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Threat, Racialization, and Mobilization:
Lessons from Southern California's Anti-Gang Injunction Movement

A Thesis submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Sociology

by

Alexander Scott

December 2019

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Threat, Racialization, and Mobilization:
Lessons from Southern California's Anti-Gang Injunction Movement

by

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Master of Arts, Graduate Program in Sociology
University of California, Riverside, December 2019
Dr. Ellen Reese, Chairperson

This study investigates how racialization and ethnic consciousness interact with threat to produce social movement outcomes. Using qualitative data collected through more than five years of ethnographic fieldwork, twenty semi-structured interviews with movement participants, community members, and attorneys, and archival analysis of media and news reports, this comparative study analyzes grassroots organizing campaigns against civil gang injunctions in Southern California. I profile three campaigns led by grassroots Chicana organizations, then analyze and compare the views and experiences of movement participants and attorneys regarding the processes and outcomes of these campaigns. Challenging research highlighting the role of threat in stimulating popular mobilization, I argue that the presence of threats is insufficient for mobilizing communities against civil gang injunctions. Drawing upon Critical race and LatCrit theory, I portray how local racial, ethnic, and cultural dynamics, as well as crime and violence, and organizing strategies interact with threat to produce mobilization. Comparing outcomes

across three campaigns, I observed that community mobilization occurred in low-income Chicana and Latina barrios within affluent white cities. In these contexts, organizers effectively used mobilization strategies that combined analyses of threat with local Chicana and Latina racial-ethnic consciousness and experiences with white racism to develop community solidarity and mobilization, while also pursuing a legal strategy to challenge gang injunctions in court. Conversely, community mobilization did not occur when organizers attempted to apply the same mobilization strategy to organizing a low-income Chicana and Latina barrio with a significant gang presence, located within a working class, Latina city. Moreover, efforts to organize around Chicana and Latina racial-ethnic consciousness were impeded by the larger Latina demographics of the city, greater rates of violence and crime, and the presence of local Chicana and Latina actors promoting the gang injunction. Failing to strategize around these dynamics and to commit adequate organizing time and resources to mobilizing residents, organizers were unable to build solidarity and mobilize the community.

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Law enforcement and policing have become highly politicized and prominent topics in public policy debates in the United States. Scholars, activists, communities, and progressive politicians have grown increasingly concerned with how policing has been waged against various marginalized groups and communities, including the racialized poor, Native/indigenous communities, immigrants, Black and Brown youth, LGBTQI and gender non-conforming people, the homeless, sex workers and others. This analysis has rightfully drawn attention to how dominant “broken windows” approaches to policing reflect the political expression of neoliberalism at the urban scale and how racism has sustained and naturalized aggressive policing as legitimate, inevitable, and inexorable (Camp & Heatherton 2016). The Black Lives Matter movement and various organizing campaigns have emerged to challenge issues associated with racism and “broken windows” approaches to policing including racial profiling, police brutality, and mass incarceration. Joining these efforts, for more than ten years community activists, and attorneys in Southern California have been organizing against aggressive policing policies known as “civil gang injunctions.”

Combining theoretical insights from social science scholarship on social movements and critical race/LatCrit theory, this paper investigates the development of three grassroots organizing campaigns against civil gang injunctions by the Chicaxs Unidxs (CU) organization of Orange County, California, and their collaborators. My research is based on qualitative data collected through more than five years of ethnographic fieldwork, twenty semi-structured interviews with movement participants, community members, and attorneys, and archival analysis of media and news reports. Applying a

critical race and LatCrit theoretical framework, I compare how organizers have synthesized strategies of community mobilization and courtroom litigation to achieve legal victories against civil gang injunctions and challenge dominant (white) legal and policing narratives that criminalize Chicanx, Latinx, and migrant communities and legitimize aggressive policing tactics. Additionally, I incorporate insights from the social movement literature to understand the conditions under which Chicanx and Latinx community members mobilized in response to the threat of aggressive and suppressive policing or failed to do so.

Building upon the political process model of social movements, scholars have shown that although violence and repression can discourage mobilization, grievances and threats of actual or potential state violence and political repression can sometimes stimulate protest movements; popular mobilization is thus not solely the result of increased political opportunities or access to elite resources (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Simmons 2016; Can Dyke & Soule 2002; Reese, Geidraitis, & Vega 2005; Almeida 2003; McKane & McCammon 2018; Almeida 2019). A grievance involves the perception of an existing injustice or injury, which may have been imposed gradually or rapidly, and understood over a longer or shorter period of time by those experiencing it. In order for a grievance to mobilize a group it is necessary that the grievance comes to be held “collectively” through “shared meaning making and experience” (McKane & McCammon 2017: 403). In contrast, “threats” are a group of actual or potential conditions perceived by a group as jeopardizing, or likely to jeopardize, their “interests, values, and at times survival” (Tarrow 1998; 86). Grievances and threats are often linked in that a threat may create new grievances or intensify preexisting grievances (Pinard 2011). For immigrant rights activists, for example,

the election of Donald Trump posed threats to gains made in obtaining legal rights and protections for dreamers, asylees, and refugees. The election of Donald Trump thus heightened migrant grievances regarding criminalization, detention, and deportation by the U.S. immigration authorities.

Within the social movement literature, threats have been described as providing opportunities for social movements to arise because they can worsen existing grievances/social conditions (Almeida 2019). Among such threats, economic problems, public health/environmental decline, the erosion of rights, and state repression have been identified as fundamental threats affecting social movement emergence (Almeida 2019). This being said, scholars maintain that threats do not automatically lead to mobilization or collective action, for groups experience and respond to threats and grievances in a variety of ways (Mckane and McCammon 2018). As an example, I have observed that of the hundreds of civil gang injunction cases in Southern California, the overwhelming majority have gone unchallenged by communities. Therefore, specific structural and social conditions are critical to movement emergence.

This study investigates the relationship between threats of increased state repression and the erosion of legal rights associated with civil gang injunctions, the organizational strategies and tactics Chicaxs Unidxs and their collaborators developed to mobilize 3 low-income Latinx communities against civil gang injunctions, and how communities responded to these strategies. In accordance with this analysis, I draw insights from critical race theory and Latinx critical theory to discuss how organizers strategically mobilized legal resources and collaborated with attorneys to legally challenge civil gang

injunctions, while also empowering Chicax, Latinx, and immigrant people. Specifically, this study addresses the following research questions: 1) How have Chicaxs Unidxs and their collaborators mobilized grassroots community and legal campaigns against civil gang injunctions?; 2) How do movement participants understand their experiences with, and outcomes of, organizing against civil gang injunctions?; 3) Why were some anti-gang injunction campaigns more successful than others in mobilizing residents to oppose civil gang injunctions?

By addressing these research questions and synthesizing theories from the literature on social movements and race and the law, this study seeks to understand how threat, local dynamics of race, culture, and crime, and organizing strategies intersect to produce social movement outcomes. Additionally, this study is directed at understanding how social movements and litigation combine to produce legal reforms. I conclude by offering insights on how organizers, organizations, and communities can effectively mobilize against civil gang injunctions within multiethnic, Chicax and Latinx communities.

In what follows, I first review the social movement scholarship related to threat and opportunity, considering how, and under what conditions, popular mobilization against threats emerges, and how threats relate to movement strategies and tactics. I then review the scholarship on Critical Race Theory and LatCrit Theory, specifically considering how white supremacist discourse and racialized power relations are embedded within the US legal system, and how multi-ethnic Chicax and Latinx social movements utilized racialization in mobilizing social movements. Next I review the literature on civil gang injunctions and provide a historical overview of the emergence of community movements

opposing civil gang injunctions, as well as background information on the Chicaxs Unidxs organization of Orange County. These sections are followed by a description of the comparative case method research design, including ethnographic participant observation and interviews with twenty organizers, community members, and attorneys in three cities. I then provide chronological summaries of separate organizing campaigns against civil gang injunctions in the cities of Orange, Santa Barbara, and Santa Ana, and provide a comparative analysis of the processes and outcomes of these campaigns. These three campaigns have in common civil gang injunctions as the target of mobilization efforts, the police and state as the source of threat, and the presence of Chicaxs Unidxs members in mobilizing communities and legal battles against civil gang injunctions.

Theoretical Framework

Threat Induced Social Movements

My study contributes to social movement scholarship, particularly models of threat-based popular mobilization, to understand the emergence of grassroots organizing movements against civil gang injunctions. As other scholars using political process theory have noted, popular mobilization often emerges in response to increased threats to groups' interests and values, including threats of state violence and political repression. This theoretical model contrasts with alternative perspectives, such as political opportunity approaches that link movement emergence to increased political opportunities (e.g., see Tarrow & McAdam here among others), or resource mobilization perspectives that link

movement emergence among deprived groups to increases in their access to organizational resources.

There are a multiplicity of grievances and threats that can stimulate mobilization and collective action. As Almeida has shown, social movements have sometimes mobilized in response to increased threats of state violence and political repression, especially within authoritarian regimes (Almeida 2003; Almeida 2019). Other scholars have demonstrated how suddenly imposed grievances such as environmental catastrophe or military conflict can be significant in mobilizing individuals to act collectively, as well as regional economic strains or perceived religious threats (Walsh 1981; Van Dyke and Soule 202; McVeigh, Crubaugh, and Estep 2017). Although threats and grievances often stimulate outrage and protest, especially when there is little risk of repression, threats of repression and violence can sometimes spread fear and diminish protest among vulnerable groups (McKane & McCammon 2017). Thus, how groups experience and respond to threats and grievances varies considerably, and specific structural and social conditions are critical to movement emergence. Among such conditions, scholars have shown that access to organizational resources can help groups translate their grievances into mobilization and influence the size of a movement (Owens, Cunningham & Ward 2015). In particular, the presence of movement organizations and leaders can facilitate threat-based mobilization and influence which groups mobilize, especially if there is a history of tensions such as racial or ethnic divisions among groups and organizations (McKane & McCammon 2017).

My analysis below suggests that movements against civil gang injunctions have emerged in response to specific threats associated with civil gang injunctions, such as

criminalization, increased policing, and a loss of legal rights among Chicana/Latina people. Yet, despite the presence of threats, social movement organizations and legal resources in each case, I observe that the level of community mobilization against civil gang injunctions varied across communities. This suggests that the combined presence of threats, organizations, and legal resources does not automatically lead to popular mobilization. I contend that a singular analysis of threat is not useful in understanding community mobilization against civil gang injunctions and it is necessary to incorporate additional theories to my analysis. In particular, Critical Race and LatCrit theories provide valuable insights for understanding how Mexican and Latina racialization, racial ethnic consciousness and ethnic culture served an important function in mobilizing or creating barriers to mobilizing against civil gang injunctions.

Critical Race/LatCrit Theory

Critical Race Theory (CRT) helps us to better understand how Chicana/Latina synthesized organizing strategies of courtroom litigation and grassroots community mobilization to wage organizing campaigns to contest civil gang injunctions. CRT can be understood as a critical theoretical framework that examines how laws tend to reinforce racial domination or white supremacy as well as how the law can be used to contest those power relations (Yosso 2015). CRT considers many of the same issues as conventional civil rights and ethnic studies discourses, but places these issues in a broader perspective that includes economics, history, context, group- and self-interest, and even feelings and the unconscious. Central to this theoretical outlook is an understanding that 1) racism is ordinary, 2) convergence with larger interests of whites is regularly present in movements

seeking to challenge or “eradicate racism,” and 3) race and races are products of social thought and relations, as well as material relations (Delgado and Stefancic 2001). Additionally, differing from traditional positivist approaches to social science research, CRT practitioners view personal narrative and story-telling as a valuable source of empirical data that can be used to confront and challenge dominant white discourses and narratives in the law and social sciences.

CRT developed out of the historic discourse and synthesis of critical theory, social science, and legal studies throughout the 20th century. This synthesis produced important critiques of legal objectivism and dominant cultural discourses (white, liberal, middle-class, male, etc.) that have historically served to maintain inequality in the legal system, social science, and society more generally. However, CRT has been subject to legitimate critiques from its own practitioners and supporters regarding a failure to adequately incorporate the legal narratives of excluded minorities. Critics have recognized and critiqued that much of CRT scholarship is defined by a binary conversation between African/black Americans and whites, and has ignored the experiences of other subordinated racial and ethnic groups in the United States (Mirandé 2000; Yosso 2005). Addressing these deficiencies, in recent years Latinx critical theory or “LatCrit” has emerged as a theoretical analysis of how racism, sexism, and classism are intimately connected with other forms of marginalization based on phenotype, culture, sexuality, surname, linguistic accents, and immigration status (Haney Lopez 2006; Johnson 1999; Montoya 1994).

LatCrit scholars have identified and discussed how immigrants of color and their descendants face processes of racialization that puts them at more risk for discrimination and racism. Challenging prevalent assimilationist assumptions that immigrant ethnicities and experiences are race-neutral, LatCrit scholars have examined how race is always present in the experiences of migrants, immigration legislation, and law enforcement (Sanchez & Romero 2010). Central to this analysis is an understanding that the United States immigration system historically excluded and restricted the rights of certain racial groups who were once considered “undesirables” (Garcia 2017: 2). In particular this process of racialization and legal exclusion has been directed at migrants from Mexico and countries in Latin America.

Racism and racialization in US immigration policy has influenced law enforcement agencies to continuously treat migrants from Latin America as suspects on the basis of what is constructed as their perceived ‘foreignness’ to the dominant White, Anglo-Saxon population/culture. This practice has severely impacted the lives of Latinx migrants, as well as Mexican Americans/Chicanxs and Latinx Americans who are American citizens, but whose citizenship and daily activities are questioned on the basis of their physical appearance, transforming them into second class citizens who are not afforded the same rights as white citizens. At times this has produced tension and conflict between Latin American migrants and Mexican Americans/ Chicanxs, as sustained migration from Latin America has been perceived by some Mexican Americans/Chicanxs as complicating their efforts to assimilate into the dominant culture and institutions (Gutiérrez 1995; Ochoa 2004).

Scholars have well documented how tensions between Mexican-American/Chicanx and migrant communities were reflected in a number of political organizations and social movement efforts throughout the 20th century (Gutiérrez 1995). This being said, mutual experiences with white racism and repression have also served to reinforce the realization among Mexican-American/Chicanx and migrant communities that while they are heterogeneous, they are inextricably linked and may be subjected to similar practices of racism and exclusion (Gutierrez 1995). Such realizations have played a central role in the emergence of collaborative, multi-ethnic Mexican-American and Latinx social movements and coalitions throughout the twentieth and twenty first centuries including labor strikes, the Chicano movement and Chicano Moratorium, immigrant rights movements, and various community campaigns (Gutierrez 1995; Ochoa 2004; Pardo 1998).

CRT and LatCrit offer important theoretical insight regarding racial power relations, the US legal system, and movements confronting white racial discourses that are useful to understanding organizing against civil gang injunctions. Below, I apply CRT and LatCrit to analyze how Chicanxs Unidxs led three organizing campaigns around a dual strategy of litigation and community mobilization that focused on challenging the constitutionality of civil gang injunctions in court and centering the experiences and narratives of Chicanx and Latinx communities. Additionally, I apply LatCrit theories of Latinx racialization to understand and compare mobilization dynamics across three campaigns. In doing so, this study contributes to legal studies literature on racialized social movements and socio-legal studies by analyzing how a grassroots Chicanx-led movement strategically used community mobilization and litigation to achieve movement goals.

Among such goals were empowering Chicanx, Latinx, and immigrant communities to challenge dominant (white) discourses regarding policing, gangs, and Latinx and Chicanx barrios, as well as the outcomes of the legal mobilization strategy.

Historical Background: Gang Injunctions

For decades, law enforcement in California have implemented a variety of methods to suppress gang activity in poor communities of color (Smith 2000). Of these methods, civil gang injunctions are among the most popular, and the most criticized. A civil gang injunction is a lawsuit filed by a district attorney in a civil court and approved by a judge, alleging that a gang and its members have occupied a specific geographic area or “safety zone” within a city in a manner that constitutes a “public nuisance” (National Association of District Attorneys 2009). Specifically, these injunctions prohibit people identified as gang members from a variety of activities that are otherwise legal, such as being in public in certain places, hanging out together, wearing certain colors, or even riding a bike. This approach to gang suppression is based on “social disorganization” and “deterrence” theories of policing in which it is predicted that “sure, swift, and severe sanctions” against gang members will deter criminal behavior (Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane 2005). Law enforcement officials, mostly white men, have argued that civil gang injunctions cause alleged gang members to believe that they are being closely watched by the police and more likely to be arrested and prosecuted for violations of the injunctions. In turn, they argue that fear of arrest and prosecution will weaken gang identity and participation in gang-related behavior will decrease (Maxson et al. 2005).

Since 1992, more than 150 civil gang injunctions have been filed in civil courts in the state of California (Spady et al. Forthcoming; O’Deane 2012). Of these injunctions, nearly all of them have been placed in poor Chicana, Latina and black neighborhoods. Contrary to dominant law enforcement narratives, studies conducted on how civil gang injunctions affect crime rates have produced mixed findings, and do not clearly support arguments that they are universally effective (Grogger 2002; Los Angeles County Civil Grand Jury 2004; Scott and Spady 2015). There is, however, considerable evidence from legal and social science scholarship that civil gang injunctions violate basic civil liberties, disproportionately target poor communities of color, and reinforce systemic racism (Barajas 2007; Crawford 2009; Muñiz 2015; Smith 2000; Spady et.al Forthcoming; Stewart 1998). In recent years, social scientists and community organizations have begun to document and analyze how civil gang injunctions affect gentrification in, or near, poor communities of color (Muñiz 2015).

Few social science studies have conducted in-depth qualitative research analyzing grassroots organizing movements against civil gang injunctions. This is important because although the current literature speaks to the problems caused by and associated with civil gang injunctions, few studies have acknowledged that communities have actively resisted and organized against them. To fill this gap in the literature, this study analyzes some of the first and most publicly visible community led grassroots organizing campaigns against civil gang injunctions in California. Documenting and analyzing the perspectives and voices of organizers, community members, and attorneys in relation to popular resistance to civil gang injunctions, this study contributes a novel sociological perspective on how

communities perceive and have organized themselves to challenge civil gang injunctions. More, it offers important sociological insight and an original case study on how contemporary social movements are organizing against dominant institutions and structures that maintain racial inequality.

Since law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles began pursuing civil gang injunctions in the early 1980s there have been efforts made by attorneys and civil rights organizations to challenge the constitutional legitimacy of civil gang injunctions in court (San Roman 2016). However, with the exception of one 1993 case where a judge removed a civil gang injunction in the city of Westminster, California Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court of California have consistently upheld the constitutionality of civil gang injunctions. Most notably, in *People ex rel. Gallo vs. Acuna (1997)* the California Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the City of San Jose may “implement a civil gang injunction that restricts non-criminal behavior if committed by alleged gang members in a particular neighborhood.”

Attorneys and legal aid organizations have been challenging civil gang injunctions since the 1980s. However, these efforts were largely led by attorneys and did not incorporate public organizing campaigns or collaboration with communities. In the past decade this pattern has changed significantly as communities have taken more active roles in organizing campaigns to remove civil gang injunctions and prevent them from being placed in their neighborhoods (Almada 2014; Cabrera 2014; Esquivel 2014; Molina 2014).

Chicanxs Unidxs and organized opposition to gang injunctions

Chicanxs Unidxs de Orange County is among the leading organizations in Southern California's anti-gang injunction movement and is widely regarded as the main organization in Orange County, having participated in campaigns against four different civil gang injunctions since 2009. Chicanxs Unidxs (CU) is a grassroots community organization founded in 2006 and based in Orange County, California. As an organization, they are dedicated to the "preservation of Chicanx, Mexicanx, Indigenous cultural heritage" and the historical legacy of their ancestral homeland in the South Western United States (Chicanxs Unidxs 2006: 1). They define themselves as a multi-ethnic, multi-generational, multi-issue grassroots organization, with the stated mission of being "an informed, independent, and community based Chicanx Mexicanx Indigenous organization that proactively and consistently identifies and challenges racism, violence, and institutional oppression" (Chicanxs Unidxs 2006: 1).

Since their founding, CU has organized and participated in a number of highly publicized and controversial community organizing campaigns in Orange County. Among the issues CU has organized around are gentrification and urban displacement, gang violence, police brutality, immigrant rights, detention, and deportation, as well as local electoral campaigns. Reflecting their mission statement, all of their organizing work is predicated on a critical understanding of how issues of racism and racial inequality negatively affect communities of color in Orange County, and are aimed at identifying and challenging these issues. Of their specific campaigns, CU is arguably most well-known in

Orange County's political and social justice circles for their efforts to prevent and remove civil gang injunctions.

CU began organizing and campaigning against civil gang injunctions in 2009 in response to the threats the policies posed to communities including the loss of legal rights, criminalization, and more aggressive policing. During their first campaign organizers from CU worked collaboratively with residents of the Orange Varrio Cypress neighborhood (OVC) in the city of Orange, and attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union and private law firms, to mobilize a 4-year community and litigation campaign (2009-2013) opposing the injunction. This first campaign led to 62 individuals being removed from the civil gang injunction and a Federal Appeals court removing the ability of law enforcement to enforce the civil gang injunction in 2013 (ACLU 2013). Following this initial legal victory, CU went on to organize a campaign against the Townsend Street Civil Gang Injunction in the city of Santa Ana (2014-2019), and participated in campaigns against a proposed civil gang injunction in the city of Santa Barbara (2013-2014) and two proposed gang injunctions in the city of Placentia (2015-2018).

Based on their organizational mission and organizing experience, Chicanxs Unidxs developed a model for organizing against civil gang injunctions focusing on 1) mobilizing residents of neighborhoods placed under civil gang injunctions to publicly oppose and organize against the civil gang injunction, and 2) mobilizing legal resources to help residents contest their inclusion and challenge the constitutional legitimacy of civil gang injunctions in court. Reflecting these strategies, CU used a variety of organizing tactics including attending court hearings, speaking to the media, working in coalitions and

collaborative projects with nonprofit and grassroots organizations, hosting legal aid clinics, picketing and staging public protests, canvassing neighborhoods, holding teach-ins and community forums, and giving presentations to local university, community college, and high school classes.

Methods and Data

This study employs a comparative ethnographic research design reminiscent of Burawoy's (1998) "extended case method" to investigate three grassroots organizing campaigns against civil gang injunctions by the Chicaxs Unidxs organization. The extended case method (ECM) is a research method that focuses on conducting detailed and reflexive ethnographic studies of concrete empirical cases in order to link empirical observations to larger structural forces in society (Burawoy et.al. 1991; Burawoy 1998). In the extended case method, researchers participate in, and observe, events and actions of individuals and groups over an extended period of time, then develop their own ethnographic story to theorize about a social phenomenon, rather than start with a theory to explain an empirical reality. Additionally, practitioners of the extended case method advocate for reflexive ethnography and researcher engagement with study participants, and challenge positivist assumptions of scientific objectivity and calls for researcher detachment. Through collaborative ethnography, in-depth interviews, and analysis of media reports and organizational documents, I worked with study participants to analyze and compare their perspectives and views of their organizing work, as well as the processes and outcome of three separate campaigns.

For this study I collaborated as an active member of the Chicaxs Undixs organization for more than five years. Since 2014 I have been an active “core” member of the organization and have assisted CU with organizing campaign events and actions, conducting research on civil gang injunctions, documenting the organization’s history using writing and photography, and assisting attorneys with analyzing evidence presented by the Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) in an active civil gang injunction case. In addition to working directly on CU’s campaigns and projects, since 2016 I have been making regular visits to one neighborhood where CU is still actively seeking the removal of a civil gang injunction. During these visits I would have conversations with residents on a wide-range of topics, including problems affecting the community related to policing and the gang injunction. Additionally, there were some occasions where I attended candle light vigils for residents who had passed away from gang violence and drug overdoses, and I even spent three months in 2017 assisting CU with transporting a local youth to and from school while he was working with attorneys on getting removed from the California State Gang Database.

Although I am an insider to CU in the sense of being an active member of the organization, I occupy a very different positionality and possess very different frames of analysis compared to most other CU members. Moreover, I am an outsider in the sense that I am a white, middle class, male, academic and do not reside in the communities where CU conducted its organizing campaigns. Reflecting my positionality, in the organizing campaigns my role has not been one of leadership, but providing ancillary support in the form of research, volunteering at campaign events, documenting events in writing and

photographs, and supporting public actions. My position in these campaigns has yielded different experiences and analytical perspectives from many CU members. To address this, I have conducted in-depth interviews with CU members and movement participants in addition to my ethnographic fieldwork, in order to triangulate my data and produce a more comprehensive and thorough understanding of events than could be achieved with either method alone. Additionally, this process of triangulation was aimed at addressing my position as a privileged outsider (white-middle class male, and academic) that supports the Chicana people leading the campaigns discussed below.

Comparison of organizing campaigns

Given that CU has organized a limited number of campaigns against civil gang injunctions, and in communities with different ethnic, linguistic, class, political, and citizenship dynamics, I chose to conduct a comparative analysis of campaigns that took place in three different cities. The locations for each of these campaigns were characterized by specific political, racial, ethnic, and class environments: Orange Varrio Cypress is a multi-generational working class Chicana Barrio located in the city of Orange, a predominately white, conservative, middle and upper middle-class city in Orange County. The city of Santa Barbara is a politically liberal, middle and upper-middle class city in Santa Barbara County, where working class multi-ethnic Chicana, Mexicana and Latina barrios were targeted for a gang injunction. Townsend Street or “Calle Townsend” is a working class and multi-ethnic neighborhood highly populated by Latina immigrants, located in the majority Latina, working class, and politically Democrat/ Liberal city of Santa Ana in Orange County.

I systemically compare these three different campaigns against civil gang injunctions in order to find patterns of difference and similarity between them. Reflecting Mills' method of difference, a comparative approach to research is concerned with identifying factors that are common and different in a given context, from which inferences can be made regarding the conditions that explain an event (Mill 2011). Building upon comparative approaches from quantitative/statistical social science, qualitative social scientists in the 1980s and 1990s developed the comparative qualitative approach as a "synthetic strategy" that would "integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach [qualitative] with the best features of the variable-oriented approach [quantitative/statistical]" (Ragin 1987: 84). Rather than basing research on the premises of quantitative research, the aim of qualitative comparison is to develop a method which is firmly rooted in an analysis of specific cases. Cases are viewed as "singular, whole entities" carefully selected by researchers, and are not "homogeneous observations drawn at random from a pool of equally plausible selections" (Ragin 1994: 300). Moreover, most case-oriented studies start with the seemingly simple idea that social phenomena in like settings (such as organizations, neighborhoods, cities, countries, regions, cultures, and so on) may parallel each other sufficiently to permit comparing and contrasting them.

I chose to compare the neighborhoods of Orange Varrío Cypress, Santa Barbara, and Townsend Street because they are among the few cases where CU has played a central role in organizing campaigns against civil gang injunctions. I also chose to compare these three campaigns because the participants in my study also commonly drew comparisons among them. Additionally, these three neighborhoods were chosen because they capture

the empirical variation of the local social, economic, and political climates where organizing campaigns against civil gang injunctions have been conducted: a working class Chicana barrio within a politically conservative city with a majority white, middle and upper-middle class population, multiethnic Chicana and Latina barrios within a politically liberal city with a majority white, middle-upper class population, and a working class Chicana and Latina barrio within a working class, politically liberal city with a majority Latina, and highly immigrant population.

The campaigns presented below have in common their organizing objectives of challenging the legality of civil gang injunctions and dominant law enforcement narratives as well as mobilizing communities to join organizing efforts. In accordance with these objectives, all three campaigns combined courtroom litigation and community mobilization. These organizing objectives and strategies emerged in response to the specific threats that civil gang injunctions represent to communities: restricting legal rights and enabling police officers to engage in more aggressive policing tactics and practices. However, despite the shared presence of political and repressive threats, and coordinated organizing campaigns, community organizing strategies produced very different outcomes, with higher levels of popular mobilization in low-income Latina and Chicana neighborhoods within cities with large white populations than in a low-income Latina and Chicana neighborhood with a significant gang presence, located within a majority Latina city. I argue that these divergent outcomes were due to the difference in their local context/dynamics specific to race and class tensions between whites and Latinas populations, the prevalence of crime associated with gangs, the presence of local actors

promoting the gang injunction, and the action or inaction made by organizers to strategize around these dynamics. Moreover, my comparison of these three campaigns provides a valuable case study to examine how popular mobilization in response to similar threats depend upon the local social and political context and organizers' strategies.

Interviews

I utilized 20 semi-structured interviews with members of Chicanxs Unidxs, residents of the Townsend Street neighborhood, Orange Varrio Cypress neighborhood, and the City of Santa Barbara, and attorneys who participated in litigation battles against civil gang injunctions. All interviews were confidential and I have concealed the identities of participants by assigning pseudonyms. All interviews were recorded with a digital voice recorder while I took notes in a notepad. The interviews were one to two hours in length, however, at times I requested additional time or scheduled additional interviews. The topics discussed during interviews included their individual involvement with organizing against or litigating civil gang injunctions, their experiences and perceptions of civil gang injunctions, as well as their perceptions of organizing goals, strategies, tactics, and outcomes.

Participants were selected for the study based on the following characteristics: 1) Sustained and active involvement in organizing, planning, and participating in campaigns against civil gang injunctions; 2) Individual efforts to litigate inclusion in a civil gang injunction; and 3) involvement in litigating civil gang injunction cases in court or providing legal consultation to groups litigating civil gang injunction cases. All audio recordings of the interviews and the handwritten field notes were transcribed verbatim into Microsoft

Word documents by myself, or an undergraduate research assistant. Upon completion of the transcriptions, I reviewed transcripts and corrected errors in them. I then analyzed and coded the data contained in each transcript and memo, bracketing information from study participants into different categories addressing the specific aims of the study. Using a grounded theory approach to data analysis, I conducted multiple coding sessions to ask analytical questions of the data, then triangulated the data sources and information construct an informed, critical argument (Creswell 2014). In particular, I analyzed and interrogated the data, identifying and comparing different and similar patterns of information and responses from participants, questioning what factors, experiences, and circumstances informed these differing perceptions.

Findings

The below findings are organized around answering the multiple research aims of this study. Based on an analysis of ethnographic field notes, interview transcripts, CU meeting minutes, and media reports, I briefly summarize CU's organizing campaigns in the Orange Varrio Cypress neighborhood, Santa Barbara, and Townsend Street neighborhood, and discuss the perspectives and experiences of participants regarding the processes and outcomes of the campaigns. Specifically, I discuss the successes of these campaigns in litigating gang injunctions and challenging law enforcement narratives, as well as the different mobilization outcomes. In doing so I draw on a variety of social science literature to interrogate why organizing campaigns were more successful at mobilizing community support and participation in the Orange Varrio Cypress and Santa Barbara campaigns than the Townsend Street campaign.

The Orange Varrío Cypress Campaign (2009-2013)

CU began organizing against civil gang injunctions in 2009 when they were contacted by residents of the Orange Varrío Cypress (OVC) neighborhood in the city of Orange about helping them challenge a civil gang injunction recently placed on their neighborhood. Through reviewing the gang injunction documents and meeting with residents, organizers developed an understanding of the terms of the injunction, the 3.78 square mile area it covered, and learned that 115 individuals had been served with the injunction. They also discovered that the judge who had approved the injunction had approved multiple gang injunctions in the past. In response, CU worked with those placed under the gang injunction to file requests to change the judge. This tactic proved effective as the court honored the request, and set a court date with a different judge.

CU and OVC residents acquired pro-bono legal support from private law firms and the ACLU of Southern California to represent the individuals who had been placed on the injunction. Equipped with a legal team and a group of motivated residents, the campaign developed an organizing framework that focused on strategies of 1) litigating the criteria the District Attorney and Orange Police Department were using to identify gang members for the injunction and 2) mobilizing residents to publicly oppose the gang injunction and attend the hearing in order to pressure and display community resistance to the judge. In the weeks leading up to the court hearing, residents and CU members collaborated to share information with residents about threats the gang injunction posed to the neighborhood and encourage people to attend the hearing. Over 100 residents turned out for the hearing, including nearly 60 people who sought to challenge their inclusion in the gang injunction

(ACLU 2013; Wood 2013). During the hearing the judge strongly criticized the criteria the District Attorney and Orange Police Department had used to identify gang members for the injunction and requested further evidence. Facing the difficulty of proving that more than 60 people were active gang members, the District Attorney dismissed all of those who had attended the hearing from the injunction. However, the injunction was upheld by default against the OVC gang and those individuals who failed to appear in court.

After the first hearing, the District Attorney and Orange Police Department began serving the injunction on the same people that had been dismissed from the case, on grounds that they were suspected of being part of the enjoined gang (ACLU 2013). The ACLU and a private law firm responded by filing a class-action lawsuit against the Orange County District Attorney and the Orange Police Department in September of 2009. The lawsuit alleged that the District Attorney and Police Department had violated due process by denying the people they were enforcing the injunction against of basic civil liberties (ACLU 2013). At the same time, CU worked with residents on mobilizing people to participate in public actions. Central to their strategy was portraying how the gang injunction unfairly criminalized the OVC neighborhood and was racially profiling Mexican-Americans/Chicanxs as gang members (James and Srisavasdi 2009). As described by a resident who led much of the organizing, this narrative resonated with the community and “gave them a reason to fight.” Among their tactics, organizers coordinated multiple marches with more than 50 residents from the OVC neighborhood to the city’s downtown area known as “the Circle,” where they were subject to racist, anti- Mexican slurs and denunciations by white patrons and business owners. As described by Marcos,

We started marching through the city of Orange protesting to the circle and stuff with signs and everything. People were calling us beaners and stuff like that. We walked in there like “fuck it.” It was like, 50 years ago. They were all [white] people just calling us shit as you go through the restaurants there and stuff... They were like “how dare you guys [Mexicans and Chicanxs] come into our circle.”

Two years after the beginning of the OVC campaign, in May 2011 the federal district court ruled that the District Attorney and Orange Police Department had violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights, and ordered them to stop enforcing the civil gang injunction. The District Attorney and Orange Police Department appealed the Decision of the District court, which moved the case to the Ninth Circuit Court for additional review. In November 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court upheld the district court ruling that the Orange County District Attorney and the local police department had violated the plaintiffs' due process rights. Effectively, the decision of the Federal Court made the Orange Varrio Cypress Injunction unenforceable and established the important legal precedent requiring due process for all individuals placed under a civil gang injunction.

Although there is no consensus among the attorneys I interviewed regarding how law enforcement officials view civil gang injunctions since the emergence of CU’s organizing campaigns, they share the opinion that organizing has impeded the ability of law enforcement to pursue and enforce gang injunctions. As described by one attorney, the ruling in the 2013 OVC case (*Vasquez v. Rackauckaus*) requiring due process for all individuals placed under a gang injunction has made the policies more of a hindrance than a help to prosecutors:

Gang injunctions have become overly burdensome. The idea with the gang injunction [was that it] was a short cut way of putting a whole bunch of people on probation without giving them any protection and that's not what it is anymore. If you have to give somebody an individualized hearing as to whether they're a gang

member you might as well just bring an injunctive relief against just them. If you have to have individualized hearings, why not have individualized cases?

Santa Barbara Campaign (2013-2014)

Utilizing the organizing knowledge and legal network they had acquired from the OVC campaign and their research work, from 2013-2014 CU members worked with organizers in the city of Santa Barbara on a campaign opposing a proposed gang injunction covering 5.41 square miles of the city and targeting the city's Chicax and Latinx barrios. Mirroring the OVC campaign, CU members advised local organizers to pursue a dual strategy of community mobilization and litigation, and helped found a local grassroots organization to lead organizing efforts. Reflecting the heterogeneity of the Chicax and Latinx communities they sought to mobilize, the new organization's membership was made up of US born Mexican-Americans/Chicanxs as well as documented and undocumented Latinx migrants.

To achieve the legal strategy, organizers acquired pro-bono legal support from private law firms and the ACLU to challenge the gang injunction in court. At the same time, the grassroots organization waged a large public organizing campaign portraying the gang injunction as racially profiling Chicanxs and Latinxs and venting extreme community opposition. Among the tactics used by organizers were community walks and canvassing, posting flyers, hosting cultural events and open mics, creating short documentary films and sharing information about the threat of gang injunctions online. This strategy proved highly successful in mobilizing Mexican American/Chicax, Latinx, and undocumented barrio

residents to attend organizing events and actions, as well as court hearings and city council meetings. As described by Miguel,

the parents...a lot of people of color...got involved because they knew that their children would get affected...And, they knew that this gang injunction...it wasn't specific to an area. The proposed gang injunction was just overkill...The minority who were like the college conservatives, [and] upper-middle class white folks, they were just outnumbered...it was just overwhelming support against it.

Additionally, organizers made efforts to pressure local politicians and public officials online and in-person meetings to oppose the civil gang injunction, eliciting the support of multiple city council members and business owners.

Following almost two years of extensive litigation and community mobilization efforts, in July of 2014 the overseeing judge issued a 32-page ruling denying the request for an injunction in its entirety. The court found that “Santa Barbara is not a community beset by substantial and unreasonable gang-related interference with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons” (City of Santa Barbara v. Eastside 2014). This second campaign marked the first time a community movement successfully stopped the creation of a gang injunction in California since 1992 (in an early but isolated Orange County case).

By obtaining legal resources and mobilizing residents to oppose civil gang injunctions, the OVC and Santa Barbara campaigns were able to pursue the litigation strategy that prevented the creation of the Santa Barbara gang injunction, and established important legal rulings regarding individual rights to due process. However, in addition to formal legal achievements, these campaigns presented important challenges to dominant

(white) policing narratives and discourses on gang injunctions as well as Chicana and Latinx communities. For decades the dominant public narrative regarding civil gang injunctions was that of law enforcement, which portrayed gang injunctions as universally effective in suppressing gang activity and crime, and that they were desired by many communities. As described on the Los Angeles Police Department's website:

Gang injunctions have a clearly demonstrable positive affect on the neighborhood area covered. Some have had a remarkable effect. In smaller areas, gang nuisance activity can be permanently removed. In larger areas, with gangs entrenched for years, the gang's hold on the area can be reduced and maintained with a small team of law enforcement officers. Anecdotal evidence is fully supportive; residents continue to ask for the period of peace a gang injunction can provide (Los Angeles Police Department 2019).

Not just portraying the effectiveness of civil gang injunctions, advocates have characteristically represented the (all but universally) black and Latinx communities targeted for gang injunctions as areas plagued by extreme levels of violence similar to warzones. Conforming to this narrative, communities of color are described by law enforcement as necessitating benevolent police intervention to help individuals disassociate from gangs. As put by Deputy Orange County District Attorney Susan J. Eckermann,

[In reference to an Orange County Gang Injunction] The situation is so dire, immediate action is needed to curb the violence (Cabrera 2014).

Similarly, an official from the Long Beach Police Department stated,

The injunction can be looked upon as a law enforcement tool, but it also provides a level of cover for members looking to leave the gang life. It is a lot easier to avoid the gang life if you know you are likely to get arrested. At the same time, if you are in a gang, the injunction is making it a little easier to get out. It may not be an alternative to joining a gang, but it certainly provides a powerful incentive not to, and that's what the LBPD set out to accomplish (McDonnell 2019).

Law enforcement perspectives on civil gang injunctions reflect many of the racist and paternalistic views of Chicanx and Latinx communities that dominate political discourse and culture in the United States. Too often, these communities are portrayed as foreign or illegal to the U.S., prone to violence, criminality, and delinquency, and necessitating the intervention of the state and law enforcement.

Challenging this view, in the OVC and Santa Barbara campaigns CU and their collaborators publicly portrayed how civil gang injunctions are repressive and unfairly criminalize Chicanx and Latinx communities. As described by Carolina:

I remember doing the presentations...and I remember people being shocked...shocked with how oppressive and suppressive these laws work for people just being put on a [gang injunction enforcement] list and there's no way to know why you're on the list or how to get off it...the normalization of being put on lists was being challenged...I think we kinda blew that idea up. To be like, no those things are not supposed to happen...Folks in different communities and communities that we belong to, a lot of people just take it, like when something happens [with police] and they know it's wrong they're just like "ah whatever that's just the way it is" [but we pushed] for people to be like no you don't have to do this, no this is not okay, and no even if you are in a gang you deserve due process.

This counter-narrative was essential to mobilizing residents in the OVC and Santa Barbara campaigns to oppose civil gang injunctions and participate in organizing activities as well as framing legal arguments. Responding to these narratives, organizers collaborated with attorneys to employ litigation as a movement tactic drawing upon legal concepts to construct claims that resonated with potential supporters in the legal arena as well as in the media and the general public. However, CU's organizing efforts were not universally successful, for the community mobilization outcomes of these campaigns differed significantly.

Townsend Street Campaign 2013-2019:

In the fall of 2013, CU began its third campaign against a gang injunction when they were alerted to a possible plan for a gang injunction on the Townsend Street neighborhood in the city of Santa Ana. Differing from the OVC and Santa Barbara campaigns, where organizing was initiated by “insiders” from each community, no CU members had connections to the Townsend Street neighborhood. For more than three months CU collaborated with other organizations to conduct community walks on Townsend Street, distribute flyers about gang injunctions, and hold meetings with residents in order to integrate themselves into the community and develop trust. Groups CU worked with included local non-profit organizations working on issues of social justice, youth empowerment, gang intervention, and urban hardship, as well as a grassroots organization addressing issues of policing. In addition to community walks and meetings, CU organized community outreach events, including holiday toy drives, open-air movie nights, and other activities for youth and families, as well as free legal aid clinics to document resident experiences with police abuse. The community outreach efforts proved effective at establishing relationships between CU members and some adult and youth residents. However, with no action from the Orange County District Attorney in regards to a gang injunction, from February to May of 2014 organizing became sporadic, consisting of a few community walks and meetings.

In June of 2014 organizing was reignited when the Orange County District Attorney filed a gang injunction against the “Townsend Street Criminal Street Gang” in civil court, shortly after a 17-year-old girl was killed in a drive-by shooting on Townsend Street.

Different from the large OVC and Santa Barbara gang injunction zones, the Townsend injunction was concentrated on a much smaller area of 0.39 square miles, targeting an area notorious for gang activity and primarily made up of low-rent apartment complexes, heavily populated by migrant families from Mexico. Additionally, the DA tried to avoid the due process rights established by the OVC case by keeping a separate “enforcement list” and not naming targeted individuals as defendants.

Through their outreach efforts, CU located fourteen individuals who were willing to work with the pro-bono attorneys to contest their inclusion in the gang injunction, then recruited a group of attorneys from the ACLU, Private Law Firms, and a local law school to represent them. CU members also recruited a small group of adult and youth residents who were interested in organizing against the gang injunction. Working with these residents, they pushed an anti-gang injunction narrative on social media and in local media outlets, staged multiple public actions, voiced opposition to the gang injunction at public court hearings and city council meetings. At the same time, organizers encountered residents who expressed a desire to see action taken against crime and violence associated with the gang. To address these concerns, CU sought to portray how a gang injunction would do more harm than good by criminalizing the entire community, and would be ineffective for addressing crime and violence. As described by Maria,

We had to find common ground...we don't have to be in agreement that the gangs stay. We don't have to be in agreement...What we were saying is: yes there's a lot of issues, but like how can we address these differently? Cause heavy policing is not gonna do it.

Complicating this narrative however, a local city council member and nonprofit based in the neighborhood portrayed the injunction as the only solution, dividing opinions among residents.

On November 19, 2014, a hearing took place in the Orange County Superior Court for the 14 individuals contesting their inclusion under the injunction. During the hearing the judge rejected the efforts of the District Attorney to enforce a preliminary gang injunction against the 14 individuals and agreed to schedule a hearing where the District Attorney would begin presenting evidence for the creation of a permanent gang injunction. At the follow up hearing in January 2015, the Judge ruled that only four individuals challenging their inclusion in the temporary injunction could “litigate the validity and constitutionality of a permanent injunction,” and that nine other individuals were entitled to hearings where the District Attorney had to prove their active participation in the gang (Cabrera 2015). Later that week however, the Judge granted a permanent gang injunction against the individuals who had failed to appear in court (Cabrera 2015).

After the permanent injunction was granted, only three individuals continued to challenge their inclusion in the gang injunction, two of whom contested the validity of the injunction as a whole. CU’s organizing efforts became increasingly focused on litigation, with members facilitating meetings and communication between attorneys and clients, and trying to mobilize residents to attend the court hearings. Over a period of months, organizing in the neighborhood became less frequent, and all efforts specific to mobilizing residents to oppose the injunction through collective action were abandoned. Although CU was able to achieve the support of some youth, parents, and adults, the significant degree

of public support and community involvement in organizing the OVC and Santa Barbara campaigns were not achieved on Townsend Street. Additionally, as the case became more demanding and the signs of a legal victory became less clear, the group of fourteen attorneys volunteering for the campaign was reduced to two by 2016. As of September 2019, the litigation has achieved the removal of 6 individuals from the civil gang injunction. The injunction is still active and enforceable against individuals who have not contested their inclusion, and there are no current legal challenges being presented against the injunction.

Multiple local social and structural dynamics affected the unsuccessful community mobilization on Townsend Street that were not present in previous campaigns. Unlike the OVC and Santa Barbara gang injunctions, which targeted working class and marginalized Chicanx and Latinx barrios within affluent cities with large white populations, the Townsend Street injunction targeted a small multi-ethnic Chicanx and Latinx barrio within the working class and majority Latinx city of Santa Ana. These different racial and ethnic dynamics presented a barrier to communicating how the gang injunction presented a threat of racial profiling and criminalization. For example, during my fieldwork on Townsend Street, I encountered residents (some opposing the gang injunction) who did not believe the gang injunction was racially motivated or that police targeted the community based on racist assumptions. Largely, they argued this was because the majority of the city and their public officials including the mayor, city council, police chief and many of the officers enforcing the injunction were Chicanx or Latinx.

Residents' perceptions of violence and crime also presented significant challenges to community mobilization. Different from the OVC and Santa Barbara injunctions, which covered massive areas of space and slovenly named hundreds of residents as gang members, the Townsend Street injunction was tailored to a smaller area notorious for gang activity and named only 29 individuals as gang members. During the campaign, CU encountered residents who were concerned about issues of crime and violence. Complicating this even further, two deadly shootings occurred during the course of the campaign. Responding to these events, a local politician and a non-profit organization actively presented the gang injunction as the only solution to the gang issue, which divided the opinions of residents on the gang injunction. As described by Carolina,

I personally think [the nonprofit] stalled a lot of the organizing....[They were] the folks that had the ear to like the parents and you know the predominantly Spanish speaking [residents]...so it wasn't a matter of the demographics of the neighborhood, it was a matter of who had the ear to the folks over there. They [the non-profit] had a little more credibility than Chicanos Unidos because they had been there offering after school programs...so I honestly think that was the bigger issue that had the folks in those positions been willing to push and really emphasize the severity of what was happening like it would've been a lot different.

Moreover, the narrative that gang injunctions posed threats to the legal rights and the safety of residents was more difficult to communicate when organizers encountered events and actors aligned with law enforcement narratives of rampant violence and crime.

Local dynamics on Townsend Street presented new barriers to CU's efforts to mobilize residents to oppose the gang injunction. However, CU members are adamant that the outcomes were also the result of their strategic decisions and failure to build solidarity

with residents. Many of the study participants identified that their campaign lacked clear goals and failed to produce local leadership to direct organizing efforts. As one CU member explained,

We didn't want the gang injunction, but we didn't really have a plan on how we we're gonna do that. It was more just like, 'We need to stop it in any way we can.' We didn't recruit that many people from the neighborhood just because we didn't have a good plan.

CU members discussed how their organizing failed to address the heterogenous national and ethnic identities of the Townsend Street residents, many of whom were immigrants. Whereas the majority of CU members were born in the United States and identify as Chicano/a/x, many of the adult residents of the Townsend Street are immigrants from Mexico or other regions of Latin America. Many Townsend Street residents are also monolingual Spanish speakers. Study participants lament that they could have navigated this context more effectively. As one member Ramona put it,

We knew that the community was highly immigrant, highly Mexican and I think we didn't utilize enough of our Spanish speakers...We're talking about two very distinct communities. One is Mexican immigrant and then you have Mexican Americans, Chicanos. They exist in the same space but they don't. A lot of times they don't even talk to each other...We were there in the space but we weren't in their space, we should've been more. I think again, we should've used more Spanish language. Maybe used more organizing tactics that are used in Mexico...I know organizing in this community is very possible, you can see that it is. People have been quite successful in Santa Ana organizing immigrant communities and we weren't quite as successful as we could've been.”

CU members made efforts to facilitate bi-lingual events and meetings with neighborhood residents. However, according to Ramona, organizers failed to consciously make the use of Spanish central to their organizing strategy. For her and other participants, this was symptomatic of a larger failure to develop specific organizing strategies addressing the ethnic and national identities of the residents, as well as the short time frame they had to

organize. This analysis is consistent with findings from research on multi-lingual organizing that suggests that conscious, multilingual approaches to organizing that utilize experienced multilingual facilitators are more effective than monolingual approaches in regards to the development of innovative ideas, coordinating actions, and cultivating solidarity among movements participants (Doer 2015; Polletta 2002; Staggenborg 1989).

CU may have lacked clear strategies specific to the local population, however, the organization was not entirely unsuccessful in their outreach efforts, for they were highly active in the community for a number of months and recruited some residents to participate in organizing. However, importantly study participants identified that these efforts were not sustained. As described by Will,

We had people. There was twenty to thirty people [organizers] coming in and that's pretty strong. People from the neighborhood were coming at different times. I thought that was good. But, we stopped door-knocking and we stopped educating folks at one time... they [community and union organizers] talk about the inside- outside organizing [in communities]... We weren't doing the inside organizing.

As is clear from Will's statement, some organizers believe they should have continued to pursue outreach efforts and built greater solidarity between themselves and the residents. Although this strategy may not have overcome the concerns of violence and crime held by some residents, establishing greater solidarity between CU members and residents would have aided organizers in communicating the threats posed by civil gang injunctions and countering the dominant narratives about these policies, which could have helped to achieve a greater degree of community mobilization.

Conclusion

Scholars have rightly identified how social movements at times emerge in response to increased threats of state violence and political repression, and how the presence of organizational resources and leaders can stimulate groups to mobilize against threats (Almeida 2019; McKane & McCammon 2018). This being said, threats do not automatically lead to mobilization or collective action, and specific structural and social conditions, and effective organizing strategies, are critical to movement emergence. CRT and LatCrit scholarship offer valuable theoretical insights on how processes of racialization and racial oppression inform Chicana and Latina experiences within the United States. It also helps us to better understand how racial-ethnic consciousness and ethnic culture can contribute to community solidarity and collective-action against perceived threats, while failure to address ethnic and linguistic differences between organizers and community residents impedes it. In line with this trend in the literature, in this article I have sought to demonstrate the conditions under which racialized, repressive threats associated with civil gang injunctions, did and did not lead to grassroots mobilization against those threats.

Chicana and Latina's movement against gang injunctions has been effective in litigating due process issues, and informing a larger legal movement that is challenging civil gang injunctions at the state level. This "advocacy power" (Jenkins 2002) has achieved considerable legal victories in removing individuals from gang injunction lists, judges striking down existing gang injunctions, and stalling the creation of new gang injunctions. Additionally, movement participants understand campaigns against civil gang injunctions as serving as important opportunities for consciousness raising or critical

pedagogy, that has challenged dominant white, discourses regarding the effectiveness of gang injunctions and the criminalization of Chicana and Latina communities in Southern California. This being said however, a comparison of CU's organizing campaigns reveals that they achieved different outcomes, and the presence of threats, organizational resources, and leaders did not always produce community mobilization.

Despite the shared presence of threats posed by civil gang injunctions, legal and organizing resources, and an extensive history of collaborative Chicana, Latina, and immigrant social movement organizing, campaigns against civil gang injunctions were not universally successful in achieving community mobilization. Key to the success of the Orange Varrio Cypress and Santa Barbara campaigns was that organizing strategies involved promoting Chicana and Latina racial ethnic narratives, consciousness raising activities focusing on local white racism and inequality, and the presence of key organizers organically connected to the communities they sought to mobilize. Due to the largely non-white demographics of the Townsend Street neighborhood and surrounding city of Santa Ana, and local issues of crime and violence, organizers encountered difficulty in linking the issue to racial profiling and criminalization. These dynamics became amplified when two deadly shootings occurred and local actors presented the gang injunction as the only possible solution to homicide and crime in the community. Rather than strategizing around these dynamics and continuing to pursue community mobilization, organizing became increasingly focused on the legal strategy and courtroom action, while community outreach and consciousness raising efforts were sidelined. Based on this comparative study, I argue that repressive threats, racial ethnic consciousness and ethnic culture can be effectively

combined to successfully mobilize barrio residents against the threats of civil gang injunctions only when organizers build community solidarity organically through grassroots leaders, develop effective counternarratives to challenge dominant white narratives about the law, and are responsive to the local cultural and social context.

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