1	3	4	14.3%	42.9%	57.1%
Reactionary	3	5	2	42.9%	71.4%	28.6%
Real	4	4	4	57.1%	57.1%	57.1%
Rebellious	0	0	3	0.0%	0.0%	42.9%
Regulated	6	5	5	85.7%	71.4%	71.4%
Reliable	2	1	2	28.6%	14.3%	28.6%
Religious	0	1	5	0.0%	14.3%	71.4%
Required	2	6	2	28.6%	85.7%	28.6%
Respectful	0	2	1	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%
Responsible	1	3	2	14.3%	42.9%	28.6%
Restrictive	3	4	6	42.9%	57.1%	85.7%
Rewarding	0	2	2	0.0%	28.6%	28.6%
Right	1	2	4	14.3%	28.6%	57.1%
Risky	0	2	1	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%
Rule-bound	6	4	8	85.7%	57.1%	114.3%
Safe	1	4	1	14.3%	57.1%	14.3%
Sanctioned	5	2	6	71.4%	28.6%	85.7%
Secure	1	3	3	14.3%	42.9%	42.9%
Selective	3	3	3	42.9%	42.9%	42.9%
Sexual	0	3	0	0.0%	42.9%	0.0%
Shady	1	2	2	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%
Sick	0	1	1	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%

Word	Institution Count over 4	Self Count over 4	Group Count over 4	Percentage of Institutional Count over 4	Percentage of Self Count over 4	Percentage of Group Count Over 4
Sinful	0	1	3	0.0%	14.3%	42.9%
Skinny	0	0	1	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Smart	0	2	1	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%
Spiritual	0	0	2	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%
Strong	2	2	4	28.6%	28.6%	57.1%
Structured	6	4	4	85.7%	57.1%	57.1%
Studious	0	1	1	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
Successful	1	3	2	14.3%	42.9%	28.6%
Sufficient	1	5	2	14.3%	71.4%	28.6%
Supportive	1	1	2	14.3%	14.3%	28.6%
Tempting	0	0	1	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Thoughtful	1	2	1	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%
Thrilling	0	0	1	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Trustworthy	1	1	1	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%
Understandable	2	2	3	28.6%	28.6%	42.9%
Unethical	1	1	2	14.3%	14.3%	28.6%
Unfair	2	2	3	28.6%	28.6%	42.9%
Unfaithful	0	1	2	0.0%	14.3%	28.6%
Unhealthy	1	3	0	14.3%	42.9%	0.0%
Unimportant	1	0	2	14.3%	0.0%	28.6%
Uninformed	0	0	1	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
Unique	0	1	1	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
Unjust	1	2	1	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%
Unnecessary	0	2	1	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%
Untrustworthy	1	2	1	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%
Useful	3	6	2	42.9%	85.7%	28.6%
Valid	3	4	1	42.9%	57.1%	14.3%
Valuable	3	7	4	42.9%	100.0%	57.1%
Virtuous	2	1	3	28.6%	14.3%	42.9%
Voluntary	0	1	2	0.0%	14.3%	28.6%
Wanted	1	4	1	14.3%	57.1%	14.3%

Word	Institution Count over 4	Self Count over 4	Group Count over 4	Percentage of Institutional Count over 4	Percentage of Self Count over 4	Percentage of Group Count Over 4
Weak	1	1	2	14.3%	14.3%	28.6%
Worrisome	1	3	1	14.3%	42.9%	14.3%
Worthy	1	3	1	14.3%	42.9%	14.3%
Wrong	0	0	2	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%

APPENDIX 2: ORIGINAL PROMPT RESPONSE SURVEY SITUATION RESPONSES

Each of these responses were collected from different respondents.

SELF-RELATED RESPONSES

1. I recently had to take a trip to Nicaragua and El Salvador in August 2011 with my family. I was at first worried about my safety and health, but my mother would not stop reassuring me that everything would be fine. I was afraid of not eating correctly because of the different foods they serve over there compared to the United States, also what if i caught the flu? Are the doctors over there licensed to prescribe medicine? What kind of school did they attend? Do they even have doctors? I was afraid that going to "poor" countries would affect my health even more. My final decision was of course to go with my family to visit other family over there, i made the decision because my little sisters were going and I couldn't go a whole month not hearing from them. I decided to risk it and if i ended up sick [which i did] than it would still be worth it.So my sisters influenced my decision to go; i had to make sure they would be okay especially since they are so young. [they are 5, 7 and 9 years old].

2. In the past six months, my family has been dealing with financial instability. My parents income has dropped by more than $10,000 and this has left me and my family to feel the decline of the American economy come down on us. Being in a sorority and having to attend college alongside my sister, my parents have to pay for many things. Along with having three other siblings they also provide for. What was at stake was my education, my home situations, and all the things I have been used to before. Since my family has always had the ideals of "family first," my sister deactivated from our sorority, we currently have to share a room in an apartment that is right next to the freeway, and we limit our expense to almost nothing. Although money has been a variable in my life in which I cannot control, I have the willpower to spend less. I don't need new clothes, I don't need to eat out, I don't need to go on vacations and have adventures. The work now expresses what future I will have. I always wanted my own room, but I share a room with my sister because it's cheaper. I cut off all the unnecessary, the wanted, and just focused on what needs to be done.

3. whether or not to allow a doctor to stick big scary needles in my spine to inject steroids

4. The decision was to move from a second floor walkup in a great walkable urban neighborhood to a ranch house in a nice but definitely car-dependent suburb.

5. I have had excessive fatigue and the doctor's medical testing revealed no reason that isn't already addressed. I had to think what to do about that. I settled on herbal supplements.

6. We had to decide whether to sell a house or rent it out. We decided to sell it.

7. Whether or not to spend money on a Rammstein (German rock band) concert. I decided not only yes, but covered expenses for two others.

8. Decided to see a psych about previous trauma. I'm going in, tomorrow.

9. Whether or not to have a colonoscopy.

10. I had to decide whether or not to withdraw my kids from a summer camp program because I didn't think they were adequately supervised. I decided to withdraw them.

11. I was diagnosed with endometrial cancer. I had to decide where to go for treatment, and whether or not I would have radiation therapy after the cancer was surgically removed. I went to the Cancer Institute of NJ, and did have radiation.

12. I had to decide whether to continue training for my very competitive, very unstable dream career or change courses and train for a more pragmatic, slow and steady sort of career. I chose to stop the training I was doing for the dream career and shift over to the more pragmatic career choice.

13. I decided to finally get help with my mental issues and was diagnosed as Major Depression/Bipolar 2

14. I moved from state to state to be in a better position health wise and financially as well as to have more support day-to-day.

GROUP-RELATED RESPONSES

1. One issue that stands out is the issue of friends at work. I currently work with my best friend Monday through Thursdays, however, I have been put in charge of schedules and other stuff pertaining to work as well as my best friend who is also my co-worker. The issue at hand, is the fact that my friend will take advantage of my friendship and come into work late or call off when she has no actual excuse to call off. She also takes longer breaks than other people and tries to extend her hours in order to get more hours and a bigger paycheck. My issue was should I confront her or tell my boss? Would my friendship be at stake or would she not care? I couldn't let this keep happening because it was unfair to the other workers, I couldn't play favorites. My final decision was to talk to her and let her know what was happening and how it looked to not only myself but to other people. What influenced me was my family. My mother has always taught me to do right no matter what, even if i lose a friend in the process. A true friend [as my mother would say] is one that sticks by you no matter what you tell him/her. So in the end i listened to my mother and told her. She at first was angry and did not speak to me,

however she came around and apologized for what was happening and promised to become a better worker.

2. Whether or not to offer a home to a friend who was about to become homeless. The friend is living with me.

3. 3. Which way to vote on Ohio Issue 2. I will vote no.

4. I had to decide whether to attempt to reconcile with an estranged in-law whose behavior is unacceptable, or whether to hold my ground and keep them out of my life.

5. I had to decide whether to maintain communication with my ex-husband or cut all ties.

6. Whether to have an unusual relationship (cyber) with a married man in a distant country. I decided to do it.

7. Decided to correct niece on misogynistic term usage. I informed her of the history behind the words, and asked her to use different terms.

8. Whether or not to testify in court on behalf of a patient.

9. I decided to attend my cousin's funeral even though it meant changing my plans and traveling at the last minute.

10. I often have to choose between a "fair-trade" food product and an ordinary one. The fair-trade products always cost more, and I am on a very limited budget. But the cheaper products are produced by methods that damage the Earth and devalue the workers. I buy the fair-trade products whenever I can.

11. My partner and I had to decide whether to model our relationship on a traditional, monogamous couple or whether we wanted to reconfigure it to address our personal needs and desires in a non-traditional way - changing it as circumstances warrant.

12. Making sure my ex husband went to prison for molesting my daughter.

13. To support my best friend in being very active in the Occupy movement (this means I'm home with the kids a lot right now) - I decided to do it.

INSTITUTION-RELATED RESPONSES

1. The only situation I can think of is when I got pulled over by a police officer for speeding. I believe that I was not speeding especially since there were cars in front of me and I was going at the same speed as them, so for the police office to just pull me over was unfair. What was at stake was receiving a huge ticket that I would have to pay

including traffic school. My mother told me to go fight it at court and not let the officer get away with it. However, I decided to drop it and just pay the fine not because I knew i was wrong but because I was/am afraid of people in that position. They have power and I have none. That is what influenced my decision.

2. whether or not to obey my endocrinologist's instructions. I didn't

3. Whether to make up a statement about self-employment earnings or use actual check stubs to verify income for reduced-fee medical care. We decided to use actual check stubs.

4. I had to decide how to comport myself to hopefully avoid a toxic situation at work where people are being fired for frivolous reasons.

5. Whether or not to lie on an application for federal funds

6. I parked in a closed lot in another city.

7. I had to choose between paying back my student loan, as agreed by probationary contract, or buying groceries. I chose groceries.

8. Whether to resist the authority of a supervisor.

9. I had to decide if I was going to take a professional licensing exam. I decided to take the exam.

10. I had to decide whether to apply for Social Security at the earliest possible age, and, if so, whether to slant the information I gave so as to maximize the amount of money I'd get

11. I have chosen to continue to procure and use medicinal marijuana even as my state has begun to crack down more seriously on medical marijuana users and dispensaries.

12. Having health issues, I spent significant time dealing with getting FMLA leave approved and handled. Eventually the cost outweighed the value, so I quit the job and moved to a place where I have more support (and don't need to work).

APPENDIX 3: EITHER-OR STATEMENTS

Whether or not to use a treatment that is not medically approved for a medical condition
Whether or not to see a psychiatrist about previous trauma
Whether or not to allow a homeless friend to live with you
Whether to pursue appropriate punishment against a family member who had committed a crime against another family member, or not
Whether to get involved in an interpersonal problem at work, or remain neutral
Whether to use private property as if it were public, or not
Whether to socialize with friends at work, or remain aloof
Whether to be open about being in a non-traditional relationship, or not
Whether to follow one's dream career, or train for a more pragmatic career
Whether to pay back a debt, or purchase basic needs such as food and shelter
Whether to cut down on financial expenditures in the face of family poverty, or continue spending at the same rate
Whether to take an examination for a professional license, or not
Whether to lie on government forms, or not
Whether to undergo a psychologically frightening medical treatment, or not
Whether to support a friend in their participation in a social protest movement, or not
Whether to undergo an embarrassing medical procedure, or not
Whether to undergo an uncomfortable medical procedure, or not
Whether to attend a family member's funeral, or not
Whether or not to spend money on something non-essential
Whether to remain in a neighborhood within walking distance of work, or move to a nicer neighborhood that required driving to work
Whether to correct someone on offensive use of language, or not
Whether to buy products based on values such as "fair trade," or based on cost considerations
Whether to testify in court on behalf of a client, or not
Whether or not to keep one's children in an extra-curricular program
Whether to obey a boss, or not
Whether to obey a doctor's orders, or disobey them
Whether to undergo a physically painful medical treatment, or not
Whether to engage in a relationship viewed as non-normative, or not
Whether to insist on one's rights under the law, or allow them to be violated by a boss
Whether to fight a traffic ticket, or pay it
Whether to take a trip to a foreign country, or stay home
Whether or not to reconcile with an estranged friend, ex-spouse, or relative
Whether to sell a house you own, or rent it

APPENDIX 4: SURVEY 1 AND SURVEY 2

SURVEY 1

Comments and skip logic are noted in italic text. Respondents did not see this text.

Informed Consent Statement, Age Verification, and Citizenship
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE
CONSENT TO ACT AS A HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECT
Linguistic Connotations of Decision-Making 2

The purpose of this research study is to determine how people make decisions. You are being asked to participate because as a US citizen 18 or over you are old enough to vote and serve as a juror. You must be a US citizen and at least 18 years of age to participate in this study. The lead researcher, Adam Sanford, M.A., plans to enroll 150 participants for this project. This study is a student project and has no outside funding sources.

The study will be conducted online at surveymonkey.com. You will be presented with situations and asked how you feel about these situations, as well as to provide some demographic information.

This study involves no more than minimal risk. There are no known harms or discomforts associated with this study beyond those encountered in daily life. This study can help us understand how and why people make decisions, which can help us understand a number of social processes.

Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. The alternative to participation is to not participate in this study. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time.

Your research records (computer-based data) will be stored in an encrypted format on a password protected computer. Only the research team will have access to your data. The data will be collected anonymously. Your decision to participate or not participate will not be shared with others. The research data will be maintained indefinitely. If during the course of this study, significant new information becomes available that may relate to your willingness to continue to participate, this information will be provided to you by the investigator.

If you have any questions about this research, you may contact the investigator of this study, Adam Sanford MA, Department of Sociology, at asanf001@ucr.edu, and the faculty advisor of this study, Robert Hanneman Ph.D., Department of Sociology, 951-827-3638, robert.hanneman@ucr.edu.

If you have any comments or questions regarding the conduct of this research or your rights as a research subject, please contact the Office of Research Integrity by phone (951-827-4811/4810/6332), by email (irb@ucr.edu) or at University Office Bldg #200, Riverside, CA 92521.

I have read and understand this consent. I affirm that I am a US Citizen and that I am 18 years or older. By clicking "next," I agree to participate in this study. (CLICK NEXT) *(Goes to page 2)*

I do not want to participate in this study, or I do not meet one or both of the minimum qualification of US citizenship or being 18 or over. (CLICK CANCEL TO EXIT)

Page 2

1. For randomization purposes, please indicate the birth month of the person in your household who had the most recent birthday.

For randomization purposes, please indicate the birth month of the person in your household who had the most recent birthday.

- January, February or March *(goes to page 3)*
- April, May or June *(goes to page 4)*
- July, August, or September *(goes to page 5)*
- October, November or December *(goes to page 6)*

Page 3

Please spend a few minutes considering the following scenario:

You are laid off from your job through no fault of your own. You have no savings. You have bills to pay and, because the economy is in a slump, you are unlikely to find a job. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next." *(goes to either page 7 or 8 randomly)*

Page 4

Please spend a few moments considering the following scenario:

People that you care about very much are avoiding you, or have actively told you they are angry with you or disappointed in you. When you ask why, you are told that your behavior has been unacceptable and that you must change it in order for their feelings to change. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next." *(goes to either page 7 or 8 randomly)*

Page 5

Please consider the following scenario:

You are arrested and charged with a misdemeanor crime. The penalty could be up to two years in jail. It is likely that you will be found guilty. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next." *(goes to either page 7 or 8 randomly)*

Page 6

Please consider the following scenario:

You are arrested and charged with a misdemeanor crime. The penalty could be up to two years in jail. It is likely that you will be found guilty. People you care about are avoiding you, or have actively told you they are angry with you or disappointed in you because of the criminal accusation you are facing. As a result of being arrested, you lose your job. You have no savings. You have bills to pay and, because of the arrest, you are unlikely to find a job even if you go free. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next." *(goes to either page 7 or 8 randomly)*

Page 7

Please rank-order the following words based on how relevant they are to the situation you were asked to think about. You may use each ranking only once.

This page cannot be reproduced in the space allowed, but the respondent was presented with the Connotations List as a grid of eighteen words and eighteen rating buttons. Ratings were labeled 1(most relevant) to 18 (least relevant) and forced ranking was required (no item could receive the same ranking as any other item). (Goes to page 8 if presented first or page 9 if presented second)

Page 8

Thinking of the situation you have just considered, please rank-order the following statements based on how relevant they feel to you. You may use each ranking only once.

This page cannot be reproduced in the space allowed, but the respondent was presented with the Prompts List as a grid of nine statements and nine rating buttons. Ratings were labeled 1(most relevant) to 9 (least relevant) and forced ranking was required (no item could receive the same ranking as any other item). (Goes to page 7 if presented first or page 9 if presented second)

Page 9

Assume that you are meeting an acquaintance for dinner, but you have accidentally left your wallet or pocketbook at home. As a result, you do not have your money or credit cards with you. You are hungry and need to eat. Your acquaintance offers to buy you a

meal, but the restaurant they suggest serves a cuisine you are not familiar with. How likely is it that you will accept your acquaintance's offer and eat the unfamiliar food?

- o Not at all likely
- o Not very likely
- o Somewhat likely
- o Very likely
- o Extremely likely

Which of these issues most influenced your decision?

- o My hunger
- o My acquaintance's feelings
- o Other (please specify) *(Goes to page 10)*

Page 10

Assume that you are visiting your parents for dinner, but you have accidentally left your wallet or pocketbook at home. As a result, you do not have your money or credit cards with you. You are hungry and need to eat, but your parents have prepared a dish you don't really like and would not normally eat. However, if you don't eat it, their feelings will be hurt. How likely is it that you will eat the food they offer you?

- o Not at all likely
- o Not very likely
- o Somewhat likely
- o Very likely
- o Extremely likely

Which of these issues most influenced your decision?

- o My hunger
- o My parents' feelings
- o Other (please specify) *(Goes to page 11)*

Page 11

Assume that you are alone in an unfamiliar city for a vacation, and you are sightseeing. You are about a mile away from your lodgings. You are hungry and need to eat, but you have accidentally left your wallet or pocketbook behind. As a result, you do not have your money or credit cards with you. There is an open-air farmer's market on the street you are walking through, and a fruit stand that seems to be unattended. There are crowds milling around. You have seen a police officer in the area earlier, but at the moment you don't see him. How likely is it that you will take a piece of fruit from the unattended stand?

- Not at all likely
- Not very likely
- Somewhat likely
- Very likely
- Extremely likely

Which of these issues most influenced your decision?

- My hunger
- The presence of other people
- The possible presence of the police
- Other (please specify) (*Goes to page 12)*

Please provide the following demographic information.

What is your age?

- 18-29
- 30-39
- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60-69
- 70-79
- 80 and above

What is your race or ethnicity?

- Asian
- Black or African-American
- Latino or Latina
- Native American
- Pacific Islander/Native Hawaiian
- White
- Two or more of the above
- Other

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other

What is your religious affiliation?

(goes to page 13)

Page 13

What is your highest degree completed?

- Less than high school
- High school graduate
- Some college
- Associate degree
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Doctoral or professional degree

Which of these best represents your household income for the past year?

- Below $20,000
- $20,001-$35,000
- $35,001-$50,000
- $50,001-$75,000
- $75,001-$90,000
- $90,001-$105,000
- Over $105,000 *(goes to page 14)*

Page 14

Thank you! This completes your participation.

If the questions you were asked made you uncomfortable in any way, please remember that these were made-up situations and do not reflect on you personally. Your participation is very much appreciated!

This survey is now complete. Please close the window. Thank you again!

SURVEY 2

Comments and skip logic are noted in italic text. Respondents did not see this text.

Page 1

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE
CONSENT TO ACT AS A HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECT
Linguistic Connotations of Decision-Making 2

The purpose of this research study is to determine how people make decisions. You are being asked to participate because as a US citizen 18 or over you are old enough to vote and serve as a juror. You must be a US citizen and at least 18 years of age to participate

in this study. The lead researcher, Adam Sanford, M.A., plans to enroll 150 participants for this project. This study is a student project and has no outside funding sources.

The study will be conducted online at surveymonkey.com. You will be presented with situations and asked how you feel about these situations, as well as to provide some demographic information.

This study involves no more than minimal risk. There are no known harms or discomforts associated with this study beyond those encountered in daily life. This study can help us understand how and why people make decisions, which can help us understand a number of social processes.

Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. The alternative to participation is to not participate in this study. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time.

Your research records (computer-based data) will be stored in an encrypted format on a password protected computer. Only the research team will have access to your data. The data will be collected anonymously. Your decision to participate or not participate will not be shared with others. The research data will be maintained indefinitely. If during the course of this study, significant new information becomes available that may relate to your willingness to continue to participate, this information will be provided to you by the investigator.

If you have any questions about this research, you may contact the investigator of this study, Adam Sanford MA, Department of Sociology, at asanf001@ucr.edu, and the faculty advisor of this study, Robert Hanneman Ph.D., Department of Sociology, 951-827-3638, robert.hanneman@ucr.edu.

If you have any comments or questions regarding the conduct of this research or your rights as a research subject, please contact the Office of Research Integrity by phone (951-827-4811/4810/6332), by email (irb@ucr.edu) or at University Office Bldg #200, Riverside, CA 92521.

I have read and understand this consent. I affirm that I am a US Citizen and that I am 18 years or older. By clicking "next," I agree to participate in this study. (CLICK NEXT)

I do not want to participate in this study, or I do not meet one or both of the minimum qualification of US citizenship or being 18 or over. (CLICK CANCEL TO EXIT) *(goes to page 2)*

For randomization purposes, please click the first button in the list you see below.

- N (*goes to page 5)*
- I *(goes to page 3)*
- IN *(goes to page 7)*

Page 3

Please spend a few minutes considering the following scenario:

You are laid off from your job through no fault of your own. You have no savings. You have bills to pay and, because the economy is in a slump, you are unlikely to find a job. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next." *(goes to page 4)*

Page 4

About a month after you lose your job, you are offered another job. Compared to your previous job, this job offers lower pay and no benefits. How likely is it that you will take this job?

- Not at all likely
- Not very likely
- Somewhat likely
- Very likely
- Extremely likely

Please rate each of these possible reasons for your decision, based on how important each reason was for your decision. You may use each ranking more than once.

This item cannot be reproduced in the space allowed, but the respondent was presented with the following list as a grid of six reasons and five rating buttons. Ratings were labeled "Not important," "Not very important," "Somewhat important," "Very Important," and "Extremely important."

My financial situation
My self-worth
My friends' opinion
My reputation in my community
Written rules and laws
Formal authorities that have power over me
Some other reason (please describe and provide a ranking)

(goes to page 9)

Page 5

Please spend a few moments considering this scenario:

People that you care about very much are avoiding you, or have actively told you they are angry with you or disappointed in you. When you ask why, you are told that your behavior has been unacceptable and that you must change it in order for their feelings to

change. (Assume that the behavior in question is one that violates a value many of your close friends and family members share, but which you consider unimportant.) Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next." *(goes to page 6)*

Page 6

After several weeks of the situation described in the previous page, one of the people who has been most angry with you approaches you. They tell you that if you apologize to each person who is offended and make amends for your behavior, you will be accepted back into the group. How likely is it that you will apologize and make amends?

- o Not at all likely
- o Not very likely
- o Somewhat likely
- o Very likely
- o Extremely likely

Please rate each of these possible reasons for your decision, based on how important each reason was for your decision. You may use each ranking more than once.

This item cannot be reproduced in the space allowed, but the respondent was presented with the following list as a grid of six reasons and five rating buttons. Ratings were labeled "Not important," "Not very important," "Somewhat important," "Very Important," and "Extremely important."

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Written rules and laws
Formal authorities that have power over me
Some other reason (please describe and provide a ranking)

(goes to page 9)

Page 7

Please consider the following scenario:

You are arrested and charged with a misdemeanor crime. The penalty could be up to two years in jail. It is likely that you will be found guilty. Please consider this scenario for a few moments and then click "Next." *(goes to page 8)*

Page 8

When you go up for trial, the public defender comes to you with a plea agreement. In the agreement, you will be placed on probation for two years. You will have to check in with a probation officer on a weekly basis. There are other restrictions to your freedom as

conditions of the probation, including loss of your passport, loss of your right to have firearms or other weapons in your home (including kitchen knives), and loss of your right to vote for the length of your probation. You will also have a criminal record for the rest of your life. In return, you will not spend time in jail. How likely is it that you will take the plea bargain?

- o Not at all likely
- o Not very likely
- o Somewhat likely
- o Very likely
- o Extremely likely

Please rate each of these possible reasons for your decision, based on how important each reason was for your decision. You may use each ranking more than once.

This item cannot be reproduced in the space allowed, but the respondent was presented with the following list as a grid of six reasons and five rating buttons. Ratings were labeled "Not important," "Not very important," "Somewhat important," "Very Important," and "Extremely important."

My financial situation
My self-worth
My friends' opinion
My reputation in my community
Written rules and laws
Formal authorities that have power over me
Some other reason (please describe and provide a ranking)

(goes to page 9)

Please provide the following demographic information.

What is your age?

- o 18-29
- o 30-39
- o 40-49
- o 50-59
- o 60-69
- o 70-79
- o 80 and above

What is your race or ethnicity?

- Asian
- Black or African-American
- Latino or Latina
- Native American
- Pacific Islander/Native Hawaiian
- White
- Two or more of the above
- Other

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other

What is your religious affiliation?

(goes to page 10)

Page 10

What is your highest degree completed?

- Less than high school
- High school graduate
- Some college
- Associate degree
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Doctoral or professional degree

Which of these best represents your household income for the past year?

- Below $20,000
- $20,001-$35,000
- $35,001-$50,000
- $50,001-$75,000
- $75,001-$90,000
- $90,001-$105,000
- Over $105,000 *(goes to page 11)*

Page 11

Thank you! This completes your participation.

If the questions you were asked made you uncomfortable in any way, please remember that these were made-up situations and do not reflect on you personally. Your participation is very much appreciated!

This survey is now complete. Please close the window. Thank you again!

APPENDIX 5 – SURVEYMONKEY POLICIES

Privacy Policy

Last updated: June 27, 2011

This privacy policy explains how SurveyMonkey handles your personal information and data. We value your trust, so we've strived to present this policy in clear, plain language instead of legalese. The policy is structured so you can quickly find answers to the questions which interest you the most.

This privacy policy applies to all the products, services and websites offered by SurveyMonkey.com, LLC, SurveyMonkey Spain, Sucursal em Portugal, and their affiliates, except where otherwise noted. We refer to those products, services and websites collectively as the "services" in this policy. Some services have supplementary privacy statements that explain in more detail our specific privacy practices in relation to them. Unless otherwise noted, our services are provided by SurveyMonkey.com, LLC inside of the United States and by SurveyMonkey Spain, Sucursal em Portugal outside of the United States.

TRUSTe. SurveyMonkey is certified by TRUSTe under its Privacy Seal program. TRUSTe is an independent third party which has reviewed our privacy policies and practices for compliance with its program requirements.

European Safe Harbors. SurveyMonkey.com, LLC complies with the US-EU and US-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce regarding the collection, use and retention of personal information from EU member countries and Switzerland. We have certified, and TRUSTe has verified, that we adhere to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles of notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data integrity, access and enforcement. View our certification on the U.S. Department of Commerce's Safe Harbor website.

Questions? For questions regarding our privacy policy or practices, contact SurveyMonkey by mail at 285 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 500, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA, or electronically through this form. You may contact TRUSTe if feel your question has not been satisfactorily addressed.

Key Privacy Points: The Stuff You Really Care About

IF YOU CREATE SURVEYS:

- **Your survey data is owned by you.** Not only that, but SurveyMonkey treats your surveys as if they were private. We don't sell them to anyone and we don't use the survey responses you collect for our own purposes, except in a limited set of circumstances (e.g. if we are compelled by a subpoena, or if you've made your survey responses public).
- **We safeguard respondents' email addresses.** To make it easier for you to invite people to take your surveys via email, you may upload lists of email addresses, in which case SurveyMonkey acts as a mere custodian of that data.

  We don't sell these email addresses and we use them only as directed by you and in accordance with this policy. The same goes for any email addresses collected by your surveys.
- **We keep your data securely.** Read our Security Statement for more information.
- **Survey data is stored on servers located in the United States.** More information about this is available if you are located in Canada or Europe.