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**THE ROOT NARRATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT: UNDERSTANDING
ARAB AND JEWISH AMERICANS SUPPORT FOR A TWO STATE
SOLUTION**

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction

of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

PSYCHOLOGY

with an emphasis in Sociology

by

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September 2016

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Tyrus Miller

Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies

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Abstract

THE ROOT NARRATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT: UNDERSTANDING ARAB AND JEWISH AMERICANS' SUPPORT FOR A TWO-STATE SOLUTION

Ella Ben Hagai

In this dissertation, I test a root narrative approach to conflict to understand the socio-psychological mechanism associated with support for a two state solution among Jewish and Arab Americans. According to the narrative approach to conflict, groups' stories about a conflict are structured around a more basic narrative schema. When members of groups acknowledge the outgroup root narrative, they are more likely to support a compromise solution to the conflict. Group values and norms will facilitate increased acknowledgment of the narrative of the other. A survey of 172 Arab Americans and 182 Jewish Americans indicates that acknowledging the narrative of the other (i.e., Arab Americans acknowledging that Israelis aim to live in peace but are vulnerable, and Jewish Americans acknowledging that the Palestinians are indigenous to the land but are dispossessed), was correlated with greater endorsement of a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. An experiment with an additional sample of Jewish Americans found that priming them to think about the Jewish value of "tikkun olam" (or "mending the world") or about anti-Semitism did not increase their acceptance of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict, as compared to a control group who was not primed. However, correlational analyses of this

sample revealed that greater attachment to Israel, disposition toward system justification, conservative views, and concerns over anti-Semitism predicted rejection of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. Understanding one's Jewish identity as based in values of the pursuit of social justice predicted increased acknowledgment of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. This research makes three key contributions. First, it demonstrates the utility of root narrative as a tool in explaining the continuation of conflict. Second, it shows how narratives traditionally studied using qualitative methodology can be tested using quantitative methodology. Third, on a practical level, this research illuminates the specific narratives that need to be legitimized in order to increase support for a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Acknowledgements

In his book *I and Thou*, the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber thinks through the philosophy of dialogue. He writes, “Only where all means have disintegrated encounters occur.” Eileen Zurbriggen's mentorship style is structured around true (Buberian) dialogue. Eileen taught me that wisdom arises through the process of listening. Because of Eileen's close, sensitive, and empathic engagement with my research and writing, she was able to recognize and encourage me to develop budding ideas not yet clearly shaped. Eileen taught me to imbue my research with value by investing time, going deep, and always trying to write the best paper possible. I am now going with joy and excitement to my next destination, and I know that it was Eileen's genius guidance that paved my path. I hope to be as good a mentor to my students as she was to me.

In a dark mood, on a rainy night on the bus up the Santa Cruz Mountains, I realized I really needed a good theory class. It was pure luck that I found myself in Professor Miriam Greenberg's epic seminar. In a beautiful room overlooking the ocean, we interchanged Durkheimian, Weberian, and Marxist lenses to discuss neoliberalism, social class, ideology, and art. Miriam fostered and encouraged my love for Bourdieu, and many of the ideas I gained from her seminars are fundamental to the approach I am proposing in this dissertation. Echoes of my conversations with Miriam are still in my mind, and they will inspire me for many more research projects to come.

I am grateful for Margarita Azmitia for sitting on my dissertation committee, and Avril Thorne for sitting on my qualifying committee. From the skilled mentorship of Margarita and Avril, I learned how to analyze narrative and found pleasure in trying to be truthful to the voice of the narrators. Both Margarita and Avril gave me the courage to mix my methods and to expand beyond traditional narrative analysis to the use of quantitative methodologies.

Two brilliant mentors at UC Berkeley showed me the way toward Ph.D research at UC Santa Cruz. Eleanor Rosch introduced to me narrative psychology. More importantly, she taught me mindfulness as a lifelong method. Barrie Thorne encouraged me to study Jewish Americans. Without Barrie's mentorship I would never have attempted to bridge my political commitment to end Israel's occupation of the Palestinians to my scientific research.

It was a privilege to complete my Ph.D. in a school that nourishes cross-disciplinary engagements. Talking with and learning from historians like Jennifer Derr, Bruce Thompson, and Nathaniel Deutsch, anthropologists like Nancy Chen and Rita Astuti, and my favorite philosopher, Jon Ellis, enriched my approach to psychology and my understanding of Jewish Americans and of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Resourceful, creative, and dedicated undergraduate researchers made the studies in this dissertation possible. I am incredibly grateful to Gaby Bornstein, Maddy Winard, Emma Siegel, Megan Ziman (and her mother), Evan Goldblatt, Sami Abdelhalim, Nadya Tannous, Mofeda Dabbo, Ernest Chavez and Gaby Leon. Also

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The Root Narrative Approach to Conflict: Understanding Arab and Jewish Americans' Support for a Two State Solution

In a prolonged conflict, such as that between Israel and Palestine, a third party may play a crucial role in bringing the two sides closer to a peace agreement (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991; Shain & Barth, 2003; Wright, 2014). In the current geopolitical reality, a likely third party to take this role is the United States (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). The extent and the manner in which the US government is involved with the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict depends in part on the opinions of Jewish and Arab Americans living in the United States (Beinart, 2012; Marrar, 2008; Shain, 2010; Zogby, 2010). In the last several years, there has been growing debate in American communities, and especially on college campuses, as to the role the US should play in mediating a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Much of this debate is promoted by Jewish and Arab Americans (Ben Hagai, Zurbruggen, under review; Dessel & Ali, 2012; Hill, Ben Hagai, Zurbruggen, under review; Erakat, 2012; Hahn Tapper, 2011). In this dissertation, I describe one survey and one experiment that I conducted to understand the narratives and the group values associated with support for a two-state solution (based on the 1967 borders) to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Through the survey, I examine the beliefs and narratives that are associated with Jewish and Arab American support for a two-state solution. I then examine, using an experiment with an additional sample of Jewish Americans, if affirming group-specific values (i.e., a sense of collective threat or concern with tikkun olam or "mending the world") causes or correlates with

an increase in acknowledgement of the narrative of the other (i.e., the Palestinian narrative). By identifying the beliefs and specifying the psychological mechanisms associated with acknowledgement of the narrative of the other, I hope to clarify the psychological processes that lead to mutual recognition among members of diaspora groups.

Jewish Americans' attachment to Israel is rooted in the framing of Israel as the Jewish homeland. To some Jewish people Israel represents the homeland promised to the Israelites by God; to others Israel represents a safe haven to which Jews can escape in case of another wave of Jewish persecution (Habib, 2004; Goldberg, 1996; Waxman, 1989). To many other Jews Israel represents the center of modern Jewish life where Hebrew is the national language and Hanukah and Passover are nationally celebrated (Seliktar, 2002). According to Cohen and Kelman (2009), Jewish Americans' "fervent attachment [to Israel] has produced billions of dollars in ongoing philanthropic assistance, a powerful and effective pro-Israel lobby, tens of thousands of visits annually.... All these expressions of support and engagement rest upon a passionate love of Israel by some Jews, and feelings of love and warmth, attachment and closeness by most" (p. 2). Young Jewish Americans' attachment to Israel is further strengthened by experiential education programs, such as the Birthright trip. Over half a million Jewish youth between the ages of 18-26 have participated in Birthright, a trip enhancing Jewish Americans' attachment to Israel and their understanding of the Jewish Israeli narrative on the conflict with the

Palestinians (Ben Hagai, Whitlatch, & Zurbriggen, under review; Sasson, Kadushin, & Saxe, 2010; Saxe & Chazan, 2008).

On the other hand, to many Arab Americans, Palestine represents an exemplar of the ongoing dispossession and injustices associated with Western colonization of the Arab world (Salaita, 2005; Staeheli & Nagel, 2006). An interview study of Arab American youth active in Palestinian solidarity organizations suggests that they identified with the Palestinian plight due to a feeling that Western powers devalue Arab and Muslim lives (Hill, Ben Hagai, & Zurbriggen, under review). Surveying people in different Arab states, Zogby (2011) concluded that “even Arabs geographically removed from the scene commonly described the Palestinian loss as ‘a wound in our heart’-a deep cut that still has not healed” (p.159). The increase in Islamophobia since 9/11 and the US wars against Afghanistan and Iraq have further enhanced a sense of Arab and Muslim dispossession that parallels the Palestinians’ experience of struggle (Yazbak-Abu Ahmad, Dessel, Mishkin, Ali, & Omar, 2015; Bazian, 2015).

The attachment members of the Jewish and Arab American diasporas have to Israel and Palestine, respectively, translates into political advocacy on behalf of Israel/Palestine. Jewish and Arab Americans influence important mediating bodies such as the United States government, the United Nations, and the Arab League (Marrar, 2008). The Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority are also impacted by Jewish and Arab American advocacy (Shain, 2010). For instance, pressure by Jewish Americans led President Truman (against the advice of his

consultants) to support the UN partition plan that led to the establishment of a Jewish state in Israel (Cohen, 1990). Jewish American interest groups have lobbied the United States government to strengthen Israel's army in critical moments in Israel's history (Goldberg 1996; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). The expansion of Jewish settlement in Palestinian occupied territories is often spearheaded by Jewish Americans who immigrate to Israel, and is financially supported by Jewish American philanthropists (Hirschhorn, 2015). On the other hand, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement, which calls on companies and governments to boycott or divest from and sanction Israel and companies associated with the Israeli occupation, is supported by Arab American organizations, and increasingly some Jewish American organizations.

Currently the approach to Israel and Palestine that is most likely to establish peace is a two-state solution in which Israel withdraws to the 1967 border, and a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital (Dowty, 2015; Kelman, 2011). The likelihood of this solution is rapidly declining as the Israeli occupation of the West Bank continues, and more Jewish settlements are built in the West Bank. Moreover, the continuation of mutual violence and terrorist attacks leads to greater mistrust between the Israelis and the Palestinian public. Diaspora support for a two-state solution is important because this solution entails a painful compromise for both populations. As part of a two-state solution Israel will likely lose control over sacred parts of Jerusalem and be required to dismantle Jewish settlements. Palestinians, on the other hand, will lose the majority of

the historical land of Palestine. The two main issues that thwarted previous peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine were lack of agreement about the status of Jerusalem and about the Palestinian refugee problem. These two issues are more likely to be resolved with the support of the Jewish and Arab diaspora populations. Political leaders in the US, Israel and Palestine, who must account for the Jewish and Arab diasporas when negotiating the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees' right of return, can be partially persuaded by diaspora populations supporting compromises on these issues. Similarly, the current rejection of a two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders by the current Israeli government may be shifted with pressure by Jewish Americans and the American government. Such pressure can be demonstrated by decreases in military aid to Israel, or the US ceasing its vetoing of a UN Security Council resolution to establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.

The purpose of this dissertation is to understand what leads Jewish and Arab Americans to support a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First I will survey Jewish and Arab Americans to examine the beliefs that correlate with support for a two-state solution. Because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is asymmetrical in that Israel has more access to resources (land, water, military and capital), and as such is more likely to decide if the conflict will be resolved, my second study focuses on Jewish Americans.

To examine why Jewish and Arab Americans come to support a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I propose a narrative approach to

conflict. I've been developing the narrative approach to conflict in my previous qualitative studies. In this dissertation I *test* this approach using quantitative methods.

The narrative approach to conflict makes four postulations.

1. When groups are in conflict each group will construct a root narrative on the conflict. The root narrative is a basic narrative schema that reflects the social structure within which members of the group are situated. Because of the segregation between groups in conflict and the different realities they face, each group narrative will disavow the outgroup narrative, creating a monolithic narrative on the conflict.

2. Narrative empathy that involves an acknowledgement of the outgroup narrative on the conflict will be associated with greater support for a peaceful and compromising solution to the conflict.

3. Group narratives will mediate between group attachment and support for peaceful resolution to the conflict.

4. Culturally specific group values and concerns can dispose individuals to greater acknowledgement of the narrative of the other.

In the first survey study, I examine the role of root narratives compared to other beliefs in predicting support for a two-state solution, among Arab and Jewish Americans. I also test if root narratives (combined into a monolithic narrative) mediate between group attachment and support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a second study, I use another sample of Jewish Americans to

examine if values and concerns central to Jewish American culture facilitate acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. The two sets of values I will focus on are concerns with Jewish vulnerability and tikkun olam values associated with Jewish commitment to mending the world. I examine if affirming these values and concerns impacts the extent to which Jewish Americans acknowledge the Palestinian narrative on the conflict.

This research makes both applied and theoretical contributions. On an applied level, it illuminates the narratives that play a central role in the perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among members of the Jewish and Arab American diaspora. It also demonstrates the values and concerns that lead to greater acknowledgement of the narrative of the other. On a theoretical level, this research offers a new analytical tool in "root narratives" that can help bridge particular cultural histories, values, and universal psychological processes.

Overview of Narrative Approach to Conflict

The analytical tool of schema has been commonly used by psychologists aiming to account for both cultural content and cognitive mechanisms (Brewer, 2000; Mandler, 2014; Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982; Oyserman, Kimmelmeier, Fryberg, Brosh, & Hart-Johnson, 2003). Schemas are understood as mental representations of cultural knowledge. Examining ideas about the self in Asia and the West, Markus and Kitayama (1991) demonstrated that different ideas about the self are cognitively represented in different self-conceptualizations. Researching gender,

Bem (1981) investigated how cultural models about masculinity and femininity are cognitively schematized and used to shape processes of remembering, perception and action (Bem, 1993; Starr & Zurbriggen, 2016). In cognitive anthropology, Quinn (1987) illuminated how contradictory cultural ideas about marriage (as an obligation or as self-fulfillment) are schematized to construct reasoning about marriage among American couples.

Although schemas have been used as a primary tool to model how culture interacts with cognitive processes, narratives can also play an important explanatory role because they are compatible with human cognitive processes (Bruner, 1990). Many researchers have looked at narrative phenomena (ways in which cognition, memory, or identity is organized in a narrative form) by using narrative research methods. Narrative methods include interviews in which people tell their life stories, and analysis of discursive data for emerging stories. Especially common is the life story approach. A salient example of research in this paradigm is based in McAdams' (2001) life-story technique. As part of this method, participants are asked to tell of their life as if it were a book with several chapters. Participants are asked to describe scenes from low points, high points, turning points and other important memories. Participants' life chapters are then coded for redemption (a bad experience turns positive) or contamination (a good event turns sour) plotlines. Often narrative sequences are correlated with measures of personality traits or individual motives to highlight the relationship between narrative and personality (McAdams, Anyidoho,

Brown, Huang, Kaplan, & Machado, 2004; McAdams, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001)

Researchers in developmental psychology have often focused on smaller stories and the interaction between co-tellers in the construction of these stories (Azmitia, Syed, & Radmacher, 2008; Bamberg, 2004; Nelson, Thorne, & Shapiro, 2011; Thorne, 2000). Some developmental research has focused on the ways in which toddlers and children become narrators by non-intrusively recording children as they recapped a day's events to themselves when on their own in their rooms (Nelson, 2006). Other researchers have examined how memories are used to form a sense of autobiographical self and a sense of identity (McLean, 2005). Socio-cultural researchers have examined ways in which children and adolescents in different cultural communities learn to narrate in different narrative genres. For instance, Miller (1997) and her colleagues found that working class mothers tended to co-narrate children's stories in ways that emphasized truthfulness, while middle-class mothers tended to co-narrate children's stories in ways that stressed children's authorship and creativity. Research on emerging adults suggests that Latino and Asian youth tend to narrate experiences of marginalization and discrimination, in contrast to white and mixed-heritage college students who tend to tell narratives about their ethnic identity that evoke a sense of difference and privilege (Syed & Azmitia, 2008).

Researchers across a range of disciplines agree that narratives are always embedded in a particular cultural and ideological context (Azmitia, Syed, & Radmacher, 2008; Bamberg, 2004; Bruner, 1990). Cultural ideologies work to shape narratives either through highlighting certain content including values or ideological assumptions (McAdams et al., 2001), and /or by shaping the praxis of narration (Miller et al., 1997). The praxis of narrating life stories, for instance in the extent to which others are allowed to join in on the narration reflect communal or individualistic ideologies. Another way to examine the interaction between cultural values and ideologies is by looking at the relationship between master historical narratives and individuals' understanding and position on current political conflicts.

In a seminal paper on social representation and historical narratives, Liu and Hilton (2004) argue that "history provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from and where we should be going" (p.537). Liu and Hilton suggest that collective memory and narratives shape how individuals understand present political realities. For instance, when French and British study participants used a narrative that framed the rise of Hitler as rooted in factors external to German society (e.g., French and British demands for large reparations after World War I) they were more likely to support agreements associated with the formation of the European Union, compared to those who framed the rise of Hitler in factors intrinsic to German society, such as Germany's authoritarian culture or fascist political tendencies (Hilton, Erb, McDermott, & Molian, 1996). Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, and Khan (2008) showed that when New Zealanders disavowed the historical colonialist origins of

contemporary inequalities in New Zealand, they were less likely to agree to a more equal distribution of resources among the white and the Polynesian Maori population. Unlike life history approaches to narratives that often use qualitative methods to examine personal narratives, social psychologists working within the social representation paradigm use quantitative methods such as survey and experimental methodologies to examine the role of historical narrative representation in support for political policies. Integrating the social identity approach with social representation theory suggests that identification with a group leads individuals to identify with a collective narrative that shapes their orientation towards political policies.

Based on the postulation that much of human thinking is structured in narrative form, in this research I argue that many stories invoked by people in a community to talk about conflict are based on a basic narrative schema. I call this basic schema a root narrative (Ben Hagai, Hammack et al., 2013). Root narratives are based on the most elementary narrative structure that includes a protagonist, a setting, an action, and a problem (Bruner, 1990). This structure is compatible with the human tendency to think about people's actions as having internal intentions. The narrative structure also allows for an account of time as changing or moving. Finally, the narrative schema can encapsulate complex causal processes, in which the protagonist's intention does not fit her actions because of the context within which she is situated (Syad & Azmatia, 2008). Because the narrative structure can encapsulate contradicting themes, this structure is especially useful in thinking and talking about conflict (Bruner, 1990).

Bringing together the literature on cognitive schema and narratives suggests that root narratives serve as structural templates used to store information told about salient cultural events, especially around conflict. The root narrative is shared by members of a community, and serves as a type of conventional discourse (see, Strauss, 2012). The root narrative structures the cultural common sense of who we are, and the problems we face as part of the collective.

My analysis of conversations between Jewish and Arab adolescents exemplifies the manner in which root narratives function in conversations. My study of dialogue groups between Jewish Israeli and Palestinian adolescents suggests that each group invoked a basic root narrative to understand and talk about the conflict between them (Ben Hagai, Hammack et al., 2013). The Jewish adolescents tended to frame the Jewish protagonist as wanting to live in peace, but because the Jewish actor is situated in the context of an Arab threat, they must act to defend themselves. Numerous stories invoked by the Jewish participants were structured based on this root narrative. For instance, when talking about the past, the Jewish adolescents repeated statements in which Jewish pioneers (or halutzim) in the early 20th century aimed to live in peace, and didn't take land from Arabs but bought it, or that the pioneers started egalitarian kibbutzim to create a socially just society. Also articulated by the adolescents was the second part of the Jewish narrative in which the collective actor is situated in a setting in which s/he must protect him/herself from Arab attacks. Examples of this part of the narrative included statements about the Arab rebellions of the 1930s and murders and vandalism from which the Jewish halutzim had to

defend themselves. Information about the present was also organized according to the root narrative in which the Jews want to live in peace but they must defend themselves. For instance, Israeli soldiers were described by the adolescents as preferring to travel the world or go to colleges, but instead they must join the Israeli Defense Force to protect their society (Ben Hagai, Hammack et al., 2013).

The Palestinian adolescents also invoked a basic root narrative when discussing different events, past and present, related to the conflict. The prototypical collective Palestinian actor was framed as native and indigenous to the land, but because of Jewish occupation, the collective actor was continually dispossessed and oppressed. This narrative was invoked when talking about historical events such as the Nakba (Palestinian displacement in 1948), as well as the current realities faced by Palestinians, including checkpoints, the building of the separation walls that dispossessed Palestinians from their lands, and discrimination against Arab Israelis (Ben Hagai Hammack et al., 2013).

Overall both the Jewish Israeli adolescents and the Palestinian adolescents invoked many stories to describe the conflict. I argue that a deep structure of many of these stories can be found in a basic root narrative. In the Jewish root narrative, the Jewish protagonist wants to live in peace but must defend themselves. In the Palestinian root narrative, the protagonist is indigenous to the land but is dispossessed because of Jewish occupation. The root narrative approach I propose here is different than the autobiographical story approach in that I focus less on personal life stories, and more on the ways in which individuals position themselves in relation to different

collective narratives and discourses (i.e. ideologies). Moreover, while many narrative researchers examine trends in narration or narrative plotline change (contamination compared to redemption), I focus on the basic content of the narrative; how the actor is framed, context and problem. In this research, I don't use narrative methods to examine the narrative phenomena, rather I use survey methods to examine the importance of narrative representations in impacting political policy (i.e. support for a two state solution). The root narrative approach I am testing here is also different than approaches that privilege historical narratives in shaping how individuals think about the present. Rather I argue that depictions of both historical and present realities will be based on the same deep structure of the root narrative schema. In other words, the root narrative approach I propose incorporates, but does not privilege, historical accounts, in shaping current understanding of conflict.

Intergroup Contact and Narrative Empathy

A long tradition of research on conflict resolution highlights the importance of affective empathy in leading individuals to support reconciliation with members of the outgroup. Decades of research on contact theory has demonstrated that when individuals like or become friends with members of a stigmatized group (e.g., gays, immigrants, and ethnic minority groups) they will be less likely to hold negative stereotypes towards them (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Nevertheless, when groups are involved in a prolonged ideological struggle, affective empathy may be less important and realistic empathy more conducive in bringing individuals to making concessions with the outgroup

(Kelman, 1999; Pettigrew, 2003).

Scholars examining political conflicts such as the Cold War, the War on Iraq, and the "War on Terror" highlight the importance of realistic empathy in diplomacy and in shifting public opinions (Smith, 2004; Betancourt, 2004; Schwebel, 2006; White, 1983; 1991). According to Pettigrew (2003), "realistic empathy does not entail sympathy for the enemy or acceptance of their aggressive acts against the ingroup. It requires only that we attempt to see the conflict through the enemy's eyes—not out of compassion but to gain insight. But we must overcome strong self-serving and group-serving biases to attain it" (p.85). Realistic empathy calls on people to imagine the situation of the other, their history and reasons for their actions, and as such it highlights situational factors triggering the actions of the outgroup. Understanding of the outgroup actions as based on situational factors, as opposed to internal traits, tends to be associated with greater likelihood of compromise with the outgroup (Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003).

The working hypothesis of the root narrative approach to conflict I propose is that groups tend to organize information about conflict based on root narratives. Because groups understand conflict based on narratives, acknowledgement of the narrative of the other can be understood as a type of realistic empathy or narrative empathy. A previous study I conducted supports this hypothesis. A survey study of a sample of Jewish Americans suggests that they framed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a root narrative in which Israel wants to live in peace but must defend itself. This framing of the conflict was associated with less support for peaceful solutions to

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ben Hagai, Zurbriggen, Hammack, Ziman, 2013). On the other hand, Jewish Americans who also acknowledged the Palestinian narrative on the conflict (i.e., acknowledged that the Palestinians are native to the land but are dispossessed because of Jewish occupation), were more likely to support a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ben Hagai, et al, 2013).

Beliefs Central to Intractable Conflict

The root narrative approach I propose in this research argues that identification with the ingroup root narrative and disavowal of the outgroup narrative will predict rejection of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This hypothesis departs from prior beliefs theorized to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Among the beliefs argued to play a role in the perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are a sense of collective victimhood, dehumanization of the outgroup (Israelis or Palestinians), and a zero-sum view on the conflict. These beliefs are part of an ethos of conflict. Such an ethos is said to assist members of groups involved in conflict to adjust to existential threat and loss associated with the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).

Collective Victimhood

One of the most salient beliefs associated with the perpetuation of conflict, in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is a sense of collective victimhood. Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori and Gunder (2009) define collective victimhood as having three different features: (1) a belief that the collective has been harmed, (2) a belief that this harm is unjust, and (3) a belief that the collective didn't have the power to

protect itself against this harm. Even though a sense of collective victimhood is often used to explain Jewish and Arab support for acts of aggression that perpetuate the cycle of violence, further research suggests a more nuanced understanding of victimhood as it is experienced by members of the Israeli and Palestinian collective. A study of Jewish Americans that examined these three features of victimhood showed that Jewish Americans tend to embrace all three in relation to past events in the diaspora, but not in relation to present events associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jewish Americans surveyed felt that Israel currently is harmed by Arab attacks and that this harm is unjust, but believed that Israel is not helpless in protecting itself against this harm (Ben Hagai et al., 2013). This finding echoes studies from Israel that suggest that the manner in which past victimhood has been confronted by Israeli society is by fostering a sense of military might so that “never again will Jews be powerless victims” (Klar, Schori-Eyal & Klar, 2013, p. 213). In other words, it appears that while past Jewish life is framed in terms of repeated instances of victimhood, today's Israel is seen as existing under threat but not helpless against it.

Zero-Sum View

According to Dowty (2005) at the “core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the claim of two people to the same piece of land” (p. 4). This mutual claim leads to a zero-sum view on the conflict in which any win to the ingroup is considered to be a loss to the outgroup. A zero-sum view on the conflict is grounded in the notion of some Jewish people that the land of Israel was destined to them by history or God.

Moreover, some Palestinians also see the land as their own since they have been the predominant inhabitants for many centuries (Smith, 2007). As a consequence of a belief in absolute ownership, any compromise over the land is seen as loss to one's own collective. Furthermore, a belief that frames the conflict in terms of a zero-sum game, in which no compromise is possible and one side wins over the other, frames the future as unlikely to bring peaceful resolution to the conflict (Kelman, 2011). In support of the premise that a zero-sum view on the conflict leads to its perpetuation, Maoz and McCauley (2005) found that zero-sum beliefs on the conflict served as a significant predictor for support for violent solutions among a sample of Jewish Israelis. Also in Israel/Palestine, Shamir and Shaikaki (2002), using a nationally representative sample of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Jewish Israelis, found that expectations supporting the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the conflict served as the most important predictors of support for reconciliation towards the outgroup among both Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis.

Dehumanization

Related to a zero-sum view on the conflict is a dehumanization of the outgroup. In a seminal study for social psychology, Sherif (1966) showed that when groups compete over scarce resources such as land or water, beliefs associated with ingroup valorization and out- group degradation will emerge. Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) have theorized that among groups living in an intractable conflict, dehumanizing stereotypes towards the outgroup are common. A study of the Jewish population living in Israel suggests that dehumanization of the Palestinians predicted

rejection of concessions towards them (Hammack, Pilecki, Caspi, & Strauss, 2011; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). Within the United States, studies indicate that dehumanization of Arab and Muslim Americans has increased since the 9/11 terrorist attack (Pangopoulos, 2006). Examining specifically Jewish and Arab attitudes towards each other, Brenick and Killen (2014) found that both Jewish and Arab adolescents rejected excluding members of the outgroup from social activities. Nevertheless, a study examining the role of media exposure of events from the Middle East on Arab and Jewish adolescents living in the US found that the more Arabs and Jews living in the United States identified with their ethnic counterparts in the Middle East, the more likely they were to hold dehumanizing stereotypes towards members of the outgroup (Huesmann, Dubow, Boxer, Souweidane, & Ginges, 2012).

Attachment to the Ingroup as a Moderator

Among members of the diaspora groups living away from conflict, attachment to the ingroup may affect the extent to which individuals come to hold certain beliefs (i.e., a sense of collective victimhood, dehumanization of the outgroup, and a zero-sum view on the conflict) or a group's root narrative on the conflict. This prediction is in line with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to Social Identity Theory, identification with the ingroup will lead to ingroup favoritism and, in the context of conflict, devaluation of the outgroup. Relating the narrative approach to conflict to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) suggests that when individuals identify with the ingroup, they are more likely to identify with the ingroup narrative. Sahdra & Ross (2007) found that among a sample of Sikhs and Hindus,

individuals who highly identified with their ingroup were more likely to remember historical events associated with collective victimhood. Recent studies indicate that representations of the nation mediate the relationship between collective attachment and support for discriminatory policies towards immigrants (Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere & Boen, 2010; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). Combining social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) with the root narrative approach I am proposing that outgroup derogation occurs on a narrative level. When individuals come to identify with a group they are more likely to adopt the group narrative and reject the outgroup narrative on the conflict (i.e., hold a monolithic narrative on the conflict).

Research Overview

My goal in this research is to clarify the beliefs and group values that promote support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among diaspora groups. In the first study, I examine which belief best predict support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a second study, I examine which group values and concerns facilitate acknowledgement of the narrative of the other. I am especially interested in the role of central themes in contemporary Jewish American culture. These themes include the pursuit of social justice (tikkun olam) and concern over Jewish vulnerability. In the second study, I will examine if these themes facilitate acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative

Study 1

In the first study, I survey a sample of Arab and Jewish Americans. I examine their levels of support for root narratives hypothesized to play a significant role in predicting support for peaceful solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, I examine the role that a sense of collective victimhood, dehumanization of the outgroup, a zero-sum view on the conflict play in predicting rejection of a two-state solution. I also analyze the role of root narratives in mediating between ingroup attachment and support for a two-state solution. My two hypotheses are as follow:

Hypothesis 1. Identification with a monolithic root narrative on the conflict that ignores the narrative of the other will be associated with rejection of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This effect will be found even after controlling for the other known predictors: dehumanization, collective victimhood, and a zero-sum view on the conflict.

Hypothesis 2. A monolithic root narrative on the conflict will mediate between group attachment (defined as attachment to the homeland) and rejection of a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited for this study through announcements on the social networking sites and alumni lists of Arab and Jewish American organizations, including college student groups, political groups, and youth groups, as well as through snowball methodologies in which research assistants and participants asked

people in their social networks to complete the survey. Among the organizations that helped announce the survey to these networks (on social media sites or listservs were) were the Olive Tree Initiative, Students for Justice in Palestine, Arab Americans for Palestine, Arab Americans Democrats of California, Arab American Heritage, Arab Detroit, Project Eid Awareness, Alumni list of the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, Alumni List of San Diego Jewish Academy (private Jewish High School), and Habonim Dror Progressive Labor Zionist organization Participants were asked to follow a link to participate in an online survey about Arab or Jewish Americans' opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Arab Sample

Responses from 172 Arab Americans were included in this study (representing 43% of the 401 people who started the survey). Participants' median age was 23 years old and average age was 27.66. Eighty-four (49%) participants identified as women and 88 (51%) as men. In terms of education, 62% (106) had completed an undergraduate degree or were currently in college, 36% (62) had completed graduate school or were currently in graduate school, and 3% (4) of the sample had a high school education or less. In terms of religion (participants were able to check multiple boxes), 29% (50) identified as secular, 23% (69) identified as Muslim (not further specified), 27% (47) as Muslim Sunni, 5% (8) identified as Muslim Shia, 12% (21) as Christian and 9% (15) as Catholic. In terms of country of origin, (participants were able to check multiple boxes): 53.4% (92) identified as Palestinians, 16% (28) identified as Lebanese, 12% (21) identified as Egyptian, 8.1%

(14) identified as Jordanian, 8% (14) identified as Syrian, 2% (4) identified as Iraqi, 2% (3) identified as Saudi, .6% (1) identified as Algerian, and .6%(1) identified as Moroccan. Although Iran and Turkey are not Arab countries, because these countries align themselves with the Palestinian plight, people who identified as Turkish or Iranian were included in this survey: 2.3% (4) identified as Iranian, and .6% (1) identified as Turkish. In terms of American politics, 41% (70) identified as Democrats, 43.6% (75) as Independent, 5% (9) as Republican, and 10.4% (18) were not sure or didn't answer.

Jewish Sample

Responses from 184 Jewish Americans were included in this study (representing 87% of the 210 people who started the survey). Participants' median age was 22 and average age was 30.4 years old. One hundred and thirteen (62.1%) participants identified as women, 68 (37.4%) as men and one selected a gender identification of "Other". In terms of education, 38% (70) had an undergraduate degree or were in college, 13.3% (24) had graduate education or were currently in graduate school, and 30.2% (55), 18.11% (33) didn't answer this question. In terms of religion (participants were able to check multiple boxes), 50% (90) were Conservative Jews, 18.1% (33) were Reform Jews, 12.6% (23) were Secular, 6.6% (12) Reconstructionist Jews, 9.9% (18) Modern Orthodox Jews, and 3.8% (7) Orthodox Jews, and 7.7% (14) were not affiliated. In terms of American politics, 71% (129) identified as liberal, 14.8% (27) as moderate, 12% (22) identified as conservatives, and 2% (4) were not sure.

Measures

Collective victimhood. Collective victimhood was measured using two original items based on Bar-Tal's et al (2009) definition of collective victimhood. The third item associated with victimhood, that the collective was "powerless in protecting itself against harm", didn't load reliably with the two other items associated with victimhood (in the Jewish sample). This is in line with previous theoretical and empirical research that suggests that helplessness is not part of how Jewish Israelis understand their current victimhood (Klar, Schori-Eyal, & Klar, 2013; Maoz & Clark McCauley, 2005). Additionally, this item didn't clearly load as part of the same factor in previous research on a different sample of Jewish Americans (Ben Hagai, Zurbriggen et al, 2013).

Items. The subject of the items was changed based on participants' ethnic identity (i.e., Arab or Jewish). For instance, in the Jewish sample, the first item read "Arab and Palestinian attacks cause the Jewish population harm and suffering." In the Arab sample the parallel item read, "Israeli attacks cause the Palestinian population harm and suffering". The second item read "The Arab and Palestinian attacks on the Jewish population are unjust and undeserved" or in the Arab sample, "Israeli attacks on the Palestinian population are unjust and undeserved".

Reliability. Items were answered on a Likert scale that included the following choices: 1. Strongly Disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Somewhat disagree, 4. Neither agree nor disagree, 5 Somewhat agree, 6 Agree, 7 Strongly agree. The reliability of this measure was demonstrated by Ben Hagai, Zurbriggen, et al (2013), who administered

these same items and found a Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha=.69$. We also administered the items to a sample of Jewish Americans before and after they went on the Birthright trip (a 10-day trip to Israel). The Cronbach alpha for the two items before the trip was $\alpha=.71$ and after the trip of $\alpha=.76$ (Ben Hagai, Whitelach, Zurbriggen, under review). In the current samples the Cronbach's alpha is $\alpha=.83$ for the Arab Americans, and for Jewish Americans $\alpha=.76$.

Dehumanization. Dehumanization of the outgroup was measured based on two items. These items were slightly different across the two samples to represent common stereotypes about Arab and Jewish Israeli culture.

Items. Arab American participants were asked their level of agreement with two statements, "the Jews are by nature aggressive people", "the Jews have a culture that is racist", and the Jewish American participants were asked, "The Palestinians are primitive people", "The Palestinians are by nature violent people" (Ben Hagai et al, 2013; Smooha, 1987)".

Reliability. All items were administered on a 7 point Likert scale with the following choices: 1. Strongly disagree, 2 Disagree, 3. Somewhat disagree, 4. Neither agree nor disagree, 5. Somewhat agree, 6. Agree, 7. Strongly agree. The reliability of this measure was demonstrated by Ben Hagai, Zurbriggen, et al, (2013) who administered the two items to a sample to Jewish Americans and found a Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha=.76$. In another study we administered the two items to a group of Jewish Americans before and after they went on the Birthright trip. The Cronbach alpha before going on the trip was $\alpha=.81$ and after the trip the Cronbach alpha was $\alpha=.80$

(Ben Hagai, Whitlatch, Zurbriggen, under review). In the current samples the Cronbach's alpha is $\alpha = .80$ and for Jewish Americans $\alpha = .70$).

Zero-sum View. Zero-sum View on the conflict was measured using a single item from Maoz and McCauley (2005), who used a single item to measure Zero-sum View

Item. "In the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, there is no place for compromise: Either the Jews win or the Palestinians win" (p.799). The Zero-sum item was presented on a Likert scale with the following choices: 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Somewhat disagree, 4. Neither agree nor disagree, 5. Somewhat agree, 6. Agree, 7. Strongly agree.

Monolithic Narrative. The Jewish and the Palestinian root narratives were conceptualized based on a narratives found to be articulated frequently in an intergroup dialogue program between Jewish Israeli and Palestinian youth (Ben Hagai, Hammack, et al. 2013). All statements were presented on a 7 point Likert scale with the following choices: 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Somewhat disagree, 4. Neither agree nor disagree, 5. Somewhat agree, 6. Agree, 7. Strongly agree.

Items. The Jewish root narrative frames Jews as wanting to live in peace but as having to defend themselves (Ben Hagai, Hammack et al., 2013). This root narrative was measured using six statements. Four of the statements making up a measure of the Jewish root narrative on the conflict included past events. These statements were, "I think that Jewish attempts to establish a Jewish state in the Middle East are justified because they intended to create a just and peaceful society", "To the

best of my knowledge, the Jewish halutzim (early Jewish immigrants to Palestine) did not intend to harm the indigenous population living in the area", "Most of the land the Jewish pioneers settled on was purchased legitimately from the Arabs", and "Since coming to Palestine the 19th century, Jews have had to consistently defend themselves against Arab attacks." Two other statements were based on the present: "The current Israeli political leadership has tried its best to achieve peace with the Palestinians", and "The Israeli government implementation of checkpoints and the separation fence are motivated by its need to defend Israel from Palestinian aggression".

The Palestinian Root Narrative frames the Palestinians as indigenous to the land but as dispossessed and humiliated by Jewish occupation (Ben Hagai Hammack, et al., 2013). This root narrative was represented by eight items. Four statements were grounded in the past: "Before the beginning of the Jewish aliyot (waves of Jewish immigrations beginning at the end of the 19th century) most of the land of Israel was populated by an indigenous Arab (Muslim and Christian) population", "The indigenous Arab population had little power to protect itself against the organized Zionist movement", "Early Jewish aspiration to settle in Israel ignored the presence and the rights of the Palestinians to the land", and "The state of Israel acted to push the Palestinians out of the land of Israel". Four statements were grounded in the present: "The Israeli government is acting to push most of the Palestinians out of the land of Israel", "The Israeli army often uses excessive amount of force when dealing

with the Palestinians", "Arab-Israelis experience discrimination in Israel", and "The Israeli occupation oppresses and causes suffering to the Palestinian population".

Reliability. Ben Hagai, Zurbriggen, et al. (2013) used Exploratory Factor Analysis to examine if statements constituting part of the hypothesized Jewish Root Narrative and Palestinian Root Narrative were distinct from other beliefs argued to be central to Jewish understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict such as Collective Victimhood, Dehumanization and a Zero-sum View on the conflict. The Exploratory Factor Analysis suggested that these beliefs represented factors separate from the Jewish and Palestinian root narratives. In the 2013 study we found a Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha = .88$ for the Jewish narrative and a Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha = .90$ for the Palestinian narrative. When we administered the narrative scale to a group of Jewish Americans before and after going on the Birthright trip we found a Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha = .91$ before going on the Birthright trip and $\alpha = .91$ upon return. In the present study we continue to confirm the factor structure of the different beliefs, using a Confirmatory Factor. In this study Cronbach's Alpha reliability for the Jewish root narrative was .59 for Arab American participants and for Jewish American participants $\alpha = .77$. In terms of the Palestinian root narrative Cronbach's alpha for Arab American participants was $\alpha = .88$ and for Jewish American participants $\alpha = .90$.

To create a monolithic narrative on the conflict scale, I deducted the outgroup narrative from the ingroup narrative and divided by two [(Ingroup narrative - Outgroup narrative)/2 = Monolithic narrative]. In other words, in the Arab sample, I subtracted the Jewish narrative from the Palestinian narrative, and vice versa in the

Jewish sample. Thus, negative scores represent higher levels of understanding and acceptance of the outgroup narrative. Positive scores present higher levels of understanding and acceptance of the ingroup narrative than of the outgroup narrative and a score of zero represents equal understanding and acceptance of the two narratives.

Ingroup Identification. Attachment to Israel was measured using two standard items from the Jewish American Annual survey (2007).

Items. The two items were: “I feel very emotionally attached to Israel” and “Caring about Israel is an important part of my Jewish Identity”. Two parallel items were constructed to measure attachment to Palestine: “I feel very emotionally attached to Palestine” and “Caring about Palestine is an important part of my Arab identity”. The Jewish sample answered items related to attachment to Israel, and the Arab sample answered items related to the Palestinians. All items were administered on a 7 point Likert scale, from 1. Strongly disagree, 2 Disagree, 3. Somewhat disagree, 4. Neither agree nor disagree, 5. Somewhat agree, 6. Agree, 7. Strongly Agree.

Reliability. The reliability of this measure was demonstrated by Ben Hagai, Zurbriggen, et al, (2013) who administered the sample to Jewish Americans. The Cronbach's alpha in that data set was $\alpha=.93$. We also administered the two items to a sample of Jewish Americans who went on the Birthright trip (a 10 day trip to Israel). We found that before the trip reliability scores were $\alpha=.96$ and after .70 (Ben Hagai, Whitlach, Zurbriggen, under review). In the current sample the reliability was $\alpha=.72$

for Jewish Americans and $\alpha=.87$ for Arab Americans.

Two-state Solution. The criterion measure of compromising solution was based on a two-state solution, proposed by the Arab Initiative (2007), the United Nations, and the American government (Kelman, 2011). This solution was summarized as a “two state solution, in which Israel withdraws to the 1967 lines and a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The capital of the Palestinian state will be the East part of Jerusalem”. This description of a two-state solution suitable for a survey sample was adopted from Maoz & McCauley (2005). Surveying a representative sample of Jewish Israelis, Maoz and McCauley found a negative correlation between a Zero-Sum view on the conflict, identification with a generally hawkish political stance, and support for a two-state solution where Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders. Surveying a sample of Jewish Americans, we found a negative correlation between a two-state solution that include withdrawal to the 1967 borders, dehumanization, a zero-sum view, and support for the Jewish narrative on the conflict (Ben Hagai, Zurbriggen, et al, 2013).

Results

To further validate the scales for this study I conducted Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Confirmatory Factor Analysis confirms that the measurement instruments are valid in the sense that the covariance structure of the items comprising the instruments aligns with the hypothesized structure of the factors that they are hypothesized to represent (Harrington, 2009). I used IBM@SPSS Amos 24.0 to conduct the CFA for the 20 items used in this sample (a zero-sum scale was not

included because it comprised only one item and thus would be unlikely to form a separate factor in a CFA). I conducted the CFA only on the Jewish American sample, because whereas I had previously conducted Exploratory Factor Analysis using the same set of items on another (independent) Jewish sample (see Ben Hagai, Zurbriggen, et al., 2013), the present study was the first time that the items had been administered to an Arab American sample. Consistent with EFA results for the previous Jewish American sample, I hypothesized a model with four latent factors representing the four scales, Monolithic Narrative (14 items), Collective Victimhood (2 items), Dehumanization (2 items), and Attachment (2 items). I allowed these factors to correlate. I determined absolute model fit using the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI). Following Weston and Gore (2006), I used $RMSEA \leq .06$ and $CFI \geq .90$ as standards of good fit. The model yielded good fit: $RMSEA = .06$ (Low .047, High .073) and $CFI = .93$. I included three correlated errors in the model. I correlated these three pairs because their MI was relatively high. The first pair has an MI of 39.51, the second, 20.02, and the third 19.83¹.

After I validated that the measures represented four different constructs, I examined levels of agreement with each construct among the Arab and the Jewish

¹ Correlated errors were between the item "To the best of my knowledge, the Jewish halutzim (early Jewish immigrants to Eretz Yisrael or Palestine) did not intend to harm the indigenous population living in the area" and "Most of the land the Zionist pioneers settled on was purchased legitimately from the Arabs." A second correlated error was between the item "Early Jewish aspiration to settle in Israel ignored the presence and the rights of the Palestinians to the land" and "The state of Israel acted to push the Palestinians out of the land of Israel". Third correlated error was between "The Israeli occupation oppresses and causes suffering to the Palestinian population" and "Arab-Israelis experience discrimination in Israel."

samples (See Table 1). In addition, I examined how individuals' responses on each construct correlated with their responses to the other constructs (see Table 2). To gain a richer and more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the Jewish and Palestinian root narratives on the conflict, other beliefs and peaceful solutions, I examined these two root narratives before adding them into a monolithic narrative on the conflict.

Arab Americans tended to strongly agree with the Palestinian root narrative on the conflict and Jewish Americans on average were neutral. Jewish Americans tended to somewhat agree with the Jewish narrative, and Arab Americans disagreed. In terms of a sense of collective victimhood, Arab Americans tended to strongly agree with statements that framed the Palestinians as victims; Jewish Americans tended to somewhat agree with statement framing Jews as victims. Arab Americans were significantly more likely to understand Jewish Israelis in dehumanizing terms, compared to Jewish American likelihood to understand the Palestinians in dehumanizing terms. Nevertheless, it is important to note that while there were differences in the extent to which Arab and Jewish Americans agreed with statement dehumanizing the outgroup, neither groups scored above the neutral line of 4 points on a Likert scale, in other words on average neither Arab or Jewish Americans agreed with statements that dehumanize the outgroup (See Table 1). There were no significant differences between the two groups in their rejection of a zero-sum view on the conflict, nor were there differences in Jewish and Arab Americans' levels of agreement with statements that indicated their attachment to Israel or Palestine. Both

Arab and Jewish Americans taking this survey tended to be neutral in respect to a two-state solution that is based on Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 borders (See Table 1).

Table 1.

Differences in Beliefs in Arab and Jewish Americans

Variable	Arab Americans	Jewish Americans	T	95% Confidence Interval of the difference	
				Lower	Upper
Palestinian narrative	6.47(.75)	4.28 (1.29)	-19.21**	-2.41	-1.96
Jewish narrative	2.50(.92)	5.01 (1.07)	23.60**	2.30	2.72
Victimhood	6.51(.97)	5.84 (.91)	-6.72**	-.87	-.47
Dehumanization	2.40(1.65)	1.80(1.03)	-4.06**	-.88	-.31
Zero-sum	2.12(1.72)	1.95(1.46)	-1.01	-.50	.16
Attachment	5.99(1.51)	6.14(1.09)	1.05	-.13	.42
Two-state solution	4.04(2.27)	4.36(2.09)	1.38	-.13	.77

Note. All measures were scored on a seven point Likert scale. 1 Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3 Somewhat disagree, 4. Neither agree nor disagree, 5. Somewhat agree, 6. Agree, 7. Strongly agree. Standard deviation in parenthesis.

Regression analysis

The first goal of this study was to examine the beliefs that best predict support for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among a sample of Jewish and Arab Americans. Before conducting the regression analysis, I examined correlation between the variables (See Table 2) and I conducted a collinearity diagnostic. In both samples all the tolerance values were above 0.01, indicating acceptable levels.

Table 2

Correlation Between Beliefs, Narratives, and Support for a Two-State Solution

Measures	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Palestinian Narrative	--	-.52**	.25**	-.02	-.04	.53**	-.18*
2. Jewish Narrative	-.80**	--	-.46**	-.29**	-.17*	-.33**	.22*
3. Victimhood	-.44**	.46**	--	.09	.04	.13	-.10
4. Dehumanization	-.40**	.38**	.22**	--	.70**	-.03	-.07
5. Zero-sum game	-.41**	.38**	.21**	.50**	--	-.01	-.14
6. Attachment	-.27**	.32**	.30**	.13	.13	--	-.19*
7. Solution	.66**	-.63**	-.44**	-.44**	-.41**	-.22**	--

Note. Correlations for Arab Americans are above the diagonal, and correlations for Jewish Americans are below the diagonal. *p < .05. **p < .01.

Following examination of correlation and the collinearity diagnostic I regressed Collective Victimhood, Dehumanization, Zero-sum View, and Monolithic Narrative measures on the Two-state Solution measure. I conducted the regression

first on the Arab American sample (see Table 3) and second on the Jewish American sample (see Table 4).

In the Arab American sample (See Table 3), the four beliefs accounted for 7.4% of the variance [$R^2=.074$, $F(4, 166)=3.30$, $p=.012$]. The strongest predictor was the Monolithic Narrative measure composed of subtraction the Jewish Narrative from the Palestinian narrative. The more individuals ascribed to a Monolithic Narrative the less likely they were to agree to a Two-state Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ($\beta=-.23$ $t(4,170)=-2.81$, $p=.006$). The other marginally significant predictor was rejection of a Zero-sum View on the conflict ($\beta=-.20$ $t(4,170)=-1.91$, $p=.057$). Notably, neither collective victimhood nor dehumanization were significant predictors.

Table 3.

Predictors of Support for a Two-State Solution in Arab Americans

Variable	B	β	t	p- level	95% CI
Constant	5.614		4.818(.000)	.001	[3.314, 7.915]
Victimhood	.001	.000	-.004(.997)	.997	[-.380, .381]
Dehumanization	.164	.120	1.136(.258)	.258	[-.121, .449]

Zero-sum view	-.262	-.199	-1.913(.057)	.057	[-.532, .008]
Monolithic Narrative	-.360	-.234	2.807(.006)	.006	[.107, .613]

Note. $R^2 = .074$. Participant scores on the Palestinian narrative was subtracted from their score on the Jewish narrative to compose a Monolithic Narrative construct.

In the Jewish American sample, the four beliefs accounted for 51% of the variance [$R^2=.51$, $F(4, 177)= 46.87$. $p < .001$]. The strongest predictor was rejection of a Monolithic Narrative on the conflict. In the Jewish sample a Monolithic Narrative represented subtraction of the Palestinian narrative from the Jewish narrative. The more individuals ascribed to a Monolithic Narrative the less likely they were to agree to a two-state solution ($\beta=-.51$ $t(4,177)=-7.82$, $p<.001$). The other significant predictors were Dehumanization of the Palestinians ($\beta=-.17$ $t(4,177)=-2.64$, $p=.009$) and Collective Victimhood. The less that Jewish Americans felt Israel was a victim, the more likely they were to support a two-state solution ($\beta=-.14$ $t(4, 177)=-2.25$, $p=.02$).

Table 4

Predictors of Support for a Two-State Solution in Jewish Americans

Variable	B	β	T	p-level	95% CI
Constant	7.432		9.167	.001	[5.832, 9.033]

Victimhood	-.325	-.141	-2.370	.019	[-.596, -.054]
Dehumanization	-.333	-.165	-2.642	.009	[-.582, -.084]
Zero-sum view	-.109	-.076	-1.215	.226	[-.287, .068]
Monolithic Narrative	-.478	-.513	-7.817	.001	[-.598, -.357]

Note. $R^2 = .514$. To construct a Monolithic Narrative on the conflict was composed by subtracting the Jewish Narrative on the conflict from the Palestinian narrative on the conflict.

The second aim of this study is to examine if a monolithic root narrative mediates between group attachment and rejection of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among Arab and Jewish Americans. To test the mediational model, I followed a four step approach recommended by Kenny (2016) (<http://davidakenny.net/cm/mediate.htm>). In the first step, I show that group attachment is correlated with support for a two-state solution (using a regression analysis). In the second step, I show that group attachment is correlated with a monolithic narrative (again with a regression analysis). In the third step, I show that monolithic narrative is correlated with support for a two-state solution, while controlling for attachment to the ingroup (using regression analysis). In the fourth step, I check the prior equation (step 3) to see if the relationship between ingroup attachment and a two-state solution becomes insignificant when adding the mediator of a monolithic narrative on the conflict (Baron & Kenny, 1986).

Figures 1 and 2, reports the results of the mediational analysis for both the Arab and Jewish samples. For the Arab American sample, the mediational hypothesis was supported. The predictor variable of Attachment to Palestine was significantly correlated with a two-state solution $B = -.28$, $SE = .11$, ($\beta = -.19$, $p = .010$). Attachment to Palestine was also significantly predictive of a Monolithic Narrative $B = .46$, $SE = .06$ ($\beta = .48$, $p = .00$) and a Monolithic Narrative was predictive of support for a Two-state Solution $B = -.36$, $SE = .11$ ($\beta = -.23$, $p = .002$). To test for mediation, we conducted a regression analysis and entered Attachment to Palestine and Monolithic Narrative as predictor variables to a Two-state Solution as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant ($R^2 = .06$, $F(2, 171) = 5.47$, $p = .005$). The relationship between Monolithic Root Narrative and Two-state Solution remained significant even while controlling for Attachment to Palestine $B = -.28$, $SE = .13$ ($\beta = -.18$; $t = 2.15$, $p = .03$). Most importantly, the relationship between Attachment to Palestine and Two-state Solution was no longer significant in this analysis $B = .15$, $SE = .13$ ($\beta = -.10$; $p = .24$).

For the Jewish American sample, the mediational hypothesis was also supported (see Figure 2). The predictor variable of Attachment to Israel was significantly correlated with support for a Two-state Solution $B = -.41$, $SE = .14$, ($\beta = -.21$, $p = .004$). Attachment to Israel was also significantly predictive of a Monolithic Narrative $B = .64$, $SE = .15$ ($\beta = .31$, $p = .00$) and a Monolithic Narrative was predictive of support for a Two-state Solution $B = -.63$, $SE = .05$ ($\beta = -.68$, $p = .001$). To test for mediation, we conducted a regression analysis and entered Attachment to Israel and

Monolithic Narrative as predictor variables to Two-state Solution as the outcome variable. The overall equation was significant ($R^2=.46$, $F(2, 181) = 76.75$, $p = .001$). The relationship between Monolithic Narrative and a Two-state Solution remained significant even while controlling for Attachment to Israel $B=-.63$, $SE=.05$ ($\beta = -.68$; $p = .001$). Most importantly, the relationship between Attachment to Israel and Two-state Solution was no longer significant in this analysis $B=-.01$, $SE=.11$ ($\beta = -.004$; $p = .96$).

Figure 1. Arab Americans





Figure 2. Jewish Americans



Discussion

The results demonstrate that in both the Jewish and the Arab American samples the Jewish and the Palestinian narratives are represented well (and are negatively correlated) within a single Monolithic Narrative factor. This Monolithic Narrative factor served as the strongest predictor to rejection of a peaceful solution among Arab and Jewish Americans (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, root narratives mediated between Attachment to Israel or Palestine and support for a Two-state Solution (Hypothesis 2). Collective victimhood, a Zero-sum View on the conflict, and Dehumanization of the outgroup are the main beliefs that have been hypothesized to explain the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007; Halprin & Bar-Tal, 2011). This study shows that root narratives depicting culturally particular histories of Jews and Palestinians play a critical role in how individuals frame the conflict. This result replicates a previous study done with a sample of Jewish Americans (Ben Hagai Zurbriggen, et al., 2013). Moreover, it highlights the importance of narratives in predicting rejection of peaceful solutions also among Arab Americans.

Limitations

The four predictors described above explained to a much greater extent support for a two-state solution among the Jewish American sample (accounting for 54% of the variance) compared to the Arab American sample (accounting for 7% of the variance). This big difference may be associated with greater variance in the Arab sample. The Arab American sample was composed of Arabs from different cultures and with roots in countries with different relationships with Israel (e.g., Iraq,

Lebanon, Egypt, and Palestine). The differences in impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on different Arabs may explain the variance in opinions not accounted for. In addition, this study is limited in the framing of a peaceful solution to the conflict as a two-state solution. Because the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rapidly changing it may be more likely that a two-state solution is no longer viable and that a one-state solution is more likely to achieve a peaceful future for Israelis and Palestinians.

Implications

The finding that acknowledgement of the narrative of the other predicts support for a two-state solution has important practical and theoretical implications. On a theoretical level it highlights the importance of narratives that account for groups' culturally specific histories in predicting support for a peaceful solution to conflict. Because both the Jewish narrative and the Palestinian narrative are associated with a sense of threat (Jews) and victimhood (Palestinians), this finding supports work that highlights the importance of an inclusive sense of victimhood in leading individuals to support a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Vollhardt, 2009). Nevertheless, it is important to note that a sense of victimhood was different between Jewish participants and Palestinian participants. The Jewish collective narrative evokes a sense of threat and the need to defend itself. On the other hand, the Palestinian narrative evokes a sense of dispossession and loss. Capturing these differences is likely to have contributed to the explanatory power of the Monolithic Narrative measure. Overall, this research supports theories that realistic

empathy (Pettigrew, 2003; White, 1991) and narrative empathy (Liu & Laszlo, 2007), are crucial in promoting peace. In line with these theories my findings suggest that incorporating aspects of the narrative of the other into one's account of the conflict leads individuals to support solutions that create more equal distribution of resources between one's own group and the outgroup.

Additionally, this research makes a contribution to researchers working within the social identity paradigm (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to this paradigm, when individuals come to identify with a group, they will favor their ingroup. During intergroup conflict people will also denigrate the outgroup. The mediation analysis suggests that this process occurs on a narrative level. When individuals identify with the ingroup, they also identify with the ingroup's narrative. Identification with the ingroup narrative is associated with rejection of the outgroup narrative. In turn, rejection of the outgroup narrative leads to rejection of a peaceful compromise towards the outgroup.

Additional Research

An important question yet to be answered is why some individuals come to have empathy towards the outgroup narrative, while others come to reject it. In the next study I further examine this question, focusing on the processes associated with Jewish Americans' acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict.

Study 2

The results of the previous study of a sample of Jewish and Arab Americans suggest that the best predictor for support for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict is acknowledgement of the narrative of the other. In this study, I examine what leads individuals to acknowledge the narrative of the other. The predictors I focus on are two central themes in contemporary Jewish culture: concerns over Jewish vulnerability and the values of tikkun olam. I argue that individuals who have a chronic concern with Jewish vulnerability and anti-Semitism are less likely to agree with the Palestinian narrative on the conflict, compared to Jewish Americans who frame their Jewish identity in relationship to the pursuit of social justice or tikkun olam. Additionally, I argue that when concerns over Jewish vulnerability or tikkun olam are affirmed, Jewish American will be more likely to agree with the Palestinian narrative on the conflict compared to a control group.

Concerns over Jewish Vulnerability

Two sets of concerns or values play an important role in how Jewish Americans understand their identity. The first set of concerns common to Jewish culture is a focus on collective threat, insecurity, and vulnerability due to Jews' minority status and historic persecution (Berenbaum, 2009; Cohen & Eisen, 2000; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Judaism's concern with vulnerability is rooted in the religion's struggle for survival. During its establishment, the Jewish religion defined itself in opposition to the pagan creeds of the Middle East. Judaism's oppositional identity led to the expulsion of Jews from Eretz Yisrael (the land of Israel) as they refused to assimilate to Roman paganism and allow Roman sculptures in the holy temple in Jerusalem (Goodman, 1993). Although there is no doubt that Jews thrived and contributed a great deal to the societies within which they settled in the diaspora,

they also experienced discrimination and oppression. In exile, Jews were commonly treated as pariahs or as second class citizens. In Spain and Portugal (especially during the 14th centuries) some Jews were forced to convert to Christianity (Graizbord, 2004). In 1272, King Edward of England forced Jews to pay an increasingly larger tax, sent their leadership to death at the Tower of London, and later expelled the rest of the Jewish population from the English island (Mundill, 2002). In other parts of Europe Jews were prohibited from buying land and participating in political and judicial processes, and were restricted to certain geographical locations (Safran, 2005). In much of the Muslim world, Jews held a protected status, but were not accorded full citizenship (Lewis, 2014). When social changes occurred in the above societies, Jews were often seen as the cause, and were violently punished. While some anti-Semitism has been promulgated based on religious differences, more modern forms of anti-Semitism have framed Jews as an inferior and dangerous race (Laqueur, 2006). The framing of Jews in racial terms culminated in the extermination of approximately six million Jews in the Shoah (Holocaust).

The marginalization of the Jewish people produced cultural narratives, rituals, and symbols that reflect, ameliorate, and make meaning of Jewish existential vulnerability. For instance, holiday rituals such as Chanukah, Purim, and Passover celebrate Jewish triumph over those who aim to oppress them. Goldberg (1996) writes that in traditional Jewish folklore,

the Jews were helpless pawns, buffeted me'evel leyom tov - from mourning to celebration - by the vagaries of cruel despots, benign

protectors, and Divine Providence itself. 'Bechol dor vador omdim aleinu lechaloteinu,' reads the liturgy of the Passover festival: In each generation they rise up against us to destroy us, but the Holy One, blessed be He, saves us from their hand (p.10).

Not only in centuries-old holidays such as Passover do Jews recite prayers thanking God for preventing their elimination. New rituals such as Yom HaShoah (Holocaust Remembrance Day), Yom HaZikaron (Memorial Day), and group trips to the death camps and to Israel are focused on the transmission of collective memory of Jewish oppression and trauma (Cohen & Kelman, 2010).

Values of Social Justice and Tikkun Olam

The Jewish historical oppression has not only led to an ongoing sense of threat, but also contributed to a cultural stance that questions dominant groups' values and norms (MacDonald, 1998). In the U.S., Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 19th century played an important role in leftist movements (anarchist, communist, or socialist), especially in New York City (Buhle, 1980). Moreover, Jewish people were overrepresented in solidarity activities with the Black Civil Rights movements fighting against segregation in the South (Salzman & West, 1997). New Left movements, such as feminism, gay liberation, and the counter-cultural movements that questioned traditional norms included Jewish leaders such as Harvey Milk, Gloria Steinem, and Abby Hoffman. The high concentration of Jewish young adults among social justice activists has been explained in relation to parental transmission of values (e.g., "red diaper babies"), as well as family dynamics in

which parents are less authoritarian and the relation between genders is more egalitarian (Lichter & Rothman, 1982; Stewart & McDermott, 2004).

Jewish response to oppression through the pursuit of social justice is also associated with the concept of tikkun olam, grounded in Jewish religious tradition. The term tikkun olam is found in the *Alienu* prayer in the Jewish Talmud (mostly in relation to divorce law), and in the Kabbalist book of the Zohar. Tikkun olam became fundamental to Jewish culture following the Holocaust. The trauma of the Holocaust led Jewish Rabbis and thinkers to promote an interpretation of this tremendous tragedy through a call for an active involvement in the mending of the world (Krasner, 2013). As Fein (1988, cited in Krasner, 2013) notes, "in order to survive, a people needs more than a strategy; it needs a reason"(p.91). The Jewish American cultural focus on active mending of the world through acts of tikkun olam was further strengthened when Hebrew and Jewish day schools revamped their curriculums to engage with issues of tzedakah (charity) and social justice (Jacobs, Doroff, & Greer, 2010). Educational curriculums and teaching tools were produced to encourage tikkun olam values within Jewish youths' sensibilities. For instance, one board game rewards participants for tikkun olam deeds, "if you will have a Bar/Bat Mitzvah twin, or have written to an adopted Refusenik family, move ahead another two spaces" (Krasner, 2013, p.78). Finally, the institutionalization of tikkun olam values in Jewish education aims to create a value-based identification that will attract and sustain liberal Jewish youth engagement with Judaism.

Zionism, Anti-Semitism, and Tikkun Olam

Concerns over anti-Semitism and values of tikkun olam also played an important role in the structuring of different Zionist ideologies. Revisionist Zionism framed the return of Jews to Eretz Israel as necessitated by anti-Semitism. Zeev Jabotinski, the ideological founder of Revisionist Zionism (rightwing Zionist movement), is quoted as saying "eliminate the Diaspora, or the Diaspora will surely eliminate you" (Turner, 2012). In a famous letter, Yonatan Netanyahu (an Israeli war hero) writes to his brother, the current Israeli prime-minister Binyamin (Bibi) Netanyahu, "We're preparing for war, and it's hard to know what to expect. What I'm positive of is that there will be a next round, and others after that. But I would rather opt for living here in continual battle than for becoming part of the wandering Jewish people. Any compromise will simply hasten the end. As I don't intend to tell my grandchildren about the Jewish State in the twentieth century as a mere brief and transient episode in thousands of years of wandering, I intend to hold on here with all my might" (Netanyahu, 1981, p.230).

The view that anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment will return in every generation situates Jews as living in constant threat. From this perspective, Jews will either always passively submit to their oppressors or live by their swords forever.

In contrast Labor Zionism (the hegemonic Zionist ideology until 1977) frames Jewish settlements as grounded in social justice principles. For Labor Zionism, the settlement of Israel was part of a social justice liberation movement that aims to find a safe place for Jews to reside. Labor and Socialist Zionists rejected the notion of

Zionism as a colonialist force, and framed the settlement of Jews in Palestine as part of modernizing process that can benefit Arab and Jewish workers alike (Herzl, 1902/2015; Krasner, 2013).

Debates among Jewish Americans Today

Currently in the United States, debates among Jewish Americans about Zionism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are also framed as informed by either concerns over Jewish vulnerability or tikkun olam. Many Jews interpret critiques of Israeli occupation and support for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement as a new form of anti-Semitism. Rejection of the occupation and BDS activism are interpreted as anti-Semitic because they deny the Jewish right for self-determination and misrecognize Zionism as a neo-colonialist movement (Fishman, 2012). Even scholars who support the BDS movement as a legitimate and nonviolent political project, argue that some fraction of BDS supporters use anti-Semitic arguments to campaign for BDS (Zunes, 2015).

While some Jews frame BDS criticism of Israel as anti-Semitic, to other Jews values of tikkun olam motive their support for BDS. For instance, Alpert (2011) frames her activism in Jewish Voice for Peace, an organization that supports BDS tactics, as a tikkun olam value,

I believe my greatest contribution to tikkun olam has been my participation in the rabbinic cabinet of Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), an organization that supports the radical notion that inspired by Jewish tradition [we must] work together for peace, social justice, equality, human rights, respect for

international law, and a U.S. foreign policy based on these ideals (p.30).

Jewish American activists who advocate for Israel tend to frame the BDS movement as an instance of anti-Semitism. Many Jewish Americans who are in solidarity with the Palestinians' cause explain their motives in relationship to values of tikkun olam.

Research on a College Campus

Our own research on the schism between Jewish students in relationship to Israel (Ben Hagai & Zurbriggen, under review) suggests that concerns with Jewish vulnerability and values of tikkun olam are important in structuring conversations about the conflict on college campuses. Jewish students who became involved in the Jewish community in college tended to be influenced by trips and educational programs that framed Israel as constantly under threat. These students interpreted critiques of Israel and students' support of bills calling on the university to divest from companies associated with the Israeli occupation as an attack on them and as anti-Semitic. Sophia, a Jewish leader at the university's Hillel explained,

I wonder, what is the fine line between being a Zionist and being a Jew. Like at what point, does hating Zionism become the new anti-Semitism? Because that's the rhetoric I hear all the time. It's like, "oh, I'm not against Jews, I'm just against Israel or the Israeli government." OK... so how many Jews support Israel? Like 85-95% of Jews support Israel, you know? So you are against 90%, 95% of the Jews... There's a reason that they say the next time in Jerusalem, it's not just a spiritual place, it's a safety net (p. 10).

Sophia understands Israel as the Jewish home; attacking it means attacking the many Jews who see Israel as their home. These attacks further highlight to her and many activists in support of Israel the importance of having a safety net for the Jewish people in Israel.

Jewish youth in our study who came to be more critical of Israel framed their Jewish identity in relationship to values of tikkun olam and social justice. For instance, Jessie, who grew more critical of the unconditional support for Israel by the Jewish community center (Hillel), explained,

I was thinking about it in silly terms. I found out once that Urban Outfitters [a fashionable clothing company] provides all this money to anti-equality anti-gay organizations. I was like I don't want to spend money there because they're giving money to these organization that I don't support. I was thinking in a silly way that this is what [the Palestinian solidarity organizations] are saying. Just by going to the university your tuition goes to an occupation that's like destroying your family's homes or killing your family (p.27)

Although Jessie qualifies her analogy as simplistic ("I was thinking of it in silly terms"), she draws an analogy between her commitment to equality and social justice values (leading her to boycott Urban Outfitters because of their support for proposition 8 which outlawed same-sex marriage) to social justice activism initiated by Palestinian solidarity organizations (aiming to divest funds from companies associated with the Israeli occupation). Her identity as a budding social justice

activist led her to empathize with Palestinian solidarity activists and acknowledge the Palestinian narrative in which the Palestinians are dispossessed from their home(land).

Qualitative Evidence on the Impact of Jewish Vulnerability

A sense of threat and vulnerability. Ample evidence from psychology studies using different methodologies suggests that discussion of Jewish trauma and a Jewish sense of victimhood is associated with disavowal of Israel's responsibility for Palestinian suffering (Bar Tal et al., 2009; Canetti-Nisim, Halprin, Sharvit, & Hobofoll, 2009; Maoz & McCauley, 2009; Vollhardt, 2009). Studies of dialogue programs between Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians suggest that discussion of historical events such as the Holocaust or the Nakba (the deportation of Palestinians from their homeland following the declaration of a Jewish state in 1948) is associated with more moments of ethnocentric talk that disavow the outgroup perspective on the conflict (Ben Hagai et al., 2013; Sagy, 2002). For instance, according to Sagy (2002), discussion of traumatic events led to "a heavy silence or to verbal violence. The result was a feeling that the group had reached a dead end, and was paralyzed in despair because of the other's impenetrability" (p. 266). Also studying dialogue groups between Jews and Palestinians, Chaitin (2014) demonstrates that a focus on individuals' experiences with the Holocaust led some participants to reject engagement with the Palestinian other. Chaitin quotes a participant who, after describing the loss of his family after the Nazis invaded Budapest in 1944, said "I would put all the Palestinians on transport and send them to the gas chambers just like

they (the Nazis) did with us...." (p. 481). The qualitative evidence suggests that reflecting on experiences of collective trauma is associated with fewer instances in which the suffering and dispossession of the Palestinian experience is incorporated into Jewish participants' account of the conflict.

Quantitative Evidence on the Impact of Jewish Vulnerability

Survey studies from Israel highlight the strong correlation between a sense of collective victimhood and Jewish-Israelis' rejection of compromises with the Palestinians. When individuals saw the history of the Jewish people as characterized by threat to its existence, they were less likely to support compromise over the status of Jerusalem (Schori-Eyal, Halprin, & Bar-Tal, 2014). In a three-wave study of Jewish Israelis, Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009) found that exposure to terrorism predicted a sense of threat (measured using the DSM, PTSD inventory), which in turn predicted framing the Palestinians as a threat. Framing the Palestinians as a threat further predicted exclusionary policies towards Palestinians ("Arabs should not be allowed equal social rights in Israel", p. 327). Using a representative sample of Jewish-Israelis, Halperin and Bar-Tal (2001) demonstrated that a sense of collective victimhood was associated with decreased openness to new information (such as reading books written by Palestinians) about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Inclusive victimhood and social justice activism. Fewer studies aim to understand what leads some Jews to exhibit empathy towards the Palestinian narrative. Some psychological studies have demonstrated a correlation between humanistic universal values and greater openness to information countering one's

own narrative on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among a sample of Israeli Jews (Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015). Nevertheless, no research to my knowledge has looked at the role of the culturally particular humanistic values such as that of tikkun olam in leading to a greater acknowledgement of the narrative of the other. Tikkun olam represents a culturally particular value rooted in Jewish tradition, with a universalistic implication of mending the world.

According to Cross's Nigrescence stage model (Cross, 1991), commitment to social justice activism, and recognition of outgroup oppression may arise after members of a marginalized group process their encounters with oppression and discrimination.

Within an internalization stage: when members of a minority group internalize their group identity they may come to recognize similar forms of oppression in the treatment of other groups. Such recognition may lead members of minority groups to commit themselves to social justice activism for their own group as well as other groups.

A sense of threat and vulnerability. Experimental studies with Jewish Americans suggest that reflection on anti-Semitism and the Holocaust is associated with rejection of Palestinian suffering. For instance, Wohl and Branscombe (2008) asked one group of Jewish students from Alberta University to reflect on the Holocaust and its impact on Jews around the world. One group of participants read a short description of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and answered questions related to Israel's responsibility for the violence with the Palestinians and their sense of collective guilt (i.e., Israelis should feel guilty about their role in the conflict).

Another group of participants (i.e., the control group) was not primed to think about the Holocaust and only read descriptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Results suggested that when Jewish students were primed to reflect on the Holocaust, they were less likely to feel collective guilt compared to Jews who were not primed to think about the Holocaust. Moreover, those primed to think about the Holocaust were less likely to think of Israel as responsible for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (i.e., "I believe that the current actions of the Palestinians are in response to Israeli oppression"). Finally, when Jewish participants were reminded of their group's victimization, they attributed Israel's actions to Palestinian terrorism more than when they were not reminded of their group's collective trauma.

In a study focused on trust, Jewish students were primed to think about Jewish victimhood by reading statements related to the Holocaust and the anti-Jewish pogroms in the Russian Empire. Participants in the control group read statements only associated with Jewish culture, such as "Orthodox Jews eat Kosher". Following the experimental manipulation, participants played an investment game on the computer that involved trusting a Jewish or a non-Jewish partner with the potential possibility of winning greater sums of money. Jewish participants who were primed to think about Jewish victimization were more likely to trust a Jewish investment partner compared to those who were not primed to think about Jewish victimization (Rotella, Richeson, Chiao, & Bean, 2013).

Additional variables

In addition to group identity values such as endorsement of tikkun olam or concerns over anti-Semitism, other variables may play an important explanatory role in understanding why some Jewish Americans acknowledge the narrative of the other. Individual differences in group attachment may impact the extent to which individuals come to agree with the outgroup narrative (Brown, 2000).

Psychologists studying individual dispositions towards different ideologies have argued that individual needs, such as the need for shared reality or the need for epistemic and existential security, bring people to justify the current system and support politically conservative policies (see Jost, 2003 for review). Individual differences in system justification played an important role in explaining people's support for the Democratic or Republican party in the United States (Jost, 2003). System justification is associated with denial of inequalities and support for social hierarchies (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). System justification is also associated with denial of climate change (Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010) and rejection of feminist attitudes (Yeung, Kay, & Peach 2013).

Personality traits have also been shown to impact people's positions on political issues. Several studies suggest that Big Five personality traits, such as Openness to Experience (and to a lesser extent, Conscientiousness), are associated with support for the Democratic or Republican party, respectively (Jost, 2006). Two personality traits have been particularly associated with political views. Openness to Experience, defined as "the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individuals' mental and experiential life" (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2011, p. 261), is

associated with left wing political positions. Conscientiousness, defined as "socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goal-directed behavior" (Gerber et al., 2011, p. 261), is associated with right wing authoritarianism.

Further research on ideology and personality suggests that the American red state / blue state divide can be explained based on differing rates of Big Five personality traits, where Red states have greater concentrations of Conscientious personality traits compared to blue states, and Blue states have higher concentrations of people with high levels of Openness to Experience (Rentfrow, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2009). Openness to Experience is negatively correlated with Right Wing Authoritarianism, a measure of conformity to government and religious authority, and rejection of those who do not conform to normative authority, such as gays and lesbians and political radicals (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). It appears that people who are creative, imaginative, and curious (associated with Openness to Experience) are more likely to be open to information that departs from the hegemonic social view. On the other hand, people who are more orderly and organized (associated with Conscientiousness) are more likely to support narratives associated with the status quo.

In conclusion, prior studies suggest that a chronic concern with Jewish vulnerability and the holocaust associate with less understanding and openness to the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. Less studied, but also likely, is that individuals' who frame their Jewish identity based on values of tikkun olam and the pursuit of social justice will be more likely to agree with the Palestinian narrative on the

conflict. In addition, predictors such as group attachment, System Justification, Openness to Experience, and Conscientiousness are likely to impact the extent to which Jewish individuals agree with the counter-normative narrative on the conflict expressed by the Palestinian narrative. Given that the normative narrative on the conflict among Jews represents a position in which Jews want to live in peace but must defend themselves, a narrative that frames the Palestinians as indigenous to the land but as dispossessed represents a counter narrative.

Finally, social positions associated with demographic categories may also explain why Jewish Americans come to reject the Palestinian narrative on the conflict.

Younger age, liberal political positions, and higher levels of education, are associated with greater individual commitment to principles of equality. Moreover, education levels associated with middle class positions tend to predict liberal political attitudes. Individuals with greater levels of cultural capital (defined as cultivation of talents and skills that are not directly linked to financial gain) may also be associated with greater levels of liberalism (Bourdieu, 1984).

Self and Group Affirmation

Although correlation between concern over Jewish vulnerability or commitment to tikkun olam may relate (in opposite directions) to openness towards the Palestinian narrative, once these concerns are affirmed they may both lead to greater openness to the outgroup narrative on the conflict. The logic that affirming concerns over Jewish vulnerability or values of tikkun olam will lead to greater

agreement with the Palestinian narrative on the conflict is derived from self/group affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006).

An expanding paradigm of research in social psychology points to the possibility that affirming certain group values may lead individuals to greater openness to opinions that contradict their own. According to the self-affirmation theory, when individuals are presented with information that contradicts their beliefs, they are likely to feel threatened. This is because our opinions are part of who we are, and when information countering our position is presented, it invalidates a part of ourselves. The threat to the self leads people to respond to information in dissonance with their position by devaluing this information (e.g., claiming that this information is incorrect, or that the source is unreliable). The self-affirmation theory suggests that because people are fundamentally motivated to sustain a sense of self integrity, when other parts of the self are affirmed, individuals will be less defensive towards information that counters their own beliefs.

In a classic experiment in the self-affirmation tradition, Cohen, Aaronson, and Steele (2000) asked Stanford students to indicate their opinions on abortion rights. Students who had a firm opinion on abortions -pro-choice or pro-life- were invited to participate in the experiment. They were randomly assigned to a control group in which they wrote what they ate that day, or to a self-affirmation condition in which they affirmed a value chosen from a list (e.g., sense of humor, creativity, social skills). Following this, participants read one argument against and one argument for abortion rights and were

asked to evaluate them. Participants who had self-affirmed evaluated arguments in opposition to their opinion as less biased compared to the control group.

Recently, researchers working within the self-affirmation paradigm extended the self-affirmation theory to examine the consequences of affirming group values. Student athletes were asked to affirm certain values following their participation in a game. These values were either framed as important to the sports team, to the individual players, or to students in the university (UC Santa Barbara). They found that group affirmation reduced the self-serving bias of the players, compared to the other two conditions. Players who were group affirmed were less likely to blame the loss on their teammates' mistakes. Such biased blaming has been found to be common among members of losing teams (Sherman, Kinias, Major, & Kim, 2007). Examining political issues, Canadian researchers found that when students affirmed group values in terms of their Canadian national identity (e.g., Canadians are self-disciplined, value family, value politics, value loyalty, value creativity) they were more likely to feel guilt and shame towards their state's treatments of the Aboriginal population, compared to a control group who didn't affirm group values (Gunn & Wilson, 2011). Nevertheless, when Israeli university students affirmed group values (e.g., Israelis value creativity, are loyal, or have integrity) they were no more likely to acknowledge harm done to the Palestinians (Čehajić-Clancy, Efron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011). The

lack of effect of affirming group values on acknowledgement of harm done to Palestinians may be because the values acknowledged (e.g., Israelis' creativity or integrity) were not related to the conflict with the Palestinians. Affirming values more closely related to the conflict with the Palestinians may lead to greater acknowledgement of their suffering.

In the following study I examine if affirming values more central to Jewish tradition, such as tikkun olam or concern over anti-Semitism is associated with greater recognition of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict compared to a control condition. This study departs from Čehajić-Clancy et al., (2011), on self/group- affirmation in that it seeks to affirm values important and central to Jewish American culture as opposed to generic values. Affirming group values that are essential to Jewish identity such as tikkun olam or a sense of collective vulnerability, may be more effective in reducing threat to the self and promoting greater acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict than affirming group values that are less central to Jewish identity.

My study also departs from Wohl and Branscombe's (2008) work on the consequences of priming Jewish Americans to reflect on the Holocaust and their sense of collective guilt, in that I do not ask people to reflect on their collective trauma but ask people to affirm an important concern in Jewish life, that of anti-Semitism. Affirming experiences with anti-Semitism may relate to

a sense of recognition of one's own collective suffering which then leads to greater openness towards the suffering of the other.

Study 2

In the second study, Jewish American participants were invited to answer an online survey about Israel, their Jewish identity, and anti-Semitism.

Participants were randomly assigned either to a condition in which they were invited to reflect on their experiences with anti-Semitism, or to one in which they reflected on actions of tikkun olam, or to a control condition in which they were asked for their age. In an initial analysis, I compared levels of support between each condition for statements depicting the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. In a second analysis, I also examined if self-reports of experiences with anti-Semitism or commitment to tikkun olam predicted acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict.

Based on the literature reviewed I made two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is based on causal analysis and the second hypothesis is based on correlation analysis.

Hypothesis 1. Priming Jewish Americans to reflect on their experiences with anti-Semitism or tikkun olam will decrease their rejection of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict, compared to a control group.

Hypothesis 2. Self-reports of chronic identity concerns about anti-Semitism and commitment to tikkun olam will be associated with acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict, but in opposite directions. Individuals

with greater concerns with anti-Semitism will be less likely to acknowledge the Palestinian narrative on the conflict, while those Jews committed to tikkun olam will be more likely to endorse the Palestinian narrative on the conflict.

Method

Participants. Participants were recruited to this study through announcements on social networking sites, listservs, and through snowballing recruitment methodologies. Hillels, (the Jewish student community centers) on college campuses across the United States were asked to announce this survey to their participants. Stanford University, UC Santa Cruz, UC Irvine, Boston College, University of Washington, Boston University, University of Nevada Las Vegas, Cornell University, Portland State University, Lewis & Clark College, Cornell University, University of Arizona, and Grand Valley State University in Michigan, were among the schools who wrote us back saying they will announce the survey to their students. In addition, we also announced the survey to Jewish political organizations, such as Stand With Us, J-Street, Jewish Voice for Peace. We announced the survey among Jewish youth groups alumni lists such as Habonim Dror, Reform Movement and Conservative movement. We also contacted Chabad Rabbis and asked them to announce the survey. Finally, Rabbis, Jewish leaders and educators were asked to send this study to their networks, or to their congregants. In the survey announcement participants were asked to follow a link to the surveymonkey website where they could answer the survey.

Overall 718 individuals began answering the survey. Twelve participants stated that they didn't identify as Jewish and were dropped from the analysis. Some 255 people passed the consent form page but didn't answer the first question (the priming condition); these people were dropped from the analysis. Of the people who answered the first question, 134 did not answer items representing the dependent variable (i.e. the Palestinian narrative) and were dropped from the analysis. Of the people dropped because they didn't complete items representing the Palestinian narrative, 90 were in the control group and were only asked their age, 21 were primed with Tikkun Olam, and 23 were asked to reflect on anti-Semitism. Some people indicated not engaging in tikkun olam (e.g., " I am sorry to report that I didn't engage in any activities of tikkun olam recently"), or experiencing anti-Semitism (e.g., " No. I live in New York City. Not a lot of anti-Semitism in Manhattan"); these people (n=21) were dropped from the analysis. Overall, 296 participants were included in the analysis (See Table 5).

Table 5. Missing Data Study 2.

Participants who started the survey: N=718	Not Jew	Passed consent form but didn't answer prime	Incomp Prime	Incomp DV (Palest Narrat)	Total Included Respondent
Missing Data	12	255			
Anti-Semitism			16 (no exper)	21	66
Tikkun Olam			5 (no exper)	23	89
No prime (asked for their age)				90	141
Total Excluded	12	255	21	134	296

Participant ages ranged from 18 to 81, with a median age of 23 and a mean age of 30. In terms of gender, 58.1% (172) of our sample identified as women, and 38.9% (115) identified as men, 2.5% (8) identified as Other and one person did not answer the gender question. In terms of religious orientation (participants were allowed to check more than one box), 26% (103) identified as secular, 39.5% (117) identified as Reform, 8.2% (24) identified as Reconstructionist, 6.3% (19) as modern Orthodox, 1.4% (4) as Orthodox, 9.5% (28) as other, and 11.1% (33) as non-affiliated. In terms of politics, 77.5% (221) identified as liberal, 9.5% (29) as “middle of the road,” and 11.3% (35) as conservative, 3.7% (11) didn’t answer. In terms of participants’ resident states, 55.7% (165) were from the Western Region of the US (51% (151) from California), 7.9% (24) were from the South, 16.1% (48) were from the Midwest, and 20.3% (60) were from the Eastern Region (about 7.5% (22) from New York).

Procedure. After electronically indicating their consent, participants were randomly assigned to three conditions. In the condition priming tikkun olam, participants were presented with this prompt:

First we would like to ask you about your Jewish identity. An important experience common to Jews is Tikkun Olam, the pursuit of social justice. Tikkun Olam connotes social action and the pursuit of social justice. Can you describe a recent event in which you engaged in Tikkun Olam actions,

promoting reparation of the world or social justice? (Remember, this survey is anonymous). Please be as specific as possible.

In the condition priming anti-Semitism, participants were presented with this prompt: First we would like to ask you about your Jewish identity. An important experience common to Jews is that of anti-Semitism and vulnerability. Anti-Semitism connotes an experience of discrimination and prejudice directed at Jews. Can you describe a recent event in which you or someone you know encountered anti-Semitism? (Remember, this survey is anonymous). Please be as specific as possible.

In the control condition participants were asked what their age was.

Overall, 141 participants were in the control group, 89 in the tikkun olam group, and 66 in the anti-Semitism group.

The imbalance between the numbers of participants in the control group, compared to the two experimental groups may be due to the increased effort required to answer a first short essay question. Writing about one's experience with anti-Semitism or tikkun olam necessitated more time and cognitive effort. I think (although I don't know for sure) that this was the reason why there were more people in the control group (only asked their age) than in the experimental groups (were asked to describe an experience with tikkun olam or anti-Semitism).

Measures

Dependent variable. The Palestinian narrative in which the Palestinians are indigenous to the land but have been humiliated and dispossessed by Jewish

occupation was measured by the same 8 item from the last study. For instance, "Before the beginning of the Jewish aliyot (waves of Jewish immigration beginning at the end of the 19th century), most of the land of Israel was populated by an indigenous Arab (Muslim and Christian) population". A reliability test resulted in Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha = .94$

Additional variable

Anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism was measured using three original items: "I have suffered very hurtful experiences of discrimination because of my Jewish identity," "I have been harassed multiple times because of my Jewish background," and "I think anti-Semitism is a serious problem on our campus or local community." Response scale ranged from 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Somewhat disagree, 4 Neither agree nor disagree, 5. Somewhat agree, 6. Agree, 7 strongly agree. Reliability was good ($\alpha=.78$).

Tikkun olam. I adapted statements from Cross' Racial Identity Scale (RIS) (Worrell, Cross, & Vandiver, 2001), which represents internalization stages, to the Jewish American context. Values associated with commitment to social justice and tikkun olam were measured using three items. Items from the RIS such as "I believe it is important to have both a Black identity and multicultural perspective, because this connects me to other groups (Hispanics, Asian-Americans, Whites, Jews, gays & lesbians, etc.)", were changed to "I believe it is important to have both a Jewish identity and a multicultural perspective which is inclusive of different groups of people (e.g., African Americans, Latinos, Muslims)." The other two items inspired by

Cross's theorization on internalized stage were: "As a Jew, I am committed to fighting for the rights of other oppressed minorities," and "I often find myself thinking about injustices happening to other groups of people" ($\alpha = .73$).

Attachment to Israel. To measure individual differences in attachment to Israel, I used two items from the Jewish American Annual Survey (2007) (see also Study 1): "I feel very emotionally attached to Israel" and "Caring about Israel is a very important part of my Jewish identity" ($\alpha = .91$).

System Justification Scale. To measure individual differences in system justification, I used Kay and Jost's (2003a) Global System Justification Scale.

Items. Eight items were included in this scale: "In general, you find society to be fair." "In general, the American political system operates as it should." "American society needs to be radically restructured.(reverse coded)" "The United States is the best country in the world to live in." "Most policies serve the greater good." "Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness." "Our society is getting worse every year (reverse coded)". "Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve."

Reliability. Kay and Jost (2013a) report reliability of $\alpha = .87$. Kay and Jost (2003b) found that system justification scores correlated significantly with "(a) scores on Lipkus's (1991) Global Belief in a Just World Scale ($r = .67$, $n = 117$, $p = .001$), (b) Quinn and Crocker's (1999) Protestant Work Ethic Scale ($r = .45$, $n = 50$, $p = .001$), and (c) a measure of general beliefs concerning needs for "balance" and "complementarity" in the social world ($r = .37$, $n = 117$, $p = .001$)" (See Jost & Kay,

2005, p. 503). Using the present sample of Jewish Americans, I found a reliability score of $\alpha=.82$.

Personality Measure. Items from the Big Five Scale were used to measure Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness personality traits (John, Naumann, Soto, 2008). In this study, I only measured two facets of personality, Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness. I focused on those because those seem to predict individuals' political disposition of liberal and conservative respectively.

Items. Items in the Conscientiousness scale include questions regarding how the participant sees him/himself, such as "Makes plans and follows through with them", "Perseveres until the task is finished", "Does things efficiently", "Does a thorough job", "Makes plans and follows through with them", "Prefers work that is routine", "Is easily distracted (reverse coded)" "Can be somewhat careless (reverse coded)" "Is a reliable worker".

Openness scale items include questions regarding the participant's self-perceptions such as. "Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature", "is inventive", "values artistic, aesthetic experiences", "has few artistic interests", "likes to reflect and play with ideas", "is original, comes up with new ideas". "is curious about many different things", "is ingenious, a deep thinker".

Reliability. Prior studies of the Big Five Inventory suggest good reliability of the five different measures of personality characteristics. Soto and John (2009) found that in a community sample the five measures "had an average reliability of .72 (range = .63–.84). In the student sample, the average reliability was .70 (range = .53–

.83), and their retest reliabilities averaged .80 (range = .71–.88, p. 86)”. In this study reliability for the Conscientiousness scale was $\alpha=.82$ and the Openness scale $\alpha=.83$

Cultural Capital measures. I used Redford, Johnson and Hannold’s (2009) operationalization of Lareau (2000) and Bourdieu’s (1984) cultural capital theoretical construct to assess participants’ level of cultural capital. In their research Redford et al., (2008) used items from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), to construct a Cultural Capital index with two questions: 1) "Do you or your eighth grader take part in any of the following activities?" (Activities were: "borrow books from the public library," "attend concerts or other musical events," "go to art museums," "go to science museums," and "go to history museums"); 2) "Has your eighth grader attended classes outside of his or her regular school to study any of the following?" (Activities were: "art," "music," "dance," "language," and "religion,").

Items. In this study we adapted these items to ask participants about their own childhood experiences, for example: As a child how often did you -

- ...borrow books from the public library?
- ...attend concerts or other musical events?
- ...go to art museums?
- ...go to science museums?
- ...go to history museums?

Participants answered the questions on a 5-point scale. “1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Often, 5. Very often”.

Reliability. Reliability in the Redford et al., (2008) study was .73. The reliability for this scale in my study was $\alpha=.80$.

Demographic variables. Demographic variables incorporated the age of participants, and a combined measure of parents' education ("What is the highest grade of school your mother [or somebody who acted as your mother] completed?" combined with "What is the highest grade of school your father [or somebody who acted as your father] completed?"). Response options for the questions about parents' education ranged from (1) "Never attended school or only attended kindergarten" to (6) "Attended or is currently in graduate school". Political position was also examined using the item, "From a list of political views that people may hold, where would you place yourself on this scale?" with responses options ranging from (1) "Extremely Liberal", (2) to (7) "Extremely Conservative".

Results

Participants primed to reflect on acts of tikkun olam compared to those who reflected on experiences with anti-Semitism and to the control group did not differ in the extent to which they acknowledged the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. The extent to which participants acknowledged the narrative of the Palestinians in the control condition (where participants reported their age) was slightly lower ($M=4.24$, $SD=1.75$) than in the tikkun olam condition ($M=4.27$, $SD=1.74$). Levels of acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict in both the control and tikkun olam conditions were slightly lower than in the reflection on anti-Semitism condition ($M=4.49$, $SD=1.71$). These differences were not significant (see Table 6).

Because no significant differences were found between the different conditions, I combined the data.

Table 6

Mean Comparison of agreement with the Palestinian narrative across conditions: ANOVA Between the Three Conditions

Prime	N	Mean	F	Significant
Control	141	4.24(1.75)	.49	.61
Tikkun olam	89	4.27(1.75)		
Anti-Semitism	66	4.49(1.70)		
Total	296	4.31(1.73)		

With the data combined, I preceded to examine predictors for acknowledgment of the narrative of the other in terms of group identity profiles as well as individual differences (See Table 7). Group identity values, and individual differences accounted for 63% of the variance in the regression analysis. [$R^2=.63$, $F(10, 267)=43.47$, $p < .001$]. The strongest predictor for rejection of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict was strong attachment to Israel ($\beta=-.28$ $t(10,267)=-5.95$, $p < .001$). The next strongest predictor was political beliefs; the more conservative participants were, the less likely they were to acknowledge the Palestinian narrative on the conflict ($\beta=-.27$ $t(10,267)=-5.13$, $p < .001$). The third strongest predictor was anti-Semitic concerns ($\beta=-.22$ $t(10, 267)=-5.12$, $p < .001$). Individual tendencies to justify the system also

predicted rejection of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict ($\beta=-.18$ $t(10,267)=-3.79$, $p=.001$). Tikkun olam also played a significant role in acknowledgement of the narrative of the other ($\beta=.11$ $t(10,267)=2.31$, $p=.021$).

Table 7

<i>Predictors of Acknowledgement of the Palestinian Narrative on the Conflict</i>						
Variable	B	β	t	p	95% Confidence Interval for B	
Constant	6.51		7.29	.001	5.31	9.24
Anti-Semitism	-.30	-.21	-.51	.001	-.32	-.14
Tikkun olam	.19	.11	2.31	.021	.03	.37
Attachment	-.34	-.28	-5.95	.001	-.46	-.23
System justification	-.30	-.18	-3.79	.001	-.46	-.14
Openness	.26	.07	1.70	.090	-.04	.56
Conscientiousness	-.18	-.07	-1.73	.084	-.38	.02
Cultural capital	.01	.01	.14	.890	-.17	.20
Political position	-.32	-.24	-5.13	.000	-.45	-.19
Age	-.01	-.07	-1.56	.120	-.01	.01
Parents' education	.01	.02	.39	.699	-.12	.19

Note.

Discussion

Results from this study do not support my first hypothesis. There was no significant difference in level of acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict following a reflection on anti-Semitism or tikkun olam. Affirming group values (significant to the group) does not appear to have a strong enough impact on the extent to which individuals acknowledge the narrative of the other. This finding is in line with studies from Israel that suggest that affirming group values (not central to the group) did not increase Jewish Israelis level of acknowledgement of Palestinians' sense of collective victimhood, or collective guilt for harm done to, or willingness make reparation towards, the Palestinians (Čehajić-Clancy et al, 2011).

One possible explanation for differences between our findings and studies in the self-affirmation tradition (e.g., Cohen, Aaronson, & Steele, 2000) is that the dependent variable that measured level of agreement with the Palestinian narrative on the conflict was too ambitious. Much of the self-affirmation literature does not argue that individuals will change their minds about a topic, but only that they will be open to information that contradicts their positions. In this study, I was more ambitious and tested not simply openness to new information but agreement with potentially contradictory information. The result does not indicate that priming Jewish individuals with different group values leads to more agreement with the Palestinian narrative on conflict.

Furthermore, while previous research looking at how North American Jews

understand the Israeli- Palestinian conflict used samples composed of students from a psychology department research pool or Hillel-affiliated students (Rotella, Richeson, Chiao, Bean - 2013; Wohl & Branscome, 2008), the sample I used was more diverse. My sample was composed of many people with long engagement with the Israeli- Palestinian conflict (based on emails I received from participants I know that some were activists in Jewish Voice for Peace, some were leaders of synagogues and some were Jewish Studies professors). Thus, it is likely that this study's samples had many participants with sophisticated knowledge of the conflict. Because of participants' substantial and stable framing of the conflict, they may have been less sensitive to priming than younger college students.

In addition, we asked participants to think about anti-Semitism or tikkun olam in relation to their own lives. Participants' examples of these values in their own lives were highly varied. For instance, some people interpreted the tikkun olam prompt as related to political activism for the "Black Lives Matter" movement or for campaigning for Bernie Sanders (who was attempting to win the Democratic nomination for United States president). Other participants' examples of tikkun olam involved participating in Jewish activities such as teaching Hebrew school or synagogue activities. The broad range of interpretations may have had different consequences on participants' engagement with the dependent variable. Similarly, some people who were primed to reflect on experiences with anti-Semitism gave examples of being teased as, for example, stingy in high school; others gave example of experiencing more directly consequential marginalization (such as not being

allowed into college); while still others invoked debating with people critical of Israel on college campuses. The variability in people's reflections makes the causal processes invoked by reflection about tikkun olam or anti-Semitism less clear in relation to engagement with the Palestinian narrative on the conflict.

Correlational Analysis

I did find support for the second hypothesis. When Jewish Americans agreed with statements that asked them if they experienced anti-Semitism and if they think anti-Semitism is a problem in their community, they were less likely to agree with statements that see the Palestinians as indigenous to the land and as dispossessed because of the Jewish occupation. On the other hand, when individuals agreed with statements that asked them if they understand their Jewish identity in terms of an imperative to fight for the rights of other oppressed minorities, they were also more likely to exhibit empathy towards the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. This finding support Cross's Nigrescence model that suggest that individuals concerned with group vulnerability will be less likely to acknowledge the other, compared to individuals who have a commitment to social justice and are more likely to acknowledge the narrative of the other (Cross, 1991).

Other variables played an important role in explaining acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. These included group attachment, political position, and individual differences in system justification. As in the first study, attachment to one's diaspora identity was associated with less acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. The more conservative individuals were, the

less likely they were to acknowledge the Palestinian narrative. Individuals with tendencies to justify the system (e.g., to believe that the system is fair and that America is the best country in the world) were less likely to see the Palestinians as indigenous to the land and as dispossessed by Jewish occupation. This finding suggests that being conservative on issues unrelated to Israel/Palestine also plays a role in explaining individuals' narrative empathy towards the outgroup. The more individuals supported the status quo and believed that the system was justified, the less likely they were to accept a counter hegemonic narrative such as the Palestinian narrative. These results are in line with studies from Israel showing that conservative beliefs and system justification decrease individuals' openness to new information and compromise solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Halprin & Bar-Tal, 2011; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015).

Limitations

It is important to note that these results are correlational, and thus bi-directional. Individuals may interpret advocacy that invokes the Palestinian narrative as anti-Semitic, because they disagree with the Palestinian narrative. In contrast, participants may experience anti-Semitism and as a result reject the Palestinian narrative. Thus, I can't know if experiences with anti-Semitism cause rejection of the Palestinian narrative on the conflict or rejection of the Palestinian narrative lead to more experiences of anti-Semitism.

An additional limitation of this study is based on the originality of the measures. This is the first time items assessing anti-Semitism or Jewish Americans'

commitment to tikkun olam have been used in a survey. The statistical validity and reliability of these items needs to be further studied and confirmed.

Additional Questions

To better understand if affirming certain themes in Jewish American culture is associated with greater acknowledgement of the narrative of the other, three main changes in the experiment should be implemented. First, more controlled priming conditions should be constructed. Evaluation of experience with tikkun olam defined in a text narrative (depicting tikkun olam as engagement with outgroup solidarity activism) will focus the priming condition and lead to a clearer understanding of how it affects participants. Second, it will be important to use a sample that is less diverse (made up of High school students, or Jewish educators). A more homogenous sample will decrease the range of interpretation of the priming conditions, and also increase the generalizability of the results to a particular Jewish group.

Future studies should also use a more taxing cognitive prompt for the control group, as the larger number of participants in the control group compared to the experimental group may have been due to a drop off of participants who didn't want to write about their experiences with anti-Semitism or tikkun olam. Because the control condition only asked participants for their age, more participants in the control group may have continued with the survey. The imbalance in number of participants between the control group and the experimental group highlights the importance of asking people to also write or engage in a cognitively costly task as part of the control group. For instance, it would be interesting to see if priming people

in the control group to reflect on social justice activism not related to Judaism will have consequences on openness to the Palestinian narrative on the conflict.

General Discussion

In this research I proposed a narrative approach to conflict. This approach makes four postulations. First that groups in conflict construct a root narrative on the conflict. Each group's narrative will disavow the narrative of the outgroup creating a monolithic narrative on the conflict. Second, when individuals acknowledge the narrative of the other they are more likely to agree to more equal distribution of the resources between the groups. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this was operationalized as support for the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. A third postulation of the narrative approach to conflict is that a group's root narratives will mediate between attachments to the ingroup and support for a peaceful solution, in this case a two-state solution. A final fourth postulation is that culturally specific group values and concerns can dispose individuals to greater acknowledgement of the narrative of the other.

The results of the first study using both the Jewish and the Arab Americans samples suggest that the Jewish and the Palestinian narratives are represented well (and are negatively correlated) within a single monolithic narrative factor. This monolithic narrative factor served as the strongest predictor for rejection of a peaceful solution among Arab and Jewish Americans. Moreover, root narratives mediated between attachment to Israel or Palestine and support for a two-state solution.

Although I didn't find any support for a causal relationship between themes of anti-Semitism or tikkun olam and acknowledgement of the Palestinian narrative, there was a correlation between concerns over anti-Semitism or commitment to social justice and acknowledgement of the narrative of the other. Individuals who reported concern with anti-Semitism were less likely to acknowledge the Palestinian narrative on the conflict. Those who reported an imperative to pursue social justice as integral to their Jewish identity were more likely to acknowledge the narrative of the other.

Overall this research makes an important contribution to intergroup conflict research and theories in psychology. First this study is one of the first to examine narrative using quantitative methods. My findings give credence to postulations derived from qualitative research that suggest that mutual recognition of the outgroup narrative supports resolution of conflict (Salomon, 2004). Moreover, much of the work in the social identity (Moscovici, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008) paradigms highlights the importance of group identification and empathy (established through friendship and contact) in reducing stereotypes and antagonism between groups. In this research I highlight the importance of narrative empathy. When individuals shift away from a one-sided narrative on the conflict they are more likely to support a peaceful solution to the conflict. This finding highlights the importance of narrative identification as opposed to simply group identification in promoting peace. Moreover, narrative empathy rather than emotional empathy (as in friendship) appears to be important in facilitating peace between Jews and Arabs. This finding highlights the importance of

engagement with the narrative of the other in increasing support for egalitarian policies.

A second contribution that this dissertation makes to the field of intergroup conflict is in its focus on the ways in which ingroup values can shape how the outgroup is framed. Famous studies in intergroup conflict focus on decreased identification with the ingroup and increased identification with a superordinate group or a personal identity in bringing people towards more intergroup cooperation (Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996). This study shows that erasure of one's ingroup identification is not necessary to reduce intergroup conflict. Rather a shift in terms of what it means to be member of the ingroup might help increase acknowledgement of the other. This research demonstrates how people who hold a strong Jewish identity that is based on an imperative toward social justice activism are likely to support the outgroup. These results highlight the role of values and how people make meaning of their group identifications in predicting the extent to which individuals acknowledge the other. The importance of meaning making processes suggests that intergroup antagonism is not an inherent process of intergroup relationship.

Limitations

This study is limited in several ways. I didn't have the financial resources to use a representative sample; hence I don't know if the root narratives measured represent the most common narratives used by Jewish or Arab Americans to frame the conflict. Second, the diversity of the Arab sample may have led to the relatively

low explanatory power of the different beliefs examined in understanding support for a two-state solution among Arab Americans. An additional study with only a Palestinian American sample needs to be conducted.

Third, all the significant results reported in this study are correlational. Hence, I can't determine primacy of one variable over the other. For instance, I can't argue that experiences and concerns with anti-Semitism lead people to reject the Palestinian narrative on the conflict, because it may be that people who reject the Palestinian narrative on the conflict may experience more attacks they interpret as anti-Semitic. In terms of the experiment, the diversity of the sample, and the broad range of interpretations of the priming conditions were likely the main reasons why no effects were detected. It is possible that in a younger sample of college students, the priming conditions would have been more impactful. Moreover, the range of interpretation of the tikkun olam and anti-Semitism should be constrained by giving examples in the priming conditions that specify what is meant by tikkun olam and anti-Semitism concerns and values.

Future Directions

A future study should examine if priming individuals in more detail to three different conditions -- activism, tikkun olam, and anti-Semitism – is associated with greater openness to information about the Palestinian plight. More openness to information about the Palestinian plight should then be tested for mediating greater support for the Palestinian narrative on the conflict and for two-state solutions.

Future research should also conduct a parallel study with a sample of

Palestinian Americans. Another survey study with an only Palestinian sample (as opposed to the current Arab sample) should be conducted to replicate the current results. Additionally, an experiment priming Palestinian group values such as attachment to the land of Palestine, endurance, or mistrust of government authority should be primed to examine the extent to which Palestinians acknowledge the Jewish narrative on the conflict.

In addition, future research should examine if the narrative approach to conflict generalizes to other types of conflict. For instance: Does acknowledgement of the narrative of the other among members of different racial groups in the US lead to greater support for affirmative action policies? Does acknowledgement of the narrative of the other among members of different socio-economic classes lead to reduced support for policies that facilitate the gentrification of working class neighborhoods?

Conclusion

The current intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be interrupted by pressure from an American third party. The nature of this pressure is partly shaped by Jewish and Arab Americans. When American Jews framed the Palestinians as indigenous to the land but as suffering, they were more likely to support a two state solution based on the 1967 borders. When Arab Americans acknowledged that the Israelis aimed to live in peace but were vulnerable, they were more likely to support a two-state solution. The American Jews who drew lessons from their collective trauma (defining their Jewish identity in terms of a pursuit for social justice across groups)

were more likely to incorporate the Palestinian narrative into their understanding of the conflict. It was not identification with the group, but the meaning people made of this identification, that played a role in bringing Jewish Americans to a more inclusive understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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