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
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The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict"



The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, Economics, and "Cultural" Violence

Edited by Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz

Description:

In the last decade, discourses of economic and political liberalization and globalization have swept the world. Yet during this same period and all across the globe, many states are fragmenting and more than 30 ethnic and sectarian conflicts have displaced or killed millions of people — and far more civilians than soldiers. The authors in this volume argue that much of this violence is closely linked to those globalizing forces and demands for economic liberalization which have weakened states' capacities, both political and financial, for redistributing resources. As a result, many states have been forced to break established social contracts, often dramatically changing power relations in heterogeneous societies that previously had been relatively stable. Drawing on case studies from Asia, Eastern Europe, North Africa, the former Soviet Union, and the United States, the authors demonstrate how these distributional issues and power shifts have been experienced as ethnic and religious discrimination and are often at the root of identity politics and violent, so-called "cultural," conflicts.

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The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict”:
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Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz,
Editors

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THE CAUSES OF CULTURAL CONFLICT: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

Beverly Crawford

As the cold war came to a close, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the rhetoric of economic and political liberalization swept the globe, there were more than thirty violent conflicts raging around the world, most of these ethnic and sectarian in nature.¹ Indeed these conflicts are not new. Some estimates suggest that cultural conflicts have inspired over half of the violent struggles within states between 1945 and 1960. The proportion increased to three quarters from 1960 to 1990.²

What marks these conflicts, separates their effects from those of interstate wars, and thus makes them an important subject for investigation on their own is that they have been significantly more devastating to civilians. In World War I, 14 percent of all deaths were civilian. That figure rose to 67 percent in World War II. And in the 1990s, *where most wars were within rather than between states*, civilian deaths totaled 90 percent of all deaths.³ By 1995 deaths in the war in the former Yugoslavia reached over 200,000; over half the population of Bosnia became refugees, and virtually all of the Serb population of Croatia was forced to flee.⁴ By 1993 civilian deaths in the war in Abkhazia were estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000. More than half of the prewar population became refugees.⁵ Five thousand people have been killed in Kashmir since 1990; over 30,000 have died in Algeria, and 18,000 have died in Punjab since the storming of the temple in 1985. While war between states seems to be on the decline, ethnic and sectarian conflict within them is on the rise. Why?

The causes of these conflicts are not immediately obvious. Some minority ethnic and religious groups assimilate and are eventually accommodated in a unitary nation-state. Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks), unlike Muslims in Bosnia, are peacefully integrated. Malaysia

in recent years has maintained interethnic peace under a moderate unitary Muslim majority state, while secular Egypt is coping with rising violence perpetrated by more radical factions of “political Islam.” Among liberal democracies, England has achieved relative political integration of minority ethnic groups, while Germany eschews such integration and has experienced relatively high levels of violence in the form of hate crimes against non-German immigrants. Other Western democracies, such as Switzerland and Belgium, maintain federations that separate ethnic and religious groups into political entities with limited autonomy that peacefully coexist with one another. And the breakup of Czechoslovakia demonstrates that secession does not have to be violent. Among our cases to be considered here, Ajaria has peacefully insulated itself from the Georgian turmoil and gained a separate and more autonomous constitutional status within Georgia, while neighboring Abkhazia was ravaged by war. Why is it, then, that some ethnic and religious problems are resolved peacefully, others remain unresolved but do not erupt in violence, and still others seek resolution in violent conflict?

We argue here that the current round of ethnic and sectarian violence is ironically linked to the apparent triumph of economic globalization and institutional transformation—the opening of new markets for goods, services, capital, and people; the construction of new democracies; and the implementation of “state-shrinking” ideologies that have swept the globe. While, with some important exceptions, developed market economies have experienced relatively low levels of cultural conflict, they have experienced that conflict nonetheless, as they have begun the state-shrinking process of economic liberalization. And transition to the market and the pressures of globalization—increased demands for industrial competitiveness and rising external debt that weakens the state’s capability and willingness to allocate resources—are associated with high levels of conflict and even violence.

While many analysts suspect that there is a link between economic globalization and the current round of cultural conflict, few have investigated potential causal forces that might explain that relationship.⁶ In this study we assess alternative explanations for cultural conflict and attempt to discover the causal mechanisms that might explain its relationship to economic globalization and liberalization. Taken together, the essays in this volume argue that cultural

violence erupts most vociferously where secular economic decline, neoliberal economic reforms, and institutional transformation have broken old “social contracts”—that is, where they have broken the rules and norms by which access to political and economic resources was once granted. Globalization and liberalization are thus “triggers” for cultural conflict, but they are not the only triggers, and they are not the underlying causes.

The breaking of old social contracts—by whatever means—leads to shifts in political power. When these power shifts are experienced as ethnic and religious discrimination and privilege, the resulting resentment and opportunity provide fertile ground for modern political entrepreneurs to mobilize support around ethnic and sectarian identities.⁷ But changes in power do not always result in cultural discrimination. Often, for example, they result in economic oppression or discrimination along ideological lines. When, then, do power shifts result in cultural threat and conflict? We argue that cultural conflict erupts most frequently in those places where old social contracts permitted ethnic and religious criteria to guide the allocation of political and economic resources. That mode of resource allocation permitted the logic of identity politics to characterize and sometimes even dominate political competition. Where identity politics once prevailed and when institutions upholding the old social contract are weakened, the odds of cultural conflict and even violence increase.

Why would the practice of identity politics increase the odds of cultural violence? The logic of identity politics suggests that claims on resources based on ascriptive criteria like ethnicity and religion are often incompatible. Conflicting claims on resources based on cultural criteria are more prone to intense conflict than disputes between interest groups. This is because while interests are malleable and multiple, making compromises and log-rolling possible, cultural identity is fixed and non-negotiable. Disputes over resources among “identity groups” will thus prove to be particularly difficult to negotiate, raising the odds of violence.⁸ But even when the logic of identity politics dominates the political game, opposing cultural groups can commit themselves to pacts that ensure social order, and the institutions of central authority can help enforce those pacts. Even when one cultural group dominates others, repressive institutions can provide for “order,” although it is discriminatory

and experienced by less powerful groups as unjust. *Cultural conflict escalates into violence when these institutions are weakened, disrupted, or transformed in ways that undermine the commitment to uphold these contracts or repress dissent.* Although there are many forces which undermine that commitment, globalization and economic liberalization are two of the most important current culprits. When the forces of globalization and the impersonal market have usurped control from domestic institutions and when those institutions can no longer credibly enforce agreements that ensured peaceful competition among politically relevant cultural groups, or when they can no longer enforce culturally discriminating policies, violence may be the only alternative course for political entrepreneurs making non-negotiable resource demands on behalf of distinct cultural groups.

The essays in this volume elaborate on, illustrate, and sometimes even “test” this argument. In this introduction, I begin with a brief discussion of our puzzle: why cultural violence appears to be everywhere on the rise and why there are significant variations in kind and levels of conflict despite historical, regional, and demographic similarities. I then turn to an examination of three alternative explanations for cultural conflict. I argue that these explanations are incomplete and suggest how an institutional approach can account for more variation in cultural conflict and violence. In the third section, I lay out the institutional argument in three steps. I begin by describing the process by which cultural identity does or does not become politically relevant and the importance of institutions in shaping and legitimating political identity. I then discuss the role of institutional disruption, weakening, collapse, and transformation in undermining and even breaking social contracts in ways that permit the rise of political entrepreneurs who wish to mobilize political support with cultural appeals; I further discuss the conditions under which those mobilization efforts can be successful and can lead to violence. Finally, I lay out the causes for institutional change and broken social contracts located in the processes of globalization and economic liberalization.

**PURPOSE: EXPLAINING THE RISE AND EXTENT
OF CULTURAL CONFLICT**

Our purpose in this study is twofold: to generate hypotheses that will explain why ethnic and sectarian violence appears to be everywhere on the rise (particularly in the current period), and why some states experience high levels of it while others in similar circumstances experience little or none. We have taken an intellectual risk in our effort to engage in large comparisons and come to general conclusions. As a rule, those who believe in the uniqueness of each case of conflict enjoy a certain intellectual advantage over those who seek to argue that patterns of variation appear across time and space. The case for uniqueness can be made simply by enriching each story with so much historical detail that generalizations and comparisons seem artificial, oversimplified, and silly. Indeed as the stories in the coming chapters will reveal, no two cases of cultural conflict are really alike. What we attempt here, however, is to abstract from the historical and descriptive complexity of each case and challenge ideographic accounts by proposing a conceptualization of the causes of cultural conflict embodied in institutional arrangements.⁹

We base our conclusions on twelve cases that vary according to region; we compare conflicts in Western Europe, the former Communist world (the former Soviet Union and the Balkans), and the developing world (Muslim-majority states and India). While ethnic and sectarian conflict is lower in the West than in post-Communist countries, and conflict is higher in post-Communist regions than in Muslim-majority states or in less developed but relatively consolidated democracies, levels of conflict also vary significantly within developing, post-Communist, and Western industrial states. Algeria and Egypt have experienced high levels of sectarian conflict while Malaysia has not; the former Yugoslavia and Abkhazia experienced protracted and bloody separatist conflicts, while Bulgaria and Ajaria remained at peace. In contrast to England, Germany has experienced relatively high levels of cultural violence. Because the role and the strength of political institutions vary widely across regions and because there are large variations in conflict levels within regions, our primary comparisons are intraregional rather than cross-regional.

Table 1
Measures of Conflict by Country/Region

Country/Region	Level of Violence	Organization	Protraction
Yugoslavia	High: war of succession	Organized military units	1991–95; prolonged
Abkhazia	High: war of succession	Organized military units	1991–93; prolonged
Algeria	High: state-threatening civil war	Organized military units	1991–present; prolonged
Punjab	Medium: nonviolent political competition, violent protests, military repression; state reduces violence, separatism	Political parties, militias, Indian military	Chronic since 1975
Kashmir	Medium: secessionist violence, government repression; state reduces violence	Political parties, secessionist movement, Indian army	Chronic since 1974
Egypt	Medium: sporadic violence and state repression	Organized Islamic groups/state police	Chronic since 1974
Germany	Low: rising right-wing violence in 1980s, increased sporadic violence 1991–93, state repression; decline in incidents of violence since 1993	Relative lack of organized violence	Sporadic dramatic increases 1991–92
United States	Low: state repression of racial violence; recent violence directed against central government	Relative lack of organized violence	Sporadic
England	Low and declining: riots, 1958, 1980–81, 1985, mischaracterized as race riots	Unorganized violent attacks	Sporadic

Bulgaria	No ethnic or sectarian violence	—	None
Malaysia	No ethnic or sectarian violence	—	None since 1969
Ajaria	No sectarian violence	—	None

Sources: The data for this table were drawn from several sources. These are cited here, along with numbers of fatalities resulting from ethnic and sectarian violence, where possible. The scoring of high, medium, and low is a judgment of relative intensity of violence in comparison with the other cases. By 21 November 1995, 250,000 people had been reported dead or missing in the former Yugoslavia. Other figures for the former Yugoslavia are listed in note 4. For Abkhazia, see note 5. For Algeria there are various estimates for deaths ranging from 15,000 (John P. Entelis, "Political Islam in Algeria: The Nonviolent Dimension," *Current History* 94, 588 [January 1995]: 13) to 40,000 (*Economist*, 8 July 1995). For the Punjab estimates of fatalities related to sectarian conflict range from 18,000 (Gurharpal Singh, "Punjab Elections 1992: Breakthrough or Breakdown?" *Asian Survey* 32, 11 [November 1992]: 988) to 20,000 (Hamish Telford, "The Political Economy of the Punjab: Creating Space for Sikh Militancy," *Asian Survey* 32, 11 [November 1992]: 969). For Kashmir, see Binder. For Egypt there have been an estimated 1,000 deaths from violent attacks by extremist Islamic groups (Sarah Gauch, "Terror on the Nile," *Africa Report* 38, 3 [May–June 1993]: 32). In Germany from 1991 to 1993, there were a total of 5,881 attacks against "foreigners" (see Jens Alber, "Towards Explaining Anti-Foreign Violence in Germany" [Cambridge, Mass.: Center for European Studies, Harvard University], Working Paper Series No. 53, table 1; cited in John Leslie's article in this volume). England has experienced sporadic social violence in recent years, which has been mischaracterized as "ethnic conflict." Elaine Thomas describes here both the violent incidents and their misrepresentation. For Bulgaria the only recorded deaths related to ethnic conflict occurred in riots in May 1989 in response to Todor Zhivkov's attempt to "Bulgarize" the country's ethnic Turks. This riot resulted in 600 deaths (Roland Flamini, "A Modern Balkan Exodus," *Time* 134, 7 [14 August 1989]: 39). There has been no cultural violence involving Pomak groups. In Malaysia the only recorded deaths from ethnic conflict occurred in a riot in May 1969, resulting in 200 deaths (see Leon Comber, *13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino-Malay Relations* [Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1983], p. 88, and Karl von Vorys, *Democracy without Consensus* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975]). Georgi Derluguian in this volume argues that Ajaria experienced very little cultural conflict in the wake of Soviet collapse. The United States has experienced sporadic and intense periods of cultural violence, primarily directed against African Americans. Recent violence, discussed in this volume by Ronnie Lipschutz, has been directed against the federal government.

Table 1 (cont.)

Cross-regional comparisons can be suggestive, however. Our cases vary according to ethnic and sectarian demographic composition. While the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Malaysia, the United States, and India can be considered multiethnic or multicultural states, England and Germany are relatively homogeneous; Egypt and Algeria are Muslim-majority states with small minority populations. Despite these demographic variations, however, ethnic and sectarian violence appears to have erupted in all of these in recent times; nonetheless, there are significant variations in intensity among these conflicts that do not correlate with levels of cultural diversity. And some social conflicts have been widely characterized as “ethnic and sectarian conflict” when they were not.

In measuring conflict levels, our scoring is largely judgmental and our rankings nominal rather than ordinal. We distinguish violent conflict from the legitimate and rule-based ethnic and sectarian conflict of identity politics. Where violent cultural conflict does occur, we measure its intensity by looking at whether it is prolonged, chronic, or sporadic, and by assessing whether it is organized or spontaneous. Higher violence is associated with separatist or civil wars threatening a central state; lower violence is associated with outcomes in which state elites repress uprisings and negotiate bargains with ethnic and sectarian groups. Variations in the conflicts are summarized in Table 1.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

PRIMORDIALISM

How can these variations in cultural conflict best be explained? The literature on ethnic and sectarian conflict and its absence has offered three explanatory approaches. The first invokes the centuries of “accumulated hatreds” between “nations” with primordial origins.¹⁰ This essentialist or primordialist approach asserts that “the urge to define and reject the other goes back to our remotest human ancestors, and indeed beyond them to our animal predecessors,”¹¹ and suggests that when the grip of central control is relaxed, “people

reflexively grasp at ethnic or national identifications or what passes for them."¹² The argument suggests that the illiberal politics of identity, with its claims of collective exclusivity, and tendencies toward xenophobia and intolerance are more natural to human societies than liberal politics of interest, which hold that individuals hold multiple and cross-cutting identities and interests that can be aggregated and represented in the political arena.

But current peaceful relations, for example, between the Germans and French in Alsace-Lorraine; between whites, Africans, and African ethnic groups in South Africa; between Pomaks, Turks, and Bulgarians in Bulgaria; or between the Chinese and the Malay in Malaysia suggest that even if accumulated hatreds once fanned the flames of violent conflict, they can be attenuated by alternative memories, more current experience, and institutional incentives. *Primordial explanations that call on "centuries of accumulated hatreds" cannot account for situations in which ethnic groups coexist peacefully. They cannot account for differences in the political expressions of cultural difference—i.e., separatist movements, efforts to control the state, or attempts at power-sharing with other cultural groups. They are thus guilty of selection bias.*

Primordial explanations are flawed in two further respects. *First, they fail to make the distinction between cultural identity and politically relevant cultural identity.* They assume that cultural differences, such as language, religion, cultural traditions, and ethnicity, automatically lead to conflict because they assume that culturally defined groups are by nature exclusionary and are dominated by parochial values that outweigh universalistic norms. According to primordial accounts, parochial norms attributed to cultural groups are believed to isolate them and lead to extremism.¹³ Extremism raises the odds of violence.

But cultural differences do not necessarily trigger the extremism of cultural conflict. Bulgarian Muslims possess different cultural characteristics from Bulgarian Christians, and Ajaris see themselves as culturally different from Georgians. But Pomaks and Bulgarians, Ajaris and Georgians have managed to live peacefully together. Indeed there is usually more conflict *within* a culturally defined group than between different groups.¹⁴ *What primordialists neglect is that cultural identities lead to conflict only when they have become politically charged.* And cultural identity is politicized only when it becomes a

criterion for discrimination and privilege in struggles over the distribution of political and economic resources, rights, and protection. Our findings thus support the claim that the political relevance of cultural identity is socially constructed.¹⁵

Second, *primordial explanations ignore the role that the institutions of the state play in easing, perpetuating, or triggering cultural conflict by structuring incentives in ways that either exacerbate or attenuate the political relevance of cultural identity.* We find that these institutional incentives, embedded in citizenship laws, rules of accountability, participation, and distribution, can structure political struggle in ways that either mute or encourage ethnic and sectarian political conflict. In Malaysia, for example, cultural identities have become politically relevant, but the institutions of state and economy have channeled identity politics into peaceful political competition. In Bulgaria, Pomak cultural identity was never politicized by state institutions and never became politically relevant. In England universal membership in the political community combined with supportive liberal institutions and the structure of party politics to depoliticize ethnic identity, thus blocking the foothold needed by ethnic entrepreneurs for significant participation in British politics. These examples suggest that the state's institutional structure and strength should be placed at the center of any explanation of cultural conflict.

By tracing the ways in which cultural identity is transformed into political identity and showing how politically relevant ethnic and sectarian identities were legitimated and in some cases *created* by political institutions of recent origin, we will show that accumulated hatreds do not have primordial origins and they do not necessarily lead to violent conflict. Indeed we would be naive not to recognize that hatreds do accumulate and collective memories of victimization can lead populations to respond to politicians who draw on the reserve of those memories to foment hatred anew in their efforts to mobilize culturally defined groups for political action and even violence. But we will show that in all cases, politically charged divisions fueled by collective memory are more likely to become violent when institutions that would shape peaceful resolutions to that struggle are weak.¹⁶ Weak institutions permit political entrepreneurs to exploit those divisions in ways that lead to violence. We thus challenge the assumption that political identities are

“given” or primordial. Indeed such a characterization of those identities simply perpetuates the myths that fan the flames of ethnic conflict and make social integration seem impossible.

SECURITY DILEMMAS

An alternative explanation for violent cultural conflict, drawing on the concept of the security dilemma in international relations theory, addresses this second deficiency in that it recognizes the importance of institutions in creating social order.¹⁷ This approach implicitly suggests that where institutions of central authority do not exist and where anarchy prevails, groups tend to seek security above all other goals. Their quest for security leads them to take measures that render other groups insecure, and those groups in turn take measures that threaten others. Thus a vicious cycle of escalating threats takes hold in the absence of a central authority that could reduce those threats. Institutional collapse or decline leads groups to seek an offensive advantage—that is, to grasp the resources that assure their security before these resources are seized by an opposing group. Thus the odds of violence are high when the security dilemma prevails.

Although this approach may indeed be useful in explaining the proximate causes of violence as a result of the actors’ strategic interaction, it is incomplete in four important ways. First, *in equating communal conflict with interstate conflict, it takes the formation of politically relevant cultural groups as given; preferences are assumed and not explained.* Like primordial explanations, accounts of ethnic conflict from this approach assume that cultural groups, like states, have conflicting and incompatible political interests, and thus they will automatically clash. These accounts are primarily concerned with how that clash might become violent. They ignore the evidence that different cultural groups do not necessarily have conflicting political interests, and they do not explore the ways in which the logic of identity politics diverges from the logic of political competition based on conflicts of interest under international anarchy.

Indeed the metaphor of the security dilemma in international politics is misplaced. The political interests of culturally defined groups, unlike the interests of states in the international system, are

not necessarily divergent. A complete account of cultural conflict and its escalation must assess the political transformation of these cultural groups. It must explain why politicized social divisions did not take the form of interest group competition, ideological movements, or class-based organizations. It must also trace the process by which cultural differences led to identity politics and explain why some cultural divisions never became politically charged. Only then can it explain why cultural interests might clash in the political arena.

Second, *the security dilemma metaphor makes the unwarranted assumption that the function of central authority is simply to mitigate and prevent conflict.* Indeed the institutions of central authority can provide the necessary transparency and information to relieve the insecurity of competing groups.¹⁸ They also work to create a political community that cements the expectation that all groups will interact indefinitely, thus enhancing the preference for cooperation among them. And they can repress social violence. But this rather narrow focus on the function of institutional strength in mitigating violence disguises the role that the institutions of central authority play in creating and legitimating cultural conflicts or in attenuating their intensity. They play this role by defining not only the constraints, but also the incentives facing social and political elites. By providing elites with both constraints and incentives, institutions shape their interests and objectives and determine which of many social divisions will become politically relevant. As Levy et al. argue, institutions “shape the logic of the political game.”¹⁹ The institutions of central authority determine whether the logic of interest-based politics, ideology-driven politics, class conflict, or identity politics will dominate political competition. Institutions do not treat all forms of conflict impartially because their function is to channel conflict, not simply to mitigate and prevent it.²⁰ Because of this channeling function, institutions not only constrain behavior, but also they shape political preferences and identities. In short, institutions can construct policies of discrimination and privilege that politicize ethnicity and religion. Or they can construct rules that prohibit cultural discrimination but provide for ideological, class, or interest-based competition.

Third, *the metaphor of the security dilemma fails to explain cultural conflict and the outbreak of cultural violence in industrial societies where*

central authority is relatively strong and social contracts are largely considered legitimate. Accounts that use the security dilemma metaphor to explain ethnic and sectarian conflict fail to explain the outbreak of violence where security dilemmas do not exist. Finally, *the approach fails to explain why institutions weaken and sometimes collapse.* A complete account of cultural conflict must take the causal arrow one step back; it must account for the causes of institutional change and the process by which change triggers cultural violence as opposed to other kinds of conflict.

THE PANACEA OF MARKETS AND “DEMOCRACY”

Despite our refutation of essentialist explanations and our empirical support for institutional arguments, our evidence challenges the currently fashionable claim that the rapid and simultaneous construction of liberal economic and democratic political institutions can mitigate ethnic and sectarian conflict.²¹ Free markets create wealth for all, the argument runs, erasing the need for violent struggle over resources. And democracy permits political aggregation and representation of all social interests, elevating conflicts of interest that can be adjudicated in the political arena over conflicts of identity that are more difficult to negotiate. The logic of liberal democracy suggests that the construction of democratic institutions makes the *individual* rather than collectivities the subject of legal protection and political participation. Democratic theory claims that if ethnic and religious conflicts do exist, they can be peacefully resolved if the organizing principles of the political system elevate tolerance and national unity above ethnic and religious domination and privilege. Furthermore, it claims that federalism, confederalism, and other forms of territorial decentralization that devolve political power to the local level create local and responsive government that will maximize individual freedom and satisfy the claims of some groups for autonomy and self-determination.²² In short, the classical liberal argument claims that the construction of markets and democracy and the decentralization of political and economic power ensures that individuals receive equal protection under the law and that economic and political competition need no longer be violent.

Despite widespread acceptance of these claims, however, the evidence suggests that *perceived economic inequities, particularly those arising from current policies of economic liberalization and the longer-term effects of globalization, can undermine liberal political practices and lead to the illiberal politics that characterize ethnic and sectarian conflict.*²³ Indeed, the case of Germany shows that a well-established liberal capitalist democracy is not immune to ethnic violence and that identity politics are not always easily dissolved within pluralist polities.

We will show that where communal differences had become politically relevant in the past, the ethnic or religious card may be the easiest one to play in the effort to mobilize political support in the face of the uncertainties of economic decline, in the shift from welfare to market economies, and in the move from centralized to decentralized polities. This is particularly evident where both political and economic decentralization threaten to break down established community and the liberal focus on individual self-reliance threatens historical bonds and leads to deep insecurities. Secular economic decline and policies of economic liberalization require the dismantling of institutions of state resource allocation; weakened states are unable to provide equal protection for all who live within their territory.

Finally, the establishment of democracy is not a panacea. Liberal democracies can indeed mute cultural conflict with institutions of inclusiveness, universal representation, and electoral systems designed to encourage elite compromise. Indeed a robust liberal democracy may be one of the strongest defenses against cultural conflict. However, democracies are not all liberal. *Illiberal* democracies may possess many of the attributes of polyarchy, like free elections, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. But they pay only lip service to the rule of law, minority and citizen rights, and independent judicial review.²⁴ Such systems can actually exacerbate cultural conflict. In periods of economic uncertainty and political transition, when states that once provided entitlements pull back or are dismantled, when illiberal democracies are so constructed that they fail to protect rights, and when the introduction of markets leads to deep insecurities, the rich symbolic resources of ethnicity and religion offer hope in their promise of collective power to those populations who feel powerless under these conditions.

THE ARGUMENT

If primordial explanations are flawed, security dilemma metaphors limited, and liberalization panaceas utopian, then what explains variation in conflict and violence? As noted above, our explanation focuses on political institutions. We follow Douglas North's rather broad definition:

Institutions are a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms embedded in those rules and compliance procedures designed to *constrain* the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing wealth, social order, and the well-being of a society. Institutions establish the cooperative and competitive *incentives* in society by virtue of their norms, rules, and procedures.²⁵

In short, institutions both constrain behavior and provide incentives for cooperation and compliance in norms, rules, and procedures for allocation, participation, representation, and accountability. As such, institutions embody the social contract between state and society. We will suggest that the various incentives for cooperation and competition that political institutions establish will hold the key to an explanation of cultural conflict and cooperation.

I begin with a discussion of how cultural identities are transformed into political identities and how politicized cultural identities are legitimated or attenuated by state institutions. I suspect that there will be higher levels of cultural violence in those areas where culture was historically politicized than in those areas where culture did not become politically relevant and other social divisions gave rise to political competition. This is not, however, an argument that all cultural conflict can be blamed on history. The institutions of the modern state are crucial in either cementing, creating, or attenuating cultural or identity politics that were created in historical power struggles. I then turn to the consequences of institutional transformation and propose that the odds of violence increase in those countries where ethnicity and religion were historically most politicized and where old institutions that perpetuated the political relevance of cultural identity collapsed.

Finally, I discuss the causes of those institutional transformations that can increase or decrease cultural conflict in the current period: globalization and economic liberalization. To the extent that economic liberalization and global integration bring economic growth and to the extent that old institutions remain strong and new institutions are resilient in creating incentives for cultural conflict in the face of economic and political pressures that might weaken or transform them, violence is attenuated and political conflict is constrained by the rules of peaceful political competition or the state's ability to repress dissent. Violent communal conflict will be more intense in those areas where ethnicity and religion became politically relevant in the past and where the institutions of central authority are now weakened, are under pressure to change, or have simply reconstituted their constitutive and allocative rules and procedures under the pressures of economic liberalization and global integration. The structure of state institutions and their ability to establish and maintain a legitimate social contract is thus key to the prevention and attenuation of violent ethnic conflict; economic liberalization and globalization can threaten to change the terms of the social contract within these institutions, thus creating political "space" for the appeals of ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs and their offers of new social contracts.

TRANSFORMATION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMATION OF CULTURAL IDENTITY

There are many ways to define social interests and identify divisions among people; not all of them become politically relevant. In most Latin American countries, for example, institutional transformation that accompanied industrialization resulted in the political dominance of divisions between capital and labor over other social divisions that could potentially be politicized—e.g., ethnic, religious, or urban-rural splits.²⁶ Why and how do cultural divisions become more politically relevant than other social divisions?

One of the most important causes of cultural identity transformation can be found in the historical policies of colonial divide-and-rule that separated subjugated populations along ethnic and sectarian lines. The constraints and incentives offered by these policies created the opportunity for political entrepreneurs among colo-

nized groups to draw on cultural identities to mobilize resistance to imperial control, gain access to political power and territory, and exercise power in the construction of new national institutions when colonial power collapsed: opportunities for drawing on other identities or interests were reduced by previous colonial policies. Although they differ substantially in most respects, the *millet* system of Ottoman rule and British colonial policies in India discussed below in this volume provide examples.

Not only external colonial domination but internal political domination and discrimination codified in political institutions—like apartheid in South Africa and the institution of slavery and Jim Crow laws in the United States—created similar cultural cleavages and led to similar historical struggles. Indeed with the founding of the United States came institutional biases in favor of people of Caucasian stock; the Naturalization Act of 1790 permitted any *white* immigrant to become a citizen after two years' residence. The political struggles in the United States throughout the nineteenth century between the federal government and the states reflect struggles between those who would politicize cultural identity and those liberalizing forces who wanted to make other social divisions politically relevant. That debate politicized race in the United States.

These and similar historical struggles in other regions that transformed cultural identity into political identity always required political entrepreneurs, individual leaders, and elites to interpret discrimination, oppression, and privilege in ways that made cultural identity politically relevant to their targeted constituencies. Their interpretations were often shaped by specific institutional incentives. The codification of racial segregation in the infamous *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision of 1896 led to systematic discrimination against blacks in voting, housing, transportation, and education. Black nationalist leaders pointed to that discrimination in their efforts to mobilize blacks in support for nonassimilation, arguing that systematic discrimination had denied them full citizenship rights. In 1954, however, the institutional basis for segregation was abolished, and the U.S. Supreme Court ordered integration "with all deliberate speed." In the 1960s, however, a new generation of black political entrepreneurs drew on historical grievances similar to those of their predecessors' and used evidence of discrimination to argue not *against* assimilation, but rather *for* the dismantling of discriminatory

practices that prevented assimilation. Indeed political entrepreneurs will interpret cultural grievances and shape their particular political agenda in a number of ways, according to the institutional constraints and incentives that face them.

In particular, when arguing for a “state of their own,” political entrepreneurs have also attempted to mobilize support by instilling culturally defined groups with a mythical and heroic past, a sense of mission and messianism, or a belief that the group had intrinsic and unique rights to territory by virtue of its ethnic or religious identity. For example, as Ernst Haas has noted, the southern slaveholding elite in the United States, whose members controlled virtually all political offices in the South, believed that the white master race was a divinely sanctioned oligarchy.²⁷

With arguments similar to these, many political entrepreneurs throughout the world have mobilized culturally defined groups for political action. Some of these arguments, like the one above, are ludicrous; other interpretations of discrimination and privilege are justified. The point here is not the truth of the interpretation, but rather that the most widely accepted interpretation of discrimination has almost always depended on the political acumen of the chief interpreters—the successful political entrepreneurs; in turn, their interpretations are shaped by institutional incentives. And these interpretations are the catalysts, transforming cultural identity into political identity.

Finally, the institutions of the central state, constructed in the critical historical period of nation-building, determined whether or not politicized cultural identity would be cemented in social and political practice and whether culturally defined groups would seek autonomy, separatism, or the right to participate with others in the political arena. Sometimes, as in parts of the former Soviet Union, these institutions created new cultural divisions that were not previously in place. At other times, as in postwar federal Yugoslavia, new institutions reinforced cultural divisions created by the historical interpretations of successful political entrepreneurs. Always, however, the institutions of the state set the terms of the social contract. The institutions that embodied the social contract structured the terms of membership in the political community, the rules of political participation and accountability, the relationship between a state’s central government and its various regions, and criteria for

the production and distribution of material resources.²⁸ In some cases, the social contract allocated resources according to previously established cultural criteria; in other cases, it eschewed those criteria in favor of merit, class, regional or territorial distinctions, or other criteria.

Where state institutions structure political membership and resource distribution according to ascriptive criteria, rewarding and punishing particular ethnic or religious groups, politicized cultural divisions become legitimate in the political arena, thus intensifying their political relevance. This means that the preferential political institutions themselves can have the effect of intensifying and even actively creating political groups that legitimate identity-based political struggles and the allocation of benefits. Preferential policies can then generate a backlash on the part of those groups excluded from benefits, intensifying the militancy of the beneficiaries and reinforcing the importance of ascription as the principle of choice in allocating benefits.²⁹ Alternatively politically relevant cultural identity may be attenuated by state institutions whose rules of allocation, participation, and membership do not recognize cultural difference as politically relevant. These rules are considered to be one of the central hallmarks of the liberal state. Secular states, for example, weaken the political relevance of religious differences. Universal suffrage and citizenship rights weaken the political relevance of race and gender divisions.

The example of citizenship rights illustrates how membership rules can attenuate or exaggerate the political relevance of cultural identity. Citizenship rules can be either inclusive or exclusive. Inclusive citizenship rules make individual civic behavior the criteria for membership, regardless of the individual's cultural attributes. Exclusive membership rules, in contrast, restrict membership in the political community to those people who are of a specified cultural origin, speak a specific language or practice a certain religion. Inclusive citizenship criteria weaken the political relevance of cultural difference; exclusive membership criteria strengthen it.

Membership in the political community, however, is not the only determinant or "cementer" of the content of political identity. Countries with inclusive citizenship laws need supportive institutions of participation and allocation to ensure that cultural identity will not become politically relevant or that its relevance will be

weakened. They need a police force to protect some cultural groups against others who would perpetrate hate crimes. They need a political system that represents the interests of all citizens. They need a system of justice that bolsters equal citizenship rights. And they need allocative institutions to address problems of discrimination and to ensure that equality of citizens is a fact and not simply an empty right. Without a set of supportive institutions, formal laws granting inclusive membership in the political community cannot prevent the politicization of cultural identity by those who practice racist and discriminatory acts. As the British case described here will show, it is not specific or isolated institutions, but rather critical institutional “clusters” that determine whether or not cultural identity will be relevant in the political arena and how identity politics is practiced.

Countries whose institutions make cultural identity politically relevant also need supportive institutions to cement that culturally defined political identity and structure rules in which political competition among cultural groups is considered fair by all competitors if they wish to maintain social stability. Systems of proportional representation, for example, are often made more legitimate by rules for executive power-sharing. In Malaysia political parties are ethnically based with a moderate Islamic catch-all party for the Malays, ensuring representation for all cultural groups. The New Economic Policy (NEP) provides a system of resource allocation that privileges Malays who have experienced economic discrimination. The allocative system is intended to bring fairness to the system of distribution and thus bolster the legitimacy of the system of political representation.

Only through a set of linked supportive institutions can particular political identities be cemented and social practices consistent with institutional rules result. When institutions send conflicting signals about the character of political identity, their legitimacy decreases, and with decreased legitimacy, they can no longer effectively shape the political identity of those in their jurisdiction. This last point requires elaboration.

The Importance of Institutional Legitimacy and Strength. When political institutions make ascription—that is, cultural distinctions—a criterion for membership, participation, and allocation, identity politics is played out in the political arena. When the institutions of

central authority are strong and perceived as legitimate, and when resource allocation is considered fair, political conflicts are less likely to become violent. Indeed perceptions of fair resource allocation are a key pillar of institutional legitimacy. Strong and legitimate institutions provide broadly accepted channels of political competition within which political actors operate in normal times. They allow central authorities to make credible commitments to distribute benefits and structure bargaining among various groups in ways that will be perceived as mutually advantageous. Institutional legitimacy enhances institutional capacity, thus reducing the threat of communal conflict by increasing the benefits of peaceful dispute resolution and reducing the benefits of violence. Although these institutions may privilege some groups over others, they can counter the threat of backlash with offers of side payments and compensation to those who see themselves as harmed by the preferential practices.

It would be wrong to assert that perfect social harmony is the result. These institutions often foster resentment because of these practices of privilege and compensation, but where they are considered essentially legitimate, their behavioral rules are echoed in other organizations and in the society at large. Thus these institutions can create “sticky” norms that shape social practice even in periods of institutional disruption. These norms, reflected in dominant public attitudes, act as a firebreak against ethnic and sectarian violence in that they provide the basis for a legitimate contract between state and society that ensures a degree of domestic order. In Germany, for example, a relatively strong set of institutions protecting individual rights weakened the discriminatory power of exclusive citizenship laws and created a large constituency that opposed discrimination and violence against immigrants. But the German case also suggests that social norms are ultimately dependent on institutional rules and procedures. Cultural violence in Germany was attenuated when those institutions were strong and violence was at its height when those institutions were weakened.

The opposite is true when state institutions are considered unfair, illegitimate, and oppressive. Often privilege is granted to one group, and others are excluded from the privileged resource allocation. Resentment is likely to build but will be repressed as long as the state is strong enough to exert coercive power to maintain social order. As we shall see in the pages that follow, for example, both

Punjabi Sikhs and Georgian peasants in Abkhazia were excluded from privileged resource allocation. Thus both sought to secede from the governing state that they perceived as oppressive. As long as that state remained strong enough to repress dissent and as long as these two groups continued to be deprived of resources for mobilization, their grievances festered, but they did not resort to violence until the institutions of the central state weakened.

Our first set of propositions, then, is the following:

- The political relevance of cultural cleavages will be sustained and in some cases even *created* if they are legitimized by the dominant institutions of state and economy.
- Conversely, the political relevance of cultural identity can be weakened if it is *not* legitimated by those institutions.
- To the extent that those institutions are strong and legitimate, they can attenuate that political relevance or channel it in the direction of nonviolent political competition.
- To the extent that the institutions are strong enough to coerce but illegitimate in the eyes of the groups excluded from preferential access to resources, resentments build but will be repressed and violence will be attenuated.
- To the extent that institutions charged with maintaining order are weak, and to the extent that previous institutions encouraged identity politics and separatist solutions to redress grievances of particular cultural groups, the odds of violence increase.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS, BANDWAGONING, AND ETHNIC ALLIANCES

In those societies whose institutions are under pressure and weakened and whose institutional legacy perpetuated and either formally or informally politicized ethnic or sectarian cleavages, political entrepreneurs emerge who have both the incentive and the opportunity to exploit cultural cleavages and perceived inequities in an effort to mobilize popular support. In part, institutional legacies determine whether populations will respond to these mobilization efforts. If political institutions encourage identity politics and if pro-

hibitions against the practice of extreme identity politics are weak, bandwagoning effects are likely to take hold. This means that when one individual sees others responding to an ethnic entrepreneur or engaging in ethnic protest, the costs of joining decrease; as the costs of joining are reduced, others are encouraged to join; indeed the costs of not joining might go up. Bandwagoning effects can escalate ethnic conflict to violence; the odds of violence increase when ethnic alliances are formed across borders.

When weakened states and resources are scarce, political entrepreneurs—whether in government or in opposition—have little to offer in exchange for support. Limited resources increase their incentive to distribute particular benefits to important supporters rather than to espouse general welfare policies whose benefits to individuals are diffuse. Under conditions of resource scarcity and institutional uncertainty and weakness, in societies where an entrenched tradition of cultural privilege and discrimination prevailed, politicians are tempted to privilege—or promise to privilege—the members of one ethnic or religious community over others. This is because their chief constituency may be a particular cultural group and because cultural patronage networks—as allocative mechanisms—require few transaction costs. In Yugoslavia, for example, the weaker the central government became, the more allocative authority fell into the hands of regional party elites. The deepening economic crisis and the collapse of the social welfare system made their role and their patronage networks increasingly important because their aid became indispensable in keeping both enterprises and individuals afloat; they made significant allocative decisions in the economy, as well as political and administrative appointments based on ethnic and cultural bonds created in their local communities.

With regard to the institutions of representation in new or fragile democracies where resources are scarce and the legacies of ethnic machines still linger, the requirement for electoral support may provide more of an incentive for political entrepreneurs to make extremist appeals that promise more benefits to the targeted ethnic group than for them to make moderate appeals to a wider population.³⁰ In explaining why he formed a nationalist Muslim political party in Bosnia, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Alija Izetbegović illustrated this logic: “Perhaps in four or five years we shall have passed through the minefield to the horizon of civil society. For now,

unfortunately, our party *must* be sectional. . . . The parties that try to represent everyone are small and weak."³¹ Before the elections of 1996, the SDA, following this logic, escalated its rhetoric of identity politics and actively and brutally oppressed the nonsectarian opposition.

If the targeted ethnic group is in the majority, the temptation to make ethnic appeals for electoral support is high if opponents are making appeals on alternative bases, especially when past institutional legacies provide the political entrepreneur with an "ethnic machine" that can deliver voter support in exchange for a credible promise of resources. Even if the targeted ethnic group is in the minority, the temptation exists to play the ethnic card by demanding ethnic autonomy. That temptation is heightened when the ethnic entrepreneur stands to gain autonomous power over a specific territory.³²

Nonetheless, even if political entrepreneurs practice identity politics in electoral campaigns and make appeals based on exclusive promises to specific cultural groups, there is no guarantee that those appeals will result in an enthusiastic response from the targeted population; indeed the efforts of ethnic entrepreneurs do not automatically result in successful political mobilization. We can expect that populations jolted out of previous roles and identities by institutional reform and collapse and soured by perceived inequities may be particularly open to political appeals that emphasize cultural oppression, discrimination, and privilege. But in the recent elections in post-apartheid South Africa, for example—a country undergoing a dramatic institutional and social upheaval—nationalist, separatist leaders in both majority and minority populations were unable to gain a significant political foothold. This was the result despite decades of apartheid and what some might call ancient hatreds. The ethnic appeals of Muslim Bulgarian political entrepreneurs also fell on deaf ears after the fall of communism there, despite institutional collapse. But ethnic appeals in the republics of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia after 1989, nativist appeals of German political entrepreneurs in the 1980s, "skinhead" rhetoric there shortly after German unification, and the separatist appeals of Abkhazian and Sikh radicals resonated with significant elements of the populations in these regions. Why?

As noted, a critical part of the explanation has to do with institutional legacies and current institutional practices—the extent to which identity politics was and continues to be cemented in political institutions and the extent to which the population expects that identity politics will dominate current political competition. The odds are higher that ethnic or sectarian political entrepreneurs fomenting cultural conflict will succeed in their mobilization efforts in those places where institutional legacies created the expectation that identity politics would dominate the political game, even if old institutions supporting that political logic weakened and collapsed. Note the “success” of Vladislav Ardzinba of Abkhazia, Slobodan Milošević of Serbia, and Franjo Tuđman of Croatia. When new institutions are able to even partially erase those legacies, their chances of success diminish. The South African case provides a good example.

Conversely, the odds are higher that political entrepreneurs who wish to *mitigate* cultural conflict and mobilize populations around ideological appeals or regional (as opposed to cultural) autonomy will be more successful when the institutional legacy supports their efforts—that is, when the institutional carriers of identity politics have not been strong and when new institutions do not encourage divisive identity politics. Kiro Gligorov’s relative success in Macedonia and Aslan Abashidze’s success in Abkhazia illustrate the point. And where the institutional carriers of identity politics have been weak, political entrepreneurs fomenting cultural conflict have been less than successful. Note the relative lack of success of the VMRO in Macedonia, the radical Muslim party in Malaysia, and Kamen Burov in Bulgaria. *In short, the resources available for the realization of the goals of political entrepreneurs vary according to the institutional legacies and degree of institutional strength in their country or region, and those resources will be good predictors of their success.*

In Britain, for example, where liberal institutions are relatively strong, the resources available to nativist political entrepreneurs who would foment violence against immigrants are scarce. In Germany, where institutions are predominantly liberal but citizenship is defined in ethnocultural terms and the political party system was undergoing change and experiencing gridlock, ethnic entrepreneurs had a wider range of available resources for political mobilization using ethnic appeals against immigrant populations. At the other extreme, in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia, where Titoist institutions

had deeply politicized ethnic and religious cleavages and where old institutions quickly disintegrated, political entrepreneurs practicing identity politics had a vast array of resources to exchange for support before institutional transformation could begin.

Indeed success and failure in political mobilization efforts based on the rhetoric of identity politics is highly correlated with institutional legacies. But what is the *process* or *mechanism* by which successful mobilization occurs? Strategic interaction theories explain how support for an ethnic entrepreneur can spread beyond the support of those who receive direct and tangible benefits in exchange.³³ They suggest that bandwagon effects influence each individual's choice to engage in identity politics. Both subsequent reduced costs of joining and increased social pressure to join exacerbate bandwagon effects. When one ethnic group jumps on the ethnic bandwagon, other groups are motivated to take countermeasures and jump on bandwagons of their own in order to *balance* against the first group's strength. Thus the importance of *timing* to the odds of escalating cultural conflict. The initial success of one ethnic entrepreneur lowers the costs and raises the incentives for other politicians from other ethnic groups to pursue exclusive ethnic or religious nationalist strategies. That is, when one ethnic bandwagon is filled, those who are excluded because they belong to a different ethnic group feel threatened, and they respond by creating bandwagons of their own. As bandwagons from opposing groups fill, holdouts feel increased pressure to build and jump on their own bandwagons lest they be left standing alone. Timur Kuran explains bandwagoning and balancing this way:

When members of one ethnic group start engaging in more ethnic activity, attention is drawn to society's ethnic divisions. Members of other groups are thus reminded of their outsider status vis-à-vis the group that initiated the process. Motivated to ensure that some group accepts them, they feel pressured to make more public displays of their identity.³⁴

But how do identity politics escalate and become violent? Just because ethnic entrepreneurs may practice identity politics and just because they can mobilize support for that practice does not automatically mean that violence will be the result. Kuran argues that to get the ethnic bandwagon rolling, political entrepreneurs must in-

initially arouse emotions and evoke images through vivid public acts. Particularly effective are acts of violence or civil disobedience. These acts are sometimes small and sporadic, but they can create the initial social pressure required to join the ethnic bandwagon. Extremists are the ones likely to engage in these initial acts; they climb on the bandwagon first to set it in motion, while moderates join later on and thus move toward extremist positions, particularly when constraints on extremism are weak. The bandwagon can also start to roll when violence is initiated against a particular group by the state. In this case, moderates are likely to be rapidly discredited and the value of extremism is heightened. The Indian army's storming of the Sikhs' Golden Temple provides a good example.

This escalation to violence when institutions weaken or collapse is not unique to the practice of identity politics. Class conflict and ideological cleavages escalate to violence in a similar way. The difference is this: the odds that bandwagoning effects under the institutional conditions described here will escalate to violence are higher because resource claims based on exclusive cultural criteria are incompatible. Compromise is always difficult when extremists dominate the political arena; it is more difficult because cultural identity is fixed and non-negotiable; exclusive claims on resources for distinct cultural groups mobilized by myths of superiority and intrinsic rights are particularly difficult to compromise.

We will witness this process in many of the stories told here. In the Yugoslav case, the escalation of ethnic nationalism that led to the 1970–71 crisis in Croatia began with banal incidents that were discounted and therefore tolerated, encouraging escalation.³⁵ The central state, then still strong enough to do so, was able to quell the violence. The 1981 Albanian riots in Kosovo began in a similar fashion, but the central state was weaker and violence began to spread. Shortly before the war broke out, mass demonstrations to protest Albanian discrimination against Serbs in Kosovo began with small groups of protesters but expanded to crowds numbering as many as one million. In Croatia, Croat gangs, often aided by the police, fire-bombed Serb homes, smashed storefronts, and arrested Serb leaders, fueling Croat nationalist sentiments and thus strengthening the political appeals of Croat ethnic entrepreneurs. In the German case, the process of escalation to large-scale violence was precipitated by the attack of eight young skinheads on Vietnamese street merchants in

Hoyerswerda. That initial act of violence was conveyed by electronic media, triggering similar incidents which spread not only throughout the east, but to the west as well. Once Hoyerswerda demonstrated the “success” of such action—that is, the action was not penalized by either state authority or public opinion—potential aggressors elsewhere risked little but expected to gain prestige among their peers by engaging in similar acts.

As the examples above suggest, political institutions can encourage or inhibit these bandwagoning effects. In Abkhazia, for example, institutions encouraged bandwagoning effects. Institutions providing preferential policies for the Abkhazian population spurred demands from the Georgian population to provide preferential policies for Georgians. In response, Abkhazian elites escalated their demands for more preferential policies. Georgians resisted; ethnic tensions heightened. The Yugoslav case tells a similar story.

Conversely, institutions can squelch the temptation to bandwagon.³⁶ In post-Wall Germany ethnic bandwagoning escalated to violence when an institutional vacuum opened in the east; it halted when liberal institutions regained strength. Indeed the lesson of the German case is that it was the *absence* of institutions to prevent ethnic bandwagoning that permitted the violent escalation of ethnic tensions and the reinstatement of institutional constraints that squelched the bandwagoning effect. But in a more subtle sense, when institutions are too weak to meet the political demands of culturally defined groups, when they can no longer make concessions to those groups and adjudicate disputes, the benefits of nonviolent political action are reduced. When all nonviolent means are exhausted, these groups may feel that they have nothing to lose through violent acts. Indeed, as we shall see, this was the case in both Punjab and Kashmir.

Finally, bandwagoning accounts draw our attention to the importance of ethnic alliances, which raise the odds of the escalation of identity politics to cultural conflict. As the bandwagons begin to roll faster, costs of participation are further lowered if ethnic alliances form across borders, bringing material and symbolic resources to new ethnic movements and parties from the more established ones. These resources affect the available incentive structure of political elites and push them to jump on the ethnic bandwagon.³⁷ In Bosnia “sister” Serb and Croat nationalist parties had preponderant

resources, crowding out non-nationalist alternatives. Abkhazian separatists called on former KGB members, elements of the Soviet army, and the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus for material support in their war of succession. Radical Islamic groups formed transnational coalitions to facilitate acts of violence across state borders. As both the Abkhazian and the Bulgarian cases demonstrate, Western human rights organizations and aid agencies have unwittingly abetted the agendas of ethnic and religious entrepreneurs in post-Communist regions and helped to swell the ranks of their supporters by providing or promising to provide material or symbolic support to targeted cultural groups. In those cases where powerful transnational patrons have encouraged a violent grasp for power on the part of their clients, in transforming societies with weakened state institutions, the odds of violence increase.

Our second set of propositions is thus the following:

- When state institutions that sustain the social contract or repress excluded groups are weakened and placed under pressure by internal or external forces in societies where cultural identity had become politically relevant, ethnic and sectarian violence can erupt.
- The eruptions will be more intense in states where political identity was most politicized and where institutions were most severely weakened. In those states, political entrepreneurs will be able to more easily mobilize support based on ethnic or sectarian appeals.
- The odds of violence increase when institutions either encourage bandwagoning effects or are too weak to stop them.
- The odds of violence increase when cultural alliances are formed across borders and the alliance partner encourages violence.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CULTURAL CONFLICT

Economic factors operate in four ways to raise the odds that communal conflict will escalate to violence. First, *economic discrimination and privilege on the basis of ascriptive criteria cause cultural identity to become politically relevant and intensify cultural identities that have*

already become politically charged. Economic discrimination and privilege can thus politicize cultural identity, even if the rules of political institutions encourage the political relevance of other social divisions. In many regions where cultural conflict has erupted, an ethnic or sectarian “division of labor” historically provided for the preferential allocation of resources to particular cultural groups. Over time, preferential systems of resource allocation created both collective resentments and claims on resources based on past entitlements and perceptions of an inherent right to those resources. These resentments and resource claims were woven into the fabric of the collective political identity of particular cultural groups. In Abkhazia, for example, the Abkhazes controlled the most lucrative crops, and their control over local administration gave them an edge in their economic competition with Georgian peasants. Georgian collective farms experienced tighter central control and fewer subsidies than Abkhazian farms. In India the Green Revolution made Punjab the breadbasket of the country, and thus the central government starved Sikhs in the region of industrial development, leading them to believe that they were being exploited for food supplies without adequate compensation. The resentments of both Georgian peasants in Abkhazia and Sikhs in Punjab provided them with strong incentives to free themselves from the oppressive yoke of central governments practicing economic discrimination. Georgians wanted Abkhazia to become part of Georgia, and Sikhs pushed for Punjab’s independence.

Second, *economic factors can weaken the political institutions that uphold the social contracts that provide social stability. Economic factors can also weaken the institutions which repressed those cultural groups with political grievances.* There are, of course, many reasons for institutional weakness and transformation—internal corruption, bureaucratic rigidity, rent-seeking behavior on the part of government elites, a failure to deliver on democratic promises, or simply constitutional changes, to name just a few. Even weakened institutions, however, can maintain a credible commitment to uphold the social contract if they have adequate material resources to exchange for social support or to repress dissent. When the resources of institutions that provided accepted distributive channels are diminished, however, those institutions withdraw from their distributive role in society. When they withdraw by dismantling their social welfare systems and privatizing state enterprises, those who are disadvan-

tagged by that withdrawal often blame the state for their hardships. These populations become increasingly cynical about their political membership in those states; a gradual loss in government legitimacy is the result.³⁸ Further, states that use discrimination and repression to maintain social order need resources to reinforce coercive policies targeted against specific cultural groups. When those resources are diminished, coercion can fail, and political entrepreneurs are likely to seize the opportunity to capture the state or secede from it. We must therefore look to the factors that diminish those resources if we are to understand the conditions under which institutional transformation raises the odds of cultural violence.

Our cases point to long-term globalization trends and short-term policy responses to those trends—i.e., forces that reduce the state's role in the economy and reduce its sovereignty over political membership—as the key domestic causes of broken social contracts and failed coercive policies. Global immigration patterns undermine the contract for political membership. National economic growth and decline and the level of external debt affect the level of resources that the state can allocate, and short-term policies of economic liberalization yield up the state's distributive powers to the market. Indeed when states make the decision to allow the market to pick economic winners and losers, they can break the social contract that once permitted them to soften some of the disadvantages suffered by particular cultural groups. The state's ability to soften such disadvantages permitted the integration of those groups into the political community. All of these forces of globalization and liberalization thus have an important impact on the state's ability to support institutions that provide social order or repress dissent.

Similarly, policies of economic decentralization can break the social contract that once permitted central governments to transfer resources to minority ethnic or religious groups who would lose those resources if local majority authorities gained control. Policies of decentralization can also break the cycle of economic discrimination against distinct regional cultural groups. These policies heighten the motivation of political entrepreneurs to confront the center and strengthen their hand with populations in their regions with their promises of autonomy. Policies of decentralization also break the chain of central control over repressive institutions, creating new opportunities for political opposition. When opposition po-

litical entrepreneurs have tangible resources to provide, they are likely to gain support.

Globalization and liberalization can trigger conflict only when economic hardships result and when those hardships fall disproportionately on distinct cultural groups. Indeed in some important cases, economic liberalization has mitigated cultural conflict. For example, as Malaysian prosperity expands the economic pie, increasing resources are available for all cultural groups. Because the allocative institutions that support the social contract distribute these resources in ways widely perceived as fair, this prosperity solidifies the legitimacy of the social contract and denies sectarian political entrepreneurs the grievances that could become the fuel for political mobilization. In Punjab, where central state restrictions have been lifted, market-stimulated growth may indeed benefit disgruntled Sikh farmers, who were excluded from a system of ascriptive resource allocation. But a note of caution is in order: it is only when states “win” in market competition and when previously disadvantaged groups benefit that economic transformation can mute cultural conflicts.

Third, *economic factors not only affect the strength of institutions at the top within society, but they also directly create conditions at the bottom that make social groups receptive to the appeals of political entrepreneurs.*³⁹ Economic hardship provides a concrete justification for political grievances that can be transformed into a resource for political mobilization.

Economic crisis and change always cause social disruption and radical dislocation of communities. When secular economic trends lead to low growth, debt crises, rising unemployment, and rising rates of immigration, and when the resulting hardships and benefits are disproportionately allocated among various cultural groups, existing political cleavages based on cultural difference are exacerbated and new ones are created. In Bulgaria, for example, the introduction of markets and the restitution of land created disproportionate unemployment among the Muslim population. In England, as industry declined in the early 1980s, the resulting unemployment was disproportionately allocated to minority populations. As Elaine Thomas describes here, in 1984, 95 percent of Handsworth’s black school leavers and 84 percent of their Asian counterparts remained jobless. It was in this area that a major riot broke out.

Economic hardships that lead cultural groups to distrust the state can make these groups available for reassignment to new political identities. The losers in economic transformation will attempt to use their political resources and position to resist changes that disadvantage them. Economic difficulties that fall disproportionately on culturally defined social groups thus create the demand for the goods that political entrepreneurs promise to deliver, particularly when those same factors that fuel cultural grievances also reduce government resources to uphold the social contract.

State withdrawal from its allocative role, the introduction of markets, and disproportionate economic hardships are grist for the mill of eager political entrepreneurs. This is exemplified in the case of Bulgaria. There the former Communist regime provided the Turkish minority with economic security. Ethnic Turks were concentrated in the tobacco industry; the state purchased tobacco, ensuring full lifetime employment. With the fall of communism, however, the inefficient and uncompetitive tobacco industry was privatized, and its failure in global markets left the majority of Turks unemployed and destitute. Now Turkish political entrepreneurs in Bulgaria label unemployment “ethnic genocide” in their effort to mobilize the Turkish population against the liberalizing policies of the new regime.

Finally, *the political entrepreneurs who are able to offer tangible resources to disadvantaged populations are those most likely to gain support.* For example, privatization deprives trade union leaders of the resources needed to mobilize support around class identities; local officials, however, who have a cache of resources or foreign support from a diaspora ethnic or religious community will be able to mobilize support around an ethnic or religious identity. If would-be ethnic or sectarian nationalists have no tangible resources to offer, they may be able to initiate random terrorist acts, but they will be unlikely to gain the necessary support to play a role in the political arena, capture the state, or secede from it.

The level of material resources available to competing political entrepreneurs is dependent upon two conditions: 1) the degree to which cultural criteria were historically used to allocate these resources; political systems in which resources were once allocated according to ethnic and sectarian criteria provide some modern ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs with a stash of material resources available for political mobilization, and 2) the level of re-

sources provided by international alliances. In the Bulgarian case cited above, Turkish political entrepreneurs had few tangible resources to offer in exchange for support. Because cultural identity in Bulgaria was not politically charged and because the Turkish party—the MRF—was legally prohibited from constituting itself as an ethnic party, its influence with the Turkish population was minimized. Although the MRF plays an important political role in Bulgaria, it has not been able to mobilize enough support in order to introduce the logic of identity politics into the political arena.

In regions where ethnic and sectarian entrepreneurs had more tangible resources to offer, they were able to gain increasing political power. Particularly where fiscal crises were deep, space was opened for politically relevant cultural groups to usurp the state's previous allocative functions and deliver alternative economic benefits to targeted cultural groups. By providing an alternative channel for economic resources, these groups either provide the first impetus for the politicization of cultural identity or they further mobilize political support against state institutions and intensify the political relevance of cultural identity. By becoming an alternative distributor of material goods in Egypt, for example, the moderate Muslim Brotherhood has been able to deepen and sometimes create the political relevance of Muslim identity. Indeed the Muslim Brotherhood and the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria have far more support that can be translated into political power than Gamma or Islamic Jihad, which can offer only an alternative identity but few tangible resources. These groups obtained tangible resources from transitional Islamic groups. In the former Soviet Union regional officials with access to material goods have been able to prevail over political competitors who can offer only symbolic resources. Because they were well positioned to convert the local state apparatus into a mechanism for the distribution of patronage, they have been able to create new political identities—often ethnic or sectarian—among their clients.

Where the fiscal crisis is deep, where cultural identities have been politicized but where political entrepreneurs have few tangible resources to offer, they may be able to organize for only sporadic violence against the regime in power or against groups who allegedly caused the economic hardship (often minority immigrant populations). In East Germany after 1990, for example, the increasing

presence of immigrants provided a focus for dissatisfactions and resentments, as the native population saw public expenditures going to “foreigners” while they were faced with rising unemployment and housing shortages. Sporadic violence against foreigners was the result. When economic crisis was attenuated and political institutions were restored, violence receded.

In short, when economic decline, rising immigration, liberalization policies, and decentralization reduce central state resources required to uphold the social contract, that contract can break. If the costs of broken social contracts fall disproportionately on culturally defined groups, the door opens to political entrepreneurs bent on mobilizing populations along ethnic and sectarian lines. Cuts in resources to culturally defined populations ensure that their appeals will not fall on deaf ears. But only those political entrepreneurs who have tangible resources to offer in exchange for support are likely to succeed in meeting their goals.

Our third set of propositions is the following:

- Economic discrimination and privilege on the basis of ascriptive criteria cause cultural identity to become politically relevant.
- Economic globalization and domestic economic policy responses can weaken the political institutions that upheld the social contract that provided social stability or the institutions that repressed dissent. Broken social contracts and weakened repressive institutions open political space for ethnic and sectarian entrepreneurs to mobilize support for their efforts to capture the state or secede from it.
- Economic hardships that fall directly and disproportionately on culturally defined social groups create the demand for the goods that ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs promise to deliver.
- The political entrepreneurs who are able to offer tangible resources to disadvantaged populations are most likely to gain support. The resources available to them are directly related to legacies of institutional resource allocation—whether cultural criteria were used as allocative principles or not—and to the level of resources available from international alliances.

- The extent of institutional disruption brought on by economic transformation and disproportionate economic deprivation, combined with the extent to which cultural distinctions were previously politicized and the level of resources available to political entrepreneurs who promote violence, will largely determine whether identity politics escalates to communal violence and will largely determine the intensity of that violence.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the central argument of this volume can be distilled as follows: Cultural identities can be transformed into political identities when cultural groups are targeted for privilege or discrimination and when economic factors, no matter how “impersonal,” lead to disproportionate hardships among culturally defined populations. The institutions of the central state can either legitimate the political relevance of cultural identity and channel cultural conflict in ways that achieve social harmony, or they can mute the political relevance of cultural identity and construct channels of allocation without regard to cultural differences. Economic strength contributes to the institutional strength that mutes the political identity of culturally defined groups or channels identity politics to peaceful conflict resolution. When these institutions are weakened, political entrepreneurs in divided societies can mobilize support around cultural identities where they had been previously legitimized, or they can act to transform cultural into political identity by pointing to disproportionate hardships where politicized cultural identities did not previously exist. Economic factors can thus impact both identity transformation and institutional strength. If institutional legacies encourage identity politics, if economic grievances are defined in cultural terms, if political entrepreneurs are initially successful in their cultural appeals for political support, bandwagoning effects and ethnic alliances increase the odds that identity politics will escalate to violence.

The chapters in this introductory section elaborate on the central concepts introduced here, and the case studies follow. In the concluding section, I draw upon the wealth of material in the stories

told in those case studies in order to defend each step of the argument.

NOTES

1. David Binder with Barbara Crosette, "As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy," *New York Times*, 7 February 1993, pp. A1, A14.
2. Cited in David C. Rapoport, "The Importance of Space in Violent Ethno-Religious Strife" (San Diego: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, January 1996); IGCC Policy Paper No. 21.
3. See Carol Bellamy, "State of the World's Children in 1996"; UNICEF report; cited in Barbara Crosette, "Unicef Report Sees Children as Major Victims of Wars," *New York Times*, 11 December 1995, p. A7.
4. By August 1995 UNHCR reported that more people had been uprooted in Bosnia than anywhere else in the former Yugoslavia, both absolutely and as a share of the population. Of the prewar population of 4.4 million, 1.3 million were displaced within Bosnia. Another 500,000 sought shelter in Serbia and Croatia, and over 500,000 live outside the former Yugoslavia. Before the war, there were 600,000 Serbs in Croatia of a total population of 4.8 million. With the Croatian offensive in the Krajina, 150,000 left. Before that, perhaps 200,000 had already left Croatia (*Economist*, 19 August 1995, p. 42).
5. See *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 28 June 1994, and *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 23, 1995.
6. See, for example, Ethan Kapstein, "Workers and the World Economy," *Foreign Affairs* 75, 1 (May-June 1996): esp. pp. 17, 22, and 26.
7. Political entrepreneurs resemble their economic counterparts in that they seek to maximize their individual interests and in doing so, have an effect on aggregate interests. The political entrepreneur seeks to maximize political power, while the economic entrepreneur seeks to maximize wealth. But like their economic counterparts, political entrepreneurs engage in risk-taking behavior to maximize their returns. For additional comments on political entrepreneurs, see David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 285-316; Paul R. Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," *Ethnicity* 3, 3 (September 1976): 225-39.
8. This assumption has not been systematically tested. A good test would compare the intensity of conflict and level of violence of "identity group"

conflicts with "interest group" conflicts, ideological conflicts, class conflicts, and interstate conflicts.

9. For important but more specific institutional approaches with general implications, see Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), and Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
10. Clinton's inaugural address; cited in *New York Times*, 21 January 1993, p. A15.
11. Cited in Bernard Lewis, "Muslims, Christians, and Jews: The Dream of Coexistence," *New York Review of Books*, 26 March 1992, p. 48. Literature in this essentialist school includes James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (London: Macmillan, 1991); R. A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations* (New York: Random House, 1970); Uri Ra'anan, "Nation and State: Order out of Chaos," in *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Breakup of Multinational States*, ed. Uri Ra'anan, Maria Mesner, Keith Armes, and Kate Martin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 13–14; and Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press, 1963). For a more nuanced version, often called the "ethnic-continuationist" version of nationalism, see Anthony D. Smith: *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), and *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
12. See, for example, James B. Rule, "Tribalism and the State," *Dissent*, Fall 1992, p. 519.
13. See Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
14. See Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Essays in the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994).
15. See Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, for a discussion of essential and constructed identities.
16. An important discussion of collective memory can be found in Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, "The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign Policy"; paper presented at the conference on the Postwar Transformation of Germany, Center for German and European Studies, University of California, Berkeley, December 1995.
17. See Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103–24; James Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict"; IGCC Project on the International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, 30 October 1995; and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict"; conference draft for the IGCC Project on the International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, 30 October

1995. Stephen Saideman makes a similar argument in "Is Pandora's Box Half-Empty or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration" (San Diego: Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1996); IGCC Policy Paper No. 18. A similar discussion involving the role of population growth and migration can be found in Lawrence R. Robertson, "Ethnic Minorities, Migration, and Conflict Contagion in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union"; conference draft for the IGCC Project on the International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, 30 October 1995.
18. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security* 16 (Summer 1991): 130–33.
 19. See Jonah Levy, Robert Kagan, and John Zysman, "The Twin Restorations: The Political Economy of the Reagan and Thatcher 'Revolutions'"; (Berkeley, October, 1995); unpublished manuscript.
 20. See E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 72.
 21. See, for example, Surjit S. Bhalla, "Freedom and Economic Growth: A Virtuous Cycle?"; paper presented at the South Asia Seminar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, February 1994; Laurence Whitehead, "Political Democratization and Economic Liberalization: Prospects for Their Entrenchment in Eastern Europe and Latin America"; paper presented at the Southern California Seminar on Political and Economic Liberalization, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 30 January 1995. Barbara Geddes makes a more narrowly economic argument when she claims that authoritarian regimes are not required for development (see "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," *Journal of Democracy* 5, 4 [October 1994]: 104–18).
 22. Lake and Rothchild, pp. 36–37.
 23. Benjamin Barber makes similar connections, although his logic of explanation diverges from ours. He argues that economic globalization also globalizes politics by creating new sources of dominance, surveillance, and manipulation, thereby weakening the nation-state. The state is thus increasingly less important as a focus of political life. Global processes do not require democracy to expand. With the decline of the nation-state as the locus of political life and the increasingly undemocratic globalization of political and economic life, subnational communities governed by fanatical hierarchies attempt to localize politics. These groups are also undemocratic in that they demand loyalty to the group above loyalty to the individual, and rights are only real for the dominant group. The result is the decline of democracy and democratic, integrating nation-states. Barber does not explain why local politics would take a nondemocratic form. See *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Random House/Times, 1995). The main themes of this book were published in an earlier article by the same name in the *Atlantic Monthly* 209, 3 (March 1992): 53.

24. On the distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies, see Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Terry Lynn Karl: "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, October 1990, and "Imposing Consent? Electoralism vs. Democratization in El Salvador," in *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–1985*, ed. Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva (La Jolla: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, UCSD, 1986); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Various Crises, and Problematic Democratization," *World Development* 21, 8 (August 1993); David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy 'with Adjectives': Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research" (South Bend, Ind.: Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame), working paper. For other arguments about the potential negative impact of democracy on ethnic harmony, see the essays in Brown, ed.
25. Douglas C. North, in *Structure and Change in Economic History*, pp. 201–2.
26. Barbara Geddes, "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe," *Comparative Political Studies*, 28, 2 (July 1995): 239–75.
27. See Ernst B. Haas, "Nationalism in the United States" (Berkeley, 1995); unpublished manuscript.
28. By constructing the rules for membership, distribution, accountability, and participation, institutions shape actor preferences by rewarding some choices and punishing others. They not only constrain some behaviors and encourage others, but also they provide power resources to some social actors and deny them to others. They thus shape the strategies of political elites, both inside and outside government, and structure the relations of power among social groups. See Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg, *The Sociology of Economic Life* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 734–49; Sven Steinmo, Katherine Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
29. Myron Weiner, "The Political Consequences of Preferential Policies: A Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 16, 1 (October 1983): 35–53.
30. See Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Press, 1972).
31. Cited in Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 219.

32. Studies of electoral processes suggest that specific promises to members of an identifiable group are more appealing to that group than moderate promises from which a diffuse population stands to gain. The logic suggests that when a political entrepreneur makes exclusive promises to a targeted ethnic group, he is more likely to win the votes of that group than if appeals are targeted broadly to a multiethnic population.
33. Important examples include Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (May 1978); James De Nardo, *Power in Numbers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Revolution," *Public Choice* 61 (April 1989); Dennis Chong, *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Susanne Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91," *World Politics* 47 (October 1994): 42-101.
34. Timur Kuran, "Ethnic Dissimilation and Its Global Transmission" (Los Angeles, 1995); unpublished manuscript, p. 15.
35. See Dennison Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy and the 'National Question,'" in *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*, ed. Pedro Ramet (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. 134.
36. For a game-theoretic approach to institutional "squelching" of ethnic conflict, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation"; paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 31 August-3 September 1995.
37. On ethnic alliances between states, see Will H. Moore and David R. Davis, "Does Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Alliances and International Interactions"; paper presented at meeting of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, Canada, March 1995.
38. Guillermo O'Donnell makes this argument in "On the State, Various Crises, and Problematic Democratization."
39. Our argument about the role of economic factors in the current period builds on work that demonstrates a linkage between economic liberalization, and globalization, on the one hand, and political mobilization along ethnic or religious lines on the other. See, for example, Gail W. Lapidus, Victor Zaslavsky, and Philip Goldman, eds., *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

SEEKING A STATE OF ONE'S OWN: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING ETHNIC AND SECTARIAN CONFLICTS

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What are the causes of ethnic and sectarian conflict? In this paper, I offer an analytical framework that rests on two central propositions. First, what has come to be called ethnic and sectarian conflict is, no more and no less, about the struggle for state power. As such, the methods utilized by participants in ethnic and sectarian movements do not differ a great deal from those of others, in different places and times, who have also been engaged in similar struggles. Second, the causes of these conflicts are not to be ascribed solely to the domestic configurations within the countries where they occur; what happens "when ethnicities collide" is also the result of global processes and forces impinging on those domestic configurations. As we shall see, these two propositions grow out of the historical nature and logics of the state and the state system, both of which are undergoing significant transformations initiated during the cold war.

In offering this framework, I depart from much of the mainstream scholarship on the origins of so-called ethnic conflict, which is apt to see it in either purely historical or cognitive terms. History, of course, plays a central role in this framework, as does cognition, but so do forms of "rational choice." History provides part of the structure within which active agents make choices about these tactics and strategies that will enable them to accumulate power, status, and wealth; ethnicity and religion then become two of the cognitive frameworks for mobilizing people behind specific projects that promise gains in power, status, and wealth.

The chapter consists of two sections. In the first, I discuss the general conditions that have led to what many consider as the

greatly increased visibility of “ethnic” conflict since 1990.¹ I also suggest that religious or “sectarian” conflict, while often relegated to the same category, is not quite the same phenomenon. In the second section, I provide a brief overview of the most widely accepted explanations for ethnic and sectarian conflict and suggest that they are, each taken individually, incomplete. I offer a more nuanced framework for explaining the emergence of ethnic conflict, with particular reference to the relationship between agents and structures. I refer to some of the arguments made in subsequent chapters by other contributors to this volume as a means of illuminating this framework.

THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF NATIONAL FRAGMENTATION

The reasons for recourse to ethnicity and religion as the sparks of so many intrastate conflicts grow out of one peculiar consequence of the end of the cold war and the processes of globalization and liberalization that the United States, intentionally or not, engendered in its prosecution.² These have, somewhat paradoxically, led to a situation in which states and national economies are prone to fragmentation, rather than the more generally expected integration.

The dual processes of the globalization of “embedded liberalism” *and* global liberalization had their beginnings in the Bretton Woods system.³ The founders of that system sought, within limits, to extend certain features of the U.S. domestic economy throughout the world as a way of ensuring that the conditions of the interwar period would not reemerge and trigger yet another world war.⁴ The system worked, and from the perspective of American capital it worked as it was designed to do, which was to make the global economy look the same anywhere in the world as it did from any vantage point within the fifty American states.⁵

To clarify this point, we need to go back to World War II, when John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and others were laying plans for the postwar economic system that would, this time, ensure the peace. The Bretton Woods system was to be based on an expansive form of liberalism: the gradual lowering of tariff barriers to trade, on the convertibility of major currencies, on the free flow of

capital (but not labor), an international division of labor based on comparative advantage. Free trade would mean that, as Cordell Hull once put it, goods, and not soldiers, would cross borders. From the perspective of the United States and the United Kingdom, this system would also result in what Gallagher and Robinson called “the imperialism of free trade.”⁶ Moreover, those countries that controlled currency, capital, and technology would be in a more or less permanently advantaged position vis-à-vis others.

Although Keynes and White did not think in terms of core and periphery, such a logic was already in place.⁷ The winners would produce the manufactured goods and retain a permanent technological edge; some countries would occupy an intermediate position in the division of labor; and yet others would be the “hewers of wood and carriers of water,” supplying raw materials to the factories of the core and buying the goods manufactured there. Such an arrangement would also maximize economic efficiency and profits, generating low-cost goods for consumption in the core countries and increasing purchasing power without the need for redistribution. There was, of course, a flaw in this logic that seems not to have been noticed at the time and which has only become really obvious over the past twenty years—although it was flagged by Alexander Gerschenkron in the early 1960s and others before him.⁸ Given the nature of scientific and technical knowledge, any single technological advantage is very evanescent.⁹ This is especially true when foreign direct investment is encouraged and when capital and technology are allowed to flow more or less freely across borders.¹⁰

Early on during the cold war, it was believed that the nonindustrialized world, and some of the industrialized countries, as well, harbored large masses of poor, dissatisfied rural residents and peasants who might prove fertile ground for communism. As Eisenhower put it in his memoirs in 1948,

Wherever popular discontent is found or group oppression or mass poverty or the hunger of children, there Communism may stage an offensive that arms cannot counter. Discontent can be fanned into revolution, and revolution into social chaos.¹¹

The key to dealing with this potential threat was economic development; the theories of Rostow, Huntington, and others were rooted in a concern about the potential attractiveness of radical revolutions

in strategically critical countries.¹² Ultimately, it was exactly this concern that led to the reconstruction not only of Western Europe, but also Germany and Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and others. While efforts were made throughout the cold war to restrict the flow of “strategic” goods and commodities to the Soviet bloc through COCOM, these rules were much less rigorously applied to American allies, who were able to develop their technological base at a very rapid rate.¹³ As these places got back on their feet, they also became more technologically advanced, in terms of not only foreign investment, but also human capital, so to speak.

At first, our allies produced goods that were too crude or cheap to be worthwhile manufacturing in the core any longer—there was once a time when the label “Made in Japan” was an indication of low product quality (as “Made in China” sometimes is today)—but they soon progressed to more advanced goods. Because certain factors of production were cheaper in follower and developing countries, it became economically rational for U.S. corporations to ship production offshore. Foreign goods could be made more cheaply and, because mass consumption was predicated on low-cost manufactures, this was beneficial to all concerned. Eventually, however, something odd began to occur. Production—and research and development, too—no longer depended very much on location at all. Some things were still cheaper to produce or put together in the Third World; others that had moved offshore were now moving back to the core. Within the core countries themselves, there were regions of periphery; indeed, within regions of advanced manufacturing, there was great demand for various types of unskilled labor. In other words, borders came to mean less and less for economies, and the particular combination of factors of production in a place came to mean more and more.¹⁴

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system—or, rather, its inevitable transformation—and the twenty-odd years of economic restructuring that followed simply signaled the limits, as well as the successes, of this approach. Indeed the weaknesses of the Bretton Woods arrangements became evident almost immediately following their establishment, and the United States found it necessary to pump increasing amounts of liquidity into the international system—through loans to the UK, the Marshall Plan, and eventually via military aid—in order to sustain the circle.¹⁵ Ultimately, there were

more dollars in circulation than could be redeemed for gold by the U.S. Treasury, and in 1971 President Nixon “closed the gold window.”¹⁶ But this particular crisis had less to do with dollars than demand: Europe and Japan, which might have been expected to be steady customers of American advanced goods, found it more rational and rewarding to produce their own, similar manufactures than to continue importing American ones. This meant that their need for dollars fell, and their surpluses grew accordingly. At the then current rate of exchange, moreover, U.S. goods were costly by comparison with European and Japanese ones; to make U.S. producers more competitive, it was necessary to devalue the dollar, which Nixon did twice. Even these devaluations did not help in the long run, inasmuch as domestic inflation, which peaked at around 15 percent per year during the Carter administration, had the effect of driving wages up at comparable rates. The result was that by the beginning of the 1980s, domestic wages and inflation were high, American manufactures were under stiff pressure from foreign products, and the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit was of increasing concern to both policymakers and Wall Street.

The Reagan administration’s tactical approach to this dilemma was threefold, even if it was not entirely intentional. First, the administration revived cold war hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the reasons for this were many, the effect was to reestablish a “hard” basis for making public policy. This, as David Stockman pointed out, had the effect of forcing choices between defense and social welfare, with the goal of reducing expenditures on the latter.¹⁷ The second was to foster a policy of high domestic interest rates and tight money in order to “squeeze” inflation out of the economy. This policy was successful, but it also resulted in one of the most severe recessions since the Great Depression, followed by a disproportionately large rise in the value of the dollar, as foreign capital flowed into the country. This undermined a good chunk of the domestic industrial base which, although not very efficient, nonetheless employed a large pool of blue-collar workers. It also drove a number of developing countries into near bankruptcy. The third tactic was deregulation, which, it was argued, would eliminate excessively burdensome rules that were imposing unreasonably high costs on businesses, squeezing their profits and lessening their efficiency and competitiveness.

The economic system that we now see encompassing the world is, in a sense, the ultimate triumph of the post-World War II planners: everyone rushing toward economic and political liberalism, everyone striving for maximum return on investment and efficiency, and no one involved in production very concerned about national borders or the “social contract” within them. Effectively, the gradual removal of national barriers to the flow of capital—the ultimate extension of the Bretton Woods project—exposed everyone, including the United States, to the logic of capital mobility that followed and the effective undermining of the nation-state.¹⁸ This is, to be sure, a rather simplistic accounting of the relationship between Bretton Woods, the cold war, and globalization, and many will find it easy to criticize. But in a more mercantilistic or economically nationalistic world, in which protectionism was a virtue rather than a sin, such a system would not have developed.¹⁹ In that world, capital would have remained under national control, and industrial policy would not have been restricted to military technology but would have incorporated civilian technology too. Government would be more concerned about the security and stability of the various parts of the nation than its absolute wealth. It might have been a much poorer world, but it would also be one in which national cohesion and culture would be easier to maintain. Instead, we are faced with a world of dialectically linked integration *and* fragmentation.²⁰

Why are integration and fragmentation linked? Global economic integration is a condition whose origins are to be found in the mid-nineteenth century, with the rise of English liberalism and the doctrine of free trade as propagated by the Manchester School. With fits, starts, and retreats, such integration has reached into more and more places in the world, creating myriad webs of material linkages. The fact that such integration has become so widespread does not, of course, mean that all places in the world share in the resulting benefits. It is uneven development that makes capitalism so dynamic and the constant search for new combinations of factors that drives innovation; the fact that there are multiple economic “systems” present in any one location simply adds to the dynamism of the process.²¹ Today’s comparative advantage may consequently be tomorrow’s competitive drag.

The political implications for the nation-state of such a process have not been given much thought. Comparative advantage is no

longer a feature of states as a whole—it never really has been in any event—but rather of region and locale, where the combination of material, technological, and intellectual is, perhaps only momentarily, fortuitous.²² The specific advantages of a place such as Silicon Valley—in many ways an historical accident as much as the result of deliberate policy²³—have only limited spillover in terms of a country as a whole. These conditions, moreover, seem not to be easily reproduced in the short term.²⁴

The competition among places to attract investment and jobs thus becomes more of a zero-sum game than a positive-sum one, and this point is not lost, for example, on the American states and cities that have established foreign trade offices and regularly send trade missions abroad as well.²⁵ Capital has its choice of locations in which to invest; cities, communities, places—and to a certain degree, labor—have a limited set of factors through which they can attract capital. Indeed, this competition has become a business opportunity for some; a recent article in the San Francisco *Examiner* describes the activities of a consulting firm providing city and regional marketing programs for economic development as resembling those

of an international arms dealer—selling weapons to one ruler and then making a pitch to the neighboring potentate based on the new threat. Part of the pitch for these [economic development] programs is that a region needs its own program to survive against the rival programs of other areas.²⁶

Such competition can become the cause of considerable political antagonism, against both the neighbors who win and the authorities who have contributed to these conditions of competitive struggle in the first place. How such antagonisms play themselves out is contextual and contingent, of course, and often depends on preexisting social and political “fault lines” that fracture under the pressures of real, potential, or imagined competition. In some countries, these fault lines were intended to be administrative but were drawn up in ethnic or national terms; in other places, the fault lines are linguistic, religious, clan-based, “tribal,” or even vaguely cultural.²⁷ It goes without saying that those places in which people have fallen to killing each other have nothing to offer global capital—they have, quite literally, fallen out of “history”—but places able to break away from the political grip of larger polities, as Slovenia escaped

the competitive drag of Serbia, will be well placed to participate in the global economy.

Ethnicity enters this equation as follows: For more than forty years, the control of states and governments was contested through the conflicting discourses of “free world” liberalism and “Soviet bloc” communism. Many of those who held power did so with the real or imagined assistance of one superpower patron; those who aspired to power asked for help from the other. The political coloration of regimes in power changed—now left, now right—but borders did not. The emergence of new nation-states was obviated by the lines drawn on the maps of the world and reified as eternally fixed.²⁸

These two dominating discourses have now been superseded by one. Inasmuch as all contenders for state control must now profess, if not practice, economic and political liberalism, material assistance in the struggle for power can no longer be generated, as it was during the cold war, by appeals to the great ideological contenders. Within a liberal framework, efforts to capture power are now seen as internationally legitimate only if they occur through some form of nominally democratic electoral process. The acquisition of power by these means, however, requires the support of the majority of an electorate, which, because of societal demography and the residues of recent history, may be difficult if not impossible in many instances.

There is, however, another strategy available to those seeking power and control: a state of one's own. National borders are now subject to change, as evidenced in the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. If one cannot capture power within an existing state, why not create a new one, within which one's brethren or associates in political belief do constitute a majority? Herein lies a problem, however: those who govern existing states are extremely reluctant to see parts of them break away since this tends to delegitimize domestically the ruling regime and open it up to attacks from all sides. Indeed, the holders of power are likely to see such secessionist efforts as threats to the security of both state and nation and to respond accordingly. Hence the logic of the state and state system, the first defined in exclusivist national terms, the second positing international legitimacy only through a “nation-state,” pushes in the direction of *more* states.²⁹ Inasmuch as the state has come to be defined in terms of a single nation—even when this is manifestly untrue—something, or someone, has to give.

This framework is not quite complete, however. Layered on top of this neo-Westphalian geopolitical structure is a more recent economic one, manifested through globalization and liberalization. Globalization, in this instance, is a process of liberalization, integration, and development, as well as social and organizational innovation, that “levels the economic playing field” by fostering capital mobility and reducing government intervention into markets.³⁰ Governments are enjoined to increase national prosperity by reducing social expenditures, with the result that the distributive functions of the state are undermined or eliminated at the precise time when they are most needed: to buy off, as it were, dissatisfied or deprived elements of the citizenry.³¹

Sectarian conflict follows from the same economic logic, but a somewhat different geopolitical one. Globalization—in its economic and other forms—has undermined “national security” not only by confusing “outside” and “inside,” but also by showing up the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of national security discourse as a means of social control. Moreover, many states are finding it difficult, if not impossible, to provide the welfare functions that would help them to buy off dissatisfied or oppositional groups. Consequently, the state is being delegitimized as the protector of society even as religious movements that claim to “protect” society through social and civil action are emerging or being revived. The proliferation of religious movements within countries and across borders is simply one manifestation of this process.³²

In a truly “globalized” world, of course, such dissatisfaction would be remedied by complete labor mobility, as was the case with immigration into the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (and which is still the case, to some degree, today). During the cold war, a certain amount of labor mobility was permitted to those seeking political asylum from leftist persecution and also in the economic and security interests of the “free world” (as, for example, Turks and Yugoslavs migrating into the European Community as “guest workers”). But today such mobility is allowed primarily only to those who possess the skills or capital to obtain a visa and emigrate; most of those left behind do not have such legal opportunities (although some number are willing to try illegal methods).³³

More fundamental than this, however, and rarely examined, is the relationship between individual identity and state policy—that is, the ways in which deliberate choices made by policymakers establish a set of opportunities and constraints for individual citizens, whose success or failure may then be strongly influenced by or dependent on these policy choices. Individuals are presented with certain opportunities or choices, but not everything is possible and, more to the point, policies put in place can restrict these choices, even if these are policies that leave much of the “action” to the market.³⁴ The forces of liberalization and capitalism and the new logic of global production can be understood as *macrolevel* or structural phenomena: they establish broad constraints and push in certain directions (although never in a wholly deterministic sense). But any discussion focused at this macrolevel operates abstractly: workers are affected, to be sure, but their preferences are assumed such that they will willingly seek out work elsewhere, either by moving, finding new jobs requiring the skills they now possess, or acquiring the new skills needed for new jobs.³⁵

This version of economic change ignores, however, what goes on at the microlevel and the ways in which *individuals* are affected by such changes and respond to them. What such structural changes actually do is to alter the “location” of individuals in a particular set of social relations, displacing them from the roles to which they have been accustomed without pointing to definitive alternatives. As one scholar of the “ideology of success and failure” in Western societies puts it,

Society is considered to be “in order” and justice is considered “to be done” when those individuals, in general, attain success who “deserve” it, in accordance with the existing norms. If this does not happen, then people feel that “there is no justice” or that something is basically wrong.³⁶

At the extremes, consequently, rationalization of such displacement may take one of two forms: self-blame or scapegoating. Self-blame is more common in the United States, given the high emphasis placed on individualism and entrepreneurship, but self-blame can also generate anger that is externalized in the form of scapegoating. Who or what is scapegoated—it may be other countries, minorities and immigrants, or particular economic or political interests—de-

depends on how the causes of displacement are explained and understood. Explanations drawn from academic economic models are, generally speaking, unintelligible to all but trained economists; putting the blame on specific individuals or groups is much easier and has “the function of replacing incomprehensible phenomena by comprehensible ones by equating their origins with the intentions of certain persons.”³⁷

What ultimately happens in a specific country is not determined by these two overarching structures; these operate, rather, by imposing certain demands *and* constraints on domestic possibilities. To understand what has happened, for example, in Yugoslavia, we must look to the ways in which the history of that country has intersected with these global structures; that is the focus of Beverly Crawford’s paper elsewhere in this volume. Below, I will propose a generalized framework for analyzing ethnic conflict within specific countries, with the caveat that only a careful reading of each one’s history, political economy, and ideology can fully explain outcomes.

GROWING TOGETHER OR COMING APART? A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS³⁸

ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM, WAR: THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

For the purposes of this chapter, we can identify five general “theories” of ethnicity. The first suggests that ethnicity is *biological*. Thus one view argues that ethnic tensions are somehow “natural.” Observes one scholar, “People reflexively grasp at ethnic or national identifications or what passes for them.”³⁹ An alternative formulation, which falls back on sociobiology, argues that “the urge to define and reject the other goes back to our remotest human ancestors, and indeed beyond them to our animal predecessors.”⁴⁰

Another view, as enunciated by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and others, invokes *primordality* and accounts for the emergence of ethnic politics and the accompanying violence by invoking centuries of accumulated hatreds among primordial “nations.” These hatreds, it is often argued, have exploded as a consequence of the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the

repressive mechanisms that kept them from boiling over for four decades. Indeed as can be seen in the case of Croatia and Serbia, such invocations, akin to a form of historical materialism, serve to “naturalize” ethnic consciousness and conflict almost as much as do genetic theories. Inasmuch as we cannot change historical consciousness, we must allow it to work its way out.

A third theory, most closely associated with Benedict Anderson, but held by many others, is the *imagined community*.⁴¹ This view suggests that ethnicity and ethnic consciousness are best understood as the “intellectual projects” of a bourgeois intelligentsia seeking to establish what Ernest Gellner has called a “high culture” distinctive from other, already existing ones.⁴² Such individuals are often located in the peripheral regions of empires or states, excluded from the center by reason of birth or class, yet highly educated and aware of the cultural and political possibilities of an identity distinct from that of the center. Ethnicity, from this view, is cultural and not inherently violent.

A fourth perspective is what can be called the *defensive* one. Here the logics of the state and state system start to come into play. Historically states have been defined largely in terms of the territory they occupy and the resources and populations they control. Hence the state must of necessity impose clearly defined borders between itself and other states. To do this, the state must plausibly demonstrate that the identities of other states and groups pose a threat to its specific emergent “nation.” Herein, then, lies the logic for the politicization of group identity or the emergence of “ethnicity” and “ethnic conflict”: self-defense.

The last view, which is discussed in greater detail below, is *instrumental*: ethnicity is the result of projects designed to capture state power and control. But such a project is not, as we shall see, a totally ahistorical one, as rational choice theory might have us believe. It is a response, as I argued above, to the logics of the state system and globalization, but it draws on historical and cultural elements that are already present and invokes the “threats” posed by other real or emergent ethnicities as a reason for its own formation.⁴³ Efforts to provide “national/cultural autonomy” to ethnic and religious groups were tried in the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires but failed largely because they did not provide to these groups the

power accorded to the dominant identity group in those empires and their subunits. Only through a “state of one’s own” was this possible.

The problem with each of these views or theories individually is that they are incomplete. Each provides some element of the whole, but none, taken alone, is sufficient. Moreover, each assumes that the phenomenon we call “ethnicity” (or alternatively “nationalism”) is necessarily the same today as it was 200 or even 1,000 years ago. But the systems within which this phenomenon has emerged over the past 200 years have not been static, and to the extent that these systemic conditions pose both demands and constraints on domestic political configurations, “ethnicity” must be different. But how? In what follows, I provide a framework for, first, understanding this difference and, second, accounting for the recent rise in “ethnic” conflict.

ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY

I begin with “ethnicity” and “identity.” What are they? How are they linked? How do they differ from “nationalism”? Or are they the same? The contemporary literature on “identity” is vast. While there is only limited agreement on what it is, there is almost universal accord that it is being challenged and changed. But it is difficult to posit challenges without some basic notion of what the concept means. More to the point, although human beings acquire “identities” as an almost biological process, the identities that they acquire are socially constructed and not biologically determined. If this is so, the specific content of identity, ethnicity, and nationality are all social and open to contestation. Why some identities have resonance for some people and others do not is not entirely obvious, as we shall see. I shall, however, offer an explanation that draws on both a material basis and a cognitive one. I also argue that there is good reason to differentiate among the three concepts, even though in practice they are often conflated.

There are two fundamental aspects to identity. First, it is *egoistic* since it consciously and deliberately locates the self in the world. Second, it is *relational*, inasmuch as it must exist in contrast to others who hold the same identity, as well as to one or more other identities. As must be evident from these two statements, there is nothing here

that limits identities or, for that matter, determines them; rather, they grow out of the social relationships among human beings. In other words, one's identity is a means of placing oneself within a social setting; indeed one can hardly say that the individual exists meaningfully without society and identity. Of course, in practice there are limits and constraints to the range of identities available to any individual or group; these are embedded in the histories of societies, and these are removed or changed very slowly, if at all.⁴⁴

People are born into their social situations and for the most part have their initial identities imposed on them by others who are older, more authoritative, more powerful. These initial identities are micro-situational, generated by the practices and structures of everyday life.⁴⁵ Socialization inducts people into other identities, some of which build on earlier ones, others of which are "new." In "traditional" societies, one was often born not only into a family and lineage, but also into a cultural and economic division of labor in which identity was fairly well fixed for most people. It was possible for individuals to change some aspects of their identity—for example, by being "inducted" and assimilated into other cultures—but it was fairly uncommon for groups as a whole to do so.⁴⁶

In the most general terms, then, we can characterize identity as being both cognitive and material, as being a means of placing oneself within a society and a social division of labor. In this respect, identity functions at three levels. First, it specifies the role of the self—Who am I? Why am I here? Second, it is relational with a group—Where am I? Who are these people around me? Third, it is relational between groups—Who are we? What do we do? None of these levels is ontologically privileged; they comprise a sort of "identity field." While I do not wish to suggest that these are the consequences of some kind of functionalist logic within societies, there is a self-reproducing logic that keeps these identity fields relatively stable over extended periods of time. Nor are they eternally fixed; they can be disrupted by crisis or catastrophe, or they can be reframed as contingencies demand.

Identities, as I theorize them here, then, are not inherently politicized. That is, if politics is about the struggle for power and resources, stable identity fields tend not to be subject to such struggles, inasmuch as this question of distribution is settled for the moment.⁴⁷ But this observation also provides a useful insight into why "modern" societies are so permeated by such political struggles. Where

identities are not relatively stable and there is always the possibility of seeking out new ones, the distribution of power and resources is not fixed. While modern societies attempt to modify such struggles through notions such as citizenship and nationalism, these impose only qualifications for participating in the distribution; they say little or nothing about how that distribution is to be decided. As I shall suggest below, saying something about this distribution—or the basis for it—is one of the critical roles of what we call the “social contract.” The social contract, in turn, is a critical part of *nationalism*.

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

How can we explain nationalism, especially in relation to identity as I have discussed it above? Nationalism is generally taken to imply the congruence of “nation” and “state,” where the state is a juridical, territorially bound entity and the nation a group of people defined by certain shared attributes.⁴⁸ Theorists tend to posit two paths via which nationalisms develop. Elsewhere in this volume, Andrew Bell-Fialkoff and Andrei Markovits cite R. D. Grillo’s schema: Either one observes the “ethnicization of the polity . . . where a state ‘constructs’ a nation from often heterogenous elements,” or the “politicization of ethnicity . . . where an ethnic group strives for and achieves statehood.”⁴⁹ In both instances, the assumption seems to be that some internal process of self-awareness and actualization is at work, out of which the need for a “nation” becomes self-evident. Having recognized this need, certain groups—most often the intelligentsia of the proto-nation—proceed to assemble the elements that will demonstrate the essential cultural and historical unity of the people in question. Whether such a unity is objectively “real” or not is beside the point; following Benedict Anderson, not only is membership in a nation “imagined”—since one never meets all other members—but the antecedents are also imagined into being so that they acquire real political force.

Self-actualization is a necessary but not sufficient condition; nationalisms do not grow out of vacuums. There must be reasons for their emergence. The spaces out of which nationalisms emerge are not empty; the inhabitants of those spaces already have identities and live within larger, mostly stable identity fields. So why should

new, state-centered ones be needed? Here the logic of the state system comes into play, a logic that overrides whatever identity fields already exist. Whereas an identity field is *place-bound*, for historical and economic reasons, it is not *strongly bounded*. That is, there are no surveyed borders between such fields; they blend into one another rather than having clearly differentiated boundaries.⁵⁰

Historically, however—that is, over the past 200 years—states have been defined largely in terms of the territory they occupy and the resources and populations they control. *Borders do matter*. Hence the state must of necessity impose clearly defined borders between identities and does so by “imagining” nationalisms that establish new intra- and intergroup (i.e., state) relations. In a sense, this involves an attempt to isolate groups from each other via “national” boundaries and to put in place a more “primitive” state of social development—Hobbes’s state of nature among states—which international relations theories describe as “anarchy” (although in practice this effort does not work).⁵¹

This also suggests why nationalism is so often associated with organized violence and warfare (and why “peaceful nationalism” might be an oxymoron). In order to override or destroy older identity fields, the state must plausibly demonstrate that their continuation poses a threat to a specific emergent “nation.” Inasmuch as coexistence has been the norm—otherwise, there would be no identity field—this can happen only through violence that provokes such threats into being and then seeks to eliminate the sources of those threats—that is, the other identities.

There is general agreement that nationalism first emerged out of the English and French revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and thence spread throughout Europe and the rest of the world.⁵² If we look at this process in Europe in particular, we discover that nationalism was as much a defensive reaction against others as a process of nation- or state-building. More identity fields than states, under other geopolitical conditions the territorial entities that preceded Germany and Italy might well have been absorbed into more powerful and threatening neighbors, as they later sought to absorb weaker ones. Their conquest and consolidation into larger units relegated these prior identities to little more than place or city names. Even those “nations” that preceded states were created for defensive reasons: Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, and others, for ex-

ample, sought to create a nation with entitlement to a state as a means of resisting the cultural and political imperialism of the Hapsburg Empire's center.

History does matter in this schema, of course, but not as the inflexible determinant of outcomes. History becomes important in that it provides the raw materials out of which ethnic identities are constructed (or imagined, to use Anderson's felicitous term). Not all feasible elements can be incorporated into such identities; only those that have arguably been historically present and have some familiarity for groups of people are part of this pool. When it is possible to argue that, for instance, language, religion, food, dress, appearance, locale, and narratives, among other things, comprise a recognizable "package" of characteristics, it becomes possible to construct an ethnic identity. Why some elements become part of the package and not others is a source of endless debate, but the reasons are probably strategic, romantic, or both.⁵³

This identity is more than the cultural unit present in an identity field, but less than full-blown nationalism, which demands a "state of its own." What we call "ethnicity" is ultimately the product of a dialectic between international processes and pressures and domestic contexts—that is, ethnicity emerges out of specific times and places, a point to which I will return below. Historically—that is, during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth—the "external" process had largely to do with the formation and propagation of the European state system. The result was a complex of militarized (or militarily dependent) states poised to defend their territories and newly incorporated peoples from their neighbors. These types of arrangements functioned reasonably well only so long as a country was able to maintain a relatively high degree of political, cultural, and economic autonomy. Autonomy could be maintained only so long as the state of affairs on the "outside" did not place unreasonable demands or pressures on such internal formations.⁵⁴ As Alexander Gerschenkron observed more than thirty years ago, however, such isolation has been very difficult to maintain in the industrialized world, and the followers often find their survival dependent on emulating the development processes of the leaders.⁵⁵ The development strategies pursued by followers such as Germany and Japan made it possible for them to become great powers after only a few decades of effort.

There is, however, a significant difference between the process described by Gerschenkron and the situation faced by countries today. At the turn of the century, state security—territorial survival and cultural distinctiveness—was *the* primary national goal, and it was manifested within Europe through the alliance system and outside of Europe via imperialism. In the name of state security, governments were able to mobilize populations toward statist ends via centralized systems of education, employment, and social welfare.⁵⁶ These programs also served, by and large, to improve individual welfare, thereby reinforcing loyalty to and identification with the state. The goals of state and individual were for the most part in concert.

While state security remains a concern today, the generation of national wealth and individual enrichment have replaced territorial integrity as the articulation of state strength—viz., the “trading state” vs. the “territorial state.”⁵⁷ Economic liberalism puts a premium, moreover, on *individual* rights and development as the engine of growth, in place of the rights and development of the *state*, which were primary at the beginning of the twentieth century; this is the notion, so popular in the United States, of “getting the government off our backs.” These goals lead to a paradox (although contradiction might be a better term): the state’s right and ability to mobilize popular support is being undermined at the very point at which the state is also required to implement policies that erode popular support and legitimacy. It is under these circumstances that the politicization of identity—ethnicity—is most likely to occur and become virulent and violent.

ETHNICITY, IDENTITY, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

None of this specifies the actual conditions under which ethnic identities are mobilized. To account for that process, we must look more closely at the relationship between domestic and international conditions and how, specifically, the latter impinge on the former. As Georgi Derluguian has put it, regarding conflicts usually labeled “ethnic,”

[Their sources are] to be found in the prevailing processes in a state’s environment, which may be only tenuously divided into

“external”—the interstate system and the world economy—and “internal,” which, according to Charles Tilly, shapes the state’s structure and its relation to the subject population and determines who are the major actors within a particular polity, as well as how they approach political struggle.

The key here is the erosion of the “internal” configuration of society—which I label the “social contract”—by these external forces.

All stable countries are characterized by political and social arrangements that have some form of historical legitimacy.⁵⁸ The concept of the social contract is conventionally ascribed to Rousseau and Locke, who argued that the state is the result of what amounts to a contractual agreement among people to yield up certain “natural” rights and freedoms in exchange for political stability and protection. Locke went so far as to argue that no state was legitimate that did not rule with the consent of the governed, a notion that retains its currency in the contemporary rage for “democratic enlargement.” Rousseau’s theory of the origin of the state owed much to the notion of consent as well, although he recognized that some sovereigns ruled through contempt, rather than consent, of the governed. Both philosophers acknowledged, as well, the importance of material life to the maintenance of the social contract.

My use of the term is somewhat different in that it assumes nothing so formalized. Sometimes these contracts are expressed in written constitutions; at other times, they are not written down but are found instead in the political and social institutions of a country. In either case, social contracts structure the terms of citizenship and inclusion in a country’s political community, the rules of political participation, the political relationship between the central state and its various regions, and the distribution of material resources within the country.

Social contracts also tend to specify the roles that people may occupy within the country and society and the relationships between these roles. Frequently these roles and relationships have what we would call an ethnic or religious character as, for example, in the traditional caste system in India, or the ethnic divisions of labor one might have found throughout the lands of the former Ottoman Empire, institutionalized in the *millet* system and still found in places in the Caucasus (as well as in American cities). Such social contracts

are frequently neither just, equitable, nor fair; they are, however, widely accepted, and people tend to try not to disrupt them, if only because such disruption can also affect the disruptors' material position. The social contract is therefore the constitutive source of social and political stability within countries. I do not claim that these social contracts are necessarily respectful of human rights or economically efficient, only that as historical constructs they possess a certain degree of legitimacy and authority that allows societies to reproduce themselves in a fairly peaceful manner over extended periods of time.

These forms of social contract are not of course found only in "traditional" societies; the ex-Socialist countries were also characterized by such arrangements, which were, once again, constitutive, if not constitutional. Certain groups or classes—the *nomenklatura*—were endowed with mostly informal rights and access to resources that gave them power and wealth within these societies, while other groups, lacking such rights and access, nonetheless had their welfare provided for by the arrangements in place.⁵⁹ Again, it is not my intention to argue the relative merits or faults of such contracts, but only to point out that they maintained a relative degree of social stability and cohesion within these countries.

It is critical to recognize, moreover, that social contracts as such are not present only with respect to state-society relations; societies themselves are characterized by such arrangements, often in spite of the active attempt by a state to alter or eliminate them. Institutions whose role it is to maintain political stability contribute to the maintenance of these social contracts, and so it should come as no surprise that when these institutions undergo transformations of a fundamental sort, so do social contracts. Indeed it is at these points of transformation that social conflict is most likely to break out.

Social contracts are thus characterized by particular distributions of power and wealth which have become institutionalized and legitimated, over time.⁶⁰ Political and economic changes challenge these distributions and threaten those who have possessed power and wealth. At the same time, however, such transitions also offer great possibilities for power and wealth to those entrepreneurial enough to see the opportunities inherent in the newly emerging systems. But they also provide the context in which political violence

can erupt, as struggles develop over who is to gain access to the newly contested levers of institutional power.

EROSION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Why should the social contract of a political collective change? Why do social relations not remain stable, especially if they are acceptable to all parties involved? To explain this, we need to look more closely at the emergence of the modern state. The state, as it began to emerge in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had an agenda different from the traditional one: to mobilize the new citizenry in the service of the state. The reasons for this remain the subject of intense debate, roughly characterized on one side by those who argue that the process was driven by the security function, and on the other by those who believe that the bourgeoisie developed alliances with rulers as a means of promoting and protecting accumulation. Whatever the reason, the resulting mobilization opened up opportunities for social mobility that heretofore had not been available. Over a period of time, therefore, the social contracts of these emerging, primarily European states began, first, to come under growing pressures, both domestic and foreign, and, second, to be codified in actual written constitutions.

It was in this context that nationalism emerged in the form of a myth-based set of beliefs that “naturalized” the inevitable association of peoples that heretofore had been linked together largely through social relations of production. The resulting social contract was not—could not be—only an ideological doctrine, however, inasmuch as mobilization and industrialization also required a restructuring of those social relations of production. In this process—what we would today call “modernization”—both identity and institutions were challenged and transformed, and peoples’ places in the social system called into question. Old roles were destroyed; new ones were created. The consequence was a significant disruption of what had come before—witness the economic and social consequences of industrialization in England during the first half of the 1800s—and a search for new sources of order.

Some fifty years were required for this instability to work its way through European societies, but the resulting “stability” was

still ephemeral. The revolutions of 1848, driven by both nascent nationalisms and populism, set in motion still another turn of the wheel, leading to the unification of Germany and Italy and setting the stage for future disorder as well. In each of these cycles, the formation of new identities was paralleled by the rejection of others, who were cast outside of the social contract of the emerging collectivity. With each turn of this wheel, moreover, the explicit material content of the social contract was downplayed in favor of the ideological content. As a citizen of the new community, one enjoyed the spiritual benefits, if not the material ones. Unfortunately you cannot eat patriotism, and in order to minimize the dissatisfactions of the poorer classes, as well as to conduct large-scale warfare, the welfare state came into being.

This amendment to the original social contract was in part a result of the Industrial Revolution and its spread throughout Europe. If citizens were to fulfill their part of the deal, they had to be able bodied, not yoked to the land through feudal relations, and willing to support government and state. Hence states increasingly found it necessary to intervene in the workings of the economy to ensure that support from their populations would be forthcoming. This meant better working conditions and higher living standards, as well as mass education to achieve socialization and training compatible with developing technology. From the middle of the twentieth century, as the security and protection function of the state became easier to flaunt but more and more difficult to fulfill (for although new armaments, promising greater levels of protection and deterrence, could always be procured, the possibilities of actually securing populations in the event of war decreased), the welfare function of the state came to dominate, reaching its apogee in the countries of Western Europe.

During the decades following World War II, therefore, there were growing expectations in terms of the quantity and breadth of services provided by government bureaucracies. The paradox was that the increasing cost of providing such services, ultimately paid through the tax base, began to generate a backlash among those who provided the revenues.⁶¹ The commitment to economic liberalism and efficiency prevalent in the last decade has put further pressure on governments to balance budgets and reduce welfare expenditures. As the shortfall between revenues and costs increases, cut-

backs in the welfare function follow, with the result that services deteriorate. This in turn leads to a gradual delegitimation of the state and a growing reliance on society to find other ways of fulfilling the welfare function. The state has also begun to fall short in yet another way. As it loses competence and begins to shed functions, it also loses the ability to manage and govern. This is especially true when governments are responsible for a vast range of highly complex problems rather than just the more traditional ones, such as war and finance—a point seen most clearly in terms of environmental quality and protection.

This process of “state-shrinking” is not, strictly speaking, attributable to any one factor. There is, however, a strong argument to be made that the processes of international competition, the globalization of capital, and pressures for economic liberalization and democratization are playing a significant role. This is true, as I shall argue below, even where liberalization has not actually taken place. The economic liberalization project of the industrialized and industrializing worlds, as well as international lenders, is largely rooted in two historical observations: first, the success of postwar economic growth strategies in the 1950s and 1960s, and second, the subsequent decrease in growth rates and economic stagnation during the 1970s and 1980s.

Paradoxically, perhaps, supporters of liberalization put the blame for economic stagnation on the very elements of the welfare state that made possible the high rates of growth in the earlier decades. It has become a virtual article of faith that reestablishing these historical growth patterns depends on reducing costs to capital of doing business. This will restore profit levels, facilitate capital accumulation, and provide incentives for investment rather than consumption. This strategy will work, however, only if social costs are sloughed off by the state onto individuals. In one form or another, this process is happening throughout the world.

Countries are therefore compelled by the pressures of the global economic system—specifically the desires of international finance and the domestic political need to establish themselves as viable players in the international economy—into pursuing domestic policies that will make them attractive to capital and foreign investment. This, it is hoped, will help them to build up an industrial base that will allow further generation of wealth, creation of economic oppor-

tunities for individual and country, and a general improvement of living standards. These policies of "structural adjustment" and their consequences have been extensively analyzed, with conflicting conclusions. Some argue that they have little or no impact on social and political stability; others find that they do.⁶² What is critical is that such policies are not implemented or even discussed in isolation; they raise questions about the very matrix of social relations, power, and wealth that characterizes every society, every country in the world—or the social contract, in other words. Difficulties arise, in particular, when such pressures are translated into the changes deemed necessary to the domestic social contract.

It is in these contexts that what appears to be ethnic or sectarian conflict is most likely to develop. To borrow a term from Marxist analysis, such situations are "underdetermined." Old institutional arrangements have been discredited and have lost their legitimacy, but this does not mean that the holders of power in those old arrangements have been executed or exiled. Often they remain in place. But the new democratic order relies for its legitimacy on new practices, such as the holding of open elections or privatization of property. These exercises lead to shifts in power and wealth that are opposed by the old guard, which will seek to restore some version of the status quo ante. Ironically, perhaps, these very same mechanisms can also lead to reproduction of the status quo ante under a different name, thereby generating opposition movements who seek to capture power in the name of a new order.

It is important to note that the exogenous forces which trigger such internal struggles are not in and of themselves to blame for the violence that often results. Economically and politically liberal societies are, when all is said and done, preferable to nonliberal ones in terms of fairness, justice, and equity. But the process of transition is fraught with risks and full of pitfalls, and the ability of a society to make the shift is strongly constrained by the social structures of the earlier period. There was no compelling reason, for example, why Yugoslavia should have fallen apart along ethnic lines, except that its constituent republics were named in these terms and resources distributed to them in these terms.⁶³

By letting the market determine winners and losers, the state yields up its right to rectify disadvantages suffered by particular groups. Moreover, while *political* liberalization is thought to provide

the wherewithal to all *individuals* to participate equally in the economy, the levers of economic and political power in many countries are to be found in the hands of some dominant group that is better placed and able to take advantage of the new conditions created under *economic* liberalization. The result is a growing disaffection among disadvantaged groups, whose identity is often defined in ethnic or sectarian terms and who come to imagine the utility of a “state of their own.”

THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS

Such disaffection does not coalesce into outright political action of its own accord, however; it must be mobilized in an organized fashion. In such situations, people face the possibility of making meaningful choices about the future that do not involve ethnically constrained identities.⁶⁴ The problem is that political and economic changes of virtually any type cut against the grain of prior stratification and corporatism. Faced with this, those who would lose power and those who would grasp it tend to see power in absolute and exclusionary terms and fall back on exclusive and oppositional identities, based on ethnic, religious, and class elements. Thus people do not grasp “reflexively” for their essential ethnic identity when political power and authority crumble; rather, exclusive and oppositional identities, based on ethnic, religious, and class elements, are politically constructed and made virulent as those in power or those who would grasp power—“political entrepreneurs”—try to mobilize populations in support of their struggles with other elites for political power, social status, and economic resources.⁶⁵

Rene Lemarchand, in a small book on the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Burundi—which bears a great deal of similarity to what has transpired in Rwanda since 1959—puts it thus:

The crystallization of group identities is not a random occurrence; it is traceable to specific strategies, pursued by ethnic entrepreneurs centrally concerned with the mobilization of group loyalties on behalf of collective interests defined in terms of kinship, region or ethnicity. . . . Clearly, one cannot overestimate the part played by individual actors in defining the nature of the threats posed to their respective communities, framing strategies de-

signed to counter such threats, rallying support for their cause, bringing pressure to bear on key decision makers, and, in short, politicizing ethnoregional identities. . . . The essential point to note is the centrality of the state both as an instrument of group domination and as an arena where segments of the dominant group compete among themselves to gain maximum control over patronage resources. So from this perspective the state, far from being a mere abstraction, emerges as a cluster of individual contestants and cliques actively involved in the struggle for control over the party, the army, the government, the civil service, and parastatal organizations. . . . *Access to the state thus becomes a source of potential rewards for some groups and deprivations for others.*⁶⁶

To put the argument more prosaically, in social settings that are underdetermined—where rules and institutions have broken down or are being changed—opportunities often exist for acquiring both power and wealth. There are material benefits to social solidarity. Kinship can function as a form of social capital, establishing relations of trust even where they have not existed previously. The political mobilization of ethnic identity is one means of taking advantage of such opportunities. That such a program might end in tears and death is hardly recognized.

Who or what, then, is a political entrepreneur? The concept comes from rational choice theorists, who argue that only those individuals who can provide appropriate incentives to potential group members will be able to mobilize them as followers. As David Laitin puts it:

A good entrepreneur . . . is one who knows how to provide “selective incentives” to particular individuals to join in the group effort. Communal groups will politicize when there is an entrepreneur who (perhaps instinctively) understands the constraints to organization of rational individual behavior.⁶⁷

Elsewhere in this volume, Philip Roeder argues that

[Entrepreneurs] compete with other political entrepreneurs for support within the population by offering programs of collective action that often benefit individuals with some markers but not others. Entrepreneurs compete with one another not only by ap-

pealing to different individuals, but often by appealing to the same individuals on the basis of the same or different markers. These competing programs identify aggregates of markers that define the ethnic community in different ways.⁶⁸

Or, as Norman Long points out in a somewhat different context:

Effective agency . . . requires organizing capacities; it is not simply the result of possessing certain persuasive powers or forms of charisma. . . . Agency (and power) depend crucially upon the emergence of a network of actors who become partially, though hardly ever completely, enrolled in the “project” of some other person or persons. . . . It becomes essential, therefore, for social actors to win the struggles that take place over the attribution of specific social meanings to particular events, actions and ideas.⁶⁹

In other words, a political entrepreneur is one who is able to articulate, in a coherent and plausible fashion, the structure of opportunities and constraints that face a specified group of people and in particular emphasize clearly the potential costs of not acting collectively. Such appeals have historically been especially persuasive in times of trouble, when societies are faced with high degrees of uncertainty and particular groups within societies see their economic and social prospects under challenge.

Not everyone can be a political entrepreneur; few people will listen to someone who has not already attained some position of power, wealth, authority, or wisdom. This, then, provides a second key to the nature of the phenomenon: the political entrepreneur is one who has a great deal to lose or, perhaps, gain and is thereby motivated to grab opportunities as they present themselves.⁷⁰ In other words, political entrepreneurs are well-placed individuals who are able to develop or carry plausible “stories” of how and why particular social conditions have come to pass—often through specification of those who are said to bear special responsibility for those conditions—and what must be done to rectify them. Such entrepreneurs may be members, present or past, of the political elite under fire, officers in the military, cultural or communal leaders, or teachers, professionals, and intellectuals. They are hardly ever members of the “masses” or “grass roots”; they almost always aspire to preserve or improve their material and political standing.

Finally, the political entrepreneur must have a special sense of what kinds of concepts and ideas are most resonant to society. This is why shared elements of history and culture—the “imagined community” of Benedict Anderson—are often called upon by such individuals: they help to establish a collective bond among a group of otherwise somewhat disconnected individuals (e.g., shared ancestry); they help to provide an account of why this group is, at this particular time in history, unaccountably suffering (e.g., “timeless hatreds”); and they help to offer a solution to the problem (e.g., a “nation” that can defend itself). Franz Schurmann wrote about this idea in relation to American politicians; he argued:

While most citizens in society hold political opinions about the economy, the state of their security, and the social quality of their lives, these opinions are periodically molded into fixed sets of ideas, which persist for a long while. . . . They are like the currents in an ocean always available for a ship captain to sail on. Good politicians have a keen sense of those currents and know how to play with them.⁷¹

The remainder of the story is relatively straightforward: inasmuch as there is no room for more than one exclusivist ethnic movement within a “nation-state,” the struggle for power seems to inevitably lead to attempts by one side to exclude or eliminate the other. At this point, the contradiction between the nominal systemic commitment to the inviolability of state borders and the right to national self-determination—really the opportunity for *national* development free of the demands of competing groups and communities—comes to the fore and the logic of war and ethnic cleansing follows.

CONCLUSION

The perceptive reader will have noted that all references to “sectarian” conflict have dropped out of the framework presented in this paper. Sectarian conflict fits only a part of this framework but for the most part involves struggles among competing social groups for state power, not a new state. Still it is instructive to note that the agents of religious “isms” seek to alter the constitutive basis of the

states they seek to rule, and do so in a manner similar to that utilized by ethnic political entrepreneurs. Survey data and anecdotal observations suggest that many of the individuals active in Islamist movements would in earlier decades have belonged to Marxist groups intent on regime change.⁷² In other words, the language has changed; the ends have not.

What this suggests is that ethnic and sectarian conflict, or what we call in this volume cultural conflict, are not about ethnicity and religion or about culture per se, but rather about setting the terms of discourse in conflict over state power and control. Just as “democracy” and “communism” functioned as discourses in domestic struggles for power during the cold war, so do ethnicity and religion operate today. They are instrumental means rather than ends. To be sure, any movement that gains power is then in a position to implement its ideology in the pursuit of certain ends. That, however, is another story.

NOTES

1.

According to the Harvard Project on Internal Conflict at the JFK School, as of late 1995, thirty-five major armed intrastate conflicts were underway around the world. The number of nonviolent conflicts has not been counted.

2.

For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see Georgi M. Derluguian, “Social Cohesion of the States,” in *From Good Times to Bad? Trajectory of the World System, 1945–2025*, ed. Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein (forthcoming).

3. John Ruggie has argued that the application was actually what he called “embedded liberalism,”—that is, the principles and goals were liberal, even if the initial practices were not. Even today, the economic system is not truly liberal as a whole, but it is liberal enough for the effects I describe here to happen. See “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 195–232.

4. This process is nicely explained in Thomas J. McCormick, *America’s Half-Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). See also Stephen Gill and David Law, “Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capi-

tal," in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 93–124.

5. This is a fiction, of course. Even within the fifty states, there are significant differences from the perspective of capital. See Candace Howes and Ann R. Markusen, "Trade, Industry, and Economic Development," in *Trading Industries, Trading Regions—International Trade, American Industry, and Regional Economic Development*, ed. Heizi Nojonen, Julie Graham, and Ann R. Markusen, pp. 1–44 (New York: Guilford, 1993); James Gerstenzang, "Boom Times Bring Trouble to Heartland," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 3 July 1995 (*LA Times* wireservice), p. C1.
6. J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review* 6, 1 (1953, 2d Series): 1–15.
7. See the essays in Wolfgang Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge and Power* (London: Zed, 1992).
8. Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1962).
9. The product cycle must have been evident to the designers of the Bretton Woods system since it was clear that in the nineteenth century national advantage had shifted from Britain to Germany and the United States. Gerschenkron's analysis of this period remains one of the best; for a more recent version, see H. Jeffrey Leonard, *Pollution and the Struggle for the World Product* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. chs. 1–2.
10. Beverly Crawford, "Hawks, Doves, But No Owls: The New Security Dilemma under International Economic Interdependence," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, pp. 149–86 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
11. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York, 1948); cited in B. I. Kaufman, *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953–1961* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 12.
12. Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). A contemporary version of this analysis can be found in Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 75, 1 (January–February 1996): 33–51.
13. Beverly Crawford, *Economic Vulnerability in International Relations: East-West Trade, Investment, and Finance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
14. Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Richard Gordon, "Globalization, New Production Systems and the Spatial Division of Labor," in *The New Division of Labour: Emerging Forms of Work Organisation in International Perspective*, ed. Wolfgang Littek and Tony Charles, pp. 161–207 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995).
15. Robert A. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

16. Joanne Gowa, *Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
17. David A. Stockman, *The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution Failed*, 1st ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
18. Gill and Law develop this argument in a theoretical fashion.
19. Not that I support mercantilism or protectionism, but see the arguments along these lines made in Michael Borrus, Ken Conca, Wayne Sandholz, Jay Stowsky, Steven Weber, and John Zysman, *The Highest Stakes: Technology, Economy and Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
20. The literature on this dialectic is expanding at an exponential rate; the best place to begin is with the essays in Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed., *Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994).
21. By this I mean that in any one location, there are economic systems of local, regional, national, transnational, and global extent. These are linked but not all of a single piece. Thus, for example, Silicon Valley is tightly integrated into the global economy, but some of its inhabitants are also participants in a service-based economy that, although coupled into global systems, is largely directed toward meeting local demand. For further discussion of the notion of multiple economies, see Gordon. This section has also been informed by a conversation with Randall Germain, University of Sheffield, 20 April 1996.
22. See, for example, Noponen, Graham, and Markusen, eds.; Neil Smith, "Uneven Development and Location Theory: Towards a Synthesis," in *New Models in Geography*, vol. 1, pp. 142–63 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
23. The term for such historical contingency is "path dependency." See the discussion of this point in Paul Krugman, *Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations* (New York: Norton, 1994), ch. 9.
24. How intentional or fortuitous is, of course, the key question. Silicon Valley was hardly the product of chance; rather, it was the result of intentional mobilization of resources by the state in its pursuit of national security. The difficulty of maintaining such a development pole is illustrated by the relative collapse of the high tech center on Route 128 around Boston. Some of the difficulties facing policymakers who might like to repeat such mobilization are discussed in Crawford, "Hawks, Doves."
25. Michael H. Shuman: "Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies," *Foreign Policy* 86 (Spring 1992):158–77, and *Towards a Global Village: International Community Development Initiatives* (London and Boulder: Pluto Press, 1994).
26. Louis Trager, "All's Fair in Selling Growth to Cities," *San Francisco Examiner*, 22 January 1995, p. C-1.
27. See Derluguian in this volume.

28. The Organization of African Unity made this a central principle. The Helsinki Accords of 1975 ratified the post-World War II borders in Europe. Very few secessionist movements succeeded in creating new states.
29. See Bob Davis, "Global Paradox: Growth of Trade Binds Nations, but it also Can Spur Separatism," *Wall Street Journal*, 20 June 1994 (Western ed.), p. A1; Frank Viviano, "World's Wannabee Nations Sound Off," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 31 January 1995, p. A1.
30. For a discussion of the process of "globalization," see, for example, Sakamoto, ed., and Gordon.
31. Abdi I. Samatar, "Neo-Liberal Strategy and Ethnic Conflict in Africa"; paper prepared for the SSRC Joint Center for African Studies Workshop on Re-configuring State and Society: Social and Political Consequences of Liberalization in Comparative Perspective, University of California, Berkeley, 22–24 April 1993.
32. This point is discussed to some degree in Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori, eds., *Transnational Religion, the State and Global Civil Society* (Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming).
33. Sassen.
34. The notion of actor choice in a structured context is discussed in Norman Long and Ann Long, eds., *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development* (London: Routledge, 1992).
35. See, for example, the brief discussion in Beverly A. Brown, *In Timber Country: Working People's Stories of Environmental Conflict and Urban Flight* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), pp. 33–35.
36. G. Ichheiser, "Misunderstandings in Human Relations: A Study in False Social Perception," *American Journal of Sociology* 60 (1949 suppl.): 60; cited in Robert M. Farr, "Self/Other Relations and the Social Nature of Reality," in *Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy*, ed. Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici (New York: Springer Verlag, 1987), p. 204.
37. Dieter Groh, "The Temptation of Conspiracy Theory, or: Why Do Bad Things Happen to Good People," in Graumann and Moscovici, eds., p. 19.
38. Much of the remainder of this paper is drawn from Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Beverly Crawford, "Growing Together or Coming Apart? Economic Integration, Ethnic Conflict and Global Security"; manuscript in progress.
39. See, for example, James B. Rule, "Tribalism and the State," *Dissent*, Fall 1992, p. 519.
40. Bernard Lewis, "Muslims, Christians, and Jews: The Dream of Coexistence," *New York Review of Books*, 26 March 1992, p. 48.
41. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, 2d ed. (London: Verso, 1991).
42. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

43. See the essays in Uri Ra'anan, Maria Mesner, Keith Armes, and Kate Martin, eds., *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Breakup of Multinational States* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).
44. In making these statements, I differentiate my position from those of such observers as William E. Connolly (*Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991]), who pair the two.
45. Geoff Hodgson, "Rationality and the Influence of Institutions," in *Real-Life Economics—Understanding Wealth Creation*, ed. Paul Ekins and Manfred Max-Neff (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 40–48.
46. There were of course conspicuous exceptions, as in the wholesale conversion of Bosnian landowners to Islam during Turkish rule.
47. The distinction between constitution and distribution within and between social groups is developed below.
48. See Uri Ra'anan, "Nation and State: Order out of Chaos," in Ra'anan et al., eds., pp. 3–32; Walker Connor, "Illusions of Homogeneity," in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 118–43.
49. Bell-Fialkoff and Markovits in this volume, citing R. D. Grillo, "Nation" and "State" in *Europe: Anthropological Perspective* (London: Academic Press, 1980), p. 7.
50. To make this point a little more clearly, the U.S.-Mexico border, and its differentiation between citizens of the United States and Mexico, grows out of state system logic. The Anglo-Latino identity complex of the American Southwest grows out of an historical and economic logic. The two are clearly linked but are not the same.
51. Indeed the process of state-building is akin to the "enclosure" of identity.
52. Gellner; E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
53. See, for example, the discussion of the way one particular language dialect became literary Serbo-Croatian in the nineteenth century in Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919–1953* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 3, 24.
54. Again, truly autonomous societies have not existed for thousands of years; the key to social stability lies in the extent to which societies are "penetrated" by others. Empires tended to be more insular and "multilayered," so that a more or less standardized social contract was imposed on local societies and adapted to local conditions. See Derluigian in this volume.
55. Gerschenkron. For a more recent discussion of this process, see Crawford, "Hawks, Doves."
56. Derluigian, "Social Cohesion."
- 57.

Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

58. "Stability" is obviously a tenuous concept. What appears to the outside or historical observer to be stable is usually quite dynamic. See, for example, the semifictional account of Višegrad, in Bosnia, in Ivo Andrić, *The Bridge on the Drina*, trans. L. F. Edwards (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
59. Leading to the famous dictum: "We pretend to work, they pretend to pay us."
60. These are the "conjunctural" time scales of Braudel, 50–100 years.
61. James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's, 1973).
62. See Samatar.
63. The basis for this division is discussed in detail in Branka Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980–92* (London: Verso, 1993); see also Beverly Crawford's chapter on Yugoslavia in this volume and Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995).
64. Todorova in this volume.
65. Political entrepreneurs resemble their economic counterparts in that they seek to maximize their individual interests and in doing so, have an effect on aggregate interests. Political entrepreneurs seek to maximize political power rather than wealth. Like their economic counterparts, they engage in risk-taking behavior to maximize their returns. For additional comments on political entrepreneurs, see below and David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, pp. 285–316 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Paul R. Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," *Ethnicity* 3, 3 (September 1976): 225–39.
66. Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 77; emphasis added.
67. Laitin, p. 302.
68. Roeder in this volume.
69. Norman Long, "From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case for an Actor-Oriented Sociology of Development," in Long and Long, eds., pp. 23–24.
70. As Laitin notes, the political entrepreneur is in this way quite like the economic entrepreneur: both are able to see and seize opportunities as they develop.
71. Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), p. 35.
- 72.

"The Orwellian State of Sudan," *The Economist*, 24 June 1995, pp. 21–22, 24;
Dale F. Eickelman, "Trans-State Islam and Security," in Rudolph and Piscatori, eds.

LIBERALIZATION AND ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURS IN THE SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES

Philip G. Roeder

The twentieth century began and ends with an explosion of claims to national self-determination and with conflict among ethnic groups. At the epicenter of this global tremor in the late twentieth century is the contested sovereignty of newly self-proclaimed states such as Abkhazia, Transdnistria, and Chechnya. While the mythology of these new states and much research in the social sciences and humanities focus on the identities and hatreds that saturate societies, the most important policy problem confronting the global community concerns the behavior of the leaders of these states that claim to be sovereign and of the states that contest this.

The surge of ethnic conflict at the end of the twentieth century is concentrated disproportionately in states that were formerly ruled by Communist parties and particularly in the Soviet and Yugoslav successor states. The occurrence of this ethnic conflict at the same time these societies are making a transition away from communism has shaken many preconceived notions—in particular, notions about the relationship between liberalization and ethnic conflict. The prevailing, perhaps naive, view of liberalizing societies had been one in which ethnic conflicts declined in significance: the process of liberalization enmeshes individuals in a web of cross-cutting social interdependencies that ultimately eclipses particularistic and potentially monopolistic claims such as ethnicity.

Events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have led some to question the existence of a *negative* causal connection between liberalization and ethnic conflict or at least to question whether the relationship between liberalization and ethnic conflict is monotonic; the intermediate stages of liberalization might actually produce a temporary rise in ethnic conflicts before they decline. I

find that liberalization, with its weakening of the state and the potential reallocation of social resources which it portends, is a permissive but not necessarily causal factor (either positive or negative) in explaining the increasing politicization of identity in the former Soviet Union. Post-Soviet ethnic conflict has less to do with the transition to a liberal economy and the weakening of the state in its relationship to society than with the shifting balance of power within the state. At the center of this conflict is the competition among post-Soviet politicians fighting over the division of the Soviet state and manipulating certain institutions of ethnofederalism to their advantage. The social actors involved in this intra-institutional struggle may have benefitted from liberalization, but they are in many ways the antithesis of liberal; moreover, the strategies of politicians to manipulate these institutions for personal advantage make future transition to liberal societies even less likely.

Specifically this paper develops three assertions about ethnic politics in the Soviet successor states. First, in nearly all instances the ethnic conflicts that have drawn the attention of the global community focus on conflicts among political entrepreneurs *within* the administrative apparatus of the successor states. The most severe ethnic confrontations—those that are most violent, widespread, and sustained—have resulted from acts of regional officials challenging the political leaders of the central governments of successor states; conspicuous examples include the civil war between the governments of Abkhazia and Georgia, the confrontation between the governments of Crimea and Ukraine, and the recent war between Chechnya and Russia. Second, these regional officials have tended to press agendas that focus on instrumental concerns associated with control over the state apparatus and its resources. Specifically the agendas of these officials seek to manipulate the mechanisms of regional government to ensure their own political survival. Third, insofar as liberalization has played a role in this confrontation, it has been a secondary cause, but it has nonetheless intensified ethnic conflicts by strengthening the power of these officials relative to the central governments, reinforcing the motivation of these officials to confront the center, and strengthening their hand within their own regions.

WHAT IS TO BE EXPLAINED?

The major ethnic conflicts within the Soviet successor states have involved confrontations between the governments of regional administrations and one of the fifteen successor state governments. The centrality of these regional governments to ethnic conflicts since the breakup of the Soviet Union is underscored by a simple comparison of the proportion of different types of interethnic relationships that have experienced violence or a major crisis. In the fifteen successor states there are over 1,300 dyads that could potentially erupt in interethnic conflict.¹ Of these dyads, 119 are hierarchical dyads between the titular nationality of a successor state and the major ethnic groups within that state; 23 of these are institutionalized in a form of ethnofederal administration such as an autonomous *oblast* or republic. As Table 1 shows, ethnofederal dyads were 17 times more likely to lead to armed conflict than other hierarchical dyads and over 217 times more likely than all other dyads. Ethnofederal dyads were 7 times more likely to lead to a major crisis than other hierarchical dyads and over 94 times more likely than all other dyads.

The cases of armed conflict include the wars between the governments of Georgia and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, Georgia and the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and Russia and the Chechen Republic. One major crisis that has not yet resulted in war-

Table 1

**Probability of Significant Ethnic Conflict by Type of
Interethnic Relationship, 1992-94**
(Percent)

	Ethno-Federal Dyads	Other Hierarchical Dyads	All Other Dyads
Armed conflicts	17.4	1.0	0.08
Major crises	21.7	3.1	0.23
{Number of dyads}	(N=23)	(N=96)	(N=1,285)

fare pits Ukraine against the government of the Crimean Autonomous Republic (Solchanyk 1994: 50–59). The cases where these conflicts do not pit formally organized federal units are equally important in pointing up the centrality of local leaders within the state apparatus to ethnic mobilization. In the conflict between Transdnistria and Moldova the leader of the autonomy drive of the former has been the chairman of the Tiraspol city soviet N. A. Smirnov with the backing of Russia's 14th Army (King 1993). In the conflict between Estonia's titular nationality and the Russian minority, the city administrations of Narva and Sillamae play central roles (e.g., *Izvestiia*, 20 July 1993).²

Within the Russian Federation itself the list of conflicts between the central state and the leaders of its republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous *okrugs* includes the most important ethnic crises:

- Chechnya. The crisis began in late 1991, when the government of President Dzhokhar Dudaev proclaimed the republic's secession from the Russian Federation.
- Tatarstan. The government of President Mintimer Shaimiev has spearheaded a campaign claiming sovereignty and a special treaty relationship with the Russian Federation based on mutual delegation of powers (e.g., *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 24 June 1993).
- Sakha (Yakutia). The government of President Mikhail Nikolaev claims economic but not political sovereignty within the Russian Federation.
- Ingushetia. The government of President Ruslan Aushev, recognized by the Russian government, pressed the republic's claim to sovereignty from Chechnya and then, without Russia's support, pressed an irregular military campaign against the North Ossetian Republic to claim territory in the Prigorodnyi *raion*.

Prior to the war in Chechnya, the Russian Federation's major "ethnic" crises of 1992–94 included the confrontation in the constitutional drafting bodies between representatives of the republics and the central leadership over apportionment of powers in the new basic law and federal treaty; the decision of republic governments such as Chechnya, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan to withhold revenues collected on their territory; and the boycott of the constitutional referendum by the leaders of Chechnya and Tatarstan and resistance

from the leaders of the Komi, Khakass, Udmurt, and Ingush homelands.³

It should be noted that throughout the post-Communist world, those states organized along ethnofederal lines have experienced the most serious ethnic crises. Among Soviet successor states this has reached the level of warfare in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Russian Federation—three of the five successor states that contained ethnofederal administrations. Among East European states secessionism and division have destroyed the two states organized as ethnofederations—the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

ETHNIC STRATEGIES OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS

What explains this close correspondence between the most intense ethnic conflict and the institutions of ethnofederalism? More specifically, why have leaders of ethnic homelands within the Soviet successor states been so quick to play the “ethnic card” during the transition from communism—that is, why have so many advanced claims for expanded regional prerogatives in decision-making predicated on the unique rights of the titular ethnic group within that region? In this section I will argue that the institution of ethnofederalism created in the Communist era encouraged leaders within the homelands to create ethnic machines. In the successor states many leaders of regional governments have turned to ethnic strategies as a way to save these machines and to improve the chances of their own survival in a rapidly changing political environment.

SOVIET FEDERALISM AND THE CREATION OF ETHNIC MACHINES

These federal institutions are the product of the Bolsheviks’ attempt to accommodate the homelands of many minorities within a common state ruled by the Communist Party.⁴ The Bolsheviks came to power with a public commitment to recognize language-based ethnic groups within a federal state. This socialist federation, in the formulation of the *Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), “differs radically from the bourgeois federa-

tion,” for the former is “the state form for solving the national question . . . [and] is based on the national-territorial principle” (1977, vol. 27, p. 255). The territorial administrative structure of the Soviet state recognized ethnic homelands as union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs alongside the oblasts (provinces) and raions (rural districts) of normal administration.⁵

Within each homeland the Soviet regime cultivated a new Communist cadre drawn from the local ethnic group. This policy of indigenization (*korenizatsiia*) sought to tie the minorities to the Soviet regime by populating the political and administrative posts of party and state in these territories with cadres drawn from the homeland’s titular ethnic group. In 1920 the People’s Commissar of Nationality Affairs, Joseph Stalin, explained that to make Soviet power “near and dear” to the minorities would require

that all Soviet organs in the border regions . . . should as far as possible be recruited from the local people acquainted with the manner of life, habits, customs, and language of the native population; [and] that all the best people from the local masses should be drawn into these institutions (Stalin 1953: 370–71).

These policies provided opportunities for nationalities representing over 93 percent of the non-Russian population to create ethnically distinct political elites within formally autonomous homelands. In most homelands, this led to proportionate overrepresentation of the titular nationality in party and state leadership posts. By the 1980s this extended well beyond the most visible posts, such as each homeland’s party first secretary, chairman of its Presidium, and chairman of its Council of Ministers, to include lower levels of administration and sensitive posts such as internal security (Hodnett 1978: 101–3, 377–78; Jones and Grupp 1984: 159–184).

Insofar as anyone within the homeland had access, this cadre monopolized the mobilizational resources essential to sustained, large-scale political action. The means of communications, particularly the indigenous-language press and broadcast media, were monopolized through the homeland institutions controlled by this cadre. Access to meeting places, such as auditoriums and public squares within the homeland, was at the discretion of this cadre. Public acts could avoid violent suppression only with the cadre’s

approval. Thus with rare exception, this cadre alone determined when the ethnic groups would be mobilized politically.

Within the homelands this cadre was also assigned the task of creating a new official and monopolistic cultural elite. To create a new culture that was national in form but socialist in content, these indigenous cadres were responsible for recruiting and training an ethnic intelligentsia to write their history, compose their ballads, and teach their children. These policies sought to limit professional and material rewards to the indigenous elite within official institutions and to deny these rewards to all who remained outside the official institutions. The homeland cadres presided over a dense network of parallel institutions that controlled all aspects of professional life.⁶ Research of significance to the ethnic group and its homeland was controlled by indigenous academies of sciences and universities. Creative professionals such as writers, artists, or architects who sought to disseminate their work under the cultural monopoly of the regime were required to join the official unions of the homeland for their respective professions. This official intelligentsia was assigned a monopoly over the public expression of ethnic identity—that is, it alone was permitted to define the ethnic markers that distinguish the nationality in politics. These markers were then central to communicating the socialist message in national cultural forms and propagandizing populations being brought into the modern sector.

A major consequence of these policies over the long term was the creation of an ethnic machine within many homelands. The cadres controlled the most valuable material resource of the Soviet system—entry into the intelligentsia. Indigenization opened career opportunities throughout the administrative apparatus of the homeland. Affirmative action expanded mobility opportunities for those aspiring to positions within the professional strata and intelligentsia. The creation of universities and academies of sciences in many homelands dramatically expanded not only the number of trained professionals within ethnic groups, but also the number of professional positions reserved for the minorities, often elevating titular nationalities to privileged positions in higher education and professional employment within their homelands. By the 1980s these included the first secretary of the homeland's union of writers, president of its academy of sciences, rectors of its principal universities, and most openings in the homeland's most prestigious edu-

cational institutions (Hodnett 1978; Jones and Grupp 1984). For example, whereas Georgians constituted 67 percent of their republic's population in 1970 (and approximately the same proportion of the college-age cohort), they constituted 83 percent of the student body of the republic's institutions of higher education (Parsons 1982: 554). Similarly, although Moldovans constituted under two-thirds of the total population of their republic in the mid-1980s, they were at least 80 percent of the student body in the law and business schools of Kishinev State University, the republic's leading educational institution. Commenting on the rapid upward mobility of the Uzbek population within their republic, Lubin contends that the Central Asians "tend to hire 'their own' first" (1981: 283). The indigenous cadres used these highly valuable positions to create a loyal clientele and an ethnic political machine filled with loyal retainers.

REGIME CHANGE AND THE THREAT TO REGIONAL ETHNIC MACHINES

The ethnic machines were designed to support politicians and their strategies within the administrative politics of the Soviet polity. That is, politicians developed these machines in the context of authoritarian (nondemocratic) politics—not to deliver votes from the local electorate since such votes could not remove or save local leaders. Nonetheless, these machines gave local leaders the power to inflict costs on those who could remove them—their superiors in the union republic and all-union party leaderships. These costs included scuttling implementation of the policies of the center since the indigenous cadres and intelligentsia were the local extensions of Soviet administration. These costs included the ability to mobilize protest and even unrest within the region. The center could not easily replace an entire ethnic machine since the policy of indigenization was predicated on the monopolistic role of the official elite and the suppression of alternative ethnic elites. Central intervention might require calling in Russians to reconstruct the indigenous political elite. For example, when Mikhail Gorbachev sought to uproot the extensive (and unacceptably corrupt) Kazakh machine created by Dinmukhamed Kunaev, he had to appoint Gennadi Kolbin as first secretary of Kazakhstan; one consequence was days of demonstrations and riots in the streets of Alma-Ata by Kazakhs.

Because these machines developed within an authoritarian polity, control over the homeland administration by the indigenous cadre was guaranteed by Moscow and the ethnic machines did not need to deliver votes in elections. As a consequence, cadres and machines who controlled a homeland could limit their constituencies to a minority of the homeland population. Indeed as Table 2 shows, in twenty-seven of thirty-five autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs, the senior titular nationality was a minority in the homeland's population. For example, in Abkhazia, with Moscow's support against Georgian resistance, Abkhazes, who constituted 17.8 percent of the population, held half of the city and raion party first secretaries and two-thirds of the republic's ministers and miraculously "won" 41 percent of the seats in the republic's parliament or Supreme Soviet (Dale 1993: 49).

Two threats have shaken these ethnic machines in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The first was the threat of democratization under Gorbachev, and the second was the loss of their patrons in Moscow following the breakup of the Soviet Union. These changes in political regimes elicited defensive responses from many leaders of ethnic homelands. The responses were conditioned by the nature of the regime changes and the implications of these changes for the political survival of the ethnic cadres and their ethnic machines. Indeed the following three propositions describe the pattern of responses in the successor states:⁷

[1] A regional leader's decision to play the ethnic card is constrained by the structure of accountability and support from the regional leader's principals.

Five post-Soviet scenarios can be arrayed along a continuum according to whether they have been more likely to lead a regional leader to play the ethnic card and whether they have tended to lead to more extreme demands for expanded regional decision-making prerogatives predicated on the unique rights of the titular ethnic group within the region:

- First, where regional leaders are still appointed by central officials and continue to enjoy support from those officials—and where attempts to mobilize independent support within the ethnic community are likely to erode that central support—regional politi-

Table 2
Major Titular Nationality as Proportion of Homeland Population, 1979
(Percent)

<i>Autonomous Republics</i>	<u>Proportion</u>	<i>Autonomous Oblasts</i>	<u>Proportion</u>
Abkhaz	17.1	Adygei	21.4
Bashkir	24.3	Gorno-Altai	29.2
Buryat	23.0	Jewish	5.4
Chechen-Ingush	47.8 (Chechens)	Khakass	11.5
Chuvash	68.4	Karachai-Cherkess	28.2 (Karachais)
Dagestani	24.5 (Avars)	Nagorno-Karabakh	75.9 (Armenians)
Kabardino-Balkar	45.0 (Kabardinians)	South Ossetian	66.4
Kalmyk	41.5	<i>Autonomous Okrugs</i>	
Karakalpak	31.1	Agyn Buryat	52.0
Karelian	11.1	Chukchi	9.0
Komi	25.4	Evenki	20.3
Mari	43.5	Khanti-Mansi	3.2
Mordvinian	34.2	Komi-Permyak	61.4
North Ossetian	50.5	Koryak	22.6
Tatar	47.6	Nenets	12.8
Tuvinian	60.5	Taimyr	16.5
Udmurt	32.1	Ust-Ordyn Buryat	34.4
Yakut	36.9	Yamalo-Nenets	16.0

Sources: Russia (1985, 1986). Excluded from this count are Ajaria, Gorno-Badakhshan, and Nakhichevan, which were homelands for subdivisions of the larger ethnic group of the republic.

cians have tended to eschew the ethnic card. In these situations attempts to play the ethnic card shorten a regional leader's tenure, so such attempts are deterred. For example, stable authoritarian regimes, such as Islam Karimov's autocracy in Uzbekistan, have maintained the hierarchical Soviet-era administrative apparatus; in an environment such as this, governments of homelands like the Karakalpak Republic within Uzbekistan have little incentive to play a strong ethnic hand (Harris 1994: 196).

- Second, in an interesting variant of the first situation, appointees can prolong their tenure of office by building support within their region; these regional officials have an incentive to engage in some mobilization of support without losing sight of their ultimate accountability to the central state leaders. In these situations (an example cited above in this essay would be the late Soviet system) leaders hope to build a regional constituency that can impose costs on the central leadership and deter some central actions to remove them. For example, in Kazakhstan regional leaders of provinces with a Russian majority have had to keep an eye on Almaty when championing Russian rights and regional autonomy because President Nursultan Nazarbaev can remove those who go too far.
- Third, where regional officials are elected regionally or depend in some other way on regional support for their continuation in office, and that constituency is multiethnic, they tend to engage in moderate efforts to mobilize support within the titular ethnic community. These leaders are cross-pressured: On the one hand, regional leaders use the ethnic card to cement loyalties within their own ethnic group but risk losing members of the coalition constituency that supports them in office; on the other hand, failure to play the ethnic card risks losing significant parts of the titular ethnic group to competing ethnic entrepreneurs in the region. Such cross-pressured regional leaders are likely to choose compromise strategies. For example, in Ukraine "the elected organs of local government in eastern and southern *oblasti* have exercised caution in their relations with the central authority in Kiev, officially distancing themselves from the maximalist demands of regionalist movements, while supporting the overall aim of greater autonomy" (Solchanyk 1994: 60). The Donetsk oblast soviet in particular has pressed for a form of loose federation

and for recognition of Russian as a state language of Ukraine but has not endorsed the calls for separatism coming from several Russian movements in the oblast.

- Fourth, where regional leaders are elected regionally or depend in some other way on regional support for their continuation in office but they do not enjoy extensive support outside the titular nationality of the region, they are more likely to undertake strong efforts to mobilize support within the ethnic community. Where the titular nationality constitutes a majority (or near majority) of the region's population, such as the Tatars in Tatarstan, regional leaders may rely on democratic elections (or nearly democratic elections) to sustain their governments and may tolerate a form of inclusive politics that grants political rights to other ethnic groups. Where the titular nationality is itself a small minority, these leaders must often rely on nondemocratic practices to sustain themselves and may turn to exclusionary policies that reserve key political posts to the titular nationality. For example, by resisting fair elections the leadership of the Chukchi autonomous okrug has maintained its hold on local power despite the 93 percent majority of its population that is not Chukchi. In Buryatia nationalist groups have urged revisions of the electoral laws and constitution to guarantee Buryat control of the parliament and presidency (*Trud*, 25 September 1992). In Khakassia the Association of the People of Khakassia "Tun," fearing the 79 percent Russian majority in the republic, urged revisions of the constitution to guarantee the Khakass at least half of the seats in one house of parliament and the posts of president, prime minister, and minister of culture (*Izvestiia*, 20 December 1991).
- Fifth, where regional leaders depend upon central support to sustain them in office and central leaders seek to remove them, regional leaders are likely to exert maximal effort to mobilize their ethnic communities. For example, following President Zviad Gamsakhurdia's threat to the existence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia (with a threat to expel the entire Ossetian population), the governments of each responded with a call to arms and civil war against the central government of Georgia.

Thus the foremost constraint on (1) the regional leaders' assessment of the value of the ethnic card to their own survival and (2) their opportunity to act upon that assessment is the rules of ac-

countability. That is, the first-order constraint in each regional leader's decision to play the ethnic card is the nature of their principal—who can pose a credible threat to remove the regional leader.⁸ Other constraints, such as the demographic composition of the region, are secondary; these are important only in some subset of principal-agent relations. None of this implies that all politicians will choose strategies congruent with the rules of accountability (all relationships were presented above in probabilistic language, such as “tend to”), but those who choose incongruent strategies tend to be selected out.

The rules of accountability can be characterized most simply as *centralized* accountability (in which regional leaders are appointed and removed by central leaders) and *decentralized* accountability (in which regional leaders can be removed by constituents within the region itself). In purest form these might be considered two hypothetical end-points on a single continuum. These affect the *motivation* of regional authorities to play the ethnic card. Under centralized accountability post-Soviet regional leaders have used the ethnic card to stay the hand of central leaders who might consider removing them (by increasing the costs to the central leaders of removing the regional leaders) or to support an attempt to escape the control of threatening central authorities entirely. Under decentralized accountability post-Soviet regional leaders have used the ethnic card when they see the ethnic machine and exclusionary citizenship as better guarantors of their survival than multiethnic support. Democracy and divided central governments (decentralized variant) have afforded the greatest *opportunities* for ethnic entrepreneurs. The Estonian republic, the Russian deadlock between president and Congress of Peoples' Deputies, and the civil war in the capital of Tajikistan, for example, have each given regional or local political entrepreneurs opportunities to play the ethnic card.

[2] *Changes over time in a regime's rules of accountability for regional leaders have been reflected in changes in their ethnic strategies.*

Indeed the evolution of the Soviet regime prior to its collapse illustrates how these changes in accountability elicited changes in the behavior of regional officials. When regional leaders were dependent on central appointment for their tenure of office (the centralized variant is a stylized description of the game under Stalin),

ethnic mobilization to build independent bases of support brought swift purges from the center and so was relatively uncommon. In the late Brezhnev administration and until the introduction of competitive elections under Gorbachev, regional leaders could use popular support to impose some costs on the central leadership and so became more widespread. Since 1990, where political competition has been permitted, the election of regional leaders by regional constituencies (decentralized variant) has elicited still more ethnic entrepreneurship.

The most important manifestation of this elicited change was the rapid shift in strategies of the leaders of union republics and other ethnic homelands during the demise of the Soviet state. The official entrepreneurs in many of these ethnic communities, who at the time of the demise of the Soviet Union became the most ardent nationalists demanding independence and promoting the interests of their ethnic communities, were previously loyal servants of the Soviet state and Communist Party; previously many of these same entrepreneurs had been the keys that ensured the continued subordination of their ethnic communities to Moscow. Consider a still more improbable case: after Tajikistan's President Nabiev agreed in late May 1992 to form a coalition government with democratic, nationalist, and Islamic parties, some of his former hard-line Communist supporters began to press ethnic agendas in order to assert the independence of their regions from the control of the central government that they saw as threatening their continued rule. In Leninabad oblast, the hard-liners threatened to secede from Tajikistan and join the autocratic regime of Uzbekistan, legitimating their plans with the claim that a high proportion of the region's population was Uzbek (Russian TV, 15 May 1992).⁹

Conversely, institutional changes that reduce the value of the ethnic card have elicited a reversal of these ethnic strategies. Following Russia's presidential coup and constitutional referendum in late 1993, the shift of power toward the center and the clear willingness of the Russian president to hold regional leaders accountable for any threats to the unity of the Russian Federation led many of the latter to moderate their ethnic claims on the center.

[3] Where ethnofederal administration gives regional leaders playing the ethnic card a greater chance of survival, even a nonminority regional

leader may play the ethnic card and seek recognition of the region as a federally constituted ethnic homeland.

Among the more interesting twists in the behavior of regional leaders is that Russian leaders of Russian-dominated regions within the larger Russian-dominated state have begun acting much like minority regional leaders—where their survival can be improved by the ethnic card. Indeed the leader of the breakup of the Soviet Union was not one of the minority leaders, but Boris Yeltsin, leading the Russian state. Within Russia itself, many ethnic conflicts are being invented on the spur of the moment with no cultural differences to account for them. For example, leaders of Arkhangelsk oblast, oblasts in the Urals, and Krasnoyarsk *krai* have demanded recognition as ethnic communities, even though their communities are composed principally of Russians, many of whom have only recently moved to these regions. The leaders of Krasnoyarsk *krai* have attempted a number of curious “ethnic” ploys, proposing that their province be elevated to the status of an Enisei Republic (*Izvestiia*, 22 and 28 October 1991), that their province be “annexed” as a homeland by the minuscule Evenki minority contained within it, and that their province be joined with other members of the so-called “Siberian people” in a Siberian Republic (*Sibirskaiia gazeta*, 23–24 June 1992; *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 17 November 1992; *Radio Rossii*, 24 March 1992; *Izvestiia*, 27 March 1992).¹⁰

AGENDAS OF REGIONAL ETHNIC MACHINES

Playing the ethnic card often means seeking the means to sustain the ethnic machine that keeps a regional leader in office. As a consequence, even though the ethnic agendas of regional leaders have included both expressive and material issues, they tend to give primary emphasis to acquiring the means to dispense material and career payoffs to their loyal followers. This is particularly true in their confrontations with the central authorities that have been most likely to lead to severe conflict. The following two propositions describe the agendas that have defined the ethnic card:

[4] *In order to expand the resources available for ethnic entrepreneurship, regional leaders tend to emphasize issues that shift control over resources from the central state to the regional administration.*

In the confrontation with the central state the ethnic agendas of regional leaders tend to stress instrumental concerns that focus on revenue-capturing opportunities. That is, regional leaders tend to focus the ethnic agenda on those objectives that will expand the resources at their control and so give them the wherewithal for selective incentives to maintain themselves in power. For example, top on the list of demands from republics in drafting the Federal Treaty was regional control over land and natural resources. The treaty, signed in March 1992, provided that "the land, minerals, water, flora, and fauna" on the territory of each republic belongs to the people living in that territory (ITAR-TASS, 14 March 1992; *Izvestiia*, 1 April 1992). Tolz observes that the demands of Sakha's (Yakutia) leadership "is a good illustration of a region of the Russian Federation that wants more autonomy for purely economic, rather than [nationalist] reasons . . . control over profits from diamond mining and production is behind the republic's campaign for more rights" (1993: 7).

In order to maximize their entrepreneurial opportunities, regional leaders tend to prefer those redistributive policies (between center and region) that expand their own discretion in the use of revenues. When confronted with alternative policies carrying similar monetary value for the region, regional leaders tend to prefer those that give them greater discretion in the distribution of funds and so greater opportunity to distribute selective incentives (see Bates 1981: 5). Thus regional leaders have pressed particularly hard for retention of taxes collected in their regions; this increases their discretion in disbursing funds and selecting those who are to be rewarded. Regional leaders have opposed the old system of sending all taxes to the center for reallocation through centrally controlled bureaucracies operating directly in the regions; this bypassed regional leaders and deprived them of support-building opportunities. In addition, regional leaders have demanded ownership of local productive assets, preferring this to equivalent or even greater subventions from the center.

Concern with preserving ethnic machines has meant that the ethnic agendas of regional leaders tend to give precedence to the

needs of the part of the ethnic community residing within the region over the needs of the larger ethnic community. The agendas of regional leaders often poorly serve the needs of the ethnic community as a whole in whose name the agenda is advanced. In many instances, a significant portion of the ethnic community, which lives outside “its” region, is excluded from the benefits of the new ethnic politics; indeed the welfare of the co-ethnics outside the region may even suffer if they become victimized in retaliation for the actions taken by the region. For example, two-thirds of Russia’s Tatars live outside Tatarstan, and the leadership of that republic has been criticized for its limited concern for their oppressed brethren outside the republic’s borders. In Moldova, as Socor notes,

More than two-thirds of Moldova’s Russians (and the same proportion of its Ukrainians) live on the right bank of the Dniester outside the area seized by the left bank insurgents since the beginning of the year. These large concentrations of Russians and partially Russified Ukrainians neither supported the left bank insurgents nor (except for the nearly defunct communist Interfront) backed up the charges by left bank Russians and Moscow that Moldova had been violating the rights of the “Russian-speaking” population (1993: 15).

Despite its claim to represent the prerogatives of Moldova’s Slavic population, the Transdnistrian leadership has apparently expended far less energy to build support among the country’s right-bank Russians than among the non-Russians residing on the left bank.

[5] The regional leader’s agenda on center-to-region redistribution is constrained by the resource base of the region.

Claims to autonomy come more forcefully from those regional leaders who sit atop valuable resource bases—examples are Sakha and Tatarstan. A survey in *Rossiiskaia gazeta* (17 November 1992) showed that popular and elite support for autonomy was stronger in regions of greater natural wealth; support was significantly lower where the homeland economy was heavily dependent on subsidies from the center (also see *Kommersant*, 16–23 March 1992). For example, leaders of the Tuva republic have resisted demands of the Tuvian Popular Front for a referendum on independence: “The

overwhelming majority of deputies not in favor pointed out that 90% of Tuva's budget consisted of subsidies from Moscow. None of Tuva's leaders supported the republic's secession from the Russian Federation" (*Izvestiia*, 18 September 1992).

CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERALIZATION

The process of transforming a command economy in the Soviet successor states—not to be confused with the ethnic consequences of a fully developed market economy—has influenced the processes of ethnic entrepreneurship described in the previous section in at least two ways. First, liberalization has led to the disintegration of centralized ownership of productive assets and has provided many new opportunities for regional officials to seize those assets that will generate appropriable rents. Second, liberalization has weakened many institutions that compete with the regional officials for loyalties and has left regional officials in a stronger position to build loyal constituencies by dispensing appropriated rents. As a consequence, the process of liberalization has actually strengthened the hand of the homeland leaders. It must be reiterated, however, that these influences are secondary to the influence of changes in the rules of accountability described in the previous section. The evidence for the influences of economic liberalization is relatively sparse and the causal connection more speculative.

Perhaps the single most important observation in considering this relationship is that during this period of economic liberalization, regional officials with ethnic agendas tend to crowd out or dominate the alternatives within their respective regions. That is, regional officials playing the ethnic card tend to eclipse alternative political entrepreneurs from "above" who seek to build loyalties in the region to the larger state, political entrepreneurs "within" the ethnic community who seek to challenge the leadership of regional officials, and political entrepreneurs "alongside" the ethnic community who offer alternative particularistic communities as foci for loyalties. Regional officials tend to attract followers from nonethnic entrepreneurs, such as class entrepreneurs who seek to weld transethnic alliances of workers, or from alternative ethnic entrepreneurs who

press different agendas. Indeed the success of the regional officials forces others in the region and ethnic community to identify themselves principally in relationship to the agenda of these officials. Many bandwagon, joining the larger movement or at least shaping their agendas to correspond to that of the officials; others reshape their agendas as explicit alternatives to that of these officials. Either way, the regional entrepreneur-officials become the focal point around which others define themselves and their own agendas. In this section I will offer a stylized description of how economic liberalization has contributed to this phenomenon of “crowding out” the alternatives in each region by the regional officials of the Soviet successor states.

CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION: COMPETITION AMONG POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS

Regional officials compete with other political entrepreneurs for support within the population by offering programs of collective action that often benefit individuals with some markers but not others. Entrepreneurs compete with one another not only by appealing to different individuals, but often by appealing to the same individuals on the basis of the same or different markers. These competing programs identify aggregates of markers that define the ethnic community in different ways and that offer alternatives to ethnicity (such as class or gender) as the basis for collective action.

A microcosmic illustration of the competition among alternative programs of mobilization can be found in Dagestan—a multiethnic republic located on Russia’s border with Azerbaijan. The peoples of this republic are the targets of competing political entrepreneurs who offer at least five different bases for mobilization. Ethnic entrepreneurs who seek to mobilize individual groups such as the Kumyk, Lezgins, and Nogai compete with entrepreneurs who seek to mobilize the so-called “peoples of Dagestan” as one. Still others, such as the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, seek to bind all so-called “mountain peoples” in a North Caucasus federal republic. All three of these compete with entrepreneurs offering Islamic, interethnic programs of collective action, on the one hand, and with those who attempt to cultivate an identity as peoples of Russia (*Rossiiane*), on the other (Ormrod 1993: 463–66, 469–71).

In the process of mobilizing followers into collective action, ethnic entrepreneurs compete for supporters' time and resources; it is important to stress that the objective is not simply to win supporters' loyalties and build identities, but also to gain a tangible commitment of future resources.¹¹ Ethnic entrepreneurs compete for these constituents by offering both expressive and material incentives to potential followers.¹² The expressive agendas may simply raise symbolic issues such as a national flag, emblem, or city names, but may involve broader promises of imagined communities (Anderson 1991: 6, 67–82). Material incentives often entail offers of special access to scarce resources such as government jobs or state expenditures. These are frequently redistributive, shifting material resources among social groups such as ethnic groups.

LIBERALIZATION AND THE ADVANTAGES OF REGIONAL LEADERS

In this competition, regional officials have tended to attract more followers than alternative political entrepreneurs and to crowd out their competitors within the region because their posts give them resources unavailable to others. Liberalization of the post-Soviet economies has tended to increase this advantage. Specifically, in a competition among political entrepreneurs where all seek similar commitments of time and resources from followers and make equally attractive expressive and material *promises*, rational potential followers are more likely to invest time and resources in political entrepreneurs who offer (1) higher likelihood of success in fulfilling their promises, (2) greater selective material incentives to joiners, and (3) lower transaction costs of joining. In each of these three conditions influencing success, regional officials have had an advantage. Liberalization increases this advantage by creating new opportunities to capture rents that can in turn be used by regional leaders to lower the transaction costs and to raise the selective benefits to supporters (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974; Tollison 1982).¹³

[6] In the competition among ethnic entrepreneurs, regional officials have tended to enjoy an advantage because their competitors can usually offer only expressive incentives.

In the competition among post-Soviet political entrepreneurs expressive incentives have been trumped by material incentives due to three characteristics of the former. First, expressive incentives have been more easily coopted or matched by competitors than material benefits in a bidding process of ethnic “me-too-ism,” while material benefits have not been so easily matched (except at the level of promises).¹⁴ The alacrity with which former Communist Party first secretaries embrace the symbols of their ethnic competitors is indeed dazzling: Eduard Shevardnadze has reportedly converted to Orthodox Christianity and “greet[s] visitors seated beneath an icon” (Clogg 1994: 4). Boris Yeltsin similarly uses the symbols of Orthodoxy and tsardom to fulfill the expressive expectations of many Russians. Thus ethnic entrepreneurs out of power are often frustrated when the regional leaders “steal” their expressive issues. Where regional leaders have embraced the symbolism of the ethnic community, such as renaming the region and its cities or proclaiming an official state language, they have deprived their competition of important issues (Hyman 1993: 294).

Second, the authors of imagined communities who gain adherents do not necessarily take these away from others; they often simply profit from the remarkably expansive human imagination, which can grow to embrace ever more people. In other words, in the competition among post-Soviet political entrepreneurs the process of identity formation is not always zero-sum, while the process of gaining commitments of time and resources is more nearly so. Communities such as believers, co-nationals, sisters and brothers, and others often coexist in the imagination and more have been added as individuals’ intellectual horizons expand. Yet the decisive objective in the competition among post-Soviet political entrepreneurs is to induce individuals to reallocate portions of their time and resources from other purposes, and individuals’ time and resources are not so expansive as their imaginations; tangible commitments to new causes must often come at the expense of other purposes. Thus ethnic entrepreneurs out of power who succeed in winning converts to their imagined communities have not always found that this identity leads to collective action in competition with the regional leaders. For example, as some observers (e.g., Hyman 1993: 296–98; Rumer 1993: 93) note, despite the rise of Islamic and pan-Turkic consciousness in Central Asia, these do not seriously rival the state as a basis

for collective action in politics. In this volume, Georgi Derluguian discusses why linguistic rather than religious appeals to ethnic identity have proven far more successful since the Soviet Union began.

Third, expressive incentives have been less effective at eliciting commitments of individual effort because they are more likely to entail public goods—at least for members of the ethnic community. Expressive agendas, such as language legislation, often cannot exclude individual members of the ethnic community who do not support the cause. Smart prospective members of the community are likely to free ride rather than allocate time and resources to the cause (Olson 1965).¹⁵ The Soviet successor states have spawned countless associations that have offered solely expressive incentives, and these have largely remained on the periphery of politics, unable to gain commitments of time and resources from the ethnic community they target.

[7] In the competition among ethnic entrepreneurs, regional officials have tended to enjoy an advantage because they can offer greater material incentives.

When political entrepreneurs make equally attractive promises and equal demands for time and resources, rational individuals are more likely to allocate time and resources to causes that in addition offer selective material incentives in exchange for support.¹⁶ That is, in this competition to get individuals to reallocate their time and resources, those political entrepreneurs who only create imagined communities are likely to fail when competing with entrepreneurs offering selective material rewards on top of their own imagined communities. Post-Soviet regional officials have tended to prevail over their competitors when they have been able to convert the local state apparatus into a giant patronage-distributing mechanism, packed jobs in the regional administrative apparatus with their loyal followers, and converted local offices of the state into mechanisms for close contact with their supporters. The importance of material incentives in building and maintaining support is illustrated by the case of the Dniester Republic in eastern Moldova. Socor (1993: 15) asks why it enjoys such strong support from its population, while the majority of Russians and Ukrainians in the other parts of Moldova seem to be relatively indifferent. The answer appears to be the massive selective incentives offered to its supporters within its ter-

ritory: the Dniester Republic continues to maintain salaries, social benefits, and military pay at high levels, despite the collapse of the local economy. Moreover, this patronage has apparently also won the loyalty of part (perhaps even a majority) of Transdniestria's Moldovan population as well.¹⁷

In rare circumstances, competitors outside the state have the assets to provide extensive material incentives and have challenged the regional leaders. An illustration of this unusual circumstance is the successful candidacy of Kirsan Iliumzhinov for the presidency of Kalmykia. Drawing on his own enormous wealth (and perhaps the financial backing of the Yeltsin government), he personally subsidized milk and bread prices in the capital (Elista) during the campaign, lavished enormous payments on his followers, and promised \$100 to each citizen from his personal fortune (ITAR-TASS, 22 February 1993; *Izvestiia*, 13 April 1993). Normally private citizens have not been able to offer such incentives, and the regional leaders who control the state apparatus have had an advantage in offering selective incentives to followers.

In addition, regional leaders have enjoyed an advantage over their competitors in their ability to minimize the transaction costs for individuals who receive these benefits. In the political realm collective action is constrained by the costs of organizing and joining (Moe 1984; McCubbins and Sullivan 1987).¹⁸ In post-Soviet politics these transaction costs include the time and resources spent by potential followers simply locating and contacting alternative political entrepreneurs (time and resources that could otherwise be given to the political entrepreneurs) and the time and resources spent by the political entrepreneurs attempting to identify followers (time and resources that could be spent buying their support). Regional officials have relied on the deep and broad reach of regional administration to make their ethnic machines (like the Soviet regime before it) the most accessible ethnic organization in the region. Moreover, many regional officials have used the coercive powers of regional governments to erect obstacles to the activities of their competitors and so raise the transaction costs associated with offering commitments of time and resources to their causes.

[8] The process of economic liberalization has strengthened the advantage of regional officials by increasing the demand for their material benefits and weakening alternative providers of these.

The process of dismantling the Soviet command economy has brought a depression that makes the resources dispensed by the regional state administration ever more valuable: potential followers offer greater commitments of their own time and resources to acquire these. For example, the flocking of unemployed youths to back their regional leaders in showdowns with the central authorities is a common phenomenon. Economic liberalization in the Soviet successor states has weakened centrally controlled institutions far more than regional administrations; some of the rise of ethnopolitics in the post-Soviet period is a consequence of the collapse of alternative sources of these material rewards. For example, the rise of regional officials has been aided by the weakening of class entrepreneurs. Soviet-era trade unions, which dispensed enormous social benefits to employees, had the opportunity to build a loyal clientele, but privatization of the economy, particularly the privatization of housing, and the collapse of the social safety net have in many instances reduced the set of resources that trade unions could dispense as selective incentives. During the transition—conditions that differ markedly from those of a fully developed market economy—older, Soviet-era institutions that used to dispense material benefits, such as ministries and so-called “public organizations,” have declined more rapidly than new post-Soviet sources have emerged. For example, independent trade unions have relatively few selective benefits to offer their followers. In short, a major consequence of liberalization of the totalitarian regime is to break up alternative centers of patronage at the same time the economic depression has increased the demand for such material benefits. Where regional administration is a strong building block of the state, the transition from totalitarianism has increased the influence of regional ethnic entrepreneurs. In a mob of political dwarves, even the political entrepreneur of modest stature appears to be a giant.

CONCLUSION

This essay has addressed an issue which is at the heart of this volume: while developed market economies may be associated with low levels of ethnic conflict, the initiation of the transition to market economics from various forms of state welfarism at the end of the twentieth century has been associated with extremely violent ethnic conflict. I have argued that in the Soviet successor states this association is real but secondary and coincidental to the major cause of the recent rise of ethnic conflict—the fight among officials within the successor state administrations over the division of decision-making authority. Economic liberalization has added additional spoils over which to fight and has given regional officials new advantages in their competition with central authorities and alternative political entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, the influence of economic liberalization on this ethnic conflict should be understood in the context of the attempt of regional officials to survive in a rapidly changing political environment by playing the ethnic card.

The relationship between economic liberalization and ethnic conflict is of course not unidirectional, and in the long term the latter may come to limit the former. Indeed the analysis in this essay suggests that the political uses of economic liberalization by regional officials may prevent the consolidation of market economies in the Soviet successor states; while the acts of regional leaders speed along the disintegration of central control over the economy, these acts also concentrate control over productive assets in the hands of politicians at the regional level. We may see one integrated command economy replaced by many smaller mercantilist economies with strong patronage-based welfare policies. Ironically post-Soviet ethnic politics may prove to be the death of the very economic liberalization that nourished it.

NOTES

1. By my count the total is at least 1,308. This counts all ethnic groups with over 50,000 members and counts each appearance of such ethnic groups in different states as a basis for a separate set of interethnic dyads. The list of armed conflicts is taken from Wallensteen and Axell (1993); that of major crises, from the agendas of the UN Security Council and the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The former was updated to include events in 1994, specifically the Chechen war.
2. For an illustration of the importance of administrative sponsorship, see the difference between the campaigns for autonomy in the Donbass and the Crimea (Solchanyk 1994). For the argument that this reliance on preexisting federal administrations is only a first stage in the course of post-Soviet ethnopolitics, see Szajkowski (1993: 172); note, however, that almost all of Szajkowski's examples are actually drawn from federal administrations.
3. Some analysts have noted the multiethnic character of the leadership of several republics that have been unusually assertive and questioned whether it is appropriate to label this whole phenomenon "ethnic" politics; see Kolstø et al. (1993).
4. I develop the themes of this subsection in greater detail in Roeder (1991).
5. The monographic studies of any number of ethnic groups catalog the endless list of grievances against this or that territorial demarcation; this does not undermine the point I have just made. In light of the poorly demarcated borders of traditional homelands and the competing claims to many lands lying between homelands, it was inevitable that many groups would be aggrieved.
6. See, for example, Loeber (1968: 133–45) and Vakar (1956: 150–51).
7. Each of the propositions in this paper is a *ceteris paribus* statement about modal behavior. I have not attempted to exhaust the constraints on ethnic entrepreneurship, but to offer a conceptual framework in which further propositions could be developed. To be "progressive" such extensions would ask how these other constraints affect the survival prospects of regional officials.
8. For a discussion of this conception of accountability, see Roeder (1994).
9. In Kulyab oblast, hard-liners threatened to create an independent state but did not press a nationalist agenda (ITAR-TASS, 23 May 1992). Similarly, much of the initial organizing of movements for regional autonomy in the Donbass and Novorossiia was inspired by oblast Communist Party leaders who feared losing their positions in an independent Ukraine (*Izvestiia*, 19 September and 16 October 1991).
10. Similarly, the leaders of Transcarpathia oblast in the Ukraine, a region in which Ukrainians constitute 78.4 percent of the population, have used the presence of Hungarian and Ruthenian minorities to justify claims to regional autonomy (Solchanyk 1994: 61–63).

11. The larger model of which this essay is an application distinguishes identity-formation (in which individuals develop an awareness that one's markers tie one to others in a group) and mobilization (in which individuals with common markers join in collective action). It begins from the assertion that the outcomes of attempts at ethnic mobilization are not predetermined by preexisting identities.
12. I should stress that I am not advancing the usual instrumentalist argument that political entrepreneurs offer only material incentives. My larger purpose in the model that lies behind this essay is to help extricate political science from the debate between primordialists and instrumentalists. This debate is a familiar one: primordialists (e.g., Connor 1972, Geertz 1963) focus on the fixed cultural markers of individuals to explain ethnic politics. Instrumentalists (e.g., Glazer and Moynihan 1975) focus on the ethnic choices that individuals make in the political realm. These approaches lead to different predictions about the sorts of issues that should give rise to ethnic conflict, the types of ethnic groups that should emerge, and the agendas that they are likely to press. My project begins from the proposition that from the perspective of political science, this is a sterile debate and that we did ourselves a disservice by importing it into our discipline. As political scientists, we appreciate that both sorts of issues are expressed through politics. To bring ethnic politics into the discipline of political science we need some alternative perspective to give us a rigorous approach.
13. A rent is defined in the technical literature as "a return in excess of a resource owner's opportunity cost" (Tollison 1982: 575) but in more common parlance refers to the amount a monopoly can earn by charging a price above what would have prevailed in a competitive market. Opportunities to capture rents can be artificially contrived by a state that restricts competition with such mechanisms as state-licensed monopolies or restrictive import licenses.
14. As in the case of expressive incentives promises of future material rewards are easily matched and coopted. Since competing entrepreneurs make equally inflated promises about the state of affairs that will follow when their imagined communities are reified, entrepreneurs cannot count on the promise of benefits from an imagined community alone to gain the commitment of time and resources to their cause. In addition, the benefits of imagined communities are often public goods. When faced by competing entrepreneurs offering equally attractive public goods, potential followers must receive some additional incentive to allocate their scarce time and resources to one entrepreneur or the other.
15. As Chong argues in his study of the American civil rights movement, no matter whether one describes these situations as prisoners' dilemmas or assurance games, in collective action, particularly in the initial stages, "the danger is that everyone will stand around waiting for others to pay the heavy start-up costs needed to initiate the process" (1991: 118).

16. This is different from the argument of Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum (1982: 421) that collective action will only occur to the degree that free riding is prevented through the production of private rewards and punishments. Indeed individuals can be prevented from free riding by expressive rewards that are positively correlated with belonging (see Wilson 1974, on solidaristic incentives), but *in a competitive environment* those expressive rewards can be matched by other ethnic entrepreneurs. The proposition of Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum must be reformulated.
17. According to one Scandinavian investigator, as much as 70 percent of the ethnic Moldovan population within Transdnistria also supports the regional regime (Kolstø et al. 1993: 986).
18. The analysis of transaction costs originated in economics with Coase's (1937) observation that complex production processes involve transactions (exchanges) among owners of various inputs and that alternative forms of organization can make these transactions more or less costly. The importance of transaction costs in ethnic mobilization has been illustrated by the tendency of new movements to mobilize preexisting organizations, much as the U.S. civil rights movement used African-American churches (Oberschall 1973; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). Transaction costs are also cited as an important reason that organizations are more likely to emerge within rather than across language groups: by facilitating communication among members, a common language lowers transaction costs (Laitin 1986: 11).

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NATIONAL CONFLICT INTERNALIZED: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE FALL OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN REPUBLIC

Michael Urban

Ordinarily the concept of ethnic or national conflict connotes a hostile relationship that has developed between or among different ethnic or national groups. This study, however, concerns a national conflict *within* a single group or, perhaps more precisely, between various groups laying mutually exclusive claims to represent a single nation, Russia. Its focus falls on a particular stage of the ongoing process of national identity construction in that country (roughly from the failed *coup d'état* of August 1991 to the successful one of September–October 1993 that ended Russia's first republic and prepared the way for Boris Yeltsin's constitution and the inauguration of a second one), a process transpiring under conditions fundamentally different from those obtaining in other post-Communist societies. Although Russia might share with them the urge to remove from its national life all traces and reminders of the Communist epoch, it also faces a unique predicament in this respect. For other post-Communist societies, the disassociation of communism from national identity has been facilitated by a background understanding that communism had never been "our" doing in the first place. Ultimate responsibility for the crimes inflicted and the damage done in its name belongs not to the nation itself but to those who had forcibly imposed it—namely, another nation, Russia. Consequently, insofar as communism had been experienced in East European countries or in the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union as Russian tutelage, culpability for the past does not rest with the nation itself.

Russia's situation is unique in this respect. There a discourse of national identity would forfeit from the outset the possibility of constructing some *other nation* to which might be assigned the blame for

the immediate past. As a result, this culpability has invaded the code of domestic political communication, infusing it with the Manichaeian logic of unqualified nationalism. In this context, the content of quotidian politics—conflict, bargaining, compromise, and so forth—easily becomes entangled with the intractable issue of national identity, as parties to a particular conflict tend to construct their opponents as enemies of the nation, and themselves, by implication, as its saviors. I wish to investigate this contest over national identity as a specific set of discursive practices in which Russian political actors participate. My methodological assumption in this respect runs parallel to that anchoring the new historiography of the French Revolution—namely, that the world of politics is built of language and those within it become the objects not of blind historical forces but of the words that they themselves utter.¹ Analysis of the relevant discursive practices thus makes this world available to us. From the point of view of their structure, these practices appeared remarkably uniform across the Russian political spectrum, amounting to a code that—at least for the period under review—seemed broadly shared. That situation, however, was dissolved by the political violence of October 1993. Although a detailed assessment of the forms of political discourse appearing in Russia in the aftermath of those tragic and traumatic events would be beyond the scope of this study, I shall conclude with a few words on that subject.

In order to provide a bit of substance to a discussion about such imperceptible things as discourse and identity—over which constantly hangs the threat of runaway abstraction—let me begin by introducing two vignettes that might illustrate concretely something of the problem of identity formation as experienced by political subjects in Russia during the period in question.

Sketch 1. A meeting on 8 July 1993—attended by some twenty representatives of the Socialist Party of Working People, the Party of Labor, and the United Social Democrats faction of the Social Democratic Party of Russia—called for the purpose of forming an electoral bloc (tentatively called the United Democratic Left) that will field a slate of candidates in elections expected in the coming months.

First Speaker: . . . The bloc that we create here in Moscow can serve as a model for others in the provinces and as a basis for forming a [new] unified party.

Second Speaker: I agree with what's been said. . . . But the word "democratic" should not appear in the name of the bloc. The people have tired of the word "democracy." It has a bad connotation, like "privatization."

Third Speaker: In the West, everybody knows that "united democratic left" stands for those parties that are insignificant. We shouldn't use that name at all.

Fourth Speaker: . . . Let's face it; what we really have in mind is a democratic socialist party, but the word "socialist" is not attractive to people either.

Fifth Speaker: And the word "party"? That's even worse!

A general discussion then ensues in which all permutations and combinations of the terms—"united," "left," "democratic," "socialist," "party," and so forth—are discarded as unsuitable for attracting voters. The question of what the organization's logo might include is met with baffled silence. The meeting adjourns with the understanding that the bloc has been formed but without a name. A full conference of the three organizations, called for the purpose of ratifying the new union, is tasked with devising a name and a logo for it.

Sketch 2. An interview (15 July 1993) conducted by the present writer with Vladimir Zharikhin, then a member of the Executive Board of the People's Party of Free Russia (PPFR), head of its Department for Public Relations, and coordinator of public relations and international ties for Civic Union, the larger coalition to which the PPFR belonged.

Interviewer: Would you begin by describing the various electoral coalitions that are now forming?

Zharikhin: There are a number of them, but in fact there are only three real political forces in the country: the national-Communist patriotic bloc, Civic Union, and Democratic Russia. I understand that in a normal, developed political situation in Russia there

would only be two—a left-center and a right-center—like the Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. or Labour and Conservative in England. One would accent questions of social security, and the other would lean toward [classical] liberal values. We don't have this because of our radical right and extreme left, which, in my view, would simply not be allowed to exist in a normal, civilized country. It's an exoticism that exists because of Bolshevism. Take the reformers, the radical part of Democratic Russia. Theirs is a Bolshevik mentality.

Interviewer: The reformers?

Zharikhin: Yes. It is a classic variant of the ends justifying the means, destroying everything for the sake of creating a new social order, a purely Bolshevik thing which is not limited to Communist ideology. Ideology itself is not the main thing. In order to achieve their aims, they use liberal ideology but remain Bolsheviks.

Interviewer: Well, you know that Democratic Russia also accuses [your coalition] Civic Union of the same thing. They say that Civic Union has been built on the base of the old *nomenklatura*, not just a part of it, but the very heart of the Communist system, the directors who controlled the entire economy.

Zharikhin: That's funny. If you look at these people [who say that] and the staff of the government and presidential team that they support, you'll see mainly that staff of the [old] CPSU. Yes, many in Civic Union belonged to the CPSU, but that was required at the time to work in their professions. We, too, defended the White House [during the coup in 1991]!

Interviewer: Then what of your opponents on the other end of the spectrum?

Zharikhin: Most of them call themselves Communists, but they're really fascists.

These short vignettes reflect a number of elements typical of political language in Russia during the period between the coups. Each illustrates to some degree the problem of representation. In the first, the members of an electoral bloc are enthused about their new-

found unity, appear to have a clear idea of their aims, but have no vocabulary with which to name their project. They are unable to represent their identity for fear that the other—in this case, the voters—would misconstrue it. They are convinced that if they were able to communicate their “real” program to the public, they would rapidly attract broad support. But they are equally certain that whatever name they might give to that coalition, campaigns for it would repel would-be supporters. So they pass the problem to a full conclave of their respective organizations, which would (somehow) untie that knot, remaining, in the meantime, nameless.

The second sketch involves the converse problem of renaming. In this respect, the projection of a given identity—here “democratic,” “reformers”—is routinely rejected by the other to whom it has been directed. In its stead the other supplies a new name. During the first republic, the vogue had been to relabel the other “Communist” (or, with even more invective, “Bolshevik”), thus appropriating and reversing the valence of that seminal marker inherited from the Soviet past. “Communist” functioned as a universal tag of opprobrium used by all against all—except, perhaps, against Communists themselves, for whom other names such as “fascists” or “lumpens” were sometimes supplied—which prevented the formation of political identities. President Yeltsin and his supporters had routinely referred to their opponents in the old Congress of People’s Deputies and Supreme Soviet as “Communists,” just as the latter had regularly applied this word or its equivalents to the president and those associated with him.² The “democrats” called their opponents “Communists,” and that favor was generously returned.³ “Democrats” have stigmatized fellow “democrats” in this way,⁴ just as those outside the “democratic” camp have done the same to one another.⁵ Even avowed Communists were caught up in this name game, as illustrated by a number of Communist groups that adopted openly religious symbols, thereby disassociating the marker “Communist” from the international proletarian movement and linking it instead to Holy Russia.⁶

Under these circumstances, no political identity was able to stabilize itself. Not only was its self-representation invalidated by the other, who returned it to sender with the cancellation mark “Communist” stamped prominently on it, but also its projection in the first instance would have been conditioned by its claim of dis-

inction from, and opposition to, all others whom it regarded as “Communist” in proportion to its distinction from, and opposition to, them. Thus projecting their identities against a phantom other—“Communists”—political subjects assumed their own phantom identities. None was anchored in relationships of mutual recognition that might establish and maintain the respective boundaries of their “positive” identities. The absence of such a political matrix within which competing identities could find mooring, the lack of recognized places on a recognizable spectrum of political identities, seemed to have encouraged political subjects to migrate toward that grand cenotaph, Russia, where individual attempts at self-validation could be cast in terms of some greater concept of nation. But the collective product of these efforts actually made matters worse as pragmatic orientations were overwhelmed by mythic notions retrieved from the past and the possibilities for political dialogue became lost in a discordant chorus of claims pitched around competing conceptions of national identity.

My discussion of the particular conditions and consequences associated with the problem of identity formation is divided into three parts. The first concerns the historical-cultural background that frames the question of nation and state in Russia. Here the focus is on the store of cultural “materials” inherited from the past that are available to contemporary political actors endeavoring to (re)construct a national identity. These materials admit to varying, even opposing, interpretations. However, of even greater moment in this process of identity formation appears to be the illocutionary interests of the actors themselves, reflected in the manner in which they have appropriated the language and symbols of the past in order to deploy them against their opponents. The ensuing bouts of blame-laying in the name of the nation thereby foreclosed the possibility for dialogue and, along with it, the possibility of making sense.

The second part explores the social conditions in which these patterns of political communication appear. Schematically this section develops the argument that the system of social representations—suppressed if not extirpated during some seventy years of communism—has remained both weak and confused. In compensation, political actors tend to advance “strong” (but shallow) representations that annex the category “national identity” and displace it onto that of “particular interests.” This feature of political dis-

course in post-Communist Russia appears to have followed from the aspects of the communicative code evident during the first republic—in particular, from reciprocal nonrecognition of signifying others and from accusations for what is commonly called national “crisis” or “catastrophe” that are accomplished in the act of renaming the other “Communist.” Not only did the reciprocal nonrecognition of identity claims deprive the discursive field of politics of recognized subjects bearing recognized interests, but also in denying recognition to the other, subjects constructed themselves in a particular way. By unmasking others as “Communists,” they presented themselves as defenders of the nation, as bearers of the national interest. This form of self-exculpation was secured, then, by demonizing the other, onto whom was projected culpability for the discredited past.

In order to illustrate the function of this code in post-Communist Russian politics, the final part of this study applies the concepts developed at a general level to a specific set of events that culminated in the violent end of the first republic. It outlines how the system of representations in place had split systematically the Russian polity into hostile camps, occluding prospects for compromise among the central players, thus turning disputes on constitutional questions into a full-blown crisis that concluded with an insurrection in the capital and its suppression by military force. My aim in this section is not to provide an exhaustive explanation for the events in question. Nor is it my intention to argue that the constitutional crisis and the ensuing bloodshed have been “caused” by the particular reconstruction of Russia’s post-Communist political discourse presented here. Rather my purpose is to provide a perspective on these events that renders them comprehensible by locating them within the phenomenal universe constructed by the discursive practices of political actors themselves. In so doing, it becomes possible to recover a layer of communicative action mediating this phenomenal universe in which instrumental-strategic activities were embedded. In the same way in which communicative action oriented toward reaching understanding—as Jürgen Habermas has shown—enables instrumental-strategic activities (in the extreme case, deception),⁷ so it appeared in the Russian context that the root categories of the prevailing discourse have disabled instrumental-strategic activities ostensibly aimed at negotiation, compromise, and consensus. Such

forms of strategic action were systematically subverted by a discourse of identity that binds its participants into a pattern of irresolvable conflict—"irresolvable" because within its categories the instruments of resolution—assemblies, agreements, referenda, and so forth—were reconstituted as weapons for the continuation of the very struggle that they had been summoned to end.

HISTORICAL-CULTURAL BASES OF STATE AND NATION IN RUSSIA

One can scarcely imagine a more contested site for establishing national identity than that bequeathed by Russia's history. Prior to 1991, the Russian people had constituted the predominant group in the empire and, thereafter, in the USSR. In either instance, however, the political unit housing this people was not a nation-state. The question of territorial boundaries, then, has long been ambiguous, with Russia appearing as both larger than the lands on which lived the Russians and at the same time smaller than the multinational state that had included the Russian nation.⁸ Moreover, the social construction of the Russian nation has historically paralleled the indeterminacy of the state's territorial boundaries. Beginning at least with Petr Chaadaev's famous *Philosophical Letters* (1830s), in which the author claimed that precisely because Russia was a nation of slaves whose achievements on the plane of world civilization amounted to nil, God and history had in store for this people a special mission of chiliastic proportions,⁹ Russian makers of symbol and myth have repeatedly transformed the sense of inadequacy engendered by contact with the West into a profusion of stories about the coming greatness that it portends.¹⁰ Within this cultural context, national inferiority sublimates itself onto something larger, usually the alleged grandeur of empire, thereby displacing the shame of inferiority that prompted the sublimation in the first instance.

Russian national consciousness, then, has taken extraordinary forms. In the words of one commentator, it might best be described as a longstanding "self-delusion" that has been finally interrupted by the collapse of the USSR, which "stripped naked" the nation and triggered an acute crisis of national identity.¹¹ In the words of another:

For many centuries the Russian individual has been accustomed [to thinking] that he [lives] within the borders of this huge state [and that] he is the master of this empire. Today we willy-nilly have ceased to feel ourselves to be the masters everywhere, but it seems that we are unable to feel like masters even here at home [in Russia].¹²

These two sets of remarks on the loss of empire proceed from an identifiable “liberal-democratic” perspective. They obviously counsel critical realism as the cure for the identity crisis induced by the collapse of the USSR. The nation, it would seem, can overcome this trauma by reexamining its (false) identification with empire and building a (true) identity for itself in consonance with the precepts followed by any—and here the stock phrases—“normal,” “civilized” country. In the view of their political opponents, however, this entire way of thinking about the Russian nation is nothing less than treason. It is based, say those of “patriotic” orientation, on the importation of foreign concepts that would corrode the very core of Russian national culture. Rather than attempting to copy what is “not ours,” these voices insist, we need to retrieve what is true and unique in Russian civilization—“the Russian idea.”

This notion is as fuzzy as it is emotionally evocative. It generally refers to a sainted nation based on the principle of *sobornost'*—a mystical notion whereby the (vicariously) assembled people (*sobor*) are united by an apprehension of religious truth that molds them into a community united in harmonious variety.¹³ This community has a unique and universally valid mission to perform in the world. Having endured great suffering and innumerable selfless sacrifices, the Russian nation allegedly has been marked as the savior of humanity (a characterization that resonates with the messianic claims of communism). Thus the millenarian purpose ascribed to the nation is imprinted on the vehicle of its realization: the state. Of course from a liberal-democratic point of view, this notion is laughed off as obscurantist malarkey. In the words of one commentator:

The idea of Russian messianism has united into a compact whole all those extremely contradictory orientations and tendencies which have been given the name “the Russian idea.” Strictly speaking, no one knows what this [idea] is. . . . [But somehow] it is that which never was and therefore always exists.¹⁴

But within the various circles of its adherents, the idea occupies the center of their systems of representation, deflecting criticism (which could only come from those ignorant of, or opposed to, “the Russian idea”) and commissioning an authoritarian state concept dressed up with *sobornost’* and aimed at the revival of national greatness via the route of empire.

The interplay of identity-seeking among political subjects tended to produce a common structure for political discourse during this period, even while the narratives issuing from the “democratic,” “Communist,” or “patriotic” camps respectively differed so markedly according to their surface content. To illustrate, consider the rhetorical postures struck by two of Russia’s most prominent politicians during this period: Sergei Baburin, a leading figure among the “patriots,” and Gennadii Burbulis, his counterpart among the “democrats.”

Baburin began his political career in Omsk, where he quickly earned a reputation as that city’s most radical democrat. He successfully campaigned for national office in 1990 on the Democratic Russia list, but, having been passed over for a key committee assignment in the Supreme Soviet, his political direction banked steeply rightward.¹⁵ As leader of the deputies’ faction Russia in the now defunct Congress of People’s Deputies, head of the political party Russian Popular Union, and a leader of the groups Russian Path and subsequently People’s Power in the State Duma, Baburin has become a principal spokesperson for the patriotic tendency in national politics. His statements on the questions of nation and state are richly embroidered with the various threads running through “the Russian idea”—fear of the corrupting influences stemming from the West, scorn for those fifth-columnists calling themselves “democrats” who would subvert Russia’s authentic cultural-political institutions, rejection of democracy itself in favor of the Russian *narodnovlastie*—a mystical form of “people’s power” roughly equivalent to *sobornost’*—and so forth. What is more, Baburin is convinced that restoring to the Russian state its proper principles is coextensive with the reestablishment of that state’s proper territorial boundaries—namely, those of the former USSR. From his perspective, the entire collection of events and processes that resulted in the Soviet Union’s collapse amounts to a “political crime” and “a provocation to war.” Popular referenda endorsing the goal of independence in

the former non-Russian republics he regards as “the biggest lie, for even in a referendum the will of the people can be falsified [when] it is expressed as a decision that leads to their own ruin.” On his calculus, non-Russian self-determination has been but “a violation of the Russian people’s right to self-determination.”¹⁶

At the other end of the political spectrum, Gennadii Burbulis began his political career in Sverdlovsk, where he had been a lecturer in Marxist-Leninist philosophy. He stood for office in the national elections of 1989 and won a seat in the USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies. Burbulis took an active part in the opposition bloc formed in that institution and, through close association with Boris Yeltsin, rose to a leading position in the “democratic” camp. In November 1991 he became Russia’s first deputy prime minister and arguably was then the most influential individual in Yeltsin’s cabinet. After leaving government service, he took the lead in organizing a “pro-presidential” political party, eventually called Russia’s Choice, on whose list he was elected to the State Duma in 1993. Unlike Baburin, Burbulis explicitly speaks the language of liberal democracy. He eschews the dream of empire as a dangerous delusion and instead projects a future for Russia that includes the familiar shibboleths of his political wing—“normal,” “civilized,” “democratic,” and based on a market economy. Following some four months of an economic policy known in the vernacular as “shock therapy,” which would allegedly deliver such a future to Russia, Burbulis participated in a “popular assembly” at which about a thousand prominent figures from the worlds of politics, letters, and the arts rallied in support of continuing the shock treatment. In Burbulis’s view, this popular assembly represented a rather magnificent example of *sobornost’*. “This sort of philosophy,” he later remarked, “is generated by the whole of society, and mostly by those who are not practically involved with power relations and who can accumulate experience in the sphere of culture,” which can be employed to shore up the authority of the government.¹⁷

The juxtaposition of Baburin and Burbulis reveals a number of features characteristic of Russian politics in the first republic. First, there was the tendency to disassociate oneself from one’s political past by assuming a hostile posture toward that which was connected to it. Burbulis, the former lecturer in Marxism-Leninism turned “democrat,” is as inclined toward explicit anticommunism as

Baburin, the radical democrat reborn as patriot, is given to condemning the treasonous activities of his former comrades-in-arms. Second, in the discourse of each, elementary logic disappeared behind cultural categories capable of creating strong semiotic effects. In the same way that Baburin regarded the restoration of empire as the exercise of Russia's right to "self-determination," so Burbulis viewed the reenactment of traditional Russian political rituals—through which authority is consecrated by mass acclamation—as fully congruent with a policy ostensibly designed to bring into being a new, "civilized" Russia based on political democracy and economic freedom. Of course Burbulis's orientation is by no means unique among those professing an outwardly reform-oriented ideology. As Yurii Afanas'ev has argued, unthinking lapses into the inimical categories of their opponents seem to be a kind of second nature for Russia's self-professed "democrats."¹⁸ Representations, as noted above, tend to be strong but shallow, pitched on semantic bases easily infiltrated by incongruous elements. Take, for instance, the "democrats'" common term for themselves—"the democratic part of the population." The pronounced oxymoronic element here suggests a sort of semantic masquerade, in certain respects reminiscent of Mikhail Bakhtin's analysis of carnival.¹⁹ Despite the shallowness of this conception, like many comparable ones, it derives its strength by the deployment of an adjectival construction capable of devouring its respective noun. Here "democratic" swallows "part." Yet "part" remains as a trace signifying the existence of some other "undemocratic" part of the population, necessarily opposed to the people, their rights to expression, self-rule, and so forth. This formulation then functions in a way analogous to "the Russian idea," in the face of which other ideas would be opposed to that which is "Russian," that which is "ours."

Relatedly, it is possible to detect in the narratives of Baburin and Burbulis a counterpart to the standard practice of nonrecognition of assertions of identity, as discussed above, in which the speakers appear to be quite oblivious to their own contradictory utterances. Given their professional training—Baburin in law and Burbulis in philosophy—this would be particularly puzzling, unless we consider the context in which they are constructing themselves as political subjects. Were it the case that a political dialogue with a recognized other were under way, then contradiction would dimin-

ish the persuasive effect of argument. Accordingly, each speaker might be expected to tidy up his statements, either by means of reflexively monitoring his own utterances or on the basis of that which his partner in dialogue might point out about them. This is obviously not the case for either Baburin or Burbulis. The manner of self-constitution via denying the other's self-representations appears to account for this phenomenon. In the absence of dialogue, narratives come to resemble that I-I form of autocommunication described by Yuri Lotman in which messages are encoded *against* the other (already redefined in the discourse as alien, evil, treasonous, and so forth) and are in fact directed back to their (collective) sender.²⁰ Within this speech situation, contradiction can be converted into another element of what Lotman has described as hyper-semiosis, a communicative orientation aiming to realize itself in one "great word." In political struggle, it takes the form of a verbal weaponry aimed at the annihilation of the other via the incantation of certain words possessing magical properties—"the Russian idea" and its synecdoches on one side of the spectrum, "reform," "democracy," and like terms on the other.

CULTURAL CODE AND SOCIAL CONDITION

At this point, a methodological proviso might be in order. Namely, in the investigation of a phenomenon as ramified as "identity," the analyst is in principle unable to situate himself on any epistemological terra firma. No appeals to theory, established fact, special knowledge, or anything else can disguise the troublesome condition that every statement made about identity is itself conditioned by the identity of its maker. To follow William Connolly's formulation, assessments of the other made on the basis of one's own system of representations inevitably involve a devaluation of the object, inasmuch as the other will invariably fail to measure up to the standards of value embedded in that same system of representations.²¹ As far as the present analysis is concerned, Russians appear as "other," and their "failures" from the standpoint of my cultural standards are already apparent in the sort of "pathological" communication patterns that I have been describing. Judgments im-

plicit or explicit in my account resonate with any number of similar statements made by Russians themselves, who frequently resort to tropes such as “political theater of the absurd” or “political zoo” in order to describe their present situation. Nonetheless, if we take Connolly’s point seriously, it remains the case that characterizations made by those within a given cultural system are not equivalent to those offered from without, regardless of surface similarities. On the other hand, however, even a successful attempt to shed my own cultural perspective and enter into that of the object of analysis would fail to solve the problem. For what could be learned from *inside* that cultural system could not be communicated back to others in my own—myself included. How might we then proceed?

It seems to me that two things can be done that would enable the analysis to continue in the face of this conundrum. First, the particular discourse(s) with which we are dealing can be reframed by isolating what Frederic Jameson has referred to as “the absent cause,” that social condition that sets discourse in motion but is not thematized explicitly in discourse itself.²² Second, on the basis of this reframing, a new understanding of the dynamics underlying communication can be developed by relating social texts back to their socio-cultural context. As such, the ostensible referent of a given text is bracketed and “the absent cause” is inserted in its place. If the second-order statement thus derived still “makes sense,” this can be taken as (imperfect) confirmation that the reframing, bracketing, and substitution are not merely an arbitrary imposition of meanings from without, but analytic devices enabling us to recover a layer of meaning that resides within the cultural system of representations itself, whether or not it has been adequately thematized by those participating in the system. Obviously analyses proceeding within the cultural system in question can provide important information about “the absent cause” and how it appears/disappears in the cultural code. We begin with some of these.

Jadwiga Staniszkis has provided a very useful starting point for our analysis by applying Claude Lévi-Strauss’s concept of *bricolage*, or “indifferent variety,” to the ensemble of social relations prevailing under state socialism.²³ The crux of her idea consists in a situation in which the repression of communication by the party-state prevented individual and collective identities from circulating in society. None could name himself openly; none could encounter the

other as the other might wish to represent himself; consequently there was no interaction among subjects qua subjects, just the presence of manifest differences (variety) toward which each subject—absent interaction—remained “indifferent.” Let us call the first dimension of our “absent cause” the absence of social interaction—indicating, thereby, an historical background that has precluded the formation of collective identities anchored in a system of cultural representations marked by mutual recognition.²⁴

If that is what had been absent, then what was present? A kind of submersion, it seems, in which individuals disappeared into “collectives” and “collectives” into the all-embracing state.²⁵ The results and implications of this long-standing arrangement have been especially topical in Russian social commentary. The following remarks by Vladimir Pankov (a deputy editor of the journal *Rodina*), are perhaps characteristic of one current in this discussion:

The Russian spirit has been made ill above all by collectivism, and stripped of all its features by an incipient degeneration. It [collectivism] has become our moral mirage, behind which we hide our own egoism in the most vulgar sense. For a long time we have lived apart from one another and nothing higher than us unites us. Our “collectivism” is not brotherhood, not a selfless service to the good, but a dictatorship of indifference, a revelry of dependence, a cowardice of consciousness.²⁶

Pankov then goes on to locate in these circumstances the sources of millenarian thinking, which he sees as imprinted on the Russian consciousness by the long experience with communism—a tendency to embrace sweeping, absolute solutions that dissolve practical problems and real responsibilities, and a countertendency to discard these same solutions just as readily as they were embraced when individual utilities so dictate because their actual function has never been to compel belief but to provide a hiding place for the self.

These tendencies toward strong but shallow representations have been amply apparent, for instance, in debates on the floors of both the Soviet and Russian parliaments. As a number of studies analyzing the language featured in these legislative fora have vividly demonstrated, speakers evince a proclivity to leap over specifiable constituencies in order to construct themselves as vessels from which flows an alleged general will. Speakers usually do not refer

to the interests of their respective districts or to those associated with some definable social group. Rather they rely on constructions such as “the people [*narod*] are sick and tired of . . .” or “the people demand . . .,” thereby enveloping their own thoughts on a given matter in the urgency of national purpose (strong representations) while substituting slogans, catch phrases, and emotionally charged absurdities (shallow representations) for persuasive argument.²⁷

The two principal “solutions” that have been on the table in Russia—“radical reform” or a return to “the Russian idea”—appear to be reminiscent of what Pankov describes and accordingly can be reframed along the lines of his argument and of that advanced by Staniszkis. In this respect, we notice that neither directs attention to practical matters in the world “as it is.” Rather, each points somewhere else—“reform” toward some place (the West) where people allegedly live “normal,” “civilized” lives; “the Russian idea” toward some suitably idealized Russian past. By shifting attention away from the immediate world of practice, neither conception permits practical matters to be discussed as practical matters. Accordingly we can regard both of them as hypersemiotic constructs emerging on a particular field of communication wherein separate interests, lacking a socially recognized medium for expression, sublimate themselves as unqualified claims to represent not merely interests, but also some genuine *national identity*, colliding all the while with others doing the same.

It is at the point of collision that denial and renaming occur. As we have noted, during the first republic the word “Communist” reverberated around all projected identities. At one level, the frequency of this mutual accusation would follow from the fact that the number of former Communists in Russia’s political class far exceeds critical mass. Since each has been busy confecting a new identity for himself, it seems reasonable to suppose that he has little difficulty in spotting the same process in the other. But at another level, there appears to be an exculpatory moment in this process as well, and it may be that herein lies its uncompromising urgency and irresistible force. For one’s own association with the discredited past, one’s own responsibility for the calamity that has befallen Russia, could be canceled via the projection of past/discarded identity onto the other. The exculpation would be then completed by the other’s annihilation.

Behind the scenes of this dramatic clash of identities, another process has been transpiring in post-Communist Russia that concerns the more prosaic matters of power and property. This might be regarded as the third dimension of our “absent cause.” Who decides what forms of property will be instituted in the economy, which portions of the state sector will pass to private hands, which state offices will retain or acquire economic functions—in short, who will determine who gets what? Here we remind ourselves of the fact that in the former state socialist countries the first act in the sequence known as “privatization” involves the creation of the juridical fiction of “property,” effected by some organ(s) of the state laying hold of the physical objects of the economy, establishing monetized values for them, and setting the terms and conditions for their sale to other parties, including the state itself. Even under optimal conditions of effective governmental bodies scrupulously observing strict legality, those in control of the relevant organs, along with their respective networks of associates, would obviously be in a position to rewrite the book on insider trading. In Russia, however, the creation and distribution of title—nothing less than the genesis of a new political and economic order—have been processes transpiring among legal structures that are not only rudimentary (at best), but also politicized by the struggle raging *within* the state.

Moreover, considering the economic structure inherited by the Russian state from its Soviet predecessor—an integrated network of monopolies functioning on the basis of commands issuing from a single economic center—it has become apparent that the economic course pursued since the USSR’s collapse has amounted more to the projection of an imaginary liberalism onto existing economic relations than to an instrumental-rational program for improving performance by stimulating investment and clearing away obstacles to market competition. The institutional context presupposed by a policy of economic liberalism has simply not been present. Undeterred by this stubborn fact, however, liberal “reformers” would use their control of state offices to free prices and introduce a form of privatization that would somehow summon this very context into existence. What happened instead, of course, was that economic actors tended to behave in time-honored liberal fashion rather than according to the liberals’ plan. Calculating their own interests, they responded to the new mix of incentives before them by slashing

production and jacking up prices.²⁸ As part of the same bargain, organized crime saw tremendous opportunities for profit-making and inserted itself into the legal economy on a massive scale. These outcomes have been characterized by the liberals as “Communist revenge” or “sabotage.” Conversely, their opponents would portray them as the intended results of a deliberate policy of treason, aimed at eviscerating a once great world power and consigning it to the status of a satrapy of rapacious Western capitalism. Hence the root issue surrounding a national economy “up for grabs”—which in itself would seem altogether sufficient to set off a political struggle of enormous intensity—has been compounded by the particular (hypersemiotic) way in which this issue and attendant interests have been mediated in the communicative code characteristic of present-day Russian politics. As we see below, the system of representations functioning in the political arena has tended to magnify rather than diminish the divisions there. It has not only encumbered the prospects for solution, but has also animated conflict potentials present at other levels of the system that have compounded the crisis at the center.

Assembling these three dimensions of the “absent cause”—the collectivist forms of social organization, their attendant modes of identity signification (“indifferent variety”), and state action undertaken to promote what is referred to as “privatization” and “marketization”—into a single figure, we can grasp it as the profound disruption and impending extinction of an entire way of life. The security provided by collectives to their members has been disappearing in the same way that the extended networks of personalized relations linking these primary units in the social order in more or less stable and predictable ways themselves have come under threat. Moreover, the system of representations inherited from the past, as Katherine Verdery has pointed out, is both reinforced by the unfolding conditions and at the same time inadequate to the task of mediating their traumatic consequences other than by reproducing them through its antidialogic categories of *we/they*, “the people”/“the enemies,” and so forth.²⁹ These conditions, then, would appear to underlie and to trigger the discourses on national identity that prevail in effectively all post-Communist states. However, in Russia the aggressive, blame-laying edge of this discourse was perforce turned inward, thus polarizing political forces into mutually antagonistic

formations. Each formation, not without reference to the activities and perceived/assumed intentions of the other, undertook its own “defense”—in the name, of course, of the nation itself—by refitting those institutions of the state that had passed under its control into weapons with which it would destroy the other.

IDENTITY CRISIS AS CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

In order to account for the fate of the first republic, I interpret some of the major events in question on the basis of the categories developed above. I begin with what appears to have been the first unambiguous manifestation of constitutional crisis in post-Communist Russia—namely, the conflict over state authority that erupted at the seventh sitting of the Congress of People’s Deputies in December 1992. My overall purpose in this respect is to demonstrate that the difficult political problems confronting the country—the question of property and its ownership as state enterprises pass to private hands, the constitutional question concerning the delineation of executive and legislative spheres of authority, and the issue of defining the relations between the central and regional governments in the federal system—were aggravated rather than mediated by the communicative code in which they were thematized.

CRISIS AND “COMPROMISE”

The crisis that broke out at the seventh Congress was initiated by a battery of constitutional amendments designed in the immediate sense to strip the president of most of his control over the executive branch and to transfer those powers to the legislature.³⁰ In the longer term, the political forces animating the legislature had set their sights on canceling the constitution’s provision for a separation of powers by relocating all governmental authority in the Congress and its full-time organ, the Supreme Soviet.³¹ Over the previous year, a realignment in the political orientations of many deputies had produced a substantial anti-Yeltsin majority that would fall in line behind its most militant elements, represented by the Front of National Salvation (FNS), which accounted for over 290 of the 880 depu-

ties voting at the Congress.³² From a detached point of view, this contest between president and parliament might be regarded simply as a power struggle over very high stakes. But it would take on an altogether different character within the phenomenal world of the actors themselves. In the discourse shared by the FNS and many other opponents of the president, the Yeltsin administration in Russia constituted a “regime of occupation” by means of which foreign powers were systematically exsanguinating the Russian nation. Framing their presidential opponent in this way, those participating in this discourse would correspondingly connote a particular identity for themselves—namely, saviors of the nation obliged to enact their role by ridding the country of the alien regime on its soil. The amendments under consideration would have accomplished that legally.

Outflanked by opponents in a legislature that through its powers of amendment had taken full possession of the country’s constitution, Yeltsin counterattacked with “the people.” This response put in place those binary oppositions—president/legislature, people/constitution—that would structure the contending discourses throughout the crisis. Although Yeltsin’s first tactical moves proved incapable of reaching their strategic targets—paralyzing the legislature by means of a deputies’ walkout large enough to remove the quorum,³³ then calling a national referendum intended to dissolve the Congress once and for all—the “compromise” that they evoked would become the condition for expanding the crisis in the months that followed. The president’s side would cleave to its shibboleth for national identity—“the people”—and deploy it against the Congress (or Supreme Soviet), which it would label “antipopular.” The anti-Yeltsin majority in the legislature would base its own claims to authority on an analogous usurpation of “nation”—rendered here as “the constitution”—and so stigmatize its opponent, the Yeltsin government, as “anticonstitutional.” Since each side was constructing its own identity in opposition to a renamed and vilified other, it was simultaneously sublimating its partisan interest in power onto a grander plane of duty before the nation. These discursive practices provided small space, if any, for a negotiated resolution of the crisis. Rather they tended to ensure from the outset that each ostensible compromise reached by the contending parties would be quickly subverted.

The first such “compromise” came on the initiative of Valerii Zor’kin, then chairperson of Russia’s Constitutional Court, which, by beginning a pattern of direct involvement of the court in the political process, would disqualify the singular institution capable of assuming a neutral position for arbitrating the conflict between the executive and the legislature. According to the agreement worked out by the court, the president, and the chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, the recently enacted constitutional amendments would be suspended along with the right to referendum by popular initiative. Hence the presidency would have its powers temporarily restored while the legislature would not have to fear a popular referendum that would (almost certainly) result in a resounding vote of no confidence. Instead a national referendum on the extant constitution, scheduled for 11 April, would somehow resolve the dispute between the two branches. Perhaps the least of the problems with this constitutional compromise was the fact that it was itself patently unconstitutional.³⁴ Of more import was the regard shown it by the parties themselves. For the presidential side, it meant that the Congress of People’s Deputies would fail the test of popular approval and perish; on the opposite side, Khasbulatov was assuring all concerned that the Congress would continue as before, regardless of the results of the referendum.³⁵

Within weeks, however, this compromise was being jettisoned by two of the parties to it, Khasbulatov and Zor’kin. The former set about devising a list of twelve questions to be placed before the voters that would confuse rather than clarify the constitutional issue;³⁶ the latter began a public campaign against the very idea of staging the referendum (that he had himself sponsored a short time earlier) by means of a series of “roundtables” at which selected “experts” and politicians would denounce the idea as a threat to Russia’s fragile stability.³⁷

By February, Khasbulatov was explaining to seminars of local soviet officials that eliminating the presidency entirely was indeed the current goal of legislative power across the country and that its present stage amounted to stripping that office of all functions save the nomination of the prime minister.³⁸ At the same time, the ad hoc roundtables sponsored by the Constitutional Court were converted by the Supreme Soviet into its “permanently acting organ.”³⁹ This roundtable, sharing little with its namesakes elsewhere, was em-

blematic of the manner in which Russia's political division has been mediated through an extended series of duplex forms that widen the very divide they ostensibly claim to bridge. The roundtable itself included over one hundred participants from various political parties, movements, trade unions, and public organizations—a number large enough to preclude the possibility of finding any accord. Indeed at its first session, some 80 percent of those in attendance were not afforded an opportunity to speak at all.⁴⁰ Moreover, since the enabling documents of this new institution both assigned quotas to participating organizations and designated by name who their spokespersons would be without any approval in most cases from the very organizations these participants allegedly represented,⁴¹ serious questions immediately erupted regarding the representative character of this assembly. Within days after its first session, the Supreme Soviet's roundtable was denounced by four participants as a sham whose actual purpose was to isolate the president.⁴² Similarly, seventy-two political parties, movements, and unions who had either been excluded from the roundtable, had chosen not to take part in it, or had decided to cease their participation after its first meeting issued a manifesto impugning the representative character of the Supreme Soviet's new "organ." Utilizing the auspices of Moscow's mayor, this group then organized its own "roundtable from below" as a rival to that sponsored by the Supreme Soviet. A number of important groups on Russia's political scene were included on it—Democratic Russia, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform, the cinematographers' and writers' unions, the Independent Miners' Union, and others.⁴³ As might be expected, this competing roundtable endorsed the April referendum as the country's only alternative to disaster while the other regarded it as the recipe for same.

By this juncture, the split in Russian political society had reached a new stage. One camp, arrayed around the legislature, possessed "its" constitution and its version of national consensus in the form of its own "roundtable." The other, grouped around the presidency, claimed the support of "the people," which it would attempt to parlay into its own constitution and organ of national consensus. In March legislative leaders summoned the Congress of People's Deputies into an extraordinary (eighth) session that revoked the December compromise, canceled the scheduled referendum, and pro-

duced the predictable plethora of tragicomic invective against the president.⁴⁴ A few days after the Congress had had its word on the matter, Yeltsin appeared on television to have his. His claim to have issued an executive order instituting direct presidential rule, while spurious,⁴⁵ and his announcement of a unilaterally initiated referendum on the constitution set for 25 April were sufficient to provoke his opponents in the legislature into calling the Congress back into yet another extraordinary session and those on the Constitutional Court into a series of self-discrediting judicial debacles.⁴⁶

At its ninth (extraordinary) session, the Congress voted to dissolve both the Federal Information Center (which influenced television and radio programming) and the institution of presidential representatives in the regions (whose formal duties were to ensure that local authorities implement certain national policies in the manner preferred by Yeltsin's administration). Since the executive was, and thereafter fully remained, prepared to ignore these decisions, constitutional crisis deepened. And the decision by the Congress to institute legislative censorship via "councils of observers," who would oversee television and radio programming at national and regional levels, deepened it further. But in its most significant act, the Congress acquiesced to Yeltsin's call for a referendum on 25 April, with the stipulation, however, that the legislature would compose the questions. It composed four: whether the voter had confidence in the president; whether (s)he supported the government's policies; whether new elections should be called for the presidency; and whether new elections should be called for the Congress. Given the hardships inflicted by some sixteen months of economic "shock therapy," this stratagem seemed guaranteed to produce a "no" vote on the second item. Perhaps this "no" would influence the voters' decision on the first question as well. At any event, Yeltsin's approval ratings in opinion polls at the time, hovering around the 25 percent mark, would have appeared to indicate that his opponents could expect to win on this item too. The final two questions on early elections would remain moot. Not only was there no implementation clause in the referendum, but also the Constitutional Court set an impossible condition by ruling that these were constitutional issues and therefore required the approval of two-thirds of all *eligible* voters. Once again, it would seem that the mechanism ostensibly designed to overcome division would instead aggravate it.

To the surprise of all concerned, Yeltsin scored victories in the 25 April referendum on all four questions. Since Yeltsin had been touting his interpretation of the proceedings as a referendum on something that had not appeared on the ballot—the constitution—he used the occasion of his success to institute a new process that would take constitution-making out of the hands of the legislature and award it to a constitutional assembly that he summoned in June.⁴⁷ By early July, this assembly had crafted a new draft constitution, merging the president's project with the most recent version produced by the Supreme Soviet's Constitutional Commission.⁴⁸ But the details of this process are not as important for our concerns as are the political divisions that it deepened and the centrifugal forces that it unleashed in the federation. Let us take up these two related problems by locating the federal question within the framework of the constitutional crisis.

FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

From the perspective of communications, a federal system might be regarded as one in which discourses concerning national and subnational identities are intertwined. Within such an arrangement, the category "nation" would always carry some trace of the subnational units that comprise it, just as the respective identities of these units would always connote, among other things, their membership in a larger whole. Conflicts involving the issue of identity at either national or subnational level would therefore ramify through the other. Viewing the politics of federalism in Russia from this vantage, it appears that disputes concerning the status of the federation's members and the respective spheres of authority proper to national and subnational governments would involve more than contests over the control of material resources. For intermeshed with these struggles over resources has been a process of identity formation transpiring in Russia's regions, signaled by declarations of sovereignty, the adoption of constitutions and other symbols of statehood, the elections of presidents, and so on. If politics (to repeat the celebrated phrase) concerns the question "Who gets what?," then federal politics in Russia would render both of these pronouns as subject to dispute. In this respect, the constitutional crisis at the

center escalated contentions surrounding each. On one hand, it compounded the problem of identity formation for subnational actors by blurring that baseline distinction—the Russian nation as represented by its state institutions—in accordance with which regional identities might be coherently formulated. Not knowing to which “Russia” one belonged—that of the president or that of the Supreme Soviet—how might (say) Tatarstan or Krasnodar discern the limits, terms, conditions, and so forth structuring the projections of their political identities? On the other, each party to the constitutional crisis would seek to enlist the support of the regions for its cause by tendering to them various concessions and inducements. Competitively bidding up the offers that they were prepared to make, the central actors thus would encourage regional elites to stake out political identities for themselves commensurate with their expanding opportunities to control resources.

Federal relations, already a difficult issue prior to the constitutional crisis, became a crisis unto themselves in the wake of Yeltsin’s decision to convoke a constitutional assembly. In anticipation of its first meeting in early June, the Supreme Soviet began in mid-May to organize its own equivalent institution, drawing into a preliminary conference in Moscow about one-half of the chairpersons of regional soviets.⁴⁹ The declaration issuing from this assembly denied any legitimacy to the constitutional convention proposed by the president, affirmed the resolve of those present to consider the Congress of People’s Deputies as the only institution entitled to undertake constitutional change, and condemned Yeltsin’s draft constitution as fundamentally incompatible with the rights of the country’s “sovereign republics.”⁵⁰ Having stanching an internal movement proposing participation in the president’s Constitutional Convention,⁵¹ the Supreme Soviet’s leadership began enlisting regional leaders and representatives from those “opposition” and “centrist” factions in the legislature that had been active in its roundtable to form its own rival institution, whose nucleus convened on 25 May.⁵² Over the following two months while the Constitutional Convention was in session, the Supreme Soviet’s leadership advertised its own incipient assembly as a place where the country’s regions—more and more assuming the role of some “third force” capable of deciding the battle at the center—might shop for a better constitutional bargain should they be dissatisfied with what Yeltsin had on offer.⁵³

For his part, Yeltsin was issuing overt assurances to the republics that his Constitutional Convention would fully respect their “sovereign” status, a condition which they had named as the price of their very participation.⁵⁴ While Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai, Chief of the Administration of the President Sergei Filatov, and presidential adviser Sergei Stankevich blitzed the hinterlands lobbying for regional support,⁵⁵ their colleagues preparing for the Constitutional Convention in Moscow drew leaders from some ten key regions into the workings of its inner circles.⁵⁶ To little avail. At the convention’s first session, the entire section of the constitutional draft pertaining to federal relations had become such a contentious issue that it was withdrawn from consideration.⁵⁷ At the convention’s second session (ending 12 July), which approved a final draft, the ambiguous wording of the articles pertaining to sovereignty failed to mollify the bulk of the regional representatives. Although the draft was approved by 74 percent of the 558 delegates taking part in the vote, the missing quarter of support was composed almost entirely of delegates from regions.⁵⁸ Since the draft could not be ratified convincingly—regardless of the forum in which this might eventually occur—without the approval of at least a majority of the regions, regional authorities would continue to hold the trump card. The major questions remaining at this time, then, would be on whose behalf—the president’s or the Supreme Soviet’s—they would play it and, relatedly, what concessions would induce them to do so.

The impasse reached at the convention reflected the way in which disputes between central and regional governments over their respective spheres of authority have been ratcheted ever upward in the face of a divided center. In order to capture some of the complexity of this process, we remind ourselves that the Federal Treaty concluded by Moscow with the regions in March 1992 established two different statuses for the “subjects of the federation” who were party to it. On the one hand, some sixty-eight of these appear as simple administrative-territorial units (*oblasts* and *krais*), while on the other, the remaining twenty have been juridically constituted as “sovereign” republics in deference to the ethnic/national claims of their leaders (Tatarstan, Sakha, Kalmykiya, and so on). For the latter, “sovereignty” has functioned as a presumed right to abide by national laws, pay taxes to the central government, and so forth as the republics’ authorities see fit. Not unexpectedly, this advantage has not

gone unnoticed by the former, many of whom began demanding by fall 1992 an upgrade in their status commensurate with that accorded the “sovereign” republics.⁵⁹ In addition to consistently pressing the demand for a single standard of rights for all subjects of the federation,⁶⁰ many regions that lacked republic status have been solving this problem unilaterally by staging referenda on this issue and using the uniformly favorable results to declare themselves “sovereign” republics.⁶¹ Threatened by equality, most of the original twenty sovereign republics no less consistently maintained that they had no intention of agreeing to a new constitutional order whose provisions fail to incorporate their special (privileged) standing.⁶²

The divided center thus became a veritable thoroughfare through which regional authorities channeled particular demands and were rewarded according to either the political loyalty that they individually professed to the Russian government or the threat that they posed to the maintenance of its nominal jurisdiction.⁶³ The pattern of ad hoc concessions from Moscow, thereby induced, resulted in a situation in which the economically advantaged regions would contribute taxes to the central government at drastically reduced rates—when taxes were not withheld altogether (as in the case of at least four of the sovereign republics)—while the poorer regions shouldered the additional burden. Moreover, a province’s ability to garner state subsidies and special allocations of scarce resources correlated negatively with its readiness to pay taxes to Moscow.⁶⁴

But taxes were only part of the picture. Ownership and control of property have seemed the grander prize, and both parties to the conflict at the center had been extending these considerations to would-be supporters in the regions to purchase their support. The process by which regional elites—often fragmented and in conflict prior to the failed coup in August 1991—began finding mutual accommodation and the capacity to unite around regional interests in opposition to the central government was accelerated by Yeltsin’s astonishing victory in the April referendum.⁶⁵ Sensing a loss of leverage should Yeltsin employ his national majority to score a quick victory on the constitutional front, regional elites closed ranks and dug in their heels. Simultaneously Yeltsin’s opponents in the legislature began amending the law on privatization in such a way as to lure these elites to their camp by confining the transfer of state property to a process involving regional state officials only.⁶⁶ With this variant

in place, those who “possessed” state enterprises under communism could look forward to owning them collectively under capitalism.⁶⁷ Although the government’s State Committee on Property, which superintends the process of privatization, explicitly refused to abide by the new legislation, it was itself busy pursuing a comparable transfer of jurisdiction to regional authorities, portending an outcome in which the “single economic mechanism” of the former USSR would be succeeded in post-Communist Russia by eighty-eight diminutive, state-centered economic complexes, each with its own customs regulations, trade and investment policies, and tax laws.⁶⁸

The inability of Yeltsin’s camp to broker an arrangement for midwifing constitutional change by enlisting the “third force” of Russia’s regions and republics would appear in retrospect as the prelude to the decision to use force against the opposition legislature. In late August, the Supreme Soviet dealt the first blow to the president’s plan for a peaceful settlement by rejecting a proposal whereby the assembly of regional and republic representatives (the Council of the Federation) would convene under the co-chairpersonship of Yeltsin and Khasbulatov in order to formulate some solution to the crisis. Indicatively, the reasons advanced by the majority of the Supreme Soviet’s leadership for ruling out this option conformed to the same dyadic proliferation of institutions—roundtables, constitutions, and so on—that had characterized the crisis from the start. In this instance, the particular Council of the Federation in question—that which had been summoned by the president during an earlier round in his contest with the legislature—was deemed illegitimate. Rather than utilizing this forum—which included one representative from the executive structure in each region and one from the corresponding soviet—the Supreme Soviet proposed an alternative one—namely, “its” Council of the Federation, which contained only the heads of regional and republic soviets.⁶⁹

The second blow to the president’s plan was dealt by “his” Council of the Federation. In the same way that Yeltsin had invited the regions to assume the role of national actors by proposing that (“his”) Council of the Federation take on the functions of an interim—and possibly permanent—legislative body, thus decommissioning the Congress and Supreme Soviet, so the regional representatives on the council responded by steadfastly eschewing deliberations on national issues and maintaining that the council

was no more than an advisory body.⁷⁰ By the time that it convened on 18 September, most members had already stated their intentions to cease participation in the council, even in an advisory capacity.⁷¹

“CORRUPTION”

Within the context of a divided political discourse reproducing itself within the structures of the Russian state as a series of mutually opposed institutions, the category “corruption” became the phenomenal form taken by the disintegration of the state. In view of the fragmentation of central authority and the concomitant tendency among regional elites to pocket as much as they could of the resources belonging formally to the state sector, the appearance of corruption on a massive scale would not be surprising. Our interest in this phenomenon, however, would concern not so much its extent but the way in which it has fed back into and ramified the national crisis at the center of Russian politics.

In considerable measure, corruption was abetted by the power struggle at the center. Not only were favors passed out to supporters of one side or the other, but also the ethic of protecting “our team” while accusing and (when possible) leveling criminal charges against the opposing side became a preoccupation for the branches of government.⁷² As the executive-legislative conflict spiraled to new levels in the aftermath of the April referendum and consequent summoning of a Constitutional Convention, “corruption” was deployed as a kind of heavy artillery by each side against the other. In this respect Lyliya Shevtsova probably has been correct to note that in the past corrupt practices all around had acted as a stabilizing factor in politics, as long as each party refrained from public accusations of the other for fear of retaliatory strikes on behalf of or by those accused.⁷³ However, this threshold was crossed by the opposition to the president when it appeared in spring that he had gathered sufficient momentum to impose a constitutional settlement on his opponents.⁷⁴ The result was wave on wave of charges and countercharges, a public discrediting of all the institutions of government, and yet another spiral of constitutional crisis initiated on 1 September, when Yeltsin “temporarily” suspended the authority of then Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi pending an investigation of

certain charges made against him (charges which subsequently have been determined to have been based on fabricated evidence).⁷⁵

Perhaps as much as anything else, “corruption” underscores how the dominant code through which identity and interest were publicly mediated in Russia functioned to exacerbate political divisions. Indeed as the apparently inflated, always sensational, and often confected nature of the most serious allegations would indicate, those making charges of “corruption” were borrowing the guise of legality simply in order to strike political blows against their opponents.⁷⁶ Since actual evidence for charges leveled was of lesser moment in this spectacle than the impulse to construct an image of the enemy as “unclean,” the casualties in the “battle with corruption” tend not to be the accused state officials—until the eleventh hour of the constitutional crisis, no criminal proceedings were initiated against any of the principals⁷⁷—but public confidence in government, respect for law, and so forth. Russia’s struggle against itself was manifest in the arena of “corruption” by two separate prosecution teams, each working on behalf of one of the antagonists in the country’s divided center, hurling allegations at members of the other camp. Both sides had been publicly blackened long before any criminal proceedings had been undertaken.⁷⁸ Corruption, then, would appear as something that was both rampant and practiced with impunity, publicly condemned yet tacitly approved within the ranks of each opposing group. It has followed the pattern of the I-I model of autocommunication that we noted in the rhetoric of Baburin and Burbulis. The category “corrupt” in the discourse of each party would not refer to malfeasance or criminality per se. Rather it functioned as another way of signifying “them.”

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The influence of the I-I form of communication was present at every turn in the constitutional crisis that ended in the destruction of Russia’s first republic. It manifested itself as two rival constitutions, two mutually inimical assemblies of “national accord,” two opposing prosecution teams rooting out “corruption,” and, prior to the storming of the Russian parliament, two presidents directing two

national governments. All of these instances would indicate that protagonists and antagonists were underscoring their resolve to communicate only with themselves. When this form of discourse dominates political life, calamity follows.

Does the character of political discourse exhibited in Russia's second republic warrant similar concerns? In certain respects, the answer would be "no." Despite all too frequent sallies into bombastic political rhetoric and the tendency to indulge in eschatological themes, the major political actors have also evinced a steadily growing capacity to communicate with one another in more "civilized"—I would say "instrumental-practical"—ways. This is especially true of the State Duma, which, despite the unflattering images of that institution recklessly employed by those enjoying the use of the television airwaves, has been developing into a genuine political institution in which representatives of the country's various political tendencies are finding something of a common language, overcoming obstacles to collaboration, and—even more important—learning to disagree with one another on a number of critical questions while remaining at least potential partners on other issues. The mutual accommodation induced by this experience in the legislature is of inestimable value for a country such as Russia, which until recently has lacked a political life, despite the fact that these actual steps toward civil accord appear neither on the economists' tally sheet nor in the calculus of some "expert" counseling the use of a "strong [executive] hand" in order to accomplish more "reforms." Slowly the experience in the State Duma is beginning to show that democratic practice—however untidy, cumbersome, and imperfect—represents a real alternative to those technocratic-utopian visions that have dominated the course of Russian politics, producing one disaster after another.

But in other respects, the old problem remains, albeit in new forms. Any foreign observer who reads Russian newspapers and listens to the country's political and governmental leaders could easily draw the (false) conclusion that the Russian people are experiencing a painful and debilitating loss of national identity. However, as Aleksei Kara-Murza has pointed out, things are just the reverse. That is, the explicit attention directed by most of the country's organized political forces to the issue of national identity does not signal an identity deficit (the assumption latent in the thinking of

the would-be providers of a national identity), but a surfeit of conflicting claims, each labeled “unacceptable” (or worse) by the others.⁷⁹ Consequently it is impossible to conclude at this writing that the elusive “stability” of which Russian authorities so often speak is imminent. As long as national identity remains a contested issue in the country’s political discourse, the possibility that some party or movement could actually succeed (somehow) in defining it and thus effecting a strategy *va-bank* to install its own brand of politics, while excising opponents as traitors, remains open. Particularly disturbing in that respect is the process set in motion by Yeltsin, following his reelection, in which a team of presidential counselors has been tasked with formulating a new national idea. Despite the intentions of the president’s men to develop a mild, benign, or innocuous concept not conducive to inspiring new crusades against “enemies” at home or abroad, it is important to note the dangers freighted such an enterprise. On one hand, any definition of the nation by those in control of state power is inherently problematic. The precedent that it sets or, in the case of Russia, reestablishes means that a dangerous threshold has been crossed; the state has arrogated to itself the right to tell its citizens who they are or who they should be. Russia’s history in this century provides ample illustration of this problem. On the other hand, NATO’s eastward expansion saddles the Russian state with dreadful problems in the area of foreign policy, problems that could easily invade domestic politics at a time at which the state has taken on the burden of supplying the country with a new “national idea.” The confluence of those factors—acute foreign threat, continued widespread material suffering, and national political doxa backed by state power—would seem a recipe for fundamentalism and the repressive practices that invariably accompany it.

NOTES

1. The seminal work in this field is François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Others include Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); William Sewell, Jr., *A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994).

2. For instance, on a single page of one number of the daily *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (11 June 1993, p. 5), one can read an essay by the leader of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, Viktor Aksyuchits, accusing Boris Yeltsin of being a Communist and another by the liberal journalist Aleksei Kiva that applies the same epithet to everyone who does not support Yeltsin. Similarly, a UPI dispatch of 12 March 1993 quotes Yeltsin's arch-opponent—Ruslan Khasbulatov, then chairperson of the Supreme Soviet—describing the entire executive branch as “genetically linked with Bolshevism,” while *Izvestiya* on the following day quotes Yeltsin's press secretary's remarks on Khasbulatov that accuse him of attempting to return the country to a Communist regime and (according to ITAR-TASS [19 March 1993]) the entire Congress of People's Deputies of staging a “Communist inquisition.”
3. For a case in point, see Andrei Golovin's remarks in an interview in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 July 1993, p. 6. For an extended discussion, see Michael Urban, “Contending Conceptions of Nation and State in Russian Politics,” *Demokratizatsiya*, no. 4 (1993): 1–13.
4. Among others, Aleksandr Tsipko, “‘Demokraticheskaya Rossiya’ kak bol'shevistskaya i odnovremenno pochvennicheskaya partiya,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 9 and 13 April 1993, p. 5; Andrei Shisov, “Vopros ‘chto delat’? ostaetsya otkrytym,” *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 5 June 1993, p. 3.
5. Evgenii Krasnikov, “Front umer, no delo ego zhivet,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 27 July 1993, p. 2.
6. Indira Dunaeva, “Anpilov byl blagorzumen,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 20 April 1993, p. 2.
7. Jürgen Habermas: *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon, 1975); *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon, 1979); *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1 (Boston: Beacon, 1984).
8. In a perceptive essay, Rogers Brubaker has demonstrated that the Russian state emerging from the USSR contained no mutually recognized institutional parameters—territory, state structure, and demographic composition—thus all but inviting political contests over their definition (see “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account,” *Theory and Society* 23 [1993]: 47–78).
9. Nikolai Berdyaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 25–27; Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 212–26.
10. In a fascinating study, Julia Brun-Zejmis has shown how the themes sounded by Chaadaev in the 1830s have reverberated through many of the foremost accomplishments of Russia's *samizdat* literature in the 1960s and 1970s (see “Messianic Consciousness as an Expression of National Inferiority: Chaadaev and Some Samizdat Writings of the 1970s,” *Slavic Review* 50 [Fall 1991]: 646–58).

11. Sergei Panarin, "My' i 'oni' glazami russkikh," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2 November 1991, p. 5.
12. These remarks were made by S. Gannushkina in a roundtable moderated by G. Koval'skaya, "Chto znachit byt' russkim?" *Demokraticheskaya Rossiya* 32 (3 November 1991): 14. A reflective analysis of this same question can be found in Dmitrii Ol'shanskii, "Politicheskaya psikhologiya raspada," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 16 January 1992, p. 5.
13. For a discussion of "the Russian idea" as it appears in contemporary political discourse, see Urban. For an example of this political orientation today, see the essay by Viktor Aksyuchits and Gleb Anishchenko, co-chairpersons of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, "Printsipy khristianskoi politiki v Rossii," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 July 1993, p. 5.
14. Yurii Buida, "Russkii chelovek dorozhe russkoi idei," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 May 1993, p. 2.
15. Interview given by Aleksei Kazannik to Oleg Bondarenko, *Segodnya*, 16 July 1993, p. 11.
16. Interview given by Sergei Baburin to Vladimir Todres, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 9 January 1992, p. 2. For a fuller representation of Baburin's views, see *Za edinuyu velikuyu Rossiyu: Istoriya rossiiskogo obshchenarodnogo soyuza v dokumentakh 1991–1994* (Moscow: Novator, 1995).
17. Interview given by Gennadii Burbulis to Len Karpinsky, "ABC of Russia's Revival," *Moscow News*, no. 14 (5–12 April 1992): 6–7.
18. For a discussion of the proclivities among Russia's "democrats" to reproduce in their own thinking those deep cultural patterns of authoritarianism *cum* popular acclamation that they readily detect and condemn in their opponents, see Yurii Afanas'ev, "Nomenklatura na 'skhode vechevoi'," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2 April 1992, pp. 1–2.
19. A full development of this point would require an entire study in itself. Here I wish to do no more than call attention to the striking similarities between the elements of carnival—especially as these have appeared in Bakhtin's description of the related literary genre, Menippean satire—and a number of features found in contemporary Russian political life. In addition to the playful masquerade characteristics displayed in each case, a short list might include Bakhtin's remarks on the dialectical relation between "fantasy" and "truth"; the combination of the incongruous; the fixation with "ultimate" questions; and importance in each of scandalous, oxymoronic, and utopian elements. Bakhtin's analysis can be found in his *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (New York: Ardis, 1973), esp. pp. 87–103.
20. Yuri Lotman, *The Universe of the Mind* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 27–47.
21. William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), esp. pp. 40–45.
22. Frederic Jameson, *The Political Unconscious* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 82–83.

23. Jadwiga Staniszkis, "Forms of Reasoning as Ideology," *Telos*, no. 66 (Winter 1985–86): 67–80.
24. Rachel Walker has also contributed to this line of analysis in "Language and the Politics of Identity in the USSR," in *Ideology and System Change in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, ed. Michael Urban (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 3–19.
25. A tendentious but nonetheless insightful and informative analysis of the nature of "the collective" in the Soviet system can be found in Aleksandr Zinov'ev, *Kommunizm kak real'nost'* (Lausanne: Editions l'Age d'Homme, 1981).
26. Vladimir Pankov, "Propoved' o nashikh grekhakh," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 25 December 1991, p. 5.
27. A. N. Baranov and E. G. Kazakevich, *Parlamentskie debaty: Traditsii i novatsii* (Moscow: Znaniie, 1991), esp. pp. 16–30; Nikolai Biryukov and Viktor Sergeev, *Russia's Road to Democracy: Parliament, Communism and Traditional Culture* (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1993); J. Gleisner et al., "The Parliament and the Cabinet: Parties, Factions and Parliamentary Control in Russia (1990–93)," *Journal of Contemporary History* 31, 3 (1996): 427–61; Nikolai Biryukov, Jeffrey Gleisner, and Viktor Sergeev, "The Crisis of *Sobornost'*: Parliamentary Discourse in Present-Day Russia," *Discourse and Society* 6, 2 (1995): 149–71.
28. Michael Spagat, "The Disintegration of the Russian Economy," in *Russia's Future: Consolidation or Disintegration?*, ed. Douglas Blum (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), pp. 47–67.
29. Katherine Verdery, "Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania," *Slavic Review* 52 (Summer 1993): 179–203, esp. 189–96.
30. *Izvestiya*, 4 December 1992, p. 2.
31. Vladimir Shumeiko, "Zachem nuzhen referendum," *Izvestiya*, 27 February 1993, p. 4.
32. Mikhail Malyutin et al., "Sedmoi S'ezd Nardeputatov: Rozhdenie i Gibel' Konstitutsionalizma v Rossii" (Moscow: Parliamentary Service of the Legislative Faction Smena—Novaya Politika, December 1992); Aleksandr Sobyenin and Eduard Gel'man, "Politicheskie pozitsii i sostavy deputatskikh fraktsii na VII S'edze" (Moscow: Independent Information-Analysis Group, February 1993). I am indebted to Eugene Huskey for this latter reference.
33. Some 400 deputies would have been required to walk out in order to achieve this result. The actual number doing so on 10 December in response to Yeltsin's initiative is a matter of some dispute. Eye-witness observers (Mikhail Forin and Vladimir Todres) put the figure at about 100. Nikolai Travkin, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, has stated that 53 deputies left the hall (interview given to Vladimir Dyudin, *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 19 January 1993, pp. 1–2), while Malyutin et al. (p. 22) cite only 40.

34. See Yurii Feofanov, "Skhvatka vlastei na fone predstavshchego referendum," *Izvestiya*, 28 December 1992, p. 3.
35. *Ibid.*
36. The twelve questions devised by the Supreme Soviet on the matter of Russia's constitution spanned the space bordered by irrelevancy, on one end—"Do you agree that the state should guarantee a right to housing?"—and acclamatory ambiguity on the other—"Do you agree that the system of state power in the Russian Federation is based on the principle of a division among legislative, executive, and judicial [powers]?" The twelve items can be found in "Osnovnye polozheniya novoi Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vynosimye na vs Rossiiskii referendum 11 aprelya 1993g.," *Narodnyi deputat*, no. 3 (1993): 4.
37. Anna Ostapchuk, "Konstitutsionnyi sud sobiraet politikov," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 16 January 1993, pp. 1–2; interview given by Valerii Zor'kin to Leonid Nikitinskii, *Izvestiya*, 27 January 1993, p. 5.
38. *Izvestiya*, 9 February 1993, p. 1.
39. *Ibid.*; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 6 February 1993, p. 1.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 9 February 1993, p. 1; *Izvestiya*, 13 February 1993, p. 2.
42. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 12 February 1993, p. 2.
43. *Izvestiya*, 17 February 1993, p. 1.
44. Symptomatic of contemporary Russian political discourse might be a statement made at the Eighth (Extraordinary) Congress of People's Deputies by that body's "speaker," Ruslan Khasbulatov: "I'm going to bring about constitutional order in Russia . . . call the president's chancellery [*sic*] and summon him here" (cited in Len Karpinsky, "Congress as a Phenomenon of the Political Landscape," *Moscow News*, no. 13 [26 March 1993]: 1–2).
45. For the text of the actual decree, issued five days after the televised speech and making no mention of a "special order" instituting direct presidential rule, see *Izvestiya*, 25 March 1993, p. 1.
46. The most ludicrous of these would include (1) Zor'kin's 21 March speech on the floor of the Supreme Soviet that labeled Yeltsin's decree unconstitutional and an "attempted *coup d'état*," and (2) the 23 March ruling of the Constitutional Court which repeated the unconstitutional claim and added that the decree also was contrary to the Federal Treaty. Each of these actions violated a number of provisions in the court's charter that prohibit judges from discussing outside of session any issue that is before the court, and others that require them to adjudicate only on the basis of signed legal documents. Moreover, the court's ruling that the nonexistent decree violated the Federal Treaty was another canard, inasmuch as the treaty had not been incorporated into the constitution and thus was not a matter of the court's jurisdiction. Finally, the court's decision that Yeltsin's call for a referendum on the constitution was a violation of legality because consti-

- tutional issues cannot be decided in this way smacks of a certain inconsistency in view of the fact that precisely such a referendum had been engineered by Zor'kin himself as part of the compromise that he had brokered some four months earlier. For details, see *Izvestiya*, 24 March 1993, p. 2, and 26 March 1993, pp. 1, 5; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 March 1993, p. 1.
47. For an outline of the various groups of delegates invited to participate in the Constitutional Convention, see *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 25 May 1993, p. 1; *Izvestiya*, 2 June 1993, p. 2. Discussions of its methods can be found in *ibid.*, 10 June 1993, p. 1; *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 9 June 1993, p. 2.
 48. *Segodnya*, 13 July 1993, p. 1.
 49. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 13 May 1993, p. 1.
 50. See the statement of the heads of supreme soviets in Russia's republics, "Prezidentskii proekt i regional'nye interesy," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 5 May 1993, p. 1.
 51. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 21 May 1993, p. 1.
 52. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 26 May 1993, p. 2.
 53. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4 June 1993, p. 2.
 54. See the document signed by sixteen of the twenty heads of republics in Russia that appeared in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 27 May 1993, pp. 1–2.
 55. Vasilii Kononenko, "Sergei Filatov: Samoe glavnoe seichas—prikratit' protivostoyanie vlastei," *Izvestiya*, 19 May 1993, pp. 1–2; Boris Reznik, "Dal'nevostochniki podderzhali prezidentskii proekt Konstitutsii," *Izvestiya*, 20 May 1993, p. 2.
 56. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 13 May 1993, p. 1. For the membership of the Constitutional Convention's inner body, "the working commission," see *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 13 May 1993, p. 1.
 57. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 17 June 1993, pp. 1–3, and 18 June 1993, p. 1.
 58. Interview with Viktor Kolomiets, sociologist at Moscow State University and official observer at the Constitutional Convention, 13 July 1993. For reports on this same matter, see *Segodnya*, 13 July 1993, p. 1; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 13 July 1993, p. 1.
 59. See the reports featured in *Moscow News*, no. 48 (29 November–6 December 1992): 4.
 60. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 June 1993, p. 1; *Izvestiya*, 15 June 1993, p. 2.
 61. *Segodnya*, 6 July 1993, p. 2, and 9 July 1993, p. 2.
 62. *Moscow News*, no. 34 (20 August 1993): 2.
 63. For a discussion of this pattern as it developed prior to the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies, see Rastam Narzikulov, "New Privileges: Post-Perestroika Variant," *Moscow News*, no. 42 (18–25 October 1992): 10–11.
 64. See the data assembled by Oksana Dmitriyeva, "Political Games around the Budget," *Moscow News*, no. 28 (9 July 1993): 2.

65. Interview with Vyacheslav Igrunov, then head of the Department for Information and Research, Russian State Committee for Affairs of the Federation (4 July 1993). See the analysis offered by Aleksei Krindach and Rostislav Turovskii, "Politicheskoe razvitie rossiiskoi provintsii," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 11 June 1993, pp. 1–2.
66. *Izvestiya*, 23 July 1993, p. 1.
67. Olga Berezhnaya, "Deputies Intend to Hold Back Privatization," *Moscow News*, no. 30 (23 July 1993): 1, 6.
68. A good overview of this phenomenon can be found in Mikhail Lantsman, "Privatizatsiya v Rossii perekhodit v rezhim avtopilota," *Segodnya*, 2 July 1993, p. 3. *Segodnya*, 9 July 1993, p. 2, noted that a Yeltsin decree issued in early July 1993 extends the control of local authorities over the privatization process for regions threatening the center with sovereignty. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 9 July 1993, p. 2, reported that the Republic of Bashkortostan had already instituted its own licensing for all trade, production, and sale of food products. According to an item in *Segodnya*, 2 July 1993, p. 2, the government in Samara arbitrarily reduced the percentage of shares in a recently privatized power company that accrue to Moscow, while rewarding itself with the difference. Finally, *Moscow News*, no. 30 (23 July 1993): 2, observed the Russian Federation's Anti-Monopoly Committee had been confiscated by regional elites who now "supervise" themselves in the course of privatization.
69. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 31 August 1993, p. 2.
70. Leonid Smirnyagin, "Politicheskii krizis v Rossii," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 September 1993, p. 4.
71. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 September 1993, pp. 1, 3, and 21 September 1993, p. 3.
72. The seminal case in this respect involved the sacking of Yurii Boldyrev, who until March 1993 had served as head of the Control Administration in the Administration of the President. In this capacity, Boldyrev had secured the dismissal of a number of regional heads of administration and their lieutenants for engaging in corrupt practices. Unfortunately from the point of view of his tenure in office, many of the dismissed officials were allies of the president's "team." Given Boldyrev's unimpeachable reputation, his firing indicated broadly that "corruption" in Russia is not a legal but a political category. On these events see *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 10 March 1993, p. 2; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 10 March 1993, p. 1. See also the interviews given by Boldyrev to Lyudmila Telen, *Moscow News*, no. 9 (25 February 1993): 4, and to Ol'ga Kondrat'eva, *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 6 April 1993, p. 4.
73. Lyliya Shevtsova, "From an August of Hope to an August of Awakening," *Moscow News*, no. 34 (20 August 1993): 1, 4.
74. This was in fact made explicit—albeit indirectly—by Khasbulatov, who commented on the occasion of accusations (*sans* concrete charges) made by the head of the procuracy's special commission before the Supreme Soviet

that “the single goal of [Yeltsin’s] constitutional reform is to rescue the thieves from accountability” (cited in Maksim Sokolov, “Politicheskii vektor,” *Kommersant*, no. 25 [21–27 June 1993]: 3).

75. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4 December 1993, p. 1.
76. Karen Brutents, “Korruptsiya ekonomicheskaya i politicheskaya,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 25 August 1993, p. 2.
77. The first criminal charges against any of the principals were not filed until 15 September, when the Office of the General Procurator of the Russian Federation accused Yeltsin ally Mikhail Poltoranin—who had continued to serve as head of the Federal Information Center that had been formally dissolved by the legislature months earlier—of abuse of office under two articles of the criminal code (*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 September 1993, p. 1).
78. Alexander Larin, “The Procurator-General Is Forfeiting Public Trust,” *Moscow News*, no. 35 (27 August 1993): 1–2; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 26 August 1993, p. 1.
79. Aleksei Kara-Murza, “Nuzhen li Rossii ‘pravo-levyi sintez’?” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 November 1996.

NATIONALISM: RETHINKING THE PARADIGM IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

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
INTRODUCTION

Among numerous typologies of nationalism few have won as widespread an acceptance as the division into Western and Eastern varieties. This dichotomy is based on a distinction between political and cultural nations introduced by Friedrich Meinecke at the beginning of this century (Krejčí and Velimský 1981: 22). It was further elaborated by Hans Kohn and Emerich Francis, whose “demotic” and “ethnic” nations fit the same paradigm.

Francis defined the ethnic (or “cultural”) nation as an “ethnic society which is politically organized in a nation-state and is exclusively identified with it” (1976: 387). This type of nation is based on *jus sanguinis*. His demotic (or “political”) nation was a demotic society coextensive with a sovereign state. (He defined demotic society as a “complex and ethnically heterogeneous society that is politically organized in such a way that all its members are, through special institutions, linked directly and without the mediation of subsocietal units to the central authority” [1976: 383]). The integration of such society is based on democratic government and cultural homogeneity (1976: 387); its identity is derived from *jus soli*.

The division has the advantage of simplicity and even a certain elegance (see Figure 1), but although basically sound, it has significant drawbacks. First, it reflects almost exclusively the European situation, virtually ignoring nationalisms elsewhere. The non-European nationalisms are usually assigned to the “Eastern” subdivision without much regard for the vast differences between a quasi-racial Japanese nationalism and the integrative nationalisms of Latin America. Even in Europe proper one finds “Eastern” nationalisms

Figure 1



and, as will be demonstrated in this paper, “Western” nationalisms in the East.

Another drawback is that, in Anthony Smith’s words, it “assumes a necessary correlation between types of social structure and philosophical distinctions” (1971: 197). In other words, the social composition of a given society acquires a predictive role in the sense that certain social strata will supposedly generate a certain type of nationalism. Actually, such interrelationships are extremely complex and cannot be considered fully deterministic. Also, some nationalisms, such as Russian, Turkish, or Tanzanian, combine voluntaristic/subjectivist elements of the Western variety with the organic/objectivist elements of the Eastern kind. Finally, the two categories are called upon “to do too many jobs . . . cover too many levels of development, types of structure and cultural situations” (*ibid.*). They end up being cumbersome.

We believe that a reevaluation of the traditional classification of nationalisms is called for. Specifically, we think that the Western/Eastern dichotomy does not sufficiently emphasize the more fundamental issues: the interaction between ethny and state and the individual’s relationship to both, especially the mode of his/her incorporation. Our paper will build upon the foundations laid by R. D. Grillo in his work on the interrelationship between “nation” and “state” and by Pierre van den Berghe on the mode of incorporation as it relates to ethnic exclusivity/inclusivity.

In Grillo’s scheme the distinct varieties of nationalism are the natural outcome of two complicated processes which he calls (1) the “ethnicization of the polity” (the “demotic” type in Francis’s terminology or the “statist” model in Anthony Smith’s), where a state “constructs” a nation from often heterogeneous elements, and (2) the “politicization of ethnicity” (the “ethnic” model in both terminolo-

gies), where an ethnic group strives for and achieves statehood (Grillo, ed. 1980: 7). We will also incorporate van den Berghe’s ideas concerning the correlation of ethnic monopolization of power (ethnically exclusive/inclusive) with the mode of incorporation (individual or collective) (see Figure 2, based on Schema I in van den Berghe 1981: 79). But we will redefine his postulates somewhat since individual incorporation, which typifies demotic nations, is inherently inclusive because it strives to assimilate all citizens of a given polity to the “official” culture. By contrast, collective or corporate conceptualization of ethnicity is by definition exclusive since it insists on descent as the criterion of admissibility.

Figure 2

	Ethnically exclusive	Ethnically inclusive
Individual (equal) incorporation	A No case	C “Liberal democracy”
Collective (differential) incorporation	B Imperial-colonial model Indirect rule	D “Consociational democracy”

This paper will continue both lines of research. Specifically, we discard the inadequate division of nationalisms into Western and Eastern varieties. Instead we will endeavor to show that virtually all types of nationalism can be found in Western as well as Eastern Europe—that it is the presence or absence of the state and the mode of incorporation which determine the nature of a particular nationalism. Our task, therefore, is to offer a new typology which takes into account both sets of variables.

We are fully aware of the fact that our paper entails a categorization in addition to an analysis. As such, all concepts developed in it are by their very nature static. But in an exercise of classification and comparative delineation stasis is not only acceptable, but it is in fact desirable. An inherent aspect of any classificatory scheme is that all concepts described therein are by necessity “ideal types” in the Weberian sense, meaning that none of them exist in their purity in the real world. But for heuristic purposes such ideal types are very useful in delineating complex realities. Such will be the case with all our categories in this paper.

We will start with definitions and categorization, continue with the traditional representation of both types of nationalism, present empirical examples of our own typology in Western and Eastern Europe, and offer our conclusions as to the validity of both typologies as well as the ongoing transformation of nationalisms which is now occurring in Western Europe. (Nationalisms of Eastern Europe are not affected by a similar transformation; they are developing within traditional parameters of the “Eastern” model.)

TYPOLGY/CATEGORIZATION OF NATIONALISMS

There are several variables determining the type of nationalism. First, the role of the state. Nationalisms enunciated and promoted by existing states will be designated as *statist*. These nationalisms define a nation as a territorial-political unit. Where the state is absent, the nationalism is *nonstatist* by definition. Proponents of the nonstatist variety see the nation as a politicized ethnic group bound together by common culture or, as anthropologists would put it, delimited by “cultural markers.” These nationalisms usually start as cultural movements.

Second, the mode of incorporation. It can be based on either the individual or the corporate entity. Here we have several subvariables. We will call nationalisms which stress individual freedoms and responsibilities of political citizenship *Lockean* since Locke was among the earliest proponents of individual freedom and of the legitimacy of political rule emanating from the consent of the governed.¹ As has been stated earlier, a Lockean nationalism promotes


the incorporation of each citizen on an *individual* basis—i.e., it opens the doors to advancement and promotion to any member of a given polity as long as s/he learns the state language and adopts the state culture. In that sense it is inherently *inclusive* because it accepts all citizens regardless of their origin.

Conversely, we will call *Herderian* those nationalisms which restrict full membership to persons of a particular origin, language, and cultural diacritica, thereby excluding outsiders.² They are inherently *exclusive*. Although individuals can and do cross ethnic boundaries into Herderian entities (e.g., through marriage), in principle incorporation is based on descent and is therefore *collective* or *corporate* in character. In fact, instead of calling it “Herderian incorporation,” it would be better to refer to it as “ethnic eligibility.”

To avoid cumbersome designations we will divide nationalisms into statist and nonstatist, depending on the role of the state, and Lockean-inclusive or Herderian-exclusive to indicate the mode of incorporation and ethnic inclusivity/exclusivity. Figure 3 offers a graphic representation of our typology. We retained the basic geographical division into Western and Central/Eastern Europe. However, we attempted to find all four varieties—statist/nonstatist and Lockean-inclusive/Herderian-exclusive—in both areas. The statist Lockean-inclusive variety in the West will be represented by England and France. Catalonia will provide an example of the Lockean-inclusive nonstatist type in the same area. In the East, Hungary fits the Lockean-inclusive statist kind while Belorussia will supply an example of the Lockean nonstatist variety.

With Herderian nationalisms we will have to start in the East since it is this part of Europe that has been traditionally considered their birthplace. Also, the statist/nonstatist order we followed in examining Western Europe will be reversed since the Herderian type develops among ethnies which do not possess a sovereign state of their own. Thus Herderian nationalisms of the nonstatist kind in the East will be represented by German and Slovak nationalisms, and Russian will provide an example of the Herderian statist variety. In the West, Basque nationalism corresponds to the Herderian nonstatist type, while the “integral nationalism” of Charles Maurras in France fits, with some allowances, the mold of the Herderian statist kind. But first we must turn to brief overviews of Lockean and Herderian nationalisms.

Figure 3



THE TRADITIONAL REPRESENTATION OF LOCKEAN NATIONALISM

In Western Europe nationalism focused on the individual and saw the state as a commonwealth based on the freely given consent of the governed. As Locke wrote in his second "Treatise on Civil Government," "Nothing can make any man [a member of a commonwealth] but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and compact" (cited in Greenfeld 1992: 400). Thus in Hans Kohn's words, "The individual, his liberty, dignity, and happiness [became] the basic element of all national life [while] the

Government of a nation was a moral trust dependent upon the free consent of the governed" (Kohn 1965: 18).

Historically this was a highly unusual line of reasoning. The emphasis on the individual, at the expense of the state as a collective institution, could develop only because in the West the modern state emerged as a consequence of a struggle between the crown and the landed aristocracy. The aristocracy, entrenched in provincial assemblies, claimed to champion "national liberties" and "national rights," which, in the context of the time, meant aristocratic privileges since the concept of "nation" did not include the lower classes.

The crown, forced to look for allies, found them in the well-to-do strata of the Third Estate. When it won, the crown proceeded to build a centralized absolutist state which required a code of communication accessible to all. In other words, the state needed a language which could be learned or imposed only through standardized education, as well as a streamlined bureaucracy and administration. The introduction of German as the language of government administration by Joseph II (Kann 1950: 53) in relatively backward Austria shows that this constituted a development which was not limited to Western Europe. As Latin lost its preeminence—in France as early as 1539 (the decree of Villers-Cotterê

ts)—and printing spread, it facilitated the development of vernacular literatures, which consolidated closely related dialects into closed fields of communication (in the Deutschian sense) inaccessible to outsiders.³ This development was further enhanced by the "hardening" of borders, another consequence of the centralized state, within which a sense of commonality could better develop. (Before, frontiers were porous and permeable, not at all the linear barriers we know today; see Braudel 1986: 298).

Finally, the concept of time changed as well. In medieval Europe,

Time, calendar, and history were reckoned by the Christian scheme. . . . Current events were recorded in relation to religious holidays and saints' days. . . . Hours of the day were named for the hours of prayer (Tuchman 1978: 54).

In other words, time was repetitive, circular, and suffused with Christian symbolism. With the Reformation this was lost. Instead, a person turned into a "sociological organism moving calendrically

through homogeneous time" (Anderson 1983: 31). Thus the "script language, monarchy, temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable" (Anderson 1983: 40) all changed. Anderson sees the origins of national consciousness in the interplay of decreasing linguistic diversity, technology (book printing), and capitalism, which created monoglot mass readership.⁴

Politically the absolutist state hinged on the king's divine right. But it was undermined by the Reformation almost as soon as the tendency toward absolutism appeared. Already Ulrich Zwingli and Jean Calvin insisted that the government had to conform to the laws of God. Zwingli's successor, Henrich Bullinger, openly asserted the right to resist bad government and revolt against tyranny (Kohn 1944: 137). Once kingship was stripped of the divine right, the person of the king lost its sacred character and became a mere mortal who could be removed or even executed. This would eventually lead to the beheading of Charles I and then Louis XVI.

The delegitimation of the divine right left a void in the conceptualization of the body politic. It was eventually filled by the notion of "the people," which was redefined as a nation by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His nation was based on the sovereignty of the people (the "general will," in his parlance) and full rights for each member, at least in theory. In such a nation, nationalism was the expression of the free individual's free will. This concept was inherently anti-monarchical, anti-feudal and anti-aristocratic. It could fully develop only in the relatively open, rapidly developing societies of Western Europe and North America whose elites believed in the Enlightenment and Reason, at least in principle, and proclaimed liberty, equality, and fraternity, at least in theory. In short, it was possible only in societies which were built on constitutionalism, parliamentarism, participatory democracy, and what we would nowadays call pluralism.

Since the bourgeoisie was the rising element in these societies—economically, socially, and politically—bourgeois values—individualism, liberalism, tolerance—permeated Western nationalism. Politically and socially these attitudes were translated into the idea of a social contract, the legal concept of citizenship, the principle of individual rights and legal equality. Moreover, since nationalism in the West developed within well-established states, it was subjected to all the constraints which West European political order imposed

on the state itself (Fishman 1973: 24–25). And since it was based on political citizenship which could be acquired, it was inherently inclusive. Historically it integrated ever wider masses of people into the politically defined nation, usually led by the middle classes, who sought allies in their struggle against aristocratic privilege. First with the crown against the aristocracy, then with the masses against the absolutist monarchy, the bourgeoisie mobilized the peasantry, the artisans, and the nascent industrial proletariat, transforming them into a new, integrated community which eventually coalesced into the nation.

THE TRADITIONAL REPRESENTATION OF HERDERIAN NATIONALISM

If certain characteristics of Lockean thought can be harnessed to depict an ideal type of Western nationalism, then a parallel construct using Herder's ideas might be useful in delineating what has come to be known as Eastern nationalism. Unlike Locke, who had merely enunciated certain principles which were incorporated into the foundations of West European nationalisms, Herder was a theoretician of a new brand of nationalism. This is not to say that he was a nationalist in the modern sense. To him nationality was not a political or biological but a spiritual and moral concept (Kohn 1965: 31) (which is not to say that he disregarded the role of the state altogether: in his conception the national state was the means through which national characteristics were developed [Ergang 1966: 255]).

Yet Herder was the first to develop a comprehensive philosophy of nationalism. At a time when nationalities were regarded as obstacles on the road to a universal, rational society, Herder believed that nationality was an indispensable building block and "an essential factor in the development of humanity" (Ergang 1966: 248). He saw the ethnic group as an organic unity whose growth was regulated by natural law. The nature of nationality and national character was religious, deterministic, divine. Laws of nature were "thoughts of the Creator," and each nationality was part of the divine plan in history (Ergang 1966: 250). In Herder's view, ethnos was an organic growth and at the same time a self-revelation of the Divine. He be-

lieved that human civilization lived in its national and peculiar manifestations, not in the Universal. People were first and foremost members of their national communities; only as such could they be truly creative (Kohn 1965: 31). In a curious premonition of the anthropomorphic analogies made popular by vulgar Darwinism a century later Herder thought that after a period of growth each national organism matures and then sinks into senility, making way for others which pass through the same cycle. It was also implied that each national organism had its own national soul (Ergang 1966: 85).

Herder's cultural polycentrism emphasized folklore, ritual, customs, myth, folk songs, and language—i.e., clues to a people's collective personality and identity (Smith 1971: 182). Polycentrism is a giveaway of Herderian nationalism: two hundred years later most Russian nationalists are equally polycentric. Thus Ilya Glazunov, a well-known painter and nationalist: "I believe that world culture has nothing to do with Esperanto but is a bouquet of different national cultures" (interview in *Vol'noie slovo* 33 [1979]; cited in Conquest, ed. 1986: 271).

Herder believed that as the group became a single unit, a being, it acquired a unique personality which found expression in its history, language, literature, religion, customs, art, science, and law. Culture, then, was a product of the group mind (Ergang 1966: 87). Herder was not a racist in any sense. "Notwithstanding the varieties of the human form," he wrote, "there is but one and the same species of man throughout the whole earth" (cited in Ergang 1966: 88). "Men are formed only by education, instruction and permanent example" (cited in Ergang 1966: 91).

While Rousseau believed that legislation and common will can turn people into a community, Herder subscribed to the view that nature was "the great architect" of human society (cited in Ergang 1966: 95). His bitterness and invective were directed against "soulless cosmopolitanism," which is somewhat reminiscent of our modern dread of anomie.⁵ Herder, however, equated this pernicious cosmopolitanism with French influence, especially French education, a rather prevalent attitude in the Germany of his time. In denouncing the French, Herder overstepped the line which separates patriotism from nationalism or even chauvinism.

In many respects Herder was the spiritual founder and the intellectual cornerstone of German nationalism. His view of language

as an outstanding mark of nationality, a reflection of its thought-life (Ergang 1966: 105); his belief that each nationality has a mission to develop its national characteristics and cultivate its national individuality (Ergang 1966: 112); his opinion that culture must be national in form and content (Ergang 1966: 251) (later reworked by Stalin to become “national in form, socialist in content”)—all testify to the extremely important role played by Herder in the rise of German and subsequent Herderian nationalisms. In this and in many other respects he was the precursor of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Giuseppe Mazzini, František Palacký, Lajos Kossuth, Jan Kollár, Dositej Obradović, and countless other East European nationalists.

Virtually all Herderian nationalisms go through several easily discernible stages. At first, a few intellectuals redefine ethnicity as a category of classification; then they have to spread their ideas among the general population and mobilize it in order to confront the state apparatus controlled by the dominant ethny; finally, after a period of struggle, their ethny either gains complete independence or settles for a limited sovereignty in a federal or consociated system.

The first stage, the redefinition of ethnicity, requires an intelligentsia. That is not to say that peasants or artisans were unaware of ethnic or religious differences. Anti-Jewish violence in medieval Europe and interdenominational massacres in France and Germany during wars of religion prove otherwise. Nor should we assume that peasants could not organize themselves: peasant wars in England, France, and Germany (and later Russia) show they could. However, only the intelligentsia with its intellectual expertise and the ability to conceptualize could make ethnic differences a major category of classification and then mobilize various interest groups in defense of an “imaginary community.”

Societies where the upper classes preferred an alien language and culture facilitated the spread of Herderian nationalism. Such preferences reduced the reading public, relegated ethnic intellectuals to a secondary position, and sent thousands of ambitious ethnic intellectuals into an alien cultural milieu. In this situation language became a matter of paramount importance. And if the country was militarily weak and disunited, as was the case in the Germanies and Italies, or subject to ethnically alien rulers, as was the case everywhere else in Eastern Europe, or even if it simply suffered from a complex of cultural inferiority, as was the case in Russia, all these

factors provided a strong stimulus to worshipping strength and unity.

Since even the most rabid ethnic nationalists could not simply deny the superiority of the civilization which they rejected, they could only fall back on the innate goodness of their ethny. Thus the wholesomeness, the manly virtues of their own people had to be contrasted with the degenerate character of the “western” neighbor. And westerners in general had to be represented as false, effeminate, and phony—in short, contemptible. Or as an old Flemish saying goes, “*Wat wals is, vals is*” (Whatever is Walloon is false). Ironically these accusations, first hurled against the French by the Germans, were later used by Slavs against Germans as the bacilli of Herderian-type nationalism penetrated further east.

Once the differences had been recognized, proto-nationalist intellectuals had to indoctrinate the people and look for allies. Although these intellectuals often found themselves close to the centers of power—as teachers of rulers’ offspring, for example—they were powerless themselves and could not effect fundamental changes on their own. Thus their indoctrination efforts were inevitably bifurcated, directed at the ruling elite on the one hand, at the lower classes on the other.

In the feudal and semifeudal absolutist states of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, where the bourgeoisie was numerically weak and politically even weaker, the nascent nationalistic intelligentsia sided with whatever allies it could find: the local gentry (as in Poland and Hungary) or even the peasantry (as in Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Serbia). While in the West nationalism developed as a political expression of the rising middle classes within the established states, in the East it developed as a cultural movement in societies which had not for the most part experienced Renaissance, Reformation, or Enlightenment.

Familiar only with authoritarian political structures, Herderian nationalism developed a strong authoritarian bent, just as Lockean-type nationalism bore the imprint of Western liberal tradition. In the West individualism suffused nationalism. In the East nationalism promoted communalism. More often than not, such communal nationalism found a natural ally in forces of reaction. This was particularly true of “satisfied” ethnic nationalism—i.e., nationalism which had achieved statehood, like Hungarian nationalism after the Com-

promise of 1867. Others—Croatian nationalism, for example—could flip-flop, siding with reactionary Vienna against revolutionary Hungary or with Hungary against Vienna, depending on the situation. This shows that much in nationalism's behavior and configuration was circumstantial and not the result of some intrinsic reactionary essence.

Intellectuals espousing Herderian-type nationalism tried to overcome their strong complex of inferiority by instilling a sense of mission and messianism. This was facilitated by the fact that many contemporary (nineteenth- and early twentieth-century) East European cultures were still suffused with religious messianism and Christian universalism, an inheritance of the Middle Ages. As Nikolai Berdyaev wrote in his comments on the Russian Revolution,

The Russian people are passing from one medieval period into another. . . . The workman is not at all inclined to pass from Christian faith to enlightened rationalism and skepticism; he is more inclined to go over to a new faith and a new idol-worship" (Berdyaev 1960: 39).

Most Russian "workmen" passed from Christianity to "prophetic" Marxism to nationalism. This explains much of the fanaticism and the dogma of early Soviet communism and Stalinism and the spread of extreme nationalism in post-Communist Russia, which surprised many observers. In much of Eastern Europe, where nationalism had made earlier inroads and where (Soviet) communism was "imported" and imposed, a large proportion of the proletariat bypassed Marxism altogether. In these countries nationalism proved to be a potent antidote to Marxism, and when the Soviet domination collapsed (or was withdrawn), nationalism reappeared as a major political force.

Romantic historicism played a major role in this turnaround. As a rule, Herderian-type nationalisms idealized the past and turned it into a cornerstone of national regeneration. The idea of nationhood centered around the folk community imagined as a healthy, manly peasant society free of degenerate Townsman and Foreigner (often equated since in many areas towns were populated by people of different ethnic origin—e.g., Germans and Jews). Xenophobic and chiliastic, Herderian nationalisms sought to recreate the imagined past in the future.

Until 1848 Herderian nationalism stressed collaboration of peoples against monarchs and saw its mission in the fight for freedom and constitutionalism (Kohn 1955: 39), which made it run on a track parallel to that of the Lockean-type nationalism. However, after 1848 it turned increasingly to the glorification of the martial spirit, worship of national heroes and their deeds in war. In a sense, this is the year when Herderian nationalism came of age: from here the pedigree becomes unmistakably "Eastern," and the line of development points increasingly in one direction: that of political intolerance and authoritarianism.

Above we delineated the position that Lockean-type nationalism is based on political citizenship in a preexisting state which promotes individual rather than communal incorporation and determines the inclusive character of Lockean nationalism. To test these assumptions we will now look for (a) *statist Lockean* and (b) *nonstatist Lockean* nationalisms in the West, as well as (c) *statist Lockean* and (d) *nonstatist Lockean* nationalisms in the East. England and France will serve as examples for case (a).

ENGLISH NATIONALISM

United under one government since at least 1017, in possession of a common literary language and venerable historical traditions, England is considered a classical representative of Lockean-type nationalism. Of particular importance is the fact that its Parliament developed as a territorial, not a tribal, assembly (Snyder 1976: 73–74).

However, as one looks closer, one discovers features which are unexpected in a Lockean nationalism. First, English nationalism arose out of a religious matrix (Kohn 1965: 16–17), which is a Herderian trait. It was the break with Rome in 1534 that laid the Protestant foundations of English nationalism. These were reinforced by the persecution of Protestants in Queen Mary's reign; in Liah Greenfeld's words, "Religion and national sentiment became identified" (1992: 66). Then, under Puritan influence, the three main tenets of Hebrew nationhood were revived: the idea of a chosen people (this goes back to Milton), the Covenant, and the messianic expectancy.

Another Herderianism is only a partial acceptance of the people of the Celtic fringe. According to Geoffrey Gorer, within the internal English context, people of the Celtic fringe are regarded as un-English, almost as foreigners (cited in DeVos and Romanucci-Ross 1975: 156–72). Here there is a clearly maintained difference between being British (no one denies that the Welsh are British) and English (which they are not).

Given the presence of clearly Herderian traits in a quintessentially Lockean nationalism, what, we may ask, separates it from purely Herderian nationalisms? The important difference, according to Hans Kohn (1965: 18), is that the individual, his liberty, dignity, and happiness were the basic elements of national life. This presupposes a voluntary accession to the political community. Indeed as it gradually expanded its political franchise in the nineteenth century, English nationhood incorporated broad masses *within an existing state* into a cohesive whole. But, we may ask, is voluntary incorporation indispensable? Is Lockeanism possible where coercion is applied? Such indeed was often the case in France.

FRENCH NATIONALISM

Like its English counterpart, French nationalism is an uneasy melange of Lockean and Herderian traits. The cultural heritage of French national identity, its literary language, the continuity of history and statehood go back to at least the twelfth century.

French nationalism is unique in that we can pinpoint the beginning of Lockeanization with precision: 1254. This was the year when the king's title was changed from *rex Francorum* to *rex Franciae* (Greenfeld 1992: 92), and the definition of Frenchness from *jus sanguinis* to *jus soli*. From that moment French identity was defined by an increasingly powerful and centralized state. The contents of identity could change drastically. In fact it metamorphosed from being a religious community, the eldest daughter of the Church, ruled by the "most Christian king" (Greenfeld 1992: 93), to a political community which owed its allegiance to the "people," which was redefined to include the whole population of France. The state and the people of France fused into a new notion of the "nation" (imported from Eng-

land, according to Greenfeld 1992: 155). The new entity was increasingly perceived in opposition to the king and, eventually, the aristocracy, which did not enter into the new Covenant, to the extent that it came to be seen as an alien race which had descended “from the forests of Franconia” (Abbé Sieyès; cited in Greenfeld 1992: 172).

Through all these metamorphoses “Frenchness” was solidly anchored within the structures of the state. This does not mean that France was a homogeneous entity. Its unity was imposed from above and concealed deep fissures in French society. In 1790 Abbé Grégoire found that while three-quarters of the population knew French, only about one-tenth could speak it (Johnson in Teich and Porter, eds. 1993: 52). In the south (*langue d’oc*) most people did not even understand the language (Braudel 1986: 81). And Eugen Weber showed that the French peasantry, especially in the south, did not join the major currents of national life until this century’s interwar period (Weber 1976).

But at least the framework of the state was already in place when French nationalism was born. Only one thing was left to do: turn all the inhabitants of the state into Frenchmen. This was the task of universal public education and the army, which spread the state language and implanted feelings of patriotism in the hearts of the citizens and their children.

The imposition of French was often implemented by oppressive methods, especially among ethnic minorities. Liberty, dignity, and happiness of the individual may be the cornerstones of Lockean-type nationalism, but methods used in French schools in Brittany, for example, were highly coercive. Schoolchildren caught using Breton at school were often made to wear a worn out old shoe around their necks, and the only way to get rid of it was to catch a playmate speaking Breton (Reece 1977: 31); at St. Yves School in Quimper teachers put a little ball in pupils’ mouths which passed from pupil to pupil (Reece 1977: 32). But Bretons fully conversant in French encountered no obstacles to advancement or prominence. And even unassimilated Bretons could count on equality before the law and that the law would be equitably applied to all citizens regardless of their origin.

Both the English and the French examples show that supposedly Lockean nationalisms are full of Herderian traits. Yet religious messianism and coercive incorporation do not necessarily lead to

Herderianism. In fact incorporation can be quite brutal, but *as long as it does not exclude* citizens, it serves the purposes of inclusivity and thus Lockeanization.

In England and France we have strong, old, well-established states. But is the state framework absolutely indispensable for the formation of Lockean identity and nationalism? If we could find an example of a “stateless” ethnic entity—perhaps a province in an existing state or a federal unit—which fully conforms to the Lockean mode, we would be able to prove that Lockeanism without a state is also possible. In our opinion, we can find this kind of entity in Catalonia.

CATALAN NATIONALISM

The Statutes of 1932 and 1979 accepted as Catalan any Spanish citizen with administrative residence in any municipality of Catalonia (Woolard 1989: 37). In the 1979 referendum on the Statute of Autonomy the key slogan during the campaign was “All those who live and work in Catalonia are Catalan” (Woolard 1989: 36). This is a quintessentially Lockean attitude based on *jus soli* and a political/territorial allegiance. Such an attitude was inevitable in a province where up to one-half of the population (estimates differ) is of non-Catalan origin. Catalonia simply could not afford to alienate one-half of its inhabitants and achieve autonomy. The support of immigrants to Catalonia, especially those from Andalusia and other parts of Spain’s southern regions, and their children was absolutely vital to create a politically meaningful Catalan identity. But no statute can make new members of a polity feel that they belong or share in the ethnic symbolism of their new home. Nor does it make them fully acceptable to the autochthons.

In the popular mind of both Catalonians and the immigrants four criteria determine one’s Catalanita: birthplace, descent, sentiment/behavior, and language—all Herderian parameters. This allows for highly varied, often unpredictable results. According to one survey, 55 percent of Andalusians permanently resident in Catalonia felt Catalan, but only 20 percent spoke the language (Strubell i Trueta; cited in Woolard 1989: 40). Castilian-speaking teenagers, chil-

dren of immigrants, use birthplace as the main criterion. This may lead to a somewhat unusual situation where self-ascription is switched along the generational divide (“My husband and I are Andalusian, but our children are Catalan”; cited in Woolard 1989: 38).

On the other side the attitudes are no less ambiguous. Native Catalans who are culturally and linguistically Catalan do not fully accept even children of immigrants, unless they have been fully Catalanized. In common perception, a Catalan is a person who speaks Catalan like a native, particularly at home, as a first and habitual language (Woolard 1989: 39)—again a perfectly Herderian notion.

The picture is further complicated by the fact that group affiliation among immigrants and their children can be regional: Murcian, Andalusian, Aragonese, etc. Also, all Castilian-speaking immigrants, especially those of low socioeconomic status, can be called Murcians or Andalusians, a “generic” designation going back to two major waves of immigration which reached Catalonia after World Wars I and II respectively. The main division runs between Catalans and Castilians, who represent the centralized, and in the Francoist past, a highly repressive state.

Upon closer investigation, one finds that the label “Catalan” may cover a number of subdesignations: “Catalans of origin,” “old Catalans,” “Catalans of always” vs. “Catalans of immigration,” “new Catalans,” “Catalans by adoption,” “recent Catalans,” “new-comer Catalans,” and a number of others—but all Catalans nevertheless (Woolard 1989: 44). The non-Catalan also consists of a number of overlapping identities such as Spanish (i.e., neutral, non-Catalan), Castilian (i.e., centralist, repressive, and thus particularly abhorrent to nationally minded Catalans), or pseudo-regional, which covers all immigrants of low socioeconomic status. However, if the immigrant and especially his or her children learn to speak flawless Catalan and adopt Catalan mores and mentality, they are reassigned into the class of full-fledged Catalans. This, incidentally, points to the importance of language, supposedly a Herderian criterion, in the Lockean model, as does the French example. But in this case the language is a highway to full integration, unlike in the Herderian self-conceptualization (a Jew who speaks flawless German is a Jew; a Jew who speaks flawless French is almost French under “normal” circumstances).

The Catalan example shows that the official stance may not completely reflect popular attitudes. In fact there are significant Herderian elements in Catalan identity, just as there are in the English identity and nationalism. To a large extent Catalonia was forced into the Lockean mode by the political realities of a large immigrant population. However, we should not overstate the case either: under similar circumstances the Russian minorities in the more Herderian Latvia and Estonia are not accepted as full-fledged Latvians or Estonians, although citizenship will be extended if the Russians learn the local languages.

Does the Catalan example invalidate the crucial role of the state in the formation of Lockean nationalisms? We believe that it does, but only to a certain extent since Catalan identity was formed within a powerful and prosperous state which flourished in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries and left a lasting imprint on Catalans. With the union of Aragon and Castile (in 1479) Catalonia lost its statehood (although not its parliament), but its identity, now demoted to the regional level, persists until today.

There is a long-standing and well-entrenched assumption that Lockean nationalisms are not to be found in Eastern Europe. We believe this is not the case and offer Hungary as an example of a largely Lockean mode in East-Central Europe.

HUNGARIAN NATIONALISM

As in Western Europe, *natio Hungarica* initially included only members of the dominant class, mostly gentry, who lived within the limits of the Kingdom of Hungary. Being Hungarian thus had no ethnic connotation. All landowners, be they Magyar, German, Slovak, Romanian, Serbian, or whatever, whether they spoke Hungarian or not, were regarded as members of the Hungarian nation (Islamov 1992: 166). The State Assembly of 1764 refused a request by the Serbian Church Council for special privileges precisely because “we believe they [Hungarian Serbs] are all Hungarians” (*ibid.*).

Although the Hungarian language knew only one designation for the country, *Magyarország*—i.e., the land of the Magyars (Islamov 1992: 167)—historical Hungary was a political and territorial

entity along Lockean lines. When, as a result of the Compromise of 1867, Hungary achieved the status of an autonomous unit within the Hapsburg Empire, less than half of its population was of Hungarian ethnic stock. It thus faced a problem similar to that of France at the end of the eighteenth century or that of Catalonia in the twentieth, although Hungary's problem was much more severe. It is therefore hardly surprising that Hungary embarked on a policy of Magyarization, similar to France's Francophonization seventy-five years before. Hungarian became the state language, and minority languages were gradually suppressed, despite a fairly liberal Nationalities Law of 1868 (Rusinow 1992: 252). Transylvania lost its local autonomy, and Croatia's was severely limited. Successive governments encouraged rapid assimilation of ethnic minorities. All together, about two million non-Hungarians were Magyarized between 1850 and 1910 (Rusinow 1992: 253), an enormous figure given the Magyar population in 1853 of only 5.4 million (taken from Hain; cited in Seton-Watson 1972: 434). The reason for this success lies in the fact that any minority member could become Magyar with all the social mobility, career advancement, and advantages of citizenship as long as s/he learned Hungarian and assimilated.

Thus in its main outline Hungarian nationalism adhered to the French model. This nationalism succeeded fairly well, at least to the extent that the Magyar proportion of the total population exceeded 50 percent (51.4 percent to be precise, without Croatia) by 1900 (Hain; cited in Seton-Watson 1972: 434). That it turned away from the Lockean mode after the dismemberment of historical Hungary in 1919 merely shows that the choice of model is largely situational. The country lost huge minority populations it had tried to assimilate. Defeat and the harshness of the peace treaty led to resentment and rejection of non-Hungarians. As a result, Hungarian identity was redefined in ethno-racial terms.

So far we have demonstrated that Lockean nationalism is not confined to Western Europe but is encountered in Eastern Europe as well. We have also shown that the statist framework, although important, is not indispensable for the appearance of Lockean nationalism. An old statist identity demoted to the level of regional identity may suffice, at least in Western Europe, to produce Lockean nationalism. Thus we are left with the proposition that Lockean nationalism is largely a function of individual incorporation based on jus

soli. This kind of incorporation promotes inclusivity. Moreover, it does not matter if it is promoted by coercive methods, as in France or Hungary, or is purely voluntary, as in Catalonia. Nor does the presence of occasional Herderianisms, such as messianism and a religious matrix, invalidate the Lockean character of inclusive nationalisms.

We have only one more type of nationalism to find in order to complete the matrix: a Lockean-inclusive nationalism of the nonstatist kind in Eastern Europe. We believe that Belorussian (or Belarusan, in the latest terminology) nationalism is a good example.

BELORUSSIAN NATIONALISM

Originally a part of the Kievan Rus', the Belorussian lands were gradually incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Already at the end of the twelfth century some Krivichan lands (Krivichi is one of the three tribes from which the Belorussian ethny later developed) passed under Lithuanian rule (Wasilewski 1920: 264–65). By the time Lithuania captured Kiev (in 1362) virtually all Belorussian lands had become part of the Grand Duchy. The incorporation was gradual and proceeded through marriage or agreement when western Russian principalities sought Lithuanian protection against hostile neighbors (Vakar 1956: 43).

The Grand Duchy itself was Lockean: all inhabitants, whatever their ethnic stock, considered themselves Lithuanian. Lithuanian Slavs were no exception; they called themselves *licviny* or *litoucy*—i.e., Lithuanians (Zaprudnik 1993: 4). Since the Slav population of the duchy was more advanced culturally and economically, Old Russian was accepted as the language of state. Repeated intermarriage of the leading Lithuanian families with Russian princesses (sixteen toward the end of the fifteenth century; four consecutive generations of the grand dukes had Russian mothers and Russian wives [Vakar 1956: 51]) brought strong Russian influence to the Lithuanian court. The Old (Belo)Russian language and culture had prestige, and gradually much of the Lithuanian upper strata were Russianized. At the time, the language of religious writings was uniform among all Eastern Slavs, but the vernacular was already

beginning to diverge from other Russian dialects, largely through local developments and borrowings from Polish.

History set Belorussians apart from other Eastern Slavs. After the first union of Lithuania and Poland in 1385, the proto-Belorusian population was subjected to strong Western (largely Polish) influence. And the Reformation rendered it multiconfessional, especially among the aristocracy, with the Orthodox, Catholics, and Protestants forming part of a whole. Typically Belorussia did not know large-scale ethnic or religious strife, either during the Reformation or later. The only massacres were perpetrated by Muscovite troops, who often killed Catholics and Jews in towns they captured. Compared to most of their neighbors, Belorussians have been remarkably tolerant. Westernization was further strengthened by the organization of city life along German models (the Magdeburg law) in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries.

As the pressure from Muscovy increased after 1550, the Lithuanian lands, including Belorussia, drew closer to Poland. For its part, the Polish crown met them half way: the anti-Catholic provisions of the Horodlo Union of 1415 were struck down (in 1562), and the country was reorganized along federal lines in 1569 (Zaprudnik 1993: 29). (The extent and degree of federalization have been hotly disputed ever since.)

The retreat of the Reformation and the imposition of the Union of Brest (by which the Orthodox acknowledged papal authority and Catholic dogma in return for a compromise on the Eastern rite, services in Slavonic, and priest celibacy [Vakar 1956: 56]) put Belorussia under increasing Polish influence. Eventually this began to affect the status of the Belorussian language. The Statutes of the Grand Duchy (codes of law) in 1529, 1566, and 1588 were all written in Belorussian. It was still the language of the ducal chancellery, the courts, the chronicles, and diplomacy (Zaprudnik 1993: 37). Until the seventeenth century, when many noble families in Lithuania and Belorussia started switching to Polish, Belorussian played the same role in the Grand Duchy that Latin had played in most European countries in the Middle Ages.

With the loss of large sections of Ukraine to Muscovy in 1654, the weight of the Eastern Slav element in the Polish Commonwealth decreased while that of Poland expanded. In 1696 Polish was made the official language (Zaprudnik 1993: 39). Catholic (i.e., Polish)

monasteries and religious establishments proliferated; conversion to Catholicism became an initiation into a higher form of civilization and a mark of distinction (Vakar 1956: 57). In Catholic homes first, in others later, Polish began to replace Russian, much like earlier Old Russian had replaced Lithuanian. Between 1596 (the Union of Brest) and 1795 (the Third Partition) most of the Belorussian nobility, gentry, and burghers were thoroughly Polonized (Zaprudnik 1993: 45). The process did not proceed without resistance. The Chamberlain of Smolensk called Polish culture “a dog’s flesh clothing our Russian bones” (Vakar 1956: 61) (so much for the absence of nationalist sentiments before the eighteenth century); Orthodox fraternities were organized in towns and uprisings erupted in the countryside. In vain, Polonization continued to spread, although as late as the last decade of the eighteenth century there were still old-fashioned lords who liked to talk Belorussian among themselves (Czeczot; cited in Wasilewski 1920: 269).

The Polish partitions were justified by Russia as the in-gathering of all Rus’—i.e., regaining of the Kievan Russian patrimony. After the Second Partition a commemorative medal was minted in St. Petersburg with an inscription, “What had been torn away I returned” (*Ottorzhennaia vozoratikh* [Vakar 1956: 66]). Ironically the Russian governments under Paul and Alexander I were not aware of the fact that the greater part of the Belorussian Slav population were not Polish, mostly because the gentry and the other educated sections of the population with which they dealt were Polish. Catholics preserved all former privileges; local administration and education were left in Polish hands, and Polonization continued unabated. It was only after the insurrections of 1830–31 and 1863, in the context of general anti-Polish repressions, that St. Petersburg “discovered” the non-Polish character of the Belorussian peasantry. Both insurrections were widely supported in Belorussia. In 1863, for example, 18 percent of the insurgents were (non-Polish) peasants, although most insurgents—about 70 percent—originated among the heavily Polonized gentry (Zaprudnik 1993: 57). To counter Polish “subversion,” the Russian government purged Poles from local administration and banned the Polish language from schools and administration. (Ironically the use of Belorussian was also prohibited on the mistaken assumption that it was a Polish dialect [Vakar 1956: 69].) However, some leading Russian figures such as Aksakov

and Katkov finally woke up to the fact that Belorussians were not Polish.

Depolonization gained momentum in 1839, when the Uniate hierarchs renounced the Union of Brest and returned to the Orthodox fold. This was the final blow to the Uniate Church: after the First Partition about 1.5 million Uniates had converted to the Orthodox faith (Vakar 1956: 68). Now the remaining 1.5 million were registered, often against their will, as Orthodox (Vakar 1956: 69). In 1840 even the names Belarus and Litva were banned; instead Belorussia became known as the Northwestern Province (Zaprudnik 1993: 50).

The insurrections precipitated a radical transformation of Belorussia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, before the appearance of nationalism, one's identity was still defined by one's religious affiliation. Catholicism was synonymous with Polishness, while Orthodoxy meant Russianness. When over 30,000 nobles and gentry switched from Catholicism to the Orthodox faith in 1865–66, they were passing, in their minds, from being Polish to being Russian. Like Polish earlier, Russian now became a mark of cultural and social distinction, especially when the best families chose (re)conversion.

The renunciation of the Union of Brest (the Uniate denomination itself had plebeian connotations) eliminated a middle category, a no-man's land between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, and split Belorussian Christians between Orthodox/Russian (81 percent in 1897) and Catholic/Polish camps (18.5 percent, according to Zaprudnik 1993: 63). The situation was further complicated by the fact that the vast majority of the educated and the affluent were culturally alien: as late as 1917, 97.4 percent of urban dwellers were non-Belorussian (Zaprudnik 1993: 67). In Minsk in 1897, 51.2 percent of the entire population was Jewish and 25.5 percent Russian; only 9.3 percent was Belorussian (Wasilewski 1920: 93). This is hardly surprising: the ruin of the Polish gentry after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the confiscations of 1863 eliminated the economic and social powers of a major Polish-leaning stratum of the population. This propelled a large section of the Jewish intelligentsia and, to a smaller extent, the business class toward Russian culture. And this introduced the Russian language into the Catholic parts of the former Grand Duchy (Wasilewski 1920: 76). Earlier, even among peasants perhaps 10 percent could read Polish while only 1 percent could read Russian

(Zaprudnik 1993: 55). After 1863 Russian began to gain ground. Even Lithuanian nationalists preferred to communicate with Poles in Russian since it did not threaten the existence of the Lithuanian ethny.

By the end of the nineteenth century, when nationalism “switched” the major boundary marker from religious denomination to language, the whole structure of ascriptive categories was radically transformed. Inevitably the fluidity of linguistic and denominational boundaries led to extremes of ascriptive confusion. As Wasilewski wrote,

In Lithuania and Belorussia we have people who speak the language of one people but who ascribe themselves to another. We have Lithuanians who cannot speak a word of Lithuanian, Poles who are very much attached to the Polish people, yet who speak (i.e., whose mother tongue is) Lithuanian, Belorussian or Latvian. We have “locals” who speak “vernacular” who define their nationality by denomination. We have families where siblings belong to two different nationalities. We have such wonders as the representative from Pinsk in the First Duma who was Polish by language and culture, came from a Lithuanian family, and considered himself Belorussian even though he grew up in Ukrainian (ethnic) territory and was closely connected with it (1920: 85).

On the other hand, such fluidity allowed the inclusion in one’s ethny of people who spoke another language and came from a different ethnic stock. This was particularly important in disputed border areas with mixed population. Here, paradoxically, acceptance and tolerance became instruments of expansion. This was particularly true in the Vilna region. Vilna had special significance for many Belorussians. Not a few still considered the city as their capital, and during the revolution of 1905 it was the first choice for convening the Belorussian Constituent Assembly (Vakar 1956: 86). The city and the vicinity were mixed in the extreme. In 1897 in the city proper 40 percent of the population was Jewish, 31 percent Polish, and 20 percent Russian. Belorussians amounted to only 4 percent and Lithuanians to barely 2 percent. In the surrounding countryside the population was even more fragmented: 26.4 percent Belorussian, 21.7 percent Jewish, 21.4 percent Lithuanian, 20.6 percent Polish, and 10.7 percent Russian (Vakar 1956: 10). The census of 1897 was conducted by Russian authorities who had an anti-Polish and anti-Jewish bias

and probably listed many Belorussians as Russians. The German census of 1916 (during German occupation), which presumably was not similarly biased, found 70 percent Poles, 23.9 percent Jews, 3.5 percent Belorussians, and 2.8 percent Lithuanians (Vakar 1956: 11) (after a mass evacuation of Russians and a large-scale expulsion of Jews by the Russian authorities). Clearly the percentage of Poles in this census was greatly inflated by adding Polish-speaking Belorussians, Jews, and Lithuanians.

This trend was continued in independent Poland. As in the times of the Commonwealth, the Belorussian was considered *gente Russus, natione Polonus* and was called *bialopolski*, (White Polish). This way the total number of Belorussians in the first Polish census of 1921 was brought down from about 3.5 million (Zaprudnik 1993: 83) to 1.03 million. In other words, only Orthodox Belorussians were counted as Belorussians. Among the Roman Catholics only 60,000 registered or were allowed to register as Belorussians, the rest being added to the Polish numbers. It is interesting that in Polesie at this late date, 62.5 percent of the entire population still considered itself “local” or “undecided” (Vakar 1956: 13).

From Belorussian history, it becomes clear how Belorussian national identity managed to develop Lockean inclusivity without a statist structure. It evolved in a state based on *jus soli*. It belonged to the large majority of the population (as high as 80 percent in the Grand Duchy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries). Being on a higher level of civilization, the Belorussian culture initially attracted and absorbed the upper strata of politically dominant Lithuanians. When the Belorussian-Lithuanian elites chose Polonization, the Belorussian peasantry was still nationally undecided, with religion still being the main marker of collective identity. Thus Orthodox Belorussians could be counted as Russian, while the Catholic ones could be included among Poles. By the same token, a religious conversion led to a switch in ethnic affiliation—to the extent that siblings from the same family could end up in different nationalities. Whatever their nominal nationality, they were not excluded from the Belorussian “family.” Thus the *jus soli* foundations of collective identity in the Grand Duchy, a long tradition of assimilation and acceptance of alien elites, confusion of denomination with ethnic affiliation, a large proportion of ethnically undecided people (the “locals”), and the desire to retain areas with mixed populations have all contributed to the

creation of a nonstatist Lockean-inclusive Belorussian identity and nationalism.

In describing Lockean nationalisms, we started with classical statist models of English and French nationalisms. When we turn to Herderian nationalisms, the order should be reversed because ethnic nationalisms in Central and Eastern Europe originated and developed without the benefit of the state. In contemplating the peculiarities of Herderian nationalisms, we will start with Germany since this was Herder's homeland and the basis for his concept of nationalism. Germany furnished the original Herderian model, which other East European nationalities were to emulate.

GERMAN NATIONALISM

It is often stated that until 1806 Germany knew no unified state. Strictly speaking, this is not true since the Holy Roman Empire provided the framework for pan-German unity. However, the empire was fragmented into about three hundred states and statelets which pursued their own interests, often at loggerheads with each other. But disunity did not prevent the emergence of broad cultural movements which developed across the whole of German cultural space. German nationalism was one of these movements. Its rise is inextricably linked with Romanticism.

Like their Western counterparts, German Romantics started as extreme individualists. But unlike the Western Romantics, Germans ended as collectivists. The transformation resulted from their longing for a true harmonious community, much like Rousseau's. But where the Swiss philosopher sought an integrated *political* community, German Romantics dreamed of an organic folk community. They looked back to the imagined glories of the past, the days of order and security, the happy time when the Holy Roman Empire was the most powerful entity in Europe. German Romantics did not want French universalism and *Weltburgertum*; rather they hoped for a new Germany of valiant, truthful, pure, courageous men, a clear proof of Teutonic superiority, which the sense of cultural inferiority demanded in compensation. German Romantic nationalism was anti-French, anti-aristocratic, anti-cosmopolitan, anti-effete, anti-in-

tellelectual. As such, it appealed to virtually all social strata (Snyder 1976: 89).

The German version formulated by Herder and then elaborated by Johann Fichte, Johann Schlegel, Ernst Arndt, Friedrich Jahn, and Christoph Müller was an “organic” version. It postulated that the nation, unique, natural, and objective, was the true subject of history, propelled by the self-moving national spirit as it gradually unfolded through history. This idea emanated from the writings of Immanuel Kant. The organic vision was based on several premises: (1) cultural diversity of humankind (Herder’s idea); (2) national self-realization achievable only through political struggle (introduced by Fichte); and (3) the subordination and dissolution of an individual and his will in the will of the organic state (also elaborated by Fichte) (Smith 1971: 17).

From there German nationalism developed a philosophy built on (a) collective self-determination for each people; (b) a free expression of national character and individuality; and (c) a “vertical” (i.e., nonhierarchical) division of the world into equal nations, each living according to the dictates of its genius (Smith 1971: 23). When applied to an individual, it meant that s/he could not change his/her nationality at will, as is possible when it is based on political citizenship. Rudolf Hess formulates the Herderian concept of nationality with clarity and precision:

The German cannot and may not choose whether or not he will be German, but that he was sent into this world by God as a German. . . . The German everywhere is German—whether he lives in the Reich, or in Japan or in France or in China or anywhere else in the world (cited in Kamenka, ed. 1977: 11).

But the laws governing the acquisition of German citizenship were formulated long before Hess and the rise of Nazism. They derive from the Reichs- and Staatsbürgergesetz of 23 July 1913, which specify that citizenship is passed by descent from parent to child, another consequence of Herder’s organic vision of ethnos (Klusmeyer 1993: 84). Thus the acquisition of German citizenship is based on *jus sanguinis*; in theory it excludes anyone who is biologically non-German. In that sense German, and by implication all Herderian nationalisms, are highly exclusive.

As for the role of the state, the German situation was somewhat different from that of most Central and East European ethnies since the German nation was not politically or culturally oppressed by alien masters. Furthermore, precisely because it was fragmented into numerous states, it had a multiple political expression denied to virtually every other ethny in the area. Its task therefore was unification, not a creation of state ex nihilo. The situation was quite different for “ahistorical” ethnies like Slovaks, who had virtually no upper or even middle classes to guide them through the process of national(istic) (re)birth.

SLOVAK NATIONALISM

Like most Herderian nationalisms which appeared among “ahistorical” people, the Slovak version developed in several stages. First, as far back as the seventeenth century, Jesuits began printing books in Slovak vernacular, in an effort to wean Protestants from the heretical faith (Brock 1976: 5). However, it was not until the 1780s that a group of Catholic intellectuals began to write in the vernacular, while a Catholic priest wrote a Slovak grammar and a dictionary. The net effect was a separation from the closely related Czech language and, therefore, community. This was the first step toward the delimitation of the Slovak ethnos. However, these proto-nationalists did not dispute that the Slovak gentry belonged to *natio Hungarica*. As Brock put it, “The feeling of separate ethnic identity is not . . . the same as consciousness of separate national identity” (1976: 7). Or in the words of Matej Bel, a Slovak intellectual of that time, an educated Slovak was someone who was “*lingua Slavus, nazione Hungarus, eruditione Germanus*” (Brock 1976: 15–16).

In the second stage, members of the Protestant (and pro-Czech) intelligentsia influenced by German linguistic nationalism began to assert Slovak cultural and linguistic separateness, but still within the political framework of the Hungarian state. The leader of this circle, Jan Kollár, was profoundly influenced by Herder; it was from his studies at the University of Jena that he brought notions of cultural and linguistic nationalism (Brock 1976: 21). It is interesting that Kollár started as a pan-Slavist and regarded his people as members

of a Slav nation. In this, he totally divorced nation and state, leaving language as the main determinant of nationality. Potentially his teaching could be used to advocate pan-Slavic unity, much like the idea of German unity was beginning to take hold across the German cultural continuum.

It was these early proto-Czechoslovak nationalists who extricated the Slovak ethnos from *natio Hungarica* because in their view only a common language created a nation (Brock 1976: 36). Then in the mid-1840s another group of Protestants, led by Stur, rejected the “Czechophiles” and advocated a Slovak language and nationality. This was probably a reaction to the introduction of Magyar as the national language in 1844 (Brock 1976: 39) (it replaced Latin) and the rise of Magyar assimilationist pressures, although theoretically they should have sought salvation in a closer cooperation with Czechs. Like Herder and Glazunov, Stur was an adherent of ethnic polycentrism. He even coined a special term for it, *kmenovitost'* (Brock 1976: 48), from *kmen'*, tribe, by which he meant the (praiseworthy) ability of the Slav nation to subdivide into tribes, of which Slovaks were one.

With their Romanian and Serbian counterparts, early Slovak nationalists used language to separate (or save) the Slovak ethnos from Magyarization. They helped explode the unity of the historic Hungarian state and then preserved Slovak distinctiveness in another, less oppressive, but potentially even more dangerous union with the Czechs. From the struggle against Magyarization, the Slovak path led to the incorporation into Czechoslovakia as a nominal state nation (already in 1837 Slovaks, Czechs, and Moravians were grouped together under the heading “Czechoslovak section” in Safarik’s work on Slav antiquities [Brock 1976: 27]), nominal independence under Hitler, federal status in 1968, and finally full independence on 1 January 1993. With some modifications this was the path taken by other Herderian nationalisms.

So far we have been dealing with classically Herderian, nonstatist nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe. If we could find a statist Herderian nationalism in the same area, we would have one more example, from the other side of the Lockean/Herderian divide, that the state’s involvement, framework, and structure are important determinants of the type of nationalism. To explore this possibility let us turn to Russia/the Soviet Union.

RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

From its beginnings in the eighteenth century the Russian national idea defined the nation as (1) a collective individual (2) formed by ethnic, primordial factors such as blood, soil, and language, and (3) characterized by the enigmatic soul or spirit (Greenfeld 1992: 261). In this, Russian national identity, as conceptualized by the Russian elite, was no different from its German, Slovak, or other Herderian counterparts, although the importance attached to a specific component might have differed from nationalism to nationalism and from epoch to epoch. As in many other aspects, the former Soviet Union retained and continued, through all the ideological permutations, the Russian national idea.

The USSR was unique among (semi)-European countries in that it had an official ethnic nationality inscribed in one's internal passport, along with citizenship, which was of course Soviet. At age 16, when the Soviet citizen acquired an internal passport, s/he had to choose his/her nationality. S/he had no choice if both parents were of the same nationality but could choose either parent's nationality if they came from different ethnic backgrounds. Thus a person of full Armenian ancestry was a Soviet citizen of Armenian nationality. If one of his/her parents was Russian, s/he could choose to become Russian. In practice it often led to an absurd, in Herderian terms, situation, where "real" nationality did not correspond to the official one inscribed in the passport. For example, an Armenian with a Russian grandmother could be officially Russian if his/her Russian/Armenian parent chose the Russian nationality. In large cities or any multiethnic areas one could often encounter people whose official ethnic nationality was inherited from one grandparent, or even a great-grandparent, rather than the immediate parent. Occasionally different siblings within the same family of mixed ethnic origin chose different nationalities so that a brother could be Russian while his sister chose to be Armenian (a reminder of the Belorussian situation, but there the context was entirely different).

The official recognition of ethnic nationality and a division of ethnic and state nationality puts the Soviet Union at the extreme end of Herderian nationalisms. Presumably Russian nationalism should be classified accordingly. And yet there are some features which

militate against it. First, as Milovan Djilas noted, “Muscovy (the state) came first—the Russian sense of nationhood came later” (cited in Diuk and Karatnycky 1990: 195). The precedence of statehood points to the Lockean model.

Another Lockean trend, the tendency toward ethnicization, known in Russia as Russification, has also been present throughout recent Russian and Soviet history. Already in 1870, the minister of education, Dmitriy Tolstoy, wrote that “the final objective of education to be provided . . . to the non-natives . . . is undoubtedly their Russification” (cited in Carrère d’Encausse 1992: 6). But then a similar situation existed in France, Germany (in regard to Posen Poles), and Hungary—in fact in any multiethnic state with large ethnic minorities.

What rendered Russian and later Soviet nationalisms decidedly Herderian was their nonacceptance, officially and on the popular level, of non-Russians. Before 1919, a non-Hungarian who adopted the Hungarian language and culture was accepted as Hungarian. A non-Russian who adopted the Russian language and mentality remained, according to his internal passport, non-Russian. This, we think, goes a long way toward explaining the rigidity and enmity in interethnic relations in the Soviet Union. The whole elaborate federal structure of the former Soviet Union was Herderian in character. It (a) gave collective self-determination to each people, (b) offered an institutionalized expression of ethnic character and individuality, and (c) allowed vertical (i.e., nonhierarchical) form to an intrinsically hierarchical relationship between various ethnies within the empire.

The sources of Russian Herderianism should be sought in the religious foundations of Russian identity. “The Russian people in their spiritual makeup are an Eastern people,” wrote Nikolai Berdyaev (1960: 7). Its culture was “the culture of the Christianized Tartar Empire. . . . (Its) soul was molded by the Orthodox Church—it was shaped in a purely religious mold” (1960: 8). This is hardly surprising. Russia for several centuries was the only independent Orthodox polity on earth. It had a mission, a messianic vocation, to lead the Orthodox people and to protect the faith. One could not be Russian and non-Orthodox, any more than one could be Soviet and anti-Communist. Moscow the Third Rome was replaced by Moscow the Capital of the World Proletariat. Forms changed; messianism remained.

But, as mentioned above, religion molded the earliest French identity, and messianism was no less pronounced in the Lockean English nationalism. Perhaps we should seek the explanation in the Russian emphasis on commonality—i.e., communal spirit (*sobornost'*) or, in Leo Tolstoy's word, *roievost'* (beehiveness). In practice these concepts implied that the individual's will had to be absorbed or lost in that of the community, the village *mir*, which was later enlarged and redefined as a religious community of the organic state. That is, incidentally, a major factor in making the Russian people receptive to totalitarian ideologies of all stripes. From the village commune and on to the Communist collective, a Russian and a Soviet person was supposed to be a member of the community. Such community could be easily redefined in *völkisch* terms, as the national community, the collective of collectives. Endowed with a sense of mission, such a community could easily develop an intolerant and highly ideological Herderian nationalism.

It is no accident that the controversy about the Russian mission molded the emerging Russian nationalism. The question of national mission was raised by Schelling and Hegel, who asked what each major country had contributed to the advance of civilization. Compared to the West, at least until the early nineteenth century, Russia had contributed very little; hence the feelings of cultural inferiority which marked Russian (indeed all) Herderian nationalisms. The controversy which ensued split the Russian intelligentsia into two camps—the Slavophiles, some of whom later drifted into ethnic exclusivity and rabid nationalism (often with a pan-Slavic bend), and the Westernizers, who looked toward Europe.

The West, according to Slavophiles, was poisoned with rationalism. Russia drew its strength from *sobornost'*. In the West the foundations of organized life were individualistic and legalistic. Russians, thanks to Orthodoxy, managed to retain "integral" personalities. A Westerner is "alienated." In Russia every individual is submerged in the community (Pipes 1974: 267). Slavophiles were "organicists"—i.e., they admired organic development, which, ironically, made them profess great admiration for what they believed was the English organic development, as opposed to the "artificial" French and German varieties.

Narodnost', national outlook, was introduced as early as 1832, virtually simultaneously with the appearance of Slavophilism, by

the minister of education, Count Uvarov, who enunciated the “truly” Russian . . . principles of Autocracy, Orthodoxy and “Narodnost’” (Seton-Watson in *Conquest*, ed. 1986: 20). But both Nicolas I and Alexander II resisted narodnost’ because of its populist implications. Only under Alexander III, under the onslaught of recently imported socialism, did nationalism finally get the stamp of official approval. However, Russian nationalism of the time was intermingled with imperialism, and here Russian was on a par with other imperial nationalisms—English, French, even American. The trend continued in the Soviet Union. And although individual non-Russians did achieve the highest levels of power—Stalin, for example—the party apparatus and the army remained predominantly an ethnic Russian preserve, with a minor addition of other Eastern Slavs.

Nothing betrays the Herderian character of Russian nationalism better than the campaign against *bezrodnyie kosmopolity*, “foot-loose cosmopolitans,” in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It was directed mostly against Jews, who—in the eyes of the nationalists—stood for everything negative, unnatural, un-Russian: rootless, international in outlook, pro-Western. At the same time, in a bizarre twist of Orwellian doublespeak, the concept of “internationalism” came to imply, in certain contexts, the willingness of non-Russians to live with the Russian Big Brother (in “fraternal agreement”), eventually leading to voluntary Russification.

As one surveys the last three centuries of Russian and Soviet history, one is struck by the multiplicity of Russian nationalisms: the Slavophile nationalism based on Orthodoxy, the “racial” chauvinism of the Black Hundreds, the official Soviet and unofficial Russian Soviet nationalisms. But they all extolled the organic commonality, the link with the sacred Russian soil, and the power and expanse of the enigmatic Russian soul, which puny, rational, individualistic Westerners cannot hope to fathom. And virtually all varieties of Russian nationalism were—and still are—heavily anti-Semitic. From the Black Hundreds of the 1880s to Pamiat’ of our time, the Jew has always been the symbol of everything un-Russian: urban, mobile, skeptical, international in outlook, and ultimately dangerous.

To summarize: Russian nationalism is an extremely complex phenomenon. Although Herderian, it displays discernible Lockean tendencies due mainly to the precedence of Russian statehood. Its Lockean side has been obscured because of the large-scale (mis)ap-

appropriation of German nationalist vocabulary in the first half of the nineteenth century, the Herderian excesses of the Slavophile wing, and the reluctance of successive tsarist governments to utilize nationalist concepts because of their populist (and implicitly democratic) overtones. (When the government finally did, in an attempt to stop the spread of socialism, it was too late.) Still, despite the presence of strong Lockean traits, virtually all types of Russian and Soviet nationalism are thoroughly Herderian, much as English nationalism and identity remain Lockean despite numerous Herderian features.

So far we have been able to find both statist and nonstatist Herderian nationalisms in Eastern Europe. We must now try to do the same in Western Europe. Of the nonstatist variety there are several: Flemish, Ulster-Protestant, Breton. We will take Basque, in close proximity to nonstatist Lockean Catalan nationalism, and two rigid statist Lockean ones, French and Spanish, to illustrate our point.

BASQUE NATIONALISM

Like their East European counterparts, Basques base their identity on language and culture (Payne 1975: 9). To be Basque, one has to have been born in the Basque country, speak Euskera, have at least four Basque surnames to indicate four Basque grandparents—i.e., purity of descent—and come from the countryside, which is supposed to be “purely” Basque (M. Heilberg in Grillo 1980: 46).

Basque history starts with resistance to Muslim invaders. Along with Asturia, the Basque country was the only part of Iberia which had successfully resisted the conquest. Although the Basques had never formed a unified polity, Basque identity was forged in constant warfare against the other religion, Islam.

The incorporation of various Basque principalities into the Spanish state was a gradual process and did not generate a “nationalistic” Basque-against-Castilian type of reaction. Until the eighteenth century Basque society remained the most traditionalist on the peninsula, in contrast to Catalonia, which had been the most advanced region since as early as the thirteenth century. Economic development, which started in the late eighteenth century, trans-

formed the Basque country into another most advanced area of the kingdom. Yet socially it remained the most Catholic and conservative.

The concept of collective nobility is essential for understanding Basque identity, for it was at the core of the Basque sense of ethnic uniqueness. Similar to Poland and Hungary, Basque nationhood was initially limited to the *hidalgua*, the gentry, defined, as in the rest of Spain, by the *limpieza de sangre*, purity of blood. In the Basque country, however (and in this it is unique among European nations), nobility was, from 1053 on, gradually extended to lower social strata. Ostensibly the demos deserved ennoblement by virtue of its “pure” blood since the country had never been subjugated by the Moors or “contaminated” by Jews. Thus “a butcher, a shoemaker, a charcoal burner, a scribe or a soldier—rich or poor—was noble” (D. Greenwood in Esman, ed. 1977: 87) simply by virtue of being Basque. This in turn led to the development of a nationalism similar in character and style to Polish or Hungarian.

With the massive industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century and the subsequent influx of Castilian immigrants looking for work (only 62 percent of the heads of households were born in the Basque country in 1966 [Payne 1975: 236]), the towns were rapidly Castilianized, while Euskera receded into the countryside (hence the importance of rural origins for “pure” Basques). As a consequence, Euskera lost status, unlike Catalan, which remained urban and thus retained high social status even during the most repressive years of Franco’s rule.

Low status and feelings of injustice and inferiority which it engendered were further exacerbated by Francoist repression, which created a sense of being persecuted (53.5 percent among Basques, compared with only 16.3 percent among Catalans, according to R. Clark in Foster, ed. 1980: 78). The new nationalism, which began to emerge during Franco’s last years in power, was more violent, radical, and doctrinaire—in short, Herderian—than almost any encountered west of the Rhine.

To complete our list of nationalisms we have only one more to find: a statist Herderian nationalism in the West. This will be a difficult undertaking. However, we believe that the integral nationalism of Charles Maurras fits the mold of an indigenous statist Herderian variety in the West. Although Maurras himself never at-

tained power, his followers, disciples, and sympathizers in the government of Pétain did. Thus to a great extent his notions determined the development and application of *pétainisme* in practice. (It is unimportant for the purposes of this paper that Pétain came to power as a result of the French defeat; what matters is that integral nationalism was indigenous and Herderian and many of its premises were endorsed by the state.)

THE INTEGRAL NATIONALISM

The list of important components in Maurras's ideological makeup is rich and varied. It includes (1) Christian conservatism of Joseph de Maistre and de Bonald ("Man is too wicked to be free") (Nolte 1966: 34); (2) critical liberalism of Auguste Comte, Le Play, Ernest Renan, Hippolyte Taine, and Fustel de Coulanges (Nolte 1966: 37); (3) belief in the desirability of law and order (from Fichte to Hegel to Comte to Marx, philosophers regarded the Present as (lamentable) strife, the (ideal) Future as stability, if not stasis (Nolte 1966: 39); (4) social paternalism of Le Play; (5) broad anti-Judaism (Renan: "To achieve perfection, Christianity must move away from prophetic Judaism") (Nolte 1966: 43); (6) hatred of the Revolution and the Jacobins going back to Taine (Nolte 1966: 45–46) and concomitantly a belief in the virtues of the ancient regime ("Prussia was victorious because it retained the ancient regime"; also implied was the equation of virility=blood=aristocracy); (7) radical conservatism of (a) de la Tour du Pin, who advocated a return to the corporatism of the Middle Ages, (b) Drumont, with his virulent anti-Semitism, and (c) Barrès, with his views on race as a historical and vigorous group-unit (Nolte 1966: 53).

As one looks at the list of Maurras's ideological antecedents, at least three things leap to one's attention: (i) the great diversity of his antecedents, which makes integral nationalism an heir to virtually the entire European civilization; (ii) the ideological proximity to totalitarianism and fascism of all strands; and (iii) the natural predisposition of any Herderian nationalism to a totalitarian ideological mode. The desirability of order and stability, which is closely linked to the chiliastic elements in fascism and communism; conservative social paternalism; anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism; corpora-

tism/collectivism; race/ethny as a historical group-unit; the equation of virility and blood with positive attributes, be it the aristocracy or a healthy worker/peasant—all of these traits testify to the Herderian character of French integral nationalism and also to its close ideological proximity with fascism and communism.

Some additional characteristics should not be overlooked. First, a combination of nationalistic and socialist/corporativist/collectivist motifs (Nolte 1966: 460). Second, fear and defensiveness—the feeling of being besieged. It was prevalent in small ethnies everywhere in Eastern Europe; it was displayed in Nazism (fear and loathing of Jews and Bolsheviks), in communism (fear of world reaction and imperialists ready to gang up on the young socialist motherland), and in integral nationalism. To Maurras *déesse France*, the chosen kingdom (clear messianism, but also a throwback to the medieval French identity; hence the stress on heritage, the sacred soil, etc.), was hemmed in by the more numerous and stronger Anglo-Saxons and Germans (Nolte 1966: 103), forcing France into an unequal alliance with the Anglo-Saxons. Unable to find solace in the present, Maurras, like most Herderian nationalists, had to look to past glories—in his case the achievements of Louis XIV.

The list of France's enemies, according to Maurras (Nolte 1966: 121–22), reads much like that of Pamiat': Jews, Freemasons, aliens of all kinds (*métèques*), Protestants (Billy Graham and Pat Robertson have been banned very recently from proselytizing in Russia under pressure from nationalists and the Orthodox Church), Germans, and Englishmen (in contemporary Russia, Americans). To Maurras, democracy and parliamentarism of any kind were anathema (“parliamentarian tea-pot” in contemporary Russian phraseology); they were a mortal threat to the nation's sovereignty and integrity. Conversely, the *Führerprinzip* was very important; it was fulfilled by the king in Maurras's scheme of things, by the monarch among “legitimist” Russian nationalists, by any strong man among most others. In short, there are striking parallels between the integral nationalism of Maurras and other Herderian nationalisms, especially Russian, as well as between both and totalitarianism.

Can nationalisms of one type be transformed into the other? What, if any, is the pattern of change?

THE PERIODIZATION OF NATIONALISMS

The periodization of nationalisms is a controversial issue. For one thing, the term “nationalism” often refers to three distinct concepts: *ethnocentrism*, *national/ethnic identity*, and *nationalism per se*—i.e., an ideological movement. While in practice it is sometimes difficult to keep all three separate, heuristically the distinction is truly indispensable. Let us now clarify the issue:

Ethnocentrism is the attachment to one’s ethnic group.

Ethnic identity is the sum total of one’s ethnic traits and markers such as language, custom, religion, etc.

National identity is the sum total of one’s national characteristics as defined by the nation-state.

Nationalism is (a) the attachment to one’s nation-state, and (b) the (modern) doctrine of nationalism, which is an ideology rather than mere attachment.

Unfortunately few scholars consistently make these distinctions (with a few exceptions like Anthony D. Smith). The distinction is very important because ethnocentrism and ethnic identity have been known since earliest antiquity, from as far back as the Sumerian city-states, while nationalism as a doctrine did not emerge until the end of the eighteenth century.

The appearance of nationalism is inextricably linked with the development of the nation-state and national identity. The problem is that there is no agreement as to the time of its germination. While traditionally the origin of nationalism has been placed in seventeenth-century England, the first nation-state (Kohn 1965: 16), some of the more recent publications have moved the beginnings of English nationalism further back into the middle of the sixteenth century (Greenfeld 1992: 30).

Whenever we agree to place the antecedents of English nationalism, it was the French and the American revolutions which transformed nationalism into a global phenomenon. So we can designate the whole period of 1530–1790 as the time of its emergence. From there we can follow Louis Snyder’s historical division into four periods (1954: 114–15):

1. Integrative nationalism (1815–71), which encompasses the unification of Italy (1860) and Germany (1870) and the abortive liberation and unification of Poland;
2. Disruptive nationalism (1871–1890), which refers to the awakening of small nationalities in multiethnic empires (Austria-Hungary, Russia, Turkey);
3. Aggressive nationalism (1900–45), which corresponds to integral/fascist nationalisms in other classifications; and
4. Contemporary nationalism (1945–54), which can be easily extended to 1975 (the collapse of the last—Portuguese—colonial empire) and can be designated as anti-colonial.

This classification, however, is highly problematic. First, disruptive nationalist revolts started much earlier—the one in Serbia as early as 1804—and they have continued into our own time, contributing to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Second, the roots of integral nationalisms go back to at least Arthur de Gobineau’s publication of *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines* in 1853 (and on to Le Pen in our time). Finally, the classification does not (and cannot, due to the early date of publication) account for the revival of ethnic nationalisms in the Western world after 1969 and, we may add, in Eastern Europe, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This and other classifications (e.g., those of Carleton Hayes, Max Handman, etc.) have limited significance in terms of the division of nationalisms into Lockean and Herderian types. Therefore, we would suggest a different approach.

Just as Grillo subdivides ethnic processes into the ethnicization of state and the politicization of ethny, we would argue that nationalisms can be subdivided into (a) disruptive—i.e., those aiming at the destruction of multiethnic states, (b) creative, whose goal is self-determination for a single ethny and the establishment of an independent state, and (c) defensive, which attempt to preserve the larger (multiethnic) entity. Occasionally one nationalism can combine all three features: Czech nationalism in 1848–1913 was simultaneously disruptive (against the Austrian Empire), creative (striving to create a sovereign Czech entity, albeit within federalized Austria), and defensive (against the separation of German majority areas from the rest of Bohemia).

It is worth noting that ethnocentrism and ethnic identity are inherently Herderian while nationalism and national identity are Lockean. Historically, Lockean nationalisms were first to appear. For the sake of accuracy, let us call them statist nationalisms. They appeared as a result of the transformation of the dynastic absolutist states of Renaissance Europe into nation-states. These states were more advanced than their feudal counterparts and were more successful on the international arena because they could mobilize their resources more efficiently. Before long the nation-state became the ideal and the standard of measurement, and ethnic groups which did not possess such a state found themselves at a disadvantage.

This was particularly the case in Germany, whose elites were conscious of their cultural unity and had the nominal political framework in the Holy Roman Empire. Hence the nation was redefined in ethnic terms advantageous to the contemporary German situation. Actually, the notion of the ethnic nation had existed much earlier: the Great Constantinople Assembly of 1417 defined the nation as “a community of people of common origin who have dissociated themselves from another race of people (*gens*), or a community differentiated from another group of people by language, which shall be regarded as the most important criterion of a nation” (Finke in Islamov 1992: 160).

Once the nation was redefined in Herderian terms, the concept was used as a force to destroy existing multiethnic empires and simultaneously to build new monoethnic entities. The process has continued into our time. In fact the revival of ethnic nationalisms in Western Europe and Canada after World War II is the result of a continued Herderianization of ethnic groups, even in the West. Even long-established statist nations like France have been flirting with Herderianism lately. In fact nowhere does the whole process appear with more precision and clarity than in France. Its old ethnic identity as the Kingdom of the Franks was gradually “detrribalized” until in 1254 the king changed his title from *rex Francorum* to *rex Franciae*. This was done within the context of a continuous struggle with the English monarchy for the Kingdom of France. By adopting this title, the French dynasty staked its claim to the whole territory of France—hence the switch to *jus soli*. The kingdom developed into a highly centralized absolutist state, which was firmly Lockeanized by the French Revolution. France has remained Lockean ever since, but the nationalisms

of indigenous ethnic minorities such as the Bretons or the Corsicans cannot be anything but Herderian. Buffeted by a massive Muslim immigration and reascent, reawakened nationalisms, feeling threatened by globalization and Americanization, France is showing an increasing tendency toward Herderianism. And smaller ethnies which have just won (e.g., the Latvians or the Slovenes) or are still struggling for their independence (e.g., the Basques and the Macedonians) cannot be anything but Herderian. They may, however, turn Lockean once they achieve an independent *monoethnic* state.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

We have shown that the traditional division of nationalisms into Western and Eastern varieties, although conceptually convenient, is inadequate. Geographically both types of nationalism can be found in Western *and* Eastern Europe. When one takes a closer look at the old dichotomy, one finds that the lines are blurred. Religious messianism, supposedly Herderian, typifies such dissimilar kinds of nationalism as English and Russian; coercion often accompanied the imposition of the dominant state language and culture in liberal democratic France; and a certain tendency toward inclusivity and integration characterized the Herderian-exclusive Russian nationalism at the imperial level. Ultimately we were compelled to discard the traditional dichotomy and concentrate instead on the role of the state and the mode of incorporation.

The state has been instrumental in creating and promoting the inclusive (they can also be called “integrative”) Lockean nationalisms such as English, French, or Hungarian, which strive toward the ethnicization of the polity. But it is not indispensable, either in Eastern or in Western Europe, as Belorussia and Catalonia attest. In Belorussia, a strong territorial component linked to the Duchy of Lithuania and an equation of religious with ethnic identity provided the basis for inclusivity based on *jus soli* and religious denomination. In Catalonia, the ancient statehood, reduced to the level of a strong regional identity, proved sufficient. Breton acceptance of autochthonous Francophones provides another example.

In general, the absence of the statist framework (e.g., in the Basque or Slovak case) or the presence of multiple states within the ethnocultural continuum (e.g., the German-speaking area) points toward a Herderian development. However, the Russian case—a strong state, Herderian nationalism—proves that this too may not be the primary determinant of nationalism's character. It is the mode of incorporation—individual in the Lockean, collective in the Herderian—which seals the fate or, rather, determines the direction a nationalist development may take. If a state already exists and has large ethnic minorities within its borders, it will be constrained by the force of circumstances to choose individual incorporation conducive to individual advancement and assimilation. This will send it along the Lockean path.⁶ If the protective carapace of the state does not exist and a (small) ethny lacks the means of enforcing its language and culture even within its ethnic territory, it will have to fall back on descent as the basis for incorporation and will be more likely to develop along Herderian lines. The integral nationalism in France shows that the Herderian variety is possible in an established state but only in conjunction with a totalitarian ideology. In other words, its time of appearance is strictly circumscribed by the epoch of totalitarianism, roughly between 1870 and 1970. Thus the mode of incorporation plays a decisive role in determining the type of nationalism, while the presence or absence of the state is an important secondary determinant.

With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the ethnic revival in Western Europe, which began after World War I and gained momentum in the aftermath of World War II, developed along Herderian lines. It could not be otherwise since indigenous ethnic minorities in Western Europe, like their counterparts in the East, lack the state apparatus to promote assimilation of nonindigenous elements. They are therefore constrained to base their ethnicity on descent, language, and culture. Once these ethnic minorities achieve statehood, however, they will in turn face the problem of “digesting” their numerous (and dangerous) minorities, much like Slovakia and various successor states of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union do now. Or if they are ethnically homogeneous, there is a good chance of their opting for the Lockean model, as did Poland after World War II. This can be achieved with relative ease in many areas of Western Europe such as Wales and Brittany, where autochthonous

Anglo- and Francophones are accepted as part of the ethnic community as long as they were born and raised there. On the other hand, in Corsica, where a significant proportion of Francophones are immigrants (mostly from Algeria and other former French possessions in North Africa), acceptance is extended only to “indigenous” Francophones (i.e., those who are locally born); this points in the Herderian direction.

In Eastern Europe change of direction, from Herderian to Lockean, will require a major switch in the mode of incorporation. If the newly independent states can do that (if, for example, Latvia and Estonia fully accept their huge Russian minorities), they will be able to Lockeanize; if not, they will be stuck in the Herderian cul-de-sac.

The newly independent states, with their instability, “dangerous” minorities, and a legacy of Herderianism, are naturally predisposed to the Herderian mode. What is more surprising is the rapid Herderianization of the Lockean citadels like France and Britain, where this process is encouraged by the massive influx of immigrants and refugees. For some time now citizens of British dominions have been allowed to immigrate only if they can prove British ancestry (parents or grandparents). Technically it may still be based on *jus soli*—e.g., someone with a Turkish grandparent who had a British passport would be eligible for British citizenship. But in effect it differs little from the German nationalization law.

France has also tightened its policies of admission and incorporation. Recently suggestions have been made, even by moderate politicians like Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, to introduce *jus sanguinis* as the sole prerequisite for acquiring French citizenship (Hoffman 1993: 66). If such proposals are accepted, France, which had developed as a Lockean entity since 1254, will switch to the Herderian mode. Whether this actually happens or not, the tendency toward Herderianization in Western Europe is unmistakable—and inherently dangerous.

There can be no doubt that a Lockean-inclusive model of nationalism—i.e., essentially a liberal nationalism—is preferable to its Herderian-exclusive counterpart. The ultimate question, however, remains by necessity an empirical one. Which form of nationalism proves to be more humane, tolerant, and decent to its citizens and *vis-à-vis* its international environment can only be ascertained by the painstaking method of case-by-case analysis. This, to be sure, is

anathema to the rigors of parsimony so essential to the explanatory power of the social sciences, as well as to the classificatory scheme forming the core of this paper. But it might in fact be the only certain method to study the multifaceted and motley collective phenomenon called nationalism.

NOTES

1.

“Every man being, as has been showed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent. . . . Nobody doubts that an express consent of any man, entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government” (Locke 1690/1924:177; Second “Treatise of Government,” #119).

2.

“For every nation is one people, having its own national form, as well as its own language” (Herder and Gottfried 1968: 7).

3.

“For what counts here is not the presence or absence of any single factor, but merely the presence of sufficient communication facilities with enough complementarity to produce the overall result. The Swiss may speak four different languages and still act as one people, for each of them has enough learned habits, preferences, symbols, memories, patterns of landholding and social stratification, events in history, and personal associations, all of which together permit him to communicate more effectively with other Swiss than with the speakers of his own language who belong to other peoples” (Deutsch 1953: 97). We would like to acknowledge Paul Lubeck’s helpful insight as the source for our establishing the categories “Lockean” and “Herderian.”

4.

Here, he is on shaky ground since nationalism in Poland and Corsica predates capitalism. And Liah Greenfeld has convincingly

placed the origins of English nationalism in the middle of the sixteenth century.

5.

“Soulless cosmopolitanism” had a curious history. It was revived in the 1920s as an accusation against unpatriotic Germans, was then taken up by the Nazis, to be finally borrowed by Stalin, who transformed it into “rootless” or “footloose cosmopolitanism” and used it in his anti-Semitic campaigns of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

6.

In India incorporation can be achieved collectively, through the incorporation of an entire tribe as a separate caste. Since this paper concentrates exclusively on Europe, we will leave India out of the present discussion. However, possible implications of collective incorporation are far-reaching.

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EXPLAINING CULTURAL CONFLICT IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS, ECONOMIC CRISIS, AND IDENTITY POLITICS

Beverly Crawford

What are the root causes of the war in the former Yugoslavia? Why did the six republics fail to peacefully separate from one another? Why was Yugoslavia unable to go the way of Czechoslovakia, with its “velvet divorce,” or the Soviet Union, with its relatively peaceful demise? Why was Yugoslavia unable to persist as a state, and why was its dissolution so violent? Why did virulent “ethnic conflict” emerge in the wake of a collapsed federal state?

A virtual cottage industry of analysis has sprung up to meet the demand for answers to these questions. Most accounts focus on explanations for the violent dissolution of the state. But few recent works have specifically addressed the last question: why “ethnic” conflict defined the adversaries and the character of the war in Croatia and Bosnia, as opposed to the regional or ideological divisions that could have potentially been exploited, and why “ethnic” conflict did not break out in other parts of Yugoslavia as the federal state dissolved.

In retrospect it is clear that the Yugoslav federal state was long headed for dissolution. A quick survey of book titles from the 1980s tells that story: *Political Cohesion in a Fragile Mosaic* (1983), *Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism* (1988), *The Improbable Survivor* (1988), *Yugoslavia in Crisis* (1989), *Descent into Chaos: Yugoslavia's Worsening Crisis* (1989). Throughout the decade, analysts grew increasingly pessimistic about the future of a united Yugoslavia. But the most shocking and puzzling question was how neighbors who had lived together peacefully for years in Croatia and Bosnia could turn on each other so viciously as Yugoslavia disintegrated. Analysts rushed to explain the ferocity of the violence by calling on “ancient hatreds” and long-

festering historical grievances. Some blamed Serbian aggression, others blamed Croatian and Muslim nationalism, and still others pointed fingers at international forces.

In this contribution I offer an alternative explanation. I argue that the roots of “ethnic conflict” in the former Yugoslavia can be found in the institutional structure of the Yugoslav political and economic systems constructed after World War II.¹ While the post-war institutional structure offered numerous incentives for identity with an integrated Yugoslav state, as well as incentives for regional (as opposed to ethnic) political loyalty, it also encouraged interethnic rivalry through its institutions of allocation, representation, and participation. As the federal state weakened, that institutional structure offered increasing incentives to political entrepreneurs to “play the ethnic card” in a bid for political power. Regional politicians used their access to resources to build a power base among local, culturally distinct populations.

As long as the federal state remained strong, ideological and regional loyalties competed with ethnic loyalties as a source of political identity. Federal institutions could adjudicate disputes among regional elites and provide for peaceful conflict resolution and repression of exclusive ethnic nationalist politics. But ironically, in order to maintain authority by deflecting criticism for economic hardship and political discrimination, the federal government decentralized its control over both the economy and the political system. Each move toward decentralization was a move toward fragmentation and the consequent erosion of federal authority. With deepening fragmentation, local elites had more resources to distribute in exchange for support and saw fewer reasons to maintain loyalty to the central Yugoslav government.

After 1989 these local elites could have mobilized around ideological appeals—like they did in the Czech Republic. Or they could have called for regional rather than ethnic autonomy, like winning politicians did in Macedonia, or like elites in Tatarstan, Ajaria, and Dagestan in the wake of the Soviet collapse.² Why did elites in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia shun ideological and regional appeals and decide to engage in vivid displays of cultural symbolism that aroused ethnic emotions and provoked images of ethnic discrimination and privilege? I shall argue that their decision was largely shaped by institutional incentives created by federal Yugoslavia

throughout the postwar period. As they became more deeply rooted, these institutional incentives discouraged coalitions that would assure moderation on divisive issues.

These incentives were reinforced by new institutional rules of participation and representation designed to accommodate multi-party elections in 1990. The rules discouraged issue-based or ideological coalitions across republican boundaries and encouraged the exclusive politics of cultural identity. Initial successful displays of ethnic symbolism—often artificially contrived—drew attention to those ethnic divisions perpetuated by past institutional incentives. In particular, acts of civil disobedience and even violence vividly recalled past grievances and created new ones. Acts of civil disobedience and violence both increased public support for politicians who played the ethnic card and encouraged more violence.

The political entrepreneurs who campaigned on ethnic nationalist platforms and won elections were tempted to oppress the minority losers to maintain their reputations, credibility, and political power. Minorities then organized around their own ethnic and religious identity to oppose the winners, and as a result, the odds of violence increased. In this way, ethnic entrepreneurs were able to eclipse other political entrepreneurs who offered alternative futures for Yugoslavia, and the “bandwagoning” and “balancing effects” of identity politics were created, particularly among Serbs and Croats, the two largest ethnic groups in Yugoslavia.

The remainder of this contribution presents the evidence to support this argument. It begins with a discussion and critique of alternative explanations for the cultural conflict in Yugoslavia. This section is followed by a discussion of the theoretical considerations that support the institutional account presented here. Section three presents a more detailed description of the institutions of federal Yugoslavia that both discouraged and encouraged the practice of identity politics. This section argues that ethnic conflict was not determined by “ancient hatreds,” but was shaped by institutional incentives. The fourth section explains why those institutions that promoted identity politics and ethnic conflict trumped the others as the central state disintegrated and the economy fragmented throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The fifth section describes how alternative cleavages collapsed into reinforcing ethnic divisions. The sixth section explains why political entrepreneurs in Serbia, Croatia,

and Bosnia decided to play the ethnic card and why ethnic politics escalated to violence. It also explains why elites in Macedonia made the decision to minimize identity politics in favor of regional autonomy, thus avoiding violent cultural conflict in the short run. The final section argues that Western states should pursue a policy of "getting the institutions right" in post-Yugoslav states in order to prevent future cultural conflicts there.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

The institutional argument presented here runs counter to those made in the recent flood of literature on the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. That literature can be divided into three rival intellectual camps. The first has been labeled the *essentialist* or *primordial* perspective. Primordial explanations stress the role of the "Balkan temperament" and "ancient hatreds" unleashed by the collapse of communism.³

Essentialist arguments are difficult to discredit because they are nonfalsifiable.⁴ They link conflict with irrational and "natural" psychological and social tendencies to "belong" to a group and to reject the "other." Although they do not explain why the central focus of belonging needs to be an ethnic or religious group, essentialists argue that this tendency emerges when it is no longer repressed. The introduction to this volume offers a critique of the broader literature upon which such essentialist or primordial arguments are based. Here I would simply suggest that there is ample evidence in the Yugoslav case to cast doubt on these claims.

Indeed the early fateful decision to decentralize political and economic power that led to federal weakness was a response to ethnic tensions. Nonetheless, it is clear that those tensions were often muted and could have been further reduced. Throughout Yugoslav history, intraethnic cultural differences shaped by regional dissimilarities were often greater than cultural differences between ethnic groups.⁵ Marriages between people of different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia were on the rise during the decade before the war.⁶ After Tito's death in 1980, the percentage of the population that identified itself as "Yugoslav" as opposed to an ethnically defined nationality

(e.g. Serb, Croat, Muslim) also grew significantly.⁷ There is abundant anecdotal evidence to suggest that many ordinary people did not know or care about the ethnic identity of their neighbors before hostilities began. As late as 1989, the majority of Serbs favored a liberal future for Yugoslavia, the preservation of the federal state, and Yugoslavia's integration into "Europe."⁸ Ante Marković, the last Yugoslav prime minister and free-market reformer and a Croat, was the most popular politician in all six republics. And during the course of the war, Serbs living in Serbia exhibited decreasing ethnic solidarity with Serbs in Krajina and Bosnia. The postwar Serb-dominated parliament of Yugoslavia even passed a law that disqualified Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia from becoming citizens of Yugoslavia.⁹ Finally, in 1996, after years of bloodshed in Bosnia, local Serb residents in former Muslim-dominated areas agreed to peaceful meetings with Muslims on the return of refugees to their homes until regional officials protested, organizing violent attacks on returning refugees.¹⁰ Certainly ethnic identity was highly politicized in Yugoslavia, but the evidence suggests that these politicized identities were not fixed, and were indeed quite malleable.¹¹

At the other extreme are explanations for Yugoslavia's violent dissolution that view *international* forces as central causes. There is a large body of both historical and current literature that blames Balkan war and its particular "ethnic" content on great power attempts to carve up Balkan states for their own advantage.¹² Indeed the post-World War I order in the Balkans exacerbated and created ethnic tensions with arbitrary borders separating many people from their homelands and from their "ethnic brethren." But forty years of peace in the region and the peaceful transition of other Balkan states from communism suggest that domestic institutions can rectify international failures and mitigate cultural conflict.

Some recent international approaches suggest that in a post-cold-war world, where the stability of superpower rivalry has disappeared, power positions are more fluid, and uncertainty is high about the source of the next international conflict. In a multipolar world, states may feel unprotected from one another, both because power is more symmetrical and because they are unsure about their neighbor's power capabilities. They therefore are likely to rush to protect themselves from real or imagined threats.¹³ Journalistic accounts of the dissolution of Yugoslavia grounded in these assump-

tions have focused responsibility for the war on Germany's diplomatic recognition of Croatia. They explain Germany's unilateral recognition by pointing to these forces. One such account, for example, suggests that a more powerful Germany in a multipolar world without the military protection of the United States perceived the need to drive south toward the warm waters of the Adriatic Sea to protect its own security. A smaller Yugoslavia with Croatia and Slovenia as allies could realize this geopolitical aim.¹⁴ The more sinister version of this claim was that given its new international power position, Germany was attempting to recreate its World War II alliance with an independent Croatia and impose a divide-and-conquer strategy in the Balkans to protect its interests and enhance its relative power in the region.¹⁵

These accounts of the recent conflict are both easily discredited and do not get to the heart of the central concern here: the causes of *cultural* conflict. Although Germany's recognition of Croatia and its utter disregard for the new government's violation of human rights against Serbs living there clearly hastened the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the war had begun six months earlier. Indeed, the specter of 1914—when great power rivalry in the Balkans ignited war in Europe—haunted the great powers in the 1990s and led them to cooperate in an attempt to end the war in order to avoid conflict among themselves. In this war, unlike the Balkan conflicts that ignited World War I, the great powers worked together to end it.¹⁶

A more nuanced international-level explanation for the dissolution of Yugoslavia is offered by Susan Woodward in *Balkan Tragedy*. Woodward argues that the institutional structures of the Yugoslav state provided a basis for prewar political stability in Yugoslavia. But Yugoslavia's pattern of global integration and domestic economic reform shaped by international financial institutions in the 1980s undermined those institutions. Liberalization and global integration required the weakening of those very state structures that had provided political stability.

Woodward's argument is compelling but incomplete and is disputed at times by her own evidence. While its analytic focus on international causes of the dissolution of the federal state provides an important perspective overlooked in both public and scholarly debates, it obscures both domestic institutional incentives for cultural conflict and the role of agency in igniting violence. Indeed

Yugoslavia's unique geostrategic position in the cold war led to early integration in the international economy, and Yugoslavia's integration into the international financial system was deeper than that of most socialist countries. The impact on domestic politics and institutional structures was a crucial cause of the later Yugoslav collapse. Nonetheless, Woodward contradicts her argument by showing that IMF policies in the 1980s were designed to *strengthen* federal institutions and that those policies were overwhelmingly rejected by domestic political forces.

Furthermore, a comparative perspective suggests that key causal elements are missing from Woodward's account. Two examples illustrate. Bulgaria was mired in international debt and saddled with conditionality requirements for repayment in the 1980s, and its government collapsed after 1989. But although it had an ethnically mixed population—with similarities to that of Bosnia—it did not experience cultural violence in the aftermath of debt and disintegration. Social conflict erupted in other countries with multiethnic populations in the face of IMF austerity programs, but that conflict has not always taken the form of cultural violence. Brazil provides the prime example. While Woodward does a masterful job of explaining the causes of the collapse of the federal Yugoslav state, her overarching explanation does not account for the eruption of cultural conflict.

A third explanation for the Yugoslav conflict suggests that the causes were *instrumental*. This literature places blame for the war not on primordial urges within society or great power pretensions within a changing international structure, but rather on "political entrepreneurs" like Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tudjman, and a host of local Serb and Croat politicians and intellectuals.¹⁷ The central argument is that these political entrepreneurs exploited ethnic differences and whipped up ethnic hatred in their effort to expand their own power base in the aftermath of institutional collapse.¹⁸ Indeed Laura Silber and Allen Little make the argument that some of these leaders, like Milošević, engineered the institutional collapse of the Yugoslav federal state in order to gain political advantage in a new, ethnically defined institutional setting of their own creation. These arguments further suggest that successful ethnic entrepreneurs attempt to enlarge their territorial power base and ensure their security through acts of aggression.¹⁹

Instrumental explanations should not be rejected out of hand. Wars always require leaders, political entrepreneurs able to mobilize populations for the support of their aggressive or defensive military efforts. But instrumental accounts of the Yugoslav war beg three essential questions. First, they do not explain why political entrepreneurs made the decision to play the ethnic card and why they were *effective* in their bid to promote ethnicity as a cleavage for political advantage in Serbia and Croatia. The preservation of a multinational Yugoslavia was for the majority of Serbs a preferable alternative to ethnic disintegration. Second, instrumental accounts do not explain why other political entrepreneurs, drawing on alternative social cleavages such as class, ideology, or simply region and territory, did not gain sufficient social support to eclipse ethnic entrepreneurs in those two republics after 1989 and in Bosnia in 1992. As noted above, Ante Marković, a Croat and a liberal, was Yugoslavia's most popular politician. Why was he defeated?

This last point raises the third issue: instrumental accounts do not explain why some leaders in Yugoslavia achieved political success by promoting alternative political programs. Indeed they do not explain Tito's earlier success as a Yugoslav political entrepreneur who effectively muted cultural conflict. Accounts of early repression and terror to achieve stability miss the point. Tito was enormously popular in the larger population, even in Serbia, and most Yugoslavs endorsed his idea of the Yugoslav melting pot. Similarly, instrumental accounts do not explain why, despite intense ethnic cleavages in Macedonia, politically successful elites there made a bid for regional independence rather than ethnic autonomy in 1992 and why Albanian and Macedonian politicians there were able to form a stable coalition against the ethnic nationalists. A politician's decision to exploit ethnic divisions or refrain from exploiting them and his success or failure in that effort must also be explained.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The introduction to this volume has detailed the institutional perspective that informs the argument I make here. Philip Roeder's chapter provides a valuable link between the broad institutional ap-

proach and the rise of ethnic entrepreneurs in Soviet successor states. I show here how his argument can also be successfully illustrated in the Yugoslav case. Like the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia's political system was characterized by ethnofederalism—that is, structures of accountability and opportunities for resource control that led regional and local officials to favor specific ethnic constituencies. Roeder argues that the process of economic liberalization and/or decentralization strengthens the advantage of regional over central officials by increasing the demand for their material benefits and weakening alternative resource providers of material goods. To the extent that they can gain control over key resources, regional officials are in a position to play the ethnic card in an effort to gain or maintain political power.

Their decision to play the ethnic card is shaped by institutional structures of accountability. When regional officials are still accountable to the central federal government and depend on central support to sustain them in office, they are unlikely to make extremist ethnic appeals in a bid for local support. When, however, central authority weakens and they become accountable to a local constituency, they calculate their chances of winning support with alternative political appeals. When their constituency is multiethnic, they may enter into coalitions that mute exclusive ethnic appeals and make political demands and promises that would benefit the population of their local region as a whole. But they may fear the loss of significant support to political entrepreneurs calling for the autonomy of a particular ethnic group. As noted in the introduction, this is because the political entrepreneur is sure that he can get the support of the targeted group but is less certain of the support of the wider population. Despite the persuasiveness of this logic, this explanation is not entirely satisfying. Even with the support of an "ethnic machine," a regional leader's decision to play the ethnic card does not automatically result in an enthusiastic response from the targeted population; nor will it automatically result in successful political mobilization. But ethnic appeals in the republics of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia after 1989 resonated with the populations in these republics. Why?

Strategic interaction theories of mass political action and theories of behavioral cascades and bandwagoning described in the introduction promise a fruitful explanation. Scholarship on previous Yugoslav

crises has noted this effect.²⁰ Recall too that political institutions can either encourage bandwagoning effects or inhibit them. In the Yugoslav case, one analyst has argued, with the federal government fatally weakened and loyalty to the center diminished, there were no incentives for political entrepreneurs to lower the tone of their agitating and provocative discourse. Nor were there incentives for intellectuals to abhor the expression of provocative nationalist sentiments.²¹ Finally, bandwagoning is related to both timing and ethnic alliances as further causes of ethnic conflict. In Yugoslavia, once nationalists had gained the upper hand in Serbia, incentives for ethnic nationalism rose in Croatia, and “sister” Serb and Croat nationalist parties were formed in Bosnia. As nationalist parties were formed and won elections and as they gained strength by forming alliances across republican borders, they crowded out other alternatives and narrowed elite political choices. By the time Bosnian elections were held, non-nationalist alternative parties did not stand a chance.²²

This approach further suggests that if all-Yugoslav elections had been held *before* republican elections, incentives to appeal to a wider population would have been higher and political parties would have been more inclusive; ethnic bandwagons would have been slower to fill. In fact, nationalist politicians insisted on holding republican elections first; bandwagoning effects then precluded the possibility of elections at the national level. If the legacy of ethnofederalism is taken into account, however, by 1991 national elections—even following republican elections—would not have prevented the escalation to violence; people had no party organization to represent their interests outside of their own republic, and alliances between non-nationalist parties were precluded by spirals of mistrust brought on by early bandwagoning.

In sum, as we shall see in this case, postwar institutions of ethnofederalism cemented the logic of identity politics in the Yugoslav federal structure. That logic did not always dominate, particularly in the population at large, and it was more pervasive in some areas than in others. Nonetheless, as the federal system weakened and local officials became increasingly accountable to local ethnic constituencies rather than the central government, the logic of identity politics strengthened throughout the multiethnic Yugoslav republics. Institutional legacies favored the creation of ethnic nationalist parties and interethnic political rivalry; bandwagoning

and balancing effects spread in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. The weakness of those legacies in Macedonia accounts for the more conciliatory path taken there.

INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES AND COMPETING POLITICAL LOGICS IN FEDERAL YUGOSLAVIA

The central premise upon which this volume is based is that authoritative political institutions channel social conflict in the direction that institutional planners prefer; thus they determine the logic that will dominate political competition and provide the basis for political mobilization. Institutions do not treat all forms of conflict impartially; they constrain some forms of competition and mobilization and encourage others.²³ They provide differential access to key resources, strengthening some actors and weakening others. In doing so, they shape political preferences and identities of both elites and publics. Institutional incentives, embedded in rules of accountability, representation, participation, and resource distribution can structure political struggle in ways that either moderate or encourage ethnic and sectarian political conflict.

After World War I, political elites in both Serbia and Croatia attempted to moderate interethnic conflict by imposing a system of pluralist political competition and an integrationist logic on the new Yugoslav state. They did so by constructing a unitary rather than a federal state system of representation and participation. That unitary state, they believed, would be based on a shared southern Slav identity and a common bond forged by the humiliation suffered at the hands of both the Ottoman and Hapsburg rulers.

Indeed some observers argue that many Croatian and Slovene elites (those who came from the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia) had joined the effort to form a Yugoslav state because they saw political advantage in participating in the governance of a unitary state over receiving minority status and enduring the restrictive franchise in Austria, Hungary, or Italy. The 1921 constitution of the newly created state of Yugoslavia was a relatively liberal one, enshrining universal male suffrage and equal civil and political rights for all Yugoslav citizens.²⁴

Not all Yugoslav elites, however, were happy with this new arrangement. Many Croatian nationalists felt that they had freed themselves from Hapsburg domination only to be newly saddled with Serbian hegemony in a unitary state. They mistrusted the new constitution, arguing that it masked Serbian control over Croatia and that a national Yugoslav identity could not be created under a Serbian king, his army, administration, and Orthodox religion. Indeed, argued such Croats, this “nation” really represented the submission of a Roman Catholic people on the periphery of civilized Europe to an inferior, Oriental culture.²⁵

Threats of Croatian secession, and the fact that large sections of the Croatian population did not accept the constitutional basis of the Yugoslav state combined with the increasing centralization of power in Serbia to prevent the formation of interethnic political coalitions in representative institutions. Divisions were exacerbated when parliament—the forum where a clash of interests was aired—shut down in 1929. Debate ended, and a fraction of the Croat elite turned to violence. Nonetheless, these elite power plays did not trigger widespread interethnic conflict in the population as a whole. Indeed that conflict was nurtured by the breakdown of the state and by the war raging in the region after 1939. Croatian elites broke from Yugoslavia to ally with the Nazis and quickly carried out a German-led plan to massacre thousands of Serbs. The decision of the Bosnian Muslim elites to throw in their lot with Croatia transformed them into the enemy of the Serbs as well. With the German defeat in 1945, Croatia surrendered, and Serbia took its revenge by killing thousands of Croat and Muslim prisoners. This violence created a vast reservoir of culturally defined grievances that would shape the construction of postwar institutions.

**FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS OF POSTWAR YUGOSLAVIA:
BALANCING “NATIONAL” INTERESTS**

With memories of mutual massacres still vivid, Tito believed that national integration was not possible in a unitary Yugoslav state. He thus established a federal system of ethnic republics after the war that would provide guarantees of national equality. Like any federation, authority was distributed between the central government and the governments of the constituent units, and the distribution of

authority could not be changed without mutual consent. The Yugoslav federation held to three broad principles of federalism. First, within their respective spheres of operation, both the central government and the constituent units were independent, and neither was subordinated to the other. Second, the constituent units participated in the making of decisions at the federal level. Finally, important federal decisions required equal representation of all of the constituent units, regardless of their size and population.

Yugoslavia, however, was not a centralized federal system like that of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, or, in its most centralized form, the Soviet Union. Indeed it did not resemble most other federations, in which the central government could make many decisions without consulting the member governments of the constituent units. Instead because Yugoslavia was so divided as a result of the events of World War II, Tito created a noncentralized federalism in which the constituent units exercised a large degree of control and authority. Although the 1946 constitution placed all mineral wealth, power resources, means of communication, and foreign trade under state control, it also stipulated that the central government could make decisions in only a few narrowly restricted issue areas without obtaining the approval of the governments of the constituent units.²⁶

Further, like the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia was now governed by the institutions of ethnofederalism, which were intended to transform ethnically based political identities into cultural/administrative identities and thereby prevent the reemergence of extreme identity politics as a dominant political force.²⁷ As Vesna Pešić argues, two kinds of national groupings were organized *hierarchically* in the constitution. Five culturally defined groups—Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, Macedonians, and Montenegrins were territorially organized in constituent republics in which, as the titular nationality, they held the status of “constituent nation.” The 1971 census recognized Muslims as a separate nation, and in 1971 Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized under the national principle as a republic, consisting of three constitutive peoples: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Those not members of these six “nations”—e.g., Jews, Czechs, Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians, Romany, Vlachs, Albanians, and Hungarians—were called “national minorities” and later “nationalities.” These groups initially suffered from lower representative status than the constituent

nations.²⁸ Susan Bridge argues that the structure of formal political representation throughout the postwar period discouraged minority participation and representation through the single-member district in both party and government. But the single-member district worked to the advantage of minorities in two defined regions where the “nationality” was a majority of the population. As we shall see, after the constitutional changes of 1974, Kosovo, with a majority Albanian population, and Vojvodina, with a majority Hungarian population, gained increasing autonomy throughout the postwar period and enjoyed equal participation at the federal level with the same representative status as the constituent nations.²⁹

A dual notion of federalism was embodied in representative institutions that in some ways resembled a traditional parliamentary democracy. The Federal Assembly was composed of a Federal Council, elected by citizens voting as Yugoslavs, and a Chamber of Nationalities, in which citizens were represented as nations and nationalities. This federal structure was intended to balance the interests of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. The importance of the equality of the constituent nations in representative institutions cannot be overstated. Indeed a territorially based federation was not considered fully adequate to provide an equal representation of Yugoslavia’s constituent “peoples” since most territorial units, even those with titular nationalities, had mixed populations. Therefore, territorial ethnofederalism was reinforced by a system of ethnic quotas or “keys” as a central principle for the allocation of political resources. All appointments to public office (including the military) were decided by a formula for the proportional representation, or in some cases equal representation, of individuals by constituent nation or nationality. The effort to maintain balance in public institutions went far beyond the intent of the quota system. For example, in an attempt to maintain balance even in the prosecution of politically motivated nationalist activities, central government authorities often went out of their way to balance a particular prosecution with charges against people from other ethnic groups.³⁰

Tito established these institutions of ethnofederalism because he believed that if the resolution of disputes between national groups appeared to favor one group over the others, the federation’s internal balance would be upset and Yugoslavia would be destabilized. His goal was to preserve the central Yugoslav state. Given Serbia’s dispro-

portionately large population and history as an independent state and given Croatian elites' historic distrust of Serbs, this was not an easy task. Indeed some analysts argue that the constitution implied an unwritten agreement between Tito and Serbian political elites in which it would espouse Yugoslav unity and equality of representation in order to mitigate Croatian fears of Serb dominance in the state apparatus and thus cement Croatia's loyalty to the center. One often heard the slogan, "Weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia."³¹

Soon the institutions of ethnofederalism would come to dominate all others in decisions of allocation, participation, representation, and accountability. At the outset, however, other powerful institutions were constructed to encourage solidarity and integration into the federal Yugoslav state. The two most prominent were the Communist Party and the army, supported by both socialist ideology and a system of privileges conferred upon those who had demonstrated loyalty to the central state. Successive constitutional and economic reforms created incentives for interregional competition among political elites over the means of economic development. These reforms also created socioeconomic divisions in the larger population that transcended ethnic cleavages, and they both encouraged and codified ideological conflict between conservatives and reformers in the party.

These divisions were potentially cross-cutting. That is, different ethnic groups who were part of the same socioeconomic class had more in common with each other than with their ethnic compatriots; different ethnic groups living in the same region potentially had common regional interests that transcended ethnic divisions; both ideological consensus and division could potentially overcome regional and cultural differences. Thus, as we shall see below, a plethora of institutions within the federal system held the potential to mitigate the importance of cultural divisions that had long plagued Yugoslavia. It is to a brief description of the alternative social cleavages created by these institutions that the discussion now turns.

INCENTIVES FOR INTEGRATION AND YUGOSLAV SOLIDARITY

Integrationist logic was initially encouraged by ideology and repression. It was further encouraged by partisan privilege as an important (though certainly not exclusive) allocative principle. First,

Tito believed that the dominance of Communist ideology would reduce the salience of ethnicity as a source of political identity and replace it with a more cosmopolitan socialist one. Tito believed that the division of Yugoslavia into separate republics would be temporary and that once Marxist ideology became embedded in social practice, Yugoslavia could become an integrated, even unitary state.³²

Initially repression bolstered this belief in the power of ideology; public debate on ethnic issues was largely forbidden, and, as in other Marxist regimes, the representation of grievances on the part of particular ethnic groups had to be articulated in economic and social terms since these were the only terms viewed by the state as legitimate.³³ Policies suppressing religion and nationalist movements were designed to stifle interethnic competition and sectarian privilege in the interest of an integrated multinational state.³⁴ These repressive measures were largely abandoned in the 1960s;³⁵ nonetheless, the political expression of nationalism remained illegal and was prosecuted. Successive constitutions prohibited the propagation or practicing of national inequality and any incitement of national, racial, or religious hatred and intolerance.³⁶

Two integrationist organizations dominated Yugoslavia's political structure: the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The LCY began as a highly centralized but carefully multinational institution which was quickly transformed after the break with the Soviet Union from an elite cadre to a mass organization. As party membership grew, it provided the only forum for political debate about alternative social interests and preferences. In fact, this horizontal political cleavage dominated all others for many years.³⁷ It differed substantially from the other Communist parties of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in that central to its ideological core was the belief that its leading role in society would disappear with the development of democracy in Yugoslavia.

The JNA was organized to encourage integration and loyalty to the federal center through its rules of accountability, participation, and representation. It had a constitutional obligation to maintain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia in the face of both internal and external threats, and it was beholden to the authority of the federal presidency. All army units were composed of a mix of officers and recruits drawn from throughout Yugoslavia. Its party organization was ethnically heterogeneous, and the ethnic quota system domi-

nated the officer corps.³⁸ The army's political influence was substantial; it had a vote in the federal party presidency equal to the republics.

Finally, elite solidarity across national lines was initially encouraged by allocative policies that privileged partisans from all national groups who had fought against fascism. Pro-Partisan Serbs from predominantly pro-Chetnik areas, pro-Partisan Croats and Serbs in Croatia, Partisan Muslims, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Slovenes held top posts in the Communist Party and in government at all levels. They created local dynasties and operated politically much like a powerful lobbying group to put pressure on the central government to pursue integrationist policies and provide generous material support to their local communes and regions. These former Partisans and their families were united by ideological preferences rather than ethnic bonds; they too assumed that a Yugoslav identity would come to replace other national political identities.³⁹

There are many indicators that these institutions were partially successful in moving Yugoslavia toward integration. I listed several at the outset: a rising Yugoslav national identity, especially among young people, the strong preference among Serbs for the preservation of the federal state, and the widespread political popularity of Ante Marković, prime minister and head of the only all-Yugoslav party in 1990. Polls taken in July 1990 showed Marković to be the most popular politician in all of the republics, with a 93 percent rating in Bosnia, an 81 percent rating in Serbia, and an 83 percent rating in Croatia.⁴⁰ In Bosnia by the late 1980s, 30 percent of marriages in urban areas were mixed marriages.⁴¹ Perhaps the most significant indicator of Yugoslav integration is the outcome of the first multiparty elections: when elections were held throughout the Yugoslav republics in 1990, no ethnic nationalist party received an electoral majority in Slovenia, Croatia, or Macedonia; in Montenegro former Communists received the bulk of the vote. Most important, no party calling for an independent ethnically exclusive state received a majority vote in any of the Yugoslav republics. Indeed election results suggested a broad preference for Yugoslav integration; this preference was stronger than many analysts believed.

SOCIOECONOMIC CLEAVAGES

Incentives for integration were accompanied by both the intentional creation of channels for the political representation of various producer groups in the Federal Assembly and the unintended institutional creation of new socioeconomic cleavages in the population at large through state plans for resource allocation. In 1953 a new constitutional law attempted to strengthen the political power of producer groups composed of all nations and nationalities. Planners believed that this change would weaken representative divisions among ethnic groups. According to this law, of the two chambers in the Federal Assembly, only one-half of one would now be elected according to the nationality principle, while the other half would continue to be elected by the people at large. The second chamber would be elected by workers in "socially owned" enterprises. Professional workers, individual peasants, and private entrepreneurs were not represented. The law thus embodied the belief that political differences would be along class rather than ethnic lines.⁴²

Workers were also given a strong participatory role in the economy. Beginning in the 1960s, the concept of self-management was introduced as the operational principle of economic management and allocation. Instead of state ownership, there would be social ownership of enterprises, governed by strong workers' councils and powerful oversight committees.⁴³ Behind the self-management principle was the belief that associations of workers had the right to participate in budgetary and managerial decisions at the workplace.

The 1965 economic reform increased enterprise autonomy further by removing regulatory burdens imposed by the central state: depreciation rates were increased and capital tax on fixed assets was cut. The reform also encouraged inter-republic enterprise relationships: enterprises were permitted to lend to other firms across republican and provincial borders directly and participate in joint ventures with them. In short, the implementation of the self-management principle, bolstered by the 1965 reform, would heighten producer political participation and thus further dilute ethnic divisions. In doing so, it would structure social competition along economic rather than along ethnic lines and thus increase loyalty to the federal state. Economic interests, however, were mediated by territorially

based representative institutions; producer representatives were grouped first by commune and then by republic.⁴⁴

Although equally represented and integrated into the management and decision-making structure of the economy, not all producer groups from all regions were treated equally when it came to allocative decisions directed from the center. In their attempt to modernize Yugoslavia, economic planners in the federal government favored some producers over others by giving some groups privileged access to material goods and services and denying it to others. Hardest hit by the new policies were the rural peasants. Yugoslavia possessed fertile agricultural land populated by an entrenched peasantry. The production of primary commodities had long been the mainstay of economic activity in the region. But the central economic goal of the postwar federal government was to transform the entire country from a backward agrarian nation into a modern industrial one. The federal government therefore poured its resources into industrial investment at the expense of the agricultural sector, thus driving peasants off the land and into the factories. Peasants who remained on the land lacked pension benefits and had little access to state housing, while they faced state-mandated prices for their produce and were provided with almost no investment capital.⁴⁵

This policy created an important cleavage between the industrial workers and public-sector employees who had migrated to the cities, on the one hand, and those who remained on the land, on the other. Furthermore, the fastest growing economic group in postwar Yugoslavia was the white collar sector, reflecting rapid growth in the state bureaucracy at all levels of government. As long as the economy grew, the differences, particularly between white collar and blue collar workers, were resolved within both the system of self-management and the Federal Assembly. By the 1980s, however, when economic conditions took on crisis proportions, Susan Woodward argues, "The primary social divisions . . . in Yugoslav society were not defined by ethnicity but by job status. . . . In terms of how people saw themselves, ethnicity was less important than either occupation and the social status it conveyed or place of residence—urban or rural—and its related culture."⁴⁶ Whether Woodward is correct or not, there is ample evidence to suggest that economic cleavages in society (defined largely in terms of urban-rural splits) and socioeco-

conomic identities were as strong if not stronger than ethnic cleavages and identities.

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS

The initial ideological cleavages among political elites of the 1950s and 1960s were analyzed by Western observers as the usual division between ideological conservatives and liberal reformers. During the late 1960s reformers dominated politics at the federal center. They were confident that given the chance, the general population would endorse their liberal policies. They were particularly confident in their own electoral success over the conservatives because a middle class was growing in Yugoslavia that would be particularly receptive to their appeals. They thus resolved to further democratize the electoral process in order to reduce the presence of conservative opponents in the legislative branches of government at all levels. To the extent that reformers gained a foothold in political competition, the entrenched political establishment was pressured to widen the franchise. Much like democratizing Western Europe in the nineteenth century, groups within the establishment who expected to benefit from reform introduced more democratic procedures as a strategy to weaken powerful conservative opponents.⁴⁷ Just before the 1967 elections, a wave of constitutional amendments increased the power of elected bodies at the federal level, particularly the Federal Assembly. And at all levels of government, elections were more hotly contested than ever before. Of course political rivalry was limited to intraparty ideological competition, and no thought was given to the creation of a multiparty electoral system. Liberalizers focused their political platform on the strengthening of market forces, freedom of speech, a merit-based system of promotions, and the withdrawal of the party from the arts and culture.

According to many observers, this path ended abruptly when some of the liberalizers in Croatia attempted to increase their popular support base against their conservative opponents by allying with nationalist political elements, who had become bolder and more openly critical with every move toward political liberalization. This coalition was a clear departure from the traditional coalition between reformers and conservatives against ethnic nationalists.⁴⁸

As I discuss in more detail below, Tito crushed this alliance, and with the backing of the JNA, he purged the party of its nationalist and politically liberal elements and left centralizers firmly in power. Those centralizers, loyal to the federal state, acted quickly to suppress nationalist movements, and they were not to emerge openly again until the late 1980s.

According to Denison Rusinow and Steven Burg, with nationalist forces excluded from political participation, the early 1980s witnessed the formation of political cleavages along three separate ideological lines: the confederationists, the ideological conservatives, and the liberal reformers.⁴⁹ Confederationists, found primarily in the leaderships of Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina, wanted to expand their own political autonomy and economic power at the expense of the central government in Belgrade. The ideological conservatives, found primarily among the partisans, the JNA, and the poorer republics, argued against the establishment of a market economy and were sympathetic to a more centralized and egalitarian polity. The liberal reformers, found mostly in the Serbian party, defended the introduction of a market economy in Yugoslavia and argued for a centralized foreign currency market and the elimination of interregional economic barriers.

These ideological divisions among elites were deep, and they spread to the public at large. Indeed the evidence of strong liberal leanings in Serbia suggests that had ethnofederalism not been so entrenched and had the federal state and party organization not been so weak, Yugoslavia would have undergone a transition from communism similar to that of other Balkan and East European states. The primary elite division would have been between reformers and conservatives; international financial institutions would have bolstered the political power of the reformers, supporting the institutions of the federal center, and even conservatives in power would have been pressed to follow their mandates.⁵⁰ Because federal institutions provided incentives for regional divisions, however, those divisions became more deeply rooted than either ideological or socioeconomic cleavages. It is to the issue of regional divisions that the discussion now turns.

CENTER-REGION AND INTERREGIONAL COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES

The twin economic goals of Yugoslav development policy had always been to reduce the disparities in regional living standards while maintaining a high rate of growth. As noted above, central economic planners believed that the overriding economic goal was to transform Yugoslavia into a modern industrialized nation. Priority was given to the development of industries that would contribute to the rapid growth of the country as a whole. But the individual republics had attained different levels of development, and as a strategy to encourage national Yugoslav integration, every five-year plan mandated the "equalization of conditions" between the developed and less developed regions.⁵¹

Resource limitations, however, produced deep tensions among the republics over the pursuit of these twin goals. Slovenia and Croatia, as the rich republics, preferred that funds be allocated by efficiency criteria; because they were most efficient, they would receive the bulk of the investment funds, and they resisted the transfer of resources to the poor. The poorer republics of Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro fought for funds as development subsidies. Because all funds were administered from a central General Investment Fund and because the central government regulated industrial development, divisions among the republics over investment took the form of center-region controversies. The poorer republics were dependent on the center for development funds, and the richer republics wanted autonomy from the center to free them from subsidies and regulation.

In addition to these conflicting pressures on central funds from the developed and less developed regions, partisan elites pressed for regional credit allocations based on political criteria rewarding partisan loyalty and punishing those who had opposed the partisans in the war.⁵² Indeed behind the scenes, regional politicians used political arguments to counter efficiency and development arguments, and they used patronage networks to lobby federal officials for regional investments; those investments would create jobs and income at home which in turn would bolster the regional power base of local politicians.⁵³

These conflicting goals and criteria for the allocation of limited material resources led to mutual resentments. No matter which cri-

teria were used, the republics who did not receive investment funds felt cheated. Three examples illustrate. First, all investment funds to stimulate growth were distributed directly to specific individual enterprises throughout Yugoslavia. These funds were initially allocated through a central investment bank; after 1965 they were allocated through a network of regional banks. Individual enterprises competed for these funds on the basis of interest rates and repayment schedules through a series of auctions. Enterprises in Croatia and Slovenia were always more competitive according to the criteria. Furthermore, since priority was given to industries that would contribute to rapid national growth, five-year plans mandated that raw material inputs would be underpriced to make such industries competitive. Again, priority industries were located in the developed regions of Croatia and Slovenia; most of the raw materials came from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Macedonia. The predominance of low-priced raw materials in the less developed regions and the absence of offsetting transfers meant that the poorer regions were penalized for providing the raw materials necessary to industrialize the country. The result, as one analyst put it, was that "both per capita investments and the grants-in-aid allocated to the less developed regions were consistently less than those allocated to the developed regions." Serbian political leaders complained about the huge transfers of industry from Serbia to Croatia and Slovenia that had taken place between 1945 and 1951 in the name of efficiency. And the introduction of market socialism in 1963, shifting economic decision-making from local party and government elites to workers' councils in the enterprises, clearly appeared to work to the advantage of more productive and industrialized republics.⁵⁴

Second, as noted above, the wealthier regions complained bitterly about the huge income transfers required for the development of the poorer republics; they were particularly bitter about the forfeiture of hard currency earnings to federal treasuries. Croatian leaders complained that despite the fact that Croatia brought in half of all foreign capital as of 1969, it was allocated only about 15 percent of the total credits, an amount insufficient for its level of development. They further argued that Croatia produced most in foreign currency earnings and enterprise profits and received much less through the redistribution process. In 1971 the president of the Assembly of Croatia stated that Croatia would have to renegotiate the

size of its contribution or abandon many of its own public works programs.⁵⁵

Finally, in the eyes of the richer republican elites, political criteria seemed to work to the advantage of the poor republics. Croatian elites pointed out that Montenegro received the most investment per capita, while Croatia, the second most developed republic able to maximize output per investment, received what Croatian leaders believed to be barely its share. This perception was formed because policies providing partisan preferences seemed to make it clear that Croatia was being punished for its record in World War II, and regions with strong partisan groups were being rewarded. Critics in Croatia and Slovenia pointed out that Montenegro and Serbia received disproportionate investment credits, largely due to the strong patronage networks of partisans in these regions.

The pursuit of conflicting goals and the overlapping institutional structure by which investment funds were distributed from the center to the republics had two important cross-cutting consequences for the locus of political cleavages and loyalties. First, as we shall see below, the accumulated allocative disputes and resentments had an important impact on constitutional debates; those debates in turn exacerbated interregional conflicts as their resolution weakened the center. Heavily, directly, and transparently dependent on the central government, the poorer regions developed the most loyalty to the center and reinforced integrationist tendencies in those regions.⁵⁶ The richer republics sought increasing decentralization of the federal system and more autonomy in economic decision-making.

A second and equally important consequence was the development of regional and republican loyalty over loyalty to the center. The institutions of economic allocation emphasized territorial over functional organization of the economy, and economic resources were distributed from the central government to the republics and regions rather than directly to individual enterprises. Thus republican loyalties replaced central loyalties, even in the poorer republics, because republican elites were responsible for procuring funds for their particular republics.

This last point is central to the argument: Because of the allocative structure, regional loyalties and divisions were created that were not necessarily congruent with “national” or “nationality” divisions. Two examples of regional loyalty (neither of which actually proves

a causal linkage to allocative principles) illustrate. The first ironically can be found in the bitter complaints of the 1986 Memorandum written by a committee of Serb nationalist intellectuals in the Serbian Academy of Sciences. The Memorandum protested Yugoslav “assimilationist” policies, arguing that they were turning Serbs living in Croatia into Croats, and it claimed that ethnic Serb writers in Montenegro and Bosnia were writing “Montenegrin” or “Bosnian” literature instead of Serb literature. And they complained that Macedonian Communists had simply Macedonized Serbs.⁵⁷ With these complaints, the Memorandum suggested that republican political identities had indeed replaced ethnic political identities.

Second, even in war, Bosnian Serbs loyal to Bosnia joined in the Bosnian government and army to oppose Bosnian Serbs who fought the government. In the first elections there after 1990, 13 Serbs were elected to the assembly who were not members of the nationalist party. Indeed ethnic cleavages were not the only—nor were they necessarily the deepest—cleavages in federal Yugoslavia. As we shall see below, territorial loyalties increasingly overlapped with ethnic loyalties as the Yugoslav center collapsed. But territorial divisions unrelated to national divisions were real and they persisted even in war.

ALTERNATIVE CLEAVAGES AND ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR FEDERAL YUGOSLAVIA

In sum, in Yugoslavia, as in all federal systems, the preservation of the state depended on the strength of institutions that encouraged loyalty to the central government. It further depended on the subordination of cultural cleavages, ideological disputes, socioeconomic divisions, and center-region conflict to central government authority. As the narrative suggests, a complex pattern of political cleavage had evolved within both the party and government structures. Indeed this was evident by the 1960s.⁵⁸ If institutional strength at the federal level had been maintained, political, socioeconomic, and regional divisions could have diffused social conflict, and Yugoslavia might have been preserved. But as we shall see below, the strength of federal institutions was slowly depleted and potential cross-cutting cleavages dissolved into ethnic divisions as ethnic repre-

sentation was strengthened and as the mercantilist policies of the republics drained economic resources. The center would not hold.

If federal Yugoslavia could not be preserved, its peaceful dissolution required that center-regional conflicts be resolved in favor of regional autonomy. As we shall see below, Yugoslavia was indeed moving in this latter direction. By 1974 the individual republics were close to becoming fully sovereign states. And as late as the summer of 1991, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović and Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov had gained support from Milošević and Tudjman for an asymmetrical federation—that is, a very loose federation in which Serbia and Montenegro would constitute the “core,” Macedonia and Bosnia would be semidetached, and Croatia and Slovenia could exercise as much sovereignty as they wished.⁵⁹ In fact, however, neither unity nor peaceful dissolution of the federal state was possible in 1991 because beginning in the 1970s, constitutional changes ironically designed to hold the federation together and subsequent economic decline caused center-regional disputes to increasingly deepen ethnic cleavages. It is to this story that the discussion now turns.

DECENTRALIZATION, DECLINE, AND THE GROWTH OF ETHNOFEDERALISM

The necessary condition for the dominance of cultural conflict in Yugoslavia was the entrenchment and expansion of ethnofederalism. Ethnofederalism politicized cultural identity, bolstered the power base of local elites, and thus deepened cultural divisions. The sufficient condition was the federal center’s decline in power and authority and the resulting economic decline. Economic decline and periodic crises triggered conflict over resources along the regional and ethnic lines that ethnofederalism had created. Constitutional changes and economic reforms throughout the life of Yugoslavia ensured that both of these conditions were met. A brief sketch of those changes reveals the resulting rising importance of ethnic divisions over purely territorial ones.

Distributive quarrels among republican elites in the Communist Party emerged from the outset. These quarrels were rarely

played out between republics directly but were always directed toward the central government. Indeed there was no forum where the republics and provinces could negotiate directly with each other.⁶⁰ As suggested above, the deepest discontent was in Croatia and Slovenia, the richest republics and the two most unhappy with central administrative controls. Fearful that this discontent would lead to calls for autonomy, aggravate ethnic conflict—particularly in mixed economic regions—and thus thwart the drive for Yugoslav integration, Tito attempted to deflect criticism and undermine autonomy demands by decentralizing most political and economic activity. The LCY thus undertook measures that conferred increasing political authority on the individual republics in the belief that more autonomy within the federal state would undermine divisive nationalisms. Indeed by the time of Tito's death, there were very few funds, favors, or power resources left in the center to distribute; republican quarrels over central resources were fierce but bore little return for the winners.⁶¹ But as we shall see below, the decline in central powers led to a disintegration of the Yugoslav market and thus a decline in economic efficiency and growth. As the economic pie got smaller, competition over resources increased and national resentments deepened even further. As Rusinow argues, by the 1970s the disintegration of the Yugoslav market into "eight mercantilist and protectionist regional fiefdoms" exacerbated the tendency on the part of regional political elites to regard the republics as separate political and national communities.⁶²

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONS AND ECONOMIC REFORMS

Successive constitutional revisions and economic reforms both codified and induced decentralization and representation by nationality or ethnic group. The 1953 constitutional amendment reduced the administrative role of the central state to five areas: foreign affairs, defense, internal security, and state administration. Although the "national economy" remained in the hands of the federal government, republics were given their own budgets over which they exercised independent control. In the search for a more impersonal allocative mechanism that would deflect criticism from the federal government, central authorities introduced administrative market

socialism. Fixed wages were abolished, centralized planning mechanisms were weakened, and financial instruments replaced administrative rules in macroeconomic coordination. The republican governing bodies were made legally independent of the federal government.⁶³

By 1963, however, economic conditions began to worsen. Recall that the industrialization drive had pushed peasants off the land and into the factories in urban areas. Wage earners pouring into the cities exerted pressure on demand for consumer goods that were in short supply. Expanding demand forced accelerated imports, and the balance of payments deficit dramatically increased. The IMF was called in to provide a structural adjustment loan; its conditionality requirement was that Yugoslavia further liberalize its economy. But as exporters, Croatia and Slovenia were suffering from the 1961 recession in Western Europe, and their exports sagged dangerously.

Squeezed both externally and internally, political elites in both republics continued to see the federal government as the target of their discontent. They saw federal fiscal policies intended to equalize levels of development among the republics as a transfer tax that would disproportionately benefit the less developed republics. Most dangerously, nationality came to be associated with locality and caused divisions within the party that cut across those between reformists and conservatives.⁶⁴

Again to deflect attacks against the center as the cause of these economic problems and to weaken discontent, a new constitution was formulated in 1963. It further decentralized the economy. This time, however, decision-making authority and autonomy devolved to the communal level. According to some observers, it seems that the aim was to localize power without further diluting the authority of the central state since the federal government still had direct links to the communes without going through the republican assemblies.⁶⁵

At the same time, the constitution expanded the meaning and practice of "ethnic balancing" in an attempt to further solidify loyalty to the center. The Chamber of Nationalities was given more legislative power. Its primary task was now to discuss and approve legislation of the assembly *on an equal basis* with the economic, education and culture, welfare and health, and organizational-political chambers which had developed out of the Council of Producers.⁶⁶ The Chamber of Nationalities was upgraded again in 1967. Elected

by republican and provincial assemblies, it now replaced the federal chamber as the senior of the five chambers, and the federal chamber was sharply downgraded.⁶⁷

This organizational change had an important impact on the locus of political accountability and thus on the locus of political loyalty. Previously most members of the Federal Assembly had been responsible only to individual communal assemblies or to the voters at large in given electoral districts. With the upgrading of the Chamber of Nationalities, however, most members were now accountable to their republican and provincial assemblies. Because no federal legislation on any subject could be passed without the consent of the members of the Chamber of Nationalities and because members of that chamber were accountable to their regional assemblies, the republics sharply increased their power at the federal legislative level. In the 1971 census, the status of "nation" was conferred upon Yugoslav Muslims.⁶⁸ Muslims could therefore be represented in the Chamber of Nationalities.

The strengthening of the Chamber of Nationalities not only deepened ethnic and regional political power, but it also exacerbated ethnic tensions. Representation in the Chamber of Nationalities was accorded by the principles of equality and proportionality. Twenty delegates to the Chamber of Nationalities were chosen by each of the six republics, regardless of population. This "balancing" effort bred resentment along ethnic and national lines. Serbs, for example, had 40 percent of the total population but had only 14 percent of the votes in the Chamber of Nationalities, while Slovenes represented 8.5 percent of the total population and had the same percentage of votes.⁶⁹ Equality in representation benefiting the richer and smaller republics was intended to offset the disproportionate economic burden placed on them by regional development policy. But the policy backfired because it channeled resentments and privileges away from territorially defined republics and directed them toward specific ethnic groups who dominated those republics. Serbs began to resent *Croats*, not just *Croatia*, for both their wealth and its representative weight in the powerful Chamber of Nationalities. That representative weight, Serb elites believed, eschewed economic allocation to benefit Croats and was unfair to Serbs. Croats, in turn, resented the disproportionate representative weight of smaller nations which provided them with political clout to push for redistributive policies

that would drain economic resources from richer republics like Croatia.

Ethnic tensions thus colored debates about regional development policy. Despite efforts to equalize levels of development among all of the republics, the gap between the rich and poor republics grew; elites in the richer republics saw little reason to continue to transfer resources to the poorer ones.⁷⁰ They thus argued for allocation of investment funds based on profitability and efficiency. The poorer republics defended their position that they needed continued transfers in order to grow.

The result was a stalemate; there was no agreement on how investment funds should be allocated in the future. This immobilism at the center, combined with the growing deficit and pressure from the IMF for further liberalization and the representative weight of the rich but small republics in the Chamber of Nationalities, led to the economic reform of 1965. The reform itself suggests a triumph for the richer republics and the decentralizers as the center was further weakened; in the course of the debate, the central government was removed from its role as the provider of investment funds to the republics and a network of republic-level banks was created.⁷¹ They were authorized to take primary responsibility for investment finance. These banks had previously been simply the administrators of government investment funds; now they were autonomous enterprises under regulatory control of the republican governments. Finally, the reform turned over most of the federal authority to raise taxes to the republics.

These changes meant an important power shift from the federal to the regional level and from territorially defined regions to ethnically defined republics. The shift in authority to the republic level doomed the regional development policy that was supposed to cement solidarity among the republics and loyalty to the federal center as it weakened the federal government even further. While the 1963 constitution had given more autonomy to the communes at the expense of the republics as a way of decreasing republican power, the 1965 reform returned authority to the republic level, and the commune's economic authority was limited to attracting industry within its territorial boundaries. Here, Comisso argues, urban areas enjoyed immense advantages over rural communes, and this served to widen urban-rural social and economic divisions. The shifting of account-

ability from the center to the republics and the shifting of representative authority to the "nations" and nationalities shifted resentments away from the center and on to specific national groups.

1974: YUGOSLAVIA BECOMES A DE FACTO CONFEDERATION

Most analysts agree that the 1974 constitution was a watershed that turned Yugoslavia into a de facto confederation of sovereign states.⁷² The powers of the federal center were reduced to foreign policy, defense, the protection of national rights, and a minimum of economic instruments. Even in these realms, decisions had to be made by consensus among representatives of the republics and the autonomous provinces.⁷³

The constitution further widened and deepened the system of ethnic and republican quotas to guarantee the smaller republics and nationalities that they would be equally represented. Where previously the quota system had generally followed the principle of proportional representation in federal appointments, it now stipulated that equal numbers from each republic regardless of population would be appointed to federal posts. Appointments to senior and mid-rank positions in federal and lower-level administrative and elective institutions, including the party, now came under the authority of republican and provincial party and state leaderships.

Finally and perhaps most important, the 1974 constitution changed the status of Kosovo and Vojvodina to autonomous provinces. They had been granted increasing authority over their investments and budgets after the 1965 reform. This constitutional change, however, moved them from a status of near-parity in the federal decision-making structure to complete equality with the republics. This meant that the Albanians in Kosovo now had de facto equal political status with the constituent national groups at the federal level. Now all six republics and the two provinces were equally represented in both chambers of the federal assembly regardless of their size. When collective leadership at the federal level was introduced, the two provinces joined in an eight-member presidency, in which each member had an equal vote.⁷⁴ Indeed such an equal representation of the constituent units in both chambers of a bicameral federal legislative assembly is not found in any other contemporary

federation. In comparative perspective, the small federal units in Yugoslavia were highly overrepresented, while large units were correspondingly underrepresented.⁷⁵

Indeed, the 1974 Yugoslav constitution established a more decentralized system of industrial, political, and territorial decision-making than any other existing federation. Over the twenty-year period from 1953 to 1974, the constitutional move toward decentralization from the federal level toward republics and provinces gave legal status to the republics as power centers, making them in fact the highest self-governing communities in Yugoslavia. And the equal status conferred upon the republics and the provinces combined with the principle of unanimity in federal decision-making bodies to ensure immobilism at the center. Any representative who felt that the interests of his republic or province would not be met by a particular federal policy could block its implementation.⁷⁶ Ethnic identity was given increasing political weight as ethnic representative bodies became more powerful and as the quota system was widened and deepened.

THE RESULTS: ECONOMIC FRAGMENTATION AND DECLINE

The result of this loss of power and authority at the center was increasing economic fragmentation of markets, duplication of investment projects, and a subsequent sharp decline in the economy as a whole. The complete story of Yugoslavia's economic decline is a complex one, beyond the scope of this essay, and is yet to be written.⁷⁷ I provide only a few examples here to illustrate the relationship between decentralization, the fragmentation of markets in Yugoslavia, and economic deterioration.

Once the regionalization of the economic policy was in place, the incentives for economic autarky increased.⁷⁸ The regionalization of the banking sector witnessed the creation of as many banks as republics and regions. Bank authorities controlled allocation to individual firms, and regional regulatory authorities controlled banking practices. This regionalization of the banking structure made a nationwide monetary policy unattainable and blocked the possibility of interregional economic activity.⁷⁹

With the regionalization of the banking system, preference in investment decisions was given to local objectives over the efficiency and profitability of the economy as a whole. Regional self-interest led to an increase in import substitution and the duplication of investment projects throughout Yugoslavia. In the period 1970-76, inter-republican trade in goods dropped from 27.7 percent to 23.1 percent of the national social product, while in 1981, 66 percent of all trade was intraregional and only 22 percent was interregional, with only 4 percent of all investment crossing republican and regional borders.⁸⁰ Invisible but thick economic walls between the republics were gradually being constructed.

The devolution of authority to the republics to collect taxes worsened the economic situation further. It prevented the central government from having a coherent fiscal policy, and because the republican tax base was smaller, local and republic taxes on incomes were higher. Higher taxes reduced consumer purchasing power. By 1982, this, along with other problems associated with regional fragmentation, was reflected in a 36 percent drop in the volume of imports.⁸¹

As investment projects were duplicated and markets fragmented, overall economic growth ground to a halt. In 1982 real gross fixed investment fell by 37 percent. Labor productivity in the public sector fell by 20 percent, and public sector earnings fell by 25 percent. The average annual growth rate fell to 0.9 percent, a drop from an annual rate of 6.3 percent.⁸² As the economy worsened, regional fragmentation increased; the conduct of economic policy now depended on the wishes of the regional party organizations. Regional enterprises were subsidized as a part of patronage systems; patronage investments could only be financed by increased borrowing; increased borrowing deepened Yugoslavia's external debt and worsened the economic system further.

As a result of uncoordinated investments, foreign reserve imbalances, and overborrowing in the 1970s, the 1980s witnessed permanent economic crisis in Yugoslavia. By mid-decade, inflation had reached 100 percent annually, while wages were frozen. The federal government faced a mounting debt obligation without any return on moneys spent. Unemployment rose from 600,000 in 1982 to 912,000 in 1983, not including the 700,000 who had been forced to emigrate abroad in order to find work. In 1981-85, unemployment in Serbia

proper was 17–18 percent, and in Kosovo it was over 50 percent. By 1985 one million people were unemployed, and in all republics except Slovenia and Croatia the unemployment rate was above 20 percent.⁸³

IMF structural adjustment loans only exacerbated regional tensions. For example, one requirement of the stabilization program was that the dinar be devalued. Bosnia was strongly opposed to devaluation because it was heavily dependent on imported intermediate goods from convertible currency areas. As the major exporters to the West, Croatia and Slovenia supported the decision to devalue. Because devaluations had to be approved by all republics, negotiations were time consuming, bitter, and divisive. Ultimately devaluation occurred, but exports failed to rise significantly and all economic indicators declined sharply. It was in this context of increasing fragmentation and permanent economic crisis that the centralizing organizations of party and army weakened, regional political entrepreneurs held sway as loyalty to the center dissipated, socioeconomic divisions dissolved into ethnic resentments, and center-region conflict gave way to national political rivalries. How and why ethnic divisions came to trump all others is the subject of the following section.

THE GROWTH OF CULTURAL CONFLICT: FROM MULTIPLE CLEAVAGES TO REINFORCING ETHNIC DIVISIONS

Above we saw that in order to maintain authority by deflecting criticism for economic hardship and political discrimination, the federal government decentralized its control over both the economy and the political system during the period 1953–74. With weakening power at the center, decentralization gave way to fragmentation, and fragmentation led to economic crisis and decline. As we shall see below, fragmentation also changed the rules of political accountability to make regional elites increasingly responsible to their local constituencies. Similar institutional changes increased constituents' dependence on those elites and gave them more resources to distribute in exchange for support. Below I describe how, in the context of fragmentation and economic decline, the institutions of ethnofeder-

alism permitted the logic of identity politics to shape the preferences of regional elites, weaken integrative institutions, and turn all potential social divisions into nationalist rivalries.

DECLINE OF LOYALTY TO THE CENTER

With the decentralization of political authority to the republics and the decline of central power came diminishing loyalty to the federal state. The devolution of power had an important negative impact on party loyalty at the federal level and on the cohesion of the army, the two institutional pillars of federal strength.

The more decentralized the system became, the more empowered were the regional party elites. As I have demonstrated above, as early as 1953, significant areas of political and economic authority had begun to devolve to the republics, and over the next ten years the republics gradually became important decision-making and patronage-dispensing centers.⁸⁴ Recall that members of the Federal Assembly, previously accountable to communal assemblies, became accountable to the republican assemblies when the Chamber of Nationalities was upgraded in 1963 and 1967. With this institutional restructuring, ethnic and regional loyalties were bolstered and loyalty to the federal center weakened.

The regional party elites achieved key positions of power for two reasons: they were the most important economic actors and they were the most important party functionaries in the administration. The most powerful political leaders were those who had access to the state resources of the individual republics and the federal government. With those resources, politicians could create significant patronage machines. The deepening economic crisis made their role even more important because their aid became indispensable in keeping both enterprises and individuals afloat. As the central economic players, they controlled up to 70 percent of all federal investment funds, investing them in their own regions. In their role as regional party leaders, they made significant political and administrative appointments; for example, they controlled 25 percent of all employment in Kosovo; one out of four people was employed in administrative work within state-owned organizations there. In

Slovenia one out of seven jobs was under the control of local and regional politicians.⁸⁵

The changes in the 1974 constitution enhanced their power further. After 1974, when cadre selection was federalized, those with political ambitions knew that their careers were dependent on the approval of the republican and provincial bodies who sent them to Belgrade and knew that they would return to those bodies after federal service. The status of federal service was declining, and these career officials were often reluctant to accept a federal post. When they did enter federal service, they were always responsive to their home constituencies. The rules of accountability increased the power and attractiveness of local offices while reducing the power of the central ones. As some observers have noted, the party as such seemed to exist only for the duration of the party congress; by 1974 it had devolved into an umbrella organization, and regional LCY leaders viewed any effort to encourage Yugoslav integration as an attempt to undermine their respective power bases. As Cohen argues, "In place of the unified party elite that dominated the communist system in its initial postwar phase, the regime was now characterized by six republican and two regional party elites that skillfully utilized decentralized authority for their respective parochial interests."⁸⁶

In addition, as the center weakened, the allocative policies privileging partisans of all nationalities began to backfire. Recall that partisan privileges were intended to encourage Yugoslav integration and loyalty by cementing elite solidarity across national lines within the party. But integrationist goals were thwarted as these partisan elites created local dynasties and began to operate much like a powerful lobbying group, putting pressure on the central government to provide generous material support to their local communes and regions. In some areas, official veterans' organizations exerted pressure on Belgrade to pursue policies favored by the local political machines of which they were a part. As the power of the center declined, partisan elites guarded their entrenched status jealously and were determined to ensure themselves the influence they felt was their due.⁸⁷

The last pillar of Yugoslav loyalty to crumble under institutional incentives for decentralization was the JNA. Throughout the process of federal dissolution, the army had clung to its constitu-

tional mandate to maintain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. It maintained its loyalty to the federal presidency. Even as the center disintegrated, it continued to pride itself on its multiethnic officer corps. But both external and internal pressures eroded the military's integrationist function. First, the rich republics threatened its funding throughout the 1980s by continually grumbling over the size and destination of their contribution to the federal budget. The Croatian parliament voted to oppose federal financing for defense in general, and the Slovene parliament balked as well.⁸⁸ Indeed because of its large share of the federal budget, the army became an important scapegoat for regional discontent against the center.

Internal problems in the army surfaced as well. Ethnic quotas in the appointment of officers had long fostered resentment, particularly among Serbs. Coming from the largest national group, they represented the majority of junior officers in the army but were restricted in opportunities for promotion by the quotas for national equality. After the Croatian crisis of 1971–72, Croatian soldiers balked at serving outside Croatia.⁸⁹ Further, republican loyalty to the JNA was threatened when in 1987–88, the government of Slovenia supported demands that young men be allowed to do their military service at home in Slovenia rather than be sent to another republic. Tensions within the military were further heightened when the Slovene government called for the use of the Slovene language in all military communications and supported young people who campaigned for conscientious objector status.⁹⁰ Both Djilas and Silber and Little suggest that by end of the 1980s the JNA began to mirror the weakness of the federal government as a whole. Shortly before Croatia and Slovenia moved toward secession, the officer corps was disproportionately Serb: with 40 percent of the population, Serbs represented 65 percent of the officer corps.⁹¹ By 1990, when Muslim and Croat youths ignored their induction notices completely, the army rank and file rapidly turned into a virtually all-Serb force.⁹²

THE COLLAPSE OF SOCIOECONOMIC CLEAVAGES INTO REGIONAL DIVISIONS AND ETHNIC RESENTMENTS

Above I suggested that ethnic divisions had been partially dissolved through socioeconomic cleavages in the 1960s and 1970s. But again, decentralization, deregulation, and the ever-worsening eco-

economic situation transformed those cleavages into territorial and republican divisions. Three examples illustrate. First, producer associations were never organized functionally and thus were never able to enter into coalitions across republic lines. Recall that in the representative institutions of federal Yugoslavia, economic interests were mediated by territorially based institutions; producer representatives in the Federal Assembly were grouped first by commune and then by republic.⁹³ Because they were subordinated to the republics and the communes, these associations never achieved autonomy; their functional interests were institutionally subordinated to the territorial interests of the republics. To the extent that ethnic divisions and political preferences granted according to ethnic identity coincided with territorial divisions, ethnic preferences and identity politics were reinforced by the representation of producer associations in the Federal Assembly.

Second, producers' territorial dependence in representative institutions was reinforced by economic dependence on republican authorities. Recall that in the 1965 economic reform, all social investment funds, previously allocated to the enterprises directly from the central government, were transferred to communal banks.⁹⁴ As a result, "extremely close" relationships developed among politicians, banks, and enterprises. As economic conditions declined and firms increasingly needed subsidies to stay afloat, their appeals to republican political authorities for favors multiplied. Local or republic governments would either aid the firms directly or, if they lacked the resources, would pressure the national government for more.⁹⁵

With enterprises increasingly dependent on regional authorities, socioeconomic issues that could have transcended republican boundaries were increasingly translated into the long-standing center-region conflict. The more successful enterprises were concentrated in the more advanced republics of Croatia and Slovenia, and from the early 1960s onward, they increasingly found central government regulation constraining. They thus entered into informal coalitions with republican authorities to push for a decrease in federal control over their activities. On the other side were the centralizers, an informal coalition of politicians from the less developed republics, regions, and firms dependent on political subsidies and favoritism.⁹⁶ Although the decentralizers triumphed in the 1965 eco-

conomic reform, the patron-client relationships that lined up on either side of the conflict continued.

These relationships and the economic commitments they fostered resulted in the virtual absence of pan-Yugoslav economic integration at the firm level and a total lack of interrepublican investment and joint venture projects. The result was a dearth of countervailing pressures to diffuse the center-region conflict. A 1962 integration campaign had failed to produce any mergers across republic boundaries. As we saw above, interrepublican trade had dropped sharply by the late 1970s and never recovered. Indeed by the end of the 1970s, the Yugoslav market had disintegrated into eight separate mercantilist economies.⁹⁷

Finally, by the 1980s, although occupation and resulting status differentials had the potential to create cleavages that crossed republican lines, the worsening economic situation and the subsequent collapse of the social welfare system led to a rise in the use of patronage networks, quotas, and cultural and ethnic bonds as the central mechanism by which scarce resources were allocated. Woodward writes that "in those poorer communities where job cuts were most severe and federal government subsidies and employment had been critical to the local economy, the employment requirement of proportionality and parity among national groups made ethnicity more salient rather than less."⁹⁸ In sum, at the elite level economic competition was subsumed in center-republic conflict, and for the public at large, economic decline and crisis fed ethnic resentments.

THE COLLAPSE OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS AND CENTER-REGION DISPUTES INTO NATIONALIST RIVALRIES

As we have seen, before the 1960s the central ideological dispute at the elite party level had emerged between the conservatives and liberal reformers. However, this division dissolved when liberals in Croatia allied with nationalists there to increase their political leverage against conservative forces. To gain the popular support of those who sympathized with nationalists, liberal reformers in the party began to issue increasingly vocal complaints about Croatia's disadvantaged position in an "unfair" federal system. They began to call for an end to economic exploitation by Belgrade, reform of the

banking and foreign currency systems, curbs on the wealth of Serbia's export-import firms, and the redistribution of former federal assets that had been taken by Serbia after the reform. As a result, the liberal-nationalist coalition turned the initial liberal-conservative debate into a centralizing-decentralizing debate at the federal level.

In Croatia the liberal-nationalist alliance terrified the Serb minority and frightened potential liberal allies in other regions. Thus isolated, Croatia's leadership relied on popular support and the increasingly bold alliance with nationalists within Croatia, further heightening tensions between Croats and Serbs both inside and outside the republic. Then in 1971 the liberalizers found that they could not end a strike at Zagreb University, organized by a militant group that they themselves had encouraged.⁹⁹ Tito called in the JNA to quell the demonstration and, more important, to suppress the liberal-nationalist coalition. With backing from the JNA, Tito purged the party in Croatia of both its nationalist and liberalizing elements, leaving more conservative centralizers firmly in power.¹⁰⁰

The "demonstration effect" then took hold. Liberalizing tendencies in the party had emerged throughout Yugoslavia, especially in Serbia.¹⁰¹ But the Croatian crisis suggested that an expansion of liberalism could open the door to nationalism. Thus in 1972 and 1973 liberals were removed from party leadership in all of the republics. By eliminating the liberal opposition in this way, the party ensured that in the case of its own demise, there would be no civil society to absorb the shocks of a transition.

While political liberalism had been crushed, economic liberals took sides in a fierce debate among the liberal reformers, ideological conservatives, and confederationists. The liberal reformers and defenders of a market economy were located primarily in the Serbian party. They argued for a unified Yugoslav market and the removal of economic barriers among Yugoslavia's republics. Liberalizers were supported by IMF officials, who had stipulated a strengthening of federal institutions to unify Yugoslavia's market. Confederationists, represented primarily by elites in Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina, argued against the unification of the Yugoslav market; such unification would curtail the expansion of their own political autonomy and local power base. With their opposition to a market economy, they found unwitting allies in the ideological conservatives.

While always overlapping, ideological debates thus began to merge with conflicts between the center and the regions. Specific disputes between the centralizers and decentralizers took on new meaning; the centralizers—found mostly in Serbia and particularly in the Belgrade party—argued against the fragmentation of the national market and for the institutionalization of market mechanisms throughout Yugoslavia. The decentralizers—found primarily in Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina—argued for the increasing use of self-management agreements on an enterprise (and thus a regional) basis in lieu of the market. Their rationale was that market mechanisms would constrain the decision-making rights of self-managed firms. By the end of the 1970s these center-region controversies began to be couched in veiled terms of national rivalries.¹⁰² In particular, anti-Serb rhetoric permeated the arguments of the decentralizers. But national rivalries would not break out in the open until Serb elites lost their loyalty to the center.

Indeed the Serbian party had always been on the side of the centralizers, in coalition with the poorer republics seeking subsidies from the federal government. But after the status of Kosovo and Vojvodina changed in the 1974 constitution, elites in both autonomous provinces argued on the side of the decentralizers, and Serb elites saw fewer reasons to remain loyal to the central Yugoslav government. By the late 1970s it appeared that the central state had ceased to serve the interests of Serb elites. With representatives in federal, republic, and party bodies from the national minority groups, both Kosovo and Vojvodina had the legal power to change the Serbian constitution and often voted against Serb preferences.¹⁰³

This was to be the final blow to the center-region controversy. As we shall see below, Serb elites began to retreat from their support for federal institutions and openly encourage ethnic preferences for Serbs in response to Albanian discrimination against Serbs in Kosovo. Respect for minority rights was abandoned. At the federal level, Serb politicians began preparations to abolish the autonomous status of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Because of the increasing strength of republican party organizations, this move was entirely legal and politically possible. If the eight-man federal presidency were left in place after autonomy was abolished, Serbia would directly control three out of the eight votes. Other politicians would find this unac-

ceptable, and they too would abandon federal institutions and retreat fully into republican sovereignty.¹⁰⁴

In sum, by stealing all political loyalty from the center, fragmenting the organizations that propped up central authority, and providing local political entrepreneurs with resources and deepening ethnic resentments both among elites and in society at large, the institutions of ethnofederalism set the stage for identity politics to be played out in Yugoslavia. As we shall see in the following section, where ethnofederalism had been most entrenched, identity politics would be most vociferous. Where ethnofederal institutions were not well established, the destructive tendencies of identity politics did not take root.

THE DECISION TO PLAY THE ETHNIC CARD: SUCCESS AND FAILURE

The legacy of ethnofederalism in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia provided three incentives for ethnic bandwagoning and balancing to take hold and for regional politicians to play the ethnic card in their bid for political power. The first and most important effect was the demise of central power, which wiped out federal protection for national and minority rights and led to domination and discrimination of minority groups wherever one ethnic group enjoyed a majority. Domination and discrimination in one area prompted countermeasures in another, encouraging the escalation of open ethnic discrimination and violence. This in turn provided incentives for local politicians to exploit ethnic resentments for their own political advantage. Where the legacy of ethnofederalism was strongest, nationalist parties won the first “free” elections in federal Yugoslavia, held in 1990. Where they dominated republican governments, they created exclusive institutions and prevented losing ethnic groups from obtaining citizenship rights in their state, thus encouraging more secessionist violence.

Ethnofederalism’s second effect was to prevent the formation of political coalitions *across ideological lines* that could reverse this trend. It thus prevented the “pacted” and peaceful transition to democracy that had taken place in Latin America and Southern Europe.¹⁰⁵ Third, by preventing political coalitions *across regional*

lines, the legacy of ethnofederalism blocked liberal politicians from obtaining positions of power. To counter nationalist political forces, liberals needed pan-Yugoslav coalitions that regional fragmentation prevented. Given the absence of loyalty to the center, the absence of incentives for ideological and regional coalitions, and the presence of ethnic resentments spurred by institutions of accountability and representation, the dominance of identity politics and its escalation to violence in Croatia and Bosnia were assured.

BANDWAGONING AND BALANCING

The first move in the slippery slope toward ethnic violence was taken in Kosovo. Smoldering beneath the surface there—and encouraged by increasing autonomy—had been a radical Albanian move for republican status or even secession. Ethnic violence began to escalate as Albanians assaulted Serbs and vandalized their property. In 1981 riots broke out in Priština University in which Albanian students called for more autonomy; the JNA was called to intervene. Legal rights were weakened as Albanian officials hesitated to charge Albanians with hate crimes.¹⁰⁶ Serbs and Montenegrins began to leave Kosovo by the thousands.

As Serbs continued to emigrate from Kosovo, economic hardship within Serbia deepened—partly as a result of the pressures of immigration. The immigration crisis, combined with the restriction of Serbia's influence at the federal level by Kosovo and Vojvodina, pushed Serb elites to assert republican power over federal law and institutions. To halt immigration, the Serbian LCY implemented a series of affirmative discrimination measures favoring Serbs who stayed in Kosovo. It provided automatic admission of Serb students to Priština University, regardless of their qualifications. It prohibited the sale of land and buildings by Serbs and Montenegrins to Albanians. It promised jobs, housing, and schooling for Serbs and Montenegrins returning to Kosovo, and it built factories for Serb workers.¹⁰⁷

The Kosovo crisis was interpreted in terms of ethnic discrimination and privilege in the public debate; this interpretation opened the door for ethnic nationalist sentiments to be freely expressed. As is now well documented in all of the literature on the Yugoslav collapse, Slobodan Milošević—then head of the Serbian LCY—took up

the appeals for help from Serbs in Kosovo and supported them in order to enhance his own popularity. With a push from Milošević, the ethnic nationalist bandwagon began to roll: the demonstrations to protest Albanian discrimination against Serbs in Kosovo began with small groups of protesters from Kosovo but expanded to crowds numbering from 10,000 to as many as one million. Silber and Little report that Milošević's staff set up a company to provide the transportation and organize protests, bussing workers in from provincial factories to attend meetings and providing them with free food and drink.¹⁰⁸ With these incentives, the bandwagon quickly filled. Milošević used the Kosovo crisis and his growing popular support to stage an inner-party coup, replacing with his own party faction those liberals who had avoided taking a hard line against the Kosovo Albanians.¹⁰⁹ The party thus began to support a Serb nationalist policy. By the summer of 1990 the Serbian government had dissolved the Kosovo assembly and purged Albanians in government posts. It then reduced the status of the two autonomous provinces to "little more than municipalities."¹¹⁰

With the open expression of nationalism now politically acceptable in Serbia and with the federal pillars of Yugoslav integration crumbling, the costs of using provocative nationalist rhetoric and engaging in ethnic violence were lowered throughout the Yugoslav republics. Extremist appeals crowded out moderate political platforms. Voters did not give ethnic entrepreneurs majorities in multiparty elections, but electoral rules combined with the political machines created under ethnofederalism and with incentives to bandwagon and balance at the elite level as more nationalist parties captured political space to escalate exclusive nationalist conflicts.

Slovenia was the first republic to hold multiparty elections in April 1990. The DEMOS, an anti-Communist six-party coalition, won 53 percent of the vote and took control of the parliament. Milan Kučan, the former Communist leader, won the presidential race.¹¹¹ To balance what he saw as overwhelming Serb power at the federal level, Kučan had supported Albanian autonomy, publicly linking Albanian civil rights with the constitutional principle of territorial sovereignty and the right of secession. He portrayed Serbia as the enemy of Slovene democracy, as witnessed by its repression of Albanian rights, clearly heightening tensions between Serbia and Slovenia.¹¹²

Croatia was the next to hold multiparty elections. On 22 April 1990 the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won the most votes in a majoritarian election and controlled two-thirds of the seats in the parliament. The electoral system underrepresented minorities and produced a legislative majority from a mere plurality of votes. The representation of minority parties, opinions, cleavages, and ethnic groups was thus artificially diminished. With only 41.5 percent of the vote, the HDZ got 58 percent of the seats in parliament. The single-member constituency electoral system further ensured that small parties were weeded out of any position of power or influence.¹¹³

The parliamentary majority of the HDZ permitted Croatia's new president, Franjo Tuđman, to refuse minority rights to the 600,000-strong Serb population in Croatia, and the first constitution violated the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) principles on minority rights.¹¹⁴ Serbs were expelled from jobs because of their nationality. In Dalmatia, Croat gangs, often aided by the police, firebombed homes, smashed storefronts, and arrested Serb leaders. Croatian Serbs responded by demanding their civil and nationality rights. These demands fell on deaf ears; the federal government was now too weak to protect them. They thus held an autonomy referendum and built roadblocks around their areas to prevent Croatian interference.¹¹⁵ Croats living in mixed areas where Serbs began to mobilize saw this as Milošević's hand stretching into Croatia.¹¹⁶ For Serbs in Croatia, these events gave credibility to the rising tone of nationalist rhetoric in Serbia. Local Serb leaders demanded that Serb-dominated territory be taken out of Croatia.¹¹⁷ Autonomy demands escalated to violence.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was the last republic to hold multiparty elections in December. On the surface it appeared that the elections would bring a successful multiethnic government to power. Although the three nationalist parties won the most votes, each from their own national group, none of the nationalist platforms was belligerent or aggressive. Although the Muslim party, the SDA, was represented by Islamic symbolism, its platform was a pluralist one. The Serbian party, the SDS, led by Radovan Karadžić, campaigned on a nationalist platform calling for the defense of Serb rights. But the party's campaign did not call for the division of Bosnia. Thus those who voted for the SDA and the SDS were not voting for parti-

tion and war. Furthermore, unlike Croatia, Bosnia's electoral rules followed the system of proportional representation. The system provided a close proportion of seats to votes, so that no one political party was underrepresented. Muslims gained ninety-nine seats in the assembly, Croats gained forty-nine, and Serbs from the SDS and other parties gained eighty-five. These seats closely represented the percentages of the vote gained by each party. Izetbegović formed a grand coalition among the three major parties, and government posts were divided among them.

This coalition, however, turned out to be a coalition of convenience in that it was created merely to form a government and not to achieve lasting accommodation, moderation, and compromise among the three dominant national groups.¹¹⁸ It quickly fell apart as Serbs began to declare large parts of the country "autonomous regions," and SDS members of the republican presidency began to boycott presidency meetings. By October 1991 the SDS had left the assembly, which then promptly voted for Bosnian sovereignty. Several days later Karadžić set up a Serb Federal Assembly in Banja Luka. When a referendum was held on Bosnian independence, Karadžić's SDS boycotted the election. On 26 April 1991 the Serbs of Bosnian Krajina created a separate assembly. Less than a year later, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia were at war.

Why did this happen? The Bosnian electoral system and government contained the key features of proportional representation and power-sharing that elsewhere have brought stable multiethnic governments to power in other divided societies.¹¹⁹ The system of proportional representation with very close proportionality was constructed to be fair to all constituent groups. It encouraged a proliferation of political parties so that all interests could be represented. Indeed forty-one parties, including the LCY, socialists, and Marković's Alliance of Reformist Forces, took part in the electoral competition.

Part of the explanation for the political breakdown can be traced to the timing of the Bosnian election and the ethnic alliances that had formed between Serb nationalist political elites in Bosnia and Serbia and Croat nationalist elites in Bosnia and Croatia. Bosnia was a latecomer, the last republic to hold elections, and nationalist parties had formed and won elections throughout Yugoslavia. Ethnic tensions had escalated in Croatia, lowering the cost of jumping on

ethnic bandwagons in other republics. Nationalists were firmly in power in Serbia and Croatia. The success of Croat and Serb nationalists in their titular republics induced Bosnian politicians to pursue exclusive ethnic or religious nationalist strategies with the aid of their ethnic "brethren." Bosnian Muslims had been granted the status of nation and thus believed they were justified in holding power as a nation. Indeed as Izetbegović noted, political parties would be doomed if they did not provide a nationalist agenda. When ideological and pan-Yugoslav bandwagons were constructed, the ethnic bandwagons had already filled and there were few left to support the alternatives. Although other parties won thirty-two seats in the Bosnian assembly, the three nationalist parties gained votes almost directly proportional to individuals' choices of national identity in the 1981 census.¹²⁰ As noted above, the broader public did not support violent nationalist aims. But ethnofederalism had provided them with few alternatives to the ethnic nationalist parties, and these parties had crowded out other options.

Furthermore, ethnic alliances had formed across republican borders, bringing material and symbolic resources to the Serb and Croat parties. Malcolm reports that Milošević had arranged to deliver arms from Serbia to the Bosnian Serbs; Prime Minister Ante Marković released a tape recording of a conversation between Milošević and Karadžić confirming arms shipments. Karadžić reported to a British journalist that he and Milošević spoke on the phone several times a week.¹²¹ Woodward reports that the most active wing of Croatia's HDZ was the western Herzegovina branch from Bosnia. Indeed in 1990 Croats in this area were granted dual citizenship with the right to vote in Croatian elections.¹²²

In short, ethnofederalism had prepared the way for these bandwagoning effects to induce political entrepreneurs to play the ethnic card. Slovenia and Croatia had long been the strongest advocates of decentralization and republican autonomy. By the 1990 elections, political and economic resources were in the hands of their regional and exclusive nationalist politicians. Serbia had long been a supporter of centralization but was pressured by new accountability rules in the 1974 constitution to relinquish political control over its territory. This intensified ethnofederalism induced Serb politicians to drop their support of the federal government and take control of territories populated by majority nationalities. Where other titular

nationalities were making exclusive claims to territory, Bosnian Muslims also began to make territorial claims. The bandwagoning effect of exclusive national claims to territory reduced incentives for pan-Yugoslav coalitions and increased incentives for an escalation to violence.

THE ABSENCE OF IDEOLOGICAL AND REGIONAL COALITIONS

The exclusivity of nationalist parties in power prevented significant political coalitions across ideological and regional lines. With the rise of nationalism, claims on resources and territory were increasingly based on ethnicity and religion, and they were often incompatible. Ethnic discrimination and repression was so widespread that a spiral of mistrust emerged in the highest levels of government. In particular, Milošević's nationalist rhetoric was perceived by Croats and Slovenes as aggression against them.

Certainly there were explicit tradeoffs among elites at the federal level, but they entailed no compromises that would injure republican power and autonomy. Each tradeoff furthered national goals. For example, in his effort to end the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Milošević made a deal with Slovenia's Kučan in the LCY Central Committee that he would approve all of Slovenia's amendments to the federal constitution if Slovenia would approve the changes that Serbia wanted with regard to Kosovo.

Woodward argues that although much of the population in Serbia favored political liberalization, liberal politicians could not counter nationalist opposition alone.¹²³ To further a liberal political program, they would have to gain support from liberals in other republics, particularly Croatia and Slovenia, where economic interests in Western-oriented liberal policies were most substantial. Recall, however, that liberals in those republics were strongly antifederalist, increasingly nationalist, and mistrusting of Serbs.

With bandwagoning and balancing effects in full swing; with nationalist parties backed by ethnic machines in power in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia; and with strong secessionist impulses in Slovenia, chances of coalitions that had historically bridged ethnic and religious differences were nil. The important exception to this process in 1990 and 1991 was Macedonia. There ethnofederalism had

not provided particular ethnic groups with territorial autonomy. Ethnic entrepreneurs did not have enough resources to successfully play the ethnic card. Proportional representation brought a coalition government to power willing to compromise. That government undermined the political power of ethnic nationalist elites and constructed inclusive rather than exclusive political institutions. It is to a brief description of this exceptional case that the discussion now turns.

MACEDONIA AS THE EXCEPTION

By all important indicators, Macedonia, like Croatia and Bosnia, should have erupted in ethnic violence. Of course the Serb and Croat population in Macedonia was small, and Macedonia was much less important in Serb nationalist mythology than Kosovo. But the Albanian minority there had long suffered institutional and social discrimination. In 1989, following Serbia's lead, Macedonia eliminated all the clauses from the republican constitution that protected Albanian and Turkish minorities. Cultural autonomy had never been granted for Albanians, and Albanians were effectively barred from government employment.¹²⁴ The VMRO, the radical nationalist party, received the most votes of any party in the 1990 election (although, like the HDZ, it did not receive a majority). Like Bosnia, Macedonia held elections late in the year, after ethnic nationalist parties had formed in other republics.

Why then did Macedonia not follow the lead of Croatia and Bosnia and erupt in ethnic violence? The lessons of this study provide a partial answer. First, as one of the most underdeveloped republics, Macedonia's political elite had always supported a strong central government and had no reason to stop its support. Growing ethnofederalism that had benefited the richer republics by providing them with autonomy and relieved them of transfer payments to the poorer regions had only harmed Macedonia. Macedonia's leaders had been schooled in a long tradition of political compromise to maintain the center, and Communist-era leaders held centrist views for which they were renowned after communism fell.¹²⁵ Gligorov had even joined with Bosnia's Izetbegović to present the idea of a loose federation that would save Yugoslavia.

But a history of commitment to the federal center was not enough to prevent the outbreak of violence. Indeed Bosnia's political role in the federation was that of a supporter of central institutions. A political structure that provided incentives for compromise was also required to prevent a bellicose and strident nationalist agenda from dominating politics. In addition to having a strong commitment to the center, Macedonia's 1990 electoral rules, like Bosnia's, provided for proportional representation. The December 1990 elections witnessed the emergence of twenty parties for electoral competition, with six of them entering parliament. With 32 percent of the vote and a similar percentage of seats, the VMRO was the strongest party but could not form a government alone. Its exclusivist claims prevented it from entering into political coalitions. Instead Albanian party leaders joined with the centrists and former communists to exclude the VMRO from government. The government then constructed a constitution that granted all ethnic groups full citizenship rights.¹²⁶ The new president, Kiro Gligorov, a former leading Communist, made no irredentist claims vis-à-vis neighboring Greece, although he reluctantly supported Macedonian autonomy.¹²⁷ No alliances were created between Macedonian parties and ethnic nationalist parties in Serbia and Croatia.

This brief comparison is only suggestive. But what it suggests is that cultural conflict was muted in Macedonia because ethnofederalism there was weak and thus coalitions could form. Ethnofederalism was weak for two reasons. First, the Albanian minority did not identify as "Muslim" when Muslims were elevated to the status of nation. Pressure for that enhanced status had come exclusively from the Bosnian Muslims; Albanians clung to their original status as a nationality. The 1961 census allowed people to call themselves "Muslim in the ethnic sense," but the Albanian minority was already "Albanian in the ethnic sense." This meaning carried over into the 1971 census as well, even though the phrase "in the ethnic sense" was dropped. Second, the Albanian minority never received its own territory like it did in Kosovo. Thus there was no historical legitimacy to a territorial claim that could incite a backlash on the part of other groups and ignite the escalation effects of identity politics.

Under the condition of this weak ethnofederal legacy, the electoral system was able to encourage coalitions and prevent the extreme nationalist party from coming to power. Like the HDZ in

Croatia, the VMRO had gained a plurality of the votes. But unlike in Croatia, proportional representation prevented the conversion of this electoral plurality to a parliamentary majority. It thus prevented the VMRO from forming a government. And because ethnofederalism was weak, a coalition that induced moderation, accommodation, and compromise could form.

Certainly undercurrents of conflict persist. The Albanian minority is growing; some analysts argue that Albanians comprise 40 percent of the population, and Macedonian nationalists perceive Albanian population growth as a political threat.¹²⁸ Albanian radicals threaten violence if minority rights are not reinstated.¹²⁹ An assassination attempt on Gligorov in October 1995 left him seriously injured, tragically ending his political career. Without Gligorov's political strength and consistent pursuit of moderate policies, the future is uncertain. Since 1992 potential conflict has been prevented by 400 U.S. troops in Macedonia under UN command.

Despite the uncertainties, the initial peaceful transition of Macedonia to autonomy and to a fragile democracy reinforces the central lesson of this essay: political institutions matter to the outbreak and prevention of cultural violence. Political institutions shape the motivations of politicians who have the power to stir up or attenuate ethnic resentments in the population at large. Even more important, institutions shape political culture. In the former Yugoslavia, the West should work to get the institutions right so that a new political culture can grow there, one that exhibits cultural tolerance and respects cultural diversity. Only then can future cultural conflicts be prevented. I conclude with an elaboration of this policy prescription.

POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

If the West is to have an influence on the future of the five new states of the ex-Yugoslavia, a clear understanding of the roots of the war there is essential. Policy prescriptions attempt to eradicate initial causes and punish the perpetrators. If causal beliefs are faulty, policies will be flawed and ultimately ineffective. The predominance of essentialist beliefs in the causes of this conflict initially led to policies

of inaction on the part of the West. Early in the war, NATO documents suggested that the very primordial nature of “ethnic conflicts” in Yugoslavia meant that war was inevitable in this region of mixed populations and that war aims would be limited to the ethnic groups involved.¹³⁰ Throughout the conflict, this perception of the war’s origins weakened any enthusiasm for either independent military action or the initiation of collective security measures to halt the conflict. A belief in instrumental accounts led some Western powers to blame the conflict on one or the other of the warring parties and then to pursue policies that sought to punish the perpetrator of “aggression.” Germany’s belief in instrumental accounts that blamed Serb aggression led to its support of Croatia. That support aggravated the conflict and fueled its spread to Bosnia.¹³¹ International explanations lead to policies that treat the perpetrators as victims and avoid policies that would provide incentives for domestic actors to take responsibility for avoiding conflict. In short, because all three of the dominant schools of explanation for the war are flawed, they have led to flawed and ineffective policies on the part of the West.

This essay has argued that political institutions are essential in both fostering and attenuating cultural conflict. Sadly, however, the Dayton accords produced political institutions in Bosnia that replicated those features of the Yugoslav constitution that encouraged ethnic rivalry and weakened the central government. Like Yugoslavia, Bosnia is constructed as a “noncentralized federation,” composed of two separate entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a federation of Bosnians and Croats within the larger Federation of Bosnia. The constitution of the Republika Srpska allows it to enter into an “association” with Serbia, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina can enter into an association with Croatia. Bosnia is thus partitioned into ethnic regions, and the Croats and Serbs each have powerful patrons.

The central government is constructed to be weak and ineffective. It takes many of its institutional features from Tito’s Yugoslavia and the 1974 constitution. The constitution provides for a parliamentary assembly constructed of two houses, a House of Representatives and a House of Peoples, similar to the Chamber of Nationalities.¹³² All decisions in each chamber are made by a majority of those present and voting. Robert Hayden argues that constitutional provisions make it possible for Croat and Muslim members of the House

of Representatives to assemble without the Serb members, declare themselves a quorum, and pass valid legislation. The constitution further specifies, however, that in the House of Peoples a quorum consists of nine members and must include three Serbs, three Muslims, and three Croats. No legislation can be passed if one group boycotts the House of Peoples. This means that legislation can be blocked by absenteeism. Like the federal presidency created in the 1974 constitution, the Bosnian presidency consists of three members, a Serb, a Croat, and a Muslim, with a rotating chair.

If the argument of this essay holds, then Western policy should be directed toward the construction of more viable institutions than those that have been constructed in Bosnia. The story told here warns that federal systems in multiethnic states must create a strong center if they are to survive. They must be strong enough to protect and maintain the rule of law and civil and political rights, and their governments must be committed to those rights. Institutions of the presidency and parliament must be constructed so that stalemates do not repeatedly occur and in which only negative majorities—able to veto decisions but unable to take positive action—do not dominate.

Strong federations can be created that do not fragment political life. Alternative institutional channels can be constructed to ensure that social cleavages will be cross-cutting and not reinforcing. The institution of market rationality can reduce the influence of patronage networks. Institutions can be created that both depoliticize and respect cultural identity. These kinds of institutions must form the basis of the post-Yugoslav states if the incentives for intercultural cooperation are to outweigh the incentives for cultural conflict.

NOTES

1. While many analysts mention institutional factors, none have presented a systematic institutional explanation. Aleksa Djilas, for example, writes that "the Party failed to establish a stable federal system that could have institutionalized and regulated relations among national groups" ("Fear Thy Neighbor: The Breakup of Yugoslavia," in *Nationalism and Nationalities in*

the New Europe, ed. Charles Kupchan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 89.

2. See for example, Edward W. Walker, "The Dog That Didn't Bark: Tartarstan and Symmetrical Federalism in Russia" (Berkeley, 1995); unpublished manuscript.
3. President Clinton made reference to "ancient hatreds" in his inaugural address, reprinted in the *New York Times*, 21 January 1993, p. A15. Laura Silber and Allen Little claim that foreign ministers from the European Community, sent to Yugoslavia in 1991 to resolve the crisis, often alluded to the "Balkan temperament, a south Slavic predisposition—either cultural or genetic—toward fratricide" (*Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* [New York: TV Books, 1996], p. 159). John Mearsheimer and Robert Pape have suggested that because Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims could *never* get along, it was better that they be separated ("The Answer," *New Republic*, 14 June 1993, pp. 22, 25, 28). Other examples include Vladimir Gligorov: "What If They Will Not Give Up? Civil War in the Former Yugoslavia," *East European Politics and Societies* 9, 3 (Fall 1995): 499–513, and "Balkanization: A Theory of Constitutional Failure," *East European Politics and Societies* 6, 3 (Fall 1992): 283–302; Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies," *Foreign Policy*, no. 92 (Fall 1993): 52–75; Heidi Hobbs, "Whither Yugoslavia? The Death of a Nation," *Studies on Conflict and Terrorism* 16, 3 (July–September 1993): 187–200; Peter Vodopivec, "Slovenes and Yugoslavia, 1918–1991," *East European Politics and Societies* 6, 3 (Fall 1992): 220–42; Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
4. See the critique of the essentialist school in Lawrence R. Robertson, "Ethnic Minorities, Indigenization, Migration, and Conflict Contagion in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union"; paper prepared for annual meeting of American Political Science Association, Chicago, 31 August–3 September 1995, pp. 4–6.
5. Djilas, "Fear Thy Neighbor," pp. 86–87.
6. Susan Woodward cites a 1991 report by Silvano Bolđć claiming that 3 million people in Yugoslavia (in a population of 22 million) were products of ethnically mixed marriages or were married to someone of a different ethnicity (*Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* [Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995], p. 36, n. 32). See also Ivan Simonović, "Socialism, Federalism, and Ethnic Identity," in *Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism*, ed. Dennison Rusinow, pp. 50–51 (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center Press, 1988).
7. The 1981 census indicated that the fastest growing nationality in Yugoslavia were the Albanians because of consistently higher population growth rates, low mortality rates, and a weaker tendency for mixed marriages. Those identifying themselves as Albanians increased 230.6 percent between 1948 and 1981. The next fastest growing group were those who defined themselves as Yugoslavs, approximately 1.2 million people, or 5.4 percent of the total population. This number was five times as high as that of the 1971

poll. In the mid-1980s, 15 percent of the youth defined themselves as Yugoslavs, and 36 percent of the surveyed youth declared that they preferred it to any other ethnic classification. Yugoslav identity rose in some areas from 0 to 10 percent and in some areas to more than 25 percent, indicating a remarkable assertion of shared political identity (see Steven Burg and Michael Berbaum, "Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia," *American Political Science Review* 83, 2 [1986]: 535–36). In Bosnia the declaration of national identification as Yugoslav jumped from 1 percent to 9 percent of the total population between 1971 and 1984 (see Pedro Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963–1983* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984], p. 149).

8. When Slobodan Milošević took it over, the Belgrade Communist Party organization had been the most liberal in all of Yugoslavia (see Woodward, pp. 93 and 97).
9. Reported in the *Wall Street Journal*, 17 July 1996, p. 1.
10. Mike O'Connor, "Violence Flares as Bosnians Try to Regain Prewar Homes," *New York Times*, 22 April 1996, p. A3.
11. See Aleksa Djilas, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs* 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 86–88.
12. For historical literature, see, for example, M.D. Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875–1878* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of Balkan National States 1804–1920* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977); and M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923* (London: Macmillan, 1966). Current international explanations include Simon Nuttall, "The EC and Yugoslavia: Deus ex Machina or Machina sine Deo?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32, 3 (September 1994): 11–26; David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Mandarin Press, 1994); Stevan Pavlowitch, "Who Is Balkanizing Whom? The Misunderstandings between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West," *Daedalus* 123, 2 (Spring 1994): 203–24; Christopher Cviić, "Who's to Blame for the War in Ex-Yugoslavia?" *World Affairs* 156, 2 (Fall 1993): 72–80; Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia" *International Affairs* 69, 3 (July 1993): 465–84; Woodward; and Paula Lytle, "U.S. Policy toward the Demise of Yugoslavia: The Virus of Nationalism," *East European Politics and Societies* 6, 3 (Fall 1993): 303–18.
13. See John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990).
14. This geopolitical argument is made by Pierre M. Gallois, "Vers une prédominance allemande" (Toward a German predominance), *Le Monde*, 16 July 1993, p. 1; cited in Wolfgang Krieger, "Toward a Gaullist Germany," *World Policy Journal* (Spring 1994): 26–38. This view has become conventional wisdom in much of the academic literature as well. See, for example, Djilas: "Germany pressed for recognition partly because it was well aware

that historical ties and proximity would entitle it to considerable influence in an independent Croatia and Slovenia" ("The Breakup of Yugoslavia," p. 97).

15. See Eberhard Rondholz, "Deutsche Erblasten im jugoslawischen Buergerkrieg" (The burden of German history in the Yugoslav civil war), *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* (Journal of German and international politics) 37 (July 1992): 829–38. For a more detailed discussion and critique of these claims, see Beverly Crawford, "Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia," *World Politics* 48, 4 (July 1996): 482–521.
16. This time it was not the danger of a wider war resulting from opposing alliances, but rather the danger of heightened political tension—clearly suggested by Germany's partisan response to the initial crisis. That tension, it was believed, would undermine multilateral security and conflict-resolution institutions which were under intense scrutiny in the post-cold-war period. For a detailed account of international cooperation in the war, see Beverly Crawford, "An Empty Nest: Reconciling European Security Institutions in the Bosnian Crisis," in *Crafting International Institutions: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting*, ed. Vinod K. Aggarwal (forthcoming).
17. This is certainly the most popular explanation in the literature. Examples are too numerous to provide a complete list here. They include Djilas, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia"; Sumantra Bose, "State Crises and Nationalities Conflict in Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia," *Comparative Political Studies* 28, 1 (April 1995): 87–117; Warren Zimmerman, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs* 74, 2 (March–April 1995): 2–21; Bette Denich, "Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide," *American Ethnologist* 21, 2 (May 1994): 367–94; Milica Bookman, "War and Peace: The Divergent Breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia," *Journal of Peace Research* 31, 2 (May 1994): 175–88; Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Obrad Kešić, "Serbia: The Politics of Fear," *Current History* 92, 577 (November 1993): 376–81; Vesna Pešić, "A Country by Any Other Name: Transition and Stability," *East European Politics and Societies* 6, 3 (Fall 1992): 242–60; Anton Bebler, "Yugoslavia's Variety of Communist Federalism and Her Demise," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 26, 1 (March 1993): 72–87; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia," *Daedalus* 121, 2 (Spring 1992): 123–40; Ivo Banac, "The Fearful Assymetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise," *Daedalus* 121, 2 (Spring 1992): 141–75; V. P. Gagnon, "Serbia's Road to Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5, 2 (April 1994): 117–31; and "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Yugoslavia," *International Security* 19, 3 (Winter 1991): 130–67; Branka Magaš, *Destruction of Yugoslavia* (London: Verso, 1993).
18. Silber and Little (esp. p. 33), for example, trace the causes of war to nationalist Serbian intellectuals who exploited nationalist sentiments among the

Serbs and primarily to Slobodan Milošević and his ability to tap those heightened sentiments and destroy federal institutions in his drive for political power. See also Djilas, "Fear Thy Neighbor," pp. 85–121.

19. Barry Posen argues that "power differentials among competing groups may create incentives for preventive expropriation, which can generate a spiral of action and reaction." He applies this logic to an explanation for initial Serbian offensives in the outbreak of war (see "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, 1 [Spring 1993]: 27–47; quote is on p. 34). His argument is structural rather than instrumental.
20. See Dennison Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy and the 'National Question,'" in *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*, ed. Pedro Ramet (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. 134.
21. Denitch, pp. 136–37.
22. Rogers Brubaker describes a triangular configuration of strategic interdependence between the decisions of elites in the Croatian "nationalizing state," local elites of the Serb "national minority" in Croatia, and elites in the Serb "homeland" that stimulated logic described here as bandwagoning and balancing. The strategic interdependence and interactive dynamic that shaped elite decisions to escalate identity politics to violence that Brubaker describes goes beyond ethnic alliances, and his framework argues for the importance of this triangular relationship between a nationalizing state, national minorities in that state, and the external national "homelands" to which they belong in stimulating and escalating violence. His account combines both timing and ethnic alliances in an explanation in which both are dependent upon this triangular relationship (see "National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External Homelands in the New Europe," *Daedalus*, Spring 1995, pp. 107–32).
23. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).
24. Alex N. Dragnich, *Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), p. 46. Stevan K. Pavlowitch argues that the similarities and common interests of the Yugoslavs were strong enough to give birth to a Yugoslav movement, to overcome the obstacles that had molded them into several distinct historic entities and to lead them to a common solution of their existential problems (see *The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and Its Problems 1918–1988* [London: C. Hurst: 1988]).
25. See Pavlowitch, *The Improbable Survivor*; Alex N. Dragnich, *The First Yugoslavia* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983); Peter Jambrek, *Development and Social Change in Yugoslavia* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975); Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1993.
26. See Vojislav Kostunica, "The Constitution and the Federal States," in Rusinow, ed., pp. 78–79. The distinction between centralized and noncentralized federalism comes from William Riker, "Federalism," in *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 5, pp. 93–172.

27. Dennison Rusinow goes so far as to argue that Yugoslavia's early postwar institutional system was a virtual carbon copy of the Soviet "solution" to the national question (see "Nationalities Policy," pp. 133–65). Susan Woodward (p. 30) agrees.
28. Vesna Pešić, "Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis," *Peaceworks*, no. 8 (Washington: D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 10.
29. Susan Bridge, "Some Causes of Political Change in Modern Yugoslavia," in *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, ed. Milton J. Esman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 345–47.
30. Woodward, p. 37.
31. See, for example, Pešić, "Serbian Nationalism"; Banac, p. 145.
32. As discussed in Dijana Pleština, *Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, and Consequences* (Boulder: Westview, 1992), in an interview with Milić, Institute of Agricultural Economics (Belgrade, 1983), p. 46.
33. See Maria N. Todorova, "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe," *East European Politics and Societies* 7, 1: 135–55.
34. Because of its collaboration with the Ustaša in Croatia and Bosnia, the Catholic Church was treated most harshly. The Orthodox Church too was suppressed, and Islam was treated with particular harshness (see Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* [New York: New York University Press, 1994], pp. 194–95).
35. Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy," p. 135.
36. Woodward, p. 37.
37. Bridge, p. 347.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
39. See *ibid.*, pp. 348–49; Malcolm, pp. 210–11.
40. See Robert Hayden, *The Beginning of the End of Federal Yugoslavia: The Slovenian Amendment Crisis of 1989* (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1992), p. 7; Carl Beck Papers, No. 1001.
41. Malcolm, p. 222.
42. Steven Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 26.
43. Wolfgang Hoepken, "Party Monopoly and Political Change: The League of Communists since Tito's Death," in Ramet, ed., pp. 29–30. The primary source on the 1965 economic reform is Ellen Comisso, *Workers' Control between Plan and Market* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 115–68.
44. See Bridge, p. 350.

45. The proportion of agricultural workers in Yugoslavia shrank from 67.2 percent in 1948 to 28.8 percent in 1981, a rapid change when compared to the United States, where it took three times as long to achieve a similar result. In Japan it took seventy-three years to move from 76 percent in 1887 to 33 percent in 1960 (see Gregor Tomc, "Classes, Party Elites, and Ethnic Groups," in Rusinow, ed.; see also Comisso, pp. 165–77). State policies of discrimination against the rural sector were not unique to federal Yugoslavia. Peasants were heavily taxed under the first Yugoslav state, and few resources were invested in improving agriculture (see Djilas, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia," p. 88).
46. Woodward, p. 44.
47. See Bridge, p. 355. It should be noted that these reformers were not liberal democrats. At most they wanted to increase the autonomy of other organizations and institutions in society outside of the party, but they stopped far short of calling for an abrogation of the LCY's power or its division (see April Carter, *Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia* [London: Francis Pinter, 1982], p. 245).
48. See, for example, Dennison I. Rusinow, *Crisis in Croatia: Part I*; American Universities Field Staff Report, Southeast Europe Series 19, 4 (1973); Bridge, pp. 363–64;
49. Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy," pp. 156–57. Rusinow quotes Steven L. Burg, "Yugoslavia in Crisis" (September 1984), unpublished manuscript, pp. 30ff.
50. For this argument, see Beverly Crawford, "Post-Communist Political Economy: A Framework for the Analysis of Reform," in *Markets, States, and Democracy: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformation*, ed. Beverly Crawford (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 3–42.
51. The main source of center-directed developed republic (DR) funds went through the federal fund for the accelerated development of the insufficiently developed republics and the autonomous province of Kosovo. It was primarily an income redistribution mechanism that drew its funds from a percentage levy on the income of the developed republics and sent it down south in the form of monetary aid for infrastructural programs. There were also the payment in kind funds that were primarily commodities that were given in lieu of money.
52. See Bridge, p. 355.
53. Egon Neuberger, *The Impact of External Economic Disturbances on Yugoslavia: Theoretical and Empirical Explanations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978).
54. Bridge, p. 355.
55. See Pleština, *Regional Development*, p. 89, and Bruce McFarlane, *Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Society* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), p. 131.
56. Burg and Berbaum, p. 547.
57. Cited in Malcolm, p. 207, and Pešić, *Serbian Nationalism*, p. 19.

58. Bridge, p. 351.
59. Silber and Little, p. 148.
60. Bridge, p. 354.
61. Rusinow "Nationalities Policy," pp. 140–41.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 141–42.
63. From Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion*, p. 26, and Bridge, pp. 350–51. See also Jozef Mencinger, "From a Capitalist to a Capitalist Economy?" in *Yugoslavia in Turmoil: After Self-Management?*, ed. James Simmie and Jozef Dekleva (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), p. 73; R. Bičanić "Economic Growth under Centralized and Decentralized Planning: Yugoslavia, A Case Study," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 5: 63–74; and Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment: 1948–1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 71.
64. Pavlowitch, *The Improbable Survivor*, p. 25. See also Comisso.
65. Comisso writes that prior to 1965 the importance of the commune in the local economy derived from its position as the lowest unit of the national plan. With the decline in federal planning, the commune became less important.
66. See Anton Vratuša, "The System of Self-Management," in *Yugoslavia in the Age of Democracy*, ed. George Macesich (London: Praeger, 1992), p. 125; and Jim Seroka and Radoš Smiljković *Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), p. 83.
67. Bridge, p. 356.
68. See Malcolm, p. 199.
69. Bridge, p. 360.
70. Comisso, pp. 115–68, is the primary source for this material. See also Paul Shoup, *Yugoslav Communism and the National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 228 and 246.
71. Comisso (*Workers' Control between Plan and Market*) states that the central General Investment Fund was formally abolished in 1963; in its place, a smaller Fund for Development, into which all enterprises paid a small contribution, was set up as a compromise measure to continue a reduced volume of capital transfers to the underdeveloped republics and provinces. The decision to use the market as the basic coordinator of economic life was more a decision by default than an act of positive policymaking. Investment planning was abandoned because political leaders could no longer agree on investment priorities and on who should do the planning; political restrictions on the operation of the market were cut because consensus was lacking on how the market should be restricted and to what extent it could be. See also David A. Dyker, *Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development, and Debt* (London: Routledge Press, 1990).

72. Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy"; Djilas, "Fear Thy Neighbor"; Stojan Bulat, "Foreign Capital, Private Property, and the Firm," in Macesich, ed., p. 139; Dyker, pp. 85–89; Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion*, p. 241; Seroka and Smiljković, p. 219; Zagorka Golubović, "Characteristics, Limits, and Perspectives of Self-Government: A Critical Reassessment," in Simmie and Dekleva, eds., p. 41.
73. Previous constitutions of 1946, 1953, and 1963 did not provide for the unanimous consent of the federal units' legislatures on constitutional amendments. To amend the constitution, a qualified majority in the federal legislative assembly was considered sufficient without any kind of consent by the federal units' legislatures.
74. In the case of an emergency, when the parliament and the cabinet could not agree, the collective presidency of the six republics and the two provinces had to reach a unanimous decision (see Steven Burg, ed., *Yugoslavia after Tito* [Washington, D.C.: Kennan Institute, 1982], p. 19. No. 157).
75. Kostunica, p. 81.
76. Harold Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 21–22.
77. For a more detailed discussion of the economic problems resulting from decentralization of credit allocation, foreign exchange, and enterprise control and planning, see Donald Green, "The Outlook for Yugoslavia's Foreign Trade and External Debt in the 1980s," in Burg, ed., p. 47; Laura Tyson, "Can Titoism Survive Tito? Economic Problems and Policy Choices Confronting Tito's Successors," in Ramet, ed., p. 184; Fred Singleton and Bernard Carter, *The Economy of Yugoslavia* (London: Croom Helm, 1982).
78. Bičanić, pp. 120–41.
79. Dyker, pp. 74–75.
80. Tomc, pp. 58–77.
81. See Comisso, pp. 115–68, and Lydall, pp. 24–25.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.
83. Woodward, pp. 64 and 73.
84. Bridge, p. 351.
85. Tomc, p. 71.
86. Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p. 33. See also Hoepkin, p. 37; Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy," pp. 136–37; and Burg and Berbaum, p. 538.
87. Bridge, pp. 351–52.
88. Woodward, p. 69.
89. Robin Allison Remington, "Political Military Relations in Post-Tito Yugoslavia," in Ramet, ed.
90. Woodward, pp. 89–90.

91. Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milošević," *Foreign Affairs* 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 91.
92. Silber and Little, p. 215.
93. Bridge, p. 350.
94. Pavlowitch, *The Improbable Survivor*, p. 25.
95. Joel Dirlam and James Plummer, *An Introduction to the Yugoslav Economy* (Columbus: C. E. Merrill, 1973).
96. Comisso, pp. 115–68.
97. Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy," p. 143.
98. Woodward, p. 56.
99. At this time, Croatian nationalist movements were centered around the traditional Catholic cultural organization Hrvatska Matica, a group that advocated cultural separatism. Among the demands made by the students was a separate Croatian membership in the United Nations (see Djilas, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia," p. 90). This demand worried Tito the most; he believed that if Croatia had a separate seat, it would ally with the Soviet Union against him.
100. Bridge (p. 364) reports that Vladimir Barkarić who had dominated Croatian politics for a generation and who remained in power after 1971, was a liberal who never questioned the value of the Yugoslav federation.
101. See Djilas, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia," p. 89.
102. Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy," p. 143, and Hoepkin, pp. 38–42.
103. Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milošević," p. 82.
104. Silber and Little, p. 63.
105. The literature on these transitions is vast. Examples include the following: Philippe C. Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far East Should They Go?" *Slavic Review* 53, 1 (Spring, 1994): 173–85; Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Karen Remmer, "Democracy and Economic Crises: The Latin American Experience," *World Politics* 42, 3 (Spring 1990); Terry Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Types of Democracy Emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe and South and Central America," in *Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in Central Europe*, ed. Peter Volten (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1992), pp. 42–68.
106. Sabrina Ramet, "The Albanians of Kosovo: The Potential for Destabilization," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 3, 1 (Winter/Spring 1996).
107. Lydall, pp. 208–12.
108. Silber and Little, p. 63. Woodward reports that the demonstrators were often paid by their employers to attend but increasingly came from among the unemployed, who needed a handout or had nothing else to do.

109. Woodward; Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milošević," p. 90.
110. Woodward, pp. 120–21.
111. The source for this material is Djilas "Fear Thy Neighbor," pp. 92–93, and Woodward, pp. 117–32.
112. *Ibid.*
113. Silber and Little, p. 90.
114. The constitution gave the president broad emergency powers; there is little separation of powers and horizontal accountability in the government. The judiciary lacks independence; its appointments and dismissals are controlled by the parliament and there is little freedom of the press. Dijana Pleština argues that the concentration of political power has given rise to a new elite of party-state functionaries "whose major decisions are made outside the proper government sphere." The constitution further states that only those of Croatian ethnicity can be citizens of Croatia, whether they live there or not. Members of other ethnic groups are not accorded the same rights of citizenship (see Dijana Pleština, "Politics, Economics, and War: Problems of Transition in Croatia" [Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, 1993]; working paper 5.15; and Robert Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics" [Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, 1992, working paper 5.2]).
115. Woodward; Posen, p. 37.
116. Woodward, pp. 107–8.
117. The best blow-by-blow account is Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin Books, 1992). See also Woodward, pp. 102–3; Djilas, "Fear Thy Neighbor," pp. 92–94; and Sabrina Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 27–43.
118. On coalitions of convenience, see Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 170ff.
119. The most important work on this subject has been done by Arend Lijphart. See *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), and *Power-Sharing in South Africa* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1985).
120. The SDA, 33 percent, the SDS, 29.6 percent, and the HDZ, 18.3 percent (Woodward, p. 122).
121. Malcolm, p. 225.
122. Woodward, pp. 230–31.
123. The above material is from *ibid.*, p. 97.
124. As of 1994, very few classes in Macedonian schools were taught in Albanian, even in areas where they are in the majority. Less than 5 percent

of government employees were Albanian. A new law requiring and enforcing Cyrillic-only script in public was used to close down Albanian-owned businesses. Gypsies remained ostracized and marginalized from the Macedonian mainstream (see Hanna Rosin, "Greek Pique: Why We Flip-Flopped on Macedonia," *New Republic* 210, 24 [13 June 1994]: 12; Amanda Sebetsyen, "Walking the Tightrope in the Balkans," *New Statesman and Society* 7, 319 [9 September 1994]: 22–23).

125. Cohen, pp. 150–51.
126. The constitution granted citizenship to residents that had been there for at least fifteen years. This meant that minorities could be citizens, but still citizenship was denied to thousands of Albanians that had emigrated to the area from Kosovo in order to avoid Serb oppression and the thousands of Bosnian Muslims that fled their homes (Janice Broun, "Worse Yet to Come? Kosovo and Macedonia," *Commonweal* 120, 2 [29 January 1993]: 4).
127. In 1994 Greece imposed an embargo on Macedonia to protest the use of "Macedonia" as the state's name and to protest the flag, which used Greek symbolism. In September 1995, to stop the embargo an agreement was reached in which the Macedonian government adopted a new flag.
128. Interview with VMRO officials, April 1994. See also Paul Mosjes, "Travels in the Balkans: Tensions and Aspirations in Macedonia," *Christian Century* 111, 16 (11 June 1994): 500.
129. Menduh Thaqi, the most vocal and radical leader of the Albanian party, has threatened a campaign of civil disobedience if positive minority rights are not granted to the Albanian minority. Following the example of Serbs in Bosnia, he has threatened that the Albanians would establish their own political structures, including an Albanian assembly (see Rosin, "Greek Pique," p. 12).
130. See NATO Press Service, press communiques M-1 (91) 42, 6 June 1991; M-2 (91) 60, 21 August 1991; S-1 (91) 86, 8 November 1991. See also Hans Binnendijk, "NATO Can't Be Vague about Commitment to Eastern Europe," *International Herald Tribune*, 8 November 1991; James Eberle, "Defence without an Enemy," *The Guardian*, 8 November 1991. For later statements to the same effect with regard to the war in Bosnia, see "Die NATO wird nicht nach Osten ausgeweitet" (NATO will not extend to the East), *Die Welt*, 31 January 1992, p. 1; and "NATO Could Supply Europe's Peacemaking Force," *International Herald Tribune*, 7 May 1992, p. 1.
131. See Beverly Crawford, "Explaining Defection."
132. The material in this section is taken from Robert M. Hayden, "Constitutionalism and Nationalism in the Balkans: The Bosnian 'Constitution' as a Formula for Partition," *East European Constitutional Review*, Fall 1995, pp. 65–68. The House of Representatives has forty-two members, two-thirds of which must come from the Muslim-Croat Federation and one-third from the Republika Srpska. The House of Peoples consists of fifteen members—five Serbs, five Croats, and five Muslims.

THE TALE OF TWO RESORTS: ABKHAZIA AND AJARIA BEFORE AND SINCE THE SOVIET COLLAPSE

Georgi M. Derluguian

INTRODUCTION

My intent here is to focus on two of the many instances of “ethnic” war and peace currently in progress throughout the Caucasus.¹ The two, in the former Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics of Abkhazia and Ajaria, which are both now technically within the Republic of Georgia, seemed to best illustrate events in the boiling cauldron of Caucasian politics. The two places are nearly identical: they are “resorts,” characterized by a Mafia-permeated society, with similar histories of Islamization, Russian conquest, and autonomy in association with the former Georgian SSR. Paradoxically the current state of affairs in each seems to differ significantly. Abkhazia has been at war with Georgia, a war characterized by rabid nationalism, ethnic cleansing, and the widespread involvement of mercenaries. The conflict in Abkhazia seemed to confirm current expert opinion: the federal structures of the Communist period invariably, and often bloodily, would break up in the course of post-Communist transitions (Vujačić and Zaslavsky 1991). Yet at the same time that conflict was splashed across the pages of the Western media, Ajaria remained almost defiantly peaceful. Both its leadership and apparently the vast majority of its population remained loyal to the ideal of a federal Georgian state. Ajaria appears to parallel the politics in some more “pro-federal” ethnic autonomous regions of Russia. Abkhazia and Ajaria thus represent the extremes of the spectrum of ethnic relations even as they display many similarities.

I will investigate the reasons for this difference. At the heart of my argument is the claim that while the Soviet state initially shored up Abkhazian political power in order to create an ally against op-

posing political forces in Georgia, it suppressed early moves toward Ajarian autonomy, permitting Georgia to pursue assimilationist policies there. Moscow thus largely *created the political relevance* of Abkhazian cultural identity, while simultaneously preventing Ajarian cultural identity from becoming politically relevant. I argue that those institutions that politicized cultural identity and the privileges and discrimination bound up with those institutions created tensions with Georgia which later escalated to violent conflict. And it is the absence of those factors that prevented similar tensions from festering in Ajaria.

To be sure, Ajaris had fewer cultural distinctions to politicize; they spoke Georgian and, aside from their adoption of Islam, saw themselves as culturally Georgian. Abkhazes, on the other hand, spoke a different, though closely related language, and long saw themselves as culturally distinct from Georgians. Nonetheless, despite cultural similarities, Ajarian elites fought for territorial autonomy from Georgia—focusing on religious differences—but were unable to attain it. In contrast, in an effort to bolster Bolshevik control in the region, in the face of a potentially renegade Georgian elite, Moscow permitted a loyal Abkhazia to exist as an autonomous republic equal in status to Georgia. This status significantly enhanced the autonomy and power of Abkhazian elites. This comparative case study, then, supports the argument that Philip Roeder makes more generally for the Soviet successor states in this volume. As he argues, and as the two cases here suggest, the Bolsheviks were committed to the political recognition of language-based, not religion-based, cultural groups within the federal state. Abkhazes were thus given the status of titular nationality, while Ajaris were denied that status. This distinction made all the difference to the odds of violent conflict when the Soviet Union collapsed.

For a long period, the powerful alliance between the Abkhazian and Moscow elites brought relative social and political stability, and what Roeder calls an “ethnic machine” was created, giving Abkhazian elites disproportionate power and resources, which they doled out to their ethnic clients in exchange for support. But in the late 1980s, glasnost deeply eroded ethnofederal institutions, and Georgians used their new-found freedom of speech to launch a campaign for confrontation with the central Abkhazian and Soviet authorities. Abkhazian elites, with the central authorities on their side, raised the

stakes by launching a campaign for Abkhazia's secession from Georgia.

With the Soviet collapse, however, Abkhazian elites lost their patrons in Moscow and Georgia was unconstrained in its effort to control Abkhazia; in 1992 Georgian tanks invaded Sukhumi, the Abkhazian capital. A war broke out, and by 1993 between 25,000 and 30,000 people had died. Indeed a large "ethnic cleansing" left Abkhazia deserted and destroyed. More than half of the prewar population had become refugees.

As noted, Ajaris, in contrast, had not attained the status of a titular nationality. Furthermore, Georgian was the official language in Ajaria, and Ajaris identified politically as Georgians. No ethnic patronage networks flourished. Thus with the Soviet collapse, few incentives and few affective or material resources existed for Ajarian political entrepreneurs to attempt secession with the collapse of central authority. There was no significant rise in political Islam in Ajaria, and the region peacefully attained a large measure of autonomy within Georgia.

In the pages that follow, I flesh out this argument with a descriptive "tale" of the two resorts. I begin with a discussion of Abkhazia, tracing the cultural differences between the Abkhazes and the Georgians, the reasons for Moscow's decision to make those cultural differences politically relevant, and some causes of tension between the Abkhazian and Georgian elites. I then trace the events that led to increasingly open political tensions between these elites and the escalation of those tensions to violence as the Soviet state weakened and then collapsed. Next, I turn to a discussion of Ajaria, the reasons for Georgia's permission from Moscow to pursue assimilationist policies, and the policies themselves. I discuss the brief rebellion in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse and explain why violence was avoided. In the final section I compare the two cases analytically and conclude that in these cases "ethnicity" is not the cause of ethnic conflict. If we can generalize from this account, we must look to instrumental explanations of "ethnic" conflict, explore how cultural differences become politically relevant, and examine how politicized cultural differences lead to social tensions and to violence.

ABKHAZIA

Any Old World nationalism legitimates itself, first and foremost, through its claims to primordality, antiquity, and therefore its superior rights to the "land." From this perspective, the Abkhazes are well within their rights to their claims of cultural uniqueness. Even the most vociferous of Georgian polemicists rarely dare to deny that Strabo's Abazgi were the direct ancestors of today's Abkhazes (Inal-Ipa 1965: 107–19). Problems arise, however, when historians assume the ungratifying but much more important task of determining the exact ethnic culture (that is, allegiance) of the medieval Abkhazian princes, who, while occasionally ruling on their own, were more often tributaries to various Georgian kingdoms, as well as the Byzantine and Ottoman empires. The dynastic name of the Abkhazian potentates, who can be traced at least as far back as the twelfth century, was Shervashidze. This is quite clearly a Georgian form, although it is derived from the Shirvan-shahs, a Persian dynasty of medieval Caspian Azerbaijan. To this genealogy, modern Abkhazes offer a counterargument: the Shervashidzes had another, purely Abkhazian clan name, Cháchba, and therefore they must be considered a local dynasty that had invented a mythological foreign ancestry, certainly not an unusual thing in feudal genealogies (Anchabadze 1976: 62–64).

Still the Shervashidze princes were Georgian in their palace culture and political leanings until the late seventeenth century, when they and the subjects of their realm were converted to Islam by the Ottomans. These conversions were, however, very superficial and reversible; during the nineteenth century, various Shervashidzes shifted back and forth across the religious divide, as the Russians and Georgians struggled with the Ottomans and their North Caucasian mountaineer allies. Eventually Georgian Orthodox priests launched a missionary movement to reconvert the Abkhazes, who had "strayed from the fold."² This religious zeal was soon transformed into a secular Georgian nationalist effort to bring the Abkhazes back into the embrace of the Georgian nation.

The Abkhazian language—related to the Georgian roughly as Breton is to French or Gaelic is to English—was not considered a problem inasmuch as the mother tongues of most Georgians are

mutually unintelligible regional dialects. But Abkhazian did not become a Georgian patois for an obvious reason: there was another dominant language—namely, Russian. Although there are reasons to suspect that Georgian is more widely known than most Abkhazes would normally admit—especially in the rural areas of ethnic contact—Russian undoubtedly gained greater ground among them throughout the twentieth century, as a reaction against Georgian attempts to assimilate them (Anchabadze 1976: 126–27).

Kinship patterns, however, clearly distinguish the Abkhazes culturally from Georgians. Anthropologists are often fascinated by the “primeval” relic forms of kinship and associated custom-based complexes still found among the Abkhazes. Indeed within this small nationality, virtually everyone is related, and the Abkhazes find it easy to establish their genealogical connections through delightful and picturesque ritual conversations, normally conducted over a well-set table.³ Most Georgians, on the other hand, establish their identity not through kinship clans and village communities, but rather through their historical provinces related to the dialects and principalities of medieval Georgia. No expert in Caucasian affairs would fail to mention this as an important difference. But cultural differences were certainly not as central to an explanation of the tension between the Abkhazes and the Georgians as the relationship between the Abkhazian elite and those in power in Moscow.

POLITICIZING CULTURAL IDENTITY

The existence of contemporary Abkhazia as a separate administrative unit with a proper ethnic identity is largely an outcome of the historical events of 1917–21. Ironically the promotion of the Abkhazian *national* cause was carried out by the *internationalist* Bolsheviks. In 1918, during their struggle against the Georgian Social Democratic regime, local Bolsheviks under the leadership of an Abkhaz, Nestor Lakoba, capitalized on agrarian disturbances and the emergence of *kiaraz*, Abkhazian peasant self-defense militias, to demand autonomy (Dzidzaria 1971; Lakoba 1987: 3–8). Georgian Social Democrats granted this right to Abkhazia within the framework of a Georgian Democratic Republic. In the 1920s the Bolsheviks made the same allowances when, under Lakoba’s leadership, Abkhazia existed as a

Soviet republic equal in status to Georgia while united with the latter under the short-lived Transcaucasian Federation (Dzidzaria, ed. 1967: 174–75; Inal-Ipa 1965: 174–77). This status (although couched in typically ambiguous Soviet legal terms) was written into Abkhazia's constitution of 1925, whose unilateral restoration in the summer of 1992 became a pretext for the current war with Georgia. Thus with the 1925 constitution began the institutionalization of Abkhazian political identity. Two other factors—Moscow's recognition of the Abkhazian language as one separate from Georgian and its policy of preferential treatment for Abkhazian peasants—both reinforced this separate political identity and created increasing tensions with Georgia.

In this respect, Nestor Lakoba looms large in Abkhazia's fortunes under Bolshevism. One of the most important and active Bolshevik leaders in Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus during and after the civil war, this political entrepreneur was virtually Abkhazia's potentate until his mysterious death in 1936.⁴ In the critical early years, Lakoba was powerful enough to resist the use of Georgian as the official language in Abkhazia without being accused of "national deviationism." This was facilitated, of course, by the fact that Stalin accused the Georgian Bolsheviks of this most mortal sin in the Bolshevik demonology.⁵ In addition, with Lakoba's maneuvering, Abkhazia was collectivized very late—not until 1936, and in some parts, as late as 1938. This meant that Abkhazian peasants were spared the most grievous dislocations of forced collectivization, while many of the Russian and Greek settler farmers in the area, whose possession dated back to prerevolutionary times, were stripped of property ("dekulakized") and deported. Their lands were then taken over by the state-organized settlers of the new *kolkhozi*, moved there from Georgia proper.

The economic and demographic impacts on Abkhazia of this Georgian immigration were long-lasting. The ethnic Abkhazian population had already been decimated during the Russian conquest of the Caucasus—the largest historical trauma in Abkhazian collective memory, which nonetheless failed to divert contemporary Abkhazian nationalists from being ardently pro-Russian. Whole districts of Abkhazia were depopulated and resettled by the Russian Caucasian command with supposedly more reliable and progressive "Christian elements": Armenians, Greeks, Georgians, even Estonians and Poles.⁶ Between 1840 and 1878 several waves of refugees

(*mahajeers*) left what was becoming the Russian empire and settled in what was then still the Ottoman Empire. And as with most of the other North Caucasian mountaineers, since the “final pacification” of Caucasia in 1864 and the ensuing exodus of the mahajeers, Abkhazes became a minority in their own land, settled in dispersed, discontinuous areas. After the massive emigrations following the abortive anti-Russian rebellions of 1866 and 1878, there remained very few autochthonous Abkhazes in the vicinity of their administrative center of Sukhum(i).⁷ Thereafter, the Georgian population in Abkhazia grew steadily, increasing from 37,000, or 28 percent of the population, in 1914 to 240,000, or 45.7 percent, in 1989 (Anchabadze 1976: 89; *Ezhegodnik* 1991: 117). Proportionately ethnic Abkhazes lost dramatically during the same period. Today there may be more Abkhazes living in Turkey, Syria, and Jordan than can be found in the historical homeland. (Some Abkhazian nationalists, keen on boosting their numbers, would say three to four times more.) As recently as 1989 the “titular nationality” of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia hardly constituted 7 percent of the capital city’s population (Anchabadze 1976: 140).

In sum, by 1945 the Abkhazes were a minority in Abkhazia but had achieved the status of a titular nationality, and through the efforts of Nestor Lakoba received all of the political benefits that that status conferred. Tensions between the Abkhazes and Georgians began to intensify as the Abkhazian elite gained increasing privileges and the Georgian population experienced increasing discrimination. As we shall see, these tensions were also present throughout the postwar period, increased during the period of glasnost, and escalated to violent conflict when the Soviet Union collapsed. It is to a description of this period that the discussion now turns.

GROWING IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

After 1945 the political economy of Abkhazia, like that of Ajaria, was shaped by its unique geographic position in the USSR as a subtropical seaside. At first glance, it would seem that economic abundance muted the political relevance of cultural identity. Indeed Abkhazia, like Ajaria, was blessed by its location. Its coastal strips and mountain valleys became prosperous resorts, and it was virtu-

ally a monopolistic producer of such universally prized products as tobacco, wines, and tea. Moscow had to purchase these commodities from the local collective farms and small factories at preferential prices. This was true even when these products were diluted with ordinary grass or water. The amount of dilution was always subject to invisible bargaining and implicit understandings. In fact, the quality of the commodity was directly related to the social destination of the final product. There was an informal yet relatively firm agreement as to how much tap water and sugar could be contained in wine sent to common shops in Russia, to local stores (where local honor had to be upheld, within limits), and finally to those “special parties,” where it was destined to be consumed by the nomenklatura (after all, to present a visiting Moscow official with a case of diluted Riesling would have been a *faux pas par excellence*).

In the aftermath of Stalinism, individual Russians (Ukrainians, Tatars, Jews, or any of the other urban dwellers of the industrial north) could afford even higher prices for the privately produced exotic fruits (primarily tangerines) exported to northern bazaars. The same urban workers and cadres eagerly swarmed to the Caucasian Black Sea beaches—useless malarial swamps or calcinated drylands until the mid-twentieth century—from Anapa in the north to Batumi in the south. At its peak, Abkhazia, with a permanent population of 500,000, was visited annually by more than two million vacationers. The coastal strip emerged as one of the wealthiest spots in the USSR, conspicuously displayed in its abundance of private mansions and automobiles.

Even as the area was transformed into the Soviet Côte d’Azur, the locals developed habits and survival techniques like in Corsica and Sicily (or at least those of Isaac Babel’s Odessa). Seaside Georgian towns, as well as the neighboring resorts in Russia, were transformed into criminal meccas. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these Mafia groups were quite powerful. Indicative of the criminalization of the region is that in the early 1990s, out of some 700 recognized “authorities” (*avtoritet*) of the Soviet gangster underworld, about 300 came from this region (*MN*, 9 May 1993).⁸

Urban Abkhazes were prominent in neither the tourist business (i.e., offering private lodgings to “wild,” undocumented vacationers, running cafes or discotheques, or acting as beach photographers or private vendors, etc.) nor in organized crime. There was little need,

inasmuch as positions in the police, managerial and party bureaucracies, and the intelligentsia provided sufficient legal and extralegal means of compensation. Tourism could be left to the Armenians and Greeks, as coal mining and power supply (concentrated respectively in the enclaves of Tkvarcheli and Inguri) were left to immigrant Russians and Ukrainians. This particular division of labor along ethnic lines was relatively comfortable to all sides and thus, in contrast to the case of the Georgians, engendered little competition with the Abkhazes. In the 1960s, when the system was booming and settling into place, local Greek, Armenian, Russian, and Georgian racketeers, accompanied by their teenaged groupies, occasionally waged fierce gangster wars among themselves. This, however, rarely jeopardized interethnic harmony. The social and political environment was very stable, the economy was growing, and public opinion in those days had little incentive to interpret a restaurant brawl or a cadaver washed ashore as anything more than they really were.

Nonetheless, the Abkhazes (or rather their elites) felt insecure in the face of an ever-growing Georgian population, backed by Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. A lack of literacy in Georgian severely limited upward mobility for Abkhazian functionaries. Normally they could not even move to positions in Tbilisi. Their children had to study at the local Sukhumi pedagogical institute or leave for Russian universities. Thus the period from Stalin's death and Beria's execution in 1953 to the present has been characterized by an Abkhazian backlash against the Georgians. Winning back the Cyrillic-based alphabet was more than a symbolic victory for the Abkhazes. Their better educated and career-minded sons were able to gain control over key positions in the local state and party apparatus, and the relative importance of the local authorities was given an enormous boost by leaders from Moscow—beginning with Stalin himself—who regularly sojourned at state villas in Abkhazia.

Indeed the advantages of direct connections between the Abkhazian elite and the Russian elite were considerable. Abkhazes controlled much of the land and the most lucrative crops, which was more important because they were less urbanized than any other group in the area (Anchabadze 1976: 146). State power, moreover, provided a mighty lever in offsetting the chronic competition from Georgian peasants.⁹

Georgians in Abkhazia experienced the moves by the Abkhazian elite to change the alphabet, gain control of key political positions, and dominate agriculture as severe discrimination. In 1978 Georgian resentment erupted in one of the most amazing mass movements ever seen in pre-perestroika USSR. The formal pretext was an unlikely one: the meaningless Moscow-sponsored campaign of an all-people's discussion of the draft constitution. Under cover of this process, Tbilisi dissidents, headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his colleagues from the self-styled Georgian Helsinki human rights monitoring group, organized their very first significant popular mobilization. But in place of what was to the vast majority of the contemporary Soviet population the abstract and alien issue of human rights, the Tbilisi dissidents began to crusade on behalf of the Georgian language.¹⁰ In a move extraordinary for the time, Eduard Shevardnadze met with a group of protesters led by Gamsakhurdia and agreed to meet their demands regarding the status of the Georgian language. In another significant exception to the usual Soviet reaction to major crises, Shevardnadze was left in place to "normalize the situation."

In these events, the ethnic Abkhazian intelligentsia and *nomenklatura*—generally interchangeable and overlapping in most Soviet national autonomies—saw both an opportunity and a grave danger. They reacted to the perceived menace from Tbilisi by convening an all-ethnic meeting at a field near the village of Lykhny.¹¹ Some 12,000 people—all Abkhazes!—attended and many Abkhazian officials made their presence at the rally conspicuous by signing a petition to be sent to Moscow. The rhetoric at the rally was, moreover, very pro-Soviet (Slider 1985). Speakers demanded that their mother tongue be made the state language of the autonomous republic and that the republic itself be transferred from Georgia to the Russian Federation.

Not long after, violent clashes between Abkhazes and Georgians were reported in several places, some involving fatalities. When Shevardnadze rushed to Abkhazia in response to events, rumors swirled that someone had taken a shot at him. Georgian signs and advertisements were defaced, and Georgian schools stoned. By that time, groups of Abkhazes were marching about Sukhumi and Gagra, jovially brandishing portraits of Brezhnev, Soviet flags, and

mock banners with slogans such as “Armenia joined Russia 150 years ago. When shall we?”¹²

By May 1978 events in Abkhazia were so out of hand that Moscow deemed it necessary to dispatch to the scene none other than Ivan V. Kapitonov, secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU in charge of cadres and organizational work, who held a series of meetings with local officials. In keeping with the Soviet tradition of favoring Abkhazian interests, he recognized the validity of some of their grievances, especially the lack of proportionate budgetary funding channeled to Abkhazia by Tbilisi (Slider 1985). The possibility or of changing internal Soviet borders was firmly dismissed, a policy clearly designed in reference to other similar cases, such as Nagorno-Karabakh. In exchange for promises by the locals to normalize the situation in Abkhazia, Kapitonov offered a gigantic plan of socioeconomic development, estimated at the time to cost between \$500 and \$750 million, and hefty quotas for the Abkhazes in education and official positions. An identical bargain was offered to the Karabakh Armenians in early 1988.

In the aftermath, a few “instigators”—mostly Georgian dissidents, including Gamsakhurdia—were imprisoned, and, to provide for balance, several Abkhazian youth who had been involved in street fighting received prison terms. but Abkhazian elites received even more privileges. Previously dismissed Abkhazian officials—numbering nearly one hundred—were reinstated in their jobs and the party. In place of the old pedagogical institute, the Abkhazes were awarded a full-scale university, with a tenfold increase in faculty and student enrollment. Abkhazian television programs proliferated, additional Abkhazian newspapers and journals appeared, and it was widely assumed that roughly 40 percent of government and judicial posts were given to Abkhazian elites and their clients. Most important, a Russian from Moscow was appointed minister of internal affairs of Abkhazia; the Georgian *samizdat* later claimed that he never hired a single Georgian for the police force. The ethnic machine was clearly at work.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC OF CULTURAL CONFLICT

Politics cannot be divorced from economics, least of all in the Soviet case. And the Soviets sought to extract their economic pound of flesh for the political benefits they had conferred. In the late 1970s, as the Soviet economy began to decline, Moscow launched a campaign to secure reliable supplies of fruit, wines, and vegetables for the industrial cities of the north. The effort was part of a larger attempt to reduce imports and expand internal resources, as well as alleviate growing popular discontent in the face of the exorbitant prices charged by private southern sellers, who were increasingly branded "Caucasian speculators."

The pressure from Moscow on Abkhazia came directly through Georgia.¹³ The measures to which Shevardnadze resorted in this instance were not unusual for this part of the USSR. Local residents vividly remember that roadblocks appeared on Abkhazia's border with Russia. Georgian police and village bosses visited rural homes, strongly urging people to sell their tangerines to state-run acquisition outlets. Prices dropped and stricter controls over collective farm property and workers' absenteeism were introduced.¹⁴ This effort led to very genuine grievances, not against Moscow, but against Tbilisi and Georgian police authorities, both of which were perceived through ethnic categories.

As described above, tensions between Abkhazian and Georgian elites were already high. Moscow's preferential policies toward the Abkhazes in 1978—and simultaneous discrimination against Georgians in Abkhazia—had become the main theme of Tbilisi dissidents. Because of the economic pressure that Moscow exerted on Abkhazia *through* pressure tactics exerted by the Georgian authorities, Abkhazian dissidents now too raised their voices in complaint. In 1988, during the heyday of glasnost, both Abkhazian and Georgian "informal" activists, drawn from among the lower and younger nomenklatura and intelligentsia, used every opportunity to launch increasingly massive political campaigns on behalf of their own ethnic brethren. Abkhazes demanded secession from Georgia (the formal demand was for the restoration of the 1925 constitution, making Abkhazia a sovereign Soviet republic); Georgian radicals called for restoration of an independent Georgia, in accord with the pre-Bolshevik 1920 constitution.

THE COLLAPSING SOVIET STATE AND THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE

Abkhazian protests were explicitly pro-Soviet, sponsored by local officials with prominent Abkhazian intellectuals as figure-heads; the Georgian nationalist campaign was anti-Soviet, led by the dissident intelligentsia, which actively sought confrontation with the Communist authorities. The Georgian dissidents escalated their campaign until eventually the Communist powerholders in Tbilisi blinked and urged Moscow to send in the army. In the tragic clash with the Soviet troops on 19 April 1989, nineteen people died, most of them women.

As a result of this outrage, the most radical wing of the Georgian nationalists, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, became the preponderant force in the republic, coming to power in the fall of 1990. Gamsakhurdia was overthrown in January 1992 by his own lieutenants, the Georgian National Guard "colonel" Tengiz Kitovani and the "head of the national rescue service" Jaba Ioseliani, both former dissidents and bohemian artists who transformed themselves into warlords while fighting the creeping wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Not even Shevardnadze's return to Tbilisi as a figure of national reconciliation and external prestige altered this chaotic trajectory of escalating violence.

The Abkhazes, whose rhetoric and orientation remained firmly pro-Soviet throughout their ethnonationalist mobilization, continued to defy Tbilisi with challenges that often smacked of provocation and probably reflected internal struggles between moderates and radicals. As a rule, those who advocated a more moderate course were former economic managerial nomenklatura from Abkhazia's Council of Ministers, mostly concerned about administrative order and property rights. The radical camp was a rather motley crowd, ranging from former members of the ideological nomenklatura to professional gangsters, from socially unstable youth to the newly made politicians of the perestroika period (including independent MPs of the partly open elections of 1989–90, journalists who had gained notoriety on the wave of glasnost, and various types of "informals" and political organizers). In a nutshell, they were people without an immediate interest in social, political, or economic stability.

The moderates argued for prudence and avoidance of the misery and destruction already evident in Nagorno-Karabakh, South

Ossetia, and Tbilisi itself. Their rhetoric centered on two arguments. First, "We are a tiny nation that cannot afford any casualties," and second, "We must be saved from ourselves before we revert back to the Dark Ages of mountaineer banditry and clan vendettas" (*SK*, no. 10, 1992). But radicals began to gain the upper hand as the conflict with Georgia spiraled into conventional warfare. This in effect pushed the moderates toward Moscow, as the Abkhazian Communist leadership found it convenient to cultivate a most unlikely company of allies. These included, on the one hand, Communist hard-liners from Moscow as well as the Soviet (later Russian) military who viewed Abkhazia as a lever against the unruly Georgians but who also had vested personal interests in their Stalin-era state dachas in Abkhazia. Sukhumi emissaries wooed to their cause such expatriate Abkhazian luminaries as the Moscow-based author Fazil Iskander, who enjoyed enormous prestige among the Russian liberal intelligentsia, and, in a huge moral victory for the Abkhazian separatists, Andrei Sakharov, who publicly branded Georgia a "mini-empire" and Gamsakhurdia a "rogue dissident."

Furthermore, Abkhazian officialdom and the intelligentsia became actively involved in reviving "ancient ethnic ties" with North Caucasian mountaineers, especially the Circassians (*Adygé*). The outcome was the creation of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, a pan-nationalist movement of autochthonous North Caucasians with an explicitly pan-Islamic and anti-Russian program and rhetoric. Karabakh had Armenia, South Ossetia had North Ossetia, Russian speakers everywhere had Russia, but Abkhazia had no ethnic "mainland." Hence the Abkhazes tried to acquire as many allies as possible; as it is said, "A clever calf sucks from two cows."

In August 1992, after a period of fairly irresponsible, if not intentionally provocative, declarations by the Abkhazian nomenklatura-nationalist leadership, Sukhumi was invaded by tanks and gangs of Georgia's "National Guard." Significantly the second Georgian army in Abkhazia was formed of local Mingrels—hence their leanings toward the exiled Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a Mingrel, and distrust of Shevardnadze, an Eastern Georgian. The commander of this army was a certain Geno Adamia, a locally notorious gangster to whom Shevardnadze eventually awarded the rank of colonel-general.

The politics of alliance-building pursued by the Abkhazian leadership between 1988 and 1992 paid off heftily (although the purely circumstantial breadth of the pro-Abkhazian alliance may eventually cause it to backfire badly). With hardly concealed aid from the Russian military and the Cossack irregulars, and with Chechen and Circassian volunteers rushing to Abkhazia from the Northern Caucasus and the Middle East, the riffraff posing as the Georgian army was thunderously defeated in fourteen months.¹⁵

The Abkhazian victory was followed by as gruesome an ethnic cleansing as could be imagined. The scale of the current depopulation of Georgians has far exceeded any of the nineteenth-century depredations executed against the Abkhazes. Two hundred and forty thousand refugees fled to Georgia, an unspecified number left for Russia, and most ethnic Greeks were airlifted to Greece. Vacant houses in this once prized area have been offered as rewards to anyone who fought on the Abkhazian side. A few tangerines were exported to Russia in 1993, most of them reportedly harvested by enslaved Georgians (*NG*, 22 October 1993). But the bulk of exports from Abkhazia in that year consisted of war loot and weaponry.

Thus in many important ways the Abkhazian case supports Roeder's central argument. The ethnic machine was strengthened when Moscow supported its Abkhazian clients against Georgian threats. But those clients lost their Moscow patrons when the Soviet state collapsed. Roeder has argued that "a regional leader's decision to 'play the ethnic card' is constrained by the structure of accountability and support from the regional leader's principals." This account has suggested that the decision to play the ethnic card on the part of Abkhazian elites was conditioned by threats from Gamsakhurdia and the inability of Abkhazia's Moscow patrons to provide support after the Soviet collapse.

AJARIA: THE LAND WITHOUT A PEOPLE?

Ajaristan was annexed by Russia from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, a relatively late date. It was at the time a typical old Anatolian area—that is, an historically created ethnographic museum inherited from Mithridates's Pontic kingdom and the Byzantine and the Trebi-

zond (Trabzon) empires. As was the case elsewhere in the empire, Ottoman authorities ruled over this mosaic via *millets*, the state-sponsored system of religious communities. Religion was thus the main determinant of group status and the foundation of socioeconomic organization.¹⁶ For example, Abkhazes living in Ajaria are firmly Muslim in their ritual practices, a striking contrast to the dispassionate pagan-Muslim-Christian syncretism of the Abkhazes in Abkhazia (Kopeshavidze 1985: 96–109). In their turn, “Ajarians”—who were Islamized Georgians, or rather Gurians from the medieval province of Guria, with its particular dialect—tended to associate with the “Turks” rather than the “Georgians.” This became dramatically evident in popular attitudes during the chaotic period of 1917–21, when Ajaria’s Muslims aided advancing Turkish armies on every available occasion, waging guerrilla war against both Russian and Georgian forces (Kazemzadeh 1951: 102; also see Kvinitadze 1985: 430–41).

There was another, purely modern factor that set Ajaria apart from the rest of Georgia. At the turn of the century, Ajaria’s capital of Batumi was linked to the oil fields of Baku by one of the earliest pipelines and a railway, and it became one of the most important ports in the world. Ajaria’s short-lived autonomy in the chaotic aftermath of World War I was largely due to conflicting geopolitical interests in the region. Independent Azerbaijan insisted that Ajaria, being a Muslim Caucasian territory, should become its enclave on the Black Sea, or at least an independent southwest Caucasian republic. British occupying authorities in 1919 favored free port status for Batumi, like Trieste and Danzig. Both Ottoman and Kemalist Turks claimed it their own, as did some Armenian politicians. And Georgians saw themselves as the only rightful rulers. In March 1921 Bolshevik cavalry stormed into Batumi hours before Turkish reinforcements could arrive, while the local Georgian garrison preferred to surrender to “any Russians” than to the Turks (Kazemzadeh 1951: 325). As a concession, Moscow agreed to grant autonomy to the Muslim population of Ajaristan as part of its Kars treaty with the insurgent government of Ankara—at the time the only foreign government that had good relations with the Bolsheviks.

Given the historical and cultural impulses for autonomy, it is not surprising that Georgian Social Democrat policies of land reform and cultural autonomy failed to integrate the Muslim population into Georgia. As the Social Democratic leader Noah Jordania sadly ob-

served at the time, "Even in theory our laws on land stand no chance in this realm of Islam. Antagonizing local begs and agas would do a thousand times more harm [to democratic Georgia] than leaving the peasants without land. Mohammed perhaps proved to be a better socialist in giving the land right to God" (cited in Chavleishvili 1977: 139).¹⁷

All of the relevant factors therefore pointed to the politicization of cultural identity in Ajaria. Nonetheless, Ajaria did not go the way of Abkhazia, with its successful bid for independence. Why not? The answer focuses on one striking peculiarity: Ajaria has no titular nationality. There is an Ajaria, but there are no Ajaris. For a student of Soviet nationalities, this is like discovering an egg-laying mammal. It is to the story of the missing titular nationality that the discussion now turns.

ETHNIC HOMOGENIZATION UNDER STALIN

We know next to nothing about the situation in Ajaria during Stalinism. Generally research on Ajaria has been extremely poor and fragmentary. Yet we know that the Bolsheviks in Tbilisi and their local comrades in Batumi, after a brief interlude in the early 1920s, unleashed what amounted to a war against the Muslim authorities and institutions of Ajaria. The stages of this onslaught were reflected in the succession of ethnic names bestowed on the Ajaris by the government in Tbilisi. The pre-1917 "Mohammedan Georgians" (or simply "Muslims") became "Ajarians" for the only time in the Soviet census of 1926, which counted 71,000 of them (Kozlov 1988: 91). Subsequently they were simply listed as "Georgians," inasmuch as no official Soviet census asked about religion. The narrowly parochial and long since sublated ethnonym "Gurian" was equally out of the question.¹⁸

Prior to World War I the universally popular assumption in Transcaucasia was that there existed basically just three indigenous nationalities in the region: Georgians, Armenians, and Muslims. In the late 1930s, however, Soviet authorities officially introduced a new ethnonym: Azerbaijani. Anyone in Transcaucasia who persisted in considering himself Muslim became, by fiat, Azerbaijani, regardless of language (which, in theory, Bolsheviks considered a key eth-

nic indicator), and this newly discovered “fact” was then recorded in the required passport. Paradoxically—although quite logically—groups inside the Azerbaijani SSR as distinct as Talyshees, Tats, Karapapakhs, Kurds, and Lezgins were, it appeared, being gradually assimilated, at least until the collapse of the Soviet order, when these obliterated identities resurfaced as new separatisms.

For a time, some Ajaris naively persisted in considering things like the neighborhood mosque, circumcision, and a separate village cemetery more important in differentiating themselves from the neighboring “others” than whatever teachers at school or the party propagandists had been telling them. The Georgian Communist leadership, then headed by Lavrenti Beria, reacted to such stubbornness with measures increasingly bordering on ethnocide, both physical and cultural. The drive toward national homogenization soon put before the newly created Azerbaijanis the choice of becoming either plain “Georgian” or being classified as totally alien “Meskheta Turks.”¹⁹ In 1944 the latter were subsequently removed from the picture as Georgia’s “Turks” and “Khemshins”—Armenians who persisted in identifying themselves as Muslims—were deported to Central Asia, ostensibly to prevent them from becoming a “fifth column” were Turkey to join with the Nazis.

Before 1945 was therefore a time of calamitous ethnic homogenization in Ajaria. With most “foreign” minorities leaving the area from 1918 to 1921 as waves of refugees, “Ajaris,” Lazes, and Christian “Gurians” gave way to Georgians. These new Georgians were largely literate in standard Eastern Georgian and increasingly secular, especially when acting in the state-controlled spheres. “Georgians” grew to become more than 80 percent of Ajaria’s population in post-1945 census counts (Kozlov 1988: 91, 210). The success of Georgianization is probably best illustrated by the fact that virtually all Abkhazes living in Ajaria know Georgian, with one-fifth even claiming it as their mother tongue, compared to an astonishingly low 1.4 percent among their compatriots in Abkhazia (Kopeshavidze 1985: 122–24; Slider 1985: 55).

The apparently successful assimilation of Ajaris into Georgia and the failure of Georgianization in Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be attributed to different modes of forming and institutionalizing peripheral political identities. The fact that Ajarian separateness was expressed in terms of *religious* affiliation automatically gave free

reign to atheist zeal among the Georgian Communists. Their strategic goals in Ajaria could thus be classified as “the struggle against noxious relics of the dark past,” not as the “development of nationalities.” Thus in Ajaria, unlike in Abkhazia, the Georgian Bolsheviks could easily afford to be politically correct while pursuing a ruthlessly chauvinist policy. With precious few exceptions, any self-conscious Georgian—especially when in power—would consider the proposition “Muslim Georgian” an oxymoron; more than that, a dangerous abnormality.²⁰ The assimilation of Ajaria was arguably among the greatest successes of the Georgian national project. No titular nationality was established in Ajaria, and Georgians won the battle over language. Eradication of illiteracy could be conducted only in standard Georgian, certainly not in the Arabic of the Koran or in Turkish. And certainly there was no legitimate native Ajarian political entrepreneur akin to the Abkhazian Bolshevik leader Nestor Lakoba.

AJARIA AFTER THE SOVIET COLLAPSE

Despite this high degree of assimilation, Ajaria all but seceded from the newly independent Georgia, *de facto* if not *de jure*, after 1991. Ajaria currently stands as a virtually independent and peaceful enclave—indeed the safest part of what is nominally the Georgian Republic. In elections in the fall of 1990 the Georgian Communists, who were destroyed elsewhere by the shockwaves of Tbilisi’s April 1989 “shovel massacre,” received an astonishing 56 percent of the votes cast in Ajaria. Why the contrast with Abkhazia?

The narrative suggests that the history of assimilation is the central difference. While Abkhazia churned in ethnic tensions during the 1970s, Ajaria remained at peace. But in addition to the history of assimilation, a central factor motivating peace in Ajaria is a political entrepreneur composed of flesh and bones, guts and wits, and bearing the name of Aslan Abashidze. Batono (Georgian for “Sir”) Aslan (certainly not *Aslan-bey*) is a man born to power as a scion of the local princely dynasty of Abashidze. During the Soviet period Abashidze’s career reached its pinnacle with the post of deputy minister of municipal affairs in Tbilisi. (Anyone at all familiar with Mafia-permeated societies would appreciate the kickback possibilities

of such a position.) Furthermore, the man widely credited for “saving Ajaria from politicians and gangsters” regularly entertains many distinguished guests, including top Russian generals and British lords (his younger son attends one of England’s exclusive public schools).

This “strongman of Batumi” came to power in April 1991, when he briefly occupied the oddly ambiguous official position of acting Ajaria Supreme Soviet chairman. From this post he engaged in a pair of self-constituting political acts—first, disbanding the last soviet in Ajaria, and second, preventing the new regional diet from convening. These were apparently very popular moves, taking into consideration mass voter absenteeism and the peculiar electoral dynamics in Ajaria.

The standard Gamsakhurdia-style explanation for Abashidze’s popularity and power was the resurgence of Islam in Ajaria, one of the few of Gamsakhurdia’s pronouncements readily bought by many Russians and Westerners, due to their inherent phobias whenever “fundamentalism” is invoked. Undoubtedly, as elsewhere in the USSR, there was some resurgence of religious practice in Ajaria in the 1970s and 1980s. But this phenomenon was clearly related to the general process of the ideological hollowing of the Communist state, rather than to an Islamic resurgence per se. Indeed such an explanation blatantly contradicts the data. There is no indication of even token political use of Islam in Ajaria (except for Gamsakhurdia’s accusations). For instance, one of Abashidze’s carefully maintained mysteries is his religious background. There are people in Batumi who will swear that they saw him in the mosque last Friday and those who will insist that they saw him in the church on Sunday.²¹ Abashidze himself insists that he is nothing but a Georgian patriot and a “son of Ajaria.”

The absence of fundamentalism can probably be explained by the legacy of Bolshevik policies. The Bolsheviks were more successful in inventing new socialist rituals than the French Jacobins, who lacked the advantage of catastrophically rapid Soviet urbanization and industrialization. Those ethnic groups most deeply involved in Communist modernization lost more of their ethnographic peculiarities than those who were not. Yet even in the core urban areas of Russia, the most important and conservative practices associated with the life cycle remained basically unchanged, though simplified

and profaned. As with most Caucasians in similar circumstances, the predominantly rural Ajarians preserved much of their traditional life, as only peasants in the twentieth-century world could. With the waning of the Soviet system, however, religion and ethnicity (which in the case of Muslim Georgians are perceived to be in dramatic contradiction) have reemerged as the pillars of identity and social regulation at the daily level. Yet it is important to differentiate between ritual religiosity and fundamentalist movements, as well as between ethnic awareness and political nationalism.

To counter growing Islamic religious awareness, even before 1988 Georgian “informals” had already begun to surface in Ajaria in order to organize “discussions” and arrange for the symbolic restoration of ancient monuments. As a result, a few formerly closed mosques were reopened as churches. The Communist authorities in Tbilisi saw little wrong in that, taking the attitude that Georgians who were not atheists had better be Christian. Batumi officials could not dare make a case of their own. In 1990 Gamsakhurdia went even further, proposing to abolish Ajarian autonomy altogether. Clearly Ajaria never challenged Tbilisi; it was Gamsakhurdia who challenged Ajaria.

To counter that challenge, Ajaris rose up in protest. A separatist movement was initiated, and tensions with Georgia escalated dangerously. Throughout the Soviet bloc during the revolution of 1989–91, a crystallizing moment inevitably occurred when people would come to the main square to rally before the building housing power. They would remain enthusiastically at the square for long hours, often for days and nights. This was always the key instance in the “deprivatization of protest,” which had been previously confined by the Communist state to people’s private spaces—their heads or kitchen tables.²² Such events would become moments of truth, providing a glimpse into the post-Communist future, or even shaping it outright.

The key question to ask of such moments is: How and in what forms did the demonstrators perform the highly carnivalesque and mysterious act of becoming a community (civil society, the nation)?²³ The Armenians would turn these rallies into mass therapy sessions, trying time and time again to overcome the traumas of Turkish genocide. The Balts would sing folk songs in huge choruses or peacefully yet firmly hold each other’s hands in enormous solidarity chains, thereby demonstrating to the “Soviet invaders” both their ethnic

vitality and “true” European civility. Led by clan elders, the Chechens and other mountaineers would come bedecked with rifles and daggers. Muscovites and Leningraders might have easily outdone May 1968 in Paris had they not been so brooding and atomized. In Georgia similar things took place. Georgians prayed in Tbilisi. The Abkhazes would unite symbolically with their ancestral spirits at the sacred field of Lykhny.

The Ajaris, however, broke with the pattern. Georgian threats to Ajarian autonomy quite clearly posed a direct danger to local Soviet elites, thereby setting the scene for the alliance which, for a brief but tumultuous time, became Ajaria’s separatist movement. On 22 April 1990, bearing red banners, separatists came to Lenin Square in Batumi (once called Azizye Square, after the cathedral mosque which stood there). The date was symbolic in a rather odd sense, being the one hundred and twentieth anniversary of Lenin’s birth. Workers’ bands played the anthems of the USSR and the Georgian SSR.²⁴ Fights broke out with Gamsakhurdia supporters, and these soon escalated into a riot. Demonstrators forced their way into the building and demanded the immediate resignation of several local bosses who, it would appear, were mostly the old-style inept and demoralized Soviet bureaucrats who had begun to display sheepish attitudes toward the increasingly dictatorial Gamsakhurdia.

The short-lived Ajarian revolution resulted in several deaths, including that of Nodar Imnadze, Abashidze’s deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the highest placed supporter of Gamsakhurdia in Ajaria. In Batumi’s version, Imnadze took a page from Afghanistan. Bursting into a government meeting, he tried to kill Abashidze but was gunned down by guards before he could open fire. The Gamsakhurdia-controlled media simply printed unspecified obituaries.

Of course, as some Georgian observers have speculated, it is also possible that Gamsakhurdia struck a deal with Abashidze (Mikadze in *MN*, December 1993). If so, this would have made the “informal” leader Imnadze redundant and ultimately expendable. This would also explain the absence of an outcry by Gamsakhurdia’s circle on what was, even by Georgian standards, the scandal of gunplay in Ajaria’s Supreme Soviet. Whatever the story, there is really no need (or desire) to know the secrets of power struggles in Georgia. Suffice it to say that Aslan Abashidze proved worthy of his princely

and other ancestors (and associates), who knew how to maintain power under the Byzantines, the Ottomans, the Russians, the Bolsheviks, and the Georgians, of whatever ilk (i.e., Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze).

Since the “revolution” in April 1991, Abashidze has ruled Ajaria Fujimori-style, as guarantor that civil strife will not emerge from within (via “parliamentary demagogues”) or without (via a Georgia plagued by warlordism and gangsterism). The internal “border” with Georgia is guarded by Abashidze’s militia, which has standing orders to disarm or destroy any armed men that might try to enter Ajaria. The police have been granted special powers to combat crime, and Batumi today is said to be one of the safest towns in the former USSR (although it is also the case that many old-time professional criminals have long since left the impoverished and exceedingly dangerous Caucasus at their own initiative, fleeing to more favorable climes in Russia, Berlin, and New York).

Ajaria’s post-Communist regime thus represents a new version of Bonapartism. Created out of the always unwieldy and now relic Soviet concept of the autonomous republic, this still unrecognized state incorporates regional isolationist interests in a highly troubled environment. Abashidze’s personal authority and his claim to power are based on a consensus among Ajaria’s population, comprising managerial elites, urban middle classes, workers and peasants—apparently both Muslim and Christian Georgians—and the minorities weary of rabid Georgian nationalism. Abashidze’s well-cultivated relations with the military commanders of the Russian bases in Ajaria are the obvious and actively displayed source of his strength. He has also maintained a well-publicized neutrality in all of the internal conflicts among Georgia’s feuding factions, as well as between Georgians and the Abkhazian secessionists. Indeed he has offered himself on numerous occasions as a mediator in these conflicts (and his family as hostages to his *bona fides*.)

The other pillar of Abashidze’s regionalist regime is control over transit trade with Turkey. In 1988, for the first time in decades, Moscow began to permit cross-border passage at Sarpi, just a few miles south of Batumi. Barter trade through Sarpi—estimated at \$60–70 million per month—is conducted primarily by individual “shuttle” traders from all over Caucasia and southern Russia who move items ranging from school notebooks to caviar and prostitutes.

Perhaps this is what Aslan Abashidze means when he humbly admits that “Ajaria has nothing of value except the good humor of its people and geopolitical advantages” (*NG*, 16 October 1993).

GEORGIA: L’EMPIRE IMPLOSÉ OR SOVIET-HANDICAPPED NATION-STATE?

In both Abkhazia and Ajaria the Georgian politics of perestroika clearly followed the generic Baltic and East European “anti-imperial” pattern of opposing the “nation” to the pro-Moscow “local Communist sellouts.” But events in Abkhazia illustrate a clear-cut case of peripheral ethnofederal countermobilization, a phenomenon also seen in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, the “internationalist fronts” representing generic Russian speakers in the Baltic states, Moldova’s rebel Gagauzia and Transdnistria, and the Crimea. In each of these, the “anti-imperial” nationalism of the dominant group was challenged by minorities—if they possessed the resources to organize. Paradoxically, perhaps, the best resource was usually the local governing apparatus, embedded in a preexistent autonomous territorial unit of some sort. Consequently the peripheral ethnic countermobilizations were invariably led by the local party/state apparatchiki or enterprise managers. The associated rhetoric would be loyalist and ultra-Leninist, *par excellence*. Until the collapse of the Communist order and the USSR, high hopes for an intervention by Moscow would be expressed; since 1991 the discourse of peripheral separatism (which, as illustrated by the Ajarian case, can be different from usual ethnonationalism) has changed only to stress Russia’s historical obligations and “vital interests.”

In Ajaria the more resolute men of property (symbolized by Aslan Abashidze in his avatar of the former Tbilisi minister of communal affairs and hence inescapably the master of kickbacks) overthrew the local “defeatist” bureaucrats in a staged popular uprising, thereby preventing Gamsakhurdia’s nationalists from establishing a local base. Eventually Abashidze won an armed truce with the subsequent central government of Georgia and imposed his control over the flow of goods over the border with Turkey. This was the result of both passive popular consensus and support offered by the former

Soviet military officers stationed in Ajaria. Because cultural identity had not been politicized, the events in Ajaria were not instances of cultural conflict.

In Abkhazia, however, culture was deeply politicized by ethno-federal institutions. Radicals led by Vladislav Ardzinba had gathered momentum from the long-standing Abkhazian ethnonationalist mobilization and institutionalization and were aided in this process by increasingly violent confrontations with various Georgian forces, such as former Soviet police, peasant militias, gangsters, and nationalist warlords. Moreover, through established channels, the Abkhazian radicals received more or less tacit encouragement from the political factions in Russia's changing establishment of 1988–93 who wanted to "punish the Georgians" (these included the CPSU's Central Committee Department of Organizational Work, Communist chauvinists in the KGB and the army, especially officers with dachas and apartments in Abkhazia, the Soviet "Unionists" among the perestroika generation of parliamentarians, all stripes of Russian nationalists seeking a cause, the Soviet Mafia in the adjacent Sochi region of Russia, plus the mountaineer pan-Islamists looking for bases and a sea outlet). Inevitably the Abkhazian radicals were bound to prevail over less dashing property-minded moderates.²⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The bottom line that emerges from the simplest formalization of the narratives presented here is that we are dealing with modern agrarian societies, shaped and transformed by centralized, neo-Stalinist institutions. The resulting configuration of power was largely locally bound, in collective farms, small enterprises, districts, and relatively small autonomous provinces, and permeated with Mafia-like relations of patronage and corruption. The "shadow economy" thus bred a "shadow apparatus" appended to the formal Soviet party/state.

As was true throughout the Soviet-type anticapitalist zone of fused economy and politics, undifferentiated social power was structured along corporatist lines, with one major difference: Soviet Cau-

casia, marked by the absence of gigantic flagship factories or agroindustrial complexes, so common in other parts of the union, was characterized by qualitatively smaller-scale corporatism intertwined with traditionally extended networks of personal loyalties. *Ethnicity, especially when buttressed by state-sponsored institutions and inequalities, assumed exceptional importance in such an environment* (see Arrighi and Piselli 1987).

It is this political relevance of cultural identity that becomes important when central institutions collapse. This contrasting tale of two resorts has highlighted that importance. In Ajaria, Soviet power muted cultural differences, while in Abkhazia, Moscow felt that it was in its own interests to exaggerate cultural differences. Recall that although the Ajaris fought for autonomy in the 1920s, the Georgian authorities, in an effort to expand their own national power base, purged the Ajarian leadership. Their ability to do this rested on the claim that Ajaris were a religious rather than an ethnic minority, and their religious autonomy was a threat to central Soviet Communist control. Thus the Georgian authorities were able to block the Ajarian effort to become a titular nationality because Moscow perceived it as a Communist struggle against religious political power rather than as a part of the ethnofederalist effort to forge the loyalty of diverse ethnic groups to a central socialist regime. In contrast, the es were able to obtain the status of a titular nationality in their struggle with Georgia. When Abkhazia became a Soviet republic, equal in status to Georgia, local Abkhazian authorities, accountable to Moscow and not to Tbilisi, gained access to the resources of political power. Tensions with Georgia escalated to violence in the wake of the Soviet collapse. Indeed what else besides “tribalization”—or “Lebanization,” caudillismo, coronelismo, warlordism, clanishness, sectarianism, whatever it is called—should we expect when the modern state, which had once engendered this milieu for some reason now forgotten, fails and withers away?

If we accept this argument, ethnicity must be exonerated from being the main culprit in “ethnic” conflict. Ethnicity is, in other words, instrumental and not primordial. Of course, the instrumentalization of ethnicity must be somewhat credible to those being addressed and must therefore refer to a litany of more or less real conflicts and grievances—or imagined into being by the means of modern propaganda. Yet this always remains a fairly circumstantial

process that cannot be completely controlled. “Accidents” (or contextual contingencies) such as violence-waging capabilities, the degree of regional insulation enjoyed by local bodies of power, external alliances and internal cleavages, the degree of popular participation and even the personality of current leaders do make a difference.

Thus we confront an environment whose stability would be organized along more or less Mafioso corporatism—Soviet-style, of course—whose historical catastrophe would inescapably resemble the turf wars of Chicago and other gangsters of similar ilk. The present time of troubles in Caucasia should be expected to continue until some Mafia-type group, or a coalition of them, succeeds in making new states—Ajaria, Karabakh, and Armenia are close to this, and that is what Shevardnadze in Georgia and Geidar Aliev in Azerbaijan are bound to accomplish—or until an external power arrives and imposes its order. The Fourth Russian Empire looms large on a not too distant horizon.

NOTES

This paper was produced while I was a visiting fellow at the Peace Studies Center, Cornell University, under the sponsorship of the SSRC MacArthur Program on Peace and Security. Special thanks to Michael Kennedy for coaching me in the Western trade of scheme-making.

1. The possibilities include the following: (1) in the Sochi area, among Shapsugs, Greeks, and the Kuban Cossacks; (2) in some of the Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation, such as Adygeia, Karachai-Circassia, Kabarda-Balkaria, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia; (3) in the historical provinces and autonomous areas of Georgia, including Megrelia, Ajaria, ia, South Ossetia (Shida Kartli); (4) in Azerbaijan (including the Azeri Turks in Georgia and in the Krasnodarsky region) between the Talyshees and the Lezgins; and (5) involving the Armenians scattered through Armenia, in Karabakh (Artsakh), in Baku, in the Krasnodarsky region, and in Georgia.
2. Ironically Abkhazia—more precisely the Holy See established in Pitsunda (Pitiunt) in the fifth or sixth century—was the center of early Christianization in Caucasia. From 1912 to 1920 this served as the basis for an earlier Abkhazian protonationalist movement to demand an autocephalous church and Abkhazian mass.

3. "A nationality that would easily fit into the New York Giants' stadium," pronounced Melor Sturua in a rather distasteful yet typical joke. Subsequently it appeared on both the *New York Times* op-ed page and the McNeil-Lehrer Newshour in October 1993. This notorious Soviet cold war propagandist incidentally is the son of a prominent Georgian Communist leader.
4. Lakoba died after having feasted in Tbilisi with Lavrenti Beria, then Georgia's first secretary. It was widely believed that Beria simply disposed of a powerful rival by poisoning him. This notion was reinforced when, soon after his lavish state funeral, Lakoba's body was unearthed and burned, allegedly for some "newly discovered evidence of spy activity" (Knight 1993: 80).
5. One of Stalin's closest lieutenants, Sergo Ordzhonikidze (himself a Georgian and a dyed-in-the-wool Communist chauvinist), at the very Central Committee meeting in 1923 which denounced the famous Sultan Galiev brand of "national communism," calmly admitted that "With the Abkhazian republic which has no literate [language] . . . we conduct our correspondence in Russian. Had we proposed to the local comrades to write in Georgian, they would have refused that resolutely" (*IV Soveshchanie* 1992: 142).
6. The Russian population in the autonomous republic soared from 12,000 to 85,000 between 1926 and 1939, during the years of Stalinist industrialization (Kozlov 1988: 91) and was accompanied by a considerable influx of Armenian refugees from Turkey, which reached 15 percent of its population by 1989. But the numerical growth of these groups stopped by the 1960s; indeed the Russian population even decreased slightly, and in 1989 constituted 16 percent of the population. Unlike the Georgians, however, these groups posed little competition to the Abkhazes in agriculture and the party/state apparatus.
7. The last "i" appeared on Soviet maps in the 1930s and remained a hotly debated issue before the current Abkhazian victory. It is required by Georgian grammar, but not by Abkhazian or Russian. In a perfect parallel, Ajaria's capital was called Batum before its Georgianization into Batumi, but here the last "i" has never been questioned.
8. "Avtoritet" is roughly an equivalent of the Mafia's *cappi*, though Russian professional gangsterism was never organized into "families" but was rather purely territorial. Also important to note is that the Russian criminal underworld was and remains highly internationalist—i.e., virtually indifferent to ethnicity as a status factor.
9. Peasant immigrants to Abkhazia were rather rural Mingrels, a subgroup of Western Georgians who have been continuously migrating over the border on the Inguri River for the past century. Lavrenti Beria was a Mingrel. So was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, whose most ardent followers and military supporters have been concentrated mostly in Western Georgia and partly in the Mingrel-populated districts of Abkhazia (especially in Gali).
- 10.

For an excellent account of Georgian nationalism made from the position of social history, see Suny (1988). It is unfortunate, though very natural, that Suny knows nineteenth-century Caucasia better than its more recent realities. Perhaps unconsciously he contradicts his own theoretical premises, so brilliantly employed in the analysis of the pre-Soviet periods, treating contemporary Georgians or Armenians in a socially undifferentiated manner, essentially as the unit of analysis and an agency ("Georgians wanted . . .").

11. Lykhny was once the residence of Abkhazia's Shervashidze/Chachba princes. It was also the place associated with some important pagan rituals, later a Christian center.
12. Moscow and Erevan at the time were celebrating the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the annexation of Persian Armenia by Russia, "the volunteer rejoining of the Russian and Armenian peoples."
13. In the Soviet command economy, overall top-down overdetermination had as its dialectical opposite the principle of underspecification of policy implementation and local procedures. In the proverbial expression of the apparat itself, "Communist know only one word: MUST!" Successive layers of managers and bosses, from the republic's first secretary down to the collective farm chairman and local police, were expected to "organize work" in order to "ensure fulfillment." The means were unimportant so long as they did not upset the metaphorical apple cart. In other words, to make sense of regional and local politics in places such as Abkhazia during the Soviet period, we must have some idea of what "tools" or practices local powerholders normally used to meet their goals. This question would be an especially sensitive one in a multiethnic area, inasmuch as the "tool kit" was largely culturally (that is, ethnically) constructed.
14. In 1980 *Pravda*, writing about "negative phenomena" in Abkhazia, admitted that "In some settlements . . . almost half of the able-bodied population [was], without any good reason, not permanently employed." This helps us to appreciate the extent of creeping decollectivization and the shadow economy.
15. According to a widely believed rumor, Shevardnadze himself, when addressing a unit of volunteers before their departure from Tbilisi, urged them to "show to the entire world that Georgian troops are not rapists, marauders, or drug addicts." In his turn, Vladislav Ardzinba, the Abkhazian leader and previously a soft-spoken Hittite historian at the Moscow Institute of Orientalistics, commented on the plunder and destruction of Sukhumi by his troops: "Alas, even regular armies sometimes indulge in it" (*NG*, 15 October 1993).
16. As elsewhere in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and Asia Minor, ethnic diversity was translated into hereditary economic specialization. As described in a contemporary Russian guidebook, in Batumi "Russians are mostly military and civil officers, skilled workers, and owners of summer houses. Numerous Poles and Germans [apparently the Baltic Russian subjects] work in the

businesses, liberal professions, and steamship companies. . . . Aside from the intelligentsia, each nationality lives pretty much in isolation from the others, preferring its own trades. Here Georgians are, par excellence, clerks, restaurateurs, chefs, servants; Armenians—shopkeepers, porters, cart drivers; Persians—gardeners, fruit and vegetable vendors, teahouse keepers; Turks are fishermen, boatmen, dockers, coffee shop owners; Greeks—bakers, blanket- and shoemakers, traders; Jews—money lenders and traders; Ajaris [Mohammedan Georgians—*sic* in the original] are peasants, villagers, often [serve as] guards and policemen” (Moskvich 1913: 433).

17. Most fertile lands in Ajaria were in *waqf* tenure—i.e., were cultivated by tenants of the mosque charitable trusts.
18. In preparation for the “glasnost census” of 1989, some ethnographers in Moscow suggested restoring to the listing, among other ethnic identities obliterated since the census of 1926, Gurians, Mingrels, Svans, and other Kartvelian (Georgian) groups. Rebukes from the Tbilisi Communist as well as the dissident establishments were prompt, oddly unanimous, and quite vitriolic.
19. In Georgia’s districts of Marneuli, Bolnisi, Gardabani, and Dmanisi, bordering on Azerbaijan, there is a considerable spillover Azerbaijani population (see Fuller 1984). These are the “true” Azeris, who speak Azeri Turkic and profess the Iranian Shi’a version of Islam. Meskheta Turks are Sunni Muslims and until their exile to Uzbekistan spoke Georgian dialects and the vernacular Osmanli Turkish.
20. Obviously a direct parallel to Serb nationalism and the Bosnian “Turks,” but with a directly opposite outcome.
21. In fact, Abashidze rarely appears in crowded places. After three assassination attempts on him, he reputedly sleeps with a walkie-talkie and a gun, always surrounded by his bodyguards.
22. For the concepts of privatization and deprivatization of protest in Soviet society, see Motyl 1987.
23. In this respect participant observations and gracious conceptualization by the Armenian anthropologist Levon Abrahamian are truly outstanding (Abrahamian 1990).
24. Very significantly, the model of demonstration was unmistakably that of the Soviet ritual May Day rallies and Subotniks (Saturdays of voluntary Communist labor). Mobilization for such official occasions was always conducted by factories and enterprises—i.e., entrusted to and controlled by managers and official trade unions.
25. I would insist that Ajaria is a more wonderful example than it seems in the narrowly Caucasian context. In fact, Georgia has strong parallels to Yugoslavia. More prosperous secessionist Abkhazia would be Georgia’s Croatia. Of course, Ajaria would then be a Caucasian Bosnia-Herzegovina. But very obviously it is not.

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ISLAMIST RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION: CULTURAL CONFLICT IN EGYPT, ALGERIA, AND MALAYSIA

Paul M. Lubeck

If one surveys the postcolonial states and societies of Islamdom, what is readily apparent is that despite contentious intellectual ferment and an explosion of social movement activity, not all states and societies with Islamic majorities are experiencing levels of communal, ethnic, or religious conflict to the degree that regimes, states, and international security are threatened. This variation raises a number of questions for the study of communal conflicts in Muslim-majority states: What factors explain the variations? Why are some state elites successful in containing the revival of radical Islamic movements while others face civil war and/or permanent low-intensity conflict? Is an Islamic nationalism replacing the secular nationalism which in the era of Fordism had been so prominent? How has the restructuring of the global political economy since 1975—the petroleum boom and neoliberal economic policies—shaped the context within which state elites and Islamic movements compete for popular support and hegemony over the discourse of nationalism?

In this essay I will argue that communal conflict, either high or low, is determined by the interaction of three factors: (1) globalization processes, including adjustment to post-Fordist economic structures, economic liberalism, and structural adjustment policies; (2) state developmental capacity, especially the ability of a state to manage economic growth and income distribution, constrain corruption levels, and manage relations with ethnic minorities; and (3) the historical legacy of Islamic institutions and movements, including indirect rule, roles of Islamic elites in the national state, and the forms of Islamist opposition. I begin with a conceptual discussion of these three factors and then illustrate the argument with a

comparison of Algeria and Egypt—countries that experienced high communal conflict—and Malaysia, a Muslim-majority state that has experienced little communal conflict.

LIBERALIZATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

During the period of national independence, regimes in Muslim-majority states varied in terms of structure, ideology, and social base, often recycling between military and civilian rule but in essence remaining authoritarian. Sometimes the secular regimes were based upon the military (Egypt, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Algeria, Indonesia, Sudan), while others relied on a centralizing, secular party like the Ba'athists (Tunisia, Iraq, Syria, and Senegal); finally, building upon alliances formed during indirect rule, some regimes institutionalized autocratic monarchical forms, combining Western technical support, Patrimonialism, and (with the exception of Iran) claiming Islamic legitimacy for authoritarianism (Kuwait, Brunei, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia). Since the onset of Fordism in 1945—in other words, except for temporary transitional periods and/or highly managed semidemocratic initiatives (i.e., Jordan, Turkey, Malaysia, Pakistan)—political liberalization as defined by Western political discourse (open elections, rule of law, minority and citizen rights, independent judicial review, etc.) has been nearly universally absent.

The absence of political liberalism means that it could not have been a causal factor in unleashing the backlash of an Islamic revival and associated communal conflicts. But what about economic as distinct from political liberalism? Notwithstanding classical liberal theory that argues for the indispensability of the political and economic, is it true that the two are always found together in actual practice? Even more pointedly in our context, are they harmonious? Conventional wisdom suggests that early political liberalization may weaken decisively a state economic elite's organizational capacity to implement subsequent liberal economic reforms (e.g., the Soviet Union). Alternatively, the introduction of economic liberalization—or more felicitously, structural adjustment programs (SAPs)—in developing states is invariably associated with economic dislocation. This

means reductions in living standards and shocks to the governing coalition. Thus, as discussed in the introduction to this volume, economic liberalization can undermine the possibility of a peaceful transition from authoritarianism to political liberalism. Since few electorates will vote to lower their real incomes, it is possible that only an authoritarian state can manage a structural adjustment program successfully (e.g., Morocco, Indonesia). Although orthodox liberal theory argues that ultimately economic and political liberalism are as inseparable as identical twins, in practice they may be more distant, for the implementation of one often destabilizes the political environment enough to block the successful transition to the second.

The evidence to be presented here suggests that economic liberalization partially explains communal conflict in Muslim-majority states. Since the onset of global liberalization in the early 1980s, world market prices for primary exports such as oil, changing investment patterns among transnationals, and increased international pressure for free trade regimes (deregulation, reduced state investment/production, and reduced tariffs) have put enormous pressure on political elites governing Muslim-majority states. With the end of the cold war in 1989, state elites have lost some of their strategic ability to leverage gains by playing off East-West rivalries. But is it possible to show a sequential causal relationship between economic liberalization and communal conflicts associated with the Islamic revival?

An analysis of the period from the post-World War II settlement to the start of international economic liberalism reveals two distinct phases. The first phase (Fordism), lasting from 1945 to 1971–74, emerges from the movement for and achievement of national independence for Muslim-majority states. This was a period of steady economic growth, Keynesian political coalitions, demand management and rising incomes, and fixed exchange rate for a gold-backed dollar, not only in the West, but also in many of the Muslim-majority states that pursued their own versions of state-led development. Most important, this “golden age of capitalism” was based upon stable and low prices for oil, the bulk of which was imported from Muslim-majority states. Within the Western alliance, the breakdown of Fordism became obvious by the early 1970s, as evidenced by tight labor markets and rising inflation; declines in real wages, productivity, and profits for reinvestment; and the internationalization of fi-

nance after the 1971 devaluation, floating of the dollar, and termination of the gold standard (Glyn et al. 1990). With the OPEC price revolution of 1973–74, the postwar Fordist model effectively stalled, lurched into crisis, and (we see in hindsight) began a transition to the globalization of finance, production, and consumption, a process aided later by innovations in microelectronics and communications.

By 1982 the international debt crisis and the Reagan political victory created a new coalition advocating neoliberal international economic restructuring, which in turn contributed to a broader process of globalization, stimulating the growth of transnational manufacturing and the internationalization of financial institutions. All of these developments constrained the autonomy and economic sovereignty of the national state. Most important for Muslim-majority states, the globalization of economies, societies, and cultures is deadly for state-led, import-substituting industrialization, for it reduces state economic autonomy, erodes national-cultural loyalty, and constrains access to resources for political redistribution. This is true unless political elites reorient their strategy to export-oriented industrialization (EOI) in the fashion of Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand (Haggard 1990).

For Muslim-majority states, the second phase began in 1973–74 with the OPEC price revolution and lasted until 1979–82. In the West, this was a period of international economic instability, rampant inflation, declining real incomes, and the dissolution of the Keynesian coalitions. But it was also marked by a surge of state-centered development in oil-exporting states. Initially at least the OPEC price revolution was a windfall for the political elites of oil-exporting states because the nationalization of the oil industry and the price revolution shifted unprecedented economic power in the form of unearned petroleum rents to the elites managing the state sector.

Unfortunately, however, not only did the petroleum boom increase the autonomy of the state elites, but it also deepened their commitment to large-scale, state-controlled, uncompetitive industrial projects and unrealistic macroeconomic policies (e.g., exchange rates), which promised them not only control over the national economy, but also personal wealth through kickbacks, bribes, and other rents to be used for coalition maintenance. Hence at a time when the East Asian NICs were restructuring their economies and societies toward state-guided but market-augmenting, export-oriented in-

dustrialization so as to adjust to increased internationalization and global competition, the euphoric oil-exporting states were restructuring in the opposite direction (Haggard 1990).

Once the commodity boom crashed in the mid-1980s (oil went from \$41 per barrel in 1980 to \$8 by 1986), the social dislocation was even greater for Muslim-majority states dependent directly or indirectly on petroleum rents. These states had so far to fall because the rents were an unearned windfall, like manna from heaven, rather than an accumulation of capital arising from a disciplined structural transformation like the East Asian NICs' management of export-oriented industrialization. By the time Khomeini triumphed in the Iranian revolution (1979), the petroleum boom had the anomalous effect of strengthening state-centered development while at the same time internationalizing consumption, finance, and labor flows, raising expectations unrealistically, inflating investment in higher education, increasing social inequality, and disrupting the social equilibrium in most Muslim-majority states as never before. The boom disrupted social relations and thus created the structural conditions in which Islamic political movements thrived.

Economist Alan Richards reminds us that oil booms raise urban incomes, stimulate construction booms, spike inflation rates, and encourage rent-seeking behavior (Richards 1987). In turn, this encourages a decline in the terms of trade for rural producers, increases rural to urban migration, tightens rural labor markets, and raises rural wages in order to compete with the booming rates of the cities. Cities themselves soon become vast construction projects absorbing enormous numbers of rural-origin unskilled laborers. Food imports rise and tastes change (toward sugar, rice, and white bread). In response, a regime awash with petrodollars typically initiates capital-intensive, state-managed irrigation schemes and encourages its allies, the urban merchant-bureaucrats-military officer stratum, to invest in luxury food production (poultry and meat) with state-subsidized, capital-intensive machinery and imported fertilizer. The central point, therefore, is that even before neoliberalism became the cutting edge of a broader globalization process at the end of the 1980s, the petroleum boom had internationalized the economies of oil-exporting states and labor exporters, disrupted the existing social equilibrium, and provided the structural stage in Iran for the first

Islamic revolutionary triumph after approximately four centuries of Western dominance.

GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND STATE DEVELOPMENTAL CAPACITY

The central explanation for the negative effects of the oil boom has more to do with the legacies of weakened state capacity in many Muslim-majority states than state control per se. Korea's Pohang Iron and Steel, for example, is state controlled, and yet it "is the world's second largest and most cost-efficient steel producer" (*Wall Street Journal*, 20 March 1995, p. A12), including a joint venture with USX in California (Pred 1992; Amsden 1989). OPEC states, in contrast, as we shall see below, were marked by feeble state institutions purporting to uphold the social contract; feeble institutions were incapable of pursuing a sustained development policy. Their bureaucracies were both bloated and rigid—indeed they were seen as dumping grounds for patronage by incumbent government. Corruption was rampant in most political institutions, and networks of patronage prevented merit-based career advancement. Political institutions both inhibited democratic initiative and perpetuated economic inequality.

Partly as a result of these ineffective and corrupt state institutions, the oil boom did not usher in an era of sustained economic development, but rather led to windfall profits that were quickly dissipated. The volatility of international markets exacerbated this situation. The crash in petroleum prices and the rising indebtedness of Muslim-majority states in the 1980s were devastating to development programs. Even the Saudis are now indebted and forced to reduce to restructuring programs managed by Western financial institutions (banks, the International Monetary Fund [IMF], and the World Bank). Note that Islamists have seized the banner of nationalism and challenged the legitimacy of the postcolonial secular state elites who administer the SAPs. Popular resistance to austerity programs, both SAPs and local initiatives, has been common in a number of Muslim-majority states with widely varying political ideologies (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, Senegal, Paki-

stan, and Jordan). Just as the petroleum boom united Muslim interests in opposition to states and corporations that had formerly controlled their resources, the debt crisis and neoliberal restructuring of Muslim economies has inspired populist resistance and rallied moderates to support the more radical Islamic opposition to political programs that reduce state subsidies, curtail state investment, and impoverish those most vulnerable in the Muslim community. Not only do SAPs violate Muslim prohibitions against charging interest on debt as well as the state's obligation to provide alms to the poor (*zakkat*)—typically in the form of state subsidies for basic needs—but also their transparently foreign control, often depicted as Western Christian or Zionist by anti-imperialist Islamists, rapidly evaporates any shred of legitimacy possessed by the postcolonial political elites.

Hence even though the crisis of peripheral Fordism has deeper historically antecedent causes, it is nevertheless true that SAPs, defined here as one of the essential regulatory and disciplining agencies of globalization, stimulate the populist dimension of the Islamic revival in economically depressed, bureaucratically overburdened, and politically corrupt states, and since they have yielded few positive results, they eventually undermine the legitimacy of the pro-Western states that submit to them. In the everyday life experiences of the believers, moreover, SAPs confirm the failure of the secular national state to provide economic security originally promised in the secular national development project. Equally important, because SAPs reduce the state's resources, they encourage the economically weak in urban centers to rely on the redistribution of basic needs (food, medicine, etc.) dispensed by Islamic charities rather than state social service agencies. In some situations the Islamic organizations have become a parallel state welfare service. Within secular states, moreover, SAPs are a boon to militant Islamic nationalist tendencies within Islamism, for they confirm to the believers the utter failure of the postcolonial secular state and the attractiveness of the Islamic nationalist alternative.

**POLITICAL ISLAM: A NEW EXPRESSION OF
THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM?**

According to Islamic political theory, the local, particular, communal (ethnic), or national identity may coexist alongside a universalistic Muslim identity only if the Islamic takes precedence. But the question of whether a Muslim's primary political loyalty lies with his/her national (Islamic) state or with the global Islamic community (*umma*) is not a trivial scholastic issue. During the period of decolonization, asserting "nationhood" became the currency exchanged for obtaining independent statehood. For example, when Pakistan was established as an Islamic state, its founder (Jinnah) stated that "Muslims are a nation," despite the fact that about a third of the subcontinent's Muslims remained in "secular" India and a substantial proportion were later prevented from emigrating to Pakistan. Islamists committed to political Islam as well as many observant Muslims are torn over the issue of loyalty to a national state over loyalty to the universal *umma*. Nevertheless, the pressing weight of the international state system has worked historically to institutionalize loyalty to an Islamically legitimized national state, while at a minimum the transnational *umma* is idealized and praised. But whether observant Muslims are committed to nationalist or internationalist strategies, it remains the case that political Islam inspires movements to challenge the Western concept of secular nationalism and the colonial-origin boundaries of nation-states, most of which became independent during the Fordist era and the cold war. Challenges to these identities and boundaries always risk raising the level of ethnic and sectarian conflict. For Muslims, the seminal issues in this intense debate are the constitution of Muslim national identity, the legitimacy of involuntarily imposed, colonial-origin frontiers and institutions, the loyalty of nationhood versus that of the transnational *umma*, and the relationship between radicals and so-called "moderate" Muslims, as well as non-Muslim minorities.

In short, the conflict that deepened Islamic political identity was between those who aspired to attain an Islamic state and those who fought to maintain a secular political community. When secular states were established in Muslim-majority areas under Western dominance in the decolonization process, Muslim movements, or-

ganizations, and political parties emerged to oppose secular nationalism and Western-dominated state boundaries. Perhaps if secular states had been strong in Muslim-majority regions, "political Islam" would have remained encapsulated in political parties and political organizations, peacefully competing for allegiance and representation within the political arena. As other chapters in this volume have suggested, a strong secular state can mute the political relevance of cultural identity. But in the Muslim-majority areas under consideration here, secular states, riddled with corruption and weakened by globalization and liberalization, were not capable of muting the popularity of political Islam. Ironically, as we shall see below, the Islamically legitimated state of Malaysia was able to weather the globalization and liberalization process much more successfully than most secular states in Muslim-majority areas and thus was able to maintain the strength to mute potential cultural conflict.

EXPLAINING HIGH AND LOW COMMUNAL CONFLICT: A COMPARISON OF THREE CASES

Let us now shift our analysis to a comparison between the Muslim-majority states of Egypt and Algeria, which pursued a secular nationalist path, and Malaysia, a state that pursued an Islamically legitimated route to independence. It should be noted at the outset that virtually all Muslim-majority states have experienced communal conflict, ethnic clashes, or Islamic insurrections in the past two decades. Even states that do not appear to be threatened by communal conflict were forced to cope with it. For example, the Syrians put down a revolt led by the Muslim Brotherhood by shelling and leveling the town of Hammah in 1982; the Saudis called on French security forces to put down a Mahdist insurrection in the great Mosque of Mecca in 1979; Muslims in Indonesia were repressed by the army in the early 1980s; and Saddam Hussein has successfully crushed Shi'ite opposition in southern Iraq.

The point here is that both secular nationalist and Islamically legitimated states have been successfully overcome by Islamic insurrectionary movements. For comparative purposes, however, one can discern polar types of outcomes: one where high communal conflict

emerges in an endemic and state-threatening way and, alternatively, situations of low conflict, generating outcomes where state elites manage to coopt, divide, or repress Islamists, successfully adjust their economy to the new global realities of post-Fordism, and negotiate bargains with sectarian and ethnic groups. Let us examine some cases in light of our argument regarding the interaction of globalization, state capacity, and Islamic institutions.

HIGH COMMUNAL CONFLICT: EGYPT AND ALGERIA

In the Egyptian case, rising communal conflict among Muslims against representatives of the regime of Hosni Mubarak and against the Coptic Christian minority have now become endemic. The combination of economic decline, corruption, and Islamist resurgence now threatens to destroy the Mubarak regime. The crisis arises because of the failure of state-centered development strategies to deliver improved living standards and institute democracy, despite considerable liberalization of the economy under Anwar Sadat and Mubarak. Since Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel, thus receiving about \$2.1 billion annually in American aid, Egypt has become a pivotal ally and the hub of American activity in the region. Over half the U.S. aid (\$1.3 billion) is earmarked for the military. Sending Egyptian forces to support the Americans in the Gulf War only confirmed the Islamist portrait of the regime as a corrupt, subservient vassal of the United States and thus allowed the Islamists to seize the banner of nationalism and populism.

Egypt has a population approaching 60 million, about a third of the Arab world. (In 1992 annual per capita income was \$640; total fertility rate, 3.8 percent; 40 percent of the population was under 15 years [World Bank 1994].) Ecologically constrained to farming in the Nile Valley, 30–40 percent of the rural population is estimated to be landless, and 95 percent of the population lives on 5 percent of the land (Weaver 1995). Burdened with an annual population growth rate (2.4 percent) that exceeded its per capita growth rate (1.8 percent) between 1980 and 1992, an illiteracy rate of 52 percent, a rising rate of rural to urban migration, and a state bureaucratic rigidity that is Pharaonic in origin, the material and ecological conditions provide a fertile incubator for political Islam and endemic communal con-

flict. An insightful ethnographic article by Mary Ann Weaver supports the statistical profile and conveys the flavor of contemporary Cairo:

People seemed to be living on the edge, as much of the city's infrastructure was being reduced to dust. Corruption flourished, and political stagnation ossified. . . . Every year Egypt produces more than a hundred thousand university graduates, many of whom cannot find jobs—in a country whose literacy rate has remained frozen at about 50 per cent. The city's once astonishing diversity of cultures and social strata had seemingly been reduced to two starkly contrasting poles: poverty, which appeared to be everywhere, and extraordinary wealth. All across Cairo . . . it was easy to spot soaring new apartment buildings of glass and polished chrome and, immediately behind them, narrow labyrinthine lanes where half naked children played. . . . The new wealth [from U.S. aid] also bred a new and ostentatious class, which surrounded Sadat and now surrounds Mubarak. Its members think little of spending four hundred thousand dollars on a new Mercedes—or a hundred thousand dollars on a daughter's wedding at a five-star Cairo hotel. . . . The government's reputation for rampant corruption is fueling popular discontent and is being exploited by the Islamists; it is also leading to growing consternation among Western donors and diplomats. Particularly nettlesome are the mounting accusations against the Gang of Sons, as the wheeling-and-dealing sons of key Mubarak officials are called; two of the most frequently mentioned are the sons of the President (1995: 55–56).

Egypt's total external debt roughly doubled between 1980 and 1991, from \$20.9 to \$40.6 billion, or 67.7 percent of GNP. Even though a high proportion of external debt is at concessionary terms (37.6 percent), neoliberal pressure for structural adjustment reforms exacerbates the mounting organizational paralysis and legitimacy problems of the Mubarak regime. Evaluating attempts at economic reform, Richards concludes that the Egyptian government refused to implement the necessary reforms to generate jobs and raise the standard of living for its rapidly growing population. Causes include a "huge but relatively ineffective state" locked into a situation where neither the state nor the interest groups are strong enough to

implement their program; the investing classes, moreover, are linked to highly profitable state contracting, and the Muslim opposition is strong enough to threaten the regime with chaos if global structural adjustment policies are implemented (Richards 1991). With a million-person bureaucracy representing the core of Mubarak's patronage powers, economic liberalism clashes head-on with the tottering regime's survival instincts. According to a former Egyptian government official, "Asking Mubarak to privatize is like asking him to take off the only suit of clothes he owns" (cited in Kaplan 1994b: 42).

If a reorientation to the new global economy is unlikely and state capacity to carry out a developmental project is enfeebled, the regime's survival increasingly depends on the American alliance for funding and legitimacy in the global system. But legitimacy, even among the Americans, is fading rapidly. Recent articles by Weaver and Kaplan present scathing indictments of Egypt's security practices and human rights record. Indiscriminate brutality, mass arrests of suspects, family members (even children) routinely tortured with electric shock, indefinite incarceration of prisoners, and the "disappearing" of suspects "are not just morally wrong—they are making enemies for Mubarak where none existed" (Kaplan 1994a: 43–44).

The story of the murder of one of Egypt's leading human rights lawyers, Abdel Harith Madani, while under police interrogation illustrates the illegitimacy of the regime. After Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and later the American embassy, joined by the Islamist-controlled syndicates of lawyers and doctors, insisted on an independent autopsy, Madani was found to have seventeen wounds, "including punctures with a sharp instrument," and to have been beaten to death. His family was not permitted to pray at his grave during the obligatory forty-day Muslim grieving period (Weaver 1995: 63). Given Mubarak's denunciation of human rights activists and the moderate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Weaver interview, just how long Mubarak lasts in this quagmire depends on the combined whims of the Egyptian military and the ability of U.S. national security spin doctors to convince the electorate that the regime serves American interests.

Obviously the full spectrum of the Islamic opposition—Islamic nationalists, Islamists, revolutionary insurrectionists, and mainstream Muslim activists such as the moderate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood—thrive in such a decadent and repressive environ-

ment. In the past two decades, the entire spectrum of Egyptian political discourse, including the government, has shifted in the Islamic direction. Social services such as education, health, and charity are increasingly provided by Islamic agencies. Disaster assistance after a recent earthquake was undertaken by a voluntarist Muslim organization in the face of state paralysis. Even Richards, while arguing that liberal economic restructuring offers the only solution, acknowledges that a “weak and often incompetent state with diminished legitimacy must now implement unpopular economic reforms” and “by now widespread popular disgust may translate into increasing support for extremist Islamists” (1991: 17).

State educational institutions have now become incubators of Islamist militancy within the state itself. To gauge the Islamists’ presence among youth and the educational institutions, Weaver interviewed the minister of education, who had recently announced that “the Islamists had successfully infiltrated primary, preparatory and secondary schools all over Egypt. . . . I couldn’t believe how many fundamentalist teachers we had in schools” (cited in Weaver 1995: 64). Weaver goes on to describe sources of funding for the parallel services sector of the Islamist movement: support offices now exist in thirty countries; funds are transferred through banks, foundations, and mosques. Her conclusion after a most revealing interview with Mubarak—who himself states “We are in a mess”—was that Mubarak blamed all Islamic terrorism on the Muslim Brotherhood and that “a severe crackdown on the Brotherhood was imminent” (Weaver 1995: 67).

Tourism, which generated over \$2 billion in badly need foreign exchange earnings before the Gulf War, collapsed when armed radical Islamic sects targeted the industry by killing tourists. A second target has been the Christian Coptic minorities, estimated to be 6–10 percent of the Egyptian population. Copts, representatives of the secular elite (e.g., Naguib Mahfouz, the Nobel Prize winner), and high government officials are the most significant victims of the violence. In the south—i.e. upper Egypt—radical Islamic groups and the security forces are engaged in a low-intensity civil war with security forces, while in Cairo sectarian and communal conflict are common.

While it is clear that the combination of economic decline, increasing external pressure for economic reform, and rising Islamist

activism threatens the success of the Mubarak government's feeble reform program, it is unclear whether the military would allow an alternative Islamic government to assume power through open, pluralist elections, or, if elected, whether the Islamists could force a coalition capable of institutionalizing an Islamic version of state-led development with sufficient reform vis-à-vis the global economic system. Like all oppositional populist movements guided by a utopian version of a "golden age" (i.e., Medina), the potential of the Islamist alternative depends on its capacity to transform the cultural solidarity, social discipline, and informally organized services into an alliance capable of delivering existing services and coping with the development demands of the new global economy.

Recent research and journalistic accounts confirm the corruption and weakness of Mubarak, widespread human rights violations by the security forces, and declining living standards for the majority. There is little doubt that if free elections were held and the Islamists managed not to divide their strength, an Islamist government could arise under the leadership of the moderate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the Egyptian case, therefore, the intersection of globalization, feeble state capacity to reorient the economy to new global economic realities, continuing dependence on the United States for aid in exchange for serving as regional ally, and rising inequality stoke the flames of the Islamist political project by offering Islamists the nationalist banner by default. Endemic communal conflict will continue unless a radical shift in policy occurs, probably through a coup or, less likely, an unexpected shift in social support toward the Islamists, which would then force the Americans (who Mubarak believes are talking to the Islamists) to accept a new Islamist regime as the only viable alternative (Weaver 1995).

A second secular nationalist state, Algeria, achieved independence after a bloody civil war and over 130 years of "White Settler" French colonialism. Unlike Egypt, Algeria does not have a precolonial history of rule by a legitimate and/or deeply rooted state. Without this historical resource, the state and the nation had to be constructed by the National Liberation Front (FLN) in the face of opposition and indifference from communities fragmented by geography, ethnicity, region, language, and (most important) their degree of assimilation into French culture. Resistance to centralized rule has a long history, one that manifested itself in nationalist, mil-

lenarian, and populist movements, most recently expressed as Islamic resistance to French colonialism during the independence movement.

Currently Algeria has fallen into civil war, with over 30,000 deaths reported by the regime (but not certified by others). Many reports place that figure at 60,000. Since 1975 the regime has followed the standard script of the petroleum-boom-driven rentier state described above—a strategy marked by euphoria, corruption, expansion of education, increasing inequality, neglect of agriculture, a bloated, inefficient public service, massive rural to urban migration, and a poorly conceived, state-centered industrialization strategy favoring heavy industry.

In the 1970s and 1980s Algeria's annual population growth rate surpassed 3 percent; the population now totals 28 million. Petroleum-driven economic growth (5.2 percent in 1984) declined rapidly to -2.7 percent by 1988 (Ruedy, ed. 1994: 81). Here an archetypical centrally planned, oil-exporting, state-centered industrial regime accumulated one of the largest per capita external debts in the world (\$23 billion). Unfortunately the economic crisis associated with the end of the petroleum boom occurred at a time when vast cohorts of students were thrust onto the labor market by the highly elitist, French-inspired educational system, which consumed 10 percent of GNP annually. For example, in the 1980s, 75–82 percent of secondary students sitting for the baccalaureate examination failed, only to join the 400,000 to 500,000 students rejected elsewhere from the educational system (Ruedy, ed. 1994: 83).

Faced with a staggering debt crisis and escalating unemployment, the liberal reformist faction of the government of Chadli Benjedid tried to reorient Algeria's relationship to the global economy by initiating an austerity program (Roberts 1994). Ironically probably more severe than an IMF SAP, Chadli's austerity program smashed already shrinking standards of living for the urban population, reduced the availability of essential commodities, and further spiked unemployment, especially of secondary and university graduates. Tensions fed by austerity reached a crescendo in October 1988, when rioting urban youths threatened civil order and the army fired point blank at the demonstrators, leaving at least 200 dead. Recognizing the need to shift gears toward economic and political liberalization, the Chadli government initiated a political and eco-

conomic reform program that produced a pluralist political constitution guaranteeing open elections even to the then fragmented Islamist movements.

Seizing this constitutional opportunity, the Islamist groups used their superior organization, based upon urban mosques, to recruit alienated youths into their movement in preparation for democratic elections. The key Islamist group, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), now a political party, "represented a complex synthesis of Islamist notions and the long established traditions of populism and nationalism . . . well described as an Islamic populist rather than an Islamist party" because "the radicalism of its rhetoric and the scale of its ambitions expressed the degree of popular alienation from the state" (Roberts 1994: 4). Hence the pivotal resource of the FIS was to claim and to define as Islamist Algeria's populist-nationalist discourse. The rest is history. After winning majorities in 55 assemblies (June 1990), the FIS and its Islamist allies shocked the world in December 1991 by triumphing in the first round of the elections for the National Assembly, winning 54.7 percent of the votes cast.

Alarmed by the threat of a democratically elected Islamist government and bolstered by French support, the Algerian army dismissed the Chadli government, canceled the second round of elections for the National Assembly, declared a state of emergency (February 1992), and finally, after imprisoning its leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Ben Hadj, outlawed the FIS in March. Not surprisingly, in a logic consistent with Thomas Jefferson's, the FIS and like-minded Islamist groups (e.g., the Armed Islamic Group) declared that if democratic alternatives were blocked by the army, they would shift their tactics and engage the army militarily. Since the closing of the democratic option by the Algerian army, Algeria has drifted toward civil war and social chaos, typically punctuated by reports of firefights, assassinations, prison riots, bombings, airline hijackings, demands for compensation for French colonialism, and plans to ignite airplanes over Paris, as well as the murdering of Berber celebrities, girls without proper head coverings, and foreign technicians. One of the central tragedies of the Algerian situation is that the democratic opening enabled a distinct Berber-speaking regional movement to emerge, but unfortunately it was caught in the civil

was between the army and the Islamists, who of course disapprove of ethnic nationalism like "Berberism."

International alliances have exacerbated the crisis of cultural conflict. As noted above, France backed the army, supported the "secular" regime financially, and supplied it with intelligence. It has therefore become the target of armed Islamist opposition. The national and populist content of the Islamist program, quite reasonably for an Arab-majority nation, calls for Arabization of education and the reduction of dependence on elite French standards. Above all, Arabization both displaces the French-educated technocrats, now favoring economic liberalization (according to Roberts 1994), and threatens French interests in the region, such as a natural gas pipeline to the European Union (EU). With over 300,000 citizens resident in Africa, France's African policy has become the major obstacle to resolution of the Algerian crisis (*New York Times*, 13 March 1995, p. A5; Roberts 1994). Taking this line of reasoning, Roberts argues that prior to its banning, the FIS was complicit with Chadli in a mutual acceptance, along with French-educated technocrats, of rapid liberalization of the economy (Roberts 1994).

In meetings in Rome during November 1994 and January 1995, Algerian parties representing 82 percent of the votes cast in the National Assembly elections signed a pathbreaking agreement calling for the legalization of the FIS, a commitment to democratic principles (such as accepting being voted out of office), fundamental liberties, political pluralism and universal suffrage, and the renunciation of violence. The recognition of pluralism is an important concession by the FIS, for it moves it away from a more rigid Islamist state position. It also reassures the Berber-speaking groups (17 percent), who opposed both the radical Islamists and the army's assumption of power (*New York Times*, 5 March 1995, p. E4). Neither the army nor its French backers embraced this accord as a basis for peace, so the Algerian government remained divided and the war continued (Roberts 1994).

In the midst of this war, however, in late 1995, the government held elections amid calls for a boycott and threats of violence. Nonetheless, with a surprisingly large voter turnout, retired general Liamine Zeroual, a secular moderate, was elected president. Calling for a national dialogue with Islamic opponents and releasing Islamic militants from prison, he attempted to drive a wedge between those militants who were willing to negotiate and those who simply want

to overthrow the regime. Indeed FIS leaders recognized the legitimacy of the election and called on Zeroual to open a dialogue with Islamic leaders. Others in the FIS claimed that the war would continue. Sporadic violence did continue after Zeroual refused to negotiate with militants.

In sum, both Egypt and Algeria have failed to adjust their industrial and export strategy to the new global economy and have retained bloated, incompetent statist bureaucracies and pursued SAPs that smashed living standards. While it is not inevitable that SAPs lead to Islamist insurrections, these two are paradigmatic examples illustrating how the combination of new global demands, state incapacity, and specific Islamic institutions combined to enable the Islamists to seize the leadership of a long-standing nationalist and populist discourse and to plunge both states into situations of high communal conflict.

LOW CONFLICT: MALAYSIA

Globalization and the absence of state capacity to sustain a developmental project proved to be critical for the states experiencing high communal conflict. It is not, however, the existence of Islamic institutions that is the cause of that conflict. When one examines the role of Islamic institutions and movements more broadly, it is apparent that states that emerged from colonialism via "indirect rule," guided by cohesive, Islamically legitimated elite institutions, tend to weather the onslaught of political Islam better than those espousing a more secular nationalist program.

Typically in Muslim-majority states, during the transition to independence, where landed Islamic elites became ensconced within the civil service and their scions formed the political class, neither the emerging political elite nor the postcolonial state shared the same questionable status as the secular states in the eyes of Islamists. Rather, for Islamists the secular state's errors were royalism, absolutism, nepotism, decadence, corruption, and political alliances with Western states. Secular regimes have always been sensitive to Islamic public opinion, usually maintaining their own *ulama*, who issued opinions (*fatwas*) supporting royalist, politically conservative interpretations of state policies while supporting Islamic populist posi-

tions when convenient. An Islamically legitimated state, on the other hand, was less likely than its secular counterparts to disturb civil society with overtly modernist ideology and development projects that disrupted community cohesion.

Malaysia is the paradigmatic case of an Islamically legitimated state that is well on its way to becoming economically successful. The United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO) was founded by sons of the Malay ruling class in order to protect Malay privileges against immigrant Chinese interests that thrived within the colonial economy. UMNO has controlled the state in alliance with elites from the Chinese and Indian communities from the time of independence (1957) until the present.

The “bargain” struck at independence granted the Malays special privileges in the political realm and the Chinese minority freedom to compete as Malaysian citizens in the economic realm. For the Malays the bargain meant Islam as the official religion, but not an “Islamic” state; a rotating sultan from the nine federated Malay states as head of state; and, most important, the delegation to the sultan of each state a considerable amount of power over land, aristocratic titles, and the administration of Islamic law and institutional affairs. Shari’a courts in each state had jurisdiction over Muslims, who had to acknowledge their state’s sultan as a religious authority. Finally, the newly independent state’s authority was strengthened by internal security laws which originated in colonial Malaya’s campaign against Communist insurgents but were later used to detain without trial competitors from oppositional movements or rival political parties. Yet, unlike in Egypt or Algeria, competitive elections are held within UMNO and in the polity as a whole, even while a trend toward “soft authoritarianism” is unmistakable given the enormous power wielded by the UMNO-led alliance (Johnson 1987).

A pivotal event occurred in May 1969, when communal rioting erupted between Chinese and Malays after a Chinese election victory. After a period of emergency rule, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was implemented from 1971 to 1991. The NEP initiated a program of truly massive state intervention into Malaysia’s economy and society, developed in response to ethnonationalist pressure from Malay capital and the shock from the racial riots of 1969 (Shamsul 1986). To summarize a complex political and legal process, the NEP (1971) was designed to (1) eliminate absolute poverty, especially among the Ma-

lay peasantry; (2) abolish the correlation between occupation and ethnicity through an "affirmative action" program requiring quotas for Malays in education, employment, and government contracts; and (3) restructure the ownership of corporate equity holdings through state funding of Bumiputera (i.e., Malay and other indigenous peoples') "trust agencies," which purchase and hold equities for the Bumiputera community. To achieve the last goal, the NEP authorized trust agencies to restructure corporate equity ownership among ethnic groups such that, by 1990, the equity share target for Bumiputera would have increased from 1.9 to 30 percent; for other Malaysians (Chinese and Indians) it would be increased from 23.5 to 40 percent, and for foreigners it would be reduced from 60.7 to 30 percent (Malaysia 1973).

Compared to virtually all Muslim-majority states from 1970 to 1990, the NEP's achievements are extremely impressive: total absolute poverty in peninsular Malaysia was reduced from 49.3 to 15 percent, and among Malays from 65 to 20.8 percent; Malay (i.e. Bumiputera) equity holdings increased from 2.4 to at least 20.3 percent, depending on how one accounts for shares held by nominees (8.4 percent) (Jomo 1989). With regard to global relations, strong state intervention in favor of income distribution and the ethnic restructuring of the economy was balanced by a moderate shift in industrial strategy from import-substitution industrialization to EOI. The promotion of Free Trade Zones (FTZs), though initially intended to sop up unemployment and sources of urban conflict, encouraged transnational corporations to locate final-state assembly (especially electronics) in Malaysia, where the local Chinese business and industrial class developed modest linkages and provided engineering and skilled labor. Since the 1970s, despite petroleum, rubber, palm, and lumber exports, Malaysia has shifted away from commodity exports and reoriented its export strategy toward manufactured goods. Representing just 8.6 percent of GDP in 1960, manufacturing more than tripled by 1992 to 26.8 percent of GDP (Bruton 1992). Even more remarkable was the growth of manufactured exports: gross export revenues from manufacturing grew at an average of 24.1 percent per year between 1971 and 1992. The share of manufacturing exports in total merchandise exports rose rapidly from 11.9 percent in 1970 to 68.5 percent in 1992, probably surpassing 70 percent in 1993 (*Economist Intelligence Unit* 1 [1994]: 28). Nor is the rise in manufactures

solely located in FTZs. While EOI began in the FTZs in 1971, their share of manufactured exports has declined to about 40 percent in 1989, down from 70 percent in 1980 (World Bank 1993: 135).

By 1989 the financial press had declared Malaysia an NIC (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 7 [September 1989]: 96; *Economist* 3 [September 1988]: 67). In fact, Malaysia now suffers from a labor shortage, especially acute among skilled electronics workers. The demand for labor attracts an estimated 1–1.5 million workers from the neighboring states of Indonesia, Philippines, Bangladesh, and Thailand to work in plantations, construction, domestic service, and manufacturing.

In the political realm, UMNO has constructed an elite alliance with representatives of the Chinese business community and formed an alliance that includes the Indian minority (circa 10 percent, about one-third of whom are Muslim). It is an ethnic alliance of accumulation, dependent in large part, to be sure, on foreign direct investment, but one that benefits most Malaysians, despite legitimate complaints about rising income inequality among the Malays, systemic corruption within UMNO, dependence on international firms, and the rentier character of the emergent Malay bourgeoisie (Lubeck 1992; Gomez 1994; Jomo, ed. 1995).

Unlike most Muslim-majority states, therefore, Malaysia's income distribution, EOI, and economic restructuring policies facilitated the absorption of rural-born emigrants to the urban-industrial sector. Similarly, elite bargaining created ethnic alliances, and the fear of communal violence encouraged compromises, greased by the distribution of rents and political booty to those who were loyal to the alliance. By shifting to EOI and electronics exports while simultaneously reducing the weight of a costly venture into state-centered, heavy industrial projects after 1987, Malaysia successfully reoriented its economy and society toward the post-Fordist environment in a way that has enabled it to emerge as a niche location for final-state electronics production within a wider global division of labor.

If structural factors such as adjustment to global restructuring, income redistribution policies, and state capacity to implement a development project are positive in the Malaysian case, what has been the role of Islamic institutions and movements in determining the incidence of sectarian and communal conflict? Ironically, in con-

trast to neoliberal formulae, it was the ethnic violence of 1969, combined with the space granted to state-centered economic development and ethnic restructuring in the 1980s, that grounded the political foundation for Malaysia's relative success.

Malays have always made their Islamic identity central to their ethnic identity; indeed the federal constitution's "main criterion in the definition of a Malay is that he or she must be a Muslim" (Mutalib 1990). Yet in spite of UMNO's hegemony, the Islamic discourse is varied and contested by parties and movements. For example, PAS, the opposition Malay-based political party advocating an Islamic state since its founding in 1951, actually opposes the nonuniversalistic ethnic preferences of the NEP on Islamic grounds, calling instead for universality and unity within the umma. Because the NEP excludes non-Malay Muslims, PAS has denounced the preferences as chauvinist and as a policy "that has only succeeded in creating a wealthy middle class and a handful of Malay millionaires" (Muzaffar 1987: 57). PAS represents an Islamic nationalist tendency whose social base is strongest among the ulama in the northern states, especially Kelantan, where it governed from 1959 to 1977 and where it continues to rule in opposition to UMNO.

Political Islam has indeed posed a threat. In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the upswing in the global Islamic revival, the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) took center stage under the influence of an organizationally skilled and charismatic speaker named Anwar Ibrahim. Inspired by the revolutionary zeal of Iranians yet claiming affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood and Maududi's *Jamaat-Islami* of Pakistan, as well as funding from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, ABIM advocated an Islamic state to replace Malaysia's quasi-secular state, the replacement of civil law with law based upon the *Shari'a*, and the Islamization of Malay institutions. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, it set up schools, seminars, publications, and services for its membership.

While tactical shifts are common among Malay Muslims, such as PAS participation in a government of national unity in the 1970s in the aftermath of the riots, ABIM was faced with the unexpected decision of Anwar Ibrahim to stand as an UMNO candidate against a PAS candidate in the 1982 general elections (Jomo and Cheek 198). His father had represented the constituency for UMNO, so Ibrahim's new alliance with Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed com-

bines elite continuity and the generational reproduction of UMNO, as well as the emergence of an urban, commoner, Western-educated yet Islamist faction as a powerful force within UMNO. Justified by his supporters as an infiltration of UMNO by ABIM, the alliance ushered in UMNO's Islamization program, designed to shift its discourse in the direction of Islamic reformism, coopt challengers like Ibrahim, and eventually tame it by denouncing and proscribing what they called violent, fanatical, and extreme tendencies of the Islamist movements (Jomo and Cheek 1988; Mutalib 1990).

Thus far UMNO's strategy appears successful. Anwar Ibrahim's meteoric rise in the UMNO government, from minister of education to minister of finance and recently to deputy prime minister, confirms the demonstrated political capacity of the Malay political elite to absorb the Islamist challenge and, because of its aristocratic origins, to open recruitment to commoners like Ibrahim. It appears that a generational succession is nearly complete.

While there was little large-scale sectarian or ethnic conflict during the export boom (1987–95), Malaysian officials have voiced concern over the recruitment of Malay students overseas by radical Islamic groups. The global organization of international Islamist networks operating as student associations at both Western and Islamic universities appears to have recruited Malaysian students into the Islamist fold, provoking the government to break up large groups of students and to send counselors abroad. Groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Jema'ah Islam Malaysia (JIM), are alleged to be "very radical and very erudite. Many of its members are professionals" (according to columnist Ghani Ismail in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 May 1994, p. 36).

In 1994 Mahathir demonstrated UMNO's power over the discourse of Islam by outlawing as heretical a messianic, communalist Sufi group—al-Arqam—and forcing its leader to recant his writings in a televised press conference. "Mahathir apparently acted after 19 Malaysian women students of the Al-Arqam sect were arrested in Cairo five months ago. The women were accused of associating with Islamic extremist groups in Egypt" (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 11 August 1994, p. 25). Here the global present of Islamist movements challenges state capacity to tame and coopt the next generation of Islamist activists, a far simpler task if full employment reigns. None-

theless, the government thus far has demonstrated that it is up to the task.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings of the comparative analysis can be summarized as follows. State institutions in both Egypt and Algeria were riddled with corruption and marked by patronage systems that weakened democratic practices and perpetuated social and economic inequality. The Algerian state suffered from the more extreme weakness of the two in that the legitimacy of the state never became deeply rooted after independence. This institutional weakness, however, was masked by the oil boom that allowed the state to expand employment, thereby propping up government legitimacy. With no system in either country of preferential resource allocation based on cultural criteria, political Islam was relatively weak, particularly during the Fordist period of state-led development and the oil boom.

Although the seeds of political Islam were planted much earlier and although Islam itself has an important political component, I have argued here that the success of political Islam in these two states coincides with the breakdown of Fordism. Fordism was associated with steady economic growth and rising incomes, and it encouraged state intervention in the economy. It was during this period that elites successfully subordinated political Islam to state-led development goals. But with the first oil shock of 1973, the Fordist era ended, and more intense integration into the international economy began. While the oil shock initially created a surge of state-centered development in oil-exporting states, the development projects initiated during this period were inefficient and uncompetitive. And oil rents were an unearned windfall rather than capital carefully accumulated. They thus led to an artificial increase in income and a rapid increase in rural to urban migration, causing a decrease in domestic agricultural production. This led to increased integration in the international economy, with vastly expanded imports of food and other materials.

Once the rents were spent, the resources available to society and the state dried up. Drastic economic decline in both Algeria and

Egypt left large numbers of the unemployed to fend for themselves. Political elites began to borrow on world markets but were unable to generate enough income to service the debt. SAPs mandated by lending institutions led initially to lower income levels, increased social inequality, reduced state subsidies, and government withdrawal from welfare programs. Desperate for resources, both states sought external allies that would provide aid to prop up their secular regimes and provide them with continuing legitimacy in the global system. While Egypt increased its dependence on the United States, Algeria increased its dependence on France.

In this environment of increasing economic hardship and obvious failure of the secular nationalist state to provide for the economic security of society, political Islam, with its offer of spiritual hope for a better future, found fertile ground. Islamic groups were able to point out that SAPs violated Muslim prohibitions and that the withdrawal of the state from its allocative responsibilities violated the obligation to provide alms to the poor. Their rhetoric also pointed to IMF conditionality requirements as instruments of foreign control over Islamic societies. With each attack on government policies, the legitimacy of the secular national state weakened. Because the state also had fewer resources to coopt potential recruits of the Islamic opposition into government programs or employment, political Islam gained new supporters. As their ranks swelled, groups espousing political Islam became bolder in their demands for an Islamic state.

The groups who were most successful in gaining adherents were *not* those groups who could offer only an alternative political identity, like Gamma and Islamic Jihad. The most powerful groups were the FIS and the Muslim Brotherhood, who possessed vast networks of charitable associations, welfare services, schools, and hospitals that could offer tangible benefits to needy populations. Transnational networks of Islamic groups formed the resource base for these projects.

Radical groups in both countries, however, perpetrated acts of violence. In Egypt the radical Gamma and the Egyptian security forces became engaged in a low-intensity civil war. But as in India, the military apparatus of the state remained strong enough to quell the worst violence. In Algeria the state was not strong enough to suppress organized political Islam, and the result was civil war.

Malaysia tells a different story. Like the other Muslim-majority states, Malaysia experienced steady economic growth and rising incomes between 1945 and 1974. After the 1969 riots between Chinese and Malay populations, flexible political institutions allowed elites to construct a program for economic distribution along cultural lines, as well as affirmative action programs. In contrast to Egypt and Algeria, with the oil boom, oil rents were converted into capital for investment in development. Malaysia's equitable income distribution, EOI, and economic restructuring policies distributed an expanding economic pie to broad sectors of the population, increasing loyalty to the state and thereby increasing state capacity. Elite bargaining created ethnic alliances that encouraged political compromise. Compromises were credible because elites had ample resources to distribute to loyal supporters. And a strong and flexible party system absorbed and thus neutralized extreme Islamist movements. Malaysia, with a diverse cultural population and an Islamically legitimated state, remained at peace.

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CULTURAL CONFLICT IN INDIA: PUNJAB AND KASHMIR

Nirvikar Singh

The conflicts in Punjab and Kashmir, two of the most visible and violent in recent Indian history, provide a natural case study for the causes of cultural conflict.¹ These two regions differ in many ways—language, religion, culture, and geography, to name just a few. Yet in both states ethnicity and religion have become politicized in surprisingly similar ways. Both these conflicts involve issues of cultural identity. They are often labeled ethnic or sectarian conflicts, with the assumption that this labeling explains them.

In this chapter, I take issue with this perspective. I will examine the ways in which each state's respective relationship to the institutions of the Indian central state has served as the focal point for the creation and maintenance of cultural identity. Despite the professed goal of secularism, the Indian state has enabled and even caused ethnic cleavages to become politically charged. In the pages to follow, I treat each case independently, starting with Punjab and then turning to Kashmir. In the final section I relate and compare the two cases, especially with regard to the role of the broader economic, political, and institutional forces at work.

PUNJAB

The case of Punjab provides an excellent illustration of the central propositions guiding this volume. As I shall demonstrate below, historical policies of discrimination and privilege gradually politicized the religious and cultural identity of the Sikhs. Each time central power collapsed or weakened, that political relevance deepened under the leadership of political entrepreneurs—like Ranjit Singh in the

late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in the 1980s. In the current period, economic factors originating in an environment of economic globalization, particularly the 1973 oil crisis, dealt a severe blow to an already weakening central regime, providing a permissive environment for the escalation of cultural conflict. Economic policies in the wake of the Green Revolution also exacerbated perceptions of injustice and served to politically mobilize the Sikh population. "Bandwagoning effects" escalated this conflict to violence.

THE HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF CULTURAL IDENTITY

The history of the Sikhs, who form a significant religious group in Punjab, contradicts the view that the kinds of conflicts we observe in the world today are primarily the result of primordially motivated tribal struggle. The Sikh religion has a relatively modern beginning, in the sixteenth century, and the history of its development, the process by which it differentiated itself from other, neighboring traditions, and the resulting conflicts have been well charted.² As we shall see below, Sikh political identity was constructed in response to changes in external circumstances and pressures; it was never fixed and immutable. Perhaps most important, institutional constraints and incentives have been key in shaping the political relevance of ethnic identity.

Guru Nanak, considered the founder of the Sikh religion, preached in the early sixteenth century a message of inclusive and mystical salvation, wedded to a practical approach to daily living. Within a hundred years, his community of disciples (the literal meaning of *sikh*) had established its own script for the regional language, sites of pilgrimage and congregation, collective wealth, and a set of hierarchical institutions. The role of the guru took on an aspect of temporal or political as well as spiritual leadership.

The egalitarianism of the spiritual message found many converts in Punjab. This was a region that had been in the path of the Mughal and all previous invaders of India and was therefore in the capital firmly under the control of the Mughal emperors, who exercised their control through regional governors. These authorities became increasingly concerned with the growing popularity of the

Sikh religion and its potential as an alternative source of social authority. As Sikhdom grew in popularity, the potential for conflict with the central authorities grew as well.

Conflict manifested itself with the arrest and death by torture of the fifth Sikh guru. By the last quarter of the seventeenth century, another Sikh guru had been executed by the Mughals, and there began a period of almost continual conflict, often in the form of guerrilla warfare. Tradition has it that the seeds of the struggle lay in unequal treatment of Hindus relative to Muslims by the later Mughals and the rulers' attempts to aggressively proselytize their religion. (The Sikhs were a distinct community by this stage, but since the boundary of the term "Hindu" is itself vague, some would include the Sikhs of the time in that category.) The religious element of the conflict, however, cannot be the whole story because there was continued conflict among Hindu rulers subjugated by the Mughals and between them and the Sikhs as well. Indeed the conflict was equally if not more motivated by a political struggle for the control of resources. The lack of well-functioning institutions for mediating conflict implied that the conflict would often be openly violent.

The argument underlying the above narrative can be stated more explicitly. People chose to become Sikhs because it enhanced their lives in tangible and intangible ways. The more people joined this community, the greater the rewards to joining and the greater its power for collective political action. Therefore the Sikhs came to be perceived as a threat to the political authority of the center, possibly including its ability to raise revenue from the region in which Sikhs lived. The center's response was to reduce the attractiveness of being a Sikh by coercive means. Coercion and hegemony caused the Sikhs to redefine the community in a politically relevant way. This redefinition included an enhanced communal recognition of the value of martyrdom and a hardening of the boundaries of Sikhism through the adoption of a set of external symbols. Indeed this early period illustrates the bandwagoning effects that led to identity politics discussed in the introduction to this volume. In terms of cost-benefit calculus, while it might have been costlier to become a Sikh, the perceived benefits were enhanced through this process, and the costs of switching back were also raised.³

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Sikhs were close to their modern cultural and political identity. This evolution resulted

from a rapid decay in the power of the center. There followed a period of violence as power was contested all over India, including Punjab. Memories of persecution had solidified political unity among Sikhs, and that unity gave them the resources to set up autonomous domains in the absence of imperial power. Individual domains were later unified by the late eighteenth century by Ranjit Singh, the ruler of one of those domains, who established a Sikh kingdom in Punjab. The Sikh identity flourished, as it was associated with political power.⁴

During the eighteenth century, however, the British East India Company rapidly filled the power vacuum left by the Mughals, and the resulting shifts in the institutions of power had important consequences for the political relevance of cultural identity in India. By the time of Ranjit Singh's death in 1839, Punjab was almost the only major region of India not under British domination. Ten years later, by relying heavily on mercenaries recruited from other parts of India, the British were able to defeat the Sikhs and bring them under their control.

This period, following the collapse of the Sikh kingdom in Punjab and the consolidation of British rule over India (control of India passed formally from the East India Company to the British crown), saw a rapid decline in the prestige and value of the distinctive Sikh identity. That decline, however, did not last long; in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, members of a new urban professional class among Sikhs began to fashion a response to the challenge posed by the alien British culture, technology, and values. The response was to create a stronger collective identity that could stand up to the onslaught of superior European technology and the values that came with it. That effort was ironically facilitated by British policy as well. As part of an inducement strategy, the British actively encouraged Sikh recruits into the British Indian Army to maintain the symbols and observances of their religion.

The politicization of cultural identity in nineteenth-century India was also encouraged by British practices of divide and rule and the institutions that implemented that practice. The British based political representation of the Indian population on religious and communal identities; this naturally reinforced and politicized those identities, hardened cultural boundaries, and increased political competition among cultural groups. Muslims and Hindus were also

trying to shore up their own cultural identities in the face of European cultural, technological, and political hegemony; in colonial governance structures each group argued for representation based on its unique cultural identity. The British strategy of dividing the potentially politically powerful population seemed to succeed.

Indeed throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, a movement for Indian independence gained momentum. The Indian National Congress (INC), as its name suggests, attempted to create a national identity rather than numerous political identities based on ethnicity or religion. But this movement was only partly successful. As would later be the case in Yugoslavia, where many Croats saw a unified Yugoslav state as a cover for Serb dominance, leaders of many smaller cultural groups in India viewed the National Congress as dominated by Hindus, with their cultural identity suppressed in the political realm only as a matter of expedience. The rise of the Muslim League and eventual partition were the consequences of this suspicion, which was certainly exploited by the British to their short-term advantage.

Thus by the beginning of the twentieth century, Sikh cultural identity had become politically relevant through the process of resistance to domination and through increasing autonomy when dominant powers weakened. Under British control and under the British policy of divide and rule, religious identities gained even more importance in the distribution of political resources. In extreme cases, economic power and prestige led to religious conversions, and Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians all competed according to the logic of identity politics.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, a resurgent Sikh religious identity took hold in Punjab, centered on the contested control of Sikh religious shrines, which the British had allowed to be consolidated in the hands of corrupt hereditary functionaries.⁵ The struggle to wrest control of the shrines was both symbolic and material; the shrines were associated with significant events in the lives of Sikh gurus, and control of the shrines meant control over substantial land and resources. In 1925 the British conceded, and control of the shrines passed to a newly created representative Sikh organization. The political relevance of Sikh identity was thus legitimated.

In the 1930s and 1940s the Sikh leadership followed the lead of the Muslims under Mohammed Ali Jinnah and established a Sikh political party.⁶ As a political party, Sikhs were represented at autonomy negotiations with the British. But in negotiations over whether and how to carve up India to create a separate Muslim state, they comprised too small a group to really matter. Concentrated in Punjab, Sikhs amounted to only about 13 percent of the region's population. With extremely limited bargaining power and no guarantee of protection from the alternative power that was to be created—the Islamic state of Pakistan—the Sikhs were forced to throw in their lot with secular India and rely on oral promises of minority protection from the INC leadership.

Partition in 1947 and the resulting displacement of populations were a major trauma for the subcontinent. What is essential to our story here is that Punjab was divided between India and Pakistan. Sikhs in the western, Pakistani part migrated to the eastern part and to the Indian capital territory of Delhi. Viewed objectively, they flourished, doing well in agriculture, trade, and government. They were also able and willing to emigrate in search of better opportunities abroad, and they continued to be heavily represented in the Indian army.

The issue of the political relevance of their cultural identity nevertheless remained one that irritated and festered. Difficulties arose during preparations of the new Indian constitution, when framers attempted to deal with the multiplicity of religions and customs, not by separating church and state, but by attempting a balancing act. Prior identities of different groups were recognized in the political arena and either validated—as with a separate personal law in some areas for Muslims—or transformed—as with special preferences for untouchables. While one might ascribe somewhat higher motives to the leaders of newly independent India than the British divide and rule, this policy actually continued the British practice of reifying and politicizing collective and cultural identities by incorporating them into the constitution.

The Sikhs suffered as a result. The British had allowed and encouraged Sikh cultural identity to evolve and thrive in the political arena, but in independent India, where they represented only 2 percent of the population and were even a minority in the Indian part of Punjab, they found themselves (along with Jains and Buddhists)

lumped together in the category "Hindus" for all legal purposes. The practical import may have been slight, but the symbolism was galling, and subsequent related developments added to the problem.⁷

The immediate task following independence was to reorganize India administratively. Having inherited a patchwork of administrative units and designations determined more by historical accident than any logical rationale, India began to reorganize on the basis of language, with about fifteen languages recognized in the constitution. Reorganization proceeded over a decade, occurring in fits and starts prodded by regional agitations, including occasional riots, as regional populations sought to gain linguistic recognition.

Punjab presented a particular problem in this regard. The language, Punjabi, has a fairly close link to Hindi, the language of the Gangetic plain. It could be and was written in three scripts: Gurmukhi, the script of the Sikh scriptures; the Persian script of Urdu (another linguistic cousin of Hindi); and the Devanagari script of Hindi. In the first postindependence census, Hindus in Punjab were encouraged by some Hindu politicians and reformers to declare Hindi as their native language. This was a throwback to the preindependence conflict between Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab over identity and political power. For Sikhs, Punjabi meant the Gurmukhi script, with its sacred connotations, which Hindu purists found unacceptable. The result was a Punjab state in India where Sikhs were not only a minority, but also deprived of the linguistic status they saw given to other groups. The desire for a Punjabi-speaking state therefore became a major focus of Sikh political action.

Many Sikhs initially felt marginalized or excluded from the Indian political system, which was partially characterized by a system of collective rights and representation. Punjabi was recognized as one of the main Indian languages in the constitution, but a Punjabi- (and Sikh) majority state was not created when other state boundaries were redrawn on linguistic lines. Linguistically based states privileged the majority culture in each such state, often to the detriment of minorities. This exclusion within a system in which access to many political resources was granted according to ascriptive criteria further deepened the political relevance of Sikh identity.

By the beginning of the 1960s, Punjab was the only major Indian region not organized on linguistic lines. The Akali Dal, the major Sikh party, which had developed its political muscle in the campaign

for control of Sikh shrines, stepped up its agitation for a linguistic reorganization of Punjab. The tactics of agitation followed very much the model developed by Gandhi and the INC at the time of the struggle for independence, including marches and fasts by leaders. It did not become violent. At the same time, the prospects for success were slight, with the central Indian leadership resisting for a variety of reasons. In particular, Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister until 1964, viewed the demand for a Punjabi-speaking majority state as a demand for a Sikh majority state and therefore unacceptable according to his secular principles. Furthermore, a potential Sikh majority state was viewed by the central authorities as a strategic weakness, given suspicions about Sikh loyalty to the center and Punjab's strategic position on the border with Pakistan and on the land route connecting Kashmir to the rest of India. Nonetheless, following the loyal performance of Sikhs in the Indian armed forces in the 1965 war with Pakistan, this latter reason for denying the Sikhs a state of their own seemed to lose its validity. More pragmatic and less insistent than Nehru on secularism as an ideal, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi agreed in 1966 to divide Punjab into separate Punjabi- and Hindi-speaking states. Mrs. Gandhi's own position in the ruling Congress Party was weak, causing her to welcome any reduction in outside pressures.

The specific conditions for the creation of two separate states—Punjab, now with a Sikh majority, and the new state of Haryana (with some territory going to a third state, Himachal Pradesh)—included several features that postponed conflict rather than ending or resolving it. Chandigarh, the city that had been designed especially to be the capital of Punjab, was shared between the two states, and there was no clear division of resources, including the most important one of river waters. Both the possession of Chandigarh and conflicts over river waters became part of a package of grievances used for political advantage by both Sikhs and Hindus.⁸

In the years following the division of Punjab, Sikh political fortunes did not fare well. The year 1967 saw the end of the political hegemony of the INC, with other parties coming to power in several major Indian states. The Congress Party subsequently split, and the following four years were marked by relative political instability, with fluid and repeatedly shifting alliances in state legislatures. The Akali Dal was able to share power briefly in Punjab, but it did not

enjoy the unanimous support of Sikhs, and its tenure was short-lived. In 1971, with the crisis that eventually led to the formation of Bangladesh, Mrs. Gandhi was able to substantially increase her political strength, and the Akalis were shut out of power altogether.

Mrs. Gandhi's high popularity was also short-lived, chiefly due to her inability to deliver on promises of eliminating poverty. The Indian economy was hit badly by the first oil shock, which prompted mounting unrest in many parts of India. Meanwhile, Mrs. Gandhi had created a spoils system which rewarded personal loyalty above all else. As government in India became the road to wealth as well as power, corruption flourished. In this climate, the Akalis attempted to regroup politically by passing a resolution calling for Chandigarh to be awarded to Punjab and river waters to be shared more favorably for the state. Furthermore, the Green Revolution, which had increased yields and prosperity, had also made Punjab the breadbasket for much of India. But popular perceptions were that the center, by controlling crop procurement, was reaping disproportionate gains at the expense of Punjabi, mostly Sikh, farmers. These major issues were linked to a variety of purely religious demands and also with a demand for increased Punjab autonomy.

Many states in India, especially at the country's periphery, have sought more independence from the center, with the larger ones sometimes achieving de facto autonomy over a range of matters.⁹ In the case of Punjab, however, the confluence of religion and geography made the central government view demands for more autonomy with suspicion. Although it did not specify clearly what more autonomy would mean in practice, this demand was later used by the central government to label Sikhs as separatist or secessionist.

THE PRESENT CRISIS

The current period of escalating violence in Punjab has its genesis in several social and economic developments.¹⁰ As noted above, the crop procurement system had created distrust of the center on the part of Sikh farmers, and dissent festered over the regional distribution of income. Furthermore, the central government, which tightly controlled investment decisions, had promoted agriculture in Punjab while starving the region of industrial investment. Hindus

were also perceived by Sikhs as dominant in trade and commerce in Punjab, and higher wages in the region were producing an influx of migrant Hindu workers from eastern India while Sikh unemployment remained high.¹¹ Finally, the central government deliberately reduced the recruitment of Sikhs into the armed forces, reversing an old tradition that in one sense had long operated as a safety valve in the region.

In 1975 Mrs. Gandhi imposed a state of internal emergency and arrested or otherwise silenced all opposition to counter the mounting unrest that had emerged in the wake of the first oil shock. In response, the Akalis in Punjab, mobilized for nonviolent resistance, courted arrest and filled the jails. Their tactics worked; in 1977 they were rewarded with a partnership in the opposition coalition at the center, which swept the Congress Party out of power in the next elections and went on to capture various state legislatures as well.

Mrs. Gandhi, seeking to regain power (which she would do in 1980), began looking for alliances wherever she could. In Punjab she tried to undermine the Akalis by covertly showing favor to a "fundamentalist" preacher, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, thereby encouraging him in his political mobilization efforts.¹² Bhindranwale was able to capitalize on many outstanding social and religious issues, mobilizing popular opposition to Hindus and other more moderate Sikh groups.¹³ When he and his followers clashed violently with Hindu and heterodox Sikh groups in Punjab, the central government responded weakly, initially doing little to restore order. It appeared that Gandhi was following in the British tradition of divide and rule.

In this chaotic environment, small groups of Sikhs, mostly young, some with military careers behind them, began to raise the issue of a separate Sikh state. The objective was typically not well defined. Though some Sikhs living in Britain and the United States had been campaigning for an independent nation of Khalistan for many years, the issue had not been taken seriously by most Sikhs in India. Indifference might have continued to characterize popular attitudes, but with the government's indiscriminate punishments for Sikh militancy, including stopping all Sikhs traveling to New Dehli for the Asian Games in 1982, sympathies began to shift.

Meanwhile, the root causes of the problems around which Sikhs were beginning to mobilize for resistance had not been addressed, and the Akalis, still the main Sikh political party, despite increasing

fragmentation, were too weak to lobby effectively for their resolution. The government refused to negotiate, under the pretext that the Akalis themselves were separatist, alternating that approach with the negotiation of agreements that it never implemented. Essentially the central government had no interest in appearing to give in to the demands of a small group when the cost might be a serious loss of electoral support in the Hindi-speaking heartland of northern India. This concern on the part of the center for the reputational effect of the measures that it took, which had not characterized earlier periods of Sikh agitation, had become very important, as evidenced by the Congress Party's rout in the region in the 1977 general election. The Akalis tended to respond in turn by becoming increasingly strident to avoid being completely sidelined by Bhindranwale. He, meanwhile, proceeded to encourage or condone guerrilla tactics to win power and to engage in a military buildup in the precincts of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the traditional seat of spiritual and temporal authority of the Sikhs. These bandwagoning effects increased the odds of violence. The situation exploded when the government used the army to attack Bhindranwale's fortified position in the Golden Temple. The move was a military success when Bhindranwale and some key followers were killed. Politically it was consistent with Mrs. Gandhi's desire to signal toughness to the rest of India's population and prevent the loss of votes to the Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Additional consequences, however, were disastrous. For Sikhs it was not unlike what Catholics might feel were the Vatican to be invaded. A whole new generation of militants was created. Then followed the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguard in October, the organized killings of Sikhs in cities across northern India (including the capital), and the sweeping electoral victory of Mrs. Gandhi's son Rajiv in December. The electoral campaign was marked by the use of advertisements deliberately suggesting that all Sikhs posed a threat to the nation and its unity. Hence Sikhs who had not supported Bhindranwale or even the Akalis were ascribed negative motivations and intentions solely on the basis of their cultural identity and religious preference. The message conveyed by this campaign was that if you were a Sikh, you were not to be trusted.

Subsequent events up to the present have involved a playing out of the government's strategy. Since it disposes over military and

other resources far greater than any Sikh militants could muster, even with liberal covert aid from Pakistan, the center has essentially won a war of attrition. Militants have typically been killed upon arrest in faked encounters to avoid the delays of the legal process. New laws have given the center draconian powers, essentially suspending all civil liberties in Punjab.

The center has continued to periodically negotiate with various Sikh politicians, sometimes coming to agreements, but never carrying them out. The general population, once the trauma of the attack on the Golden Temple and subsequent pogroms had faded, slowly came to prefer the organized and predictable violence of the government, which at least allowed it to go about its daily business, to the increasingly desperate and arbitrary violence of the militants. The insurgency had also become a cover for purely criminal activity, as there was no coherent leadership and no clear objectives beyond separation from India.

In 1991 state elections were held after a record-breaking stretch of direct rule by the central government (including periods of essentially military occupation). Boycotted by opposition Sikh parties, the elections nevertheless resulted in the installation of a Sikh chief minister from the ruling Congress Party. The state government doubled its already large deficit in the following year doling out money to appease as many as possible.¹⁴ At this time, it seems that the center has succeeded in its objectives in Punjab since absolutely nothing has been conceded politically, while the level of violence, after a massive increase through the 1980s, has been greatly reduced.

In sum, while cultural conflict in India is a deeper structural problem, with its roots in discriminatory resource allocation, the present crisis was triggered by the growing instability of the political party system and the first oil shock, which strained the government's fiscal capacity, weakened its allocative and distributive institutions, and helped to undermine a social contract based on the government's taking the lead in trying to achieve economic growth as well as a more equitable distribution of income. This situation evoked widespread challenges to the elected central government that continued through the 1970s and several changes of government.

In short, the present crisis is associated with the central state's gradual loss of its grip on power. Under these conditions, an institutional analysis must focus on changing cost-benefit calculus from

the perception of the center and from the perception of peripheral cultural groups in relation to the center. In the case of Punjab, its strategic and economic importance for India and the reputation effects involved for the central government—namely, the Congress Party as it tried to maintain power—made it inevitable that the center would hesitate to make any concessions. Even concessions that were negotiated were never delivered, or they were offered with conditions that made them unacceptable. If the response of those making demands was ultimately violent, this was partly a rational negotiating strategy since the actual perpetrators of violence have been those with little to lose from such a course of action.¹⁵ The only logical response of the central government was an even greater level of violence. This has been the consistent policy of the Indian government ever since independence since its prime imperative is its dominance over its sphere of control.

Finally, with regard to the argument that the weakening of the central state raises the odds of violent cultural conflict, it is worth noting that the executive branch of the central government in India has gradually eroded the checks and balances provided by the legislative and judicial branches. The legislature has tended to be an adjunct of the executive, and the judiciary is easily overruled, in addition to being overburdened. Thus in India institutions for the resolution of conflict through arbitration are extremely weak. When those institutions are weakened, violent conflict becomes a more rational choice.

KASHMIR¹⁶

The Kashmir issue, with the western and northwestern part of the area under Pakistani administration and the northeastern corner controlled by China, has intrinsically a more international character than the conflict in Punjab. The focus here is on the part under Indian administration and conflict between Kashmiris there and the central Indian government. It is a heterogeneous region, including the Kashmir Valley, which is mostly under Indian control and the center of current conflict. To the north lie the regions of Hunza, Gilgit, and Baltistan, which are mainly under Pakistani control. To the south are

Poonch and Jammu, the latter representing a Hindu majority region. To the east is Ladakh, which is primarily Buddhist.

Despite the differences, the conflict in Kashmir has many parallels to the conflict in Punjab. In particular the case illustrates how even when political entrepreneurs like Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah struggle to emphasize class and social divisions, if central regimes recognize cultural cleavages over social and economic cleavages in the political arena, those cultural cleavages are likely to become politically charged. Pakistan's involvement in the crisis has tipped the balance toward cultural (as opposed to class or ideological) conflict. Its support for Kashmir's incorporation into Muslim Pakistan mobilized Kashmiri Hindus to struggle for incorporation into India. Because opposing forces were mobilized as cultural groups, cultural conflict was assured, despite the efforts of secular politicians like Nehru and Abdullah.

POLITICAL IDENTITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since it is geographically more separate from the northern Indian plains than Punjab, Kashmir has also enjoyed longer periods of autonomy. It is singular among the regions of India in having a chronicle of its rulers written as long as a millennium ago, the *Rajatarangini* of Kalhana.¹⁷ Hinduism and Buddhism flourished in early Kashmir, with Islam making substantial inroads here as in the rest of India. Kashmir retained its autonomy until 1586, when it was incorporated into the Mughal empire by Akbar. Since Indian rulers are perceived as successors to Mughal kings, it has been suggested that 1586 marks the watershed in Kashmiri history, dividing it between periods of Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri rule. This notion of a watershed continues to color relations between the region and the central Indian government.¹⁸

The modern history of Kashmir is of course more complicated than this simple dichotomy suggests. As the Mughal empire waned, the control of Kashmir also slipped from the center in Dehli. For a time, Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs and Punjab succeeded in establishing domination over Kashmir. Control then passed to Hindu Dogra rulers, descendants of a general in Ranjit Singh's army. Concentrated in Jammu and nearby foothill areas (now in the Indian state of Hi-

machal Pradesh), the Dogra spread their dominion over all the regions of Kashmir. In the colonial period and as was the case with other Indian princes, they were essentially subservient to British power on the subcontinent. The strategically important northwestern regions of Hunza and Gilgit were administered directly by the British.

The salient point in this context is that the Dogras were perceived by the inhabitants of the Kashmir Valley as outsiders, and rule by “outsiders” continued even after the lapse of Mughal control. The relationship between Dogra rulers and various subjects served to charge identity in the region and infuse it with political relevance. As I shall elaborate below, there was a Kashmiri identity which overlapped with but also often overrode the Muslim political identity which has come to be stressed in the current conflict.¹⁹ This Kashmiri cultural identity was supported by a distinctive language and traditions, though such statements apply more to central Kashmir than its peripheral areas, which are somewhat distinct in their own right.

Because the rulers were Dogra Rajputs, that group was directly favored in the ruling structures over other inhabitants—Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, or Sikh. For example, at one stage, 60 percent of certain government posts went to Dogras, despite lower average educational qualifications.²⁰ Thus, while Muslims were at the bottom of the social hierarchy, Hindus such as Kashmiri Pandits were also less favored by the rulers.

PREINDEPENDENCE AND PARTITION

In 1931 there was a Muslim upsurge against the ruler, sparked by religious and social issues. The writings of those involved suggest that the focus of the revolt was more the feudal regime than religious difference, a circumstance that became explicit in 1938, when Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah split from the Muslim Conference, the main Muslim grouping in Kashmir. He formed the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (AJKNC), which described the 1931 events as “a war of the oppressed against the oppressor . . . to seek justice and redress. If the ruler was Muslim and the subjects Hindus, the war would have been fought on similar grounds.”

Not surprisingly, the Maharaja of Kashmir portrayed events differently, as a conflict between Muslims and Hindus. Thus governing bodies rather than popular groups redefined a *conflict over perceived inequality* as a *conflict over cultural identity*. The maharaja found support from both existing Hindu groups in the rest of India and new Hindu parties he encouraged in Kashmir.²¹ Furthermore, a section of Muslims themselves had its own preference for using religious demarcations for political ends.

Thus we can trace the existence of two starkly competing paradigms for understanding events in Kashmir: one based on religious difference, the other on class or economic difference. While central authorities at the top stressed cultural difference as the key political division in society, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah stressed class divisions in his political mobilization efforts. While the AJKNC welcomed all cultural groups and secular membership into its ranks, Muslim landlords opposed the AJKNC because it did not support them *as Muslims* and they were criticized as one of the oppressors. Indeed the socialist ideology of the AJKNC permitted a natural alliance with the INC, dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru, himself a Kashmiri Pandit. Thus these conflicting interpretations of the source of conflict embodied a competition of two political “logics” for dominance: identity politics vs. class-based political struggle. Nevertheless, the fact that over 70 percent of the population of Kashmir (and over 90 percent of the valley) was Muslim and that it made up an even larger fraction of the less well off undeniably led to a conflation of the two sources of difference. With added encouragement from the center, identity politics came to dominate.

By 1946, when the partition of India was beginning to appear certain, the AJKNC had irrevocably parted ways with the All India Muslim League led by Jinnah, deliberately choosing to seek an arrangement with the INC that would provide for accession to India but with maximum autonomy for Kashmir. Nonetheless, identity politics seemed to dominate the struggle as it escalated to violence. At a time when the rest of India was beset by protests and fierce fighting, in Bengal, Punjab, and other areas, Jinnah’s All-India Muslim League began its “direct action” campaign on 16 August 1946, and there followed a wave of violence and counterviolence.

In Kashmir, Abdullah reiterated his commitment to freedom based on opposition to princely state authority (as opposed to free-

dom based on Muslim identity). He had already called for an end to Maharaja Hari Singh's sovereignty, making references to the French and Russian revolutions. In January 1947 the AJKNC boycotted state elections because the franchise was limited and they were organized on communal lines, with seats reserved for different cultural groups. The Muslim Conference participated and established its strength in areas such as Poonch. Its policies echoed those of Jinnah, and because the AJKNC, composed primarily of Muslims, was tarred with the brush of identity politics despite its secular ideological platform, Hari Singh responded by using Hindu and Sikh troops to suppress agitation by both the Muslim Conference and the AJKNC.

On 15 July 1947, the British formally announced that British India would be partitioned into Pakistan and India. On 25 July, Viceroy Mountbatten met with India's semi-independent princes and offered them a choice as to whether they wished to belong to Pakistan or India. The criteria were contiguous borders or communication with Pakistan or India, and there was some lip service to obeying the "will of the people." By the time of partition, many princes accepted one dominion or another. Most Muslim contiguous states acceded to Pakistan, while most of the others acceded to India. Hari Singh, hoping for autonomy, delayed making a decision. He signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on 15 August, the day of independence.²² He also offered such an agreement with India, but the Indian leaders prevaricated. Thus at the time of Indian independence and Pakistan's creation, Kashmir's fate was undecided.

THE FIRST KASHMIR WAR

Especially in Poonch and other areas bordering Pakistan, the violence associated with the partition and Indian independence had also spilled over into Kashmir. In June 1947 there was the "no-tax" protest, resulting in the formation of a secessionist movement in Poonch province.²³ In mid-August martial law was imposed, accompanied by widespread violence and revolt. At the same time, attacks on Muslims in Jammu, which some said were linked to Hari Singh's government, led to the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Muslims. There was also a controversy over supplies from Pakistan to Kashmir, which were guaranteed under the Standstill Agreement but

which both Kashmir and the Indian office accused Pakistan of deliberately withholding.²⁴ Pakistan simply blamed shortages on the violence in the region itself.

Tribal groups from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border were already supplying arms to Poonch, as well as taking part in some of the fighting. The fighting also spread to the Mirpur District in Jammu. There is evidence that Pakistani regulars were involved, although the government of Pakistan of course denied any official involvement at that time. Apparently the military command of the "resistance" as it gradually took shape was headed by Muslim rebels, sympathizers from Pakistan, and officers who had deserted Hari Singh's government.

The revolt was fairly successful, worrying Singh's government enough to motivate concessions to both the AJKNC and Nehru, who, sharing ideological sympathies, was on friendly terms with Sheikh Abdullah of the AJKNC. Abdullah, who had been imprisoned, was released on 29 September. At the same time, evidence "makes it clear that [India and the state of Jammu and Kashmir] were heavily engaged in the planning of some kind of Indian military intervention."²⁵ In early October a battalion entered Kashmir from the friendly princely state of Patiala. These developments may have been viewed with fear and alarm by Pakistan and by those Muslims in Kashmir who wished to ally themselves with Pakistan. On the evening of 21 October, Pathan tribespeople, Muslims, Pakistanis, and rebellious Kashmiri mutineers took over towns in Poonch, and by the next morning they came very close to the summer capital, Srinagar. What actually happened next is not entirely clear.

The Information Service of India stated that Kashmir was simply "invaded" by foreign troops and rebels, while others claim that tribespeople helped the local forces counter a planned Indian invasion.²⁶ In any case, on 24 October, the state of Azad Kashmir was proclaimed, with central Indian authorities occupying Poonch, Gilgit, and surrounding areas. Hari Singh then grudgingly signed an accession order with India, allowing for the possibility that Abdullah would head the government in exchange for Indian military assistance.²⁷

Nonetheless, the war dragged on, and by May 1948 Pakistani regulars were officially involved at the front. In Mountbatten's negotiations with Jinnah (Mountbatten was the governor general of

India, while Jinnah was the governor general of Pakistan), India agreed to a UN-supervised election for the whole country, but Pakistan insisted that the terms of partition settled the matter: Kashmir was a Muslim-dominated state that had a contiguous border with Pakistan; therefore Kashmir should accede to Pakistan. The war lasted until a cease-fire was signed in January 1949. On 27 July 1949, the Karachi Agreement created a border based on military positions, resulting in a de facto partitioning of Kashmir.

It is significant that the Indian leadership, in recognizing that Sheikh Abdullah was the key to the accession of Kashmir to India, realized that he had to be offered something in return. In a letter to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (an important INC leader who became India's first home minister), Nehru wrote that Abdullah was "very anxious to keep out of Pakistan and relies upon us a great deal for advice. But at the same time he cannot carry his people with him unless he has something definite to place before them."²⁸ This was in fact the assurance of Indian leaders that accession would be subject to approval of the people of Kashmir, and this commitment was made a part of the Instrument of Accession.

KASHMIR IN INDIA

After the cease-fire, the Indian government had two conflicting tasks: placating demands by Hindu nationalists to integrate Kashmir fully into the Indian union and keeping Kashmiri leaders satisfied enough to maintain their support for the union. The second aspect was the progressive change in the balance between these two sides, with a long-run trend toward eroding any special status for Kashmir.

These two forces were at work right from the beginning of Kashmir's inclusion in India. Sheikh Abdullah took over the leadership of the government with a title equivalent to prime minister, emphasizing his special status. At the same time, India admitted Kashmiri representatives to discussions on the framing of the new constitution, even as the United Nations was attempting to sort out the issue of how popular approval of accession to India would be decided. In 1949 it was already being suggested in India that the will of the people might be determined by elected representatives rather than directly by a plebiscite in Kashmir.²⁹

The constitution of 1950, under Article 370, did provide the state of Jammu and Kashmir several rights specific only to that state. Aside from matters of defense, external affairs, and communications, everything would theoretically be under the control of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.³⁰ In late 1951 elections were held for Kashmir's constituent assembly, resulting in an overwhelming majority for the AJKNC, which the Indian leadership chose to interpret as a show of support for Kashmir's inclusion in India. At the same time, Hindu nationalist groups began to demand the abrogation of Article 370 and the full incorporation of Kashmir into India. The logic of identity politics now came to dominate Kashmir's fate, even as Abdullah struggled for secularism and a recognition of class divisions.

The balance was tipped in favor of identity politics when, in 1952, Abdullah launched a major program of land reform, which was opposed by the central government on the grounds that it would adversely affect mainly large non-Muslim landholders. Despite re-affirmation by Nehru to Abdullah in July 1952 of Kashmir's special role and autonomy, relations rapidly deteriorated, and Abdullah was arrested on 8 August 1953. The Indian leadership appeared to fear that Abdullah would attempt to move toward independence for Kashmir.

Whereas India had viewed Abdullah as indispensable at the time of accession, it was now able to use its military presence and other resources to replace him with a more pliable leader of the AJKNC. There followed a period of about twenty years of manipulated elections, bribery of Kashmiri leaders through the resulting guarantee of power and patronage, and gradual erosion of Kashmir's constitutional autonomy. Article 370 was untouched in some respects (such as restrictions on ownership of Kashmiri land by non-Kashmiris), but it was attenuated significantly. Most important, on 14 May 1954, Constitutional Order 1954 was issued which extended the power of the center over more than defense, communications, and foreign affairs. Over time, then, little was left of the special status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.³¹

Dissent simmered in the state throughout this period. Abdullah was released from prison in 1958 but soon rearrested. Further moves were made toward removing Kashmir's special status. In 1963 the sixteenth amendment to the constitution obliged all candidates to uphold the integrity of India. This and other measures made a posi-

tion supporting a plebiscite in Kashmir essentially treasonous. In 1965, tension along the cease-fire line in Kashmir erupted into a war between India and Pakistan which ended in a stalemate, as had the earlier conflict over Kashmir.³²

Sheikh Abdullah continued to be in and out of prison. As autonomy within India receded as a possibility, the other two options, independence and merger with Pakistan, gained adherents. But India's victory in the 1971 war that created Bangladesh and the subsequent Shimla Pact between India and Pakistan, which recognized the division of Kashmir, persuaded Abdullah to negotiate an agreement with Indira Gandhi, now seemingly the undisputed leader at the center. He returned to power as chief minister of Kashmir, and in exchange for accepting Kashmir as an integral part of India, he was given assurance that all acts and ordinances issued after his arrest in 1953 would be reviewed.

THE CURRENT CRISIS

In 1977 elections that marked the end of Mrs. Gandhi's state of internal emergency saw an overwhelming victory for Abdullah over both the main national parties. These were probably the first free and fair elections in Kashmir. But there followed a period of political instability at the center that undermined these positive developments. In particular, a proposed review of acts and ordinances never took place. In 1982 Sheikh Abdullah chose his son Farooq, who was a doctor rather than a professional politician, to succeed him in power. Sheikh Abdullah died in the same year.

After 1982 the political situation deteriorated rapidly. Farooq Abdullah did not have the leadership credentials or ability of his father. Corruption increased dramatically. Political alliances in Kashmir were made and broken with rapidity. Farooq Abdullah was in and out of power. There was a return to the rigging of elections. The earlier changes in Kashmir's status allowed for increasingly direct and heavy-handed central intervention. By the late 1980s Farooq Abdullah's government was resorting to violence to control popular dissent. That dissent was blamed on Pakistan and Pakistani sympathizers.

After 1990 Farooq Abdullah was removed from power again and replaced by direct rule from the center, through the agency of the appointed governor of the state. The level of violence and repression escalated and has continued at a relatively high level until recently. Surprisingly, just as in Punjab, there is now some indication that the central government has been successful in containing the dissidents, who remain split between those still seeking independence and those who prefer a merger with Pakistan. Both of these groups are exclusively Muslim, and non-Muslims have become explicit targets for their violence, though Muslims who do not support either course of action are also attacked. However, recently the level of rhetoric has altered, and there is a good chance that violence will subside. One can only speculate as to the mechanism used to achieve this change. The experience in Punjab and elsewhere suggests that open force has been combined with secret bribes or concessions.

COMPARISONS

Punjab and Kashmir are strikingly different. Sikhs in Punjab remained a minority, while Muslims in Kashmir constituted an overwhelming majority. The class or occupational structure was also different. In Punjab, Jats, traditionally peasants, comprised the majority of Sikhs, but landholdings were relatively equal and farmers generally did well. In Kashmir the distribution of land was much more unequal, with Muslims generally at the bottom rungs of the ladder. For Muslims in Kashmir, discrimination extended to other occupations as well: they were relatively worse off in education and in the professions and government. In Punjab many Sikhs maintained a close traditional affinity with Hindus, while in Kashmir there was a clear religious cleavage between Muslims and non-Muslims, reinforced by the existence of a large Muslim community in Pakistan (in addition to the even larger world Islamic community). For Sikhs there was no external group with which to merge or to turn to for aid.

The course of events in the two regions has also differed in several respects over the last few decades. Language became a rallying point for Sikhs after independence, while it remained a nonis-

sue for Muslims in Kashmir. Punjab after partition became a full part of India on the same terms as other provinces; it contained several small princely states, but these were absorbed routinely into the Indian state of Punjab. The course of events in Kashmir, however, involved a gradual and continual erosion of initial promises of autonomy. Thus conflict in Punjab involved attempts to gain greater autonomy, while in Kashmir the issue was preserving whatever had been promised. As Kashmiri autonomy eroded, however, the two conflicts became more similar since both sought more freedom from central control and the politics of identity came to dominate the struggle.

In 1965–66 the interests of Kashmiris and Sikhs collided to some extent. Pakistan certainly had support from some Kashmiris in the 1965 war with India, though significantly less than it expected. Sikhs at this time were solidly behind India. Their heavy presence and strong performance in the Indian armed forces has been cited as a factor in the decision at the center to create a Punjabi-speaking (and Sikh-majority) state by further partitioning Punjab in 1966. The 1965 war helped to solidify Indian control of Kashmir by demonstrating that it would not be easy to wrest it away militarily.

The 1966 decision, however, carried the seeds of further problems. It gave the Akali Dal a striking success, its first perhaps since the Gurdwara Reform Movement of the 1920s. At the same time, the decision left unresolved issues which would be available in the future as political capital. In Kashmir by this time, the avowedly non-religious AJKNC had been weakened sufficiently and its policies thwarted, so that religious groupings gained a credibility they had not had in Kashmir before and at the time of independence.³³ Thus starting from very different initial conditions, Punjab and Kashmir moved closer together in terms of the issues with which they confronted the central government and the dominance of cultural conflict. In both cases, the most useful and powerful political mobilizing dimension appeared to be religion, and the desire was for greater political autonomy for religious groups. In both cases, identity politics came to dominate all other political logics.

In searching for answers as to what underlay the desire for autonomy, primordial explanations are sometimes cited as a motivating factor. This answer assumes a desire to be separate purely on the basis of being a Sikh or a Muslim. But as we have seen, this was

not the case in earlier periods. Both Sikhs and Kashmiri Muslims to some extent chose to be associated with India. It could be that there were restrictions on the free practice of religion for these groups, but again this does not seem to have been the case: religious institutions and practices were always respected by the central state in postpartition India.

Indeed cultural identity was at issue in both cases, and religion operated as a politically powerful mobilizing force. Religious identity was the seed that grew to an overarching politicized cultural identity. In the case of Punjab, the status of the language and associated script became a major irritant in relations between Sikhs and the center. For Kashmiris, the general sense of a Kashmiri identity, which was a regional identity but also Muslim (because of the Muslim majority), was threatened by central attempts to solidify Kashmir's place in the Indian union.

It might seem that many of the demands from the regional groupings were relatively innocuous and could have been resolved with less violence. However, the fact that minority religions were the identifying characteristics of the demand groups conditioned the state response. From the center's point of view, therefore, strategic considerations in both cases militated against autonomy, while economic arguments for retaining tight control were stronger for Punjab than for Kashmir.

The conditions for potential conflict between the center and culturally defined political groups also existed to some extent in other Indian regions. There too the result has often been violent conflict. Yet the two cases studied here stand out in terms of the duration and relative intractability of the problems. Despite their initially different characteristics, the nature of the two conflicts has become somewhat parallel. Several reasons may be adduced for this development.

First, to the extent that the disagreements involve cultural groups that are avowedly different from the Hindu majority, there is less accommodation on both sides. This is true even though Hinduism itself is an amorphous entity, with significant cultural overlaps among different religious groups in the same region but great differences across regions.³⁴ What is significant is not only that Sikhs and Muslims stand out as different, but that this difference makes it harder for any central government to make concessions to them, as

doing so is seen as appeasing a group that glories in its separateness. This is a theme that is continually harped on by Hindu groups that have been attempting to redefine a Greater Hindu identity. In this respect, the conflicts in Punjab and Kashmir have an important common thread that can be attributed to the growing political relevance of cultural identity in both regions. Ironically the growing politicization of cultural identity that the center abhors is stimulated and maintained by institutions that politicize culture in "secular" India.

A final parallel in the two conflicts is the impact of exogenous geopolitical events. In particular, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly had a major impact on the two conflicts. It took place in December 1979, capping a period of several years of instability in that country. The invasion increased Pakistan's strategic importance in the region since it became the haven for Afghan rebels and a conduit for American arms and supplies to them. Many of these arms, as well as some captured from the Soviets, found their way into Punjab and Kashmir. Pakistan also became aggressive in promoting dissidence in the two Indian states. These geopolitical changes help explain why Punjab and Kashmir erupted in more intense violence than other parts of India, where in other respects the preconditions for conflict might also have been present.

Thus starting from very different initial conditions, Punjab and Kashmir moved closer in terms of the issues with which they confronted the central government and the methods they employed. As the central state's commitment and power to enforce a secular principle deteriorated, especially in terms of the transition from Nehru to Gandhi, old cultural identities which had been quiescent for a period came springing back to political life. The most useful and powerful mobilizing tool for political entrepreneurs appeared to be religion. Whereas in earlier periods both Sikhs and Kashmiri Muslims to some extent chose to be associated with India, in the recent period sectarian struggle and the desire for autonomy became far more prominent.

In short, these two cases both illustrate the central propositions that guide this volume: institutions that embody political power can create and perpetuate identity politics and are important to our understanding of the political relevance of cultural identity. When those institutions weaken, even slowly, as is evident in the Indian case, cultural differences can become the dominant tool for political

mobilization and rationalization for political conflict. This is especially true when a third party—like Pakistan—encourages and facilitates conflict. In India institutional weakness and flawed institutions themselves have led to conflicts between the center and regions such as Punjab and Kashmir. In each of the cases, I have suggested that the inability of the center to credibly commit itself to courses of action has produced conflict. Weak institutions have led to this inability. In the case of Kashmir this is a process that began right after the constitution was framed. A constitution may be viewed precisely as a device for achieving credible commitment: it makes it hard to change agreements that have constitutional status. But the special status of Kashmir guaranteed in the constitution was rapidly chipped away through amendments and through gap-closing ordinances and legislation. Commitments became less credible. In Punjab, negotiations between Sikh political leaders and the center illustrate a similar problem of commitment. These were typically negotiations outside any legal framework, in the sense that agreements reached could not be enforced by a court. This effectively removed incentives for the center to implement the agreements *ex post*.

The two cases suggest that the institutional problems in India that encourage cultural conflict can be generalized. First, the constitution is too easily amended. Second, the courts have too limited a jurisdiction *vis-à-vis* the legislative/executive branch of the government. In either case, the inability of the center to make credible commitments reduces the range of mutually beneficial agreements that can be achieved and exacerbates the potential for conflict.³⁵ Thus one might argue that institutional reform which strengthens the courts and reduces the mutability of the constitution might help to reduce the likelihood of violent conflicts at the subnational level. Another way of thinking about this is that groups will invest in violence if they think that the expected payoff from more peaceful ways of pursuing their interests is relatively low. More effective mechanisms for negotiation and enforcement of agreements between a sovereign central government and constituent governments will improve this tradeoff toward less violence.

As I have indicated above, this does not mean that institutions are all that matter in explaining cultural conflict. In India, as in many countries, religious identities are often salient. When they overlap

strongly with language, class, geographical contiguity, and other dimensions of identity, that bundle is easily activated. It becomes a tool for political mobilization simply because enough dimensions of material and nonmaterial interests coincide. I would argue that the role of political entrepreneurs in such a process is merely instrumental, in that they effectively package and sell grievances but cannot do so unless they have a sufficient number of concerns to work with. Institutions can create, perpetuate, or ameliorate those concerns. In other words, without tangible resources and either the support or weakening of institutional constraints, no political entrepreneur will be able to create ethnic conflict out of thin air. Since much collective action is about access to resources, the key question is why some demands are more likely to become violent than others. Here I would suggest that this will occur when institutions for bargaining are weak, and this may apply more to such regional groups than (say) to groups organized on principles such as employment,³⁶ though it is also the case that the strength of identification with one's fellow workers is unlikely to match that created by religion, language, and ethnicity.

Ironically in the case of Kashmir, central political institutions created the monster of identity politics, mobilizing the population to demand accession to Pakistan. Even support of the central authorities for a secular politician like Abdullah—in order to ensure closer ties with India—could not transform cultural conflict once it had started down its slippery slope. Political entrepreneurs are essential in mobilizing cultural groups; entrepreneurs emphasizing class or ideological divisions in society are less successful where political institutions have provided incentives for the practice of identity politics.

Finally, the case comparison suggests that while economic inequalities can exacerbate conflict, they are not always the essential ingredient of cultural conflict. Even though Punjabi agriculture benefitted from the Green Revolution and farmers were subsidized in some ways, the popular perception was one of being exploited for food supplies without commensurate returns. It has been argued that industrial investment in Punjab was generally curtailed because of its strategic border position. The same point about lack of industrial investment may be made about Kashmir, though in this case the

rationale for such investment seems weaker. Economic issues mattered in both cases, but in Punjab they seemed to matter more.

In contrast to other cases in this volume, cultural conflict at least in Punjab is likely to be muted by the economic liberalization taking place there.³⁷ Two points are salient. First, a freeing up of restrictions on foreign and domestic investment will allow a more natural course of development to occur in Punjab and defuse some of the conflicts over how to slice the economic pie. This view is perhaps supported by the muted response to the assassination of the Punjabi chief minister in September 1995. Second, to the extent that liberalization leads to economic growth, that growth will allow the center to more effectively bribe away dissidence. It has de facto been pursuing this strategy in Punjab, despite the overall pressure on central government finances. But of course this is only a short-term solution. In fact, one might speculate that the increasing inability of the center to do this in the 1980s, as government finances came under greater pressure, may also have contributed to the increase in internal cultural conflict in India. Reversing the trends in government finances may help in defusing conflict in other spheres.

NOTES

1. Useful general and specific background readings on India include, without being comprehensive, Chopra, ed. (1982), Dasgupta (1970, 1977), George (1986), Gupta (1978), Jeffrey (1986), Kohli (1989), Kohli, ed. (1988), Manor (1988), and Rudolph and Rudolph (1986).
2. An excellent reference on the Sikhs is Hawley and Mann, eds. (1993), particularly Chapter 7, by Gurinder Singh Mann. This book also has a comprehensive bibliography, so I shall not cite detailed references on the Sikhs here.
3. Of course reducing all decision-making, including that involving nonmaterial benefits, has the danger of being tautological, but it does push one to look for explanations rather than appealing to irrationality or imponderables.
4. This was not a theocratic state: Sikhs remained a minority of the population, and Ranjit Singh followed a policy of religious inclusiveness in his government.

5. Two recent contributions to the understanding of the modern period in Sikh history are Fox (1985) and Kapur (1986). I believe neither of these is a completely accurate analysis, but each has some value.
6. Although both Sikhs and Muslims, neither of which are monolithic groupings, were represented in minor political parties on the left and in the INC, the main Sikh party could validly claim to represent the majority of Sikhs.
7. In fact, Sikh leaders involved in the framing of the constitution refused to sign a document they said did not keep in any sense the admittedly vague promises of autonomy made to them by the leaders of the INC.
8. A particularly striking illustration of this packaging effect comes from Haryana. Not only was "Haryanvi" created as a semi-official name for what had been a dialect closer in sound and spirit to Punjabi than to official Sanskritized Hindi, but an educational formula that required teaching Hindi and a regional language (or Sanskrit) in all schools was applied in Haryana by requiring Telegu, a South Indian language, rather than Punjabi! This was clearly a step beyond the postindependence language dispute in the census referred to above.
9. The best example of this is of course Tamil Nadu. The central government typically enters into an alliance with one or other of the two main Tamil parties, while the central opposition sides with the one left over. Regional autonomy at one stage extended to the Tamil Nadu government's practically pursuing an independent, albeit covert, foreign policy with regard to the Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka.
10. After this contribution was completed, I became aware of two detailed, recent analyses of the Punjab situation—Telford (1992) and Chima (1994). The reader is referred to them for additional detail beyond that presented here.
11. The Punjab rural economy was unable to absorb Sikh young people in jobs they judged acceptable, which is why unemployment as an issue is consistent with the influx of migrant labor.
12. The use of the term "fundamentalist" is problematic since it has many connotations, but it does capture Bhindranwale's emphasis on tradition, orthodoxy and differentiation, and opposition to the openness of certain reforms characterizing the Sikh resurgence of the late nineteenth century.
13. Whereas earlier leaders looked to Western models such as the British colonists or the Soviet revolutionists for ideologies that would provide coherence to their communities, Bhindranwale spoke of Sikhism in terms that emphasized its similarity to Islam (as well as Judaism and Christianity) and distinction from Hinduism.
14. The figures are in Chelliah, Rao, and Sen (1993), though the interpretation of state expenditure activities is mine and not theirs.
15. A formal economic model to demonstrate the rationality of conflict is in Grossman (1991), though his model does not necessarily capture the salient features of the cases under discussion. His paper has additional references

on formal models of conflict based on rational pursuit of material goals. See also Hirshleifer (1991).

16. The term "Kashmir" will be used as shorthand for the area contained within the boundaries of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
17. See Stein (1979) for one translation.
18. Puri (1990) states, "A part of their distrust of Delhi is a reflection of their perception of the present rulers as successors of the Mughal kings whose role is flaunted by them in Kashmir to establish their secular credentials." This has a striking parallel in the position taken by Bhindranwale and other Sikh militants in Punjab.
19. This point is further developed in a report on a seminar on Kashmiri tradition (Puri 1990).
20. This material is drawn from Navlakha (1991).
21. Interestingly the Sikhs in Kashmir, who created their own political group on religious lines, were more aligned with the Hindus in this situation. This may have reflected history, class, and a reaction to the rise of the All-India Muslim League, rather than any religious affinities.
22. Indian princely states made Standstill Agreements with either Pakistan or India to keep relations the same as they had been with British India until the state decided to accede to Pakistan or India.
23. See Lamb (1991): 123.
24. See Information Service of India (1956): 5–6.
25. See Lamb (1991): 130.
26. Rizvi (1992) quotes Moore's analysis, "[which] establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the scheme of [Pakistani] invasion originally emerged spontaneously among the tribes as a response to [attacks] against Muslims in East Punjab and the Maharaja's [Hari Singh's] territories."
27. Again the facts are not entirely clear. Certainly Singh signed the order on 26 October. But Lamb (1991), interpreting one of the diplomatic records, finds that the actual signing of the accession agreement took place *after* Indian military support started. This weakens India's argument that its military support was justified on the basis of an accession order. The only legally binding document in place was the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. Although this seems a technicality, it does give a feeling of the type of debate that would fill many UN volumes. The possibility that Abdullah would head the government was not in the accession document.
28. The letter is cited in Navlakha (1991).
29. See *ibid.*, p. 2954.
30. An extensive discussion and interpretation of this constitution-making process, with reference to Kashmir, as well as its broader implications, is in *ibid.*

31. Other laws were introduced outlawing activities that disputed the integrity of India, its flag, or its constitution. By 1957 a new constitution was put into place modeled on the Indian one, and accession to India was accepted by the constituent assembly of Kashmir. A complete chronology can be found in Appendix I in Bose et al. (1990).
32. Lamb (1991) views Pakistan as much more the instigator in 1965 than in 1947. He suggests that Pakistani leaders overestimated the support of the Kashmiri population in the case of such a conflict. This is consistent with the notion that the Kashmiris would prefer some form of autonomy to domination by India or Pakistan, even though the latter may be the only realistic options.
33. Both Sheikh Abdullah and his replacement, his brother-in-law Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, might be labeled "populist", but whereas the former implemented policies toward land reform and greater availability of primary education, the latter focused more on policies such as food subsidies. These were abolished by Abdullah when he came back to power.
34. An extreme position would be that the heterogeneity of beliefs and cultures across India makes the term "Hindu" an artificial construct when applied in a religious sense. Certainly the current emphasis among some political organizations in actively promoting the concept of "Hindutva" suggests that artificiality. However, the point to be made is not that Hinduism is naturally monolithic, but that there is a commonness among enough Hindus so that Sikhs and Muslims had too much otherness to have their demands easily accommodated.
35. A counterargument is that actually the flexibility is good, in the sense that it allows pressures to be accommodated and so reduces the potential for conflict. Thus if the center in India was facing increasing pressure from the Hindu nationalist end of the political spectrum, it was beneficial that it could amend the constitution easily with respect to Kashmir's special status. But it remains true that the possibility of additional commitment expands the available range of options without ruling out noncommitment options or renegotiation. If, for example, Kashmiris had veto power with respect to changes in special provisions affecting them, they could have been bribed to accept such changes. This still does not rule out the possibility of things entirely falling apart in such a situation.
36. One can trace violence in these contexts as well. See Rudolph and Rudolph (1986), for example.
37. Kerala, in the south of India, is a state that has competing minorities and has been relatively ill-treated by the center but has not erupted in violent conflict. In addition to substantial differences in strategic location and historical development (e.g., education levels) as compared to Punjab and Kashmir, Kerala in the early 1980s saw its people well placed to take advantage of their better education in jobs in the oil-rich Middle East.

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REEMERGING ETHNIC POLITICS IN GERMANY: FAR RIGHT PARTIES AND VIOLENCE

John C. Leslie

With the emergence of resentments over an increasing number of foreign residents onto the political agenda of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it seemed that even the most stable industrial democracies would not be spared the resurgence of ethnic politics accompanying the end of the cold war. In winter and spring 1989 the successes of far right political parties, particularly the Republikaner (REPs), brought the relationship between Germans and non-Germans to the center of the political arena.¹ A few months later, as the authority of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) collapsed in the East and unification gained momentum, many feared the fluid situation would provide opportunity for political entrepreneurs on the extreme right to articulate the concerns of some in the new society for a reformulation of exclusive German nationalism. During the first year of German unity these fears remained unsubstantiated. Then, in fall 1991, far right parties pushed themselves and the ethnic boundaries of German society back to center stage with the entrance of another extreme right party, the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), into Bremen's state parliament. This time, however, the electoral successes of far right parties were accompanied by a new development: a dramatic escalation of violence against many of Germany's foreign residents. For another year the growing influence of far right parties and escalating violence against "foreigners" paralleled one another until fall/winter 1992-93, when both the fortunes of these parties and the level of violence abruptly began to decline.

This chapter traces the emergence and politicization of ethnic tensions in German society from the late 1980s through the early years of unification. It explains two very different outcomes in this

process: the emergence of political entrepreneurs competing in the electoral process who advocated exclusive boundaries to German society, on the one hand, and the spontaneous eruption and “band-wagoning effects” of xenophobic violence, on the other. It attributes these differing outcomes to the changing institutional opportunities and constraints imposed on actors by the political system of the FRG during this period. Prior to fall 1989, the institutions of West German democracy did not prohibit entrepreneurs from exploiting political and social problems associated with rising immigration to provoke a nativist backlash. However, they did ensure that backlash remained contained within the rules of parliamentary democracy. Unification changed the course of events by transferring issues and debates about immigration from the tight constraints of West German society to the fluid environment in the East. This transfer resulted in an explosion of violence against “foreigners” throughout Germany. Finally, the eruption of violence itself brought movement among established actors in the German polity to reorganize and reaffirm key elements of the rules governing ethnic relations in the FRG, with the result that far right parties were pushed out of electoral politics and xenophobic violence was removed to the criminal margins of society.

The chapter is organized into three parts. The first part investigates the initial outcome in Germany’s ethnic relations: the electoral opportunity created for far right entrepreneurs by the dramatic rise of immigration to West German society during the 1980s. It discusses the legal and normative institutions that set parameters within which immigration became defined as an issue in the political arena. It then considers how these constraints shaped the choices of established political parties in the FRG on issues associated with immigration. Finally, it demonstrates how these established actors provided an opportunity for a new type of far right political party to capitalize electorally on the tensions produced by the rising number of foreigners entering German society.

The second part focuses on the second outcome, or how unification changed the course of events to produce xenophobic violence. First, it considers the emergence of a fluid social environment in the East as institutional mechanisms of integration and social control collapsed together with the SED regime. Then it explains how the transfer of the inflammatory rhetoric of immigration and asylum

from the West to the East generated a rapid escalation of xenophobic violence that spread across both parts of Germany.

Finally, the concluding section describes the response of actors in the German polity to xenophobic violence. Both established political parties and large numbers of citizens moved to reinforce certain rules about ethnic relations and change others, which resulted in the marginalization of xenophobic violence as well as far right parties.

POLITICIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE FRG AT THE END OF THE 1980s: CHANNELING ETHNIC TENSIONS INTO THE ELECTORAL ARENA

External shocks, especially a rapid rise in the number of immigrants, brought ethnicity back to the center of West German politics at the end of the 1980s. This section traces the process by which immigration and relations between German and non-German residents were shaped politically and channeled into the electoral arena, with the result of temporarily opening an electoral opportunity for the REPs and other far right parties. In examining these processes, the section focuses on two sets of institutional parameters and the choices of political actors within them. First, it examines the constraints imposed by existing laws which embody three very different, even contradictory, views of the “proper” relationship among Germans, non-Germans, and state authorities. Second, it considers norms about the National Socialist (NS) past—which themselves find expression in legal statutes—as they constitute barriers to political appeals based on race and hierarchy. Finally, it looks at established political parties as strategic actors in an uncertain environment whose actions shape opportunities faced by others in the party system.

IMMIGRATION: THE BOUNDARIES OF GERMAN SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL AGENDA

As was the case throughout Western Europe, rapidly rising numbers of immigrants during the 1980s prompted questions about the boundaries of society in the FRG into the political arena.² The

new arrivals presented a peculiar problem in the FRG. Even into the present, many German politicians claim, "Germany is not a country of immigration." In fact, the FRG still makes no legal provisions for immigration. The lack of such regulations, therefore, shapes 1) the means that hundreds of thousands of people who annually seek entrance to West German society use to achieve this end, 2) the problems associated with this development, and 3) the manner in which political debates evolve around the issue.

Although the FRG has no immigration law, three other mechanisms create legal openings for those seeking residence in West German society. The first of these reflects the lasting legacy of West German recruitment of "guest workers" between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s. While recruitment of foreign workers was stopped in November 1973, government policies aimed at the integration of resident aliens permit family members and dependents to join resident guest workers in the FRG.³ As a result, these policies have brought about both continued growth and a changing composition in the guest worker population.⁴

To those in Eastern Europe who can demonstrate their German ethnicity, Article 116 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and the 1953 Federal Expellees and Refugees Law provide a second means of entrance to the Bundesrepublik.⁵ With Mikhail Gorbachev and the advent of *glasnost*, societies in Eastern Europe became more open not only to the internal flow of information, but also to the outward flow of emigrants. After 1986 the steady exodus of "ethnic Germans" from Eastern Europe to the FRG rapidly accelerated (see Table 1). Although demonstrating German ethnicity often required little more than a German name or a parent or grandparent with a German name—and little or no understanding of the German language—these "ethnic Germans" became citizens of the FRG upon arrival.

The final avenue of entrance into West German society has become the most controversial. Article 16 of the West German Basic Law guarantees those who are "politically persecuted" a subjective right to asylum.⁶ State authorities were required to hear all claims to asylum, and applicants could demand access to the legal system if they felt decisions in their case were made unjustly. Thus by the end of the 1980s, the reunification of guest worker families, the liberalization of conditions for ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe, and the asylum

Table 1

Immigration into the Federal Republic during the 1980s

Year	Ethnic Germans (<i>Aussiedler</i>)	East Germans (<i>Übersiedler</i>)	Asylum
1980	52,071	12,763	107,818
1981	69,455	13,208	49,391
1982	48,170	13,208	37,423
1983	37,925	11,343	19,737
1984	36,459	40,974	35,278
1985	38,968	24,912	73,832
1986	42,788	26,178	99,650
1987	78,523	18,958	57,379
1988	202,673	39,832	103,076
1989	377,055	343,854	121,318

Sources: For asylum applicants, 1980–89, see Ursula Münch, *Asylpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 2d ed. (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1993), p. 253; Klaus J. Bade, ed., *Aktuell Kontrovers: Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 2d ed. (Hannover: Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1992), p. 30. For ethnic Germans and East Germans, 1985–89, see Barbara Marshall, “German Migration Policies,” in *Developments in German Politics*, ed. G. Smith, W. Patterson, P. Merkl, and S. Padgett (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992), p. 249. For ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and those from the GDR for 1980–84, see Thomas Mayer, “Immigration into West Germany: Historical Perspectives and Policy Implications,” in *German Unification, Economic Issues*, ed. Leslie Lipschitz and Donogh McDonald (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1990), p. 131; International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 75.

Note: These figures represent new arrivals, excluding entering dependents of resident guest workers. Further, this table does not indicate the number of resident aliens departing the FRG.

guarantee in Article 16—complemented by liberal access to judicial review of petitions—were providing several hundred thousand newcomers temporary or permanent residence in the FRG each year.

Accompanying this inflow was a catalogue of economic, social, and fiscal problems which ensured that immigration, in one form or

another, would find its way onto the agenda of party politics. New arrivals in all of the above categories contributed to the general infrastructural problems associated with immigration: education, social services, and the difficulties of integration into housing and labor markets as well as in society generally.⁷ The arrival of ethnic Germans and asylum applicants, however, precipitated special problems. Responsibility for the housing and support of both groups was delegated to state and local authorities, for whom this became a large and increasingly visible fiscal and political burden. Resentments among Germans regarding the size of such expenditures were aggravated by the privileged access—sometimes above the level granted other citizens—ethnic Germans received to occupational retraining programs, public housing, subsidized loans, and cash grants.⁸ These highly visible demands by newcomers on the social product gave currency to potentially explosive political questions about who was entitled to enter German society and participate in the division of its welfare.

INSTITUTIONAL TOPOGRAPHY OF IMMIGRATION POLITICS

At the same time that a large and growing number of immigrants was entering West German society, immigration did not legally exist, so the influx of newcomers and the problems associated with them stood open to political definition as these developments were pushed onto the agenda of party politics. However, politicians seldom enjoy unrestricted freedom to choose how developments will be brought into the political arena. Rather, a set of contradictory attitudes concerning the relations of Germans, non-Germans, and public authority—embedded in German society and institutionalized in German law—defined the parameters within which immigration and its associated problems were thematized as issues on the agenda of interparty politics. This section presents these attitudes, their institutional reflection in German law, and the boundaries they set for the developments in question. For convenience only, these perspectives have been given the labels “ethnocultural,” “statist/communitarian,” and “liberal.”

More than the other two, the ethnocultural perspective shaped the politics of immigration at the end of the 1980s.⁹ At its philosophi-

cal core, this perspective rests not only on a belief in the nation or *Volk* as a constitutive entity reflected in language, culture, and history, but also on a strict demarcation of the boundaries between nations and peoples. The sticky problem historically has been whether these boundaries have been drawn according to psychological or biological lines. In a country like Germany, where this demarcation has evolved according to biological criteria, the logic of this perspective, taken to its extreme, holds that members of the community are born different and special and that the presence of nonmembers represents a dangerous dilution of that which makes the community unique. Although since the end of World War II public expression of such attitudes has entailed a serious risk of public and legal censoring, the ethnocultural perspective and biological definition of community boundaries remain firmly embedded in German law. The most prominent examples of this are the *jus sanguinis* regulation of citizenship, through the continued use of the 1913 citizenship law, and the extension of citizenship rights to "ethnic Germans" in Eastern Europe through Article 116 of the Basic Law.

While the inclusion of these regulations in the legal structure of the West German state reflected practical and even humanitarian considerations at the end of the war as much as a desire to maintain the ideal of a unified "ethnic" German nation after defeat and division, their persistence has, nonetheless, profoundly shaped the politics of immigration in the 1980s.¹⁰ This is seen most significantly in the situation obtaining in 1989, when no less than 7 percent of the resident population of the FRG lived without full rights of political participation.¹¹ Not only blatantly undemocratic, this situation also created positive incentives for politicians to engage in the divisive politics of ethnic identity. Because foreign residents of the FRG who are not citizens of other European Union (EU) countries are at present unlikely to acquire either citizenship or the right to vote, politicians can engage in immigrant bashing without fear of electoral reprisal by immigrant voters.

The second perspective in German attitudes and laws governing the residence of foreign nationals reflects traditions of continental statism and communitarianism. From this point of view, lawmakers should be hesitant to codify the rights of individuals for fear that doing so might impede the attainment of a higher purpose—the realization of the *raison d'état* or "general will." Instead,

there is greater willingness to restrict individual rights in pursuit of social outcomes and to entrust state administrators with discretionary power to manage conflicts between individual and state or communal interests. The history of postwar West German attempts to regulate political asylum and guest workers is replete with legislation seeking to maximize the discretionary powers of state actors and to limit the ability of individuals to block administrative authority, particularly through judicial review.¹² Prominent examples are the 1965 Foreigner Law (*Ausländergesetz*) and the 1992–93 change in the constitutional regulation of political asylum.

In the postwar decades of rapid economic growth, those working according to a statist/communitarian perspective introduced a deceptively simple calculus into the regulation of foreign nationals in German society. As guest workers represented the first large-scale influx of foreign nationals since the immediate postwar period, much of the foundation for the regulation of relations among Germans, foreigners, and public authority evolved from experience with them. During the years of the “economic miracle” it was easy to think of the presence of guest workers as a relatively simple affair: as long as they represented a net gain for the community—defined exclusively in short-term, material terms—they were tolerated. Should they become a burden, they would have to leave.¹³ Events in the 1970s dispelled both the illusion of uninterrupted economic growth—which conveniently concealed differences of interest between guest workers and other elements of West German society—and the belief that foreign labor could be managed purely as an industrial input. Persistent growth in the guest worker population, even after the 1973 recruitment stop, raised, among others, a troubling question: with what justification and at what price could human beings be excluded from full participation in a democratic society? By the 1970s, then, statist/communitarian regulations came in conflict with the last perspective.

The final set of attitudes informing the regulation of foreigners in the FRG and the evolving politics of immigration belongs to the liberal and humanist traditions of the Western democratic experience. Liberals and humanists advocate strong institutional mechanisms for the protection of individual rights against encroachment by either the state or social majorities. As in the constitutions of other Western parliamentary democracies, the FRG’s Basic Law contains

articles guaranteeing certain fundamental individual rights to all on its territory, regardless of nationality. In the development of the politics of immigration, none has been more important than Article 16, which guarantees the politically persecuted a right to asylum, and Article 19, Paragraph 4, of the Basic Law, which ensures recourse to judicial review to individuals who feel their rights have been unjustly curtailed by administrative decision.

Conceived partly in atonement for the crimes of National Socialism, these articles have provided access to the physical security and material wealth of West German society to a great number of individuals. Many of these individuals were clearly entitled to political asylum under Article 16, and many were not. Liberal access to judicial review for all asylum applicants, however, has had the consequence that by the early 1980s the average length of asylum proceedings had stretched to longer than six years.¹⁴ During this time public resources finance not only housing and support for these individuals, but also the cost of legal proceedings themselves. As the number of applications increased, case backlogs swelled, reviews lengthened, and the asylum process became a steadily more attractive means of entrance to West German society. As this became a vicious cycle, resonance grew—first among state and local politicians and then in the broader public—for a halt to the “abuse” of Germany’s asylum laws.¹⁵

Because each is embedded in the legal structure of the FRG, these three perspectives represent the key topographical features of the arena in which the presence of foreigners became politicized at the end of the 1980s. As late as the early 1980s, these three principles coexisted tenuously in German politics and society without finding their way to the center of competition among the major political parties. Alone, undisguised appeals based on an ethnocultural vision of society were excluded from politics. By the mid-1980s mounting pressure to solve the problems associated with the rapidly rising number of immigrants forced politicians to search for ways to frame these developments politically. This process of politicization involved elevating certain interpretations of problems, along with policies to rectify them, while subordinating others. Before turning to the role of political parties in shaping the politics of immigration and relations between German and non-German residents, we must examine the powerful taboos about racism and the NS past, which

also represent considerable constraints on possible outcomes in West German ethnic relations.

THE PAST AS CONSTRAINT ON THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC RADICALISM

As a result of history, exclusive nationalism and ethnic politics have become the intellectual property of the extreme right. Further—and also a result of history—nowhere else in Western Europe does past experience weigh so heavily against organized expressions of exclusive nationalism as in the FRG. Revulsion at the crimes of the NS era and Germany's defeat, occupation, and dismemberment at the end of World War II are reflected not only in popular attitudes, but also in institutional norms and legal structures. These norms and laws severely circumscribe public space to the expression of such ideas, particularly when they are advocated by organizations. While these barriers have not precluded the existence of organizations—even far right political parties—holding such ideals, they channel their development in one of two directions.¹⁶ Such organizations must either move away from overt advocacy of racism and ethnic hierarchy or be pushed into a clandestine existence on the criminal margins of society. This section considers these social and legal barriers to the organized politics of ethnic exclusivity.

Both popular attitudes and rules of self-government within social organizations reflect the strength of norms condemning the Nazi past as a constraint on radical politics, particularly by ethnic entrepreneurs and far right parties. Observers of public opinion in the FRG note that public satisfaction with democratic institutions has risen parallel to a decline in the number of those voicing positive associations with the NS past. Further, because they exist in chronological juxtaposition with one another, support for the ideas and institutions of the FRG seems to be inextricably intertwined with rejection of National Socialism. Such developments represent a structural limitation on the electoral support for appeals based on exclusive nationalism even during periods of considerable institutional change.¹⁷ Moreover, such attitudes, especially since the late 1960s, have found nearly constant reinforcement in the rules and norms governing many important social organizations. For organizations associated with the political left, this is a matter of ideologi-

cal course. However, even in organizations that are politically neutral or on the democratic right, one finds strict controls over flirtations with the intellectual property of the extreme right. Such controls in key social organizations contribute in turn to the creation of similar controls in other organizations, with the eventual effect of building an infrastructure of democratic civil society within which there are few enclaves where extreme nationalist and racist attitudes can be expressed openly.

In addition to the norms permeating popular attitudes and organizations, formal, legal restrictions on the content of political messages circumscribe the room for maneuver of radical political organizations. Three articles of the Basic Law set tight legal boundaries on the behavior of political organizations operating at the fringes of democracy. Article 18 permits the restriction of the civil rights of those who would turn the freedoms of conscience, unrestricted dissemination of ideas, and association against the "basic order of freedom and democracy." Article 9, Paragraph 2, grants state and federal interior ministries authority to disband associations whose purpose or activities operate contrary to law, the constitutional order, or the reconciliation of different peoples. Finally, Article 21, Paragraph 2, provides for the proscription as "unconstitutional" of any political party that, according to the behavior of its members, seeks to undermine or eliminate the basic order of freedom and democracy or that endangers the existence of the FRG.¹⁸ These limitations have been refined and extended by the rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court against extremist organizations of both the political right and left. The enforcement of these regulations demonstrates that a measure of conformity to certain ground rules is a prerequisite of existential importance to extremist parties in the FRG.

While not eliminating the politics of ethnicity altogether, these constraints push the development of ethnic politics, and the political organizations that would capitalize on them, along two divergent courses. Explicit association of an organization with violence and/or the discredited racism and ideology of the NS past almost ensures that some combination of state authorities, other political parties, and even the broader electorate will move to drive it out of the political arena and out of existence or into the ghetto of clandestine Nazi and neo-Nazi politics. To avoid marginalization, far right par-

ties and ethnic entrepreneurs must perform a most delicate—and perhaps impossible—balancing act. While avoiding explicit endorsement of violence, racism, and NS ideology, they must also differentiate themselves from parties of the democratic right, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU), on the basis of concrete issues. Consequently, the chances for such entrepreneurs to win votes outside a core of ideologically motivated voters, of far less than the 5 percent threshold necessary for parliamentary representation, remain hostage to the choices of other actors—primarily other parties—within the electoral system. Rarely do established actors intentionally leave open space on an issue hospitable to ethnic entrepreneurs. However, with the politicization of immigration at the end of the 1980s, such a configuration did emerge.

THE ELECTORAL OUTCOME: OPENING POLITICAL SPACE FOR FAR RIGHT PARTIES ON IMMIGRATION

Given the narrowly defined room for maneuver of far right organizations, the politicization of the FRG's ethnic tensions in the form of electorally competitive far right parties at the end of the 1980s seems unlikely. To understand how this came to be, it is necessary to consider the actions of established political parties on issues surrounding immigration within the constraints outlined above. This section describes the role of both strategic choices made by established parties and the consequences of those choices—whether intentional or unintentional—in creating an electoral space for far right parties to capitalize on the tensions arising from immigration. Because the existence of a potential does not ensure that it will be exploited, a brief account will be given of the entrepreneurial character of the FRG's far right parties, particularly the REPs.

The absence of legal avenues for immigration, or even a public discussion that West Germany might be a “land of immigration,” left open the political definition of problems arising from the annual influx of hundreds of thousands of people. But even as the weight of numbers assured that these problems would find their way onto the political agenda, it was up to elected political representatives to frame them as issues and propose solutions to deal with them. Here the immigration issue became the subject of one of the dilemmas that

has arisen out of the declining ideological distance that separates major parties and their voters not only in the FRG, but also in many Western industrial societies. As polarized ideological interpretations of the world wane, large parties have increasingly laid their claim to political power in the capacity to manage economic and social problems. Simultaneously, such problems, including immigration, have become sufficiently complex to defy solution by the means readily available. However, under the pressure of electoral competition, can any party—government or opposition—admit its uncertainty or helplessness in the face of an important problem without appearing inept or handing its political adversaries an electoral advantage?¹⁹ Because immigration in the FRG was embedded in this dilemma, established parties confronted the strategic choice between recognizing the complexity of issues and seeking a nonpartisan, long-term solution—hoping political competitors would cooperate—and preempting the adversary and forsaking long-term solutions to maximize short-term political gain (or at least minimize short-term losses). While the outlines of this choice seemed clear, actors could not anticipate all the consequences of one choice or another. The following examines first the choice of the CDU/CSU (“Union” for short) on issues of immigration and then the consequences of these choices for others in the political system.

During the latter part of the 1980s elements within the CDU/CSU sought to define the growing influx of foreigners into West German society as the result of a “misuse” of the FRG’s liberal regulation of political asylum. According to this formula, those entering by this means were at best economic refugees, but more likely they were merely individuals seeking to exploit German prosperity and a generous welfare system. The solution offered by Union politicians, therefore, was to change the constitutional provisions for asylum. In binding “misuse” to a position demanding change in the constitutional rules for asylum, the Union drew a line of conflict between the values of statist/communitarians and those of liberals. Thus immigration was raised immediately from an issue that had separated elected representatives at different levels of the federal system to the agenda of intra- and interparty politics.

While initially a CSU response to a local challenge from the Bavarian Republikaner, the Union’s position was also calculated to electorally neutralize its major competitor, the Social Democratic

Party (SPD), on the issue of immigration. Changing constitutional provisions for asylum required a two-thirds majority and therefore opposition support. Union willingness to sacrifice the liberal principles contained in Article 16 was calculated to aggravate the always tense relations between the defenders of liberal, humanist values and the more statist/communitarian-oriented Social Democrats within the SPD. The inevitable deadlock between groups within the SPD, so Union strategists calculated, would then have the effect of alienating those voters, particularly in urban districts, who were confronted on a daily basis with the social and fiscal consequences of immigration. It was assumed that the Union, on the other hand, could posture itself as the responsible party, offering a programmatic response to these problems, only to be blocked by the obstructionism of an opposition without an alternative.

Convincing evidence for the primacy of electoral concerns over the desire to manage problems of immigration is offered in the striking contrast between Union attacks on asylum-seekers and the policy of Helmut Kohl's government toward "ethnic Germans" from Eastern Europe. Under the Special Program for Aussiedler, from August 1988 "ethnic Germans" gained unrestricted entry to the FRG and access to public resources equal to native West Germans.²⁰ This was done in spite of the fact that 1) most Germans considered the new arrivals from Eastern Europe—more than 80 percent of whom spoke no German whatsoever—at least as foreign as most asylum applicants, and 2) in 1988 twice as many "ethnic Germans" entered the FRG with the aid of government policy as asylum-seekers entered by means of Article 16. In 1989 the number of "ethnic Germans" was three times as high (see Table 1). However, unlike a change in Article 16, controlling the flow of "ethnic Germans" and the demands they placed on the resources of state and society did not require a two-thirds parliamentary majority. Of course, these East Europeans tended to be religious, conservative, and hold patriarchal values, which might incline them to vote for the Union.²¹

Union efforts to focus public attention on the "misuse" of asylum produced several consequences, none of which was fully intended. First, in a climate where asylum-seekers were portrayed as an undeserving burden, not only distinctions between different groups of foreign residents, but also distinctions between different justifications for the reform of the legal avenues of entrance into the

FRG began to erode. In formal justifications for reform, Union politicians emphasized West Germany's limited fiscal capacity to manage a potentially limitless "flood" of foreigners.²² Asylum reform was presented as a practical necessity dictated by the problem of limited material resources. However, while arguments about limited capacity rest on a statist/communitarian logic, the rhetoric of "misuse" injected a chauvinist element into public discussions. Asylum applicants were not presented as humans who, for whatever reason, were leaving their homes behind, but as frauds and even parasites sapping the affluence and security created by German society. Such statements leave little distance between themselves and perspectives that would attribute the prosperity of (West) German society to some fortuitous characteristic of Germans that is lacking in other races or cultures. In short, the inflammatory rhetoric of some Union politicians bridged across the debates of acceptable politics—between libertarian concerns for individual constitutional rights and the needs of the state or national community—to the racial and cultural hierarchies espoused by far right groups.

A second consequence of the "misuse" campaign was also not precisely what Union politicians had planned. The challenge to Article 16 did produce the expected conflict between the defenders of different values within the SPD. Further, the inability to resolve the internal party controversy did drive a wedge between the Social Democrats and some voters concerned with the problems of immigration. However, in spite of internal divisions, the SPD was able to damage Union credibility on the problems of immigration. Social Democrats assaulted Union responsibility for swelling numbers of "ethnic Germans" from Eastern Europe, demanding a revision of Article 116. As neither side could implement reforms over the objections of the other, the West German electorate was treated to the unseemly spectacle of its elected representatives engaged in a series of transparent electoral maneuvers, in which the various categories of foreign residents were reduced to pawns. Consequently a very visible and damaging deadlock developed at the center of the political system.

Through the environment of inflamed rhetoric and political deadlock, the "misuse" campaign had a third unintended consequence. Far right organizations acquired an opportunity to transcend the politics of the radical right ghetto. In their defense of

Article 116 and their rhetorical tenor, Union politicians found themselves in the uncomfortable position of narrowing the ideological ground between themselves and parties of the extreme right. More important, they also gave the far right a concrete issue with which to differentiate themselves from the CDU/CSU. To Union critiques that they were the peddlers of discredited ideas from the past, far right politicians could respond—albeit disingenuously—that it was not they who were defending the legal notion of a *Volk* by letting in hundreds of thousands of “ethnic Germans” who understood neither the language nor the culture of the FRG.²³ At the same time, the large parties’ inability to formulate a concrete policy on immigration offered far right parties a chance to assume a populist stance vis-à-vis not only the Union, but also the party system as a whole. Against the backdrop of legislative gridlock, far right politicians portrayed themselves as the representatives of the common people against a uniformly cynical and corrupt political class. With a small measure of authenticity, they could claim the issue was not “asylum applicants” or “ethnic Germans”—these were labels that interested professional politicians, not common people—but rather too many foreigners. Far from offering an outlet for voters to make an abstract or ill-defined protest, far right parties focused electoral dissatisfaction on a concrete issue and the real shortcomings of the political system in dealing with immigration.²⁴

As noted, the presence of opportunity offered no guarantee that political organizations of the far right would be prepared to exploit it. It was the innovation of the REPs to seek explicitly to maintain distance in public between themselves and statements of ideology, use of Nazi symbols, and—especially—any association with violence. With mixed success, the REPs sought to adapt right extremism to the rules of parliamentary democracy. Borrowing an innovation of the French Nouvelle Droite, the REPs were careful to couch their objections to foreigners in German society in the language of culture and values, thereby skirting the stigmatizing issue of racism.²⁵ To preempt official and popular suspicions about personal links between the party and other far right organizations, Paragraph 3 of the REP party statute excludes from membership the functionaries of any political organization considered anticonstitutional or radical.²⁶ However, the need to bind the loyalties of committed far right activists and to create an appearance of respectability before the public

created too many inconsistencies and demanded a nearly untenable balancing act that the party leadership maintained with only limited success.

Neither the REPs nor the other far right parties successfully carved out a section of the West German electorate as their own hunting ground. Rather they collected a heterogeneous group of voters whose bonds with the other parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) had been loosened.²⁷ Displaying a pattern of development found in the electorate as a whole, where socioeconomic factors and party identification are becoming less and less tightly aligned, REP voters are not readily distinguishable from the electors of other parties according to demographic characteristics. Far right supporters are overwhelmingly male, more likely to have the minimum required formal education, and be workers or self-employed;²⁸ however, REP supporters in 1989 could not easily be differentiated from the West German electorate in terms of age, confession, income, union membership, or home ownership.²⁹

Where demographic traits fail to distinguish far right supporters, however, the subjective orientations of these voters present a more revealing picture. When asked to list spontaneously the most important political problems of the day, REP supporters responded most frequently "asylum-seekers" (34 percent), followed by "ethnic Germans" (26 percent). The most common responses among the sample as a whole were "environmental protection" (33 percent) and unemployment (29 percent).³⁰ The reasons supporters listed for giving their votes to the REPs are also revealing in this sense. Eighty-two percent of REP supporters cast their vote for the party because of dissatisfaction with the other parties.³¹ Almost 90 percent of these voters saw the REPs as a party "that raised problems neglected by other parties."³² Finally, 72 percent of REP voters gave as one of the main reasons for voting for the party "Because the REPs advocate solutions to the 'foreigner problem.'"³³ In these data it is clear that the problems of immigration—and more specifically the inability of the deadlocked political system to deal with them—presented far right parties a rare opportunity to extend their support by articulating and focusing the frustrations of many voters with established political representatives on a concrete issue.

The emergence of far right parties represents just one possible outcome for the way tensions growing out of the unsolved problems of immigration could be channeled into West German politics. Rising

immigration during the 1980s spread serious social problems throughout West German society that would not be kept off the political agenda. While strong social norms and legal restrictions kept developments from turning violent, there was no guarantee that the tensions produced by immigration would not find reflection in electoral politics of ethnicity, as long as actors demonstrated a minimal conformity to taboos about racism and violence. In fact, the restrictive regulation of German citizenship and political participation provides no disincentive for such development. Politicians who exploit nativist frustrations with foreign residents—whether in established or far right parties—face no possibility of electoral punishment from naturalized voters.

Ultimately, however, established politicians bear responsibility for the emergence of identity politics in the form of far right parties. Faced with the complexity of immigration, these politicians had to decide between long-term bipartisan reform, on the one hand, or framing the issue to maximize immediate political advantage, on the other. The competitive nature of the electoral environment seemed to point to the prudence of the latter course. However, the Union's choice to frame issues according to the formula of "misuse of asylum" and constitutional change created the polarized and deadlocked environment which opened a space in the otherwise narrow constraints imposed on the electoral efforts of far right parties. Furthermore, the successes of far right parties in spring 1989 had the effect of hastening internal realignment and strengthening advocates of a harder line on "foreigners" within the Union.³⁴ Floating voters felt their votes for far right parties vindicated by the sudden attention they received from an otherwise unresponsive political class, and it is not clear whether movement by the Union would have recaptured these voters or consolidated the position of far right parties in a manner similar to the development of the National Front in France. In any case, a few months later unification dramatically changed the course of developments.

IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC TENSIONS AFTER UNIFICATION: THE ERUPTION AND SPREAD OF XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE

German unification is sometimes described as a hostile corporate takeover where Western institutions and practices were simply extended eastward. This analogy is contradicted by the record of ethnic relations before and after unity. While far right parties re-emerged after more than a year of dormancy in some Western state and local elections after fall 1991, unification was accompanied by a different manifestation of ethnic tensions in German society, an explosion of violence against foreigners starting in summer 1991 (see Table 2). The collapse of the centralized SED regime and the accession of the newly reorganized East German states to the FRG through the provisions of Article 23 of the Basic Law created a completely new and fluid social environment onto which the institutions and practices of West German parliamentary democracy were superimposed. The injection of the same debates and issues concerning immigration into this new social environment created opportunities for a different type of actor—skinhead cliques—to produce a different type of outcome in the management of ethnic tensions: spontaneous attacks on foreign residents.

The investigation of the changing nature of ethnic relations in the FRG after unification proceeds in four sections. First, it considers the emergence of a turbulent social environment after the SED's collapse and rapid unification. The second section examines the transfer of issues and debates surrounding immigration from the West to the East. The third looks at the actors who discovered an opportunity for themselves in this new situation. In the final section, the analysis demonstrates how opportunity and actors came together in one highly publicized incident of xenophobic violence in the Eastern city of Hoyerswerda and how this incident (and others like it) generated the bandwagoning effects which spread violence not only throughout the East, but to the West as well.

Table 2
Right Wing Violence, 1982–93

Year	Total (Number)	East Germany (Number)	Percent
1993	1,814		25
1992	2,584	865	33
1991	1,483	493	33
1990	270		
<i>Old FRG</i>			
1990	128		
1989	103		
1988	73		
1987	76		
1986	71		
1985	69		
1984	83		
1983	67		
1982	53		

Source: Jens Alber, "Towards Explaining Anti-Foreign Violence in Germany" (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for European Studies, Harvard University, n.d.), table 1; Working Paper Series No. 53.

COLLAPSE AND UNIFICATION: THE DISRUPTION OF STATE CONTROL AND ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE IN THE EAST

To understand why immigration produced such profoundly different consequences in ethnic relations before and after unity, some attention must be given to the social environment left in the wake of the collapse of the GDR and German unification. The transformation of Eastern society brought two developments that were important for the initial eruption of violence. First, rapid reorganization precipitated a collapse of the organs of state control and social integration. At the same time, many East Germans were faced with

a new and complex environment within which they were expected to make choices, even as many of the associations that had previously provided information and direction in this process were falling away. This lack of a comprehensive and authoritative network of institutions and associations, simultaneously binding citizens to society and subjecting them to state authority, distinguishes the post-unification experience of East Germans from developments in the West prior to fall 1989 and provides the backdrop for the escalation of xenophobic violence.

While society in the GDR bore little resemblance to Western civil societies, for forty years centrally directed organizations integrated some East Germans into Leninist state-society and kept the rest under tight control. Starting in late summer 1989, however, nearly every form of organized social activity—from the center of the political system down to family life—underwent at least temporary disruption, weakening normative and coercive controls over individual behavior. The following considers the consequences for social controls of the administrative reorganization of the East and the introduction of the Social Market Economy.

The collapse of centralized control by the SED produced three patterns of administrative transformation which had the effect of eliminating or undermining the authority of state controls. First, at the extremes of the old system—at the political center and in local administration and production—old organizations collapsed. The record of forty years of absolute power eliminated all credibility from the party's claim to the right to exercise central political authority. Power devolved rapidly from the party center, first to other points within the party organization, then to citizens' groups outside the party, and finally to other parties backed by Western sponsors.³⁵ At the local level, the departure of more than 400,000 East Germans who fled the GDR between late 1989 and early 1990 left behind often insurmountable gaps in production, administration, and the provision of services.³⁶ While other organizations filled the vacuum at the political center, many of the social and economic holes at the local level remain unfilled long after unification.

Two other patterns of transformation contributed to the weakness of those institutions which emerged out of the turbulence of unification. First, some elements of the old administration—particularly local government and services—remained in place, but with their

effectiveness undermined by association with the old regime. This was particularly true of police and courts which faced—not unsubstantiated—accusations of systematic collaboration with the secret police. Thus not only unfamiliarity with a new legal framework, but also a social environment hostile to official authority threw up obstacles to the enforcement of a newly proclaimed “rule of law.”³⁷

Second, where important institutions collapsed or were too compromised to remain under old management, organizations from the West replaced them. This is true of unions, industrial management, and political parties.³⁸ These institutions obtained material and personnel resources from the West, and their authority came not so much as the local and spontaneous representatives of interests in East Germany, but from the faith that they were responsible for stability and prosperity in the West and that they would recreate these conditions in the East. Insofar as they were staffed by Westerners and seen as acting in accordance with directives from the West, these organizations maintained an alien presence, limiting their influence over members in the East. Further, their authority was highly dependent on the maintenance of economic prosperity and stability.

The introduction of the FRG’s Social Market Economy upset relations between East Germans and society on an even more basic level. By summer 1991 economic shock therapy, carried out through the introduction of the West German DM at a one-to-one exchange rate and the efforts of unions to quickly raise Eastern wages to Western levels, produced unemployment at an official rate of 18 percent and at an unofficial rate in excess of one-third of the Eastern working population.³⁹ Further, prior to 1989 large enterprises (*Kombinate*), in addition to their part in industrial production, often played a large role in the local provision of public housing, consumer goods, education, and social and leisure activities for workers and their families. Skyrocketing debts and wage rates accompanying currency union and the breakup and reorganization of *Kombinate* by the Treuhandanstalt eliminated these auxiliary functions before other organizations could step in to replace them.⁴⁰ Finally, claims for restitution of confiscated property by Westerners and elimination of many generous provisions of the Eastern welfare system brought insecurity and disruption right into family life. Many families in the East now faced the disruptions associated with losing a home or the guarantee of free child care.

Together shock transformation of the economy and public administration created a social environment in which both material resources and organized social life were relatively scarce. Even the substantial transfer of resources from West to East has taken place through the central government and has been devoted to maintenance of stability through the subsidization of consumption, profoundly shaping the organization of economic and social life. As a consequence of these developments, the bonds which tie citizens to the normative order of society, as well as the mechanisms which control them should they breach this order, were temporarily disrupted in the East. This fluidity allowed tensions between German and non-German residents to develop along a different path than was possible in the West.

MOVING THE PROBLEMS AND DEBATES SURROUNDING IMMIGRATION EAST

Accession to the FRG through the provisions of Article 23 transferred more than the institutional rules and organizations of Western parliamentary democracy East. With laws and parties came also the issues and debates of the FRG's political system, including the unsolved problems of immigration. Regardless of whether Western politicians understood this, immigration and politicians' comments on it had a different audience in Easterners, who themselves confronted a different set of problems than their new Western compatriots. Consequently, as with the rise of far right parties in the West before 1989, established politicians played an instrumental role in setting the stage for the second outcome in ethnic relations, xenophobic violence.

As a concrete problem, immigration was introduced through the Treaty on Unification. It stipulated that the new *Länder*—in proportion to their population rather than in consideration of the social conditions prevailing in the East—take 20 percent of new asylum-seekers as well as 20 percent of “ethnic Germans” from Eastern Europe.⁴¹ Although it never approached Western levels in practice, the increasing presence of foreigners in the East provided a focus for many of the dissatisfactions accompanying unity. In the face of massive unemployment, housing shortages, and the myriad unsolved problems of reorganizing Eastern society, it proved difficult for officials to address or diffuse popular resentments over public expenditures and accommodations

for foreign residents. Indeed local authorities in the East often proved unable or unwilling to manage rising tensions between German and non-German residents before they escalated into incidents such as those at Hoyerswerda and Rostock.⁴²

Far more important than the physical transportation of immigrants eastward, however, was the projection of the politically polarized debate about these issues into Eastern society. Within months of unification public attention refocused on these issues in both parts of Germany. In the course of summer and fall 1991, under General Secretary Volker Rühe, the Union's "misuse" campaign against asylum-seekers took a subtle but important turn. Rather than the state having reached its capacity to accommodate new immigrants, Union politicians suggested that the massive misuse of the right to asylum had overwhelmed the population's capacity for tolerance.⁴³ Quickly the existence of a mythical threshold for society's capacity to accommodate foreign residents became common wisdom, and even commentators who should have known better began to speak of the "threshold of *Überfremdung*" (overalienation) as fact.⁴⁴ In the more volatile East such statements made the situation more hospitable to racism and xenophobia in two ways. First, they provided existing and nascent skinhead cliques a target group, an "other" against which to define themselves. For these groups Union statements provided outside confirmation by authoritative observers that the presence of this "other" was dangerous and undesirable. Second, the ambiguity toward violence contained in such statements supported the rationalizations of many perpetrators that they were carrying out the will of the silent majority which politicians themselves were too hypocritical to enact. At the very least, they excused perpetrators of violence by placing responsibility for it on the victims. Thus in the turbulence of Eastern society, imported rhetoric of immigration and asylum created the perception that violence was tolerated. The costs of engaging in acts of violence against foreigners were thus lowered.

ENTREPRENEURS IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT: AUTONOMOUS SKINHEAD CLIQUES

While polarized debate on immigration and deadlock at the political center of the FRG created opportunity for electoral entrepreneurs from the far right at the end of the 1980s, this same situation

was not duplicated in the East after unification. To the surprise of most observers, including far right parties themselves, the turbulence of this environment did not translate into a new electoral potential for parties like the REPs. In fact, since 1989 no far right party has approached the 5 percent electoral threshold in local, state, national, or European elections in the five new Länder. Rather, the fluidity of Eastern society in the immediate aftermath of unification created an opportunity for a completely different kind of actor: small, autonomous groups of young men who, at least in external appearance, adopted the symbols and language of racism, xenophobia, and even National Socialism. This section considers the origin of these groups and the opportunity presented to them by the apparent permissiveness of postunification society to antifoignier violence.

More than 90 percent of xenophobic acts of violence against foreigners in East and West Germany between 1990 and 1993—including those in Hoyerswerda and Rostock—were committed by groups of men under the age of 25.⁴⁵ Of these, about half were committed in groups of ten or fewer. While these cliques represent a rudimentary form of organization and while the overwhelming majority of their members claim a skinhead, extreme right, or xenophobic orientation, it might make some sense to describe them as political organizations.⁴⁶ However, even if these are political organizations with a specific ideological orientation, this does not immediately betray the goals or reasons for their existence. Most of these cliques, far removed from the ambitions of far right parties or clandestine neo-Nazi movements, do not seek to win state power or to promulgate a political agenda. Rather, they serve the immediate needs of their members for orientation and a sense of political identity in a turbulent environment.

The core of many of these skinhead cliques came into being during the later years of the GDR. From their origins it is clear that the extreme right ideology and symbols of these groups served primarily the needs of their members for an independent political identity vis-à-vis the homogenizing official culture of “real-existing socialism.”⁴⁷ By the late 1970s and early 1980s media-transmitted expressions of Anglo-American youth culture, such as heavy metal, punk, and skinheads, had become nearly interchangeable symbols of resistance for young East Germans against the official culture of

the GDR. Distinctions between these categories were less important than the fact that they were all proscribed by the authorities.⁴⁸ However, because the self-identification of the GDR was inextricably bound up with a rejection of the NS past, the symbols of the Third Reich proved powerfully alluring to those wishing to express their alienation from the official order. Evidence suggests these symbols were already in ascendance by the late 1980s in many parts of the East German youth subculture.⁴⁹ With the collapse of the old social order, existing far right groups formed a core around which other disattached youths could coalesce. Further, the rhetorical environment of the postunification asylum debate provided external reinforcement—or at least did nothing to disabuse members—of a xenophobic interpretation of their surroundings.

Considerable heterogeneity and intergroup mobility exists between political, unpolitical, left, and right skins, pointing to the fact that neither ideological goals nor service to organizations is the primary motive for membership. Rather, the purpose of most skinhead groups centers more on their mere existence than the realization of a common external goal. Such groups provide a measure of integration and belonging missing in other aspects of life in a turbulent environment. They offer members the security of numbers. Finally, in dividing the external society into superordinate and subordinate categories, groups furnish members a sense of orientation toward the outside world.⁵⁰

Violence has proven an effective means of consolidating and reinforcing group bonds. It forcefully delineates boundaries between the group and the external environment. It creates its own demand for the safety of the group. It is the primary means of testing the group's schema for classification of the external world into superior and inferior categories. Finally, it even mediates a common set of values concerning masculinity, comradeship, and action.

Because the origin and operation of such cliques focuses on association for its own sake, rather than organization toward a common political purpose, there are considerable barriers to the incorporation of these loose cliques into formal far right organizations. One observer has suggested that members of skinhead cliques approach action, violence, and group membership hedonistically—out of the individual desire for experience, rather than out of commitment to the realization of an idea—in a kind of “post-modern neo-

Nazism."⁵¹ It has also been observed that individuals with such orientations seldom subordinate themselves to the discipline required by the Führer/cadre organizations of old-style clandestine far right groups.⁵² Consequently attempts by more organized groups to instrumentalize skinhead violence have been unsuccessful.⁵³ Planned and organized acts of violence remain unusual, while the majority of attacks on foreigners seem to be more or less spontaneous incidents facilitated by too much alcohol, boredom, and television-mediated examples to imitate.⁵⁴

HOYERSWERDA AND THE PROCESS OF ESCALATION

Attacks by German youths on foreign residents in Hoyerswerda, 17–24 September 1991, illustrate both the processes shaping the eruption of ethnic violence in the new FRG and a turning point in that development. In this week of increasing confrontation, one observes the interaction of skinhead cliques, official weakness, public tolerance, and the appearance of success of violent action, which brought ethnic relations in the FRG to a brutal nadir in the months following. Conveyed by electronic media, these events triggered similar incidents which spread not only throughout the East, but to the West as well.

Initially the process of escalation in Hoyerswerda was precipitated by the attack of eight young skinheads on Vietnamese street merchants at the city's weekly market on Tuesday, 17 September.⁵⁵ Having been chased from the market by police, a group of about forty youths then proceeded to a dormitory housing guest workers from Mozambique; there the attack quickly escalated from yelling racial epithets to throwing Molotov cocktails. In the succeeding evenings, the siege of the dormitory became what one observer described as an "after-work ritual."⁵⁶ On Wednesday, the situation devolved into direct physical confrontations between German youths—assisted by neighborhood residents—and occupants of the dormitory. By Thursday evening, 19 September, a crowd of 300–400, including skinheads from Cottbus and Magdeburg, had gathered to chant "Sieg Heil" and "Ausländer Raus!"⁵⁷ On Friday, in an effort to head off another incident when a group of fifty or so youths gathered on the central market square, local police met the rioters with several

hundred reinforcements. However, rather than controlling the situation, the confrontation degenerated into an inconclusive power struggle between authorities and the mob.⁵⁸

The weakness and disarray of police as well as local and state authorities from Saxony became dangerously obvious to an ever-widening audience. Hoping to return calm to the situation, police removed sixty Mozambiquan guest workers from the dormitory. However, official capitulation only brought on a further escalation of the situation. Recognizing the weakness of the police, anarchists from Berlin arrived to challenge the xenophobic attackers.⁵⁹ Describing the situation as completely chaotic, police speaker Wolfgang Kiessling remarked bitterly that neither the mayor nor local legislative representatives had been in contact with the police until Saxony's interior minister arrived on Sunday, 22 September. "They're letting us die here," Kiessling complained.⁶⁰

By Monday, 23 September, the damage wrought in Hoyerswerda was complete. Along with 4 serious injuries, 28 minor injuries, and 83 people taken into custody, the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force had suffered a serious loss of credibility.⁶¹ Under massive police protection, and to the applause of 1,000 bystanders, another 150 asylum-seekers were removed from the dormitory. Before a television audience, violence had now attained its ostensible goals with the appearance of public support and official tolerance.

With the televised example of Hoyerswerda, weak social controls, existing skinhead cliques, and the appearance of official tolerance combined to generate bandwagoning effects that led to an upward spiral in the number of violent attacks on foreign residents.⁶² The spectacle of violence assured media attention. While most in the FRG felt opprobrium for such incidents, television also transmitted these events from one group of disattached youths to others, as well as to neighborhoods where they lived. In these marginal zones, dislocation and disintegration associated with unification, as well as frustrations over local authorities' inability to manage problems arising out of the need to house foreigners, had already considerably loosened the bonds which tied residents to the norms of the new German society. Subsequently what was seen as barbarism by broader society was greeted as heroism among the already disaffected.⁶³ Once Hoyerswerda demonstrated the "success" of such action and that neither state authority nor public opinion was prepared

to penalize it, potential aggressors elsewhere were confronted with a new, less costly schedule of risk for participation in violence. Within this environment small groups of perpetrators risked little but stood to gain prestige among their peers by engaging in such acts.⁶⁴ In the weeks following Hoyerswerda, attacks on foreigners' dormitories were duplicated not only in the East but in the West as well. Table 2 demonstrates the qualitative jump in the number of acts of violence against foreigners with a xenophobic motivation that took place in 1991.

In the management of ethnic tensions, German unification involved more than a simple eastward extension of the laws and practices of the old FRG. Rather, attempts to extend constitutional regulations and political debates to the East encountered the fluid environment of a society undergoing rapid and dramatic transformation. In this situation, issues and debates surrounding immigration did not serve to shift or consolidate loyalties to particular electoral representatives or even to the institutional framework of democratic representation itself. In many parts of Eastern society an articulated infrastructure for social integration, interest aggregation, and political representation simply did not exist. In this environment, the relocation of immigrants and the asylum debate provided external justification among the most alienated for participation in the few informal but indigenous associations which did exist—skin-head cliques. Further, weak social controls in the East and media coverage drove the interrelated processes of group integration and antforeigner violence into a spiral of escalation. Finally, although originating in the climate of the East, violence against foreigners did not stop at the old intra-German border. Rather, with the appearance of public tolerance, it moved rapidly to the West, where it had previously been confined to the criminal margins of society.

CONCLUSION: CONSOLIDATING THE FRG'S INSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS

The explosion of xenophobic violence was the consequence of a transitory situation associated with the disruption immediately following the collapse of the East German system and rapid unifica-

tion. The preceding section has demonstrated how tensions in Eastern society, under already turbulent conditions, were exacerbated by the policies and rhetoric of established political actors before and after unification. This section briefly considers the actions of citizens and politicians to sort out and stabilize regulations governing relations among Germans, non-Germans, and state authority in the face of increasingly violent and numerous attacks on foreign residents before it attempts to draw conclusions about the room for radical ethnic politics in the political system of the FRG.

In late fall 1992 the post-Hoyerswerda climate of apparent public and official tolerance turned abruptly against xenophobic violence. Two developments undermined the appearance of tolerance for right extremism in Germany: the changing public perception of violence and the increasingly aggressive posture of state authorities toward far right activities of all types. Metamorphosis of the public climate was brought on first by the death of two young girls and their grandmother in the firebombing of the home of a guest worker family in the Western city of Mölln in November 1992. This event precipitated a spontaneous and highly visible transformation in the public perception of violence against foreigners and xenophobia generally. Prior to this event, mass assaults on dormitories housing foreign residents had at times been publicly excused as understandable eruptions of social frustration at the failures of immigration policy. The attack at Mölln confronted the German public with premeditated murder motivated by racial hatred and committed by two or three individuals acting under the cover of night. Such naked transgression of taboos about violence and racism made the xenophobic nature of the wave of assaults against foreign residents undeniable. That a precipitous change in the public climate accompanied the events in Mölln is confirmed in both measures of public opinion and the participation of hundreds of thousands in candlelight processions protesting xenophobic violence in December and January.⁶⁵

Second, and perhaps inspired by the example of their constituents, federal and state interior ministers—under both the CDU/CSU and the SPD—moved aggressively to dispel any appearance of tolerance for violence and right extremism. State authorities recognized the imperative of leaving no doubt as to the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. While the risks of participating in acts of violence were made clearer by the sentences handed down in trials

of several participants in such incidents, this message was reinforced by the federal interior minister's decision to ban a number of violent neo-Nazi splinter groups in both East and West.⁶⁶

Ironically the eruption of xenophobic violence and the eventual public and official reaction to it also proved catastrophic for the electoral chances of far right parties for two reasons. First, as the public climate swung rapidly against violence, it was difficult for electoral organizations such as the REPs and DVU to maintain the finer distinctions between their own rhetorical attacks on foreigners and skinhead violence. State authorities, who were usually also representatives of a party losing votes to the far right, did what they could to facilitate the conflation of these categories in public.⁶⁷ Consequently far right electoral parties were swept up with more violent groups in the blanket reaction against right extremism.

The second reason xenophobic violence proved catastrophic for the electoral fortunes of far right parties is that it contributed to ending the deadlock between the CDU and SPD on asylum. While both parties were hemorrhaging votes to the right in Western state elections, events outside the FRG seemed likely to make the current situation worse and perhaps even uncontrollable.⁶⁸ By early 1992 civil war in Yugoslavia and the collapse of the Soviet Union made a new wave of refugees and an aggravation of already tense social relations seem inevitable. Against this backdrop, the threat to public order represented by escalating violence put enormous pressure on the major parties to end the stalemate on immigration. Changing Article 16 became the path along which movement took place as a result of the Union's ability to consistently trumpet the themes of "asylum" and "misuse." Against the focused Union barrage, the internally divided SPD stood no chance in the contest to frame the issue of immigration in public. Recognizing their advantage, Union leaders took the opportunity to blame Social Democrats not only for a rising number of asylum-seekers, but also for violence. Since—according to Union politicians—violence was the reaction of a society taxed beyond its capacity for tolerance, an end to SPD intransigence on Article 16 would not only limit the number of asylum-seekers, but also remove the cause for violence. In summer 1992 the Social Democratic leadership gave up resistance to constitutional change and agreed to the inclusion of lists of "secure" countries and transit

states from which the FRG would no longer accept asylum applicants.

While the "Asylum Compromise" did not solve the FRG's problems with immigration, it did dispossess far right parties of the populist platform from which they could berate the major parties "to do something about foreigners!" Now they had to suggest a programmatic alternative to the Union's position. In this situation far right parties in Germany lost all room for maneuver. They are now trapped in a predicament where they must either formulate a position which is only marginally different from their mainstream rivals or advocate an ideologically motivated program which puts them outside the normative boundaries of acceptable politics. They have no profile if they do the former, and they are damned if they do the latter.

Both of these developments demonstrate the continuity of constraints over possible outcomes in ethnic relations in the FRG before and after unification. On the one hand, overt racism and violence continue to be met by public rejection and legal action by state authorities. On the other hand, organizations seeking to follow an electoral course by distancing themselves from these taboos remain highly dependent on openings left for them by other actors in the political system. When no such space exists, the appeals of such parties remain confined to a small core of deeply alienated ideological voters—precisely where far right parties seemed headed in 1993 and 1994.⁶⁹

The emergence of far right parties before and xenophobic violence after German unification demonstrates the role of normative institutions in channeling the development of ethnic tensions in the FRG. The normative structures of all functioning parliamentary democracies contain either implicit or explicit proscriptions against social violence and racism. As the experience of the FRG before unity demonstrates, however, these are not sufficient to preclude aggravations of ethnic tensions in society, such as the problems associated with a rapid rise in immigration, from finding expression in the political system as exclusive nationalism and xenophobia. The experience of the FRG immediately after unity provides us with a powerful reminder that these constraints do not operate among those who remain outside the integrative and control structures of demo-

cratic society. Here, if allowed, violence and racism may provide substitute mechanisms for integration and social organization.

However, developments in the FRG also make no indication that the emergence of entrepreneurs exploiting ethnic tensions in a democratic society is inevitable. Rather, the German experience points to the intended and unintended consequences of actors' choices within the constraints of the normative and competitive institutional structures of democracy. Rapid growth in the number of foreign residents during the 1980s combined with the special situation that the FRG makes no legal provision for immigration to confront elected representatives with a choice about how to frame problems associated with immigration within the political arena. However, politicians did not enjoy unlimited freedom in doing this. The path of history, left by preceding generations in the form of laws and social norms, creates opportunities to frame issues in some ways while foreclosing others. For instance, the institutional topography of the FRG made it possible for German politicians to substitute the term "asylum applicant" for "immigrant" and call for change of the constitutional regulation of asylum on the grounds that German society was burdened beyond its limits by the existing liberal regulation. What they could not demand was that borders be closed and all foreigners be forcibly repatriated on the grounds that they threatened the health of the German Volk. Nevertheless, they were confronted with a choice and multiple paths along which to proceed.

The evolution of the competitive electoral system provides the second set of constraints on how German politicians chose to frame issues. As the ideological lines that divide both parties and electorates become less distinct, parties find themselves in increasing competition to attract the same voters. Often they do so by portraying themselves as effective managers and problem-solvers. However, at the same time they must be sure to differentiate themselves from competitors. Therefore, when confronted by a set of issues as complex as immigration, for which long-term solutions are likely to require institutional reform and a broad degree of social and political support, politicians face another choice. On the one hand, they can admit the complexity of the situation and seek the cooperation of other actors, including competitors, in arriving at a solution. This strategy requires a great deal of trust that others will not seek to exploit the issue for their own advantage, and it harbors the risk that

if cooperation in fact ensues, voters may cease to distinguish between competitors, thereby leaving space for new entrants. On the other hand, actors can rely on the limited memories of their constituents, foresake programmatic reform, and seek to preempt competitors by drawing lines on the issue so as to maximize both interparty distinctions and electoral advantage. Because immigration was an issue still relatively open to definition, West German politicians faced these competing alternatives at the end of the 1980s.

Finally, information is limited and history happens but once. Actors can never anticipate all the consequences of their actions. The explosive growth in immigration (an aspect of globalization discussed elsewhere in this volume) combined with the creation of a visible yet disenfranchised immigrant minority—the result of Germany's restrictive regulation of citizenship—presented a considerable opportunity for political entrepreneurialism—or so Union politicians thought. However, it was the efforts of established politicians—and the Union in particular—to exploit this opportunity for short-term electoral gains—rather than their failure to do so—which opened space to far right parties. In 1989 self-serving partisanship and deadlock at the political center handed a populist platform to those far right organizations making at least cosmetic efforts to conform to social norms about the NS past. Furthermore, the commitment of actors to this strategy at the moment of unification contributed to the outbreak of xenophobic violence. Only after paying a horrible price in human lives and suffering have relations among German and foreign residents and public authority begun to move in the direction of preunification stability. Yet almost none of the problems which precipitated these events has been solved. Although violence was highest in the fluent environment of institutional transformation after unification and receded with the restoration of institutional strength, the economic uncertainties that exacerbated conflict in the East still persist.

The future of ethnic relations in the FRG is open. On the one hand, the recognition by politicians within all parties—at least behind closed doors—that reform of Germany's citizenship law, Article 116, and immigration practice is necessary provide reason for hope. Indeed, as I have argued here, that law was partially responsible for creating the conditions in which these events unfolded. On the other hand, the SPD's recent attempt to instrumentalize resentments over

“ethnic Germans” against the CDU in state elections in Rheinland-Palatinate and Bad-Württemberg leave less room for optimism that politicians will resist temptation to exploit these issues populistically.

Politicians must recognize that norms about racism and violence, and even the laws built on them, are perishable goods. The persistence of a hierarchy of political rights and the efforts of “democratic” politicians to instrumentalize popular sentiments against weak minorities will eventually undermine them. In fact, prominent observers have sounded the alarm that in the wake of the asylum debate there are indications that Germany has become less tolerant of foreigners.⁷⁰ Ultimately the greatest potential for alienation and resentment in German society exists among the large and growing population of disenfranchised permanent residents themselves. Until these people are successfully integrated into democratic society, they—like some East German youth before them—may learn to take a different view of racism and violence.

NOTES

1. The far right political parties with which this contribution is concerned, unless otherwise stated, are the Republikaner (REPs), Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), and the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU).
2. For an explanation of xenophobic parties and violence as a “natural” reaction to the increased presence of ethnically different populations in West European societies, see Dieter Fuchs, Jürgen Gerhards, and Edeltraud Roller, “WIR UND DIE ANDEREN: Ethnozentrismus in den zwölf Ländern der europäischen Gemeinschaft,” *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 45, 2 (1993): 238–53. This analysis clearly rejects the automaticity of the argument presented by Fuchs et al.
3. It is perhaps interesting to note that despite the expenditure of some effort to find figures, it seems the exact number of dependents of guest workers entering and leaving Germany is not known, or at least not published.
4. For an analysis of the contradictory tendencies in official German policy toward guest workers, as well as of the changing composition of the guest worker population and particularly the rising ratio of dependents to employed workers after the recruitment stop, see Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880–1980*, trans. William Templer (Ann Arbor:

University of Michigan Press, 1990); see esp. ch. 5, "Gastarbeiter in the Growth Economy, 1945–1980," pp. 235–37.

5. For an analysis of the evolution of legal provisions for the entrance of "ethnic Germans" into the FRG, see Silke Delfs, "Heimatvertriebene, Aussiedler, und Spätaussiedler: Rechtliche und politische Aspekte der Aufnahme von Deutschstämmigen aus Osteuropa in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 48 (26 November 1993): 3–11.
6. Article 16, para. 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) prior to 1993; Article 16, para. 1, thereafter.
7. For a more complete analysis of such problems in English, see Herbert, pp. 235–43.
8. See Barbara Marshall, "German Migration Policies," in *Developments in German Politics*, ed. G. Smith, W. Patterson, P. Merkl, and S. Padgett (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 247–63. For empirical confirmation of resentments toward "ethnic Germans," see also Karl-Heinz Klär, Malte Ristau, Bernd Schoppe, and Martin Stadelmaier, eds.: *Die Wähler der extremen Rechten*, vol. 1, *Weder verharmlosen noch dämonisieren*, and vol. 3, *Sozialstruktur und Einstellungen von Wählern rechtsextremer Parteien* (Bonn: Demokratische Gemeinde-Vorwärts Verlag GmbH, 1989), in which it is stated that fear and opposition to foreigners are directed above all against *Aussiedler* and then against *Asylbewerber* and other *Ausländer* (vol. 1, p. 10). However, Klär et al. give no data confirming this assertion, and it appears that in the study to which the authors refer subjects were asked to respond only to specific questions about *Aussiedler* and not the other categories. Given that the study was commissioned and carried out by the party executive (Parteivorstand) of the SPD, it must be suggested that this assertion reflects the political interests of those conducting the study. This being said, there is little doubt that *Aussiedler* were the source of considerable resentment among some Germans.
9. It has also received far and away the most scholarly and critical attention. For the most influential example of such attention, see Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
10. Heribert Prantl, "Hysterie und Hilflosigkeit: Chronik der Asyldebatte seit der deutschen Einheit," in *Zuwanderung und Asyl in der Konkurrenzgesellschaft*, ed. Bernhard Blanke (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1993), p. 305.
11. Hans-Georg Golz, "Wir müssen lernen, mit Fremden zu leben: Neue Daten und Fakten zur Migration," *Deutschland Archiv* 28, 1 (1995): 5.
12. For a full account of postwar asylum policies, see Ursula Münch, *Asylpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Entwicklung und Alternativen*, 2d ed. (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1993), esp. chs. 2 and 3. For a fuller treatment of policies on guest workers, see Herbert, esp. ch. 5.
13. For examples of this simplistic utilitarian logic, see *ibid.*, pp. 209ff.
14. Münch, p. 72.

15. *Ibid.*
16. For an analysis of two periods of the “flowering” of organized right extremism in the postwar FRG—1949–1952, with the Deutsche Reichspartei (DRP) and the Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP), as well as the rise and fall of the NPD between 1966 and 1969—see Richard Stöss, *Die Extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, 1989).
17. For a long-term analysis of changing German attitudes toward democracy and the NS past, see David Conradt, “Changing German Political Culture,” in *The Civic Culture Revisited*, ed. G. Almond and S. Verba (London: Sage, 1989), pp. 212–72.
18. Stöss, *Die extreme Rechte*, pp. 35–36.
19. This problem was first suggested by Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems,” in *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 177–200. Ursula Feist elaborates it more clearly for the contemporary German party politics in “Niedrige Wahlbeteiligung: Normalisierung oder Krisensymptom der Demokratie in Deutschland?,” in *Protestwähler und Wahlverweigerer: Krise der Demokratie?*, ed. Karl Starzacher, Konrad Schacht, Bernd Friedrich, and Thomas Leif (Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1992), pp. 53–54. Note that this interaction could also be represented as a standard game of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). This type of formal presentation adds nothing to the analysis, and it seems that while the actors may have thought the payoff structure reflected a PD outcome, they were in fact engaged in a game of chicken. This was something they discovered only once it was too late.
20. See Marshall, pp. 256–57.
21. See Barbara Koller, “Aussiedler in Deutschland: Aspekte ihrer sozialen und beruflichen Eingliederung,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 48 (26 November 1993): 15.
22. The specter of the resources of the FRG being overwhelmed by a flood of foreigners is a prominent theme in the rhetoric of Union politicians. See, for example, former president of the Constitutional Court Wolfgang Zeidler’s suggestion that “a billion Chinese would have entrance” to the FRG; former Bavarian interior minister and present minister president Edmund Stoiber’s speculation about “100 million or more potential asylum applicants”; and former CSU general secretary Erwin Huber’s observation that in Eastern Europe “millions of people” were sitting on packed suitcases “looking toward Germany” (cited in Münch, pp. 106–7).
23. For an analysis of the tensions in the REP position on Aussiedler, see Norbert Lepszy, “Die Republikaner,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* no. 41–42 (1989): 7.
24. Considerable controversy erupted in 1989 as to the origin and meaning of the electoral successes of far right parties. Researchers and politicians split between those who claimed these events were the result of a protest vote

and those who viewed voters of the far right as being driven by the convictions of a “comprehensive right extremist outlook on life” (*geschlossenes rechtsextremistisches Weltbild*). This contribution eschews the universalizing assumptions underlying both perspectives. Several works have demonstrated that a great number of Germans (estimates run from 4 to 17 percent) have a “comprehensive right extremist outlook on life,” yet only on one occasion (the 1989 election to the European Parliament) has a number of voters in this range actually voted for far right parties. “Outlook on life” is insufficient to explain voting behavior; even right extremists are in some way motivated by the external environment. However, it is also not simply coincidence that the opportunity for the far right arose with immigration. Deadlock on almost any other issue would not have produced such an opportunity for far right parties. In essence, the perspective here is that voters were registering their dissatisfaction with the major parties on a set of issues on which they often had preexisting far right proclivities. For some contributions to this debate, see Franz Urban Pappi, “Die Republikaner im Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik: Protesterscheinung oder politische Alternative?,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 21 (1991): 37–44; Klär et al., eds., vols. 1 and 3; Jürgen Falter, *Wer wählt rechts?* (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1994); Eike Hennig, *Die Republikaner im Schatten Deutschlands* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991).

25. Hans-Gerd Jaschke, *Die “Republikaner”: Profile einer Rechtsaußenpartei*, 2d ed. (Bonn: Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachf. GmbH, 1993), p. 44.
26. Stöss, *Die extreme Rechte*, pp. 60–61.
27. Klär et al., eds., found that 40 percent of REP voters in the 1989 European election had voted for the Union in 1987 while 20 percent had voted SPD and another 20 percent had not voted. Roth points out that in the 1989 Berlin election 53 percent of REP voters came from the Union camp while 21 percent came from the SPD.
28. See Joachim Hofmann-Göttig, “Die Neue Rechte: Die Männerpartei,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 41–42 (6 October 1989): 21–31; Klär et al., eds.; Hans-Joachim Veen et al., *The Republikaner Party in Germany: Right-Wing Menace or Protest Catchall?* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993); and Richard Stöss, “Rechtsextremismus und Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 11 (12 March 1993): 50–61.
29. Note that in the Berlin and Frankfurt elections, as well as in analyses of support for the REPs focused specifically on some North German cities, observers have noted that far right parties fare disproportionately well among voters between 18 and 24; see Dieter Roth, “Sind Die Republikaner die fünfte Partei?,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, nos. 41–42 (6 October 1989): 10–20; Hofmann-Göttig; and Hennig. For the European elections this overrepresentation of the young is leveled out considerably. The difficulty of distinguishing REP supporters from others has prompted Veen et al. to hang the label “catch-all” on the REPs.

30. *Politbarometer* survey, August 1989; cited in Roth, p. 16.
31. Adenauer Foundation No.8902XO, November 1989; in Veen et al., eds., p. 47.
32. Infas report on the European elections of 1989; in Klär et al., eds., vol. 1, p. 47.
33. Adenauer Foundation No.8902XO; in Veen et al., p. 47.
34. See, among others, the controversy over Heiner Geissler's renomination as general secretary and other internal machinations in "Kohl: Dann werde ich bockig," *Spiegel*, no. 32 (7 August 1989): 16–18; and "Ob ich die Ende zusammenbringe?," *Spiegel*, no. 17 (24 April 1989): 17–18.
35. See, for instance, Konrad Jarausch, *The Rush to German Unity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), and the contributions in Smith et al., eds.
36. Klaus J. Bade, "Einführung," in *Aktuell Kontrovers: Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 2d ed., ed. K. J. Bade (Hannover: Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1992), p. 37.
37. Roland Sturm, "Government at the Center," in Smith et al., eds., pp. 112–13.
38. For a description of the "unseemly scramble of the West German parties 'taking over' in East Germany," see William Patterson and Gordon Smith, "German Unity," in Smith et al., eds., p. 27.
39. Official unemployment rates grossly understated the actual rate. Many Eastern workers and employees were put on the status "part time–zero hours" and were in effect paid unemployment compensation by the government through their often bankrupt enterprises. See George Akerlof et al., "East Germany in from the Cold: The Economic Aftermath of Currency Union" (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
40. On the organization and breakup of the Kombinate, see Ulrich Voskamp and Volker Wittke, "Modernization Blockades Become Downward Spirals—The Reorganization of Enterprises and Combines in the Former GDR" (Göttingen: Soziologische Forschungsinstitut der Georg-August Universität, 1991), and Bernhard Eller and Peter Schulze, "The Economic and Social Reconstruction of Eastern Europe: The Case of the Five New German Länder"; paper presented at conference on the Transformation of Eastern Europe, University of California, Berkeley, April 1991.
41. Bade, p. 35.
42. Willems notes that nearly always a long history of complaints to police and local officials about conditions near accommodations housing guest workers and asylum applicants preceded the eruption of violence (Helmut Willems, *Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt: Einstellung, Täter, Konflikteskalation* [Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1993], pp. 217–23).
43. Volker Rühle in *SZ*, 24 September 1991.
44. For a controversial academic contribution to this perspective, see Fuchs et al., pp. 238–53.

45. Ninety-nine percent of violent acts and 100 percent of deaths with a xenophobic motivation were committed by males; 90 percent were committed by males aged 25 or younger, and 72 percent were committed by males under 20 years of age; 93.8 percent of all violent acts were committed by groups of which one-half had fewer than ten members (see Willems, pp. 110–13).
46. Among the cliques, 82.2 percent claim one of these three affiliations (Willems, p. 127).
47. The following analysis of the origin of skinhead cliques and their postunification development draws from Manfred Stock, "Youth Culture in East Germany: From Symbolic Dropout to Politicization," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 27, 2 (1994): 135–43.
48. For an autobiographical account of one young East German's odyssey through the youth subcultures of the GDR and ultimately to the leadership of one of East Germany's largest and most active neo-Nazi organizations, see Ingo Hasselbach, *Die Abrechnung: Ein Neonazi steigt aus* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1994).
49. Bernd Wagner claims that court records demonstrate that before 1989 right-extremist oriented youths were attempting to build or consolidate a position of dominance among disaffected East German youths. See "Gewaltaktivitäten und 'autonome' rechtsextrem-orientierte Strukturen in den neuen Bundesländern," in *Neo-nazismus und rechte Subkultur*, ed. W. Bergmann and R. Erb (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 1994), pp. 77–98.
50. *Ibid.*
51. Uli Jähner in Rainer Erb, "Rechtsextremistische Gruppengewalt in den neuen Bundesländern," in *Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland: Voraussetzungen, Zusammenhänge, Wirkungen*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994).
52. Rainer Erb and Werner Bergmann, "Einleitung," in Bergmann and Erb, eds.
53. Willems, p. 137.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 184ff.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
56. Knut Preis, "Pogrome als Feierabendritual," *SZ*, 24 September 1991, p. 3.
57. Willems, p. 227, and *SZ*, 21 and 22 September 1991, p. 5.
58. Willems, p. 227.
59. *SZ*, 23 September 1991, p. 2.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *SZ*, 25 September 1991, p. 1.
62. For quantitative analysis of the catalyst effect of incidents such as Hoyer-swerda and Rostock on the escalation of violence in Germany, see Thomas Ohlemacher: "Bevölkerungsmeinung und Gewalt gegen Ausländer im

vereinigten Deutschland" (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin [WZB], November 1993); publication FSIII 93–104, and "Xenophobia in the Reunified Germany," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 23, 3 (June 1994): 222–36.

63. Eckert in Willems, p. 233, n. 287.
64. In his investigation of legal depositions on acts of antforeigner violence, Willems (p. 186) finds that perpetrators often discussed attacks they had seen reported on television immediately prior to their own acts.
65. See discussion in Horst Becker, "Einstellungen zu Ausländer in der Bevölkerung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1992," in Blanke, ed., pp. 141–49, and Ohlemacher, "Bevölkerungsmeinung und Gewalt."
66. These were the Nationalistische Front (27 November 1992), the Nationale Offensive (22 December 1992), and the Deutsche Alternative (10 December 1992). See Bernd Siegler, "Die Apparat und die Rechten," in *Der Pakt, Die Rechten und der Staat*, ed. B. Siegler (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt GmbH, 1993).
67. For examples, see *Spiegel*, 13 September 1993, p. 51; *FAZ*, 17 September 1993, p. 5; and *FAZ*, 1 November 1993, p. 2.
68. For an analysis of the vote in the 1992 state elections in Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein, see Ursula Feist, "Rechtsruck in Baden-Württemberg und Schleswig-Holstein," in Starzacher et al., eds., pp. 69–77.
69. Falter.
70. For rather disturbing evidence of this, see comments on police violence against foreigners in the FRG in "Amnesty International: Ausländer als Opfer. Polizeiliche Misshandlung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," May 1995; ai-Index EUR, 23 June 1995. See also opinion polls which report xenophobia as the greatest concern among foreigners living in Germany, ahead of financial problems and separation from their land of origin in the "Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer über die Lage der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Document AS2-73-40, 23 November 1995, p. 19.

FROM "CULTURE WARS" TO SHOOTING WARS: CULTURAL CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES

Ronnie D. Lipschutz

Everyone knows what constitutes the notion of conspiracy. Conspiracy implies that members of a confession, party, or ethnicity . . . are united by an indissoluble bond. The object of such an alliance is to foment upheaval in society, pervert societal values, aggravate crises, promote defeat, and so on. The conspiracy mentality divides people into two classes. One class is pure, the other impure. These classes are not only distinct, but antagonistic. They are polar opposites: everything social, national, and so forth, versus what is antisocial or antinational, as the case may be.¹

Popular wisdom and conventional history has it that Texas won independence from Mexico in 1836 and was annexed subsequently, in legal fashion, by the United States in 1845. Apparently, as we were reminded by the recent confrontation between the representatives of the sovereign "Republic of Texas" and agents of the "illegal occupation government of the United States," the conventional wisdom is wrong (as is so often the case). According to the republic's World Wide Web site, Texas has been a "captured nation since 1865":

The congress of the United States failed from 1836 until 1845 to annex Texas to the U.S. as a state because *they did not have the authority under their constitution to do so*. They finally passed a resolution (an agreement which is only a statement of intent and has no force of law) to annex Texas. In 1861, the People of Texas, by popular vote, exercised their right under the resolution to withdraw from the agreement. . . . After the civil war, the Union Army came to the Southern States and also to Texas and took over by military force and rule.²

Perusal of various sites on the Web suggests that this is a common sentiment among some segments of the U.S. public. It is possible to find numerous statements of a similar ilk, usually associated with groups and organizations that might be generously characterized as being on the political margins rather than in the mainstream.

This standoff, the trial of Timothy McVeigh in the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and the case of the Montana Freemen in 1996 continue to be represented as unusual events. Yet only a few days after the peaceful resolution in West Texas, a similar well-armed group took up residence in an official building in Venice, claiming to represent the independence movement of the "Sublime Republic," the title of the once independent Venetian city-state. Such episodes force us to ask, once again, "What on earth is going on here?" Are such people a bunch of marginal lunatics, as the media would have us believe, who have no awareness of "real" historical events? Are they criminals bent on stealing money and property from others through various (il)legal strategies, such as property liens and official-looking warrants?³ Or is there more than meets the eye to such standoffs between "separatists" and the "authorities"?

Although such groups are small and on the margin, it would be incorrect to think that they are aberrant; separatist groups such as the Montana Freemen, the Arizona Vipers, the Michigan Militias and various Aryans are all of a piece with a much more extensive process of cultural conflict affecting the United States as a whole, through which non-Anglo minorities are deemed to pose a threat to the integrity and survival of the white majority. In a typical example of the conspiracy mentality, these mostly white groups darkly warn of plots being carried out by cabals of bankers, Jews, Communists, Trilateral Commissioners, the Institute for Policy Studies, and members of the Council on Foreign Relations, among others, all meant to subjugate and enslave free, sovereign citizens.

Between these groups and the mainstream, there is a continuum of beliefs. Many members of U.S. society seem to feel that they too are under siege by subversive or foreign forces over which they have little or no control—these perpetrated by Hollywood, Washington, and Wall Street. Interestingly the "cultural offensive" waged by the Republican Right since 1990 or so is not so different in substance from the far right, although its warriors are more careful to pinpoint liberals of various stripes as the enemy. While the culture wars are

not obviously “ethnic”—it is the unruly minorities and supporters of multiculturalism who are categorized as ethnic or racial, not the majority—there are fascinating parallels between what is happening in the United States and so-called ethnic conflict in other places around the world. More to the point, in the United States culture is being used in instrumental fashion, as “ethnicity” has elsewhere been used, by political elites intent on acquiring or restoring declining power and privilege.

In this contribution, I map out the contours of cultural conflict in the United States today. I recognize that such conflict has been a feature of American politics since before the founding of the United States, but I believe it is useful to place the current wave in both an historical and comparative context. I begin with a brief discussion of the conception of culture and the way it is being used by academics and journalists. Next, I describe three manifestations of cultural conflict, including growing racial polarization throughout the United States, a more specific discussion focused on California, and the controversy over multiculturalism, and I situate these in the longer history of racial and cultural discord within the United States. In the third part, I address the erosion of the American social contract, which has much to do with the recent upsurge in cultural conflict. That social contract is under pressures that in some respects are similar to those of the past but in others are different. Finally, I provide some concluding thoughts about the possible consequences of the processes discussed here.

THE CLASH OF CONCEPTUALIZATIONS: CULTURE, IDENTITY, GEOPOLITICS

For most of the cold war, the omnipresent possibility of nuclear war, the threat of Communist subversion, and the fear of being identified in an FBI file somewhere in Washington, D.C. as a Pinko Comsymp were sufficient to keep U.S. citizens from straying too far from the free world straight and narrow. The 1950s set the standard for societal discipline, even though they also laid the seeds for the resistance and indiscipline that followed during the 1960s. But Red-baiting in the United States never went away completely; it continued

long after the end of the Red Scares of the 1950s—one can find it even today, in the excoriation of so-called liberals⁴—although the language of discipline and exclusion became more genteel as time passed. Still, since the end of the Soviet Union, it has been difficult for political and social elites to discipline a potentially unruly polity; that things could get out of hand without strong guidance from above is the message of both South Central and Ruby Ridge.

But why has such social disruption afflicted the United States? Here we begin to tread on somewhat shaky ground. The problem is, it would seem, a collapse of authority. Once upon a time, social rules and relations were fixed and people "knew their place." Today, as Marx might have observed again, "All that is solid melts into air." Marx attributed social instability to the workings of the market; today's social critics are more inclined to attribute it to an erosion of cultural "values." Culture and values are, however, problematic terms. Culture is generally seen as some kind of structure that is very slow to change—if indeed it changes at all—and is binding on those who belong to one. Values are in effect equivalent to the fixed preferences of rational choice theory and microeconomics. Finally, because both have contributed to societal success, they must have some evolutionary advantage in terms of competition among societies and countries. Conversely, the abandonment of both is a sure sign of decadence and decline.⁵

Nor is such essentialization of culture restricted to the domestic sphere. Since the end of the cold war, culture, identity, and values have become prominent explanatory variables in international relations. More than this, they have been invoked, in essentialist and history-ridden terms, as factors as invariant as the earth on which they are found. In this respect, states once came into conflict over raw materials (or so it is often said); today they are liable to come into conflict over raw ideals. Straits, peninsulas, and harbors were once the objects of military conquest; today religious sanctuaries, languages, and national mythologies seem to be the subjects of occupation. At one time, territory was viewed as the container of the nation; today some seem to see culture as a form of containment. The result is a new type of geopolitics that invokes not the physical landforms occupied by states but the mental platforms occupied by ethnicities, religions, and nations. In this scheme of things, culture is understood as being fixed and immutable. It does not—indeed it

cannot—change, for such change would transform the society just as surely as would physical conquest.

Among the more prominent proponents of geoculturalism are Benjamin Barber, Robert Kaplan, and Francis Fukuyama,⁶ although the best known is Samuel P. Huntington, with his “clash of civilizations”:

The years after the cold war witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in people’s identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines. . . . In the post-Cold War world flags count and so do other symbols of cultural identity, including crosses, crescents, and even head coverings, because culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people.⁷

Huntington’s definitions of culture and identity are peculiar, framed as oppositional to other cultures and identities and linked to what he calls “civilizations”:

People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. *We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.*⁸

Hence in his schema, culture, identity, and civilization are defined not in terms of associational values, but as *enemies* of one another.

While anthropologists continue to have serious disagreements about what exactly is meant by the term “culture,” we can define it as the combination of social factors—norms, rules, laws, beliefs, and relationships necessary to the reproduction of a society—with material factors that help produce subsistence and foster accumulation. Huntington’s cultural elements obviously fit into this schema, although he sees them as fundamental rather than contextual, and fixed rather than fluid. Most anthropologists would probably agree that while there are prominent and often ancient historical elements to be found in all cultures, they are neither static nor stagnant and that major changes in both internal and external environments are likely to disrupt a society and change it as its members adapt to new

conditions. Huntington, conversely, seems to believe that cultures and civilizations, like continents and oceans, are fixed and forever.

The parallels between classical geopolitics and Huntington's geoculturalism have been widely noted.⁹ The classical geopolitics of Halford J. Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, and Nicholas J. Spykman were a discourse of power and surveillance, a means of imposing a hegemonic order on an unruly world politics.¹⁰ Cold war geopolitics divided the world into West and East, good and evil, with perpetual contestation over the shatter zones of the Third World (adrift in some purgatory of nonalignment). Today these neat geographic boundaries can no longer be drawn between states and across continents; the shatter zones are within both countries and consciousnesses. Yet in a cartographic fantasy, Huntington offers tidily drawn maps whose geocultural borders, with a few exceptions, follow modern boundaries between states. (A few oddities do show up, such as an outpost of "Hindu civilization" in Guyana; Hong Kong remains "Western," in spite of its return to China; Circumpolar Civilization is entirely missing).¹¹

There is yet another contradiction evident here: geoculture, as pictured in Huntington's conceptualization, seems to lack any material basis. To be sure, geoculture is connected to great swaths of physical territory, the "civilizations" that loom much larger than the states found within them, but these have no evident material or even institutional existence. For example, the Islamic *umma*, imagined by some and feared by others, is much larger than the states it encompasses, but between Morocco and Malaysia it is also riddled by sectarian as well as cultural differences, even down to the local level. Geoculture shows no such variegation. People simply identify with those symbols that tell them who they are—"crosses, crescents, and even head coverings," as Huntington puts it—killing, stealing, and raping for no reason other than fealty. Culture and identity, twinned together, come to function as a sort of proto-ideology, almost a form of "false consciousness," to which people are loyal because they seek anchor in a tumultuous world. And because ideologies are of necessity mutually exclusive, civilizational cultures must also be unremittingly hostile to one another. The inevitable conclusion is the "clash" predicted in Huntington's title, and the replacement of the cold war order with a new set of implacable enemies.

Just as “culture”—whether racial, linguistic, religious, or something else—is invoked for instrumental purposes in Huntington’s schema, so does it fill the same role at the domestic level. The key to his conception of culture as fixed is that people cannot change cultures any more than the color of their skins, and if they are not of us, they must be against us. In similar fashion, it must follow that those who are culturally labile cannot be of the culture that they have forsaken and must be enemies of that culture. In other words, culture wars abroad and at home are part and parcel of the same phenomenon. Indeed Huntington is quite explicit on this point:

A more immediate and dangerous challenge [than the erosion of Christianity among Westerners] exists in the United States. Historically American national identity has been defined culturally by the heritage of Western civilization and politically by the principles of the American Creed on which Americans overwhelmingly agree; liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property. In the late twentieth century both components of American identity have come under concentrated and sustained onslaught from a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists. In the name of multiculturalism they have attacked the identification of the United States with Western civilization, denied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings.¹²

As we shall see below, however, Huntington is not quite correct.

IF CALIFORNIA LED, WOULD OTHERS FOLLOW?

January 7, 1995, was a day of independence for California. While giving his second gubernatorial address, Governor Pete Wilson threw down the gauntlet of states’ rights, declaring defiantly that “California is a sovereign state, not a colony of the federal government.”¹³ Needless to say, Wilson did not call out the troops, nor did civil war break out in the state, although he did seem to be trying to provoke a form of civil conflict, manipulating a wave of statewide public sentiment based on the scapegoating of “outsiders” and “aliens.” These foreigners were a variegated lot. They included the Clin-

ton administration, various agencies and representatives of the federal government in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere, legal and illegal immigrants (mostly from Mexico), ethnic and racial minorities, and others. At the time, Wilson's declaration of independence was simply shrugged off as rhetoric; in light of other themes that emerged during his aborted run for the 1996 Republican presidential nomination and since, it should be understood as more than just mere provincial populism.

Wilson was not alone in this. Virtually all Republican candidates for public office, and not a few Democratic ones, incumbents as well as newcomers, ran against government and the state in 1996. This electoral tactic arose partly as a result of the success of Congressman Newt Gingrich and his "Contract with America" in 1994, but also in response to what seemed to be a groundswell of resentment, suspicion, and even hate against the federal government and other unnamed actors. Underlying this was a broadly felt sense—irrational perhaps, but nonetheless felt—that America was no longer in control of its destiny. The sources of this resentment are not well understood, but scapegoats—many of them revived from earlier times—were easily found.

Wilson came to the presidential race with a built-in advantage (even though it did not in the end prove very helpful). As the lone office-holding governor running for the Republican nomination, Wilson hoped to exercise control over what no other candidate truly possessed: a territorial base and fifty-two electoral votes. This enabled him to play a triple game: first, he could claim to be looking out for the interests of his "republic" by arguing that California was getting a rotten deal from Washington;¹⁴ second, he could enhance his political stature at home by playing on Californians' "national" resentments against outsiders who were consuming the state's resources and money; and third, he could propose to reform (literally, perhaps) federal policies so that Californians would believe they might get more of the spoils flowing from Washington. Not everyone shrugged off his game as just presidential politics or sectoral interests. The leader of the Aryan Nation, speaking at the annual Aryan World Congress in Idaho, said that Wilson was "beginning to wake up to Aryan views," an endorsement that was quickly disavowed.¹⁵ Still, in his run for the presidency, Wilson became the political entre-

preneur *par excellence*, determined to play various divisive cards as a means of enhancing his power and political base.

A political entrepreneur is someone—usually a well-educated member of the professional class or intelligentsia—who, as David Laitin puts it,

is one who knows how to provide “selective incentives” to particular individuals to join in the group effort. Communal groups will politicize when there is an entrepreneur who (perhaps instinctively) understands the constraints to organization of rational individual behavior.¹⁶

Thus a political entrepreneur is one who is able to articulate, in a coherent and plausible fashion, the structure of opportunities and constraints that face a specified group of people and in particular can emphasize clearly the potential costs of *not* acting collectively. Such appeals have historically been especially persuasive in times of trouble, when societies are faced with high degrees of uncertainty and particular groups within societies see their economic and social prospects under challenge. It is under these conditions that we find the emergence of cultural conflict. More to the point, such conflict is often highly instrumental: those who would grasp power try to mobilize populations in support of their struggles with other elites for political power, social status, and economic resources (see the quotes from René Lemarchand in “Seeking a State of One’s Own,” above).¹⁷

Some might challenge this analysis, but whether or not it is an accurate description of Wilson’s strategy, his entrepreneurship is best understood as a product of economic globalization and political fragmentation that has come to play a major role in cultural conflict around the world.¹⁸ That the United States has not yet fragmented or fallen into internal warfare in this century does not mean that it might not in the future; the evidence of constitutive conflict—manifested in racial, “ethnic,” and “cultural” terms—is already all too clear.¹⁹ Such conflict is not merely about welfare or middle-class entitlements or taxes. It is *constitutive* and thereby represents a challenge to the very basis of the American state and its social contract. It is not about the *size* of one’s piece of the pie, in other words. It is about who is *entitled*, under the terms of the contract, to participate in the *division* of the pie.²⁰ And, it is not primarily about ethnic *mi-*

norities demanding enhanced rights or returns; it is mostly about elements of the white majority fearful of losing in what they see increasingly as a zero-sum game.²¹

Whether American political institutions are sufficiently flexible to adjust to the pressures engendering such constitutive conflict is as yet unclear, especially in light of historical divisions around race and ethnicity. There is little reason to think, however, that American "exceptionalism," pluralism, or political liberalism will necessarily be sufficient to prevent such internal conflict from becoming much sharper and more evident than it is today, or that it might not also acquire a territorial aspect beyond the current evident ethnic and communal character. What will matter in the long term are the ways in which groups of people will organize collectively to protect themselves against larger political and economic forces over which they feel they have neither control nor influence. While it is not out of the question that such organization could take on a states' rights character, pitting one state against another, there are other fault lines in American society—some territorial, some demographic—that have in the past formed the basis for intrasocietal conflict. These could reappear.

CONSTITUTIVE AND CULTURAL CONFLICT: THREE CASES

SLOBODAN ON THE SACRAMENTO?

In the past, California's Governor Pete Wilson has had a fairly "liberal" reputation, for which he has often been taken to task by more conservative Republicans. Given this, his political transmogrification to a harder conservatism came as something of a surprise and made many fellow party members suspicious of his true motives. To establish conservative *bona fides* in his run for the presidency, Wilson played off what was seen as a growing concern over the real or imagined impacts of changing demography and immigration on the state's politics and economy. Because Republican primary voters tend to be overwhelmingly white and conservative, the potential alienation of other voting blocs was not a concern to him. Hence in the months before the 1994 election, Wilson gave his active

support to Proposition 187, a citizen-launched ballot initiative that proposed to eliminate virtually all welfare benefits for individuals living in California without legal sanction. Wilson claimed that such illegals were costing the state more than \$3 billion a year, a not insignificant sum considering the economic and budgetary problems California had experienced during the first half of the 1990s. The proposition was overwhelmingly passed by the state's voters in November 1994 but stayed by judicial injunction. If and when the law is implemented, however, it can only marginally redress the growing demographic shift toward minorities in the state.

Wilson next filed suit against the federal government, demanding that it reimburse California \$3 billion spent on mostly Mexican illegal alien prisoners and welfare recipients. He argued that the federal government had failed in its responsibility to guard the country's borders and that therefore these costs were the fault of federal policy and should not be borne by California alone. Given the country's financial problems, Congress was reluctant to approve even as much as the \$300 million or so promised by the Clinton administration. But the point of the suit was less budgetary than political: it provided a means to mobilize the resentment of the citizens of California against the federal government's not paying its "bills," as well as those ethnic immigrants who did not "belong" in the state.

Then Wilson decided to actively oppose affirmative action, claiming not only that it discriminated unfairly against "qualified" whites and Asian-Americans, but also that the sins of the past should not have to be atoned for by the present generation. In July 1995 he attended his first meeting of the University of California Board of Regents since 1992 to vote on a proposal to eliminate affirmative action programs in university admissions, contracting, and hiring. Wilson next signed an executive order eliminating affirmative action in a number of state agencies. He filed suit against California and a number of state officials, arguing that they were violating state law in implementing affirmative action (although the case was later thrown out). Finally, he expressed unqualified support for a November 1996 ballot measure (Proposition 209), colloquially called the "Angry White Man's Initiative," which banned all affirmative action by state agencies. The initiative was passed overwhelmingly. Political analysts suggested that Wilson had latched onto these issues in order to revive his flagging presidential campaign, which eventually

collapsed. Recent data issued by Boalt Hall School of Law at Berkeley show an 81 percent decline in black admissions and a 50 percent drop in Hispanic admissions as a result of the elimination of affirmative action.²²

For most analysts and voters, Wilson seemed to be doing what was necessary to become a viable presidential candidate. In order to appeal to an increasingly conservative primary electorate, Republican presidential candidates must stake out increasingly conservative positions. These in turn have acquired a growing antigovernment and antimorality tone, presenting federal institutions—Congress, the Internal Revenue Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, federal police forces, plus those who illegally or unfairly reap benefits from Washington, D.C.—as "enemies of the people." Not only are such positions socially conservative, but they also tend to delegitimize government and the welfare state policies of the past seventy-five years. But such positions do not grow out of some sort of objective political logic about the optimal size of government or the proper role of the state; rather, they tap into sentiments held by the active primary electorate regarding a desire for the state to establish and police *moral* boundaries.

There is no reason to believe that Wilson or any of his colleagues are sympathetic to far-right, militaristic, and racist currents that have surfaced and been discussed in the media since the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building in April 1995. Nor, for that matter, is there anything new about running against government or minorities in the quest for public office. But attacks on Washington and federal efforts to redress economic, social, and political inequities range from the mild antistatist claims of a Bob Dole to right-wing conspiracy theories about black helicopters subscribed to by a Helen Chenoweth.²³ With the systematic delegitimization of some aspects of government, the state and its representatives become the focus of broader attacks on their legitimacy. These attacks, moreover, have less and less to do with what government can or should do, and more and more to do with politicians' adherence to fundamental social, moral, and constitutional values.²⁴ And they are increasingly couched in historically constructed *cultural* terms, thereby challenging membership in the American polity of certain groups, ethnic as well as political. They are, in other words, *constitutive* challenges.

MULTICULTURALISM AS CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE NATION

In an article on the collapse of the "First Russian Republic," Michael Urban points out that "Ordinarily, the concept of ethnic or national conflict connotes a hostile relationship that has developed between or among different ethnic or national groups." Within homogenous nationalities, however, we might see "various groups laying mutually exclusive claims to represent a single nation."²⁵

Urban writes about Russia, where the Yeltsin government has been sponsoring a competition for the best conceptualization of a new Russian ideology, but he might as well have been speaking of the United States. What is fundamentally at stake in Russia—who is a "true" Russian?—is also the case in the United States: What does it mean to be "American"? What must one do to be a member of the American community or nation? To what ascriptive or shared characteristics and beliefs must one subscribe in order to be accepted?²⁶ That this question, once thought to be long settled, has not been decided can be seen in the vociferous attack from some quarters on the notion of "multiculturalism." Multiculturalism is viewed by those opposed to it not only as a repudiation of fundamental American beliefs, but also as a conspiracy against the nation and its founding culture.²⁷

Of course, the United States has never been as culturally homogenous or unchanging as is sometimes pictured in political rhetoric or imagined in public discourse. Still, there does exist a core mythology, rooted in images of the Founding Fathers, the American Revolution, religion, family, and capitalism. These are routinely invoked in discussions of American history, its politics and social programs, and so on. As William S. Lind (of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation) put it several years ago, "Traditional American religious and cultural values remain the foundation of both prosperity and liberty; if America abandons them, it will end up neither prosperous nor free."²⁸ Who threatens such values? Who claims that they should be abandoned? Critics of multiculturalism argue that it involves an attack on the United States itself and have gone so far as to declare a "culture war" to be under way. While there is no single definition of what the term itself means—it depends, as Humpty Dumpty would have it, on "which is to be master—that's all"—we can characterize

it as a movement whose members seek others with whom they share cultural and ascriptive bases on which to organize, associate, and perhaps act politically. This is radical only insofar as it overturns the American myth of the "melting pot," via which all citizens, of whatever background, came to adopt the dominant, mostly white American creed of patriotism.

According to Lind, therefore, the threat to America comes from not only foreign sources, but also, in his words, "the explicit assault on Western culture by 'politically correct' radicals," the acolytes of multiculturalism. Huntington argues the following:

The American multiculturalists . . . reject their country's cultural heritage. . . . The multiculturalists also challenged a central element of the American Creed, by substituting for the rights of individuals the rights of groups, defined largely in terms of race, ethnicity, sex [*sic*] and sexual preference.²⁹

Oddly, the culture war is being conducted less against multiculturalism per se than against traitors within the ranks, in line with Freud's "narcissism of small differences." How else to explain Newt Gingrich's analysis of the impact of the so-called "counterculture" on American society, a tendency that he has claimed is "terrified of the opportunity to actually renew American civilization."³⁰

Such renewal seems to involve a revival of the two hundred years preceding the 1960s and the creation of a peaceful country and social consensus that hardly ever existed. Others have sounded similar trumpets. For example, in a 1991 essay on multiculturalism entitled "Whose America?," Paul Gray warned:

The customs, beliefs and principles that have unified the U.S. . . . for more than two centuries are being challenged with a ferocity not seen since the Civil War. . . . Put bluntly: Do Americans still have faith in the vision of their country as a cradle of individual rights and liberties, or must they relinquish the teaching of some of these freedoms to further the goals of the ethnic and social groups to which they belong?³¹

Supporters of multiculturalism would deny such intent and assert that the movement represents an effort to appreciate the contributions of non-Western, nonwhite societies to American culture, an effort that, if successful, would contribute to greater social equality

and cultural enrichment. This seems fairly innocuous, but there is, I would argue, a fundamental misunderstanding of what is actually going on.

Both perspectives seem to take it for granted that what is at issue here is a fairly simple struggle for power: which is to be master—that's all. The master, however, gets to define the culture, and the culture defines how people will behave. In a world of economic liberalization and individual opportunity, why does this matter? Surely culture is next to irrelevant? No. As I have suggested elsewhere,

Defining oneself in [different cultural] terms requires defining someone else in different terms; differentiation thus draws a boundary between the self and the Other. This Other is not, at first, necessarily a threat in terms of one's own continued existence, although ethnicity can and does become securitized. But the peaceful acceptance of an Other requires that boundaries be drawn somewhere else, and that security, the speech act, specify another Other. . . . There are always implicit risks in the peaceful acceptance of an Other as a legitimate ontology, because doing so raises the possibility, however remote, of accepting the Other's characteristics as a legitimate alternative and, consequently, of being taken over by the Other.³²

In this struggle—and despite exclamations of allegiance to political liberalism—demography seems to be destiny: majorities rule, minorities lose. This notion was evident in the political response to the ideas thought to be present in Lani Guenier's writings; it cropped up in commentaries on the Million Man March; it is evident in debates over employment and welfare mothers. That whites still constitute a demographic majority throughout the United States—even in places such as California—does not, however, temper that majority's fear that it is in decline and will at some point in the future be overtaken by others. In the future, if majorities continue to rule, members of the formerly majority culture will have to either adjust to these new realities or struggle to maintain the old ones.

Constitutive conflict is thus about the nature and content of the American social contract—and the way it is changing or being changed. Those who advocate a return to "traditional values" are, in

effect, endorsing the reinstatement of social conditions as they imagine them to have been in the past—*whether or not they ever existed in the imagined form*. To accomplish this reconstruction, it is necessary to undo those changes that have, it is thought, led to current conditions. Inasmuch as this would wreak economic havoc and lead to much greater social turbulence, the next best possibility is to attempt to change society's historical consciousness, editing it in such a way as to make that past a golden age when the problems of the present did not exist. Nationalism is, after all, about the creation and possession of a particular history that provides the legitimation of the particular nation. Lose control of history, and you lose the nation.³³

BLACK HELICOPTERS, UNMARKED CARS, AND NEW WORLD ORDERS³⁴

The extremes of constitutive conflict are most notable in the emergence of the mostly white and religiously conservative militias or "Patriot Movement." Although the origins of the militias in their more or less current form can be traced back at least to the 1950s,³⁵ the movement only really emerged in the public eye after the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building in April 1995. Prior to 1995, there had been a limited amount of research conducted on these groups; since that time, the literature has exploded, although it remains largely in the realm of storytelling.³⁶ Understandably, the members of these groups are reluctant to discuss with nonmembers their beliefs and practices, although they are all too willing to post them on Web sites.³⁷ Nonetheless, Web sites, newspaper and journal reports, and recent books contain enough information to illustrate how these groups and their members view the American state and government.³⁸

According to these sources, on the order of 10,000 to 100,000 Americans belong to militias, although some observers believe that the number of "soft supporters" could run into the millions.³⁹ The organized groups are found primarily in three parts of the United States: the "Rust Belt," especially Michigan and midwestern farming regions; rural areas throughout the west, where property rights are thought to be threatened by environmental regulation; and inland sections of the far west—between the Cascades and the Great Plains—which have the lowest minority population in the contigu-

ous United States.⁴⁰ These are regions whose historical comparative advantage lay in raw material extraction and commodity production, and which have been hit particularly hard by the vagaries of international markets and globalization over the past twenty years.⁴¹ Historically, moreover, these areas have proved fertile ground for populist movements of both right and left, which have grown most rapidly during difficult economic periods among people who have found their relative material status in decline. As one newspaper story puts it,

Many of the far-right extremists are relatively unskilled white males who are the unwitting and now angry victims of a rapidly changing world, a world where borders are constantly disappearing and a kind of "one-worldism" is rapidly engulfing them.⁴²

Or, as an article on the Militia of Montana observes:

The growth of militias in this state can in part be ascribed to the local psycho-geography and economic hard times. Montana is conservative and poor, and many of its citizens have always felt "colonized" by remote centers of power; the state suffered through a ten-year recession in the 1980s and is now enduring the transition from a mining and timber economy to a low-wage vacation and service economy.⁴³

It would be a mistake, however, to leave it at that. Increasingly, this type of limited-education, blue-collar populism is being linked to white-collar workers who are fearful for their job security or have already been downsized (as the English like to say, "made redundant"). As seems to be the case with these types of groups throughout the world, many of the leaders of the Patriot groups are well-educated, articulate, and widely read professionals.⁴⁴ But, excepting a very small number of organizations and members, they are virtually all white, too.

Most of the militia members interviewed by journalists—who are on the lookout for the more extreme rather than the average member—seem to share a conspiratorial view of U.S. politics. The country, they claim, is coming under the control of organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, international bankers—often thought to be Jewish—and the United Nations, all of which are part of a plan to create a "one-world gov-

ernment."⁴⁵ "What has happened," claims a member of the El Dorado County (California) Militia, "is that the military have painted all their helicopters black and the government is run by FEMA [the Federal Emergency Management Agency]":

If [President] Clinton declares a national emergency, he has this big multinational force, a United Nations force, made up of German, Dutch, French and Gurkha soldiers. There's a bunch of them out at the air base and a bunch more right across the border in Canada.⁴⁶

According to another article,

Some [conspiracy] theorists believe that proof of a planned U.N. takeover can be found on the back of a 1993 Kix cereal box, which shows a map of the United States carved up into 11 regions. This, conspiracists say, is an illustration of the New World Order plot to reduce the country to departments after the conquest.⁴⁷

While the militias themselves seem not to have yet become involved in organized systemic violence against ethnic minorities, some of the more extreme groups with which they share ideas and views have been implicated in such acts. Indeed, although there is reported to be a growing migration of white racists to the Pacific Northwest—called the "Northwest Imperative"⁴⁸—and few minority members in militias, most Patriot Movement groups stress that they are not racist.⁴⁹ They are more a manifestation of what has been called in another context "white siege culture"—that is, "Where a dominant group's self-awareness is heightened by attacks on its power and privilege . . . the group may mobilize its resources and members to respond to what are seen as threats to its well-being."⁵⁰

Such violence as has occurred has been directed primarily toward government representatives and returned by the latter. A few well-known episodes, including the destruction of the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, the confrontation between federal agents and white separatist Randy Weaver in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and the siege of the Montana Freeman compound, as well as the exhortations and activities of "home rule" advocates—who believe that the highest level of state authority is the county and the highest representative is the county sheriff—have fed a tendency to issue warnings about and threats against not only government police

agencies but also any agent of the federal government, including resource agency staff in the field.⁵¹ These representatives, some fear, are there to take away property and rights, a view that is also offered by the “Wise Use” movement, as well as a few right-wing members of Congress.⁵²

What are the central beliefs of these groups? First, they believe that the federal government’s failure to respect individual rights—manifested in the Waco and Idaho episodes—its apparent yielding of authority to the United Nations and various “conspiratorial” organizations, and its support of various international trade initiatives such as NAFTA and the World Trade Organization are deliberately aimed against Americans. These make it illegitimate. Second, if the federal government has no local authority under the Constitution and the county is the fundamental unit of government, the authority of the federal state to regulate and enforce laws and contracts is called into question. Third, if Washington is the enemy, as some constitutional fundamentalists suggest, it should be resisted and even deposed, and this effort must originate at the local or regional level.⁵³ Thus Washington—and the culture associated with its politics—becomes the enemy that must be ejected from the body politic.

While these views might seem paranoid, if not wholly unreasonable, they are not an example of isolated extremism. Indeed they rest at one end of a continuum of beliefs that run from Christian Identity all the way to Republicans and Democrats in the middle of the political spectrum. And it is not that Pete Wilson and his colleagues endorse the extreme positions of these groups or the violence that might erupt as beliefs are put into action. What links the extreme with the middle is the systematic effort to delegitimize the existing political system and its policies. In the case of the politicians, this is done as an instrumental tool for mobilizing political supporters in various electoral contests, not in order to overthrow the state. In the case of militia members and others, it represents an effort to restore the constitutive beliefs—the “American Creed”—as the basis for politics and society. But if the state is illegitimate, then who is legitimate? And who decides?

THE END OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL CONTRACT?

How might we explain these stories? In the sections that follow, I offer a two-part framework. Here I propose that although antistatism in the United States has a long and often tawdry history, this latest cycle is a reaction to what is broadly perceived as the erosion of the American social contract.⁵⁴ To reiterate the underlying framework: All stable countries are characterized by political and social arrangements that have some form of historical legitimacy.⁵⁵ The concept of the social contract is conventionally ascribed to Locke and Rousseau, who argued that the state is the result of what amounts to a contractual agreement among people to yield up certain "natural" rights and freedoms in exchange for political stability and protection. Locke went so far as to argue that no state was legitimate that did not rule with the "consent of the governed," a notion that retains its currency in the contemporary rage for "democratic enlargement." Rousseau's theory of the origin of the state owed much to the notion of consent as well, although he recognized that some sovereigns ruled through contempt, rather than consent, of the governed. Both philosophers acknowledged, as well, the importance of material life to the maintenance of the social contract. My use of the term is somewhat different in that it assumes nothing so formalized. Sometimes these contracts are expressed in written constitutions; at other times, they are not written down, but are found instead in the political and social institutions of a country. In either case, social contracts structure the terms of citizenship and inclusion in a country's political community, the rules of political participation, the political relationship between the central state and its various regions, and the distribution of material resources within the country.

Social contracts also tend to specify the roles that people may occupy within the country and society and the relationships between these roles. Frequently these roles and relationships have what we would call an "ethnic" or "religious" character as, for example, in the traditional caste system in India or the ethnic divisions of labor one might have found throughout the lands of the former Ottoman Empire, institutionalized in the *millet* system, and still found in places in the Caucasus (as well as in American cities). Such social contracts are frequently neither just, equitable, nor fair; they are,

however, widely accepted, and people tend to try not to disrupt them, if only because disruption can also affect the disruptors' material position. The social contract is therefore the constitutive source of social and political stability within countries. I do not claim that these social contracts are necessarily respectful of human rights or economically efficient; only that as historical constructs, they possess a certain degree of legitimacy and authority that allow societies to reproduce themselves in a fairly peaceful manner over extended periods of time.

These forms of social contract are not, of course, found only in "traditional" societies; the ex-socialist countries were also characterized by such arrangements, which were, once again, constitutive, if not constitutional. Certain groups or classes—the *nomenklatura*—were endowed with mostly informal rights and access to resources that gave them power and wealth within these societies, while other groups, lacking such rights and access, nonetheless had their welfare provided for by the arrangements in place.⁵⁶ Again, it is not my intention to argue the relative merits or faults of such contracts—only to point out that they maintained a relative degree of social stability and cohesion within these countries. It is critical to recognize, moreover, that social contracts as such are not only present with respect to state-society relations; societies themselves are characterized by such arrangements, often in spite of the active attempt by a state to alter or eliminate them. Institutions whose role it is to maintain political stability contribute to the maintenance of these social contracts, and so it should come as no surprise that when these institutions undergo transformations of a fundamental sort, so do social contracts. Indeed it is at these points of transformation that social conflict is most likely to break out.

Social contracts are characterized by certain terms of membership (or citizenship) to which are attached particular distributions of power and wealth, which have become institutionalized and legitimated over time.⁵⁷ Note, moreover, that actual possession of these attributes is not necessary; membership in or affiliation with the group to which those who actually possess power and wealth belong may be sufficient. Political and economic changes challenge these distributions and threaten those who have possessed power and wealth. At the same time, however, such transitions also offer great possibilities for power and wealth to those entrepreneurial enough

to see the opportunities inherent in the newly emerging systems. But they also provide the context in which political violence can erupt, as struggles develop over who is to gain access to the newly contested levers of institutional power. In the section that follows this one, I argue that the pressures forcing change in the social contract are to be found primarily in the economic sphere, the result, in part, of globalization. As I define the term here, globalization is more than just an economic phenomenon; it is also about the redrawing of borders and boundaries, with concomitant cultural and social effects. As such, it is a culturally destabilizing process with political implications for the nation-state that have hardly been acknowledged but which are potentially quite serious.

What then are the terms of the American social contract (or "Creed," as Huntington and others call it)? What does it take to become "an American" (as opposed to a citizen of the United States)?⁵⁸ Traditionally such questions were thought to be relatively easy to answer. One "melted" into American society—even if one did not give up all cultural attributes—found gainful employment that would improve one's lot, and participated regularly in the civic rituals of the country, including the customary invocation of its founding myths through voting, holidays, education, and political rhetoric.⁵⁹ The three major clauses implicit in this process—equal economic opportunity, procedural equality, and national allegiance through integration—have long been fundamental. They are principles of action to which are linked specific ideological beliefs.

EQUAL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Theoretically, at least, each American is granted the possibility of achieving a modicum of economic well-being through access to education and job markets.⁶⁰ Historically the basis for such opportunity and access was to be found in, on the one hand, the steady expansion of the American economy, which created a rising demand for labor (except during periods of economic recession) and, on the other hand, through growth in the educational system, which not only supplied the demands of business, but also socialized children into the practices of American politics and production.

In practice, access was always uneven, with some groups—especially racial minorities such as African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Hispanics, and Latinos—finding themselves structurally disadvantaged for historical and geographic reasons. The civil rights movement, as well as subsequent affirmative action programs that were later extended to other ethnic and racial minorities, were intended to redress these disadvantages by providing a substitute for the social connections and linkages to power that accrue to members of the dominant group.⁶¹ Despite the claims of opponents to such programs, these programs have been focused primarily on *individual*, not *group*, access and opportunity, and thus do not violate the tenet of individual equal economic opportunity. I return to this point below.

PROCEDURAL EQUALITY

The second “clause” of the American social contract granted equal legal and political rights to all Americans. Again in practice such equality was not granted to everyone, which was one reason for voter registration efforts during the civil rights movement and under subsequent federal legislation. It was also the rationale behind the extension of certain procedural rights, through court decisions and legislation, to individuals arrested on suspicion of having committed crimes. Provision of such legal rights was intended to develop a sense of membership in the political community and responsibility to it that was not forthcoming in the social and economic contexts. Through such membership, it was believed, the citizen would come to feel as though s/he had been treated fairly and with justice, no matter what the specific outcomes of political, legislative, and judicial processes might be.

ALLEGIANCE THROUGH INTEGRATION

The third “clause” of the contract, more implicit than the other two, made membership in the American “community” contingent upon an individual’s acceptance, espousal, and practice of certain patriotic tenets. This included adherence to the country’s founding myths. Following World War II, anticommunism became an addi-

tional badge of inclusion (who can forget "America: Love it or leave it"?). To reject such tenets and myths was tantamount to treason, and for a time, anyone who professed support for communism was alienated from the community at large, fired from his job, and even expelled from the country. Such allegiance to the nation also made it possible, on the one hand, to obscure various internal divisions within the nation and, on the other hand, to justify and promote various welfare-state programs—ranging from the War on Poverty to the Apollo program to the National Defense Highway Act to the New Math—as integral parts of a united cold war effort against the enemy.

There are other clauses in the social contract, but these three have been the central ones. The critical point here is that each element is related to *individual* behavior, not that of *groups* (or places specifically defined in terms of disadvantaged minorities or geography).⁶² In recent decades, in spite of widespread belief to the contrary, there have been no systematic efforts to redress the *structural* economic disadvantages accruing to ethnic minorities as communities within the United States, unlike the case in the European Union, which has active programs of redistribution to redress some of the disparities in wealth among member-states and regions.⁶³ To be sure, affirmative action programs have been targeted toward members of ethnic minorities, but in fact, in contrast to regional policies in places such as Yugoslavia or Europe, it has been individuals within these minorities, and not the groups themselves, that have been the targets of such policies. In other words, affirmative action has been entirely in keeping with the liberal, individualistic tendencies of U.S. politics. Nonetheless, there is a widely held and growing belief that such programs provide collective advantages to minorities and therefore represent a fracturing of the postwar social contract.⁶⁴

As suggested by the stories presented above, a large segment of conventional wisdom has to be that a liberal and alienated government, in collaboration with a social and political elite, is systematically trying to promote multiculturalism and undermine white privilege. But the erosion of the social contract is not quite so simple. First, while "equal economic opportunity remains the sine qua non of the system, as evidenced by Newt Gingrich's repeated invocation of the concept of an "opportunity society," one must possess appro-

priate tools and skills in order to seize opportunities. Those who lack the requisite skills or cannot sell themselves to prospective employers might well face dismal economic prospects or downward mobility. Moreover, to the extent that those who confront these dismal prospects see their lot as arising from the policies put in place by the country's political leadership—which they are, but not in the way generally understood—the material basis for broad belief in this element of the social contract is undermined.

Procedural equality remains in place, although it is coming under increasing pressure as well. The number of registered voters in the United States continues to decline, as does actual participation in elections. There is a growing movement, as evidenced in laws such as “Three strikes and you’re out” and Proposition 187 in California, to strip various procedural rights from two-time felons, illegal immigrants, and even legal ones. Efforts to limit AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) and other welfare benefits granted to those who have moved from one state to another essentially restrict rights of citizenship granted in principle by the U.S. Constitution. And whether it is true or not, events such as the criminal trial of O. J. Simpson suggest to many that wealth makes it possible to evade the law.⁶⁵

Finally, allegiance through integration has become the focus of the culture wars, as I suggested above. The collapse of communism removed one central and unifying element in the contract—anticommunism—and in spite of a search for new enemies, nothing has as yet emerged to take its place.⁶⁶ Paradoxically, perhaps, the changing demographic complexion of the United States and the emergence of affirmative action and multiculturalism are in no small part a *result* of the policies associated with anticommunism. These policies, on the one hand, facilitated the immigration of large numbers of refugees from Communist countries in the name of maintaining that social contract while, on the other, they helped to foster the economic prosperity that has made the United States so economically attractive to immigrants.⁶⁷ But economic globalization has eroded the old borders between countries that made allegiance through integration essential in the past; cultural loyalties are split, even if political ones are not.

IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID!

How can we explain the erosion of the American social contract and the cultural conflict that has emerged? As I suggested above, conventional wisdom claims that the emergence of both multiculturalism and the largely white reaction to it is cultural and value-based. Few attempts have been made to ask *why* culture and values appear to so many to be under threat—most accounts invoke "modernization" and resistance to it.⁶⁸ Consequently the culture wars are waged in and through a variety of venues, including the media, education, politics, and social policy. Studiously avoided by almost everyone, however, are the economic roots of the entire process of social and cultural change. Indeed it is in the economy that the origins of culture wars are to be found, in the final stages of integration of America into the global economy (and to some extent vice versa), the global move toward hyperliberalism, and the industrial revolution associated with the information age.⁶⁹

The result of these policies—liberalization, social reorganization, and a partial form of structural adjustment—has been a squeeze on labor and the privileging of capital.⁷⁰ Gradually the squeeze has been extended from the blue-collar to the white-collar workforce, as well as the military and defense sectors, with successive downsizings and mergers among corporations as they struggle to reduce costs, improve balance sheets, and maintain share value.⁷¹ By now, whether or not it is statistically correct, there is a widespread perception within major segments of the American labor force that no forms of employment are secure.⁷² While policymakers and academics such as Robert Reich argue that "symbolic analysts," the production workers of the information age, are secure for the future,⁷³ the reality is that new information technologies may make many of them redundant too.⁷⁴

Moreover, many people who are downsized or merged out of a job have little or no chance of finding new employment at comparable wage rates.⁷⁵ As Paul Krugman has somewhat optimistically put it, trying to explain what is happening,

Modern technology in effect mandates much wider disparities in earnings among workers than we have experienced in the past. . . . In the long run . . . the trend toward growing economic

disparities is likely to reverse itself even in the absence of any deliberate policy action. The Industrial Revolution created huge inequalities in its first half-century, but eventually produced [after fifty years] a middle-class society of unprecedented affluence. The Information Revolution will probably do the same.⁷⁶

Until this happens, however, the effects of this new industrial revolution will have to work their way through the system. Those who do not lose their jobs will be fearful of the possibility; those who do lose their jobs will become disillusioned with the system; those who are educated but unable to find jobs commensurate with their skills will become cynical and nihilistic. And all will be thrown into the hypercompetitive arena of the "opportunity society," where success is measured in terms of wealth and status. The practical consequence of the process Krugman describes is that the material basis for American "culture" is being steadily eroded, even as we hear calls from conservative pundits for a need to restore that culture through a return to historical "values." But whereas material prosperity legitimated the American social contract of the 1950s, a revival of the value system of the 1950s will not restore the material prosperity of those times.⁷⁷ The reality is that not only is such restoration not possible, but also attempting to do so would further undermine the material base of American society.

A true return to the values of the 1950s would require a reversion to an economic Fortress America. Foreign capital inflows would dry up, interest rates would skyrocket, the value of the dollar would plummet, and a bear market on Wall Street and elsewhere would make 1929 look like a picnic. The resulting decline in living standards would hardly bode well for political stability. There is no turning back. Greater integration into the global economy poses risks for American society as well, in that the resulting benefits will not be distributed evenly across the United States. Some regions, some groups, and some individuals will find themselves better off than others but less willing to compensate those who do not do as well. In this context, it may well be, as David Rieff has suggested, that multiculturalism is a "superstructure" to these economic transformations, simply a means of making more money by appealing to niche markets.⁷⁸

FAULT LINES AND FRONT LINES

Why does the erosion of the social contract matter, and what does it have to do with cultural conflict? To understand this connection, we must turn to a discussion of security and the state.⁷⁹ Generally speaking, national security is seen in *material* terms: the protection of territory, population, and resources against external enemies and internal subversion. But this conception is incomplete. At the core of any nation-state—in its social contract—there are a set of notions laying out what it represents. A state may embody certain ideals—freedom, liberty, etc.—or the aspirations of a group of people self-defined as a nation—Jews, Palestinians, etc.—or notions about a golden past and a bright future. These notions are wrapped up in a mythos that is central to what we generally call *nationalism*, and it is this that is generally held to animate the political life of the nation-state. But nationalism is not merely a means of animating the state; it is also central to its *reproduction*—that is, to its survival as a unified and distinct political entity.

Ordinarily threats to the survival or continuity of a state are seen as originating from the outside—the security dilemma and self-help in anarchy are the classical representations of this problem—while domestic problems fall under the police powers of the sovereign.⁸⁰ It is perhaps worth noting here that governments routinely suppress dissidents or “subversives” in the name of national security, although what is really being protected is a particular regime and not the state per se. There is, however, another category of domestic “threats” that strike at the very legitimacy of the idea of the state, and it is with these that I am concerned here. These are *constitutive* threats, which undermine the basis on which the state is organized and may, if allowed to proceed, disrupt domestic political continuity. Paradoxically, however, constitutive threats are rarely allowed to proceed to a logical conclusion; more frequently, the majority against whom such threats appear to be aimed will react to protect its prerogatives.

The stories told above suggest that the security of the state and its society must be intimately bound up with the national mythos—what Barry Buzan calls the *idea* of the state.⁸¹ A failure to maintain the mythos can be, from the state’s perspective, merely annoying or possibly catastrophic. That is why enemies are important.⁸² In-

deed to the extent that it is possible to define external enemies arrayed against the nation, the mythos of national solidarity is reinforced, and having defined an “other,” it is also much easier to define the “self.”⁸³ When an enemy can be found, the national security mythos reproduces itself almost without effort.

Suffice it to say here that American postwar “culture” was rooted in a certain self-image of the relationship among individual and national identities, work, and economic growth. Both proponents and critics of liberalism often argue that economic growth is essential to social peace inasmuch as if everyone sees his or her position improving in absolute terms, he or she will be satisfied; a stagnant economic product, by contrast, sets the stage for distributional conflict.⁸⁴ When such conflict breaks out, who has a right to a share of the pie? With the argument I presented above about the ethnic/religious/class nature of the social contract, it becomes apparent why such conflict might break out along those preexisting divides. The history of those divides does matter.

In order to “recenter” displaced individuals—and explain their displacement in terms of the social requirements of the nation-state—it has historically been helpful, if not necessary, to find an enemy. One way is to create new boundaries, be they national, social, or both. During the cold war, the enemy was to be found outside the boundaries of the “free world.”⁸⁵ In the name of national security, consequently, a variety of state-led welfare policies and economic strategies was deployed that might not under other circumstances have been ideologically permitted or politically possible. In the United States, in particular, national security policy allowed the development of a relationship in which the interests of state, capital, and labor, in joint opposition to communism, appeared to be complementary (whether true or not).⁸⁶ This coalition was greatly weakened beginning in the 1970s, as political relations with the Soviet Union and China improved, and it was further undermined by the structurally rooted loss of international competitiveness and chronic trade deficits. In the end, capital had no choice but to treat American labor as the functional equivalent of labor anywhere else in the world, and their interests diverged. The state, having yielded its mobilization prerogative to the market, had no choice but to follow.⁸⁷

None of this explains clearly where and how the preexisting divides have been or might become real fractures. I would argue here

that there is a dialectical relationship between the processes of economic globalization and political fragmentation,⁸⁸ and that in the United States multiculturalism has something to do with the latter. Where the United States differs from places beset by ethnic and sectarian conflict is that it is not administratively divided along ethnic or national lines. There are no explicit fault lines "on the ground" that could stand as obvious boundaries between competitive territories because patterns of settlement and development generally cross state, county, and municipal borders. There are no juridically defined political units whose constitutive character is ethnic—at least not at the present time. But embedded in this dialectical relationship there is the possibility of spatial differentiation that could in the future have ethnic content.

Demographically such regions are to be found in some parts of the country, and not surprisingly, these have become potential front lines in the culture wars. What is surprising perhaps is that these regions are not necessarily ethnically or racially diverse—the Pacific Northwest is one such place—and that the target of public opinion is as much the political system itself as identifiable groups of people. As differentiation among places is fostered, by both economic/political competition and scapegoating, the ethnic element is more than likely to become sharper; indeed the very essence of the culture warriors' attack on multiculturalism is to be found in the latter's difference from "traditional" American (read white) norms, values, and culture.

Discrimination against ethnic minorities is not a new phenomenon in the United States; it was of course enshrined in the Constitution with respect to the question of slavery and institutionalized in Jim Crow laws following the Civil War. Other forms of discrimination against minorities have not been constitutively grounded, however; rather, they have been enforced through social norms and laws. While social discrimination has formed a more or less continuous background throughout the past two centuries, legal discrimination has been more cyclical, a response to both economic crisis and international political tensions. Thus, for example, the internment of Japanese during World War II was a response to war; earlier impositions on Chinese immigrants and restrictions aimed primarily at East Europeans during the first half of the twentieth century were

largely the result of economic pressures. In this respect, such “nativist” restrictions are nothing new.

Indeed responses by the white majority to successive waves of immigration into the United States have had a cyclical character running in parallel to the state of the domestic and international economies. This should come as no surprise either. During periods of relative prosperity and low unemployment, real or apparent competition in the labor market is limited; when recessions or bad economic times hit, this competition becomes a catalyst for antagonism against those who “take away jobs.” Anti-immigrant nativist movements among the white population have also typically had a cultural character that paradoxically can be understood as a “liberal” response to deteriorating economic conditions. Indeed antagonisms are more often expressed in cultural as opposed to economic terms, inasmuch as the former are easier to understand—even if wrong—and have greater political resonance. Periods of prosperity are also likely to instill greater self-confidence in the members of society, as well as the society itself, and this also weighs against scapegoating of the culturally different.

Finally, “visibility” is important. Groups of people who maintain a low profile, for whatever reason, are unlikely to generate much in the way of resentment on the part of the white majority. It is no accident that the civil rights movement began in earnest in the 1950s and reached its apogee in the 1960s, for that is the period during and after a major influx of blacks into northern urban areas in search of opportunities growing out of the transformation of the American economy after World War II. The growing visibility of Latino communities in recent years, especially in the American Southwest, is a result of economic “push-pull” factors in Latin America and the United States and the changing demographics of places, such as the Northeast and southern California, which are often the focus of media attention.

That episodes of ethnic tensions in the United States have been largely catalyzed by changing economic conditions is less interesting for the purposes of this paper than how and why this latest round might be different from earlier ones. One of the framing hypotheses of this paper suggests that it is the changes in the social contract and efforts by ethnic entrepreneurs to restore power or wrest it from dominant elites—both wrought by the larger processes of global eco-

nomic integration and liberalization—that trigger hostilities between self-defined ethnic groups. In principle, this process ought to be evident in earlier cycles as well. What is different is that in earlier times, integration was not so evidently global, liberalization was not so unbounded, and the consequent changes in the domestic division of labor were not quite so all-encompassing as they appear to be today. Whether these processes are “real” is less important than how they are being perceived and acted upon. The result is a growing legitimation crisis of the American state and what appears to be an increase in constitutive conflict, especially that with a racial character.

Ultimately there is significant risk in the rhetorical tactics of those who would restore “traditional values and culture,” inasmuch as there is little chance that the root causes of such extremism can or will be addressed through ordinary politics. Even were the Republicans to take full control of Washington, they could not fully undo the effects of globalization. There is likely, as a result, to be growing frustration and anger on the political extreme(s) that could move toward the political middle. The inability of American political institutions to address these root causes in the short term will further delegitimize them without putting in place new institutions or ideologies. There might then be a temptation in some places to “go it alone.” Territorial secession seems far-fetched today; it could look less absurd in the future.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have offered a framework for analyzing the erosion of the American social contract, a consequence of processes of globalization set in train following the end of World War II. In essence, I have argued that the favored material position of the United States during the 1950s and 1960s was during the following decades eroded by the very economic institutions put in place through the Bretton Woods system. This was neither intentional nor foreseen, but it had the effect of eroding the terms of the domestic social contract and creating political disaffection among certain segments of the polity who have seen their privileged position under

threat by both multiculturalism and economic transformations. There is no “ethnic conflict” in the United States, but there is nevertheless a large and disaffected group of white “dispossessed” who cannot come to terms with the social transformation that is a result of American success in the world. The resentment of these groups and individuals is channeled into a challenge to the legitimacy of the federal system, a challenge that runs the gamut of the American political spectrum. The extreme right proposes to take up arms in defense of its eroding position by posing an international threat to the national security of the country, aided and abetted by the federal government and its representatives. A failure to address these resentments—and I argue that they cannot be addressed, given the structure of domestic economic interests—will further exacerbate them. The “true nation” might, in this schema, rise up against the “false one” and restore the proper order of things, whatever that might be.

Human beings are continually getting into situations wherein they can no longer understand the world around them. Something happens to them that they feel they did not deserve. Their suffering is described as an injustice, a wrong, an evil, bad luck, a catastrophe. Because they themselves live correctly, act in an upright, just manner, go to the right church, belong to a superior culture, they feel that this suffering is undeserved. In the search for a reason why such evil things happen to them, they soon come upon another group, an opponent group to which they then attribute certain characteristics: This group obviously causes them to suffer by effecting dark, evil, and secretly worked out plans against them. Thus the world around them is no longer as it should be. It becomes more and more an illusion, a semblance, while at the same time the evil that has occurred, or is occurring and is becoming more and more essential, takes place *behind* reality. Their world becomes unhinged, is turned upside down [*sic*]; in order to prevent damage to or destruction of their own group (religion, culture, nation, race) they must drive out, render harmless, or even destroy those—called “conspirators”—carrying out their evil plans in secret.⁸⁹

NOTES

1. Serge Moscovici, "The Conspiracy Mentality," in *Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy*, ed. Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici (New York: Springer Verlag, 1987), p. 154.
2. "An Introduction to the Republic of Texas"; <http://republic-of-texas.prg/Intro.html>. Emphasis in original.
3. As it turns out, Ambassador Richard McLaren had been excommunicated from the "true" Republic of Texas for his activities. So he was a criminal separatist, so to speak.
4. See, for example, "Conservative Accuses Gingrich of Cozying Up to Liberals," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 6 February 1997, p. A8.
5. I am not making this up; see Samuel P. Huntington, "The West, Civilizations, and Civilization," in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), ch. 12, esp. p. 304.
6. Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995); Robert Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth* (New York: Random House, 1996); Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995).
7. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 19, 20.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 21; emphasis added.
9. See, for example, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "At the End of Geopolitics? Reflections on a Plural Problematic at the Century's End," *Alternatives* 22, 1 (January–March 1997): 35–55.
10. Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Norton, 1919/1962); Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace*, ed. H. R. Nicholl (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944).
11. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 26–27.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
13. Steven A. Capps, "Wilson Sworn in with a Blast at Feds," *San Francisco Examiner*, 8 January 1995, p. A-1.
14. Wilson's suspicions survived the demise of his candidacy: he subsequently turned down a \$40 million federal grant for California's educational system, claiming that it would be too intrusive.
15. Michael Janofsky, "White Supremacists Hold Hate Fest," *San Francisco Examiner*, 23 July 1995 (*New York Times* wire service), p. A2.
16. David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 302.
17. *Ibid.*; Paul R. Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," *Ethnicity* 3, 3 (September 1976): 225–39.

18. See Lipschutz, "Seeking a State of One's Own," in this volume.
19. The white and black responses to the verdict in the Simpson trial, to the Million Man March, and to other racially polarized incidents suggest that a very serious racial divide lies just beneath the surface of American politics; see two essays by George M. Fredrickson: "Land of Opportunity?" *New York Review of Books* 43, 6 (4 April 1996): 4-7, and "Far from the Promised Land," *New York Review of Books* 43, 7 (18 April 1996): 16-20.
20. See John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," *Philosophical Review* 64 (1955): 25.
21. Donald G. Baker, "Race, Power and White Siege Cultures," *Social Dynamics* 1, 2 (1975):144.
22. "Fewer Blacks Admitted to California Law School," *New York Times*, 15 May 1997 (national edition), p. A14.
23. Nina Burleigh, "The Movement's Sympathetic Ears on Capitol Hill," *Time*, 8 May 1995, p. 66.
24. For numerous examples of this point, see <http://www.best.com/~jdu-laney/politics.html>.
25. Michael Urban in this volume.
26. Liberalism, of course, eschews ascriptive characteristics as indicators of nationality, yet shared beliefs, while not genetic or kin-based, are usually accepted without question.
27. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 305-7.
28. William S. Lind, "Defending Western Culture," *Foreign Policy* 84 (Fall 1991): 40. See also Maureen Dowd, "G.O.P.'s Rising Star Pledges to Right Wrongs of the Left," *New York Times*, 10 November 1994 (national edition), p. A1.
29. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, p. 306.
30. Cited in Dowd.
31. Paul Gray, "Whose America?" *Time*, 8 July 1991, p. 13.
32. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 218. See also Moscovici.
33. This paragraph would not be complete without invocation of George Orwell's *1984*.
34. For those unfamiliar with right-wing conspiracy theories, the New World Order is a UN-orchestrated movement intent on taking over the United States using unmarked (black) helicopters and cars, Russian tanks, and foreign troops stationed in Canada just across the U.S.-Canadian border.
35. See, e.g., "Robert Bolivar DePugh and the Minutemen," in John George and Laird Wilcox, *Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1992), pp. 274-98.

36. Among the books that discuss some of these beliefs are James A. Aho, *This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), and Michael Barkun, *Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).
37. See, e.g., <http://www.best.com/~jdulaney/urls.html>; <http://hate-watch.org>; and Mark Rupert's tour at <http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/max-pages/faculty/merupert>.
38. The weekly newsmagazines—*Time*, *Newsweek*, *U.S. News and World Report*—as well as the *New York Times* provided extensive coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing, but most reports focused on guns and conspiracies. For brief overviews, see Alex Heard, "The Road to Oklahoma City: Inside the World of the Waco-Obsessed Right," *New Republic*, 15 May 1995, pp. 15–20; Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyon, "Militia Nation," *The Progressive* 59, 6 (June 1995): 22–25; Garry Wills, "The New Revolutionaries," *New York Review of Books*, 10 August 1995, pp. 50–55, and the books cited therein; Michael Kelly, "The Road to Paranoia," *New Yorker*, 19 June 1995, pp. 60–75. For a somewhat more sympathetic view, see Alan Bock, "Weekend Warriors: Is the Militia Movement a Threat?" *National Review* 47, 10 (29 May 1995): 39–42.
39. Berlet and Lyon, p. 22; Jill Smolowe, "Enemies of the State," *Time*, 8 May 1995, pp. 59–60. According to an April 1995 Gallup Poll, almost 40 percent of those surveyed agreed with the statement that the federal government "poses an immediate threat to the rights and freedoms of ordinary Americans" (cited in Victoria Pope, "Notes from the Underground," *U.S. News and World Report*, 5 June 1995, p. 24).
40. Marc Cooper, "Montana's Mother of All Militias," *The Nation*, 22 May 1995, p. 715.
41. See, for example, Timothy Egan, "Siege Is Subplot in Town's Survival Drama," *New York Times*, 23 April 1996 (national edition), p. A1; Mark E. Rupert, "Globalization and the Reconstruction of Common Sense in the U.S.," in *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, ed. S. Gill and J. Mittelman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). The article can be found at Rupert's Web site (see n. 37 above).
42. Michael Taylor, "Extremists Bracing for New World Order," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 25 April 1995, p. A7.
43. Cooper, p. 717. See also Beverly A. Brown, *In Timber Country: Working People's Stories of Environmental Conflict and Urban Flight* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
44. Many of the leaders of right-wing ethnic and sectarian movements around the world are well-educated professionals, although the groups are invariably described as "grassroots" organizations. So far as I know, this phenomenon has not been studied.

45. Michael Janofsky, "World of the Patriots' Movement Is Haunted by Demons and Conspiracies," *New York Times*, 31 May 1995, p. A14. See also Berlet and Lyon; Pope; Smolowe. See especially <http://www.best.com/~jdu-laney/urls.html>. Perversely, not long ago one found similar conspiracy theories about the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and other such groups emanating from the political left.
46. Taylor. What is ironic in this statement is that, in the 1980s, FEMA was assigned the task by the Reagan administration of conducting urban civil defense evacuation drills as a part of a program of nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. See Daniel Deudney, "Political Fission: State Structure, Civil Society, and Nuclear Security Politics in the United States," in Lipschutz, ed., pp. 87–123.
47. Serge F. Kovaleski, "Theories on Bombing Flourish," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 11 July 1995 (*Washington Post* wire service), p. A7. Others claim the map shows nine or ten regions: Philip Weiss, "Outcasts Digging in for the Apocalypse," *Time*, 1 May 1995, p. 49; Tom Morgenthau and Steven Shabad, "The View from the Far Right," *Newsweek*, 1 May 1995, pp. 37–38.
48. Tom Reiss, "Home on the Range," *New York Times*, 26 May 1995, p. A11.
49. Whether the militias are inherently racist is a contested question. Some are integrated; some are driven only by constitutional concerns; a few are even African-American. Many, however, appear to subscribe to racist, if not racist, views. The Christian Identity movement, which has been linked to some armed groups and the Aryan Nation, is clearly racist.
50. Baker, p. 144.
51. Wills, pp. 54–55; Morgenthau and Shabad; Pope; Smolowe.
52. David Helvarg, "The Anti-Enviro Connection," *The Nation*, 22 May 1995, pp. 722–23; Burleigh.
53. Paul Glastris, "Patriot Games," *Washington Monthly* 27, 6 (June 1995): 23–26.
54. See Lipschutz, "Seeking a State of One's Own," in this volume.
55. "Stability" is obviously a tenuous concept. What appears to the outside or historical observer to be stable is usually quite dynamic. See, for example, the semifictional account of Višegrad in Bosnia in Ivo Andrić, *The Bridge on the Drina*, trans. L. F. Edwards (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
56. Leading to the famous dictum: "We pretend to work, they pretend to pay us."
57. These are the "conjunctural" time scales of Braudel, 50–100 years.
58. Verena Stolcke, "Talking Culture: New Boundaries, New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe," *Current Anthropology* 36, 1 (February 1995): 1–23, makes the distinction between citizenship, which involves legal rights and responsibilities, and nationality, which involves membership in the nation, either by birthplace (*jus soli*) or blood (*jus sanguinis*).
- 59.

This process is discussed, albeit in the British context, in T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), pp. 1–85.

60. In principle, each legal resident, whether citizen or green card holder, is granted this possibility. Native Americans were never included. More recently legal aliens have been excluded too.
61. Note that this is roughly equivalent to Robert Putnam's "social capital." Within these groups, such social capital did exist, but it was only weakly linked to the broader society.
62. Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787–1861," *International Organization* 49, 2 (Spring 1995): 191–228.
63. This might be a controversial statement, but even the programs associated with the War on Poverty did not, for example, deliberately direct capital investment into inner cities.
64. Why, for example, white males believe they are routinely "passed over" for promotion in favor of supposedly "less-qualified" women and minorities when the evidence is so inconclusive is not clear. But see below.
65. It should be pointed out that cases in which the defendant can afford to pay \$10 million for a defense in a capital crime trial are extremely rare. More often it is the millions or more backing the prosecution matched against the few thousands available to the defendant.
66. This remains the case notwithstanding the efforts of some academics and commentators to construct new enemies. The best known is Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*. A more recent example is Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1997).
67. See Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). The emphasis on family reunification has further fostered such immigration.
68. This is Huntington's argument as well as Kaplan's. Barber blames the market.
69. See, e.g., Stephen Gill, "Structural Change and Global Political Economy: Globalizing Elites and the Emerging World Order," in *Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System*, ed. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, pp. 169–99 (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994); Rupert, "Globalization"; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "The Great Transformation Revisited," *Brown Journal of International Affairs* 4, 1 (Winter/Spring 1997): 299–318.
70. It does not qualify as bona fide structural adjustment because the dollar remains dominant in the global economy and the United States has not yet been forced to reduce its budget deficits. But it would be interesting to compare the effects of somewhat similar policies on labor in the United States and ex-socialist countries.

71. Sylvia Nasar, "More Men in Prime of Life Spend Less Time Working," *New York Times*, 12 December 1994 (national edition), p. A1.
72. Louis Uchitelle, "Changing Economy Spawns 'Anxious Class,'" *San Francisco Chronicle*, 21 November 1994 (*New York Times* wire service), p. A6; Jonathan Marshall, "Don't Tie Anger to Low Wages," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 29 May 1995, p. D1; *San Francisco Chronicle* article, 23 April 1996, p. A2. See also the series in the *New York Times*, "The Downsizing of America," 3–9 March 1996.
73. Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations* (New York: Vintage, 1992), Part 3.
74. For example, "electronic classrooms" may make it possible for one professor to lecture to many classrooms at the same time, thereby reducing labor costs for universities (see Jonathan Marshall, "Electronic Classes Give Students More Options When Teacher Is Far, Far Away," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 21 March 1995, p. A1). For a more optimistic view, see "A World without Jobs?" *The Economist*, 11 February 1995, pp. 21–23.
75. Peter Kilborn, "New Jobs Lack the Old Security in Time of 'Disposable Workers,'" *New York Times*, 15 March 1993 (national edition), p. A1.
76. Paul Krugman, "Europe Jobless, America Penniless?" *Foreign Policy* 95 (Summer 1994): 20, 31.
77. To some degree, conservatives recognize that exhortation is not enough; they are not, however, prepared to embrace the broader structural changes that would be required to reestablish traditional values. See, for example, Robert B. Gunnison and Erik Ingram, "GOP Group's Pitch to Switch Carriers for Christian Values," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 23 April 1996, p. B1, which describes an effort to get phone subscribers to transfer their long-distance calls from AT&T, MCI, and U.S. Sprint—all "godless" and "immoral"—to AmeriVision, a Christian phone company.
78. David Rieff, "Multiculturalism's Silent Partner," *Harper's*, August 1991, pp. 62–72. Actually in a rather crude, neo-Marxist fashion, Rieff argues that multiculturalism is a tool of niche marketing, rather than a collective positioning in response to globalization.
79. This section draws on Lipschutz, "Negotiating the Boundaries."
80. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "The State as Moral Authority in an Evolving Global Political Economy," in *From Past Imperfect to Future Conditional: International Relations in the Decades Ahead*, ed. José V. Cipurut (forthcoming).
81. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2d ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991).
82. And why new enemies must sometimes be created out of whole cloth; see Dieter Groh, "The Temptation of Conspiracy Theory, or: Why Do Bad Things Happen to Good People?" in Graumann and Moscovici, eds., p. 16.
83. See Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, p. 21. Unfortunately this seems to be a necessary element of nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism, a point that I examine in *On Security* ("Negotiating the Boundaries").

84. This point is strongly argued in William Overholt, *The Rise of China* (New York: Norton, 1994). Overholt frames his argument in terms of liberalization in China, but the essential point remains the same.
85. Whether or not the Soviet Union actually constituted a security threat to the United States is here beside the point; the construction of such a threat served to bolster social solidarity.
86. Again, the nature of such a coalition is discussed by T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship*, pp. 114–27.
87. Lipschutz, "The Great Transformation Revisited."
88. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "From Place to Planet: Local Knowledge and Global Environmental Governance," *Global Governance* 3, 1 (January–April 1997): 83–102.
89. Groh, p. 1.

MUTING INTERETHNIC CONFLICT IN POST-IMPERIAL BRITAIN: THE SUCCESS AND LIMITS OF A LIBERAL POLITICAL APPROACH

ELAINE THOMAS

In the years immediately following World War II, substantial numbers of people from South Asia and the Caribbean resettled in England. While these certainly were not England's first immigrants, their arrival and settlement eventually inaugurated a controversial round of political conflict and public concern about the increasingly multiracial composition of the population.

Britain relied heavily upon a liberal political approach to muting and marginalizing this kind of political conflict. This approach can be understood as consisting of several related elements. First, British law was exceptionally liberal in granting political rights to new arrivals. Since the vast majority of nonwhite immigrants arriving after the war came from the New Commonwealth, they were already British subjects and citizens of the United Kingdom. As a consequence, political rights were extended even to *first-generation* immigrants. In other words, British law politically incorporated new arrivals from former colonial areas even more readily than did (say) the laws of France, where citizenship was extended to most second- and third-generation immigrants born on French national territory. Second, norms of social and political respectability, the institutionalization of local Community Relations Councils (CRCs), and the Labour and Conservative Parties' organizational interests worked together to limit the politicization of racial issues. Race-related issues and passionate political appeals related to such topics were not admitted to the realm of legitimate and respectable public political discussion. Finally, where political entrepreneurs and fringe parties did bring race talk into national politics, the dynamics of liberal

democratic electoral competition successfully muted and reestablished the marginalization of such talk within a few short years.

The postwar politics of British race relations thus mark a particularly clear case of a type of approach to interethnic conflict commonly favored in current discussions of citizenship, nationality, and ethnic conflict. The liberal approach to interethnic conflict that underlies many of the major elements of British policy and political behavior also commonly informs comparative examination and analysis of ethnic politics. Common liberal assumptions prevalent in this area include the ideas that ethnic or racial conflicts are inherently less susceptible to negotiation than other forms of conflict, notably economic ones.¹ Following from this, the politicization of racial and ethnic conflict is believed to bode ill for peace and social order. Since it is commonly believed to be irrational and peculiarly unsusceptible to negotiation and peaceful resolution, it is also often believed that politicized ethnicity is bound ultimately to lead to violent social disorder and political instability.² Public discussion of race and ethnicity and the politicization of racially charged conflicts are therefore to be avoided.

A related set of liberal assumptions often prevails in current discussions of citizenship. Citizenship is normally treated as a legal status—that is, as a matter of legal nationality—and legal restrictions on nationality acquisition are then the focus of comparison. Legal nationality is assumed to be important because it is normally the necessary precondition for national voting rights. The entitlement to full political rights that legal nationality confers is in turn assumed to generate a sense of full membership, as well as social acceptance of those who are classified as full community members. Again, the liberal approach to interethnic relations is supposed to reduce social conflict, this time by favoring the social integration of immigrants or their descendants.

The British story suggests that liberalism works as an approach to the muting of interethnic political conflict. As such, it might at first appear as a relatively unproblematic illustration of the success of a liberal political approach. However, at the same time, the British story also suggests that the muting of such political conflict may have more limited value as a recipe for immigrants' social integration and the prevention of violent social and political conflict than is commonly supposed. Despite the success of this approach to the

muting of interethnic political conflict in Britain, violent disturbances in poor urban neighborhoods showed themselves to be a surprisingly intractable and enduring problem that outlasted both the politicization of racial issues and the rise of far-right parties. Successful depoliticization alone did not automatically result in full acceptance of minorities' rights to public presence, social order, or the elimination of violent conflict with an ethnic dimension.

This paper traces the history of the rise and subsequent significant abatement of racial conflict in postwar British politics. It also examines and analyzes the more significant violent urban riots of this period. Given Britain's more or less consistent reliance on a liberal political approach to the muting of interethnic conflict, it stands as a particularly telling illustration of the limits of that approach in terms of its translation of depoliticization into social integration and public order. The apparent anomalies of the British experience in this regard actually point to the need for refinement of the categories and assumptions which currently underlie and guide most of the growing literature on citizenship, nationality, and interethnic relations.

For one thing, the limits of the liberal political approach in Britain point to the need for a different approach to the examination and analysis of citizenship. If citizenship is understood as a matter of entitlement to public presence and influence, then it is not simply a matter of legal nationality. One needs to look beyond citizenship as an official status that confers a particular set of legal rights and thus beyond the rules and requirements regulating access to that status as well. What then becomes crucial are the social and institutional norms and practices necessary for the lived realization of citizenship understood as a matter of entitlement to public presence and influence. Social and institutional norms and practices that regulate the restriction or realization of citizenship in this sense help account for the apparent paradox of recurrent violent conflict and disorder in poor British urban neighborhoods where ethnic minorities are concentrated in the context of rapid civic incorporation of minorities, successful liberal depoliticization of racial issues, and marginalization of far-right parties.

POSTWAR PROSPERITY AND POLITICAL CONSENSUS

Overall, the years immediately after World War II were a period during which racial issues played very little role in British national politics. However, closer examination reveals that these years were in fact a time of submerged strains. These would later contribute to such marked symptoms of racial tension as the rise of the National Front (NF) and direct attacks on minorities residing in British cities.

THE PLACID SURFACE

During the immediate postwar period, the Labour and Conservative Parties enjoyed an overwhelming ascendancy in the British political arena. In 1959 the two parties together captured fully 93.2 percent of the vote.³ The postwar Keynesian consensus was thus an overwhelming electoral success. This period can therefore be regarded as the heyday of state intervention directed toward increasing material security and equalizing economic outcomes between individuals and social groups.

During the latter part of this period, from 1964 to 1975, racial issues in Britain were also remarkably depoliticized. Britain's major political parties had a shared interest in keeping racial issues off the political agenda and therefore avoided making them a point of competition.⁴ Surveys conducted during the 1966 election campaign found that most voters saw little difference between the major parties on race-related issues. Labour and Conservative leaders alike sought to depoliticize race because race-related issues constituted a troublesome point of internal division within both parties. Keeping racial issues off the political agenda thus helped both parties to bridge these internal divisions by turning their attention instead to issues on which there was a sounder basis for internal party consensus.

Depoliticization—at least in the absence of censorship—is an inherently fragile strategy. It takes only one party or party faction to rock the boat. For a while, party leaders were nonetheless able to depoliticize race successfully because they did not confront organized opposition to their position either within their own parties or from outside.⁵ Neither party stood to benefit from politicization, and the success of the Keynesian compromise and postwar growth were

such that there seemed to be little available space in the British political arena for new, more extremist or ideological parties.⁶

Depoliticizing racial issues was also part of the broader consensualist strategy pursued by both the Labour and Conservative Parties during these years—i.e., avoiding “ideological” issues with the aim of capturing centrist voters.⁷ Both parties regarded capturing these voters as the key to winning elections under prevailing conditions of close electoral parity between the two.⁸ The avoidance of racial issues was thus part of the larger “catch-all” strategy that was increasingly adopted by parties throughout Western Europe.⁹

Britain’s Labour and Conservative Parties also sought to ensure that discrimination and tensions with the established national residents would not lead to the politicization of racial issues by New Commonwealth immigrants. Together they therefore supported the establishment of local-level institutions designed to both mitigate local racial tensions and create a buffer between national party politics on the one hand and race-related conflicts and demands on the other. The parties therefore lent national financial support to the CRCs, which had emerged spontaneously at the local level in hundreds of British towns and cities.¹⁰ This may explain why the national government during these years did not take a more active role in organizing immigrants’ social integration than it did. While the Conservative Party facilitated Commonwealth immigration to the country to meet the demands of employers for additional workers during the 1950s and 1960s, the government did nothing to plan this immigration. Nor did it act to ensure that the increased demand for affordable housing and public services, including education, was met. Housing and services were in short supply after the war in any case, and immigration predictably increased pressure on the limited housing stock. The increased competition between immigrants and native workers for limited resources, especially housing, in turn provoked predictable tensions for which the immigrants were often blamed.¹¹

On the positive side, it appeared that the leadership of the major political parties in London had succeeded in establishing an overwhelmingly liberal public discourse on race relations. Until 1976 this “liberal language of analysis [was] predominant amongst politicians, bureaucrats, certain of the quality media and leaders of key institutions such as the police.”¹² Racial harmony was emphasized,

and open references to racial differences were generally avoided. This liberal discourse stood in contrast to the rhetorical connections increasingly made between minorities, on the one hand, and the lawlessness and disorder on the other, connections that informed mainstream public interpretation of the riots of the 1980s.¹³

UNACKNOWLEDGED UNDERTOWS

The depoliticization of race following World War II and the development of a liberal, antiracist public discourse may appear to indicate that racial tensions were limited. Signs of racial harmony during the heyday of the Keynesian compromise may seem to point to a correspondence between interventionist national economic policy and the achievement of harmonious race relations. In reality, however, there were unmistakable signs of submerged racial tensions even during the heyday of Keynesianism, growing prosperity, and commitment to the welfare state.

Urban Violence. In 1958 racial violence broke out in Nottingham and Notting Hill. The outburst took the form of attacks by local white residents on immigrants who had recently settled in the area. The clashes led to the election of a number of populist Conservative candidates to Parliament that year. Although the disturbances called national attention to race and immigration issues and to the absence of an explicit government policy on immigration, the parties remained reluctant to address these issues. Admittedly, some limited response from national political leaders was forthcoming in the form of preliminary immigration restrictions introduced by the Conservatives in 1961.¹⁴ For the most part, however, consensual organized official silence was maintained, and the first local sparks of racial violence were swept under the rug.

Popular Attitudes. The exacerbation of local racial tensions was the hidden negative consequence of the established political parties' depoliticization of racial issues during this period.¹⁵ Although little was said in Parliament on the subject of race during these years and while Labour and Conservative politicians alike treated it as a political nonissue, survey data indicate that powerful public concerns

about the growing presence of nonwhites developed during this period.

Popular concern with the major parties' neglect of racial issues merged in the form of growing disquiet with the numbers of immigrants arriving in Britain. Survey data show that during the 1960s and 1970s more than three-quarters of the electorate considered recent immigration rates to be too high. Surveys in 1960 found the electorate overwhelmingly opposed to immigration, by a margin of six to one.¹⁶ The intensity of popular concern on this score is suggested by 1968 survey research findings which indicated that more than 25 percent of the British public identified immigrants as the most urgent problem facing Britain. When immigration restrictions were implemented, they were targeted at nonwhites from the New Commonwealth.¹⁷

The proceedings of the 1958 and 1961 Conservative Party conferences also reflected increasing grassroots pressure for attention to racial issues in the form of new restrictions on nonwhite immigration. The first motion to limit such immigration was introduced in 1958. In 1961 more than forty such motions were introduced, reflecting a precipitous increase of pressure on the Conservative Party from its constituents.¹⁸

Political Weakness of Liberals on Racial Issues. Precisely because the prevailing liberal forces within each party successfully depoliticized racial issues during this period, they never mobilized their constituents in active support of liberal racial policies. The lack of such a popular following was to prove problematic for the liberals once the consensus they had maintained in favor of depoliticization was broken in 1968 by Enoch Powell, a New Right Conservative MP, and then by other New Right politicians in the years that followed. The liberals had long held sway in Parliament, but they lacked active public support. Precisely because their established strategy had been to cooperate in silencing public political discussion of race, once the silence was broken and public debate was opened, the liberals found themselves in a weak position. Having focused on silencing the issue, they had not developed a discourse to address it.¹⁹

One might argue that xenophobia and racial prejudice among the general public are simply a given. By this account, the average party supporter could not be expected to exhibit the same liberal

high-mindedness as party leaders, and to initiate public discussion of race would inevitably have opened a Pandora's box of primordial prejudice. In reality, however, the available evidence suggests that British public opinion was quite malleable and that public speech by party leaders in favor of liberal positions on race issues had the capacity to significantly alter popular perspectives. The Labour Party strongly opposed the restrictions imposed by the Conservative Party on New Commonwealth immigration in 1961. In a well-publicized speech, Hugh Gaitskill argued that the government should do more to provide adequate social services, facilitate the integration of immigrants into British society, and prevent discrimination rather than pandering to racial intolerance by restricting immigration. Within a month of Gaitskill's speech, 14 percent of the electorate had changed its position to one more consonant with that which he had articulated.²⁰

Even in Enoch Powell's home constituency of Wolverhampton, an examination of local press coverage of issues related to race and immigration suggests that popular concern with such issues generally did not take the form of antagonism toward immigrants *per se*, at least not prior to Powell's inflammatory anti-immigration speeches of the late 1960s. While there was extensive interest and community involvement in issues related to immigration and the social tensions it produced, it was mainly directed toward the reduction of discrimination and efforts to promote interracial harmony. In fact, even during the period of heaviest nonwhite immigration into Wolverhampton, no far-right or anti-immigrant group managed to attract any significant local following.²¹ Thus substantial popular concern with race and immigration issues was not necessarily indicative of the inevitability of a populist backlash against minorities, even in Powell's home constituency.²²

Popular concern about nonwhite immigration has the potential to lead to quite a range of political expression: from demands for immigration restrictions, to support for local race relations initiatives, to calls for more adequate social service provision from the central government, to violent collective attacks on immigrants like those that took place in Notting Hill. Gaitskill's speech demonstrated the substantial influence that organized political parties wielded in determining the direction that popular concern would take and thus the nature of its social impact. The problem was that

the internal divisions and electoral strategy of the major parties were such that public statements like Gaitskill's were few and far between. In conjunction with industrial decline, the major parties' depoliticization strategy would therefore set the stage for the rise of the far right.

ERUPTION OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE 1970S AND EARLY 1980s

RISING INFLUENCE OF THE FAR RIGHT

As noted above, discussion of racial issues was repressed within the Conservative Party from 1964 to 1976 as part of the major parties' consensus to depoliticize racial issues. Challenges to the suppression of racial issues then developed through extraparliamentary groups, most notably the NF. These groups demanded that the parties acknowledge race as a relevant and legitimate political issue. They attempted to direct unaddressed popular concerns in a particularly pernicious direction, combining calls for expulsion of nonwhite immigrants from England with overt anti-Semitism and demands for British support of white Africa.²³ The NF was the product of a merger of a variety of extreme right-wing organizations, including the League of Empire Loyalists. Formerly a faction within the Conservative Party, the league had been discredited within the party by 1960 and sought new political allies.²⁴ Like Labour, the Conservative Party at the time regarded capturing swing votes at the center as the key to electoral success. This led to the marginalization and extraparliamentary organization of extremist elements that were no longer represented and therefore no longer captured within Conservative Party ranks. The NF thus capitalized on weaknesses of the very catch-all strategy that once seemed to make the two center parties so invincible.

During the 1960s the Conservative Party suffered what Andrew Gamble has characterized as a "crisis of ideology," which inhered in the party's inability to sufficiently differentiate its program from socialism and to present it effectively. As Gamble argues,

Heath offered a detailed analysis of Britain's economic problems and a list of appropriate remedies, but he had little conception of

how this programme could be presented to secure the support and enthusiasm of his followers in the party and in the country.²⁵

Electoral evidence from this period suggests that a comparable crisis of ideology ultimately affected the Labour Party as well. Whereas in 1959 the two major parties together had captured over 90 percent of the popular vote, by 1974 they together captured only 75 percent.²⁶ Voters were pulling away from the two major parties, and this pulling away manifested itself in a variety of ways: challenges from third parties, the rise of extraparliamentary movements, the emergence of demands that conflicted with the positions of the parties' established leadership, and new intraparty conflicts within Parliament itself.

While the views of the New Right were still ununified and lacking in focus, the Conservative crisis of ideology nonetheless opened the way for their increasing influence on the positions of party leaders, particularly Heath.²⁷ The Monday Club was established within the Conservative Party during these years. The club opposed all nonwhite immigration and became the primary voice for illiberal, anti-immigration sentiment in Parliament. At its peak in 1972, the club claimed 34 MPs and approximately 6,000 members.²⁸ During these same years, the New Right became increasingly influential within the Conservative Party.²⁹ The increasing influence of the New Right and the establishment of the Monday Club were signs that under the still relatively placid surface of consensus politics, the major parties were increasingly unable to contain the popular undertows that would eventually tear the postwar consensus on economic and racial issues apart.

More extremist elements calling for recovery of the British Empire or for active repatriation of minorities already living in Britain, as opposed to a mere freezing of future immigration, were driven out of the mainstream parties and the parliamentary arena, however. These views nonetheless attracted substantial popular support. The stage was thereby set for an upsurge in popular support for the NF. By the summer of 1976, the NF had emerged as a serious political force. Indeed the party frequently received at least 8 percent of the popular vote, and in a series of local elections that spring and summer it attracted as much as 15 percent of the returns. The party captured almost 20 percent of the vote in Leicester in the municipal

elections in May and also made a particularly strong showing in working-class districts of London and in Sandwell and Bradford. Meanwhile, skinheads in many areas staged a series of provocative marches.³⁰

The rising fortunes of the NF on the electoral front in 1976 corresponded to a notable increase that year in the incidence of direct attacks on Asians (i.e., members of minority populations originating from the Indian subcontinent) living in Britain's cities.³¹ Indeed despite its rising electoral fortunes, the main strategy of the NF was not to win elections. Given Britain's majoritarian electoral system, an objective of winning was clearly unattainable. The NF's central strategy was therefore to "repatriate" nonwhites through direct violent attacks on Asians living in communities with high concentrations of nonwhite residents. Rather than trying to displace the existing major parties, the NF thereby tried to reshape the social environment within which Britain's minorities lived in such a way as to make continued residence in Britain undesirable.³² The Home Office estimated that 7,000 or more attacks would be reported in 1982. The East End of London was the site of a particularly high number of violent incidents.³³

As the NF's extraparliamentary demands that race be put back on the political agenda reached their peak in the mid-1970s, the conditions that had deterred the Conservative Party from taking a strong position on such issues changed. The major reason that the Conservatives had agreed to the depoliticization of racial issues was that the party itself was internally divided on these issues. In 1961 there were three major positions on immigration within the party. First were the so-called "Tory radicals," who supported liberal immigration policies on the grounds that such policies were beneficial to the national economy. Second, there was a sizable contingent of "Commonwealth idealists," a group sympathetic to the empire. This faction consisted largely of former colonial governors and residents. Like the Tory radicals, the Commonwealth idealists were favorable to liberal immigration policies, though for different reasons. The idealists supported liberal immigration rules as an important manifestation of Britain's continued commitment to maintaining close ties with its former colonies. Finally, there were the supporters of the New Right, a faction increasingly strong in Conservative constituencies but still relatively weak in Parliament. The New Right primarily

represented the professional middle class and diverged from the other two factions in supporting such new restrictive immigration legislation as the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. Race and immigration issues therefore threatened to split the party, so their politicization was actively avoided.

By 1975, however, the segment of the Conservative Party with close ties to the empire had largely disappeared.³⁴ Moreover, because of perceived changes in domestic labor market conditions, those interested in using immigration policy for economic ends were no longer opposed to immigration restriction. Labor was no longer believed to be in short supply, and Tory radicals, supportive of the interests of British industrial employers, therefore no longer favored liberal immigration policies as they had immediately after the war.³⁵ With the decline of the Commonwealth idealist faction and changes in labor market conditions, a new consensus between the Tory radicals and the New Right developed. The party therefore became more receptive to tighter immigration restrictions, and the disincentives that had previously discouraged the Conservatives from campaigning on racial issues for fear of jeopardizing party unity were largely removed. Even as the strength of extreme right forces demanding repoliticization of racial issues grew, it also became increasingly safe for the Conservatives to respond to those demands.

Thus the repoliticization of race did not result from the efforts of extremist "entrepreneurs" capitalizing on popular prejudices alone. Rather, it resulted from the conjunction of such pressures with the changing dynamics of competition between the major parties and with the changing composition of forces within the Conservative Party itself. The major parties' centrist strategies were beginning to threaten the credibility of their claims to offer their followers distinct, meaningful political identities. Moreover, long-standing assumptions that had underpinned the parties' perceived interests in pursuing consensual strategies were undermined. The Keynesian compromise was not delivering the same rates of growth and employment as it had first seemed to promise, and pursuit of such policies may no longer have provided party leaders with the same degree of legitimacy and authority as it had originally. Building more distinct party identities and politicizing other issues may then have begun to appear more attractive. Meanwhile, the assumption of long-term parity between the parties was upset, as was the long-

standing belief that capturing “floating” centrist voters was the key to electoral success.³⁶ Given Britain’s stable majoritarian electoral system, if the Conservative Party had enjoyed a more solid, stable base of popular support, the challenge of the NF might well simply have been ignored. If the major parties had spoken directly to rising popular concerns about race and immigration and worked to channel those concerns in more positive, liberal directions, it is unlikely that the far right would have found such a ready foothold. Finally, if the composition of the Conservative Party leadership had not changed, the need to maintain the support of the Commonwealth idealists would have foreclosed the strategy that Enoch Powell soon successfully introduced. Ironically the progressive abandonment of an imperial project paved the way for the promulgation of ethnic nationalism in British politics.

REPOLITICIZATION OF RACE IN NATIONAL POLITICS

By the late 1970s race was out in the open as an explicit issue in the major parties’ political campaigns, and the Labour and Conservative Parties increasingly diverged in their positions on race-related issues. The Conservatives led the repoliticization of race, beginning with a series of speeches by shadow home secretary William Whitelaw. As Anthony Messina has argued, these speeches had the effect of “catapulting race to the forefront of British politics.”³⁷

Enoch Powell was particularly influential in upsetting standing beliefs about the advantages of centrist electoral strategies. His inflammatory anti-immigration speech of 1968 seemed to observers dramatically to demonstrate the potential electoral advantages of new, nonconsensual strategies of openly racist politicization of New Commonwealth immigration. Paul Foot summarizes Powell’s contribution to British politics as follows:

His campaign has altered the dimensions of political debate in Britain. Open attacks on coloured people and their presence in Britain are now part of respectable political controversy.³⁸

As Gamble points out, however, the *content* of Powell’s position on immigration actually did not diverge from standing Conservative Party policy. The departure that Powell introduced was instead rhe-

torical and inherited in "his attempt to stigmatize immigrants as strangers, an object of justifiable fear and hatred, and as a source of future division in the nation."³⁹

This departure had considerable impact on Conservative intra-party politics and lent significant strength to the New Right. It suggested a viable solution to the crisis of ideology with which the party was struggling and to the declining electoral performance with which the crisis was associated. Powell's 1968 anti-immigration speech clearly violated the prevailing norms of "respectable" political expression. The speech won him lasting notoriety—and considerable attention. Heath dismissed Powell from his shadow cabinet for making it, but this dismissal did anything but diminish Powell's influence. As the letters and demonstrations supporting him underlined, unlike Heath, Powell was drawing strong popular support. Powell's speech marked "an attempt to search out a new constituency, by breaking with the restrictions placed on the politics of support by what was practicable for the politics of power."⁴⁰

The success of that effort was soon demonstrated by the overwhelming immediate popular reaction. As widely reported at the time, within days of his speech, Powell received over 100,000 letters, fewer than 1,000 of them expressing disagreement. A Gallup Poll, the results of which were also widely noted, found that 74 percent of the population "agreed" with the speech.⁴¹ The dockers' and meat porters' unions—seemingly unlikely supporters of someone as hostile to cooperative state-union relations as Powell—staged demonstrations supporting him. Powell thereby won personal support from the working class and demonstrated the possibility of attracting such support by "breaking down consensus politics and establishing the basis for a new popular Conservatism."⁴²

By contrast, prior to his speeches on race relations, Powell had attracted few followers and was not seriously regarded as a potential future Conservative Party leader.⁴³ His failure to inspire enthusiasm is significant in light of the fact that he was also a forerunner of the New Right in his adherence to monetarism and advocacy of neoliberal economic policies.⁴⁴ Without inflammatory racism, Powell's monetarism was not attracting substantial working-class support. It was in using racism to sell the monetarist New Right to British workers that Powell's appeal became a model for future New Right strategy.⁴⁵ In advocating a peculiar melange of monetarism and

immigration restriction, Powell's position foreshadowed the new Tory strategy that would become ascendant with Thatcher's subsequent takeover of the party leadership.

Powell cast the existing terms of British citizenship into question by contrasting the legal terms of citizenship with a common sense standard of real "belonging." He attacked what he described as the "legal fiction" of Commonwealth citizenship, which he regarded as a manifestation of lingering illusions that Britain was still an empire rather than a nation.⁴⁶ Powell described the task facing Britain in 1972 as that of "rescuing its identity from the delusions and deceits of a vanished Empire and Commonwealth" and set himself the task of "defining a new national identity."⁴⁷ As early as 1969 Powell proclaimed that "nationhood, with all that word implies, is what the Tory party is ultimately about."⁴⁸ In 1972 Powell took a strong stand against Britain's admission of Asian Ugandan refugees, despite their legal status as full-fledged British subjects. Powell argued:

The practice of international law which requires a country to re-admit or admit its own nationals applies in our case only to those who *belong* to the United Kingdom and not to other Commonwealth citizens, whether classified as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or not.

Instead, he argued, India was the Asian Ugandans' "true home," and it was therefore India that should readmit them.⁴⁹ Similarly, in a 1968 speech delivered in Eastbourne, Powell maintained that "The West Indian or Asian does not by being born in England become an Englishman. In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact, he is a West Indian or Asian still."⁵⁰ Here again Powell contrasted the legal definition of citizenship with his constituents' sense of who really "belonged" to the society, and he argued that the latter ought to take precedence over the former as the standard of true political membership. The result was to call into question nonwhite immigrants' official status as full-fledged British citizens.

As in his *laissez-faire* economic analysis, Powell thus set society against the state, country against crown, and set himself as the champion of the former against the latter. By linking a more nationalist standard of political membership with neoliberal economics in this fashion, Powell imbued the latter with new popular political appeal.

Disraeli had once rallied the working class to the Conservative Party with his “one nation” pro-imperial vision. Powell turned Disraeli’s trick on its head, demonstrating that after empire, working-class support for the Conservative Party could be recaptured using nationalist appeals once again. But this time nationalism was turned against the imperial ambitions of the Disraeli years. Ironically the effect of this reversal was to reassert the superiority of white “Englishmen” over “black” citizens. The former were deemed true members of society, while the latter were asserted to be only legally or fictively so. The native white person was an “Englishman,” the non-white immigrant at most a “United Kingdom citizen.” As for the very sizable contingent of Irish and other white immigrants, they did not factor in Powell’s rhetoric at all.⁵¹ Powell thereby demonstrated that paradoxically the culmination of the Conservative Party’s long retreat from its old imperial commitments reopened rather than foreclosed political opportunities for the Conservatives to reclaim the tried and true rhetorical trump cards of the imperial era. Powell’s example thus laid the way for the Conservative reclamation of race, which subsequently became unmistakable during Thatcher’s election campaign of 1978–79.⁵² Immigration again figured prominently in the 1979 parliamentary election campaigns.⁵³

RIOTS IN THE CITIES, 1980–81

In the 1980s a series of violent disturbances broke out in England’s cities. In 1980 one such incident occurred in Bristol. In 1981 the number increased to thirty-five; the most dramatic took place in the Brixton area of London and the Toxteth area of Liverpool.⁵⁴ The riots took place in areas with unusually high proportions of minority residents, and they were marked by incidents in which Afro-Caribbean youths attacked either whites—usually police officers—or Asians—usually shopkeepers. Some observers misleadingly characterized these episodes as race riots or saw them as confirmation of existing fears of a distinctive black propensity to violent criminality and lawlessness.⁵⁵ The media, like many politicians, treated the riots of 1981 as an un-British phenomenon in a country known for domestic tranquillity and social peace.⁵⁶ However, police records and other reports pertaining to the most significant of the riots suggest that

significant numbers of white youth also took part in several of these incidents.⁵⁷ Despite their location in the ghettos, these incidents may be more accurately characterized as retaliatory youth assaults against the police than as episodes of interracial violence *per se*. Nonwhites did not even constitute a majority of those arrested. Of the approximately 4,000 people arrested in connection with the July 1981 riots, only one-third were classified as nonwhite.⁵⁸ What the rioters arrested had in common was that they were disproportionately young and unemployed. Of those arrested, fully 70 percent were 21 or younger, and nearly half were jobless.⁵⁹

The fact that these riots occurred soon after Thatcher took office is one of the strongest pieces of apparent evidence in support of the contention that economic liberalization policies led to violent ethnic conflict in Britain. In the aftermath of the riots, Labour MPs highlighted the coincidence between the summer's unprecedented wave of violent civil disorders and the doubling of the nation's unemployment rate during the first two years of the Thatcher government to just over 11 percent, the highest level in Britain since the 1930s. Thatcher's neoliberal economic policies and her monetarist approach to controlling inflation in particular were largely responsible for this precipitous short-term rise.

Aside from their timing, another aspect of the riots might also appear to confirm such an interpretation. Instances of urban violence had proven effective in the past as a means of attracting financial support from the central state to support social services in impoverished areas with relatively high proportions of minority residents. Like the Notting Hill riot of 1958, the riots of 1980–81 attracted needed state resources to deprived urban neighborhoods.⁶⁰ The 1981 riots led to increased government attention to urban social policy and an increased number of ethnic minority-led projects, including projects under the auspices of the Partnership Schemes and the Urban Programmes. Funding for the Urban Programmes was increased by just over 65 percent, and a new Youth Training Scheme run by the Manpower Services Commission was also introduced. Funding from private sources for projects aimed at reducing racial disadvantage in urban areas also increased dramatically, doubling between 1981 and 1985.⁶¹ Ultimately, however, economic considerations alone cannot fully explain the riots. There was no consistent correlation between the severity of unemployment in particular areas and the severity of

rioting.⁶² No rioting occurred at all in Glasgow and Tyneside, the two cities with the highest unemployment rates in Britain.⁶³ The riots of 1981 therefore cannot be explained in terms of rising levels of unemployment alone.

E. P. Thompson's work on early modern bread riots shows that violent episodic crowd behavior was sparked by perceived injustice, not by sheer material deprivation.⁶⁴ If perceived injustice played an essential part in motivating collective violence on the part of famished rural peasants, then on the face of it, it is not implausible that the same might well be true of poor urban rioters. Indeed the riots of 1981 were closely related to local tensions between law enforcement officials and local youth. By some accounts, tensions with local youth of Afro-Caribbean origin were particularly marked. Where riots broke out, they were most serious in areas where there was a tougher policing policy.⁶⁵ Since the mid-1960s, Britain's police forces had become increasingly removed from the residents of the areas in which they worked. The size of forces increased during these years, as did the use of patrol cars, which tend to create a greater sense of distance between police and local residents. The role of local police committees also declined markedly. At the same time, police forces became increasingly politicized and began to place greater emphasis on apprehending criminals as opposed to providing general assistance to the public, as they had traditionally done. This change in emphasis led to increasing reliance on several widespread policing practices that contributed to serious tensions with local residents. These included extensive use of Section 4 of the 1824 Vagrancy Act, commonly known as the "sus law." Using the sus law, the British police were empowered to arrest loiterers on suspicion of intention to commit a crime. Disproportionate numbers of minority youth were unemployed. They were therefore disproportionately apt to be "loitering" and were commonly portrayed as potential criminals. There was therefore no dearth of suspicious black loiterers, and the provision was used disproportionately against them. This practice generated ongoing tensions between younger members of ethnic minority groups and the police.⁶⁶ The sus provisions of the Vagrancy Act were abolished in 1981, but local police forces then began making more extensive use of their authority to stop and search suspicious people at their discretion, a practice with apparently similar effects on police-youth relations.

The two most dramatic riots of 1981, as noted, were in Brixton and Toxteth.⁶⁷ The events that triggered these riots, the behavior of the rioters, and the statements of young residents (including those who participated in the disturbances) all point to the importance of strained relations between the police and local residents. Like the riot of 1980 in Bristol, which was touched off by a police raid directed at underage drinking and illegal drugs,⁶⁸ both the Brixton and the Toxteth riots were clearly triggered by conflicts between police and local residents.

Local officers in the Toxteth area of Merseyside in Liverpool made extensive use of their authority to stop and search "suspicious" motorists and pedestrians in the months before the riot. The practice was, if anything, even more ineffective in Brixton than in Liverpool.⁶⁹ In the aftermath of the rioting, Lord Scarman was appointed to investigate its causes and to prepare an official report presenting his findings. The Scarman Report cited heavy-handed policing methods as a major underlying factor contributing to the outbreak of violence and recommended the elimination of such practices.⁷⁰ While Scarman agreed that general deprivation and disadvantage constituted "a set of *conditions* which create a predisposition toward violent protest," he stressed that the behavior of the police played an essential role in triggering the violence which ultimately occurred.⁷¹

The statements and actions of those involved in the riots support Scarman's conclusions. In the words of one observer of the riot in Toxteth, "The mob was not all drunk, nor blind with rage. Its members, rather, were in conscious rebellion against property and police."⁷² In the Moss Side area of Manchester, rioters attacked a police station, throwing bricks at it and yelling, "Kill, kill, kill!" as they set fire to police cars outside. The message was clear and simple. As one rioter explained his involvement in the violence, "I've been arrested every week. Stop, search, stop, search. I threw a couple of bricks, hit a couple of policemen. Just getting my revenge."⁷³

In Liverpool the rioters' one clear demand was for the resignation of the area's chief constable, Kenneth Oxford. Discussing the reasons for the anger evident in the rioting, one young resident said, "I never expected to work, because there's no jobs. What gets us is the feeling that you can't walk on the street without being picked up."⁷⁴ Living in overcrowded tenements, children from disadvan-

tagged areas of Liverpool like Toxteth played in the streets from a young age, and naturally they tended to congregate there with friends.⁷⁵ As the site of daily activities that cannot be carried out elsewhere and as a gathering place for young people's peer groups, street space is apt to take on greater significance in areas like Toxteth than it might in more affluent or less densely settled communities. The restriction on the use of street space that police reliance on stop and search tactics created was therefore apt to be particularly resented. In explaining the events, one young rioter said of the police, "They hate us, and we hate them."⁷⁶ Surprisingly Oxford himself basically concurred in this interpretation of the riot in his district. As he explained to the press, "This was not a race riot. Their fight was with us."⁷⁷

The riot in Brixton began when a crowd misinterpreted the intentions of a police officer who was apparently attempting to assist a black man who had just been stabbed.⁷⁸ The intensity of the crowd's reaction to this apparently minor incident becomes more comprehensible when considered in the context of recent events and innovations in "crime prevention" policing methods used in the neighborhood. Participants in the London rioting complained to reporters about the fact that after six months the police still had not found a suspect for a fire that had killed thirteen young people at a party in Deptford.⁷⁹ Several weeks before the riots, as part of a Black People's Day of Action, thousands of people had participated in a march protesting the police's failure to catch the arsonist(s).

It was shortly after this protest that operation Swamp '81 was launched. Young black residents reportedly saw the operation as a demonstration by the police that they alone controlled the streets, not the thousands of blacks who had recently marched (through the streets) in protest against them.⁸⁰ An intensive saturation campaign, Swamp '81 involved deploying some 112 police officers to "flood" designated areas of Lambeth thought to be particularly ripe for crime. A new helicopter brought in to sweep over the playground and chase out suspects reportedly delighted local children and undoubtedly made the operation a great deal noisier and more impossible not to notice.⁸¹

The officers flooding Brixton also made extensive use of stop and search powers to apprehend suspected robbers and thieves. From 6 to 11 April alone, some 943 persons were stopped and 118

arrests were made in conjunction with the campaign. Despite the aggressive approach, the results were not particularly impressive from a crime prevention standpoint. Of those stopped or arrested, fewer than 25 were ever formally charged with theft, and fewer still were ever convicted.⁸² These figures suggest that in the name of upholding law and order, the police succeeded only in carrying out an organized campaign of harassment against the local population.

To understand the behavior of the rioters in the disturbances, it is essential to recognize the concentrated symbolic enactment of on-going conflicts between police and residents over control of public (street) space. The rioters in Brixton aimed in part to demonstrate that their control of movement in the streets was superior to that of the police, at least as long as the riot lasted. One reporter described the riot:

The battle was for the power to pass along the streets. The police would test their ability to do so by forming a phalanx behind plastic riot-shields, advancing a block, and stopping with nowhere to go until the order came to go back again. The rioters, knowing the area far better, would greet the advance with a shower of missiles, sprint round the block, and appear again at the other end of the street to meet the phalanx coming back. It became a ritual.⁸³

By this description, the behavior of the rioters appears as a coherently choreographed display of their superior ability to move, and to control movement, about the neighborhood streets. The rioters were described here as literally pushing the police around. Despite its ritual quality, if this was a reprisal against the authorities who had been pushing around Brixton's young residents, both the fact and the form of the rioters' retaliation were quite physical and literal. The behavior of the police for which the rioters retaliated was also literally that of controlling and restricting their targets' movement about the streets. The riots were not just inarticulate acts of misdirected rage against poverty. They are better understood as political conflicts about access to, control over, and free movement within public space. That is, they were violent conflicts over citizenship. However, to appreciate the stakes of the riots in this sense, citizenship must be understood in terms of the entitlement to public presence and influence in shaping the terms of collective life. Such

entitlement and influence is constituted and expressed through social and institutional practices, not simply in terms of the formal rights contingent upon official nationality.

RENEWED MARGINALIZATION OF RACIAL CONFLICT IN BRITISH NATIONAL POLITICS: THE SUCCESS AND LIMITS OF A CLASSIC LIBERAL POLITICAL RESOLUTION

WANING POPULAR INTEREST IN RACE AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES

Asked on the eve and the day of the 1983 national elections which issues had influenced their choice of candidates, only one percent of voters surveyed designated immigration as having been a relevant concern.⁸⁴ While the results of such surveys are inherently imperfect, the contrast with the levels of popular concern exhibited in surveys of the 1960s and 1970s is nonetheless dramatic and unmistakable. By 1986 grassroots interest in immigration within the Conservative Party was also in decline.⁸⁵

DECLINE OF THE FAR RIGHT

During the 1980s the far right seemed to be on the rise on the European continent. By contrast, in Britain it was clearly in decline, having peaked in 1976 and subsequently receded. On the face of it, this decline was surprising, especially given the record levels of unemployment in Britain during the 1980s.⁸⁶ The major reason for the far right's unusually poor fortunes in Britain during the 1980s was the rise of the Conservative New Right and its abandonment of post-war consensus politics in favor of Thatcherism.

Thatcher's election to office spelled disaster for the far right as the Conservative Party captured their supporters. As one commentator put it, "The NF . . . was utterly side-swiped by the advent of Thatcherism." The NF's attacks on Thatcher's appointment of Jews to her cabinet were not enough to keep most far-right supporters on board. Given Thatcher's initial tough stance on immigration and the overall stridency of her political style, the far right was left with little

basis on which to distinguish itself from the center right in terms that would appeal to disgruntled working-class voters.⁸⁷

More surprisingly, Thatcher's election had a similarly dampening effect upon the influence of the Monday Club and its extremist anti-immigration demands within the Conservative Party. In the wake of the Monday Club's loss of influence, new anti-immigration organizations emerged within the party, but they proved much less cohesive than the Monday Club and exerted little influence.⁸⁸ Indeed by 1986 a new intraparty consensus on immigration had apparently emerged. The party was by then remarkably united behind the new status quo. The influence of far-right cliques within the party had been greatly eroded, and liberals within the party had come to accept existing immigration controls as a necessary measure to preserve harmonious race relations.⁸⁹ The late 1980s thus resembled the late 1960s and early 1970s in that race and particularly Commonwealth immigration restrictions were again removed from active political debate. However, the late 1980s differed from earlier years in that this time popular concerns regarding race and immigration were not simply shunted from the political arena for fear of activating intraparty divisions. Instead a real consensus was apparently established.

MORE RIOTS IN 1985

The decline of racial politics and far right parties did not, however, restore lasting social harmony to disadvantaged urban areas. Despite signs that racial tensions were ebbing at the national political level, rioting in England's major cities nonetheless recurred. In 1985 there were three major riots: in Handsworth (Birmingham), in Brixton (London), and in Tottenham.⁹⁰ Like the 1981 riots, the riots of 1985 all took place in areas characterized by high levels of social and economic disadvantage.⁹¹ As in 1981, however, tensions between youth and the police, not poverty per se or frustration with state withdrawal from society, played a key role in touching off each of the riots.

In July 1985 some seventy local youths in Handsworth started a riot which resulted in looting and in the burning of police cars. Less than two months later, violence again broke out, this time on a larger scale, culminating in four deaths and the burning of some forty-five

buildings in Lozells Road. The resulting damages were estimated at £2 million.⁹²

The context in which violence emerged was one of rampant unemployment and cuts in social expenditures. Handsworth was an especially impoverished area of Birmingham. The fundamental cause of deprivation in the area was the long-term decline of the British automobile industry, the former mainstay of the city's economy. As the industry declined between 1978 and 1984 and new sources of employment failed to develop, Birmingham lost a third of its manufacturing jobs, resulting in extremely high levels of unemployment in the city's least fortunate districts, particularly among younger members of ethnic minority groups. In 1984, four months after leaving school at age 16, 95 percent of Handsworth's black school leavers and 84 percent of their Asian counterparts remained jobless.⁹³ Surveying the damage in the aftermath of the riot, Clare Shorts, MP for Handsworth's Ladywood constituency, asserted that it could be "explained in three words: employment, employment, employment."⁹⁴ The effects of unemployment were compounded by expenditure cuts that reduced funds available for community projects to a grossly inadequate level. In the wake of these cuts and the abolition of the West Midlands Metropolitan Council, the "future viability of the scores of voluntary projects in the area [was thrown] seriously into doubt."⁹⁵

There had been a history of cooperative community-police relations in this area. Given this history, the *New Statesman* argued that cuts in state funds for community development projects, not policing policies, were the essential cause of the violence. As one reporter put it succinctly, "Take away the funds that prop up the tottering communities, and that's that for community policing." An explanation of the violence that centers on policing policy is also counterintuitive given that the riot broke out the very morning after a local carnival supported largely by the police as part of their acclaimed community-based approach in Handsworth.⁹⁶ It should be noted, however, that the superintendent supportive of community policing policies was replaced in April 1985, just three months before the first disturbance in the area. Following his replacement, local police began to crack down on illegal behavior that had previously been tolerated. The crackdown resulted in a series of raids which in turn heightened tensions between the police force and the local community.⁹⁷

The events immediately responsible for triggering the September riot suggest that police-community relations problems did play a significant role in provoking the riot, the area's community policing history notwithstanding. The riot immediately followed the arrest of a young black man outside of a local pub for an alleged parking violation. The arrest came in the context of a crackdown on drug dealing outside the pub. Police in the area had been understood to be "soft" on marijuana-related offenses, as well as on parking violations.⁹⁸

Once the riot started, the violence took on the character of a conflict between local black residents and Asian shopkeepers. Most of the violence took the form of attacks by blacks on the cars and shops of local Asian merchants.⁹⁹ Rioters left black-owned establishments in the same area conspicuously untouched, and they did not damage public buildings in the area. Only one window of the local school was broken, and the area's new recreation center was left undamaged.¹⁰⁰ The pattern of looting and burning suggests that tensions between blacks and Asians played a greater role in shaping the behavior of the rioters than local leaders cared to acknowledge. Nonetheless, it should be noted that such tensions were not what set off the riot in Handsworth. Resentment against a police action that appeared unfair given established local norms was.

The same was true of the riot that occurred in Brixton soon thereafter.¹⁰¹ As in the case of the 1981 riots, blacks were not the sole participants in the night's violence. Rather, black and white residents alike took part.¹⁰² Caution is therefore in order in interpreting the violence in Brixton as a "race riot." The riot was one of local residents in an area with a high proportion of minority residents, and it was directed against the area's police force.

In a scenario strikingly similar to that in Brixton, the 1985 riot at the Broadwater Farm Estate in Tottenham was provoked by the death of a black woman during an unauthorized search of her house.¹⁰³ Like Handsworth, Tottenham had enjoyed relatively cordial relations between police officers and community residents. The chief superintendent of police, Colin Crouch, was a strong advocate of community policing. Rank and file officers, however, proved resistant to the restraint that Crouch's philosophy demanded. During the week prior to the riot, a stop and search operation was set up at

the entrance to the housing project.¹⁰⁴ The resulting riot was the most serious to take place that year.¹⁰⁵

As in the case of the other disturbances of the late summer and early fall, the riot was perceived and presented in the press as having a clear racial aspect. Thus according to the usual pattern, the disturbance was interpreted as a race riot because of its location in a predominantly black neighborhood and because of the ethnically based targeting of attacks that appears to have shaped the violence that unfolded.¹⁰⁶ However, tensions between local residents and the police, not ethnic tensions that emerged in the wake of the state's withdrawal from social relations in the interest of economic liberalization, were clearly what triggered the disturbance. As for the violence that occurred in Toxteth, Liverpool, on 30 September, it too was provoked by the same kinds of tensions between community residents and the police force that had touched off violence in other areas.¹⁰⁷ These riots arose neither from poverty per se nor state absence, but rather from conflicts and perceived injustices associated with active state efforts to reduce local crime and disorder.

The exclusive preoccupation of many observers with socioeconomic forms of deprivation in the riot-prone areas has encouraged them to overlook specifically *political* forms of deprivation in these areas. It has long been argued that political violence and civil disorder are apt to emerge where political institutionalization fails to keep pace with political mobilization.¹⁰⁸ It should therefore be noted that areas where the major riots occurred were characterized by not only high levels of poverty and social disadvantage, but also low levels of integration into effective representative institutions. As Benyon points out, life in these violence-prone neighborhoods afforded residents "few institutions, opportunities, and resources for articulating grievances and for bringing pressure to bear on those with political power."¹⁰⁹ Media reports of the riot in Handsworth similarly noted the "absence of any political power for such communities."¹¹⁰ Significantly, although complaints about police misconduct were frequent in these areas and were a major focus of the demands of the autonomous black organizations that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, complaints by community residents on this score did not suffice to change local policing practices.¹¹¹

Paradoxically perhaps, the lack of channels for effective political expression and representation in these communities did not re-

sult from the weakness of the central state in relation to these communities. In fact, it was the central state itself that abolished local governments in London and Handsworth, where some of the most serious rioting took place. Furthermore, the ability of local authorities to fill the gaps left by cuts in central state provision were limited through rate-capping, a restriction imposed on local authorities by the central state.¹¹² The declining power and influence of Britain's labor unions in the wake of Thatcher's defeat of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) strike of 1984–85 may logically be expected to have further diminished the availability of institutional channels for the collective expression of grievances. Union channels may have been particularly significant to Britain's minority residents. As Albert Hirschman has suggested, where official channels do not make "voice" a viable option, dissatisfaction may instead be expressed through "exit."¹¹³ Unemployed residents of housing projects like Broadwater Farm Estate, however, are unlikely to "exit" for the simple reason that they may have nowhere else to go. In this context, violent forms of extra-institutional political expression like the riots of 1981 and 1985 are not entirely surprising.

CONCLUSION

Interethnic conflict has never been as severe, prolonged, or violent in Britain as it has been in many other countries. However, as an unusually clear case of reliance on widely accepted liberal political wisdom in the management of interethnic relations, recent British history reveals the virtues and limitations of such an approach with exceptional clarity. Interethnic political conflict and violent social disorder in postwar Britain have risen and fallen entirely independently of changes in legal criteria for nationality and voting rights. A remnant of imperial paternalist ambitions, British law vis-à-vis New Commonwealth immigrants was extremely liberal in this regard. New Commonwealth immigrants enjoyed the status of U.K. citizens and were therefore free to emigrate to England without restriction until 1962 and continued to benefit from liberal access to voting rights thereafter.

Nonetheless, developments in 1960s and 1970s Britain had much in common with more recent developments in Germany, where minorities' access to national citizenship was much more restricted.¹¹⁴ Both witnessed many of the same developments: the short-lived rise of new far right parties, competitive politicization of nonwhite immigration, attempted promulgation of ethnic nationalism, and violent attacks on foreigners residing on national territory. Moreover, the political sequence underlying these developments in each case was quite similar. Given that Britain's attribution of citizenship to its nonwhite immigrants was exceptionally liberal, while German law has been exceptionally restrictive in this regard, an approach to citizenship and immigration politics that looks beyond legal nationality and its comparative accessibility is clearly in order.

The vicissitudes of post-imperial British racial politics also point to the need to transcend the statutory approach to citizenship. In order to account for the apparent paradox of recurrent urban violence and social disorder in the context of an otherwise apparently successful liberal political approach to the muting and marginalization of social tensions associated with immigration, a thicker approach to belonging is in order. Citizenship is a legal label that confers a bundle of rights and duties, but it should also be understood as a matter of real entitlement to public presence and influence as regulated and enforced by social and institutional norms and practices. The realization of citizenship therefore depends on factors other than formal nationality and voting rights. As Britain's recent urban riots suggest, viable democratic supportive institutions—from policing policy to local government—are also essential to citizenship and social integration, of which the integration of minorities or immigrants is but one aspect. The possession of the political rights linked to citizenship does not guarantee that civil rights, usually thought of as anterior to voting rights and less exclusive in their application, are realized in daily practice. To understand the riots of 1981 and 1985, one must appreciate that centuries after the freeing of peasants from their estates, even voters with national citizenship may not be free, practically speaking, to move freely within, much less beyond, their own urban neighborhoods. Comparative research on citizenship and interethnic relations needs to look beyond the law to the social and institutional norms and practices that shape minorities' lived sense of entitlement, public presence, and

influence. Voting rights matter, but formal political rights alone cannot be treated as a proxy for effective social trust, practical acceptance, and the lived sense of full membership conducive to social integration and lasting reduction of violent social conflict.

NOTES

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1. For recent notable examples of this claim, see Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. xviii, and Daniel Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 224.
2. For example, on the inevitably corrosive effects of ethnic politics on established political parties and other “brokerage institutions” that contribute to democratic stability and peaceful conflict resolution, see Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), pp. 6, 66, 83–84, 90. One might argue that these claims are only intended to apply to “plural” or what others have called “deeply divided” societies and are therefore not applicable to the British case. However, in their treatment, it is ethnic politics themselves that distinguish plural societies from their more stable and peaceful pluralistic counterparts (p. 62). Thus where ethnic politics develop, their emergence is interpreted as a sign of transition from a pluralistic to a plural society (p. 93). A pluralistic version of ethnic politics is therefore a logical impossibility within the system of definitions presented.
3. Colin Leys, *Politics in Britain* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), p. 65.
4. Anthony Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 2, 36–37. Also see Paul Foot, *The Rise of Enoch Powell: An Examination of Enoch Powell's Attitude on Immigration and Race* (London: Cornmarket Press, 1969), pp. 92–93, on the Labour and Conservative Parties' active cooperation in dampening down racial issues during the 1966 election.
5. Messina, pp. 6, 26–27, 46–49, and 183–84.
6. For classic examples, see Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963); Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1962).

7. Messina, pp. 13–14.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
9. Otto Kirschheimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems,” in *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 177–200.
10. Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900–30, and Britain, 1948–68* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), and Messina, p. 55. These organizations were originally created through grassroots initiatives directed primarily at easing the initial adjustment of immigrants from the Commonwealth to life in the British Isles.
11. Foot, *Rise of Enoch Powell*, pp. 130–31. Also see A. Sivanandan, “Race, Class, and the State: The Black Experience,” *Race and Class* 17 (Spring 1976): 347–68.
12. John Benyon, “Spiral of Decline: Race and Policing,” in *Race, Government and Politics in Britain*, ed. Zig Layton-Henry and Paul B. Rich (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 240.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Messina, p. 24.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
18. Andrew Gamble, *The Conservative Nation* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 181.
19. Foot, *Rise of Enoch Powell*, pp. 142–43.
20. Messina, pp. 28–29, and p. 189, n. 22.
21. Foot, *Rise of Enoch Powell*, p. 57.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 43–54. The nonantagonistic nature of early immigration concerns in this area is also noteworthy in light of the fact that the West Midlands subsequently emerged alongside London as one of the NF’s two strongest geographical strongholds. (See Martin Harrop et al., “The Bases of National Front Support,” *Political Studies* 28 [June 1980]: 271–83.)
23. François Duprat, “La Percée politique du nationalisme en Grande-Bretagne,” *Défense de l’Occident* 25 (June 1977): 57–65, and Messina, pp. 123–24, 186–87.
24. Gamble, *Conservative Nation*, p. 177. Also see Christopher T. Husbands, *Racial Exclusionism in the City: The Urban Support of the National Front* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 6.
25. Gamble, *Conservative Nation*, pp. 91–92.
26. Leys, p. 65.

27. Gamble, *Conservative Nation*, p. 92. At this point, however, the New Right figured as an influence on Heath himself, rather than as the source of a successful challenge to the existing Conservative Party leadership.
28. Messina, p. 138.
29. The major strength of the New Right, like the Labour Left, however, was outside of parliament, among the party's constituents (see Leys, p. 65).
30. R. W. Johnson, "Rebirth of the Right," *New Statesman and Society* 4 (8 March 1991): 10; also see Messina, p. 124, and Paul B. Rich, "Conservative Ideology and Race in Modern British Politics," in Layton-Henry and Rich, eds., p. 57.
31. R. W. Johnson, p. 10.
32. Messina, p. 124.
33. Zig Layton-Henry, "Race and the Thatcher Government," in Layton-Henry and Rich, eds., p. 91.
34. Messina, p. 144.
35. Sivanandan, pp. 349–51.
36. Messina, p. 18.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 125–26.
38. Foot, *Rise of Enoch Powell*, p. 140.
39. Gamble, *Conservative Nation*, p. 121; also see Foot, *Rise of Enoch Powell*, p. 39. Foot notes that Powell never made any published statement in support of immigration control until 1964, by which time such control was "an expression of mainstream opinion in the Party."
40. Gamble, *Conservative Nation*, p. 121.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 121; Rich, "Conservative Ideology," p. 53. Analyzing the reasons for support given by signers of a random sample of 3,537 of these letters, Diana Spearman found that 1,128, or almost 32 percent, cited fears of British culture and traditions. Ironically, Spearman's analysis of the content of these letters suggests that the vast majority supported Powell as a victim of an unjustified abridgement of the right to free speech, given Heath's removal of him from the shadow cabinet following the speech. Spearman divided supportive responses into seven categories based on stated grounds of support: complaints regarding immigrants' behavior, fears for British culture (including fears for British culture with special emphasis upon liberty), strain on social services, fear of repetition of events in the United States, financial fears, overpopulation, and racism. Spearman's statistical analysis of the distribution of supportive letter signers in the random sample among these categories found that a mere 0.3 percent appeared to support Powell out of sympathy with racism per se, whereas a striking 24 percent cited concern for liberty, usually meaning free speech. In fact, fully 74 percent of signers counted in the "fears for British culture" category actually fell within this subset ("Enoch Powell's Postbag," *New Society*, 9

May 1968, pp. 667–69; rpt. as “Letters of Blood,” *New Statesman and Society* 5 [28 August 1992]: xii–xiii.) However, in the wake of Powell’s dismissal, what was bound to have been most immediately striking was that he had received an incredible number of letters, almost all of them supportive. Gamble’s analysis is therefore not undermined by Spearman’s findings; what is called into question is the conclusion of party leaders and many commentators that Powell actually attracted overwhelming support by tapping a reservoir of popular racist sentiments. It is difficult to know what those responding to the Gallup Poll agreed with when they classified themselves as agreeing with the speech. As noted, Powell’s policy position was no different from the established Tory position at the time. It was the tone and rhetoric of the speech that were considered shocking and provoked his dismissal. It is unlikely that respondents meant to indicate that they “agreed” with the tone and rhetoric of the speech, those being features of a speech of which one “approves” or “disapproves” rather than “agrees” or “disagrees.” In asking respondents whether they “agreed” with the speech, the poll asked the wrong question. Nonetheless, the message that the results communicated to observers would have been that popular reaction to the speech had been overwhelmingly favorable.

42. Rich, “Conservative Ideology,” p. 53; Gamble, *Conservative Nation*, p. 121–22.
43. Foot, *Rise of Enoch Powell*, p. 138.
44. Rich, “Conservative Ideology,” p. 55.
45. 1972, Powell characterized the Conservative Party as properly “a capitalist party and a party of free enterprise [that] accepts the market as the arbiter of measurable material benefit and rejects the state.” He therefore called for the reduction of the state’s involvement with unions and for state withdrawal from its role in setting exchange rates and in providing housing and other social services. These measures, Powell argued, would reduce inflation and help to restore a free society. While in office, the Conservative leadership resisted Powell’s ideas, but their ideological appeal made them increasingly attractive and difficult to ignore once the party returned to opposition (see Gamble, *Conservative Nation*, pp. 115–18).
46. Paul B. Rich: *Race and Empire in British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 207, and “Conservative Ideology,” p. 52.
47. Cited in Gamble, *Conservative Nation*, p. 120.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 119–20.
49. Cited in Harry Goulbourne, *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Imperial Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 117. Emphasis in original.
50. Cited in Foot, *Rise of Enoch Powell*, p. 66. In his address to a political meeting in Gloucester in October 1969, the logic of Powell’s appeal again ran along these lines. In response to a question from the audience, Powell asserted that “The British people have been told that they must deny that there is

any difference between those who belong to this country and those others. If you persist in asserting what is an undeniable truth, you will be hounded and pilloried as a racist" (cited in Foot, *Rise of Enoch Powell*, p. 104).

51. For historical information on English hostility toward and violent attacks against Irish, Jewish, and other white immigrant groups, see Panikos Panayi, ed., *Racial Violence in Britain 1840–1950* (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1993), and Paul Foot, *Immigration and Race in British Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965).
52. For over a decade, no prime ministerial candidate had directly addressed the issue of race. It was therefore remarkable when in a televised interview in 1978 Thatcher announced that the issue should be subject to official political discussion: "I think there is a feeling that the big political parties have not been talking about this [immigration] and sometimes . . . we are falsely accused of racial prejudice. . . . Now we are a big political party. If we do not want people to go to extremes—and I do not—we must talk about this problem and we must show we are prepared to deal with it." When asked whether she was trying to recapture Conservative voters who had defected to the NF, she similarly stated: "Oh, very much back, certainly, but I think that the National Front has, in fact, attracted more people from Labour than from us; but never be afraid to tackle something which people are worried about. We are not in politics to ignore people's worries: we are in politics to deal with them." Given her televised and widely reported reference to the "swamping" of British culture by immigrants in 1978, many accused Thatcher of not merely attending to the issues of concern to the NF's supporters, but of pandering to their prejudices as well (Messina, p. 144; quotes from Messina, pp. 127–28 and 143–44. Originally reported in *The Times*).
53. Whereas a mere 6 percent of Conservative candidates had cited immigration as an issue in their campaign addresses in 1974, 25 percent mentioned the issue in 1979. There was a similar upsurge of attention to the issue on the part of Labour candidates: 27 percent addressed themselves to the issue in 1979, whereas only 2 percent had done so in 1970 (see Messina, p. 130).
54. Ceri Peach, "A Geographical Perspective on the 1981 Urban Riots in England," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 9 (July 1986): 396.
55. See Stuart Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978).
56. Benyon, p. 236. Also along these lines, Ralf Dahrendorf commented that the riots marked "a breakdown of traditional British society in which people were basically well-behaved toward each other" (cited in Marguerite Johnson, "Anger in the Streets," *Time* 118 [20 July 1981]: 30).
57. Paul Gilroy, "Steppin' Out of Babylon—Race, Class and Autonomy," in *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain*, ed. Centre for Cultural Studies (London: Hutchinson, 1982), p. 279.
58. Peach, pp. 399–405; Benyon, p. 229. It should be noted, however, that the riots of July 1981 would appear to have involved more participation by

poor whites than the April 1981 riot in Brixton, where white rioters were not in evidence. (See Tony Bunyan, "The Police against the People," *Race and Class* 23 [Winter 1981]: 153–70.)

59. Benyon, p. 229; Peach, pp. 396–402.
60. In the wake of the Nottingham riot, the local council extended previously denied financial grants to the local Voluntary Liaison Committee and to the Coloured People's Housing Association (see Messina, pp. 55–56).
61. Layton-Henry, pp. 89–90.
62. Peach, pp. 396–402.
63. "Britain's Inner Cities," *The Economist* 280 (18 July 1981): 27.
64. E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," *Past and Present*, no. 50 (February 1971): 76–136.
65. Peach, pp. 396–97, 408–9.
66. Benyon, pp. 229–30, 261.
67. The riot that broke out in Brixton lasted three days. In the course of the rioting, 226 people were injured (including 150 police officers), 26 buildings and 20 vehicles were burned, and over 200 people were arrested (see Layton-Henry, p. 87).
68. Peach, p. 407.
69. Between January and July 1981, officers from four of the larger police stations in Merseyside stopped and searched almost 4,000 people. As in Brixton, this strategy did not prove particularly effective from a crime-detection standpoint. The 3,842 "stops" carried out by officers from these four stations resulted in a mere 179 arrests. In other words, more than 95 percent of those stopped and searched were never charged with anything whatsoever. (See Rob Rohrer, "Why Police Opened Fire," *New Statesman* 102 [18 September 1981]: 5).
70. Layton-Henry, p. 90.
71. Scarman Report; cited in Benyon, p. 228.
72. "Britain: The Tops of Volcanoes," *The Economist* 280 (11 July 1981): 28.
73. Cited in M. Johnson, p. 32.
74. Cited in Mike Phillips, "Rage That Shattered Thatcher," *New Statesman* 102 (17 July 1981): 8.
75. F. F. Ridley, "Unemployed Youth in Merseyside," *Political Quarterly* 52 (January–March 1981): 23.
76. Cited in M. Johnson, p. 32.
77. John Brecher and Seth Mydans, "Britain's Days of Rage," *Newsweek* 98 (20 July 1981): 34.
78. Peach, p. 407.
79. Phillips, "Rage That Shattered Thatcher," p. 8.

80. Mike Phillips, "It Couldn't Happen to the Met. . .," *New Statesman* 101 (17 April 1981): 3.
81. "Police off Brixton's Map," *The Economist* 279 (18 April 1981): 54.
82. Benyon, p. 231.
83. "Police off Brixton's Map," p. 55.
84. Ivor Crewe, "How to Win a Landslide without Really Trying: Why the Conservatives Won in 1983," in *Britain at the Polls 1983: A Study of the General Election*, ed. Austin Ranney (n.p.: AEI, Duke University Press, 1985), p. 176.
85. Layton-Henry, p. 96.
86. R. W. Johnson, p. 10.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
88. Rich, "Conservative Ideology," p. 66.
89. Layton-Henry, p. 96.
90. Peach, p. 396.
91. Benyon, p. 268.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 263–64; Derek Bishton, "This Isn't a Riot—It's a War," *New Statesman* 110 (13 September 1985): 12.
93. "Poor Handsworth's Asians Pay the Price of Prosperity," *The Economist* 296 (14 September 1985): 59.
94. Bishton, p. 13.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
96. *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13. As *The Economist* reported, under the auspices of a police force that had been "handling Handsworth 'sensitively' since well before 1981," the Sunday before the rioting "had been Handsworth's carnival day, with jolly bands in the streets, as policemen swapped hats with buxom ladies and puffed cautiously on hand-rolled smokes. In the happy aftermath there were, on Monday, only a dozen policemen on the district's streets" ("Now Handsworth Burns," *The Economist* 296 [14 September 1985]: 16).
97. Benyon, pp. 263–64.
98. "Poor Handsworth's Asians", pp. 59–60.
99. *Ibid.*; "Now Handsworth Burns," p. 16.
100. "Poor Handsworth's Asians," p. 60; "Now Handsworth Burns," p. 16. Interestingly, both Afro-Caribbean and Asian community leaders were at pains to deny that the riot represented an ethnic conflict. After the riot they appeared "together in solidarity in front of the cameras" and pointed out that Asian youths had numbered among the perpetrators of the violence (see Bishton, p. 13).

101. The incident that triggered the Brixton riot of 28–29 September was the shooting of a woman by police forces while they were searching her home for her son. A delegation of the woman's relatives and other residents was formed and went to the police station, where they confronted officers about the shooting. A crowd rapidly developed to witness the confrontation. The police promised the delegation that an enquiry would be conducted to investigate the shooting. The crowd was not satisfied with this promise, however, and expressed dissatisfaction by verbally challenging the police. Within less than an hour, petrol bombs were being constructed and thrown at the police station. Widespread looting and burning of stores and cars up the street eventually ensued, resulting in damages estimated at £3 million and some 220 arrests (see Benyon, p. 264, and "The Cops Still Kick Ass," *New Statesman*; 110 [4 October 1985]: 5).
102. Benyon, p. 264; Wiseman Khuzwayo, "Saturday Taught Me It Takes Seconds, Not Hours, for Full Riot to Break Out," *New Statesman* 110 (4 October 1985): 5; "The Cops Still Kick Ass," p. 5.
103. The police maintained that the woman had simply collapsed during the search. Her family, however, claimed that she had been assaulted by the officers involved in the search and that they had subsequently failed to call an ambulance (see Peach, p. 408; Benyon, pp. 266–67).
104. Black youths complained that they were being singled out and subjected to abusive treatment. In this context of increasingly tense community-police relations, the police stopped and searched a car driven by Floyd Jarrett, a young black man well known in the community for his involvement in the local social center. Eventually Jarrett was arrested on charges of assaulting an officer while his car was being searched, charges he denied. Five hours later, the police carried out a search of his home, during which his mother died. Jarrett alleged that the police had stolen the key to his house during his arrest. The police denied his allegations (see Benyon, pp. 266–67).
105. A number of police officers were shot, some 200 officers and 20 others were injured, petrol bombings were reported, fire was set to cars and buildings, stores were looted, and the local police commissioner was stabbed to death.
106. Only a few shops were looted, but as in the other riots, those that were targeted were generally owned by British Asians, while businesses owned by British Afro-Caribbean blacks in the same area were conspicuously spared. Likewise, *The Economist* characterized the perpetrators of the violence as "a mainly black mob." The housing project where the riot occurred, the worst in Haringsey, itself had a majority of black tenants ("Burnt Hopes," *The Economist*, 30 September 1981).
107. In the context of a reported increase in police-community tensions in the area that summer, four young black residents were denied bail at the magistrates' court. That night, a protest began outside the Toxteth police sta-

tion which ultimately led to a number of attacks on police cars and officers (see Benyon, p. 264).

108. See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).
109. Benyon, p. 268.
110. "Handsworth Is a Social Issue," *New Statesman* 110, 2842: 3.
111. Gilroy, p. 304.
112. "Handsworth Is a Social Issue," p. 4; Andrew Gamble, *The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 115.
113. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
114. See John Leslie's contribution to this volume.

IDENTITY (TRANS)FORMATION AMONG BULGARIAN MUSLIMS

Maria Todorova

This chapter analyzes identity formation among Bulgarian Muslims—Pomaks—especially since 1989, and it assesses the ways in which institutional structures in Bulgaria have mitigated *against* the rise of a politicized Pomak identity and muted ethnic conflict. In the case of the Bulgarian Muslims, political entrepreneurs who sought to use identity politics to mobilize support have had few tangible resources to offer in exchange. This is primarily because there was virtually no institutional basis for the politicization of Pomak cultural identity. In the historical process of nation-building, the marker for national identity became language rather than religion in Bulgaria. Bulgarian Muslims' religious "difference" from their Christian counterparts has proven insufficiently distinctive to permit the rise of a Pomak political identity. Nonetheless, recent events have shifted the balance of power and resources, allowing both for a potential for conflict to occur in the future and for observers to witness the process of political identity-formation in action.

The use of the term Muslim in the Bulgarian context needs precise elaboration. It is used as an ascriptive concept, comprising both religious Muslims and the large group of secular individuals recognizable as "Muslim" through names, kinship ties, rituals, etc. In terms of ethnolinguistic groups, the largest among them is the group of ethnic Turks, followed by Bulgarian-speaking Muslims and Muslim gypsies. There are also some confessional nuances between the dominant Sunni majority and a small Shi'ite (Kizilbas) minority. This paper will confine itself to the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, further referred to as Bulgarian Muslims or Pomaks.¹

The first part of this chapter discusses the historical background of identity-formation in the larger Balkan setting and out-

lines the development of the Bulgarian Muslim population until the end of the 1980s. This background is essential for understanding the particular mechanisms of (national) identity-formation in the region, as well as the articulation of claims and interests which invariably evoke those historical precedents or arguments that politicize cultural identity. The following sections analyze internal and external factors influencing the formation of a politicized cultural identity and the factors leading to cultural conflict suggested by the propositions that comprise the analytic framework of this volume. I examine the influence of domestic political institutions—political parties and organizations—in articulating interests and charging group identities. I also look at cultural and psychological ingredients: the role of language, religion, and education in affirming or transforming identities, as well as the workings of ethnic hierarchies and stereotypes. Further, I examine the process of economic liberalization in Bulgaria after the collapse of communism. That is, I look at the direct repercussions of the cataclysmic transformations in the overall economy on different ethnic/confessional groups and the possible link between perceived economic interests and individual identity, group identity, and loyalty. The external factors comprise aspects of regional and global security, as well as foreign political and economic pressures. In particular, I explore how the prospects for regionalization (particularly in relation to Turkey) directly affect political formations and group interests and thus (indirectly) identities. This also poses the question of the economy as part of national security, as it has been increasingly interpreted today. In this general framework I explore the concrete case of the Bulgarian Muslims as an intermediate group caught halfway between and claimed by both opposing poles.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The existence of Muslim enclaves in the Balkans is the direct legacy of five centuries of Ottoman rule over the peninsula. The fundamental consequence of the establishment of the *Pax Ottomana* in the Balkans was the abolition of state and feudal frontiers, something which facilitated or enhanced population movements and the

interpenetration of different population groups within a vast territory. Although there are no reliable aggregate figures on population shifts before the nineteenth century, attempts have been made to assess the character and effects of these movements. The chief historiographical controversy centers on explanations for the sizable Muslim population in the Balkans: colonization versus conversion theory.² Whereas there were significant population transfers from Anatolia to the Balkans between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, by the sixteenth century this settler colonization process had stopped, and yet the percentage of Muslims in the region continued to grow (albeit staying in the minority). This suggests that in fact there were a great number of personal conversions to Islam among the non-Muslim populations of the Balkans. The nonenforced or so-called voluntary conversions can be viewed as the result of indirect pressure or coercion (economic and social, but not necessarily administrative), with the goal of attaining social recategorization. It is, moreover, the individual and predominantly single character of these conversions which explains the fact that integration into the new religious (and social) milieu was accompanied with a subsequent loss of the native tongue. The exceptions are the cases where these conversions occurred *en masse* in larger or smaller groups, irrespective of whether they were voluntary or enforced: Bosnia, Albania, the Rhodope Mountains region (the Pomaks), Macedonia (the Torbeshi), etc.

The outcome of the debate between the colonization and conversion theories, as well as about the mechanisms of conversion, would have been of merely academic significance were it not for the fact that practically all recent attempts at dealing with minority problems (assimilation, emigration, resistance to these policies, propaganda, etc.) are being legitimized by means of this historical experience. It also serves as a base for opposing claims advanced by different political actors at present.³

The most substantial changes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries occurred as a result of the secession of the Balkan nation-states from the Ottoman Empire. The massive emigrations triggered by political circumstances were atypical for the rest of Europe at the time, to be surpassed only by the events of World War II.⁴ Despite these drastic population shifts, not a single one among the Balkan countries achieved the cherished ideal characteristics of

the nineteenth- and twentieth-century European nation-state: ethnic and religious homogeneity. All Balkan countries (Turkey inclusive) resorted to similar solutions in trying to solve their minority problems in the new context: (forced) emigration and assimilation. The failure of these policies and the subsequently unresolved minority issues are essentially the sources of existing and potential crisis points in the Balkans: Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Transylvania, Thrace.

Turning specifically to the case of Bulgaria, we see that in many ways the institutional legacies of Ottoman rule and the development of the modern nation-state have created conditions similar to those found throughout the Balkans—with an important exception: although relations between Bulgarian Christians and Bulgarian Muslims have at times been quite bloody, today the potential for renewed conflict seems relatively low in relation to what can be found in other parts of the region. To understand how this is so, we need to understand the particularities of the case.

The Pomaks inhabit several regions of Bulgaria but are concentrated as a compact mass almost entirely in the Rhodope Mountains, where they have practiced their traditional occupations—mostly animal husbandry, but also agriculture—for centuries.⁵ The process of their conversion to Islam has been gradual and protracted and, despite some excellent research, impossible to reconstruct in all its details and historical depth. The historiography which traces the gradual process of Islamization of the local Christian inhabitants from Ottoman registers beginning in the sixteenth century is the most convincing from a scholarly point of view.⁶ Its conclusions are well corroborated by the daily and active coexistence between Bulgarian Christians and Muslims, who in some cases keep memories of their kinship alive.⁷ At the same time, there is a whole body of journalistic and partly academic literature which has built on folk legends and insists on the abrupt, violent mass conversion of the population in the second half of the seventeenth century. Despite the profound intellectual and ideological strain between these two explanations, they interface on one point: that the converts were part of the already consolidated Bulgarian ethnic group and that by converting to Islam, their conscious Bulgarian ethnicity was weakened or completely obliterated. Against this, Greek historiography, having to deal with a Pomak presence in its own part of the Rhodopes,

has promoted a theory that they are Slavic-speaking Muslims of Greek (or Hellenized Thracian) origins.⁸ Finally, some Turkish works (clearly on the outside margins of scholarship but widely used as political propaganda) advance the thesis, already dominant in the Kurdish case, that the Pomaks are “mountain Turks.”⁹ Again, all these theories could be simply treated as illustrations of historiographic and ideological trends were it not for their immediate role in legitimizing identity claims.

As a whole, the literature dealing with relations between Bulgarian Christians and Muslims in the Ottoman period is unanimous on the point that there had been a remarkably well-developed *modus vivendi* of coexistence, something which was preserved in the subsequent period on the local level and in everyday life. It seems that beginning in the first half of the nineteenth century, with the economic advance and cultural revival of the Bulgarian Christians and the development of a national consciousness among them, the latent opposition between the two confessional groups was gradually transformed into open hostility.¹⁰ The culmination of this antagonism came with the secession of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire, following the April uprising of 1876 and the ensuing Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78. The April 1876 uprising was ruthlessly suppressed, provoking European public opinion to deal with the Bulgarian horrors. This aspect of the Eastern crisis is well known and researched in the historical literature. What is less known, and reluctantly dealt with, is the fact that Bulgarian-speaking Muslims took an active part in the squelching of the uprising and committed unspeakable brutalities. This provoked the retaliation of the Christians in 1878 with the advance of the Russian armies, and a substantial part of the Pomaks emigrated to the confines of the Ottoman Empire, refusing to live under the rule of the *giaours* (a derogatory term for non-Muslims, particularly Christians). Many took part in the so-called “Rhodope mutiny,” an organized counterattack of the Ottoman armed forces and the Muslim population of the Rhodopes (Turks and Pomaks), headed by the former British consul in Varna and Burgas and volunteer officer in the Ottoman army, Saint Clair, with the active support of the British embassy in Constantinople. With the dismemberment of the country into what came to be called San Stefano Bulgaria after the peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in March 1878, the Rhodope region was included

in the province of Eastern Rumelia, which was to be ruled by a Christian dignitary. About twenty Pomak villages refused to recognize this authority, forming the so-called "Pomak republic." This lasted for about eight years until 1886, when, one year after the unification of the Bulgarian principality with Eastern Rumelia, the frontier with the Ottoman Empire was finally demarcated and these villages were included in the Ottoman Empire until the Balkan wars.¹¹

The alienation of the Bulgarian-speaking Muslim population was compounded by the fact that the newly created Bulgarian nation-state did not attempt to integrate it but instead treated it as indistinguishable from the larger Muslim group. Thus in all censuses of the late nineteenth century (1880, 1885, 1888) the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims were entered under the heading "Turks." It was only in the 1905 census that a separate group—"Pomaks"—appeared.¹² During the 1920s and especially during the 1930s a sustained campaign began in the press urging public opinion to discriminate between religious and ethnic allegiance and to accept the Pomaks as part of the Bulgarian nation. This idea was most intensely espoused by the small educated elite among the Pomaks (principally teachers) who strove to elevate the economic and cultural level of their group and to rescue it from its ever-growing marginalization.

In 1937 the organization Rodina (Motherland) was formed. Its principal aim was to foster a Bulgarian ethnic consciousness among the Bulgarian Muslims. Its activities covered mostly the Central and Western Rhodopes; it proved unsuccessful in the Eastern Rhodopes. In the course of seven years the organization introduced Bulgarian-language worship in the mosques, translated the Qur'an into Bulgarian, created a Bulgarian Muslim establishment separate from the Turkish, and promoted the creation of a local elite by enrolling Bulgarian Muslims into secondary and higher education establishments. It also attempted to reform everyday life by casting away the traditional costume, improving the lot of women, and ceasing the practice of circumcision.¹³ Most important, in 1942 it embarked on a campaign to change the names of the Bulgarian Muslims to Bulgarian, although not Christian, names. It has been estimated that by September 1944, two-thirds of the Pomak population in the Central Rhodopes had changed their names.¹⁴ Immediately after the war, Rodina was dissolved on the grounds of being a nationalistic Bul-

garian, reactionary, and racist organization. The Muslim names of the population were restored by 1945.¹⁵

The Rodina movement of the 1930s and 1940s was regarded as a *revival* (*vîzrazhdane*) of the lost ethnic/national consciousness of the Bulgarian Muslim converts. This very concept and the accompanying discourse, as well as the geographic span and the character of its activities, is very important to keep in mind when considering the obvious continuities with later assimilation campaigns directed at the Pomaks (in the 1960s and 1970s), and the internationally much publicized campaign directed at the Turks in the latter half of the 1980s. Although the activities of Rodina are less than controversial and its assessments even more so, ranging from limitless idealization to complete repudiation, the substance of its efforts, the evaluative element aside, can be seen as an attempt to bridge existing religious boundaries through linguistic unity and to replace or at least subordinate the heretofore dominant religious identity by ethnic/national consciousness.¹⁶ In other words, Rodina served to usher the Bulgarian Muslims from one set of institutional norms derived from Ottoman rule stressing religious affiliation to a new set of norms more in keeping with the modern, language-based notions of identity promoted by the contemporary Bulgarian nation-state. At least in its initial conception, it was essentially a grassroots effort (despite the utilization sometimes of questionable methods and although it soon came to be used by the authorities) to blend a minority with the dominant majority and thus acquire the mechanisms of vertical mobility.

Insofar as the complex ethnic and religious diversity is a continuity from the Ottoman period, it would seem at first glance that we are faced simply with the workings of the Ottoman legacy (both in its specifics and as an imperial legacy in general). Yet the issue becomes more complex when taking into account the different and competing ways of shaping group consciousness in general and ethnic and national consciousness in particular. Nationalism in the Balkans in the nineteenth century was constructed primarily around linguistic and religious identities. Language was perceived by practically all national and cultural leaders as the mightiest agent of unification. The efforts of the new states centered on the creation of secularized, centralized, and uniform educational systems as one of the most powerful agents of nationalism, alongside the army and

other institutions. Yet this very emphasis on the unifying potential of language stressed at the same time its exclusiveness and the rigidity of the ethnic boundaries it delineated. This precluded the integration (except in the cases of assimilation) of different linguistic groups into a single nation.

Moreover, not only did groups of different linguistic background from the dominant ethnic group in the nation-state prove impossible to integrate; so also did groups of identical ethnic background and speakers of the same (or dialects of the same) language, like the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, the Slavic Bosnian Muslims, the Torbeshi in Macedonia, etc. These cases invoke the general problem of religion as a political boundary, that of the Balkan Muslims in particular. Despite the fact that language indeed had become the nucleus of different ethnic and national identities among the Balkan Christians (Orthodox for the most part), it could not raze the fundamental boundary between Muslims and Christians that had been established during the centuries of Ottoman rule. The reason for this was not, as the great bulk of Balkan and foreign historiography maintains, the fact that Orthodoxy played a major and crucial role in nation-building.¹⁷ In fact, "religion came last in the struggle to forge new national identities" and in some cases "did not become a functional element in national definition until the nation-states had nationalized their churches."¹⁸ It never could be a sufficient component of national self-identity, and even in the national struggles its primary contribution was to strengthen the opposition to the Muslim rulers.¹⁹ Within the Orthodox ecumene, the process of nation-building demonstrated "the essential incompatibility between the imagined community of religion and the imagined community of the nation."²⁰

This does not mean that the religious boundary between Christianity and Islam was the only divider. Clearly the different Christian denominations, and particularly the opposition between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, presented additional frontiers of tension. Yet these frontiers did not prove as insurmountable.²¹ Ironically Balkan nationalism, which irrevocably destroyed the imagined community of Orthodox Christianity, managed to preserve a frozen, unchangeable and stultifyingly uniform image of the Muslim community and consistently dealt with it in *millet* terms. In other words, the Christian populations of the Balkans began speaking, among themselves, the

language of nationalism, whereas their attitudes toward the Muslims remained in the realm of the undifferentiated religious communities discourse. Here we see a case of overlapping and conflicting institutional legacies. A modern set of institutional norms is juxtaposed with an older but structurally determined set of institutional practices. A manifestation of this Christian attitude was the continuous and indiscriminate use of the name “Turk” to refer to Muslims in general, a practice still alive in many parts of the Balkans.²²

On the other hand, it could be maintained that as a whole, the Balkan Muslims, because they could not adapt to the national mode and were practically excluded from the process of nation-formation in the Balkans, retained a fluid consciousness which for a longer time displayed the characteristics of a millet mentality, and thus the bearing of the Ottoman legacy. This does not mean that Islam—or for that matter religion—became an alternative form of national consciousness.²³ In fact, it did not. In the reality of an independent Bulgarian nation-state after 1878 with Orthodox Christianity as the official religion, it meant, however, that Muslims were marginalized in the face of a sphere which proved to be exclusionary to them.

The Turks within the Muslim sphere were the first to shed the millet identity and, to a great extent under the influence of the development of Turkish nationalism in neighboring Turkey but also favored by the significant degree of cultural autonomy in the first decades after World War II, develop an ethnic consciousness. This did not happen with the Pomaks. There had never been homogeneity within the Muslim sphere. The Bulgarian Muslims had been viewed as an inferior category not only by the Bulgarian Christians, but, because of the lack of Turkish as their language, also by the Turks. Intermarriages between the two Muslim groups have been extremely rare. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the articulation of the inferior status of the Pomaks (in the first case because they allegedly espoused an “inferior” religion, in the second because they did not master a “superior” language) is the rationalization of a social opposition, a reflection of the antagonisms between mountain and valley populations, between a mostly pastoral versus a mostly sedentary agrarian culture, and later of the isolation of a particularly confined agricultural group within a rapidly industrializing society.

In short, historically virtually all attempts to politicize Pomak cultural identity failed. Because language and not religion became the national identity marker, Pomaks became Bulgarians, stifling separatist impulses. At the same time, as we shall see in more detail below, Pomaks were marginalized in Bulgarian society and made to feel inferior, despite formal institutional attempts to integrate them into the “nation.” That marginalization would later make them vulnerable to attempts by political entrepreneurs to mobilize them for political action by politicizing their group identity.

ASCRIPTIVE IDENTITY AND SELF-IDENTITY

The current terms used in both the scholarly literature and the press to denote the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims—*pomatsi* (Pomaks) and *bilgaromohamedani* (Bulgaro-Mohammedans—i.e., Bulgarian Muslims)—are ascriptive and as a whole are avoided by the group they designate.²⁴ It seems that the term Pomak was used in public discourse for one of the first times when it attracted the attention of Vassil Aprilov, a wealthy Bulgarian merchant and important figure of the Bulgarian cultural revival during the nineteenth century. In his Odessa-based newspaper *Denitsa na novobilgarskoto obrazovanie* (The morning star of modern Bulgarian education), Aprilov wrote in 1841 about

Bulgarians who profess the Mohammedan faith. . . . In their family circle and with other Bulgarians they speak the Bulgarian language and Turkish with the Greeks and with the Turks. Their personal names are also Turkish. . . . All of their Turkified brethren the Bulgarians call Pomaks, the meaning of which I have not found out yet.²⁵

This quote is not only one of the earliest documentations of the term, but also aptly illustrates an important element which has persisted ever since: the conjunction of Turks with Muslims (the Islamized Bulgarians are Turkified; they have Turkish, not Muslim, names).

Three decades later Felix Kanitz, the famous author of “Donau-Bulgarien und der Balkan,” not only gave a valuable description of the “*moslemisch-bulgarischen Pomaci*,” but also offered an etymology

of the term. It derived, according to him, from the verb *pomoci* (to help), as they were considered helpers of the Turks.²⁶ The folk etymologies of the local Christians proposed other meanings. They derived from *pomamvam*, *pomamil se* (being cheated, duped), *pometnal se* (betrayed, abandoned), and even *pomiya* (garbage), but all were without any exception pejorative.²⁷

Pomak was not the only, and not even the main, designation. More common as an outside designation was the term *akhryani*. Its etymology is deduced from either the Greek for worthless, awkward, rough, wicked, or else a bastardized version of Agarenes, descendants of Hagar, a common pejorative for the Muslims in the Middle Ages, but reserved for the Bulgarian Muslims in the later period. In the case of the Greek etymology, an interesting attempt has been made to stress its ancient origins, pointing not at an ethnic but at a socioeconomic antagonism: the binary opposition mountain/valley paralleling the ancient opposition barbarity/civilization.²⁸

The term Bulgaro-Mohammedans is a literary appellation which today is the one almost exclusively utilized by academics and journalists. Its origins can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century, when it appeared in scholarly works emphasizing the Bulgarian ethnic character of this population.²⁹ By the 1930s and 1940s it was accepted by many educated Pomaks as a neutral term which was to replace the existing pejoratives. As expressed in a letter from one of the leaders of Rodina, Svetoslav Dukhovnikov at that time *müfti* of Smolyan, at present *müfti* of Plovdiv, reporting on the activities of his organization,

We stopped calling ourselves "Pomaks," "Akhryans," etc. and adopted the designation "Bulgaro-Mohammedans," which was accepted in the administration and in scholarship.³⁰

Another young imam, Mehmet Dervishev, declared at the time:

By religion, we are Muslims, but this does not prevent us at all from being Bulgarians. Religion should not divide nations because what distinguishes nations from one another is language and blood.³¹

Arif Beyski, another activist of the Rodina movement, thus summarized the relationship between ethnicity and religion:

The Muslim religion which we profess does not prevent us from feeling Bulgarian in the least. . . . We are Bulgarians according to ethnicity and Muslims according to religion! . . . Being Muslim does not at all mean that we are Turks. For if we are to judge ethnicity by faith, then we would have to be called Arabs because Mohammed, our prophet and the founder of the Muslim religion, was not a Turk but an Arab. . . . However, we are not Arabs, but we are whites and of the Slavic race. It is clear to us as daylight that religion cannot determine ethnicity. One religion can comprise many ethnicities, and there can be many faiths within one nation. It is the language which determines ethnicity and divides nations into separate states. It is language which draws boundaries between nations. Examples abound. Here Greece and Romania profess the same religion as Bulgaria, but it is language which distinguishes them. . . . How can it be otherwise when there are only five main religions in the world but there are over 70 different nations and states. . . . So I ask those of my coreligionists, Bulgarian Mohammedans, who by an inexcusable delusion call themselves Turks simply because they have received their faith from the Turks, what is the reason for that?³²

This is not merely a document of the 1940s which presents the ideas of the Rodina ideologues but the quintessence of the official argument claiming the Bulgarian Muslims as part of the Bulgarian (ethnic) nation. It is also espoused today by adherents among the Bulgarian Muslims of an integration process with the mainstream Bulgarian population (i.e., Christian by religion or name). As such, it is a pertinent illustration of the attempt to redefine self-identity by appropriating the mechanism of political identity-formation of the dominant group—i.e., a national and therefore political consciousness constructed primarily around linguistic identity. As the present chairman of the Rhodope Union, Branko Davidov, put it:

I consider myself a Bulgarian. Some circles do not want to see the Bulgaro-Mohammedans as Bulgarians and do all they can to detach them from their ethnic roots. If the Turks harbor the illusion of salvation in their fatherland, our fatherland is here. Our mother tongue is Bulgarian. . . . The boundary of a nation is its language. Why should the Bulgarian Mohammedans feel emigrant in their own fatherland?³³

This feeling is particularly strong in the Central Rhodopes (especially the Smolyan district). According to the observations of local leaders and intellectuals, the majority of the local Pomaks in the town of Smolyan feel that they are Bulgarians. This feeling seems especially intense among Pomak women, who categorically refuse to change back to Muslim names, an opportunity provided by the reversal of assimilation politics at the end of December 1989. These women fear that a change to Muslim names will mean a concomitant encroachment on their position.³⁴ It is symptomatic that this position is most strongly espoused in the regions where the traditions of the Rodina movement were most powerful. Again, it is in these regions that the appellative Bulgaro-Mohammedans has been partly internalized and often appears as a self-designation, although there are no reliable quantitative sociological data.

Those who aim at a real and effective social recategorization, however, understand that this is possible only by a complete blending with the dominant group—i.e., by erasing the existing religious boundary. This may explain the success of a grassroots Christianizing campaign in the Rhodopes led by Father Boyan Sariev, himself a professed “descendant of Bulgarian Mohammedans” and leader of the Movement for Christianity and Progress (Ioan Predtecha).³⁵ According to Sariev, the new religious identity is the only solution for the split identity of the Bulgarian Muslims, which he calls “national hermaphroditism”:³⁶

There is no other difference but the religious between the Bulgarians and the descendants of the Islamized Bulgarians. Only Islam stands like a Chinese wall between them. Besides, religion is a very strong [element] in defining one’s national identity. On the basis of religion this population will join the Christian brotherhood, which is its historical place.³⁷

During the past three years the movement claims to have converted 50,000 Bulgarian Mohammedans, “who secretly and gradually came to yearn to feel part and parcel of the Bulgarian population.”³⁸ Most of these people—about 37,000—live in the Central and Eastern Rhodopes and are, according to Sariev, members of the younger and middle generation. The ambition of the movement is to convert 75 to 80 percent of the Bulgarian Muslims by the end of the century. Thus far, its main success has been in the same areas that

the Rodina movement had received support. The reaction of the rest of the Christian Bulgarian population is still unclear, although the Orthodox Church has reacted frantically to the movement's endeavors to enlist the financial and political support of the Vatican in its missionary activities, despite the assurances of Sariev that this would not open the door to Catholic propaganda.³⁹

As a whole, the name Bulgaro-Mohammedans has not fared as well as a self-designation, despite its aura of being a politically correct term, not least because of its clumsiness. At one of the local censuses during the Communist period, three options were offered: Turks, Bulgarians, and Bulgaro-Mohammedans. One of the interviewees chose to be entered as "Bulgaro-Mohammedan" but exclaimed, turning to the mayor, "Why don't you drop this Bulgarian? After all, I am a Mohammedan."⁴⁰ In fact, the most widespread cultural self-identification among the Bulgarian Muslims has been and is simply "Mohammedan," a nominal tribute to the resilience of millet consciousness.

In some cases, a genuine intellectual resistance appears against the attempts to impose a definite political (Bulgarian or Turkish) identity to the Pomaks. When inhabitants of Padina (a completely Pomak village in the Eastern Rhodopes) exclaim, "What we are, who we are, what we believe is our own destiny; don't meddle with our souls!" this is not simply exhaustion in the face of pressure.⁴¹ It is an authentic indifference to a kind of political identity which asserts itself not only as the norm in the conditions of the nation-state, but also claims the exclusive loyalties of the population.

Very interesting in this respect is a protest letter signed by 924 inhabitants of the small frontier village of Kochan in the Satovcha municipality in southwestern Bulgaria. The letter is a declaration against the accusations of a Macedonian organization in the region that a coercive process of Turkification has been taking place. The authors of the letter refer to themselves as Muslims: "We, the Muslim believers from the village of Kochan. . ."; "We are proud that all inhabitants of the village of Kochan are Muslims, and this was confirmed by the last census"; "the industrious Muslim population of the municipality and of our village"; etc. None of the appellatives used by the outgroup are accepted as an accurate label for their identity:

Notwithstanding what you call us—Bulgarians, Mohammedans, Bulgarian Muslims, Pomaks, even Macedonians—we declare that we are a reality which, much as you would like it not to exist, is a fact, and you have to accept us such as we are.⁴²

At the same time as “Mohammedan” or “Muslim” reflects belonging to a religious group, the grip of religion on the Muslim population is quite problematic, although certainly growing. It is primarily among the generation over 50 years of age that fervent believers can be encountered. The adult generation between the ages of 20 and 50 does not possess religious habits, nor does it have clear religious ideas. Its attachment to Islam is mostly a way of demonstrating opposition to previous constraints and prohibitions. Among the very young, however, under the influence of family and the new public sphere, there is a renewed interest for the teachings of Islam. This, according to specialists, creates an important bridge between the youngest and the oldest generations, which most likely will contribute to a rise of religiosity and religious knowledge.⁴³

Still, at present only 29 percent of the Muslims in a poll taken in the Eastern Rhodopes responded to the question “What do you know about Mohammed?” with answers like “Allah’s prophet” or “something like Jesus Christ.” The rest declared they knew nothing.⁴⁴ The knowledge of the dogma is not to be mixed up with religiosity. The question “Do you believe in God?” was answered in the affirmative by 73 percent of the Turks, 66 percent of the Pomaks, 59 percent of the gypsies, and 37 percent of the Bulgarians.⁴⁵

In addition to the term Bulgaro-Mohammedan, there is also a host of other competing designations, practically all of them literary appellatives. Most of them are only ascriptive terms with very limited circulation. A group of them insists on the Turkish character of the Bulgarian Muslims, calling them “Pomak Turks,” “Rhodope Turks,” “Kuman Turks,” or simply subsuming them under the title of “ethnic Turks” who had ostensibly forgotten their mother tongue and adopted Bulgarian after 1912.⁴⁶ Despite the somewhat histrionic attention this propaganda and the explosive issue of the “Turkification” of the Bulgarian Muslims have received in the Bulgarian press, success has been relatively limited and geographically confined to the region of the Southwestern Rhodopes. There is one new element in the cultural self-identification of the Bulgarian Muslims which,

despite its very restricted influence, merits attention. It asserts that the Pomaks are in fact descendants of the first Muslims in the Balkans, who arrived on the peninsula shortly after the birth of Islam and gradually adopted the language and customs of their Bulgarian neighbors. This theory of an alleged "Arabic" origin of the Bulgarian Muslims comes directly from Muslim missionaries sent from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Pakistan.⁴⁷ It is exclusively with their financial support that the Qur'an has been published in Bulgarian in new editions and is circulating in enormous numbers.⁴⁸

Lastly and most recently, there has been a political attempt to emancipate the designation "Pomak" from its derogatory connotations and declare the existence of a Pomak ethnic minority. In April 1993 a new party was registered, the Democratic Labor Party, which was founded at the end of 1992.⁴⁹ Its leader, a political entrepreneur by the name of Kamen Burov, is the mayor of the village Zhiltusha in the Eastern Rhodopes, himself of Bulgarian Muslim descent.⁵⁰ Despite Burov's expectations of support from the majority of the Pomaks, the status of the party is still unclear. However, it has received considerable attention from the press, not least because of the specter of (real or perceived) American involvement.

Burov was sent to the United States to attend a seminar on ethnic diversity. It is there that he was apparently converted to the idea of a Pomak ethnic minority and, according to him, received the assurances of American and UN administrators to help him with the recognition of such a minority, something considered to be an important step in the democratization of the country:⁵¹

People in the United States were surprised when all of us introduced ourselves as Bulgarians. They openly asked us how Bulgaria has managed to create a country of only Bulgarians. I introduced myself as a Bulgarian citizen of Muslim descent. The Americans were interested in how our origins differ from those of the Turks, and the question of the Pomaks arose. In America nobody is irritated at somebody else's self-identification. The Bulgarian parliament should not tell me who I am. I have a soul, and it cannot be obliterated. I feel a Pomak, and nobody can frown on me for my ethnic self-identity.⁵²

Upon his return to Bulgaria, Burov founded his party and immediately sought American backing:

As a leader of the Democratic Labor Party, I have already sought the official support of the American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, and the American Ambassador to Bulgaria, Hugh Kenneth Hill, to insist that the category "Pomak" be included in the next census. . . . The West does not like to be deceived. It wants a clear message: in Bulgaria there are Turks, Bulgarians, Pomaks, gypsies, Jews, Armenians.⁵³

The coverage of this event would have been much more modest were it not for the general, often close to paranoid, concern with outside pressure, coupled with the somewhat clumsy manner in which American diplomats in Bulgaria have been trying to pontificate about democracy in general and ethnic relations in particular.

Burov himself based the need for a separate party on the premise that the Pomaks were a separate ethnic group.⁵⁴ He actually proposed his own definition of ethnicity: "This population has its customs, culture, and folklore, which means that it is an independent ethnic group." When asked about the language, he conceded that the Pomaks spoke Bulgarian but that this did not hamper their recognition as a Pomak ethnic group.

Opposing interpretations of what defines an ethnic group lie at the basis of different approaches to the Pomak problem by different political actors. Practically all Bulgarian parties stress "objective" characteristics. In this the approach is not different from Burov's, except the logical conclusion is that a separate Pomak ethnic group cannot exist because ethnically these people are part and parcel of the Bulgarian ethnic community. Often a decision of the Constitutional Court in 1992 is cited:

The categories race, nationality, ethnic belonging, gender, and origin are determined from the time of birth and cannot be acquired or changed in the process of the social realization of the citizen in society.⁵⁵

Against this treatment, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (the so-called Turkish party) advocates an essentially voluntaristic approach, putting an exclusive theoretical premise on self-determination:

Most certainly the ethnic problem can be the object of scholarly research, but to look for a direct link between ethnic conscious-

ness and ethnic origins is an ethnobiological treatment of the question. . . . Let everyone be considered as they feel themselves.⁵⁶

At the same time, in a slip, the same leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms who made the above statement responded to a question concerning the rejection of the historically formed status of the Bulgarian Muslims and the adoption of an ethnic Turkish consciousness in the following way:

We do not care about the genetic origins of people. Let this be the domain of historians and other scholars. We approach this question *politically*.⁵⁷

In short, the Pomak population in the current period has been struggling with the definition of its own cultural identity, while at the same time political entrepreneurs like Burov have attempted to infuse Pomak cultural identity with political relevance. Burov has been less than successful, not only because Pomak cultural identity is so fluid and contested, but also because past efforts to politicize Pomak identity met with resistance and were never institutionalized. In the following section, I discuss the motivations for and the implications of these efforts to “Christianize,” “Bulgarianize,” “Turkicize,” “Arabize,” and “Pomakify” this complex cultural group.

INTERESTS AND IDENTITY

In December 1992, seven years after the last national census of 1985, which did not supply data on the ethnic composition of the population, a new census was conducted. This census reestablished criteria which it was hoped would provide relatively reliable information about the ethnic breakdown of the Bulgarian population. Three measures were used to denote ethnodemographic characteristics: ethnicity, mother tongue, and religion.⁵⁸ The results in the first category showed 7,272,000 (85.8 percent) declaring Bulgarian ethnicity, 822,000 (9.7 percent) claiming Turkish ethnicity, 288,000 (3.4 percent) describing themselves as gypsies, and 91,000 (1.1 percent) comprising all other ethnic groups. The second criterion pro-

vided the following results: 7,311,000 (86.3 percent) speakers of Bulgarian; 829,000 (9.8 percent) speakers of Turkish; 257,000 (3.0 percent) speakers of gypsy (*sic!* in the census). The third criterion showed 7,373,000 (87.0 percent) as Christian (7,303,000 Orthodox, 51,000 Catholics, and 19,000 Protestants) and 1,078,000 (12.7 percent) as Muslim (1,002,000 Sunni and 76,000 Shi'a).⁵⁹

The accuracy of these results was contested by a number of specialists on the grounds (among others) of having prompted considerable numbers of Pomaks to declare themselves Turks (and some even Arabs) by failing to provide a separate category for the Bulgarian Muslims.⁶⁰ It was also clear that a considerable number of Muslim gypsies had declared themselves Turks, according to both ethnicity and mother tongue.⁶¹

All together about 143,000 Muslims declared themselves part of the Bulgarian ethnic group. It is difficult to establish the number of Pomaks among the group with Turkish self-identification, but preliminary research conducted in June 1992 showed that about 18–20 percent of the Bulgarian Muslims in the Southwestern Rhodopes preferred Turkish identity.⁶² It is impossible to come up with reliable aggregate figures about the numbers of persons of Pomak origin who have identified themselves completely as either Turks or Bulgarians according to all three criteria, but in unofficial sources the total number of Pomaks is reckoned to be around 250,000.⁶³

The census thus serves as a way to channel the formation of identity. By polarizing responses as it does, respondents are forced to choose between a given set of criteria which ignore or deny other criteria to which they might respond. Already at the time of the census-taking, but especially following the publication of the census results, one particular issue inflamed public opinion and served as a rallying point for opposing opinions. It concerned the ethnic self-determination of the population in some of the ethnically mixed municipalities in southwestern Bulgaria, and more concretely the results coming out of two of them: Gotse Delchev and Yakoruda. Details of the latter case virtually flooded the daily press and exacerbated political passions to the extent that a parliamentary commission was set up to investigate the alleged accusations of manipulation and pressure on the population and to establish whether there had been violations of the principle of voluntary self-determination.

Of the total population of the Yakoruda municipality of 12,000 (all together 7 villages), only about 2,500 declared themselves to be Bulgarians, a symmetrical reversal of the results of two decades ago, when Muslims constituted about the same minority.⁶⁴ The rest declared themselves to be ethnic Turks. In this particular municipality the Muslims are Pomaks who have no practical knowledge of Turkish; therefore, their self-identification as Turks gave rise to bitter accusations of Turkification. For the same reason, the question of the optional study of Turkish in schools, which kindled a flaming discussion all over the country, was especially bitter in this region. Of the 1,721 students in the municipality, 1,174 were entered as Turks. As a reaction to that, many Bulgarian parents recorded their children under the age of 16 as Americans, Japanese, Germans, and even Eskimos, arguing that their children were parts of these ethnic groups as much as their Muslim counterparts were Turks.⁶⁵ The "Japanese" and the "Eskimos" in particular indicated Chinese as their mother tongue. This 400-strong "Chinese"-speaking group pointed out that it would look for the defense of its human rights in the Chinese embassy in Sofia.⁶⁶

That the Pomaks' Muslim identity is rendered politically invisible by the language-based institutions of modern Bulgaria does not preclude the potential for other forces to politicize Pomak cultural identity. Cultural conflict reached a high degree of intensity by the middle of 1992, when local imams refused to bury the deceased who had not changed their names back to Muslim ones after 1989.⁶⁷ At the same time, this region was the object of active attention on the part of emissaries of the World Islamic League. A number of mosques have been built in the region with the financial support of the league.⁶⁸ The theory of the Turkish ethnic origins of the Pomaks, who had allegedly forgotten their language under the stressful events of 1912, has gained ground precisely in this region. This theory is espoused by the Movement of Rights and Freedoms, whose representatives are at present leaders of the municipality.⁶⁹ It has to be kept in mind that these are the regions where the forceful change of names in the 1970s campaign was particularly gruesome, where the Rodina movement of the 1940s had no success, and where followers of the reconstituted, extremely nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) are especially active.⁷⁰

The parliamentary commission finished its report at the end of January 1993. It was signed by four of the five deputies of the commission, members of the feuding Bulgarian Socialist Party, and the Union of Democratic Forces—one of their rare moments of consensus. The only deputy who did not sign was a member of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. The commission stated that the principle of voluntariness had apparently not been violated and that there were no cases of direct physical violence (section 7).⁷¹ Still it concluded the following:

With the active participation of representatives of the local authorities and administration, a turkification of the Bulgarian Muslims is taking place. At the same time, the Bulgarian Christians are the objects of pressure and are feeling insecure (section 13).⁷²

The report was discussed in parliament in May 1993 and a declaration was sent over to the Legislative Commission.⁷³ Finally, after another round of heated exchanges, on 17 September 1993 a parliamentary majority voted to annul the census results on ethnic criteria for the two municipalities.⁷⁴

Although the issue of the Turkification of the Bulgarian Muslims is undoubtedly exaggerated, there obviously is in place a process attracting members of the Pomak community in particular geographic areas to the Turkish ethnic group in order to bolster the political power of this ethnic minority. The mechanism of this attraction is complicated: it involves economic, social, political, cultural, and psychological issues which I analyze below.

Parallel to the national census, the National Statistical Institute ran a research program to establish the number of unemployed in the country at the time of the census (4 December 1992).⁷⁵ Although the data on unemployment are not ethnically specific, there is no question that the economic crisis accompanying the social and economic transformation after 1989 has severely hit areas of high Muslim concentration. In general, the economic reform has resulted in higher unemployment rates in the agricultural sector (18.0 percent, compared to 13 percent in the cities).⁷⁶ The rural population is disproportionately exposed to a higher risk of unemployment resulting from both problems accompanying the reorganization of agriculture and the fact that some villagers are completely devoid of a means of

livelihood. (The latter include former tobacco growers and workers in small industrial enterprises located in villages.) A considerable part of the rural population was employed in nearby towns (daily labor migration) and has been left unemployed following cuts in the urban industrial sector (especially the mining industry).⁷⁷ The laws voted by parliament about the restitution of land to former owners, although not yet implemented on a large scale, will leave considerable portions of the Muslim population in the plains practically landless. This is not the case in the mountain areas, but there it is the collapse of the tobacco industry, especially in southwestern Bulgaria and the Central Rhodopes, which has affected Bulgarian Muslims and Turks disproportionately since this hard and time-consuming occupation was almost entirely in their hands.⁷⁸ Likewise, the mining industry in the far southeast, with a heavy concentration of Turks and Bulgarian Muslims, is in total disarray. Finally, there was a special state policy of economic incentives—the so-called “border benefits”—which were poured into the border regions of the Rhodopes and thanks to which “the border population attained a standard of living during the years of totalitarian rule which by far surpassed the traditional standards of the region.”⁷⁹

The great demographic shifts accompanying the industrial revolution in Bulgaria after World War II, and particularly the drastic urbanization, left the Muslim population behind. The figures from the last census of 1993 show a mere 17 percent of members of the Turkish ethnic group living in cities.⁸⁰ Although there are no comparable data for the Bulgarian Muslims (since they were not identified as a separate group), it can be safely maintained that the share of urban dwellers among them is statistically insignificant.

Taking into account the reasons for unemployment, the National Statistical Institute has differentiated between two groups of unemployed: those who were previously employed (about 75 percent) and those who had never before entered the workforce (about 25 percent; these are school and college graduates and released military recruits). Further, municipalities have been divided into three groups, according to the nature of unemployment. The two districts with the highest percentage of unemployed who had been laid off were Blagoevgrad (63.7 percent) and Smolyan (66.1 percent)—well over the national average of about 50 percent.⁸¹ These are the two

districts where the Bulgarian Muslims almost exclusively reside. Within these districts the figure rises to 85 percent for some localities.

If one uses the aggregate data for both types of unemployed (laid off and having never worked), several municipalities (all in the Blagoevgrad and Smolyan districts) come out as hard hit economically, with an unemployment rate of over 90.0 percent: Borino (96.4 percent), Gîrmen (95.4 percent), Satovcha (95.1 percent), Dospat (95.0 percent), Bregovo (94.2 percent), Strumyani (94.2 percent), Khadzhidimovo (94.2 percent), Razlog (94.0 percent), Yakoruda (93.7 percent), Sandanski (92.1 percent), Gotse Delchev (91.9 percent), Kirkovo (91.9 percent), Devin (91.7 percent), Kresna (91.0 percent), and Nedelino (90.3 percent).⁸²

It should come as no surprise that it is precisely in these ethnically mixed regions that tensions have become exacerbated and that different types of politicized ethnic and religious propaganda have had the greatest success. In Yakoruda unemployment has reached nearly 94 percent. Sabriye Sapundzhieva, the former director of the youth center and one of the 140 college graduates in this municipality of 12,000, summarizes as follows:

The problem does not consist in whether we are going to have Bulgarian family names or not, but in the fact that the municipality is in a total economic and managerial impasse. Here a host of incompetent people were removed from power by another host of incompetent people. . . . And in order to divert attention from their own ineptitude, they constantly invent ethnic conflicts and religious wars. It sounds as if here everyone goes around with an axe, a rifle, or a knife. If our municipality were flourishing and each of us was getting a salary of 5,000 to 6,000 leva, if the enterprises were not deliberately ruined, if our forests were not exported to Greece and to Turkey for pennies—would anyone have made an international problem out of Yakoruda? It seems that only the United Nations, the Security Council, and NATO have not dealt with us.⁸³

The municipality of Dzhebel in the district of Kîrdzhali (another heavily affected district in southeast Bulgaria) has responded to the severe economic pressure by mass emigration. About two-thirds of its population (almost exclusively ethnic Turks) have left for Turkey since 1989.⁸⁴ Emigration to Turkey is also the response of some Bul-

garian Muslims. Their exact numbers cannot be established because the ones among them who emigrate officially are claiming ethnic Turkish identity so that they could fall within the provisions of the emigration convention with Turkey. Still others attempt to cross the border illegally, facing the risk of extradition.⁸⁵ While the Bulgarian press of all political colorings unanimously accuses the Movement for Rights and Freedoms of an intentional and forcible campaign to Turkicize the Bulgarian Muslims, it cannot conceal the fact that the movement bases its appeal on the economic argument. The movement has clearly set its priorities. Its leader, Ahmed Dogan, states, "Our party is faced with a fundamental problem which is social in principle: unemployment."⁸⁶ Its emissaries assure the population that Turkey as their fatherland will look out for them and will save them from the economic crisis.⁸⁷ It is quite symptomatic that economic emigration to Turkey was practiced by the Bulgarian Muslims before the war also. According to a poll taken by local Christians in 1934 and kept in police archives, Pomaks were being driven out of the country by the utmost misery of their situation. This was the primary reason for their Turkification and their alienation from Bulgaria.⁸⁸

It is not coincidental that one of the primary motives for the creation of the Pomak party (the Democratic Labor Party) is articulated in terms of economic needs: "to defend the people from these regions from unemployment and to assist private businessmen."⁸⁹ "These regions" are the mountainous and semimountainous areas. In fact, the party's leader, Kamen Burov specifically emphasized the primarily social and economic rather than ethnic aspect of his party, despite his insistence on the recognition of a Pomak ethnic minority to bolster its (and his) political power. Asked how he would handle the active presence and aspirations of the Movement of Rights and Freedoms in these same mountain areas, Burov responded in an undisguised discourse of interests:

We do not make claims against any political power, and we consider it natural that there should be political struggle. If the MRF manages to improve the life of our people, it might be able to win them over. Whoever helps the population in the mountainous and semimountainous regions economically will hold the winning card because people will know who has provided for them.⁹⁰

Here interests have been articulated not simply through economic concerns. As already mentioned above, members of the Bulgarian Muslim community who react against the subordinated status of their group in the existing ethnic/religious hierarchies and who strive to achieve a genuine social recategorization consider that the only way to attain this goal is by a complete merger with one of the opposing groups which lay claims on them while looking down on them: Turks and Bulgarians.

In a revealing interview, Father Sariev recalls his days as a student in the police academy and his subsequent service in the Ministry of the Interior before he was fired as politically unreliable in 1987:

At school, in the academy, and especially at work my fellow workers would set me apart; they would put me down simply because I was . . . a Pomak. Circumcised! I was haunted by a morbid feeling; I was accumulating dissatisfaction. . . . What I was bearing before as anguish was channeled into an idea, and the idea urged me to action. . . . By language, by origins and mentality, by customs, we are Bulgarians. It is unnatural to feel like foreigners in our own fatherland. Only Christianity will return us to the Bulgarian roots.⁹¹

Others are even more outspoken about their motives. According to a Bulgarian Muslim veterinarian, "We are ready to convert to Christianity on the condition that we are not going to be treated as second-class Christians, just as we were treated as second-class Bulgarians."⁹²

Similar motives apply to some of those who look to the Muslim sphere as an acceptable assimilative alternative. Khadzhi Arif Karabrahimov, at present district müfti for Smolyan, rejects the notion that there is a process of Turkification:

This is not correct. There is no Turkification; there is attraction. If a family terrorizes its children but the neighbor embraces them, it is only natural that they would be attracted to him. If our country, which all Muslims consider their fatherland, treated everyone equally as a fair mother, believe me, I would strongly contend that nobody would look at the neighbor.⁹³

Likewise, the mayor of Gotse Delchev, Khenrikh Mikhailov, comments on the ambiguous position of the Bulgarian Muslims:

This population occupies an intermediate position between the Bulgarians and the Turks. Neither fish nor meat. And now it prefers to join the Turks because the Bulgarians devastated it, they battered it, didn't give it a chance to exist.⁹⁴

These same motives have given some acceptance to the message of the Arab missionaries mentioned above. Laughable as it may seem, their arguments have received some attention for at least two reasons. First, they confer to the exponents of this belief a proper identity in the face of both Bulgarians and Turks, who look down upon them even when they try to blend into their communities; second, they furnish them with "their own" cultural and political protectors from the Muslim world.⁹⁵

This last element—a strong outside protector—is a very important component, present in practically all efforts to articulate a collective cultural or political identity. The Bulgarian Muslims who wish to enter the Turkish ethnic group look to Turkey for economic and social salvation; Burov's Pomak party very definitely wants to enlist American patronage; even Sariev's endeavor to bring the Pomaks back to their "Bulgarian roots" looks to the Vatican for support. Although his religious movement converts Bulgarian Muslims to Orthodoxy, it recognizes the supremacy of the Pope, not the Bulgarian Patriarch. The reason, according to Sariev, is that this is the only way to alert foreign public opinion about the problems of the Bulgarian Muslims, which, over the course of a century, no one in Bulgaria has either managed or really wished to solve. The authority of the Vatican would stand as a strong guarantee that this process of grassroots conversion to Christianity would remain irreversible.⁹⁶

The involvement of the foreign policy factor serves as an especially aggravating influence on the ethnic question. As a small and weak country which reappeared on the European scene only during the past century, Bulgaria has always felt extremely vulnerable to outside pressures. Particularly strong has been the "by-now stereotyped sense of threat from Turkey from the outside, and that of the Islamic minorities on the inside."⁹⁷ This is exacerbated at present by a multitude of additional causes: first and foremost, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact as a guarantee for Bulgarian security and attempts by the country to find its place in the European security system free from the status of a Soviet/Russian client state; an increased tendency

to marginalize Southeastern Europe within the European framework following a double standard approach to East Central Europe and the Balkans; the simultaneous increased armament of Greece and Turkey after 1989 in the face of a total collapse of the Bulgarian military industry and military potential; the central role Turkey has set itself to play in the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union and its ambitions as protector of Muslim minorities in the Balkans (even more aggravating in this respect is the obvious backing Turkey is receiving from the United States and the perception that it is one of the favored client states of the only global superpower); the chaos in the former Yugoslavia and the very conflictual and controversial messages that the international community is sending.⁹⁸

Some publications display close to paranoid overtones:

The loss of these 200,000 Bulgarians [i.e., Pomaks] is not only yet another amputation on the body of the nation—a body already drained of its blood—but is also turning the Rhodopes, where they predominantly live, into a true Turkish fortress. This creates favorable conditions for the emergence of a new Cyprus and for Turkey's securing a bridgehead for an advance into Europe and . . . into the Mohammedan regions of the disintegrating Yugoslavia: into the Sandzhak, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina.⁹⁹

The publication of a map with the geographic distribution of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria in a 1990 issue of the *International Herald Tribune* had room for apocalyptic comments. The map showed the whole Black Sea coast as a region inhabited by ethnic Turks, and it was seen as proof that "the ethno-religious problems will be linked to territorial and separatist claims."¹⁰⁰ Leaving aside the debate on whether the threat to Bulgarian security is a real or perceived one, it is at least possible to argue that "to a certain extent, the removal of that feeling of threat lies beyond the competence of the Bulgarian state."¹⁰¹ Indeed, as Henry Kissinger well realizes, the global approach to security issues gives ample ground for anxiety:

The Partnership for Peace runs the risk of creating two sets of borders in Europe—those that are protected by security guarantees, and others where such guarantees have been refused—a state of affairs bound to prove tempting to potential aggressors and demoralizing to potential victims.¹⁰²

This feeling of threat is further aggravated by the uncertainty of what constitutes a national minority by international standards and what would be the precise implications of its legal recognition.¹⁰³ Among a variety of different and controversial opinions, the main difficulty in reaching a common interpretation seems to lie in the opposing approach to minority rights as collective or as individual. The fears expressed by the Bulgarian side about the recognition of national minorities are based on the danger of secessionism. Far-fetched as these fears might seem at first sight, the ambiguous and controversial approach of the international organizations to the questions of self-determination versus territorial integrity in general (and in the Yugoslav case in particular) compounds these concerns.¹⁰⁴ Even the developments in the former Yugoslavia of creating a federation in Bosnia between Croats and Muslims set precedents which are elsewhere observed with apprehension.¹⁰⁵

The issue is conceptually unclear also among exponents of the idea of increased rights for ethnic minorities. While some members of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms request the recognition of national minorities as the only guarantee for their survival the leader of the party, Dogan, warned that Europe was delaying the decision on the issue of ethnic minorities because of its explosiveness.¹⁰⁶ At a municipal conference, he offered an award of 1,000 levs to any of the deputies who would define the preconditions for a national minority.¹⁰⁷

It is naive to attribute the denial of minority existence to a typically Balkan syndrome. Rather, given the extremely complex demographic and geopolitical picture of the region, it would be utopian to expect that Bulgaria, the other Balkan states, and for that matter all other East European countries would support the recognition of national minorities before international criteria were agreed upon.

CONCLUSIONS

To summarize, in dealing with the intermediate position of the Bulgarian Muslims in the framework of the history and institutions of the Bulgarian nation-state, and especially with an eye to the process of formation and political transformation of their group identi-

ties, it is imperative to recall both the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire with its millet system and the mechanisms of ethnic/nation formation in the Balkans and specifically in Bulgaria, with its linguistic and religious centrality. This process effectively excluded members of the majority of different confessional and linguistic groups from the process of national integration (except in the cases of assimilation). For a long time after independence, the Muslim community was consistently dealt with in millet terms. With the gradual exception of the Turks, the Balkan Muslims did not adapt to the national mode and retained a fluid cultural consciousness which for a longer time displayed the characteristics of a millet mentality. While the Turks were the first to shed the millet identity within the Muslim sphere, they did so to a great extent influenced by the development of Turkish nationalism in neighboring Turkey.

The Pomaks, for their part, persevered in their refusal to conform to a definite type of ethnic/national or politicized identity. Indeed they have in general refused numerous attempts on the part of political entrepreneurs—both those in pursuit of national integration and those in pursuit of political separatism—to politicize their cultural identity. It must be noted that throughout this century the several drastic attempts to forcefully and sometimes violently assimilate them into the Bulgarian community have been effective. There were no Pomak separatist movements and little effort until recently to obtain group rights in the political arena. It is important to emphasize, however, that as a group, the Bulgarian Muslims remained almost completely politically, socially, and economically isolated. Only during the Communist period were some efforts initiated for the economic development of the regions in which they lived, but they remained sporadic, inconsistent, and insufficient. Communist institutions in the centralized Bulgarian state attempted to integrate them into the national community but suppressed any impulse to politicize their cultural identity.

After 1989 the areas inhabited by the Bulgarian Muslims have been the ones most severely hit by the economic crisis, with all the ensuing repercussions on social, ethnic, and political actions and mobilization. Among the many variables described or mentioned in this chapter, the economy has played a crucial role in contributing to the politicization of their cultural identity. The end of the centralized economy and the liberalization of economic efforts have re-

sulted in a further marginalization of the Pomaks' territories. There political mobilizers attempt to exploit economic grievances in an effort to transform cultural cohesiveness into political identity. Economists and policymakers are well aware of this effort, and a variety of views has been advanced to handle the problem and thus weaken those political mobilization efforts.¹⁰⁸ Yet even if some economic improvement is achieved (and this is unlikely), other factors are at work in transforming Pomak cultural identity into political identity and thus increasing politicized cultural tensions in Bulgaria.

Indeed it is true that "at all times, and not only at moments of economic crisis, collective political actors emerge who may help to determine political outcomes."¹⁰⁹ Political parties and other groups exert strong pressure on the Pomak population to make its cultural identity politically relevant. Their success in acquiring loyalties and in shaping identities obviously depends on how far they are able to meet a variety of group interests, not only economic ones. In their intricate maneuvering between what they wish to offer and what they are able to deliver, they are caught up in a complex game within the state political sphere, which imposes limitations on them. Among these factors, international constraints and incentives are of prime importance. As already indicated, the precarious geopolitical situation of the country, the new interpretations of national security which include the economy, and the explosive issue of ethnic minorities in the new international context further compound the struggle between political groups and the search for efficient solutions to their economic and political problems.

The issue of a political identity in the pursuit of group interests is a defining feature in the development of the Bulgarian Muslim population. As one researcher has put it, they are "well aware of their group distinction and are now looking for ways to explain it."¹¹⁰ This statement, however, needs some elaboration. Despite the fact that the Pomaks are usually seen and described as a compact entity by the out groups, their presumed uniformity is far from real. Precisely because they were not fully caught in the homogenizing efforts of the nation-state, regionalism among them is even more pronounced than among other groups. Therefore, their response to the challenges of the new economic and political climate after 1989 takes the form of a variety of group identities, rather than of a single one. Nonetheless, although there still is a part of the Pomak community which

displays characteristics of cultural and political identity diffusion (uncertainty as to who they are), we are witnessing in the current period that the majority is increasingly adopting cultural identity foreclosure (commitment to one cultural identity at the expense of all others).¹¹¹ What this means is that given international pressures, Pomaks are being forced to identify along the lines of the divide between Bulgarians and Turks. Economic factors, geopolitical pressures, international definitions of group vs. individual rights, and political institutions that define who can be represented in the political arena will determine the success of attempts to create a distinct politicized group self-identity among the Pomaks.

NOTES

An abbreviated version of this article appeared in

1. On Balkan Muslims, see H. T. Norris, *Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993).
2. On this historiographical dispute, see Ömer Lûtfi Barkan: "Osmanli imparatorlugunda bir iskân ve kolonizasyon metodu olarak sürgünler," *Istanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 11, 13, 15 (1949–1951), and "Rumeli'nin iskânı için yapılan sürgünler," *Istanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 13 (1950); Elena Grozdanova, *Bilgarskata narodnost prez XVII vek: Demografsko izsledvane* (Sofia, 1989); Antonina Zhelyazkova, *Razprostranenie na islyama v zapadnobilgarskite zemi pod osmanska vlast, XV–XVIII vek* (Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1990); Sami Pulaha, *Aspects de démographie historique des contrées albanaises pendant les XV^{ème}–XVI^{ème} siècles* (Tirana, 1984); M. Sokoloski, "Islamizatsija u Makedonija u XV i XVI veku," *Istorijski casopis*, 1975, p. 22.
3. This is not the case only with obvious converts from Islam like the Pomaks. During a 1984–89 campaign aimed at changing the names of the Turks in Bulgaria, the legitimation behind it was the belief that the Turks too had been converts who had additionally forgotten their mother tongue. A more subtle, and for some regions plausible, version of this theory claimed that today's Turks, particularly the compact mass in northeastern Bulgaria, were ethnically linked to the proto-Bulgars, a Turkic tribe which, after the demise of the Great Volga Bulgaria in the steppes north of the Black Sea, founded the Bulgarian state in the Balkan peninsula in the seventh century A.D. The

dominant account in Bulgarian historiography has it that the comparatively few, if ruling, proto-Bulgars were completely Slavicized by the ninth century, especially with the conversion of the state to Christianity, and that the population of the two medieval Bulgarian empires, having acquired the Bulgarian self-designation, was espousing a consolidated Slavic Christian identity and using the Slavic language. Against this opinion a theory was advanced, based mostly on linguistic, archaeological, and ethnographic data, that a substantial group of the proto-Bulgars was never linguistically assimilated into the Slavic majority. With the arrival of the Ottoman Turks in the fourteenth century, these groups either retained their status as Turkic-speaking Christians (the Gagauz) or converted to Islam, the religion brought by the (maybe) linguistically related Ottomans. As already noted, this is merely one in the line of many theories, but it problematizes the uncritical use of the term *ethnic* Turks (unless one sticks to the generic use of the term as espoused by pan-Turkism).

4. Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Dimitrije Djordjević, “Migrations during the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars and World War One,” *Migrations in Balkan History* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1989), pp. 115–29.
5. For general studies on the Pomaks, see Stoyu Shishkov: *Bilgaromohamedanite (Pomatsi): Istoriko-zemepisen i narodonauchen pregled v obrazi* (Plovdiv, 1936), and *Pomatsite v trite bilgarski oblasti: Trakiya, Makedoniya i Miziya*, vol. 1 (Plovdiv, 1914); A. Primovski, *Bilgarite-mohamedani v nashata narodnostna obshtnost* (Sofia, 1940); R. Solakov, *Bilgarite-mohamedani v minaloto i dnes* (Sofia, 1940); N. Vranchev, *Bilgari-mohamedani (pomaci)* (Sofia, 1948); Lyubomir Miletich, *Lovchanskite pomatsi* (Sofia, 1889); Kiril Vasilev, *Rodopskite bilgari-mohamedani* (Plovdiv, 1961); *Kompleksna nauchna rodopska ekspeditsiya prez 1953 godina: Dokladi i materialy* (Sofia, 1955); Tsvetana Romanska et al., eds., *Narodnostna i bitova obshtnost na rodopskite bilgari* (Sofia, 1969); *Rodopite v bilgarskata istoriya* (Sofia, 1974).
6. See, for example, Strashimir Dimitrov: “Demografski otnosheniya i pronikvane na islyama v Zapadnite Rodopi i dolinata na Mesta prez XV–XVII v.,” *Rodopski sbornik* 1 (Sofia, 1965), and “Pronikvane na mohamedanstrvoto sred bilgarite v Zapadnite Rodopi prez XV–XVII vek,” *Rodopi*, nos. 6–7 (1972); Grozdanova; Zhelyazkova.
7. Boryana Panayotova, “Bilgari-mohamedani i khristiyani v Tsentralnite Rodopi: Pogled vîrkhu tekhnite vzaimootnosheniya,” *Aspekti na etnokulturnata situatsiya v Bilgariya i na Balkanite* (Sofia: Tsentr za Izsledvane na Demokratsiyata, Fondatsiya Friedrich Naumann 1991–92), vol. 2, p. 36; for a recent illustration of the relations between Bulgarian Muslims and Christians in Yakoruda and the tradition of keeping up kinship ties between them, see Bozhidar Kardalev, “Zabîrkva se porednata gorchiva chasha za bilgarite mohamedani,” *Duma*, 9 June 1993.
8. This complicated theory clearly tries to disregard religious and linguistic boundaries by emphasizing blood/kinship ties. Interestingly enough, it was not exploited so as to integrate the Pomaks living in the Greek Rho-

dopes to the Greek majority community. Having noted the “Bulgarian danger” during the cold war period, Greek authorities were principally concerned with obliterating the potential Slavic—i.e., Bulgarian—allegiance of the Pomaks. Instead they treated them as Turks, a decision they bitterly regret nowadays when facing problems with their Turkish/Muslim minority. On the Pomaks in Greece, see Emmanuel Sarides, *Ethnische Minderheit und zwischenstaatliches Streit-object: Die Pomaken in Nordgriechenland* (Berlin, 1987). See also a critique of the Greek theses in Tatjana Seypell, “Das Interesse an der muslimischen Minderheit in Westthrakien (Griechenland) 1945–1990,” in *Minderheitenfragen in Südosteuropa*, ed. Gerhard Schwamm (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992), pp. 377–92.

9. See, for example, Hüseyin Memisoglu, *Pages from the History of Pomak Turks* (Ankara, 1991). This work was published in both Turkish and Bulgarian and presents the thesis that the Pomaks were descendants of Kuman Turks of the eleventh century, that their language is a Turkic dialect, that Christians entered the Rhodopes for the first time after 1912, etc. The author, a graduate of the Sofia Communist Academy of Political Science (AONSU), subsequently taught the history of the Bulgarian Communist Party to engineers under his previous name, Memishev. In 1988 he left for Turkey (Ilcho Dimitrov, “Disertant na AONSU izdava divotii v Ankara,” *Duma*, 15 April 1993). A brochure published in Istanbul in 1976 under the title “The Essence of the Tragedy of the Rhodope Turks in Bulgaria” offers similar theories and is still distributed in large quantities among the Bulgarian Muslims in the Rhodopes (see Paunka Gocheva, “Koi vkara vilka v Balkanskata koshara,” *Duma*, 12 May 1993). As a whole, the 1980s saw a proliferation of propaganda literature on both sides of the Bulgarian-Turkish border, and quite often the Turkish works managed to outdo their Bulgarian counterparts in their zealous and phantasmagorical claims.
10. Panayotova, p. 37.
11. On the Rhodope mutiny and the Pomak republic, see Khristo Popkonstantinov, *Nepokornite sela v Rodopskite planini*, vol. 1 (1878–1879) (Tirnovο, 1887), vol. 2 (1878–1886) (Sofia, 1886); Vassil Dechov, *Minaloto na Chepelare*, vol. 1 (Sofia, 1928); Khristo Khristov, “Polozhenieto na rodopskoto naseleniye sled Osvobozhdenieto i za t.nar. ‘nepokorni’ bilgaromokhamedanski sela,” *Is minaloto na bilgarskite mohamedani v Rodopite* (Sofia, 1958). It is symptomatic that with the exception of the previously cited works, practically no scholarly research was undertaken on this interesting problem. The multivolume *History of Bulgaria*, whose 559-page vol. 7 covers the period 1878–1903, has two pages on the mutiny, no allusion to the republic, and only mentions the Pomak villages as referred to in the clauses of the 1886 treaty (*Istoriya na Bilgariya*, vol.7 [Sofia, 1991], pp. 39–40, 193).
12. Panayotova, p. 38.
13. Tinka Alexandrova, “Rodopskite bilgari i islyamskiyat ‘dzhihad,’” *Vecherni novini*, no. 37 (21/23 February 1992): 6.

14. This had not been the first time the names of the Bulgarian Muslims had been changed. During the Balkan wars in 1912–13, there was a coercive campaign which was reversed in 1914 but at the price of the further alienation of the Pomaks. For a survey of the consecutive renaming campaigns among the Pomaks throughout the twentieth century, see Yulian Konstantinov, "An Account of Pomak Conversions in Bulgaria (1912–1990)," in Schwamm, ed., pp. 343–57.
15. Panayotova, pp. 39–40. For a detailed account of the activities and goals of Rodina, see the contemporary periodicals *Rodina* and *Rodopa*. For a recent analysis of the organization, see Alexander Karamandzhukov: "Dokumenti po vîznikvane i deynostta na družbite 'Rodina,'" *Rodopski sbornik* 5 (Sofia, 1983), and "Dokumenti za rodinskoto vîzrozhdensko dvizhenie sred bilgarite mohamedani v Zapadnite Rodopi," *Rodopski sbornik* 6 (Sofia, 1987).
16. For an idea about the highly emotional degree of discussion on Rodina, see (among others) the discussion in *Aspekti na etnokulturnata situatsiya v Bilgariya*, pp. 42–46; also Vladimir Ardenski, "Koi vkara vîlka v kosharata?," *Trud*, 26 December 1991.
17. For a general exposition defending this view and based mostly on the Greek case, see George G. Arnakis, "The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism," in *The Balkans in Transition. Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Charles and Barbara Jelavich (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 115–44.
18. Paschalis Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans," *European History Quarterly* 19, 2 (April 1989): 184.
19. The exception is the Albanian case, possibly because nationalist ideas developed simultaneously among its different religious components, of which the Muslims were the majority, and because the perceived danger from without came from Christian quarters (Greeks and Serbs) rather than from the Muslim center.
20. Kitromilides, p. 177.
21. See, for example, the coexistence and cooperation between the Romanian Uniate and Orthodox churches, where Romanianness became the dominant link. Despite the anti-Catholic prejudice in Bulgaria, the small Bulgarian Catholic community, as well as the even smaller group of Bulgarian Protestants, were considered and perceived themselves an organic part of the Bulgarian nation. The unbridgeable division between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs can be explained not only by irreconcilable religious differences, but also by the fact that the two communities had for a long period developed within different historical traditions, the Croats essentially outside the Ottoman sphere. During the nineteenth century the notion of separateness, although not irreversible, had become internalized by significant groups of the respective populations who were cherishing separate state-

building ideals, despite and alongside the substantial appeal and support for the Yugoslav idea.

22. Eran Fraenkel, "Urban Muslim Identity in Macedonia: The Interplay of Ottomanism and Multilingual Nationalism," in *Language Contact—Language Conflict*, ed. Eran Fraenkel and Christina Kramer (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 29–44.
23. The only case where, at least theoretically, a "Muslim nation" has emerged is among the highly secularized group of Bosnian Muslims, under the specific administrative arrangement of Tito. The type of political nationalism which they seem (at least officially) to espouse is of a distinctly different variety from the organic nationalism of other groups in the region.
24. As a self-designation, Pomak has been internalized only by small groups in the Lovech area and in some regions of the Rhodopes and Macedonia (Alexei Kalionski, "The Pomak Dilemma," *La Transmission du savoir dans le monde musulman périphérique* (Paris: Programme de Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur le Monde Musulman Périphérique, March 1993), p. 122; *Lettre d'Information*, no. 13).
25. Cited in Stoyan Raychevski, "Bilgarite mohamedani," *Rodopi*, no. 7 (July 1993): 5.
26. F. Kanitz, "Die moslemisch-bulgarischen Pomaci und Zigeuner im Nördlichen Balkangebiete," *Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien*, vol. 6 (Vienna, 1876), p. 75.
27. Recently in an interview a Bulgarian Muslim teacher from Krumovgrad exclaimed, "Pomak means *pomichen* [tortured] Bulgarian" (see "Bilgaromohamedani priemat khristiyanstvoto ot . . . papata," *Bilgarski dnevnik*, no. 1, 14 June 1991, p. 18).
28. Bozhidar Alexiev, "Ekologichna sreda: Istoricheska traditsiya (myusulmanskite obshtnosti v Iztochnite Rodopi)," *Aspekti na etnokulturnata situatsiya v Bilgariya*, vol. 1, pp. 161–62.
29. Kalionski, p. 122.
30. Alexandrova, p. 6.
31. *Sbornik Rodina*, vol. 1 (1937–1938) (Plovdiv: Izdanie na Bilgaro-Mohamedanskata Kulturno-Posvetna i Blagotvoritelna Druzhba Rodina v gr. Smolyan, 1939).
32. Cited in Tinka Alexandrova, "Rodopskite bilgari i islyamskiyat 'dzhihad,'" *Vecherni novini*, no. 22 (31 January/1 February 1992). The term used in the original for "ethnicity" is *narodnost*, usually translated as "nationality."
33. "Bilgarite mohamedani sa otvorenata rana na Bilgariya," *Duma*, no. 131, 9 June 1993.
34. Oral interviews in Smolyan, Chepelare, and Mogilitsa in August 1993.
35. This movement was officially established on 18 April 1990 in Kirdzhali. See "Bilgaromohamedani priemat khristiyanstvoto," pp. 17–18.

36. Radka Petrova, "Svetoto křishtenie sa prieli okolo 50 khilyadi mohamedani," *Duma*, 12 June 1993.
37. Interview with Boyan Sariev, "Vizhdam Rodopite kato ogromen khram na Khristos," *Standart*, 21 July 1993.
38. Filipa Serafimova, "Dukhovniyat monopolizim v Iztochnite Rodopi e razrushen," *Demokratiya*, 12 June 1993; Petrova, "Svetoto krshtenie."
39. Sariev's movement, if successful, will in fact establish a church in Bulgaria: an Orthodox church which recognizes the supremacy of the Pope. For more on his motives, see the section on identity and interest.
40. Oral interview with Stoyan Raychevski (August 1993), deputy from the Union of Democratic Forces, whose father had been the mayor of a village in the Rhodopes.
41. Cited in Radka Petrova, "Gryakh li e da se otirvesh ot Allaha, se pitat v selo Padina," *Duma*, 9 July 1992. When a few people of the village converted to Christianity, this was viewed by the rest of the villagers as an unpardonable act of apostasy. The Christian pastor who visits the village weekly is met by open hostility. At the same time, the attempts of the Movement of Rights and Freedoms to win the political support of the village are a total failure. The claims of the movement that the population consists of Rhodope Turks are considered unserious and laughable.
42. The whole text of the letter was published in the newspaper of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, *Prava i svobodi*, no. 16 (16 April 1993).
43. Goran Blagoev, "Sivremennite religiozni izmereniya b zhivota na myusulmanskoto naselenie ot Iztochnite i Zapadnite Rodopi," *Etnicheskata kartina v Bilgariya* (Sofia: Izdatelstvo Klub '90, 1993), pp. 85–86. See also Iordan Peev, "L'Islam et les musulmans en Bulgarie"; lecture series delivered at the Académie Française in Paris, 1993, p. 44; cited with the permission of the author.
44. *Ibid.*
45. These results come from a poll conducted among a representative sample of 3,227 people in the municipalities of Gotse Delchev, Yakoruda, Satovcha, Velingrad, Girmen, and Madan (Yasen Borislavov, "Gergyovden i Trifon Zarezan sblichavat khristiyani i myusulmani," *Duma*, 12 May 1993).
46. See note 8.
47. For details, see Tsvetana B. Georgieva, "Struktura na vlastta v traditsionnata obshtnost na pomatsite v rayona na Chech (Zapadni Rodopi)," *Etnicheskata kartina v Bilgariya* (Sofia: Izdatelstvo Klub '90, 1993), pp. 73–74.
48. Peev, pp. 47–48. One translation was published in London with the support of the Ahmadiyah sect; the other is the work of the former Bulgarian Grand Müfti and is published in Saudi Arabia. Its first edition numbered 4,000 copies. The second edition of 200,000 copies was expected to arrive in Bulgaria by the end of 1993 (*Trud*, 3 September 1993).
49. *Kontinent*, 28 April 1993; *Duma*, 29 April 1993.

50. The village is part of the Ardino municipality, Kîrzhali district.
51. In *Standart*, 29 April 1993, Burov mentions that he has received the support of Ahmed Sandikcioglu, chairman of a UN organization for the defense of human rights in Eastern Europe; see also *Duma*, 29 April 1993.
52. An extensive interview with Kamen Burov was published in *Standart*, 25 May 1993.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Burov maintains that the Pomaks number half a million people. Asked about his sources, he responded, "I know the Rhodopes thoroughly and I have an idea about the population" (*Standart*, 25 May 1993).
55. Decision no. 14 of the Constitutional Court, published in *Dîrzhaven vestnik*, no. 93 (1992). Cited in *Duma*, 16 June 1993. The category "origin" has usually been used to indicate social background.
56. Ibrahim Tatarli in "Pravoto na samoopredelenie e beleg za zrelostta na demokratsiyata," *Prava i svobodi*, no. 22 (28 May 1993): 4.
57. Cited in Slavcho Vodenicharov, "Istinskoto litse na DPS v Rodopite," *Duma*, 25 November 1991 (my emphasis).
58. Religion, according to the instructions for the census, was defined as "a historically determined affiliation of the person or his parents or predecessors to a group with a defined religious outlook." This was an obvious attempt to account for the sizable number of the population which were indicating that they were nonbelievers, atheists, etc., particularly among the strongly secularized and urban Bulgarian majority.
59. Petko Bozhkov, "Etnodemografska karakteristika na naselenieto v Bîlgariya," *Demokratiya*, no. 977 (21 April 1993). For the detailed data, see *Demografska karakteristika na Bîlgariya (rezultati ot 2% izvadka)* (Sofia: Natsionalen Statisticheski Institut, 1993).
60. See, for example, the critique by Romyana Modeva, "Natsionalna stabilnost ili etnicheska konfrontatsiya ni ochakva," *Duma*, no. 180 (5 August 1993). This article, as well as another by Milko Boyadzhiev in *Standart*, 29 April 1993, attacked the organizers of the census for having included the criteria on ethnicity and religion as especially disintegrating and destabilizing.
61. Among the contingent of emigrating Bulgarian Turks to Turkey, gypsies are consistently turned back by the Turkish authorities. The latest claim to Turkish ethnic and linguistic allegiance, besides common religion, is probably an attempt to overcome this differentiation.
62. Ilona Tomova, press conference on the ethnocultural situation in Bulgaria, *Duma*, 6 May 1993. See also more detailed results published in Borislavov.
63. In *Duma* on 27 April 1993, Paunka Gocheva disclosed that in 1970–72, at the time of the name-changing campaign against the Bulgarian Muslims, they numbered about 220,000. Taking into account their growth rate, she puts their present number at 280,000. According to an article in another daily, of the 822,000 self-defined members of the Turkish ethnic group,

- 100,000 are Pomaks and 200,000 gypsies (see Elena Trifonova, "Yakoruda—Golyamoto chakane za edna istins," *Standart*, 20 April 1993). Konstantinov ("An Account of Pomak Conversions," p. 344, n. 3) cites 270,000 Pomaks as an official figure of the Ministry of Interior by May 1989 but does not disclose his exact source.
64. Yanora Grigorova and Yassen Borislavov, "Bilgarite v Yakoruda styagat neshto kato vîstanie," *Duma*, 15 May 1993.
 65. Boika Asiova, "Yakoruda se poturchva spokojno," *Duma*, 27 November 1992. According to the census rules, children over 16 determine their ethnic characteristics themselves; under this age, it is the prerogative of their parents.
 66. Grigorova and Borislavov; Trifonova.
 67. *Ibid.*
 68. Grigorova and Borislavov.
 69. Trifonova.
 70. The IMRO, which had enjoyed a state-within-a-state status in Bulgaria following World War I and had terrorized the political life of the country in the interwar period, was banned after the military coup of 1934. It was revived after the fall of communism in 1989. Despite its shrill and vociferous nationalism and its great wealth, the organization has not thus far engaged in any extralegal activities. The mayor of Yakoruda, Naile Salikh, blames the inflated reports of ethnic tensions in the municipality and the whole inflamed public debate exclusively on the leaders of the local branch of the IMRO (*Nov Pirinski vestnik*, no. 60 [8–14 December 1992]).
 71. *Prava i svobodi*, no. 22 (28 May 1993), p. 3.
 72. *Prava i svobodi*, no. 24 (11 June 1993), p. 3.
 73. Mariana Kirova, "Turtsizirat se Yakoruda i gr. Gotse Delchev," *Demokratiya*, 22 May 1993. A protest against the report of the parliamentary commission was filed by Naila Salikh and was published in *Prava i svobodi*, no. 26 (25 June 1993).
 74. For different reactions to the parliamentary decision, see *Zora*, 30 September 1993; *168 chasa*, 26 September 1993; *Duma*, 29 September 1993.
 75. The information was gathered on a special card at the same time as the census data. The pollsters interviewed all males between the ages of 16 and 59 and all females between 16 and 54. The results were published in *Bezrobotni v republika Bilgariya kim 4.12.1992 godina (predvaritelni dannii)* (Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1993).
 76. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
 77. *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12.
 78. After 1989 Bulgaria lost its traditional tobacco markets in Eastern Europe, especially the large market of the former Soviet Union, but also the markets of Poland and Hungary. At the same time, the local consumer market for Bulgarian cigarettes has shrunk fourfold because of the low tariffs imposed

on imported cigarettes (“OSD komentira tjutjunevata promishlenost,” *INFB BIP*, no. 13 [29 September 1993]).

79. Yulian Konstantinov, “‘Nation-State’ and ‘Minority’ Types of Discourse: Problems of Communication between the Majority and the Islamic Minorities in Contemporary Bulgaria,” *Innovation in Social Sciences Research* 5, 3 (1992): 85–86.
80. Bozhkov.
81. *Bezrobotni v republika Bilgariya*, p. 12.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 13. For a particularly moving narrative of the plight of one concrete Bulgarian Muslim village—Barutin, with its central square nicknamed “Parliament of the Unemployed”—see lengthy information in *Demokratiya*, 5 June 1993. Michael L. Wyzan has noted that the definition of unemployed has been especially inclusive in this census. It was therefore the subject of official criticism that anyone who was not paid was considered to be unemployed (see “Economic Transformation and Regional Inequality in Bulgaria: In Search of a Meaningful Unit of Analysis”; paper presented at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Honolulu, November 1993).
83. Interview with Sabrie Sapundzhieva in *Nedelen Standart*, 6 June 1993, p.6.
84. Radka Petrova, “V Dzhebel he si shtat kmeta, toi se pravi na glukh,” *Duma*, 23 January 1991.
85. *Demokratiya*, 19 July 1993.
86. *Otechestven vestnik*, 14 October 1993.
87. “Za bilgarskiya koren turskiyat ezik ne e maichin,” *Duma*, 9 October 1991.
88. *Aspekti na etnokulturnata situatsiya v Bilgariya*, vol. 1, p. 274.
89. Interview with Kamen Burov, *Standart*, 25 May 1993.
90. *Ibid.*
91. “Bilgaromohamedani priemat khristiyanstvoto,” p. 18.
92. *Ibid.*
93. “Unizhava ne tova, koeto vliza v ushite, a koeto izliza ot ustata,” *Pogled*, 13 September 1992.
94. Boyka Asiova and Kipra Dobreva, “Gorchivi plodove po likatushnata piteka,” *Duma*, 14 December 1991.
95. Peev, pp. 47–48.
96. “Bilgaromohamedani priemat khristiyanstvoto,” p. 17.
97. Konstantinov, “‘Nation-State’ and ‘Minority’ Types of Discourse,” p. 81.
98. For a very strong statement on the position of Bulgaria, its military potential, and its security, see the interview with Defense Minister Valentin Alexandrov in *168 chasa*, no. 48 (29 November 1993), p. 21.

99. The quote is from one of the ultranationalist newspapers, *Zora*, 28 January 1992. Cited in Konstantinov, "'Nation-State' and 'Minority' Types of Discourse, p. 77.
100. Modeva.
101. Konstantinov, "'Nation-State' and 'Minority' Types of Discourse," p. 81.
102. Excerpt from Henry Kissinger's book, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); published in *Time*, 14 March 1994, p. 76.
103. For an account of the work of European institutions in the postwar period on the problem of ethnic minorities, see Rudolf Kern, "Europäische Institutionen und Minderheiten," in Schwamm, ed., pp. 61–77.
104. In this respect, see the ill-begotten initiative of French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur for signing a pact on European stability. This project, initiated in June 1993, although pro forma pan-European with the participation of the United States and Canada, was actually supposed to deal only with East Central and Eastern Europe, "the countries whose relations are not yet stabilized by their association with one of the great European political formations." While verbally committed to the inviolability of frontiers, the plan in fact envisaged the possibility of border changes. It also clearly showed a switch to the collective interpretation of minority rights. Preliminary discussions with all East European representatives who objected vehemently to the double standard virtually have invalidated the initiative. It is significant, however, that while France advocates collective rights of minorities as applied to Central and Eastern Europe, it has opposed this approach for the whole continent (see France's stand at the Copenhagen conference of 1990, described in Kern, p. 68).
105. Questions arise about the future of the Serbs in Bosnia. Are they going to be allowed to step into a confederation (even if not seen as a possible step for unification) with Serbia proper, as the latest information from the White House seems to indicate? What will the attitude toward the Kosovo Albanians be were they to demand a confederative status with Tirana at a later date? And the Albanians in Macedonia? And if the same happens to the Hungarians in Slovakia or in Romania? And all the Russians living in the former republics of the USSR?
106. *168 chasa*, 26 September 1993.
107. *Standart*, 18 October 1993.
108. In this respect, see the articles in the section on "Ethnic Relations and the Economy" in *Aspekti na etnokulturnata situatsiya v Bilgariya*, vol. 1, pp. 197–279.
109. John Rex, "Ethnic Mobilization in a Multicultural Society," *Innovation in Social Sciences Research* 5, 3 (1992): 72.
110. Georgieva, p. 74.
111. On identity diffusion and foreclosure, see Rex, p. 66.

THE CAUSES OF CULTURAL CONFLICT: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE

Beverly Crawford

The argument that has unfolded in these stories suggests that differences in identity transformation, institutional legitimation of political relevance, and response to globalization and liberalization explain differences among states with regard to cultural conflict. These factors also explain variation in the intensity of violence. In this chapter, I summarize the evidence for these claims. As in any cursory summary, the presentation of evidence is greatly simplified. Despite this qualification, however, it will become clear that countries that should have experienced similar levels of cultural conflict—given their level of development, population composition, and strength or weakness of the central government—did not do so. And countries that should have experienced different kinds and degrees of conflict were hit by similar levels of violence. These differences can be traced directly to institutional structure and strength.

Taken together, the essays in this volume illustrate the strength of this institutional argument in two ways. Some of the essays have examined societies that are different in most respects, save preferential political institutions, to see whether and how much institutions matter to the intensity of politicized cultural identity. Abkhazia, Yugoslavia, Germany, and India can be roughly compared in this way. In addition, we look to societies that may be similar in important respects, but one is lacking these preferential institutions. Bulgaria and Bosnia, Abkhazia and Ajaria, and Germany and England suggest comparisons along these lines.

IDENTITY TRANSFORMATION, LEGITIMATION, AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH

Our first set of institutional propositions suggests that if political institutions historically provided preferential benefits to ethnic or religious groups whose political relevance had been previously established, then politicized ethnicity and religion would continue, but it would not necessarily lead to violent conflict. Malaysia illustrates this proposition. Alternatively, if cultural identity had not been previously politicized, institutions could create that political relevance or prevent its initial emergence. The Soviet case is a good example. To the extent that those institutions were strong, they could channel identity politics in nonviolent political competition. Both the Soviet case and the case of Malaysia illustrate.

Alternatively, institutional rules and procedures could be structured in ways that prevented cultural identity from becoming politically relevant at all. To the extent that these institutions are strong, political competition takes the form of class or interest group conflict. The United States and England provide appropriate case material for an exploration of this claim. Our institutional approach leads to the expectation that ethnic and religious differences will not be politically relevant in those societies lacking strong preferential institutions—such as England and the United States. But it will be relevant in those societies where such institutions prevail.

The presentation of the evidence for this first stage of the argument is in three steps: the first is a description of the process of identity transformation in the cases under examination. The second is a description of how the political relevance of cultural identity is either weakened or intensified by two institutional factors: the rules of political membership—that is, nationalist ideologies and citizenship laws—and institutions that allocate political and economic resources. The third step is a discussion of the relevance of institutional strength to the reduction of violence.

HOW CULTURAL IDENTITY BECOMES POLITICALLY RELEVANT

As noted in the introduction to this volume, not all social divisions become politically relevant. The stories told here concentrate

on how cultural identities and divisions became politicized. In all cases, where cultural conflict has been most intense, cultural identities were transformed into political identities. But they did not become politically relevant in the same way in each case. The strategies of colonial rulers provided one source of identity transformation. The institutions of new states provided another. And religious precepts provided yet another avenue for the politicization of cultural identity. In the stories told here, if one of these factors was present and provided a means for interpreting cultural grievances, that interpretation became the “raw material” that political entrepreneurs could mold in their political mobilization efforts.

The Indian case illustrates how cultural identity was transformed into political identity through the preferential policies of colonial rulers. Sikh political identity was created as early as the seventeenth century with Mughal repression; it became entrenched with eighteenth-century Sikh political autonomy and further fixed in the nineteenth century with British colonial policies of divide and rule.

In both Germany and the Soviet Union, the institutions of the state itself politicized cultural identity. Soviet ethnofederalism infused cultural identity with political relevance, even in places where it had never been relevant before. In Germany, cultural identity became politically relevant in the process of “nation-building,” and that relevance was codified in the Reichs- und Staatsbürgergesetz of 1913, which specified that German citizenship was passed by descent from parent to child, excluding anyone who was not biologically “German.”

In Muslim-majority states, cultural identity was fused with political identity through the precepts of religious beliefs. Despite Islam’s universalizing and transnational tendencies, the enforcement of Islamic law requires a territorial state. Malaysia, for example, emerged from colonialism under the leadership of elites who created an Islamically legitimated state, which, Lubeck argues, “was much less likely to disturb civil society with overtly modernist ideology and development projects that disrupted community cohesion.” Thus the state’s legitimacy was never questioned by adherents of political Islam, and it could effectively block incentives for Islamic movements to become politically radical. After all, Muslims in Malaysia had a state of their own. In contrast, the rise of a more radical

political Islam was assured in Egypt and Algeria when secular states weakened and could no longer meet their obligations to society. Indeed the Islamic faith contains the seeds of politically relevant cultural identity which are more likely to sprout and thrive in the more fertile ground of Muslim-majority states than in Muslim-minority regions like Bulgaria or the Soviet Union, where language rather than religion became the national identity marker. Because language marked national identity in both countries, religious difference lost much of its political relevance.

The case of Pomaks in Bulgaria provides a good example of the weakening of the political relevance of religious identity in Muslim minority states. Like the Bosnian Muslims and the Hindus in India, many Bulgarian Muslims had converted to the religion of Muslim rulers to gain political and economic advantage. In Bulgaria, the process of nation-building in the nineteenth century saw a political struggle between those who wanted language and those who wanted religion to be the national identity marker. Bulgarian Christian nationalists wanted to exclude Bulgarian Muslims from the nation they tried to construct, and grievances resulting from their exclusion began to etch themselves on the Pomak collective memory. But when language became the dominant national identity marker in independent Bulgaria, religion lost much of its power as a rallying point for political mobilization. After 1945, the unitary Bulgarian state under communism was characterized by universal and inclusive laws of citizenship and policies of indiscriminate political repression. These factors diminished the political relevance of Bulgarian Muslim identity. In contrast, in Yugoslavia, where language did not become a political identity marker, religious identity became a benchmark for national identity and thus became relevant in the political arena.

In all the cases above we saw how culture was politicized to some degree through both discrete and prolonged historical episodes of discrimination and privilege. And the liberal democracies were not immune. Recall that in the early history of the United States, only white immigrants had easy access to citizenship. The abandonment of Reconstruction, Jim Crow laws, and segregation marked much of post-civil-war U.S. history. In Britain, the Alien Restriction Act of 1914 strengthened the restriction of non-Commonwealth foreigners that began in 1905 in an effort to curtail Jewish

immigration. That act was renewed annually until 1971. Immigration from the Commonwealth was also restricted in the 1960s; in March 1965, the Conservative Party issued a document in which it explicitly rejected the viability of a multiracial state “not because we are superior to our Commonwealth partners but because we want to maintain the kind of Britain we know and love.”¹

In all cases, then, cultural grievances became more or less embedded in historical memory, and ethnic or sectarian political entrepreneurs always had episodes of discrimination and privilege to call upon in their efforts to gain support from distinct cultural groups. But in some places, identity politics came to define the logic of the political game, and in other places, it did not. In those places where it did, the odds of violence were higher. And in those places where the logic of identity politics was weaker, the odds of cultural conflict decreased. The incentives and constraints offered by political institutions, and the strength of those institutions to follow through, largely determined those odds.

CREATING AND CEMENTING POLITICAL IDENTITY: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS

Once cultural identity is politicized, the sustained intensity of that political relevance depends on state institutions. Those institutions define the rules of political membership, representation, and resource allocation. When these institutions structure membership, representation, and resource allocation according to previously established cultural criteria, “identity politics” dominates the political game. When other criteria are used, cultural identity is less relevant in the political arena. Where identity politics is practiced, states can channel it in peaceful political competition as long as they can make credible commitments to shape and uphold agreements made among culturally defined political actors. It is when the state can no longer make those commitments credible that security dilemmas can begin to shape political competition and permit it to take a violent turn.

Inclusive and Exclusive Nationalism. As the Bulgarian case noted above aptly illustrates, the most critical historical juncture in which dominant and enduring political identities are formed and cemented is the nation-building process. In that process, social contracts are

constructed in which the terms of citizenship and inclusion in the political community are forged and embedded in state constitutions, legal systems, and political practices. "Nationalism," replete with its dominant identity markers, becomes the ideological justification for the terms of inclusion in or exclusion from the political community; its ideas and symbols provide the logic for a legitimate "national" political identity that both encompasses and transcends ethnic, religious, linguistic, clan, caste, or family identities. These more parochial cultural distinctions can indeed become politically relevant within the framework of a "national" political identity, but the national political identity comes to dominate all others when nation-states are strong. This is because national identity defines who is a member of the political community and who is not. For example, in the relatively homogeneous societies of Germany and England, religious identity was politicized in the seventeenth century, but its political relevance was attenuated over the next two centuries by the rise of the secular state. In both countries, alternative, nonreligious political markers were created in the critical process of nation-building. This was supposed to be the case in Algeria and Egypt as well; the growing weakness of the secular state, however, opened a political contest over the particular cultural content of national identity in both states, and religion became an important contestant.

Although many varieties of nationalism have been analyzed in the literature,² the distinction between two alternative forms has often been cited as crucial to a full understanding of communal conflict: exclusive nationalist ideologies, which make intrinsic identities and cultural attributes of race, religion, or language the criteria for membership in the political community, and inclusive nationalist ideologies, which make individual civic behavior the criteria for membership. Inclusive nationalism is thus blind to cultural difference in its criteria for political membership.

Inclusive nationalism is based on the principle of individual incorporation; membership is open to any individual, and acceptance into the nation is open to all, regardless of ethnic origin or religious belief. Inclusive nationalism is associated with secular states; thus membership in the political community is not dependent on religious belief. All else being equal, inclusive nationalism weakens the political relevance of cultural identity. The British case illustrates. As Liah Greenfeld writes, "English national consciousness

was first and foremost the consciousness of one's dignity as an individual."³ As the British empire grew, this inclusive concept of membership grew as well. Membership in the political community included Commonwealth immigrants but excluded other aliens. Immigrants to England from the UK were thus British nationals with all the rights and obligations of citizenship. Furthermore, under inclusive nationalism, membership in the nation became a function of civic behavior, not ethnicity; immigrants could legally seek and obtain political rights, and British citizenship remained relatively easy for them to obtain.

Exclusive nationalism, in contrast, restricts membership in the nation to persons of a particular cultural origin, making descent the principle of incorporation into the political community. Often, when groups are excluded from membership in the political community because of their cultural origins, they organize to fight for inclusion or autonomy. The resulting struggles have historically led to cultural conflict. Obviously, in homogeneous societies, exclusive claims to national identity and territory will not trigger these fights. In multicultural societies, however, ideologies of exclusive nationalism can justify the expulsion of those from the political community that do not meet the criteria. Conventional wisdom has it, for example, that Germany's exclusive form of national identity and the citizenship laws based on ethnic exclusion largely explain the current rise in the violence against "foreigners" there. The same argument can be made about Croatia. By the same logic it can be argued that relatively low levels of violence against immigrants in England can be attributed to inclusive nationalism and citizenship laws there. It follows that inclusive membership in the political community would create a disincentive for those political entrepreneurs who would foment nativist sentiments and mobilize support with the politics of exclusion.⁴

The problem with this argument is that inclusive nationalism and resulting universal citizenship laws characterize all of our cases except Germany and parts of the former Yugoslavia, and yet considerable variation in cultural conflict and violence can be found among those inclusive nations. The United States followed England in its inclusive national idea, and India's universal citizenship laws are based on British principles. In Muslim-majority states, citizenship laws are based on British and French colonial statutes of inclusion,

and although Islam has the privileged status as the official religion, one does not have to be a Muslim to be a citizen. And former Communist countries espoused inclusive nationalist ideologies and extended universal citizenship in order to reduce the salience of ethnicity as a source of political identity.⁵ In short, because most of our cases have inclusive citizenship laws and yet there is much variation in levels of conflict, we can conclude that exclusive nationalism does not fully explain how the political relevance of ethnicity and religion is created, perpetuated, and can lead to violence. We must therefore look more deeply than distinctions among nationalist ideologies and the membership institutions built upon them to find the causes of cultural conflict. It is thus to an examination of other institutions and social practices that the discussion now turns.

Rules of Participation and Allocation. Without strong supportive institutions to uphold and protect the rights of minorities, inclusive national ideologies as a basis for citizenship—characteristic of Western liberal democracies and Communist systems alike—do (and did) not offer a panacea for communal conflict. In democracies, institutions that ensure minority participation in political competition, a police force that protects minority rights, and institutions that play an allocative role in disadvantaged minority communities can bolster inclusive citizenship rights, increase social integration and peaceful political participation, and strengthen minorities' identification with the state. As minority "national" identity with the state increases, state legitimacy and thus state strength increase as well. For example, the consensual politics of both the United States and Britain have long been held as a model of political participation that fosters the social and political integration of distinct cultural groups. Majoritarian political systems push debate to the center of the political spectrum. Political change comes about through compromise among ideological, cultural, and interest groups. Because of high barriers to entry into the political system of new, small parties, the political systems and electoral laws in both countries have encouraged two-party alignments and discouraged extremist politicians. Parties engage in catch-all strategies, through which platforms are formulated to attract floating centrist voters.⁶ This system discourages extreme forms of cultural conflict and fosters social integration.

But consensual politics can foster social integration only if legal institutions protect minority rights and if other institutions allocate

resources without cultural discrimination. In the United States, for example, as Lipschutz argues, the institutions supporting an integrative political system were equal economic opportunity, procedural legal equality, and welfare programs intended to foster national allegiance. Without supportive institutions, the power of consensual politics and inclusive citizenship to weaken the political relevance of cultural identity is reduced, and the probability of protest and violence on the part of excluded minority communities increases. Furthermore, without broadly representative allocative institutions, ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs in majority populations have the political space in which to inflame and exploit nativist sentiments.

England provides an example of the importance of supportive institutions to the strength of an integrative political system. As Elaine Thomas's contribution to this volume shows, until the mid-1970s, broad citizenship rights for Commonwealth minority immigrants were bolstered by majoritarian party politics and a network of Community Relations Councils (CRCs) designed to mitigate racial tensions. In order to maintain party unity, both Labour and Conservative leaders kept issues of race off of the political agenda. Furthermore, both parties aimed to capture centrist voters, and depoliticizing race was part of the catch-all strategy to avoid "ideological" issues in that effort.

These efforts, however, fell short of their goal. Although the CRCs were intended to improve the economic conditions of new immigrants, newcomers often suffered from housing and public service shortages. Competition for a limited housing stock between native workers and immigrants provoked racial tensions, and by the 1970s, the efforts of the police to enforce the depoliticization of race were weakened. Police officers, who had lived in those areas in which they worked, began to move out, and they placed more emphasis on apprehending criminals than providing assistance. As these institutions supporting an integrative political system were weakened in the 1970s and 1980s, incidents of cultural conflict increased.

Our cases also suggest that just as exclusive nationalism can provide an affective and symbolic resource for political entrepreneurs to begin the process of communal conflict, that conflict can be attenuated by strong state institutions that have other attributes of

inclusion and protection of cultural minorities. Germany provides an example. Germany's constitution explicitly obligates the state to protect the individual rights of residents without regard to citizenship. The right of individual immigrants to political asylum in Germany was particularly strong. Furthermore, the Federal Republic's institutional norms and legal structures reduce the opportunity for extreme right-wing politicians to espouse claims of German racial and cultural superiority. These institutions weaken the role of exclusive citizenship laws in fomenting violence.

These examples suggest that those states who decide to remove culture struggles from the political arena must do so through a network of strong and supportive institutions. In many cases, however, culture long ago entered that arena and was so intensely politicized that it could not be removed. In those cases, cultural claims were settled in nonviolent political competition, and institutions were constructed to do the job.

In democratic systems, when cultural identities were historically transformed into political identities and when past grievances and institutional barriers prevented minority groups from being fully assimilated into the "nation," some liberal democracies attempted to bring minorities into the political community by providing for collective as well as individual political representation and protection. They did this by constructing rules of political competition that avoided winner-takes-all outcomes, guaranteeing that minorities had a political voice, and by proportional representation, coalition governments, political guarantees for the divisions of key offices among ethnic and religious groups, and reciprocal vetoes. These rules ensured that identity politics would define the political logic, but as long as political entrepreneurs acted within the rules and as long as political institutions were strong enough to ensure that they did, political conflict did not become violent and social stability was enhanced. The problem of cultural conflict emerged when cultural identity was politicized and some cultural groups were excluded from the system of privilege.

The case of India illustrates. Linguistic difference provided the criteria for the division of independent India into a system of federal states—each state privileged its majority culture, often to the detriment of minorities. Most minorities in those states, however, had states of their own, and direct cultural conflict was diffused in this

way. But the Sikhs, who had long spoken their own language and whose political identity had been established through historical persecution and encouraged under British rule, were denied the privilege of statehood. Sikhs saw themselves as a politically relevant cultural group, excluded from an important and accepted form of political participation. The result was a struggle for territorial independence.

Obviously Communist systems eschewed this pluralist mode of national incorporation of minorities. Indeed the division of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia into "ethnic" republics was an attempt to gain loyalty to the central state by providing universal citizenship and transforming ethnicity into a cultural/administrative identity, thereby preventing its reemergence as a dominant political force. At the same time, central authorities provided those administrative units with some autonomy and collective representation to ensure their loyalty to the socialist system. This system intensified the political relevance of ethnicity, negating the effect to depoliticize it, but channeled it in nonviolent political competition.

As Philip Roeder's essay elaborates, this Communist system of ethnofederalism created ethnically distinct political elites in the Soviet Union. These elites, who were accountable to central authorities in Moscow, also controlled access to scarce resources, such as education, the media, and entrance into coveted professions. That control facilitated the creation of what Roeder calls Soviet "ethnic machines" and what Derlugian calls ethnic and religious "patronage networks," whose leaders exchanged resources for loyalty from the titular ethnic group. Although the leaders were accountable to Moscow, the machines and networks made it difficult for Moscow to alter those local practices and thus gave local leaders wide-ranging autonomy. It was in this way that ethnicity became politically relevant; titular ethnic groups came to believe that they had unique political rights and unique access to resources distributed in the political arena.

The contrasting cases of Ajaria and Abkhazia are apt illustrations of how this system created and maintained politicized cultural identity in the Soviet Union. As I will discuss below in this essay, they also illustrate how such systems are prone to violence once state institutions begin to fail. Ajarian elites once made a bid to become a titular nationality, but Georgian authorities could block this effort

with Moscow's support because it was seen as a Communist struggle against a religious political movement; Moscow's goal, of course, was to rid the new state of religion's political power. When Ajarian elites thus lost the battle over their status as a titular nationality, Ajaria became an integral part of Georgia, subordinate to Tbilisi, and Ajaris began to identify themselves politically as Georgians.

As Derluguian argues, the Abkhazes, in contrast, won the status of a titular nationality over Georgia's objections. That status, in turn, made Abkhazia a republic and thus made it equal in rank with Georgia. Because local Abkhazian political elites were now accountable to Moscow and not to Tbilisi, they gained enormous access to power resources and economic benefits. Abkhazes came to occupy a disproportionate number of administrative and political positions and gained control over much of the agricultural production of the most lucrative crops. The "ethnic machine" fought to prevent Abkhazian farms from being collectivized, thus allowing them to remain autonomous, while the land cultivated by the majority Georgian population came under collective and centralized control. Derluguian's comparison suggests that divergent allocative institutions weakened Ajarian political identity and strengthened Abkhazian political identity.

There are striking similarities between the Yugoslav case and that of Abkhazia, and between Bulgaria and Ajaria, in both the levels of communal violence after the fall of communism and the institutional structure created under communism. In Yugoslavia, ethnically defined republics legitimated the political relevance of cultural identity. Although ultimately accountable to the central government in Belgrade, political elites found that they could use funds distributed from the center to the republics to build a political power base at the local (republic) level in order to mobilize and gain the political loyalty of their culturally defined populations.

Bulgaria, in contrast, was a unitary state, and the Pomak population was fully integrated into the nation. Because historically there had been only a weak and ultimately failed effort to construct a Pomak political identity, there was no need for the Communist regime to single out the Pomaks for either special repression or privilege. If anything, the Pomaks were coincidentally privileged because they enjoyed "border benefits"—that is, development funds that were granted to the border regions of the Rhodopes in which they

lived. They thus attained a higher than average standard of living for the region. Nonetheless, because Bulgaria was a small and unitary state, these border benefits were doled out directly from the central government to the border populations; unlike in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, there were no intermediary political entrepreneurs who could control the distribution of those benefits in order to enhance their own power base. In short, Pomaks identified themselves first and foremost as Bulgarians.

Like India, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, Malaysia constructed rules of collective representation, allocation, and participation. Of course, as noted above, Malaysia's citizenship laws are inclusive, based on British colonial statutes. These laws prevented Malaysia from becoming an Islamic state. Nonetheless, Islamic political elites made certain that Islam would become a state religion, defining educational and dominant cultural practices. The codified dominance of Malay culture and religion led minority Chinese citizens to organize and struggle for collective political representation, thus intensifying the political relevance of cultural identity. The Chinese created their own political party, the MCA, and won electoral victories.⁷ But when radical Islam threatened to polarize the Malay community, it was absorbed by UNMO, the moderate Islamic catch-all party, in much the same way that Germany's Christian Democrats and England's Conservative Party absorbed right-wing extremists. Thus while the political relevance of ethnic identity was legitimated in the political arena, the political relevance of religious identity was minimized.

Malaysia also implemented policies of collective resource allocation. After the pivotal riot of 1969, in which Malays violently opposed a Chinese election victory, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was initiated. It was intended to eliminate absolute poverty, especially among the Malay peasantry, and create an "affirmative action" program guaranteeing quotas for Malays in education, employment, and government contracts to counterbalance Chinese economic dominance. The system was considered relatively fair by all cultural groups because all were provided access to resources and representation.

In sum, in all of our cases, cultural identity became politically relevant in historical struggles over resources. But in some cases, that relevance was deeper and more widespread than in others. What matters most to our puzzle of cultural conflict and its intensity, how-

ever, is whether modern institutions “cemented” the logic of identity politics, enabling it to define the logic of the political game. In most places where violence was high, the institutions of central authority, despite inclusive nationalist ideology, legitimated and thus cemented that political relevance of cultural identity through the rules of allocation and participation.

Germany and the Muslim-majority states are exceptions to these findings. Of the industrial societies, Germany’s exclusive nationalism and citizenship laws are associated with higher levels of cultural violence than those found in other industrial countries, but those levels are much lower than in Egypt and Algeria, which both have inclusive citizenship and nonpreferential resource allocation. And Malaysia, with its preferential policies of resource allocation, has low levels of violence.

These exceptions suggest that while preferential institutions may cement the practice of identity politics, that practice will not automatically lead to cultural conflict. And though they may try to block that practice, they are not always successful. Institutions must be strong enough to channel cultural conflict in the political arena in peaceful competition or to create other incentives for political competition that weaken the political relevance of culture. The key to the peaceful practice of competitive identity politics—the intervening variable between identity politics and violence—seems to be institutional legitimacy and strength. Nonetheless, cultural conflict still arises in areas, like Germany and England, where institutions have remained strong. And communal conflict has been absent in many multicultural societies, like Bulgaria, whose institutions have collapsed. Thus institutional weakness must work together with other factors in order to trigger cultural conflict. In the pages to follow, therefore, I assess the weight of institutional strength, transformation, decline, and collapse in relation to the incentives and constraints provided by institutional legacies in our general explanation of communal violence.

INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY AND STRENGTH

The most enduring institutions upholding the social contract are found in the Western industrial democracies. Their political in-

stitutions are resilient, their bureaucracies efficient, their economies robust, and loyalty to the nation strong. State institutions in industrial democracies are stable enough to cushion society against shocks imposed by changes in the international economy; they possess the capabilities to withstand the international economic vacillations that have severely weakened the allocative institutions in less developed countries. When allocative institutions are strong, they sustain the state's commitment to uphold the social contract. When those institutions are weakened or even when their rules are changed, the credibility of those commitments is reduced, and it is then that political entrepreneurs have the opportunity to propose alternative social contracts and mobilize support in their favor.

England's political institutions were capable of countering efforts to undermine citizenship rights, maintaining majoritarian electoral laws, and creating allocative institutions to mitigate racial tensions. Germany's political institutions protected individual rights of residents, regardless of whether they were citizens or not. And constitutional constraints created and perpetuated widespread social norms that weakened the political appeals of the far right, and even threatened their very existence, should they challenge those norms. In the 1970s and 1980s, these institutions were disrupted in both countries, but the norms they created were resilient, and the conflict that did emerge was sporadic and short-lived.

The Communist institutions of inclusive membership and ethnofederalism combined with the repressive apparatus of the state to mitigate ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. All political elites were accountable to Moscow and Belgrade. According to Derluigan, these institutions played a successful stabilizing role during the 1920s and continued to support Soviet state order for almost seven decades. Indeed the institution of ethnofederalism provided a much more important "glue" to hold the USSR together than did Communist ideology. Until the fall of communism in Yugoslavia, the institutions of ethnofederalism, though weakened by economic pressures and policies of decentralization, prevented succession turmoil and the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict. Bulgaria, in contrast, was a unitary state with a strong Communist government until 1989. Allocative institutions privileged party members and functionaries rather than particular ascriptive groups. Pomak cultural identity thus remained depoliticized under strong institu-

tions of universal citizenship and nondiscriminating resource allocation.

In Egypt and Algeria, the political relevance of Muslim identity was initially weakened by a network of institutional arrangements that accompanied formal independence after World War II. These institutions privileged interest-based political competition in a democratic framework, state-initiated economic development, and import-substitution industrialization. In both states, secular governments upheld a social contract which did not privilege any religious group, despite the existence of Muslim-majority populations. Although the institutions that upheld that nonsectarian social contract were weak in Algeria and Egypt, that weakness was masked by the oil boom of 1971–74, which initiated a surge of state-centered development, leading to rising incomes. Rising incomes, in turn, bolstered secular nationalism and kept political Islam at bay.

These examples and our overall findings suggest that institutional strength plays an important role in mitigating violence in societies where identity politics dominates the political process. And it provides an important firebreak to the practice of identity politics in those societies where cultural identity has not become politically relevant and where institutions structure the logic of the political game to promote class and interest group competition. As long as ethnofederalism remained strong in former Communist countries, identity politics was peacefully channeled through patronage networks. As long as the secular state remained strong in Muslim-majority states, political Islam was held at bay. As long as the secular state in India remained strong, cultural competition and conflict remained relatively nonviolent and repressed. And Germany's strong liberal institutions prevented the far right from mobilizing the population with extreme nativist sentiments.

But institutional weakness alone cannot fully explain the outbreak of cultural violence and variation in its intensity. Communism collapsed in Bulgaria and Ajaria, yet cultural conflict did not turn violent. In part, we believe, this was because previous institutions had not politicized cultural identity. Conflict did break out in Germany, where institutions were relatively strong. The evidence suggests that this was because cultural identity is politicized in Germany by citizenship laws. And conflict erupted in Egypt and Algeria, where institutions had attempted to inhibit the practice of

political Islam. We believe that those institutions were always fragile and that given the precepts of Islamic faith, where Islam was considered a political force, a secular state would have had to be much stronger than it actually was if religion were to be removed from the political arena. Indeed in Malaysia, elites did not even try to construct a secular state, and the moderate Islamic state that they built was able to coopt political Islam and block extremist elements. Thus we must conclude that cultural violence is not only a function of institutional weakness, but also results from a confluence of institutional legacies and current incentives, openings for cultural conflict that emerge in institutional transformation and overall institutional strength. Table 1 summarizes the argument.

INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS, POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS, ETHNIC BANDWAGONING, AND EXTERNAL ALLIANCES

In all of the states under consideration here, ethnic and sectarian violence was absent or minimal when state institutions that either upheld the social contract or repressed dissent were strong. This is true of states that legitimated the political relevance of cultural identity and states that did not. Thus state strength is often mistaken for the cause of cultural peace, and state weakness and collapse is mistaken for the cause of cultural conflict. The importance of this variable is captured in commonplace, intuitive, and partly correct accounts of the rise of ethnic and sectarian conflict after the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war.⁸ Most of these accounts, however, are unreflective of deeper causes or roughly linked to primordial explanations. The tendency is to ascribe these conflicts to the vanished “lid on the pot” once provided by central authority. But an overemphasis on the lid obscures the importance of the ingredients in the pot and the intensity of the heat.

The thrust of this book’s argument is that the causes are more complex and have to do with the terms of the social contract and how changing, weakening, and collapsing institutions affect them. As the stories told here have suggested, institutional strength is relative and sometimes ephemeral. Some states collapse without being revived before violence sets in. Others collapse but are transformed

Table 1

Institutional Legacies and Current Incentives as Factors of Cultural Violence

Country/ Region	Identity Transformation	Membership	Resource Allocation	State Strength	Politicized Identity
Yugoslavia	World War II atrocities	Inclusive	Ethnofederalism	Eroding until 1991	Ethnic machines
Abkhazia	Created by Soviet state	Inclusive	Ethnofederalism	High until 1991	Ethnic machines
Algeria	Latent political Islam	Inclusive	No cultural preferences	Weak	Secular state briefly weakens political Islam
Punjab (Sikhs)	Mughal repression, eighteenth-century autonomy, British divide and rule	Inclusive	Sikh exclusions from cultural preferences in independent India	Central state strong until oil crisis	High
Kashmir	British divide and rule	Inclusive	Secular vs. religious parties	See Punjab	High
Egypt	Latent political Islam	Inclusive	No cultural preferences	Strong until after 1974	Secular state briefly weakens political Islam
Germany	Nation-building	Exclusive	Welfare state, obligation to protect individual rights	High until 1990, after 1991	Ethnic Germans vs. foreigners; high
United States	Nation-building	Inclusive	Majoritarian	High	Limited
England	Nation-building	Inclusive	Majority catch-all parties	High	Weak identity politics
Bulgaria (Pomaks)	Language weakens Muslim political identity	Inclusive	Equal repression, collective farms	High until 1989	Weak/no identity politics
Malaysia	Islamic state, political minorities	Inclusive	Cultural preferences	High	Democratic identity politics
Ajaria	Weak, reversible conversions	Inclusive	No ethno-federalism	High until 1991	No identity politics

in ways that renew an acceptable social contract. Others are gradually weakened and slowly withdraw from support of the social contract. Others are simply disrupted and are flexible enough to revive their commitments to social order. Still others are actually strengthened over time. The puzzle is that while all strong states maintained social peace—hardly a puzzle at all—some multicultural states that experienced a total collapse of their institutions also remained at peace. And some strong states undergoing marginal institutional transformation began to experience cultural conflict, even though they were subsequently able to contain it. Our stories suggest that state weakness and collapse must be combined with other forces to cause cultural conflict.

Our second set of propositions suggests that when state institutions are weakened, transformed, or simply disrupted by internal or external forces, cultural violence will erupt and become more violent in those places that had previously politicized culture. Violence is less likely—even where states have collapsed—in those places where culture had not been previously politicized. The odds of violence increase when institutions either encourage bandwagoning effects or are too weak to stop them and when alliances form across borders with cultural “brethren” who encourage violence.

Weakened and transforming institutions seem to always create an opportunity for the emergence of political entrepreneurs who wish to shift the changing and uncertain distribution of power in their favor. Whether those political entrepreneurs decide to politicize culture in their bid for power depends upon their calculations of the surest strategy for success. Usually, they decide to politicize culture only if they believe that they will gain a following in targeted groups. The stories told here have suggested that belief is bolstered if at least one of two conditions holds: if previous institutions cemented the logic of identity politics so that resources are available for cultural mobilization, or if economic hardships have fallen disproportionately on distinct cultural groups, providing a concrete justification for political grievances that the political entrepreneur can transform into a resource for support. In this section, I review our cases in light of the institutional incentives that might create a demand for the goods that political entrepreneurs fomenting cultural conflict have to offer; in the last section, I examine economic conditions in the

cases under review to assess the extent of the “demand” for those political goods that economic hardships create.

Recall from Lipschutz’s conceptual essay that political entrepreneurs are “well-placed individuals who are able to develop or carry plausible ‘stories’ of how and why particular social conditions have come to pass.” They draw on collective memories of victimization and heroism to specify those who bear “responsibility for those conditions—and what must be done to rectify them.” Their central goal is to mobilize populations to seize the institutions of the state or to create states of their own. They can draw on cultural grievances inherited from the past, but as Michael Urban reminds us here, these grievances “admit to varying, even opposing, interpretations.” The power of the interpretation, he argues, depends on the discursive practices of the political entrepreneur—that is, on the power of the language that he uses and the way that he deploys the “past” as a weapon against his opponents.

Our cases show, however, that whether the language “works” and whether political entrepreneurs will have the material and symbolic resources to mobilize significant support depends significantly on the institutional legacies that continue to shape the political game. Institutional legacies can either intensify or attenuate the impact of the political entrepreneur’s story and the collective memories that support it. These legacies vary with the intensity of conflict, as we shall see below.

In Abkhazia and Yugoslavia, where violence has been intense and protracted, the institution of ethnofederalism deeply politicized ethnic and religious cleavages and provided resources to political entrepreneurs in their effort to mobilize support, initiate bandwagoning effects, and create cross-border alliances. In Ajaria and Bulgaria, on the other hand, where cultural identity had not been so deeply politicized, institutional collapse did indeed create space for the rise of political entrepreneurs, but they had fewer resources with which to politicize cultural identity. The relative absence of politicized identity in these regions and lack of tangible resources to mobilize support weakened those political entrepreneurs who would perpetrate violence.

Singh’s account of Punjab and Kashmir suggests that slow institutional erosion correlated with increasing Sikh and Muslim demands for autonomy in both regions. When resources from the

center trickled to a halt, local elites in both regions attempted to gain control of territory and resources that would enhance their power base, much like they did in Abkhazia and Yugoslavia. The Indian case differs, however, in that the repressive apparatus of the central state retained the ability to contain bandwagoning effects, even when Sikh emigres pressured Punjabi Sikhs to fight harder and when alliances were made between extremists in Kashmir and Pakistan. The state's repressive apparatus was strong even while central allocative institutions disintegrated. Because the army was able to suppress violence, the violence that did erupt was less intense.

Lubeck's account of Egypt and Algeria suggests that state institutions in these two countries were riddled with corruption and marked by patronage systems that weakened democratic practices and perpetuated social and economic inequality. Algeria was the weaker state, but its weakness was masked by the oil boom of the 1970s. The debt crisis of the 1980s, however, created a fiscal crisis in both states that exposed their weaknesses. The exposure of the weakened state in both countries, their desperate international alliances, and their inability to meet the needs of their populations led to a decline in secular nationalism and created a ripe opportunity for entrepreneurs promoting political Islam to gain a foothold in both societies. Islamic groups seeking political power were able to provide welfare services to those groups that the state had abandoned and the market had defeated. They also provided these groups with a messianic vision that promised them a "non-Western and distinctly Islamic path to modernity and development." Bandwagoning effects followed the path described in the introduction to this volume: acts of violence and civil disobedience on the part of extremists created social pressure to join the bandwagon; the disaffected joined in as well, and the ranks of groups promoting political Islam swelled.

The contrast between Egypt and Algeria highlights the important role of institutions in either encouraging or inhibiting bandwagoning effects that political entrepreneurs set in motion. While the Egyptian state was able to repress mounting violence, the weaker Algerian state was not. When, in 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won a majority in the national assembly, the army took the reigns of government, outlawing the FIS. With democratic alternatives closed in a state much weaker than that of Egypt, the FIS took up arms, and civil war was the result.

In contrast to Egypt and Algeria, Malaysia maintained a strong state in the wake of the oil boom and the debt crisis. This strength was founded partly on Malaysia's flexible political institutions. Elite bargaining created alliances between ethnic groups that encouraged political compromise. The compromises were credible because elites had ample resources to distribute to those loyal to the alliance. And a strong and flexible party system absorbed and thus neutralized extreme Islamicist movements. Malaysia, with a diverse cultural population, remained at peace. Nonetheless, if our argument to this point is correct, a weakening of the Malaysian state in the future is likely to lead to intense cultural conflict there because its political institutions have indeed cemented the political relevance of cultural identity.

In all of these cases, cultural violence was highest where states that had previously politicized culture had collapsed. Violence was lowest where states did not politicize culture, whether they collapsed or not. Malaysia provides the exception, suggesting that state strength and, more important, state legitimacy can keep the peace where culture has been politicized. A comparison of Egypt, Algeria, and India, however, still leaves an unsolved puzzle: Algeria had a high level of violence, while Egypt and India had medium levels of violence when states weakened. Yet Egypt and Algeria had not previously politicized culture, while India's institutions had exacerbated cultural divisions. The state's ability to repress violence in all three states and the extreme roughness of our measurement limits our ability to positively correlate the intensity of cultural conflict with institutional legacies. The comparison of these three cases in light of the others suggests only that where legacies of institutional discrimination and privilege prevail, cultural conflict in a weakened or collapsing state takes the form of successionist tendencies and is likely to be higher; where those legacies were absent, political entrepreneurs mobilize to capture the existing state, and the intensity of conflict is likely to be lower unless the state is too weak to prevent its violent capture.

England, Germany, and the United States provide examples of industrial states that experienced a rise in right-wing nativist rhetoric and popular sentiment that correlated directly with a significant weakening of the party structure in all three countries. Nonetheless, in all three states, institutions providing legal protection of minori-

ties were able to inhibit the bandwagoning effects that political entrepreneurs and their inflammatory rhetoric initiated.

In all three countries, the changing structure of the party system created space for the rise of the extreme right, while the presence of immigrant communities in the face of increasing unemployment made some populations receptive to extreme right appeals. Bandwagoning effects could take hold because in all three countries the large integrating political parties experienced a “crisis of ideology” that led to their decline in popularity.⁹ In England, the two major parties, which had captured over 90 percent of the popular vote in 1959, received only 75 percent in 1974. Germany’s party fragmentation began a decade later. In the 1970s, the SPD and CDU/CSU could collect over 90 percent of the vote, but in 1987, their share had declined to 81.3 percent. In the 1990 elections, their share fell to 77.3 percent. In the United States, the percent of the population that actually voted decreased from a high in 1976 of 53.3 percent to 52 percent in 1980 to 50.1 percent in 1988.

Recent studies of shifts in party structure suggest that if political parties begin to weaken or fragment, with larger catch-all parties losing votes, those large parties attempt to recapture lost constituencies by incorporating the smaller parties’ positions into their own platforms. Smaller parties can espouse a “pure” ideological rhetoric, often by creating sensational issues, since they expect to capture only a small fraction of the vote or none at all; larger parties respond by incorporating radical positions in digestible form to retain their traditional voters. Left-right dichotomies are diluted, and class-based voting is replaced by issue-based voting.¹⁰ Larger parties are tempted to embrace the extreme positions in order to retain the constituencies that could be attracted to extremist parties.

In England, the structural weakening of the majoritarian electoral system fanned the flames of National Front extremism, leading it to espouse more extreme rhetoric than it would have if it had a chance of winning a national election. Bandwagoning effects took hold. The rise of the National Front, in the face of a declining constituency, struck fear in the hearts of conservatives and encouraged right-wing sentiments within conservative ranks. As a result, the anti-immigrant Monday Club in the Conservative Party was born. As Thomas writes, “The club opposed all nonwhite immigration and

became the primary voice for illiberal, anti-immigration sentiment in Parliament.”

Conservatives thus took up race as an issue in order to snatch it from the National Front. And Margaret Thatcher began to pander to the prejudices of National Front supporters. She further proceeded to destroy channels for effective political expression and representation in poor communities. Police were increasingly removed from the areas in which they worked, and they placed more emphasis on apprehending criminals than providing assistance. By the 1980s, police brutality, racial discrimination, and abuse of police authority played an important role in triggering violence in minority communities; that violence, in a political milieu of rising extreme right rhetoric, was characterized in the media as “racially motivated,” even though it was not. In fact, these riots were motivated by the frustrations of unemployment and by the increasingly harsh measures taken by the police in immigrant neighborhoods. Institutional changes contributed to frustration and the motivation to retaliate against the police. But because dominant institutions had not politicized cultural differences, the violence was not stimulated by the racism and xenophobia that the extreme right had tried to cultivate.

Nonetheless, England’s flexible institutions were able to respond to some of the grievances that had brought on the violence. The central state responded with the offer of resources to deprived urban neighborhoods. It also increased the number of minority-led projects and increased funding for the Urban Programme. The extreme right was subsequently neutralized and violence was attenuated.

Bandwagoning effects triggered by party fragmentation and successful institutional efforts to halt them were evident in Germany as well. The rise of the extreme right in a fragmenting political system led the conservative CDU to take an anti-foreigner stance in order to capture lost voters. “Ethnic Germans” were still permitted to enter Germany from abroad with full citizenship rights. Conveniently, these “ethnic Germans” were traditional right-wing voters, and the CDU was eager to capture their support. But because they were granted generous material benefits, tensions over immigration rose, and the CDU’s interpretation was that the problems were caused by “foreigners”—that is, nonethnic German immigrants. The

CDU thus moved to change the constitution to restrict immigration of nonethnic Germans. The SPD opposed this amendment, and political gridlock was the result.

This gridlock, Leslie argues, opened space for the far right to shape the political rhetoric and focus it on anti-foreigner sentiments. And when the Republikaner exploited nativist frustrations with foreign residents, exclusive citizenship laws channeled that frustration and the increasingly hostile rhetoric toward non-German immigrants. As Leslie writes, "The [CDU and CSU's] choice to frame issues according to the formula of 'misuse of asylum' . . . created the polarized and deadlocked environment" in which the appeal of far right parties on "foreigners" found resonance with voters.

The rise of the far right increased the hostility of anti-foreigner rhetoric and thus created an atmosphere in which the odds of violence against foreigners increased in typical bandwagoning fashion. But the far right did not cause the violence. Before 1989, strong liberal institutions shaped far right behavior to the rules of parliamentary institutions and competitive politics in the FRG. And in the GDR, strong state institutions upheld social controls that blocked all dissent. It was the collapse of those institutions and Germany's unification that opened the door to violence. The near absence of political institutions and social cohesion in the East led to the spontaneous formation of skinhead groups whose members looked to one another for identity and community. When the stipulations of the unification treaty on immigration were implemented, large numbers of immigrants moved East; the confluence of right-wing rhetoric, the absence of institutions to ensure social order, large numbers of dislocated and unemployed youth organized in skinhead groups eager to jump on the nativist bandwagon, and an influx of immigrants ensured a violent explosion. And violence fed on itself as it strengthened social bonds in skinhead groups. As noted above, however, Germany's political institutions protected individual rights of residents, whether or not they were immigrants. And constitutional constraints on extremist parties prevented them from obtaining real political power. Thus when institutional strength in the East was restored, violence abated, and liberal norms in the West, bolstered by constitutional constraints on extremist activity, further weakened the far right and inhibited the political mobilization efforts of its political entrepreneurs.

Finally, in the United States, a decline in discipline and cohesion in the major parties weakened their capacity to govern because they could not ensure enough party solidarity to push through assertive policies. Political gridlock resulted at the federal level, exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy brought on by the policy failures of the 1960s.

Indeed the 1960s brought a surge of activist state efforts to achieve greater social integration of diverse cultural groups. But because of the weakness of federal institutions—designed deliberately to be weak through the separation of power and other features of the Madisonian system—these programs could not be successfully implemented. Central institutions simply did not have the capabilities to carry out interventionist policies. The result was a series of policy disasters that began to undermine public support—particularly the support of moderates—for federal intervention. Those disasters created an opportunity for political entrepreneurs to draw on the institutional legacy of decentralization and the limited state to mobilize support for a sustained effort to dismantle federal institutions.¹¹

By the 1970s, federal government gridlock and the absence of party discipline in a political atmosphere of declining federal legitimacy permitted political mavericks to rise within the party system.¹² Political victory went to those entrepreneurs who offered increasingly extreme positions on the dismantling of the central government. Indeed Reagan, like Thatcher, was able to mobilize support by polarizing politics and promising increasing federal government decentralization.¹³

Ronnie Lipschutz argues here that political opportunity for the rise of extremist proponents of nativist policies was created by party mavericks who had launched this attack on federal government and who were increasingly supported by the more moderate political elements. As public doubt about the continuing legitimacy of central authority spread, an atmosphere was created in which mainstream political entrepreneurs could attack federal welfare policies that transferred shrinking national resources to the poor—including large numbers of immigrants and ethnic minorities. And politicians' attacks on central authority and federal policies, as well as their increasing practice of divisive identity politics, created an atmosphere that nourished the growth of more extreme right-wing militias, the Patriot Movement and the Northwest Imperative. But in the

United States, as in England and Germany, liberal institutions were able to block widespread influence of these groups. The relatively strong inclusive institutions of citizenship and participation inhibited bandwagoning effects and prevented the opening for extremist violence against foreigners that emerged in Germany. Right-wing militias have yet to become involved in violence against ethnic and religious minorities. Instead, violence has been directed against the central government, most notably in the bombing of the Oklahoma federal building in 1995.

Lipschutz argues, however, that this lack of systematic cultural violence does not mean that it will not erupt in the future if the institutions of central authority continue to lose their legitimacy. Ethnic and religious minority rights continue to be protected by governmental institutions. This protection of collective rights, intended to bolster other social integration efforts, has ironically triggered a backlash, with increasing calls for protection of the individual against collective minority rights and privileges. Those calls can become a pretext for political entrepreneurs in a transforming institutional environment to espouse xenophobic and racist ideologies in an effort to mobilize support for the “protection” of an ethnically defined majority.

A comparison of the three industrial democracies reveals the importance of institutional incentives, legitimacy, and strength to the reduction of violence. Nonetheless, the weight of each of these factors is difficult to measure. Of the three cases, only the German story suggests that institutional legacies provided an incentive for political entrepreneurs to espouse nativist sentiments and politicize culture. Nothing in the stories told so far tells us why entrepreneurs in England and the United States decided to politicize culture as opposed to other potential social divisions. To understand that decision and why it was a useful tool to mobilize support, we must turn to the political economy of cultural conflict. Comparisons among all our cases, however, roughly suggest a set of general causes of ethnic and sectarian conflict. In all of our cases, the weakening of some or all key state institutions that upheld the social contract opened a window of opportunity for political entrepreneurs who mobilized popular support by exploiting cultural divisions. Whether they succeeded in getting their bandwagons rolling depended on three things: institutional legacies of discrimination and privilege, the

strength of their cross-border alliances, and the strength of institutions that could block their progress. But it was institutional strength and the absence of a legacy of the practice of identity politics that mattered the most to the absence of intense cultural conflict.

The cases suggest that bandwagoning effects and the formation of cross-border cultural alliances leading to cultural violence are highest in collapsed states that had deeply politicized cultural identity. Where cultural identity was not previously politicized, bandwagoning effects and cross-border alliances were weaker, and collapsed states did not experience cultural violence. Table 2 summarizes this argument. The two problems of similar levels of violence in states that had politicized culture and states that did not, and the motivations of political entrepreneurs to play the ethnic card in states with relatively weak legacies of identity politics, still remain. I turn to a discussion of the political economy of cultural conflict in order to seek solutions to these problems.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CULTURAL CONFLICT

Until this point, our assessment has suggested that the kind and degree of institutional collapse combined with degree of politicized cultural identity explain the outbreak of violence and its intensity. The final leg of our argument proposes that variations in legacies of economic discrimination and privilege largely contribute to the intensity of the political relevance of cultural identity. And the kind and degree of institutional transformation—collapse, decline, or disruption—can largely be explained by the state's position in the international economy, its ability to withstand the negative forces of globalization, and the economic disruption of liberalization. Further, the more intense the legacy of politicized cultural identity, the more material resources available to ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs when central states weaken. Political entrepreneurs with the most material resources will be the winners in political competition. Finally, economic hardships that fall directly and disproportionately on culturally defined social groups create the demand for the goods that ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs promise to deliver. I now turn to the evidence for these final propositions.

Table 2

Strength of Institutions and Cross-Border Cultural Alliances as Factors of Cultural Violence

<u>Country</u>	<u>State promotes</u>	<u>Institutions</u>	<u>Cultural Alliances</u>	<u>Bandwagoning</u>	<u>Level of Violence</u>
Yugoslavia	Identity politics	Collapse	Yes	Yes	High
Abkhazia	Identity politics	Collapse	Yes	Yes	High
Algeria	Secular politics/ social integration	Collapse	Yes	Yes	High
Punjab	Identity politics/ social integration	Decline	Yes	Yes	Medium
Kashmir	Identity politics/ social integration	Decline	Yes	Yes	Medium
Egypt	Secular politics/ social integration	Decline	Yes	Yes	Medium
Germany	Identity politics/ social integration	Collapse and transformation in the East	Few	Yes but halted	Low/medium
United States	Social integration	Disruption	No	Halted	Low
England	Social integration	Disruption	No	Halted	Low
Bulgaria	Social integration	Collapse and transformation	No	No	None
Ajaria	Social integration	Collapse and transformation	No	No	None
Malaysia	Identity politics	Growing strength		No	None

Post-Communist regions varied significantly in their legacies of economic discrimination and privilege along cultural lines. We saw above that in Abkhazia and Yugoslavia, the institution of ethnofederalism cemented the political relevance of cultural identity, and it was most clearly associated with cultural violence after communism's collapse. What perpetuated that institution was the flow of material resources allocated according to ascriptive "ethnic" criteria. Abkhazian farmers received more subsidies and experienced less central control than Georgian farmers in Abkhazia; ethnic machines provided a disproportionate share of jobs in the government bureaucracy for Abkhazes. In Yugoslavia as well, ethnofederalism took the form of distinct ethnic republics; investment funds were provided to these republics by the central state partly according to political and ascriptive criteria rather than economic rationality. Ascriptive allocation fostered both resentment and perceptions of intrinsic "rights" to further resources from the center. This system fostered mutual resentments and suspicions of other republics; resentments, suspicions, and belief in one's own collective intrinsic rights to resources solidified ethnic identity, weakened loyalty to the central government, and reinforced the dominant logic of identity politics at the federal level. In both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, however, as long as the central state was relatively strong, ethnofederalism functioned as a channel for effective if not efficient resource distribution, despite the resentments and fears that it nourished. It was when the central state weakened and finally collapsed that those resentments and fears became resources for mobilization in the hands of political entrepreneurs espousing violent secession and capture of territory.

The roots of collapse can be traced to the beginning of the cold war and the position of these countries in the international economy. In the Soviet Union, Stalin refused to become part of the new postwar international economic order and attempted to steer the Soviet Union in the direction of economic autarky.¹⁴ But Soviet growth rates fell—not only because of the distortions of central planning, but also because of the inefficiencies of autarky. The Soviet bloc found itself on the sidelines in the race for economic prosperity as its technical expertise in commercial industry began to lag far behind the industrial capitalist nations. Throughout the cold war, technology gaps between the USSR and the West widened and multiplied.¹⁵ Only

when Gorbachev came to power did the Soviet regime open the floodgates to the international economy and begin the process of creating internal markets.¹⁶ These moves were initially widely supported by Soviet economic elites, who (it would now appear rightly) believed that the USSR would not remain a great military power unless it could raise the technological level of its industry to meet the standards of global competition. Opening to the West was one of the many strategies of renewal constructed to meet this goal.

Domestic reforms and market ties with the West, however, obviously failed to shore up the declining economy. Because internal economic rigidities still persisted, Western technology was purchased as a substitute for economic restructuring; Soviet planners knew that if they tried to compete in the international economy with sales of oil, timber, furs, and other commodities, they would never be as competitive as states that produced computers, advanced components, and new materials. If Soviet industries were to compete in the world market, innovative technology would have to be imported. But the hard currency that was required for the technology purchases necessary to the production of these goods could be earned only through increased exports. Export earnings, however, were subject to the vagaries of commodity markets, and when they could not cover imports, technology had to be purchased with Western credits.

Growing internal economic weakness meant that the Soviet Union and the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries were eventually plunged into debt to purchase technology and consumer goods and raise wages to stave off domestic unrest. East European and later Soviet debt to the West reached dangerously high levels in the 1980s, only to be reduced by drastic cuts in Western imports and massive rescheduling. Subsequent decreases in economic growth rates and decline in living standards squeezed populations who could no longer be mobilized by ideological appeals. The collapse of the central state was inevitable.

Yugoslavia experienced a similar path of debt-led institutional decline. After 1973, the fourfold increase in the price of oil combined with a decline in the economic growth rate to trigger expanded borrowing on international markets. Western banks and their governments were only too eager to provide balance of payments financing and additional export credits. The accumulation of petrodollars in

Western banks, combined with the 1974 recession, freed loan capital as lenders scrambled to compete for business. Like most other borrowers, Yugoslavia had little difficulty in arranging loans on excellent terms in a financial environment marked by excessive liquidity and overcompetition among lenders. Borrowing created an artificial sense of economic well-being. Consumers became increasingly dependent on imports, and exports became increasingly uncompetitive. As imports grew faster than exports, repaying the debt in convertible currency became increasingly difficult. New loans were needed to service old ones.

As the external debt exploded and as the global recession closed export markets, regional conflicts over the distribution of economic resources contributed to economic decline. Recall that the regionally based allocation of resources in Yugoslavia increased local power and the political strength of local political entrepreneurs at the expense of the central state. As the various regional political elites gained increasing autonomy from the federal government, they began to follow self-protective import substitution policies, leading to important losses in economies of scale. Furthermore, the regional governments did not coordinate foreign exchange stockpiles. The absence of coordination led to fragmentation of economic activity and the reduction of the stock of available capital for new investment. The resulting losses of revenue to the central government helped to undermine its ability to resist further regional encroachments on its effort to coordinate economic activity.

In the period after the collapse of the central state, the Yugoslav situation differed from that of Abkhazia in that the disintegration of federal control over resources created opportunities for regional officials in ethnic republics to seize assets and gain political support. Local Abkhazian officials, on the other hand, were cut off from their patronage networks in Moscow with the Soviet collapse. Bereft of internal resources, they looked outward to potential alliances and received enough military support from Russia and trans-Caucasus alliances to defeat the Georgians.

In contrast to both of these areas, Bulgaria and Ajaria had not developed a system of ascriptive resource allocation. Therefore, the collapse of central control in the face of economic crisis did not leave ethnic or sectarian political entrepreneurs with internal resources to exchange for political support. Nonetheless, in Bulgaria, given the

“cultural division of labor” under which Pomaks and Turks were largely employed in uncompetitive and inefficient tobacco industries and farming, a transition to a market economy left a disproportionate number of Muslims unemployed. Economic hardship made them available for reassignment to a new political identity, and sectarian political entrepreneurs—like Kamen Burov—attempted to cash in on the discontent in an effort to gain political support. With only a Pomak identity and no material resources to offer, however, Burov’s efforts were less than successful. Economic factors thus explain the political entrepreneurs’ decisions to exploit cultural grievances for political advantage, but institutional incentives and constraints explain whether they can get the bandwagon rolling or not.

With no system of preferential resource allocation in Egypt and Algeria, political Islam was relatively weak, particularly during the Fordist period of state-led development and the oil boom that provided an expanding economic pie and full employment. Although the seeds of political Islam were planted much earlier and although Islam has an important political component, Paul Lubeck argues here that Islamic activism was transformed into a movement capable of seizing state power only with the breakdown of Fordism.

For Egypt and Algeria, as for many other economies around the globe, the Fordist period from 1945 to 1971–74 was associated with steady economic growth and rising incomes. Fordism encouraged state intervention in the economy, its direct and indirect control of basic industries, and import substitution industrialization. It was during this period that elites in Muslim-majority states successfully subordinated political Islam to state-led developmental goals.

But the Fordist era ended with the oil shocks of the 1970s, and at the same time, these states became increasingly integrated into the international economy. Oil rents were consumed rather than invested. When these oil rents were spent, political elites in Egypt and Algeria began to borrow on world markets and eventually had to implement structural adjustment programs mandated by international lending institutions. These programs initially led to a drop in aggregate income, reduced state subsidies, and forced government withdrawal from welfare programs. In this environment, political Islam could thrive, and the state had nothing to offer in order to entice potential recruits away. Indeed, as Lubeck notes here, the

groups who were most successful in gaining adherents were the FIS and the Muslim Brotherhood. With their transnational networks of Islamic groups as a resource base, they were able to create charitable associations, welfare services, schools, and hospitals, offering tangible benefits to needy populations.

Egypt and Algeria thus conform to our predictions about the role of economic factors in cultural conflict. At the outset, the secular state made no cultural distinctions with regard to economic discrimination and privilege; indeed these were states where Islam was the state religion. But widespread hardship brought on by a flawed policy response to the oil boom and the effects of increasing external debt weakened the political institutions that upheld the secular social contract. Widespread unemployment and rising poverty were the unavoidable marks of a broken social contract in both countries. Political space was thus opened for sectarian entrepreneurs promoting the goals of political Islam to mobilize support in opposition to the secular state. Those with tangible resources to offer gained the most support for their efforts.

In contrast, Malaysia experienced steady economic growth and rising incomes between 1945 and 1974 and stable investment patterns during this period. Rather than attempting to construct a secular state, elites created a program for economic distribution along cultural lines. A system of equitable income distribution and export-oriented industrialization increased loyalty to the state. Cultural conflict was thus contained by a growing economic pie and the channeling of cultural disputes into arenas of legitimate political competition.

India's system of ascriptive allocation had historically led to conflicts among Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. Economic discrimination exacerbated these conflicts. When the central government separated Punjab into two states—a Sikh-majority state of Punjab and a new Hindu-majority state of Haryana—there was no clear decision on how river waters were to be split. Both Sikh and Hindu politicians used the grievance over river waters to mobilize the support of their respective populations for their political platforms.

Sikh grievances focused not only on valuable and contested water rights, but also on long-term issues of perceived economic discrimination. The Green Revolution had made Punjab the breadbasket of India, but the central government controlled crop procure-

ment, and Sikh farmers, believing that they could gain more if their crops were sold in a free market, resented state control. Sikhs further resented Hindu dominance in trade and commerce in Punjab. Finally, the central government had starved Punjab of funds for industrial investment in order to promote it as an agricultural region. Each of these grievances deepened the relevance of Sikh political identity and made the Sikh population available for mobilization by political entrepreneurs seeking autonomy.

Although Kashmir historically enjoyed more autonomy from India than Punjab, it was a Muslim-majority region with a powerful Hindu minority that demanded full incorporation within India. While Pakistan pushed for Kashmir's incorporation as a Muslim-majority region, Kashmir's leader, Abdullah, attempted to steer a middle course by seeking autonomy within India and holding to secular principles that would place him above religious cleavages. The central Indian government, however, seemed to favor the Hindu minority, and when Abdullah attempted to implement land reform that would benefit the majority Muslim population, Hindu landlords resisted and the central government came to their aid. Religious cleavages were thus deepened by perceived economic injustice, and intense conflict was the result.

The conflicts in both Punjab and Kashmir intensified as the allocative resources of the central Indian government declined. The oil crisis of the early 1970s affected India in roughly the same way that it affected Yugoslavia. Exploding oil prices and the increasing demands for fertilizer brought on by the Green Revolution led to expanded borrowing on international markets. Export markets contracted under the weight of the global recession, but petroleum-based imports continued to expand. With growing deficits, foreign debt skyrocketed as well. In this environment of shrinking resources, unrest mounted. Indira Gandhi distributed spoils to those who demonstrated personal loyalty to her and abandoned general welfare policies that would benefit the Indian population as a whole.

Economic factors, therefore, worked in much the way we predicted to exacerbate cultural conflict in India. Economic discrimination and disproportionate hardships suffered by both Sikhs in Punjab and Muslims in Kashmir provided widespread incentives for secession. International oil shocks and the resulting debt crisis in India withdrew resources that the state could have used to promote

social stability. Political entrepreneurs were able to mobilize support for secession on the basis of economic grievances, and violence erupted as the central state resisted secession. The state's repressive resources, however, remained intact, and chronic violence has been regularly suppressed.

The consequences of the trend in economic liberalization in India, however, do not appear to conform to our predictions. We suggested that by further shrinking state resources, liberalization policies would exacerbate conflict. In Punjab, liberalization may well have the opposite effect: restrictions of the central state on industrial investment are being lifted under liberalization policies; new industrial investment funds will erase discriminatory policies practiced in the past and, as Singh suggests, "defuse some of the conflicts over how to slice the economic pie." By depriving the population of grievances, liberalization policies may also deprive Sikh political entrepreneurs of the resources they need for social mobilization. Thus the effect is likely to be the opposite of that in Egypt and Algeria, where Islamist political entrepreneurs were able to offer tangible goods in exchange for support. And it is likely to be the opposite of that experienced in the former Soviet Union: Sikh leaders in Punjab and Muslim leaders in Kashmir did not gain the political control over resources that local officials in the Soviet Union had gained; they therefore have not been well positioned to convert the local state apparatus into a mechanism for the distribution of patronage.

We are now in a position to partially solve the puzzle of the sources of cultural conflict in the comparison of the Muslim-majority states and India. Recall that levels of violence in Egypt and India were similar, although Egypt had not politicized culture, while India had. And violence in Algeria was more intense and prolonged than in India, despite the construction of a secular state there after independence. Our discussion of economic factors sheds some light on this problem. In the Muslim-majority states, the political relevance of cultural divisions was latent, and it was the weakening of the state and its refusal to deliver on the secular social contract that was the root cause of cultural conflict. In India, in contrast, it was the initial institutional cementing of ascriptive policies that lies at the heart of cultural conflict. Institutions of allocation and representation—perceived as unjust—provided a motivation for Sikh and Kashmiri claims for secession. Economic grievances intensified that motiva-

tion. The weakening of the state only provided the opportunity for intensified demands on the part of these two groups for autonomy.

From the stories told here, then, we can generalize that the propensity for cultural conflict was higher in India than in either Egypt or Algeria because identity politics was cemented in political institutions and was perceived by secessionist groups as unjust. Sikh and Kashmiri autonomy demands long predated the oil crisis that crippled the central state. In contrast, in Egypt and Algeria, the weakness of political Islam would have been assured had Fordism succeeded. State strength and the economic factors that bolster it can act as a firebreak to the practice of identity politics in states that strive for social integration and eschew ascriptive allocative and representative policies. State strength in countries where identity politics is practiced and where resentment over discrimination and privilege is rising can only reduce the opportunity for intense conflict.

The Western industrial democracies have the fewest institutional characteristics associated with cultural violence among the cases under investigation here. On the whole, their institutions have not promoted identity politics to the extent practiced elsewhere in the cases under review; although they have experienced some institutional disruption since the early 1980s, that disruption and even shifts in the structure of party politics do not compare to the institutional erosion and collapse experienced in our other cases. The violence that has occurred has been sporadic rather than chronic or prolonged. Nonetheless, the Western democracies have all experienced a rise in right-wing nativist sentiment, cultural conflict, sporadic riots, and hate crimes, all in the absence of political institutions that would politicize culture, especially in the United States and England. Economic factors provide a powerful explanation for both the response to right-wing extremism and violent conflict that appears to be racially motivated and thus greatly influence the political entrepreneur's decision to exploit cultural divisions for political gain.

First, although the political institutions of the United States, England, and Germany have acted as a firebreak against the practice of identity politics, they have not prevented economic discrimination along ethnic lines that produced social conflict among distinct cultural groups. In the United States, immigration controls have al-

ways been biased in favor of North and West European immigrants, and economic discrimination against African Americans has been deep and prolonged. Indeed in the 1950s, while whites moved to the suburbs, the inner cities became the ghettos of blacks, Latinos, and Asians; by the 1960s, 80 percent of blacks in the United States lived in ghettos. Forty-four percent of black families had incomes of less than \$3,000 per year, and the black unemployment rate has steadily remained more than double that of whites.¹⁷ Indeed in the early 1980s, while the unemployment rate for whites was close to 8 percent, for blacks it was 20 percent. Economic discrimination and privilege in the United States have clearly caused cultural identity to become politically relevant despite increasing efforts to encourage social integration.

In Britain, cultural identity was similarly politicized by economic factors. Disproportionate numbers of blacks in Britain were unemployed; as noted, the great majority of blacks and Asians in the Handsworth district of Birmingham were unemployed. Discriminatory measures and economic hardship made the political relevance of race unavoidable in Britain.

Liberal governments in both England and the United States attempted to eradicate the effects of discrimination with government welfare policies. In England, unemployed immigrants had access to national assistance and public housing. Partnership schemes, urban training programs, and a youth training scheme were introduced in the early 1980s as a response to the 1981 riots. In the United States, the Great Society and War on Poverty programs were initiated in the 1960s, also as a response to race riots and social unrest. These programs were designed to increase the earning capacity of cultural groups who had been clearly marginalized in the economy. Affirmative action programs were launched that were designed to provide benefits to ethnic groups who had been the victims of economic discrimination in order to aid policies of social integration. As Lipschutz notes here, these programs focused on individual rather than group access and opportunity, in keeping with the institutional bias against the politicization of cultural identity.

State measures to weaken the political relevance of cultural identity caused by economic hardship and discrimination initially appeared to be headed for success. In the United States, the educational and employment opportunities of ethnic minorities greatly

improved after 1970. For a while it appeared that income transfers and subsidies to the poorest in America would reduce the income gap between whites and ethnic minorities.¹⁸ In England, as noted above, the CRCs helped to diffuse racial tensions.

These policies and programs may have continued to encourage social integration, limit identity politics, and mitigate economic discrimination had it not been for flawed implementation efforts, a reduction of resources available to the central state caused by economic recession and decline, and political backlash triggered by rising unemployment. Both countries, as noted above, faced political obstacles to the expansion of institutions that would support a wider reach for government programs of economic allocation. And both faced institutional obstacles to state intervention in the economy to reverse the effects of economic decline when it occurred.¹⁹

Indeed it did occur. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, both England and the United States experienced low levels of unemployment, tight labor markets, and rising wages. The economic growth that characterized this period increased revenues to the state that could be used for social programs and increased overall per capita income. But after 1973, both countries experienced the shocks of economic decline and deep recession. While England was suffering from the growing unemployment effects of long-term industrial decline, the United States too was beginning to show the signs of industrial weakness, evident first in the economy's response to the oil shocks of the early 1970s. In England, the nation's unemployment rate during the first two years of the Thatcher government doubled to top 11 percent, the highest level in Britain since the 1930s. In the United States, the unemployment rate went from 4 percent in 1980 to over 11 percent in 1984, almost a threefold increase. In both countries, the budget deficit ballooned and interest rates skyrocketed.

In response to the effects of the oil shocks and recession of the 1970s, the Reagan and Thatcher governments of the early 1980s drastically reduced the allocative role of the central state in society, squeezing the economic programs that bolstered social integration. As Lipschutz argues in his theoretical essay here, the commitment to economic liberalism and efficiency put pressure on government to balance budgets and reduce welfare expenditures. Services then deteriorated. Reagan passed on social expenditures to the states to distribute, and he cut some programs altogether.²⁰ Thatcher initiated

a painful austerity program, raising taxes and cutting government spending. She rewrote the labor code, delivering a powerful blow to the trade unions, thus reducing the availability of an important channel for the expression of economic grievances. She introduced dozens of new laws limiting the spending powers of local governments and abolished a number of local authorities and programs such as the CRCs.

These cuts in the institutional support for the integrative social contract in both countries did not help race relations in either. Where services were withdrawn, loyalty to the state and the political system weakened. Where Thatcher had abolished local governments with large immigrant populations in London and Handsworth, some of the most serious riots broke out. Indeed through their negative impact on the employment rate, Thatcher's neoliberal policies played a role in setting the stage for violence, seen in the series of riots that erupted in 1981 and 1985. The weakening of the trade unions as a channel for the expression of grievances, Thomas argues, was particularly significant to Britain's minority residents, especially since there were no other minority interest groups at the national level or within the Labour Party. And it was during Reagan's presidency in the United States that black unemployment soared. In 1980, 75 percent of blacks questioned in one poll believed that there was little racial tension in their own neighborhoods. But by 1989, 75 percent believed that whites were obstructing blacks in their efforts to achieve equality.

Although these neoliberal policies did indeed exacerbate racial tensions, it was the effect of long-term economic decline on employment combined with the state's efforts to mitigate the effects of culturally biased economic discrimination that triggered the practice of identity politics in both countries. And identity politics was not practiced primarily by minority populations hurt by economic decline (although affirmative action in the United States did lead to the politicization of cultural identity groups claiming entitlements from the state). Ironically, identity politics was practiced most vociferously by white political entrepreneurs like Enoch Powell and Pete Wilson, who attempted to gain political support from white majority populations experiencing increasing economic hardship resulting from long-term economic decline. They attempted to gain that support by scapegoating nonwhite immigrants and other ethnic minori-

ties and attacking the central state for providing entitlements to those minorities.

Both minorities and the central state provided an easier target for blame than the structural economic conditions that had led to unemployment and widespread economic dissatisfaction. Indeed economic recession decreases state revenues and simultaneously increases demands on state resources. It also causes more direct economic competition between native and immigrant labor over scarce resources than in periods of economic prosperity. In England, for example, declining industries had relied on immigrant labor for their competitive advantage in international trade, directly reducing the native workforce. Although immigrant workers bore the brunt of economic recession, as indicated by higher than average unemployment rates, native workers were not protected from rising unemployment by the immigrant buffer.²¹

Political entrepreneurs took advantage of the explosive combination of widespread economic dislocation and the presence of immigrant communities, placing blame on immigrants for taking the jobs and housing of the white workforce. They also blamed affirmative action, welfare, and housing programs for protecting minorities from the vicissitudes of the market. In England, for example, the immigrant community invariably had higher levels of unemployment than the native workforce and was gradually pushed into the slums of the cities where it had worked. But slum removal projects required that slum occupants be housed in public housing. Thus unemployed immigrants living in the slums leapfrogged over natives who were on the waiting list for public housing.²² Enoch Powell took advantage of these rising tensions in his political rhetoric, in which he stigmatized "immigrants as strangers, as objects of justifiable fear and hatred, and as a source of future division in the nation."²³ He received overwhelming support for his position from the native population. And Pete Wilson openly supported a proposal that would ban all affirmative action in the state of California.

In Germany a similar story can be told. As noted above, Germany was saddled with a set of political institutions that openly politicized cultural identity and legitimated economic discrimination against non-German immigrants. Although the German economy remained much more robust after 1974 than the economies of the United States and Britain, Germany experienced a fourfold in-

crease in the rate of unemployment between 1975 and 1979, and a fivefold increase between 1987 and 1991. Although the supporters of right-wing extremist parties closely reflected a cross-section of the West German electorate as a whole in the 1980s, the majority felt pessimistic about the economic situation and felt that their financial situation was bad. During the same period, over 2 million immigrants streamed into Germany; 1 million were ethnic Germans from the East, about 500,000 were East Germans fleeing west, and about 600,000 were asylum-seekers. As in England, foreign workers were more likely to become unemployed and eligible for social services than natives. Given the institutional incentives discussed above, political entrepreneurs targeted asylum-seekers as the foreigners who undermined German social stability.

The economic situation was much worse in East Germany, where violence against foreigners was the most severe. Leslie notes that the "shock therapy" that introduced the West German mark into the East after unification produced an official 18 percent unemployment rate by 1991. Public housing and the provision of consumer goods and social and leisure activities by the socialist enterprises vanished. The East after unification was characterized by a scarcity of not only institutions, but also material resources.

Nonetheless, in all three countries, the availability of resources to political entrepreneurs outside of mainstream politics was minimal. Political entrepreneurs promoting violence had the fewest resources to offer in exchange for support. While mainstream parties moved to the right as a result of the rise of nativist extremism on the part of a few political entrepreneurs, they stopped short of promoting violence. Indeed the National Front in England lost its following even in a period of high unemployment. Right-wing extremist groups in Germany lost much of their following after stability was restored in the aftermath of unification. Economic grievances can influence the political entrepreneur's decision to exploit cultural grievances, but institutional incentives and constraints best explain whether he will succeed.

We can now draw some brief conclusions regarding the role of economic forces in cultural conflict. In the cases of conflict we have examined here, economic factors have been crucial magnifiers of the forces that create politically charged cultural identities. In some

cases economic discrimination and privilege caused groups to organize and fight against discrimination in the political arena.

Lipschutz argues that trends in economic globalization and liberalizing policy responses to those trends explain the kinds of institutional transformation that can promote cultural conflict. Our cases show that states which opened themselves to international economic forces and pursued liberalizing policies with the weakest economies experienced the most dramatic reduction of resources in the period of transition to the market. Where those resources had been allocated to various cultural groups according to ascriptive criteria, vulnerability to cultural conflict was highest. The case of India is illustrative.

The combination of a drastic reduction in state resource distribution and direct economic hardship engendered by market forces worked to make populations available for reassignment to new political identities. Political entrepreneurs who had tangible material resources to offer in exchange for political support were the winners in political competition. If they promoted a violent resolution to cultural conflict, the odds of violence increased. Evidence from Yugoslavia and Abkhazia supports this claim.

Where institutions were merely disrupted by globalization and liberalization but did not collapse and where institutional legacies largely promoted social integration, political entrepreneurs promoting cultural violence had fewer resources to offer in exchange for support. England and the United States provide the examples. Germany experienced greater institutional disruption and economic dislocation in the East than England, and cultural identity was more deeply politicized, but the economy and state resource base remained relatively strong. There the odds of violence were higher, but political entrepreneurs promoting violence had few tangible resources to offer in exchange for support. They were therefore able to promote violence but unable to sustain it when institutional strength was restored.

Where institutions were severely weakened by globalization and liberalization but where identity politics had not previously been dominant, cultural groups promoting a political agenda were able to offer alternative channels for resource allocation, thereby politicizing cultural identity in the liberalization process. In Algeria, where the state was less deeply rooted and the crisis most severe,

political entrepreneurs promoting violence (often with outside economic support) were able to gain the most support. Egypt, with a relatively stronger state capable of repressing violent groups and their leaders, experienced less violence. Table 3 summarizes the argument.

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in these cases points to a relatively simple finding: countries whose political institutions politicize cultural identity are more vulnerable to cultural conflict than countries whose political institutions promote social integration of diverse cultural groups. Economic discrimination and privilege outside of those institutions can perpetuate or trigger the political relevance of cultural identity, but strong political institutions promoting social integration can act as a firebreak and reduce the political “charge” on culture.

Vulnerability to cultural conflict does not automatically bring on cultural violence. The legitimation of identity politics creates incentives for political entrepreneurs to mobilize populations along exclusive cultural lines. But if states provide a legitimate arena for entrepreneurs to compete and if resources available for allocation are abundant, identity politics, like other kinds of political competition, will be legitimate and stable. It is when demographic and economic changes undermine the rules of the game, undermine the legitimacy of political institutions, and lead to perceptions that the balance of political power is unfair that identity politics, like other forms of political competition, can escalate to cultural conflict and violence. Institutions must be strong and flexible if identity politics is to be stable. When institutions fail, previous incentives promoting social and political divisions along cultural lines are likely to persist and ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs may have a stash of resources to distribute in exchange for support.

Just as vulnerability to cultural conflict does not automatically bring on cultural violence, states whose institutions promote social integration are not immune to cultural strife. Historical, ideological, and sectarian legacies can provide incentives to politicize culture.

Table 3

Economic Hardship, State Resources, and Entrepreneurial Resources as Factors of Cultural Violence

Country/Region and Violence Level	Economic Factors Cause Cultural Discrimination	State Attempts to Mitigate Discrimination	Economic Factors Affect State Capacity	Resources Available to Political Entrepreneurs
Yugoslavia High	Yes	Yes	Erosion and collapse, oil shocks, debt	Resources for regional and former party officials, yes
Abkhazia High	Yes	No	USSR erosion and collapse	Transnational resources for Abkhazian officials
Algeria High	Not during Fordist period	Yes	Oil boom, debt, and rapid decline	FIS, yes; transnational resources
Punjab Medium	Yes	No	Oil shocks, debt crisis, rapid decline	Few resources for sustained violence
Kashmir Medium	Yes	No	Oil shocks, debt crisis, rapid decline	Few resources for sustained violence
Egypt Medium	Not during Fordist period	Yes	Oil boom, debt, rapid decline	Muslim Brotherhood, yes
Germany Low	Yes	No	Rising unemploy- ment in 1980s	Few resources for sustained violence
United States Low	Yes	Yes	Economic decline rising unemployment	Few resources for sustained violence
England Low	Yes	Yes	Economic decline, rising unemployment	Few resources for sustained violence
Bulgaria None	No	—	Economic collapse, debt	No resources for sustained violence
Ajaria None	No	—	Economic collapse of USSR	No resources for sustained violence
Malaysia None	Yes	Yes	No; high economic growth	No resources for sustained violence

And economic discrimination and advantages can push cultural leaders into the political arena to protest grievances or protect privilege. State institutions must provide ample resources and rules to make social divisions like class, interest, or ideology more relevant than culture in the political arena if they wish to avoid political conflict along cultural lines. And they must distribute resources in ways that promote social integration and redress past grievances if they wish to reduce the influence of ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs and ensure loyalty to the state. If the institutions of allocation and distribution weaken where historical legacies of cultural conflict persist in the form of economic discrimination, ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs may be ready to provide alternative resources to deprived populations and thus garner political support and weaken the legitimacy of the state even more.

Inability to compete in an increasingly globalized economy causes the institutions protecting social order to erode, weaken, and even collapse. Globalization means that even stronger states entering global competition must give up their control over the production and distribution of goods within their territories and let the market, rather than political institutions, allocate resources. Despite the seeming impersonality of the market, when these resources are distributed in ways that privilege some cultural groups and discriminate against others, those who lose in the market will lose their loyalty to the state that may have once tried to redress the effects of discrimination.

Sustained and organized violence erupts where the logic of identity politics was cemented in state institutions and where those institutions collapsed and loyalty to the central state disappeared. It also erupts where historical legacies perpetuate the idea that cultural distinctions are politically relevant and states that resisted that idea have weakened and collapsed, losing what loyalty they might have had. Chronic violence appears in areas where states have practiced identity politics and in states whose ability to allocate political and economic resources has severely declined but whose military apparatus is strong enough to repress efforts by cultural groups to secede or capture the state for themselves. Sporadic violence occurs where identity politics is permitted, where liberal institutions penalize attacks on human rights, but where those institutions are disrupted. It also occurs in states with strong institutions promoting social inte-

gration but where a legacy of economic discrimination prevents some cultural groups from achieving full citizenship rights.

NOTES

1. See Jeanette Money, "No Vacancy: The Politics of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial Democracies" (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies), pp. 22–23. Working Paper.
2. See, for example, the contribution by Bell-Fialkoff and Markovits in this volume. See also Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso Press, 1983); Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism and the First Era of Global History* (New York: Harper, 1962); Emerich Francis, "The Ethnic Factor in Nation-Building," *Social Forces* 46, 3: 338–46; R. D. Grillo "Nation" and "State" in *Europe: An Anthropological Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1980); Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
3. Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 86.
4. See, for example, how the different conceptions of citizenship rights in France and Germany (i.e., based on *jus sanguinis* versus *jus solis*) affected the growth of exclusive nationalism in Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
5. That identity was to be shaped by a "cosmopolitan" socialist ideology. Public debate on ethnic issues was largely forbidden, and the grievances of particular ethnic groups had to be articulated in economic and social terms since these were the only terms viewed by the state as legitimate. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Maria Todorova, "Language in the Construction of Ethnicity and Nationalism: The Bulgarian Case" (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, November, 1992); Working Paper Series No. 5.5. Michael Urban in this volume shows that the "imperialism" of Russian national identity in the process of consolidation before the socialist revolution transcended cultural differences. Thus in the current period, political conflict in Russia—though hardly a homogeneous society—is played out among culturally homogeneous elites, each advancing their own particular interests by making exclusive claims to national identity. By unmasking their opponents as "Communists," for example, the new "democrats" in Russia present themselves "as defenders of the nation, as bearers of the national interest." By using the language of identity, they then demonize their opponents by declaring them culpable for the discredited past.

6. See Otto Kirchheimer, "The Catch-All Party," in *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph La Palombara and Myron Wiener (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
7. On the struggle between inclusive and exclusive definitions of citizenship in Malaysia, see Lowell W. Barrington, "Citizenship and the 'Nation-Builder's Dilemma': Ethnicity, Nation-Building, and State-Building in Newly Independent States"; paper prepared for annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 31 August–3 September 1995, pp. 8–11.
8. See, for example, David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Fears and Global Management: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict" (January 1996), p. 15; IGCC Policy Paper No. 20.
9. See Wolfgang G. Gibowski and Max Kaase, "Auf dem Weg zum politischen Alltag," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 11, 12 (1991): 3; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Abstract of the United States, 1994*, p. 288.
10. For these arguments, see Richard Rose, *Voters Begin to Choose* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1986), and Russell Dalton, Scott Flanagan, and Paul Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). On "digestibility," see Ulf Mintzel, "Grossparteien im Parteienstaat der Bundesrepublik," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 39 (March 1989): 3–14.
11. The hallmark of the American political system had been the limited Madisonian state, designed to divide political power. The design was etched in the constitution: separation of powers, federalism, and the Bill of Rights. Allocative institutions reflected the laissez-faire tradition in economic life, and they gave rise to institutions that were incapable of successfully implementing an interventionist allocative economic policy. See Jonah Levy, Robert Kagan, and John Zysman, "The Twin Restorations: The Political Economy of the Reagan and Thatcher 'Revolutions'" (Berkeley, October 1995); unpublished manuscript.
12. James L. Sundquist, "Party Decay and the Capacity to Govern," in *The Future of American Political Parties: The Challenge of Governance*, ed. Joel L. Fleischman (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982).
13. Levy, Kagan, and Zysman, p. 20.
14. See Christopher Mark Davis, "The Exceptional Soviet Case: Defense in an Autarkic System," *Daedalus* 120, 4 (Fall 1991): 113–20.
15. See Beverly Crawford, *Economic Vulnerability in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), ch. 4.
16. For example, by 1 January 1991 there were 2,905 Soviet joint ventures with Western firms, and some of these involved the transfer of dual-use technology over the entire life of the project. Of those registered, 1,027 were operational. See John Lloyd, "Joint Ventures Gleam amid Economic Gloom," *Financial Times*, 27 April 1991, p. 2.

17. Ernst Haas, "Nationalism in the United States" (Berkeley, 1995), p. 49; unpublished manuscript. See also Figure 1 for unemployment rate differences between blacks and whites.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 62. Haas cites Hugh Hecllo, "The Political Foundations of Antipov-erty Policy," in *Fighting Poverty*, ed. Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 314.
19. This is the argument of Levy, Kagan, and Zysman. They argue that in both countries, historical legacies and institutional structures mitigated against aggressive state intervention in the economy, reducing the resources that are necessary for effective policy, resources that are available in France or Japan. They argue that while the Madisonian legacy and federal system impeded state intervention efforts in the United States, external forces, such as the City of London and trade unions, constrained the ability to undertake aggressive intervention in England. If, for example, England were to have initiated policies of deficit spending to stimulate domestic demand, trade deficits would have resulted and the value of the pound would have been threatened. The position of financial institutions in the City would have been undermined by a devaluation of the pound; therefore the political strength of the City prevented Keynesian demand stimulus.
20. Levy, Kagan, and Zysman argue that social expenditures were not cut but simply passed on to the states to administrate.
21. Money, pp. 13–14.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
23. Andrew Gamble, *The Conservative Nation* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 121; cited in Elaine Thomas's contribution to this volume.

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