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The Building of Regional Security Partnership
and the Security Culture Divide in the Mediterranean Region

by

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Abstract

Fulvio Attinà examines the concept of "regional security partnership" both theoretically and in the context of Euro-Mediterranean region-building. He argues that this partnership is an intermediate venture on the road to the possible appearance of a Euro-Mediterranean security community. By discussing the difficulties of negotiating a security partnership in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Attinà highlights the security culture divide on both sides of Mediterranean. The differences in the security culture between European and Arab states have deepened in recent years in view of regional and global developments, constituting a major obstacle to the implementation of a security partnership. Attinà argues, however, that the interaction between the two shores of the Mediterranean in coping with globalization-driven problems may prevail over the factors that have led to a deepening of the security culture divide in recent years.

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The building of regional security partnership and the security culture divide in the Mediterranean region

According to many political scientists, the Mediterranean area is less than a region and more of a geographical place characterized by fragmented dynamics, huge problems and strong identities in the sub-areas of interaction in which it is divided. Disbelief in the Mediterranean area as a political region made the debate on the nature of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the future of the relations between the European and North African societies and states a rather scant exercise. However, two main interpretations can be distinguished in the present stage of this debate: the hegemony/domination and socialization/inclusion interpretation. In the former, the Barcelona Process was launched to incorporate Med-partners in a European-led economic region. The ‘triple logic’ (as Etel Solingen calls it in this volume) and multidimensional nature of cooperation, which includes politics, security, culture and human affairs in addition to economic cooperation, was given to the Partnership project in order to make the Mediterranean a politically, socially and culturally stabilized system with the ultimate goal of building a steady European hegemony on the region. According to the second interpretation, instead, the Partnership’s goal is to build a *zone of prosperity, stability and peace*¹ and no room for deliberate construction of unequal relations between the partners. To achieve this goal, the European Union institutions and governments act to lead the Med-partners to respect norms and practices needed to achieve economic growth, political stability and peaceful conflict resolution. In this perspective, the Barcelona Process is, at the same time, a gap-reducing process between the societies and states of the two shores of the Mediterranean, an inclusion process of the Med-partners in the neo-liberal global system (Tovias, in this volume), and a mutual socialization process of all the partner countries to the same practices, as largely discussed in the Adler and Crawford’s introductory chapter in this volume)².

¹ As spoken out in the Barcelona Declaration.

² The two interpretations of the Barcelona Process are extensively examined in Attinà (2003).

The contrast of views within the group of political analysts of the EMP is better understood in the wider contrast of perspectives that separates from one another two groups of analyses of international regions. In mainstream literature on international regions, high similarity (and even homogeneity) of culture and institutions is essential to further political cooperation among states and adopt common norms of conflict management and resolution. In this perspective, difference in culture and institutions causes instability, conflict, any durable cooperation and no integration. Culture and institution similarity, instead, allows the formation of community and the management of inter-state conflict with no use of violent means. This condition of similarity is the main tenet of the security community school after Karl Deutsch's seminal research conducted in the early 1950s (Deutsch et al. 1957). It must be stressed that this view about cooperation and integration as dependent on the close proximity of the cultural traits of the societies of a regional system assumes that during the integration process only small cultural changes occur. This view does not allow betting on the likelihood that a group of societies with distant culture traits turns into an integrated entity and security community under the effect of increasing flows of communication and interactions. In recent years, however, the study of international regions has been confronted with the observation of regional co-operation programs that are constructed on different conditions, that is to say on the leaders' perception of common problems and consequent intensification of political dialogue between governments that belong to societies with few similarities of culture and institutions.

The need for revising the perspective on regional cooperation is forwarded by scientists that maintain that regional cooperation occurs in the contemporary world when governments recognize that negotiation to set up policy coordination is important to cope with the problems shared by the states of a geographical area (see, for example, Coleman and Underhill, 1998; Vayrinen, 2003). This interpretation largely relies on the conviction that, irrespective of culture distance and institution difference, global trends cause dangerous effects to the countries of an area in as different fields as environment for the problem of pollution, demography for the problem of migration, and public security for the problem of organized crime and illegal trade. Because geographical proximity reinforces interconnection between contemporary societies and states, one country's action and inaction regarding trans-border problems directly affect

neighboring countries. The decision to adopt actions and policies divergent from the neighbor's aggravates the problems experienced by both states. Alternatively, no decision either aggravates or drops one's problems into the neighbor's territory. For this reason, governments are urged to turn to cooperation and policy coordination with neighboring country governments in order to provide states with stability, people with personal security, societies with economic growth, and social groups with cultural protection. Problems caused by interconnection can be taken under control by national governments when policies, strategies and regulations of the national level are coordinated with policies, strategies and regulations issued by international institutions that make use of various means of coordination and action. Institutions that take as their responsibility the solution of those problems, even though they were not created for this mission, like EU, ASEAN, APEC and NAFTA, are cases of this kind of regional institutions.

Region analysts are consequently invited to turn their attention also to geographical areas, like the Mediterranean region, which are short of culture and institutions similarity. So far, these areas have been ignored by region analysts as regions of cooperation because of the low level of relations and small similarity of values and common identity within the group of the participating countries. These facts notwithstanding, interactions among states and societies within non-homogenous regions are growing in number. Cooperation projects have been put in place by the governments of regions with no strong similarity of attributes like the East Asia/Pacific, Central Asia and Euro-Mediterranean region. Consequently, one comes to the conclusion that the countries of these regions with no tradition of making collective decisions to face common problems come close to the condition of the countries that in the past created political and security communities after establishing strong social interactions based on consistent similarity of values and institutions.

This chapter looks at the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation process within the regional perspective briefly illustrated here above. In harmony with this perspective, the process of cooperation named the Barcelona Process, and also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, looks as an institution-building process to set out means of reaction to global trends and resolve the specific aspects of global problems in the Mediterranean region by sharing the same practices, as it is explained also in the

introductory chapter of this volume. This process has the potentiality of moving the Mediterranean countries toward shared identities and, in the long run, the founding of a political/security community. In particular, this chapter deals with the building of the Mediterranean security partnership as an intermediate venture on the road to the eventual appearance of the security community of the Euro-Mediterranean countries. It stresses the need for the development of a concerted system – named as *regional security partnership* - as the main step forward in the construction of security community institutions in the Mediterranean region. In the first section, the concept of regional security partnership is defined taking into account the analysis of regional changes in different parts of the world. The concept of regional security partnership is adopted to represent the condition of interaction and integration of geographical groups of countries linked together by a structured set of relations that stands in between the extremes of un-structured regional relations and security community-structured relations. The second section deals with the problems of negotiating a security partnership in the framework of the Barcelona Process. The third section is about the security culture of two country blocks on the shores of the Mediterranean. This section deals with the suspension/hibernation of security negotiation in the region during the past years as caused by the security culture divide on the two sides of the Mediterranean basin. In the concluding remarks, however, it is maintained that the interaction process between the two shores of the Mediterranean to cope with globalization-driven problems can prevail on the contingent factors that hardened the culture divide in the last few years.

Regional security partnership

The term *regional security partnership* designates the security arrangement of an international region that originates from the consensus of the states to cooperate on the reduction of violence and enhancement of stability and peace in the region by making use of different types of agreements and mechanisms, such as formal security treaties, international security organizations, joint action agreements, multilateral dialogue processes, peace and stability pacts including confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy measures, and also measures for influencing the domestic structures and processes of the countries at risk of internal violence. Almost all the

countries of the region including all the relevant powers and also extra-regional powers are the members of the regional security partnership.

The construction of the present European security arrangement, which started with the 1972 decision to hold the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is the first case of regional security partnership building in international politics and, to the present time, the only full fledged case of regional security partnership. The peculiarities of Europe international politics in the bipolar and post-bipolar era and the presence of the EC/EU, CSCE/OSCE and Atlantic Alliance are invoked as the conditions that carried out the present security system of Europe. But, the distinctiveness of European politics cannot support the argument that Europe's regional security partnership is destined to be the unique case of security partnership of the world system³ because concern for the building of cooperative management of security problems in other regions of the world - like the East Asia/Pacific, Central Asia and the Mediterranean region - points to the opposite. Actually, the European and three further cases – the ASEAN Regional Forum in the East Asia/Pacific, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asia, and the Mediterranean project - are on the list of the current processes of regional security partnership. The four cases are concisely presented here.

1. The *European security partnership* developed after the launching of the Helsinki Process in 1972 and matured in the 1990s with the creation and/or integration of multilateral mechanisms and organizations like NATO, NATO's Eastern projection mechanisms known as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the OSCE offices and mechanisms, the EU's security and defense policy (ESDP) and Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), and the EU's economic cooperation programs (like PHARE) and enlargement policy. It includes all the states of Europe and the non-European members of the OSCE, i.e. the former Soviet Union countries of Asia, the United States and Canada (see, among others, Attinà, 2001a; Barbè, 1995; Bronstone, 2000; Flynn and Farrell, 1999; Ghebali, 1989; Ghebali and Warner, 2001).

2. The *ASEAN Regional Forum*, also known as the ARF, developed in the East Asia-Pacific region after the First ARF Chairman's Statement in 1994. The objectives of

³ On various opinions on this point, see Fisher (2000) and Xenakis (1998).

ARF are to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest, and make significant contributions towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region. ARF membership increased from initial 18 to 23 countries including the United States and European Union (see Attinà and Zhu, 2001; Cossa, 2000; Johnston, 1998; Kivimaki, 2001).

3. The *Shanghai Cooperation Organization* (SCO), earlier known as the Shanghai Five Initiative, was created in the Central Asia region in 2001. Shanghai Five originated from the summit meeting of five states (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) held in the Chinese city in April 1996. Since the first summit meeting, a series of agreements among the five states have been concluded and practical measures have been agreed on to strengthen effective cooperation in various fields and mutual trust among member states. The Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field along the Border Areas and the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas, signed in 1996 and 1997, are the most important agreements to implement security partnership building among the five countries. Practical measures to crack down on international terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal immigration and other forms of cross-border crimes have been included in the security measures (see Attinà and Zhu, 2001; Zhang, 2001). The Shanghai Five mechanism was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on June 15, 2001. After Uzbekistan's admission in 2001, the SCO counts on six member states. Finally, two permanent offices have been created in January 2004, the SCO's office in Beijing and the Antiterrorism Center in Tashkent.

4. The *Euro-Mediterranean project* of security cooperation was launched in Barcelona in 1995 and is presently aimed at the signing of the Mediterranean Charter of Peace and Stability (further analyzed later in this chapter). For the past years, the development of the project has been confronted with the derailment of the Middle East Peace Process. However, the Work Program approved at the Valencia Foreign Ministers Conference of the EMP (22-23 April 2002) confirmed "*the mandate of the Senior Officials on the Draft Charter for Peace and Stability to continue their work as appropriate so as to enable the Charter to be adopted as soon as the political situation allows*". Today, the project is confronted also with the post-9/11 anti-terrorism policies of the Western governments and the post-Iraqi war problems that slow down the

security partnership building process. However, 9/11 and terrorism had the positive effect of reinforcing the efforts towards including domestic security and police co-operation in the agenda of the Partnership. The consequences of the Iraq war are still unclear. They depend on the results of the normalization process of the Iraqi political system. Also the new EU's "neighborhood policy" plan affects the Mediterranean security partnership building process. In the *Wider Europe—Neighbourhood Communication*⁴ to the Council and the European Parliament, the European Commission set out a new framework for relations with Russia, the Western NIS (i.e. Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) and the Southern Mediterranean countries. This new policy plan is aimed at developing a zone of prosperity and a 'ring of friends' with whom the EU can enjoy close, peaceful and co-operative relations. The European Union offers the prospect of a stake in the EU's internal market to those countries that make concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms. In particular, beside measures to enhance economic integration and liberalization, positive actions of the neighboring countries are invited to strengthen co-operation to prevent and combat common security threats, improve conflict prevention and crisis management, and promote human rights, cultural co-operation and mutual understanding. The Commission's Communication confirms the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership methods and updates the group of the Med-partners. Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey are not listed as Southern neighbors targeted by the *Wider Europe—Neighbourhood* policy because the former two countries will be full members of the European Union in 2004 while Turkey's candidacy to enter the EU makes this country not eligible to participate in the policy aimed at developing special relations with countries who are not perspective members of the European Union. Furthermore, the Communication's list of the Southern Mediterranean countries adds Libya (since 1999 an 'invited observer' to the EMP Ministerial Conferences) to the remaining Med-Partners of the EMP (i.e. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Authority).

On knowledge of these four cases, regional security partnership building looks as a novel process of the international system. It takes place when the

⁴ See COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels 11.3.2003, and also *Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument*, COM(2003) 393 final, Brussels, 1 July 2003.

governments of an area, despite culture difference, unresolved political and territorial problems and mutual claims on various issues, develop a preference for dialogue on political controversies and conflict means. Following this choice, they can progressively acquire a habit to negotiation when dealing with the solution of mutual conflicts.

Knowledge of the above cases allows highlighting the main attributes of a regional security partnership. First, this arrangement is based on a set of documents that include one or few fundamental agreements, and a number of related operative agreements. In the fundamental agreements - namely, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for A New Europe; the 1994 Chairman's Statement at the First ASEAN Regional Forum; the June 2001 Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; and the 1995 Barcelona Declaration on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - shared principles of peaceful relations are proclaimed and also sources of conflict, tension and instability are made public by the partner governments. Operative agreements, instead, are about concrete measures for the co-operative management of international and internal problems of security. The fundamental agreement is the initial step of partnership building, but the regional security partnership turns into an effective means when operative agreements and mechanisms are established.

To prevent the risk of violent conflict that can break down the stability of the region, the partner governments create multilateral offices and make use of existing and newly created international organizations to deal with the agreed security measures. Although ad hoc security agreements between couples and small groups of partners (mostly, in Europe) play important functions in the regional arrangement of security, multilateral offices and organizations are the most important collective actors of all security partnerships, especially in as much as they are responsible for peace-making and peace-keeping operations. However, both international organizations and small group military coordination agreements have the effect of defense de-nationalization (Zang and Zurn, 1999) as much as they create structures of common defense and multilateral forces that are important to the building of common security measures.

During the past twenty years, the European security partnership has been developing the largest group of means of security cooperation. The means to strengthen international security in Europe include measures of cooperative security and confidence-building to prevent misunderstandings and the preemptive use of military

force; measures based on the commitment of the states to provide resources for collective security such as rapid intervention forces to interrupt military conflicts and deter aggressive actions; and military and civilian crisis management capabilities to restore peaceful relations. The means to strengthen internal security conditions include measures of economic aid to the countries in need and policies of economic integration of the countries of the region in order to ease inter-state tensions by means of collective economic growth and welfare; political assistance to improve internal democracy in order to constrain the aggressive aspirations of leaders and social groups by the values and procedures of democracy; and programs for developing domestic civil societies and building relations between national civil societies in order to ease tensions by promoting social pluralism and creating mutual understanding among the countries of the region with the promotion of trans-national social relations.


All these measures were experimented in Europe in the post-communist transition of former Soviet countries and the violent conflicts of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The SCO and ARF agreements consider some of the international measures of the European security partnership as instruments of the Central and East Asia/Pacific security systems. However, specific international and internal measures are expected to develop in different regions according to the nature of the international relations and security culture of the place.

It is emphasized here that the scientific interest for regional security partnership is born from the fact that this arrangement is a remarkable novelty of international politics and has important effects on the change of the security culture of the states. In fact, regional security partnership is different from all other forms of security co-operation. In particular, it differs from two traditional forms of local security arrangement known as the system of opposite military alliances and the system of collective security. It is different also from the special form of security cooperation defined by political scientists as security community. It is worth to note that regions in which there are no important motives for international conflict do not fit into the analysis of regional security partnership in as much as the governments of these regions do not have important strategies for building structures of security co-operation. Arie Kacowicz (1998) studied these “zones of peace” in which states are “satisfied” - primarily of the territorial order – and, consequently, abstain from expanding national

security strategies and negotiating on security co-operation as well. He cites Southern America as the symbolic case of a zone of peace.

To make it clear, security arrangements at the region level are represented on a one-dimension line. Regional security partnership stands on the right side of the line, closer to the extreme of the most advanced form of security community, i.e. the amalgamated security community.

The regional security arrangement line



- A - Opposite alliance system
- B - Collective security
- C - Regional security partnership
- D1 - Loosely coupled Pluralistic security community
- D2 - Tightly coupled Pluralistic security community

The organized forms of security cooperation at the region level are ordered on this line by the dimension of the increasing degree of social and institutional integration of the member states. However, the line does not represent a continuum with a single process of change. In other words, a geographical group of countries does not necessarily move from one point to the next on the right or the left of the line. Changing from one point to another is a matter of both social integration and political decision of the leaders of the countries. Increasing social integration is the pre-condition for the political leaders decide for more organized forms of security cooperation and institutionalized forms of peaceful management of international conflicts. Having borne in mind this condition, the main differences between regional security partnership and other forms of regional security arrangement can be summarized as follows.

States enter alliances when they encounter security dangers they cannot neutralize otherwise. Cooperation in military alliances is based on the traditional concept of state security as the condition of a group of states that coordinate military force in order to threaten the use of force to dissuade potential aggressors. Governments reject reliance on self-help and national military force as inappropriate and/or

insufficient means. For political and/or strategic reasons they prefer coordinating and aggregating national forces with likeminded countries rather than relying only on national armies and self-help. Very often, the formation of a military alliance incites an opposite group of countries to join in a contrary alignment and build up military capabilities. In this frequent case, the security arrangement of the region takes the form known as system of opposite military alliances. This arrangement leaves aside some states of the region as neutral states until incentives for neutrality are available. It must be added that military alliances do not always enhance state security but may turn into a condition of less security for the alliance members that become the object of aggression because of their membership in the alliance.

Differently from the opposed military alliance system, regional security partnership is based on a different concept of security building. The best way to understand it is to bear in mind the approach to international security developed in the Helsinki Process. In this approach, the dissuasion of aggressor states and avoidance of international violence are believed to be at hand by including in a single regional security arrangement all or almost all the states of the region and also extra-regional powers rather than pooling national armed forces in opposed military alliances and alignments. This form of regional security maintains also that measures of cooperative security (like exchange of information on military policies and structures) and comprehensive security (i.e. military and non-military aspects of security) must be included in regional agreements. Furthermore, regional security partnership attributes importance to both international and internal measures to improve the security conditions of the region and preserve geopolitical stability.

These characters of the regional security partnership are relevant also to the difference between security partnership and the system of collective security. In the latter, security agreements are restricted to the commitment of the states to make national armed forces available on demand against the aggressor and instantly form a collective force to intervene in case of need. Responsibility for the domestic conditions of the countries of the region is not included in collective security agreements.

Security partnership is different also from the arrangement known as security community, initially theorized by Karl Deutsch as a group of people which have become integrated and consider war as an obsolete instrument of conflict

resolution (Deutsch et al., 1957). A security community is brought into being by the high level of transaction and communication flows that bind together a group of people who think of themselves as a community and produce favorable conditions for the establishment of institutions of peaceful conflict resolution. Deutsch made a distinction between amalgamated security communities, which are formed by states that abandon their full sovereignty and merge into an expanded state, and pluralistic security communities in which states retain their legal independence. As also Adler and Barnett remark (1998), pluralistic communities vary between the loosely and tightly coupled form on whether they are close to persistent state sovereignty separation or emerging government centralization.

Security partnership agreements, in contrast, are formed within groups of countries characterized by some conflict divisions, not-large flows of transactions and communication, and little commonality of values and institutions. The countries of the region may have different security cultures, but they are not so distant from one another as to prevent the formation of consensus on cooperation in security problems. In other words, these countries are inclined to manage conflict divisions and solve international problems by taking steps towards the reduction of the risk of violent confrontation, and allow the flow of mutual communication and transactions to increase on their own. These conditions apply to the whole group of the countries of the partnership project, but it is possible that some countries of the group are not divided by conflict lines, are linked by large flows of mutual transactions and communication, and share the same values. As much as security cooperation in a regional partnership becomes strong and durable over time, the observance of common practices by the partner states produces common orientations towards problems and values. On their turn, common practices and orientations lead to the formation of we-ness and common identities of the people of the partner states (Adler and Crawford, in this volume). Hence, it is possible that regional security partnerships develop into security communities but no case of this change is thus far available to analysis. On this regard, it is worth to notice that the use of the concept of security community to define the state of security relations in the European area is appropriate on condition that the concept is applied only to the group of the Western Europe and North America countries, the so-called North-Atlantic Community. The concept of security community, instead, does not yet pertain to the

Pan-European system, i.e. the group of the OSCE countries. Alternatively, the security arrangement of these countries is properly defined by the concept of regional security partnership as far as this arrangement neither is any longer a system of opposed military alliances nor is in the condition of becoming any soon a security community in deutschian terms, i.e. “a group of people which has become integrated”. This does not exclude, however, that sub-groups of countries develop stronger ties and particular identities as in the case of the just mentioned loosely coupled pluralistic security community of the European and American members of NATO and the tightly coupled pluralistic security community of the EU member states, which is close to become an amalgamated security community.

To summarize this part of this chapter, it has been argued that practices and instruments of security cooperation change over time. New ones are invented, experimented and added to instruments and practices in use. Regional agreements of security partnership have been created to supplement other security cooperation agreements like military alliances and defense pacts in providing security to the states of regions in which conflict divides countries but power competition is relaxed. The attributes of a regional security partnership, which have been shortly described above, are summarized as it follows.

Pre-conditions

- awareness of the countries of the region for interdependence and the local effects of global problems,
- relaxed or no power competition in the international politics of the region and restrained use of violence in international conflicts.

Conditions

- consensus of the governments of the region on building security cooperation by reducing violence in international relations, improving international and domestic stability, and promoting peace and economic growth,
- no system of opposite military alliances.

Structures and means

- written fundamental agreements,
- operative agreements, multilateral offices and international organizations,
- a set of international and internal measures and mechanisms of conflict management and prevention,
- involvement of extra-regional powers (very probable).

Consequences

- reduction of the gap between the security doctrines and cultures of the countries of the region,
- increase of defense de-nationalization,

- development of security community (possible).

In the following part of this chapter, the building of a security partnership in the Mediterranean region is analyzed and the perspective of a long-term process of security community is assessed.

The project of the Mediterranean security partnership

The Barcelona Process has been constructed on the belief that global problems and the growing interdependence between the countries of the area surrounding the Mediterranean Sea have important effects on their relationship (Attinà, 2003). In the early 1990s, the European governments worried about the deterioration of the state of security in the area and recognized that no-action made problems worsening fast. To react to the ineffective Mediterranean cooperation programs of the past, the European Commission proposed a wide-range framework of initiatives and programs in the fields of economy, finance, society, culture, politics and security. This proposal became the 1995 Barcelona Declaration with the annexed Work Program. The program, named as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, was developed in the subsequent years by conferences and meetings of government representatives and experts aimed at implementing the EMP's goals, namely prosperity, peace and stability in the Mediterranean area (Philippart, 2003).

According to the EMP approach, security is both the overall effect of the multidimensional strategy of the Partnership as defined in the three Barcelona Declaration Chapters (on Politics and Security Affairs; Economic and Financial Affairs; and Human, Social and Cultural Affairs) and the object of specific initiatives within the 1st Chapter frame. For this reason, the Barcelona Declaration has the nature of the fundamental agreement of a regional security partnership and is on hold to explicate full effects in the security domain depending on the partner governments' decision to agree on operative agreements to implement multilateral mechanisms and measures of cooperative security. The most important step ahead in carrying out the operative measures and mechanisms of the Mediterranean security partnership is the negotiation of the Mediterranean Charter of Stability and Peace.

The signature of a Stability Charter for the Mediterranean was proposed after some years of inaction on the Work Program of the Politics and Security Affairs

Chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. The aim of the proposal was to draw the countries of the Mediterranean towards a regional security system designed on the European security partnership model. It is worth to mention that, when the proposal was made, the French Prime Minister, Eduard Balladur, had already taken to a positive end his 1993 project of issuing the Stability Pact for Europe. The aim of Balladur's project was to declare the solemn commitment of all the governments of post-Cold War Europe to political stability and abstention from war to solve conflicts and disputes over border, territory and national minority problems. Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries welcomed Balladur's Pact to manifest both compliance with Western values and commitment to act as reliable partners in Europe in the perspective of becoming members of the European Union. The negotiation successfully ended with the 1995 signature of the Stability Pact for Europe, which was passed to the OSCE for its implementation. The real consequence of the Stability Pact on the international politics of Europe was not impressive. Its symbolic value was also a short-lived one. Very soon, few people were aware of the existence of the Pact. However, it was believed that the commitment of the European and Mediterranean governments to a Pact alike was appropriate to foster security also in the post-Cold War Mediterranean region. In particular, anchoring peace to political stability was believed to be a priority in the Mediterranean area. An agreement was reached about starting negotiations on the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Stability and Peace at the level of Senior Officials and experts, but very soon it was understood that the Mediterranean governments had divergent perceptions of threats and challenges to political stability.

On April 1999, the Stuttgart EMP Ministerial Conference made public the state of the Charter negotiation process. It was recognized that a strict legal conception of the Charter was not on the agenda but just a document committing the partners to political dialogue, evolutionary and progressive development of partnership-building measures, good-neighborly relations, regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy. The Stuttgart Conclusions included the Ministries' commitment to endow the Charter with the *appropriate decision-making mechanisms* to make all decisions by consensus: a commitment still waiting for fulfillment. Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter were annexed to the Stuttgart Conference Conclusions. In the Guidelines, the EMP Group of Senior Officials was assigned the task of working out a

comprehensive schedule of the negotiations including additional ad hoc meetings in order to complete the elaboration of the Charter by the time of the successive Ministerial Conference. In addition, the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers welcomed initiatives aimed at exchanging information on the signature and ratification of international instruments in the fields of disarmament and arms control, terrorism, human rights, and international humanitarian law. They also underlined the importance of developing partnership-building measures, like the establishment of a Euro-Med system of disaster prevention, mitigation and management. Since the Stuttgart Ministerial Conference some progress has been made in this last field. No real progress, instead, has been made on the Charter project. Discussions and negotiations among experts continue to be held. To someone, the Charter project is dead, but this event is a change and not the end of the regional security partnership building process.

It is worth reminding that the negotiation on the Charter is not the only multilateral initiative for building a new security arrangement in the Mediterranean (Biscop, 2003). The “Mediterranean dialogue” initiatives of the OSCE and NATO are of importance and, especially the second one, in some degrees in competition with the EMP’s security construction project. In 1994, OSCE decided to establish an informal contact group with experts from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia with the aim of sharing information on confidence-building measures with the representatives of these countries. Starting in 1995, annual seminars were organized by the OSCE and individual Mediterranean country⁵. However, the OSCE initiative has been losing momentum with the passing of time. Regarding the Atlantic Alliance, in 1995, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia accepted NATO’s proposal to open a direct dialogue with a view to achieve better mutual understanding and foster the process of regional stabilization. Later, it was agreed to hold the Dialogue session twice a year and focus the agenda on exchange of information and technical assistance in the area of civil emergency planning. The military dimension of the Mediterranean Dialogue included observation visits of officials of the six non-NATO

⁵ OCSE’s projection in the Mediterranean dates back to the early years of the Helsinki Process. On the assumption that security in Europe was closely linked with security in the Mediterranean and the process of improving security could not be confined to Europe but extended to other parts of the world, in particular to the Mediterranean area, a chapter on “Questions relating to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean” was included in the Helsinki Final Act (1975).

members to NATO exercises and military bodies, exchange of staff officers and port visits to Dialogue Countries by NATO's naval forces. Except for seminars, conferences and other information sessions, the dialogue has been strictly bilateral, that is between NATO and the single dialogue country. In addition, in July 1997, NATO decided to create the Mediterranean Co-operation Group, a forum for political discussions on Mediterranean security issues between Alliance members. The Iraqi war and Bush's strategy of attention to North Africa can strongly influence NATO's Mediterranean policy. A new range of bilateral agreements with selected Mediterranean countries, like Morocco and Algeria, are expected.

These initiatives and the importance of the military presence of the United States in the Mediterranean area signal the need for taking into consideration the problem of including external actors in the negotiation on the Mediterranean security partnership. This problem is not on the official agenda of the negotiation among the EMP countries. But, the European and East Asia/Pacific security partnerships demonstrate the importance of including external actors, including the United States, as partners of the regional security arrangement.

Failure to reach so far any agreement on the content and signature of the Charter has been attributed mainly to the worsening of the Middle East conflict and today also the occupation of Iraq. Undoubtedly, the Arab perception of the role of European states in the Middle East conflict as unbalanced towards Israel has been a strong obstacle to the construction and signature of the Charter (Joel Peters, in this volume). In addition, as already said in this chapter, terrorism and the Iraqi war worsened the environment of the negotiation. However, attention is directed here towards another obstacle hindering the negotiation, that is the divide of security culture. So far, governments have given the task of reducing the divide to the "seminar diplomacy" actors, as is explained later in this chapter.

The European and Arab security cultures

Perception of security problems and management of external security relations depend on views of the political leaders and the culture of the country. In the present analysis, the concept of security culture is used to explain the security policies and decisions of states as intrinsically influenced by their recent past experience in

dealing with security problems. More precisely, this analysis assumes that recent past experience and beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols are intimately related and add to one another in shaping the country's security culture. This culture shapes the government preference for certain security instruments (or combination of instruments) rather than others that are also available while learning from recent past experience is responsible for culture change, adaptive decisions and new strategies of action.

It is worth to say that, although recent studies focus on how security culture affects the relations of the countries of individual geo-political areas (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Kacovicz, 1998; Solingen, 1998), a specific security culture is also an attribute of the whole international system in as much as the majority of the political leaders of the world share experiences and beliefs on security, stability and peace. International law, the United Nations and world conferences for arms control and conflict issues are the institutions for the construction of the world security culture. National and international diplomatic services, epistemic communities of military doctrines and conflict resolution experts, and political leaders are the agents of the formation and diffusion of the worldwide security culture. It is also worth to remind that security cultures of states and regions interact and change over time under the influence of the institutions and agents of the world security culture and the diffusion of new ideas, practices and experiences. Some of the traits of the security culture of an individual region can be valued by the leaders of other regions and imported from an area to another one in as much as governments recognize to be tackled by similar security problems, and the security mechanisms of an area are valued to be tested to positive effect.

Bearing in mind the above propositions, the security cultures of the European and Arab countries are shortly analyzed here as separate social values that influence the present state and future prospects of security cooperation in the Mediterranean⁶. However, four qualifications of the analysis are in order here. First, the security cultures of individual states of the two groups are to some extent different from one another but this difference is left aside because intra-group difference is much smaller than the difference with external countries. Second, there is another party in the negotiation, Israel, whose security culture is national self-defense supplemented by the military

⁶ The following presentation of the two security cultures of the Euro-Mediterranean partners resumes and updates a precedent published study (Attinà, 2001 b).

alliance with great powers, namely the United States. Albeit the problem of self-definition, pointed out by Del Sarto (in this volume), Israel is not alien to negotiate forms of security cooperation as shown by the proposal to include confidence-building measures in the peace plan with the Palestinian Authority. However, this negotiation proposal, which is not yet a regional security measure, is hindered by the mutual lack of trust between Israel and its neighbors. We detain here on the security culture of the Arab and European countries because they constitute the largest blocks of partners in the Euro-Mediterranean negotiations. Third, both cultures are under the effect of the worldwide security culture. For this reason, an extent of convergence of the two cultures can reasonably be expected. Finally and foremost, interactions in the wider frame of the EMP and the narrow frame of the Charter negotiations are expected to decrease the distance between the two security cultures and, in the long run, produce the merger of them.

The European security culture. The current security culture of the European countries has been influenced by three recent experiences: (1) the nuclear deterrence strategy and arms control negotiations of the Cold War and *détente* times; (2) the Helsinki Process with the three-decade long elaboration of the ideas and formation of the mechanisms of comprehensive and cooperative security; and (3) the formulation of national and multilateral defense policies in the 1990s to react to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to countries and non-state actors insensitive of the conventional logic of military strategy.

(1) European policy-makers focused on arms control to stabilize East-West confrontation, halt nuclear arms race and, above all, reduce the risk of nuclear war between the opposite blocs of the European countries that was contained in the Cold War deterrence strategy. The positive conclusion of all important arms control negotiations convinced the Europeans that security negotiations are a valuable tool to reduce the risk of violence between rival countries and a good instrument to cause an extent of common socialization of the people responsible for international security relations in different countries. Analysts attributed the positive conclusion of those negotiations to a large extent to the meetings and conferences of the so-called *arms control community* (Krause and Latham, 1999). This network of scientists, professionals and experts of the two blocs was the agent of the interaction and dialogue that promoted

the development of common meanings, innovative ideas, and cooperative solutions essential to construct the European regional security system (Adler, 1998). The arms control community was so much appreciated as positive negotiation means that it was replicated in the Helsinki and Barcelona Process negotiations. Adler coined the term “seminar diplomacy” with regard to the former process (Adler, 1998: 138-142) because the expert meetings were modeled after university seminars. “Expert network”, instead, is the official term to name the same practice in the framework of the EMP.

(2) For the first time in history, the right of the sovereign state to secrecy in military affairs was circumvented when verification measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of arms control agreements were invented by the Cold War arms control negotiators. The superpower governments agreed on the principle that arms control treaties are useless without appropriate measures of publicity and transparency that are needed to reduce uncertainty about the enemy’s compliance with the agreed norms. The East and West European governments acknowledged so much this principle that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) developed the principle in the wider concept of confidence building measures (CBMs) aimed at avoiding misperceptions and make military intentions explicit. They came also to believe that CBMs are the essential element of any project of regional security (Darileck, 2000).

The early CSCE view of the CBMs included only voluntary notifications of military activities and forms of voluntary transparency, like the presence of foreign observers to military maneuvers and reciprocal visits of military personnel. In the 1992 “Vienna Document” of the CSCE, instead, CBMs were taken as compulsory instrument of the European security system. Military information and personnel exchanges were designed to regulate various aspects of military power by mutual consent, such as size, technical composition and operational practices of the national armed forces.

CBMs caused the transformation of the security relations of the countries involved in the mechanism. The *realpolitik* tradition of Europe was modified to include the new concept of security as the product of mutual confidence and dialogue between enemies. Briefly, the co-operative multilateral approach was acknowledged as more efficacious than national threats, unilateral approaches and opposed strategic power systems to attain peace and security at the region level.

Given that both the Soviet and Western countries accepted the ideas of arms control and security measures, the Europeans were inclined to believe that difference of political culture and values is not an obstacle to implement regional security projects built on the principle and mechanisms of co-operative security. In addition, the arms control and CSCE experiences caused Europeans to believe that a quite fast process of security culture change is possible in the contemporary world⁷.

The CSCE/OCSE security model is also responsible for the introduction of the concept of comprehensive security in the European security culture. This concept focuses on the non-military aspects of security especially in the contemporary world. It includes economic, environmental, political and human factors within the group of the factors essential to build international security. In particular, the rationale of the political and human dimension is that peaceful international relations depend on the domestic conditions of all the countries concerned. These conditions include justice and the rule of law, democracy and pluralism, human and minority rights, free and autonomous civil society, individual freedom, and market economy. Acceptance of comprehensive security by the people and governments of Eastern and Central Europe was facilitated by the crisis of communism, increasingly manifest over the time period of the Helsinki Process.

Briefly, in the early 1990s, the European countries were the first group of countries in the world to opt for building a regional security partnership founded on the culture of comprehensive and co-operative security to avoid the destructiveness of contemporary international and internal wars in the region. Furthermore, they admit as possible that the same security arrangement is constructed in other parts of the world. In fact, the 1995 Barcelona Declaration committed EU countries and the Mediterranean

⁷ Adler's remarks on the importance of the experience matured by OSCE members are particularly illuminating in this regard: "*When assessing and measuring the influence of OSCE's practices, we cannot simply look at this institution's regulative tasks or short-range activities, because what matters most is the long-range effectiveness of its practices and activities as constitutive of community identity and bonds. For example, when the OSCE sends a mission to Tajikistan or to Estonia, organizes a seminar on military doctrines or confidence-building measure (CBMs), or, as part of its CBM regime, requires states to open up their military activities for inspection, what matters most is not the short-range success of the mission, seminar, or inspection, but the construction of a foundation for community practice and behavior. Moreover, one needs to assess whether OSCE innovative practices and activities have contributed to the collective understanding of the OSCE as a "region" and to changing the way that peoples in this region collectively think about their security*" (1998: 121).

partners to work for building the Euro-Mediterranean security system with similar attributes.

(3) However, over the 1990s, the European governments recognized that some aggressive and irrational countries within the European borders, like the Serbian Yugoslavia Federation, and at short distance from Europe, like Libya and Iraq, were unreceptive of cooperative mechanisms. For this reason, without denouncing the European security model, they started a “new discourse of threat and danger” (Krause and Latham, 1999: 39). This discourse considers the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism as the principal threat to international security and, consequently, proposes the development of a European common defense policy and Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as conditions for international stability and peace.

This description allows us to say that the European security culture will keep the present double-sided form combining the concepts of co-operative and comprehensive security with the discourse of the new threats and dangers as long as the arms control culture does not gain again over the proliferation of WMD at the global level and the regional security partnership model is firmly introduced in other regions of the world.

The Arab security culture. Strong cultural, linguistic and religious factors link the Middle East and North Africa Arab people across state borders. For this reason, the Arab leaders always exhibit support for the security of the whole Arab people as the condition for the security of the single nation. However, Arab governments are also very much concerned with threats to the stability of domestic regimes and security of the elite in power. For this reason, they manifest preoccupation for Arab trans-national movements as cause of insecurity for their country’s political order. Indeed, the security culture of contemporary Arab countries is founded on two distinct views: the Arab nation view, which advocates for an Arab trans-state community as the building block of peace and security in the area, and the view of the society of Arab states, which believes in friendly relations between the Arab states as foundation of security in the Arab world and condition for protecting the individual Arab country against external interference.

In the recent past, internal problems and the international environment have negatively influenced the Arab views on international security. Domestic problems like regime stability, national cohesion and economic performance negatively influenced the view of the single Arab nation. At the same time, the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab state conflicts (such as between Iraq and Syria, Egypt and Sudan, Algeria and Morocco) played against the view of the society of the Arab states. In addition, Cold War competition in the region seized many internal and international political processes and caused the consolidation of authoritarian domestic regimes and adversarial international politics because the Soviet Union and Western states provided their 'clients' with direct support including financial resources and armaments.

The international experience of the Arab countries after the end of the Cold War and bipolar politics did not change very much the nature of their security culture but reinforced the culture of national power. In fact, social and economic problems and the policy-makers' perception of threat to their regime strengthened the national security views of the leaders. At the same time, territorial disputes and the power structure of the area conditioned the international security views of the countries of the region. The Arab view on territorial issues as the principal obstacle to security is mostly influenced by the Israeli problem. To the Arabs, Israel is the most intrusive, aggressive and expansionist state, non-respectful of Arab states' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic parity is considered the minimal condition to obtain security with respect to Israel. Therefore, the state-security culture of the Arabs has been strengthened over other views of region-security arrangements.

However, in the 1990s, two views contrasting with the traditional views came to the front. The Arab leaders' belief in strong military power as the key to solve the security dilemma of state and society has been contrasted by the people's growing concern for issues different from state/regime security. New views of Arab security manifested against regime stability and the policy of diverting financial resources from domestic projects to national military force. A reformist view of Arab security developed in North Africa characterized by a strong orientation toward domestic issues, emphasis on civil society security, achievement of better conditions of life and the need for economic reforms in agreement with the traditions of the Arab culture and Islamic religion. But the largest critical movement against the status quo discourse of domestic

politics is the Islamist view. It is constructed around a radical conception of the security needs of the Islamic countries. Strong emphasis on religion and culture identity makes the Islamists concerned with the external threat of the non-Islamic world and the internal enemies of un-Islamic groups. Some Islamist movements engage in violent actions; others use non-violent means. All of them criticize the state for failing to meet the socio-economic needs of the society and aspiration to turn down external influence and intervention.

Briefly, security cooperation at the region level is still unfamiliar to the Arab security culture. Building regional security through co-operative means creates strong suspicions in governments attached to national military power and the traditional view of state strategic secrecy. The Arab countries never practiced co-operative security mechanisms as the European countries have been doing since the Helsinki Process started. Also comprehensive security is a suspicious concept to Arab political elite and policy-makers. The environmental and economic dimension of security is an acceptable concept but is also viewed as interference in national sovereignty. The human and political dimension of comprehensive security, instead, is still unaccepted by the Arab leaders who consider human and political measures of enhancing region security as true violation of the Arab political order.

Conclusions

The present trends of the European and Arab security cultures are different from one another. Liberal idealism and pragmatic realism are the prevailing cultural and political values to solve international problems in Europe and the Western world. These values have been influenced by the experience matured over the past century. In early time, the failure of the earliest disarmament conferences, non-aggression pacts and the League of Nations, all inspired by liberal idealism, caused the realist policy of containment and the opposite military alliance system of Cold War Europe. Subsequently, the positive results of the negotiations between the opposite alliances paved the way for change while the introduction of new perspectives on international security cooperation at the region level was implanted in the traditional realist view of security. Pluralism is present also in the security culture of the Arab Mediterranean countries. The Arab community culture and the national power paradigm pertain to

contemporary Arab countries both for tradition and recent experience. But Arab countries, despite the Arab League, never practiced any multilateral institution management of regional security problems. For this reason, the decision to sign the Barcelona Declaration as the fundamental agreement of the regional security partnership building process, and also the decision to negotiate the signature of the first operative agreement, i.e. the Charter for Stability and Peace, did not yet make out the expected effect of a working regional partnership. In other words, the Euro-Mediterranean partners have been able to meet with one of the conditions of the regional security partnership theory, i.e. to achieve consensus on security cooperation, but great difficulties exist against building the operative instruments of a security partnership. At present, on the experience of the seminar diplomacy of the Helsinki Process, reliance on the action of the network of the diplomats and security experts engaged in the project is the main instrument to keep the process going on (see Aliboni, Ammor, de Vasconcelos, 2002; Aliboni, Guazzone, Pioppi, 2001; Biad, 1999; Spencer, 1999). This network has the crucial task of approaching the convergence of the two security cultures and find out measures of partnership-building, conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy that best fit the expectations and values of all the parties.

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