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The Indifferent Subnational State: Sinaloan State Government relations with its Diaspora in Los Angeles

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Publication Date

2019

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

The Indifferent Subnational State: Sinaloan State Government relations

with its Diaspora in Los Angeles

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of

the requirements for the degree Masters of

Arts in Chicana and Chicano Studies

by

Fernando Enrique Villegas Rivera

2019

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Indifferent Subnational State: Sinaloan State Government relations

with its Diaspora in Los Angeles

by

Fernando Enrique Villegas Rivera

Master of Arts in Chicana and Chicano Studies

University of California, Los Angeles, 2019

Professor Matthew Alejandro Barreto, Chair

The Mexican state of Sinaloa has not developed diaspora policies directed to the Sinaloan Diaspora in the United States, even though the economic and social contributions to the state are significant and despite the existence of a significant group of Sinaloans in a situation of extreme vulnerability due to their precarious legal status. Current literature on diaspora policies has not developed a framework to understand atypical cases such as the case of Sinaloa. I developed a mixed method research design case study of state-diaspora relations in the Sinaloa-Los Angeles transnational field. I argue that political, economic, and organizational factors explain the absence of diaspora policies. Findings suggest that this is due to anti-democratic orientations of Sinaloan local governments, lack of strong Sinaloan Hometown Associations, and low remittance dependency at the state level. Only municipalities with few resources have developed a relationship with the diaspora or are willing to do so.

The thesis of Fernando Enrique Villegas Rivera is approved.

Abel Valenzuela Jr.

Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda

Matthew Alejandro Barreto, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2019

DEDICATED TO

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A Dios, mi familia, mis amistades y mi comunidad,

sin ellos, los logros individuales no tienen significado.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

In the context of international migration, home state governments have increasingly approached their diasporas in the past three decades. Among emigration states, the case of Mexico is unique and exemplar since it is considered the leading state in the development of diaspora policies according to various scholars such as Délano (2018) and Ortega (2013 and 2012), and some Mexican diplomats[1]. From 1990 onwards, the Mexican state transitioned from a limited engagement approach towards its diaspora to a more active and institutionalized relationship (Santamaría 1994; Délano 2018; Waldinger 2014; Goldring 2002; González 2006). This increase in their relationship crystalized in the creation of different institutions and laws to recognize the Mexican diaspora's needs.

Indeed, the Mexican state at its different administrative levels –federal, state and municipal–, along with their counterparts in the United States (e.g. Hometown Associations, NGO's, migrant-led organizations, among other actors), helped to create conditions for a better integration of migrants in their communities of residence with the purpose of defending them against anti-immigrant policies, and/or to tap into their influence for development in Mexico (Délano 2011 and 2018; Fitzgerald 2008). After the implementation of diaspora policies[2] at the federal level, state-diaspora relations at the subnational or local level[3] increased, especially since 2000's (Valenzuela 2007).

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[1] Personal interview with Adriana Argaiz, Mexican Consul for Community Affairs in Los Angeles, U.S. (December 2018).

[2] Scholars use different forms to refer to diaspora policies such as "diaspora bureaucracies", "diaspora engagement policies", "diaspora management policies" among others and we have to recognize that there is no consensus. For the purposes of my work, I will use Délano (2018: 7) conceptualization of diaspora policies which are policies that "aim to strengthen ties between emigrant communities and their countries of origin".

[3] The political-administrative territorial limits in Mexico comprise 32 *entidades federativas* (federal entities) to which I will be referring as states. In turn, each state is constituted by municipalities of which we find 2457 throughout the country (INEGI 2019)

Accordingly, almost all states in Mexico have created diaspora policies at some level, although their development has been more prevalent in states from the Historical region[4]. Regardless, most states have created different programs, institutions and policies for their diasporas as it has been documented by scholars such as Ortega (2012; 2013), Yrizar and Alarcón (2006), Fernández de Castro et al (2007), Valenzuela (2007), Vila (2007), and Moctezuma (2015).

Map 1. Migratory regions in Mexico

Source: Durand and Massey (2003: 71)

From a methodological point of view, diaspora policies have begun to be explored more recently in some of the states of the Central region[5] such as Mexico City (Délano 2019), Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla, Mexico state, or Morelos (Fernández de Castro 2006; Vila 2007). However, this topic has

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[4] Durand and Massey (2003) categorize the Mexican territory into 4 regions: Historical, Border, Central, and Southeast. The historical region, which is the most studied, is comprised by the following states: Zacatecas, Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Durango, San Luis Potosí, Aguascalientes, Nayarit and Colima. Migration to the U.S. from these states represented more than 50% of the entire Mexican emigration between 1925 and 2000.

[5] States from the Central region: Mexico City, State of Mexico, Oaxaca, Morelos, Puebla, Hidalgo, Querétaro and Tlaxcala (Durand and Massey 2003)

not been analyzed in states from the rest of the regions but with some very few exceptions (Ortega 2012 and 2013; Vila 2007). It is clear that more studies are needed for understanding the emergence of diaspora policies in states from the border and southeast region.

Theoretically, studies on diaspora policies at the subnational level are scarce. Moreover, few scholars have directed their efforts to understand this phenomenon in negative cases, *id est*, cases where there is a lack of interest or indifference on the part of national or local governments. For instance, in a quantitative study on diaspora policies of thirty-five national states, Ragazzi (2014) found that "indifferent states" are often overlooked in the literature, making this type of cases an interesting counter-factual object of analysis. He briefly theorizes this "indifference" or lack of interest of sending countries as a result of the political-economic model adopted by a country. In the case of indifferent states, they are characterized by a type of government relying on traditional welfare state policies, open borders, significant fiscal pressures, and partially regulated labor markets. However, because of the broad quantitative nature of this study, the "minor details" are lost, and the author recognizes that qualitative data and interdisciplinary collaboration is crucial to "confirm, refine, or dismiss" his findings (Ragazzi 2014: 86).

Meanwhile, Klekowski (2017) emphasize the gaps in the field and calls for research on the role of Nonstate Actors (NSA) in order to decenter state-centric understandings, and to advance research at the micro level of analysis that take into account not only the national or federal scale. Similarly, Cohen (2017) noticed the existence of just a couple of studies focusing on municipal policies, however in this case, actions focus on migrant returnees (Föbker, Temme, and Wiegandt, 2014; Nijenhuis & Leung, 2014; Chacko 2007 cited in Cohen 2017). It is still unclear why there is a lack of engagement on the part of home state governments towards their diasporas or vice versa. For instance, in cases where the remittances sent by migrants of a particular state contribute

significantly to the state economy, it would be expected that the state government would respond in an instrumental way, that is, they would have to court migrants in order to potentiate their remittances, according to the "tapping" perspective. In reality, the response of states and types of engagements with their diasporas are not always explained by current theories.

As a result of this lacunas, several calls have been raised for conducting studies in states where there is a "lack of interest" or "indifference" for developing diaspora policies at the national and subnational levels (Délano and Harris 2017; Ortega 2013; Cohen 2017; Ragazzi 2014, Klekowski 2017, and Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004).

Two other conceptual frameworks are relevant to discuss: literature on transnationalism and international relations. In both fields, there is also a lack of studies directing their efforts to comprehend the relations between diasporas and the local governments of their countries of origin, especially those involving migrant-led transnational organizations and local state and municipal governments. As such, there is no consensus on the causes and consequences of these type of engagements (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016).

In response to the aforementioned methodological and theoretical lacunas within the literature on diaspora policies, transnationalism, and international relations, I explored the transnational process occurring between the Sinaloan state government and its diaspora in the United States. Sinaloa is located in Northwestern Mexico with a historical connection to Los Angeles. In this state, the local government has not developed strong relations with its U.S. based diaspora in recent decades; despite the importance of their economic contributions to the state's economy and notwithstanding the significant number of Sinaloans living in the U.S, mainly in Los Angeles.

Map 2. Sinaloa's Geographic Location

Source: INEGI (2019)

Indeed, Ortega (2013) already noted that Sinaloa has one of the lowest levels of institutional capacity for approaching the diaspora among all Mexican states. How do we explain low levels of diaspora policies in cases such as Sinaloa where the significance of the migratory phenomenon would signal the development of higher levels of outreach from the Sinaloan state government for instrumental purposes? A broad question posited by Délano and Harris' (2017) is also relevant here since it has not been explored in depth: why is it that some diasporas are "recognized/nurtured" while others are "neglected/denied" by different actors in both the country of origin and destination?

From this puzzle or research problem arise two specific research questions that my study will answer: What factors explain the absence of diaspora policies in Sinaloa? To what extent has the role of the Sinaloan government been crucial in shaping variations of State-diaspora transnational relations in Sinaloa and Los Angeles from 1990 to 2018?

In this paper, I argue that the lack of a significant relationship and collaboration between Sinaloan local governments, especially at the state level, and its diaspora is due to different factors that I

classify into three types: political, economic, and organizational. These three spheres also vary depending on the level of analysis[6].

- P*olitical factors* explain the lack of an institutionalized or more active relationship between the Sinaloan *state* government and the diaspora, due to anti-democratic orientations on the part of Sinaloan political elites. Until now, Sinaloan state governments have been able to exclude important sectors of the society without high political costs. At the municipal level, although there has been a significant increase in electoral competition between political parties in the past two decades, party elites and municipal governments have not needed to open spaces for the participation of citizens, regardless where they are located.

- The *economic sphere* helps us to partially understand state-diaspora relations in Sinaloa. Although family remittances are important for the state's economy, and especially for thousands of families, these resources have not been significant enough to influence the state government to create diaspora policies directed to Sinaloan migrants. Since Sinaloa's economy does not depend on migrant family or collective remittances, they are able to exclude migrants from the polity. Only municipalities with few economic resources have developed a relationship with the diaspora or are willing to do so more actively.

- O*rganizational sphere:* Strong and institutionalized Sinaloan HTA's in L.A. are absent. The few Sinaloan HTAs have not been able to demand their inclusion as transnational citizens with full rights vis-à-vis their home state. In turn, this is due to the existence of a

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[6] E.g. economic factors could be relevant in explaining state-diaspora relations in specific Sinaloan municipalities but not so at the state level.

weak Sinaloan migrant civil society, which can be explained by the socioeconomic characteristics and precarious legal status of the Sinaloan diaspora in the United States.

In conjunction, these three spheres help to explain why the Sinaloan state government has not developed policies for the diaspora and why there is no significant relationship between both group of actors: migrants and the local government. This study will provide new insights and evidence in understanding why some subnational states and municipalities are not courting and/or supporting their diaspora by focusing on this paradigmatic case.

DATA AND METHODS

My research focuses on the Sinaloan state-diaspora relations in the US-Mexico transnational field in response to calls raised by scholars from the fields in question, and because organized Sinaloan migrants themselves, specifically members of the *Fraternidad Sinaloense de California* (from now on FSC) −the main Sinaloan HTA−, are demanding to the state their inclusion as transnational citizens. To be able to respond my research questions, I developed a mixed method research design case study of state-diaspora relations in the Sinaloa-Los Angeles transnational field. Transnational fields represent a set of multiple set of interconnected social networks in which ideas, practices and resources are exchanged, organized, and transformed. These spaces are multi-dimensional and function in different forms, levels and depth (Levitt 2005). In attending the transnational approach and different levels of analysis, I am in line with Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) critique to what they called *methodological nationalism*, or the prevalent assumption in social sciences that nations are the basic unit of inquiry. Accordingly, I have conducted fieldwork in both the United States and Mexico and have collected information from Mexican state officials at the federal, state, and municipal level.

In my study, the information obtained of the Sinaloan diaspora in the U.S. is not representative due to limitations in terms of data. There is no enough available information for understanding their transnational relation with their home governments. Then, due to availability in information, and because it has been proved that Mexican migrants that are members of Hometown Associations are one the most transnationally involved in politics among different types of Mexican migrants in the U.S. (Portes and Fernandez-Kelly 2016; Portes et al 2008), I focus on the relations between Sinaloan HTA's and the Mexican state at the federal, state and municipal level. I emphasize here the relation between the FSC, the largest and most important Sinaloan migrant-led membership organization in the U.S., and the Mexican state.

For collecting and analyzing data, I used a mixed methodology approach that includes quantitative and qualitative information. Qualitative methods include: Analysis of relevant literature, 30 extensive interviews, information provided through emails and via messaging platforms with key informants such as leaders of the FSC, Mexican government officials at different levels in Mexico, and informal conversations with residents of different communities in Sinaloa. I also conducted direct observation at different locales where organized immigrants have or used to have presence in Sinaloa, in order to understand the impact of the resources they send and the evolution of collective remittances through time, and to identify their counterparts at the municipal level. I travelled to Zacatecas, one of the states were diaspora policies first emerged, to interview leading experts on the topic and government officials working with migrants in the development of diaspora policies.

The criterion I used to choose my interviewees comes from Maxwell's (2005) *participant selection* strategy. He argues that *purposeful selection* strategy is the most important element to consider in qualitative selection decisions. He describes this method as: "a strategy in which particular

settings, persons, or activities are selected deliberately in order to provide information that can't be gotten as well from other choices". I also relied on additional sources of information including research on newspapers, magazine articles, government publications, and official consular memos.

With respect to quantitative data, I draw from databases from different U.S. and Mexican national institutions as well as from international organizations. Specifically, I draw on data from the *Programa 3 x 1 para Migrantes* to measure state-diaspora relations between organized Sinaloans in the U.S. via Hometown Associations (to which I refer sometimes simply as "the diaspora" or the "organized diaspora"), and also to measure the impact of these resources in their communities of origin in Sinaloa.

To measure the organizational development of the Sinaloan diaspora, I used the *Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior* (IME) database, which is the largest source of information gathering data on Mexican migrant-led organizations in the world, and information of organizations provided by the FSC.

Databases from *Instituto Nacional de Migración* (INM), *Secretaría de Desarrollo Social* (SEDESOL), *Consejo Nacional de Población* (CONAPO)/BBVA, and *Banco de México* (BANXICO), along with existing research served for understanding the migratory phenomenon in general and the living conditions and socioeconomic variables of Sinaloans in Mexico and in the U.S.

LAYOUT OF THE THESIS

To elucidate the proposed queries, I present first current debates in the fields of state-diaspora relations, international relations, and transnationalism from a multidisciplinary approach since I used concepts and theories from sociology, political science, and international relations. As

Durand and Massey (2003) have argued, multidisciplinarity is needed when studying the complexities of the migratory phenomenon. The literature review enables us to better understand the processes that explain how transnational relations between home state governments at different levels and the diaspora are formed, constituted and strengthened or weakened.

In Chapter two, I briefly delineate the current context regarding state-diaspora relations across the globe in order to identify larger trends. Afterwards, since a historical perspective is crucial if we want to understand when, why and how diaspora policies emerged in Mexico, my third chapter presents an explanatory framework that observes a unique increase in state-diaspora relations that begun at the end of the twentieth century due to political and economic reasons. More specifically, the 1990s marked the beginning of a new stage in Mexican State-diaspora relations. Currently, the relation between the Mexican state and its diaspora has been institutionalized and strengthened as a response to a hostile political climate against Latino migrants. In another section of this chapter, I explain why and how Mexican subdiasporas started to collaborate in a more frequent manner with municipal and state governments since the 2000's. I also present the literature review to explain how scholars have studied the emergence of diaspora policies at the subnational level.

In Chapter four, I provide a first approach for understanding the paradigmatic case of state-diaspora relations in the Sinaloa-Los Angeles transnational field. To do so, I describe the origins, evolution and current state of Sinaloan Migration to the Los Angeles region. I also describe the amount of remittances sent to Sinaloa in the past two decades and I explain the significance of these resources for Sinaloans. Then, in this same chapter, I describe the organizational forms that Mexican and Sinaloan migrants have developed in the U.S., since the beginning of the 19th century, focusing in California and L.A. Is in this chapter that I trace the origins of Sinaloan Hometown Associations and their relation with the state, and I provide original non-published information

about the phenomenon, it's causes and effects on the community. In addition, I traced the origins of the *Fraternidad Sinaloense de California* –the largest and most important Sinaloan migrant-led membership organization in the U.S.– and the relation established with different governments across time. I contribute to the literature with original data on the creation and evolution of the FSC.

Finally, in chapter five, I conducted an analysis of the factors explaining the absence of diaspora policies in Sinaloa. To perform a systematic analysis, I used a multifactorial and multilevel approach in which I grouped the main factors in three spheres: political, economic, and organizational. I analyzed the impact of these three groups of factors at the subnational state and municipal levels. The significance of these spheres sometimes varies depending the level of analysis.

2. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS: STATE-DIASPORA RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND TRANSNATIONALISM

In this section I succinctly delineate the main debates underlying this essay. I present current debates in the field of state-diaspora relations and useful concepts from the discipline of international relations. Both frameworks are necessary to better understand the relations between states at the subnational level and their diasporas. I used concepts from the disciplines of international relations, sociology, and political science since a multidisciplinary approach is necessary to understand the migratory phenomenon, as it has been recognized by scholars such as Durand and Massey (2003). Afterwards, I explore current debates on transnationalism, and I explain how this field has been reconceptualized to unveil the role of the state in the development of transnational relations and policies towards the diaspora. At the end of the chapter I provide an

explanation on the emergence of transnational communities and HTAs by taking into account the concepts of social capital and social networks.

STATE-DIASPORA RELATIONS

There have been efforts on the part of academics and policy makers to develop the field of state-diaspora relations in the past two decades. Now, we have a good amount of both quantitative and qualitative studies to better understand the reasons for the emergence of diaspora policies at the national level, what the characteristics are of the states that are more prone to develop them, and the type of diaspora policies they implement (Délano 2018).

If we map the different frameworks that explain the emergence of diaspora policies, we will find that there are three main explanatory realms. The first one has been called by some scholars as the "tapping" perspective (Délano 2018; Gamlen et al 2017). According to Gamlen et al (2017), the main goals in developing diaspora policies are related to the instrumental use of migrant resources for development and for security reasons on the part of the emigration state.

The second perspective has been recognized as the "embracing" framework, and its main goals have to do with how origin-states *embrace* their diaspora to shape its own political identity and goes beyond instrumental motivations such as economic and political interests on the part of states. States do this by developing the national and ethnic identity of their citizens (Gamlen et al 2017; Délano 2018).

A third perspective has been denominated "governing" or "governance" framework, which put more emphasis on external factors in comparison with the first two perspectives I explained. That is, for advocates of the governance perspective, international organizations and some states influence how other states will govern migration. In this sense, diaspora institutions implemented across the globe are a reflection of a global system of migration in which states of origin and

destination share a responsibility in the management of migratory movements of people. As Gamlen et al (2017) put it: "states needed to find ways of 'sharing responsibility' for the various burdens and benefits of migration". This perspective has gained more support since the evidence found to date indicates that more states are following this logic (Gamlen et al 2017).

In sum, national emigration states approach their diasporas for three main reasons: as a form of conceptualizing the diaspora as an asset; as a way of recognizing the importance of the diaspora in the process of identity formation of the state of origin; and as a result of shared global norms or mode of governance between countries across the globe (Goldring 2002: Délano 2011; Délano and Harris 2017; Délano 2018; Gamlen, Cummings and Vaaler 2017; Cohen 2017).

Still, some lacunas of knowledge are still prevalent. We need much more research to explain why there is an absence of diaspora policies or lack of interest on the part of states to develop them. Ragazzi (2014) offered one of the few theorizations for understanding these types of cases, where the impact of remittances in the sending-state would signal the development of a policy for their diaspora to increase such resources, although they are not developing diaspora policies. Nigeria and Belgium experiences are representative of these cases where the explanatory capacity of the instrumental hypothesis aforementioned is insufficient.

As such, the author developed a "governmentality hypothesis" to unveil the reasons underlying the contra-factual, as well as other cases. The hypothesis posits that the type of political-economic model (e.g. planned economy, welfare state, or neo-liberal) of the state in question would explain the development or underdevelopment of diaspora policies. In the case of indifferent states, the most common political-economic model implemented is the traditional welfare state. In addition, characteristics such as an open borders policy, significant fiscal pressures, and partially regulated labor markets are found within the "indifferent" cluster of countries (Ragazzi 2014: 86). Yet,

scholars have not developed a comprehensive analytical framework to understand these cases at the national or subnational level.

Moreover, since scholars are still trapped into a methodological nationalism approach, there is a need for understanding the factors that drive diaspora policies at different levels of analysis. One of the few studies that take into account a multi-level analytical approach is the one conducted by Délano (2011), where she devoted herself to understand why and how states vary in their approach to their diasporas and how they manage migration more in general. Her comprehensive methodological approach is evident in the following statement:

"The reasons why states vary with respect to the degree to which they extend rights, the kind of ideology and rhetoric used in relation to emigrants, and the policies or programs that they pursue to control or manage emigration can be explained by domestic, transnational, and international factors." (Délano 2011: 10).

Is in these ways that the emergence of diaspora policies has been studied in different disciplines.

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE: UNDERSTANDING SUBNATIONAL DIASPORA POLICIES

Globally, local governments are playing a greater role in creating and implementing strategies for local development since they have been pushed to compete in the global market (Velázquez 2007) within a context of increased interconnectedness. Varsanyi (2010) argues that the "neoliberal conduit" or neoliberal globalization has altered the local economic landscape in dramatic and differentiated ways. The flexibilization of labor is a response to the model, and cities have had to adapt to such scheme. Indeed, the global is increasingly influencing the local and viceversa, although this not mean that borders are "waning". In this respect, the debate about the extent that the sovereign power exerted by the state has declined or not has not reached a consensus, with some scholars arguing that, indeed, neoliberal globalization, international financial institutions,

and fragmented visions of groups coming from below have caused that "key characteristics of sovereignty are migrating from the nation-state" to other realms (Brown 2010); and others arguing the contrary since the increase in border restrictions on the part of states is evident, which should be seen as a natural reflection of the continued prominence of state power (Jones 2016).

As non-central or local governments are increasingly crossing national borders to reach Non-state Actors, the literature on international relations have been developing concepts to understand this new trend since this discipline used to focus their analysis on the Nation-state (Gilpin 1986 in Ortega 2012; Velázquez 2007). In Latin America, especially in Mexico, Argentina and Brasil, the theoretical debate centered in understanding why local governments are acting more prominently in the international and transnational arenas has used different concepts such as *federal diplomacy, paradiplomacy, local diplomacy, constitutive diplomacy,* or *decentralized international cooperation* (Ortega 2012; Velázquez 2007; Schiavon 2010). The "confusion", according to Ortega (2012) and Velázquez (2007) is not just conceptual but is also prevalent at the practical level since governments are not clear in how to conduct or regulate international policies or actions since this has historically been a federal attribution mandated in legal national and international frameworks.

In Mexico, one of the concepts that has been used within the Foreign Ministry (*Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores*) is *federal diplomacy,* especially after 2000. The concept was coined by Brasil's Foreign Ministry and it looks to understand international relations of subnational states in the context of increased decentralization. This understanding is in line with the United Nations concept of *decentralized international cooperation* which was developed to underscore international activities between subnational states in the global scene to potentiate or generate

development at the local level in countries of the Global South (Díaz, 2007 and Europa, 2010 in Ortega 2012).

This global strategy has been greatly criticized by scholars such as Márquez (2012) or García (2009) among others, since they argue that the political and economic goal of this agenda is to implement neoliberal policies with the intention of leaving the problems of development to the communities themselves[7]. States in Latin America have neglected their responsibility as main actors in fostering development, delegating the management of its economy to various international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, United Nations, to the international financial oligarchy, and to national elites. This have brought severe economic crises that resulted in a national as well as an international migratory explosion since the 1990s.

Going back to the discussion about the concepts that have been used to understand foreign relations and actions on the part of Mexican states, Ortega (2012) noted that it is the concept of *paradiplomacy* coined by Duchacek (1990 cited in Ortega 2012) and refined in subsequent publications that have predominated among most Mexican scholars. However, there is no consensus yet from the academy nor is there uniformity in the use of terminology from the Mexican government. Mexican state officials have used different concepts besides the *federal diplomacy* concept mentioned above (Ibid).

Paradiplomacy is defined as the external processes and actions developed among noncentral governments or federal states (e.g. counties, municipalities, local governments in general) and

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[7] Regarding the negative effects of neoliberal policies, in a study on local policy responses to immigration in the U.S., Varsanyi (2010) emphasizes the detrimental economic effects of neoliberal policies for both migrants and some sectors of the communities where they arrive, finding a nexus between such policies and anti-immigrant backlash.

other international actors such as nation-states, local governments, corporations, international organizations, among others (Duchacek and Soldatos in Velázquez 2007; Duchacek 1990 in Ortega 2012). In addition to the definition, the authors categorized paradiplomatic activities in different subconcepts, of which I will highlight two: Regional paradiplomacy and transregional paradiplomacy.

These concepts are relevant to this study and have been used by scholars to understand the external activities undertaken by state governments in Mexico emphasizing their geographical location and expanding it to include relations between non-state actors and non-central governments. *Regional paradiplomacy* refers to the international activities that different actors undertake between states located in border regions. An example of this type of diplomacy are the policies implemented by the state of Nuevo Léon through the *Centro de Atención a Migrantes* (CAM) to manage temporary worker programs with visas H2A and private companies in the U.S. (Valenzuela 2007; Ortega 2012; Hernández-León 2017). With regard to the category of *transregional paradiplomacy*, it includes international relations between non-central states that do not share borders with each other but that their central governments do. An example of this are the relations between municipal governments in Sinaloa and the HTA called *Fraternidad Sinaloense de California*, in Los Angeles to create development projects in the communities of origin of Sinaloan migrants.

For these scholars, paradiplomatic relations in Mexico vary depending on a number of domestic and international factors such as economic resources of non-central governments, geographical location, demographics, political context (e.g. democratization), legal framework, relation with the federal government, migratory intensity, global interconnectedness and interdependence, among others. Some of these factors coincide with the development of diaspora policies in some Mexican states and I use some of them as variables to analyze in coming sections.

The international relations conceptual framework is useful to understand global trends on international relations and help us to enhance our understanding about the surge in relations between NSA and subnational governments from a critical perspective.

TRANSNATIONALISM

Transnationalism was defined in 1999 by Portes et al as "the occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation" (p. 219). Surpassing the individual level of analysis, Levitt argues that migrants live within *multiple transnational social fields* which include those who stay and those who leave. These fields represent a set of multiple set of interconnected social networks in which ideas, practices and resources are exchanged, organized, and transformed. Transnational social fields are multi-dimensional and function in different forms, levels and depth (Levitt 2005).

The transnational perspective allowed to describe a phenomenon that, although not entirely new, has reached unprecedent interest among scholars from different disciplines in the last decades. In the case of migration scholars, they have previously focused on migrant's integration processes, neglecting the influence of their linkages with their countries of origin in such analyses.

From the 1990's onwards, migration began to be studied from the transnational perspective, which has been fundamental for understanding contemporary (and past) migratory processes. Now, the increase in the intensity and impact of different flows of people, goods, information and symbols becomes clearer due to the transnational lens (Vertovec 2009). What is *new* now is the intensity, speed and efficiency of transnational linkages due to more sophisticate technologies. Thus, despite great distances and the existence of international borders between countries, with all the restrictions that this entails, certain kinds of relations have intensified globally (Vertovec 2009; Moctezuma 2011).

However, this perspective has gained criticism and also has generated "mixed feelings" among some scholars. For example, if we focus on migrant political transnationalism, some scholars argue that transnational political ties could undermine the political and social incorporation of immigrants in the U.S. (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Waldinger 2013; Escala et al. 2011), and others had gone as far as making similar claims from an anti-Latino/anti-immigrant perspective (Huntington 2004 in Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016). In a similar vein, Escala et al. (2011) argue that it is precisely their transnational *philanthropic* engagement with their hometowns what limits their political, social and civic participation in the U.S. They argue that immigrants are already saturated by various obligations, ranging from the family to the workplace; thus, by adding more activities to their agendas, their capacity to get involved in political and civic activities is considerably reduced.

Similarly, Ramakrishnan and Viramontes (2010) recognize the inherent difficulties that HTAs experience in their attempts to engage with their homelands. They show how HTAs are even more constrained than mainstream and ethnic organizations in terms of resources and political visibility. Nonetheless, they recognize the importance of HTAs in creating spaces that allow disadvantaged immigrants to engage in political and/or civic affairs. Such spaces are important at a time where a hostile political climate fostered by the new U.S. presidential administration, threatens not only their successful incorporation in this country but also its mere permanence in this country.

There is also a recognition on the exceptionality of these types of engagements, especially the political ones. For instance, DeSipio (2011) noted in his study of Latin Americans and Asians that only a minority have transnational political ties; rather, they prefer to be engaged in cultural and/or social activities with their homelands. These and other scholars are not enthusiastic about the role that HTAs can play as transnational political and civic agents.

Yet, "pro-transnationalism" scholars have found evidence that do not support the latter argument since they have found evidence that shows how immigrant engagement in transnational organizations facilitate their incorporation into U.S. society (Fox and Rivera-Salgado, Forthcoming; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016; DeSipio 2011; Escamilla 2009; Félix 2019). While these types of engagements are not representative of the immigrant population overall (Waldinger 2013; DeSipio 2011), some organized immigrants have substantially contributed to their host and home communities (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016). The "optimistic" group of scholars highlight the effects of political participation in the host country and the incremental consequences on transnational political and civic activities (DeSipio 2011; Escamilla 2009). Then, what matters the most in this case is not representativeness but their capacity to create global proposals (Moctezuma 2013) and the impact and potential of those proposals for generating social change and social justice.

At the organizational level, the analysis of the transnational processes has not been the focus of scholars. It is until recently that transnational studies along with host and sending countries have shifted their attention towards the organizational efforts of migrants. One of the reasons that propelled this shift relates the increase in remittances and intensity of immigrants transnational engagaments with their home countries, which in turn propitiated institutionalized forms of political connections of diverse nature (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016). There is also some evidence showing how transnational immigrant organizations have, for instance, contributed substantially to the formation of high-tech growth poles in some cities of China and India (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016), while Mexican migrants have raised the quality of life of numerous families throughout Mexico by sending collective remittances; with or without collaboration with the Mexican state (Villegas 2014; García 2009).

Another body of literature that also explores the organizational activities of immigrants, has focused on the different paths they follow on the host society in terms of political participation, social incorporation, citizenship acquisition, organizational development and levels of transnationalism (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2010; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016; Veronis 2013; Zabin and Escala 2002; Fox and Rivera-Salgado, Forthcoming; Moctezuma 2013). These studies have found variation across and within countries, making it difficult to find clear patterns among immigrant organizations, even when members of these organizations share language and culture.

Overall, within the literature on transnational organizations, I found no academic consensus regarding the consequences of getting actively involved in these types of activities. As Portes and Fernández-Kelly (2016) argues, we need to find substantial empirical evidence to shed light on this debate.

From a methodological perspective, transnationalism has evaded what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) called *methodological nationalism*, or the prevalent assumption in social sciences (and in other fields) that nations are the basic unit of analysis. Indeed, migration scholars have focused overwhelmingly in the states of destination of migrants or "developed immigration countries", leaving aside the analysis of the countries of origin and how both are intrinsically interrelated (Délano and Harris 2017).

The common assumption for leaving the emigration state out of the analysis is that their agency to shape migration and migrants' lives is limited due to the existent asymmetric relationship between both states. Scholars have challenged such assumption by showing how diaspora policies and diverse actors coming from both states influence the migration phenomenon and how such policies assist migrants to integrate them better in their countries of destination (Délano and Harris 2017;

Délano 2018; Ortega 2013; Bada 2014; Goldring 2002; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016). Indeed, as Délano (2018: 11) argues, this "can be a productive way to move beyond nationalistic frameworks (…) to consider different political units (at the local, national, transnational, or supranational levels) that can participate more effectively in achieving goals of social justice, equality, and democracy."

Nonetheless, transnational scholars commonly attributed a weaker role to the state power in shaping the lives of immigrants. Until recently, they argued that national states' sovereignty was "waning", in Brown's (2010) words, and believed that the tendency would make it irrelevant. These scholars attributed a greater role to different groups coming from below and as such, their subsequent analysis displaced the relevance of the state. However, since the power exerted by states is being evident in actions such as restricting the inclusion of immigrants by virtue of granting citizenship just to certain individuals, they have had to rearticulate their position by "bringing the state back in" as Délano and Harris (2017: 4) argue.

From this departure point, I am able to begin exploring gaps in knowledge on the role of emigration states –at the state and municipal level– and other actors within it, in shaping the lives of their diasporas, their reasons for doing so, and the reactions or involvement of migrants themselves into these processes. My research will contribute to the transnational literature in unveiling these reciprocal influences between the subnational state, the Sinaloan diaspora, and the communities involved.

SOCIAL NETWORKS, THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES AND HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS

When migrants arrive to the host country through their social networks, they tend to congregate in specific communities, giving birth to what Moctezuma (2011a) called *daughter communities*.

Relationships that migrants form are a product of those social networks which serve as a valuable resource to someone that arrives in a new or hostile environment (Massey et al 1990). Moctezuma (2011) understands social networks as mutual aid networks that serve for exchanging favors, which varies depending on the context of origin of the migrant, being rural or urban. Social networks could be based on family or kinship, friendship or *paisanaje,* or the shared identity based in their communities of origin (Massey et al 1990; Zabin and Escala 2002), and they represent social capital, that is, all the set of formal and informal networks, trust and rules which promote cooperation and coordination among members of a group, which are supposed to have mutual benefits (Putnam 1993)[8].

Daughter communities precede migrant organizations. These types of communities originate as a product of social networks, a territorial referent and a *cultura matriótica* (matriarchal culture), which are reproduced in the community of destination, crystallizing then as a daughter community (Moctezuma 2005). While time passes, and migrants have settled, they celebrate different festivities and, paradoxically, they also seek new forms of belonging, thus, looking back to their communities of origin (Moctezuma 2011).

EMERGENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS

Hometown Associations emerge when migrants organize themselves and begin to help their communities back home by donating school buses or clothes, or when they carry out social, cultural, economic projects and, sometimes, negotiate with governments of the communities of origin, and even which those of the destination country to achieve greater impact (Moctezuma

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[8] It is important to mention that some authors like Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993 quoted by Durand and Massey 2003), pointed out that social capital could have also negative effects such as discrimination, exploitation or patronage practices.

2005). Lanly and Valenzuela (2004 quoted by Ibarra 2005, 184) argue that HTAs are created to foster a sense of community among migrants and strengthen their cultural ties with their communities of origin through different types of works or donations.

Per Zabin and Escala (2002), the process begins when some migrants with some sort of civic consciousness create a leadership committee to represent the daughter community. The authors mention how migrants' attitudes are shaped by what they socialized in their home countries, thus, reproducing what was learned back home. Through their *habitus*, they carry out practices that cannot be understood if we do not consider both the context of origin and destination, hence the difference in complexity, number and characteristics of HTAs.

On other occasions, communities or governments of origin request and promote the creation of HTAs, which is usually accompanied by a proposal or request that, in a good scenario, will lead to the financing of a project in such community. Zabin and Escala (2002) point out the existence of such HTAs, most of which are only recognized by their members and do not have formal contact with more complex HTAs.

Another characteristic is that their conformation is predominantly rural, that is, according to Massey et al (1987 quoted by Zabin and Escala 2002), immigrants of urban origin do not pertain or create HTAs based on their *barrio* or *colonia* (neighborhood). Rather, in the case of grouping with an HTA, they do so but in the HTAs that represent their father's hometowns before moving to the urban centers.

There are more complex HTAs compared to those analyzed in the last paragraphs. Moctezuma called them "second level" HTAs because they transcend the representation of a single town to represent a state, country or even an entire ethnic group, consequently, expanding their scope, and bringing together more basic HTAs. However, per Moctezuma (2013), its importance does not lie

in the number of HTAs grouped but in their greater organizational level and complexity in their activities. Itzigsohn (2000 quoted by Moctezuma 2013) points out that quality of these HTAs can be noticed when they have more stable and longstanding institutionalized practices between immigrants and their social organizations, as well as between the State and its political institutions. The *Federaciones de Clubes* (Federations of clubs) are a good example of a second level HTA. However, according to Moctezuma and Pérez (2006), this is not necessarily a linear process where all clubs would coalesce or group into a second level HTA after a certain amount of time, rather, these types of organizations follow a much more complex process where they can follow multiple directions or trajectories. For these authors, the better organized a HTA is, the more political influence it can have towards the government of origin.

3. EVOLUTION OF STATE-DIASPORA RELATIONS IN MEXICO

Since the 1990s, there has been a sustained increase in the development and creation of diaspora policies across the world (see graph 1) (Délano 2018; Gamlen et al 2017). Emigration states and their populations within them have had gradually changed their perceptions towards migrants, transitioning from a perspective that depicted them as "traitors" of the polity to a positive on. Now they are being increasingly constructed by most countries as "national heroes" as a way of recognizing and understanding the benefits of extending the arms of the state in order to strengthen their engagements with the diaspora.

This shift in the narrative is also true for Mexico. This was the evident when Vicente Fox, former president of Mexico (2000-2006), delivered a speech describing Mexican migrants as "heroes nacionales" (Délano 2018). Indeed, the trend continues in Mexico as the current director of the *Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior* (IME, Institute of Mexicans Abroad), Roberto

Valdovinos, recently used the "heroes" narrative to praise migrants' contributions to their homeland (Domínguez 2019).

Graph 1. Categorization of Countries with Diaspora Institutions and its Development, 1980-2014.

Source: Gamlen et al (2017: 3)

*The graph only show the states that are members of the United Nations.

Diaspora policies have increased in Mexico at unprecedent levels during the last three decades. Beginning in 1987, state-diaspora relations experienced a turn. The *Programa de Acercamiento del Gobierno de Mexico con la Comunidad Mexicano-Norteamericana* marked the beginning of a new stage in Mexican State-diaspora relations. The program started in 1987 at the end of the presidential term of former Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid, however, it was fully developed by former Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) (Santamaría 1994).

The recently created *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD) commanded by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, represented a strong opposition for the PRI in the 1988 elections. Due to the political

inclusive approach of "*el ingeniero*"[9], the "Cardenismo" movement enjoyed a large group of supporters on both sides of the border (Ibid). Salinas and his group understood the political threat that *Cardenismo* represented and they responded in an unprecedented way by approaching the diaspora and Chicanas/os more proactively.

Chicanas/os and Mexican immigrants were growing numerically and their political power and influence also developed. In the case of Mexicans, the 1986 IRCA agreement granted legal status to more than 2 million Mexican immigrants which in turn facilitated transnational organizing (Délano 2011: Durand and Massey 2003). Although, it is important to note that the Salinas group was interested in strengthening the relationship with Chicano/a leaders more than with Mexican immigrants in order to garner their support. For the Salinas group, privileging the relation with Chicanos/as was important since they needed their lobbying efforts for supporting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Santamaría 1994; Délano 2011; Alarcón 2006; González 2006; Waldinger 2014; Goldring 2002). Indeed, the instrumental relationship developed by the Mexican government probed successful in the approval of NAFTA and for unifying the Latino community (González 1993).

This stage was characterized by a renewed, more active and institutionalized relationship on the part of the Mexican state towards its diaspora that crystallized in the creation of several programs and policies. These programs were intended to aid Mexican immigrants in the U.S., to protect their rights when returning to Mexico, and to strengthen their ties with their home communities and governments (Délano 2011, González 2006) with the purpose of sustaining the flow of remittances and originated due to the political factors described above.

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[9] In Mexico, Cárdenas is commonly known by many people as *El Ingeniero*

The first outreach government program was called *Programa de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero* (PCME) and it was created in 1989 during the Salinas administration as a response to a proposal from organized Chicana/os. It was the first among other outreach programs created during this period (Santamaría 1994; Alarcón 2006) and was designed with the purpose of developing links between state governments and their emigrants to not lose influence with the immigrant community, and to develop projects in mutual collaboration (Lizárraga et al. 2010). The *Programa Paisano* was another program that emerged in recognition and as a response to the constant mistreatment and abuse exercised by Mexican government authorities towards their own co-nationals who traveled Mexico to visit their communities of origin. Other programs were created in coordination with Mexican Federal agencies to provide health or educational services to the diaspora and to generate linkages between their own organizations and public or private agencies on both sides of the border (González 1993)

In this way, the emergence of outreach policies intended to establish links with Mexicans and Chicana/os in the U.S., is not only explained by economic concerns or pure instrumental interests (e.g. interest on remittances on the part of the Mexican state) but also by political and contextual external factors such as problems of discrimination and exclusion faced by the Latina/o community in both countries (Délano 2011; Alarcón 2006).

During the two next federal administrations, with president Ernesto Zedillo of the PRI (1994-2000), and Vicente Fox of the PAN (2000-2006), these outreach policies and interest in increasing State-diaspora relations continued, especially under the Fox administration. The creation of the PCME in 1990, the Presidential Office for Migrants Abroad (OPME) in 2000, the *Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior* (IME) in 2003, and the approval of the law that allowed the Mexican

vote from abroad in 2007, all were evidence of such changes in the State-Diaspora transnational relations.

Under President Felipe Calderon's administration (2006-2012), these relations continued, and in a way, they were strengthened as a response to anti-immigrant rhetoric and bills against Mexicans in the U.S. As evidence demonstrating increased efforts that went beyond the discourse, we can see how his administration assigned budget increases to the consulates and media campaigns in the US for promoting a better image of Mexican immigrants (Délano 2011 and 2018). Cooperation in other matters concerning migration also increased.

In the case of the administration of former President Enrique Peña (2012-2018), cooperation with the U.S. government was more inclined to attend transit migration. In fact, it is well documented how the Mexican State developed an ambivalent discourse claiming to be a humanitarian state for immigrants fleeing from violence; however, it has systematically violated their rights (Castañeda 2015; Villegas 2017).

How do we explain the incremental relationship between the Mexican state and the diaspora in the past three decades? In sum, the exponential growth of remittances and migration combined with political and economic interests on the part of Mexican state agents; a tight bilateral relationship with the United States; demands of migrant organizations and NGOs; and more recently, the expansion of state outreach activities to protect migrants as a response to anti-immigrant U.S. policies are all factors that allow to better understand an increase in state-diaspora relations at the national level according to current literature (Santamaría 1994; Waldinger 2014; Délano 2011 and 2018; Valenzuela 2007; Bada 2014).

3.1. MEXICAN STATES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH DIASPORAS: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND CURRENT TRENDS

In the past two decades, states and municipalities in Mexico started to play an active role in different spheres of the public life. Although these changes at the local level were much more pronounced at the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century, *Michoacanos* and *Zacatecanos* started these types of relationships long ago. In the mid-seventies, the transnational Zacatecan community developed a modality which they called "One for One", gathering funds in collaboration with some municipal governments to carry out projects for bettering their communities of origin. Their long migration experience, good leadership, a strong civil society and the willingness of local governments to collaborate with them, were translated into the formation of a new type of public policy (Moctezuma 2011; 2015).

The "One for One" program evolved to the "Two for One" program in 1993 (Moctezuma 2011) with the inclusion of the state government into the design and implementation of development projects. According to García (2009), Zacatecans and their local governments financed hundreds of basic infrastructure projects. In 1999, the program changed to "Three for One program for Migrants" when the three levels of government and migrant HTA's were collaborating in conjunction.

In general, the *Programa Tres por Uno para Migrantes* works under a concurrent scheme, that is, for every dollar given by the HTA, the government in its three levels (federal, state and municipal) complements it with three more dollars. Ideally, each agent contributes with 25% of the investment. In practice, this has not been always the case with migrants sometimes contributing with 50% and sometimes just "virtually" participating without any economic contribution. The program proved to be successful, and in 2002 it was extended to the entire country as a federal

program[10]. It presented a rapid growth and wide acceptance on the part of Mexican HTAs. HTAs multiplied across the country along with their contributions and participation with local governments[11] due to different factors that are not solely attributable to the 3 X 1 Program. The federal government had already begun to decentralize their public policies (Velázquez 2007) and to liberalize the electoral system, which was a result of social and political demands across the country (Verdugo 2009).

In the case of *Michoacanos*, they established the first migrant office in Mexico in 1992, and it was called the *Dirección de Servicios de Apoyo Legal y Administrativo a Trabajadores Emigrantes* (DSALATE). This office was in charge of providing support to deceased migrants for repatriating their bodies to Michoacán as a result of the increase in deaths in their attempt to cross the dessert to enter to the United States. A former director of the *Instituto Michoacano de los Migrantes en el Extranjero* stated that the emergence of diaspora policies to serve *michoacanos* were also a product of the pressures and demands of e*xbraceros* (Yrizar and Alarcón 2010). This account shows how, in some cases, state-centric explanations for the emergence of diaspora policies are incomplete or misguided. Indeed, migrants exert influence vìs-a-vìs their home states governments to implement diaspora policies.

Migrants from different states started to collaborate with municipal and state governments in a more frequent manner since 2000's (Valenzuela 2007). The increased prominence of the states and municipalities in Mexico in their approach to their respective diasporas, is part of a larger trend in

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[10] The impacts of this program will be analyzed in dept in the last chapter with a focus on Sinaloa.

[11] Márquez (2006) argues that the 3x1 was part of a more comprehensive agenda that had the political and economic objective of implementing neoliberal policies, with the explicit intention of leaving the problems of development to the communities themselves.

which the local has been pushed to compete in the global market (Velázquez 2007) within a context of "neoliberal globalization" or "neoliberal conduit", which also has dramatically altered the local economic landscape (Varsanyi 2010). Competitiveness led some states and municipal officials to engage with migrants abroad to promote culture, tourism, agriculture, services, etc.

Simultaneously, the federalization or decentralization of power in Mexico strengthened the autonomy of states and some cities (Délano 2010 and 2018; Smith 2005; Fitzgerald 2008; Bada 2014; Burgess 2014; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016; Ortega 2012 and 2013; Valenzuela 2007; Verdugo 2009). Greater autonomy at the local level along with increased competition between political parties in Mexico, or democratization, modified their domestic approach to politics. Beginning in 1990's, political elites had to expand their reach by courting their diasporas in the U.S., affecting the transnational life of migrants. This happened more markedly in states such as Puebla (Smith 2005), Michoacán (Bada 2014), Jalisco (Ortega 2012), or Zacatecas (Moctezuma 2015; Yrizar and Alarcón 2010).

Therefore, changes at the international and national levels, affected what happened at the local and transnational spheres in Mexico and vice versa. Transnational relations between the diaspora and local officials crystalized into diaspora policies at the local level (Velázquez 2007; Ortega 2012), mostly in states from the Historical and Central regions.

3.2. DIASPORA POLICIES IN MEXICO AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

Currently, almost all states have established an institute, office, policy or program to coordinate and/or foster their relation with Mexican migrants in the U.S., returned migrants or with migrants in transit through Mexico (e.g. Migrants from Central America fleeing from violence in their home countries). In spite of this, there are few studies that analyze the factors that propel the emergence

of diaspora policies at the state and municipal level. Existing studies show important variations in terms of institutional capacity or scope of policies directed to the diaspora on the part of subnational states (Ortega 2012 and 2013; Vila 2007; Fernández de Castro et al 2007).

Durand and Massey (2003) argue that Mexican state governments from the "historical region" (see Map 1) have developed a stronger relationship with their diaspora due to its massiveness, historicity, stability and strong social networks, which in turn have led them to secure the highest rates of legalization[12] compared to migrants from other regions in Mexico. In fact, U.S. immigration policies such as IRCA benefitted mostly Mexican immigrants from the historical region, which allowed them to consolidate their networks and strengthen their organizations. In turn, higher levels of integration explain the formation of more numerous and institutionalized transnational organizational forms, as Portes and Fernandez-Kelly (2016) have demonstrated.

From this departure point, we can see how HTA's of some states from the historical region such as Zacatecas or Michoacan, are in better conditions to put pressures on their governments to create policies that take their voices and interests into account (Bada 2014; Moctezuma 2015; Ortega 2012 and 2013; Vila 2007). Due to these reasons, the historical region has been the focus of researchers.

Other factors proposed by scholars to explain the emergence of diaspora policies in states from other regions include the leadership of some state governors or municipal authorities in response, of course, to political, economic or social pressures, or as part of global trends (Délano 2019; Fernández de Castro et al 2007; Vila 2007; Ortega 2012). The leadership or initiative of state

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[12] This region is the most stable in terms of the number of migrants that have been "expulsed" from their communities in the past 150 years, and all present high or very high levels of migratory intensity. Migrants from these states have developed strong social networks and, because of this, they benefitted extensively from the Immigration Reform and Control Act

governors or municipal authorities have prompted the creation of policies to support migrants in the U.S., to foster the creation of HTA's, and to take advantage of the collective remittances they send to their communities of origin. Jalisco, Yucatan, Morelos or Veracruz exemplify these types of cases (Ortega 2012).

Then, as I have stated, factors that explain the emergence of diaspora policies at the subnational level are multidimensional and vary according to the level of analysis (transnational, international, national, or local). In fact, because there is a multiplicity of factors that could explain such variations, Vila (2007) created a categorization to distinguish state-diaspora relations at the subnational level. She used subnational states as her main unit of analysis and found 4 main models of government approaches: *Active, reactive, managing, and incipient*. The first model depends greatly on the leadership of state governors to develop programs to support migrants and community development programs such as the *Programa 3 x 1 para Migrantes*. They also emphasize the importance of fomenting the creation of HTA's in the U.S. so that they are able to invest in their communities of origin. Jalisco and Yucatán are examples of *active* state governments according to this author.

Reactive governments are acting in response to pressures on the part of HTA's such as the ones formed of migrants from Zacatecas or Veracruz. HTA's from these states, specially Zacatecans, have exerted influence on their local government to include them as transnational actors in the political arena, to collaborate in community development projects, or to create investment projects in conjunction with the private sector or international organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank.

Managing state governments such as Puebla and the State of Mexico are states that manage federal programs to potentiate their effects. Programs such as the Programa Paisano Mexiquense and the

implementation of the *Programa Tres Por Uno* are part of the agenda in the latter case. With regard to Puebla, López (2005 in Vila 2007) argues that state government engagement has been limited to manage federal programs as well. Vila characterize actions implemented by states within this category as being limited in their support to migrants, and with clientelist attitudes which erode migrant collaboration and trust with their counterparts in Mexico.

Incipient government approaches to migrants are characterized by states that are beginning to recognize their population abroad and that are designing few programs for the diaspora, although without resources to implement them.

Another categorization which is more recent and comprehensive is the one developed by Ortega (2012 and 2013). In the most comprehensive study to date on the institutional capacity of Mexican states in their transnational relation with their diaspora, Ortega (2012 and 2013) found that variations across states are not always explained by variables related to the migratory phenomenon[13] such as volume and proportion of migrants, or remittances compared to the state GDP. She found that other factors are more relevant in explaining the level of state-diaspora relations such as the organizational level of HTA's in the United States and their capacity of negotiation vis-à-vis their home state governments; the national political context where some states experienced increased party competition; the decentralization of power from the federation to the states; and the institutional and political context in the United States (Ortega 2013; Valenzuela 2007).

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[13] Ortega (2013) included 6 variables, 4 exogenous (organizational structure of the *Oficinas Estatales de Atención a Migrantes* (OFAM), policies and programs, additional offices located outside of the state and level of international relations of state governments) and 2 endogenous (intensity of the migratory phenomenon and number and strength of HTA's).

Ortega (2013) also found that there are just four Mexican states were their institutional capacity is weak or absent: Sinaloa, Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo, and Campeche. The absence of diaspora policies or low levels of state-diaspora relations in the latter three states, is explained by the *instrumental hypothesis* since they all have low levels of migratory intensity, low volumes of migrants compared to their respective states population, and non-substantial impact of remittances to their states economies (as measured by the percentage of remittances compared to the states Gross Domestic Product, GDP), thus, they are not "attractive" for state governments. Nevertheless, Sinaloa is the exception to the rule. Low levels of diaspora policies directed to Sinaloans in the United States are not explained entirely by the instrumental approach. In Chapter five, I provide an explanatory framework for understanding this paradigmatic case.

4. THE SINALOA-CALIFORNIA TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTION.

Sinaloans have been migrating to the United States even before Mexican migrants from the traditional sending states like Jalisco, Michoacán, or Zacatecas[14]. Sinaloan historian Antonio Nakayama argue that the origin of Sinaloan emigration to what is now U.S. territory dates to the second half of the eighteenth century, when people from what we now know as the Sinaloan municipalities of El Fuerte, Culiacán, Sinaloa, Cosalá, San Ignacio[15], and El Rosario settled in what is now the state of California[16] (Lizárraga et al., 2010). Sinaloan and Sonoran migrants allegedly "founded" the town called *Nuestra Señora de Los Ángeles Porciúncula* in 1781, now known as Los Angeles (Nakayama 1980 quoted by Sánchez 2014), the US city where most

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[14] Durand and Massey (2003) include in this region the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Durango, San Luis Potosí, Aguascalientes, Nayarit and Colima. This is also known as the historic migrant-sending region.

[15] Pio Pico, the last Mexican governor of California was born in San Ignacio (Nakayama 1980, quoted by Lizárraga 2005).

[16] Soldiers from the northern states of Mexico arrived in the region with the purpose of settling in the lands of what is known today as California.

Sinaloans immigrants live nowadays. Nonetheless, by that time Mexicans were replacing Native Indians *Gabrielinos*, actual founders of the city[17], as the main labor force (Estrada 2008).

After the signing of the *Tratado de Guadalupe-Hidalgo* in February 2nd, 1848 Mexicans suddenly turned into immigrants because the agreements of such treaty, which supposedly provided US citizenship to Mexicans living in this territory, were not followed (Sánchez 1993; González 1999 in Cano and Delano 2007; Chávez-García 2006). Coincidentally, gold was discovered in California in the same year[18], which in turn attracted Mexicans from states of Northern Mexico such as Sonora and Sinaloa, but also from states that were farther south such as Zacatecas.

The Gold Rush changed the demographics of *El Pueblo de Los Angeles* so much that a section of the city dominated by Mexican immigrants from Sonora was called "Sonoratown" by Anglos (Estrada 2008; Sánchez 1993). Los Angeles became "Americanized" by the 1870s, forcing Mexican Angelenos (former Californios[19]) and Mexican immigrants that arrived in thousands −mainly from the northern states of Sonora and Sinaloa− to maintain some traditional cultural practices and adapt to a harsh environment.

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[17] El Pueblo de La Reina de Los Angeles del Río Porcíuncula was founded in 1781 by 44 racially mixed arrivers from Sinaloa and Sonora and other northern Mexican states, however, Indigenous people inhabited the area long before (Estrada 2008; Nakayama 1980 in Lizárraga 2005). According to Estrada (2008), the design of the *pueblo* envisioned by Spanish Governor Felipe de Neve, was not solely based on the Spanish system methods since the Native Indians *Gabrielinos* contributed significantly to the founding and development of the city with their cultural and geographical knowledge, and also as a source of labor (Estrada 2008). Through different eliminatory methods (Lytle 2017) and because of diseases, Indian population in California drastically declined from 72,050 in 1848 to 12,500 in 1880. Under California Law, Indians did not have federal protection. Anglos reasoned that "the quickest and easiest way to get rid of [their] troublesome presence was to kill [them] off, [and] this procedure was adopted as a standard for some years." (Estrada 2008: 57).

[18] Approximately 20,000 Mexicans moved to work in the gold mines by that time, however, they were quickly expelled by white Anglo settlers (Lytle 2017; Chávez-García 2006; Sánchez 1993). Despite this, such movements represented the most significant migration from Mexicans to California compared to other migrations that took place during the Spanish and Mexican rules. By 1900, Mexicans living in California represented 7.82 % of the entire Mexican-born population that resided in the US (Corwin 1975 in Sánchez 1993).

[19] During Spanish and Mexican rule, inhabitants of California were known as "Californios". Their decline came right after the *Tratado de Guadalupe-Hidalgo* and the term stopped being used in the 1880s (Estrada 2008).

Concentration and segregation of Mexicans in LA or "Barrioization", was true throughout the 19th century but changed during the first four decades of the 20th century. By the latter period, Mexicans were scattered along east and central Los Angeles. After World War II, demographic changes and racial segregation, which was more pronounced in these years, prompted the emergence of the East Mexican side (Sánchez 1993).

While Mexican migration to California dates back to the 19th century, massive movements began in the early 20th century. It was until this period that California gained prominence as a recipient of Mexican immigrants due to pull factors such as economic opportunities (e.g. agriculture, mine and railroad work) and relaxed federal policies on migration but, more importantly, due to push factors in Mexico such as federal policies implemented during the Díaz dictatorship that left thousands of peasants without land and jobs; the demographic increase that created a labor surplus; the revolutionary upheaval brought by the *Revolución Mexicana* of 1910; and the new connections created by the railway system. Sánchez (1993) complicates Mexico-US migration explanation during this period by stating that it went beyond "push-pull" factors, since US corporations that controlled the main railroads companies in the US, actively promoted the construction of the railroads in Mexico[20].

The majority of Mexican immigrants arriving in Los Angeles during this period were from rural communities; small towns in which their inhabitants presented "customary modes of thought and behavior *and* recently arrived examples of machinery and culture"[21]. This tell us that the culture

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[20] Along with economic changes, the "Americanization" process that the construction of the railroad system brought to Mexico would signify the "modernization" of Mexican Indians, which in turn would have pulled "Mexico into the twentieth century" (Sánchez 1993: 22). This logic ("the modernization of the Mexican Indian") was implemented again in 1942 by both US and Mexico states through the creation of the Bracero guest worker program (Loza 2016).

[21] According to Sánchez (1993), most Mexican agricultural towns where different to the ones found in the US during that period since

brought by Mexican immigrants was not merely "traditional" and/or "static", as it was portrayed by some scholars, but it was a mixture of rural and urban cultures which was characteristic of rural Mexico in that period. These Immigrants predominantly came from mid-center Mexican states such as Jalisco, Zacatecas, or Guanajuato and from northern states at the border such as Sinaloa, Sonora or Chihuahua. An important proportion came also from Mexico City and few from southern states[22] (Sánchez 1993; Lizárraga 2005). Migrants in L.A. (and in the U.S.) had not developed a strong national identity and their racial composition was mestizo/Indian. Some were "acculturated Indians", or Indians who spoke Spanish but practiced some Native and European costumes (Sánchez 1993). According to Estrada (2008), differences in terms of class, region of origin and race were crucial in the ways Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles differentiated between themselves.

Massive movements of Sinaloans arriving to Los Angeles also started at the first half of the 20th century, although with intermittent cycles in which Sinaloan emigration has increased and declined. A critical event would mark the future of Sinaloa in different and complicated ways. During the 1970s, the Mexican government started *Operación Cóndor*, one among other governmental attempts to eradicate drug trafficking. The program mainly targeted Sinaloa[23], but also Durango, Chihuahua (the so-called *Triangulo Dorado*, Golden Triangle) and Guerrero, and prompted a wave of violence mainly affecting the rural communities located in the mountains of *El Triangulo*. This would lead to the displacement of large contingents of people to other

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[22] It is relevant to highlight distinctions between regions or states of origin of Mexicans since, contrary to popular ethnocentric assumptions among most US scholars, there are important variations among Mexicans in terms of race, class and culture. For instance, states at the northern region such as Sonora or Chihuahua had the highest literacy rates in the country and lower gender disparities compared to states from the center or the south such as Michoacán or Guanajuato (Sánchez 1993).

[23] Sinaloa is the birthplace of drug trafficking in Mexico, which dates to the 1910s (Valdéz 2017).

municipios within Sinaloa, to other states in Mexico, and to the U.S. (Valdez 2017, Lizárraga 2005, Lizárraga et al 2010). Later, during the 1980s and 1990s, violence would continue in Sinaloa which, along with various economic crises[24], caused massive expulsion of people. As one of the consequences, some localities disappeared altogether.

As a result of exacerbated violence and economic hardships (81 % migrated for this reason), a significant proportion of Sinaloans emigrated to the U.S. It is indeed a strategy for improving their income but also a survival strategy since violence in the mountain region or *la sierra*, originated by organized crime and the military, has increased migration from these areas (Lizárraga et al 2010; López 2017).

CONTEMPORARY SINALOAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

Currently, Sinaloan emigration to the U.S. compared to emigration from other Mexican traditional-sending states is moderate. The accumulated number of Sinaloan immigrants living in the U.S. amounts to 239,620 people, but only taking into account the 1990-2013 period. This figure represents 2% of Mexicans residing in the U.S. in 2013, however, if we add the 2nd and 3rd Generation Sinaloans, the number would double or triple. Moreover, these estimates do not consider undocumented Sinaloans which represent around 59 % of the total (Lizárraga et al. 2010). More recent figures show that Sinaloans represented 1.6% of all Mexican migrants in the U.S., although this percentage is not accurate representation since it is based on *Matrículas consulares*, which is a document that Mexican consulates provide to migrants in need of some sort of identification (Serrano and Jaramillo 2018). Most migrants do not need or acquire matrículas.

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[24] According to Granados (2005), from 1982 to 1995, Mexico was affected by several economic crises which damaged Sinaloa to a greater extent.

To have a better sense of the intensity of Sinaloan migration compared to Mexican migrants from other states, the *Consejo Nacional de Población (National Population Council)* created a measure called Migratory Intensity index (MII). This measure integrates four variables: Households receiving remittances; households with migrants in the U.S.; households with circular migrants; and households with returned migrants. In this sense, the MII index for Sinaloa position the state in the 23rd place at the national level with a medium level of Migratory Intensity (CONAPO 2012).

Due to the historical connection with California, the vast majority of Sinaloans decide to emigrate to the Golden State (52 %), and a lower proportion to Arizona (28 %). However, similar to migrants from other Mexican states, they are increasingly moving or arriving to other states like Illinois, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Nevada, Idaho or North Carolina[25] (Lizárraga et al. 2010). In a similar vein, Serrano (2016) noted that Sinaloans are concentrated mainly in California and Arizona, however, he found that the first state accounts for almost 70 % of Sinaloans, while Arizona, Nevada, Texas and Utah have less than 7 % of Sinaloans each[26].

Sinaloans concentrate in specific localities due to their social networks, as most Mexicans immigrants do. Per Ibarra (2004), their main destination within California is the city of Los Angeles, representing 21 % of Sinaloans living in the U.S. Other preferred destinations are San Francisco, Stockton (Lizárraga et al. 2010), Victor Valley (García 2005 quoted by Montoya 2008) or Pasadena (Pintor 2014).

However, due to the current hostile context for Latina/o migrants, Sinaloans are disproportionally affected by anti-immigrant policies implemented by the current administration. Sinaloans deported

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[25] This phenomenon is not particular to Sinaloans since the destinations of Mexicans in general have diversified in the last decade (Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2005, Massey 2008).

[26] Is important to note that Serrano (2016) only considers migrants that are actually registered in the consulates, thus, greatly reducing representativeness.

by U.S. immigration authorities represent 4.6% of the entire number of Mexican migrants deported in 2017 (Serrano and Jaramillo 2018). This tell us that Sinaloans are a highly vulnerable population compared to other Mexicans in the U.S.

The places of origin of Sinaloan migrants who left their home communities to settle in L.A. are the municipalities of Culiacán, Mazatlán, Mocorito, Guasave and Ahome (Ibarra et al., 2004). Considering not only Los Angeles but the U.S. in general, Serrano (2017) found that, within Sinaloa, these municipalities are the same ones that have more migrants abroad with the majority emigrating from Culiacán (30.6%), Guasave (11%), Ahome (10%), Mazatlán (10%) and Mocorito (5%). However, if we use the 2010 Absolute Migration Intensity Index (IAIM), the four municipalities that have the highest levels of MII are Elota 3.50 (medium), Choix 3.39 (medium), Mocorito (3.33), and San Ignacio (medium) (Serrano 2017). On the other side, the three municipalities with lowest levels in the same year but according to CONAPO (2012) are Angostura (very low), Mazatlán (very low) and Concordia (low).

Family Remittances

Sinaloans send family remittances that are very important to the households that receive them. In 2018, they sent $797 million USD, the highest amount received to date (BANXICO 2018). In 2016, for instance, the state received $620 million USD, which represented 2.3% of the total share at the national level, placing Sinaloa in the 17th place. In that year, Sinaloans sent the largest amount of remittances in the history of the entity, yet these resources are still increasing. In terms of the percentage of households receiving family remittances, in 2016 Sinaloa was ranked 13th nationally since 4.8% of Sinaloan households received remittances. For these households, remittances represented 17.7% of their income (Serrano and Jaramillo 2018). There is no doubt

that *migradolares* are an important source of income for the families that receive them, and they have multiplier effects for the economy in general.

At the municipal level, Culiacán (39%), Guasave (13%), Ahome (12%), and Mazatlán (11.5%) are the municipalities that received the largest amount of family remittances in 2016, with 462.6 million USD, which represents 75 % of the state total (see Graph 3). However, if we consider the proportion of households receiving remittances, Cosalá, Mocorito and Elota are the municipalities that were most dependent on remittances in 2010 with 9.20%, 8.49% and 8.17% respectively.

Graph 2. Sinaloa: Family remittances, 2003-2018 (USD, millions)

Source: Own elaboration based on data from BANXICO 2019.

Graph 3. Sinaloa: Remittances per Municipality, 2017

Source: Own elaboration with data from BBVA/CONAPO (2019).

4.1. THE ORGANIZATIONAL SPHERE: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF MEXICAN AND SINALOAN HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS

Immigrants from different countries have formed organizations across the world and for a variety of reasons. The diversity in their forms of organizing have also varied depending on factors such as country of origin, historical period, ethnicity, race, political objectives, among others. For instance, countries in the Global North have their own immigrant organizations as is the case of France, or Spain where immigrants from Mali, Senegal and Ecuador have formed their owns HTAs to aid their communities of origin (Daum 1995; Lavigne-Delville 2000 quoted by Beauchemin and Schoumaker 2009; Lacomba 2016).

Countries in the Global South also have their own migrant associations as Beauchemin and Schoumaker (2009) called them. These author's research shows how immigrants and domestic

migrants living in West African countries like Burkina Faso or Ivory Coast contribute to the development of their communities of origin. In the case of Latin Americans, it. Is also natural form them to create organizations and they have done so all over the world. For instance, Lacomba (2016) showed how Ecuadorian immigrants created transnational organizations in Madrid, Spain and in New York City, to engage in political matters in both their home and destination countries.

In the U.S., immigrants from a wide range of countries have formed different types of organizations such as religious congregations, soccer clubs, migrant clubs and federated Hometown Associations (HTA's), unions, among others (Fox and Bada 2008). These organizations vary with respect to their historical roots, type of actions, objectives and organizational level. In the case of HTAs, which is one of my units of analysis, they have become the most common type of organization among Mexicans, Salvadorians and Guatemalans since the late 1990s (Escala et al. 2011, Rivera-Salgado et al. 2005).

Currently, Mexican HTAs represent the largest and most extensive organizational form among first-generation Mexican immigrants in the U.S. (Zabin and Escala 2002; IME 2017). At the subnational level, immigrants from Guanajuato, Jalisco, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Zacatecas –states from the historic migrant-sending region per Durand and Massey (2003) regionalization– have the largest number of HTAs. If we focus on Sinaloan immigrants, they also have created HTAs, varying in amount and organizational levels. Hence, if we want to be able to understand why they have formed different type of organizations, what is their current state, their interactions and transnational dynamics vis-à-vis their home states and governments, we need to delve into the historical roots of Mexican HTA's in L.A. For that matter, in the following subsection I provide a non-traditional account of the origins of HTA's in the city of Angels.

THE ORIGINS OF IMMIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS IN LOS ANGELES: A NON-TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT

It is true that contemporary HTAs are different from their predecessors in different ways, they have evolved and adapted depending on different factors attributable to the context of origin and destination in which they were created. However, regular understandings of Mexican HTAs depict them as completely new forms of transnational engagements (Iskander 2016).

Some trace their historical roots to the 1960's in South California where they incipiently began to organize to support sick, injured or deceased migrants (García 2007 and 2009; Goldring 2004). Vega (2004) traced its origins to the 1970's when they begin to organize soccer clubs which later on evolved into philanthropic organizations such as the HTAs that are more common nowadays. Others like Moctezuma (2005), trace their origin to the 1920s, however, those organizations where naturally distinct to current HTAs. For this author, such discrepancies tell us that immigrant organizations are older and more diverse than is normally accepted or believed.

Indeed, we can trace back their origins to the 19th and 20th Century, where Mexican and Chinese[27] immigrants formed organizations known as *mutualistas*, *hui guan* or *tongxiang hui* (mutual aid societies). Excluded from the possibility of entering into U.S. unions, Mexican immigrants found organizing alternatives to protect themselves (Gómez-Quiñones 1994 in Cano and Delano 2007). Continued social exchanges at public spaces such as the Plaza fostered their creation. Mutualistas

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[27] During the late 19th century, more than 75,000 Chinese immigrants lived in the US, of which the majority resided in California. Indeed, Native Indians were being replaced by the Chinese. As a result of an economic crisis known as the "Panic of 1873" and the increase of Chinese immigrants, Anglos implemented different laws in order to restrain their mobility and to exclude them from the nation. A preeminent Chinese HTA was the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), mostly known as the Six Companies. In Los Angeles, the CCBA was established in 1889, after the creation of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, and it was comprised of 27 smaller organizations. As a response to the exclusion Act, they enacted a massive disobedience campaign, which is considered to be the first movement for immigrant rights in the U.S. history (Lytle 2017; Zhou and Lee 2016; Faragher 2016).

served as a form of protection since the arrival environment was adverse for them, they helped to some extent to achieve better socioeconomic conditions, to strengthen cultural ties, and to serve their communities of origin (Gonzalez 1990 in Iskander 2016; Lytle 2017; Faragher 2016; Patiño 2017; Zhou and Lee 2016; Sánchez 1993; Cano and Délano 2007).

Mexicans experimented violence as a product of exclusionary laws[28] and forming *mutualistas* can be conceived as an act of resistance since they were excluded from unions. A sense of solidarity had to be constructed to challenge Anglo discrimination and violence, and this organizations challenged the system in different ways. Mexican mutual-aids organizations embraced Mexican history and used it to provide them with identity. Nationalistic as they were (as many current Mexican HTAs are), some *mutualistas* constrained their membership to Mexican born individuals; yet others were open to include Mexican Americans or non-Mexicans[29] (Cano and Delano 2007; Patiño 2017; Sánchez 1993). Similar to the activities that some current HTAs still perform, *mutualistas* helped families to return the remains of their deaths to their home communities[30] and provided health and legal support, as well as recreational services (Cano and Delano 2007). This is why "undesirable" immigrants have had a long organizing history in Los Angeles and it may also help to explain why Los Angeles is the leading city in the fight for spatial and social justice

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[28] U.S. settler colonial practices resulted in exploitation, marginalization and, in some cases, extermination of native, indigenous, blacks, immigrants and any other undesirable group since the very foundations of the country. This is particularly true to Los Angeles, since there exist a documented history in which westward expansion of U.S. Anglo settlers during the second half of the 19th century, driven by the Manifest Destiny ideology, performed criminal and punishment acts among other methods such as incarceration, the implementation of a property regime or biological/cultural assimilation, towards natives (Tongva-Gabrielinos), indigenous, Mexican mestizos, blacks, Asians and people of color in general, with the main purpose of seizing their lands and allocating resources to the benefit of the "white Anglo settler" (Nakano 2015; Lytle 2017; Faragher 2016).

[29] Organizations such as the *Congreso de Pueblos que Hablan Español* was one of the first organizations that addressed problems of both communities, along with the struggles of other groups such as Filipinos or the Japanese (Patiño 2017; Sánchez 1993).

[30] For a full ethnographic account of these acts, see "Specters of Belonging", in which Félix (2019: 140) use the concept of "transnational afterlife" to "understand Mexican migrant's cultural politics of mourning and the making of a posthumous transnational tradition.

(Soja 2014). Therefore, *mutualistas* are the original predecessors of the transnational Hometown Associations which are known in Mexico as *Clubes de migrantes* or *Clubes de oriundos* (Gutiérrez 1999 in Cano and Delano 2007).

Another type of transnational organization created by Mexicans in the U.S. were called the *Juntas* or *Sociedades Patrióticas*, also known as Juárez Clubs. These clubs were created with political and revolutionary purposes, however they also dedicated time to organize cultural and recreational activities such as beauty contests and Mexican festivities. Because they were eminently political organizations, the *Sociedades Patrióticas* had close ties with the Mexican state (Cano and Delano 2007).

During the 1920s and 1930s, *legal violence*[31] on the part of the U.S. enhanced the prominence of Mexican immigrant organizations such as labor unions and *mutualistas,* but other organizations also emerged. The *Clubes Liberales*, *Juntas Constitucionales*, the *Comisiones Honoríficas* (Honorary Committes) and the *Brigadas de la Cruz Azul* (Blue Cross Brigades) were created to address injustices and inequalities and to promote Mexican culture or *Mexicanidad* for strengthening their ties with their communities of origin in collaboration with Mexican consulates (Cardoso 1982; Corwin 1978; González 1999 in Cano and Delano 2007; Patiño 2017; Ngai 2005). Patiño (2017) calls such acts of resistance as *encuentros*, which where practiced by the Mexican community and Mexican authorities to device collective solutions to the exclusionary policies and practices on the part of the U.S.

In Los Angeles, ethnic diversity and class divisions were part of the city environment. Since many participated in the Mexican Revolution (Estrada 2008), they used their political skills within the

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[31] Menjívar and Abrego (2012) understand *legal violence* as the kind of violence that results from and is made possible through implementation of law.

organizations that were already in the city. The Plaza de Los Angeles was the central space for gatherings and meetings of Mexican immigrants and their associations. Organizations created in L.A. such as the *Confederación de Sociedades Mexicanas* (CSM) and the *Confederación de Uniones Obreras Mexicanas* (CUOM), advocated for worker rights in collaboration with the Mexican consulate and the Mexican based *Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana* (Patiño 2017; Gutiérrez 1999 in Cano and Delano 2007).

Hometown Associations similar to some that are still functioning nowadays emerged in the 1960s. As it was argued before, they enacted similar forms of support towards their communities of origin and contributed along with local authorities from their communities of origin in order to improve them. However, Gómez-Quiñones (1983 in Cano and Delano 2007) describe this period as one in which the collaboration between the Mexican state and organized Mexicans in the U.S. was weak.

Currently, HTAs are the largest and most extensive organizational form among first generation Mexican immigrants in the U.S. (IME 2017; Zabin and Escala 2002) and they are found in global cities such as Los Angeles or New York, and in smaller cities such as Salem or Woodburn in Oregon (Stephen 2007). Within the Los Angeles region we can find the largest number of HTAs throughout the U.S.

Moctezuma (2013) argues that all Mexican states have an HTA in the U.S., although not all are formally registered, and they differ in terms of their level of organization and scope. The reasons for such asymmetries are still unclear and there is no consensus among transnational scholars. What makes even more difficult to understand such variations is the lack of sources providing systematic data on HTAs because of the reasons mentioned above. Nonetheless, the IME has the largest existing database which registers different types of Mexican immigrant organizations across the world. This database shows that immigrants from the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco,

Guerrero, Oaxaca and Zacatecas have formed the largest number of HTAs. These states have developed mature migratory circuits that in turn have resulted in the creation of large migrant communities which are the base for the creation of HTAs. A strong migrant entrepreneurship is also an expression of strong immigrant communities (Moctezuma 2015)

At the organizational level, among the HTA's that are more transnationally active and complex we find the *Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California* (FCZSC), The *Federación Internacional de Zacatecanos en Los Angeles,* the *Federación de Clubes Unidos Zacatecanos en Illinois* (FCUZ) the *Federación de Clubes Michoacanos en Illinois* (FCMI), the *Clubes Unidos Guerrerenses del Medio Oeste* (CUGMO), the *Federación de Clubes de Guerrerenses radicados en Chicago* (FCGC), the *Federación de Clubes Jaliscienses en el Sur de California* (FCJSC) and the *Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales* (FIOB).

Of the above, the oldest and the most developed for a long time was the Zacatecan FCZSC, which served as an example for migrant organizations due to their numbers, higher organizational development, political power, transnational engagement in the projects developed, and a "strategic transnational leadership" (Moctezuma 2013 and 2015: 50). Moctezuma (2003 quoted by Pintor 2014) argues that is mainly because Zacatecans used to have the largest number of HTAs in the U.S., the most advanced organizational development, and due to the synergy created by governmental programs like the *Programa Tres por Uno para Migrantes* (Three for One Program for Migrants) that emerged as a result of the initiative of Zacatecan organized immigrants[32].

Up to this point, it is worth to define collective remittances and to distinguish their types. Moctezuma and Pérez (2006: 125) define them as ⊡a savings fund that HTA´s use to the creation

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[32] In the last chapter, I analyze the 3 x 1 Program at the national, state and municipal level and its specific implications regarding transnational engagement of Sinaloans and the Mexican state.

of projects that benefit the community, and a resource that obliges negotiation with different levels of government, allowing the realization of projects that remain historically underdeveloped[33]. The authors differentiate collective remittances between formal and informal ones. The former ones are those where the state and HTAs participate conjointly regardless which level of government is engaged. The latter ones are those were HTAs participate without direct government interference. Because the focus of my study is to understand state-diaspora relations, I focus on formal collective remittances, although it is very important to acknowledge that an uncountable amount of informal collective remittances is sent by HTAs in Sinaloa and Mexico. We still don't have an estimate of these resources.

SINALOANS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES

One of the first Sinaloans HTAs, if not the first, is the Club San José which is based in Los Angeles, California, and was created in 1979 by a group of immigrants from the locality of Agua Verde, a small rural coastal town with a little more than five thousand inhabitants and belonging to the municipality of Rosario, Sinaloa. In this case, it was the initiative of the parish of the town, and not the migrants, who asked for funds to build a church, which is why the HTA bears the name of the patron saint of the locality (Pintor 2014).

This was one among many philanthropic actions undertaken by the *Club San José* in support of their community. Through donations and collective remittances, they engaged in several transnational actions and contributed to community development with the participation of the local

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[33] Personal translation: Las remesas colectivas constituyen dos cosas: un fondo de ahorro que las asociaciones de migrantes destinan a la realización de proyectos de beneficio comunitario, y un recurso que obliga a la negociación con los distintos niveles de gobierno, permitiendo la realización de obras comunitarias que permanecen como rezago histórico.

inhabitants and, in some cases, collaborating with the government. Javier Benítez, one of the founding leaders of this HTA, developed links with a U.S. based NGO called *All Saints*, which is part of the Baptist Churches. This coalition made it possible to carry out several philanthropic actions in Agua Verde. Due to their success and good experiences, the *Club San José* obtained recognition and prestige, and according to Renato Pintor, it laid the foundations for the creation of the only federation of Sinaloan clubs that have ever existed, the *Fraternidad Sinaloense de California*[34] (Ibid). Nonetheless, the successful transnational process that began in Agua Verde is now eroded. This community does not receive collective remittances from the San José Club anymore, and almost all the projects are abandoned. (Personal conversations with members of the community of Agua Verde (Pintor 2014). What happened in Agua Verde reflects also the erosion of the transnational process at the state level[35].

Another experience where organized Sinaloan migrants, the local community, and municipal, state and federal authorities worked together, happened in El Rosario, the main city in the municipality that bears the same name, and in Los Angeles. It all started in 1983, when Luis Villegas Murguía[36], a prominent citizen of El Rosario, along with "Conchita" Aragón de Cobb who was living in L.A., worked together to raise funds in Los Angeles with the aim of building a recreational park in El Rosario. Villegas recalls that the municipal president or major of the town did not have enough funds to finish the park, and he thought (Mr. Villegas) that through the creation of an HTA in L.A., they could collect enough money to finish it. Conchita did the difficult task of contacting and organizing a big event on the day of the Virgen del Rosario, which is the Patron Saint of the town

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[34] The transnational dynamics of the FSC will be explored in depth in a subsequent section.

[35] I will explain the reasons of this decline in the last chapter

[36] Luis Villegas Murguía, interview by Fernando Villegas, October 2013, personal records.

and an important day for migrants. It was a complete success. Between 200 and 300 migrants attended, and they were not only able to collect the necessary funds for finishing the park, but they also created the club El Rosario, in which Conchita served as the first president and Luis Villegas was declared first honorary life president.

With the creation of the club many other donations came, being a nursing home the main project in which migrants collaborated along with subsequent municipal governments. Even the federal government collaborated with funds for the nursing home. Mr. Villegas mentioned how the former Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari congratulated them and authorized federal funds for the project[37]. Currently, the organization still exists but it is not active since their members have aged and their children are not interested in sending collective remittances per Villegas account. He also mentioned that experiences of corruption on the part of the municipal authorities made them distrust and decided to stop collaboration with municipal officials. This experience could be one of the first transnational actions in Sinaloa in which organized migrants, the state at different levels, and the local community collaborated.

An important episode in the history of Sinaloan HTAs that has not been written until now is still living in Villegas memories. After being major of El Rosario, he remembers being contacted by his friend, Jose Angel Pescador, who was at that time Consul General in Los Angeles. Pescador knew about Villegas`s work with Sinaloan HTAs and was interested in fostering these linkages in order to create more HTAs and unify existing ones. In fact, as a result of Pescador's initiative, and Villegas's and "Conchita's" organizing skills and contacts with migrants in L.A., they helped to

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[37] For understanding the underlying political motivation of Salinas de Gortari see Chapter 3.

create the first Sinaloan federation of clubs that coalesced HTAs from different municipalities and villages from the state: La *Fraternidad Sinaloense de California.*

LA FRATERNIDAD SINALOENSE DE CALIFORNIA

I was invited by José Ángel Barajas, current President of the FSC, to have lunch in his preferred *restaurante* in Montebello, California. While having lunch, we started to talk about different topics. Barajas was born in Mazatlán, Sinaloa and came to the U.S. when he was a teenager. He has been part of the FSC for more than 17 years. In 2000 he was the 2nd Vice-President of the FSC, when Octavio Barrón was the President. He mentioned his perception on the number of Sinaloans in California, which according to him amount to more than 700,000. We also talked about the subject of which most Sinaloans speak, *el Narcotráfico* and how it has affected the FSC. He mentioned that an internationally recognized drug trafficker, who was close to "El Chapo" Guzmán, was president of the FSC for a time. By that time, he recalls, many left the *fraternidad*. Now, the FSC has been recovering and it has a membership of approximately 8000 individuals.

Almost nothing has been researched about the FSC within academia, and there are limited data from other sources as well. We know that it was created in 1991 and it is based in Los Angeles. It was founded by Sinaloans Jose Ángel Pescador Osuna and Humberto Gálvez. The former was Consul General of Mexico in Los Angeles by the time the FSC was founded, and Secretary of Public Education at the federal level in Mexico. Gálvez is founder of *Pollo Loco Restaurante*, a well-known fast food chain that began in Sinaloa, México and now has several branches in Los Angeles. In an interview with Mario Cárdenas, member of the FSC board, Director of Plaza México in Los Angeles, and former president of the *Consejo de Federaciones Mexicanas en*

Norteamérica (COFEM, Council of Mexican Federations in North America)[38], he mentioned how important Pescador Osuna was for promoting the formation of HTAs, not only for Sinaloans but for Mexicans in general. He recalled that the FSC was the most important HTA among all HTAs by that time, due to Pescador's influence in conjunction with the work of other leaders such as his brother, who was the former president of the Sinaloan Club Bamoa, from the municipality of Guasave, Sinaloa.

MARIO. Sinaloa had a very great boom when my brother was [a member] (…) and [because] Pescador Osuna (…) was one of the promoters of these type of organizations. He [Pescador] was one of the greatest drivers [of the organization] and not only the one from Sinaloa but also for the rest [of the organizations from other states].[39]

The information regarding the importance of the FSC due to Pescador's work was corroborated in different interviews with leaders in both Sinaloa and Los Angeles. For instance, in my interview with José Angel Barajas, current President of the FSC, he recognizes the role of the *Mazatlecan*[40] as one of the founders of the *Fraternidad*. Villegas Murguía also mentioned how Pescador was organizing migrants in L.A. during his time as Consul General and how different Sinaloan state governors and internationally recognized artists from Sinaloa such as Lola Beltrán, regularly attended the events organized by the FSC. Among the state governors that attended to the events organized by the FSC were Antonio Toledo Corro, Francisco Labastida, Renato Vega, Juan S. Millán, and more recently, Mario López Valdéz. Another source that corroborates how the FSC had a prominent role among Mexican HTAs in the U.S., is a message written by José Luis Bernal,

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[38] COFEM is a non-profit organization that groups the largest number of second-level HTAs and organizations from different countries.

[39] Own translation from Spanish to English. Parenthesis indicate deliberate omission of information provided by the interviewed person, and which I considered non-relevant to the topic and/or confusing.

[40] Mario Cárdenas and José Ángel Barajas (FSC current main leaders), interview by Fernando Villegas, May 2017, personal records.

former Consul General of Mexico in 2000. In a letter addressed to the FSC, he stated: "The Fraternidad Sinaloense has always distinguished itself for being one of the Mexican home town associations with greater vigor and unity" (FSC Magazine 2000, 7)[41].

José Angel Pescador Osuna is certainly, one of the most influential figures for understanding not only the emergence of the FSC but also to elucidate how the broader federal agenda was implemented simultaneously in both Sinaloa and Los Angeles and how impacted locally and transnationally. As major of Mazatlán (1987-1989), General Consul of Los Angeles in two periods during the 1990s and having worked in different positions during Salinas de Gortari's administration, he provided crucial information to my study. According to Pescador's account, forming the FSC was "completely" his idea, "even the name" since he was part of a social group which included the word *Fraternidad* in its name. He recalls how the successful experience of Zacatecan's HTAs served as a model and thought it was possible to draw on that experience to create Mexican HTAs all over the country, especially in L.A. He was committed to create the first Sinaloan federation following the example of the *Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California* (FCZSC), and convened to a first meeting at his home in L.A. at the beginning of 1990:

> The first meeting was at my home. I invited between 30 and 40 persons and everyone attended. We were in the courtyard, and I raised the idea of organizing again, as Sinaloans did in the past, through specific organizations (…)[42]

The meeting was successful and two weeks later Pescador convened a second formal meeting at the consulate. Sinaloan leaders and entrepreneurs attended, and some of them served as presidents of the FSC. The first president was Humberto Gálvez, a successful Sinaloan entrepreneur, the

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[41] Personal translation: "La Fraternidad Sinaloense siempre se ha distinguido por ser una de las organizaciones de oriundos mexicanos con mayor vigor y unidad."

[42] Jose Ángel Pescador, unpublished data, August 9th, 2018.

second was Javier Benítez, and the third Octavio Barrón. Pescador mentioned that after Barron's term, the FSC started to decline, although it was very successful at the beginning as other of my interviewees have highlighted. They also created between eight and eleven HTAs from different Sinaloan municipalities for the purpose of having organized migrants to receive Mexican state governors and officials instead of U.S. entrepreneurs and government officials.

Per Pescador's account, Sinaloan state and municipal officials, and Sinaloan migrants were very active at that time, more than state officials and migrants from most Mexican states, and he explains the effervescence due to different factors of which he highlights the following: His role as General Consul due to his regional identity as Sinaloan, which probed beneficial in strengthening Sinaloan migrant-led organizations and supporting the Sinaloa diaspora through consular services; the role of Sinaloan governors, especially Francisco Labastida's (1987-1992) support to the diaspora and leadership to bring municipal presidents together (all from the PRI party). Labastida was especially supportive compared to other governors. He provided resources for organizing events and invited recognized characters of different political, economic and artistic circles from both Mexico and the U.S., although there was no support for business projects. At the meso and organizational level, the competition between municipal governments and HTAs to bring funds to their respective communities; and at the macro level, the federal electoral competition due to *Cardenismo* since consulates where strengthened "to balance [political] forces"[43].

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[43] On this latter factor see chapter 3 and Bada (2014: 88) for an account of the first experiences of using federal funds and linking states with migrants in order to build community projects through the federal program PRONASOL's International Solidarity funds. According to Bada, this was the first time that SEDESOL worked along state governments and migrants to finance codevelopment projects.

Image 2. FSC leaders and Luis Donaldo Colosio, Former Mexican Secretariat of Social Development

Source: *Mexicanidad* magazine (1993)[44].

The decline of the FSC, and Sinaloan HTAs, will come after Pescador ended his second term as Consul General. He provided some explanations that explains the "dismemberment" of the organization which are worth noting. First, the lack of interest of state governors in continuing the relationship with the diaspora with the exception of Governor Francisco Labastida. Second, the poor work with the communities of subsequent Consuls. "Political consuls" were replaced with professional consuls, leaving the communities behind; with the exception of Carlos González who has published books an article focused on state-diaspora relations. Third, a weak leadership within the FSC who have not achieved the economic and political contacts needed for strengthening the organization. Pescador argues that "the FSC does not exist right now. I acknowledge that they have kept the name (…) but it gained a very bad reputation. At least they provided a decent perception of Sinaloans".

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[44] One year after this picture, Luis D. Colosio was assassinated when he was running for the Presidency of Mexico as a candidate for the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) (Loaeza and Prud'homme 2010).

Currently, the *Fraternidad* has a 501c3 non-profit status, which was acquired in 1994 (Barajas 2017; FSC Magazine 2016) and has no political affiliation. As their main objective, the FSC thrives to be a "important catalyst" to improve the living standards of their places of origin. For example, the FSC HTAs have supported their communities in Sinaloa through various works such as the construction of libraries, churches, nursing homes, donation of ambulances, school buses, scholarships, medical equipment, help in emergency situations such as natural disasters, equipment for the disabled, the construction of electrification and water plants, roads, among many others. At the same time, this HTA has functioned as an organizational support for Sinaloan clubs, representing immigrants vis-à-vis U.S. and Mexican governments, thereby going beyond the local community and expanding their sphere of influence (Lizárraga et al 2010; Pintor 2014; FSC website). As Moctezuma (2011a) points out, these types of HTAs represent a higher form of organization compared to first level HTAs, transcending the local realm since their actions are more complex.

Regarding the HTAs that have been part of the FSC, Arturo Lizárraga (2005), a pioneer in migration studies in Sinaloa, noted that the first HTAs emerged from localities of great migratory tradition and with high number of emigrants, that is, all rural. In this sense, I found that the emergence of HTAs that make up the *Fraternidad* ranged from the late 1970s to the end of 2000. In 2000, the FSC was comprised of 14 HTAs, which represented 10 municipalities (FSC Magazine 2000). By 2016, the FSC grouped 19 HTAs, representing 11 municipalities (see table 1). As mentioned before, a significant number of HTAs are not formally registered. This is partially evidenced by comparing the HTAs registered in the IME database with HTAs that are part of the FSC: only 4 HTAs that currently pertain to the FSC were formally registered in 2014 (IME 2014). As such, it is important to take into account HTAs that are not part of the FSC.

Table 1. Hometown Associations that are part of the *Fraternidad Sinaloense de California*

HTA	Location in the US.	Municipality in Mexico
Club Escuinapa	Montebello, Ca.	Escuinapa
Club Angostura	Paramount, Ca.	Angostura
Club Mazatlán	Los Angeles, Ca	Mazatlán
Club El Rosario	Los Angeles, Ca.	El Rosario
Club Culiacán	Fontana, Ca.	Culiacán
Amigos Del Roble	La Puente, Ca.	Mazatlán
Club La Cruz de Elota	El Monte, Ca.	Elota
Club Costa Rica	Alhambra, Ca.	Culiacán
Club Guasave	Santa Ana, Ca.	Guasave
Club Agua Verde	Pasadena, Ca.	El Rosario
Club Rosa Morada	Lynwood, Ca.	Mocorito
Club Sinaloa de Leyva	Los Angeles, Ca.	Sinaloa (municipality)
Club Cosalá	Los Angeles, Ca.	Cosalá
Club Verdura	South Gate, Ca.	(No data)
Club Mocorito	Buena Park, Ca.	Mocorito
Club Amole	Los Angeles, Ca.	Guasave
Club Unidos por La Trinidad	West Covina, Ca.	(No data)
Club Bamoa	Lynwood, Ca.	Guasave
Club Guamuchil	Lynwood, Ca.	Salvador Alvarado

Source: Own elaboration based on data from FSC Magazine.

The FSC non-profit status (501c3) means that they do not have any political affiliation. According to Portes et al (2008), this could inhibit them to directly participate in U.S. politics, for instance, in electoral campaigns; as opposed to informal organizations. However, despite this legal obstacle, some of its members are actively participating in U.S. politics and they are supporting pro-immigrant candidates from the Democrat party. Others have been members of the Republican party, although one of them mentioned that the hostile political context, especially anti-immigrant rhetoric has distanced from the party.

Portes et al. (2008) found that 65 % of Mexican, Colombian and Dominican organizations engaged in political activism such as supporting candidates, organizing debates between candidates, disseminating political propaganda among its members and/or the immigrant community in

general, among others. In addition to being active in the U.S, the FSC participate in binational programs such as the 3 X 1 Program, and they have worked with state and municipal governments in the past, and more recently they are doing so mainly with municipal governments.

## THE *PROGRAMA TRES POR UNO PARA MIGRANTES* IN SINALOA

Organized Sinaloans in the U.S. have been sending collective remittances to their hometowns since the late 1970s. Most of these philanthropic engagements were carried out without governmental participation; even though there are also successful experiences where governments and HTAs have collaborated and developed projects.

Since the implementation of the 3 X 1 Program at the federal level, projects in collaboration with the Sinaloan government have multiplied. All municipalities in Sinaloa, except Cosalá, have carried out at least one project taking advantage of the Program. In total, considering the participation of all Sinaloan HTAs, 201 projects have been carried out with a value that exceeds $6,368,000, of which almost 30% corresponds to contributions made by Sinaloan HTAs.

This last figure shows that Sinaloan HTAs are providing more resources than their counterparts which contradicts the Rules of Operation (ROP 2018) of the program that establishes an equal share for each agent, a criterion that it is not fulfilled in many cases.

Sinaloa's performance in the development of the Program is low since it does not correspond to its proportion of migrants in the U.S., or with the amount of family remittances that Sinaloa receives. For example, in 2012, Sinaloan HTAs that participated in the 3 X 1 Program correspond to 0.87 % of the national total and the percentage of the projects carried out by Sinaloan HTAs accounted for 0.64% at the national level (See "economic factors" in the following chapter for more on the 3 x 1 Program).

Graph 4. Sinaloa: Contributions to the 3 X 1 Program by agent, 2002-2013

Source: Own elaboration based on data from UMR-SEDESOL 2013
*Contributions: Blue: Federal government, Purple: HTAs, green: Municipalities, Red: state government
*Figures are in pesos

5. FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN THE RELATION BETWEEN SINALOAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE SINALOAN DIASPORA

The institutional capacity of Sinaloa's diaspora policies is among the lowest in Mexico (See Graph 4). In this chapter, I focus on the political, organizational, and economic factors that explain the absence of diaspora policies in Sinaloa, a state where, despite the significance of Sinaloan migrants' contributions to the state's economy and the well-being of thousands of families, and notwithstanding the vulnerability of an important proportion of Sinaloans living in the U.S., there are no policies created to address the demands and needs of the Sinaloan diaspora, and there is also no interest from the state government and some municipalities in developing a relationship with them.

Graph 5. Mexico: Institutional Capacity of Migrants offices by state, 2010

Source: Ortega 2013: 120

In most cases, and according to the existent literature on diaspora policies, the important influx of remittances and the significant number of Sinaloan migrants would lead to the existence of a more significant relation between the diaspora and their home government authorities, which in turn would also lead to the existence of, at least, some diaspora policies; however, as I have argued, this is not the case for Sinaloa.

To unveil the reasons of the lack of cooperation between the Sinaloan state authorities and the diaspora, it was important to understand the origins of Sinaloan migration to California, the causes and evolution of the migratory process, the places of origin and destination, the general profile of the Sinaloan migrant, their organizational practices, and the impact of their family and collective remittances to the communities of origin. I have already done this analysis in the previous chapters. Now, I am able to draw connections between my initial exploratory research to find explanations that elucidates the current state of Sinaloan state-diaspora transnational relations.

I propose to use a multifactorial analysis grouped into three spheres: political, organizational, and economic. The importance of these three realms also varies depending the level of analysis. This

multifactorial and multilevel approach is helpful to better visualize and explain the factors that are behind the "Sinaloan paradox".

POLITICAL FACTORS

Democracy has been used as one of the variables that helps to explain the efforts of states to approach the diaspora. At the national level, I highlighted how domestic political factors such as the electoral competition in Mexico during the 1988 elections pushed Carlos Salinas de Gortari to court the diaspora and the Chicana/o community. Indeed, the instrumental hypothesis partially explains the approach of the Mexican state and subsequent policies implemented at the national level; although the state also responded to protect the human rights of Mexicans. At the subnational level, things become more complicated. Ortega (2012) explains that when local governments represent a different party to the main ruling party, their outreach actions to the diaspora could be part of a democratization process in which local governments represent excluded sectors of the population. This can contribute to greater plurality and democratization at the local level.

In the case of Sinaloa, outreach for what could be seemingly political purposes on the part of local governments happened more markedly during the Salinismo period when Francisco Labastida, from the same party, was state governor. One of the purposes of many HTAs created during his term was to court state governors and Mexican officials, per Pescador's account. After Labastida's term, others state governors have visited and reunited with members of Sinaloan HTAs, however, they have not done it to obtain political benefits or as a response to political threats in Sinaloa since they do not need them economically or politically, nor are they sensitive to the needs of vulnerable Sinaloan migrants. According to Mario Cardenas, politicians have visited them to ask for favors. Mario recalled how during Renato Vega's term as state governor (1993-1998), a representative of his administration was sent to arrange a visit to the Dodger's stadium since the governor wanted

to pitch there and, apparently, they needed some sort of support from Sinaloan HTAs. In general, the treatment towards migrants has been arrogant.

In my interviews with leaders such as José Ángel Barajas, Mario Cárdenas, and former Consul Pescador, all agreed that this lack of collaboration between the FSC (and Sinaloan HTAs in general) and Sinaloan state governments is longstanding. Another episode showing the rupture between members of the FSC and state officials from different administrations, was mentioned by Mr. Barajas and Mario Cárdenas. Because of conflicts they had with Mario López Valdez, governor of Sinaloa during the period 2010-2016, they decided to work autonomously. This version was corroborated in my interview with Mario Cárdenas:

> MARIO. When Malova [Governor's nickname] came, we organized a breakfast and everything and I was one of those who asked him, because first he said that he was the most inclusive governor, (…) then I told him, I have just two questions for you, if you are the most inclusive, why aren't we included in your [state] development project? [inaudible] Because the word "migrant" does not appear. If we are almost a million [migrants in the US], we represent the fifth part of Sinaloa's population (…) you cannot consider yourself the most inclusive if we are not included [in the governor's project][45].

The governor's reaction to Cardena's questions was one of exasperation. These types of conflicts show how state-diaspora relations can be conflicting and does not occur automatically. The decision of the FSC to move away from "MALOVA's" administration could well have been of paramount importance for its development and even its survival, since as Moctezuma (2013) points out, when the government tries to control or corporatize HTAs, they are substantially damaged, weakening them, and losing their sense of community.

It is possible that this conflict between the FSC and the Governor led the latter to halt collaboration with HTAs through the 3 X 1 Program. When revising the contributions of the Program during the

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[45] Mario Cárdenas, interview by Fernando Villegas, May, 2017, personal records.

Governor's administration (2010-2016), we can clearly observe that the share of the state suffered a drastic decrease, in fact, the state contributions to the Program ceased since 2012 (see Graph 4).

Indeed, this conflict has resulted in a heavier burden for Sinaloan HTAs as they have absorbed the investment that the state government should have contributed. As stated before, this has not been an isolated event as other governors have shown no interest in collaborating with Sinaloan organized migrants in the U.S. In a short conversation between Arturo Santamaría and former Sinaloan Governor Juan S. Millán (1999-2004), he mentioned that the relation with members of the FSC during his term was "not pleasant". Even more recently, the current state Governor Quirino Ordáz, a Mazatlecan who is affiliated to the PRI, rejected Barajas request to meet with the FSC to talk about the creation of the Casa Sinaloa in Los Angeles, something that the FSC has been asking for more than twenty years.

HTA's from other states like Guanajuato or Michoacán have succeeded in negotiating with state governors to gain political, economic or social benefits. One example is the *Casa Michoacán*, one of the most important community centers in Chicago, which was established by the Michoacán government as a response to pressures from Michoacan HTAs. The center provides different services to migrants and the community in general such as birth certificates, information regarding elections, or courses of various kinds. It has also served as an incubator for organizing political protests against anti-immigrant actions (Bada 2014). For Sinaloans, the lack of institutions like Casa Michoacán means having fewer opportunities to integrate in the U.S. and as transnational citizens.

What are the reasons for this estrangement and lack of cooperation among the state government and Sinaloan HTAs within the political sphere? Bada (2014), pointed out that a critical moment in the evolution of state-migrant civil society relations was the "democratic" transition elections that

happened first, in states like Jalisco (1995) or Michoacan (2001), and then at the federal level, when Vicente Fox from the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN, National Action Party) won the national elections in 2000, removing the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party) from the Presidency, a party that had more than 70 years in power. This important episode in Mexican political history improved the relations between some state governments and organized immigrants in the U.S., since some governors understood the influence of migrants in different spheres of the Mexican society and because they needed their electoral and economic support. Even if migrants themselves could not vote, they sent money for the political campaigns of candidates and called their families to influence their vote.

However, democratization processes within Mexico greatly varies and states have followed different directions. According to the Local Democracy Index, the state is ranked in the 16th place nationally with a negative figure. Compared to other states of the region, Sinaloa's democracy performs poorly (Ventura and Ortega 2014). Indeed, I argue that Sinaloa has not experienced a true democratic transition. Almost all state governments have been part of the PRI, with the exception of MALOVA's government. Even though he run for office with the PAN and won in 2010, this was only a façade that enabled him to compete and, subsequently, win the elections. López Valdez has historically been part of the PRI. The rest of Sinaloan governors have not developed diaspora policies directed to Sinaloans and they have only managed federal programs in an incipient manner; with the exception of Labastida, who did it in response to Salinas's instrumental approach to the diaspora. Using Vila's (2007) categorization, the state government of Sinaloa has applied an *incipient* government model in their relations with the diaspora.

It is true that political change happened in Sinaloa in the context of federalization and decentralization of power from the national center to the states. Beginning in 1983, and as a result

of pressure on the part of political parties opposed to the PRI –which has been the ruling party in Sinaloa– social movements, and NGOs, the state experienced a political electoral liberalization at the municipal level. Indeed, some electoral spaces where opened for the PAN and few other political parties such as the Labor Party, although this happened within a context of negotiations between political and entrepreneurial elites, thus, excluding civil society and discouraging social mobilization. Per Verdugo, civil society participation and inclusion "is a pending issue of local democratization" in Sinaloa (Verdugo 2009: 170). Since Sinaloan political elites have not even needed to include local civil society to retain power, it is simply impossible to expect them to seek political revenues abroad. Among Political Scientist focused on Mexican politics, there is no consensus whether this is a democratic setback or simply part of a necessary process towards democratic transition (Marengui and García 2014; Verdugo 2009).

On the Sinaloan migrant side, if local elites and politicians do not ask for their political participation, they often won't participate. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993 quoted by Danielson 2013) have theorized this issue and they noted that being asked to participate politically is key in the participation or non-participation of people in political activities.

We can conclude that Sinaloa's government null interest in approaching the diaspora and the lack of diaspora policies is due, in part, to the prevalence of "anti-democratic" state orientations. Until recently, Sinaloa was ruled by an authoritarian political elite which was reluctant to incorporate Sinaloan civil society, whether it was inside Sinaloa or outside the national territory. The effects and impact of such orientations have transcended borders since Sinaloan immigrants in the United States have to deal with different obstacles without the support of their home state, and the transnational life of Sinaloan HTAs transnational life has been obstructed as a result of the disdain of the home state

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Family remittances and collective remittances sent by Sinaloan migrants have not compelled state governments to recognize their contributions to the state economy, although they are a significant source of income for thousands of Sinaloan families. As I highlighted in Chapter 4, Sinaloan migrants are sending hundreds of millions of dollars per year, and in 2018 they sent a record amount, almost reaching 800 million dollars (see Graph 2). To have a better sense of the importance of remittances to the state's economy, we can contrast them with the State Gross Domestic Product (SGDP). In 2013, family remittances accounted for 2.6% of the SGDP, standing above the national average of 2.1% in that year. In 2017, the remittances-SGDP ratio increased to 3.40%. This increase show how Sinaloa is becoming more dependent on remittances. Moreover, if we make the same comparison but at the municipal level, remittances become more important since seven municipalities received remittances which accounted for more than 10% of their municipal GDP (MGDP) in 2010, and three are above 20%. For instance, in 2010, family remittances received in Cosalá, San Ignacio, and Badiraguato accounted for 26%, 20%, and 19% of the MGDP respectively[46] (see Table 3).

The Remittances/MGDP ratio is relevant to understand why some municipal governments are more interested in reaching their diaspora than others. The municipalities located in the mountains, which all are rural, are more dependent on remittances, which is reflected in the high proportion of this flows compared to their MGDP. All these municipalities have high levels of poverty and marginalization, negative population growth -which indicates depopulation-, high percentage of

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[46] Personal calculations based on a study conducted in 2014, which can be found in Mendoza et al. 2014, and data from BANXICO and BBVA/CONAPO (2018). Municipal remittances data is available for the year 2017, however, the most recent data calculating GDP at the municipal level in Sinaloa comes from 2010. Due to limitations in time and information, I calculated the weight of remittances at the municipal level using comparable data from 2010.

households that have at least one resident living in the U.S. and, consequently, a high proportion of households receiving remittances. Due to these harsh conditions, remittances are used mainly just for consumption. The results of my study on remittances in Sinaloa coincide with other studies such as Valdivia and Lozano (2010) and Montoya (2008), where it seems very difficult for remittances to promote a process of self-sustaining economic growth, at least for the municipalities located in the mountains.

	Table 3. Sinaloa: Family Remittances and Municipal GDP comparison, 2010			
	Municipality	**Family remittances in 2010 (million pesos)**	**GDP, 2010 (millions of pesos at constant prices)**	**Remittances/municipal GDP ratio (%)**
1	**Cosalá**	$ 91	$ 351	26.07
2	**San Ignacio**	$ 92	$ 448	20.52
3	**Badiraguato**	$ 57	$ 301	18.87
4	**Choix**	$ 103	$ 717	14.33
5	**Concordia**	$ 64	$ 550	11.68
6	**Sinaloa**	$ 305	$ 2,633	11.58
7	**Mocorito**	$ 248	$ 2,163	11.47
8	**Rosario**	$ 109	$ 1,897	5.75
9	**Elota**	$ 204	$ 3,587	5.68
10	**Guasave**	$ 813	$ 17,710	4.59
11	**Salvador A.**	$ 262	$ 5,971	4.39
12	**Escuinapa**	$ 117	$ 3,087	3.78
13	**El Fuerte**	$ 123	$ 3,660	3.36
14	**Angostura**	$ 86	$ 2,653	3.25
15	**Navolato**	$ 174	$ 8,740	1.99
16	**Culiacán**	$ 1,734	$ 108,812	1.59
17	**Mazatlán**	$ 719	$ 48,256	1.49
18	**Ahome**	$ 632	$ 44,084	1.43
	SINALOA	**$ 5,939**	**$ 255,621**	**2.32**

Source: Own elaboration with data from Mendoza et al (2014)

Once I have demonstrated the significance of remittances sent by Sinaloan migrants to their home communities, is difficult to understand why there are no diaspora policies created to court or attend the necessities of Sinaloan migrants. According to the instrumental hypothesis, states with significant proportion of migrants and remittances are more prone to court the diaspora in order to use their resources for development purposes in their communities of origin, or to create policies to maintain their linkages to sustain the flow of remittances. However, as I have argued, this is not the case in Sinaloa. Although remittances at the state level represent 3.40% of the STGDP, the state government do not entirely depend on these resources and they are willing to exclude migrants from the polity. This is reflected in the low levels of diaspora policies in the state. Nonetheless, when we compare Sinaloa with states that have high levels of institutional capacity in their approach to the diaspora such as Coahuila or State of Mexico, that have similar Remittances/STGDP ratio, lower levels of MI, and less proportion of migrants with respect to their own population (see Table 4), then, the instrumental hypothesis is less useful as an explanatory framework.

I argue that the economic variables that I have analyzed do not correspond with the level of institutional capacity of diaspora policies in Sinaloa. This is shown in Table 4, where I highlight four states with the lowest level of institutional capacity towards their diaspora: Sinaloa, Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo, and Campeche; and four states with the highest institutional capacity, that is, Michoacán, Zacatecas, State of Mexico, and Coahuila.

The instrumental hypothesis does explain, for instance, why Campeche, Baja California Sur, or Quintana Roo are among the states with the lowest levels of institutional capacity in Mexico. They all have very low Migratory Intensity, and their economies are not dependent on remittances as the Remittances/SGDP ratio shows. It also explains two cases in the other extreme, that is,

Michoacán and Zacatecas, which are the states with the highest level of institutional capacity in their approach to the diaspora. These states have high levels of MI and their economies are dependent on remittances, therefore, their home state governments and municipalities have developed diaspora policies for attending the needs of these groups of migrants, to court them for obtaining political revenues, and for implementing co-development programs in their communities of origin, as many other scholars have documented (Bada 2014; Moctezuma 2015; Ortega 2012; Yrizar and Barbosa 2010; Fernández de Castro et al 2007).

Table 4. Migratory Phenomenon, different variables: 2005, 2010						
Mexican state	Migrants in the US (2005)	Proportion of migrants with respect to their own pop (2005)	Migratory Intensity (2010)	Deported or repatried migrants (2010)	Remittances/State GDP relation (2010)	Institutional Capacity
Sinaloa	208,219	7.5	Medium	20,023	2.4	Very Low
Campeche	10, 466	1.3	Very Low	1202	0.1	Very Low
Baja California Sur	23,287	4.6	Very Low	385	0.6	Very Low
Quintana Roo	23,542	2.2	Very Low	782	0.7	Very Low
Michoacán	1,061,867	25.1	Very High	50,322	9.4	Very High
Zacatecas	508,924	35.9	Very High	10,790	6.9	Very High
Estado de México	565,457	4.5	Low	24,503	2	Very High
Coahuila	192,115	7.6	Low	4,494	0.8	Very High

Source: Own elaboration with information obtained from Ortega (2013: 112, 113).

The state and municipalities in Sinaloa have only worked with migrants through the Federal Program 3 X 1, and the economic impact of the program to the state's economy is not significant. The investment of the 3 x 1 program from its inception to mid-2012 was $6,368,000 USD approximately. Sinaloa's participation in the program does not correspond to the proportion of migrants in the U.S., or the amount of family remittances received. For instance, in 2012, Sinaloan

HTAs that participated in the Program represented 0.87% nationally; the projects carried out 0.64%, and the federal investment corresponded to 1.59% of the total federal resources. One of the main explanations is the low or null interest of the state government to collaborate with migrants, as I have argued.

However, at the municipal level, collaboration between local authorities and migrants is different and more active. Indeed, *municipios* are closer to the diaspora since they are able to create direct linkages and there are more possibilities to negotiate among themselves due to a more nuanced correlation of forces, in Gramsci's terms. At this level of analysis, the instrumental hypothesis helps us to partially explain the phenomenon. In my interviews with municipal officials from all the state, I found that it is in the most marginalized Sinaloan municipalities where state officials have or are willing to collaborate with HTAs due to budgetary constraints. On the other hand, municipal officials from the strongest economies at the municipal level such as Culiacán, Mazatlán are less interested in collaborating with Sinaloan HTAs and they have only done it on a few occasions. This is explained when we analyze the Remittances/MGDP ratio, which is very low in this municipalities (see Table 3). Some officials from these municipalities had no idea how the 3 x 1 Program works. In other cases, they have used the resources of the program without including migrants or recognizing their contributions, and solely for the purpose of obtaining more resources for public works. This is the case of a soccer field that was built In Mazatlán

In sum, economic factors do not entirely account for the lack of interest on the part of the state government to create diaspora policies, other variables need to be taken into account when explaining the phenomenon at this level. At the municipal level, economic factors become more relevant when explaining the disinterest of municipal officials from the strongest economies such as Culiacán, Mazatlán, or Ahome, or the strong interest and higher level of collaboration from

municipalities with high levels of marginalization and highly dependent on remittances such as Cosalá, San Ignacio, Badiraguato, or Choix.

ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

Since the economic contributions of Sinaloans have not been enough for occupying an important space in the agenda of state governors, organized Sinaloans migrants in the form of Hometown Associations have demanded their inclusion. Nonetheless, unlike what has happened in other states, the demands of Sinaloan HTAs have not taken effect and have not been consolidated. Besides the political and economic factors, I presented and that partially explain the lack of diaspora policies directed to Sinaloan migrants abroad, I argue that Sinaloans have not been able to form strong non-governmental organizations or HTAs neither in Los Angeles nor in Sinaloa. Both Sinaloan Civil Societies have not been able to pressure local governments so that their demands are heard, included and implemented.

In the case of the Sinaloan Migrant Civil Society in the form of HTAs, a crucial stage began in 2002 with the creation of the 3 x 1 Program for Migrants. After 2002, Sinaloan HTAs multiplied. By using the data provided by the *Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior*, I found that most Sinaloan clubs were registered after 2002, that is, 13 HTAs were created after that year, which represents 76.47% of the total HTAs formally registered with IME. In contrast, HTAs created before that date represent only 23.53 % (see Table 5.). What these figures show, align with Duquette-Rury and Bada's (2013) findings, were they noted a significant increase in the emergence of HTAs at the national level as a result of the implementation of the 3 X 1 Program. The authors found that the percentage of HTAs created after 2000 at the national level represents 76% of the total, and only 23% were created before that date, replicating almost exactly the data I found in the case of Sinaloan HTAs.

Table 5. Sinaloa: Hometown Associations

HTA	Foundation Year	Place of Foundation	Municipality	# members
Asociación de Concordenses	2011	Los Angeles, California	Concordia.	10
Club Elotense	2011	Lynwood, California	Elota	10
La Angostura	N/D	Monaca, Pennsylvania	Angostura	12
Cerro de Culiacán-San Luis	2013	St. Louis, Missouri		27
Club Activo Sinaloa de California	1995	Los Angeles, California		326
Club E Amole	1995	Cudahy, California	Guasave	24
Club Guamuchil	2011	Lynwood, California	Guamuchil	150
Club Mazatlán	1994	Los Angeles, California	Mazatlán	400
Club Rosa Morada	2008	Lynwood, California	Mocorito	50
Cubiri del Amole	2009	Downey, California	Guasave	100
El amole	1999	Bell, California	Guasave	100
Club de Migrantes Amigos de los Mochis	2010	Mesa, Arizona	Ahome	N/D
Desarrollo Paisano de Rosario	2007	Phoenix, Arizona	Rosario	10
El Hijo Pródigo	N/D	Phoenix, Arizona	Ahome	10
Club Social Pericos USA	2007	Moreno Valley, California	Mocorito	
Club Angostura en California	2011	Santa Ana, California	La Angostura	10
Club Migrante de Sinaloa Norte	2009	Greensboro, Carolina del Norte		6
Federación de Sinaloenses del Condado de Orange	2004	Garden Grove, California		75
Asociación de Sinaloenses en Arizona	2008	Tucson, Arizona		45

Source: Villegas (2014)

The emergence of most HTAs before 2002 was spontaneous. After that year, financial support from the 3 X 1 Program encouraged both Sinaloan migrants in the U.S. and primarily municipal governments, due to budgetary constraints as a result of the State withdrawal within the neoliberal context, to create HTAs and to expand the scope of their contributions. Still, the number of Sinaloan HTAs is limited if compared with the number of HTAs in other regions of the country

with a similar migratory tradition or volume of migrants in the U.S. In fact, as I have stated, there are great disparities among Mexican HTA's in terms of organizational development and transnational engagements.

If we take into account HTAs that are part of the FSC but not registered in the IME database, the number increases, although not substantially. In addition, not all HTAs that are counted as part of the FSC or that are registered in the IME database are active. Some of them are only artificially created by municipal governments to be able to qualify for the 3 x 1 Program, the so-called "Ghost HTAs". Others that pertains to the FSC are not active anymore according to Mario Cárdenas. Indeed, he mentioned that there are just few HTAs that are really active, what accounts for the low levels of organizational capacity of Sinaloans in the U.S. How do we explain that there are so few Sinaloan organizations in the U.S.?

One hypothesis is related to the type of leadership and internal organization of the FSC, since it has been the main HTA in the history of Sinaloa. Lizárraga et al 2010 argued that the FSC is different from other HTAs whose organizational mechanics is authoritarian and corporatist as the ones described by Moctezuma (2013), where clientelism is reproduced since it is one of the characteristics of Mexican politics. The authors stated that the FSC elects the members of its board of directors in a democratic fashion, which in turn represents the organization. In addition, HTAs that make up the FSC have a voice within the organization, where they can vote and, consequently, have the final say in the decision-making process. Part of this process is also described on the FSC website, thus coinciding in the description provided by Lizárraga et al (2010). However, during a personal conversation with José Ángel Barajas, when asked about the selection process of the board he clearly stated that he is the one who chooses them. In addition, there are other voices from within the FSC and from external actors that criticize the internal organizational practices of

some leaders of the FSC. They believe that the lack of internal democracy and authoritarian practices in the management of the FSC, have greatly affected the growth of the organization and that even obstructs the emergence of more Sinaloan HTAs. In fact, some federal officials that managed the 3 x 1 Program have made serious accusations regarding the actions of some of their leaders.

Another hypothesis that helps to understand low levels of association of Sinaloans in the form of *clubes de migrantes* or HTAs is more structural. A great proportion of Sinaloans hold undocumented as status, actually, Lizarraga et al (2010) estimated that 59% of Sinaloans in the U.S. are undocumented. To corroborate the high proportion of Sinaloans without legal documents, we can analyze the number of Sinaloans deported in 2017. According to Serrano and Jaramillo (2018), Sinaloans deported by U.S. immigration authorities represent 4.6% of the entire number of Mexican migrants deported. Indeed, Sinaloan migrants are a highly vulnerable population compared to other Mexicans in the U.S. They were not substantially benefitted by US policies such as IRCA, which obstructed their integration to the U.S. society. Without legal status, Sinaloans have not been able to form numerous organizations, or have been able to achieve significant levels of institutionalization in their organizational forms. In addition, previous research has noted that migrants from rural areas are more likely to form HTAs (Zabin and Escala; Lizárraga et al 2010), which in turn are more prone to help their communities of origin. This also helps to explain why Sinaloans are less prone to form HTAs since they come mostly from urban contexts.

In sum, an intersection of political, economic and organizational factors explains the lack of diaspora policies created to attend the needs and demands of the Sinaloan diaspora. HTAs in Sinaloa have been unable to forge an effective compromise with the Sinaloan state government in

Mexico, or with municipal governments that results in the creation of diaspora policies to attend their needs and demands.

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