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“The Exigencies of War”: The Army Specialized Training Program and Washington
University, 1942-1945

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Education

by

Jennifer Ann Rivera Silverman

March 2015

Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Margaret A. Nash, Chairperson

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2015

The Dissertation of Jennifer Ann Rivera Silverman is approved:

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Dedication

To my parents Barry and Hilda, with love and appreciation.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

“The Exigencies of War”: The Army Specialized Training Program and Washington University, 1942-1945

by

Jennifer Ann Rivera Silverman

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Education
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Dr. Margaret A. Nash, Chairperson

The Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) was the largest military training program during World War II. The program, created to meet “the exigencies of war,” included developing the Army’s manpower supply while training soldiers to meet the technological challenges of the war. In addition, the program also sought to reduce the impact of decreasing enrollments in higher education. To this end, the military partnered with over 220 colleges and universities who then provided training in engineering, foreign language and area studies, personnel psychology, and medical sciences which included dentistry, medicine and, veterinary sciences. The purpose of this study was to examine the ways in which the ASTP impacted higher education. In addition, this study explores how administrators met the demands of this wartime program. A review of the historiography reveals little information about the program’s impact beyond its military

goals. In order to understand the role of the ASTP in higher education, a case study method was employed. Washington University in St. Louis, MO was selected as the site for investigation. The institution provided a rich historical context due to its size, status as a private institution, and its location within a developing urban area. Data for this study includes primary documents from Washington University's archives, the Missouri State Historical Society along with local and national newspapers. Findings from this research assert that changes to higher education generally attributed to the GI Bill in 1944, began prior to the Bill's implementation due to higher education's involvement in war training programs. Results also identify the ways in which Washington University began the process of expansion and accommodation prior to the GI Bill. Lastly, the study reveals how administrators at Washington University leveraged the institution's agency through its participation in the ASTP in an effort to grow and develop the institution while increasing its prestige in the postwar period.

Table of Contents	Page
Introduction	1-7
Chapter 1 - Review of the Literature	8-34
Chapter 2 - Context	35-54
Chapter 3 - The Army Specialized Training Program in Review	55-83
Chapter 4 - The Path to Designation: Becoming an ASTP Institution	84-102
Chapter 5 - Transitioning from a Peace-time to a War-time University	103-122
Chapter 6 - Assimilating to Life in the Post-War Era	123-146
Conclusion	147-154
Bibliography	155-163

Introduction

On December 12, 1942, the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) was announced. The program was anticipated to provide a “continuous flow” of trained military personnel to be technicians and specialists who would meet “the exigencies of war.”¹ The program planned to enlist 150,000 men. In order to meet this goal, the military partnered with America’s colleges and universities because the military lacked the facilities to train, feed and house such a large number of men. A year after the announcement, at the height of its capacity with 140,000 participants, the program was rumored to be dissolving. In March 1944, once again citing “the exigencies of war,” the military officially announced that the program would begin to be dismantled. Although the program existed for approximately a year and four months before it was downsized and later discontinued, it was the largest military-based war time training program during World War II (WWII).

Although the ASTP enrolled the most trainees than any other wartime program, it has often been overlooked. Instead, the historical literature that has examined higher education and the military’s relationship has primarily focused on the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944, more commonly known as the GI Bill of Rights or simply as the GI Bill. While the Bill popularized the link between military service and education and shifted how Americans thought about higher education, the literature has resulted in the most-ly anecdotal conclusions that higher education became democratized as a result of the

¹ “New Plan Suspends Liberal Education,” *New York Times*, December 18, 1942.

Bill's education benefit; it does not take into consideration the impact of World War II training programs such as the ASTP.² In addition, the literature does not address the impact that these wartime training programs had at the institutional level and the challenges faced by institutional administrators as they worked to manage multiple and competing priorities. This gap in the literature needs to be filled because it will add to our understanding of why and how America's institutions of higher education were impacted and changed by the events of World War II; it will also provide another window through which to consider the impact of the GI Bill of Rights.

In this dissertation, I examine why the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) impacted higher education and the significance of this program beyond its military goals. Given that the ASTP remained in place for approximately two years, I seek to understand what impact this program had on the relationship between the military and higher education. What can we learn from the experience that may help us to better understand the development of higher education in the postwar era? At an administrative level, this dissertation seeks to understand under what circumstances administrators made decisions as a result of their participation in the ASTP. How did higher education's participation in the ASTP shift the trajectory of an institution's development and higher edu-

² Richard M. Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education: A Brief History," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 502, (1989): 15-28; Daniel A. Clark, "'The Two Joes Meet. Joe College, Joe Veteran': The G.I. Bill, College Education, and Postwar American Culture," *History of Education Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (1998): 165-189; Robert Serow, "Policy as a Symbol: Title II of the 1944 G.I. Bill," *The Review of Higher Education* 27, (2007): 481-499.

cation at-large?

This dissertation is an historical analysis of the impact of the ASTP through a case study analysis. I situate my study at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri between the years 1942 and 1945. This time frame was selected because the ASTP program began and ended during this period. However, for the purposes of understanding the larger context of higher education, I contextualize my study between 1940 and 1965 because this time period takes into consideration issues that, in the past, have not been associated or examined in connection with the Army Specialized Training Program. To gain an in-depth understanding of the implications of the ASTP at the local level, a case study method was employed. In addition, locating my research at the institutional level provided the opportunity to explore how an administration responded to the needs of the war effort and those demands placed upon institutions of higher education by the military and the federal government.

Washington University was selected because it provided a rich context within which to locate my research. Washington University is a small, private liberal arts institution located just west of the Mississippi River in St. Louis, Missouri. Washington had the benefit of being located in an urban industrial environment that helped shape the university's growth. This historical context along with Washington's status as a small, private institution provided a rich context for my research.

In keeping with the methods used to conduct historical analysis, primary materials were used for this study. A cross-section of documents were analyzed in an effort to iden-

tify issues that were worthy of investigation, decisions, and their results that were made within the context of the parameters stated above. In order to understand the variety of factors that either influenced or caused administrators to act, I consulted a variety of primary sources from varying contexts, both internal and external to Washington University that related to the Army Specialized Training Program.

To understand how the urgency of wartime demands interacted with educational policies and practices, I utilized primary sources to make sense of how Washington University operated in an environment with competing priorities and challenges. Because institutional governance structures are influenced by a variety of environmental factors, including faculty, students, alumni, contractors, and donors to name a few, institutions of higher education typically strive to conform or reject various and potentially inconsistent rules and regulations.³ Primary sources that addressed the opinions, preferences, and concerns of the aforementioned forces were reviewed. In particular, documents pertaining to the chancellor of the university, faculty members, student opinions, national opinions, and various divisions of the military, including the War Department and regional Army representatives, provided critical information that shows why Washington University met the demands of WWII and how this was accomplished.

Documents collected and used for this research were located primarily at Washington University's Archives. Some documents from the State Historical Society of Mis-

³ John C. Corson, *The Governance of Colleges and Universities: Modernizing Structure and Processes* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975).

souri's archives were also referenced, along with national and local newspaper publications, such as *The Washington Post*, *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, and *The Globe* among others. By consulting primary sources that addressed and discussed issues that the ASTP had on a national level and issues that concerned administrators at Washington University specifically, it was possible to accept or reject the importance of the ASTP in higher education. Together, these documents provided a rich context to understand why the ASTP was an important wartime program; it will hopefully encourage additional research on a much overlooked area that examines the intersection between higher education and the military during a critical point in our nation's history.

Between this introduction and the concluding chapter are two main parts in this dissertation. Each part has three chapters, for a total of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic through a review of the literature that addresses the federal government's role in higher education, including the GI Bill of Rights. This is followed by an examination of the role of the military in higher education and concludes with an analysis of the limited number of studies that discuss the Army Specialized Training Program and other wartime training programs. Together, these sources identify what we know about higher education's roles and responsibilities in the mid-twentieth century while highlighting the gaps in knowledge.

The second chapter provides contextual information for the time period examined in this project. For the purposes of this investigation, it is important to explore the context of American society and higher education both prior to and beyond the approximate two-

year lifespan of the ASTP. After all, the ASTP did not occur in a vacuum within a specific period of time. Instead, the need for the ASTP was precipitated by events prior to its existence and, similarly, the impact of the ASTP went beyond its date of termination. This section provides the framework within which the significance of the ASTP can be fully assessed.

The third chapter provides a detailed overview of the Army Specialized Training Program. In this section, the purpose, goals, and plan of the ASTP are analyzed in order to understand how the program functioned. Also included in this chapter is an examination of some of the most widely debated and discussed criticisms of the program.

In the second half of this dissertation, I begin a case study of the impact of the ASTP at Washington University. Chapter four, "The Path to Designation: Becoming an ASTP Institution," examines life at Washington University prior to the ASTP's implementation. It also looks at the process that was required by colleges and universities in general, and Washington in particular, to become a designated ASTP institution. The chapter also considers other wartime training programs and their impact on Washington University that occurred both before the United States entered World War II, and before the university was approved as an ASTP institution. The chapter concludes with a brief look at some of the challenges of the ASTP, a topic that is developed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Chapter five, "Transitioning from a Peace-Time to a War-Time University" considers the changes that occurred at Washington University during the Second World War.

These changes are examined within the context of the University's attempt to meet the needs for both war effort in general, and the ASTP in particular.

In chapter six, "Assimilating to Life in a Post-War Era," there are two primary focuses. The first considers the changes that took place at Washington University as the institution's administrators began to shift its emphasis from the war back to academic life. The section also explores how, during this transition, changes to the university's administration impacted and shifted institutional goals. With these new goals in mind, the second area of focus is considered. This second area examines the purpose and development of the institution's engineering research program and the implications this program had on the institution as a whole.

The conclusion of this dissertation begins with a discussion about the significance of the ASTP and how it began to re-shape higher education prior to the implementation of the GI Bill. By incorporating the impact of the ASTP on higher education into our understanding of the development of higher education in the postwar era, we can more fully comprehend the ways in which higher education has both shaped and been shaped by the needs of our nation. The chapter concludes with thoughts about questions that remain unanswered, areas where further research should be considered, and new questions that were raised during this investigation.

Chapter 1 – Review of the Literature

As the purpose and goals of higher education shifted over time in response to the needs and demands of the nation, the critical issue of what role, if any, the federal government should have in higher education remains the subject of debate and examination. Scholars from various disciplines that include economics, education, political science, and sociology have examined different aspects of the federal government's role in higher education, and consequently what impact their participation would have upon access, and for whom. While a general consensus remains that the end of World War II became a turning point in the history of higher education, much of this has been attributed to the availability and use of the federally-funded GI Bill of Rights education benefit. However, the literature that considers the contributions and impact World War II training programs had on institutions and the subsequent impact they had on higher education has been little explored. This chapter explores scholarly articles that consider the federal government's role in higher education, with particular emphasis on the GI Bill of Rights, the role of the military in higher education that includes a discussion of the development of the idea of the citizen-soldier and, concludes with an examination of the limited research on the Army Specialized Training Program and other wartime training programs.

According to Goldin and Katz, it was in the shadows of the Morrill Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890 and the Smith Hughes Act of 1917 that the shape of higher educa-

tion in America took place between 1890 and 1940.⁴ During this time, research universities flourished and public institutions emerged “as leaders in educational quality.”⁵ Public institutions became larger, private schools enrolled more students, professional schools started, and the number of denominational institutions declined as did small liberal arts colleges. Goldin and Katz, after analyzing the shifts in industrial organization and political economy, provide an explanation as to why the structure of higher education changed “so abruptly” between the 1890s and 1920s. They assert that higher education grew as a by-product of the growth of the application of science to industry, which became increasingly important. However, Barnard and Best argue that higher education, developed in the 1920s free of national pressures had, “in a negative sense, considerable effect on education.”⁶ Rather than responding to shifts in industrial organization and political economy, Barnard and Best assert that in the absence of national pressures, education developed more freely; this, they state, was especially evident in the area of educational theory where the philosophy of pragmatism became a forerunner of the field.

Due to a lack of national crisis, the period between World War I and World War II is generally considered to be a time of *laissez faire* by the government regarding the

⁴ Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, “The Shaping of Higher Education,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 13, no.1 (Winter, 1999): 37-62.

⁵ Goldin and Katz, “The Shaping of Higher Education,” 37.

⁶ Harry V. Barnard and John Hardin Best, “Public Education in the U.S., 1918-1945,” *Current History* 41, no. 239 (1961): 22-27.

course and trajectory of American higher education.⁷ Because the 1920s were a time of peace and prosperity, Barnard and Best argue that there were few national pressures to which education needed to respond. As a result, education developed in an experimental and theoretical fashion.⁸ With relatively minimal pressures in the 1920s, Barnard and Best assert that public education in the United States experienced a shock with the 1929 crash of the stock market. From the late 1920s until 1945, American higher education experienced a time of crisis, which required the federal government's involvement in American education for mutually beneficial reasons. The stress of World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II together spurred the spirit of nationalism and patriotism; this led to the creation of yet more federally-supported programs.

Christopher Loss, a public policy and higher education researcher, also argues that during the 1920s elite higher education administrators dramatically shifted their approach to managing their institutions. They began to reorganize their bureaucracies in an effort to know their students more intimately in order to better meet their students' needs. This reorganization combined educational with therapeutic practices, which decisively shaped the politics of higher education. Together, they "created an organizational structure that would prove remarkably adaptable to the personal and political demands of suc-

⁷ Barnard and Best, "Public Education in the U.S.," 22-27. Christopher Loss, *Between Citizens and the State: The Politics of American Higher Education in the 20th Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

⁸ Barnard and Best, "Public Education in the U.S.," 23.

cessive generations of students.”⁹ Yet despite the strides made by educational administrators to understand student perspectives, this did not bridge the gap in the relationship between government and higher education.

According to Loss, the function of the relationship between higher education and the New Deal in the 1930s helped to “build a new and more powerful state”; this challenged the idea that the institution of higher education was “inconsequential” to policymakers. Instead, Loss argues that it was through the connection with higher education that the government was able to connect citizens to their government. The New Deal accomplished this by relying on higher education to deliver three federal programs and services: agriculture adjustment and university extension, the national youth administration and federal work study, and the federal forum project. Together, these programs strengthened the New Deal’s state building, connected citizens to the state, and laid the foundation for future federal-academic research partnerships.

Questions and concerns about the future of American higher education also rose to the forefront of the minds of the nation’s educators and policymakers during discussions concerning the New Deal in the 1930s. Although these talks were halted due to World War II, the Office of Education remained concerned about the equal and democratic access of education. Once resuming discussions, George F. Zook, president of the American Council on Education (ACE), recognized that policymaking in higher education was critical because policies should reflect equality of opportunities, which “includ-

⁹ Loss, *Between Citizens and the State*, 20.

ed the issue of student access to higher education.”¹⁰ In 1947, Zook played an even bigger role in promoting higher education when he oversaw the President’s Commission on Higher Education, which aimed to establish equality in higher education; the commission eventually published a report that shaped the discourse of higher education in the postwar period, as we will see.

Despite the New Deal’s strides in building a stronger state, the momentum of the New Deal waned; many of its programs were brought to a close by 1943 as attention re-focused on the war effort. By 1942, government officials and veteran’s groups began to concern themselves with the end of the war and the return of millions of service members. In 1944, the GI Bill of Rights was adopted by Congress and implemented at the local level. The Bill provided eligible veterans of World War II opportunities to pursue their education; it also provided government backed loans to create businesses or purchase homes. Created with several goals in mind, the Bill was intended to delay veterans entrance into the workforce and sought not to derail the nation’s burgeoning economy by providing economic opportunities; it desired to avoid a repeat of events after World War I.¹¹

¹⁰ Philo Hutcheson, Marybeth Gasman, and Kijua Sanders-McCurty, “Race and Equality in the Academy: Rethinking Higher Education Actors and the Struggle for Equality in the Post-World War II Period,” *The Journal of Higher Education* 82, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 121-153.

¹¹ J.M. Stephen Peeps, “A B.A. for the G.I.... Why?,” *History of Education Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (Winter, 1984): 513-525. Veterans of WWI demands for payment of their service certificates climaxed in the Bonus March of 1932 when over 40,000 veterans of WWI and their supporters marched in Washington, D.C. The march ended when United States

In hindsight, the GI Bill is both lauded and criticized for its impact on access to higher education.¹² Lauded as “the law that changed America” by Milton Greenberg, the GI Bill of Rights was a federal government policy that provided financial aid directly to students. Unlike the Morrill Land Grant Acts and the Smith-Hughes Act, a vocationally oriented agricultural program created to meet local needs, the GI Bill had an indirect impact on higher education.

There is a clear debate within the literature that analyzes whether or not and to what extent the bill provided greater access to higher education or widened the already present gap of college going rates among races, ethnicities, and socioeconomic groups. Examining pre- and post-war college-going rates, some scholars argue that enrollments

troops attacked war veterans with tear gas, ultimately significantly damaging the Hoover administration’s election-year campaign.

¹² Examples of scholars that praise the Bill include: Michael J. Bennett, *When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1996); Edward Humes, *Over Here: How the G.I. Bill Transformed the American Dream* (Orlando; Harcourt Inc., 2006); Suzanne Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens: The Making of America’s Greatest Generation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Suzanne Mettler, “The Creation of the G.I. Bill of Rights of 1944: Melding Social and Participatory Citizenship Ideals,” *The Journal of Policy History* 17, (2005): 345-374; Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992). Critics of the Bill’s impact include: Hilary Herbold, “Never a Level Playing Field: Blacks and the GI Bill,” *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education* 6, (1994-1995): 104-108; David H. Onkst, “‘First a Negro...Incidentally a Veteran’: Black World War Two Veterans and the G.I. Bill of Rights in the Deep South, 1944-1948,” *Journal of Social History* 31, (1998): 517-543; Sarah Turner and John Bound, “Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the G.I. Bill and World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans,” *The Journal of Economic History* 63, no. 1 (2003): 145-177.

increased at an expected rate even accounting for wartime losses.¹³ Economist Marcus Stanley also found that many veterans who attained a college education would have done so with or without the GI Bill since the impact of the program was concentrated among the upper half of the distribution of socioeconomic status.¹⁴ This finding supports the assertion that the enrollment trends from the mid-1940s to the late 1950s are consistent with the prewar expected rate of enrollment. Yet, some scholars argue that the increase from under 1.5 million students to almost 2.7 million students is evidence that the GI Bill democratized higher education. Conversely, other scholars argue that the increase in college attendees, whether its increase was expected or not, did not have a democratizing effect. Instead, these scholars posit that local level control of the implementation process stifled the democratization process.¹⁵

Part of the democratizing effect of the GI Bill has been linked to the increase in enrollments in the postwar period. However, it is also important to highlight that while the GI Bill may have helped increase enrollments after the war, scholars do not include the effect of military trainees enrollments in wartime training programs such as the ASTP when analyzing the democratic effect of government's financial intervention on higher

¹³ John Bound and Sarah Turner, "Going to War and Going to College: Did World War II and the G.I. Bill Increase Educational Attainment for Returning Veterans?" *NBER Working Paper Series*, (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999): 784-815.

¹⁴ Bound and Turner, "Going to War and Going to College," 784-815; Marcus Stanley, "College Education and the Midcentury GI Bills," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, no. 2 (May 2003): 671-708.

¹⁵ Ira Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005); Onkst, "First a Negro"; Turner and Bound, "Closing the Gap".

education. For example, Goldin and Katz observe an enrollment increase from 1900 to 1940 of 529%; however, figures between 1940 and 1945 are not considered.¹⁶

While Goldin and Katz address enrollment growths prior to World War II, Leander Boykin argues that enrollment in higher education continued to increase even after veteran enrollments dropped off due to an increase in high school graduation rates.¹⁷ Boykin also recognizes the trend of increased enrollments even after veteran enrollments declined because education began to be recognized as a factor in social mobility. In addition he asserts, there was an increasing demand for education as a prerequisite for employment.

In considering the Bill's democratizing effects, it is also regarded as providing greater access to higher education because of its racially neutral language. Any soldier who fulfilled the requirements was technically eligible for the financial benefits offered by the GI Bill. In questioning why delegates of the Deep South supported a racially neutral or racially inclusive bill, political scientist Ira Katznelson argues that delegates of the Deep South supported the legislation because of an explicit caveat written into the Bill: "No department, agency, or officer of the United States, in carrying out the provisions of this part, shall exercise any supervision or control, whatsoever, over any State education-

¹⁶ Goldin and Katz, "The Shaping of Higher Education," 37-62.

¹⁷ Leander Boykin, "Trends in American Higher Education," *The Journal of Negro Education* 26, no. 2 (Spring, 1957): 193-199.

al agency, or State apprenticeship agency, or any educational or training institution.”¹⁸ This caveat effectively removed power from the federal government by allowing oversight of the Bill’s implementation to be conducted by veteran officials at the local level.

With limited federal oversight, the implementation of the Bill at the local level allowed local veterans officials to create administrative barriers for black veterans who sought access to their education benefits.¹⁹ As a result, Katznelson argues, Congressional officials of the Deep South supported the Bill knowing de jure racial segregation would continue. These implementation issues and administrative barriers thereby contributed to broadening the gap between whites and non-whites, especially in the South.²⁰ As historian David Onkst argues, the challenge for black veterans, especially those who resided in the South, was that they were “negroes” that happened to be veterans.²¹

As we have seen from the late 19th century up to the adoption of the GI Bill in 1944, the federal government’s role in the distribution of financial aid and financial support for higher education remained limited. Prior to the Bill, discussions about the federal government’s role in support of postsecondary education typically centered around whether, if at all, federal agencies should assist colleges and universities and how the

¹⁸ Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill), P.L. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (June 22, 1944).

¹⁹ Herbold, “Never a Level Playing Field”; Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action was White*; Onkst, “First a Negro”.

²⁰ Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action was White*.

²¹ Onkst, “First a Negro.”

government should involve itself with higher education.²² Part of this debate was grounded in Amendment X of the Bill of Rights, which states that those powers not specified in the Constitution, such as the support of education, were reserved for oversight by the state.

By the end of World War II, America's colleges and universities occupied a new role in society at the regional and national levels. Institutions of higher learning, once primarily attended by middle- and upper-class members of society and more narrowly focused on research, began to transform as a result of the implementation of various government programs and policies. According to the literature, no government policy was more instrumental in changing America's institutions and American's attitudes towards higher learning than the GI Bill of Rights. With an influx of both students and money, the Bill enabled institutions of higher learning to increase their physical capacity, develop their curriculum, and, most importantly, increase enrollments; this allowed thousands of working and middle-class Americans to complete a college degree. Soon a college education was recognized as the vehicle by which access to a middle-class lifestyle could be attained; consequently, America's colleges and universities became the location of the manifestation of the American dream.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, a new dialogue about the role of higher education began to occur. The conversation shifted as fears of communism were ignited as a

²² Philo Hutcheson, "The 1947 President's Commission on Higher Education and the National Rhetoric on Higher Education Policy," *History of Higher Education Annual 22*, (2002): 91-107.

result of the Sputnik crisis, which heightened the intensity of the Cold War.²³ The role of research in higher education, specifically research institutions, became increasingly important for the federal government as science research and the development of the sciences took center stage. This development can be seen in the establishment of the National Institute of Health and the founding of the National Science Foundation in 1950. Due to increased interest in national defense the government passed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958 to reinvigorate research funding. However, if we examine the relationship between higher education and the government that was strengthened during WWII through the implementation of military training programs, we can see signs of the development of this mutually beneficial relationship through the various research projects that were pursued during this time period.

As the emphasis on the importance of higher education increased, the government's role in education became the focal point of the rhetoric and discourse regarding access in the postwar era. This is most evident in the 1947 Truman Commission's *Higher Education for American Democracy* report. According to historian Philo Hutcheson, "no other report on U.S. higher education has spawned such enduring debate" than the Truman Commission's report.²⁴ Hutcheson states that the 1947 President's Commission established a national rhetoric on higher education that was relatively unified and compre-

²³ Philo Hutcheson and Ralph Kidder, "In the National Interest: The College and University in the United States in the Post-World War II Era," in *Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research*, eds. John C. Smart, Michael B. Paulsen (New York: Springer, 2011), 221-264; Urban, *More Than Science and Sputnik*.

²⁴ Philo Hutcheson, "The 1947 President's Commission," 91-107.

hensive. The report, unlike any of its federally sponsored predecessors, identified issues critical to “equal educational opportunity” in higher education, such as expanded access, increased institutional diversity (specifically in developing the community college’s role in educating the masses), and the federal government’s role in the financing of colleges and universities.²⁵ Importantly, the report explicitly defined the meaning of “equal educational opportunity,” proclaiming that higher education was for “all persons, to the maximum of their individual abilities and without regard to economic status, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry.”²⁶ Hutcheson also asserts that “the rhetoric of the report” is key to understanding higher education policy including debates about the mission, roles, and financing of higher education in the United States.²⁷

Hutcheson asserts that the commission used the concept of indirect financial support in the GI Bill of 1944 and extended the idea of support to all students based on their financial need as a way of promoting access. This is especially critical given that increased access and financial support are inextricably linked. We can see the development of the concept of financial support from the GI Bill to the Commission’s efforts and ultimately to the development of the Higher Education Act of 1965 when a federally supported financial aid system was implemented and awarded federal monies based on financial need. However, this framework does not incorporate the indirect impact that

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ *Higher Education for American Democracy: A Report of the President’s Commission on Higher* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947-1948).

²⁷ Hutcheson, “The 1947 President’s Commission on Higher Education,” 91-107.

WWII training programs, such as the Army Specialized Training Program, had on the development of the government's role in higher education and funding. Equally, these arguments do not take into consideration how institutions changed their policies and practices in order to meet wartime demands and the resulting indirect impact that these changes had on access in the postwar era.

Considered quite forward thinking for its time, the Commission's report both garnered opinions of support and created cause for concern through its assertions for the need for federal support and involvement in the nation's higher education system. As a result of the report, supportive and concerned discussion began at both the national and institutional level over the proposal that federal agencies support colleges and universities instead of students as in years past. However, the report failed to take into consideration the large amounts of money that was directly paid to institutions of higher education during World War II that supported the training and education for members of the armed forces.

Prior to the report, the government's role in higher education and its financial support had been both limited and sporadic; therefore, this was a significant change. The report identified specific issues that were critical to the development of higher education and argued that they were "both investments in and insurance for the democratic future of a free people."²⁸ These investments included expanding access, increasing institutional

²⁸ *Higher Education for American Democracy: A Report of the President's Commission on Higher* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947-1948).

diversity through the use of community colleges, and federal financing of colleges and universities. Taken together, these ideas were intended to provide greater equality of opportunity to Americans in regards to higher education. Those opposed to the recommendations of the report had several critiques. They were concerned about the balance between the public and private sectors of higher education, the reach of federal control in higher education, and the nation's capacity to handle a surge of new students should access be widened.²⁹

It was generally agreed upon that the nation's institutions needed financial support from the government, especially after the decline in veteran enrollments. However, the discourse about the government's role in higher education shifted from discussing what type and extent of power and authority the government should have over higher education to how government could best offer assistance. Despite the impact the report had on the nation's discourse regarding federal involvement in higher education, most of the report's recommendations would not be implemented until the early 1970s; the exception to this was the adoption of the NDEA, which passed in 1958. While the NDEA provided low interest loans to college students, the genesis of this act was primarily prompted by issues of national security as well as national economic and social welfare rather than democratic ideals.

The development of debate and discourse regarding higher education that was created by the report was significant and enduring. Prior to the military's direct involve-

²⁹ Hutcheson, "The 1947 President's Commission on Higher Education," 91-107.

ment in universities through programs like the ASTP, federal and military connections to higher education institutions had been limited. Notable exceptions include the Morrill Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890, as well as the Federal Vocational Educational Act of 1917. As historian Richard M. Abrams asserts, the establishment of the Morrill Land Grant Acts not only provided states land to build public institutions of higher education, which also established many Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), the acts also provided income to institutions, and, importantly, established the military's connection to higher education by requiring these institutions to provide military training.³⁰

Another effort made by the federal government to assist in the development of education was the Federal Vocational Education Act of 1917. On behalf of the federal government, the act, commonly referred to as the Smith Hughes Act, sought to assist in the development of agricultural and vocational education in order to help meet the local needs of the community.³¹ After only one year of operation, the appropriations to this program were increased from \$700,000 to \$2.4 million dollars. By the 1932-1933 academic year, funding increased to nearly \$10 million a year.³²

Despite this early connection between the federal government by way of the military and financial aid to higher education, the government's role in the financing of higher education remained obscured until after the ASTP was dissolved and the GI Bill was

³⁰ Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education," 15-28. Goldin and Katz, "The Shaping of Higher Education," 37-62. The Morrill Land Grant Acts required land-grant institutions to offer ROTC programs.

³¹ Loss, *Between Citizens and the State*.

³² *Ibid.*

introduced. Despite the fact that the connection between the military and higher education began with the Morrill Act in 1862, it was the GI Bill that popularized the military's connection to higher education; at this point, both the government and military became prominently entwined with universities.

However, the connection between the military and its citizens originates with the concept of the citizen-soldier during the colonial period. During this time period, the colonists created a militia in anticipation of conflict. Due to this constant anticipated threat, every able man was required to possess arms and train periodically for the militia. It was considered an honor to fulfill one's civic duty. The citizen-soldier was willing to fight if needed, but was not interested in a military career. Unlike the British Army, which highlighted class distinctions, the militiamen of the colonies served under officers who were neighbors, friends, and relatives. As threats of conflict began to subside, the militia's focus shifted to policing local problems and developed into more of a social institution.³³ Although the militia appeared to be a group of irregulars, they were perceived to be "more trustworthy, brave and effective in battle" than the professional British troops because a professional army was regarded with suspicion.³⁴

Despite the trepidation of a creating a professional army, the demands of the Revolutionary War led to the development of America's first professional army. As a result

³³ Peter Shapiro, "The Citizen Soldier," in *A History of National Service in America*, ed. Peter Shapiro (College Park: Center for Political Leadership and Participation, 1994).

³⁴ Lee S. Duemer, "The Fusion of Military Education and The Citizen-Soldier: Origins of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862," *American Educational History Journal* 33, no. 2 (2006): 7-15.

of this war, the need for a professional army was recognized. Thus began America's dual-army tradition where one army was a permanent, well-trained army while the other remained serviced by citizen-soldiers. Later, the idea of the citizen-soldier would include draftees and those in reserve units; however, the driving force behind any military program continued to be determined by manpower needs. Though the need for educated officers was apparent, the professional army did not last much beyond the Revolutionary War and "no provisions were made for military education of the officer corps."³⁵

While the Morrill Land Grant Act helped to establish land-grant institutions to promote education for citizens the military component of the Act was added in 1862, after the Civil War ensued. Scholars such as Abrams, often assert that the military component of the Act was an afterthought. However, Duemer argues that based on an historical evidence of a 100-year-old military education trend, the addition of a clause that required the inclusion of training in "military tactics" at land-grant institutions was not made in "an absence of mind." Historian Lee S. Duemer's detailed historical examination of the development of the Morrill Act reveals that the education component of the act was the result of a long-standing struggle between the need for military education and the tradition of the citizen-soldier.³⁶

Though the idea of the citizen-soldier became dormant after the Civil War, it was

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education," 15-28. For a detailed analysis of the development of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 see Lee S. Duemer's "The Fusion of Military Education and the Citizen-Soldier: Origins of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862."

revived on two different occasions: once in the years before World War I, and again during the years between World War I and World War II. The first time featured the idea for Universal Military Training (UMT). Universal Military Training was a program that required a year of training before a soldier was reverted to reserve status. Though UMT was considered by Congress, legislative action was never taken. The second idea centered around Citizen Military Camps. The camps would provide men with military training over the course of a summer. The men were volunteers and were mostly college students or well-to-do young professionals.³⁷ While the idea of UMT did not succeed, Congress did approve three significant acts that impacted the tradition of the citizen-soldier. First, the National Defense Act of 1916 created the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), which provided military training for male students while in college who were enrolled in land-grant institutions. Congress also passed the Selective Service Act of 1917 as America entered World War I. The act enabled the government to build an army through conscription. Men were required to register; substitutes or purchased exemptions were not allowed, unlike the ability to escape the draft during the Civil War.³⁸ Those who failed to register ran the risk of imprisonment. Based on the successes of the draft and conscription systems during World War I, the drafting of men in times of war would become a mainstay. After World War I, the idea of the citizen-soldier again faded and, more importantly, concepts of peacetime became “associated with disarmament rather than prepared-

³⁷ Shapiro, “The Citizen Soldier.”

³⁸ Ibid. A commutation fee allowed a draftee to avoid the army by paying \$300 or the draftee could purchase a substitute by offering a bounty at a market rate.

ness.”³⁹

By 1939, another war was on the horizon; in September of 1940, Congress passed the Selective Service and Training Act. This was the nation’s first peacetime draft legislation and it established Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) for Army enlisted men. For purposes of the draft, all men between the ages of 21 to 35 were required to register. From here, men were selected through a lottery process and then were certified by a local civilian draft board.⁴⁰ It was not until after the attack on Pearl Harbor that the United States entered World War II.⁴¹ At this time, Congress passed a wartime draft act in order to mobilize manpower. The Selective Service registered 36 million men; approximately 16.3 million were drafted and inducted into service.

As a result of the wartime draft, universities suffered; according to Shapiro, “[b]y the spring of 1942, the situation on college campuses was chaotic. Draft calls and enlistments were reducing college enrollments. Student deferments were given mainly to those in science and engineering courses, to the detriment of the liberal arts.”⁴² Beginning in 1942, in an effort to create a continuous flow of trained soldiers to meet the wartime manpower demands, the Army and Navy created college programs for the nation’s colleges and universities. The Army’s ASTP and the Navy’s V-12 program sent college-aged soldiers to programs across the nation in the sciences, engineering, medicine, lin-

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941.

⁴² Shapiro, “The Citizen Soldier.”

guistics, and area and language studies. Thus, the tradition of the citizen-soldier was redefined to that of citizen soldier-student.

While the relationship between higher education and the military began in 1862 with the Morrill Land Grant Act and the tradition of the citizen-soldier is rooted in the colonial period, it is only since the postwar era that the relationship between higher education and the military has become a prominent feature of American society. Though the GI Bill helped to popularize the image of the student-soldier, the tradition of the student-soldier developed out the need to build up the nation's army. Out of this demand the Army Specialized Training Program emerged. However, the literature that addresses the ASTP and other wartime training programs remains severely limited, unlike that of the GI Bill of Rights' impact on higher education.

Only a handful of scholars and some authors have contributed to the literature of the Army Specialized Training Program. Independent author Louis E. Keefer is, by far, the most prolific contributor to the literature. A former participant of the ASTP, his book *Scholars in Foxholes*, along with two non-peer reviewed articles is primarily a collection of memoirs from fellow participants.⁴³ While the first chapter and a half of his book provides a solid overview of the design of the program and a description of the selection

⁴³ Richard A. Eads, *A Study of the Army Specialized Training Program*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 1947; Louis E. Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes* (Reston: COTU Publishing, 1988); Louis E. Keefer, "Exceptional Young Americans: Soldiers and Sailors on College Campuses During World War II," *Prologue* 24, no. 4 (1992): 375; Louis E. Keefer, "On the Homefront in World War II: Solider-Scholars at West Virginia State College." *West Virginia History* 53 (1994): 119-132.

process for both soldiers and institutions, the information that remains consists mostly of anecdotal evidence. While this information is helpful in learning about the day-to-day experiences of trainees in the ASTP, the book and articles lack a critical analysis about the program's purpose and impact. Similarly, Richard Eads' dissertation about the ASTP is a purely descriptive endeavor. While Eads provides a solid overview of the program, his dissertation does not consider the students' experience or that of the institutions. In addition, his dissertation was written in 1947, shortly after the program ended and becomes weighed down by the intricacies of the various areas' curricular offerings.

On the other hand, the use of higher education for military training purposes did produce a great deal of discussion among educators. For example, members of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) used their bulletins to express their opinions of how the government and military used higher education in preparing for war.⁴⁴ Oftentimes, these opinions were presented as letters to the editor or an open letter to the members of the association. While much of this communication was an expression of frustration, these organizational outlets were used to communicate current and pertinent information to its membership. Other publications include those produced by the Army and scholars from various fields, which also provided detailed information about

⁴⁴ Examples of such communications include: Ralph E. Himstead, "Higher Education and the War," *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* 29, no. 5 (December, 1943): 712-713.

the ASTP, the selection process of personnel and their training.⁴⁵ As the ASTP progressed and the Army Specialized Training Program Reserve (ASTPR) was implemented, information about requirements and processes shifted to this new program.⁴⁶

Similar to the AAUP's publication, other professional organizations also used their association's publication as a way to share and communicate opinions and thoughts with colleagues. This was particularly the case with language associations who had many strong opinions about the ASTP's pedagogy for foreign language instruction.⁴⁷ Some used the opportunity to champion the ASTP for bringing attention to the need for increased foreign language instruction. Bruno Lasker, for example, remained particularly concerned about the sudden demise of the ASTP and what it would mean for foreign language instruction, its students and its faculty.⁴⁸ Other language reports focused on providing their readers with an overview of foreign language instruction and what could be

⁴⁵ "Personnel Research in the Army: V. The Army Specialized Training Program," Staff, Personnel Research Section, Classification and Replacement Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, n.d.; Robert A. Davis, "Testing in the Army and Navy," *The Psychological Bulletin*, n.d.; "Testing as a Part of Military Classification," *Social Science* 97, no. 2526 (May, 1943): 473-478; Malcolm M. Wiley, "The College Training Programs of the Armed Services," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 231, (January, 1944): 14-28.

⁴⁶ John R. Craf, "The Facts about the A.S.T.P. Reserve," *The Clearing House* 18, no. 7 (March, 1944): 402-404.

⁴⁷ Henri C. Olinger, "Editorials," *The Modern Language Journal* 31, no. 1 (January, 1947): 49.

⁴⁸ Bruno Lasker, "Three Problems, One Opportunity," *Far Eastern Survey* 13, no. 6 (March 22, 1944): 52-54.

learned under the Army's program.⁴⁹

In other ways, journals such as *The Journal of Higher Education* and the *Journal of Educational Sociology* became vehicles for a repository of information regarding the Army's program. Many of these scholarly publications published articles that provided an overview of the program's requirements, essential facts, information about processes such as deferments, and updates about new aspects of the program. While all of this information was worthwhile and pertinent, it was all written at the time that the ASTP was in place and is not based on empirical research and offers no historical perspective.

Conversely, *The Journal of Negro Education* published an entire issue that discussed educational opportunities, or lack thereof, for black citizens through the various war training programs. An excellent example of this is James C. Evans' article, which provides a thoughtful overview of educational opportunities for blacks. Based on his review of various wartime training programs, opportunities for education were limited for blacks; first and foremost, this was because the military was segregated, which severely limited opportunities for blacks. In cases where black units did exist, many men did not meet the admissions requirements due to educational deficiencies. Those who did not

⁴⁹ Herbert Schueler, "Foreign Language Teaching under the Army Specialized Training Program," *The German Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (November, 1944): 183- 191; A.E. Sokol, "The Army Language Program," *The Journal of Higher Education* 17, no. 1 (January, 1946): 9-16; Barry L. Velleman, "The "'Scientific Linguist' Goes to War: The United States A.S.T. Program in Foreign Languages," *Historiographia Linguistica* XXXV, no. 3 (2008): 385-416.

qualify were sent to special training units where their time was spent in remediation.⁵⁰

According to Evans, the ASTP and the Navy's V-12 program admitted men who were at the "other end of the [educational] scale" since these programs operated with the highest prerequisites for admission.⁵¹ Out of the more than 220 institutions selected for participation with the ASTP, only 6 Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) had units for a total of 1,405 trainees out of approximately 140,000 trainees.⁵²

In addition to the aforementioned studies and publications that focus on various aspects of the ASTP's impact on higher education, only a handful of other studies also consider the impact of other wartime training programs.⁵³ The most comprehensive review of these programs was written by V.R. Cardozier in 1993.⁵⁴ In his book, *Colleges*

⁵⁰ For more information about special training units, see: Paul Witty, "What the War has Taught us About Adult Education," *The Journal of Negro Education* 14, no. 3 (Summer, 1945): 293-298.

⁵¹ James C. Evans, "Adult Education for Negroes in the Armed Forces," *The Journal of Negro Education* 14, no. 3 (Summer, 1945): 437-442.

⁵² Keefer, "On the Homefront." All black ASTP units were hosted at Howard University, Prairie View A&M State College, Meharry Medical College, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College, West Virginia State College and West Virginia University.

⁵³ Other military programs include the Navy College Training Program (known as the V-12 program), Army Air Force College Training Program, Signal Corps, Transportation Corps, military administration courses, Special Services Division, Quartermaster Corps, Corps of Engineers, Army Medical Corps, Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), Women's Reserve of the United States Coast Guard Reserve (known as SPARS for the Coast Guard motto *Semper Paratus* – "always ready"), Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), among others. A variety of civilian-based training programs such as the Engineering, Science, Management War Training program, United States Armed Force Institute (USAFI) and many industry-based programs that partnered with institutions of higher education.

⁵⁴ V.R. Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993).

and Universities in World War II, Cardozier provides an excellent descriptive overview of the many military and industrially-based training programs. He offers insight into the programs' purposes, goals, problems and outcomes. Beyond his description of these programs, he also provides a general overview of the impact of these programs on higher education without emphasizing one program over another.

Using a similar method, Clarence L. Mohr also provides a general overview of some of these programs as well. However, Mohr is primarily interested in the impact these programs had on Southern learning institutions. In considering the impact that the war and these programs had on educational opportunities for blacks in the South, Mohr asserts that the programs were "important less for their direct accomplishments than for the precedents they established."⁵⁵ He argues that their presence, however temporary, altered areas of research and graduate training, access to higher education and even gender relations, both during the war and for future educational patterns. The effect of these programs, including the GI Bill he asserts, was particularly significant because they helped bring Southern institutions into the national mainstream, thereby providing new opportunities for Southern blacks.

While the topics, information and concerns that have been shared through the literature are broad in scope, the majority of the works lack empirical evidence, distance from the actual events and are often purely descriptive endeavors. Articles and books that

⁵⁵ Clarence L. Mohr, "World War II and the Transformation of Southern Higher Education," in *Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South*, ed. Neil R. McMillen (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1997), 33-55.

have contributed to our understanding of the ASTP and other military and defense training programs that have been written in retrospect still do not offer insight into the impact of the program on higher education. The literature needs to be developed in order to gain a better understanding of how these wartime programs impacted higher education. This will allow for a deeper understanding of the relationship between the military and higher education and the government and higher education. In turn, we stand to learn in what ways higher education began to change before the GI Bill came into existence.

Over the past seventy years, scholars from various fields have examined issues in higher education in an effort to understand the role of the federal government and the military in higher education and in what ways access impacted institutions of higher education and its students. While it is commonly asserted that the GI Bill broadened access to higher education in the postwar era, it is clear that enrollments in higher education increased significantly both prior to and after the availability of the GI Bill. In tracing the development of the citizen-soldier to the citizen student-soldier, we see how the military's relationship with higher education has shifted over time based on the needs of the nation. The limited literature on the ASTP leaves many gaps. This dissertation seeks to fill in some of these gaps, and increase our understanding of a critical moment in the development of the institution of higher education in America.

The chapter that follows provides an overview of the context for the time period between the early twentieth century to 1965. The chapter considers information relevant to higher education's status in relation to the military and government in order to contex-

tualize the development of the ASTP. The chapter seeks to provide the context for understanding the significance of the ASTP as part of our larger understanding in the history of both the military and the federal government's relationship to higher education.

Chapter 2 - Context

By 1965, the nation's colleges and universities had grown by leaps and bounds no one could have predicted earlier in the century. Set against a backdrop of two world wars, a great economic depression, and the nation's largest fight for civil rights, higher education had become embedded into the nation's social, political, and economic fabric. By midcentury, higher education had also solidified its role in national service and research. Higher education became more involved and responsive to the nation's needs and Americans began to place greater emphasis on the purpose and value of postsecondary education. As more students began to enroll, many institutions were forced to keep pace by increasing their physical capacity, hiring more faculty, and expanding their curriculum to meet the demands of increased enrollment. As access to higher education broadened, the notion that higher education provided an avenue for socioeconomic mobility further enhanced its reputation.

While the relationship between the federal government and higher education strengthened and expanded through New Deal programs, the military programs that became a part of the student campus life, such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), also helped slowly diversify the student body. Having a military presence on campus also expanded curricular offerings due to the need to add or incorporate military prescribed curriculum. This chapter provides an overview of the context of higher education from the early twentieth century through the postwar period. I begin with an overview of the state of higher education and access in the early 1900s to World War II. Next,

the development of the ASTP is reviewed in order to contextualize its significance over time. I conclude this chapter with an examination of higher education's relationship with the military in the postwar era, which was strengthened by programs such as the ASTP.

During the early twentieth century, the institution of higher education underwent considerable changes in its position in the nation's social fabric. Early in the nation's history, higher education was regarded as an elite and restrictive institution. However, the appearance of land-grant colleges and universities along with the development of the junior college made higher education one of the primary institutions that helped advance America's position as a leading nation and served as a vehicle for socioeconomic mobility. According to historian John Thelin, the idea of going to college began to gain popularity at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.⁵⁶

For the majority of Americans in the mid- to late-1800s, a college education was not financially accessible nor was it necessary for future employment. Those who believed that an undergraduate education was both valuable and necessary came primarily from white, wealthy families. They enrolled their sons as a means to expand their social contacts and further develop their prestige. The curriculum sought to refine the students' sensibilities, which included courses in Greek, Latin and oration.⁵⁷

Despite the fact that higher education was not readily accessible to the majority of

⁵⁶ John R. Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).

⁵⁷ Helen L. Horowitz, *Campus Life: Undergraduate Cultures from the End of the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).

Americans, the idea that going to college could provide a path for socioeconomic mobility was nascent. At the turn of the century, interest in higher education continued to develop as the public became fascinated with the collegiate lifestyle that was beginning to emerge between 1890 and 1910. For aspiring families, going to college and earning a degree became “a way for a nouveau riche family to gain social standing.”⁵⁸ Together, these ambitions made going to college both fashionable and prestigious; in turn, this increased enrollments, thereby rescuing many colleges from financial demise due to their low number of enrolled students.

As institutions began to increase their student bodies, the larger, more prestigious institutions, such as those created by the Morrill Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890, began to exhibit similar characteristics that would eventually lead to the development of the nation’s great modern universities.⁵⁹ Additionally, both public and private institutions engaged in basic disinterested research which added to the development of their prestige.⁶⁰ These “great” institutions set the standard for institutional best practices, including how the institution functioned as an enterprise, what it provided and produced in terms of

⁵⁸ Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*, 155.

⁵⁹ The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 helped states to establish affordable, public higher education and taught courses in agriculture, home economics, mechanical arts, and other practical arts relevant to the time period. The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1890 replenished federal funding for the land-grant program and also helped to fund black colleges in the South which were previously excluded.

⁶⁰ Roger L. Geiger, “After the Emergence: Voluntary Support and the Building of American Research Universities,” *History of Education Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Autumn, 1985): 369-381.

its faculty, administration, student body, curriculum, and even a campus' architecture.⁶¹

As these facets of institutional life began to respond to the needs of society, higher education became a necessary and important component of life in America. Higher education began to develop its relationship with government and the American public began to understand the purpose and goals of higher education more broadly.

Due to the fact that a college education remained financially out of reach for most families in the early twentieth century, higher education was not a place for the masses. Families that could afford to send a child to college were often white middle-class families that would send one son who demonstrated the most potential for academic success with the intent of meeting other white males of similar stature to develop their prestige. Oftentimes women and minorities (both racial and ethnic minorities) were restricted from attending colleges and universities due in part to their location and their heritage. This remained especially true in New England as both religion-based quotas and racial segregation were standard both in the North and in the South. For women, enrollment was often limited to earning teaching credentials whereas ministry studies were a viable option for blacks who resided in the South.⁶²

⁶¹ Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*, 127. Thelin borrows the term "great" from Edwin Slosson's 1910 anthology, *Great American Universities*, which identifies 14 "great" universities and their characteristics, however there was regional bias. He did not consider development at Southern institutions.

⁶² Barbara Solomon, *In the Company of Educated Women: A History of Women and Higher Education in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Clarence L. Mohr, "World War II and the Transformation of Southern Higher Education," in *Remak-*

Despite these limited enrollment options, enrollments in higher education increased between the early 1900s and the early 1940s as the perceived need and value of an education began to grow. The notion of the “collegiate ideal” of the early 1900s continued to develop; as more students enrolled in college, the academic culture began to change throughout the early 1900s to the 1920s. Colleges began to add courses in business and math and regarded these courses as a springboard for future success. By 1919, 15 percent of Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty attended college, an increase of more than 10 percent from 1917. As campuses began to transform their institutions both by their physical appearance and their curriculum, higher education became more readily accessible to the larger public.

Between World War I and World War II, enrollments increased significantly from 250,000 to 1.3 million students.⁶³ Students also had more enrollment options. New types of institutions began to develop: the development of technical institutes and the two-year junior college were especially important during this time period. The presence of new women’s colleges helped women account for about 40 percent of student enrollment between World War I and World War II. The idea of going to college was becoming embedded into America’s “culture of aspiration,” yet despite this shift in perspective and increased enrollment opportunities, options for advanced study for women remained limited and blacks continued to face challenges in access, which created an even larger gap

ing Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South, ed. Neil R. McMillen (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1997), 33-55.

⁶³ Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*, 205.

between white and black educational attainment levels.⁶⁴

By the time the United States became involved in World War II, a positive relationship between the federal government and higher education had begun to develop due to a variety of reasons. One way that this relationship developed was through federally sponsored research. World War I stimulated a research economy; an economy where both the federal government and private industry began to fund university research with regularity. Through this partnership, the 1920s saw a proliferation of industrially sponsored research; however, World War II motivated the federal government to sponsor research at universities rather than to induct scientists into the services and then station them at federal labs as it had done during World War I.⁶⁵ The success of this partnership carried over in the postwar period which witnessed continued growth in the research economy.⁶⁶ This partnership helped to establish the utility of higher education while it provided opportunities for faculty to engage in research thereby increasing an institution's prestige.

During WWII, the relationship between the military and higher education and the government and higher education continued to be strengthened by a variety of wartime training programs. Programs such as the government sponsored Engineering Defense Training (EDT) program, established in October 1940, and the military's ASTP and the

⁶⁴ Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*.

⁶⁵ Roger L. Geiger, "Milking the Sacred Cow: Research and the Quest for Useful Knowledge in the American University Since 1920," *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 13, no. 3/4 (Summer-Autumn, 1988): 332-348; Roger L. Geiger, "Organized Research Units: Their Role in the Development of University Research," *The Journal of Higher Education* 61, no. 1 (1990): 1-19.

⁶⁶ Geiger, "Milking the Sacred Cow," 338.

Navy's V-12 programs created in December 1942, were among the largest programs created to aid the war effort.⁶⁷ Similar to the Student Army Training Corps (SATC) of World War I, these programs were also housed on college and university campuses and provided training for workers and soldiers for tasks within the Armed Forces and war related industries. In addition to providing a space to educate and train military trainees, the institutions financially benefited from the program because the military compensated them on a per capita basis. During this financially difficult time, these programs proved to be critical to an institution's viability.

By the time the war ended on September 2, 1945, higher education in America was a shell of its former self. Although enrollments dropped during the war due to the military draft, higher education had developed from a relatively small, obscure, and separatist institution understood and used by an elitist few, to a place where increasingly diverse ideals and individuals began to mingle. The development of junior colleges through local initiatives "provided affordable, geographically accessible college studies."⁶⁸ As with most institutions during WWII, higher education was judged by its utility and its ability to respond to the nation's needs was realized.⁶⁹ Much of this can be attributed to

⁶⁷ The Engineering Defense Training program became the Engineering, Science and Management Defense Training program and was then renamed the Engineering, Science, Management War Training (ESMWT) program. This program was operated by the Office of Education from October 1940 through June 1945.

⁶⁸ Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*, 250.

⁶⁹ Robert M. Hutchins, "The Outlook for Education," *The Phi Delta Kappan* 26, no. 1 (September, 1943): 3-8.

the impact that programs such as the ASTP, among other factors, had on higher education.

As WWII progressed, Americans differed in their opinion whether or not the United States should be involved in the war. During the 1920s and 1930s, the United States maintained a small army and held an isolationist perspective. This perspective was still quite prevalent prior to America's entrance into the war. This is evidenced by a poll taken in fall 1940 where only 10 percent of American's supported participation in the war.⁷⁰ Opinions were sharply divided between isolationists who believed America should stay out of the war, and interventionists, who believed the United States should participate.

From a logistical perspective, several factors proved problematic for the Army, which gave pause to the United States' participation in the war. Of concern was the size of the army, which needed more soldiers. Due to the nation's isolationist perspective, only a small army had been maintained. Unlike WWI, emphasis for the Second World War was placed on air strategies versus land strategies. This created a need for trained technical specialists. Next was the issue of training. The Army's program was not equipped to provide the necessary types of extensive training or background courses that were required to produce military engineers and officers.⁷¹ In addition, war production efforts needed to be increased.

⁷⁰ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 2.

⁷¹ The Adjutant General's Office, "Personnel Research in the Army," n.d.

Several issues impeded the development of America's Army. First was the misconception that there was a limitless supply of men. There was a pool of men; however, the need exceeded the supply. As the size of the army increased, the manpower shortage became more acute. Another issue related to deferment. Men who were enrolled in college courses considered relevant to war needs were offered deferment. Likewise, men whose jobs related to war production were also offered deferment since their roles were considered relevant to war's needs. Also problematic was the enlistment age, which was 20 years old. This was an issue for higher education, the military, and for young men who had not yet reached 20 years of age. These young men graduated from high school around the age of 18 and either went to work or enrolled in college for two years. However, during this two year time span, they were unable to advance their futures because after two years they would enlist. Both the military and higher education became concerned about what to do for these men during this two year time gap. These issues and concerns stayed ever present as educators began to consider how higher education might contribute to the war effort.⁷²

As America prepared for battle, the American Council on Education (ACE) became the spokesperson for higher education during World War II. The leadership role absorbed by the ACE was logical since the organization represented all institutions of higher learning, regardless of differences in institutional type. Beginning in June 1940 and continuing through January 1942 the ACE convened a series of meetings between

⁷² Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*.

educators and government officials. The purpose of these meetings was to determine how the nation's colleges and universities could be used to support the war effort.

On August 5, 1940, the American Council on Education and the National Education Association (NEA) convened a meeting that included representatives from 55 educational organizations to discuss national defense and education's role in it. The major outcome of this meeting was the creation of the National Committee on Education and Defense.⁷³ This committee was co-chaired by George F. Zook, president of the ACE, and William E. Givens, secretary of the NEA. In February 1941, the ACE convened another meeting to consider how higher education might organize for the purpose of supporting national defense. At this meeting, 500 people from 370 colleges represented 40 states along with government officials. Here, higher education officials reminded the government of higher education's facilities and willingness to cooperate and aid national defense to the best of their ability.⁷⁴ Another much smaller meeting was held at the end of July 1941. This time, higher education officials increased their efforts in order to secure from the government a better understanding of the roles that higher education might play to support the war.⁷⁵

At the end of January 1942, another meeting was held. At the end of this meeting, educational delegates pledged the support and strength of the nation's colleges and universities for the war effort. In turn, the federal government was to conduct a study of how

⁷³ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*.

⁷⁴ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 5.

⁷⁵ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 6.

institutions could be used. At this meeting, the National Committee on Education and Defense and the United States Office of Education created a 16-point plan to help colleges prepare for a period of war. Some of the points from this plan included the adoption of accelerated courses, that federal financial aid be provided to institutions during wartime, along with the recommendation to award college credits for military service for veterans. They also urged government “to develop an overall policy regarding the use of colleges during wartime.”⁷⁶ Unfortunately, according to Keefer, neither the military nor the government was ready to address that concern for another six months.

College administrators began to speak out; they were concerned about reducing enrollments which in turn would lead to financial strains. After the draft age was lowered from 20 to 18 in November 1942, this concern became more serious. Some of the recommendations from educators regarding the use of higher education facilities came from James B. Conant who recommended “the wholesale use of the nation’s colleges to train new Army and Navy officers.”⁷⁷ William O. Hotchkiss, president of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute recommended the development of a training corps where men would be sent to college for short, full-time courses without pursuing a college degree. He argued against the completion of a college degree because it would take too much time. He supported Conant’s idea, but believed it would be too time-consuming: America needed trained engineers as quickly as possible. By creating short, full-time courses, training

⁷⁶ Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes*, 4.

⁷⁷ Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes*, 5.

would be focused and immediate, allowing soldiers to enter in the field sooner. Ultimately, these ideas created the framework for the ASTP and V-12 programs.

In order to coordinate manpower for military, industrial and civilian uses, on April 18, 1942, President Roosevelt established the War Manpower Commission (WMC) by executive order. Under the direction of the WMC, in April 1942, the Army created the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) which allowed men under the age of 20 to commit to the Army (air force, ground or service). These men were allowed to remain on inactive duty through graduation at college provided they had good grades and passed their exams to enter their sophomore year. This was similar to the Navy's V-1 and V-7 programs, which were for freshman and sophomores and, then juniors and seniors respectively. However, in August 1942, the language of the contract was changed to active duty reserves due to "unforeseen circumstances" and the reservists were drafted once they reached draft age.

Later, changes to active status in various Army programs would create much confusion for students and administrators. Administrators never had assurance that students would or would not be activated despite previous guarantees. Similarly, draft-age students were unsure if they should enroll in courses for the following term because they did not know if they would be drafted. As was usually the case, students on reserve status were generally allowed to complete their current term rather than being removed prior to the end of the term. However, not knowing when men would be drafted made planning course schedules and hiring faculty challenging. These changes also increased levels of concern for higher education because it impacted enrollment, thus revenue.

According to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, as the need for men increased it became increasingly difficult to justify the deferment of college students. Those younger than 20 continued to enroll in the Enlisted Reserve Corps; then, in November 1942, Congress lowered the draft age to 18 and then the Army subsequently called these men to active duty. This prompted criticism from administrators because the decisions appeared to be shortsighted as the administrators had anticipated a “feeder” relationship between the Army and higher education. Between the lowered draft age, the potential loss of revenue and the possible implications of both issues, the higher education community was prompted to re-strategize possible plans for higher education’s relationship with the military. Educators realized they would have to accept any program to keep students enrolled.

In the meantime, as Congress continued to draft 18 year olds, colleges continued to predict financial disaster. However, surprisingly, campuses were not as financially strained as anticipated. This was due to military and national defense training programs that were for vocational technology training such as the Engineering, Science, Management and War Training program (ESMWT) and the ROTC which remained in place. However, this did not apply to all institutions. For example, St. Louis University in St. Louis, Missouri, had to close its law school due to low enrollments and the inability to fund the program for those who remained. Other institutions had to close their doors altogether, while others closed their doors for the duration of the war.⁷⁸

In response to these concerns, the ACE established a committee to create recom-

⁷⁸ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 211-215.

mendations for the War Manpower Commission. The “Committee on the Relationship of Higher Education to the Federal Government” was formalized and chaired by Edmund E. Day of Cornell University. In mid-October 1942, this committee recommended a college training corps for technical training for the Armed Forces. President Franklin D. Roosevelt received this proposal and “immediately urged” war secretaries Henry L. Stimson and William F. Knox, of the Army and Navy respectively, to consider the recommendation. Based on President Roosevelt’s recommendation to consider the proposal, the concepts of the ASTP and the V-12 programs were developed. Some Army officials objected to sending men to college on the basis that the forces were already short-staffed as more men were needed in the field to fight. Lieutenant Lesley J. McNair for example, was a strong opponent of these educational programs; he did not think a college education would improve a soldier’s ability to fight.⁷⁹ Despite these objections, on December 12, 1942, the ASTP and the Navy’s V-12 programs were announced by the Joint Statement of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on the Utilization of College Facilities in Specialized Training for the Army and Navy.

Prior to entering World War II, America’s place in the world was uncertain. The Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s left behind a nation that struggled economically. Minimal jobs were available, many families struggled financially, and the disparity between classes became more evident as time progressed. The decision to enter WWII created a thriving wartime economy, yet many feared it would collapse as the na-

⁷⁹ Ibid, 41.

tion transitioned to a postwar economy. Despite fears of a postwar recession, due to the reduction of war-related production, the return of thousands of veterans and limited job opportunities, postwar planning efforts, which included the development and adoption of the GI Bill of Rights in 1944, proved to be wildly successful and helped America successfully transition to a peacetime economy and prepare for the Cold War.⁸⁰

After World War II, higher education came to be regarded as a primary vehicle for social mobility, thus forcing Americans to think more deeply about the purpose of higher education and who should attend. In order to accommodate the flow of veteran students, many campuses began to expand their physical space, increase their course offerings, and broaden their curriculum. During the period between 1940 and 1965, large scale national and international events impacted higher education. Of these events, the GI Bill of Rights had the greatest impact on the nation's colleges and universities when considering the financial and enrollment implications on the institutions themselves.

With the impending return of thousands of veterans and limited job opportunities, the GI Bill provided multiple benefit options and simultaneously delayed the entrance of tens of thousands, if not millions, of veterans into the job market by providing them with a financially generous education benefits package. A soldier had to have served 90 days or more and have been discharged or released "under conditions other than dishonorable"

⁸⁰ Bennett, *When Dreams Came True*; Humes, *Over Here*.

to qualify to receive the Bill's benefits.⁸¹ Veterans who met these requirements were entitled to federal aid for the purposes of pursuing an education, loans for the purchase of homes and businesses, and unemployment payments of \$20 a week for up to one year. More specifically, Title II of the Bill, the education benefit, provided veterans with a year of federal financial aid and an additional day of schooling for each additional day of service for up to a total of 48 months. Under these conditions, veterans who gained admission to a postsecondary institution were eligible to receive up to a maximum of \$500 for tuition, fees, and books.⁸² In addition, a monthly stipend provided for both single and married veterans \$75 and \$105 respectively.

By 1947, it became apparent that Americans were interested and concerned about a college education. Much of this concern was due to the overwhelmingly high usage rates of the Bill's education benefit. In the fall of 1945, 88,000 veterans had applied to use their education benefits; by 1948, more than 1 million veterans had enrolled in higher education. By the time the Bill's benefits expired in 1956, approximately 7.8 million out of 16 million veterans utilized the Bill's education benefit; of the 7.8 million veterans, approximately 2.2 million used the education benefit to pursue a 4-year degree or higher.

Although the Bill was anticipated to be only mildly successful, the GI Bill impacted institutions of higher learning and the American public in several significant ways.

⁸¹ Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens*; Olson, *The G.I. Bill*; Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*.

⁸² *Idem*. Postsecondary education was defined as any public and private 2- and 4-year institutions, including but not limited to proprietary, independent and vocational programs.

With the deluge of veterans applying and enrolling in the nation's colleges and universities, the Bill simultaneously provided institutions of higher education with new and returning students, and new sources of revenue to develop their faculties, physical space, and curriculum. This growth in higher education also highlighted the disparity between institutions and access. In 1947 President Harry S. Truman's Commission on Higher Education published a report that formally articulated the concept of broadening access and affordability of higher education by asking how the federal government could financially assist colleges and universities.⁸³ Though these ideas did not become more solidified until the passage of the Higher Education Act in 1965, the publication of the report created national objectives for higher education and created a framework to discuss the role of higher education in the United States. By the end of the 1940s, government's concern about transitioning to a peacetime economy had been assuaged and higher education ascended to national prominence as both the vehicle for social mobility and as an integral partner in government's research efforts.

One of the lasting impressions created by the success of the Bill is the link between military service and education. Evidence for this assertion is found in how the Bill shifted how Americans thought about higher education, including ideas about who should enroll and what benefits could be derived from a college education. The romantic image

⁸³ U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. "The GI Bill's History." Accessed February 16, 2011. http://www.gibill.va.gov/benefits/history_timeline/index.html; Hutcheson and Kidder, "In the National Interest"; Clark, "The Two Joes Meet," 165-189; Humes, *Over Here*; Robert Serow, "Policy as a Symbol," 481-499; Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*.

of GI Joe as “Everyman” and the development of the postwar idea that “Everyman” had the opportunity for social mobility was created and reinforced when GI Joe returned as “Joe Veteran” and then transitioned to “Joe College.”⁸⁴ Because the image of thousands of veterans storming college and university campuses permeated news and media outlets, “Joe College” became the symbolic representation of the average American. From this perspective, the GI Bill changed how the public thought about higher education. However, it is critical to note that this image was largely a representation of white males, thereby undermining the certainty of a democratized system of higher education. Despite the limitations of the image of the average American, the symbolic value of the Bill is that it operated as a function of the government’s attention to individualism and inclusiveness by providing a variety of financial benefits to all veterans who qualified for benefits regardless of race.⁸⁵

Ultimately, the Bill is credited with launching America’s postwar period of growth and expansion; it solidified the significance and importance of higher education in a new world order. Americans increased the value they placed on going to college as well as the relationship of higher education as a gateway to upward mobility. The realization that higher education provided an avenue to greater social mobility, financial security, and participation in the American dream placed pressure on politicians and institutions of higher learning to reconsider issues of access in the postwar era.

⁸⁴ Serow, “Policy as a Symbol,” 481-499.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

From the early 1900s to the mid-twentieth century, the role of higher education in America grew exponentially. Initially accessed by sons of elite families, by 1950 higher education was hitting its stride. At the end of World War II, America began to shift in important ways and the institutions of higher education were no exception. Enrollments increased, campuses expanded, changes in curriculum were made according to industry demands, faculty expertise was readily sought by the government, and the connection between higher education, government, and its citizens was never stronger. The GI Bill not only provided funding for veterans to pursue higher education, and it also indirectly provided colleges and universities with unprecedented levels of federal funds. The remarkable effect of the GI Bill was to identify the importance of access to higher education and who should be able to access it; this question is still pondered today.

As higher education gained relevance and importance, it embedded itself in American culture and society. Ideas about going to college, collegiate life, and the benefits of a college degree became substantive. For the majority of Americans, opportunities to enroll expanded and the importance of relevant and necessary curriculum became paramount. While opportunities for enrollment by women and racial and ethnic minorities were not available in equal measure to that of white males, the fight to broaden access to higher education was percolating, especially in the South. Once World War II ended, the issues of access and equality of access in higher education quickly surfaced as the social, political, and economic ramifications of disparity became clearer as America began to redefine its role on a global scale.

As we will see in the next chapter, the development of wartime training programs had a significant effect on higher education. This effect was felt across campus communities as institutions struggled to meet the demands of the war effort. The chapter that follows provides an overview of the intricacies of the Army Specialized Training Program. Through an examination of the components of the ASTP, it is possible to understand the policies and processes of the program while highlighting the ways in which higher education needed to respond to the military's requests.

Chapter 3 - The Army Specialized Training Program in Review

In November 1942, the one thousand attendees at the 56th annual convention of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools received reassuring news when the United States Army and Navy's "long awaited college training programs were announced."⁸⁶ The representatives for both the Army and Navy announced that they would utilize the facilities available at the nation's campuses to "maintain a steady flow of young men suitable for specialized educational training."⁸⁷ In addition, the plan would enable the Army to select qualified young men "on a broad democratic basis, without regard to financial resources."⁸⁸ The news proved a welcomed relief for educators who faced reduced enrollments, a lowered draft age, and increasing financial strains. Concerned educators were unsure how the war would continue to impact higher education; thus, the possibility of hosting one of the programs meant an opportunity to assist in the war effort, and, equally important, participation came with financial subsidies from the military on a per capita basis that would help sustain many institutions throughout the war.

Although America's participation in World War II was publicly supported, America's entrance into the war was not without hesitation. However, the Japanese attack on

⁸⁶ Keefer. *Scholars in Foxholes*.

⁸⁷ "Army and Navy Plans for Training Service Men in the Colleges," *New York Times*, December 18, 1942, p. 23.

⁸⁸ "Army and Navy Plans for Training Service Men in the Colleges," *New York Times*, December 18, 1942; "Army and Navy Use Of Schools Lauded," *New York Times*, February 15, 1943, p. 15.

Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, made participation unavoidable. As a result of this act of war America entered WWII and began the process of re-building a depleted military force. The military recognized that warfare had evolved since World War I; it had become more technical and required college trained specialists. Out of the need to train young men to win an increasingly technological war emerged the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) and the Navy College Training Program (NCTP), better known as the Navy's V-12 program.⁸⁹ This chapter will examine the Army Specialized Training Program in detail. The chapter begins with an overview of the program; it will then examine the soldier and institutional selection process and review the program's curriculum. The next part of this chapter describes what transpired while the program remained in place and how the end of the program subsequently impacted higher education. The chapter concludes with a look at two of the most widely debated and discussed criticisms of the program.

On December 12, 1942, under the direction of Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) was formally announced to the nation. Throughout the course of its existence, the program directed the training of 145,000 young men.⁹⁰ The ASTP was designed to create a pipeline of college-trained specialists

⁸⁹ The Army Specialized Training Program was approved by the War Manpower Commission and was published in conformity with the provisions of the President's Executive Order on Manpower on December 5, 1942. (Joint Army – Navy Release: "Army & Navy Set up Plan for Training Specialists in College").

⁹⁰ "Army Halts College Study for 110,000," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 19, 1944, p. 1.

for the duration of the war. Based on a series of exams, the program selected qualified young men and placed them into specialized training programs in engineering, foreign language and area studies, personnel psychology, and medical sciences, which included dentistry, medicine and, veterinary science. The military covered all expenses for the newly admitted specialists. They also received a basic pay of \$50 per month and were required to wear army uniforms. At its peak enrollment, over 220 colleges and universities across the nation participated in the program. The military's payments to the institution covered the use of the facilities, cost of instruction, room and board for enlisted Army personnel, plant maintenance and operation, medical care and services, as well as the restoration of the facilities to their normal condition once the contract expired. On the other hand, the Army was responsible for the soldiers' physical and military training as well as instruction in calisthenics.⁹¹

Though slow to start, the program picked up speed toward its enrollment goal of 150,000 men about six months after its scheduled start date. However, a little over a year after the program began, 110,000 men were quickly called to service, leaving approximately 35,000 men in the program. Stimson cited "the exigencies of war" as the reason why the men were sent primarily overseas to combat. In addition, the Army asserted that since the Selective Service was unable to draft the 7,700,000 men needed for the war, it

⁹¹ "Principles of Contract," n.d. Approved by the Under Secretary of War and the Under Secretary of the Navy. Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs; "Army & Navy Plans for Training Servicemen in the Colleges," *New York Times*, December 12, 1943, p. 23; Letter from War Department to Dr. W.C. Coffey, President, University of Minnesota, February 27, 1943. Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs.

was necessary to draw upon the young men in the ASTP to make up the difference. By the spring of 1944, the Army effectively ended the program by returning the young men to regular training units with the exception of those who were in the advanced stages of the medical and engineering programs.⁹²

Overall, the program was regarded as a “mistake” and the Army was accused of being “shortsighted” by educators, members of the public and by high-ranking military officials since the program failed to create a pipeline of trained specialists.⁹³ Some argued that the program provided a safe harbor for college-bound men, while those who were not academically capable were immediately called to service. Although the war was won despite a lack of trained specialists, the experience of contracting higher education with the military to meet wartime needs proved to be both mutually beneficial and enduring.

In February 1943, Colonel Herman Beukema, Director of the ASTP, sent a 13-page letter to all of the presidents of the institutions likely to be offered contracts with the Army’s program. The letter provided details of the program, which included an ambitious plan to generate future doctors, engineers, chemists, dentists, psychologists, linguists, veterinarians, and more. When news of the details began to spread, the *Chicago Daily*

⁹² “Army Abandons Its Specialized Training Course,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 12, 1943, p. 7; “Army to Take 110,000 College Trainees for Combat Duties,” *Washington Post*, February 19, 1944, p. 1; “Army Slashes College Training, Shifts 110,000 Men to Line Duty,” *New York Times*, February 19, 1944, p.1; “Army Training Cut Cramps Colleges,” *New York Times*, February 20, 1944, p. 22.

⁹³ “Army Training Cut Cramps Colleges,” *New York Times*, February 20, 1944, p. 22; “Army Slash In College Program Hit,” *Washington Post*, February 20, 1944, p. M1; “Letters to the Editor: Liquidation of the ASTP,” *Washington Post*, February 26, 1944, p. 8; Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 41.

Tribune remarked that the student soldiers are “going to burn the midnight oil” in order to keep pace with “one of the most rigorous of all educational assignments.”⁹⁴ In total, the program required up to 61 scheduled hour weeks with no absenteeism allowed. The student-soldiers’ day would begin at 6:30 a.m. for breakfast and was scheduled to end at 10:30 p.m.; Saturday was the only exception as the day ended at 3:30 p.m.. Every minute of the soldiers’ day was scheduled and accounted for. A week would include 24 or 25 contact hours of class or lab time, 5 hours of military drills, 6 hours of physical education, and 24-25 hours of supervised study time.⁹⁵ Due to the rigorous nature of the program, the Army did not allow trainees to participate in intercollegiate athletics however, they were allowed time for intramural athletic contests after their work week ended on Saturday.

Each term was twelve weeks in duration placing the program on a quarter system. There was one week in between each quarter to allow time for the grading of final exams. The program continued in this fashion until a soldier reached the end of his program. While in the program, a soldier received an education as well as room and board at the military’s expense. As one newspaper article noted, everything was provided for the ASTP trainees: “[t]heir textbooks are handed to them as if they were guns. The only thing

⁹⁴ “Soldiers Facing 59 Hour Week In School Training,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 12, 1943, p15.

⁹⁵ Letter from Herman Beukema, February 27, 1943. Chancellor Papers, George R. Throop, Series WWII Records, Series 1, Box 1. The letter is not addressed to a specific person or institution, however it does provide an official overview of the ASTP.

they have to buy is their diplomas.”⁹⁶

In the newspaper articles and Army publications leading up to the implementation of the ASTP, the program was touted as providing opportunities for young men on a “democratic basis.” The foundations for this basis was rooted in the idea that young men, regardless of financial resources, would be able enroll in higher education at the military’s expense. However, this opportunity was contingent upon a number of factors. First and foremost, induction into the Army was the first step in the lengthy selection process. Next, an individual needed to be between 18 and 22 years of age for the basic phase of the program or over 18 for the advanced phase.⁹⁷ The program also required soldiers to have graduated from an accredited high school or the equivalent and achieved a score of 110 or higher on the Army’s General Classification Test (AGCT). Later, the minimum score on the AGCT would increase to 115, which was the same requirement for consideration for admission to West Point. All men entering the service through the Selective Service were required to take the ACGT; however, a candidate had to express a desire to enroll in the ASTP in order to be considered for the program.⁹⁸ If the aforementioned points were achieved, the candidate moved to a Specialized Training and Reassignment

⁹⁶ “Army Will Pay For Training of 14,000 Doctors,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 18, 1943, p.9.

⁹⁷ Letter from Herman Beukema, Colonel, G.S.C. Director, Army Specialized Training Division, February 27, 1943. Chancellor Papers, George R. Throop, Series WWII Records, Series 1, Box 1. The confusion regarding the age requirements for basic and advanced levels is in the original document.

⁹⁸ The Army General Classification Test (AGCT) was only offered twice a year. The AGCT was given to all men entering the Army. The test measured one’s learning ability. A score of 110 or higher was believed to include the top 30% of young men.

(STAR) Unit where he would be housed, fed, and given additional tests for one to three weeks.

While at the STAR unit, the soldier was required to take an academic aptitude test, similar to college aptitude tests. This exam would determine what, if any, strengths a particular individual had for any of the Army's areas of specializations, regardless of personal interests. If the score on the aptitude test was acceptable, the soldier would then be called before the selection ASTP Board for an interview. The board was comprised of commissioned officers who worked closely with the unit personnel officer. Based on the Board's recommendation, the soldier would or would not be admitted to the ASTP. If admitted to the program, a soldier was placed into the highest academic level for which he qualified. The academic portion of the program was divided into basic and advanced levels. However, before being sent to a specific Army Specialized Training Unit (ASTU) at the contracted college or university where he would begin his specialized training, he was sent to 13-weeks of basic training.⁹⁹

Interestingly, approximately the first 110,000 men selected to participate in the ASTP were already enrolled in college. This was mainly due to the fact that the first ACGT was administered in April 2, 1943, too soon for those who planned to graduate in June from high school to qualify for the ASTP. The men in college were already inducted into the Army on a reserve basis since their participation in the war as a combat soldier

⁹⁹ Eads, *A Study of the Army Specialized Training Program*, 31; "College Chiefs Scan New Army and Navy Plans," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 18, 1942, p.2.

had been deferred due to their enrollment in college. Soldiers enrolled in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) were eligible to apply for the ASTP, but not automatically selected for participation. They, too, had to take the AGCT and aptitude tests; however, they had already completed basic training as part of their reserve status.¹⁰⁰

From the beginning of the program, the Army knew it could not feasibly train 150,000 soldiers in a variety of specialized fields. For this reason, the military contracted with the nation's colleges and universities because they had facilities that were sufficient "in extent or character."¹⁰¹ Aware that the recently lowered draft age would deplete colleges and universities of "the principal source" of college aged men, the military knew that the addition of military programs would "aid materially in preserving [the nation's] schools for their significant post-war responsibilities."¹⁰² However, when the ASTP was announced in December 1942, it was not yet known how institutions would be selected nor what conditions would be required of these institutions in order to receive a government contract.

Rather than having institutions submit information about the merits of their institution, the War Manpower Commission (WMC) requested that institutions respond to a

¹⁰⁰ "Army and Navy Plans For Training Service Men in the Colleges," *New York Times*, December 18, 1942, p. 23.

¹⁰¹ Letter from Herman Beukema, Colonel, G.S.C. Director, Army Specialized Training Division, February 27, 1943, Chancellor Papers, George R. Throop, Series WWII Records, Series 1, Box 1.

¹⁰² Joint Army-Navy Release, "Army & Navy set up Plan for Training Specialists in College." Letter from Herman Beukema, February 27, 1943.

questionnaire. The questionnaire required very detailed information about an institution's physical capacity to ascertain how many soldiers could be accommodated by the number of available classrooms, laboratories, offices, beds, mess halls, and so on. Information about current enrollments including a breakdown of men, women and their levels, the number of faculty members in which fields, staff members, and programs were also important points of inquiry. Ultimately, a joint committee comprised of representatives from the Army, Navy and the War Manpower Commission selected institutions.¹⁰³ However, committee approval did not necessitate that the institutions would be used. It simply meant that the institution was eligible to enter into a contract with the Army or Navy to conduct training.

It was also determined that institutions had to have an established ROTC program at their institution in order to participate in the Army's selection process. This was problematic for historically black colleges and universities in the South because many of these institutions did not have a ROTC program. In the end, the committee selected institutions based on the facilities available at a particular campus. Land-grant colleges and universities were more likely to receive a contract due to the Army's emphasis on engineering while smaller, private institutions along with state teachers colleges often did not meet the Army's criteria.¹⁰⁴ Once an institution was selected for a particular area of specialization, representatives of the Army visited the campus to ensure that the facilities would

¹⁰³ "Issue New List of 238 Colleges in War Program," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 3, 1943, p. 6.

¹⁰⁴ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 20.

meet the Army's needs. Only after a site visit would a contract between the government and the institution then be issued.¹⁰⁵

The Army anticipated that several hundred institutions would be required when the program reached its peak enrollment.¹⁰⁶ By March 3, 1943, 238 colleges and universities received approval for use by the Army and Navy programs. This brought the total number of eligible institutions to 435.¹⁰⁷ On March 7, another 52 institutions were added to the eligible-for-contract list.¹⁰⁸ This number does not include the total number of institutions that had contracts with various government entities for other programs, including the training of the Aviation Cadets, the Engineering, Science, War Management Training (ESWMT), the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), and other war training programs along with a variety of "short courses"; however, the ASTP operated with the highest prerequisites for admittance. The "net effect" of these programs and their use of the nation's colleges and universities meant that higher education was "one of the most

¹⁰⁵ Letter from Colonel Raymond W. Briggs to Chancellor Throop, April 14, 1943; "Contract between the United States of America and [name of institution]," Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs.

¹⁰⁶ Letter from Herman Beukema, Colonel, G.S.C. Director, Army Specialized Training Division, February 27, 1943. Chancellor Papers, George R. Throop, Series WWII Records, Series 1, Box 1.

¹⁰⁷ "Issue New List of 238 Colleges in War Program," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 3, 1943, p. 6.

¹⁰⁸ "52 Schools Join List Approved in War Program," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 7, 1943, p. 14.

vital features of the development of [the nation's] armed strength.¹⁰⁹ According to college officials, the plan was “a complete submergence of the American system of liberal education to winning the war” and this became evident when the curriculum for the program was released.¹¹⁰ Government and collegiate officials also believed that the program would have a measurable impact on institutions in terms of their financial well-being and enrollments. Overall, it was agreed that, in the long run, higher education would be “vastly advanced thru widened democracy” which the ASTP offered through its “democratic” selection process.¹¹¹

According to Beukema, the primary objective of the ASTP's curriculum was the soldier's development “along selected lines and within the shortest possible time compatible with sound teaching procedures.”¹¹² However, in order to achieve this goal, it became necessary for the Army to consult with educators nationwide. While the Army had expertise in military tactics and physical training, developing courses in the sciences and social sciences required input from the nation's experts. Not only were particular aspects of the academic subjects beyond the scope of Army officials, it was necessary for the curriculum to be consolidated into a 12-week quarter, unlike the traditional 16-week semes-

¹⁰⁹ Letter from Herman Beukema. Colonel, G.S.C. Director, Army Specialized Training Division, February 27, 1943. p. 1. Chancellor Papers, George R. Throop, Series WWII Records, Series 1, Box 1.

¹¹⁰ “College Chiefs Scan New Army And Navy Plans: Face Extensive Changes Under War Program,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 18, 1942, p. 2.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Letter from Herman Beukema. Colonel, G.S.C. Director, Army Specialized Training Division, February 27, 1943. Chancellor Papers, George R. Throop, Series WWII Records, Series 1, Box 1.

ter. For these reasons, the Army Specialized Training Division developed curriculum for the ASTP in consultation with America's educators. A special committee of the American Council on Education was appointed to provide advice and counsel to the War Manpower Commission. The committee included administrators and educators from the nation's premiere institutions.

The curriculum was divided into two phases: a basic phase and an advanced phase. The basic phase consisted of 3, 12-week sessions during which ASTP trainees took the same elementary courses in mathematics, physics, English, history, and chemistry. Soldiers also began their specialized studies in one of the following fields: area studies (foreign languages and cultures), engineering, pre-medical and psychology. The advanced phase varied between 1 to 4, 12-week terms, depending upon the specialization in which the trainees were enrolled. The advanced phase contained specialized curricula in the aforementioned areas of study.¹¹³ The program also required institutions to administer tests, short written papers and other testing procedures on a regular basis. Though ultimately the college officials were responsible for the effectiveness of instruction, the Army commandant assigned to the institution was responsible for "ensuring the execution of the terms of the contract" and was obligated to address any concerns about failure to

¹¹³ The advanced phase of the ASTP included engineering specializations in: aeronautics, chemical, civil, electrical (communication), electrical (power), mechanical (design & maintenance), mechanical (automotive & internal combustion) and, sanitary engineering. Chemistry, Physics, and Psychology were also included.

comply with the college president.¹¹⁴

In addition to delivering the curriculum as approved by the Army, institutions were also asked that the standards of instruction for the ASTP be high enough that the course(s) could be used towards the completion of graduation requirements for a bachelor's degree. Yet, despite the fact that the Advisory Committee to the Army Specialized Training Division believed that all of the courses in the program were "on or above the college level and that they [were] worthy of credit toward academic degrees," the decision whether or not to award academic credit rested with the individual institutions.¹¹⁵ In the hope and anticipation that a soldier would matriculate after the war, the Army strongly urged colleges and universities to maintain complete records of the soldier's attendance in courses. The program was seen not only as an opportunity for the nation's colleges and universities to train soldiers for specialized areas, but it was also an opportunity for soldiers to continue their education, which the Army believed would help prepare them for citizenship in the postwar period.

After all of the announcements and institutional reviews, it was anticipated that by February 1, 1943, the ASTP would be in full swing. However, by the end of May 1943, there were grumblings about the effectiveness of the Army program since only about 240 eligible institutions, out of more than 400, had contracts and these remaining institutions

¹¹⁴ Letter from Herman Beukema, Colonel, G.S.C. Director, Army Specialized Training Division, February 27, 1943. Chancellor Papers, George R. Throop, Series WWII Records, Series 1, Box 1.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

could have handled another 41,000 students. Some engineering schools reported that they were operating only at 50 percent of their normal load. In turn, these issues caused educators to project a critical attitude “of inevitable antagonism” towards the Army. Some of this resentment stemmed from the fact that the ASTP adhered to an accelerated pace in order to train specialists in the shortest amount of time possible. However, the fear was that the accelerated pace would reduce the quality of engineering education. This was not a surprise to educators, but it did highlight the differences between the goals of higher education and that of the Army; educators were not interested in “high pressure instruction methods” or curriculum focused solely on specialized training.

The next six months proved challenging for educators, administrators, and Army personnel as educators began to identify points of contention. Criticisms of the program ranged from the concern over the dearth of liberal education built into the ASTP, to problems with the flow of students to and from institutions, to the soldiers’ concern about their future after completion of the ASTP. It was anticipated that completion of the ASTP would lead toward a commission; however, this was not the Army’s intention, yet the point of confusion was hardly clarified.¹¹⁶ The Army’s failure to clarify its objectives would contribute to its demise.¹¹⁷ Despite warnings from administrators and educators as early as February that the plan, as it was currently conceived, would be difficult to administer and the curriculum too accelerated, the Army continued with its plans. To make

¹¹⁶ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 42.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

matters worse, the Navy's V-12 program was progressing smoothly and educators praised its curriculum, pace, and implementation — the exact opposite of the Army's program.

Fortunately for the Army, by November 1943 the tide had turned as the ASTP had passed the half-year mark and was fully operational. Approximately 140,000 trainees were enrolled in 222 colleges and universities nationwide with a plan for 10,000 trainees to be added each month. The program was finally on track to maintain a capacity of 150,000 trainees. The *New York Times* reported that by “and large, college presidents express[ed] their approval of the program as it [was] now being conducted.”¹¹⁸ As time progressed, the popularity of the ASTP increased, which resulted in the increased quality of its participants; “only the very best in the field” were being selected.¹¹⁹ Even more, it was reported by an unknown college head that the morale of the students in the ASTP was satisfactory. Anecdotally, the college head attributed this degree of satisfaction to the lack of financial strain the students experienced, unlike its civilian students. As for the pace of the program, the college head did not seem to think that it had over fatigued the students.¹²⁰

All of the goodwill that had been created between the Army and higher education as well as the Army and the public quickly deteriorated in December 1943. In the December 18th *Bulletin* of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP),

¹¹⁸ “140,000 Trainees Now in Colleges Under Army's Specialized Plan,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1943, p. 23.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

General Secretary of the AAUP Ralph E. Himstead addressed the members of the association to provide clarification regarding stories that began to circulate which indicated that the ASTP would begin to be gradually “liquidated.”¹²¹ In his letter, he assured his constituency that, in response to the headlines, the ASTP was not in a process of “liquidation” and that had been the case all along. The number of soldiers in the program was based on the “actual needs of the Army and Services.”¹²² Furthermore, Himstead stated that consultations with representatives of the Armed Forces “indicate that every effort will be made to give notice to the individual institution as far in advance as possible regarding any changes in the quota for such institution” and that in “the initial reduction, every effort will be made to prevent the elimination of institutions having small units of men and to spread the bulk of the reduction over the institutions having the larger quotas.”¹²³ In addition, he noted, that the Army contracts called for a 90-day notice before the program could be terminated at an institution.

Despite the assurance Himstead received from Stimson, on February 18, 1944, President Roosevelt approved the scaling back of the ASTP. This decision was made on the advice and counsel of Generals Lesley J. McNair and George C. Marshall who both warned of the impending shortage of soldiers. As the pool of draftees had been depleted and warfare increased in Europe, more soldiers were needed to fight. Even if the draft

¹²¹ Ralph E. Himstead, “Higher Education and the War,” *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, 29, no. 5 (December 1943): 712-713; “Army Abandons Its Specialized Training Course,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 12, 1943, p. 17.

¹²² Himstead, “Higher Education and the War,” 712-713.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

pool had not been depleted, it would have taken too long to train new soldiers. Therefore, it proved more efficient to liquidate the ASTP and assign the soldiers to combat duty. The government asserted that the Army was 200,000 men short of its goal to have 7,700,000 men in uniform by the end of 1943. Some blamed the elimination of the ASTP on the Selective Service's draft boards failure to meet the Army's manpower requirements. The shortage of available men also raised the possibility that the draft boards would have to review the files of those who they deferred to determine if their reasons for deferment were no longer valid.

Although the ASTP was set to be eliminated, it was anticipated that after the war, there would be a shortage of doctors, dentists, and engineers. For this reason, soldiers enrolled in advanced phase courses in medicine, dentistry, and engineering were allowed to continue until they completed the curriculum. This left approximately 35,000 soldiers in the program after approximately 110,000 ASTP trainees were transferred to combat assignments from mid-February through April 1st. The Army believed that the 110,000 transferred soldiers possessed enough training "to qualify for noncommissioned and technical assignments, particularly in the infantry."¹²⁴ Of the 35,000 remaining soldiers, 5,000 were pre-induction students who remained enrolled until their basic training was completed.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ "Army Halts College Study for 110,000," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 19, 1944, p. 1.

¹²⁵ "Army Slashes College Training, Shifts 110,000 Men to Line Duty," *New York Times*, February 19, 1944, p.1; "Education in Review: Sudden Closing of Army Training Pro-

In response to questions regarding the elimination of the Army's program, Stimson stated that "had personnel been delivered on schedule, more time would have been available to organize and train units to meet the dates scheduled on the basis of our strategic plans, but now the Army must use every measure of manpower economy practicable." Stimson called the ASTP "very desirable but not absolutely essential" and therefore it "must be sacrificed and other activities curtailed."¹²⁶ The Navy's V-12 program continued without similar cutbacks because they planned better, established and communicated the specific objectives of their program and because military activities were kept to a minimum.¹²⁷ They also staggered the call to active duty based upon the schedule of new ships being built for war.

The announcement of the liquidation of the program resulted in a flurry of public dissent. In the "Letters to the Editor" column in the *Washington Post* on February 26, 1944, an Army mother expressed outrage regarding the liquidation of the program: "The manpower shortage should have been foreseen by the War Department months ago and enrollments in both the ASTP and V-12 programs halted in order to properly train the boys for combat. The ASTP boys should not be used merely to fill a quota."¹²⁸ Not only was the Army mother angry that the shortage was not anticipated, the woman remained

gram Creates Many New Problems for Colleges," *New York Times*, February 20, 1944, p. E9.

¹²⁶ "Stimson Says Army Requires 7,700,000 Men," *The Washington Post*, March 31, 1944, p. 5.

¹²⁷ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 72.

¹²⁸ "Letters to the Editor: Liquidation of ASTP," *Washington Post*, February 26, 1944, p. 8.

concerned about the well-being of the ASTP trainees while in combat. Certainly going to classes, completing homework assignments, taking exams, learning military tactics a mere 10 percent of the time, and participating in physical training was no way for a combat soldier to appropriately prepare for war. As she saw it, the Army was sending “practically untrained boys into combat” without possessing sufficient necessary military training.¹²⁹

By the beginning of March 1944, the Army was considering a “broad expansion” of its pre-induction specialized training reserve program, which enrolled 17 year olds.¹³⁰ This would expand the Army’s college program to youths below the draft age. The Army argued that the age restriction would allow youths a minimum of six months of college work before being called to service “[e]xcept in the event of an unforeseen military emergency.”¹³¹ The program, called the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program (ASTRP), targeted young men under the age of 18 who wanted to qualify for six months cost-free college schooling.

The ASTRP began August 9, 1943, and provided Army specialized training for qualified 17-year-old high school graduates before they entered the Army on active duty. They were granted military scholarships and sent to various colleges and universities se-

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ “Army Drafts Pre-Induction Training Plan,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 3, 1944, p. 1; “Army to Expand College Program With Youths Below the Draft Age,” *The New York Times*, March 3, 1944, p.1; “Army Will Expand Training Boys, 17,” *The New York Times*, March 3, 1944, p. 8.

¹³¹ John R. Craf, “The Facts About the ASTP Reserve,” *The Clearing House* 18, no. 7 (March 1944): 402-404.

lected by the War Department. At these schools, they received academic instruction in the basic phase of the ASTP: “The primary aim of the Reserve Program is to direct a continuous flow of qualified young men toward Army specialized training prior to their entry into active military duty.”¹³² A maximum of 25,000 reservists was set forth by the War Department. The program also worked to entice young men to join the Army before their 18th birthday as a way of diverting them from joining the Navy. The Army had greater manpower needs than the Navy and they both drew from the same pool of eligible men. The military paid for their tuition, textbooks, housing, room and board, and medical care. Their schedule was similar to that of the ASTP and they were required to take basic ROTC training if the institution they attended possessed a ROTC program.

According to George F. Zook, President of the American Council on Education, the elimination of the ASTP would have a “very serious effect” on institutions already hit hard by the war. Institutions that were most vulnerable were those that did not have a contract with the Navy, those that did not have female students, and smaller institutions. As a result of the elimination of the ASTP, colleges were often forced to revise their curriculum and find new sources of revenue. Some options to offset revenue loss included opening a night school and/or hosting summer session terms. The elimination of the program also meant that faculty would have to be reduced. Frederick A. Middlebush, Chancellor of the University of Missouri, predicted that the elimination of the program would

¹³² Craf, “The Facts About the ASTP Reserve,” 402-404; “17-Year-Old Youths Go To College for Army”, *The Science News-Letter*, August 21, 1943, pp. 115-116.

mean “a 20 per cent [*sic*] cut in [their] enrollment.”¹³³ Other university heads also criticized the Army’s lack of foresight and the negative impact the reduced enrollments would have on their institutions.¹³⁴ On the positive side, though, buildings that were converted to accommodate the needs of the student soldiers could be returned to their original use and purpose; classrooms would no longer be overcrowded.

Although the cut in the ASTP was sure to send a “heavy blow” financially to the nation’s colleges and universities, college heads “promised to cooperate loyally in whatever manner they may be called upon for the war effort.”¹³⁵ Because of the war, many small colleges and junior colleges had to close their doors; some temporarily and others permanently.¹³⁶ For institutions whose doors remained opened due to the Army’s program, these closures posed a grave concern; they worried that they would face a similar fate once the ASTP ended and if deferment laws changed. This remained a concern for all institutions, especially those without large endowments or those that relied heavily upon student’s tuition payments for a large portion of their revenues: “It will even be more difficult for the colleges to adjust themselves to the crisis than might have been the case a year ago. All in all, it would appear much better for the Army never to have launched the

¹³³ “Army Slash In College Program Hit,” *Washington Post*, February 20, 1944, p. M1.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* Other university heads included Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chancellor of Stanford University, President Milton Eisenhower of Kansas State and Ralph D. Hetzel of Pennsylvania State College.

¹³⁵ “Army Training Cut Cramps Colleges,” *New York Times*, February 20, 1944, p.22; “Education In Review: Sudden Closing of Army Training Program Creates Many New Problems for Colleges,” *New York Times*, February 20, 1944, p. E9.

¹³⁶ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*.

program in the first place than thus abruptly to abandon it.”¹³⁷

Despite anticipating a bleak future for many liberal arts colleges after the elimination of the ASTP, many of these colleges reported “satisfactory fiscal condition and in some cases greatly improved situations, both as to total investment in buildings and equipment and in regular income and endowment.”¹³⁸ Endowments grew, as did equipment and buildings, as a result of institutional growth from the development and investment of funds while the ASTP was in service.

The Army Specialized Training Program, for all of its well-intentioned purposes and goals, was not without challenges or criticisms. Educators criticized the program’s educational components while the public was enraged about the Army’s shortsighted training plan, while arguing that the program was a refuge for elite men rather than being truly democratic in composition. In addition, the public argued that the program lacked clear direction and purpose; they believed it ultimately was the beneficiary of having the right people support the politics of the program. Yet it was the program’s curriculum and pedagogical practices that received a great deal of attention and was the subject of many debates.

Despite the fact that the curriculum for the ASTP was developed by the Army in consultation with educators of the American Council on Education and approved by the War Manpower Committee, the Joint Army and Navy Personnel Board and the Office of

¹³⁷ “End Of The ASTP,” *Washington Post*. March, 1, 1944, p. 8.

¹³⁸ “Finances Solid, Colleges Study Post-War Path,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 21, 1944, p. 26.

education, educators objected to the rather paltry treatment of the liberal arts curriculum.¹³⁹ Concerns about the lack of liberal education ranged from arguments about the need for liberal education in a democracy, to its function as a characteristic of an educated citizenry, to the concern that small colleges would suffer without being able to provide instruction in liberal education. The concern over the inclusion of liberal education stemmed from a general consensus that a liberal education was the foundation of democratic society and active citizenship; these characteristics were believed to be critical in planning for a peace time society.

According to Robert M. Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, the liberal arts were “the arts of communication” and in order to have a democratic community, every citizen must receive a liberal education.¹⁴⁰ Under the ASTP, technical training and accelerated courses in specialized subjects were taught at the expense of a liberal education because, as Hutchins points out, the goal of the ASTP is distinct to that of the higher education; the ASTP was a training program whereas higher education sought to educate individuals on a broad scale. When asked if the Army's plan would destroy liberal education, Secretary of War Stimson replied, “Temporarily yes, so far as the able-bodied men of college are concerned, but in the long run, emphatically no. The immediate necessity is to win this war, and unless we do that there is no hope for liberal education in this coun-

¹³⁹ Two of the most widely known dissenters were Robert M. Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago and Dr. Harold Dobbs, President of Princeton University.

¹⁴⁰ Hutchins, “The Outlook for Education,” 3-8.

try.”¹⁴¹ For Stimson, the goal was clear; he understood the necessity of focusing technical training at the cost of other programs.

Hutchins also knew that education had become “a sideline of educational institutions.”¹⁴² In a lecture at the University of Chicago, Hutchins explained that the military programs are simply training programs and that “[a]ny resemblance between education and the schemes of the Armed Forces is purely coincidental.”¹⁴³ By the time the ASTP was underway in April 1943, colleges and universities across the nation were being transformed into gigantic training camps seemingly overnight. While it was important for the future of higher education in America to maintain its educational institutions, Hutchins warned that the maintenance of education must not be confused with the maintenance of educational institutions, indirectly referring to the financial benefits afforded by the Army’s program.

Another critique of the program challenged the specifics of the curriculum as a whole. The quantity and quality of the accelerated curriculum, especially in terms of foreign languages and engineering, were carefully scrutinized. According to many scholars of foreign languages, “[t]he war . . . created a much wider awareness of [America’s] ignorance.”¹⁴⁴ The immediate need to supply the Army and Navy with men equipped with a knowledge of foreign languages and the ways of life abroad exposed a very real and sub-

¹⁴¹ “New Plan Suspends Liberal Education,” *New York Times*. December 18, 1942.

¹⁴² Hutchins, “The Outlook for Education,” 3.

¹⁴³ Hutchins, “The Outlook for Education,” 3.

¹⁴⁴ Lasker, “Three Problems, One Opportunity,” 52-54.

stantial gap in American knowledge. For Bruno Lasker, a member of the American Council staff, the end of the ASTP marked the end of funding for scholars of foreign languages and area studies, resulting in the possibility that America would remain ignorant of these languages and cultures.¹⁴⁵

Other foreign language faculty, anxious about the end of the ASTP and foreign language instruction, raised real concerns that the lessons learned in teaching students would be forgotten. Ernst Rose, a foreign language instructor at New York University in his correspondence to *The German Quarterly*, contends that his experience with the ASTP,

has been quite exhilarating. The program gave us a chance to prove, under ideal conditions, what we language teachers have vainly tried to propagate theoretically for a number of years: that American students are just as capable as European students of learning a foreign language and that with the right concentration upon essential aims and with the correct amount of time found necessary by the profession, they can be taught to master a language just as efficiently as anybody else.¹⁴⁶

Clearly there was an assumption that American students were not capable or as capable of learning foreign languages as European students. Foreign language instructors agreed that it was “easier and quicker” to learn to write in a foreign language after mastering the spoken word than to learn a language in the reverse.¹⁴⁷ However, traditional academic learning objectives in America prioritized reading and writing over speaking, thereby extending the amount of time it would take to master a foreign language. For many instruc-

¹⁴⁵ Lasker, “Three Problems, One Opportunity.”

¹⁴⁶ Ernst Rose and Theodore Huebener, “Correspondence: The Future of the AST Program,” *The German Quarterly* 17, no. 3 (May, 1944): 161-164.

¹⁴⁷ Sokol, “The Army Language Program,” 9-16.

tors, the ASTP's emphasis on speaking as a mode of instruction proved that American students could master a foreign language just as efficiently. However, the ASTP required maximized instruction in the foreign languages; as a result, approximately 27 hours per week were devoted to some form of language instruction, many more hours than would normally be allowed for such instruction.

In the same issue of *The German Quarterly* appeared another letter to the Editor written by the Acting Director of Foreign Languages in New York City, Theodore Huebener. He expressed his concern for the praise regarding the Army's foreign language program. He was concerned that the Army's apparent ability to teach men to speak a foreign language with fluency within a few weeks created the impression that learning a second language was an easy process, one that schools and universities had been unsuccessful in accomplishing. He warned his readers that the framework within which the Army operated was "highly concentrated ... with a single utilitarian aim, to small groups of selected young men who ha[d] every inducement to learn."¹⁴⁸ He argued that it was not the inability of the universities or school to teach a foreign language, nor was it the ingenuity of the Army's program that made the teaching and learning process easy, rather it was because there were multiple controlled factors which helped created this successful program. These factors included the selection of men who had a certain aptitude for learning a foreign language, the intensity of the programs' instruction, the amount of time devoted to learning the language, and, perhaps most important of all, the aim of the lan-

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

guage program was entirely different than that of a traditional foreign language program. For Heubener, “the crux of the whole matter is *time*. The Army devotes 27 hours a week to language [and area] study; the high school but five periods of 45 minutes each. The A.S.T.P. is actually a concentrated course of six years of high school work!”¹⁴⁹ Even more, he asserts, the goal of the ASTP’s foreign language program is the ability to comprehend and speak a language other than English. High school did “not have this singleness of aim” cites Heubener.

For all the criticism and public, political, and educational challenges faced by the ASTP, the irony of the criticism is that once the ASTP was liquidated and the war was won, the focus of the conversation very quickly shifted to addressing the needs and ideals of a postwar society. With this shift in conversation came the realization that the impending return of thousands of veterans to American society would require higher education to respond with a readiness and adeptness towards speed and efficiency. As veterans began to return from war, colleges and universities realized that veterans were eager to move on with their lives because of the delay the war had imposed. In turn, in an effort to make efficient use of veterans’ time, educators began to discuss and implement ways to quickly process, enroll, and graduate as many veteran students as possible in the shortest amount of time as possible. Accelerated terms were offered, classes were offered year-round, more student housing was built, more faculty were hired, and credit was awarded for military education and training. The very actions that were once troublesome and

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. Italics and exclamation are present in the original letter.

heavily criticized were now adopted by higher education in this postwar period.¹⁵⁰

America's entrance into World War II proved both necessary and problematic. The challenge imposed upon the military was the need to train thousands of soldiers for an increasingly technological war as quickly as possible. To meet this demand, the Army created the ASTP, which would train and educate soldiers at the nation's colleges and universities. Higher education responded by availing their services to the Armed Forces. In exchange, institutions of higher education received government subsidies towards the maintenance of their facilities and equipment, room and board for army personnel, and to provide a variety of social services for soldiers. However, this placed higher education in a precarious position. While it was the mission of higher education to educate and conduct research free of external interests, the coupling of the military and higher education posed challenges for higher education's mission. Higher education found itself trying to maintain academic tradition while preparing for war and the prospect of peace. The challenge, then, for institutions was to balance academic tradition with military demands for economic benefit.

Although the ASTP never reached its full potential, the program contributed to the war effort and ultimately laid the framework to help the nation transition to a peacetime society. The program also helped to prepare higher education for the types of changes that would be necessary to accommodate the impending return of thousands of veter-

¹⁵⁰ Cohen, *The Shaping of American Higher Education*; Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*.

ans who would later use the GI Bill's education benefit. The ASTP provided thousands of young men with the opportunity to augment their education beyond the high school level, provided them with training necessary for the war effort, and significantly contributed to the financial viability of over 220 colleges and universities across the nation. In addition, the program provided an opportunity for many men, who may not have otherwise had an opportunity, to attend college. It is not entirely clear how many ASTP trainees returned to higher education after the war; however, the education they received during their time in the ASTP was beneficial for not only themselves, but for society as the United States emerged as a world leader. As Hutchins expressed, "[w]e are educating not earthworms, but men, and we are educating them for new responsibilities and new aspirations. We must raise our eyes from the needs and duties of earthworms to the responsibilities and aspirations of men in the new world that is bound to come."¹⁵¹

Now that we have an understanding of the purpose, goals and requirements of the ASTP, it is possible to examine Washington University's history and why the administration sought to participate in the Army's program. The next chapter uses a case study method to begin to understand why Washington both needed and wanted to participate in the ASTP. While it was common for institutions to want or be compelled to participate in the war effort, Washington University's administration recognized the potential benefits of the university's participation in the ASTP as we will see in the next chapters.

¹⁵¹ Hutchins, "The Outlook for Education," 3-8.

Chapter 4 - The Path to Designation: Becoming an ASTP Institution

Leading up to and during America's involvement in World War II, higher education became a national focal point. The facilities of the nation's institutions of higher education had the physical capacity to train soldiers, and, perhaps more importantly, their faculties possessed the knowledge and the abilities that would be needed to win the war. Washington University was one of hundreds of colleges and universities whose campus was host to multiple war-related programs. In many ways, the story of Washington University is representative of many other institutions who participated in wartime training programs.¹⁵² Yet the experiences and the outcomes of the experiences of Washington's contribution to the war effort are unique in how they positioned Washington for growth and development in the postwar period. This chapter begins with an overview of Washington's history and its involvement in the war effort prior to its participation in the Army Specialized Training Program. Next, I review the status of the university prior to the implementation of the ASTP, which I follow with a discussion of the process of institutional selection. Once Washington was designated a military center for the ASTP, details about the tentative number of trainees and their arrival dates are discussed. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of Chancellor George A. Throop's growing challenges and concerns regarding the ASTP.

Located just west of the Mississippi River, a small, non-denominational private institute by the name of Eliot Seminary was founded in 1853 in St. Louis, Missouri.

¹⁵² Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*.

Through the vision and leadership of William Greenleaf Eliot Jr. and Wayman Crow, who were concerned about the lack of educational institutions in the Midwest, a charter for Eliot Seminary was developed. Their partnership was unique: Eliot was a pastor of a small Unitarian church and named “the Saint of the West” by Ralph Waldo Emerson, whereas Crow was a local business man whose company was on its way to becoming one of the largest wholesale dry goods companies in the United States. Although an unlikely pair on the surface, both men were committed to public service and were concerned about the greater good.

Worried about the future of the Mississippi Valley, they believed it was necessary to provide shape and direction to a rapidly growing population that they believed would suffer, like the West, if not for the introduction of some civilizing forces. In their minds, education provided the civilizing force needed. Together, they, with the help of other business, political, and religious leaders, sought to establish an institution that would offer courses in the industrial arts to both men and women in St. Louis. Though a man of the cloth, Eliot “believed to his core that church was the proper place for religious instruction, and that narrow, secretarian influences must not taint educational truth.”¹⁵³ For this reason, the founders of what would later become Washington University created a charter free from religious influence with an emphasis instead on principles of “educational truth.”

¹⁵³ Ralph E. Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis: A History* (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society Press, 1996).

Also aware of his religious prominence in the community, Eliot, soon after its incorporation, appointed a subcommittee to choose a name other than his own in order to disassociate the institute from his religious convictions. Eliot wanted the institute to be free from a secretarian cast, which he believed would not be the case if the institute bore his name. A year after its incorporation, Eliot Seminary was renamed Washington Institute, inspired by the first president of the United States, George Washington. To this day, the university's reference to President Washington can be seen in the yearbook's tongue-in-cheek title, *The Hatchet*.

By the fall of 1854, Washington Institute began to offer evening courses in industrial training and basic general studies. Students ranged in age from 8 to 46 and by the end of winter session in 1855, 270 students were enrolled.¹⁵⁴ Of these students, 60 percent were immigrants from England, Germany, and Ireland. By day, most of the students were semi-skilled workers or laborers. Between the years 1854 and 1856, Washington Institute began to flourish. However, had it not been for the deep pockets of its founding directors, it is likely that Washington Institute would have remained a part of St. Louis' nineteenth century history.¹⁵⁵

More often than not, when the institute needed money to fund its development, the founding directors were the primary source of institutional endowments. In order to

¹⁵⁴ Candace O'Connor, *Beginning A Great Work: Washington University in St. Louis 1853-2003* (St. Paul: Litho, Inc., 2006), 11.

¹⁵⁵ O'Connor, *Beginning A Great Work*, 11. There were 17 original founding directors of Eliot Seminary. They were mostly local businessmen, politicians and men of the community.

move forward with plans for development, the founding directors agreed that minimum endowment amounts were to be raised before the institute would or could financially move forward. As in the past, the founding directors reached into their own pockets and provided the money needed to reach the minimum endowment amount required. Money was not the only item that was donated to the endowments; land was also donated. With these donations, the school added more departments, hired more faculty, and erected new buildings. As the institute began to grow in scope, breadth, and capacity, the founding directors thought the name of the institute should more clearly communicate its educational design. In an effort to fulfill this idea and to move the nascent institution forward, the institute was renamed Washington University in 1857.

From the late 1800s to World War I (WWI), the university moved forward with its educational mission and plans for development. However, with the onset of WWI, the university's enrollment dropped, causing some concern. Despite their concerns, enrollments increased after WWI ended; the student population went from approximately 700 students in 1918 to over 3,000 in the fall of 1919. In the years that followed the end of WWI, the university was the beneficiary of another growth spurt.¹⁵⁶ While this momentum carried the university forward through the 1920s, the crash of the stock market on October 29, 1929, signaled that difficult times lay ahead. At first, the university was not greatly impacted — at least not financially.

¹⁵⁶ “Acting Chancellor Wallace present the following statement of progress of the University since he took office”, Senate Record, February 28, 1945. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 7, Chapter 15, Part 1, F1.

In 1928, George A. Throop was appointed Chancellor of Washington University after having served as Acting Chancellor during the 1927 academic year, while the university's 7th Chancellor, Herbert Hadley, was ill.¹⁵⁷ A professor of Greek and Latin, Throop was the university's leader during the Great Depression and most of World War II. He served the university for 36 years before he retired in June 1944 under rumors of poor health.¹⁵⁸ Surprisingly, Throop "disliked dealing with the public ... and hated the details of his office He named Walter McCourt as assistant chancellor to handle those responsibilities," yet when it came to dealing with the ASTP and other war related training programs, Throop was the primary representative.¹⁵⁹

In November 1932, Throop announced that the university had hit hard times. The endowment, which covered half the annual tuition of \$250, had decreased by more than \$200,000. The drop in real estate value was primarily to blame for the decreasing endowment; however, gifts to the university also floundered.¹⁶⁰ In an effort to reduce costs, Throop announced in December that there would be a 4 percent reduction in salary; another 10% cut followed in the New Year.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ O'Connor, *Beginning A Great Work*.

¹⁵⁸ *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 28, 1944.

¹⁵⁹ O'Connor, *Beginning A Great Work*, 146.

¹⁶⁰ "Acting Chancellor Wallace present the following statement of progress of the University since he took office", Senate Record, February 28, 1945. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 7, Chapter 15, Part 1, F1.

¹⁶¹ "Washington U. to Reduce Salaries of Professors and Other Employees," *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 26, 1932; "Washington U. Staff to Get 5 Pct. Pay Cut on December 1," *The Globe*, October 29, 1932. This was not the first time in Throop's tenure that he cut salaries. During the Depression era of the early 1930s, Throop reduced salaries 5%

During the Depression Era, the campus community, especially the student body, became acutely aware of world events.¹⁶² As questions of war and peace abounded, an increasing number of students became involved in activism. In 1936, the 3rd Annual Peace Day took place. Students held the belief that war should be avoided; however, in 1939, a speaker at the Armistice Day celebration encouraged students to prepare for war rather than peace. Students took heed; during the 1940-41 school year, students organized committees, created organizations, and highlighted opportunities to help with the war effort.¹⁶³ Under Chancellor Throop's leadership, the university remained committed to contributing to the war effort.

By the early 1940's, Washington University's growth stalled due to the Depression and the impending Second World War. Building projects and developing academic programs were indefinitely delayed and faculty salaries were cut. Fortunate to have survived the Great Depression, Washington University entered World War II with commitment and apprehension. As was typically the case, institutions and organizations nationwide supported the government and the war. As the war became increasingly complex and tenuous, America's need for an educated workforce that could meet its war production needs increased exponentially. As a result, the federal government partnered with institutions of higher education to provide evening and weekend classes to train workers

in 1932 and then another 5% in 1934 due to a \$200,000 decline in income from endowments and investments.

¹⁶² Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 389.

¹⁶³ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 391.

for new fields or to augment their skill set.

Similar to many institutions across the nation, Washington University began to offer evening classes to train workers for defense industries. In 1939, Washington University was selected to offer a flight training program financed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA). In October 1940, President Roosevelt signed a bill authorizing the Office of Education to contract with colleges and universities that offered engineering programs to offer Engineering Defense Training (EDT).¹⁶⁴ Washington University signed this contract with the United States Office of Education. Through this contract, Washington began to offer defense courses for the Government's EDT program.¹⁶⁵ The program began with only five courses in February 1941; by the time it ended in 1945, the curriculum had expanded to offer more than 50 courses in total, provided training for more than fifteen thousand people at Washington University alone.¹⁶⁶

National defense quickly become a top priority, an effect that the university deeply felt. Prior to conscription, the military began to frequent college and university campuses with the hopes of recruiting faculty and students. By 1941, the effect of faculty and student withdrawals and the university's overall entrenchment in war preparations was so

¹⁶⁴ "Enrollments Open For Civilian Pilot Training Program" *Student Life*, October 6, 1939, p. 3; "CAA Primary Class Still Open For More Student Pilots" *Student Life*, October 15, 1940, p. 2; "Defense Training for Engineers" *The Alumni Bulletin*, October 1940, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 6.

¹⁶⁵ "Large Number Register For Defense Courses" *Student Life*, November 14, 1941; "Training in War Work In Free Night Classes" *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 14, 1943.

¹⁶⁶ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 391.

great that Throop reported this fact in his report to the Board; *The Alumni Bulletin* even added a section titled, “The University and National Defense.”¹⁶⁷ By the time the ASTP was announced, Chancellor Throop was managing multiple programs and multiple priorities, including but not limited to: the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA), the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC), EDT and its civilian student population.¹⁶⁸ Washington University was certainly doing its fair share in contributing to the war effort. With different requirements in place for each program, different areas of specialization and expertise needed, and the changing requirements and demands placed upon institutions of higher education, Throop’s ability to manage these programs speaks to the strength of his organizational leadership.

As the nation’s attention continued to focus on the war and the war effort, Washington concentrated on meeting the government and military’s needs while managing multiple priorities. By the early 1940s it was apparent that the Depression and the war had taken a toll on enrollments at Washington University. In 1941 overall enrollment at the University (including all graduate and professional programs) totaled approximately 3,341 students.¹⁶⁹ This included 1,195 students in the College of Liberal Arts and 432 students in the School of Engineering. For the 1942-43 academic year, an increase of 90

¹⁶⁷ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 391.

¹⁶⁸ The Engineering Defense Training (EDT) program was later renamed the Engineering, Science, Management War Training program (ESMWT).

¹⁶⁹ Report of the Chancellor, November 11, 1942. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, *War and the University*, F2.

students was reported bringing total enrollments to 3,432 students.¹⁷⁰ By 1943, the net overall decrease in enrollment amounted to approximately 758 students as compared to 1942 enrollment figures. The largest decrease in enrollment was in the College of Liberal Arts, followed by the School of Engineering; however, there were small increases in medical, dental, and nursing school enrollments. Due to the decrease in enrollments, Washington lost approximately \$200,000 in tuition. Even more, it was anticipated that enrollments would drop even further as the reservists were called to active duty.

According to Throop though, under the circumstances, Washington could not expect a better situation.¹⁷¹ Here he was referring to Washington's participation in various war-related training programs. Distinct advantages came with being selected as a military training center. Being a military center meant enrollment was less likely to be negatively impacted because the military programs brought students to the dwindling campus population and these programs were funded by the military. Hosting a military program created another stream of revenue, which was particularly appealing given the impact of the Great Depression. As a result of these benefits, a severe competition among higher education institutions began.¹⁷² At first, Washington did not fare well in this competition. It first applied to participate in the Navy's training program; however, the university did not receive a contract. It was only after Washington was denied participation in the Navy's

¹⁷⁰ Report of the Chancellor, November 4, 1943. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, F2.

¹⁷¹ Report of the Chancellor, November 4, 1943. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 3, Chapter 16, War and the University.

¹⁷² Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 399.

program that Throop set his sights on the Army's training program.

Throop's understanding of the enrollment situation at Washington University took into consideration enrollment in the various defense war training programs. When these enrollments were taken into account, compared to the overall state of higher education and that of other institutions, enrollments at Washington appear to have skyrocketed. Including the 1,500 to 1,600 Army trainees that were on campus for the Air Army Corps program and also including those enrolled in the ESMWT programs and University College, the total number of students being served numbered 8,905; the largest number of students ever handled by the University in institutional history.¹⁷³ Even more, these figures do not include medical or dental Army and Navy trainees. Throop seemed to be pleased with the number of trainees that were sent to Washington University: "So far as I can obtain information, I do not believe any institution has fared better in the assignment of the Army units than the University here."¹⁷⁴

As phenomenal as this enrollment figure may appear, especially during a time of war, these programs caused a great deal of strain on the university and its staff. All corners of the campus were working over time. Throop reported that up to 25 percent of the instructional staff took a leave of absence to work for the government, industry, or were called to military service; administrators also took leaves of absences, placing even great-

¹⁷³ University College provided part-time and evening adult education.

¹⁷⁴ Report of the Chancellor, November 4, 1943. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 3, Chapter 16, War and the University.

er strains on those who were left.¹⁷⁵ Ironically, though, the reduction in faculty and staff helped to reduce costs for the university, yet it also caused other problems. All of these changes left the university short-handed. Those left behind were required to pick-up additional duties and responsibilities; the university as a whole was in need of more instructors, which were difficult to secure.¹⁷⁶

As Washington began to take on additional responsibilities with fewer staff and faculty members, it became necessary for the military to take stock of the resources available at institutions of higher education. The War Manpower Commission (WMC) was charged with the responsibility of creating programs in order to ensure that the nation had a supply of trained individuals for the purposes of supporting the war effort.¹⁷⁷ In an effort to ascertain where these programs might be held, Edward C. Elliott, Chief of the Professional and Technical Employment and Training Division of the War Manpower Commission, sent a letter to all colleges and universities asking them to complete a 4-page questionnaire. The purpose of the survey was to obtain specific information needed by the Armed Services; it also gathered information needed to assess the facilities and faculties available at the nation's colleges and universities for the War Manpower Com-

¹⁷⁵ Letter from Chancellor Throop to Malvern Clopton member of the Corporation, June 14, 1943, p. 3. Morrow, *Unused Notes*, Chapter 16, F3.

¹⁷⁶ Report of the Chancellor, November 4, 1943. Ralph Morrow, *History of Washington University*, Box 3, Chapter 16, *War and the University*.

¹⁷⁷ Letter from War Manpower Commission to College or University President, December 11, 1942.

mission.¹⁷⁸ While completion of this questionnaire was required of all institutions, the WMC was clear to indicate that request of the information was not an expression of approval for a contract; it was simply an assessment.

The questionnaire contained ten sections of information. The first section, “General Information,” posed a wide range of questions from basic to specific, such as the institution’s address, the population of the nearest town or county and distance to the city where the campus was located, to more specific questions regarding the institution’s accreditation, control status, library volume, a list of academic divisions with male and female enrollments in each division, and, if convenient, a map or a photograph showing the arrangement of buildings on campus with a key.

Section II of the questionnaire surveyed “Current Staff and Enrollment Data” by division, major/field/specialization, academic standing, sex, graduation timelines for students, enrollments, and teaching staff for all modern languages. The third section requested information about housing on campus, including dormitories, fraternity or sorority houses, and rooming houses. As it related to campus housing, institutions were required to discuss how they arrived at their estimated maximum capacities.¹⁷⁹ Whether it was required by all universities or colleges or not is unclear; however, Washington University also provided the WMC with information about nearby hotels, including their dis-

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ War Manpower Commission National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, Survey of Colleges and Universities, Section III, Housing, December 11, 1942, p. 8. Chancellor’s Papers, George R. Throop, Series WWII Records, Box 1, War Manpower Commission, Staff and Enrollment Data.

tance to campus and number of rooms.

Specific housing locations also had to be identified. The WMC wanted to know who operated the building (in case the University had contracted with an outside facility), the number of persons currently occupying the space (divided by sex), the maximum number of persons a place could accommodate with present equipment as well as with additional equipment. With additional equipment, Washington University claimed to be able to accommodate between 1190-1425 individuals; without additional equipment, housing was limited to 581-631. In an explanation of how the University arrived at this range, they stated that the “Estimate of maximum capacity based upon catalogue announcements and actual occupancy. With additional double-deck beds, capacity could be more than doubled.”¹⁸⁰ In order to accommodate more students, the university would need to purchase additional beds. The university’s response to housing capacities went on to incorporate estimates for 20 neighboring hotels and apartments. The university estimated that these additional off-campus locations could house 5,422 persons.

Section four of the questionnaire asked about “Dining Facilities.” The maximum capacities for each dining room and cafeteria operated primarily for students, operated either by the institution or a student group or other person(s), was required for each dining facility. The remaining six sections inquired about the classroom and lecture rooms, auditoriums and assembly rooms, teaching laboratory facilities, athletic facilities, hospital facilities, and facilities now being used by current government contracts; each question

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

asked similarly detailed questions about space, maximum capacities, and university capabilities. Institutions were also asked to identify how many classrooms and lecture halls could accommodate a range of students. Fifty percent of Washington's classrooms could hold between 50 to 99 persons. Rooms with installed projection equipment and other types of equipment were also identified.

As of December 1942, Washington's traditional program enrollment total was 3,504, including graduate students. However, when enrollments in University College, summer enrollment and the ESMWT were included, enrollment at Washington more than doubled to 7,263 students. Enrollment in the ESMWT program alone was 2,107, which represented nearly 30 percent of the overall enrollment. Total vocational and professional enrollments were 2,309, accounting for both male and female students. Engineering had the largest enrollment at 520 male and female students followed by Medicine with 514 students.¹⁸¹

Concerning faculty, Throop reported all full-time equivalent personnel (including instructors and all administration) in the Arts and Sciences totaled 115.5 faculty members, 10 of whom were women. The vocational and professional programs hired a total of 199.5 instructors; 157 men, 42.5 women. Overall institutional totals for faculty were 316: 262.5 men and 52.5 women. The questionnaire also inquired about the availability of in-

¹⁸¹ War Manpower Commission National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, Survey of Colleges and Universities, December 11, 1942. Chancellor's Papers, George R. Throop, Series WWII Records, Box 1, War Manpower Commission, Staff and Enrollment Data.

stitutions to provide instruction in specific areas. For example, the Army was particularly interested in knowing which, if any, modern language courses were available for instruction. Washington University, between regular session and night school, taught eight foreign languages: French, German, Spanish, Italian, Russian, Portuguese, Chinese, and Japanese. French, German and Spanish had 5, 4, and 3 instructors respectively despite the fact that Spanish had the largest student population with 435 students, then German with 279 and French with 161 students.¹⁸²

Once an institution was selected to participate in the ASTP, the institution was then informed which Army Specialized Training Unit (ASTU), such as area and language studies, engineering and psychology, they would host. Institutions were designated specific AST units based on an assessment of the Army's needs and the institution's available resources. The ASTP offered various units of academic instruction and an institution's invitation to participate did not require that they provide instruction for all units. Institutions were selected to take specific units of the ASTP, not all units. However, the process did not end here. Once selection and designation took place, the Army conducted in-person inspections of the facilities to determine how many trainees could be accommodated in a particular unit as well as what messing facilities were available for that particular AST unit.¹⁸³ Ultimately, Washington University was selected to offer instruction

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ April 4, 1943. Chancellor Throop, Series 15 ,Box 1, Army Programs. Letter from Chancellor Throop to Raymond W. Briggs of the Headquarter for the Seventh Service Command of the Army Service Forces.

in Basic and Advanced Engineering, Area and Language Study, Pre-professional Medical and Dental programs, as well as Professional Medical and Dental programs.¹⁸⁴

The process from questionnaire to acceptance was remarkably swift, especially in light of other challenges that lay ahead. Washington University received the questionnaire in December 1942; shortly after the completed questionnaire was received by Washington, D.C., Washington University was offered an ASTP contract. On February 3, 1943, President Throop learned that Washington University was selected to participate in the ASTP. Immediately before this, President Throop received notification on January 22, 1943 that Washington University had been selected to host two pre-meteorological programs for the Army Air Forces under the Weather Program. On or about March 1, 1943, approximately 350-400 students were scheduled to arrive and start training in the Pre-meteorology “B” and “C” programs; instruction was scheduled to begin on or about May 1, 1943 in the Pre-meteorology “C” course.¹⁸⁵ Washington University was on its way to becoming a military center.

The first group of ASTP trainees was scheduled to begin March 1, 1943. It was anticipated that a group of 450 trainees would arrive at this time. The trainees were slated

¹⁸⁴ A letter to Chancellor Throop from an unknown source. One of the points covered is the possible increase of ASTP trainees to 700 including the 400 basic engineering already present adding 150 advanced engineering students and 150 Area and Language Study students.

¹⁸⁵ Western Union telegram, January 11, 1943. It is not clear how many meteorology students were scheduled to arrive at Washington University, nor is it clear how many meteorology students actually arrived. Different sources reference different numbers. It is likely that they were all correct at one point during the many discussions, but it is unknown how many meteorology students actually attended Washington University.

to be juniors and seniors in civil, mechanical, electrical, and chemical engineering. Based on this information, Langsdorf, the Dean of Engineering suggested that Throop delay submitting an Air Corps proposal “since it would preempt housing facilities and overload mathematics and physics departments whereas Army Specialist Program will utilize Engineering Departments.”¹⁸⁶ Dean Langsdorf’s recommendation proved to be sage advice because on April 19, 1943, Throop received a letter from Colonel Malcolm E. Craig asking if Washington University could accommodate more students because many of the institutions contracted for the ASTP “now have no facilities for housing and messing students.”¹⁸⁷

By April 1943, higher education administrators across the nation were beginning to feel the negative effects of what appeared to be the ASTP’s lack of planning. To make matters worse for the ASTP, the Navy’s V-12 program appeared to function without any problems. Trainees for the V-12 program arrived on campus on-time, programs began as planned, and the strain the Navy placed upon institutions appeared to be less demanding. For these reasons higher education’s praise for the V-12 program was rousing.¹⁸⁸

Throop became increasingly anxious about the delayed arrival of the ASTP student soldiers. In a letter to Fred J. Kelly of the U.S. Office of Education, Throop expressed his disappointment in the implementation of the Army’s program: “It is not in-

¹⁸⁶ Western Union telegram, February 12, 1943.

¹⁸⁷ Letter from Colonel Malcolm E. Craig to Chancellor Throop. April 19, 1943. Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1 - Army Programs

¹⁸⁸ “Army College Program Is Reported Bugged Down,” *New York Times*, May 22, 1943, p. 1.

tended to be a complaint, ... [b]ut it does seem possible that most of these could have been avoided and could be avoided in the future... with sufficient definiteness to meet the needs of the Army and put into operation without delay and without the waste of time and labor expense now involved.”¹⁸⁹ In addition to his letter to the Office of Education, Throop repeated his concerns often in letters and memos to the War Department and other Army related divisions:

The difficulty in this is that we cannot make our preparations sufficiently in advance to receive the students, and we cannot hold our staff together, especially in the technical fields. For instance, we are expecting to receive students in the basic and advanced phases of the engineering curricula early in June, but we have no official assurance to this effect: only the personal statement of the Seventh Service Command in Omaha, Nebraska, to the effect that it is expected that the units will arrive at that time.¹⁹⁰

It appears that the concerns of administrators regarding the lack of organization and follow through did not fall on deaf ears. In a separate letter dated April 28, 1943, from Joe N. Dalton, Brigadier General of the War Department, to Throop, Dalton stated that the primary problem was refining and improving the Army’s policies and procedures and increasing the flow of soldiers into the program so that training at selected institutions could begin as quickly as possible: “[W]e appreciate the many problems which confront you in changing from a peace-time to a war-time basis.”¹⁹¹ Aside from acknowledging the challenges faced by institutions, little was done to change how the Army adminis-

¹⁸⁹ Letter from Chancellor Throop to Fred J. Kelly, Office of Education, April 24, 1943.

¹⁹⁰ Letter to Brigadier General Joe N. Dalton from Chancellor Throop, May 1, 1943, Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs.

¹⁹¹ Letter from Brigadier General Joe N. Dalton to Chancellor Throop, April 28, 1943. Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs.

tered the ASTP.

As the ASTP struggled to implement its program, Throop remained dedicated to supporting the war effort. With various other wartime training programs already in place, the struggle to maintain the institution's availability for the ASTP while maintaining the institution's financial solvency were a challenge. Despite this, Throop stood steadfast in his belief that it was the "university's obligation to offer its every facility for war training" just as it was the university's responsibility to educate its students "to take a leading part in the post-war planning for peace."¹⁹² While the other war training programs appeared to operate with little to no problems, the ASTP continued to struggle until finally in May and June of 1943, trainees who had been scheduled to arrive in February finally began to arrive at contracted campuses.

Once trainees arrived at Washington University, the campus continued its transition from a peace-time to a war-time campus. The next chapter explores the details of this transition and the impact it had on the university. An analysis of the administrative challenges is discussed in greater detail along with the changes that were made in order to meet the demands of the delayed ASTP and the other war training programs. A better understanding of the challenges and the rationale for the subsequent decisions that were made by Throop are revealed in this analysis.

¹⁹² "W.U., 1941-1942," *Student Life*, December 8, 1942, p.2.

Chapter 5 - Transitioning from a Peace-time to a War-time University

In an effort to keep up with the needs of the war effort, Washington University, like colleges and universities nationwide, reassessed their policies and practices in order to meet the demand for the ASTP and the other war defense training programs.¹⁹³ Business practices of the past were unable to sustain a university during a war. Administrators, faced with shrinking enrollments and endowments, reconsidered their institution's position and role during the war era. As a result of this assessment, a new way of organizing and operating institutions emerged. As a visiting reporter noted, "Washington now is ... a military post and not merely a cloistered university."¹⁹⁴ Life on the once small, quaint, and quiet campus changed.

As a military center, a new breath of life spread throughout the campus that desperately needed relief from the effects of the Great Depression and the call to active duty. Campus life focused on contributing to the war effort; with that came many changes to both academic and student life. When asked the difference between being a civilian college student versus an ASTP student-soldier, one Washington student noted that their sleep schedule differed; now a member of the ASTP, the Army saw to it that all soldiers received eight hours of sleep per night — significantly more than he was accustomed to as a civilian undergraduate.¹⁹⁵ Whether this implied that life as a student-soldier was more or less challenging or socially engaging than as a civilian student is unknown; how-

¹⁹³ Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*.

¹⁹⁴ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 402.

¹⁹⁵ "Two Army Units Become Part of Campus Life," *Alumni Bulletin*, May 1943, p. 5.

ever, life on campus certainly changed.

Life at Washington University, both during World War II and during the lifespan of the ASTP, underwent serious changes in terms of its physical capacity, administration, faculty, curriculum, shifts in the academic calendar, and in its student body. Some changes were at the margins, others cosmetic, while others impacted how the university did business for years to come. This chapter commences by investigating changes that transpired at Washington University during its transition from a peace-time to a war-time university. It considers changes that resulted due to shifting objectives that include the ASTP and other war training programs. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the administration's response to the complexities created by the ASTP program.

Student Life, Washington University's student run newspaper, maintained a watchful eye on the movement of civilian and military students as the campus became entrenched in supporting the war effort. The newspaper monitored the comings and goings of military units and tracked the movement of civilian students as they made room for Army trainees. Housing was now a challenge for Washington University. For civilian students, making room literally meant moving off-campus, leaving behind their university accommodations. This included both male and female students. Dormitory spaces were revamped and converted to double or triple rooms. Students were vacated from their resi-

dence halls, including Givens, Lee, Liggett and McMillian Halls.¹⁹⁶ McMillan Hall, a dormitory dedicated specifically for women, became housing for military students. Givens Hall was remodeled “at the cost of several thousand dollars to accommodate 300 advanced engineering and area and language study army students.”¹⁹⁷ Most civilian students found housing in private homes and residences near the campus through appeals made by Campus YMCA-YWCA to congregations of local churches.¹⁹⁸ By the time Army students took up residence in Givens Hall in October 1943, approximately 2,000 soldiers enrolled in courses and training programs at Washington University.

Due to the limited space, women who came from out-of-town to attend Washington University were placed in a large off-campus residence as well as at a local hotels.¹⁹⁹ Similarly, fraternities were relocated to separate, off-campus locations.²⁰⁰ On February 26, 1943, *Student Life* reported that four houses on fraternity row would be taken over on March 10th by Army trainees to house 250 meteorology students. Later, around March

¹⁹⁶ Regarding McMillan Hall: “Engineering Students Arrive at Washington U.,” *The Globe*, June 11, 1943; “Givens Hall Now Serves As Barracks for Army,” *Student Life*, October 1, 1943. p. 5.

¹⁹⁷ “Soldiers Now Housed in Givens Hall,” *The Alumni Bulletin*, October, 1943, 13, no. 1 p. 1.

¹⁹⁸ “Students from Dormitories Now in Private Homes,” *Student Life*, March 5, 1943.

¹⁹⁹ “2 New Dorms for Out-of-Town Coeds,” *Student Life*, October 1, 1943; “Students From Dorms Now In Private Homes,” *Student Life*, March 5, 1943. p.3.

²⁰⁰ “Beta TKE, Sig Chi, And KA To Leave Row By March 10,” *Student Life*, February 1943. p. 1; “Sig Nu’s May Vacate Without Army Orders,” *Student Life* March 2, 1943, p.1; Report of the Chancellor, “Housing Women Students,” November 4, 1943, Ralph Morrow, War and the University, Box 3, F2.

7th, a fifth fraternity was displaced.²⁰¹ Fraternities, along with all other civilian students, continued to be relocated for the duration of the ASTP.

Declining enrollments and the addition of war training programs negatively impacted student life on hundreds of campuses. Washington University was no exception to this phenomenon. Extra-curricular activities dwindled. Homecomings were cancelled.²⁰² Greek organizations, athletics, student government, and student productions such as newspapers and performances all drastically reduced the frequency of their meetings, publications, and performances — if they were lucky; some activities were halted for the duration of the war.²⁰³ Student government, at first, began to reduce the frequency of their meetings before faculty ultimately placed a hold on their meetings altogether. Ironically, the very thing Americans were fighting for abroad – democracy, was being limited at Washington University with the hiatus of student government. However, the administration argued they lacked the faculty needed to facilitate or oversee the organization as a whole. As the number of faculty had dwindled, it was an understandable response to their situation.

Other extra-curricular activities were suspended due to a lack of student availability. Fraternity activities were placed on hold due to an insufficient number of civilian stu-

²⁰¹ “Beta TKE, Sig Chi And KA To Leave Row By March 10,” *Student Life*, February 26, 1943; “Sig Nu’s May Vacate Without Army Orders,” *Student Life*, March 7, 1943.

²⁰² “In Lieu of Homecoming,” *The Alumni Bulletin*, November 1943, 13, no. 2, p. 1.

²⁰³ “Quadrangle Club Suspends Musical Comedy Activities In Support of War Effort,” *Student Life*, August 31, 1942, pp. 1, 6; “Closed for the Duration,” *The Hatchet*, 1943, p. 115.

dents, while *Student Life* and other student run productions lacked the students needed to produce their products with the same frequency prior to the start of the war. The same held true for homecoming; the lack of students made homecoming obsolete. University athletics faced a similar situation: the high participation rate of young men in various training programs left few civilian students to participate in collegiate athletics. Adding to the demise of athletic competition, the ASTP, unlike the Navy's V-12 program, forbade student soldiers from participating in collegiate athletics. The ASTP forbade student soldiers to participate in organized collegiate sports due to its rigorous academic program and limited downtime; participants lacked the free time to engage in activities unrelated to the program. Unlike the ASTP, the Navy's V-12 program did not follow an accelerated time schedule; they were not preparing to train and deploy their trainees immediately.

Like the rest of the campus, the academic calendar was not immune to change. The campus transitioned from a semester system to a trimester-based system; it also increased the number of summer sessions that were held.²⁰⁴ Prior to the war, Washington had one 6-week long summer session; however, with the demand to graduate as many men as quickly as possible, summer sessions were extended to a full term of 15 weeks beginning summer 1942; in addition, they offered two 6 week sessions. Approximately 2,600 students attended in the summer of 1942. Prior to that, the highest summer enroll-

²⁰⁴ "On War Basis," *Student Life*, January 9, 1942, p.1. New academic calendar announced by Throop on this day in an assembly. The purpose of the new calendar was primarily to provide men with a full college education before going to war that would culminate with a bachelor's degree.

ment was 1,348 during the summer of 1938. Women, still received the option of summer vacation if they chose not to follow the accelerated program. This transition to a trimester plan and increased summer sessions meant that a four-year degree could now be earned in 2 2/3 calendar years.²⁰⁵

In addition to the university operating on a trimester basis, the university began to accept freshman three times a year.²⁰⁶ Now students had the opportunity to start their courses in the College of Liberal Arts in June, September, or February; they could also continue their courses without breaks. A comical yet somewhat cynical observation made in an article about college war training programs captures the essence of the impact that accelerated academic calendars had on college campuses: the author writes: “The other day a Princeton student left class to go to the washroom and missed his entire sophomore year.”²⁰⁷

While the creation of an accelerated program helped meet the needs and demands of government, it created problems and concerns for administrators and faculty. Of primary concern to educators was the belief that the quality of the classes would suffer at the expense of transitioning to a trimester system and an increasing focus on wartime programs. However, the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, William Bowling, expressed the belief that the quality of academic instruction would not suffer because of the

²⁰⁵ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 392.

²⁰⁶ “Bowling Anticipates Increase In Number of Freshman Women,” *Student Life*, October 1, 1943.

²⁰⁷ C.T. Reid, “College Level Training – War and Postwar,” *Southern Flight*. p. 48 (received July 31, 1943).

ASTP.²⁰⁸ Yet there were many factors to take into consideration regarding educators concerns. First, the quality of the curriculum received from the Army to the colleges and universities specifically for the ASTP worried faculty. These ASTP courses condensed the timeframe to teach the material from 15 to 10 weeks. Therefore, apprehension about the quality of the curriculum was two-fold. One concern questioned whether or not the curriculum had been watered down; if so, could the courses still be considered to be college-level? A second question asked whether instructors could teach the entire course within the shortened time frame? Although the Army consulted high ranking university officials and experts in various disciplines while developing ASTP's curriculum, ultimately the curriculum remained proprietary to the Army and the institutions were required, by contract, to teach the curriculum they received.²⁰⁹

Another concern swirled around the methods of instruction for certain academic fields. They raised a specific apprehension regarding the pedagogy used in foreign language courses. Prior to the implementation of the ASTP, foreign language instruction's primary focus was on developing reading and writing skills, followed by speaking and comprehension skills. Conversely, the ASTP's curriculum prioritized speaking and comprehension and focused only slightly on reading and writing. The Army argued that their primary concern, as related to foreign language instruction, was ensuring a soldier's abil-

²⁰⁸ "Chancellor Throop & Deans Discuss Education and War," *Student Life*, September 29, 1942, p. 1, 2.

²⁰⁹ "Joint Army-Navy Release," n.d. Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs, General.

ity to converse with the local population both quickly and effectively. The ability to read and write remained secondary to the Army's overall goal. Unlike academia, the Army cared little about providing soldiers with a well-rounded approach to the study of a foreign language. They simply wanted soldiers to learn to speak as quickly and as fluently as possible.²¹⁰

As Washington University transitioned from a peace-time to war-time campus, additional changes occurred outside of student activities and curriculum. The combination of the call to active duty and the addition of various war-time programs forced the administration to adjust its administrative structure and required them to recruit new instructors, specifically to teach the ASTP courses. As Chancellor of the University, Throop had oversight over all aspects of the institution. Everything from contracting with the government for war training programs, hiring faculty and approving their salaries, approving the purchase of equipment, and even the very color of paint and carpet that was used in buildings fell under the purview of the Chancellor. As Chairman of the General Administration, he oversaw the entire administration, which was divided into three units: Special Services, Administrative, and Academic.²¹¹

Within the administrative units, a division was created between units under the university's purview and programs whose administrators reported directly to the Army.

²¹⁰ Letter from War Department to Presidents of Institutions Participating in the ASTP. September 13, 1943. ASTP, Foreign Area and Language Study, University of Missouri Papers, 1943-1944, F6.

²¹¹ "Administration University and Army Programs Personnel Chart," n.d. Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs, General.

Of the seven administrative programs under the Army, five belonged to ASTP; the other two were the Army's Meteorology and Air Corps programs. The ESMWT also reported to the university because, though a government sponsored program, it had no affiliations with a particular branch of the military. A handful of administrators held multiple positions and juggled multiple interests. For example, William Bowling was Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and also oversaw the ASTP's Pre-medical unit. Similarly, Richard Jones oversaw the Graduate Division of Washington University while also being the administrator of the ASTP's Area and Language program. In another case Alexander S. Langsdorf, Dean of Engineering, was also a part of the University's General Administration. As far as academic units were concerned, the dean of each department reported directly to Chancellor Throop.²¹²

In terms of policies, a new tuition reimbursement policy was adopted by Washington University in January 1943 in response to announcements made that various groups of men were being called to active duty. Those who participated in the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) and the Air Corps Reserve (ACR) were called to active duty, while non-ERC students (i.e. civilian students) needed to report for the local draft board. Though these announcements had the potential to negatively impact Washington's enrollment, Throop received notice on January 27, 1943 that the Army Enlisted Reserve Corps (AERC) were unlikely to be called to service before March, April, or possibly June

²¹² Ibid.

1943.²¹³ As a result of this information, students enrolled in courses to continue progress towards their degrees; depending on their major, administration also encouraged students to augment their skill sets for the war effort. Washington University in turn, adjusted its tuition reimbursement policy in order to encourage enrollment by providing greater flexibility within their reimbursement policy.

Faculty shortages, common across institutions of higher education during World War II, proved no different at Washington University. As early as 1941, Throop noticed a depletion of faculty members and felt compelled to report this observation to the Board of Directors.²¹⁴ Much of the depletion of faculty in 1941 occurred as a result of the bombing of Pearl Harbor as many faculty members were called into service or went to work for the government or private industry. For example, Roy S. Glasgow, head of the Electrical Engineering program, moved to Washington, D.C., to work for the Armed Forces as a senior consultant on communication.²¹⁵ Arthur Hughes, head of the Physics department, left to become the director of personnel at Los Alamos.

Not only was it difficult to keep faculty from leaving, it also became difficult to replace those who left. Throop estimated that about 25 percent of the full-time faculty had volunteered for military or civilian service, or entered private industry.²¹⁶ The most acute shortages of faculty were in engineering, physics, mathematics and English — the

²¹³ Letter from War Department to University President. January 27, 1943. Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs, General.

²¹⁴ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 391.

²¹⁵ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 397.

²¹⁶ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 403.

areas most emphasized by the military. It was estimated that by January 1943, half of the English faculty had volunteered for military duty.²¹⁷ Consequently, the faculty shortage continued to worsen: “[T]he procuring of teachers in mathematics and physics, subjects which are common to and in fact the main part of all programs. Physicist [*sic*] are now worth their weight in gold, and mathematicians are not far behind.”²¹⁸

In its April 1943 bulletin, the American Council on Education (ACE), in regards to faculty personnel, expressed understanding that with the implementation of the Navy and Army programs, faculty deferments became a big question.²¹⁹ ACE acknowledged the possible strain on faculties; however, based on Occupational Bulletin No. 23, the ACE believed that while there may be shortages in specific fields, “available information indicates that no over-all shortage exists.”²²⁰ Suggestions to fix this problem included adjustments from within and among departments and the “loaning” of faculty members from one institution to another to meet some of the serious shortage issues: “In the fields of science, the National Research Council will be glad to assist in all legitimate transfers of faculty members, especially in physics and math.”²²¹ The bulletin explained that in April 1943 the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel requested colleges and universities to report both shortages and surplus of faculty personnel in order to cre-

²¹⁷ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 397.

²¹⁸ Chancellor Throop to Malvern Clopton, p. 5, April 6, 1943. Ralph Morrow, *War and the University*, Chapter 16, Box 3, F2.

²¹⁹ “Higher Education and National Defense,” Bulletin No. 52 issued by the American Council, April 15, 1943.

²²⁰ *Ibid*, 3.

²²¹ *Ibid*.

ate a national roster that, would hopefully be updated regularly; they hoped that, ultimately, it would “render valuable assistance in meeting not only the faculty personnel problem in their own institution, but also the total national problem.”²²² The situation did not improve. On January 8, 1944, Dean Bowling reported that “[a]lmost every member of our instructional staff is now engaged in some aspect of the military work in connection with the AST Units now stationed on [the] campus.”²²³

Part of the problem resided in the fact that certain subjects, such as physical sciences, engineering, and mathematics, became increasingly popular. These courses were popular not only because they were critical to war training programs, especially the ASTP, but also because civilian students sought to take these subjects as well. In an effort to both meet the demand for more instructors and fill the vacated positions, the university engaged in the practice of cross-instruction. This practice began during the 1942-43 school year and was expanded following year. Cross instruction required a current faculty member to go outside of their academic area to teach another subject. In 1943, Throop reported “that since Pearl Harbor, 15 percent of the hilltop faculty had taught courses in other than their home departments, a proportion large enough to support the contention that a side effect of World War II was to slow the thrust toward intellectual specialization

²²² Ibid.

²²³ January 8, 1944. ASTP Files, Box 3, Series 1, War Manpower Commission Status Reports.

that began in the nineteenth-century.”²²⁴

Losing critical staff left Washington University in a quandary; they had assured the government that they possessed enough staff to teach specific classes, but this was no longer the case: they needed to recruit new instructors. Upon learning the university needed instructors, several male faculty members offered their spouses as possible replacements. Many of these women, prior to marriage, worked as school teachers and might prove suitable substitute teachers for general education courses. The university also turned to local press corps, news departments, radio stations, and advertising firms to solicit English teachers. To find math instructors, they contacted high school teachers, civilian government agencies, or military personnel stationed in or near St. Louis. Foreign language instructors were sought from churches and other religious organizations. Private industry provided the majority of instructors for engineering programs.²²⁵

Faced with the serious issue of faculty shortage, Throop began to apply for draft

²²⁴ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 404. In addition to cross-instruction, departments and individuals who taught courses that were, on the surface, not directly related to the war effort felt pressure to adjust their curriculum to meet the war demands while simultaneously having to justify their department and course's relevance and value to the war effort.

²²⁵ Letter to The Rev. Louis Donanzan, August 21, 1943; Letter to Right Rev. V.J. O'Hara, August 10, 1943; Western Union telegram to Rev. Emil N. Komora, September, 1943; Western Union telegram to Dr. Alfons Nehring, September, 1943; Western union telegram to Luise A. Lenel, September 14, 1943; Letters of appointment for Dr. Melitte Gerhard, Mr. Silvio Muschera, September 1, 1943; Mrs. Virginia Stockhavesen McManon, September 8, 1943; Miss Pauline Costa, Mr. Cesare Auigni, September 18, 1943; Mr. Jack R. Parsell, September 21, 1943; Mr. Jean Saba and Mr. Joseph D'Elia, September 30, 1943.

deferment for some faculty on behalf of the institution. In April 1943, Throop wrote to Colonel Raymond W. Briggs of the 7th Service Command, seeking to defer the draft of certain staff members who played critical roles on the campus and were heavily involved in the ATSP. Colonel Briggs, though acknowledging the handicap the university faced without their faculty, asked Throop, “What would you do if they up and died on you or were sick or injured and in the hospital?”²²⁶ Though his reply was both morbid and realistic, it did little to assuage the challenges that lay ahead for Throop and Washington University with the continued military induction of critical members of the campus community. Ultimately, “the University relied heavily upon part-time faculty, almost forty of whom received appointments in July 1943 alone.”²²⁷

Much to the dismay of administrators across the nation, the implementation of the ASTP from concept to reality, created many additional challenges. As seen in the previous chapter, applying to host the ASTP was no small feat. It took a great amount of assessment and planning to accommodate the perceived needs of the Army. Inspections were conducted, housing was made available, instructors were hired, certain numbers of trainees were allocated to each institution, dates for their arrival were set, and then nothing happened. Washington had fully prepared for the scheduled arrival of trainees; however, the Army’s process of induction and assignment got off to a very slow start. To make matters worse, the Navy’s V-12 program, which was the Navy’s counterpart to the

²²⁶ Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs.

²²⁷ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 403.

ASTP, was lauded by administrators for its clarity of communication and planning. The Navy's success set against the Army's troublesome beginnings further revealed the problems associated with the implementation of the Army's program.²²⁸

One of the primary concerns for Throop was the anticipated arrival of Army trainees. When the ASTP was officially announced in December 1942, the Army communicated that a total of 2,100 men would enter colleges and universities as part of the ASTP in February 1943.²²⁹ Subsequent groups of men were scheduled to arrive in April, May, August, November and beyond until the program reached its capacity of 150,000 trainees.²³⁰ However, in February, institutions were still being approved for the ASTP, contracts with approved institutions were still being negotiated and trainees were still being tested and examined in preparation for placement. As it turned out, only 12 institutions were approved and had entered into contracts with the Army by April.²³¹ Washington's contract was not finalized until April, which when compared to other institutions, occurred much earlier during the span of the ASTP than was typically the case. Contracts with other institutions peaked in December 1943 with 227 institutions; however, this number fluctuated and began to decline in 1944. Eventually, Army trainees arrived at Washington University on June 1943.

²²⁸ "Army College Program Is Reported Bugged Down," *New York Times*, May 22, 1943; Letter from Chancellor Throop to Brigadier General Joe N. Dalton, May 1, 1943.

²²⁹ Military Government Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General, December 30 1942.

²³⁰ Military Government Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General, December 30, 1942; Letter from Omaha to Chancellor Throop, March 27, 1943,

²³¹ Eads, *A Study of the Army Specialized Training Program*.

For Throop, the problem with delayed and unknown start dates, along with the need to know how many trainees would arrive, was an issue of preparation. In a letter to Brigadier General E.W. Smith of the U.S. Army, Throop expressed his desire that the Army and its contract negotiators arrive at an agreement as soon as possible “in order that arrangements may be made and adjustments within the institution which will permit us to adapt ourselves to the situation.”²³² The process of being prepared for the arrival of trainees was all-encompassing. In order to prepare for their arrival, the campus’ physical capacity had to be rearranged to accommodate the needs of the ASTP. Civilian students were relocated off-campus, double rooms were converted into triples, and messing facilities were expanded. As far as teaching was concerned, additional instructors needed to be recruited, hired, and processed. In his efforts to make the university as ready as possible for the ASTP, Throop had already hired additional instructors and relocated civilian students off-campus in March. With the delayed arrival of the trainees, the newly allocated spaces and recently hired talent were left empty and waiting.

Empty residence halls and hired, but not yet working, instructors were a financial drain on the university’s already limited resources. In addition, the delayed arrival of trainees also impeded the university’s ability to recruit qualified instructors since other institutions and private industry were also searching for individuals with similar abilities. As Throop notes in a letter to Malvern Clopton, a member of the university’s Corporation, the university was having a difficult time securing instructors in math and physics,

²³² Letter from Chancellor Throop to Brigadier General E.W. Smith, February 8, 1943.

subjects, which were common and critical components of the ASTP, especially the engineering program. As mentioned earlier, not only was it difficult to recruit instructors in physics and mathematics as the demand for them had increased exponentially, but their salaries became commensurate with their scarcity.²³³

Throop continued to express his frustration that the main difficulty with the Army program remained the inability of the administration to “ascertain sufficiently in advance the coming of the units and what they desire.”²³⁴ By the time the ASTP reached peak enrollment rates in August 1943, the flow of trainees to and from institutions became reliable. Unfortunately, this did not last very long as rumors of the curtailment of the ASTP began in December. In March 1944 it was officially announced that the program would be liquidated.

Throop and other administrators and faculty members at Washington University were resourceful in attempting to collect, secure, and share the most recently available information from the War Department, their service command, and the Army. By inquiring across institutions, Washington’s administration was able to make changes at the margins. For example, in trying to determine the actual allowance per man, per month that should be anticipated for trainees in the engineering division of the ASTP, Dean Langsdorf contacted A.A. Potter, Dean of Electrical Engineering at Purdue University.²³⁵

²³³ Letter from Chancellor Throop to Malvern Clopton. June 14, 1943, p. 5.

²³⁴ Letter from Chancellor Throop to Malvern Clopton. June 14, 1943, p. 6.

²³⁵ Letter from A. A. Potter, Dean of Engineering at Purdue University to Dean Langsdorf, March 27, 1943.

Unfortunately, Potter had the same difficulty as Langsdorf in arriving at this type of allowance. The Army contracts made it especially difficult to make any calculations that could be used for planning purposes. Some line items did not carry over from month to month, whereas other line items were paid in advance and were subject to recall based on actual expenditures. On the other hand, if actual costs exceeded the payment, institutions had to wait for reimbursement.

The allocation of money proved a problem regarding the housing situation. Along with the challenge of making space to accommodate as many ASTP trainees as possible, housing was further complicated by the uncertain method of payment by the Army. In December 1942, it was only assumed that the government would pay the regular charges for tuition, board, and room; however, there was no assurance of this expectation for some time. This proved to be troublesome as the university moved forward with its plans to participate in the ASTP as they were unsure of whether the amount that would be offered by the Army would, in fact, actually cover the costs incurred.²³⁶

To a certain extent, the government was aware of the uncertainty that the ASTP caused for institutions. In an emergency supplement issued by the American Council on Education (ACE) regarding the ASTP and Navy programs, the ACE acknowledged that though there were now 488 colleges and universities that were “approved” to participate in these programs, this number would undoubtedly change as inspections were conduct-

²³⁶ Chancellor’s Report, December 1, 1942. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University Box 3, Chapter 16, War and the University.

ed.²³⁷ They recognized that campuses faced much uncertainty as to when trainees would arrive at the campuses and when the program would actually begin. The ACE also stated in April 1943 that:

due to factors largely beyond the control of those immediately in charge of the ASTP, a still further uncertainty has developed. There is as yet no assurance of the number of men who will be detailed at the training programs and hence the extent of the 'approved' facilities which will actually be used. There is accumulating evidence that the number may be less than originally planned. Delays have already occurred in the sending of men to the institutions for the ASTP and it now appears that the program will not be in operation in any significant number for at least several weeks, and probably not in full operation until June or July. In the light of this fact, colleges and universities are urged to delay any adjustment of housing of students, of student schedules, and in capital outlay until the contracts are negotiated.²³⁸

The acknowledgement of the delay in the program and the suggestion that institutions should in turn, adjust their plans and processes was an attempt to provide updated information in advance to institutions. This was especially the case for Washington which had already entered into a contract with the Army, part of which was based on the immediate availability of all the space and services outlined above.

Throop was an eager administrator. He worked tirelessly to ensure he had the most up-to-date and accurate information. Often, though, he lacked sufficient information to proceed without difficulty. Despite of all of the shortcomings of the ASTP, Throop felt “reasonably sure that [the University would] come out of [the] year without great difficulty. . . . Fortunately we are in rather good condition, and do not have great expenses, so

²³⁷ “Higher Education and National Defense” issued by the ACE, Bulletin April 5, 1943, no. 52. p. 1; Chancellor Throop, Series 15, Box 1, Army Programs.

²³⁸ Ibid.

far as I know, confronting us. We shall probably have a very much more difficult time after the war is over than we have now”²³⁹

Fortunately for Washington University, Throop had already begun to consider and anticipate possible financial difficulties after the war. Just as he was concerned about the financial viability of the institution since the Depression, Throop remained focused on discovering ways in which Washington could leverage its facilities and talent for the overall financial health of the institution. As we will see in the next chapter, Throop’s plans for a postwar institution included taking advantage of the ways in which the institution meet the wartime demands to assist in the war effort. Not one to be nearsighted, Throop recognized the importance and the need to develop Washington’s engineering program as this would be the vehicle to not only help Washington transition back to a peace-time institution, but also develop Washington’s engineering program to increase its national reputation. In turn, greater prestige meant greater opportunities for research, campus development, endowments as well as expanded opportunities for student development.

²³⁹ Letter from Chancellor Throop to Malvern Clopton, April 6, 1943, p. 6.

Chapter 6 - Assimilating to Life in the Post-war Era

Multiple factors changed higher education during the postwar era. For Washington University, the ASTP proved a catalyst for change. Washington University changed many of its policies and practices in order to meet the wartime demands for the ASTP and other wartime programs.²⁴⁰ While many of the changes at Washington were made to accommodate the short-lived program, the institution's participation in the ASTP identified ways in which Washington could contribute to the training and development of educators, researchers, and leaders in the postwar era. The first half of this chapter examines the challenges and opportunities that occurred as a result of changes in the university's administration that took place prior to the dismantling of the ASTP. The impact of the ASTP on Washington's School of Engineering is also examined since this became the primary site of opportunities for growth and development in the postwar era. The subsequent section explores how Washington University developed and strengthened its prestige by capitalizing on its contribution to the war effort through its participation in the ASTP and other military training programs. All together, these changes helped the university to transition back to a peace-time campus, while still widening its sphere of influence and securing its place as a leader in engineering research in the postwar era.

One of the more significant challenges that opened an avenue of opportunity for

²⁴⁰ Washington University temporarily lowered its graduation requirements, created a war service tuition refund policy, made credit recommendations for participation in the ASTP, maintained multiple teaching terms which in turn created the need for multiple commencement ceremonies.

Washington University was due to an unexpected transition in leadership. At the December 1943 meeting of the Corporation, Harold B. Wallace, President of the Corporation, read Throop's request to retire on June 30, 1944, or to go on leave indefinitely.²⁴¹

Throop's request was not anticipated nor was it precipitated by a particular event or issue. Throop simply stated that he was tired and wished to retire. As news of his retirement began to spread, rumors about poor health circulated; however, these proved to be unsubstantiated. At first Throop stated that it would be better if he were to retire once a successor was appointed. Ultimately he did not believe that this was critical to his eventual retirement, as evidenced by the fact that it was not until June 27, 1944, just three days prior to Throop's retirement, that Harold Wallace was appointed Acting Chancellor of the University by the Deans and Administrative Officers of the University.²⁴²

However reluctant the Corporation may have been in approving Throop's retirement, Throop's departure from the Chancellorship created an opportunity for growth and expansion. During his appointment, Wallace considered the immediate and future needs of the university. He began to change the university's administrative structure by creating

²⁴¹ "Retirement of Chancellor Throop," Minutes of the meetings of the Corporation, December 2, 1943, Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 3, Chapter 16, War and the University, F2.

²⁴² "Retirement of Chancellor Throop," Minutes of the meetings of the Corporation, December 2, 1943; "Enthusiasm over University's Future Reflected in Gifts to Alumni Fund," *The Alumni Bulletin*, 14, no. 6, July 1945, p.2; Report of the Chancellor, June 6, 1944, "Appointment of Acting Chancellor and Executive Council"; "H.B. Wallace Named Acting Head of W.U.," *St. Louis Star-Times*, June 28, 1944. Harold B. Wallace was a member of the Washington University Corporation for 32 years. He was President of the Corporation from 1942 until 1951.

new positions and made changes that directly impacted faculty in a positive way. He created a Dean of Men's position, which helped to boost campus morale through the stimulation and coordination of student activities.²⁴³ Other additions to the administrative structure included the development of a Veteran's Service Bureau, developing the Department of Social Work into the School of Social Work, as well as helping to procure an endowment for the School of Music.²⁴⁴ Wallace also increased faculty salaries and supported the recruitment of stronger faculty members.²⁴⁵ In addition, Wallace also made many improvements to the campus with funds received from the Army for the restoration

²⁴³ "A Boost to Morale" *Student Life*; "Douglas V. Martin Named Dean of Men at W.U." *The Alumni Bulletin*. October 1944, vol. 14, no. 1. p. 3; Report of the Chancellor, February 28, 1945. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 7, Chapter 16, Part 1, F1.

²⁴⁴ "Acting Chancellor Wallace presented the following statement of progress of the University since he took office", Senate Record, February 28, 1945. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 7, Chapter 15, Part 1, F1. As part of the support for discharged veterans, Washington University announced in October 1944 that it developed a system to award college credits based on service in the armed forces. Credit would "be given for work completed in the Army or Navy college training programs, for courses completed under the United States Armed Forces Institute, and for educational development as measured by tests given either by the Armed Forces Institute or by the university"; "College Credits for Discharged Veterans, *The Alumni Bulletin*, vol. 14, no. 1. October 1944, p.8; "Statement of Policy Regarding Credit in Washington University for Returning Members of the Armed Forces" Morrow, Unused notes, Ch. 16, F3. Communication between James (last name is illegible) and Dr. Ralph Morrow regarding the transition from Throop to Wallace and then Compton. April 30, 1982. "Acting Chancellor Wallace present the following statement of progress of the University since he took office", Senate Record, February 28, 1945. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 7, Chapter 15, Part 1, F1.

²⁴⁵ "Acting Chancellor Wallace present the following statement of progress of the University since he took office," Senate Record, February 28, 1945. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 7, Chapter 15, Part 1, F1.

of facilities formerly used by the ASTP.²⁴⁶ Likewise, he addressed other items of deferred maintenance. For these reasons, Wallace's appointment received both excitement and enthusiasm from the campus community and alumni alike.²⁴⁷ Though these improvements warranted much appreciation from the campus community, evidence suggests that the Chancellor's search committee had other concerns that it wished to address.²⁴⁸ However, these issues did not dampen the campus' excitement for the changes that were taking place.

One of Wallace's greatest accomplishments as interim Chancellor proved to be his recruitment of Arthur Holly Compton to the Chancellorship at Washington University in April 1945. Compton's appointment even surpassed the excitement surrounding Wallace's changes to the institution.²⁴⁹ As the ASTP, at first slowly and then quickly, dis-

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ "Throop Reported Planning to Quit at Washington U," *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, May 18, 1944; "Throop's Successor Being Considered," *The Globe*, May 19, 1944; "W.U. Loath to Let Dr. Throop Quit," *The Globe*, May 21, 1944; "Retirement Plan for Dr. Throop Approved," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 28, 1944; "Chancellor Throop Resigns; H. B. Wallace, Acting Head," *The Alumni Bulletin*, July, 1944 13, no. 6, p.1.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Letter from Wallace to Compton. October 19, 1944. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, Box 3, F2. "A Resolution of Appreciation" Adopted April 17, 1945; "A Boost to Morale," *Student Life*; "Douglas V. Martin Named Dean of Men at W.U.," *The Alumni Bulletin*. October 1944, vol. 14, no. 1. p. 3. A resolution of appreciation was adopted by the Corporation and was subsequently, permanently recorded in the annals of Washington University congratulating and praising Wallace "for his service to the University as Acting Chancellor and for his initiative and foresight in securing a man of Dr. Compton's unique qualifications for the Chancellorship of Washington University." Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, Box 3, F2. In February 1985, the Alumni House and Washington University honored the Wallace family by acknowledging H.B. Wallace's contributions to the University and credit him with identifying "the

mantled, and the war came to an end, Wallace recognized that science and technology would become increasingly important areas of knowledge and critical components of research in the postwar era. Compton, a world renowned scientist and educator, was poised to raise the profile of the university. Knowing that having Compton as chancellor would strengthen the university in a number of ways, Wallace relentlessly recruited Compton. Even after Compton urged Wallace to continue the search without his name due to his wartime commitments, Wallace urged the Corporation to do nothing more towards securing a Chancellor with the hope that the end of the war would provide Compton the freedom to reconsider the offer.²⁵⁰ “[T]he element of time in the development of a University which will live on for centuries,” said Wallace, “does not enter into the importance of securing the man who can best capitalize and produce outstanding results.”²⁵¹ Eventually Wallace’s perseverance paid off when Compton accepted the position as Washington University’s 8th Chancellor.

importance of finding a distinguished academic and educator to lead Washington University toward new goals after World War II. It was [Wallace], persisting in his quest for excellence, who convinced Arthur Holly Compton, . . . , to come to St. Louis as Chancellor of Washington University. It was he who poised the institution for its take off as a national research university.”

²⁵⁰ Letter from Wallace to Compton, October 19, 1944. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, Box 3, F2; Letter from Compton to Wallace, April 30, 1945; A.H. Compton, Postal Telegraph from Compton to Wallace, October 10, 1944. Compton was clear to communicate to Wallace that he was committed to war time responsibilities including work for the Government and the University of Chicago and because of these commitments he was unable to accept the appointment.

²⁵¹ Letter from Wallace to Compton, October 19, 1944. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, Box 3, F2. Letter from President of the Corporation [Wallace] to Compton, July 14, 1944.

Compton's appointment to the Chancellorship provided more opportunities for the University to develop its infrastructure and personnel as it transitioned to a peacetime campus. Compared to Throop, who led from behind the desk, Compton proved to be an excellent emissary for the university and the city of St. Louis. Unlike Throop, a professor of Greek, Compton's academic and research background closely matched government's interest in research and the industry's focus on product development in this new, postwar era. A man of international repute, Compton was a Nobel Prize winning physicist and a leader of the Manhattan Project. He possessed a reputation for excellence in education, teaching, and research. Similar to Throop, Compton understood the importance of developing partnerships external to the institution in order to successfully navigate a postwar world. A sign of confidence in Compton's ability to help Washington achieve greater success showed in the increase of alumni support. The *Alumni Bulletin* reported that the university's endowment began to receive "a steady increase in Alumni Fund gifts," which continued even after the issue went to press.²⁵²

Prior to the war, the role of the chancellor was an all-encompassing position that blurred the lines between doer, seeker, and leader. However, as the university transitioned from war mode and began to grow in many different ways, one person could no longer lead and manage all facets of academic, institutional, and student growth. As a result of these changes, the role of the chancellor became more narrowly defined and a greater di-

²⁵² "Enthusiasm over University's Future Reflected in Gifts to Alumni Fund," *The Alumni Bulletin*, July 1945 14 no. 6, p. 2. The largest amount of money donated to the university occurred in 1942 and totaled \$23,422.06.

vision of labor became necessary. An increase in administrative workloads made it necessary to create new positions of leadership within the administration. To this end, an Office of Central Administration (OCA) was created. The Chancellor remained the authoritative figurehead of the university while the position of Vice Chancellor was created to oversee policies across the schools, university contracts with third parties, including the government, and to plan the development of the university.²⁵³ Also part of the OCA was the Dean of Faculties who oversaw the development and ensured the satisfaction of campus faculty, while the Director of Business Administration tracked university spending. An OCA position for a Director of Public Relations was also created to interface with the public. Other members included the Deans of Men, the College of Liberal Arts, the Graduate School, the Medical School and the Director of Business Administration.²⁵⁴ Together, these administrators were responsible for moving the institution forward in a deliberate and planned manner.

Cognizant of the need to restructure the work between admissions and record keeping, Compton created a central registrar's office and a Dean of Admissions position was created to oversee both the Office of Admissions and the Office of the Registrar.²⁵⁵

In addition to managerial oversight, the Dean had two primary responsibilities: adminis-

²⁵³ Bulletin to Deans and Chairmen of Departments from Chancellor Compton. ASTP Files, Box 1, Series 1, Administrative Notes, August 1, 1946. Mr. Charles Belknap was appointed to this new position. He had previously been the President of Monsanto Chemical Company. His appointment is effective October 1, 1946.

²⁵⁴ ASTP Files, Box 1, Series 1, Administrative Notes, August 1, 1946.

²⁵⁵ ASTP Files, Box 1, Series 1, Administrative notes. August 1, 1946. Bulletin to Deans and Heads of Departments from Chancellor Compton.

ter admissions policies and procedures that were “formulated” by faculty and the Deans, and to approve or deny the admission of students.²⁵⁶ Prior to the war, Washington University did not have a selective admissions process as applicants were considered for admission based on their high school record and a handful of necessary documents. In most cases, the cost of tuition for regular full-time enrollment proved too prohibitive for working-class and some middle-class families; the cost of tuition made the admissions process selective on its own.

Challenges and opportunities for change at Washington University were not limited to the administrative realm. Academic programs also changed and adapted to new approaches as a direct result of Washington’s participation in the ASTP. Faculty and administrators, in response to the nontraditional teaching methods used by the ASTP, sought to develop and prepare a new generation of educators through expanded curricular options. For example, Washington established a physical education major in September 1945 as a direct result of the ASTP’s requirement that all trainees participate in five hours of physical education per week.²⁵⁷ At first, Washington took the military’s physical education requirement and made it a prerequisite for graduation. The decision to incorporate physical education resulted from Throop’s belief that it was Washington’s “responsibility to do what [it] can to turn out educated men who are physically fit to take their places in

²⁵⁶ Letter from Stearns to Compton, July 6, 1946. ASTP Files, Box 1, Series 1, Administrative notes; August 1, 1946. Bulletin to Deans and Heads of Departments from Chancellor Compton.

²⁵⁷ “New Curricula Announced, Physical Education B.S. Degree Offered By Washington U,” *Student Life*, September 13, 1945, p. 1.

the armed forces of the United States.”²⁵⁸ However, less than six months after the graduation requirement was implemented, the physical fitness ability of male students had improved more than 23 percent.²⁵⁹ Based on the positive results rendered by the physical fitness program, Washington began to offer a bachelor’s of science degree in physical education in fall 1945.²⁶⁰ Washington anticipated that the field of physical education would continue to expand and develop in the postwar period to incorporate theory and practice, anatomy, kinesiology, and various psychologies to help meet the increased demand for primary and secondary teachers of physical education.²⁶¹

Despite the interest in developing physical education programs, the instruction of foreign languages received most of the attention from faculty and national academic foreign language organizations. This resulted from the ASTP’s Area and Foreign Language program’s relatively high success rate in teaching trainees to speak and comprehend a foreign language in a very short amount of time. The high success rate was an outcome of the Army’s strict emphasis on verbal fluency; their non-traditional emphasis on speaking, instead of reading and writing proved effective. Though some instructors deviated from teaching the prescribed curriculum due to their own teaching pedagogy, they were reprimanded.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ “23% Improvement Shown in Gymnasium Program,” *Student Life*, February 4, 1943. p. 4.

²⁶⁰ “Physical Education B.S. Degree Offered By Washington U.,” *Student Life* September 13, 1945. p. 1 vol. 70; “Physical Training For Men Intensified,” *Student Life*, August 21, 1942. p. 1, 7; “Washington U. Plans Training For War,” *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, September 27, 1942.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

manded by university presidents by order of the war department and ordered to teach the program as the Army dictated and not tradition. Despite that, the majority of teachers worked with the ASTP's curriculum and pedagogy, which allowed trainees as much practice as possible speaking and listening since this was, according to the War Department, "[t]he most satisfying language instruction for ASTP trainees."²⁶²

As the Army's need for soldiers shifted, Washington University both changed instructional policies and created new ones to adjust to the loss of the ASTP program. These changes manifested in many areas, but especially in regards to tuition; Wallace, during his time as Chancellor called, for a proposal to raise tuition for the 1944-45 academic year.²⁶³ The cost of educating a student had risen as the income that the university received from investments and the Army declined. As the cost of living had increased approximately 20 percent over the past three years, the proposal suggested that the charge for tuition reflect this change by raising rates from \$250 to \$350 a year.²⁶⁴ Not only would the tuition increase help offset the reduced purchasing power of the dollar and the loss of Army revenue, but also provide the funds needed for merited adjustments in salaries for faculty and staff members. The increase in revenue would also allow the university to offer better salary packages to potential faculty members.

Ultimately, the proposed increase in tuition resulted in another study that con-

²⁶² Letter from the War Department to Presidents of Institutions Participating in the A.S.T.P., Folder 6, University of Missouri, September 9, 1943.

²⁶³ "Recommendation for Increasing Tuition," Report of the Chancellor, July 10, 1944.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

ducted an investigation of tuition rates at other private institutions. The study concluded that even during typical times when compared to other private institutions, Washington University's tuition was still lower than the national average. Based on fall registrations, the Board of Directors approved increases in tuition for the College of Liberal Arts, the Schools of Engineering and Architecture, the School of Business and Public Administration, the School of Law and University College. Tuition increased from \$125 to \$175 per semester for full-time day students (i.e. civilian students) and became effective for fall and spring semesters in 1944.²⁶⁵ During this time, it was also recommended that increases in tuition for students in the School of Graduate Studies, the School of Fine Arts, the Summer School, and for part-time students at the university not be raised until after spring 1945.²⁶⁶ Tuition increases were not considered for the Schools of Medicine, Dentistry, or Nursing at this time.

Overall, Washington University's administration proved relatively successful in managing a variety of programs with limited resources. The changes that occurred at Washington University in the immediate postwar era resulted from the many decisions that were made years earlier. In some cases, the decisions and plans made on behalf of the university in the postwar era happened due to the university's direct involvement with the ASTP and other war training programs. The ASTP's emphasis on engineering was

²⁶⁵ "Recommendation for Increasing Tuition," Report of the Chancellor, July 11, 1944. Ralph Morrow History of Washington University, Box 7, Unused Notes, Chapter 16, Part 2, F1.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

especially important for the University's School of Engineering. In 1939, the school was rapidly approaching dire straits. In response to Chancellor Throop's request for an estimate of the financial needs of the Department of Electrical Engineering, Chairman Roy S. Glasgow reported, "As mentioned last year, we are in urgent need of several pieces of rather expensive equipment, but I see no hope of obtaining them unless special funds for the purpose are somehow secured."²⁶⁷ In addition, Glasgow also sought to increase faculty salaries in an effort to retain certain faculty members. However, his requests were left unfilled.²⁶⁸ Fortunately for the School of Engineering, World War II was a technological war, which required the development of new weaponry and industries to support the war effort. The School of Engineering was poised to benefit from the war if it could leverage its estimated value to the war effort in the postwar period.

On October 7, 1942, The School of Engineering at Washington University received an anonymous gift in the amount of \$27,531.25. Including other gifts from the same donor, the total gift amount reached approximately \$100,000 by December 1942.²⁶⁹ The timing of the gift was serendipitous, remarked Throop; including other gifts from the

²⁶⁷ Letter from Roy S. Glasgow to Chancellor Throop, March 13, 1939. ASTP Files, Box 1, Series 1, Budget 1930-1939.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ "Anonymous Gift to Engineering," Report of the Chancellor, October 15, 1942. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, Box 3, F2.

same donor, the total gift amount reached approximately \$100,000.²⁷⁰ During the inter-war years, the School of Engineering suffered, perhaps more so than any other school or department at Washington University. It neither reaped the benefits of the war industry during WWI nor did it escape the financial downturn caused by the Depression. Equipment for the programs was outdated, the buildings were victims of deferred maintenance, and Dean Alexander Langsdorf worried that the meager salaries would do little to prevent faculty from taking jobs elsewhere.²⁷¹ However, World War II spurred engineering schools across the nation. Engineering programs swelled as they began to train and educate thousands of civilians and military personnel.²⁷² The war, said Wallace, “convince[d] key people, that technology [was] destined to play a leading role in the post-war world. ... Locally, [the School of E]ngineering could claim to be giving more toward winning the war than any other division of the University.”²⁷³

With the knowledge that the School of Engineering stood to make the greatest impact to the war effort, came the revelation that it would be in the best interest of the University, its School of Engineering, and the city of St. Louis to develop the engineering programs at Washington University. The remainder of this chapter traces the development of Washington University’s School of Engineering from “a curious establishment”

²⁷⁰ Ibid. At the time, the School of Engineering consisted of: Chemical, Civil, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering. The anonymous donor requested that his/her donation only be used to purchase equipment for any of the departments except Chemical Engineering.

²⁷¹ Morrow, *Unused Notes*, Ch. 16, F2.

²⁷² Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 409.

²⁷³ Ibid.

to a local and national leader of industrial research in the postwar era, which brought with it much needed funding opportunities. The section also argues that Washington's participation in the war training programs, specifically the ASTP, were key factors in being able to leverage this important development.²⁷⁴ To understand the significance of the development of Washington's Engineering departments and its subsequent financial gains, it is necessary to begin the story just after the Depression, a time when Washington's financial situation was at its lowest. By taking a step back in the history of Washington, we can observe what the university did to help offset the financial disparities, but also how the development of the engineering department rose to become the university's greatest asset.

Not unlike other organizations, the Depression was not kind to higher education. In 1932, Throop reported a \$200,000 decline in income in Washington's budget from its endowments and investments. By November 1933, this deficit had increased to \$500,000.²⁷⁵ By the end of 1934, it was estimated that Washington's income had dropped another 15% from its 1933 starting point.²⁷⁶ Positions were left unfilled, departmental budgets were continuously reduced, and faculty members who remained received increased teaching loads; however, not all who worked were paid. Fortunately, by mid-1937, the economy began to turn around; increased job opportunities and higher salaries

²⁷⁴ *Hatchet*, 1943.

²⁷⁵ "Drop of Half Million In University Income Announced by Throop," *Student Life*, November 3, 1933, p.1.

²⁷⁶ "W.U. Operating Income Nearly 15 Pct. Under '33," *The Globe*, December 21, 1934.

marked this trend.²⁷⁷ In spite of a promising economic outlook, in February 1938 the university was still operating with a \$400,000 deficit.²⁷⁸

At first, the university tried to assist and offset the impact of its declining income. As a means of addressing the issue of joblessness in the early 1930s, the university began to offer tuition free courses to unemployed men and women who had completed two years of college work.²⁷⁹ The College of Liberal Arts, Business, Engineering, Law, and the Graduate division, each participated in this program.²⁸⁰ Next, in an effort to lessen the impact of the overall financial condition of the university, Throop reduced salaries 5% in 1932 and then another 5% in 1934.²⁸¹ Despite the fact that the economy appeared to be in a mode of reconciliation, the university attempted to sell some of its real estate in July of 1939 as nearly 58% of its endowment was in real estate holdings.²⁸² Although the decline in Washington's endowment could have been worse, Throop clearly indicated that the institution was certainly not wealthy as a means to justify the administration's decisions to reduce salaries and sell portions of its property.²⁸³ As the 1930s drew to a close, the university began to recover financially and student morale began to improve. Yet, during

²⁷⁷ "Boom Days Here for College Grads," *The Globe*, June 30, 1937.

²⁷⁸ "Chancellor Says University Is 'Not Wealthy,'" *Student Life*, February 4, 1938, p. 1,3.

²⁷⁹ "How Unemployed May Enter Washington U.," *The Globe*, September 3, 1932; "Washington U. Free Tuition Sought By 400," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, September 9, 1932. (2735)

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ "Washington U. to Reduce Salaries of Professors and Other Employees," *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 26, 1932; "Washington U. Staff to Get 5 Pct. Pay Cut on December 1," *The Globe*, October 29, 1932.

²⁸² "Washington U. Trying To Sell Real Estate," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 25, 1939.

²⁸³ "Chancellor Says University Is 'Not Wealthy,'" *Student Life*, February 4, 1938, p. 1, 3.

this recovery period, the financial needs of the School of Engineering did not remain a priority. However, during the 1942-1943 academic year, the school came “into its own.”²⁸⁴ The School of Engineering rose to new heights as enrollments increased, and the school cultivated both prestige and strength as it became a leader in industrial research in the Mississippi Valley.

The School of Engineering made great strides during World War II; however, its resources did not keep pace with the advances in engineering technologies. With the advent of the war training programs, especially the ASTP, the school’s facilities became taxed while its programs quickly reached capacity. Soon the programs were overcrowded and understaffed.²⁸⁵ Aware of the challenges confronted by the School of Engineering even before the ASTP began, Throop was cognizant that the School was in a particularly prime position to leverage the heightened importance and awareness that now surrounded developments in engineering technology. Throop expressed his belief that Washington University stood at the threshold of opportunity at the October 1942 board meeting:

This would be an excellent time, owing to the acceleration of production and income in engineering industries, to make a vigorous attempt to collect funds for the purpose of developing the School of Engineering and supporting it in the future. It is probably true that many individuals and firms would be interested in contributing on a generous scale to this purpose, who would not be interested in other parts of the University. The various engineering industries represented in the city have a stake in the School, and I believe would respond to an attempt to place the

²⁸⁴ *Hatchet*, 1943.

²⁸⁵ Report of the Chancellor, February 19, 1942. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, Box, 3, F2. “The situation in the School of Engineering, on the other hand, is considerably complicated by the increase in enrollment, as well as by the depletion of the staff for civilian or military purposes.”

School of Engineering on a footing comparable to the other well-known institutions of the country. Funds might be accumulated on an annual basis sufficient to warrant even building operations in the future, and it is doubtful if a better time than the present could be found.²⁸⁶

In his statement to the Board, Throop outlined his vision for the development of the School of Engineering. He envisioned a collaborative effort, one where private industry would advance funds to the School of Engineering in order to purchase equipment necessary for research and in turn, the School would conduct research for the benefit of the stakeholders. Through this reciprocal relationship, Washington's School of Engineering would be able to procure equipment necessary for the functions of research, while the research itself would help to raise the institution's prestige and it would be of benefit to the local community.

With this vision in mind, Throop turned to Dean Langsdorf, who created a detailed three-option plan, formalizing Throop's concept. In his plan, Langsdorf boldly made his case to support the development of the School of Engineering: "Only a dynamically growing institution may hope to assume its proper function in the growing world that lies ahead."²⁸⁷ In other words, failure to plan to grow as an institution and failure to be responsive in a changing world would be to the detriment of the school and institution as a whole. The "life of the city and of the University are interdependent," asserted Lang-

²⁸⁶ "Anonymous Gift to Engineering," Report of the Chancellor, October 15, 1942. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, Box 3, F2.

²⁸⁷ "Summary of Plans for the Development of the School of Engineering of Washington University" 1943. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 3, Chapter 16, War and the University, F2.

sdorf.²⁸⁸ The industries in St. Louis “furnish practical experiences for the students in the School of Engineering and the School, in turn, supplies trained engineers to the industries. ... Here are opportunity and responsibility.”²⁸⁹

Langsdorf’s plans were multidimensional. There were direct benefits for the School of Engineering and local industry along with indirect benefits for the university. Specifically, the School of Engineering wanted to increase its enrollment to 800 students as it attempted to increase its prestige as a research based program.²⁹⁰ However, to achieve these goals, the school needed to increase its capital. To this end, three financial plans for the development of the School were offered. Under each of the three plans, money was allocated to three areas. The first area allocated money for the core engineering departments: chemical, civil, electrical, and mechanical engineering. For each of these departments, Langsdorf budgeted to hire more faculty, purchase more equipment and supplies, and to hire research assistants. In the second area, he allocated money to provide some financial support to other engineering and engineering related departments on campus; these included administrative, architectural, and geological engineering as well as chemistry, mathematics, and physics. The last area sought to establish three new engineering departments: aeronautical, diesel engineering, and metallurgy. Plan I required an additional \$150,000, whereas Plans II and III required an additional \$235,000 and \$328,000 a year respectively. In addition to the anticipated annual expenditures, the

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

plans also included the erection and furnishing of certain buildings as well as the cost of upkeep. Each plan included an estimated cost of \$350,000 for buildings and \$150,000 for the maintenance of these buildings. Based on document analysis, it is not clear which of the three plans the university approved; however, the university launched its campaign to raise money for its engineering development program in 1943.²⁹¹

By November 1943, Throop reported that “consistent and steady efforts” had been made towards raising additional funds. With pledges from local industry, the school had raised about \$140,000 toward the goal of raising \$150,000 to support the School of Engineering.²⁹² Companies such as Century Electric Company, Busch-Sulzer Diesel Engine Company, the Gaylord Container Corporation, the Mississippi Lime Company, Western Cartridge Company, and others had donated to this fund.²⁹³ These companies expected that their donations would help fund the development of programs that related to their industry. As part of the development process and in an effort to meet the demands of the new partnerships, the school launched the three new engineering programs.²⁹⁴ In turn, these programs benefited from external funding as they pursued research and projects for companies and organizations in the areas of design and instruction in the use of diesel engines, aeronautical engineering and in metallurgy. Washington University stu-

²⁹¹ Report of the Chancellor, November 4, 1943. Ralph Morrow, History of Washington University, Box 3, War and the University, Chapter 16, F2.

²⁹² Morrow, Unused Notes, Ch. 16 F4. Report of the Chancellor, “The Engineering Development Program,” November 4, 1943.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

dents also benefited from applied research opportunities while the institution continued to develop and increase its prestige. Eventually, a committee formed to manage the development fund; it included many local industrialists and civic leaders.²⁹⁵

As support for the fund continued to develop, the financial base grew and a new committee emerged. At a Board meeting on December 12, 1944, the Corporation of Washington University authorized the creation of a Committee on Research in Applied Sciences to seek, secure, review, and approve industrially sponsored research projects.²⁹⁶ The research projects selected for this program were required to advance scientific knowledge, provide opportunities for professional development for both the faculty and student body, and to attract and retain faculty while increasing the institution's prestige.²⁹⁷ The committee's acceptance of a particular project came with the understanding that the project gave "promise of a worthwhile addition to scientific knowledge useable for teaching purposes."²⁹⁸ In essence, the development of this committee ensured a mutually beneficial relationship between the corporation or individual sponsor and the university. Research projects accepted by this committee were required to be in accordance with

²⁹⁵ *The Alumni Bulletin*, October 1943 13, no. 1, p. 2. Members of the committee included John Olin, chairman, Damon D.B. Wack, E.D. Nims, Harry Bussmann, William K. Norris, Percy Orthwein, Hayward Niedringhaus, W. Stuart Syminton, H.B. Wallace, John B. Strauch, Leicester Faust, J. Russell Coulter, H.B. Mathews, J. Wesley McAfee, J.S. McDonnell, Jr., Chancellor George R. Throop, and Oliver F. Richards, secretary.

²⁹⁶ "Outline of Plan for Industrially Sponsored Research Projects in the Washington University" Revision of December 6, 1944. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, Box 3, F2.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

all university procedures and regulations imposed on them as a federally funded organization.

After the committee met with great success, less than a year later, a new research foundation was incorporated by the University. On November 30, 1945, under the Chancellorship of Arthur Compton, a non-profit corporation for research and development for work beneficial to the "general expansion of industry" was incorporated.²⁹⁹ While the Committee on Applied Research successfully obtained third party contracts, their success was seemingly driven by H.B. Wallace's efforts to recruit Compton to Washington in 1944. During the recruitment phase, Compton clearly expressed an interest in developing specific cultural and scientific projects at Washington provided he had "full cooperation and support from industries and leading citizens."³⁰⁰ To this, Wallace told Compton that he had "already been enthusiastically assured of this support."³⁰¹ By the time the research foundation was incorporated, Compton had assumed the Chancellorship and wrote about the connection and importance between research and the community in the foundation's inaugural brochure.

Ultimately, the Research Foundation both defined and broadened the scope and benefits of research for the university. The foundation defined Washington University's Research Foundation's (WURF) purpose and sought to engage in research projects com-

²⁹⁹ Washington University Research Foundation Booklet. November, 1945.

³⁰⁰ Letter from Wallace to Compton. October 19, 1944. Ralph Morrow, Chapter 16, War and the University, Box 3, F2 .

³⁰¹ Ibid.

panies or other organizations would sponsor. These projects would contribute to the development and improvement of the immediate region for the public good, and research for the purpose of national defense. Each project would be proposed to the Research Director and the Research committee. Together, they would discuss the project's feasibility, duration, probable cost, and identify relevant staff and equipment that would be needed for the project. In addition to having control over project selection, the Foundation also had "at its disposal the staffs of all the scientific and engineering departments of WU."³⁰² It is not known how the foundation's ability to assign projects to university faculty impacted faculty appointments; however, the foundation's ability to assign university's faculty and staff to a project is a testament to the university's value on the importance of research in the postwar era. Even more, the fact that the foundation was originally put forth by the State of Missouri's Legislature, demonstrates the state's awareness on the importance of research and its plan to participate in postwar economic development. The incorporation of the foundation did, indeed, place Washington University in an interdependent relationship; as Dean Langsdorf asserted, it was necessary to become a "dynamically growing institution" in order to assume its proper function in the growing world that lies ahead."³⁰³

This chapter has argued that through the challenges of participating in the Army's program, Washington University also experienced many opportunities for growth and

³⁰² Washington University Research Foundation Booklet. November, 1945.

³⁰³ "Summary of Plans for the Development of the School of Engineering of Washington University," 1943.

development. Administratively, changes occurred due to the unforeseen retirement of Chancellor Throop; however, the change in leadership provided an opportunity to reorganize, redefine and create key administrative positions. In addition to changes at the administrative level, participation in the ASTP proved to be a catalyst for change. In particular, due to the Army's physical fitness requirement, Washington University created a new physical education major. However, the end of the ASTP also brought with it the need for Washington to restructure its tuition policy as part of its plan for success in the postwar era. Lastly, Washington's involvement with the ASTP created what was perhaps the single most important opportunity for Washington: the chance to not only contribute to the war effort, but also raise the university's reputation. Under Throop's direction, the campus was able to capitalize on the importance of engineering by creating a plan that would help develop the engineering school through a third party funding program. The success of the program not only elevated the school's obscure position within the institution, but it also launched Washington's reputation as a viable research partner with local industry. Together, the changes influenced through its participation in the ASTP helped to secure and promote Washington University's position as a leader of industrial research and education in the Mississippi Valley.

Through the many changes that occurred at Washington University, as either a direct or indirect result of its participation in the ASTP, we have learned a lot about the impact of wartime training programs on higher education. Moreover, through these experiences we can observe how an institution's response to a wartime demand helped institu-

tions prepare for the thousands of veterans who would eventually return to the nation's institutions to utilize their GI Bill benefits. The concluding chapter to this dissertation reviews the significance of the ASTP on higher education and why this often overlooked program should be included in our understanding of the impact of World War II on institutions of higher education.

Conclusion

This project originally began as an investigation of the impact of the GI Bill on institutional administrations. Given the prominence of the Bill in the literature and the attention it gained in popular culture, I anticipated finding information from and between university administrators, faculty, and other constituents detailing the experiences of implementing and adjusting for this new postwar program. However, much to my disappointment, there was relatively little information in not one or two, but *three* university archives. The archives did contain primary sources that mentioned the Bill; however, not enough information was present to make an argument about the Bill's impact at the institutional level. There was information about the need to increase the institution's physical capacity, to hire more faculty due to increasing enrollments, yet this information could not be correlated to the GI Bill specifically. For a moment, I thought my research could speak to the lack of information regarding the Bill; however, this too was not sufficient for a dissertation.

At a loss about how to proceed, I returned to the secondary literature. It was during this re-examination of Washington University's history that I discovered a brief, yet critical statement: "Correspondence with the armed forces occupies more space in the chancellor's records for 1943-44 than any other item... ." ³⁰⁴ The reference to the "armed forces" included, but was not limited to, the Army Specialized Training Program. My curiosity was piqued and I embarked on a quest to learn as much as possible about the

³⁰⁴ Morrow, *Washington University in St. Louis*, 400.

ASTP. The process of discovery proved to be a challenge. There was a significant lack of information in the literature on higher education and World War II regarding wartime training programs with the exception of V.R. Cardozier's book.³⁰⁵ His book describes the impact of World War II with specific attention to the various wartime military and government wartime training programs that occurred on the nation's colleges and universities. This dissertation builds on his work by providing an in-depth examination of how the ASTP impacted a particular institution. The more I learned about these programs and about the ASTP in particular, the more I began to realize that there was a connection between the development of higher education in the postwar era and the military due to the presence of programs such as the ASTP.

The conclusion of this dissertation begins with a review of what we know about the military training programs and higher education while identifying the gap in the literature that my dissertation addresses. Next, I review my central arguments which are followed by an examination of the contributions this dissertation makes to the literature on higher education and the Army Specialized Training Program. Next, I explore questions that were left unanswered and those that surfaced while conducting this investigation. I also include a discussion about opportunities for future research. Lastly, I conclude with a brief description of what occurred at Washington University in the late 1940s as the GI Bill made its mark on higher education.

³⁰⁵ For more information about V.R. Cardozier's book, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, see Chapter 1.

While the GI Bill has undoubtedly made significant contributions to the development of higher education and provided greater opportunities for access, these changes did not begin with the implementation of the Bill as generally explained in the literature. As my dissertation demonstrates, the demands placed upon institutions for programs like the ASTP created the need for institutions to quickly mobilize their faculty and staff along with creating space for unprecedented enrollments within a short amount of time. To attribute these changes to the postwar era fails to recognize the significance of the World War II training programs on higher education.

The primary purpose of the ASTP was to train young men for war, but as this program developed, though, it became a financial lifeline for institutions due to declining enrollments. The program also proved to be a catalyst for changing how higher education operated. The relationship created by the ASTP between universities and the military helped to bring higher education to the forefront of American minds for its military usefulness, while providing an opportunity for higher education to become more engaged in the nation's struggles. The broadening of higher education's reach and influence just prior to the passing of the GI Bill created an opportunity for significant growth and expansion in a myriad of ways. Higher education was no longer a cloistered ivory tower; it had become part of mainstream America.

Central to my argument has been the importance of the administration's response to the war time demands placed upon higher education. In addition, I argue that these responses helped to shape, build and contribute to the development of the institution of

higher education and the larger community. I examined the impact of the ASTP and the ways in which it provided the framework for the development of new and creative policies and practices, some of which ultimately impacted issues of access. I accomplished this by using Washington University for a case study analysis.

By examining how an administration responded to the ASTP, we can begin to understand how institutions began to change before the GI Bill was implemented. While it is true that institutions needed to manage the large numbers of veterans returning with the Bill's benefit, campuses were already in the process of expansion and accommodation due to their involvement with these programs. It appears that the story of the ASTP was obscured by other war-related issues, and the large scale of the GI Bill. The Bill's role in the transition back to a peacetime economy also overshadowed scholars' interest in the wartime programs. This dissertation is the first attempt in understanding the connection and intersection between the military and higher education that goes beyond observing how the military used higher education to further its own interests. Rather, this dissertation's primary contribution is that it examines the agency of an institution and how it used the military to further its own interests in the post war era.

The second major contribution of this dissertation is that it begins to question the existing concept that the GI Bill expanded access to higher education. From this dissertation it can be argued that the significance of the ASTP and other war training programs cannot be limited to its military function of training young men for technical positions during times of war. The program had greater implications for the development of higher

education in the postwar era. One of the implications discovered through this research is that higher education had already demonstrated its ability to respond quickly and effectively to national needs prior to the implementation of the GI Bill and prior to the ASTP. This not only helped the war effort, but it began the process of expansion and accommodation previously thought to have begun in the postwar era. It is also quite possible that the ASTP provided increased access to higher education however, in order to make this assertion, more research in this area is needed.

During the course of this research project, as with any project, new questions were raised while others were left unanswered. For example, although it was not a requirement for participation, the War Department encouraged institutions to award college level credit for trainees who took ASTP courses. While I was not able to confirm that this practice took place at Washington University, there is evidence in the primary sources to support the assertion that Washington intended to award credit for ASTP courses.³⁰⁶ Also, due to the accelerated academic year, along with other changes to policy that allowed students to graduate early it is likely that Washington awarded college credit for ASTP courses since there were five commencement ceremonies held during the 1943-44 academic year. After all, the trainees were not only academically qualified, but they were future officer material because admission requirements for the ASTP were the most rigorous of all the wartime training programs.

Future research would benefit from an examination regarding the awarding of col-

³⁰⁶ ASTP Files, Box 1, Series 1, College Credit for ASTP Work.

lege-level credit. Even more, it would be interesting to learn what happened to trainees who did not complete their education prior to the end of the ASTP. Did they return to return to complete their degrees after the war? Did they return to the same institutions or did they enroll elsewhere? If they enrolled elsewhere, did their new home institution award credit for their military training courses? Did they eventually earn degrees? Answers to these questions will help us to determine if the ASTP helped to democratize educational opportunities. It may be difficult to find answers to these questions; however, institutional educational records have the potential to provide answers to these questions.

While my dissertation has added to our understanding of the ASTP and its impact on higher education, more research is still needed. The ASTP was just one of many war training programs that occurred during WWII. Other programs that would benefit from further research include the Navy's V-12 program, national defense programs such as the Engineering, Science, Management War Training program, the Army's Meteorology program, the Women's Auxiliary Corps as well as the 6 all-black ASTP units. It would be insightful to examine how these programs individually and collectively impacted specific institutions and student populations during World War II and beyond. Through an examination of these programs we can also hope to gain insight as to how they helped to democratize or diversify higher education. Some questions that may be considered might include: In what ways did these programs develop research opportunities in higher education? How did the programs, if at all, provide opportunities for social mobility after the war through increased opportunities for access or employment? If we limit the scope of

our investigations as we explore the developments and relationships of higher education solely to the GI Bill and the postwar era, we fail to recognize the importance of the events and decisions that occurred prior to the Bill's implementation.

Although the ASTP was a short lived program, there is much that can be learned from the experience of the program from the institutional perspective. For Washington, the program proved to be a significant part of its survival during World War II, while becoming a springboard for growth after the war. In the years before the ASTP, Washington University continued its pattern of growth and development that began to emerge as the war ended. During the 1947-48 academic year, enrollment at the university reached "flood tide" status with over 17,300 students.³⁰⁷ According to Compton, "[t]his was the challenge for which [Washington University] had been preparing."³⁰⁸ When asked if the university could maintain high standards with such a large enrollment, for Compton the answer was clear: "The educational outcome has been good," he said referring to the overall development of the university in the postwar era.³⁰⁹

The administrators at Washington University understood their responsibility to the community and the nation and were committed to continue improving the quality of teaching and research. They opted to limit the size of their student body, strengthen their teaching staff, provide the facilities necessary for research and instruction in order to de-

³⁰⁷ "The Chancellor's Message: The Task of Education in 1948, Washington University's Place in Meeting this Task," 8.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

velop their students and make a unique contribution to education in the Mississippi Valley. For Washington University, the ability to accomplish these goals is the legacy of the ASTP and other programs. For us, their experience provides a window through which we can assess the impact of the Army's program on higher education.

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