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National Reform and Municipal Revolt in a Revolutionary Spain:  
Political Culture in Western Andalusia, 1766-1823

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Charles Nicholas Saenz

Committee in charge:

Professor Pamela B. Radcliff, Chair  
Professor Carolyn P. Boyd  
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Professor Cynthia M. Truant  
Professor Eric Van Young

2013

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2013

## DEDICATION

*To my parents, for inspiring a love of learning.*

## EPIGRAPH

“What distinguishes our century from others, our country from others, and our situation from others is that in the Spanish nation the sickness has become chronic which in other societies is acute. The phenomenon which is transitory in other countries is permanent here. There is never born from within our anarchy a strong power which masters it. In our discords there are neither victors nor vanquished; and nothing results from the obstinate struggle of all the elements except confusion and chaos.”

- Juan Donoso Cortés, *El Piloto* 10 April 1839<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Juan Donoso-Cortés, “The Conditions for Revolution,” *El Piloto*, Wednesday, April 10, 1839,” in *Donoso Cortes: Readings in Political Theory*, ed. by R.A. Herrera (Ave Maria: Sapientia Press, 2007).

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC	<i>Actas Capitalares</i> (sometimes <i>Autos Capitulares</i> )
ACS	Archivo de la Catedral de Sevilla
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional
AHN-SN	Archivo Histórico Nacional – Sección Nobleza
AHPS	Archivo Histórico Provincial de Sevilla
AMC	Archivo Municipal de Carmona
AMCS	Archivo Municipal de Cazalla de la Sierra
AME	Archivo Municipal de Écija
AMLC	Archivo Municipal de Las Cabezas de San Juan
AMLL	Archivo Municipal de La Luisiana
AMLR	Archivo Municipal de Lora del Río
AMM	Archivo Municipal de Marchena
AMMF	Archivo Municipal de Morón de la Frontera
AMO	Archivo Municipal de Osuna
AMS	Archivo Municipal de Sevilla
AMSM	Archivo Municipal de Sanlúcar la Mayor
AMU	Archivo Municipal de Utrera
BC	Biblioteca del Congreso
BNE	Biblioteca Nacional de España
MSCL	Mandeville Special Collections Library

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I owe a special debt of gratitude to several persons, without whose support the present dissertation would not have come to fruition. My fellow graduate students challenged me to reflect on key historiographical questions in seminar discussions, shared useful pedagogical techniques as I ventured into the classroom for the first time, read drafts of my written work, and served as a constant source of both support and inspiration. I have been fortunate to be part of a large community of professional Hispanists-in-the-making at UC San Diego. Our occasional *tertulias* influenced the development of my research and writing and provided a necessary social outlet as I delved into the solitary work of dissertating. Andrea Davis and Robert L. Long have been a part of this group from almost the very beginning and deserve special mention.

In Spain, I benefitted tremendously from the intellectual and social support network provided by the Spanish Fulbright Commission and many individuals. From among my Fulbright cohort, in particular I wish to thank Aaron Olivas, Heather See, and Daniel I. Wasserman Soler. My research endeavors in Spain depended on the support of Dorleta All, Alejandro Gomez-del-Moral, and Luis Muñoz. Several graduate students of the Universidad de Sevilla were essential in connecting me with professional colleagues and directing me towards useful archives. Of special note, I would like to thank David Chillón Raposo. Antonio Pina García and Israel Ojeda Ledesma were kind enough to provide me with an *entrée* into everyday life in Sevilla.

Archivists and library support staff are the unsung heroes of the historical profession. Several archivists in Spain and the United States have helped me to root out interesting source material. In San Diego, I wish to thank Lynda Claassen and her staff at

the Mandeville Special Collections Library. In Madrid, I benefitted from the expertise of staff at the Archivo Histórico Nacional, the Biblioteca del Congreso, and the Biblioteca Nacional de España. The municipal governments of the following towns granted me access to local archives: Las Cabezas de San Juan, Carmona, Cazalla de la Sierra, Écija, Lebrija, Lora del Río, La Luisiana, Marchena, Morón de la Frontera, Osuna, Sanlúcar la Mayor, and Utrera. In particular, the assistance offered by Francisco Ledesma Gámez (Osuna) and Marina Martín Ojeda (Écija) was nothing short of exemplary.

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My committee members witnessed this project develop from a draft prospectus and into its current form. During this time, Eric Van Young reviewed a forthcoming article in draft form. Carolyn P. Boyd and Cynthia M. Truant contributed their time and energy to supporting my intellectual endeavors while transitioning into retirement; Alan Houston while serving as Provost of Eleanor Roosevelt College. Meanwhile, Pamela B. Radcliff has reviewed much of my work in progress, performed several critical editorial interventions, and assisted me in other ways while balancing the many obligations of being a department chair. Of course, I remain responsible for any errata, formative missteps, or lost opportunities that might appear in the final product.

Finally, I wish to thank my family and loved ones for supporting this project over the years. It is tremendously gratifying to see an end to this project and I look forward to celebrating this achievement with them.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

National Reform and Municipal Revolt in a Revolutionary Spain:  
Political Culture in Western Andalusia, 1766-1823

by

Charles Nicholas Saenz

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, San Diego, 2013

Professor Pamela B. Radcliff, Chair

At the start of the nineteenth century, the Spanish Monarchy underwent a moment of profound crisis in which the sovereign powers of the king passed to local communities. This dissertation examines how that crisis altered the practice of politics in what became modern Spain. Utilizing the region of Western Andalusia as a case study, I explain how municipalities adapted to the advent of new political systems of rule beginning in 1808. I

argue that the relationship between the central government and local governments changed in this period. At the middle of the eighteenth century, monarchy and municipalities enjoyed roughly equal status with one another. By 1823, the central government considered local communities subordinate to the will of the Spanish nation as a whole. Meanwhile, municipalities maintained a sometimes fierce defense of their political position vis-à-vis the central government.

The transition from absolutism to constitutionalism that corresponded to the end of the Old Regime in Spain further contributed to the development of a more politically active and locally engaged population in Western Andalusia. War against the French roused deep sympathy for the *patria chica*. As Spanish patriots worked to reestablish political order under a series of *juntas*, local communities avoided ceding their sovereignty to centralized institutions. Local municipalities even interpreted central provisions of the Constitution of Cádiz (1812) to suit their needs in advance of those claimed by the nation. Thus, the advent of modern government in Western Andalusia was coupled with the intensification of localist political sensibilities.

## INTRODUCTION

Not long after the expulsion of the French from Western Andalusia in 1812, eleven residents of Écija submitted a petition to the central government asking that it restore two significant privileges once held by the town in the distant past. These men asked that Écija become the capital of a province in the new administrative organization of the country, and also that the town become the seat of a restored ecclesiastical diocese.<sup>1</sup> “Écija reasonably asks to return to being a capital,” the petitioners explained, not out of a desire “for ostentation or for caprice.”<sup>2</sup> The authors of the petition argued that the division of the peninsula should owe to a combination of historical precedent and to the practice of commerce and the equitable distribution of state resources. In this way, the petitioners made a sophisticated argument, drawing on the language of past and present, to frame a much older, even ancient, claim about the value of local government as the foundation of a strong state. In effect, their petition spoke to the emergence of a new political culture in the Spanish Monarchy at the start of the nineteenth century. What were the consequences of this political culture on the structural configuration of the Spanish Monarchy? And how does this story shed new light on the history of the so-called “Age of Revolutions” in the Spanish Monarchy and the Atlantic World?

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<sup>1</sup> As far back as the Roman period, Écija (then Astigi) had been a major regional center of trade and commerce. For a time, it had also been a diocesan see. As legend had it, from this important Roman settlement Saint Fulgentius (San Fulgencio) had once governed an ancient Roman Catholic diocese as bishop. Many of the petitioners had served in positions of authority on the municipal town council of Écija and were thus local political elites. While the demands were local, these local agents understood the historical context and related political dynamic into which their petition figured. Consequently, the petitioners tailored the language of their document so that it would appeal to the complex variety of political interests and concerns that animated the behavior of those political elites who led Spain’s first constitutional regime.

<sup>2</sup> Francisco de Paula Diaz. *Al soberano congreso Ecija suplica que se erija en provincia su comarca, restableciendola capital y restituyendole su obispo* (Écija: Joaquin Chaves, 1813), 12.



The language and political strategies employed by the authors of the Écija petition signified a break in the manner by which local political elites within the Spanish Monarchy found themselves engaging with the central government. The political culture of the Spanish Monarchy during the Old Regime favored deference to legitimate authority while preserving the essential parity that existed between individual towns and a reigning monarch. This relationship preserved an ancient balance between power vested locally and that ceded to a central authority. Although a strict top to bottom orientation existed in the practice of government, extending from the king to local governments, in effect the relationship between these two political entities was roughly egalitarian. However, it was not in the custom of local political elites of the Old Regime to make proposals for change. That the Écija petitioners were brazen enough to ask the central government to elevate the status of their town to such heights attests to the emergence of a new political culture in which citizens made direct claims on their government. In the aftermath of the French invasion that began in 1808, there emerged a new willingness on the part of local political elites to challenge the established conventions of the old Regime. A new political culture emerged in response to political disorder and the absence of legitimate government during this era. The manner in which political elites in this period went about coordinating the war effort reinvigorated an ancient tradition of municipal independence. Renewed faith in local government placed a strong emphasis on local politics in this period that was to have profound and lasting effect on the political culture of Spanish society for more than a century.

The emergence of a new political culture within the Spanish Monarchy after 1808 attested to a transformed notion of sovereignty in the Spanish Monarchy. In response to

the French invasion and the forced abdication of the Bourbon kings, the municipalities of the Spanish Monarchy were transformed into sovereign political entities, empowered to act of their own accord to provide for the sustenance and well being of local communities. In the months and years that followed 1808, political elites worked to piece together the Spanish Monarchy from among its constituent parts, taking municipalities as their starting place. In doing so, political elites utilized notions of sovereignty rooted at the local level to accomplish the goal of imperial restoration. This process ultimately led to promulgation of *La Constitución política de la Monarquía española* in 1812. Although this constitutional charter was only in effect for a brief while, the broader implications of a transformed sovereignty forever changed the practice of politics within the Spanish Monarchy. A new political culture fundamentally altered the practice of politics at the local level, invigorating the people of the Spanish Monarchy with a fervent desire to become more involved in the decision-making process and reorienting the relationship of municipal governments to the central government. In this frame, political events at the local level resonated at much larger scale affecting the contingent possibilities of empire in wider Hispanic Atlantic.

The world at the close of the eighteenth century was a volatile place in a state of global crisis wrought by war and revolution. According to C.A. Bayly, a sense of crisis pervaded societies during this period – including the loss of a certain bond to the local – that came as the result of a long and protracted process of historical change, which would culminate in the birth of modernity.<sup>3</sup> In the words of David Armitage, a “contagion of sovereignty” had burst onto the world stage with the American Declaration of

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<sup>3</sup> C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

Independence (1776).<sup>4</sup> New ideas regarding the legitimate exercise of political sovereignty set about unraveling the established political order. The birth of the United States and the revolution in France beginning in 1789 did not directly inform political events within the Spanish Monarchy or make political changes there inevitable, but rather figured as part of a significant international context into which these events were situated. The Spanish situation was both unique and quite complicated. As José María Portillo-Valdés has described this moment, the events of 1808 signaled the beginning of a dynastic crisis that was soon joined by accompanying military and constitutional crises to form a “triple crisis” in the Spanish Monarchy. Simultaneously, Spanish political elites were confronted with the task of governing a monarchy in the absence of a monarch, repulsing a foreign invasion, and legitimizing actions taken in defense *la patria* in the context of a new constitutional order.<sup>5</sup> The problem of sovereignty was situated at the core of each of these crises.

Indeed, the most significant political aspect of the period immediately after 1808, as Jeremy Adelman has stressed, was a “crisis of sovereignty” in the Spanish Atlantic world.<sup>6</sup> For three centuries, the monarchy had served as the glue that bound a disparate array of kingdoms situated in both hemispheres, often quite different from one another in

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<sup>4</sup> David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), see especially chapter 3.

<sup>5</sup> José María Portillo-Valdés formulated the idea of a “triple crisis” to describe the political situation provoked by 1808. The resulting crisis developed on three fronts because it triggered separate, though still interrelated, problems stemming from the dynastic, federative, and constitutional composition of the Spanish Monarchy. See his *Revolución de Nación. Orígenes de la cultura constitucional en España, 1780-1812* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000).

<sup>6</sup> Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). The broad contours of this author’s argument were also presented in “An Age of imperial Revolutions,” *American Historical Review* 113.2 (Apr. 2008): 319-340; and “Iberian Passages: Continuity and Change in the South Atlantic,” in *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840*, eds. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 59-82.

social and cultural terms, to a common cause defined in imperial terms. Even in the aftermath of the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the dynastic transition from Habsburg to Bourbon rulers managed to largely preserve the territorial integrity of the Spanish Monarchy.<sup>7</sup> Whereas the Habsburgs rulers had favored a largely decentralized system of governance that privileged the experience and independence of local elites, Bourbon rulers embarked on a very different system of rule.<sup>8</sup> During the eighteenth century, a series of Bourbon kings succeed in centralizing the bureaucracy of the central government in Madrid. This produced a political system in which the sovereign powers of the reigning monarch were absolute. At the start of the nineteenth century, nominally Spanish communities in the far-flung realms of the Spanish empire confronted the need to reconcile their allegiance to the Bourbon dynasty with its ouster and replacement by a new dynasty.

For some historians, this pivotal moment of crisis throughout the Spanish Monarchy constituted a dispute over the place of political autonomy in a realm as geographically extensive as that of the Spanish Monarchy. For Jaime E. Rodríguez O., the Spanish American response to crisis involved demands for greater political autonomy in place of formal emancipation from the empire. In his view, only with the rejection of autonomy did there emerge full-scale independence movements capable of drawing upon

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<sup>7</sup> Although the Spanish Monarchy lost many important possessions under the Treaty of Utrecht (1714), notably the enclave of Gibraltar and several territories in northern Italy, this owed to the negotiation of a durable peace with belligerent power and not a challenge to the territorial integrity of the realm. Although some regions like Catalonia were home to influential factions that favored a continuation of Habsburg rule, they were easily pacified and did not pose a significant threat to the new Bourbon dynasty.

<sup>8</sup> These alternate systems of government reflected contrasting Habsburg and Bourbon experiences of ruling the Holy Roman Empire and France, respectively. New monarchs from these dynasties ruled the Spanish Monarchy with the political tactics of their forbearers in mind and the wisdom of foreign political advisors close at hand.

the support of a wide variety of social classes.<sup>9</sup> Taking the work of Rodríguez O. as a starting point, Portillo-Valdés has posited that it was the constitutional model adopted at Cádiz left virtually no space for autonomists who posed a threat to the social and territorial integrity of the realm.<sup>10</sup> A contest between the investment of political power centrally and the disbursement of sovereign powers to co-equal regional entities stands at the heart of both approaches. Neither scholar has tackled directly the situation of local communities in this crisis.

Nonetheless, scholarship on Spanish America has unearthed the variety of responses to this crisis, in which local elites drew upon the historical precedents of the distant past in order to adapt to a new political reality. This process of adaptation led some local political actors to create self-sufficient political regimes responsive to the principles of liberal democracy and provided others with fertile grounds to initiate full-scale independence movements. Evident in this variety was the lack of a predetermined outcome. Narratives that stress a strict continuation of regime loyalty or a clear rupture of national independence oversimplify of the negotiated and highly contingent aspects of this transition.

A variety of local response to the crisis of sovereignty appeared in peninsular Spain as in Latin America. However, historical literature on the peninsular dimension of response to the crisis of sovereignty has focused above all else on the national level and largely ignored regional and local experiences, which were assumed to comprise part of a

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<sup>9</sup> Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *The Independence of Spanish America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>10</sup> José María Portillo-Valdés, *Crisis atlántica. Autonomía e independencia en la crisis de la monarquía hispana* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006).

common process of nationalization. Historians of the Spanish nation tend to see the rise of a cohesive Spanish nation out of the remnants of empire without accounting for how it was that a multitude of locally-oriented political communities coalesced in the first place. Regional and local histories should figure at the center of this narrative because historical contemporaries were engaged in the systematic reconstruction of the Spanish Monarchy from among its constituent parts.

The territory of peninsular Spain shared a historical experience that contrasted sharply with those of Spanish America, which had undergone an extensive project of conquest and colonization by European-born Spaniards. Peninsular municipalities predated the Spanish Monarchy that rose about them in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Indeed, many Spanish municipalities, especially in southern Spain, dated to the period of Roman settlement of the Iberian Peninsula, if not before. Roman Hispania became the most Romanized region of the ancient Mediterranean world outside of the Italian Peninsula. At an individual level, ancient *municipia* experienced the decentralized rule of Visigothic kings and later conquest by Moorish and Christian armies. In the medieval period, successive kings granted individual municipalities the right to participate in representative assemblies, known as Cortes, which controlled major aspects of crown policy through the authority to raise revenue by taxation. The influence of municipalities in the affairs of the crown was so strong that popular objection to the accession of a foreign-born king stoked their revolt in 1520. In what became known as the Revolt of the Comuneros, Spanish King Carlos I had been forced to reconquer the rebellious municipalities over which he nominally governed. Well after this period, Spanish municipalities continued to think of themselves as individual political entities.

The expansion of a vast multicontinental empire aside, peninsular subjects of the Spanish Monarchy owed their political allegiances first and foremost to the most local of affiliations, their *patria chica*. At an atomic level, then, the basic building blocks of the Spanish Monarchy in the European context were unquestionably individual municipalities.

What is most visible at the municipal level is not a national solution to the crisis of sovereignty but a local one. That is, I argue that local communities framed municipal rights as the backbone of a re-legitimized Spanish Monarchy. It should not come as a surprise that Spaniards attempted to reconstitute one of the world's oldest and vastest empires along political lines that placed municipal freedoms at the heart of efforts to rebuild this system in the fold of a nation-state. The success or failure of national politics was often contingent upon the circumstances of local politics. This dissertation examines the process of imperial collapse and reconstitution through the lens of local communities in Western Andalusia. Disintegration of the Spanish Monarchy came as the result of a crisis of sovereignty in the Spanish Atlantic, which met with a variety of pragmatic political responses on both sides of the Atlantic.

I argue that this process manifested itself in Western Andalusia around a discourse that framed municipal rights as the backbone of a durable political system. This discourse stemmed, in part, from the influence of the Spanish Enlightenment. More immediately, however, it emerged in response to the central government's implementation of an ambitious project of imperial reform during the middle of the eighteenth century. The so-called Bourbon Reforms, connected in their own way to the Spanish Enlightenment, faced considerable challenges from members of the Spanish

aristocracy, the Church, and even municipalities, which rediscovered ancient privileges as an effort to preserve their existing status. Political dislocations sparked by Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 allowed for reform-minded local elites to gain the upper hand in the contest between the major stakeholders of the regime. The effect of this intervention by local elites was cultural production of new political norms, or a new political culture, that would endure in Spain well into the twentieth century.

#### POLITICAL CULTURE IN WESTERN ANDALUSIA

Political culture has developed as a theoretical concept during the last fifty years. Political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba first introduced the idea of "civic culture" in the 1960s. For Almond and Verba, a civic culture sought to explain how citizens of participatory democracies engaged with politics and to represent their view toward this process.<sup>11</sup> Political culture has since developed a strong following among historians tracing the transition of European societies away from absolutist rule. This trend owes in large part to the role of the linguistic turn in reorienting historical examination of political change away from strictly institutional or economic causes to a framework that has embraced the role of language in shaping how such processes developed. In her seminal study of the French Revolution, Lynn Hunt defined political culture as "the values, expectations, and implicit rules that expressed and shaped collective intentions and actions."<sup>12</sup> Keith Michael Baker, another historian of the French

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<sup>11</sup> Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

<sup>12</sup> Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 10.



Revolution, distanced himself further from the definition offered by Almond and Verba, portraying their approach as overly reliant on values and sentiments. Favoring a more linguistic approach, Baker conceived of political culture as “the set of discourses or symbolic practices” by which “individuals and groups in any society articulate, negotiate, implement and enforce the competing claims they make upon one other and upon the whole.”<sup>13</sup> In this study, the emerging political culture revolved around attempts by operatives of the central government and local political elites to legitimize representative and later constitutional regimes, and how, in the process, these actors made political claims of one another.

This claims-making process reveals a practical negotiation over the terms of sovereignty. I will use sovereignty in the context of the present work to define the right to rule or, rather, to exercise power in legitimate terms. The concept of sovereignty has been a special obsession of political theory in the Western world. Since the foundation of a scholarly political tradition in ancient Rome, Europeans devoted considerable energies to explaining how and why singular individuals or groups of people held a legitimate right to govern over others. In absolutist monarchies, religious principle served to legitimize rule. As the writing of Thomas Hobbes demonstrated, there was also patent fear of social disorder and the potential for mob rule that underwrote the defense of absolutism throughout much of the early modern period.<sup>14</sup> The intellectual developments of the European Enlightenment challenged the integrity of a limited view of sovereignty and

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<sup>13</sup> Keith Michael Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political History in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4.

<sup>14</sup> Europe hosted several republics in the early modern period. However, sovereignty was never widely distributed and instead confined to the members of a commercial and social elite. As in Venice, executive power was often shrouded in the trappings of monarchy.

posed the possibility of new and expansive social categories, much as peoples and nations, possessing a right to sovereignty. The American and French Revolutions provided a context for the transition of these ideas from theory to practice. Popular sovereignty and national sovereignty offered new models for the practice of legitimate governance in the Western world. On the basis of the Cortes's claims to exercise national sovereignty, scholars of Spain have taken 1812 to mark the beginning of Spanish nationhood. Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that the Spanish conception of nationhood remained somewhat weak throughout the nineteenth century.<sup>15</sup> The idea of Spanish nationhood was unable to offer a clear resolution to the crisis of sovereignty.

What is clear is that the Spanish Monarchy followed its own political trajectory, separate from that of the United States or France. In contrast to the focus of these countries on the people and the nation as possessors of sovereignty, in the Spanish Monarchy there persisted a belief in the fundamental importance of municipalities as the essential depositories of sovereignty,<sup>16</sup> as epitomized by the urban Revolt of the Comuneros in 1520-1521.<sup>17</sup> Although the Bourbons, who ascended to the Spanish throne at the start of the eighteenth century, did much to obscure the use of this reasoning, the

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<sup>15</sup> For a look at the “weak nationalization” thesis, see José Álvarez-Junco, *Mater dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001) and Borja de Riquer i Permanyer, “La débil nacionalización de España en el siglo XIX,” *Historia Social* 20 (2004): 97-114. The existence of strong peripheral national movements at the close of the nineteenth century has been exemplary of this failure.

<sup>16</sup> Philosophical refinement of this idea owed to the interventions of Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez, leading intellectual figures at the University of Salamanca and members of the neo-scholastic movement associated with that institution. An excellent background is found in the Jaime E. Rodríguez O., “The Origins of Constitutionalism and Liberalism in Mexico,” in *The Divine Charter: Constitutionalism and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico*, ed. Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 1-34.

<sup>17</sup> On the Revolt of the Comuneros, see Joseph Pérez, *Los Comuneros* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2006).

crisis of 1808 witnessed its recuperation in dramatic fashion. Cities mattered, as did lesser municipalities, in resolving the crisis.

In the face of a multitude of municipal contexts in which to plot the patterns of historical change, we can still find macropolitical patterns across distant reaches of the Spanish Monarchy. From local sites in peninsular Spain and Spanish America, political elites negotiated different levels of identity and discourse, from the transatlantic to the local. Rodríguez O. has argued persuasively for the existence of a common transatlantic political culture, and Scott Eastman has suggested in his study of Spanish Catholicism that common religious beliefs bridged the Atlantic world and provided the ideological framework for constituting a transatlantic idea of nationhood.<sup>18</sup> However, shared religious foundations proved incapable of holding the Spanish Monarchy together. As Eric Van Young has cautioned, there is also a causal problem associated with attributing the outcome of local events to larger trends.<sup>19</sup> Pan-Spanish identities were often severed by local politics. Indeed Jordana Dym has demonstrated that local politics held the potential to inform the precise manner in which Spanish American municipalities in Central America responded to the imperial crisis and how they chose to reaggregate into

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<sup>18</sup> Both of these studies owe a great deal to the foundational work of François-Xavier Guerra, *Modernidad e independencias. Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas* (Mexico City: Mapfre, 1992). Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *"We Are Now the True Spaniards": Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808-1824* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). Scott Eastman, *Preaching Spanish Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1859-1823* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012).

<sup>19</sup> Eric Van Young, "Of Tempests and Teapots: Imperial Crisis and Local Conflicts in Mexico at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century," in *Cycles of Conflict, Centuries of Change: Crisis, Reform and Revolutions in Mexico*, eds. Elisa Servín, Leticia Reina, and John Tutino (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

new regional entities.<sup>20</sup> Historical literature on Mexico has also done much to explain the emergence of the post-imperial order from a regional perspective that has been responsive to the local dimension of politics.<sup>21</sup>

Such an examination of local political culture and its relevance to the creation of a unique Spanish peninsular identity has never been undertaken. A comprehensive understanding of imperial disintegration and the reaggregation of the Spanish Monarchy's atomic parts into new national configurations requires examining the peninsular dimension of local responses to the crisis as well. Thus, the present study seeks to resolve this error and to add valuable insight into the political culture of an integral corner of the Spanish Monarchy.

#### ATLANTIC HISTORY, THE AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, AND MODERNITY

The local perspective in the Spanish Monarchy was linked to the transnational through the Atlantic world. In fact, the Spanish Monarchy was far more invested in a transatlantic system of human migration, imperial expansion, and trade than it was in the affairs of the European continent. Recent scholarship has presented the Atlantic world as the essential venue that provided for the formation of modern principles dictating cultural affairs and the practice of politics.<sup>22</sup> Perhaps no state figured into this system more

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<sup>20</sup> Jordana Dym, *From Sovereign Villages to National States: City, State, and Federation in Central America, 1759-1839* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006).

<sup>21</sup> Michael T. Ducey, *A Nation of Villages: Riot and Rebellion in the Mexican Huasteca, 1750-1850* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2001); Peter Guardino, *Peasants Politics, and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero, 1800-1857* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), and *Time of Liberty: Popular Political Culture in Oaxaca, 1750-1850* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

<sup>22</sup> A voluminous corpus of literature on the Atlantic world has been published in the past fifteen years. For an overview of what constitutes Atlantic history and the state of the field, see Bernard Bailyn,

prominently than that of the Spanish Monarchy. Spanish involvement in the New World in the century after Christopher Columbus's "discovery" of the New World sparked reconsideration of what it meant to be human in the debating halls of the University of Salamanca.<sup>23</sup> In the eighteenth century, the problems of empire provoked peninsular officials to undertake a major restructuring of trade policy to suit the realities of colonial commerce. By the nineteenth century, it was the imperial dimension once again that initiated a wholesale restructuring of the political foundations of the Spanish Monarchy. Historians of the new imperial history have noted that it was often the case that the experience of colonialism radically reshaped the self-identity of the metropole more often than that of the colony.<sup>24</sup> Although this work has focused most extensively on British colonialism to date, it was also the case that this interplay of political communities operated within the confines of the Spanish Monarchy as well.

The actions, concerns, and behaviors of Spanish rulers operating from Madrid during the mid-eighteenth century demonstrate the importance of the empire in framing

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*Atlantic History: Concept and Contours* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Alison Games, "Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities," *The American Historical Review* 111.3 (2006): 741-757; and Philip D. Morgan and Jack P. Greene, "Introduction: The Present State of Atlantic History," in *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*, eds. Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, 3-33 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Examination of the intersecting ways in which cultural interactions in the New World and the Old World's engagement with and governance of its colonies have provide fertile plain for understanding the origins of modernity in Europe. Central to this narrative has been the role of New World communities in challenging the inherited practices of the Old.

<sup>23</sup> Debates between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés Supúlveda resulted in crown issuing a moratorium on the enslavement of the native peoples of the Americas and indirectly prompted the origins of the transatlantic slave trade. On this subject, see Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1982).

<sup>24</sup> See Catherine Hall, *Civilizing Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imaginations, 1830-1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); and Kathleen Wilson, ed., *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

state policy. Serious losses in the volume of transatlantic trade threatened to destabilize the peninsular economy. Meanwhile, military losses in the Western Hemisphere held the possibility of radically reshaping the position of the Spanish Monarchy vis-à-vis other European continental powers. Thus, the process of imperial disintegration and reintegration examined here unfolded in an imperial and geographic paradigm that was both Atlantic and somewhat imperial in nature.

The transformation of the monarchy at the end of the eighteenth century created the context for crisis. Before then, the Spanish Monarchy was never imperial in the conventional sense. A relic of the Reconquista of the late medieval period, the Spanish Monarchy came into being as an assemblage of crusader states allied together behind the leadership of a single monarch. Under the Habsburgs, this model was applied to the New World as well where successive viceroalties came into being as nominally co-equal partner kingdoms of those that persisted on the Iberian Peninsula. The distinction between metropole and colony was then far less stable than was the case in other European empire-building schemes. Peninsular kingdoms were, of course, well integrated into the Spanish imperial system. Latin American historiography has argued that an aggressive policy of imperial reform – a “second conquest” to some historians – launched at the close of the eighteenth century transformed this relationship towards a more imperial one.<sup>25</sup> This body of literature has challenged an older body of literature that supported the view that such changes were of little import to the duration of a long-

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<sup>25</sup> See David A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763-1810* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

standing imperial relationship that survived intact until at least 1808.<sup>26</sup> In fact, the Bourbon Reforms were as much a shock to patterns of rule in peninsular Spain as they were in Spanish America.

Indeed, whatever the impact of these reforms on the Spanish Monarchy as a whole, for Sevilla the Bourbon Reforms signaled the loss of its privileged position within an older network of trade and imperial administration. Decentralization of imperial trade networks during the middle part of the eighteenth century caused the declining importance of Sevilla in the ambit of transatlantic trade. For the majority of the colonial period, the city of Sevilla served as the sole entrepôt of Spanish trade with its overseas colonies, witnessing the arrival of a considerable wealth of bullion, new herbs and medicinals, and other precious commodities. The royal trading house relocated from Sevilla to the open water port city of Cádiz in 1717. Shorn of its unique role in the imperial system, the city of Sevilla nonetheless retained its prime importance to the realm, remaining an important seat of regional governance and religious administration. To a significant extent, however, it also became quite unexceptional in imperial terms. The meteoric rise of Cádiz from a small port city to major locus of trade aside, no single city directly benefitted from the decline of Sevilla. Only Madrid survived as a major focal point of imperial rule. Paradoxically, it was the declining position of Sevilla in this period that makes it an ideal case study, less a special outlier and more of a rough approximation of other points throughout the imperial domain. As such, the present study exists as an

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<sup>26</sup> Hugh M. Hamill, Jr. *The Hidalgo Revolt: Prelude to Mexican Independence* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1966).

exercise in cis-Atlantic history – history of a single component part of the Atlantic World to which unfolding patterns of continuity and change were no less marginal.<sup>27</sup>

Another piece of the larger context for this study is the so-called “Age of Revolutions,” which links widespread political change emanating out of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) to the chronologically distant but similarly revolutionary events of 1848. Historians of the Age of Revolutions argue that interrelated political revolutions throughout the Atlantic world translated into long-term changes that provoked the advent of “modern” political constituencies and political cultures. An earlier version of this historiography narrowly defined the parameters of this new political culture. For R.R. Palmer, modern implied democratic, and did not extend well beyond England, France, and the United States.<sup>28</sup> Use of the phrase “The Age of Revolution” by E.J. Hobsbawm further entrenched the concept in the North Atlantic.<sup>29</sup> Over the past thirty years, scholars of the Spanish Atlantic, led by the late François-Xavier Guerra, have worked to broaden the scope of this concept to encompass the entire Atlantic.<sup>30</sup> The work of Rodríguez O. has done perhaps more than any other scholar to refigure the importance and

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<sup>27</sup> David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, eds. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 15-24. This owes in part to the limitations of the archives involved. A thorough study of multiple Atlantic points of comparison would have posed considerable logistical challenges. Well-know Atlantic historian Alison Games has advanced a similar view, see “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges and Opportunities,” *American Historical Review* 111.3 (June 2006), 746.

<sup>28</sup> R.R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America*, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959-1964).

<sup>29</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848* (New York: New American Library, 1962).

<sup>30</sup> François-Xavier Guerra, *Modernidad e independencias* (Mexico City: Mapfre, 1992).



connectedness of events in the North Atlantic with those in the Hispanophone world.<sup>31</sup> Whereas Rodríguez has dismissed the decisive impact of European intellectual developments of the mid-eighteenth century, José María Portillo-Valdés has credited the confluence of the Atlantic revolutions to the spread of the European Enlightenment.

It is worth noting that the experience of successive rapid transitions and associated disorder of the age of revolutions was not limited to the Atlantic world alone. Napoleon's armies mastered control of Central Europe before they entered Spain.<sup>32</sup> The resulting disorder was felt far and wide: estimates suggest that well over half of the German population changed rulers at least once by the year 1806.<sup>33</sup> In some circumstances, political allegiances changed with stunning frequency. The secularized bishopric of Osnabrück alone switched rulers no less than six times in the period 1802-1814.<sup>34</sup> Amid such turmoil, contemporaries adapted to altered notions of political legitimacy and confessional realignments with far reaching implications. On the Italian Peninsula, events followed a similar course to those in Germany. In the south, Neapolitans and Sicilians were faced not only with the ouster of one Bourbon monarch and the substitution of Napoleon's brother Joseph, but also after 1808 the imposition of

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<sup>31</sup> Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *The Independence of Spanish America* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>32</sup> The literature on Napoleon's rule of Europe comprise a weighty sum of volumes in many languages. Among the best sources in English remains Owen Connelly, *Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms* (New York: The Free Press, 1965); and Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), especially 371-395.

<sup>33</sup> Michael John, "The Napoleonic Legacy and Problems of Restoration in Central Europe: The German Confederation," in *Napoleon's Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe*, Eds. David Laven and Lucy Riall (London: Berg, 2000), 85.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

Napoleon's brother-in-law, the General Joachim Murat.<sup>35</sup> In short, during the height of the Napoleonic Era the continent was a kaleidoscope of changing political regimes.

Further afield the experience was no different.

Spanish America shared the experience of its Iberian metropole, experiencing in successive fashion the suspense of the French invasion, the rally to the patriotic cause, the implementation of constitutional rule in 1812, and the absolutist restoration. Amid this backdrop of a surprisingly uniform application of official rule were superimposed the various political regimes instituted by the independence movements that dated almost from the crisis of 1808. In the Mexican case, independence came in 1821 and with it near constant alterations in political regimes for the next forty years. As with the Spanish case, what endured was uneven adherence to a new political culture.

In this Spanish Atlantic context, historians of Latin America have done a far better job at tracing the importance of political literacy in the colonies and their successor states than historians of peninsular Spain. The popularity of the Age of Atlantic Revolutions paradigm has led to intensive focus on the period 1750-1850 in Latin American historiography. Extensive study of the transition from the political governance of the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain to modern Mexico and its sister states in

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<sup>35</sup> The Neapolitan case has special importance for two essential reasons. In the first instance because Joseph Bonaparte governed from Naples as he later did from Madrid in the capacity of a French usurper. Joseph's departure in 1808 to assume the Spanish throne paralleled that of Carlos III in 1759. Both would-be-reformers learned to govern in Southern Italy. To some extent, whereas the French failed to export the Revolution into Spain, they succeeded in the Mezzogiorno. In the second instance, Italian and Spanish liberal political networks often fed on one another in the post war period. Indeed, the liberal movements in both countries after the war were closely related. On Neapolitan history during the Napoleonic period, see John A. Davis, *Naples and Napoleon: Southern Italy and the European Revolutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Central America has stressed the heavily local character of this phenomenon.<sup>36</sup>

Additionally, this change has been told expertly by a number of studies, which have noted the importance of political culture in understanding this moment.<sup>37</sup> Given such an awareness of political culture and local history in Mexican historical circles, it is surprising that work on Spain in a similar vein has been slow in coming to the peninsula.

Utilizing political culture as a lens into the world of everyday Spanish life in a regional context, I seek to uncover the evolution of a local politics during the period in question. This focus on the micro-political angle is further meant to serve as a proxy for similar processes of political debate and negotiation that took place across Spain. In this respect, it is my hope that such an angle will add nuance to a central facet of Spanish political life during the Age of the Revolutions that has lacked serious reflection in earlier studies.

#### ON WESTERN ANDALUSIA AS CASE STUDY AND A WORD ABOUT SOURCES

It is impossible to study the relationship between local communities and larger geo-political and social configurations by treating the former in isolation of the latter. Examining the interactions of multiple towns as part of a regional system provides a useful intermediary space in which to contextualize the relationship of municipalities to one another and to the larger political and social systems to which they belong. Western

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<sup>36</sup> Jordana Dym, *From Sovereign Villages to National States: City, State, and Federation in Central America, 1759-1839* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006) and Eric Van Young, *The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology, and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810-1821* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

<sup>37</sup> Peter Guardino, *The Time of Liberty: Popular Political Culture in Oaxaca, 1750-1850* (Duke: Duke University Press, 2005).

Andalusia serves as useful region of investigation for the purposes of this study for several reasons. Life at the local level in the region was opened to a series of exceptional crises during the period 1766-1823. These included epidemics and subsistence crises that were exceptional for their severity. Politically, Western Andalusia was the site of the most unique experiments in Spanish local governance between 1766 and 1823, including the tenure of Pablo de Olavide as the political head of the city and the short but significant rule of the Junta Suprema de Sevilla and the Junta Suprema Central, both of which governed for a time as national governments during the French captivity of Fernando VII. The smaller towns in the vicinity of Sevilla were at the core of this experience, taking part in multiple political transitions and at times viewing the regional capital as ally and enemy. Free from the imposition of French occupation longer than most areas of the peninsula, the region also had more time to evolve politically between the crisis of 1808 and the restoration of Fernando VII in 1814. A major religious center, the city of Sevilla also serves as an excellent place to observe the complicated relations between civic and religious officials. In short, Western Andalusia figures as the essential site of investigation for examining the crisis of sovereignty as it transpired in peninsular Spain. No local experience in the peninsula was as comparatively rich in terms of social or cultural change.

I use the term “Western Andalusia” to define the region surrounding Sevilla. Western Andalusia has never constituted a formal region in the administrative practices of Spaniards themselves. Instead, the much larger geographic region of Andalusia, encompassing the Guadalquivir River Basin and the adjoining south Mediterranean coastline, has been a more enduring regional configuration. During the later part of the

eighteenth century, contemporaries would often reference “the four kingdoms of Andalusia,” collectively referring to the region bound by the kingdoms of Córdoba, Granada, Jaén, and Sevilla. These southernmost peninsular kingdoms came into being during the final stage of the Reconquista between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. The most geographically extensive of the four, the Kingdom of Sevilla covered a territory that included much of the western half of the region. Nonetheless, by the close of the period under examination, geographic division of the realm had been reordered to fit a provincial configuration. The transition from kingdom to province for Sevilla did not mean the preservation of existing boundaries. Much of the territory corresponding to the new provinces of Cádiz and Huelva was taken from what had been part of the Kingdom of Sevilla in years prior to 1808. None of the aforementioned territorial distinctions are then of much relevance in defining the parameters of study. For this reason, I have taken to using Western Andalusia to describe the area encompassing what another observer might have chosen to characterize as “greater Sevilla” or “Lower Andalusia,” in recognition of the westward flow of the Guadalquivir.

It is worth stressing that this dissertation will focus on local political culture. Operatives of the central government, seen here to encompass the monarchy and the people and institutions that governed in its name, including the Council of Castile and the Cortes, will appear on occasion as key actors within my narrative. Removal of these actors altogether would obscure important aspects of historical contingency and prove counterproductive towards explaining the relationship between local political communities and the wider world. Describing the relationship between the central government and local actors remains an integral component of the present study.

However, for my purposes it is the local dimension of politics that interests me above all others. Indeed very little has been written on this subject.<sup>38</sup> In some instances local political cultures were found within municipalities, as in the populous neighborhoods of the city of Sevilla or the many smaller neighboring settlements that adjoined formal municipalities in rural areas. However, local actors tied in some fashion to the municipalities of Western Andalusia will serve as my principal protagonists.

In order to get at the voice and perspectives of local actors, I have relied on a variety of source materials. These include documents drawn from the major state archives of Spain, including the National Historical Archive, the National Library of Spain, and the Library of the Congress of Deputies. These institutions have been useful in gathering printed material like newspapers, pamphlets, and ephemera. However, the holdings of municipal archives in Western Andalusia have served as the principle source of my evidence. Municipal archives preserve the handwritten minutes of town council meetings from the foundation of a settlement to the present. These records, known as *actas capitulares* (AC), provide the essential archival basis for this dissertation.

*Actas capitulares* serve as an excellent foundation for the present study because of their rich content and the manner in which they were kept. All AC were maintained with a mind toward satisfying the most bureaucratic excesses of Spanish government. Such behavior included often exhaustive notations relating to every facet of an issue from its emergence to its resolution. Public notaries responsible for maintaining AC were trained in the scriptural shorthand of their day and the formalities of public administration.

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<sup>38</sup> Only very limited historical work has been completed on the role of municipalities during this period and one work of reference remains that of Concepción de Castro, *La revolución liberal y los municipios españoles, 1812-1868* (Madrid: Alianza, 1979).

Professionally, they considered their role to be that of an objective bystander. Furthermore, council members were obliged to sign the completed AC in testament to their accuracy. Yet like all human artifacts, the keeping of AC was a highly subjective business. Not every aspect of a meeting was necessarily recorded, especially when meetings were held in closed session. On occasion, official correspondence, public testimony, and other items appear affixed between unrelated items of business. Other entries state the execution of specific orders of the council. The collection of presented material reads as a chronology of what mattered to contemporaries, with much to offer the imagination by way of what was not recorded or never given due closure. Perhaps owing to resulting challenges for historical interpretation and certainly because of their focus on issues of concern exclusively towards the maintenance of local government, AC have not figured into historical accounts that narrate larger frames of historical experience. The AC were often unfairly dismissed as the reserve of antiquarians.

Local historical techniques have come a long way since the first generation of practitioners was criticized for lacking a firm theoretical foundation. Indeed, founding practitioner of modern local history W. G. Hoskins opposed the application of theoretical models to local history. His successor in the immediate post-World War II period Herbert Finberg disagreed with this view, treating the creation of a sound methodology as an important means to assert the significance of local history alongside more established traditions.<sup>39</sup> Finberg insisted that scholars should write local history on an arc beginning with the origin of a community and taking into consideration its rise, decline, and

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<sup>39</sup> John Beckett, *Writing Local History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 114-115.

inevitable fall.<sup>40</sup> Thankfully, such a heavily teleological approach has been dropped by more recent generations. What has emerged has been a fervent debate over the relationship between local histories and national histories and the appropriate tools by which to construct firm linkages between the two.

The move to redress discordant histories at play between national and local experiences has been typified by two distinct national schools of local history. In Germany, colleagues at the Max Planck Institute for History during the 1970s and 1980s made use of social scientific techniques adopted for national histories to explain local case studies that confirmed macro-historical explanations using micro-historical examples.<sup>41</sup> The Italian school of *microhistoria* that emerged around the same time as its German counterpart has been portrayed as a counter-reaction to quantitative methods.<sup>42</sup> Many adherents of this group began as firm Marxists and feared a “human cost” in the writing of national histories from a heavily social scientific perspective.<sup>43</sup> Some have been critical of this swing, suggesting it shows a movement from one extreme to another. Local historians have been criticized for being overly nostalgic and for studying historic moments in lieu of explaining more complicated and long-term instances of historical change.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> It is worth noting that this practice remains firmly identified with the English tradition of local history. Carol Kammen, *On Doing Local History*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2003), 4.

<sup>41</sup> This group included German-born historians Hans Medick and Jürgen Schlumbohm in addition to American David Sabeian. Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), 106-107.

<sup>42</sup> Peter Burke, *History and Social Theory*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 41.

<sup>43</sup> Well-known members of this group include Carlo Ginzberg, Carlo Poni, Giovanni Levi, and Edoardo Grendi. Iggers, 101-102.



The present study examines local political culture, but is not an exercise in local history. My approach is neither purely quantitative nor so limited in scope as to preclude analysis of trends operating on a much larger scale. To avoid an incidental or anecdotal approach, I have drawn evidence from several towns, each in its own way representative of a unique type of settlement. To this effect, I have consulted the records of towns that were cities in their own right and others that were owned in the corporate sense by powerful members of the Spanish peerage. These towns varied in their size, distance, and geographic orientation from the city of Sevilla. In some instances, these towns were home to a vibrant merchant community. Others subsisted almost exclusively on large-scale agriculture; still others on a narrow subsistence economy tied to their situation in mountainous areas.

The scope of the present study examines Western Andalusia in a regional sense. To avoid being overly reliant on AC, I have also consulted printed sources held in the major state archives to account for what emerged in the public sphere beyond the solitary officialdom of local government. These archives were also instrumental in providing me with access to the many pamphlets produced during the period of my study. These ranged from the merely incidental account of a special event to more concerted examples of political gamesmanship, which were no doubt meant to capitalize on the emergence of a vibrant public sphere. Though most of these were published in Sevilla, this was not exclusively the case. Undeniably, however, there exists a disproportionate amount of source material relevant to the city of Sevilla. Indeed, Sevilla will figure at the core of this study. This owes not simply to the wealth and availability of source material, but also

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 112-113.

to its important position in the region. Sevilla was a major population center, the core of regional public and religious administration, an important hub of trade and commerce, and a nodal point of information exchange. As I will show, Sevilla was situated at the core of a regional system.

## CHAPTER LAYOUT

In the chapters that follow, I will examine historical change in Western Andalusia from the dimension of local political culture. Chapter 1 will present the mechanics of municipal government and local societies in Western Andalusia. My treatment examines important aspects of the social and cultural lives of contemporaries to explain how these forces mediated the realm of the politically possible. In providing context of this kind, I will provide the reader with a baseline by which to gauge political change after 1766.

Chapter 2 will explore the region of Sevilla after the Tumult of 1766, which reoriented the reform agenda of the regime in several ways. In Western Andalusia, a new reform agenda included the implementation of an ambitious program of reform under the stewardship of the Peruvian-born Pablo de Olavide. I present this stage of reform as existing within the parameters of state paternalism that was the hallmark of the Bourbon absolutist regime and adhering to a colonial model of development that linked events in the peninsula with other reforms initiated throughout the Spanish Monarchy like those initiated by the better known administration of José de Gálvez in New Spain. In short, this chapter will demonstrate how sclerotic the Bourbon regime was shortly before the onset of crisis in 1808.

In chapter 3, I explore the response of Sevilla to the crisis of sovereignty initiated in 1808. In the absence of a legitimate monarch to govern the vast transatlantic domain of the Spanish Monarchy, municipalities were left as sovereign political entities. I argue that local communities in Western Andalusia ceded partial sovereignty to the Junta of Sevilla for the purpose of organizing a collective defense against the French. However, many communities objected to the means whereby the Central Junta assumed sovereign and supreme powers from the regional *juntas*. This act of usurpation undid local faith in novel supralocal political institutions and led to the entrenchment of a localized response to the crisis. During the French occupation of Western Andalusia, local communities remained isolated in their resistance.

Chapter 4 will examine Western Andalusia during the First Constitutional Period (1812-1814). In this chapter, I contend that the survival of the constitutional regime depended on the proper implementation of new legal provisions enumerated in the Constitution of Cádiz. My analysis of the rehabilitation of former French collaborators demonstrates the importance of municipal governments in this period. Under the terms of the Constitution, municipalities were expected to reform local government through the creation of new offices and political institutions in pursuance with their adoption of constitutional provisions. As my analysis of events in two towns will demonstrate, there sometimes existed a wide disparity in the manner by which representatives of the central government and municipal governments interpreted central provisions of the Constitution.

Chapter 5 will explore the role of ritual culture in Sevilla during the period 1808-1814. Ritual culture certainly figured into the political life of Western Andalusia during the early modern period. However, I argue that this period witnessed the use of ritual

culture as a means to promote political indoctrination whereby new ideas were imparted to a receptive population. Additionally, ritual culture was significant in this period because it allowed non-elites to take an active part in crafting the acceptance of new political regime like the restoration of absolutism in 1814.

My analysis of the Second Constitutional Period begins with chapter 6. In this chapter, I will examine the genesis of the Riego rebellion, viewing it as a local phenomenon with significant implications for the practice of politics at the central level of government. I seek to explain how it was that the peoples of Western Andalusia responded with aversion to participation in the revolt. My explanation will draw on the long-term implications of guerilla warfare and banditry in the region and briefly explore how it was that municipalities responded to the problem of political instability posed by the rebellion.

In chapter 7, I argue that the volatile politics of the Second Constitutional Period (1820-1823) signaled the failure of Fernando VII's restoration to resolve the crisis of sovereignty opened in 1808. The Second Constitutional Period demonstrated the tremendous importance of local politics in peninsular Spain after 1814. Once again, municipal politics took center stage in the contest between Fernando VII and the Cortes. Fernando VII attempted to clear away significant changes to the political culture of the Spanish Monarchy initiated after 1766 and accelerated by the crisis of sovereignty after 1808. His inability to fathom the implication of these changes, a political viewpoint shared by his ministers, produced widespread resentment in peninsular circles and furthered the disintegration of the imperial system constructed by his predecessors.

## CHAPTER ONE:

### Western Andalusia as Region:

#### Sevilla and Environs at the Middle of the Eighteenth Century

Western Andalusia figured as one of several regions within the political geographic boundaries of the Spanish Monarchy during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.<sup>1</sup> Although scholars frequently define regions as merely the casual byproducts of trade networks and administrative structures, the present study expands on this approach to offer a more inclusive idea.<sup>2</sup> I take region to mean an intermediary socio-cultural space situated between the boundaries of a state and those of local communities, extending within or across the political boundaries of districts, provinces, or other political units. In my view, three features serve to define the contours of regions: limiting features of geography, a high volume of personal interactions organized in systemic

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<sup>1</sup> The inspiration for this chapter owes in no small part to Eric Van Young, "Doing Regional History: A Theoretical Discussion and Some Mexican Cases," in *Writing Mexican History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 167; first published in "Doing Regional History: Methodological and Theoretical Considerations," *Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers Yearbook 20* (1994): 21-34, and "Introduction: Are Regions Good to Think?" in *Mexico's Regions: Comparative History and Development* (La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1992), 1-36.

Although historians of Spanish history have not devoted considerable attention to this subject, the anthropologist Carmelo Lisón-Tolosana has written on the subject, see his "Sobre áreas culturales en España," in *Ensayos de Antropología Social* (Madrid: Editorial Ayuso, 1973), 40-107. See also Julian Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierra*, 2nd Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); Michael Kenny, *A Spanish Tapestry: Town and Country in Castile*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961); Carmelo Lisón-Tolosana, *Belmonte de los Caballeros: A Sociological Study of a Spanish Town*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); William A. Douglas, *Death in Murélag: Funerla Prectice sn a Spanish Basque Village* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969); Richard Maddox, *El Castillo: The Politics of Tradition in an Andalusian Town* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993); and Susan Tax-Freeman, *Neighbors: The Social Contract in a Castillian Hamlet* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

<sup>2</sup> This tendency towards thinking of regions as material features of human societies continues to fade. Post-modern scholarship has facilitated the birth of human geographic frameworks that explore more cogently the relationship between geographic spaces and social communities. Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen offer a convincing argument in support of the mutability of regional geographies as socio-cultural concepts in *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

fashion, and shared cultural traditions. Over time, the second and third of these features serve to deepen the uniqueness of regional cultures.

Historians have noted the emergence of the first glimmers of regional identity dating to 1808.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, it is clear that a sense of collective identity emerged close in keeping with the formation of regions as lived spaces.<sup>4</sup> Much scholarship has focused on the relationship between regions and nations.<sup>5</sup> For the purposes of this study, regions are not taken as nations.<sup>6</sup> That is, regions are not strictly social entities. While social bonds serve to facilitate the development of regional systems through the integration of local interpersonal networks, a region ultimately depends upon geographic considerations that

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<sup>3</sup> Ferran Archillés and Manuel Martí, “Ethnicity, region and nation: Valencian identity and the Spanish Nation-state,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24.5 (2001): 779-797.

<sup>4</sup> In this regard the definition provided above coincides closely with that provided by Xosé-Manoel Núñez, “The Region as Essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840-1936),” *European History Quarterly* 31.4 (2001): 483.

<sup>5</sup> Scott Eastman sees regional identity as having been subsumed by national identity during the War of Independence, *Preaching Spanish Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759-1823* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 2012), 49. Indeed, the relationship between local communities and nationalism has also come under much scrutiny, though focusing on a period well after those concerned here. This owes to Ferran Archilés, “Una nacionalización no tan débil: patriotismo local y republicanismo en Castellón (1891-1910),” *Ayer* 48 (2002): 283-312; and Alon Confino, “Lo local, una esencia de toda nación,” *Ayer* 64 (2006), 19-31.

<sup>6</sup> Xosé-Manoel Núñez, “The Region as Essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840-1936),” *European History Quarterly* 31.4 (2001): 483.<sup>6</sup> A lengthy literature exists on nations and nationalism. Of course, the best known work on the subject and the one with which I wish to draw a clear contrast is that of Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983). On the birth of Spanish nationalism, see Chapter 3. As David A. Bell reminds us, national identity has a tendency to change over time; *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001). A new and evolving body of literature has sought to portray regionalism as a kind of acquired social identity, similar in scope to nationalism. On this subject, see Eric Storm, *The Culture of Regionalism: Art, Architecture and International Exhibitions in France, Germany and Spain, 1890-1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011). I take regional identity to mean something less than a national identity as used in the context of this chapter. Nationalists are rightly portrayed in sociological literature as harboring an emphatic and essentialist admiration for the nation that frequently verges on the religious. Nationalists are almost by definition frequently willing to fight and die for the nation. By comparison, regionalists are often relatively non-political in their behavior. I will use regional identity in the context of this chapter to signify awareness of a regional system, absent the affective qualities of nationhood.

presuppose patterns of supralocal societal integration. Regions are furthermore both real and imagined spaces. They define the extensiveness of actual human networks of social interaction and information exchange but also suppose that the reach of these networks remain closed to wider connection with the outside world. Why does the present study require framing Western Andalusia as a region?

Pre-modern European political communities were typically very small. In the Spanish Monarchy, the practice of local politics was essentially municipal in scope, and was typified by a campanilistic pride of place in the *patria chica*, or “little homeland.” This is not to say that local politics during this period tended towards being backwards or particularly inward looking, but rather simply that the average person was more animated by interests of a local than a supralocal nature and, thus, oriented towards the affairs of the municipality more readily than those of the central government. When people of the eighteenth century looked beyond the municipality, their range of contact with the world beyond was limited by immutable features of geography and built infrastructure that served to limit the range of travel. Although, at least in a theoretical sense, all early modern Spanish municipalities owed allegiance to the king, crown and court were often quite distant. For this reason, local political elites in pre-modern Spain often engaged with regional elites as an alternative to visiting Madrid.

No existing regional geographic framework accurately depicts the historical space in which these political elites operated. This space matters for the purpose of situating the interplay of national and local politics and their contrasting political cultures. With the crisis of sovereignty unleashed by the French invasion of Spain in 1808, regions became central to the political dynamic that unfolded in subsequent months and years. It was at

the regional level of public administration that the political designs of central governments were enforced, contested, negotiated, and ultimately implemented. Likewise, the region was the most immediate geo-spatial context in which municipalities and their inhabitants engaged with the larger world, including the state and its agents of governance. Understanding how the region of Western Andalusia functioned before 1808 will provide a means to contextualize revolutionary processes of change that began thereafter.<sup>7</sup>

I argue that by the middle of the eighteenth century, Western Andalusia constituted a coherent region in the minds of the people who lived there. I have defined the geographic contours of Western Andalusia in general terms already.<sup>8</sup> In this chapter, I examine the composition of Western Andalusia in greater detail, presenting the social and cultural factors that provided for its cohesion as a region. Although subsequent chapters will adopt a diachronic approach to examining the interplay of historical processes, the present chapter will take a synchronic approach towards framing the study of the region.

The regional status of Western Andalusia stemmed from an elaborate system of overlapping and interconnected systems of public administration and commerce. Reciprocal relationships were a foundation linking people and institutions together. These relationships served to provide a sense of social cohesion. Meanwhile, everything from architectural styles to regional forms of religious observance served to make Western

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<sup>7</sup> A similar though unsubstantiated claim is made in Irene Castells and Antonio Moliner, *Crisis del Antiguo Régimen y Revolución Liberal en España, 1789-1845* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 2000), 9.

<sup>8</sup> A rough approximation corresponds to the contemporary Spanish province of Sevilla. See the Introduction. Very briefly, it is important to remember that Western Andalusia was situated along the valley of the Guadalquivir River between the mountainous terrains of the northern Sierra Morena and the southern Sierra Sur. In the west, it bordered coastal municipalities situated along the Atlantic seaboard. In the east, it extended to the intensely hot and unpopulated “deserts” of Andalusia located on the road between Sevilla and Córdoba.



Andalusia palpably different from other regions of Spain. During the eighteenth century, new cultural and social bonds of affinity served to deepen the cohesiveness of this regional system. The Spanish Enlightenment was integral to this process. Through advancement of a new sociability, the Spanish Enlightenment contributed to the emergence of a public sphere in Spain that extended from major urban areas to much smaller communities. Regional forces of social cohesion even mediated local public spheres. The expansion of printing and the spread of urban cafes were most apparent in cities that were the nodal centers of regional systems. This story was not unusual in the annals of the Western world. However, the prevalence of distinct regional systems was a key determinant of municipal self-identification within the Spanish Monarchy situated at the heart of the present study.

#### THE REGION AS THEORETICAL PROBLEM

Today, few would argue that the people of Andalusia possess a distinct regional identity. In the international popular imagination, the region conjures images of bullfighters and Flamenco dancers. It figures on the tourist itineraries of most Americans who visit Spain for this reason. This popularity owes, in part, to the influence of Washington Irving and other foreigners writers. For Western audiences beyond Spain, during the nineteenth century, Andalusian culture welcomed an encounter with the exotic past of Al-Andalus.<sup>9</sup> This sense of shared history and culture has served to give the

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<sup>9</sup> Such orientaling appears also in the travel narrative of Noah Mordecai and the writings of George Ticknor. On this subject, see Richard L. Kagan, "From Noah to Moses: The Genesis of Historical Scholarship on Spain in the United States" in *Spain in America: The Origins of Hispanism in the United States*, ed. Richard L. Kagan (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2002); and Rafael Sánchez-Mantero,

region a shared identity in the present. Still subtle variations in the manner of speech and perceived worldview continue to mark subregional identities within contemporary Andalusia. Despite this trend, pollsters note the tendency toward the creation of an increasingly homogenized Andalusian identity.<sup>10</sup> A tension then exists today between what Andalusia is and what it is to become. This very fact poses a very real challenge for the social scientist in the present but also points toward the complexities of attempting to define regions historically. Regions are human artifacts that exist in time and are prone to change with the emergence of new paradigms of lived experience.<sup>11</sup>

What did Andalusia look like in a regional sense during the eighteenth century? In some areas the rural holdings of powerful aristocratic magnates created a patchwork of extensive fiefdoms. Virtually microstates, such estates effectively controlled the labor market of rural farmhands and the vassalage of whole municipalities, whose governments were handpicked by the local lord. For many reasons, it is tempting to use a feudal model to explain the geographic breakdown of Andalusia into constituent regions. The vast

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“Viajeros y diplomáticos en el reinado de Fernando VII. El descubrimiento de España por los americanos,” *Ayer* 41 (2001): 141-160.

<sup>10</sup> On the expansion of Andalusian regional economic development, see John Naylor, “Ascent and Decline in the Spanish Regional System,” *Geography* 77.1 (1992): 46-62; and on the advent of new Mediterranean migration patterns, see Russell King, “Migration and Development in the Mediterranean Region,” *Geography* 81.1 (1996): 3-14.

<sup>11</sup> In this sense, I take the region to constitute something quite different from the deterministic geographic category that figures at the core of other studies. In particular, the geographical regions that grounded the work of *Annalists* were immutable and both socially and politically deterministic. This high structuralism was on view in Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), the first volume of which was first published in French in 1949. A later generation of *Annalists* distanced themselves from this view. See for instance the work of Emanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *The Peasants of Languedoc*, trans. John Day (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1977), first published in French in 1966. For an extreme case of environmental determinism, see Euclides da Cunha, *Rebellion in the Backlands*, trans. Samuel Putnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944). By contrast, I view regions as the product of human invention. Thus, they were mutable constructs shaped by social and political forces rooted in human behaviors.

tracts of land held in aristocratic hands stretched across various political districts and jurisdictions, suggesting that administrative boundaries were of little consequence in defining the features of a regional system. Despite such a medieval image, Andalusian aristocrats did not command armies, tended to reside in larger cities, and largely deferred to local administrators on matters of municipal government. Indeed, as many scholars agree, feudalism never came to Spain.<sup>12</sup> The comparison misses the mark. Such an organization of the region would place significant influence on the ability of Andalusia's aristocracy to order the distribution of labor, especially in rural areas. A more comprehensive economic picture ought to include the urban dimension, where cities like Sevilla – although significant depositories of aristocratic wealth – complicate the picture somewhat with the inclusion of wealth from communities of artisans and merchants.

Economic historians have taken to describing regions as networks of trade dependent upon dominant modes of transportation and the distribution of major markets. For example, David Ringrose examined the tendency of large Spanish cities to dominate regional economies in Spain.<sup>13</sup> In a later study, Ringrose presented the greater Guadalquivir River valley as a well-integrated regional economic subdivision of the larger Iberian peninsular economy.<sup>14</sup> His formulation was a product of the movement of goods, people, and information – the flow of each a practical consideration in shaping the contours of a regional economy. Although confirming the regional economic

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<sup>12</sup> Luís García de Valdeavellano, *Las instituciones feudales en España* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1963), 235.

<sup>13</sup> David R. Ringrose, *Madrid and the Spanish Economy, 1560-1850* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), see especially chapters 9, 11, 12.

<sup>14</sup> Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the "Spanish Miracle,"* 49-50, 291-309.

interconnectivity of the region, Ringrose's regional system encompassed a territory that was likely far beyond the scope of that appreciated by historical contemporaries. Other historical accounts have avoided trying to answer difficult questions related to regionalism.<sup>15</sup>

Interest in nations and nationalism inspired a new generation of scholarly research on this question. In his study of Cerdanya, Peter Sahlins explained how it was that residents of one frontier territory, which straddled the French-Spanish border, came to identify as French or Spanish. His study supported the claim that identity formation came as the product of complex social interactions. Furthermore, Sahlins argued that local identity formation preceded the imposition of strict boundaries from above. National elites depended on boundary making in the periphery to secure the demarcation of boundaries between nations.<sup>16</sup> Although not written with the question of regions and regionalism in mind, Sahlins' work described the processes whereby territorial units could break apart and reform as the product of social forces. Significantly, Sahlins' study pointed to the ability of social forces operating at the local level to shape the

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<sup>15</sup> León Carlos Álvarez-Santaló declines to offer a geographic description in *La población de Sevilla en el primer tercio del siglo XIX. Un estudio de las series demográficas sobre fondos de los archivos parroquiales* (Sevilla: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1974), 53. He defers instead to classic historical accounts like those of José Velázquez y Sánchez, *Anales de Sevilla de 1800 a 1850*, 1872 Facsimile Edition, ed. Antonio Miguel Bernal (Sevilla: Servicio de Publicaciones, Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1992); and Joaquín Guichot y Parodi, *Historia del Excmo. Ayuntamiento de la muy noble, muy leal, muy heroica é invicta ciudad de Sevilla*, vols. III and IV (Sevilla: Imp. de El Mercantil Sevillano, 1898-1903). Richard Herr almost conspicuously avoids defining regions in his study of the first wave of desamortization campaigns that were launched by the crown at the close of the eighteenth century. Rather, in search of "a more macro level" of study, larger in scope than the seven local communities at the core of the book but still somewhat more intimate than a national study, Herr makes use of the political category of the Spanish province to examine the regions surrounding Jaén and Salamanca. As such, Herr followed a line of inquiry structured more about archival considerations than the features of lived systems in which historical contemporaries encountered change. Richard Herr, *Rural Change and Royal Finances in Spain at the End of the Old Regime* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 539.

<sup>16</sup> Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

outcome of seemingly national policies. His study is of great value to explain the formation of national identities and the borders of nation-states.

However, for the purposes of the present study, Sahlins approach is lacking for two reasons. First, Western Andalusia was not a frontier region and the social identification of its inhabitants along national terms was not inherent to the precise demarcation of the Spanish nation-state *vis-à-vis* other nation-states. At stake was the internal configuration of the Spanish state. Second, municipalities depend on a variety of interactions that are not strictly social in nature. Municipal governments are certainly products of the people who run them, but as institutions are also responsive to economic, political, and other forces that private individuals are more readily able to defy. Thinking regionally in municipal terms, then, means something more.

Despite such reticence, there is good cause utilize the category of regions more thoughtfully. Historians of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Spain have taken to conducting what are essentially regional studies without reflecting critically on what these regions meant historically.<sup>17</sup> While some regional systems appear to have undergone only minimal modification in the past two centuries, this does not appear to have been the experience of southern Spain where regional systems underwent significant change. Much of this change occurred during the period of the present study as the politically and socially heterogeneous transatlantic Spanish Monarchy disintegrated and

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<sup>17</sup> On the Basque Country, see Renato Barahona, *Vizcaya on the Eve of Carlism: Politics and Society, 1800-1833* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1989); and José María Portillo-Valdés, *Los poderes locales en la formación del régimen foral, Guipúzcoa, 1812-1850* (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1987); *Monarquía y gobierno provincial. Gobierno y constitución en las provincias vascas, 1760-1808* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1990); *Sueño Criollo. El doble constitucionalismo en el País Vasco y Navarra* (San Sebastián: Nerea, 2006). On Galicia, see Barreiro Fernández. On Navarra, see John Lawrence Tone, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

was replaced in the peninsula by the more politically and socially homogenous nation-state that is modern Spain. Spanish colonial regional boundaries were often the fault lines that determined the shape of post-colonial successor states in the Americas.<sup>18</sup> Explaining how peninsular Spain emerged from this process intact without fracturing into a multiplicity of nation states requires understanding Western Andalusia as a region.

Defining a region for the purposes of examining the interplay of super- and sub-regional political cultures requires something more than merely designating a suitable geographic space and description of regional economic systems as other scholars have done. As at least one scholar has argued, one of the logical outcomes of examining political culture has been a redefinition of politics to encompass a broader range of informal mechanisms that provided for exercise of power.<sup>19</sup> Whereas traditional political history tends to examine the distribution of power in rather formal terms as dependant on the designation of political offices and an array of carefully delineated rights and privileges, the present study sees power as essentially diffuse in nature. Political culture depends on a variety of geographically contingent social features. These include the spatial geographies of civic, juridical, military, and religious districts. Only in rare instances did the contours of these spaces match perfectly. Other significant considerations include patterns of land tenure, agricultural production, religious

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<sup>18</sup> The formation of nation-states in the Americas was a complicated process. In some cases, nation-states took the form of former Spanish colonial jurisdictions, as in the case of the Chile. Mexico succeeded in resisting regional centrifugal forces to preserve the shape of what had been New Spain. By contrast, New Granada broke apart into several countries. For an excellent case study on the formation of new nation-states in Central America as a process that merged colonial jurisdictions and emergent national identities, see Jordana Dym, *From Sovereign Villages to National States: City, State, and Federation in Central America, 1759-1839* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006).

<sup>19</sup> Peter Burke argues as much in *History and Social Theory*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 79. His argument builds on the “micro-physics” of power argument put forward by Michel Foucault in *Power/Knowledge* (1980).

observance, and even political loyalties. What emerges from this mix is an amorphous jumble of interconnected systems and networks situated around a nodal center. It was the city of Sevilla that bound the region together and linked Western Andalusia to the crown.

This was typical of the Spanish Monarchy in general. Major cities served as primary points of linkage between the central government and distant regions, which were envisioned as independent kingdoms (see fig. 1). Indeed, the connection between the urban settlements the imperial project was so closely intertwined as to warrant Richard L. Kagan to describe the Spanish Monarchy as “an empire of towns.”<sup>20</sup> Separate kingdoms persisted in peninsular Spain through the end of the Old Regime as relics of the medieval past. This resulted in a political system that John H. Elliott once described as a composite monarchy.<sup>21</sup> As Anthony Pagden put it, the Spanish Monarchy was “a federation of quasi-autonomous kingdoms with only one king.”<sup>22</sup> When threatened from outside, Spaniards of all stripes viewed their imperial compact through a lens of nationhood. Yet from within, Spaniards adhered to the idea of belonging to separate *patria*.<sup>23</sup> Depending on the observer, these *patria* varied in size from viceroyalties to captaincies-general, and even, in peninsular Spain especially, to various

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<sup>20</sup> Richard L. Kagan, *Urban Images of the Hispanic World, 1493-1793* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), especially 28-39.

<sup>21</sup> This idea builds on that proposed by H.G. Koenigsberger, and suggests that nominally equal kingdoms were effectively rendered into a system of dependency based on the development of core and peripheral zones. See J. H. Elliot, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," *Past and Present* 137 (Nov. 1992): 48–71. This idea does not mean to imply that the center was uniformly successful in enforcing its position. The parameters of this system required negotiation between officials at various levels of bureaucracy. On this point, see Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe, "Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation-State and Empire Building," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 88.2 (2008): 173–209.

<sup>22</sup> Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 117.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*





Mainlands of the Ocean Sea, Archduke de Austria, Duke of Burgundy ... Lord of Bizcay, and of Molina, etc.” As sovereign of each of these realms, the king exercised the right to name officials to govern in his name. By the later part of the eighteenth century, four viceroys, or vice-kings, governed Spanish America. In Madrid, a single Council of the Indies remained responsible for the management and implementation of imperial policy in all four New World viceroyalties. Meanwhile, the Council of Castile played a similar role for the peninsular domain. While this arrangement effectively made the Kingdom of Sevilla part of Castile, it did not mean that subjects in Western Andalusia viewed themselves as Castilians. As with so many administrative titles, Castile signified little to the people of Sevilla. In the absence of a cohesive national consciousness, it was the law of primogeniture and institutions of state that held the Spanish Monarchy together.

At the regional level, this was not the case. A deeper set of connections linked together the residents of individual regions. Bounded by the spatial limitations of regional geography, these connections constituted economic relationships, social affiliations, and cultural bonds. Such connections did not lead to the formation of a regional consciousness that would have pitted the inhabitants of one region against those of other constituent regions of the Spanish Monarchy. However, for the community residing within each region, such connections provided the basis for a distinct sense of regional awareness that extended beyond mere attachment to local settings. Furthermore, although regions were not clearly defined within the institutional structure of the Spanish state, regional connections were influential in shaping local political cultures throughout the peninsula. Western Andalusia was an exemplary case in this regard, as the implementation of Bourbon Reforms manifested local responses that were visible across

the region of Western Andalusia if the Spanish Monarchy as a whole. Thus, while the Kingdom of Sevilla did not operate in a legal sense, the region of Western Andalusia was very much a living, breathing unit of peninsular organization and a pole around which local political cultures took shape.

#### THE KINGDOM OF SEVILLA

On present day maps, the Kingdom of Sevilla would appear as almost the whole of Western Andalucía. Within this expanse were 189 towns (*poblaciones*), including seventeen cities. In terms of population, a contemporary figure suggests 128,253 *vecinos*, or male heads of households resided within Western Andalusia. Population counts were often completed in this fashion as a means to assess tax obligations. It is difficult to estimate the actual population from such censuses, but a number in excess of five times that figure seems reasonable. Moreover, to this count of heads of households one must add 30,098 secular clerics and 9,828 male and female members of the regular clergy in 218 monasteries and 110 nunneries. Further obscuring the numbers were 127 hospitales, numerous hamlets (*aldeas*), roadside inns (*ventas*), landed estates (*cortijos*), and farmhouses (*casas de campo*), which did not yield reliable headcounts.<sup>26</sup>

During the later eighteenth century, the unity of Western Andalusia began to yield to reformers' intent to cleave a cumbersome relic of the medieval Reconquest into much smaller and more manageable administrative unit. Even the church saw the need to

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<sup>26</sup> The seventeen cities were: Sevilla, Cádiz, El Puerto de Santa María, Jerez de la Frontera, Écija, Carmona, Arcos de la Frontera, Ayamonte, Medina Sidonia, Moguer, Sanlúcar de Barrameda, Algeciras, Sanlúcar la Mayor, Tarifa, Gibraltar, San Roque, and Antequera. Bernardo Espinalt-García, *Descripción del Reino de Sevilla*, Introduction by Manuel García-Fernández and María Antonia Carmona-Ruiz (Sevilla: Ayuntamiento, 2010), 6-7.

recognize the growing importance of newer urban centers, establishing a new diocese at Cádiz. In 1785, the peninsula was divided into 31 provinces at the behest of the Count of Floridablanca, who was then first minister of state.<sup>27</sup> A series of bureaucratic reorganizations under first the French occupational regime and later the constitutionalist government broke the old kingdom of Sevilla into first two and later three roughly equivalent provinces headquartered first, at Cádiz and Sevilla, and eventually also at Huelva. In determining where to draw provincial boundaries, Bourbon and later French administrators looked to regional administrative structures already in place.

## REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

Apart from networks of trade, the administrative networks of Western Andalusia were the most salient organizational features of the region. However, the distribution of regional administrative networks owed to the imposition of competing jurisdictions that were anything but organized. The roles and functions of Bourbon officials were at once both highly stratified and conflictive in the sense that some areas of administration were either administered jointly or never clearly oriented within the administrative obligations of any single office holder. Because of this ambiguity, locals were frequently able to play one administrator off against another. In order to understand how this might happen, we can explore some of the major regional administrative structures and the officials associated with them

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<sup>27</sup> Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon's Cursed War: Spanish Popular Resistance in the Peninsular War, 1808-1814* (London: Verso, 2008), xv.

In Madrid, a complex bureaucracy of separate governing institutions managed affairs of state. By the year 1801 this bureaucracy numbered 6,372 public servants.<sup>28</sup> Increasingly, the still nascent but evolving role of prime minister was charged with coordinating the work of these bodies in service to and at the pleasure of the Spanish monarch, whose executive role required absolute obedience. Separate ministries for war, grace and justice, and the treasury, among others, oversaw the army, Church affairs and the judicial system, and finances, respectively. As implied above, the absence of regional or provincial clearinghouses created a bottleneck for communications in Madrid. Much of what any office did on a daily basis was focused almost exclusively on official correspondence with distant operatives. Although legislative power was vested in the king, who made law through royal decrees, or *cédulas*, several councils facilitated this role through review of existing policies and occasional recommendations for reform.<sup>29</sup>

The Council of Castile held sway over the peninsular, or metropolitan, affairs of the monarchy.<sup>30</sup> It was the Council of Castile that served as the primary point of contact between local governments and the central government. On the occasion of royal coronations, such as that of Carlos IV in 1789, the Cortes – a representative assembly of the major peninsular cities with origins in the medieval period – was called into session.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Feliciano Barrios-Pintado, *España 1808. El gobierno de la Monarquía* (Madrid: Real Academia de La Historia, 2009), 30.

<sup>29</sup> A distinction existed between royal *cédulas* issued by the king alone and *pragmáticas* issued jointly by the king and Cortes when assembled. Richard Herr, “The Constitution of 1812 and the Spanish Road to Parliamentary Monarchy,” in *Revolution and the Meaning of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Isser Woloch (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 65, 68-9.

<sup>30</sup> Feliciano Barrios-Pintado, *España 1808. El gobierno de la Monarquía* (Madrid: Real Academia de La Historia, 2009).

On such occasions, the king had the chance to supplement the use of unilateral decrees with *pragmáticas*, joint resolutions of king and Cortes. The accession of Fernando VII in 1808 offered an occasion to convene such a body and for the irregular and symbolic opportunity of the king to temporarily share sovereignty with his subjects.

The administration of justice was another area of overlapping jurisdictions. Smaller towns included a judge of first instance among their ranks of public officials. In the larger cities, royal *audiencias* heard special cases and appeals from lower tribunals. These, in turn, were overseen by more senior chancellery courts. Those headquartered in Granada oversaw all south peninsular *audiencias*.<sup>32</sup> Under the Bourbons, the creation of *intendencias* corresponded to a need for better tax collection strengthened by institutions with superior data keeping ability and alternate coercive powers that exceeded those mechanisms already at the disposal of the crown.<sup>33</sup> In most instances, the jurisdictional boundaries of an *intendencia* corresponded to the separate kingdoms of the Spanish Monarchy. Individual *intendentes* were also named as *corregidores* of the capital city of each kingdom. In the case of Sevilla, this meant the office of *asistente*.

Within the peninsular realm of the Spanish Monarchy, the army was dispersed geographically into several captaincies-general. Each captaincy-general comprised a geographic territory that only loosely conformed to the political and jurisdictional

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<sup>31</sup> It is worth stressing the fact that the Spanish Cortes held session in 1789 without major incident, the same year that the Estates-General of France was called back into session, with revolutionary consequences.

<sup>32</sup> “si bien un Real Decreto de 1790 apartó de su jurisdicción Extremadura y la Audiencia de Grados de Sevilla.” Eduardo Díaz-Lobón, *Granada durante la crisis del antiguo régimen, 1814-1820* (Granada: Diputación Provincial, 1982), 109. In 1812, became simply Audiencia of Granada until 1814 – page 110.

<sup>33</sup> The intendency system was brought from France, where the French Bourbons used it to their advantage in the construction of a strong absolutist state.

boundaries of other categories of the Bourbon state administration mentioned previously. Captains-general commanded the resources of all military installations within their domain and had at their disposal the most effective means for maintaining domestic order available to the Old Regime. In the absence of a modern police force, the army was frequently called into urban areas to quell bread riots, into the countryside to pursue bandits, and to serve a wide variety of other functions.

Old regime institutions were an amalgamation of varied administrative networks, each with a different historical *raison d'être*, each having its own jurisdictional boundaries. The centralizing drives of the early Bourbons explored briefly in chapter two brought a greater sense of rationality to this ordering. Throughout this reorganization, however, the guiding logic behind reform was largely economic in nature and, though led by key promoters of the Spanish Enlightenment, directed by imperial competition more than by an abiding sense of idealistic pragmatism. Enduring against the backdrop of such change was the institution of the municipality.

## THE MUNICIPALITIES OF WESTERN ANDALUSIA

At the most local of levels, every municipality in Spain was granted a kind of corporate local government known as an *ayuntamiento*.<sup>34</sup> Although many of the settlements of Andalusia dated to the Roman period or well before, the *ayuntamiento* system dated to the medieval period. The enduring and pervasive quality of local life has already been discussed in some detail. However, it is worth stressing that a town was also a *pueblo*, and so something more than a simple legal entity. As Julian A. Pitt-Rivers

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<sup>34</sup> Tamar Herzog, *Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

explained, the *pueblo* “is not merely a geographical or political unit, but the unit of society in every context. The *pueblo* furnishes a completeness of human relations which makes it the prime concept of all social thought.”<sup>35</sup> The legal designation of *ayuntamiento* reified and added some validation to pre-established communities. The Habsburg kings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries perpetuated the medieval model because it provided a stable source of income, as the Crown elevated villages to town status in exchange for sizeable donations to the royal coffers. The Bourbon dynasty, which governed Spain from the start of the eighteenth century, largely succeeded in waging a decades-long campaign to dismantle local privileges to create a more centralized rule, a circumstance of history that has detrimentally affected historical writing on Spain to the present.<sup>36</sup> Yet, as the strength of the Bourbon monarchy began to crumble at the end of the eighteenth century, the monarchy resorted to the sale of land once again, reversing its hold over a cohesive political unit managed from Madrid. This reversal provided an exceptional opportunity for the resurgence of municipal authority.<sup>37</sup> Matters were simply brought to a head with the French invasion of 1808.

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<sup>35</sup> Pueblos were the essential building blocks of the state. This view was common throughout the Mediterranean world, where community was based on locality, a norm with evident implications for jurisprudence, social conceptions of the *patria chica*, and even the emphasis on observance of the local cults of saints: Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierra* 2nd Ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 30-1. On this subject, see also Julio Caro-Baroja, “El Sociocentrismo de los pueblos españoles,” in *Razas, pueblos y linajes* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1957), 261-292; William Christian, *Person and God in a Spanish Valley* (New York: Seminar Press, 1972); David D. Gilmore, *The People of the Plain: Class and Community in Lower Andalusia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Michael Kenny, “Parallel Power Structures in Castile: The Patron-Client Balance,” in *Contributions to Mediterranean Sociology*, ed J.G. Peristany (Paris, Mouton, 1968), 155-162; and Carmelo Lisón-Tolosana, *Belmonte de los Caballeros: A Sociological Study of a Spanish Town* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

<sup>36</sup> This historical change, perhaps more than any other, has misconstrued the fact that the local dimension of historical experience remained of paramount importance well into the early modern period. Helen Nader, *Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516-1700* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 9.

The number and variety of civic offices within an *ayuntamiento* varied by town, but each town was headed by a *corregidor*, appointed by the king, who represented the apex of the local administrative hierarchy. Three exceptions existed to this rule: Sevilla, the neighboring town of Marchena, and Santiago de Compostela, which were overseen by royal *asistentes* who differed from *corregidores* only in name.<sup>38</sup> The authority of the *ayuntamiento* was vested in an administrative town council, or *cabildo secular*, which ranged in size from one town to the next and varied in composition. An *alcalde* (or *teniente corregidor*), sometimes several, second in hierarchy to the *corregidor*, headed the *cabildo* and oversaw the work of other municipal officers. Generally larger settlements had large *cabildos* with a sophisticated variety of municipal officers. In the smallest of towns, a small handful of persons rotated from office to office. In both instances, *cabildos* provided an impressive and reliable system of self-government.

Beginning in the sixteenth century, *ayuntamientos* became complicit in the crown's selling of municipal offices to raise money. This occurred above all else in larger cities where the wealth of aristocrats allowed the practice to prosper. With the entailment of these offices as part of the inheritance of each successive generation from its forebears, a powerful oligarchy emerged from this process.<sup>39</sup> The authority of the *ayuntamiento* derived, in part, from the class status of its membership. All posts were effectively restricted to aristocrats. This practice was maintained by a self-sustaining tendency on the

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<sup>37</sup> Richard Herr, *Rural Change and Royal Finances in Spain: At the End of the Old Regime* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

<sup>38</sup> Manuel Antonio Ramos-Suárez, *El Patrimonio Cultural de Marchena y la ocupación Napoleónica* (Marchena: Ayuntamiento de Marchena, 1999), 17.

<sup>39</sup> Antonio Domínguez-Ortiz, *Sociedad y Estado en el Siglo XVII Española* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1976), 455.



part of aristocrats to elect their peers to serve in successive fashion. Thus, although the *cabildo* elected officers to serve twelve-month terms set to coincide with the calendar year, the intent was not democratic in scope though the *ayuntamiento* wielded a certain representative claim to consider the plight of all inhabitants. All officers were in practice servants of the crown working on behalf of the king, and not in the public interest.

The most significant factor affecting the size of a *cabildo* was the number of *regidores* (council members) entitled to take part in proceedings. In Sevilla, the number was well above one hundred. Inclusion in the most junior rung of the Spanish peerage, was a requirement to serve as a *veinticuatro*, one of two categories of *regidores*. Lesser aristocrats were eligible to hold the title of *jurado*. Non-aristocrats were excluded entirely. However, this did not preclude the advancement of wealthy persons of modest birth to prominent municipal positions. This was especially the case in larger urban settings. Council meetings began with the celebration of a mass conducted by a municipal chaplain, and so there was a religious representation as well.<sup>40</sup> However, religious officials were not invested typically in the business of municipal *cabildos*.

The structure of local government and the powers accorded to municipal *cabildos* also varied by type of town. Much in the same way that the Old Regime formalized a convention of discrimination among social groups before the law, towns were granted special privileges and obligations depending on their historical legacy, population size, and political relationship to the monarchy and important aristocratic households. Larger towns were generally conceded the title of city (*ciudad*), which granted the *ayuntamiento* a relatively high degree of autonomy in determining the course of its own affairs. Sevilla

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<sup>40</sup> Eduardo Díaz-Lobón, *Granada durante la crisis del antiguo régimen, 1814-1820* (Granada: Diputación Provincial, 1982), 108.

was an exemplary case. Sevilla had been a city for centuries by virtue of its prominent size and historical significance. This distinction owed, in part, to the city's place as an ancient crossroads of successive trade networks extending across the Guadalquivir River. Sevilla was also an important depository of royal assets. The Palace of the Real Alcázar served as an imperial residence dating as far back as the era of the Cordoban Caliphate. The city was also home to major royal institutions, including a royal mint and the headquarters of the tobacco monopoly. For a brief five-year spell between 1729 and 1733, Sevilla was even the capital of the Spanish Monarchy while Felipe V sought out its temperate climes to ease his worsening health. Thus, the city held a special place within the historical and political cosmos of the Spanish Monarchy.

As a city, Sevilla had the right to send a representative to the Cortes. This important distinction secured the place of Sevilla among the upper echelon of the peninsula's leading urban centers. In fact, the practice of calling the Cortes continued throughout the early modern period and well into the time period of the present study, although by the eighteenth century it was merely a ceremony to mark the succession of a new monarch. Sevilla sent delegates to attend the Cortes of 1789 held to mark the coronation of Carlos IV, and in 1808 when Napoleon Bonaparte hastily organized a Cortes at the French seaside city of Bayonne, Sevilla was called upon to do so once again. Representation in the Cortes was not the same as that accorded to a democratic assembly. Delegates did not represent constituencies so much as the legal entity of the city. Thus, the system protected the autonomy of the cities and the political independence of the powerful aristocrats who controlled them.

Cities were one kind of chartered municipal entity that existed under the legal system of the Old Regime, but they were from typical. Apart from that of city, the designation of town (*villa*) or hamlet (*lugar*) was most common. Neither towns nor villages held a right to representation in the Cortes, but they often experienced the same form of *de facto* administrative independence enjoyed by cities. Towns and villages held under the royal domain (*realengo*) experienced virtually the same administrative independence as larger cities. Like cities, towns were overseen by a *corregidor* appointed by the king and local notables often succeeded in securing inheritable appointments to the town council by force of tradition and legal right. The creation of aristocratic sinecures fostered the independence of municipal institutions because the major families that controlled the administration of each town maintained a strong sense of independence from the crown. In this way, local oligarchies limited the ability of crown officials to penetrate the affairs of local government.

However, some municipalities often lacked the political independence of large cities and other municipalities held in *realengo*. This was especially the case in areas held as part of the *mayorazgo*, or inheritable legal entity, of an aristocrat. Under the terms of a *señorio*, aristocrats were essentially granted the means to administer municipalities on behalf of the monarch. In such instances, the composition and membership of the *ayuntamiento* was deferred to the aristocrat by right of the local *señor*. This right, guaranteed by seigniorial privilege, afforded powerful aristocrats extensive powers to determine the membership of municipal *cabildos* held within their legal domain. In such instances, one individual in effect controlled the appointment of all municipal officials. For instance, throughout the early modern period the *ayuntamiento* of Osuna owed the

membership of its *cabildo* to the prerogative of the Dukes of Osuna (of the Téllez-Girón family). The Dukes of Arcos de la Frontera (of the Ponce de León family) held similar sway over Marchena. Still more complex medieval legacies, in most instances deriving from the Reconquista, gave the king and religious prelates the power and influence to handpick favorites to fill local posts.<sup>41</sup>

We should also take note of what has been called “the overwhelmingly urban nature of the countryside.”<sup>42</sup> Spanish municipalities were never simply a legal or purely corporate construction. Every municipality was also a territorial unit.<sup>43</sup> This facet of political organization meant that no part of the peninsula was rural in the sense of being beyond the boundaries of neighboring urban centers. Municipal boundaries extended into unsettled areas and encompassed a *término*, including unincorporated “dependent hamlets”<sup>44</sup> known as *aldeas*, a feature of municipal organization that provided each settlement with a surrounding hinterland that was legally and often culturally as much a part of the confines of the municipality as the buildings that stood along the main plaza. I stress this idea not to imply that Spain was somehow a single sparsely populated

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<sup>41</sup> One estimate for the region of Western Andalusia has the produced the following distribution: realengo, 32.6%; eclesiástico, 4.1%; secular, 63.1%. Antonio Miguel Bernal, *La Lucha por la tierra en la crisis del Antiguo Régimen* (Madrid: Taurus, 1979), 43.

<sup>42</sup> Nader, 14. A description of this phenomenon also appears in Kagan, *Urban Images*, 19-20.

<sup>43</sup> The very idea of municipal jurisdiction dates to the ancient world. Roman *municipia* were the local building blocks of classical Hispania. A *municipium* was home to a minimum number of Roman citizens and was afforded self-government within the larger empire unlike lesser *coloniae*. Roman Civil Law, the foundation of Spanish law well into the modern era, privileged the position of the *municipium* as an indispensable component of the governing political order. The Roman province of Baetica in Southern Iberia was no different. During the Flavian period, Western Andalucía was dotted with a network of Roman settlements governed by strikingly similar local statutes. Hartmut Galsterer examines the law code of one settlement located in the modern province of Sevilla in “Municipium Flavium Irnitatum: A Latin town in Spain,” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 78 (1988), see especially pages 79-80, 89-90.

<sup>44</sup> The phrasing has been taken from Richard Maddox, *El Castillo: The Politics of Tradition in an Andalusian Town* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993).

conurbation, but rather to comprehend the mental map of the people that lived there. Dense settlements within each municipality were stitched together by extensive trade, postal, and pastoral routes, but were far from a social or cultural whole. In fact, neighboring towns differed considerably in many ways.

In the intimate world of eighteenth century Spain, networks extended only so far. The regional world of the average peasant was quite small. The history of land ownership or the formation of trading networks served as the foundation of informal regional units known as *comarcas*, often presided over by powerful members of the local aristocracy.<sup>45</sup> In parts of Andalusia, distance from Madrid elevated some aristocrats to the status of petty monarchs within a comarca. This subregional world stitched the peninsula together. In some instances, the socio-environmental frame of the comarca provided the strict organizational logic behind the designation of independent *partidos judiciales*, which covered the aggregate territory of several municipalities. *Partidos judiciales* served as the building blocks of the peninsula's many historic kingdoms, and later the provinces replacing them.

#### SEVILLA AS REGIONAL NODE

By the middle of the eighteenth century, Western Andalusia constituted a coherent region in the minds of the people who lived there. I have defined the geographic contours of Western Andalusia in general terms already.<sup>46</sup> The city of Sevilla was

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<sup>45</sup> Susan Tax Freeman, "Identity in Iberia: Some Remarks," in *Iberian Identity: Essays on the Nature of Identity in Portugal and Spain*, eds. Richard Herr and John H. R. Polt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 199.

undeniably the most influential municipality in Western Andalusia.<sup>47</sup> As such, it functioned as a regional node (see fig. 2). That is, it was both formally and informally the central place of a regional system and that region's primary point of contact with the Spanish Monarchy and wider world.<sup>48</sup>

This position emerged principally as the organic result of various economic and political forces. Such political forces included the designation of Sevilla as the center of regional administrative activities by successive political regimes. Named Hispalis by the Romans, the city was an important center of administration and trade during the era of the Roman Empire. In the period that followed collapse of the Muslim Caliphate of Al-Andalus, Sevilla (then Isbiliya) was the capital of a wealthy and influential successor state. When Fernando III of Castile (St. Ferdinand) captured it in the thirteenth century, Sevilla was declared the capital of a kingdom of the same name. Shortly after its capture, it gained the reputation of being the most loyal bastion of support for the crown. When the son and heir of Fernando III, Alfonso X the Wise, faced civil war, Sevilla was one of

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<sup>46</sup> A rough approximation corresponds to the contemporary Spanish province of Sevilla. See the Introduction. Very briefly, it is important to remember that Western Andalusia was situated along the valley of the Guadalquivir River between the mountainous terrains of the northern Sierra Morena and the southern Sierra Sur. In the west, it bordered coastal municipalities situated along the Atlantic seaboard. In the east, it extended to the intensely hot and unpopulated "deserts" of Andalusia located on the road between Sevilla and Córdoba.

<sup>47</sup> According to Carrie B. Douglas, "the town implies a region that, together, creates one's essential personality." *Bulls, bullfighting and Spanish Identities* (Tucson: University of Arizona, Press 1999), 216, fn6.

<sup>48</sup> Two useful theoretical frameworks for thinking about the emergence of Sevilla as a regional node are central place theory and network system theory as described in Paul M. Hohenburg and Lynn Hollen Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe, 1000-1994* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 4-7, 47-73. Walter Christaller developed central place theory to explain the origin and distribution of urban areas. Under this theory, a hierarchy of towns developed to provide for the coordination of commercial markets, transportation needs, and administrative purposes. Sevilla would have represented the highest degree of sophistication in such a system. Networks systems theory seeks to explain how multiple regional systems are drawn together in complex and overlapping relationships. While Sevilla was an important center of regional activity, it was also closely connected at various points in time to regional networks bounded to cities such as Buenos Aires, Havana, and Madrid.

only a handful of cities that remained loyal to him, offering the rightful king refuge within its walls. In return for the city's defense, Alfonso X granted Sevilla the right to address itself as *Muy Noble y Muy Leal* (sometimes abbreviated to M.N. y M.L.), a status that carried with it special distinction in the heraldic world of the medieval period and which the city continued to exploit well into the modern period.<sup>49</sup>



Figure 2: The Region of Western Andalusia.<sup>50</sup>

The kingdom of Sevilla was quickly absorbed into the Castilian monarchy and in a short time Castilian displaced Arabic and Mozarabic as the dominant language of the region. Aside from slight variations in regional dialects, no significant degree of linguistic differentiation marked the south of Castile from the north. This linguistic

<sup>49</sup> Indeed, at the conclusion of the War of Independence the city was officially designated as the *Muy Noble, Muy Leal y Muy Heróica* (sometimes M. N. M. L. y M. H.) Ciudad de Sevilla. Although recognition of this status had been granted by the constitutional regime, the restored monarchy chose not to take issue with the claim and no effort was made to overturn the title.

<sup>50</sup> This map was taken from David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the "Spanish Miracle," 1700-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 292.

homogenization resulted from the significant influx of northern Castilians during the crusade period, including soldiers, religious communities, and aristocrats responsible for the settlement of the newly conquered region. Although this period witnessed the establishment of some new towns and the expansion or decline of others, by and large the new Christian overlords protected the distribution of settlements and the regional relationships that had endured for centuries. The dominant position of Sevilla within its surrounding region was by then a somewhat durable feature of history. The city retained an influential position in a regional and economic sense throughout the period in question.

The waterways linking together the valleys of the Guadalquivir Basin knit together a system of trade and commerce that figured as one of four distinct peninsular economic zones that endured throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.<sup>51</sup> Sevilla was situated at the core of this system as the major market town and center of regional administration. While the city relied on the surrounding countryside to provide valuable foodstuffs and other commodities, its outsized influence in this regional system also served to set regional demand. As a major source of capital, the lenders of Sevilla also kept the region prospering in financial terms. This reciprocal relationship joined the economic interests of the city's urban denizens and residents of the rural hinterland. Major regional municipalities often hired agents to represent their interests in Sevilla.<sup>52</sup> Although ocean-going vessels could not navigate the Guadalquivir above the floating

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<sup>51</sup> The Andalusian economic region received attention earlier in this chapter. Comparable economic regions existed for Barcelona and the Mediterranean littoral, Bilbao and the northern coast, and Madrid and the interior mesetas. On these regions, see Ringrose, 46-49, 187-290.

<sup>52</sup> As was the case of Osuna. León Carlos Álvarez-Santaló, ed., *Osuna, 1751. Según las respuestas generales del Catastro de Ensenada* (Madrid: Taba Press, 1991), 51.



bridge at Sevilla, shallow-keeled vessels and barges maintained water-borne linkages as far east as Córdoba. This traffic kept transit costs low in comparison with overland routes. The river served as the region's artery, but it could also have a crippling effect.

Though landlocked, Sevilla's port linked the city to the wider world.<sup>53</sup> From the sixteenth century, Sevilla served as home to the Casa de Contración, which managed the flow of maritime traffic across the Atlantic and provided for the assessment and collection of royal taxes. It was also the home of the powerful merchants' guild known as the Consulado. Because of this, Sevilla functioned as the entrepôt for all Spanish trade with the New World for much of the early modern period. In the words of one scholar, this gave Sevilla a dualistic "economic soul" in that it was both the major point of departure for goods produced in Spain sent overseas and also the point of entry for raw goods from the Americas.<sup>54</sup> American silver and other goods flowed into the city, funding the construction of Baroque churches among other projects. The timing of investments in monumental works of residential architecture and charitable institutions flowed from this prosperity gave the regions a distinctive baroque appearance. In the sixteenth century, fear of Protestant conspiracies moved Philip II to limit the movement of foreigners throughout the Spanish Monarchy. Sevilla's position as a center of transatlantic trade made it one of the more cosmopolitan cities in the realm. Although

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<sup>53</sup> Historians of the Spanish economy have noted the persistence of a marked economic dualism that separated a stagnant inland economy from that of a vibrant coastal one. Although situated inland, Sevilla corresponded to the latter zone. Ringrose, *Madrid*, 4.

<sup>54</sup> Álvarez-Santaló, 53.

foreigners did not travel extensively within the region, the city played host to French, German, and Italian communities.<sup>55</sup>

Around the turn of the eighteenth century, increasing levels of silt in the Guadalquivir River forced royal planners to reconsider the position of Sevilla in the transatlantic maritime trade. Relocation of the major shipping operations to the coastal port of Cádiz, which became final in 1717, marked the beginning of a prolonged economic and social decline for Sevilla. The city's population declined from about 130,000 in 1700 to 80,000 by 1795.<sup>56</sup> Cádiz appeared destined to displace Sevilla as primary regional node of economic activity. As it so happened, the position of Cádiz proved a fleeting one. A series of Bourbon reforms launched during the middle decades of the eighteenth century gradually restructured patterns of transatlantic trade. By 1778, the reforming zeal of the Bourbons led to establishment of "free trade" between the Iberian Peninsula and the wider Spanish Monarchy. Free trade under this policy did not permit foreign ships to trade directly in Spanish ports. Rather, it diversified the ports of first call for Spanish ships crossing the Atlantic.<sup>57</sup> The major features of the mercantile economy remained intact. Yet the advent of free trade did manage to displace the function of royal administration as the engine of transatlantic enterprise, substituting in its place an emergent and rapidly growing class of commercial free agents. Spanish ports

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<sup>55</sup> Modern street names Alemanes, Francos, and Génova, are said to derive from the clustering of these groups. On street names, see Santiago Montoto, *Las Calles de Sevilla* (Sevilla: Nueva Librería, 1940).

<sup>56</sup> These numbers are based on figures given by León Carlos Álvarez Santaló, *La población de Sevilla en el primer tercio del siglo XIX. Un estudio de las series demográficas sobre fondos de los archivos parroquiales* (Sevilla: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1974), 61-62. The total population of Spain during the period 1715-1797 rose from roughly 7.5 million to about 11.5 million. These numbers were drawn from Ringrose, 72.

<sup>57</sup> Classical economists and political liberals later developed the modern theory of free trade in response to Adam Smith and publication of *The Wealth of Nations* (1776).

along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines appear to have benefitted most from this change. This, in turn, slowed what had been a meteoric expansion of wealth centered in Cádiz. Thus, while Sevilla suffered a terrific loss of prestige, population, and investment of wealth shortly after the start of the century, Cádiz did not fully succeed in eclipsing Sevilla as the major hub of regional economic activity. Sevilla became one of two primary regional economic centers in the Guadalquivir River valley, and the one best oriented towards inland markets for agriculture and manufacturing.

Manufacturing in Sevilla expanded during the eighteenth century as the crown devoted considerable energy to the renovation of old monopolies and the creation of new ones.<sup>58</sup> This led royal planners to initiate two major projects in Sevilla. The Royal Artillery Foundry (Real Fábrica de Artillería) dated to the sixteenth century, but an aggressive campaign to rebuild the facility began in 1720. Construction on the workshops of the Royal Tobacco Factory (Real Fábrica de Tabacos) began in 1728. As the singular production site for Spanish tobacco products, this project figured as one of the more lucrative investments of the crown, and as a major part of the city's image.<sup>59</sup> As a symbol of royal wealth and prosperity, the presence of a mint within its walls further served to emphasize the tremendous importance of Sevilla as a major beneficiary of royal largesse. Industry and prestige went hand in hand, and was another way in which Sevilla maintained its position within the region.

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<sup>58</sup> Industrial activity remained a small portion of the overall economy. Figures for 1797 suggest that only around 12% of the population was involved in industry. Agriculture absorbed roughly 66% of the population and services another 22%. Castells and Moliner, 16.

<sup>59</sup> The structure later served as the backdrop of the Prosper Mérimée novella *Carmen* and the opera by Georges Bizet of the same name.

## THE HINTERLAND

Western Andalusia comprised seven distinct ecological zones.<sup>60</sup> The mountainous zones of the Sierra Morena to the north of Sevilla and the Sierra Sur to its southeast were perhaps most evident. In the extreme southwest of the region, a swamp-like zone known as Las Marismas extended along the Guadalquivir River. Further upstream, a drier riparian zone known La Vega ran from Sevilla to the westerly extreme of the region, skirting the southerly extent of the Sierra Morena. To the west of the Guadalquivir rose a basin known as El Aljarafe. To the east and south of the Guadalquivir River, a terrain that featured rolling hills ambling toward the Sierra Sur was known as La Campiña. Because of the ideal quality of its farmland, La Campiña had been one of the most densely settled areas of the Iberian Peninsula from prehistoric times. During the Roman era, vast estates known as *latifundias* divided the landscape into a patchwork of large farms controlled by wealthy patricians. The intervening centuries had not altered this pattern of land tenure in dramatic fashion.

The core feature of La Campiña was the *hacienda*, an institution not unlike the Roman villa. The landed elite, typically aristocrats but also some persons of more modest birth, owned these *haciendas*. The hacienda was headquartered typically around a *cortijo*, or farmhouse, which featured as a multiuse facility that often included living quarters for the owner and farmhands. Haciendas channeled the resources of men, money, and capital toward large-scale agricultural production. In this respect, the primary drive behind their organization and administration was commercial. Owners produced grain and sold it to towns, which held it in dry form within local granaries, or *pósitos*. Commercial instinct

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<sup>60</sup> In Spanish, these are sometimes referred to as *comarcas agrarias*. To avoid confusion, I have avoided the use of *comarca* in this context.

aside, there was also a social aspect to the hacienda system. These commercial enterprises served as a basic component of social order in the countryside. Especially in more rural areas, a small few controlled the employment of thousands.

Pastures and wooded areas were often designated as a *dehesa*. *Dehesa* designated land unsuitable for farming purposes. Such land was often used for grazing livestock, including cattle, pigs, and sheep. These lands were sometimes owned and managed by individuals or independent families. Also, some towns held such property, known as *tierras baldías*, and granted use on a communal basis. The right of usufruct in such land by individuals or landowning groups, often in control of neighboring lands, was common as well. Such lands provided the towns of La Campiña with ample control of surrounding countryside. Administering this land was the local *ayuntamiento*. Thus, in keeping with the oligarchic structure of the society, such territory was managed almost exclusively by social elites, most often local aristocrats who dominated ownership of the *haciendas*. In many places the role of a single aristocratic household was pronounced as in the case of the lands controlled by the Dukes of Osuna near Morón de la Frontera. The unstructured life of the *dehesa* was, however, also an escape in some sense.

The world of the *sierras* which bounded Sevilla to the north and south, contrasted with life in La Campiña. Unlike La Campiña, where a few towns of moderate size existed amid vast latifundias focused on agricultural production, the sierras featured networks of small towns integrated into a pastoral economy. The oak forests of the Sierra Morena provided the perfect pasturelands for pigs and the wetter inclines of the Sierra Sur served as the perfect terrain for sheep. Although local town governance in this zone remained aristocratic in nature, a death of extremely wealthy aristocrats weakened the sway of the

aristocracy to a considerable degree. Absence of the strict social ordering of the hacienda also left pastoralists of the sierra largely immune to the sort of pressures evident elsewhere. The numerous valleys and rocky hideaways of the sierra also afforded bandits with the perfect refuge, unlike the exposed terrain of La Vega and La Campiña.

Contrasting systems of land tenure and geography divided the region of Western Andalusia into several *comarcas*, or subregional systems.<sup>61</sup> In some instances, these were defined by the uniformity of regional terrain: life in the mountains offered a lived experience that was often quite different from that found elsewhere in the region. *Comarcas* also formed around the influence of neighboring towns. Economically, the major towns of *comarcas* served as secondary centers of economic activity within a regional system. Such towns included Carmona (La Campiña), Cazalla de la Sierra (Sierra Morena), Écija (La Campiña), Morón de la Frontera (la Campiña), Osuna (Sierra Sur), Sanlúcar La Mayor (El Aljarafe), and Utrera (La Campiña and Las Marismas). Sevilla dominated much of La Vega and the northern portion of Las Marismas. Thus, surrounding Sevilla was a province that was far from a simple, homogenous political demarcation but rather a complex environment in which the city asserted influence over local systems of land tenure in addition to networks of trade, patterns of commerce, and the structure of political administration.

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<sup>61</sup> The number varies. Various translations for *comarca* include area, county, district. County and district overstate the administrative significance of *comarca*, while area is simply too vague a translation. I have chosen to use “subregion” because several *comarcas* were often included within the confines of a regional system. Each *comarca* also included several towns.

## THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY AND THE CHURCH

The Catholic Church of the eighteenth century was no longer the heroic and mystical force it had once been at the height of Spanish power and prestige.<sup>62</sup> Nonetheless it remained a potent force in the daily life of the Spanish Monarchy during the late eighteenth century, especially in Western Andalusia. This was especially true in more remote and non-urban communities. The collection of regular tithes and the ownership of immense land holdings secured the position of the Church as a tremendous depository of wealth. A formal ecclesiastical government oversaw this enterprise and administered the local business of the Church. The wealth and administrative order the Church provided, in turn, fueled a system of cultural patronage that energized the Spanish Baroque. The effect was an imposing one. Opulent parish churches, outdoor shrines, and ubiquitous Latin crosses graced every corner of the urban landscape; in the countryside no traveler was far from a roadside shrine, the prosperous estate of a religious community, or the obligation of the faithful to adhere to religious traditions.

Because no serious religious threat to Roman Catholicism had existed within the Spanish Monarchy since the era of the Tridentine reforms, the Catholic Church oversaw a community of believers that was among the most uniform of its day. The brutal religious wars that racked England, France, the German lands, and elsewhere, never crossed the Pyrenees. Although patterns of religious observance (e.g. veneration of specific saints, the importance of certain religious festivals, etc.) varied greatly within the peninsula, to say nothing of the empire at large, uniformity in terms of confessional alignment offered the Spanish Monarchy perhaps its greatest impetus toward social cohesion and the

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<sup>62</sup> William J. Callahan, *Church, Politics and Society in Spain, 1750-1874* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 2.

foundation for political order. Nowhere throughout the Spanish Monarchy was the vision of lawful government and religious legitimacy on better display than in Western Andalusia where the image of the crusading Ferdinand III – one of the city’s patron saints – attested to the close union of temporal power and spiritual faith.

A clear linkage between the abstract world of religion and its more worldly obligations was maintained by an elaborate culture of ritual. Anthropologists have provided a basic framework for understanding the significance of regular commemorations of saints’ days and other religious observances. In Sevilla, important religious occasions included the feast day of Saint Fernando and festivities associated with the Virgen de los Reyes. The first celebrated the patron saint of Sevilla and the “liberator” of Christian Western Andalusia in ceremonies that upheld the close bond between throne and altar. The second celebrated a Spanish tradition of Marian devotional cults, commemorating one attributed to the sixteenth century reign of Fernando II and Isabella I.

The “deep” resonance of religious ceremonies had a profound impact on the worldview of participants and profound consequences for the structure and cohesiveness of whole communities.<sup>63</sup> In a sense, it was the religious calendar – dominated as it was by the life of Jesus and the Church itself – that drove the comings-and-goings of seasons and the passage of time.<sup>64</sup> To mark the passage of important events, no festive observance

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<sup>63</sup> See Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); and Clifford Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

<sup>64</sup> Of great importance as well was the life cycle of the reigning monarch whose personal anniversaries littered the annual calendar. For an excellent overview of the annual religious calendar, see Edward Muir, *Ritual in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), especially chapter two, “The ritual calendar,” 62-88.



was complete without a procession. Processions were the essential act in the ritual world of the eighteenth century. Participation in ritual allowed for access to the world of religion. In a world closed to religious accommodation and one which predated the strict identities of class, race, and nationality that were to come in the course of the nineteenth century, access to the religious community of believers defined perhaps the most basic claim an individual could make to being part of something larger than him/herself. Being Catholic was as much a social obligation as it was a religious one.

Even in smaller towns where a single parish served the entire populace and surrounding countryside, the parish church was the essential factor in determining informal obligations owed by the individual to the larger community. By means of its monopoly over the conferral of the sacraments, even the lesser members of the clergy wielded immense control over access to the religious world. Ahead of affiliation to the smallest of political entities was an abiding awareness of the particular parish into which one fit. To shun participation in parish life branded an individual as outsider. The parish church was the most common locus of local religious affiliation. Every Spaniard knew precisely the boundaries of the parish they belonged to. The contours of a parish were often traced and retraced during the course of a year by the nearly continuous series of processions that linked the formal commitments of the members of various *cofradías* and *hermandades* to the less formal, though no less important role, of spectators. All lay religious groups were tied to a church and, except in exceptional circumstances, to a specific parish community. The city of Sevilla maintained thirty parish churches within its walls, each with a flock roughly equivalent to the population of a small town and occupying a geographic space of several medieval city blocks. Parishioners were

expected to receive of the Catholic sacraments, go to masses regularly, and confess. It was also at the parish level that Church officials collected tithes, a regular component of Church income and an obligation of all souls. The parish church also offered a link to the wider Church. In southern Iberia, the average parish was quite large. Only 303 parish churches supported 750,000 souls in and around Sevilla.<sup>65</sup> However, the ratio of the clergy to the laymen differed in Sevilla, because there were many parish churches – 30 in all – and numerous religious communities that also served the population. The relative wealth of its parishes as compared to those beyond its walls likely supported a higher per capita number of secular clergy. The parishes of the capital also generally had a higher quality of clergyman than rural parishes. They were more likely to have acquired theological training at the University of Sevilla.

At the regional level, the Church hierarchy depended on the work of a diocesan administration to police the work of priests and the piety of its constituency. A concordat signed with the Pope in 1753 secured the supremacy of crown over pontiff granting the king of Spain control of the delegation of benefices. Such ardent regalism stemmed in no small part from the strong Jansenist vein that ran through the ideological core of the Spanish Enlightenment and the practice of enlightened despotism. Diocesan representatives made regular visits to parishes. Records of each visit were then held in the diocesan archives. By virtue of its size and historic stature, Sevilla was one of eight metropolitan sees in peninsular Spain. The Archbishop of Sevilla was superior to a number of suffragan bishops, whose dioceses, together with his, made an ecclesiastical province. In Sevilla, the Palace of the Archbishop stood in the Plaza of the Virgin de los

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<sup>65</sup> Callahan, 10.

Reyes alongside the Cathedral of St. Mary of the See. The Palace, a magnificent baroque building made of brilliant red brick, housed not only the personal living quarters of the Archbishop, but also the bulk of the diocesan administration, including the courts of canon law.

A separate building on the opposite side of the Cathedral housed the *cabildo eclesiástico*, the cathedral chapter, which shared the governance of the diocese with the archbishop. The Dean of the Cathedral regularly chaired the ecclesiastical *cabildo*. Most of its members were trained in canon law. Although the number and stature of the cathedral canons varied from one diocese to the next, Sevilla was at the high end of the spectrum. In a testament to the wealth of the archdiocese of Sevilla, the total number of canons numbered in excess of sixty, and some of these individuals were paid more than 60,000 reales annually.<sup>66</sup> These authorities were principally responsible for administration of ecclesiastical courts and for the maintenance and good order of the many monasteries, charitable institutions, hermitages, and other religious establishments within the confines of the diocese.

The number of religious institutions in Sevilla was nothing short of astounding. With eighty-four monasteries in the city, regular clerics (those living under an established rule) outnumbered secular clerics by a wide margin.<sup>67</sup> Beyond performing the religious duties dictated by their rules, members of these groups were often integrated into the larger community as educators. In addition, the regular clergy in Sevilla could call upon more than 1,500 persons to take part in the more important religious processions like

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, 21.

those for Holy Week and Corpus Christi.<sup>68</sup> Explaining the large numbers presented here requires placing the city within its proper place amid the transatlantic flow of men, money, and goods that arose during the early modern period. As the gateway to the New World, Sevilla was the point of departure for the ambitious evangelizing missions organized by Catholic orders operating in the Americas. Large religious houses were constructed to support the staging of men awaiting transport overseas. The reverse flow of wealth out the Americas supported ever more impressive construction campaigns. In the later half of the eighteenth century, the number of regular clergy remained one of the more curious demographic features of Sevilla.

Emblematic of the localized nature of the religious hierarchy was the institution of the Spanish Inquisition. An Inquisitor-General of Spain administered the Spanish Inquisition. Several provincial tribunals managed more mundane operations. Fourteen separate provincial tribunals of the Inquisition were headquartered in a number of cities. The one based in Sevilla was situated just beyond the city walls in the ancient Roman citadel known as the Castle of Saint George. The role of the Inquisition in this period was a shadow of the brutal and exacting instrument first established in the late fifteenth century to enforce religious orthodoxy. In keeping with the ardent regalism of the Bourbons, Carlos III sacked one inquisitor-general for obeying Rome before him and replaced him with a successor of a more enlightened sort. By the 1780s the Inquisition had all but lost its control of censorship. Yet the period immediately following the outbreak of revolution in France witnessed the rise of a new wave of Inquisition-administered censorship that matched the efforts of the state to confront subversive

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

political agitation and other seditious attacks. The inquisitorial machine, even while dormant, posed a threat to widespread political engagement. Indeed, unlike France, where the monarchy relied on a sophisticated secret police, in peninsular Spain the Inquisition had proven itself a more effective agent of repression.<sup>69</sup>

At the highest level in Spain, the religious hierarchy was far from a centralized bureaucracy. It was, after all, a “palimpsest of historical accretion,” the product of centuries of the Reconquista, the territorial and financial disputes of various diocesan courts, and changing realities in the flow of people and resources at the local level.<sup>70</sup> A Papal Nuncio resided in Madrid as the official representative of the Supreme Pontiff and the primary point of contact with the Roman Curia. However, the role of Papal Nuncio was not the same as an official designate of the Pope conferring authority from one office to the next. A council of bishops loosely overseen by the Primate of Spain – the Archbishop of Toledo – coordinated the implementation of Church policy, but only in exceptional circumstances and never in regular fashion. Thus, the Spanish Church was an institution lacking strong cohesion.<sup>71</sup> This feature of governance did not lead to the formation of a national Church. It was rather the decentralization of the church that proved its most defining characteristic. The territorial blocks of the eight archdiocesan sees marked off regional churches that functioned independently of one another and adapted to local culture, traditions, and patterns of pious observance in many ways.

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<sup>69</sup> Fraser, xx.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, xviii.

<sup>71</sup> Callahan, 7.

## NEW FORMS OF SOCIABILITY AND THE BIRTH OF A PUBLIC SPHERE

Beyond the formal institutions of the Church and state, other avenues helped in the formation of political culture at the local level. These existed beyond the superstructures of Church and state that extended throughout the Spanish Monarchy. These institutions operated in the larger cities like Sevilla more than anywhere else because the cities had a critical mass of educated professionals and the wealth to support sophisticated forms of civil society. As has been mentioned already, non-aristocrats were effectively excluded from membership in the *cabildos* of large cities and this prohibition led the merchant class in Sevilla to find other outlets for engagement in the social and ceremonial life of the city.

The Royal Society of Horsemanship (Real Maestranza de Caballería) of Sevilla dated to the sixteenth century, and was founded as “an aristocratic brotherhood of military-religious origin” that petitioned the crown for the right to hold an exclusive monopoly on the holding of bullfights within the city.<sup>72</sup> Over time, this social institution became the most important association open to non-aristocrats in Sevilla. Bullfighting had emerged as a sport intricately tied to the image of the monarchy. The sixteenth century witnessed Spanish monarchs participating in them on horseback. The Bourbons, however, were not especially fond of the sport.<sup>73</sup> However, the frequency of bullfights

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<sup>72</sup> Julian Pitt-Rivers, “The Spanish Bull-Fight: And Kindred Activities,” *Anthropology Today* 9 (1993): 13.

<sup>73</sup> Bullfighting underwent a profound transformation during the eighteenth century from a tradition closely associated with the royal court and aristocracy to a pastime with a popular following. Widespread interest in currying favor with the new governing dynasty and its distinct tastes led to a wholesale rejection of the practice by the aristocracy. Before the new audience, the sport changed. Participants no longer faced bulls on horseback but rather on foot. This change has been cited as evidence of a changing appreciation for the value of the aristocracy among the popular classes. Various depictions by Francisco Goya demonstrate the chaotic nature of plebian bullfights, which were to some degree a notable counterpoint to the social

did not lag significantly either in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. The connection of the monarchy to the occasion and spectacle afforded by bullfights did not die. Over thirty cities and towns held *corridas* to mark the accession of Carlos IV in 1789.<sup>74</sup> Nonetheless, the indifference of the Bourbons propagated a space for wealthy merchants to become important leaders of the local community during the eighteenth century.

Operating as a corporate institution, the Real Maestranza de Caballería of Sevilla was organized as a sort of business partnership of wealthy individuals with the ready capital to support the bullfights. *Corridas* were ultimately money-making ventures, but inclusion within the closed community of capitalists with the wherewithal to stage such large-scale events was the ultimate goal. Designation as such denoted a social status on a par with petty nobility in a part of the Spanish Monarchy where *señorismo* was still deeply felt. Membership in the Maestranza placed its benefactors atop the socio-cultural status of the city on a par with leaders of the *cofradías* and *hermandades*. Like these lay religious associations, the leaders of the Maestranza presided over a key social and cultural spectacle that had great potential to affect the public consciousness. Although the Real Maestranza was still the reserve of the aristocracy throughout much of the eighteenth century, the growing number of non-aristocrats among the ranks of its leadership was suggestive of larger changes afoot.

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order and decorum on display in a traditional fiesta. Timothy Mitchell, *Blood Sport: A Social History of Spanish Bullfighting* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), see especially chapter two, pages 47-56.

<sup>74</sup> Adrian Shubert, *Death and Money in the Afternoon: A History of the Spanish Bullfight* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 181-182.

The eighteenth century witnessed an explosion of new forms of sociability within the Spanish Monarchy that came as a byproduct of the Enlightenment.<sup>75</sup> The Spanish Monarchy was not unique in this respect, and the trend followed a pattern on display elsewhere in Europe, what has been called the emergence of a “public sphere.”<sup>76</sup> This development was exemplified in peninsular Spain by the tradition of the *tertulia*. The *tertulia* developed out of informal gatherings of learned, often wealthy, men for discussion of ideas. Overtime these gatherings became more formalized, even institutionalized, around somewhat closed networks of regular participants in a set meeting place, often in the salon of the most distinguished member. A parallel development was the expansion of discussion points from topics as varied as politics and statecraft. It was inevitable that the increasing formality of *tertulia* tradition led to institutionalization.

The eighteenth century also witnessed the rise of learned institutions granted official license by the Bourbon crown. This movement developed in two stages. In the first phase, typical of the first half of the century, the crown was directly involved in the formation of venerable cultural institutions. Among the first was the Real Sociedad Sevillana de Medicina y Ciencias (Royal Society of Medicine and Sciences) in 1700.

Almost immediately progressive inquiry faced challenges from important advocates of

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<sup>75</sup> This has been most closely studied in the context of pre-revolutionary France. For instance, see Dena Goodman, *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Recently, this has been extended to include the post-revolutionary period; see Steven Kale, *French Salons: High Society and Political Sociability from the Old Regime to the Revolution of 1848* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). For an excellent treatment of this trend beyond France, see Deborah Hertz, *Jewish High Society in Old Regime Berlin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). On Spain, see Richard Herr, *The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958).

<sup>76</sup> Published originally in German in 1956, see Jürgen Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989)



Aristotle and Galen, backed by scrutiny of the Inquisition.<sup>77</sup> Other institutions included the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language (Real Academia Española) in 1713, the Royal Academy of History (Real Academia de la Historia) in 1738, and the Royal Academy of Fine Arts of St. Ferdinand (Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando) in 1744. Learned societies beyond Madrid and the seat of the royal court, included the Royal Sevillian Society of Letters (Real Sociedad Sevillana de Bellas Letras), which was formed in 1752. As the pace of the Enlightenment quickened at mid-century, this formal model fell out of fashion.

A second wave of institution building, reliant on the social networks of the *tertulia* tradition, rose out of the example provided in the Basque Country by the Basque Regional Royal Society (Real Sociedad Vascongada), formed in 1764. The utility of such societies was widely apparent to civil administrators, among them the enlightened public servant Count of Campomanes, who in 1774 encouraged the creation of many such societies throughout Spain.<sup>78</sup> A year later, the Sevillian Patriotic Society (Sociedad Patriótica Sevillana) was formed in the Andalusian capital to promote the study and public discourse on matters related to commerce, industry, and the arts. Similar insitutions emerged in towns with a critical mass of learned individuals. These towns were not all as large as Sevilla. In the hinterland of Sevilla, the University of Osuna facilitated the formation of the *tertulias* responsible for the organization of the Royal

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<sup>77</sup> Francisco Sánchez-Blanco Parody, *Europa y el pensamiento español del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1991), 32-3.

<sup>78</sup> See his *Discurso sobre el fomento de la industria popular* (1774).

Patriotic Society of Osuna (Real Sociedad Patriótica de Osuna) in 1778.<sup>79</sup> Other associations arose in smaller towns throughout the Guadalquivir Basin.<sup>80</sup>

## CONCLUSION

By the middle of the eighteenth century, Western Andalusia was a well-integrated region formed by a geographical setting suitable for the movement of people and goods along the Guadalquivir River. Sevilla was the nodal center of this region, driving regional activities and providing an essential link with major cities elsewhere within the Spanish Monarchy and Europe. Beyond being a merely geographic and economic designation, the region of Western Andalusia was also a cultural community with characteristic, regional religious practices such as the Marian cult of the *Virgen de los Reyes*. The districts of the region shared a history and architectural styles, which distinguished Western Andalusia from other regions in Spain. In cultural terms, the Spanish Enlightenment was also a moment shared by the inhabitants of Western Andalusia. Although this movement was limited to urban elites and members of the higher clergy, the movement of people and ideas between the *tertulias* of Sevilla, lesser towns, regional universities and other learned communities further supported the existence of a unique regional system.

In the chapters that follow, Western Andalusia will figure at the heart of a chronological account tracing the emergence of a new local politics in peninsular Spain. Municipalities will take center stage as the practice of politics and policy-making became

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<sup>79</sup> Enrique Soria-Medina, *La Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Osuna* (Sevilla: Diputación de Sevilla, 1975), 51-2.

<sup>80</sup> Alberto Gil-Navales, *Las Sociedades Patrióticas, 1820-1823. Las libertades de expresión y de reunión en el origen de los partidos políticos*, Vol. 1 (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1975), 9-10.

gradually more accommodating of the public at large. After 1766, a new brand of public official wielded his position throughout the region to promote reform, and in doing so undermined royal prerogative in Western Andalusia. With the dramatic events of 1808, the region of Western Andalusia was effectively cut off from the rest of the Spanish Monarchy. Political leaders in Sevilla and other municipalities responded with an impressive degree of political resilience and expediency. The challenge of reintegrating the region into the larger Spanish peninsular framework followed their path. Political elites negotiated this process at the municipal level, although their dialogue was essentially with Sevilla, the region's political center. In this process, municipalities frequently challenged the regional supremacy of Sevilla. Thus, Western Andalusia as region will serve as a useful context for situating future chapters.

## CHAPTER TWO:

### **Reason Imposed Unreasonably:**

#### **Reform Comes to Western Andalusia, 1766-1800**

On Palm Sunday 1766, Madrid was the scene of an immense riot.<sup>1</sup> The crown had recently taken to enforcing a long-standing ban on the wearing of long cloaks and broad-brimmed hats, seen to provide for the concealment of weapons. Enforcement of the crown's ban prompted members of the local police to stop two men in the Plaza of Antón Martín. When an altercation ensued, onlookers sided with their fellow subjects in resistance to agents of the crown. This encounter triggered a series of violent outbursts throughout the city. Rioters stormed a public armory and engaged in clashes with the royal guard before making public demands of the king.<sup>2</sup> Four days of chaos reigned in the city; troops called to quell the violence failed to restore order. In fear for his life, King Carlos III fled the city. Violence spread beyond the capital in the days that followed, endangering social order in very nearly every corner of the Iberian Peninsula.<sup>3</sup> Carlos III

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<sup>1</sup> Several recent, book-length historical accounts of this event have appeared, better known as the Tumult of Esquilache. An older generation of scholarship by social historians has focused on the class dimensions of this conflict marking the tensions that persisted between an entrenched aristocracy and urban poor while also noting the significance of this moment to larger narratives about the rise of the bourgeoisie. Recently, scholars have approached the symbolic dimensions of this crisis as a means to contextualize the nature of eighteenth century patterns of political rule and the preservation of social order. Detailed accounts of the Tumult appear in José Andrés-Gallego, *Esquilache y el pan, 1766* (New Orleans: University Press of the South, 1996); and José Miguel López García, *El Motín contra Esquilache* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2006). For Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, the Tumult served to mark a contrast between different periods of reform in Spain and Spanish America, see *Apogee of Empire: Spain and New Spain in the Age of Charles III* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); On the wider implications of this event on Spanish culture and society, see Alberto Medina Domínguez, *Espejo de Sombras. Sujeto y multitud en la España del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Historians have argued that the events of 1766 were far from a spontaneous affair, and rather emerged as the product of coordinated efforts by aristocrats intent to derail the growing strength of the crown.

was so disturbed by the events of Semana Santa that his valet remarked that the king later awoke in a panic upon hearing the faint sound of St. Peter's Day revelers coming from the streets beyond his bedchamber.<sup>4</sup> Not since the Revolt of the Comuneros in the sixteenth century had popular dissent so endangered the position of the crown. These riots represented the first crack in the lustrous veneer of Bourbon absolutism, and signaled the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Spanish Monarchy. In this sense, the events of 1766 marked the start of a decades-long drift towards the eventual collapse of Old Regime Spain.

This chapter examines the Spanish Monarchy from 1766 to roughly 1800 with a special focus on Western Andalusia. I argue that the final decades of Old Regime Spain were plagued by the inconstancy of an imperial project of reform. Reform began at the start of the eighteenth century as a means to guard the political position of the then new Bourbon dynasty. At mid-century, the political position of the monarchy secured, reform evolved into to a program determined to increase the productive capacity of Spanish society to provide the crown with greater revenue. Enemies of reform persisted throughout this period but never coalesced into a unified opposition. In the aftermath of the riots of 1766, the monarchy's position weakened substantially. The greatest beneficiaries of this turn of events were ultimately the municipalites of the Spanish Monarchy.

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<sup>3</sup> A miners' strike also disrupted New Spain in 1766. Although this occurrence bore no connection to the events that transpired in peninsular Spain, it offers a compelling case for envisioning 1766 to mark a turning point on both sides of the Atlantic.

<sup>4</sup> This account was attributed to the king's *aide de chambre* and was referenced by Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos in his *Diarios*. In Laura Rodríguez, "The Spanish Riots of 1766," *Past and Present*, (1973), 58.

My portrayal of a weak monarchy persists at odds with depictions of Carlos III as an “enlightened despot.”<sup>5</sup> Scholars have portrayed enlightened despots as supremely powerful monarchs who ruled in the absence of representative institutions and utilized centralized political regimes to impose forms of rule based on intellectual precepts provided by the age of reason. The myth of enlightened despotism ignores the inherent fragility of monarchy in the eighteenth century. Monarchy rested on the cornerstone of divine law, which the Enlightenment did much to unravel. Nonetheless, a generous swath of time separated 1766 from the violence unleashed on France in 1789. Because of actions taken in the aftermath of the riots, the Spanish crown forestalled collapse of the Old Regime well into the nineteenth century. Through an ambitious program of reform, the crown worked to breathe new life into moribund institutions and to innovate new

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<sup>5</sup> For further background on the links between absolutism and the Enlightenment in eighteenth century Europe, see C.B.A. Behrens, *Society, Government and the Enlightenment: The Experience of Eighteenth-century France and Prussia* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985); Hamisch Scott, ed., *Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth Century Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); and Derek Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005). Although rare, references to “Enlightened despotism” appeared in the writings of eighteenth century *philosophes*. “Enlightened absolutism” was later used by Wilhelm Roscher to describe the same idea in the mid-nineteenth century. On the appearance of these terms, see Beales, 42-59. The link between monarchy and reform projects modeled on the tradition of the Enlightenment has served to give this body of literature a sense of coherence. On the Spanish dimension, see Stein and Stein, *Apogee of Empire*; Charles C. Noel, “Clerics and Crown in the Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808: Jesuits, Jansenists and Enlightened Reformers,” in *Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe*, eds. James E. Bradley and Dale K. Van Kley (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2001), 119-153, and “In the House of Reform: The Bourbon Court of Eighteen Century Spain,” in *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750-1830*, ed. Gabriel Paquette (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 145-166; Gabriel B. Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-1808* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); Andrea J. Smidt, “Enlightened Absolutism and New Frontiers for Political Authority: Building Towards a State Religion in Eighteenth-Century Spain,” in *Limits of Empire – Essays in Honor of Geoffrey Parker: European Imperial Formations in Early Modern World History*, eds. Tonio Andrade and William Reger (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 33-57, and “*Luces por la Fe*: The Cause of Catholic Enlightenment in 18th-Century Spain,” in *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe*, eds. Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 403-452. Paquette has ably framed “regalism” as the language of reform, suggesting that the crown argued persuasively that it was best suited to manage the competing interests of corporate institutions and society at large in order to bring about an effective program of reform. On this subject, see the review article by Gabriel B. Paquette, “Empire, Enlightenment and Regalism: New Directions in Eighteenth-century Spanish History,” *European History Quarterly* 35.1 (2005): 107-117.

approaches to resolve simmering social tensions. Especially in the decade after 1766, the Spanish Monarchy demonstrated a tremendous resiliency though ultimately fell victim to long-simmering social discontents. What was the nature of this reformist program in peninsular Spain and how did its development shape the practice of politics in Western Andalusia?

The local character of Bourbon rule was the most noticeable feature of reform in the region of Western Andalusia after 1766. In this chapter, I analyze the administration of Pablo de Olavide as Asistente and Intendant of Sevilla and Superintendant of the Nuevas Poblaciones during the period 1767-1775. During this period, the crown favored a top-down model of rule managed by the central appointment of *corregidores* and other senior officials operating at the local level. The central administration conceded the need for appointed officials to adapt to local circumstances in order to give the regime a local face. On occasion these same central operatives of the crown viewed the success of local experiments as instructive towards formulating policy for more widespread implementation throughout the peninsula. At the same time, this program of reform succeeded in reviving support for a tradition of municipal rule that had existed for centuries in Spain but which the centralizing campaigns had done much to elide. This tradition had been suppressed rather effectively by the absolutist state under the Habsburg and later Bourbon dynasties. The generous political and social support Olavide provided to local officials and intellectuals countered this trend and opened a space for political action at the local level that hitherto had been closed to all but the monarchy's appointed representatives.

## REFORM (RE)INVISIONED

Reform of the state bureaucracy was a persistent concern of the Spanish Monarchy from the very advent of the eighteenth century. Upon securing the throne of the Spanish Monarchy for the House of Bourbon at the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), Felipe V pursued an aggressive program of reform at the peninsular level. His motivations in this regard were largely punitive. As a penalty for supporting the Hapsburg cause, the Catalan territories lost their historic autonomy with the decision to disband the Council of Aragon. The intensified centralization of the peninsular government under the auspices of the Council of Castile brought with it the loss of many regional and local privileges. As Felipe V turned his interest to the possibility of securing the French throne, his eagerness to pitch difficult political battles with the peninsular elites waned. The cause of reform was not seriously raised once again during the reign of Fernando VI (1746-1759), and not until the accession of Carlos III.

Carlos III, the eldest son of Felipe V and his second wife, Isabel Farnese, relocated to Madrid from Southern Italy, where he reigned jointly as King Carlos VII of Naples and King Carlos V of Sicily from 1735 to his inheritance of the Spanish Monarchy in 1759. Carlos III arrived in Madrid with an army of Italian advisors who were at the heart of the king's political administration, among them Leopoldo di Gregorio, Marquis of Squillace (Castilianized as "Esquilache"), and Minister for the Treasury and War. Together they set about implementing vast reforms. Some of these included civic initiatives coinciding with socially limited but valuable services provided by religious communities and the institutional Church. Among the various initiatives under way, they expanded welfare programs for orphans and military widows. Additionally, the



status of property holdings and assets of municipalities were reorganized in favor of the crown. In a somewhat fitting testament to the intellectual “century of lights,” major cities were lit for the first time by intricate systems of publically funded street lighting systems. Under the direction of François Cabarrús, the Bank of San Carlos (later the Bank of Spain) took shape and the national lottery came into being. Perhaps most notably, a series of Caroline reforms in the realm of trade favored the liberalization of commerce within and beyond the Spanish Monarchy. In the Peninsula, this meant an end to administrative price fixing of the grain market, a change manifested most visibly in rapid and often sudden price fluctuations in the cost of related goods. No longer tied to prices set by imperial bureaucrats, changes in the price of grain bore a direct impact to the price of bread. In urban areas, this reawakened the specter of bread revolts that were such a common spectacle of prior centuries.<sup>6</sup>

The King’s favoritism towards foreigners at court was a source of irritation to native-born members of the governing aristocracy. It would be rather easy to ascribe a sort of protonationalism to the behavior of the court towards the king’s coterie of Italian ministers. In fact, it is hard to defend the case that a coherent sense of national identity existed. Rather, members more likely responded to a sense of displacement provoked by the introduction of a new faction within the precarious balance of politics at the royal court. The riots of 1766 demonstrated that in times of crisis the foreign character of public officials could become a matter of popular concern. The public clearly viewed non-local administrators as indifferent to the will of the public good.

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<sup>6</sup> López-García, 87- 95.

The events of spring 1766 escalated quickly. On 20 March, Squillace issued the call for observance of a long-standing law prohibiting broad-brimmed hats and long cloaks, supposedly used to conceal weapons. Three days later, 6,000 persons gathered in the Plaza Mayor intent on finding Squillace. Hearing of the disturbance while away from home, Squillace was able to find refuge in the royal palace. In the ensuing violence, rioters smashed recently installed lamp posts – dubbed “Esquilaches” – and rioters also stopped a number of coaches in the hope that they might find the elusive minister, a move that precipitated fears of class violence among magnates like the Duke of Medinaceli, himself the victim of such an assault. The following day as many as 30,000 persons entered the Puerta del Sol before marching to the still new royal palace where they engaged the King’s Walloon Guards, suffering many casualties. To quell the crowd, Carlos III was forced to take to the balcony of the Royal Palace, accompanied by the crucifix-brandishing Father Juan de Cuenca, who publically read aloud four popular demands: the removal of Squillace from his ministerial posts, the removal of all foreign ministers, the elimination of the Walloon Guards, abolition of the rules on public dress, and the lowering of food prices. Having acquiesced to these humiliating demands, Carlos III then fled to the Royal Palace at Aranjuez in the middle of the night. When news reached the city that the King had fled, rioters in bands of 500 took to the streets on 25 March shouting “God save the king, death to Squillace.” Rioters were successful in forcing troops called to quell the insurrection to barricade themselves within the walls of the Buen Retiro. The rioters then called for two additional concessions: that the king should return to the city and that he issue a general pardon to *tumultuarios*. Carlos III agreed to the new demands on 26 March by a declaration read aloud in the Plaza Mayor

that same day. In a short time, the crowd dispersed and folded back into the obscurity of the city.

Far from suggesting a formless urban tax or bread revolt, the behavior of the rioters points to clearly political ends. For instance, having failed to find the man himself, rioters burned an image of Squillace having first carried out mock legal proceedings to declare the man a public enemy. Although one of only a limited number of cases within the context of the eighteenth century, such acts exhibit certain characteristics of the political culture in place at mid-century that would persist through the start of the nineteenth. Of particular interest was the use of ritual and symbol. Far from mere chaos, the nature of political resistance during this period favored a certain decorum that preserved a compact between sovereign and subjects, but offered potent expressions of public opinion. Defamation of a public image of Squillace was tantamount to staging his symbolic death. The fact that rioters chose to address their demand to the king supports the view that they respected both the king's right to rule and the dispensation of royal justice. Far from a full-blown rebellion directed against the king, the riot was instead a direct appeal to the sovereign – the only sort open to non-elites. Selection of a priest to serve as interlocutor served both to distance the baseness of the appeal and to bridge the divide between the local and global concerns of the monarchy.<sup>7</sup>

Violence in Madrid spread to the provinces within days. In the Basque Country, for more than two weeks rioters made themselves masters of the region. There they

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<sup>7</sup> Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *Carlos III y la España de la Ilustración* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005), *Sociedad y estado en el siglo XVIII español* (Madrid: , 1976), and José Miguel López García, *El Motín contra Esquilache. Crisis y protesta popular en el Madrid del siglo XVII* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2006).

fashioned a crude form of self-government and were successful in implementing a number of laws on a surprisingly wide range of issues.<sup>8</sup> Throughout western Andalusia there were several events registered as subversive by the central government, ranging from incidents in remote and mountainous towns like Cabezas Rubias on the frontier with Extremadura, and Ronda in the Sierra Sur. On the coast, disturbances took place in Cádiz and San Lúcar de Barrameda.<sup>9</sup> In no instance did these compare to the degree of organization witnessed further north. In Sevilla, for example, the impact of events in Madrid had only limited political currency. On 18 April, the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla offered condolences to Carlos III:

SEVILLA, to the Royal Feet of Your Majesty, with the greatest respect, made presently aware of events in Madrid and other Towns and of the distress that it has caused, do to this end compliant with its obligation manifest to Your Majesty its love and immutable loyalty to your Sacred and August Person, offering its lives and belongings to whatever should be of greatest satisfaction and service of Your Majesty to that end which inspires your ardent zeal, so that it should be the one to give always to Your Majesty the most exemplary evidence at the earliest to whatever should be of your sovereign right to ask.<sup>10</sup>

Such expressions were not limited to Sevilla. Antonio Vallardes de Sotomayor, later a member of the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País of Osuna, offered a poem

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<sup>8</sup> Laura Rodríguez, "II. Los Motines de 1766 en provincias," *Revista de Occidente*, 122 (May 1973), 191.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, 193.

<sup>10</sup> "SEVILLA à los Reales Pies de V. M. con el mayor respeto, hace presente, entendida de los sucesos de Madrid, y otros Pueblos, el desconuelo, que le han causado, y con este motivo, cumpliendo con su obligación, manifiesta á V. M. su amor, é immutable lealtad á su Sacra Augusta Persona, ofreciendo sus vidas, y haveres á quanto sea del mayor agrado, y servicio de V. M. á que le inspira su ardiente zelo, y á el de dár siempre á V. M. las mas brillantes pruebas de lo prompta, que está a quanto sea de su soberana dignacion." AMS, Section 12, Vol. IV, no. 26.

written on behalf of the people of Madrid.<sup>11</sup> On 28 April, Carlos III issued a reply to the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla:

In your letter dated the eighteenth of the current month, I see renewed the love and loyalty that you have always dedicated to my Royal Service and to the fulfillment of my wishes. That I might warrant your recognition, to you in all occasions that offer themselves I will give sure signs of trust, for which I am certain to receive your fidelity and respect.<sup>12</sup>

The local ramifications of 1766 were minor in Sevilla because the compact between sovereign and subjects survived. The paternalism on display in the exchange above makes clear that among elites of this period, as was the case in Sevilla as elsewhere, the compact between governor and governed was not only a foundation managed and preserved by members of the ruling elite, but also one that expected a clear expression of deference of the latter to the former. This was the nature of Bourbon absolutism as it manifested itself at mid-century. The frank expression of loyalty on the part of the *ayuntamiento*, without comment regarding the cause of the disturbance, was expressive of the fact that virtually no avenue short of violence existed for local governments to influence central policy. Beyond Madrid, local governments on the peninsula were expected to await direction from the capital much as colonial territories across the Atlantic.

The crown took immediate short-term actions to resolve the crisis. Squillace was removed from his ministerial posts and sent to Venice as ambassador. Public calls for the

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<sup>11</sup> Madeline Sutherland, "Antonio Vallardes de Sotomayor and the Motín de Esquilache," *Dieciocho* 32.1 (Spring 2009).

<sup>12</sup> "En vuestra Carta de diez y ocho del correinte, veo renovado el amor, y lealtad, con que fiempre os haveis dedicado a mi Real Servicio, y à la folicitud de mis fatifacciones. Me deben todo aprecio vueftros ofrecimientos; y en todas las ocafiones, que fe ofrecieren, os daré feguras feñas de la confianza, con que quédo de vuestra fidelidad, y refpecto." AMS, Section 12, Vol. IV, no. 25.

removal of the most potent public embodiments of foreign rule were met, though fellow Italian minister Pablo Jerónimo Grimaldi, Marquis of Grimaldi, kept his post as chief minister. The king named Aragonese aristocrat Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, Count of Aranda, as President of the Council of Castile, instating a new strongman for the regime. Aranda quickly moved to exile the Marquis of La Ensenada and his anti-Italian cohort from court on suspicion of their supposed complicity in the disturbances. A new retinue of more than 15,000 soldiers was permanently garrisoned in and around the immediate vicinity of the city. Madrid was divided into eight *cuarteles*, each headed by separate *alcaldes*, to allow for better supervision by authorities. Further militarization was achieved through the virtual incorporation of provincial militia units under the command of the military, a move that proved irksome to local officials.<sup>13</sup> In the end, all concessions save the general pardon were overturned, although king and court did not return to Madrid until December. Once reduced to little more than a “war of skirmishes between the Spanish court and Rome,” the eighteenth century witnessed a heightened confrontation between church and state. Ultimately, the pivotal moment in this enduring clash between adherents of a strong and independent church and the defenders of absolute monarchy, and perhaps the most significant outcome of the riots, emerged a year later.<sup>14</sup> In the spring of 1767, the Society of Jesus – unpopular as it had been with Carlos

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<sup>13</sup> José Contreras-Gay, *Las milicias provinciales en el siglo xviii. Estudio sobre los regimientos de Andalucía* (Granada: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1993), 233.

<sup>14</sup> Richard Herr, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 13.

III for some time – was identified as the main culprit behind the riots and exiled, with its vast properties reverting to the crown.<sup>15</sup>

The Tumult has undergone generations of scrutiny by scholars influenced by all sorts of historical training. Generations of historians were keen to note the role played by elite *agents provocateurs*, among them firebrand Jesuit priests, members of the nascent bourgeoisie, and political outcasts from the royal court. Yet no evidence exists to support an account of such incitement.<sup>16</sup> Historical scholarship of recent decades has instead favored the view that the revolt was essentially the work of the unprivileged classes. Yet here and there persists persuasive evidence to discredit such a clearly class-based depiction of the revolt, except where historians invoke the surprising coalescence of class interests as the most exceptional component of the crisis. The riot, then, was less a striking example of class conflict and rather something more clearly cross-class in character. In this regard, the events of 1766 exhibit the potential disruptive energy of the Spanish masses that rested beneath the surface of Bourbon absolutism throughout the eighteenth century. At the same time, historians of all varieties have recognized the momentous significance of this event, what became known as the Tumult Esquilache, as the growth pains of a rapidly modernizing political and cultural construct, the opening volley in the near century-long collapse of the Spanish Old Regime.

The Tumult of Esquilache represented the first and last time that a domestic political crisis threatened the stability of the Spanish Monarchy prior to the crisis

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<sup>15</sup> John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 265-6.

<sup>16</sup> José Miguel López García, *El Motín contra Esquilache. Crisis y protesta popular en el Madrid del siglo XVII* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2006), 13.

precipitated by the largely external pressures of the nineteenth century. This is exceptional in many regards. In the first place, the riots of 1766 offer definitive evidence of popular agitation decades prior to the deeply engaging moments of the War of Independence. Rumor was a potent force throughout Europe as demonstrated by events in France prior to the French Revolution.<sup>17</sup> In pastoral visits to parishes located within the archdiocese of Sevilla, the most frequent vice reported to the see was that of gossip (*murmuraciones*), a testament to the relative strength of rumor mills in the small towns.<sup>18</sup> Urban networks did not require the emergence of print culture to provoke riot and rebellion. The rapid expansion of printed journals and other publications, however, further facilitated the spread of news and ideas, especially among members of the urban elite. Despite this fact, the governing regime was never exceptionally capable of using such media for promotional purposes. That Spain suffered no further disruptions of a similar magnitude owes largely to the course of reform initiated in the wake of the riots.

The events of 1766 precipitated a radical reorientation of imperial policy toward reform. Reformers had to adapt their program to suit new political realities. This required that they reinvision the scope and intent of their policies to suit the new imperatives of the crown. Liberalization of the grain trade had proven unpopular with a large segment of the urban population. Further liberalization posed a threat to the security of the monarchy. The complicity of aristocratic elements in provoking and fanning the fires of

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<sup>17</sup> Such an event was not uncharacteristic of mid-eighteenth century Europe. A 1750 riot in Paris, the last major disturbance for the city prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, grew out of the explosive potential surrounding rumor moving through local networks of exchange. See Arlette Farge and Jacques Revel, *The Vanishing Children of Paris: Rumor and Politics before the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

<sup>18</sup> For a sample of such reports from the Sierra de Aracena between 1785 and 1787, see ACS, Archivo General del Arzobispado de Sevilla, II. Gobierno, 4. Libros de Visitas Pastorales, legajo 05181.



revolt warned against taking a hard line policy against any single segment of the public, much less the pursuance of any policy that put significant pressure on the privileges of the peninsula's most well positioned. The then recent resolution of the Seven Year's War (1756-1763) provided a way out of the deadlock. Reform of imperial policy in the years after 1766 would focus heavily on the Spanish Americas, leaving politics on the peninsula the time and space to work through still latent hostilities.

The period after 1766 entailed the most decisive, and to some extent disruptive, phase of Bourbon reforms in Spanish America. The shift of Madrid's attention from the peninsula to its overseas territories mirrored a similar drive on the part of the English to reposition their hold on North America, having recently ousted the French from Quebec. In the English case, new pressures applied to its thirteen colonies south of Quebec were at least partly to blame for the American Revolution that began in 1776. A related tragedy of errors spurred by fiscal problems that dated to the Seven Year's War, only exacerbated by French support for American revolutionaries, provoked revolution in France by 1789. The violent fate shared by the colonial powers of the Americas – especially after the eruption of violence in Saint Domingue in 1791 – threatened to envelop Spain by the close of the century. Fueling fears of revolution at home, news from Paris in 1789 bore odd similarities with the streets of Madrid in 1766. Despite such prognostications, the Spanish Monarchy survived the eighteenth century without the prophesized collapse of order in any of its territories.

The potential for revolt was an ever-present specter in the Americas since the early days of the Conquest. Hernando Cortes himself sailed to the Mesoamerican mainland in defiance of orders from the royal governor installed at Havana. His conquest

of the Aztec empire was in a sense founded on a bold act of defiance; and Francisco Pizarro's expedition to the heart of the Incan empire on another terrific overreach of authority. Well into the eighteenth century, vast areas of Spanish America operated beyond view of the Spanish Monarchy. What mattered most was that essential enterprises like mines, commercial trade, and limited agricultural production supplied the metropole with a regular and continuous stream of revenues. To make use of a now well-worn model for framing the newfound energy of the Spanish Monarchy in Spanish America, the Bourbon Reforms of the eighteenth century constituted nothing short of a Second conquest of the Americas. The new imperial program desired to reassert the metropole's dominance over its colonial possessions and to make the imperial system of trade a lucrative and self-supporting state enterprise.<sup>19</sup>

To bring its colonial possessions into closer line with imperial objectives, Madrid aimed to strip away the ability of distant territories to function without direct administrative oversight. To this end, two new viceroalties were carved out of Spanish territory in South America; to the viceregal courts of Lima and Mexico were added Caracas and Buenos Aires along with new subdivisions to provide for more direct local rule. A new standing army and the reinforcement of coastal fortresses in the Caribbean were added to the list of resources at the disposal of governing officials. In addition, the establishment of intendancies throughout Spanish America expanded the importance of tax collection from the Spanish Monarchy's overseas subjects as a primary function of the colonial regime, especially when considered alongside an increase in the sales tax

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<sup>19</sup> Posing the Bourbon reforms as a second conquest of the Americas was an argument first advanced by David Brading, though now popular among historians of Latin America. See David A. Brading, *The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492-1867* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

applied to commercial trade. In a further bid to expand colonial profits through increased trade, the long-standing commercial monopolies established between the Consulado of Cádiz and a handful of American ports were broken in favor of what contemporaries hailed as free trade. Not free trade in the modern sense, free trade in the world of the Spanish eighteenth century leveled only a partial blow to the system of mercantilism that had endured in place since the sixteenth century. Ships were free to enter some ports of their choosing, but continued to face steep fees from royal officials. Far from a strategy to give Spanish Americans greater freedoms, the aim of the measure was the expansion of taxable markets and was accompanied by other reforms in keeping with this new alignment of revenue streams. Perhaps most invasively, American-born administrators were replaced by peninsular-born men, a political change heralded by some historians as signaling a pivotal moment in the fostering of a cultural separateness from peninsular Spain. For the first time, so the argument goes, the territories of Spanish America were treated differently from those of the peninsula and, in turn, began to think of themselves as separate.<sup>20</sup>

This argument, however, overlooks the fact that Spanish America on the whole remained loyal to the metropole throughout the eighteenth century. New Spain was exemplary of this fact despite limited resistance to changes toward commercial policy. Although rebellion in the Andes erupted during the 1780s, it did not emerge as a direct response to the Bourbon reforms and order was restored by the close of century. The drive for autonomy and eventually independence gained momentum only with the disruptions of the early nineteenth century. In this regard the historical experience of

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<sup>20</sup> For an excellent summary of the Bourbon reforms in Spanish America, see Jaime Rodríguez O., *The Independence of Spanish America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19-35.

Spanish America paralleled that of the peninsula quite closely. Although reforms refigured political culture in Spanish America, they did not make the disintegration of the Old Regime compact inevitable.<sup>21</sup>

Recolonizing the Americas did not mean that the Spanish Monarchy turned away entirely from advancing reforms in the peninsula. Successes in the Americas were simply more visible and certainly more financially tangible. Dating to the period in the immediate aftermath of the Tumult of Esquilache, Carlos III took three steps to reinforce the position of the Crown in the peninsula. First, in an attempt to weaken the position of the aristocrats, he introduced at least two officers to every municipal government devoted to the representation of the third estate in local governance. Second, to counterbalance the danger evoked by the growth and expansion of Spain's urban communities, the king supported the establishment of new agrarian colonial settlements in Andalusia, investments in the durable future of enlightened despotism. Lastly, as an experiment to curb the rebellious spirit of major urban areas, he appointed enlightened polymath and darling of the court, the Lima-born Pablo de Olavide, to serve as Royal Asistente of Sevilla. The remainder of this chapter will devote special attention to these reforms.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> On the limits of reform in the peninsular realm of the Spanish Monarchy, see Lynch, 247-290, and on the imperial dimension see Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 47-53, 132-139. For more information on the Túpac Amaru Rebellion in the Andes, see Sinclair Thompson, *We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).

<sup>22</sup> Pablo de Olavide y Jáuregui (1725-1804), knight of the Order of Santiago, was born in Lima, where he studied law and was appointed as a judge of the local audiencia. He traveled to Europe, never to return to native soil, to represent himself on the charge of embezzlement brought before a Madrid-based court in 1750. Following the outcome of the trial he was suspended from the holding of public office. During this time he traveled throughout Italy and France, where he befriended several leading figures of the French enlightenment, including the likes of Diderot and Voltaire. Immediately prior to returning to public office, his home in Madrid became a focal point of regular *tertulias* that served as one of the primary focal points of the enlightenment in Spain. His writing on agriculture is sometimes closely associated with the tradition of the French physiocrats. On Olavide, see Marcelin Defournaux, *Pablo de Olavide, el*

## COLONIZING THE ANDALUSIAN HINTERLAND

Haste accompanying the colonization of the Sierra Morena followed years of intellectual debate within elite circles regarding the potential for economic renewal. General consensus portrayed economic growth as stagnant, population in steady decline, and agricultural production on near life support. Irish-born bureaucrat Bernardo Ward traveled the peninsula in the 1750s at the behest of Fernando VI and recognized the need for internal reform. In his *Proyecto económico*, Ward lamented depopulation and acknowledged that Spain was in need of further information regarding modern farming techniques, which he believed were best introduced into the Spanish Monarchy by foreigners.<sup>23</sup> Ward's findings were received warmly by Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Count of Campomanes (after 1780), the fiscal of the Council of Castile, who aggressively promoted the implementation of this vision for the Spanish Monarchy.

The riots of 1766 moved the contours of this discussion from the remote intellectual orbit of policy debates into the realm of hard policy objectives. On 18 October 1766, Johann Kaspar Thürriegel proposed colonization of the Sierra Morena to

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*afrancesado* (Sevilla: Padilla, 1990) for a biographical reading that treats him as a Francophile; Luis Perdices Blas, *Pablo de Olavide (1725-1803), el ilustrado* (Madrid: Editorial de la Universidad Complutense, 1995) for an account that places him more squarely within Spanish intellectual circles; Manuel D. Capel Margarito, *Pablo de Olavide, un criollo en el equipo reformista de Carlos III* (Jaén: M. Capel, 1997); Juan Marchena Fernández, *El tiempo ilustrado de Pablo de Olavide. Vida, obra y sueños de un americano en la España del S. XVIII* (Sevilla: Alfar, 2001).

<sup>23</sup> Finished in 1762, but published posthumously in 1779 by Campomanes, see Part I, Chapter 8, for his discussion of depopulation and Part I, Chapter 9, on agriculture. Among the possible causes for the depopulation of the peninsula identified by Ward was the movement of persons to Spanish America. It is worth noting that Spanish America did not suffer from depopulation. In fact, the relative strength and stability of population figures for Spanish America would later pose a challenge for determining the proportional allotment of representatives to the Spanish Cortes convened in 1810, as an equitable arrangement would have left peninsular deputies in the minority. On the general problem of depopulation in central and southern Spain, see Herr, Ch. 4.

the Council of Castile.<sup>24</sup> The proposal called for the settlement of six thousand *colonos*, all of them farmers or artisans and Catholics of German and Flemish extraction, in the *desiertos* of the Sierra Morena and Northern Andalusia. Coming just months after the riots that shook the Spanish capital in the spring of that year, the proposal further offered an aggressive means to confront stresses on the supply of grain, a major concern of rioters, with a system of land tenure idealized by reformers. Unsettled since the classical period, Thürriegel's use of the term *desierto* sidestepped an explanation of climatic conditions in the Sierra Morena altogether and referred to the sparsely inhabited nature of the territory that separated central Castile from Andalusia in the South.<sup>25</sup> In the absence of any existing infrastructure, whole settlements would have to rise from the countryside.<sup>26</sup> In this uninhabited backlands, Thürriegel proposed the introduction of nothing short of civilization itself. The crown gave planners a *tabula rasa* on which to plan an ideal community.

This unsettled backlands was of urgent concern to the monarchy in the post-1766 ambit of policy for three reasons. First, left largely to the reserve of bandits, the stretch of land was an embarrassing source of lawlessness for a regime that prized order. Second, this uninhabited *terra incognita* made the distance between the center and South of the peninsula much further than actually was the case. In logistical terms, settlement of this area had the potential to shrink the burden of administering the peninsula. Lastly, in more

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<sup>24</sup> AHN, Inquisition, Lejago 1822, no. 2.

<sup>25</sup> Coincidentally, it is worth noticing that much of this terrain corresponds to land that modern meteorological science has identified as among the very hottest in all of modern Spain.

<sup>26</sup> Central planners had announced a plan to rebuild the Madrid–Sevilla road in 1761 and to turn the un-navigable portion of the Guadalquivir River into a canal in 1776, but neither of these projects became a reality. Paul J. Hauben, “The First Decree of the an Agrarian Experiment in Bourbon Spain: The ‘New Towns of Sierra Morena and Andalusia, 1766-76,’” *Agricultural History* 39.1 (1965): 35.

blatantly political terms, the land served as the point of connection between the imperial bureaucracy in Madrid and the wealth of the South. This buffer foiled the centralizing efforts of the Bourbon administrators to make the peninsula function as a cohesive administrative unit. The result was a peninsula composed of regions that were unnecessarily distant from the guiding graces of Madrid. Settlement opened the possibility of a better integrated and more functionally unified territory in which the operatives of the crown could exert their influences more effectively. [i.e.local v. center]

Carlos III accepted Thürriegel's proposal with the promulgation of the *Fuero de las Nuevas Poblaciones* (Law Code of the Nuevas Poblaciones), first published in the *Gazeta de Madrid* on 5 July 1767. The zeal of Thürriegel's promotions and the fashioning of an idyllic settler environment aside, the success of the project depended on the dedicated support of the imperial bureaucracy as well. It is worth considering the utopian vision accorded the project by policy makers and by colonists alike. This was a bold experiment requiring the complicity of the Spanish Monarchy. The idyllic setting offered by Thürriegel was dependant in no small part on the direct intervention of the King. The colonies of the Sierra Morena were to become as much a product of the Bourbon administration as they were the private concern of a small handful of industrious adventurers. Pivotal to understanding the intervention of the Spanish Monarchy was the decision to promulgate a formal *fuero*, a legalistic convention granting special rights and privileges reserved by the crown, to approve of Thürriegel's settlement plan. The land designated for the Nuevas Poblaciones was extracted from the fold of the Old Regime land tenure system altogether. All existing claims to the territory by persons and corporate entities were overturned in a dramatic expression of the king's absolute power.

The Nuevas Poblaciones of Sierra Morena encountered virtually no resistance from individuals or corporate institutions. By contrast, the comparatively more populous and less remote region chosen for the Nuevas Poblaciones of Andalusia provoked resistance almost immediately. Seizure of the untilled lands of Écija in 1768 for addition to the territory granted to the new settlement of La Luisiana prompted the beginnings of an ongoing dispute between members of the local *cabildo* and royal officials regarding the legality of such an act. When, in December of that year, Ecija dispatched armed men to retake the land for use in the pasturing of mares, Olavide intervened to accuse the town of violating the will of the king. Relations between Ecija and La Luisiana would remain strained for years. Although the town would not recover its lost territory, such disputes demonstrated the willingness of local governments to challenge controversial legislation by the central government. More to the point, it stresses a conviction held among municipalities that the historic rights granted to them were sacred and inviolable, and not subject to alteration even by the central government.<sup>27</sup>

In a further display of their intended functional autonomy, The Nuevas Poblaciones were separated from all existing administrative hierarchies. A superintendent was named to serve as overseer of the project from a capital set for construction in La Carolina; a second capital responsible for the western half of the region was constructed in La Carlota in later years. The fuero prohibited the growth of large land-holdings in favor of a system promoting small farms and encouraging shared use of common land. In a bid to break the stranglehold not only of the aristocracy but also that of the large and powerful corporations, the traditional rights of the Mesta to graze sheep where it pleased

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<sup>27</sup> AME, AC, Books 185-190 (1768-1973). See also J.A. Filter Rodríguez, 104. In Reese, see pages 98-103.



was overturned. The fuero further banned the holding of lands by the church and withheld the right to found religious communities. No church entities beyond the local parish church and no ecclesiastical officials of higher rank than parish priests were to hold local sway. As Antonio Domínguez Ortiz commented, the Nuevas Poblaciones represented “a trial exercise in ideal society, one that would have no class differences, dead hands (*manos muertas*), the privileges of the Mesta, noble estates, and other residues of the past interfering against virtues of an enlightened sort.”<sup>28</sup>

In keeping with the intellectual genesis of the project, Carlos III named Pablo de Olavide as Superintendent of the Nuevas Poblaciones, jointly as Royal Asistente and Intendent of Sevilla. Olavide was an interesting choice for several reasons. Although born in Lima, Olavide was not a colonial in the strict cultural sense of mid-eighteenth century Peru. Olavide’s father, Navarrese by birth, had followed career advancement through the ranks of the viceregal administration to become Contador Mayor of the Tribunal de Cuentas of Lima. Olavide’s Europeaness, a product of his birth, ensured ascendancy within the caste system of Spanish America and guaranteed the same status to his children. Olavide’s mother, despite her Basque-sounding name, descended from a family of Sevilla. Although herself a native of Lima, she shared the same status as her husband and so secured for her son the status of being born a pure blooded European. Olavide was thus born a foreigner in foreign lands.

Olavide’s European “homecoming” came in response to accusations of wrongdoing during his tenure as a Judge in the Audiencia of Lima. As was his right by birth, Olavide petitioned as a European to have his case heard in Madrid. It is unclear

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<sup>28</sup> Filter-Rodríguez, 28.

how welcome Olavide felt in Madrid. Madrid was a great deal different from Lima, and though strong prejudice against colonial subjects did not exist, it is hard to imagine him having avoided all forms of bias. The case against him dragged on for some years and Olavide was not formally absolved until 1761. During this time, it seems Olavide took his European status, acquired by the delicate social complexities of society in Spanish America, to heart, albeit by embracing a more liberal use of the term than had been ever intended. Olavide made frequent trips to France and the Italian states. As a resident of Paris, he frequented the salons of the French capital and was in contact with numerous *philosophes*. In this regard, he represented the very highest echelons of the enlightened order in the Spanish Monarchy and was a close friend of the leading lights of the Spanish Enlightenment. All the same, Olavide was something of a renegade. From his contact with Voltaire and Diderot, it seems he developed an antagonizing spirit of contention with Spanish officials in defense of intellectual freedoms. The Nuevas Poblaciones were, however, also very close to Olavide's intellectual curiosities. As Olavide recognized in his *Informe sobre la ley agraria* (1768), the latifundias of Andalusia were of particular concern for the structural stability of the Spanish economy. The massive *cortijos* of powerful landholders employed large numbers of farm-workers during seasonal harvests, but reduced this same population to abject poverty levels during the off-season. In effect, Andalusia posed an extreme, and resolving this problem held tremendous potential for the Spanish Monarchy as a whole.

Carlos III overlooked the scions of established families and chose a native of the New World to direct the Crown's most ambitious attempt at domestic colonization on the Iberian Peninsula since the Christian conquest of the southern reaches of the Iberian

Peninsula. However, this was not to be anything like the process of granting *repartimientos* of land to aristocratic households, chivalric orders and various religious orders as had been done before. The king called upon Olavide to direct the colonization of Andalusia with true foreigners. Finding suitable colonists required considerable effort. The terrain of the Sierra Morena and Northern Andalusia was marketed to would-be colonists as a veritable paradise. “Hardly anyone does not know that Spain is a land of a climate so happy and a region so blessed of heaven that neither heat nor cold exhibit their worst,” persuaded promotional materials. To the most humble of potential immigrants, the land was presented as “the most productive in Europe and ... produce[s] the most beautiful wheat, rye, barley, oats...also all kinds of vegetables, turnips, Brussels sprouts, peas, beans, artichokes, cauliflower, asparagus, lettuce, and similar crops in great abundance and with little work.” In reality the Sierra Morena was a very challenging environment to farm. Settlements situated in Western Andalusia encountered the most severe summer temperatures in the whole of the peninsula. Furthermore, settlers were far from neighboring settlements and open to attack from bandits who considered the deserts of the Sierra Morena and Northern Andalusia their exclusive territory by right of force. Immigrants, however, were to take faith in the protections of a king, whom, it was said, “they call more a benign father worried for the happiness of his people than a king.”<sup>29</sup>

Planners built on the legacy of Spanish colonialism in the Americas. There, indigenous settlements were frequently leveled and rural communities urbanized through the construction of new towns built along a grid formation. By building the Nuevas

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<sup>29</sup> José Antonio Filter-Rodríguez, *Orígenes y fundación de la Luisiana, El Campillo y Cañada Rosal. La colonización de Carlos III en la campiña sevillana*, 2nd Edition (Sevilla: Consejería de Cultura de la Junta de Andalucía, 1986), 60.

Poblaciones in this manner, colonial urban planners followed Roman practice, much in fashion during the Spanish Renaissance, which viewed the civilizing mission as inextricably linked to the process of urbanization.<sup>30</sup> Coincidentally, pagan empire building corresponded nicely with the evangelical mission of the Catholic Church as put forth by St. Augustine in the *City of God*. “Well-ordered” settlements were an attempt to mimic a heavenly ideal.<sup>31</sup> Grids and straight streets were then central to the mission of the Spanish Monarchy both to establish a vehicle for the promotion of cultural association and subjecthood and as the obligation of any Catholic monarch. The grids that came to define the urbanscapes of the Nuevas Poblaciones were more directly patterned on an Enlightenment assault on the disorganized and erratic urban streetscapes that hampered the productive efficiency of the peninsula’s largest cities. The architecture of the Nuevas Poblaciones was further reminiscent of colonial America where the cost and labor associated with stone masonry was substituted for more humble materials. At least in physical form, what emerged in the deserts of Andalusia looked strikingly like the early Spanish colonial settlements in densely populated areas of the Americas.

At its core, the project exemplified an experimental exercise in free enterprise directed from above. Inhabitants were given vast freedoms not accorded to subjects of the Spanish Monarchy in the rest of the world. They faced neither restrictions on industry posed by corporate entities like the guilds, nor the burdens of working lands owned and controlled by aristocratic households and religious communities. It is hard to deny the

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<sup>30</sup> Richard L. Kagan, *Urban Images of the Hispanic World, 1493-1793* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 31-4.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, 21, 28.

conclusion that the political sacrifice was a significant one. Olavide governed at the pleasure of the king and in the absence of local governments, restricted from forming throughout the territory of the Nuevas Poblaciones under the provisions of the ban on corporate entities. In essence, the Nuevas Poblaciones were the pinnacle of absolutism. Colonos lived and worked in an idyllic, almost Rousseauian, state of nature. Here was the ultimate compact between loyal subjecthood and absolute monarchy, the ideal model for Bourbon reform of Andalusia.

#### SEVILLA IN THE AGE OF OLAVIDE

Olavide was destined to leave not only an enduring mark on the Nuevas Poblaciones, but also on the city and surrounds of Sevilla. Simultaneous to his appointment as superintendant of the Nuevas Poblaciones, Olavide was named Royal Asistente and Intendant of Sevilla. Olavide was actually to begin his term in Sevilla, later relocating to the Sierra Morena as the major civic buildings of La Carolina neared completion. Thereafter, he frequented both seats of government. As Asistente, Olavide was the king's appointed representative in Sevilla.<sup>32</sup> There he took his residence at the Real Alcázar in 1767. He arrived at an auspicious time. The reform agenda of the monarchy was in full swing, close allies of Olavide held sway at court, and his friend served as the heads of key government ministries. Within the city of Sevilla, the absence of the Jesuits created an excellent potential for the exercise of a new dynamic of power, one no longer almost exclusively focused on the influence of the church. In their wake,

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<sup>32</sup> Sevilla was one of only three cities in which the title of *corregidor* was substituted by that of *asistente*. The usage of "asistente" was a legacy of historical tradition and entailed no significant difference by comparison to the powers and rights vested in persons who held the office of *corregidor*.

the Jesuits left property to sell, an educational system to harness, and a new foothold in local finances for the monarchy to exploit. The appointment made Olavide the leading political figure in the city, a person capable of directing local policy as both a brilliant problem solver and able power broker. More than any other person Olavide set the tone of politics in Sevilla at mid-century and came to define the political culture that emerged in the capital and its environs at the close of the eighteenth century.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that class violence was a palpable component of the violence that racked Madrid in 1766. Of the various reforms initiated after the riots in Madrid and elsewhere, one had virtually no prior precedent in the philosophical and policy discussions of the mid-eighteenth century. To limit the ability of the aristocracy to control the urban plebs and to offer a means for the plebs to gain a closer appreciation for their indebtedness to the crown, Carlos III and his ministers sought to break the monopoly of local governance of towns by aristocrats through the dilution of their power, creating new offices for which they were ineligible. The new offices were instituted by royal order on 5 May 1766. The law called for the election of a single community representative (*síndico personero*) and four deputies of the Commons (*diputados del Común*) to join the *cabildo* of every *ayuntamiento* in towns with a population greater than two thousand inhabitants. Creation of these offices has been mistakenly offered as evidence of the first institution of “universal suffrage” in Spanish history.<sup>33</sup> The effect was a good deal more limited in scope, although a profound departure from the constitution of the Spanish Monarchy to that date. The law gave the Commons a formal

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<sup>33</sup> Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, “El Consejo en la Edad Moderna,” in *Ayuntamiento de Sevilla: Historia y Patrimonio*, edited by Antonio Collantes de Terán Sánchez (Sevilla: Ediciones Guadalquivir, 1992), 53.

place in local government, acknowledging both the estate's prior exclusion from office holding and technical absence in terms of representation, while proposing a way to realize, in a reformed manner, the eternal compact between the estates. In practice, the male heads of families (*vecinos seculares*) were to gather by parish to name a set of electors who were, in turn, responsible for the direct election of the representatives of the Commons (*Los Comuneros*).<sup>34</sup>

The call for nominations to select parish electors in Sevilla was issued on 6 December. In the broadsides released to the public, the process for coordinating the selection of electors was explained in detail. Four officials of the *ayuntamiento* were named to coordinate the process in each of four districts and every parish within those districts given authority to name twelve electors to serve on its behalf (see fig. 3). On 29 December, electors were then to elect, by paper or voice vote, the individuals to hold each of the five offices. The new office-holders were to formally assume membership in the *cabildo* on the first of the year and to remain in that post for the entirety of 1767.<sup>35</sup> It is worth noting that these boundaries were based on the religious geography of churches known to all and regularly demarcated by frequent religious processions. All the same, the need to create such districts precipitated one of the first instances of boundary making by local governments in densely populated areas. In an age during which identity was foremost and closely associated with parish affiliation and to a much lesser residence by municipality, inhabitants were ascribed a new civic identity linked directly to their representation in local government.

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<sup>34</sup> Fernando Javier Campese Gallego, *La Representación del Común en el Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (1766-1808)* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2005).

<sup>35</sup> AMS, Section 5, Vol. 281.

Sr. Theniente Mayor.		Sr. Alcalde de la Justicia.	
PARROQUIAS.	Elect. <sup>s</sup>	PARROQUIAS.	Elect. <sup>s</sup>
Sagrario...	12	San Eftevan.	12
San Salvador...	12	San Bartholomè.	12
San Isidoro...	12	Santiago el Mayor.	12
San Miguel...	12	San Nicolàs.	12
La Magdalena...	12	San Ildefonso.	12
San Vicente...	12	San Martin.	12
San Lorenzo...	12	San Marcos.	12
	84.	.....	84.

Sr. Theniente Segundo.		Sr. Theniente de la Vara.	
PARROQUIAS.	Elect. <sup>s</sup>	PARROQUIAS.	Elect. <sup>s</sup>
Sta. Maria la Blanca...	12	Santa Cruz.	12
Omnium Sanctorum...	12	Santa Marina.	12
San Gil...	12	Señora Santa Ana.	12
San Julian...	12	San Andrès.	12
Santa Lucìa...	12	San Pedro.	12
San Juan de la Palma..	12	San Bernardo.	12
San Romàn...	12	San Roque.	12
Santa Catalina...	12	.....	...
	96.	.....	84.

Figure 3: Electoral Districts for the Four Deputies of the Commons in Sevilla.<sup>36</sup>

In 1770, the Ayuntamiento moved ahead with a plan to strengthen this designation through the creation of four ward heads (*alcaldes de barrio*) to facilitate the management of the city. The precedent for this move was certainly the creation of similar divisions in Madrid following the riots of 1766. The comparison with Madrid was explicit in town records, which mandated the distribution of marble-headed staffs of office for each ward head patterned on those used in Madrid, so that office-holders “might be known and respected by all.”<sup>37</sup> Whereas the move to subdivide Madrid after 1766 was clearly motivated by an effort to marshal the policing powers of the state in the service of the urban local government, the initiative in Sevilla appears to have to have

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> AMS, Section 12, Vol. IV, no. 35.



emanated from less insidious designs. Subdivision of the city into component neighborhoods allowed for the establishment of a number of civic institutions and the expansion of services offered by the city.

Closer and more reliable management of the city led to all kinds of additional improvements. In two areas, Sevilla leapt forward dramatically during this period. Dual campaigns in favor of street cleaning and urban lighting emerged around this time. While discussion of changing political systems and the ascent of new ruling classes have dominated discussion of modernization in the social sciences, it is hard to overemphasize the revolutionary importance of clean streets and navigable nighttime avenues. The putrid smell and near perfect night blindness of the Spanish Monarchy's most urbanized settlements to this point in history was a palpable reality for contemporaries. Far from serving as pervasive reminder of foreign influence at court, street lamps made the night time labyrinth of Sevilla navigable without torch for the first time. Efforts to bring extensive lighting to the streets benefitted from the street cleaning campaign of prior years. To this point in history, the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla maintained a largely symbolic presence in the city with few tangible administrative functions beyond its organizational role in preparing major celebrations like royal visits and other exceptional occasions. The enforcement of order remained largely beyond the fold of local government and rested with the policing powers of the central government; dispensation of justice was within the exclusive purview of the royal law courts (*real audiencias*). Public works broadened the presence of local government beyond the elegant and lofty confines of city hall and offered tangible services to ameliorate life in the urban setting.

Each reform built upon the next. Although attempts to better maintain the cleanliness of the urban environment in Sevilla predated the eighteenth century, a sanitation board (*junta de limpieza*) was not formed until 1757. However, it did not gain importance for little over a decade until Olavide intervened to issue a formal ordinance guiding the work of streetcleaners and the creation of five district offices (*quarteles*).<sup>38</sup> In all likelihood, the thought given to the layout and distribution of parishes by district required for the election of representatives of the Commons played a part in facilitating this planning. Certainly, the process of coordinating trash collection provided city planners with a thoughtful understanding of the city by which to plan an approach to public lighting. Public fury meted out to the lampposts of Madrid in 1766 notwithstanding, the move to light the streets of Sevilla was welcomed positively. The union of street cleaning and the maintenance of newly installed lampposts suggest the extent to which one project relied on the next. What emerged was an administrative infrastructure capable of guiding the nature and organization of basic city functions. A strong indication of local knowledge gained from such experiences came in the form of the city's first map – a detailed representation that included every major building plot and public space – issued for the first time in 1773 – arranged by district and further subdivided into neighborhoods.<sup>39</sup>

Such modernization campaigns were not out of keeping with Sevilla's distinction as one of the Spanish Monarchy's test environments for progressive reforms in the

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<sup>38</sup> Reglamento General de Limpieza de las Calles por Semanas, issued 13 August 1769. See Francisco Javier Hernández-Navarro, *Sevilla limpia e iluminada: el padrón de Fincas Urbanas de 1795* (Sevilla: Fundación Cultural de Colegio Oficial de Aparejadores y Arquitectos Técnicos, 2006).

<sup>39</sup> This map hangs in the AMS and has not been assigned a call number.

commercial sector. Royal reformers were as concerned with the means to spur commerce as they were with the need to maintain a competitive empire and productive agricultural base. A royal monopoly on tobacco dated to the earliest days of conquest in Americas. However, it was not until the eighteenth century that the crown undertook construction of a massive cigar factory in Sevilla, eventually completed during the 1750s, which pooled the enterprises of curing, crushing and rolling tobacco into a single location. Construction of bronze metalworks, designed principally to supply artillery divisions with a fresh stock of armaments, culminated in 1768. In each instance, the focus was on increased productive efficiency though both projects remained well within the bounds of Old Regime mercantilism. The situation of both edifices beyond the city wall was, nonetheless, an important testament to the spirit of change and modernization that defined the experience of city residents and visitors alike.

Much ink has been split on the cultural dimension of the Enlightenment in the Spanish world, but this was a not a movement limited to the realm of letters and the closed world of the academies. Such projects portray a city that was very much at the core of the Spanish Enlightenment. That said, the city served as host to a cultural milieu that was very much the rival of Madrid and centers of learning further afield. Few portrayals of the Spanish Enlightenment by other scholars have been remiss to note the importance of the salon culture that merged the closed world of academia and the more open sectors of the urban population. Contemporaries were proud to note not only the strength and variety of several regular intellectual societies, or *tertulias*, in existence during the tenure of Olavide. More importantly, they were proud to note the direct participation of the *asistente*, a voice that implied the direct approval of the crown, who

welcomed members to attend meetings held within his residence at the Real Alcázar.<sup>40</sup> Regulars included the likes of Olavide's cousin Gracia, Francisco de Bruna, Ignacio Luis de Aguirre, the Count of Aguilar, and Domingo Morico, and likely also a young Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, who arrived in the city to serve as *alcalde de crimen* at the royal audience in 1768.<sup>41</sup> Around this time, it seems Olavide was actively working to promote the creation of a sort of public library.<sup>42</sup> The eventual institutionalization of the *tertulia* tradition in Sevilla was formalized at the behest of Olavide with the foundation of the Sociedad Patriótica Sevillana in 1775 – patterned on the official favor granted to the first of such organizations founded in the Basque Country a few years prior – and the renewed activity of the Royal Sevillian Academy of Fine Letters (Real Academia Sevillana de Buenas Letras).<sup>43</sup>

It is hard to gauge to what extent the vitality of major urban areas bled over into more modest towns and farming settlements. In the case of the Nuevas Poblaciones, it was possibly quite high, fueled by the movements of Olavide and his retinue. There is some evidence for thinking in terms of this transfer working in the other direction.

Although of minor importance by the population standards of Sevilla, Osuna was

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<sup>40</sup> María Dolores Arbolí Iriarte, “Los orígenes de la Sociedad Económica Sevillana de Amigos del País (1775-1778),” Separada de la comunicaciones presentadas al I Congreso de Profesores Investigadores celebrado en El Puerto de Santa María, September 1982, Vol. I: Historia de Andalucía (Sevilla, 1982), 152.

<sup>41</sup> From Pedices Blas, 60 - Ceán Bermúdez, (1814), 18.

<sup>42</sup> Pedices Blas, 49 – “Pablo de Olavide al Ilmo. Sr. D. Manuel Quintano Bonifaz,” La Peñuela, 18 de noviembre de 1768 (A.H.N.), Inquisición, leg 4.210\*, ms borrador, letra de Olavide.

<sup>43</sup> The nodal model of regional organization has been popular to the study of economic history for some time. While it is evident that larger cities almost certainly dominated the economic balance within specific regions of the Spanish Monarchy, data on the cultural dimension of this equation remains lacking. Exemplary nodal economic studies are David Ringrose, *Madrid and the Spanish Economy, 1560-1850* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) and Pierre Vilar, *Catalonia en la España Moderna* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1987)

certainly involved in this process of cultural exchange as we have seen already. Patterned on the formation of such groups in other towns, the emergence of a formal institution in Osuna points to the rising intellectual interest among elites in matters of public policy that held a strong resonance well beyond major urban centers. Only some towns stored the potential to support a formal institution granted full powers to use the royal designation. Royal concessions required money and more often than not a historical claim to importance. Home to the court of the Dukes of Osuna, Osuna also served as home to a university with an illustrious pedigree that reached to the sixteenth century, a testament to the patronage of the ducal household. In the later part of the eighteenth century, it was here that Sevilla-born José María Blanco White studied for the priesthood, a religious training from which he would later distance himself to become best known as a writer, poet, and a key architect of the early Spanish liberal movement as it emerged on the international scene.<sup>44</sup>

Osuna was not exceptional with regards to a trend of growing local interest in political affairs. A short distance from Sevilla, the ducal courts of Medinaceli in Sanlúcar de Barrameda on the coast and that of the House of Arcos in Marchena further inland extended the network of patronage within Western Andalusia well beyond the walls of Sevilla. Still there is evidence in towns like Ecija that the spread and use of printing presses by independent publishers became more commonplace. The wealth and variety of new cultural institutions certainly offered a foundation for this trend. More distinctly commercial ends appear to explain this growth as well. In Sevilla, as was likely the case

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<sup>44</sup> José María Blanco y Crespo (1775-1841), also known as Joseph Blanco White, was born to an English diplomat of Irish ancestry and a Spanish mother. He is perhaps best known as the redactor of the monthly journal *El Español* in London between 1810 and 1814, during which time he benefitted from the patronage of Henry Vassall-Fox, the Lord Holland.

in other neighboring towns, there appears to have emerged an active public sphere situated around cafes that promoted the reading of printed material and the exchange of ideas. The Café de los Patriotas on Génova Street in central Sevilla was exemplary of this trend. It is worth noting that such an addition to the political culture of the city likely blurred the status of local elites, a distinction once reserved for aristocrats and members of the *cabildo*, a body that faced increasing scrutiny at century's end.<sup>45</sup>

The aggressive gains of the Enlightenment in Sevilla, especially with respect to the renovation of the urban landscape in the city, taken aside, the movement also faced fierce resistance at the local level. Such resistance was embodied perhaps most emblematically by the Bourbon campaign against bullfighting, which pitted reformers and the bulk of the middling and lower classes of Sevilla against one another. An outgrowth of Habsburg court traditions, bullfighting was a matter of civic pride in Sevilla. The eighteenth century witnessed the transformation of bullfighting from an elite display of wealthy extravagance to the status of most favored sport of the masses. Considered a barbaric practice by the Bourbons, monarchs beginning with Felipe V pursued an aggressive campaign against the practice that reached new heights in the mid-eighteenth century.<sup>46</sup> A critical stage in this process came with the formation of the Real Sociedad de la Maestranza de Sevilla, a corporate institution granted the exclusive right

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<sup>45</sup> In this instance, it is hard to avoid mention of Jürgen Habermas and his work pertaining to the public sphere. While the spread of print culture and the proliferation of mediums for the circulation and debate of ideas was certainly critical to the political change experienced within the Spanish Monarchy during the Age of Revolutions, alone it cannot explain the outcome of events. At no point was this culture strong enough to overcome the full brunt of the prevailing Bourbon censorship regime. It did, however, benefit from the weakening of the central position and the rise of a more strictly localo-centric regime of information policing and dissemination. See Ramón Solís, *El Cádiz de las Cortes. La vida en la ciudad en los años de 1810 a 1813* (Madrid: Silex Ediciones, 1987).

<sup>46</sup> Adrian Shubert, *Death and Money in the Afternoon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 54.

to promote bullfights in 1739. A defining symbol of the emergent wealth of the association was the construction of a bullring. Prior to this point, bouts were typically held in the Plaza de San Francisco where the galleries of the *ayuntamiento* granted prime standing to town officials. The new corporation was destined to remove the public status accorded to control of the best seats in the venue from aristocrats that dominated the *ayuntamiento*, granting new preferred status to the merchants that managed the corporation. The project, which in addition to the ring itself included the development of a large residential and commercial block on the western side of the Guadalquivir River, was a start and stop affair that followed the multiple prohibitions against bullfighting that accompanied the sport throughout the century.

Reform also threatened the position of the Catholic Church and its various institutions. Critical to this discussion was the 1746 publication in Rome of Luis Antonio Verney's tome, later published in Spanish in 1760, *Verdadero método de estudiar*. Verney's attack on the Jesuits and scholastics gained resonance among educated circles and was a frequent topic of debate in *tertulias* and other gatherings. The expulsion of the Jesuits in 1766 favored a reorganization of secondary education in Sevilla and posed the perfect opportunity to reform universities across the Spanish Monarchy. The suppression of *colegios mayores* that same year added additional fuel to the fire engulfing religious educational institutions. The 1767 report on the state of university education produced by Gregorio Mayans y Siscar provoked a call for wider examination of the subject of university reform. Into this void stepped Olavide, who in Sevilla was at the center of a debate over what to do with the recently vacated property of the Jesuits. It was the *Plan*

*de estudios* drafted by Olavide that was to serve as the most highly regarded response to the issue.<sup>47</sup>

Olavide's plan was something more than a mere shot across the bow of religious educational institutions. It offers a fascinating look into the politics of Sevilla in the thick of the Spanish Enlightenment. Olavide regarded the university as a "public office instituted by the Government for the education of men that shall have opportunity to serve the State."<sup>48</sup> In short, Olavide held an essentially secular view of higher education. He was not alone. Olavide's plan built upon others presented in the *tertulias* of Sevilla. That presented by Cándido María Trigueros before the Academia Sevillana de Buenas Letras spoke openly of public education. The introduction to his proposal praised Descartes for having turned his back on Aristotle and the scholastic method.<sup>49</sup> The content of the proposal encouraged new philosophical discussions and insisted on the introduction of more practical studies like mathematics. Perhaps most controversially, it called for the total exclusion of regular clergy from the university setting. Despite such a radical stance, religious communities were in no place to mount a clear opposition. Instead, the plan drew fire for economic reasons; it was never the intention of the Crown to pay for public education through public rents. Olavide's plan called for the University of Sevilla's independence from the oversight of the local archbishop and for the suppression of four canons of the Cathedral to pay for the costly reform measures. Ignoring the plan's financial implications, Carlos III authorized the plan on 22 August

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<sup>47</sup> Francisco Aguilar-Piñal, *El plan de estudios de Cándido María Trigueros (1768)* (Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, 1984), volume does not include page numbers.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> Herr, 164.



1769. Shortly thereafter, Olavide left for the Sierra Morena where he established a residence in La Carolina to oversee the Nuevas Poblaciones.<sup>50</sup> Meanwhile, his *Plan* was such a success that Campomanes urged the Council of Castile ordered curriculum revision for all Spanish universities.<sup>51</sup>

The church, however, did regain its footing. Though a number of universities heeded Olavide's call for a more reasoned approach to public education, the initiative gained little ground at Salamanca. In June of 1771, the tribunal of the Inquisition in Sevilla sent a voluminous report to the Suprema attacking Olavide's plan for university reform. The plans produced at other universities followed a similar fate. The real hammer came from the Sierra Morena, where Olavide was denounced by a cleric for anti-Catholic policies he established in the communities of the Nuevas Poblaciones. Though the Fuero granted to the Nuevas Poblaciones prohibited religious institutions beyond local parish churches, Olavide had extended the ban to include limitations on begging for alms and weekday masses among other changes.<sup>52</sup> Decrees issued as early as 4 November 1775 recognize Olavide as sitting Asistente of Sevilla but note his absence (*ausencia*) from affairs of government, an awkward recognition.<sup>53</sup> In November 1776, agents of the

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<sup>50</sup> Francisco Núñez-Roldán, "La Universidad de Sevilla en el siglo XIX," in *La Universidad de Sevilla, 1505-2005. V Centenario*, coords. Ramón María Serrera and Rafael Sánchez Mantero (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla y Fundación El Monte, 2005), 228.

<sup>51</sup> Olavide's plan for university reform, which endured in place into the nineteenth century, remained a source of deep seated resentment for religious communities into the nineteenth century. Between 1807 and 1824, the Olavide plan was disestablished on three separate occasions and reinstated twice, ultimately succumbing to a resurgence of religious fervor at the close of the revolutionary interval. In this regard, it curiously shared the same fate as the Inquisition, which was disestablished for a second and final time in 1820. See Manuel Moreno Alonso, "La Universidad de Sevilla en la crisis del Antiguo Régimen (1800-1823)," *La Universidad de Sevilla, 1505-2005. V Centenario*, coords. Ramón María Serrera and Rafael Sánchez Mantero (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla y Fundación El Monte, 2005), 250-252.

<sup>52</sup> Herr, 209.

Inquisition arrested Olavide with the apparent backing of Carlos III. On 13 October 1778, Olavide was proclaimed a heretic before a ceremony that included seventy members of the governing elite.<sup>54</sup> Among the gravest of offenses, Olavide was faulted for his admiration of French *philosophes*, notably Voltaire and Rousseau, and for having advanced the Copernican system. The sentence leveled against Olavide banned his return to Sevilla and the Sierra Morena for life and ordered that he endure an eight year arrest at a monastery where he was to undergo religious reeducation. Ultimately, in 1780, taking advantage permission to visit curative waters in Catalonia, Olavide fled across the Pyrenees into France.<sup>55</sup>

Olavide's fall killed the spirit of enlightenment and reform in Sevilla. In 1776, Juan Antonio de Santa María was named as Olavide's successor as Royal Asistente of Sevilla. Olavide's lieutenant in La Carolina was named Superintendente of the Nuevas Poblaciones. The two positions were never again united under the auspices of a single person. Many of the projects to which Olavide devoted extended time failed to develop further. Indeed, in the absence of a charismatic designate of the crown, grand plans faltered and were never executed to their fullest potential. Subsequently the resurgence of the church and *ayuntamiento* signaled the beginnings of a renewed conservatism.

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<sup>53</sup> AMS, Section 5, Vol. 281.

<sup>54</sup> It is unclear who held the reigns in this show trial. The fact that Carlos III did not intervene on Olavide's behalf is significant, but it is unlikely he was persuaded by the power of the Church. Most historians have viewed presiding Inquisitor General Felipe Bertrán as a reformer. Some have argued that Bertrán's counselors put him up to the display and that the Olavide trial was simply most high profile case of several launched against progressive reformers. See Callahan, 35; and Antonio Álvarez de Morales, *Inquisición e Ilustración, 1700-1834*, (Madrid, 1982).

<sup>55</sup> Herr, 210.

## THE FAILURE OF REFORM

I wish to contrast the urgency of the reforms initiated after 1766 to their spectacular failure less than ten years later. Not one of Olavide's successors proved his equal. Arguably, the intendency system once championed across Spain in the era of Olavide died before the final decade of the eighteenth century. The system depended on a sure supply of bold and able office-holders, which waned after the 1770s, perhaps succumbing to paranoia drawn from the example of Olavide. Increasingly more frequent and disruptive, transfers and promotions caused regular turnover. Short stints in office did not lead to the sort of immersion in the problems facing local communities required of an effective intendency system designed to stay above the fray of a well-structured bureaucracy. Instead, successive intendants positioned themselves amid the already thick local bureaucracy of late eighteenth century, where they posed no serious challenge to entrenched members of the aristocracy in possession of the reigns of the *ayuntamientos*.<sup>56</sup>

Problems arose in the Nuevas Poblaciones. Despite early successes, the Nuevas Poblaciones ran into severe trouble in 1768.<sup>57</sup> Poor construction standard led to housing troubles in February. Summer brought the onset of an epidemic of the so-called *tercianias*. Harsh weather in early fall also threatened the success of the project. Complaints to the Council of Castile in late December issued by Joseph Anton Yauch – a contracted hand hired to gather prospective colonos in Switzerland – triggered a formal review to protect the international reputation of the project headed by one of Olavide's foremost skeptics,

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<sup>56</sup> Lynch, 305.

<sup>57</sup> At least one broadside published 1 July 1768 sought to challenge negative accounts. Preponderance of disease was no greater than other surrounding settlements. AHN-SN, "*Carta de Juan Tomás Ten, sobre las nuevas poblaciones de Sierra Morena*," Osuna, C. 3361, D. 16. Filter Rodríguez, 141-147.

Council jurist Pedro Pérez Valiente.<sup>58</sup> During the investigation, Pérez Valiente was named acting Superintendente of the Nuevas Poblaciones from April to August of 1769, a move which forced Olavide from the scene.

Olavide had mixed feeling about the colonists.<sup>59</sup> A visit by Olavide to La Luisiana demonstrated the full extent of the problem. Between April and August, colonos succumbed to disease and stopped working altogether. In summer, a complete harvest was lost. Survivors were left starving beneath little more than tables to avoid the scorching sun that baked the still roofless structures of the settlement. The foreigners brought to rescue the Spanish Monarchy from decline were to require rescue themselves. Olavide was forced to evacuate a sizeable portion of the settlement to a nearby field hospital erected in Écija, where they faced a hostile *ayuntamiento*, still at odds with the development for having committed the grave offense of taking its land.<sup>60</sup>

Among the groups Pérez Valiente encountered in Andalusia during his stay was a delegation from Écija. Olavide considered the complaint of Écija the result of a rich few. Pérez Valiente, however, saw the matter quite differently. Whereas Pérez Valiente considered property concerns in Sierra Morena so problematic that only mere correction would do, the situation in Andalusia was such that he ought to make a dramatic

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<sup>58</sup> It seems Capuchins in Yauch's native Switzerland spread rumors and controversy about the project, which forced the Swissman to make a personal visit to the site in 1768. Thomas Reese, 128: Alcázar Molina, *Las colonias alemanas*, pp. 120-121, provides a digest of the memoria. José Antonio Filter Rodríguez, *Orígenes y fundación de la Luisiana, el Campillo y Cañada Rosal: La Colonización de Carlos III en la campiña sevillana*, (La Luisiana: Coria Gráfica, 1986): 57. There had been earlier criticism from Thurriegel and Johann Gloecker, a German chaplain in Sierra Morena, in August 1768.

<sup>59</sup> Thomas Reese: *Carta de Olavide al Ministro de la Real Hacienda, de 6 de abril de 1769*, AHN, Fondos Contemporáneos, Ministerio del Interior, leg. 328. Juan Baños Sánchez-Matamoros, Concha Álvarez-Dardet, Francisco Carrasco Fenech, "Contabilidad y Control sobre el Individuo. El Caso de Las Nuevas Poblaciones De Sierra Morena y Andalusia (1767-1771)", 66.

<sup>60</sup> Filter-Rodríguez, 157.

intervention.<sup>61</sup> Although Pérez Valiente expressed great concern over the expropriation of lands to Aranda, it seems Campomanes intervened to defend Olavide's reasoning.<sup>62</sup>

Although additional settlements were built in subsequent years, the promotion of the project slowed never to reach its forecasted size. The model never gained traction as the basis for a wholesale reconsideration of the imperial order and served only to fuel antagonism of local governments and aristocrats alike toward the central government.

The Bourbons lost out not only in the case of the Nuevas Poblaciones. The political position of the monarchy diminished as well. The failure of the Bourbon campaign against bullfighting was a good indication of this fact. Despite the resistance of Bourbon administrators, and another ban leveled in 1786, the Maestranza continued to rise. The outcome was a new and very visible ascendancy for the merchant base of the city and the emergence of a new cultural space in the city. From this point, the traditional home of bullfighting in the city, the Plaza de San Francisco became marginalized as a space for cultural celebrations and transformed more specifically into a venue for hostile civic expression. This would become painfully evident in the use of the space beginning in 1808.

The great winner in this contest was the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla. Not only did the local government achieve tremendous successes in the area of civic reorganization, it proved successful in abutting the resistance of the popular classes. The *comuneros* did not alter considerably the interplay of politics at the local level. Local notables in Sevilla

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<sup>61</sup> Reese, 147.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 142.

were effective in co-opting ascendant members of Sevilla's nascent bourgeoisie.<sup>63</sup> This was a pattern repeated elsewhere in the region where strong oligarchies emerged, as was the case in Osuna where the duke named the majority of the town's *cabildo*, the five *comuneros* notwithstanding.<sup>64</sup> The aristocracy strengthened their control of the *cabildo* and the *ayuntamiento*, in turn, solidified its position as the most visible political authority at the local level. It was a Pyrrhic victory for the aristocracy. In elevating the role of local government to the heights of cultural consciousness, the aristocracy also made the *ayuntamiento* matter. As events at the start of the nineteenth century would later show, this would mean the actions—as well as relative inaction—of the Ayuntamiento could have real implications for the stability of the prevailing social order.<sup>65</sup>

Additionally, the church proved capable of rebounding from the assault leveled against it beginning with the succession of Carlos III's liberal regime and the crushing expulsion of the Jesuits in 1766. In failing to wrest power of persecution from the Church, the central government failed again. The church held considerable sway over public opinion. In a city like Sevilla, the church held the power to make or break policy and resistance to reform from the religious community was sure to derail future efforts. The outcome was a city and a region governed not by Madrid, but rather by a coalition of aristocratic *ayuntamientos* – increasingly at odds with a rising merchant class – and reactionary clerics. Political culture in Western Andalusia evolved around this new power

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<sup>63</sup> This fits with data collected in the Madrid region. See Jesus Cruz, *Gentlemen, Bourgeois and Revolutionaries: Political Change and Cultural Persistence Among the Spanish Dominant Groups, 1750-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>64</sup> Fernando Javier Campese Gallego, "Vida Municipal de Osuna en el reinado de Carlos IV: Una aproximación," in *Osuna entre los tiempos medievales y modernos (siglos XIII-XVIII)*, edited by Manuel García Fernández and Juan José Iglesias Rodríguez (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1995), 471-483.

<sup>65</sup> Campese Gallego, *La representación del Común*, 405-412.

dynamic, which required that legitimate social action take place in reverence of religion and with the end goal of securing not royal approval but rather that of the local *ayuntamiento*.

## WAR AND REVOLUTION

The death of Carlos III and the ascent of Carlos IV in 1788 preceded the start of the French Revolution by a matter of months, however it was the French Revolution that guaranteed defeat of the centralization projects initiated by the advisors of Carlos III. The political climate precipitated by the start of the French Revolution ushered out a generation of reformers. In a short span of time, enlightened government officials Cabarrús, Campomanes, and Jovellanos succumbed to court factionalism and fell from grace in dramatic fashion. Floridablanca underwent a dramatic role reversal from a defender of reform to radical conservative. Under Floridablanca the heads of the patriotic societies were ordered to curb their activities and on 24 February 1791 the circulation of all private periodicals in Spain was suspended.<sup>66</sup> A year later Floridablanca was dismissed and replaced by the Count of Aranda who was to hold the position of chief minister for only a brief interlude preceding the rise of Carlos IV's great favorite, Manuel de Godoy. In 1793, Carlos elevated the young soldier to assume the highest responsibilities of state. It was an untested Godoy, who would, in the end, broaden discontent with the centralized and absolute rule of the Bourbons from a cause of court factionalism to a concern of widespread public discontent and bring the lingering collapse of the central government to a head in the nineteenth century.

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<sup>66</sup> Herr, 262.

War with France was the key catalyst in accelerating the saturation of public interest in matters of state. Floridablanca's conservative turn had mirrored a new paranoia. Before the start of the war, the Council of Castile circulated order to the *ayuntamientos* in 1790 calling for the collection and destruction of *Catecismo francés*, a work targeting rural readers, on the grounds "that it contains maxims and seditious principles contrary to public tranquility."<sup>67</sup> The threat to domestic tranquility posed by French revolutionaries coupled with Carlos IV's revulsion at the beheading of French King and fellow Bourbon Luis XVI left the central government ready to accept the challenge of war when France declared a start to hostilities in 1793. Although Spain signed a peace treaty with France in 1795, swearing to become an ally of the France, the affair was ruinous to public morale. Elite concern over Spanish backwardness became widespread. Instead of hailing him as one of their own, the Spanish public turned against Godoy. Faced with clear public opposition to his government, Carlos IV was forced to sack Godoy in 1797, reenlisting many of the figures cast out of government, but the king reversed course again in 1801 with a second purge of enlightened ministers and the restoration of Godoy.<sup>68</sup> The sum effect was only to deepen a public sense of crisis, and the perception that the monarchy was no longer up to the challenge of redemption. With the monarchy growing distant and local government becoming more visible in its utility, the central government began its sudden fall from public grace.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> AMS, Section 5, Vol. 226, no. 16.

<sup>68</sup> During this time, Jovellanos was briefly reinstated as minister of grace and justice from 1797 to 1798. He was imprisoned upon Manuel de Godoy's return to office

<sup>69</sup> It is worth mentioning that Richard Herr has portrayed the Godoy ministries as the second coming of the Enlightenment in Spain. This does not, however, account for the public opposition that responded to these reforms. Unlike the reforms initiated at mid-century, this round was seen as wholly foreign, coming as they did against the backdrop of news from France and the official alliance of this



The growing association of central government with the flaws of the regime did not, however, affect the status of the crown a great deal. Rather, it was the bureaucracy that took the hit. In fact, the image of the monarchy remained an important tool for local government. After all the privileges bequeathed upon the *ayuntamientos* were founded upon the institution of the monarchy. In Sevilla, the baroque funeral honors held to mark the death Carlos III and the coronation celebration for Carlos IV, both held in 1789, as well as the pageantry that accompanied a royal visit to the city in 1796 required a large investment on the part of the local government. Such moments afforded the city a key opportunity to reinforce its own symbolic claim to the majesty of the royal person. Critical to these commemorations was the use of portraiture to invoke the presence of the monarch when physically absent. This tradition would come to play a pivotal part in motivating crowd behavior in later years. Reverence granted to such representations points to the enduring popularity of the monarchy during these years, and by extension to the unpopularity of bad government seen to stand at fault.<sup>70</sup>

Floridablanca was not the only casualty of the French Revolution. Olavide lived in obscurity outside of Paris for a decade before imprisonment in France during the height of the Reign of Terror. The experience proved more effective than the religious reeducation regimen mandated by the Inquisition in making him a devoted adherent of

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regime with that of Spain. For a more in depth analysis of this period, see Richard Herr, "Good, Evil, and Spain's Rising against Napoleon," in *Ideas in History: Essays presented to Louis Gottschalk by his Former Students*, Eds. Richard Herr and Harold T. Parker (Durham: Duke University Press, 1965), 157-181.

<sup>70</sup> For an excellent overview of these celebrations, see Francisco Ollero, "La imagen del rey en las celebraciones públicas de la Sevilla ilustrada," in *Nación y constitución: De la Ilustración al liberalismo*, edited by Cinta Canterla González (Sevilla: Junta de Andalucía, 2006), 571-587. Interestingly, Herr and others have asserted that Spanish *ilustrados* differed from French philosophes insofar as the former maintained a steadfast loyalty to the idea of the monarchy and the social importance of the church, a distinction not shared with the latter.

the Catholic Church. Following his release, Olavide penned a four volume track in support of religion that was to become “the Spanish best seller of the turn of century.”<sup>71</sup> For his efforts, Carlos IV welcomed Olavide back into the good graces of the Spanish Monarchy and permitted him to resettle in the small town of Baeza in Eastern Andalusia, not far from the Nuevas Poblaciones of the Sierra Morena. He died there in 1803.

Even prior to his death, the legacy of Olavide held heavy sway over the domestic policies of Carlos IV. Reform envisioned limitless growth for Spain, which the crown could tap as it pleased. The failure of reform made wartime expenditures after Spain went to war with France in 1793 difficult to balance. No longer motivated by utopian aspirations to transform Spain into a model state, the precarious financial situation of later century forced the hand of the Crown to explore potential revenue sources with renewed vigor. The situation was certainly at an extreme. Alongside direct taxes, the crown issued three war-time bond sales that netted 964 million reales by 1796. The devastation of trade with Spanish Americas, however, wiped out the government’s ability to cover the bonds. Meanwhile, the war, while making the peasantry likely more well off thanks to wartime price fluctuations, led to declining wages in the cities. On the wings of this crisis, riots erupted in Sevilla, as elsewhere, during the winter of 1797 and again in the spring of 1798.<sup>72</sup> Unable to put itself in greater debt and unwilling to explore further taxation of a population already on edge the crown explored still more exceptional means to balance its ledgers. On 19 September 1798, the crown issued four decrees that would allow for the disestablishment of noble, religious, and other estates, thereby initiating a

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<sup>71</sup> Herr, 370.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, 396.

process of *desamortización* that would become a central hallmark of church-state relations in nineteenth century Spain.<sup>73</sup>

Records show that about two thirds of urban property within the city of Sevilla was held by various religious institutions in 1795. Among the various religious institutions, the city alone contained 31 parish churches, 7 monasteries, 45 convents, 13 schools, 6 houses for the regular clergy, 15 hospitals, 4 beateries, 12 hermitages, 6 seminaries, and two houses of misericordia. The numbers swelled beyond the city in surrounding towns. Already weakened by increased taxes levied for services like street cleaning and lighting in the early 1790s, their situation grew worse as the century drew to a close. The desamortization campaign began in 1798 largely protected property held by the religious *cabildos*. However, it also made significant cuts to properties held by the religious communities.<sup>74</sup> Having removed itself from the local orbit, the central government treaded on the one institution that could assist it in shoring up support among local communities. Worse still, the financial situation continued to unravel.

## CONCLUSION

Earlier generations favored the legacy of Carlos III. By most accounts, Carlos III was the Spanish exemplar of an enlightened despot, an absolute ruler driven to implement a reasoned program of rule that encouraged political and social reform. The distinction of

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<sup>73</sup> The individual decrees are examined in detail in Richard Herr, *Rural Change and Royal Finances in Spain at the End of the Old Regime* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 93-99.

<sup>74</sup> Hernández-Navarro, 52-54, 73-79.

enlightened despot was, however, misleading in the case of Carlos III. Enlightened despots were quite effective at maintaining political order. As the Tumult of Esquilache demonstrates, the regime of Carlos III was not a stable one. After 1766, fear of revolt led the king to favor policies that were indicative of a more pragmatic approach to rule at the local level. At the same time, Carlos III placed the security of his political position ahead of enlightened policies. Carlos III was willing to sacrifice the position of reformers to threats from the religious estate. The Inquisition's spectacular character assassination of Olavide pointed to the diminished position of the monarchy in the political landscape of peninsular Spain at the close of the eighteenth century. Although the crown proved capable of expelling the Jesuits from Spain for the order's supposed involvement in the Tumult of Esquilache, Carlos III and his agents were unwilling to launch an attack on the Inquisition after Olavide fell from grace. In essence, the monarchy became the unwitting victim of its own devices. Meanwhile, the reforms introduced by Olavide frustrated municipalities like Écija. The Inquisition's attack on Olavide cooled Bourbon reformist impulses in Western Andalusia at the same time as reformist zeal had revived local awareness of municipal rights. This left the impression that the monarchy was only willing to advance the cause of reform so far. Thus, the monarchy energized local impetus for reform while simultaneously discrediting itself as an agent of reform.

At the middle of the eighteenth century, the monarchy and the municipalities of the Spanish Monarchy enjoyed a roughly egalitarian relationship. Although local political elites deferred to the crown on matters of imperial policy, at the local level they retained a certain political prominence. Reforms launched after 1766 threw this balance into disarray. Unable to insert the voice of the commons into local government, the monarchy

was unable to win this group to its side, and in the process further alienated local political elites. Olavide's fall from grace injured not only himself, but also the image of the central bureaucracy as the embodiment of effective rule. The municipalities succeeded in assuming the banner of political leadership by the close of the eighteenth century.

At the close of the eighteenth century, the central government failed to resonate as a guarantor of good governance and as a source for the betterment of local communities. In this context, local political elites considered themselves able agents of political and social reform should a widening in the realm of political action present itself. Spanish municipal governments were left waiting and ready to implement a new and ambitious program of reform. This moment came in 1808 when a French invasion formally knocked the teetering monarchy out of the political equation. Local political elites stepped into the political void to provide for a more effective manner of rule. In the chapters that follow, local dynamism revived during the era of Olavide will serve to frame municipal responses in Western Andalusia to the crisis of sovereignty that emerged in the wake of the French invasion of 1808.

## CHAPTER THREE:

### **The Crisis of Sovereignty at the Local Level: Organizing**

#### **Resistance and Negotiating Occupation in Western Andalusia, 1808-1812**

The extreme political crisis that emerged in 1808 with the collapse of the Spanish Monarchy led to an explosion of local political activity throughout Western Andalusia. I argue that the immediate concern of most Spaniards at the start of the crisis was the loss of their personal and civic freedoms. Well before religion and nation became central to the cause of revolution, a need to restore and defend the ancient rights of local government motivated the people of Western Andalusia in their struggle against the French. In a distinct break with the past, local political of Western Andalusia took an active role in governing the empire. As a byproduct of providing for public order and the defense of the patria, Western Andalusians worked towards the reconsolidation of the Spanish Monarchy from among its constituent parts.

Scholarship on the earliest phase of the War of Independence (1808-1814) has emphasized the politically passive nature of the Spanish people at the outset of the conflict. When historians have attributed political agency to the Spanish people in managing the political ramifications of the war, they have focused above all on the role of nationalism invoked by political elites active at the central level of government as an evident motivation.<sup>1</sup> This appraisal overlooks the reality that most Spaniards cared little

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<sup>1</sup> This position appears in the writings of José Álvarez-Junco, *Mater dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001); and Scott Eastman, *Preaching Spanish Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759-1823* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012). Although there is little doubt that usage of the terms “nation” and “sovereignty” flowered in this period, see for instance Mónica Quijada, “Sobre nación, pueblo, soberanía y otros ejes de la modernidad en el mundo hispánico,” in *Las nuevas naciones: España y México, 1800-1850*, ed. Jaime E. Rodríguez O., 19-52 (Madrid: Fundación MAPFRE, 2008), this was not linked to a popular understanding of what was meant by nationhood at the local level.

for what happened to the Spanish Monarchy as whole, and were instead concerned most essentially with their *patria chica*, or little homeland.<sup>2</sup> In a second but related vein, some historians have explained the behavior of the Spanish as a diametrically opposed, and even xenophobic, rejection of all things deemed French. For instance, Ronald Fraser has stressed that popular resistance, exemplified by development of guerilla warfare, stemmed from the repressive policies of the occupational regime, which meted out physical violence and political tyranny in equal form.<sup>3</sup> In this sense, the Spanish people were compelled to create modern political institutions out of an expediency derived of wartime necessity. In contrast to these two positions, I argue that the Spanish people worked to craft a durable political framework in the service of local needs but which served the larger political ends of the Spanish Monarchy. During this time, seemingly new political institutions were formed from long-standing principles upholding the virtues of local independence and self-government.

The creation of *ad hoc* administrative councils, or *juntas*, was integral to political organizing during this period. Indeed, the turn to *juntas* in response to the evolving political crisis was a common theme throughout the Spanish Monarchy.<sup>4</sup> *Juntas* were common to Spanish government prior to 1808. However, the unique political situation

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<sup>2</sup> That a national response to the crisis was little more than a myth has been explored by Rodrigo García-Carcel, *El sueño de la nación indomable: Los mitos de la Guerra de la Independencia* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> Fraser writes, having dismissed with national patriotic narrative, that “The reality of the war for the population in general was very different ... only one constant stood out: popular hatred of the repressive imperial occupation forces which thieved a living off the land ... laid waste to villages, vandalized churches and wantonly killed, nominally to support a usurper king.” Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon’s Cursed War: Popular Resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War* (London: Verso, 2008), xiii.

<sup>4</sup> On this point, see Manuel Chust, “Una bienio transcendental: 1808-1810,” in *1808: La eclosión juntera en el mundo hispano*, ed. Manuel Chust (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007); and Jaime E. Rodríguez O., “El juntismo en la América Latina,” in *Las Experiencias de 1808 en Iberoamérica*, eds Alfredo Ávila and Pedro Pérez-Herrero, 69-103 (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2008).

that emerged in 1808 provided for their transformation into influential repositories of political power. Foremost among the variety of *juntas* created during this period were those that governed at a regional level, including the Junta of Sevilla, which exerted significant political control over Western Andalusia during 1808.

*Juntas* reordered the practice of government in Spain. Spanish government under the Old Regime was marked by a system of rule that linked each municipality directly to the reigning monarch. Direct lines of communication between royal functionaries based in Madrid and centrally appointed local representatives of the crown, like the *corregidores*, allowed for little negotiation on matters of policy implementation at the local level. The *ayuntamientos* were expected to implement policy without debate on matters of utility and efficacy.<sup>5</sup> By contrast to this model, the spontaneous character and less formalistic conventions of the *junta* provided a basis for deliberations at the local level. The outcome of local discussion could then more readily filter upwards to supralocal regional institutions like the Junta of Sevilla. Thus, the *junta* provided for a reversal in the flow of political decision-making between central and local governments.

In the pages that follow, I will examine the history of Western Andalusia during the early years of the War of Independence and extending into the period of the French occupation.<sup>6</sup> Confronted by a crisis of sovereignty, the people of Western Andalusia

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<sup>5</sup> Centrally appointed local intermediaries were able to invoke a right to refuse policy implementation at the local level. Especially in Spanish America, royal officials would on occasion state the phrase “*obedezco, pero no cumpla*” (I obey, but I do not comply) in their communications with the central government. This practice was likely more common outside of Europe because of the unique demands of government beyond the continent were not always apparent to officials based in Madrid. To this effect, the crown relied on the expertise of centrally appointed local intermediaries to assess the situation. In no case were *ayuntamientos* allowed to dismiss the execution of royal policy. The refusal of an *ayuntamiento* to comply with royal policy would have been taken as an act of local rebellion.



rejected the premise that Napoleon could lay claim to political control of all Spanish municipalities. Under the leadership of the Junta of Sevilla, the municipalities of Western Andalusia worked to build a regional political system that preserved their local freedoms while responding to the military task at hand. These same municipalities began the process of reaggregating the Spanish Monarchy at a regional level. And while the French were able to invade Western Andalusia in early 1810 and institute an occupational regime that lasted the better part of two and a half years, they were incapable of governing the region in a centralized manner. Individual towns insisted on setting the terms of their collaboration or continued to resist the occupation in clandestine fashion.

#### WESTERN ANDALUSIA AT THE ADVENT OF A NEW CENTURY

At the turn of the nineteenth century, the political life of Western Andalusia resembled that of the late eighteenth century. A series of conflicts, affecting the central government especially, had not substantially altered the political life for most Spanish subjects or the political culture of Spanish society more generally.<sup>7</sup> For the majority of

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<sup>6</sup> My analysis will consider Sevilla apart from small towns and villages owing to a disparity in the variety of source material available to historians studying these communities. The war was rough on the preservation of administrative documents; many records also appear to have been destroyed or lost by the French. Because of this, my narrative will require linking the experiences of disparate communities into a narrative built upon the accounts of several towns.

<sup>7</sup> In 1788, Carlos III died and his son and heir acceded to the Spanish throne as Carlos IV. Only a year later, Europe witnessed the outbreak of the French Revolution. Senior agents of the Spanish Crown, including the Count of Floridablanca who remained prime minister until 1792, responded with panic, fearing that the country was on collision course with a similar spate of violent political upheaval. The government response included significant new restrictions on the freedom of the press. In 1793, Carlos IV declared war on the French First Republic shortly after the beheading of his Bourbon cousin, Louis XVI. In exchange for peace against France in 1796, the Spanish Monarchy agreed to an alliance with France under the terms of the Second Treaty of San Ildefonso. (The First Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777 had resolved a territorial dispute between the Spanish Monarchy and the crown of Portugal.) This agreement required that the Spanish Monarchy go to war with Great Britain. This move demanded tremendous attention from the governing bureaucracy in Madrid and the commitment of Spanish soldiers to distant battlefields.

the Spanish population, the enduring unit of political life remained that of the municipality. Although Spanish political elites maintained a formally egalitarian view of the essential parity between central and local governments, a more informal paternalistic relationship operated between the Spanish king and his subject municipalities, which mirrored that of father and child.

The bond between monarch and municipality remained the foundation of Spanish political culture at the start of the nineteenth century. Individual municipalities remained quite capable of managing their own affairs and little served to bind them together apart from a common loyalty to the Bourbon dynasty. At the regional level, regional institutions, like the territorial law courts, or *audiencias*, continued to function much as they had done for centuries. Only the introduction of intendancies had altered the role of regional institutions significantly and the public rationale behind their creation was a need for greater efficiency in the realm of tax collection. Regional institutions were not seen as intermediary forms of government placed between the central and local governments. From the vantage of the *ayuntamientos*, regional institutions were corporate bodies that existed alongside municipal institutions and facilitated the practice of good government by the monarchy. No strict hierarchy existed for administrative purposes that clearly subordinated municipalities to the monarchy.

The response of municipalities in Western Andalusia to the yellow fever epidemic of 1800 demonstrated the continued resiliency of local government in the final years of the Old Regime. Yellow fever arrived in Spain by means of the Atlantic port at Cádiz.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The annual of Sevilla's history in the period 1800-1850, compiled by José Velázquez y Sánchez, chief archivist of the AMS during the mid-nineteenth century, will serve as an important source for the purposes of this study. It is worth noting that Velázquez's work was not published until 1872, but drew

Despite development of trade policies that opened several new ports of trade, Western Andalusia remained an important point of contact with Spanish America. The yellow fever outbreak of 1800 was not the first of its kind in peninsular Spain. However, the ferocity of the resulting epidemic brought life to a standstill. Four years later, as the severity of the outbreak began to fade, one chronicler estimated more than 75,000 were infected in Sevilla alone, a city modern estimates suggest numbered at around 80,000 people.<sup>9</sup>

During the epidemic, extensive areas of Western Andalusia were quarantined, effectively sealing zones contaminated by yellow fever from contact with neighboring communities. The result was a hyper-seclusion of some of the peninsula's more remote communities. According to one account, in Écija local health officials "used all their vigilance to prevent the contact of people with people suffering from this fever in the general vicinity."<sup>10</sup> In a society with no recourse to vaccination and unfamiliar with the modern science of epidemiology, quarantines, however disruptive to the pace of local life, proved virtually the only means to combat the disease.

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heavily on a variety of primary documents at the author's disposal in the municipal archive. Speculation that the contagion was likely connected to a yellow fever outbreak in the Mississippi delta led to the labeling of the disease as "*la epidemia Americana*." José Velázquez y Sánchez, *Anales de Sevilla de 1800 a 1850*, ed. Antonio Miguel Bernal (Sevilla: Servicio de Publicaciones Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1994), 7, 17.

<sup>9</sup> Contemporary numbers place the exact number infected persons at 76,488, of which 61,718 survived and another 14, 685 died, which implies a mortality rate of nearly 20%. Velázquez y Sánchez, 13. Population estimate based on L. Carlos Álvarez-Santaló, *La población de Sevilla en el primer tercio del siglo XIX* (Sevilla: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1974), 62.

<sup>10</sup> "La Juntad de Sanidad empleaba toda su vigilancia en impedir la comunicación del pueblo con las personas que padecían esta fiebre, y con las que se hallaban en sus inmediaciones." José María Mociño, *Disertación de la fiebre epidémica, que padeció Cádiz, Sevilla y la mayor parte de Andalucía desde el año 1800 y principalmente de la que sufrió Ecixa el año 1804*, ed. Juan Carlos Arias-Dívito (México: Sociedad Mexicana de Historia y Filosofía de la Medicina, 1982), 41.

In response to the emerging health crisis, municipalities established local health boards (*juntas de sanidad*). These health boards organized at the behest of each *ayuntamiento*, or municipal council, to manage the local response to the crisis. As a mechanism of first response, the boards were effective in executing the coordinated response of local officials and medical professionals to mitigate the effects of the plague on daily life. Typically access to quarantined areas was accomplished only by means of the presentation of a personal passport and a certified letter of entry issued by the local health board. The decision to place sanitary cordons around neighborhoods or even whole towns rendering them “*incomunicado*” with surrounding areas was not taken lightly. Although potentially harmful at an economic and even social level, these boards demonstrate the resiliency and resourcefulness of municipal governments in this period. In the absence of a regional coordinating body, these local boards proved effective in maintaining public order and directing the traffic of persons within larger towns and between distant towns of the region. By 1804, the epidemic subsided, and life in Western Andalusia returned to its pre-crisis rhythm without long-term damage to the economy or social norms.<sup>11</sup> In a short time the furious pace of sanctioned festivals and religious processions resumed once again.

Quarantines erected during time of disease were not the only challenges inhibiting the steady flow of communications within and beyond the region. For national news, the inhabitants of Sevilla relied almost exclusively on the royal postal service route that ran between Madrid and Cádiz. Regular postal service ran from Madrid every Tuesday and

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<sup>11</sup> In fact, statistical evidence suggests that private ownership of urban property in the city of Sevilla increased considerably during the period 1800-1802, reducing the sum held by religious institutions. See Francisco Javier Hernández-Navarro, *Sevilla limpia e iluminada: el Padrón de Fincas Urbanas de 1795* (Sevilla: Fundación Cultural del Colegio Oficial de Aparejadores y Arquitectos Técnicos, 2006), 79.

Friday, with a return service working in reverse from Cádiz these same days of the week. The route from Madrid to Sevilla took four days. A letter that left Madrid on a Tuesday at one in the afternoon would arrive in Sevilla at around seven in the evening on the following Saturday. Assuming that a letter made it to Sevilla, its recipient had roughly four hours to draft a response to send back to Madrid by way of the return route service. Along the way, postal carriers faced an unsettled stretch of the mountainous Sierra Morena and, despite the continued survival of the Nuevas Poblaciones, the still largely unsettled wasteland of northern Andalusia. Especially in more remote areas of the Sierra Morena, travelers were threatened by intermittent banditry, which led to the occasional disruption of the postal service.<sup>12</sup>

The challenge of maintaining reliable communications with the central government exposed the remoteness of Western Andalusia at the start of the nineteenth century. As much a psychological problem as a logistical one, the relative treacherousness of the overland postal route made the conceptual distance between the central government and municipalities in Western Andalusia much larger than was actually the case. Because the circuit took nine days to complete, political elites in Western Andalusia no doubt viewed themselves as quite removed from the central government in Madrid. Local political elites in Sevilla, as elsewhere within the region, understood that crisis might require them to act without due consultation from Madrid. This fact empowered local political elites with considerable freedom to act as they sought necessary in some circumstances. Thus, the political culture of the Old Regime provided

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<sup>12</sup> Francisco Aguilar-Piñal, *La Sevilla de Olavide, 1767-1778* (Sevilla: Servicio de Publicaciones, Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1995), 41.

a political basis for municipal governments to govern themselves in moment of severe crisis like that which began during the spring of 1808.

## THE TWILIGHT OF THE OLD REGIME

The context for the crisis of sovereignty that erupted during the spring of 1808 dated to the political rise of Manuel de Godoy, the king's chief minister of state.<sup>13</sup> Sustained war, first with France and later with Great Britain, had precipitated popular unrest throughout peninsular Spain.<sup>14</sup> The growing strength of an anti-French faction at the royal court coupled with a riot at the Royal Palace of Aranjuez led to the dismissal of Manuel de Godoy on 18 March 1808. The local response to this incident signified the permanence of the Old Regime political traditions on the cusp of their collapse.

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<sup>13</sup> Carlos IV promoted Manuel de Godoy to the rank of chief minister in Madrid. As a person of non-noble birth, Godoy had quickly risen from the barracks of the palace guard and into the role of a senior confidant to the king and queen. Godoy's appointment signaled a departure from the tradition of nobles inhabiting the senior-most ranks of the Spanish governing establishment. For negotiating an end to the war with France and securing a Franco-Spanish alliance, Godoy was named Prince of Peace. Despite receiving accolades for his service to the crown and the promise of lightened restrictions on the freedoms of the press, regular troop conscriptions and state intervention in the agricultural markets, which were felt most significantly at the local level, stoked public resentment. Chief among the complaints of the Spanish people was a belief that Godoy and the pro-French faction at the royal court had led the country into an embarrassing and shameful compact with revolutionary France against the major Catholic powers of Europe. A thorough summary of Godoy's tenure in office appears in the work of Richard Herr, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), In particular, consult pages 239-265.

<sup>14</sup> Under the terms of its alliance with Imperial France, the Spanish Monarchy was at war against England from 1796 to 1802, and again from 1804 to 1808. A Third Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800 forced the Spanish Monarchy to surrender Louisiana to France, which Napoleon promptly sold to the United States in an effort to raise funds for continuing his European wars. In 1805, the crushing naval defeat inflicted by the British under Lord Nelson against the combined French and Spanish fleets at the Cape of Trafalgar – a short distance off the Spanish coast near Cádiz – exemplified the costs of the alliance in tangible terms for the Spanish public and served to further heighten domestic political tensions. Two years later, a suspected *coup d'état* conspiracy organized against the Spanish crown and supported by both the royal court's anti-French faction and the Infante Fernando triggered the brief imprisonment of the latter. Against this backdrop, Napoleon crossed the Spanish border under the pretense of launching an attack against the Portuguese.

In Sevilla, public dislike of Godoy and the justification given for his removal from office demonstrates how the politics of the central government were interpreted at the local level. Widespread dislike of Godoy's government and its policies had provoked much ire in Sevilla. As this anger developed within in the context of the paternalistic relationship between the king and his subjects that structured the political culture of the old regime, the person of Carlos IV was beyond reproach. Nonetheless, new conscription and taxation burdens imposed by the crown faced widespread public resentment. In the king's place, Godoy came to symbolize the political failings of the regime. As a result, the people of Sevilla blamed Godoy for the situation that required significant contributions of men and money to the central government. The royal favorite stood accused of exercising "ministerial despotism." That is, the public held Godoy responsible for corrupting the monarchy and abusing his position as prime minister.

The fall of Godoy was celebrated at the local level in Sevilla. News of Godoy's fall from grace arrived in the Sevilla on 22 March 1808, and quickly spread by word of mouth.<sup>15</sup> The better part of the city rioted (*se amotinó*) upon hearing report of Godoy's ouster, apparently moved by a public reading of news in a café on Génova Street. From this central location, a group of Sevillians ran north to the parish church of San Juan de Dios where they requested the keys to the building. Facing the hesitation of the superior, the crowd entered the church entered by means of the cloister and tore down the painting of Godoy that hung in the main chapel of the church, in a spot it had occupied for little

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 56.

more than four months.<sup>16</sup> The attack on the image of Godoy was meant as a public rejection of both the man and his policies. After the initial assault “...every person left triumphant with a bits or tiny shreds that multiplied further as the group tore them into very small pieces, because everyone wanted to take part in the ruin of the portrait. It was a very great disturbance of the people (although very short) and the general happiness very great indeed.”<sup>17</sup>

This scene unfolded with the implicit sanction of the official representative of the king in Sevilla, Royal Asistente Vicente Hore – an ally of Godoy – who took the fall of the prime minister to signal a significant shift in the position of the government.<sup>18</sup> The Asistente did not intervene to stop the public disturbance that condemned his political patron. The decision to figuratively tear Godoy limb from limb conformed to the norms of absolutist society. During the Tumult of Esquilache in 1766, rioters in Madrid had publically burned a portrait of the government minister they endeavored to remove from

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<sup>16</sup> My account of the history of Sevilla in the period 1800-1852 owes a great debt to the collection of diaries kept by Félix González de León, now preserved in the AMS. A close follower of the performing arts in the city, González de León initially kept his diary to document productions in Sevilla’s main playhouse, the Teatro de Comedia, but his observations and musings on the events of the day provide an important window into the daily life of Sevilla during the first half of the nineteenth century. Section 14: *Crónica de Don Félix González de León*, Vol. 9. 22 March 1808.

Several additional sources have assisted me in making sense of the González de León diary. José Velázquez y Sánchez used the González de León diary to write *Anales de Sevilla de 1800 a 1850*, which I will continue to use throughout this and future chapters. Velázquez y Sánchez served as the archivist of the AMS at the close of the nineteenth century. His thoughts on the archive, including the section devoted to the diary of González de León, appear in *Memoria del Archivo Municipal de Sevilla*, Facsimile Edition, 1864, ed. Marcos Fernández y Sánchez (Sevilla, Servicio de Publicaciones, Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1992). My reading of the González de León text and those of Velázquez y Sánchez was aided by Robert A. Schneider’s examination of the diary kept by Pierre Barthès in *The Ceremonial City: Toulouse Observed, 1738-1780* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

<sup>17</sup> “Despues cada persona salía triunfante con una pedazo ó astilla las que se multiplicaron partiendolas en muy pequeños trozos, porque todo el pueblo queria tener parte en la Ruino del retrato. Fue muy grande el alboroto del pulo (aunque muy corto) y mayor la general alegría,” Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Velázquez y Sánchez, 5.



office.<sup>19</sup> Asistente Hore allowed for the crowd to express dissatisfaction with a disgraced man as a means to preserve public faith in the monarchy. Godoy symbolized nothing short of a public sacrifice to quell growing unrest and the potential for a catastrophic break with the monarchy.

In another testament to the survival of Old Regime political culture, local political elites in Western Andalusia were opposed to Godoy and might have stoked the passions of the popular classes. In 1804, Godoy advanced a plan to carve a new maritime province from the existing provinces of Sevilla and neighboring Granada, which would have stretched from the Portuguese border to Málaga. This proposal irritated local elites in Sevilla who objected to the creation of novel provincial entities that would have challenged the power and influence of regional institutions based in the city. Rumor had it that Godoy had fallen in love with the coastal city in which his mistress resided, Sanlúcar de Barrameda, and sought to elevate this new town to the rank of a provincial capital.<sup>20</sup> The fall of Godoy did mark an end of the elevated political standing enjoyed by Sanlúcar de Barrameda among the towns of coastal Western Andalusia. Political elites had a history of promoting public unrest as a means to bring about desired changes in policy. Political elites were tied to the outbreak of violence at Madrid in 1766 and the Tumult of Aranjuez that resulted in Godoy's dismissal.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> José Miguel López-García, *El motín contra Esquilache: Crisis y protesta popular en el Madrid del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial), 110.

<sup>20</sup> A popular claim, though unsubstantiated, argued that Godoy had offered Portugal to Napoleon for the taking in exchange for the coastal Portuguese Algarve region, which was to become the personal fiefdom of the Spanish minister. It is unclear when and from what source the claim originated though it appears frequently in narrative accounts of the Spanish war with France.

<sup>21</sup> Several accounts claim that the Marquess of la Ensenada fanned the fires of public unrest during the Tumult of Esquilache. Antonio Domínguez-Ortiz, *Carlos III y la España de la Ilustración* (Madrid:

Violence related to Godoy's removal followed a geographic pattern common to the early modern period. Political disturbances in the center of the country tended to radiate outward to the peripheral zones, whereas similar occurrences that began outside of the capital only rarely disrupted the political life of Madrid. The Tumult of Esquilache was typical of this phenomenon, as the initial shock of violence in Madrid rippled throughout the provinces in the subsequent weeks.<sup>22</sup> The Tumult of Aranjuez that led to the dismissal of Godoy produced echoes of violence in geographically peripheral communities like Sevilla. This too implied the durability of an Old Regime political culture in which local communities responded to the political life of the center like a child answering to the call of a parent.

However, the invasion of a sacred space for the purposes of retrieving the painting of Godoy broke with the norms of the Old Regime. The crowd appears overlooked the resistance of the local superior. In all likelihood, that the superior feared the threat to the church property posed by an angry mob. The crowd's willingness to bypass the superior implies an almost blatant disregard for the sacred spatial boundaries of the Catholic Church. Indeed, it was striking how closely this episode mirrored popular images of the French Revolution in Spain. Spanish propagandists had gone to great lengths in condemning the French assault on religion. Aside from this moment, there exists little cause to believe that Spanish support for religion was on the wane. The behavior of the

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Alianza Editorial, 2005), 120-121. However, more recent accounts have denied the existence of suitable sources to justify such a claim. On this point, see López-García, 13, especially fn 5. Several conventional histories of the Tumult of Aranjuez suggest that the Count of Montojo and other members of the anti-French faction of the royal court pushed the popular classes to act. Charles J. Esdaile, *Spain in the Liberal Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939* (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 11-14.

<sup>22</sup> See chapter 2.

crowd spoke to the political tensions present in 1808 at the local level and the potential for the wider public to become active in the political realm.

## THE ERUPTION OF A CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Crisis for the Spanish Monarchy developed as a result of events affecting the central government in Madrid. In response to the ouster of Godoy, Napoleon chose to intervene directly in Spanish affairs of state. The Tumult of Aranjuez resulted in the brief accession of Ferdinand VII who quickly emerged as the people's favorite.<sup>23</sup> In response to this event, beginning in March 1808 the French emperor began to occupy Spanish towns with French troops as a maneuver to force the abdications of both Carlos IV and Fernando VII.<sup>24</sup> On 2 May 1808, the people of Madrid rose against the French occupation of their city.<sup>25</sup> This event triggered the start of the Spanish War of Independence.

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<sup>23</sup> Little was known of the Infante Fernando at the local level. Nonetheless, Fernando enjoyed an early public esteem as a political innocent. This contrasted sharply with the public image of Godoy who the Spanish people viewed as a "despot" immersed in political scheming prevalent in the Spanish capital.

<sup>24</sup> Napoleon redirected his army to Madrid under the pretense of mediating the dispute between the two kings. Napoleon's intervention compelled Carlos IV and Fernando VII to negotiations organized by the French emperor at the French town of Bayonne. At Bayonne, both sovereigns were forced to abdicate their birthrights to the Spanish throne. The Bourbon abdications effectively decapitated the leadership of the Spanish government. As many of the senior government ministers had left Madrid to accompany the Bourbon sovereigns to Bayonne, this left the French army in effective command of the Spanish capital. With news of the abdications made public and Napoleon's army situated within the walls of Madrid under the pretense of maintaining order until the negotiation of a political settlement, relations between French troops and the inhabitants of Madrid soon fell into decline.

<sup>25</sup> On 2 May 1808, with rumor spreading that the French planned to remove the youngest Bourbon prince from Madrid, local agitators provoked a riot in front of the royal palace. The riot precipitated a violent response from the French troops stationed in the city. In the hours that followed, French regulars, scimitar-wielding North African mercenaries, and point blank cannon blasts were turned against the civilian population in what was quickly immortalized as the "*Dos de Mayo*" rising. At the Barracks of Monteleón, a small contingent of Spanish regulars led by Sevilla-native Luís Daoíz and Pedro Velarde fought to the last man, but the suppression was total. Political executions of Spanish civilians ran until dawn the next day.

Despite a tumultuous public reception regarding word of the “*Dos de Mayo*” rising, local political elites in Sevilla adopted cautious tone. News arrived in Sevilla on 6 May 1808 spread by a slew of private letters and printed notices.<sup>26</sup> The public’s access to reliable information regarding events in Madrid was imperfect. If later events are any indication, rumor likely spread through Sevilla with impressive speed. By one account it was clear that the public knew “...the French shot a large multitude of persons.” And “with this news in the morning there arose great alarm and a public disturbance (*alboroto*) with [participants offering] shouts of ‘Long Live King and Country, Death to the French!’”<sup>27</sup> Despite such public hostility, local officials hesitated making a formal break with the new French occupational regime installed in Madrid. Senior political elites of the *ayuntamiento* essentially accepted a French view of the unfolding political crisis, which insisted that all powers of state – and thereby control of every municipality – had transferred to Napoleon. Although the municipal government of Sevilla organized a formal oath-swearing ceremony to express public loyalty to the captive Fernando VII and acquiesced to calls that volunteers register for the local militia, it neither condemned the usurpation of the central government by the French nor made plans to mount a counter-attack. In effect, the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla bade due deference to the inheritor of the Spanish crown, favoring a course of adherence to standing tradition.

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<sup>26</sup> Manuel Moreno-Alonso, *La revolución “santa” de Sevilla (La revuelta popular de 1808)* (Sevilla: Edita Caja San Fernando de Sevilla y Jerez, 1997), 24. On the spread of news, see Velázquez y Sánchez, 57.

<sup>27</sup> “... los Franceses havian fusilado a una multitud grandisima de aquel Pueblo. Con estas noticias desde por la mañana hubo un grande alarma y Alboroto con los vivos de el Rey y la Patria: y mueran los Franceses.” AMS, Section 14, *Crónica de Don Félix González de León*, Vol. 9, 37.

The French immediately understood that the key to governing Spain depended on quieting the disfavor of local communities. Although unable to enforce its rule in any strict sense without sufficient troops on the ground, the French occupational regime issued edicts from Madrid to the inhabitants of Sevilla ordering compliance in a number of areas. Notably, it called for “...quietude, and good housing and hospitality to French persons moving about the country.”<sup>28</sup> To the people of Western Andalusia, it asked that they recognize French General Joachim Murat, Duke of Berg, as the king’s designate (*lugar teniente*) in the kingdom.<sup>29</sup> Significantly, in an attempt to embolden the legitimacy of the French attempt to construct a constitutional premise for the occupation, on 23 May an edict affirmed Sevilla’s right to send delegates to the Cortes.

The Bayonne Cortes recognized the influential political role of cities within the Spanish Monarchy, creating “a pact” that, from the vantage of the new monarchy, would “unite our *pueblos* with Us, and Us with our *pueblos*.”<sup>30</sup> Napoleon viewed a Cortes composed of representatives drawn from the major cities of the Spanish Monarchy as the best means to validate the terms of his usurpation of legitimate power. In effect, by calling the Cortes and asking Sevilla and other major cities to take part, Napoleon called representative institutions of the Spanish people to retroactively sanction his actions.<sup>31</sup> Although Sevilla did not send a delegate to the Cortes held at Bayonne, the assembly of

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<sup>28</sup> “...quietud, y buen alojamiento y hospitalidad a los Franceses que transitaron.” Ibid. 11 May 1808.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 14 May 1808.

<sup>30</sup> Preamble: “pacto que une a nuestros pueblos con Nos, y a Nos con nuestros pueblos.” The word “pueblo” underwent a change in usage during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, evolving from a meaning associated with various kinds of settlements, including towns and villages but implying cities especially, to one representing “the people” more generally. See also Velázquez y Sánchez, 61-62.

<sup>31</sup> AMS, Section 14, *Crónica*, 23 May 1808.

notables that met there did succeed in establishing a governing statute that gave a legal and contractual premise to the selection of Napoleon's brother, Joseph Bonaparte, as King José I of Spain.<sup>32</sup> In fact, the speed by which the French moved to secure the legitimacy of the occupation irritated many local communities. Only large towns were represented in the Cortes and so under the terms of political legitimacy advantageously applied by the French, the bulk of the Spanish population was not represented at Bayonne.

An insufficient response on the part of the Ayuntamiento to the French usurpation provoked popular discontent in Sevilla that culminated in revolution. Tensions in Sevilla escalated significantly on 26 May 1808. Limits on reliable news and many negative reports out of Madrid stoked public concern. The town was "quite annoyed and discontent" with news from Madrid and the knowledge that a French army had been dispatched to pacify Andalusia; shouts of "Death to the French" carried on all evening.<sup>33</sup> Despite stated plans to call a Cortes, the Spanish feared the arrival of troops that would signal an occupation and the loss of civic and personal freedoms.

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<sup>32</sup> The document promulgated at Bayonne was known formally as the Constitution of Bayonne. Yet scholarship by tradition has referred to the Statute of Bayonne, as the document owed more to the invention of Napoleon and his brother than the product of a genuinely democratic process. The Statute of Bayonne declared Roman Catholicism as the singular religion of the nation, but did not state explicitly the composition of this same nation. With regard to the political representation of the people, the Statute created a 24-member Senate composed of senior officers of state (ministers, captains-general, etc.) named by the king and a 172-member Cortes divided into three estates (clergy-25, nobility-25, and "*el pueblo*"-122). Of the 122 seats allocated to *el pueblo*, these were chosen in one of four ways. Sixty-two deputies were chosen at the provincial level by *juntas* of electors composed of special *regidores* drawn from among the municipalities of a province. The statute further stipulated that *ayuntamientos* representing the "principal cities" of the realm, Sevilla included, would select an additional 30 deputies. The final two categories of deputy were named by the king and came from the fields of business and commerce (15) and the arts and sciences faculty of Spanish universities (15). Municipal governments and their officers played the greatest part in naming deputies to the Cortes, selecting well over a majority of seats. However, the Statute of Bayonne was silent on the question of how local communities went about forming municipal governments, which served to limit the influence of diverse constituencies in this process.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 26 May 1808.

The central concern of the revolt launched against the leadership of the Ayuntamiento was a desire to exercise the political will of the people of Sevilla. Pursuant with this agenda, the organizers were intent to overthrow the collaborationist *ayuntamiento* by force. Sevillians proved successful in gaining entry to the royal artillery warehouse near the river and began to arm the populace during the night of 26-27 May. Early on the morning of 27 May, an armed crowd gathered before the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla in the Plaza of San Francisco (see fig. 4). Conspirators gathered the members of the *cabildo* in an extraordinary session, having wrested actual control of the city from the *ayuntamiento* without much effort.




Figure 4: Anonymous, “Escena de la Guerra de la Independencia en Sevilla,” Fundación FOCUS-Abengoa, R. 342.

The political events that followed demonstrated the continued respect of the conspirators for the institution of the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla. Rebel leader and merchant Nicolás Tap y Nuñez, known to history as *El Incognito*, met with Asistente Hore, members of the *ayuntamiento* and the Royal Audiencia of Sevilla, as well as a number of other local officials, and ordered them to swear their loyalty to Fernando VII and to declare their support for the rebellion against the French. To coordinate the regional defense of Western Andalusia, the participants of this meeting agreed to form the Junta of Sevilla, naming the accomplished military veteran and former government minister Francisco de Saavedra as its president.

The choice of Saavedra to lead the Junta of Sevilla was an exceptional one for several reasons. First, the crowd could have called for any individual to lead the Junta of Sevilla and overlooked the possibility of choosing a social equal with a lifetime of experienced rooted in the history and traditions of Sevilla. The substance of unfolding events did not pertain to class struggle, and rather was about resolving a political mess.<sup>34</sup> Having immediately dismissed many political elites from consideration owing to the

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<sup>34</sup> The selection of Saavedra to lead the provisional government may also speak to the awkward coalition of conspirators responsible for planning the uprising. This included members of the local aristocracy, clergy, and members of both the merchant and popular classes. The Count of Tilly, an eyewitness to the more violent moments of the French Revolution and a central conspirator in the 27 May uprising, was convinced that the revolution in Sevilla required consummation in blood, as was the case in France. Although the organizers appear to have shunned actual violence as a matter of tactics more generally, the Count of Aguila, *procurador mayor* of the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla and scion of one of the city's most enlightened public figures, was hauled to the Castle of Triana beyond the city walls on the West side of the Guadalquivir River where he was tortured and summarily executed. Although prior appraisals have viewed the violence of May 1808 as confrontation of distinct social classes, it is rather hard to avoid the conclusion that the attack was at best anti-oligarchic – if mob violence really even need to rely on a unifying ideology – and directed against hereditary office holders.

Moreno-Alonso's account of this event focuses heavily on the writings of Tap y Nuñez written some time after the actual events of 1808. See Manuel Moreno-Alonso, *La revolución "santa" de Sevilla. La revuelta popular de 1808*. (Sevilla: Edita Caja San Fernando de Sevilla y Jerez, 1997). In the view of Tap y Nuñez, the uprising was essentially a popular one. However, this assessment falls apart when the distribution of participants from various social groups are considered more fully.



belief that they had actively collaborated with the French, Sevillians turned to an experienced and able former government minister to lead them. The crowd understood the political enormity of the task at hand and desired an experienced, even if that individual had spent the bulk of his professional career active outside of the city. Second, Saavedra was also a renowned *ilustrado*, ranking among the more progressive administrators of his time. He moved in the circles that both his contemporaries and later historians consider the intellectual core of the Spanish Enlightenment. Although the Enlightenment was firmly linked with France, against which Spain was now at odds.

Finally, Saavedra's selection was significant because he represented a contrast to Godoy. Saavedra did not advance his candidacy personally. In fact he was sick in bed while local political elites worked to broker a compromise.<sup>35</sup> Godoy had ordered Saavedra to leave Madrid after forcing him out of office. Saavedra returned to his native city of Sevilla only a few years before in order to retire from public affairs. His move from retirement to the head of the local government came as a total surprise. As Saavedra later commented, the events of 1808 converted him "into a central political figure" of the Spanish revolution.<sup>36</sup>

The description of events at the local level in Sevilla has defied the simple categorization of historical contemporaries and later historians. According to Saavedra, the events of 27 May were nothing short of an uprising (*sublevación*).<sup>37</sup> In his account of

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<sup>35</sup> Francisco de Saavedra, *Memorias inéditas de un ministro ilustrado*, translated by Manuel Moreno-Alonso (Sevilla: Editorial Castillejo, 1992), 234.

<sup>36</sup> "me convirtiera en una figura política central." Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 233. Javier Fernández Sebastián has argued that there was a great deal of conceptual overlap in the use of terms like levantamiento, alboroto, motín, and revolución; see "Levantamiento, guerra

the War of Independence, the Count of Toreno used the term rising (*levantamiento*) to describe events in both Madrid and Sevilla.<sup>38</sup> Although the former term implies a class-based action, it was unlikely that either usage was employed in a conscious effort to impute a social dimension to either of these two events. Both terms, however, kept to the idea of resisting legitimate authority and would have been common to describing local revolt to the crown during the eighteenth century.

The widespread use of “revolution” represented a more significant semantic break. Two distinct notions of revolution existed in peninsular Spain at the start of the nineteenth. The first notion constituted a strictly political event that, building on the ideas of Aristotle, represented the modification of an existing political order or the complete transition from one to another. In this sense of the word, revolution was little more than a regular and even normal “turn of the celestial sphere.”<sup>39</sup> A second understanding of the word owed to the French Revolution and related more closely to the idea of a sudden and wholesale change in the social fabric of a political community. While some accounts describe a political revolution in Sevilla,<sup>40</sup> others are quick to dismiss the moment as anything but socially revolutionary.<sup>41</sup>

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y revolución. El peso de los orígenes en el liberalismo español,” in *Sombras de Mayo. Mitos y memorias de la Guerra de la Independencia en España, 1808-1908*, ed. Christian Demange (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2007), 187-220.

<sup>38</sup> José María Quiépo de Llano Ruiz de Saravía Toreno, *Historia del levantamiento, guerra, y revolución de España* (Paris: Baudry, 1838).

<sup>39</sup> The definition comes from the 1780 edition of the *Diccionario de la lengua castellana por la real Academia española*. Fraser, 125.

<sup>40</sup> The word is omnipresent in the diary of Velázquez y Sánchez.

<sup>41</sup> “Grito General de la Nación, Proclama de Sevilla,” in *Colección de proclamas, bandos órdenes discursos, estados de ejército y relaciones de batallas publicadas por las Juntas de Gobierno, o por algunos particulares en las actuales circunstancias* (Cádiz, 1808), 20-25.

The idea of revolution might also have carried important religious undertones. Historian Manuel Moreno-Alonso described the events of 27 May 1808 as the “Holy” (*Santa*) Revolution of Sevilla.<sup>42</sup> Participants were intent to cleanse the local government of profane elements that resulted from the collaboration of political elites with anti-religious Frenchmen, thereby sanctifying the practice of good government. There was certainly a religious dimension to the rising, which included the active participation of the clergy. Father Manuel Gil also played a leading role in organizing the people. However, this pattern also replicated past revolts in Spain. The Tumult of Esquilache featured the significant involvement of Father Cuenca, who served as a representative of the people in their negotiations with Carlos III.<sup>43</sup>

What matters most my purposes was the idea that revolution was somehow linked to the local level.<sup>44</sup> Many contemporaries viewed events in Sevilla as a stand-alone revolution. Although the 27 May revolution effectively followed the occurrence of events elsewhere, it was viewed as unique phenomenon. Public appeals to the people of Sevilla spoke of “our revolution.” By implication, these authors exhibited a firm sense of civic pride in the city and its people. Whereas revolution could signify an alteration in the political constitution of the Spanish Monarchy as a whole, it was fundamentally something actuated at the local level.

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<sup>42</sup> Manuel Moreno-Alonso, 13-18.

<sup>43</sup> Like Father Cuenca had done from the balcony of the Royal Palace of Madrid in 1766, Father Gil was said to have brandished a crucifix while participating in the events of 26-27 May 1808.

<sup>44</sup> References to “*revolución*,” and “*rebolucion*” in some cases, appear in the accounts provided by several participants and observers. Relative uncertainty in contemporary sources as to how one ought to spell the word might suggest the relative newness of its use. If so, perhaps the organizers of the event passed this language on the wider public, which possessed little experience with this term. As other scholars have shown, the notion of revolution as an intellectual construct dates to this time.

This period also witnessed the frequent invocation of patriotism to motivate the local population. Historians have mistakenly attributed patriotism in this period to signify a love of the nation – a social community defined by a common sense of belonging – whereas they should more fitfully apply it.<sup>45</sup> At least at the outset of the War of Independence patriotism and nationalism were distinct concepts.<sup>46</sup> Spanish nationhood was a concept under development during the War of Independence. However, it remained a mostly intellectual exercise until later in the nineteenth century.<sup>47</sup> By contrast, patriotism was a concrete idea to most Spaniards. Indeed, a number of “patriotic” societies emerged in Spanish towns during the later part of the eighteenth century. These associations of learned men were situated in urban communities and sought to apply local experiences and learned wisdom to the resolution of civic problems. Patriotism at the local level in 1808 was an idea associated with *la patria*, and above all else, this referred to *la patria chica*, or “little homeland,” a space approximate to the *término* of a Spanish municipality.<sup>48</sup> In this sense, *la patria* signified a civic and spatial entity and not a social

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<sup>45</sup> D. A. Brading, *The First America: The Spanish monarchy, Creole Patriots and the Liberal State, 1492-1867* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 445; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, *How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 204-210; Eastman, 20-25, and footnotes 187-188; and Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 8.

<sup>46</sup> David A. Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 20.

<sup>47</sup> The emergence of Spanish nationalism during the nineteenth led to a retroactive application of national significance to the War of independence at a popular level. As José Álvarez-Junco commented on the manner in which the War of Independence received its name, “*Un conflicto de tanta complejidad, naturalmente, no fue fácil de bautizar*” (A conflict of such complexity, naturally, was not easy to baptize). The conflict was initially “the present war” and later “the war against Napoleon.” Only decades after the conclusion of the war did its meaning develop a connection to the idea of national “independence.” See José Álvarez-Junco, *Mater dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001), 125.

<sup>48</sup> On this point, see chapter 1. During the early modern period, the writings of Cicero were exceptionally influential. Cicero linked patria to city, and placed loyalty to one’s city above obligations

one. Patriotism served as an effective rallying cry because it emphasized a appreciation for local ingenuity and political independence.

## REGIONAL GOVERNMENT COMES TO WESTERN ANDALUSIA

The revolution of 27 May 1808 succeeded in freeing Sevilla from obligation to the central government in Madrid, overrun as it was by the French. At the same time, it preserved the loyalty of the city and eventually the region to Fernando VII. The revolution further signaled an important turning point in the history of Sevilla's political position within the region of Western Andalusia. Although the Old Regime recognized the existence of geographically co-terminous kingdoms and provinces, these institutions lacked a clear place in the structure of Spanish government owing to the variety of jurisdictional claimants operating within each.<sup>49</sup> Out of the immediate crisis of sovereignty posed by the absence of a legitimate central government to which the region owed its allegiance, the Junta of Sevilla became a legitimate and sovereign regional power.

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owed to family and kinsmen, Kagan 24. At the start of the nineteenth century, the idea of *la patria* was connected with the idea of motherhood and the "motherland" according to Fraser, 9. This matches well with the image of the "*mater dolorosa*" in the volume by José Álvarez-Junco, *Mater dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001). However, Fraser also contends that such propagandistic notions likely had little resonance and that average Spaniards were likely more moved by the need to "defend their houses, families, crops and possessions from the ravages of the French army," 200.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, *la Patria* became synonymous with country, as with the motto of the Guardia Civil: "*todo por la patria*" (everything for the country). Scholarship attributing such a notion of *la patria* as country to the early nineteenth century does so anachronistically.

Unlike France, the Spanish Monarchy was composed of several kingdoms. This added an additional layer of complexity to defining local units of affiliation. In this sense the Spanish Monarchy was rather like the German lands. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship ad Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 4.

<sup>49</sup> These included corregidores, intendentes, captains-general, and other officers appointed centrally. On this subject see, chapter 1.

The process of unifying the political will of the people of Western Andalusia into a coherent political program required subordinating the independence of individual municipalities to the Junta of Sevilla. One day after the revolution in Sevilla, the Junta of Sevilla “dispatched orders to all people of the province that they should recognize and obey” its orders.<sup>50</sup> The rejection of the French occupational regime by individual municipalities did not imply their outright acceptance of an alternative political regime. Municipalities within Western Andalusia confronted virtually no established convention that would have made them suzerain to Sevilla. Nonetheless, the municipalities of Western Andalusia responded with zeal in support of the political program offered by the Junta of Sevilla.

The foremost concern of the Junta of Sevilla was to provide for the defense of the region. On 29 May 1808, the Junta of Sevilla issued an *instrucción* calling upon towns with at least 2,000 inhabitants to form *juntas* for the purposes of coordinating the war effort. In towns with less than 2,000 persons, this role passed to the local *ayuntamiento*. *Junta* members were tasked with gathering able-bodied men – first volunteers and later conscripts between the ages of 16 and 45 – forming them into companies, and then designating appropriate officers. Additionally, *junta* members were responsible for securing voluntary loans of a “patriotic” character from their fellow residents while reserving the right to gather forced contributions if needed.

Municipal *ayuntamientos* retained the right to act independently of one another, essentially to act as independent states. Although the Junta of Sevilla imposed a strict hierarchy on the region with regard to the war effort, it did not completely wrestle away

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<sup>50</sup> “... se despacharon ordenes a todos los pueblos de la provincia para que reconociesen y obedeciesen á la Junta de Sevilla.” AMS, Section 14, *Crónica*, 28-29 May 1808.

the sovereign character of municipalities to govern in a local capacity as they pleased. The decision to create new institutions that would stand alongside the much older municipal *ayuntamientos* attested to the sovereign character of local government. The Bourbon abdications had effectively produced a mass disaggregation of the Spanish Monarchy to its atomic parts. Municipalities were now sovereign to act of their own accord. Local *juntas* were vested with the authority to raise men and money to wage war against the French, but not necessarily to govern.

In managing the regional levy, the Junta of Sevilla delegated significant decision-making capacity to local officials who maintained a high degree of operational independence.<sup>51</sup> Like other settlements in the region, Carmona first among them, immediately heeded the call of the Junta of Sevilla, acknowledging the *instrucción* and intimating a desire to comply with the call to arms.<sup>52</sup> A Latin quotation scrawled across the cover of the record book of the Carmona *junta* offers a window into the mindset of this local *junta*. Likely taken from Seneca's *Epistulae morales* it read: "Up to the *very end* of life never cease to serve the common good."<sup>53</sup> The leadership of the Carmona *junta* clearly viewed themselves as filling an important and necessary civic obligation in the face of confronting almost insurmountable odds. In documenting the creation of a *junta* to heed the call of the Junta of Sevilla, the city leadership noted a desire to provide

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<sup>51</sup> This also meant that Old Regime political elites, who tended to dominate the membership of local *juntas de guerra*, remained in positions of power. On this point, see Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon's Cursed War: Popular Resistance in the Spanish Peninsular War* (London: Verso, 2008), 245.

<sup>52</sup> Manuel Antonio Ramos-Suárez, *El Patrimonio Cultural de Marchena y la ocupación Napoleónica* (Marchena: Ayuntamiento de Marchena, 1999), 19.

<sup>53</sup> I have added the emphasis in italics. The original reads "*Usque ad ultimum vitae finem non desinemus communi bono operam dare.*" Although not cited directly, this line appears to be a shortened version of one appearing in the *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*. AMC, Book 1153: *Expediente de Juntas Guvernativas*.

“for the conservation of the good order and defense of the *Patria* against all enemies.”<sup>54</sup>

The willingness of *carmonenses* to follow the lead of the Junta of Sevilla spoke not of a blind subservience to a regional capital, but rather to the responsibilities of local government to its people. Settlements large and small responded in kind. In Montellano, a small town of roughly 3,000 inhabitants tucked against the Sierra Sur, the first enlistment yielded 71 men, the bulk of them between the ages of 16 and 25.<sup>55</sup> More would follow in later cycles. Thus, the *juntas* mobilized local communities in the service of a common patriotic cause

The Junta of Sevilla proved very effective in marshaling the political will of Western Andalusia in the service of providing an impressive military defense of the region. In the absence of a central government loyal to Fernando VII, the Junta of Sevilla attempted to position itself at the center of the insurgency launched against the French. In mid-July 1808, enlistees of Western Andalusia under the command of the Junta of Sevilla participated in a stunning victory over French forces at the Battle of Bailén, which ended the invasion of Southern Spain and reversed the strategic position of Napoleon’s army in the Iberian Peninsula. This accomplishment secured the position of the Junta of Sevilla as a forceful military presence and strengthened its claim to serve in more formal fashion as a government as well.

On the back of this success, the Junta of Sevilla professed greater political significance. Though a number of *juntas* were formed spontaneously across the

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<sup>54</sup> Despite stating an intent to heed the call of the Junta of Sevilla, the date of this first meeting was stated as 27 May 1808. It is likely the events of this meeting were likely recorded at a later date. *Ibid*, 6.

<sup>55</sup> Manuel Hidalgo-Romero, *Las villas de Montellano y Algodonales en la Guerra de la Independencia* (Sevilla: Gráfica Castellana, 2000), 36.



peninsula, only the Junta of Sevilla used the appellation of “*Suprema de España e Indias*” (Supreme of Spain and the Indies). The use of “supreme” served as an explicit declaration of the Junta of Sevilla’s sovereign power. The Junta of Sevilla justified this claim by referencing the loyalty of subject towns within Western Andalusia. It adhered to the principle that in the absence of a monarchy, the people were sovereign.<sup>56</sup> The new Junta ordered similar institutions established in other parts of the country to send delegates to Sevilla to create a national council capable of managing a coordinated assault against the French and the continuity of a central government.

In simple form, the Junta of Sevilla called for the construction, or rather reestablishment, of the Spanish Monarchy by its constituent parts.<sup>57</sup> It justified this move by referencing the loyalty of *juntas* in Spanish America. The Junta of Sevilla made use of its geographic position and historic link to the larger empire as a means to assert its preeminent political position within peninsular Spain. This idea provoked resentment from the other regional *juntas* of the Iberian Peninsula, many of which also professed to hold supreme powers. The other regional *juntas* called into question the inherent right of Sevilla to lead a project of imperial reintegration. If the Spanish political model was essentially atomic in character, no constituent regional part had a right to force its position upon all the others.

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<sup>56</sup> Eastman, 59; Fraser, 127.

<sup>57</sup> Manuel Moreno-Alonso, *El nacimiento de una nación. Sevilla, 1808-1810: La capital de una nación en guerra*. (Madrid: Catédra, 2010).

## THE RISE OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA

The explosion of *juntas* at the regional and local levels threatened the historic position that the Bourbon political regime had worked to accrue over decades. It implied a diffuse vision of sovereignty in which power was vested in the people at large and not to a singular power like the king. The formation of supreme *juntas* drawing from the support of regional municipalities implied the bottom-up construction and legitimization of political entities. In effect, the crisis of sovereignty led to a grassroots movement to resurrect component kingdoms that formed the Spanish Monarchy. No political body existed with the requisite grassroots legitimacy to incorporation of the regional *juntas* into a larger geographic and governmental framework that could resemble the pre-war Spanish Monarchy. This posed the possibility that sovereign regional *juntas* might become independent states.

Faced with the problem of feuding regional *juntas*, senior statesmen, like the octogenarian José Moñino y Redondo, Count of Floridablanca, called for the creation of a central government. The French retreat from Madrid opened the possibility of a central location for such an assembly to convene. It seems Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, an enlightened polymath and one of the most senior Spanish statesmen at the time, argued stringently in favor of Madrid, though he feared the potential disruption of the local citizenry.<sup>58</sup> Organizers deemed the Royal Palace at Aranjuez both central enough and sufficiently removed from the crowds of Madrid to allow for the assembly to perform its

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<sup>58</sup> William Francis P. Napier, *History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814* (London: John Murray, 1828), 305. The “*Dos de Mayo*” rising activated popular interest in the political affairs, as had the 27 May revolution in Sevilla. In the aftermath, of the Tumult of Aranjuez, why the Royal Palace at Aranjuez would have been viewed as sufficiently removed from the same popular element remains uncertain.

essential functions: the waging of war and the establishment of an central government. In late September, the Junta Suprema Central y Gubernativa del Reino (hereafter the “Central Junta”) met for the first time, naming Floridablanca as its president. The Central Junta immediately declared itself sovereign, empowering itself to act on behalf of the Spanish people. However, this idea remained an abstraction. The Central Junta did little to formalize its relationship to the regional *juntas*. Meanwhile, a large number of political elites objected to the legitimacy of the Central Junta.

In the autumn of 1808, a French advance forced the Central Junta to depart from the relative political security of Aranjuez to another city of sufficient size to host the central government and its entourage. The Central Junta made the decision to head for the southwest of the Peninsula to maintain its communications with Spanish America. As local historians have noted, in this period Sevilla regained the prominent position it held during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when it was the most important urban settlement in the peninsula, a distinction that owed in no small part to the distinction of the city as the metropolitan entrepôt of Spanish trade throughout the world.<sup>59</sup> In those days, influential royal institutions based locally in Sevilla, like the Consulado and the Casa de Contración, mediated the link between the municipality and sovereign power. In the aftermath of its demotion from supreme to subordinate status, the Junta of Sevilla served a role similar to these early modern commercial institutions.

The co-residence of the Central Junta and the Junta of Sevilla in the same capital exposed the risk of a contested sovereignty. Although the Central Junta had declared itself sovereign several months earlier, it had never faced a need to impose this fact on a

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<sup>59</sup> José Manuel Cuenca-Toribio, *Historia de Sevilla: V. Del Antiguo al Nuevo Régimen* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1976).

local population. The political position enjoyed by the Central Junta had remained an abstract idea, supported by the regular army but never submitted to the test of the Spanish people at large. The survival of the Central Junta as a sovereign political power would require the acknowledgment of the power vested in it by the people of Seville. Given the affection of Sevillians for the Junta of Sevilla and the turbulent history of the city during the 27 May revolution, acceptance of the Central Junta's position was not a foregone conclusion.

The task of solidifying the political position of the Central Junta in Western Andalusia was achieved, in part, by careful use of long-standing cultural traditions. On 16 December, representatives of the Junta of Sevilla and the Ayuntamiento rode by horse to receive the Central Junta and its entourage beyond the city walls. Entry to the city was performed with much fanfare as though indicating the arrival of a monarch. This was followed by a triple pealing of the bells housed in La Giralda on the morning of 17 December.<sup>60</sup> Having seized the authority to govern in the name of the king as a self-appointed representative of the royal person, the Central Junta inherited the right to take the Salón de Embajadores in the Real Alcázar as its official place of residence. In doing so, it displaced the Junta of Sevilla, which was forced to share the municipal *casas consistoriales* with the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla. Thus, the Central Junta made symbolic appropriation of customs reserved for royalty like the ringing of the Cathedral bells, and its occupation of the Real Alcázar, to elevate its status within Sevilla.

Shortly after arriving in Sevilla, the President of the Central Junta died on 30 December. The rites of death held for the Count of Floridablanca required the

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<sup>60</sup> Manuel Moreno-Alonso, "Estudio Preliminar," in *El Alcázar de Sevilla en la Guerra de la Independencia. El Museo napoleónico* (Sevilla: Patronato del Real Alcázar de Sevilla, 2009), 41.

coordination of the municipal and ecclesiastical *cabildos* working in conjunction with the Central Junta. The Junta of Sevilla appears to have played no significant role in planning this event. Each of these institutions was furthermore compelled to take part in the ceremonies, which constituted a rather baroque festive display of order and rank. This event no doubt assisted the Central Junta in publically situating itself vis-à-vis the other major political institutions operating within the city. However, the occasion of commemorating the death of a national hero – for this was how the image of Floridablanca was crafted in subsequent months – also helped to rally the interest of the public toward a shared cause.<sup>61</sup>

Nonetheless, the Central Junta also took formal political action to assert its political position. On 1 January 1809 the Central Junta issued a *reglamento* suppressing the “supreme” character of the regional *juntas* and subordinating them to its control. Members of the Junta of Sevilla fumed at their new classification as the Junta Superior de Sevilla.<sup>62</sup> In the months that followed, the senior leadership of the Junta of Sevilla virtually evaporated. Acislo de Vera left for his new post as the Bishop of Cádiz. Hore left his position as asistente, likely due to a scandal cooked by the Central Junta. Meanwhile, General Castaños, promoted to the ranks of civil leadership after Bailén, confronted the disgrace of being blamed for a series of subsequent military defeats. By contrast, the president of the Junta of Sevilla, Saaavedra, was named to head a ministry, which owed perhaps to a close and longstanding bond to one of the Central Junta’s representatives for Asturias, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos.

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<sup>61</sup> This event is treated more extensively in chapter 5.

<sup>62</sup> Manuel Moreno-Alonso, *La Junta Suprema de Sevilla* (Sevilla: Alfar, 2001), 292-295.

During 1809, the Junta of Sevilla survived in a diminished capacity while the Central Junta inherited political control over Sevilla and the surrounding region. Significantly, the suppression of the Junta of Sevilla did not devolve into a violent confrontation. In fact, the Junta of Sevilla remained a useful coordination point for managing the relations of the Central Junta with the many municipalities within the region of Western Andalusia. The power play between the Central Junta and the Junta of Sevilla during the early weeks of 1809 was not without significant consequences. Specifically, it seems the imposition of a strict political hierarchy in the region affected the willingness of municipalities to work with political agents in Sevilla. Following the records of the Junta de Carmona for 1809, there was an evident sense of concern in communiqués drafted by the Central Junta. Effective control of the region was slipping away. Officials did not complain of municipal malfeasance or disobedience so much as repeatedly insisting that local officials make a greater effort to contain public disorder.

Correspondence between political elites of the regional and local *juntas* during this period exhibited a heavy emphasis on the strict regimentation of hierarchy imposed between towns. Major settlements like Carmona, Écija, Osuna, and others were nodal points of information exchange within their respective districts, or *partidos*. In light of the kinds of directives given to them as *cabezas de partido*, they were envisioned as subregional administrative centers. Communications from this period display a sense of urgency over the rise of brigandage in rural areas.<sup>63</sup> Defeats on the battlefield in 1809 led

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<sup>63</sup> “Lo que traslado á V. SS. reproduciendoles de nuevo quantas órdenes les tengo comunicadas en el particular, para que dirigiendo inmediatamente esta á las Justicias de los Pueblos de su partido, tenga por V. SS. y por todos el mas puntual y exácto cumplimiento en la parte que á cada uno corresponde, empleando todos los recursos de fuerza que por su instituto deben prestar las Milicias y Vecinos honrados de los mismos Pueblos para perseguir y aprehender á toda clase de malhechores, y conservar libres de

to mass desertions and a turn to irregular soldiering, or guerilla activity. Despite the patriotic associations linked with *guerrillismo*, often this activity was merely opportunistic. On occasion, the Central Junta mandated the formation of a kind of posse comitatus to root out such groups, though to no apparent avail. The changing tide of the war appears to largely have gotten away from the Central Junta.

The arrival of the Central Junta in Sevilla and the subsequent fashioning of a political hierarchy between the central and regional governments invalidated the sovereign status of the Junta of Sevilla. Nonetheless, Sevillians took great pride in the arrival of the Central Junta. For centuries, official documentation regarded Sevilla as a “Most Noble and Most Loyal City” of the realm. This distinction might have affected the decision of the Central Junta in its search for a suitable refuge.<sup>64</sup> In any event, both *juntas* remained loyal to the monarchy and this provided a useful political context for Sevillians to frame their loyalties to a central government.

After the subordination of the regional *juntas*, the Junta of Sevilla assumed the role of a regional coordinating body and no longer wielded the power and influence it once did. In its diminished capacity, the Junta of Sevilla worked to enlist volunteers and order conscriptions for the regular army, distributed resources, and managed the conveyance of policy guidelines determined by the Central Junta throughout Western Andalusia. The constituent municipalities of Western Andalusia had vested sovereign

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*insultos los aminos y sus respectivas términos, segun lo tengo tantas y tan repetidos veces prevenido y recomendado: en inteligencia de que nueva y mas positaamente hago responsables á V. SS. Y á todas las Justicias de qualquiera robo, insulto, ó vexación que se cometa en sus respectivas dependencias.”*

<sup>64</sup> The official motto of the Sevilla, often inscribed as the rebus “NO8DO,” is said to derive from a symbolic attempt to abbreviate the saying “it has not abandoned me” (*no me ha dejado*), attributed to the learned Alfonso X when the city sided with him against the revolt launched by his son and eventual successor Sancho IV.

power in the Junta of Sevilla. The Junta of Sevilla's relinquishment of this power to the Central disempowered its effectiveness to impose political order at a regional level and made local communities suspect other supralocal political entities like the Central Junta. As a result, individual municipalities within Western Andalusia withdrew politically into themselves, thereby placing the difficult project of peninsular reintegration at a standstill.

#### THE CAPITULATION OF SEVILLA

The manner in which the city of Sevilla negotiated its transit into the political sphere of the French occupational regime demonstrates once again the tremendous influence of local civic pride and concern for self-government. Although the Junta of Sevilla constructed an army capable of defending the region during the summer of 1808, the advent of the Central Junta in Sevilla led to the elimination of military powers of command vested in the regional *juntas* at the outset of the crisis. Western Andalusia was left defenseless when the Central Junta chose to withdraw from Sevilla to a comparatively more defensible strategic position at Cádiz. The strictly hierarchical nature of the Central Junta's system of rule had also disenchanting many towns within Western Andalusia lessening the will of local communities to rebuild the kind of regional political cooperation that emerged after the revolution of 27 May 1808. In effect, the Central Junta had succeeded in politically dividing the municipalities of Western Andalusia, leaving them open to conquest by the French. As each town of Western Andalusia reflected on how best to fend for itself in the face of coming disaster, Sevilla considered first providing for its own defense before ultimately welcoming French armies into the city.



Western Andalusia benefitted from a roughly nineteen-month break in the war with France during which to build the political regime described above. The sack of Córdoba by the French in June of 1808 had left much of Southern Spain open to attack and left the countryside stricken by terror. The dramatic and unexpected victory of General Castaños at Bailén in the summer of 1808 had ended the danger of a French invasion of Andalusia temporarily. However, in 1809 Napoleon returned to Spain to coordinate the reassertion of French rule south of the Pyrenees embarrassed by a reversal of the French position in the peninsula and the willingness of his brother to cede territory to Spanish armies. A crushing Spanish defeat at the Battle of Ocaña in November of 1809 left Andalusia open to attack once again. From his base of operations in Madrid, Napoleon dispatched Marshal Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult at the head of 60,000 troops to Andalusia. The campaign was a rapid one, aided by the withdrawal of Spanish armies under the command of the Central Junta from Western Andalusia.<sup>65</sup>

The people of Sevilla did not hail the coming contest with the French as a kind of national crucible. Expression of national patriotism withered in the press as Sevillians confronted how their local communities could survive the attack. On 22 January 1810, with the arrival of news that the French had returned to Córdoba, the public grew anxious and upset; many individuals turned to their local parish churches for prayer.<sup>66</sup> Others turned to harassing the members of the Central Junta, blaming them for failing to offer sufficient defenses against the advancing French.

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<sup>65</sup> This view was expressed by Franciso Amorór in 1814. Manuel Moreno-Alonso, *Sevilla napoleónica* (Sevilla: Ediciones Alfar, 1995), 12.

<sup>66</sup> Velázquez y Sánchez, 98.

The behavior of the Central Junta in this crisis reflected its identity as a national institution. Confronted with the likely loss of Western Andalusia, the Central Junta acted to preserve itself in the interest of continuing the war against France. This meant seeking refuge in the easily defensible coastal city of Cádiz. As the membership of the Central Junta made plans to depart for Cádiz, it chose to dissolve itself in recognition that a formal Cortes would convene to take its place. On 24 January, the membership of the Central Junta set sail for Cádiz along with most of the boats docked along the shore of Sevilla, many of them carrying canons, religious artwork, and other valuables threatened by the French.<sup>67</sup> Many religious orders followed the Central Junta by land, leaving Sevilla for Cádiz in fear of French anti-clericalism.

Resuscitating the leadership role Junta of Sevilla to take charge of the situation at the local level proved useless. In the absence of the Central Junta, total anarchy threatened to envelop Sevilla. In the absence of the army and a sizeable police force, the Ayuntamiento held no sufficient means to enforce public order. Seeking a way to restore some order and perhaps even to coordinate the defense of the city, former Junta of Sevilla president Francisco Saavedra attempted to resuscitate the political and military role played by the Junta of Sevilla in 1808. As he later asserted, “I returned to reassume the presidency of the Junta of Sevilla, taking all authority upon myself to mitigate the disorders that threatened.”<sup>68</sup>

However, public sentiment in Sevilla during this moment of severe crisis turned to concern of the local above all else. Turning to one symbol of local pride, the Cathedral

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid, 97-98.

<sup>68</sup> “*volví a reasumir la Presidencia de la Junta sevillana, revistiéndome de toda autoridad para contener los desórdenes que amenazaban,*” Saavedra, 234.

*cabildo* placed the mummified body of Saint Fernando on public view, as the faithful pleaded for holy intercession from the city's patron saint.<sup>69</sup> As it had done on the evening of 26 May 1808, the public armed itself from the holdings of the Royal Armory defeating the ability of Saavedra and other leadership to coordinate a well-organized defense of the city. Almost daily crowds gathered in the Patio of the Real Alcázar calling for the Junta of Sevilla to form a regency government.<sup>70</sup> In calling for a regency government, the people of Sevilla dismissed with the legitimacy of the Junta of Sevilla and expressed their preference of a strong locally-constituted and centralized command in place of a diffuse and representative one. All forms of external government became suspect. The members of the Central Junta who remained in Sevilla were arrested and imprisoned.

The people of Sevilla proved unresponsive to calls for political organization along anything but local lines. Continued violence defeated the efforts of Saavedra, working on behalf the Junta of Sevilla, to restore calm. Saavedra believed the people of Sevilla felt betrayed by the decision of the Central Junta to flee for Cádiz, and he considered himself tarnished by prior association with this body, which poisoned the people's view of him.<sup>71</sup> Although Saavedra made efforts to provide for the defense of the city and the maintenance of public order, his hold collapsed amid continued public disturbances. Eventually, the Junta of Sevilla, like the Central Junta before it, was forced to flee beyond the city to the safety of Cádiz. Saavedra traveled still further taking his family to the

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<sup>69</sup> Velázquez y Sánchez, 100.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, 99.

<sup>71</sup> Saavedra, 234.

Spanish enclave of Ceuta in North Africa, where they joined a large refugee community.<sup>72</sup>

The resulting situation left the local Ayuntamiento in a position of greatest legitimacy. On 31 January, with the French army in view of the city, the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla called a gathering of the town council held in concert with the leadership of the main corporate institutions to agree that the mayor offer a “decent surrender.”<sup>73</sup> In many ways the terms of surrender displays the independence the city maintained throughout the early years of the war. Sevilla mayor Joaquín de Goyeneta presented the French with a twenty-one point document calling for, among other things, the preservation of the Catholic faith, the protection of lives and property, and the continuation of existing customs and traditions. In exchange, the city offered to recognize the Statute of Bayonne, asserting the rights of José I to rule as a constitutional monarch in Spain. Perfectly willing to forego a violent confrontation with the city, the French received Goyeneta with open arms agreeing to the terms as stipulated.<sup>74</sup>

On 1 February the French entered a quiet Sevilla. For the first time, the inhabitants of Sevilla were offered a glimpse of the new king, as José I entered the city accompanied by French soldiers. Despite a minor disturbance at the Cathedral, the choir was called upon to sing celebratory songs of welcome and the bells were rung to mark the arrival of the king. These greetings were met with the rather contrasting image of forced evictions of the regular clergy from of a number of houses. Having evicted their former

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid, 235.

<sup>73</sup> Velázquez y Sánchez, 101.

<sup>74</sup> AMS, Section 10, AC, 31 January 1810.

occupants, the French troops sacked and pillaged the religious houses almost immediately, though certainly the buildings were used to quarter soldiers within the occupied city. In keeping with tradition, three nights of illumination followed with public buildings lit in the evening to encourage foot traffic and additional celebration. Three days later a *Te Deum* was sung in the Cathedral to celebrate the entry.<sup>75</sup> In a complete reversal of the political gains made by the revolution of 27 May 1808, the city looked to a new central government, conveniently headquartered for the time being within the city walls. During the occupation, the Ayuntamiento, then under the leadership of Goyeneta, actively cooperated with the French government.

The diary of González de León demonstrates the successes and failures of the new regime to adapt to its newfound position at the pinnacle of the local festive culture. The French understood the importance of local celebrations. Almost immediately upon taking the city, the French leadership issued a call for illuminations and the signing of *Te Deum* masses in the city and throughout the province. Intent to bring about a renewed state of normalcy, on 9 February José presided over the inaugural performance of the reopened Comedic Theater. It seems the Ayuntamiento covered the full cost of the performance, making it free and open to the general public, and was awarded the honor of having the king watch the performance from its box, despite the fact that a royal box had been prepared for the occasion. The king wished to stress his proximity to the city government to engender popular support for the new regime.

The king's public display of affection made his failure to observance local tradition only a few days later rather mysterious. On 12 February, the king left for

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 103.

Granada “without paying leave to anyone.”<sup>76</sup> As per standing custom, the king was expected to present himself at the Cathedral before departing. The main altar and several chapels had been opened and decorated to welcome him. The members of the ecclesiastical *cabildo* waited to receive the king in full dress until in the afternoon they discovered that he had left on horse earlier in the day. The public snub was intentional, and perhaps an affront to religion and the role of the Church in Spanish society. The Statute of Bayonne was secular in nature and did not recognize a link between political power and the observance of religion. This move did little to foster the continued support of local political elites for the French occupational regime. In any event, José I severely misread the symbolic importance of local tradition.

For a city that saw such commotion in the early weeks of the War of Independence, the nearly two-year occupation of Sevilla by the French was among the very quietest periods in the long history of Sevilla. No major conspiracies threatened the well being of the numerous French officers who took the city as their primary residence. José I made the palace of the Real Alcázar his personal residence during his time in Sevilla. Among the more important representatives of José I, General Murat took residence in the Palace of the Archbishop and the Count of Montarco, the civil governor of Andalusia, in the palatial complex of the Duke of Medina-Sidonia. Despite the residence of such luminaries, the occupation corresponded to a commercial low point for the city. Only a few years earlier the city had witnessed the restoration of its former prominence, as when it commanded the flow of trade with Spanish colonies in the Americas. With its access to these markets severed and its neighboring coastline the site

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<sup>76</sup> Moreno-Alonso, 17.

of a prolonged military siege by the French of the last enclave of “free” Spain in Cádiz, Sevilla’s commercial options stood at a virtual standstill. The near total collapse of local agriculture in the period 1810-1812 forced the French to contemplate the erection of a new local government alongside a virtual subsistence crisis that was not easy to resolve with the bulk of external grain resources directed to the army.<sup>77</sup> These major challenges already apparent, the French made their presence still more unpopular.

During their roughly thirty-one month occupation of Sevilla, the French worked vigorously to implement revolutionary changes in Sevilla and surrounding towns already accomplished to the north of the Pyrenees. Despite the contractual nature of the surrender, the French occupational regime reneged on a number of areas. Notably, against the express wording of the agreement, a large contingent of standing troops remained within the city walls. As the public had feared, the French expelled regular clergy from their religious houses and desamortized church property. It was during this period that many religious houses fell into disrepair prompting their demolition in later years. In some cases, the French tore down religious houses to build markets or other public spaces.<sup>78</sup> Although these policies were popular with some, they caused deep-seated resentment for many.

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<sup>77</sup> A particularly cold winter and spring of 1812 likely contributed to the reversal of the French position and the sudden success of the allied counter-attack. Francisco Loscertales, *Historia política y militar de Sevilla en los primeros quince años del siglo XIX* (1962).

<sup>78</sup> These included the Convent of San Francisco that was replaced after the war by the Plaza Nueva and the Convent of la Encarnación that became the Plaza of la Encarnación, an important market place.

## THE FRENCH OCCUPATION BEYOND SEVILLA.

The collapse of the Spanish defensive position signaled panic through out Western Andalusia. Resistance collapsed in many areas and the French faced only minimal opposition to their forward march through the region. With the defeat of major urban centers like Sevilla, French troops were permanently garrisoned with an eye towards maintaining political order over the surrounding countryside. However, support was always weakest in more rural areas and increased with distance from the center of regional administration established at Sevilla. In an effort to establish himself as a legitimate constitutional monarch, José I toured many of the larger towns of the Western Andalusia mountainous southern region, including Arcos on 27 February and Ronda on 2 March, receiving the welcome of municipal officials and celebrating mass at major religious institutions.<sup>79</sup> The success of this charm offensive was mixed. Although larger towns of La Campiña, like Écija and Osuna, yielded to the new political situation, some smaller towns offered stiff resistance to the French occupational regime.

Individual towns responded to the arrival of the French in different ways. Indeed, the political transition from the reign of the Central Junta to the French occupational regime varied by town. The capitulation of Sevilla did not signal the immediate transfer of all towns in Western Andalusia to the rule of José I. In Carmona, the transition appears to have been somewhat chaotic as there exists a roughly two-month break in the records of that town's *cabildo* between January and March.<sup>80</sup> In all likelihood the inhabitants of Carmona offered significant resistance to the French, which did not allow for the

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<sup>79</sup> *Gazeta de Madrid*, 11 March 1810.

<sup>80</sup> AMC, AC, Books 222-223.



municipal leadership to convene in formal fashion. By contrast, the records for Écija show that the town *cabildo* met on 2 February to receive the thanks of French officials for the calm transfer of the city into their possession.<sup>81</sup> The records of Osuna include a collection of documents related to the suppression of several religious orders housed within the city walls. In a circular dated 20 February, the new French intendente called for the immediate implementation of the decree forcing the closure of cloistered religious communities and the abandonment of vestments particular to members of the regular clergy.<sup>82</sup> The rapid implementation of such protocols no doubt irritated many residents and confirmed the worst fears of some. In instances where the municipal leadership openly welcomed the arrival of the French to avoid loss of life and damage to the town, the sudden implementation of anti-Catholic measures largely worked against the popular support of municipal officials.

The experience of Montellano offers a significant counter example of how other towns in the region fared. Located in the Sierra Sur, this small town had been granted the status of a municipality in 1788 when it was cleaved from the municipal *término* of Morón de la Frontera. By this process, townsfolk had succeeded in seizing land owned by the ducal household of Osuna, which it managed despite a clear legal ruling on the matter. Given this history, it should likely come as no surprise to learn that Montellano did not bend to French rule without a fight. Political elites within Montellano had worked for several years to secure the independence of the town from neighboring municipalities

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<sup>81</sup> AME, AC, Book 226, 2 February 1810.

<sup>82</sup> AMO, AC, Book 103, insert. More information regarding the period of French rule in Osuna is available in Francisco Luís Díaz-Torrejón, *Osuna napoleónica (1810): Una villa andaluza y su distrito durante la ocupación francesa* (Sevilla: Fundación Genesian, 2001).

and would not contemplate surrendering their town. These same political elites took to the *guerrillismo* as a means to fight for the independence of their town.

Early Spanish historians viewed the guerilla resistance as a tactical response taken by irregular troops in order to wage a war of national liberation against the formidable and well-trained forces of the French army.<sup>83</sup> However, the behavior of guerillas in and around Montellano during the French occupation suggests that the phenomenon of guerilla warfare was, at least in part, one that allowed for locals to protect their local communities from the French army. Guerilla bands offered towns protection in exchange for provisions.<sup>84</sup> For this reason, guerillas were not universally drawn to the defense of all Spanish peoples and towns, but rather favored remaining close to a central base of operations. In most circumstances it seems this also the peacetime place of residence for much of the band. These were not patriots in the conventional sense of warriors fighting a national cause. Some guerilla bands consisted merely of men fighting to protect their small corner of the Spanish Monarchy.

Montellano was distant from major French troop garrisons and had evidently allied itself to a number of small guerillas bands that operated nearby.<sup>85</sup> The proximity of

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<sup>83</sup> This view appears in the work of Toreno, *Historia del levantamiento*, and José Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *La Guerra de la Independencia. Historia Militar de España de 1808 a 1814* (Madrid: Imprenta del Crédito Comercial, 1868). For a more recent scholar account, see Charles J. Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon: Guerillas, Bandits and Adventures in Spain, 1808-1814* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). For a contrasting view, consult the work of John Lawrence Tone, *The Fatal Know: The Guerilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), especially pages 6-7. For an account that attributes both competing nationalist and “traditionalist” motivation, see Renato Barahona, *Vizcaya on the Eve of Carlism: Politics and Society, 1800-1833* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1989), 27-28. See also the invocation of Manuel Revuelta-González in Hidalgo-Romero, 27, 42-43.

<sup>84</sup> Fraser, 401.

<sup>85</sup> These guerilla bands were linked to an impressive complex of guerilla units, which was among the densest anywhere in the peninsula and which extended in its reach to the southern coast. This

hilly terrain allowed these bands to move relatively unnoticed from their base of operations to Montellano where they received provisions to continue their assault on French detachments. Historical records suggest that a local guerilla leader named José Romero-Álvarez secured the office of mayor by popular acclamation in the difficult days following the arrival of the French in the region. The reasons for this are not clear, but it seems likely that the townsfolk replaced their legitimate municipal officers in the hopes of finding an able leader to coordinate a defense of the town from French assault. The French were well aware that the town openly sided with the guerillas and only begrudgingly acknowledged the legitimacy of the French occupational regime when forced to do so. Evidently determined to impose order and root out the bases of the guerilla insurgency that operated with impunity in the region, French troops set fire to Montellano on two occasions during April 1810. The fire burnt much of the town.<sup>86</sup>

The story of Montellano's defense quickly became one of the more celebrated events in the War of Independence. The Cortes celebrated the people of Montellano for their defense of the town and refusal to yield to the French. The experience of the French attack was so remarkable that the Cortes later granted Montellano the distinction of a new heraldic seal (see fig. 5) featuring a burning town and the motto: "*Por los franceses. 14 y 22 de Abril 1810.*"<sup>87</sup>

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population figure was taken from Manuel Hidalgo-Romero, *Las villas de Montellano y Algodonales en la Guerra de la Independencia* (Sevilla: Gráfica Castellana, 2000), 17.

<sup>86</sup> On the attack and the curious story of José Romero-Álvarez, see Hidalgo-Romero, 61-139. The neighboring town of Algodonales faced a similar French attack on 1-2 May 1810.

<sup>87</sup> Although use of the seal predates the Second Constitutional Period, the formal right to use this new municipal seal was not granted by the Cortes until 1820. Juan José Antequera-Luengo, *Principios de transmisibilidad en las heráldicas oficiales de Sevilla, Córdoba y Huelva* (Sevilla: FacEdiciones, 2012), 205.



Figure 5: The Seal of Montellano during the Second Constitutional Period.<sup>88</sup>

Although somewhat anecdotal, the experience of Montellano suggests that smaller municipalities removed from the main bases of French power in Western Andalusia were more resilient than the larger cities of La Campiña in preserving their independence in the face of a concerted effort by the French to impose a new political order. If so, size and distance from the regional capital largely determined the extent to which local communities were able to preserve their local freedom and sense of traditions. The people of Montellano appear to have responded in the aftermath of the attack by taking a somewhat less brazen show of their dislike for the French occupational regime, but did not aver in their support for local guerilla bands.

## CONCLUSION

The political organization of the Spanish Monarchy fell into disarray in 1808 with the French invasion. With the collapse of the central government, cities and small towns alike confronted a crisis of sovereignty. Individual towns became sovereign political entities as political elites worked to craft a resolution to the crisis. In larger towns like Sevilla, crowds propelled the creation of *juntas* to represent them led by experienced

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<sup>88</sup> Author's photo taken from Hidalgo-Romero, 121.

political elites. From this grassroots response, regional *juntas* like the Junta of Sevilla began the process of reintegrating the Spanish Monarchy from among its constituent parts. Although this process occurred at a peninsular level through the cooperation of regional *juntas*, it was vested in the idea of popular sovereignty. The view of popular sovereignty upheld in this process was a corporate one in which the municipality served as the essential building block of larger political units.

The process of imperial reintegration was impeded by the persistence of a political culture that did not easily adapt to new political realities. The *juntas de sanidad* established during the yellow fever epidemic of 1800-1804 were one example of the tremendous effectiveness of local government in confronting crises during the Old Regime. Local communities did not relinquish their faith in local institutions easily. In the absence of the king, many municipalities remained skeptical of larger political institutions like the Central Junta. Public reaction in Sevilla to the ouster of Godoy suggests that the people of Western Andalusia were suspicious of the public officials who managed the central government.

The French conquest of 1810 precipitated a renewed crisis for the people of Western Andalusia. When confronted with the threat of a French attack, the people of Sevilla fell into panic. Ultimately, political elites in Sevilla were able to negotiate a surrender that spared a French attack. This action placed the political interests of the city and its inhabitants ahead of those owed to other political entities. The decision of other communities, like Montellano, to continue offering violent resistance to the French testifies to the fact that no single pattern typified the local response of various municipalities to this new crisis.

At a regional level during the period 1808-1812, Western Andalusia witnessed the rapid rise and sustained decline of an integrated system of government. The *juntas* had offered the potential for political elites to rebuild the Spanish Monarchy from the bottom-up. However, this process was derailed by a local concern for municipal independence. When confronted with renewed crisis, local communities turned into themselves and favored the preservation of municipal autonomy above all other considerations. Nonetheless, this experience laid the groundwork for a new attempt at political reintegration launched under the constitutional regime of 1812.

## CHAPTER FOUR:

### **Revolt of the Municipalities: Situating the Role of Local Communities within the Nation during the First Constitutional Period, 1812-1814**

On 19 March 1812, the General and Extraordinary Cortes of the Spanish Nation assembled at Cádiz promulgated a constitutional charter for the Spanish Monarchy. Spain's first written constitution, *La Constitución política de la Monarquía española* (hereafter "Constitution of Cádiz"), declared sovereign power to reside essentially in the Spanish nation.<sup>1</sup> I argue that the introduction of national sovereignty did not trigger an end to the centrality of local politics during the First Constitutional Period (1812-1814).<sup>2</sup> The central government established by the constitutional regime deferred significant responsibilities to the municipal governments, which used their position to exert considerable influence over local communities. Furthermore, these same municipal governments used the legal regime created by the Constitution to advance their own ends.

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<sup>1</sup> Article 3: "*La soberanía reside esencialmente en la Nación, y por lo mismo pertenece a ésta exclusivamente el derecho de establecer sus leyes fundamentales*" (Sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, and the same [nation] retains exclusively the right to establish its fundamental laws). The complex intellectual origins of this idea appear in José María Portillo-Valdés, *Revolución de Nación. Orígenes de la cultura constitucional en España, 1780-1812* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000). On the direct link between nation and sovereignty in the Spanish Constitution of Cádiz, see José María Portillo-Valdés, " 'Libre e independiente'. La nación como soberanía," in *Las Experiencias de 1808 en Iberoamérica*, eds. Alfredo Ávila and Pedro Pérez-Herrero, 69-103 (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2008). The War of Independence and the Constitution of Cádiz serves as the point of departure for writing about the history of nationalism in Spanish history in José Álvarez-Junco, *Mater dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001). On the fashioning of a transatlantic national consciousness during this period, see Scott Eastman, *Preaching Spanish Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759-1823* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012).

<sup>2</sup> My use of the phrase "First Constitutional Period" owes to the organization of the AMS. The AMS has separated documents pertaining to the span of time bound by the "liberation" of the city from French control (1812) and the abrogation of the constitutional order (1814) into Section 8 of its holdings, entitled "*Primera época constitucional*." Section 9 of the AMS pertains to the "*Segunda época constitucional*" and the years 1820-1823. Because many of the same institutions abrogated in 1814 were resuscitated in 1820 with little regard for the intervening years, some historians treat the periods 1812-1814 and 1820-1823 as a unified whole. On this point, see Alberto Gil-Novales, *El trienio liberal* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980), 60. However, I feel the political cultures of these periods are sufficiently distinct as to warrant treating them as separate entities for the purposes of the present study.

In this way, municipalities became major stakeholders in the transition to a new political culture. This line of research suggests that Spanish municipalities were more influential stakeholders than was the case elsewhere in Western Europe.<sup>3</sup>

The framers of the Constitution had declared the nation as sovereign in a bid to resolve the crisis of sovereignty that had persisted in the Hispanic world since the abdications of Carlos IV and Fernando VII. During the intervening four years, political uncertainty had wrought tremendous political change in regions of peninsular Spain. In Western Andalusia, political institutions, like the Junta of Sevilla, began to govern the territorial vestiges of the Spanish Monarchy's component kingdoms like sovereign states. At the local level, municipalities worked to actively situate themselves within the political framework that emerged in this period. The Cortes sanctioned the creation of a new political framework with the Constitution of Cádiz. This chapter seeks to explain how the municipalities of Western Andalusia situated themselves within the political framework established by a constitutional regime in which the Spanish nation figured as a sovereignty political entity.

During the First Constitutional Period, individual municipalities, whose allegiance to the crown did not extend to another political entity, confronted the prospect of yielding their independence to provide for the creation of a viable nation-state from the remnants

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<sup>3</sup> Much of Western Europe constituted far more centralized political states, which had long disposed with the idea of caring much for the rights and freedoms owed to municipal governments. In France, the central government based in Paris ran rough shod over provincial communities and for a time during the political frenzy of the French Revolution appeared more willing to violently subjugate these regions by force rather than to engage in a constructive political dialogue. On this point, see Alan Forrest, *Paris, the Provinces and the French Revolution* (London: Arnold, 2004). In the United Kingdom, parliament intervened to remake the political constitution of the British state during the nineteenth century. Successive reform bills transformed rotten boroughs from poor reflections of the local will into democratically contested electoral districts. See John A. Phillips and Charles Wetherell, "The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political Modernization of England," *The American Historical Review* 100.2 (1995): 411-436.



of empire. Surprisingly little has been written on this subject as it applies to peninsular Spain and virtually nothing in English.<sup>4</sup> No other historian has bothered to consider the significance of the period 1812-1814 on local politics in Western Andalusia. Yet exploring how the Constitution of Cádiz influenced the relationship that existed between the central government and Spanish municipalities offers a useful window to view the development of political culture in Spain during the early nineteenth century. By focusing on the rehabilitation of French collaborators at the local level and the political squabbles of municipal governments with major institutions of state, I argue that local actors endeavored to create a space for themselves to act as part of the Spanish nation while remaining independent of the central government. In this way, the residents of individual municipalities were as pivotal to the formation of a new constitutional political culture in Spain as were the comparatively small number of men responsible for drafting the Constitution of Cádiz.

This chapter points to the simple fact that lawmakers could draft and adopt a new constitution, but it was quite another task to make a constitutional political culture.

Change of dominant political cultures tends to follow major political alterations in the

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<sup>4</sup> The paucity of historical work on this period relates to the challenge of locating useful documentation. War and political disorder throughout much of the nineteenth century did not provide for the survival of reliable source material, much of which was stored at the local level in municipal archives. In Spanish, general treatments of this period as concern the history of Sevilla appear in the work of José Manuel Cuenca-Toribio, including *Estudios sobre la Sevilla liberal, 1812-1814* (Sevilla: Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, 1973); and *Del Antiguo al Nuevo Régimen. Historia de Sevilla*, Vol. V (Sevilla: Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, 1976). In English, The role of guerrillas during this period has been examined extensively in Charles J. Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventures in Spain, 1808-1814* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon's Cursed War: Spanish Popular Resistance in the Peninsular War, 1808-1814* (London: Verso, 2008); and John Lawrence Tone, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerilla War in Navarre and the Death of Napoleon in Spain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). Expedited treatment of this period as it applied to Spanish history more general appears in Charles J. Esdaile, *Spain in the Liberal Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

organizational fabric of states and nations. That process tended to be a messy one; a complex back and forth of give and take between major stakeholders. The First Constitutional Period represented a transitional moment in which the political dynamics of a new Spanish constitutional order were under negotiation. Research on Latin America certainly suggests that municipal rights and local politics were instrumental to shaping the emergence of new states throughout the Hispanic world.<sup>5</sup> In Spanish America, the politics of constitutionalism unleashed a flurry of political activity linked directly to the emergence of independence movements.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, the reader should not take political confrontation present during the First Constitutional Period and the existence of occasional political intransigence between various political elites of the central and local levels of government and the institutions they represented as a sign necessarily of either the likely emergence of regional independence movements in peninsular Spain or the unsuitability of constitutionalism to Spanish society more generally. Political confrontations, like those discussed in this chapter, were instead a useful and productive means whereby the Spanish people attempted to iron out the implicit values and expectations of a new constitutional political culture.

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<sup>5</sup> This line of reasoning is evident in the work of Peter Guardino, *Peasants Politics, and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero, 1800-1857* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); *Time of Liberty: Popular Political Culture in Oaxaca, 1750-1850* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Michael T. Ducey, *A Nation of Villages: Riot and Rebellion in the Mexican Huasteca, 1750-1850* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004); and Jordana Dym, *From Sovereign Villages to National States: City, State, and Federation in Central America, 1759-1839* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> An alternate interpretation of independence movements in Mexico that discards with the political significance of the Constitution appears in Eric Van Young, *The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, ideology, and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810-1821* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

In order to present my case, I will focus on the experience of municipalities in the region of Western Andalusia. For a little over twenty months, beginning in the late summer of 1812, Western Andalusia underwent one of the more exceptional political experiments in Spanish history to that point in time. Until the return of Fernando VII in the spring of 1814, territory freed from the French occupational regime was placed under constitutional rule. In this context, Western Andalusia experienced the fashioning of constitutional rule with greater intensity than any other region in peninsular Spain. Although the regions of Galicia and the Spanish Levant were early converts to the constitutionalist cause, their continued exposure to French attack made them difficult to administer.<sup>7</sup> By comparison, Western Andalusia was situated behind a protective cordon provided by the advance of a joint Anglo-Iberian army under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington.<sup>8</sup> Because of its proximity to Cádiz, Western Andalusia was also more closely integrated into the constitutional regime than either Galicia or the Spanish Levant.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> On the Galician experience, see José Barreiro-Fernández, *Historia Social de la Guerra de la Independencia en Galicia* (Vigo: Edicións Xerais de Galicia, 2009); and *Liberales y absolutistas en Galicia, 1808-1833* (Vigo: Ediciones Xerais de Galicia, 1982). On the Spanish Levant, see Isabel Burdiel and María Cruz Romero, "Old and New Liberalism: The Making of the Liberal Revolution, 1808-1844," *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 75 (1998): 66-80.

<sup>8</sup> Several excellent military histories of this period exist, though nearly all showcase a heavy emphasis on the role and participation of British forces in what was known to them as the Peninsular War. Among the more reliable scholarly accounts are those of David Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); and, more recently, Charles J. Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: A New History* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).

<sup>9</sup> Both of these regions were accessible to agents of the Cortes by sea, through entry at major ports like La Coruña and Valencia. Further inland, these regions were home to formidable mountainous terrains that posed a stark contrast to that of Western Andalusia with its vast open spaces extending along the Guadalquivir Basin and deep into the Iberian Peninsula.

Throughout the pages that follow, I will examine how local actors in Western Andalusia endeavored to create a vital political role for themselves within the institutional parameters defined by the Constitution of Cádiz. My examination will unfold in two parts. First, I will examine the local process whereby municipalities rehabilitated French collaborators. This localized process situated the municipality at the center of efforts to rebuild the social fabric of Spanish communities at the conclusion of the war. Second, I will examine the interplay of political negotiations between municipalities of Western Andalusia and the central government through consideration of two unique episodes. My analysis of each episode will draw on a microhistorical approach, which will allow me to extrapolate broader conclusions about this period in the history of Western Andalusia.<sup>10</sup> In the first instance, I will recount the story of how the town of Los Barrios ousted its mayor and then sought recourse to peaceful dispute resolution provided by the Audiencia of Sevilla. In the second instance, I will examine the roots of a comparatively more confrontational encounter between residents of La Puente de Don Gonzalo and agents of the Cortes. These episodes demonstrate how local citizens were involved in the process of instituting a constitutional political culture.

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<sup>10</sup> A microhistorical approach might seem an odd choice for writing the history of a European community during the nineteenth century, as historians using the techniques associated with this school of historical methodology apply them to instances in which there exists little available source material. Historians of modern Europe generally have a wealth of primary source material at their fingertips, as a result of extensive recordkeeping maintained by complex state institutions and elaborate bureaucracies, with which to construct comprehensive historical narratives. However, only fragmentary evidence survived the era in question. This came as the result of irregular recordkeeping during key moments of political change, the later destruction of records related to the First Constitutional Period in response to a directive from Fernando VII and his restored absolutist regime, and the occasional fire and flood that wreaked havoc on municipal archives.

## THE POLITICS OF LOYALTY IN “LIBERATED” SPAIN

The process whereby municipalities rehabilitated French collaborators demonstrated how local citizens were involved in the process of instituting a constitutional political culture in peninsular Spain. The highly localized nature of this process allowed municipalities to serve as the essential arbiters of citizenship. This built upon a much older tradition of local civic participation as the ultimate precondition of citizenship in Spanish communities.<sup>11</sup> Because the process was left to municipalities, local communities were able to dismiss the definitions of citizenship prescribed by the central government. Through this process, municipalities were able to renegotiate the meaning of citizenship in the new constitutional regime in order to suit the local communities they represented. This gave municipalities a significant role in the new constitutional political system as the central place in which local communities witnessed the interpretation of complex questions related to the political culture of the constitutional regime, like the nature of citizenship.

Meanwhile, this reorientation of political activity from the central to the local levels of government constituted a patent rejection of the role the Cortes was set to play in the new constitutional regime as a depository of the sovereign power vested in the nation. The Constitution of Cádiz defined a person's national status as a precondition for citizenship.<sup>12</sup> However, actual policy adopted to resolve the lingering problem of French

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<sup>11</sup> Tamar Herzog, *Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

<sup>12</sup> Article 18: “*Son ciudadanos aquellos españoles que por ambas líneas traen su origen de los dominios españoles de ambos hemisferios y están vecindados en cualquier pueblo de los mismos dominios*” (Citizens shall consist of those Spaniards whose parental lineages on both sides derive from Spanish dominions in both hemispheres and who are resident in any town within the same dominions).

collaborators granted municipalities the right to confer the status of citizenship. The local interpretation of citizenship discarded the notion that inclusion in the Spanish nation could be a universal and indivisible principle applied evenly throughout the country and substituted it with a highly local vision of the nation as a collectivity of sovereign municipalities.



Figure 6: Thomas Sutherland, “*La Batalla de Sevilla de 1812*,” Fundación FOCUS-Abengoa, R. 169.

The First Constitutional Period began in Western Andalusia during the late summer of 1812. On 27 August, morning greeted the inhabitants of the city of Sevilla with the sight of Spanish troops overlooking the city along its Western flank from the bluffs adjoining the small town of Castilleja de la Cuesta. The first Spanish units engaged

the French on the fields of Sevilla's western approach under the command of General Juan de la Cruz Murgeon (fig. 6). Almost immediately a revolt began within the city. Spanish forces entered Sevilla with the welcome support of its inhabitants. The rising happened so quickly that González de León took note of the fact that the French were forced to abandon their baggage trains along with several pieces of artillery and numerous firearms. In the streets lay dead large numbers of women and children. In the afternoon, Cruz Murgeon ascended the steps of the *ayuntamiento* and proclaimed the rule of Fernando VII as the constitutional monarch of a "liberated" Spain. This act ended thirty-two months of French occupation. By the beginning of September, nearly the whole of Western Andalusia had cast off the yoke of French rule.<sup>13</sup>

In the months that followed, political elites in Western Andalusia went about restoring their political autonomy, overturned by the French occupation, and began to implement constitutional rule. This process required weeding out French collaborators, tainted by their allegiance to the French occupational regime. The role of the "afrancesados" – a name applied generally to those Spaniards who sided with the government of Joseph Bonaparte – has received substantial scholarly attention already. However, this attention has focused most extensively on the senior ranks of the Spanish political establishment.<sup>14</sup> Many Bonapartist ministers of Spanish origin followed King José I across the Pyrenees and into French exile. Yet many low-level, especially local,

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<sup>13</sup> AMS, Section 14, *Crónica de Don Félix González de León*, Vol. VI, Book 13 (27 August 1812), 62, 64-66.

<sup>14</sup> Miguel Artola, *Los Afrancesados* (Madrid: Atlas, 1953); Hans Juretschke, *Los afrancesados en la Guerra de la Independencia: Su génesis, desarrollo y consecuencias históricas* (Madrid: Rialp, 1962); and Juan López-Tabar, *Los Famosos Traidores. Los afrancesados durante la crisis del Antiguo Régimen, 1808-1833* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2004). On the fate of *afrancesados* in Jaén, see Emilio Luis Lara-López, "La represión de los afrancesados: Condenas sociales, jurídicas y políticas. El caso de Jaén (1812-1820)," *Hispania Nova* 3 (2003): 38-50.

functionaries were left behind, as the French army pursued a rapid withdrawal from Western Andalusia. The suddenness of the French retreat exposed many French collaborators to the hostility of the communities they once governed and in which they continued to reside.

Constitutionalists collectively referred to local French collaborators as “*empleados*,” or employees, of the French occupational regime, though the implications of this word were a great deal more politicized than the name would otherwise suggest at first glance. While some Spaniards had taken to the hills to fight in the guerilla resistance, a large number had stayed in their homes and not only resided within occupied towns but also actively collaborated with the French as municipal administrators. As a result, a social dichotomy emerged, which pitted the image of the loyal and patriotic guerilla against that of the traitorous *empleado*. The final months of the occupation had made the distinction between these two kinds of person all the more apparent.

The gulf between categories of patriot and *empleado* deepened as the French occupational regime began to collapse. A number of Spaniards were hung or garroted in Sevilla throughout the winter of 1811-1812 for charges that appear closely tied to guerilla activity. The most common crime appears to have been the fatal mistake of having been caught armed in rural areas. However, on 24 May 1812, the French caught a spy of the Spanish army “with papers and proclamations,” presumably issued by the Cortes.<sup>15</sup> A full-scale resistance seems to have emerged around this time that pitted a clandestine patriotic movement against the French occupational regime. Local histories suggest that the French were especially brutal in ferreting out suspected guerillas in smaller towns

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<sup>15</sup> An interesting case, in this instance the governor appears to have overturned a death sentence at the last moment; precisely why remains unclear. AMS, Section 14, *Crónica*, 24 May 1812.



they considered distant from the watchful eyes of officials in Sevilla. The public punishment of guerillas in Sevilla was exercised by the local officials of the French occupational regime, which only served to heighten popular support for the guerillas and foster deeper resentment of collaborationists. In the context of a liberated Spain still at war with Napoleonic France, officials of constitutional Spain looked upon those who had once sworn an oath of loyalty to the French emperor with suspicion. Rumors ran rampant of a sort of fifth column composed of former collaborators.

Apart from the politics of war, the French also managed to foment resentment in other ways. This was especially the case in larger cities, which were somewhat removed from exposure to guerilla activity because of the installation of large French protective garrisons and the inability of their inhabitants to make ready use of extramural resources. The final months of the French occupation had been especially difficult for the inhabitants of the region of Sevilla. Poor harvests beginning in the fall of 1811 threatened famine throughout the region. The brutality of the French occupational regime as it weathered an extreme subsistence crisis certainly weakened public support as well. Public executions noted in the diary of González de León during the final months of the occupation hint at a significant increase in the number of crimes linked to the city's subsistence crisis. On 10 June, one man was garroted for having stolen a piece of salted cod; on 1 July, four men were executed for having stolen wheat.<sup>16</sup> Evidently, amid the rise of a rural insurgency and an escalating subsistence crisis, the French occupational regime reached a level of brutality not seen even in the early days of its existence. The

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<sup>16</sup> AMS, Section 14, *Crónica*, entries for 10 June and 1 July 1812.

collapse of the French occupational regime then exposed the reality of a deeply divided society torn between patriots and collaborators.

The immediate postwar period provided two paths for the resolution of the political tension that existed between patriots and collaborators. In the wake of two and a half years of foreign occupation and the frequent use of martial law by the French, the people of Western Andalusia were primed to exact a violent revenge on their oppressors. Personal vendettas and group vengeance offered one path towards retribution for the worst wrongs. During the chaos of the Spanish conquest of the region, no doubt many scores were settled on the battlefield. Such violence responded to the most severe of circumstances. However, the worst offense of many collaborators was simply disloyalty to the patria and their local communities. A second path for resolving such offenses entered into force with the advent of constitutional rule. This second path was framed within new constitutional norms.

The desire to punish *empleados* as enemy collaborators was a strong one, but it was not the only reason that would motivate harsh treatment before fellow Spaniards. Memory of the Old Regime hung in the minds of contemporaries. Ministerial despotism was viewed as one explanation for the collapse of good government during the reign of Carlos IV. The Spanish public viewed the officials of the Old Regime as partly to blame for the French invasion because many of them remained in office under the French occupational regime. Such officials often remained in office under the guise of seeing a need to provide for public safety and the maintenance of order. Yet townsfolk generally took this move as owing to the persistence of lax morals and ruinous ambition, which were closely linked to the Old Regime. A genuine revolution to restore good government

then called for a complete overhaul in the type of persons running the new constitutional regime.

The Cortes adopted a policy towards *empleados* as its army began to liberate occupied territory. Although the Cortes declared an amnesty for Spanish deserters of the French military, it did not extend such a privilege to civil servants. As the Spanish army began to push into Western Andalusia, it quickly encountered the problem of what to do with local governments established under the French occupational regime. On 11 August 1812, the Cortes issued a decree stating that *empleados* were to cease in their activities immediately upon the conquest of territory under their administration.<sup>17</sup> Little more than one month later, another decree clarified that *empleados* were neither eligible to stand for election nor to hold public office.<sup>18</sup> Finally, in November the Cortes prescribed rules for constitutional *ayuntamientos* to facilitate the “*rehabilitación*” (rehabilitation) of *empleados*.<sup>19</sup> Only by means of rehabilitation could former *empleados* hope to regain an elevated social standing within their communities and perhaps one day to reenter the ranks of the local political elite.

The language of rehabilitation adopted by the Cortes to describe the process whereby French collaborators were granted membership in the Spanish nation suggests a great deal about the new constitutional regime. First, rehabilitation implies the acquisition

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<sup>17</sup> Decree 184, 11 August 1812.

<sup>18</sup> Decree 192, 21 September 1812.

<sup>19</sup> Decree 209, 14 November 1812.

of a new skill set. The Latin root of the verb “to rehabilitate” meant “to make able.”<sup>20</sup> In this sense, the architects of the rehabilitation process were intent to make able men of the *empleados*, likely so as to benefit once again from their experience. Of course, before allowing *empleados* to reenter government, constitutionalists had to certify that these men understood the complex nature of the new political system adopted by promulgation of the Constitution of Cádiz. Rehabilitation then implied a certain degree of optimism for the potential to transform erstwhile absolutists and agents of ministerial despotism into functioning members of a constitutional system.

Second, rehabilitation attested to the political character of the process. *Empleados* were never put on trial in a formal sense. Constitutional *ayuntamientos* were vested with the responsibility of managing the rehabilitation process and not the *audiencias*. The crime in question was one of a civil and not a criminal nature. *Empleados* initiated the process of rehabilitation themselves as a means to clear their names. As part of the process, *empleados* found other persons of sound character to speak in support of their inherent qualities and behavior during the French occupation.<sup>21</sup> As such, this process was more about recovering lost reputations than it was about assigning guilt. Undoubtedly the stigma of association to the French occupational regime remained with some who, in turn, likely stayed at the margins of local communities.

Finally, rehabilitation implied a certain public dimension to this process as well. The non-judicial nature of the process certainly hinted at this idea. At a larger level, this

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<sup>20</sup> “*Rehabilitar*” meant “*Habilitar de nuevo ó restituir alguna cosa á su antiguo estado*” (To make able again or restore something to its former state) according to La Academia Española, *Diccionario de la lengua castellana por la real Academia española*, 5th edition (Madrid: La Imprenta Real, 1817).

<sup>21</sup> AMSM, Section 10, AC, Book 20 (1809-1813).

process was not about recuperating individual reputations so much as making the wider social landscape safe from contamination by impurities. Political communities had to ensure that *empleados* were safe for reentry into the body politic, the nation. The ideal of citizenship enshrined in the Constitution of Cádiz invited the active participation of the public in all political affairs. A successful constitutional order depended on citizens staking claims on what mattered to them.

During the First Constitutional Period, a lively public debate surrounded the question of what to do with the *empleados*. The community of *empleados* was submitted to the court of public opinion, which operated most effectively at the local level. The process of rehabilitation never amounted to a full amnesty and left many people of Western Andalusia skeptical of the whole idea. As the title of one publication issued in Sevilla by a senior judge put it, those rehabilitated under the terms of the legal concession offered by the Cortes were little more than proselytes to a new faith.<sup>22</sup> That is, they adapted their loyalties to the new regime in preference to remaining at the margins of Spanish society.<sup>23</sup>

Two paths emerged from this public discussion. On the one hand, there existed a desire for vengeance. Public dislike for *empleados* no doubt manifested itself in verbal and perhaps physical assaults in town streets, squares, and other public settings. Especially vitriolic attacks were also presented in print. In one such publication,

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<sup>22</sup> José Gabriel de Losada, *La amnistia general de los proselitos del Gobierno frances. Problema político resulto* (Sevilla: Imprenta de Calle Vizcaynos a Cargo de D. Anastasio López, 1813).

<sup>23</sup> There is an obvious parallel here with the experiences of Jewish and Muslim *conversos* during the early modern period. The suspected loyalties of these peoples and their descendants often made them targets for the Inquisition. Purity of blood (*limpieza de sangre*), or rather proof of a lineage absent of Jewish and Muslim influences, was a requirement of high office. Distant ancestors of question or the failure to accurately document one's family history were cause for suspicion and potentially scandal.

empleados were threatened with the humiliating punishment of being stabbed by firework-laden *banderillas*, the long darts used by matadors to wound bulls. The author of this attack insisted “the healthy part of the people yearns for reform in all branches of public administration and the separation of many *empleados* who have certainly shown their commitment to the intrusive government.” The attempt to cast empleados as a diseased segment of the population kept to a prevalent discursive technique that described despotism as a kind of political pathogen. In this sense, popular discourse also noted the risk for public contagion. “Let us not delude ourselves,” the same pamphlet continued, “to validate the political conduct of their tenure in service of the enemy would weaken the spirit of true patriots.” At stake for the body politic was not simply the loyalty of the *empleados* themselves, but also the potential risk of contagion for healthy, loyal Spaniards. “We are not selfish,” the author insisted, “we should convince ourselves of the need to take a bold step that will strengthen the security of the state.”<sup>24</sup>

On the other hand, the public responded to such attacks with a mix of agreement and revulsion. While impassioned assaults on the sullied character of collaborators succeeded in resonating along a patriotic chord with readers in the liberated zones, such language cut to the nerve as well. “By faith!” declared one pamphlet drafted in response to that referenced above and printed in Sevilla, “what if these employees had forsaken their offices for no other end than that of an apparently patriotic sense of self-preservation?” “We can say with reason,” he continued, “that the true selfish persons are those who even judge the poor *empleados*.” In this way, the debate over the status of the *empleados* hinged on questions of personal loyalty tied to performance as a loyal patriot

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<sup>24</sup> M.R.M., *Banderilla de fuego a los empleados que se quedaron en esta ciudad sirviendo a los franceses* (1812).

to the Spanish patria during the French occupation. These *empleados*, the author insisted, “have done a heroic deed of sacrifice in the face of your enemy ... you wish to label all those persons as patriots who sought refuge in Cádiz as a way to safeguard their cowardice, or their selfishness; they [the refugees] might have made the same sacrifice [as the *empleados*] with a resolve to die in fulfillment of their destinies as was preordained.” As this author seemed to imply, the distance between patriot and *empleado* was not so great. Although politically ascendant, the class of patriots that sought to wreak political retribution on willing collaborators faced significant opposition. Few Sevillians had answered the call to defend the city when the French stood ready to conquer it and many had chosen chose a course of self-exile in Cádiz. The publication of this response points to the strength of a large opposition to the radical position taken by self-declared patriots.<sup>25</sup>

Another pamphlet published in the town of Écija called for a more nuanced treatment of the problem. In *Observaciones sobre empleados, emigrados y patriotas*, another author divided collaborators into a three-part hierarchy composed of separate groups. In the first category were those men who adhered to the French occupational regime out of a sense of ambition or personal pride. The author conceded there were very few men of this kind, but each was a traitor in his own right and so not deserving of citizenship but rather total exclusion from the political community. In the second category, were men who capitulated to the French out of mere weakness of character. The actions of this “considerable number” of men did not warrant exclusion from the political community, but rather required punishment or rehabilitation. In the final category were

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<sup>25</sup> J.M.F., *Reflesiones al papel intitulado banderilla de fuego a los empleados que se quedaron en esta ciudad sirviendo a los franceses* (Sevilla: Viuda de Vazquez y Compañía, 1812).

men who the French had forced into their service. In such instances, claimed the author, these men were not culpable for they did “not directly seek the ruin of the *Patria*.” In doing so, they did not succumb to a degrading sense of self-love; they put country before themselves. Thus, a certain appreciation for the selflessness of the patriotic cause was an essential means of othering. The defining characteristic of each category was loyalty to the patria, not to a Spanish nation or a specific political creed.

It is worth pausing on this point to note the role of nationalism in framing the emergence of the *empleado* debate. Historians of nationalism have stressed the importance of debates over inclusion and exclusion within a social community bonded to a particular national identity as a key component of state formation in Europe during the early nineteenth century. More generally, Benedict Anderson has outlined the role of “print culture” in consolidating a shared sense of identity based on language affiliation.<sup>26</sup> I would like to draw attention away from merely inserting the debate over *empleados* as fitting within a narrative about nationalism as a key feature of nation-building projects. While it would be tempting to associate pamphlets like the kind discussed here as print culture of the sort described by Anderson, in reality a case of othering surfaces more evidently. Spaniards evidently sought to cast *empleados* as apart from the community of true Spaniards, as non-Spaniards, even anti-Spaniards.

As with similar attempts at othering, the goal was to define the essential characteristics of a group of insiders. Insiders were men of high patriotic credibility deemed fit to serve in the new constitutional regime as model citizens. The attempt to differentiate between *empleados* and loyal Spaniards was related to the reconstruction of

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<sup>26</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).



local identities. Also at stake was a need to historicize the origins of legitimate government. Some contemporaries viewed the constitutional system as a French creation. The nebulous genealogy of the prevailing political current suffered from ambiguous origin. The debate over *empleados* was in part an attempt to correct a popular view of the constitutional system as a product of French invention. Rendering French collaborators ineligible for service in the new regime accomplished this goal. At the heart of the debate was an effort to assert the authentic Spanish character of the new regime.

The author of the *Écija* pamphlet identified a second three-part hierarchy for refugees seeking to equate the multifaceted character of *empleados* who established themselves under the French occupation with the diverse experience of emigrants who fled cooptation. In the first category were those refugees compelled to flee out of “an ardent love for the *patria*” to serve in the central government assembled in Cádiz. As with traitors, the author conceded there were genuinely few men of this kind. Into the second category fell those refugees who migrated out of a sense of obligation to follow their employment in the institutions of the legitimate government. Comprising a significant sum of men, this category elicited comparison with the vast number of Spaniards who stayed in the occupied zones tending to the needs of their local community in the absence of a professed zeal for the occupational regime. In the final category were men who took refuge out of a sense of fear, seeking to move out of the range of the enemy but expressing no discernible reverence for the plight of the country. As with the first hierarchy, loyalty to the Spanish *patria* was a central question. Here too was the role of fear as a distinctly disgraceful trait. In a manner reminiscent of the

exchanges above, the author drew an essential distinction between the competing ideals of patriotism and selfishness.<sup>27</sup>

Beyond Sevilla and larger towns like Écija, debates over the fate of *empleados* were largely confined to municipal *ayuntamientos*. In such places, low literacy and limited access to printing presses have not left a considerable paper trail of printed opinion. However, handwritten town records demonstrate that the process of political rehabilitation was centered at the local level. Municipal governments were charged with the difficult task of managing the rehabilitation process. The town of Sanlúcar la Mayor, located roughly 30 miles due west of Sevilla, provides entry into understanding how this process occurred at the local level. A wealth of material information has survived in the *actas capitulares* of Sanlúcar. Here the records of the Procurador Síndico General de Empleados lists the names of rehabilitated civil servants, often referencing the existence of “positive proof of [their] loyalty and patriotism.” Similarly, these records make special note of the fact that these same persons “enjoyed a high esteem and good opinion in public.”<sup>28</sup>

Essential to clearing oneself from charges of disloyalty was evidently the role of public opinion. Having fellow citizens attest to the political qualities of individual *empleados* had the effect of rebuilding critical social bonds so key to the functioning of smaller towns. Records also suggest that persons who never held high office under the French were more easily excused from public scrutiny. Still, the collection of personalized files containing “testaments of purity” from various persons appears to have

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<sup>27</sup> E.M.E., *Observaciones sobre Empleados, Emigrados, y Patriotas* (Écija: Joaquín Chaves, 1812).

<sup>28</sup> AMSM, Section 10, AC, Book 20 (1813).

been a common practice for all persons. Although the tradition of keeping detailed records fit with the practices of Spanish bureaucracy, this practice also suggested a desire to cleanse the body politic of impure persons. Individuals were rehabilitated beyond the shadow of a doubt in an attempt to verify public loyalty and to eliminate fears of shadow conspiracies still lurking in place. In many towns, records related to *empleados* have not survived or were, perhaps more likely, deliberately destroyed. This poses the possibility that several smaller communities dealt with the situation in less than legal ways. However, no evidence to support such a claim appears to have survived.

The possibility of political rehabilitation offered by the Cortes opened a path toward social reconciliation that was greeted by the public in mixed ways. In larger towns, battles in the press attempted to strike a clear distinction between patriotic loyalists and *empleados*. Significantly, the public did not hesitate to attack the decision of the Cortes to offer a course of rehabilitation for *empleados*. In some instances, individuals and some groups openly rejected the decision to rehabilitate *empleados*. This meant local communities found themselves more capable of dispensing justice on this issue than the central government. Additionally, this debate produced an urban population prone to deep cleavages on other social issues. By contrast, at least on the face of it, in smaller towns the process of rehabilitation appears to have been more personal in practice and to have effected a more wholesale reconciliation. In both cases, political questions surrounding the *empleados* were at the heart of a lively public debate over the merits of the new regime and the fitness of certain persons to participate in the process of building a durable constitutional order.

In sorting out what to do with *empleados* resident throughout Spanish communities, the Cortes deferred decision-making to local governments. Municipal governments found themselves empowered once again to act on behalf of their local communities. In doing so, municipal governments effectively rehabilitated former French collaborators in a process that included a significant degree of public participation in the form of published materials and verbal testimonials. This process remained contained to the local level. In the next three sections, I will turn my attention to examining interactions between municipal leaders and agents of the Cortes.

#### FACE TO FACE WITH A NEW POLITICAL REALITY

In contrast to the rehabilitation of *empleados*, which the Cortes left to local governments, in other areas it sought to establish its hegemony, provoking struggles with local governments on the distribution of authority in a constitutional regime. On occasion, the central government found it necessary to intervene in local affairs to remedy situations that compromised the legitimacy of the new political regime. These instances exposed the complex relationship that persisted between municipal leaders and agents of the Cortes, and to a lesser extent between these parties and the local communities they represented, throughout the First Constitutional Period.

In analyzing the case studies that follow, I have treated the Constitution of Cádiz as a foreign blueprint for government forcibly imposed on much of Western Andalusia. The process of drafting the Constitution of Cádiz was closed to all persons except those who were either members of the Cortes or resident in the city as it endured a state of siege. Although the Cortes professed to be a representative institution, not all of its

deputies were elected from among democratic constituencies.<sup>29</sup> The process of convoking the Cortes began before the French overran Western Andalusia, beginning in early 1810 the French occupied much of Western Andalusia, and this made the holding of formal elections throughout the region impossible.<sup>30</sup> For this reason, some deputies for Western Andalusia and other regions of occupied peninsular Spain were chosen from among eligible natives of those areas resident in Cádiz.<sup>31</sup> During the siege of Cádiz, only limited snippets of news passed the frontier between the Spanish and French armies, though on occasion word did travel into Western Andalusia by way of Portugal in the east. This meant that only a small few in Western Andalusia knew much about the business of the Cortes prior to the late summer of 1812. Much of the region had little say regarding who represented them in the Cortes or on the subject of the drafting the Constitution itself. Formal word of what had transpired at Cádiz came only with the conquest of the region by the armies of “free Spain.” Thus, for much of the region of Western Andalusia, the new constitutional regime was effectively foreign.

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<sup>29</sup> The deputies of Spanish America were a major exception to this claim. Throughout the spring of 1810, elections were held in Spanish America. The deputies named in this process constituted the first democratically elected officials of the central government in Spanish history. As newly elected deputies from Spanish America arrived by sea, they displaced temporary deputies chosen by the Cortes from among eligible merchants resident in Cádiz. Carlos Forment, *Democracy in Latin America, 1760-1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003).

<sup>30</sup> For more information regarding the process of calling the Cortes into session and apportioning representation, Federico Suárez, *El proceso de la convocatoria a Cortes, 1808-1810* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1982); and *Las Cortes de Cádiz* (Ediciones Rialp, 2002).

<sup>31</sup> The special commission charged with convening the Cortes initially designated the region of Western Andalusia the right to name 15 deputies and 5 alternates. This number was later modified to give Cádiz a right to name 3 deputies, leaving the total number of seats allocated to Western Andalusia at 12. Additionally, the Junta of Sevilla and the city of Sevilla were each named a deputy. In all, 14 deputies in the Cortes represented the people and institutions of Western Andalusia. Quintí Casals-Bergés, “Proceso electoral y prosopografía de los diputados de las Cortes extraordinarias de Cádiz (1810-1813),” *Historia Constitucional* 13 (2012): 201-209.

At the same time, local elites were forced to react to the new political blueprint. In a short space of time, local political elites learned they were beholden to new political institutions and their agents. Subsequently, agents of the constitutional regime began to issue orders to their seeming subordinates at the local level. Among other things, these orders included a call to form new municipal governments. The Constitution of Cádiz had declared all settlements throughout the Spanish Monarchy with a population greater than 1,000 persons eligible to form an *ayuntamiento*.<sup>32</sup> *Ayuntamientos* created by royal charter in compliance with the legal traditions of the Old Regime were expected to reconstitute themselves under guidelines provided by the new constitutional government to become *ayuntamientos constitucionales*. These guidelines required that municipalities hold elections to fill the offices that comprised the local town council.<sup>33</sup> Although popular elections had been a matter of municipal political life since the political reforms of 1766, they were not previously the means of selecting more than a handful of special officers designated “of the Commons.” Thus, the Spanish people were accorded the right to select all local officials for this first time in Spanish history.

In large cities like Sevilla, the formation of new municipal governments did not pose a significant challenge at an organizational level or to the maintenance of public

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<sup>32</sup> This clause appears in Article 310 of the Constitution. It was not frequently applied in peninsular Spain where there existed a wealth of old *ayuntamientos*. However, it was very popular in areas of Spanish America, like New Spain. See Antonio Annino, “Cádiz y la revolución territorial de los pueblos mexicanos, 1812-1821,” in *Historia de las elecciones en iberoamérica, siglo XIX. De la formación del espacio político nacional*, ed. Antonio Annino, 176-226 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995).

<sup>33</sup> Article 312 specifically ordered that elections determine who would serve as *alcaldes*, *regidores*, and *procuradores síndicos*. It further declared that the practice of inherited office holding terminate immediately.

order. Local political elites published the Constitution of Cádiz in Sevilla on 29 August.<sup>34</sup> Some of the French collaborators responsible for administering the local government during the French occupation fled with the retreating army. Remaining local political elites reformed the Ayuntamiento de Sevilla in a provisional capacity under the leadership of Joaquín de Goyeneta, the very same man responsible for brokering the surrender of the city two and half years earlier. On 12 September, this provisional *ayuntamiento* took an oath of loyalty to the constitutional regime.<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, the Cortes insisted that its agents purge the Sevillian *cabildo* of all former French collaborators. On 27 October, the members of a new constitutional *ayuntamiento* took their oaths of office.<sup>36</sup> This ease of this transition allowed for similar successes in subsequent elections, which followed shortly thereafter. By late December, the city's parishes held elections that would initiate the process of selecting provincial deputies to sit in the Cortes.<sup>37</sup>

Sevilla was unique in that it had enjoyed a privileged place in the development of the constitutional regime. The process of calling the Cortes began in the Real Alcázar of Sevilla when the city played host to the Central Junta. Furthermore, as a city with a historical right to send deputies to the Cortes, the Ayuntamiento of Sevilla had sent a deputy to Cádiz to serve on its own behalf. Thus, Sevilla had taken part in the political

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<sup>34</sup> Vázquez y Sánchez, 138.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 140.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 143.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 146. Normally, under Article 36 of the Constitution of Cádiz, parish elections would have occurred on the first Sunday of October. However, the political transition of Sevilla and many other towns remained unresolved at that point in time. A December timeline suggest that political elites worked energetically to implement key electoral provisions of the new constitutional charter.

discussions that bore fruit with the Constitution of Cádiz. For the city of Sevilla, clear linkages bound it to the new constitutional regime.

Under the geographic administrative structure adopted by the new regime, Sevilla also retained its status as the seat of the provincial capital.<sup>38</sup> This meant that it retained the influence of having the regional provincial administration based within its walls. Although this stood for little under the Old Regime, the Constitution of Cádiz envisioned an expanded role for provincial institutions in governing the country. This new role stemmed principally from the creation of *diputaciones provinciales*. These institutions included a *jefe político* named by the king and a council of indirectly elected public officials. Intendants kept their powers of fiscal oversight and tax collection but were subordinated to the institutional structures of the provincial administration. Taken together these institutions formed a new and formidable layer of government inserted between the capital of the monarchy and local communities. This situation mirrored the strict hierarchy of central, regional, and local governments put in place during the reign of the Central Junta. Because the new provincial diputación would govern from Sevilla, this meant that the city would enjoy unfettered access to regional political officials, the prestige of serving as capital, and ability to lord this status over surrounding towns. Nonetheless, many towns in Western Andalusia appear to have embraced the new constitutional regime. In quick fashion, these *ayuntamientos* interpreted key aspects of the document with a mind to suit their own purposes. As a result, local communities

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<sup>38</sup> Article 11 called for “*una division más conveniente*” (a most convenient division) of Spanish territory in to several provinces. However, it did not explicitly state these boundaries of the provinces, delegating this authority to the Spanish nation. Later laws were expect to flesh out the actual boundaries of the provinces.



engaged in a dialogue with the central government over the proper implementation of provisions set forth in the Constitution of Cádiz.

#### LOS BARRIOS AND THE MEANING OF TRUE JUSTICE AND CHARITY

The case of Los Barrios demonstrates how the prescription of the Cortes were contested and negotiated. Certainly by comparison to Sevilla, the experience of smaller towns during the First Constitutional Period was quite different. For such settlements the Constitution constituted a mysterious political invention brought into the region by a conquering army. Although this army freed subject municipalities from their obligations to the French occupational regime, this did not undo the sting of their abandonment by this force just one and a half years earlier. The *ayuntamientos* of Western Andalusia had good cause to be skeptical of the new regime and the changes it brought. To this end, they engaged with it adhering to the conventions of the Old Regime, which in no way rendered them a weaker political party.

During the summer of 1812, residents of the small town of Los Barrios ousted their mayor, Joaquín María de Eguiguren.<sup>39</sup> The town, situated just a few miles inland from the port of Algeciras, had been settled by Spanish refugees of Gibraltar, taken by British forces during the War of Spanish Succession at the start of the eighteenth century. At the start of the nineteenth century, Los Barrios was home to a small population of about 3,000 that worked the hilly agricultural fields that abutted the town on all sides. Town councilmembers objected to the participation of Eguiguren in the new constitutional municipal government on the grounds that he represented the worst of the

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<sup>39</sup> I have translated *alcalde mayor* as mayor.

Old Regime. To fellow councilmen, Eguiguren was a “despot,” whose command of the town treasury and grain supply exposed a penchant for arbitrary rule that had violated the conventions of legitimate government.<sup>40</sup> To follow their reasoning, his behavior had undermined the traditional relationship between the town’s senior executive and the town council; one founded on a cooperative system of council oversight. Notably, the mayor was ousted without violent riot or complex social scandal. As the town viewed the situation, their accusations were in accordance with implementing provisions set forth in the Constitution of Cádiz, adopted only a few months earlier. Sure of their victory, the town submitted their case for arbitration to the Audiencia of Sevilla when the mayor protested.

In Los Barrios, we are confronted with the development of a new political culture defined by the relationship of municipalities to the central government. In their letter to the Audiencia dated 18 July 1812 the town councilmembers of Los Barrios asked that Eguiguren “might be disposed of his employ, leaving the town at liberty to elect another mayor as specified in the sacred Constitution.”<sup>41</sup> As the grounds for their case, the town councilmembers claimed that Eguiguren had violated legal provisions that governed the use of public funds. Specifically, he had used public funds without the due oversight of the town council during a time of war. Of special note, in its review of the case the Audiencia curiously paid special attention to the publication of the Constitution in the

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<sup>40</sup> The original references *despota* and *arbitrariedad*. AHPS, Real Audiencia de Sevilla, “El Ayuntamiento de los Barrios solicitando la deposición de su Alcalde Mayor” (1812) - Expediente formado en virtud de representación de la villa y ayuntamiento de Los Barrios solicitando la deposición del alcalde mayor de ella D. Joaquin M.<sup>a</sup> de Eguiguren. Signatura 540/4.

<sup>41</sup> “... *que el referido Alcalde Mayor sea depuesto de su empleo; quedanos el Pueblo en libertad para elegir otro segun lo previene la sagrada Constitucion ...*” Ibid.

town on the occasion of Los Barrios's liberation from French rule and the implementation of constitutional rule after that point. Just one month later, the Audiencia of Sevilla issued its decision, stating: "It is scandalous that, having been published in the town this fundamental law of the state, there was not put in effect the naming of the municipal leadership, nor the process ... to encharge other municipal officials." In a rebuff to the position of the town councilmembers, it continued: "... it is understandable that the mayor of the same town took sole charge of the use of public funds."<sup>42</sup> According to the Audiencia, the state of war that persisted in the countryside during this period did not require the same adherence to formal procedures as that expected in peacetime.

The Audiencia rejected the position of the town councilmembers, but also did not side with Eguiguren. Although the Audiencia excused Eguiguren for his apparent mismanagement of public funds, it was more concerned by the fact that the mayor had continued his role despite provisions made for the election of new municipal officials under the Constitution. In this respect, the town councilmembers were similarly complicit in their civic malfeasance. Despite their concern with the observance of existing protocols and their attempt to cite relevant constitutional provisions, their treatment of the rule of law was selective at best.

The Audiencia claimed that the town councilmembers had violated Article 6 of the Constitution of Cádiz. One of the more curious items included in the Constitution of Cádiz, Article 6 fell under Chapter 2, which described the inherent qualities of Spanish

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<sup>42</sup> "*Dice: q.<sup>e</sup> es escandaloso q.<sup>e</sup> habiendose publicado en el Pueblo esta Ley fundamental del Estado no sé haya puesto en execucion el nombram.<sup>10</sup> de Alcaldes, ni proceso ... á encargar á los demas oficiales municipales las funciones de su privativa atribucion: Tambien es espectral q.<sup>e</sup> el Alcalde m.<sup>or</sup> de la misma villa entriseda exclusivam.<sup>16</sup> en el manejo de los fondos publicos contraviendo la Ynstruccion de Propios y Positos q.<sup>e</sup> mandan intervengan los Regidores ...*" Ibid.

nationals. Specifically, Article 6 designated the principle obligations expected of all Spaniards: that they possess a “love of *la Patria*” and a disposition toward being just and charitable.<sup>43</sup> In the view of the Audiencia, both Eguiguren and the town councilmembers had violated the constitution by failing to carry out elections. In doing so, they had been unjust and uncharitable to their fellow citizens by the new standards of the day. In order to verify that the Ayuntamiento of Los Barrios complied with the expectation that it hold new elections, the Audiencia ordered that it render notice of having done so inside of fifteen days.

The timing of the Los Barrios case suggests many things about the early practice of constitutionalism in Spain. First, it was significant that within six months of the Constitution’s existence and while war continued to rage against the French in other parts of Andalusia, Spanish municipal leaders were already employing the new language of constitutionalism to make claims and resolve disagreements. Constitutions are often seen to mark a definitive moment of rupture in the legal history of a polity. That the townsfolk of Los Barrios were willing to engage so confidently with the content of the Constitution suggest that the new regime was not so alien as some historians have implied.

Second, the willingness of the townsfolk to seek resolution from the Audiencia suggests that the constitutional regime enjoyed an early legitimacy in liberated areas. While it was true that the constitutional regime faced resistance in many quarters, especially after the Cortes was seen to have intervened in the realm of religious affairs with the abolition of the Inquisition, at least initially its legitimacy was not in question. Furthermore, its very existence likely provided a contrast to the comparatively ill-

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<sup>43</sup> Article 6: “*El amor de la Patria es una de las principales obligaciones de todos los españoles y, asimismo, el ser justos y benéficos.*”

received and never properly enforced constitutional charter of the French occupational regime.

Third, such occasions provided the means for local citizens to engage with the meaning of key provisions of the new constitutional charter. While the case presented here suggests that the interpretation of constitutional provisions was often incomplete, it was significant that town councilmembers interpreted specific articles of the Constitution of Cádiz as a means to justify what were likely ongoing political disputes. This treatment implies that the constitution was not simply received in an unquestioned manner and applied uniformly, but rather that non-elites challenged and reinterpreted central aspects of the document with a mind towards advancing personal interests. This provided the means for relatively ordinary citizens to become involved in the political realm.

The parties pertaining to the dispute hailed from the upper echelons of the Los Barrios community – all were veterans of municipal governments from the Old Regime. The Audiencia's ruling forced the issue into the public limelight by granting the male population of the town an opportunity to weigh in at the ballot box – a practice with which they were already familiar – thereby limiting the influence of petty personal politics and significantly broadening the variety of social actors involved in resolving this case. The exuberance of the Audiencia for upholding electoral laws points to the profound faith of the new regime in elections as a measure designed to limit some of the worst administrative squabbles of the Old Regime.

Fourth, there was a feeling shared by the senior most officials of the central government that the survival of the new constitutional regime depended, at least in part, on the effectiveness of constitutional rule at the local level. The Audiencia's concern for

the proper execution of municipal elections points to this fact. Under the Constitution of Cádiz, the complex system of indirect elections that provided for the selection of provincial representatives to the Cortes was rooted at the local level. Corrupt municipal politics and the infeasibility of municipal elections threatened to undermine the entire constitutional project. The attention given to Article 6 was telling. Town councilmembers attempted to predicate their case on the argument that Eguiguren had behaved in a manner unbecoming of a Spaniard. Specifically, they argued Eguiguren had been neither just nor charitable in his management of the town's finances and the local grain supply. The Audiencia shot back that both the mayor and town council were in violation of Article 6 for failing to hold new municipal elections. The town councilmembers were in no place to accuse Eguiguren of malfeasance as they had willingly overlooked their obligations as well.

The Los Barrios case demonstrated that local communities turned to the past as precedent for modeling the future. In Los Barrios, engagement with the new constitutional regime meant looking to the past for answers. Town councilmembers ignored the call for new elections and took established protocols of the Old Regime as standing law while actively interpreting the Constitution of Cádiz to suit their own devices. While clearly town councilmembers of Los Barrios sought to advance their local interests, they fully engaged with the emerging constitutional culture to carve out the largest role for local governments.

## LA PUENTE DE DON GONZALO AND THE PROPER ROLE OF THE STATE

The experience of La Puente de Don Gonzalo (modern Puente Génil) builds on what was witnessed in the case of Los Barrios. It presents what happened when a town chose to resist the political judgement of the central government. For expediency's sake, I will refer to La Puente de Don Gonzalo as simply "La Puente." La Puente does not figure prominently into the traditional history of Spain. It played host to no major battles in Spanish history and was not the seat of any major institutional or administrative offices. In this respect, it was rather like the majority of small towns dotting Western Andalusia during the early nineteenth century. Although formally located under the dominion of the Kingdom of Córdoba in the early modern period, the town actually straddled the Génil River, which formed the border between the provinces of Córdoba and Sevilla. Thus, it resided within the cultural and economic ambit of Sevilla and firmly within the region of Western Andalusia. During the late 1780s, the town numbered roughly 6,000 inhabitants, a number that would almost double in the next 60 years.<sup>44</sup> Yet, despite an apparently high rate of growth, La Puente remained a somewhat closed society at the end of the eighteenth century.

The conflict between local and central interpretations of the new constitutional regime centered on the composition of the town council. The entrenchment of old families in La Puente produced significant disorder during the transition to constitutional rule. A mix of confusion and malice resulted in a controversy known to local historians as the "*episodio de los mismos*," or quite literally the "episode of the sames." As mentioned already, under the Constitution of Cádiz, all municipalities were required to provide for

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<sup>44</sup> Jesús Estepa-Giménez, *Aportación al estudio de la disolución del régimen señorial: Puente-Génil 1.750-1.850* (Puente-Génil: Gráficas Consolación, 1980), 83.

the election of an *ayuntamiento constitucional*. The Ayuntamiento of La Puente, one elected by a majority of the electorate defined by the more limited terms of enfranchisement established by the French occupational regime, refused to acknowledge the requirements of the new constitutional electoral law. When finally ordered to do so in mid-1813, town councilmembers deliberately rigged the outcome of the subsequent election to create a town council that was effectively the same as the one before it. Into this mix, there entered the Baron of Casa-Davalillos, *jefe político* of the Province of Córdoba and an agent of the Cortes, who sought to correct the apparent misuse of the Constitution through armed force if necessary. Seeking to exercise the constitutional requirements of the new regime, the Baron insisted that the town call new elections and enforced his order with the imposition of armed men who arrested several public officials. The result was a furious town council, a confused public, and a very irritated Cortes. In order to redress the grievances committed against them, town councilmembers made a special appeal to the Cortes in an attempt to sack the Baron. The argument persisted through the end of the First Constitutional Period, and never reached a settlement prior to the restoration of Fernando VII.<sup>45</sup>

Although the town council of La Puente disregarded the Baron, town councilmembers did not challenge the legitimacy of the constitutional regime. Town Councilmembers demonstrated a concrete working understanding of the new constitutional regime. Not only do they cite relevant articles of the Constitution of Cádiz, still little more than one year old in the summer of 1813, but they also granted deference

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<sup>45</sup> Enrique Aguilar-Gavilán, “Agustín Álvarez Sotomayor. Semblanza y trayectoria política de un liberal pontanés,” in *Puente Génil, pasado y presente: I congreso de historia*, ed. Enrique Soria-Mesa (Córdoba: Servicio de Publicaciones Universidad de Córdoba, 2002), 412, fn 8.



to the rule of the Cortes in due form. While not in accordance with guidelines instituted by the Constitution of Cádiz, an election had taken place and the result was seen by many in the town to bear credibility. Interestingly, the council stated the Baron of Casa-Davalillos endangered the “sacred rights” of Cortes and Crown, the “nascent liberty” of the village inhabitants and, in grandiose fashion, “national order” itself. Far from an *ad hominem* attack on the Baron, the response reads more as a clear enumeration of the various rights and privileges afforded the municipality under the new constitutional order.<sup>46</sup>

Town councilmembers focused on building a case for themselves as victims of administrative overreach. Not only does the appeal predicate the legitimacy of the town council to derive from “the council of electors named by an absolute plurality of votes from the people,” but it also makes a concerted attempt to associate itself with the regime instituted at Cádiz by the expediciencies of wartime. First, a conscious effort was made to argue that the rights of the standing council derive from its allegiance to the patriotic cause during the French occupation. In stark nationalistic fashion, its enemies are portrayed as French collaborators who seek only to undo the gains of the Spanish. In this

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<sup>46</sup> Consider the following excerpt: “*Los que subscriben, naturales y vecinos...que componian su Ayuntamiento constitucional, y la junta de electores nombrada á pluralidad absoluta de votos por el pueblo...representar á las Córtes ó al Rey para reclamar la observancia de la Constitución, según artículo 373 de ella misma y considerando á V. M. encargado en velar sobre ella y las leyes para dar cuenta á las próximas Córtes de las infracciones que haya notado segun el artículo 160, por esta exposición se dirigen á su augusto trono para manifestarle una serie dilatada de atentados monstruosos, que conspiran á un mismo tiempo contra sus sagrados derechos, contra nuestra libertad naciente, y aun contra el decoro nacional.*” Interestingly, in securing the claims of the *ayuntamiento*, the authors also make use of a “general will” (*voluntad general*) argument on pages 22-23. Though not beyond the realm of possibility, it is unlikely the authors allude here to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, though the idea is quite tempting. *Copia de la representación dirigida á la diputación permanente de las Córtes generales y extraordinarias del reyno por los individuos que la subscriben contra el Baron of Casa-Dabalillos gefe superior político de la provincia de Córdoba, por los atentados cometidos en la villa de la Puente de don Gonzalo contra la Constitución de la Monarquía española y decretos de S. M.* (Écija: Imprenta de Don Joaquin Chaves, 1813), 3.

sense a new election would only provide “protection to the enemies of tranquility and public interest, acolytes and servants of the occupational regime.” Second, the authors offered the exceptionality of a state of war as cover for their actions. As they argued, despite the method of its election, the *ayuntamiento* was installed only three days after the local pronouncement of the Constitution, which was perhaps meant to suggest that the constitutionality of the council derived from its loyalty to the new regime. Third, on a political level the council identified with the policies of the regime, though with a less stringent conviction. Whereas the authors condemn “the burdensome yoke of feudalism,” feelings toward the abolition of the Inquisition are less clearly stated and more ambivalent.<sup>47</sup>

With less uncertainty, the authors present the Baron’s infringement on the municipal rights of the town as a case of “lèse civil liberty.” Returning to the matter of Spanish localism, it was clear that the authors believed the common good derived from the municipality and found centralized government suspect. For the town councilmembers, civil liberty required that municipal rights trump those of central authority. Such an argument undermined the role of *jefes políticos*. Indeed, the authors assert that executive power was corrupting: “the agents of executive power are those that have [ruled] always with the liberty of the pueblos. From here, or by means of armed force, is where the Constitution ought to fear its ruin; not from the constitutional municipalities, for they are the work of a free people.” At the heart of claims made by the

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 4-6.

town councilmembers was a defiant localism that worked at odds with the centralization of authority undertaken by the constitutional regime.<sup>48</sup>

The town council's stubborn refusal to acknowledge the authority of the Baron put the regime on edge. The projection of the new regime's legitimacy depended, at least in part, on its use of force. Refractory towns presented the specter of revolt. In their remonstrance, town councilmembers portrayed the intervention of the Baron as having disturbed the peace (*tranquilidad público*). Elsewhere in the same document, town councilmembers decried the "monstrous arbitrariness" of the Baron, which made the regime in some sense no better than its predecessor.<sup>49</sup> Reading between the lines in such instances, it was evident once again that town councilmembers sought to offer a convincing case of victimhood in the language of liberty and despotism.

In response to the complaint lodged by the town council of La Puente, the Baron authored a *contestación* in October of 1813 and a more lengthy *representación* in January 1814 using the same language.<sup>50</sup> The Baron accused town councilmembers of making a veritable ruckus out of "heated controversy" (*ruidosos sucesos*) and insisted that the town council was both "anti-constitutional and illegal." Attributing the conflict, in part, to personal differences, the Baron portrayed the spirit of the town councilmembers as one of gross "injustice, inequality, vengeance, and bad faith."<sup>51</sup> Concerning the election held in

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 17, 20.

<sup>50</sup> It is likely other documents relating to the events described here remain in existence. If so, these were not retained by the Cortes.

<sup>51</sup> *Representacion del gefe político de Córdoba, Baron of Casa-Davalillo, á S.M. las Córtes manifestando sus procedimientos en la Puente de Don-Gonzalo, para justificarse del delito de infraccion*

the intervening months, which produced the same result as before: “In a word the null *ayuntamiento* had formed a commitment to be re-elected, and in doing so did not prevent the persistence of legal blemishes of which it was not purified.”<sup>52</sup> In summary fashion, “they made a game out of the Constitution,” contended the Baron, and offered “disobedience to commands” of the government.”<sup>53</sup>

In defining contrast to the philosophical stance taken by the town councilmembers, the Baron upheld the sanctity of constitutional laws and denied the right of municipalities to nullify those promulgated by the Cortes:

Our wise Constitution, founded on the most healthy principles of justice and political reason, far from authorizing this genre of offenses, expressly commands [government officers] to arrest dangerous perpetrators, and proceed against them according to the order prescribed in our legislation ... this is what has been implemented with a specificity that has perhaps no comparison in the course of the Spanish revolution.<sup>54</sup>

Clearly, the Baron of Casa-Davalillos was a man convinced of the virtues of the constitutional regime, and one who found little merit to municipal privileges. By such a measure, constitutionalism exercised from above faced a critical problem. Although forced to yield to exceptions in wartime, with the withdrawal of the French the Cortes and its agents refused to yield to exceptions in peacetime. The harshness of the regime and its brusque disregard for politics at the local level made it an unwelcome guest in many instances. Instances such as this perhaps explain why the regime failed to gain the support of the public in the face of the coming Bourbon restoration. Some municipalities

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*de constitucion de que falsamente se le acusa* (Córdoba: Imprenta Real de Don Rafael Garcia Rodriguez, 1814), 3.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 12, 18.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 28.

found the best means to preserve their ancient rights and privileges to rest in the restoration of the old political order.

That town councilmembers chose to publically engage the Cortes after the Baron succeeded in disrupting their control suggest a budding public sphere. The decision to publish and then circulate their grievance suggests that town councilmembers maintained a drive to recruit local public opinion. Given that much of the local population was illiterate, town councilmembers were seeking perhaps also to market their cause to local political elites in neighboring towns. In this sense, the publication of the Baron's side to the story was also significant as it was likely done to counter balance the spread of news and information coming from the town councilmembers of La Puente. In formal accounts of the episode, ordinary townsfolk are largely absent, but appeals to public opinion play out in printed items produced by both parties. This suggests quite a stir was made in the town. Reading against what was written, control of the town's restive population was very likely near the center of the issue. Certainly the public at large in La Puente had the benefit of numbers on its side. It would be difficult to imagine a disengaged public in the context of any war. Indeed, the area around La Puente was a hotbed of guerrilla activity.

Interestingly, the town councilmembers began their published appeal to the Cortes with a clear identification of themselves as "*naturales*" and "*vecinos* of the town of La Puente," recognizing notions of citizenship dating back centuries. Recent scholarship has suggested that such terms emerged during early modern Spain as a way to define the complex combination of rights and duties applied to community members in a process that originated at the local level. Town councilmembers were fluent in the language of citizenship employed by the Old Regime. The use of *naturales* and *vecinos* in place of the

more constitutionally grounded notion of *ciudadano* implies the resilience of older notions of political identity.<sup>55</sup>

This second episode demonstrates two points. First, as with Los Barrios, local actors in La Puente were comfortable engaging in a constitutional dispute with a political institution they deemed legitimate to hear their case. Unlike Los Barrios, where internal factions disrupted the coherence of that town's case against mayor Eguiguren and so were duly admonished, in La Puente a well-organized group of town councilmembers succeeded in prosecuting their case against the meddlesome Baron. Second, on clearer display in La Puente was the expression of a defiant localism. Town councilmembers in Los Barrios certainly considered themselves doing what they deemed best for the town. Those of La Puente were willing to challenge agents of the regime over the division of authority and the space for local autonomy in a constitutional regime. Lastly, this case hints at a realization on the part of both the Cortes and town councilmembers of La Puente in the role of public opinion and the public sphere.

#### THE LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

Local communities clearly engaged with constitutional culture at the local level. Although only in some cases did this appear to reach far beyond local political elites, there was cause to believe this would have changed had the First Constitutional Period provided sufficient time to allow for the further maturation of constitutional political

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<sup>55</sup> Tamar Herzog argued that the Spanish notion of citizenship that emerged after 1812 was based on notions of *vecinidad* and *naturaleza*, but the links between these two systems of thought have not received conclusive explication to my mind. On this discussion, see Tamar Herzog, *Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

relationships. During the brief two years of constitutional rule, there was an apparent attempt to work through the negotiation of these relationships. This signaled a strong foundation on which to build in future years.

Rather unfortunately, political elites of the central government failed to convincingly connect constitutionalism in Spain to a tradition with deep roots at the local level. Instead, they frequently resisted the expedient local interpretation of the Constitution and simultaneously left open the potential for local communities to contest the new order. Worse of all, they failed to make constitutionalism resonate on an individual level as something worth fighting and dying to defend. The restoration of absolutism in 1814 was not imposed against the vein of a strong popular resistance. The reasons for this are manifold and complex. At least in part, this owed to the regime's failure to provide an appropriate degree of flexibility in the execution of local government. Considerable flexibility extended to constitutional *ayuntamientos* to rehabilitate empleados resulted in significant public backlash. Spaniards at various levels of government were able to understand and interpret – even reinterpret – the central tenets of the new constitution, often in pursuit of advancing their own interests. Objection to the constitutional regime came from the manner in which the central government chose to impose its interpretation of the constitutional charter as the rule of law. The failure of the central government to effectively put down such challenges after 1814 meant that similar problems would plague future constitutional regimes. The legacy of municipal engagement during the First Constitutional Period was then the image of modern constitutional government as something essentially open to negotiation between the central government and local communities.

In contrast to this narrative of failure, it is worth also stressing that the constitutional regime did succeed in garnering the attention of local communities. Spanish citizenry did not reject the political option presented by elites in its entirety. In fact, the political culture first introduced by constitutionalist elites during the First Constitutionalist Period became in later years an ideal worthy of emulation. Local communities clearly enjoyed the degree to which the constitutional regime offered a means for direct interaction with the central government. Ultimately, the brief constitutional period was quite successful in introducing a political vision for Spain that could operate in the modern political context of the nineteenth century.

The War of Independence, the promulgation of the Constitution of Cádiz, and the First Constitutional Period itself were seen together as transformative moments, both as they transpired and in the years that followed. As political change first came to Sevilla in 1808, one diarist wrote of “revolution.”<sup>56</sup> Speaking to his countrymen in a small town, one priest described the Constitution as, “that which breaks the funeral veil that has covered yourselves,”<sup>57</sup> bringing life to a dead Spain. Years later, the Conde de Toreno would herald these years as marking the beginning of a great movement by Spaniards “to reclaim their lost freedom.”<sup>58</sup> In doing so, Toreno built upon a particular historical narrative that would grow in liberal political circles during the nineteenth century. Yet this was also a view that was palpable at the local level. Inherent in all such statements

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<sup>56</sup> AMS, *Crónica de Don Félix González de León*, Section 14, Vol. 9. 22 March 1808.

<sup>57</sup> “*La que rompe el funesto velo con que os cubrieron.*” *Discurso que en la villa de Estepa y en su jura de la Constitución política de la Monarquía pronunció el doctor Don Josef Maria de Miera Pacheco, Primer Capellan Real de la Capilla del Palacio de Aranjuez el 18 de octubre de 1812* (Écija: Don Joaquín Chaves, 1812).

<sup>58</sup> “*...reivindicar su libertad perdida.*” Conde de Toreno, *Noticia de los principales sucesos del gobierno de España, 1808-1814*, ed. Albert Gil-Navales (Pamplona: Urgoiti Editores, 2007).



was a belief in the monumentality of the times. These years, and the events connected to them, were seen to mark a sudden and profound break with the past. Modernity, it seems, had come to Spain.

If the First Constitutional Period was as truly monumental as contemporaries described it, then it set a significant precedent for evaluating future moments of change, all of which were seen to pale in comparison. Implicated in the theoretical modernity of the First Constitutional Period was the local memory of a constitutional regime that was, at least in practice, quite complicated. National leaders understood the importance of local communities as a conduit to transforming the substrate of a national political culture. Meanwhile, local political elites made use of their position to negotiate the terms of their transit into a political regime of which they were quite skeptical. Municipal elites understood the opportunity before them and chose to selectively interpret the Constitution of Cádiz.

## CONCLUSION

Although the Constitution of Cádiz vested sovereignty in the Spanish nation, the First Constitutional Period witnessed the perpetuation of a very local variety of sovereignty that situated municipal politics at its core. This was evident in the tactic taken to rehabilitate *empleados* of the French occupational regime. Through this process, local governments exerted outsized influence in determining who resided within and beyond the nation of loyal Spaniards. This meant that the terms of inclusion within the Spanish nation were ultimately limited by connection to a local community more so than an abstract body of persons bound by a common national identity. Some towns also resisted

the application of universal legal provisions derived from the Constitution in preference to attempting to negotiate the form these laws would take when enacted at the local level. This signaled the existence of a willingness on the part of municipalities to negotiate the degree of their adherence to a common national vision for the Spanish state.

The revolt of the municipalities against the imposition of a uniform legal regime had vast implications. In an immediate sense, it complicated the ability of the constitutional regime to consolidate its control over conquered territory thereby limiting the influence and reception of constitutional ideas at the local level. In a more lasting sense, local interpretation of constitutional provisions and the attempt to negotiate the application of specific laws set a problematic precedent for the practice of government in nineteenth century Spain. From the perspective of the central government, future constitutional regimes would have to exercise a more complete domination of local communities. Meanwhile, at the local level, constitutionalism originated as a framework that allowed for a significant degree of negotiation between central and local governments, neither of which were wholly sovereign.

## CHAPTER FIVE:

### **Pomp and Circumstance in a Political Vein:**

#### **Ritual Culture in a Revolutionary Sevilla**

Political elites in Western Andalusia exerted considerable influence over the practice of politics at the local level. These individuals – chiefly aristocrats, clerics, and persons of wealth – controlled the political activities of town councils and formally represented the interests of municipalities in their dealings with the central government. The exclusion of traditional non-elites from participation in local government spoke to the survival of overlapping patterns of political and social stratification within local communities. Until 1808, the popular classes of Western Andalusia had only very rarely taken part in politics. During the Old Regime, popular participation in the political life of local communities had occurred in the form of urban riots. Such disturbances were somewhat limited to the history of larger settlements, like Sevilla, and were frequently generated in response to elite propaganda. The municipal reforms of 1766 provided one avenue for popular participation in government at the local level. Yet these reforms failed to alter fundamentally the composition of most municipal councils by the close of the eighteenth century. Indeed, at the start of the nineteenth century, political elites in many towns continued to inherit municipal offices from blood relatives. Political culture remained essentially elitist in character. Nonetheless, it was during the period 1808-1814 that the Spanish people began to assert a new political role for themselves in local politics that contrasted sharply with that of previous centuries.

In Sevilla, traditional non-elites learned how to model political behavior by watching various forms of ritual displays put on by established political elites. At least

six political transitions in six years provided the inhabitants of Sevilla with a series of moments to examine how traditional political elites legitimated new regimes and rallied public support to their cause. Sevilla was, like many early modern cities, a “ritual city” in which ritual served to define civic identity.<sup>1</sup> Festivals, processions, and other forms of ritualized activity were integral to performing the process of political transition because they linked key political ideas associated with each regime to the civic identity of the city. Public ceremonies served at once as public occasions designated to mark the rise of new political regimes and pivotal moments of public indoctrination, which elites used to impart values consistent with the new regime to a receptive population. This idea was first advanced by Mona Ozouf who linked the performance of new festivals and other celebrations in revolutionary France to the performance civic identity and political agency.<sup>2</sup> As Peter Burke has made clear, ritual was a useful means to convey political power.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, ritual offers an important lens for historians “to see” how political power was viewed by contemporaries.<sup>4</sup> Indeed frequent political transitions and their accompanying ritual displays offered a means for contemporaries to unpack the significance of new political ideas. However, the stunning frequency of transitions in this period does not fully explain why there emerged a new appreciation for the utility of public ritual in a political vein.

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Trexler, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980); and Edward Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

<sup>2</sup> Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution*, trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). Since the publication of Ozouf’s book, numerous publications have examined the role of festivals in framing political culture in the Hispanic World.

<sup>3</sup> Peter Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

<sup>4</sup> Alejandro Cañeque, *The King’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 11-12.

The sudden appeal of public ritual stemmed from the crisis of sovereignty that wreaked havoc throughout the Spanish Monarchy in 1808. The revolution of 27 May was consistent with the existence of a public faith in the principle of popular sovereignty. In the weeks and years that followed, well after local political elites had largely succeeded in neutralizing the populist character of the Junta of Sevilla, the people of Sevilla looked for new ways to express their political will. Public ritual provided a useful means for aspiring political elites to take part in local political life without having to hold municipal office.

Public rituals provided for the democratization of politics. These events forced the political life of a community beyond the private corridors of city hall and into public spaces. They succeeded in broadening the ranks of who participated in government at the local level. In effect, this made political festivals an ephemeral aspect of the public sphere that began to emerge around this time.<sup>5</sup> The emergence of a public sphere was significant in that it provided a useful means for non-elites to influence public opinion and thereby to affect the actions of traditional political elites. Thus, by 1814 the exclusion of traditional non-elites from the ranks of municipal government no longer ensured the exclusion of these same individuals from active participation in local politics.

Ritual culture in this period was not altogether new and clearly built upon the rich traditional religious celebrations that remained popular throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In Sevilla and surrounding towns, ritual culture was a way of life, occurring regularly and in accordance with the Catholic festive calendar built around

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<sup>5</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

the commemoration of saints' days and liturgical cycles. A thriving tradition of ritual culture was also present in other parts of the Spanish Monarchy.<sup>6</sup> Scholarly literature on New Spain and its successor states, especially Mexico, in the context of the early nineteenth century has described the cultural practice of maintaining old traditions alongside new practices. Despite a heavily secular dimension to these festivals, inspiration often came from the ceremonial life of the Catholic Church. Writing on Mexico, Michael Ducey has described this merging of past and present as a kind of "dualism" that persisted well into the nineteenth century.<sup>7</sup> More recently, Matthew O'Hara has rejected efforts to draw a strict dichotomy between cultures of past and present, suggesting instead that the past was a frequent source of cultural innovation in the context of nineteenth century Mexico.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, the recycling and reappropriation of religious cultural elements alongside newer, more clearly political ones attested to the utility of tradition. Audiences trained in one mode of symbolic appreciation could easily interpret the relevance of new ideas if they were presented in a similar format. Thus, political organizers exploited religious traditions as a convenient tool to present new ideas.

The present chapter will demonstrate how ritual culture was used by various political organizers in order to legitimize new regimes and to fashion political behavior

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<sup>6</sup> Linda A. Curcio-Nagy, *The Great Festivals of Colonial Mexico City: Performing Power and Identity* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004); John A. Marino, *Becoming Neapolitan: Citizen Culture in Baroque Naples* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011); and Frances L. Ramos, *Identity, Ritual, and Power in Colonial Puebla* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012).

<sup>7</sup> Michael T. Ducey, *A Nation of Villages: Riot and Rebellion in the Mexican Huasteca, 1750-1850* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004).

<sup>8</sup> Matthew D. O'Hara, "The Supple Whip: Innovation and Tradition in Mexican Catholicism," *American Historical Review* 117.5 (December 2011): 1373-1401.

during the period 1808-1814. That is, I will trace the use of festivals as one tool available to political agents in their attempts to influence public opinion and shape the values and expectations of fellow subjects and citizens. Of particular note for this period was the diffusion of this technique from the narrow coterie of political elites to the somewhat more politically heterogeneous ranks of non-elites. That the people at large understood the utility of festivals as a means to promote the cause of a particular political group and, more significantly, their later decision to use such events to advance their own political agendas speaks to the transformative nature of this period. Such political activity laid the groundwork for a more socially heterogeneous political culture in later decades.

In order to make my case, I will analyze a series of festivals from the political life of Sevilla, with supporting evidence drawn from other small towns, during the period 1808-1814. Taken together, these festivals exhibit how the practice of politics was gradually democratized. In the first instance, I will use the rites of death held in 1808 for José Moñino y Redondo, Count of Floridablanca, to demonstrate how the Central Junta used the influence of Sevilla's ritual culture as tool to demonstrate its legitimacy. I will then explain how the constitutional regime sought to use public ceremony in 1812 to impart its new vision of government to a receptive citizenry. Finally, I will show how non-elites appropriated such ceremonial practices to celebrate the return of absolutism in 1814.

#### DEATH AND RITUAL IN A STATE OF CRISIS

The manner in which political elites responded to the death of the Count of Floridablanca sheds light on the unique cultural and political climate of the still young

Central Junta and the city of Sevilla during the winter of 1808-1809. Floridablanca, the first president of the Central Junta, died on 30 December 1808, roughly two weeks after his arrival in Sevilla. Floridablanca was laid to rest amid splendor fit for a member of the royal family. Although Floridablanca had faced declining health for some time, the loss for the Central Junta was a sudden one. Certainly the Central Junta had never devoted time to consideration of the process for observing such a high-ranking death nor to consideration of the proper commemorative occasion required to mark such an event. There existed no established protocol for the Central Junta to follow. The Central Junta also faced the reality that significant time and fiscal restraints narrowed the scope and variety of options open to it. Yet even at a moment of extreme crisis, the political leadership of Spain saw it fit to commemorate, even celebrate, the passing of a public figure with substantial pomp and mythmaking.

Floridablanca's death presented both tragedy and political opportunity for the Central Junta. Only then recently installed in its new seat at the Real Alcázar of Sevilla, the Central Junta accorded elaborate burial rites to Floridablanca as a means to garner public attention for itself. Indeed, the sovereignty of the Central Junta was still tenuous at best, its status contested not least of all by the Junta of Sevilla. The residence of the Central Junta alongside the Junta of Sevilla in the same city pitted these two institutions against one another in the same urban space. The Central Junta needed a commemoration worthy of a king to turn an otherwise destabilizing moment into one capable of galvanizing popular support for its position within the city and beyond. The burial of Floridablanca provided an opportunity for the Central Junta to legitimize its role as the sovereign and preeminent political institution of the Spanish Monarchy in the absence of



Fernando VII. This depended on the elaborate construction of a myth surrounding the image of Floridablanca as a founding hero the political regime initiated by the creation of the Central Junta. In the months that followed, the Central Junta attempted to further embellish the myth of Floridablanca in prose. Both of these activities spoke to the passive role of Sevillians as spectators of politics, and not as participants.

The rites of death held for Floridablanca demonstrated the importance of ritual culture to Spanish society at the start of the nineteenth century. It provided a window into viewing how political elites sought to fashion a new public image of sovereign power and the display of authority vested in high office.<sup>9</sup> There was no monarch present to oversee the festivities. Indeed, the honor bestowed upon Floridablanca by the ostentation of his burial came at the prompting of a government with no formal recognition to act in the name of a legitimate monarch. In fact, the rites of death accorded to Floridablanca served a political purpose. The burial ceremony and subsequent other actions discussed here served to legitimize the Central Junta by drawing attention to its respect for a man of impeccable loyalist credentials. In this way, the situation gave the Central Junta a momentous opportunity to profess a similar loyalty to the crown.

As president of the Central Junta, Floridablanca was the first leader of a representative, though still not elected, central government in Spain. Under the political regime established by the Junta Central, Floridablanca remained the subject of a king.

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<sup>9</sup> On the public image of the monarchy and its related rituals and ceremony, see María Carmen Fernández-Albéndiz, *Sevilla y la Monarquía. Las visitas reales en el siglo XIX* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2007); Agustín González-Enciso and Jesús María Usunáriz Garayona, eds. *Imagen del rey, imagen de los reinos. Las ceremonias públicas en la España Moderna, 1500-1814* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1999); and Javier Valera, *La muerte del Rey. El ceremonial funerario de la monarquía española, 1500-1885* (Madrid: Turner, 1990).

Although the Central Junta was effectively the product of a grassroots initiative meant to channel the legitimate will of the Spanish people at large, no popular elections were involved in the selection of its members. The regional *juntas* named individuals to join the Central Junta and these men maintained a firm loyalty to the legitimacy of Fernando VII. In the context of the Central Junta, Floridablanca signified a sort of *primus inter pares*, as the leader of the otherwise equal members of the Central Junta. Rather than festivities of a republican sort, the Central Junta intended to lavish royal treatment upon a man still, in technical terms, the subject of an absolute monarch.

Floridablanca was the ideal subject for such a purpose. In many ways, he was a symbol of the eighteenth century Enlightenment in the Spanish Monarchy. As a distinguished minister in the government of Carlos III, Floridablanca had experience overseeing the political affairs of the Spanish Monarchy at war. During this time, Floridablanca served alongside many political reformers and was considered an agent of good government.<sup>10</sup> In this respect, he was a perfect contrast to the deeply resented Manuel de Godoy.<sup>11</sup> In Murcia, it had been Floridablanca who, once drawn out of self-imposed seclusion in a Franciscan monastery, became head of the regional *junta* and organized the local response to the crisis.<sup>12</sup> Under the aegis of this octogenarian and

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<sup>10</sup> Shortly before reaching the age of forty, Moñino made a name for himself as a fierce advocate of the Bourbon assault on the Jesuit order, defending not only policy that led to the expulsion of the Jesuits and the expropriation of their properties by the Spanish state in 1767 but also securing the abolition of the order itself in 1773 while ambassador to the Vatican court. It was for the triumph in this regard that led Carlos III to grant Moñino the title of Count of Floridablanca that same year. His star continued to rise and by 1777 Carlos III named Floridablanca as his chief minister in Madrid, a position Floridablanca held for the remainder of the reign.

<sup>11</sup> It was widely know that Godoy had exiled Floridablanca from Madrid.

<sup>12</sup> Rafael Herrera-Guillén, "Introducción," in *Floridablanca en la guerra de la independencia*, Ed. Rafael Herrera Guillén (Murcia: Tres Fronteras Ediciones, 2008), 27.

former minister of state, whose association offered the new institution both legitimacy and considerable skill in matters of statecraft, a national resistance to the French occupation took concrete form. While the royal personage of Ferdinand VII provided the central cause around which to erect a national response to the French, from a more pragmatic standpoint it was Floridablanca who quickly came to embody the heart and soul of the movement. Furthermore, Floridablanca exemplified the dramatic success of a non-noble bureaucratic class that swelled the ranks of Spanish government during the eighteenth century. Although not of noble birth, Floridablanca was among the most loyal agents of the Bourbon crown and a defender of the principle that blood and birth determined access to royal status. Thus, Floridablanca provided the model example of an accomplished everyman whose loyalty to king and country could serve as a useful source of inspiration.

The unique ceremonial rites developed in response to the death of Floridablanca were not replicated in the dying years of the Old Regime. In part, this owed to the brief existence of the Central Junta. Floridablanca's successors as president of the Central Junta survived the demise of this regime and the Cortes did not involve itself in such ritual-making. Notably, the death of another former government minister, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos – secretary of the Central Junta's special committee charged with the task of calling the Cortes into session – was not afforded high honors in 1811. The rites developed for Floridablanca were indicative of the transitional character of the period in which the Central Junta governed over Western Andalusia. During this period, the precise relationship of figures like to Floridablanca to sovereign power and the will of king and people remained in a state of transition. The Central Junta's commemorative

response to the death of Floridablanca reflected a measured adaptation to an evolving political situation.

There was good cause to believe that the rites of death lavished on Floridablanca did not come at his own request. Floridablanca was not a liberal despite his involvement in the early stages of the national response to Napoleon's invasion. In realistic terms, it would be anachronistic to apply the term liberal to a political figure prior to the political battles of the Cortes that began in 1810. Floridablanca viewed himself as an agent of reform, but only in a limited and almost wholly economic capacity. Floridablanca was entrenched in the aristocratic elitism of late Old Regime Europe. He had no interest in systematic political or social upheaval, much less revolution. Floridablanca watched in abject horror as revolution in France threatened to breach the Pyrenees, and would very likely have been astonished to see himself praised in such a fashion.

From the very moment of his passing, commemorating the life of Floridablanca became a matter of public spectacle. As official records and the diary account of Félix González de León attest, early on 30 December the 45 bells of the Cathedral rang twice over. The bells of La Giralda were matched by the multitude of bells housed in the nearly thirty parish bell towers of Sevilla. Subsequently, volleys of canon fire echoed about the city throughout the day every quarter hour. For the residents of Sevilla, it quite nearly was impossible to overlook the passing of Floridablanca. All accounts read the same, the bells tolled to mark the death of a personage "as if he were an *Infante* of Spain."<sup>13</sup>

The immediate and frequent use of "infante" in a number of records raises many questions. Spanish dynastic houses recognized infantes as the legitimate heirs of a

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<sup>13</sup> "Como si fuera *Infante de España*." AMS, Section 14, *Crónica de Don Félix González de León*. Vol. IV, Book 9, 135.

reigning monarch. As such, the title was not purely honorific, but also signaled a legal claim to inherit the throne. Although in 1795 Carlos III had extended the title to the male grandchildren of a reigning monarch (deemed *infantes de gracia*), separate royal decrees were required in each instance and, as always, blood relation to the reigning monarch remained the essential *sin qua non* for consideration. The humble and non-royal blood origins of Floridablanca gave him no credible claim to the title without a significant reinterpretation of his political and social status. Despite this fact, it seems the decision to use this title was never seriously questioned. Furthermore, given the frequency in use of the phrase in various unofficial accounts, in all likelihood this special honor was of wide repute and likely a topic of considerable public discussion.

This apparent departure from tradition aside, in preparing to commemorate the death of Floridablanca, the Central Junta relied on a set of well-established customs. The Central Junta did not adopt the traditions of the Old Regime outright, but rather accepted a number of foregone conclusions regarding what was technically possible given existing circumstances. Official occasions, especially burial and funeral ceremonies posed a risk to public order. Only a matter of months prior to Floridablanca's death, a public riot before the *ayuntamiento* had declared the city's loyalty to the insurgent cause in what became later known as the "Holy Revolution" of Sevilla. In the aftermath of these events, the Junta of Sevilla had sought to restore public tranquility. Thus, the Central Junta invoked public sentiments at its own risk.

The Cathedral *cabildo*, situated at the head of the city's ecclesiastical community, provided events with religious validation. The Cathedral *cabildo* was called into extraordinary session by the Cathedral Treasurer to discuss the situation seemingly after

the immediate discovery of Floridablanca's death. The *cabildo* authorized the ringing of the Cathedral bells of La Giralda as though Floridablanca were "*como Ynfante de España*" expressing its desire that all secular and regular churches take similar efforts to match the Cathedral's display. Before adjourning, the group expressed its willingness to observe requests regarding the degree of pomp and format for the services determined by the Central Junta.<sup>14</sup> Later that day the *cabildo* was called into session once again to hear word that the Central Junta desired the greatest degree of ostentation possible to commemorate the passing of Floridablanca. In agreement, the *cabildo* set the start of the ceremony at ten in the morning the next day to follow regularly scheduled Saturday morning choir services, and commissioned the Cathedral workshop to begin dressing the interior of the church to receive mourners.<sup>15</sup>

The beginning of the burial rites mimicked long-standing royal tradition. In keeping with standard royal practices, Floridablanca's body was taken to lay beneath the elaborately decorated gilt ceiling of the Sala de Embajadores at the Real Alcázar.<sup>16</sup> In the wake of a fire in 1734 that consumed a golden salon located in the old royal palace of Madrid, the Bourbons had resorted to a number of alternatives. Upon the passing of Carlos III in 1788, the dead king had lain in the Salón de Embajadores at the new

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<sup>14</sup> "Yglesias del Clero Secular, y Regular se hiciese igual demonstracion, y q.e por lo relativo á Aparato, modo, y demas circunstancias con que debia celebrarse el funeral, se esperara la determinazion de S.M. la Junta Suprema, que trataba de este asunto segun se insinuó por dicho Señor Presidente." Biblioteca Colombina, ACS, Fondo Archivo Histórico Capitular, Secretaría, AC, Book 171 (1808), 96.

<sup>15</sup> "Quien lo juntó p.a oir oficio de la Suprema Junta Central, despues de Hora, en que dá cuenta S. M. del fallecim.to del Sr. Presidente de ella, y haber resuelto, q.e se celebrar sus honras y entierra en esta Santa Yglesia mañana 31 del corr.te á las 10 de la mañana, y q.e se lleve luto p.r 9 días. El cab.o acordó su cumplim.to mandado q.e el entierro sea mañana despues del Coro p.r la mañana con la mayor ostentacion q.e se hace en esta Santa Yglesia, dando Comision á los SS. de Fabrica y demas segun costumbre." Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Manuel Moreno Alonso, "Estudio Preliminar," in *El Alcázar de Sevilla en la Guerra de la Independencia. El Museo napoleónico*, Ed. Rocio Ferrín Paramo (Sevilla: Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2009), 42-43.

palace.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the placement of Floridablanca's body in the Sala de Embajadores at the Real Alcázar in Sevilla fits with an expedient attempt to follow existing custom.

Prior to the burial ceremony on the morning of Saturday 31 December 1808, an elaborate procession bore the body of the deceased from the Real Alcázar to the Cathedral. The processional ordering in this instance fitted with practices of the period despite obvious modifications. Diarist Félix González de León provided a vivid account:

There came forward an artillery squadron with its canons, followed by infantry troops before the cross of the archdiocese accompanied by two parish crosses ... Then the parish priests, the University of Beneficiados, two church canons from [the parish of] El Salvador, the ecclesiastical *cabildo* with all of its members, the presiding Lord Archbishop Co-Administrator dressed in the vestments of his rank. Behind came the body uncovered on its bier, directed by an honor guard flanked by four members of the Central Junta at each corner and surrounded by halbardiers and honor guards bearing arms, [followed still] by the coffin in which the burial would take place carried also by an honor guard. Then followed the Junta of Sevilla with bands of black over their carnelian vestments. And behind them the Central [Junta] ... Then the honor guard [once again], and finally two or three battalions of troops with music and flags.<sup>18</sup>

The formation and placement of the cortege followed convention and replicated the well-established tradition of public processions that were the hallmark of public life during the Old Regime, and in Sevilla. Upon entering the Cathedral by way of its main door – a significant occasion unto itself – the body was conducted to a raised platform described as higher than that used for Cathedral canons. At the transept, the secular *cabildo* of Sevilla and representatives of the Inquisition greeted the dignitaries of the *juntas*.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Javier Valera, *La muerte del Rey. El ceremonial funerario de la monarquía española, 1500-1885* (Madrid: Turner, 1990), 146.

<sup>18</sup> AMS, Section 14, Vol. IV, Book 9, 139-141.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

Throughout the events, ritual practices maintained a perfect balance between order, hierarchy, and religion.

Commemoration of Floridablanca did not end with the conclusion of a burial ceremony held in the Cathedral. Although the ceremony ran until two-fifteen in afternoon, other observances continued in the hours and days that followed. At its conclusion, dignitaries relocated to the Real Alcázar on foot and in a formation organized by the honor guard and halbardiers. Marking the formal conclusion to the event was a round of three gunshots and cannon fire issued for the final time after regular quarter hour intervals that had broken the public peace for a full day. Later in the day, the secular *cabildo* declared a mandatory mourning period of three months for all male heads of households.<sup>20</sup> In this way, ecclesiastical and secular figures worked together to commemorate the death of the Count in a public fashion.

Despite the apparent continuity of a number of customary practices associated with the Old Regime, Floridablanca's rites of death also included several novel elements. Foremost in this regard was the public manner in which ceremonial events unfolded. As Javier Valera has noted, the early nineteenth century coincided with the arrival of a distinctly new trend in the world of public funerals. Rites of death transformed from mostly private affairs into public celebrations of patriotic heroism. These gained in popularity as Spaniards attempted to mark the anniversaries of the "*Dos de Mayo*" rising during and after the War of Independence.<sup>21</sup> Event organizers tended to create a somber experience to accompany the death and burial of Floridablanca, but it also held an

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 143-5.

<sup>21</sup> Valera, 180-183.



important instructive quality for contemporary elites intent to foster a notion of patriotic heroism and model behavior. Holding a public ceremony allowed the Central Junta to model ideal behavior. Floridablanca's sense of devotion to king, country and the task of government served as an instructive model of patriotism.

As a symbol of the ideal patriot, praise of Floridablanca cut to the heart of an unresolved tension over the idea of patriotism produced in the wake of the crisis of sovereignty. On the one hand, political elites active at the central and regional levels of government framed patriotism as defense of the Spanish nation. In this sense, the idea of the patria was synonymous with a conceptualization of the Spanish nation as a geographically expansive social unit. This idea was ultimately enshrined in the Constitution of Cádiz. On the other hand, local political elites appear to have favored a more particularistic sentiment that limited the concept of patria to the more immediate patria chica. Floridablanca was unique in that his comportment at various points after the initial rising fit the patriotic ideal favored by each side. Floridablanca first rose in political prominence as a leader of the Spanish resistance from his native home of Murcia. However, the Central Junta downplayed this fact, preferring instead to stress Floridablanca's legacy as the leader of the central, and presumably national, government. Thus, the Central Junta advanced an ideal of the true patriot as an individual who placed loyalty to supralocal concerns above those of a purely local sort.

The process of solidifying the myth of Floridablanca in the popular imagination began almost immediately at the conclusion of the burial ceremony. Following the burial ceremony of 31 December, the Central Junta placed a lengthy epitaph on Floridablanca's

sepulchral monument.<sup>22</sup> To draft its thoughts into expressive Latin, the Central Junta recruited Agustín Muñoz Álvarez, a local professor of classics at the University of Sevilla. The Latin inscription commemorated a “wise old man,” who was, it insisted, “quietly, by the singular providence of God, to deliver Spain from ruin at the time of danger.”<sup>23</sup> The use of Spain in this context clearly linked Floridablanca with the Spanish Monarchy as a whole and distanced patriotic associations with his memory from anything remotely local. The epitaph further argued the presidency was bestowed upon Floridablanca “by the unanimous suffrage of fellow citizens [to secure] salvation for the country and to restore freedom for Ferdinand VII.”<sup>24</sup> At no point did the Spanish directly elect Floridablanca to high office; it was the members of the Central Junta who performed this task. However, such a turn of phrase served to defend the democratic pretensions of the Central Junta, thereby adding yet another veneer of legitimacy to an otherwise tenuous regime.

The process of entrenching the myth of Floridablanca continued through a mix of additional ceremony and prose. A *túmulo* was erected within the Cathedral,<sup>25</sup> and funeral honors were held for the deceased on 20 and 21 January with ostentation set to match that of the burial ceremony.<sup>26</sup> The day following the completion of Floridablanca’s second

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<sup>22</sup> José Moñino y Redondo, *Obras originales del Conde de Floridablanca y escritos referentes a su persona*, ed. Antonio Ferrer del Río (Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, 1867), 515.

<sup>23</sup> AMS, Section 14, Vol. IV, Book 9, 145.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> See Alfredo J. Morales, “Las honras fúnebres por Floridablanca en Sevilla y el túmulo proyectado por Cayetano Vélez,” *Boletín de la Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando* 73 (1991): 181-90.

<sup>26</sup> “El mismo aparato que el funeral.” ACS, AC, Book 172, 3.

round of honors, the Central Junta commissioned native Sevillian polymath Alberto Lista y Aragón to write a eulogy for Floridablanca. Lista's name was put forward by Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos,<sup>27</sup> who likely secured the sum of one hundred doubloons out of the Central Junta's accounts for payment.<sup>28</sup>

First published in 1809, the *Elogio histórico* written by Lista was a great deal more than simple eulogy. The *Elogio* portrayed Floridablanca as an ideal public servant, motivated by unbending loyalty to the crown and directed in every action by a constant devotion to the law of God.<sup>29</sup> According to the *Elogio*, it was Floridablanca who offered the path to an "enlightened patriotism." Floridablanca role in creating the Central Junta marked the first time "forever memorable in the annals of humankind that sovereignty passed without complaint" from the *juntas* to a central government, "now the sole depository of public authority."<sup>30</sup> To follow Lista's presentation of historical events, true patriotism stemmed from a willingness to suspend localist sentiments in the service of a

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<sup>27</sup> Gaspar de Jovellanos, "Elogio al conde de Floridablanca. 22 de enero de 1809," in *Floridablanca en la guerra de la independencia*, Ed. Rafael Herrera-Guillén (Murcia: Tres Fronteras Ediciones, 2008), 116-7.

<sup>28</sup> "Sobre el elogio del conde de Floridablanca. 22 de enero de 1809," in *Floridablanca en la guerra de la independencia*, Ed. Rafael Herrera Guillén (Murcia: Tres Fronteras Ediciones, 2008), 117-8.

<sup>29</sup> "Floridablanca, si bien gozaba como filósofo cristiano en el retiro de su patria las dulzuras de la vida domestica y los testimonios lisongeros de una conciencia no mencionada, lloraba empero como buen patriota los males que sus conciudadanos padecian, y los males que les amenazaban...Léjos de los negocios, léjos de las ilusiones engañadoras de la ambicion, desplega toda la dulzura y amabilidad de su carácter, así como ántes habia manifestado toda la energia de su genio. Sencillo y frugal en su trato, dotado de toda la prodigalidad de una beneficencia activa, amable á los que le rodeaban y humilde adorador del Dios, cuya santa ley habia moderado constantemente su conducta." Lista, 22-3.

<sup>30</sup> "¡Gloria sin fin á Floridablanca y á las sabias juntas que supieron reunir todos los partidos y someter todas las opiniones al yugo de su ilustrado patriotismo! ... En aquel instante, por siempre memorable en los anales de genero humano, pasó la soberanía, sin quejas, sin reclamaciones, sin turbulencias, de las juntas que tan gloriosamente la habian exercido á la Suprema gubernativa, único deposito ya de la autoridad pública y de las esperanzas de la nacion. No hay exemplo en la historia de igual revolucion: no hay pueblo alguno, en que se hubiera realizado con tan grande tranquilidad." *Ibid.*, 32.

greater good. This served to validate both the Central Junta and the men behind its creation. Floridablanca died, it argued, “but the memory of the good that the nation owes to him never will die. He died, but the example of his character to the government and the Spanish people will endure eternally.”<sup>31</sup> In this way, Lista framed Floridablanca as a hero, even savior of the patriotic cause. Such was the message of this farewell to a man whose passions in life were not the subject of public appeal. The *Elogio histórico* represented a significant investment on the part of the Central Junta toward the creation of a myth around the memory of Floridablanca.

In framing the myth of Floridablanca, the Central Junta used religious and royal motifs that supported its claim to legitimacy. Working in cooperation with religious authorities, the Central Junta advanced an image of Floridablanca as a kind of saint. This was apparent in terms of the reverence exercised during Floridablanca’s burial ceremony. However, the Central Junta’s later decision to mythologize Floridablanca in prose as the savior of the national resistance replicated the process whereby local communities worked towards the beatification of Catholic saints.<sup>32</sup> This exceptionally public attempt to foster an image of civic sainthood did not rely solely on the symbolism of religion. It was buttressed by royal motifs that linked divinity and kingship.

Royal motifs accorded kingly status to Floridablanca. Situating Floridablanca as the equivalent of a Bourbon king allowed the Central Junta to stress its legitimacy in other ways. The Central Junta effectively used Floridablanca as a substitute for Fernando

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<sup>31</sup> “Murió; pero la memoria de los beneficios que la nación le debe, no morirá jamás. Murió: pero el impulso comunicado por su genio al gobierno y pueblos español se conservará eternamente.” *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>32</sup> An excellent example of this tradition can be found in Daniel Harlan Max Berenberg, “Patrons and Petitioners: Evolution of Saint Cults and the Formation of a Local Religious Culture in Early Modern Sevilla,” PhD Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2005.

VII and made use of this switch to offer public displays of its loyalty to the monarchy as an institution. This deflected attention away from the fact that the monarchy had never sanctioned the Central Junta and would never have consented to its existence as a sovereign entity. The use of the title infante has been mentioned already. This practice began early after Floridablanca's death and appears to have continued to his internment. In fact, ecclesiastical officials in Sevilla conceded to the burial of Floridablanca in the Royal Chapel of the Cathedral. The Royal Chapel housed the remains of Ferdinand III (Saint Ferdinand) – Sevilla's medieval liberator and patron saint – and those of Alfonso X. While the Cathedral contained the tombs of many illustrious figures, only the Royal Chapel had been accorded the special distinction of being a repository for persons of royal blood. The Royal Chapel linked a man not born of royal blood to two exemplary kings by mere proximity, thereby alluding to the permanence of his royal status. Thus, in this absence of Fernando VII, the Central Junta created a person worthy of worship as a king.

Ultimately, the rites of death and commemorative practices enacted to mark the death and burial of Floridablanca offer a window into understanding the complex political situation in Spain during the winter of 1808-09. Unable to call upon the person of king directly to invoke its legitimate claim to rule on his behalf, the Central Junta and its supporters nonetheless made careful and studied use of tradition to secure their position within the political cosmos of Sevilla and a nation at war. Absent from this dynamic was the role of a legitimate sovereign body, played by the Cortes between 1810 and 1814. The elevation of Floridablanca to the rank of infante suggested of the early triumph of what would later become a liberal mission – rooted in the Constitution of

Cádiz – to displace the exclusive right of Bourbon blood to dictate the terms of political legitimacy. To what extent the wider public bought the image of Floridablanca as a saintly embodiment of the patriotic cause remains unclear. Political figures in this instance were content to have the public play the role of spectator to political events. In later periods, the public would advance from sidewalk and church pews to play a more active role in public ritual and thereby take an active part in the political life of their community.

#### RITUAL CULTURE DURING THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

With the end of the French occupation and the promulgation of the Constitution of Cádiz in 1812, a corresponding drive towards legitimization for the new political regime, evident in the ritual culture of the period, opened a new phase in the political history of Western Andalusia. During this time, the basic tenets of constitutional rule were actively imparted to the citizenry at large often through use of ritual culture. Political elites at all levels of government understood the utility of ritual culture as a medium to spread awareness of the Constitution of Cádiz and its legal prescriptions. This mindset fit with the behavior of Central Junta's leadership in 1808 when it used public ritual to commemorate the death of Floridablanca. Nonetheless, the First Constitutional Period signaled a new stage in the history of ritual culture in Sevilla. During this period, political elites sought to engage the public more actively in the celebration of public festivals. Because of the efforts launched by political elites in this regard, the people of Sevilla transitioned from spectators to participants of ritual culture.

During the First Constitutional Period, Western Andalusia enjoyed the implementation of the legal framework put into force by the Constitution of Cádiz longer than any other region of peninsular Spain. The Cortes of Cádiz had promulgated the Constitution in March 1812; only a few months later, at the time of the capture of Sevilla, the constitutional regime was still in its infancy. The manner in which the people of Sevilla responded to the Constitution of Cádiz figured into a continuum of responses experienced throughout peninsular Spain that closely matched their time of exposure to the constitutional regime. In Vizcaya and other parts of the Basque Country, the Constitution met with a cold reception. As Renato Barahona argued, “Not only was there much confusion over what it signified but, more importantly, there was a marked unwillingness—even among some of the more forward-looking minds—to break with tradition and established forms of government.”<sup>33</sup> Reception of the Constitution and the accompanying constitutional regime in Valencia provides a stark contrast to that of Vizcaya. The urban and rural populations of the Spanish Levant enthusiastically received the constitutional regime.<sup>34</sup> Similarly, in Galicia the general response was a positive

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<sup>33</sup> An end of the French occupation of the Basque Country came in the spring of 1813. The Cortes did not name a *diputación provincial* for Vizcaya until 28 September 1813 – almost precisely one year after the liberation of Sevilla – though Barahona notes that this institution remained inactive through at least the fall of that year. French occupation of the Basque Country was comparatively much longer than that of Western Andalusia, having originated as early as 1808 in some areas. Support for the constitutional regime in Vizcaya appears to have been limited to a small coterie linked to publication of the local periodical *El Bascongado*. See Renato Barahona, *Vizcaya on the Eve of Carlism: Politics and Society, 1800-1833* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1989), 29. See also José Portillo Valdés, *Los poderes locales en la formación del régimen foral: Guipúzcoa, 1812-1850* (Bilbao: Servicio Editorial Universidad del País Vasco, 1987); and *Monarquía y gobierno provincial: poder y constitución en las provincias vascas, 1760-1808* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1991).

<sup>34</sup> Valencia and its surrounding countryside underwent French occupation for a far shorter time than elsewhere on the peninsula. A spectrum of Valencians, from political elites to rural bandits and their largely peasant-based retinue, were eager defenders of their region and quick converts to constitutionalism. See Manuel Ardit Lucas, *Revolución liberal y revuelta campesina. Un ensayo sobre la desintegración del régimen feudal en el País Valenciano, 1793-1840* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1977), 211-212; and Scott

one.<sup>35</sup> In both of these places, the Constitution of Cádiz was in force longer than in the Basque Country. Still neither Valencia nor Galicia experienced longer periods of rule under Constitution of Cádiz than did Western Andalusia.

The framers of the Constitution of Cádiz appreciated the role of public ritual following from religious example in verifying the legitimacy of political actions. This tradition was inherited from the political culture of the Old Regime, which utilized ceremony and ritual as a means to mark key transitional moments in the political life of the monarchy. These moments included royal births and deaths, abdications and accessions, marriages, and so on. During the French occupation, this practice continued with regular commemorations of moments in the life of José I and the Emperor Napoleon. Festivals were not limited to large cities like Sevilla. The municipal records of Marchena attest to the fact that festivals were planned to commemorate the wedding anniversary of the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Maria Luisa in 1810, while the town marked Napoleon's saint day in 1812.<sup>36</sup> Events included bullfights, dancing, public games such as *cucañas*, and the disbursement of wine to the troops and bread to the poor.<sup>37</sup>

The pairing of civic and religious forms of commemoration was an important means of promoting the regime's essential legitimizing precondition, its link to divinity.

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Eastman, *Preaching Spanish Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759-1823* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012), 62-64.

<sup>35</sup> José Barreiro-Fernández, *Historia Social de la Guerra de la Independencia en Galicia* (Vigo: Edicións Xerais de Galicia, 2009).

<sup>36</sup> AMM, legajos 793 and 1713.

<sup>37</sup> *Cucañas* refers to a competition that involved climbing a greased pole. Manuel Antonio Ramos-Suárez, *El Patrimonio Cultural de Marchena y la ocupación Napoleónica* (Marchena: Ayuntamiento de Marchena, 1999), 37.



The constitutional regime recognized the centrality of religion to Spanish society and made provisions for religious practices to coincide with political events. These included to the celebration of key moments in the political life of citizens. Ceremonies included formal acts of oath-swearing, balloting during elections, and the investiture of new municipal officers.<sup>38</sup> Under the Old Regime, municipal officers were required to swear oaths of loyalty to the crown. Of course, public elections dated to the municipal reforms of 1766. These were not, then, altogether new practices. However, with the advent of the constitutional regime, many ceremonies were held in public and planned to coincide with a religious ritual of some kind. In this regard the heavily secularized oath-swearing ceremonies of the French occupational regime might have set an important precedent. The Spanish constitutional regime invoked a more religious dimension to its celebrations. The traditional Catholic mass was the most common form of religious ritual, but also quite common was the practice of signing of a *Te Deum laudamus*, or hymn of praise.<sup>39</sup> Upon departure of the French in Marchena, one of the very first actions organized by the town council was a special thanksgiving mass and *Te Deum* scheduled in the parish church of San Juan.<sup>40</sup>

The constitutional oath-swearing ceremonies held in Sevilla merged civic pride with the practice of religious faith. On 12 September 1808, the provisional secular and ecclesiastical *cabildos* of Sevilla swore oaths of loyalty to the Constitution of Cádiz. The

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<sup>38</sup> On oath-swearing in the Constitution of Cádiz, see Articles 117, 131, 173, 195, 212, 241, 279, 291, 337, 374; on elections; on investiture, see 117.

<sup>39</sup> The reference to *Te Deum* masses appears in Article 58; Catholic masses were mandated under Articles 47, 48, 71, and 86.

<sup>40</sup> AMM, AC, Book 21 (1806-1814), session dated 2 September 1812.

secular *cabildo* took this oath in its chambers at the *ayuntamiento* before joining its ecclesiastical counterpart at the Cathedral.<sup>41</sup> This practice replicated longstanding tradition, as oath-swearing ceremonies were common to the inaugural rituals held in accordance with the appointment of new municipal officers. Such ceremonies were traditionally accompanied by words of blessing from local religious officials. Throughout the Old Regime, these ceremonies were essentially private and held behind closed doors in the chambers of the city hall.

A significant break with the practices of the Old Regime came one day after the private oath-swearing ceremonies held by the secular and ecclesiastical *cabildos* when, as prescribed by the Constitution, political elites facilitated a second, public oath-swearing ceremony during the regular Sunday mass held in the Cathedral. “In this manner,” political elites provided “that all classes of people should take an oath” of loyalty to the new Constitution.<sup>42</sup> This event included a formal reading of the Constitution by Ventura Ruíz Huidobro, the secretary of the secular *cabildo*. Following this reading, Cathedral canon Nicolás Maestre “delivered a short sermon exhorting the people that they might admit themselves with zeal to the new Constitution.”<sup>43</sup>

Those persons present in the Cathedral were invited not merely to witness local recognition of the Constitution of Cádiz, but also to participate in the creation of a new political regime. Following Maestre’s sermon, the president of the *ayuntamiento*, Manuel

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<sup>41</sup> Vázquez y Sánchez, 142.

<sup>42</sup> “*De este modo para que la jurasen todas las clases del pueblo.*” AMS, Section 14, *Crónica*, Book 12, 13 September 1812.

<sup>43</sup> “*Dixo un corto discurso exhortando al pueblo a que admitiese gustoso la nueva constitucion.*” Ibid.

Fernando Ruíz del Burgo, “said in a loud voice [to the people assembled] ... ‘Do you swear to keep and observe the new political constitution published by the Regency and sanctioned by the general Cortes that you have just heard presented to you?’” The people responded: “Yes, we swear.” Ruiz del Burgo continued, “Do you swear to know and defend your King, the Lord Sir Fernando VII?” Again, the people responded: “Yes, we swear.” In this way, the people of Sevilla present in the Cathedral professed their allegiance to the constitutional regime. This act validated the idea that the Cortes could not simply impose the new constitutional regime from above but rather had to secure the consent of the governed. As with a traditional Catholic mass, this ritualized event included music. Indeed, the singing of a *Te Deum* concluded the ceremony, bringing together individual voices once again in a common profession of faith.<sup>44</sup>

The performance of longstanding ceremonial practices and ritual played an important role in verifying the legitimacy of the new regime. Upon hearing of Godoy’s fall from grace in 1808, townsfolk of Sevilla had organized an impromptu celebratory procession that had culminated in the destruction of his image placed in the church of San Juan de Dios.<sup>45</sup> Processional culture in Sevilla remained a focal point of public interactions during the First Constitutional Period. These included both traditional religious processions but also extended to more civic-minded efforts. With the latter, the use of religious elements remained of apparent importance. The Cathedral and other

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<sup>44</sup> “*Dixo en alta voz ... ¿Jurais guardar y observar la nueva Constitucion política publicada por la Regencia y sancionada por las Cortes generales que se os acaba de haver presente? A los que respondió el Pueblo, y el Clero Si juramos. Despues bolvio a preguntar, ¿Jurais conocer y defender a vuestro Rey, el S.<sup>or</sup> D.<sup>n</sup> Fernando 7.<sup>o</sup>? y respondió Clero y Pueblo, Si juramos. Ynmediatamente se entono y canto el Te Deum ... con lo que se concluyo este acto.*” Underlining appears in the original. Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> See chapter 3.

religious buildings often figured as stopping point or end destination of such processions. Religious elements also extended to more incidental practices including the use of *ciriales*, metal staffs for the carrying of large candles. In other instances, such seemingly incidental behavior originated out of genuine political intent. To give one example, the practice of hanging portraits of political leaders behind key altars in the city remained a popular means of validating political authority. The opportune use of Fernando VII's portrait served to add a certain degree of authenticity to the political nature of public gatherings during the First Constitutional Period.

New practices focused on situating the Constitution in place of the king as heart of the regime. Designation of public spaces as “of the Constitution” was central to the ceremonies of the constitutional regime. The central square of most towns was renamed *plaza de la Constitución*, as was the case in Sevilla where the Plaza of Saint Ferdinand lost the appellation of the city's patron saint. The squares found in Spanish towns, especially the largest and most central among them, were integral to the fashioning of civic identity.<sup>46</sup> This act was solemnized by the placement of a plaque to commemorate the change. In many towns, major thoroughfares were also renamed to commemorate the Constitution of Cádiz. In Sevilla, the city government renamed *calle Génova* as *calle de la Constitución*. This act linked the city's principal civic space, formerly the Plaza of Saint Ferdinand, with the main door of the Cathedral, thereby presenting written law as the essential link between the civic and the religious. Although implicit, this act imperiled the position of the monarchy, which had historically served as the glue that bound the civic and the religious together.

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<sup>46</sup> Jesús Escobar, *The Plaza Mayor and the Shaping of Baroque Madrid* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Political elites did a great deal to fashion a ritual culture at odds with absolutism during the First Constitutional Period. They were aided by the inheritance of a ritual culture in Western Andalusia. Political elites celebrated the advent of constitutional rule in public fashion as a major achievement for the people of Spain. At the same time this meant invalidating centuries of absolutism by constantly stressing the potential for unlimited monarchy to deteriorate into despotism. Although Fernando VII remained at the head of what was nominally a constitutional monarchy, the royal person was simply not a symbol of the regime in the same way as the Constitution. Sizeable celebrations were not held to commemorate the accession of Fernando VII, his birth date or other significant moments in the life of the king. This changed with the return of absolutism in the 1814 when anti-constitutionalist elites reconstructed a ritual culture around the figure of Fernando VII.

#### ABSOLUTISM RESTORED FROM BELOW

The return of Fernando VII from France and the subsequent restoration of absolutism in 1814 signaled a new stage in the evolution of ritual culture. The restored regime of Fernando VII endeavored to roll back the political changes adopted by the Cortes and pretended not to acknowledge the tremendous influence of political ideas introduced during the previous months. In this contest, a fissure emerged between constitutionalists who supported the preservation of the prevailing regime and conservatives who supported the return of absolutism. In Sevilla, as elsewhere throughout peninsular Spain, processions and festivals assisted in the return to a political culture that celebrated the reigning monarch. This reassertion of royal authority called attention to the

merits of Fernando VII and the Bourbon monarchy in an attempt to delegitimize the Constitution of Cádiz, which had enjoyed a privileged place in the ritual culture of the First Constitutional Period. Significantly, social elites played a diminished role in this process, as new leaders, emboldened by the experience of participating in the ritual culture of the constitutional regime, stepped to the fore as organizers.

Ritual culture facilitated the restoration of absolutism at the outset of Fernando VII's return from French exile. On 3 April 1814, when word reached Sevilla of Fernando VII's return to Spain, regulars and self-proclaimed "patriots" of one café on Sierpes Street drew parallels with the timing of his return and the celebration of Palm Sunday set for the same day.<sup>47</sup> From among the crowd present at the café, they named representatives to write Fernando VII congratulating him on his return and invited others present to affix their signatures in a testament of loyalty. "Let us give a testament of our joy," read the document, "and let us offer to the public those demonstrations owed: music, toasts, and all kinds of amusement analogous to such great satisfaction, which will be our occupation in these days so pleasant."<sup>48</sup> Public ritual was viewed as a means to mark the transition. Indeed, in a related vein, efforts to inculcate the figure of the king as the new symbolic focal point of an alternative regime began almost immediately. The following evening, representatives of the café were sent to congratulate known patriots and even passers-by to draw an even larger crowd than the night before, one which celebrated "The King, *Patria* y Religion" and several generals associated with the Allied

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<sup>47</sup> *Los Patriotas del café de la calle fe la Sierpe por Fernando VII* (Sevilla: Imprenta del Setabiense, 1814), 1.

<sup>48</sup> "Demos pues un testimonio de nuestra alegría, y hagamos la pública con aquellas demostraciones que la designen, musicas, brindis, y toda clase de diversiones analogas á tan gran satisfaccion, será nuestra ocupacion en estos dias tan placenteros." Ibid.

victory, including Wellington.<sup>49</sup> The members of this cohort assert they offered toasts to Nicolás Tap y Nuñez, the famed “El Incognito” of the revolution of 1808 and somewhat of a royalist folk hero, and others, amid shouts of “Viva!” to Fernando VII, raised hats and handkerchiefs, and “tears of the purest happiness, which bathed the cheeks of loyal Sevillian Spaniards.” In a privileged place within the venue hung a portrait of Fernando VII, flanked on one side by a band and protected on the other by a guard of the Royal Artillery Corps.<sup>50</sup>

The political machinations of elites in Madrid followed local displays of faith and loyalty to the person of Fernando VII. A few days after word of the king’s return, sixty-nine deputies of the Cortes issued the so-called “Manifesto of the Persians,” calling for the return of absolutism.<sup>51</sup> The document was to prove the death knell of the constitutional regime. The author of the document, the Sevillian Bernardo Mozo de Rosales, focused on the ills of ministerial despotism, responsible in his mind for the corruption of a monarchy already limited by divine law, justice, and the fundamental laws of the state.<sup>52</sup> He argued that it had been the despotism of enlightened minds that led directly to the Constitution of Cádiz. In this way, Mozo de Rosales deployed a rhetorical

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<sup>49</sup> “*El Rey, Patria y Religion.*” Ibid, 1-2.

<sup>50</sup> “*Las lagrimas de la mas pura alegria, bañaban las mejillas de los leales españoles sevillanos.*” Ibid, 2.

<sup>51</sup> Although the Manifiesto called for an end to the constitutional regime, it is possible to read the document as voicing support for a limited monarchy. Regardless, it was used to justify a return to pure absolutism. It was so named because of a supposed tradition among the Persian ruling elite to leave the country in a state of mournful uncertainty following the death of a monarch. A mandatory three day waiting period was said to follow before the proclamation of a successor. The total number of deputies stood at 184.

<sup>52</sup> Bernardo Mozo de Rosales, *Representacion y manifiesto que alguno diputados á las Cortes ordinarias firmaron en los mayores apuros de su opresion en Madrid, para que la Majesdtad del Señor D. Fernando el VII* (Madrid: Imprenta de Coleado, 1814).

narrative stressing the decline of Spanish government into a state of despotism to discredit the constitutionalist regime much as enemies of Godoy had done several years earlier. In the following days and months, the supporters of Fernando VII utilized ritual culture to legitimize yet a new regime.

Sevilla offers an excellent example of how political organizers used public ritual in mobilizing support for the *coup d'état* that brought down the constitutional regime at the local level. On 6 May 1814, revolution came to Sevilla once more. Intentionally or otherwise, conspirators appear to have followed closely the repertoire of the political transition seen years earlier. According to Félix González de León, the coup began with a disturbance in the Cafe of The Patriots on Génova Street, the main artery running between city hall and the main entrance to the Cathedral.<sup>53</sup> Drawn by regulars of the Cafe, a crowd gathered extending northward to fill the Plaza of San Francisco. In a state of seeming celebration, the crowd stormed city hall to remove the plaque commemorating the anniversary of the constitution, setting it on fire and breaking it. From this moment, we are told the crowd began to shout “*Muera la constitution! Viva Fernando VII! Viva la Inquisición! Mueran los liberales!*” Much as they did six years earlier, the crowd then dispersed into bands which ran through the city collecting arms and more men. Before the Comedy Theater in the Plaza del Duque, one band awaited the end of the evening’s performance before taking the portrait of Fernando VII that hung there. From the Plaza del Duque, this band carried the portrait to the Plaza de San

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<sup>53</sup> The account offered by Francisco de Saavedra recounts a more ominous beginning: “Y, desde la caída de la tarde se empiezan a notar síntomas de motín, o si se quiere una efervescencia del pueblo que amenaza desordenes. Los muchachos, que son en este caso el botafuego, se juntan, y dan vivas a Fernando VII y mueras a la Constitución.” Francisco de Saavedra, *Memorias inéditas de un ministro ilustrado*, trans. Manuel Moreno Alonso (Sevilla: Editorial Castillejo, 1992), 259.



Francisco in a formal procession headed by the town's former Alferes mayor bearing a standard.<sup>54</sup> Upon entering the parish of San Miguel, the parish church sounded its bells, and, in turn, was met with those of the other urban parishes. Eventually the procession wound its way back into the heart of the city.

A large crowd had assembled in the Plaza of San Francisco between the Royal Audiencia and the city hall. In the formal meeting chambers of city hall, beneath the portrait of Fernando VII,<sup>55</sup> the members of the city's *cabildo* of 1808 reconvened for the first time in six years, thereby restoring the absolutist order in Sevilla. Before a large crowd gathered in the square below and from the gallery of city hall, Joaquín de Goyeneta, the very man who negotiated the surrender of Sevilla in 1810 was declared Royal Asistente of Sevilla by popular acclaim.<sup>56</sup> This public act gave the new government a mandate to engage in more thorough reforms. Calling upon the people to express their desires and concerns, Goyeneta heard public requests for the restoration of the Inquisition, the religious communities, the law courts, *empleados*, and other remnants of the old regime, whereupon representatives of these institutions were called to city hall in order to receive authorization for their reappointment. Before concluding for the evening, Goyeneta dispatched a delegation to the king to tell of events in the Andalusian

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<sup>54</sup> According to Francisco de Saavedra, at roughly the same point in the evening, another band numbering 300 people woke the former president of the Junta of Sevilla from his bed and accompanied him by torchlight to the Plaza of San Francisco. The group insisted that they carry him in an improvised litter of some kind (*una silla de baqueta*). He succeeded in convincing that band that he could walk of his own volition. *Ibid.*, 261.

<sup>55</sup> González de León does not attest to what became of the painting, but Saavedra offers a first-hand account from within the meeting chambers of city hall. *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> Goyeneta likely was selected by elites conspiring to bring down the constitutional government well in advance of the rising. However, historical accounts like that offered by González de León suggest that public backing served to legitimize the move and gave conspirators political cover without which the evening's events might have been overturned.

capital. The decision was met with many happy shouts of “*Viva*” and at one in the morning participants returned home without considerable disorder.<sup>57</sup>

Once again, as had been the case during the First Constitutional period, elites performed a political transition, which was validated, in turn, by a public outpouring of support. Nobody residing within the city could have ignored the events as they transpired. González de León notes that in addition to the noise of the crowds and the cacophony of the parish bells that the city was well lit with spontaneous illuminations and decorated with many attractive hangings. The only hint of a negative reception among some quarters was a delay in the ringing of the bells housed in La Giralda. These lagged behind the bells of the parish churches. As had been the case in 1808 at the announcement of Floridablanca’s passing, the bells of La Giralda typically led those of the parish churches. Although González de León states that revelers gained entry to the Cathedral without force, this incident might suggest that some quarter of the city’s religious establishment objected to the overthrow of the constitutional regime.

Conspirators worked to frame the rising as a spontaneous act of popular will. Saavedra suggested that conspirators assuaged dissenters with money: “accomplices walked through the neighborhoods distributing money to win those persons that shouted out against the new government and even against the King.”<sup>58</sup> If this was true, it suggests that anti-constitutionalists were not confident in their control of the situation. Public ritual, like the very public appointment of Goyeneta as Asistente of Sevilla in the renamed Royal Plaza of Fernando VII, was then likely another tool in the arsenal of

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<sup>57</sup> *Crónica de Don Félix González de León*, AMS, Section 14, *Crónica*, Vol. VII, Book 15 (6 May 1814), 43-47.

<sup>58</sup> Saavedra, 263.

political options deployed by the anti-constitutionalists used to intimidate defenders of the constitutional regime into a state of reluctant complicity with the mob.

Other ritual acts employed by the anti-constitutionalists displayed a more menacing character in the variety of political tactics employed by conspirators. Saavedra noted that a band of revelers came to his residence after burning copies of the Constitution in the Royal Plaza of Fernando VII. In an interesting overlap with what happened during the transition of 1808, they were preceded by “bands [of musicians which] ran about the city with tambourines, drums, and guitars.”<sup>59</sup> The experience unnerved Saavedra somewhat. Rather frankly, he recounted that he was not robbed, this potentially menacing band having succumbed instead to “joy and bacchanalia.”<sup>60</sup> A subtle form of political coercion, such a turn of events also fit nicely into early narratives of the transition of 1814, which stressed the spontaneous character of events. Nonetheless, the Constitution was not easy to duplicate and an abundance of printed copies spoke to the degree of planning involved. The presence of other ritual elements, like a portrait of the king, further attested to the planned character of events.

Whether by painting or living embodiment, participants appear keen to have manifested the symbolic connection of the king to their political undertaking. The prominent placement of the king’s portrait in ritualistic settings was a popular convention of the Old Regime. The virtual presence of the king lent ritual activities a sense of legitimacy. Meanwhile, the proclamation of Goyeneta as the official representative of the king from the most visible place in the city’s foremost civic space underlines the

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 262.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 263.

ritualistic importance of the king's presence. Indeed, there was also an important religious element connected to the person of the king. So reviled was the constitutional plaque that its replacement by a new stone bearing the words "Royal Plaza of Fernando VII" was commemorated in poetry. As the author of this poem explained, the new plaque served to consecrate a "profaned spot."<sup>61</sup> Events appear to have transpired in similar fashion in smaller towns.<sup>62</sup>

A similar pattern of behavior appears to have been common throughout all of Andalusia. In neighboring Granada, revolution broke out on 17 May 1814, likely provoked by Old Regime civil servants, nobles, and clergy members. Unrest several days earlier that threatened to tear down the constitutional plaque in the central Plaza of Bibarrambla had been averted by the jefe político. However, as events unfolded on the 17th, the pattern looked strikingly similar to that in Sevilla. At sunrise, a crowd gathered in the Plaza del Triunfo carrying a portrait of Fernando VII. The members of the old

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<sup>61</sup> Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE), R/60258(23), "*Al ver colocada la nueva los en la Plaza de San Francisco de Sevilla, con la inscripcion PLAZA REAL DE FERNANDO VII en lugar de la que decia Plaza de la Constitucion, dixo un forastero el siguiente:*"

SONETO.

Lápida celestial, piedra divina  
te apellida gustoso un *Gaditano*  
que admira en tu inscripcion de Dios la mano,

y en tu colocacion *lealtad muy fina*:

El influxo del cielo es quien inclina  
a tal empresa, al pueblo SEVILLANO,  
para que grabe en ti del SOBERANO  
el nombre augusto que lo patrocina.

SEVILLA en ti consagra un monumento  
que por siempre eternice su memoria  
y purifique el sitio profanado,  
Mudando de esta plaza en un momento  
el titulo afrentoso que su gloria  
habia obscurecido y degradado.

SONNET.

Celestial plaque, divine stone  
pleasingly calls you a native of Cádiz  
who admires in your inscription the hand  
of God,

and in your placement a very fine loyalty;  
The intercession of heaven is who inclined  
in this business, to the people of Sevilla,  
that they see in you, the Sovereign,  
the august name that deserves it.

Sevilla consecrates a monument to you  
that will forever preserve your memory  
and purify this profaned spot.  
Removing from this plaza in a moment  
the outrageous insult to your glory  
that had obscured y degraded.

<sup>62</sup> In Marchena, plaques were swapped on 14 May 1814, one week after the events described in Sevilla. AMM, Book 21, session dated 14 May 1814.

*ayuntamiento* were called to present themselves and upon doing so reestablished the pre-constitutional regime. Here too a member of the old guard was called to lead the restoration by popular acclaim. Following a Te Deum mass at the church of Our Lady of Las Angustias, a crowd gathered once again in the Plaza of Bibarrambla, successful this time in its determination to tear down the commemorative constitutional plaque. A canvas with the royal arms was hung in its place. Another Te Duem mass followed, this time in the Cathedral, attended by a portrait of the king carried through the main entrance of the Cathedral beneath a canopy. Again, accounts were careful to note the lack of violence and absence of disorder.<sup>63</sup>

What was most surprising about the political transition of 1814 was the widespread popularity of the return to absolute rule and the abrogation of the Constitution of Cádiz. Despite a flurry of public constitutional ceremonies, everything from oath-swearing ceremonies to public anniversaries, the public seems to have given little thought to overturning the constitutional order. The behavior of Spaniards warrants comparison to that of French revolutionaries. The Spanish received Fernando VII with open arms and this struck an interesting contrast to the French rejection of Louis XVIII. Clearly the mythic heights of fame enjoyed by Fernando VII during the war came as a product of clever propagandists who were intent to foster a messianic image around the captive king. Whereas in the French case, the trial of Louis XIV was nothing short of an

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<sup>63</sup> Eduardo Díaz-Lobón, *Granada durante la crisis del antiguo régimen, 1814-1820* (Granada: Diputación Provincial, 1982), 131-40. The documentary appendix of this work includes an excellent first hand account of these events entitled “Noticia de las ocurrencias de Granada en 17 de Mayo de 1814” (Archivo Biblioteca Universidad de Granada C-19-56[5]). See pages 185-189.

“exercise in dymistification,”<sup>64</sup> by the end of the war the Spanish had not witnessed a similar desacralization of the monarchy. On the contrary, Fernando VII and the defense of the monarchy remained at the heart of Spanish political culture through the end of the War of Independence. Indeed, throughout the war, Fernando VII enjoyed the popular and near messianic moniker of “The Desired One” (*El Deseado*). Thus, there remained a popular base of support for the king at the end of the conflict.

Several events portray the support Fernando VII enjoyed among the popular classes. One fitting example came on 6 July 1814, when female residents (*vecinas*) of a housing development in Sevilla known as Corral Nuevo executed an elaborate festival. This festival included both a procession of Fernando VII’s portrait and an accompanying celebration in the Plaza of San Salvador. These events were significant for two reasons. In the first place, it does not seem as though local governmental institutions like the Ayuntamiento or Audiencia took part in sponsoring the event. Though representatives of these institutions appear to have taken part in an official capacity, these individuals were not involved in organizing the event itself. Documentary evidence suggests that this was a popular festival in keeping with the pattern of civic festivals that began in 1808.<sup>65</sup> Second, this event was unique in that it featured significant female participation and might have been wholly organized by women. One standard view of political participation during the period 1808-1814 has argued that, unlike men, women were

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<sup>64</sup> Michael Walzer, “The King’s Trial and the Political Culture of the Revolution,” in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, vol. 2, ed. Colin Lucas (Oxford: Pergamon, 1988), 190.

<sup>65</sup> For a full account of the procession and accompanying celebration described here, see Q.D.G., *Noticia de modo con que celebraron las vecinas del Corral nuevo, situado en la collacion de Nuestro Señor el Salvador de Sevilla, en la noche del 6 de Junio de 1814, á su amado Monarca el señor Don Fernando VII* (Sevilla: Imprenta de Padrino, 1814).

unable to effectively capitalize on the experiences of wartime to make a political space for themselves in the political workings of the country during peacetime.<sup>66</sup> The blatantly political behavior of the vecinas of Corral Nuevo runs counter to this view.

The procession organized by the vecinas of Corral Nuevo mimicked those executed by all-male *cofradías* and *hermandades* linked to parish churches. Those processions were typically done in veneration of a specific saint or a version of the Virgin associated with one of the Marian cults. The portrait of Fernando VII was carried from the Convent of Santa Inés to the Plaza of San Salvador by a procession of groups and individuals that lent gravity and a sense of officialdom to the proceedings. Leading the procession was an accompaniment of “the most decent ecclesiastical and secular persons, broken by a detachment of troops, followed by four young men dressed in the manner of old Spain with sword in hand and a band of trumpeters.” Following the men were two women elaborately dressed in allegorical fashion representing Spain and Sevilla, each with the requisite flag in hand. Behind them gathered an entourage of maidens composed of one group of eight dancers and four women who formed a chorus for the celebration held later that day. At the rear of the procession, the portrait itself was borne aloft by six young men in a “magnificent triumphal cart ... [with] many wax candlesticks.” In more traditional religious processions, the place of the portrait would have been filled by a carved rendition of a saint dressed in vestments appropriate to the occasion. At the rear of

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<sup>66</sup> John Lawrence Tone, “Spanish Women in the Resistance to Napoleon, 1808-1814,” in *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*, eds. Victoria Lorée Enders and Pamela Beth Radcliff (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 277.

the procession, there followed an eight-year-old girl tossing flower petals, a magistrate of the Audiencia, and another band of troops with trumpets.<sup>67</sup>

The path taken by the procession recognized the traditional spaces associated with ritual culture in the city and the significance of recent political events in transforming the urban geography. Far from an economical passage from one point to the next, the procession followed a zigzagging path that featured many of the more significant ceremonial sites of the city. From its starting place at the Convent of Santa Inés, the procession made its way to the Plaza de la Encarnación, to Sierpes Street, to the Plaza de Fernando VII (formerly “of the Constitution”), to Chicarerros Street, to Francos Street, to the steps of the Cathedral, to Génova Street (formerly “of the Constitution”), back to the Royal Plaza of Fernando VII and Calles Chicarerros and Francos, and ultimately to the Plaza of San Salvador.<sup>68</sup> Although it passed through the Royal Plaza of Fernando VII, it does not appear to have paused to commemorate the tremendous civic importance of this space, which had figured so prominently into the political life of constitutionalist commemorations. The selection of this space along the route of the procession was nonetheless quite significant. Retracing major ceremonial sites of the constitutionalists with a portrait of Fernando VII signified an effort to cleanse these spaces of their affiliation with the constitutionalist regime by rendering them significant once again to the cultural life of the city.

The vecinas of Corral Nuevo decorated the Plaza de San Salvador in advance of the festival to provide an appropriate venue for the celebration that followed. Organizers

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<sup>67</sup> Q.D.G., 2.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.



hung the plaza with damask fabric and cut cloth to form a sort of pavilion. In the center of this pavilion, carpenters constructed a temporary platform, which was later covered with carpets. Ostentatious use of damask fabric and carpets bespoke the importance of the portrait of Fernando VII that was to occupy a central place on the platform. Upon arriving in the Plaza of San Salvador, the portrait of Fernando VII was removed from the cart it occupied during the procession. From the cart, the portrait was transported to the back wall of the platform where it hung beneath a fabric canopy provided by the construction of the pavilion. In this way, the portrait of Fernando VII hung as an object of public veneration. The resulting festival incorporated song and dance in a celebratory commemoration of Fernando VII.

While songs figured among the various cultural devices of political agents well before 1814,<sup>69</sup> perhaps never before did propagandists use them as effectively. Indeed, careful propagandists had used songs to glorify the Constitution of Cádiz.<sup>70</sup> However, the rhythmic pattern of songs used in the celebration organized by the *vecinas* of Corral Nuevo effectively coupled well with the tradition of spontaneous verse, or *coplas*, particular to Western Andalusia.<sup>71</sup> These songs were suited ideally to their audience because they imposed new lyrics on a rhythmic and melodic structure familiar to

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<sup>69</sup> One of the earliest collections of songs from this period commemorates the French “constitution” of Bayonne. L.Z.O., *La constitución de España en canciones de musica conocida: para que pueda cantarse al piano, al organo, al violin, al baxo, a la guitarra, a la flauta, a los timbales, al harpa, a la bandurria, a la padereta, al tamboril, al pandero, a la zamioña, al rabel, y todo genero de instrumentos campestres* (Sevilla: Impr. de la viuda de Vazquez y Cia, 1808).

<sup>70</sup> BNE, VE/1369/9(1) “*Canción patriótica que en celebridad el dia 9 de julio hace el pueblo español en elogio de la Constitución, de los representantes de la nación y de la utilidad de esta resulta.*”

<sup>71</sup> Other songs from this period departed from such a format. See BNE, MC/5307/44, “*Canción al Sto. Alzamiento de los defensores del trono y altar. Canción de la mayoría de la nación.*”

Sevillians. Thus, the composers of these songs clearly intended participants to learn them easily and to disseminate them widely.

The songs were part of a wider effort designed to draw the public into the event. To this effect, female performers danced on stage with boughs of flowers while singing the patriotic verses written in celebration of Fernando VII.<sup>72</sup> Dancers were met with

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<sup>72</sup> Complete song lyrics and chorus responses appear in Q.D.G., 3-4:

Primera cancion.

España de su gloria  
enarbola el pendon  
contra el derecho injusto  
de la Constitucion.

Atended á su informa,  
y sabreis la traicion  
conque á los españoles  
les cubrian de horror.

Estrivillo.

Alegria, alegria, Sevilla,  
que no hay Constitucion,  
solo reyna Fernando,  
la Patria, y Religion.

Segunda cancion.

Fernando, y en su solio  
ha empezado á mandar,  
y en el primer decreto  
contra la libertad.

Amemor á un rey Justo,  
pues exemplo nos dá  
de amor á sus vasallos,  
de justicia y piedad.

Estrivillo.

Publicidad, publicidad, Patriotas,  
nuestra felicidad,  
pues Fernando es un rey  
tan lleno de bondad.

Tercera cancion.

Recibe gran Monarca  
del Imperio Español  
de estas vuestros vasallos  
una pobre oblacion.

Mirad su fino afecto  
y leal corazon  
pues gustosas te ofreces

First song.

Spain in its glory  
flies the standard  
against the unjust law  
of the Constitution.

Listen to the report,  
and you will know the treachery  
for which Spaniards  
were covered in horror.

Chorus.

Joy, joy, Sevilla,  
that there is no Constitution,  
there only reigns Fernando,  
*la Patria*, and religion.

First song.

Fernando, on his throne  
has begun to command  
and in the first decree  
against freedom.

Mark a Just king  
for the example he gives us  
of love to his vassals,  
of justice and piety.

Chorus.

Publicize, publicize, Patriots,  
our happiness,  
since Fernando is a king  
so full of goodness.

Third song.

Receive the great monarch  
of the Spanish Empire  
of these your vassals  
a poor offering.

Look at his fine affection  
and loyal heart  
since pleasantly you offer

repeated shouts of “Long live the King, Religion, and the Holy Inquisition!” throughout the evening.<sup>73</sup> Whether conscious of it or not, participants were public endorsing the actions taken by Fernando VII. Thus, this festive gathering became an opportunity for event organizers to secure public professions of loyalty to the new regime. It seems general revelry to this effect continued on the next day and for sometime thereafter.

The festival organized by the vecinas of Corral Nuevo points not only to the continuity of ritual culture in Sevilla during this period, but also to the means whereby such traditions provided a mechanism for political coercion. The involvement of so many persons, including members of both the civic and religious communities, and the structure of the procession point to the highly structured nature of this event. This was something more than a spontaneous response to the restoration of absolutism. It was clearly organized. The portrait of Fernando VII occupied a space typically reserved for an object deserving of religious worship. The whole situation bespoke an effort to create an almost religious reverence for the new regime. Nonetheless, supporters of absolutism made their case for the restoration of absolutism utilizing the novel convention of political culture developed after the initial demise of absolutism in 1808.

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la vida y corazon.

the life and heart.

Estrivillo.

Chorus.

Cantad, cantad, españoles,  
y todos a una voz  
digna Fernando reyne,  
cambien la Inquisicion.

Sing, sing, Spaniards,  
all together in one voice  
for worthy Fernando reigns,  
that he restore the Inquisition.

<sup>73</sup> Q.D.G., 3.

## CONCLUSION

Ritual culture offers a means to understand how contemporaries fashioned public support for new regimes. Through elements of ritual culture like processions, ceremony, and festival, the supporters of each new regime sought to mobilize fellow countrymen in the unique system of beliefs particular to their political program. Precisely because the period 1808-1814 witnessed several political transitions, political elites felt they had to appeal to and explain the return of absolutism to the larger population. In the process, they established a new and enhanced role for public ritual in political life. At the same time, these rituals were important in presenting the public with many new political ideas that would shape the development of political culture in Western Andalusia in the long-term. Ritual culture explains how political actors disseminated political ideas to the Spanish people at the local level, and also how one community of Spaniards received these ideas.

In addition to digesting new political ideas, the Spanish groups appropriated the business of producing ritual culture itself. Indeed, the democratization of ritual culture was clearly one of the more significant developments of this period. This change mirrored the expansion of more inclusive forms of government and the introduction of democratic elections after 1812. In some respects, this also was consistent with the development of a public sphere in this period. Political elites, and later non-elites, worked to promote the representation of political ideas in the public realm and to frame their reception in a positive light because they became invested in the survival of various political regimes. This suggests that the Spanish public was not a passive body receiving

political change without reflection, but rather that the nature of legitimate government was a matter of active public contestation.

## CHAPTER SIX:

### **The Riego Rebellion in Western Andalusia:**

#### **Into the Void of a Lingering Crisis of Sovereignty**

The restoration did not resolve the crisis of sovereignty at the local level, creating opportunity for yet another political transition to which local governments would have to respond. On 1 January 1820, military officer Rafael de Riego initiated a rebellion against absolutism and in support of the Constitution of Cádiz. In a matter of months, the Riego rebellion grew to become the first successful *pronunciamiento*, or military intervention, in Spanish history. Municipal support for the restored constitutional regime was at its weakest in Western Andalusia. The present chapter seeks to uncover why this was the case. I argue that the Riego rebellion responded to the persistence of a crisis of sovereignty in Spain after 1814. The weakness of the central government led municipalities to fend for themselves and, especially in Western Andalusia, to view the politics of the nation as largely irrelevant to their concerns. The withdrawal of municipalities from nominally national politics intensified the emergence of a local political culture that looked unfavorably on the role of the central government. At the same time, Riego's trek from town to town within the region demonstrated the continued need for the central government to impose its control over local communities as a means to secure its sovereign status.

Direct involvement on the part of the military in the political affairs of the Spanish nation would become a common trait of early nineteenth century. Conspiracies and rebellions became a recurring feature of the period following the restoration of absolutism in 1814. As José Luís Comellas argued, the Riego *pronunciamiento*

represented the culmination of these events.<sup>1</sup> In some sense, it represented the maturation of an insurrectionary will that emerged out of the guerilla movement in the final years of the War of Independence and gradually gained currency among more established sectors of the social elite, including the Spanish Officer Corps.<sup>2</sup> As the history of the Second Constitutional Period demonstrates, this maturation was still incomplete by 1820. An initiative borne out of the spontaneous response of local auxiliaries and the popular classes, the pronunciamiento could not easily adapt to leadership by Spanish officers. It was unstable because the prevailing political culture was in a state of transition between the bureaucratic formalism of the Old Regime and the messy political landscape of liberal democracy. By the end of the nineteenth century, pronunciamientos would become mostly bloodless, almost ceremonial affairs.

The period 1814-1819 did not witness the reconsolidation of a sovereign power at the central level of government and this informed the development of events in 1820. Although the monarchy entertained a seemingly powerful hold over the central government, from a local vantage the influence of the central government was quite limited. The rise of banditry limited the influence of distant policy makers in Madrid and strengthened the position of local political elites who were forced to respond to the crisis without the support of the central government. To this effect, the Riego rebellion emerged in the context of a persisting crisis of sovereignty. With the virtual irrelevance

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<sup>1</sup> José Luis Comellas, *Los primeros pronunciamientos en España, 1814-1820* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1958). On the history of pronunciamientos in peninsular Spain, see José Cepeda Gómez, *El Ejército español en la política española 1787-1843. Conspiraciones y pronunciamientos en los comienzos de la España liberal* (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1990).

<sup>2</sup> Roberto L. Blanco-Valdés, "Paisanos y soldados en los orígenes de la España liberal: sobre revoluciones sociales, golpes de Estado y pronunciamientos militares," in *Las nuevas naciones. España y México, 1800-1850*, ed. Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (Madrid: Fundación Mapfre, 2008), 273-92.

of national politics, the success or failure of the Riego rebellion was largely immaterial to the municipalities of Western Andalusia. The exception to this rule was the small handful of well-garrisoned towns, Sevilla foremost among them, which enjoyed the physical protection of the absolutist regime. Thus, many towns were allowed to revisit their relationship with the central government and the exercise of sovereignty itself.

### *LOS NIÑOS DE ÉCIJA* AND BANDITRY IN THE PERIOD 1814-1819

Banditry in Spain after 1814 grew out of the *guerrilla* movements that had been popular during the War of Independence. Guerrilla movements arose in the aftermath of the initial French invasion, as the decapitation of the central regime in Madrid had devastated the regular army. In the face of the considerably better trained and well reinforced French troops, remnants of the regular army offering resistance to the French war machine had been forced behind the siege lines at Cádiz or to remote fields of conflict in neighboring Portugal. In the occupied territories, only guerrilla resistance proved an effective means of fighting the French. However, whereas units of the regular army remained loyal to the commands of the central military command, the loyalty of guerrilla bands often depended on the position taken by their local commander. This made them susceptible to control by charismatic leaders who exploited them for illicit purposes at the conclusion of the war.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Charles J. Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon's Cursed War: Spanish Popular Resistance in the Peninsular War, 1808-1814* (London: Verso, 2008); and John Lawrence Tone, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).



Guerilla bands were also symptomatic of the preservation of strong local bonds in place of nationally-oriented allegiances. Guerrillas often operated close to home and were frequently resistant of large-scale coordinated maneuvers with other bands or elements of the regular army that would take them far from their traditional bases of operations. The experience of Montellano discussed in chapter 3 adhered to this fact. As Stanley Payne noted “During the War of Independence, the country as a whole reverted to its medieval structure, in which towns and provinces, separated from one another by military operations, sometimes operated as autonomous cantons. After the war, they remained disunited.”<sup>4</sup> Guerrilla warfare had preserved the autonomy of individual towns from the central government during the war. After the war, the remnants of guerrilla bands effectively preserved this relationship by providing a continued need for individual towns to provide for their own protection.

Although they had proven useful during the war, guerilla bands posed the potential for continued conflict after the war. At the conclusion of the war, the central government proved unable to incorporate guerrilla units into the regular army. Accompanying economic malaise during the period 1814-1819 left limited employment alternatives for a generation of youth trained only in how to fight.<sup>5</sup> As a result of these problems, many guerilla bands turned to banditry in the post-war period. The process of transition from guerillas to bandits was a fluid one. Whereas townsfolk had been supplied guerrilla bands during the war, acting in support of the patriotic cause, after the war many

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<sup>4</sup> Stanley Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> Josep Fontana, *La quiebra de la Monarquía absoluta, 1814-1820* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1971).

towns discontinued the practice of provisioning these groups. Subsequently, many bands turned to extortion as the simplest means to provide for their existence.

In the mid-eighteenth century, banditry had been one of the central concerns leading to the creation of the Nuevas Poblaciones in the Sierra Morena. Banditry in rural areas of Western Andalusia had been a problem for centuries, but only occasionally experienced on such scale. Historically, bandits preferred the mountainous terrains of the Sierra Morena and the Sierra Sur. Uniquely, the threat of banditry after 1814 extended throughout the major regional agricultural zone known as La Campina. Unlike their peers in the sierras, the livelihood of persons residing in La Campina depended on farming. Banditry left farmers unwilling to leave the safety of fortified towns and walled hacienda to complete their tasks in the fields.

The rise of banditry also limited regional integration. In addition to threatening towns, bandits preyed on baggage trains moving throughout Western Andalusia. Baggage trains provided for the movement of goods bound for market and the delivery of mail. The obstruction of the regular mail service disrupted the transmission of orders and reports between political officials at various levels of government. Banditry then not only further deepened the economic crisis but also disrupted lines of communication between towns. Not since the quarantines of 1801-1804 had individual municipalities felt so isolated from one another. This situation, in turn, served to strengthen the position of bandits as municipalities were left to fend for themselves.

An excellent example of banditry in this period, the attacks of *Los Niños de Écija* were the scourge of Western Andalusia in the years after the restoration of absolutism in 1814. Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, a string of authors

romanticized Los Niños as typical Andalusian *bandoleros*.<sup>6</sup> This role cast Los Niños as noble ruffians and exemplars of an independent mindset viewed by many in Spain as characteristic of the Andalusian people. Contemporaries viewed Los Niños in a very different light as petty thieves and a threat to public order. The six or seven men who formed the core of the band were likely from Écija, or neighboring hamlets, although it was impossible to determine exactly where each member of the band resided prior to leaving home. These core members were involved in guerilla activity during the War of Independence, but turned to banditry after the war in response to the poor economic situation. Beyond the core members, at various times the group probably numbered as large as thirty men.<sup>7</sup> Los Niños harassed several towns within La Campiña, but appear to have focused their attacks in and around Carmona, Écija, Marchena, and Osuna. They were especially active between 1815 and their eventual capture in 1817.

*Los Niños de Écija* provide an important avenue for understanding how banditry in rural areas affected the political expectations of local communities in Western Andalusia towards the central government between the constitutional periods. Los Niños proved a threat to commerce in the region because they impeded the movement of persons and baggage trains throughout the region. The central government proved incapable of combating the problem. In its place, individual towns, guilds, and *hacendados* within the region contributed money to raise an army of riflemen (*escopeteros*) “to exterminate the bands of thieves that have desolated their territory.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Vicente Durán-Recio, *La verdadera historia de “Los Siete Niños de Écija”* (Écija: Imprenta Serrano, 1994), 16-31.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 72-75.

The process of identifying those who provided aid to the bandits was also handled locally, as in the case of Osuna where lengthy records were kept on the affiliation of local persons with members of the famous band of bandits.<sup>9</sup>

Although absolute, the king and his instruments of state were clearly incapable of providing protection to local communities and individual towns were instead responsible to provide for their own security. This situation had obvious parallels with the quarantines imposed at the start of the century. Individual towns were once again cut off from neighboring communities. However, municipalities remained capable of providing for their own defense through the erection of a regional response that mimicked the creation of *juntas* in 1808. This situation meant that the central government was of little consequence to the preservation of order at the local level. In effect, the central government had ceded its sovereignty to local communities, which acted in the absence of a sovereign power. Thus, despite the restoration of absolutism, years later a crisis of sovereignty continued in peninsular Spain.

The persistence of a crisis of sovereignty in peninsular Spain was mirrored by the persistence of a crisis of sovereignty in the wider Spanish Atlantic. Despite the inability to provide for domestic order during the period 1814-1819, the crown embarked on an ambitious program of conquest to retake Spanish America. Effectively broke, the monarchy relied on local communities to support this endeavor. Through an elaborate system of taxation and tribute, municipalities paid for this project in money, men, and

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<sup>8</sup> "...exterminar las cuadrillas de ladrones q.<sup>e</sup> ha [sic] desolado su territorio." AME, Legajo 591, "Espedientes que pertenecen al exterminio de malhechores."

<sup>9</sup> AMO, Legajo 167, "Sumarios contra los encubridores de la cuadrilla 'Los niños de Ecija,' años: 1816-1822."

materiel when confronted with an army at its doorstep. Through such means, the monarchy organized an expedition to the Americas by “terrorizing the municipalities” of peninsular Spain.<sup>10</sup> This meant that the crown was willing to exact a harsh cost from loyal towns to preserve the empire while offering little in the way of basic services of protection in return. Furthermore, the forced burden to sponsor the reconquest of Spanish America made these towns complicit in the subjugation of other free and, to follow the Constitution of Cádiz, equal municipalities across the Atlantic Ocean.

#### RIEGO AND THE MUNICIPALITIES OF WESTERN ANDALUSIA

The Riego pronunciamiento grew out of a bloody process of trial and error during the period 1814-1819 in which would-be revolutionaries constantly worked to refashion the rules of political engagement with the absolutist regime. The use of sovereign power was situated at the core of these interactions. Although a guerilla leader coordinated the earliest attempted pronunciamiento, later efforts were centered within the officer corps and reflected the existence of a complicated relationship between the monarchy and its army. Fernando VII did not enjoy the full support of the army after the 1814. Elements within the army contested the principal of absolute monarchy, so many soldiers having resided in France under captivity during the War of Independence where they engaged with the political philosophy of French revolutionaries. The Riego rebellion built upon the experiences of other failed pronunciamientos because it exploited this tension. However, it succeeded in the long run because the rising focused on the political

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<sup>10</sup> Eric Christiansen, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 20.

mobilization of the population at large. Riego and fellow conspirators sought to enlist the support of fellow Spaniards by pushing municipal governments to enter the political fray.

The origins of the Riego rebellion stemmed from the placement of the army in small towns throughout Western Andalusia. Years earlier, when the Spanish military began preparations for an invasion of the Americas, it chose Cádiz as the principal site of preparations.<sup>11</sup> During late 1819, in an effort to avert the infection of the expeditionary force by an outbreak of yellow fever in Cádiz, individual battalions were moved out of the city and into surrounding towns. In these smaller towns, soldiers encountered the severe dislike of local communities, which objected the cost associated with the American expedition and the manner the monarchy pursued to raise sufficient funds. The dispersal of the expeditionary forces also weakened the degree of control lead commander Enrique José O'Donnell y Anethen, Count of La Bisbal, exercised over junior officers. This move left ambitious officers with a revolutionary disposition in the perfect position to foment rebellion.

Other scholars have suggested that the Riego rebellion was unrelated to the placement of the expeditionary army in smaller towns. Indeed, a number of historians have focused extensively on the role of masonic lodges in fomenting rebellion among members of the officer corps. In June 1819, La Bisbal discovered and repressed a conspiracy organized by officers of the expeditionary force near the coastal town of El

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<sup>11</sup> In May 1815, the king ordered a mass expeditionary force to assemble at Cádiz and to prepare for voyage to Spanish America. Rebellions in all four vicerealties threatened to dissolve the hold of Spanish rule almost as quickly as it had been instituted in the sixteenth century. Fernando VII, resolved to restore the empire to its full glory and maintain the inheritance he seized prematurely in 1808, had mandated the use of force against his recalcitrant subjects as easily as he had against liberal elements in peninsular Spain. The process of gathering enough men and ships to transport this conquering force took years. In 1819, the arrival of an insufficient number of Russian vessels to transport the army caused further delays. In the interim, as was the case at the start of the century, a massive yellow fever epidemic struck as seasonal temperatures began to climb threatening to wipe out soldier and civilian alike.

Puerto de Santa María on the Bay of Cádiz. Historians have speculated that a number of other rebellions were planned but not acted upon.<sup>12</sup> However, much of this work has relied on outdated presumptions regarding the relationship between masonry and liberal revolutionaries. Grievances on the part of military officers who lamented the slow development of plans to embark for Spanish America matched well with the political apathy of local communities toward the monarchy. Military officers and municipal leaders shared a common dislike for the central government's apparent lack of effectiveness.

The zone of settlements surrounding Cádiz witnessed the birth of constitutionalism in 1812 and its population was known to have a special fondness for the constitutional charter so closely associated with the city. Although a useful mechanism to counteract conspiratorial gatherings between potential co-conspirators, spreading officers about the countryside actually weakened the intelligence gathering abilities of the central command, thereby granting sub-commanders a degree of freedom they did not have when the same forces were stationed together. Efforts to avoid the spread of disease had likely furthered the independence of each commander as ties were severed under quarantine orders. Supposing the elaborate system of quarantines erected in 1800-1804 was put into effect once again in the same or roughly similar fashion in late 1819, each unit was

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<sup>12</sup> Speculation about the link between masons and liberalism and the precise role of Masonic lodges in planning conspiracies against the absolutist regime has deep roots in historical accounts of the Second Constitutional Period written during the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, fear of a Masonic menace within conservative sectors of Spanish society remained a common thread through the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. The literature on the Palmar conspiracy is somewhat lacking, though excellent recent work has been carried out by Francisco Varo-Montilla, "La participación de la tropa en la sublevación del Palmar," *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, Historia Contemporánea* 15 (2002): 25-40; and "El Mariscal de Campo Sarsfield y la represión del pronunciamiento del Palmar," *Hispania Nova* 3 (2003): 172-188.

essentially a island unto its self with little knowledge of what was happening in neighboring towns, much less a few miles beyond the perimeters of the encampments.<sup>13</sup>

The views expressed at the start of the rising adhered to the idea that conspirators sought to reconstitute a nation capable of resolving the lingering crisis of sovereignty. On 1 January 1820, at the town of Las Cabezas de San Juan, 35 year-old Lieutenant Colonel Rafael de Riego y Nuñez of the Battalion of Asturias stationed in that town, took to a balcony overlooking the central plaza and proclaimed his support for the Constitution of Cádiz.<sup>14</sup> From the very beginning of the rebellion, Riego invoked the term “nationalists”

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<sup>13</sup> It certainly appears at least from civilian sources that the sort of quarantine precautions placed into effect were quite strong by the standards of the time. J. M. M. de E., *Relación de lo ocurrido en Sevilla, con motivo de la enfermedad contagiosa, que han padecido los vecinos de la Collación de Santa cruz y sus inmediatos, este año de 1819* (Sevilla: Imprenta Real y Mayor, 1819), 4.

<sup>14</sup> Rafael del Riego Núñez y Flórez Valdés (1784-1823) was born in Santa María de Tuña, a small village within the municipal confines of Cangas de Tineo (today Cangas de Narcea) in Asturias. Born of a noble household with a somewhat modest fortune, family members of Riego held important royal and ecclesiastical administrative posts at one time or another in Madrid and within the region. Raised in the culturally enlightened Asturias of Campomanes and Jovellanos, Riego was educated at the University of Oviedo before joining the army in 1807 shortly after moving to Madrid. The French captured Riego on two separate occasions in 1808. Although he escaped from his first experience of incarceration at the Royal Palace of El Escorial, he was transferred to France as a prisoner of war on the second occasion after being captured at the Battle of Espinosa de los Monteros. Riego traveled about various parts of Western Europe once he secured leave of the French in 1813, and arrived back to Spain in time to swear an oath to uphold the Constitution of Cádiz in the La Coruña of General Lacy. The return of Fernando VII put an end to the First Constitutional Period shortly thereafter. It is unclear exactly when Riego became Mason. A near wholly discredited biographical tradition credited his time in France, common to the experience of so many Spanish POWs, as a rationale for explaining the tenor of his political radicalization in subsequent years. Indeed, for a time there was an effort among Spanish historians to claim that a more radical strain of revolutionary liberalism had been imported from abroad and spread about the country by means of secretive Masonic lodges. Regardless of whether it owed to his credentials as a Mason or his membership in the Spanish officer corps, Riego was privy to many of the conspiratorial plots organized by more senior Spanish military officers during the period 1814-1819. However, Riego figured as a major political player in conspiratorial circles only very late in the space of time between the First and Second Constitutional Periods. A close reading of events leading up to the revolt of 1820 would suggest that the role of Riego in launching the rebellion that later bore his name has been magnified largely as a figment of the heroic myth that grew around him shortly after the restoration of constitutional rule in 1820 and in the polemics of subsequent generations. For a short biography, see Alberto Gil Novales, *Rafael del Riego. La Revolución de 1820, día a día* (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1976); and also the article by Juan Francisco Fuentes, “<<Yo nada valgo>>: Rafael del Riego y la revolución liberal español,” in *Liberales eminentes*, eds. Manuel Pérez Ledesma and Isabel Burdiel (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008): 13-42.



in order to identify supporters of his cause.<sup>15</sup> Riego insisted his love for the troops was great, and for this reason he could not consent to make them leave their “patria” so that they might fight a war against fellow Spaniards which he considered both “unjust” (*injusta*) and “useless” (*inútil*). Instead, “The sacrifice of your [lives]” he exhorted, might be necessary “to break the chains that have oppressed [the Spanish people] since the year 1814.” In short, he argued that only restoration of the Constitution of Cádiz and its critical guarantee of fundamental rights to Spanish citizens could prove “enough to dissuade our American brothers” from their chosen course.<sup>16</sup>

Casting aside the logic of absolutism that undergirded the very formation of the expeditionary force, Riego compelled his compatriots to raise the banner of constitutionalism as the best means to end the family squabble between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. His words were meant to alter the nature of the war in the public consciousness from a conflict between Fernando VII and unruly subjects across the Atlantic to a failure of citizens empowered under the Constitution of Cádiz to act in full recognition of their rights. Thus, Riego’s intent at the earliest stage of the rebellion was to execute something a good deal more elaborate than a simple palace coup. Instead, he sought to rouse public support for a popular revolution.

From the beginning, the organizers of the rebellion lacked a crucial understanding of how to launch a popular movement. Some historians have portrayed Riego as sort of

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<sup>15</sup> The leaders of the rebellion took up the term *Nacionales* quite early. Alberto Gil Novales, *El Trienio Liberal* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980), 4.

<sup>16</sup> “*el sacrificar las vuestras, para romperles las cadenas que los tienen oprimidos desde el año 14. ... basta para apaciguar a nuestros hermanos de América.*” Rafael de Riego, “18. Cabezas de San Juan, 1 enero 1820, Proclama a las tropas,” in *Rafael de Riego. La Revolución de 1820, día a día*, ed. Alberto Gil Novales (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1976), 34-35.

*caudillo* – a Spanish term denoting “one who leads.” The use of this term suggested a top-down approach to the rebellion that emphasized the role of Riego in directing the initial course of events and the long term goals of the revolutionaries.<sup>17</sup> The municipal records of Las Cabezas do not suggest that the townsfolk or the *ayuntamiento* itself had a great part to play in the launch of the conspiracy.<sup>18</sup> Shortly after his arrival in Las Cabezas, Riego had presented himself to the *ayuntamiento* in a *cabildo* session on 20 December 1819.<sup>19</sup> Although this meeting supplied Riego with the necessary introductions and contacts to extend the conspiracy into the civilian realm, it does not appear as though he colluded with civil officials of the *ayuntamiento* in any serious way, at least nothing to an extent that has left a trail of surviving material evidence.

However, Riego and his contemporaries believed in the power of municipal institutions to affect social change. Upon securing towns, Riego would frequently mark the formal transition of municipalities from absolutism to constitutionalism with formal ceremony. Events of this kind mimicked the use of ritual culture seen during the First Constitutional Period. It was Riego who provisionally declared Diego and Antonio Zulueta as provisional *alcades constitucionales* of Las Cabezas.<sup>20</sup> The choice of a prominent balcony in the center of town to proclaim the return of the Constitution of

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<sup>17</sup> Jaime E. Rodríguez O., “Los caudillos y los historiadores: Riego, Iturbide y Santa Anna,” in *La construcción del héroe en España y México, 1789-1847*, eds. Manuel Chust and Víctor Mínguez (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2003), 309.

<sup>18</sup> The records for this period have decayed significantly, but are still possible to read. AMLC, AC, Book 13.

<sup>19</sup> Although records for this period have been preserved, their state of conservation does not make for easy reading. AMLC, AC, Book 13 (1816-1828), *cabildo* session dated 20 December 1819.

<sup>20</sup> Antonio Moliner y Prada, *Revolución burguesa y movimiento juntero en España. Las acción de las juntas a través de la correspondencia diplomática y consular francesa, 1808-1869* (Lleida: Editorial Milenio, 1997), 94; and AMLC, AC, Book 13, *cabildo* session dated 1 January 1820.

Cádiz suggested that Riego wished to appear at the head of the rising and to lead the civilian sector of the local population into open revolt. The symbolic character of performing a transition was not lost on the local townsfolk who witnessed these events. Even if municipal leaders were not directly involved in the rising, they understood the role envisioned for them by Riego. Local communities understood that they were being invited to assume a political role in the contest between revolutionaries and the state. Their response was tempered by an interest to preserve the well being of the local patria ahead of the central government and the nation in general.

Riego sought to inspire the people to back his revolt in writing as well. In a letter to public officials and the Spanish people, Riego insisted Spain was "living at the mercy of an arbitrary and absolute power, exercising not the least respect for the fundamental laws of the Nation ... fashioned in Cádiz amid blood and suffering." The refusal of Fernando VII to adhere to a document described by Riego as a "pact between the monarch and the people, the foundation and incarnation of all modern nations," reflected this fact. "To save himself," Riego asserted, it was necessary that Fernando VII swear an oath to uphold and respect the "just and liberal" Constitution of Cádiz, because it was the only "legitimate affirmation" of the rights and responsibilities of all Spaniards from the King to the lowest farmer (*último labrador*).<sup>21</sup> Riego emphasized that the existence of a social contract between governor and governed as the essential precondition of political

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<sup>21</sup> "España está viviendo a merced de un poder arbitrario y absoluto, ejercido sin el menor respeto a las leyes fundamentales de la Nación. El Rey ... no ha jurado ... la Constitución, pacto entre Monarca y el pueblo, cimiento y encarnación de toda Nación moderna. La Constitución, justo y liberal, ha sido elaborada en Cádiz entre sangre y sufrimiento. Mas el Rey no la ha jurado y es necesario, para se salve, que el Rey jure y respete esta Constitución de 1812, afirmación legítima y civil de los derechos y deberes ... de todos los españoles, desde el Rey al último labrador." Emphasis added. Rafael de Riego, "19. Cabezas de San Juan, 1 enero 1820, Proclama a los oficiales y al pueblo," in Gil Novales, *Rafael de Riego*, 35.

modernity. Through the reinstatement of constitutional governments at the local level, Riego viewed himself as rebuilding the pact between both.

Riego's also drew upon new ideas. His portrayal of the Constitution of Cádiz as an enumeration of "liberal" principles did not carry the same political currency during the First Constitutional Period that it did during the Second. The word liberal first emerged as an adjective to describe a set of principles viewed as reformist or progressive in some way. Only much later, did the word come to denote affiliation with a certain political mindset, eventually the grounds for the formation a specific political faction, and only then as an adjective meant to describe political policies favored by this group.<sup>22</sup> In many ways, Riego's attempt was an apolitical call to arms avoiding many of the issues that had divided conservative *serviles* and radical *exaltados* in the final years of the First Constitutional Period. The optimism of his use of "liberal" to mark the inherent virtue of the Constitution overlooked an evolving political dynamic. Riego could not have fully imagined the politicization that would come only a few months later. At the same time, the use of liberal was likely lost on participants at the local level.

At face value, a liberal revolt signified few things to contemporaries beyond a stated opposition to the prevailing economic and social conditions of the country. Pronouncements issued by Riego likely did not have the persuasive effect he wished. Historians have overlooked the fact that townsfolk were compelled to revolt and, in key

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<sup>22</sup> See two articles by Javier Fernández-Sebastián, entitled "Liberalismos nacientes en el Atlántico iberoamericano. <<Liberal >> como concepto y como identidad política, 1750-1850" and "Liberalismo – España," in *Diccionario político y social del mundo iberoamericano. La era de las revoluciones, 1750-1850 [Iberconcepciones-I]*, ed. Javier Fernández Sebastián (Madrid: Fundación Carolina, 2009), 695-731 and 783-796, respectively.

instances, not to revolt for reasons which had very little to do with Riego.<sup>23</sup> Local communities were profoundly unhappy with the extreme burden associated with the expeditionary force assembled at Cádiz. The accumulation of men, materiel, and provisions had strapped the resources of the country and placed especial burdensome pressures on municipalities near to Cádiz. Riego's exhortations aside, the revolt offered a quick exit from this squeeze. A review of the historical experiences of Las Cabezas during key historical moments of change and transition during the era of the War of Independence does not reveal any riotous behavior on the part of the local population nor a strong culture of support for the constitutional regime. The location of the rising was incidental. However, this fact alone suggested that Riego sincerely believed in the possibility of recruiting any municipality to the cause of rebellion.

In the weeks that followed the *pronunciamiento* at Las Cabezas, the rising accelerated quickly promoting Riego to near mythic status. Fellow conspirators acted out their parts as had been planned. La Bisbal had been sacked some time earlier under suspicion of having allied with conspirators after an earlier incident and was not present to organize a new round of repressive measures. Indeed, it seems as though central command was blind to the threat altogether. Joined with the Battalion of Sevilla based in Villamartín, a force under the command of Riego overtook the military headquarters in Arcos de la Frontera by surprise on 2 January. The fall of central command put a further two battalions in a position to aid the rebellion. Captain Carlos Rabadán insisted that one

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<sup>23</sup> Jamie E. Rodriguez O. offers a comparison with Agustín de Iturbide and Antonio López de Santa Anna that in this case views a long-term historiographical fascination with these "great men" as a failing on the part of analytical work examining important transitional moments in the history of Mexico and Spain. Rodriguez O., "La construcción del héroe," 310, 334-335.

of Riego's first acts after securing the town was to establish constitutional officials.<sup>24</sup>

Rabadán also wrote in a public statement issued from neighboring Bornos that Riego congratulated his troops on “the glory ... gained by our heroic pronunciamiento,” in what was perhaps the first reference to the performance of what was to become the central political act of nineteenth century Spain<sup>25</sup>

While Riego set to work north of Cádiz, Coronel Antonio Quiroga initiated a march on the city from the south, from Alcalá de los Gazules. Perhaps viewed as an omen of things to come, the weather was uncharacteristically cold. Sevilla experienced a heavy snowstorm on 11-12 January, which dumped as much as one and a half feet (*media vara*) of snow on the ground before turning into rain.<sup>26</sup> Facing high water, Quiroga arrived at the Bay of Cádiz only after Riego had made a triumphant entry into El Puerto by way of Jerez de la Frontera. Although the conspirators named Quiroga as commander-in-chief of the combined army with Riego as his second, the boldness and speed of the later had already done much to make him the best known figure among the conspirators and it was his name that quickly became synonymous with the rebellion. Most of the conspirators were in their thirties at the outset of the rebellion. They had come of age politically and militarily during the War of Independence. Their formative years had been shaped by the experience of the First Constitutional Period. In this regard, the appointment of the fifty-

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<sup>24</sup> Eugenia Astur, *Riego. Estudio histórico-político de la Revolución del año veinte*. (Oviedo: 1933), 171.

<sup>25</sup> This reference to pronunciamiento was the basis for subsequent uses of the word to describe the recurring episodes of military involvement in Spanish political affairs that become such a common occurrence in nineteenth century Spain according to Stanley Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 14. Statement printed in Astur, *Riego*, 174; and again in Gil Novales, *Rafael del Riego*, 37.

<sup>26</sup> José de Velázquez y Sánchez, *Anales de Sevilla de 1800 a 1850*, facsimile edition (Sevilla: Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1994), 244-245.

three year-old veteran military commander Manuel Freire de Andrade y Armijo (a native of Carmona) as Captain-General of the Four Kingdoms of Andalusia and head of the royalist response to the revolt made the conflict a generational one.

Freire reframed the dynamics of the rebellion in more than one way. Having left Sevilla as commander of the Army of Andalusia for El Puerto, Freire offered the first serious challenge to the Nationalist cause since the start of the rebellion nearly a month earlier. The arrival of Freire coupled with the resistance of the Cádiz made the situation of the Nationalists somewhat urgent. Cádiz had not fallen into the hands of the rebellion as quickly as had been anticipated. The city's impressive physical defenses, known as La Cortadura, built to thwart the French a decade prior proved a formidable obstacle. Furthermore, surrounding towns hesitated to defend their conversion to the constitutional cause by force of arms because they feared reprisals of the Army under Freire. In the interim, the revolt remained stalled in the city of San Fernando (formerly La Isla de Leon). A virtual stalemate existed when Riego made a break for Algeciras with a small band of men at the end of January. It was amid the military stalemate of late January that Riego chose to leave San Fernando for Algeciras at the head of a small band of troops described by contemporaries as a "mobile column" (*columna móvil*). He had been lured there by rumor that Algeciras could supply men needed to bolster the Nationalist cause. However, José O'Donnell, brother of the Count of La Bisbal, severed Riego's route of return. For the next six weeks, Riego and his band were forced to move from one town to the next to evade O'Donnell and fellow captors, as the fate of the pronunciamiento hung in the balance.

## CONSTITUTIONALISM ON THE MARCH

O'Donnell's pursuit of Riego brought the military rising in support of the Constitution of Cádiz to the attention of local communities throughout Western Andalusia. The rising, which began as a localized matter of military insubordination, broadened into a regional political crisis. Riego's loss of a route of return to Cádiz forced him first to move eastward along the Costa del Sol, entering Málaga to uproarious celebration on 18 February, before turning northward into Sierra Sur. From the Sierra Sur, Riego descended into La Campina of Western Andalusia where his mobile column made direct contact with the people of Morón de la Frontera and other towns. The encounter of Morón with the forces of Riego and O'Donnell provides a means to appraise the reception of the rising at the local level in Western Andalusia.

Riego sought to evade his captors outside of major cities like Málaga. Accounts suggest he and his fellows did not feel as though they could rely on the complete support of the city's inhabitants. Instead, the countryside posed a more welcoming alternative both as the natural environment of the guerilla fighter and perhaps for its comparative degree of political accommodation as well. Indeed the size of the mobile column required constant resupply of food and other supplies. Conviction to live off the land in evasion a royalist force and against the regime so loudly denounced by the organizers of the revolt framed Riego as something more than mere astute tactician. In taking up such a public cause against an unjust authority, Riego joined the ranks of the Robin Hood-like "social bandit," a staple of rural life in Western Andalusia and very much a vestige of the recent war against Napoleon.



Local communities did not receive Riego as a welcome hero. Riego's trek across the sierras of Málaga in late winter brought him into the southern province of Sevilla by early spring. Far from declaring open support from his rebellion, by and large towns preferred to avoid being drawn into the struggle. What kind of support the residents of the sierras gave to Riego remains unclear. The mobile column did not reach larger haciendas until it descended into La Campina of Sevilla. Sources suggest provisions were requisitioned by force on occasion. However, the large decline in the number of partisans despite only minor military confrontations suggests that a high number of desertions likely owed to insufficient local support. Further, it does not appear as though locals joined the ranks of the mobile column as untrained auxiliaries in significant numbers, certainly not enough to stave off the desertion rate. In thinking about the experience of smaller towns in this episode, the town of Morón de la Frontera serves as a useful example.

The civic records of the Sevillian town of Morón were clearly expunged of sensitive content. Not only are the *actas capitulares* for the months pertaining to the Second Constitutional Period entirely absent, but also the pages leading up to the transition make no reference to the proximity of Riego's mobile column moving through the sierra to the south of town. The bulk of the surviving documentation for the early months of 1820 focuses almost entirely on complications relating to the appointment of *cabildo* members. Indeed, the sole reference to the insurrection in the *actas capitulares* of Moron de la Frontera indicates only that a letter written by interim Regent of the Sevilla Audiencia Isidoro Sanz de Velasco was read aloud in the *cabildo* session held on 21

January.<sup>27</sup> The letter was short on details pertaining to the revolt, which it identified as a “mutiny of several units of the army destined for overseas territories garrisoned in pueblos with their respective command.”<sup>28</sup>

However, the letter made no secret of the offense committed against the king declaring the “actions taken by the mutineers as contrary to the Sovereign will of His Majesty, contrary to established laws and standing ordinances, and a threat to the well-being of these same pueblos.”<sup>29</sup> Among the various instructions given to the town were the enforcement of passport controls, the use of parish priests to monitor public order and investigate discussions held in cafes and other public meeting places, and the obligation to report any known movements of the enemy to military authorities. Should the mutineers take the town, the Audiencia asked the *ayuntamiento* to risk humiliation at the cost of remaining loyal to the king. The Audiencia further asked the town to direct any deserters of the mobile column to the provincial headquarters of the Captain-General of Sevilla. This provision would suggest that as late as the end of January the Audiencia, if not the central government itself, considered the revolt a rather routine occurrence, akin to the long list of similar revolts that had sprung up during the preceding six years. At the very least, it seems fair to say that the Audiencia expected the matter to fade away of its own accord as mutineers tired of the revolt. The Audiencia was intent to assert its authority as a means to further encourage the loyalty of the *ayuntamientos* and the people

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<sup>27</sup> This letter was sent to all towns in the province. A number of copies have been saved in surviving records. AMMF, AC, Book 62 (1820), 478-back and 481-front.

<sup>28</sup> “*la sublevacion de varios cuerpos del egército destinado á Ultramar, que se entere á los pueblos de la respectiva comprension.*” The original has been preserved within the binding of the *actas capitulares* for 1820. AMMF, AC, Book 62, 479-front – 480-front.

<sup>29</sup> “*el procedimiento tomada por la tropa revolucionada es contraria á la Soberana voluntad de S. M., contrario á las leyes y ordenanzas, y turbativo de la felicidad de los mismos pueblos.*” Ibid.

it governed. It expected both to remain loyal to the king and cooperate in efforts to restore order to Western Andalusia.

Revolution came to Morón at around noon on 3 March, Riego's mobile column entered the town having fled from neighboring Montellano on the frontier with the Province of Cádiz with O'Donnell's vanguard close at its heels. The next day, O'Donnell reached Morón and commenced an attack. In an effort to allow Riego time to secure the ruins of the castle atop the town, destroyed by the French upon their retreat in 1814, in a fool's errand 60 infantrymen and 15 horsemen of Riego's mobile column met the brunt of O'Donnell's attack. Upon entering the town, O'Donnell's superior forces attempted to surround the castle, which forced Riego's battalion to leave the town and retreat into the nearby hills where the fighting continued until shortly after nightfall. Riego's second-in-command, Evaristo San Miguel, claims that as few as 400 men in the mobile column survived the battle and made it to Villanueva early the next morning.<sup>30</sup> In the following days, the mobile column passed through the Eastern fringe of Western Andalusia pursued by O'Donnell. Only a few days after the bloody encounter at Morón, the mobile column passed by Estepa without entering the town and made for La Puente de Don Gonzalo where a royalist cavalry unit based out of Osuna harassed it with sharpshooter fire. Although the experience of the mobile column in Morón might have dissuaded it from entering other towns, the presence of sharpshooters suggests as well that royalist units were intent on keeping the mobile column away from walled towns of considerable size,

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<sup>30</sup> Evaristo San Miguel, *Memoria sucinta sobre lo acaecido en la columna movil de las tropas nacionales al mando del Comandante General de la Primera Division D. Rafael del Riego, desde su salida de S. Fernando el 27 de Enero de 1820, hasta su total disolucion en Bienvenida el 11 de Marzo del mismo año* (Oviedo: Francisco Cándido Perez Prieto, 1820), 17-19.

which might have offered safe harbor to the mutineers. Upon leaving the outskirts of La Puente, the mobile column made for Córdoba.<sup>31</sup>

By O'Donnell's own admission, his forces were three times the number as those of Riego, though of an inferior quality. O'Donnell estimated that Riego lost 500 men to death, wounds, capture, and desertion at Morón. The confrontation in Morón marked the first and only time Riego and his band of mutineers directly engaged their pursuers. Though the encounter was not a success, news of the confrontation and the continued survival of the mobile column were communicated to the population of Cádiz only a short time thereafter.<sup>32</sup> The public was a clearly very much aware of the state of the Riego revolt as it transpired in real time. As with the account of San Miguel, O'Donnell did not provide many details regarding the reception of the campaign among the civilian element.<sup>33</sup> Riego likely attempted to establish a constitutional *ayuntamiento* in Morón as he had done elsewhere. Records suggest that if this was the case it did not last long. By 11 March, Francisco Cavallero Enriquez, the very same man who began the year as head of the local *ayuntamiento* appeared in the *cabildo* records as “*alcalde mayor* of His Majesty.”<sup>34</sup>

## REBELLION IN THE NORTH

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>32</sup> “Núm. 19. *Adicion á la órden de la Division, por la noche*,” in *Memoria de los sucesos de Cádiz des del 7 de enero hasta el 17 de marzo del presente año de 1820* (Sevilla: La Viuda de Vazquez y Compañía, 1820), 65-66.

<sup>33</sup> José O'Donnell, “Suplemento,” *El Restaurador*, October 28, 1823, 9-12.

<sup>34</sup> AMM, AC, Book 62, *cabildo* sesion dated 11 March.

It was a crisis of sovereignty that led to the downfall of absolutism in 1820. Historians of the Second Constitutional Period have been quick to privilege the role of the military in bringing down the absolutist regime of Fernando VII in 1820. Military rebellion certainly served to spark a much larger event. However, it was the role of individual municipalities that was really instrumental to the outcome of events. The declaration of several towns in support of the rebellion prevented it from becoming just another political disturbance. These towns clearly did not view Fernando VII to reign as a legitimate sovereign, but lacked the means to coordinate crafting an alternative vision worthy of displacing him. Although the return of a constitutional regime patterned on that adopted in 1812 was not a vision with universal appeal, it offered a banner around which to organize. The rebellion served as a catalyst around which a new movement led by the municipalities could galvanize the widespread support.

Riego's arrival in Córdoba demonstrated the complexity of the evolving political situation. On 7 March, Riego's mobile column, by that point numbering only 300 men, entered Córdoba to a curious welcome. San Miguel attributed this welcome to an indescribable admiration on the part of the Cordovans. "The streets were full of people," he wrote, "whose silence indicated surprise and astonishment for our courage."<sup>35</sup> San Miguel's account seems unlikely. Córdoba did not declare openly for the constitutional revolt with any speed. Yet the very fact that Riego was not apprehended and that his men appear to have entered the city unmolested suggests something about the political temperament of civilians and local officials towards the rebellion. Cordovans saw little to gain by apprehending the mutinous band. Rather than embrace the constitutional regime,

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<sup>35</sup> "*Es indecible la admiracion ... Las calles estaban todas llenas de gentío, cuyo silencio indicaba la sorpresa y pasmo que les causa nuestro arrojo.*" San Miguel, 21.

they appeared similarly indifferent to the prospect of executing a total break with the regime of Fernando VII. The Cordovan response to Riego's band, like that seen in Morón, was a studied exercise in pragmatism and restraint.

Despite the restrained response of towns in Western Andalusia, the rebellion generated political excitement in other regions of Spain. Riego's dash through Western Andalusia gave the rebellion a new lease on life. At the start of March, the regime of Fernando VII appeared capable of containing the rebellion. Military units throughout the Peninsula remained loyal to the king. Nonetheless, the failure of the regime to abruptly end the affair spelled disaster. Although somewhat ineffective at the local level in Western Andalusia, Riego's dash through Western Andalusia invigorated local communities in the north of Spain. The regime's policy of containment failed on 21 February when the municipal government of La Coruña – site of the failed Juan Díaz Porlier conspiracy in 1815 – declared itself in open support of the rebellion. The *ayuntamientos* of other large Galician towns followed suit with that of El Ferrol on 23 February. On 25 February, Vigo and Pontevedra declared their support for the rebellion as well. Full-blown contagion had spread to Northwest Spain.<sup>36</sup> This moment threatened the possibility of civil war.

Whereas smaller cities remained indifferent to the situation, large settlements became central to the evolving situation. Urban populations showed the greatest support for the revolt. On 24 January, the leaders of a constitutionalist riot in San Fernando, not far from Cádiz, attempted to open the city gates to the Nationalist army encamped

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<sup>36</sup> A rather sharp divide existed in Galicia between revolutionary commercial hubs stretching along the Atlantic coastline and the more conservative heartland of the interior, including the cities of Santiago de Compostela and Orense. Emilio González López, *Entre el antiguo y el nuevo régimen: absolutistas y liberales. El reino de Fernando VII en Galicia* (A Coruña: Ediciós do Castro, 1980), 77-80.

nearby. Putting down the riot in San Fernando proved a challenge for the royalist troops garrisoned there.<sup>37</sup> The precedent of La Coruña posed a crisis of confidence for the government and the very regime itself and invited other populations to voice their opposition. Subsequent pronouncements from the *ayuntamientos* of Zaragoza (Aragón) and Barcelona (Catalonia) on 5 March and 10 March, respectively, heightened the crisis. Sevilla remained notably loyal to the absolutist cause. From this moment regaining the political upper hand for the regime required something more than a spate of court marshals and urged action of the part of the civil sector as well.

Despite evident widespread disaffection with the regime of Fernando VII, the king resisted considering the possibility of negotiating with rebellious towns, viewing them and wholly subordinate to the his authority. Fernando VII favored a military solution until his armed forces finally chose to break ranks with him. In the face of a rapidly deteriorating situation, the crown had ordered La Bisbal to gather troops in defense of the monarchy. Instead of offering his continued support, La Bisbal declared his support for the Constitution of Cádiz at the town of Ocaña in central Spain. La Bisbal's defection to the constitutionalist cause destroyed all hope of Fernando VII reversing the situation. On 7 March, the very same day that Riego and his band of 300 entered Córdoba, the captain of the royal guard, faced with rioters in Madrid, convinced Fernando VII to accept the return of the Constitution of Cádiz.

The sudden collapse of the regime speaks to the persistence of a crisis of sovereignty in 1820. The crown proved incapable of providing for public order during the period 1814-1819 and folded in 1820 when confronted by a prolonged crisis. Indeed, its

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<sup>37</sup> J.R.M., *Memoria de los sucesos de Cádiz des del 7 de enero hasta el 17 de marzo del presente año de 1820* (Sevilla: La Viuda de Vazquez y Compañía, 1820), 10-12.

collapse came in response to an almost routine disorder. For contemporaries, the collapse was almost surreal. O'Donnell later admitted that he was surprised to hear that Riego was quite nearly on the verge of fleeing to Portugal with a significantly reduced band of followers as events transpired to the north. The army of Quiroga and Riego were actually of little consequence. Quiroga attributed the risings in Galicia and that of La Coruña in particular, with having secured victory out of near defeat.<sup>38</sup> The political actions of individual municipalities were the central events that secured the collapse of absolutism in 1820.

## CONCLUSION

The immediate context for a renewed political crisis in 1820 was a crisis of sovereignty. The restored absolutist regime of Fernando VII failed to effectively demobilize the guerrilla element at the conclusion of the War of Independence. Banditry, which emerged in the immediate post-war period in response to this problem, posed a grave risk for towns throughout Western Andalusia, especially those in the Sierra Sur and La Campina. This served to undermine the legitimacy of the absolutist regime. The perennial threat of attack by bandits and prolonged economic crisis after the war forced municipalities to fend for themselves, effectively negating the reconsolidation of a strong central government.

From the vantage of municipalities in Western Andalusia, no regime between 1808 and 1819 imposed effective order and stability over the nation as a whole. Because

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<sup>38</sup> José de Urcullu, *Relación histórica de los acontecimientos más principales ocurridos en la Coruña y en otros puntos de Galicia en febrero y marzo de este año, con el objeto de restablecer la constitucion Política de la Monarquía Española* (La Coruña, 1820), 147-148.



of this, municipalities in this region increasingly looked to the leadership of local elites rather than to central political elites. The nation-building project began during the First Constitutional Period collapsed after 1814 and was never attempted as a social project by Fernando VII and his ministers in Madrid. As seemingly national events came to influence the political life of the country with the Riego Rebellion of 1820, municipalities adopted a self-preservationist strategy that favored pragmatism over adherence to political ideology.

Indeed, unlike the First Constitutional Period when local government thought to negotiate their relationship with the central government, none thought to do so during the period restored absolutist regime of Fernando VII. This lack of interest in negotiation suggested that the municipalities of Western Andalusia did not think highly enough of the restored regime of Fernando VII to engage with it directly. Indeed, this bred a suspicion of the central government in general throughout Western Andalusia. Tellingly, only after widespread acceptance of the constitutional regime in other parts of the country, did the municipalities of Western Andalusia adopt a willingness to participate in the political process once again.

The great exception to this rule was the city of Sevilla. Sufficiently garrisoned by the Spanish army, the city remained loyal to the absolutist regime early in the crisis and was among the last cities to accept the restoration of the constitutional regime. While Sevilla had been among the ranks of the first revolutionary cities of 1808 and had welcomed the constitutionalist forces that liberated it in 1812, a fair share of the city's residents welcomed the restoration of absolutism in 1814. Although the prospect of confronting royalist troops was the principal reason Nationalists avoided targeting

Sevilla, the loyalties of the civilian population were perhaps a significant consideration as well. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the residents of Sevilla exhibited an early excitement for the prospect of a restored constitutional regime.

## CHAPTER SEVEN:

### **Political Modernity Arrives in Local Spain: Western Andalusia during the Second Constitutional Period, 1820-1823**

Between 1820 and 1823, Spaniards witnessed the restoration of constitutional monarchy brought about by the success of the Riego rebellion. These years marked the culmination of a transition from one variety of political culture to another. During the Second Constitutional Period, local communities were invested once again in the realm of national politics, as *ayuntamientos* adapted to a constitutional political system for the second time inside of ten years. This chapter will examine how the elite-centered politics that emerged during the First Constitutional period gave way to the tumultuous popular politics of the Second Constitutional Period. I argue that the persistence of a constitutional political culture after 1814 provided for the rapid return of constitutionalism at the local level in 1820. Constitutionlists used the ritual culture of the First Constitutional Period to facilitate the restoration of a constitutional regime. This ritual culture invited new sectors of the social community to participate in the political process. In Western Andalusia, as elsewhere, this led to the radicalization of politics in the public sphere.

A transformed political culture at the local level yields new conclusions about the advent of modernity in Spain at the start of the nineteenth century. The degree of political contestation on display at the local level demonstrates something significant about the tenor of local politics. Historians of Spain have tended to think in fairly teleological terms towards framing what an older generation of scholarship labeled as a “prolonged

bourgeois revolution,”<sup>1</sup> and more recent scholarship has described as a “liberal revolution.”<sup>2</sup> In both narratives, historians have viewed the arrival of a durable parliamentary system enshrined within a constitutional framework as a central marker of modernity. In each framework, an elite group, defined in class terms in the case of the bourgeois revolution model or ideologically in the case of the liberal revolution model, tried and, in the end, failed to marshal the support of local communities. These models suggested that local communities either lacked the capacity for distinctly modern political activity or were mired in the conservatism of religion and blind absolutism.

However, approaching this historical moment from the local level uncovers evidence to the contrary. Earlier chapters examined the extent to which local elites engaged in political activity linked to the national level. These elites were politicized by their participation in local government during the First Constitutional Period. By 1820, latent knowledge of constitutional government and related political ideas inherent to local elites coupled with the sophistication of public venues for the dissemination of information allowed for the sudden emergence of a genuinely popular political movement in support of the Constitution of Cádiz. That is, the extraordinary events of 1820, allowed for the eruption of political activity limited previously by the delicate surface of containment imposed by the repressive measures of the absolutist regime.

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<sup>1</sup> On Spain’s prolonged bourgeois revolution, there exist many works. For a good primer, consult Miguel Artola, *La burguesía revolucionaria, 1808-1874* (Madrid: Alianza, 2007). The bourgeois revolution model favored class conflict as its most enduring feature.

<sup>2</sup> By contrast, the liberal revolution model has focused more fundamentally on the ideas associated with the revolutionaries themselves. On the liberal revolution, see Isabel Burdiel, “Myths of Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century Spanish Liberalism,” *Journal of Modern History* 70 (1998): 892-912; and Jesús Millán and María Cruz Romeo, “Was the liberal revolution important to modern Spain? Political cultures and citizenship in Spanish history,” *Social History* 29 (2004): 284-300.

My argument will demonstrate that Spaniards adopted a modern path in the political transition from absolutism to liberal democracy because local communities were not only invested in the process of political transition but also were to some extent determinative of the outcome of events at the national level.<sup>3</sup> Large cities and small towns alike witnessed the dramatic growth of a politicized constituency, as townsfolk engaged in political discussions in their local taverns and joined secret societies. Far from their previous portrayal as inscrutably “‘primitive’ or ‘archaic’ forms of social agitation,”<sup>4</sup> these secret societies allowed for the further politicization of the population. The level of public involvement in the political realm during the Second Constitutional Period was so strong, in fact, that elites found themselves unable to control the situation. Indeed, the emergence of a flourishing political base at the local level was also seen as a threat by some elites who favored the preservation of a limited role for non-elites in the political workings of the state.

#### THE CONSOLIDATION OF A PUBLIC SPHERE IN WESTERN ANDALUSIA

The Habermasian view of democratization has privileged the emergence of the “public sphere” as a critical turning point in the secularization of politics at the end of the

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<sup>3</sup> A model treatment of the relationship between modernization and public participation in the political realm remains that of Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). On Spain, see Isabel Burdiel and María Cruz Romero, “Old and New Liberalism: The Making of the Liberal Revolution, 1808-1844,” *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 75 (1998): 66-80; and comments in Guy Thomson, *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain: Democracy, Association and Revolution, 1854-75* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 5.

<sup>4</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1959), 1. On the history of secret societies, see also J.M. Roberts, *The Mythology of the Secret Societies* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1972); and Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile: Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

early modern period and positioned this change as an almost inevitable component of the march toward modernity. This narrative has highlighted the crucial role of coffeehouses and other social venues in providing a “discursive space” that allowed for the unmediated flow and maturation of political ideas.<sup>5</sup> As has been stated in previous chapters, the emergence of a public sphere throughout much of Spain was a product of the mid-eighteenth century and was a relatively unremarkable phenomenon in Spanish cities by the early nineteenth century. Román Solís has detailed the strength of the public sphere in Cádiz during the years of the first Cortes of the modern era, noting the importance this discursive space as a backdrop to more formal parliamentary debates over the language of the Constitution of Cádiz.<sup>6</sup> This trend was commonplace in other areas of Spain as well, including Barcelona and, of course, Sevilla.<sup>7</sup>

The public sphere had a greater relevance during the Second Constitutional Period than at any previous point in Spanish history because of the relative stability of social conditions at the time. Spain’s second attempt at constitutional government in 1820 enjoyed a far better social situation than had been the case in 1808-1814. The deprivations caused by war against the French and the occupation itself confronted the inhabitants of Western Andalusia with far greater concerns in 1812 than the successful implementation of a constitutional regime. Trade throughout the Guadalquivir Basin had

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<sup>5</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

<sup>6</sup> Ramón Solís, *La Cádiz de la Cortes. La vida en la ciudad en los años de 1810 a 1813* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1958).

<sup>7</sup> The Cafè de la Font in Barcelona was a case in point. Josep Fontana, *La revolució de 1820* (Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau, 1961), 22.

recovered nicely by 1820.<sup>8</sup> Efforts to reconstruct buildings and infrastructure damaged by the war were already well underway.<sup>9</sup> Thus, unlike those of the First Constitutional Period, the people of Spain during the Second Constitutional Period were undistracted by the menace of severe economic dislocations, famine, and war. Furthermore, from the local tavern to the press, this same population enjoyed a far better variety of avenues to engage in political activity.

The emergence of a public sphere in Spain was facilitated by the expansion of a number of sites for political activity in cities like Sevilla. In 1820, the city of Sevilla was home to fifteen streets with paved sidewalks.<sup>10</sup> Not all of these streets were wide for, as one contemporary put it, “there are not more than two or three through which two carriages could pass abreast.”<sup>11</sup> Such streets were major thoroughfares and essential conduits between important urban spaces. Sidewalks in those days were tiled and served as a conduit for foot traffic in busy thoroughfares where carts and carriages obstructed the gathering of bystanders. Génova Street was included in this growing list of paved streets and figured into the urban geography as both a key point of transit and a public place for gatherings of a wide range of Sevillians drawn from across the various social classes. Long since city’s principal avenue, Génova Street stretched from the main door of the

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<sup>8</sup> Trade with Spanish America enjoyed a certain degree of resilience throughout the War of Independence according to David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the “Spanish Miracle,” 1700-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 119-120.

<sup>9</sup> In the case of the city of Sevilla, this included the creation of new public squares to replace monasteries damaged beyond repair by the French. At least during the period 1820-1823, however, these new spaces did not seem to yield in importance to more historically significant spaces like the Plaza of San Francisco and those adjoining the Cathedral complex.

<sup>10</sup> Manuel Chaves, *La calle Génova de Sevilla* (Sevilla: Librería de José de los Heros, 1911), 13.

<sup>11</sup> Michael J. Quin, *A Visit to Spain; Detailing the transactions which occurred during a residence in that country, in the latter part of 1822, and the first four months of 1823. With general notices of the manners, customs, costume and music of the country* (London: Hurst, Robinson, and Co., 1824), 318.

Cathedral, the heart of festive religious life in Sevilla, to the central square flanked on either side by the city's major civic institutions, the Ayuntamiento and the territorial law courts of the Audiencia. This line of transit and social interaction extended northward from the Plaza of San Fernando along Sierpes Street. Together, Génova Street and Sierpes Street formed the main thoroughfare of the city.

The Génova-Sierpes thoroughfare served as the epicenter of social life for the middling classes, which congregated in its *fondas*, or public taverns. At a *fonda*, visitors sipped coffee, tea, or hot chocolate while listening to someone read aloud the news of the day. During the early years of the nineteenth century, the number of regular periodicals published in Sevilla grew in size and many were circulated through this venue. These establishments served as venues for the production of theatrical shows, the brokering of business deals, the hosting of social events, and the selling of food, wares, and second-hand goods. In many instances, these taverns were also inns, which provided cheap lodging for travelers. Because of this, *fondas* were also sites for the first-hand dissemination of news from neighboring towns and locations further afield.<sup>12</sup>

In a large city like Sevilla, there were certainly many *fondas* comparable to public venues found in other parts of Europe. An English visitor to Sevilla in 1823 remarked that there were several *fondas* modeled “upon the plan of Paris.”<sup>13</sup> Only a limited amount of information about these venues survives. The *fonda* known as El Caballo Blanco (The White Horse) was one that offered several rooms for rent. Rather curiously, it featured the odd placement of a kitchen at the entrance of the establishment, which might mean

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<sup>12</sup> Chaves, 10-11, 13.

<sup>13</sup> Quin, 307.



that it sold food and drinks from the sidewalk.<sup>14</sup> The placement of seating away from the front of this establishment and the gaze of sidewalk spectators might have made this venue useful for illicit activities. Another *fonda*, known as Café de la Cabeza del Turco (Café of the Head of the Turk), featured the bust of a Turkish man over its front door and was supposedly a popular place for the meeting of collaborationists during the era of the French occupation of the city.<sup>15</sup>

The role of Café Génova superseded the importance of all other *fondas* during the Second Constitutional Period. Under the name Café de San Fernando, this same venue had featured as a gathering site for the enemies of Napoleon in 1808.<sup>16</sup> As its name suggested, this *fonda* was located on Génova Street where it abutted the city's principal civic square located in front of the *ayuntamiento*. Owing perhaps to its location, Café Génova was at the center of political organizing among more radical sectors of the political community.<sup>17</sup> During the Second Constitutional Period, this *fonda* and others provided a venue for the circulation of news and information and served as a site for political organizing.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Chaves, 10.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 11-12.

<sup>17</sup> This was so evident that the *fonda* was acknowledged later in colloquial fashion as the Café de los Liberales.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 11-12.

## FROM CONVERSING TO ACTING

Much as they had years earlier, public venues played a central role in performing the business of political transition in 1820. The political freedoms offered by the constitutional regime of the First Constitutional Period provided a space for political organizing in support of Fernando VII in 1814. On the occasion of Fernando VII's return from French exile, one *fonda* in Sevilla served as a useful venue for absolutists to begin preparations for facilitating the restoration of absolutism.<sup>19</sup> Despite the potential for military repression during the early months of 1820, Café Génova featured as a site of political organizing for constitutionalists. In these venues, supporters of the Constitution of Cádiz were able to learn more about the progress of the rebellion in the south and the state of Riego's trek through the wilderness of the Sierra Sur. As *ayuntamientos* in the north of the country began to declare openly for the regime, the regulars of Café Génova plotted revolution on a local scale.

The shift from conversing about rebellion to plotting revolt proceeded quickly, aided by the defection of military personnel. On 10 March regulars of Café Génova, gathered supporters of constitutional rule and marched to the *ayuntamiento* where they interrupted a *cabildo* session and demanded the restoration of constitutional rule in Sevilla. At some point prior to that event, Juan O'Donojú, the provincial military governor of Sevilla, agreed to lead the formation of a local governing *junta* working in collusion with the planners of the revolt. His cooperation secured the loyalty of the military to the cause of revolt and eliminated the possibility of a military intervention. In

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<sup>19</sup> *Los Patriotas del café de la calle fe la Sierpe por Fernando VII* (Sevilla: Imprenta del Setabiense, 1814).

the midst of public revolt, O'Donojú presented himself as a willing convert to the revolution already under way and had his leadership validated by public acclamation.

The planners of the revolt were conscious of the need to make a symbolic statement about what had transpired. In the minutes that followed, the crowd removed the marble plaque denominating the open square in front of the *ayuntamiento* as the Royal Plaza of Fernando VII and smashed it to pieces. In its place, rioters posted a printed sign reading “Plaza of the Constitution.”<sup>20</sup> Once again parish bells rang to signal political change as the new governors rushed to proclaim the transition to officials in neighboring towns.<sup>21</sup>

Also on 10 March, rioters turned their fury on another symbol of absolutism, the Inquisition. Rioters stormed the official residence of the Holy Office in Sevilla housed in the Castle of San Jorge. Long since an enemy of reformers, the Inquisition had been abolished by the Cortes in 1813 and reestablished by Fernando VII upon his restoration to the Spanish throne. In the years after the restoration of absolutism, the Inquisition gained notoriety as a weapon of the crown against perceived threats to the absolutist regime. The resulting confrontation inflicted a heavy toll on the castle, as rioters ransacked room after room in their quest to unveil the secrets of the Inquisition. In the central patio of the building, an immense bonfire was built out of pending case files and the archives of the Inquisition. In the end, rioters succeeded in releasing two persons confined in the castle arrested on suspicion of being masons. As was the case in Madrid, the repressive

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<sup>20</sup> At the start of the First Constitutional Period in 1812, a similar action had renamed the Plaza of Saint Fernando as the Plaza of the Constitution. The space was renamed Royal Plaza of Fernando VII in 1814. See chapter 5.

<sup>21</sup> Velázquez y Sánchez, 246.

reputation of the Inquisition had far outpaced reality.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, this brazen attack in broad daylight rendered a significant symbolic statement.

Symbolic actions like the renaming of the central square before the *ayuntamiento* and the assault on the Inquisition were key to establishing the ascendancy of the new constitutional order, but might have also alienated sectors of the population. The regulars of Café Génova were almost certainly members of the Sevillian middle class. However, their assault on the *ayuntamiento* did not constitute a clearly class oriented struggle. Established elites of the absolutist regime were involved in planning the rising or cooperated with the transition. As with the planning of the revolt in Café Génova, the actual business of facilitating the transition took place inside an enclosed space, which limited the participation of Seville's lowest classes. By contrast, public events like the renaming of the square before the *ayuntamiento* and the storming of the Castle of San Jorge invited the participation of a wider range of the social strata. At the same time, the attack on the Inquisition exposed a more complicated situation. By one chronicler's account, "the common people [*la plebe*] of Sevilla were more a spectator than active participant in the celebration of a regime, whose practices revolted their instincts and clashed with their traditional habits."<sup>23</sup> Nonetheless, organizers evidently sought to recreate a genuinely popular movement similar in many ways to the community of persons responsible for overthrowing the absolutist regime of 1808.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 245. Rioters found only one prisoner lodged in the offices of the Inquisition in Madrid: "a French priest whose extravagant royalism had culminated in a crazy mysticism." H. Butler Clarke, *Modern Spain, 1815-1898* (New York: AMS Press, 1969), 47.

<sup>23</sup> "La plebe de Sevilla era más bien espectadora que parte activa en las fiestas de un régimen, cuyas prácticas repugnaban aun sus instintos, chocando con sus hábitos tradicionales." Velázquez y Sánchez, 247.

As in 1808, there existed a crisis of sovereignty at the national level.<sup>24</sup> In response to this situation, local leaders of the revolt against the absolutist regime of Fernando VII called for the creation of a regional *junta*. This same leadership appointed Francisco Cavaleri, the Marquess of Albetos, Pedro García, Félix Hidalgo, and Zacarías Monge to oversee a *junta* of Sevilla, at least until such time as the Cortes could be called to govern once again. The creation of this *junta* effectively reasserted the right of local communities to establish a sovereign government. Not until Fernando VII swore an oath to uphold the Constitution of Cádiz would the municipal government of Sevilla or surrounding towns recognize the king's claim to rule as a legitimate monarch.

Despite a rather brazen attack on the Inquisition, Sevilla remained a religiously conservative city at the outbreak of the constitutional government in 1820. Contemporaries understood that other groups could exploit the model of political organizing that had provided for the restoration of the constitutional regime. To this end, the ascendent political elites of the restored regime closely watched public events. On 15 March, a Te Deum was sung to celebrate the return of constitutional monarchy without incident. However, during Holy Week, interim provincial *Jefe superior y político* Tomás de Moreno y Daoíz issued an order prohibiting the use of Nazarene dress and nighttime processions.<sup>25</sup> Processions had proven a trigger of counter-revolutionary riots in Cádiz, Alicante, and Valencia.<sup>26</sup> Moreno y Daoíz intended to avert opportune scenarios that might provoke violence from more conservative quarters. Thus, almost from the very

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<sup>24</sup> See chapter 6.

<sup>25</sup> Velázquez y Sánchez, 249.

<sup>26</sup> Moliner y Prada, 123.

beginning, efforts to reimpose constitutional rule had to balance revolution with fears of counter-revolution. Constitutionals had certainly gained the upper hand but understood that a delicate process of conversion that lay ahead.

#### ELITE FACILITATION OF THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALISM

In the wake of his return from French exile and the abrogation of the Constitution of Cádiz in 1814, Fernando VII clearly hoped that local support for the constitutional charter and a working knowledge of constitutionalism would die a quick death. As the tumultuous events of 10 March in Sevilla demonstrated, this was not the case. With the complicity of military leaders who obfuscated the threat of repressive measures, local communities were willing to rally to the cause of constitutionalism. This posed a problem for political elites, who feared the participation of the people in the political realm. Fernando VII's decision to swear an oath to restore and uphold the Constitution of Cádiz on 9 March 1820 provided for the rapid return of constitutional monarchy to peninsular Spain. For local elites, the king's willingness to abide by the terms of the Constitution of Cádiz provided an important element of legitimacy to the restored regime. This gave local elites an opportunity to mitigate the influence of non-elites by restoring the boundary between those individuals in government and the community of the governed through the performance of ritual. This mirrored the response of elites to the situation presented in the aftermath of popular revolt in 1808.

During the Second Constitutional Period, local administration reverted to the form it had taken during the period 1812-1814. Local elites reestablished *ayuntamientos constitucionales* and worked with central officials to coordinate the appointment of

*diputaciones provinciales*. Meanwhile, authorities in Madrid issued a call for elections to convene the Cortes. In response, parish officials began planning the first stage of the electoral process to select provincial deputies. The effect was as a dramatic reversal of absolutism. Local elites worked to restore the constitutional regime rapidly. A wealth of knowledge regarding the Constitution of Cádiz and, more significantly, the basic working components of constitutional rule clearly survived at the local level. The resuscitation of public ceremony from the First Constitutional period spoke to this fact.

During the Second Constitutional Period, local elites restored the highly symbolic ritual practices of the First Constitutional Period. Rituals like the hanging of new plaques on local *ayuntamientos*, oath-swearing ceremonies, and the hearing of mass to accompany special political events unfolded almost naturally. Local officials conducted a flurry of formal ceremonies to accompany the political transition from absolutism to constitutionalism at the local level. Performing the restoration of the constitutional regime in 1820 replicated ceremonial practices surrounding the introduction of constitutional rule in 1812. The first stage in this process required the private adoption of the constitution by members of the local civil and religious establishment. On 8 April 1820, both the secular and ecclesiastical cabildos of Sevilla swore oaths to uphold the Constitution of Cádiz in their respective meetings spaces. Subsequently, these institutions joined together to attend a special performance of *Te Deum s* in the Cathedral.<sup>27</sup>

A second stage in this process involved the formal proclamation of the decision by local elites to adhere to the constitutional regime. At the conclusion of the *Te Deum* on the afternoon of 8 April, a procession of civil and religious dignitaries relocated to the

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<sup>27</sup> Velázquez y Sánchez, 249-250.

*ayuntamiento* for a public reading of the Constitution by the secretary of the secular cabildo. A second reading was presented from a stage erected at the western entrance of the Cathedral. A third reading followed in the Plaza del Triunfo on the south end of the Cathedral. The conclusion of each reading triggered a round of bells and volleys of cannon fire.<sup>28</sup>

A third stage in this process involved the public reception and adoption of the constitutional charter. As was the case years earlier, a public oath-swearing ceremony was held in the Cathedral one day after the adoption of the Constitution of Cádiz by local elites. On 9 April, Sevillians convened in the Cathedral to hear a reading of the Constitution presented for a fourth time by the secretary of the secular cabildo. Following the reading, local prelate Leandro de Flores presented a sermon in which he praised the Constitution of Cádiz as a sacred achievement. At the conclusion of the mass, Moreno y Daoíz called upon the public to swear an oath of loyalty to the Constitution. Having heard his call “being answered by voices of consent,” there followed a Te Deum in commemoration of the event. In the days that followed, Sevillians repeated this act in every parish church within the city walls and at the formal administrative meetings of several civic institutions, including the University of Sevilla and Real Maestranza de Caballería.<sup>29</sup>

The final event of 9 April involved an effort by elites to validate one of the more significant actions taken during the rising of the previous month. The rising of 10 March witnessed the rechristening of the Royal Plaza of Fernando VII as the Plaza of the

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> “*siendo contestando por algunas voces del concurso.*” Velázquez y Sánchez, 250-251.



Constitution. One month later, only a poster served to mark this change. The act of renaming the space had decentered the political significance of the monarchy in the primary civil ceremonial space of Sevilla. Restoring the symbolic position of the royal person offered another means to cement the political hold of elites at the local. The king's willingness to swear on oath of loyalty to the restored regime linked him directly with the Constitution of Cádiz. To this end, local elites hung a portrait of Fernando VII beneath a canopy from the gallery of the *ayuntamiento* overlooking the rechristened space. At the end of May, a marble plaque designed by Antonio Cabral Bejarano replaced the poster amid the noise of bells and canon fire in a service attended by Rafael del Riego, O'Donojú, and Moreno y Daoíz.<sup>30</sup>

At the heart of the political transition of 1820 was the revival of a ritual culture established during the First Constitutional Period. Ritual culture served to mark political transition in 1820 as it had in 1812. As during the First Constitutional Period the staging of political events at the outset of the Second Constitutional Period remained situated firmly within the bounds of political elites. Local elites initially found themselves capable of controlling the public reception of political events through well structured and carefully managed ceremony.

## CONSTITUTIONALISM RESTORED

During the Second Constitutional Period, the popular realm of political engagement expanded from participation in ritual culture to the creation of new proto-party affiliations. Whereas ceremony existed to reify the sense of right and legitimacy

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

underpinning the constitutional regime, these new affiliations suggested a faith in its long-term durability. In other words, the political culture rapidly shifted from a realm in which the essential public debate was over the validity of the constitutional regime to one in which a variety of contested political issues were brought to the fore. The politicization of the elections for the Cortes held in 1820 demonstrated this fact. During the First Constitutional Period, elections focused principally on the advancement of qualified and experienced representatives of the local community to participate in supralocal political assemblies. By contrast, the election held in 1820 witnessed a more concerted interest on the part of local elites to balance several political considerations. The inclusion of Rafael de Riego in this process also witnessed an attempt to incorporate a wider social base into later stages of the electoral process.

Riego was welcomed in Sevilla as a conquering hero (fig. 7). As the best-known figure behind the rebellion, Riego quickly became a symbol of the constitutionalist cause. In this section, I uncover how Riego tainted this image by entering politics at the local level in Sevilla. The behavior of Riego uncovers a tension that existed in the exercise of constitutional government under the Constitution of Cádiz. Although a novel political framework, the Constitution of Cádiz protected the role of privileged elites in the political decision-making process, especially with regard to elections. Riego efforts to make the process more transparent yielded the degree of public interest in the political working of the country and the limitations imposed by the existing political framework. Ultimately, Riego's intervention broke the solemnity of the electoral process, which had been a closed affair during the First Constitutional Period, and invited the public to take greater interest in the political process.



Figure 7: J. Casares, “*Entrada del general Riego en Sevilla*,” Fundación FOCUS-Abengoa, R. 247.

Parish elections constituted the most immediate way in which local communities engaged in the political process. On 30 April, parishes across the province convened to name electors for the selection of provincial deputies to the Cortes. As had been the case during the First Constitutional Period, all male citizens older than 25 years of age were eligible to vote in the selection of parish electors. Men charged with the right to name electors for each provincial *partido judicial* (judicial district) were ultimately to compose the provincial selection committee for deputies to the Cortes. As subsequent events suggested, this system of indirect election left open the possibility of manufactured

results based on the influence and sway of elite actors who owed their status to their position within the deeply entrenched social hierarchy of the Old Regime and of new figures whose public fame emerged as the result of new sources of social mobility wrought by the experience of war and revolution.<sup>31</sup> Characteristic of this trend and chosen on that day to serve within the ranks of parish electors was Rafael del Riego, only recently promoted to the rank of general.

On 8 May, parish electors met in Sevilla. Their first order of business was to attend a mass of the Holy Spirit in the Cathedral with a patriotic exhortation presided over by Canon Andrés de Amaya. Having concluded the mass, parish electors returned to the *ayuntamiento* where they named a *junta* of electors for the province composed of representatives from each *partido*. Certainly up to this point, the practice of politics Sevilla functioned as it had during the First Constitutional Regime. Voters named the Prebendary Pedro Muñoz de Arroyo for Antequera, Francisco Serapio Lancha for Aracena, Prebendary Juan María Pérez for Archidona, Manuel García for Ayamonte, José María Romero Estrada for Carmona, Prebendary Diego Martín Blanco for El Cerro, Fernando de Lugo y Valero for Constantina, Fernando Agustín de Aguilar for Écija, José Salinas Cornejo for Estepa, licenciado and Prebendary Bruno Becerra y Villarroel for Fregenal, Luís Hernández Pinzón for Huelva, José Montalvo y Ovando for Lora del Río, Juan Dias de la Cortina for Marchena, Antonio Romero y Soria for Morón, Antonio García for Osuna, doctor y Prebendary José Contreras y Ruíz for Sanlúcar la Mayor, Diego de Cáceres for Villalba del Alcor, and Juan Vicente Giralde for Utrera. For the

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<sup>31</sup> Normally parish elections were scheduled for the first Sunday of October, Constitution of Cádiz, Title 3, Chap. III, Art 36. On participatory qualifications, see Art. 35. On mass of Holy Spirit, see Art. 47, and on *Te Deum*, see Art. 58.

three *partidos* of Sevilla, the voters named as electors Prebendary and University of Sevilla Professor Juan Francisco Zapata, Gregorio González Azaola, and most significantly the now General Rafael del Riego y Nuñez, whose very presence immediately politicized the public position of a mostly bureaucratic body which had been heretofore a kind of insulation from the sort of highly politicized election processes that had been so destabilizing in the French case and elsewhere. The membership of this final group of province-wide electors finalized, once again the group returned to the Cathedral for a *Te Deum* mass. It seems as though conclusion of that mass signaled the beginnings of an intense round of political negotiations that would ultimately involve the public at large.<sup>32</sup>

The public knew of those negotiations derived from an account published by Riego. In a pamphlet published a day after the selection of provincial deputies to the Cortes on 22 May, Riego acknowledged that *partido* electors had gathered for “three or four meetings (*juntas*)” at his lodgings in advance of the formal deliberations. Although having professed an interest to remain apart from the business of politics, Riego now found himself at the heart of provincial intrigue. “Co-citizens and friends of mine,” he explained, “The same interest that thrust me into the [political] arena with a sword in hand to avenge my Patria and restore her to liberty ... compelled me against the misgivings of my heart to accept the most delicate office of *partido* Elector for Sevilla.”<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> In fact, parish electors were supposed to meet in the capital of the *partido*, see Constitution of Cádiz, Title 3, Chap. IV, Art. 59, and convene on the first Sunday of November, see Art. 60. On mass of the Holy Spirit, see Art. 71; *Te Deum* not required by the Constitution. Velázquez y Sánchez, 251-252.

<sup>33</sup> “*Conciudadanos y amigos míos: El mismo interés que me arrojó en la arena con la espada en la mano para vengar mi Patria y restituir á ella su libertad ... me estimuló contra los presentimientos de mi corazón á aceptar el delicadísimo ministerio de Elector de partido por Sevilla.*” Rafael del Riego,

Riego stressed that these meetings had been a critical means for electors to refine (*depurar*) the list of possible candidates to a select the few whose credentials as constitutionalists were beyond question.

Riego's words offer insight into the deliberations that went into selecting deputies. In one place, the document lauded the credentials of Manuel López Cepero, priest of the parish church of El Sagrario.<sup>34</sup> In another, Riego explained the disqualification of University of Sevilla humanities professor Félix José Reinoso on the grounds of having once written words supporting the creation of a bicameral system of representation.<sup>35</sup> Although, he could not offer a verbatim presentation of the monologue presented by an elector named Magistral, Riego summed up the words presented against Reinoso in this fashion:

Freedom of opinion is one of the fundamental laws of our Constitution. Without it there can be no representative system, nor is it possible in the absence of malice to make it a crime that a citizen might have various and opposing views to those of the Constitution in this or that article: our legislators are men. Infallibility is not a quality attached to [the Constitution's] sublime character. [Legislators] may lose themselves. They may slip into errors from which no mortal is immune. In the representative system, in the system of freedom, one may deem himself well-deserving of a Patria and of a Government he who [navigates] with lights (*luces*) to aid him along a path outlined in the Constitution. [This] is the most direct road to correct the shortcomings that may have found their way into the present work.<sup>36</sup>

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*Manifiesto de Don Rafael del Riego, elector del partido de Sevilla, á todos los de la provincia* (Sevilla: Imprenta de D. Bartolomé Manuel Caro, 1820), 1.

<sup>34</sup> Riego, *Manifiesto de Don Rafael del Riego*, 1-2, 6

<sup>35</sup> Bicameral assemblies offered a more limited version of franchise favored by social elites and political conservatives.

<sup>36</sup> “*La libertad de las opiniones es una de las leyes fundamentales de nuestra Constitucion: sin ella no puede existir el sistema representativo, ni es posible sin malignidad imputar á crimen el que un ciudadano tenga opiniones diversas y opuestas á las de la Constitucion en tal ó cual artículo: nuestros legisladores son hombres; la infalibilidad no es una cualidad anexa a su caracter sublime; pueden haberse*

Although a respected figure, Reinoso's seemed too much at odds with the Constitution for Riego and his peers, who feared that an upper chamber of parliament would put a hold on the speed of political reform. In short, the pamphlet suggested that a healthy degree of debate went into deliberations and that electors did not simply elevate Old Regime elites to new positions of authority without the due diligence required of "enlightened" public officials and loyal constitutionalists. At least this was the view for which Riego tried to secure public support. Electors were problematic for the effective exercise of the public will as one man could only imperfectly reflect the desires of several. Riego understood this fact, and attempted to circumvent this problem by making the reasoning of the electors and matter of public record.

Representatives of rural areas were intent to use the state of political affairs to their advantage by means of leveraging the significant number of *partido* electors drawn from beyond the walls of the regional metropole. Historically representation in the Cortes had been a privilege of the Spanish Monarchy's major cities. Motivated by Antonio García, *partido* elector for Osuna, who "insisted with such intensity not to concede to Sevilla more than two deputies, having in the *partidos* men of such merit markedly superior" to those in Sevilla, a significant block of provincial electors were committed to the cause of granting smaller towns and rural areas a greater role in the Cortes. It seems García was successful in committing Riego to his agenda. Riego commented in the

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*extraviado; pueden haberse deslizado en errores de que ningun mortal está exento: en el sistema representativo, en el sistema de la libertad se reputa benemérito de la Patria y del Gobierno aquel que con sus luces las auxilia por la senda trazada en la Constitucion: es el camino mas directo para corregir las faltas que pueden haberse mezclado en su obra.* " The pamphlet identifies one "citizen Magistral of Antequera, Elector for that partido," however only Pedro Muñoz advanced to the rank of *partido* elector for Antequera according to several sources. It was likely the case that Magistral was a parish elector who attended the informal gatherings at Riego's lodgings where he presented the case against Reinoso. Riego, *Manifiesto de Don Rafael del Riego*, 2.

pamphlet that at one point his effort to advance consideration of Coronel Antonio Remón del Valle y Zarco, a personal preference and a candidate publically supported by both Captain-General O'Donojú and provincial Jefe Político Superior Moreno y Daoíz, stemmed from the fact that he would have unbalanced a sort of *partido*-based quota system. Indeed informal caucusing around specific candidates or political ends appears to having been a common practice.<sup>37</sup>

At some point it appears Riego joined an informal four-person voting bloc, which, apart from himself, included *partido* electors Antonio Romero of Morón, Fernando Aguilar of Écija, and Pedro Muñoz of Antequera. Together, these men worked to advance the cause of several prospective candidates, del Valle y Zarco among them. It appears as though contemporaries took the view that the hero of Las Cabezas had attempted to fix the outcome of the results in some fashion. If this was the case, it was quite nearly a wholesale failure. Ultimately, it became a source of lasting embarrassment for Riego. The efforts of this gang of four were discovered and made public. Riego was shamed for attempting to subvert the supposed secretive machinations of absolutists with secretive political dealings of his own. Riego's entry into politics at the local level in Sevilla transformed him from hero to political opportunist in the public eye.<sup>38</sup>

The actual election of deputies unfolded without incident. On 22 May, the electors attended a mass of the Holy Spirit in the Cathedral before relocating to the neighboring Lonja to name the seven provincial deputies of Sevilla to the Cortes in a session presided

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 1, 5.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 3-5.



over by provincial Jefe Político Moreno y Daoíz.<sup>39</sup> The outcome of deliberations was the appointment to the Cortes of the large landowner and mayor of Sevilla Francisco Cavaleri, José Manuel López Cepero, and Gregorio González Azaola of Sevilla, elector for Osuna Antonio García, Manuel Sánchez Toscano of Huelva, María Vecino of Morón, and elector for Sevilla Juan Francisco Zapata. As alternates, the electors further named Juan Muñoz de Alanís of Estepa, José de Mier of Paterna (today Paterna del Campo), and Antonio María Rojas of Ayamonte. Having concluded its business, the *junta* decamped to the Cathedral once again to observe a Te Deum mass in celebration of the sacred act.<sup>40</sup> In total, four deputies were drawn from the city of Sevilla. The populous towns and rural areas of the province were left with three of the seven seats. Nonetheless, having failed to block the sway of the city, García did succeed in winning a seat of his own as one of the seven deputies for the Province of Sevilla.

Riego was determined to have the final say. The pamphlet was dated two days after the deliberations of the *juntas of partido* electors, and might very well have been drafted a day or two earlier when Riego's memory of events was still fresh. Riego counted Gonzalez Azaola among the "defenders of despotism" and called into question the length of his residency in Sevilla, an essential requirement to serve as deputy in the Cortes. Similarly, Riego hinted that the same eligibility requirements discredited Sánchez Toscana, who was in a state of personal bankruptcy and therefore not, as the Constitution required, "in the full exercise of his rights." Riego even went so far as to blast García for

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<sup>39</sup> Because of the accelerated timeline for elections required by the restoration of the constitutional regime, the meeting date did not correspond to the first Sunday of the month of December as required under the Constitution of Cádiz, Title 3, Chap. V, Art. 79. On the requirement to hold a Mass of the Holy Spirit, see Cap. V, Art. 86; on the presidency see Art. 81.

<sup>40</sup> Velázquez y Sánchez, 252.

his “unsteadiness” (*inconsecuencia*) of mind for having allowed the city to hold such sway in the naming of deputies. At least in some ways, Riego’s behavior suggested an obligation to maintain a state of full disclosure as a means to promote the sort of government transparency not seen under absolutism. However, a second reading was perhaps more persuasive. Riego closed by speaking on behalf of the gang of four expressing the hope that “this impartial writing ... will be our apology for all time’s sake, the most solemn proof of our [political] disinterestedness and love of country.” While hard to accept with the full vantage of historical perspective, it seems Riego intended the document as an expression of his loyalty not to any one political faction but rather to the idea of constitutionalism itself.<sup>41</sup> Whether this owed to a certain political naïveté – highly likely – or a more nefarious attempt to disavow all knowledge of the political realities at work remains unclear. The political factionalism that made the political distinctions between liberals and conservatives so pronounced in later years had not yet fully matured. However, by inviting the public into the otherwise closed realm of electoral decision-making process, Riego also provided a means for the public to become for invested in the outcome of the political process.

## THE RISE AND CRISIS OF A NEW ASSOCIATIONAL CULTURE

The rise of a new associational culture signaled the beginnings of a critical stage in the political history of Western Andalusia. A “new sociability” had marked the expansion of the European Enlightenment, as groups of learned individuals met to

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<sup>41</sup> “*Este escrito imparcial ... será nuestra apologia en todos tiempos y la prueba mas solemne de nuestro desinterés y amor á nuestra Patria.*” Riego, *Manifiesto de Don Rafael del Riego*, 5. On eligibility to serve as a Deputy of the Cortes, see Constitution of Cádiz, Title 3, Chap. V, Art. 91.

exchange ideas and discuss new discoveries. In Sevilla, the *tertulia* of Pablo de Olavide facilitated the emergence of this practice in Western Andalusia. However, these groups did not typically engage themselves in the discussion of politics. This changed with the advent of the Riego rebellion. The actions of Riego during his military campaign and through his involvement in the electoral process of 1820 invited the people of Western Andalusia take part in the political realm. Citizens clearly desired a means to channel their political interests into action. Because aristocrats continued to dominate municipal governments, non-aristocrats worked to fashion a space of their own for engaging in political maneuvering. Patriotic societies (*sociedades patrióticas*) and secret societies like the Comuneros and Anilleros were situated at the heart of this process.

Patriotic societies grew out of the tradition of the economic societies of Amigos del País. These societies emerged in the late eighteenth century upon the model of the Sociedad Vascongada, started in Basque Country during the 1760s at the behest of the Count of Campomanes. Patriotic societies formed in major towns like Sevilla form the remnants of important institutional predecessors like local Amigos del País. One such institution formed at Osuna in 1820.<sup>42</sup> Patriotic societies centered on the discussion of politics and generally supported the constitutional regime. Because patriotic societies often met in *fondas*, these discussions were effectively public.<sup>43</sup> To speak of these groups as a complete mix of social groups would be misleading. *Fondas* were often the reserve

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<sup>42</sup> This is perhaps not surprising considering that Osuna, though not the largest town in the province after Sevilla, was the home of a ducal court that had shown itself to be a strong patron of other civic institutions, including the Sociedad Económica de Osuna with its roots in the eighteenth century. Alberto Gil Novales, *Las Sociedades Patrióticas, 1820-1823. Las libertades de expresión y de reunión en el origen de los partidos políticos*, Vol. 1 (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1975), 9-10.

<sup>43</sup> By contrast, Olavide would host his *tertulias* in the comparatively private confines of the Real Alcázar.

of the middle classes. Nonetheless, they catered to a wide spectrum of clientele. Whether directly associated with a specific political society or otherwise, this clientele could form the basis of an urban mob and figured as a convenient tool for political agitators. In contrast to such public associations were the secret societies that gained new importance during this period.

Secret societies constituted a second kind of associational culture that developed during the Second Constitutional Period. Secret societies were not altogether new to Spain. The Masons were active in Spain throughout 1814-1819.<sup>44</sup> However, the Second Constitutional Period witnessed a rapid proliferation of new secret societies that were not linked directly to existing Masonic lodges. Furthermore, several of these groups were very successful at advancing their political agendas through effective use of printed sources and other forms of propaganda. The terms of membership in these groups were secret. However, the essential purpose of these groups was well known. All of these groups could claim a political purpose and most were created to defend of the Constitution of Cádiz.

The Comuneros were indicative of new secret societies and were perhaps the best known of these groups. A strong belief in the supremacy of local government animated this group. Indeed, the Comuneros took their name from the failed revolt of 1520, in which the towns of Castile had attempted to resist the Habsburg inheritance of the Spanish throne. Historians know a great deal about this group because the constitution of

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<sup>44</sup> An extensive literature exists on the role of Masons in Spanish politics during this period. However, much of this literature dates to the Franco era when Masons were vilified as part of a foreign plot to import revolution from abroad. New scholarship has called into question the sometimes fantastic role ascribed to Masonic lodges in organizing political conspiracies and the like. Regardless of the extent of their political organizing, Masonic lodges were likely limited to social elites and were not a source that provided for the inclusion of new social groups in the political realm.

the Comuneros was published in 1822.<sup>45</sup> Local Comunero groups were linked to an extensive multilevel organization. Groups of two to six members were known as *merindades*. *Torres*, composed of several *merindades* were often headquartered in larger towns. Regional capitals, like Sevilla, were home to *castillos*, which coordinated the activities of several *torres*. This structure mimicked the local units of parish, *partido* and province that served as the organizational structure behind the electoral process set forth in the Constitution of Cádiz.

Secret societies were an important step in the development of what would later become popular political parties. The localist stance of the Comuneros served as an effective means of recruiting followers. A less popular secret society, known as the Sociedad del Anillo (Society of the Ring), demonstrated the variety of political positions adopted by secret societies during this period. Anilleros were constitutionalists, but favored a more conservative political regime that would feature greater powers for the central government. Senior leaders of this organization included drafters of the Constitution of Cádiz like Francisco Martínez de la Rosa and the Count of Toreno.

A third kind of collective actor developed during this period. Anti-constitutionalists reformed guerillas bands as a means to weaken the restored constitutional regime. An attack on the town of Villanueva de Córdoba to the northeast of Sevilla in 1822 highlights this fact. In this instance, an *ad hoc* group of anti-constitutionalists attacked the town, targeting the constitutional plaque affixed to the local

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<sup>45</sup> Anastasio López, “Constitución de la confederación de los caballeros Comuneros, y reglamento por el gobierno interior de las fortalezas, torres y castillos de todas las merindades de España Madrid: en la Imprenta del Imparcial,” *Pararayo sevillano contra tormentas políticas y morales*, May 2, 1822, 18-23.

*ayuntamiento*.<sup>46</sup> The use of symbolic violence in this instance suggested the limited political repertoire of this sort of group. Although the social composition of this group remains unclear, it is likely that several non-aristocrats were involved in this attack. While anti-constitutionalist guerilla groups were not very active in Western Andalusia during the Second Constitutional Period, they were quite the specter of revolt in other parts of Spain.

Beginning in 1822, outright rebellion against the constitutional regime broke in several parts of the country. Central Old Castile witnessed the rise of a conservative counter-revolution, resisted in large part by the formation of pro-constitutional guerrilla movements in the remote countryside. At around the same time, revolt in rural Catalonia spread to the region's wine-growing region, which had seen a collapse of its market with the loss of colonial revenues.<sup>47</sup> Also in 1822, several towns in Catalonia were in a state of open revolt against the constitutional regime. At least in a few instances these towns also formalized their act of defiance to the constitutional regime by smashing municipal plaques hung to commemorate the Constitution.<sup>48</sup> In some areas, the rebellion survived to the end of the Second Constitutional Period, though virtually whole of the Catalan coastline remained loyal to the constitutional cause. These rebellions suggest the emergence of non-elite political mobilization beyond Western Andalusia.

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<sup>46</sup> "Copia literal del parte remitido por el gefe superior político de Cordoba," *Diario económico de la ciudad y provincia de Sevilla*. June 11, 1822, suplement.

<sup>47</sup> Torras Elías, 35-56.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, 69-71.

## CAPITAL ONCE AGAIN

The emergence of new associational culture and the advent of mobilization across class boundaries provoked panic among more conservative political ranks. The formation of a central government headed by Francisco Martínez de la Rosa in February of 1822 posed to the possibility of a moderate turn in the course of political events. But in the summer of that same year, a revolt from within the ranks of the Royal Guards meant to restore absolutism precipitated instead the rise of a more radical government under Evaristo San Miguel.<sup>49</sup> Throughout the summer, the activities of the revolutionary societies became more hostile, even revolutionary, refusing any suggestion of moderation and calling for the end of Bourbon rule altogether.<sup>50</sup> When confronted with more threats of counter-revolution, the San Miguel government took a defiant stance, declaring its continued support for the Constitution of Cádiz. Meanwhile, the bulk of population situated in the lowest rungs of the social ladder remained uninvested in either the constitutional regime or its alternatives.

The radicalization of events in Spain triggered the attention of the European powers and sparked a military intervention by France.<sup>51</sup> In the spring of 1823, the Cortes

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<sup>49</sup> Sánchez-Mantero, *Los Cien Mil Hijos de San Luis y las relaciones franco-españoles* (Sevilla: University of Sevilla, 1981), 13, 20.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, 20-21.

<sup>51</sup> Assembled at the Congress of Verona (1822), the Holy Alliance agreed to support a French invasion of peninsular Spain led by Louis-Antoine d'Artois, Duke of Angoulême and heir apparent to the Crown of France. European potentates had deferred the question of intervention in Spain on two separate occasions at the Congresses of Troppau and Leibach, held in 1820 and 1820-1821, respectively. Admittedly, at the time, threat of revolution in Italy was the far more pressing concern, especially for the Eastern powers. In the interim, the pace of revolution in Portugal had also raised concern. Although the British delegate Arthur Wellesley, by then Duke of Wellington, refused to support the cause of intervention against former allies of the peninsular campaigns, the other Congress attendees rallied behind a French offer to intervene in Spain as Austria had done in Italy only a year before. France, for its part, had not been thoroughly opposed to the idea of a moderate monarchy at its borders. The regime of Louis XVIII was itself

faced capture by the French army under the command of the Duke of Angoulême. It chose to relocate to Sevilla. The move mimicked the course taken by the Central Junta in 1808 when confronted by the threat of capture from Napoleon. According to English traveler Michael J. Quin, the king's arrival in Sevilla was marked by a somber mood set against rainfall.<sup>52</sup> Authorities went to great lengths towards energizing Sevillians in advance of the king's arrival – bringing frequent attention to the considerable prestige the city was said to gain while serving as capital – in order to finance the considerable cost of receiving him. However, donations to this effect were meager.<sup>53</sup> As was custom, the Ayuntamiento invited the inhabitants of the city to decorate their residences and prepare for three nights of illuminations. Quin noted that a public edict of a “peculiar nature” ordered all taverns to close at three o'clock – obviously so as to avoid public disorders.<sup>54</sup> Although tensions ran high, the arrival itself was so without incident as to have warranted Quin's description of the event as akin to watching “a funeral procession ... so uninteresting ... so melancholy.”<sup>55</sup> Once so “desired” a political figure, the king was now little more than an embarrassment; a reminder of Spain's weakness to foreign pressure and the still unrealized potential for political change that had embodied the start of revolution only three years earlier.

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obliged to adhere to constitutional limitations established by the Charter of 1814. In France, experienced politicians and veterans of the French campaigns in Spain under Napoleon warned against regime change channeling the horrors of guerrilla warfare and the lingering sting of defeat still fresh in their minds. Others chided them for drawing parallels with 1808 when French armies fought to impose a new monarchy under Joseph Bonaparte. On this occasion, the French army intended to launch an invasion not to secure the ouster of Fernando VII but instead to defend his continued rule.

<sup>52</sup> Quin, 318.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 304, 308, 314-5.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 318.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 320-1.



The arrival of the Cortes led to the reorganization of political space in the city. Fernando VII secured the Real Alcázar as his place of residence, which made the former home of the Central Junta insuitable for the Cortes. As its meeting place, the Cortes chose the church of San Hermenegildo, vacant since the expulsion of the Jesuits in the eighteenth century. Agustín Argüelles, architect of the Constitution of Cádiz, and fellow member of the Cortes Alcalá Galiano are known to have taken up residence in a *fonda* managed by Antonio Castañeda on Génova Street.<sup>56</sup>

The arrival of the central government did not reorder the usage of space in the city considerably. With the notable exception of the church of San Hermenegildo, the central government made use of existing political spaces. The king made use of the former residence of the royal Asistente. At least some of the deputies appear to have wasted little time inserting themselves into the nerve center of political life in the city located along Génova Street. Members of the Cortes mingled with local political elites. To contemporaries this likely suggested a close, almost near indistinguishable relationship between the central and local governments.

Michael J. Quin's arrival in Sevilla at the twilight of the Second Constitutional Period offers a useful frame for thinking about the collapse of the regime. As an outsider, Quin cuts through much of the political tension apparent in the writing of Spanish contemporaries in the retelling of his visit. Published in London a year after the fall of the Second Constitutional Period, Quin's travel narrative focused extensively on the political situation in Sevilla, intent to capitalize on the attention Spain's failed constitutional

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<sup>56</sup> Chaves, 11.

regime had garnered in the English press. His account was rather frank with regard to the prevailing political spirit of the city:

I made some inquires [sic] into the feeling of the Sevillians with regard to the Constitution, and the answers received from persons resident here for some years, were shortly to this effect. That when the Constitution was first proclaimed, a number of rich proprietors, and of steady commercial men embarked ardently in the cause, under the hope that liberal institutions would tend greatly to the amelioration of their different interests. Within the last year, however, the frequent changes of ministry produced corresponding alterations in all the offices within the reach of their power; and the displacements and successions directed by the actual ministry, soon after they came into office, were particularly peremptory and extensive. The new *employes*, it was said, consist mostly of that half-educated gentry, who, after leaving school, had spent the greatest part of their lives in the coffee-houses, and billiard and gambling rooms; and when they found themselves invested with authority, they exercised it in a rude, and sometimes oppressive manner, assuming to themselves the character of exclusive and ultra zealous Constitutionalists. The early and rational friends of the Constitution frequently experienced causes of disgust in the conduct of these new men; and they found, according to their views and feelings, fifty petty tyrants, where only the influence of the one was formerly distantly felt. They, in consequence, retired from the scene of public affairs altogether, and yielded it to the Exaltados—so the new men were here, as elsewhere, styled. The result of these proceedings upon the general spirit of Sevilla was to render it exceedingly indifferent towards the Constitution.<sup>57</sup>

Quin's account demonstrated that the introduction of a new associational culture accelerated a process of political cleavage, which led to the rapid polarization of Spanish politics in Western Andalusia as elsewhere in Spain between radical constitutionalists and old guard conservatives.

Quin's remarks reflect the extent to which the divisions of the Second Constitutional Period provoked a reactionary response of the part of Sevillians. He further noted that the Church supported neither one side nor the other in this conflict, but

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<sup>57</sup> Quin, 312-3.

rather engaged the public only in the routine performance of religious duties.<sup>58</sup> Unlike the First Constitutional Period, the zeal of priests at the pulpit in support of the constitutional regime lacked outside of formal public ceremonies. The role of religious authorities was significant, especially in Sevilla, where many contemporaries claimed the hold of religion was stronger than elsewhere in the peninsula. In a telling comment, Quin noted the general state of political indifference on the part of Sevillians as “a barbarism of which the Madrid emigrants complained.”<sup>59</sup> In summarizing his thoughts on the survival of the constitutional regime in Spain at the conclusion of his account, Quin offered a third appraisal of the situation:

The Constitution, no matter what may be its excellence or imperfection, has certainly not succeeded in gathering around it the sentiments and good wishes of a majority of the people of that country ... From my own observations and those of others, I can safely state that the great majority of the people ... desired nothing so much as peace. They have been vexed and injured by repeated contributions and conscriptions, and lately, by anticipations of the current year's taxes, their means of complying with them being extremely limited. The agitations prevailing the last two years in Spain have, in a great measure, suspended the usual internal trade of the provinces, and the people were called upon to make fresh sacrifices—one day to the factious, the next day to the Constitutionals, at a time when they were impoverished beyond all precedent.<sup>60</sup>

As a foreign traveler, Quin was relatively established, socially speaking, and would not have been an active participant of gatherings situated at the bottom of the local social hierarchy. That the deprivations of wartime exactions and the economic dislocations were so evident speaks to the extremity of the situation. It also suggests that the relatively affluent commercial class did not see the case for change aligning well with the potential

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 331.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 332.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 317.

for future financial prosperity. Moreover, the difference of one regime from the next does not appear to have been effectively articulated to contemporaries. The vast majority of the population remained unmoved by the political events transpiring around them, preferring instead to remain divested from the political process.

The disaffection of the lowest classes was devastating for the constitutional regime in the face of foreign invasion.<sup>61</sup> Facing capture, the government in Sevilla agreed to relocate to Cádiz, as the Central Junta had done in 1810. Cádiz's formidable defensive position had once shielded the Cortes from French attack and offered to do so once again, though it was perhaps the enthusiasm of the *gaditanos* for the Constitution of Cádiz that proved the more convincing argument. The city of Cádiz remained in 1823 as steadfastly constitutional as it had been during the years of restored absolutism. Quin noted in his visit to the city that there hung "over the door of almost every house an article of the Constitution, such as the proprietor selects as appertaining to his trade or profession, or expressive of a favourite principle ... written in large letters of gold on a wooden tablet."<sup>62</sup>

Supporters of the constitutional regime fled Sevilla with the Cortes. Fernando VII was said to have left Sevilla amid cries of "*¡Viva la Religion!*" (Long Live Religion!) and "*¡Viva el Rey Absoluto!*" (Long Live the Absolute King!).<sup>63</sup> In the absence of its king,

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<sup>61</sup> A large French army entered Spain in April of 1823. Spanish regular units were largely ineffective against the French. Many generals put up only token resistance before fleeing abroad, often to England. Few cities even put up a fight. Zaragoza, the site of two brutal sieges against the French during the War of Independence, and one of the first cities to declare for the constitutional regime, allowed the French to enter their gates without resistance. Madrid was taken on 23 May. On the invasion, see Stanley G. Payne, *Ejército y sociedad en la España liberal, 1808-1936* (Madrid: 1977), 30-31.

<sup>62</sup> Quin, 327-8.

<sup>63</sup> Clarke, 69.

the city of Sevilla welcomed the French army with open arms as it made its way to Cádiz. As news of Sevilla's transition made it to smaller towns, locals undertook the process of performing similar transitions back to the form of political arrangements as they stood in late 1819. Late on the evening of 15 June, the people (*el pueblo*) of Marchena gathered in their central square to remove the tablet affixed to the *ayuntamiento* proclaiming the town's allegiance to the constitutional regime. The *cabildo* records clearly indicate that townsfolk then openly "proclaimed for the Sovereignty of the O[ur] L[ord] King Don Fernando VII." Late that same night a small detachment of troops arrived seeking rations the town, which was obligated to provide for their needs. Once again, a public manifestation served as the essential precursor to the restoration of absolutism in the countryside.<sup>64</sup>

The next day, spontaneity was replaced by a sense of order and formality. Constitutional officials were formally ejected from office. Senior Mayor Celedonio Josef de Arpe and his second, Bernardo de Vergara, selected a new *cabildo* in its place. Interestingly, the *cabildo* ordered that all townsfolk remain armed until such time as the constitutional units were no longer a threat to the town, and also as a protection against ultra-royalists (*Extra-realistas*) and rogue French units. The town feared attacks from groups on both ends of the political spectrum and sought to remain independent. No person was allowed to leave the city armed. Instead, standing orders required all persons entering the countryside to tend to the fields must first leave weapons in the possession of the *ayuntamiento*. Evidently the *ayuntamiento* feared the dispersal of armed townsfolk

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<sup>64</sup> "...proclamaron por la Soberanía de N.º S.º El Rey Don Fernando VII." AMM, AC, Book 23, session dated 16 June 1823. Fernando VII actually refused to consider relocating to Cádiz. The government ruled Fernando VII incapacitated and formed a constitutional regency to drag him out of the city by force in mid-June.

into the hills where guerilla bands were likely to form. Aside from fears of a guerilla insurrection, the *cabildo* remained worried about the threat of additional urban disturbances. All taverns were ordered closed at the conclusion of the nightly mass and all bell towers were quieted except in case of emergency. Establishing a curfew and limiting access to the bells had the effect of limiting the ability of constitutionalists to organize a counter-transition or aid the doomed constitutional regime in any significant way. Before concluding its business for the day, the *cabildo* sent word to Sevilla and the neighboring municipalities of Arahal, Osuna and Écija stating the municipality's new allegiance and that public order remained undisturbed.<sup>65</sup>

Events transpired in a similar fashion to the north of Sevilla, where on 16 June Lora del Río also witnessed the removal of the constitutional plaque from City Hall amid a tolling of bells. A solemn *Te Deum* was sung in the principal church featuring the prominent placement of a portrait of Fernando VII.<sup>66</sup> In a letter saved in the *cabildo* records of Lora del Río, the Royal Commissioner for the Four Kingdoms of Andalusia, Antonio Maria de Segovia, asserted that *ayuntamientos* and justices of the peace represented “the greater part of the good administration and happiness of the towns” and so were considered of great interest to the restored regime. In a decree dated 9 April, the king ordered that municipalities drop all changes initiated by the constitutional regime. Furthermore, all *ayuntamientos* were ordered to reconstitute themselves as they appeared on 1 March 1820.<sup>67</sup> Lora del Río like Marchena did not abide by this request in exact

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<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>66</sup> AMLR, AC, Book 22, *auto de cabildo* dated 16 June 1823.

<sup>67</sup> AMLR, AC, Book 22, printed letter dated 16 June 1823.

form. Precisely why this was the case remains uncertain. In each instance the general nature and scope of local administration returned as it last appeared prior to the start of the Second Constitutional Period.

Throughout Western Andalusia, local communities witnessed the return of absolutism amid mundane formality. Municipal *cabildos* rapidly dissolved themselves and restored municipal officers initially deposed in the spring of 1820. Local elites, regardless of their political sympathies, understood that it would be impossible to muster sufficient civilian resistance as to prove capable of withstanding the brunt of an extended military engagement with the French. In the military sphere, the war ground to a virtual standstill as well. The Battle of Trocadero in late August secured the eventual defeat of the constitutional regime. Before the French began a full-scale assault on Cádiz in mid-September, they received word that the Cortes had dissolved itself and Fernando was effectively free to act once more as an absolute sovereign.

## CONCLUSION

The constitutional regime in force between 1820 and 1823 crumbled precisely because it proved incapable of restoring order and stability to Spain. Constitutional government provided for a political awakening at the local level that destabilized the position of political elites to manage the political situation as they had in 1812-1814. This situation failed to resolve fundamentally the crisis of sovereignty that persisted in the aftermath of the Bourbon restoration of 1814. Like its predecessor, the restored constitutional regime struggled to impose order through central institutions and was instead overwhelmed by fractious politics at the local level. The infusion of constitutional

politics into a stronger public sphere succeeded in achieving a deep political division in place of political unity. The end result was a citizenry that was largely disaffected by the practice of national politics. This sense of withdrawal served only to deepen the retreat of local communities from participating in the construction of a strong central government.

At the local level, the Second Constitutional Period closed a cycle of change in the realm of political culture that dated to the middle part of the eighteenth century. Royal reforms initiated in 1766 sought to invigorate the practice of politics at the local level through the incorporation of representatives of the Commons into the composition of municipal cabildos. That project failed to overcome the influence of local aristocratic elites. The crisis of sovereignty that opened in 1808 allowed for the emergence of new systems of rule that posed the possibility but did not fulfill the goal of widening the scope of social participation in local government. However, it was during the Second Constitutional Period that the practice of politics at the local level broadened to include the participation of historically excluded groups. With this achievement, the local communities of Western Andalusia transitioned into the domain of political modernity.



## CONCLUSION

Between 1766 and 1823, local political culture in Western Andalusia underwent a profound transformation. This transformation affected most significantly the relationship of local communities to the central government. During the early modern period, municipalities enjoyed a roughly egalitarian relationship with the monarchy. Although the towns of Western Andalusia were effectively subjects of the crown, the political vision of the state enshrined in the governing philosophy of the Spanish Monarchy viewed municipalities as partners in the performance of good government. At the start of the nineteenth century, the crisis of sovereignty that developed in response to the French invasion of 1808 precipitated a significant change in the relationship between the central and local governments. As local communities embraced the principle of self-rule, they became resistant to the idea of a centralized state. Correspondingly, the central state made the terms of interaction between different political institutions more clearly demarcated, even adding additional layers of government.

At the middle of the eighteenth century, the municipalities of Western Andalusia found themselves situated within an ancient and enduring political system that treated them like partners in the maintenance of political order. The philosophical origins of this partnership dated perhaps as far back to ancient times when individual *municipia* were established by the Roman Senate to accelerate the process of imperial expansion in the Mediterranean world. Self-functioning towns were seen to embody the best virtues of Roman law, which would later serve as the foundation of the medieval Spanish legal system. The transition of the Pagan world to Christianity had further deepened the role of

towns as autonomous centers of government that shared power with diocesan and metropolitan centers.

The transition from antiquity to the medieval period was not a perfect one with regard to the practice of politics in Western Andalusia. The situation that presented itself in Western Andalusia was complicated by more than five hundred years of Muslim rule. Especially in Southern Iberia, a political relationship emerged between central governments and autonomous local communities that focused on the interplay of noble and religious elites. This relationship emerged out of the complex political history of the Castilian conquest of the Moorish taifa kingdoms in Southern Iberia. The crown had relied on the aristocracy, the Church, and crusading orders to wage war and to settle this region. Representatives of these elite groups were rewarded handsomely with land in compensation for their services. At the same time, these elites retained a sense of ownership in the securing of the monarchy's great victory that informed their right to take part in government. Under the Habsburgs, the influence of aristocratic control increased as the crown took elite payments in exchange for the creation of more towns. Thus, the survival of the Spanish Monarchy as a whole came to rely on the loyalty of political elites willingly given in exchange for an increased stake in local affairs and effective autonomy from the central government.

The arrival of the Bourbon monarchy at the start of the eighteenth century disrupted this balance because it sought to restructure a highly decentralized Spanish Monarchy along firmly centralized lines. The earliest stages of reform, launched during the reign of Felipe V in the aftermath of the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), focused above all else on the elimination of redundant regional institutions, but did not

interfere directly in the local realm of government. This changed in the aftermath of the Tumult of Esquilache of 1766. The attempt to insert a role for non-aristocrats in the politics of local government antagonized established political elites. These elites succeeded in stalling this period of reform. If, however unsuccessful in the short-term, this moment of reform did succeed in introducing new ideas regarding the practice of effective government into the realm of government at the local level. These ideas included the practice of open elections capable of diversifying the makeup of town councils, the introduction of alternative models of civil government like that of the *Nuevas Poblaciones* which could exempt local communities from the pressures of corporatism, and an awareness of the role for small-scale resistance in providing effective opposition to political initiatives launched from the center. Each of these ideas proved an instructive lesson for political elites.

When the crisis of sovereignty erupted in 1808, these lessons were applied to the situation at hand. Local political elites proved capable of marshaling public support for the reconstitution of political order along local lines almost immediately. The need for a unified response to the threat of French armies led to the creation of supreme *juntas* founded on the notion that a claim to govern could emanate from the local as likely as the royal. Although elections were not always implemented by political elites with expediency, this bespoke an awareness of the legitimacy inherent to the democratic process and the fear that rapid change was often the most violent. Likewise, the process of rehabilitation launched for the *empleados* after the constitutional regime's conquest of Western Andalusia implied a new concern with validating the legitimacy of who made up the community of Spaniards, and by extension the composition of a legitimate electorate.

Indeed, the entire constitutional project relied on the effectiveness of the institutional transition at the local level.

As the Second Constitutional Period suggests, the political events of the First Constitutional Period were effective in introducing a basic awareness of democratic ideals and the knowledge of how to govern under a constitutional regime. When confronted with a renewed crisis of sovereignty, local communities turned to their experiences of the First Constitutional Period to inform their behavior moving forward. Ultimately, the vitality of local politics during the period 1820-1823 served to influence the practice of politics at the central level of government. Although the common history of early constitutional regimes in Spain remains one of eventual collapse, the success in resuscitating local constitutional governments often has been overlooked. The success of restoring the constitutional regime in 1820 set a significant example for doing so again in 1833.

The early history of constitutionalism in Spain was then one of grassroots mobilization. The reconstitution of political order at the local level in the wake of the crisis of sovereignty of 1808 framed the creation of the regional supreme *juntas*. This action, in turn, led directly to the Constitution of Cádiz. Similarly, the declaration for individual towns in support of the Riego rebellion in 1820 led to the reimposition of the same constitutional regime for a second time. Local communities were central to political developments in this period. Local politics informed the direction that the reconsolidation of centralized power took after 1808.

But there were tensions between local and national governments in this early history of constitutionalism that were not resolved. The period after 1808 was marked

also by the imposition of a strict hierarchy between the local, regional, and central governments in Spain. Under the Old Regime, local governments were not invited to take part in the formulation of laws but effectively were given the right to decline the imposition of new legal requirements. The situation provided by the crisis of sovereignty gave occasion for regional and local governments to negotiate their relationship with the central government and their adherence to new laws. This change originated against the backdrop of the Central Junta's feud with the many regional *juntas*, which had initially resisted the legitimacy of a central political authority. Although the Central Junta succeeded in securing its place as the preeminent political institution of the Spanish monarchy prior to the advent of the Cortes in 1810, its feud with the regional *juntas* was quite damaging and contributed to the disaffection of local governments to the cause of a revived sovereignty vested at a supralocal level. During the First Constitutional Period, the legacy of this discord explained the resistance of local communities to agents of the Cortes.

At the local level, municipalities attempted to negotiate with the central government over the application of constitutional provisions well after the demise of the Central Junta. During the First Constitutional Period, performing the act of transition was not a passive process and often involved the active participation of local officials and the public at large who were intent to take part in shaping the terms of their transit into a new mode of political rule. To this end, the articles of the Constitution of Cádiz were adapted and sometimes consciously misapplied to suit the expediency of local needs. This tendency towards negotiation in place of noncompliance was a conscious adjustment to the ascendant position of the central government. The conditions of the new order

initiated by the advent of constitutional rule meant that local communities could not resist the central government openly without engaging in an act of revolt. However, through deft interpretation of the meaning and intent attributed to certain constitutional provisions and other laws, municipalities could hope to win exceptions to the uniform application of specific legal requirements.

During the Second Constitutional Period, municipalities appeared ready to negotiate their place within the context of the restored constitutional regime but found little cause to do so. Individual municipalities offered their support to the Riego rebellion on a case by case basis only when confronted immediately by the influence of the politics of the central government at their doorstep. Support for the new regime in every instance depended on what the central government could offer local communities. The evident weakness of the restored constitutional regime compromised its ability to serve as a party worthy of direct negotiation.

The close connection between the establishment of a constitutional regime and the will of local communities to interpret the meaning behind specific legal requirements set an important precedent for the practice of government in nineteenth century Spain. The pairing of these developments led local communities to believe that laws established at the central level were open to reinterpretation at the local level. This stance implied the essential sovereignty of local communities to the detriment of successive central governments, which worked feverishly to impose their authority over subordinate municipalities. In particular, it proved a challenge for the authors of written constitutions to craft documents that clearly elaborated the role of the central government in its

dealings with other political institutions. The implementation of a hierarchical political order was accompanied by several other changes.

One of the most significant changes in the political culture of Western Andalusia during this period was the gradual weakening of the aristocratic hold over the practice of politics at the local level of government. Power vested locally was no freer than power vested centrally if access to government remained limited to a narrow coterie of social elites who doubled as political elites. At the middle of the eighteenth century, local aristocrats maintained a strong foothold on the appointment of municipal officials. This provided a sense of constancy to local government that has been portrayed elsewhere as the source of a local timelessness, or the idea that small towns failed to adapt to changing times.

This study has argued that local communities throughout Western Andalusia were not staid repositories of conservatism and instead exhibited a political dynamism that was vital to securing the role of municipal politics within the highly localized political construct that continues to define modern Spain. Municipalities responded with enthusiasm to the variety of political situations they confronted. Political elites situated at the local level engaged with new political ideas and grappled with how they should best respond to a major crisis of sovereignty in 1808, ultimately negotiating the terms of a new political construct with an attention to preserving the right of individual towns to maintain a considerable degree of self-government vis-à-vis the center. Simultaneously, their efforts were met with the gradual expansion of opportunities for local communities to take part in the affairs of government.

The development of more socially inclusive local governments did not trigger the same kind of national awakening seen elsewhere in Europe. This transformation failed to occur because the advent of modernity in Spain corresponded to the survival, even entrenchment, of local government as the most immediate and certainly the most relevant level of government readily available to the average Spaniard. Thinking and feeling of one's self as Spanish held no political utility beyond the War of Independence. Although the war against the French figured as an important backdrop for the accelerated development of national political culture in Spain during the early nineteenth century, it was not a necessary precondition for the changes that took place. While some scholars have heralded 1808 as marking the birth of a uniquely national culture in Spain, my study suggests that it would be anachronistic to apply such an idea at the local level until at least 1823, if not much later.

Perhaps the most significant development of this period and the politics it unleashed was the resurgence of a new centralism in Spain that endured through the end of the nineteenth century and perhaps well into the twentieth. During this time, constitutional regimes struggled to contain volatile local politics. The greatest threat to constitutional regimes in Spain during the nineteenth century – Carlism on the right and anarchism on the left – were movements that resonated out of local political dynamics. Meanwhile, the Spanish First Republic (1873-1875) would ultimately succumb, in part, to the political disorder wrought by a cantonalist revolt in which municipal governments declared themselves sovereign and independent political entities within a confederal vision of Spain as a collection of towns.



The nineteenth century witnessed a long succession of central governments based in Madrid. Each political transition required a significant overhaul in the officials vested with political authority and the introduction of new values. In concomitant fashion, local governments were forced to transition from one form of government to another with some degree of regularity. Although the brevity of some political experiments might preclude the possibility that many municipalities fully transitioned from one kind of government to another, the evidence uncovered here suggests that elites and, in some cases, the public at large did grapple with the implications of political change, however brief. This means that events at the central level resonated at the local level. More significantly, the evidence presented here suggests that local communities were key to the collapse or survival of political regimes imposed over the country as a whole. In fact, we might more effectively think of local communities as having shaped the form of the central governments rather than the reverse.

The experience of Western Andalusia has many parallels with other regions of the Spanish Monarchy. In Spanish America, local communities were central to large-scale political movements from the middle part of the eighteenth century through to the end of the nineteenth century. Individual towns were part and parcel of the independence movements that spread through the region at the start of the nineteenth century. Similarly, the success of conservative and liberal movements relied on the support of local communities whose power was represented institutionally in the town council. More so than framing the nation as a homogenous whole, scholars of late colonial Spain have adopted the practice of thinking of Mexico and other successor states as nations of

villages. This heterogeneous vision of a plurality of political voices and a diffuse sovereignty has many parallels with the case of peninsular Spain.

A common experience of response to crisis and the drive to protect local government as the most legitimate foundation of political order arose on both sides of the Atlantic. The political histories of Western Andalusia and Spanish America were intertwined throughout the era of Spanish colonialism in the New World. The crisis of sovereignty that broke in 1808 enveloped both regions in a profound interval of political change that would come to affect their political histories for years thereafter. Even after the independence of Spanish America, these regions shared the centrality of local government under the Spanish Monarchy as foundational principal directing their later political development. From this shared origin, both Spanish America and Western Andalusia retained much in common during the nineteenth century as successive states attempted to fashion nations out of villages.

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