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### Author

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Heritage Modernity:  
Heritagization of the Grand Canal and Everyday Life in Hangzhou, China

By

Shu-wei Tsai

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

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University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor You-tien Hsing, Chair

Professor Michael Johns

Professor Nelson H. Graburn

Professor Margaret Crawford

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## Abstract

Heritage Modernity: Heritagization of the Grand Canal and Everyday Life in Hangzhou, China

by

Shu-wei Tsai

Doctor of Philosophy in Geography

University of California, Berkeley

Professor You-tien Hsing, Chair

This dissertation examines how heritagization indicates modernity, which provides a city with a new social and cultural experience and aspiration from exploring the past. This modernity—heritage modernity, suggests an improved society and promised future while this modernity does not claim a total break with the past.

The Grand Canal in Hangzhou, China, is chosen for this empirical study. As the city is recognized as a tourism city with three UNESCO World Heritage sites in this decade, the dissertation explains how these social, economic, and cultural processes configure the urban spatial setting and its cultural preservation. The urban cultures and the city have been under redefinition as heritage machine has reformed local communities, their local identities, and memories associated with the city.

Heritagization of the Grand Canal involves three processes: the canal's disuse, the starting of preserving the canal, and the growing awareness of the canal heritage. This study indicates a series of social-spatial process regarding heritagization, and heritage modernity is the product of the growth machine and developmentalism social-engineering projects. Heritage modernity utilizes the past to prepare and support the urban agenda. However, the pursuit of it excludes unwelcome pasts and undesirable social groups in the path to a bright future. Thus, heritage preservation is better understood as heritagization as the latter indicates how heritage has been used for current urban development projects.

Chapter One reviews existing scholarships on approaches of critical heritage studies, and it addresses four themes discussed as current issues of heritage preservation: local development, museum and the modernity-making, social-engineering, and performance. The following chapters use the case study to elaborate on each theme further. Chapter Two introduces how the Chinese Grand Canal becomes a national heritage site and how local states triggers the “heritage machine” to evaluate potential heritage sites with the belief in developmentalism. This chapter also discusses how the use of heritage, finance, and the levels of recognition determine its



practical, social, aesthetical, and cultural value in the era of heritagization. Chapter Three examines the making of the World Heritage Qiaoxi Cultural District in the context of urban renewal and heritagization. By museumification, aestheticization, and invention, the mechanism of sanitation excludes filthy parts of the local histories and environment, and transformed this area as a heritage-themed cultural district. Chapter Four discusses the “returning residents” in the resettlement community. This area in its post-industrial development is a residential and commercial area, with the general increase in rent in Hangzhou, this area attracts middle-class people to move in and results in gentrification. However, besides the coming of these new Hangzhou residents, the original residents faced social reshuffling, and social expectation, material compensation, and generational differences have complicated social relations. This social process implies that despite the heritagization stresses on the idea of on-site living preservation of the Grand Canal and local communities, social and spatial transformation still takes place by the Grand Canal heritage. Chapter Five discusses how cultural heritage in Hangzhou is remade to represent the city’s image by examining its legacies in the development of tourism and two mega-events held in this city. The four dimensions regarding heritagization suggest how heritage as tools for social inclusion and exclusion works in contemporary society in which a new type of modernity becomes dominant in urban life and urban experience to citizens.

Heritagization shapes the temporal and spatial relations in the contemporary urban context and indicates and expects a new social and cultural order provided by heritage modernity. By the new arrangement of heritage representation and social-spatial engineering, this modernity, in turn, redefines the social subjects to be modern to follow up the pace of developmentalism, sanitation modernity, modern housing, and the making of a venue city with virtues such as civility and tolerance. This modernity shapes the image and characters of a city and heritage become renewable resources that can be invested and represented.

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## Chapter 1: Heritage Set in Motion

My family and I first visited Hangzhou in the winter of 1993 via a short flight from Taiwan. I cannot recall much of the city on that trip, but I do remember going sight-seeing to West Lake. Local friends of my parents guided us on a boat tour of the lake. However, the West Lake Pavilion was under repair and closed to the public. We had several typical Hangzhou dishes, such as Dong Po Pork, West Lake Vinegar Fish, and Longjing Shrimp at Louwailou, a famous and touristy restaurant in the lakeshore area. We visited the Yue Fei's Tomb and heard from local friends about the famous Qiantang River tide, another tourists' wonder in Hangzhou. While we heard many stories of local history, not one word was uttered about the Grand Canal throughout our visit. Several years later, I learned of the Chinese Grand Canal from high school textbooks in Chinese history class. It was the embodiment of hydraulic knowledge and political ambition combined; it was a gigantic engineering project that mended the north-south geographical imbalance of China, and a military facility to transport goods and grain tax. It was one of the symbols of China's imperial control, but, to the general public, it had no status as a cultural relic to commemorate.

I revisited Hangzhou in the summer of 2015. At that time, the Grand Canal was a newly enlisted World Heritage (WH) site that crossed six provinces (Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong, and Henan), two provincial-level cities (Beijing and Tianjin), 35 cities, and 58 heritage sites. Hangzhou is one of the 35 cities, and the Grand Canal became the city's second WH site after the inclusion of West Lake in 2011. As only half of the canal is still operational, the Hangzhou section is fortunate to still be able to display its living nature. The Gongchen Bridge area in the Gongshu District is the canal's most famous heritage area that accommodates traditional art and craft centers. Its western part is a recognized WH site and is home to an ancient and beautiful bridge—also a WH site. The area is further-graced with a modern museum cluster, which includes a canal-themed museum and a canal plaza. All were built in recent decades. In addition to West Lake, the canal quickly became the second-most popular cultural center since its inscription on the World Heritage List in 2014.

To me, the canal was an old piece of infrastructure that I learned about at school. It was difficult to suddenly regard it as a piece of precious cultural heritage, not to mention its sudden transformation into an officially recognized cultural heritage site. This phenomenon aroused my curiosity about how the presence of thousands of years of ancient heritage had been modernly preserved and centralized within a mere two decades.

As a human geographer, I ask how the already-existing canal becomes a newly-enlisted WH site and how this process affects local communities and nations as a whole. How would this title change the existing canal ways? What is the use of the afterlife of the Grand Canal as a WH heritage, and how would it change? How do locals become aware of new cultural recognitions over existing artifacts after heritagization? How and why does a cultural heritage site become necessary in terms of its practical use and aesthetic value? What do citizens consider this heritage to be, and does it matter to local communities?

This introduction reviews the relevant literature before the telling of the canal's heritage stories in the following chapter. I start with the introduction of the World Heritage Convention and its practices over the past decades.

## 1.1 Heritage Boom and Critical Approaches: UNESCO World Heritage Convention since 1972

This subsection introduces the background of the most recognizable international practice conducted by the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Convention in 1972 and its social and political implications for heritage studies.

Conventional heritage studies tend to emphasize the importance of the material originality of heritage sites and how scientific methods can evaluate heritage with objective standards. In this sense, the only recognizable heritage that could be verified as worthy and feasible to preserve would exist. This approach follows scientific methods to evaluate heritage. In so doing, the method commonly seeks general and universal values of heritage and, consequently, erases its meaning and history. Moreover, these science-based disciplines, combined with formal education, co-construct the “authorized heritage discourse” (L. Smith, 2006a, p. 11) and privilege heritage with “universal value” by scientific verification. This science-oriented preference, and the materially biased approach in evaluating heritage result in the rising power of formal institutions and some specific disciplines—for example, archaeology, planning, and architecture (Winter, 2013).

Conventional views of heritage preservation, however, have been practiced and authorized through dominant global institutions led by the UNESCO World Heritage Convention. Harrison (2013) observes that the political aspects within the preservation scheme of the concept of “World Heritage” indicates “thinking in particular ways about the relationship between objects and the past, and about the role of the state in using particular objects to tell particular kinds of stories about its origins and to establish a series of norms with which to govern its citizens” (p. 42). In this sense, heritage preservation is explicitly linked to the political realm from the very beginning. Moreover, UNESCO’s efforts have created a “global public sphere” and “active cosmopolitan citizenship” in which diversities within heritage assets are regulated and instrumentalized into the formation of the “cultural commons” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 2006).

From this, two major implications of the UNESCO World Heritage scheme come to light. Firstly, not only is the convention a common practice, but it also shapes heritage discourses and hierarchy. As previously mentioned, the emphasis on the universal value arouses fears on the uniformity of heritage that can easily dismiss its local diversities and preservation practice. Moreover, the support from some global institutes, such as the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and UNESCO, may serve to limit the voices and perspectives of other cultural practices. Di Giovine (2009) holds that the UNESCO World Heritage List is not only the dominant global institution but also a global place-making endeavor that creates a “heritage-scape” that “totalizes worldwide differences.” (p. 411) Moreover, this scientific-based approach to heritage, with its focus on material forms and objects, tends to gloss over social and historical backgrounds. Herzfeld (2004) points out that, within this structure, even “the rhetoric of tradition and modernity is not only the epiphenomenal expression but one of the most critical instruments of hierarchy” (p. 30). This discourse asks for “universal heritage value” for humankind, thus forcing the convention to act as “a totalizing discourse representing a global hierarchy of value” (Harrison, 2013, p. 64). In short, this form of practice and discourse has designated the priority of each heritage site and set its level of cultural significance, thereby homogenizing heritage.

The second implication relates to the actors of nomination and inclusion. States are the only actors qualified to nominate heritage to the convention. This discussion focuses on the political aspect of cultural heritage at a global level. This implication somewhat dismisses the

first in its admission of the important role and power still held by individual states—but is still indicative of modern states, rather than the owners of the “cultural commons” holding power. As a result, heritage sites, assets, or practices must be recognized and nominated by a state which may well be only attempting to strengthen its own cultural and political agenda by doing so. These practices remind preservationists and scholars of the preservation politics found in different geographical levels and teach them how to effectively deal with the issues of originality and universal value from the start of the process to the inclusion on the List. However, not all of this is to say that the UNESCO World Heritage Convention is wrong to bear the task or evil by doing so. Rather, it serves to remind more critical and open perspectives to instead study heritage from social, cultural, and geographical approaches.

Conventional heritage studies focus far more on the materiality of tangible heritage objects or physical sites and therefore neglect the social relations between material heritage and its surrounding social contexts. The most important revision to this conventional approach is to regard, and critically review, heritage in its social contexts so that the meanings of its production and representation at the time of its creation should be considered more worthy of interest than the objective components of an artifact. In other words, the critical approach aims to recognize that heritage is never univocal in its meaning-making processes. This tendency also guarantees the importance of seeing the heritage creation process in terms of state-building projects. Therefore, despite the necessity of viewing the World Heritage practice as a global preservation endeavor, the nomination and evaluation processes require the state to scrutinize its own political stance and cultural policies to proceed. This will be further discussed in the following section.

These two implications suggest concern over not only the loss of diversity through the “authorization process” but also the politicized process by nation-state actors. For conventional heritage studies, these political and social aspects might be unnecessary, since the only focus lies on the materiality and verification of the originality of heritage sites or objects. However, the fix provided by critical heritage studies is to see heritage as a process rather than an unchangeable object. It seeks to explain the “chains of connectivity” between heritage and its audiences and see the dialogue between these actors as the essence of heritage studies (Harrison, 2013). This view sees heritage as an active process in which human actors, for a wealth of reasons, determine to promote and evaluate a historical object or practice as important and worthy of contemporary attention (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1998). In recent discussions, critical heritage scholars have focused on the “geographical turn” (Winter, 2013) and the perspective from the cultural landscape itself (Taylor & Altenburg, 2006) to suggest that heritage is highly context-dependent and “situated” (Winter, 2013) in geographic conditions, such as location, landscape, and geopolitics.

This focus is vital to framing this research from a geographical perspective from the research design’s inception. For this dissertation, the concept of “heritagization” is essential as it suggests “the process by which objects and places are transformed from functional ‘things’ into objects of display and exhibition” (Harrison, 2013) rather than merely holding on to artifacts. The process and how it has been related heritage into contemporary society would be the main focus of critical heritage studies.

Instead of asking questions that interest planners, historians, and archaeologists such as “How can we reuse heritage?” or “What was the use of heritage,” this study attempts to answer the following question: “How is heritage used at multiple geographical levels?”. This study aims to relate heritage preservation with the perspectives of human geography and critical heritage

studies. It starts to discuss contemporary heritagization from four social-spatial dimensions: heritage machine, sanitization, gentrification, and performance.

## **1.2 The Heritage Machine: Political Economy of Cultural Sites**

Heritage can be a resource for local development in the neoliberalism trend and the era of cultural commodification. The neoliberal turn signals the shift in paradigm from the Keynesian model to the Schumpeterian model (Cox, 1993) and it indicates place-based economy emphasizes more on investment rather than production. In the 1960s, urban governments provided social services, such as housing and education, to improve living conditions within their jurisdictions. In the 1970s, this was replaced by entrepreneurial governance in terms of dominating the redistribution systems at the transition from the Fordist to the post-Fordist mode of production (Harvey, 1989). This neoliberal trend brought by global capitalism not only determines the spatial form of a city or region but also plays a pivotal role in urban governance in Western society. In other words, land-based development and investment and the stakeholders become dominant in contemporary urban political economic sphere.

This transition resulted in a wave of urban growth with increased populations and the creation of business-friendly environments as its key features. Eventually, this entrepreneurial turn serves to transform a city into a “growth machine” (Molotch, 1976). The concept of the “growth machine” deals with place-based boosterism and stands in opposition to the urban ecology theory proposed by the Chicago School in which a city is seen as an empty place to be “naturally” taken or invaded. Instead, Molotch argues that “place-based” and plural interests, along with planning on economic development by local elites, such as rentiers, sports teams, businessmen, newspaper publishers, real estate investors, and bankers, affect both the use of land and local politics. The ranks of growth coalitions are also swelled by a range of additional players, such as universities, media and utility owners, business representatives and civic organizations, cultural leaders, and labor unions (Logan & Molotch, 2007). The alliances of urban elites, with their shared interests in local economic growth, are thus firmly partnered in the pursuit of business-friendly and market-oriented forms of city governance and resource allocation. Cities are “growth machines” that attract higher populations and redistribute employment. This concept supports the notion that place-based growth would necessarily benefit the overall well-being of the city. In this sense, “place” must, therefore, compete with other localities for public resources to gain the preconditions of growth. This ideology influences local government to view cities not just as places where people live, work, and form social relationships, but also areas where it is imperative to create a good business climate for enterprises to “vote by feet” (Logan & Molotch, 2007). This entrepreneurial turn indicates the decline in the importance of social welfare in favor of economic profit, and the subordination of social policies to economic development (Jessop, 2002).

This trend is spreading to Chinese cities where market-oriented economy has replaced command economy in 1979 after reform under Deng Xiaoping, who took over after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976. The post-socialist political regime can be characterized by the impersonal nature of its rule, which is in stark contrast to the personal and ideological rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders under Mao. Most importantly, the post-Mao regime decentralized territory and function within a fragmented bureaucracy (Lieberthal, 2004), and granted not only higher degrees of autonomy but also the flexibility to the local state.

One of the most salient similarities between neoliberal Western cities and post-socialist Chinese cities is the increasing role of local states to act like entrepreneurial entities. Decentralization and marketization have been prominent features in post-Maoist governance



patterns. Although the central government still has the power to appoint key local officials, it has reduced its direct involvement in local development projects and empowered municipal governments to lead economic development efforts. Most importantly, cities in higher positions of administrative hierarchy enjoy more autonomy, financial resources, and greater access to transport infrastructure (W. Wu & Gaubatz, 2013). Consequently, decentralization is often accompanied by frequent administrative changes in post-reform China; this “inflated urbanization” is a direct result of localities seeking greater autonomy and freedom to stimulate local development in post-Maoist cities (Chung & Lam, 2004). On the other hand, marketization (along with decentralization) has contributed to the rise of the local “developmental state” (W. Wu & Gaubatz, 2013). This type of local state actively pursues global capital and guides the direction of economic policies. In comparison to neoliberal cities in the U.S., it is the local state (Shepherd, 2013), not the public-private, pro-growth coalition that is the instigator of land-centered development with planning strategies (W. Wu & Gaubatz, 2013). The important role played by land politics in post-Maoist China serves to exemplify social transition and institutional continuity.

The different institutional background and social system, however, largely determine the game rules and the players in local development. In China, the economic reform of 1979 allocated resources through a dual-track system (Naughton, 1995), thus avoiding strong impacts to the economy while initially adapting rural areas to a market economy. In rural areas, the market economy resulted in the successful industrialization and economic growth of the Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs). It should be noted that the specific forces behind this success are currently under debate—they might be local governments (Oi, 1992) or private capitalists (Y. Huang, 2008). In cities, state-led economic development welcomed foreign capital, which allowed State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to proliferate in the 1990s (Y. Huang, 2008). The remaining social systems and institutions work to influence the competition over territoriality.

Considering the other social systems in use, such as the Household Registration System (the *hukou* system<sup>1</sup>), SOEs, and the work unit (*danwei*<sup>2</sup>), urbanization processes in different locations — namely, urbanization in the urban core, urban fringe, and rural fringe — have determined the extent of these processes in post-Maoist China (Hsing, 2010). Urbanization in the urban core can simply be termed “urban redevelopment.” Since the land system is often blamed for its inefficiency, municipal governments use urban planning and market reasoning to take over the urban spaces previously controlled by SOEs. Consequently, the pre-existing SOEs and *danwei* compounds are under threat either from the city government (Hsing, 2010) or from the need for self-sufficiency (Bray, 2005). Urbanization at the urban fringe includes urban expansion and the industrialization of the rural TVEs. The former process is accompanied by

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<sup>1</sup> The *hukou* system stratifies the population into ‘agricultural’ and ‘non-agricultural’; the categorizations determine the service and eligibility that individuals can enjoy. The urban population is eligible for social services provided by local governments, such as medical care, childcare, housing subsidies, and education for children. In contrast, the rural populations have access to these programs through their rural collectives, the quantity and quality of these social programs are highly dependent on the conditions of each rural entity (Chan, 2009). As a result, rural-to-urban migrants face the immediate challenges of having little social security in cities, so the discussion on spatial mobility usually concerns the *hukou* system.

<sup>2</sup> Work unit, of *danwei*, provides not only the salary but also social services such as housing, childcare, and medical care for its members. Work units belong to the socialist organization that distributes social welfare rather than the market mechanism. Members of the same *danwei* are both colleagues and neighbors. *Danwei* is the predominant source of identity among urban residents (Bray, 2005).

deindustrialization, flows of capital, change of urban land use, and the development of suburban housing and transportation (Yixing Zhou & Ma, 2000). The latter process involves the rise of “corporatist villages” (Hsing, 2010), which must bargain for greater resources with which to develop local infrastructure, and monetary compensation for the land lost in the urbanization process. Lastly, urbanization in the rural fringe is demonstrated by the small-town development program. This urbanization empowers township governments to legally develop collective lands at a low cost (Hsing, 2010).

Local states in contemporary Chinese cities follow neoliberal trends as previous institutional constraints have been loosened, if not entirely removed. Since local states are largely responsible for local revenue and spending, the most available asset—land—began to be utilized in growth machine politics. According to the constitution of the PRC, the land is classified as either state-owned urban land or collective-owned rural land. The basic rationale of land ownership established at the outset of the PRC has remained unchanged, even after the 1979 economic reforms. Land use is still regulated through the dual-track land system, meaning that land, depending on its status, can be transferred from the urban plan track of administrative allocation or the rural collective sector (G. C. S. Lin, 2009). This dual-track system, however, is inconsistent with the reality of the commercial development of land markets. Moreover, institutional deficiencies, such as the undefined level of collective ownership, customary law, and an incomplete legal framework, reinforce this “institutional ambiguity” (P. Ho, 2010). The economic or political efficiency of this model has seen much controversy and debate. On the one hand, Ho has argued that this “deliberate institutional ambiguity” is a designed arrangement by the central government to allow flexible local arrangements and provide a buffer against large-scale social conflicts. On the other hand, Lin (2009) has suggested that the definition of land is not fixed—it can only be exercised and understood in terms of dynamic social, political, and economic processes. Hsing (2010) agrees with Lin and further argues that this institutional gap and inconsistency provides a physical and discursive basis for the state, users, residents, and villagers to claim their “territoriality.” These institutional settings and gaps result in more implicit game rules in land politics in Chinese cities.

As such, heritage is often used as part of the cultural commodification process and to trigger local development in both rural and urban areas. Consequently, heritage preservation became more closely involved with the private endeavor and incentivized local development interests as well as investment by private sectors and local governments. As heritage is essentially place-based and contains opportunities for stakeholders to invest, pro-growth coalitions often consider its existence, management, and representation. This trend makes heritage matter more to the local economy than it did. An increasing number of case studies indicate that heritage is also used for urban redevelopment, city branding, and tourism. Barthel (1996) linked the ideas of consuming history and the growth machine to develop the concept of the “heritage machine,” which enables local interest groups to commoditize heritage sites, tourism, and history to retain their economic benefits. Chinese heritage preservation, or heritage-related investment, became even more highly associated with land politics once land use rights became exchangeable on the market. Heritage preservation relates to growth machine politics and results in the positive effects of local development in rural and urban China. Shepherd (2013), taking the case of the Wutai Shan heritage preservation, suggested that the resident displacement project was idealized into a great “sacrifice” for World Heritage preservation. Ironically, Shepherd points to the trend of building booms taking place around designated religious sites, since their designation suggests a future potential in land development for both

investors and locals. Nevertheless, widespread temple construction projects are underway within the core zone. Not only are temples being renovated and repainted, but guestrooms and dormitories have also been constructed to serve growing demand by visitors. World Heritage status, although intended to safeguard listed sites from the negative effects of tourism, has stimulated the revival of a local economy based on religious practice (Shepherd, 2013, p. 115). Moreover, heritage preservation can be said to aid cultural commodification. Using Lijiang Town as a case study, Su (2015) argues that the commodification of cultural heritage opens up three markets—tourism, real estate, and investment capital—in which local elites and local authorities have experienced the largest benefit of preservation.

In sum, since the 1970s, the political economy of global and post-Maoist cities has been characterized by the decentralized market-oriented economy and strengthened by the trend of cultural commodification. The local government seeks investment opportunities and ways in which to attract middle-class residents in order to increase the tax base. However, the former requires private sectors and local elites to form a growth machine. At the same time, the latter shares similar goals with another channel of instructional and social resources, as well as constraints from the socialist legacy. As the urban economy and urban culture enjoy symbiotic relationships in many instances, the urban governance of the growth coalition in many cities is further influenced by neo-liberalization.

Conversely, the urban governance of Chinese cities is less influenced by global capitalism and the neoliberal shift, allowing the local state to take the lead instead. Heritage preservation might be considered useful in machine politics. The examples and experiences are suggestive of explaining urban development for local cultural production and consumption.

### **1.3 Sanitizing Heritage: Removal and Purification of Dark Histories and Memories**

This section discusses two goals in sanitization: moral enhancement and indication of social progress. In addition to economic benefit generated directly or indirectly from heritage preservation, heritage can be a tool for social improvement and moral enhancement. This section focuses on sanitization—which is a strategy in heritage preservation and representation to purify symbolic meanings of cultural sites while removing and purifying unwanted or socially disease-ridden artifacts and buildings.

As for the criteria which categorize different parts of heritage into “good” or “bad,” current scholarships focus on what is the ideal “order” of display and who and how actors render past histories and traditions into the desired order. Inspired by Michel Foucault (1971), heritage representation is an embodiment of the constituted social and cultural order, “which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another” (p. Preface: xx). This statement rejects the possibility of random or neutral displays put together with a disinterested attitude. If this is the case, how is the target audience to follow the inner order? Critical museum studies often place a great deal of attention on the politics and human-made order within displays. The objects on display represent the formalization of heritage knowledge and cultural identities. Thus, they create a space, a moment, or a perspective from which the public can learn or remember.

Museums and universities exemplify how institutions intended to direct collective learning and identity formation. Artifacts in displays there are attempted to place heritage into desirable contexts following educational, scientific, or nationalist ends. These institutions can also be used to purify heritage and thus support the construction of the authorized discourse. They are known as centers of education and knowledge dissemination and, most importantly, as a place for “civic seeing” (Bennett, 1995). “Museum” implies the “learning paradigm,” which assumes the use of

displays to teach and enlighten spectators and thus contribute to shaping their identity, knowledge, and manners. In this sense, exhibition spaces have more in common with schools and should not merely be regarded as heritage storage rooms. Modern museums provide public and social functions beyond the everyday work of teaching and welcoming visitors, and visitors have “referential,” “associational,” and “cognitive” experience in museums (Graburn, 1977). However, while the value-laden nature of heritage turns exhibitions into a negotiation with value judgments (Macdonald, 1998), exhibitions are often produced to appear naturally neutral. With scientific displays, an exhibition seems to be a mere representation of incontestable facts. Spaces like laboratories and museums provide the spatial foundation of the “disciplined gaze” (Dias, 1998). The past seems represented in such a logical and natural-seeming way that the audience can hardly recognize the presence of contemporary sociopolitical conflicts.

This thread of discussion is essential when current scholarships deal with the notion of “dissonant heritage” (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996) or called as dark or difficult heritage. This type of heritage associates with the experience of wars, diseases, massacres, atrocities, genocides, prisons, or heritage of authoritarian governance (Harrison, 2013). These themes seem to suggest conflicts and collective traumas in the time of heritage preservation and representation. However, the use of the “dissonant heritage” still reinforces a collective identity from the perspective of the victims or a shared universal human value (Ashworth, 2008; Denton, 2014). From this perspective, the composition of dark heritage stresses both remembering and forgetting of tangible and intangible heritage. In this sense, the reasons of the representation of dissonant heritage is not that distinguished from its counterparts. The inherent pedagogical nature in a museum’s displays and practices must also be aware of new societal and economic changes.

As for museums in China, social progress is also a focus. The rationale behind the displays found in Chinese museums and national monuments embodies two distinct natures of socialist legacies and the new developmental trajectories toward neoliberal and global settings and managerial patterns. Despite exhibitions and museums being primarily intended to influence the thoughts, behavior, memory, and identity of the visitors, they could also help consolidate Chinese society with a unifying perspective regarding social progress. Denton (2014) gives two examples of this: Maoist ideology’s utopian nature in revolutionary manners of historiography, and the subsequent propaganda reform policies regarding the new era of modernization, science, and technology (pp. 243–244). Varutti (2014) provides the example of SOE-run museums to illustrate how these semi-public sectors, instead of the single actor “state,” increasingly affected part of the “public realm” after their reform and opening. Museums also function to facilitate tourism and local development and offer practical and material benefits through their construction, operation, and the role played in tourism. For example, Chinese museums serve multiple purposes as they might provide proof to authenticate souvenirs or living residents (Graburn & Jin, 2017). This type of “use” is related to the previous discussion on the political economy of heritage and cultural commodification. As for cultural preservation, activism over cultural preservation in Chinese cities is more locally based and often related to conflicts between local governments and residents. Yao and Han (2016) explain how cultural elites mediate state-society interaction, or both intrastate and intra-society interactions by mobilizing their social network (*guanxi*). Local states and the public are concerned most about material gain. This pro-growth coalition is often accused of being the prime exploiters of cultural resources and economic growth, thereby victimizing local people and the environment in which they live and continue their cultural practice.

Heritage preservation practice often faces challenges between top-down initiatives and local people and everyday lives. It has to determine which part of cultures and knowledge are worthy of being preserved and which to be eliminated. People living in proximity to heritage sites or natural preserves, for example, are at large excluded in the process of preservation if their presence, lifestyles, and memories represent a conflicting nature to the desired social and cultural order.

Sanitization sometimes works for modernization, especially in a context of Western modernization. The following example does not focus on heritage *per se*, but it demonstrates how state mediated Chinese society through the notion and practice of modern knowledge, in contrast to how traditional cultures and local knowledge had functioned. As part of the discussion surrounding modernity in urban development, Rogaski (2004) argued that the idea and practice of “hygiene” (*weisheng*) affected urban life in Tianjin, which during 1860–1945, acted as a treaty port city. With the arrival of colonial power and social programs, such as the New Life Movement and the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign, new infrastructure, medical practices, education, and purchases of imported *weisheng* commodities flooded the city. The Chinese elite embraced the “hygiene modernity,” associated with a powerful governance system, modern science, and rationality. Hygiene modernity, along with imperialism, complicates the transformation of urban life and the modern Chinese state. In another historical study, Peter Carroll (2006) demonstrated how Suzhou had been reconstructed as both an ancient and modern city with the introduction of Western planning throughout 1895–1937. Two modes of modernization occurred in various urban projects, such as road construction, economic development, and the preservation of historical relics (*guji*). The first mode is known as “preservationist modernization,” a nationalist mindset to rescue Chinese cultural symbols and essences. The second mode is “economist modernization,” which heavily promotes urban growth and sees heritage as little more than an impediment and backwardness. Within the framework of urban development and colonial advancement, Carroll (2006) argued that the city prioritized economic modernization while leaving the *guji* to be widely incorporated into modernist monuments. This historical development makes the city a modern-ancient city.

This subsection has discussed how heritage representation help shape an awareness of modernity and social progress. However, this process seems inevitably excluding other voices, knowledge, and social practice as the most powerful actors take the lead to reach modernity.

#### **1.4 Heritage as Social-Engineering Project: Formation of New Subjectivities**

Heritage preservation in current scholarship implies social improvement or moral progress for the underprivileged population at underdeveloped places. Besides those physical improvements triggered by local growth machines, heritage preservation also increase cultural awareness of local communities as the boundaries between outside tourists, experts, planners, and local communities are kept intentionally so that social inclusion and exclusion take place in heritage preservation.

Within discussions of tourism anthropology, the encounters between tourists and “authentic” locals delineate the floating boundary of heritage and authentic culture. Dean MacCannell (1973) used the concept of “staged authenticity” to describe the “back and front” regions of a tourist setting where visitors believe the back region would provide a more authentic glimpse at what was being visited. The ability to enter the inhabited back region eliminates the status of being distant to the “core” of the social life of those under observation. Tourists tend to believe the performative aspect of the show on a stage-like setting and the authentic life existing at the back, off-stage region. The discussion on authenticity provides a lens with which to

analyze the power relations between the seer and the seen. Another issue concerning authenticity is also explored in the study of the carefully arranged “stage” or ethnic theme park. Magnus Fiskesjö (2014b) examines a case in which young Wa people were used at a Shenzhen theme park in Shenzhen. The dance performance, totems, the dark skin of the Wa were used to support the pursuit of imagined primitivism in tourism. Those Wa originally came to the city with little option other than working in factories, but the tourism industry provided better salaries than what the average migrant worker could expect. The social and cultural meanings of the “staged” population and practice have therefore been purposefully twisted to conform with contemporary society and the tourism industry. Besides, the boundary between being more and less progressive is intentionally stressed and arranged in this type of tourism setting.

Another notion of the “staged” population is the idea of the “staged symbolic communities” proposed by Barthel (1996, p. 36). Through an analysis of heritage preservation in the U.S., she concluded that “historic preservation provides a set of values and activities. It provides a locus for caring and means of creating the self through the social process as devotees go about their chosen work of 'saving' buildings and creating a moral community” (p. 103). This is to say that heritage provides a chance to reach the moral goal of being a model community. The focus is, therefore, not on tourism, but upward social progress. Similarly, Tim Oakes (2012) analyzes the preservation projects of the Tunpu culture—specifically the Ox Market Fort and Mountain Cleft projects—and found that the instructions of following “the traditional Tunpu style” unintentionally led other Tunpu villages to imitate the idealized villages and landscapes. He further argued that preservation not only showcased the utopian landscape of villages but also helped shape the villagers’ ideologies to be self-aware cultural subjects.

This new experience concerning heritagization actively identifies its “heirs” and “subjects” while concurrently excluding the history, stories, and living experience of the “subaltern.” The Euro-American sense of modernity is virtually synonymous with enlightenment. Moreover, intellectual discussions concerning the narratives and history of developing countries and post-colonialist contexts address the excluded and underprivileged social and cultural subjects. By reviewing the narrative and representation of “Indian history,” Dipesh Chakrabarty (1992) argued that the dominant narratives homogenize Indian history from a set of dichotomies suggesting a “linear calendar”: despotic/the rule of law, medieval/modern and, later, feudal/capitalist. This historiography excludes the subalterns and their “subjecthood” from the “imagined modern.” This linear nature and social-cultural exclusion characterize the pursuit of modernity. This vision involves the discussion on modernity in state-building projects, displays, and local development and how shared cultural roots and beliefs continue alongside a deep longing for an incomplete project toward progress and a break from the unselected past. As David Lowenthal (1985) puts it, “[t]he past as we know it is partly a product of the present; we continually reshape memory, rewrite history, refashion relics” (p. 26).

Despite these heritage minorities (or the seen) being initially regarded as passive agents or victims of cultural commodification, in proclaiming themselves the heirs of authentic and ancient culture, they are able to survive social transformation by charging tourists to witness their heritage practices. Lisa Breglia (2006) details the heritagization process of Mayan archaeological sites and analyzes the politics between local communities, different generations, and tourism development. Her research leads her to the conclusion that heritage is not an artifact but a renewable practice and that heritagization takes place by way of two processes: the codification of land and the categorization of indigenous identities (2006, p. 33). As visitors to the region expect to see the heirs of the ancient Mayans, she describes the studied communities as being

“modern ancients.” As an example, she documents how the federal custodians of Chichén Itzá take advantage of their familial ties, their past living experience, and the geographical proximity to the archaeological site to appropriate its cultural meaning and heritage—despite the majority of the Mayan community having been relocated to another city. In this sense, heritage is a renewable resource in which cultural meanings are changeable and contested (Breglia, 2006). This heritagization process is not simply an attempt to create an authentic tourist location, but more of a social process in which local communities experience and compete.

Other studies have concerned themselves with displays of modernity shown in post-socialist Chinese contexts. Lisa Rofel (1999) proposes the idea of change in social experiences since the days of socialist China from the perspective of gender. In this study, modernity is demonstrated in terms of more individualistic and intimate social relationships. Through the ethnographical study of three female workers belonging to three generations, she proposes the idea of “other modernities” to detail how personal stories resonate with national narratives at different historical moments, and how modern subjectivities have been formed and “gendered” in the pursuit of modernity. As working disciplines and society transitioned from socialist to post-socialist, resulting in the pursuit of modernity, Rofel argues that “modernity existed as a narrated imaginary: it is a story people tell themselves about themselves in relation to others” (1999, p. 13). The plural form of “modernity” refers to the differentiated social experiences that the subaltern has lived, witnessed, and imagined.

Moreover, heritagization can create and add cultural and social meanings. The study of Jordan Sand (2013) on Tokyo’s Yanesan area showed how its successful preservation through a voluntary social organization created the locality and the vernacular life within the community. In this case study, residents identified far more with three communities of their choice, as opposed to those assigned to them by the jurisdictional authority. Despite the absence of monuments or iconic architecture, this contemporarily-made heritage stirred up nostalgia for the past and the longing for a peaceful lifestyle.

As the represented population are placed within the heritagization process and identity formation, a new social, cultural experience—which I will refer to as modernity—appears. This process does not appear solely; it often comes with urban renewal and gentrification, accelerated by the pace of deindustrialization and cultural commodification. Gentrification in the U.S. has a historic context of downtown deindustrialization, urban blight, and displacement. When these social and spatial processes occur, the wealthy group of people gradually moved to the suburbs. At the same time, the overall conditions of downtown began deteriorating because the tax was decreasing, and revenue could hardly maintain local development. When the city starts to reinvest in this area, the return of the middle-class people might cause the rent to increase and exclude the remaining lower-class from this unaffordable area. Therefore, this area would become gentrified. Gentrification becomes a social process shared on a global scale (Atkinson & Bridge, 2004).

In a Chinese context, gentrification refers to the coming—rather than the return—of the middle classes. In the new market-oriented economy, local states are willing to invest urban land whereby plots of land that may once have been used by industries (mostly SOEs) begin instead to be incorporated into the urban development and land speculation. This investment might cause gentrification; the capital comes to downtown. However, gentrification does not necessarily bring to mind issues of race, existing downtown poverty, social displacement, and the return of capital and wealthy residents as it would in the U.S (Palen & London, 1984). However, it is a shared experience in which ordinary environments can be renovated into spaces more attractive



to the urban elite, resulting in their original residents leaving to find cheaper housing areas (Chatterjee & Parthasarathy, 2015; González Martínez, 2016). The case study done by Shaw (2005) on the gentrification of Sydney's central business district describes how white settlements in the inner city triggered gentrification in the context of cultural consumption. Arkaraprasertkul (2017) proposes an alternative version of gentrification by studying the historical vernacular building style of *lilong* architecture in Shanghai. He argues that the area's original residents left voluntarily due to high rent prices, leaving the current renters to enjoy the location and historical atmosphere of authentic Shanghai free from financial worries. These ideas support the notion that the rapid pace of development has had a detrimental effect on modern heritage practices and cultural consumption. Furthermore, the fact that heritage should be placed into the context of cultural commodification in which its historical context might be less important than the mere form of its representation.

Heritagization indicates an appreciation of the past. However, this appreciation in commercialism and tourism might shake existing social relations and local identities. Heritage preservation out of local development does not only refer to the past but more to the future, where modernity is the new direction of social progress.

### **1.5 Heritage as Performance: Modernization and Civilization for State-Building**

Previous subsections have reviewed how cultural heritage connects to the contemporary social-spatial process. This subsection, in contrast, emphasizes the temporal dimension of heritage preservation and the pursuit of modernity.

Public heritage has been used as an expression of political unity well before the WH Convention. Nationalist narratives encourage the public to appreciate cultural heritage because this commemoration helps state-building projects in the performative form of the festival, exhibition, and mega-event. Cultural heritage, with the supports from the state, shapes collective identities and ideologies with nationalist tones and sentiments. Historians have elaborated on how tradition, festivals, histories, and myths are used to consolidate political unity. For example, Stuart Hall (1999) explains the connection between national origin and collective social memory as selected from heritage discourse: “nations construct identities by selectively binding their chosen high points and memorable achievements into an unfolding ‘national story.’ This story is what is called ‘Tradition.’” (p. 5) Tradition then becomes part of the tools used for identity formation. Therefore, pure “tradition” is impossible to trace without noticing the appearance of the initiator. Eric Hobsbawm (1983, p. 4) coined the term “the invention of tradition” to describe how symbols and norms are repeatedly practiced and formalized as rituals in relation to the more recent past than their actual origins and practices (p. 4). He also reminds that it is important to be able to distinguish between customs and tradition, as the former represents the process while the latter indicates the symbols of the formalization of the former.

As nations create and use traditions to enhance cultural and social cohesion, the shaping and reshaping of collective memories become crucial for both public display and everyday social practice. As public displays, parades, monuments, and national holidays can become part of nationalist “traditions,” the physical spaces themselves concerning heritage display also become associated with remembering, forgetting, and nostalgia. Exhibitions in these settings are designed to be emotive rather than mere reflections of the quality of the site (Ashworth, 2008). Nostalgia is one of the typical emotions used to reflect loss and foster nationalist sentiments. Boym (2001) indicates two kinds of nostalgia—restorative and reflective—and each space serves to bolster the emotions that nostalgia creates. Restorative nostalgia often aims to recover a sense of nationalism, embodied by monuments preserved in their original condition. In contrast, reflective



nostalgia recognizes the irreversibility of time and the powerlessness of humans to change the past; it emphasizes the loss, ruins, and fragility of human beings and their spaces. Here, nostalgia not only refers to mourning the loss of artifacts but, more importantly, the loss of primitiveness or simplicity (Fiskesjö, 2014a; Rosaldo, 1989).

Another type of display concerns a temporary spectacles and mega-events. Spectacles, like festivals and world fairs, aim to attract non-elite spectators by displaying great events and wonders. Consumerism, involvement, freedom of choice, democracy, and enjoyment are all emphasized in this type of event (Macdonald, 1998; Varutti, 2014). However, in spite of the freedom and autonomy found in such exhibitions, scholars have tended to suggest that historical and cultural values have been commercialized. This has led to a failure to explain both how these consumer-oriented displays challenge the formal method of an exhibition and what the broader social implications of these events are. Regarding world fairs, the consumer-spectators are assumed to be superior—in terms of social hierarchy—because of their more significant level of human “progress” than the people on display. The freedom to watch and visit actually serves to distinguish the observers from the participants. For example, in the American world fairs held between 1870 to 1916, the shared theme was a racial hierarchy in which Anglo-Saxons enjoyed their perceived economic success due to their self-proclaimed higher morality and dignity over non-white people (Rydell, 1984). Similarly, the Expo 2010 Shanghai China is an example of an “imagineering project” that allowed Shanghai (and China as a whole) to claim superiority over other countries in terms of economic development. Although the official theme was “Better City, Better Life,” the Shanghai Expo was nicknamed the “Economic Olympics”—a name highly indicative of the expo’s unspoken goal of showing economic superiority and power through domestic and international competition between other global cities (Winter, 2012).

China’s state-building projects show similar tendencies in both claiming and breaking from the past. But in the discussion of Chinese heritage, the notion of “civilization” stands out in searching its cultural roots and increase its cultural outreach. The idea of civilization helps support the imaginary nature of modernity to maintain the state’s desired social order as it employs its apparatus. Ann Anagnost (1997) indicates that China, in its post-reform era, has used the idea of civility (*wenming*) to consolidate its society in the manner of “cultural evolutionism” in the post-Mao political period. She argued that, as culture was so heavily tied to the issue of class struggle during the Cultural Revolution, the idea of *wenming* not only escapes the political risk of being associated with this project but is also indicative of the civilized and productive labor force that would bridge China to a transnational economy. This type of civilization project is crucial for China’s consolidation of its territory and ethnic minorities. The concept of borderland is contextualized in the process of empire- and state-building, meaning that the borderland is not shaped by one single political force (Perdue, 2009). Despite this, Piper Gaubatz’s assumption (1996) that the borderland is a place where different cultures meet is perhaps too simplistic and ignores the often invisible power behind the process of cultural selection and representation. An example of this can be seen in the representation of ethnic figurines in the Museum of the Southwest University for Nationality in China (Varutti, 2014). Rich cultural diversity and coherence between ethnic groups and the Han Chinese are suggested here. In this representation, the Han Chinese remain the dominant group in this diaspora, and the display reiterates the “correct” order of different ethnic groups.

As mentioned in the formalization subsection, China has actively managed its natural and cultural resources so as to use them as the basis for modern civilization to show the continuity in these state-building projects. This practice also reflects how civilization brings implications of

Chinese heritage to heritage preservation. Before the modernization of heritage preservation began in the late Qing dynasty, heritage properties were largely possessed by imperial and private owners. It was not until the late Qing dynasty that monuments and heritage started to become public. According to Lai, the transition began when social elites and the central government developed a state ideology—mixing Chinese Confucianism and Western imperialism—which raised public awareness on the protection of cultural heritage (Lai, 2016). Chinese cultural heritage preservation was a process dominated by the nation-state and a handful of scholars within education and cultural institutions, such as research institutes, universities, or party-political branches. Nowadays, cultural preservation projects are exercised on a localized scale within enclosed circles of experts or cultural elites (Yao & Han, 2016), such as scholars, state representatives, and local party representatives. In most cases, citizens are merely passive receivers.

Through cultural preservation and the modernization of underdeveloped societies and areas, the Chinese state and the Han nation have the historical reference and the correct path toward a better future. Existing works on Chinese museums emphasize the coexistence of continuity and changes to the context-dependent rhetoric of national heritage. Chinese civilization has been the most central theme of Chinese museums. Varutti (2014) illustrates how Chinese nationhood has been represented in Hangzhou's Silk Museum and Tea Museum, and how it suggests the continuing process of Chinese civilization and culture: the cultural and political aspects which point to a single ancestry and Han-centric source of civilization and culture. In addition to domestic heritage being used to showcase state-building efforts, China seizes the initiative to nominate and manage heritage sites for largely political reasons. For China, joining in with the global heritage process was not simply an endorsement of international strategy, but also an effective way to consolidate national and domestic policies. This concern is said to be the main driving force behind China's nomination of heritage sites. China has been ambitious to globally strengthen its soft power (Silverman & Blumenfield, 2013) and its control over frontier areas (Harrell, 2013). The latter echoes China's preservation practice: the prioritization of heritage site nominations on coastal or frontier areas (J.-R. Li, 2015).

This subsection addresses how the state uses cultural and natural resources to govern and design its overall development path. The understanding of nationhood and tradition helps position this study in the cultural relations between state and society. Modernization consolidates its domestic societies by economic development, social engineering, and heritage preservation. Modernity in the existing literature is linked to a new set of social, cultural, and political experiences, expectations, and awareness concerning social progress. Due to some claiming it as synonymous with Western Enlightenment, some researchers have suggested alternate definitions of modernity in a different social context. Heritage modernity is employed in the social-spatial engineering projects with the goal of reaching a better future on local, national, or global levels.

## **1.6 Structure of the Dissertation**

This dissertation is organized with the three main themes: heritage as growth machine, heritage as a formalized social-engineering project (sanitization and gentrification), and heritage as performance. These separate parts of analysis together support one of the main arguments of this study that heritagization is not only part of state-building project but also involves local spatial-social dynamics. As the heritagization of the Grand Canal was a state-initiative, it triggers a series of urban development that centers heritage preservation. Heritage formalization and sanitization, gentrification, and mega-event co-construct a new urban experience and exclude unwelcomed past and citizens. Heritagization consists of a series of social and cultural exclusion

and inclusion thus determines a new set of social and cultural experiences—heritage modernity—toward social progress.

Chapter Two firstly addresses several important issues on the national endeavor on the attempts to be included on the WH List. It discusses how the Chinese state prepared for the Grand Canal's nomination to show how its representation of a modernized version of a heritage site worthy of preservation in the WH era. While the chapter indicates that the heritagization of the Grand Canal was a state-initiative under the authorized global heritage regime, it had different impacts on the local neighborhoods. The three examined canal neighborhoods in Hangzhou—Tangxi Town, the Xiaohe, and Gongchen Bridge neighborhoods—share a similar canal culture and current social and economic situations toward developmentalism in Hangzhou, but they each formulated different strategies to the new challenges and opportunities brought by heritagization. Their continual development is indicative of the rent-oriented development and the requirement of cultural recognition with which to supplement public attention and resource inputs from heritagization. A comparison of the three neighborhoods demonstrates how heritage preservation functions in favor of the growth machine and helped initiate a series of land-based developments. Each growth coalition established developmental agendas and recognized cultural values regarding the originality and integrity of their canal sections. Each coalition made use of financial, cultural, and historical sources to promote tourism and small business with locals while renewing the built environment to promote a business-friendly atmosphere. Cultural recognition has a significant impact on the plan as the former has chances to attract more investment or public resources. Therefore, cultural leaders and local elites have powers in evaluating heritage as their assessment might bring potential investors confidence to develop.

Among the three neighborhoods, the Gongchen Bridge area most effectively engaged at the level of heritage-related development. Chapter Three closely examines the construction of the Gongchen Bridge area (including the WH site, Qiaoxi Cultural District), the most recognized canal heritage district, and the site of the Hangzhou section. This area began its land-centered development in earnest in 1896, after having functioned previously as a treaty port. It subsequently became a red-light district, before finally being repurposed as an industrial area in the late 1990s. Throughout the entire 20<sup>th</sup> century, the locals regarded this area as morally and physically decrepit. However, following the beginning of urban renewal in 1997 and a subsequent heritagization, this area has been transformed into a livable and clean museum cluster with renovated factory buildings. After analyzing information from interviews and local historical records, I have identified the three mechanisms used in the process to culturally and socially sanitize the area: museumification, aestheticization, and invention. Local authorities dominated this process through their arrangements of the displays of heritage objects and sites and their planning of several museums to sanitize past history. The spate of urban renewal included not only environmental improvement projects but social-engineering work also. The majority of the original residents (consisting of retired SOE workers and villagers) stayed after the completion of the renewal project and heritagization. However, the “boat people”—the most underprivileged social groups from the poor Northern Jiangsu area—have gone. Chapter Three shows the modernity hidden in this social-engineering project, as heritage preservation implicitly guarantees improvement and sanitization following the earlier pace of deindustrialization.

The official rhetoric for this development emphasizes how this lowland area was remodeled into a modern museum cluster with original local people living in renovated and improved housing. In Chapter Four, I examine how the so-called “on-site preservation” in Qiaoxi Cultural District triggered a wave of gentrification and the formation of new social and cultural

identities. The focus here is on the new social relations within and beyond the canal's resettlement housing complex. The first meaning of gentrification refers to the arrival of the middle-classes from other areas. Resettlement projects suggested a more civilized housing form from the previous crowded housing with their lack of planning, infrastructure, and public spaces. In terms of preservation, the relocation efforts to high-rise resettlement housing complexes are regarded as successful due to the locals' ability to remain in the same (but improved) neighborhood. However, throughout the 2000s, several housing projects in the area were instigated, but this time, it was the middle-classes (who had moved in from other areas) that were to be accommodated. The gentrification process serves to remind the retired SOE workers that their time as a socially privileged group is at an end. In this case study, the second meaning of gentrification refers to the upward mobility of the villagers. High compensation paid to previously low-income villagers has shifted economic conditions so drastically that some of them became landlords. This double-pronged gentrification exacerbates the retired SOE workers' emotional longing for a socialist past. As for the resettlement apartment housing in Qiaoxi Cultural District, the co-existence of the traditional housing form and the renovated cultural district are out of place in both the past and modern landscape, juxtaposing the renewed past and a promised brighter future to the new generation.

Chapter Five focuses on the overall development of another WH site—West Lake. I trace its tourism history of the past century to see how its heritage was designed to represent the image of the city to both locals and visitors. Hangzhou has long been a tourism city, and it takes advantage of its heritage resources to further contemporary development. Compared to the previous chapters, which concern themselves with the spatial dimension of heritagization, this chapter addresses the temporal dimension of heritage tourism and mega-events. Tourism is not only a revenue-increasing and local economy-booming activity but also a social practice that differentiates people and their cultures to represent a unified urban culture. For Hangzhou, hosting a mega-event helped to greatly enhance the positive image of the city so as to maintain its tourism city status. All these moments indicate the hidden lessons for Hangzhou citizens concerning modernity—progress, civility, new social and cultural orders, and a new experience relating to the outside world.

Chapter Six concludes this research by addressing two types of modernity: linear modernity and heritage modernity. Linear modernity defines a process with a clear—if not emphasized—break with the past. It appreciates newness and believes in its superiority to (and replacement of) the old. In contrast, heritage modernity also expects social progress, but it often refers to several important historical moments to suggest that the path to the right future has its origins firmly in the past. As a result, useful objects, values, and norms from the past might still be helpful to social progress. As this case study attempts to show, Hangzhou had not been a strong economic force until the turn of the century. Several urban and preservation projects aimed to modernize the city and make it fit to be a venue from which to represent its glorious past. As such, the two selected, nominated, and finally enlisted as World Heritage Sites: West Lake and the Grand Canal became the city's cultural symbols. West Lake represents a delicate literati culture, while the Grand Canal embodies trade and communication. The excluded stories of “grandma pilgrims” of West Lake and those of “boat people” along the Grand Canal have been less told in official rhetoric and everyday conversation. Heritagization, in this sense, facilitates the social-engineering of the existing citizens and reshaping of the urban landscape, the visitors' impression of the city's public image is thus altered.

## Chapter 2: Heritage Machine: Segmented Developmentalism in the Canal Neighborhoods

The chapter starts with historical traces of the Grand Canal and explores the role of the Hangzhou section in the history of the water of Hangzhou. It then discusses three canal neighborhoods along the Hangzhou section: Qiaoxi neighborhood, Xiaohe Street neighborhood, and Tangxi Town to see how their divergence indicates the trajectories of heritagization. The prosperity of Hangzhou has relied largely on water transportation; however, with increasing land and sea transportation and urban expansion starting in the 2000s, the importance of the three neighborhoods in terms of canal use is decreasing.

This study refers to local development starting around the 2000s along the Hangzhou section as part of the outcome of the “heritage machine.” By “machine”, this chapter suggests that local growth did not all come spontaneously. Instead, the “growth machine” was first triggered by urban expansion and then connected with “heritage machine” during the time of heritagization. Though the canal had been extended or abandoned sometimes in histories, the primary function of it had been transportation. Therefore, the primary decisive condition was the quantity of water and the feasibility and efficiency of canal transportation. In the era of heritagization at the national and eventually global level, heritage preservation and its evaluation scheme incorporate endeavor into the new wave of land politics in urban and suburban areas. This endeavor and enthusiasm involve calculated bargaining and evaluation of growth coalitions, which produce differentiated localities. As this dissertation will argue, as a linear heritage property connected by sites, the cultural processing of the Grand Canal has been incorporated into land politics and the urban developmental agenda.

I borrow Arjun Appadurai’s idea on “the production of locality” (Appadurai, 1996), which is a revised notion concerning the production of space from Henri Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1991). Appadurai (1996) proposes that the concept of locality is not merely a spatial or scalar idea but more as a socially relational network, quality, and value, in which neighborhood works as a social form to realize, produce, and reproduce “local subjects”. I will present the three canal neighborhoods as a set of relational localities that have shared a similar historical path in terms of *Caoyun* and regional natural and cultural conditions. Also, they have new challenges regarding urbanization and urban expansion and different fates in the era of heritage preservation. The term “canal neighborhood” will be used throughout the dissertation to refer to the three canal clusters rather than “canal communities” or “canal towns,” since the latter pre-assumes a homogenous social-cultural formation and identity within bounded areas under the shaping of canal transportation and culture. Appadurai (1996) uses “neighborhood” to refer to “the existing social forms in which locality, as a dimension of value, is variable realized (pp. 178-179). Sharing a similar understanding of the concept “locality” with Appadurai, I will explain how three neighborhoods realize canal culture and canal heritage in the era of urbanization and heritagization.

This chapter will first introduce how the three neighborhoods have been identified in previous canal transportation and the evaluation in terms of historical and cultural values under the practice of the WH nomination and enlistment. It will then analyze how the theory of “growth machine” (Molotch, 1993) and the derived versions of “heritage machine” (Alonso González, 2019; Barthel, 1996). This concept explains how heritage preservation becomes part of the aims of the growth coalition, which seeks to promote local-centered development and investment. By reviewing the concept from the perspective of the relational “locality,” I analyze the process of the canal neighborhoods in heritagization and suggest connections between

heritagization and land development. Furthermore, this chapter addresses how the new and foreseeable land development brings and differentiates local growth in these heritage neighborhoods. As parts of the same canal section, the three neighborhoods shared similar historical and geographical conditions and cultural background. However, since the lands they have own different attributes regarding land development, such as plot size, proximity to the main canal channel, infrastructure, and existing population, they underwent different levels of urban renewal and housing development through the operation of the heritage machine.

This type of growth machine also requires local elites to promote and support local investment. Since this one is triggered by heritage, growth coalition requires a great amount of assessment from cultural elites such as officers in preservation offices, scholars, popular historians, inheritors of local brands to help identify which part of culture would be beneficial to the operation of the heritage machine.

These three neighborhoods are represented as Neighborhood A (Tangxi Town), a suburban non-WH canal town near a WH Site (Guangji Bridge); Neighborhood B (Xiaohe Street neighborhood), an urban non-WH Site; Neighborhood C (Qiaoxi neighborhood), an urban WH Site by a WH site (Gongchen Bridge). This chapter examines each of their social-spatial development triggered by urbanization and canal heritagization. Despite WH practice and discursive forces often result in a homogenizing effect on heritage, this chapter concludes that the three neighborhoods have been differentiated through the operation of the heritage machine. The contrast in Neighborhood A and Neighborhood C can be used to validate the ideas land development helps create new rent-generating heritage sites. It demonstrates how heritagization works in urban or suburban areas, given the same developers and similar historical sites surrounded. Another contrast in the comparison between Neighborhood B and Neighborhood C supports the idea that heritagization requires future potentials and materiality in land development and cultural recognition. The cases of these three neighborhoods indicate how the formation of the concept of authenticity defines the function and the imagination of heritage sites, and then shape the ways of heritage practice on three canal neighborhoods.

Similar pasts and geographical conditions do not guarantee a unitary developmental trajectory as well. Therefore, whether they have been included in the WH List of properties, the process of urbanization has had more of an effect than other previous historical or water-based factors.

## 2.1 The Grand Canal and its Legacies

The Grand Canal was a political and economic product relating to *the Caoyun* system (漕運)—a centralized infrastructural water system and institutions for logistics for the court. It was the cooperation between functional artificial waterways, natural water systems, hydraulic facilities, and coordinating institutions. *Caoyun* served the role of stabilizing the Chinese empires, and political stability, in turn, determined the fate of the *Caoyun* system (R. Huang, 1964). The aims of building and connecting were to balance the natural and economic differences between localities and to transport military supplies. Since water transportation was the only way to transport heavy materials effectively, building canal systems was the task for rulers to transport military necessities, weapons, and then tax in commodity forms. Even though it was a centralized system, the Grand Canal was never a coherent waterway. Instead, it connected facilities and waterways of an extensive north-south inland water system, and its operation depended on natural terrains, seasonal changes, maintenance, economics, and wars.

The earliest part of the canal was the Hangou Canal, which was built for military purposes. According to *Zuo's Commentaries*, in the fall 486 BC, the King of Wu ordered the construction of the Hangou Canal in order for the Yangtze and Huai Rivers to be connected. Before the Sui dynasty, there were many small canals also built for military purposes, and many of them became the construction basis for the Grand Canal. The Grand Canal underwent two large-scale integrations afterward in Chinese history.

The Grand Canal was first integrated and extended on a large scale during the Sui dynasty (581–618 BC) by Emperor Yang of Sui. He ordered the dredging of several sections, which form the two main canal ways centered around Luoyang (the Yongji Canal and Tongji Canal) as a right-sided Y-shaped canal system shown in Figure 2-1, which came to be known as the Sui-Tang Canal. These two canal systems connected the political center and economic center. As part of this grand undertaking, Emperor Yang ordered more than 3.5 million workers to build the Jiangnan Canal.<sup>3</sup> According to “Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government: The Records of Sui Dynasty”: “[Emperor Yang of Sui] ordered to penetrate the Jiangnan River, it is more than 432 km long and more than 30 m wide between Jingkou (present-day Zhenjiang) to Yuhang (present-day Hangzhou), it is navigable for large dragon boats.” After this project, the canals became a national system first time in Chinese history. Nowadays, these sections are included in the UNESCO World Heritage Properties.

The second great integration of the Grand Canal was ordered by Kublai Khan during the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), which extended the previous canal to inner Da-du (present-day Beijing). This integration connected the Jiangnan Canal and the new extension. The redirected I-shaped canal is known as the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal. Since its construction, it allowed the transportation of wealth and resources to Beijing, which in turn helped Beijing grow, and has been the principal and most distinctive part of the whole Grand Canal system.

The two large-scale canal construction and integration projects showed the importance of the functions that *Caoyun* served. First, the main function of the integrated canal systems was for taxation. The *Caoyun* system managed to logistically transport tax tribute grains via the canal network. As the capital cities of Sui and Yuan were located in the north, grain transportation from the south was crucial for sustaining the political center of the Chinese empires. Following on from this, the second function the canal served was to maintain political balance and stability as the canal allowed the geographical separation of political and economic centers. Besides, these canal waterways and institutions not only sustained the capitals in terms of resources and food but also resulted in the birth of canal towns along the present-day Grand Canal—especially cities along the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal.

Two situations worsened the *Caoyun* system in the late Qing dynasty. Domestically, maritime transportation displaced canal transportation, which resulted in the decreased maintenance of the latter. Furthermore, the expansion of the spread of two great revolts—the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1872) and the Nian Rebellion (1853–1968)—threatened the operations of both the *Caoyun* system and the Qing Empire. Internationally, many ports were forced open during the imperialist invasions beginning with the Opium War. Modern vessels for maritime transportation performed better in terms of time, cost, and safety, and so they gradually displaced sailboats (C.-S. Chen, 1970). During the last years of the Qing Empire, the *Caoyun* system was ordered to cease in 1905.

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<sup>3</sup> According to the display in the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal Museum in Hangzhou. Visit date 11 Jul. 2015.






Figure 2- 1 The Grand Canal World Heritage Properties. From 2016 Advisory Body Evaluation (ICOMOS).



Although the *Caoyun* system stopped operating, the existing canal ways still function for irrigation and transportation purposes in several subsections. However, as a national waterway system, less than half of it (877/1,794km) still serves to transport throughout all seasons (J. Wang, 2007). From Jinan southward, parts of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal and the Zhedong Canal are still used for transportation via commodity ships and passenger ships, although transportation relies primarily on road traffic or sea traffic. Some sections are not navigable, but they may still be used for modern water drainage systems or irrigation (Shu, 2008). In the mid-1900s, local people or authorities close to the canal filled in certain ditches with concrete and rocks in order to reclaim land or for sanitary concerns. In other sections of the canal, the water has become highly polluted and malodorous by the dumping of waste. In other words, the canal has neither the same appearance nor serves the same political and economic functions for the modern state as it once did.

Apart from the functions of the canal after the *Caoyun* era, the Grand Canal is also a symbol of Chinese nationalism. As part of Chinese heritage, its role as a symbol has been changing. The first attempt to preserve the whole Beijing-Hangzhou canal was made by Luo Zhewen in the 1950s. Luo was an architect and a famous cultural preservationist. His most well-known contribution to Chinese heritage was the advocacy for the preservation of the Great Wall in the 1980s. At that time, mainstream experts in cultural preservation believed that only objects that have lost their original functions could be classified as “cultural relics” (*wenwu* 文物). According to their standards, some sections of the Beijing-Hangzhou canal were still operational, so the canal was considered as infrastructure rather than heritage (Chia, 2014). For example, in a research report written in 1958, when the Planning Committee of the Grand Canal was established, it initiated the dredging engineering project to make the whole canal navigable for barges weighing over 2000 tons, after having been silted for 103 years. This project sought to build a new canal between Beijing and Tianjin and to widen and deepen the canal way between Tianjin and Hangzhou. This project also involved straightening bends to shorten the total length of the canal from 1,782 to 1,583 km, and directly connecting this canal to the Qiantang River (C.-S. Chen, 1970). Although it does mention the historical and cultural significance of the Grand Canal, it has no mention of any preservation plans of the canal.

It was not until the 1980s that Chinese pro-preservation scholars and architects started to re-examine Chinese culture and heritage from the top-down in the post-Mao era. In 1985, Zhewen Luo, Renzhi Hou, Xiaoxie Zheng, and Hanxi Yang helped China join the “Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.” Chinese experts started to examine which potential sites to nominate, and some of them considered the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal. However, because some riverbeds had dried, become polluted, or the watercourses had changed, it was thought to be too “fluid” to be a coherent cultural object. Moreover, experts also believed that the motivation for establishing the canal was not for the public welfare but for the emperor, namely, Emperor Yang of Sui, to appropriate natural resources from the south. Therefore, the physical conditions and the symbolic meaning of the canal were not appropriate for heritage site nomination (K. Yu, 2009).

The discussion over the value of the Grand Canal started in 1986. China's Central Television station (CCTV) aired a TV documentary, “On the Canal” (CCTV, 1986), to introduce culture along the canal to the general public. This documentary was filmed in 1984 and aired

from March 1986 to January 1987<sup>4</sup>. The main motivation for filming this documentary was to promote the South-North Water Transfer Project rather than cultural reflections of heritage preservation. In the preface episode, it interviewed the then Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province Fang Wang, he gives positive feedback on the documentary and says that “(we) should place great emphasis on the role the canal plays on socialist modernization of economic development.”<sup>5</sup> This documentary was a powerful propaganda piece, especially when there were few channels and media sources for people to choose from. The South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWT project) aims to transfer river water from the Yangtze River to the Yellow River, Huai River, and Hai River in the north. It is said that the original idea to start the South-North Water Diversion Project was from Chairman Mao. When he listened to a work report in the Hydraulic Committee of the Yellow River, he concluded, “the south has plenty of water, the north much less. If possible, the north should borrow a little.”(EBCNews, 2007; TheEconomist, 2018a). Therefore, even though this documentary was filmed and produced in the post-Mao era, the urge for modernization either in Mao’s and Deng’s era and this urge changed the official discourse of the Grand Canal unexpectedly. At that time, the ancient motivation for a state to construct canals fit into the contemporary one—“humans could—and should—control nature.” The rationale behind the exploitation of natural resources has not changed drastically after the economic reform (Marks, 2012, p. 273). However, this management and development along the long canal require intense horizontal and vertical collaborations and coordination. This project consists of three routes: the eastern, central, and western routes. The earliest construction started in 2002 with the eastern route—the whole length is 1154 km from the lower Yangtze River area Suzhou to Tianjin, and it began to transfer water in 2013 (W. Li, 2014). The eastern route has better physical conditions than the other two since the water is abundant, and the physical conditions, including the supply of water, are more stable. More importantly, the existing Beijing-Hangzhou Canal would serve as the main riverway for the east route, rendering building a new one redundant. This documentary not only provided general knowledge about the canal to the Chinese people but also set the official rhetoric about the role of the canal and its heritage play regarding Chinese civilization and economic modernization. However, the Grand Canal, in the general public's eyes, has no connection to Chinese “cultural relics.” It had always been a political-economic infrastructure, despite dynastic changes or temporary disposal for the operation of the empires. It was ironic that the Grand Canal was first regarded as a public issue and degrading because of local development. No one at that time foresaw that the preservation two decades later would trigger a new wave of local development.

After its non-use for the nation, it turned into a cultural legacy as its nomination as a cultural route—a recognized form of cultural heritage on the global level. The beginning of the cultural preservation of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal started in the early 2000s. This tendency is partly because China has been actively participating in the global heritage regime to gain high recognition over cultural development. It was not until 2005 that the preparation for its World Heritage nomination began. In 2004, the State Administration of Cultural Heritage proposed to list the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal in the waiting list for World Heritage nomination. However, this proposal delayed since no city was willing to take the lead (J. Wang, 2007).

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<sup>4</sup> According to the webpage about the writer of the narration of this documentary—Hanyuan Chen <http://jishi.cntv.cn/program/gongzuofang/chenhanyuan/souye/index.shtml> [accessed 13 Mar. 2020]

<sup>5</sup> From CCTV (1986), Preface at 16:50.



Figure 2- 2 The South-North Transfer Project.  
From (TheEconomist, 2018a)

The most effective persuasion to preserve the canal was from several influential preservationists, and several of them had participated the previous advocacy for the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal. They were Zhewen Luo, Binren Zhu, and Xiaoxie Zheng. However, at this time, their worries and hopes differed from the previous proposals. They worried about the canal as the speed of urbanization along the Beijing-Hangzhou was increasing and proposed to incorporate the canal as the prospective heritage property for WH nomination. Moreover, at this decade, China has been active in WH bid and these experts were optimistic about the opportunity for the enlistment of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal.

In 2005, UNESCO announced “Guidelines on the Inscription of Specific Types of Properties on the World Heritage List”, which has identified four cultural heritage categories: cultural landscapes, historic towns and town centers, heritage canals, and heritage routes. This expansion gave a great opportunity to the bid for World Heritage of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal, as this type of cultural heritage has been identified in the manifesto. In 2005, these preservationists lobbied to mayors in the cities along the Beijing-Hangzhou canal for preserving and nominating it as a world heritage at the time when China was entering its 20th anniversary of joining the World Heritage Convention. In “The Letter about Speeding up the Protection of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal Heritage and the Preparation for the World Heritage Bid,” they claimed that the “values and the contributions of Beijing-Hangzhou Canal would have almost achieved the level of the Great Wall”, as whose values had been recognized in the last century. In March 2006, they wrote another proposal named “Advocation on the Protection and ‘Application for World Heritage Nomination’ of the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal” marked the apex of increasing official awareness of the preservation of the Grand Canal. It says:

*The Grand Canal heritage fully satisfies the conditions of ‘the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention.’*

*Therefore, it processes undoubted universal value and signifies our ethnicity, culture, and identity.*<sup>6</sup>

Fifty-eight members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) signed the proposal and reiterated the urgency to preserve the canal as the only way to save it from overdevelopment and urbanization (Wen, 2006). In May 2006, experts, city representatives, and members of the National Committee of the CPPCC made a ten days tour along the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal. They discussed how to preserve and nominate the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal for the bid and afterward announced the "Hangzhou Manifesto: Protection and Application for Inscription of World Heritage" (Tan, 2012).

In June 2006, the State Administration of Cultural Heritage (SACH) included the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal in the sixth set of Major Historical and Cultural Sites Protected at the National Level. At the end of the year, SACH published the revised "The Preparation List of Potential World Heritage Site," and the Grand Canal was at the priority among other thirtyish options (Q. Liu, 2012). The operation of the Preparation List is a national mechanism of heritage administration to manage those nominated sites by local states and their placement (Silverman & Blumenfield, 2013). In this practice, the order of nominations is not first come first served. Instead, state authorities decide the priority according to the level of preparation and will put the heritage that might be inscribed on the List with the most certainty among other heritage in the same type and category. The typical situation is that a local state proposes a property or practice to the central authority, and the state evaluates the heritage and decide whether to put it on the Preparation List or not. From the viewpoints of the preservationists and officials in preservation offices, the preparation for the WH bid of the Grand Canal is rendered "special" in two manners. First, the case of the Grand Canal is not usual because non-local experts proposed it, and the CPPCC agreed to prepare for its nomination. Secondly, even though the Chinese state had admitted the value of the Grand Canal system, there was still a need for a mechanism to coordinate preservation projects at all levels of administration. In September 2007, SACH appointed Yangzhou city as the leading city of the preparation for the inscription of the World Heritage of the Grand Canal and set the "Office for Enlistment of the World Heritage List of the Grand Canal" (J. Chan, 2013, p. 95). Yangzhou was representative of SACH to coordinate local states to prepare the process of heritage inscription. This setting of the office thus demonstrated the cross-level action of this heritagization in which city governments still played the most crucial role in preservation practice. Besides, Yangzhou and Hangzhou actively competed for the position to lead the preparation for the bid.<sup>7</sup> It is clear that no city was willing to take the lead in 2004. However, a few years later, cities became more aware of the benefits of canal heritage preservation due to the increased attention from the central government.

In mid-2007, this state-led strategy expanded its scope from the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal to the "Chinese Grand Canal," including the Sui-Tang Canal and the Zhedong Canal for the bid. After this change, the project incorporates 33 cities compared to the previous 18 cities (Tan, 2012). Here I present the words in the most "official" discourse of the whole heritagization process before formal inclusion—the "Tentative Statement for World Heritage Nomination of the Grand Canal" (thereafter, "The Nomination Statement"). According to the Nomination Statement, the "value of representation" of the Chinese Grand Canal heritage lies in its function

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<sup>6</sup> All translations from Chinese to English are by the author unless otherwise noted.

<sup>7</sup> Interview, 20180801, No.170.

for the *Caoyun* system and political stability and balance between political centers on the north and food production centers on the south for continuous dynasties since Sui to Qing.

In mid-2014, the Grand Canal property was successfully inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. As a heritage property, the Grand Canal connects five main river basins (Hai River, Huai River, Yellow River, Yangtze River, and Qiantang River), with a total length of 1,011 km (see Figure 2-1).

Despite being an entire heritage property on the WH List, however, the Grand Canal—the cultural object—becomes an assemblage of sections and sites in terms of preservation practice and management. The scope includes six provinces (Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong, Henan), two provincial-level cities (Beijing and Tianjin), 35 cities, and 58 heritage sites (see Figure 2-1). The Chinese Grand Canal heritage consists of ten sections: Tongji Canal, Yongji Canal, Huaiyan Canal, Jiangnan Canal, Zhedong Canal, Tonghui River, Bei Canal, Nan Canal, Huitong Canal, and Zhong Canal. According to the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) Advisory Body Evaluation 2014, the historical names of the ten sections have also been preserved. The table below shows the names of each section under the three principal integrated canal systems.

	Subsections	Navigable <sup>8</sup>	Passing Hangzhou?
Sui-Tang Canal	Tongji Canal (Bian River)	No	No
	Yongji Canal	No	No
Beijing-Hangzhou Canal	Huaiyan Canal (Li Canal)	Yangzhou section	No
	Jiangnan Canal	Suzhou section; Jiaxing-Hangzhou section	Tangxi Town; Qiaoxi Cultural District; Xiaohe Street
	Tonghui River	No	No
	Bei Canal	No	No
	Nan Canal	No	No
	Huitong Canal	No	No
	Zhong Canal	Suqian section	No
Zhedong Canal		Hangzhou Xiaoshan-Shaoxing section; Shangyu-Yuyao section	Xixing Town

Table 2- 1: Names and conditions of subsections of the Grand Canal

As a hydraulic facility, the Grand Canal represented how Chinese empires used this infrastructure to stabilize and, most importantly, centralize political and economic powers. The Statement indicates:

*The Chinese Grand Canal is crucial in solving the imbalance of social and natural resources between the north and the south. Its construction and functioning communicate logistics and the political and economic centers, resulting in closer political, military, cultural connections between the north and the south. It works for national unification, political stabilization, economic prosperity, cultural exchange, and technological development and affects China and the World positively and profoundly. The Chinese Grand Canal still works for commuting, transportation, flood prevention, irrigation, and water delivery and has been indispensable transportation (p43).*

<sup>8</sup> According to “The Nomination Statement” (SACH, 2013).

The efforts for heritage preservation of this gigantic heritage are of various incentives. For the Chinese state, this nomination project seems a nationalist endeavor to promote a Chinese heritage on the List, which recognizes it with a universal value. (rewrite) However, the truth is that the whole process started because of the worries of disappearance of heritage under the era of urbanization.

The nomination process and the inclusion of these properties accelerated the transformation of the canal from an example of hydraulic infrastructure into a new land-based heritage site in the contemporary World Heritage practice. Here follows the inclination stated in the Advisory Body Evaluation from ICOMOS:

*In accordance with the Constitution and the Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China, the nominated properties are either state-owned (88%) or collectively owned at local level (12%). The state-owned property consists of the canals, their banks and verges, and the territory of the towns. The rural and suburban property consists of rural communities in accordance with constitutional and legal texts. 162 local communities are concerned with the properties and 632 with the current buffer zones.*

This description well illustrates the tremendous potential for land-centered development along with this large heritage site. In the past, lands surrounded had never been as important as they are today under the operation of the heritage machine. Heritage machine means heritage preservation links to local growth thus become part of urban developmental agenda.

Heritage preservation might be involved in economic development and cultural-engineering projects. Reviewing the recent past of this national heritage, it has been working for the pursuit of modernity. The SNWT project indicates economic modernization, emphasizing how humans can dominate the environment through technology and knowledge. The more recent heritagization of the Grand Canal, in contrast, suggests a search from the past to continue Chinese civilization. In this sense, the modernization project related to the Grand Canal on a national scale can be read with the case study of Suzhou (Carroll, 2006). Peter Carroll (2006) indicates how two modes of modernization—“preservationist mode” and “economist modernization mode”—operate in urban planning and heritage preservation. He details how these two modes of modernity shaped the appearance and new economy of Suzhou in the last century. In the case of Suzhou, Carroll argues that the economist mode of modernization finally surpassed the preservationist mode. In contrast, this study will continue to demonstrate that heritage modernity would take a more significant part in the process of modernization in contemporary Chinese cities.

## **2.2 Hangzhou and its Waters**

After reviewing the extensive history of the Grand Canal, Hangzhou seems to be just one of the canal towns that served as the southern terminal of the Beijing- Hangzhou Canal. Even though the city was never the focal point which the *Caoyun* system aimed primarily to serve, the canal in Hangzhou has supported the economy and bring the birth of many canal neighborhoods. I will show how Hangzhou and its waters are connected and how the Grand Canal (the Hangzhou section) changed but retained its part in water transportation. The history and canal heritage sites of this city will also be introduced.




Figure 2- 3: Map of metropolitan Hangzhou, modified from Du, X., & Huang, Z. (2017). Ecological and environmental effects of land use change in rapid urbanization: The case of Hangzhou, china. *Ecological Indicators*, 81, 243-251. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2017.05.040> [accessed 10 Mar. 2020]

Hangzhou is the capital city of Zhejiang Province, with an administrative area of 16,596 km<sup>2</sup> and a total population of about 7.4 million. Its history can be traced back to the Qin dynasty (221 BC), and its prehistorical records can be traced back to Liangzhu Culture in the Neolithic period.<sup>9</sup> Politically, it was the capital of the Wuyue Kingdom (907–978 AD) during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period. It was called Lin’an, a walled city, and the temporary dynastic capital of the court of the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279 AD) (C. Fu & Cao, 2019). Despite the legitimacy of Hangzhou as a capital city in Southern Song is debatable, being a de facto capital gave the city not only its urban layout but also its historical significance.

The geographical conditions of Hangzhou important to its political significance, either as a capital of the empire or as one of the food production centers for the empire. Excellent location, improved agricultural technologies, and natural terrains with slopes and rivers that secured food production for the increasing population made Hangzhou an ideal place for the court. Geographically, this city is surrounded by, and organized with, water systems: the Grand Canal, West Lake, the Qiantang River, and the Xixi Wetland.

The city as a whole has been especially famous for Buddhist temples and pilgrimages in Chinese history; fame reserved not only for the elite and literati who visit West Lake. According to Gao (2004), temple culture did not merely serve the elite, but the associated services provided,

<sup>9</sup> The archaeological findings in Liangzhu were inscribed in 2019 as UNESCO “Archaeological Ruins of Liangzhu City.” The prehistoric records of human settlement of Liangzhu Culture in northern Hangzhou are excavated and reveal early civilization in this area. It supports the hypothesis that there were human clusters in the Tai Lake area (c.340–2250 BC), centering in Liangzhu, Hangzhou.



such as accommodation and simple food, enhanced Hangzhou as a tourist-oriented city. The establishment of the Grand Canal brought about several cultural sites along the section (see Figure 2-4). Hangzhou is also famous for both its religious sites and its stories with intellectuals, as many poets had appreciated the beauty of West Lake in the history of Chinese literature. Hangzhou is one of the first of “the nation's renowned historical cultural cities<sup>10</sup> as announced in 1982. Despite there was less effort in preservation than development in the city in the post-reform era, Hangzhou has been awarded three UNESCO World Heritage Sites within less than one decade: West Lake in 2011, the Grand Canal (the Hangzhou section) in 2014, and the Liangzhu archaeological ruins in 2019. Among them, West Lake has been the most famous, and its relationship with urban history is close. The construction of the Grand Canal system was essential to Hangzhou for allowing access for communication and logistics. Liangzhu ruins are located far outside of the urban Hangzhou area; therefore, its impacts on the city have been the least among the three.

The Zhedong canal, across the Qiantang River, began its course in Hangzhou and connected the eastern part of Hangzhou to Ningbo, a seaport city. It was essential to connect Hangzhou, the then capital, to the sea in the Southern Song dynasty. During the Yuan dynasty, when the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal was redirected to Beijing, Hangzhou served as the southern end of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal. Compared to other northern sections, the Zhedong Canal and the Hangzhou section of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal still functions in the present day.

The studied section is the Hangzhou Section of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal. It is 39 km long between Tangxi Town and the Sanbao area (see Figure 2-4). Compared to other sections along the Grand Canal, the Hangzhou section is not only navigable, but the local cultures around it are also attractive to tourists. Museums, tea culture, silk culture, Hangzhou cuisine, restored local temples, and Chinese medical clinics along the canal all indicate the richness of these local living cultures. Nowadays, the most developed subsection, between Gongchen Bridge to the Wulin Gate water taxi terminal, is about 6 km in Gongshu District. As shown in the map below, the blue line between Guangji Bridge and the Qiantang River represents the Jiaying-Hangzhou section, while on the east side of the Qiantang River starts the Zhedong Canal.

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<sup>10</sup>” The complete list includes Beijing, Chengde, Datong, Nanjing, Suzhou, Yangzhou, Hangzhou, Shaoxing, Quanzhou, Jingde Town, Qufu, Luoyang, Kaifeng, Jiangling, Changsha, Guangzhou, Guilin, Chengdu, Zunyi, Kunming, Dali, Lhasa, Xi’an, Yan’an.






Figure 2- 4: Canal heritage sites along the Hangzhou section.  
From Jia (2018).

Preservationists and officials regard the section between Tangxi to Wulin Gate as the most distinctive part in Hangzhou, in terms of the heritage value of the Grand Canal and *Caoyun* system. As the Advisory Body Evaluation from ICOMOS indicates, heritage sites of the Jiaxing-Hangzhou section (one subsection of the Jiangnan Canal, as seen in Table 2-1) “bear witness to a diversified network of waterways associated with rivers and lakes,” not as many attentions were put on the Zhedong Canal. The Zhedong Canal is given the least value of the three main waterways by canal historians because it did not play as significant a role as the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal and Sui-Tang Canal in terms of *Caoyun* history. Its cultural value lies in the fact that it did connect to the Sea Silk Road and sped up trade and cultural exchange between the Chinese and foreign peoples. Besides, the historical cooperation of the two canals helped the Sea Silk Road and the Grand Canal to meet in eastern Zhejiang, making Zhejiang a place where economic and cultural exchanges were frequent. Although it is still in use and essential for local development in Hangzhou. From the perspectives of historians interviewed, the first reason for this is that most parts of it are natural rivers, a feature that does not highlight the value of the

Grand Canal heritage, as mentioned earlier. The second reason is that preservation practice in contemporary China requires a lot of historical texts or archaeological remains. Due to its continuous use, the Zhedong Canal is lacking in archaeological findings and much less documented in historical records. The third reason, related to the second, is that the canal has little to do with historical capitals, so the historical significance in terms of the *Caoyun* and supporting the unity of the Chinese nation is not distinguishable. However, the contemporary heritagization still incorporated Zhedong canal because of two reasons: first, an expert Qiaoyi Chen, who was familiar with canal history and Shaoxing local culture, urged to call attentions on the preservation of this canal; secondly, Zhedong Canal connected to a port city—Shaoxing, which was one starting port of the Maritime Silk Road. Therefore, the incorporation is necessary in enlarging the contents and roles of the Grand Canal for this canal has been a vital route domestically and internationally. From this fact, it is clear that the composition of the canal heritage had been debatable and easy to add into.

Among the Hangzhou Section, three canal neighborhoods have been identified: Neighborhoods A (Tangxi Town), B (Xiaohe neighborhood), and C (Qiaoxi Cultural District). The Grand Canal heritage had been expanded from the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal to three major canal systems; however, during the nomination process, Hangzhou proposed several sites to the state, but three of them failed to enter the final phase of selection. They were the international custom within the Secondary Municipal Hospital of Zhejiang, Neighborhood A, and Neighborhood B. According to staff in the preservation office, the hospital site was rejected because it was not closely connected to the canal. Additionally, the building cluster no longer existed, and only one previous building remained. It alone could not show how the canal and it were connected. Moreover, it was located inside of a hospital still in use, meaning that the foreseeable cost of preserving this site might be considerable.<sup>11</sup> The second site was located by the branch river of the canal. The lack of well-known buildings or famous people made its cultural value less than that of Neighborhood C. As for Neighborhood A, the integrity of its cultural sites and physical environment were not considered satisfying. One fact that exacerbates the cultural value of Neighborhood A is that during the late 1990s, it had been under renewal so that the old riverside landscape did not completely remain (Ren, 2015). As a result, preservationists and officials gave up nominating the whole of the Neighborhood A but instead chose a single site for WH nomination.

At the final phase, when SACH reviewed those sites and their qualities, only neighborhood C remained on the final list as it was the most representative among them, in terms of the integrity of canal heritage. This evaluation brought this neighborhood more fame and higher expectation in terms of local development and land speculation. For the district government, this chance would help this area upgrade from a deindustrialized area on the urban fringe to a residential area and move toward a developer-friendly area. Heritage preservation is operated to a “heritage machine” in which preservation guarantees place-based development and forms a growth coalition of local elites for real estate development, tourism, infrastructure, or investment (Molotch, 1976). This process is also linked to cultural commodification in which cultural resources—tangible or intangible, become the commodities to be consumed by visitors. In a studied case in Lijiang, Yunnan, Su (2015) demonstrates how the commodification of urban

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<sup>11</sup> Interview 20180801, No.171.

heritage brings the local ethnic minority people into the chains of competitions as remaining its WH old town status to attract tourists and promote heritage tourism.

The “living” character and “still in use” status is an important quality to address this heritage site in official heritage discourse. Early before 2010, the then director of SACH gives a lecture on the preparation for the nomination of the Grand Canal, he addresses the canal as a “living and flowing cultural heritage with blood, flesh, and spirit”(Historical Data and Study Committee, 2009). The introductory words on the UNESCO World Heritage Center say the Grand Canal “has played an important role in ensuring the country's economic prosperity and stability and is still in use today as a major means of communication.” In the localized discourse regarding the Hangzhou section, “living heritage” (*huo-tai-yi-chan*) has been described as part of positive evaluation.

Except for culture evaluation within water history and *Caoyun* history in terms of different canal systems, a noteworthy fact is that the current Hangzhou section between Tangxi to Wulin Gate is not the original canal way. As shown in Figure 2-4, there are two waterways within Hangzhou. According to the *Gazetteer of the Unified Qing Empire: Zhejiang Volume*, towards the end of the Yuan dynasty, the farmer-turned-rebel leader, Shicheng Zhang, ordered the dredging of a new river from Tangxi South Wulin Port to Jiangzhang Bridge. This section was named the Newly-built Canal or the Northern Custom River. The Newly-built Canal is part of the current-day Jiangnan Canal (a subsection of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal) that is prominent in the public consciousness. The previous canal way in use is the current Shantang River. Its course lay between Linping and Genshan Gate, functioning for the *Caoyun* system during the Song, Yuan, and early Ming dynasties. This less famous section is also included on the UNESCO World Heritage List but, besides the canal way, there is only one site which was appointed within this inscription.

Table 2-2 shows canal heritage sites within Hangzhou's jurisdiction. With different existing material remains and conditions, each heritage site has its unique feature in contemporary urban dynamics and cultural politics. The latter part of this chapter will examine three canal neighborhoods along the Jiangnan Canal. Xixing Town (of the Zhedong Canal) will not be included because of the historical values of the Zhedong Canal are not of a balance of that of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal, which results in the limited information and historical texts available for this neighborhood. Also, Xixing Town belongs to another regional canal culture, which centers in the eastern part of Zhejiang. Locals and experts do not categorize Xixing Town as part of the same cultural zone as the three canal neighborhoods this chapter discusses.

Section	Canal neighborhoods	Jurisdiction	Cultural Recognition
Jiangnan Canal (Jiaxing-Hangzhou section)	A: Tangxi Town	Yuhang Dist.	WH: Guangji Bridge
	B: Xiaohe Street	Gongshu Dist.	Municipal heritage site
	C: Qiaoxi Cultural District	Gongshu Dist.	WH: Qiaoxi cultural district and Gongchen Bridge
Zhedong Canal	Xixing Town	Binjiang Dist.	World Heritage: Xixing dock

Table 2- 2: Four canal neighborhoods in Hangzhou



Figure 2- 5: Administrative Divisions of Hangzhou. From Hangzhou Tourism Commission [http://en.gotohz.com/whyhangzhou/quickfacts/201706/t20170621\\_147113.shtml](http://en.gotohz.com/whyhangzhou/quickfacts/201706/t20170621_147113.shtml) [accessed 30 Mar. 2020]

### 2.3 Tangxi Town: An Ancient Canal Town Facing Dilemma of Development and Preservation

Neighborhood A, Tangxi Town, is located in the Yuhang District in northern Hangzhou, administratively, and is seen as not belonging to urban Hangzhou because of its geography and culture (see Figure 2-6). It owns an administrative area of 79 km<sup>2</sup> and a total population of about 100,000. It was one of the canal towns by the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal. According to the *Tangxi Gazetteer* (T. Wang, 1890):

*Tangxi had been a peripheral area before the Yuan Dynasty. It did not develop nor open up until the Caoyun river was dredged, and the Long Bridge was built. This town has been included in historical records since the Yuan and Ming dynasties.*

This canal town used to be a place where water transportation brought visitors, trades, and economic prosperity. The landmark of this town is a 7-arched Guangji Bridge (or the Long Bridge as locals call it), as shown below. According to the Nomination Statement, the bridge was initially built in 1489 AD and renovated during 1662–1722. It stands at 78.7 m in length and is 5.2 m wide. It had been as crucial as Gongchen Bridge, but after the decline of the town, the bridge was merely a physical monument of the town's former glory.



Figure 2- 6: Map of Yuhang District. From “The Changing Dynamics of Land-use Change in Rural China: A Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang Province” - Scientific Figure on ResearchGate. Available from: [https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Study-area-Yuhang-Zhejiang-province\\_fig1\\_23539467](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Study-area-Yuhang-Zhejiang-province_fig1_23539467) [accessed 29 Sep 2019]

In the past, the Guangji Bridge area in Tangxi was much more prosperous than the Gongchen Bridge area. According to the recorded oral storytelling, the arched curve of the Guangji Bridge was half a head higher than the Gongchen Bridge. Therefore, many ships would prefer stopping in Tangxi to trade. However, as the latter was destroyed, but restored within years, the heightened and widened bridge and, its attraction to ships and trade, harmed the *feng shui* of the former (Committee of Folkloric Literature of Gongshu District, 1989). Even now, the popularity of canal culture is still concentrated on the Gongchen Bridge area, despite the cultural and historical value of the Guangji Bridge and Tangxi are comparable to that of the Gongchen Bridge.

Despite the same level of cultural heritage status of Guangji Bridge and Gongchen Bridge, the pace of development and heritagization in Tangxi is much slower and more passive. Tangxi Town was prosperous thanks to its proximity to the canal, but it began to decline because railway transportation displaced the Grand Canal. As water took a more secondary role in this field, Tangxi could not serve as a transportation node and commercial exchange center. As a result, Linping, a city in the fringe of the metropolitan Hangzhou area, grew rapidly instead due to the setup of a railway station before entering, and after leaving, Hangzhou.<sup>12</sup>

Aside from changes to transportation, heritage machine plays a crucial role in revitalizing the neighborhood. The municipal government set up the Yunhe Group to help as the primary

<sup>12</sup> Interview 20180731, No.169.

developer; however, despite the successful preservation of the single bridge, the area's land could not generate rent for further growth. The people in Tangxi, especially the seniors, do not consider it necessary to destroy their houses to build new ones. Some local people expressed their longing for “complete preservation”, by which they meant the recovery of all previously demolished buildings, including rice and sauce shops, which had existed in their childhoods. For example, the Tangxi Catholic Church was under a renovation project and re-decorated with glasses, and local people disliked the new design and came to another church.<sup>13</sup> As for young people in Tangxi, most of them work outside of Tangxi due to the limited job opportunities, showing little interest in local development. As most of them work in cities, they encourage their parents and grandparents to accept development as the compensation for demolition is profitable since they see a lot of sudden-rich in the developing areas.<sup>14</sup> Besides, staying people are indifferent in running a business in more effective ways. An employee of the Yunhe Group said: “local business people open their business in the morning and close it at noon because they have no will and vision to run a business.”<sup>15</sup> This statement is derogatory as the locals in Tangxi are regarded as lazy and refusing to a visionary process, in the eyes of the “growth coalition”—in this case, active investors, active preservationist, and developers. This company also faced difficulties when it invited investors from outside of the town as there was a seemingly small potential for investment: little popularity, a lack of significant historical identity, and a somewhat remote geographical location with poor connections to elsewhere. In addition, people there speak a Tangxi dialect rather than Hangzhou dialect, and, culturally speaking, it is closer to Linping. This cultural attribute also results in less willingness for investors to enter this ancient canal town for future investment.

Despite local preservationists and developers disagree with each other only when concerning the degree of development over preservation. Local preservationists believe only when this area develops, then locals will find out the past glory, and the visitors will notice this place. Therefore, they have the same primary aim to invest heritage sites and local traditions of Tangxi Town in most cases. The preservationists, many are the owners of local brands, believe the task of the group is to restore the wealthy past of Tangxi, a goal in line with their own. The Yunhe Group has promoted several time-honored brands of pastries, and dried fruits for sale to tourists, as Tangxi Town is renowned for its varieties of fruits, such as loquat and plums. However, for a more realistic profit return, this group also rented out spaces to chain food stores into this ancient town. KFC and Starbucks are located right next to Guangji Bridge on the southern canal bank, the main entrance to the canal neighborhood. Despite the objection of local preservationists against these chain stores, the group’s staff persuaded responded by saying, “now your children and grandchildren wouldn’t need to go to Linping to have KFC; they could have it right here in their hometown.” This type of debate or explanation best illustrates the dilemma of the preservationist: what kind and level of development would help preserve rather than destroy local heritage?

The general agreement of the heritage-oriented growth coalition, however, is the undeniable value of Guangji Bridge, a current WH site. With this authorized title, it is even more representative of the history of this canal town. This bridge divides the town horizontally and

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<sup>13</sup> Interview 20170731, No.61.

<sup>14</sup> Interview 20170731, No.58.

<sup>15</sup> Interview 20170731, No.60.



serves as the connector. It is of cultural and symbolic meanings as it best embodies the past prosperity. Local preservationist explained that each arch of the bridge was like a driving lane today, so these seven arches indicate how busy water traffic had once been.<sup>16</sup> They also claimed that Tangxi was a place for leisure, where famous painters and poets such as Zikai Feng, Daqian Zhang, Dafu Yu, and Changshuo Wu came, played, and stayed.



Figure 2- 7: Guangji Bridge now and then. (Left) Photography by the author; (Right) From Lao (2015, p. 27).

However, the situation of Guangji Bridge and water transportation had made the perceived authenticity of this neighborhood from bad to worse. In the 1990s, the local Maritime Safety Administration proposed to pull down the bridge to allow large vessels to pass. Since then, the bridge and its arches have not been able to cope with more frequent and larger cargo ships passing under. A debate took place about keeping or destroying the bridge. However, local preservation bureaus, cultural preservationists, and local people insisted on the importance of the bridge in terms of local history. Therefore, a local official proposed to build an alternative canal channel to bypass the bridge. After three years, the local government spent 75 million RMB to dredge another new channel that could handle the passing of 500-ton cargo ships. This, however, did not draw the matter to a close. Though the new channel was capable in terms of navigation, being 800 m longer meant that many ship drivers preferred using the old one and risked the crush under Guangji Bridge.

In July 2006, the local authority closed the old channel under the bridge, and all vessels had no choice but to pass through this new channel section (Y. Chang, 2017). This project was rendered as part of the heritage protection and also recorded in the Nomination Statement, showing the preservation efforts of local authorities. However, this effort, in turn, makes the bridge and the waterway less lively. In the case study of the Mt. Wutai WH site in Shanxi, Shepherd (2013) suggests that heritage preservation in China might make way to economic development rather than maintaining the authenticity under the exercise of the state power. Therefore, in Shepherd's case, the displacement of residential areas took place, and locals were removed to another empty cluster for the preservation project. This "clean-up," he argues, indicates how the past is selected and how the present is restored to market the heritage site. Therefore, as a new temple was built upon the original site, a monk said it is not entirely new but

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<sup>16</sup> Interview 20170731, No.60.

a renovated building rebuilt. The implication from the case echoes the dilemma Tangxi faces. When might the use of heritage harm its physical existence, to what extent will it be a satisfying response or protective strategy to maintain its originality and authenticity?



Figure 2- 8: The small section under the Guangji Bridge is not navigable. The maintenance staff on the boat was cleaning the watergrass from overgrowth. Photography by the author.

Besides, physical artifacts that Tangxi owns include not only the bridge but also an imperial tablet—the Qianlong Imperial Tablet (erected in 1751). Standing next to the northern canal bank, the tablet is another piece of treasured tangible heritage in Tangxi Town, though not with the WH title. This tablet was inscribed with words indicated a granted award for Zhejiang as it was the only province that did pay for the tax grain among the region of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang provinces as the emperor was delighted to see the good tax revenue from this area. This tablet had been undiscovered until local people found it accidentally during the second national survey of cultural relics in the 1980s.<sup>17</sup> It was a piece of cultural heritage doomed to destruction in the Campaign to Destroy the Four Olds during the Cultural Revolution. Fortunately, a wall of a silk mill obscured and thus saved it. The stone tablet was higher than the wall, and its tip remained uncovered, leading locals to think it was merely a border stone between Tangxi and Deqing on the north side.

Tangxi town government, however, devoted too much effort on it. During the years of the canal heritage nomination, the town government installed a new pavilion to display the stone tablet formally, but these extensive renovation efforts stopped it from being incorporated into the list of final canal heritage properties.<sup>18</sup> Even though the local government faced the exclusion of the imperial tablet on WH nomination and the following success, the Yunhe Group, and local preservationists kept investing in the town's local history. A replica of this tablet was in the permanent exhibition in a new local museum—the Granary Museum. Besides, several hotels and homestays were designed for tourists—especially backpackers—to stop and experience the same tour and route through Tangxi as the Emperor Qianlong took in 1751. Despite the southern visits

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<sup>17</sup> Interview 20170731, No.61.

<sup>18</sup> Interview 20180801, No.170.



taken by Emperors Kangxi and Qianlong being primarily to inspect the waterworks and promote social order (M. G. Chang, 2003), local preservationists and developers emphasized the wealth of Tangxi Town and the satisfaction of the Qing emperors with the stable income from these affluent southern territories. This satisfaction is evidenced by the inscription on the tablet, which shows the appreciation from Emperor Qianlong.



Figure 2- 9: Qianlong Imperial Tablet and the Pavilion.  
Photography by the author.

A further reason for imperial visits, according to a local preservationist, is the distance between Tangxi Town and the Wulin Gate of Hangzhou. He said that the distance of 55 *li*<sup>19</sup> (about 32 km) was the average distance that a group of people riding horses could advance in one day. Therefore, there were often posts and temporary palaces every 55 *li* on a route. Tangxi Town is about 31 km north of Wulin Gate, the northern entrance to the waterways of Hangzhou, so Tangxi was very likely to be a rest-stop before the Emperor Qianlong entered Hangzhou. As there is neither evidence nor historical records showing that the emperor had stayed for a night in Tangxi Town, it is likely that this preservationist and other cultural promoters were so eager to attract tourists and public attention that they developed theories regarding imperial visits.

Besides the imperial visits, Tangxi was a popular stop along the pilgrimage route in the past centuries, and visitors would buy souvenirs on the way back home. Another popular tourism activity would be seeing plum flowers at Mt. Chao in spring. Unfortunately, this was not attractive enough to tourists, especially as they would seldom pass the ancient pier and Guangji Bridge. While canal histories would hardly interest visitors, the growth and potentials of investment have aroused more attention. A tour guide who grew up there reported, the visitor would be interested in the history of Guangji Bridge several years ago but turned to be more interested in the rent of the store and housing of this canal neighborhood to see if there would be worth investing.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> *Li* (里) was a measuring unit in imperial China under the Ming and Qing dynasties, which was about 576 m.

<sup>20</sup> Interview 20170731, No.61.

Natural resources, local traditions, historical records, tangible heritage, and historical detection help the group and local preservationists promote heritage tourism, even though residents are mostly indifferent to preservation efforts and cultural promotion to non-residents. Heritage machine in Tangxi did not succeed in leading desired growth but have made the remaining heritage sites more distant to their original appearances and use.

#### **2.4 Xiaohe Neighborhood: A Modest Non-WH Canal Neighborhood**

After reviewing a canal neighborhood in suburban Hangzhou, the following two neighborhoods sit in Gongshu District, the northern part of urban Hangzhou. Gongshu District is located on the northern side out of the Wulin Gate of downtown Hangzhou. In terms of urban land development, this district had little to do with downtown Hangzhou and West Lake. This aside, its service as a terminus of the Grand Canal meant that this area was the northern entrance to Hangzhou for grain taxation, trade, and pilgrimage. Gongshu had been the center of state-owned manufacturing industries in Hangzhou after the PRC established its regime. This area was planned for socialist production and has started its deindustrialization since the late 1990s when it was incorporated into modern Hangzhou and became one of the five central urban districts. Gongshu District owns an administrative area of 69.21 km<sup>2</sup>, and the population around 380,000. In terms of the cultural resource, it owns the most WH sites of the Chinese Grand Canal property (3 out of 11) among districts in Zhejiang province. As for the subsection passing the district, it is also the best-preserved of the entire Hangzhou section (GongshuDistrictOffice, 2019).

Situated next to a small distributary, Xiaohe literally means “small river”—an upstream branch of the Grand Canal. In the past, small boats carrying wood or bamboo traveled between Hangzhou or eastern Zhejiang province to the western part. The geographical nature of this area confined the neighborhood within several distributaries along which large cargo ships were never able to pass. Xiaohe neighborhood is more isolated than other canal neighborhoods geographically, and it served as a residential area. In this sense, its historical and cultural values are mostly on a local scale.

This neighborhood contained welfare housing (*gong-fang*) for cadres<sup>21</sup> and the rest majority of residents were SOE workers, and also a few of them were villagers.<sup>22</sup> The former lived within the work unit compound while the latter lived in houses on rural collective lands. Several local entrepreneurs built private housing, and boat people built informal dwellings as well. Boat people belonged to another social class.

Boat people (*chuan-min*) were predominantly migrants from rural areas in Huzhou and Jiaxing (in Jiangsu Province). Locals termed them “fellows from the north of Yangtze River” (*jiang-bei-lao*), a derogatory term.<sup>23</sup> In East Asian historical and social context, they were known as people who live permanently in boats and represent distinctive cultural and social propensities (Anderson, 1970). Besides, boat people had lived here, and they have traditionally been regarded as a poor and uncivilized social class. They built simple dwelling in this neighborhood and thus brought this place an image as a place for lower-class people. When I visited this area, a staff in the residents’ committee emphasized to me that it was a neighborhood mostly for ‘ordinary

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<sup>21</sup> *Gong-fang* literally means public housing in Chinese, but *gongfang* was a type of state policy and residential subsidy only for SOE workers so should be understood as welfare housing. It was not salable until the Housing Reform in 1988.

<sup>22</sup> Interview 20170721, No.34.

<sup>23</sup> Interview 20170727, No.49.

urban people' (*cheng-shi-ping-ming*) rather than the 'urban poor' (*cheng-shi-pin-ming*), to stress this past of this area belonged to vernacular people rather than the poor. From the perspectives of the local people, this type of further explanation is needed since most Hangzhou citizens regarded this neighborhood as a ghetto, mainly because some boat people settled there during the 1960s–1990s.




Figure 2- 10: Images of Xiaohe neighborhood in the 1990s. From (Left) G. Wang and Chan (2006, p. 27); (Right) L. Zhong (2010, p. 459).

Despite the difference in social classes, their lives were not comfortable equally with the crowded and deteriorated living environment. There were “pole spider webs of wire cables” in this low-lying area where two households shared a 30 m<sup>2</sup> unit in the 1990s,<sup>24</sup> as shown in Figure 2-10. These boat people had lived in and shared a relatively closed society, and some of them left Hangzhou after land transportation had gradually displaced water transportation in the late 1980s.

As the urban renewal and environmental improvement of the early 2000s took place along the canal, and its branches, few of the staying boat people were able to return. During the renovation project, local surveyors classified these informal dwellings built mainly by boat people as dilapidated housing and had them removed. In contrast, those buildings that remained were renovated to their “original” state during the late Ming and early Qing dynasties.<sup>25</sup> However, since buildings, there have undergone several renovations, and the already bounded land was occupied by residents, there is little room for further development, construction, and preservation.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, its rank in terms of the originality in the heritage evaluation is not as high as that of the Qiaoxi area.

Among all these buildings of the three neighborhoods, one existed before the renewal and still accommodate the original family is Yao's house at the corner of Xiaohe neighborhood. It is a local landmark of this neighborhood and was a self-built wood factory with green brick dating

<sup>24</sup> Interview 20170814 No.112.

<sup>25</sup> Interview 20170814, No.12.

<sup>26</sup> Interview 20170810, No.95.

back to 1942-1943. I heard from locals that CCTV came to interview him about the story of the house, and this interview represented an excellent recognition for this small neighborhood. Yao and his children and grandchildren are living there together. With help from staff, Yang, of Xiaohe residents' committee, I was invited to the house and met the owner of the house, Yao. Before entering the house, Yang told me that a dispute regarding land use right going on between Yao and the municipal government, and the house site was part of the land appropriation area. She asked me not to talk about land issues because Yao might have resentments in the meantime, so she reminded me: we would just focus on safer topics such as “culture” and “history.”

After the greeting, we started to chat, I thought I might witness quarrels or confrontation, but fortunately, I did not. Yao was friendly to me, and he was especially interested in my Taiwan background. We talked about how it looked like and how they lived with the canal and its branches. He expressed a sense of loss when talking about Chinese traditional culture—one of the assigned and safe topics. He said that culture and Confucius traditions were very likely to be inherited in Taiwan, not in mainland China where the Cultural Revolution broke the inheritance of culture and tradition. For informants I encountered, “Cultural Revolution was a mistake” was a consensus. However, what he wanted to express was that since I was not one of them, I had the chance and ability to acknowledge Chinese culture and tradition.

Yang left earlier, and Yao and I continued to chat. Without the presence of Yang, Yao seemed more relaxed and started to change the topic to his concerns to the house. At first, the municipal government assigned his house to be preserved but not for their residence but its future use as a planned exhibition room. More surprisingly, no one talked this decision to him until he saw a field layout attached to the wall of his house and sensed the foreseeable demolition. Therefore, he started to petition in person (*shang-fang*, 上訪) and succeeded at the highest level with the support from the then municipal party secretary Guoping Wang. He ended this story by commenting that “*yan-wang-yi-jian, xiao-gui-nan-chan*” (閻王易見, 小鬼難纏), meaning it is always easy to deal with the ruler of hell but most annoying to face those little devils. This proverb is often used when people feel frustrated and bothered by trivial administrative stuff, but the problem is soon resolved when people have direct communication with the person in charge of the whole thing. After the successful petition visits, several families followed Yao's example of lodging complaints and succeeded in keeping their houses with minor renovations.<sup>27</sup>

During Wang's term in 2000–2010, this type of story could happen since he had been relatively tolerant of cultural preservation, in the eyes of several interviewees and researchers (Yao & Han, 2016). However, seldom of these stories were told during the field trips, Chapter Four will explain what this kind of silence means in the section of resettlement housing. This case demonstrates a current tendency on heritage preservation and the museum boom in China. It is similar to Liang (2014)'s study in which he finds that the top-down rehabilitation process usually excludes residents but keeps their houses that are in proper maintenance and shape for planned museums, in the case study of historic areas in Shanghai. In this way of formalizing existing buildings, this area is elevated into a symbolically high land in terms of cultural meanings that depart it from its disgraceful past.

Despite these efforts and success, historians and preservationists still regarded Xiaohe as a less valuable heritage site due to its lack of celebrated or well-known buildings and formal

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<sup>27</sup> Interview 20170817, No.113.



recognition. Also, Xiaohe neighborhood has less value than the Qiaoxi area due to its proximity to a useful but aesthetically unpleasing piece of infrastructure: the Xiaohe Oil Storage Depot. It was not feasible to remove this facility just for heritage preservation. The Yunhe Group expressed that they had worked on connecting the open spaces and trails along the two riversides of this canal section. However, the west side could not be connected because of this storage depot. During the field trip in 2017, locals believed that the oil storage depot seemed to be one of the main physical reasons that this place could not become a WH-rank heritage site. In June 2019, this depot was closed and had been under demolition since October 2019. The planned completion date was by the 2022 Hangzhou Asian Games.



Figure 2- 11: (Left) Image of renovated houses in Xiaohe neighborhood; (Right) The House of Yao. Photography by the author.

Ironically, less fame and lower recognition have kept this neighborhood “original” and “authentic” and saved it from more intensive development, which would destroy the atmosphere and habitability of this confined neighborhood. Around 65% of residents chose to return and continue the life of “household by the canal” (*yun-he-ren-jia* 运河人家), Xiaohe neighborhood is still regarded as an inhabited heritage district but can hardly upgrade and expand physically and culturally (B. Li & Liu, 2018). Xiaohe was awarded the “Chinese Habitat Award” in 2007. This neighborhood was delisted in the preparation process of WH bid due to the secondary location in terms of *Caoyun* history and the limited area for further development. However, this situation of less cultural recognition and economic motivation for the local development make this neighborhood remains its “back region.” It is the most modest and least touristy among the three canal neighborhoods along the Hangzhou section.

## 2.5 Qiaoxi Neighborhood: A Model of the On-site Preservation of Canal Culture

This section seeks to explain how rent generated from urban renewal and land sales help rather than hinders heritage preservation. Qiaoxi neighborhood (or known as West Gongchen Bridge Cultural District) sits on the west side of Gongchen Bridge, which is the most significant canal heritage site and landmark, Gongchen Bridge sits across the canal on Gongshu District. According to the Nomination Statement, Gongchen Bridge is a three-arched bridge, measuring at

98 m long and 16 m high. This bridge is the most notable landmark of the Hangzhou-Jiaxing section, and it is surrounded by museums and a historic district. This renovated area is accessible in terms of canal culture. Notwithstanding the help of the Qiaoxi Cultural District, this area is considered desirable for both established and new Hangzhou residents because of its pleasing aesthetic improvement.

The Gongchen Bridge area had great potential to be a heritage district not only because of its proximity to the bridge itself, but also because of its favorable geographical conditions. The surrounding areas are flat lands which mostly belonged to SOEs and rural collectives of Jiru Village. The straight and wide canal could still accommodate large vessels, and this area began a stage of urban renewal in the late 1990s. In short, the plots of lands were ready for heritage preservation and further development, which welcomed the construction of new facilities and renovation for tourism and cultural promotion. East side of this area was more urbanized because it owned more SOE entities and housing complexes. In contrast, west part of it was more empty and rural. This disparity instead caused the earlier development of east side of this area, which left little for the following heritagization process to invent. Here heritage growth took place more on the west side of this area as the growth machine advanced on the east side and left little for the second wave of growth. During the preparation for the WH bid, Hangzhou selected the west part, that is the Qiaoxi area, as one of the candidates for nomination. From the perspective of preservationists and officials, Gongchen Bridge and the existing factory buildings had the potential to be part of the heritage district—which was perfect for preservation and a new wave of development.

Urbanization provides incentives for rent-seeking stakeholders to develop land—whether this is demolition, preservation, or destructive preservation. As the economy of Chinese cities becomes market-oriented, previous urban planning has been gradually displaced to fit a market economy rather than land revenue. However, finance then becomes a practical issue for preservation. The then Party Secretary of Hangzhou, Guoping Wang, and his administration were very enthusiastic about combining land development and heritage preservation into a single developmental project. They developed a strategy called “gold encircles jade,” which means real estate investment in land (gold) development and infrastructure around heritage sites (jade). The “Comprehensive Preservation Project of West Lake” and the “Preservation Project of Xixi Wetland,” for example, are two notable preservation projects in Hangzhou completed during his term from April 2000–January 2010. In his words, “raw” land costs little, and the city government helps “cook” those the same pieces of land which are then worth much more.<sup>28</sup>

The Gongchen Bridge area had been under renewal under the implementation of the “Comprehensive Preservation Project of the Hangzhou section of the Grand Canal” during 2003–2010. Since 2004, the Hangzhou city government has spent hundreds of millions RMB to complete the “Comprehensive Canal Preservation Project (Phase one)” along the 11-km canal section, turning this section into a big public park (Bao & Huang, 2006). This project incorporated the Gongchen Bridge area and the Xiaohe neighborhood. This project covered the section (about 39 km) between Sanbao Gate to Tangxi Town. The municipal government set up the Yunhe Group since the city government could not handle these investments directly. Large parcels of land, retrieved from former state-owned firms, were placed on the market, sold quickly, and developed into sites for luxury housing and commercial buildings. The usual

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<sup>28</sup> Interview 20180720, No.152.

practice of this strategy is to invite investment in infrastructure and environmental engineering projects to create a balance between development and preservation. The municipal government uses public bids to invest in land and real estate but keeps most of the land to itself. Therefore, as the land value increases, its revenues could be used for preservation—mostly renovation and subleases to outside investors.

This company manages all affairs regarding land, demolition, tourism, and investment along the Hangzhou section and part of the Zhedong Canal. To put it simply, the Yunhe Group has been in charge of all the preservation works and investment projects on the four canal neighborhoods, the three mentioned and the Xixing Town. It is a for-profit company that must keep its financial leverage feasible. With the financial support from land revenue, the heritage sites, especially those sites within the Qiaoxi Cultural District, are under careful management and continuing inputs on preservation. Except for decent infrastructure and management, this continuing function for water transportation of this area becomes the most authentic element of the Hangzhou section. Therefore, even though this area has gradually been influenced by urban development and modern buildings, as with other parts of the expanding urban areas of Hangzhou, water transportation is still operational there while the cultural district is well-planned for preservation and representation. As a result, Qiaoxi has been incorporated into the World Heritage management system, and the increase in popularity and management makes it a famous cultural district throughout the whole Grand Canal heritage property.

Ironically, the regulation of this section also raises questions about the authenticity of the heritage site. One uncertain factor is that the section will be closed for large vessels after 2020. Hangzhou launched The Grand Canal Expansion Project of Zhejiang Section in 2017, which aims to increase traffic and capacity by deepening and widening a 33.9 km-long section that will allow larger vessels of up to 1,000 tons pass, rather than its current capacity, which is less than 500 tons. However, a further task is to establish another 26.4 km channel for vessels to take a detour via the Qiangtang River (Yujing Zhou, 2017). In this way, large vessels will not pass by the narrow arch under the Gongchen Bridge, nor use the Sanbao Canal Gate as this gate mostly slows down transportation speeds. As illustrated in the map below, the red line is the current Beijing-Hangzhou Canal, while the blue line is the new canal under construction. Local people in Hangzhou were interviewed regarding their opinions on this alternative route. There was widespread support for its construction. Some of them believed this new channel would excite land development along its still underdeveloped path; some felt relieved that vessels would be faster skipping old sections to avoid passing by the Sanbao Gate or being slowed by the traffic congestion under Gongchen Bridge. Others foresaw a more comprehensive preservation effort as no large vessels would pollute and cloud the water of this ancient canal. This new canal seems to solve a lot of the problems and conflicts between preservation and heritagization that Hangzhou faces today. Furthermore, this solution also provides the city with another lens with which to examine the use of the Grand Canal as a heritage site and as a working facility.

Besides land development, Qiaoxi neighborhood has developed its tourism economy, also under the management of the Yunhe Group. Even though the riverside areas had been renovated to their previous appearance and residents returned to the areas, local contexts and businesses had been transformed. The vernacular type of commerce, such as grocery stores, local restaurants, tea houses, has gone. Fashionable, modern, and retro-style restaurants, cafe, and bookstore replaced them and turned to be places where locals seldom walked in. Chapter Three will discuss more details of its main business street.

After its incorporation on the WH List in 2017, the Hangzhou Beijing-Hangzhou Canal (Hangzhou Section) Comprehensive Protection Commission applied for, and was awarded, the World Leisure International Innovation Prize for their comprehensive project for this area—“The Comprehensive Project in Qiaoxi Historic District: From Slums to a Leisure-oriented Heritage Highland.” This area became a big museum cluster with scattered returned residents living in the back alleys of this cultural district. These three neighborhoods have been distinguished from each other regarding locations, and the expected growth through the growth machine. However, under the operation of the heritage machine, they are becoming more controlled in terms of sharing the same desire of developmentalism. A recent study on the WH designation of the Hangzhou Section argues that this section underwent “over-commercialisation” because of the mismatch between the pro-Western ideological heritage practice and local authorities’ expectations in a non-Western society (M. Zhang & Lenzer, 2020). This study does not aim to criticize the WH practice. Instead, it examines how this disparity in turn “has created” these three localities regarding their cultural values along the same section.




Figure 2- 12: Current canal route (red) and the new channel under construction (blue). Adapted from Fang (2010).



## 2.6 Uses of Canal and Canal Heritage: From Transportation to the Heritage Machine

This chapter examines the preservation process of Hangzhou's three canal neighborhoods. It has shown that the past function of the canal was to support the *Caoyun* system, but in the present day, the changes in water transportation, physical conditions, and the pace of urban development all help determine the trajectories and values of each canal neighborhood. Therefore, although they have shared a similar "locality" and quality in terms of their connection to the Hangzhou section, they further expanded the scope of canal culture in different directions under the heritage machine. As a result, each canal neighborhood was trying to realize its unique cultural values while seeking for rent. Three tendencies have been discussed.

First, this tendency helps to build the Grand Canal as a heritage machine, which connects with local development and land speculation, thus value and potential revenue would bring shape the willingness and expectation for preservation. This tendency indicates the contemporary change of canal neighborhoods to a land-based development rather than a spontaneously developed neighborhoods thanks to water transportation. Despite the homogenizing works from WH enlistment and the heritage machine, different localities have been produced and reinforced in heritagization. The analysis of heritage machine in this chapter has shown that despite with similar incentive to invest land-based properties and similar interest groups, the urban process and the relationships between local development, municipal finance, the timing for the urbanization of each of them have differentiated effects on their growth and preservation potentials. Even though both the Qiaoxi area and Tangxi Town contain significant cultural artifacts and history, and are both managed by the same developing company, the process of heritage preservation and development differed depending on the ability to generate the rent. This use of the canal heritage is to provide a cultural reference from which to guarantee future-oriented progress. In the case of the urbanized Gongchen Bridge area, the lands were sold to developers and could be put into the first round of speculation. In contrast, the development of Tangxi Town was clumsy. It contains no fewer historical artifacts and has no less history than the Gongchen Bridge area. However, due to the lack of money put aside for large projects, there were not enough resources to further develop and preserve heritage sites.

The second tendency is that the location and materiality—the physical attributes—of heritage sites matter in the practice and discourse of heritagization. Qiaoxi and Xiaohe are only one km away from each other in an urbanized area. However, because of geographical conditions and the level of connectedness to *Caoyun* history, they enjoy different cultural recognitions from preservation practices. For these two urban canal neighborhoods, the efforts to improve water quality, living environment, and public spaces were more focused on providing better opportunities for future investors rather than for residents. In this sense, only urbanized and "cooked" lands can promise a more modernized future while still retaining semblances of tradition, which can be used to generate more rent in the heritagization process. Therefore, official discourses and the recognition of heritage is essential to assure the value of local communities to investors. For the heritage-centered growth coalitions, gaining this recognition can help them earn more resources with which to construct more facilities and infrastructure, which in turn stabilizes growth. Here a virtuous circle of capital accumulation is shown, which is something that can be seen to happen in the Qiaoxi area, but not the other two canal neighborhoods discussed in this chapter.

The third tendency is shown in the discussion on authenticity and the dilemma between preservation and development. For Tangxi Town, the lack of investment resulted in slower development and fewer preservation inputs from outside entities. The current preservation

practice, for example, the new waterway to preserve Guangji Bridge, was not useful for preserving and promoting the value of the bridge. It made the bridge and the section useless and far less lively than the section around Gongchen Bridge. For the Xiaohe neighborhood, less cultural recognition and public attention prevented its development, but at the same time, they also protected this area for over-preservation and over-development. As the canal became a heritage site, the change of its use from infrastructure to a cultural object to be appreciated can be well noted. However, the primary use of the canal as a heritage property is to generate rent and reputation.

Here I demonstrate that the use of the canal and the use of canal heritage are not entirely overlapped. Since the use of the canal as both infrastructure and heritage can cause some conflict, new coordination and regulations are required. In past use, lands along the canal were not as precious as what they are in the present day as the heritage machine becomes the center to consolidate resources to promote local culture and foreseeable land development and tourism. The current plan for preserving the section between Tangxi to Wulin Gate has been associated with the urban agenda to shorten and widen the passage channel for cargos passing urban Hangzhou. This pro-growth project also supports land-based development since large lands with clean water will be available when large cargos give up the current path under Gongchen Bridge. Tourist agencies, officials, and preservationists hoped that the ancient canal could be better preserved with cleaner water. They also believed that this new channel would prevent artifacts, monuments, and facilities along the current section from damages. However, overprotection, as the case of Guangji Bridge shows, results in a dying hydraulic facility. As Qiaoxi neighborhood will witness the decreasing use of water transportation, this subsection, and its cultural value will be evaluated and contested, as what happened in Tangxi Town and Xiaohe neighborhood. This fact is ironic since, according to the heritage discussions of the Grand Canal as a whole hydraulic system, this function is one of its core cultural values. In this sense, the Grand Canal is an international, national, and local heritage site all at the same time. With different connotations and opportunities, the canal has been transformed from a waterway into a formalized cultural heritage. The protection and planned future use have to fit into the trajectories of local development and decline.

The city is a growth machine, while different incidents or agencies can trigger the machine. The three canal neighborhoods, as shown in this chapter, have been under the operation of two waves of growth. The first wave was the overall urban expansion of Hangzhou, which affected Tangxi Town and part of the Gongchen Bridge area in the 1990s. However, under the second wave of growth triggered by the “heritage-machine” in the early 2000s, the three localities and their attributes have been further reinforced by the machine and growth coalition. With different cultural evaluation and the level of urbanization, land development becomes segmented, as shown in the developmental trajectories of the three localities.

After all, what is the different main character of heritage-induced development and redevelopment from other types of urban development? This chapter indicates that “localness” becomes a unique quality of these localities, which is what cultural elites and investors evaluated as part of another heritage quality—“authenticity.” Therefore, the heritage machine’s first character is the emphasized connections or coexistence between the now and then, either physically or symbolically. This connection is usually shown in the form of cultural clusters, monuments, heritage tourism, repurposed buildings, and museums. This arrangement expects the effects that people might appreciate the value or lessons stressed by the past, especially in a fast-moving society. Another character of this heritage-related development is the growing

significance of cultural elites and preservationists since they carry significant weight in determining heritage sites' value. The next chapter will demonstrate how authorities and cultural elites sanitized the Gongchen Bridge area's local histories and turned it into a cultural district.

### Chapter 3: Heritage as Sanitization: Rebirth of the Gongchen Bridge Area

Chapter Two demonstrates how the three canal neighborhoods with similar historical and geographical conditions follow different trajectories in contemporary socio-spatial transformation. Among other canal heritage sites in Hangzhou, Qiaoxi neighborhood (or the West Gongchen Bridge Cultural District, as named by UNESCO World Heritage Center) is the most urbanized and recognized cultural district, with a large museum cluster repurposed from previous SOE factories. It receives the greatest amount of preservation resources, such as financial support, public attention, and recognition. This cultural district is regarded as a model of heritage preservation as it allows development and secures a number of former residents resettle down on the neighboring areas. However, besides the urbanization and heritage nomination processes, the renovated cultural district was the outcome of a set of social-spatial engineering—embedded within its local cultural politics.

This chapter is organized with chronological order with three phases: 1895–1949, 1949–1997, and 1997–present. It analyzes the histories of sites of the Gongchen Bridge area (including the whole Qiaoxi neighborhood) in the context of the whole development since 1895. During the first phase, this area began to develop and turned to be a red-light area of Hangzhou, and subsequently, in the second phase, this area became a production center of SOEs. Having been a concession area and a red-light district during the early 1900s–40s, and then a socialist production center in the 1950s–90s, this area underwent a series of transformations into a cultural district in terms of its physical landscapes and symbolic meanings. At the end of 1990s and the early 2000s, deindustrialization, the river remediation project (i.e., “Comprehensive Preservation Project of the Hangzhou section of the Grand Canal”), and the preparation for the World Heritage Bid in 2008, along with the opening of the museum cluster, a large open plaza, and lighting projects, mostly turned this site from an old and low-key area into a world-level cultural district.

The heritage-making process during the current period physically, socially, culturally, and symbolically cleaned the site—described by the term “sanitization.” Sanitization is a strategy to reconstruct social and cultural orders among new and old physical settings to reach social improvement and moral enhancement goals. It uses cultural elements and improvement projects to exclude unwelcome images and associations and replaces them with new decoration and artistic expression.

This chapter will emphasize the connection and disconnection between displays and landscape in historical and contemporary contexts to see how the canal heritage has been memorialized through sanitization. This process is implemented through three social-spatial engineering mechanisms: museumification, aestheticization, and invention. Museumification means the opening of museums and, eventually, turning an area into a big “museum of architectural history,” as the then-mayor described for his aims of urban renewal and cultural preservation.<sup>29</sup> This serves to educate the public about the corrected understanding of displays and to replace, hide, and blur any dark or unsavory histories at the same time. Aestheticization refers to beautification and, more importantly, the depoliticization of local social and cultural contexts. Invention means physical and symbolic additions to make an area more attuned to recognized local traditions. This mechanism also helps romanticize the landscape and embeds

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<sup>29</sup> Guoping Wang’s speech on the Annual Meeting of the Center for Urban Studies of Hangzhou, 12 Nov. 2017, at the Hangzhou Normal University in Hangzhou.

nostalgic sentiments behind these new projects. Through these three mechanisms, the history, landscape, and heritage sites along the Grand Canal are nicely arranged within the assigned heritage boundary.

The making of the district is less a cultural preservation but a modern project, in which modernity concerns with two ideas: legibility and hygiene modernity. James Scott (1998) demonstrates how state modernization planning is often destructive to society because it removes one type of local knowledge that can only be learned by practice (*mētis*). By analyzing the rationale of modern urban planning and its opponent Jane Jacob, Scott claims that those modern planning and social-engineering projects use the skill of coding to make the improved society legible. I will demonstrate how heritagization uses similar strategies to remove *mētis* and cultural practice to make the WH site legible. Besides, Ruth Rogaski's (2004) idea of hygiene modernity derived from the case study of colonial Tianjin provides a lens to see how the idea of the imagined, a better, a cleaner cultural counterpart may influence social changes. The sanitization mechanism uses museumification, aestheticization, and invention to assembly the past traces and stories into a coherent and displayable cultural district. By implying how the canal has been clean again, the improved cultural contents and industrial heritage are working not only for the physical improvement of this cultural district but also a morally sanitized model community. Current studies on museum and heritage display capture the political and economic aspects of developing museum as business or ways of social control. However, they do not capture the nuance in terms of the change of local historiography, image, and social dynamics beyond but related to museum displays. In this section, I will also address how cultural politics are employed in heritage representation (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1998).

This chapter concludes that heritagization is never a neutral process of freezing the past but a sanitization process that cleanses unwanted physical artifacts while purifying the symbolic meanings of heritage. As a result, although many former residents returned to this area after its urban renewal and stayed close to their former industrial and socialist homes, the landscape itself is a brand-new product resulting from heritagization and sanitization.

### **3.1 1895–1949: Japanese Settlement and the Birth of the “Abnormal” Red-Light Area**

The Gongchen Bridge area lay to the north of downtown Hangzhou. The area around this section had little significance in terms of location and history before 1895. The only nameable sites were the Beixin Customs office (for tariffs within the domestic *Caoyun* system) and Gongchen Bridge (see Figure 3-2 for the current location of this customs office). Its own lands were of little value and used for economic production. Gongchen Bridge was the landmark for ships southbound to know if they would soon be arriving in Hangzhou. Its past significance lay on its function of water transportation and proximity to Haining, an important inland port, and the seaport of Zhapu, (present-day Zhapu town in Jiaxing, Zhejiang).

This area had been developing at a relatively rapid pace since 1895, when China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, after being defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War by Japan in 1894. According to the treaty, Hangzhou was ceded as one of the four treaty ports of Japan<sup>30</sup> and was obligated to open its trading area to other foreign forces. According to the epilogue of a gazetteer written in 1896:

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<sup>30</sup> Shashih, Chungking, Soochow and Hangchow (i.e., the name of Hangzhou before 1958)

*Gongchen Bridge is outside of the Beixin custom and surrounded by empty lands. Most lands along the canal were farming lands and silkworm farms, with scattered graves. This area was not an area accessible to other large cities. However, it stretches a hundred li northeast toward Haining and two hundred li eastbound to Zhapu<sup>31</sup>. Considering this condition, it might be a good place for commerce and trade. In autumn 1894, enemies from the east [Japan] defeated our soldiers. In the following year, the two forces reached an agreement, people from the east [Japan] set trading areas in Suzhou, Hangzhou, Shashih, and Zhenjiang...The silk firm, stores, and markets gathered, and the unmarked graves and the ghosts were removed to other places, just like what happened in Shanghai and Tianjin. Since then, we have seen large vessels and motors in this commercial area around Gongchen Bridge (Pengnian, 1896).*

This treaty became active on October 1st, 1896. Since then, the land development of the east part of the Gongchen Bridge area became focused and fast. The Zhejiang provincial governor sent the lieutenant governor to establish the Foreign Affairs Bureau and investigate a proper site for a concession zone in advance (L. Zhong, 2010). The governor picked a site enclosed within Yunhetang Road to the west, the Gongchen Bridge to the south, Wayaotou to the north, and the Lujiawu River to the east, occupying a total area of 1.87 km<sup>2</sup>. It included two plots: the Japanese concession zone in the north and foreign trading areas in the south, as shown in Figure 3-1. This area was approximately 1.5 km in length and 1 km in width (Cai & Wang, 2015, p. 26).

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<sup>31</sup> One *li* was 576 m long in the Qing dynasty. Therefore, the distance between the Gongchen Bridge area and Haining was about 57.6 km and 115 km between the Gongchen Bridge area and Zhapu.




Figure 3- 1: Map of Japanese concession zone and foreign trading area. Adaption by S. Fu (2016) from Osato (2003, p. 156)

However, the Japanese preferred a location outside of the Yongjin Gate, nearer to West Lake (L. Zhong, 2010), rather than this plot outside of the city walls (See Figure 3-2). China refused Japan’s proposal and insisted on the Gongchen Bridge area in order to keep the colonial forces out of more densely populated Manchu’ settlements (Cai & Wang, 2015; S. Fu, 2016; L. Zhong, 2010). To take the initiative in this matter, the Chinese authorities cultivated and built roads on the area within the bridge to “secure power” (Pengnian, 1896). There is not enough evidence to indicate what the decisive factor was that made Japan ultimately accepted China’s proposal. However, it should be noted that this suburban area was a compromise of sorts between the Qing Empire and Japan due to its location near to the Wulin Gate (the northwest gate of the city) being considered acceptable. This passage also hopes to show that land



development there did not just naturally occur but was instigated through institutions and geo-political calculations.



Figure 3- 2: Map of the metropolitan area of Hangzhou. From Orange Smile travel agency [http://www.orangesmile.com/common/img\\_city\\_maps/hangzhou-map-0.jpg](http://www.orangesmile.com/common/img_city_maps/hangzhou-map-0.jpg) [accessed 10 Mar. 2020]



Another noteworthy change during this period was the beginning of industrial enterprises. In 1889, three wealthy merchants, Yuanji Pang, Bing Ding, and Zhenyuan Wang, planned to establish a silk reeling firm and received financial help from the Qing Empire to do so. Afterward, Tongyi Silk Reeling Factory opened in 1896 on the west side of Gongchen Bridge, which later became an iconic firm of the Gongchen Bridge area (Pengnian, 1896).

After developing into a foreign settlement, this area became a notorious red-light district with small housing clusters for merchants and workers. Gangsters, businesspeople, and prostitutes ran the streets and gave this area a bad name. Under imperialism, this place did not prosper fully as Shanghai, its neighboring counterpart (L. Wang, 2000), though it was sometimes dubbed “the little Shanghai” by locals (M. Zhou, 2012). In order to attract tourists and boost the economy, the Japanese authorities legalized “five industries” in this area, these being: brothels, theaters, teahouses, smoking houses, and restaurants. After that, the Japanese also legalized gambling houses, and these entertainment industries made this area, especially the east side of Gongchen Bridge, become prosperous in an “abnormal” way (R. Chen, 2015, p. 35).

Aside from the assigned industries, teahouse culture had been prominent as one of the most popular social, cultural practices in this area. Early in the late Qing era, around the 1850s, tea houses were common public places for merchants, vendors, farmers, fishers, artisans, boat people, and officials to meet up for business, leisure, or to relax during the breaks between work and travel. There were hundreds of teahouses along this section in what is now Gongshu District, including high- and low-end ones. In either type of teahouses, consumers could enjoy story-telling performances and afford frequent visits and consumption. Besides, since the more profitable gambling, smoking opium, and sexual services markets were institutionalized under the Japanese-dominated era, the newly-established Japanese, as well as existing, teahouses, went “astray” (L. Zhong, 2010) to keep up.

Among these small residential clusters in the Gongchen Bridge area, Fuhai Li, built in 1928, was one of the most concentrated prostitution clusters in Hangzhou. It was located between Jinhua Road and Lishui Road on the east of Gongchen Bridge, where the Canal Plaza is located (as shown in Fig 3-3). Fuhai Li was a *lilong* cluster named after a famous red-light area in Shanghai (Z. Lin, 2014). In Hangzhou, there were an estimated 6,000 prostitutes (both licensed and unlicensed), which made up 3–3.5% of the total female population of Hangzhou at the time (Yan Jun, 2008b). Within its small confines, Fuhai Li housed 223 licensed brothels and 434 prostitutes (An, 2014). However, these numbers could well be underestimated since there were many unlicensed sex workers within the same area. These industries resulted in one of the most important red-light areas in Hangzhou. A place which became a “den for gambling and prostitution (L. Wang, 2000), reaching its lowest point in the 1930s.

The sex industries in this area faced challenges to stay since the Republic of China established by the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) set regulations and control over prostitution. This regime regarded it as a serious social and cultural problem and initiated the series of reforms in the 1920s–30s, known as the Nanking Abolition Campaigns. The new government worked hard to abolish prostitution as part of social reform to direct Chinese culture into a “modern” and orderly society, in which prostitution was to be considered harmful not only for the oppressed women, but also for the health, morality, and most importantly, the national development of society (Hershatter, 1997). In 1928, the Nationalist regime banned prostitution in the cities of the neighboring provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui. Hangzhou was one of the targeted cities for the prostitution ban.

However, the reforms and regulations turned out to be a failure. Hangzhou published the “Regulation of Prostitution” in November 1929. Therefore, in downtown Hangzhou, the unlicensed prostitutes were banned, and only two areas in Hangzhou continued to allow licensed prostitution: the Gongchen Bridge area and the Jianggan area (Municipality, 1933). The then administration provided another method to reduce the number of licensed prostitutes. This method was to gradually transfer randomly-selected prostitutes from a draw to the Provincial Educational Rehab center, where those selected prostitutes would be trained and taught new skills and eventually “marry out” (YanJun, 2008b). Nevertheless, brothel owners in the restricted areas used different strategies to avoid the draw. For example, they might send the prostitutes elsewhere before the draw started. Prostitution and gangs acted symbiotically in this business and could, therefore, gain information effectively in advance of policy implementation.

The confrontation between pimps and local authorities became escalated. According to news reports, once in 1930, approximately 1,000 female pimps, thugs, and gangsters destroyed the rehab center, released the prostitutes within it, and beat and humiliated the officials (EasternTimes, 1930, 1933). The main reason for their fierce opposition to abolition was due to the threat to their livelihood. This area turned out to be a place not only of bad repute but indelibly associated with prostitution. According to a news commentary in *Municipal Review*:

*Gongchen Bridge in northern Hangzhou is nothing but a place of prostitution in the eyes of the Hangzhou people. If you met someone asking you where you were going, and you replied, Gongchen Bridge, this person would think you were used to visiting brothels. Hangzhou people have no idea about the commercial port, the Japanese concession, and the Chinese trading market (Xiong, 1935).*

The failure of the abolition movement did not serve to decrease the number of sex workers. Furthermore, the Hangzhou Provincial Public Security Bureau even reissued business licenses to 86 prostitutes in 1936 (YanJun, 2008a, 2008b). The abolition movement in Hangzhou was forced to announce its failure during the republican era.

Nearby the red-light district stood a Taoist temple—Zhang Taxian Temple. It played an important religious role during this period. According to Pengnian (1896), the deity worshipped there, Zhang Taxian, was a Buddhist practitioner with no affiliation to Hangzhou. He came and stayed in a simple self-built dwelling in the Gongchen Bridge area in 1871. He was said to have cured people suffering from disease and cleaned the neighborhood voluntarily. Some people thought him to be insane, while others believed he was an incarnated deity. One day in 1878, he sat on the bridge and suddenly jumped down from it—whether to save a person or an animal or as a sacrifice, the reasons remain unknown—and was found dead. Local people appreciated his contributions and buried his body on the east side of the bridge (around 100 m from the abutment of Gongchen Bridge) and made a statue to worship him. However, as the treaty and the following plans had determined to turn this area into part of a port and trading area, the burial site was to be removed so as not to obstruct the crossroad and the area's future use. Interestingly, there appeared to be some unexplainable power which helped Zhang's burial site to not only remain but prosper:

*Workers fainted when they started to dig. It should be the spirit of Zhang, who tricked them and gave them a lesson. Those foreigners did not believe that, so they tried to dig it instead. Zhang's spirit never gave up; whether Chinese or foreigners, he made them faint anyway. The foreigner who just came fainted*

*right away. Therefore, foreigners not only stopped removing his grave but also built a temple to worship him. Since then, this temple has been prosperous. During ordinary days, many people burn incense and kowtow, most of them are supposed to be ladies of leisure. During the pilgrimage seasons, rural visitors can cause traffic jams on the two wide roads (EasternTimes, 1933).*

From this news report, this area became popular with local prostitutes and pilgrims. The most pilgrimage tourists came from regional areas via the Grand Canal, and their final destinations would be temples around West Lake. I will further discuss this type of tourism in Chapter Five. In sum, this phase of local development started in 1895, paused at the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), and ended during the Second Civil War (1945–1949). According to the materials available, land-based development began to wane at this time. During this warring decade, the Gongchen Bridge area was turned into a battleground because of its geographical location and its function for water transportation. People in this area and downtown Hangzhou suffered greatly from warfare, food deficiency, and the cessation of trade and business throughout this difficult time. In the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan controlled Huafeng Paper Mill in this area and ordered Chinese workers to work. Although rebellions and strikes took place against the Japanese occupying forces, all of them failed (Xu, 2015). Soon after Japan surrendered in 1945, the civil war between the Nationalist Party and the communists broke out. This civil war resulted in the defeat of the Republican regime and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

### **3.2 1949–1997 Industrialism: The Model Socialist Production Center**

This area had functioned as an entertainment area with bad repute outside of urban Hangzhou. Afterward, it served as an industrial area in the first half-century of the PRC regime. The new regime started to establish a state-owned property system. It confiscated existing private firms, lands, and businesses, and actively established its new socialist urban industries and rural entities as part of the planned economic system.

For Hangzhou, it took five years from 1949–1954 to transform the private business ownership into public-private and eventually nationalized ones (Gao, 2004). Since then, the area was reorganized into an industrial production center, where prostitutes and gangsters were leaving or were sent to labor camps as part of production forces. Many state-owned factories were established along the canal in Gongshu town (nowadays Gongshu District) in the 1950s. This area thus became one of the most important industrial bases not just in Hangzhou, but within Zhejiang province as a whole. In an urban planning meeting in 1953, A.C. Maxim, an urban expert from Russia, suggested that Hangzhou could be developed as a city for recreation, tourism, and cultural activities. During this period, the Russian model was seen as the ideal for planning, and urban planners of Hangzhou followed Maxim’s advice and decided to have four districts that served different functions: the downtown (Shangcheng and Xiacheng Districts) for commerce, West Lake for recreation, the belt of the Qiantang River for higher education, and Gongshu and Jianggan for factories to protect West Lake and downtown Hangzhou area from industrial development and pollution (Gao, 2004).

Along the section between Gongchen Bridge and Xiaohe Street sat textile firms of cotton, silk, and flax. Aside from textile firms, this section saw growth in shipbuilding, thermos bottle, paper, and cloth dyeing firms. The rationale of this type of industry expansion was to reduce the dependence on import goods and raw materials. Therefore, these types of industries were termed: “industries for the nation” (*min-zu-gong-ye*), and Gongshu was known as the center of *min-zu-*

*gong-ye* in Hangzhou. These state factories were leading industries not just locally but on municipal or provincial levels. The “Four Large Manufacturing Plants” near Gongchen Bridge have been famous and significant to the development of this area: Zhejiang Flax Mill, Hangzhou Silk Printing and Dyeing Mill, Hangzhou First Cotton Factory (& Dyeing Factory), and Huafeng Paper Mill. Many families in Hangzhou city as a whole (not simply the Gongchen Bridge area) were employed by one of them (M. Zhou, 2012). As part of the socialist work-unit system (*danwei*), these SOEs were in charge not only of production but of the lives of their employees as well (termed, collective consumption).




Figure 3- 3: Map of the locations of former SOEs in the Gongchen Bridge area. QX stands for the Qiaoxi Cultural District while XH, the Xiaohe neighborhood. Base map from google map.

Although known as “industries for the nation” in the planned economy, these businesses were not fully owned by the state. For example, some factories were state-funded but were pre-owned by the private sector, such as the Hangzhou First Cotton Textile Manufactory, Huafeng Paper Mill, and Thermos Bottle Factory. The first *min-zu-gong-ye* of this area—Tongyi Silk Reeling Factory—belonged to this category. It was first established by private entrepreneurs in the late 1890s, as mentioned above, but then in 1955 became part of state property and had its name changed to the Hangzhou First Cotton Factory. This was a usual method to nationalize the



economy during the 1950s as the PRC regime started to lower the proportion of private ownership of factories by using joint enterprises (Gao, 2004).

Some factories were funded directly by the state, such as the Zhejiang Flax Mill, Hangzhou Silk Printing and Dyeing Mill, and Hangzhou Dahe Shipbuilding Co. To take the shipbuilding company as an example, it was initially the Gongshu State-Owned Shipbuilding Firm, established in 1958, then renamed the Hangzhou Dahe Shipbuilding Firm and relocated to its current site on the west bank of the Grand Canal. Funded by the Hangzhou municipal government and Gongshu District government, it specialized in producing wooden ships before 1967 and powered boats after then. This firm reached its peak in the 1970s when it had almost 900 employees.



Figure 3- 4: Image of Hangzhou First Cotton Plant. From M. Zhou (2012, p. 98).

Aside from these state-owned entities, another type of production unit became active during this period—the labor camp or *laogai* entity. *Laogai* translates to “reform through labor.” This type of labor camp was a way for the public security system to incorporate delinquents and criminals into production. Honglei Silk Mill was one such company, and parts of its site and buildings were used educationally. Known as the House of Reformation and Learning and established by the Republican nationalist regime, its official name was the Dyeing and Weaving Mill of Administration Section under the charge of the Hangzhou Public Security Bureau. In August 1954, the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government issued the “Regulation on Labor Reform,” and Zhejiang Public Security Office established the Labor Reform Bureau, which then took charge of the Dyeing and Weaving Mill (Xu, 2014). During the Cultural Revolution, this mill was renamed *Honglei*—meaning “red thunder” in Chinese. This name, with its strong suggestion of the Chinese communist spirit, is still in use today. According to retired workers from other factories, many prostitutes and local gangsters were sent to Honglei Silk Mill. Working in this firm was not as respected as being employed in other neighboring state-owned firms since local people were aware of the different status of its workers. In short, this area served primarily for production in this planned economy. The entertainment industry still existed, but its scope had been largely decreased.

Industrialism brought with it not only economic development and social reorganization but also heavy pollution. Water in this section was termed “stinking water” due to the polluting effects of the market reform starting in the late 1970s. In the 1980s, as the state proposed to

protect and reuse the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal, the pollution issue slowly began to attract public attention, but no authorities offered practical solutions. Apart from the plants themselves, deteriorated neighborhoods and a lack of sewage infrastructure and water treatment facilities worsened the state of the environment. Besides, the underlying terrains of this area also resulted in flooding during the 1980s to the early 2000s. What follows is a description of this area before 1996:

*[I]t was like a huge formicary: various tattered dwellings crowded together, and the extremely high density of dwelling and population would give you goosebumps. You would see a darkened river separate the formicary in the middle, and the 400-year-old Gongchen Bridge was like a malnourished umbilical cord connecting the two sides of the canal (M. Zhou, 2012, p. 34).*

Aside from the deterioration of the environment, the management of factories along the canal faced unprecedented difficulties during the 1990s. However, this phenomenon was not local nor regional, but nationwide. Labor wages and the price of raw materials increased, and the institutional problems of SOEs worsened this situation so that a large number of these factories were forced to close or declare bankruptcy, leading to an overall decline and restructuring of SOEs. From November 1998 to November 2000, Hangzhou Thermos Bottle Factory, Zhejiang Flax Mill, Hangzhou First Cotton Textile Manufactory, Hangzhou Silk Printing, and Dyeing Mill, Honglei Silk Mill, and Hangzhou Dahe Shipbuilding Co. either closed or went bankrupt, leaving many workers unemployed (R. Chen, 2015, pp. 16-17). Several sites for these socialist entities were turned into housing plots for the modern and luxury commercial housing projects. For example, a realty corporation in Hong Kong bought the original site of East-South Flour Plant and built the housing project “Wulin Waitan.” The average price is more than 78 thousand RMB/m<sup>2</sup>. Another project is “Wulin Yihao,” which the Greentown Group (Hong Kong) and Hangzhou Binjiang Real Estate Group Co. (Hangzhou) bought the original site of Hangzhou Auto Motives Plant in 2006 and co-developed the housing project. This housing project has been with top price among Hangzhou since its complete construction in 2015, now costing more than 101 thousand RMB/m<sup>2</sup>, while the average housing price in Hangzhou is around slightly more than 26 thousand RMB/m<sup>2</sup>.<sup>32</sup> The names of both projects contain “Wulin,” referring to Wulin Gate, the northern city gate near the pier on the Grand Canal.

This growth was tied to the growth machine I explained in the previous chapter, and this “deindustrialization” and restructuring of the SOEs made the following heritagization of the canal possible. It is noteworthy that deindustrialization in Hangzhou was a process of restructuring the state economy rather than a decline of the regional economy and a decrease of the population as that in the U.S. since the 1970s. Therefore, the deindustrialization caused a large scale of unemployment but, at the same time, allowing new room for development for other types of economy and private business owners. Also, it released large parcels of land for commercial and residential use. This SOE restructuring also signaled the shifting realization of land value through the market of land use rights.

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<sup>32</sup> Data collected from Anjuko Inc. at <https://hangzhou.anjuko.com/> [accessed 17 Feb. 2020].

### 3.3 1997–present: Heritagization through Social-Spatial Sanitization

As mentioned in the previous sections, the perceived dark past and dirty environment (both physically and socially) of this area were intertwined with local, national, and international developments since 1896. This century-long development has undergone a severe transformation since 1997. This area underwent urban renewal and river remediation and turned out to be a livable post-industrial neighborhood and then a cultural heritage district within a relatively short period. The east part of the bridge was more urbanized and developed since it owned more SOEs than the west part. Hangzhou municipal government and Gongshu District government foresaw the profit of urban renewal of this area and initiated the project in 1997. It was not until 2001 that the authorities decided to incorporate the west part of the bridge into the project. This area was under renewal thanks to the “growth coalition” for their attempts to realize land values. This renewal had nothing to do with heritage preservation.

This whole process started with urban projects and the whole designated heritage area, and its neighboring heritage sites also underwent a series of nuanced mechanisms to fit in with the new goal of this area. These mechanisms are harder to pinpoint as compared with urban expansion, urban renewal, and river remediation projects. As local states tend to emphasize the “innate nature of vernacular canal culture” and the existing Qiaoxi neighborhood, this section seeks to explain how heritagization operates three spatial mechanisms of sanitization—museumification, aestheticization, and invention—to manage physical artifacts and the dark past of this canal neighborhood.

#### I. Museumification

The first important mechanism is museumification. Museumification, in this subsection, refers to the removal of living elements and real use and the transition to an idealized representation (Gobster, 2007; Lijun Zhang, 2018) in cultural or natural preservation. Besides, museumification here also indicates the increasing establishment of museums or reuse patterns as museums of the existing but repurposed buildings. Both ways help to clean up a few existing industrial buildings and hydraulic artifacts.

In the same period, significant museum development happened in this area. Chinese modern museums in the post-socialist era indicate a break from the Maoist era. Displays in modern museums or exhibition halls in the Maoist era indicate more on an adapted Marxist-Lenin historiography, which stressed on the utopian-oriented present while disregarding the past privileged elites and middle-class people (Denton, 2014). Modern museums in the post-socialist era, instead, stress a broader historical vision on globalization, colonization, and nationalism. Since this era represents the economic reform and opening, class struggle has no longer a theme of museum display (Varutti, 2014). The development echoes with the Chinese museum boom temporally since the 1990s and spatially in the (re)developing areas. There are three waves of museum expansion since the PRC regime, and the current one is the third, characterized as the decreasing socialist emphasis and increasing stress on nationalism and state cohesion (Denton, 2014). This heated interest in museum expansion also resonated with the context of local development and heritagization of this area with the promotion of the Grand Canal culture. As the former SOEs went bankrupted or removed, their buildings and warehouses became useful in the wave of museumification. In the first decade of the 2000s, Hangzhou, as other canal cities, was aware of the nomination of the Grand Canal, so Guoping Wang asked to keep some factory buildings for future use in preservation. Despite these efforts on preservation, the main tendency

has still been demolition than preservation, but the emphasis on the use of old buildings was stressed in those urban projects as to make the city “the museum of architectural history” rather than “the museum of historic buildings”<sup>33</sup> This rationale is also embodied in the museum cluster in the West Gongchen Bridge cultural district.

For museums in the West Gongchen Bridge cultural district, they serve as a tool to mediate the past and the future through showcasing the previous buildings and the redeveloped traditional craft and knowledge on the canal. Old buildings were repurposed into museum buildings and public arts while the contents in exhibition filter local history and promote land development and the cultural achievement of local authorities.

Despite most of the land from state-own factories was put on the land lease market and sold to big private real estate developers so that most of the old buildings were demolished, and then Hangzhou municipal government decided to keep a few of them and repurposed them into museums. The function of these museums is to keep and maintain the old building structures of factories and warehouses rather than to focus entirely on their collections.

Most of the collections are non-local, such as artworks of traditional crafts in Hangzhou and neighboring cultures. However, as new and free sheltered spaces, these museums can turn a dark past into something displayable and decent. In the small area of the west and east sides of Gongchen Bridge sit six museums (see Figure 3-5), serving to sanitize local industrial history in the name of cultural preservation.




Figure 3- 5 :Map of the six museums. Base map from Gaode Map.

<sup>33</sup> The speech was given during the opening ceremony of the annual meeting of the Center of Urban Studies of Hangzhou on 12 Nov. 2017.



## 1. Museum cluster on the West Side

The museum cluster on the west side contains five museums, the buildings of which are former factories and warehouses. The buildings of the cluster are mostly part of the industrial heritage display, occupying a total area of approximately 55,000 m<sup>2</sup>. It consists of the Chinese Knives, Scissors, and Swords Museum, the Chinese Fan Museum, the Chinese Umbrella Museum, the Hangzhou Arts and Crafts Museum, and the Workmanship Demonstration Pavilion.

The Hangzhou municipal government funded the three thematic museums (knives, scissors, and swords, fan, and umbrella) and the operator is the Yunhe Group. They officially opened in September 2009. According to the official introduction of the four museums:

*[They]... are specialized in traditional and modern arts and crafts, which have precious collections and exhibitions of historical relics and artworks. Crafts masters and intangible inheritors have their artistry here displayed publicly and inherited, which makes the museums a fresh record of cultural heritage of the Grand Canal and the city civilization of Hangzhou, establishing cultural awareness to incorporate modern city life with tradition.*<sup>34</sup>

Although the introductory words indicate the appreciation of local tradition and its juxtaposition with modern life, the real function for them is to showcase these industrial buildings rather than the displays inside of them. The Chinese Knives, Scissors, and Swords Museum building was rebuilt on the basis of the former Qiaoxi Local Specialty Warehouse, and the exhibition hall occupies 2,460 m<sup>2</sup>. The Chinese Fan Museum was rebuilt on the site of the Hangzhou First Cotton Factory (the exhibition hall for which covers 2,623m<sup>2</sup>). The China Umbrella Museum is newly built, and its hall covers an area of 2,411m<sup>2</sup>. The size of each museum is not in proportion to the displays inside, and displays were not engaging nor well organized. The set of displays, however, did indicate that Hangzhou, or Zhejiang, has been a place full of materials and people with skills thanks to the canal. However, in comparison with the Hangzhou Tea Museum and the Hangzhou Silk Museum, they do not hint as much the connection of materials and civilization as the tea and silk museums do (Varutti, 2014).

Another important museum is the Hangzhou Arts and Crafts Museum, which was renovated from part of the Honglei Silk Mill. This museum is also a municipal museum operated by the Hangzhou Bureau of Landscape and Cultural Heritage. The Yunhe Group was its manager at the beginning of its planning and early phase of operation. The museum has four stories, and each floor holds an exhibition: a temporary exhibition on the first floor, an exhibition on local history on the second floor, a permanent exhibition on the third floor, and a public area for youth and student activities on the fourth floor. This museum was built in 2011, and its permanent exhibition received the Best Museums Award of the Chinese Museums Association in the same year. The title of this museum award was “Qiantang Artisanship, Essence of the Works of Nature—Hangzhou Arts and Crafts Museum”<sup>35</sup> and the exhibits there are mainly production tools and displays of intangible cultural heritage and local craftsmanship.

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<sup>34</sup> Official website of Hangzhou Arts and Crafts Museum: <http://www.zgdjss.com/#!/app/main/introduction> [accessed 24 Apr. 2019]

<sup>35</sup> Official website of the Chinese Museum Association <http://www.chinamuseum.org.cn/plus/view.php?aid=5106>. [accessed 25 Apr. 2019]

Despite the apparent success of the museum, the uses and function of the site (and the planned museum) were never made entirely clear. Most Honglei factory buildings and employee dormitories were destroyed in the 2000s over fierce resistance from the then employees, though at this point, the future use of the site had not been revealed (Y. Xin, 2008). Part of the site later was turned into a shopping mall, and part of the building was kept for a museum. According to a member of the museum staff, it was originally planned as a museum of modern industrialization, but the calls for collections yielded few display items. This aside, the bearing capacity of the building and its levels was not suitable to house heavy industrial production facilities.<sup>36</sup> In other words, the museum was a demolition- rather than a preservation-oriented project. Therefore, this museum and the neighboring shopping mall sit on the previous site of the Honglei Silk Mill, both of which are now becoming part of the landscape. The essence of this spatial arrangement is to change the focus from what has gone to what is on display, and this arrangement works as part of the achievement of the sanitization mechanism.

On the west side is the Workmanship Demonstration Pavilion Museum, which stands on the site of the Tongyi Silk Reeling Firm. It occupies 3,200 m<sup>2</sup>, and the main displays are intangible manufactory heritage practices, not limited to Hangzhou.

At the front entrance of the museum, spectators can see a set of tableaux of the theme of the canal culture. One of the tableaux demonstrates the busy traffic under the Gongchen Bridge, as shown in Figure 3-6 below. This collection brings the landmark (the Gongchen Bridge) and a vernacular scene to the front of the display and creates a nostalgic impression. Moreover, as Susan Stewart suggests, miniature offers “a world clearly limited in space but frozen and thereby both particularized and generalized in time (Stewart, 1993, p. 48). This tableau thus particularizes lives by the Gongchen Bridge by emphasizing the bridge and the landscape, while generalizing the local lives without other people and histories indicated. This display works as a miniature to show the cultural symbol of the bridge with some nameless figurines with customs in the late Qing and early Republican era when the water was clear. Nonetheless, spectators would not sense the past of its history as a red-light area during the same historical period indicated by the customs of the figurines.



Figure 3- 6: Image of a tableau inside of the Workmanship Demonstration Pavilion museum. Photography by the author.

<sup>36</sup> Interview 20180727, No.164

When entering the main exhibition room of the museum, visitors will find that the roofs and the interior space are well preserved in the shape of the factory. The vertical windows on the lower parts of the sloped roofs helped circulate air while protecting cotton yarn from direct sunlight. In the center of the main exhibition area stands a reeling machine, but it was not operational at the time I visited. This museum accommodates intangible heritage practices and provides space for master artisans and their apprentices to make woven products from bamboo and practice wood carving and other handicrafts. These artisans receive subsidies from the public sector and can use the museum to display their work. The reality is that society is losing more and more experienced artisans, and few young people are willing to learn and take up this craft as a lifelong career. According to a museum staff member, learning these skills, and gaining craftsmanship, is challenging in modern society as young people have more and various life options where they can choose other more profitable, and less time-consuming jobs. As a result, most prospectus apprentices there would consider it too “inefficient” for a career.<sup>37</sup> The museum is a working space to showcase how these artisans make traditional crafts and also a place for visitors to see this disappearing aspect of culture.



Figure 3- 7 Images of the roof inside of the Workmanship Demonstration Pavilion Museum. Photography by the author.

These five museums at Qiaoxi neighborhood is now part of the post-industrial landscape along this section. Along with the success of the WH bid, this area as a whole becomes a place for guest to see intangible cultural practice. However, the displays inside them had little to do with the canal and local cultures.

## 2. The Beijing-Hangzhou Canal Museum

On the east side of the bridge lies the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal Museum, which is the first canal-themed museum in China. This plot of land was the Fuhai Li, the *lilong* cluster hosting sex workers. This cluster, as described, was demolished due to urban renewal (Ren, 2015), and

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<sup>37</sup> Interview 20170727, No.50.

nothing left there. The whole new planning process for this site started in 2002, and the canal museum opened in 2006 (L. Zhong, 2010). The establishment of this museum aims to display the canal culture and make the center a collection for the research conducted on canal heritage and history (Qi, 2009). Geographically, it sits on the east side of the canal and faces the Canal Cultural Plaza and the Gongshu District Office, and the building is of little historical value.

The museum itself is newly built rather than renovated from previous buildings. The site of the museum occupies an area of 45,000 m<sup>2</sup>. The building area itself is 10,700 m<sup>2</sup>, and the exhibition area is 5,500 m<sup>2</sup> (L. Zhong, 2010). Administratively, it is part of the Comprehensive Canal Protection project proposed by the Hangzhou municipal government and was funded by the Gongshu District government, meaning that it is less involved with the municipal government. When entering the museum lobby, visitors will see a wall with engraved calligraphy and drawing by local artists. The calligraphy work appreciates the efforts put for the WH nomination, while the drawing depicts the Gongchen Bridge area with a remark on the left side: Gongshu has been prosperous since the past, as shown below (Figure 3-8).



Figure 3- 8: Images of the wall on the lobby of the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal Museum. Photography by the author.

It includes four exhibition halls: “Establishment and Changes of Canals,” “The Uses of Canals,” “Preservation and Comprehensive Planning Projects of the Zhejiang Section,” and “Canal Culture.” The first two exhibitions are relatively neutral; they introduce Chinese canals and their political settings and contributions to Chinese empires throughout history. After a tour of the first two exhibition halls, the museum displays start to take on more of a “local” flavor—a way to appreciate the efforts and dedication from local authorities. There is a plaque hanging on the corner of a traditional corridor, which reads: “The Dream of World Heritage Comes True.” Photos from the World Heritage Conference in 2014 are also displayed there. This space on the corner shows up of a sudden, in terms of museum visiting. Before entering to another exhibition hall on local achievement on cultural preservation, I saw a painter with a simple table and a chair selling his books, painting, postcards on the corner of the transitional space. He sat there with his teapots and was supposed to talk with visitors interested in canal culture while selling his art pieces and books.

After passing this corner, the third exhibition introduces heritage sites of the Hangzhou section. Visitors can see a river model below the transparent ground floor. Though lacking in substantial artifacts, this hall does contain images and descriptions of preservation projects. This is designed to emphasize the connections between achieved heritage preservation projects of the



district government. As a result, even though this museum, among the six, is themed with the canal, this museum can be viewed as a local museum at the district level, which exhibits the achievement of local states rather than the remaining canal cultures.

The first mechanism—museumification—helps this area sanitize the unsavory part of industrial artifacts and stresses on the traditional art and craftsmanship. It creates an atmosphere of appreciation of local culture, which echoes with the heritagization projects of the Grand Canal. The museum, in this mechanism, aims to educate spectators and disseminate knowledge (Bennett, 1995). This mechanism helps the Gongchen Bridge turn into a giant civil open space from a cluster of dim factory buildings. In sum, the development of Chinese museums multiplies since 2000s, as this subsection shows, this tendency also resonates with the “museum booms” in China. Moreover, in the analysis of those heritage sites and displays, it is clear that the whole area falls in the overall design and arrangement into a total perfection and control under the framework and the concept of “museum.” This subsection also demonstrates how local states manipulate the display to arouse collective memories, showcase their achievement, and sanitize part of the histories of this area.

## II. Aestheticization

The second significant mechanism is aestheticization, which means to not only beautify physical artifacts but to use aestheticism as a tool to depoliticize and present each artifact in a coherent and neutral manner. The most significant work done around the Gongchen Bridge area would have to be on the new Qiaoxi Street and the remaining industrial heritage sites.

### 1. Qiaoxi Street

The heritagization of the Gongchen Bridge area and other smaller sites is regarded as a living and successful example of “on-site” preservation. Qiaoxi literally means the western part of the bridge (in this instance, Gongchen Bridge). Qiaoxi Street—a pedestrian street that runs parallel to the canal—is the main street within Qiaoxi Historic District. This street is aligned by two sets of two-story townhouses built in the style of the late Qing and early Republican period (1840–1912), accommodating nice restaurants, charming souvenir stores, cafes, bookstores, and boutiques on the ground floor. In contrast to the museumification in the previous subsection, this type of vernacular housing skipped the industrial period while tumbledown dwellings and plain grocery stores crowded this area.



Figure 3- 9: Images of Qiaoxi Street. Photography by the author.

In one chapter of the book “National Past-Times,” Anagnost (1997) describes the making of the “nation-scape” for tourism by providing the case study of the Fuzimiao market area in Nanking. The case with the similar architectural form of the “white stucco walls and black-tiled roofs” which represents very similar cultural references of the Jiangnan (South of Yangtze River) culture. Furthermore, the return of commodity economy for tourism development in the 1980s shows a new combination of global capital flows and local “tradition” when local authorities promote the old “market” in the post-socialist era.

In contrast, the making of the Qiaoxi cultural district was not primarily for promoting tourism development but more for the prospective land revenue from real estate development from urban renewal and heritagization. Even though these renovated buildings follow the same pattern (that stores located on the ground and second floors are for store owners or households), the owners of these stores are seldom locals. Notwithstanding, this area is still generally considered a vernacular cultural district. The leading operator of this street is the Yunhe Group, which built and renovated townhouses and apartment complexes to represent the riverside landscape. It owns the use rights and has the authority to invest, making it the most prominent landlord of the heritage district. It leases real estate to store owners and has the power to decide which industry is suitable and profitable.

A little portion of former residents live in the renovated or rebuilt townhouses around the back of the alleys, while most of them live in high-rise residential resettlement buildings within walking distance of the main street. The residents are said to enjoy strolling, relaxing, and socializing around the area, thus becoming part of the canal's nostalgic heritage landscape in the eyes of visitors. During the day, residents might pass by this area when out for walks with their grandchildren, do some grocery shopping at supermarkets in modern shopping malls, go gambling at small mahjong rooms behind the main streets outside of the heritage district, and chat with their new and old neighbors in open spaces. Both renovated temples and the Chinese medical clinic, Fang Hui Chun Tang Chinese Medicine Co., seem to be proof of a preserved traditional way of life. It is now common to see the elderly take a rest or go to see a doctor inside of the Fang Hui Chun Tang Chinese Medicine Co. during hot days, even though this branch only opened in 2010. Tourists also appreciate the presence and slow tempo of the lifestyle of the original residents with an appetite for witnessing an “authentic” living culture.

There is, however, no longer a traditional teahouse. A well-known teahouse in this cultural district is the Lao Kaixin Teahouse, which opened in 2011 and is still operational, is located on the 500 m<sup>2</sup> site of a former gathering place and wood merchant area. Built in 1924, it once served as an almshouse for dock workers. This building has since been renovated and turned into a teahouse in which a Chinese talk show regularly takes place. It is an important site for the intangible heritage within the Qiaoxi area.

Zhihua Zhou, the host of the TV program, *Kaixin Teahouse*, funded and planned this teahouse. Its official web page says: “The tea house aims to promote the tea culture and inherit intangible heritage.” “Intangible heritage,” in this instance, refers to the live talk show performance given, and the simple meals and tea for the audience that the teahouse provides.

Zhou specializes in a Hangzhou-styled solo talk show style named Xiao Rehun. The first known famous performer of Xiao Rehun was Baolin Du in the late Qing dynasty. Xiao Rehun performers, usually nameless vendors at the same time, stood in the streets or docks reporting the news and criticize and satirize politics in a humorous manner. This performance did not require ample space nor literacy of the audience and became very popular for ordinary people. This vocal performance reached its peak in the 1920s but fell during the Cultural Revolution. The

term—Xiao Rehun—literally means “small, heat-related dizziness,” and was used as a way to escape accountability by hiding behind a nonsensical invention.



Figure 3- 10: (Left) Image of the Lao Kaixin Teahouse; (Right) Introduction of the Almshouse. Photography by the author.

Now, this remarkable local performance is intended as a way of reviving traditional cultures. In 2006, Xiao Rehun was incorporated on the National Intangible Heritage List, and Zhou is the most representative and influential inheritor of Xiao Rehun. However, since the social contexts have changed, and those traveling boat people and merchants no longer exist in this area, this attempt could hardly be called successful. This situation has continued because Xiao Rehun is performed in the Hangzhou dialect, but nowadays, urban people, especially young people in Hangzhou, communicate in Mandarin Chinese. In addition, despite local residents speak Hangzhou dialect, Lao Kaixin being a famous teahouse that hosts traditional performances, its high prices mean that locals will often turn to socialize in less well-known mahjong rooms outside of the cultural district. The talk show performances are typically held on Friday evenings, and the price for watching (and drinking tea) usually comes to 50 RMB, while the average salary income in Hangzhou in mid-2017 was 7,608 RMB.<sup>38</sup>

Qiaoxi Street also features two lines of tradition-like stores, and the targeted customers are tourists rather than residents. Although this area is also a tourist spot, tourism has not changed the lives of local people. Su (2015) argues that urban entrepreneurialism starts to commodify the heritage site in a case study of Lijiang Old Town, Yunnan. She notes that there are three markets created—the tourist market, the real estate market, and the capital market, and the local states and local elites benefit the most from the tourist market. In comparison with the case of Lijiang, Qiaoxi Cultural District has earned most from the real estate, and few residents in this case study obtain benefits, whether directly or indirectly, from heritage tourism. The tourism company is run by the Yunhe Group. For local people, Gongchen Bridge is the only site that has not changed at all. However, for the tourism industry, the museum cluster does not make considerable profits, and the establishment of these museums was not to make money, as mentioned in relation to the first sanitization mechanism. Therefore, the most feasible way to develop tourism is to utilize the

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<sup>38</sup> According to a business report from Asiaone, see <https://www.asiaone.com/business/top-10-chinese-cities-highest-average-monthly-salary> [accessed 13 Mar. 2020]

living canal heritage and create experience-oriented canal tourism, such as boat tours, night tours, and wedding parties on the canal.

The largest ferry terminal of this section is the Wulin Gate terminal, from which passengers can take ferries eastbound to the Qiantang River or northbound to the Gongchen Bridge terminal (see Figure 3-2). It is a pleasant experience to spend 30 minutes taking the water taxi to travel to Gongchen Bridge on the 6.6 km-long route, all the while seeing boats loaded with sand or building materials pass along the canal. During the daytime, the ferry service is part of the public transportation system and costs little. During evening hours, the waterbus becomes part of local tourism. The nightscape of the Hangzhou section is another tourist attraction in which the tourism industry is eagerly investing. The lighting project along this section started in 2009 and gained international design awards, including the “City People Light” award that same year. This project was a cooperation between a French lighting designer, Roger Narboni, and his Chinese counterparts: Zhongtai Lighting Technology Co., Philip Lighting (China), and the China Academy of Art (Y. Tang, 2009). This lighting project was inspired by the traditional water landscape of China, with the colors green and blue being used to represent the design concept. This award-winning project was too ostentatious to fit in with Chinese aesthetics, which are traditionally more implicit and contained, according to a local artist and preservationist.<sup>39</sup>This new lighting also bothered residents in the neighborhood along the canal banks (Y. Tang, 2009). Despite these criticisms, this spectacle, mixed with the sight of renovated buildings along the riverbank, provides the night cruises with an excellent visual experience of the mix of traditional and modern Hangzhou.



Figure 3- 11: Image of nightscape along the section. Photography by the author.

Holding wedding parties on the ferry is an attempt to expand the scope of business. While traditionally, this was the necessary vehicle for transporting wedding-related goods, the boat served as a functional vehicle rather than a fashionable means of transportation. For boat people, a distinct “non-local” social group, wedding parties on the boat symbolized a new start in life

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<sup>39</sup> Interview 20160702, No.8.



since the boat would be a new home for the newly-weds—despite the hardship and risk of working and living on a boat. As a result, this modern version is a luxury experience for middle-class urban couples or tourists who can afford the extra expense for this fun wedding experience. These designs of the tourism products are part of the sales strategies of the Yunhe Group rather than the preservation efforts for the WH properties and even the local economy.

## 2. Statue of female workers

At the corner of the museum cluster on the west bank of the bridge stands a white statue of two female bodies: one stands with straight arms holding a piece of cloth, and the other kneels with her right hand in a salute. The meaning and location of the statue have lost some relevance since the factory was removed, and it now stands at the entrance to a parking lot of a shopping mall. Originally it was a public statue inside the Russian style factories of the Honglei Silk Mill, as shown in the right of Figure 3-12. The rest of the former factory buildings are repurposed used for the Hangzhou Art and Craft Museum, but this statue remains isolated on the island of a parking lot entrance.

Few visitors knew and cared about the past of these repurposed buildings in the era of heritage preservation, however. The appropriation of its statue, and the process of aestheticization, transformed it from a socialist site to an artistic one. Within the social-spatial mechanism of aestheticization, the meaning of these female workers has changed from celebrating socialism and liberation to representing a nostalgic memory of industrial workers.

Aestheticization, as one mechanism for sanitization, helps filter several past and refine the selected ones with original contexts removed. As shown in this subsection, these beautifying practices around the canal heritage sites and properties support the total transformation of this area rather than improve several sites randomly.




Figure 3- 12: (Left) Current Statue. Photography by the author. (Right) Workers and the statue in 1992. From X. Chen, Huang, and Wei (2014)

### III. Invention

The last important mechanism is the invention, through which new cultural objects are made and harmonized by combining heritage-making with the other two mechanisms. Decorations on the crushproof pillars, a Taoist temple, and public sculptures exemplify new inventions through heritagization.

#### 1. Canal Cultural Plaza

The Canal Cultural Plaza is situated on the east side of the neighborhood, by the entrance to Gongchen Bridge, close to the Gongchen Bridge passenger ships terminal. This plaza was planned in 2002 and formed part of the first phase of the Comprehensive Preservation Project of the Hangzhou section of the Grand Canal.

It has an area of 52,000 m<sup>2</sup>. It is not a heritage site, but its excellent location connects Gongchen Bridge, the Canal Museum, and the Gongshu District Government Offices, making it central to the Gongchen Bridge area's east bank. This plaza is equipped with a giant gateway arch structure (called *paifang*), embossed pavement, a bronze sculpture, pavilions, and a musical fountain. This plaza mixes Chinese and Western styles. As an open space, it is mainly empty and centered with a *paifang* structure with inscribed Chinese characters, which read: “the benefits (of the canal) last one thousand years” on one side, and: “key dock in the north-south waterway” on the other. *Paifang* is a traditional Chinese architectural style that, according to the intentions of the builders, could be distinct from religious *paifang* in temples and non-religious *paifang* designed to promote “correct social norms,” such as loyalty, filial piety, or to acknowledge the political and military merits of a specific person. This monumental gateway celebrating the canal is located halfway between Gongchen Bridge and the Plaza. This positioning helps the gateway to serve as a transitional space between the ancient heritage of the canal and a modern monumental space surrounded by the Canal Museum and district office buildings.



Figure 3- 13: The gateway arch on the Canal Plaza, connecting the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal museum and the plaza. Photography by the author.

This arrangement provides more of the monumental effects of this place with the sense of control, rather than appreciating the canal culture. As Stewart (1993) suggests in the nature of public space, “the art of public space is an eternalized parade, a fixing of the symbols of public life, of the state, within a milieu of the abstract authorities of the polis” (p. 90). This statement

explains why the east side has been arranged with the “authorized” Canal Museum and the new district office buildings, along with the *paifang* and the plaza. This plaza is the embodiment of openness and control. Furthermore, the arrangement and openness of the plaza are designed to counteract the area's somewhat troubled past. It was the site of the Fuhai Li before and the nearby Taoist Zhan Taxian Temple before the 1990s and 1958, respectively. The two important sites in terms of local histories had disappeared before the era heritagization even started.

This plaza is now a place for local people to spend their evenings dancing, exercising, or socializing. In the early morning or evening, many locals join with their neighbors to take part in plaza dancing at the Yunhe Plaza or the aisles outside of the museum cluster. However, this plaza is more than an open urban space for recreation.

Its proximity to the District Office and its openness requires some special attention. As shown in the right of Figure 3-14, police officers march through this plaza every morning. Additionally, security guards routinely patrol the area and help maintain order, despite the lack of open criminality or confrontation. While speaking with a few locals on a corner of the plaza at around 10 a.m. on a bright, summer weekday, security guards came approached and asked my intentions. For them, I was clearly an outsider on a weekday morning when people of my age usually go to work or take care of their children. Once they had left, the locals told me that these guards had a duty to investigate people they felt were behaving unusually. This check seemed to make sense to the locals. They told me that it had been strictest before the 2016 G20 Summit, and since then, “they have loosened their control. That is the way it is,” they concluded. This invisible social order has been employed within this physically open but spiritually modernized plaza, without the somber trace of its past. This area, with its museums and open spaces, has become a modern residential area where the remaining buildings and local contexts have been reassembled.



Figure 3- 14: (Left) Locals dancing on the Plaza. (Right) Police march through the Plaza. Photography by the author.

## 2. *Baxia* on the crushproof pillars

Gongchen Bridge is considered the most authentic part of the whole Hangzhou section, despite the removal of a functional pipe and the change of pavement for the pedestrian. Aside from the bridge and its structure, there is something new to it. Four new crushproof pillars were added to the bridge as part of the hydraulic facility to protect the body of the bridge. Four



concrete dragons (*baxia*) in traditional Chinese stone-carving style lie on each pillar top outward from the arch of Gongchen Bridge, as shown in Figure 3-15.

This installation project began in 2005 when the municipal government authorized an engineering company and spent one million RMB installing the pillars to protect the bridge.<sup>40</sup> However, without any references or instructions, one artisan working on this project crafted this decorative creature on top of the crushproof pillars.<sup>41</sup> As the dragons were physically created, there came to be myths about the creature in official preservation documents. The creature on top of the pillars, according to local preservationists, is a mythological animal called a *baxia*. A *baxia* is said to be the sixth son out of nine and able to rule the water. From this explanation, the existence of this creature on the side of Gongchen Bridge has been rationalized despite it having nothing to do with local culture or belief—not to mention that water culture had never been embodied along the riverside until the latest wave of heritagization after the early 2000s.



Figure 3- 15: Images of Baxia by Gongchen Bridge. (Left) Photography by author; (Right) Getty Image.

Local authorities cared little for the cultural origin of these inventions, as long as they would catch public attention. This cultural misplacement provides room for further discussion on the timing of heritage inclusion. This project, and its subsequent artistic expression, was only possible at this time as the bridge was merely listed as a provincial-level cultural heritage site. At the time, there was no committee in charge of the cultural affairs of the Grand Canal and Gongchen Bridge; only some offices responsible for navigation or engineering projects on the canal. Some staff members in these offices expressed that their works before were mostly demolition projects but, since 2014, had been “upgraded” to cultural affairs and protection projects. These offices were then placed under the supervision of the Bureau of Landscape and Cultural Heritage and the Center of Comprehensive Protection of the Canal.<sup>42</sup>

Once the Grand Canal was inscribed on the List, the local government had to be careful about any additions to the World Heritage site. In other words, it was the timing of the heritage inscription that made the stone *baxia* possible within the heritage area. The *baxia*, the “invented heritage,” is at odds with the scholarly attention of experts due to the latter's preference for

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<sup>40</sup> Interview 20170805, No.75; 20170805, No.76.

<sup>41</sup> Interview 20180919, No.175.

<sup>42</sup> Interview 20180919, No.175.

historical records, archaeological evidence, oral histories, and the remnants of original heritage pieces rather than modern cultural products. However, in the current decade, people even plan to utilize these inventions. According to the president of the Association of Promotion of Local Culture and History Peng Zhou, the son of the owner of Lao Kaixin Teahouse, the association plans to recruit students from a local art college to design a cartoon version of the *baxia* for sale.

Aside from concerns over “invented traditions,” accidents still take place, and the stone *baxia* even fell into the water. Upon that account, the pillars and stone *baxia* were designed to protect the bridge rather than the subject to be protected and preserved. However, from the process of the invention and function of crushproof pillars and *baxia*, it is clear that it was not just a method to improve the safety matter of the transportation to accommodate “modern vehicles” but also a meaning-making process that brings a mythical touch of the bridge. In 2017, the local government set a traffic light near the arch under Gongchen Bridge so as to control the passing of vessels and ferries in a more modern way. The traffic light changes every 30 minutes to allow ships to pass in one direction only. A retired ship worker living by the Qiaoxi Cultural District commented:

*The arrangement of the traffic light pissed off cargo helmsmen and ship workers, of course. It made the whole process much slower... But this arrangement is for heritage nomination and protection, which is more important [than transportation] so they have nothing to do with it.*

This passage shows the trend that heritage preservation is now the top priority even though it slows down the speed of transportation, which is ironically one of the most important features of the living canal heritage.

### 3. Commemorative Wall

Within the Cultural District, a roughly 20 m-long commemorative wall displays several writers, such as Xun Lu and Dafu Yu, and their travels to the Gongchen Bridge area. As mentioned in the previous chapter, local officials and preservationists prioritize heritage sites with historical texts about famous people or historical figures. When texts are available, local authorities prefer creating tangible monuments to “emphasize” and “better preserve” this history. This tendency is also shown in the case of the construction of the pavilion to emphasize the Imperial Tablet of Emperor Qianlong in Tangxi Town in the previous chapter.

On a long wall separating the residential alleys and the business on Qiaoxi Street shows several artists and writers and their works and anecdotes about this area. Among them, Dafu Yu was a famous writer native to rural Hangzhou in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. One of his representative works illustrates the affair between the protagonist and a prostitute, nicknamed Xiao Tianwang, which took place in a brothel near Gongchen Bridge (D. Yu, 1927). Among this new invention to commemorate stories and history, the section dedicated to Yu, with the title “Dafu Yu and the Bond with Gongchen Bridge,” says:

*Dafu Yu wrote of his several experiences in visiting the Gongchen Bridge area. One of his works, “The Desolate Afternoon,” was a story that took place in the Gongchen Bridge area. This story was written in a café in Shanghai as a gift for his wife, Yingxia Wang. Wang's grandfather had lived by Gongchen Bridge.*

This full description acknowledges and appreciates the famous writer, and the bonds between himself, his wife, and this area. However, the storyline of this short story centers around the lead character's struggles between his passion for a prostitute in the Gongchen Bridge area and the sense of loyalty to his wife. As mentioned, this area was a famous red-light district. However, in all of the descriptions and museum displays of the canal heritage, visitors will not see any mention of this past history due to the sanitization of the heritage district. Heritage inscription does not include the story in this memorization of the main storyline and has sanitized part of the content of this newly-built commemorative wall.



Figure 3- 16: Image of Dafu Yu on a cement wall in Qiaoxi Cultural District. Photography by the author

#### 4. Zhang Taxian Temple

Another crucial cultural invention is the refashioning of Taoist belief and the worship of Zhang Taxian. This temple is a relocated one from the east side of Gongchen Bridge to the west side. It was a popular place to worship for rural pilgrims and local prostitutes alike. The temple which was dedicated to him was built shortly afterward but was partly destroyed in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Finally, the temple was removed in the 1950s during the communist era. The previous temple site, which also contained his grave, was located at the present-day canal plaza. The grave was destroyed in the 1960s and replaced by a health office. Since then, no replacement temple has been erected on this same site.

During the heritagization phase, officials negotiated with the local Daoism association to rebuild the temple as a way to appreciate local tradition during the time of the comprehensive preservation project. Since the original site of the temple was reserved for the construction of the canal plaza, the temple was rebuilt on the other side of the canal in 2009. The new Zhang Taxian temple was set on the Qiaoxi Historic District—an area without any physical connection to Zhang's practices or his worship. The new temple is clean and new, the building area is 751.62 m<sup>2</sup>, and there is no longer any gravesite. The sign at the entrance of the new relocated temple, simply says that this temple is for the worship of the generous and kind Taoist, Zhang Taxian, originally from Hubei, who had excellent medical knowledge. The relocation of this site placed it in the proximity of a traditional Chinese medical clinic. This, in turn, has created an atmosphere that medical knowledge and religious worship are nicely connected to this cultural district.

However, neither visitors nor residents can find the cultural relationship between the temple and local history since this has not been included either in the display or introduction to the heritage sites. This temple is not one that visitors would plan to stop by, in comparison to the Zhang Taxian Temple in the past or Lingyin Monastery today.



Figure 3- 17: Image of the entrance of the Zhang Taxian Temple. Photography by the author.

## 5. The Ship Workers Statue

Without clear identification, the Ship Workers Statue on the riverbank outside of the Chinese Fan Museum suggests the absence of the boat people or local ship workers.

The heritagization of the Hangzhou section, as this case shows, does not include the distinct social group of the boat people. This historic district is full of cultivated local culture in which many histories have been sanitized. While local preservationists and community workers mentioned that one shortcoming of the cultural district was a lack of famous local residents, which in turn gave the community little selling points to visitors. A feasible way to advertise this area was to promote vernacular culture—life in the past as represented by a collective of anonymous people. This resulted in the area's public art expressing itself in an intimate, rather than monumental scale. One significant example is It depicts three men, bare to the waist, together with a wooden pole to shift a heavy load. This statue acknowledges the real ship workers and speaks of their former role in this area. They usually lived on the boats, trading and carrying commodities along with the canal generation after generation. While they did not usually have a place on land, this riverside area and Xiaohe neighborhood (mentioned in Chapter Two) were where some ship workers established temporary and straightforward dwellings. Rodney Harrison (2013) cites Smith's "authorized heritage discourse" (2006b) concept to discuss how exclusion takes place in heritage preservation in which experts might evaluate heritage through their own expertise that might exclude minorities and other subaltern groups.





Figure 3- 18: A Statue of Ship Workers. Photography by the author.

In the 1980s, due to the decreasing job opportunities, some abandoned their boats and found jobs on land, others simply left Hangzhou, and some remained to work as helmsmen on water taxis. Scenes of ship workers bustling about their business have disappeared from the area. Instead, in the era of heritagization, they have been replaced by statues in the post-industrial landscape around these new modern museums and canal banks. In Hangzhou, there is a distinguished theme of public sculpture about vernacular figures, including fishers, boat trackers, tea pickers, and vendors (Ma, 2008). These statues are reminders and the only remaining links to this past way of life. For residents who witnessed the transformation, the renovated buildings may seem like they were those of old, but it is an inescapable fact that the originals have long gone. After the Comprehensive Preservation Project and the process of nomination for the WH bid, the water and canal have different connotations and serve a new purpose related to tourism and new symbols of cultural identities.

### **3.4 Canal Becomes a Sign of Civilization**

In this chapter, I have reviewed the history of the Gongchen Bridge area and demonstrated how this place transformed from a non-place to a World Heritage District through state policies in the past. Three contemporary social-spatial mechanisms are indicated: museumification, aestheticization, and invention. The municipal government's overall controls and sanitation determine how the ideal vernacular cultures and communities could be imagined as carriers of industrial and socialist nostalgia and traditional craft. As those remaining traces become legible and formalized in museums and monuments, the dark sides of the local histories and knowledge have been evicted from the making of a WH cultural district.

Through the new representations of heritage, visitors could hardly assemble a complete picture of the past from a single perspective since the three mechanisms have reshaped the past landscape and the memories. The examination of the making of this WH cultural district demonstrates how local knowledge is either removed or kept after sanitization. Museums, cultural districts, and cultural recognitions might distort the histories and artifacts, as indicated in this chapter. This chapter shows how sanitization helped not only cleanse the area's history and

environment but also improved its social-cultural perception to both locals and visitors. In the more distant past, the canal had been a symbol of imperial control on materials and taxation. More recently, the area studied here enabled a Japanese invasion and brought the birth of a red-light district and “industries for the nation.” Later, it became part of the socialist production system, which heavily polluted the water due to the failure and inference of the local government. Today, the canal has been sanitized through the heritagization process and has been instrumental in enabling and promoting local development and vernacular culture. If one goes to the ferry taxi in the evening, one would see the lights along with this subsection and hear the tour guide introducing the canal:

*The Beijing-Hangzhou Canal has brought countless fortunes and cultures. Before the establishment of the river, Hangzhou was a small town not known to people. After the creation of the canal, Hangzhou county's fame exploded throughout the south Yangtze River. The two sayings: “Qiantang is prosperous immemorially,” and “Hangzhou is a real city born because of the canal/luck.”*

The passage is part of the 2017 education training materials for tour guides from the official tourism agency of this canal section. The first word “yun” of “yun-he” (meaning “canal”) is a play on words of “yun-chi” (meaning “luck”), so the introduction intends to express that Hangzhou is lucky to have prospered because of the canal. As development and heritagization become a continuous process, the functions, meanings, and perceptions of the canal to this area transform and change. The canal transformed from a filthy but practical canal for local development and industrialization to a spectacle of cultural heritage, even if the so-called vernacular cultures are mostly not what original residents might recall. Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, this canal section will not accommodate large vessels in the near future. Instead, new life will be revived into the riverside cultural district through the social-spatial engineering around this ancient infrastructure.

Despite that this area does not rely on its tourism revenue, this preservation case is considered a successful one as the remaining buildings repurposed to serve as museums, and an open green riverside walk provides a comfortable living environment. The environmental improvement attracts affluent residents moving in this neighborhood during the time of the expansion of Hangzhou's urban area. While many of the longtime residents move in resettlement high rise and a few of them move in resettlement apartments within the West Gongchen Cultural District. It seems this area accommodates the old and the new in an organized way. As local governments and developers are active in developing the canal and its tourism and try to make use of its marketing capabilities, the canal is changing into a nostalgic symbol in the background of local people's everyday life. This will be further discussed in the following chapter.

## Chapter 4: Inclusive and Exclusive Gentrification

This chapter seeks to demonstrate how a new identity formation process is taking place on the returned locals after factors such as urban expansion, deindustrialization, heritagization, and gentrification. It discusses the lives of the returned residents in resettlement housing complexes around Qiaoxi and Xiaohe neighborhoods. Administratively, these complexes are under the management of five community organizations (*shequ* in Chinese, including changzhenqiao, yongqinlu, qiaoxi, jiru, and xiaohe), headquartered in three street offices<sup>43</sup> in Gongshu District: Xiaohe, Xianfu, and Gongchenqiao (see Figure 4-1).

In the official heritage discourse on canal heritage, the elderly residents are considered part of the canal heritage and witnesses of canal culture. Their presence within these heritage districts seemingly supports the rhetoric of “living preservation” and “on-site preservation,” thus validates the perception of authenticity. However, as will be shown in this chapter, these returned residents came back to almost the same site but left behind the social position, after a decade of renewal and gentrification. The social-spatial reorganization changed their identities and subjectivities. As most of them in resettlement communities are living in upscale housing next to several modern commodity housing complexes, this new housing styles and the juxtaposition of these housing types tell stories and the process of how new subjectivities emerge at the period of heritagization and gentrification.

The social relation has been changed after locals returned to the newly-built resettlement housing projects. Following Li Zhang’s study (2010) on the formation of middle-class communities in modern *xiaoqu* (gated community) in China, this chapter discusses how a new social and spatial dynamics contributes to the following gentrification and identity formation. As modern *xiaoqu* were commercial housing that people purchase so that residents in each household are foreign to each other. The case this chapter will show is resettlement housing, with a similar physical arrangement as the commercial housing but different in the composition of residents and the construction quality. Resettlement housing accommodates returning locals (after renewal and demolition projects). Therefore, besides the proximity of residence, there are still social and emotional connections between the residents.

This chapter will explain how the ideal “on-site preservation” becomes “on-site gentrification” under the urban renewal and heritagization of the Grand Canal. Also, it will explore how the overall improvement and heritagization-incited pride also consolidate their identities while differentiating the making of subjectivities. It starts with an introduction to the social relations between local neighborhoods in the past, the renewal project (1997–2012), and new formations of social identity within these resettlement housing complexes. This new experience is seldom discussed as this returning group, composed of former SOE employees and workers and villagers, falls beyond the discussion of the Chinese new middle class and the disadvantaged landless villagers or migrant workers. Inspired by the work from Lisa Rofel (1999), I analyze how the former social groups and the generational difference broadly define who they are. Descendants of former SOE workers are known as “factory second-generation,” while those of former-villagers-present-landlords are known as “demolition second generation.” Far from being representative of the Grand Canal culture, as a whole homogenized collective, they have struggled with the urban process and social reshuffling in the gentrification process.

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<sup>43</sup> Street Office is a community office under city level in China.

While gentrification in the discussion on the U.S. indicates a reverse process from industrialization, urban poverty, deindustrialization, and urban renewal, and it becomes prosperous again and attracts middle-class people to move “back.” Gentrification, in this case study, shows that two processes are taking place during the overlapped period. The first type of gentrifier is locals. As they returned to the site, which would be improved and the rent of it had increased, those SOE employees and villagers benefited from the land revenue from compensation and the resettlement housing. Nevertheless, the two types of locals enjoyed differentiated compensation in terms of former hukou, so the SOE employees felt unfair and lost in the new era of urbanization as they were a privileged class in the society in the planned economy. While the pace of development advances unevenly through this area, the remaining heritage sites remind people of a past where industrialization and state policies provided a real reason for people to stay. Most of them belonged to either a *danwei* or a rural collective. However, as the SOEs closed due to bankruptcy and economy restructuring, workers had to rely on their resources. Many of them feel the state betrayed their trust by embracing a market-oriented economy in which they have neither advantage nor a competitive edge. Ironically, they also benefited from the first wave of housing privatization and the second wave of urban renewal, in which the two changes secured their on-site residence.

Conversely, villagers have benefited from these processes as they have become urban residents in the era of urbanization. They gave up most of their lands but became wealthy landlords at a time. The second type of gentrifier is the new Hangzhou people, most of them live in the commodity housing complexes. Whether being homeowners or tenants, most of them have little histories with Gongshu District, if not Hangzhou. Their presence supports the impression of positive local development and land speculation, which also helps in the increasing rent of this area. This type of gentrification also affects local perception. It reminds locals, especially former SOE employees, of the social and economic disparities between now and then, and also between them and the new Hangzhou people.

#### **4.1 SOE Workers, Farmers, and Boat people by the Canal before the 1990s**

This area, known as the Gongchen Bridge industrial area or Gongchen Bridge workers’ area (nowadays the Gongchen Bridge area and the north side of Xiaohe neighborhood), accommodated around 60,000 SOE workers in large companies in the 1960s–1990s. Under the state command economy scheme, there were neither formal private enterprises nor a market mechanism to manage production and consumption. There were no private residential areas in the modern sense. Instead, people were housed according to their *hukou* status. The Chinese *hukou* system (household registration system) started in 1958, in which all Chinese citizens owned either an agricultural or non-agricultural *hukou* in a particular location. The primary function of this system was designed for social-spatial control so that the state could coordinate production and allocate resources by this system. On one side, it prevented rural to urban migration by providing the urban population with more social welfare. On the other hand, this system supported the “urban-industry-bias” development trajectory. It allowed the state to assign minimum welfare to prioritize urban workers in the high-priority industrial sector (K. W. Chan, 1994).

Workers and the working class in this area discussed in this chapter referred to SOE workers, who worked in state-owned enterprises and owned non-agricultural *hukou* under the command economy. One of the fundamental characteristics of the command economy is that “planners issued commands that assigned production targets to firms and directly allocated resources and goods among different producers. Prices lost their significance as the primary

signal that directed resource allocation in the economy” (Naughton, 2007, p. 59). Work units (*danwei*) belonged to SOEs, and they provided good working conditions as these work units provided benefits to workers from “cradle to grave.” In short, SOE workers were considered earning a decent income and enjoying social service within their residential work-unit compound.




Figure 4- 1: Administrative divisions (Street Offices) of Gongshu District. Base map from Wikipedia.

Furthermore, they were often given priority to recruit the next generation of these workers. In the era of the planned economy, factories provided meals and dormitories, access to education for their children, insurance, public showering spaces, hair-dressing services, and even leisure activities, such as cinemas or dance groups. Therefore, job opportunities in SOEs attracted many outstanding youths considering their education, family background, or capability. According to Zhang (2010), the factory wage was stable and fitting; the enterprise labor union stipulated certain conditions to distribute welfare benefits by grading each worker according to their length of service, marital status, children, education, and the job of their spouses. Wu (2005) argues that the work unit housing provision was “efficient” for the state to provide minimum conditions needed for production. As a result, their everyday lives were limited to the work unit and highly dependent on the policies and conditions of each work unit.

A work unit functioned as part of a top-down supervision approach. For example, in Gongshu District, most factories enforced a policy to encourage couples both to work in the same enterprise. This kind of policy would not only provide better care to the household but also serve to monitor assigned birth quotas and distribute privileges so as to limit future births within the work unit (Naughton, 2007). At that time, China strictly regulated population growth by

implementing the One Child Policy from 1979–2015. In this way, factory workers could only have one child, regardless of the substantial combined income they could earn. In the case of SOEs in Gongshu District, a second child would not only not enjoy the benefits of the work unit, but could also result in the dismissal of its parents.<sup>44</sup>

Apart from material gains and better social services, *danwei* compounds provided another type of living, as well as the formation of a kind of self-identification from an emotional and social aspect. Bray (2005) describes the work unit compound as a “walled social space,” which is not only for production but also a space of social and cultural practice. He argues that this space demonstrated the “governmentality” under the Chinese planned economy and reshaped individual “subjectivity” within each work unit. A large number of residents in the studied communities were SOE factory workers and employees, and many of them reported having both material and emotional connections to these work units. The society of the work unit, and the child policy of the time, resulted in the birth of the “factory second generation” (*chang-er-dai*, 廠二代) whose parents worked in SOE factories and children of this generation had few siblings due to the One-Child Policy. In China, this term implies the generation from middle-class families who had lifetime tenure with stable incomes and guaranteed urban residency. This social institution provided this generation a stable family condition and often a job within SOEs. As suggested, the working class in SOEs in the last half of the century has different connotations regarding the social class as that of Western society and studies relating to it. SOE employees and workers in Chinese society are regarded as people with an “iron rice bowl.” In Chinese idiom, it means that people with it have lifelong job employment and guaranteed job security, which is “unbreakable.” Local people have the impression that SOE employees and workers could be lazy and less efficient, as they did not need the motivation to improve their productivities. In short, the perception of SOE employees and works is more similar to that of people working in public sectors in Chinese society.

The counterpart of SOE workers, in this chapter, is villagers from Jiru Village. The other two villages: Dujiaqiao and Guojiashe, are also located on the west side of the canal. Administratively, these villages belonged to their collectives, which managed collective lands and properties. This area was once the urban and rural fringe of Hangzhou. As the area of Jiru Village covered the whole Qiaoxi neighborhood and part of Xiaohe, given its larger size (1,100 households) to two similar villages, its development has been closely associated with the transformation of this area. The other two villages—located on the northwest part of the Gongchen Bridge area (as shown in Figure 4-2)—formed part of the auto-town development and economic zone for computer science. Furthermore, the small size of Dujiaqiao Village (971 former villagers in 270 households), and the fact that Guojiashe administratively belongs to Xianfu Street, mean that these two villages (in both their past and present) are less significant in canal preservation as Jiru. Therefore, the local village discussed in this chapter is Jiru Village unless otherwise stated.

The majority of Jiru villagers who only owned an agricultural *hukou* did not have the same level of access to medical and educational resources as urban citizens. However, most villagers had agricultural *hukou*, while some had non-agricultural *hukou* through working in SOEs, marriage, or receiving a college degree.

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<sup>44</sup> Interview 20170722, No.40 and No.41.






Figure 4- 2: A mental map drawn by a former villager in Jiru. Upside indicates south.

The lives of Jiru villagers were notably difficult before economic reform. Before industrialization, villagers made their living by planting fruit trees and vegetables, or through sericulture. Then, when this area became a production center, large numbers of villagers worked full- or part-time in factories due to the fact that these activities could not fully support them and their families. Within a household, there was usually at least one family member who worked in factories for additional income. Besides, SOEs required a larger workforce during peak seasons, so this supplementary rural labor force became a necessity. Moreover, this practice became even more prevalent when local authorities confiscated rural lands to build more factories, which in turn recruited these “landless” villagers as compensation.<sup>45</sup> The mutual independence of villages and SOEs is noteworthy. Working at SOEs brought not an economical safety valve for villages but its provision of another social identity as a worker. This situation was also typical in villages in other parts of China. Siu (2007) describes a case study in Guangzhou, in which working in factories gave many villagers not only salaries but also the dual social position as villagers and workers. According to a resident, during the 1950s to 1980s, most people on the east side of Gongchen Bridge owned urban *hukou* while the people on the west side of them owned urban

<sup>45</sup> Interview 20170811, No.105.



and rural *hukou*. However, thanks to the proximity to the SOEs and the mutual dependence between these factories and villagers, those village workers might be able to work in the factories, and they identified themselves as both farmers and workers.<sup>46</sup>

After a restructuring of the rural economy in the 1980s, the economy improved thanks to the village corporations. In 1984–1986, Jiru village opened its doors to a refrigerator factory, a shoe factory, and a lighting factory. Its collective corporation peaked in 1989. After this period, the village collective mostly relied on the rent of its lands. Besides, individual villagers had revenues from renting out part of their homes (5,000–10,000 RMB/month), which leads one to assume they must have had already-favorable living conditions (H. Jin & Zhu, 2012). Even though the income from collective lands brought villagers a better livelihood, most villagers still aspired to own an urban *hukou* and leave the village behind.

Boat people were the third large category in this area. They did not have assigned housing nor ownership of collective lands. According to a news report, there were four major types, according to the ways of livelihood, of boat people: fishing by using eagles to catch fishes, hunting waterfowls, nesting fishes, and carrying stuff to trade. The last group was the largest of boat people and relied only on the boat rather than fields or farming on lands. They had everything on the boat. They were used to living on the boat in the river and willing to invest their money on buying boats, just as people would instead buy houses or farmlands. There was a proverb in this social group: “when you befriend the person, tell him to build a boat; when you do not, tell him to build a house instead.” This news report concludes, boat people were illiterate and dumb and did not seek for improvement (HuaihaiPeriodical, 1935). This description shows that boat people belonged to another group rather than SOE workers or local villagers. Despite the fact that boat people around the Hangzhou section have moved to other places, local people in Hangzhou still have negative impressions on them, such as poor, ill-educated, isolated, and unable to upwardly mobile.

These three groups of people were living in this area peacefully but owned distinct social and cultural entities. SOE workers were paid laborers and entitled to social services, and the second generation of these workers continued to enjoy the stable social statuses. In contrast, villagers owned agricultural *hukou* and collectively owned lands that were not productive in terms of agricultural produce nor rent. The boat people were ranked lowest not because of their income since they might be rich in terms of ownership of boats and business. However, this social group has been considered a closed and shifting community due to the nature of moving. In addition, they seldom have social connections with people outside of the boat people community. The understanding helps understand how and why the preservation of the canal eventually included workers, villagers but excluded boat people, a social group considered to be the closest to the canal.

#### **4.2 Change of Land Uses: Deindustrialization, Urban Renewal, and Preservation**

Despite these three social groups seeming distinct from each other, all of them had stayed equally in a deteriorated area before urban renewal. The Gongchen Bridge area was not a desirable location. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this area was suburban and lacked sewerage systems and decent infrastructure. The terrain was low, so that it suffered from heavy rains and flooding. Socially, although the east side had since become prosperous, this was a place

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<sup>46</sup> Interview 20170811, No.105.

where the sex industry and negative social impressions weighed heavily upon people's minds. As a result, the people of Hangzhou did not regard it as a livable residential area. This perception continues, especially in the minds of "old Hangzhou residents" in downtown Hangzhou, which will be explained in the latter part of this chapter. Simply put, people lived there because of work opportunities (in SOEs or on boats) and an attachment to the village, rather than their preference in terms of quality of life. The residents on the east side (mostly SOE workers) lived in a home with an average size of approximately 24m<sup>2</sup>, and each household shared stoves and toilets. Villagers lived a large home, but those with only agricultural *hukou* lacked access to a stable job and social service.

On December 22, 1997, the renewal project of the Gongchen Bridge area began and also initiated the social reshuffling process. The first phase of the project (during 1997–2001) was only planned for the east side of the area. This zone included 113 acres for planning and a construction area of 1km<sup>2</sup>. As part of this project, approximately 7,600 households and 300 *danwei* were demolished. In 2001, this project expanded to incorporate the western part of the Gongchen Bridge area (another planned area of 134 acres, and a construction area of 1.2 km<sup>2</sup>), with another 2,000 households and 100 *danwei* demolished (N/A, 2012). Among the overall affected population were approximately 9,600 households and 400 *danwei*. The contemporary practice of renewal projects in China consists of two main entities: one is the Demolition and Relocation Bureau (*chai-qian-ban*), an office where local authorities coordinate, and the other is a private-sector construction firm, the Yunhe Group in this case. The group helped coordinate demolition, compensation, and restoration.<sup>47</sup> The primary task of the group was to distribute funds between demolition, construction, and preservation equitably. It has functioned as the tool of the municipal government and Gongshu District and has managed property in this area. This process required negotiation with the planned returning residents and different authorities concerning timing, the progress of signing contracts, land appropriation, demolition, selecting future units, and moving into new relocation units following construction.

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<sup>47</sup> Interview 20170810, No.95.





Figure 4- 3: Map of the Gongchen Bridge area renewal project. From M. Zhou (2012, p. 36).

As for the compensation packages offered, those SOE workers with their units were guaranteed to receive a unit of the same size as the previous one. Locals would simplify this compensation package as *chai-yi-pei-yi* (拆一赔一). Most of the returning SOE workers were encouraged to buy allocated housing units at a discounted price during the housing reforms which started in the 1990s. This reform was an essential part of housing commodification, in which the state work unit took the lead (Bian, Logan, Lu, Yunkang, & Guan, 1997). Despite the fact that this reform only applied to those work-unit workers in the urban area, it did privatize some housing spaces and it preserved some privileges for SOE workers in the transition from a socialist economy to a market-oriented one (Y. P. Wang & Murie, 2000). In 1998, SOEs were not allowed to construct housing since, and existing housing was reserved for privatization (Shepherd, 2013; Y. P. Wang, Wang, & Bramley, 2005). Although housing could be traded on the market, what was actually for sale was the use right of the dwelling rather than property or land ownership.

According to the measurements of the head office of the demolition officials, the minimum floor area of each resettled unit was 51 m<sup>2</sup>. Those who lived in homes smaller than 51 m<sup>2</sup> were obliged to buy extra floor areas at less than 2000 RMB/m<sup>2</sup> (M. Zhou, 2012). As for people who wanted to buy larger units, but whose previous residences were already larger than 51 m<sup>2</sup>, they would buy extra floor space to return to the pre-built unit. The other option was “monetary relocation”—compensation in the form of money only. I was not able to ascertain how many residents received to move out. However, those who had chosen to take the one-time monetary compensation regretted their decision due to an increase in rent payments and the unfamiliarity of living in modern high-rise buildings elsewhere (S. Tang, 2015). Housing, in the case of the former allocated dwellings, has become the commodity for rent on the market, rather than the base of collective consumption under the socialist planned economy. Here a transition appears from the uses of housing. The values and connotations of housing have also changed in the process of urban renewal.

For the SOE workers who had rented and lived in allocated housing, they were to be given a standardized dwelling as big as 53 m<sup>2</sup> per household. This group of residents was the most eager to return to the area because of the sheer difference in size between their current and future homes, which, as one resident recalled, were around 10 to 20m<sup>2</sup> per unit.<sup>48</sup> However, the relocation policies for allocated housing were not consistent, as there were several practices in the same project due to the different criteria of local authorities. For example, a conflict mentioned in the previous chapter at Honglei Silk Mill in 2008 highlights the issue of renewal and relocation. The district government forced through the demolition in the name of urban renewal and claimed that it was a necessary step to manage the properties after the mill had permanently closed. However, the workers insisted on their residential right to live in the allocated housing, not that they had much of a chance to negotiate (Y. Xin, 2008).

As for the villagers, in contrast to the workers, their lives relied primarily on the rent of land. One of the collective revenue channels was the renting out of collective lands to investors in order to build factories or storage spaces. One option available to them was for each villager to construct and divide extra rooms on their homesteads to rent out to migrant workers. In this way, they could receive monthly rent payments individually. For Jiru villagers, the lack of direct foreign investment, and its isolated location and natural condition, meant lower revenue and

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<sup>48</sup> Interview 20170817, No.115.



fewer bonuses were paid out. Not to mention there was no comparison between Jiru and other wealthy villagers of the Pearl River Delta area and areas with excellent geographical locations, such as Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province.

A significant transition of this village took place during 2002–2012, following the extension of the renewal of the west part of the Gongchen Bridge area. In 2002, the village collective became a *shequ* residents' committee, which meant that “village” at the administrative level would be changed into a part of the local governance system in cities. This change also meant that villagers could own non-agricultural urban *hukou*. Despite the initial positive attitude to the transition due to the provision of social programs such as medical care and pensions, this transition paved the way for land expropriation—which would deprive villagers of rent revenues.

At first, individual Jiru villagers refused to accept the land encroachment taking place in 2004–2005, but the process could not be stopped. Throughout this decade, approximately 1,200 households in Jiru were demolished, and 900 relocated, with large-scaled demolition starting in 2004 (H. Jin & Zhu, 2012). The Gongchen Bridge renewal project and the compensation afforded to them could be seen to be beneficial. During this process, villagers were required to give up not only the use right of their housing units, as the SOE workers did but also the collective land ownership of most parcels of land. Therefore, local authorities decided to provide each member with village *hukou* 55m<sup>2</sup> in the form of built flats as compensation, regardless of the age of each member. For example, a Jiru household of four people could receive a total of 220m<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, a 220m<sup>2</sup> apartment could be divided into two large-sized or three medium-sized, pre-built units in the resettlement housing complexes. As a result, though these former villagers could not enjoy either the rent revenues and larger-sized housing units to which they were accustomed in villages, their new living spaces were still more spacious than those of the average Hangzhou resident, which was 35.8 m<sup>2</sup> per person in 2017 (Y. Zhang, 2017).

As for those boat people who had not belonged to SOEs nor attached to local village collectives, they did not receive compensation in any form. They had no legal right or local *hukou* to the lands, housing, or property. Besides, their homes belonged to the category of informal dwellings, which were to be demolished in the renewal process. A few boat people stayed within Hangzhou and worked as helmsmen for the water buses. As a social class, they have disappeared from this area. Nowadays, in this subsection of Gongchen Bridge, visitors can see vessels passing under the arch of the bridge, or they can take a water taxi on a night tour. However, boat people have become part of the intangible heritage since all that remains of them are the sculptures along the west side of the canal bank.

This section summarizes the change of land use and the renewal compensation of the project. This project has been a model case for Gongshu district and Hangzhou municipal governments as it improved living conditions while protecting most former residents without serious conflicts or financial deficits. As shown in this section, families of SOEs received 53 m<sup>2</sup> while villager 55 m<sup>2</sup> per person. This disparity in this redistribution of the housing area and legal rights resulted in the reverse of financial ability. As housing prices have skyrocketed in Hangzhou since 2010 (see Figure 4-4 below), returning residents were considered lucky to be able to enjoy the improved location, infrastructure, and the chance to stay in an area unaffordable to many.




Figure 4- 4: Residential Property Prices in Hangzhou (2008– 2017). From CEIC Data <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/property-price-residential-prefecture-level-city/cn-property-price-residential-zhejiang-hangzhou> [accessed 11 Mar. 2020]

### 4.3 Dilemma of Resettlement Housing

The returning residents—the previous SOE workers and villagers—started to move into the resettlement housing in the 2000s, with the final batch of residents moving in in 2012. At that time, those relocated residents might not foresee a gentrifying outlook of this area.

After renewal, three types of housing projects can be observed around the two canal neighborhoods: Gated community (*shang-ping-fang xiaoqu*), resettlement community (*hui-qian-fang*), and allocated housing (*gong-fang*) (see Table 4-1 below). Among them, the first two types of housing dominate the riverside of this subsection, and both allow the use rights of housing transfers in the market. In this sense, both of them can be broadly defined as commodity housing. However, the identification of residents divides them into two distinguishable categories—commodity *xiaoqu* and *hui-qian-fang xiaoqu*.

The gated community represents the modern lifestyle and middle-class taste, accommodating mostly educated and wealthy families. *Hui-qian-fang* is notorious regarding construction materials, structure, property management, and the quality (*suzhi*) of residents.<sup>49</sup> People believe that these resettlement housing projects were completed carelessly. Moreover, they report that poor design and cheap materials are proof of kickbacks to local officials and developers. As for the third housing type, the remaining allocated housing (*gong-fang*) is not as extensive and usually only for tenants within specific entities, cadres, or for people under specific social welfare programs. The housing is scattered on the back of alleys within Xiaohe neighborhood and the east side of Gongchen Bridge. This type of housing in the studied area is not of considerable size or situated in a prominent location in terms of urban renewal. Crucially, this type of housing remains unsellable. The discussion on allocated housing in this sector will thus be excluded from this chapter.

<sup>49</sup> Interview 20170805, No. 65; 20170809, No.86; 20170814, No.108.



	Building form	Residents
Gated community ( <i>shang-ping-fang xiaoqu</i> )	High-rise, gated housing complex	Young family, middle-class family, tenants
Resettlement high-rise housing ( <i>hui-qian-fang xiaoqu</i> )	loosely gated housing complex	Former SOE workers/employees, former villagers, tenants
Resettlement housing in Qiaoxi cultural district	Townhouses, courtyard houses, low-rise apartment	
Allocated housing ( <i>gong-fang</i> )	Apartment without elevator	Cadres or people with special needs or channels

Table 4- 1: Three types of housing

### I. Gated Community Housing

This area was turned in to a mixed residential and business area in the late 1990s. The previous deindustrialization followed by housing speculation started around the Wulin Gate pier. With the process of westbound and northbound expansion from downtown Hangzhou, the southern part of Gongshu District becomes a good candidate for residence due to many factors: its incorporation into urban Hangzhou with adequate infrastructure—comparatively the rent in this area is still cheaper than downtown Hangzhou—the large redesigned open spaces and green areas along the remediated canal, and good school districts.

Moreover, in the late 1990s, when the state was restructuring SOEs, the sites of those *danwei* were turned into the use of private housing projects in the urban renewal process. Most residents and landlords there are new Hangzhou residents—people who came to Hangzhou in recent decades (or their recent descendants). In contrast, old Hangzhou residents are people whose grandparents or earlier ancestors came and stayed in Hangzhou. Although Gongshu District was not a preferred residential area and not even counted as part of Hangzhou city, the improving physical environment that came with the city's rapid north and westward expansion has made this place promising in terms of rent. Since residents in gated community housing around the two canal neighborhoods came from different places, they seldom know their neighbors.

In contrast, few former residents live in gated community housing because they are not able to afford the cost of new modern housing. The most visible representation of the difference between the two is the price. The price of the gated community housing is significantly higher than the resettlement housing, even though they are located within the same area and share the same physical environments outside of their communities. Sampled from five resettlement housing projects and four gated communities, the result of the average price difference from March 2016 to December 2018 is approximately 12,525 RMB/m<sup>2</sup>, a number over 40% higher than the average price of resettlement housing (See Figure 4-5 and Table 4-2 below).




Figure 4- 5: Locations of gated community housing projects (in white boxes) and high-rise resettlement housing (in yellow boxes). Reproduced on the base map from Google Map.

	Names	March 2016	March 2017	March 2018	December 2018	Average
Resettlement Housing complexes	A	16,411	28,190	32,253	35,150	28,001
	B	19,043	31,129	40,287	40,153	32,653
	C	16,939	29,497	35,162	37,932	29,883
	D	16,198	28,897	37,323	35,997	29,604
	E	15,816	26,176	33,184	34,787	27,491
	Ave. price (RMB/m <sup>2</sup> )	<b>16,881</b>	<b>28,778</b>	<b>35,642</b>	<b>36,804</b>	<b>29,526</b>
Gated Communities	F	17,705	26,703	33,777	35,220	28,351
	G	31,652	53,008	57,970	61,816	51,112
	H	27,501	44,190	58,440	65,295	48,857
	I	N/A	38,347	46,603	48,968	44,639
	Ave. price (RMB/m <sup>2</sup> )	<b>25,619</b>	<b>40,562</b>	<b>49,198</b>	<b>52,825</b>	<b>42,051</b>

Table 4- 2: Sold prices of housing projects around Qiaoxi neighborhood. Data collected from Anjuke Inc. at <https://hangzhou.anjuke.com/community/gongshu/>

Residents in gated communities in urban China are regarded as a new social formation of middle-class people. Zhang (2010)'s case study on social relations in the modern housing complex demonstrates how a new "spatialized" middle class emerges in urban China and how neighbors have shared socialist housing, but they are strangers to each other. Tomba (2014) suggests that the emergence of this middle class is associated with the postindustrial

development of Chinese cities. He argues that housing privatization can excite domestic consumption to triggered growth; moreover, it would gain social and political supports from this mainstay group. Both studies suggest the contemporary context of the rise of modern urban housing in a transitional economy and society, providing contemporary context of the studied case in a post-socialist society.

From the perspectives of the old Hangzhou people, residents in gated communities are young, educated, rich, and more refined than those locals. In addition to financial ability, one distinguishable difference of residents in gated communities is their “quality” (*suzhi*) is considered higher than those of locals. This quality is shown as part of social education, civility, and the cooperation of maintaining community affairs and facilities, and mixed with the generation, social class, residential cultures, and the willingness and financial ability to ensure the quality of security and property management. As the implication suggests that the middle-class residents are more competitive and become the privileged social group in this area. Compared with these middle-class new residents, longtime residents are less welcomed to local development and progress. This situation is similar to what Tomba (2014) suggests: “Greedy developers, inefficient management companies, and even uncooperative neighbors became the embodiment of a drag on China’s modernization...” (p. 57). Those returning residents, in the eyes of local government and new Hangzhou people, do not belong to the preferred population in terms of increasing the quality and housing price of their living environment. When doing fieldwork, there was little opportunity to talk to these new residents’ other than when they walked and stayed outside of their residential communities (access was denied to a non-resident like myself).



Figure 4- 6: Image of a gated community.  
Photography by the author.

## II. Resettlement Housing

It has been shown that resettlement communities are one of the social-spatial products from rapid urbanization and the following heritagization. It is not a mere outcome of housing commodification or social welfare programs in the pro-developmental campaign. This subsection shows two types of resettlement housing. The first one is a high-rise, with a similar look to a gated community. It is often regarded as a product of social progress and modernization. The second type is *lilong* housing and apartments within the Qiaoxi neighborhood. This type of housing aims to restore the traditional landscape where those former residents returned to witness the improvement of the overall environment and the preservation of the canal section. However, as this subsection will demonstrate, both resettlement housing types fall into the in-between spectrum in terms of residential modernity and traditional folk culture.

### 1. High-rise Resettlement Housing

More than 96% of returning residents live high-rise resettlement housing. At first glance, this type of housing is similar to a gated community: enclosed high-rises with security guards and open spaces for the housing complex. Elevators, gardens, and parking lots are arranged inside this type of resettlement housing. This type of building is the product of urban renewal before the heritagization of the Hangzhou section, but it is often included in the official heritage rhetoric to support the success of the on-site preservation. However, the concerns of life in the resettlement community worry residents living inside.

The first and primary reason is the perceived inferior quality of construction and the poor-design style. Despite not hearing any exact example about the construction or problems regarding these high-rises, people living inside or outside generally seem to believe that the quality of resettlement housing was doomed to be substandard. In addition, their plain and flat appearance is clearly part of the “*hui-qian-fang* style”—loosely designed and carelessly built.

The second reason is the quality of maintenance and security. Resettlement housing complexes have a gate for cars and pedestrians, but as shown above, pedestrians, cyclists, and cars can all enter. Even though one or two security guards have been assigned for each housing complex, the entrances and open spaces are not monitored carefully. In modern housing, the reinforcement of monitoring control and entry reflects two social changes: increasing anonymity among neighbors and the increasing fear of urban crime (Caldeira, 2000; Low, 2001). Therefore, gates, security enforcement, and other spatial controls are generally provided within gated communities. In contrast, it was not problematic in the slightest to walk into a resettlement housing complex and speak with residents and even security guards. As for resettlement high-rises, the low maintenance fee can only stretch to essential property management services, leaving little for any further physical improvement.

The third reason for the lower price and decreased preference relates to the concern of the *suzhi* of neighbors. As mentioned earlier, *suzhi*, or quality, in fact, is the combination of social education, civility, and politeness. Information gathered from resettled communities shows that residents, social workers, property managers, and security guards have very consistent opinions about the difference between residents in *hui-qian-fang* and commodity housing. In the mindsets of locals—whether old or new Hangzhou people, the ranking of *suzhi* is considered high for new Hangzhou residents, middling for former SOE workers, and low for former villagers.



For new Hangzhou residents, they might not be able to distinguish a villager from an SOE worker. However, they believe that living in the same housing project with those “locals” is not desirable, as the former believes that the locals will not take care of the public property in the housing complex. Among the “locals,” villagers were blamed because they tended to grow vegetables in public gardens and their refusal to pay for property management.<sup>50</sup>



Figure 4- 7: Images of resettlement housing complexes. Photography by the author.

There exists a disparity between habit and expectation. Locals are not used to living in housing complexes. In terms of living environments, locals—especially former villagers—prefer large areas on the ground floor. For many of them, it is their first time living in a housing unit inside a high-rise. As former villagers had previously enjoyed large living and open spaces, so living in a smaller collaborative housing unit can feel limiting (H. Jin & Zhu, 2012). Their habit in rural housing results in their extensive use of public spaces in the resettlement complex. They also have less awareness of the established boundaries in public shared spaces and private places. Regarding the new social norms of modern living, residents in gated communities seem more likely to keep their distance from other neighbors rather than befriend them. In addition, locals do not have a nowadays feel a sense of community to pay fees to sustain maintenance and security. To put it simply, their past collective and socialist ways of living do not translate over to their modern resettlement housing, which is the in-between form of modern living and semi-welfare housing.

Those returned residents in the resettlement housing complexes, however, are not only the outcome of preservation but also the betterment of their lives in terms of the conditions of dwelling and surrounding environment at first glance. Similar to an ethnographical study in Shanghai, Ho argues that his case study of the Cucumber Lane has endured a new spatial reorganization, which is, in fact, part of the state-led project of modernity which guaranteed a bright future of the socialism for the proletariat class (W.-C. Ho, 2010). Those improvement projects are transformative in terms of spatial and social relations of the existing population. Similarly, the implication of the resettlement high-rise around the West Gongchen Bridge area suggests a better future in the post-socialist era when workers and villagers all moved to modernized housing complexes and enjoy new urban life and welfare provided by the municipal

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<sup>50</sup> Interview 20170824, No.135.

government. However, another variable is the increase in the housing price of this area, which exacerbates the distance between former SOE workers and former villagers.

In addition to social norms in modern housing complexes, another change also helped shape the new identity of locals. The largest landlord, besides the Yunhe Group, is the past-villager-present-urban-residents. They belong to the moneyed class since they received better compensation than those former workers and have been able to accumulate their wealth from the renewal project. Additionally, villagers no longer have collective land ownership after the rural-urban transition. However, they still participate in the collective village membership, entitling them to receive the annual bonus from village cooperative enterprises.<sup>51</sup> Compared to previous decades where rural lands were not expensive in the suburban area of Hangzhou, the rent from rural lands has markedly increased since urban Hangzhou started to expand outward to incorporate Gongshu District. Therefore, villagers in this area are considered lucky because their farmlands were excellently located and faced demolition at a perfect time, which significantly determined the compensation package. For example, a village household located on the fringe of Gongshu District and Yuhang District received 3 million RMB at once for monetary compensation, and another in the most popular area of northern Gongshu District received 10 million RMB.<sup>52</sup>

As a result, even though villagers and retired workers are living in the same gated *hui-qian-fang xiaoqu*, the overall economic conditions for them have reversed: former villagers live comfortably on rental income, and retired workers can only rely on pensions. Since the urban renewal projects started before the urban expansion, the Gongchen Bridge area was regarded as a suburban area that local governments labeled a cheap place for resettlement housing projects. Therefore, the then development and environmental improvement helped attract both population and investment. These residents, whether they were workers or villagers, are seen as lucky by benefitting from both the improved environment and the rising rents.

As a result of these social and spatial changes, the everyday life of old residents has also changed following the market reform, housing reform, SOE restructuring, environmental protection, and heritagization. Although they are still around, they have not been modernized in terms of urban renewal, even though the past collective ways of living had disappeared.

## 2. Rebuilt *Lilong* Housing and Apartments

This type of resettlement housing is concentrated within the Qiaoxi cultural district. Since this district is a WH site with a tourism economy, the management and the use right system are not the same as in resettlement high-rises, which are not under the WH management system. Within the Qiaoxi Cultural District, approximately 260 out of 1,112 households returned to this small neighborhood among those who had chosen to be relocated, the rest opted to move to resettlement high-rise complexes (M. Zhou, 2012). In this sense, this neighborhood was diluted in terms of the change in the density of the residential population between now and then.

According to the renewal plan and the preparation for the WH nomination, the central theme of resettlement housing is “on-site relocation,” which emphasizes the authenticity of the

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<sup>51</sup> For Jiru village corporation, they own property at Bei-cheng-tien-di, a shopping mall with a supermarket, a karaoke place, movie theater, and restaurants, on the west outside of the Gongchen Bridge area. This shopping mall opened in 2013 and closed in 2018.

<sup>52</sup> Interview 20170724, No.43.



original way of life and local cultures. Therefore, courtyard houses renovated apartments, and new-built apartments were the preferred forms for relocation housing in this area. It seems that returned residents in the low-rise housing were able to more easily accustom themselves to their new homes than those in high-rise resettlement housing because the site, buildings, and the preservation were designed to be in keeping with the original neighborhood while the overall conditions have been improved. For example, local official rhetoric suggests that originals move back to the area, but the overall environment has been upgraded and modernized. “Buildings in Qiaoxi Street were low and narrow, and streets filthy and convoluted. Qiaoxi Street today not only well preserves its historical characters but also improves the living conditions.” (M. Zhou, 2012, p. 95)




Figure 4- 8: Images of Qiaoxi Street before renewal. From (M. Zhou, 2012, p. 95)

As with the high-rise resettlement housing, the building materials and techniques used As with the high-rise resettlement housing, the building materials, and techniques used traditional-style housing were reportedly substandard. In this type of resettlement housing, residents did not only perceive the lousy quality but suffered from it. Residents living in a townhouse confirmed the unbearable nature of living in these houses due to the Yunhe Group using poor-quality materials and trash as the foundation so that there is no insulation between the floor and the earth. With an invitation, I walked into one such house and felt the air stagnant and humid on a summer day. Residents explained that it would be worse in winter when the corners and walls would collect moisture in the air and cause serious mold damage. They reported that building this type of house should be fairly simplistic, but without sophisticated construction, living in the resettlement housing in Qiaoxi Cultural District is problematic.

The two bodies in charge of residential affairs are the Yunhe Group, which is responsible for property management, and the Qiaoxi Community Office, which provides social services. As a result, if a problem occurs in a private housing unit, both groups would pay little attention to the complaint. They would be much more concerned if the problems relate to allocated housing, or when residents “make a scene” to request repairs or other arrangements. For example, several residents staged a protest for similar issues on housing renovation on Gongchen Bridge to gain attention, and the problem was quickly solved afterward.<sup>53</sup> In other scenarios, residents found it impossible to challenge them, and monetary compensation was seen as the best offer because it seemed impossible to solve the problems from the ill-construction once and for all. Residents

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<sup>53</sup> Interview 20170805, No.75 and No.76.

were aware of the power of the two entities, so they refrained from complaints. Therefore, the problems they reported were never visible or traceable in local media or on the Internet.

It then became clear that this “on-site relocation” and preservation project in Qiaoxi neighborhood was not as smooth as it appeared. Apart from the individual reports from the interviewees, more residents faced more than merely living in poor-quality units. For example, 62 households on Jixian Lane had to move out of the renovated housing units because of safety issues. Those two- or three-floor buildings were built originally in the 1970s and renovated in 2007.<sup>54</sup> However, despite this renovation, pipes leaked and walls cracked, causing experts to condemn six housing units as dilapidated and dangerous. The Yunhe Group funded the repair and reconstruction projects with the assistance of the Gongchen Bridge Street Office. Residents moved out by June 2017, and the demolition project started that same year. They were able to return in April 2019 (J. Wu, 2019), almost five years after the neighborhood was officially placed on the WH List.



Figure 4- 9: (Left) Jixian Lane undergoing demolition in 2017. Photography by the author. (Right) Image of Jixian Lane after reconstruction. From J. Wu (2019).

It may come as a surprise to hear of the disparities and unfortunate living experiences in an aesthetically designed WH site. In summer 2017, while walking from Gongchen Bridge to the Hangzhou Arts and Crafts Museum through the back alleys and lanes of Qiaoxi Street, I saw a painted accusation on the wall of an apartment building, which read: “The Yunhe Group constructs tofu-like buildings.” (運河集團造豆腐) (see Figure 4-10 below) I have not had the chance to talk with residents who would return to Jixian Lane since they were living outside of this neighborhood. However, the accusation on the wall and words from other residents indicated the indignation of people toward the Yunhe Group. Its content was similar to what I learned from residents in the resettlement housing of its ill-quality of construction.

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<sup>54</sup> Interview 20170805, No.75 and No.76; 20170809, No.93.



Figure 4- 10: Image of the graffiti accusing the Yunhe Group. Photography by the author.

It turns out that the goal of on-site preservation has never been fully accomplished as the needs of residents were never indeed considered or formed part of the developmental agenda of the heritage machine while they could neither stay in the unchanged past under the pace of urbanization and urban expansion. The real-life attitudes towards the original residents were not quite as respectful as claimed on the official rhetoric about canal preservation and folk cultures as the “witnesses” of the Grand Canal. Moreover, the cultural districts were themed and decorated in the style of the late Qing Dynasty to the Republican Era of China, celebrating an era in which the living canal witnesses did not experience.

To sum up, resettlement housing aimed to provide similar or better living places to original residents while preserving the cultural landscape of this area. This vision is associated with a utopian goal to recover the desirable part of the past. Barthel (1996) argues the notion of utopia is often seen rested in the future but is, in fact, in the past, and heritage communities are part of the social projection to the idealized past. She makes the distinction between “staged symbolic communities” (SSCs) and “living community” in which the former is the representation of the past heritage community while the latter the direct heirs of the past heritage community. According to her, SSCs might be ahistorical since their roles work for a longed reflection rather than an indication of the past.

This observation fits the current situation of the residents in those resettlement housing as they represent both SSCs and living communities within original neighborhoods. However, as this study indicates, this representation is possible through social and cultural exclusion as the boat people living by the canal were not included in the whole process. Since the compensation and options of resettlement housing were only available for people with housing use rights (for those who have bought private housing) or ownership of collective lands (for village only), boat people as a social group disappeared at the transition to the land-based regime.

In local official heritage discourse, this renewal project and subsequent heritagization succeeded in preserving the “living communities.” Without intentional training or instruction, those retired workers and villagers who are living in the resettlement housing complexes are noted as the “witness to the canal heritage.” However, as this subsection demonstrates, local



communities returned to live in either “modernized” resettlement high-rises or antiqued dwellings do not enjoy comfort housing—everyday life of the old Hangzhou residents in the series of resettlement housing projects. Currently, Qiaoxi canal neighborhood is a refreshed cultural district, where prostitutes and boat people disappeared, SOE workers retired and started to get used to their new homes, and landless villagers were transformed into landlords.

#### 4.4 On-site Preservation or On-site Gentrification?

The previous sections have shown another reality for returned residents, the witnesses to the land-based transformation from a deteriorated place with factories to a gentrified residential area with museums.

This section seeks to explain the notion of mobility in the process of gentrification—in which people with money are willing to invest and live somewhere, which has previously been considered an inappropriate place to do so. This section will explore gentrification through the discussion of two kinds of mobility: physical mobility and social mobility. The first aspect of gentrification is the physical mobility of the middle class. Gentrification is known as “the back to the city movement” in the context of U.S. urban dynamics (Florida, 2002; N. Smith, 1996). This movement is characterized as the physical movement of the middle class, which fled to suburbia to escape from the blighted downtown areas where deindustrialization took place.

The similarity lies in these new Hangzhou people are also competitive and capable of moving to an area more amenable to work, life, and the overall arrangement of family members. As mentioned in previous chapters, this area had not previously been a preferred place for private investment and residence. However, as the process of housing commodification and the removal and closures of SOEs continued, this area successfully gained investment in housing and commerce. In addition, because of the process of heritage preservation, local governments became aware of the quality of this area in terms of the management of these WH sites and maintenance.

In this case study, the area described attracts the educated gentrifiers—new Hangzhou people who came to work rather than returned. Hangzhou implements new talent policies targeting young and educated professionals to strengthen the city’s local economy, as shown in Table 4-3. This strategy for the growing “second-tier cities,”<sup>55</sup> such as Hangzhou, is to attract the talented people with *hukou* welfare and housing subsidy, which are limited in the “first-tier” Chinese cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen.

Permanent residence permit ( <i>hukou</i> )	Housing	Entrepreneurship
Persons eligible for <i>hukou</i> registration must have an undergraduate degree, be under the age of 45 and have resided in Hangzhou for a year; or have at least a graduate degree.	Fresh graduates of foreign nationality are eligible for a one-time housing subsidy of Rmb20,000 if they hold a master's degree, and Rmb30,000 if they hold a PhD.	The city offers personal loans of up to Rmb500,000; small and micro-business loans are available, up to Rmb3m.

Table 4- 3: Talent policies Hangzhou, 2018. Selected from The Economist (2018b) TheEconomist (2018b)

<sup>55</sup> The Chinese city tiered system uses GDP, administrative levels, and population as three main criteria to categorize its cities into four clusters: the first-tier cities, second-tier cities, third-tier cities, and fourth-tier cities. This study uses first-tier or first-rate, and second-tier or second-rate alternately.

These migrant elites are willing to live outside of the city center and commute to work. One reason for the choice is the rent and availability. Downtown Hangzhou has been expensive, and the housing sites are limited because of its small area, which is already taken up by natural spaces. In addition to the limited site, local authorities have demolished informal rental housing and urban villages at a large scale in the wave of beautification movement for the 2016 G20 Summit. Therefore, these affordable but illegal rental housing units are not available options for tenants in downtown Hangzhou. Another reason is that many new enterprises set their offices outside of downtown areas and suburban areas to enjoy subsidies or lower rents so that Gongshu might be an ideal location as it sits on a rather central place in terms of commuting to areas of metropolitan Hangzhou. Concerning time and cost for commuting, this area is a realist option for both work and life.

Urban expansion and the additional condition of heritage management ensured the local developmental agenda, thus making this area a competitive “new” district in local development. These new Hangzhou residents can afford to live or rent in new modern gated communities in Gongshu district, where the lands were previously for SOEs. This level of gentrification took place because of deindustrialization, and the urbanization that proceeded it. While many choose to buy or rent a home in a gated community, few choose to buy a unit in a resettlement housing complex. Concerning the low quality of resettlement buildings, and the low *suzhi* of returning locals, the concerns of these migrants elites—as with the general middle-class in Chinese cities—relates mainly to commuting, school districts, safety, local amenities, and medical services of the neighborhood (Tomba, 2014). It is noteworthy that in this case study, the new Hangzhou residents do not consider locals dangerous or problematic, and no real conflict exists between these two social groups. The perception of *suzhi*, in this case, is not relevant to the discussion on criminality and poverty but more relevant to the everyday social life and living habit.

Another aspect in which to consider gentrification is to do with social mobility, which resulted from “rural to urban transition.” The most significant change is that former villagers become de facto urban landlords, despite local authorities having confiscated most of their land ownership. In the past, Jiru villagers were not traditionally wealthy, and most of them had only agricultural *hukou*, meaning that they could not enjoy any social welfare service. They now are urban residents with urban *hukou* and enjoy social welfare, schooling, and medical insurance provided by the municipal government. Most importantly, the crucial factor of this upward mobility comes from urban renewal and compensation, which provided more resettlement housing units in terms of area, and the following improvement projects and heritage preservation then supported the increasing rent of this area. For former villagers, despite their legal ownerships of collective land had been limited after the *hukou* transition; however, being landlords with use rights in urbanized housing units is much more profitable than being villagers with land ownership. Also, though the original villagers became urban residents, the village cooperative remains the only village-related organization that manages the remaining collective lands and property. In 2017, former Jiru villagers still enjoyed the bonus income from rent and revenues of the remaining collective lands and assets. In short, there are no villagers de jure anymore; all of them belong to *shequ* residents’ committees in the street offices of the city government. As shown, the past title of land ownership secured a larger compensation to former villagers, especially in places fit for gentrification.

The gap in affluence between former villagers and former residents is clear to see. This is not an unusual situation at the time when some villages financially benefit from urbanization and



urban expansion in many Chinese cities. The former SOE employees and new Hangzhou residents regard these former villagers as *tuhao*, meaning upstarts without any *suzhi*. This term is often associated with another coined term in Chinese society: *chai-er-dai*, the “demolition second generation”. The term *chai-er-dai* refers to wealthy village youths with access to means and benefits solely because their parents received great compensation from the government. These terms connote disparagement and basically mean that while they have money, they lack in culture and cultivation. Nevertheless, at the same time, wage people are envious of the sudden wealth. One Hangzhou citizen told me that people joked that people would prefer having a red “*chai*” (demolition) for the red spring couplets on the gate (which is the usual practice before demolition) instead the usual “*chun*” (spring) or “*fu*” (blessings) because the former would bring wealth that people could hardly earn for their entire lives.<sup>56</sup>

Aside from these newly coined terms for this emerging moneyed class in the context of Chinese urbanization, another useful indicator of social mobility is marriage. Former villagers sought to have non-agricultural connections, and for village women, marriage to men with urban *hukou* would be an ideal way for them to leave the village (H. Jin & Zhu, 2012). The situation has become reversed. As one retired SOE worker put it,

*...in the past, no girl would have liked to marry someone from a village.  
However, those village boys who were looked down on are now rich landlords.  
They own residential units, with each costing 20,000 RMB/m<sup>2</sup> ...we have  
nothing to compete with them.*

Similarly, another former SOE employee also expressed that, “because villagers became super rich, even a handicapped villager could get married easily.”<sup>57</sup> The possibility of a sudden rich strengthens the social status of villagers. Hangzhou people are highly aware of urban demolition projects and compensation packages because these policies might suddenly, and drastically, change their prospects. In a recent study, Jiang & Lu (2015) argue that the process of urbanization in Hangzhou affects how female villagers deal with their *hukou* benefit and marital status. Female villagers adapted matrilineal arrangements to maintain their *hukou* status and corresponding benefits, rather than marrying out of their home villages. Marrying out meant giving up their “length of *hukou* service” and the ownership of collective lands. According to the authors, this practice is carried out more for economic considerations rather than the increasing social and feminist awareness. In other words, this practice involves less cultural reflection and political ambition to change the role of a woman in a family. This finding is intriguing because, in the recent past, marrying an urban resident implied mobility upward while marrying a villager was regarded as a downward one. For Gongshu District, the large-scale demolition of urban villages, which began in 2017, will continue to create many new village millionaires. In the most popular local online forum in Hangzhou—the 19 Lou forum—a post says that 2017 was a historic year for demolition, so single women would have to “catch” their prospective husbands at several spots in Hangzhou, and “ten thousand *tuhao* would be born in Gongshu District every minute.” (19LouForum, 2017) Even though the public image of *tuhao* is predominantly negative, their wealth still makes them enticing candidates for marriage, and the previous upward mobility via marriage has reversed to a certain extent.

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<sup>56</sup> Interview 20180720, No.152.

<sup>57</sup> Interview 20170722, No.41.

Here the change in social standing between SOE employees and villagers is stressed. SOE employees believed themselves to be model citizens: educated, productive to the national economy, loyal to the country and the party, and hard-working. The work-unit system formed a “social contract” between workers and the state (W. Tang & Parish, 2000), through which the latter guaranteed lifelong benefits to workers and their families. However, after the restructuring of SOEs, they no longer felt protected by state policies. Compared to the displaced peasants or laid-off workers in the rustbelt cities, however, they were provided with new housing units at little cost in a developing area, thanks to the first wave of housing privatization and the urbanization and environmental improvements which followed. Their children, the “factory second-generation,” would be ideal partners with whom to form a socially and financially stable family. However, in the era of the dominance of the private sector, the role these former SOE workers play in the modern economy has diminished.

Many retired workers who belong to the “lost generation” revealed these mixed emotions, including bitterness, jealousy, a sense of betrayal, but also nostalgia when talking of villagers. They experienced the period when they or their family were assigned to areas under the planned economy. Later, they suffered social and cultural chaos during the Mao-era. At their middle ages, they faced massive layoffs in the late 1990s in Deng’s era of economic reform. They are now in their sixties and seventies and do not feel secure and stable in the current political and economic climate. They truly believed that the state would take good care of them from “cradle to grave.” as the state was the most powerful provider responsible for the welfare of workers and their families.<sup>58</sup> As the state had directed, if not dominated, the trajectories of their lives, they felt betrayed at seeing so many commitments broken. As one interviewee recalled his early life, and the suffering experienced by the suppression which came mostly from the then promoted class struggle of the Cultural Revolution, he told of how he was greatly touched when he read the line, “I love the nation but who loves me instead?” in a propagandistic play named “Teahouse” (1957) by Lao She, a famous novelist and dramatist in the 20<sup>th</sup> century China. He then started to wipe his tears<sup>59</sup>. Their memories and experience are aptly mirrored by the canal in that they both have a dark, but hard-working, past. Unfortunately, the nation does not appreciate and provide support for people of this generation, especially those retired urban citizens interviewed in this case study. Memories of the canal form part of their collective memory—it represents purity and a precious moment before they started to suffer from social unrest and large-scale economic restructuring.

In my conversations with these elderly residents, many of them commented on their changing fortunes using a saying, “*san-shi-nian-he-dong, san-shi-nian-he-xi*” (三十年河东, 三十年河西), which is similar to the expression, “the tables have turned.” This, on the one hand, explains that these workers admit to the better life they had in comparison with their poor neighbors, but now this situation has reversed. Poor villagers were jealous of factory workers; now these workers are envious of wealthy villager landlords.<sup>60</sup> On the other hand, this expression implies that this circumstance is neither explainable nor predictable. For those laid-off workers, the reason for them leading a comfortable life was because they were regarded as highly

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<sup>58</sup> Interview 20170811, No.105.

<sup>59</sup> Interview 20170719, No.28.

<sup>60</sup> Interview 20170722, No.41; 20170821, No.126.

competent and hard-working. However, there seems little reason for villagers being so wealthy except for their sudden luck in the process of urbanization and heritagization.

It is noteworthy that there is little visible tension between retired SOE workers and former villagers, despite the feelings of dispossession that often affects former workers. From the perspective of an outsider, I could not see the difference between former villagers and workers. Urbanization with the economic restructuring has blurred the social and spatial boundaries to some extent, as *danwei* and village cooperatives have become less critical to the everyday lives of locals. Urbanization transformed the Gongshu District from a suburban area to a new urban area while, at the same time, turning villagers into landlords. The urbanization in this area is not a serious cause for concern for local people. However, for these laid-off and retired workers, it is not only the transformation of the city that is visible but also the total retreat of the state, along with their loyal workers. The state guaranteed a bright future for workers to dedicate their lives to but, eventually, it gave this future to private enterprises and a market that privileges villagers and new urban elites. No matter who they were and are, they share and shape new collective memories about living in modern communities.

The overall improvement of infrastructure in this area helped the rise of rental prices in Hangzhou, along with urban expansion and canal heritagization. A brand-new apartment unit cost slightly above 10,000 RMB/m<sup>2</sup> in 2006, which rose to at least 50,000 RMB/m<sup>2</sup> to 60,000 RMB/m<sup>2</sup> in mid-2017.<sup>61</sup> The increasing demand for housing has also affected the price of rent. The new wave of demolition in 2016 and 2017 also stirred the demand for housing since families facing relocation needed temporary dwellings, meaning that locals, as well as migrant workers, had to rent accommodation.<sup>62</sup> The shortage of affordable housing did not greatly impact the locals because they received compensational rent during the relocation process, but, for migrant workers in the service industry, it was not easy to find affordable housing—not to mention that there were many wealthier prospective tenants competing with them.

Another housing project aggravates the gentrification of this area. Jiangnan Li is the project and funded by the Greentown Real Estate Co. It stands on the north side to the Qiaoxi neighborhood and is designed as a courtyard housing complex with single houses with traditional Chinese architectural styles. It owns 76 units, and each contains 200–800 m<sup>2</sup>. According to a report on sales price,<sup>63</sup> in mid-2017, the average sale price was 170,469 RMB/m<sup>2</sup>; in 2019, 178,640 RMB/m<sup>2</sup>.

This area is now a residential area with a cultural district, museums, and greenery around. Most residents and citizens are proud of the restored and clean waterway and the modernized heritage landscape. This benefits not only villagers (because of the increased revenues from rent), but also retired factory workers whose living standards have improved. The canal flowed through their lives, yet it is losing its function in that it is no longer the main infrastructure for transportation and industrialization. Instead, factory sites, the Gongchen Bridge, and the waterways have become objects to be commemorated in the era of land-based economy, land transportation, and heritagization.

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<sup>61</sup> Interview 20170731, No.58.

<sup>62</sup> Interview 20170727, No.49.

<sup>63</sup> Data collected from Anjuke Inc. at <https://hangzhou.anjuke.com/community/trends/746818> [accessed 13 Mar. 2020]

#### 4.5 Nostalgia and the Future of Heritage

I recalled the time when I just started fieldwork in Hangzhou in the summer of 2015. I visited museums and also tried to find local people to chat around nearby open spaces. Upon knowing my intention and research interests, locals usually would tell me how the environment had improved, and the canal had been crucial in the history of China and Hangzhou. They would say this place was a good place to study the Grand Canal since still some old buildings remained after the renewal of the Qiaoxi Cultural District. When I asked them for further references, most every informant, whether local or not, would say, “go and talk to the elders hanging out by the canal.” However, to my surprise, not only that those “elders by the canal” had fewer memories about the canal than about the factories, but also, they mentioned a lot about their physical and emotional losses in their times, in the present day, and in the future that new rich Hangzhou people would replace the locals socially.

The emotional loss of the locals represents a sense of nostalgia for their childhoods in socialist China. This “socialist nostalgia” is generated through the subjectivity making process through the pursuit of modernity. In Lisa Rofel (1999)’s case study of silk factory workers, she analyzes how “gendered” modernity evolves with socialist China and post-socialist China. She contends that “(s)ocialist nostalgia in China also longs for the very ways of life that the socialist state destroyed.” In her study, socialist China and its utopian dreams are conceived “innocent” and had accommodated these “productive female workers” as important production force in their times. This historical moment, their “speech act” (including “speaking bitterness”), and their nostalgia allow them to form their subjectivities. Similarly, the nostalgia in the studied communities indicates the longing for the loss of not only childhood and the vanishing Chinese society characterized by socialist features. Echoing with the criticism of “imperial nostalgia” (Rosaldo, 1989), the longing for the past transformed their bitter past into a sweet and “innocent” one. The nostalgia complicates the relations between old and new Hangzhou people, former workers and villagers, and the different generations of these residents.

Therefore, as their presences represent the continuity of the canal, this chapter has demonstrated how local identities have been shaped by the process of urbanization, heritagization, and gentrification. In the process of local transformation, those remaining residents, and the coming of new Hangzhou residents, have reshaped the gentrifying landscape of this area.

Furthermore, new social dynamics define what “localness” means to different social groups, and how “being local” indicates mobility in the process of gentrification. Gentrification triggers identity formation as the heritagization of the Grand Canal hid these emotions and identity changes. It gave the impression that those locals were witnessing the always-existing canal and representative of the canal culture. For preservationists, the presence of locals, however, provides an authentic feel to the Qiaoxi Cultural District and the Xiaohe District. Moreover, Hangzhou residents who grow up downtown usually think unfavorably of this area. To them, anywhere outside of the old city walls is not considered to be “Hangzhou” at all. Not to mention that they considered the previous suburban industrial area morally and physically filthy and not as cultivated and nurtured by the Southern Song dynasty cultures and West Lake cultures as the downtown area.<sup>64</sup> In addition, in their minds, the first generation of the SOEs came from

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<sup>64</sup> Interview 20180716, No.141 and No.142.

all over the country and was not regarded as “local” enough.<sup>65</sup> However, in the official rhetoric of canal preservation, the returning locals in Gongshu District are qualified to represent the vernacular canal culture. Therefore, the locals—whether former workers or villagers—are called or self-identify as “old Hangzhou people” when the conversation is between new Hangzhou people or visitors. This sense of locality is embodied in daily conversation, social relations, and the accuracy used to identify (and classify) different social groups and their home areas.

As local culture is the theme for the canal district, this chapter has discussed the idea of on-site preservation and new identity formation while, at the same time, challenging the essence and value of “localness.” Cultural experts, residents, authorities agreed on localness as one criterion of authenticity. Furthermore, the level of localness suggests the level of effort put to balance development and preservation. Once again, local officials considered the cultural district is authentic since they had had pressures to invest and demolish dwellings in this area while being designated as a cultural district. While urban renewal and heritagization excluded boat people and sex workers physically and discursive, the longtime returning resident become the representatives of localness.

For the boat people and sex workers living in the area in the recent past, social and spatial transformation expelled most, if not all, of them. The land-based development resulted in the loss of boat people’s discursive power in the making of canal culture. As shown in the previous chapter, visitors and residents only see their images in the form of public art and hear romanticized stories about living on a boat. The number and the image of local sex workers diminished in the process of modernization and sanitization. Similarly, their images could only be seen in a purified form as a female worker dedicated to their labor into production.

The sanitized landscape aside, many locals feel perplexed about the state’s attitudes toward local development and the core value of canal culture. With their collective identities twisted during the social-spatial process, heritagization and the Grand Canal provide another memory considering the changing role of the state. As this chapter seeks to find the memories of these former residents staying in the same neighborhood, the notions of living heritage, localness, authenticity, and nostalgia are highly contested in either modernized or antiqued housing projects.

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<sup>65</sup> Interview 20170811, No.105.



## Chapter 5: Heritage Moments: Staged City in Performance

Previous chapters have shown how the Chinese Grand Canal heritage was produced and represented in Hangzhou and how heritagization and urbanization shaped local development and the formation of new social subjectivity. Heritagization of the Hangzhou section became part of the process of exclusion, expelling the unwelcome population and memories, and leading the burgeoning local economy and real estate development. As the previous chapters focus on the Grand Canal heritage, this chapter gives a broader view of the cultural development of Hangzhou's heritage and tourism. Famous heritage sites in Hangzhou are embedded with the history of commerce, pilgrimage tourism, modern tourism, and mega-events. This chapter will show how the Grand Canal, West Lake, religious sites, and monuments have been deployed in these tourism-related scenarios. It also examines the social and cultural contexts of being a tourism city and how this fame shapes the characters and image of the city.

This chapter borrows concepts and ideas from tourism anthropology and event studies to explore how the city has been staged in tourism and mega-event. I will explore how the city has represented itself and positioned its heritage on the front stage while keeping its backstage—the society—in order. As Robert Rydell (1984) suggests, the U.S. has taken advantage of the series of world fairs at the turn of the 20 century and presented a racial hierarchy to blur the class struggle. In other words, mega-event is not only an important indicator of growth but also a supporter to keep the society stable. This chapter discusses how mega-events in Hangzhou have differently worked for presenting the city's images while social programs for promoting civility and remaking spectacle are under managed in parallel.

The beginning of this chapter examines these moments from the examination of tourism development in the past century Hangzhou. Traditional tourism in Hangzhou had related to pilgrimage tourism, in which pilgrims traveled from regional areas via boats during a specific period every year to temples in Hangzhou. First, the Grand Canal (the Hangzhou Section) had been a crucial route for water transportation for rural pilgrims from the Hangzhou-Jiaxing-Huzhou area, coming to religious sites in Hangzhou. In the local and regional context, this section was important not only for its relation to *Caoyun* history, but also for its function in connecting neighboring areas, and—in the more recent past—for its role in helping Hangzhou emerge as a tourism city. Then I will explore the 1929 West Lake Expo, which was one of the apexes in the history of city branding and tourism of Hangzhou. During this event, West Lake became the base for nationalism and then a modernized tourist attraction in the last century, along with the urban reconfiguration during the Republican era. Subsequently, I will then show how the PRC regime continued, changed, and discarded some heritage practices while pursuing modernity in promoting heritage tourism. Tourism is part of the tradition of Hangzhou, as many existing cultural and religious sites represent. However, the city is reinventing several traditions along this line to advertise its natural and cultural resources by hosting mega-events.

This chapter demonstrates that tourism and cultural representation have been performing specific functions through different periods in history and different political regimes. The 2016 G20 Summit indicates another apex to not only city branding, the making of heritage spectacle, and social controls. By tracing the history of tourism, mega-events, and “heritage spectacle,” this chapter examines how urban transformation, social engineering, and image-making work together in producing a new social order that made Hangzhou a decent venue city.

Hangzhou has been marginalized in terms of economic and political recognition. It was not a long-term and not even a formal capital in Chinese history but a famous tourism city several centuries ago. Economically, it has a food production center but not a substantial industrial and

modernized city that gains money and international connections through industrialization. These facts become clearer when comparing it with its strong neighbor Shanghai. Though owning a similar geographical, historical, and colonial development, Hangzhou was not as well-developed economically as Shanghai. Both were treaty ports, but Hangzhou lacked the phase of full colonialism, so its economic performance and the industrial and economic connections were weaker than Shanghai.

However, the existing social, cultural, and economic conditions of Hangzhou push the city to actively enhance its competitiveness. This chapter emphasizes the making of several moments of modernity of the city, indicating their cultural and social roots in the overall social progress since the last century. This chapter will use the concept of “means of modernity” from Arjun Appadurai (1996) to see how heritage in tourism and the mega-event scenario becomes the means of modernity for the city to pave its way to heritage modernity. This ultimate goal to be a venue city asks for appropriate accommodations, transportation, infrastructure, a positive city image, and a corresponding stable society. Therefore, the city pursues modernity that longs for a future concerning the past, where Shanghai was never a considerable viral city several centuries ago. I will demonstrate two phases of modernity: the first is linear modernity, and the second is heritage modernity. Linear modernity starts as the modern transportation started to be operated and reached its peaks in the 1929 West Lake Expo and the Maoist era. Heritage modernity started in the late 1990s and early 2000s and has reached its first peak in the 2016 G20 Summit. This expo successfully connects urban development and rearrange the West Lake area to consolidate its cultural, social, political, and spectacular values. These references work when the current policy requires social supports from “histories” and “stories” to prove Hangzhou's characters as “delicacy” and “tolerance,” as indicated in official rhetoric.

### **5.1 Transforming the Tourism Landscape: West Lake is Coming to Town**

This section first examines what is referred to as the traditional tourism in Hangzhou in the past century and subsequently how this tradition underwent a drastic change during the Republican era.

“Above is heaven, below are Suzhou and Hangzhou” is a well-known Chinese proverb dating from the Southern Song dynasty. Since the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127), thanks to the agricultural improvement and population growth, part of the Jiangnan region (South of Yangtze River region) replaced Weihe Plain as the new national food production center. Hangzhou and Suzhou became two of Jiangnan's grain production areas since then, and abundant food supply was one of the main reasons that Hangzhou became a temporal capital in the Southern Song dynasty, as discussed in Chapter Two. Hangzhou has been associated with prosperity and climate-friendly environment. Moreover, Chinese literati in the Song dynasty appreciated sight-seeing and wrote poems and prose pieces about West Lake. This image was further spread outside of China by the Italian merchant Marco Polo. In his travel writings, he described Hangzhou—“Kinsay,” meaning “the capital” as it was the previous capital of the Southern Song dynasty—as the “city of Heaven” on earth. The urban layout was grandiose, and the sensual pleasure of West Lake earned its nickname as “the melting pot of money” (Moule, 1907, p. 14). The prosperous image is deeply imprinted in visitor's minds, imagination, and tourism experience and helps sustain its fame of being a tourism city.

Besides, Hangzhou was home to numerous Buddhist temples and monasteries since the Wuyue Kingdom in the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period. Supported by extensive water transportation networks, the city had long been a regional center connected with religious festivals, pilgrims, and events. This pilgrim tourism tradition was associated with regional water

transportation via the canal system and fueled the prosperity of businesses in Hangzhou. The primary destination area for this pilgrimage was West Lake and its surrounding hills (See Figure 5-1). The traditional practice was centered on an incense-burning pilgrimage around the West Lake area (L. Wang, 2000) and reached its peak during the spring season at lunar February 19, the birthday of *Guanyin* (Chinese translation of Avalokiteshvara). Some pilgrims continued their stays until the birthday of the Lord of the Sun at lunar March 19, and the following Tomb-Sweeping festival (usually fall around the solar calendar fifth day of April)(Y. Zhong, 1983).

Pilgrimage visitors were akin to each other concerning their homes and social backgrounds: they came from the Hangzhou-Jiaxing-Huzhou Plain and Jiangsu Province by boat and docked at Songmuchang (Y. Zhong, 1983). In addition to their regional homogeneity, the population of this pilgrim cohort was also relatively undifferentiated. The majority of these pilgrims were rural elder women, or “grandma pilgrims,” as Hangzhou’s people called them (Gao, 2004, p. 230). These grandma pilgrims were wealthy peasants who came to pray for good harvests in agriculture and silk-worm raising. This annual visit was their only chance in the entire year to get away from rural homes and chores and to shop for necessities, hand-crafted commodities, and souvenirs in the urban areas. Cosmetics, Tienzhu chopsticks, paper umbrellas, and silk products were extremely popular, as Hangzhou's handcrafted manufacturing was then well-established. In addition, the teahouses or small restaurants near the destination temples or monasteries also profited, taking in three times their usual income from this tourism (Y. Zhong, 1983, p. 316).

As the map below shows, West Lake and monasteries were outside of the city wall, but the pilgrimage-related shopping activities took place in the City-God hill (also known as the Wushan area). These pilgrim-shoppers came to Hangzhou in the late winter and early spring for gods-worshipping and spent the rest of their time shopping. This type of tourism was beneficial to local commerce as they also bought necessities such as Wanglaonian combs, Zhangxiaquan scissors, and Chinese medicines from famous makers in the city. For business owners at that time, the pilgrim season was also the peak season, and they would earn half their annual revenue during this month (Y. Zhong, 1983). In addition to those necessities, pilgrims bought souvenirs along the route on their way back home. The aforementioned Tangxi town was a popular stop for its local souvenirs—candied fruits—a favorite souvenir for those pilgrim visitors.




Figure 5- 1: “Map of Gongchen Bridge business port and tourist attractions around West Lake, Hangzhou county” in the Republican Era. From Xu (2015).

By 1909, the new railroad between Shanghai and Hangzhou had started to operate. Sites proximate to the new stations were getting attention for modern development. Two years later, after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, the Republic of China, led by the Nationalist Party (or Kuomintang, KMT), replaced the Qing regime and established its capital in Nanjing. The new



regime ordered the abolition of the Manchu settlements (also known as bannermen garrisons) — a significant symbol of Qing governance during the period from 1644 to 1912 (S. Fu, 2016). The site is located on the northeast side of West Lake. In 1913, Xingyi Ruan planned to build Hangzhou’s New Business District on the site of the Manchu settlement. This project replaced the previous settlement with new paved roads and stores in a modern urban planning style with a grid system and five lakeshore parks. Under the management of Fucheng Zhu, this plan also ordered the removal of the city gates between the previous Manchu settlements and the lake, as well as the renovation of the lakeshore areas and establishment of public exercise center, education hall, and lakeshore parks. Three gates on the west side by the lake—Yongjin Gate, Qiangtang Gate, and Qinbo Gate—were on the earliest list of removals (see Figure 5-2, no.1, 2,3). Since then, the beauty of West Lake has been part of the city. Hangzhou’s residents described this change as “West Lake was moving into the city” (Y. Zhong, 1983, p. 191). This urban project not only changed the layout of downtown Hangzhou and brought about the New Business District as a new urban center. The programmed changes also established a visual connection from the new city center through the new planned accesses. This series of new spatial arrangements helped the development of the east side of the lake and changed it to the central business area from the Wushan area on the east-south corner of the city.




Figure 5- 2: Hangzhou in the Qing dynasty, upside indicates south. Adapted by Wang (2000, p. 109) from Tong Longfu.ed (1993)

These urban modernization plans also changed tourism practice in Hangzhou. First, the relationship between Shanghai and Hangzhou became temporally closer, and Hangzhou became a popular tourism destination for Shanghai elites. During the Republican era, middle-class people working in Shanghai spent weekends away in Hangzhou—a three-hour train ride from Shanghai.



These educated middle-class people were used to Western-style leisure activities; they were interested in sightseeing at West Lake and regarded this 'tradition' as a way to appreciate the elite intellectual culture that was associated with West Lake (L. Wang, 2000). For Shanghai visitors who were used to living in a crowded modern city, Hangzhou was attractive for providing another side of leisure life. Hangzhou and its natural landscape and religious sites represented the face of Chinese traditional culture, and its new urban layout provided a new way to appreciate both that heritage and the new urban culture. Thus Hangzhou's tourism at that time changed, as new social groups emerged in the new regional economy and new tourism dynamics followed.

Second, the spatial settings around the lake were changed as the new authority removed the city walls and the Manchu settlements. The new authority re-planned an accessible business district nearby, sightseeing at West Lake and shopping at the New Business Center became part of tourism in the city. This tourism practice was in contrast to the prior pilgrim tourism in which "grandma pilgrims" traveled to temples around the "suburban" lake by boat during the spring break and annual tomb-sweeping festival, and then shopped at what was then the commercial center: City-God hill area. Most pilgrimage-related activities, as well as the lake, were outside of the city center. While the lake was "moving into the city," related activities had taken place in the newly planned downtown area—the New Business District.

Third, aside from the transformation in downtown Hangzhou, several tourism sites emerged in the new social context. For example, the Mt. Mogan area, 100 km from Hangzhou, became a summertime attraction after the construction of the Shanghai-Hangzhou railroad. For Westerners in Shanghai, Mt. Mogan was the nearest escape, the perfect location to evade the hot urban summer; thus, they came there and built their summer resorts. There were 130 houses in the area and approximately 600 visitors coming each summer (Dai, 2011). Later Chinese officials and elites also built houses in the area (Zhang; & Song, 2008). Another example is the expansion of Yue Fei's tomb and its association with West Lake. Yue Fei was a Southern Song loyalist general who fought against the Jurchen Jin dynasty and died in Hangzhou. His tomb and temple had been rebuilt several times under the order of, for example, founder of the Ming dynasty and the Emperor Qianlong in the Qing dynasty. The former, Yuanzhang Zhu, honored Yue Fei and sent a representative offering sacrifice each year on the anniversary of Yue Fei's death. This commemoration became even more sophisticated in the following reigns in the Ming dynasty. In Qing dynasty, the Emperor Qianlong paid respects to the shrine during the "southern tours" for the commemoration of the loyalty (Donglan, 2005). In the Republican era, the tomb was renovated with the construction of a new hall and a courtyard for the purpose of attracting tourism money (L. Wang, 2000). The new invention of Yue Fei worship was also associated with the natural landscape. There was a saying: "If you go to West Lake now, you must pay your respects at the Temple of General Yue Fei, and as soon as you mention Yue Fei's shrine, West Lake must come to mind" (Donglan, 2005).

This section shows that the traditional practice associated with religious sites and transportation sites was changed during the modernization of Hangzhou in the Republican era. The cultural and social meanings and functions of West Lake and the Grand Canal changed. West Lake, formerly part of a rural landscape with religious sites, changed into a focus in urban development. As for the Grand Canal, water transportation had been the primary method to carry rural visitors via the canal and its branches. But as the railroad began to operate, the composition of visitors and their tastes and preferences in leisure activities also transformed the tourism landscape.

## 5.2 A Break with the Traditional Hangzhou: The 1929 West Lake Expo

Not until 1929 did the city host a mega-event. The motivation for hosting the 1929 West Lake (*Xihu*) Expo was to celebrate the victory of the Northern Expedition<sup>66</sup> and to promote manufacturing industries. The rationale of using mega-events as a way to promote economic and political performance was to teach and direct a modern state into the right trajectory in modern science and rational thinking. As several leaders of the Republican era had studied in Western countries and Japan, they were influenced by the contemporary belief that modernization would benefit the state and the people it governed, leading to a strong modern state.

Before 1929 the Republican government had made several attempts to stage expos, but these attempts had failed due to the chaotic conditions of an era dominated by warlords. Xingyi Ruan, the Director of the Zhejiang Products Exhibition Hall, made several drafts and proposals for a mega-event. However, his plan did not develop until the political situation had calmed down in 1927 (S. Fu, 2016). Another attempt had come from governors. In 1924, the Zhejiang Military Recovery program director Yongxiang Lu and Zhejiang Governor Zhaiyang Zhang had planned to hold an expo. All of their plans had been abandoned due to unstable political situations within the Republican regime (Ai, 2009). With the close of the Northern Expedition (1926–1928), the Nationalist Party defeated the warlords and transitioned from military governance to the period of political tutelage. In 1927, Chair of Zhejiang Province Jingjiang Zhang invited Menglin Jiang, Zhenjun Cheng, and Fengmian Lin to discuss how to promote urban development in Hangzhou. They reached an agreement to prepare the West Lake Expo in the name of encouraging consumption of national products, with the goal of using expos to promote urban development and renew the urban environment. In October 1928, the Zhejiang Provincial Government Committee passed the proposal for the expo and established the Preparatory Committee.<sup>67</sup> The draft proposal from the Zhejiang Construction Bureau cited five reasons for the Expo: first, improving domestic products and industrial development; second, promoting and advertising domestic products; third, supporting industry and commerce by buying domestic products; fourth, strengthening the economy of Zhejiang; fifth, commemorating the victory of the Northern Expedition (Yang, Wang, & Xu, 2011). Thus, this expo functioned as an embodied announcement for national development and also a medicine for curing the national illness of backwardness and thus attain modernity. The exhibition halls were themed as follows: Revolution, Museum, Art, Agriculture, Education, Hygiene, Silk, and Industry.

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<sup>66</sup> The Northern Expedition (1926–1928) was a military campaign launched by the National Revolutionary Army of the KMT, aiming to reunify China after regional warlords and the *Beiyang* government had divided China into several political parts.

<sup>67</sup> Information from the Museum of the West Lake Expo. Visit date: 3 Aug. 2018.



Figure 5- 3: Map of the venue. Photo taken in the Museum of the West Lake Expo.

The West Lake Expo opened on June 6, 1929, and closed on October 20, 1929. The site selection showed an interesting contrast between the new industrialism and the tradition of West Lake. The venue selection is intriguing because West Lake was a traditional cultural site rather than an industrial base for development. But the choice was logical to expo organizers for two reasons. The first reason was to support business in the New Business District, which was proximate to the lake. The main venue was located around West Inner Lake areas, occupying a 5 km<sup>2</sup> area, including the Broken Bridge (Duan Chiao), Solitary Hill, Temple of General Yue Fei, Bei Mt., and Precious Stone Hill (See Figure 5-4 below). As the railroad and urban spatial restructuring took place in the early phase of the Republican regime, the former western part of the city had been opened to the lake and had become a transitional zone between the New Business District and the lake. The spatial arrangement proposed for the expo was thus for the convenience of visitors using railroad transportation and suggested the new modernist social and political order.

The second reason for the site was West Lake itself. It was clear that West Lake was already a tourist attraction; it thus was logically appropriate as the expo venue. Besides this recognition of existing use patterns, the lake was also a stage for juxtaposing the old and new nationalist sites. The old nationalist site is the Temple of Yue Fei; as new sites, the authorities ordered the building of several monuments to commemorate national heroes and the expo itself. The expo planners believed that the natural beauty of the lake and the new modern monuments would arouse nationalist sentiment in visitors, encouraging them to appreciate the nation in its entirety and the specific efforts of its national martyrs. As a result, several monuments were installed during the preparation. Among these was the 1929 installation of a monument of KMT revolutionist Yinshi Chen at the No. 3 Park. In subsequent years, during the 1930s, the liminal spaces within those lakeshore parks would become the site for another two monuments to KMT revolutionary military martyrs. Moreover, the West Lake Expo Pagoda was newly built. In comparison to other famous ancient pagodas around the lake, such as Leifeng Pagoda (built originally in 977) on the south side and Baoshu Pagoda (built originally in 976) on the north side, the West Lake Expo Pagoda represented a new architectural style, yet the pagoda form still represented the essence of Chinese architecture. As a result, this pagoda and the West Lake Expo Bridge were important additions to the landscape to commemorate the expo (NorthChinaDaily,



1931) while the existing heritage sites and ancient pagodas were not the intended cultural carriers.




Figure 5- 4: Full view of West Lake.  
 From [https://www.travelchinaguide.com/attraction/zhejiang/hangzhou/west\\_lake.htm](https://www.travelchinaguide.com/attraction/zhejiang/hangzhou/west_lake.htm) [11 Mar. 2020]

Several crucial organizers and designers of this expo studied in Europe and Japan and believed the expo functioned as an indicator of national development and a booster of nationalism and scientific knowledge. At that time, domestic politics and the economy were in ruins after years of warfare, so it was a time for the then government to promote a new order to stabilize the society and its own legitimacy. As Chitao Dai, an influential KMT politician, expressed it,

*The rationale of an expo lies in promoting culture and industry. Expo is a clear mirror, reflecting the past of cultures and industries in miniature...Expo simply reflects the reality of the nation and the society and does not take additional responsibilities...we have to admit that in the past two decades China has fallen behind the world because its science and education have not developed and progressed (NorthChinaDaily, 1929).*

In short, the expo was viewed as ways in which a state had advanced compared to other developed countries and its recent but undesirable past. It is, however, noteworthy that the “culture” mentioned was not the traditional nor the local culture. Rather, it was the national culture that national leaders and expo proponents hoped would sustain the future national

development and would shape citizens' thinking. These politicians and cultural elites attempted to make a positive cultural transition possible, and the eventual solution was to introduce a new culture to cultivate and educate citizens. Expo and world fair arrange different objects and display images of cultural objects or practices to present an evolving social order. As Rydell (1984) suggests, the series of the world fairs in the U.S. between 1876–1916 promoted industrial capitalism dominated by the white people—that were investors and the Federal government. In order to fit the political and economic developmental trajectories, expos were arranged to present the idea of a utopian image in which the Darwinist idea was the primary rationale for the desired path of social and racial progress.



Figure 5- 5: Left: The West Lake Expo Pagoda. Designed by Jipiao Liu. Right: The West Lake Expo Bridge. From Hangzhou Archives

For the West Lake Expo planned, planners and architects were ambitious to change the national ideology and culture into the ones that could support modern industrialism to echo with the Republican regime. The architect of this exhibition hall is Jipiao Liu, who has studied painting and architecture in Paris. He returned to China in 1927, serving as a professor in the design department at Hangzhou National Art College, where Fengmian Lin was then president of the college. In the 1929 Expo, he led the designs of the Industrial Exhibition Hall—whose modern and European style attracted more attention than any other hall or building in the Expo. Jipiao Liu was ambitious in introducing Art Deco to China.:

*This is my first challenge in China. When I was in Europe planning for expos, it was easier because more time and budget were allowed. However, it (the West Lake Expo) is unprecedented in backward China. I expect this expo to provide a chance for the Chinese to understand Art Deco architecture...the ultimate goal of architectural style is to present the idea of the designer and the national culture. It is not easy, and we have first to introduce Western architecture and then to harmonize the two styles of Western and Chinese architecture. With these works completed, we can go on to create a new style that represents ideas and a new culture (J. Liu, 1929).*

Expos, in Liu's mind, serves as a medium to introduce other more advanced cultures and improve national culture. As it operated as an announcement of urban transformation and social progress, it is not surprising that the decoration and design of the venue should follow the principle of expressing modernity—a directed path for the whole nation moving forward without looking back. In preparing for this expo, modernization of the landscape and roads around the



venue had taken place: houses and tombs were removed in order to make way for road construction and widening. These events were reported in news items like “Houses along the lake are being pulled down for constructing a highroad” (EasternTimes, 1929a), and “The Exhibition of the West Lake Expo is taking positive steps. Those tombs beside Tuan Chiao have already been removed, yielding a path for making a new main street” (EasternTimes, 1929b). In addition, rocky paths on the northern lakeshore were renovated into flat, wider versions with new pavement (NorthChinaDaily, 1934).



Figure 5- 6 Images of two sides of the main entrance to the West Lake Expo. From Hangzhou Archives.

Beside of the environment improvement and the new design, this modernized venue provided another type of leisure activity. The new lighting and the new construction of monuments also signaled the modernization of tourism in this expo. Several new leisure activities and tourism practices—including sightseeing at night and boat tours—took place around the lake during the expo (See Figure 5-7).




Figure 5- 7: Images of night lighting (left) and boat tour (right) on West Lake in the 1929 West Lake Expo. From Hangzhou Archives.

In contrast to pilgrimage-related shopping, this event promoted and encouraged visitors to buy machine-made products instead of those associated with the pilgrim tourism economy. Paper fans, traditional medicine, and hand-made scissors were not the focal products since the expo emphasized the innovation and technology of domestic machine-made products. For example, Tienzhu chopsticks were famous local products made of bamboo from Mt. Tienzhu. But during the West Lake Expo, Tienzhu chopsticks were considered inferior to artificial ivory or plastic ones. As one contemporary advertisement shows below (on the left of Figure 5-8):

*(Grandmas) would bring Tienzhu chopsticks back from their pilgrimage to Hangzhou every year. This year is different, due to the West Lake Expo. Tienzhu chopsticks are not bad, but how to compare them with the artificial ivory ones? You should buy some as souvenirs for friends and relatives; nine out of ten would love them (Shishixinbao, 1929b).*

The other ad (shown below on the right) told visitors, “Tienzhu chopsticks were always popular products for consumers. Since the Expo showcased the chopsticks made from artificial ivory, they have defeated Tienzhu because they are cheaper and sturdier (Shishixinbao, 1929a).” From the information above and the analysis of the museum display of the Gongchen Bridge Area, it is clear to see the change and contrast between historical appreciation, industrial promotion, and the new wave of heritagization. Tienzhu chopsticks were popular souvenirs in the pilgrim economy and tourism, but they went less welcomed as the 1929 Expo promoted industrial advancement over traditional crafts. However, in the era of heritagization, the traditional hand-made products from local materials returned popular in the newly-built museums in Hangzhou and were claimed to be the foundation of the prospering city with the help of the Grand Canal, as explained in Chapter Three.

Figure 5- 8: Left: “Grandma’s Chanting”, from Shishixinbao (1929b). Right: “The Defeated Tienzhu Chopsticks”, from Shishixinbao (1929a).



In sum, the West Lake area in the late 1920s and early 1930s was a nationalist site embedded with economic ambitions and political sentiments. The expo itself was part of a modernization project with new political settings and functioned as an important marker for the progress of the city and the new Chinese nation. It is also an embodiment of modernity, declaring a break with the past Chinese traditional society and culture. The removal of the Manchu settlements and city walls and the renovated lakeshore area with its connection to the newly built New Business Area, as well as the West Lake Expo and venue designs, all indicated the newness of the regime. As for the physical legacy of this expo, only the site of the Industrial Exhibition Hall remains. It now serves as the site of the Museum of the West Lake Expo, including three main parts: World Expos and Chinese society, the 1929 West Lake Expo, and the Successive West Lake Expos. Few Hangzhou people would notice the museum as well as the past event and its stories behind.

### 5.3 Mao’s Heritage Reform

Yet these reiterated or newly created heritage sites were changing and disappearing during the second Sino-Japanese War. In the new era after 1949, they were further fated to be removed or attenuated. One can imagine, under the PRC regime, KMT-related monuments at lakeshore areas were among those removed or gradually demolished, if not being destroyed by the invading Japanese army in the late 1930s.

The PRC did not, however, remove all the tangible and intangible heritage of the city. As mentioned in Chapter Three, A.C. Maxim, a Russian expert, had suggested the city to be planned for tourism and recreation. Followed this urban plan, the southbound cadres of PRC carefully kept and managed the cultural resources in Hangzhou. After the PRC revolution and the “liberation” of Hangzhou, the new regime controlled how and to what extent the city should keep and discard its specific traditions and cultures. The cultural heritage went through several drastic reforms and changes under this new political and economic commands. In this period of time, the city followed the instructions from the state to build an industrial city without social classes, and eventually a center of production rather than a center of consumption (Qian, 2014). As in other parts of the city, as mentioned in Chapter Three, the city developed its socialist economic production plan and assigned each district with different tasks under this guidance. The first “public space” appeared in this period—which is the Wulin Square (called Red Sun Square before renaming in 1978) and became an important center with Hangzhou Theater and Zhejiang Provincial Exhibition Hall.

As religious practices around West Lake were still allowed, these traditions grew much less popular at the time when the armed force People’s Liberation Army (PLA) came to Hangzhou and reformed the monasteries (Gao, 2004). The new regime organized the monks and nuns to a program of “self-support” under the new social order of Chinese communism, rather than depending on donations from worshippers. The goal was part of Mao’s belief in self-reliance. Although the regime did not prohibit religious activities nor demolish religious buildings, it discouraged people from holding religious beliefs. The pilgrimage continued, but it became less influential in the then society and its local religious cultures (Gao, 2004). Not surprisingly, monuments of the KMT martyrs were removed or demolished gradually and no longer be viewed at their original sites.

“Opera reform” best exemplifies how intangible cultural heritage in Hangzhou was preserved but redirected. A local cultural heritage—the Yue Opera (*yueju*)—had been under several attempts to be reformed to fit in the new socialist campaigns and Chinese communist propaganda. According to Gao (2004), the Yue Opera has been featured by soft Zhejiang accent and existing love stories in which the CCP had difficulties in changing the content of them. Therefore, the CCP tried to use street talk show performance to displace the Yue Opera as the latter had more room to revise and to be politicized. Besides, the CCP also encouraged theaters and playwrights to show or produce revolutionary stories. However, since the popularity of the Yue Opera was still high, the CCP even asked to review the script of the performance, and adjusted the storylines to fit the original stories as stories of class struggle and the failure of feudalism. A transition occurred at the Geneva Conference in 1954, the then Premier Enlai Zhou introduced the movie to Western guests: *Liang Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai*, which was initially a story from the Yue Opera. He also mentioned that this opera as one of Chinese cultural heritage. After this event and the success of the movie version of it, the Yue Opera gradually became acceptable by the southbound cadres.

Besides the general aims to develop a socialist city in the Mao era, Hangzhou had its own political task. Mao recognized Hangzhou as his third home (after Hunan and Beijing) and held many informal political gatherings there. Therefore, many cultural facilities and private villas were not destroyed for Mao’s visit or political gathering. This fact gave local leaders chances to have more connections to top leaders, while the former needed supports from the central government (Gao, 2004). From November 1955 to January 1956, Mao stayed in his private villa by the lake, where many tombs of historical figures and heroes. Mao was not satisfied and

complaining: “All around me is tomb” and “There are too many tombs around West Lake; they can be dismantled and moved out to the suburbs and buried there. Can’t the dead also live a collective life?” His words came effective in a short time, and all the tombs surround his dwelling were demolished. This demolition project was supposed to expand to the whole West Lake area but stopped by the State Council of PRC. Mao was not happy about the incompleteness of this project and complained about “being neighbor of the ghosts” when he stayed in Hangzhou in 1964 (Forster, 2019; Z. Zhou, 2016).

Although the West Lake area was not planned as industrialist production, it had been assigned a task to contribute to the economy as its sole beauty was not appreciated in the new society that followed the spirit of Chinese communism: class struggle and self-reliance. Not only the temples mentioned before had to sustain nuns and monks there, but the natural environment would also be appreciated most if it could provide economic value. Therefore, West Lake had been a place for pure leisure, and it should be turned into a place that would benefit economic development under this principle. As a result, the 5.6 km<sup>2</sup> lake became a site for the fishery, and its surrounding mountains became fields of trees, flowers, and herbs for economic value (Qian, 2014). Similar proposals were shown in newspapers in the 1930s, but the formal one was in 1949 to raise 170 thousands of fish to remove the lake grasses and earn revenue (Yu, 1949).

The “plan to reform West Lake,” according to Gao (2004), aimed to turn the city and the lake into productive places while the Communists did not destroy the leisure function of Hangzhou as the role of the back garden of Shanghai. According to Gao (2004), Hangzhou—“the Geneva of the East”—and had kept its urban development at the expense of total industrialization but also prevented the overall destruction of the cultural heritage of Hangzhou during Mao's years. Moreover, the Russian specialist had somewhat prophesied that the city could become a center for international conferences, based on its beautiful landscape and cultural resources.

#### **5.4 Normalizing a Venue City and a City of Virtue: “A Good Host, A Better G20.”**

This was the first time the city would host a global event. China had been ambitious to take a global lead in terms of hosting mega-events. As the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the 2010 Shanghai World Expos, and the Guangzhou Asian Games had all taken place in China, the announcement that Hangzhou would host the 2016 G20 Summit was not wholly surprising. However, the choice of Hangzhou as a host city was beyond many people's expectations: Hangzhou was not one of the most influential cities in China in terms of its economy or political role and had no experience in hosting an international event.

The selection of venue might be related to its tourism, its burgeoning private economy, and its relationship with the current President Xi Jinping, the former Part Secretary of Zhejiang Province. The preparation for this event was also deployed for its urban development, with two main tendencies urban expansion and the increasing investment of suburban Hangzhou since the beginning of the new century. This urban restructuring process has been associated with the housing market, investment in suburban areas, and the strategical expansion to adapt the new urban economy as the SOEs had diminishing roles in the economy since the 1990s and the spaces provided for private investors and business in new service sectors.

One of the indicators of urban expansion and increasing private investment of Hangzhou is the development of the Qianjiang New City, beginning in 2002. This project aims to lead the city to proceed from the “West Lake era to Qiantang River era” (Qian, 2012) and lead another type of urban growth into an underdeveloped area. This developmental trajectory evolved from the historically constrained downtown area. As West Lake and its preservation limit the scope and



building height around the designated area, and as urban expansion and the demand for urban land have become more and more pressing, the municipal government needs to find somewhere else to boost its land economy. Along with the long-term developmental agenda, the 2016 G20 Hangzhou Summit was planned to take place on September 4 and 5 in the Qianjiang New City on the south bank of Qiantang River (Figure 5-10). Instead of in the crowded downtown area, the mega-event would be hosted in the developing areas of the city. The main venue for the 2016 summit was located in the Hangzhou International Expo Center in Xiaoshan District. Thus, the underdeveloped area along the Qiantang River and the city's former northern suburban area have become valuable and easy to develop into modernized urban sites under the accelerating pace.



Figure 5- 9: Image of Qianjiang New City. Screenshots from YouTube video G20 Summit 2016 Opening Gala in Hangzhou [accessed 10 Mar. 2020]

Along with the planned modernization, the Hangzhou government started a series of urban improvement projects. Due to the short time frame to prepare for 2016, this wave of beautification focused on the short-term improvement of façades and building surfaces and the installment of urban furniture. This wave of beautification concentrated on the two banks of the Qiantang River and the main entrances to the city. Its two main focuses were illegal buildings en route to the airport, or close to the summit venues and West Lake, also underwent demolition. During the preparation of this summit, many precious historical buildings were destroyed, including some on the municipal cultural preservation list and some built in the Republican era.<sup>68</sup> Where demolition was urgent, there would be an extra bonus paid to the house owners who cooperated and moved out in the early phase of the process. For example, one policy encouraged dwellers in part of the Jianggang District, the eastern part of downtown Hangzhou, to move out and gave a subsidy to those who did so early and voluntarily before the then-forthcoming 2016

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<sup>68</sup> Interview 20180717, No.145.



G20 summit. This area was not part of the summit venues, nor was it close to West Lake. The urgent reason for demolition: it was unpleasant for visitors on planes to look down at this area<sup>69</sup>.

There is limited information about the scope and number of the series of demolitions and renovations that took place during 2015 and 2016. But according to official news released before the summit, there were 651 infrastructure renovation projects that mainly dealt with “environmental treatment, hotels for state guests, and airport expressways.”(CCTV, 2016) For most citizens, Hangzhou did not change its appearance at all; the event simply helped the city renovate some buildings.<sup>70</sup> In some areas of Hangzhou, however, residents faced large-scale demolition, undertaken for the stated purpose of improving visual integrity. For example, in the Mt. Mantou neighborhood, more than 400 illegal buildings in the residential cluster were demolished, and 1,642 illegal rental units were emptied within approximately 100 days. As the official news report remarked: “the stationary living environment of decades is transforming at a rapid pace” (Du, 2016). The efforts to enhance visual integrity were superficial as many façades were repainted or renovated, but the back of them remained

Thus, the real reason for the demolition was not illegality alone, but the location of the illegal building: an illegal construction in a highly visible location was a problem. The area under severe demolition was about 20 km away from the main venue Hangzhou International Expo Center. Under the name of “Environmental Improvement Project for the G20 Summit,” 5,942 housing units in nine villages in the Qiaosi administration of Yuhang District faced demolition in the first half of 2016 alone (N/A, 2016b, 2016c; Tian, 2016).

The area is located to the east of downtown Hangzhou. It is the main production center for clothing, with 604 enterprises and more than 90% of the local population migrant workers employed in local clothing manufacturing industries. Around 2010, villagers built six-story buildings (each costing approximately 70 to 80 thousand RMB) on borrowed money, specifically for renting to migrant workers. At the time, this type of construction did not violate any regulations. Nevertheless, during the wave of demolitions five or six years later, local authorities claimed they allowed only buildings with fewer than four stories: hence these structures were illegal. Although the demolition project provided compensation to owners, the fine for illegal building per extra m<sup>2</sup> exceeded the compensation; each of them had to pay 100 thousand RMB beyond the amount they were compensated (R. Lin, 2016).

Aside from improvements to the built-up environment, the G20 Summit event also demanded a clear sky to advertise the achievement of environmental governance. The G20 Blue sky was to indicate a ‘campaign-style governance’ that integrated scientific knowledge into policymaking with social scientists (Shen & Ahlers, 2019). It was not the first time China had ordered display of a clear blue sky for such a global event. Olympics Blue (2008) and APEC Blue (2014) in Beijing had shown the world China's determination, as Beijing had long suffered from air pollution, smog, and a bad reputation for its air quality. In preparation for the G20 Summit, China took similar strategies to order pollution-prone firms, such as steel producers to shut down months in advance of the event. The range of regulation was not limited to the Hangzhou metropolitan area but involved hundreds of companies radiating from the center of Hangzhou to neighboring provinces and cities—including the Mt. Yellow area and the famous porcelain production town of Jingdezhen in Jiangxi—outward to four hundred km (J. Jin, 2016).

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<sup>69</sup> Interview 20170805, No.78.

<sup>70</sup> Interview 20180718, No.149.

This regulation also applied to the logistics industry, with levels of controls organized into a designated core area, a strictly controlled area, and a controlled area. Before the summit opened, Hangzhou was named the first city in China without coal-firing production, steel production, and high-emission vehicles (TVBS/FOCUS, 2016).

Another project—the lighting project in Qianjiang New City, the main venue for the 2016 G20 Summit—also expressed modernity and progress to officials and locals alike. More than 100 lighting projects were operated during this event, to display the prosperity of the city and of China and its enhancement on the water pollution protection in Hangzhou. The three main areas of lighting were on the sides of West Lake, the Grand Canal, and the Qiantang River. According to statistics from the public sector, these projects earned a 35% increase in revenue from night-time boat tour tickets compared with the same months from other years (Lighting, 2017). These settings were not temporary for the event; local authorities have kept the projects working since the summit, with the result that the Qiantang River night boat tour now attracts more attention than the downtown canal night boat tour.<sup>71</sup>

The improvement of the urban landscape, air quality, and lighting has changed the visual experience of the city. However, this kind of cosmetic improvement for the city did not bring many positive impacts to ordinary people. For them, the efforts put forward for the event did not improve their daily lives; they merely saved face for the state. These kinds of beautifying projects were locally called “face projects” (*mian-zi-gong-chen*), with reputations as their motive, and their beautification practices were shallow and of surface value. However, for those who are pro-growth, the project has been positive. One official said that the lighting projects for the G20 summit have greatly improved the appearance of Hangzhou and have caused it to be considered a first-rate city. The official added, “since then, we don't have to introduce [Hangzhou] as the city 150 km away from Shanghai” (Lighting, 2017). The beautification projects for the event eventually showed off the city’s new-built beauty and the city’s capacity to emphasize the natural landscape via lighting projects and by tourism planning in the city. Though the target audience for these projects was not the citizens who had paid the price to adapt to this change, their general goals—improvement and beautification—have since been accepted by the residents in the host city. But “face” is not always a derogatory word in such a scenario, as I learned in a chat with a Hangzhou taxi driver. He recognized my non-local accent and asked where I was from. I told him I was from Taiwan. He then turned proud and told me that he was satisfied with the recent development of Hangzhou. He believed Hangzhou would grow even faster and better than it already had, with large financial subsidies from the central government and revenues from local states. When he asked me about urban development in Taiwan, and I replied that it was smaller and slower than the current pace in Hangzhou (as Hangzhou was growing and expanding dramatically), he was thrilled and readily dismissed Taiwan as just one of China’s provinces. I was not surprised by his words, as I had encountered similar conversations. I asked the taxi driver about the G20 Summit and the forthcoming 2022 Asian Game in Hangzhou, and he said,

*China would build brand new venues and a metro system for these events... China always builds new even though there are existing and functional buildings around...as you see in Beijing (for the 2008 Olympic Games), Hangzhou (for the 2016 G20 Summit), and Guangzhou (for the 2012*

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<sup>71</sup> Interview 20170727, No.49.

*Asian Games) ...all of these are about 'face' ...if these events were domestic, then there wouldn't ever be new venues or infrastructure.<sup>72</sup>*

Many Hangzhou citizens I encountered felt proud of their state and city as both had the ability and power to save face. Meanwhile, even though the event-driven urban beautification project was drastic in terms of its control over logistics and work-school-leisure arrangement, this event itself seemed not profoundly affecting most people in Hangzhou. The expelled and permanently excluded group was low-income migrant workers as illegal housing, such as the rent-sharing unit and street stands, were no longer allowed.<sup>73</sup> Considering the numerous demolition projects of the Qiaosi and Mt. Mantou neighborhoods, Hangzhou was pushing out those who could only afford to live in these areas or illegal housing units for a two-day event. This fact suggests that the city is under a social and spatial upgrading and exclusion process. At the same time, the event and the beautification projects speed up the transformation with the emphasis to save face. Though both events advocated nationalism, in comparison with the West Lake Expo in the last century, the G20 Summit promoted the city on a global scale while seeking a more profound social transformation. The West Lake Expo aimed to redirect national culture while improving the national economy. Addressing political progress and industrial advancement, the West Lake Expo paid little attention to the social-engineering function that mega-events might ask.

Aside from the beautification and normalization of the changes that resulted from the event, propaganda promoted the city's "tradition of civility." The first strategy was to awaken nationalist sentiment in citizens to share the pride and prosperity of being the host city for the nation. This strategy, though, was not undertaken by advocating patriotism directly in propaganda. It started as a reminder for Hangzhou people to practice the way Hangzhou has traditionally been to its guests. The rhetoric went like this: Hangzhou has long been a tourism city that welcomes guests from all over the world. The official slogan of the G20 event was "A good host, a better G20" (办好 G20，当好东道主), and the rationale implied of being a "good" host drew on two concerns—security and "face"—to ensure guests' safety and enjoyment.



Figure 5- 10: Image of the poster saying, "A good host, a better G20". Photography by the author.

<sup>72</sup> Interview 20180718, No.150.

<sup>73</sup> Interview 20170727, No.49.

Beyond ideological promotion, the second strategy was to create a series of social programs to celebrate civility and hospitality. Local authorities and news channels focused on these good virtues as belonging to Hangzhou residents' heritage and then promoted them through several campaigns and programs in the name of hospitality—an even softer appeal than nationalism or patriotism. Enthusiastic volunteers joined programs to support the events' progress. For example, programs aimed at the G20 Summit, such as English learning, training for taxi drivers, and volunteer programs for retired citizens and college students, provided opportunities for locals to become part of the event. More than 26,000 school and college students applied to be volunteers in the G20 Summit, with 6,000 chosen after the first selection round. According to two student volunteers from Zhejiang University, the training courses included English conversational skills, Chinese culture, and inside information about the event and the venues. Students were eager to be part of the event because it gave them a rare chance to see global leaders in the flesh. In addition, it took place during the summer break, so most students were available for the training. In other words, they were designed not only to support the event and its guests but also to teach local people how to brand the city to others.

During this 'event campaign,' civility and politeness were stressed as essential to 'being a good host.' This social program worked for reminding the hosts to be friendly and to be more aware of the connection between Hangzhou and the other part of the world, which is oversimplified as the other developed countries. As Ann Anagnost (1997) suggests, the rhetoric of "civilization" fits in post-Mao national imaginary to transform social subjects into the disciplined and orderly labor force. In the post-Mao period, as market reform has changed the direction of the state, the state thus emphasizes the significance of ration and how social subjects can follow it to regulate human nature, which is often dominated by irrational tendencies. In this sense, nature suggests uncultivated tendencies that should be governed by policies or social norms. The civility campaign in Hangzhou did ask social subjects to follow a particular rule and discipline. However, the different parts lay on the naturalization part of the civility in the case of Hangzhou. One of my informants told me these campaigns for promoting civility were nothing new:

*Hangzhou has been a tourism city, and Hangzhou's people are used to visitors and are always generous, friendly, and polite to them...G20 Summit just reinforced this disposition ...since the municipal government asked us to be 'civil and courteous' to the guests.<sup>74</sup>*

It is interesting that although the speaker was aware of the instructions newly issued from local authorities, she nevertheless believed that the hospitality she was trained to display in this event was also a natural propensity of "Hangzhou people." As the making civility in Chinese society is suggested as a denaturalizing process, this social program tended to implant the idea of the inherited nature of Hangzhou people.

The propaganda also emphasized the historical origins of the hospitality and cosmopolitanism of people in Hangzhou. For example, the designer of the event logo (a professor from China Academy of Art in Hangzhou) used "bridge" as a conceptual representation, expressing that Hangzhou was made famous for its many bridges in the 13<sup>th</sup> century when Marco Polo visited and called it "the city of a thousand bridges." Besides, the

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<sup>74</sup> Interview 20170730, No. 57.

bridge image represents the connection and dialog between East and West. According to the logo designer, the bridge on the logo is composed of 20 lines, representing the 20 members meeting at the summit. The red seal represents the promise and also expresses the cultural component in Chinese traditional culture (N/A, 2016a; Q. Wu & Sun, 2018). This overall image of the logo and the symbolic meanings of the bridge indicate a balanced relationship “authorized” by the host state—China.




Figure 5- 11 Image of the event logo. From the official G20 website:  
<http://www.g20chn.org/English/China2016/Logo/> [accessed 10 Mar. 2020]

The other way of being a good host, in contrast, is not very “welcoming.” The third strategy was strict regulations on citizens and visitors regarding commuting and logistics. One month before the event, the city was filled with checkpoints in every public space and hotels. In early July 2016, with two months until the summit, a local friend and I boarded a bus from Xiaoshan District to downtown Hangzhou. With a straight face, the bus driver asked me to open my backpack. Residents remembered ever since security checks in the subway have been reinforced.<sup>75</sup>

Fieldwork in the summer of 2016 felt different from other field trips during 2015, 2017, and 2018. That summer, I was staying in a hotel near the Gongchen Bridge, a place I had stayed in before. This hotel was 8 km away from the downtown area and 13.5 km from the main venue of the summit and with the Qiantang River separating the two areas. At this visit, when I checked in, the front desk staff paid particular attention to my travel permit because I was not a domestic traveler with Chinese identification. As a traveler from Taiwan, I used the mainland travel permit for Taiwan residents (MTP) rather than an international passport as my identification. This document and my background created, in the clerk’s eyes, an in-between social and political identity. From the perspective of Chinese people, I was not indeed a “foreigner” since they believed Taiwan was part of China, and I did speak Mandarin Chinese and looked like just one of them. Yet that night, about 10 p.m., I received a phone call from the front desk to check if I was the holder of the MTP and to ask how many people were staying with me in my room. In addition to late-night phone calls, at the same hotel, staff were checking passports and IDs on each floor at the elevator entrance every morning and evening. This check was not for me alone

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<sup>75</sup> Interview 20180728, No.167.



but for all people staying in the hotel. However, this experience with frequent checks during commuting is impressive and unprecedented.

In addition to scrutiny of all outside visitors, the Hangzhou city government applied strict regulations to its citizens and temporary residents. Hangzhou municipal government, under the permission of State Council and Zhejiang Provincial Government, announced in late June of 2016 that, except for positions required to run the Summit, public sector and private sector employees in Shangcheng, Xiacheng, Jianggan, Gongshu, Xihu, Bingjian, Xiaoshan, Yuhang, and Fuyang would be given a holiday for the entire first week of September (see Figure 2-5). Moreover, during the period of the summit, citizens were encouraged to travel outside the city. A quarter of the city's population went for tourist breaks outside of Hangzhou, with their identification cards allowing them to travel to neighboring provinces and scenic areas at discounted prices. This tourism was called as "being sent on tourism" by Chinese—since it was not totally voluntary, given the fact of the half shut down of the functions of the city. The Zhejiang Tourism Bureau, along with 11 other cities, held a tourism fair—"Welcome G20 Summit, Depart from Hangzhou to explore the Poetic Zhejiang"—and released 10 billion RMB to promote tourism outside the city (L. Xin, 2016). This pro-tourism policy also changed tourism practices for Hangzhou locals. For example, the famous scenic area Mt. Yellow City in Anhui province, 200 km away from Hangzhou, created a promotion for Hangzhou residents, college students, and temporary residents, offering them free entry to Mt. Yellow's 55 scenic areas. Between September 1 and September 5, almost 146,000 tourists visited the site; 102,000 of them were from Hangzhou (Dong, 2016). Local authorities also ordered migrant workers holding temporary Hangzhou working-permits to leave the city; some of these workers had already gone home because many of their employers had shut down workplaces or business due to "environmental concerns or safety." Dissidents and potential troublemakers on record were "invited" to suburban areas by police to participate in rural tourism (*non-jia-le*, 农家乐) under supervision (CentralNewsAgency, 2016).<sup>76</sup>

A key point here, articulated to me by several middle-aged Hangzhou residents, is that they did not enjoy travel. Many of these informants have experience abroad, but they would have preferred to stay in Hangzhou. One concern was the need to spend money on tourism, for a generation of Chinese who would feel guilty for indulging in this kind of leisure.<sup>77</sup> Another reason was simply that Hangzhou's people believed they already had everything worth visiting within their city: the lake, the river, and mountains. They did not need to go "outside" to explore these natural landscapes. This attitude also contributed to the cultural confidence I often saw in older Hangzhou people. The irony that people in this famous tourist city had to leave their homes in order to greet guests was not lost on locals, who invented a sarcastic slogan to echo the official one: "An expelled host, a better G20" (赶走东道主，办好 G20) when describing the relationship between hosts and guests for this event.

This city is still one that hosts tourists, but now the most numerous and most welcomed guests are not "grandma pilgrims" or middle-class tourists from Shanghai, but international tourists. As the three strategies had been applied to the reordering of Hangzhou society, these experiences during the event were spread out on cyberspaces rather than physical public spaces. For Chinese citizens, there had been only official sources of information from mass media, and

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<sup>76</sup> Interview 20180612, No.162.

<sup>77</sup> Interview 20170817, No.113.

the lack of public debates and the strict censorship provided little room for public speech. Studies of the Chinese netizens, emerging internet citizens, show how the “new opinion class”<sup>78</sup> is influencing the state-society relation of contemporary China. As an experienced host state, China has been shutting down online forums during mega-events as in the 2008 Beijing Olympics Games (Qiang, 2011). Same in the case of G20 Hangzhou Summit, local online forums and that of local universities were shut down during the G20 Summit days for unexplained reasons.

Despite the event requesting local participation and welcoming gestures to foreign guests, random citizens were not welcome in both the preparation and the event itself. Hangzhou netizens, emerging internet citizens, expressed their objections and disagreement online, and cyberspaces became areas where isolated audience members and netizens could discuss and debate the event. From the voices of Hangzhou netizens, other netizens could understand what was happening in the frenzied hosting city. Even though under the strict control and censorship, some dissonant opinions leaked from personal blogs. Since a collectively and liberally public realm, whether physical or virtual, is not foreseeable, random speech by netizens becomes not only the voice but also the indicator to see the boundary between acceptable public speech and something in violation of the laws. A famous critique, also the only available one, was on a personal blog: Enping Guo, a public servant, working in a street office in Taizhou, Zhejiang province, titled a July 15 post “Hangzhou, shame on you.” He criticized the summit preparations for overspending, privilege politics, and went on to comment on the state’s lack of confidence:

*I haven't visited beautiful Hangzhou City this year but often hear about the city and its preparation for the G20 Summit. All streets are undergoing renovation, roofs brightened, shops beautified. More astonishing, the government is paying ten thousand RMB to each household around the main venue and ask them to leave the city for tourism... Of course, Hangzhou is not a place where you can just go as you wish...The natural appearance of Hangzhou is a paradise on earth, and no other city can compare with it, and it is the pride of our country....If hosting an event [means] paying the price of disturbing people, everyday life, and the normal social order, then the event is doomed to failure before it starts. There is a saying we have learned since we were children: the benefit of the state is the top priority. This saying implies that what benefits ordinary people has no value...Why don't you, Hangzhou, welcome the world with your natural look and just take it easy?*

According to the post, Hangzhou people had endured disturbance over their everyday lives while the visitors were supposed not to see the real Hangzhou—or the city in the “back region”. As mentioned earlier, those face projects were of no substantial contribution but as part of the lesson for Hangzhou people to decorate their homes to the guest as a gesture to show their inherited civility and hospitality. In this post, Hangzhou did not represent as a friendly city to its residents at that point, and its appreciated natural beauty was lost in the rapid beautification projects for another promoted image of the city.

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<sup>78</sup> Cited from Qiang (2011) and the original source is from Zhu Huaxin, Shan Xuegang, and Hu Jiangchun, “2009 China Internet Public Opinion Analysis Report,” in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “2010 Society Blue Paper,” 22 Dec. 2009.

This post attracted great concerns from local authorities as it was traveling over the Internet and was no doubt a sensitive one for censorship. Guo was under investigation by July 20 and then arrested on July 21, “charged of using the Internet for “pick quarrels and provoke trouble.” He was simultaneously fired from his job for the same reason. The crime Guo was accused of was that he made “groundless” claims about the budget, even though the actual information and budget numbers were inaccessible to verify if his claims were true or false (Zeng, 2016). According to another news report, one journalist living in Hangzhou refused an interview because he believed that talking about the event could lead to treatment similar to Guo’s (Creaders.net, 2016). When I was collecting information, especially the negative comments from locals, several informants friendly reminded me to write “safe” comments on these projects (environment improvement, urban renewal, and heritagization) to avoid breaking the laws and getting into trouble. They told me how fast the net-army could be under its censorship, and it was only a mild reminder of deleting the online post. However, instead of just watching, filtering, and deleting the posts in the pre-G20 period, the Hangzhou government created an online bulletin, called the “Zone to Break the Rumors,” to clarify where rumors spreading on the Internet.

The seemingly safe and open cyberspace was not a welcoming place for speech anymore. As mentioned above, public speech and gathering on public space around the Grand Canal has been limited due to the event. Now on-line forums are more restricted and controlled. For personal security, netizens chose to be silent at the time for public security over the Internet.

### **5.5 The Spectacle, Spectators, and Netizens**

Most of my interviewees on the “back region”, when asked to recall their G20 experiences and the inconvenience that resulted from this event, admitted the disturbance, but seldom were these docile Hangzhou people willing to say more about the event. It was clearly dangerous to express opinions freely that would challenge the legitimacy of the nation. The most commonly reported negative experiences were all similar in character: frequent security checks, the closing of online forums, school closings, or being asked to leave their workplace or residence. This inconvenience was trivial and thus tolerable, especially the mega-event was temporary.

For the invited visitors on the “front region”, during their leisure time from meeting, they and their dependents were arranged to visit heritage sites and go shopping for local silk products. Some of them visited museums at the Qiaoxi museum cluster. As one staff in the Workmanship Demonstration Pavilion Museum reported, those guests were invited to visit some special handcraft products designed for this event, such as leather carved national flags of the attendants 20 countries, and a “G20 teapot” made of mineral materials in Hangzhou.<sup>79</sup> In the Hangzhou Arts and Crafts Museum, the dependents of those global leaders were led to see the “Flower of West Lake”—which was a silk umbrella representing the traditional handicraft in Hangzhou.<sup>80</sup> This event tourism is distinguished from traditional tourism since it was not a repetitive custom as pilgrimage tourism. However, it was not similar to the 1929 Expo. As the 1929 Expo pursued more on a new national culture and discarded the backward traditions, the 2016 Summit instead displayed traditional cultures in the context of globalization and heritagization.

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<sup>79</sup> Interview 20170727, No.50.

<sup>80</sup> Interview 20180727, No.164.

One thing that was shared between people on both the back and front regions was the gala on West Lake. Residents shared uniformly positive experiences and memories of the opening gala of the Hangzhou G20 Summit. They told me: “If you go to West Lake, do go to watch the show: Impression West Lake.” This show is a replica of the summits’ opening gala. A month before the G20 event, the city had already been under the strictest supervision. As the event came closer, even fewer people were staying in Hangzhou. West Lake, the most popular site throughout Hangzhou's tourist year, emptied out, and its scenic area would be closed from August 20 to September 6. As the summit was approaching, West Lake’s scenic area was closed with a lot of security guards and police to ensure the “absolute safety.”<sup>81</sup> Though the lake and its surrounding area were not used for meetings, several hotels around West Lake accommodated global leaders. For people living within the area, local authorities outlawed cooking with gas stoves around West Lake (CitizenPowerinChina, 2016). Also, people living in this area were asked to close their windows and to always turn their stoves off for the duration, with monetary subsidies paid to cover air conditioning.<sup>82</sup>

West Lake, the face of the city, was part of the opening concert spectacle. The authority in charge of West Lake’s protection was concerned about the protection of the WH site. At that time, West Lake already had been designated a WH site, but it was nevertheless selected as the site for this opening gala. Several preservationists and scholars came to lobby against this proposal, but they were “invited to have an informal chat” by the municipal government, which implied a soft warning and formalization of the proposal. As one of them described: “we had turned silent for the preparation for the performance after knowing it had been permitted.”<sup>83</sup> The soft objection from cultural preservation did not change the decision at all, and after the show, few people asked about the negative impacts the show might have caused. This fact supports and further supplement the discussion of cultural elites in cultural preservation. The cultural elites were the only group that spoke up for the concern for negative impact and challenged the instruction from the central government in a soft manner. However, as experienced cultural promoters, protests, and experts, they were sensitive enough to stop their lobbying and secure their positions and future chances to cooperate with preservation projects (Yao & Han, 2016).

The compromised stage was set on the Yuehu Lake area on the northwest corner of the lake (see Figure 5-4) because the water area there was the smallest; the “impacts” of the show would thus also be smaller. Though the most famous theme of the lake was the “Ten Scenes”<sup>84</sup> but as a negotiation concerning the performance and the protection, this proposed site was “still meaningful culturally” for its proximity to “the Jade Belt Bridge”—one of the “Eighteen Scenes of West Lake” during the Ming dynasty<sup>85</sup>.

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<sup>81</sup> Interview 20180717, No.145.

<sup>82</sup> Interview 20180612, No.162.

<sup>83</sup> Interview 20180717, No.145

<sup>84</sup> Ten Views of West Lake” was first mentioned in the Southern Song dynasty, including: “Sunset on Leifeng Pagoda,” “Evening Bell from Nanping Hill,” “Lotus Breeze at Qu Winery,” “Remnant Snow on Broken Bridge”; “Autumn Moon above the Placid Lake,” “Spring Dawn at Su Causeway,” “Listening to the Orioles by the Willow Ripples,” “Watching Fish at Flower Cove,” “Twin peaks piercing the Clouds,” “Three Stupas and the Reflecting Moon.”

<sup>85</sup> Interview 20180801, No.170.



Figure 5- 12: Images of the nightscape of West Lake. Screenshots from YouTube video G20 Summit 2016 Opening Gala in Hangzhou [accessed 10 Mar. 2020]

Yimou Zhang was the chief director of the G20 show and he also directed the opening ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 2014 APEC Reception in Beijing. The theme of the gala performance was “Hangzhou, A Living Poem.” Though the performance and its related fireworks were not open to the public, these were broadcast on live TV channels and websites. In contrast to the tight social controls and the closure of most public areas leading up to the event, the outdoor opening gala was definitely a spectacle welcoming to the majority of Chinese and Hangzhou people, even those who were being directly prevented from approaching West Lake at that time. The platform was set in the lake, 3 mm below the water’s surface; the design made the lake itself the background and the stage where performers and dancers moved with the splash of water. The one-hour show included nine programs in the integrated Chinese and Western forms of art: symphony orchestra, ballet dance, folk dance, Yue Opera, vocals, a poetry reading, Chinese zither and cello ensemble, and piano solo. This “fusion” on a WH site provided the cosmopolitan gestures to the audience while holding some Chinese elements. For example, the image of “bridge” in Chinese style—either the one projected to the audience as part of the stage setting or the “Jade Belt Bridge” repeated to appear in several programs, as the picture collage shows below (Figure 5-13).

This image is different from that in the 1929 Expo. The West Lake Expo Bridge shown in Figure 5-5, instead, worked as part of the modern construction to rearrange the venue. However, in the gala of the 2016 G20 Summit, the bridge only worked as part of the background for the performance, as West Lake was not a venue but the stage for this event. Compared to the 1929 West Lake Expo, when heritage representation had been less stressed as the “modern” monuments and buildings had, the concert in the 2016 G20 Summit shows the confidence to set



Chinese heritage in front of the audience. The Republican government sought to reform its national culture while accomplishing its political tasks and regarded its own culture as backward and regressive.



Figure 5- 13: Images of Jade Belt Bridge and the stage set on the lake. Screenshots from YouTube video G20 Summit 2016 Opening Gala in Hangzhou [accessed 10 Mar. 2020]

The whole situation had been changed in 2016. The ultimate goal of this gala was to express “China’s style and cosmopolitan nature,” so the director designed the program to incorporate Chinese and Western masterpieces, to show China's cultural confidence and ambition to dominate world politics (F.-c. Chang, 2016). Zhang explained that the music such as Swan Lake, and Symphony No.9 by Beethoven in the form of orchestra chosen because they are all “universal language,” just like the summit, “where the world has dialogues with each other and works towards progress together”(Nan, 2016). As this decade, Chinese cultural heritage in Hangzhou is not evaluated by its use for tourism or social reform, and productivities but its performativity, which leads, however, to modernity.

The show was designed not only for the international audience but also for the domestic audience as well. For the international audience, the night breeze and the Chinese music from the south were smooth and delightful. The performances on the lake, and their setting, expressed the serenity of the Jiangnan landscape. The lighting and choreography of the performance emphasized the water as an important symbol of Hangzhou.

Besides, to have a closer look at the programs, the Yue Opera is the one which mostly connected to the host city. The plot performed is from Lian Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai, which had been shown as part of the entertainment in an international conference in Geneva in 1954. At that time, Zhou Enlai suggested the title to be “the Chinese Romeo and Juliet” to convey its resemblance to the Western tragedy love story to the foreign audience who did not get the context of the original story. However, in this gala, the plot was titled “The Butterfly Lovers,” which is more fitting to the original story rather than to be a counterpart of another story in different historical and social contexts. Moreover, this time China did not need to decipher the story from Yue Opera since this time, Hangzhou was the host entity, also the center of Yue Opera performance. It is noticeable that the combination of elements has shifted significantly

from the 1929 Expo. Now China is displaying the advancement of its national culture, and this time the main concern is not of cultural “backwardness” that had then worried architect Jipiao Liu and other reformers in the late 1920s.

Out of curiosity and based on repeated suggestions from informants, I watched the clip from China Zhejiang TV on a media-services provider—LE TV. I discovered that the enjoyment of watching the clip not only allowed me to watch the beautiful and spectacular show; that medium also allowed me to see the debates, agreements, and comments on bullet-screens. Bullet-screen is a feature embedded on video strips, allowing audience-members to respond in typed comments to the show's progress in real-time. While I should note that I have no way to know if these reviews and comments were screened or sanitized, reading the remaining comments is nevertheless illuminating. Many netizens described the scene—the show and the audience in this global leaders’ meeting—as referencing ancient forms of tribute and China’s traditional role as the receiver of tribute and viewer of spectacle, and they were proud to see this image. They expressed delight in the display of national pride and China’s soft power. They also evaluated the Chinese nation and Chinese cultures from the view of host-guest relations. Netizens debated whether foreign guests would understand the content of each program since grasping the meaning of some of them would require cultural and historical references. Some rude comments were posted, arguing that foreigners (they used the word “barbarians”) would never understand the core of Chinese culture and that this cultural superiority saved face for China and augured a positive future path for China and Hangzhou.

The most conflict-prone comments related to expenditure for the event and the display of wealth. Simply put, these comments asked whether all the efforts, regulations and even the concert itself were designed solely to “save face.” Some proponents were arguing that it is the soft power that grants China to show its face without guilty. Opponents were defending for other social issues and the financial and social expenses for this event. Their disagreements, however, were soon “harmonized” (*hexie*, or the internet term as river-crabbed) as they were entering the series of spectacles. Netizens expressed excitement about the foreseeable prosperous boom in tourism in Hangzhou and praised the city for its beautiful natural landscape as well as its burgeoning internet-related business.

West Lake spectacle in the era of heritagization carried not only nationalist sentiments. Moreover, it was a spectacle and the “means of modernity” (Appadurai, 1996). As mentioned earlier, West Lake is the “face” of Hangzhou, but in this event, it worked more than a face. It could dominate the direction of modernity in the event from the perspective of global cultural flows. Modernity, as Appadurai suggests, is a way in which a society toward globalizing progress. Through cultural flows in the making of ethnoscaples, mediascaples, technoscaples, financescaples, and ideoscaples (Appadurai, 1996, p. 33), globalization promises not a homogenization process but a de-territorialized experience. However, if this event was an attempt to connect the city and the globalized development, this cultural event shows a synergy of these cultural flows locally rather than being de-territorialized. In contrast, the social process in the host city asked citizens to appreciate their cultural roots and transform themselves into modern beings. Those virtues of the hosts, cultural resources, and the ability to commute through cultural performance on a WH site have made this tourism city are ready for the next step, as the propaganda and the gala suggested.

In short, with the proceeding of the event, the debates over event expense, economic power, cultural superiority, local pride, and nationalism were distilled into a rosy harmonic picture about the past and the future of the city and the nation. Most locals were not allowed to

attend in person—nor were they even able to walk the city’s streets freely during the two days of the summit—but they watched the concert as a way to feel substantially involved in the event and to satisfy their curiosity for the engrossing event. For the Hangzhou residents, the city was achieving global visibility and showing off cultural traditions, and beautiful landscape viewers considered superior to those of other first-rate cities. The show not only provided a sense of pride; it also helped ease months of social tension between the Hangzhou people and the authorities. For the domestic audience outside Hangzhou, these performances conveyed a message of cultural superiority and economic power—that this beautiful performance could happen in a second-rate city was refreshing to a Chinese audience. Non-Hangzhou residents appreciated the city’s role in this event, and they felt proud to be part of the Chinese nation. Those who had not previously recognized this rising city felt proud as well.

### **5.6 The Staged City Awaiting the Next Moment**

At the completion of the G20 Summit, the common public theme was happiness. Hangzhou's people were delightful because the event’s success predicted a promising future for the city, not to mention its closing meant going back to a normal life rhythm. Officials were happy because the summit succeeded in enhancing the status of Hangzhou: “Before this summit, only Beijing, Shanghai, Xi-an, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen were internationally known. After this summit, more and more people learned that there is a Hangzhou city in China. Not to mention that Hangzhou is gifted with West Lake.”<sup>86</sup> One thing observers shared in common: they believed that the G20 Summit did not change, create, or transform the city, but merely reinforced the propensity and the “human nature” of Hangzhou people. As to the regulation and control of air and water quality, in those respects, the city is improving in the wake of the event, and the city's aesthetics and urban afforestation are also improved as a result.

After the G20 Summit was over, on September 7, 2016, Hangzhou’s municipal party committee and municipal government addressed to its citizens a thank-you note for their cooperation during the event:

*Dear fellow citizens and friends,*

*The attention-attracting G20 Hangzhou Summit has successfully come to an end. We want to express our gratitude and respect to all of you citizens. Because of you, Hangzhou fulfilled the task of planning for the summit peacefully and showed domestic and international guests the tastes and sights of the city...Providing service and protection for this event is an important political task and a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for development. This year, citizens as a group actively devoted themselves to the preparation work with the belief “A good host, a better G20” ... fully demonstrated the spirit of the city: delicacy, harmony, tolerance, and openness... Thank you for your participation and your selfless contribution to making ‘the beautiful Hangzhou city.’ Thank you for considering the situation as a whole over your personal interest, and thank you for caring for the safety and peace of the city. The world applauds Hangzhou! ...The post-summit era of Hangzhou has come...*

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<sup>86</sup> Interview 20180717, No.145

*The summit's success will become a new start for Hangzhou in internationalization...*

*PRC Hangzhou Municipal Party Committee*

*Hangzhou municipal government*

*September 7, 2016*

This post indicates several elements implied in modernity: the chance for development, progress, image-making, and the mentality of being civil and tolerant. It is not without irony to see municipal leaders celebrate the event as “glory for the people” despite the reality that those people had limited mobility, if not totally absent, from the scene during that specific period of time. This “sacrifice” not only represented the cooperative attitudes Hangzhou people had but also a price for the pursuit of modernity—a new social and cultural experience that might discard the ordinary aspect of the city. Only those belonging to the spectacle will be presented in this staged city, indicating a bright future ahead.

It seems a happy ending for the city and also good mental and physical “prep” for the citizens as they look toward another mega-event forthcoming: the 2022 Asian Games. As people in the city grow increasingly aware of the impacts of these mega-events, the current time period between 2016 and 2022 is generally known as the pre-Asian Game or the post-G20 era, indicating foreseeable controls and restrictions will be further normalized.

Hangzhou is seizing all opportunities to showcase its urban development and its cultural heritage. Recent and forthcoming “achievements” are attaining a heritage listing for Liangzhu Archaeological Ruin and winning the bid to host the 2022 Asian Games. In many people’s aspiration, the city is close to becoming a first-rate city to be aligned with Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, competing with other powerful second-rate cities such as Nanking, Chengdu, and Chongqing. For the preparation of the Asian Games, the city has already started a series of demolition projects targeting more than 100 urban villages, mostly centered in the northern part of the city.

As a city limited in size and with an economy that has been developed in a relatively short period of time, Hangzhou wields its cultural heritage as a powerful weapon for the city: the city can show its distinguished nature as prosperous and welcoming, both in its natural and its cultural environments. We can see in this chapter, cultural heritage sites appearing, disappearing, and reappearing according to assigned political and social tasks over the past century. In both the 1929 Expo and the 2016 Summit, West Lake functioned as the face of the city, but it represents different modernities and aspirations of the city’s future. With the experience of these moments, the city is moving forward to gain global and national exposure and, at the same time, digging into its past and its historical legacy as it prepares for the next event. For the city's residents, the making of a tourism city is not only about leisure activities; it is also about the impact of those activities (and the focal mega-events that now partly drive the city's development agenda) on residents' everyday experiences, and about residents' experiences of adjusting to these pivotal moments.

## Chapter 6: Heritage Gives Birth to Modernity

Heritagization, urban renewal, deindustrialization, museum development, gentrification, and mega-event hosting incorporate modernity—a new social and cultural order and experience. As these projects aimed to improve local environments and development, they became tools for social engineering, excluding some localities, memories, and social groups once attached to them.

After Hangzhou hosted the G20 Summit in 2016, the city did not pause in its expansion. It immediately aimed to renovate itself for the upcoming 2022 Asian Games and has already laid out its urban agenda concerning the event. Local authorities and citizens refer to this period as the “post-G20 and pre-Asian Games period” as a milestone of Hangzhou’s urban development. The pursuit of modernity has come with its schedule that has guided citizens to be prepared for the upcoming event and the association civilization, social education, and new order it will bring. Compared to the G20 Summit, the preparation time given for hosting the Asian Games is much longer, leading citizens to expect more influential urban projects thanks to the event.

Moreover, the prosperous city image has enhanced a collective identity of being hosts in a tourism city. However, this study indicates that heritagization of the Grand Canal and the G20 summit hosting have harmonized social and cultural dissonance by inclusion and exclusion. The canal neighborhoods located on rural lands and Hangzhou’s boat people were not deemed worthy of fitting into WH discourse and practice. Instead, the museum boom, gentrification, heritage tourism, the civility program, and developmentalism are more characteristic of the exclusive nature of heritagization. Heritagization can be understood as three continuous but slightly overlapped processes, and each indicates lessons of modernity.

### 6.1 Dying Heritage and Urban Projects bound for Modernization

The first process is that historical relics become “dead” or lose original functions, and the general public and cultural elites do not see values of relics. This process echoed economic modernization, which followed the priority to strengthen economic and efficiency. In this case, the canal had been polluted by SOEs, and water transportation became secondary to land traffic.

Before the early 2000s, Hangzhou followed the linear modernity in which the overall goal was to further nationalism and Chinese civilization by designated pedagogical approaches. The promotion of this type of modernity comes from national to local governments, aiming to fulfill economic modernization. This type of modernity project focuses on the visual display and formalization of heritage artifacts (museums, social education, and sanitization). More importantly, it reminds the Chinese of their civilization’s final goal. It believes that the right parts and positive features of heritage will continue to function since the “survived” heritage has undergone social, cultural, and political competition and selection—not unlike Darwin’s survival of the fittest notion. Analysis of heritage and Hangzhou in the Republican era shows that the KMT regime sought to correct and “modernize” the “old” China.

By eliminating “backward” traditions such as prostitution and handcraft industries, and erecting monuments and hosting mega-events, republican politicians imagined a brand-new national culture. The PRC, in its early years, still followed a similar modernity strategy after having defeated the KMT. It proposed another modernity based on Marxist theories of class and Chinese society’s progression under socialism. Several nationalist symbols around West Lake were relocated or demolished, and the lake itself was used for agriculture and fishing. During that period, the three canal neighborhoods represented the golden years of industrial modernity in



which Hangzhou—especially what is now known as the Gongshu District—developed into an industrial powerhouse. The canal neighborhoods in Hangzhou were densely populated lowlands, and residents, including SOE workers, villagers, and boat people, had little chance to leave.

Before the mid-1980s, the canal was of little social and cultural importance in the face of Chinese development—not to mention that the working sections were heavily polluted by the SOEs. Indeed, some sections were buried to make way for urban construction and infrastructure. The Grand Canal drew attention in the 1980s from its use as part of the SNWT project to serve a new political and ecological task. It began to represent a modernity reflective of technological and economic development, and the cultural aspect of the canal was not appreciated as much as the economic and political ones. Beginning in the early 2000s, urban expansion, urban renewal, and the following improvement projects concerning heritage preservation and the promotion of local culture reflected the pursuit of “heritage modernity”—a set of new social, cultural, and spatial experiences for residents of, and visitors to, Hangzhou. This modernity was co-constructed by the central and local states and promoted cultural modernization.

Similarly, while the final goal was cultural and economic modernization, the means to reach it were not the same as with linear modernity. Instead, heritage modernity featured social and cultural processes under economic and spatial restructuring: deindustrialization, urban renewal, social engineering, heritage tourism, and mega-events. Through this cultural and social practice, Hangzhou owned several localities with differentiated modernization levels and prepared a path to modernity where cultural achievement formed part of the state-building project relating to the reshaping of local histories.

## **6.2 Social-engineering and the Excluding Urban Process**

The second process is often known as heritage preservation, in which the disappearance, loss, or the changes of heritage arouses attention, awareness, and evaluation from authorities and cultural elites. After a series of experts’ examination and arrangement, it becomes a target for an authorized/official preservation of a specific time and space. In the presented study, cultural elites started to advocate the Grand Canal’s state nomination to the WH Center. During the preparation, the Grand Canal became a potential collective asset. Since it might bring investment and development during the preparation, local states supported and took advantage of this nomination. During this process, the Chinese state shaped the “AHD,” the authorized heritage discourses, emphasizing how the canal helps transportation, communication, exchange, and economic prosperity along the route and has contributed to the Chinese state’s unity.

This study proposes that the urban process and heritagization of the Grand Canal and later the whole city reveal two kinds of modernities: linear and heritage modernity. Heritage preservation provides a one-way path to modernity and an evolving one—heritage modernity—embedded within urban agendas and social-engineering projects.

Heritage modernity refers to a regressive pattern, or mode, to reach the promised future from selected points in the past. Nonetheless, as this study demonstrates, it also excludes contemporary social and cultural elements, and processes, that are considered obstacles to progress. The selection and exclusion elements of the discussions concerning heritage are often linked to discussions of authenticity and originality. As discussed in the introductory chapter, heritage evaluation is disciplinarily biased. Furthermore, heritagization is not a neutral process due to its selective display of the past to highlight the contemporary values of heritage. That being said, heritagization, from the very beginning, takes a biased approach to evaluation. However, in the later process of heritagization, several social processes are still excluded. This

part of the dynamic has more to do with contemporary living experience than simply remembering or forgetting the past—indeed.

The Grand Canal, West Lake, and Hangzhou city had been under the modernization project for economic production. Concerning the Grand Canal heritage, the SNWT project and the formation of national heritage aptly demonstrate the attempt to make it an object of pedagogy. Regionally, West Lake and Hangzhou in 1929 were at the turning point to reform the state and later became the manufacturing center. Since the late 1990s, urban expansion, heritage, and heritage modernity followed linear modernity, highlighting the ambition that led to Hangzhou's renaissance. Regarding local society in Hangzhou in the early 2000s, as urban development swallowed the remaining canal sections, the Western heritage framework deigned to accept canals as a category in the new global heritage framework. Chapter Two has examined how new urban development projects reshaped the geography of the three canal neighborhoods, and how their “localities” were (and are) constituted and evaluated in terms of the cultural values on the heritagization that followed. However, this urban agenda indicated by heritagization suggests not only urban modernization and physical improvement, but also new modernity—heritage modernity. This type of modernity is not the same as the modernity discussed in the existing literature. It connects, rather than breaks, with the selected past to a path to modernity.

“Hygiene modernity” discussed in Chapter Three fits the social transformation to aim for a “clean” vision of social progress in the post-industrialist period. Removing local practice and excluding disadvantaged actors did help to modernize the Qiaoxi Cultural District while the “rightful” heritage—the factory buildings by a purified canal—remains in use. Nevertheless, when diving into local histories and development, many of them have been sanitized if not erased from the vernacular cultural heritage displays. In the case study of the Qiaoxi Cultural District, I have shown a mixed type of modernity that boasts of a better version of society and claims a connection to the selected past and local histories. Despite the pursuits of heritage modernity and the preceding linear modernity overlap, those localities, such as the east part of the Gongchen Bridge area and the Tangxi Town, started to develop earlier before the best timing transition. Since they had destroyed all cultural artifacts to ask for an entire redevelopment; thus, they might have lost opportunities for further exploration of their historiographies.

### **6.3 New Formation of Identities**

The third process is more implicit than the other two. As heritage shapes new social and cultural relations by inclusion and exclusion, thus creates subjectivities of its promoters and residents nearby. The analysis on returning residents shows that heritagization is better understood as an intertwined social and spatial process rather than a state-led unilateral process that led to gentrification.

This study suggests that this awareness generated in heritagization is essential in forming a new identity and subjectivity regarding modernity. On the surface, the three processes could be recognized merely as a direct outcome of heritage-triggered development and gentrification. Indeed, it is reasonable as Chinese cities follow neoliberalist urban governance and a market-oriented economy in its post-socialist era. In this sense, those neoliberal Chinese cities require private sectors to take over employment and housing responsibility while socialist institutions—whose power and influence are waning—limit the social welfare channels and land ownership.

However, this study emphasizes how everyday life, expectation, and collective memories have been twisted under heritagization of the Grand Canal and new representation of the whole city. In contrast, this research attempts to demonstrate how heritage is used in different historical moments and current days as some political, economic, social tools to fulfill an overall social and

cultural progress. The general urban tendencies have affected how different actors participated and operated heritage preservation in Chinese cities. Recent studies have tended to see it as an incentive that reinforces the urban process, or within the realm of identity politics. Fewer have regarded it as the content and rationale of the pursuit of modernity—as this study suggests.

The heritagization of the Hangzhou section included preserving the vernacular culture, museums of local handicraft art, and several installments and renovations of monuments or sites. As shown in Chapter Three, heritage became a social-spatial engineering tool that sanitized local history and resettled locals into modern housing complexes while concurrently repurposing factory buildings into museums—thus formalizing heritage to fit into Western heritage modernity.

However, these new arrangements on old buildings and sites also served to exclude several underrepresented demographics due to heritage modernity regarding some social and cultural elements as hindrances to progress. The museum, in this sense, works as a place for display and a site for development. Prostitutes and their history around the Gongchen Bridge, the boat people of Hangzhou, locals of Tangxi town, famous tombs around West Lake, *laogai* workers, and villages around the developing areas of Hangzhou, to name but a few were eliminated from the version of Hangzhou's history told from WH and official Chinese perspectives.

From the perspective of Western heritage practice, Chinese heritage is less focused on original materials. It thus resembles another form of authenticity because of the difference in local knowledge and notions on heritage. However, as this study shows, authenticity is secondary to modernity. As Western modernity dominates the WH framework, heritage and its society must challenge the Western idea of modernity in terms of universal value and authenticity. When experts examined Chinese heritage through a Western lens, the Grand Canal was objectified as another dissected part of the whole heritage.

The absence of several social groups and histories indicates one of the functions of heritage modernity: exclusion. As shown in Chapter Two and Three, several neighborhoods and pieces of Gongshu histories were not selected and formalized in public displays. Boat people left this area, and the gentrifiers came to become the dominant group in this area. Besides, heritagization draws a boundary between the returning residents and visitors and new middle-class comers, as explained in Chapter Four. The represented residents in the resettlement communities surrounding the Gongchen Bridge can be described as “staged symbolic communities” comprised of loyal SOE workers or diligent villagers. They have witnessed the changes to the Grand Canal.

Housing privatization and land-selling were standard practices and resulted in a distinct social group and generation—namely, the urban retired or laid-off residents from SOEs. As this study suggests, retired SOE workers can now enjoy the improved environment along the canal. However, compared to the new middle-class residents in the adjacent high-rise housing complexes, they tend to feel underrepresented within this neighborhood. The rising status of former villagers often exacerbates these feelings. Former villagers became citizens after the urbanization of the 2000s. Their previous ownership of collective lands resulted in far higher compensation than SOE workers from urban renewal projects. As a result, former villagers became the landlords of two or three units and moved to the new resettlement houses alongside retired SOE workers. The latter would often have just one unit after compensation. The project aimed to improve the physical environment and to develop the SOEs sites. However, the “on-site” practice kept everything the same except for social relations and living experience. However, the feelings generated by this social reshuffling turned not into social conflict, but

rather a slight resentment and nostalgia. By speaking of their past employment in the Hangzhou SOEs, the retired workers can recall the socialist promises while adapting to the new future.

In their new social and cultural lives, heritage modernity suggests a civilized urban culture along the preserved canal rather than a nostalgic return to the socialist past. The expelled prostitutes and boat people who made their living there were excluded from contemporary heritagization. The question remains: what was the real-life of the represented population? Those remaining populations were considered fortunate enough to stay in their homeland. What with compensation and rebuilt livable neighborhoods, they were (and are) able to enjoy a stable life in the resettlement communities in their retirement from SOEs. However, they have been forced to deal with new social and economic conditions in which they have made way for new middle-class people moving into the commodity high-rise housing. For the Hangzhou people, cultural heritage has represented the glorious path to prosperity and the promise to conquer the future and overtake other developing cities. While Hangzhou may not be as famous or industrially robust as Shanghai, but with cultural sites and West Lake, the city surpasses Shanghai in heritage tourism and is distinct from its modern and Westernized culture. Thanks to the railroad construction of the early 20th century, the connection between Hangzhou and Shanghai has strengthened. At the same time, the role of transportation of the Grand Canal decreased in importance for mass tourism.

The remaining population, in contrast, made their living mostly from factories or farming. After the nationwide economic restructuring and housing privatization, the SOE workers had to retire from their posts. Deindustrialization in Hangzhou freed the previously owned lands to the private market, and the following urbanization freed the *hukou* restriction to villagers. Those institutional limits became new chances in the era of urban renewal. The villagers gained the most compensation from renewal and were able to stay in the resettlement housing complex. While the overall environment became livable after urban renewal and heritagization, and the urban expansion had covered the southern part of the Gongshu District, the Gongchen Bridge Area is currently a residential area where middle-class people would choose to live. This area is now gentrifying as the new wealthy comers continue to stay. The returning people become wealthy since they could earn the difference between the current increasing rent and the compensational amount of money. However, the process is concerned with the financial ability of residents and the quality of residents. As housing becomes a product rather than a collective property, the modernity hidden in the new resettlement housing and the new commodity high-rise indicates a bettered and civilized form of housing and social relations.

I have attempted to elaborate this point by presenting the 2016 G20 Summit case study and comparing it with the 1929 West Lake Expo. As shown in Chapter Five, Hangzhou citizens, especially longtime residents, have a similar type of collective awareness. This awareness is a mixture of self-regulation, friendliness, local pride, and a time-framed expectation to the coming of the next event, leading a reinforced image of Hangzhou being a tourism city since centuries ago.

#### **6.4 A Transitioning Modernity**

Both of the two indicated modernities seek political and social unity, though they each hold different temporalities of progress. Linear modernity imagines a political unity residing at the end of a linear and progressive trajectory, with a clear delineation of past and present. It believes that the newer, the better, since the worst parts are supposed to have been eliminated with time. Consider heritage in terms of linear modernity, and heritage would be of very little use because it

seldom indicates the future path to cultural and political unity. In this sense, the Grand Canal is unimportant except for sections for another modern project.

Heritage modernity, instead, allows for greater use of historical references to proceed to a better future. During the early phase of heritagization in the 2000s, Hangzhou prepared its related heritage sites up for nomination with several reference points, meaning that the city strove toward its historical and cultural significance concerning several specific moments in history. Several discernible cultures shone in the making of heritage modernity: vernacular commercial culture and craft in the Southern Song Dynasty, canal culture in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the literati culture of West Lake in the Northern Song Dynasty, nationalist culture in the Republican era, the Expo in 1929, industrial heritage in the Gongchen Bridge industrial area since 1895, the recent heritage development since the 2000s, and the mega-event of this decade and that of the next.

The two mega-events analysis attempts to show how West Lake has been the stage for national development and the subsequent social progress. The 1929 West Lake Expo indicated the pursuit of linear modernity and a break with traditional Chinese culture while the 2016 G20 Summit showcased several cultural heritage sites in light of traditional cultures. These moments have shaped the city's different faces, images, and memories for its citizens and visitors alike. Most importantly, they have become intangible assets with which the city can proceed to a better future. Therefore, no matter how the Grand Canal is regarded as a UNESCO World Heritage site with recognized "universal value" and "integrity," it is far too reductive to give a single meaning comprehensible enough to cover the geographical and historical contexts.

Through these efforts, the city has pursued heritage modernity to connect with its glorious while concurrently rewriting its historiography. This type of modernity inspires an emotional reaction back to locality, identity, and nostalgia. The canal's past and current functions work together for the benefit of current and future generations. For centuries, the Grand Canal worked for Imperial China as a unifying infrastructure. In contrast, its current form as a heritage site works for the state, cities, localities, and neighborhoods for different urban modernization projects. Heritagization involves several levels of social and political concerns, as demonstrated by how the Grand Canal—an ancient infrastructure with little recognized value—was transformed into a protected and appreciated national and global heritage site, with much of the work being done by local governments.

Hangzhou has had the advantage of being able to reflect its past while developing lands and consolidating its capital for the future. Modern tourism in Hangzhou follows the same process of heritage modernity. Though being a famous pilgrimage destination, the new form of tourism appreciates the geographical advantages and cultural history of the past literati rather than the cultural history of the grandma pilgrimage. For the city per se, the appreciated tourism tradition mainly belongs to modern tourism, including small business within downtown Hangzhou, sight-seeing, and the religious sites around West Lake. Since the Republican Era, the Grand Canal's service for the pilgrimage decreased in fame with this underrepresented population. This being said, heritage reminds people with different memories and levels of power to concurrently negotiate its symbolic meanings and physical setting. Modern tourism is part of the modernization project. During the Second Sino-Japanese War and the following Maoist period, Hangzhou faced war and the new phase of industrialization, respectively. Under Mao, the tourist sites were converted for production or preserved for political elites. Tombs around West Lake were relocated to the suburbs, and the lake itself became a large fishing pool for agricultural revenues. After the Maoist Era, post-socialist Hangzhou aimed to become an



industrial city that brought heavy pollution to the Grand Canal and the city. In the 1990s, cultural heritage preservation and the environment were still not pressing concerns since, at that time, national economic restructuring was a significant issue for the central state.

Moreover, local states needed to accommodate SOEs and laid-off employees. However, several plots of SOEs were re-developed through urbanization in the 1990s. Along with the process of deindustrialization and heritagization, the change indicated the shift to a different type of modernity—heritage modernity.

This heritage modernity is not exclusive to China. However, it is indicative of new modernity that prioritizes cultural origins and the corresponding new socio-cultural order, over industrial, socialist, and post-Maoist modernity and thus declares a total break from the past. This new modernity is neither entirely internal nor external to Chinese society. However, it is instead an evolving process from previous attempts at modernity pursued by China and revised to fit its historiography regarding the formation of its nationalism.

The transition to heritage modernity takes place at a later point. With help from the central state, local governments seek several developmental trajectories with a chosen reference point from which to continue their own canal story. These historical accomplishments and histories indicate heritage modernity suggestive of multifaceted state-building endeavors in the past, and present-day tasks yet to be realized.

Modernity, in this sense, represents continuous prosperity along the canal, although the nature of the canal has been twisted to follow the direction of urban expansion. Furthermore, this study has demonstrated how sanitization of the Gongchen Bridge area's heritage worked with local engineering revitalization to provide a cleansed museum cluster surrounded by art and monuments. Modernity here indicates that the canal's improvement is beneficial to the promotion of local history and traditions. At the same time, harmful cultural and social elements have been excluded.

From this aspect, heritagization was not merely a national project. Instead, multiple parallel projects combined with urban, cultural, event-modernity, and, eventually, the modernity for the Chinese nation's current civilization project. Contemporary heritagization connects heritage sites and facilities to suggest a geographically continuous hydraulic infrastructure. In contrast, the city connects the dots in its history to show its modernity as a competitive city.

Nevertheless, how do people imagine a nation-state from this heritage modernity which continues to refer to past comments full of cultural and social differences and values? Starting from the examination of the preservation of the Hangzhou section of the Grand Canal, I have demonstrated that heritagization firstly simplifies and homogenizes each heritage site's cultural differences into a political and historical agenda to proceed to a better future. In this sense, this part of heritagization can be described as linear modernity in which history is not as significant as its contemporary meanings. This linear modernity promotes pedagogical approaches in which the canal's history is placed within a single authorized discourse that appreciates modern Chinese civilization.

Critical heritage scholars have already stressed the importance of viewing heritage from geographical and local contexts. As a cross-scale national heritage site, the Grand Canal heritage is not just a vital WH site for commemorating the past. However, it more closely resembles an embodiment of its new social and cultural meanings for contemporary Chinese society. However, this geographical framework divided it into spatial existence but lacked the understanding of its temporal relations between scales. For example, the Grand Canal heritage nomination (and formation) started from local proposals rather than historical facts. In this sense,

the visible Hangzhou section and preservation achievements are only possible within the contemporary heritagization rather than the historical *Caoyun* practice.

While it is easy to assume that heritagization is a localized project that only applies to Hangzhou, this study emphasizes the relations between local and central state-building efforts by demonstrating how Hangzhou followed the government's instruction and was chosen as the host city for the 2016 G20 Summit and the 2022 Asian Games. Heritage modernity implies a longing for a modern and civilized state and society. Hangzhou's new social formation is deeply appreciative of urban development, hygiene modernity, modern living, and civility and hospitality. It realizes the dream of being modern: to be a venue city with well-known heritage sites. Critical heritage studies argue that theories should be placed within local contexts to see how authenticity could be correctly assessed. This study has shown this to be a mistake. It assumes this to be the correct and legitimate heritage practice to recognize the universal value and authenticity of each tangible and non-tangible piece of heritage. Therefore, if using this type of discourse to "examine" the Grand Canal's heritage, it would seem that the canal has been preserved in the style of WH but "with Chinese characteristics"—such as the color of the socialist past, gentrification, the mega-events, and soft but authoritarian power. However, when heritagization in China is often unanimously regarded as the side effects for urban development and the incentive of state-building, thus heritage is never explained in its biography and the way it is being remembered. Seeing heritagization as part of social progress toward modernity helps to understand the relationships among all these improvement projects and how "well-done" they would be in the contemporary political economy and agenda for development. Fundamentally the pursuit of modernity redirects the Chinese method of heritagization and Hangzhou's urban development and thus shapes the social subjects—the heirs, the excluded, the forgotten, the worshipped, the missed, and the returned.

### **6.5 Heritage Modernity in Perspective**

The concept of heritage modernity proposed shows a dynamic in which urban society is set standing at present, looking back to the past and then moving toward the future. This study has shown how heritagization and mega-event provided a new social experience and cultural awareness to the city. People may wonder, expect, resist, succeed, or fail to keep up their paces with the overall progress during the process.

This study attempts to bridge the gap between urban studies and heritage studies by considering heritage in multiple geographical scales and temporalities. Heritagization in current scholarship is often simplified as a top-down plan led by the state or strong neoliberalist private sectors, which excludes "authentic" heritage practitioners. Therefore, this thread of discussion regard heritage preservation as an imperative to preserve an authorized and valuable past worth contemporary attentions. In this sense, heritagization is a process in which the integrity of "real" heritage communities would have been harmed. This dissertation avoids directly probing into "authenticity" since the concept itself usually sets a boundary of itself within a specific time and space.

However, this study does not aim to tell an "authentic heritage story" as it doubts the constructed and confined authenticity idea. Instead, it contributes to social and cultural struggles within the heritagization-led process, aiming to explain how heritage functions in a different scenario and historical background and helps shape new subjectivities of current residents in urban Hangzhou along the canal. The concept of staged authenticity helps explain how a staged city—either as a tourism or host city of a mega-event—and the social-spatial process changes citizens' expectations regarding heritage and social progress.

Despite the opposition against the existence of “authenticity”, this study could be more comprehensive if it would deal with issues of those excluded social groups and their heritage-related practice and how local knowledge concerning hydraulic practice evolved with heritagization of the Grand Canal and West Lake. Future research might extend how local society has worked with water-related practice and how it has been removed, changed, or maintained through heritagization.

Future research regarding heritage geography and tourism anthropology will strengthen theories in critical heritage and event studies. As critical heritage studies focus on the actual use of heritage in its situated context, it often neglects than how heritage and its surrounding settings become its current state and how locals perceive these changes. The current discussion in event studies pays more attention to the physical effects or symbolic meanings of deploys of the events than to citizens’ perceptions and expectations.

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## Appendix: Field Interviews

Code	year	Date	Location	Title
1	2015	0714	Gongchen Bridge area	Folk painter
2		0716	Beijing	Professor
3		0718	Beijing	Grad student
4		0723	Beijing	Professor
5		0730	Chengdu	Professor
6		0803	Chengdu	Taxi driver
7		0805	Chengdu	Tour guide
8	2016	0702	Gongchen Bridge area	Folk painter
9		0702	Gongshu dist.	Taxi driver
10		0703	Xiaoshan dist.	Researcher in museum
11		0705	Xiaoshan dist.	Migrant worker
12		1128	Beijing	Professor
13		1130	Beijing	Cadre in a village organization
14	2017	0703	Gongchen Bridge area	Resident
15		0704	Xiacheng dist.	Housing agent
16		0706	Gongchen Bridge area	Retired teacher
17			Gongchen Bridge area	Folk painter
18			Gongshu dist.	Employee in medical care center
19		0707	Qiaoxi cultural district	Resident
20		0711	Gongchen Bridge area	Resident
21			Gongshu dist.	Employee in e-commerce company
22		0712	Xiaoshan dist.	Employee in e-commerce company
23				Employee in e-commerce company
24		0714	Gongshu dist.	Residents
25		0715	Qiaoxi cultural district	CEO
26				Retired professor
27		0717	Gongshu dist.	Employee of the Communist Youth League
28		0719	Gongchen Bridge area	Former SOE worker
29				Grad student
30			On a water taxi	Water taxi driver
31			Xiaohe neighborhood	Community work
32		0720	Qiaoxi cultural district	High school teacher
33				Grad student
34		0721	Xiaohe neighborhood	Journalist
35			Gongchen Bridge area	Resident
36				Resident
37				Resident
38				Former SOE manager
39			Former SOE manager	
40		0722	Xihu dist.	Former SOE manager
41				Resident
42			Gongshu dist.	Migrant worker
43		0724	Xiaohe neighborhood	Journalist
44			Resettlement housing complex near Xiaohe neighborhood	Former SOE manager
45				Former SOE manager
46		0725	Xiaohe neighborhood	Local business owner
47				Former SOE manager
48		0726	Gongshu dist.	Deputy Director in the Party and Government Office of the Yunhe Group
49		0727	On a water taxi	Tour guide

50			Qiaoxi cultural district	Tour guide
51		0728	Gongshu dist.	Resident
52			Gongshu dist.	Security guard
53		0729	Resettlement housing complex near Gongchen Bridge	Resident in gated community
54				Former SOE manager
55			Gated community	College student
56			Phone call interview	Blogger specializing in real estate market in Hangzhou
57		0730	Xihu dist.	Volunteer of river protection project
58		0731	Tangxi town	Staff of Yunhe Group
59				Staff of Yunhe Group
60				Staff of Yunhe Group
61				Tourist guide
62		0801	Xixing town	Migrant worker
63				Former resident
64				Resident
65				Grad student
66		0802	Gongshu dist.	Museum staff
67			Gongshu dist.	Staff in local business
68			Gongshu dist.	Cultural preservationist of the <i>She</i> ethnicity
69			Gongshu dist.	Former SOE worker
70			Gongshu dist.	Resident
71			Gongshu dist.	Staff in local business
72		0804	Gongshu dist.	Former SOE worker
73			Qiaoxi cultural district	Resident
74				Former SOE worker
75		0805	Qiaoxi cultural district	Former SOE worker
76				Resident
77				Resident, volunteer in residents' committee
78				Volunteer in residents' committee
79				Graduate student
80		0807	Xihu dist.	Employee in insurance industry
81		0808	Gongshu dist.	Owner of local business
82		0809	Resettlement housing complex near Qiaoxi cultural district	Resident
83				Resident
84				Former resident
85				Housing agent
86				Security guard
87				Security guard
88			Resettlement housing complex near Qiaoxi cultural district	Resident
89			Resettlement housing complex near Qiaoxi cultural district	Staff in a residents' committee
90			Resettlement housing complex near Qiaoxi cultural district	Staff in a residents' committee
91			Qiaoxi cultural district	Volunteer in residents' committee
92				Staff in a residents' committee
93				Former SOE worker
94			Resettlement housing complex near Qiaoxi cultural district	Staff in a residents' committee
95		0810	Qiaoxi cultural district	Staff in the Canal Research Institute (Education department)
96				Staff in the Canal Research Institute
97		0811	Resettlement housing complex near Gongchen Bridge	Former SOE worker
98				Former SOE worker
99				Former SOE worker



100			Former SOE worker
101			Staff in a residents' committee
102			Staff in a residents' committee
103			Staff in a residents' committee
104			Staff in a residents' committee
105			Cadre in a residents' committee
106		Gongchen Bridge area	Chair of cultural association, preservationist
107	0812	Xihu dist.	Staff in Alibaba
108	0814	Xiaohe neighborhood	Cadre in a residents' committee
109			Former SOE worker
110			Former SOE worker
111			Local business owner
112			Staff in a residents' committee
113	0817	Xiaohe neighborhood	Resident
114			Staff in a residents' committee
115		Resettlement housing complex near Gongchen Bridge	Former SOE worker
116			Former SOE worker
117			Former SOE worker
118			Former SOE worker
119	0818	Tangxi town	Local business owner, popular historian
120			Director of Yunhe Group
121			Manager of temple
122	0820	Resettlement housing complexes near Xiaohe neighborhood	Resident
123			Resident
124			Resident
125		Gongshu dist.	Employee in former SOE
126	0821	Gongchen Bridge area	Staff in Jiru village corporation
127			Staff in Jiru village corporation
128		Qiaoxi cultural district	Former SOE worker
129		Gongshu dist.	Former SOE worker
130		Gongshu dist.	Former SOE worker
131	0822	Xihu dist.	Graduate student
132		Phone call interview	Professor
133	0823	Xiacheng dist.	Preservationist, popular historian
134		Qiaoxi cultural district	Volunteer in residents' committee, Jiru villager
135	0824	Resettlement housing complex near Xiaohe neighborhood	Staff in residents' committee
136			Former SOE worker
137			Resident
138	0825	Phone call interview	Staff in a think-tank on urban issues
139	2018	0210	Taipei, Taiwan
140		0612	Taipei, Taiwan
141		0716	Xiacheng dist.
142			Xiacheng dist.
143			Shangcheng dist.
144			Security guard
145		0717	Xiacheng dist.
146			Shangcheng dist.
147		0718	Yuhang dist.
148			Yuhang dist.
149			Yuhang dist.
150			Yuhang dist.
151			Xihu dist.
152		0720	Shangcheng dist.

153		0722	Xihu dist.	Grad student
154		0723	Shangcheng dist.	Professor
155	Professor			
156		0724	Xihu dist.	Grad student
157			Xiacheng dist.	Taxi driver
158			Xiacheng dist.	Professor
159				High school teacher
160		0725	Shangcheng dist.	Staff in Hangzhou River Regulation Center
161				Director of the Engineering Dep. of the Canal Research Institute
162				Director of the Dep. of Development of Northern Hangzhou
163		0726	Xiaoshan dist.	n/a
164		0727	Qiaoxi cultural district	Researcher in museum
165		0728	Xihu dist.	Former Deputy Director of Shangcheng dist.
166				Professor
167			Shangcheng dist.	High school teacher
168		0730	Phone call interview	Former researcher
169		0731	Yuhang dist.	Professor
170		0801	Xihu dist.	Staff in West Lake preservation office
171				Staff in West Lake preservation office
172		0903	Xihu dist.	Publisher
173		0904	Yuhang dist.	Deputy director in a think-tank on urban studies
174		0905	Xihu dist.	Professor
174			Xihu dist.	Grad student
175		0906	Xihu dist.	Grad student, student voluntary worker in G20
176		0919	Phone call interview	Professor