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'Learn baby Learn,' Federal Education Policy and the Disciplining Politics of Opportunity:
1965-1999

By

Mahasan V Offutt-Chaney

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Education

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in Charge:

Professor Daniel H. Perlstein, Chair

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Professor Cybelle Fox

Fall 2019

'Learn baby Learn': Federal Education Policy and the Disciplining Politics of Opportunity,
1965-1999

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by

Mahasan V. Offutt-Chaney

Abstract

‘Learn baby Learn’: Federal Education Policy and the Disciplining Politics of Opportunity, 1965-1999

by

Mahasan Violet Offutt-Chaney

Doctor of Philosophy in Education

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Daniel Perlstein, Chair

Throughout their history, schools in the United States have served as both a primary mechanism for treating poverty and in doing so also a key mechanism for regulating, governing and criminalizing low-income and racialized students. This study explores the evolution of federal education policy and particularly the nation’s largest anti-poverty education program, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965), to track how federal policy makers framed ideas about education, race, and urban poverty as they pursued federal education reform. Drawing on theories of social control and tracing popular ideas about the causes of Black poverty, this study finds that since its origins, one of the primary features of antipoverty education reforms, or “educational opportunity” has been the desire to curb urban disorder, and Black rebellion and in doing so characterize children as disorderly, criminal and punishable. A process that ultimately made way for the imposition of more punitive, criminalizing school discipline reforms. I employ archival methods to examine how federal policymakers' ideas about educational opportunity and tougher school discipline practices changed across three eras: 1965-1969; 1983-1987; 1993-1999. These three eras are significant to both the punitive turn in US federal social policy and are also critical moments in the expansion of the federal role in education reform. I find that undergirding these key moments of federal education reform has been an enduring *disciplining politics of opportunity* –a political project that relies on shifting notions that education can be used as an equalizing force to bring about racial and economic uplift. Throughout this dissertation I interrogate how educational opportunity as discourse and policy functions to regulate behaviors, restrict protest, and ultimately impose stricter, more punitive and more criminalizing school rules. The politics of opportunity undergirding federal educational policies are predicated on a presumed marker of urban, often Black criminality.

This dissertation is divided into three chronological and thematic chapters. After the introduction chapter, Chapter 2 explores the origins of federal education policy. As federal policy makers strategized their legislative program for their budding War on Poverty, they simultaneously envisioned the ways that educational programs including Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) could be used as a primary strategy to confront urban poverty and issues about urban delinquency and crime. This chapter uses the urban rebellions as a backdrop to explore how ESEA and other education initiatives stemming from the War on Poverty were promoted as programs that could address disorder. Suggesting

that these initiatives were more than just an “opportunity program” for the “educationally deprived,” this chapter demonstrates that ESEA and other federal education programs were used by federal policy makers to discipline Black urban youth away from delinquency and urban rebellion. This “vision,” to use educational opportunity to discipline Black students, has remained an enduring legacy of 1960s federal education policy.

Chapter 3 explores how the disciplining politics of opportunity shifted in the 1980s. educational opportunity as a strategy of social uplift was no longer used to equalize the opportunity structure or regulate protest. Rather, during the period of educational and welfare state retrenchment and a heightened criminal turn during a burgeoning the War on Drugs, Reagan officials drummed up fears about the rising problem of school disorder to implement a new goal in federal education policy making: increased school discipline. While other scholars have identified how President Ronald Reagan provided an explicit ideological view of the federal government’s role in education few studies have explored how school discipline and crime control was a consistent part of that ideological message. Moreover while many studies of 1980s federal reform focus on how the Department of Education’s report *A Nation at Risk* altered the goals and priorities of federal and state reform, this chapter provides a new lens for examining the effects of 1980s education reform. Focusing on the release of an internal report “Discipline in Our Schools” released months following *A Nation at Risk*, this chapter explores how Reagan officials partnered with educational leaders including teacher unions and Black school leaders—to make discipline, not more school funding the focus of educational opportunity to urban students. School discipline and increased school order was cast as the civil rights issue of the time--an idea that would go on to frame school reform during the 1990s.

The last chapter explores how President Bill Clinton’s proposed “third way” approach to social policy and education reform embraced opportunity by appealing to individual and community responsibility. I demonstrate that federal education initiatives designed for low income children worked in concert with other federal initiatives and served as part of a single umbrella message—to reform the delinquencies of “urban crime,” and welfare “dependence.” Through federal reforms like Goals 2000, IASA and education initiatives in the federal crime bill stiffer discipline policies, police and penal technologies were incorporated into schools. Second education initiatives were combined with paternalistic welfare reform policies to tackle multiple forms of dependency. Although Clinton sought to distinguish his social policies from earlier Democratic presidents, when it came to crime control, urban policy and reforming education, his policies and discourse harkened back to earlier Democratic policymakers. These similarities were most visible in his belief that educational solutions could alleviate problems of racialized poverty and “urban violence.” Yet the disciplining politics of opportunity had shifted-- ‘safe and discipline schools’ equipped with police, and metal detectors became a key goal of ensuring urban students had the opportunity to learn just as fighting other forms of delinquencies would discipline students away from a future of welfare dependence.

By relying on a discourse of educational opportunity (education as the key to social uplift)—liberals and conservatives have not only distracted from broader oppressive forces such as the persistence of police violence, mass incarceration, rising economic insecurity, but overtime policy makers and educators have used educational opportunity policies (like Title I) and a more punitive understanding of opportunity (as access to more ordered, disciplined, and crime and violent free schools) to impose stricter and more punitive school rules. Thereby far from providing economic uplift, schools become institutions that subject students to regulatory punitive social control.

To my mom, who in the summer of 1965 saw the National Guard ride through her neighborhood and no longer wished to be a “good negro.” And to Ayo too for fighting displacement, going limp in a sheriff’s arms and for reciting her personal Black lives matter manifesto before being carted to Santa Rita.

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It seems necessary in an education based dissertation that I begin my acknowledgements dedicated to the schools that were so fundamental in shaping the ideas that guided this research. The public schools in Berkeley California represent both the promise and perils of liberal education. Berkeley' school assignment system allowed me to attend schools that were racially and socio-economically diverse. And still, despite what I believe to be true commitments to ideals of equality, and integration, these same schools upheld troubling discriminatory practices. I spent most of high school frustrated by what truly was two separate schooling experiences, one well to do, white, academically rigorous and the other where Black students were tracked, overly punished, suspended and disciplined within classes, ignored and patronized. It was only through working with student organizers, activist teachers and education advocacy organizations in Berkeley and the greater Bay Area that I developed the language to raise questions about these inequities. Organizations like Youth Together, RISE, and teachers in what was then called Community Partnerships Academy pushed me to organize, research and understand how racial, economic and educational inequalities were perpetuated. These moments I now see as formative to my academic trajectory. I am still full of questions and perhaps future projects will allow me to see more clearly how it is that Berkeley schools have developed as they have.

Through coursework and conversations with mentors at UC Berkeley I expanded the scope of my inquiry into the study of school discipline. I am deeply appreciative of my dissertation committee for their thoughtful probing. First, no words could give full acknowledgement to the level of support, commitment and deep care my chair Daniel Perlstein has shown to me and the ideas in this project. Over the years Dan has reminded me to take my ideas seriously, to never apologize, and to write something interesting. I'm am also thankful to Janelle Scott who has exemplified through her scholarship and teaching that understanding racial inequality in education often necessitates studying the structures, people and organizations who make decisions. Last, but certainly not least, I am grateful for the mentorship and generosity of Cybele Fox who has helped me think deeply and with specificity about how race has shaped the US welfare state and has pushed me to articulate how and in which ways schools matter to the story of US social policy. I am so thankful that they have encouraged me to see this dissertation as the first step in a broader project and research trajectory.

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Abbreviations

AFT	American Federation of Teachers
ECIA	Education Consolidation and Improvement Act
ESEA	Elementary and Secondary Education Act
IASA	Improving American Schools Act
HEW	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
NARA	National Archives Records Administration
NEA	National Education Association.
LBLJ	Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
OEO	Office of Economic Opportunity
RRPL	Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
WJCPL	William J Clinton Presidential Library

Chapter 1: Introduction

Two contradictory themes have characterized national policy concerns around educating low-income Black children in public schools. The first theme concerns the extension of equal opportunity to all students. In 1954 federal courts outlawed the American tradition of segregated schooling and by 1965 federal dollars were distributed to local schools through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to support training programs, early childhood education, and compensatory programs “to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.”¹ Over time, the national discourse about increasing opportunity has narrowed from an emphasis on the structural limitations placed on racially and socioeconomically segregated neighborhoods, to conversations about school standards, gaps in achievement, and the opportunity to choose out of failing public school systems through the proliferation of school choice. The discourse of “education opportunity” presents the promise that all students including low-income and racialized students be provided an avenue to individualized social mobility through self-reliance, and meritocracy.

The second major, and contradictory, theme has been the pervasive installation of school discipline and the various means of punishment used to discipline Black students. Black children are subject to constant surveillance and are disproportionately impacted by strict discipline practices and zero tolerance policies in schools and classrooms.² Since the 1970s, not only have Black suspension rates more than doubled, but Black students are more likely to be suspended and expelled than students of other racial groups and, are more likely to be subjected to severe consequences for less serious and more subjective reasons.³ School discipline practices also serve a larger regulating function. For instance, school ethnographers have found that school punishment reinforces racial stereotypes about Black students, such that Black students are seen as criminal, trouble-makers and uneducable.⁴ Through school punishment, teachers and school officials sort students and train them into citizens who are meant to follow and obey the rules of society.⁵ Moreover, even as recent federal policy initiatives have attempted to make school discipline practices more equitable for Black students, federal policy makers similarly frame

¹ The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 89-10 P.L., § 201 (1965) for instance mentions that Title I was designed to serve the culturally deprived. This term was popularized in the 1950s and 1960s to discuss the limited opportunities facing poor children and increasingly understood in more racialized terms. For an overview see: Sylvia L. M. Martinez and John L. Rury, “From ‘Culturally Deprived’ to ‘At Risk’: The Politics of Popular Expression and Educational Inequality in the United States, 1960-1985,” *Teachers College Record* 114, no. 6 (2012).

² Ann Arnett Ferguson, *Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Victor M. Rios, *Punished: Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys*, (New York: NYU Press, 2011); Russell J. Skiba, Choong-Geun Chung, Megan Trachok, Timberly L. Baker, Adam Sheya, and Robin L. Hughes, “Parsing Disciplinary Disproportionality Contributions of Infraction, Student, and School Characteristics to Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion,” in *American Educational Research Journal* 51, no. 4 (August 1, 2014): 640–70; Anne Gregory, Russell J. Skiba, and Pedro A. Noguera, “The Achievement Gap and the Discipline Gap Two Sides of the Same Coin?” in *Educational Researcher* 39, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 59–68; Damien M. Sojoyner, “Another Life Is Possible: Black Fugitivity and Enclosed Places,” *Cultural Anthropology* 32, no. 4 (November 18, 2017): 514–36.

³ Daniel J. Losen and Russell J. Skiba, “Suspended Education: Urban Middle Schools in Crisis,” *EScholarship*, (September 13, 2010); Skiba, Chung, et al, “Parsing Disciplinary Disproportionality Contributions of Infraction, Student, and School Characteristics to Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion.”

⁴ Ferguson, *Bad Boys*; Sojoyner, “Another Life Is Possible.”

⁵ Ferguson, *Bad Boys*.

Black students as punishable, damaged or in need of being fixed.⁶ Most studies on school discipline reasonably focus on the local, emphasizing how teachers reproduce discriminatory practices in the classroom, how schools impose systems of surveillance, and districts and cities collaborate in a network or punitive youth control complex.⁷ Though the federal influence over a range of education initiatives has increased since the federal government took a larger stake in education during the 1960s, few studies have explored how federal level policy actors have contributed to and shaped school discipline policy and practice. By examining the evolution of federal education policy, this dissertation explores how federal level policy makers have made way for punitive school practices—often through the very policies meant to equalize schooling opportunities for Black students. More specifically, federal level policy makers have used the rhetoric of educational opportunity both as an ideology and policy to respond to broader political economic forces and in doing so have focused on individual corrections to poverty and the problems poverty are believed to spawn. In doing so policy makers have also rationalized, encouraged and given rhetorical weight and financial support to stricter, more punitive and increasingly criminalizing school discipline practices.⁸

Although the federal government has no constitutional authority over education policy the War on Poverty marked a turning point in the spread of federal control over public schools. Poverty planners imagined that through policies like the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the \$1 billion Title I program, poor children would be able to educate their way out of poverty.⁹ Thus, numerous education and training initiatives became a major weapon in fighting the War on Poverty, which could be won, touted President Johnson, “only if those who are poverty’s prisoners can break the chains of ignorance.”¹⁰ Yet as this dissertation uncovers, these early federal policy makers not only framed students as “prisoners” of poverty, but constructed, with the ideas of social scientists, that poverty was also the source of their dissatisfaction, alienation and supposed criminality. In subsequent eras, federal policy makers have moved away from liberal notions that poverty makes crime and instead framed crime as that which made poverty. By the 1980s conservative federal officials blamed social policy for creating the permissive behaviors that they believed contributed to poverty. Central to both these claims was that education and federal education policies could intervene and disrupt the relationship between racialized poverty and notions of criminality—and it is this aim that I argue

⁶ For a review of President Obama’s My Brother’s Keeper initiative see: Michael Dumas, “My Brother as ‘Problem’ Neoliberal Governmentality and Interventions for Black Young Men and Boys,” *Educational Policy* 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 94–113.

⁷ Victor Rios uses the term youth control complex to describe the culture of punishment that connects schools, law enforcement, other community institutions. See Rios, *Punished*

⁸ Paul J. Hirschfield, “Preparing for Prison? The Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA,” *Theoretical Criminology* 12, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 79–101.

⁹ The Tenth amendment to the constitution left control of education to the states. Emily A Bowman’s study shows how between 1862 and 1963 Congress rejected unrestricted federal aid to schools thirty-six times. See: Emily Bowman, “The American Educational Paradox: National Values, Local Policies,” Ph.D., Indiana University, 2012. For more on how 1960s social policy overcame the historical restrictions of federal funding over local education see Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, *The Political Dynamics of American Education*, (McCutchan Pub. Corporation, 2009), 13; Stephen Kemp Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, *ESEA: The Office of Education Administers A Law*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968); Julie Roy Jeffrey, *Education for Children of the Poor: A Study of the Origins and Implementation of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965*, (Columbus: Ohio State Univ Press, 1978).

¹⁰ Quoted in Jeffrey, “Education for children of the poor: a study of the origins and implementation of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,” (Dissertation, Rice University, 1972), 63.

has been one of the primary but overlooked goals of federal education policy. Far from simply providing educational or economic support, federal education policy has always been envisioned as an anti-delinquency and anti-crime measure. Liberals and conservatives have not only relied on a discourse that education can be used as the key to social uplift, but overtime policy makers and educators have used a more constrained and punitive understanding of opportunity as access to more ordered, disciplined, and crime-free schools to impose stricter and more punitive school rules. Underneath the message of educational opportunity are shifting messages about how to treat poverty, and contain students seen as criminal.

My focus on both the disciplining forces of federal education policy and the lineage of school discipline policies at the heart of federal education reform diverges from the robust historiography on the evolution of federal education policy. Most studies focus on explaining the changes between the original ESEA and its 2002 reauthorization, No Child Left Behind (NCLB).¹¹ As the common narrative details, the 2002 reauthorization focused less on equalizing schooling for low income and disadvantaged youth and more on accountability and standardizing outcomes for all students. No Child Left Behind represented a drastic shift in federal education goals—no longer did federal policy makers emphasize equalizing educational inputs, but federal policy makers aimed to standardize educational outcomes. To understand that shift studies have focused primarily on three main periods of federal reform: 1965-1980; 1980-1990; and 1992-2002.¹² During the first period, between 1965-1980 historians like Hugh Davies Graham and Gareth Davies point to the importance of institutions in securing the federal government's role in federal education policy making. While prior to the 1960s, the United States resisted national education policy, by the end of the Johnson administration, growing triangular networks with a vested interest in education expansion pressed Congress to increase funding for education. Interest group lobbyists, federal district judges and career civil servants played important roles in expanding and securing federal involvement in education despite the rise of conservatism that followed the 1960s such that by the 1980s liberals and conservatives came together to protect federal education programs from the cuts proposed by the Reagan administration.¹³

¹¹ No Child Left Behind Act of 2001

¹² For more on the history of federal education change see: Patrick J McGuinn, *No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965-2005*, (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Lorraine McDonnell, "No Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education: Evolution or Revolution?" *Peabody Journal of Education* 80, no. 2 (April 2005): 19–38; Elizabeth DeBray, *Politics, Ideology & Education: Federal Policy During the Clinton and Bush Administrations*, (New York: Teachers College Press, 2006); Paul Manna, *School's in: Federalism and the National Education Agenda*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006); Gareth Davies, *See Government Grow: Education Politics from Johnson to Reagan*, (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2007); Jal Mehta, *The Allure of Order: High Hopes, Dashed Expectations, and the Troubled Quest to Remake American Schooling*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Maris Vinovskis, *From A Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind: National Education Goals and the Creation of Federal Education Policy*, (New York: Teachers College Press, 2015). For a review of these three periods in ESEA's evolution see: DeBray, *Politics, Ideology & Education*, Chapter 1; Jack Jennings, "Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise."; McDonnell, "No Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education: Evolution or Revolution?" Jack Jennings, "Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise," *The Phi Delta Kappan* 81, no. 7 (2000): 516-522; Christopher T. Cross, *Political Education: National Policy Comes of Age*. (New York Teachers College Press, 2004).

¹³ Davies, *See Government Grow: Education Politics from Johnson to Reagan*; for a similar account see Hugh Davis Graham, *The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Years*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984). Graham described that while prior to the 1960s, the United States resisted national education policy, by the end of the Johnson administration, growing triangular networks with a vested interest in education expansion pressed Congress to increase funding for education.

Scholars tracing federal reforms through the second phase between 1980-1990 argue that the 1980s represented on one end a period of retrenchment, or at least attempts at retrenchment. Under the Reagan administration, conservatives attempted to cut the newly instated federal Department of Education, convert federal funding to block grants, and introduce school vouchers. Although these attempts were unsuccessful (in part because of the bipartisan congressional support), the Reagan administration successfully held steady the number of children served under Title I.¹⁴ On the other hand, scholars recognize that the 1980s and specifically the infamous 1983 report *A Nation at Risk* as a critical moment in federal education policy. The historiography on the 1980s tends to focus on the role of ideas as the force shaping federal policy. New ideas shifted the nature of policy debate, introduced new actors involved in federal policy making and created momentum for institutional changes.¹⁵ More specifically scholars have tried to understand how the power of ideas and paradigms elevated education reform to a national issue, launching state and local reforms for more accountability and increased standards. As Jal Mehta summarizes the *Nation at Risk* report linked educational and economic concerns in ways that created broad and deep political momentum for school reform; by emphasizing high standards for all, it shifted the discussion from high-poverty students to all students; by focusing on the failings of school and not society, it narrowed the scope of potential reforms to focus exclusively on school improvement; and by measuring schools by quantifiable results, it accelerated a trend toward test-based accountability that continues undebated.”¹⁶

These ideas persisted into policy during the third phase which began in the 1990s. Education became a crucial electoral issue for conservatives and liberals charting a middle path. Under the Presidencies of George H.W Bush and Bill Clinton a new policy regime was set into place, stressing excellence for all students and high-stakes accountability for results. Gone was the "equity education policy regime" focused on funneling resources to disadvantaged students.¹⁷

These studies provide important overviews of the key players, interest groups, political dynamics and the power of ideas in shaping the educational landscape since 1965. Yet by working backwards in trying to explain the rise of NCLB, these studies have limited their analysis to policy issues related to standards, accountability and also school choice but have largely bypassed how and in which ways federal reforms have driven school discipline practices. Only in passing have studies addressed the role that school discipline played for federal education reform.¹⁸ Studies for example outline how “safe, disciplined, drug-free schools,” were

¹⁴ For a broader account on the politics of retrenchment see Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State?: Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Pierson argues that the 'policy legacies' of previous governments and the political supports that developed around social programs made retrenchment difficult.

¹⁵ Mehta, *The Allure of Order*; Mehta, “How Paradigms Create Politics: The Transformation of American Educational Policy, 1980–2001,” *American Educational Research Journal* 50, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 285–324; Patrick J. McGuinn, *No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965-2005*, (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

¹⁶ Mehta, *The Allure of Order*.

¹⁷ Patrick J. McGuinn, *No Child Left Behind*

¹⁸ For exceptions see John F. Jennings, *National Issues in Education: Elementary and Secondary Education Act*, (Phi Delta Kappa International Incorporated, 1995). Other studies on federal reform mention that school discipline reform was agreed upon with bipartisan consensus see for instance: DeBray, *Politics, Ideology & Education*; Maris Vinovskis, *From A Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind*. Others like Jesse Rhodes dismiss that there has been a disciplining turn. See Jesse H. Rhodes, *An Education in Politics: The Origins and Evolution of No Child Left Behind*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

included as part of the national goals established during the National Governor's Association's Charlottesville education summit and later incorporated into Clinton's Goals 2000 and the Improving Americas' Schools Act.¹⁹ Yet these works do not interrogate how and in which ways school discipline became a key direction of federal policy. As a result, studies have overlooked how school discipline has worked alongside privatization, standards movement as a major force in reforming schools, and, most importantly, how school discipline alongside these other policy changes contribute to the broader regulation, management and "disciplining" of students—particularly low-income, Black and brown students in urban schools.

Relatedly, previous federal policy studies make implicit arguments about race by attending to the shifting federal focus from equity policies to standards, yet generally leave uncontested the racial ideologies undergirding equity and "opportunity" policies. In doing so we have little clarity about the ways racialized social relations and race-coded discourses provide resources for political actors driving reform.²⁰ Race not only provides a key cultural resource for the production of anti-poverty and federal education policies—but social and educational policies are also sites where racial meanings and inequalities get produced.²¹

I reexamine these three eras of federal education reform to demonstrate that federal policy makers equipped with ideas and knowledge about the causes of poverty and, in particular, Black poverty promoted a discourse of educational opportunity that relied on ideas about delinquency, urban disorder, and racialized poverty. These discourses reinforced and reproduced ideas about the pathologies of urban, Black and low-income communities as both "objects of pity," to quote historian Daryl Michael Scott, but also painted urban students as potential criminals.²² Diverging from previous studies my account of federal education policy explores how federal reforms including federal efforts to incorporate stricter school rules ultimately operate as "disciplining" projects—used to pacify resistance and regulate the behavior of poor, urban and racialized children. The power of disciplining and punishment is that it has a lasting effect on those who have not committed a crime or school offence. Punishment, as Michelle Foucault defines the concept, is not just about the punished but "is directed above all at others, at all the potentially guilty."²³ Sociologist Anne Ferguson's work on race and school discipline practices serves as an instructive example. Ferguson argues that through school discipline or the enforcement of school rules, students are labeled "good," "bad," "having potential," "troubled," and "troublesome."²⁴ Ferguson finds that although African American males might be labeled into contrasting categories, schoolboys who follow rules or troublemakers who do not—schoolboys were always on the brink of being redefined into the troublemaker category. With these forms of categorization, the enforcement of school rules also serves as a disciplining project. Federal policy makers, I argue, use federal education policy to engage in a similar disciplining project;

¹⁹ Maris Vinovskis, *From A Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind. See the ways school discipline was included in national goals see for instance page 25-27*; Other studies on federal reform mention that school discipline reform was agreed upon with bipartisan consensus see for instance: DeBray, *Politics, Ideology & Education*; Others like Jesse Rhodes dismiss that there has been a disciplining turn. See Jesse H. Rhodes, *An Education in Politics: The Origins and Evolution of No Child Left Behind*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

²⁰ Soss, Fording and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*, 4.

²¹ Ibid, 13; See also Robert C. Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).

²² Daryl Michael Scott, *Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880-1996*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

²³ Michel Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1979

²⁴ Ferguson, *Bad Boys*

one that treats the *deserving* members of educational opportunity as always on the brink of being collapsed into categories of troublemaker, or “disruptive,” “delinquent,” and “criminal.”²⁵ And one that uses shifting notions of educational opportunity to enforce stricter school rules.

Much, though not all of this story focuses on how federal policy makers used the largest and most expensive education anti-poverty program, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), to impose order in urban communities and schools. Departing from previous studies, I argue that understanding the politics of federal education reform is not just a story about how federal reform has changed—but a story about how federal reformers have used school policies to change, regulate and discipline the poor and particularly the urban poor. The urban is both a real place demarcated by neighborhoods and sets of policies and an imagined space replete with racialized constructions of identity for those who occupy its boundaries.²⁶ Federal policy makers’ understanding, framing, and descriptions of the problems of the urban changes over time, which in turn shapes the educational solutions promoted during each era. Each chapter of this dissertation details the story of how the politics of race and punishment became inextricable from one another as education became a central component of federal social policy between Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty to Clinton’s “third way” era to end “Welfare as we know it.” These eras span both liberal and conservative presidential regimes, represent significant moments in federal education reform, and also mark different moments within the punitive turn in U.S. social policy. These eras are also significant to the transformation of the US welfare state, which as I will argue in the following sections, informs how we might understand the disciplining function of federal education reform.

Over the course of this study I address the following research questions:

1. How have ideas about poverty, race and social policy influenced the evolution of federal education reform?
2. How do policy makers, including presidents, executive aides, and members of Congress describe the problems of urban poverty and in which ways do they propose educational solutions to mitigate these problems?
3. How have federal policy makers invoked concerns around discipline as they embrace educational reforms through federal education initiatives?
4. And lastly how have policy prescriptions and frames about educational opportunity changed over time?

The next section situates this study within the history of education and social policy. I then introduce the theory of social control that guides my analysis. In the last section I introduce the dissertation outline by mapping out my theory on the disciplining politics of opportunity that is traced throughout the following chapters.

Discipline and opportunity: The History of Education and functions of the US Welfare State

²⁵ Ferguson, *Bad Boys*. The pressures and dilemmas this group faced around race and gender identities from adults and peers were always palpable forces working against their maintaining a commitment to the school project. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (New York: Vintage, 1977), 95.

²⁶This conception of the urban is borrowed from Zeus Leonardo and Margaret Hunter, “Imagining the Urban: The Politics of Race, Class and Schooling,” in *International Handbook of Urban Education*, (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2007,) 779–801.

The methods schools use to both provide opportunity and discipline poor and urban communities have been a central tension in the history of education.²⁷ Advocates of the common school movement during the mid 19th century, for example, sought to assimilate the expanding immigrant population and to inculcate them with civic and moral virtue. Likewise, early 20th century reformers believed that providing school lunches, medical and dental inspections, summer programs and recreation would help to preserve democracy, assimilate different groups, eliminate poverty, improve health outcomes, enforce child labor laws and reduce crime.²⁸ Central to these reformers' efforts to promote school-based social services was a belief that schools could remedy and prevent wayward youth—specifically urban immigrants—from turning toward crime and delinquency, or mass disorder through protest.²⁹ As one early 19th century educator mentioned, “if we were to define the public school as an instrument for disintegrating mobs, we would indicate one of its most important purposes.”³⁰ At its origins, social reformers have used the public school, alongside the penitentiary, reform school, and mental hospital, as part of a network of institutions used to enforce social control.³¹

The opportunity and disciplining functions of the US schools are tied to the broader function of the US welfare state—defined here as the system of government provision which both protect people from income losses, poverty and illness, yet one that also stratifies and functions as a mechanism of social control.³² The welfare state is typically studied through the social insurance programs (unemployment and social security) or social assistance programs (means-tested programs like “welfare”). However, since the nineteenth century, education has constituted one of the key public benefits provided by governments.³³ Even though the US is often considered a welfare state laggard, the US was also at the forefront of countries offering public education.³⁴ Indeed a body of literature has sought to clarify the role of public schools to

²⁷ For a review on the “educationalization” of social problems see Diane Ravitch, *The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945-1980*, (New York: Basic Books: 1985); Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe. “Educationalizing the Welfare State,” in P. Carter & K. Welner (Eds.), *Closing the opportunity gap: What Americans must do to give every child an even chance*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 25–39; David F. Labaree, “The Winning Ways of a Losing Strategy: Educationalizing Social Problems in the United States,” *Educational Theory* 58, no. 4 (November 2008): 447–60.

²⁸ David Tyack, “Health and Social Services in Public Schools: Historical Perspectives,” *The Future of Children* 2(1) (1992): 19–31; Miriam Cohen, “Reconsidering Schools and the American Welfare State,” *History of Education Quarterly* 45 (4) (2005), 511–37; David Tyack, *The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Carl Kaestle, *Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983).

²⁹ Diane Ravitch, *The Great School Wars: A History of the New York City Public Schools*, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Tyack, “Health and Social Services in Public Schools.”

³⁰ For quote see Davidson Douglass, *Jim Crow Moves North, The Battle over Northern School Segregation, 1865-1954*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15; David Tyack, *The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 29. italics mine

³¹ Michael B. Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts*, (New York: Teachers College Press, 2001), xxvi-xxvii, 19.

³² For the social stratification function of welfare states see Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1990).

³³ Michael Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America*, (New York: Basic Books. 1997), 22

³⁴ Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in United States*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1995), 77; for other accounts see, Lee Rainwater Garfinkel and Timothy Smeeding. *Wealth and Welfare States: Is America a Laggard or Leader?*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Margaret Weir and Ann Shola Orloff, *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

the broader body of social policies.³⁵ Political scientists Ira Katznelson and Margarete Weir refer to their book, *Schooling for All: Class, Race, and the Decline of the Democratic Ideal*, as an “analytical lament” for the “excision of education from most studies of social policy and the welfare state.”³⁶ They argue that like the broader welfare state—schools have the potential to bring about equality, reshape social structures, and narrow differences between social groups.³⁷ Others like, Historian Miriam Cohen argue that American’s commitment to universal education helped mobilize support for broader social services and expand the welfares state. School reformers appealed to the innocence of children and American’s commitment to universal education in order to build support for welfare state programs, government regulation, and distribute social services.³⁸ Cultural norms about the right to schooling were based on both a liberal commitment to meritocracy and an egalitarian ethos of wide access to education that allowed the working class, ethnic minorities and the middle class to rally behind the call for universal access to schooling and eventually build up other social services. As I will argue in the next section, policy planners relied on the liberal commitment to education-based meritocracy to expand the welfare state in the 1960s in ways that also contributed to the social control function of the newly expanded educational opportunity programs.

Education, Race and social policy between the News Deal and the Great Society

While education may have been central to early US social policy making, by the time social policies were federalized with the New Deal in the 1930s education typically was of secondary importance to other federal goals to revive the economy, create jobs and alleviate economic hardships.³⁹ As David Tyack, Robert Lowe and Elizabeth Hansot argue, “The New Deal may have been a watershed in politics and the centralization of government...[but] it was not one in the governance and finance of public schools.”⁴⁰ Congressional and Presidential support of federal education initiatives was also undermined by racial politics, religion and the fear of centralized government.⁴¹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt feared that federal funding of education would disrupt his coalition of urban liberals such as Catholics who would not get education money to fund their private schools and conservative southerners who did not want to

³⁵ For scholarly accounts on education and the welfare state see; Cohen, “Reconsidering Schools and the American Welfare State.”; Michael B. Katz, “Public Education as Welfare,” *Dissent Magazine*, 2010; Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe, “From New Deal to No Deal: No Child Left Behind and the Devolution of Responsibility for Equal Opportunity,” *Harvard Educational Review*, 76(4), (2006): 474-502. See also Martin Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy*, (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2000).

³⁶ Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir, *Schooling for All: Class, Race, and the Decline of the Democratic Ideal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), ix.

³⁷ Katznelson and Weir, *Schooling for All*, 5.

³⁸ Miriam Cohen, “Reconsidering Schools and the American Welfare State,” *History of Education Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (December 1, 2005): 511–37; see also Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in United States*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1995).

³⁹ Tyack, Lowe and Hansot, *Public schools in Hard Times*. Education programs included the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), National Youth Administration (NYA) and the emergency educational program of the Works Progress Administration (WPA); see also Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe, “Class, Race, and the Emergence of Federal Education Policy: From the New Deal to the Great Society,” *Educational Researcher* 24, no. 3 (April 1, 1995): 4–21.

⁴⁰ David Tyack, Robert Lowe, and Elisabeth Hansot, *Public Schools in Hard Times: The Great Depression and Recent Years*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 95.

⁴¹ Tyack, Lowe and Hansot, *Public schools in Hard Times*, 103.

disrupt the segregated South.⁴² Moreover, just as southern senators placed race-based exclusions and restrictions in other New Deal policies in ways that systematically excluded Black Americans from new programs and benefits, they also opposed federal authority over schooling out of fear that they might be forced to equalize schooling for Black Americans.⁴³ Thus race prevented federal policy makers from nationalizing federal education programs

Unlike the New Deal, which systemically excluded Black Americans from accessing the social rights extended to white Americans, The Great Society took on a more central role in alleviating racial and economic disparities. For Jill Quadagno the Great Society, or the “equal-opportunity welfare state,” attempted to eradicate racial inequality, particularly for Black Americans, by pouring funds into education, housing and community action programs in urban ghettos. Race, Quadagno argues, was pivotal to policymaking, and the War on Poverty represented a well-intended but poorly executed effort to treat racial inequality. Consequently, white backlash eventually undermined support for programs like community action and job training initiatives.⁴⁴ Since the 1960s, I argue that federal educational policy has remained one of the few vestiges of the opportunity welfare state. Unlike other areas of social policy that became subject to conservative backlash, education policies have continued to expand.⁴⁵ To this point historians, Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe argue that 1960s federal policy makers effectively “educationalized” social policy.⁴⁶ Instead of expanding the New Deal, which more directly intervened in economic planning by instituting minimum wage, unemployment insurance, retirement benefits, and the right of workers to unionize, Great Society social planners favored education and job training programs that were designed to improve opportunities for those on the margins by “enabling them to help themselves.”⁴⁷ If the goal of poverty planners was to create economic opportunity, particularly for Black Americans in cities, one of the lasting legacies of this period has been the continued reliance on education to meet these goals.

Other historical and political accounts have complicated how we understand the function, race-based legacy and even the well-intentionality of 1960s social policy. For scholars like Elizabeth Hinton, Naomi Murakawa and Vesla Weaver, the Great Society also laid the foundation for crime control and propelled the development of the punitive carceral state.⁴⁸ Policy makers shaping anti-poverty social and education reforms were as motivated by a desire

⁴² Tyack, Lowe and Hansot, *Public schools in Hard Times*, chapter 3; See also Emily A Bowman, “The American Educational Paradox: National Values, Local Policies,” (Dissertation, Indiana University, 2012).

⁴³ For more on the racial exclusions during the New Deal see Robert C Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Jill Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Ira Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006); Cybelle Fox, *Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal*, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012).

⁴⁴ Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare*, 4

⁴⁵ Davies, *See Government Grow*. In federal education policies, this pursuit to provide opportunity to those in poverty would extend to cover other groups including the bilingual and handicapped.

⁴⁶ Kantor, and Lowe, “Educationalizing the Welfare State,” in Prudence Carter and Kevin Welner’s Eds; *Closing the Opportunity Gap: What America Must Do to Give Every Child an Even Chance*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013

⁴⁷ Kantor, and Lowe, “Educationalizing the Welfare State,”; Kantor and Lowe, “From New Deal to No Deal, 477.

⁴⁸ Elizabeth Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016). Naomi Murakawa, *First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Vesla M. Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” *Studies in American Political Development*, 21, no. 2 (2007): 230–65.

to curb the supposed delinquencies of Black young people as they were to meet the demands of civil rights activists.⁴⁹ As Elizabeth Hinton argues, 1960's social policy is perhaps "best understood as a manifestation of fear about urban disorder and about the behavior of young people, particularly African Americans."⁵⁰ Similarly, educators and policy makers articulated and drew upon fears about the urban as they advanced education reforms through programs like Title I of the ESEA, the nation's largest anti-poverty education program. Thus Great society programs both extended rights to Black Americans by focusing specifically on education and used education initiatives to counter fears of urban problems.

At its origins, education and social reformers used schools to bring about equality, expand social policies and to "discipline," regulate and control poor and marginalized communities. This dissertation traces these educational themes by locating them at a different origin point—the creation of federal education policy during the Great Society. Following in the tradition of liberalism, 1960s poverty planners defined social reform as education, not redistribution, and focused resources on the individual rehabilitation of poor people and racial minorities.⁵¹ I argue that since the inception of the Opportunity Welfare state federal policy makers continually advocate for racial and economic uplift through education, while relying on and simultaneously constructing racialized images of Black, urban and also Latinx students as "criminal," "delinquent," "at risk," or "culturally deprived." Federal policy, I argue, thus serves a broader disciplining function—to regulate the behaviors of urban students and over time, federal policy makers have used education reform and a discourse of opportunity to advocate for and impose more punitive and criminalizing education laws and practices. In the next section, I outline how educational opportunity operates as a mechanism of social control, functioning at the symbolic and material level and defined by ideational and political and economic shifts.⁵²

Theories of Social control, Disciplining, and Criminalizing through federal education policy:

Although social policies soften hardships associated with poverty through programs like unemployment insurance, social security, job creation and education, political elites can also use social policy as a mechanism of social control thereby reproducing inequality.⁵³ This latter function is realized by reinforcing social status through stratified programs and by disciplining, regulating, and punishing the behavior of program recipients.⁵⁴ In this view, the purpose of social

⁴⁹ Studies have demonstrated that while there was growing concern about youth delinquency, in the 1960s delinquency was increasingly understood in more racialized terms as a problem of Black areas; Judith Kafka, "Disciplining Youth, Disciplining Women: Motherhood, Delinquency, and Race in Postwar American Schooling," *Educational Studies* 44 (2008): 197–221; Jeffrey, *Education for children of the Poor*.

⁵⁰ Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*, 32.

⁵¹ For more on liberal notions of individualism and educationalization see See Katz, *The Undeserving Poor*; see also Leah Gordon, *From Power to Prejudice: The Rise of Racial Individualism in Midcentury America*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

⁵² Other scholars of punishment have taken similar theoretical approaches. Loïc Wacquant for instance argues that punishment is both material and symbolic defined by Political economy and discursive. Loïc Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity* (Durham NC: Duke University Press Books, 2009). Ann Ferguson studies punishment within an elementary school. she argues that punishment operates through institutional practices, and the other is through cultural representations of racial difference. *Bad Boys*.

⁵³ Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*, (New York: Vintage, 1993 (1971)).

⁵⁴ Piven & Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*; Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor*; Soss, Fording and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*.

programs is not to end poverty, or simply extend opportunity but rather to use social programs to control poor populations.⁵⁵ In this tradition, sociologists Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward argue that welfare state relief programs expand and contract to regulate the working class and enforce work. They argue for instance that the vast relief programs initiated during the New Deal were political concessions to widespread protests among the unemployed, farmers, and industrial workers. Once political order was restored, however, some programs were cut and those that remained were “so degrading and punitive as to instill in the laboring masses a fear of the fate that awaits them shall they relax into beggary and pauperism.”⁵⁶ The implicit message being, one had better work or else be subjected to punitive and degrading programs.

This social control cycle was repeated during the Great Society. Social unrest in Northern cities led politicians to respond to grievances of Black Americans by providing modest concessions through welfare expansion and, as I explore in chapter 2, promoting politically popular education programs like Title I of ESEA. Education programs would provide young people or the “deserving poor” with the discipline of schooling in order to pacify them from challenging, through political protest, the state sanctioned violent conditions of ghetto neighborhoods. Protest against police violence was seen by policy elite as criminal and education policy served as a soft approach to combatting criminality.⁵⁷

The 1970s and 1980s marked the emergence of a new era characterized by growing political conservatism, political backlash against the social policies and civil rights gains of the 1960s and the intensification of efforts to criminalize poverty. Given these changes scholars have since intervened and updated Piven and Cloward’s theory by looking at the effects of neoliberalism. Joe Soss, Richard Fording and Sanford Schram for example argue that during the neoliberal era, poverty management was restructured through policy devolution, privatization, performance systems and also punitive policy tools and criminal logics.⁵⁸ Loïc Wacquant argues that Piven and Cloward’s cyclical dynamic of public aid expansion and contraction had, by the 1980s, been superseded by a new system whereby social policy became tied to an extended police and penal net that serve as a “single apparatus for the management of poverty.”⁵⁹ The regulation of the working class was no longer left solely to the social arm of the welfare state but relied also on the “controlling arm of the penal state.”⁶⁰ Under this new system, the poor were not just regulated through work requirements, but rather punished through crime control—including the influx of prisons which had expanded fivefold between 1965 and 1988.⁶¹ Moreover, policy makers, business elites and economists had turned their backs on the welfare state in favor of the market. As Victor Rios writes, “the state had not abandoned the poor; it had reorganized itself, placing priority on its punitive institutions, such as police, and embedding

⁵⁵ Soss, Fording and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*.

⁵⁶ Piven & Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, 3. Programs like the Work Progress Administration were cut while those that remained were the programs that remained were state administered unemployment insurance or categorical assistance programs.

⁵⁷ For Piven & Cloward’s description of the Great Society see *Regulating the Poor* (P. 243- 245); The deserving poor is a category of seen as worthy of government support- children, those with disabilities, older people. The undeserving are those seen as lazy Black mothers termed welfare queens, men and those who are seen as refusing to work. For more on the undeserving poor see Katz, *The Undeserving Poor*.

⁵⁸ Soss, Fording and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*, 8.

⁵⁹ Loïc Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*, First edition, paperback issue edition (Durham NC: Duke University Press Books, 2009). 14.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Drugs*, 310.

crime-control discourses and practices into welfare institutions, such as schools.”⁶² Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that federal education policy makers continued to use federal policy as a disciplining and behavioral regulatory intervention. Yet the demise of Black radical protests, meant that policy makers were no longer regulating protest. Rather, under this new era of mass incarceration and the abandonment of the welfare state, federal policy makers used existing education programs to regulate children through a discourse of crime control and by advocating for stricter school rules. Under Clinton, federal policy makers used funding for low income students to impose stricter more punitive school policies including funding more police and technologies of surveillance.

Educational Elite, School Reform and the Role of Ideas

Throughout the dissertation I examine how the ideas of policy makers in charge of planning educational reforms—often informed by social scientific theories about the cause of Black poverty—illuminate the social control function of federal school reform and the ways that education reform reproduces ideologies about race. As Michelle Foucault contends governance and disciplining are linked with modes of thought. Thus studying the technologies of power requires an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them.⁶³

Historians of Black education have taken similar approaches and found that elite educational reformers, including social scientists, leaders of philanthropic organizations and government officials have long perpetuated racist ideologies to promote education reforms that reproduce political economic structures and racial subjugation.⁶⁴ Social science experts and policy elites have not only been deeply influenced by racial ideologies and politics, but also use these ideas to influence political discourse and social policy.⁶⁵ As Daryl Scott argues in *Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880-1996*, social science imagery of Black personality has been shaped by experts motivated and influenced by racial ideologies and politics.⁶⁶ Scott argues that social science ideas about Black people as damaged have been used by both conservatives and liberals to make and justify social policy. On the one hand, conservatives use claims of Black pathology, Black sexuality and violence to rationalize segregation, justify exclusionary policies and to end welfare programs. On the other, liberals evoke racial damage imagery to build white sympathy toward Blacks and justify policies of inclusion and rehabilitation. Research on poverty, or what historian Alice O’Conner refers to as “poverty knowledge,” has had a lasting impact on the social policy vocabulary by determining political meanings, policy consequences and establishing the terms of debate.⁶⁷ Concepts such as social “disorganization,” “deviance,” or “dysfunction”; or concepts such as the “tangle of pathology”; “culture of poverty,” the “underclass,” have been used in social policy in ways that

⁶² Victor Rios, *Punished: Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys*, (New York: NYU Press, 2011), xiii.

⁶³ Thomas Lemke, “‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality,” *Economy and Society* 30, no. 2 (2001): 190–207.

⁶⁴ For more on how federal elites reinforce racial ideologies see Watkins, *The White Architects of Black Education*. William Watkins explores the ideological beliefs of early 20th century school reformers to demonstrate how these reformers used schooling to stabilize the regional political economy and reduce class conflict in the south, build profits and offer an educational solution to the “Negro problem”; See also: Ansley T Erickson, “Desegregation’s Architects: Education Parks and the Spatial Ideology of Schooling,” *History of Education Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (November 1, 2016): 560–89. Erickson demonstrates that desegregation advocates and policy makers’ anti-Black and anti-urban ideas about race and space influenced federal education proposals in the 1960s and 1970s

⁶⁵ Scott, *Contempt and Pity*.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ O’Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*

reinforce the notions that poverty is created by psychological and cultural processes.⁶⁸ Over the course of this study, I examine how school reform and its ideologies are influenced by the broader base of poverty knowledge governing ideas about race, poverty and education.

Presidents and Federal Elite

My analysis of educational and policy elite focuses primarily on presidential administrations, administrators within the Office (later Department) of Education, Congress and other federal and local officials frame issues define problems and set agendas about school discipline, race, and education. Presidents are in a unique position to address Congress address the American people and to use the power of words to promote agendas and shape public policy and organize the discursive terrain shaping political, social and economic activity takes place.⁶⁹ As historian Daniel Rogers articulates,

In the very course of the everyday acts of politics, presidents and their speechwriters cannot help mapping an inchoate theory of society and politics: an image of the nation as a collective entity over which they preside. Presidential speeches not only use public words for tactical ends, large and small, but...they set into circulation mental pictures of society and its field of obligations...Even at its most formulaic and ritualized...the modern rhetorical presidency offers a window into the stock of ideas, assumptions, and social metaphors that hold traction in their day.⁷⁰

I look specifically at how presidents defined the problems of race, discipline and made public proposals to increase discipline, whether that be through implementing programs, reforming behavior, or by advocating for stricter often more punitive discipline practices in schools. Presidential discourse, while central to this story, is perhaps most poignantly described in chapter three where I show how Reagan set out to make school discipline a primary rhetorical device in his lukewarm efforts to reform schools. Yet even when presidents like Reagan spent little political capital on reforming education, their statements on education had real discursive and material effects. I demonstrate how Reagan's efforts to promote an image of urban school disorder emboldened his other anti-crime efforts and substantiated later federal efforts to build out a more robust federal effort to employ stricter and more punitive reforms.⁷¹ Presidential and policy discourse also inform how race is constructed as educational leaders define and describe the educational problems faced by low-income Black (and sometimes Latinx) students. Over time, politics and policies are racialized at the level of code words that are fundamentally nonracial in nature, but have, through the process of association, assumed a strong racial component. Terms such as "welfare," "urban" and "low-income" fit this process.⁷² Following federal political discourse illuminates how issues such as school discipline or even crime were

⁶⁸ O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 14-15.

⁶⁹ Jeffrey S. Ashley and Marla J. Jarmer, *The Bully Pulpit, Presidential Speeches, and the Shaping of Public Policy* (Lexington Books, 2015), ix; H. G. McIntush, "Defining Education: The Rhetorical Enactment of Ideology in 'A Nation at Risk,'" *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 3 (3) (2000): 419-44

⁷⁰ Daniel T Rodgers, *Age of Fracture*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 15.

⁷¹ Ross Collin and Joseph J. Ferrare, "Rescaling Education: Reconstructions of Scale in President Reagan's 1983 State of the Union Address," *Journal of Education Policy* 30, no. 6 (November 2, 2015): 796-809; H.G. McIntush, "Defining Education."

⁷² Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley. "Playing the Race Card in the Post-Willie Horton Era: The Impact of Racialized Code Words on Support for Punitive Crime Policy," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 69, no. 1 (2005): 99-112; Leonardo and Hunter, "Imagining the Urban".

raised, why it rose as it did during the different eras, how such issues emerged within broader discussions of school reform and the effect its rise had on the broader political debate.⁷³

Data Sources

I began my investigation into the relationship between education, social policy and forms of social control by diving into three main bodies of secondary literature. First, a number of education studies helped to illuminate the politics guiding federal education reform from the 1960s on. A number of studies on the 1960s helped guide my understanding on early education policy. Such studies include Gareth Davies, *See Government Grow: Education Politics from Johnson to Reagan*; Julie Roy Jeffrey, *Education for Children of the Poor: A Study of the Origins and Implementation of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965*; Hugh Davis Graham's, *The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Years*. Elizabeth DeBray's, *Politics, Ideology & Education: Federal Policy During the Clinton and Bush Administrations*, and Patrick J. McGuinn, *No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965-2005* were particularly helpful in shedding light on the politics guiding later reforms during the 1990s.

Also useful were intellectual histories that examined the politics of U.S. social policy. The most significant of these studies include Alice O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History*; Daryl Michael Scott's, *Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche*, and Michael B. Katz's, *In the Shadow Of the Poorhouse: A Social History Of Welfare In America*. Lastly a number of studies on race and the welfare state discussed how racial politics intercepted with local and federal poverty policy. These studies include Jill Quadagno's, *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty* and Robert C. Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State*. A subset of studies on the U.S. welfare state also analyze how punitive forms of crime control were integrated into social programs and used as anti-poverty social policy including Elizabeth Hinton's, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime. The Making of Mass Incarceration in America*, Loïc Wacquant's, *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*, and Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram, *Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race*.
From

My analysis also draws from primary archival sources collected from a number of national archives including presidential libraries, records from the federal Office of Education found at the federal archives in College Park, Maryland, and the personal papers of one former Secretary of Education.⁷⁴ The Office of Education's records include the files of the Commissioner of Education, the Assistant Commissioner of education and the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education. These records lend details about how federal policy makers within the executive offices framed problems of poverty, race and delinquency and urban problems and subsequently produced policies to respond to these problems. The records from the federal office of education and the commissioner of education were only available until the 1980s but proved to offer valuable documents and memos about the ways federal policy makers

⁷³ For a review on the importance of the national politics of education, see: Frederick M Hess and Patrick J. McGuinn, "Seeking the Mantle of 'Opportunity': Presidential Politics and the Educational Metaphor, 1964-2000," *Educational Policy* 16, no. 1 (January 2002): 72-95.

⁷⁴ My chapter on 1990s federal reform also includes data from Secretary of Education Richard Riley housed at the University of South Carolina in Columbia, SC.

understood the relationship between education and urban disorder during the 1960s. I also collected documents from presidential archives of the three presidents that held power during the three eras this dissertation examines. This includes data from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, TX, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, CA and the William Clinton Library in Little Rock, AR. These presidential records provide detail about domestic policy concerns, political agendas and also inform how Presidential administrations framed and subsequently sought to resolve problems related to education and urban poverty. Particularly helpful were the files of white house aides tasked with domestic policy issues.

In addition, I use Congressional hearings to get an account of how members of Congress discussed education reform issues and how they framed the problems of school discipline and urban violence. Congressional hearings also allow me to examine how witnesses including school superintendents, think tanks, and school unions are producing knowledge or ideas about urban schools and their needs. Lastly, I triangulate these federal archival sources with newspaper records. Newspaper sources collected from *the ProQuest Historical newspaper* database helped me identify how policies, programs and reports were being discussed nationally and regionally.

Together I look at how federal policy makers engage with shifting ideas about poverty, and the role of the political economy to make claims about education and discipline. Ultimately policy makers use federal education policy and a discourse of educational opportunity to perpetuate different forms of social control.

Dissertation Overview: Federal education policy the “disciplining Politics of opportunity”
This dissertation presents a new perspective on the relationship between race, education, and the punitive turn of social policy. I argue that there is a shifting “disciplining politics of opportunity,” that undergirds federal education policy between 1965 when policy makers envisioned how educational programs could pacify Black resistance to a period in the 1980s and 1990s whereby increased order, control and eventually policing was reframed by federal policy makers as one way to bring forth racial equity through schools. I am interested both in how education policy functions as a “disciplining force,” or a tool of governance in which federal policy makers use education policy to address problems of poverty, and come to consistently name, sort, categorize, and regulate behavior through what became politically popular education opportunity initiatives. At the same time, I am interested in “school discipline,” the onset of school rules, the practices of suspension, removal, technologies of surveillance and increased police presence and how federal policy makers choose to reframe problems of educational equity as one of school rules, school disorder and indiscipline. In each of these processes policy makers come to define opportunity in relation to a presumed Black criminality defined broadly as protest, school disruption, or one’s potential to create violence.

I use the term “opportunity” in this context to mean the policies enacted to bring about racial equality through economic support and premised on a liberal notion of meritocratic advancement. Recall that the opportunity programs that made up the Great Society Opportunity welfare state were initiated, at least in theory, to eliminate economic impediments to African Americans and that education initiatives have remained a key institution in federal social provision. In the post-opportunity era, the period of rising conservatism, of reigning neoliberalism, education has continued to be a politically popular social policy credited for creating programs for individual meritocratic advancement that appeal to the disadvantaged, while allowing policy makers to disavow more politically unpopular “big spending” programs. Fredrick Hess and Patrick McGuinn argue that due to growing middle-class disenchantment with

redistributive social programs, federal policy makers—particularly Democrats—use education as a means of promoting a more activist social agenda.

On one hand, education escaped the moral hazard dilemmas associated with the troubled politics of welfare—because no critics would argue that school spending would undermine the work ethic or self-reliance of children. On the other hand, education offered Democrats away to steer large amounts of resources toward disadvantaged communities while focusing attention on the most sympathetic members of those communities.⁷⁵

Education policies are one area of public spending that the broader public and policy officials openly support. In contrast, social assistance or welfare has long been weak, not politically stable, and often linked with misrepresentations of recipients as poor and Black. Such associations reinforce stereotypes of Black people as lazy and “undeserving,” of social supports thereby limiting public support of the already politically vulnerable programs.⁷⁶ As this dissertation uncovers, education remains a politically popular anti-poverty program—one that Democrats can pursue without seeming to “reward” undeserving recipients. This approach also allows them to respond in a limited way to issues of race and civil rights without being a specifically race-targeted program and therefore bearing the backlash of more racially targeted programs⁷⁷ Throughout the course of this dissertation, however, I demonstrate that liberal and conservative policy makers still use schools to justify punitive and disciplining practices and make claims about the urban and disorder. Although educational opportunity programs are often mapped in the public mind as merit-based programs for the deserving, federal policy makers have often advocated for more punitive school rules in ways that treat children as members of the undeserving poor or those who do and do not merit help.⁷⁸

This dissertation is divided into three chronological and thematic chapters. Chapter 2 describes the political conflicts surrounding the origins of federal education policy. As federal policy makers strategized their legislative program for their budding War on Poverty, they simultaneously envisioned the ways that educational programs including Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) could be used as a primary strategy to confront urban poverty and issues about urban delinquency and crime. This chapter uses the urban rebellions as a backdrop to explore how ESEA and other education initiatives stemming

⁷⁵ Hess and McGuinn, “Seeking the Mantle of ‘Opportunity’”.

⁷⁶ For more on how the public understands policies in racialized ways see Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare*,

⁷⁷ Elizabeth, and Patrick McGuinn, “The New Politics of Education Analyzing the Federal Education Policy Landscape in the Post-NCLB Era,” *Educational Policy* 23, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 15–42. Debray and McGuinn argue for instance that education became particularly salient to presidential elections, by the 1990s, Congressional Republican’s attempts to demolish the Department of Education and convert federal spending into unrestricted block grants cost them favor with the American public and contributed to their defeat in presidential elections.

⁷⁸ For a history of how people have been categorized as either the deserving or underserving poor and how these boundaries have been debated see Michael Katz, *The Undeserving Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with Poverty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Katz describes how people who occupy the category often changes overtime. At times, men and especially those seen as suffering from substance abuse are seen as undeserving. At other points, women and unmarried mothers especially women of color occupy the category of undeserving. Frequently, immigrants and the undocumented are seen as undeserving. For an analysis of how ideas about deservingness interact with how policies pass or fail see Brian Steensland, *The Failed Welfare Revolution: America’s Struggle Over Guaranteed Income Policy* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008).

from the War on Poverty were promoted as programs that could address disorder. Suggesting that these initiatives were more than just an “opportunity program” for the “educationally deprived,” this chapter demonstrates that ESEA and other federal education programs were used by federal policy makers to discipline Black urban youth away from delinquency and urban rebellion. This “vision,” to use educational opportunity to discipline Black students, has remained an enduring legacy of 1960s federal education policy.

Chapter 3 explores how the disciplining politics of opportunity shifted in the 1980s. Educational opportunity as a strategy of social uplift was no longer used to equalize the opportunity structure or regulate protest. Rather, during the period of educational and welfare state retrenchment and a heightened criminal turn during a burgeoning the War on Drugs, Reagan officials drummed up fears about the rising problem of school disorder to implement a new goal in federal education policy making: increased school discipline. While other scholars have identified how President Ronald Reagan provided an explicit ideological view of the federal government’s role in education few studies have explored how school discipline and crime control was a consistent part of that ideological message.⁷⁹ Moreover, while many studies of 1980s federal reform focus on how the Department of Education’s report *A Nation at Risk* altered the goals and priorities of federal and state reform, this chapter provides a new lens for examining the effects of 1980s education reform. Focusing on the release of an internal report “Discipline in Our Schools” released months following *A Nation at Risk*, this chapter explores how Reagan officials partnered with educational leaders including teacher unions and Black school leaders—to make discipline, not more school funding the focus of educational opportunity to urban students. School discipline and increased school order was cast as the civil rights issue of the time--an idea that would go on to frame school reform during the 1990s.

The last chapter explores how President Bill Clinton’s proposed “third way” approach to social policy and education reform embraced opportunity by appealing to individual and community responsibility. I demonstrate that federal education initiatives designed for low income children worked in concert with other federal initiatives and served as part of a single umbrella message—to reform the delinquencies of “urban crime,” and welfare “dependence.” Stiffer discipline policies, police and penal technologies were incorporated into schools Through federal reforms like Goals 2000, IASA and education initiatives in the federal crime bill. Second education initiatives were combined with paternalistic welfare reform policies to tackle multiple forms of dependency. Although Clinton sought to distinguish his social policies from earlier Democratic presidents, when it came to crime control, urban policy and reforming education, his policies and discourse harkened back to earlier Democratic policymakers. These similarities were most visible in his belief that educational solutions could absolve problems of racialized poverty and “urban violence.” Yet the disciplining politics of opportunity had shifted-- ‘safe and discipline schools’ equipped with police, and metal detectors became a key goal of ensuring urban students had the opportunity to learn just as fighting other forms of delinquencies would discipline students away from a future of welfare dependence.

Finally, chapter five offers concluding reflections on the continued relevance of the disciplining politics of opportunity. Federal policy makers continue to lean towards

⁷⁹ Patrick McQuinn review in *perspectives on politics* vol6 no.3. (2008); Richard Jung and Michael Kirst, “Beyond Mutual Adaptation, into the Bully Pulpit: Recent Research on the Federal Role in Education,” April 1986.

individualized education solutions for problems of racialized police violence. I end by advocating for a politics that pushes organizers, teachers and educational researchers to reach beyond educational demands or educational solutions to racial inequality, racism and state sanctioned violence.

Significance

This dissertation illuminates how federal policy reformers embrace two seemingly opposing traditions when proposing federal reforms for low-income, Black, and urban schools. Federal reforms designed to bring about opportunity can work to simultaneously regulate, discipline and sometimes punish those receiving federal education support. Moreover, I describe how federal education policy evolved as ever-present worries about urban crime and racialized poverty heightened, contributing to our understanding of the contradictions within federal education programs. Second, this dissertation expands the narrative and scope of studies on school discipline and criminality. Most studies of school discipline rightfully explore how school and classroom practices lead to the over penalization of Black students, yet school actors are not the only ones shaping school reform on beliefs that discipline problems impede academic success. This study traces issues of school discipline and criminality to the beliefs and actions of federal policy makers executing federal reforms. Third, my study contributes to studies of U.S. social policy. Much like other poverty-serving welfare state programs, federal education policy has become increasingly standardized, privatized and punitive. Education reforms are part of an overall system of poverty governance. Through institutions like schools, prisons and welfare, the behavior of the poor—beginning first with poor children—is to be regulated, controlled and disciplined. Yet by masking reforms under the guise of educational opportunity—the punitive evolution of education has evaded our watch.

I would like to emphasize that while I am thinking critically about US social policy it is not to dismiss, or to abdicate federal responsibility for providing economic support, creating robust job policies, or educational support. Rather, I hope that by interrogating the assumptions, and ideologies, that govern poverty knowledge and federal policy makers we may be able to create fairer, more just, less punitive and less criminalizing social and education policies.

Chapter 2: A “vision of Something to be done:” Summer riots, “crime,” and Educationalizing Black Resistance: 1965-1968

In 1966, just one year after the most extensive federal education legislation was passed in Congress and signed into law by former teacher Lyndon Baines Johnson, Congress reconsidered ways to improve aid to children under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The most extensive portion of ESEA, Title I, accounted for \$1 billion in aid to local educational agencies for the education of children from low-income families in order to meet the “special educational needs of educationally deprived children.”¹ Congress added a new title for handicapped children in the 1966 amendments, and expanded Title I coverage to institutionalized orphans and neglected and delinquent children.

As special interest groups lobbied together to secure funding from the expanding education legislation, Blaine Madison, North Carolina Commissioner of Juvenile Correction and president of the National Association of Training Schools and Juvenile Agencies persuasively made his bid.² Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Madison questioned why institutionalized delinquents had been excluded from the previous year’s \$1 billion Title I fund. “Institutions serving delinquent youth in the United States,” Madison declared, “are the greatest congregation of unlearned, uncared for, unwanted, unloved, and undisciplined young people to be found in the country.”³ The institutionalized young people Madison spoke of were all “bundles of nerves and energies and emotions” and residence institutions like his that served “the socially and psychologically maladjusted” also represented “the last chance that some juvenile delinquents will ever have to prevent their going into a life of crime.”⁴ This 1966 ESEA amendment that filled “the gaping hole in coverage for children in state supported schools for neglected and delinquent” youth was just one way that ESEA and other education initiatives were put in place to discipline those deemed delinquent during the early years of federal aid to elementary and secondary education.⁵

Madison’s testimony about the potential of school institutions to address the behavior of the “maladjusted” illuminates much about the ideologies of educational leaders and federal policy makers who were responsible for shaping 1960s social policy and federal education reform. Like Madison, federal policy makers in Congress, the federal Office of Education and Presidential aides relied on pathological claims about the deficits of poor children and poor families. Furthermore, they promoted educational programs by making specific claims about Black cultural deficit and Black delinquency.⁶ Alongside the 1966 amendment, federal policy

¹ Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

² For more on the role of interest groups in 1960s federal education legislation see Hugh Davis Graham, *The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Years*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984).

³ *Statement of Blain Madison to U.S Congress, Senate, Senate subcommittee on education of the Committee on Labor and Public welfare. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1966*, 89th Cong., (1966), 1305-1307. *ibid.*

⁵ “Administrative History of the Department of Health Education and Welfare,” Elementary and Secondary Education. Administrative History Box 3. Folder, Administrative History Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.p.321. Vol I, parts IV Office of Education Part II. Lyndon Bains Johnson Library. Hereafter LBJL

⁶ Madison also corresponded with Governor Luther Hodges during the 1958 “Kissing case” during which two Black children were arrested for kissing a white girl on the cheek. In Madison’s correspondents with Governor Hodges, Madison suggested that the children be kept in juvenile care until the boys’ mothers could improve their living situation. See Anders Walker, *The Ghost of Jim Crow: How Southern Moderates Used Brown V. Board of Education to Stall Civil Rights*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 76.

makers discussed how educational opportunity might cool the long hot summers of urban uprisings that spread across Black cities during the 1960s. Many federal officials, including President Johnson, reported that schooling was what “ought to be done about the riots in the cities.”⁷ The most prominent of these uprisings occurred in Watts during the summer of 1965, Detroit and Newark in the summer of 1967, and spread across multiple cities after Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination in the spring of 1968.

While almost all school districts were eligible for Title I funds, arguments about how programs like Title I could resolve “delinquency” had specific racial appeals. Government reports at the time estimated that while Black children represented just 8.4% of children in homes for dependent and neglected youth (88.4% were white) they represented a third of all youth in training schools for juvenile delinquents.⁸ Alongside programs like Job Corp, Model Cities and other education-based anti-poverty programs, aid to elementary and secondary education was seen by federal policy makers as an important disciplinary mechanism that could intervene in and subdue unrest in Black urban communities.⁹ Education programs did not trigger the same white backlash that threatened other Great Society programs in part because recipients were children and expanding more education programs was not seen as rewarding rioters.¹⁰

This chapter begins with a background on the War on Poverty and its major educational triumph, ESEA. It explores how the ESEA, like the broader body of social policies expanded to provide “opportunity” to urban Black Americans, was simultaneously structured to discipline and regulate their behavior. Focusing on federal policy makers’ ideas about how schools could respond to racialized delinquency, crime, and unrest during the long hot summers of the 1960s offers a novel view of the origins of ESEA. Early studies critiqued the ways that federal policy makers used federal aid to respond to social problems related to race and poverty.¹¹ What has drawn less attention is how policy makers imagined the ways that aid to education, particularly Title I of ESEA, could be employed to combat threats of Black delinquency and urban unrest. Doing so illuminates how policy makers used the language of “educational opportunity” to promote ideologies about Black pathology that linked race, and urban poverty with an impervious and enduring commitment to combat and make criminal Black rebellion. Using the examples of urban rebellions in Watts, I examine how policy officials used ESEA and other education initiatives as a preferred, “non rewarding” War on Poverty program to confront Black rebellions. Next, I look specifically at the education proposals surrounding the Detroit and Newark riots of 1967 to document the ways that education policy makers proposed Title I funded education programs to confront claims about Black leisure, restlessness and alienation-induced violence. The last section examines the policy discussions surrounding the assassination of

⁷ Job Corps, Model cities and the poverty program could do some of this. “Notes of the President’s Meeting with Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News on August 4, 1967,” Thomas Johnson’s Meeting Notes Box 1. Folder. July 1967-May 1968 Meetings with Correspondents. LBJL

⁸ Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “The Negro Family: A Case for National Action,” (Washington, DC: Office of Policy Planning and Research, U.S. Department of Labor, March 1965): 38.

⁹ “Notes of the President’s Meeting with Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News on August 4, 1967,” Thomas Johnson’s Meeting Notes Box 1. Folder. July 1967-May 1968 Meetings with Correspondents. LBJL

¹⁰ For more on the race-based backlash against War on Poverty programs see Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line* and Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare*. For rising welfare rolls in the North see Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, 243. They argue that welfare rolls climbed 58% between 1964 and 1968. The 121 urban counties increased 80% after 1964, even in the South welfare rolls increased 43% after 1964 (245).

¹¹ Gary Orfield, *The Reconstruction of Southern Education: The Schools and the 1964 Civil Rights Act*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1969); Julie Roy Jeffrey, *Education for Children of the Poor*.

Martin Luther King and the ways that policy makers envisioned how education could serve as a long-term vision to treat fears about Black pathology, resentment and delinquency.

ESEA, Juvenile Delinquency and the Educational War on Poverty

Through ESEA, policy makers outlined key methods and areas of intervention for developing education initiatives to confront poverty and its problems. Title I projects, which varied widely, were developed by local educational agencies, sent to the state education agency and approved by the Commissioner of Education. As historian Hugh Davis Graham observed, “when Title I was implemented, it produced not *a* Title I program, but something more like 30,000 separate and different Title I programs.”¹² Some provided in-school remedial reading and language projects, remedial mathematics and language programs, and others focused on cultural enrichment and afterschool programs. Title I also hired auxiliary personnel or teacher aides to provide students with individual attention, help with school discipline and student behavioral concerns and work to connect school to community. The other titles of ESEA did not distribute money based on the poverty formula of Title I. Title II provided grants for books and school libraries, Title III of the act sought to improve educational innovation through funding supplementary educational centers and services and offering educational programs outside of school, Title IV went to educational research and training, and Title V would help to strengthen state departments of education.

Educational initiatives played a particularly significant role under the War on Poverty and were dispersed throughout early anti-poverty War on Poverty programs. Proposals in the Economic Opportunity Act—the centerpiece of The War on Poverty—were dedicated to community action which would become the most controversial title of the Economic Opportunity Act because it allowed the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to bypass local governments and fund nonprofit agencies and work directly with African Americans, who in the south had been excluded from participation in poverty planning and redistribution.¹³ The new federal OEO, created training programs such as Job Corps, and VISTA (which later became AmeriCorps) and oversaw federal work study programs like Upward Bound and the Head Start Program. These programs emphasized both individualized education solutions to broader social problems. As the Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II, reflected:

[I]nstead of trying to put money directly into people's pockets in the Roosevelt style... The War on Poverty built into people the capacity to solve their problems by giving them the opportunity for education... President Johnson really had to go all out to get this great legislative program through and to say, "we're going to solve this problem and this problem and this problem through education."¹⁴

Indeed, by emphasizing training and educational solutions to issues of poverty, urban deindustrialization and racial inequality, Johnson era policy makers framed poverty as an individualized or cultural problem, as opposed to one of wealth distribution and economic inequalities.¹⁵ The War on Poverty's education initiatives complemented the emerging ideas

¹² Graham, *The Uncertain Triumph*, 204.

¹³ Crystal R. Sanders, *A Chance for Change: Head Start and Mississippi's Black Freedom Struggle* (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Quadagno *The Color of Welfare*.

¹⁴ “Oral Interview of Harold Howe II,” October 29, 1968. P.11. Oral History Collection. LBJL.

¹⁵ Kantor and Lowe, “From New Deal to No Deal”; Dunning, “New Careers for the Poor: Human Services and the Post-Industrial City.” *Journal of Urban History* 44, no. 4 (July 1, 2018): 672; Tyack, Lowe, and Hansot, , *Public Schools in Hard Times*; Kantor and Lowe, “Educationalizing the Welfare State,” in Prudence L. Carter and Kevin G.

about poverty that circulated academic and liberal reformers at the time. Though some popular texts argued that poverty was linked to structural inequality, the analysis of the poor focused less on the political economic conditions related to jobs or income and more about the psychological and demographic traits of the poor themselves.¹⁶ Individual skills and behavior explained why people were poor. In turn, liberal policy makers believed that investing in human capital through education and training would help to overcome both economic and racial disadvantages—particularly for the young, often unemployed Black males in overcrowded northern ghettos.¹⁷ Education and training programs thus were designed to help the poor help themselves. As historians Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe argue, the Great Society “aimed not to protect the least advantaged from the inequities and uncertainties of the labor market, but rather to develop individuals’ human capital so that they might participate in it.”¹⁸

The Great Society’s education initiatives did provide some jobs particularly for women and mothers in the growing human service sector. Black mothers were trained to work as educators in early education programs, largely employed as teacher aides to support student behavior and bring communities in closer contact with schools. Educators and policy makers believed that communities were alienated from white dominated school structures. In addition, some of the main advocates for supporting paraprofessionals through education saw these jobs as a way to rebuild the urban economy around the provision of services and encourage the arrival of a service economy as part of a comprehensive antipoverty strategy.¹⁹ As I will describe in later chapters, these jobs specifically created to tackle unemployment, support students in schools, and conciliate Black families who demanded that schools were unresponsive to Black students would become grounds for attack as education reformers focused more on standards and “excellence.”

The War on Poverty’s education, training, and community action programs were directed at racial minorities and, as reviewed in the introduction, became a primary vehicle of extending opportunity to African Americans.²⁰ For example, evaluators of ESEA argued that educational assistance was the best means of helping the “children of the urban Negro poor” for whom education offered “perhaps one of the best means of unshackling themselves from the chains of poverty.”²¹ The Great Society was an educational solution—one that as President Johnson asserted was built in three areas: “our cities, our countryside and in our classrooms.”²²

Of the mounting problems that education was fit to solve was the issue of Black delinquency—a mystification of political contestation made most visible by the Black rebellions

Welner, eds., *Closing the Opportunity Gap: What America Must Do to Give Every Child an Even Chance*, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

¹⁶ O’Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*.

¹⁷ Jeffrey, *Education for Children of the Poor*. Traces the War on Poverty’ education initiatives to The Kennedy administration’s poverty task forces which concluded that education offered young Black unemployed people the possibility of economic improvement.

¹⁸ For more on the educational differences between War on Poverty programs and the New Deal see Kantor and Lowe, “Educationalizing the Welfare State and Privatizing Education,” 26-27

¹⁹ For a review of teacher aides in the great society see Dunning, “New Careers for the Poor”; for the role of mothers organizing for early childhood education see Sanders, *A Chance for Change*.

²⁰ For more on racial exclusion in Welfare State policy, see Ira Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006); Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare*, 21.

²¹ “Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children,” January 31, 1968, 5. WHCF EX FG 763 Box 410. Folder, National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children 1/1/67-2/29/68. LBJL

²² Johnson quoted in Maurice R. Berube, *American Presidents and Education* (New York: Praeger, 1991).

that spread across the ghettos of the U.S. 1960s liberals lumped civil disobedience, mass uprisings, and individual acts of petty crime together as problems caused by poverty and thus susceptible to educational solutions. These problems of urban disorder that policy makers and social scientists argued characterized the ghetto were caused by poverty and could be improved upon by providing residents of the ghetto with opportunity. The emphasis on opportunity that eventually drove much of the War on Poverty, including community action had developed as social scientists and policy makers sought to understand and redress urban poverty and delinquency. In their 1960 book *Delinquency and Opportunity*, Sociologists Lloyd Ohlin and Richard Cloward argued that lower-class youth turned to crime and delinquency because they lacked access to structures of opportunity and unsympathetic institutions discouraged their will to succeed.²³ This theory of opportunity became influential within President Kennedy's administration, which developed a host of anti-delinquency demonstration programs focused on counseling, job training and programs emphasizing early childhood education and remedial reading. Speaking before Congress, Kennedy reasoned that while there was no single cure for the mounting delinquency problem, "surely the place to begin is the malady which underlies so much of youthful frustration, rebellion and idleness: and that malady is lack of opportunity."²⁴ Moreover, while mounting problems of juvenile delinquency had been of growing national concern affecting youth of every race, class, and social background, by the 1960s the discourse around juvenile delinquency was increasingly understood in more racialized terms. Poverty planners' views about the crumbling inner city drove them to invest in anti-delinquency programs that largely targeted Black youth and also reinforced the beliefs that Black inequality was primarily caused by cultural pathologies.²⁵

The remaining sections explore how federal reformers, local educators, poverty planners and administration officials proposed education programs as a soft approach to urban social control. Liberals in the Johnson administration would continue to argue for the "anti-crime" effects of War on Poverty programs as racial conservatives and critics of his social program campaigned against social spending and swelling instances of urban rebellions. To paraphrase President Johnson—bemoaning violence in the streets meant voting to support the War on Poverty, the Civil Rights Act and major educational bills.²⁶ Educational opportunity could address, prevent and quell Black rebellions that erupted across Black ghettos during the long hot summers of the 1960s.

²³ Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity*, 2nd edition (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); See also chapter 2 in Jeffrey, *Education for Children of the Poor*; chapter 5 of O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*; Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*.

²⁴ John F Kennedy. Special Message on our nation's youth, 14 February 1963. President's Office Files. Legislative Files. Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-052-014. Accessed from on November 1, 2019

²⁵ Judith Kafka, "Disciplining Youth, Disciplining Women: Motherhood, Delinquency, and Race in Postwar American Schooling," *Educational Studies* 44 (2008): 197–221; For a discussion on race, delinquency and the efforts of the Kennedy administration, see Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*, especially chapter 1. Hinton for example notes that 80% of youth served by Kennedy's juvenile delinquency demonstration programs in cities like Detroit, Philadelphia, and Cleveland were African American, and even in cities that had smaller Black populations like Syracuse and New Haven Connecticut half of the participants in the anti-delinquency demonstration programs were Black (18).

²⁶ Lyndon Johnson, "Remarks on the City Hall Steps, Dayton, Ohio," in *Public Papers of the Presidents 1963–64*, vol. 2 (1965), 1371. Cited in Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, (New York: The New Press, 2010), 45.

ESEA is not a Reward for Rioters: Watts California and Igniting the Long Hot Summers

Educational programs designed to address Black poverty are perhaps best understood as programs designed to address the Black poor themselves rather than to redress the structural conditions and preexisting policies that kept Black people in segregated and impoverished communities. When ESEA funds were paired with the legislative teeth of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which restricted federal funds from segregated institutions, officials from the Office of Education held within their grasp a major weapon for enforcing integration. Yet when the Office of Education began distributing Title I allocations in the fall of 1965, it faced immense challenges in confronting school segregation.²⁷ On August 29, 1965, Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel wrote the White House and reported that the “great majority of Negroes will not be attending desegregated schools in the fall.”²⁸ He reported that 12 school systems said, “flatly that they would not comply with Title VI; 33 districts sent in ‘unsatisfactory plans’; 154 districts failed to report anything, and thousands of districts were operating under limited free choice plans.”²⁹ In addition, civil rights groups, such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), asserted that integration was “still moving at a snail’s pace” and denounced the Office for promoting school choice plans and distributing funds to districts who maintained segregation through choice.³⁰ Black students in Northern cities would—like their counterparts in the deep South—also be attending segregated schools in the fall of 1965. Over the next three years the administration would move away from using ESEA and Title VI to penetrate the tightly segregated schools in the North.³¹ Although the administration would not change the structure of northern school segregation, they could however use education programs to change the children and families who remained in segregated urban schools. Such was the case when the Watts area of Los Angeles erupted in rebellion in August 1965.

Racialized Political Rhetoric and promoting Educational Programs in Post-Riot Watts

Watts made national headlines in the summer of 1965 after California Highway patrolman Lee Minikus arrested 21-year-old motorist Marquette Frye on August 11th. The McCone Commission, charged by California Governor Pat Brown to account for the causes and details of the Watts riot recounted the events that lead to the rebellion stating that more than 1,000 people gathered and watched the arrest of Marquette Frye and his brother.³² The report continued that things escalated when their mother who had become “belligerent” after watching her sons struggle with the police, “jumped on the back of one of the officers and ripped his shirt.” This initial scene incited the six-day riot that ended with 200 buildings completely destroyed by fire, \$40 million in property damage, just under 3,500 arrests and 34 deaths.³³ The collective violence in South Central Los Angeles became, as Historian Elizabeth Hinton argues, “the litmus test for

²⁷ For more on the Office of Education and the politics of desegregation see Orfield, *The Reconstruction of Southern Education*.

²⁸ Memorandum for Joseph Califano from Francis Keppel “Daily status of desegregation plans,” HU 2-5 Box 50. Folder 11/22/63- 9/6/65 LBJL

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Orfield, *The Reconstruction of Southern Education*, 127-8.

³¹ For more on desegregation efforts in Northern cities see Thomas J. Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North*, (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2009); Russell Rickford, *We Are an African People: Independent Education, Black Power, and the Radical Imagination*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

³² Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots., John Alex McCone. (1965). *McCone Commission report!: complete and unabridged report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riot*.

³³ *ibid* p. 23

the War on Crime.”³⁴ The violence between anti-policing residents of South Los Angeles and police forces was used as evidence that excessive force, policing, surveillance could contain criminality. Watts too became the litmus test that education and social programs could be pursued alongside excessive policing to attack the roots of urban disorder and prevent future rebellions.³⁵

Soon after the chaos wrought by police brutality, delinquent youth, and “belligerent” mothers (to cite the McCone commission), President Johnson would sign appropriations for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act on September 23, 1965. By October, the U.S. Office of Education received and approved applications from 47 states and the District of Columbia. The Office of Education also considered one project from California for the Watts area of Los Angeles. The Watts program proposed bringing to the riot-torn area an additional 305 teachers, 80 remedial kindergartens, and four new centers for pre-school and primary age children that would employ 150 teacher aides and up to 1,000 parents. In addition, the California Department of Education reported that they would add 15 counselors and 15 counseling aides in the elementary schools and hire more health care professionals, including more than 20 doctors, 55 nurses, and 55 nurses’ aides to do health examinations for the 200,000 children in the area. ³⁶ Thus, education initiatives also provided teacher aide jobs to Black and Latino mothers during a period when other low-skilled jobs were disappearing and deindustrialization increased.³⁷

Other districts proposed different ways to utilize their initial Title I funds. In Dodge County, Georgia the Board of Education wanted to provide children in eight elementary schools and one high school with certificates to purchase clothes and school supplies, establish a kindergarten for four and five-year-olds, and provide special classes for slow learners. Providence, Rhode Island planned to establish a reading clinic for 15 inner-city elementary schools, and Broward County, Florida aimed to take a “mobile reading laboratory” on the road to provide “specialized reading instruction and testing facilities” to 20,000 students.³⁸ New York City officials proposed an additional pre-kindergarten program, a summer program for emotionally disturbed children, and a plan to remove the 6th grade from overcrowded elementary schools, an action that would also further the desegregation of the city’s junior high schools.

Overall, more than 97% of the nation’s 25,000 school districts were eligible for the \$775 million Congress had appropriated to Title I.³⁹ The projects highlighted demonstrated that Title I programs could be “as diverse as inner-city and rural education needs.”⁴⁰ Still, policy makers typically approached these “diverse needs” with basic assumptions about the needs of poor

³⁴ Hinton. *War on Poverty to the War on Crime*. 64

³⁵ Hinton also lays out the argument that policing and social programs including education would be pursued together in the fight against crime p73

³⁶ Quotes are from “Memorandum for Honorable S. Douglass Cater, Jr from Harold R. Levy. October 4, 1965,” National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children 11/23/63-6/22/66. EX FG 763 Box 410. LBJL.

³⁷ Arthur Pearl and Frank Reismann advocated for human service positions such as teacher aide positions for the poor as a solution to economic transformations like deindustrialization which decreased access to low-wage jobs. Pearl and Riessman, *New Careers for the Poor; the Nonprofessional in Human Service*; Frank Riessman, “Teachers of the Poor: A Five-Point Plan,” *Journal of Teacher Education* 18, no. 3 (September 1, 1967): 326–36; see also Dunning, “New Careers for the Poor.”

³⁸ Quotes are from “Memorandum for Honorable S. Douglass Cater, Jr from Harold R. Levy. October 4, 1965,” WHCF EX FG 763 Box 410. Folder, National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children 11/23/63-6/22/66 LBJL

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

children, particularly the needs of the Black poor. Policy makers reproduced ideas about the pathologies of the Black poor believed to lack the skills, values and attitudes of middle-class families.⁴¹ In the aftermath of the Watts riot for example, the US Department of Labor released the confidential report, “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.” The author of the report, Undersecretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan, analyzed the “tangle of pathology” that overwhelmed the lower-class Black family.⁴² According to Moynihan the ghetto child was thought to come from illegitimate, welfare-dependent, female-headed homes and these broken families had an “unmistakable influence” on the academic performance of Black youth.⁴³ Moynihan suggested that the programs of the federal government should enhance the stability and resources of the Negro American family, and specific elements of a national effort should be coordinated in terms of one general strategy.⁴⁴ While Moynihan believed his coordinated general strategy would be best used toward a job program that would put unemployed Black fathers back to work to cut welfare dependency, bring about family stability and improve educational achievement, in the aftermath of the Watts rebellion, much of the coordinated strategy was aimed at making schools social centers. Title I fit the bill.

Moynihan, like many other social scientists of the day, also asserted that poverty and alienation produced other pathologies like the delinquency and crime demonstrated in the rebellions.⁴⁵ Although no school buildings were destroyed in the Watts rebellion, social scientists and poverty planners believed that lack of educational opportunities contributed to ghetto rage that led to the Watts rebellion. Psychologist Kenneth Clark described how Black violence was one of the social and psychological costs of living in the ghetto. Clark did not believe that male unemployment and the matriarchal family structure were the primary causes of Black pathology. Rather, these were merely symptoms of the structural conditions that confined Blacks to ghetto neighborhoods.⁴⁶ In his book, *Dark Ghetto, Dilemmas of Social Power*—which greatly influenced the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ understanding of urban poverty—Clark argued that ghettos were “social, political, educational and above all—economic colonies.” The ghetto walls were constructed by those with power to confine those who had none. He argued that those confined within the walls of the dark ghetto developed a deep sense of alienation and rage. Clark later wrote that the Black ghetto of Watts, though “lined with palm trees,” was no different from the Harlem neighborhood described in *Dark Ghetto*. In Watts, “the inmates of the ghetto” were “segregated, desperate people with no jobs, or servile jobs, little education, broken families, delinquency, drug addiction, and a burning rage at a society that *excludes them from the things it values most.*”⁴⁷ These observations reinforced the structurally conditioned yet nonetheless psychological explanations for the causes of rebellion.

Government reports reflected these same ideas about the ramifications of Black isolation and ghetto poverty. The McCone Commission argued that “the attitude and awareness of the

⁴¹ For more on the social science ideas undergirding 1960s compensatory education programs, see Ravitch, *The Troubled Crusade*, 158.

⁴² United States Dept of Labor Office of Policy Planning and Research, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*, First Edition (University of Michigan Library, 1965).

⁴³ *Ibid*, 36.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 46.

⁴⁵ For a review on how Moynihan borrowed from other scholarly reports see O’Conner’s *Poverty Knowledge*, 196.

⁴⁶ Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power*, (Wesleyan University Press, 1965); see also O’Conner’s *Poverty Knowledge*.

⁴⁷ Kenneth B. Clark, “‘The Wonder Is There Have Been So Few Riots’: So Few Riots’,” *New York Times* (New York), 1965.

Negro community regarding opportunities in employment, education and recreation lead to the frustration and discontent that lead to the Watts riot.”⁴⁸ They recommended improving employment opportunities, law enforcement and also endorsed an “emergency education program” that would overcome the problem of overcrowding in schools in the riot area.⁴⁹ In many ways, drawing attention to educational disparities as the McCone Commission had done also served to obscure state sanctioned violence and structured poverty that residents of the ghetto were rebelling against. While The McCone Commission drew attention to overcrowded schools, unequal course offerings and limited access to libraries, they also dedicated a substantial portion of their report to “environmental factors” as the cause of educational inequality. The report claimed, for instance, that the low level of education amongst adults and “disciplinary and law enforcement problems” in the community had contributed to the low level of educational achievement. Such reports thus made education both a cause of racial inequality and a focus of reform. Educational opportunities would not only help to make up for the believed inadequacies that the ghetto child inherited from their families and communities, but improving educational opportunities was seen as a way to absolve some of the rage that segregation wrought. The idea of educational opportunity promoted in policy reports and social science research thus reiterated and reproduced ideas about the pathologies of Black communities and youth who dissented against racial violence through rebellion.

While some social scientists, planners and policy makers investigated the psychological costs of limited opportunities and ghetto isolation, others contested the political costs that certain opportunity programs might bear. Though Los Angeles mayor Sam Yorty claimed to have favorable relations with the Negro community, he had a record of opposing Black rights in areas such as job creation, police relations, and federally supported poverty boards. In 1962, Mayor Yorty opposed hearings by the State Civil Rights Commission investigating “the relationships between the police and minority groups” on the grounds that such hearings would cater “to the dissidents in the community.”⁵⁰ In addition, days before to the 1965 rebellion, Yorty had also failed to implement any of the newly designed federal anti-poverty Community Action Programs intended to redistribute power to poor communities over the policies that were designed to serve them. The federal OEO required that local poverty boards be representative of the low-income community members. In Los Angeles, like other cities, Community Action Programs faced opposition from local officials who argued that only elected officials should control the board.⁵¹ And although Secretary of Labor William Wirtz argued that federal efforts focus on building a jobs program for Watts, Yorty argued that job creation would not deter riots but instead would be “extremely dangerous and would build up a case for potential riots.”⁵² Mayor Yorty believed that supporting a job programs might be considered a reward for rioters yet he did not hold the same worries about extending education programs. After the riots, President Johnson sent Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark to head a taskforce to overcome

⁴⁸ California Governor Brown charged the commission with finding out “The opportunities for Negroes in employment, education, and recreation in the troubled area; and the attitude and awareness of the Negro community regarding those opportunities.” Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots (McCone Commission), 8.

⁴⁹ Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots (McCone Commission), 8

⁵⁰ Rosemarie Brooks, “Daley And Yorty About Ready To Try ‘Flying Right’: They Reserve Original Decision On U.S. Anti-Riot Assistance,” *The Chicago Defender (National Edition)*, (Chicago), August 21, 1965.

⁵² See Horne, *Fire This Time*, 287; Wirtz had called for a large public works program modeled on the New Deal as part of the War on Poverty, but Johnson shied away from such massive spending and management by the federal government.

the causes of urban disorder and “to make available the best programs now known to wipe out the causes of violent outbursts such as those witnessed in Los Angeles.”⁵³ California Governor Pat Brown, Mayor Yorty and other local officials who made up members of the task force churned out a \$29 million anti-poverty project for the “riot-battered” Watts area—a project that was largely geared toward education. President Johnson provided examples of eight programs that would make up the \$29 million-dollar project and all but one of Johnson’s examples were exclusively education-focused. Aside from the manpower development program to increase employment and training opportunities, the remaining seven focused on improving the Los Angeles school system. These programs would add vocational centers for “economically distressed adults”; establish remedial reading classes, new kindergarten, and secondary classrooms; and offer a “wide range of intensive remedial, cultural vocational and health projects to 20,000 students.”⁵⁴

These funds would come from the OEO, yet despite the Economic Opportunity Act’s call for the “maximum feasible participation,” one news report noted that no grassroots organizations were mentioned in the apportionment of the \$29 million.⁵⁵ While the Mayor and Congressional leaders argued over what distributing federal poverty funds meant for Watts families, the Los Angeles Sentinel reported that “Nobody asked the Watts father what he thought of the program, or how he could participate in placing the funds where they would do the most good.”⁵⁶ When the OEO did begin funneling an award of \$7,401,339 to finance 28 community action programs in Los Angeles, city schools received the largest portion (\$4.4 million) and county schools were awarded 1.7 million.⁵⁷ It is also unclear if or how families, or community action groups were included in designing the federal education programs in Watts even though guidelines within Title I emphasized that there should be “continuous and genuine working relationships between the local school system and the community action agency during the period when programs were planned and developed, and carried out.”⁵⁸ Despite any exclusion of community groups, as Attorney General Ramsey Clark reported, the city schools were geared to meet the immediate crisis.⁵⁹

Many of these reforms had been proposed by teachers within the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) who for instance urged a “crash educational program,” that called for using funds under Title I to aide schools in poverty, limiting class size to no more than 22 students, a broad afterschool program, and a team of psychologists, social workers, and psychiatrists to serve every four schools as well as selecting 10 elementary schools in Watts to pilot an effective program for schools.⁶⁰ Despite the turn towards education amongst other anti-poverty agencies, one AFT official and teacher in the riot area accused the school board of “the same kind of

⁵³ Paul Weeks, “Red Tape Stalls U.S. Funds to Help Watts: More Than Two-Thirds of \$29 Million Ordered by Johnson Is Bugged Down Watts Aid funds,” *Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File)* (Los Angeles), October 18, 1965.

⁵⁴ Robert Thompson, “Johnson Orders \$29 Million Watts Rehabilitation Work: First Phase to Focus on 45 Projects JOHNSON,” *Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File)*, (Los Angeles), September 3, 1965.

⁵⁵ Weeks, “Red Tape Stalls U.S. Funds to Help Watts”; Jones, “Riot Leaves Sense of Hopelessness.”

⁵⁶ Bill Lane, “POVERTY: An Underlying Factor,” *Los Angeles Sentinel (1934-2005)*; *Los Angeles, Calif.* August 19, 1965.

⁵⁷ Weeks, “Red Tape Stalls U.S. Funds to Help Watts:.”

⁵⁸ *Report of the National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children* (National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children, Washington, DC., 1966), P22

⁵⁹ Weeks, “Red Tape Stalls U.S. Funds to Help Watts.”

⁶⁰ Harry Bernstein, “Union Urges ‘Crash Schooling’ for Watts: Teachers Propose 10-Point Plan Stressing Pupil Needs, Smaller Classes,” *Los Angeles Times (1923-1995)* (Los Angeles), August 26, 1965.

procrastination and inertia that other governmental officials and agencies exhibited before and during the tragedy.”⁶¹ The union, for instance, requested that the school board hire more teachers to conduct home visitations and parent conferences and to encourage teachers from other areas to transfer to Watts.⁶²

Yet the tendency to use schools and education to respond to urban rebellion in Watts, reflected federal interests to treat poverty—and its problems—with education solutions. Local officials promoted education initiatives as programs that would bring opportunity to the Watts area, but also made clear that these programs were not designed as a specific response to the riots. Rather, most of the school programs promoted to bring calm to the post-riot Watts area were designed as early as February 1964 under the President’s Committee on Youth Crime and Juvenile Delinquency.⁶³ This suggests that national interests in combatting delinquency had made it easy to respond to the riots through education. Through schooling, national and local efforts could provide a general strategy to deal with family inadequacies, juvenile delinquency, and racialized rage. Members of Congress even spoke out against the tendency to rely on education to respond to urban poverty. Democratic Representative John Dent of Pennsylvania for example lamented the desire to “orient the main part of our efforts in the anti-poverty program toward the orientation of a better education. This we need, this we must get... after we have satisfied, and apparently this country can satisfy, all its needs for food and clothing.” For Dent, schools were important, yet they should not have been the federal focus of antipoverty efforts.

While Black protesters did find schools a major point of frustration, educational inadequacy were not the major cause of 1960s urban rebellion.⁶⁴ There were reports that children went hungry in school because some schools lacked cafeterias. Educators and students complained of school overcrowding. And students reported that “school was irrelevant,” or that teachers did not “understand the problems of the kids.”⁶⁵ Yet as James Farmer, the national director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), suggested, the revolt in Watts “was not a striking out with blind fury...the revolt had eyes. It picked its targets. And those targets were symbols of exploitation.”⁶⁶ The eyes of fury it seems were not cast on schools—which were not set a flame in the days of revolt. One news article reported the fact that no schools were damaged during the riots, was the “most heartening thing” to some principals and teachers who (perhaps wrongly) concluded that the schools being left undamaged indicated that they “were getting

⁶¹ Bernstein, Harry. “Teachers Union Submits Watts Plea to Board,” *Los Angeles Times (1923-1995)*, (Los Angeles), August 27, 1965.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ School protests were of course a major part of civil rights activism For a few sources on 1960s student protests see David Cecelski, *Along Freedom Road: Hyde County North Carolina and the Fate of Black Schools in the South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Jon Hale, “Future Foot Soldiers or Budding Criminals?: The Dynamics of High School Student Activism in the Southern Black Freedom Struggle.” *Journal of Southern History* 84, no. 3 (July 27, 2018): 615–52; for more on activism and the politics of Black pedagogy see, Daniel Perlstein. “Minds Stayed on Freedom: Politics and Pedagogy in the African-American Freedom Struggle.” *American Educational Research Journal* 39, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 249–77.

⁶⁵ Jack Jones, “Many Schools Lack Cafeterias: Watts schools,” *Los Angeles Times (1923-1995)*; (Los Angeles), October 14, 1965. Gerald Horne, *Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s*, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1995).

⁶⁶ “Teachers Urge Riot Aid For Los Angeles: Crash Program Being Planned,” *The Chicago Defender (National Edition) (1921-1967)*, (Chicago), August 28, 1965.

through to their students.”⁶⁷ Families, community members and students of course had many gripes against the school system just as they did with the conditions of ghetto life overall. Yet by investing in school programs, federal and local efforts responded to the educational demands but may have left unattended more direct ways to respond to Black rage—particularly as reports of police brutality continued to mount and were left unattended. While ghetto schools, and likely some of its teachers and principals were not to be celebrated, grievances against the school system were not the sole or even most direct cause of the summer riots that ignited during the summers of the 1960s.

As the summers continued to pass throughout the 1960s, the public resisted expanding social programs and thus rewarding or “bribing the rioters.”⁶⁸ For example the OEO that sought to distribute power to poor communities became more aligned in the public mind as a program that rewarded rioters and thus more susceptible to political backlash.⁶⁹ Title I, however, was not a program that rewarded rioters. Title I, according to one Office of Education employee, was “not a give-away program: it [wa]s an opportunity program.”⁷⁰ Its full funding “would show the sincere commitment for action and sacrifice by ‘the establishment.’ A commitment that the government could not afford to renege on.”⁷¹ By March of 1966, 11,500 of the 25,000 eligible school districts throughout the country had one or more Title I projects approved and a total of \$757 million had been obligated to 13,503 projects benefiting 5.6 million children.⁷²

Education programs could do little to improve housing discrimination or combat police brutality, and despite providing some jobs particularly to teacher aides they could not produce a full employment program. Yet education reformers promoted ideas about the self-perpetuating ghetto pathology that permeated throughout academic and policy discourse in order to promote educational changes. Through education, the liberal administration could respond to riots, prevent delinquency, address cultural deficiencies and provide “opportunity” without worrying about the political backlash that might come from “rewarding” rioters. Indeed, local and national leaders believed anti-poverty education initiatives such as Title I and programs offered through the Office of Economic Opportunity might use schools to solve the real problem of Black poverty—ghetto deviancy.

“What About August?” ESEA, Summer Programs, and Hard-core Youth

Like Watts, ESEA reauthorizations in 1967 occurred alongside more urban rebellions and policy makers again proposed education reforms to confront the pathologies they believed caused disorder. Yet historians of education have tended to prioritize other politics surrounding the 1967 reauthorizations. In 1967, Congress once again reauthorized the ESEA and debates around its reauthorization reignited long stemming concerns about local-control, race, and religion. For

⁶⁷ Jones, “Many Schools Lack Cafeterias.”

⁶⁸ Many memos and newspaper articles in the Johnson archive mention this concern for rewarding Rioters, see: “Memorandum to Charles J Zwick Director Bureau of the Budget from Robert A. Levine, Assistant Director Office of Economic Opportunity. ‘Kerner Commission Report’ March 14, 1968,” Office Files of James Gaither Box 289. Folder Cities supplemental. LBJL.

⁶⁹ For more on the backlash against the race-based War on Poverty programs see: Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare*; Robert C. Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*; Weir and Orloff, *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States*, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press), 1988.

⁷⁰ “Letter to Harold Howe II from John E. Davis. August 9, 1967,” Office Files of the Commissioner of Education Box 278. Folder, “City Riots 1967,” RG12. NARA II.

⁷¹ “Letter to Harold Howe II from John E. Davis. August 9, 1967.” Office Files of the Commissioner of Education, Box 278. Folder, “City Riots 1967,”. RG12. NARA II.

⁷² *Report of the National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children. 1966* p.4

instance, Minnesota Congressman Albert Quie introduced an amendment that attempted to shift \$3 billion in federal school aid into general block grants to states—a move seen as a conservative attempt to dismantle the Great Society.⁷³ In addition, the Vietnam War left further financial constraints on the domestic War on Poverty and drove the president to hold the domestic budget.⁷⁴ Yet the growing urban crisis also forced federal policy makers to think of ways that the existing Great Society programs might absolve the mounting pressure in urban areas. Although the “educational efforts to defuse the social dynamite came under sniper attack in Congress,” as one New York Times article stated, policy makers nonetheless believed federal education aid could be one such solution.⁷⁵ In the wake of ongoing summer riots, the largest of which occurred in Newark and Detroit, policy makers in the Office of Education and presidential aides devised ways that expanded how Title I funds would be used to bring about summer programs, community schools, and improved facilities aimed at keeping alienated ghetto youth occupied during weekends and summer months.

Policy officials responded to summer riots by proposing that education, youth employment, and recreation could provide structure to idle youth, particularly young Black males who were seen as the main instigators and participants of summer riots.⁷⁶ Some reports estimated that “a big percentage,” 522 of the 4,200 of those arrested during the Watts riots, were young men.⁷⁷ In addition to urban riots, federal officials also claimed that young men were responsible for other crimes. One presidential task force found that “most crimes (75%) [we]re committed by boys and young men 25 years old and younger”. Most of these crimes (75%) were committed in cities and associated with an “attendant problem of spawning ghettos” with “restive” youth who enjoyed increased unsupervised leisure that “sharpen[ed] the contrast between the haves and have nots.”⁷⁸

Attending to the increased leisure time amongst Black youth became one way to deal with the urban problems. Some officials cited the 1964 riot in Harlem and the resulting federal job program as a case in point. The five-day rebellion in Harlem had set off the streak of summer riots when a police officer shot a 15-year-old boy leaving summer school. Officials believed that the federal funds that had since provided jobs for 4,000 youth worked to deflect Harlem from the riots that had struck Watts in 1965.⁷⁹ As the War on Poverty pushed forward, however, Black unemployment remained higher than that of their white counterparts. Unemployment among all youth aged 16-21 had decreased to 15.2% by June 1967, in the same year the number of unemployed Black youth aged 16-21 had increased to 27%.⁸⁰

Arguments about male unemployment continued to complement other racialized and gendered frames about the causes of “Negro frustration.” Not only did Black youth between the ages of 16 and 21 suffer from high unemployment rates, but federal officials attributed their frustration to

⁷³ See Graham, *The Uncertain Triumph*, 149-59.

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Fred Hechinger, “Education School vs. Riots,” *New York Times*, (New York), July 30, 1967.

⁷⁶ for a thorough description on the ways federal anti-poverty efforts were geared toward young Black males who were seen as the main proponents of summer riots see Elizabeth Hinton *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*.

⁷⁷ “The State: Los Angeles: Help from U.S. Task Force,” *Los Angeles Times*, (Los Angeles), August 29, 1965.

⁷⁸ “Crime Control and Reduction,” July 6, 1967, Office Files of James Gaither Box 19. Folder Presidential Task Force, LBJL; These arguments were similar to those made in Cloward and Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity*.

⁷⁹ “The State: LOS ANGELES: Help From U.S. Task Force.” *Los Angeles Times*, (Los Angeles), August 29, 1965.

⁸⁰ “Notes of the President’s Meeting with the Cabinet, August 2, 1967,” Thomas Johnsons Meeting Notes Box 1, folder August 2, 1967 Cabinet Meeting, LBJL.

“the product of the matriarchal system.”⁸¹ Policy concerns around idleness and unstructured time again reflected the social science ideas of the era. Sociologist E. Franklin Frazier and others argued that good child rearing depended on strong discipline in which children followed a routine that curbed impulsive behavior. Unstructured matriarchal families thus lead to the large amount of juvenile delinquency and crime amongst Negroes.⁸² It was believed that during the summer months, schools might step in to provide the structure absent from Black families and the stability and encouragement that might come from stable employment. According to one Office of Education official, schools could combat Black rage and the disintegrated family structure with “Bold and imaginative” school leaders. These leaders needed to “recognize that summer comes every year and it does not end six weeks after the regular school year ends... They must ask ‘what about August?’ There will be millions of kids on the street of the ghetto, during August with nothing to do.”⁸³ Policy makers at the federal and also local levels reiterated this need to invest in programs to keep ghetto youth, particularly teenaged males, off the street in the summer when schools were out and jobs were few.

Alleviating Alienation in Detroit and Newark 1967

One of the school leaders who knew all too well that summers came every year was Norman Drachler, superintendent of Detroit’s public schools. On July 24, Detroit, like Watts and Harlem before it, experienced a police-incited rebellion. When it subsided on July 27, 43 people had been killed, more than 2,000 injured, and 4,000 were in police custody.⁸⁴ Less than two weeks after the riots ended in Detroit, Drachler testified before the Senate’s education subcommittee on the Elementary and Secondary Education bill that had already passed in the House.⁸⁵ Drachler reported that Detroit’s 178 schools eligible for federal funds were “in areas most affected by the riots.” He used his testimony to describe the responsibility of the public-school system to promote three goals: “academic achievement, self-development, and social responsibility” amongst school children. Drachler claimed that while schools did “not have the direct responsibility for adequate housing, adequate employment or law and order,” when school systems lost balance among the goals of academic achievement, self-development and social responsibility, “the community is disrupted, and upheaval may occur.” For Drachler, like other school leaders, schools had a social responsibility to maintain social stability and prevent disorder.⁸⁶ Later in his testimony, Drachler noted that one way the Detroit school system aimed to prevent disorder was through summer programs. In the spring of 1967, they “launched the largest summer school program in Detroit’s history.”⁸⁷ According to Drachler, in 1966 only 49,000 students were in summer school. By 1967 they launched a program that enrolled over 100,000 students, and of the 1,800 high school students who were involved in their youth work

⁸¹ “Memo from Chuck Smith to William Rioux from MacKnight Black Memorandum ‘Use of Public Schools in Big Cities to Avoid Riots,’” August 2, 1967, Center for community Planning Riots, Office of Education BESE Box 11. NARA II.

⁸² Scott, *Contempt and Pity*.

⁸³ “Memo from Chuck Smith to William Rioux.”

⁸⁴ Kyle Longley, *LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 4.

⁸⁵ Susan Jacoby, “Detroit Schools Facing Crisis. School Head Describes Traumatized Children,” *Washington Post*, (Washington D.C.), August 10, 1967. Found in “City Riots 1967” Office Files of the Commissioner of Education Box 278. RG12, National Archive II.

⁸⁶ Norman Drachler *Testimony before the subcommittee on education*,” U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. *Education Legislation*. 90th Cong., (1967), 1452.

⁸⁷ Ibid

program, “only seven were apprehended by the police during the riots.”⁸⁸ While equipping students with academic achievement, responsibility, and self-development, schools could also serve a preventative role in thwarting urban crisis. Schools were also crucial in immediately attending to the rebellion. The board of education met on Tuesday, July 25, to plan out the needs of the area and according to Drachler 12 schools were occupied by Army troops and Michigan National Guardsmen. Although no rioters had turned on the school—the schools it seemed could be used to turn against rebellion.

Local school officials were not the only ones linking school programs with reforming the riot capabilities of ghetto youth. Presidential aides and bureaucrats in the Office of Education also brainstormed ways to address Black unrest through summer programs. On July 26th, when the National Guard was finally deployed to Detroit, other federal officials including middle and upper grade professionals in the Department of Health Education and Welfare held several informal meetings to “discuss emergency measures for alleviating the conditions which led to big city ghetto riots.”⁸⁹ From these informal meetings, five officials of the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education, led by Associate Commissioner Nolan Estes formed “a small, quiet, very low-key visitation team to cities that had undergone riots” including Detroit and Newark.⁹⁰ During the visits, Office of Education officials observed that ghetto residents did not see their schools as part of the “solution to the problem of frustration- induced lawlessness,” but as part of the problem itself; the school was seen as “alien to their lives.”⁹¹

Again, the administration believed that African American men between the ages of 16 and 24 were primarily responsible for the unrest, and they became the target of federal policymakers.⁹² Following this line of reasoning, Charles Smith, the Special Assistant for Urban Education in the Office of Education critiqued existing Title I programs for “concentrating on remedial reading, extending day activities, and recreation,” programs that Smith believed, “missed hard-core youth.”⁹³ Testifying before the Kerner Commission, which was initiated in the days following the Detroit riots, Smith argued that Title I dollars could be better spent to prevent civil disorder by “spending more money on grades 10-12 who are most involved in civil disorder.”⁹⁴ These programs for Commissioner of Education Harold Howe consisted of prioritizing summer programs and field trips that “break the bonds of isolation which compress inner city children into ghetto neighborhoods” and to projects that train staff in ghetto schools.⁹⁵ Such added funds “could be put into effect very quickly, would keep people off the streets, and

⁸⁸ *Testimony of Norman Drachler. U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent subcommittee on investigations; committee on Government operations Race, Civil, and Criminal Disorders.* 90th Cong., (1968), 1535.

⁸⁹ “Memo to John F Hughes from MacKnight Black ‘Use of Public Schools in Big Cities to Avoid Riots,’” July 26, 1967. Office of Education BESE Box 11. Folder, Center for community Planning Riots. NARA II.

⁹⁰ “Memo from Nolan Estes to Harold Howe II ‘Initial Riot Responses,’” August 1967, Office of Education BESE Box 11 Center for community Planning Riots. NARA II.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Elizabeth Hinton also discusses the federal interest in “Hard core” youth. *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*, 13.

⁹³ Dr Charles II. Smith, Bureau of Elementary Secondary Education, and Welfare, November 2, 1967, Office Files of James Gaither Box 244. Folder, “Witness Outline Digests” Committee on Civil Disorders,” Witness Outline Digests, LBJL.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ “Memorandum to the Secretary-Designate from Harold Howe II,” April 17, 1968, Office Files of James Gaither, Box 289. LBJL

would help provide “wholesome,” “hearty,” “recreation and entertainment.”⁹⁶ Many proposals suggested that one way to cool the rage of young rioters who threatened further protests was to invest in facilities like swimming pools. After all, Smith noted, “Negroes enjoy swimming too.”⁹⁷

After visiting Newark and Detroit, the Office of Education team found that “If Newark and Detroit were typical situations,” then federal education programs would need to concentrate more heavily on ghetto schools which required “investments more massive than anything heretofore conceived of by local, state, and federal education agencies.”⁹⁸ The Office of Education officials saw that there was an “urgent need for the schools to become more closely identified with the community and with community needs and interests.”⁹⁹ Across the board, philanthropies, businesses, civil rights groups, and other federal departments advocated for community investment as a means to empower alienated Black communities and thwart the alienation that led to rebellion. Many philanthropic and business elite also threw their support behind improving city conditions. The Flint, Michigan-based Mott Foundation was instrumental in developing ideas about the value of community schools and community education. Such organizations advanced the idea that “Community centers in neighborhood schools,” could be built in cities that contained a good deal of “social dynamite.”¹⁰⁰ Community schools would intervene in ghetto alienation and provide the recreation that would prevent idleness. “A building that creates community can become a source of pride. One does not destroy that which he feels to be his own and that which serves him.”¹⁰¹

Proposals to make schools more responsive in many ways reflected the demands of civil rights groups, parents and students, who across the country, advocated for more culturally responsive curriculum, and more teachers and school leaders that represented the diversity of the student body. Throughout the 1960s, Black students, families and educators in cities like Chicago, Englewood (NJ), Boston and New York organized against flawed integration plans, conducted boycotts and organized alternative ‘freedom centers.’ In Los Angeles, students demanded textbooks that acknowledged Black and Chicano culture, bilingual education, more minority teachers and principals, dress and grooming codes that aligned with the cultural diversity of the students including allowing Black students to wear their natural hair.¹⁰² Local leaders responded to these demands by attempting to make schools more responsive to

⁹⁶ “Immediate Steps to Improve Life in the Urban Ghettos.” Office Files of the Commissioner of Education Box 278. RG12. Folder, “City Riots 1967.” NARA II.

⁹⁷ Memo from Chuck Smith to William Rioux from MacKnight Black Memorandum ‘Use of Public Schools in Big Cities to Avoid Riots,’ August 2, 1967. Office of Education Bese Box 11. Folder, Center for community Planning Riots NARA II.

⁹⁸ “Letter to The Secretary From Harold Howe II,” 1967, Office Files of the Commissioner of Education. Box 278. RG12. Folder, “City Riots 1967,” NARA II.

⁹⁹ “Memo from Nolan Estes to Harold Howe II ‘Initial Riot Responses,’ . August 1, 1967. Office of Education Bese Box 11. Folder, Center for community Planning Riots. NARA II.

¹⁰⁰ “Untitled Document,” n.d. Office Files of James Gaither box 258. Folder, DC Public schools (2 of 2). LBJL

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Judith Kafka, *The History of “Zero Tolerance” in American Public Schooling*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); For more on student protests see John L. Rury and Shirley Hill, “An End of Innocence: African-American High School Protest in the 1960s and 1970s,” *History of Education* 42, no. 4 (January 1, 2013): 486–508; Barry M. Franklin, “Community, Race, and Curriculum in Detroit: The Northern High School Walkout,” in *Curriculum, Community, and Urban School Reform*, edited by Barry M. Franklin, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2010) 57–79; Daniel H. Perlstein, *Justice, Justice: School Politics and the Eclipse of Liberalism*, (New York: Peter Lang Inc., International Academic Publishers, 2004); Elizabeth Todd-Breland, *A Political Education: Black Politics and Education Reform in Chicago since the 1960s*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018).

community needs. School leaders in Detroit “pursued the aims of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Economic Opportunities Act” by embracing community involvement and extending schools to the broader community by opening schools for activities like childhood-parent education groups, social and recreational activities and community meetings.¹⁰³ In Detroit, federal education funds were used to employ 2,000 school and teacher aides “indigenous to the community” to improve education in the area. These paraprofessionals worked in part to provide a formal link between the school, community and parents. Detroit school leaders also responded to the growing demand for courses and programs in “Afro-American history and culture” by selecting textbooks and other instructional materials that acknowledged the contributions of Negroes and initiated courses in Negro history.¹⁰⁴

Some activists saw the movement to link schools and community as being driven by elite interest to appease Black demands. Radical Black leaders pushing Black independent schools critiqued the inclusion of African American history and culture in public school curricula as little more than “Black patchwork on a snow-white blanket of white nationalist education.”¹⁰⁵ President of the United Federation of Teachers Albert Shanker, who led the 1968 strike against Black community control in New York, noted that business support of community controlled schools was simply a form of “riot insurance.”¹⁰⁶ Liberal education programs such as community schooling, new curriculum reforms, and even new educators employed as “indigenous” teacher aides represented more than new education initiatives that could improve learning amongst the educationally and culturally deprived. But when paired alongside urban rebellions and administrative fears of Black protest- education programs represented the softer-side of social control. According to sociologist Lloyd Ohlin, an early architect of the ideas behind community control, community-based reforms were meant to help assimilate low-income people to the broader social order. As Ohlin saw it, the success of “indigenous social movements,” or aspects of community control was not solely their ability “to redistribute and broaden the basis of social power and the exercise of authority” but also the potential to “reduce pressures toward deviance” and to “heighten the personal investment of members in the established social order.”¹⁰⁷ Thus as one historian has summarized, in the era of riots, these movements for some represented the desires of powerful white interests to restore social stability “in not simply through the iron fist but also by the velvet glove of Black leadership development.”¹⁰⁸

By August of 1967, President Johnson urged the Senate to restore funding to proposals that might serve as major weapons against urban blight. Such programs, Johnson reiterated, were “no reward for violence.”¹⁰⁹ In a letter to Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield Johnson wrote that programs providing \$50 million to crime control, \$25 million toward juvenile delinquency,

¹⁰³ *U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent subcommittee on investigations; committee on Government operations Race, Civil, and Criminal Disorders*. 90th Cong., (1968) 1535

¹⁰⁴ *Testimony of Norman Drachler. U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent subcommittee on investigations; committee on Government operations Race, Civil, and Criminal Disorders*. 90th Cong., (1968), 1535.

¹⁰⁵ Cited in Russell Rickford, *We Are an African People: Independent Education, Black Power, and the Radical Imagination*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7.

¹⁰⁶ Richard Kahlenberg, *Tough Liberal: Albert Shanker and the Battles Over Schools, Unions, Race, and Democracy*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 275; see also Perlstein, *Justice Justice*.

¹⁰⁷ Cited in O’Conner, *Poverty Knowledge*, 127.

¹⁰⁸ Karen Ferguson. *Top Down: The Ford Foundation, Black Power, and the Reinvention of Racial Liberalism*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 11.

¹⁰⁹ Robert B Semple Jr, “Johnson Calls on Senate to Pass Full Urban Aid,” *Special to The New York Times*, (New York), August 17, 1967.

\$2.06 billion to the Economic Opportunity Act, \$662 million to Model Cities, \$750 million to urban renewal, and the \$1.6 billion earmarked for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act represented “an all-out commitment to the safety and well-being of our cities and the citizens who live in them.”¹¹⁰ ESEA became a part of the all-out commitment to bring safety and order to the cities, in part by claiming to provide order and structure to the lives of young Black students.

1968: Education and the Forward-Looking Vision

In early December of 1967, Johnson began outlining what would be his last State of the Union speech, writing down notes about meeting “fundamental national problems” and focusing on the disadvantaged with programs in “education/health.” He wrote that “we can’t do it all at once but we have to keep moving toward our goals.”¹¹¹ One goal remained responding to the root causes of Black anger and resentment through programs like the \$2.1 billion manpower program, Model Cities, and adding 300,000 housing units for low to middle income families. Yet Johnson also spoke of another goal: to reduce the crime and violence that had been demonstrated in part by the summer rebellions throughout the decade. By 1968 the mood in the country was focused more on stopping urban rebellions and fears of crime than on expanding the Great Society and its focus on reducing poverty and racism. Toward this latter goal, Johnson stressed his anti-riot programs and the Safe Streets Act which invested \$400 million worth of “seed money” in the War on Crime.¹¹² Yet as evidenced by memos from presidential aides and other members of the administration following the assassination of Dr Martin Luther King, policy makers would continue to use education to address the root causes of anger and resentment and reduce crime and violence. Just one month after the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) released its report on the causes of violence, white brutality once again precipitated Black protest across the country. This time “city problems” were not caused by a Black motorist in Watts, taxi-drivers in Newark, or hotel-party-patrons in Detroit but the death of the young civil rights leader standing on the balcony of the Lorraine Hotel in Memphis, Tennessee on April 4, 1968. After Dr. King’s assassination, violence erupted in Black areas across 125 cities. Federal officials moved to quell riots and demonstrations with guns and troops and getting tougher on crime, but also by promoting education which could serve alongside the troops as a long-term solution to the problems of urban protest.¹¹³

Policy advisors suggested that the President address Congress and the nation, and that the speech should make sure to provide a positive image of the reforms the administration was promoting in Black neighborhoods, in particular. Arthur Okun, the President’s economic advisor sent a memo to Johnson’s principal adviser and speechwriter. He offered that “the president’s speech and program on the urban emergency should work to reconstruct the much-damaged faith in progress toward a unified cohesive nation. He wants to convey the conviction that, over time, the situation can improve in the ghettos, in cities and for all of the poor.”¹¹⁴ Okun also suggested that the president’s speech should promote a “renewed forward-looking vision”—one that outlined “steps for assuring the poor a greater sense of control over their own lives and, particularly, over the institutions which immediately and personally affect them.”¹¹⁵ Much of the

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Longley, *LBJ’s 1968*, 11.

¹¹² Ibid, 12; Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*.

¹¹³ Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*.

¹¹⁴ “Memorandum for Mr. Harry McPherson. ‘From Arthur Okun A Strategy for Cities Programs.’ April 9, 1968,” 1968 Cities supplemental. Office Files of James Gaither Box 289. LBLJ

¹¹⁵ Ibid

forward-looking vision toward ghetto-improving programs would have no doubt included relying on existing programs to expand education. Joseph Califano, Special Assistant to the President suggested that Johnson give a national speech highlighting a “new rededication to the cause of justice and equality” and suggested that they build on the progress of legislative programs including jobs, anti-inflation tax, model cities, and also advised that they ask for “increased expenditures to urgent domestic programs.”¹¹⁶ These urgent programs included the presidents’ housing bills, the Safe Streets and Gun Control Act, and “increased appropriations for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and Teachers Crops.” In addition, Califano reiterated proposals that emerged every summer about the central role that summer programs could play in abating the idleness that lead to revolt.¹¹⁷

As in previous years, 1968 proposals continued to focus on programs targeting ghetto isolation and alienation and those that would keep youth active during summer months. The Department of Health Education and Welfare for example proposed a \$200 million summer-based community program that could be the “most urgently needed and most soundly conceived program which could be mounted this summer.”¹¹⁸ Although the administration could not expand on the existing federal budget, officials did suggest a supplemental budget for the summer program that would use “Title I or Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act” and would emphasize education recreation and training for teenage youth.¹¹⁹ The massive investments from Title I and Title III would fund innovative programs like model cities, community schools, and extended school programs that would keep the schools open 15 hours per day six days a week.¹²⁰

Alongside these tangible programs, administrative memos continued to stress the earliest goals of the Great Society—to detract from “delinquency” and its’ causes by extending “opportunity” to Black, low-income and the “educationally deprived.” Memos also highlighted the social control capacity of War on Poverty programs. Officials believed that highlighting the success of the educational war on poverty might help to pacify the anger stewing in Black communities. One speech proposal urgently demanded that the administration needed to act. “If we do not act now, Negroes will lose faith, the thin ranks of the militants will swell... Violence and hate and bloodshed will follow.”¹²¹ Yet perhaps what was more important than any specific action was to give the appearance that the administration was responding to Black demands. This was exemplified by Robert Levine, the chief planner for anti-poverty programs in the OEO, who stated that “education and health—are important for a *long-run* anti-poverty, real equality opportunity program.”¹²² More importantly, he highlighted that it was “better to provide the ghetto with the idea that something is really going to be done than to do precisely the right

¹¹⁶ “Draft for the President from Joe Califano,” 1968 Cities supplemental. Office Files of James Gaither Box 289. LBJL

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ “Memorandum for Honorable Douglass Cater from Wilbur J Cohen. April 25, 1968.” Office Files of James Gaither Box 289. Folder, 1968 Summer Supplemental. LBJL

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ “Suggestions for Presidential Speech to Congress and the Nation. April 9, 1968.,”. Office Files of James Gaither, Box 289. Folder, 1968 Cities supplemental LBJL.

¹²² Ibid. emphasis mine,

thing.”¹²³ In other words, the promise of anti-poverty programs like education was as effective an approach to the problems of poverty and ghetto unrest as providing the best solution to poverty. Education would remain a prominent long-run anti-poverty solution—even if it was not the best solution to either poverty or anti-Black violence. The promise of education programs may have been enough to contain dissent.

Conclusion

The ways that local and federal policy makers worked together to advocate for increased educational opportunities during heightened points of urban crisis illuminates much about the ways that education programs became part of the “long run anti-poverty” and equality program. Symbolically federal policy makers saw aid to elementary and secondary education as part of the larger project to provide structure to the “culturally and educationally deprived.”¹²⁴ Education programs could provide recreational activities, cultural programs, and enrichment opportunities that might discipline the Black poor away from “delinquency,” rebellion and other forms of ghetto alienation. These programs would redirect their actions into calmer, less resistant activities. Educational opportunity became a preventative measure to reform youth behavior and the cultural pathologies of their families and neighbors, and also a conciliatory symbol of government’s lukewarm commitment to economic and racial progress.

Sociologists Richard Cloward and Francis Fox Piven argue that protest tactics and actions demonstrated in Watts, Detroit, Newark, and other cities represent one of the few means that those in poverty have to press for their own political interests. Political leaders respond to protest by offering tangible and symbolic concessions to remedy group grievances. Yet such programs do not just exist to extend opportunity to groups, social programs also help to reintegrate disaffected groups into less politically “disturbing” forms of behavior. According to Piven and Cloward, while some concessions are withdrawn overtime, others become permanent institutional reforms, particularly if innovations turn out to be compatible (or not incompatible) with the interest of more powerful groups. Federal education policy can be seen within this framework.¹²⁵ As one critic of the Great Society mentioned, the antipoverty programs such as “model cities, summer programs etc.” may have just been “bones thrown at the poor in an attempt to keep them quiet.”¹²⁶

Federal aid to education and the OEO’s community action initiatives were two of the main drivers of the War on Poverty. Yet school aid was among the most popular programs of the Great Society. Community Action Programs designed to operate independently of existing community welfare and education programs were seen largely as a program to help poor Black people. As the Watts case demonstrates, such programs were not compatible with the interests of local municipal and city leaders who saw community control as an attempt to divert power away from themselves. Title I, on the other hand, was compatible. Federal education programs like the ESEA, though discussed by policy makers as being useful in responding to Black riots, was not targeted to only Black or urban districts. Education aid would “help the entire country” by improving the quality of schooling available to every American child, and would give a new

¹²³ “Memorandum to James Gaither from Robert A. Levine. ‘The President’s Speech.’ April 9, 1968.” Office Files of James Gaither Box 289. Folder, 1968 Cities supplemental. LBJL.

¹²⁴ Elementary and Secondary Education Act..

¹²⁵ Piven and Cloward, *Poor People’s Movements*, 3-7; 29-30.

¹²⁶ “Letter to Joe Califano from Jim Gaither,” June 4, 1968. Annual Report National Council on Economic Opportunity. Office Files of James Gaither Box 237. LBJL

chance for knowledge to the children of the poor.¹²⁷ In addition, while Congress could turn their backs on other programs because of the riots, as Democratic Senator Wayne Morse claimed, “little boys and girls” in ghetto schools could not be forgotten because of “the bad judgement of some of the adults.”¹²⁸ Liberal leaders framed education, and educational opportunity in terms of the deservingness of their children even as older youth and parents were cast as undeserving of social supports.

Title I was also politically popular because funds were spread across all Congressional districts. Ninety percent of school districts received Title I funding, which also meant that Title I was only ever a modest fiscal intervention in equalizing economic and educational inequality.¹²⁹ Title I was also stripped of its more redistributive components that perhaps would have generated more focused backlash. Initially, Title I mandated cooperation between the local school agencies and Community Action Programs by encouraging community members to take part in planning programs, a mandate that would become a source of friction.¹³⁰ Title I funding was also initially tied to desegregation enforcement, but by the end of the 1960s Title I became more compatible with maintaining segregated school systems. Unlike the *de jure* system of school segregation in the South, *de facto* segregation in the North could not be legally fought to overturn separate school systems. By 1967 Congress agreed to not restrict funds from districts without giving districts six months’ notice. Furthermore, the administration became unwilling to force desegregation by restricting Title I funds and by 1969 left the enforcement to the courts.¹³¹ Although ESEA may have had the potential to reform schools through redistributing educational resources for Black students, this chapter demonstrates Title I was used most prominently towards reforming Black students through reinforcing a discourse of deprivation.¹³²

Still, through the Great Society federal policy makers responded to Black protest in ways that did provide more economic and educational equity for Black communities. Funding from ESEA helped “shift the tide of integration” in the South where in 1972 more Black children attended integrated schools than in the North.¹³³ Education also provided mothers with jobs in swiftly deindustrializing cities. Yet deciding to change the characteristics of the individual through job training, education programs and even through education-based jobs rather than alter the structure of the economy, or place limits on police brutality ultimately inhibited the potential of the Great Society and its education based opportunity initiatives. What this chapter demonstrates is that at the heart of contemporary federal policy, the very origins of federal educational opportunity, lies an alternative origins story: to use schooling and federal aid to combat “urban crisis,” ghetto isolation, and fears of Black “delinquency.” At its very origins, the ESEA opportunity program was used to ameliorate Black grievances with racialized state violence and was simultaneously used to combat the fear of Black retaliation against the

¹²⁷ Lyndon B. Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty," March 16, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26109>.

¹²⁸ *U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Education Legislation, 90th Cong., (1967), 1457.*

¹²⁹ David K Cohen and Susan L. Moffitt, *The Ordeal of Equality: Did Federal Regulation Fix the Schools?*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

¹³⁰ Stephen Kemp Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, *ESEA: The Office of Education Administers A Law*, (Syracuse University Press, 1968), 31-33.

¹³¹ Jeffrey, *Education for Children of the Poor*.

¹³² For a similar argument see Scott, *Contempt and Pity*.

¹³³ Sanders, “Money Talks.”

conditions of ghetto life. In the end, education initiatives within the Office of Education, including Title I, became the acceptable way to both combat urban violence by disciplining urban Blacks into less politically disturbing forms of behavior (e.g. rioting) and provided the Black community with the belief “that something was actually being done” for the Black community. As federal education expanded into more conservative times and eclipsed with Clinton’s “New Democrat” third way approach to social reform, the message of educational opportunity for poor students would be increasingly detached from structural causes of urban poverty and focused more on urban students’ capacity for criminality. The rallying call of Black protest “burn baby burn” had been replaced with an educational form of social control- “learn baby learn.”¹³⁴

¹³⁴ “Learn, Baby, Learn, ’ ” *Boston Globe* (1960-1988); *Boston, Mass.*, August 14, 1966.

Chapter 3 : Discipling a “Nation at Risk:” Law and Order, “Excellence” and the Bully Pulpit, 1983-1988

As Lyndon Johnson wrapped up his presidential term hoping to redeem his Great Society from both the unpopular Vietnam War and Black rebellions that overshadowed his social policies, liberal-actor turned conservative governor of California Ronald Reagan proposed an alternative social program—the Creative Society.¹ In 1968 Reagan gave a speech calling for states’ rights against the tyranny of centralization, and advocating for the market and not government as a more efficient way to solve societies problems. “Individuals,” he claimed, “including the hardcore unemployed and women could thus be better served by the private sector.” Though Reagan did not question the “desirability of reducing human misery and poverty or making opportunity, health, housing, and education available to all,” he nonetheless questioned if the Great Society could accomplish these goals and remain “free.” In short Reagan advanced a neoliberal theory of political economy characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade and one that required state intervention to create and preserve market practices.² Reagan’s 1968 speech appealing to a developing conservative coalition and advocating for the private sector instead of the centralized policies of big government foretold the policies that he would pursue during his presidency. Amidst worsening economic conditions including inflation, rising unemployment and a ballooning budget deficit, his “creative” system of decentralized and privatized governance shaped his goals around education and his broader body of social policies.

Reagan lamented that despite huge investments that went into education programs in the 1960s, schools were subjected to decreased standards and international decline.³ His solutions called “for a broad range of creative approaches by concerned parents, by educators, by the private sector, and by government.”⁴ Yet as Reagan reluctantly stumbled toward, and then strategically embarked upon the movement for educational excellence with the release of the 1983 report *A Nation at Risk* ⁵ the issue of school discipline became one of Reagan’s most creative approaches to school reform. In this chapter I argue that the federal focus on school discipline represents a new era of social control, one defined broadly by mass incarceration and the War on Drugs—a context that illuminates federal interest in school discipline and order. By the 1980s, increased rates of incarceration followed changes in urban labor markets that shifted from manufacturing to services—contributing to joblessness and stagnated and declining wages. The Republican party capitalized on the anxieties about ghetto revolts and racial disorder and built on the law-and-order politics established during the War on Poverty. During the period of

¹ Ronald Reagan, “The Creative Society,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* 34, no. 9 (February 15, 1968): 266.

² David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.

³ The white house office of the Press secretary, March 17, 1983 To the Congress of the United States. Office Files of Morton Blackwell. education box 8. Folder, Education 9 of 10. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Hereafter RRPL.

⁴ The white house office of the Press secretary To the congress of the United States. March 17, 1983. Office Files of Morton Blackwell, Box 8. Folder, Education 9 of 10. RRPL

⁵ National Commission on Excellence in Education, *A Nation at Risk*; Reagan Historian, Lou Cannon argues that Reagan’s interest in the *Nation at Risk*, “one of the most thoughtful documents to emerge from any government agency during the Reagan presidency” was largely rhetorical. Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role Of A Lifetime*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 730.

economic decline criminal justice policy became a way to control of surplus populations.⁶ Conservatives mobilized around crime-related issues and reconstructed popular images of the poor in ways that legitimated the contraction of public assistance programs and the expansion of social control.⁷

Similarly, conservative officials within the Reagan administration drummed up fears about school disorder in order to promote a new movement of “educational excellence” and redefine the issues of civil rights in education. By using the bully pulpit, promoting a new report “Disorder in Public Schools,” and appealing to leaders in education including teacher unions, researchers and local educators, the Reagan administration promoted educational excellence, school effectiveness, and race-based equity by campaigning against violence, crime, disorder, and indiscipline in public schools. Previous accounts of 1980s education policy have focused on the ways the rising excellence movement of the 1980s shifted the goals and direction of federal education from equity and inputs for the disadvantaged to standards and excellence for all.⁸ Yet the excellence movement should also be understood as a movement to impose stricter discipline. The first section reviews Reagan’s educational policies and uses the anti-welfare discourse of conservative thinkers to frame the ideas governing the excellence movement emerging in the wake of *A Nation at Risk*. I argue that the education standards movement and the successive claims to impose academic and behavioral discipline is part of the broader, though specifically racialized, attack on the “permissiveness” of previous social policies. The next section explores how the Reagan administration campaigned for increasing school discipline by promoting a message of national leadership, teacher support, and inexpensive reform. Next, I examine how policy makers tied calls for school discipline to broader educational research claims for “effective schools.” Administrative officials claimed that discipline would not only make schools more effective, but more equitable. Lastly the administration further abdicated federal responsibility to education programs by exploiting the effectiveness of “get-tough” Black leaders. More than any other opportunity program what urban schools needed to provide educational excellence, was not more money, or federal intervention but strong, local, Black leaders who would impose strict discipline. These examples demonstrate that the excellence movement spearheaded a national effort to increase school discipline particularly in urban schools and recast educational opportunity as stricter school discipline.

Recontextualizing 1980s Education Policy: Racialized Politics of Welfare State Retrenchment and crime control.

Much has been written about federal education reform under Reagan and the lasting legacies that resulted from the federal report, *A Nation at Risk*.⁹ Secretary of Education, Terrance Bell established the National Commission on Excellence to bring attention to the “the widespread

⁶ Gilmore, *Golden Gulag*; Melissa Hickman Barlow, “Race and the Problem of Crime in ‘Time’ and ‘Newsweek’ Cover Stories, 1946 to 1995,” *Social Justice* 25, no. 2 (72) (1998): 149–83.

⁷ Beckett, *Making Crime Pay*, 51.

⁸ For a review of Reagan era education policies see. McGuinn, *No Child Left*; Mehta, “How Paradigms Create Politics;” Mehta, *The Allure of Order*; Vinovskis, *From A Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind*.

⁹ David C Berline and Bruce J Biddle, *The Manufactured Crisis: Myths, Fraud and the Attack on America’s Public Schools*, (Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley, 1995); William L Boyd and Charles T Kerchner, eds., *The Politics of Excellence and Choice in Education: 1987 Yearbook of the Politics of Education Association*, (New York: Falmer Press, 1988); Joseph T. Murphey, ed., *The Educational Reform Movement of the 1980s: Perspectives and Cases*, (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan, 1990); Paul Manna, *School’s In Federalism and the National Education Agenda*, (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007); Guthrie and Springer, “A Nation at Risk Revisited.”

public perception that something [wa]s seriously remiss in our educational system.”¹⁰ The report listed a number of indicators to depict the educational risks facing the nation: curriculum had been “diluted, and diffused;” the amount of homework assigned had decreased; American students were not performing as high on international tests as students of other industrialized nations; SAT verbal and math scores demonstrated a “virtually unbroken decline;” and 23 million American adults were functionally illiterate. While other studies later contested the claims of the report and actually found that test scores showed a steady improvement *A Nation at Risk* no doubt influenced the terms of the debate.¹¹ Still the report had an immediate impact as news on the Commission’s report made the front page of almost every major newspaper across the nation and three major networks featured the release of the Report as their lead story in the evening news.¹²

Aside from *A Nation at Risk*, the Reagan administration saw little policy victory in education. Despite campaign promises to abolish the newly instituted Department of Education, introduce block grants and implement vouchers, Reagan’s retrenchment goals were never fully actualized.¹³ Most of the policy enactments of the Reagan revolution came in 1981 with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA). The 1981 Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA) cut education spending by 10% instead of an initially proposed 25% and consolidated twenty-nine categorical programs. Funding for bilingual education declined by 54%, and other programs for the handicapped lost about 6% to inflation between 1980 and 1988.¹⁴ Moreover, although Title I (now called Chapter I) was conserved during most of the 1980s fewer children were served by Title I than had been served in the late 1970s. It would take 10 years before the number of students assisted would be restored to 1980 levels.¹⁵

Reagan’s success in education was one of shifting the rhetoric and messaging through the bully pulpit.¹⁶ As Patrick McGuinn notes, the 1980s marked a shift away from the “ideational foundation” of equity-driven federal education that had characterized the 1960s.¹⁷ Republican rhetoric about the failure of public schools increased the salience of education in national politics and helped to generate momentum for increased federal leadership in school reform even though his “new federalism” advocated for the decentralization of government programs.¹⁸ As *A Nation at Risk* famously reported, “The educational foundations of our society were being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people.”¹⁹ The main

¹⁰ National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1.

¹¹ See for instance C. C. Carson, R. M. Huelskamp, and T. D. Woodall, “Perspectives on Education in America: An Annotated Briefing, April 1992,” *The Journal of Educational Research* 86, no. 5 (1993): 259–310.

¹² Holly G. McIntush, “Defining Education: The Rhetorical Enactment of Ideology in *A Nation at Risk*,” *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 2000), 419–443.

¹³ For more on the politics of retrenchment see Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State?: Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

¹⁴ Deborah A. Verstegen and David L. Clark, “The Diminution in Federal Expenditures for Education during the Reagan Administration,” *The Phi Delta Kappan* 70, no. 2 (1988), 138.

¹⁵ John F. (Jack) Jennings, “Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise,” *The Phi Delta Kappan* 81, no. 7 (2000): 516.

¹⁶ Richard Jung and Michael Kirst, “Beyond Mutual Adaptation, into the Bully Pulpit: Recent Research on the Federal Role in Education,” April 1986; William Lowe Boyd, “How to Reform Schools Without Half Trying: Secrets of the Reagan Administration,” *Educational Administration Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (1988): 299–309.

¹⁷ Patrick J. McGuinn, *No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965-2005* (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

¹⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 5.

selling point of the report were based on international comparisons that demonstrated that the achievement levels of American students had declined.²⁰ As some educational researchers have written, the focus on international competition and stricter performance reflected the New Right's narrative in which the USA's troubles were cast as the result of its people's lack of discipline (and not the lack of jobs) and focus on the hard knowledge of math and science, not the soft skills of self-esteem and cultural sensitivity.²¹ As Michael Apple has written, "behind the stress on higher standards, more rigorous testing, education for employment and a much closer relationship between education and the economy in general, and so on was the fear of losing in international competition and the loss of jobs and money."²² *A Nation at Risk* thus presented education reform and the problems facing schools in economic terms.²³

A Nation at Risk's focus on the increasing permissiveness of educational rigor fit well within the conservative call to reform and abolish Great Society programs and reflects a broader ideological realignment that focused less on the structures that prevented opportunity and looked more at questions of "dependency."²⁴ During the 1970s, conservative federal policy makers were not concerned with ending poverty as much as they were focused on the imperatives of changing social policy. The political obsession with welfare—and more so ending the problems that welfare wrought—defined how conservative policy makers and social thinkers came to understand and define poverty.²⁵ Pundits of anti-poverty programs claimed that the problem of the poor was not poverty, but rather the permissive policies of the 1960s that enabled pathological behaviors like dependency, irresponsibility and other antisocial behavior such as the tendency toward criminality.²⁶ In George Gilder's 1981 *Wealth and Poverty*, the conservative author claimed that New Deal liberalism had created moral hazard. It was work, family, and faith that lifted the poor out of poverty.²⁷ Yet for Gilder the poor of the 1970s refused to work hard. The demoralization of the poor was the consequence of a perverse welfare system, which eroded "work and family" and thus kept "poor people poor."²⁸ Other conservative commentators like Charles Murray expressed a similar position about the negative behaviors that social policies breed amongst the poor. The *New Republic* pronounced that Murray's book *Losing Ground* would forever change the terms of the poverty debated and considered the book "the most important work on poverty and social policy since Michael Harrington's *The Other America*."²⁹ Despite massive spending on social welfare after 1965, Murray argued that federal social policies had created perverse incentives that removed Black Americans from the labor force, reproduced disincentives for marriage, increased criminal behavior and reduced their educational drive. Social policies had provided the poor with short-term rational options which encouraged

²⁰ the report for instance noted that American students failed to come first or second on 19 academic tests, and in comparison with other industrialized nations American students came last seven times. *A Nation at Risk*

²¹ Collin and Ferrare, "Rescaling Education: Reconstructions of Scale in President Reagan's 1983 State of the Union Address." *Journal of Education Policy* 30, no. 6 (November 2, 2015): 796–809. This article explores Reagan's 1983 State of the Union Address, quote paraphrased from p 803.

²² Michael W. Apple, *Educating the 'Right' Way : Markets, Standards, God, and Inequality, Second Edition*, (London: Routledge, 2006), 31

²³ McIntush, "Defining Education."

²⁴ For more on the ideological realignment see O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*.

²⁵ For more on the ideologies undergirding 1980s poverty politics see Scott, *Contempt and Pity*; O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*; Katz, *The Undeserving Poor*.

²⁶ Katz, *The Undeserving Poor*

²⁷ Gilder, George F. *Wealth and Poverty*. Bookthrift Company, 1981.

²⁸ Quoted in Katz, *The Undeserving Poor*, 171.

²⁹ Cited in O'Conner, *Poverty Knowledge*. 250.

unemployment, illegitimacy, crime, and welfare dependency and ultimately created ever more poverty among the very people the Great Society presumed to help most.³⁰

Murray and other commentators also discussed how the expansion of educational rights to students through the courts and federal programs created permissiveness, poor behavior and would eventually lead to the ultimate disgrace, welfare dependency. Despite more spending in education through programs like Title I of Elementary and Secondary Education Act, changes in schooling led to lax behaviors that ultimately, Murray claimed, led to the decline in educational success, particularly among the lower-income urban Blacks.³¹ To Murray's own admission, he did not have data to draw conclusions about the magnitude of the problems in inner-city schools. Nevertheless, he asserted that in urban schools large numbers of students were in the halls and the stairwells, congregated in groups, and simply used schools as a "sort of social center," only attending homeroom and then cutting "most or all of the rest of their classes."³² Without any data to support his assertions, Murray connected the reform period of the 1960s, including the growth in education spending, with unsubstantiated observations about disorderly inner-city schools flooded with students in the hallways, who if attended school at all only attended non-academic classes.

For Murray and others, the claims of increased school disorder in inner-city schools were the result of due process requirements that had been extended to students in the 1970s which in turn had restricted how schools could suspend and discipline students.³³ At the end of the 1960s, the courts and other federal agencies such as the Legal Services Program established by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) advanced legal challenges to public school disciplinary practices.³⁴ The Supreme Court's in *Goss v. Lopez* (1975) extended due process rights of public school students facing short-term suspension and established "more formal procedures" for students.³⁵ *Goss v. Lopez*, like other court cases that followed, were initiated to challenge suspensions following student protests. The case represented students in Columbus, OH when 75 students from Central High School were suspended in demonstrations for observance of Black History Week.³⁶ After 1975, protest and free expression issues took up only eight percent of school discipline challenges in state and federal appellate cases.³⁷ Murray concluded that such cases shifted how students behaved in schools and limited teacher's ability to teach. "In the typical inner-city school," students would resist demanding teaching styles and "the rebellious students" would in turn make life miserable for the teacher through disruptive behavior in class, through physical threats, or by going through official channels and complaining to the administration that the teacher was "failing to observe their rights." Other conservative scholars wrote similarly about the disruptive effects of federal mandates which negatively impacted the culture of schools. For conservative author Thomas Sowell, federal mandates like school

³⁰ Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980*, (New York: Basic Books, 1984), Chapter 12.

³¹ *Ibid*, 260.

³² *Ibid*, 96-102

³³ *Ibid*, 172-3; For a review on the issues related to courts and moral authority in schools see Richard Arum et al., *Judging School Discipline: The Crisis of Moral Authority*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).

³⁴ Arum, *Judging School Discipline*. 8

³⁵ *Goss v. Lopez*, 419 US 565 (Supreme Court 1975).

³⁶ *Goss v. Lopez*; see also Arum, *Judging School Discipline*. 39

³⁷ Arum, *Judging School Discipline*, 23. School discipline was challenged over student use or possession of drugs (16 percent), alcohol (6 percent), weapons (6 percent), violence (14 percent), and general misbehavior (50 percent). Courts also became somewhat less sympathetic to students, deciding in favor of schools at levels similar to those of the early 1960s (that is, in approximately two thirds of cases

desegregation- drastically changed the characteristics of the schools for the worse—more violence, more disruption and less educational excellence.³⁸

As conservative authors and politicians promoted a platform demeaning social spending, they simultaneously promoted a program of “law and order.” In 1968, the issue of crime received an unprecedented level of political and media attention. By 1969, 81% of those polled believed that law and order had broken down and the majority blamed communities and Negroes who start riots.”³⁹ Pundits also claimed that welfare’s permissiveness created crime. Indeed, crime and welfare were major themes of Reagan’s campaign rhetoric as he often repeated stories of the “welfare queen” who had “80 names, 30 addresses, 12 social security cards” whose “tax-free income alone was over 150,000.”⁴⁰ The welfare queen remained an enduring symbol of welfare fraud, a story Reagan would repeat to Congressional leaders as one of his strategies to achieve the budget savings he had promised.⁴¹ If, as this chapter argues, Reagan’s success in education was his use of the bully pulpit, perhaps nowhere was his use of public discourse stronger than over constructing images of crime and drugs as The War on Drugs was declared in 1982—drugs were reframed through political rhetoric and media imagery as a grave threat to the national order. The Reagan administration hired staff to publicize the emergence of crack cocaine in 1985 in an effort to build public and legislative support for the new war on drugs. While the call for a War on Drugs avoided explicit racial political appeals the accompanying media campaign inspired by the administration was saturated with racial images and further solidified the public image of the criminalized Black drug user.⁴²

Ultimately, these broader conservative conversations about crime, welfare permissiveness and reduced standards took center stage in 1980s federal education policy. As the following sections demonstrate, focusing on improved discipline practices was compatible with the conservative call to reform permissive social policies of the 1960s. Improving academic standards, addressing student misbehavior and promoting “excellence” was discursively advanced as a way to promote economic growth and to address issues of civil rights, even as policy makers shunned policies that would actually make schools more equal.

Presidential leadership, Teachers Turned Police, and the inexpensive message of school discipline

When Reagan eventually “took up the crusade” for the school reform movement by helping to disseminate the National Commission of Excellence’s findings about diminishing standards in U.S. schools, he also tacked on his own agenda related to increasing school prayer, and parent vouchers.⁴³ These issues alongside the effort to reform disorder in the classroom would help Reagan to lead the “disciplined efforts” schools needed to reach high expectations. Embarking

³⁸ Thomas Sowell, “Black Excellence the Case of Dunbar High School,” *The Public Interest*, 197; for similar studies on the moral authority harmed by desegregation see Gerald Grant, *The World We Created at Hamilton High*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).

³⁹ Beckett, *Making Crime Pay*, 48; for more on how Reagan followed along the trajectory set by Johnson and Nixon see Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*. She argues that although the Reagan administration is generally credited with spearheading the domestic policy shift toward urban surveillance, the national crime control programs it developed in the 1980s were hardly a sharp policy departure. The war on drugs should be seen as the culmination and the fulfillment of federal crime control priorities rather than the beginning.

⁴⁰ Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*; Edsel and Edsel *Chain Reaction*, 148.

⁴¹ Cannon describes how Reagan would also use the anecdote of the welfare queen in meetings with foreign leaders *President Reagan: The Role of A Lifetime*, 759.

⁴² This review of racial images and the War on Drugs is borrowed from Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 103.

⁴³ Terrel H. Bell, *Thirteenth Man: A Reagan Cabinet Memoir*, (New York: Free Press, 1988), 164.

on a month-long drive to deliver messages on the state of U.S. education, Reagan joined forces with teachers by emphasizing one area of common ground between the teacher's union and the president –increasing school discipline.

Albert Shanker, the President of the American Federation of Teacher's (AFT), invited Reagan to speak at the union's Los Angeles convention in July 1983. Even though Shanker had previously opposed Reagan-backed education reforms, such as merit pay for teachers, after reading *A Nation at Risk* Shanker told top members of the union that "The report was right, and not only that, we should say it before our members."⁴⁴ Some delegates in attendance at the Los Angeles convention dissented from the union by staging a quiet walkout against Reagan, who they saw as anti-labor and anti-public education. Still, the President received "several points of hearty applause," the loudest of which came when the president described his shared interest in the federation's stance on school discipline. "The A.F.T.," declared Reagan "believes in stricter discipline codes in schools, including provisions to remove students who have histories of repeated disruptive behavior."⁴⁵ Despite the controversy of having invited the Republican President to speak before the 580,000 member teacher's union, Shanker too received a standing ovation for his remarks on student discipline when he declared that "teachers are not interested in disciplining children. They did not decide to become policemen, or psychiatrists or jailers. They want[ed] to be teachers."⁴⁶ Reagan officials later acknowledged that although Shanker "distanced himself from the president in general terms," he nonetheless "praised the President for raising the [discipline] issue."⁴⁷As Shanker recalled, "I can't remember a President of the United States ever saying before we might do something about the discipline problem."⁴⁸

Shanker's advocacy for increasing national attention to the problems of discipline in the classroom left him in an easy alliance with the Republican president. Fifteen years after organizing for collective bargaining for New York City's teachers, Shanker's support for more conservative oriented educational reforms including higher standards for teachers and students, seemed to conflict with his earlier positions.⁴⁹ Journalists took note of the supposed switch with newspaper headlines that read: "Shanker's Bold New Image"; "Shanker Out Front Again in Push for School Reform" "Shanker: Once-Militant Unionist Turns Moderate."⁵⁰In many ways however, the more moderate, Reagan leaning bent of the AFT and its leader Al Shanker continued a legacy of teacher advocacy that had arched towards racial conservatism. Shanker had drawn controversy during the Oceanhill-Brownsville fight for community-controlled school

⁴⁴ Kahlenberg, *Tough Liberal*, 263.

⁴⁵ David Shribman, "Reagan Implies That N.E.A. Lessons Are Aimed at Brainwashing Students." *New York Times*, (New York), July 6, 1983; see also Kahlenberg, *Tough Liberal*, 264.

⁴⁶ Harry Bernstein, "No Backing for Reagan, Union Chief Says," *Los Angeles Times (1923-1995)*; (Los Angeles), July 6, 1983.; Shanker made similar comments in his September 12, 1983 address to the National Press club Luncheon Address by Albert Shanker, National Press Club Luncheon (Washington, District of Columbia, September 12, 1983).

⁴⁷ Memo to Mike McManus, Don Clarey and Peter Robinsons from Mike Horowitz. January 25, 1984. Office Files McManus, Michael box 9. Folder, Discipline in Schools. RRPL.

⁴⁸ David Shribman, "Reagan Implies That N.E.A. Lessons Are Aimed at Brainwashing Students." *New York Times*, (New York), 1983.

⁴⁹ David G. Savage, "Shanker Out Front Again in Push for School Reform: SHANKER: School Reform Push SHANKER: Once-Militant Unionist Turns Moderate," *Los Angeles Times (1923-1995)*, (Los Angeles), July 2, 1983.

⁵⁰ Maeroff, "Shanker's Bold New Image: Shanker's New Image," *New York Times*, (New York), 1984; David G. Savage, "Shanker Out Front Again in Push for School Reform: Once-Militant Unionist Turns Moderate," *Los Angeles Times (1923-1995)*, (Los Angeles), July 2, 1983.

boards in 1968 when he led the United Federation of Teachers on a nearly two-month strike against the dismissed teachers and administrators amidst increasing racial tensions between the Black community school district and the largely Jewish teacher union.⁵¹ Shanker also made “disruptive students” an issue in the 1967 teachers strike when he demanded that teachers be given more professional authority to remove such students from the classroom.⁵²

Educator’s support for more school discipline were at times divided along racial lines. In response to Shanker’s 1967 demands to remove students that teachers deemed disruptive, Black and civil rights organizations responded that Black children in racist school systems needed more due process. Support of increased security was also a point of contention between Black educators and predominantly white teacher unions. In the summer of 1969, Chicago Public Schools instituted public school security policies that increased police access to schools. Although the white Chicago Teachers Union supported increasing security, Black Teachers feared that such measures would target politically active Black students and would place them in danger of overpolicing⁵³

By the 1980s, Shanker continued to disregard racial concerns by painting school discipline as a matter solely about teacher’s work and teacher turnover. For Shanker, the “culture of chaos,” that teachers experienced was caused by a “disproportionate number of troubled students,” most often found in large urban school systems.⁵⁴ Similar concerns about teachers in minority schools would make their way into the administration’s memorandum on student discipline which argued that “White teachers who taught in predominantly minority secondary schools [we]re seven times more likely to be attacked and need medical attention.”⁵⁵ Shanker asserted that the “atmosphere of silence” in the 1980s around the discipline issue resembled the one that surrounded the law and order issue of the late sixties and early seventies. He advocated that teacher, liberals and conservative politicians should no longer remain silent about the problem of disorder. “Somehow, somebody has gotten the idea that if you talk about law and order in the schools, you have to be a conservative that if you are a liberal, you keep your mouth shut and talk about the underlying causes of the problem.”⁵⁶ Presidential aides recognized that in sharp contrast to the larger teacher union, the National Education Association (NEA), the American Federation of Teachers had taken a lead role on the school discipline and violence issue and Shanker had become “one of the most articulate spokesmen in the country on this subject.”⁵⁷

With the support of the teacher’s union and inspired in part by the “the tremendous response” of his discipline message with the AFT,⁵⁸ Reagan officials mobilized their efforts to tackle school discipline.

⁵¹ For more on the racial politics undergirding the New York Teachers strike see Perlstein, *Justice, Justice*.

⁵² Ibid. 29

⁵³ Todd-Breland, *A Political Education*, 351.

⁵⁴ Prepared Statement of Albert Shanker. *United States Congress Committee on the Judiciary: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice*, 98th Congress (1984) (statement of Albert Shanker).

⁵⁵ Memorandum for the Cabinet Council on Human Resources: *Disorder in Our Public Schools* (United States, Department of Education, 1983). 7

⁵⁶ *United States Congress Committee on the Judiciary: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice*, 98th Congress (1984) (statement of Albert Shanker).

⁵⁷ “Memo to Mike McManus from Mike Horowitz "meeting with National Leaders Re School Violence/Discipline,” January 5, 1984. Office Files of Michael McManus box 9. Folder, specific projects file discipline in schools(1), RRPL.

⁵⁸ President Gets School Discipline Report: Low-Cost Federal Initiative is Expected. *Education Times*. Monday January 9, 1984.

A New Report on School Discipline

According to some accounts, 1983 had “been the Year of the Report on Education.” Every month a major report concerned with the state of American education was released and dozens of state task force reports and articles about school renewal, effective schools, and business-school partnerships were also released.⁵⁹ Four months after the National Commission on Excellence in Education released their report, President Reagan and Secretary Terrel Bell directed the Human Resources Cabinet Council CCHR—one of many cabinet councils established to debate and shape the major policies of the Reagan administration—to establish a working group on school discipline and produce one more report on education.⁶⁰ Gary Bauer, Undersecretary of Planning, Budget and Evaluation in the US Department of Education, served as the Chairmen of the group. Bauer joined the Department in August of 1982, motivated to “continue to move ahead to complete the Reagan revolution.”⁶¹ Chairing the working group and helping to create and then disseminate the message about the purported rising problems of crime, indiscipline and violence spreading through urban schools became one way that Bauer contributed to this mission.

The final report “Disorder in our Public Schools” was released to the President on January 3, 1984.⁶² Although it was released as an internal memorandum, and without the fanfare of the more famous, *A Nation at Risk*, the working group’s report originally titled “Chaos in the Classroom,” positioned the problem of school discipline and violence a central component of rising criminal risk facing the nation.⁶³ The memorandum on school discipline included selective evidence to hammer down their points about the rising problem of discipline in schools and the obstacles discipline posed for education. For example, the report began by citing evidence from the Gallup education poll indicating that for the past 10 years, the public’s major concern over public schools had been the lack of discipline. Most of the alarming data points came from the National Institute of Education’s (NIE) 1978 study on crime and violence. The report summarized findings from the NIE study citing that each month 282,000 students were physically attacked in Americas secondary schools; 112,000 students were robbed through force or threat; three million secondary school children were victims of in-school crime each month and almost 8% of urban junior high and senior high school students missed at least one day a month because they were afraid to go to school. The report also referenced the challenges that teachers faced in the classroom. Each month 6,000 teachers were robbed, 1,000 teachers were assaulted, 125,000 teachers were threatened with physical harm and 125,000 teachers were afraid to confront misbehaving students. Moreover, the report described the challenges faced by teachers in “big-city” junior high schools citing, shocking reports of a teacher in New Orleans who “watched while two boys threw a smaller child off a second floor balcony, and of high school girls in Los Angeles, angry over low grades, tossed lighted matched at their teacher,

⁵⁹ Education Commission of the States, “A Summary of Major Reports on Education,” November 1983. Denver Co. Education Commission of the States

⁶⁰ Hedrick Smith “Reagan Setting up 6 Cabinet Councils to Shape Policies,” *The New York Times*, (New York), February 15, 1981.

⁶¹ Letter to Morton Blackwell from Gary Bauer. Office Files of Morton Blackwell. Box 8. Folder, Education (6 of 10) RRPL

⁶² *Memorandum for the Cabinet Council on Human Resources: Disorder in Our Public Schools* (United States, Department of Education, 1983).

⁶³ Other working titles included “Disruptive Schools: The Barrier to Excellence”

setting her hair on fire.”⁶⁴ Some of the administration’s evidence of the impending national crisis of school discipline also came from local district reports. On the heels of Boston’s infamous 1970s school bussing controversy, the Reagan administration relied strongly on one report—Boston’s 1983 Safe Schools Commission. As one department administrator noted, “the major evidence we are using to indicate that serious public school problems of crime and disorder still remain is the 1983 Boston school system report.”⁶⁵ The chairman of the Boston’s Safe Schools Commission, retired State Supreme Court Justice Paul Reardon “found too much disruption, violence and fear in the city’s school.” He also lumped school bussing into his claims that the schools had become unsafe, noting that the “upset of learning that goes on, the theft and vandalism, the possession of weapons and drugs, disorder on buses and physical and verbal abuse,” was unacceptable.⁶⁶ Just as racist opponents of school bussing in Boston had used the fear of violence to oppose school desegregation, the anti-bussing Reagan administration would rely on the Boston study to support their campaign against classroom disorder, school violence, and indiscipline.

The selected evidence put together to articulate the growing problem of school crime and indiscipline was refuted and critiqued by members of Congress and educators.⁶⁷ Michael Casserly, the Director of Legislation and Research for the Council of the Great City Schools, claimed the report was destructive and “panders to the ugliest stereotypes that the public holds about inner-city schools.” While issues of discipline and crime, and disruptive students existed in schools, Casserly maintained that schools “we are not crawling with them as this report implies.”⁶⁸ President of the NEA Mary Futrell claimed similarly that public schools were not “Blackboard jungles,” as the Reagan administration seemed to imply. Futrell argued that attitudes about discipline problems were actually changing. She argued that in 1978, 74 percent of the teachers surveyed by NEA reported that discipline problems impaired their ability to teach. In 1983, that percentage was down to 45 percent.⁶⁹ Former teacher and Democratic Congressman Patrick Williams from Montana felt that the Reagan administration had “callously ignored the issue” of discipline and was now suddenly and “dangerously focusing upon it.”⁷⁰

Despite criticisms, the Reagan administration used the report to advocate for increased discipline in public schools—an issue that became one of the primary objectives of federally led school reform. Reagan spoke to 2,000 educators on December 8, 1983 at the National Forum on Excellence in Education, drawing attention to the problem that school discipline and teacher authority. Reagan lamented that teachers lacked the authority to quiet down their classes and that “in some schools, teachers suffer[ed] verbal and physical abuse,” and lacked the authority to

⁶⁴ *Memorandum for the Cabinet Council on Human Resources*, 4.

⁶⁵ Memo to Mike McManus from Mike Horowitz “meeting with National Leaders Re School Violence/Discipline,” January 25, 1984. Office files of Michael McManus. box 9. Folder, specific projects file discipline in schools(1), RRPL.

⁶⁶ “Boston Panel Finds Fear and Violence in Schools,” *New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast)*, (New York), December 4, 1983.

⁶⁷ Gerald Boyd, “Witnesses Say White House Is Distorting School Violence,” *New York Times*, (New York), 1984; Leah Latimer, “Report Draws Criticism Locally: Educators, Parents Dispute Reagan Report on School Discipline,” *The Washington Post*, (Washington D.C.), January 24, 1984.

⁶⁸ *U.S. Congress Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Crime and Violence in the Schools Hearing before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice*. 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 120, (1984).

⁶⁹ *Senate Committee on Crime and Violence in Schools*, 109.o

⁷⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on education and labor, Oversight on school discipline subcommittee on Elementary, Secondary and Vocational Education, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. January 23, 24, 1985. 150

make students do school work.⁷¹ While federal programs such as the ESEA had been a priority of other administrations, Reagan's 1981 Education Consolidation and Improvement Act had already reformed many of the provisions of ESEA by simplifying eligibility requirements, increasing flexibility for states to use federal education funds, and reducing federal funding for education by nearly 20 percent.⁷² Instead Reagan argued that schools didn't need more money—schools simply needed to “restore good old-fashioned discipline.”⁷³

By January of 1984, the administration began to spread their message through radio announcements, newspaper articles and Congressional hearings. The message was clear that the nation needed to restore discipline in schools, fight school crime and violence and limit the legal rights of children facing suspension from school. That same month Reagan gave his first radio address of the year devoted to the subject of “school violence and discipline.”⁷⁴ Reagan used his Saturday morning radio speeches to connect with the American people and to set the agenda-for media reporters and to shape the headlines in the Sunday newspapers and draw broadcast media coverage.⁷⁵ He spoke that every month 3 million secondary school children were subjected not to “ordinary high jinks” but “crime” in-school. Classrooms were not “temples of learning,” but rather schools “filled with rude, unruly behavior and even violence,” and declared that “we can't get learning back into our schools until we get the crime and violence out.” The radio announcement was just the beginning of the administration's media activity on discipline. The speech and a fact sheet about school discipline, was sent to editors and columnists across the country. Secretary Bell, appeared on “Face the Nation,” wrote an Op-Ed for *USA today*, and did interviews with *Newsweek*, the *New York Times* and the *Boston Globe*. Department Under Secretary Bauer did regional radio interviews and spoke with reporters from *Education Week*, *Washington Post*, *People magazine*, and the *Chicago Tribune*.⁷⁶ Lastly, hearings were scheduled in the House Education and Labor Committee and Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice.⁷⁷ The administration was well on their way to spreading their message about increased crime and disorder in the nation's schools.

While the administration wanted to guide national and Congressional interest toward the increasing problem of school discipline, they also wanted to reduce the impulse to increase funding toward the problem. The report was intentionally broad about framing the federal direction over the discipline issue. Authors of the report recommended that Department of Education focus public attention to the problems of school disorder through the National Institute of Education which would “conduct extensive research into the prevention of school discipline/violence problems.”⁷⁸ They suggested that the Department of Justice prepare friend of the court briefs in order to support the authority of teachers, principals and school administrators

⁷¹ Ronald Reagan “Remarks at the National Forum on Excellence in Education in Indianapolis, Indiana. accessed <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/120883b>.

⁷² McGuinn, *No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965-2005*, 42.

⁷³ Reagan “Remarks at the National Forum on Excellence.”

⁷⁴ Ronald Reagan, “Radio Address to the Nation on School Violence and Discipline (January 7, 1984.)” in the Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984 Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985.

⁷⁵ Howard H. Martin, “President Reagan's Return to Radio,” *Journalism Quarterly* 61, no. 4 (December 1984): 817–21; Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones, “‘Until Next Week’: The Saturday Radio Addresses of Ronald Reagan.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (2002): 84–110.

⁷⁶ Memo to Pamela Bailey from Anne Graham “Media activity on Discipline in the Classrooms.” Jan 12, 1984. Michael McManus box 9. Folder, specific projects file discipline in schools(1). RRPL

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ *Memorandum for the Cabinet Council on Human Resources*, 21.

as they dealt with school discipline problems. In addition, the Department's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention would establish a National School Safety Center which would collect and disseminate data on school safety problems. Lastly, they advised the administration and the president to “speak out and exercise national leadership” on the need to restore order and discipline to the nation’s schools.⁷⁹

Critics contended that the discipline issue was “cheap politics,” and that Reagan was using the discipline issue to gain political support and distract from federal cuts in educational aid. ⁸⁰ For members of the administration, discipline provided a unique opportunity to provide presidential leadership over a low-cost reform. Some of his aides for instance recommended that the President meet with a selected group of national leaders who have effectively dealt with violence and discipline matters including former governors, minority principals, and academic experts in order to demonstrate “a major act of Presidential leadership,” over the issue of school discipline.⁸¹ While Reagan called for a reduced federal role over education, decreased funding and a decentralized government, his administrative aides proposed that presidential leadership could steer the campaign against indiscipline in the classroom without dedicating any more than their rhetorical campaign at the supposed problem of school disorder. As debates about school discipline made their way into the House and Senate hearings, the administration hoped that Senator Arlen Specter, who chaired the Senate hearings on school violence, would neither steal “the President’s thunder,” away from the discipline issue nor call “witnesses who will find ways to urge new spending programs in order to make any school discipline initiative ‘real.’”⁸²

As previous accounts have discussed, the Reagan administration's use of the bully pulpit was the centerpiece of 1980’s education policy.⁸³ With little more than effective use of rhetoric and symbols the Reagan administration helped to reshape the semantics and agenda of American Education policy.⁸⁴ He also used the bully pulpit to promote to advocate for increased discipline in the classroom by calling attention to issues of crime, violence and classroom disruption. Part of the success of the discipline message was that it was linked with other messages related to school effectiveness and race-based “civil rights,” to which the next section explores. Important is that although Reagan did not make explicit references to race in his radio message about school crime, his broader anti-crime message often exploited racial hostility and resentment for political gain.⁸⁵ Similarly, the message about school discipline both exploited animosity against school busing, while also making school discipline a message about equal education provision.

Discipline: The Other Side Of Excellence and the New Civil Right.

As policy makers spread their message about increasing discipline, they were strategic about linking their message against crime and classroom disorder with the burgeoning standards movement. In one memo, Assistant Secretary Anne Graham claimed that their approach was to

⁷⁹ *Ibid*

⁸⁰ “Making it an issue helps restore order” Opinion. *USA Today*. January 10, 1984 Office files of Michael McManus box 9. Folder, specific projects file discipline in schools(1). RRPL

⁸¹ Memo to Mike McManus from Mike Horowitz January 25, 1984. Office Files of Michael McManus box 9. Folder, specific projects file discipline in schools(1). RRPL

⁸² “Memo to Mike McManus from Mike Horowitz” Office Files of Michael McManus box 9. Folder, specific projects file discipline in schools(1). RRPL

⁸³ Jung and Kirst, “Beyond Mutual Adaptation, into the Bully Pulpit.”

⁸⁴ William Lowe Boyd, “How to Reform Schools Without Half Trying: Secrets of the Reagan Administration,” *Educational Administration Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (1988): 299–309.

⁸⁵ Edsall and Edsall, *Chain Reaction*.

“emphasize that the problem of disorder in the classroom [wa]s closely related to the broader problem of the ‘rising tide of mediocrity.’”⁸⁶ For Graham and other White House aides responsible for spreading the discipline message, educational reforms and restoring discipline went “hand in hand” and could only succeed if crime and disorder were removed from the schools.⁸⁷ “Good discipline,” as Gary Bauer claimed, “was essential to an effective educational program.”⁸⁸ As research about urban school ineffectiveness took off, the Reagan administration would use the momentum of effective school research to build its case for more disciplined schools. Moreover, combating indiscipline and crime presented the Reagan administration with an opportunity to champion their own version of education-based civil rights—one that framed urban student disorder as the leading cause of academic failure. Yet as Reagan officials promoted the movement of educational excellence in effect helped substantiate educational inequality.

The administration based many of their claims about discipline and learning on the burgeoning field of effective-schools research. The 1966 Equality of Opportunity report, (commonly known as the Coleman Report, after its lead author James Coleman) found that student achievement was little affected by school resources such as school facilities, curriculum and teacher quality. Rather the attributes of other students, or peer effects, accounted for the variation in achievement of minority children. ⁸⁹ These findings seemed to indicate that investing in school resources and improving school facilities could do less to improve schooling outcomes than focusing on peers and family background. In response, a number of researchers published findings in the mid and late-1970s demonstrating that it was possible to improve student academic performance in low-income, largely minority schools by focusing on school improvements.⁹⁰ Ronald Edmonds’ article, “Effective Schools for the Urban Poor,” for instance argued that “equitable public schooling begins by teaching poor children what their parents want them to know and ends by teaching poor children at least as well as it teaches middle-class children.”⁹¹ Effective schools research in its infancy was always about the urban poor, and by extension- though not often explicitly stated—research about the Black and brown children that occupied urban schools. Consequently, the Reagan administration’s call for stricter discipline as a means toward effective schools cast a message about the Black and brown children in these ineffective schools as in need of discipline.

While many of the later effective schools studies did not make race a central feature of their analysis, effective schools research continued to explore how urban schools could effectively improve learning outcomes for the “socio-economic disadvantaged,” and found that improved order and discipline in school was one of the key features that lead to effective schools. In their review of effective schools research Stewart Purkey and Marshall Smith for

⁸⁶ Memo to Pamela Bailey from Anne Graham media activity on discipline in the classroom. Jan 12 1984. Office files of Michael McManus box 9. Folder, discipline in schools (1) RRPL

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ *Senate Committee on Crime and Violence in Schools*, 58.

⁸⁹ James Coleman, “Equality of Educational Opportunity.” National Center for Educational statistics, 1966. 302

⁹⁰ James Coleman, “Equality of Educational Opportunity.” National Center for Educational statistics, 1966; see also Larry Cuban, “Transforming the Frog into a Prince: Effective Schools Research, Policy, and Practice at the District Level,” *Harvard Educational Review* 54, no. 2 (July 1, 1984): 129–52, 3; Mehta refers to the Coleman report as part of the forgotten standards movement in chapter four of *The Allure of Order*; Kenneth K. Wong and Anna C. Nicotera, “Brown v. Board of Education and the Coleman Report: Social Science Research and the Debate on Educational Equality,” *Peabody Journal of Education* 79, no. 2 (March 2004): 122–35.

⁹¹ Ronald Edmonds, “Effective Schools for the Urban Poor,” *Educational Leadership* 37, no. 1 (October 1979).

example argued that reasonable rules, fairly and consistently enforced, reduced behavior problems that interfered with learning, and promoted feelings of pride and responsibility in the school community.⁹² By setting clear goals, shared high expectations, and establishing “order and discipline,” effective schools developed a sense of community, reduced alienation and increased achievement. Other studies like James Coleman’s 1981 *Public and Private Schools: An Analysis of High School and Beyond* argued that in all areas of behavior, public schools had greater student behavior problems than schools in any other sector.⁹³ In addition, students in public schools took fewer academic courses, and spent fewer hours on homework, comparisons that for Coleman “were not happy ones for American public schools.”⁹⁴ The administration cited both the Purkey and Smith report and Colman’s high school study in advocating for increased presidential leadership over school discipline.⁹⁵

The Reagan administration also sought guidance from conservative advisors to relate the problems of disorder with excellence. Mike Horowitz, the General Counsel for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) believed that professors like Diane Ravitch, Horowitz’s “personal friend,” “a leading critic of busing,” and “along-term neo-conservative,” was well aware of the need to deal with school discipline and violence in order to achieve academic excellence.⁹⁶ Other popular conservative intellectuals, like Chester Finn, co-director of Vanderbilt’s Center for Education Policy advised administrators within the US Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention on school discipline and violence.⁹⁷ Finn advised that the President not depict school discipline as only “or even primarily” as a question of school “security.” Although Finn wrote that getting criminal behavior, “unspeakable acts and incorrigible people” out of the schools was “an absolutely necessary precondition,” for effective teaching and learning to occur. He also advised the administration to focus on organizing the schools such that children acquire the knowledge, skills and behaviors that “lead them to become self-disciplined youngsters and responsible adults.”⁹⁸ Similarly, for Al Shanker, violence was not the major problem in schools, rather it was the question of serious disruption that deserved the focus of policy. Discipline, in terms of school disorder, was “the other side of the school excellence coin and cannot be overlooked.”⁹⁹ These conservative critics who championed educational “excellence,” while at the same time admonishing more progressive educational reforms, would also lend their expertise in advancing a more repressive message of behavioral correction.

As the other side of excellence, policy makers argued that improved discipline could be more effective in bringing about educational equity than programs designed and put forth during the 1960s. To this point, Reagan announced that “Black Americans and the struggle for

⁹² Stewart C. Purkey and Marshall S. Smith, “Effective Schools: A Review,” *The Elementary School Journal* 83, no. 4 (March 1983) P445

⁹³ James Coleman, et al, *Public and Private Schools. An Analysis of High School and Beyond: A National Longitudinal Study for the 1980’s.* (1981) 46.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 125.

⁹⁵ *Memorandum for the Cabinet Council on Human Resources.*

⁹⁶ “Memo to Mike McManus from Mike Horowitz "meeting with National Leaders Re School Violence/Discipline,” January 5, 1984. Michael McManus box 9 specific projects file discipline in schools(1), RRPL

⁹⁷ *Ibid*.

⁹⁸ Letter from checker Finn to Michael Horwitz “the education issues.” February 28, 1984. Robinson peter box 13. Folder, Education (1 of 2). RRPL.

⁹⁹ *Senate Committee on Crime and Violence in Schools*, 23.

excellence in education” would be the theme of the first ever Black history month in 1984.¹⁰⁰ Yet Reagan was no champion of racial civil rights in education or elsewhere. He opposed both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, respectively. Like other social conservatives, he masked his disapproval of federally initiated race-based programs under racist code words of protecting “state rights.” For example, he evoked a message of state’s rights when opening his campaign for president in 1980 in Philadelphia Mississippi- the site of the 1964 brutal murder of civil rights activists James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner.¹⁰¹ Reagan campaigned against policies that he believed obstructed individual freedoms such as forced busing and affirmative action. As one historian noted, “Reagan rejected the idea of a society ordered along racial lines. Instead of proportional representation and equality of results, Reagan stood for individual rights and equality of opportunity.”¹⁰² His disavowal of policies like school bussing and affirmative action, however, demonstrated more accurately that he rejected the fact that society was and had been racially ordered. During his presidential campaign, Reagan criticized affirmative action programs for distorting civil rights “into federal guidelines or quotas which require race, ethnicity or sex—rather than ability and qualifications—to be the principal factor in hiring or education.”¹⁰³ Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds, the head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division was similarly dedicated “to the principled path of color-blindness,” believing like other Reagan conservatives that racial preferences were a “quick fix” that conservative historian Raymond Wolters said “diverted attention away from more serious problems that beset Blacks—joblessness, family dissolution indifference to schoolwork, and the destruction of neighborhoods by crime and drug trafficking.”¹⁰⁴ For Reagan and members of his administration, to the extent that racial inequality existed, it remained tied to stereotypically outlined behavioral pathologies and not the result of state sanctioned racism.

Moreover Reagan Republicans staged rhetorical attacks on policies like school bussing while arguing that it was actually the problems of disruption, school violence and discipline that were at the heart of civil rights campaigns.¹⁰⁵ The working group on school discipline dedicated a substantial portion of their memorandum to minorities and discipline claiming for instance that “minorities,” were even more worried than whites about the lack of discipline as they were “doubly affected by violent and disruptive schools” and were also more likely to have their learning disrupted.¹⁰⁶ The report continued that it was “discipline problems,” not ghetto isolation,

¹⁰⁰ Ronald Reagan, “Black History Month Ceremony,” February 2, 1984, Robinson, Peter Files. Signing Ceremony: Black History Month. Box 1, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Collections. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitalibrary/smf/speechwriting/robinson/box-001/40-486-5717105-001-034-2018.pdf>

¹⁰¹ Michael C Dawson and Lawrence D. Bobo, “The Reagan Legacy and the Racial Divide in the George W Bush Era,” *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 1, no. 2 (September 2004): 209–12.

¹⁰² Raymond Wolters, *Right Turn: William Bradford Reynolds, the Reagan Administration, and Black Civil Rights*. Routledge, 2018.

¹⁰³ Cited in Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty*, 548.

¹⁰⁴ Wolters, *Right Turn*; For reviews of Raymond’s work see Charles Henry, “Review of *Review of Right Turn: William Bradford Reynolds, the Reagan Administration, and Black Civil Rights*, by Raymond Wolters,” *The Journal of American History* 84, no. 2 (1997): 741–42.

¹⁰⁵ Wicker, Tom. “Fighting the Last War: [Op-Ed].” *New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast)*; New York, N.Y. June 7, 1985; For a review of Reagan and the private school tax battle with the IRS see Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role Of A Lifetime*, 457-463; “Going Back to the Back of the Bus: Civil Rights Enforcement With Blunted Bayonets,” *New York Times* (New York), November 10, 1985.

¹⁰⁶ *Memorandum for the Cabinet Council on Human Resources*, 10.

increasing rates of child poverty, joblessness or reduced social protections that had “effectively stolen the tickets to upward mobility that public schools have traditionally provided.”¹⁰⁷ These assertions that upheld ideas about individual and cultural affinities reflected the ideas of other conservative critics who substantiated racists arguments for the need for stricter criminal and education policies by alluding to their supposed civil rights implications. Charles Murray argued for instance that the permissive education practices and liberal criminal justice policies of the 1960s and 1970s had left the deserving poor “most at risk,” as they remained in poor neighborhoods and schools where disadvantaged delinquents were allowed to remain. In return, the most deserving of the poor got nothing except “easier access to welfare” and stripped them of the “opportunities to reach their potential.”¹⁰⁸

Such attempts to repurpose discipline initiatives under the veil of civil rights again ignored accusations by parents, civil rights groups and children advocacy organizations that reported that Black children were disproportionately punished, suspended and expelled in schools. According to a 1975 Children Defense Fund report, Black students were suspended at twice the rate of any other group. School suspensions they concluded, were more likely to hurt “children who are Black, poor, older and male.”¹⁰⁹ The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which had since been divided into separate departments under the Carter administration, concluded similarly that “in many hundreds of school systems throughout the nation, minority children are receiving a disproportionate number of discipline actions in the form of expulsions and suspensions and are being suspended for longer periods than nonminority children.”¹¹⁰ That same year the Office of Civil Rights received 41 complaints alleging discrimination in school discipline, including complaints against Anne Arundel County in Maryland, which by November of 1984 would settle out of court for a 1981 incident involving five Black children being locked in a closet as a form of punishment.¹¹¹ Despite ongoing systemic charges of race-based school discipline violations, some reports denounced that race remained a primary concern of those battling school crime and punishment. The *Wall Street Journal* reported that while the “prevailing doctrine of a few years ago said we should not pay much attention to the discipline issue because it was a symptom of institutional racism... political culture is changing. People are no longer so intimidated by the idea that they might be called racist or reactionary if they demand safety for their children.”¹¹² Similarly, the working group disputed those who claimed school discipline was synonymous with anti-minority school policy. Emphasizing their point, the authors of the working group argued that those who made such claims

“had the matter precisely backward: The hard-won right of minority children to an equal educational opportunity is being jeopardized by unsafe and disorderly schools. Permitting

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Murray, *Losing Ground*, 201.

¹⁰⁹ Children’s Defense Fund. *School Suspensions Are They Helping Children*. 1975.

¹¹⁰ “HEW Reports Bias in School Discipline.” *The Sun* (1837-1994), (Baltimore), September 4, 1975.

¹¹¹ Statement of Peter. E Holmes before the subcommittee on Education. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Subcommittee on Education “oversight Hearing on HEW Enforcement of School Related Civil Rights Problems, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess., April 30, 1975. 4. Government Printing Office, 1975; Kaye Thompson, “Anne Arundel Schools Settle Discipline Suit: Pupils Put in Closets to Receive \$30,000,” *The Washington Post* (1974-Current File), (Washington, D.C.), November 1, 1984.

¹¹² “School Shape-Up.” *Wall Street Journal*; New York, N.Y. January 6, 1984.

the current deterioration of order in the public schools to continue would be anti-minority in the most fundamental sense.”¹¹³

Not only had discipline become a way for the administration to address issues related to racial civil rights and equal opportunity, but through reforming school discipline they could contest existing strategies to enforce racial equity. The administration argued that the problem of urban violence was both the underlying cause of Black demands for busing and white refusal of busing. For members of the working group, “[u]rban school violence and indiscipline” was “at the heart of the busing controversy.”¹¹⁴ Thus it was not white racism, failures of courts to redistrict segregated school systems, or government abandonment of goals to enforce integration, rather it was the problem of indiscipline and violence in many inner-city schools that was a “major factor” in the abandonment of urban public education for private schools and public schools in the suburbs.¹¹⁵

As the administration pursued school discipline and crime as their primary civil rights issue in education they continued to dismiss existing civil rights strategies. Pursuing integration for instance would not absolve urban schools of their rising discipline problem. Speaking on behalf of the administration, Secretary of Education Terrel Bell claimed that socioeconomic factors might be the underlying cause of behavioral problems. Bell argued that “busing [wa]s a band-aid and a temporary measure at best. For Bell, busing would be a poor solution to the problem of discipline because “at the end of the bus ride you have the student right back there in that segregated ghetto neighborhood. You have the student there on weekends. You have the student in that neighborhood during all of the summer.”¹¹⁶ In other words, school discipline and the alleged behavior problems of would-be-bused students would remain as long as ghetto communities remained a problem. Bell continued, “until we’re able to make some more progress in helping minorities to make it in our society, economically, we’re going to continue to see this [discipline] as a serious problem.” Though Bell supported the administration in promoting the discipline message, his acknowledgement that poverty remained a problem of urban communities had left him in further disfavor with other members of the administration.¹¹⁷ Tiptoeing away from Bell’s answer, General Counsel Mike Horowitz advised that the discipline message not focus on economics or Black poverty. Horowitz claimed that while minority students might be prone to indiscipline by reason of their economic poverty, it made “far more sense to refer to the civil right of the vast majority of inner-city students to a good learning environment—one that is threatened by failure of schools systems to effectively discipline unruly students.”¹¹⁸ Civil rights and educational opportunity was not a question of ghetto poverty. Rather, under the Reagan administration, the question of educational opportunity had been reduced to the learning environments of inner-city schools.

Expanding Urban Opportunity: Black Leaders and Disciplining the Disorderly

¹¹³ *Memorandum for the Cabinet Council on Human Resource*, 13, emphasis in original.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, .12

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Briefing by secretary of education Terrell H Bell and deputy undersecretary Gary Bauer on school discipline Media Relations office. Box 11 Education Box 6. [education] school violence/discipline. RRPL

¹¹⁷ For Bell’s description of his relationship with the Reagan Cabinet see. Terrel H Bell, *Thirteenth Man: A Reagan Cabinet Memoir*. New York : London: Free Press, 1988.

¹¹⁸ Memo to Mike McManus from Mike Horowitz. January 9, 1983. Office Files of Michael McManus box 10. Folder, Subject-specific projects file: discipline in schools (2). RRPL

Lastly, The federal focus on implementing excellence and enforcing minority civil rights through discipline occurred as Black elected officials gained more prominence on school boards, and in city governments throughout cities across the United States. As new leaders took over changing cities, the Reagan administration selected the stories of “minority principals” known for establishing strong disciplinary codes and bringing about successful ‘turn-around’ schools in the inner-city to push their school discipline agenda and rationalize the need for more rigid control over predominantly Black students.

The administration highlighted the work of local school leaders as they promoted their school discipline agenda while simultaneously absolving themselves of responsibility to lead new federal directives or support any broader redistributive programs. Testifying before the Senate subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, Alfred Regnery, Director of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, suggested that schools like George Washington Preparatory High School located in the Watts area of Los Angeles served as a “very good example,” of an effective turn-around school. Regnery reported that while just four or five years earlier, drugs and gangs were a serious problem and “crime was rampant” in the school “which was 95% Black and 5% Hispanic.” It was McKenna’s leadership, not additional spending, that turned this school around.¹¹⁹ Not only could school leaders improve discipline which would in turn lead to school turn around in violent urban schools, but addressing school discipline for Regnery would also serve to combat neighborhood crime. Regnery claimed that in four years, George Washington Preparatory High School had seen suspensions decrease by over 40% and truancy decrease by over 60%. He argued, when “schools are able to maintain order and where they are able to provide students with a structure where they know what is expected of them, truancy goes down. And where truancy goes down, neighborhood crime goes down also.”¹²⁰

Administration officials similarly believed other minority school leaders who had established strong disciplinary codes could also help to advise the President on the matter. Such leaders included Francis Vasquez from the South Bronx; James Williams principal of Cardoza High School in Washington DC; Norris Hogans, the principal at Carver High School in Atlanta, and San Diego’s Director of Security, Alex Rascone, a “Hispanic,[who was] also reportedly very articulate and committed on the subject.”¹²¹ In addition, Principals like Joe Clark, one of the first Black school administrators in Paterson, New Jersey and principal of Eastside High School drew recognition from the Reagan administration and the media for his controversial discipline strategies that included walking around the halls with a baseball bat, chaining school exits to keep out drug dealers, and for unauthorized suspension of 66 students.¹²² As one *Time* magazine reviewer wrote, “In a country fed up with kids out of control, Clark seems to represent one effort to return to the law-and-order of a more innocent time.”¹²³ According to one news article, Clark was “the Reagan administration's favorite high school principal.” Clark drew praise from President Reagan and Secretary of Education William Bennet agreeing to do pro bono consulting work with the administration on issues such as “children, education and Blacks.” Clark likewise praised Reagan. Speaking before a mostly white audience Clark critiqued the US welfare system

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 27.

¹²⁰ Testimony of Alfred Regnery. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee *Crime and Violence in schools*. 25

¹²¹ “Memo to Mike McManus from Mike Horowitz "meeting with National Leaders Re School Violence/Discipline,” January 5, 1984. Office files of Michael McManus. Box 9. Folder, specific projects file discipline in schools(1),RRPL.

¹²² Regnery testimony U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee *Crime and Violence in schools*. 26

¹²³ Ezra Bowen, et al, “Getting Tough New Jersey Principal Joe Clark Kicks up a Storm about Discipline in City Schools,” *TIME Magazine* 131, no. 5 (2/1/1988 1988): 52.

that made Black people unproductive. Reagan on the other hand had taken “the handout away from Black people and ma[de] us work for ourselves.”¹²⁴

As the Reagan administration leaned on Black leaders to promote their school discipline message, his urban policies had drastic impacts on other local officials. By the 1970s and 80s more Black leaders were being elected to municipal offices. In 1973, Atlanta, Detroit, and Los Angeles had elected their first Black mayors. Ten years later, Chicago, Charlotte, and Flint would also elect their first mayors.¹²⁵ In 1970 there were almost 1400 Black elected officials, by 1980 almost 5,000 Black officials had been elected throughout the south and in cities with Black majorities.¹²⁶ Many of these cities by the 1980s would be marked by a declining manufacturing force, increased reliance on low-wage service sector jobs, increasing poverty rates and substantially segregated ghettos and social isolation.¹²⁷ It was within these cities with rising rates of poverty, decreasing industry and declining tax revenue that perhaps felt the strongest blows of the Reagan Revolution, purposed with cutting taxes, limiting the size and scope of the federal government, reducing government “excess” and spending and a steady withdrawal of urban funding. As Reagan’s new federalism was put in place, funding of community development block grants, urban development action grants, general revenue sharing, mass transit aid, employment and training programs, clean water construction, assisted housing and various programs of the economic development administration faced major decreases. According to one account, grant programs that benefited city governments were cut 46% between 1980 to 1990.¹²⁸ Andrew Young, mayor of Atlanta between 1981-1989 later reflected, that “minority opportunity” had “waxed and waned” in because of “retrenchment in the areas of education and civil right, and we must resolve to expand opportunity once more.”¹²⁹ By contrast, through celebrating principals like Joe Clark and others who imposed strict and often punitive and abusive school strategies, the Reagan administration could further promote their reform agenda that focused on decentralizing reform, cutting “excess” from 1960s policies they deemed unnecessary, and celebrate “entrepreneur principals” who would lay down the law with students.¹³⁰

Conclusion

In 1983 *A Nation at Risk* garnered massive media attention with alarmist claims that test scores were rapidly declining and promoting fear that other industrialized countries were threatening to outpace America’s technological superiority. Reagan continued to sound the alarm as his administration conflated education excellence with a message of restoring discipline and ending crime. The 1984 Republican Party Platform celebrated President Reagan for leading the national renewal to get back to the “basics,” for restoring education to prominence in public policy and for moving away from “the disastrous experiment with centralized direction of our schools that

¹²⁴ Jesse H. Walker, “Clark Says Reagan’s Denials Spur Blacks,” *New York Amsterdam News (1962-1993)*, (New York), May 14, 1988; “Principal Declines White House Offer,” *The Baltimore Afro-American*, January 23, 1988.

¹²⁵ On Chicago, see Todd-Breland, *A Political Education*.

¹²⁶ Harris, *The Price of the Ticket*.

¹²⁷ Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, 40-46.

¹²⁸ Wayne Waxman, *Double Trouble: Black Mayors, Black Communities, and the Call for a Deep Democracy*, (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2005). The 46% figure comes from Demetrios Caraley, “Washington Abandons the Cities,” *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no. 1 (1992): 1–30, 8.

¹²⁹ Cited in Gary Orfield and Carole Ashkinaze, *The Closing Door: Conservative Policy and Black Opportunity* (University of Chicago Press, 1993), xi. For more on the politics of Black leadership see, Cedric Johnson, *Revolutionaries to Race Leaders: Black Power and the Making of African American Politics*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).

¹³⁰ Howard Kurtz, “The Wyatt Earp Of Eastside High,” *Washington Post*, (Washington, D.C.), January 14, 1988.

persisted from 1965- 1980.” They wrote that “students cannot learn in an undisciplined environment,” and applauded the President's promise to provide protection to teachers and administrators against suits from “the unruly few who seek to disrupt the education of the overwhelming majority of students.”¹³¹ As a result of the President’s effort, communities across the nation “lengthen[ed] the school year,” increased school requirements and insisted on school disciplinary codes.¹³² Ultimately, the Reagan administration embellished claims about violence and drummed up fears about the ways uncontrolled classrooms prohibited educational and—by extension—national success. This merging of school discipline and education excellence effectively made the problem of violence, crime and school discipline one of the enduring images of failing schools.

Previous scholars have pointed to the ways that Reagan’s rhetorical presidency reset national goals towards standards, accountability, deregulation and school choice. This chapter adds to this previous scholarship by arguing that the Reagan administration’s appeal to stricter discipline reform similarly recast national goals toward stricter school discipline. Significant is that the administration cast discipline as its civil rights agenda, while dismissing desegregation goals and restricting the expansion of federal dollars to programs like Chapter I (Title I). The Reagan administration promoted a discipline message meant to be “broad” without “too many specifics.”¹³³ The administration’s message was intended to bring attention to the problems of crime, discipline, and disorder without “urging new spending programs that might make the “school discipline initiative ‘real.’”¹³⁴ Yet the lasting effect of the 1980s discipline message had real impacts. When viewed within the broader punitive context of the burgeoning War on Drugs, the Reagan administration’s media campaign to bring attention to school discipline and urban crime mirrored his broader media blitz against crime used to justify its War on Drugs.¹³⁵ As Michelle Alexander notes, the Reagan administration embraced funding priorities and instituted programs that made “the rhetorical war a literal one.”¹³⁶ The discipline campaign against urban school disorder would similarly move into a direction that was more “real.” The National School Safety Center, developed by the Departments of Justice and Education to support the school-discipline focused excellence movement, would provide opinions on legal briefs to districts and local courts working “to expel campus crime,” and would also provide data on school crime that the Clinton administration would use to further solidify zero tolerance policies in the 1990s.¹³⁷ In addition, policies like the Drug and Safe Free Schools Act—passed under the 1986 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act—further focused federal policy on issues of school safety, disorder and the federal War on Drugs. While imposing discipline would become the Reagan administrations preferred solution to enforcing effective schools,

¹³¹ Republican Party Platform of 1984. August 20, 1984. Accessed from presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1984

¹³² Issues Alerts: education policy. Douglas Holladay box 5. Folder, issue alerts: education policy. RRPL

¹³³ Memo to Gary Bauer. Reagan library Office Files of Douglass Holladay. Box 9. Folder, School discipline (1). RRPL.

¹³⁴ “Memo to Mike McManus from Mike Horowitz ” Office files of Mike McManus. Folder, meeting with National Leaders Re School Violence/Discipline.” RRPL

¹³⁵ Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*; Becket *Making Crime Pay* 53

¹³⁶ Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 72. Alexander notes for instance that The Reagan administration funneled cash grants to law enforcement agencies encouraging them to prioritize drug-laws. Other federal agencies such as the DEA offered training, intelligence and technical support to local agencies while the Pentagon offered military intelligence and weapons to state and local agencies. For more on the financial incentives or “bribes” that the federal government offered local police agencies see chapter two.

¹³⁷ Morain, “Judge Orders Oakland Schools to Find Way to Expel Campus Crime.”

schools would also be used to enforce the broader drug war. Nancy Reagan headed the campaign to impose anti-drug curriculum. Within the White House, the Secretary of Education would work alongside the secretaries of Defense, State, Housing, Urban Development and Labor, the CIA director the national security advisor and other cabinet officials to coordinate public safety needs.¹³⁸

Reagan's policies, though advancing the federal role in school-based discipline reform, were also the outgrowth of bipartisan, liberal-backed policies that merged social welfare and law enforcement as a response to socioeconomic and racial inequality.¹³⁹ Poverty exploded in the inner cities of America during the Reagan years and by 1984 some 13 million children lived below the poverty line—a number greater than when Lyndon Johnson declared the “war on poverty” in 1965.¹⁴⁰ His policies also “borrowed strength” from local and state governments.¹⁴¹ Reagan's effort to restore order was part of a broader movement that had spread throughout schools and districts during the 1970s. In the South, school districts adopted new disciplinary codes that deemed student walkouts illegal and subjected students to immediate suspension. These district policies were developed with law enforcement officials and granted school principals the right to notify the police and swear out warrants if students refused to leave school grounds once ordered to do so.¹⁴² As criminal justice scholars contend, the call for law and order through declarations of a War on Drugs was part of a political ploy to capitalize on white racial resentment against African Americans.¹⁴³ In a similar way, the attack on urban school disorder had also capitalized on resentment toward Black student protest and school policies that sought to equalize outcomes for Black students such as school busing.

The 1980s educational politics have had a lasting and enduring legacy on how we understand the issues of poverty, race and federal school reform. As a discursive project, the message on school discipline joined a broader system of social control that linked student behavior with academic rigor and economic competition. Education reform was linked with economic growth as employment prospects waned and imprisonment prospects of Black and brown students in urban ghettos increased.¹⁴⁴ As the standards movement evolved to produce stricter sanctions on high poverty schools, Black students continued to be targets of harsh school discipline policies leaving them disproportionately represented in accounts of suspension and

¹³⁸ Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*, 319.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role Of A Lifetime*, 46.

¹⁴¹ Paul Manna, *School's in: Federalism and the National Education Agenda*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006). “Borrowing strength,” according to Manna is the process by which policy entrepreneurs at one level of government attempt to push their agendas by leveraging the capabilities possessed by other governments in the federal system. Education reform in the U.S. takes shape through the interaction of policy makers at national and state levels who borrow strength from each other to develop and enact educational reforms.

¹⁴² Jon N. Hale, “Future Foot Soldiers or Budding Criminals?: The Dynamics of High School Student Activism in the Southern Black Freedom Struggle,” *Journal of Southern History* 84, no. 3 (July 27, 2018): 615–52.

¹⁴³ Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 200.

¹⁴⁴ Paul J. Hirschfield, “Preparing for Prison? The Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA,” *Theoretical Criminology* 12, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 79–101; Kathleen Nolan and Jean Anyon, “Learning to Do Time: Willis's Model of Cultural Reproduction in an Era of Postindustrialism, Globalization and Mass Incarceration,” in *Learning to Labor in New Times*, (London: Routledge Falmer, 2004, 133–50.

expulsion. Federal policy makers used the rising standards movement to not only redirect but also manufacture a crisis in school disorder, indiscipline and crime.

Thus, By the 1980s, the rising “excellence” movement constituted a new moment of race based social control. The Johnson administration funded education programs in part to discipline urban youth from rebelling against ghetto conditions and police terror. 1960s poverty planners believed that education reform like other Great Society programs would help to eliminate barriers to race-based opportunity. Under Reagan, policy makers casted crime, the disruptive student and the potential criminal and not racial ghettos and state sanctioned racism as the primary inhibitor of opportunity. In this way, one of the striking legacies of 1980s federal education politics is that the Reagan administration had recast race-based opportunity *as* stricter discipline.

Chapter 4: Education ‘as We’ve known it,’ delinquents, dependents and the Opportunity for Community Responsibility, 1993-1999

On April 29, 1992 a non-Black jury acquitted four white police officers of assault charges for the brutal beating of motorist Rodney King—a decision that sparked several days of unrest in Los Angeles, California, resulting in 11,000 people being arrested, and 63 deaths. In light of the uprising, politicians attempted to explain the cause of violence. Conservatives like President George H.W. Bush asserted that the riots in Los Angeles resulted from social welfare programs created in the 1960s and 70s. Arkansas Governor and Democratic Presidential nominee Bill Clinton said he was “appalled” by conservative claims and instead asserted that the violence stemmed in part from the “12 years” of Republican “denial and neglect.”¹ Clinton would spend the remainder of the campaign trail and his two terms in office positioning himself away from both Republican neglect and Democrat social spending, instead positioning himself as a New Democrat by proposing a “third way.” Nearly 30 years after the Watts riots, Democratic leaders continued to contend with problems of urban violence and Black poverty by crafting political responses to the assumed pathologies that poverty spawned. If 1960s liberal leaders and social scientists attributed Black violence to poverty, racial inequality and limited opportunities available in ghetto communities- and 1980s reformers claimed that poverty resulted from permissive social policies of the 1960s, Clinton’s third way merged the language of opportunity with demands of programmatic and personal accountability. Speaking in the days following the Rodney King riots, Clinton offered his third way solution with soundbites that expressed themes of strengthening the family, placing more police on the street and promoting individual responsibility. He distracted from the police brutality that generated the riots, and instead spoke on youth who were “lost to crime, drugs and gangs,” and failed schools that resulted from “families that are troubled.”² By the 1990s, third-way liberals focused not only on how poverty bred crime but also on how crime bred poverty.³

Education reform during the 1990s was emblematic of Clinton’s third way. For one, Clinton’s call for federal leadership and spending in education was a policy area that had broad public support and was unlikely to engender welfare type criticisms.⁴ While welfare was more strongly associated with government permissiveness, schooling was seen as a way to support the poor and all students without appearing to be a government handout. Thus Democrats could appear to be tough on crime and welfare and still present as soft on matters of race and economic opportunity by emphasizing support of education.⁵ Second, education programs linked funding

¹ Robert Pear, “The 1992 Campaign: Democrats; Clinton, In Attack On President, Ties Riots To ‘Neglect,’” *The New York Times*, (New York), May 6, 1992.

² “Put People First’ to End Urban Strife, Clinton Says.” *Los Angeles Times*, May 26, 1992; Pear, “The 1992 Campaign.”

³ Clinton for instance spoke during the second day of the Rodney King Riots “We must begin by reclaiming safety and order and lawfulness in our streets. Crime breeds poverty just as much as poverty breeds crime.” In another line he spoke that Presidents could not “wipe the stain of crime and drugs and lost human wreckage away from the schools of any community in America unless the people are willing to take responsibility--each and every one of them--to lift up the children in their communities.” Cited in “‘Put People First’ to End Urban Strife.”

⁴ McGuinn, *No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965-2005*, 76.

⁵ For more on Democratic strategy to appear touch on crime and welfare by embracing conservative proposals see Dick Morris, *Behind the Oval Office*, (New York: Random House Value Publishing, 1998); Soss, Fording, and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*; Gilens, *Why Americans Hate Welfare*.

with results. Democratic leaders wrote of ending “the inequities that create educational ghettos among school districts” yet emphasized “insisting on results.”⁶ Together, the initiative Goals 2000: Educate America Act which established a set of national goals to bring about educational achievement by the year 2000 and through the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA), the 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, federal aid for the disadvantaged, including funds for Title I, would be used to pressure states to adopt systems of standards, tests and accountability.⁷ Finally—and what will be the focus of this chapter—these acts and other education programs passed during the Clinton administration were also crucial sites to expand the reach of crime control and rationalize punitive welfare state sanctions. I analyze 1990s education reform within the context that Loïc Wacquant has described as the “sudden downsizing of the social assistance sector,” and the “upsizing of its penal wing.”⁸ I demonstrate how federal education goals contributed to governing, regulating, and criminalizing urban youth that reinforced enduring ideas about the pathologies of urban families and promoted an educational paternalism to respond to urban poverty. More specifically by increasing policies for safe and drug free schools and relying on a discourse of violence and community policing the Clinton administration sought to regulate urban children. And by promoting family involvement, tackling the delinquent teenage mother, and by instituting education reforms such as school choice, federal education debates reinforced ideas about the morality of welfare or would-be welfare moms. Ultimately education reforms reified a new politics of opportunity aimed to bring about racial and economic equity through increased policing and promoting family and individual responsibility.

Education Policy and the “single umbrella message” for the urban disadvantaged

The Clinton administration enacted Goals 2000 before authorizing the \$6.3 billion Title I of ESEA, which by 1994 served 5 million students.⁹ Goals 2000 grew out of the excellence in education and standards-based reform movements of the 1980s and 1990s. The early groundwork for Goals was set when President Bush and the National Governors Association (NGA) convened the 1989 Education Summit in Charlottesville and agreed upon six goals for American education. Arkansas’ Governor Bill Clinton, co-chair of the NGA’s education task force and chair of the Democratic Governors Association was a key player at the summit.¹⁰ Like these earlier education initiatives, Goals 2000 advanced educational priorities that included school readiness, increased high school graduation rates, competency in subjects like English, science, foreign languages, science and mathematics, adult literacy and citizenship readiness, and also established goals for safe, disciplined and drug-free schools.

Goals 2000 was highly anticipated by policymakers. Richard Riley, former governor of South Carolina and Clinton’s Secretary of Education asserted that like other major legislative victories in education including President Lincoln’s Morrill Act of 1862 which provided land grants to universities and President Johnson Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,

⁶ Cited in McGuinn, *No Child Left Behind*, 79.

⁷ For more on Clinton era reform see DeBray, *Politics, Ideology & Education*; McGuinn, *No Child Left Behind*; Rhodes, *An Education in Politics*, 124; Vinovskis, *From a Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind*.

⁸ Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor*, 196; Gilmore, *Golden Gulag*; Murakawa, *First Civil Right*.

⁹ Vinovskis, *From A Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind*, 75-76.

¹⁰ Vinovskis, *The Road to Charlottesville: The 1989 Education Summit*.

Goals 2000 “stood as an education beacon.”¹¹ Others like Special Assistant for Economic Policy Paul Diamond argued that the new national value in Goals 2000, had “its roots in Brown V. Board of Education,” as it posited a “broad national value to inform states localities, communities, and firms...with a new national norm and set of expectations.”¹² Perhaps the main similarity between Brown and Goals 2000 is that both the court ordered law to end segregation and the Congressionally passed Goals 2000 set to outline approaches to educating “disadvantaged” children. Desegregation, however, was not one of the new educational goals. Others have noted, Goals 2000 codified the shift from the historic federal focus on ensuring equity for disadvantaged students and impoverished schools to a reform-oriented federal education policy regime that promoted school improvement and increased student achievement through choice, standards, assessments, accountability and additional spending.¹³ This chapter reexamines the legacy of Goals 2000. The emphasis on creating “safe, disciplined, and violent free schools” not only reinforced stereotypical beliefs about Black poverty that had long undergirded federal education policy, but the law also codified the belief that schools needed more discipline by imposing police and surveillance into high poverty schools. Moreover, as I demonstrate next, these new education reforms law also aligned with broader policy ideas about the need for paternalism in managing poverty.

Theories on Poverty, race and Social Policy.

By the 1990s, liberal social scientists began to revisit research on the poor as they sought to understand the persistence of urban poverty. After the Moynihan report of the 1960s triggered academic criticism against studies which blamed the victim, liberal social scientists largely abandoned research on the issue of poverty and the Black family.¹⁴ This absence meant that conservative social critics, like those reviewed in the previous chapter, dominated discussions about poverty and played a role in influencing the direction of conservative policies. That is until Sociologist William Julius Wilson attempted to reclaim the topic away from conservatives by offering a structural analysis to the problems of Black poverty. Wilson’s 1987 study *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City the Underclass and Social Policy* argued that the “urban underclass,” of the inner-city, or “ghetto poor,” were caught up in a “tangle of pathology” caused by urban deindustrialization and loss of manufacturing jobs for low-skilled working class workers after 1970. Wilson asserted that these conditions stripped the Black community of discipline, undermined the two-parent home, left women as the heads of households and trapped residents of the Black ghetto in a “cycle” of welfare dependence, teen pregnancy, and crime.¹⁵ For Wilson, social policies needed to move away from a focus on racial discrimination and instead look to more expansive “race-neutral” programs such as full employment, job training, child care and family allowances which he thought would disproportionately benefit minorities.

¹¹ Richard Riley The Goals 2000 Educate America Act. Providing a World Class Education For Every Child. 3 in Jennings, John F. *National Issues in Education: Goals 2000 and School-to-Work*. Phi Delta Kappa, Phi Delta Kappa, Institute for Educational Leadership (Washington, D.C.) 1995.

¹² “Memorandum for Bill Galston and Gene Sperling from Paul Dimond. "Analogies between Brown and Goals 2000,” May 1, 1994. Speechwriting David Kusnet OA/Box Nummber 4284. Economic Related Speeches/info[2]. Clinton Digital Library(hereafter CDL)

¹³ DeBray *Politics, Ideology & Education*.

¹⁴ For more on the academic criticisms of the Moynihan report see Scott *Contempt and Pity*; O’Conner *Poverty Knowledge*.

¹⁵ Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*.

Yet Wilson's theories on the underclass and Black poverty were adopted in ways that detracted from his structural claims about deindustrialization and the loss of jobs and focused more on the ghetto's "tangle of pathology." Journalists like Nicholas Lemann for example wrote controversial reports on the underclass and described how problems such as out-of-wedlock childbearing, unemployment, crime, and poor educational achievement had "overwhelm[ed] the ghetto" for more than fifty years.¹⁶ Lemann drew on these ideas while advising the new Clinton administration. In a memo to communications director George Stephanopoulos and speech writer Bob Boorstin, Lemann suggested that the administration focus on "conditions in urban ghettos" as a policy area where the administration had "a good chance of being able to produce results." Not only would the conditions of the ghetto be "easier and cheaper" to fix than economic concerns but focusing on four subject areas around "crime control, education reform, housing and jobs" would allow the new administration to save costs on more expensive universal programs. For Lemann, such programs could address the ghettos' worst problems "without having an official 'ghetto program,'" but Lemann saw that they would be "winnable battles," and would be seen by middle class constituents as "sensible, not like giveaways."¹⁷ At least for Lemann, education initiatives and crime control could serve as "race-neutral" yet ghetto specific policies demonstrative of Clinton's broader third way vision of social reform.

Despite the rise of liberal scholars like Wilson, conservative thinkers maintained their influence over shaping the direction of social policies as they outlined ways that poverty programs could function to govern the lives of the poor. Unlike other conservative thinkers who sought to abolish welfare, Lawrence Mead's 1986 book *Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship* suggested that federal authority over social policy should be applied "in a benevolent, directive way."¹⁸ Federal programs and in particular programs like Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC), the program Americans generally refer to as welfare, needed to impose work obligations on the poor to help them escape dependency. Mead's 1997, *The New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty* similarly advocated for paternalistic social policies that he argued could reduce poverty by providing assistance and by requiring that the poor meet certain behavioral requirements which would be enforced through close supervision.¹⁹ For Mead, government must step in as a disciplinary authority for the poor's own good through policies that "in effect treats adults like children."²⁰ These supervisory policies like workfare initiatives served as the backdrop to 1990s welfare reform. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996 enacted a five-year lifetime limit on welfare eligibility, mandated work requirements to promote individual responsibility, discouraged illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor mothers, denied increased benefits for additional children while on welfare, and cut spending for welfare programs.²¹

¹⁶ Nicholas Lemann, "The Origins of the Underclass," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 1986, 31–55 and July 1986, 54–68, were widely discussed, and amongst poverty experts, controversial journalistic reports on the underclass. See also O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 267; Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, 55. Wilson describes how popular media focused on a ghetto culture of poverty instead of the structural factors that accompanied the middle-class exodus.

¹⁷ "Letter to George Stephanopoulos and Bob Boorstin from Nicholas Lemann," December 15, 1992. National Security Council, Speechwriting Office. Folder "100 Days" Outside Advice". CDL

¹⁸ Lawrence M. Mead, *Beyond Entitlement*. New York: Free Press, 2001 (1986). p.215

¹⁹ Lawrence M. Mead, *The New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty*, (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1997), 2.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 26.

²¹ Daryl A. Carter, *Brother Bill: President Clinton and the Politics of Race and Class*, (Little Rock: University of Arkansas Press, 2016), 180-1.

While paternalistic practices in welfare reform would in effect “treat adults like children,” paternalistic practices in education might in-turn hold poor schools and poor students to the same responsibility criteria as their parents. Chester Finn, Reagan’s former assistant secretary of education wrote a chapter in Mead’s *The New Paternalism* and also advocated for “paternalism” by advocating for standards-based reforms.²² He argued that paternalist approaches like “direct instruction” and “mastery learning,” were especially effective in boosting the achievement “among disadvantaged young people,” and would ultimately improve instruction, school management and overcome the “mediocre” academic achievement set in place with Great Society programs like Title I and Head Start. As was customary amongst conservative thought, Finn promoted paternalistic approaches as the most effective way to educate racially coded “disadvantaged” students. He rationalized paternalistic curriculum by arguing that standards-based reform had long been linked in “paternalist union” with other domains of social policy like crime control, truancy laws, and welfare reform. Finn argued that education and welfare reform were already linked in programs like Wisconsin’s Learnfare program that reduced parents’ welfare benefits if their minor children were not in school, and programs like Ohio’s Learning, Earning and Parenting program which sought to increase school attendance by making welfare check payments of pregnant and parenting teenagers conditional of school attendance.²³ School reform for the disadvantaged was thus seen as a way to incorporate and advance the social control features of other anti-poverty programs. From curricular reforms to welfare reform, proponents of paternalism argued that schools would relinquish dependence on government funding, link funds with results, and through learnfare programs, reinforce punitive behavioral norms of young mothers and their families by making welfare payments conditional of school attendance.

Not only did journalists and educational researchers see the benefit of linking education with broader poverty reform initiatives, but policy advisers within the administration similarly saw the political utility that education reforms be part of broader initiatives to reform urban youth. Policy advisers wrote to members of Clinton’s Domestic Policy Council suggesting that the activities related to “disadvantaged youth,” such as “initiatives from the educational agenda, welfare reform, some of the crime bill,” and “urban policy,” be framed as part of a “single framework.”²⁴ Through a “single umbrella message on youth from the bully pulpit” the administration could set goals for youth safety, reduce crime, set pathways to work through graduation and skills and reduce pregnancy.²⁵ Education reformers, social policy theorists and administration advisers thus saw school reform as part of a broader political project to reform urban youth. For the presidential administration, school reform would secure their third way approach to being tough on crime and welfare by utilizing schools and educational opportunity to advance their war on crime, dependence and ultimately punish those seen as recipients of Great Society liberalism.

Community Responsibility and the Opportunity to be Free of Crime

²² Debray, *Politics Ideology and Education*, 52.

²³ Chester Finn, “Paternalism goes to School,” in eds Lawrence M Meads, *The New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty*, (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1997), 222-6.

²⁴ CITATION NEEDED

²⁵ Memorandum to Bill Galston, Bruce Reed, Gene Sperling from Jeremy Ben-Am, Sheryll Cashin, Paul Dimond, Belle Sawhill. November 4, 1994. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Welfare Reform Series. Folder “Teen Pregnancy [3],” CDL

Six months before signing the \$30 billion Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which Clinton claimed would end an “era of excuses” and put “law and order” over “party and politics,”²⁶ his administration and officials within the Department of Education planned also to end an era of excuses in education. More than just an education provision, The Safe Schools Act of 1994, part of the Goals 2000 legislation would set stricter, albeit voluntary, state standards for schools and served as one of many education efforts to combat the threats of violence—particularly in urban areas. The place to start in rebuilding communities was with young people, and as Secretary of Education Richard Riley surmised, schools could not effectively address problems of violence alone. Schools needed “the help and support of the entire community” including families, youth, businesses, law enforcement, public health agencies.²⁷

Reflecting on early initiatives to promote the National Education Goals developed in 1989, Secretary of Education Richard Riley revealed that Goals could have done more to include grassroots efforts, recalling that “little effort was made to engage teachers or principals broadly in this very important education development.”²⁸ Later, members of Congress would refer to Goals 2000 as “a bottom-up education reform with support from the top down.”²⁹ If Goals offered top down support for bottom up reform, the administration’s education-based anti-crime initiatives sought to garner support for community-based initiatives. Community-based policing and community-based crime prevention programs like the Community Oriented Policing Services, AmeriCorps and elementary and secondary education reforms used schools to increase policing, surveillance and impose more punitive discipline policies.³⁰ Community policing would ostensibly distribute policing powers to neighborhood members, violence preventative programs and schools.

Fighting Crime

When Clinton signed the most expensive crime bill in history on September 13, 1994, he noted that “children ha[d] become the most likely victims of violent crime and its most likely perpetrators.”³¹ The crime bill would help young children by building prisons to keep “100,000 violent criminals off the street,” and creating after school programs “where they can go after school where they are safe” and where “teachers replace gang leaders as role models.” Yet even with schools open late, the country would not be truly safe until all Americans took “responsibility for themselves, their families, and their communities.”³² More importantly, although crime may have been generalized as a national problem, Black and Latino youth of the

²⁶ David Johnston and Steven A. Holmes, “Experts Doubt Effectiveness Of Crime Bill,” *The New York Times*, (New York), September 14, 1994.

²⁷ Remarks prepared for US Secretary of Education Richard Riley. “safeguarding our youth” given at a 1993 meeting on violence prevention. Box 61. Folder, topical education, violence in schools general 1992-1998. Richard W Riley Collection.

²⁸ John F. Jennings, ed., *National Issues in Education: Goals 2000 and School-to-Work* (Bloomington, Ind. : Washington, D.C: Phi Delta Kappa Intl Inc, 1994). PAGE #

²⁹ Senator Robert Kennedy. Cited in Lee Anderson,. *Congress and the Classroom : From the Cold War to “No Child Left Behind.”* Penn State University Press, 2007.

³⁰ Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, Pub.L. 103–322. Title III Crime prevention programs

³¹ William Clinton, “Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,” September 13, 1994, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg1539.pdf>.

³² William Clinton, “Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,” September 13, 1994, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg1539.pdf>; “Clinton Signs Crime Bill, Urges Responsibility,” *Chicago Tribune (1963-1996)*, (Chicago), September 14, 1994.

inner-city were seen as the primary victims and the main perpetrators of violence. As one document briefing on school violence estimated, homicide was “the leading cause of death among Blacks, regardless of gender or age accounting for 30 percent of deaths among Black males aged 5-9; 41 percent of deaths among Black males aged 10-14; and 62 percent of deaths among Black males aged 15-18.”³³ The 1992 national Democratic Party platform referred to inner cities as “crime-ravaged communities” and identified how crime was “not only a symptom but also a major cause of the worsening poverty and demoralization that afflicts inner city communities.”³⁴ Other reports noted that the rate of school-associated violent death was more than 3 times higher for Black students than the rate of white students, and almost twice as high in urban school districts than rural ones.³⁵

Clinton began rehearsing his message of community responsibility to members of the Black community while promoting his crime bill. For example, President Clinton campaigned for his anti-crime bill, school reform and welfare reform agenda before a congregation of Black ministers at the Temple Church of God in Christ in Memphis Tennessee—where 25 years before, Dr. Martin Luther King gave his last sermon.³⁶ In his speech, Clinton stressed how cultural pathologies were the leading cause of urban decline. “Unless we do something about crime and violence and drugs that is ravaging the community,” Clinton told the congregation, “we will not be able to repair this country.” He reminded the congregation of their responsibility to bring the hopes of Dr King to fruition by charging that Dr. King did not “live and die to see the American family destroyed,” nor had he fought, “for the freedom of people to kill each other with reckless abandon.” Standing in the very place where Dr. King had been assassinated in an act of white terrorism, Clinton advocated for community responsibility against Black on Black crime, and in support of the “over 160,000 children who stayed home out of fear that they would be hurt in school,” while strategically ignoring the persistence of white violence.³⁷ For Secretary Riley, this speech to African American ministers “struck the mark and set the tone about confronting violence and the need to protect those things that bind us together—our communities, our schools and our families.”³⁸

While both liberals and conservatives fought for control over the crime message, there were variances in how education-based or community prevention programs could be included alongside more punitive reforms. Black leaders within the Congressional Black Caucus worried about the harmful ramifications of the crime bill, while Republican opponents of the bill saw

³³ Briefing on School Violence for Secretary Richard W. Riley. September 15, 1993. subject files Domestic Policy Council Mccown Gayner Box 12. Folder, Mccown Gayner subject files national commission on drug free schools binder 1 7323. WJCPL

³⁴ Cited in Murakawa. *The First Civil Right*, 121.

³⁵ Phillip Kaufman, et al., “Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2001,” (Washington, DC: Departments of Education and Justice., October 31, 2001).

³⁶ Memorandum for Mike Sullivan from Carter Wilkie. *November 22, 1993*. Office of Speechwriting and Carter Wilkie, “Clinton's Top 10 of 1993,” *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2019, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/33206>; Kevin R. Anderson, “Bill Clinton. Race and the Crisis of the American Spirit,” in eds. Jeffrey S. Ashley and Marla J. Jarmer *The Bully Pulpit, Presidential Speeches, and the Shaping of Public Policy*, (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015).

³⁷ Bill Clinton. Remarks to the Convocation of the Church of God in Christ in Memphis. November 13, 1993. Accessed from <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-convocation-the-church-god-christ-memphis>

³⁸ Memo for John Podesta From Secretary Richard Riley. “State of the Union Address”. December 30, 1993 FOIA 2006-0465-F - David Kusnet, Speechwriter,” *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2019, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14506>.

many of the preventative programs as an excuse to fund social programs. In the early 1990s, Black Americans within large cities and Black segregated suburbs demanded that politicians confront urban violence. Their calls for tougher police protection were paired with calls for full employment, quality education, drug treatment, and criticism of police brutality. Members of the Black Congressional caucus pushed forward an alternative bill that included investments in prevention and alternatives to incarceration, devoted \$2 billion more to drug treatment, \$3 billion more to early intervention programs, and put forward the Racial Justice Act, which would have made it possible to use statistical evidence of racial bias to challenge death sentences.³⁹ Other Black officials worried that the crime bill would add to the already expanding prison population, resulting in more African Americans being incarcerated with longer sentences. Wade Henderson, Director of the NAACP's Washington Bureau, hoped for more than "empty rhetoric" that ignored "the economic and social underpinnings to crime in America and makes 'us' the problem."⁴⁰

Some Republicans on the other hand rejected preventative programs in the crime bill as promoting more government spending. Part of the legislation, for instance, designated block grants for midnight basketball programs to provide recreational activities for inner-city youth. A program that Republican senators characterized as "hugs for thugs."⁴¹ Moreover as Congress debated where to cut costs, Republican Senator Bob Dole argued that "Any cuts should be from the social-spending account."⁴² Three billion dollars were eventually cut from the final bill, most of which came from prevention programs, which meant that less than one-fourth of funds that were appropriated were earmarked for preventative measures. The final legislation authorized 8.8 billion for hiring more police, 7.9 billion in state prison grants, mandated life sentences for some three-time offenders and created new federal capital crimes. Despite these cuts, Republicans Representative Henry J Hyde argued that in the law the democrats got a "two-fer-a crime bill and President Clinton's stimulus program."⁴³

Although Republicans saw preventative measures within the crime bill as more social spending—these preventative community-oriented approaches to crime control were nonetheless tied to more police control and presence in schools. The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) part of the crime bill redeployed community officers and targeted specific crime problems such as school-related crime. Joseph E. Bran, Director of the COPS Office, argued that the program would "foster unprecedented partnerships between law enforcement and elementary and secondary schools."⁴⁴ The grants allowed local law enforcement agencies to work with school districts and other school-based organizations to develop community policing solutions. The COPS Office defined "community policing" as "a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to

³⁹ Elizabeth Hinton, Issa Kohler-Hausmann and Vesla Weaver, "Opinion: Did Blacks Really Endorse the 1994 Crime Bill?" *The New York Times*, (New York), April 13, 2016.

⁴⁰ Wade Henderson, "How the Nation's Crime Bill Will Affect Blacks," *New Journal and Guide (1916-2003)*; (Norfolk, VA), July 6, 1994; "Clinton's Crime Bill Called Racist," *Los Angeles Sentinel (1934-2005)*, (Los Angeles), September 22, 1994.

⁴¹ Darren Wheelock and Douglas Hartmann, "Midnight Basketball and the 1994 Crime Bill Debates: The Operation of a Racial Code," *The Sociological Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (2007): 315–42.

⁴² see Beckett, *Making Crime Pay*, 61.

⁴³ William J. Eaton and Robert Jackson, "Major Crime Bill Ok'd by Conferees," *Los Angeles Times (1923-1995)*, (Los Angeles), July 29, 1994.

⁴⁴ "President Clinton Announces School-Based Community Policing Grants; 12 Massachusetts Communities to Receive Funds to Address School-Based Crime," *PR Newswire; New York*, September 9, 1998.

proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”⁴⁵ Moreover, it is likely that Black schools stood to be most impacted by these “unprecedented partnerships,” as studies have found that receiving a large COPS grant was positively and significantly associated with city police spending, especially in cities where Blacks accounted for a larger percentage of the population.⁴⁶ Other researchers have found that federal grants for police in schools increases discipline rates by 6 percent and that Black students experienced the largest increases in discipline—driven by sanctions for low-level offenses or conduct violations.⁴⁷

Other community-based programs would also support crime control efforts.⁴⁸ The National Service program, AmeriCorps was test-run as a pilot program during Clinton’s Summer of Safety in cities across the country in 1994. Deputy Assistant of National Service, Rick Allen advised that President Clinton remark on the ways that National service would play a part in “every administration initiative at home.” As a part of community policing, “AmeriCorps members will help free cops from desk-work to get back on the street--or better yet, they'll come into communities at the side of uniformed officers and stay there to help create neighborhood watch associations or advise citizens how to make their homes and businesses safer.”⁴⁹ Early AmeriCorps anti-crime community initiatives were implemented across the country. In Los Angeles, volunteers spent the summer monitoring school playgrounds in dangerous neighborhoods. In Austin, TX, AmeriCorps jobs went to public housing residents in an effort to improve their work skills, while “giving them more of a stake in the places where they live.” In Washington DC, Boys and Girls club directors from across the city selected about 100 young people aged 5 to 17 as participant in the program. Teenagers in Ward 1 served as “safe haven safety cadets” learning “how police prevent violent situations,” and peer groups in Wards 7 and 8 would teach methods for handling potentially violent situations.⁵⁰ In San Francisco, participants were former gang members patrolling “dangerous areas,” urging gang members away from violence and drugs, and intervening “when trouble brewed.” While AmeriCorps programs were initiated to support crime control, some program participants resisted the community policing

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services Office, Community Policing Defined, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=36>.

⁴⁶ Robert Vargas and Philip McHarris, “Race and State in City Police Spending Growth: 1980 to 2010,” *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 96–112.

⁴⁷ Emily K Weisburst, “Patrolling Public Schools: The Impact of Funding for School Police on Student Discipline and Long-Term Education Outcomes,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 38, no. 2 (2019): 338–65. This study finds that increases federally funded police programs raise middle school discipline rates by 6 percent. The rise in discipline is driven by sanctions for low-level offenses or school code of conduct violations. The author also finds that Black students experience the largest increases in discipline and that exposure to a three-year federal grant for school police is associated with a 2.5 percent decrease in high school graduation rates and a 4 percent decrease in college enrollment rates.

⁴⁸ For more on community policing see William Thomas Lyons, *Law, Meaning and Violence: Politics of Community Policing: Rearranging the Power to Punish*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

⁴⁹ Memorandum for John Podesta from Rick Allen 1994 state of the union address. “FOIA 2006-0465-F - David Kusnet, Speechwriter,” *Clinton Digital Library*. <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14506>. the final state of the union speech mentioned national service only in passing “Many of our initiatives, from job training to welfare reform to health care to national service, will help to rebuild distressed communities, to strengthen families, to provide work.” See Bill Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union” 1994. The American Presidency Project. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-12>

⁵⁰ “Police Offer Youth Program To Discourage Crime, Violence,” *The Washington Post*, (Washington, D.C.), June 30, 1994.

initiatives. For instance, one summer of safety group in San Francisco organized 40 groups for a rally against the crime bill's "three strikes provision."⁵¹ Overall programs like AmeriCorps linked youth service, community patrol and policing by employing and training youth specifically in fighting crime.⁵²

By forging closer ties between police and communities, federal crime control programs helped monitor, surveil and coach youth away from their perceived potential to engage in criminal activity. Moreover reforms like longer mandatory minimums, community policing, and more rehabilitative and preventative programs like midnight basketball helped Democrats gain footing on a range of crime issues that enabled more order-maintenance policing.⁵³

Community Policing, Zero Tolerance and Reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

In 1994 when ESEA was reauthorized for the eighth time, the new reform would not only raise standards, better target funds to higher poverty counties and districts, but also included preventative programs aimed to help keep the president's 100,000 more police campaign pledge. The reauthorization of ESEA included new programs like The Safe Schools Act, The Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Act, and the Gun Free Schools Act (GFSA). Each of these programs were designed to fulfill goal seven of the National Education Goals by encouraging approaches to make "schools and neighborhoods safe and drug free."⁵⁴ For Secretary of Education Richard Riley, The Safe Schools Act was "an aggressive program designed to help free schools of violence that have turned our classrooms into war zones."⁵⁵ Though Riley noted that violence could strike anywhere, "from impoverished, decaying inner-city schools to the most gleaming suburban campuses," the bill that would authorize \$175 million in the first two years, was geared not toward these "most gleaming suburban campuses."⁵⁶ Rather, the Safe Schools Act required that schools be receiving or eligible to receive Title I (Chapter I) concentration grants and was reserved for "school districts most troubled by high rates of crime and violence." Ninety-five percent of the money would go to "where it [was] needed most urgently—to local educational agencies with the most serious crime, violence, and discipline problems."⁵⁷

The Clinton administration's educational concerns for school standards and their broader fight to combat crime supported a growing local trend to increase school policing. The funds from programs like the Safe Schools Act could be used to coordinate school-based violence prevention activities, conflict resolution programs and increased security measures on campus.

⁵¹ Elizabeth Shogren, "Reviews Mixed for Trial Run of Youth Corps," *Los Angeles Times*, (Los Angeles), September 11, 1994.

⁵² Similar community and youth led crime prevention strategies were also put in place in other administrations. Elizabeth Hinton's history on the Public Housing Security Act under President Carter. Hinton argues that under the Carter administration urban policy became crime control policy in part by regulating crime in public housing and linking community patrols with job training. Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*, Ch. 8.

⁵³ Murakawa, *First Civil Right*, 150.

⁵⁴ For a review of the national education goals and a report on its progress see Department of Education. "Making Progress: An Update on State Implementation Of Federal Education Laws Enacted in 1994." Washington, DC. 2000

⁵⁵ Remarks Prepared for US Secretary of Education Richard W Riley. June 11, 1993.3. Domestic Policy Council Mccown Gayner. BOX 12 National Commission on Drug Free Schools. Binder 1 7323. 20110255 S oa/id 7330 WJCPL

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Remarks Prepared for U.S. Secretary of Education Richard W Riley. June, 20 1993. Box 61. Folder, topical education, violence in schools general 1992-1998 violence. Richard Riley Collection.

Up to one-third of funds could be used for school remodeling, metal detectors, and for hiring security personnel.⁵⁸ Although the administration discouraged the use of metal detectors because of reports that they were “costly,” provided a “false sense of security” and that they “disrupt the normal operation of a school,” many of the country’s largest school districts already owned metal detectors, and with the support of the Clinton administration they stood to gain more.⁵⁹ According to one report, by January of 1994 metal detectors “of some fashion,” were already being used in approximately 35% of the nation’s 100 largest school districts. Atlanta had 24 hand-held metal detectors and six walkthroughs. Boston public schools had 200 handhelds that were used upon request at the high schools and their three walkthrough metal detectors were used at k-12 alternative schools. School officials from Dade-County hired an outside security company that sent two teams of four people to eight randomly selected secondary schools daily who would monitor the schools with hand-held metal detectors. Dallas had 137 walkthroughs, four walkthroughs were used at every high school and two at each middle school. In Detroit 90% of the high schools had walkthroughs used daily. Los Angeles had 305 hand-held metal detectors. Other districts like Tulsa, San Francisco, Rochester and St Paul, and Baltimore had none.⁶⁰

In its first year, the administration reports noted that it had awarded \$18 million of the Safe Schools grants to nineteen agencies in fourteen states to schools with the “greatest violence and discipline problems.”⁶¹ Most of the programs would use law enforcement personnel, security equipment and would support school level partnerships of law, health, school officials and the broader community to identify and prevent safety violation incidents. The \$1,000,000 grant to Boston Public Schools, which in 1994-95 school year was 47.9% African American and 23.9% “Hispanic,” would feature a “partnership of school, police, court, corrections, and social services personnel that meet weekly to prevent and contain crime and violence” and an “automated system for monitoring incidents and feeding information to people who can intervene promptly.”⁶² Chicago Public schools’ \$3,000,000 collaboration of schools, parents and other community members would develop a safe schools project through “security-assurance support teams” to assist schools in forming and implementing safe school plans, education and training support teams and a dissemination network to relay information; Houston’s \$900,000 grant went toward a collaboration between the Houston independent school district, the University of Texas and Houston Police Department designed to collect data and implement a safety and security plan. Five middle schools in The New York Community School District #18 would get \$845,625 for a community wide violence program. Moreover teachers would receive aggression replacement training, to change “teacher behaviors that contribute to student discouragement,” and peer coaching to support the implementation of violence prevention strategies. Parents would be provided with home visits to help them reduce violence at home, job training, and “counseling to reduce family risk factors,” and students would be given “opportunities to learn

⁵⁸ Metal Detectors, Summary of Enclosed Information. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Crime Series, “Safe Schools,” *Clinton Digital Library*

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ School Systems Represented by the Council of the Great City Schools Use of Metal Detectors. January 1994. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Crime Series, “Safe Schools,” *Clinton Digital Library*.

⁶¹ Safe Schools grants for 1995. Domestic Policy Council and Jose Cerda, “Event - NEA [National Education Association] School Safety Speech, April 8, 1995 [1],” *Clinton Digital Library*

⁶² Ibid; Data from Boston public schools accessed from <http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/statereport/enrollmentbyracegender.aspx>;

alternatives to violence, conflict mediation and build resiliency skills.” The \$508,238 to Norfolk Public schools would develop community/school partnership to reduce juvenile arrests, court referrals and school expulsions. The \$1,196,339 to Portland, OR, a district that had just 33% minority students, included conflict resolution training, peer mediation, curriculum development and education for students and parents/community members about the dangers of weapons and how to safeguard schools and homes.⁶³ Alongside the collaboration between “the schools and police” the project in St. Louis Public Schools would give \$914,802 to 16 schools, and “four neighborhood safety nets would be established in four high crime areas;” In Stockton, CA high-risk students and families in a district that was 39% Hispanic 13% African American and 23% Asian and 16.9% white would be taught anger management, coping and violence prevention life-skills.⁶⁴ In addition, police officers would work at targeted schools to promote school safety, provide drug and gang prevention education and mentor at risk students.⁶⁵ As these programs demonstrate, the Safe Schools grants effectively funded programs that would more closely link schools and police agencies.

Other reforms set in place under the reauthorization of ESEA in 1994, also worked to enforce the administration’s anti-crime initiatives and more tightly link state and local school funding with increased policing efforts. For example, The Gun Free Schools Act (GFSA) established new federal “zero tolerance mandates” requiring that local educational agencies refer any student who brings a firearm or weapon to a school to the criminal justice or juvenile delinquency system.⁶⁶ Before they were included as part of the ESEA reauthorizations, zero tolerance policies were already being implemented by school boards and supported by local and national education groups. In July of 1994, delegates at the American Federation of Teachers’ biannual convention approved a resolution calling on school districts to adopt zero tolerance policies to expel students found with drugs or weapons on campus or for assaulting a teacher or fellow student.⁶⁷ John Cole, president of the Texas Federation of Teachers, said he would have liked to see the zero tolerance resolution include profanity, but acknowledged that “verbal abuse of teachers by students is a hard sell” to school administrators.⁶⁸ Under the GFSA, each state receiving assistance under ESEA was required to have a law that schools expel any student for at least a year for bringing a firearm to school or else risk losing funds made available to the state under the ESEA. Many states also used the new policy to cover a number of other offences.⁶⁹

⁶³ Racial demographics from Portland is from the 1997-1998 school year accessed from <https://www.ode.state.or.us/sfda/reports/r0045rpt.asp> on October 5, 2019.

⁶⁴ California enrollment district data accessed from California Department of Education <https://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/DstEnrAll.asp?cYear=1994-95&cChoice=DstEnrAll&cSelect=3968676%2D%2DSTOCKTON+UNIFIED&Level=District&myTimeFrame=S&cTopic=Enrollment&cLevel=District&Thename=stockton> on Oct 5, 2019.

⁶⁵ Safe Schools grants for 1995. Domestic Policy Council and Jose Cerda, “Event - NEA [National Education Association] School Safety Speech, April 8, 1995 [1],” *Clinton Digital Library* <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/86776>.

⁶⁶ Gun-Free Schools Act (P.L. 103-382)(GFSA)

⁶⁷ “Teachers’ Union Wants to Expel Students Who Carry Guns,” *New York Times*, 1994; “Teacher Union Advocates Zero Tolerance for School Violence,” July 19, 1994, Domestic Policy Council and Jose Cerda. “Zero Tolerance for Guns in Schools [1],” Clinton Digital Library.

⁶⁸ “Teacher Union Advocates Zero Tolerance for School Violence,” Domestic Policy Council and Jose Cerda, “Zero Tolerance for Guns in Schools [1],” *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed August 5, 2019, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/97177>.

⁶⁹ Jennifer A. Sughrue, “Zero Tolerance for Children: Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right,” *Educational Administration Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (April 2003): 238-58, 242.

In addition, the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Act, Title IV of ESEA also carried out drug and violence prevention programs supporting “safe zones of passage” for students between home and school through enhanced law enforcement, neighborhood patrols, and similar measures. This program provided financial assistance to 97% of all school districts and was later critiqued in one Brookings institute paper as constituting “symbolic pork”—putting money into every Congressional district to symbolize federal concern about the problem of crime or drugs in schools.⁷⁰ Governors were required to use at least 10% of their grant awards to create partnerships with law enforcement agencies. State Educational Agencies also were required to allocate 30% of their funds to local educational agencies with the greatest need such as high rates of alcohol or drug use, arrests and convictions of youths for violent or drug or alcohol related crimes, illegal gang activity and other factors.⁷¹ Such partnerships could focus on bringing police officers into classrooms to educate youth about drugs or implement strategies such as community/school team policing programs.⁷² One safe and drug free schools initiative in a predominately urban African American middle school in Lancaster County, SC, Project Success, targeted youth who had a history of violent and or drug related discipline problems. According to a report, Project Success “deliberately exploited” community connections to coordinate responses to student misconduct. The report noted that the program’s primary teacher was married to a police officer, and used to teach in a juvenile detention center and was consequently “able to use her relationships with [the detention center] and the sheriff’s department to rapidly address and resolve problems such as attendance (e.g., she may go to the child’s home with a police officer and inquire about the cause of a child’s absence).”⁷³ This example demonstrates how school reforms like the SDFSCA could use community-school relations to impose more policing.

Through federal education reforms, schools would be part of the broader effort to make communities more responsible for confronting crime. Although programs were targeted at urban youth in particular, it was not long before researchers took note of the racial disparities imposed by the Clinton administration’s school discipline initiatives. In particular, zero tolerance policies disproportionately harmed Black students as they were overrepresented in expulsion and underrepresented in alternative forms of discipline. Schools that relied more heavily on suspension and expulsion were also those that showed highest rates of minority overrepresentation in school discipline.⁷⁴ Overall, the education initiatives that made up federal initiatives like Goals 2000 and IASA would contribute to the administration’s anti-crime efforts. As Secretary of Education Riley concluded, “All of these activities would complement the broader efforts under the recently enacted crime bill.”⁷⁵

Disciplining Families and Delinquent Motherhood: from Teenage Moms to Teacher Aides.
If crime and violence had been one of the crises that the administration sought to tackle,

⁷⁰ Lawrence W. Sherman, “The Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program,” *Brookings Papers on Education Policy* 2000, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 125–56.

⁷¹ William Modzeleski, “Creating Safe Schools: Roles and Challenges, a Federal Perspective,” *Education and Urban Society* 28, no. 4 (1996): 414

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Durbin, et al, *Project Success: A School-Based Alternative to Expulsion*, 1994.

⁷⁴ Pedro Noguera, “Preventing and Producing Violence: A Critical Analysis of Responses to School Violence,” *Harvard Educational Review* 65, no. 2 (July 1, 1995): 189–213; Russell Skiba, and Reece Peterson, “The Dark Side of Zero Tolerance: Can Punishment Lead to Safe Schools?” *The Phi Delta Kappan* 80, no. 5 (1999): 372–82.

⁷⁵ Riley. Improving Americas schools Act. *Journal of Law and Education*. 534

a purported “dependency” issue amongst teenage mothers and school employees was another.⁷⁶ Speaking before 300 students at Washington, D.C.’s Kramer Junior High School, Clinton reiterated themes about the perils of teenage pregnancy, single parenthood and individual responsibility. One student asked what children could do to help restore the family—to which Clinton responded “If you really want to rebuild the family, then people have to decide: I’m not going to have a baby until I’m married. I’m not going to bring a baby into the world I can’t take care of. And I’m not going to turn around and walk away when I do it. I’m going to take responsibility for what I do.”⁷⁷ Just as the Clinton administration used new federal directives to control urban youth they marked as violent, federal officials also tackled “irresponsible” families and other forms of delinquency—particularly welfare dependence.

Thirty years after the Department of Labor published the Moynihan Report which attributed the “cycle of poverty” to the crumbling Negro family, Clinton’s New Democrats focused on the family as a target of policy reform. Administration reports like the Department of Justice’s “Family Life, Delinquency, and Crime: A Policymaker’s Guide” completed in May of 1994, reaffirmed the position that the family was a powerful socializing force and warned of the ways parents could negatively influence children. Children with criminal parents faced “greater likelihood of becoming a delinquent than children with law-abiding parents,” and single-parent families, particularly mother-only families, “produced more delinquent children than two-parent families.”⁷⁸ research continued to suggest that children raised in single-parent families tended to fare worse academically and economically than those raised in two-parent families.⁷⁹

As the Clinton administration and conservatives in Congress vied for political control over promises to “end welfare as we know it,” policy officials continued to deride mother-only families and Black single mothers, in particular. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, caricatures of Black recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children AFDC as “welfare queens” dominated debates about race, gender, poverty, and government responsibility. Conservatives suggested that welfare created a “culture of dependence,” that incentivized women to have children, prevented marriage, and discouraged work in the low-wage labor market.⁸⁰ Policy makers on the left and right converged around the ideas that welfare fostered idleness and antisocial behavior forming a “new consensus” around ideas about poverty that centered dependency and individual responsibility as the key issues in debates about poverty.⁸¹ National news stories also continued to cast similar racist images about the Black poor who were overrepresented in national news about the poor and were more likely to be associated alongside stories that were unpopular with the public.⁸² Thus, welfare continued to be vulnerable to attack

⁷⁶ Wanda S Pillow, *Unfit Subjects: Education Policy and the Teen Mother, 1972-2002*, (New York: Routledge, 2004.)

⁷⁷ Remarks by the President to Students at Kramer Junior High School cited in Proposal Outline: National Teen Pregnancy Initiative,” I. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Welfare Reform Series, “Teen Pregnancy [3].” Clinton Digital Library; see also Schmidt, Peter. “Federal File: Pep Talk - Education Week.” *Education Week*, February 9, 1994. <https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1994/02/09/20fedf.h13.html>; “Clinton Warns Youths Of the Perils of Pregnancy.” *The New York Times*, February 4, 1994, sec. U.S.

⁷⁸ Family Life, Delinquency, and Crime: A Policymaker’s Guide” completed in May of 1994, 6.

⁷⁹ For a review see Weaver, *Ending Welfare as We Know It*.

⁸⁰ Weaver, *Ending Welfare as We Know It*.

⁸¹ This argument around the new consensus in Poverty Knowledge is borrowed from Alice O’Conner *Poverty Knowledge*, Ch. 10.

⁸² Richard Clayton and Jonas Pontusson. “Welfare-State Retrenchment Revisited: Entitlement Cuts, Public Sector Restructuring, and Inegalitarian Trends in Advanced Capitalist Societies,” *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (October 1, 1998): 67–98; for more on stereotypical media representation of poverty see Gilens *Why Americans Hate Welfare*.

in part because its adult recipients, mainly able-bodied single mothers, were increasingly seen as undeserving and perceived by public as lazy.⁸³ Similarly, by the mid-1980s teenage pregnancy became firmly linked with social welfare reform and teenage pregnancy became an implicit problem of Black and Latina girlhood—or as Wanda Pillow writes “Black teen mothers, became synonymous with the welfare mother.”⁸⁴ As such, policy conversations about teenage pregnancy were tied to broader raced and gendered political discourse about family instability, cycles of poverty and welfare dependency. For example, in her speech before the National Summit on Children and Families, Carol Rasco, former elementary-school teacher and Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, attributed poverty to disintegrating or “never forming at all” families. Rasco reported that while overall 28 percent of babies were born to unmarried parents, “for African-Americans, it’s more than 55 percent.” She continued that 79 percent of children born to unmarried mothers without high school diplomas were living in poverty while only eight percent of children born to married high-school graduates were living in poverty.⁸⁵ Although administrator officials painted teenage pregnancy as a problem for Black youth, other studies argued that since 1985, birthrates among unmarried white teenagers had been increasing and those among unmarried Black teens had been largely stable.⁸⁶ Although in 1994, the 400,000 teenage mothers receiving AFDC constituted just eight percent of those receiving aid, policy analysts working within the administration linked a national teenage pregnancy epidemic with increasing welfare dependency.⁸⁷ Administrative reports included data points reiterating the teen mother welfare connection claiming that nearly one million American teenagers or about 11% of women ages 15-19 become pregnant every year; more than three-fourths of all unmarried teen mothers would be on welfare at some point during the five years following the birth of their child;⁸⁸ and that 40%-50% of mothers receiving support from (AFDC) had their first child in their teenage years.⁸⁹ Although scholars would later conclude that childbearing teenagers had relatively little effect on the levels of poverty, administration officials like Rosco nonetheless concluded that “the stable family” was “the best anti-poverty program our country has ever devised.”⁹⁰ Such remarks worked to further erode confidence in support for non-working or

⁸³ Ellen Reese, *Backlash Against Welfare Mothers: Past and Present*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

⁸⁴ Pillow, *Unfit Subjects*, 33 ; see also Kristin Luker, *Dubious Conceptions: The Politics of Teenage Pregnancy*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); for more on race and welfare queen see Sparks, Holloway. “Queens, Teens and Model Mothers Race, Gender and the Discourse of Welfare Reform.” In *Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform*, edited by Sanford F. Schram, Brian Soss, and Richard C. Fording. University of Michigan Press, 2003.

⁸⁵ Carol Rasco’s Speech National Summit on Children and Families. April 2. Domestic Policy Council, Carol Rasco, and Miscellaneous Series, “Speech Material,” *Clinton Digital Library*. accessed October 10, 2019 <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/21299>

⁸⁶ Kristen Luker, for example finds that by 1990, 57 percent of all babies born to unmarried teenage mothers were born to whites Luker, *Dubious Conceptions*.

⁸⁷ Jodie Levin-Epstein “understanding the Clinton welfare bill: teen pregnancy prevention and teen parents” Center For Law and Social policy July 27, 1994. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Welfare Reform Series, “Teen Pregnancy [3], accessed December 18, 2019 <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/31984>.

⁸⁸ “The Clinton Administration: Working in Partnership to Prevent Teen Pregnancy. Draft,”. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Welfare Reform Series, “Teen Pregnancy [3],.” Clinton Digital Library. <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/31984>.

⁸⁹ Levin-Epstein “Understanding the Clinton Welfare Bill,” 3.

⁹⁰ In *Dubious Conceptions*, Luker looks at arguments about teenage pregnancy and rates of poverty. Carol Rasco’s Speech National Summit on Children and Families. April 2. Domestic Policy Council, Carol Rasco, and

teenage mothers while simultaneously demonstrating that racial and economic inequality was perpetuated by Black people themselves.

The war on welfare “dependency” and teenage pregnancy led policy makers to promote a wide range of welfare reform proposals aimed at interrupting the “cycle of dependency.” The Republican’s “Contract with America,” for example, proposed a “personal responsibility act” to end welfare payments to unmarried mothers and allow states to use the money instead to build orphanages. The Progressive Policy Institute, the think-tank arm of the Democratic Leadership Council, responded that the Republican’s proposals were “punitive,” and instead recommended that teenage mothers be given welfare benefits only if they agree to stay in school or participate in job training. They also recommended an alternative residency program than the Republican’s orphanage proposals, offering “second-chance homes” where teenage mothers could live with older couples who would act as role models and would provide day care to children while young moms were at school or in job training.⁹¹ Although such proposals may not have been as punitive, they did not diverge from the paternalistic commitments of broader welfare reform agendas.

President Clinton’s campaign to curb teenage pregnancy included utilizing the bully pulpit to bring awareness to the problems of teen pregnancy. He also implemented changes to welfare policy, such as requiring welfare recipients to work after receiving aid for two years, requiring minor mothers to live at home in order to receive aid and requiring mothers to identify their children’s father. The Clinton administration also urged states to require teenage mothers to remain in school as a condition of receiving welfare and sign contracts indicating “exactly how they’re going to take responsibility for their own lives.”⁹² Twenty-six states already had rules requiring young mothers to stay in school as a condition of receiving benefits. Wisconsin’s “Learnfare” punished teenagers and their families for not attending school, whereas “Bridefare” rewarded young parents for getting married and penalized them for having babies while on welfare.⁹³ Clinton also proposed new education-based grants to reform teenage-pregnancy including \$300 million for programs in 1000 schools and \$100 million for programs in “distressed neighborhoods.”⁹⁴ As educational researcher Wanda Pillow notes, such programs were developed under “a discourse of education as responsibility,” yet were not developed with the white, middle-class girl in mind, rather these programs were “focused upon the low-income, unwed, and assumed ‘minority’ teen mother,” who had “a responsibility not to become a burden on the taxpayer.”⁹⁵

Miscellaneous Series, “Speech Material,” *Clinton Digital Library*; Proposals Outline: National Teen Pregnancy Prevention Initiative. April 30, 1994 p3. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Welfare Reform Series, “Teen Pregnancy [3],” accessed April 23, 2019, *Clinton Digital Library* <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/31984>

⁹¹ Barbara Vobejda, “Democratic Group Offers Plan to Curb Teen Pregnancies,” *The Washington Post (1974-Current File)*, (Washington, D.C.), December 1, 1994; Sylvester Kathleen, “second-Chance homes: breaking the cycle of teen pregnancy. Policy Briefing Progressive Policy Institute. June 23, 1995. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Welfare Reform Series, “Teen Pregnancy [3]. *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed April 23, 2019, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/31984>.

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⁹³ O’Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 290; Thomas J. Corbett, “Welfare Reform in Wisconsin: The Rhetoric and the Reality,” in Donald F. Norris and Lyke Thompson, eds., *The Politics of Welfare Reform* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995)

⁹⁴ Jason DeParle, “President to Campaign Against Teen-Age Pregnancy,” *New York Times*, (New York), 1994; Jodie Levin-Epstein *Understanding the Clinton Welfare Bill: Teen Pregnancy Prevention and Teen Parents 1994*

⁹⁵ Pillow, *Unfit Subjects*, 73.

Former leaders within the Department of Education were also key proponents of welfare reform. In his editorials, talk show appearances and public speeches, President Reagan's former Secretary of Education William Bennett promoted the idea that welfare encouraged women to bear children out of wedlock and urged Congress to adopt punitive policies to discipline poor young women. Testifying before Congress on behalf of the right-wing think tank, Empower America, Bennett argued that ending welfare was "'tough love' on a large scale." By ending welfare, "young girls considering having a baby out of-wedlock would face more deterrents, greater social stigma, and more economic penalties arrayed against them if they have their babies. There would, therefore, be far fewer births to unwed mothers."⁹⁶ Bennett advocated for restrictive regulations to unwed teens in order to undermine support for welfare while simultaneously blaming mothers or would-be mothers for the cause of economic inequality.

Schools were critical to the mission of moralizing women and building panic about a range of urban ills. Secretary of Education Riley advocated for the importance of education as he warned of the harms of crime and teenage pregnancy. Providing a "first cut at some language on education" for Bill Clinton's 1994 State of the Union speech, Richard Riley warned of the reality that there were "too many guns," "too much violence," too many "young girls getting pregnant and being forgotten by the fathers of their babies," and too many "schools that don't function." The way out of poverty and "the way out of a life of despair, anger and violence is the education of our children and the building of their character."⁹⁷ Partisan differences aside, education leaders argued that government and schools could alter the problems of teenage pregnancy by altering the women, character and behavior of those who dared risk getting pregnant.

Although teenage pregnancy was not a key Congressional debate amongst lawmakers reforming Goals 2000 and IASA, debates about welfare and welfare moms nonetheless often considered the role of education and thus made teenage pregnancy a decision about federal education policy.⁹⁸ Policy officials within the Domestic Policy Council listed the ways programs within the Department of Education such as Title I would help combat high dropout rates, illiteracy and poor employment prospects, "all of which are risk factors for early childbearing."⁹⁹ Moreover, federal education initiatives within the Department of Education including Goals 2000, School-To Work Opportunities Act, and the Safe and Drug Free Schools Act targeted the administration's proposals to prevent teenage pregnancy and encourage parent participation.¹⁰⁰ Schools served under Title I were required to have a written parent involvement policy and were required to work with parents to develop "a school parent compact" that would outline how parents, staff, and students would "share the responsibility" for improving student achievement

⁹⁶ Reese, *Backlash against Welfare Mothers*, 159; Bennett, William J. 1995. "Testimony for Empower America." In *Contract with America- Welfare Reform*. Hearing before the subcommittee on Human Resources of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives. Pp 156-78. 104th Congress., 1st session.

⁹⁷ Memorandum for John Podesta from Secretary Richard Riley. December 30, 1993. . "FOIA 2006-0465-F - David Kusnet, Speechwriter," *Clinton Digital Library*. Accessed December 18, 2019 <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14506>.

⁹⁸ Pillow, *Unfit Subjects*, 218. Pillow's educational policy account of teenage motherhood focuses on the racialized ideological discourses in policies such as Title IX in 1972 and welfare reform. For Pillow, "Welfare reform constituted a shift from treating teen mothers as entitled subjects...to punishing them through social welfare regulation."

⁹⁹ Memorandum for distribution from Debbie Fine, November 8, 1995, 9. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Welfare Reform Series, "Teen Pregnancy [3]," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed April 23, 2019, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/31984>.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*.

and helping children achieve high standards.¹⁰¹ Just as education policies would fortify the department's broader anti-crime initiatives, administrators within the Departments of Education, Justice, and Health and Human Services promoted education programs that would encourage personal responsibility for youth that would also "complement the parental responsibility obligations of welfare reform." As one proposal outlining teenage pregnancy prevention programs put forth "programs like Goals 2000, school-to Work... and after-school and jobs programs included in the prevention package in the Crime Bill" all provided "an essential building-block" for the administration's comprehensive campaign for youth balancing "opportunity and responsibility."¹⁰² Schooling institutions and education services became a central feature of reforming not only welfare policy but also the young girls who liberal and conservative policy makers saw as serial dependents.

President Clinton proposed welfare reform that would tackle dependency, and Congressional conservatives took the fight against dependency to a more radical extreme.¹⁰³ After vetoing two other welfare reform proposals, President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996. This abolished the sixty-year-old AFDC program, and replaced it with a block grant program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) for the states that ended legal entitlement to benefits. It contained strict work requirements and placed time limits on receive welfare benefits. As Historian Alice O'Conner summarized, The Clinton administration's poverty experts embraced and defined the parameters of welfare reform "that promised to change the behavior of poor people while paying little more than rhetorical attention to the problems of low-wage work, rising income inequality or structural economic change."¹⁰⁴ Federal provisions also permanently excluded people with drug felony convictions and immigrants, and banned those with drug felony convictions from using food stamps and temporary assistance.

Welfare reform, Family Morality and the Case of School Choice

Like the broader discourse used to drastically change welfare, advocates of school choice framed various market reforms as a means to impose family stability and counteract urban disorder. As Republicans took over Congress in 1995, they reintroduced 1980s conservative education proposals to abolish the Department of Education, use federal money to create block grants, and introduce school vouchers as a choice model. Some school choice advocates argued that federal Title I dollars would best be distributed by allowing the market to improve the school systems and have families choose away from failing schools. Educational historian Diane Ravitch, for example, advocated for turning Title I into a "portable entitlement" that would follow children to schools that they chose.¹⁰⁵ The Clinton administration, though against using Title I funds as a

¹⁰¹ Richard W. Riley, "The Improving America's Schools Act and Elementary and Secondary Education Reform," *Journal of Law & Education* 24 (1995). 529. The Statute ESEA Id. § 11 18(d)(1).) outlined that a compact describe the school's responsibility to provide high quality curriculum and instruction and the "ways in which each parent will be responsible for supporting their children's learning, such as monitoring attendance, homework completion and television watching; volunteering in their children's classroom; and participating as appropriate, in decisions relating to their education of their children and positive use of extracurricular time

¹⁰² Proposal Outline: National Teen Pregnancy Prevention Initiative. April 30, 1994, 3. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Welfare Reform Series, "Teen Pregnancy [3]," *Clinton Digital Library* accessed April 23, 2019, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/31984>.

¹⁰³ O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 4.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Diane Ravitch, "Student Performance." *Brookings Review*, vol. 17, no. 1, 1999

voucher or portable entitlement did support other school choice programs like charter schools. Clinton had long advocated for charter schools and made a “big deal” over the fact that Arkansas, where he had served as governor, was the second state to have passed their public-school choice program.¹⁰⁶ Likewise, the IASA mentioned public school choice as an option for school improvement if after three years a school was designated low-performing.¹⁰⁷

School choice proposals reflected desires to reform and moralize families and bring about responsibility. Paternalistic beliefs about the power of social policy to cure the pathologies that prevented low-income mothers from regulating their own behavior, also embraced the idea that such paternalistic control should be structured on market terms.¹⁰⁸ School choice would not just allow families to choose away from failing schools, but would also enable families to choose away from failing students, unsafe and disorderly learning communities, and embrace choice schools. Vouchers were also promoted during the 103rd Congress as an anti-violence measure. One Senate amendment proposed a voucher demonstration program directed at economically disadvantaged students and students who were enrolled in schools with a history of violence.¹⁰⁹ Clinton administration officials also advocated for school choice proposals as a political strategy to combat Republican voucher proposals and offer their own conciliatory choice plans to urban communities. Michael Cohen, special assistant to the president for education policy argued for instance that the democratic administration needed “a better answer to vouchers than we have, especially when the debate focuses on doing something for disadvantaged kids in failing (mostly inner-city) schools.”¹¹⁰ By relying on the claims of urban violence and discourses of failing inner city schools, both Democrats and Republicans pushed for their own choice proposals. These rationales extend beyond traditional market explanations about competition, innovation and the reliance on markets to close failing schools and relied more on arguments about how markets and choice can be specifically suited for the problems of the “inner city.”¹¹¹

Republicans revival of Reagan-era proposals such as school choice was related to broader skepticism about the welfare state and social programs. Since the 1980s, Conservative think tanks had taken on a more prominent influence over setting both welfare reform and providing policy proposals for Title I and ESEA programs. It is no wonder that some of these school choice advocates explicitly linked the movement for school choice to the fight against welfare dependency. Robert Rector, Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, advocated for school vouchers as he testified on welfare reform before the Republican controlled House Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities. He argued that welfare reform, vis-à-vis school reform should focus on “moral values.” Like others who made culture of poverty arguments, Rector argued that the problems of the underclass were rooted in behavior and values—and that institutions like the church which had “historically been proven to be tremendously effective in

¹⁰⁶ Mike Cohen. Richard W. Riley Oral History. Clinton Presidential History Project Miller Center., University of Virginia August 30, 31, 2004 Online: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/richard-w-riley-oral-history-secretary-education>. Accessed December 11, 2019.

¹⁰⁷ DeBray, *Politics, Ideology & Education*, 61.

¹⁰⁸ Soss, Fording, and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*, 27.

¹⁰⁹ Chris Dodd, “The 1994 Reauthorization of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act,” in eds John F. Jennings, *National Issues in Education: Elementary and Secondary Education Act*, Phi Delta Kappa International Incorporated, 1995. 137; Debray *Politics, Ideology & Education* 61.

¹¹⁰ Memorandum for Bruce Reed From Mike Cohen. Accountability. September 20, 1996.

Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Education Series, “Accountability,” *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed April 20, 2019, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/22366>.

¹¹¹For the market rationales of school choice proponents see Chubb and Moe, *Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools*.

changing the moral values and helping people to help themselves,” could help curb crime, prevent school dropouts, and reduce drug use. Rector opined that like the church, a pilot voucher program where parents choose where their kids go to school would have a strong effect on “shaping the moral character of young people,” and that “without that type of moral renewal and free choice in education, all the welfare reform that we could do at the national level or at the State level will be ineffective.”¹¹² Proposing school vouchers was about more than providing low-income families the “opportunity” to choose out of failing schools but rather as Rector argued, using vouchers for private or religious schools could discipline and moralize urban communities away from social ills such as drug use, crime and dependence. The market became another way of enforcing self-discipline.¹¹³ Neoconservatives ultimately believed these mothers and children should be subjected to supervisory governance for their good and the good of society.¹¹⁴

The increasing role of the think tank sector solidified the ideological realignment around social policy making—including education. Since the 1980s, privately funded networks of conservative think tanks specialized in producing clear ideological policy advice. Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the think tank sector developed greater influence over Republican lawmakers and testified on issues such as welfare reform more frequently than university-based academics.¹¹⁵ Conservative think tanks played a crucial role in undermining public support for welfare in the 1980s and 90s, produced antiwelfare rhetoric that drew on hostilities toward poor minorities and unwed mothers. Furthermore, this rhetoric also influenced ideas about school choice and vouchers as the appropriate educational solution for low-income families.¹¹⁶

Little More Than an “inner-city jobs program,” Title I and the Decline of War on Poverty
The tensions between choice, delinquent motherhood and education reform came to head during reauthorization of ESEA in 1999 as debates about Title I effectiveness focused on teacher quality and the reliance of teacher aides as instructors in Title I schools. By 1998, the \$8 billion program served nearly 10.5 million students in close to 50,000 schools and also employed more than 189,000 teachers, reading specialists, instructional assistants, school nurses, counselors, and social workers.¹¹⁷ Questions that guided the House hearings on the reauthorization included familiar Republican frames about the program’s effectiveness; “Was there still a role for the Target Assistance program?”; “Should Title I benefits be portable?”; “Were Title I parents becoming more involved in their children's education?”; “and were Title I teacher’s aides “a wise use of taxpayers' dollars?”¹¹⁸ The Clinton administration similarly hoped to tackle the problem of

¹¹² United States. Congress. House. Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities. (1995). *Contract with America: hearing on welfare reform : hearing before the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, House of Representatives, 105 Cong., 1st sess, hearing held in Washington, DC, January 18, 1995*. Washington: U.S. pp 17-18.

¹¹³ Soss, Fording, and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*, 28, citing Mead, *Beyond Entitlement*.

¹¹⁴ Soss, Fording, and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*, 25.

¹¹⁵ DeBray, *Politics, Ideology & Education*, 15; 24-25; Weaver, *Ending Welfare as We Know It*, 143.

¹¹⁶ Reese, *Backlash against Welfare Mothers*, 151.

¹¹⁷ Report of the citizens’ commission on civil rights, “Executive Summary. Title I in Midstream: The Fight to Improve Schools for Poor Kids.,” fall 1998. p.5

¹¹⁸ United States. Congress. House. *Title I: What’s Happening at the School District and School Building Level: Hearing before the Committee on Education and the Workforce, House of Representatives, 106 Cong., 1st sess, Hearing Held in Washington, DC, July 27, 1999*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : 2000. p.2

teacher quality which was “exacerbated by the use of paraprofessionals in instructional roles.”¹¹⁹ Despite the partisan differences that ultimately prevented ESEA from being reauthorized in the final years of Clinton’s administration, across the aisle, federal policy makers agreed that Title I should not be used to endorse failing schools or practices that lead to failing students, including hiring underqualified teaching staff. Under a new educational accountability act within the ESEA, the Department of Education aimed to improve the quality of instruction in Title I programs by phasing out the use of paraprofessional aides in instructional roles and encouraging aides to seek full certification.¹²⁰

The strong reaction against teacher aides demonstrates how arguments about responsibility and welfare dependency were reproduced within conversations to reauthorize Title I in ways that although discussing work, nonetheless reinforced racist discourses prominent in welfare reform that paraprofessionals were “undeserving,” lazy, or worse, fraudulent. By the time ESEA was up for reauthorization the, Title I program had accumulated thirty years’ worth of complaints—of which teacher quality was just one of many. Civil rights groups and families had long criticized Title I programs on the ground, arguing that they were designed to teach only basic and not advanced skills, Title I enforced low expectations of poor and minority students, and that programs isolated students from the mainstream classes by pulling them out of the classroom for remedial classes. Additionally, Black parents complained that Title I programs relegated their children to a second-class education.¹²¹ Still, Civil Rights groups and evaluators of the Title I program supported increasing Title I funds, encouraged enforcing state accountability, and improving professional development. For critical proponents of Title I, teacher accountability was just part of the problem.¹²² For others, like members of the Urban League, improving teaching standards was part of a “no excuses” era of urban school reform. They argued that it was incumbent upon school districts and states to put qualified teachers in every classroom even if it meant placing “well-meaning but ill-prepared minority teachers at risk.”¹²³

Focusing Title I reauthorizations on the effectiveness of Title I paraprofessionals would ultimately put minority educators at risk, as the program had historically funded community-based Black and Latina mothers.¹²⁴ In the 1960s, social scientific, philanthropic, and government officials had advocated for “new careers” to address urban poverty and deindustrialization by building the human services sector and hiring paraprofessional workers to deliver services in

¹¹⁹ Message from the President of the United States transmitting his administration’s proposal for Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Papers referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, Armed Services, and Banking and Financial Services. 106th Congress. 1st sess. U.S. Government Printing Office.

¹²⁰ United States Congress. Hearing of The Committee On Health, Education, Labor, And Pensions. 106 cong., sess 1. Feb 9 1999. 16.

¹²¹ Quote cited in Ralph Frammolino, "Title I's \$118 Billion Fails to Close Gap," *The Los Angeles Times*, (Los Angeles), January 17, 1999.

¹²² Yu, Corrinne M., and William L. Taylor. *Title I in Midstream: The Fight To Improve Schools for Poor Kids. Report of the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights, Summer 1999.* Citizens Commission on Civil Rights, 2000 M St, 1999. <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED438372>. p16

¹²³ Price Hugh. The "No Excuses" Era Of Urban School Reform Feb 14, 1997. 8. Domestic Policy Council, Bruce Reed, and Subject Files, “National Urban League,” *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2019, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/31473>.

¹²⁴ Juravitch, Nick. “Paraprofessional Educators and Labor-Community Coalitions, Past and Present. Labor Online. Retrieved from <http://lawcha.org/wordpress/2015/02/24/paraprofessional-educators-and-labor-community-coalitions-past-and-present/>.

education and healthcare. When ESEA was passed in 1965, local education agencies used funds to hire the mothers of schoolchildren to work in neighborhood schools and help alleviate the “problems” associated with poverty. Administrators, activists and scholars had hoped paraprofessional programs would improve instruction—and school discipline—by having them serve as liaisons between parents and teachers and ultimately enhance communication and cooperation between schools and communities.¹²⁵ Developing educational careers for women, some of whom were employed as teacher aides, and most of whom were African American was part of a deliberate employment goal of mid-century antipoverty policy makers.¹²⁶

By the 1990s, the educational advantages associated with paraprofessionals and the employment goals set forth during the Great Society had fallen from policy debates. Discussions were not aimed around social responsibility of job provision but rather the individual responsibility of workers who were framed as taking funding away from Title I kids. While the employment and education reforms of the 1960s went hand-in-hand with meeting the broader goal of ending poverty, New Democrats had retreated and shifted the goals of what educational opportunity could achieve. Department of Education officials argued that paraprofessionals were not an asset but a cost. Mary Jean LeTendre, an official within the Department of Education who oversaw Title I, argued that using Title I funds to employ paraprofessionals or aides had amounted to “a jobs program for members of the community.” Instead of using the money on jobs, LeTendre added that she believed the program needed “to be focused on the needs of the kids.”¹²⁷ It is likely that paraprofessionals saw their jobs as focused on the kids, and that their working in teaching capacities for which they were not qualified was more a reflection of fiscally constrained districts than of their own malfeasance. One official from the American Federation of Teachers defended teacher aides by suggesting that teacher aides were often misassigned, used as substitute teachers, and for doing the jobs of teachers.¹²⁸ Leaders from the Council of Great City Schools acknowledged that many of the largest urban districts had substantial problems “recruiting and retaining teachers and other staff” and that in some communities recruiting aides had been the only way to overcome staffing and language barriers.¹²⁹ Moreover, although Congressional and White House leaders complained about the cost of Title I workers, Congressional leaders less commonly focused on how their labor was being exploited, and instead focused on why teacher aides failed to become fully certified teachers.¹³⁰ Such accusations further placed blame on workers for not seeking more stable, better paid, and certified employment.

These arguments demeaning the work of mothers not only dismissed the original employment goals of these programs, but within the broader context of welfare reform, deployed similar discourses of fraud and mismanagement that rationalized cutting social programs and made way for privatizing services.¹³¹ Some school districts even began responding to teacher aide concerns redirecting funds to teacher training or contracting out to private companies. In

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Dunning, “New Careers for the Poor.”

¹²⁷ Ralph Frammolino, “Title I’s \$118 Billion Fails to Close Gap; Program Has Been Unable to Lift Academic Level of Poor Students, Research Shows.” *Los Angeles Times*. January 17, 1999.

¹²⁸ Sack, Joetta L. “Debate Turns On Role of Title I Aides.” *Education Week* 19, no. 14 (December 12, 1999). For history of AFT and unionization of teacher aides see Kahlenberg, *Tough Liberal*.

¹²⁹ Joetta L. Sack, “Debate Turns On Role of Title I Aides,” *Education Week* 19, no. 14 (December 12, 1999): 1.

¹³⁰ Hearing of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions. US Senate. 106th session (1999).

¹³¹ Charges of welfare fraud have long served as a pretext for cutting welfare rolls. See for example Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor* and Soss, Fording, and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*.

Pueblo, CO, Education Trust, a Washington based non-profit helped the district lay-off 62 aides, most of whom were Latino/a "moms and dads," who had worked for the district from 10 or 15 years. The money saved from the dismissal of school aides would instead be redirected into professional training for teachers. In Compton, CA, the district used some of the \$9.3 million that it received from Title I to pay the private firm, Sylvan Learning Systems to tutor students in reading and math. Sylvan would charge Compton a discounted rate of \$22 per hour--or \$1,500 per student served—services the company would typically charge parents a rate of \$45 per hour. As researchers have noted, policies set in place under the Clinton administration—including IASA and Goals 2000—which set content, performance standards and expected states to hold schools accountable for achievement, served as defining moments in the rise of education privatization.¹³² Moreover the discourse around the ineffectiveness of Black and Latinx teacher aides became one way to usher in the private firms who might provide more efficient instructional services. Architects of new careers service jobs had hoped the human service industry would provide sustainable jobs for low wage earners, arguing that while deindustrialization was inevitable—the human service economy was “least likely to be automated out of existence.”¹³³ Yet they failed to predict how such work might first be demeaned, then privatized out of existence. Privatization in education particularly over services traditionally performed by Black women, was like other areas of social policy reform, touted as a solution to issues of dependency, fraud and bureaucratic waste.

At its origins, ESEA and Title I was designed to bring social and economic opportunity to the “educationally deprived,” by linking school-based compensatory education programs with the community. Employing Black and Latina mothers to forge this link was central to policy makers’ anti-poverty education-based goals. These positions both provided jobs but also served a broader poverty regulating goal. To revisit the aims of Lloyd Ohlin, cited in chapter two, “indigenous social movements” with which jobs like teacher aides were part was to “reduce pressures toward deviance” and to “heighten the personal investment of members in the established social order.”¹³⁴ By the 1990s, policy makers had forgone these employment goals, seeing teacher aides as oppositional to the new goals to increase standards and educational outcomes. But the decline in Black social movements and the increase in policing and crime control may have also relegated the social control function of these teacher aide positions as obsolete. What purpose does community-school connections serve if community policing, school safety officers, take on these new responsibilities of providing social order, just as federal policy makers and district leaders instead dismissed the significance of labor performed by women of color and instead ushered in market-based solutions to the problems of education inequality? Title I, as one article put forth, may have been “no match for the challenges presented by poverty and problems such as racial tensions, language barriers, crime, violence and drug use.”¹³⁵ Yet as this chapter demonstrates, urban communities, urban children, would be-welfare moms, and teacher aides did not stand a chance against the paternalistic and punitive direction of federal opportunity.

Across the board Title I and other education reforms had contributed to the social control features of antipoverty policy. Education policy had increased surveillance measures by funding

¹³² Patricia Burch, *Hidden Markets: The New Education Privatization*, (New York: Routledge, 2009).

¹³³ Dunning, “New Careers for the Poor, 674”; Pearl and Riessman, *New Careers for the Poor*, vii.

¹³⁴ Ohlin, “The Development of Indigenous Social Movements Among Res-idents of Deprived Urban Areas,” cited in O’Conner *Poverty Knowledge*, 127.

¹³⁵ Frammolino, “Title I’s \$118 Billion Fails to Close Gap..”

more security and policing technology in schools. Education reforms were also merged with punitive welfare reform techniques to prevent Teenage mothers from becoming welfare dependents. And through reforms like school choice and a renewed focus on teacher quality, Black mothers were further demonized as irresponsible. Policy makers addressed long-held civil rights claims about unequal access to quality schooling yet did so in ways that painted Black and Latina mothers as irresponsibly leeching off a system and made paraprofessional a source of urban student disadvantage.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that federal education initiatives designed for low-income children worked in concert with other federal initiatives and served as part of a single umbrella message—to reform the delinquencies of “urban crime,” welfare “dependence” and bring to urban communities a new politics of opportunity—one that defined racial equity and economic mobility as individual responsibility. Through programs like Goals 2000, IASA and education initiatives in the crime bill, stiffer discipline policies, police and penal technologies were incorporated into schools. Moreover, the discourse undergirding curricular reforms would continue to be based on the potentially delinquent aspect of the low-achieving student. Secretary Riley urged educators to raise their academic standards noting that “the surest and fastest way to create an angry, sometimes violent 19-year-old illiterate dropout is to give that young person a watered-down curriculum which says early on that he or she isn’t good enough to learn anything more.”¹³⁶ Pulling from the age-old belief that schools would solve problems of urban violence, Riley and other administrative officials rationalized imposing a more rigorous curriculum as a way to reach those alienated by the belief that they lacked the capacity to learn. Stricter school standards and school discipline and ultimately individual responsibility became the opportunity disadvantaged students needed to get ahead.

Although Clinton sought to distinguish his social policies from earlier Democratic Presidents, when it came to crime control, urban policy and reforming education, his policies and discourse harkened back to earlier Democratic policymakers. This was exemplified by the belief that education had the political potential to do something about the problems of racialized poverty and “urban violence.” Naomi Murakara argued that the Democratic punitive turn is best situated within the trajectory of postwar liberal law-and-order. “On one hand, the damning image of soft-on-crime liberalism pushed centrist Democrats rightward, toward harsher positions and proposals. On the other hand, the actual institutional legacies of Great Society liberalism had fortified carceral machinery.”¹³⁷ Like the Democratic and Republican administrations that preceded the 1990s, Clinton’s anti-crime initiatives would encourage an interagency and community-based approach to not only combat and manage urban “crime” and school disorder, but also produce an image of the urban and disadvantaged as criminal.¹³⁸

I also argued that the Clinton administration and Congress targeted other forms delinquencies and “failures” of primarily Black women across the school system. When the Clinton administration targeted welfare reform they also encouraged states to impose rules

¹³⁶ “Lon Eileen Schools and Violence on Riley’s Front Burner,” *The Advocate*, (Baton Rouge, LA), April 13, 1994. Richard Riley Collection. Box 61. Folder, topical education, violence in schools general 1992-1998. South Carolina Political Collections, University of South Carolina.

¹³⁷ Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime* makes a similar argument about the continuation of crime control under the Reagan presidency.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.* Hinton traces the community-based approaches through the Kenned, Johnson and Carter administrations and makes the argument that under Carter the focus on crime control shifted from combatting to managing crime.

around teenage mothers mandating the ways they must participate in school in order to receive benefits. Historian Michael Brown argues that welfare reform was rooted in individual failure by and large—the failure of poor Blacks to accept work when it was available, a failure to stay in school, or a refusal to get married.¹³⁹ As this chapter lays out, these individual failures were conscripted in the administrations campaign against teenage motherhood, conservative rationales to prioritize school choice and vouchers as part of the broader campaign to reform mothers and families, and congressional and administrative calls to reform the work provisions of Title I while insinuating that Title I workers took advantage of the program over the needs of children. These state mechanisms of surveillance and punishment worked to penalize marginalized women while blaming them for their own disadvantaged positions.¹⁴⁰ In each of the cases, Black women were blamed for perpetuating educational and economic instability. Of course, these tropes of Black women as the source of Black family instability and poverty harkened back to postwar social science research.

Despite the continuations, there were differences between Clinton era education and social reform and those of the Democratic leaders of the 1960s when this dissertation began. First, in the 1960s, social scientists, private philanthropies and federal policy makers acknowledged structural causes to the problems of urban communities, even as they often supported individualized and pathologized solutions to such problems. Problems such as delinquency and rebellion had been previously linked to limited economic opportunity in Black ghettos. By the time Clinton took office, Black violence—and in particular Black on Black violence—had been stripped of any structural characteristics. Providing the poor with economic uplift was no longer a problem for government, rather government would equip the poor with responsibility to confront the supposed pathologies of violence, crime and dependency that kept them in poverty.

Second, police and policing technologies took on a more central feature of providing educational opportunity in the 1990s. Although some reports in the 1960s attributed racial and ghetto inequality to white racism and police violence—by the 1990s the police and policing technologies were described by President Clinton as purveyors of urban opportunity. Through educational programs like Goals 2000 and IASA and new crime laws pushing community policing, crime control was formally linked to school institutions. 1960s policy makers promoted opportunity programs such as recreation activities, summer programs and job programs in part to respond to demands and pacify urban resistance. While Reagan era officials argued in the 1980s that controlling school disorder was a racial civil rights issue, Clinton made crime control and school reform his “third way” answer to the problems of racial civil rights. Crime control and education reform, to revisit the advice of journalist Nathan Lemann, could address the ghettos’ worst problems “without having an official ‘ghetto program,’” and they would be “winnable battles” seen by middle class constituents as “sensible, not like giveaways.” Education offered Democrats a way to steer resources toward disadvantaged communities by focusing attention on the most sympathetic members of those communities—children—while also advocating for more crime control and surveillance through a discourse of opportunity to safe and violent free schools.

¹³⁹ Michael Brown, *Ghettos, Fiscal Federalism, and Welfare Reform* in Sanford F. Schram, Joe Soss, and Richard C. Fording, *Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003). 49.

¹⁴⁰ For more on the ways mothers are punished by state policy see Dorothy E. Roberts, “Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers,” *UCLA Law Review*, 2012.

Third, although Title I had previously avoided the rising backlash against the Great Society, by the end of the Clinton administration many aspects of the program including how the program was structured and how the program supported its original anti-poverty aims through job support became subject to the same politics of welfare reform. As the administration came to a close, Republicans proposed reforms to further reduce regulations, transfer more rights to states, privatize Title I funding through vouchers and ultimately promoted reform packages that former Assistant Secretary of Education Chester Finn remarked “would do for education what reform did for welfare.”¹⁴¹ Terry Peterson, counselor to the Secretary of Education later reflected, “Sometimes I think, without being stated, opposition from some Republicans to some of our programs, let’s say Title I, was because they explained it as another welfare version.”¹⁴² What I have argued is that education had not avoided the dilemmas associated with the troubled politics of welfare. Education proposals were part of a “single umbrella message” to govern over the urban delinquent, whether that be the already criminal, the would-be welfare dependent, or those in failing “urban job programs.”

In many ways, reforms like IASA and Goals 2000 differed substantially from the original ESEA as it changed the structure of federal reform by introducing whole school programs instead of pull-out programs for Title I and by setting state standards for achievement outcomes instead of simply allocating funding to schools. Yet, education reformers did not totally abandon the initial driver of Title I, which continued to focus on reforming the “culturally deprived” in 1960s terms, or by the 1990s, the urban and the truly disadvantaged. Ultimately, understanding the full effects of 1990s federal school reforms to improve schooling for disadvantaged and urban students requires examining not how federal education reforms changed but rather how they expanded the initial legacies of the Great Society to reform the poor by turning away from the more redistributive active government goals and relying more on individual responsibility, markets and expanding the more punitive impulses of early reformers.

¹⁴¹ Nina Shokraii and Chester Finn, “Ending Ed Policy As We Know It,” *The Weekly Standard*, March 13, 2000.

¹⁴² Riley Oral History. Clinton Presidential History Project Miller Center., University of Virginia August 30, 31, 2004 Online: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/richard-w-riley-oral-history-secretary-education>.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

“burdened individuality” designates the double bind of emancipation—the onerous responsibilities of freedom with the enjoyment of few of its entitlements, the collusion of the disembodied equality of liberal individuality with the dominated, regulated and disciplined embodiment of Blackness, the entanglements of sovereignty and subjection, ... the power generative of this condition of burdened individuality encompassed repression, domination, techniques of discipline, strategies of self-improvement, and the regulatory interventions of the state.

Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*

On August 18, 2014 President Obama addressed the nation about the unrest that ensued in Ferguson Missouri following the police murder of 18 year old Michael Brown. Obama’s address was commemorative of 1960s liberals concerned about the limited opportunity structure that led to dissatisfaction, “delinquency” and revolts. According to Obama, one of the nation’s challenges remained “dealing with communities that feel left behind, who, as a consequence of tragic histories, often find themselves isolated, often find themselves without hope, without economic prospects.” In response to the unrest Obama promised to open a civil rights investigation into Michael Brown’s death, and work with the Community Opportunity Policing Services (COPS) to build more confidence within the community. He also promoted his My Brother’s Keeper initiative which was launched six months before to address “the persistent opportunity gaps facing boys and young men of color.”¹ Speaking about Ferguson, Obama added that the initiative would support men of color who were over-represented in the criminal justice system, who had higher rates of suspension in school, and who faced “more frequent interactions with criminal justice system.” The My Brother’s Keeper initiative worked in partnership with cities, communities, parents, school superintendents, the private business sector, and corporations to move young men “on a better track”... and to ‘inculcate more trust, more confidence in the criminal justice system.’² Obama suggested as presidents before him, that communities and police needed to form better relationships and in the tradition of third-way New Democrats who abdicated social spending, and big state solutions to social problems—Obama’s opportunity program would be led by the private sector.³ Private-sector partners—not the government—would raise \$200 million over five years in an effort to end “the persistent opportunity gaps facing boys and young men of color.”⁴ Nearly five decades after the long hot summers prompted policy makers to pacify Black unrest in part by recommending educational solutions, Obama’s “My Brother’s Keeper” initiative continued to promote individualized educational solutions to structural inequities.

Programs like the My Brother’s Keeper are demonstrative of the pervasive *disciplining politics of opportunity* that have extended through federal educational reforms for the “disadvantaged” —a politics that I have argued serve to regulate behavior, restrict protest and since the 1960s have been predicated on a presumed marker of urban, often Black criminality.

¹My Brother’s Keeper alliance. Accessed from <https://www.obama.org/mbka/> on November 5, 2019.

²“Obama’s Remarks on Ferguson, Mo. and Iraq,” *Washington Post*;

³For an analysis of My Brother’s Keeper see Dumas, Michael J. “My Brother as ‘Problem’ Neoliberal Governmentality and Interventions for Black Young Men and Boys.” *Educational Policy* 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 94–113. For Dumas this program represents a form of neoliberal governmentality whereby educational policy constructs racial inequality as a result of individual choice and cultural defect.

⁴Quoted in Michael J Dumas. “My Brother as ‘Problem,’”⁹⁴

This politics is not confined solely to federal policy. Contemporary market reforms similarly rely on discourses of educational opportunity that are laden with assumptions about supposed pathologies that undercut educational achievement. Just as Reagan officials appealed to claims of “civil rights” when advocating for restored “order” in the classroom, today’s educational leaders rely on similar discourses in order to push their education reform agendas. For example, market-based school reformers often cast market-based school choice reforms as fulfilling the promises of the civil rights movement and rely on narratives of damage and struggle whereby Black youth in low-income settings are framed as ‘broken’ and in need of ‘fixing.’⁵ Perhaps the best example of this persisting logic is the proliferation of “no excuse” schools. No Excuse schools represented by charter management organizations like the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP), have left their mark on the educational opportunity policy landscape. Proponents of no excuse schools attempt to counter the “disadvantages” students enter school with by adopting high academic expectations, longer school days and year, and a ‘no-excuses’ approach towards disciplinary issues.⁶ In doing so no excuse charter schools rely on behavioristic regulations intended to improve standardized test scores, promote a college-going culture and enculturate students with middle-class norms.⁷ Thus school rules prescribe student behavior, dictate how students dress, how they enter a classroom, how they walk through the school, how they should pay attention in class, and even how students should organize their binders. These reforms simply reproduce familiar racial ideologies about the supposed cultural pathologies of Black communities and suggest that only through behavioral management and paternalistic practices will students attain educational and economic opportunity.

Obama’s administration did however set out to reform school discipline practices in ways that finally responded to parents, organizers and educational researchers who had long argued against the racially disproportionate discipline practices that left Black students over-represented in various measures of school punishment. Whereas Reagan and Clinton advocated for increasing school security, and school order in ways that culminated in financing more police through federal Title I dollars, President Obama’s Supportive School Discipline Initiative made eliminating the school-to-prison pipeline an educational priority of his administration. Yet as recent studies have demonstrated, federal efforts to eliminate the school to prison pipeline have resulted in practices that don’t stray too far from the behavioral regulation practices of earlier eras.⁸ Danfeng Soto-Vigil Koon found that Obama’s School Discipline Initiative concealed larger economic and political tensions and excluded the more radical demands of community

⁵ For a review of market based reforms see Scott, Janelle, and Jennifer Holmes. “The Political Economy of Market-Based Educational Policies: Race and Reform in Urban School Districts, 1915 to 2016.” *Review of Research in Education* 40, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 250–97; Scott, Janelle T. “The Politics of Venture Philanthropy in Charter School Policy and Advocacy.” *Educational Policy*, 2009. Baldrige, Bianca J. “‘It’s like This Myth of the Supernegro’: Resisting Narratives of Damage and Struggle in the Neoliberal Educational Policy Context.” *Race Ethnicity and Education* 20, no. 6 (November 2, 2017): 781–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13613324.2016.1248819>. p.281); for an overview of how market reformers rely on a discourse of civil rights to promote market reforms see Janelle T. Scott, “A Rosa Parks Moment? School Choice and the Marketization of Civil Rights.” *Critical Studies in Education* 54, no. 1 (2013): 5–18.

⁶ Joanne W. Golann, “The Paradox of Success at a No-Excuses School,” *Sociology of Education* 88, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 103–19, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038040714567866>; Beth Sondel, “‘No Excuses’ in New Orleans: The Silent Passivity of Neoliberal Schooling,” *The Educational Forum* 80, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 171–88.

⁷ Beth Sondel, “‘No Excuses’ in New Orleans: The Silent Passivity of Neoliberal Schooling,” *The Educational Forum* 80, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 171–88.

⁸ Danfeng Soto-Vigil Koon, “Education Policy Networks: The Co-Optation, Coordination, and Commodification of the School-to-Prison Pipeline Critique,” *American Educational Research Journal*, June 12, 2019. 1-40.

groups, educators and activists who advocated for de-policing and antiracist pedagogy in schools. Moreover, new federal efforts continued to stress psychological explanations to structural problems and continued to rely on the expertise of mental health and law enforcement professionals. For example, the Department of Education and Department of Justice helped to structure a network of psychologists, police juvenile courts, edu-businesses, and other education advocacy organizations that ultimately coopted and commodified the more radical critique of organizers and educators. Far from addressing the prison pipeline as a problem of expanding law enforcement and imprisonment, federally supported networks had framed the problem of school discipline and the school to prison pipeline as educators' failure to control misbehaving youth.

When placed within a broader historical context, these contemporary reformers simply contribute to a longer legacy whereby educational reforms and discourses of opportunity are used as mechanisms of social control. I began this story in the 1960s. In chapter two I argued that Great Society liberals sought to equalize racial and economic inequality by focusing on the limited opportunity structures they believed reproduced racialized poverty. Federal dollars supported community schools, employment programs like teacher aides, after school initiatives, and academic programs that focused on literacy and mathematics. These were laudable initiatives that provided jobs to families and communities and funding to local schools in ways that improved education for low-income children. These gains aside, I argued that education programs served to discipline Black youth away from resistance and served to conciliate broader demands to dismantle ghettos, integrate schools, and end police violence. Second such policies extended educational provisions by labeling students into pathologized categories and claiming to provide opportunity by presenting Blacks "as damaged objects of pity," as alienated, and rageful, "rather than citizens whose rights had been violated."⁹ Policies like Title I and other educational programs for low income students were legislated as programs for the "culturally deprived" that would bring about Black equality, and address Black "delinquency," through compulsory education. This practice reproduced an enduring image of education as the ultimate preventative against crime and that ultimately left local educators and school leaders open to impose their own regulatory reforms against student disorder and school-based protests.¹⁰

In the period following the 1960s intersecting economic and political forces including conservative attacks on Keynesian economic policies supported by a growing resurgence of law and order ultimately altered how urban poverty was governed by social policy and how policy makers related education to poverty. As others have described, by the 1980s the poverty debate underwent an ideological realignment that focused less on the structures that prevented opportunity and looked more at questions of "dependency." Neoconservatives argued that poverty and urban disorders were exasperated by welfare state interventions. Using this ideological realignment and a shifting political economy as a backdrop, I argue in chapter three that federal education policy makers redirected their message of educational opportunity to focus on classroom disorder, and "indiscipline." The new movement for educational excellence reinforced the dominant image of urban disorder and contributed to the broader crime control message and ultimately was used to discredit redistributive policies of the 1960s. What was so powerful about the discipline message was that federal policy makers redefined educational

⁹ Scott *Contempt and Pity*, xvii

¹⁰ Jon Hale, "Future Foot Soldiers or Budding Criminals?: The Dynamics of High School Student Activism in the Southern Black Freedom Struggle." *Journal of Southern History* 84, no. 3 (July 27, 2018): 615–52. <https://doi.org/10.1353/soh.2018.0165>.

opportunity in ever more restricted terms as “educational excellence” itself predicated on claims for more ordered, “disciplined” and crime free schools.

The ideological realignment, shifting welfare politics, and new ideas about the causes of Black poverty also moved liberals further to the right.¹¹ By the time Clinton came to office, the discipline message from the bully pulpit had deployed into an all-out interagency attack on what remained of any of the redistributive aspects of the opportunity welfare state. Aspects such as community control and participation had moved further away from redistributing social power and was oriented more toward reinforcing responsibility. Part of the responsibility message required that communities work in “partnership” with policing powers, just as federal dollars originally earmarked for the disadvantaged was redirected to school “safety” initiatives.¹² The social control feature of Education policy was no longer about pacifying Black resistance against police violence but rather education policy and schools became a primary site with which to deploy police and disrupt welfare dependency.

A key takeaway from this study is that at least since the 1960s racial and economic Opportunity has largely been confined to individualized education solutions in ways that despite the best efforts of Great Society planners obscured structural inequality and deflected from the very real occurrences of anti-Black violence. Ultimately postwar liberals like those described in chapter 2, had as Naomi Murakawa argues, “criminalized” the race problem by linking disparate occurrences of civil disobedience, mass uprisings, and individual acts of petty crime in ways that “militated against recognition of Black humanity.”¹³ Federal leaders in my account had similarly educationalized the “crime” problem by making educational opportunity the stand in for broader social redistribution. Schools became both a space in the public imaginary to redistribute opportunity and to prevent and redress notions of cultural deficit. The foundation of any contemporary notion of a school prison pipeline was already being placed as 1960s policy makers made education opportunity predicated on notions of an urban, Black “delinquency” problem. As federal reformers reauthorized federal education reforms into the 1990s federal policy makers would use education policy for the disadvantaged to impose more law and order.

Scholarly Contributions

I have chosen to study discipline, criminality, and punishment not from the confines of on-campus-suspension rooms, or through specific police interactions, or even through formal discipline policies per say. Rather throughout this dissertation I have argued that forms of social control, punishment and disciplining are prominent through programs intended to bring about equality. This approach is similar to the one taken by Saidiya Hartman in *Scenes of Subjection*.¹⁴ Hartman demonstrates how racial domination and Black suffering and routinized violence not only persisted through enslavement but was also enforced through notions of reform, enjoyment, rights and consent. In this way, Hartman’s work provides new ways of reassessing the history and function of education policy and reform. Routinized violence and terror are not only present through specific scenes of violence but are also present in *the mundane and quotidian*. Political

¹¹ O’Connor. *Poverty Knowledge*, 259

¹² In Elizabeth Hinton’s account much of the merger between social policies and crime control was initiated in the 1960s and expanded in subsequent years *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*. Schools similarly had undergone this merger before the 1990s. (By 1966 federal Title I dollars were used to support education initiatives in juvenile detention facilities) Yet under the Clinton administration federal dollars were used to fund police in schools.

¹³ Murakawa, Naomi. *First Civil Right*, 9-10

¹⁴ Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*, Race and American Culture (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

and social control both persist through and are obscured by liberal discourse, and by everyday practices to ensure opportunity. Disciplining and criminalizing logics were embedded within calls for equal education; through proposals for more recreation programs; inserted in rationales to incorporate more “swimming pools,” in Black neighborhoods (as one 1960s’ Office of Education official recounted), and even persisted through demands to enforce “educational excellence.” My account of the evolution of federal education policy thus hopes to translate the “mundane” and “quotidian” tasks of education policy making—into a study of the evolving forces of Black subjection.

Moreover, Hartman’s work also pushes us to think beyond the individuality embedded within the discourse of *educational opportunity*. This discourse reinforces ideas about the transformative power of education to equip individuals with a meritocratic form of social mobility so heavily engrained in American culture.¹⁵ During the Great Society, liberal policy makers reinforced this tendency by making education reforms a proxy for social and racial equity.¹⁶ Yet in Hartman’s terms, equality (or opportunity) simply equips students and families with little more than a “burdened individuality,” repression, domination, techniques of discipline, strategies of self-improvement, and the regulatory interventions of the state.¹⁷ Social policies dependent on enhancing individual skills through education initiatives thus shifts blame away from structural conditions and burdens students with the responsibility for their own success or failure. This “burdened individuality” which has followed Black Americans through reconstruction, and as this dissertation demonstrates- through the extension of social rights during the Great Society conveys the “antagonistic production of the liberal individual, rights bearer, and raced subject as equal yet inferior, independent yet servile, freed yet bound by duty, reckless yet responsible, blithe yet brokenhearted.”¹⁸ Far from securing opportunity through education initiatives the educationalized welfare state has secured this burdened individuality—and left burdened individuals to fight against the criminal status that is consistently placed on them.

This study has contributed to other areas of academic research. First, by focusing on the evolution of post-Great society education initiatives this study attempts to disentangle the relationship between education and the welfare state.¹⁹ I show that the disciplining and social control functions that have long plagued both schools and social assistance programs have proliferated through federal education policy. Like other social policy domains, discourses and technologies of crime control and policing have been merged with federal education policy and directed the ways schools police children.²⁰ relatedly, this study contributes to how we understand the political economy of education. As scholars like Pauline Lipmann, Jean Anyon, and others conclude, improving schools and educational outcomes requires expanding economic

¹⁵ For an excellent history on individualization and education solutions see Leah Gordon’s Gordon, Leah N. *From Power to Prejudice: The Rise of Racial Individualism in Midcentury America*. 1 edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015.

¹⁶ This is borrowed from David Labaree. “The Winning Ways of a Losing Strategy: Educationalizing Social Problems in the United States.” *Educational Theory*, 453

¹⁷ Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*, 5

¹⁸ Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*, 121

¹⁹ Michael B. Katz, “Public Education as Welfare”

²⁰ Armando Lara-Millán, “Public Emergency Room Overcrowding in the Era of Mass Imprisonment,” *American Sociological Review* 79, no. 5 (October 2014): 866–87; Rios, *Punished*; Soss, Fording, and Schram, *Disciplining the Poor*.

supports through a more robust welfare state.²¹ This study also suggest that we take seriously the full range of what welfare states do; not only has U.S. social policy historically discriminated against Black Americans and Latino immigrants, but poverty assistance programs stigmatize, regulate and criminalize poor recipients. In other words, it is not enough to hope to improve schools by expanding social policies without contending with the very real ways welfare programs, including education initiatives, perpetuate inequality.

Second, this study contributes to studies on school discipline. Research on school discipline often explore how school discipline operates within classrooms, at the school level and within districts to reproduce racial and educational inequalities. My account adds to these studies by demonstrating how federal policy makers have used education funding to counter presumed delinquencies of school children, and furthermore how federal policy makers have built on these presumptions to shape national discourse and federal policy about school discipline and crime. Local school leaders, teachers and principals impose discriminatory discipline practices but since the 1980s federal officials have also encouraged school leaders to impose stricter reforms and in the 1990s began financing stricter zero-tolerance policies. There is also a renewed interest amongst historians of education about how student protests of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as school desegregation movements contributed to the onset of criminalizing policies.²² Future works would benefit from examining how and in which ways these local practices both inspired or interacted with federal discourse and eventually pushed a national reform movement that strengthened local efforts.

Third this study has contributed to scholarship on the history of ideas and the influence of ideas on the trajectory of federal education reform.²³ Throughout this dissertation I have related the ideologies influencing federal education reform to the major currents and thinkers shaping ideas and the policy directions about poverty and racialized poverty in particular. Like other studies I have found that Black poverty is consistently pathologized as delinquent, disorderly, and dependent, which liberals and conservatives rely on as they push their own education reform agendas. Future works might build on the intellectual histories outlined by other scholars to look at the contested ways a broader range of thinkers, civil rights groups, and think-tanks contributed to school reform agendas to impose more punitive school reforms and how and in which ways these various actors and institutions influenced the direction of federally led discipline reform.

I'd like to end by proposing that educational researchers move beyond discourses that reproduce students, learners and their families as pathological. Part of this requires conducting research that complicates the relationship between education, race and academic success or failure. Moreover, studies on race in education might expand to look beyond racisms' subjects and focus instead on the ways architects and policies reproduce oppressive systems. As James Anderson outlines in the introduction of his classic text the *Education of Blacks in the South*

²¹ Jean Anyon, *Ghetto Schooling: A Political Economy of Urban Educational Reform* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1997); Pauline Lipman, *The New Political Economy of Urban Education: Neoliberalism, Race, and the Right to the City*, 1 edition (New York: Routledge, 2011).

²² Kafka, history of Zero Tolerance; Jon N. Hale, "Future Foot Soldiers or Budding Criminals?: The Dynamics of High School Student Activism in the Southern Black Freedom Struggle," *Journal of Southern History* 84, no. 3 (July 27, 2018): 615–52.

²³ For the intellectual histories influencing this work see Gordon, *From Power to Prejudice*; Katz, *The Undeserving Poor*; O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*; Scott, *Contempt and Pity*.

“both schooling for democratic citizenship and schooling for second-class citizenship have been basic traditions in American education... both were fundamental American conceptions of society and progress, occupied the same time and space, were fostered by the same governments, and usually were embraced by the same leaders.”²⁴ The history and origins of federal education policy fit squarely within this tradition. Black communities and civil rights organizations have long fought for educational resources, integrated schooling, community control over their schools, and in response federal educational policies have made improvements in the lives of Black children and low income schools by institutionalizing funding, programs and even jobs for parents. My account has focused primarily on how education reform has been used to discipline Black resistance and used discursively to impose more regulatory school policies. By relying on a discourse of educational opportunity (education as the key to social uplift)—liberals and conservatives have not only distracted from broader oppressive forces such as the persistence of police violence, mass incarceration, rising economic insecurity, but overtime policy makers and educators have used educational opportunity policies (like Title I) and a more punitive understanding of opportunity (as access to more ordered, disciplined, and crime and violent free schools) to impose stricter and more punitive school rules. federal educational policies may provide economic uplift, but they have also subjected students to regulatory punitive social control.

Yet just as schools and policies continue to oppress, there are those that use protest to continue to demand just and more humane versions of education and social policy. In the subtext of this dissertation have been the insurgent actions of young people and students conjuring their own visions of what’s to be done about the persisting violence facing Black and urban communities and schools—small acts of resistance that push against the social controlling forces of schools, police and discourses of opportunity. Demanding more of public officials and public schools requires that educators, families and communities seek more than mere education concessions. Communities, schools and researchers must instead strive for a politics unburdened by “individuality” and untethered to behavior regulation aimed at changing low-income students who are termed “at risk,” “disadvantaged,” and “deprived.”

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