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Race, Ethnicity, and the Minimum Wage: Assessing the Impact of Racial and Ethnic  
Attitudes on Minimum Wage Preferences

By

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

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of the

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2022

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## Abstract

The literature on the link between racial attitudes and policy preferences has produced extensive evidence that racial attitudes do play a role in shaping policy preferences on a wide range of issues. But why should we expect racial attitudes to influence minimum wage policy preferences specifically? We have historical evidence that when the minimum wage was first established at the federal level with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) of 1938, there were racist motivations behind the provisions included in a facially race-neutral policy, specifically with regard to who was excluded from the minimum wage and other labor protections, including maximum working hours and overtime pay. To appease southern Democrats whose economies depended on the exploitation and subordination of Black workers, agricultural and domestic workers, labor sectors that were predominantly occupied by black workers, were exempt from these new federal labor protections (Linder 1987; Perea 2011). In the lead up to the passage of the 1938 FSLA, some opponents of the legislation explicitly communicated the racist motivation behind their opposition. Comments like those of Martin Dies of Texas who stated, “what is prescribed for one race must be prescribe to the others, and you cannot prescribe the same wages for the black man as for the white man” and Edward Cox of Georgia who expressed that the FSLA would “render easier the elimination and disappearance of racial and social distinctions” serve to illustrate such motivations behind opposition to establishing a federal minimum wage in the U.S. (quoted in Perea 2011, 115-116). There is evidence that in the early history of the federal minimum wage in the U.S., racial attitudes, at least with respect to lawmakers, racial attitudes helped shape preferences on minimum wage legislation. While groups that were historically excluded from minimum wage and other labor protections have gradually been covered as the FSLA was updated and amended— though many vulnerable workers remain excluded form FSLA protections— are current minimum wage policy preferences still influenced by racial attitudes?

This dissertation analyzes whether and how race and ethnicity impact policy preferences and attitudes on minimum wage increases. Chapter 1 draws on literature that examines how

and why racial and ethnic attitudes shape preferences on a range of welfare policy issues to analyze whether and how racial and ethnic attitudes impact white support for minimum wage increases at the federal level. Using Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Callaghan and Olson (2017), I theorize that white individuals perceive the minimum wage as primarily impacting Black and Latino populations, and combined with negative conceptions of Black people and Latinos, such associations lead to lower levels of support for minimum wage increases. Using 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study survey data, I find evidence that among white people, those holding more negative attitudes toward Black people and those who hold more restrictive immigration views are less likely to support minimum wage increases. Partisanship and ideology are also predictors of minimum wage preferences.

Chapter 2 turns to preferences on state-level minimum wage increases and applies intergroup conflict theory and intergroup contact theory to analyze whether racial and ethnic context impacts the level of support for state-level minimum wage increases. In this chapter, I test two competing hypotheses: conflict theory suggests that larger Black and Latino populations reduce support for minimum wage increases among white people while contact theory suggest that larger Black and Latino populations increase support for minimum wage increases. To test these competing hypotheses, I collected county-level data on state-level minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory and on demographic characteristics. I find that a higher percentage of Black people is associated with larger minimum wage approval margins, supporting contact theory, and that a higher percentage of Latinos in a county is associated with lower minimum wage approval margins, supporting conflict theory. Here, I also find that more Democratic counties had higher minimum wage approval margins.

Finally, chapter 3 focuses on white perceptions of the potential impact on federal minimum wage increases on income inequality. Scholars have argued that the minimum wage as an issue, and in particular the effects of minimum wage increases, should be conceived and analyzed in terms of justice and equality. I analyze attitudes on the minimum wage in terms of its potential to reduce economic inequality, an issue of justice and equality given

that increases and expansions in who qualifies have been found to have reduced wage and income inequality along racial lines. I ask if racial and ethnic attitudes impact whether whites believe that minimum wage increases would reduce income inequality and argue that those holding more negative views of Latino and Black populations are less likely to believe that minimum wage increases reduce economic inequality. Using survey data from Pew Research's American Trends Panel, I find limited evidence that racial and ethnic attitudes are associated with beliefs about the potential of minimum wage increases to reduce income inequality among white people. I also find limited evidence that partisanship and ideology play a role in shaping these views.

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# 1 Support or Oppose? The Effects of Racial and Ethnic Attitudes on Support for Raising the Minimum Wage

## Abstract

Although it has remained stagnant in recent years, survey evidence suggests that increasing the federal minimum wage is overall widely popular. Various polls have consistently shown that majorities support raising the minimum wage. However, such surveys also show that there is a gap in support between white level of support and Black and Latino level of support. White support raising the federal minimum wage at lower levels compared to Black people and Latinos. Given that existing research argues and has found evidence that racial and ethnic attitudes impact support for a wide range of welfare policy issues, I ask if racial and ethnic attitudes among white people also influence minimum wage preferences. To analyze this question, I use 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data and logistic regression analysis and find that racial and ethnic attitudes are associated with support for raising the minimum wage. I find that among white people, those who hold more negative attitudes toward Black people and those who hold more restrictive immigration policy preferences are less likely to express support for raising the federal minimum wage. I also find that partisanship and ideology are associated with minimum wage preferences.

## 1.1 Introduction

The U.S. federal minimum wage has stagnated at \$7.25 since 2009 despite increasing cost of living and loss of purchasing power to inflation although some states and cities have implemented their own policies setting the minimum wage above the current federal level (DeSilver 2017). While the federal minimum wage has stagnated for nearly a decade, public opinion surveys have found broad support for proposals to raise the minimum wage. For

example, in a 2019 Pew Research Center poll, 67% of respondents indicated being in favor of raising the minimum wage to \$15 an hour (Davis and Hartig 2019). Similarly, in the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), 69.82% of respondents indicated being in favor of raising the federal minimum wage to \$12 by 2020 (Ansolabehere, Schaffner and Luks N.d.). However, despite high overall support for raising the federal minimum wage, these surveys did find differences in support along racial and ethnic lines. The 2019 Pew Research survey found that a large majority of Black and Latino respondents supported increasing the minimum wage (93% and 73% respectively) while whites supported increasing the minimum wage at a lower level with 60% approval. Similarly, a 2016 Pew Research survey found that 89% of Black and 71% of registered voters supported raising the minimum wage to \$15 an hour compared to 44% of white registered voters (DeSilver 2017). The 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) found that 91% of Black respondents and 78% of Latino respondents supported increasing the federal minimum wage while 65% of white respondents supported raising the minimum wage. Lower levels of support for raising the minimum wage among white respondents raises the question of whether minimum wage preferences are influenced by racial and ethnic attitudes, specifically animosity against minority and historically marginalized groups.

Though the literature has yet to explore why support for raising the federal minimum wage is lower among white people compared to other racial and ethnic groups or whether racial attitudes influence white opposition to minimum wage increases, scholars have analyzed how racial attitudes impact other policies, namely welfare policy. Several scholars have analyzed why white Americans express widespread support for several anti-poverty programs typical of the welfare state such as education and health spending and benefits for the elderly, but express much lower support for means-tested programs like Food Stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), later Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (Smith 1987; Peffley, Hurwitz and Sniderman 1997; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Gilens 1996*a*, 2000; Goren 2008). These means tested programs are what scholars refer

to when exploring the determinants of welfare policy attitudes. Earlier work focused on and found evidence that factors like economic self-interest from high- and middle-income taxpayers (Kleugel and Smith 1986; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Skocpol 1990; Cook and Barrett 1992) and individualism (Feagin 1975; Kleugel and Smith 1986; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989) as well as partisanship and ideology (Cook and Barrett 1992) help shape opposition to welfare. Scholars then asked whether racial attitudes also influenced opposition to welfare policies. While earlier scholarship on the determinants of opposition to welfare policy failed to consider whether racial attitudes shaped opposition to welfare, scholars did begin to directly question whether racial attitudes could also drive white opposition to welfare.

Gilens (1996*a*, 2000), focusing on white Americans' view of Black Americans, questions whether racial attitudes shape opposition to ostensibly race-neutral policies including welfare. Using survey and experimental evidence as well as analysis of media coverage and portrayal of welfare recipients, he concludes that negative racial attitudes about Black Americans influence white Americans opposition to welfare. Though views about non-Black poor people, individualism, ideology, partisanship, age, education, and income all influence white Americans views on welfare policy, he concludes that racial attitudes about Black Americans are the most important factor shaping white opposition to welfare. Such opposition happens because there is an association between welfare programs and Black Americans due to implicit media portrayals in media of welfare recipients as primarily Black and undeserving poor, feeding stereotypes of Black Americans as lazy that leads to whites perceiving welfare as being a policy for Black Americans even though welfare is a facially race-neutral policy.

In examining white opposition to welfare, other scholars have expanded the literature by asking whether attitudes toward other historically marginalized groups also shape opposition to welfare, focusing primarily on Latinos due to demographic shifts and increasing immigration salience. Fox (2004) considers how views about Latinos as well as ethnic context impact white support for welfare and finds that while the “more Latinos are in a white respondents' state or county, the more hardworking whites think Latinos are,” this view nonetheless re-

sults in whites expressing a preferences for lower welfare spending (615). Furthermore, she also finds that disproportionately white states, the lazier whites perceive Latinos, the less they want to spend on welfare. Similarly, she finds that the more negative views of Black people whites have, the less they want to spend on welfare in most states regardless of ethnic context. Johnson (2001) finds similar results, arguing that higher diversity in states in total reduce support for racial integration and in lower support for higher welfare spending and Luttmer (2001) also find that support for more welfare spending decreases when whites live in close proximity to welfare recipients of another race. Other studies have suggested that negative immigration attitudes, closely associated with Latinos, decrease support for increasing welfare spending due to increasing racial and ethnic heterogeneity and negative immigrant stereotypes (Garand, Xu and Davis 2017) and that negative affect toward undocumented immigrants increases support for decreasing welfare spending (Hussey and Pearson-Merkowitz 2013).

The impact of racial attitudes on policy preferences has also been studied with respect to policies other than welfare, both those that are race-neutral and those explicitly designed to address race-based inequities. Motivated by the gap between the public's expressed commitment to racial equality, but lack of support for policies intended to promote racial equality, scholars asked whether racial attitudes played a role in shaping attitudes on race-based policies. Scholars found evidence that factors like perceived discrimination of Black people is a predictor of opinion on affirmative action policies in employment and education (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Tuch and Hughes 1996) and that anti-black attitudes are associated with opposition to policies like school busing and affirmative action (Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979; Bobo 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1982). On ostensibly race-neutral policies, scholars have found evidence that racial conservatives express lower support for healthcare reform (Tesler 2012; Banks 2014) and that negative evaluations and stereotypes of Black people are associated with increased support for punitive criminal justice policies (Hurwitz and Peffley 1997, 2005; Peffley and Hurwitz 2002).

Drawing on literature that examines the link between racial and ethnic attitudes and policy preferences, this paper seeks to understand whether there is a relationship between racial and ethnic attitudes and minimum wage policy preferences among white people. Using this literature, I propose a theory that explains why we might expect that attitudes about Black and Latino populations influence white people’s preferences on federal-level minimum wage increases. I use 2016 CCES survey data to analyze whether such a relationship exists and examine whether partisanship and ideology also play a role in shaping minimum wage preferences. The results of my analysis suggest that attitudes toward Black and Latino populations are significantly correlated with white people’s minimum wage preferences. I also find that partisanship and ideology are associated with minimum wage preferences.

## 1.2 Theory

Existing literature has found evidence that racial attitudes impact white people’s preferences on welfare policy as well as a number of other policy issues. But why should we expect that white people’s minimum wage policy preferences are affected similarly? Turning to literature that focuses other redistributive policies that are common features of the welfare state can help us understand why minimum wage policies specifically may be influenced by racial attitudes. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004), in explaining the gap in social welfare spending (redistributive policies) between the U.S. and Europe, argue that racial attitudes and racial relations explain a large portion of this gap. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) argue that in the U.S., in contrast to European states where the poor are perceived as being poor because of unfortunate circumstances, the poor are perceived as lazy and thus undeserving as receiving benefits from the welfare state. Because racial antipathy plays a role in shaping beliefs about the poor and because racial minorities are overrepresented among America’s poor, white Americans are more resistant to a more generous welfare state given that “income-based redistribution will redistribute disproportionately to these minorities” (3). Alesina and Glaeser (2004) expand on this idea,



arguing that America’s racial and ethnic heterogeneity and the overrepresentation of distinct and visible minorities among the poor have allowed opponents of social welfare policies to use racial and ethnic divisions and antipathy to attack such policies. They ultimately conclude that “American racial fractionalization can explain approximately one-half of the difference in the degree of redistribution between the United States and Europe” (181). More recently, Callaghan and Olson (2017) have also analyzed how racial attitudes impact preferences for social welfare redistributive policies, concentrating on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). They argue that the EITC is a “hidden welfare” policy—that is a policy that is not typically thought of as welfare or as part of the welfare state—and that if it is unearthed, or viewed as part of the welfare state, it will be subject to “the racially charged environment in which traditional welfare state programs operate” and become racialized (65). Through experimental evidence, they find that when the EITC subject to the same type of racialization as means tested welfare programs, white support for the EITC, driven by negative racial attitudes against Black Americans.

The work of Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), Alesina and Glaeser (2004), and Callaghan and Olson (2017) provide insights about the relationship between racial attitudes and redistributive policies, and using their insights, we can build a theory about how racial attitudes impact minimum wage policy preferences. Following Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, one potential mechanism through which racial attitudes influence minimum wage preferences is through the association of minimum wage to poverty and poverty to Black people and Latinos, two groups that have historically been negatively portrayed and perceived. Minimum wage is a feature of the welfare state and is a redistributive policy that primarily benefits low-wage earners. The majority of all workers earning minimum wage or less at the national level are white, representing 75.4 % of workers earning at or below minimum wage in 2017, and when we examine the proportion of workers earning at or below minimum wage by race, we find that there is little difference between major ethnic and racial groups (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Among white and Hispanic or Latinos, the proportion

of those earning at or below minimum wage is 2% while at 3%, the proportion is slightly higher among Black workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics). However, minimum wage policies will be associated with the poor because minimum wage policies specifically target low-wage work, and thus to Black people and Latinos because of the overrepresentation of these two groups among America's poor. The association of minimum wage with poverty and with historically marginalized groups will lead white Americans, particularly those holding negative racial attitudes toward Black people and Latinos, to view minimum wage policies as primarily benefitting racial and ethnic groups that have historically been negatively perceived and conclude that they are not deserving of higher wages. If these historically marginalized groups are negatively perceived, as being lazy for example, and they are also perceived as being the primary beneficiaries of increased minimum wages, then support among whites with negative attitudes toward Black and Latino people should be lower. As a result, I hypothesize the following:

$H_1$ : Those holding more negative attitudes toward Black people are less likely to support minimum wage increases.

$H_2$ : Those holding more negative attitudes toward Latinos are less likely to support minimum wage increases.

However, as Callaghan and Olson (2017) note, not all social welfare policies have been racialized and it is possible that when whites think about welfare, they are not associating minimum wage with poverty and by extension to particular negatively perceived racial and ethnic groups. The minimum wage has not been part of the discussion in the literature on the impacts of racial attitudes on traditional means-tested welfare policies, nor have scholars considered whether the issue itself has been racialized or subject to racial appeals. Additionally, scholars have not analyzed whether political figures specifically have deliberately raised racial tensions using this policy issue (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). At the federal level, the issue of minimum wage has gone through periods of action and inaction, and it is unclear how important the issue of minimum wage has been for the public since surveys have

not specifically asked the public. Surveys asking the public what the most important issue facing the country today find that a very small percentage of people name wage issues as a top issue, ranging between one to two percent of respondents in the period from November 2018 through May 2019 (Gallup). Concerning media coverage, journalist Peter C. Baker notes that minimum wage is covered in two ways, representing supporters and opponents of the minimum wage (Baker 2018). Supporters argue that minimum wage increases benefit workers by raising their wages and allowing them to lead better lives. Opponents argue that minimum wage policies, as policies that intervene in the free market, hurt workers by increasing the cost of labor and leading to job losses (Baker 2018). It does not appear that compared to traditional means-tested welfare policies the minimum wage has been subject to the same level of national salience or issue racialization.

It is possible that if the issue of minimum wage is subjected to a similar type of racialization as traditional welfare policies, we will see racial attitudes influencing minimum wage policy preferences. Even if the issue itself has not been racialized by political figures and the media, framing the issue with racial appeals and priming underlying racial attitudes may result in such racial attitudes shaping preferences on minimum wage policy. Race continues to be a major social cleavage in American society and implicit racial appeals, that is appeals that “present an ostensibly race-free conservative position on an issue while incidentally alluding to racial stereotypes or to a perceived threat,” can have racializing effects on public opinion (Mendelberg 2001, 9). Mendelberg (2001) argues that implicit racial appeals are effective in society’s where the norms of equality have been embraced and aspired to, but where racial conflict and division persists. He argues that implicit racial appeals are effective because the “implicit nature of these appeals allows [candidates] to prime racial stereotypes, fears, and resentments while appearing not to do so” (4). On the other hand, explicit racial appeals are less effective because they seem to violate the norm of equality, making it less likely that their “racial predisposition” will influence their opinion and more likely that the overt racial appeal will be condemned. These implicit racial appeals can be made through

words or through visual cues that convey “derogatory racial meaning” which prime underlying racial attitudes (9). As a result, issues that are not overtly racial become racialized through the use of implicit racial cues that prime underlying attitudes and ultimately influence policy opinion.

However, it is nonetheless possible that the issue of the minimum wage has not gone through the process of racialization and that white people are not negatively associating poverty, the minimum wage, and Black and Latinos. Alternatively, it is possible that minimum wage policy preferences are not influenced by racial attitudes and are instead shaped by ideology and partisanship. It is possible that partisanship is a primary predictor of minimum wage policy preference with Republicans being more likely to be against raising the minimum wage and Democrats being more likely to be in favor of raising it. Currently, at the national level, it is Democratic leaders who have voiced support for legislation raising the federal minimum wage. As previously noted, Bernie Sanders, caucusing with Democrats, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez have been visible and vocal proponents of such a policy and Democratic Party has adopted the \$15 minimum wage to their platform, though red states Democrats did oppose the \$15 Raise the Wage Act (McPherson 2019). On the other hand, at the federal level, Republican political leaders have expressed opposition to raising the minimum wage. For example, Senator Lamar Alexander, chairman of the Senate labor committee, expressed that minimum wage hikes are not the way to increase wages for American workers, but rather through tax cuts, reduced regulation, and improving the economy (De-laney and Jamieson 2018). Similarly, it is possible that ideology shapes minimum wage preferences. Minimum wage as a policy that regulates the labor market is at odds with conservative ideals of limited government intervention and allowing the free market to set the price of labor. Opposition to minimum wage increases may be primarily driven not by racial attitudes, but by a belief that it is not the role of the federal government to mandate how much employers must pay their employees. Thus I also propose the following hypotheses:

$H_3$ : Democrats are more likely to support minimum wage increases compared to

Republicans.

$H_4$ : Liberals are more likely to support minimum wage increases compared to conservatives.

### 1.3 Data and Methods

To analyze whether racial attitudes influence minimum wage preferences, I use data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study because it asked respondents their opinion on raising the federal minimum wage and includes a battery of questions on racism as well as a battery of questions on immigration. Interviews were conducted in two waves in the fall of 2016 by YouGov with a total of 64,000 responses collected. However, because this research seeks to understand whether and how white people’s opinion on the minimum wage is shaped by their attitudes toward Black and Latino people, the sample is restricted to white respondents only. For this research, I decided to use 2016 CCES data because the 2016 presidential election prominently featured debate over raising the federal minimum wage while movements pushing for higher minimum wages at the local and state level also received significant attention (Simonovits, Guess and Nagler 2019; Klein 2017). That the issue of raising the minimum wage received significant attention suggests that the issue is salient and that most people will have “developed meaningful opinions about it” (Simonovits, Guess and Nagler 2019, 404).<sup>1</sup> Thus, we can expect that respondents in this survey are expressing meaningful opinions about the minimum wage.

For this research, the outcome of interest is attitudes on the minimum wage among white people. To measure attitudes on the minimum wage, I use the following survey question: “Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress, would you vote for or against the following? Raises the federal minimum wage to \$12 an hour by 2020.” This variable is coded (1) if respondents answered “For” and (0) if respondents answered “Against.” Figure 1 presents opinion on raising the minimum wage by race and ethnicity. Overall, support for

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<sup>1</sup>The 2020 election also prominently featured discussions about raising the minimum wage, however, at the time of this analysis, 2020 CCES survey data was not yet available.

raising the minimum wage is high among all respondents, with 69.8% in favor and 30.2% against and is high amongst the different racial and ethnic groups represented in the survey. Focusing on white, Hispanic, and Black respondents, the largest racial and ethnic groups in the U.S., figure 1 shows that compared to Hispanic and Black respondents, white respondents indicated lower support for raising the minimum wage with 65.4% in favor and 34.6% opposed, though support is above 50% for all three groups.<sup>2</sup> Amongst white, Hispanic, and Black respondents, white respondents showed lower levels of support for raising the federal minimum wage.

There are some validity concerns that should be noted regarding this measure of support for raising the federal minimum wage. The question included in the 2016 CCES does not ask about general support for raising the federal minimum wage, but asks whether they would vote to raise the federal minimum wage under specific conditions, to \$12 an hour by 2020, and thus respondents could have expressed support because of these specific provisions. It is possible that participants responses to the question of whether or not they would support raising the federal minimum wage if the minimum wage rate was set above or below \$12 an hour. Similarly, it is also possible that participants' answers to the minimum wage question would change if the time frame under which such raise would be implemented was shortened or lengthened. Despite such validity concerns, I expect that this question will nevertheless yield meaningful information about white respondents' attitudes on the minimum wage because of the fact that the minimum wage was prominently discussed during the 2016 presidential election primary and general elections. While limited by the specific provisions included in the survey question, measuring support for raising the minimum wage through the question included in the 2016 CCES will still yield meaningful information about attitudes on the minimum wage.

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<sup>2</sup>Amongst Black respondents, 90.9% indicated being in favor of raising the minimum wage while 9.1% indicated being against raising the minimum wage. Amongst Hispanics, 78.3% were in favor and 21.7% were opposed.




Figure 1: Support for Increasing Minimum Wage Among by Race and Ethnicity

The primary independent variables of interest are white people’s attitudes toward Black and Latino people. To measure white people’s attitudes toward Black people, I use a four-item battery designed to capture attitudes toward Black people included in the 2016 CCES. DeSante and Smith (2020) designed this four item battery to both “estimate the relationship between cognitive beliefs about the racial status quo and emotional reactions to racism” ultimately capturing racial fear, beliefs about institutional racism, racial empathy (639). The CCES includes the following four questions:

- (1) I am angry that racism exists.
- (2) White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.
- (3) I often find myself fearful of other races.
- (4) Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.

Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with each of the four statements on a 1-5 Likert with the following options: “strongly agree,” “somewhat agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “somewhat disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” I have coded each of the four questions from a racially liberal to racially conservative direction and Figure 2


presents the distribution of responses amongst white participants for all four battery items<sup>3</sup>. Rather than combine the four-item battery into one scale, I include each item separately in my model because De Sante and Smith (2020) argue that each item is designed to capture the different ways that Americans think about race (cited in Green and McElwee 2019). Following the theory outlined previous, I expect that those with more racially liberal views are more likely to support raising the minimum wage.<sup>4</sup>

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
<sup>3</sup>Question wording and coding scheme is included in the appendix. Anger at racism existing and white people having advantages because of the color of their skin are coded as racially liberal attitudes. Being fearful of other races and believing that racial problems are rare and isolated situations are coded as racially conservative attitudes

<sup>4</sup>Table 2 in the appendix presents the interitem correlation between the four items included in the racial attitudes battery. Chronbach's  $\alpha$  value is 0.57, further suggesting that each item should be considered separately in the analysis.







(a) Angry that Racism Exists



(b) White People Have Advantages



(c) Fear People of Other Races



(d) Racial Problems are Rare and Isolated

Figure 2: Racial Attitudes Among White Respondents

The 2016 CCES does not include questions that directly ask about attitudes about Latinos. However, it does include a battery of questions that asks about attitudes on different immigration issues. Though attitudes on immigration do not directly measure attitudes toward Latino people, and thus raises validity questions, research suggests that Latinos are strongly linked with immigration and that Latinos have gone through a process of racialization that has marked them as a non-white racial group existing in a white-created and imposed racial hierarchy (Massey 2014; Cobas, Duany and Feagin 2009; see also Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013; Zepeda-Millán 2017; Armenta 2017; Vargas, Sanchez and Jr. 2017; Massey 2012; Almeida, Biello, Pedraza, Wintner and Viruell-Fuentes 2016*a*; Davies 2009;

Menjívar 2021; Maldonado 2009). To summarize, Latinos as a group are racialized and there is a strong association between immigration and Latinos. As a result, we can expect that the immigration battery will capture white people's attitudes toward Latinos due to their link with immigration and because of the process of racialization that they have undergone.

To measure attitudes toward Latinos, I use the following questions on immigration issues where respondents were asked whether they think the U.S. government should or should not do each of the following:

(1) Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.

(2) Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border.

(3) Grant legal status to people who were brought in to the U.S. illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school.

(4) Identify and deport illegal immigrants.<sup>5</sup>


Responses were coded in a liberal to conservative direction and figure 3 shows the distribution of responses for each of the four immigration items included in this analysis. Responses were coded (1) if they responded that the government should take action on the liberal immigration policy and (2) if they responded that the government should take action on the conservative immigration policy.<sup>6</sup> As with the racial attitudes battery, I include each immigration item separately in my model rather than combine the items into a single scale because each item captures different elements of immigration policies, from granting legal status for adults vs. those brought without legal status as children to deporting people already in the U.S. and preventing people from coming to the U.S. through increased border enforcement. Using immigration attitudes as a proxy for attitudes about Latinos, I expect that those with more

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
<sup>5</sup>Four other questions were included in the immigration battery, but were not included in this analysis because they dealt with action toward U.S. employers, Syrian refugees, banning Muslims from coming to the U.S., and increasing the number of visas for overseas workers rather than immigrants in general.

<sup>6</sup>Question wording and coding scheme is presented in the appendix. Granting legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least three years and granting legal status to people who were brought into the U.S. illegally as children are coded as liberal immigration policies. Increasing the number of border patrols at the border and identifying and deporting illegal immigrants is coded as a conservative policy.


liberal views on immigration are more likely to support raising the minimum wage.<sup>7</sup>




(a) Grant Legal Status to Immigrants Who Have Worked and Paid Taxes



(b) Grant Legal Status to Those Brought Illegally as Children



(c) Increase Border Patrol



(d) Identify and Deport Undocumented People

Figure 3: Immigration Attitudes Among White Respondents

Attitudes toward Black and Latinos are not the only factors that likely influence white people's attitudes toward raising the federal minimum wage. I am primarily interested in the influence of party identification and ideology and include measures for both in my model. For party identification, the 2016 CCES asked respondents whether they thought of themselves as (1) Democrat, (2) Republican, (3) Independent, (4) Other, or (5) Not sure. I expect that compared to Democrats, all other party identifiers are less likely to support

<sup>7</sup>Table 3 in the appendix presents the interitem correlation between the four items included in the immigration attitudes battery. Chronbach's  $\alpha$  value is 0.7.

raising the minimum wage. The survey also includes a question that asked respondents to describe their political viewpoints as either (1) very liberal, (2) liberal, (3) moderate, (4) conservative, (5) very conservative, or (6) not sure. Figure 4 presents the distribution of party identification and ideological identification and shows that most respondents identify as a Democrat, Republican, or independent and that most identify as either liberal, moderate, or conservative. I expect that compared to those who identify as very liberal, all others are less likely to support raising the minimum wage.




Figure 4: Party Identification and Ideology Among White Respondents

Furthermore, I also include a number of other control variables in my model that may also shape how individuals view raising the federal minimum wage.<sup>8</sup> First, I include standard controls of age, gender, and education. Individuals' opinions about raising the minimum wage are likely influenced by their material economic conditions, specifically about whether or not they might benefit from a higher minimum wage, so I include variables that capture individual's economic conditions including household income, whether their income has increased or decreased, whether they have lost a job, and whether they have received a raise. Because unions have historically supported raising the federal minimum wage, I also include measures of whether the individual is or has ever been a union member and whether any member of the

<sup>8</sup>Variable description and coding schemes are provided in the appendix.

household is or has ever been a union member. Additionally, I included a dummy variable measuring whether or not the respondents state of residence has right-to-work laws because contextual factors may also influence individuals attitudes on the minimum wage and states with right-to-work laws may be more hostile to potential increases to the minimum wage (Whitaker, Herian, Larimer and Lang 2012). Finally, because existing literature has found evidence that the racial and ethnic context in which the individual resides influences people’s opinions on various policy issues, I also include contextual variables that measure racial and ethnic context (Branton 2004; Branton and Jones 2005; Benegal 2018; Baybeck 2006; Hood and Morris 1997*a*, 2000; Kinder and Winter 2001; Berinsky 2002; Wong 2007).

To analyze the relationship between white attitudes toward Black people and Latinos and attitudes on raising the federal minimum wage, I estimate three binomial logistic regressions. For each of the three models, the independent variable is support for raising the federal minimum wage to \$12 an hour by 2020, where (1) is for and (0) is against and all three models include the variables of party identification, ideology, as well as all the same other control variables. Model 1 estimates the relationship between immigration attitudes and support for raising the minimum wage while omitting the four-item racial attitudes battery. Model 2 estimates the relationship between racial attitudes and support for raising the minimum wage while omitting the four-item immigration battery. Model 3 (full model) estimates the relationship between support for raising the minimum wage and both racial and immigration attitudes. Estimating the three models allows me to assess whether racial and immigration attitudes impact support for raising the minimum wage independently and when both racial and immigration attitudes are accounted for. Survey weights are included in all three models.

## 1.4 Results

Models 1 and 2 found that both immigration and racial attitudes, with some exceptions, are significant predictors of support for raising the minimum wage and Model 3 (full model)

found that when both immigration and racial attitudes, with some exceptions, are accounted for, both still are significant predictors of support for raising the minimum wage. In all three models, party identification and ideology were also significant predictors of For this research, I will focus on the results of the full model.<sup>9</sup> Figure 5(a) presents the full model coefficients for racial and immigration attitudes and figure 5(b) presents the full model coefficients for party identification and ideology. Figure 5(a) allows us to see that regarding immigration attitudes, granting legal status to people who have held a job and paid taxes, increasing border patrol, granting legal status to those brought to the U.S. without documents, and deporting undocumented immigrants are all significant predictors of support for the minimum wage. In terms of racial attitudes, anger at racism existing, perceptions of white people having certain advantages, and beliefs about whether racial problems are rare, isolated events are significant predictors of support for the minimum wage while being fearful of people of other races is not a statistically significant predictor of support for raising the minimum wage. Turning to party identification and ideology, figure 5(b) allows us to see that both party identification and ideology are significant predictors of support for raising the minimum wage.




Figure 5: Party ID, Ideology, and Racial and Immigration Attitudes Coefficient Plots (Full Model)

<sup>9</sup>See appendix for full model output for all three models.

To assess whether the primary independent variables of interest function in the direction expected, we will examine the odds ratios for these variables, where a value greater than 0 indicates higher odds of supporting raising the minimum wage and values less than 0 indicating decreased odds of supporting raising the minimum wage. Odds ratios are presented in table 1. Beginning with racial attitudes, table 1 indicates that, as previously mentioned, fearing people of other races is not a significant predictor of support for raising the minimum wage. However, table 1 also shows that compared to the baseline most racially liberal attitude, white people's odds of supporting raising the minimum wage decrease if they have more racially conservative attitudes when it comes to anger that racism exists, opinion on whether white people have certain advantages, and opinion on whether racial problems are rare, isolated instances. Though one measure of white people's attitudes towards Black people was not statistically significant, this finding nonetheless lends support to  $H_1$  because having more racially conservative views on the three measures of racial attitudes toward Black people outlined above decreases white people's odds of supporting raising the minimum wage.

Now turning to immigration attitudes, table 1 indicates that for all four immigration items, compared to the baseline liberal position on immigration, having a more conservative position on these immigration issues decreases white people's odds of supporting the minimum wage. Compared to being in favor of the government granting legal status to those who have worked and paid taxes and being in favor of granting legal status to those brought as children without documents, not being in favor of such policies decreases white people's odds of supporting the minimum wage. Similarly, compared to not being in favor of increasing the number of border patrols at the U.S.-Mexico border and not being in favor of deporting undocumented people, being in favor of such policies decreases white people's odds of supporting raising the minimum wage. These findings on immigration attitudes lend support to  $H_2$  because, given I am using immigration attitudes as a proxy for attitudes toward Latinos, more conservative attitudes toward Latinx people decrease white people's odds of supporting raising the minimum wage. However, because immigration attitudes are

not a direct measure of attitudes toward Latinx people, there is uncertainty about the degree to which this measure accurately captures attitudes toward Latinos and thus to the extent to which I am capturing the relationship between minimum wage preferences and attitudes toward Latinos.

Finally, I turn to looking at party identification and ideology. Table 1 suggests that compared to Democrats, identifying as a Republican, independent, other party, or being unsure of one’s party identity decreases white people’s odds of supporting raising the minimum wage. In terms of ideology, compared to identifying as very liberal, identifying as more conservative than very liberal, or if one is unsure of one’s ideology, decreases white people’s odds of supporting raising the minimum wage. These findings lend support to  $H_3$  and  $H_4$ , thus suggesting that party identification and ideology as well as attitudes toward Black and Latinx people influence white people’s attitudes on the minimum wage.

Table 1: Odds Ratios for Party ID, Ideology, and Racial and Immigration Attitudes (Full Model)

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Odds Ratio</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>z</b>	<b>p&gt; z </b>
Party Identification				
Democrat (Baseline)				
Republican	0.36	.02	-15.01	0.00
Independent	0.44	0.03	-15.06	0.00
Other	0.17	0.02	-15.98	0.00
Not Sure	0.48	0.06	-6.02	0.00
Ideology				
Very Liberal (Baseline)				
Liberal	0.61	0.11	-2.8	0.01
Moderate	0.3	0.05	-6.96	0.00
Conservative	0.16	0.03	-10.42	0.00
Very Conservative	0.11	0.02	-11.87	0.00
Not Sure	0.45	0.09	-3.86	0.00
Increase Border Patrol				
No (Baseline)				
Yes	0.84	0.04	-3.99	0.00
Deport Undocumented People				
No (Baseline)				
Yes	0.91	0.04	-2.11	0.03
Grant Legal Status				




Yes (Baseline)				
No	0.76	0.03	-6.28	0.00
Grant Legal Status Children				
Yes (Baseline)				
No	0.81	0.04	-4.5	0.00
Angry Racism Exists				
Strongly Agree (Baseline)				
Somewhat Agree	0.72	0.03	-7.12	0.00
Neither Agree nor Disagree	0.62	0.03	-9.06	0.00
Somewhat Disagree	0.56	0.06	-5.53	0.00
Strongly Disagree	0.56	0.08	-4.16	0.00
White People Have Advantages				
Strongly Agree (Baseline)				
Somewhat Agree	0.62	0.05	-5.98	0.00
Neither Agree nor Disagree	0.5	0.04	-8.13	0.00
Somewhat Disagree	0.39	0.03	-10.77	0.00
Strongly Disagree	0.39	0.03	-10.83	0.00
Fear People of Other Races				
Strongly Disagree (Baseline)				
Somewhat Disagree	0.98	.05	-0.51	0.61
Neither Agree nor Disagree	1.09	0.06	1.72	0.09
Somewhat Agree	1.02	0.06	0.38	0.7
Strongly Agree	1.26	0.19	1.50	0.13
Racial Problems Rare and Isolated				
Strongly Disagree (Baseline)				
Somewhat Disagree	0.79	0.05	-4.31	0.00
Neither Agree nor Disagree	0.81	0.05	-3.38	0.00
Somewhat Agree	0.6	.04	-7.49	0.00
Strongly Agree	0.51	0.05	-7.11	0.00


**Notes:** Dependent variable is support for raising the federal minimum wage (1=For; 0=Against).

To better substantively understand these results, we will now turn to analyzing the predicted probability of supporting raising the minimum wage by each of our main independent variables of interest. Figure 6 presents the predicted probabilities of supporting raising the minimum wage with 95% confidence intervals by each of the four racial attitudes items with all other variables set at their mean. The x-axis represents the response categories for each item while the y-axis represents the predicted probability of supporting raising the minimum wage. As we can see in figure 6, the predicted probability of supporting the minimum wage


is above 50% for each racial attitude measure and for each response category, but there are differences by response categories within three of the four racial attitudes measures: anger that racism exists, opinion on whether white people have certain advantages, and opinion on whether racial problems are rare, isolated situations. Here we compare the most racially liberal response on the three statistically significant racial attitude measures to the most racially conservative response. Figure 6(a) shows that if one strongly agrees that they are angry that racism exists, the probability of supporting raising the minimum wage is 73%, but if they strongly disagree that they are angry that racism exists, the probability of supporting raising the minimum wage is 60%, a 13-point decrease. Similarly, figure 6(b) shows that if one strongly agree that white people have certain advantages, the probability of supporting raising the minimum wage is 80% while the probability is 62% if they strongly disagree that white people have certain advantages, a 18-point decrease. Finally, figure 6(d) shows that if one strongly agrees that racial problems are rare, isolated situations, the probability of supporting raising the minimum wage is 74% while it is 59% if they strongly agree that racial problems are rare and isolated instances, a 15-point decrease. Overall, having more racially conservative views decreases one's probability of supporting such an increase. This finding supports  $H_1$ .




(a) Angry that Racism Exists



(b) White People Have Advantages



(c) Fear People of Other Races




(d) Racial Problems are Rare and Isolated


Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Support for Raising the Minimum Wage by Racial Attitudes Among White Respondents (Full Model)

Turning to immigration attitudes, figure 7 presents the predicted probabilities of supporting raising the minimum wage with 95% confidence intervals by each of the four racial attitudes items with all other variables set at their mean. The x-axis represents the response categories for each item while the y-axis represents the predicted probability of supporting raising the minimum wage. We also observe here that the predicted probability of supporting raising the minimum wage is overall high at above 60%, but there are differences by response options within the four immigration attitudes measures. Figure 7(a) shows that if one supports granting legal status to immigrants who have worked and paid taxes, the probability of supporting the minimum wage is 72% whereas if they do not support such a policy,


the probability drops to 66%, a 6-point difference. Similarly, if one supports granting legal status to those brought without status as children (figure 7(b)), the probability is 72% and drops to 67% if they do not support this policy, a 5-point difference. Figure 7(c) shows that if one does not support increasing border patrol on the U.S.-Mexico border, the probability of supporting raising the minimum wage is 71% and is 67%, a 4-point decrease. Finally, figure 7(d) shows that if one supports identifying and deporting undocumented people, the probability of supporting the minimum wage is 70% and drops to 68% if they support this policy, a 2-point drop. There is a smaller decrease in the predicted probability of supporting the minimum wage from the most liberal to most conservative position compared to racial attitudes, but there is nonetheless a decrease and this finding supports  $H_2$ . However, the effects are overall small.




(a) Grant Legal Status to Immigrants Who Have Worked and Paid Taxes



(b) Grant Legal Status to Those Brought Illegally as Children



(c) Increase Border Patrol



(d) Identify and Deport Undocumented People

Figure 7: Predicted Probability of Support for Raising the Minimum Wage by Immigration Attitudes Among White Respondents (Full Model)

Focusing now on party identification and ideology, figure 8 presents the predicted probability of supporting the minimum wage with all other variables set at their mean. The x-axis represents the response categories for each item while the y-axis represents the predicted probability of supporting raising the minimum wage. Figure 8(a) shows predicted probabilities by party identification and we can see that identifying as a democrat results in a probability of supporting the minimum wage of 81% which drops to 61% if identifying as a Republican and to 65% if identifying as an independent, a 20- and 16-point decrease respectively. Figure 8(b) shows predicted probabilities by ideology and we can see that the

probability of supporting raising the minimum wage decreases the more conservative the ideology. Identifying as very liberal results in a predicted probability of 89%, as liberal in 83%, as moderate in 71%, as conservative in 56%, and as very conservative in 47%. From the most liberal to the most conservative position, there is a 42-point decrease in the probability of supporting raising the minimum wage. These results support  $H_3$  and  $H_4$ . Party identification and ideology as well as racial and immigration attitudes play a role in shaping attitudes toward the minimum wage.




Figure 8: Predicted Probability of Support for Raising the Minimum Wage by Party ID and Ideology (Full Model)

### 1.5 Conclusion

This paper sought to determine whether racial and ethnic attitudes influence minimum wage preferences among white people. Though existing literature has not yet explored this relationship, I argued that white people associate the minimum wage with Black people and with Latinos and that negative perceptions of Blacks and Latinos leads whites to express lower support for raising the federal minimum wage. I also hypothesized that partisanship and ideology play a role in shaping minimum wage preferences. The results from my analysis support my hypotheses that more negative attitudes toward Black people and Latinos is

associated with lower support for raising the minimum wage. Even when controlling for partisanship and ideology, racial and ethnic attitudes were still significantly correlated with minimum wage preferences, but compared to immigration attitudes, racial attitudes have a bigger effect size on the likelihood of indicating support for raising the minimum wage.

Though I found support for my hypotheses, the results from my analysis raise questions about variable measurement. Because my dependent variable included very specific provisions about a hypothetical minimum wage increase policy, questions are raised about the extent to which results are dependent on the specific question wording. It is possible that support for minimum wage increase might wane or increase depending on what the policy proposal sets a potential new minimum wage rate. Thus, one way to expand this research is to test the same hypotheses on different policy proposals that suggest different new minimum wage rates. Doing so would serve as a robustness check on the results of this analysis and would increase confidence in these results. Using different proposed minimum wages could also shed light into whether support for minimum wage depends on how high or low minimum wage changes are proposed. This research can also be improved by having direct measures of attitudes toward Latinos. I used immigration preferences as a proxy for attitudes about Latinos given that this groups is strongly linked with immigration, however, there is uncertainty about whether such preferences are actually capturing opinions about Latinos. Thus, using survey data that includes direct questions about what people think about Latinos would improve confidence in these results.

My theoretical argument offers additional pathways for future research. Because there is not a significant amount of research on the relationship between racial and ethnic attitudes and minimum wage preferences, it is unclear whether white people do in fact associate minimum wage issues with Black people and with Latinos or whether such association leads to lower support for minimum wage increases. One potential path for future research is to explore whether white people do in fact make this association and whether such an association, if present, is negative. A first step in this process is to conduct surveys asking

people which racial or ethnic group they believe make up the largest percentage of minimum wage earners and analyze whether estimates of minimum wage earners are associated with minimum wage policy preferences. To summarize, the results from this analysis support my hypothesis that racial and ethnic attitudes influence minimum wage preferences, but measurement issues call into question the validity of my results, thus providing a way to improve and expand this research. Furthermore, testing my proposed theoretical argument also offers a way to expand this research and to better understand the relationship between racial and ethnic attitudes and minimum wage preferences.



## 1.6 Appendix A

### 1.6.1 Survey Question Wording and Variable Coding

**Support for Raising the Federal Minimum Wage:** Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress, would you vote for or against each of the following? Raises the federal minimum wage to \$12 an hour by 2020.

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

**Party Identification:** Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...

- (1) Democrat
- (2) Republican
- (2) Independent
- (3) Other
- (4) Not Sure

**Ideology:** In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?

- (1) Very liberal
- (2) Liberal
- (2) Moderate
- (3) Conservative
- (4) Very conservative
- (4) Not sure

**Age:** In what year were you born?

2016 - (birth year)

**Gender:** Are you male or female?

- (1) Female
- (2) Male

**Education:** What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- (1) No high school
- (2) High school graduate
- (3) Some college
- (4) 2-year
- (5) 4-year
- (6) Post-grad

**Income:** Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

**Union Membership:** Are you a member of a labor union?

- (1) Yes, I am currently a member of a labor union

- (2) I formerly was a member of a labor union
- (3) I am not now, nor have I been, a member of a union

**Household Union Membership:** Other than yourself, is any member of your family a union member?

- (1) Yes, a member of my household is currently a union member
- (2) A member of my household was formerly a member of a labor union, but is not now
- (3) No, no one in my household has ever been a member of a labor union

**Income Change in the Past 4 Years:** Over the past four years, has your household's annual income ...?

- (1) Increased a lot
- (2) Increased somewhat
- (3) Stayed about the same
- (4) Decreased somewhat
- (5) Decreased a lot

**Lost a Job:** Over the past four years, have you lost a job?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

**Received a Raise:** Over the past four years, have you received a raise at work?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

**Immigration Attitudes: Grant Legal Status:** What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

**Immigration Attitudes: Increase Border Patrol:** What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border.

- (1) No
- (2) Yes

**Immigration Attitudes: Grant Legal Status Children:** What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Grant legal status to people who were brought to the U.S. illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school.

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

**Immigration Attitudes: Deport Undocumented People:** What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Identify and deport illegal immigrants.

- (1) No
- (2) Yes

***Racial Attitudes: Angry Racism Exists:*** I am angry that racism exists.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Somewhat agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Somewhat disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

***Racial Attitudes: Racial Advantages:*** White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Somewhat agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Somewhat disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

***Racial Attitudes: Fear People of Other Races:*** I often find myself fearful of people of other races.

- (1) Strongly disagree
- (2) Somewhat disagree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Somewhat agree
- (5) Strongly agree

***Racial Attitudes: Racial Problems Rare:*** Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.

- (1) Strongly disagree
- (2) Somewhat disagree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Somewhat agree
- (5) Strongly agree

### 1.6.2 State Level Variables Coding

***Right to Work State:*** Dichotomous variable for each state coded 1 if right to work laws were present in 2016 and 0 otherwise.

***State Minimum Wage Above Federal:*** Dichotomous variable for each state coded 1 if the state minimum wage was above the federal minimum wage in 2016 and 0 otherwise.

***Black Population 2016:*** Continuous variable of population estimates from 2016 of the Black population by state.

***Latinx Population 2016:*** Continuous variable of population estimates from 2016 of the Latinx population by state.

***Ethnic Diversity:*** Continuous variable of ethnic and racial diversity by state from Lee, Martin, Matthews and Farrell (2017).

***Black Population Change (1990-2016):*** Continuous variable of change in the Black population between 1990 and 2016.

***Latinx Population Change (1990-2016):*** Continuous variable of change in the Latinx population between 1990 and 2016.

***Ethnic Diversity Change (1980-2015):*** Continuous variable of change in ethnic and racial diversity between 1980 and 2015 from Lee et al. (2017).

### 1.6.3 Racial and Immigration Attitudes Variable Correlation

Table 2: Racial Attitudes Interitem Correlation

<i>Variable</i>	Observations	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Test Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	$\alpha$
Angry Racism Exists	40,056	+	0.6872	0.4647	0.3293408	0.4358
White People Advantaged	40,059	+	0.7752	0.4504	0.2318872	0.4126
Fearful Other Races	40,015	+	0.4522	0.1104	0.6035063	0.6680
Racial Problems Rare	40,006	+	0.7268	0.4484	0.2785351	0.4202
Test Scale					0.3608429	0.5719

Table 3: Immigration Attitudes Interitem Correlation

<i>Variable</i>	Observations	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Test Correlation	Average Interitem Covariance	$\alpha$
Grant Legal Status	46,289	+	0.7631	0.5443	0.0845803	0.6083
Increase Border Patrol	46,289	+	0.6599	0.3880	0.1095315	0.7033
Legal Status Children	46,289	+	0.7004	0.4481	0.0997627	0.6679
Deport Undoc. Immigrants	46,289	+	0.7908	0.5908	0.0779637	0.5783
Test Scale					0.0929596	0.7053

### 1.6.4 Full Model Output

Table 4: Impact of Racial and Immigration Attitudes on Minimum Wage Preferences Among White Respondents

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Party Identification			
Democrat (Baseline)			
Republican	-1.16 (.06)	-1.09 (.07)	-1.01 (.08)
Independent	-0.97 (.06)	-0.88 (.06)	-0.83 (.06)
Other	-1.91 (.11)	-1.78 (.11)	-1.77 (.11)
Not Sure	-0.9 (.12)	-0.77 (.12)	-0.74 (.12)
Ideology			
Very Liberal (Baseline)			
Liberal	-0.73 (.17)	-0.53 (.18)	-0.49 (.18)
Moderate	-1.61 (.17)	-1.29 (.17)	-1.19 (.17)
Conservative	-2.38 (.17)	-1.98 (.18)	-1.83 (.18)
Very Conservative	-2.7 (.18)	-2.38 (.18)	-2.19 (.18)
Not Sure	-1.2 (.2)	-0.93 (.21)	-0.79 (.21)
Age			
(Younger → Older)	.009 (.001)	0.01 (.002)	0.01 (.002)
Gender			
Female (Baseline)			
Male	-0.22 (.04)	-0.15 (.04)	-0.14 (.04)
Education			
No High School Diploma (Baseline)			
High School Graduate	-0.39 (.12)	-0.37 (.12)	-0.36 (.12)
Some College	-0.73 (.12)	-0.71 (.12)	-0.72 (.12)
2-Year College	-0.72 (.13)	-0.68 (.13)	-0.68 (.13)
4-Year College	-0.98 (.12)	-0.97 (.12)	-0.99 (.12)
Post-Graduate	-0.9	-0.91	-0.95

	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)
Income			
(Lower → Higher)	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Union Membership			
Currently a Member (Baseline)			
Formerly a Member	-0.23	-0.26	-0.26
	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)
Never a Member	-0.3	-0.33	-0.34
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Household Union Membership			
Member Currently a Member (Baseline)			
Member Formerly a Member	-0.32	-0.33	-0.35
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
No Member Ever a Member	-0.24	-0.26	-0.26
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Income Change in Past 4 Years			
Increased a Lot (Baseline)			
Increased Somewhat	-0.08	0.02	0.02
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Stayed the Same	-0.3	-0.16	-0.14
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Decreased Somewhat	-0.42	-0.25	-0.21
	(.11)	(.12)	(.12)
Decreased a Lot	-0.57	-0.43	-0.38
	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)
Lost Job in Past 4 Years			
Yes (Baseline)			
No	-0.32	-0.31	-0.32
	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)
Received a Raise in Past 4 Years			
Yes (Baseline)			
No	0.21	0.19	0.20
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Right to Work State			
No (Baseline)			
Yes	-0.19	-0.16	-0.17
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
State Minimum Wage Above Federal			
No (Baseline)			
Yes	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Governor's Party			
Republican (Baseline)			
Democrat	0.04	0.04	0.03

	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Latinx Population (2016)			
(Lower → Higher)	0.45	0.58	0.59
	(.44)	(.45)	(.45)
Black Population (2016)			
(Lower → Higher)	0.81	0.81	0.89
	(.42)	(.42)	(.43)
Latinx Population Change (1990-2016)			
(Lower → Higher)	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Black Population Change (1990-2016)			
(Lower → Higher)	0.12	0.13	0.13
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Ethnic Diversity (2015)			
(Lower → Higher)	0.004	0.003	0.003
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Ethnic Diversity Change (1980-2015)			
(Lower → Higher)	0.007	0.006	0.006
	(.005)	(.005)	(.004)
Immigration: Increase Border Patrol			
No (Baseline)			
Yes	-0.27	-	-0.17
	(.04)		(.04)
Immigration: Deport Undocumented People			
No (Baseline)			
Yes	-0.2	-	-0.1
	(.04)		(.05)
Immigration: Grant Legal Status			
Yes (Baseline)			
No	-0.39	-	-0.28
	(.04)		(.04)
Immigration: Grant Legal Status Children			
Yes (Baseline)			
No	-0.35	-	-0.21
	(.04)		(.05)
Race: Angry that Racism Exists			
Strongly Agree (Baseline)			
Somewhat Agree	-	-0.36	-0.33
		(.05)	(.05)
Neither Agree or Disagree	-	-0.54	-0.69
		(.05)	(.08)
Somewhat Disagree	-	-0.66	-0.93
		(.1)	(.09)
Strongly Disagree -		-0.67	-0.93
		(.14)	(.09)

Race: White People Have Advantages			
Strongly Agree (Baseline)			
Somewhat Agree	-	-0.54 (.08)	-0.48 (.08)
Neither Agree or Disagree	-	-0.82 (.08)	-0.69 (.08)
Somewhat Disagree	-	-1.09 (.08)	-0.93 (.09)
Strongly Disagree	-	-1.13 (.08)	-0.93 (.09)
Race: Fear People of Other Races			
Strongly Disagree (Baseline)			
Somewhat Disagree	-	-0.04 (.05)	-0.02 (.05)
Neither Agree or Disagree	-	0.05 (.05)	0.09 (.05)
Somewhat Agree	-	-0.04 (.06)	.02 (.06)
Strongly Agree	-	0.15 (.15)	0.23 (.15)
Race: Racial Problems Rare and Isolated			
Strongly Disagree (Baseline)			
Somewhat Disagree	-	-0.23 (.06)	-0.24 (.06)
Neither Agree or Disagree	-	-0.23 (.06)	-0.22 (.06)
Somewhat Agree	-	-0.53 (.07)	-0.51 (.07)
Strongly Agree	-	-0.71 (.09)	-0.67 (.09)
Constant	4.84 (.28)	4.93 (.28)	4.99 (.28)
<hr/>			
N	39,598	39,315	39,315
Pseudo $R^2$	.23	.25	.26
<hr/>			

**Notes:** Dependent variable is support for raising the federal minimum wage (1=For; 0=Against). Models estimated with logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Sources:** Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2016; US Census; American Community Survey; Lee et al. (2017); The Economic Policy Institute National Conference of State Legislatures.



## 2 Does Local Racial and Ethnic Context Impact County-Level Support for Minimum Wage Increase Ballot Measures?

### Abstract

Racial and ethnic context has been shown to have an impact on preferences and attitudes on various issues including housing, taxes, and immigration as well as on attitudes toward outgroups. There are two competing theories explaining how and why ethnic and racial context matter: intergroup conflict theory and intergroup contact theory. While intergroup conflict theory suggests that racial and ethnic diversity lead to perceptions of racial threat and to increased prejudice against outgroups, intergroup contact theory suggests that ethnic and racial diversity leads to increased intergroup trust and to a correction of outgroup stereotypes. Using intergroup conflict and contact theories, I argue that there are two possible ways that racial and ethnic context impact support for raising state-level minimum wages, I develop competing hypotheses that suggest that larger Black and Latino populations can either lead to higher or lower support for state-level minimum wage increases. To test these hypotheses, I analyze county-level data on state-level minimum wage increase measures and find partial support for both conflict and contact theories. OLS estimates found that higher Black county populations are associated with higher support for raising the minimum wage while higher Latino populations are associated with lower support for raising the minimum wage. County-level partisanship was also found to play a significant role in impacting support for raising state minimum wages.

## 2.1 Introduction

While the federal minimum wage has remained stagnant since 2009, states have increasingly taken action to raise the state-level minimum wage above the current federal minimum (Whitaker et al. 2012; Arthur 2017; Rose 2020). Currently, 30 states and Washington D.C. have minimum wages above the federal level, with 18 states and D.C. including provisions to automatically adjust the minimum wage for inflation each year (*Minimum Wage Tracker* N.d.). In addition to raising state minimum wages through legislative action, another way that states have seen their minimum wages increase is through voter-approved measures either initiated by the public or introduced by state legislatures. The fact that the public has directly expressed their preferences on the minimum wage through the ballot box provides researchers an opportunity to analyze voter preferences and the factors that influence those preferences. In particular, this research is interested in examining the relationship between race, ethnicity, and preferences for state-level minimum wage increases.

Existing literature has not yet analyzed whether race and ethnicity play a role in shaping preferences on state-level minimum wage increases, however literature that examines the relationship between local racial and ethnic context and attitudes on a range of policy issues, in particular literature on inter-group contact and threat theory, offers a way to examine whether and how race and ethnicity impacts attitudes on state-level minimum wage increases. Focusing on racial and ethnic diversity, scholars have found evidence that demographic context indeed matters and that it plays a role in shaping public opinion, policy preferences, attitudes toward minority groups, and voting behavior (Key 1949; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Branton and Jones 2005; Hopkins 2009; Zingher and Thomas 2014). Branton (2004) finds that the racial and ethnic diversity in which white voters live impacts how they vote on ballot initiatives that specifically target racial and ethnic minority groups. Similarly, Tolbert and Grummel (2003) analyzed white voter support in California's 1996 Proposition 209, which aimed to end affirmative action, and found that white support was higher where Latino, Black, and Asian populations were larger. Other scholar have found evidence that

racial and ethnic context impact white people’s resentment against Black people, preferences on local taxes, and on attitudes on immigrants and immigration (Orey 2001; Hopkins 2009; Fussell 2014; Rocha and Espino 2009; Hood and Morris 1997*b*; Newman, Velez, Hartman and Bankert 2015; Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez and Schildkraut 2018). Findings from these studies suggest that racial and ethnic context, specifically that of the Black and Latino populations, plays a role in shaping white people’s attitudes on a number of different issues. Thus, these findings raise the question of whether racial and ethnic context, focusing on Black and Latino populations, also play a role in shaping support for state-level minimum wage increases.

The studies discussed above are situated within the larger literature debating how and in what direction racial and ethnic context influence attitudes and positions on various issues. There are two major competing hypotheses seeking to explain how and why racial and ethnic context matter– the intergroup contact hypothesis and the intergroup contact hypothesis, each of which have been supported empirically in different works. To summarize, racial conflict theory posits that: “The perception of threat, grounded in conditions of real competition, is the engine that drives social conflict. Thus, insofar as racial proximity breeds the perception of racial threat, proximity will increase the potency of prejudice” (Kinder and Mendelberg 1995, 403 cited in Hood and Morris 2000, 196). On the other hand, social contact theory suggests that racial proximity lessens conflict and argues instead that contact with outgroup members reduces prejudice because negative outgroup views are corrected (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2005; Gundelach 2014). These two theories offer competing expectations about how ethnic and racial diversity might impact white people’s attitudes and preferences on various issues. Conflict theory suggests that racial diversity leads whites to have negative perceptions of racial and ethnic minorities and thus to oppose policies which might benefit racial and ethnic minorities while contact theory suggests the opposite would happen.

This paper seeks to understand the relationship between race, ethnicity, and preferences on state-level minimum wage increases by applying intergroup conflict and intergroup con-

tact theories. Specifically focusing on Black and Latino populations due to a history of marginalization, negative stereotypes, and outgroup bias against these two groups, I argue that there are two possible ways that racial and ethnic context plays a role in shaping levels of support for state-level minimum wage increases (Cranmer and Cranmer 2013; March and Graham 2015). Following intergroup conflict theory, I hypothesize that the larger the Black and Latino populations, the lower the support for increasing the state-level minimum wage will be among white people as a result of white perceptions of economic threat and increased prejudice. However, following intergroup contact theory, it is also possible that the larger the Black and Latino population, the higher the support for state-level minimum wage increases will be among white people as a result of corrected negative outgroup attitudes. These are the two primary competing hypothesis that are explored in this paper, however, because the Democratic Party at large has expressed more support for raising the minimum wage compared to the Republican Party, I will also test the alternative hypothesis that racial and ethnic context does not play a role in driving support for state-level increases, but is rather driven by partisanship.

To test these hypothesis, I analyze county-level data on state-level minimum wage increase ballot measures. For this research, I collected county-level data on the margin of victory of state-level minimum wage increase ballot measures that took place after the last time the federal minimum wage was increased. I also collected county-level demographic data, specifically on the percent Black and Latino population in a county, and on county partisanship. Using OLS, I estimated the relationship between the minimum wage measures' margin of victory and the percent of the population that is Black and Latino. My results found partial support for the conflict hypothesis and partial support for the contact hypothesis. While larger percentage of Black people in a county were associated with larger margins of victory, larger percentages of Latinos in a county were associated with lower margins of victory. Moreover, more Democratic counties had larger margins of victory. These results are a first step in understanding the relationship between race, ethnicity, and support for

state-level minimum wage increases in particular with respect to the impact of local racial and ethnic context.

## 2.2 Theory

Intergroup contact theory argues that proximity drives perceptions of racial threat and outgroup prejudice. In *Southern Politics: In State and Nation*, a prominent example exemplifying contact theory, Key (1949) found that white one-party dominance in southern states was explained by the size of the Black population and found that one-party dominance was strong in “black belts” where the proportion of Black people was highest. He argued that whites in areas where the Black population was high sought to establish in one-party dominance in order to maintain white rule. Later research has also found evidence that supports the conflict hypothesis specifically concerning white perceptions of threat against Black people and Latinos. Giles and Hertz (1994) argued that in “contexts where the threat posed by a minority group is high, the dominant group’s response is predicted to be more hostile than in contexts where that threat is low” and found that where the Black population was more highly concentrated, there were decreases in white Democratic voter registration. Such a decline was a response to increasing Black influence within the Democratic Party. Other scholars have also found that the size and concentration of Black populations negatively impact racial segregation, lower neighborhood satisfaction, and increase prejudice against Black individuals (DeFina and Hannon 2009; Baybeck 2006; Taylor 1998; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995). Furthermore, other research also suggests that the size, change, and concentration of the Latino population results in white perceptions of racial threat and increased prejudice. For example, Hero and Tolbert (1996) and Tolbert and Hero (1996) find that support for Prop 187, California’s extreme anti-immigrant initiative driven by hostility against Latinos, was higher in areas with larger Latino populations.

Regarding state-level minimum wage increases, why should one expect that racial and ethnic context, specifically with respect to Black and Latino populations, impact white

people's preferences on state-level minimum wage increases? Intergroup conflict theory posits that "multicultural settings lead to intergroup conflict and mistrust evoked by intergroup competition over economic resources, political power and cultural dominance" (Gundelach 2014, 129). Thus, using intergroup conflict theory, I argue that in settings where the Black and Latino populations are larger, white support for raising the state minimum wage will be lower because of white perceptions that wage increases will primarily benefit Black and Latino workers. In chapter one, I argued that white people associate poverty with Black people and Latinos, associate the minimum wage with poverty, and as a result associate the minimum wage with Black and Latino populations. Being in closer proximity to Black people and Latinos will make such an association salient which will then lead to a perception that minimum wage increases will primarily benefit Black and Latino workers. Such a benefit will threaten white people's economic dominance and to combat that threat, white people will not support state-level increases in the minimum wage. From this argument, I hypothesize the following:

*H*<sub>1</sub>: Higher Black and Latino populations are associated with lower levels of support for raising the state minimum wage.

In conflict with intergroup conflict theory, intergroup contact theory proposes that intergroup contact reduces conflict and prejudice against outgroups Allport (1954). This theory suggests "that repeated and continuous encounters with outgroup members in varied settings result in a learning process about the outgroup, which in turn corrects negative views of the outgroup and reduces prejudice" (Gundelach 2014, 128). Scholars have also found empirical evidence that supports this theory. Robinson (1980) analyzes the impact of housing integration on white people's attitudes toward Black people and finds that living in integrated neighborhoods reduces white racial prejudice against Black people, arguing that close proximity leads to intergroup understanding and to a reduction of prejudice. Similarly, Schmid, Ramiah and Hewstone (2014) and Gundelach (2014) find that ethnic diversity is associated with higher levels of intergroup trust as a result of lower perceived threat and increased

trust. Analyzing California's Prop 187, Hood and Morris (2000) found that as contact between whites and Asians and whites and Latinos increased, white support for Prop 187 decreased. Furthermore, Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) in their analysis of the relationship between racial and ethnic composition and anti-Latino and anti-Black stereotypes find that intergroup contact reduced anti-Latino and anti-Black stereotypes. As with the intergroup conflict theory, research has also found empirical support for the intergroup contact theory.

Following intergroup contact theory, it is also possible that larger Black and Latino populations increase white people's support for raising the state minimum wage. I argue that although white people may hold the view that Black and Latino workers would be the primary beneficiaries of minimum wage increases, being in close contact with Black and Latino people will not result in such a view being salient and will not lead to perceptions of economic threat. Rather, being in proximity and in repeated contact with Black and Latino people will lead to greater understanding and increased trust instead of feelings of racial threat. Greater trust and understanding will lead white people to understand that Black and Hispanic people will benefit from minimum wage increases and support that potential benefit while also understanding that they are not the only groups who might benefit from minimum wage increases. Following this argument, I propose the following hypothesis:

$H_1$ : Higher Black and Latino populations are associated with higher levels of support for raising the state minimum wage.

Alternatively, it is possible that racial and ethnic context play no role in shaping preferences on state-level minimum wage increases and that support or opposition is actually driven by partisanship. Compared to the Republican Party, the Democratic Party has expressed more support for raising the minimum wage at the federal level and prominent figures associated with the Democratic Party, such as Bernie Sander and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, have publicly expressed strong support for raising the federal minimum wage. Furthermore, Johnson (2002) and Waltman and Pittman (2002) find that partisanship influences state-level adoption of increased minimum wages. As a result, decisions on whether or not to

increase the state minimum wage could be driven by partisan politics, with Democrats being more likely to support increases at the individual level and at the aggregate level, more Democratic areas exhibiting greater support. Thus, I also hypothesize the following:

$H_3$ : The more democratic an area, the higher the support for increasing state minimum wages.

## 2.3 Data and Methods

To analyze whether there is a relationship between local racial and ethnic context and support for raising the minimum wage, I collected county-level data on statewide minimum wage increase measures as well as county-level demographic characteristics. Data was collected for all statewide measures held after the last time Congress raised the federal minimum wage in 2009 with a total of twelve races included from 2013 to 2020<sup>10</sup> Table 5 lists the specific races included in the data as well as the percent of voters voting “yes” or “no” on raising the state minimum wage. The table shows that voters in all the races included in the data approved raising the state minimum wage. Though there is no variation in terms of whether or not voters approved their minimum wage measures at the state level, there is variation at the county level in terms of both whether or not voters approved the measure and in the margin of victory in counties that did approve minimum wage increases. Thus, for this analysis, I will conduct county-level analysis to determine whether there is a relationship between support for raising the minimum wage and racial and ethnic context.

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<sup>10</sup>The data includes the 2014 Illinois Minimum Wage Increase, a nonbinding advisory question approved by voters and ultimately introduced and passed by the Illinois legislature. The data excludes Alaska’s 2014 Ballot Measure 3 because voting data reported by the state did not match Census county-level data.



Table 5: State Ballot Measures and Voting Outcomes

Year	State	Measure	Yes (Percent)	No (Percent)
2013	New Jersey	Question 2	61.3	38.7
2014	South Dakota	Measure 18	55.1	44.9
2014	Nebraska	Initiative 425	59.5	40.5
2014	Illinois	Min. Wage Increase Question	63.7	31.8
2014	Arkansas	Issue 5	65.9	34.1
2016	Washington	Initiative 1433	57.4	42.6
2016	Maine	Question 4	55.5	45.0
2016	Colorado	Amendment 70	55.4	44.6
2016	Arizona	Proposition 206	58.3	41.7
2018	Missouri	Proposition B	62.3	37.7
2018	Arkansas	Issue 5	68.5	31.5
2020	Florida	Amendment 2	60.8	39.2

**Source:** Ballotpedia.

For this analysis, my dependent variable is support for raising the minimum wage and is measured as the minimum wage measure approval margin for raising the state minimum wage at the county level. This research expands Wilson’s (2019) undergraduate honors thesis which analyzes the relationship between the Hispanic population and the minimum wage approval vote margin in the 2004 Florida Minimum Wage Amendment at the county level. To measure the minimum wage approval margin, I collected % “yes” and % “no” totals for each of the twelve ballot measures listed in table 5 using the respective states’ Secretary of State’s official election results by county, recording the minimum wage approval margins for 748 counties. In total, 547 counties voted to raise their state’s minimum wage and 201 counties voted against raising the minimum wage. Figure 9 shows the distribution of the

minimum wage approval vote margin by county which ranged from -52.9 to 81.5 and has a median of 10.98. Using minimum wage approval margins by county allows us to explore variation in levels of support for raising state minimum wages even if overall at the state level, minimum wage measures were approved.




Figure 9: Distribution of Minimum Wage Approval Vote Margin

In this research, the primary independent variable of interest is racial and ethnic context. Because my theory posits that the Latino and Black population potentially impacts policy preferences in two competing ways, I will measure racial and ethnic context as the percent Black population and percent Latino population in each county. Black and Latino population estimates were collected for the year during which the state minimum wage measure took place.<sup>11</sup> County-level population data was obtained from the American Community Survey conducted by the Census Bureau for 748 counties. The county-level Black population ranged from 0% to 62.6% with a mean of 6.5% and a median of 1.3%. Figure 10 depicts the distribution of the Black population and shows that overall, the distribution of Black population at the county level for the cases included in this dataset is right skewed. Looking

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<sup>11</sup>Florida's minimum wage measure took place in 2020, however, 2020 population estimates were not yet available at the time of data collection and analysis. 2019 population estimate were instead recorded for Florida. 2019 estimates were also used for all Census data.

at the Black population against the minimum wage approval margin, the scatter plot shows that there is a moderate positive association between the Black population and the minimum wage approval margin at the county level. This research is interested in exploring whether racial context measured as the Black population in a county is a significant predictor of the minimum wage approval's margin of victory.




Figure 10: Distribution of County-Level Black Population




Figure 11: Minimum Wage Approval Vote Margin by Black Population

As stated previously, this paper is also interested in exploring whether ethnic context, in particular the impact of the size of the Latino population, impacts support for raising the minimum wage. Like the measure of racial context, I will measure ethnic context as the percent Latino population by county using American Community Survey estimates during the year in which the minimum wage measure took place.<sup>12</sup> The Latino population ranged from 0% to 83.2% with a mean of 7.9% and a median of 3.5%. Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of the percent Latino population by county and as with the distribution of the Black population, the distribution of the Latino population at the county level for the cases in this data set is right skewed. In looking at the distribution of the Latino population against the minimum wage measure margin of victory in the scatter plot presented in figure 13, it is unclear if there is an association between the Latino population and the minimum wage measure’s margin of victory. The analysis that will follow will examine whether ethnic context is a significant predictor of the minimum wage measure approval’s margin of victory.




Figure 12: Distribution of County-Level Latino Population

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<sup>12</sup>The American Community Survey uses the term “Hispanic” rather than Latino. Figures and tables where American Community Survey data was used, the label Hispanic is used. Hispanic and Latino are used interchangeably.




Figure 13: Minimum Wage Approval Vote Margin by Hispanic Population

In addition to the impact of racial and ethnic context, this paper will also analyze the relationship between partisanship and support for raising the minimum wage. To measure partisanship at the county level, I use Democratic margin of victory in the most recent presidential election held before or concurrent with the minimum wage ballot measure using election return data from Politico.<sup>13</sup> The greater the margin of victory for the Democratic candidate in a county, the more Democratic the county. Figure 14 illustrates the distribution of the Democratic margin of victory in presidential elections which ranges from -80.4 to 87.4 and has a mean of -28.6 and a median of -32.9. The scatterplot in figure 15 plots the Democratic presidential margin of victory against the minimum wage approval margin of victory and indicates that there is a positive correlation between the two. That is, the higher the Democratic margin of victory, the higher the minimum wage approval margin of victory, suggesting that the more Democratic a county, the higher its support for raising the state minimum wage.

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<sup>13</sup>The 2012 presidential election is used for minimum wage ballot measures that were held in 2013 and 2014; the 2016 presidential election is used for measures held in 2016 and 2018; and the 2020 presidential election is used for races held in 2020.




Figure 14: Distribution of Democratic Presidential Vote Margin




Figure 15: Support for Increasing Minimum Wage Among by County Party ID

Other factors in addition to racial and ethnic context and partisanship may also shape how counties vote on minimum wage measures seeking to raise the state minimum wage in particular other demographic and socio-economic characteristics. To control for the effects of demographic and economic factors, I will use different demographic and economic county-level indicators included in the American Community Survey for the year in which

the minimum wage measures took place. With respect to demographic characteristics, I will include controls for age and gender because the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), in summarizing the characteristics of minimum wage workers, have noted that they tend to be young and are more likely to be women (Krogstad 2014). Socioeconomic factors may also play a role in whether populations support raising the minimum wage. The BLS estimates that those with bachelor's degrees are least likely to earn the minimum wage or less, thus I will also control for education by measuring the percent of the population 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or higher. Finally, because research suggests that minimum wage increases can lead to increased wages and reduction in poverty, I will also control for county income and poverty by including measures of a county's median income and poverty rate (Cooper, Mokhiber and Zipper 2021).<sup>14</sup>

The nature of the data and the measurement of the dependent and independent variables call for ordinary least squares regression. For this research, I estimate two OLS models to analyze whether there is a correlation between the margin of victory of measures raising the state minimum wage and racial and ethnic context. In the first model, I include a measure of racial and ethnic context that adds the percent of the county population that is Black and the percent of the population that is Hispanic. The second model includes two separate measures for the percent of the population that is Black and the percent of the population that is Hispanic. No counties were dropped or are missing data and both models include 748 cases in the analysis.

## 2.4 Results

Table 6 presents the OLS estimates for both models.<sup>15</sup> The dependent variable in both models is the minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory. As mentioned above, I use two measures of racial/ethnic context, where model 1 includes a measure the adds the percent Black population and the percent Hispanic population in a county and model

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<sup>14</sup>See appendix for details on variable measurements and summary statistics.

<sup>15</sup>See appendix for full model results.

2 includes separate measures for the percent Black and percent Hispanic population in a county. Beginning with model 1, table 6 shows that when combining the percent Black and Hispanic population, racial and ethnic context is not significantly associated with the minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory. However, when separating the percent Black and percent Hispanic population in model 2 in two different variables, both the percent Black and the percent Hispanic are significantly associated with the minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory. In both models, county-level partisanship was significantly associated with the minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory. For the rest of this analysis, I will focus on the results from model 2.

Table 6: Minimum Wage Approval Margin Output

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Total Population	0.003 (.002)	0.005 (.002)
Black Population	-	0.23 (.06)
Hispanic Population	-	-0.15 (.06)
Black and Hispanic Population	0.05 (.04)	-
Partisanship	0.41 (.03)	0.4 (.03)
Constant	12.92 (103.06)	-9.9 (101.55)
N	748	748
$R^2$	.51	.52

**Notes:** Dependent variable is county level minimum wage initiatives approval margin. Models estimated with OLS. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Source:** American Community Survey.



Focusing on model 2, which measures the percent Black and the percent Hispanic in two separate variables, the model estimates indicate that the percent Black population, percent Hispanic population, and county partisanship are all significantly associated with the minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory. Higher Black populations in a county are positively correlated with higher minimum wage increase measures' margins of victory. Model estimates suggest that, holding all other variables constant, for every unit increase in the Black population, there is a predicted 0.23 increase in the minimum wage increase measure's margin of victory. More substantively, figure 16 plots the predicted margin of victory with 95% confidence intervals by the percent Black population and with all other variables held at their means and shows that as the share of the Black population in a county increases, the minimum wage increase measure's margin of victory also increases. For example, a county that is 0% Black is predicted to have a minimum wage increase margin of victory of 9.9, increases to 12.2 when the population is 10% Black, and increases to 14.4 when the population is 20% Black. However, it should be noted that the confidence intervals widen the higher the Black population. Overall, these results support  $H_1$  and suggest that, in line with contact theory, racial diversity increases intergroup trust.




Figure 16: Predicted Minimum Wage Approval Margin by Black Population (Model 2)

Turning to the impact of ethnic context, measured as the percent of the county population that is Hispanic, on the minimum wage approval vote margin, model estimates in table 6 suggest that the size of the Hispanic population in a county is significantly correlated with support for raising the minimum wage. Contrary to my findings on the relationship between the size of the Black population and the minimum wage approval margin, I find that the percent Hispanic population in a county is negatively correlated with the minimum wage approval vote margin meaning that the higher the Hispanic population is in a county, the lower the minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory. Holding all other variables constant, model estimates show that for every unit increase in the percent Hispanic population, there is a predicted 0.15 decrease in the minimum wage approval margin of victory. To illustrate these findings, I calculate the predicted margin of victory by the percent Hispanic population seen in figure 17 with 95% confidence intervals. This figure shows that when the Hispanic population in a county is 0%, the predicted minimum wage increase measure's margin of victory is 12.5, decreases to 11.0 when the Hispanic population is 10%, and decreases again to 9.5 when the population is 20% Hispanic. However, similar to my findings on the Black population, the confidence intervals widen as the Hispanic population increase thus decreasing confidence in the predicted margin of victory by Hispanic population. Whereas my finding on the relationship between the size Black population and the minimum wage approval margin supported  $H_1$  and contact theory, my findings on the relationship between the size of the Hispanic population and the supports  $H_2$  and conflict theory.




Figure 17: Predicted Minimum Wage Approval Margin by Hispanic Population (Model 2)

Finally, in this research I also analyze the relationship between county-level partisanship and the minimum wage approval margin. Referring back to table 6, model estimates show that partisanship, measured as the Democratic presidential margin of victory by county, is significantly associated with the minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory. As hypothesized ( $H_3$ ), I find that as the presidential Democratic margin of victory increases, the minimum wage increase approval margin increases. Specifically, for every unit increase in the Democratic presidential margin of victory, there is a predicted 0.4 increase in the minimum wage increase measure's margin of victory. Predicted minimum wage approval margins by Democratic presidential margin of victory with all other variables held at their means are presented in figure 18 and illustrates the predicted increase in the minimum wage increase approval margin of victory as a county's Democratic presidential margin of victory increases. For example, when the Democratic presidential margin of victory is -40, the predicted minimum wage approval margin of victory is 6.8, increases to 14.7 when the Democratic presidential margin of victory is -20, and increases further to 30.7 when the Democratic presidential margin of victory is 20. To summarize, these results suggest that county level partisanship plays a role in determining the extent to which voters in a

county support state-level minimum wage increases. Furthermore, while both the size of the Black and Hispanic populations were significantly correlated with support for raising the minimum wage, county-level partisanship had the biggest effect size on minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory.




Figure 18: Predicted Minimum Wage Approval Margin by County Party ID (Model 2)

## 2.5 Conclusion

In this paper I analyzed whether racial and ethnic context play a role in shaping preferences on state-level minimum wage increases by testing competing intergroup conflict and intergroup contact hypotheses. Overall, I found partial support for both the conflict and contact hypotheses and these results raise various questions about how racial and ethnic context influence support for state-level minimum wage increases as well as offering new avenues for research. First, in model 1, I found that the total percent of a county that is Black or Latino was not associated with the minimum wage measures' margin of victory. On the other hand, in model 2 I found that both the percent Black and the percent Latino populations in a county were significantly correlated with the minimum wage measures' margin of victory though in opposite directions. These results raise the question of why the total

Black and Latino county population was not associated with the measures' margin of victory while separating the percent Black and Latino populations into two separate measures was significantly correlated with the margin of victory. It is possible that these results are dependent on measurement construction or that the size of the Black and the size of the Latino populations are driving different responses among white people. Delving further into this question will help us better understand how, why, and whether racial and ethnic context influence preferences on state-level minimum wage increases.

This research can also be improved and expanded upon by including other variables that might also influence county-level support for minimum wage increases. An important factor that is missing, but for which no data was available at the county level is who exactly is voting for and against minimum wage increases. At the county-level, no data was available detailing support and opposition for minimum wage increases by race and ethnicity. Data detailing voter turnout by county by race and ethnicity was also not available. Knowing this type of voter information will allow for a better understanding of the interplay between racial and ethnic context and support for increasing state minimum wages. Additionally, another piece of data not available, but which can also help lead to a better understanding of support for raising the minimum wage and to what extent racial and ethnic context play a role is how many people in a county are minimum wage earners. Including such data into this analysis would provide a clearer picture of the role that racial and ethnic context play in shaping minimum wage preferences. Overall, this first step in trying to understand the role of racial and ethnic context in minimum wage preferences found support for both conflict and contact theory, but there are numerous ways this research can be improved and expanded that will provide a clearer understanding of the relationship between race, ethnicity, local context, and support for raising the minimum wage.

## 2.6 Appendix B

### 2.6.1 Variable Measurement

***Minimum Wage Approval Margin:*** Continuous variable measuring the minimum wage increase measure margin of victory.

***Age:*** Continuous variable measuring the median age of the county.

***Sex Ratio:*** Continuous variable measuring the number of males per 100 females in a county.

***Education:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the population 25 and older who have a bachelor's degree or higher in a county

***Poverty:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the population for whom poverty status is determined living below the poverty level in a county.

***Median Income:*** Continuous variable measuring the median income in the past 12 months in a county adjusted to 2020 dollars.

***Unemployment:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the labor force (employed + unemployed) that is unemployed in a county.

***Occupation: Service:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the civilian employed population 16 years and older working in service occupations including healthcare support, protective service occupations, food preparation and serving related occupations, building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations, and personal care and service occupations.

***Occupation: Management:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the civilian employed population 16 years and older working in management, business, science, and arts occupations including management, business, and financial occupations, computer, engineering, and science occupations, education, legal, community service, arts, and media occupations, and healthcare practitioners and technical occupations.

***Occupation: Sales:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the civilian employed population 16 years and older working in sales and office occupations including sales and related occupations and office and administrative support occupations.

***Occupation: Production:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the civilian employed population 16 years and older working in production, transportation, and material moving occupations.

***Occupation: Natural Resources:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the civil-

ian employed population 16 years and older working in natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations including farming, fishing, and forestry occupations, construction and extraction occupations, and installation, maintenance, and repair occupations.

***Total Population:*** Continuous variable measuring the total population in a county.

***Black Population:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the population in a county identifying as non-Hispanic Black.

***Hispanic Population:*** Continuous variable measuring the percent of the population in a county identifying as being of Hispanic/Latino origin.

***Partisanship:*** Continuous variable measuring the Democratic margin of victory in a presidential election by county.

## 2.6.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table 7: County Level Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Minimum Wage Approval Margin	748	11.3	20.2	-52.9	81.5
Age	748	41.9	5.6	23.5	67.4
Sex Ratio	748	100.9	11.1	82.5	191.5
Education	748	28.1	9.4	6.4	60.6
Poverty	748	15.9	6.3	3.3	52.6
Median Income (Thousands)	748	51.1	12.8	27.9	122.9
Unemployment	748	6.5	3.5	0	29.6
Occupation: Service	748	18.2	3.4	7.4	32
Occupation: Management	748	31.9	6.4	15.8	55.5
Occupation: Sales	748	21.4	3.3	5.9	55.5
Occupation: Production	748	15.5	5.6	2.2	31.5
Occupation: Natural Resources	748	12.8	4.1	4.3	32.4
Total Population (Thousands)	748	106.3	332.8	0.4	5246.5
Black Population (Percent)	748	6.5	11.2	0	62.6
Hispanic Population (Percent)	748	7.9	10.6	0	83.2
Black + Hispanic Population (Percent)	748	14.3	15.3	0	84.7
Partisanship (Democratic Vote Margin)	748	-28.6	28.0	-80.4	87.4

## 2.6.3 Full Model Output

Table 8: Minimum Wage Approval Margin Model Estimates

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
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Age	0.28 (.11)	0.18 (.11)
Sex Ratio	-0.24 (.05)	-0.25 (.05)
Education	0.22 (.12)	0.25 (.11)
Poverty	0.6 (.17)	0.51 (.17)
Median Income	-0.26 (.08)	-0.22 (.09)
Unemployment	-0.45 (.22)	-0.41 (.07)
Occupation: Service	-0.15 (1.04)	0.16 (1.03)
Occupation: Management	0.12 (1.04)	0.29 (1.02)
Occupation: Sales	0.25 (1.04)	0.52 (1.02)
Occupation: Production	1.35 (1.03)	1.15 (1.01)
Occupation: Natural Resources	-0.28 (1.05)	0.24 (1.04)
Total Population	0.003 (.002)	0.005 (.002)
Black Population	-	0.23 (.06)
Hispanic Population	-	-0.15 (.06)
Black and Hispanic Population	0.05 (.04)	-

Partisanship	0.41 (.03)	0.4 (.03)
Constant	12.92 (103.06)	-9.9 (101.55)
<hr/>		
N	748	748
$R^2$	.51	.52
<hr/>		

**Notes:** Dependent variable is county level minimum wage initiatives approval margin. Models estimated with OLS. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Source:** American Community Survey.

#### 2.6.4 Robustness Check: Florida Omitted

For this analysis, I collected Census county-level data corresponding to the year in which a minimum wage measure took place. For example, 2013 county estimates were collected for New Jersey’s 2013 minimum wage measure. However, because Florida’s most recent minimum wage measure took place in 2020, 2020 Census county-level estimates were not yet available, and 2019 estimates were used instead. Because of potential year-to-year fluctuations, I decided to exclude Florida to ensure that the results found in this research hold. Table 9 presents the full model estimates, where model 1 adds the total percent Black and Hispanic populations and model two includes separate measures for the percent Black and percent Hispanic population in a county. In omitting Florida’s 2020 minimum wage measure, I find the same relationship between the county percent Black population, percent Black population, and county-level partisanship and the minimum wage increase measures’ margin of victory. To further confirm that my results hold while omitting Florida’s 2020 minimum wage measure, I also calculate predicted minimum wage increase margins of victory by county Black population, Hispanic population, and Democratic presidential margin of victory. Figure 19 depicts the predicted minimum wage increase measures’ margin of victory by the county percent Black population and shows the same relationship found in this paper’s analysis; the greater the Black population, the greater the margin of victory.

Similarly, figure 20 show the same relationship between the percent Hispanic population and the minimum wage increase margin of victory, with the margin of victory decreasing as the Hispanic population increases. Finally, figure 21 also finds the same relationship with respect to partisanship. Here, the figure shows that the greater the Democratic presidential margin of victory, the greater the minimum wage increase measures' margin of victory. My results from the analysis conducted in this paper hold when Florida is omitted.

Table 9: Minimum Wage Approval Margin Output: Florida 2020 Omitted

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	0.27 (.13)	0.13 (.12)
Sex Ratio	-0.17 (.06)	-0.16 (.06)
Education	0.15 (.12)	0.18 (.12)
Poverty	0.71 (.18)	0.58 (.18)
Median Income	-0.22 (.09)	-0.17 (.09)
Unemployment	-0.58 (.24)	-0.52 (.23)
Occupation: Service	-0.04 (1.06)	0.50 (1.03)
Occupation: Management	0.22 (1.05)	0.49 (1.02)
Occupation: Sales	0.43 (1.05)	0.82 (1.02)
Occupation: Production	1.38 (1.04)	1.6 (1.01)

Occupation: Natural Resources	-0.17 (1.07)	0.54 (1.04)
Total Population	0.003 (.002)	0.004 (.002)
Black Population	-	0.34 (.06)
Hispanic Population	-	-0.18 (.12)
Black and Hispanic Population	0.1 (.05)	-
Partisanship	0.38 (.03)	0.37 (.03)
Constant	-8.35 (104.7)	-43.5 (101.79)
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N	681	681
$R^2$	.48	.51

**Notes:** Dependent variable is county level minimum wage initiatives approval margin. Models estimated with OLS. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Source:** American Community Survey.




Figure 19: Predicted Minimum Wage Approval Margin by Black Population (Model 2)




Figure 20: Predicted Minimum Wage Approval Margin by Hispanic Population (Model 2)




Figure 21: Predicted Minimum Wage Approval Margin by County Party ID (Model 2)

### 3 Race, Ethnicity, Inequality, and the Minimum Wage: Perceptions of How Minimum Wage Increases Reduce Economic Inequality

#### Abstract

Attitudes on minimum wage increases range beyond whether or not individuals and groups support or oppose increases and discussions on the minimum wage extend beyond the technical impacts of such increases. Scholars have argued that issues of the minimum wage should be conceptualized and discussed in terms of justice and fairness and that outcomes of minimum wage policies should also be considered in terms of whether they advance ideas of justice and equality. Because the minimum wage has been found to have reduced wage and income gaps along racial lines, in this paper, I consider minimum wage increases in terms of their potential impact on income inequality, an impact that would advance ideals of justice and equality. I ask if racial and ethnic attitudes impact how white people perceive minimum wage issues in terms of economic equality. Using data from Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel, I analyze whether racial and ethnic attitudes impact beliefs about the impact of minimum wage increases on income inequality and find some evidence that racial and ethnic attitudes impact beliefs about minimum wage increases and income inequality. This analysis also finds some evidence that partisanship and ideology also play a role in shaping beliefs about the minimum wage's impact on income inequality.

#### 3.1 Introduction

Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation have focused on how race and ethnicity play a role in impacting support for raising the minimum wage both at the federal and at the state levels.

However, there is more to the issue of the minimum wage beyond whether or not individuals and groups support or do not support increases. Other aspects of the minimum wage may also be influenced by racial and ethnic attitudes. For this research, I am interested in how individuals view the potential impact of minimum wage increases, in particular in terms of who benefits from minimum wage increases, how such potential benefits are perceived, and whether racial and ethnic attitudes play a role in shaping those perceptions.

Scholars have argued that economic issues, including the minimum wage, should be considered in terms of what their impacts are and if such impacts promote ideas of justice. Green (2014) argues that “minimum wages are ultimately about notions of fairness in wage setting” and that they should be thought of as “attempts to ban what are viewed as unfairly low wages” (311). Rather than merely an economic issue, as a policy issue, the minimum wage should be considered in terms of how they interact with theories of justice and with movements in inequality (311). Furthermore, Levin-Waldman (2000) also considers minimum wage issues in terms of justice, arguing that the minimum wage allows us to consider how it can be used as a tool for achieving social goals. Similarly, in exploring the legal viability of local minimum wage increases in the face of federal inactions, Dalmat (2005) views the issue of raising the minimum wage as one of economic justice and argues that local increases offer a way to fight rising economic inequality that has been observed in the United States at a more local level. Moreover, Rogers (2014) also considers the issue of the minimum wage in terms of justice and argues that minimum wage laws advance social equality. Overall, the work of these scholars suggest that minimum wage outcomes cannot and should not only be considered in terms of their very technical impacts, but rather that outcomes should also be considered in terms of whether they advance notions of justice and fairness.

One outcome of interest that looks beyond the very technical aspects of minimum wage laws and their impacts is the question of whether minimum wage laws reduce income inequality, in particular income inequality along racial and ethnic lines. Income inequality in the United States has been increasing and while the cause of such increase is a results of

multiple factors, one factor that has been found to have contributed to that increase is the declining real value of the federal minimum wage given that it has not kept up with inflation and costs of living and given that it has in recent years remained stagnant (Dalmat 2005; Derenoncourt, Noelke and Weil 2021). However, recent research has found that the 1966 Fair Labor Standards Act which “extended federal minimum wage coverage to agriculture, restaurants, nursing homes, and other services that were previously uncovered and where nearly a third of black workers were employed,” increased the wages of Black workers and resulted in a decrease in the racial earnings and income gap (168). The idea that increasing and expanding the minimum wage can lead to a decrease in income inequality and in particular to a reduction in income inequality along racial and ethnic lines raises the question of how the potential that the minimum wage can reduce income inequality is viewed and whether racial and ethnic attitudes play a role in shaping those views.

In this paper, I seek to understand whether and how racial and ethnic attitudes impact attitudes on the minimum wage in terms of its potential to reduce economic inequality. Using insights from literature on the impact of racial and ethnic attitudes on different welfare policy issues, I argue that white people’s perception of the minimum wage is indeed influenced by their attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities, specifically attitudes toward Latinos and Black people. I expect that white people who hold more racially conservative views toward Black and Latino populations are less likely to believe that minimum wage increases can lead to reductions in income inequality. Those with more racially conservative views towards Black and Latino populations are less likely to believe that minimum wage increases can reduce income inequality because they are less likely to view minimum wage issues in terms of justice and as potential tools for advancing social goals such as a reduction in inequality. As an issue that is associated with poverty and with Black and Latino workers, minimum wage increases will not be associated with potential reductions in income inequality along racial and ethnic lines, but rather will be viewed as groups receiving undeserved benefits. Additionally, in this paper I also analyze whether partisanship and ideology impact how



white people perceive whether minimum wage increases can result in a reduction in economic inequality.

To analyze the relationship between racial and ethnic attitudes and views on the minimum wage in terms of its potential to reduce income inequality, I use data from Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel which asked respondents whether they thought that potential increases in the federal minimum wage would lead to reductions in income inequality. My analysis finds partial support for my hypothesis that those holding more negative attitudes toward Black and Latino populations are less likely to believe minimum wage increases can lead to reductions in income inequality. I also find partial support for the impact of partisanship and ideology.

## 3.2 Theory

Scholars have analyzed the relationship between racial and ethnic attitudes and white preferences on various welfare policy issues and I have argued in chapter 1 of this work that white people's minimum wage preferences are also impacted by racial and ethnic attitudes (Gilens 1995, 1996*b*, 1999; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Fox 2004; Callaghan and Olson 2017). But why should we expect that racial and ethnic attitudes will also play a role in whether white people view minimum wage increases as having an impact on income inequality? I argue that one way racial and ethnic attitudes among white people shape whether they believe minimum wage increases can potentially reduce income inequality is through the association between poverty, the minimum wage, and racial and ethnic minorities, specifically Latinos and Black people. Drawing on Alesina and Glaeser (2004), I argue that white people associate poverty with the minimum wage and poverty with Latinos and Black people, then making the association between the minimum wage and Latinos and Black people. White people will perceive minimum wage issues as primarily affecting Latinos and Black people. This association happens because Black and Latino populations tend to be overrepresented amongst America's poor even if in reality, white people make up the majority of minimum

wage earners.

When considering if the minimum wage might reduce income inequality, white people will think of Latino and Black minimum wage earners. Assuming that ideas of reducing income inequality are thought of as ideas advancing social justice goals such as equality, I argue that those with more racially conservative views towards Latinos and Black people will not associate minimum wage increases with ideas of justice and equality. Because of negative stereotypes about Latino and Black populations, specifically believing that Latinos and Black people are lazy, unwilling to engage in hard work, and that they are part of the undeserving poor, when thinking about minimum wage issues these negative conceptions about Latinos and Black people will be recalled due to the association between Latinos and Black people and the minimum wage. Thus, when considering whether minimum wage increases might reduce income inequality, an action that might advance justice in terms of equality, those holding negative views of Latino and Black populations will not consider minimum wage increases as advancing justice. Any increase in the minimum wage is undeserved and thus does not advance justice and does not reduce income inequality. Following from this argument, I hypothesize the following:

*H*<sub>1</sub>: Those holding negative views of Latinos are less likely to believe that minimum wage increases reduce income inequality.

*H*<sub>2</sub>: Those holding negative views of Black people are less likely to believe that minimum wage increases reduce income inequality.

It is also possible that partisanship and ideology rather than racial and ethnic aptitudes shape how white people view minimum wage increases in terms of potential reductions in income inequality. As has been discussed in chapters 1 and 2, compared to the Republican Party, the Democratic Party has expressed much more support for raising the federal minimum wage and additionally, previous research has found that support for minimum wage increases is predicted by partisanship (Johnson 2002; Waltman and Pittman 2002). As such I hypothesize the following:

$H_3$ : Compared to Republicans, Democrats are more likely to believe that minimum wage increases would result in income inequality reductions.

Furthermore, ideology may play a role in shaping views about social and economic inequality (Major and Kaiser 2017; Azevedo, Jost, Rothmund and Sterling 2019; Charles 2008). In American political discourse and culture, liberalism is associated with ideals of social justice and with an openness for using government action to achieve such goals. On the other hand, conservatism is associated with a preference for a laissez-faire approach and with an opposition to welfare. Thus, I hypothesize as follows:

$H_4$ : Those identifying as liberal are more likely to believe that minimum wage increases would result in income inequality reductions.

### 3.3 Data and Methods

This paper analyzes the relationship between race and ethnicity and perceptions of how the minimum wage impacts income inequality using survey data from Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel . Specifically, I use Wave 54 of the American Trends Panel conducted between September 16 and September 29, 2019 by Ipsos Public Affairs because this survey panel asked respondents their opinion on whether raising the minimum wage would reduce economic inequality. A total of 6,878 were collected, however, because I am analyzing white people’s attitudes toward the minimum wage and whether such views are shaped by their attitudes toward Black and Latino people, I am restricting my sample to white respondents only. Moreover, because the Wave 54 survey is split into two questionnaires (Form 1 and Form 2), only part of the full sample was asked their views on economic inequality and the minimum wage, thus my sample will be further restricted to those who received the question (Form 1). I expect that using data from September 2019 will yield meaningful information about attitudes toward the minimum wage because the 2020 presidential election as well under way and the prospect of raising the federal minimum wage was widely discussed by candidates (Pramuk 2019; Rosenberg 2020). The issue of raising the minimum wage will have

been salient and expressing some meaningful opinion about the issue (Simonovits, Guess and Nagler 2019).

In this paper, the outcome I am analyzing is white people's perceptions of the minimum wage as it relates to issues of economic inequality and serves as my dependent variable. To measure attitudes toward the minimum wage in relation to their impact on economic inequality, I use the following question included in the Wave 54 American Trends Panel: "Regardless of whether or not you support each of the following policies, how much, if at all, do you think each of the following proposals would do to reduce economic inequality in the U.S.? Increasing the federal minimum wage." Responses were coded as follows: (1)= "a great deal"; (2)= "a fair amount"; (3)= "not too much"; and (4)= "nothing at all," with (1) being the most liberal attitude on the impact of raising the federal minimum wage on economic inequality and (4) being the most conservative attitude. Response percentages among white respondents are presented in figure 22 and this figure shows that 38% of respondents answered that raising the federal minimum wage would reduce economic inequality a great deal, 28.7% answered that economic inequality would be reduced a fair amount, 20% answered that raising the federal minimum wage would not reduce economic inequality too much, and 13.1% answered that raising the federal minimum wage would not reduce economic inequality at all. All together, most white respondents indicated that they believe that raising the federal minimum wage would either reduce economic inequality a great deal or a fair amount.

While the question outlined above directly asks about the potential impact of raising the federal minimum wage on economic inequality and while I expect respondents to provide meaningful information on this question, there are still some validity concerns associated with this question. First, while the survey question asks respondents to consider how raising the minimum wage might impact economic inequality regardless of whether or not they support raising the minimum wage, it is possible that respondents' views on the impact of raising the minimum wage on economic inequality are shaped by whether or not they already support raising the minimum wage. Thus, individuals may not be expressing their

true opinion on how raising the minimum wage might impact economic inequality. Second, although I expect that because presidential candidates were already discussing the issue of minimum wage in the run-up to the 2020 election, it is possible that even if the issue of the minimum wage was salient for people, they nevertheless were not thinking of the issue in terms of its potential impact on economic inequality. As such, it is possible that with regard to the issue of the minimum wage in terms of economic inequality, the issue is not as salient as just whether or not individuals support raising the minimum wage at the federal level.




Figure 22: Opinion on the Impact of Raising the Minimum Wage on Reducing Economic Inequality Among White Respondents

For this research, I hypothesize that white people’s opinion of how raising the minimum wage might impact economic inequality is influenced by their views on Latinos and Black people due to a perception that these two groups primarily are minimum wage earners. To measure white people’s attitudes toward Latinos, I use the following survey question included in Wave 54 of the American Trends Panel: “How much of a priority should each of the following be for the federal government to address? Reducing illegal immigration.”<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup>The Wave 54 American Trends Survey also included the following questions on immigration:(1) “How much, if at all, do you think each of the following contributes to economic inequality in the country? The growing number of illegal immigrants working in the U.S.”; (2) “Regardless of whether or not you support each of the following policies, how much, if at all, do you think each of the following proposals would do to reduce

Responses were coded (1) if they answered that reducing illegal immigration should be a top priority,(2) if they answered that it should be an important, but lower priority, (3) if they answered that it should not be too important a priority, and (4) if they responded that reducing illegal immigration should not be done.<sup>17</sup> Here, responses are coded in a conservative to liberal direction, with (1) reducing illegal immigration being a top priority being the most conservative position on immigration and (4) indicating that reducing illegal immigration should not be done being the most liberal position on immigration. Although this question does not directly ask respondents their views on Latinos, as mentioned in chapter 1 of this research, existing literature suggests that Latinos have become racialized as non-white and that Latinos as a group are linked with immigration (Massey 2014; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013; Zepeda-Millán 2017; Almeida, Biello, Pedraza, Wintner and Viruell-Fuentes 2016*b*; Maldonado 2009).

Because of this process of racialization and the link with immigration, I use immigration attitudes as a measure for attitudes toward Latinos. Figure 23(a) presents the percentage of responses among white respondents for the question on the extent to which the federal government should prioritize reducing illegal immigration. The figure shows that among white respondents, 41% indicated that reducing illegal immigration should be a top priority, 31.8% indicated that reducing illegal immigration is an important, but lower priority, 23.2% indicated that reducing illegal immigration is not too important a priority, and 3.4% indicated that reducing illegal immigration should not be done. Overall, the majority of white respondents indicated that the reducing illegal immigration should be either a top priority or an important, but lower priority.

Turning to my measurement of white people's attitudes toward Black people, Wave 54 of the American Trends Panel did not include a question that directly asked respondents their

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economic inequality in the U.S.? Reducing illegal immigration.”; and “Do you think the country's current economic conditions are helping or hurting the following groups? People who are Hispanic?”. However, these questions were only asked to respondents who received form 2 of the survey while the minimum wage and inequality question was only asked to respondents receiving form 1 of the survey. As such, these questions were not used in this analysis.

<sup>17</sup>Survey question and response wording is available in the appendix.

attitudes toward Black people. However, the following question was included in the survey and serves as my measure of attitudes toward Black people: “How much, if at all, do you think each of the following contributes to economic inequality in this country? Discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities.”<sup>18</sup> Responses were coded (1) if they responded that discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities contributes a great deal to economic inequality, (2) if they responded that it contributes a fair amount, (3) if they responded that it does not contribute to economic inequality too much, and (4) if they answered that it does not contribute to economic inequality at all.<sup>19</sup> In this coding scheme, (1) indicating that discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities contributes a great deal to economic inequality is the most racially liberal position and (4) indicating that discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities does not contribute to economic inequality at all is the most racially conservative position.

Though this question does not ask about Black people specifically, I expect that individuals will think of Black people when they think of racial minorities given historical racial relations between white and Black people in the U.S. It should be noted that because respondents are also asked about ethnic minorities, they may also think about Latinos, the largest ethnic group in the U.S.; however, there is widespread public confusion about what race and ethnicity are and are often conflated (Markus 2008). Figure 23(b) presents the percentage of responses for this survey question and shows that 25.7% of respondents indicated that discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities contributes a great deal to economic inequality, 31.6% indicated that it contributes a fair amount, 27.5% responded that it does not contribute too much, and 15.2% responded that discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities does not contribute to economic inequality. The majority of white respondents responded either that discrimination contributes a great deal or a fair amount to economic

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<sup>18</sup>The survey did include the following question: “Do you think the country’s economic conditions are helping or hurting the following groups? People who are black.” This question asks directly about people’s opinion on whether the economy is hurting or helping Black people specifically. However, only participants who received form 2 were asked this question and the question on the potential impacts of raising the minimum wage on economic inequality were only asked of participants who received form 1.

<sup>19</sup>Question and response wording is available in the appendix.

inequality.




Figure 23: Immigration and Racial Attitudes Among White Respondents

In this research, I also analyze whether party identification and ideology play a role in shaping how white people view the potential impact of raising the federal minimum wage on economic inequality. To summarize, I hypothesized that Democrats are more likely than Republicans and other partisans to believe that raising the minimum wage can play a significant role in reducing economic inequality and that the more liberal an individual is, the more likely they are to believe that raising the minimum wage can contribute to a reduction in economic inequality. Wave 54 of the American Trends Panel includes both a question on individuals' party identification and a question on their ideological identification. Figure 24(a) presents the percent of white respondents identifying as Republican, Democrat, independents, or something else. The figure shows that among white respondents 32.3% identified as Republican, 31% identified as Democrats, 28.1% identified as independents, and 8.6% identified as something else. Figure 24(b) shows the percentage of the responses for individuals' ideological identification among white respondents. This figure shows that few individuals identify as either very conservative or very liberal, with 9% identifying as very conservative, 26.6% as conservative, 33.9% as moderate, 20.2% as liberal, and 10.4% as



very liberal.




Figure 24: Party Identification and Ideology Among White Respondents

Other factors may also influence white people’s views on how raising the minimum wage potentially impacts economic inequality, so in this analysis, I also include various control variables.<sup>20</sup> To begin, I include controls for age, gender, education, and income because existing research has found that these factors influence attitudes toward increasing the minimum wage or to income inequality (Jeong and Lee 2021). Because individual’s material economic conditions and their perception of the economy because of their current economic situation may also play a role both in how they view the minimum wage and income inequality, I also include measures of individual’s current financial situation, the impact of wages on their current financial situation, how often they worry about paying bills, their perception of the economic conditions of the nation, whether the economy helps or hurts the wealthy, and whether the economy helps or hurts the poor. Because unions in general support minimum wage increases, I also include a variable that measures how much influence people think unions have in today’s economy. How people view economic inequality in the U.S. may also influence how they view the potential impact of raising the minimum wage on economic inequality, so I also include measures for individuals’ opinion on how much of

<sup>20</sup>See appendix for survey question wording and coding.

a priority reducing economic inequality should be for the federal government and how much economic inequality currently exists in the country.


Although the dependent variable in this research is ordinal, because proportional odds assumptions are violated, I estimate multinomial regression models to analyze the relationship between white people's racial and ethnic attitudes and their views on whether raising the federal minimum wage might reduce economic inequality. I estimate three multinomial logit regression models, each where the dependent variable is white people's view on the extent to which raising the federal minimum wage might decrease income inequality: (1) A great deal; (2) A fair amount; (3) Not too much; (4) nothing at all. Model 1 includes the measure of immigration attitudes and not the measure of how much discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities contributes to economic inequality, model 2 includes the measure of how much discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities contributes to economic inequality but not the measure of immigration attitudes, and model 3 (full model) includes both. All models use sampling weights. As in chapter 1, estimating three models allows me to assess whether attitudes toward Latinos and attitudes toward Black people each independently influence white people's attitudes toward the minimum wage in terms of its relationship to economic inequality and whether both play a role when both attitudes toward Latinos and Black people are considered in the same model.

### **3.4 Findings**


In all three models, I find similar relationships between white people's ethnic and racial attitudes and their views on the extent to which increasing the federal minimum wage might decrease economic inequality. As such, for this analysis, I will focus on model 3 (full model) results. Full model estimates as well as relative risk ratios for immigration, racial attitudes, party identification, and ideology are available in the appendix, however, to facilitate interpretation, I generate predicted probabilities for each of the four outcomes, where outcome (1) is the base outcome. As previously outlined, the dependent variable is the extent to which

white respondents believe that raising the minimum wage might reduce economic inequality, with the response options being: (1) A great deal; (2) A fair amount; (3) Not too much; and (4) Nothing at all. Overall, across the four categories, I do not find a consistent relationship between immigration attitudes, racial attitudes, party identification, ideology, and attitudes on the minimum wage with respect to its relationship with economic inequality.


Beginning with the impact of immigration attitudes and minimum wage attitudes, I find that immigration attitudes only have a significant effect on minimum wage attitudes for outcome (4), raising the minimum wage reduces economic inequality nothing at all. Figure 25 illustrates the predicted probabilities of opinions on the impact of raising the federal minimum wage by immigration attitudes, holding all other variables at their means. As discussed, outcome (1) is the base outcome, and I find that immigration attitudes are not significantly correlated with outcomes (2) or (3), but I do find significant correlations with outcome (4). In figure 25(b), we can see that the probability of answering that minimum wage would not reduce economic inequality at all is highest when answering that reducing illegal immigration should be considered a top priority by the federal government at 0.08%, drops to 0.04% when answering that reducing illegal immigration should be an important, but lower priority, slightly increases to 0.05% when answering that reducing illegal immigration should be not too important a priority, and is virtually 0% when answering that reducing illegal immigration should not be done by the federal government. Overall, the probability of indicating that raising the federal minimum wage would not reduce economic inequality at all is very low but is lower when individuals hold more liberal views on immigration compared to when individuals hold the most conservative position on immigration. These results offer partial support for  $H_1$  given that more conservative positions on immigration were associated with a higher probability of holding more conservative views on the impact of raising the minimum wage on reducing economic inequality.




(a) Outcome 1: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: A Great Deal



(b) Outcome 2: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: A Fair Amount



(c) Outcome 3: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: Not Too Much




(d) Outcome 4: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: Nothing At All


Figure 25: Predicted Probabilities of Opinion on the Impact of Raising the Minimum Wage on Inequality by Immigration Attitudes (Full Model)

Moving on to analyzing the relationship between racial attitudes and attitudes on the minimum wage, I find that racial attitudes are a significant predictor of outcomes (3) raising the minimum wage reduces economic inequality not too much and (4) raising the minimum wage reduces economic inequality not at all. Once again, the base outcome (1) is indicating that raising the federal minimum wage would reduce economic inequality a great deal. Figure 26 presents the predicted probabilities of answering each of the four outcome categories by racial attitudes. Focusing first on outcome (3) (raising the minimum wage reduces economic inequality not too much), figure 26(c) shows that when answering that discrimination against


racial and ethnic minorities contributes a great deal to inequality, the probability of indicating that increasing the federal minimum wage would reduce economic inequality not too much is 16.8% and increases to 34.1% when answering that discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities does not contribute at all to economic inequality, a 17.3 point increase. Similarly, when looking at outcome (4) (raising the minimum wage reduces inequality nothing at all) in figure 26(d), we see that when answering that discrimination contributes a great deal to economic inequality, the probability of selecting outcome 4 is 3.8% and increases to 8.2% when answering that discrimination contributes not at all to economic inequality, a 4.4 point increase. Outcomes 3 is the second most conservative position and outcome 4 is the most conservative position on this minimum wage question and these results show that the probability of selecting this response increases when selecting the most conservative position on whether discrimination contributes to economic inequality compared to selecting the most liberal position on the issue of discrimination and economic inequality. These results suggest that holding more conservative racial attitudes increase the probability of holding more conservative attitudes on the issue of raising the minimum with respect to its potential impact on economic inequality reduction.




(a) Outcome 1: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: A Great Deal



(b) Outcome 2: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: A Fair Amount



(c) Outcome 3: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: Not Too Much




(d) Outcome 4: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: Nothing At All


Figure 26: Predicted Probabilities of Opinion on the Impact of Raising the Minimum Wage on Inequality by Racial Attitudes (Full Model)

In this paper, I also analyze the relationship between party identification and attitudes on whether the minimum could decrease income inequality and found that party identification is only a statistically significant predictor of outcome (3), raising the minimum wage reduces economic inequality not too much. Figure 27 presents the predicted probabilities of responding to to each of the four categories by partisan identification with all other variables held at their means and figure 27(c) presents the predicted probability of outcome (3) specifically. This figure shows that the predicted probability of responding that raising the minimum wage would reduce income inequality not too much is 20.2% when identifying


as Republican, increases to 22.8% when identifying as Democrat, and increases further to 35.3% when identifying as independents. Outcome 3 is the second most conservative position on this minimum wage issue and based on  $H_3$ , I expected that more conservative positions on the minimum wage would be associated with Republicans, and to a lesser extent with independents. However, these findings show that compared with Republicans, Democrats are actually more likely to select outcome (3), the second most conservative position on this minimum wage issue, compared to those identifying as Republicans. Thus, this result does not support  $H_3$ .




(a) Outcome 1: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: A Great Deal



(b) Outcome 2: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: A Fair Amount



(c) Outcome 3: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: Not Too Much




(d) Outcome 4: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: Nothing At All


Figure 27: Predicted Probabilities of Opinion on the Impact of Raising the Minimum Wage on Inequality by Party Identification (Full Model)

Finally, in this paper I analyze the relationship between partisanship and opinions on whether raising the minimum wage reduces economic inequality and find that ideology is a significant predictor of outcome (3), increasing the minimum wage reduces economic inequality not too much and outcome (4), increasing the minimum wage reduces economic inequality not at all. Figure 28(c) presents the predicted probability of responding that increasing the minimum wage would reduce income inequality not too much with all other variables held at their means and shows that the probability is 34.7% when identifying as very conservative and is 13.4% when identifying as very liberal, a 21.3 point decrease. Similarly, figure 28(d) shows that the probability of responding that raising the minimum wage would reduce income inequality nothing at all when identifying as very conservative is 9.6% and decreases to 1% when identifying as very liberal, an 8.6 point drop. Because outcome (3) is the second most conservative position and outcome (4) is the most conservative position on this minimum wage issue, these results suggest that compared to those who identify with the most conservative ideology, those who identify with the most liberal ideology are less likely to hold the second most conservative view on this minimum wage issue. These results suggest that having a more conservative ideology is associated with having more conservative views on the minimum wage, thus supporting  $H_4$ .







(a) Outcome 1: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: A Great Deal



(b) Outcome 2: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: A Fair Amount



(c) Outcome 3: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: Not Too Much



(d) Outcome 4: Minimum Wage Reduces Inequality: Nothing At All

Figure 28: Predicted Probabilities of Opinion on the Impact of Raising the Minimum Wage on Inequality by Ideology (Full Model)

In summary, the results from this analysis find some support for  $H_1$ ,  $H_2$ , and  $H_4$ , but not for  $H_3$ . However, only weak support was found for each of these hypotheses as each of my primary independent variables of interest were only significant predictors of only some outcome categories of my dependent variable where outcome (1) is the base outcome. Immigration attitudes were only significantly correlated with outcome (4) and find that more conservative positions on immigration are correlated with more conservative attitudes on the minimum wage, supporting  $H_1$ . Racial attitudes were significantly correlated with outcomes (3) and (4) and results suggest that more conservative racial attitudes are correlated with more con-

servative views on the minimum wage, supporting  $H_2$ . Ideology is significantly correlated with minimum wage attitudes for outcomes (3) and (4) and I find that being more conservative is associated with having more conservative views on the minimum wage, supporting  $H_4$ . On the other hand, I did not find support for  $H_3$  given that I found that Democrats were more likely to support the second most conservative compared to Republicans. Overall, this analysis partially supports my hypotheses.

### 3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I analyzed attitudes on the minimum wage with respect to whether they might reduce income inequality and examined whether such views are influenced by racial and ethnic attitudes among white people. I also explored whether partisanship and ideology play a role in shaping whether people believe that increasing the minimum wage would lead to reductions in income inequality. Overall, I found partial and weak support for my hypotheses. However, while these results do not entirely clarify how racial and ethnic attitudes shape opinion on whether minimum wage increases could lead to a reduction in income inequality, this analysis offers various avenues for future research in particular with regard to better measures and data and to testing theory assumptions.

Regarding measurement and data, having better measures of racial and ethnic attitudes as well as better measures of perceptions of whether and how the minimum wage might reduce income inequality. First, having survey questions that directly ask respondents their attitudes toward Black people and Latinos would greatly increase our confidence that our measures of racial and ethnic attitudes are actually capturing what people think and how people perceive specific racial and ethnic groups. Second asking people directly about whether they believe that increases in minimum wages could lead to reductions in income inequality along racial and ethnic lines would make the link between racial and ethnic attitudes much clearer. Having better and more direct measures of our concepts of interests would help expand our understanding of the relationship between racial and ethnic attitudes and attitudes

on the minimum wage in terms of justice, fairness, or equality.

Testing my theoretical assumptions is another way to expand this research and our understanding of the relationship between racial and ethnic attitudes and minimum wage preferences. One path forward is to explore once again whether people associate minimum wages with Black people and with Latinos. A further path forward is to investigate whether people believe Black people and Latinos in particular are deserving of minimum wage increases. Testing these two key assumptions I made in my theory will allow for a much clearer understanding about the mechanisms through which racial and ethnic attitudes impact preferences on minimum wage increases. Despite weak and partial support for my hypothesis, the theoretical arguments made in this chapter and the empirical results from my analysis raise important questions about the relationship between racial and ethnic attitudes and issues of minimum wage as defined in terms of justice, fairness, and equality.

## 3.6 Appendix C

### 3.6.1 Survey Question Wording and Variable Coding

*Attitudes on Whether Raising the Minimum Wage Reduces Economic Inequality:* Regardless of whether or not you support each of the following policies, how much, if at all, do you think each of the following proposals would do to reduce economic inequality in the U.S.? Increasing the federal minimum wage.

- (1) A great deal
- (2) A fair amount
- (3) Not too much
- (4) Nothing at all

*Party Identification:*

- (1) Republican
- (2) Democrat
- (3) Independent
- (4) Something else

*Ideology:*

- (1) Very conservative
- (2) Conservative
- (3) Moderate
- (4) Liberal
- (5) Very liberal

*Age:*

- (1) 18-29
- (2) 30-39
- (3) 50-64
- (4) 65+

*Gender:*

- (1) Male
- (2) Female

*Education:*

- (1) Less than high school
- (2) High school diploma
- (3) Some college, no degree
- (4) Associate's degree
- (5) College graduate/some post graduate education
- (6) Post graduate degree

**Income:** Last year, that is in 2019, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes?

- (1)
- (2) High school diploma
- (3) Some college, no degree
- (4) Associate's degree
- (5) College graduate/some post graduate education
- (6) Post graduate degree

**Education:**

- (1) Less than high school
- (2) High school diploma
- (3) Some college, no degree
- (4) Associate's degree
- (5) College graduate/some post graduate education
- (6) Post graduate degree

**Union Power:** How much power and influence do you think each of the following have in today's economy? Labor unions.

- (1) Too much power and influence
- (2) Not enough power and influence
- (3) About the right amount

**Current Financial Situation:** How would you describe your household's financial situation?

- (1) Live comfortably
- (2) Meet your basic expenses with a little left over for extras
- (3) Just meet your basic expenses
- (4) Don't even have enough to meet basic expenses

**Impact of Wages in Financial Situation:** Not all people face the same financial pressures. Thinking about your own household's financial situation, how much, if at all, does each of the following affect your household's financial situation? Wages and incomes?

- (1) A great deal
- (2) A fair amount
- (3) Not too much
- (4) Not at all

**Worry About Paying Bills:** How often, if ever, do you worry about each of the following? Paying your bills.

- (1) Every day
- (2) Almost every day
- (3) Sometimes
- (4) Rarely
- (5) Never

***Economic Condition of Nation:*** Thinking about the nation's economy, how would you rate economic conditions in this country today?

- (1) Excellent
- (2) Good
- (3) Only fair
- (4) Poor

***Economy Helps/Hurts the Wealthy:*** Do you think the country's economic conditions are helping or hurting the following groups? People who are wealthy.

- (1) Helping a lot
- (2) Helping a little
- (3) Hurting a little
- (4) Hurting a lot
- (5) Neither helping nor hurting

***Economy Helps/Hurts the Poor:*** Do you think the country's economic conditions are helping or hurting the following groups? People who are poor.

- (1) Helping a lot
- (2) Helping a little
- (3) Hurting a little
- (4) Hurting a lot
- (5) Neither helping nor hurting

***Government Priority: Reducing Inequality:*** How much of a priority should each of the following be for the federal government to address? Reducing economic inequality.

- (1) A top priority
- (2) Important, but lower priority
- (3) Not too important
- (4) Should not be done

***Economic Inequality in the Country:*** Thinking about the level of economic inequality in the country these days... Would you say there is...

- (1) Too much economic inequality
- (2) Too little economic inequality
- (3) About the right amount of economic inequality

***Government Priority: Reducing Illegal Immigration:*** How much of a priority should each of the following be for the federal government to address?

- (1) A top priority
- (2) Important, but lower priority
- (3) Not too important
- (4) Should not be done

***Race/Ethnicity Contributes to Inequality:*** How much, if at all, do you think each of

the following contributes to economic inequality in this country? Discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities.

- (1) Contributes a great deal
- (2) Contributes a fair amount
- (3) Contributes not too much
- (4) Contributes not at all

### 3.6.2 Full Model Output

Table 10: Impact of Racial and Immigration Attitudes on Economic Inequality and the Minimum Wage Among White Respondents

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<b>Baseline Outcome: A Great Deal</b>			
<b>Outcome: A Fair Amount</b>			
Party Identification			
Republican (Baseline)			
Democrat	-0.40 (.27)	-0.26 (.26)	-0.29 (.27)
Independent	-0.01 (.27)	0.06 (.26)	0.04 (.27)
Something Else	-0.04 (.33)	0.04 (.33)	0.02 (.34)
Ideology			
Very Conservative (Baseline)			
Conservative	0.36 (.46)	0.29 (.48)	0.31 (.47)
Moderate	-0.26 (.43)	-0.30 (.44)	-0.30 (.44)
Liberal	-0.48 (.48)	-0.47 (.48)	-0.47 (.149)
Very Liberal	-0.75 (.50)	-0.71 (.49)	-0.71 (.51)
Age			
18-29 (Baseline)			
30-49	0.28 (.26)	0.28 (.26)	0.29 (.26)
50-64	0.11 (.26)	0.10 (.26)	0.12 (.27)
65+	0.12	0.12	0.15

	(.28)	(.28)	(.28)
Gender			
Male (Baseline)			
Female	-0.20	-0.15	-0.14
	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Education			
No High School Diploma (Baseline)			
High School Graduate	-0.03	-0.303	-0.03
	(.48)	(.47)	(.47)
Some College	-0.03	0.03	0.03
	(.47)	(.46)	(.46)
2-Year College	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(.53)	(.52)	(.52)
4-Year College	0.31	0.41	0.39
	(.47)	(.46)	(.46)
Post-Graduate	0.51	0.63	0.61
	(.41)	(.48)	(.47)
Income			
> \$30,000 (Baseline)			
\$30,000 - >\$40,000	-0.12	-0.08	-0.09
	(.30)	(.30)	(.30)
\$40,000 - >\$50,000	-0.30	-0.22	-0.22
	(.30)	(.30)	(.30)
\$50,000 - >\$60,000	-0.31	-0.24	-0.25
	(.30)	(.30)	(.30)
\$60,000 - >\$70,000	-0.22	-0.13	-0.14
	(.30)	(.30)	(.30)
\$70,000 - >\$80,000	-0.19	-0.16	-0.16
	(.34)	(.34)	(.34)
\$80,000 - >\$90,000	0.03	0.06	0.06
	(.37)	(.38)	(.38)
\$90,000 - >\$100,000	-0.05	0.05	0.04
	(.37)	(.38)	(.38)
\$100,000 or more	-0.15	-0.12	-0.13
	(.30)	(.30)	(.30)
Union Power			
Too Much Power and Influence (Baseline)			
Not Enough Power and Influence	-0.53	-0.51	-0.52
	(.24)	(.24)	(.24)
About the Right Amount	-0.17	-0.14	-0.14
	(.23)	(.23)	(.23)
Current Financial Situation			
Live Comfortably (Baseline)			
Meet Basic Needs with Some Left Over	0.08	0.06	0.07
	(.21)	(.21)	(.21)



Just Meet Basic Needs	0.19 (.30)	0.15 (.30)	0.15 (.30)
Not Enough for Basic Needs	0.23 (.41)	0.13 (.42)	0.14 (.42)
Impact of Wages on Financial Situation			
A Great Deal (Baseline)			
A Fair Amount	0.44 (.18)	0.44 (.18)	0.43 (.18)
Not Too Much	0.32 (.26)	0.32 (.26)	0.31 (.42)
Not At All	-0.58 (.31)	-0.58 (.32)	-0.58 (.32)
Worry About Paying Bills			
Every Day (Baseline)			
Almost Every Day	0.07 (.29)	0.02 (.2)	0.01 (.29)
Sometimes	0.60 (.26)	0.53 (.26)	0.53 (.26)
Rarely	0.53 (.30)	0.47 (.28)	0.46 (.30)
Never	0.53 (.33)	0.47 (.33)	0.47 (.33)
Economic Condition of Nation			
Excellent (Baseline)			
Good	-1.36 (.49)	-1.36 (.48)	-1.37 (.48)
Fair	-1.56 (.52)	-1.55 (.50)	-1.57 (.51)
Poor	-1.50 (.63)	-1.47 (.61)	-1.48 (.61)
Economy Helps/Hurts the Wealthy			
Helping a Lot (Baseline)			
Helping a Little	0.02 (.25)	-0.01 (.25)	-0.01 (.25)
Hurting a Little	0.52 (.39)	0.60 (.39)	0.60 (.39)
Hurting a Lot	-0.53 (.39)	-0.58 (.39)	-0.58 (.39)
Neither Helping nor Hurting	-0.60 (.24)	-0.59 (.24)	-0.59 (.25)
Economy Helps/Hurts the Poor			
Helping a Lot (Baseline)			
Helping a Little	0.62 (.53)	0.60 (.49)	0.59 (.49)
Hurting a Little	0.96	0.95	0.94

	(.55)	(.52)	(.52)
Hurting a Lot	0.24	0.28	0.26
	(.55)	(.51)	(.51)
Neither Helping nor Hurting	0.40	0.37	0.36
	(.60)	(.57)	(.57)
Government Priority: Reducing Inequality			
A Top Priority (Baseline)			
Lower Priority	0.58	0.57	0.57
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)
Not Too Important	0.59	0.50	0.49
	(.34)	(.35)	(.35)
Should Not Be Done	-0.27	-0.25	-0.25
	(.57)	(.57)	(.57)
Economic Inequality in Country			
Too Much (Baseline)			
Too Little	-0.48	-0.51	-0.50
	(.32)	(.33)	(.32)
About the Right Amount	0.00	-0.04	-0.02
	(.29)	(.29)	(.29)
Government Priority: Reducing Illegal Immigration			
A Top Priority (Baseline)			
Lower Priority	0.06	-	0.08
	(.24)		(.24)
Not Too Important	0.09	-	0.12
	(.27)		(.28)
Should Not Be Done	-0.06	-	0.03
	(.57)		(.50)
Race/Ethnicity Contributes to Inequality			
A Great Deal (Baseline)			
A Fair Amount	-	0.23	0.24
		(.18)	(.18)
Not Too Much	-	0.78	0.78
		(.24)	(.24)
Not At All	-	0.11	0.13
		(.33)	(.33)
<b>Outcome: Not Too Much</b>			
Party Identification			
Republican (Baseline)			
Democrat	-0.22	-0.12	0.003
	(.32)	(.32)	(.34)
Independent	0.70	0.76	0.81
	(.28)	(.28)	(.29)
Something Else	0.65	0.71	0.81
	(.39)	(.38)	(.39)
Ideology			

Very Conservative (Baseline)			
Conservative	0.19 (.46)	0.17 (.48)	0.20 (.49)
Moderate	-84 (.44)	-0.83 (.45)	-0.82 (.45)
Liberal	-1.20 (.50)	-1.14 (.51)	-1.11 (.51)
Very Liberal	-1.97 (.57)	-1.68 (.59)	-1.76 (.60)
Age			
18-29 (Baseline)			
30-49	-0.06 (.32)	-0.02 (.32)	-0.02 (.32)
50-64	-0.57 (.31)	-0.44 (.31)	-0.49 (.32)
65+	-0.53 (.34)	-0.35 (.34)	-0.40 (.34)
Gender			
Male (Baseline)			
Female	-0.53 (.19)	-0.40 (.19)	-0.40 (.19)
Education			
No High School Diploma (Baseline)			
High School Graduate	-0.13 (.53)	-0.20 (.49)	-0.19 (.50)
Some College	-0.32 (.52)	-0.36 (.49)	-0.35 (.49)
2-Year College	-0.27 (.58)	-0.39 (.56)	-0.40 (.57)
4-Year College	0.50 (.53)	0.55 (.50)	0.58 (.51)
Post-Graduate	0.64 (.54)	0.70 (.50)	0.73 (.51)
Income			
> \$30,000 (Baseline)			
\$30,000 - >\$40,000	0.03 (.39)	-0.01 (.38)	0.003 (.39)
\$40,000 - >\$50,000	-0.01 (.36)	0.04 (.36)	0.05 (.36)
\$50,000 - >\$60,000	-0.13 (.38)	-0.06 (.38)	-0.06 (.38)
\$60,000 - >\$70,000	-0.42 (.38)	-0.34 (.38)	-0.32 (.38)
\$70,000 - >\$80,000	-0.17 (.46)	-0.03 (.45)	-0.06 (.45)

\$80,000 - >\$90,000	0.10 (.49)	0.10 (.52)	0.05 (.50)
\$90,000 - >\$100,000	0.33 (.44)	0.38 (.43)	0.42 (.43)
\$100,000 or more	-0.09 (.39)	-0.09 (.37)	-0.10 (.39)
Union Power			
Too Much Power and Influence (Baseline)			
Not Enough Power and Influence	-1.06 (.28)	-1.06 (.28)	-1.03 (.28)
About the Right Amount	-0.12 (.24)	-0.15 (.25)	-0.11 (.25)
Current Financial Situation			
Live Comfortably (Baseline)			
Meet Basic Needs with Some Left Over	0.22 (.27)	0.23 (.26)	0.21 (.26)
Just Meet Basic Needs	0.13 (.40)	0.15 (.38)	0.13 (.39)
Not Enough for Basic Needs	0.003 (.66)	-0.14 (.63)	-0.15 (.65)
Impact of Wages on Financial Situation			
A Great Deal (Baseline)			
A Fair Amount	0.52 (.21)	0.56 (.21)	0.57 (.21)
Not Too Much	0.73 (.29)	0.75 (.30)	0.74 (.30)
Not At All	-0.11 (.37)	-0.13 (.37)	-0.14 (.38)
Worry About Paying Bills			
Everyday (Baseline)			
Almost Every Day	-0.44 (.38)	-0.55 (.37)	-0.54 (.37)
Sometimes	0.66 (.33)	0.60 (.32)	0.61 (.33)
Rarely	0.58 (.37)	0.48 (.36)	0.50 (.37)
Never	0.57 (.44)	0.58 (.44)	0.56 (.45)
Economic Condition of Nation			
Excellent (Baseline)			
Good	-1.04 (.48)	-1.13 (.47)	-1.11 (.48)
Fair	-1.19 (.54)	-1.25 (.53)	-1.23 (.53)
Poor	-1.50	-1.51	-1.61

	(.71)	(.68)	(.70)
Economy Helps/Hurts the Wealthy			
Helping a Lot (Baseline)			
Helping a Little	0.10	0.08	0.06
	(.27)	(.27)	(.27)
Hurting a Little	-0.01	0.18	0.17
	(.46)	(.45)	(.45)
Hurting a Lot	-0.29	-0.20	-0.25
	(.61)	(.57)	(.59)
Neither Helping nor Hurting	0.10	0.16	0.14
	(.27)	(.27)	(.27)
Economy Helps/Hurts the Poor			
Helping a Lot (Baseline)			
Helping a Little	0.30	0.27	0.26
	(.47)	(.45)	(.45)
Hurting a Little	0.23	0.21	0.25
	(.49)	(.48)	(.48)
Hurting a Lot	-0.31	-0.23	-0.21
	(.47)	(.44)	(.44)
Neither Helping nor Hurting	0.13	0.14	0.16
	(.54)	(.52)	(.52)
Government Priority: Reducing Inequality			
A Top Priority (Baseline)			
Lower Priority	0.79	0.67	0.72
	(.24)	(.24)	(.25)
Not Too Important	1.42	1.09	1.14
	(.36)	(.36)	(.37)
Should Not Be Done	0.83	0.52	0.58
	(.55)	(.55)	(.55)
Economic Inequality in Country			
Too Much (Baseline)			
Too Little	-0.22	-0.16	-0.19
	(.36)	(.34)	(.35)
About the Right Amount	0.61	0.61	0.52
	(.29)	(.29)	(.29)
Government Priority: Reducing Illegal Immigration			
A Top Priority (Baseline)			
Lower Priority	-0.36	-	-0.33
	(.27)		(.27)
Not Too Important	-0.40	-	-0.33
	(.31)		(.31)
Should Not Be Done	0.18	-	0.38
	(.55)		(.61)
Race/Ethnicity Contributes to Inequality			
A Great Deal (Baseline)			

A Fair Amount	-	0.39 (.27)	0.41 (.27)
Not Too Much	-	1.47 (.32)	1.48 (.31)
Not At All	-	1.07 (.39)	1.09 (.38)
<b>Outcome: Nothing At All</b>			
Party Identification			
Republican (Baseline)			
Democrat	0.09 (.50)	-0.11 (.50)	0.11 (.50)
Independent	0.41 (.33)	0.43 (.33)	0.51 (.34)
Something Else	0.82 (.45)	0.66 (.45)	0.84 (.45)
Ideology			
Very Conservative (Baseline)			
Conservative	-0.06 (.47)	-0.11 (.49)	-0.05 (.49)
Moderate	-1.41 (.48)	-1.50 (.50)	-1.43 (.49)
Liberal	-2.70 (.81)	-2.86 (.78)	-2.72 (.78)
Very Liberal	-3.70 (1.06)	-3.60 (1.02)	-3.43 (1.05)
Age			
18-29 (Baseline)			
30-49	-0.97 (.39)	-0.97 (.38)	-1.02 (.38)
50-64	-1.86 (.39)	-1.70 (.39)	-1.86 (.39)
65+	-1.89 (.43)	-1.65 (.42)	-1.80 (.44)
Gender			
Male (Baseline)			
Female	-0.65 (.24)	-0.50 (.25)	-0.45 (.25)
Education			
No High School Diploma (Baseline)			
High School Graduate	-0.96 (.74)	-1.13 (.67)	-1.10 (.68)
Some College	-0.63 (.74)	-0.718 (.66)	-0.77 (.67)
2-Year College	-1.52 (.81)	-1.62 (.75)	-1.65 (.76)

4-Year College	-0.03 (.74)	-0.09 (.66)	-0.02 (.67)
Post-Graduate	-0.19 (.75)	-0.26 (.67)	-0.22 (.69)
Income			
> \$30,000 (Baseline)			
\$30,000 - >\$40,000	1.09 (.50)	1.02 (.51)	1.02 (.50)
\$40,000 - >\$50,000	0.46 : (.56)	0.62 (.60)	0.60 (.57)
\$50,000 - >\$60,000	0.76 (.52)	0.95 (.53)	0.87 (.53)
\$60,000 - >\$70,000	-0.42 (.53)	-0.32 (.56)	-0.28 (.55)
\$70,000 - >\$80,000	0.94 (.57)	1.32 (.60)	1.21 (.60)
\$80,000 - >\$90,000	0.032 (.72)	-0.06 (.70)	-0.13 (.72)
\$90,000 - >\$100,000	1.38 (.55)	1.53 (.57)	1.51 (.57)
\$100,000 or more	1.44 (.50)	1.57 (.51)	1.53 (.50)
Union Power			
Too Much Power and Influence (Baseline)			
Not Enough Power and Influence	-1.73 (.38)	-1.72 (.38)	-1.70 (.38)
About the Right Amount	-0.24 (.27)	-0.26 (.29)	-0.20 (.29)
Current Financial Situation			
Live Comfortably (Baseline)			
Meet Basic Needs with Some Left Over	0.46 (.30)	0.47 (.29)	0.43 (.30)
Just Meet Basic Needs	0.35 (.45)	0.32 (.45)	0.30 (.45)
Not Enough for Basic Needs	0.43 (.87)	0.31 (.93)	0.26 (.91)
Impact of Wages on Financial Situation			
A Great Deal (Baseline)			
A Fair Amount	0.19 (.28)	0.28 (.27)	0.33 (.28)
Not Too Much	0.30 (.37)	0.32 (.39)	0.36 (.39)
Not At All	-0.78 (.47)	-0.80 (.49)	-0.75 (.49)
Worry About Paying Bills			

Every Day (Baseline)			
Almost Every Day	-0.06 (.45)	0.09 (.46)	0.02 (.45)
Sometimes	0.64 (.44)	0.69 (.44)	0.64 (.45)
Rarely	1.01 (.48)	1.05 (.48)	1.00 (.48)
Never	0.51 (.54)	0.68 (.55)	0.60 (.56)
Economic Condition of Nation			
Excellent (Baseline)			
Good	-1.55 (.49)	-1.63 (.49)	-1.58 (.49)
Fair	-1.38 (.59)	-1.36 (.59)	-1.30 (.59)
Poor	-0.07 (.83)	-0.40 (.84)	-0.21 (.35)
Economy Helps/Hurts the Wealthy			
Helping a Lot (Baseline)			
Helping a Little	0.38 (.32)	0.41 (.32)	0.34 (.32)
Hurting a Little	0.92 (.55)	1.11 (.54)	1.03 (.53)
Hurting a Lot	-0.10 (.64)	-0.27 (.66)	-0.35 (.65)
Neither Helping nor Hurting	-0.18 (.34)	-0.162 (.34)	-0.21 (.35)
Economy Helps/Hurts the Poor			
Helping a Lot (Baseline)			
Helping a Little	-0.21 (.51)	-0.14 (.50)	-0.14 (.49)
Hurting a Little	-0.53 (.58)	-0.45 (.56)	-0.40 (.56)
Hurting a Lot	-0.87 (.55)	-0.58 (.53)	-0.63 (.53)
Neither Helping nor Hurting	0.37 (.59)	0.33 (.57)	0.39 (.57)
Government Priority: Reducing Inequality			
A Top Priority (Baseline)			
Lower Priority	0.87 (.35)	0.75 (.36)	0.85 (.36)
Not Too Important	2.11 (.44)	1.71 (.45)	1.83 (.46)
Should Not Be Done	2.63 (.56)	2.18 (.57)	1.30 (.58)



Economic Inequality in Country			
Too Much (Baseline)			
Too Little	-0.12 (.43)	0.2 (.42)	-0.01 (.42)
About the Right Amount	0.75 (.33)	0.79 (.33)	0.66 (.34)
Government Priority: Reducing Illegal Immigration			
A Top Priority (Baseline)			
Lower Priority	-0.80 (.33)	-	-0.73 (.34)
Not Too Important	- (.46)		-0.47 (.45)
Should Not Be Done	-13.87 (.68)	-	-14.00 (.76)
Race/Ethnicity Contributes to Inequality			
A Great Deal (Baseline)			
A Fair Amount	-	-0.61 (.46)	-0.61 (.46)
Not Too Much	-	0.66 (.45)	0.63 (.44)
Not At All	-	1.14 (.49)	1.14 (.49)
<hr/>			
N	2,074	2, 068	2,067
Pseudo $R^2$	.27	.28	.28

**Notes:** Dependent variable is opinion on whether raising the federal minimum wage impacts reduces economic inequality (1=A great deal; 2= A fair amount; 3= Not too much; and 4= Nothing at all). Models estimated with multinomial logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Source:** Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel Wave 54, September 2019.

### 3.6.3 Relative Risk Ratios for Party ID, Ideology, Immigration Attitudes, and Racial Attitudes (Full Model)

Table 11: Odds Ratios for Party ID, Ideology, and Immigration, and Racial Attitudes (Full Model)

Independent Variables	RRR	Standard Error	z	p> z
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**Baseline Outcome: A Great Deal**

**Baseline Outcome: A Fair Amount**

Party Identification

Republican (Baseline)				
Democrat	0.74	.20	-1.09	0.28
Independent	1.04	0.29	0.15	0.89
Something Else	1.02	0.35	0.07	0.94
Ideology				
Very Conservative (Baseline)				
Conservative	1.37	0.65	0.65	0.52
Moderate	0.74	0.33	-0.67	0.50
Liberal	0.62	0.30	-0.97	0.33
Very Liberal	0.49	0.25	-1.40	0.61
Priority: Reduce Illegal Immigration				
A Top Priority (Baseline)				
Lower Priority	1.09	0.26	0.34	0.74
Not Too Important	1.13	0.31	0.44	0.66
Should Not Be Done	1.03	0.51	0.07	0.93
Race/Ethnicity Contributes to Inequality				
A Great Deal (Baseline)				
A Fair Amount	1.27	0.23	1.32	0.19
Not Too Much	2.18	0.53	3.19	0.00
Not At All	1.13	0.38	0.39	0.69

**Outcome: Not Too Much**

Party Identification				
Republican (Baseline)				
Democrat	1.00	.34	0.01	0.99
Independent	2.26	0.65	2.83	0.01
Something Else	2.25	0.88	2.07	0.04
Ideology				
Very Conservative (Baseline)				
Conservative	1.22	0.58	0.41	0.68
Moderate	0.44	0.20	-1.81	0.07
Liberal	0.33	0.17	-2.17	0.03
Very Liberal	0.17	0.10	-2.94	0.00
Priority: Reduce Illegal Immigration				
A Top Priority (Baseline)				
Lower Priority	0.72	0.20	-1.20	0.23
Not Too Important	0.72	0.23	-1.03	0.30
Should Not Be Done	1.46	0.89	0.61	0.54
Race/Ethnicity Contributes to Inequality				
A Great Deal (Baseline)				
A Fair Amount	1.51	0.40	1.55	0.12
Not Too Much	4.41	1.36	4.80	0.00
Not At All	2.97	1.13	2.87	0.00

**Outcome: Nothing At All**

Party Identification				
Republican (Baseline)				
Democrat	1.10	.55	0.19	0.84
Independent	1.67	0.58	1.49	0.14
Something Else	2.32	1.05	1.86	0.06
Ideology				
Very Conservative (Baseline)				
Conservative	0.95	0.47	-0.10	0.92
Moderate	0.24	0.12	-2.89	0.00
Liberal	0.07	0.05	-3.48	0.00
Very Liberal	0.03	0.03	-3.27	0.00
Priority: Reduce Illegal Immigration				
A Top Priority (Baseline)				
Lower Priority	0.48	0.16	-2.17	0.03
Not Too Important	0.63	0.28	-1.03	0.30
Should Not Be Done	8.35e-07	6.37e-07	-18.34	0.00
Race/Ethnicity Contributes to Inequality				
A Great Deal (Baseline)				
A Fair Amount	0.54	0.25	-1.33	0.18
Not Too Much	1.89	0.86	1.43	0.15
Not At All	3.13	1.53	2.33	0.02

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**Notes:** Dependent variable is opinion on whether raising the federal minimum wage reduces economic inequality (1= A great deal; 2= A fair amount; 3= Not too much; 4= Nothing at all).

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