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THE AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS:

A PRELUDE TO MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

by

B.I.C. IJOMAH

We should aim at the establishment of a unified
military and defence strategy. I do not see much
virtue or wisdom in our separate efforts to build
up or maintain vast military forces for self-defence
which, in any case, would be ineffective in any
major attack upon our separate states.

Kwame Nkrumah (1963: 219)

In 1963, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana outlined three major reasons why *Africa must unite*.[1] The first was the urgent need for unified economic planning, the second was the need for a unified military and defence strategy and the third which is consequent upon the first two was the need for a unified foreign policy and diplomacy.

After intense discussion, the majority of African leaders opted for the creation of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) as a vehicle toward Pan Africanism.

The pious expectations of the O.A.U. that it would, among other things, foster unity and solidarity of African States through

(1) *political and diplomatic co-operation;*
(2) *economic co-operation, including transport,*
 and communication;
(3) *educational and cultural co-operation;*
(4) *health, sanitation, and nutritional co-operation;*
(5) *scientific and technical co-operation; and*
(6) *co-operation for defence and security,*[2]

have not, in eleven years led to African unity. At best the O.A.U. has become a miniature United Nations where motions and resolutions are passed but nothing concrete is achieved. This is not to deny the fact that co-operation at different

levels has created a sense of unity. But mere consciousness of the need for unity is not enough. What Africa needs is functional unity which would lead to integration on social, economic, political and military levels.

Obviously, the O.A.U. still does not anticipate any kind of unity as proposed by the late President Kwame Nkrumah in 1963. But the trend in Africa forces one to speculate that as the champions of violence displace the civilian members of the O.A.U., the rationale for a unified military strategy will become imperative. For now, however, many military leaders are reluctant to give up national sovereignty because they use their power as a source of personal wealth.

Lasswell's Garrison-State hypothesis[3] contends that the arena of world politics is moving towards domination by specialists on violence. Not only have many African countries moved in this direction but it seems that this movement is bound to gather momentum and become more centripetal. Table 1 shows the various military interventions in Africa. An examination of this table indicates that military intervention has become an African phenomenon. This does not in any sense imbue the military with any greater sense of nationalism, or more sincere dedication to national issues. In fact the Dahomean experience as well as the experience in many other African countries shows that one of the important motivating factors is personal ambition to power and wealth among the military leaders. Of course this ambition is often hidden by avowed love of the fatherland. But when the architects of the military take-over fail to share the national 'cakes' equitably, there generally follows a coup of consolidation. This comes about when members of the core group that planned the first intervention accuse the military leaders of failing to live up to their expectations. The Algerian case and the rise of Boumedienne is typical; so is the case of Captain Michael Micombero who systematically overthrew King Ntare V of Burundi on 28th November, 1966. In spite of these weaknesses, the military as a political force has come to stay in Africa. Any politician that piously expects that the military would willingly hand over power to the civilians may be living in a fool's paradise. The reintervention of the military in Ghana, or the Togo and Dahomean experiences are manifestations of a pattern. Transition from the military to civilian rule has always been welcomed by rapacious politicians who have been waiting quite impatiently for the exit of the soldiers. The current aspirations of Nigerians carried in Nigerian Newspapers, all hoping that the military

men would honour their pledge to hand over power to the
civilians in 1976, may be like the waiting for the coming of
the Lord. The civilians have as yet not been allowed any
political forum for discussions and exchange of ideas from
which may emerge a workable framework for national stability.
Although after eight years of military rule, it has become
obvious that the soldiers and their civilian advisers have
nothing new to offer, it is my view that this military
rule will continue to block *a return to participatory democracy*.

The Rationale for African Military High Command

Nkrumah's argument that the military might of any individ-
ual African State is so insignificant that it would be ineffec-
tive in any major attack upon it is worth a critical examination.
With the exception of Egypt with a defense budget of 480 million
dollars, and Nigeria with .326 million dollars budgeted for
defense, no other African country comes close enough to South
Africa in terms of the emphasis placed on military prepared-
ness. The Egyptian situation is understandable because of
the continued Arab-Israeli relationship. The excessively
high spending on the Nigerian Armed Forces appears unreal-
istic in view of the peaceful atmosphere after the civil war.
Most of this amount is spent on salaries and non-defensive
structures. South Africa's Armed Forces total 129,400 with
a military defense budget of 370 million dollars. In addition,
South Africa spends more than 3.57 million dollars on secret
services. South Africa is less dependent on foreign aid for
its manufacture of tanks, armored cars and missiles of limited
ranges. The proportion of South Africa's defense budget to the
total national budget is .0998, while the combined defense
budgets of the 39 independent African countries considered
here is 1,389.64 million dollars, which is .085 of the com-
bined national budgets (see table 4).

The vulnerability of African countries is more accentu-
ated by a very poor system of intra-continental communications,
and the over-exposure of defenseless African countries to South
Africa and Rhodesia. During the Non-Aligned Summit in
Lusaka in September, 1971, the President of Botswana, Sir
Seretse Kharma disclosed that the reluctance of Botswana to
play an active and prominent role in the struggle for the
establishment of majority rule throughout Southern Africa
was due to their particularly exposed position and the severe
limitations this imposed on his country.[4]

Even in less exposed countries like in Nigeria, the politi-

cization and civilianization of the military have brought in
their wake, a decline in the military virtues of the soldiers,
and the incursion of corruption into military ethos. This
corruption and the lust for money, power, wealth and privilege,
have made the loyalties of the soldiers so conditional and un-
predictable, and the life span of any government depends in
Rapoport's views, on private ambitions of soldiers who are
rarely restrained by a sense of public morality. [5] Rapoport
contends that in the event of the unpredictability of such
a praetorian regime, only strong personalities can secure
momentary stability, but they rarely produce the institutions
to confirm on appropriate successors. (E.g. General Gowan
of Nigeria, Haile Selassie of Ethopia, Julius Nyerere of Tan-
zania may have as strong personality only momentary stability).

The uncertainty of many African regimes and the possi-
bility of overthrow any moment have created the Switzerland
racket, where the nations' wealth is spirited away to foreign
banks,denuding the countries of development capital: And
because most African countries are ruled by corrupt oli-
garchies, their domestic policies are largely ineffective.
This ineffectiveness of even the well-intentioned policies
helps to make the conditions of the poor masses even more
pitiable and to excite the sympathy of ambitious military
officers who become *the most fruitful source of political
intrigue.* [6]

Thus as long as the African Armed Forces continue to
be interested in domestic politics, its preparedness for
any foreign encounter will be limited. While the ruling
oligarchies scheme to retain the powers they have grabbed
from their predecessors, power gamblers spend sleepless
nights scheming to discredit the disreputable rich and to
wrest powers from them. This leads to domestic instability
becoming self-generating, and needs an external sedative
to usher in domestic and internal stability.

This external sedative will be the establishment of
a continental military command that can step into any African
country to ensure that peace and orderly development are not
disrupted by power-hungry individuals. The danger of
continental tyranny would be avoided by each country contri-
buting forces to the continental army and sending repre-
sentatives to the Command Council. The presidents of the
various countries would become regional governors, and con-
stitute the continental government, bringing the military
squarely under the rule of a continental executive.

Although some have argued that at present, there is no unifying event in Africa to justify the call for the African High Command, it is my contention that the existence of racist governments in Rhodesia and South Africa is a potential threat to the security of African governments. Admittedly the goals which the Organization of African Unity has set for itself include the eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa, but it seems unlikely that the O.A.U. can achieve this goal without forcefully confronting apartheid. The cases of Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique must be seen as different from those of Rhodesia and South Africa. In the latter cases, Britain has shyed off possible confrontation with the racists. Whereas in the cases of the Portuguese *colonies*, the internal desequilibrium in Portugal itself augurs well for the freedom fighters in Africa.

It would also be wrong to believe that the imminent independence of Portuguese African colonies has been mainly influenced by the persuasions and sanctions of members of the Organization of African Unity. If anything, it was the military and other physical aids from the O.A.U, individual African nations and the international community to the freedom fighters, which made it possible to shatter the hopes of Portugal ever winning her colonial wars. Frustrated by the indormitable courage of the Africans, Portugal was forced to embark on a program of granting independence.

South Africa has no allegiance to any colonial master, nor does Rhodesia take Britain seriously. In the absence of any such external pressures, it appears that the only pressure that would succeed is physical (not moral pressure from independent African countries).

Organski (1959) contends that any potential aggressor can only be repelled when confronted by an equal amount of force or power. The combined military strength of African countries could overwhelm both South Africa and Rhodesia. No doubt the military forces of South Africa and Rhodesia are increasing. At the same time Swaziland, Zambia, and other mushroom nations cannot contemplate providing a force or forces that can counterbalance them. It thus appears plausible to advocate a unification of African Armed Forces in order to force the racist regimes to make some concessions. When the African Military High Command can pose a reasonable threat to apartheid, possible war may be averted if South Africa and Rhodesia make concessions in consideration of the growing strength of the combined African forces.

Only a united military strength of African countries can provide sufficient force to counterbalance the strength of South Africa and Rhodesia. By advocating a united military force, I am asking for contributions from independent military units. I am piously hoping that a continuation of the present phenomenon of military rules in Africa will create a necessity for the development of an ideology to which African Military Leaders would be oriented. This ideological orientation will provide the glue that will hold the countries' armies together such that in the event of a possible confrontation, it would be between African Military Command versus the racists.

But the likelihood of the African Military Leadership endorsing the establishment of African Military Command depends on the intensity of their identification with the Organization of African Unity and the intensity of their shared faith that the liberation of African colonies from the clutches of colonial exploitation is a desired goal. The obvious trend is that as soon as African Military elites develop a unified ideology or sharpen their definition of their common enemy, or develop an identity of shared fate, the road will be paved for the rule of benevolent dictators.

These benevolent rulers in order to avert any possible coups against them will be compelled to sign defensive pacts with fellow African Military leaders. In time, a number of these military pacts will lead to a loose federation of the armed forces of the countries involved, and exchange of personnel. As the interaction amongst members of the armed forces increases, there will follow an increase in their perception of their responsibility to Africa.

Notwithstanding the failure of previous attempts to effect regional unity, it is my contention that the fusion of the military elites of two or more countries in order to protect their common interests will in time extend to other countries. Such a fusion will come about by decrees after preliminary discussions at top military levels.

Obstacles to African Military High Command

In spite of the convincing rationale for the integration of the African military units, an analysis of probable obstacles is pertinent. These obstacles are both psychological and social. The psychological variables relate to individual motivations and individual circumstances leading to military

take-over in various countries. We will also examine the love
of power, and the probability of an individual relinquishing
power once entrenched.

On the social level, we will analyse group involvement
and disturbances of both domestic and foreign commitment.
Domestic commitment refers to the patterns of alliances that
made it possible for the soldiers to take-over power. Foreign
commitment refers to attachment of various African countries
to external sources of funds. We will examine some external
military aid to African countries to show that in spite of
the inconsequential nature of these aids, African countries
will not only be reluctant to pull their forces together,
but will have a lot of pressures exerted on them such that
their concerted national consciousness will be watered down
to hypocritical motions and resolutions.

A study of the various military interventions in Africa
reveals that the principal architects are the members of the
opposition in countries that still enjoy civilian exploitation
of the masses. In countries under military regime, intervention
is fanned by some radical elements within the Armed Forces,
or some disgruntled members who feel that they have not had a
fair deal in the sharing of booties of their intervention. In
many cases, it is a combination of both the radical elements
within the Armed Forces and some members of the opposition.
In some, for example in Uganda, an intervention has been
triggered by some members of the ruling group. Generally,
a disagreement within the ruling group may lead to a coup
of consolidation in which the Head of Government is accused
of a number of things to justify his overthrow. His erst-
while chief lieutenant steps in to seize power.

It is not correct to argue, like some theorists of
evolution, that internal disequilibrium is self-generating
in a dialectical format of thesis - anti-thesis. Even when
we concede the factors of internal forces, it must be admitted
that there is hardly a coup in Africa without foreign interests
at work. Foreign aid has had negative impact on governments
of developing nations. The impact of foreign aid is not less
significant on the military than on civilian governments. Three
tables provided (7,8,9), though not exhaustive, reflect
vulnerability of African Armed Forces to external influences.
Table 8 shows that America spent (1950-1965) more than 58%
of its military aid to Africa in Ethiopia. Of course this
is understandable in view of America's large military base in
Ethiopia. It is not surprising therefore that many African
scholars speculate with some justification that America
may be connected with the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie.

America's proposed military Aid for the fiscal year 1967
shows (see table 9), that only 3.1% of American military
aid was proposed for Africa. In spite of this pitance,
those African countries receiving American aid appear
firmly tied to the apron strings of Washington. When for
instance Ethiopia had a defense budget of 17.5 million
dollars, and was promised American aid of 80.9 million dollars,
one wonders what type of independence Ethiopian armed forces
would have from America.

Moreover the Ethiopian case is typical of American aid
policies. Jacob Kaplan in the challenge of Foreign Aid (1968)
contends that the staff of the military and economic aid
missions

> *must seek accommodation from public and private*
> *groups at home and . . . they must try to moderate*
> *demands and attitudes in the aided country while*
> *engendering a responsiveness to U.S. interests.*

He goes further to argue that

> *the allocation of defense support and military*
> *assistance among developing nations has borne little*
> *relation to the relative usefulness of their military*
> *forces.*[10]

My 1972 study also pointed out that ex-colonial countries
have contributed more than any single factor to the establish-
ment of ceremonial and under-utilized armed forces with soldiers
who find time to become pre-occupied with the domestic
politics of their respective countries.

The basic contention here is that as long as African
countries depend on foreign nations for the up-keep of
their armed forces, they will be unable to develop an
ideological orientation that would make the creation of a
continental armed force a desired goal. Aid is given only
to those countries where the donor has some vital interests.
Pressures from foreign donors who want to see the unity of
Africa remain a political mirage will always harp on the
abrogation of sovereignty by the mushroom states of they opt
for an integrated military force for Africa. Certainly such
pressures do not eminate from the overt concern about the
actual security of the African countries. They eminate
from the concern of the donor countries about their individual
investments. The retention of a balkanized Africa is a
strategy to which the Western Powers are committed. It

would be fool-hardy for African countries to believe that the so-called technical advisers would be altruistic in their military advice.

The ultimate contention of the paper is that Nkrumah's call for unified economic planning, and a unified foreign policy must follow the unification of the bases of power and authority. Nkrumah saw the political kingdom as a prelude to economic and military integration. With the present trend in Africa, it is contested that civilian politics in Africa cannot improve on the Latin American pattern unless the powers of the national military are limited to maintaining peace in local affairs. If the present Heads of African States become regional Governors of their respective countries, the continental government would then be responsible for insuring that the continental armed forces can be drafted from one country to another to arrest any emergency which under our present circumstances would lead to a coup.

The writer is adopting this rather radical view because of the obvious disruptive effects of military interventions in various countries. They not only impede economic progress but prevent the development of national goals. Every coup leader discredits his predecessor. He spends the first three years trying to learn what his predecessor was doing fairly well; the next two or three years are spent amassing wealth, the remaining years are years of uncertainty. After six years in office, the coup leader if he is lucky to survive six years has nothing more to offer. People get impatient and critical, and naturally debate on whether a return to the *status quo ante* would not be more salubrious. Witch-hunting of course follows, critics are detained in the name of state security, and of course the intellectuals who had earlier flocked to the new regime begin to flee. It has been pointed out that when the intellectuals, no matter how dishonest they may be, begin their flight from the ruling regime, the stage is set for a national hollocaust.

Argument for the Gradual Fusion of Countries

It has been shown by U.N. and F.A.O. reports that Africa supplies more than 66% of the world cocoa, 58% of sisal, 65% palm oil, 26% groundnuts, 14% coffee, 11% olive oil; 96% of world diamonds excluding the U.S.S.R.; 69% of cobalt; 63% gold, 48% antimony, 37% manganese, 34% chromite, 32% phosphate rock, 24% copper, 19% asbestos, 15% tin, 4% iron ore, and 4% buxite. Nigeria alone produces 85% of the world's supply of columbite,

It is for this reason that one makes bold to call for a
more functional role of the members of the armed forces.
An increase in the interdependence of the armed forces of
various African countries will minimize individual ambitions
of the soldiers, and highlight the needs of the countries.
Moreover, when the armed forces of various African countries
come under a High Military Command, the interests of the
mushroom countries will for some time be dominated by a
transcendental concern for the continent. This will reduce
the countries to the status of States functioning within a
continental government.

Conclusion

Briefly put, the emergence of a continental government
for Africa cannot arise out of the wishful aspirations of
the hypocritical vote catchers. It must arise out of a felt
need for greater continental security. A unification of the
armed forces will of course call for a unified economic
planning for the continent. The increased economic inter-
dependence of African countries will hasten the tempo of
development in the communications systems, and call for a
closer front in international and diplomatic relations with
non-African countries. When the responsibility for the
security of the African continent is centralised, there will
be greater introspection. That is, the African countries
will now find time to look inwards for bases of self-
development rather than the uneasy reliance on foreign aids.

At present, the influence of the military men in the
Organization of African Unity cannot be underestimated. It
is projected that as the military men assume political roles
in all African countries, the need for internal security
of these political roles would call for alliances no matter
how fragile and loose they might be at the on-set. But
like the creation of other States such as Canada, the United
States of America, or even the fusion of some other smaller
units into larger wholes, the fusion of African States
given the continued threats of neo-colonialist interests in
Africa will be a matter of time.

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Footnotes

1. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, London: Heinemann, 1963.

2. Zdenek Cervenka, *The Organization of African Unity and its Charter*, London: C. Hurst & Company, 1969, p. 33.

3. Harolk Lasswell, "The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today" in Huntington (ed.) *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962, pp. 1-68.

4. Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record 1970-71*, London: Rex Collings, 1971, p. 8472.

5. David C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961, p. 73.

6. *ibid*, p. 74.

7. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, London: Heinemann, 1963, p. 217.

8. *ibid*, p. 145.

9. Herbert J. Spiro (ed.), *Africa: The Primacy of Politics*, New York: Random House, 1966, p. 5.

10. Jacob Kaplan, *The Challenge of Foreign Aid*, New York: Frederick Praeger, Publishers, 1968, p. 252.

11. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, London: Heinemann, 1963, pp. 150-151.

Table 1

Military Interventions in African Countries Since Independence

S/N.	COUNTRY	YEAR OF INDEPEN-DENCE	REVOLT RIOTS STRIKES DEMONSTRA-TIONS	ATTEMPTED ASSASSINA-TION	ASSASSIN-ATION	ATTEMPTED COUPS	SUCCESS-FUL COUPS	CIVIL WAR TRIBAL WAR	SCORE
1.	Algeria	July 3, 1962			Khemisti, Ap. 12, 1963	Dec. 14, 1967	June 19, 1965 Bella Ousted	Berber re-volt--Oct. 8, 1963	18
2.	Botswana	Sept. 30, 1966		Nov., 1967					2
3.	Burundi	July 1, 1962			Premier Ngendan-dumwe, Ja. 16, 1965	Oct. 19, 1965	Nov. 28, 1966		12
4.	Cameroon	Jan. 1, 1960				Dec. 30, 1959--Ja. 2, 1960		From 1960-1964	14
5.	Central Africa Republic	Aug. 13, 1960					Ja. 1, 1966		5
6.	Congo Brazzaville	Aug. 15, 1969	Strike '63 Riots Aug. 15, 1964, 7/18-27/65.			Jan. 10, 1966 May 13,'68 7/31/68	Aug. 14, 1963 Oct. 2, 1968		26

S/N.	COUNTRY	YEAR OF INDEPEN-DENCE	REVOLT RIOTS STRIKES DEMONSTRA-TIONS	ATTEMPTED ASSASSINA-TION	ASSASSIN-ATION	ATTEMPTED COUPS	SUCCESS-FUL COUPS	CIVIL WAR TRIBAL WAR	SCORE
6.	Republic of Chad	Aug. 11, '60				Oct. 4, 1961 Aug. 1971			8
7.	Congo	Aug. 15, '69	Strike '63 Riots Aug. 15, '64 Riots July 18-27, '65 Riots June 27, 1967			Jan. 10, 1966 May 13, 1968 July 31, 1968	Aug. 14, 1963 Oct. 2, 1968		26
8.	Dahomey	Aug. 1, '60	Dec., '60 Oct. 3-6, 1966			May 30, 1961	Oct. 28, 1963 Dec. 22, 1965 Dec. 27, 1967 Dec., '69 Oct. 26, 1972		

S/N.	COUNTRY	YEAR OF INDEPEN- DENCE	REVOLT RIOTS STRIKES DEMONSTRA- TIONS	ATTEMPTED ASSASSINA- TION	ASSASSIN- ATION	ATTEMPTED COUPS	SUCCESS- FUL COUPS	CIVIL WAR TRIBAL WAR	SCORE
9.	Ethiopia	Never a Colony Except for '35-'41	1973, 1974			Dec. 15-17, 1960 Nov., '66	1916 Sept. 12, 1974		15*
10.	Gabon	Aug. 17, 1960					Feb. 19, 1964		5
11.	Gambia	Feb. 18, 1965							0
12.	Ghana	March 6, '57	1957, 1958, 1959, 1961, Nov. 7, '61	1958, 1959, Aug., 1962 1964, Jan.3		April 17, 1967, Nov. 28, 1968	Feb. 24, 1966 Jan. 13, 1972		31
13.	Guinea	Oct. 2, 1958				Dec. 22, 1961, Nov. 11, '65 Nov.-Dec. 1970			12

* The recent September 12, 1974 coup in Ethiopia has not been added to the score

S/N.	COUNTRY	YEAR OF INDEPEN- DENCE	REVOLT RIOTS STRIKES DEMONSTRA- TIONS	ATTEMPTED ASSASSINA- TION	ASSASSIN- ATION	ATTEMPTED COUPS	SUCCESS- FUL COUPS	CIVIL WAR TRIBAL WAR	SCORE
14.	Ivory Coast	Aug. 7, '60				1962; Jan., 1963			8
15.	Kenya	Dec. 12, '63	Apr. 28, '66; Jan., 1964			1965	1964 Tribal		12
16.	Lesotho	Sept. 30, 1960	Riots 1966						1
17.	Liberia	July 26, 1947	Sept. 13, 1961	June 24, '55; Feb. 5, 1963		Aug. 1958			7 2
18.	Libya	Jan. 2, '52	Feb., '52 Mar. 21, '59 Jan. 26, '64 May, '65		Oct. 6, '54	1958, July 20	Sept. 1, '69		16
19.	Malagasy	Mar. 26, '60	1972						2
20.	Malawi	July 6, '64	Sept. 30, '60; Feb. 13, '65; Oct. 30, '66						3

S/N.	COUNTRY	YEAR OF INDEPEN-DENCE	REVOLT RIOTS STRIKES DEMONSTRA-TIONS	ATTEMPTED ASSASSINA-TION	ASSASSIN-ATION	ATTEMPTED COUPS	SUCCESSFUL COUPS	CIVIL WAR TRIBAL WAR	SCORE
21.	Mali	July 20, '60	Dec., '63			Oct. 2, '62	Nov. 19, 1968		10
22.	Mauritania	Nov. 28, '60				Aug. 15, '63			4
23.	Morocco	Mar. 2, '56, from France; Ap. 7, '56; from Spain	Riots '58 Revolt '62 Riots '65			June, '63 July, '71 Aug., '72		1959	21
24.	Niger	Aug. 3, '60		Apr. 14, '65		Dec. 2, '63; Oct. 15, '64			10
25.	Nigeria	Oct. 1, '60	Riots '64 Ethnic Clashes '64; Demon.,1964; Riots, '65			1962	Jan. 15, '66; July 29, '66	1967-1970	25
26.	Rwanda	July 1, '62	July, '62				July 5, '73	1964	12

S/N.	COUNTRY	YEAR OF INDEPEN-DENCE	REVOLT RIOTS STRIKES DEMONSTRA-TIONS	ATTEMPTED ASSASSINA-TION	ASSASSIN-ATION	ATTEMPTED COUPS	SUCCESS-FUL COUPS	CIVIL WAR TRIBAL WAR	SCORE
27.	Senegal	June 20, '60	1963	1967	'61, '62				11
28.	Sierra Leone	Apr. 17, '61	July, '63 Strike, '68 Demon.	2 times in 1971		Mar., '71	Mar., '67 Apr. 8, '68		20
29.	Somalia	July 1, '60	July 2, '60			Dec. 10, '61; '63	Oct., 1969	Tribal Clashes 1962	
30.	Sudan	Jan. 1, '56	'60, '64			'57, May '59, July '65, '66	1958, 1969	1964 Racial War	34
31.	Swaziland	Sept., '68							0
32.	Tanzania	Apr. 26, '61				'64, Jan.			4
33.	Togo	Apr. 27, '60		'61, '62, '67	Jan. 13, '63	Apr. 10, '63; Nov. 10, '66	Jan. 13, '63; Jan. 13, '67		27
34.	Tunisia	Mar. 20, '57	Dec., '66			Dec. 24, '62			5

S/N.	COUNTRY	YEAR OF INDEPEN-DENCE	REVOLT RIOTS STRIKES DEMONSTRA-TIONS	ATTEMPTED ASSASSINA-TION	ASSASSIN-ATION	ATTEMPTED COUPS	SUCCESS-FUL COUPS	CIVIL WAR TRIBAL WAR	SCORE
35.	Uganda	Oct. 9, '62	Ethnic Violence '63 Riots '66				Jan. 25, '71		7
36.	Egypt	1922		1965		'53, '54, '65, '66	July 23, '52		23
37.	Upper Volta	Aug. 5, '60				1967	Jan. 3, '66		9
38.	Zaire	June 30, '60	1970		Feb. 13, '61	July 9, '60 July 7, '64 Aug., '64 Mercenaries 1967	Sept. 15, '60; Nov. 25, '60	Jan.-Feb. '61; Jan., '62; Sept. 2, '60	48
39.	Zambia	Oct. 24, '64	Riots '68						1

Footnote to Table 1

To arrive at the scores, the following procedure was used: various events in which the military had to intervene were identified and rank-ordered from 1-7. Thus, political rioting, strikes, student demonstrations, etc. were given a score of 1 since military intervention is minimal, and depended on the orders of the civilian government. Attempted Assassination was given a score of 2; successful assassination 3; attempted coup 4; coup 5; tribal/religious warfare 6; and civil war 7. The scores were given for each occurrence, and the total for each country was then taken on all items identified for each country since the attainment of independence.

TABLE 2

AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION AS INDEX OF
INSTABILITY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BY AREA BLOCKS

BLOCK 1	BLOCK 2	BLOCK 3	BLOCK 4
18	2	14	1
15	12	8	12
16	5	31	25
4	26	31	4
21	48	12	7
34	5	8	49
5	1	7	
23	3	10	
136	12	10	
	0	25	
	1	11	
	115	20	
		27	
		9	
		223	

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	Df	MS	F	F.05
Total sum of squares	4910.67	38			
Between groups	262.21	3	87.40	.66	2.8
Within groups	4648.46	35	132.81		

F is not significant at .05 with 3 and 35 degrees of Freedom.

TABLE 3

AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION SCORES AS AN INDEX OF INSTABILITY

Group A	Group B
2	28
14	12
5	48
8	15
26	0
31	12
5	31
8	7
12	3
1	4
16	10
1	25
21	12
20	11
34	25
0	4
5	7
9	23
10	27
1	

Total	229	304
	===	===

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	Df	MS	F	F.05
Total SS	4910.67	38	201.72		
Between Groups	201.72	1	201.72	1.58	4.1
Within Groups	4708.95	37	127.27		

F is not significant at .05 level with 1 and 37 df. It is con-
cluded that military intervention is a general phenomenon in
Africa.

TABLE 4

AFRICAN MILITARY SITUATION

S/No.	Country	Countries' Population	Armed Forces Including Police, Gendarmarie National Guard and para Military	Proportion of total Population	Budget in Dollars	1969/74 Defence Budget in Dollars	Proportion of National Budget
1.	Algeria	12,943,000	100,000	.008	1,568,825,911	99,190,283	.06
2.	Botswana	648,000	1,000	.002	26,570,000	1,418,547	.053
3.	Burundi	3,406,000	1,900	.0006	23,880,597	3,444,317	.144
4.	Cameroon	5,562,000	11,350	.002	138,638,819	27,727,764	.20
5.	Central African Republic	1,488,000	3,100	.002	45,153,043	4,054,735	.10
6.	Republic of Chad	4,100,000	6,300	.002	55,311,487	5,835,000	.11
7.	Congo	870,000	4,550	.005	70,219,662	5,400,000	.05
8.	Zaire	21,637,876	80,000	.004	56,949,408	5,400,000	.10
9.	Dehomey	2,800,000	4,250	.002	38,181,491	3,957,508	.10
10.	Ethiopia	23,900,000	81,400	.003	125,844,660	17,450,486	.14
11.	Gabon	350,000	2,860	.008	72,020,166	4,250,000	.06
12.	Gambia	350,000	560	.002	9,611,292	-	-
13.	Ghana	8,500,000	37,900	.005	371,043,478	42,608,696	.12
14.	Guinea	3,795,000	8,900	.002	92,910,569	5,870,000	.06
15.	Ivory Coast	4,690,000	7,050	.002	254,000,405	16,609	.0001
16.	Kenya	10,942,705	16,900	.002	223,064,310	18,550.725	.08
17.	Lesotho	970,000	1,500	.002	36,775,302	1,949,091	.05
18.	Liberia	k,500,000	10,900	.007	62,200,000	3,100,000	.05
19.	Libya	k,875,000	15,600	.008	511,560,000	84,000,000	.16

TABLE 5

CORRELATION BETWEEN POPULATION RANK
AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

COUNTRY	MILITARY INTERVENTION RANK	POPULATION RANK	d	d^2
Algeria	28	32	-4	16
Botswana	6	4	2	4
Burundi	22.5	16	6.5	42.25
Cameroon	25	27	-2	4
Central African Republic	11	8	3	9
Republic of Chad	15.5	19	-4.5	20.25
Congo	34	5	29	841
Zaire	39	36	3	9
Dahomey	36.5	13	23.5	552.3
Ethiopia	26	37	-11	121
Gabon	1.5	1	0.5	0.25
Gambia	11	2	-9	81
Ghana	36.5	30	6.5	42.25
Guinea	22.5	17	5.5	30.25
Ivory Coast	15.5	21	-5.5	30.25
Kenya	22.5	31	-8.5	72.25
Lesotho	4	6	-2	4
Liberia	13.5	9	4.5	20.25
Libya	27	10	17	289
Malagasy	4	28	-24	576
Malawi	7	22	-15	225
Mali	18.5	25	-6.5	42.25
Mauritania	4	7	-3	9
Morocco	30	35	-5	25
Niger	18.5	23	-4.5	20.25
Nigeria	32.5	39	-6.5	42.25

TABLE 5 (Contd.)

Country	Military Intervention Rank	Population Rank	d	d^2
Rwanda	22.5	15	7.5	56.25
Senegal	20	18	2	4
Sierra Leone	29	14	15	225
Somalia	32.5	12	20.5	420.3
Sudan	38	34	4	16
Swaziland	1.5	3	-1.5	225
Tanzania	8.5	33	-24.5	600.3
Togo	35	11	24	576
Tunisia	11	24	-13	169
Uganda	13.5	29	-15.5	240.3
Egypt (U.A.R.)	31	38	-7	49
Upper Volta	17	26	-9	81
Zambia	4	20	-16	256

$$d^2 = 6046.20$$

$$= 1 - \frac{6 \quad d^2}{N^3 - N}$$

Where N = 39

$$= -0.61$$

TABLE 6

Country	Rank on Military Intervention	Rank on Defense Budget	d	d^2
Algeria	28	38	-10	100
Botswana	6	3	3	9
Burundi	22.5	4	18.5	342.25
Cameroon	25	29	-4	16
Central African Republic	11	8	3	9
Republic of Chad	15.5	18	-2.5	6.5
Congo	34	15	19	361
Zaire	39	32	7	49
Dahomey	36.5	16	20.5	420.25
Ethiopia	26	33	-7	49
Gabon	11	9	2	4
Gambia	1.5	1	.5	.25
Ghana	36.5	35	1.5	2.25
Guinea	22.5	19	3.5	12.25
Ivory Coast	15.5	23.5	-8	64
Kenya	22.5	26	-3.5	12.25
Lesotho	4	7	-3	9
Liberia	13.5	13	.5	.25

TABLE 6 (Contd.)

Country	Rank on Military Intervention	Rank on Defense Budget	d	d^2
Libya	27	28	-1	1
Malagasy	4	25	-21	441
Malawi	7	6	1	1
Mali	18.5	23.5	-5	25
Mauritania	8.5	17	-8.5	72.25
Morocco	30	37	-7	49
Niger	18.5	14	4.5	20.25
Nigeria	32.5	36	-3.5	12.25
Rwanda	22.5	5	17.5	306.25
Senegal	20	31	-11	121
Sierra Leone	29	10	19	361
Somalia	32.5	20	12.5	156.25
Sudan	38	34	4	16
Swaziland	1.5	2	.5	.25
Tanzania	8.5	21	-12.50	156.25
Togo	35	11	24	576
Tunisia	11	22	-11	121
Uganda	13.5	30	-16.50	272.25
Egypt (U.A.R.)	31 ·	39	-8	64
Upper Volta	17	12	5	25
Zambia	4	27	-23	529

TABLE 7

FRENCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE (EXCLUDING GIFTS OF EQUIPMENT) IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

	1964
Cameroon	1.84
Central African Republic	1.40
Chad	1.36
Dahomey	2.00**
Gabon	.88
Ivory Coast	2.00
Malagasy	11.66
Mauritania	1.30
Niger	1.00
Senegal	1.40
Total	24.84

** French gift of military vehicles was worth $2.00 million.

Source: M.J.V. Bell, Military Assistance to Africa, ("Adelphi Papers," No. 15, Dec., 1964, 155) cited in Henry Bienen op. cit., p. 101.

Note: Bell gave the total military assistance to Africa as $48.4 million.

TABLE 8

U.S.A. AID TO AFRICA

MILITARY GRANT AID PROGRAMMES CHARGEABLE TO
APPROPRIATIONS DELIVERIES ... 1950 - 1965
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Cameroon	.2
Zaire	7.4
Dahomey	.1
Ethiopia	80.9
Ghana	.05
Guinea	.05
Ivory Coast	.1
Liberia	3.1
Libya	8.1
Mali	1.6
Morocco	18.4
Niger	.1
Nigeria	.5
Senegal	2.5
Sudan	.1
Tunisia	15.1
Upper Volta	1.0
	Total 138.00

Source: Henry Bienen, "Foreign Policy, The Military and Development: Military Assistance and Political Change in Africa," in Richard Butwell (ed.) Foreign Policy and Developing Nations; Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969.

TABLE 9

FISCAL YEAR, 1967

PROPOSED U. S. MILITARY AID IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

	AMOUNT	PERCENT
Europe	36,129	3.5
Near East and South Asia	240,125	23.4
Africa	31,816	3.1
Far East	387,340	37.7
Latin America	71,999	7.0
Regional costs	68,991	6.7
Worldwide costs	190,600	18.6
	1,027,000	100.00

Source: Military Assistance Facts 2, cited in
Henry Bienen, op. cit., p. 103.