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women mentioned above. Still, one can only wonder how the intervening years and varying popular attitudes towards Native American culture have affected the whole community. Considering her ability to "see" into the heart of the community, one hopes Neely will return to Snowbird and continue this study of a people in motion.

In the interim, readers might examine Neely's contribution to *Indians of the Southeastern United States in the Late 20th Century* (J. Anthony Paredes, ed., 1992). Here one may find much to recall *Snowbird Cherokees*, although Neely offers more up-to-date information on the Eastern Cherokee as a whole, especially concerning the economic impact of bingo. This essay may be viewed as a valuable supplement to Sharlotte Neely's long-anticipated study of the remarkable Snowbird Cherokee community.

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Yellowstone Command: Colonel Nelson A. Miles and the Great Sioux War, 1876–1877. By Jerome A. Greene. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991. 333 pages. \$35.00 cloth.

The Great Sioux War of 1876–77 is most remembered for the "last stand" of George Armstrong Custer, which continues to be discussed and debated in numerous publications. It is commonplace for histories to mention that, after Custer's defeat, the government concentrated military forces in the Northern Plains region and soon subdued the Sioux. Events most often related in the military victory include the battle of Slim Buttes, the attack on the Northern Cheyenne by Ranald S. Mackenzie, and the negotiations leading to the surrender of Crazy Horse, all credited to General George Crook, who received the nation's acclaim. Until now, the military effort involving the troops commanded by Colonel Nelson A. Miles in the Yellowstone region of Montana after the defeat of Custer's troops has not had a serious, detailed examination. Jerome A. Greene, a historian with the National Park Service, previously published an account of Crook's fight against American Horse at Slim Buttes. Here he continues the task of relating the aftermath of the Little Big Horn battle, narrating the activities of Miles's Yellowstone command and concluding that it was decisive in finalizing the army's victory in 1877.

Miles's Fifth Infantry was quickly transferred from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to the Northern Plains in Montana after the news of the Custer defeat. The goal of the army, besides restoring confidence after months of seemingly ineffective campaigning, was outlined by the commanding officer of the Military Division of the Missouri, Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, who requested a congressional appropriation to establish forts in the heart of the region of the "hostiles," allowing the military to forestall any attempts by the Indians to maintain a sustained struggle for independence. Miles's troops were destined to garrison the new posts and patrol the Yellowstone Valley, but he had a more active campaign in mind that would defeat the Sioux quickly and bring fame and promotion to himself. "My opinion was that the only way to make the country tenable for us was to render it untenable for the Indians," Miles stated, intending to use the new posts for winter operations against the Indians, attacking their villages when they were least able and likely to fight. This method had been employed successfully on the Southern Plains earlier and, Greene notes, was an outgrowth of the Civil War campaigns of Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley and of William Tecumseh Sherman during his march in Georgia. This early use of the concept of "total war" would force the Sioux to the agencies and to dependence on the government. While such a winter campaign would be ruthless and would bring much hardship to women and children as well as to warriors, there was little doubt that it would be effective. The army justified this form of warfare as humane, because it brought a decisive end to conflict that otherwise would create even greater suffering through extended fighting.

Miles, contemptuous of less energetic strategies by superiors and associates, established the fortifications and carried out his plan. His campaign involved much marching in severe cold and, despite winter clothing, brought suffering to his troops in the field. However, their hardships were few compared to those of the Indians whose villages were destroyed, costing them homes, food, and transportation (horses were confiscated and/or shot). While there were no decisive battles that gained the fame of the Little Big Horn, Rosebud, or Slim Buttes, the confrontations and endless pursuit were crucial in ending the independence of the Sioux and the Northern Cheyenne. Preventing Crazy Horse's Oglala from joining Sitting Bull's followers, Miles fought "heretofore little-known engagements" at Cedar Creek against Sitting Bull, in the Wolf Mountains against Crazy Horse, and at Muddy Creek against

Lame Deer, inflicting severe defeats on the Indians, causing divisiveness in their camps, and dashing "all hopes the Indians might have held for reasserting their dominance in the region" (p. xiv). Many Indians moved to the agencies when the prestige of Sitting Bull and other leaders was undermined by their apparent inability to stem the conflict and successfully negotiate an end to the relentless campaign.

While Greene's portrait of Miles as a military commander shows him to be decisive, effective, and victorious, it is difficult to like the man he portrays. A perfectionist and overachiever, he was abrupt and demanding, egotistical and temperamental, and quick to condemn superiors and colleagues. He criticized Crook and Terry for lackluster campaigns and demanded that he be given the central role, exploiting his relationship with Sherman to his advantage. Clearly, he believed only a show of force would lead to the end of conflict and, perhaps too quickly, broke off negotiations during the parleys he held with the Sioux. While negotiating with Sitting Bull, Miles briefly considered killing him but was prevented by his awareness of society's condemnation of such an act while meeting under a flag of truce. Sometimes it appears that his wish for fame and promotion outweighed his desire for cooperation and understanding, both with friends and foes.

"I confess a consuming fascination for the tactical details explaining the courses of engagements between army troops and Indians," writes Greene, whose narrative focuses on military effort and thought (p. xiv). Employing numerous primary sources that allow careful documentation of the campaigns and having personally examined the battlegrounds, Greene reconstructs the engagements and places them in perspective. The centrality of the military is never in doubt, despite the author's attempts to include accounts by Indians who fought against Miles and his efforts to follow their peregrinations. Further attention to the victims of this early use of "total war" and expressions of concern might have added a greater sense of impartiality to a generally objective account of the warfare. Such comments, however, were unlikely in the aftermath of the Custer defeat from an army regularly in conflict with a powerful opponent, and it is not surprising that they are infrequent in the documentary records.

Greene is an excellent writer, and his account can be read with enjoyment; occasionally, however, the narrative is disrupted with detailed discussions of the movements of each of the units in the field. Concerning his interpretation that Miles's campaign was

decisive and led to the end of the Sioux War, Greene presents overwhelming evidence. General Alfred Terry wrote Miles that "it is to be regretted that you will not receive from the public at large credit for the results which are really due to your efforts" (p. 222). Greene rectifies that delayed recognition in this definitive account, documenting both the methods and results of Miles's relentless campaign to bring about a swift and complete military victory to end the Great Sioux War.

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