

# What Do Donors Want? Heterogeneity by Party and Policy Domain (Research Note)

September 27, 2019

## **Abstract**

Influential theories indicate concern that campaign donors exert outsized political influence. However, little data documents what donors actually want from government, and existing research has devoted less attention to donors' views on individual issues. We present findings from an original survey of U.S. donors, including an oversample of the largest donors, and a concurrently-fielded mass survey. We document significant heterogeneity by party and policy domain in how donors' views diverge from those of citizens. We show that Republican donors are much more conservative than Republican citizens on economic issues, whereas their views are similar on social issues. By contrast, Democratic donors are much more liberal than Democratic citizens on social issues, whereas their views are more similar on economic issues. Both parties' donors, but especially Democratic donors, are more pro-globalism than their citizen counterparts. We also replicate these patterns in an independent dataset. Our findings have important substantive implications for the study of American politics.

Members of Congress are advised to spend nearly half their working hours raising money from large-dollar donors,<sup>1</sup> putting them in constant touch with a narrow slice of the U.S. population: under 1% of Americans donate over \$200 in any given election cycle.<sup>2</sup> Yet, even as influential theories express concern about donors' potentially outsized influence on policy (e.g., [Hacker and Pierson 2011](#)), we know remarkably little about what they actually want from government, particularly compared to the massive amount of survey data collected on the opinions of ordinary citizens and even politicians themselves.<sup>3</sup> To inform theoretical and substantive research on donor influence, this note provides a more-detailed account of donors' policy preferences.

This study advances the literature by documenting heterogeneity by party and policy domain in how donors' views diverge from those of citizens. Existing research largely conceives of donors' views on a single ideological dimension (e.g., [Bafumi and Herron 2010](#); [Hill and Huber 2017](#)), documenting that the "donor class" in each party is more extreme than citizens of that party on this overall dimension. We break new ground with findings about donors' views specific to each party in multiple policy domains. To the best of our knowledge, this heterogeneity has heretofore not been reported.

To do so, we build on previous efforts to interview donors to political campaigns by analyzing an original survey of partisan donors ( $n = 1,152$ ).<sup>4</sup> Unique to our survey is that it included an oversample of the top 1% of donors, from whom we have hundreds of responses. The respondents to our survey collectively contributed over \$17.2 million to campaigns since 2008. We compare donors' views to the benchmark of partisan citizens' views measured in a separate original survey.

---

<sup>1</sup>"Call Time For Congress Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak Work Life," *The Huffington Post*, [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/call-time-congressional-fundraising\\_n\\_2427291.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/call-time-congressional-fundraising_n_2427291.html)

<sup>2</sup>"Donor Demographics," *OpenSecrets*, <https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/donordemographics.php>

<sup>3</sup>Our work is related to but distinct from the literature that has documented affluent Americans' views (e.g., [Gilens 2012](#)).

<sup>4</sup>We do not have room in this note to extensively review past efforts to survey political donors. In Online Appendix [A](#), we present characteristics of past donor surveys.

This comparison allows us to assess how donors are different from citizens of the same party—the most comparable group in the public, and to whom politicians may be more responsive were donor influence to decline (Lax, Phillips and Zelizer 2019).

Our data documents extremely large differences between the political views of partisan donors and mass partisans—however, these differences dramatically vary by party and policy domain in a manner not previously reported. We consider three domains: economic policy, social policy, and globalism (e.g., immigration and free trade). We find that Republican donors’ views are especially conservative on economic issues relative to Republican citizens, but are typically closer to Republican citizens’ views on social issues. By contrast, Democratic donors’ views are especially liberal on social issues relative to Democratic citizens, whereas their views on economic issues are typically closer to Democratic citizens’ views. Finally, both groups of donors are more pro-globalism than citizens, but especially Democratic donors. These differences are very large: for example, the gap between *Republican donors’* and *Republican citizens’* views on economic issues is as large as the gap between *Republican citizens’* and *Democratic citizens’* views. We also replicated our findings in a pre-registered analysis of an independent dataset gathered by other scholars.

Our findings contribute to our understanding of donor influence by identifying specific ways donors are especially likely to distort representation: encouraging Republican politicians to be especially conservative on economic issues, encouraging Democratic politicians to be especially liberal on social issues, and encouraging both parties to support more pro-globalism policies. Our results may therefore be relevant to understanding a variety of puzzles in contemporary American politics, including: the Republican Party passing fiscally conservative policies that we show donors favor but which are unpopular even with Republican citizens; the focus of many Democratic Party campaigns on progressive social policies popular with donors but that are less publicly popular than classic New Deal economic policies (Bartels 2018; Nyhan 2016); and the popularity of anti-globalism candidates opposed by party establishments, such as Donald Trump

and Bernie Sanders (Oliver and Rahn 2016). As with previous research, our descriptive data cannot definitively establish the role of donors in such phenomena. However, by advancing an understanding of donors' preferences that makes distinctions between the parties and between policy domains, our work can help significantly refine theoretical and substantive understandings of donors' views and potential influence, as well as point the way towards possibilities for future research to understand the mechanisms that generate the distinctive views held by each party's donor class.

## Original Survey Data

Our population of interest is partisan donors, who we define as donors who give to only one political party. We focus on these individuals so that they can be directly compared to partisans in the mass public. They also constitute the vast majority of individual donors (Li 2018).

We were able to conduct a survey focused on partisan donors thanks to the data Bonica (2014) made available, which joins donor histories across many years, allowing us to identify donors who consistently give to only one party regardless of who controls government. To recruit donors to our survey, we first constructed a sampling frame we defined as follows. We began with data from Bonica (2014) on the names and addresses of all disclosed political donors in the US, updated for giving in 2016. We then selected all donors who the Bonica (2014) data recorded, since 2008, as having given a disclosed donation to any campaign affiliated with one party but, at any time since 1978, had never given a disclosed donation to a campaign affiliated with the other party. Among this group, we computed the total amount each donor had donated from 2008–2016. Finally, within each party, we sampled 4,100 donors who had given a total in the top 1% and 4,100 who had given a total in the bottom 99% of donors. The average donor in the top 1% strata gave \$37,447 in disclosed donations during 2008–2016. To recruit these donors to our survey, we sent them a letter in February 2017 at the address associated with their donations. The letter directed donors to a

website where they could enter a unique identifying code and respond to the survey.

To compare donors with mass partisans, we also gathered 1,636 survey responses from the mass public from Survey Sampling International. We quota-sampled to achieve benchmarks on education, gender, race, and party identification. This mass survey launched the same week as the survey invitations arrived to donors by mail; the median response date to the mass and donor surveys was two days apart.<sup>5</sup>

Due to space constraints, we provide detailed data on survey response rates and representativeness in Online Appendix E. For the donor sample, the AAPOR RR1 response rate was 7.0%. Because the mass public sample was not a probability sample drawn from a sampling frame, there is no relevant AAPOR disposition code for the response rate. We find that the donor sample is generally closely representative of the sampling frame on many characteristics. The exception is that very large donors were less likely to respond to the donor survey. Thankfully, we oversampled very large donors in anticipation and so still have responses from hundreds of them. Online Appendix E also presents descriptive statistics on donors' demographics, contributions, and geographic distribution. The mass survey is generally similar to the American National Election Study and the American Community Survey on key demographic variables.

Question wordings can be found in Online Appendix G. For ease of interpretation, we rescale every item to range from 0 to 1. We also create indices of these items. In particular, we pre-registered which survey items would be used to construct each of three issue indices: economic issues, social issues, and globalism issues. We average responses to the rescaled items in each area into an additive index. The economic issues index consists of 5 items on issues such as taxation and increasing government spending on various public programs. The social issues index consists of 4 items on the following issues: gay marriage, the death penalty, gun control, and abortion. The globalism index consists of 4 items on issues related to trade, immigration, and whether the

---

<sup>5</sup>We also analyzed data from these surveys in a separate project [AUTHOR CITATION] on the political ideology of technology entrepreneurs. That project did not examine differences between donors and mass partisans as we do here.

US should focus on problems at home or abroad. The economic and social items and indices are coded to lie between 0 (most liberal) and 1 (most conservative). The globalism items and indices are coded to lie between 0 (most pro-globalism) to 1 (most anti-globalism).

Our goal was to assign items to indices based on our theoretical priors, as specified in our pre-analysis plan (see Online Appendix [I](#)). An alternative approach would be to simply assign all items to a single additive index of liberal-conservative ideology, which is what an atheoretical exploratory factor analysis may recommend ([Broockman 2016](#)). If donors and mass partisans do not differ across issue domains and a single dimension were sufficient to capture their views, then we should observe little heterogeneity across our *ex ante* pre-specified policy domains in the results. That is, any bias from inappropriately assigning variables to separate indices that tap the same latent constructs should bias us away from finding heterogeneity across issue domains. However, as discussed in the next section, we do indeed observe important heterogeneity across issue domains. A confirmatory factor analysis of our measurement model can be found in Online Appendix [B](#).<sup>6</sup>

We also replicate our findings in an independent dataset ([Hill and Huber 2017](#)) collected by merging donation records to the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). We pre-registered which items in these data we would use to form each policy index, and how we would test our hypotheses in both datasets (see Online Appendices [G.2](#) and [I](#)). These tests represent a conceptual—rather than exact—replication, as they rely on different items and the survey was conducted at a different point in time. This is a strength, not a weakness; if our findings replicate in this different dataset, it suggests they are not confined to the scope of our particular sample and questionnaire.

The results we present in the main text are unweighted. We present weighted results in Online

---

<sup>6</sup>Higher random measurement error in the mass public responses could also make mass partisans appear more moderate than donors across all issue domains in both parties. However, there appear to be systematic sources of heterogeneity that cannot be accounted for by measurement error *per se*: our principal conclusions regard how the differences between mass partisans and donors *vary* by issue domain and party, differences simple random measurement error in the mass survey responses could not easily generate.


Appendices [C](#) and [D](#). The weighted results are similar, and in fact usually stronger.

## Results

Figure [1](#) shows the mean difference between donors and mass partisans by item in each of the three policy domains. Points further to the right indicate instances where donors are more conservative than citizens in their party, whereas points further to the left indicate instances where donors are more liberal than citizens in their party. Each subfigure shows individual issues in one of the three policy domains. The last row in each subfigure gives the mean difference in each policy domain, averaging together responses to the individual issue items shown just above. Figure [2a](#) also summarizes the differences between donors and mass partisans by policy area, showing the mean among donors with a  $\$$  and mass partisans with an  $M$ .

We first examine Republicans. Figure [1a](#) shows that Republican donors are 0.15 units more conservative on economic issues than Republican mass partisans on average. For example, 52% of Republican donors strongly disagree that the government should make sure all Americans have health insurance, versus only 23% of Republican citizens. This gap is fairly consistent across the four economic items. On the other hand, Figure [1b](#) shows that Republican donors are similar to citizens on social issues on average, with a difference of only 0.03 units on the average issue. One exception is that Republican donors are especially conservative on gun control. The difference in these differences between donors and voters on the average economic and social issue ( $0.15 - 0.03 = 0.12$ ) is highly statistically significant ( $t = 5.89$ , see Online Appendix [D](#) for regression results that provide formal statistical tests). It is also substantively large: *the gap between Republican citizens and Republican donors on economic issues is as large as the gap between Republican citizens and Democratic citizens*. Panel [2b](#) replicates this analysis in the [Hill and Huber \(2017\)](#) data. We obtain a similarly sized and statistically significant difference-in-differences estimate of 0.11 ( $t = 7.89$ ).

**Figure 1:** Mean Differences Between Donors and Citizens On Individual Items



*Notes: Each point shows the average difference between donors and voters within each party (difference between donors and voters for Democrats = D, Republicans = R). Each row shows this difference on an individual issue; the last row of each subfigure shows the average difference on an additive index formed from these issues.*

Next, we turn to Democratic donors and citizens. As shown in Figure 1b, Democratic donors are 0.27 units more liberal than Democratic mass partisans on social issues, compared to the 0.12-unit average difference on economic issues shown in Figure 1a. For social issues, the gap is particularly pronounced for capital punishment—80% of mass Democrats support the death penalty whereas only 40% of Democratic donors do. For economic issues, Democratic donors are somewhat more liberal on the issue of universal healthcare than on other economic issues, where



their views are only slightly more liberal than mass Democrats. The overall difference-in-difference estimate between donors and voters on social versus economic issues is 0.15 (0.27 – 0.12) and statistically significant ( $t = 14.79$ ). This difference is substantively large—the gap between Democratic citizens’ and donors’ views on social issues is nearly as large as gap between Democratic and Republican citizens’ views. We also replicate this analysis using the Hill and Huber (2017) data in Figure 2b. Although the point estimate is smaller (a difference-in-difference of 0.04 units), it is correctly signed and statistically significant ( $t = 10.24$ ).


Finally, Figure 1c shows that donors are more globalist than mass partisans in both parties. As summarized in Figure 2a, the estimate in our survey is an average difference of 0.12 units, which is statistically significant ( $t = 13.34$ ), and similar in size to the large differences described above. For example, 83% of citizens agreed with the statement “We should pay less attention to the problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home” versus only 44% of donors. Although this difference exists in both parties, it is mainly driven by Democrats. As shown in Figure 1c, Democratic donors are more globalist than Democratic mass partisans on all issues except for free trade. On the Republican side, the main item that drives the gap is the general question on concentrating on problems at home vs. abroad. Republican donors are actually less globalist than mass partisans on trade policy. Why does free trade seem to be an outlier issue for both parties? It could be because trade has stronger economic features than the other issues in this domain, and so patterns on it bear some resemblance to the patterns in the economic domain. Figure 2b shows that we again obtain a similar and statistically significant estimate when replicating this analysis in the Hill and Huber (2017) data (an average difference of 0.07,  $t = 8.52$ ).<sup>7</sup>

---


<sup>7</sup>Republicans are more pro-globalist than Democrats in the Hill and Huber (2017) data likely because their survey was administered in 2012, when Republicans were more supportive of free trade. In 2017, when we collected our data, the partisan difference on this issue reversed. Further, the issues on each of the two surveys differ, with Hill and Huber (2017) focusing more on military intervention and not including items on immigration. Nonetheless, donors were more globalist than citizens in both parties in both datasets.

**Figure 2: Mean of Policy Indices, by Party and Policy Domain**


**(a) Original Data, Unweighted**



**(b) Replication in Hill and Huber (2017)**



**(c) Original Data, Top 1% of Donors Only**



*Notes: 95% confidence intervals are overlaid in gray.*

Exploiting our survey’s large oversample of superelite donors, we find that these results consistently grow stronger when limiting our comparisons to the top 1% of donors. Figure 2c presents these results. Among Republicans, the difference between mass partisans and the top 1% of donors is 0.19 units larger on economic issues than social issues ( $t = 6.75$ ). Among Democrats, it is 0.17 larger on social than economic issues ( $t = 15.11$ ). The top 1% of donors in both parties are also 0.16 units more globalist than mass partisans ( $t = 14.07$ ). Hence, the most elite donors exhibit preferences even more in line with our overall findings.

In Online Appendix D we present regression results with formal statistical tests. These regressions show the results for the entire dataset, only when limiting our comparisons to the top 1% of donors, and when weighting the data. The weighted results are also shown graphically in Online Appendix Figure OA1. Online Appendix Figure OA2 also shows the relationships between the policy indices and the amount donors contributed. The results again show our findings only get stronger for larger donors: larger donors are more pro-globalism and economically conservative; in the Democratic Party, larger donors are also more socially liberal. In Online Appendix F we also show distributions of the indices by party for citizens and donors.<sup>8</sup>

## Potential Mechanisms

What could explain the pattern of results described above? Although our data are not designed to test specific mechanisms, we discuss potential theoretical explanations in hopes that our descriptive findings will inspire subsequent research.

---

<sup>8</sup>One potential concern is that our comparisons between donors and mass partisans conflate differences in donor status as well as differences in the strength of partisan attachments. However, we find fairly modest differences in party ID strength between donors and mass partisans: Democratic donors who identify as Democrats are 0.16 scale points stronger on the standard seven-point party ID scale (which has a three-point range in this subsample, as it is defined by three levels of partisan strength); for Republicans, the analogous figure is 0.10 scale points weaker. As a result, the point estimates do not change when controlling for the strength of party ID by introducing dummy variables for every level of party ID and their interactions with issue area into the regressions reported in Table OA5: the Economic Issues  $\times$  Donor coefficient changes from 0.12 to 0.11 for Republicans and from 0.15 to 0.16 for Democrats, and the statistical significance levels remain the same.

Donors have two main characteristics than distinguish them from the mass public. First, we would expect individuals who can afford to donate to campaigns to have higher income, wealth, and education in general. Indeed, in our data over half of donors are millionaires (see sample characteristics in Online Appendix E). Other research finds that individuals higher in socioeconomic status and who live in high-income areas are generally more economically conservative and more socially liberal—i.e., less populist and more libertarian—all else equal (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee 2011; Malka, Lelkes and Soto 2019). Self-interest may clearly play a role for this pattern on economic issues; on both economic and social issues, Malka, Lelkes and Soto (2019) also discuss possible mechanisms for these associations related to psychological dispositions such as needs for security or certainty. Second, we expect that partisans who choose to donate should have greater levels of interest in politics than those who do not choose to do so. Those with greater interest in politics tend to have more extreme views, either because having extreme preferences motivates political interest and participation (i.e., selection into being politically active among the extreme) (Hill and Huber 2017; Abramowitz 2010) or because attentiveness to political messages causes individuals’ preferences to grow more ideologically consistent and loyal to their parties’ policy stances (i.e., a causal effect of being politically active) (Broockman 2016; Lenz 2012). We therefore expect donors to be more extreme than mass partisans on average (i.e., Republican donors more conservative and Democratic donors more liberal).

Given these two characteristics of donors (higher socioeconomic status and greater interest in politics), one potential source of the heterogeneity by party and policy domain we document is *cross-pressuring*. That is, for some policy domains, donors’ wealth, income, and education on the one hand and greater interest in politics on the other hand work in competing directions, whereas for other policy domains they reinforce one another. For instance, on social issues, Republican donors are cross-pressured: their greater wealth and education should be associated with more liberal attitudes (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee 2011) but their greater interest in politics would

predict greater conservatism (Broockman 2016; Lenz 2012). This may net out to their views on social issues looking similar to mass partisans. Conversely, on economic issues, there is no cross-pressuring: both their wealth and political interest predict greater conservatism than mass partisans. On the other hand, Democratic donors experience cross-pressure on economic issues, with their greater political interest predicting economic liberalism but their greater income and wealth predicting economic conservatism. However, we found that Democratic donors appear to be slightly more economically liberal than mass partisans, suggesting that partisan loyalty may outweigh economic self-interest. On social issues, Democratic donors are not cross-pressured: both their greater wealth, income, and education *as well as* elevated political interest should lead them to be more liberal than mass Democrats on social issues, which we find they are to a much greater extent than they are on economic issues.

Why are donors—particularly Democrats—more pro-globalism? Previous research has tied globalism (e.g., pro-free trade and immigration) to higher levels of cosmopolitanism (Jackman and Vavreck 2011). This could be due to both the economic and cultural benefits elites draw from globalization. Another possibility is that donors tend to live in urban areas where they are exposed to foreigners and foreign cultures more often, and so develop greater positive affect for foreign individuals and cultures (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee 2011).

To test these theoretical mechanisms, future research will likely require additional data on the preferences of wealthy individuals who do not choose to donate. This would allow us to disentangle to what extent donors' distinctiveness is driven by their socioeconomic status or political attentiveness. Survey data on truly wealthy Americans is extremely difficult to collect (e.g., Page, Bartels and Seawright 2013), but would further our understanding of donors considerably. Panel data tracking wealthy individuals over time would provide additional leverage to understand to what extent changes in their political views may cause or are caused by changes in their donation behavior.

A final theme future research could explore is to what extent donors may also appear to be

more extreme on certain dimensions due to differences in intensity. Donors may assign more personal importance to some policy domains than others, and this could explain differential gaps in extremity by party and policy area if intensity and extremity are correlated. For instance, Republican donors may care more about economic issues due to material self-interest and therefore place more weight on these policy domains. On the other hand, Democratic donors may place more weight on post-materialistic cultural concerns. Future research would need to ask questions about issue importance to test this hypothesis. Separate from intensity is the issue of confidence (Ortoleva and Snowberg 2015). Because donors are more interested and active in politics, they may exhibit greater knowledge and confidence in their opinions, which is also correlated with extremity. Subsequent studies should therefore measure political knowledge and confidence of donors and mass partisans. Unfortunately we did not ask donors these questions, as we sought to keep our survey as short as possible to increase the likelihood of response and completion.

## Implications for Understanding American Politics

While future research should investigate the mechanisms for the descriptive patterns we report, these findings have important substantive implications in their own right. In both our original survey of partisan donors with an oversample of superelite donors and in a dataset gathered by other scholars, we documented previously unreported heterogeneity in the gap between the parties' donor and mass bases. We found that whereas Republican donors are relatively more extreme than Republican mass partisans on economic issues, Democratic donors are relatively more extreme than Democratic mass partisans on social issues.<sup>9</sup> Both parties' donor bases are also more pro-globalism than their mass bases, but Democratic donors moreso. These patterns have important implications for several debates about American politics.

---

<sup>9</sup>This accords with Maks-Solomon and Rigby (2019), who find "rich and poor Democrats disagree on social issues while rich and poor Republicans disagree on economic issues" (p. 1).

First, our results may be relevant to understanding asymmetric polarization, or the empirical claim that Republican politicians have polarized more than Democrats. Insofar as economic issues represent the “first dimension” of American politics captured in these analyses, our findings lend credence to theories that suggest a role for donors in contributing to this pattern (Bafumi and Herron 2010).

In addition, research on the influence of the wealthy has found that legislators appear to represent affluent copartisans better in cases when affluent and non-affluent voters within their party disagree (Lax, Phillips and Zelizer 2019). Our work provides additional structure that helps predict when these disagreements among copartisans are most likely to occur. For example, our findings may help explain why the Republican Party pursues policies such as tax cuts for the wealthy and the restructuring of entitlement programs, which many surveys indicate go against the preferences of their own partisan voter base. On the other hand, our results may help explain why Democrats often prioritize making liberal social policy proposals despite having more popular policy positions on economic issues.

Finally, our findings may shed light on recent leaders of both parties (e.g., George W. Bush, Barack Obama) pursuing pro-globalism agendas in support of free trade and expanded immigration, as well as the popularity of anti-globalism populists (e.g., Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders) in both parties (Oliver and Rahn 2016).

## References

- Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Bafumi, Joseph and Michael C. Herron. 2010. “Leapfrog Representation and Extremism.” *American Political Science Review* 104(3):519–542.

- Bartels, Larry M. 2018. "Partisanship in the Trump Era." *Journal of Politics* 80(4):1483–1494.
- Bonica, Adam. 2014. "Mapping the Ideological Marketplace." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2):367–386.
- Bramlett, Brittany H., James G. Gimpel and Frances E. Lee. 2011. "The Political Ecology of Opinion in Big-Donor Neighborhoods." *Political Behavior* 33(4):565–600.
- Broockman, David E. 2016. "Approaches to Studying Policy Representation." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41(1):181–215.
- Gilens, Martin. 2012. *Affluence and Influence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hacker, Jacob and Paul Pierson. 2011. *Winner-Take-All Politics*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Hill, Seth J. and Gregory A. Huber. 2017. "Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate." *Political Behavior* 39(1):3–29.
- Jackman, Simon and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. Cosmopolitanism. In *Facing the Challenge of Democracy*, ed. Paul M. Sniderman and Benjamin Highton. Princeton, NJ: Princeton.
- Lax, Jeffrey R., Justin Phillips and Adam Zelizer. 2019. "The Party or the Purse? Unequal Representation in the U.S. Senate." *American Political Science Review* Forthcoming.
- Lenz, Gabriel S. 2012. *Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians' Performance and Policies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Li, Zhao. 2018. "How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities: Evidence from Access-Seeking PACs." *American Political Science Review* 112(4):792–808.
- Maks-Solomon, Cory and Elizabeth Rigby. 2019. "Are Democrats Really the Party of the Poor? Partisanship, Class, and Representation in the US Senate." *Political Research Quarterly* .



- Malka, Ariel, Yphtach Lelkes and Christopher J. Soto. 2019. "Are Cultural and Economic Conservatism Positively Correlated?" *British Journal of Political Science* 49(3):1045–1069.
- Nyhan, Brendan. 2016. "Is the Slide Into Tribal Politics Inevitable?" *New York Times*.
- Oliver, J. Eric and Wendy M. Rahn. 2016. "Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 667(1):189–206.
- Ortoleva, Pietro and Erik Snowberg. 2015. "Overconfidence in Political Behavior." *American Economic Review* 105(2):504–35.
- Page, Benjamin I., Larry M. Bartels and Jason Seawright. 2013. "Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans." *Perspectives on Politics* 11(1):51–73.

# Online Appendix

## Contents

<b>A Previous Donor Surveys</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>B Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Three Issue Indices</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>C Figures Referenced In Main Text</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>D Formalization of Statistical Tests</b>	<b>27</b>
D.1 Model Specifications . . . . .	27
D.2 Statistical Tests . . . . .	28
<b>E Additional Detail on Surveys</b>	<b>33</b>
E.1 Survey Response Rates . . . . .	33
E.2 Survey Representativeness . . . . .	33
E.3 Additional Details on Donor Respondents . . . . .	36
E.4 Histograms on Individual Items . . . . .	41
<b>F Histograms of Policy Indices</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>G Question Wordings</b>	<b>51</b>
G.1 Original Survey . . . . .	51
G.2 Hill and Huber (2017) Survey . . . . .	55
<b>H References for Appendices</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>I Pre-Analysis Plan</b>	<b>62</b>

## A Previous Donor Surveys

We are not the first to survey donors; Table [A](#) on the next page lists previous donor surveys. However, our paper is the first we are aware of to note heterogeneity by party and policy domain in how donors' preferences diverge from those of mass partisans. Further, our oversample of superelite donors is unique among recently conducted studies.

**Table OA1: Previous Donor Surveys**

Citation	Survey Year	Actual Donations Measured? (– = Self-Reported)	Policy Questions In Multiple Domains	Oversample Top Donors	Parallel Mass Survey
<b>Original Data Collection</b>					
<b>This Study</b>	<b>2017</b>	✓	✓	✓	✓
Barber (2016a); Barber (2016b); Barber, Canes-Wrone and Thrower (2017)	2013	✓	–	–	✓
Gooch and Huber (2018)	2017	✓	–	–	✓
Francia et al. (2003, 2005)	1997	✓	✓	✓	–
Powell (1982, 1989)	1978	✓	–	–	✓
Brown, Powell and Wilcox (1995)	1988, 1992	✓	✓	–	✓
Brown, Hedges and Powell (1980a, b)	1972	✓	–	–	–
<b>Data from Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)</b>					
Bafumi and Herron (2010)	2006	–	–	–	✓
Baker (2019)	2008-2014	–	✓	–	✓
Hill and Huber (2017)	2012	✓	–	–	✓
Rhodes, Schaffner and La Raja (2018)	2010-2014	–	–	–	✓

## B Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Three Issue Indices

We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis in which we modeled three latent variables (economic attitudes, social attitudes, and globalism attitudes) (see Table [OA2](#)). The three latent variables were predicted by the observed survey items associated with the indices as described in the main text and consistent with the pre-analysis plan. We allowed the latent variables to be correlated with one another. To identify the model, the loading of one observed survey variables was fixed at 1 for each of the three latent variables.

Model fit statistics indicate that our pre-registered measurement model fits the data well. The standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) is 0.077, under the recommended threshold of 0.08 ([Kline \(2016\)](#)). Further, the coefficient of determination (akin to an r-squared) is 0.953, close to the maximum value of 1. All of the factor loadings are of the expected positive sign and are statistically significant.

We compared this model to a single-factor model in which all survey items loaded on one dimension (see Table [OA3](#)). The fit statistics are worse than the three-factor model (SRMR: 0.089; coefficient of determination: 0.859). We also estimated a two-factor model where the globalism items loaded on the same factor as the economic items as they all broadly deal with economic policy (see Table [OA4](#)). The fit statistics are again worse than for the three-factor model (SRMR: 0.089; coefficient of determination: 0.909).

**Table OA2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Three-Factor Model)**

<b>Observed: Federal Spending on Poor</b>		<b>Observed: Free Trade</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	1.000 —	Latent: Globalism Issues	1.188 (0.065)
Constant	0.730 (0.007)	Constant	0.650 (0.009)
<b>Observed: Programs for Poorest</b>		<b>Observed: Immigration</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	0.750 (0.028)	Latent: Globalism Issues	0.944 (0.043)
Constant	0.672 (0.006)	Constant	0.531 (0.005)
<b>Observed: Taxes on \$1 million</b>		<b>Observed: Same-Sex Marriage</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	0.534 (0.025)	Latent: Social Issues	1.000 —
Constant	0.872 (0.005)	Constant	0.731 (0.007)
<b>Observed: Taxes on \$250k</b>		<b>Observed: Death Penalty</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	0.562 (0.027)	Latent: Social Issues	1.033 (0.045)
Constant	0.823 (0.005)	Constant	0.466 (0.009)
<b>Observed: Healthcare</b>		<b>Observed: Gun Control</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	1.165 (0.037)	Latent: Social Issues	1.256 (0.043)
Constant	0.693 (0.007)	Constant	0.618 (0.009)
<b>Observed: Problems at Home</b>		<b>Observed: Abortion</b>	
Latent: Globalism Issues	1.000 —	Latent: Social Issues	0.856 (0.028)
Constant	0.392 (0.006)	Constant	0.730 (0.007)
<b>Observed: Trade vs. Jobs</b>			
Latent: Globalism Issues	1.325 (0.061)	N	2818
Constant	0.259 (0.008)	$\chi^2(62) = 2986.19$	

**Table OA3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (One-Factor Model)**

<b>Observed: Federal Spending on Poor</b>		<b>Observed: Free Trade</b>	
Latent: Ideology	1.000 —	Latent: Ideology	0.928 (0.051)
Constant	0.730 (0.007)	Constant	0.650 (0.009)
<b>Observed: Programs for Poorest</b>		<b>Observed: Immigration</b>	
Latent: Ideology	0.762 (0.032)	Latent: Ideology	0.738 (0.031)
Constant	0.672 (0.006)	Constant	0.531 (0.005)
<b>Observed: Taxes on \$1 million</b>		<b>Observed: Same-Sex Marriage</b>	
Latent: Ideology	0.478 (0.025)	Latent: Ideology	1.146 (0.043)
Constant	0.872 (0.005)	Constant	0.731 (0.007)
<b>Observed: Taxes on \$250k</b>		<b>Observed: Death Penalty</b>	
Latent: Ideology	0.486 (0.027)	Latent: Ideology	1.30 (0.055)
Constant	0.823 (0.005)	Constant	0.466 (0.009)
<b>Observed: Healthcare</b>		<b>Observed: Gun Control</b>	
Latent: Ideology	1.252 (0.041)	Latent: Ideology	1.509 (0.057)
Constant	0.693 (0.007)	Constant	0.618 (0.009)
<b>Observed: Problems at Home</b>		<b>Observed: Abortion</b>	
Latent: Ideology	0.712 (0.0345)	Latent: Ideology	0.953 (0.040)
Constant	0.392 (0.006)	Constant	0.730 (0.007)
<b>Observed: Trade vs. Jobs</b>			
Latent: Ideology	0.946 (0.047)	N	2818
Constant	0.259 (0.008)	$\chi^2(65) = 3748.23$	


**Table OA4: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Two-Factor Model)**

<b>Observed: Federal Spending on Poor</b>		<b>Observed: Free Trade</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	1.000 —	Latent: Economic Issues	0.875 (0.048)
Constant	0.730 (0.007)	Constant	0.650 (0.009)
<b>Observed: Programs for Poorest</b>		<b>Observed: Immigration</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	0.769 (0.031)	Latent: Economic Issues	0.695 (0.029)
Constant	0.672 (0.006)	Constant	0.531 (0.005)
<b>Observed: Taxes on \$1 million</b>		<b>Observed: Same-Sex Marriage</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	0.484 (0.025)	Latent: Social Issues	1.000 —
Constant	0.872 (0.005)	Constant	0.731 (0.007)
<b>Observed: Taxes on \$250k</b>		<b>Observed: Death Penalty</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	0.499 (0.027)	Latent: Social Issues	1.002 (0.044)
Constant	0.823 (0.005)	Constant	0.466 (0.009)
<b>Observed: Healthcare</b>		<b>Observed: Gun Control</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	1.222 (0.039)	Latent: Social Issues	1.244 (0.043)
Constant	0.693 (0.007)	Constant	0.618 (0.009)
<b>Observed: Problems at Home</b>		<b>Observed: Abortion</b>	
Latent: Economic Issues	0.655 (0.033)	Latent: Social Issues	0.857 (0.028)
Constant	0.392 (0.006)	Constant	0.730 (0.007)
<b>Observed: Trade vs. Jobs</b>			
Latent: Economic Issues	0.891 (0.045)	N	2818
Constant	0.259 (0.008)	$\chi^2(64) = 3595.23$	



## C Figures Referenced In Main Text

**Figure OA1: Mean of Policy Indices, by Party and Policy Domain – Weighted**




Note: See Online Appendix [E.2.3](#) for a discussion of how we constructed the survey weights.


Figure OA2 shows binned scatterplots of the relationship between contribution amounts for donors and the policy indices. The points in each panel are averages of the policy indices within equally sized bins of donors grouped by contribution amount; the lines show the quadratic best fit.

**Figure OA2:** Relationship Between Contribution Amounts and Policy Indices – Binned Scatterplots

**(a) Economic Index**




**(b) Social Index**



**Figure OA2:** Relationship Between Contribution Amounts and Policy Indices – Binned Scatterplots (continued)

**(c) Globalism Index**



## D Formalization of Statistical Tests

### D.1 Model Specifications

As explicated in the pre-analysis plan in Online Appendix [II](#), we estimate the following OLS regression models by stacking together responses to the economic and social issue indices and clustering standard errors by respondent.

We first estimate the following model restricting the sample to Republican donors and Republican mass partisans:

$$A_i = \alpha + \beta_1 RD_i + \beta_2 E_i + \beta_3 (RD_i \times E_i) + \epsilon_i. \quad (1)$$

$A_i$  is each respondent's score on an attitude index (scaled to lie between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding with more conservative attitudes),  $E_i$  is a dummy variable representing whether the attitude is from the economic issues index (the baseline is that the attitude comes from the social attitudes index),  $RD_i$  is a dummy variable representing Republican donors (with mass Republicans as the baseline category), and  $\epsilon_i$  is stochastic error at the respondent level.  $\beta_1$  captures the anticipated greater conservatism of donors than citizens in the Republican Party in general (in this case using social issues to establish a point of comparison). Using this model, if we find that  $\beta_3 > 0$ , it indicates that Republican donors are especially conservative on economic issues.

For Democratic donors and Democratic mass partisans, we estimate a similar model:

$$A_i = \alpha + \beta_1 DD_i + \beta_2 E_i + \beta_3 (DD_i \times E_i) + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where  $DD_i$  is a dummy variable representing Democratic donors (with mass Democrats as the baseline category), and the other variables are defined as in equation [\(1\)](#). Using this model, if we find that  $\beta_3 > 0$ , then it indicates greater liberalism of Democratic donors than mass Democrats on

economic issues to be smaller than on social issues (the baseline category).

Finally, we pool Republicans and Democrats together to estimate the following model:

$$G_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 P_i + \epsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where  $G_i$  represents the globalism issues index (scaled to lie from 0-1, where larger values are more pro-globalism),<sup>10</sup>  $D_i$  represents Republicans and Democratic donors pooled together (with mass Republicans and Democrats as the baseline category), and  $P_i$  is an indicator for partisanship with 1 = to Republican respondents and 0 = Democratic respondents. Using this model, if we find that  $\beta_1 > 0$ , then it indicates that donors within both parties are more pro-globalist.

## D.2 Statistical Tests

Table OA5 shows the results from estimations of equations (1) and (2) in our data. The coefficient on the interaction between donors and economic issues is significant in all regressions. Table OA6 shows the same in the Hill and Huber (2017) data.

Table OA7 shows the results from estimations of equation (3) in our data, and Table OA8 shows the same for the Hill and Huber (2017) data. Per equation (3), the indicator for donors is significant in all regressions.

All of these tables show the overall results, the results when weighting, and, in the case of our data, the results when only using the top 1% of donors to compute the means for the donor sample. See Online Appendix E.2.3 for a discussion of how we constructed the survey weights for the analyses that use weights.

---

<sup>10</sup>In the Figures we code larger values as more anti-globalism to maintain the interpretation of the indices as more conservative. However, for our formal hypothesis tests we reverse code this index in order to be consistent with our pre-analysis plan. The choice of the sign on the index does not affect the results.

**Table OA5: Results from Original Survey Data (Economic and Social Issues)**

	<b>Full Sample</b>		<b>Top 1% Donors</b>		<b>Weighted</b>	
	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems
Economic Issues	-0.28*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.28*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.29*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)
Donors	0.03 (0.02)	-0.27*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.30*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.03)
<b>Economic Issues × Donors</b>	0.12*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.06)	0.12*** (0.03)
Constant	0.65*** (0.01)	0.36*** (0.01)	0.65*** (0.01)	0.36*** (0.01)	0.66*** (0.01)	0.37*** (0.01)
Observations	1,876	3,304	1,613	2,329	1,822	3,226
R-squared	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.23

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are issue positions ranging from 0 (liberal) to 1 (conservative). Omitted categories are social issues and mass partisans. Leftmost two columns present unweighted results from full sample of donors and mass partisans. Middle two columns present unweighted results but only include oversample of top 1% of donors. Rightmost two columns present weighted results from full sample of donors and mass partisans.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed)

**Table OA6: Results from Hill and Huber (2017) Data (Economic and Social Issues)**

	Unweighted		Weighted	
	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems
Economic Issues	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Donors	0.08*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.00)	0.07** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.00)
<b>Economic Issues × Donors</b>	0.11*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	0.63*** (0.00)	0.18*** (0.00)	0.61*** (0.00)	0.21*** (0.00)
Observations	42,642	53,497	42,642	53,497
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are issue positions ranging from 0 (liberal) to 1 (conservative). Omitted categories are social issues and mass partisans. Leftmost two columns present unweighted results from full sample of donors and mass partisans. Rightmost two columns present weighted results from full sample of donors and mass partisans.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed)

**Table OA7: Results from Original Survey Data (Globalism Issues)**

	Full Sample			Top 1% Donors			Weighted		
	All	Reps	Dems	All	Reps	Dems	All	Reps	Dems
<b>Donors</b>	0.12*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)
Republican	-0.21*** (0.01)	—	—	-0.20*** (0.01)	—	—	-0.21*** (0.01)	—	—
Constant	0.47*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.00)	0.27*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.00)
Observations	5,166	1,884	3,282	3,936	1,620	2,316	5,032	1,822	3,210
R-squared	0.25	0.01	0.11	0.26	0.01	0.15	0.23	0.02	0.11

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are issue positions ranging from 0 (anti-globalism) to 1 (pro-globalism). Omitted categories are mass partisans and Democrats. Leftmost three columns present unweighted results from full sample of donors and mass partisans. Middle three columns present unweighted results but only include oversample of top 1% of donors. Rightmost three columns present weighted results from full sample of donors and mass partisans.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed)



**Table OA8: Results from Hill and Huber (2017) Data (Globalism Issues)**

	Unweighted			Weighted		
	All	Reps	Dems	All	Reps	Dems
<b>Donors</b>	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Republicans	0.07*** (0.00)	—	—	0.06*** (0.00)	—	—
Constant	0.67*** (0.00)	0.75*** (0.00)	0.67*** (0.00)	0.69*** (0.00)	0.76*** (0.00)	0.69*** (0.00)
Observations	47,729	21,217	26,512	47,729	21,217	26,512
R-squared	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are issue positions ranging from 0 (anti-globalism) to 1 (pro-globalism). Omitted categories are mass partisans and Democrats. Leftmost three columns present unweighted results from full sample of donors and mass partisans. Rightmost three columns present weighted results from full sample of donors and mass partisans.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$  (two-tailed)

## E Additional Detail on Surveys

In this section we describe the response rates and representativeness of our partisan donor and mass public samples.

Online Appendix Section [G](#) gives the full question wordings.

### E.1 Survey Response Rates

The response rate to our donor survey (7.0%) compares similarly to high-quality surveys of the mass public. For example, Pew’s response rates to their phone surveys are 9%; see “What Low Response Rates Mean for Telephone Surveys,” *Pew*, <http://www.pewresearch.org/2017/05/15/what-low-response-rates-mean-for-telephone-surveys/#fn-291178-1>. Other response rates, such as to the *Washington Post*’s telephone polls, are even lower. And cumulative response rates—taking into account all stages of the sampling process—of high-quality Internet panels such as the GfK Knowledge Panel can be below 1% ([Callegaro and DiSogra \(2008\)](#)). Our donor survey was conducted by mail, and its response rate compares favorably to response rates of mass public surveys conducted by mail ([Broockman, Kalla and Sekhon \(2017\)](#)).

### E.2 Survey Representativeness

#### E.2.1 Partisan Donor Survey

Table [OA9](#) compares the donor sampling frame and survey respondents on observable characteristics. Race and gender are estimated as above. Unsurprisingly, the largest donors were slightly less likely to respond to our survey, but our oversample recruited in anticipation of this meant that we still have hundreds of super-elite donors in each party in our data.

The response rate among Democratic donors was 10.8% and the response rate among

**Table OA9:** Characteristics of partisan donors who responded to survey and in sampling frame.

	Donated Since 2008 (mean)	# Donations Since 2008 (mean)	Top 1% of Donors by Amount	Self- Reported Age (mean)	Self- Reported Millionaire?	White*	Male*	N
Whole Frame (With Oversample)	\$19,002	32.8	50%	Unknown	Unknown	93%	59%	16,400
Respondents	\$14,967	55.0	43%	63	52%	94%	61%	1,152

\* Race and gender is estimated from last and first names. The white category refers to non-Hispanic whites.

Republican donors was 3.2%.

### E.2.2 Mass Public Survey

Table [OA10](#) presents information on the representativeness of this sample, which is generally comparable to the US Census and the American National Election Study (ANES). We used the standard ANES party identification question to identify partisans and included leaners.

### E.2.3 Weighting

As a robustness check, we also conducted weighted analyses. We constructed weights for both the donor and mass public samples using entropy balancing with the `ebalance` package in Stata ([Hainmueller \(2012\)](#)). For the mass public sample, we weighted to the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS) for all variables presented in Table [OA10](#) except for race and ethnicity, where we used the 2016 American National Election Study because the ACS race and ethnicity questions do not separate non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics in the same way as our surveys. The donor sample was weighted to the sampling frame variables listed in Table [OA9](#).

For our original survey data, we weight the donors to match to the sampling frame; we weight mass partisans to match to the ACS/ANES. For the [Hill and Huber \(2017\)](#) data, we apply both CCES weights and weights per our PAP to increase the weight of larger donors (roughly doubling

their weight).

One challenge with comparing our original donor survey with the Hill and Huber (2017) survey is that their dataset contains more small donors, whereas many of the theories of elite influence revolve around larger contributors. To gather our main dataset we oversampled the top 1% of donors as a result, and they constitute nearly 50% of our sample. To make the datasets more comparable, we will create a threshold that equals 1 in the Hill and Huber (2017) dataset if the donors gave \$200 or more in total disclosed donations from 2010 - 2012 (2 election cycles) and equals 1 in our data if the donors gave \$500 or more in disclosed from 2008 - 2016 (5 election cycles). We then weight the Hill and Huber (2017) data such that the share above that threshold is the same as in our data.

**Table OA10:** Descriptive Statistics of SSI Sample, American Community Survey, and American National Election Study

	SSI	2015 ACS	2016 ANES
<b>Education</b>			
Less than High School	3.9%	12.9%	9.0%
High School/Some College/Associate's	68.3	59.0	55.2
Bachelor's Degree	16.8	17.9	22.6
Graduate Degree	11.0	10.1	13.3
<b>Gender</b>			
Male	47.1%	49.4%	47.5%
Female	52.9	50.6	52.5
<b>Race</b>			
White	69.3%	73.1%	67.6%
Black	11.9	12.7	10.2
Hispanic	10.6	—	14.4
Asian	5.7	5.4	2.6
Other	2.5	8.9	5.3
<b>Age</b>			
18-29	24.9%	21.7	16.7%
30-49	36.9	33.6	32.2
50-64	23.4	25.4	26.0
65+	14.8	19.2	25.0

*Note: Education categories collapsed for comparability across surveys. 2015 ACS considers Hispanic to be separate variable from race/ethnicity.*


### E.3 Additional Details on Donor Respondents

In this subsection we present additional details on the respondents to our donor survey.

#### E.3.1 Contributions


Figure OA3 shows the distribution of amount contributed from 2008 to 2016 among the sampling frame (including the oversample of large donors) and the survey respondents. Figure OA4 shows the same for the number of contributions given.

**Figure OA3:** Amount Given - Respondents and Sampling Frame



*Notes: Log base 10 used.*

**Figure OA4:** Number of Contributions - Respondents and Sampling Frame



*Notes: Number of contributions above 100 are topcoded at 100.*


### E.3.2 Geographic Distribution

Figures [OA5](#) and [OA6](#) show the geographic distribution of Democratic and Republican donors, respectively, in our sampling frame and who responded to the survey. Each point on these figures represents one county in the US, with the size of the points scaled to the number of donors. Counties where there were no donors have no point shown.


The map uses the Mercator projection. Please note that Alaska and Hawaii are not drawn to scale and that their geographic placement is approximate.

**Figure OA5: Geographic Distribution of Democratic Donors**

**(a) Sampling Frame**




**(b) Survey Respondents**




**Figure OA6: Geographic Distribution of Republican Donors**

**(a) Sampling Frame**



**(b) Survey Respondents**





We did not preregister weighting our survey data by region, but based on pre-submission feedback we have calculated the average response rate to the donor survey by region. Table OA11 shows the results.

**Table OA11:** Response Rate by Region and Party

	Democratic Donors	Republican Donors
Midwest	11%	2%
Northeast	9%	2%
South	9%	3%
West	14%	5%

Unsurprisingly, as we are located at a West Coast-based university, we see slightly higher response rates among donors in the West. However, the indices do not vary by region among donors, suggesting this is unlikely to introduce bias and that weighting on region would not change our results.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup>In particular, regressions within both parties of each index on indicators for region yield substantively small coefficients and insignificant *F*-statistics.

## E.4 Histograms on Individual Items

In this section we show the distributions on each individual item in our survey. Online Appendix [G](#) gives the question wordings.

**Figure OA7: Economic Issues**


(a)




**Figure OA7: Economic Issues (continued)**

**(b)**

Increase taxes on those making >\$250k per year.




Increase taxes on those making >\$1MM per year.



**Figure OA7: Economic Issues (continued)**

**(c)**


Support for universal healthcare, even if means raising taxes.




**Figure OA8: Social Issues**

**(a)**

**Same-sex marriage.**




**Death penalty.**




**Figure OA8: Social Issues (continued)**

**(b)**

**Gun control.**




**View on abortion.**




**Figure OA9: Globalism Issues**

**(a)**

Pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems at home.




American jobs vs. free trade and foreign jobs trade-off.




**Figure OA9: Globalism Issues (continued)**

**(b)**

Free trade agreements a good thing.



Immigration.






## F Histograms of Policy Indices


In this section we show histograms of each of the policy indices broken down by the party and donor/citizen levels.

**Figure OA10:** Economic Policy Index Histograms




Graphs by Level and Party

**Figure OA11: Social Policy Index Histograms**



Graphs by Level and Party

**Figure OA12:** Globalism Policy Index Histograms



Graphs by Level and Party

## G Question Wordings

### G.1 Original Survey

This section gives the wording of the survey questions we combined into each index, as specified in our pre-analysis plan.

#### G.1.1 Economic Issues

1. Do you think federal government spending on each of the below should be increased, decreased, or stay the same? *Aid to the poor*

- Increased
- Stay the same
- Decreased

2. The federal government collects tax money and spends it on many different types of programs. How much do you support spending money on government programs that benefit only the poorest Americans?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

3. The federal government collects tax money from many different sources. How much do you support raising tax money through income taxes on people who earn over \$1 million per year?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

4. The federal government collects tax money from many different sources. How much do you support raising tax money through income taxes on people who earn over \$250,000 per year?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

5. Do you agree or disagree with this statement: “The government should make sure that every American has health care coverage, even if it means raising taxes to pay for it.”

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

## G.1.2 Social Issues

1. Do you support or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?

- Strongly support
- Somewhat support
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

2. Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?

- In favor
- Not in favor

3. What do you think is more important—to protect the right of Americans to own guns, or to control gun ownership?

- Protect the right of Americans to own guns
- Control gun ownership

4. There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?

- By law, abortion should never be permitted
- The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger
- The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established
- By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice

### G.1.3 Globalism Issues

1. Do you agree or disagree with this statement: “We should pay less attention to the problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home.”

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

2. Which of these statements comes closer to your own views?

- We should protect American jobs even if it means reducing the standard of living of people living overseas.
- We should improve the standard of living of people living overseas even if it means losing some American jobs.

3. In general, do you think that free trade agreements like NAFTA and the policies of the World Trade Organization have been a good thing or a bad thing?

- Good thing
- Bad thing

4. When it comes to people from less-developed countries immigrating to the United States, which one of the following do you think the government should do?

- Let anyone come who wants to
- Let more people come than we do today, but not everyone

- Keep letting in the same number of people as we do today
- Let fewer people come than we do today
- Prohibit people coming here from other countries

## **G.2 Hill and Huber (2017) Survey**

For the replication using the Hill and Huber (2017) data, we again pre-registered the construction of three issue indices. For the economic issues index, we use 5 survey items from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) on government spending on social programs, tax cuts, and the Affordable Care Act. For the social issues index, we use 3 survey items on gay marriage, abortion, and the don't ask/don't tell policy. For the globalism index, we use 5 survey items on free trade and the conditions under which military intervention in foreign contexts is appropriate.

### **G.2.1 Economic Issues**

1. Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. 2011 House Budget Plan. The Budget plan would cut Medicare and Medicaid by 42% and would reduce debt by 16% by 2020.

- Support
- Oppose

2. Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. The Tax Hike Prevention Act. Would extend Bush-era tax cuts for all individuals, regardless of income. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated \$405 billion.



- Support
- Oppose

3. Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Repeal Affordable Care Act. Would repeal the Affordable Care Act.

- Support
- Oppose

4. Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Affordable Care Act of 2010. Requires all Americans to obtain health insurance. Allows people to keep current provider. Sets up health insurance option for those without coverage. Increases taxes on those making more than \$280,000 a year.

- Support
- Oppose

5. If your state were to have a budget deficit this year it would have to raise taxes on income and sales or cut spending, such as on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending? Choose a point along the scale from 100% tax increases (and no spending cuts) to 100% spending cuts (and no tax increases). The point in the middle means that the budget should be balanced with equal amounts of spending cuts and tax increases. If you are not sure, or don't know, please check the 'not sure' box.

- 0=All from tax increases
- 100=All from spending cuts

### **G.2.2 Social Issues**

1. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view on abortion?

- By law, abortion should never be permitted
- The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger
- The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established
- By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice

2. Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally

- Favor
- Oppose

3. Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. End Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Would allow gays to serve openly in the armed services.

- Support
- Oppose

### **G.2.3 Globalism Issues**

1. Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. Would remove tariffs on imports and exports between South Korea and the U.S.

- Support

- Oppose

2. Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to intervene in genocide or a civil war?

- Yes

- No

3. Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to assist the spread of democracy?

- Yes

- No

4. Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to protect allies from foreign attack?

- Yes

- No

5. Would you never approve of the use of U.S. military troops?

- Yes

- No

## H References for Appendices

### References for Appendices

- Bafumi, Joseph and Michael C. Herron. 2010. "Leapfrog Representation and Extremism." *American Political Science Review* 104(3):519–542.
- Baker, Anne E. 2019. "The Partisan and Policy Motivations of Political Donors Seeking Surrogate Representation in House Elections." *Political Behavior* pp. 1–20.
- Barber, Michael J. 2016a. "Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology." *Political Research Quarterly* 69(1):148–159.
- Barber, Michael J. 2016b. "Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters in the U.S. Senate." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80(S1):225–249.
- Barber, Michael J., Brandice Canes-Wrone and Sharece Thrower. 2017. "Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?" *American Journal of Political Science* 61(2):271–288.
- Broockman, David E., Joshua L. Kalla and Jasjeet S. Sekhon. 2017. "The Design of Field Experiments With Survey Outcomes: A Framework for Selecting More Efficient, Robust, and Ethical Designs." *Political Analysis* 25(4):435–464.
- Brown, Clifford W., Lynda W. Powell and Clyde Wilcox. 1995. *Serious Money: Fundraising and Contributing in Presidential Nomination Campaigns*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, Clifford W., Roman B. Hedges and Lynda W. Powell. 1980a. "Modes of Elite Political Participation: Contributors to the 1972 Presidential Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 259–290.

- Brown, Clifford W., Roman Hedges and Lynda W. Powell. 1980b. "Belief Structure in a Political Elite: Contributors to the 1972 Presidential Candidates." *Polity* 13(1):134–146.
- Callegaro, Mario and Charles DiSogra. 2008. "Computing Response Metrics for Online Panels." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72(5):1008–1032.
- Francia, Peter L., John C. Green, Paul S. Herrnson, Clyde Wilcox and Lynda W. Powell. 2003. *The Financiers of Congressional Elections: Investors, Ideologues, and Intimates*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Francia, Peter L., John C. Green, Paul S. Herrnson, Lynda W. Powell and Clyde Wilcox. 2005. "Limousine Liberals and Corporate Conservatives: The Financial Constituencies of the Democratic and Republican Parties." *Social Science Quarterly* 86(4):761–778.
- Gooch, Andrew and Gregory A. Huber. 2018. "How Issue Positions Affect Candidate Performance: Experiments Comparing Campaign Donors and the Mass Public." *Political Behavior* pp. 1–26.
- Hainmueller, Jens. 2012. "Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects: A Multivariate Reweighting Method to Produce Balanced Samples in Observational Studies." *Political Analysis* 20(1):25–46.
- Hill, Seth J. and Gregory A. Huber. 2017. "Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate." *Political Behavior* 39(1):3–29.
- Kline, Rex B. 2016. *Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Powell, Lynda W. 1982. "Issue Representation in Congress." *Journal of Politics* 44(3):658–678.
- Powell, Lynda W. 1989. "Analyzing Misinformation: Perceptions of Congressional Candidates' Ideologies." *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 272–293.

Rhodes, Jesse H., Brian Schaffner and Raymond La Raja. 2018. "Detecting and Understanding Donor Strategies in Midterm Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 71(3):503–516.

# I Pre-Analysis Plan

We filed a pre-analysis plan for another project which described how we would combine the survey items into economic, social, and globalism issue indices in our original data. We use the same items as that other project when analyzing our original data. We then filed the below pre-analysis plan before analyzing the Hill and Huber (2017) data. In selecting items which items to use to form the economic, social, and globalism indices from the Hill and Huber (2017) data, we examined all of the policy items they analyzed and selected items that we expected to solely tap the economic, social, and global domains.

## Pre-Analysis Plan for “The Divergent Preferences of Partisan Donors and Mass Partisans”

Date: August 27, 2018

### **Introduction**

This pre-analysis plan will be filed before statistical analysis of previously collected data. As part of our study of the political preferences of technology elites (“Predispositions, the Political Behavior of Wealthy Americans, and Implications for Economic Inequality: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs”), we interviewed partisan donors and the mass public about their attitudes on economic, social, and globalist policy views. Based on some patterns in those data, along with prior literature, we pursued this follow-up project where we seek to compare the preferences of partisan donors and mass partisans, and assess how legislative behavior influences future donations. Hence, **this is not a traditional pre-analysis plan in that we are not completely blind to the data.** We have investigated some patterns in the dataset, but have not explicitly conducted the statistical analyses described below. Further, we have not yet analyzed the Huber and Hill (2015) dataset, which serve as an out-of-sample replication of our core analyses.

### **Empirical Predictions**

We pre-register the following empirical predictions:

- (1) Republican donors are especially conservative relative to Republican voters on economic as opposed to social issues.
- (2) Democratic donors are especially liberal relative to Democratic voters on social as opposed to economic issues.
- (3) Both groups of donors are more “globalist” (e.g., pro free trade and immigration) than the mass public in their parties

### **Categorization of Issues**

We will use the same categorization as in the truly blind PAP we filed for our original project.

Economic Issues: We asked 11 questions about economic redistribution: q3.1.1, q3.1.2, q3.1.3, q3.1.4, q3.1.5, q3.1.6, q3.1.7, q3.1.8, q3.1.10, q3.2.1, q3.2.2. We plan on constructing an additive index of these 11 items, coded to lie between 0 (liberal) and 1 (conservative).

*Note added after filing PAP: This list did not accurately reflect the categorization actually used in our original project, which it was our intent to mirror here. Those items are: q3.1.1, q3.2.2, q3.4.1, q3.4.2, and q3.5.*

Social Issues: We asked 4 questions about social issues: q5.1, q5.2, q5.3, q5.4. We plan on constructing an additive index of these 4 items, coded to lie between 0 (liberal) and 1 (conservative).



Globalism Issues: We asked 4 questions about neo-liberal economic attitudes related to globalization: q4.1, q4.2, q4.3, q4.4. We plan on constructing an additive index of these 4 items, coded to lie between 0 (anti-globalist) and 1 (pro-globalist).

### **Statistical Models:**

To test empirical prediction (1), we will stack the social and economic issue indices in the same dataset and cluster the standard errors by respondents, and then estimate the following model via OLS restricting the sample to Republican donors and mass Republicans:

$$A_i = \alpha + \beta_1 RD_i + \beta_2 E_i + \beta_3 (RD_i \times E_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $A_i$  represents a position on an attitude scale (rescaled to lie between 0 and 1 as noted above),  $E_i$  is a dummy variable representing whether the attitude is from the economic issues scale (the baseline is that the attitude comes from the social attitudes scale),  $RD_i$  is a dummy variable representing Republican donors (with mass Republicans as the baseline category), and  $\varepsilon_i$  is stochastic error.  $\beta_1$  captures the anticipated greater conservatism of donors than voters in general (in this case using social issues to establish a point of comparison).

We predict that  $\beta_3 > 0$ . That is, the difference in conservatism between Republican donors and mass Republicans on economic issues should be larger than the difference between Republican donors and mass Republicans on social issues.

To test empirical prediction (2), we stack the data as we did for testing empirical prediction (1), and estimate the following model via OLS restricting the sample to Democratic donors and mass Democrats:

$$A_i = \alpha + \beta_1 DD_i + \beta_2 E_i + \beta_3 (DD_i \times E_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $A_i$  represents a position on an attitude scale (rescaled to lie between 0 and 1 as noted above),  $E_i$  is a dummy variable representing whether the attitude is from the economic issues scale (the baseline is that the attitude comes from the social attitudes scale),  $DD_i$  is a dummy variable representing Democratic donors (with mass Democrats as the baseline category), and  $\varepsilon_i$  is stochastic error.

We predict that  $\beta_3 > 0$ . That is, the difference in liberalism between Democratic donors and mass Democrats on social issues should be larger than the difference between Democratic donors and mass Democrats on economic issues. Recall that all variables are signed such that higher values reflect conservative attitudes.

To test empirical prediction (3), we estimate the following model via OLS in three samples: (1) restricting the sample to Republican donors and mass Republicans; (2) restricting the sample to Democratic donors and mass Democrats; and (3) pooling Republicans and Democrats together.

$$G_i = \alpha + \beta_1 RD_i + \varepsilon_i \text{ (sample 1)}$$

$$G_i = \alpha + \beta_1 DD_i + \varepsilon_i \text{ (sample 2)}$$

$$G_i = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 P_i + \varepsilon_i \text{ (sample 3)}$$

where  $G_i$  represents the globalism issues scale,  $RD_i$  represents Republican donors (with mass Republicans as the baseline category),  $DD_i$  represents Democratic donors (with mass Democrats as the baseline category),  $D_i$  represents Republicans and Democratic donors pooled together (with mass Republicans and Democrats as the baseline category),  $P_i$  is an indicator for partisanship with 1 = to Republican respondents and 0 = Democratic respondents, and  $\varepsilon_i$  is stochastic error.

To test the robustness/generalizability of our findings, we will also conduct a set of secondary analyses identical to the above but limiting the donor dataset to those donors we have already identified as in the top 1% of partisan donors. (This is not possible with the Huber/Hill dataset because the number of large donors is fairly small.)

### **Replication with Huber and Hill (2017) Data**

We replicate the tests of empirical predictions (1)-(3) with a separate dataset collected in 2012 (the 2012 CCES). We believe that empirical prediction (3) might be weaker in these data because the survey predates the rise of Trump in 2012. All models will be estimated as above. Here, we specify which survey items are most similar to the ones asked in our own survey and how we will classify them into scales.

Economic Issues: CC332A, CC332D, CC332G, CC332I, CC415r. We plan on constructing an additive index of these 5 items, coded to lie between 0 (liberal) and 1 (conservative).

Social Issues: CC324, CC326, CC332J. We plan on constructing an additive index of these 3 items, coded to lie between 0 (liberal) and 1 (conservative).

Globalism Issues: CC332F, CC414\_3, CC414\_4, CC414\_5, CC414\_7. We plan on constructing an additive index of these 5 items, coded to lie between 0 (liberal) and 1 (conservative).

One challenge with comparing our first dataset with the Huber and Hill (2017) dataset is that their dataset contains more small donors, whereas many of the theories of elite influence revolve around larger contributors. To gather our main dataset we oversampled the top 1% of donors as a result, and they constitute nearly 50% of our sample. To make the datasets more comparable, we will create a threshold that = 1 in the Huber and Hill (2017) dataset if the donors gave \$200 or more in total disclosed donations from 2010 - 2012 (2 election cycles) and = 1 in our data if the donors gave \$500 or more in disclosed from 2008 - 2016 (5 election cycles). We then weight the Huber data such that the share above that threshold is the same as in our data.