

UCLA

UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

The Origins and Consequences of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/71m8m2nc>

Author

Gottfried, Matthew Stuart

Publication Date

2014

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

The Origins and Consequences
of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science

by

Matthew Stuart Gottfried

2014

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Origins and Consequences
of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises

by

Matthew Stuart Gottfried

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2014

Professor Steven L. Spiegel, Co-Chair

Professor Arthur A. Stein, Co-Chair

This dissertation identifies the determinants of public opinion in coercive terrorist crises and explores how the effects of coercive terrorism on public opinion incentivize the decisions of democratic leaders. Using a multi-method research design, the project includes innovative randomized survey experiments fielded in Lebanon and the United States, statistical modeling of Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process, and interviews with government officials and policymakers. I find that public attitudes in coercive terrorist crises are highly dependent on the intensity of terrorist campaigns, government concessions and intransigence, prior population exposure to terrorism, prior attitudinal strength and ambivalence, partisanship, and the reaction of the political opposition. Yet, the data reveal that publics are surprisingly resilient to this type

of coercive diplomacy across all of my case studies. If terrorism provides any sense of urgency to change course, it is likely the result of inaccurate leader perceptions rather than being grounded in strong empirical reality.

These findings have important policy implications. Leaders coping with the aftermath of terrorist attacks can use the results to generate appropriate policy responses to the changing international and domestic environments. They provide international mediators important intellectual capital as they work to facilitate and resolve longstanding international disputes. They increase our knowledge of how the threat of terrorism, not just the act itself, can affect government policy. As al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups attempt to coerce governments across the globe, such information is of critical importance to policymakers. Lastly, they improve our understanding of the nature of coercive diplomacy and international conflict in general.

The dissertation of Matthew Stuart Gottfried is approved.

Tim Groeling

Robert F. Trager

Steven L. Spiegel, Committee Co-Chair

Arthur A. Stein, Committee Co-Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2014

To Mom, Dad, and Glenn

Table of Contents

1	Introduction: The Domestic Politics of Coercive Terrorism	1
1.1	The Definition of “Terrorism”	4
1.2	The Mechanism of Public Opinion	10
1.3	Is Terrorism an Effective Coercive Instrument?	16
1.4	Plan of the Dissertation	27
2	The Determinants of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises	30
2.1	The Threat of an Irrational Public	31
2.2	The Emergence of a Rational Public?	35
2.3	What Shapes Public Approval in Coercive Terrorist Crises?	41
2.3.1	“Event-Driven” Hypotheses	41
2.3.2	“Elite-Cue” Hypotheses	48
2.4	Research Design	54
2.4.1	Experimental Survey Research	54
2.4.2	Statistical Analysis of Israeli Public Opinion	60
2.5	Conclusion	61
3	Terrorism, Coercion, and Public Opinion in the United States	63
3.1	A History of Sporadic Terrorism	65
3.1.1	Terrorism in the Early Years	65
3.1.2	The Anarchist Wave	67
3.1.3	The Anti-Colonial Wave	70

3.1.4	The New-Left Wave	71
3.1.5	The Religious and Far-Right Wave	74
3.2	The U.S. Survey Experiment	81
3.3	Results	86
3.3.1	The Cost of Appeasement and Terrorism	86
3.3.2	The Mediating Effect of Partisanship and Opposition Praise	91
3.3.3	The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in the United States	95
3.4	Conclusion	96
4	Terrorism, Coercion, and Public Opinion in Lebanon	98
4.1	Lebanon's Turbulent History	99
4.1.1	Sectarianism and Civil Conflict	99
4.1.2	Terrorism and Sectarianism in Post-Civil War Lebanon	103
4.1.3	The Hariri Assassination and Modern Lebanese Politics	106
4.2	The Lebanese Survey Experiment	113
4.3	Results	117
4.3.1	The Cost of Appeasement and Terrorism	117
4.3.2	The Mediating Effect of Partisanship and Opposition Praise	122
4.3.3	The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in Lebanon	125
4.4	Discussion	128
4.5	Conclusion	131
5	Terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	133
5.1	The Origins of Conflict and Early Terrorism	134

5.2	The Rise of Arab Guerilla Activity and Terrorism	140
5.3	Terrorism Goes International	143
5.4	The First Palestinian Intifada	150
5.5	The Road to Oslo	154
5.6	Conclusion	160
6	Sabotaging the Peace? Coercive Terrorism in the Oslo Peace Process	162
6.1	The Role of Public Opinion in the Oslo Peace Process	166
6.2	The Data	169
6.3	Empirical Strategy and Results	175
6.3.1	Determinants of Average Israeli Approval	176
6.3.2	Determinants of the Distribution of Israeli Approval	182
6.3.3	Determinants of Individual-Level Approval	195
6.4	Discussion	208
6.5	Conclusion	213
7	Conclusion: The Stability of the Public Mood in Coercive Terrorist Crises	215
7.1	Under What Conditions is Terrorism Coercive?	216
7.2	Implications and Conclusion	221
	Appendix	225
	Bibliography	232

List of Figures

1.1	Basic Causal Mechanism of Coercive Terrorism	11
1.2	Presidential Job Approval of George W. Bush	23
2.1	Experimental Survey Research Design	56
2.2	Modern Terrorism in Lebanon and the United States	58
3.1	U.S. Presidential Approval in Coercive Terrorist Crisis	87
3.2	Substantive Effects on Approval in the United States	92
3.3	The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in the United States	96
4.1	Distribution of Questionnaires (%) per Lebanese Qada	115
4.2	Lebanese Prime Minister Approval in Coercive Terrorist Crisis	119
4.3	Substantive Effects on Approval in Lebanon	123
4.4	The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in Lebanon	126
4.5	The Costliness of Terrorism in Lebanon and the United States	127
6.1	Israeli Public Support for Oslo and Palestinian Terrorism	173
6.2	Expected Proportion of Approval of Oslo Peace Process	192
6.3	Demographic Features Predicting Support for Oslo Peace Process	197

List of Tables

2.1	Determinants of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises	53
3.1	Threat Perception of Terrorism in the United States	81
3.2	Comparing U.S. Sample “Audience” to ANESP and U.S. Census	85
3.3	Determinants of Approval in the United States	90
4.1	Threat Perception of Terrorism in Lebanon	113
4.2	Lebanon Survey Demographics	116
4.3	Determinants of Approval in Lebanon	121
6.1	Determinants of Monthly Support for Oslo	178
6.2	Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 1) . .	185
6.3	Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 2) . .	186
6.4	Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 3) . .	187
6.5	Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 4) . .	188
6.6	Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 5) . .	189
6.7	Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 6) . .	190
6.8	Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 1)	200
6.9	Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 2)	201
6.10	Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 3)	202
6.11	Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 4)	203
6.12	Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 5)	204
6.13	Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 6)	205
7.1	When is Terrorism Likely to be Coercive?	218

Acknowledgements

The completion of this dissertation could not have been possible without the help and support of others. First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation committee co-chair and primary advisor Steven Spiegel. To say that Steve has been generous with his time is an understatement. He read multiple drafts of my work and provided invaluable feedback throughout each stage of this project. He was always quick to respond to my emails and write letters of recommendation for research grants, and his encouragement kept me going at some of the most difficult junctures. What is more, Steve is an inspiration. His tireless effort to pursue peace in the Middle East keeps me an optimist about conflict resolution in this very troubled part of the world. I feel truly blessed to have been part of his peace-making endeavors while at UCLA and hope to carry on his mission of peace with similar vigor.

I would like to thank my dissertation committee co-chair Arthur Stein. Art provided sage advice on the framing of this project and played a critical role in its theoretical development. He too has written countless letters to help me secure funding for my research, and I cannot begin to adequately express my appreciation for our multiple-hour long conversations on my work and on the challenges of being a young scholar.

I am grateful for all of the help of my committee member Robert Trager, especially on the experimental research design of this project. Rob truly is superhuman when it comes to his expertise on research methods. His guidance and instruction helped me gain traction on issues that otherwise seemed impossible to study. He also showed me the ropes on how to write academic articles, provided numerous letters of recommendation, and has been a true mentor over the years.

I am indebted to my outside committee member Tim Groeling. Tim was absolutely essential in helping me launch the survey component of this dissertation. He carefully reviewed my questionnaires and helped me pilot the surveys on students in UCLA's Communication Studies Department. He also facilitated my maturation as a scholar of public opinion.

I also would like to thank my committee member Matthew Baum. Matt played an important role in the development of my dissertation proposal and the framing of this project. In addition, he provided important insight into how publics form foreign policy attitudes.

While not part of my dissertation committee, several others contributed greatly to this project. Jeffrey Lewis and James Honaker provided superb guidance and training on the statistics used in this study. Lynn Vavreck was incredibly helpful in suggesting ways to improve the quality and realism of survey experiments. Maha el-Swais was terrific as she assisted me in the translation of my questionnaires into Arabic. Alicia Jammal at Information International and Liana Epstein at SurveyMonkey were tremendous in helping me acquire nationally representative samples of the adult populations in Lebanon and the United States respectively. Belal Hibri and his family were amazingly kind to provide me a place to stay while conducting survey research in Beirut. Marc Trachtenberg offered continuous encouragement, helped me secure research funding, and acted as a true mentor on how to approach academic work. I also presented earlier versions of this work at APSA, MPSA, and WPSA conferences, and greatly appreciate helpful comments from Mia Bloom, Risa Brooks, Tiffany Howard, Chris Moore, and Jeffrey Weber.

I owe a profound debt of a gratitude to the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, and UCLA's Graduate Division. This research would not have been possible without their generous financial support.

I was fortunate to have learned from my brilliant colleagues, especially Ron Gurantz, Brad Stapleton, Andrew MacDonald, Dov Levin, Matthew McKinney, Max Abrahms, Galen Jackson, Paasha Mahdavi, Koji Kagotani, Sarah Leary, Yuki Yanai, Chad Nelson, Leah Halverson, Joslyn Barnhart, Jeff Paris, Liana Epstein, Lauren Wong, and Jonathan Schettino. Each contributed in important ways to the ideas and execution of this study.

I want to thank the support and patience of my beautiful and loving wife Rebecca Beattie. Rebecca was gracious to listen to my theoretical ideas, to humor my nerdy excitement about this project's results, and to lift me up during times of scholarly frustration. She also played an active role in editing various drafts of my work. Almost certainly the final product would have been less palatable to read without her keen eye and suggestions.

Finally, I want to thank my parents Stephanie and Phillip and my brother Glenn. They sparked my interest in international politics, nurtured my passion for education, and have been my biggest supporters over the years. I dedicate this dissertation to them.

-Matthew S. Gottfried

06/01/2014

MATTHEW S. GOTTFRIED

EDUCATION:

- 2008 **M.A., *Political Science***
University of California, Los Angeles
- 2005 **B.A., *Political Science, Minor in Arabic and Islamic Studies (Cum Laude)***
University of California, Los Angeles

NON-DEGREE EDUCATION:

- Summer 2009 *Non-Degree Study Abroad, Intensive Arabic Language*
Qasid Institute for Classical and Modern Standard Arabic, Amman, Jordan
- 2003—2004 *Non-Degree Study Abroad, Arabic Language and Middle East Politics*
American University of Cairo, Egypt

WORK EXPERIENCE:

Teaching Assistant/Associate/Fellow/Consultant, University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA (2007—Present)

Led weekly discussion sections for over 12 courses on Middle East politics, Islamic political thought, U.S. foreign policy, international security, and the politics of nuclear weapons; received a mean student evaluation score of 8.6 on a scale of 1-9. Also taught a 10 week seminar for new teaching assistants on how to teach political science to undergraduate students and provided them with instructional feedback.

Track II Conference Organizer/Rapporteur, Center for Middle East Development, UCLA
Los Angeles, CA (2006—Present)

Assisted in the organization of over 10 Regional Security and Cooperation Conferences for the Middle East. Worked with a wide variety of officials, policymakers, and academics while facilitating working group meetings and writing executive summary reports.

Research Assistant, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Project
Los Angeles, CA (2012)

Researched spatial and temporal patterns of violence in Egypt and Lebanon as part of a larger project aiming to forecast political violence around the world.

SELECT PUBLICATIONS & CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS:

- Forthcoming “Does Terrorism Pay? An Empirical Analysis,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* (with Max Abrahms).
- 2013 “The Domestic Politics of Coercive Terrorism,” *American Political Science Association*.

- 2013 “A Preference for War: How Fairness and Rhetoric Influence Leadership Incentives in Crises,” American Political Science Association (with Robert F. Trager).
- 2012 “Terrorism, Coercion, and Public Opinion in Lebanon: An Experimental Investigation,” Midwest Political Science Association.
- 2010 “In the Wake of Terrorism: The Short-Term Effects of Political Violence on Public Support for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” Midwest Political Science Association.
- 2008 “Domestic Constraints and International Negotiations: Increasing the Bargaining Space in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” The First International Academic Conference on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Pathways to Peace, Central Connecticut State University.

SELECT GRANTS, HONORS & FELLOWSHIPS:

- 2012 – 2013 Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Dissertation Fellowship
- 2012 - 2013 Political Science Department Nominee for UCLA Teaching Award Competition
- Fall 2012 Head of UCLA Delegation to Kuwait, Sponsored by the UCLA Center for Middle East Development and Kuwaiti Ministry of Information
- 2011 - 2013 The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Research Award
- Summer 2010 Graduate Summer Research Mentorship Fellowship, UCLA
- 2009 - 2010 Charles F. Scott Fellowship, UCLA Graduate Division Endowed Fellowship
- Summer 2009 Foreign Language Area Studies (FLAS), Intensive Advanced Arabic Language
- 2009 Political Science Department Qualifying Paper, Passed with Distinction
- 2005 Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society
- 2003 - 2004 David L. Boren Scholarship, National Security Education Program

LANGUAGES & SKILLS:

- Languages: Advanced Proficiency in Arabic, Basic Spanish
- Advanced Statistics: Experimental Survey Research, Econometric Analysis, Time-Series Modeling
- Fieldwork: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the United States
- Analysis Tools: Survey Design, R, STATA, EXCEL

CHAPTER 1

Introduction:

The Domestic Politics of Coercive Terrorism

On 7 October 2001, the United States launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. The Taliban regime had allowed al-Qaeda, the organization responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 people, to operate freely within her borders and refused to surrender the group’s leadership to U.S. authorities. Moments after the first airstrikes, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number two in command at the time, attempted to appeal to the self-interests of the American public. In a tape released to al-Jazeera, he called on Americans to dissociate themselves from their government, which was leading them “into a new war it is certain to lose, and in which [they] will lose [their] children and [their] property.”¹ The following year, Osama Bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, released a statement justifying the group’s need to target civilians:

“It is a fundamental principle of any democracy that the people choose their leaders, and as such, approve and are party to the actions of their elected leaders.... By electing these leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the children of Iraq. The American people have the ability

¹ Quoted in Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds*, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 76.

and choice to refuse the policies of their government and even to change their government, yet time and time again, polls show that the American people support the policies of the elected government....This is why the American people are not innocent. The American people are active members in all these crimes.”²

The message was unequivocal: pressure your government to change its foreign policy or al-Qaeda would hold you accountable and continue its terrorist campaign against you.

This grim narrative brings into focus several elements critical to our understanding of terrorism. First, aggrieved groups often use terrorist attacks for coercive purposes – to convince a government to take (or not take) a particular course of action. Second, it highlights the causal mechanism of how coercive terrorism is supposed to work. Extremists use terrorism in attempt to decrease popular support for the incumbent government and its policies because of the government’s failure to protect the public. This gives the government an incentive to comply with terrorist demands in order to stop future attacks and maintain public confidence.

As the specter of terrorism looms over the post-9/11 world, few policy issues are more pressing to understand than the consequences of coercive terrorism on public opinion and government policy. Yet, we actually know very little on the extent to which terrorism shapes public opinion and how the public’s reaction generates pressure on decision-makers to change their policies. As a result, some of the most fundamental questions on the topic remain unanswered. What are the determinants of mass opinion in coercive terrorist crises? Who is

² Bin Ladin, Usama Bin Muhammad., “Azzam Exclusive: Letter from Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin to the American People,” *Waaqiah.com*, 26 October 2002, in “Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994-January 2004,” FBIS Report, GMP20040209000243, 9 February 2004.

most susceptible and resilient to this violent communicative message? Can terrorism exert a coercive influence on democratic leaders by causing a shift in public approval, and if so, under what conditions?

The answers to these questions are tremendously important for international security. Most clearly, if counter-terrorist efforts fail, it is imperative to quantify the consequences of terrorism on public opinion. This is particularly important because terrorist attacks are often strategically timed to disrupt elections and international negotiations (Kydd and Walter 2002; Braithwaite et al. 2010). Policymakers coping with the aftermath of terrorist attacks can use this information to generate appropriate policy responses to the changing international and domestic environments. It also provides international mediators important intellectual capital as they work to facilitate and resolve longstanding international disputes. In addition to these benefits, research into these questions increases our knowledge of how the threat of terrorism, not just the act itself, can affect government policy. As al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups attempt to coerce governments across the globe, such information is of critical importance to policymakers. Lastly, the answers to these questions help to improve our understanding of the nature of coercive diplomacy and international conflict in general.

In the pages that follow, I demonstrate that public attitudes in coercive terrorist crises are highly dependent on the intensity of terrorist campaigns, government concessions and intransigence, prior population exposure to terrorism, prior attitudinal strength and ambivalence, partisanship, and the reaction of the political opposition. Yet, while terrorism produces horrific bloodshed and national tragedy, I find that publics are surprisingly resilient to this type of coercive diplomacy. That is, contrary to commonly made assumptions, terrorism does little to actually change public approval of governments and their policies. Mass opinion is quite stable

and resolute. This outcome holds in a variety of strategic environments, from communities in conflict-prone territories highly exposed to political violence to those in much more peaceful places. As such, terrorism should only generate minimal, if any, coercive pressure on leaders to alter their policies. This research, however, also reveals that while terrorism affects public opinion on the margins, policymakers often operate under the assumption that terrorist violence has a significant effect. If terrorism provides any sense of urgency to change course, it is likely the result of inaccurate leader perceptions rather than being grounded in strong empirical reality.

1.1 The Definition of “Terrorism”

This research aims to uncover the origins of mass opinion in coercive terrorist crises and to investigate the extent to which changes in public preferences generate political incentives for leaders to alter their policies. Before diving into these complex issues, it is important to address a very sensitive and controversial issue. What exactly do I mean by “terrorism?”

Terrorism is quite an elusive concept. In the mid-1980’s, Schmid and Jongman (1988) recorded 109 different definitions. Some experts even suggest that if an energetic researcher updated this study, it is likely that there would be nearly twice as many definitions today.³ The problem is that “terrorism” is a pejorative term. If someone is sympathetic to a cause of an aggrieved group, he or she might be less inclined to label it as a “terrorist” organization irrespective of the group’s tactics. He or she might justify the use of terrorism on the basis of moral equivalency. “Yes, they target civilians,” one might say. “But the people they are

³ See, for example, Andrew Silke, “An Introduction to Terrorism Research,” in *Research on Terrorism: Trend Achievements and Failures*, ed. Andrew Silke (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 1-27.

fighting for *also* have suffered at the hands of the government [or occupying forces].” The cliché “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” captures the problem of perception.

Nevertheless, it is critical to start on common ground. While there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, most scholars agree that terrorism involves the use or threat of politically motivated violence against noncombatants by an organization other than a state to cause intimidation or fear among a target audience. This is the definition that I will use throughout this study.⁴

There are several fundamental elements that stand out from the definition. The first is the obvious use of violence. The archetypical weapons of terrorism include explosives and incendiary devices, delivered conventionally or by suicide attacks, but other types have been used including chemical weapons, hijackings, kidnappings, snipings, and stabbings. Although terrorist groups have never used biological agents and atomic devices, these weapons in the hands of extremists remain a primary fear of governments as well as their publics (Gurr 1979; Schelling 1982; Levi 2004; Allison 2005; Bunn and Wier 2006).

The second element is terrorist groups commit violence against civilians or noncombatants. In this way, the definition makes an important distinction between political terrorism and what is referred to as “guerilla warfare.” Terrorist campaigns mainly target a country’s civilians. In contrast, guerilla campaigns mainly target a country’s military (Wilkinson 1986; Laquer 1987; Abrahms 2010). Over the course of a guerilla campaign, aggrieved groups attempt to establish liberated areas and build small military units, which they hope will gradually grow in strength,

⁴ This definition is similar to how American law defines terrorism, as “premeditated, political motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” See “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001,” The United States Department of State, 2002. Accessed 1 October 2012. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10286.pdf>.

number, and equipment. They then try to establish their own institutions, conduct propaganda, and engage in other open political activities in these liberated areas (Laquer 1987). A prime example is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which sought to establish an independent Tamil state in the northeast of Sri Lanka by mainly targeting the Sri Lankan military, conquering territory, establishing independent institutions, and engaging in open propaganda campaigns.

The goals of terrorist organizations and guerilla groups can, and often do, overlap. The difference, however, lies in the means of achieving their objective. Guerilla campaigns attempt to coerce governments by mostly engaging military forces. In contrast, terrorist campaigns rely on indirect coerce measures by mostly targeting the civilian population. Thus, the causal mechanism involved is quite different. This study focuses on cases in which civilians and noncombatants are the primary targets.

The third element is terrorist violence comes from an organization other than a state, what Martha Crenshaw (1986) calls “bottom-up” terrorism. Although states can suppress, put down, or constrain segments of a population through brutal repression (Wilkinson 1986), this study’s definition of terrorism captures a unique power dynamic. Rather than a “strong” actor (e.g., a state) attempting to coerce a “weak” actor (e.g., segments of a population), terrorism involves a weak actor attempting to coerce a strong actor. As Kydd and Walter (2006) note, “Terrorists are too weak to impose their will directly by force of arms. They are sometimes strong enough, however, to persuade audiences to do as they wish by altering the audience’s beliefs about such matters as the terrorist’s ability to impose costs and their degree of commitment to their cause.”⁵

⁵ Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism.” *International Security* 31(2006), p. 50.

The fourth element is terrorist groups use violence for political ends.⁶ Historically, terrorism has had three purposes: to gain attention to a cause, to gain supporters, and to coerce opponents to change or maintain the status quo (Jones and Libicki 2008). Although these purposes are seemingly separate, the first two, explained in more detail below, are usually a means to the third. Terrorist groups want to gain attention to their cause and boost sympathy to improve their bargaining position and increase their ability to coerce governments. The long-term goals of terrorist groups have varied over time, but five have had enduring importance: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance (Kydd and Walter 2006).

The last element is that terrorism attempts to influence an audience. Several audiences are central in this dynamic: governments, the government's constituency, and the terrorist group's constituency. As mentioned above, aggrieved groups often use terrorism for coercive purposes.⁷ It is difficult, however, for terrorist groups to directly coerce governments with brute force against military targets because they are "weak" actors. Thus, terrorist groups rely on a different strategy. They employ relatively small bouts of violence against a vulnerable civilian population in an attempt to generate a disproportionate public response relative to the number of people

⁶ Research thus far has found little support that terrorism is a psychological phenomenon characterized by a unique set of psychological traits or mental pathologies (Kruglanski and Fishman 2006). Although isolated, individual motivated acts of terrorism occur, most scholars agree that there is no common "terrorist personality." See, for example, Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism," in *Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues*, ed. Margaret G. Hermann (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1986).

⁷ On coercive terrorism, see Stohl 1979; DeNardo 1985; Freedman and Hill 1986; Wilkinson 1986; Crenshaw 1990; Kydd and Walter 2002, 2006; Pape 2005; Abrahms 2006; Kydd and Walter 2006; Jones and Libicki 2008; McCormick and Fritz 2010; and many more.

directly harmed (Wilkinson 1986, p. 51). These groups hope that the victimized population will exert enough political pressure on their government to make concessions. As Schelling (1966) long ago pointed out, “The victims of coercion, or the individuals most sensitive to coercive threats, may not be directly in authority...they may have to bring bureaucratic skill or political pressure to bear on individuals who do exercise authority, or go through processes that shift authority or blame to others...”⁸ Pape (2005) agrees, arguing that terrorism attempts “to inflict enough pain on the opposing society to overwhelm its interests in resisting [their] demands, and to induce the government to concede, or the population to revolt against the government.”⁹

Terrorist groups are not only interested in foreign governments and their citizens. They are also interested in influencing their own constituency. By building sympathy to their cause, aggrieved groups hope to recruit new members thereby increasing their ability to inflict costs on the state (DeNardo 1985; Wilkinson 1986; Kydd and Walter 2002; Lake 2002; McKormick and Fritz 2010). For instance, terrorist groups may want to provoke a major response from the targeted country as a form of collective punishment (Kepel 2002; Lake 2002). Lake (2002) explains that massive retaliation of this sort can discredit the targeted state and push the moderates within the terrorist group’s constituency into their arms. As a result, the capability of the terrorist organization, in terms of membership size, willingness to fight, and financial assistance, increases.¹⁰

⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 86.

⁹ Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York, NY: Random House, 2005), p. 28.

¹⁰ In contrast to Lake’s mechanism, Laqueur argues that the strategy of provocation hopes to draw in major 3rd party states rather than moderates from the terrorist’s constituency. See Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), pp. 74-75.

For example, Islamic extremists seemed to have adopted this strategy in the latter part of the 20th century. During the 1970s and 1980s, militant Islamism grew in popularity across the Muslim world due to the successes in the Iranian Revolution and in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, however, Islamists faced a series of setbacks in Egypt, the Gulf, Bosnia, Algeria, and Turkey. Kepel (2002) argues that their inability to retain political power and maintain popular support in these cases explains why extremists have resorted to spectacular acts of terrorism such as the September 11 attacks. The purpose, in Kepel's view, was to reverse the process of decline with incredibly destructive violence, which would provoke massive retaliation and garner popular support for the extremists among the victimized masses.

Although terrorist groups are interested in recruitment, it is important to remember how popular support and sympathy translate into political capital to change or maintain the status quo. Terrorist organizations want to build support in their domestic constituency to help embolden the group as they pursue their international agenda. Greater group membership and sympathy increase the capability of extremist groups, thereby allowing them to perpetrate more terrorist acts. In other words, it is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.

Finally, in addition to these five definitional elements, terrorism can be further differentiated between domestic terrorism and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism involves dissidents within a country attempting to displace the policy or leadership of their country. By setting an example of malcontent, domestic extremists hope to encourage latent supporters to actively express their support for the terrorist cause and to create a revolutionary environment (DeNardo 1985; Crenshaw 1990; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). In contrast, international terrorism involves nationals of one country attempting to displace the policy or leadership of another


country (Wilkinson 1986; Schelling 1990). Unless otherwise specified, this study confines itself entirely to cases of international terrorism.

1.2 The Mechanism of Public Opinion

Given the central importance of public opinion in coercive terrorist crises, it is essential to discuss this causal mechanism in more detail. As we have seen, terrorist groups are not strong enough to coerce governments directly. They can, however, try to increase coercive pressure on leaders by using indiscriminate violence against civilians in order to alter their evaluation of the incumbent government. Although this dynamic is explicit, it raises two important questions. How are terrorists able to access mass opinion? And to what extent do leaders fret over attitudinal changes in their domestic audience?

Extremists are able to access mass opinion largely because of three factors. First, since terrorist groups target civilians, they are able to directly affect the immediate victims and those in close proximity to the violence. Indeed, surviving or witnessing a terrorist attack can have a profound effect on the psychology of any individual (Hayes and McAllister 2001). Second, terrorism is able to reach people beyond the immediate victims because the attacks provide a novel and sensational news story. Advances in literacy and mass communication have greatly empowered terrorist groups by facilitating a much more extensive reach to the public (Schmid and de Graaf 1982). This is especially true today as the internet, 24-hour cable news stations, and social media provide viewership with constant access to shocking imagery and details about terrorist violence. Lastly, terrorism has a strong agenda-setting function. As Crenshaw (1990) writes, “If the reasons behind violence are skillfully articulated terrorism can put the issue of

Figure 1.1: Basic Causal Mechanism of Coercive Terrorism



political change on the public agenda. By attracting attention it makes the claims of the resistance a salient issue on the public mind.”¹¹

Having access to public opinion and theoretically altering foreign policy preferences, however, is not enough to generate coercive pressure on leaders. It can only create bargaining leverage if (1) mass opinion changes and (2) leaders care about such changes. Putting aside the first condition for a moment, since it is the focus of this project, it is germane to consider the second. Why would leaders care about public opinion in the first place?

At the most basic level, leaders almost always strive to remain in power (Downs 1957). As a result, their preferences are strongly influenced by the preferences of the “selectorate,” the subset of the population that sustains a leader in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). In democratic societies, this influence derives from the opinion of voters and manifests in the form of electoral reprisal (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989; Marra and Ostrom 1989; Sobel 2001). Public opinion takes on an even greater role when international agreements need a popular referendum for ratification and implementation (Putnam 1988; Moravscik 1993; Trumbore 1998; Shamir and Shakiki 2005), an important dimension to Israeli-Palestinian peace talks for instance.

¹¹ Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), p. 17.

A number of studies and anecdotal evidence indicate that public approval and disapproval matter to democratic decision-makers (Edwards 1976; Ragsdale 1984; Marra, Simon, and Ostrom 1989; Russett 1990; James and Oneal 1991; Kernell 1997; Cohen 1995; Baum and Kernell 2001; Ostrom and Job 1986). In the area of foreign policy, for example, Hinckley (1990) draws on his personal experience as Special Assistant to the Senior Director for Crisis Management on the National Security Council Staff during the Reagan administration. He claims that public opinion polls were at the heart of the President's decision-making. Similarly, Russett (1990) finds a strong statistical relationship between public opinion in a given year and changes in military spending in the subsequent year. Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) conclude that foreign policy attitudes play an important role in voting in U.S. presidential elections and, in fact, explain why candidates spend time campaigning on foreign policy themes. Oded Eran, former Israeli Ambassador to Jordan and head of Israel's negotiations team with the Palestinians from 1999 to 2000, witnessed the same thing in Israel. He reports that Israeli Prime Ministers were briefed every day on the mood of the Israeli public. During the 2000 Camp David talks, Prime Minister Ehud Barak even read these briefs before any of the other reports because "he was very sensitive to what the public thought about [the peace talks]."¹²

Political leaders do not blindly follow opinion polls. It is one of many considerations that they take into account while gauging policy options. But – and this is the key point – if decision-makers neglect significant changes in public opinion on highly salient policy issues such as national security in times of crisis, they become susceptible to domestic costs that could jeopardize their political survival or disrupt fulfillment of their domestic and international agendas. In this way, mass opinion incentivizes decision-making even if it does not fully

¹² Oded Eran. Interview by author. 2 September 2012.

characterize leader preferences. As Senator Everett Dirksen famously quipped, “When I feel the heat, I see the light.” It is through this mechanism that terrorist groups hope to coerce governments. This research, therefore, explores the extent to which terrorism generates political incentives for democratic leaders to change government policy by creating shifts in public approval, which has been shown to correlate with the probabilities of winning elections (Campbell and Lewis-Beck 2008). This approach is identical to a growing number of experimental studies (Tomz 2007; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Horowitz and Levendusky 2012) and formal models (Schultz 2001; Ramsay 2004; Leventoglu and Tarar 2005).

At this point, it is essential to discuss the relationship between regime type and terrorism. Many scholars argue that democracies are more sensitive to the effects of terrorism than authoritarian regimes for many reasons. First, democracies allow freedom of organization, expression, and movement for its citizens, which extremists can leverage to perpetuate attacks with relative ease (Engene 2004; Hamilton and Hamilton 1983; Wilkinson 1986; Savun and Phillips 2009). Second, democracies usually contain a free news media, which eagerly reports on sensational acts of violence. This helps to spread fear among the targeted population and increase awareness of the demands of the aggrieved group (Li 2005; Nacos 1994; Wilkinson 1986). As citizens become stoked with fear over their vulnerability to terrorist violence, they are more likely to demand an end to the attacks. In contrast, authoritarian regimes have more control over the media and can underreport terrorist acts and grievances, thus limiting its effects on the public (Kydd and Walter 2006). Third, democracies protect civil liberties, which can make counterterrorism measures more difficult (Wilkinson 2001). Search and seizure laws, for instance, can mean very different things in democratic and authoritarian regimes. Lastly, as mentioned above, political institutions and public opinion constrain and incentivize democratic

governments in ways that might not happen in authoritarian regimes (Schmid 1992; Li 2005; Wilkinson 1986). Consequently, terrorist groups tend to view democracies as “soft” targets because publics perceptibly have a low cost threshold and a high ability to affect state policy (Pape 2005).

Authoritarian regimes are not entirely immune to domestic costs (Gourevitch 1978; Weeks 2008; Trumbore and Boyer 2000). Dictators still need to gain political legitimacy, placate political elites who might challenge their leadership, and achieve approval to avoid uprisings, coups, and revolutions. Domestic groups in authoritarian regimes conflict among themselves, and politicians and bureaucrats who run the state have some leeway in policy decisions, thereby providing an opening for societal input (Gourevitch 1978). Dictators also tend to be illegitimate in the eyes of the regime’s citizenry because of the way they came to power. In short, if an autocrat fails to gain support from political elites, the military, or even society, the executive may face a fate even worse than losing an election – a coup d’état or revolution that will lead to their demise or exile. As Trumbore and Boyer (2000) remark, “...no leader, no matter how autocratic, is completely immune from domestic pressure, whether that takes the form of rival political parties seeking partisan advantage, as in democratic settings, or rival factions jockeying for influence and power in bureaucratic-authoritarian systems.”¹³

Empirically minded scholars have focused on the implications of the regime type arguments rather than directly investigating if terrorism is more effective in democratic states than authoritarian states. As the argument goes, if terrorism is more likely (or perceptibly more likely) to be effective in democratic regimes, then foreign terrorist groups should target liberal

¹³ Peter F. Trumbore and Mark A. Boyer, “International Crisis Decision Making as a Two-Level Process.” *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (2000), p. 680.

states at a higher frequency.¹⁴ Pape (2005) finds that suicide terrorists almost exclusively attacked democracies occupying contested territory between 1980 and 2003. In contrast, Wade and Reiter (2007), who use a more comprehensive dataset for the same period, find no significant relationship between regime type and suicide terrorism. Turning to a broader definition of terrorism, other scholars (Schmid 1992; Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 1998, 2001; Li and Schaub 2004; Li 2005) find that democracy encourages transnational terrorism. Yet, Savun and Phillips (2009) disagree. They find that transnational terrorist groups are more likely to target democracies, but it has less to do with regime type and more to do with activist foreign policies that correlate strongly with democratic nations.

Overall, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from this literature. Terrorist groups might not be able to choose what regime to resent anymore than they can choose what family, culture, sect, or geographic space they belong to. For example, Arab militants probably would have committed terrorist attacks in Israel following the 1948 War of Independence or Nakba (meaning “catastrophe” in Arabic) regardless of Israel’s choice of political system. Although I am sympathetic to the regime type arguments, this study confines itself entirely to cases of international terrorism that occur in democracies and open societies. This does not preclude that

¹⁴ While not speaking to terrorism’s effectiveness, it is important to note that other scholars (e.g., Crenshaw 1981, p. 383; Schmid 1992; Eubank and Weinberg 2001) argue that democracies discourage terrorism by offering access to the political process, for instance, through elections and forming political parties. This argument, however, is more applicable to incidents of domestic terrorism rather than international terrorism. Somewhat puzzling, many studies examining this claim have relied on datasets that only contain incidents of transnational terrorism (e.g., Eubank and Weinberg 1998, 2001; Eyerman 1998; Li 2005). This would imply, for example, that foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda would be dissuaded from terrorism because they could vote in U.S. elections or form their own political party, which of course is not possible unless their members were U.S. citizens.

the findings cannot be generalized to other regime types. Authoritarian regimes may be vulnerable to the effects of terrorism through a similar public opinion mechanism. Nevertheless, the causal mechanism is much clearer and precise in democracies.

1.3 Is Terrorism an Effective Coercive Instrument?

The fundamental issue that lies at the heart of this study is how much coercive pressure terrorism generates on leaders to grant concessions to extremist groups. Current research on the topic typically rely on large-N empirical analyses that correlate outcomes, usually “success” or “failure,” with the use of political violence (Gurr 1979; Pape 2005; Abrahms 2006; Cronin 2009; Jones and Libicki 2008; Gaibullov and Sandler 2009; and many more). By focusing almost exclusively on policy outcomes, they therefore try to infer the degree of coercive pressure exerted on leaders rather than measuring it directly.

From the 1970s to the 1990s, the prevailing view was that terrorists groups fail to obtain their stated political demands (Gurr 1979; Cordes et al. 1984; Laquer 1987; Freedman and Hill 1986; Wilkinson 1986; Schelling 1993; but see Michael Stohl’s (1979) interpretation of Palestinian terrorism in the 1970s). For instance, looking at terrorist activities in 87 countries from 1961 to 1970, Gurr (1979) was unable to identify one unambiguous case where political terrorism yielded any sort of revolutionary change.¹⁵ Similarly, investigating international trends in 1982 and 1983, Cordes et al. (1984) found that “Terrorists have been unable to translate the consequences of terrorism into concrete political gains. Nor have they yet revealed a

¹⁵ See Ted Robert Gurr, “Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960s,” in *Politics of Terrorism*, ed. Michael Stoll (New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1979), p. 24.

convincingly workable strategy that relates terrorist violence to positive political power.”¹⁶

Schelling (1991) concludes that “Acts of terrorism almost never appear to accomplish anything politically significant. True, an intermediate means toward political objectives could be attracting attention and publicizing grievances. But with few exceptions it is hard to see that the attention and the publicity have been of much value as ends in themselves.”¹⁷

Following the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process and the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, scholars began to reevaluate the political utility of terrorism. Indeed, if terrorism is a strategy of futility, why would extremist groups continue to engage in such violent and costly activity? This empirical puzzle has led some scholars to conclude that it “pays” (e.g., Dershowitz 2002; Lake 2002; McCormick 2003; Pape 2005; Kydd and Walter 2002, 2006). Alan Dershowitz (2002) argues that Palestinian terrorism from the late 1960s to the early 1990s was a highly successful case because it brought the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to the negotiating table with Israel and helped to launch the Oslo Peace Process. In turn, this lesson has inspired other groups to engage in similar violent activity. In an important study, Kydd and Walter (2002) claim that terrorism can be a remarkably effective strategy at sabotaging a peace process. In their view, terrorist attacks can persuade the targeted population that the moderates in the terrorists’ constituency are weak and untrustworthy, thereby undermining attempts to reach and enforce a peace settlement. Pape (2005) comes to a similar conclusion about the coercive effectiveness of terrorism. Surveying 315 incidents of suicide terrorism around the globe from 1980 to 2003, he finds that terrorist campaigns achieve political gains about half of the time.

¹⁶ Bonnie Cordes, Bruce Hoffman, Brian M. Jenkins, Konrad Kellen, Sue Moran, and William Sater, *Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983* (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1984), p. 49.

¹⁷ Thomas C. Schelling, “What Purposes Can ‘International Terrorism’ Serve?” in *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, ed. R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 20.

Yet, several recent studies have found empirical evidence consistent with the earlier scholarship that rejects the efficacy conclusion (Abrahms 2006, 2008, 2010; Jones and Libicki 2008; Cronin 2009). Abrahms (2006) looked at the success rate of terrorist campaigns for 28 active foreign terrorist organizations as designated by the U.S. State Department in 2001. He concludes that terrorism is an ineffective strategy because these groups had only obtained their stated political objectives by targeting civilians 7 percent of the time. Cronin (2009) examined more than 400 terrorist organizations from the MIPT database. She found that less than 5 percent of these terrorist organizations had succeeded to achieve their stated political demands.¹⁸ Using an updated version of the RAND-MIPT database, Jones and Libicki (2009) looked at all terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006. They found that only 10 percent of the 648 terrorist organizations had achieved their goals.

What can be made of this rich and lively debate? Why are the conclusions so different between these scholars? Why is it so difficult to determine the level of coercive pressure that terrorism can generate on leaders from these studies?

Although this literature has contributed greatly to our understanding of the consequences of terrorism, their approach introduces several methodological issues that generate skepticism about some of their conclusions. The first issue is coding subjectivity of the dependent variable. Researchers tend to define “success” according to their own criteria – typically whether the terrorist group obtained some or all of its demands – thereby inviting allegations of confirmation bias. On the one hand, focusing on the stated political objectives is a maximalist rubric for success and will deflate the success rate of terrorism. For instance, the PLO, which started as a

¹⁸ See Audry Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 81.

terrorist organization, helped to keep the Palestinian question alive and eventually created a semi-autonomous government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The organization, however, failed to produce a viable Palestinian state. Should a researcher consider the PLO a failure? The first criteria might indicate that it is. On the other hand, focusing on any semblance of government appeasement or policy change is a minimalist rubric for success and will inflate the success rate of terrorism. Was al-Qaeda successful, for example, because air travelers can no longer bring large quantities of liquids onto commercial airliners in the United States? The second criteria might indicate that it is. Without a universally accepted standard, the dependent variable “success” will remain an arbitrary threshold, and many of the empirical findings on the efficacy of terrorism are contingent on how the researcher defines it.

Terrorism studies also tend to measure “success” according to whether the terrorist group obtained some or all of its demands across time. The problem is that terrorist groups often change their demands with time, or issue ambiguous demands or none at all, at least publically. In some instances, the stated demands might not even meet the expectations of aggrieved groups. They might issue maximalist demands in hope of getting more from the government than limited demands would otherwise achieve. Some terrorist groups also might change their political behavior without changing their stated political objectives. Hamas comes to mind as a possible example. While the movement espouses the destruction of Israel in its charter, Hamas has offered a long-term “hudna” or armistice to Israel in exchange for a Palestinian State. Israelis, western politicians, and academics rightfully question the sincerity of this offer, but suppose that Hamas and Israel were able to reach a deal that left both players intact and Hamas’ charter remained unchanged. Would Hamas still be counted as a failure? In short, it is difficult to pin down an appropriate metric of “success” or “failure” based solely on terrorist demands.

The second issue is spurious correlation. Researchers often allow terrorist groups to operate under an indefinite time horizon. As long as an aggrieved group publicized a political demand at some moment in time, any movement on that issue area irrespective of how long it took or why it occurred could appear to be a terrorist success. Yet, it is difficult to determine if an apparent concession was the direct result of terrorist violence or spurious with some other exogenous phenomenon.¹⁹ As a result, we do not know how much of an effect should be attributed to terrorism, or to what extent the relationships are coincidental.

The third major issue is strategic selection bias. In the real world, we cannot test for counterfactuals, and the observable decisions of terrorist groups likely depend on political context. Extremists might resort to terrorism only when they think it will be successful or when they have no other option available and thus most likely will fail anyway. The former would inflate the strategic value of terrorism while the latter would deflate it. If terrorist tactics are not the only option available, a comparison between terrorism and alternative strategies such as civil resistance provides valuable insight – that is, it answers the question effective compared to what (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). While this approach provides a useful benchmark, it too is vulnerable to selection bias because the choice of strategy, violence or non-violence, is endogenous. Civil disobedience and protest might be adopted only when its practitioners believe it will be successful and avoided in difficult environments such as in regimes governed by the most ruthless of leaders. Would a non-violent protest, for example, have been more successful than terrorism in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq? Without both strategies being tried under identical conditions, it is difficult to be sure (Gould and Klor 2010). The progression of the recent Syrian

¹⁹ Lawrence Freedman, “Terrorism and Strategy,” in *Terrorism and International Order*, ed. Lawrence Freedman, and Christopher Hill (London: Routledge, 1986), p. 65.

Civil War might provide some insight. What began as a non-violent movement in March 2011 transitioned into an armed insurrection following President Bashar al-Assad's incredibly brutal crackdown on the demonstrators. Still, this case does not provide a perfect counterfactual because one strategy preceded the other.

The unobservable introduces another serious challenge. Terrorism might be most effective when it is not used, similar to nuclear weapons (Schelling 1966). If the threat of terrorism is credible, extremist groups might not have to use it. Concerned governments might reason that it is best to appease the extremists *ex ante* rather than risk serious domestic costs *ex post*.

Therefore, the threat alone could be enough to coerce government appeasement assuming the domestic costs of terrorism are high enough. If terrorist demands and government concessions are made in private, however, this outcome would not be observable. By excluding these unobservable incidents, a researcher biases the success rate of terrorism downward.

Lastly, most observational studies on coercive terrorism do not systematically examine public opinion even though its influence is central to their claims. There are several good exceptions (Hayes and McAllister 2001; Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008; Davis and Silver 2004; Bali 2007; Fielding and Penny 2009; Gould and Klor 2010; Montalvo 2011; Jaeger et al. 2012), but they still do not overcome selection bias issues or address terrorism in a coercion framework.²⁰ Their conclusions also tend to be applicable to one specific case without providing a sense of how their results are valid beyond that case.


For instance, the American response to the September 11 terrorist attacks provides one seemingly unique example. On 11 September 2001, nineteen Islamic extremists affiliated with

²⁰ Regarding terrorism's effect on public support for limiting civil liberties, see Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009.

al-Qaeda hijacked four U.S. commercial aircraft departing from Boston, Washington, and Newark. The hijackers flew two of the planes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, and one into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth plane crashed into a field in Pennsylvania, most likely on its way to the White House. The attacks killed nearly 3,000 people and injured more than 6,000. Shocked and horrified, Americans rallied behind President George W. Bush, and his approval rating soared from 51 percent on September 10 to 86 percent on September 15 (See Figure 1.2). Hetherington and Nelson (2003) point out that the American reaction is distinctive for three reasons. First, the 35 percentage point rally of support for George W. Bush is the largest in recorded history, nearly doubling all previous presidential bumps in the polls. Second, Bush's approval rating of 90 percent on September 22 was the highest rating of any U.S. president in history. Third, the rally-round-the-flag effect (Waltz 1967; Mueller 1973) lasted longer than any other in history.

Some argue that the Madrid train bombings generated a different reaction. On 11 March 2004, three days before the Spanish election, several bombs exploded at three railway stations in Madrid resulting in almost 200 deaths and injuring close to 2,000 people. Polls conducted in early March 2004 had the ruling party in Spain, the Popular Party (PP), in the lead by an average of 4.7 percent. The results of the March 14 election revealed a clear turnaround in the margins for each party. The main opposition party, the Socialist Party (PSOE), won the election with 42.6 percent against the PP's 37.7 percent of the vote. As a result, many observers attribute the 9.6 percentage point swing in approval and the PP's losing of the election to the Madrid attacks. Others cite the mishandling of the crisis by the Spanish government and its attempt to blame the Basque separatist movement ETA as the main cause (Bali 2007; Rose, Murphy, and Abrahms 2007; Montalvo 2011), thus demonstrating the potential problem of spurious correlation.

Figure 1.2: Presidential Job Approval of George W. Bush



**Participants responded to the question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president? Source: Gallup, Inc.*

Research into the effects of terrorism in Israel, easily the most studied case, reveals mixed and contradictory results (Kydd and Walter 2002; Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008; Fielding and Penny 2009; Gould and Klor 2010). Berrebi and Klor (2008) examine how terrorism affected party preferences of Israeli voters in the parliamentary elections of 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, and 2003. They find that district-level attacks within three months of the elections cause a 1.35 percent increase in that locality's support of the right bloc of parties. Given the closely divided body of voters in Israel, Berrebi and Klor conclude that this is a significant political effect and could hinder peacemaking efforts by increasing the number of politicians opposed to the peace process.

The use of party support as the dependent variable, however, introduces a lack of statistical control. Party platforms often change, and when they do, analysts cannot infer voter preferences

from grouped electoral outcomes across time. Addressing this issue, Gould and Klor (2010) find that the increase of support for the right-wing parties in Israel is in fact due to the shifting political landscape toward the left. That is, terrorism did not increase the number of right-wing hawks opposed to the peace process, but increased the number of right-wing moderates who were more accepting of it. What is more, they find that Palestinian terror attacks can cause Israelis to be more willing to make territorial concessions as long as the violence is below a certain threshold. In their view, terrorism is not making the population more intransigent toward concessions, as Berribi and Klor suggest, but more conciliatory.

In another important study, Fielding and Penny (2009) analyze the effect of terrorism on Israeli monthly support for the peace process during the al-Aqsa Intifada. They find that a 1% increase in monthly Israeli military casualties decreases public support for the peace process by 0.09%. Civilian casualties, they argue, has a non-linear effect. Four or fewer civilian casualties in a month (not including Israelis in the West Bank or Gaza) have no effect on public support of the peace process. They predict, however, that a much higher number of civilian casualties (e.g., 20 people) in a month, though rare even during this period, would significantly decrease the ratio of supporters to opponents. Thus, Fielding and Penny conclude that short-term variations in the intensity of violence translate into significant changes in the degree of support.

While this study makes an important contribution, most Israelis had believed the peace process already had failed during the al-Aqsa period. Methodologically, this means that the dependent variable, monthly public support for the peace process, did not vary much and, thus, the effect of terrorism is likely undervalued. Substantively, we still do not know the extent to which extremist violence is coercive on decision-makers by shifting public approval during active and serious negotiations, that is, when such changes would matter politically.

Turning to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, Hayes and McAllister (2001) investigate how political violence can sustain a conflict. From 1968 to 1998, violence between the Catholic republicans, Protestant loyalists and British security forces claimed the lives of 3,289 people and injured over 40,000 people. Analyzing surveys from 1968, 1973, 1978, and 1998, Hayes and McAllister find that widespread exposure to terrorism enhances latent approval of paramilitarism and reduces public support to decommission paramilitary weapons. As a result, exposure to violence can make populations less willing to make concessions and end conflicts peacefully. It is important to note, however, several caveats. The large space of time between surveys makes it difficult to conclude whether the changes in political attitudes can be fully attributed to violence or other external factors. The questions in each survey are not identical, thereby making it unclear how much of the variation can be attributed to question wording. In addition, the multivariate analysis reserved to the 1998 survey is also unclear on the substantive and statistical significance. Although this study is quite suggestive, it still does not get at how terrorism affects approval of incumbent governments and their policies.

Finally, it is important to discuss two important studies that investigate the relationship of terrorism and public support in limiting civil liberties. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) investigate how authoritarian values structure civil liberty preferences in combating terrorism in the United States. According to their theory, individuals who score high in authoritarianism view the world in black and white terms, express a need for closure, and tend to affiliate with the Republican Party. Those who score low on authoritarianism are more comfortable with ambiguous shades of gray, are less needing of closure, and tend to affiliate with the Democratic Party. Using parenting and child-rearing practices as a measure of authoritarianism, they find authoritarian individuals are more supportive than their less authoritarian counterparts on the use

of wiretaps without a warrant and the use of video cameras in public places to fight terrorism. They also find that authoritarians prefer that the media should not report on “secret measures” in fighting terrorism and do not think it is appropriate to criticize the president on issues relating to terrorism. This division between high and low authoritarians, however, diminishes as threat perceptions increase because of a natural tendency for all people to seek safety and security. Thus, they find that authoritarianism has no effect on civil liberty preferences when individuals are highly worried about terrorism.

Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) offer another theoretical framework on how citizens cope with terrorist threats. Drawing on survey results and experimental research in the United States and Mexico, they identify three coping strategies that citizens adopt to decrease the anxiety and fear associated with the threat of terrorist attacks. The first technique is to increase distrust, hostility, intolerance, and punitiveness toward other individuals in society. The second technique is to turn control over to a strong political figure and project an extraordinary leadership capability onto him or her. The third technique is to support a “dual objectives” policy that protects the homeland by limiting civil liberties and adopts an aggressive foreign policy posture abroad. Merolla and Zechmeister conclude that these coping mechanisms can put a democracy at risk by denying the civil liberties of certain segments of a population, using biased evaluations of leaders while voting, and propelling a state into an overly interventionist foreign policy.

Although these studies make very important contributions, they do not evaluate public opinion in a coercion framework. Moreover, authoritarianism, as Hetherington and Weiler note, should not have an effect in terrorist crises because of the heightened sense of threat. It is also unclear if Merolla and Zechmeister’s coping mechanism will apply to other cases, particularly

regarding the American predilection toward an aggressive foreign policy when under the stress and anxiety induced by terrorism. For instance, we did not see this reaction in Spain where voters strongly opposed Spanish participation in the Iraq War before and after the Madrid train bombings. Thus, the reader is left to wonder under what conditions their findings hold.

In summary, a growing body of literature has sought to understand the efficacy of terrorism in shaping government policy. These studies have made a significant contribution on the consequences of terrorism, but they exhibit serious issues associated with defining the dependent variable, spurious correlation, selection effects, and neglect of the casual mechanism of public opinion. The few studies that have addressed mass opinion face similar operationalization issues as the large-N observational studies or do not address terrorism in a coercion framework. What is missing is a strong theoretical basis to explain what factors influence public attitudes in coercive terrorist crises and how much coercive pressure these types of crises generate on governments to change their foreign policies.

1.4 Plan of the Dissertation

I have argued that terrorist groups are weak actors who cannot directly coerce a foreign government through brute military force. They can, however, target civilians of that country in hope of radically changing their political preferences. This attitudinal change is what is supposed to generate coercive pressure on governments to alter their policies. Therefore, the key to understanding the effect of terrorism on government policy and decision-making is to elucidate what shapes public attitudes in terrorist crises and what leader incentives are induced by such concerns. The subsequent chapters of this project develop and test several important theoretical expectations that will do just that.

In the next chapter, I discuss the threat of an irrational and capricious public on democratic governance and present competing hypotheses on what shapes mass opinion in terrorist crises. The main variables that I identify include the intensity of the terrorist campaign, government concessions and intransigence, prior population exposure to terrorism, prior attitudinal strength and ambivalence, partisanship, and the reaction of the opposition political elites. The chapter concludes with a multi-method research design that will establish a clear causal relationship between these variables and public opinion and determine their relative importance in coercive terrorist crises. The design includes innovative randomized survey experiments fielded in Lebanon and the United States, time series analysis on Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process, and interviews with government officials and policymakers.

Chapter 3 provides a historical overview of the American experience with terrorism, which represents a case with low exposure to terrorist violence. It then discusses the results from the first survey experiment fielded on a large representative sample of the U.S. voting-age population.

Chapter 4 provides a historical overview of the Lebanese experience with terrorism as a point of comparison to the American experience. After establishing it as a high exposure case, it discusses the results from a parallel experiment fielded on a large representative sample of the Lebanese voting-age population. Taken together, the cross national results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 elucidate the most important variables that govern public reactions in coercive terrorist crises and demonstrate the extent to which public attitudes hinge on environmental factors.

Chapter 5 provides a historical overview of modern terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and background of the Oslo Peace Process. As one of the world's longest ongoing disputes inundated with terrorism, this case holds tremendous policy implications for conflict

resolution and peacemaking. It is also an ideal case because it provides ample public opinion data to test the theoretical arguments made in this project.

Chapter 6 investigates how terrorist attacks, party preferences, and individual attributes affected Israeli support for the Oslo Peace Process, and considers the extent to which terrorism sabotaged the peacemaking efforts. The public opinion data come from the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, which monitored Israeli public support for the peace process with monthly public opinion surveys. The event data come from an original dataset that I constructed using newspaper archives. I also incorporate primary sources and interviews with government officials to determine their perception on how terrorism affected public opinion.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with a discussion on how the results contribute to our understanding of terrorism and coercion. It discusses how the findings fit into the larger public opinion literature regarding what influences the tenor of public opinion during major international crises. Finally, it provides a series of policy implications that will assist decision-makers as they cope with the aftermath of terrorist violence.

CHAPTER 2

The Determinants of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises

On 5 October 1995, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin stood before the Knesset, Israel's parliament, requesting the ratification of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Characteristic of Rabin, his speech was visionary and blunt. It outlined many of the important components of the deal, also known as Oslo II, and reiterated the government's desire for peace with the Palestinians. He also expressed great concern over the threat of extremist violence that, in his view, could derail the peace process:

“The primary obstacle today, to implementing the peace process between us and the Palestinians, is the murderous terrorism of the radical Islamic terrorist organizations, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which are joined by the rejectionist organizations...it is their political aim to murder Israelis, because they are Israelis, through acts of terror, in order to cause the cessation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Because this is their aim, we have no intention of shirking from the efforts toward peace, even if the acts of terrorism continue to harm us. We, on our side, will make every effort against the terrorists.”¹

¹ Yitzhak Rabin, “Remarks by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the Ratification of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 October 1995.

The source of Rabin's fear was a sudden negative shift in the Israeli public's approval of the peace process, which would prevent his government from carrying out negotiations and implement the terms of any future deal. But how serious was this threat as a result of extremist violence? To get at this issue, we need to uncover the determinants of public opinion in coercive terrorist crises.

This chapter identifies the factors that influence public opinion in coercive terrorist crises. Drawing on the public opinion and international relations literatures, it begins by discussing the threat of an irrational public on decision-making and explores the extent to which foreign policy preferences are stable and respond in sensible ways to the changing international environment. Subsequently, it identifies several key variables that theoretically have an independent influence on how publics react to terrorism. The chapter concludes with a research design that will establish a causal relationship between these variables and public opinion and determine their relative importance in moving mass opinion.

2.1 The Threat of an Irrational Public

Scholars have long been interested in the ebb and flow of public opinion on foreign policy.² Early theoretical works in the liberal tradition espoused the necessity of the public to put a constraint on decisions-makers, especially on matters of war. As Immanuel Kant, arguably the most famous philosopher of liberalism, declared, "The easiest thing in the world to do is to declare war. Here the ruler is not a fellow citizen, but the nation's owner, and war does not

² For an excellent discussion on the historical development of public opinion in foreign affairs, see Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 1-37.

affect his tables, his hunt, his places, of pleasure, his court festivals, and so on.”³ Some Liberals even assert that public opinion is “a repository of wisdom” that possesses the ability to weigh the available evidence in a reasonable way and support action that is ultimately prudent.⁴ In fact, many academics and political elites explain the so-called democratic peace, the empirical regularity that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war against each other at least partly on the fact that democratic publics ultimately constrain belligerent leaders in times of crisis (e.g., Small and Singer 1976; Doyle 1983; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992; Russett 1993; Ray 1993; Chan 1997).⁵

Not all political theorists maintain such optimism regarding the role of public opinion in foreign affairs. Early political “Realists” insisted that defense of the national interest relies on strategies that maintain the balance of power in the international system, and the public is not capable of maintaining support for such long-term projects. Alexis De Tocqueville, for instance, a French philosopher sympathetic to American society and politics, foresaw a threat to democracy resulting from altercations in political attitudes of intense, private self-interest and passionate enthusiasm. In particular, he was troubled by the instability of moods, “the propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence, and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion,” and its relative free sway over

³ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1983), p. 113.

⁴ Holsti 1996, p. 3.

⁵ As Gartzke (1998) notes, however, this explanation is unsatisfying because democracies are no less likely to fight wars than non-democracies. The democratic peace hypothesis only holds when democracies are paired against other democracies. This begs the question: why do publics constrain their leaders in crises with democratic states, but not with non-democratic states?

foreign policy.⁶ In his mind, as well as the minds of other Realists, it was doubtful that democracies could satisfy the requirements necessary for effective international diplomacy.

With the advent of scientific polling in the United States, nascent public opinion research seemed to agree with the Realists. Early findings suggested that the masses were neither wise nor prudent, but rather capricious, lacking intellectual structure and volatile. Gabriel Almond (1950), a prominent American political scientist, referred to this finding as the “plastic mood” of the public. He wrote that on questions of a remote nature, such as foreign policy, the public tends to react “with formless and plastic moods which undergo frequent alteration in response to changes in events. The characteristic response to questions of foreign policy is one of indifference. A foreign policy crisis, short of immediate threat of war, may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger; but the reaction is still a mood, a superficial and fluctuating response.”⁷

Walter Lippmann, another prominent American intellectual, also struggled with the role of public opinion and its influence on foreign policy. In 1925, Lippmann wrote that he was disenchanted by the liberal ideals of the “sovereign” and “omnicompetent” citizen because people generally do not vote, when they do it is for the head of a ticket, and the public is not informed about the policies for which they hold attitudes. Rather, he saw public opinion as a reserve of irrational force brought into action during a crisis.⁸ Later in his life, Lippmann derided mass opinion for being destructively wrong at such critical junctures:

⁶ Quoted in Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: Hancourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1950), p. 32.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁸ Walter Lippman, *The Phantom Public* (New York, NY: Hancourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1925), p. 69.

“The people have imposed a veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too intransigent. Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this century. It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decision when the stakes are life and death.”⁹

The dynamics of public opinion on foreign policy worried Almond and Lippmann with good reason. Although the American public had supported U.S. military action during World War I and World War II, it was not clear that such popular support could be sustained in the post-war era. After all, the United States had historically been an isolationist great power prior to World War I, and she quickly returned to her old ways following the capitulation of the Central Powers in 1918. Would the United States go back to an isolationist foreign policy following World War II? With the growing threat of the Soviet Union and its challenge to democratic and liberal ideals, a veto from the public in the Cold War era could cause the dominoes to fall in favor of international communism.

These sentiments – that public opinion is shortsighted, capricious, unpredictable, and even a danger to foreign policy – parallels with contemporary research on terrorism. Under the backdrop of another serious threat to international security, scholars and governments alike worry about the ease to which attitudes could be swayed by small bouts of intense violence. If extremist groups are able to mold the plastic mood of the public in their favor, and these changes

⁹ Walter Lippman, *The Public Philosophy* (Boston, MA: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1955), pp. 19-20.

induce an ample amount of coercive pressure on decision-makers to change their foreign policy, then extremists will not only continue to use terrorism, but they will increase their reliance on it. Thus, much of the debate on terrorism's coercive effectiveness, as well as the prudence of public support in times of crisis and war, hinges on the extent to which publics are rational, or at least respond in sensible ways to the changing international environment.

2.2 The Emergence of a Rational Public?

As polling methodology improved, analytical techniques became better, and voluminous amounts of data across time became available, the pendulum of an irrational and capricious public began to swing in the opposite direction. By the 1970s, public opinion research started to indicate that the masses were much more “rational” – that is, stable and form coherent and mutually consistent patterns – than had previously been thought.¹⁰ For example, Caspary (1970) investigated the degree of stability in American attention to foreign affairs and their support for international programs and commitments abroad.¹¹ Using polling data from the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), he found that the American public maintained a strong and stable “permissive mood” toward international involvement. In fact, he suggests that if there should be any concern about mass opinion, it is not because the public is too fickle as the Lippmann-Almond “mood” theory suggests, but that it is much too complacent.

Why then did we see the unstable attitudes in the early public opinion results? Achen (1975) attributes the preliminary finding to measurement error and the “fuzziness” of polling questions,

¹⁰ Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1992), p. xi.

¹¹ Participants of the survey responded to the question “Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs.”

not the instability of a public mood.¹² When correcting for these issues, he found a sharply increased estimate of stability and coherence in voters' political thinking. Page and Shapiro (1982, 1992) agree, attributing the “instability of moods” finding to the wording of survey questions and sampling error. In their seminal work, they collected a large volume of data from several reputable polling agencies, including NORC, the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), and the Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies (SRC/CPS) at the University of Michigan, over the period of 1935 to 1979 (Page and Shapiro 1982), and later to 1990 (Page and Shapiro 1992). After investigating repeated questions that had a similar wording, they found that changes in foreign policy preferences (e.g., a desire for the United States to take an active role in international affairs, support for military aid abroad, declining support of the United Nations, and military spending) did not undergo any significant changes, and when they did, the changes were not usually very large. Foreign policy preferences only changed rapidly in response to major events such as a war, confrontations, or crises, and seldom “snap back” immediately after a change had occurred. Moreover, Page and Shapiro stress that rapidity of opinion change is not sufficient in itself to constitute evidence of capriciousness. The changes were often reasonable responses to the changing international environment.

Why do we observe these stable and “rational” foreign policy preferences in public opinion surveys? Page and Shapiro explain that individuals, as well as the public in the aggregate, have real policy preferences based on underlying needs, values, and beliefs held at any given moment. Researchers can ascertain this central tendency or “long-term preference” by averaging the opinions expressed by the same individual at different moments in time. As long as an

¹² For an excellent discussion on framing effects in survey questions, see James N. Druckman, “The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence,” *Political Behavior* 23 (2001), pp. 225-256.

individual's opinions fluctuate around the same central tendency, his or her long-term preferences will be stable despite observed momentary fluctuations in opinion. More importantly, researchers can accurately measure collective preferences of a population by averaging its opinion at any given moment. This is so because any random deviations of an individual from their long-term preference, due to question wording for example, cancel out over a large sample of individuals. As a result, any measurement error in collective public opinion is largely free of the random error associated with deviations of individual attitudes.¹³

With this conception of a rational public, scholars began to search for dispositions that help to explain the stable attitudinal trends in the dynamics of foreign policy preferences.¹⁴ Hinckley (1992) identifies four basic dispositions that have had special attention in the literature since World War II: (1) Isolationists who oppose any kind of involvement in international affairs; (2) accommodationists who believe in international cooperation and shun military intervention; (3) internationalists who favor international involvement, but believe some instances require unilateral military action; and (4) hardliners who favor international involvement and support more unilateralist military actions. Others (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998) argue

¹³ Page and Shapiro 1992, pp. 15-17.

¹⁴ Scholars have identified several long-term trends in American foreign policy preferences. From the end of World War II to the Vietnam War, Americans displayed consistent support for the use of force abroad to thwart the spread of international communism, what is referred to as the "Cold War consensus." In the post-Vietnam War period, Americans became much more risk adverse; interventions and aggressive foreign policies became less popular. At the conclusion of the Cold War, some scholars (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; but see Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996) identified a third trend in American preferences, the so-called "post post-Vietnam" pattern of American opinion on the use of force. According to this trend, the public became "pretty prudent" and judiciously determined support based on the "principal policy objective."

that since the end of the Cold War, the principal policy objective is also important. Public opinion supports the use of force if the mission is defensive in nature, to coerce an aggressive power such as Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in 1990. They do not support the use of force if the mission is offensive in nature, to impose political change within another state. In a similar way, Hermann et al. (1999) find that isolationism versus internationalism, assertiveness versus accommodativeness, and the geopolitical context regarding what is at stake (e.g., state interests, relative power, perceptions on the adversary's motives, and judgments about the cultural status) all influence support for military intervention.

With a slightly different conceptualization, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) propose a hierarchical model on how public attitudes are structured. At the uppermost tier, core values such as ethnocentrism and moral beliefs about killing in warfare dictate second-tier or abstract beliefs concerning the role of government in handling foreign affairs (e.g., militarism, anticommunism and isolationism). These abstract beliefs in turn determine the third-tier: specific policy preferences on issues like defense spending, involvement of U.S. forces overseas, international trade, and nuclear armaments.

Although these dispositional dimensions are useful in understanding long-term foreign policy preferences, at least in the United States, the conditions for when the public would sustain support for military engagements are less clear. After all, what would explain declining support for a conflict over time if the distribution of public dispositions and the geopolitical context regarding what is at stake remain relatively constant? To this end, some researchers emphasize the role of events during a war, such as the number of military casualties (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 2000; but see Larson 1996; Feaver and Gelpi 2004) or the perception of success

(Kull and Ramsay 2001; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005/2006).¹⁵

Indeed, this research agenda has had a direct impact on U.S. policy during the Second Iraq War, and helps to explain why George W. Bush gave his 1 May 2003 speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln with a banner saying “Mission Accomplished” in the background. Such an image, it was argued, should generate the perception that success already has been achieved and thus garner favorability in the American public.

In contrast to this event-driven scholarship, other researchers focus on the public’s reliance on elite cues as carried in the news media. Because most people are uninformed about foreign affairs (Holsti 1996), they are ill-equipped to independently assess complex international events (Baum and Groeling 2007) as the aforementioned event explanations suggest. Thus, the elite-cue scholars argue that publics rely on informational shortcuts or heuristic cues (Sniderman et al. 1991; Popkin 1994) to gauge approval. In politics, these cues include party identification (Stanly Jr. and Mirer 1974; Rahn 1993; Popkin 1994; Nelson and Garst 2005) and elite rhetoric, especially from the political opposition (Brody 1991; Jordan and Page 1992; Baum and Groeling 2007, 2010) as well as dissenting elites from the incumbent’s party (Baum and Groeling 2010).

How do these elite cues influence the tenor of public support during the course of a war? At the beginning of a conflict, decision-makers generally enjoy strong public support because of elite consensus supporting the president (Mueller 1973; Brody 1991; Jentleson 1992; Zaller 1992; Baum and Groeling 2010; Berinsky 2010). The incentives of the news media and political elites, however, help to unravel this support (Zaller 1992; Baum and Groeling 2010; Berinsky

¹⁵ Larson (1996) and Feaver and Gelpi (2004) find that publics are willing to incur casualties as long as they understand and agree with the importance of the issue under dispute.

2010).¹⁶ Baum and Groeling (2010) demonstrate vividly that the media has an interest in reporting on stories that are novel, and political elites have an interest in receiving media coverage. As information becomes available that a war is not going well, politicians have an incentive to criticize the incumbent's conduct of foreign policy, and the media have an incentive to disproportionately over report this criticism, especially from members of the incumbent's own political party due to its novelty. The uninformed public uses these negative cues from the political elites as carried in the news media while gauging leader approval. From this perspective, mass opinion is not completely rational as previous research indicated. Rather, the public is following the lead of rational, self-interested elites.

Needless to say, the existing public opinion literature has made great strides in explaining long-term foreign policy preferences and what conditions affect the tenor of public support during major conflicts, at least in the American context. Although it is not unified on whether the public is a "rational" force, scholars today generally agree that collective opinion reacts in sensible ways to events, elite rhetoric, and individual-level dispositions. Unfortunately, the literature has largely neglected short-term changes in public opinion, such as during times of crisis, because these events have been perceived as ephemeral and thus of little political consequence (Baum 2004; Berinsky 2010).

This study takes issue with this conclusion because short-term shifts are exactly what should generate coercive pressure on leaders in coercive terrorist crises. They matter politically because attacks are often strategically timed to correspond with elections, international negotiations, and

¹⁶ The public opinion literature (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar, Shanto and Adam Simon 1994) has long identified the powerful role of the media in agenda-setting, the ability of the news media to define the "significant issue of the day," especially in foreign policy.

conflict resolution. In this realm, public opinion may prove to be capricious and irrational. Temporary moments of passion and anger could be disruptive to government policy and jeopardize leader tenure. Therefore, to understand the threat of terrorism, we must identify the factors that likely shape mass preferences during coercive terrorist crises and examine the conditions under which they will generate political incentives for government decision-making.

2.3 What Shapes Public Approval in Coercive Terrorist Crises?

Similar to the scholarship on long-term foreign policy preferences and public views of war, mass opinion during terrorist crises can be generalized into two types: “event-driven” hypotheses and “elite-cue” hypotheses.¹⁷

2.3.1 “Event-Driven” Hypotheses

The “event-driven hypotheses” suggest that the nature of international events and political context directly determine public opinion in terrorist crises. Recall that terrorist groups use small bouts of violence against a vulnerable civilian population in hope of generating a disproportional reaction relative to number of people directly harmed. The public response might be anger, fear, or apprehension, but in all cases the aim is to muster disapproval of the incumbent who has failed to protect its citizens as well as disapproval of his or her policies which have motivated extremists to adopt terrorist tactics. The sudden negative shift in approval is supposed to generate incentives for the government to appease terrorist demands in order to stop future violence, provide a sense of national security, and maintain public confidence.

¹⁷ Berinsky (2010) makes a similar distinction while discussing American public views of war.

As this causal story suggests, there are two important, but countervailing mechanisms embedded in the “event-driven” tradition. The first mechanism, *the costliness of attacks*, underscores the conventional view that publics are highly sensitive to the number of attacks and casualties. As attacks and casualties mount, publics become conciliatory and disapproving of the status quo.¹⁸ Indeed, this argument is not just theoretical, but also is found within statements of aggrieved groups. For example, Marwan Barghouti, one of the most prominent leaders of Fatah’s young guard, saw violence as a means to restart negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians during the al-Aqsa Intifada. In a 2001 interview with Ben Caspit, Barghouti asserted “Our challenge is to prove to you [Israelis] that there will be no security without peace. Only an agreement, and nothing else...We will continue our struggle, until you understand...This Intifada will lead to peace in the end. We need to escalate the conflict.”¹⁹

The second mechanism, *the costliness of concessions*, emphasizes that publics are disapproving of government appeasement of terrorism. This can be due to four main reasons. First, concessions are inherently costly because the state is giving up something that its citizens prefer to possess. The public’s desire for the disputed good might be based on its strategic, monetary, moral, spiritual or ancestral worth, but in all cases the population believes it is worse off without it. Second, a concession in the near-term could increase the capability of the group allowing it to commit more attacks in the future. Ceded territory, for instance, could be used as a

¹⁸ See Pape 2005; Kydd and Walter 2002, 2006. Scholars have also discussed this mechanism in the context of nuclear weapons (Schelling 1966), and public views of war (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 2000; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Karol and Miguel 2007).

¹⁹ Ben Caspit, “You’ll Miss Me Yet: Interview with Marwan Barghouti,” *Ma’ariv*, November 9, 2001, in Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 5th ed. (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 2004), pp. 527-30.

staging ground to launch more attacks against the state. On a smaller scale, monetary-based concessions could be used to fund the group's armed struggle. Third, government appeasement could create a reputation that the state is a weak actor. Common knowledge of this sort could encourage other aggrieved groups to adopt similar tactics against the state. "If it worked for them," an extremist group might reason, "why can't it work for us?" Lastly, governments and publics might believe that terrorist groups are simply insatiable and thus appeasement would provide no benefits, only costs as the previous reasons explicate. According to the "commitment problem,"²⁰ for example, uncertainty about whether terrorist groups will uphold their end of a deal – stopping future attacks in exchange for a concession – can prevent leaders from negotiating with terrorist groups.²¹

Overall, it is likely that both of these event-driven mechanisms, the costliness of attacks and the costliness of concessions, are at least partly right. That is, publics will react negatively to concessions *and* will react negatively to continued attacks. Thus, the *Terrorist Campaign Hypothesis* and *Concession Hypothesis* are quite straightforward.

²⁰ See Fearon 1995.

²¹ Abrahms (2006, 2008) argues that this uncertainty can occur because of a psychological heuristic – people tend to draw a direct correspondence between the extremeness of terrorist acts and its desired ends, associating violence with enmity toward the population rather than the legitimacy of the demand or grievance of the extremist group. Consequently, the targeted public believes that appeasing the terrorist group by making a concession will not stop future attacks since the attacks are perceptibly about hatred. A similar outcome could be attributed to a constructed belief, an intersubjective understanding that one should never concede to terrorist violence. The popular government line, "we will not negotiate with terrorists" could help to reinforce this norm. The difference is Abrahms argues that the mechanism is psychological and seemingly cannot be changed whereas a constructivist acknowledges the malleability of ideas.

Terrorist Campaign Hypothesis: *A terrorist campaign will decrease leader approval.*

Concession Hypothesis: *Concessions to a terrorist group will decrease leader approval.*

Yet, a leader has an incentive to make a concession if and only if additional attacks prove to be more costly than granting a concession. Thus, the issue of whether terrorist violence is coercive depends entirely on whether the public reacts *more* negatively to concessions or terrorist attacks. It becomes imperative to investigate when each mechanism is likely to take a dominant role in shaping mass opinion. We must, therefore, explore other factors that shape voter perceptions of terrorist attacks and appeasement.

The effect of terrorist violence on public opinion may depend on the strategic environment of where the attacks occur. On the one hand, populations could become desensitized to the effects of terrorist violence as they become inundated with it. Consider a place where the threat of terrorism remains random and unusual. In such places potential victims cannot adjust to the uncertainty. In contrast, consider a location where terrorism is so constant as to become normal or expected. In such places attacks are more likely to become a fact of life than a continual source of shock (Crenshaw 1983, 1986; Horowitz 1983; Cordes et al. 1984). Indeed, the cognitive psychology literature underscores that forewarning and predictability cause resistance to persuasive messages (Johnson et al. 2005).

Anecdotal evidence seems to support this mechanism. For example, following a 2012 suicide attack in Baghdad that killed 32 people and injured nearly 60 others, an Iraqi doctor

somberly explained that the attack was horrific, but events like this have become normal in Iraq. “These attacks happen so regularly that dealing with them becomes a skill you have. It’s terrible, but true.”²² What this implies, as the *Desensitization Hypothesis* lays out below, is that terrorism should have a marginal effect on mass opinion in strategic environments where terrorism is constant and routine; and terrorism should have a larger effect in strategic environments where terrorism is limited and variable.

Desensitization Hypothesis: The negative effect of terrorism on approval ratings will be higher in security environments with infrequent exposure to political terrorism than in security environments with frequent exposure.

On the other hand, terrorist attacks may generate an additive effect on public opinion in the opposite direction. Populations constantly subjugated to the horrors of terrorism could become more outraged than populations with little exposure to it and, as a result, will be less willing to stand by their leader during a terrorist crisis if he or she does not provide adequate security and safety. They may reason that “enough is enough.” International relations scholars (Richardson 1960; Toynbee 1954; Blainey 1973; Levy and Morgan 1986; Pickering 2002; Garnham 1986; Most and Starr 1980; Nevin 1996) have identified a similar mechanism at the public opinion level regarding military intervention. According to the “war-weariness hypothesis,” war induces its participants to be less willing to engage in subsequent wars until the memory of war and the pain associated with it fades. The so-called “Vietnam Syndrome” in the United States is the

²² “Car Bomb Attack Near Funeral in Baghdad Kills 32 People.” *BBC News*, 27 January 2012. Accessed 9 October 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16755347>.

most well-known example, but there are other possible candidates such as British and French sentiments after World War I.²³ Following a similar logic, the *Terrorism Fatigue Hypothesis* posits that populations highly exposed to terrorism will become fatigued by it, and thus will have a higher propensity to disapprove of their leaders as terrorist violence increases than in environments seldom exposed to terrorism.

***Terrorism Fatigue Hypothesis:** The negative effect of terrorism on approval ratings will be lower in strategic environments with infrequent exposure to political terrorism than in environments with frequent exposure.*

In addition to the strategic environment, the strength of an individual's political attitudes can also influence the effect of terrorism. Attitude formation can be thought of as process similar to Bayesian updating (Baum and Groeling 2010). According to this theory, attentive individuals incorporate new political messages as they receive them, and the size of the effect depends on the strength of their prior political attitudes (Zaller 1992; Baum 2002). Those with strong attitudes resist changing their minds in the face of dissonant messages. Those with weak attitudes, however, are easily swayed by new political messages.

Research has shown that most citizens become aware of terrorist attacks due to the close symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media (Schmid and de Graff 1982; Laquer 1987; Livingston 1994; McKormick and Fritz 2010). In other words, the media eagerly reports

²³ Although public opinion may reflect war-weariness tendencies, international relations scholars have found little to no evidence that it affects subsequent decisions of leaders to engage in military interventions. See Singer and Small 1972, 1974; Levy 1982; Levy and Morgan 1986.

on terrorist incidents because they provide novel and sensational news stories. In turn, most individuals receive these communicative messages because images and details about the attacks saturate the airwaves and, in modern times, discourse on the internet. As a result, targeted audiences are rarely ambivalent in the context of terrorist crises (Crenshaw 1983). This would be true regardless of the targeted community's strategic environment or level of prior exposure to terrorism. Thus, the *attitudinal strength hypothesis* explains that while terrorism should have the largest effect on those who are ambivalent, its net effect will not be very large because any targeted population should contain few ambivalent individuals.

Attitudinal Strength Hypothesis: The effect of terrorism on approval will be higher among ambivalent individuals than among strong-minded individuals. Since terrorism generates little ambivalence in targeted societies, however, its net effect should not be very large.

Because the world is a very complex place, especially in the realm of terrorism where acute violence can create chaos and general disarray, dispositions help individuals to interpret international developments. Similar to Zaller (1992), I define a disposition as an individual-level trait that helps to interpret events and accept or reject incoming political communications.²⁴ There has been considerable convergence in the public opinion literature that foreign policy attitudes are structured around dispositions of militarism (e.g., Verba et al. 1967; Mandelbaum

²⁴ See John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 22. Note that my use of the word "disposition" is synonymous to Zaller's use of the word "predisposition."

and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1986; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Russett 1990; Zaller 1992; Holsti 1996). On the one hand, “hawkish” voters emphasize the importance of a strong military to deter adversaries and exhibit a willingness to use force to promote the national interest. On the other hand, “dovish” voters emphasize the importance of cooperation and accommodation to prevent conflict and avoid unnecessary provocation.²⁵ In a similar way, public attitudes in coercive terrorist crises could be structured along a corresponding hawk-dove dimension. Hawkish individuals will be more resistant to the demands of terrorist groups than their more dovish counterparts even if appeasement were to stop future attacks. Dovish voters will be more willing to consider negotiating with terrorist groups and granting a concession if it will produce a cessation of violence. Therefore, the *Militarism Hypothesis* postulates that dovish voters will be more approving of government appeasement than hawkish voters.

Militarism Hypothesis: Approval ratings for government appeasement of terrorism will be higher among individuals holding “dovish” dispositions than among individuals holding “hawkish” dispositions.

2.3.2 “Elite-Cue” Hypotheses

In contrast to the event-driven hypotheses, the “elite-cue hypotheses” suggest that the impact of events depends less on the viewer’s direct interpretation, even with the help of dispositions, and far more on the interpretations offered by political elites as carried in the media. Although this mechanism is fundamental in the public opinion literature, it has been largely ignored in the

²⁵ These are, of course, idealized characterizations, and extremeness in either position is rare. See, for example, Verba et al. 1967; Russett 1990.

coercive terrorism literature. Studies in American political behavior have long found that party identification has a strong bearing on political attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960; but see Kelley, Jr. and Mirer 1974). When individuals have very little information, as they usually do on foreign policy (Holsti 1996; Baum and Groeling 2010), they often adopt the positions of their political party rather than independently forming their own judgment (Campbell et al. 1960; Mueller 1973; Stanly Jr. and Mirer 1974; Rahn 1993; Popkin 1994; Nelson and Garst 2005). For instance, Campbell et al. (1960) find that voters tend to cast their vote according to party rather than campaign issues. Similarly, Mueller (1973) finds that voters use the position of the leadership of their party as cues on how to vote. This insight generates the *Partisanship Hypothesis*.

Partisanship Hypothesis: *Approval ratings in a coercive terrorist crisis will be higher among individuals affiliating with the same party or coalition as the incumbent government.*

As discussed earlier, more recent trends in the public opinion literature focus less on blind partisan voting and party reputation and much more on the degree of opposition party support and the balance of elite rhetoric – the ratio of positive messages to negative messages coming from the political elites. According to this body of scholarship, if political elites from the opposition party approve of a leader during a foreign policy crisis the attentive public (i.e., those

who receive new political messages) will likely agree with that message.²⁶ This has long been cited as the source of “rally-round-the-flag” events (Brody 1991; Zaller 1992, 1994; Baum and Groeling 2010; Berinsky 2010). If opposition elites disapprove, the attentive public will mirror that split along partisan lines. Thus, both party alignment and opposition elite cues can influence public perceptions in coercive terrorist crises. The *Opposition Praise Hypothesis* explicates this dynamic more formally.

***Opposition Praise Hypothesis:** Political opposition praise of the incumbent’s decision-making in a terrorist crisis will increase approval relative to criticism.*

What remains unclear, however, is why political elites choose to rally behind the executive during some political crises and choose to dissent at other times. This issue is particularly important if elite cues shape public perceptions in coercive terrorist crises. The explanation given in the existing literature is that political elites are simply hedging their bets. Criticizing the executive during a high profile international crisis is very risky. If the decision-maker’s policy is successful the opposition would be in a bad position come election time if they opposed it. As a result, members of parliament are risk adverse at the beginning of a crisis. If the decision-maker’s policy fails after some time opposition elites feel safe to criticize his or her policy (Zaller 1994; Zaller and Chiu 2000; Baum and Groeling 2010).²⁷ One senior congressional

²⁶ See Zaller 1992. Berinsky (2010) adopts Zaller’s (1992) model, but with a twist. Rather than focusing solely on the balance of elite rhetoric, Berinsky argues that prominent elites such as the president can act as a strong cue-giver. The position of this politician has the potential to polarize opinion similar to the balance of elite messages.

²⁷ Elites could be supporting the president in a crisis due to an informational gap between the executive and the public. According to Baum and Groeling (2010), at the beginning of a conflict the executive has complete

foreign policy aide in the United States expressed this logic when discussing the congressional vote to support President George H. W. Bush in the 1991 Persian Gulf War: “Why not support the president when he stands up for American interests? You can always withdraw your support later if you want to. In the meantime, go along.”²⁸

Yet, office seeking elites in the opposition might not be playing a “wait and see” game at all. Public opinion dynamics also generate political incentives for the opposition that limits their freedom of reaction. On the one hand, members of the opposition might experience backlash if they criticize a leader at the onset of a terrorist crisis regardless of early policy success or failure. For example, imagine a politician who believed that the United States “had it coming” following the September 11 terrorist attacks because of America’s “misguided foreign policy in the Middle East.” It seems unthinkable that an office seeking politician would have made such a public statement out of fear of a backlash. If terrorist attacks continued in the United States, however, such an argument might have been more acceptable.

On the other hand, public approval of the opposition might be the result of how closely opposition rhetoric adheres to public expectations. If the public strongly believes that the

information regarding the “reality” of the crisis, but the general public does not have any information except what the administration is providing. As a result of this information gap, there are no countervailing messages available for the opposition to seize upon. Over time, however, “reality” begins to assert itself because the media and political elites begin receiving and transmitting information that is independent from the administration and that contradicts the presidential message.

²⁸ Quoted in John R. Zaller, “Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War.” *In Taken by Storm*, ed. Lance Bennett and David Paletz (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 256. Also see Matthew A. Baum, and Tim J. Groeling, *War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public Views of War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 29-30.

government should not appease extremist groups that employ violence, they would approve of opposition criticism when the leader makes a concession even if that decision stops future violence; they would disapprove of opposition criticism when the leader does not make a concession. In short, to generate a complete picture of what influences public reactions in coercive terrorist crises, it is essential to look at the political incentives of both the incumbent government and the opposition. This discussion generates two more important expectations, the *Opposition Incentives with Attacks Hypothesis* and *Opposition Incentives with Appeasement Hypothesis*, about how the public incentivizes opposition rhetoric.

Opposition Incentives with Attacks Hypothesis: *Opposition approval ratings will be higher if the opposition elites criticize the incumbent government if terrorist attacks increase and are highly deadly.*

Opposition Incentives with Appeasement Hypothesis: *Opposition approval ratings will be higher if the opposition elites criticize the incumbent government when the leader appeases the aggrieved group.*

To summarize, this section identified several important hypotheses on what likely influences public evaluations of the incumbent government and its policies during coercive terrorist crises. The key determinants include the level of violence, government concessions, the strategic environment, attitudinal strength, militarism, partisanship, and the reactions of the opposition elite. Table 2.1 summarizes these determinants. The hypotheses above the dotted line are the event-based hypotheses and those below the dotted line are the elite-cue hypotheses.

Table 2.1: Determinants of Public Opinion in Coercive Terrorist Crises

Hypothesis	Expected Effect
Attacks Hypothesis	<i>Decrease</i> in approval as attacks Increase
Concession Hypothesis	<i>Decrease</i> in approval if concession is made
Desensitization Hypothesis	<i>Decrease</i> in approval will be highest when population exposure to terrorism is low
Terrorism Fatigue Hypothesis	<i>Decrease</i> in approval will be highest when population exposure to terrorism is high
Attitudinal Strength Hypothesis	<i>Decrease</i> in approval will be highest among ambivalent voters
Militarism Hypothesis	<i>Decrease</i> in approval given a concession will be highest among hawkish voters relative to dovish voters
Partisanship Hypothesis	<i>Increase</i> in leader approval if voter affiliates with the incumbent's party or coalition
Opposition Praise Hypothesis	<i>Increase</i> in approval if opposition elites praise incumbent
Opposition Incentives with Attacks Hypothesis	<i>Increase</i> in opposition approval if opposition criticizes incumbent as attacks increase
Opposition Incentives with Appeasement Hypothesis	<i>Increase</i> in opposition approval if opposition criticizes incumbent after the incumbent makes a concession

The next section introduces a research design that will illuminate the origins and consequences of public opinion in coercive terrorist crises while also overcoming the methodological issues identified in chapter 1 that have impeded previous research.

2.4 Research Design

This project adopts a multi-method research design to test the above hypotheses. First, it makes use of innovative randomized survey experiments fielded in Lebanon and the United States.

This approach overcomes the shortcomings of observational research because the experimental design allows us to isolate the key variables, determine their relative causal influence, and address important counterfactuals that would be impossible to explore in the real world. To help demonstrate that the results are externally valid and not the manifestation of a pseudo-lab setting, this project also conducts a series of statistical analyses on Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process.

2.4.1 Experimental Survey Research

Because it is difficult to evaluate the effects of coercive terrorism with observational data – largely due to biases associated with coding subjectivity of the dependent variable, spurious correlation and strategic selection effects – I adopt two randomized survey experiments administered on large, nation-wide representative samples of the Lebanese and U.S. adult populations. In the survey vignettes, respondents learn about a terrorist attack in their respective country. The perpetrator demands the release of one of its leaders from prison or it will commit more terrorist attacks if the government does not release him. I then independently and randomly vary three potential sources of public approval in coercive terrorist crises: (1) the


government's policy response regarding appeasement; (2) the aggrieved group's decision to execute more terrorist attacks; and (3) the political opposition's reaction in parliament. Thus, the research design creates a fully crossed 2 X 2 X 2 experiment, generating 8 distinct treatment groups in each country.

After respondents read about the crisis and outcome, they were asked whether they approved or disapproved of how their democratic leader handled the situation.²⁹ To help respondents digest the information, I provided bullet point summaries for reference as they answered the questions. I asked several open-ended questions to help confirm that respondents fully considered the vignette information while answering. In addition, respondents had the opportunity to provide demographic information and their partisan affiliation, as well as answer questions about their experience with politics to determine if these indicators predict response outcomes. Figure 2.1 summarizes the structure of the experimental design.

By measuring leader approval at all outcomes of the coercive terrorist crisis within a confined bargaining context, this study is the first to avoid methodological issues common in empirical studies on terrorism's coercive effectiveness. First, randomized experimental manipulation guarantees statistical control and isolates the causal effect of all the independent variables. Thus, we know that the effects are not spurious. Second, the research design focuses on the coercive mechanism of terrorism, public approval, rather than on so-called terrorist "successes" or "failures," a common dependent variable in terrorism research that is highly vulnerable to confirmation bias. Third, we observe all possible outcomes in the crisis including

²⁹ Respondents gauged approval according to a 5 point ordinal scale. In the analysis, I transform approval into a binary variable in which approval includes those who "strongly approve" and "somewhat approve."

Figure 2.1: Experimental Survey Research Design




those that real-life leaders may choose to avoid. This allows us to make unbiased estimates of the coercive pressures leaders face and avoid bias from selection effects.

Lastly, Lebanon and the United States are ideal research sites. The American and Lebanese cases, as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, represent two very different security environments with respect to terrorism, thereby making the results more generalizable. Figure 2.2 helps to show this difference by displaying the ratio of fatalities from terrorist attack per 100,000 people in each population (START 2012). With exception to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States has had few incidences of political terrorism or major threats to its national security.³⁰ In contrast, Lebanon underwent a very violent civil war lasting from 1975 to 1990 killing more than 150,000 Lebanese and injuring over 200,000 others (O'Ballance 1998). During the 1980s, it was a lightning rod of terrorism, mostly in the form of assassinations, bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, car bombings, and suicide attacks (Wills 2003). Terrorist activities continued in the 1990s and still persist today, such as (but far from limited to) the car bomb that killed former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and 22 others in February 2005. Focusing on these locations also helps to address the issue of survey timing and their proximity to actual attacks. In Lebanon, a terrorist attack targeting UN peacekeepers occurred during the survey, demonstrating that this location continues to weather perpetual attacks. In contrast, no terror incident occurred in the United States during the course of the survey. In addition to different security environments, both countries have democratically elected leaders and parliaments with opposition coalitions. This allows us to study how

³⁰ The United States has faced sporadic periods of low intensity terrorism since the end of the American Civil War (Blin 2007; Lutz and Lutz 2007). While the September 11 terrorist attacks were the worst in human history, it was quite small when considering the proportion of the U.S. population directly victimized.

Figure 2.2: Modern Terrorism in Lebanon and the United States



partisanship and opposition reactions influence public views in coercive terrorist crises. Moreover, these locations provide easy access to respondents. The United States has a democratic and open society, and Lebanon is sufficiently democratic to meet the needs of this study and has a relatively open society for the Arab world.

Survey experiments are excellent tools to identify causal relationships (Druckman et al. 2006). At the same time, they do have their limitations. They can lack realism or the treatment manipulations may not be strong enough to produce the expected effect (Barabas and Jerit 2010). Pessimists might also question the extent to which the results are externally valid. I have adopted several strategies to help minimize these complications. First, I crafted the vignettes to describe an event similar to those found in *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-2005 (ITERATE 5)*, which contains detailed information from over a thousand international terrorist incidents. This dataset demonstrates that prisoner release, a plausible demand that could be made in both Lebanon and the United States, was the third most common demand following money and country-specific political demands (Mickolus et al. 2006).³¹ Second, the language, syntax and tone of the terrorist demand in the vignette come from a real terrorist statement. Third, I described additional actions that democratic leaders would likely take in terrorist crises such as increasing security at airports, train stations, government buildings and other major public spaces. This is important because leaders adopt a package of responses,

³¹ Although it is possible that the nature of the terrorist demand could have an impact on the dynamics previously discussed (DeNardo 1985; Pape 2005; Kydd and Walter 2006), it is important to emphasize that this would only affect the absolute measurements rather than the *comparisons* across treatment groups and countries. Moreover, this demand might not be as perceptibly costly relative to others, such as moving military forces or relinquishing territory. Therefore, prisoner release acts as a “hard” test if terrorism is not coercive because individuals could be more willing to concede to such a relatively modest demand than endure increasing violence.

not just one, such as making a concession. Finally, all respondents were shown an identical image of an actual terrorist attack to evoke emotions related to coercive terrorist crises. In combination, these strategies arguably generate more realism and external validity than many survey experiments in the international relations literature. To demonstrate further that the experimental results are externally valid, this study investigates the extent to which the above variables affected the peacemaking efforts in the longest running conflict in modern times, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

2.4.2 Statistical Analysis on Israeli Public Opinion

The second method in this project involves statistical modeling that explores how Palestinian terrorism and party politics influenced Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process. The public opinion data come from the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, which monitors Israeli public support for the peace process with monthly public opinion surveys. The event data come from an original dataset that I constructed using newspaper archives. The dataset contains all incidents of Palestinian terrorist attacks that primarily targeted Israeli civilians while also recording the number of casualties, the location of the attacks, and whether the perpetrator used suicide tactics or more conventional methods such as shootings, stabbings, or explosive devices. Because it is possible that decision-makers may have misperceived the actual impact on public opinion, I also interviewed Israeli, Palestinian, and American officials directly involved in the negotiations.

This case has several unique features that make it ideal for studying how terrorism impacts mass opinion. First, Israel is a democratic country that holds regular elections and its prime ministers are subject to a vote of no confidence at any time. Thus, Israeli leaders are particularly

sensitive to changes in voter preferences. Second, terrorism during the Oslo period occurred regularly in this small Jewish state and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other major international media sources have done a good job documenting these attacks. Third, Israel is an attractive case because unlike most countries, there is ample public opinion data. After the signing of the Oslo Agreements in September 1993, the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research began monitoring Israeli public support for the peace process with monthly public opinion surveys. Lastly, the results have tremendous policy implications. As governments bargain in international negotiations and mediators attempt to support and advise the involved parties, it is essential to understand how political violence affects public opinion.

It is critical to emphasize that Palestinian civilians have also been victims of Jewish extremism and state retaliatory policies, and the occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank has created tremendous hardships for Palestinians on a daily basis. Although these points are incredibly salient for understanding why peacemaking efforts have been so difficult, they lie outside the scope of this research. The core concern that pertains to this project is what factors govern public reactions in terrorist crises and to what extent changes in mass opinion create political incentives for government decision-making. Research on Israeli reactions gets at this issue. Moreover, unlike on the Palestinian side, the Israeli side has ample public opinion data to investigate these issues in a systematic way.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I reviewed the scholarly debate on whether public opinion is an irrational force that is brought into action during times of crisis or if foreign policy preferences are coherent and respond in sensible ways to international events, elite rhetoric, and the dispositions of

individuals. Recent findings in the literature seem to signal a reasonable public, but these patterns speak much more to the long-term and medium-term trends in mass opinion and far less to short-term shifts in preferences during international crises. This is problematic because terrorist attacks could engender sharp changes in public opinion, which can jeopardize elections, international negotiations, and conflict resolution. Thus, the extent to which public opinion is rational in the short-term is immensely important in generating theoretical expectations on what influences public opinion following terrorist attacks.

At this point, it is still unclear whether mass opinion responds in sensible ways to international crises in the short-term. I have provided, however, seven important variables that theoretically structure and influence public preferences. These include the intensity of the terrorist campaign, government concessions and intransigence, the strategic environment of the targeted country, individual dispositions of militarism, prior attitudinal strength, partisanship, and the reaction of the opposition political party. To determine the conditions under which these variables influence public reactions to terrorism, I proposed a two-pronged research design: (1) original experimental survey research fielded in the United States and Lebanon; and (2) statistical analyses on Israeli public opinion during the Oslo Peace Process. The next chapter will begin to analyze the American experience with terrorism and determine the influence of coercive terrorism on U.S. public opinion.

CHAPTER 3

Terrorism, Coercion, and Public Opinion in the United States

On the day that the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, George W. Bush addressed the nation from the treaty room of the White House. He cited the failure of the Taliban to heed to American demands and introduced details about the U.S. military operation underway in Afghanistan. He also emphasized that terrorism was a new threat to the United States. “We’re a peaceful nation. Yet, as we have learned, so suddenly and so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In the face of today’s new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it.”¹ This newness narrative would appear in President Bush’s statements throughout his presidency. In a speech during his second term, he stated that following the September 11 attacks, “it became instantly clear that we’d entered a new world, and a dangerous new war.” He added:

“Free nations have faced new enemies and adjusted to new threats before – and we have prevailed. Like the struggles of the last century, today’s war on terror is, above all, a struggle for freedom and liberty. The adversaries are different, but the stakes in this war are the same: We’re fighting for our way of life, and our ability to live in freedom. We’re fighting for the cause of humanity, against those who

¹ George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan,” The Treaty Room of the White House, Washington, DC, 7 October 2001.

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.

seek to impose the darkness of tyranny and terror upon the entire world. And we're fighting for a peaceful future for our children and our grandchildren.”²

President Bush captured a real sentiment in the United States. Terrorism seemed to be something new and relatively foreign to Americans. For some, it might be a surprise to learn that the United States actually has faced several bouts of terrorism throughout her history. The American experience with terrorism, however, has been mostly of the domestic variety. International terrorism, with only a few exceptions, had occurred overseas, far from U.S. soil. Moreover, the instances of terror in the United States had been sparse, variable, and inconsistent. For these reasons, the perception that terrorism is an unusual phenomenon prevails in the United States even in the post-9/11 world. It is far from an everyday fact of life.

This chapter explores the extent to which terrorism is coercive through public opinion in a low-exposure environment, the United States of America. It begins with a historical overview of the American experience with politically motivated terrorism. Most of the events described do not fully fall under the definition of coercive terrorism as used in this project. They are important to discuss, however, because they fully contextualize terrorism in the United States and justify its use as a low-exposure case. The subsequent sections introduce the randomized survey experiment fielded in the United States, describe the methodology that I used to obtain a large, nation-wide sample of the U.S. adult population, and then present the results.

² George W. Bush, “Address on the Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists,” The East Room of the White House, Washington, DC, 6 September 2006.
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.

3.1 A History of Sporadic Terrorism

3.1.1 *Terrorism in the Early Years*

In the early years of U.S. history, North America witnessed only a few instances of what could be loosely defined as terrorism.³ As the colonists moved ever closer to the American Revolutionary War, mobs of dissidents spearheaded by organizations such as the Sons of Liberty, opposed British laws (e.g., the Stamp Act) and other British practices in the colonies. These actions were almost exclusively non-lethal and targeted the property of the British Crown, as was the case with the Boston Tea Party.

The period between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, known as the Jacksonian era, was much more violent. Warfare between the United States and the Native Americans, the arrival of more settlers, and federal and state policies of removal (particularly in Georgia) pushed the indigenous tribes westward in what resulted in ethnic cleansing. Prejudice and intolerance sparked organized mob violence against minority communities, chiefly against Hispanics, Chinese, Blacks, Irish Catholics, and Mormons. In the 1850s, the Know-Nothing Party intimidated voters on Election Day, and street fights occasionally broke out as a result. Slavery was also an important flashpoint. This issue motivated assaults, murders and tarring and feathering between abolitionists and pro-slavery groups, especially in Kansas, leading up to the American Civil War.

Following the Civil War, the assassination of Abraham Lincoln is arguably the first well-known example of modern terrorism in the United States. On 14 April 1865, John Wilkes

³ For an excellent overview of terrorism in the United States, see Arnaud Blin, “The United States Confronting Terrorism,” in *The History of Terrorism*, ed. Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007); and Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz, *Terrorism in America* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). For a good discussion on incidents in the early period, see Lutz and Lutz 2007, pp. 13-53.

Booth, a famous stage actor at the time, shot the President in the back of the head at Ford's Theater. Although Booth acted on behalf of the Confederate cause, the war by that time had ended and the leadership of the Confederacy was on the lam. As a result, there was no specific political objective in mind nor was it intended to spark a campaign of terrorism.⁴

One of the earliest domestic terrorist organizations also formed at this time. Founded in Pulaski, Tennessee in December 1865, the Klu Klux Klan (KKK) feared the consequence of black enfranchisement, a constituency that outnumbered white Americans in many parts of the South and voted uniformly Republican, the political party of Abraham Lincoln.⁵ From their point of view, this meant that the radical regime of Reconstruction and Republican dominance would remain in the South.

Accordingly, the purpose of the KKK was to combat Congressional Reconstruction and suppress the African American population. Klan members dressed in white hoods and garb to intimidate, torture, and murder former slaves who challenged the existing social and political order. They drove out Northern school teachers, so-called "carpetbaggers," who they believed would encourage an insurrection. They assaulted judges, intimidated juries, and attacked officials

⁴ Blin 2007, p. 401.

⁵ For background on the Ku Klux Klan, see David M. Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism: The First Century of the Klu Klux Klan, 1865-1965* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965); Chester L. Quarles, *The Ku Klux Klan and Related American Racist and Antisemitic Organizations: A History and Analysis* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1999); and Rory McVeigh, *The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). The actual date of the first meeting of the Ku Klux Klan is debated among historians. Many scholars, however, agree on December 1865. See Quarles 1999, p. 30.

who did not give whites priority or who had foreclosed their property.⁶ The Klan also had an important impact on the political process, as they helped segregationist white Democrats win elections. This contributed to the federal government's decision to end Reconstruction in 1877. Once federal troops and the "carpetbaggers" withdrew, the Southern status quo returned, and the KKK was no longer needed. As a result, Klan activity declined. Yet, the KKK would reemerge two more times in U.S. history: in 1915 against the threat of communism, increasing immigration, as well as social vices (e.g., bootlegging, moonshine, gambling, and prostitution), and again after World War II to oppose desegregation and the Civil Rights Movement.

3.1.2 *The Anarchist Wave*

The first major wave of modern terrorism to hit the shores of the United States was anarchism.⁷ Growing out of the struggle between labor unions and employers, this movement called for the abolishment of government in favor of voluntary and cooperative social interactions. The first American anarchist group was the Molly Maguires, a secret organization of Irish Catholic miners in Pennsylvania.⁸ From 1865 to 1875, the Mollies were responsible for a variety of violent acts,

⁶ Chalmers 1965, pp. 9-21.

⁷ In a very important work, David Rapoport originated the thesis on four modern waves of global terrorism: anarchist, anti-colonial, new left, and religious. He defines a wave as "a cycle of activity in a given period – a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups' characteristics and mutual relationships." See David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Kruth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), p. 47.

⁸ The term Molly Maguire originally referred to dissidents opposed to English landlords in Ireland. See Lutz and Lutz 2007, p. 70.

including arson and murder that targeted bosses and the police. U.S. authorities eventually dismantled the group, but its members became an inspiration to the global anarchist movement. In fact, Mikhail Bakunin, who is considered the father of modern anarchist theory, prepared to visit the United States to see the group's activities first hand in 1874 until his health made the trip impossible.⁹

In 1882, Johann Most immigrated to the United States and through his periodical *Die Freiheit*, he became the spokesman of the anarchist movement in North America. With the help of Albert Parsons and Augustus Spies, Most created the International Working People's Association, also known as "Black International." The leadership of this group played a significant role in the infamous 1886 Haymarket Square incident. During a worker's strike in early May, a policeman opened fire on the crowd, killing one person and wounding several others. In response, August Spies wrote an editorial in the anarchist periodical *The Alarm* calling on his followers to take up arms in revenge. "If you are men, if you are the sons of your grand sires, who have shed their blood to free you, then you will rise in your might, Hercules, and destroy the hideous monster that seeks to destroy you. To arms we call you, to arms!"¹⁰ Approximately 3,000 people attended the rally at Haymarket Square in Chicago to support their fellow workers. Suddenly, an unknown assailant threw dynamite at the police. The blast from the explosive as well as the exchange of gunfire that ensued claimed the lives of 11 people, including seven policemen.

⁹ Blin 2007, p. 402.

¹⁰ "Revenge! Workingmen to Arms!!" Single-page letterpress broadside, 4 May 1886.

Over the next three decades, the anarchist movement would turn to assassination as its tactic of choice.¹¹ On 6 July 1892, one important episode occurred in Pennsylvania at the Homestead Steel Works where strikers and private security of the Carnegie Steel Company clashed killing about ten people. The state of Pennsylvania responded by sending in its militia with orders to break the strike. Furious over these events, a young anarchist named Alexander Berkman entered the office of Henry Clay Frick who had organized the suppression of the strike, pulled out a pistol and shot him several times. Frick survived the assassination attempt. Berkman was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison, though he was eventually released in 1906.¹²

The most notorious anarchist assassination in the United States occurred on 6 September 1901. Leon Czolgosz, a 28 year-old anarchist inspired by the assassination of Italy's King Umberto I in 1900, concealed a pistol under a handkerchief and shot President William McKinley at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York. Doctors were unable to find one of the bullets lodged in McKinley's abdomen, and as a consequence, he died 8 days later. In the aftermath of the assassination, Czolgosz was arrested, tried, and sentenced to the electric-chair. Vigilante mobs, outraged over McKinley's assassination, targeted other known anarchists, and the police arrested scores of them including Emma Goldberg, a popular anarchist speech writer. Using language similar to that of President George W. Bush following the September 11 attacks, President Theodor Roosevelt declared that the cause of the anarchist is "to be found in his own evil passions and in the evil conduct of those who urge him on, not in any failure by

¹¹ Although not part of the anarchist movement, political assassinations became a recurrent theme in the New Mexico territory at the end of the 19th century. See Lutz and Lutz 2007, pp. 67-68.

¹² Blin 2007, pp. 402-403.

others or by the State to do justice to him or his.” He added, “Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race; and all mankind should band against the anarchist.”¹³

Despite heightened awareness of anarchism, activities in its name continued for several more decades in the United States. Three events are particularly noteworthy. On 1 October 1910, John and James McNamara, two union members of the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, detonated a bomb at the offices of the Los Angeles Times, killing 21 newspaper employees and wounding over 100 more. Six years later, a bomb exploded at the Preparedness Day parade in San Francisco, killing 10 people and wounding about 40. Then, on 16 September 1920, unknown anarchists planted a bomb at the J. P. Morgan Bank in New York; the blast claimed the lives of 34 victims and injured more than 400 people. Following the J. P. Morgan attack, the U.S. government orchestrated a robust and expansive crackdown involving the arrests of thousands of anarchists, which finally put an end to the anarchist “Red Scare.”¹⁴ With exception to a number of race riots that broke out in various parts of the country, terrorism would largely disappear in the United States until after World War II.¹⁵

3.1.3 The Anti-Colonial Wave

In the post-war era, the anti-colonial wave of terrorism was at its height around the globe, and many of the great powers had been consumed with terrorist and guerilla activities. The United

¹³Theodore Roosevelt, “First Annual Message,” 3 December 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>. Also see Richard Bach Jensen, “The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900-1914,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13 (2001), pp. 15-46.

¹⁴ Blin 2007, pp. 404-405.

¹⁵ See Lutz and Lutz, p. 88.

States had largely avoided this wave because it had limited overseas territorial possessions and often pressed for the elimination of colonial empires. The liberation of Puerto Rico, however, became the focal point for two very important events in the United States that fall under anti-colonialism.

In 1898, the United States acquired Puerto Rico from Spain as part of the Treaty of Paris that concluded the Spanish-American War. Determined to liberate the territory, Griselio Torresola and Oscar Collazo sought to assassinate President Harry S. Truman at the Blair House in Washington, D.C. in 1950. They failed, and both militants were shot dead in a gunfight with police outside the Blair House. Four years later, Puerto Rican nationalists would try again to send a message to the United States to abandon Puerto Rico. On 1 March 1954, Lolita Lebrón, Rafael Cancel Miranda, Irving Flores, and Andrés Figueroa Cordero opened fire on congress at the House Representatives Chamber of the U.S. Capitol building. Five congressmen were severely injured, but no one was killed. The assailants were immediately arrested, tried, and sentenced to life in prison. Cordero would be released in 1978, however, and President Jimmy Carter exchanged the remaining dissidents for several CIA operatives who were being held in Cuba on espionage charges.

3.1.4 The New Left Wave

The New Left wave of terrorism hit the United States in the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁶ The Civil Rights Movement, the Vietnam War, and other wars of national liberation played an influential role in shaping this movement. In particular, the effectiveness of the Viet Cong's primitive guerrilla

¹⁶ While very important, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 does not appear to have common characteristic with any wave of terrorism, nor does it appear to have links to any particular political cause.

tactics against the American military goliath demonstrated to some that the contemporary system could be overturned despite the seemingly insurmountable strength of the U.S. government.¹⁷

The New Left focused on student activity as the vanguard to mobilize the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and political activism grew across many major universities, especially the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and the University of California at Berkeley.¹⁸

The most important group that embodied the New Left ideology was the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Vehemently anti-war (it organized the first “anti-Vietnam War” march to Washington in 1965), the SDS organized non-violent protests across college campuses and various American cities. These protests occasionally gave way to violence and rioting, as had occurred at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, Illinois where police attacked the protestors and vice versa.¹⁹ As the Vietnam War escalated, the group attracted more militant-minded members who called for more drastic action. Consequently, the organization splintered and new radical groups formed including the Weatherman Underground.²⁰ This group was

¹⁷ Rapaport 2004, p. 56.

¹⁸ Blin 2007, pp. 405-6.

¹⁹ The Democratic National Convention protests of 1968 largely consisted of members from the SDS as well as two other youth-oriented counterculture revolutionary groups – the National Mobilization Committee to End War in Vietnam and the Youth International Party.

²⁰ The Weatherman faction got its name from a position paper it submitted at the Chicago national convention of the SDS in June 1969 titled “You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows,” lyrics from the Bob Dylan song “Subterranean Homesick Blues.” See U. S. Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, *The Weather Underground*. 94th Cong., 1st sess. 30 January, 1975, p. 9.

responsible for a string of bombings targeting police, government buildings, public property, and banks throughout the 1970s, but it had little real impact on American politics.²¹

Other New Left groups followed a similar path of activism and militancy. The Black Panther movement, for example, was responsible for non-violent protests, shootings, as well as murder. Created in 1966, the Black Panthers espoused Black Nationalism as their major focus, but would later turn to a more inclusive doctrine of anti-capitalism and socialism. Another important group was the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), which carried out a number of deadly attacks and bank robberies. They are best known for the kidnapping and brainwashing of Patricia Hearst, heiress of William Randolph Hearst's media empire.

Ultimately, the New Left extremists were unable to achieve any radical change in American society, and law enforcement efforts severely hindered their activity. As the movement began to wither away, only a few individuals unaffiliated with any group carried out attacks at least partly on behalf of the New Left (as well as for personal reasons). For instance, Theodore Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, was responsible for 16 separate mail and package bombings that killed 3 people and injured 23 others.

It is important to highlight several other significant events during this period, even though they do not fall under the New Left wave of terrorism. On 22 November 1963, President John F. Kennedy was killed as he rode in an open-top convertible in Dallas, Texas. On 4 April 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated while standing on a balcony of the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, Tennessee. Three months later, on 6 June, Robert F. Kennedy was fatally shot at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, California by Sirhan Sirhan, a Palestinian immigrant outraged over Kennedy's support for Israel.

²¹ On Weatherman Underground activities, see U.S. Senate 1975, pp. 13- 42.

3.1.5 The Religious and Far-Right Wave

The United States is currently weathering a fourth wave of terrorism in the form of religious and far-right extremism. More than at any other point in American history, this threat has come from both domestic and international sources. On the domestic side, there are communities on the far-right who oppose any form of government and who have withdrawn themselves to remote parts of the country waiting for the Second Coming and a great racial war. These “survivalists” are often heavily armed, and on occasion have clashed with Federal agents and law enforcement officers with deadly consequences. This was the case, for example, with the Weaver family at Ruby Ridge, Idaho in 1992 and the Branch Davidians led by David Koresh at Waco, Texas in 1993.²² In fact, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nicols stated that the incidents at Ruby Ridge and Waco motivated them to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995, which killed 168 people and injured over 680 others.

Far-right extremists often draw on passages from the Christian Bible to justify racist, anti-homosexual and anti-abortion positions, and these positions have persuaded some to become terrorists. In the 1980s and 1990s, these radicals have been responsible for nearly one hundred arson fires, around forty bomb explosions (often at abortion clinics), physical assaults on about a hundred people (usually medical personnel and patients at abortion clinics), and the murder of seven people.²³ Another notorious incident occurred at the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta,

²² On various survivalists groups including the Patriot movement, the militia movement, and other far-right extremist groups in America such as Covenant, Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA), the Aryan nations, and Skinheads, see Quarles 1999, 129-153. It is important to note that some far-right groups are not exclusively Christian and white. For example, the Jewish Defense League, formed by Rabbi Meir Kahane, committed several terrorist acts in the United States since its founding in 1968. See Lutz and Lutz 2007, p. 105.

²³ See Blin 2007, pp. 407-8.

Georgia. On 27 July 1996, Eric Robert Rudolph exploded three pipe bombs during the Olympic Games, killing 2 and wounding 111 others. In a statement, Rudolph explained that he was motivated by U.S. abortion laws, his hatred toward homosexuals as well as his disdain for the Federal government.²⁴

On the international side, the United States has been facing a growing threat from Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorism. These attacks have been mostly overseas thereby only having a limited effect on Americans back home. The wave began with the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and the student seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran that resulted in a 444 day hostage crisis. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used the incident to embarrass President Jimmy Carter and hurt his chances of reelection. In this context, it is not surprising that the hostage crisis ended minutes after the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan. The timing was meant to be a final political jab at Carter for supporting the recently deposed leader of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

Throughout the Reagan years, the United States was burdened with kidnappings, ransoming and killing of its citizens abroad.²⁵ This was especially true in Lebanon as the country spiraled deeper into its civil war (discussed in more detail in the next chapter). The United States had had a strong diplomatic presence inside of Lebanon, and following the Sabra and Shatila Massacre in 1982, Washington sent troops to Lebanon as part of a multinational force to protect Palestinian civilians, help stabilize the Lebanese state, and oversee the evacuation of foreign forces

²⁴ Eric Rudolph, "Full Text of Eric Rudolph's Confession." *National Public Radio*. 14 April 2005. Accessed 28 November 2012. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4600480>.

²⁵ For an excellent discussion on terrorism during the Reagan years, see David C. Wills, *The First War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy during the Reagan Administration* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003).

including the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Israel, and Syria.²⁶ This increased international involvement only invited attacks from radical Islamists. On 18 April 1983, a bomb exploded at the U. S. embassy in Beirut killing 67 people. Six months later, on 23 October, a suicide truck bomber struck the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut, killing 243 servicemen. The U.S. embassy, now relocated just north of Beirut in Awkar, was bombed again in September 1984, killing 11 and injuring 14. Americans also became the target of assassinations, such as the murder of Malcolm Kerr, former Professor at the University of California at Los Angeles and President of the American University in Beirut.

Similar events would play out elsewhere in the world.²⁷ In 1983, a suicide bomber attacked the U. S. embassy in Kuwait, killing 6 people and injuring more than 80 others. Americans were killed in bombings at the airports in Rome and Vienna in 1985, the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin in 1986, and onboard Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded on 21 December 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people. U.S. citizens were also victims in the infamous hijackings of Kuwait Airways Flight 221, TWA Flight 847, and the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro.

What began as a globally successful upsurge of Islamist militancy – the overthrow of the Shah, the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the coup d'état in Sudan that brought the Islamist Hassan al-Turabi to power – quickly turned into a series of setbacks in the 1990s. In Egypt, Sunni extremist failed to spark a revolution by using terrorism against western intellectuals, regime

²⁶ See Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada,” 27 October 1983. Accessed 4 December 2012. <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/102783b.htm>.

²⁷ For a list of terrorist incidents of significant magnitude between 1981 and 1989, see Wills 2003, pp. 7-10.

supporters, and the country's tourism industry. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia rejected the offer from veteran jihadists of Afghanistan to protect the Kingdom from Iraq following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Instead Riyadh turned to the United States, which outraged Islamists like Osama Bin Laden because it brought non-Muslims to sacred soil.²⁸ In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United States in partnership with the Soviet Union launched the Madrid Peace Conference, which for the first time brought Israeli and Arab leaders together for direct peace negotiations. In late 1992, President George H. W. Bush authorized Operation Restore Hope, which deployed 25,000 American troops to Somalia in hope of reversing the deteriorating security situation in the Horn of Africa. Many in the region interpreted this move as a U.S. attempt to destabilize and overthrow Turabi's regime in Sudan.

These events convinced some radical Islamists that rather than targeting the "nearby enemy," autocratic regimes that ruled with an iron-fist in the region, their efforts should focus on the "faraway enemy," Western states that had propped up these regimes and supported Israel.²⁹ At the top of the hit list was the United States of America. On 29 December 1992, Islamic militants bombed a hotel in Aden, Yemen, in hope of killing American servicemen. This attack is believed to be the first committed by al-Qaeda. Three months later, on 26 February 1993, a 1,500 pound bomb stashed inside of a Ryder truck rental exploded in the underground parking area of the World Trade Center in New York City. The blast killed six people and injured over 1,000 others. Law enforcement agents swiftly arrested the conspirators, which included

²⁸ See Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 316.

²⁹ For an excellent discussion on the evolution of this strategy among Islamic extremists, see Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 70-107.

Mohammad Salameh (who rented the truck), Nidal Ayyad (who acquired the chemicals for the bomb), Mahmoud Abouhalima (who help to mix the chemicals), Ramzi Youssef (who was central to the planning), and Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman (the “Blind Sheikh” who acted as the spiritual guide and was a founder of Gama’a Islamiyya in Egypt).³⁰

Despite the success of Federal agents in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack, militant aspirations would continue abroad where the United States was most vulnerable. On 13 November 1995, a group calling itself “the Islamic Movement of Change” detonated a bomb at a U.S. leased military building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 6 people and injuring 60 others.³¹ Then, on 25 June 1996, a truck bomb ripped through the Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that housed U.S. Air Force personnel. 23 Americans were killed and more than 300 were wounded.³² Hezbollah of the Hijaz, an organization that had received support from Iran, was principally responsible.³³

On 23 February 1998, al-Qaeda formally declared war on the United States. In a statement published by the Arabic newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, Osama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and

³⁰ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Philip Zelikow, Executive Director; Bonnie D. Jenkins, Counsel; Ernest R. May, Senior Advisor), *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 72.

³¹ “Ambassador: Car Bomb Destroyed Military Building,” *CNN*, 13 November 1995. Accessed 3 December 2012. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/saudi_blast/11am/.

³² Phillip Shenon, “23 U.S. Troops Die in Truck Bombing in Saudi Base,” *New York Times*, 26 June 1995. Accessed 3 December 2012. <http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/062696binladen.html>.

³³ On Iran’s involvement, see Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: the Conflict between Iran and America* (New York, NY: Random House, 2004).

their associates Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, Sheikh Mir Hamzah, and Fazlur Rahman issued a fatwa (meaning religious ruling) requiring Muslims to kill Americans, both civilian and military:

“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, ‘and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,’ and ‘fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.’”³⁴

Al-Qaeda quickly turned its hateful words into action. On 7 August 1998, two truck bombs exploded at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salam, Tanzania. The Nairobi attack destroyed the U.S. embassy and killed 213 people, including 12 Americans. The Dar es Salam attack killed 11 people, none of whom were American. Al-Qaeda’s next attack would occur in Yemen on 12 October 2000. While the USS Cole was anchored in the Port of Aden, a small bomb-laden motor boat exploded into the side of the ship, killing 17 crewmembers and

³⁴ “Nass Bayan al-Jabha al-Islamiyya al-‘Aalimiyya li-Jihad al-Yahud wa al-Salabeen.” *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, 23 February 1998. Accessed 3 December 2012. <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm>. An English translation is available from the Federation of American Scientists. <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>.

wounding at least 40 others. Finally, as discussed earlier, al-Qaeda struck again on 11 September 2001 in what would become the worst act of suicide terrorism in history.³⁵

In short, this narrative was meant to provide a review of the American experience with terrorism. On the surface, it may appear that the United States has weathered serious episodes of terrorism, but it is important to keep these events in perspective. They occurred across a long period of time spanning more than 235 years. Different generations experienced each of these different waves, which likely diminished their effect. Moreover, international terrorism, which is the focus of this project, had occurred only a handful of times on U.S. soil – the Puerto Rican attacks, the World Trade Center bombing, and the September 11 attacks as the only exceptions. Even after the horror of September 11, American lives largely went back to normal. In a recent United States Studies Centre (USSC) poll conducted in May 2011, it found that only 3% of Americans believed that terrorism was the most important issue facing the United States, and only 22% of Americans thought that there was more than a 50% chance of a terrorist attack occurring in the next 12 months.³⁶

In the survey described below, I asked Americans how likely they thought a terrorist attack would occur in the United States tomorrow.³⁷ The results are presented in Table 3.1. Similar to

³⁵ Although unrelated, it is important to mention that Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel also killed a number of Americans throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.

³⁶ Simon Jackman and Lynn Vavreck, “Americans and Australians Compared: Ten Years after 9/11,” *The United States Studies Centre*, 2 June 2011. Accessed on 4 December 2012.

http://ussc.edu.au/ussc/assets/media/docs/publications/1106_911Survey.pdf.

³⁷ I argue that the wording “tomorrow” is better than “in the next 12 months” at capturing American threat perception. Longer time spans would likely inflate the statistic without necessarily tapping into the urgency that some Americans feel regarding terrorism.

Table 3.1. Threat Perception of Terrorism in the United States

	All	Democrats	Republican	Independent
Very Unlikely	33 %	44 %	23 %	31 %
Somewhat Unlikely	25 %	27 %	25 %	23 %
Neither Likely Nor Unlikely	16 %	14 %	20 %	20 %
Somewhat Likely	17 %	12 %	24 %	20 %
Very Likely	4 %	2 %	5 %	6 %

U. S. Survey: In your opinion, what is the likelihood that there will be a major terrorist attack in the United States tomorrow?

the USSC finding, one in five Americans thought an imminent terrorist attack was likely to occur. Only 4 % believed that an imminent attack was very likely to occur. Thus, these data confirm that America adequately represents a low-intensity environment where terrorism is seen as being a remote threat. The next section introduces the U.S. survey experiment and examines the coercive effectiveness of terrorism in this low-exposure environment.

3.2 The U.S. Survey Experiment

Following the convention of experimental survey research on foreign policy issues (Tomz 2007; Trager and Vaverick 2011), the questionnaire begins by telling respondents that “The following questions are about U.S. foreign policy. You will read about a hypothetical situation similar to situations our country has faced in the past and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. I will describe one approach American leaders have taken and ask whether you approve or disapprove of that approach.”³⁸

³⁸ Appendix A provides the full text of a sample survey.

Next, all respondents received a vignette about a deadly car bomb attack in the United States, killing 10 people and injuring many others. They were shown an image of an actual car bomb attack to help increase the realism of the situation and evoke emotions related to coercive terrorist crises. They learn that the perpetrator, a group with possible links to al-Qaeda, demands the release of one of its leaders from prison or it will commit more attacks if the government does not release him: “Pull back your dogs from our people, and release our leader from your prison – or else there will be no safe place for anyone in America. If you do not free him, we will continue to tear your hearts out with explosives, and surround your every post with our bombs. We give you this final warning that an ocean of blood will be spilled.” This language came from an actual al-Qaeda statement to help make the situation as realistic as possible.³⁹

The respondents then find out about the immediate actions taken by the President, who is affiliated with either the Democratic Party or Republican Party. “The [Democratic or Republican] President immediately increased security at airports, train stations, government buildings and other major public spaces. The President stated that additional intelligence and military resources would be brought to bear against this group and related threats.” Because I found no statistical difference between the presidential parties in the United States, the analysis below aggregates them into incumbent supporters and opposition supporters.⁴⁰

³⁹ See Evan Kohlman, “Video Threat to Lebanon from ‘Al Qaida in Greater Syria,’” *Global Terror Alert*, 25 May 2007. Accessed 5 April 2011.

<http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0607/qaidashams0607.pdf>.

⁴⁰ The reputation of political parties is thought to be influential on voter attitudes (Petrocik 1996; Schultz 2005; Baum and Groeling 2010; Trager and Vavreck 2011). Political parties often develop long term reputations on different policy issues (Downs 1957; Petrocik 1996). In the United States, for example, the Republican Party maintains a more “hawkish” reputation on national security issues than the Democratic Party. From this viewpoint,

The independently and randomly assigned treatments follow. In the first treatment, the President does or does not concede to the perpetrator's demand. Following this action the President declares, "Americans should go about their daily business. These measures will keep this country safe." In the second treatment, the aggrieved group does not commit any more attacks or they commit 9 additional attacks, killing a total of 100 people within one year.⁴¹ Based on the history of terrorism in the United States, this is a significant campaign of violence in a very short period of time. In the final treatment, the political opposition praises or criticizes the incumbent's conduct of foreign policy. After reading the vignette, respondents are asked

Republicans are more eager to increase defense spending and more willing to use military force abroad than their Democratic counterparts. In international relations, a reputation for toughness or "hawkishness" can signal strength and deter unwanted exploitation. At the same time, a hawkish leader runs the risk of excessive defense spending and conflict escalation if the disputing sides are unwilling to compromise. A reputation for cooperation or "dovishness" can open the door for peaceful diplomacy. Yet, it might encourage challenges from opponents who perceive the incumbent government as weak. A dovish leader might also lack the credibility or ability to demonstrate that he or she can convince a society opposed to an international agreement to go along and implement the deal. When a hawkish party, however, breaks from its unaccommodating tradition and initiates mutual cooperation, scholars argue that voters with more hawkish preferences can infer that objective conditions rather than partisanship or ideology prompted the moderated position. This change convinces them that accommodation is a reasonable choice sought to benefit the national interest (Trager and Vavreck 2011). Indeed, Schultz (2005) makes a similar argument for why it is politically easier for a hawkish leader to initiate peace negotiations and conclude a sustainable settlement. It may in fact have taken "a Nixon to go to China." Yet, in the context of coercive terrorism, there does not appear to be a difference between presidential parties. Thus, party reputations of hawkishness or dovishness do not influence public perceptions in terrorist crises, particularly toward appeasement.

⁴¹ It is important to note that the word "terrorism" or "concession" does not appear anywhere in the vignette or survey questions in order to avoid priming respondents with highly pejorative terms. Instead, I adopt neutral language that simply describes the actions.

whether they approve or disapprove of how their leader and the opposition elites handled the coercive terrorist crisis.⁴²

SM Audience, a new Internet-based panel highly reflective of the U.S. population, administered the U.S. study.⁴³ The sample closely matches the U.S. Census stratification on gender, age, and geographic region, more so than many high-quality Internet-based panels. It is well-balanced on political ideology and partisanship. On ideology, 41% self-identified as liberal and 39% as conservative. On partisanship, the mean score on a 5-point scale was 2.8, where a Republican is scored as a 5.⁴⁴ The subject-pool does slightly skew on Internet usage, income and education, but no more than other frequently employed Internet-based panels. Nevertheless, the statistical analysis below confirms that these differences, while small, have no bearing on the results. Table 3.2 provides comparative demographic breakdown between the U.S. sample, the U.S. Census, and the un-weighted Annual National Election 2008-9 Panel, which provides a useful benchmark for high quality Internet-based samples (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012).

⁴² Respondents gauged approval according to a 5 point ordinal scale. In the analysis below, I transform approval into a binary variable in which approval includes those who “strongly approve” and “somewhat approve.”

⁴³ The primary method of recruitment into the panel is SM surveys. Over 30 million unique respondents answer SM surveys sent out by their subscribers each month. Individuals who participate in these surveys are then recruited into the Audience panel subject pool, which over time has become a very large diverse group of people highly representative of the U.S. population. For each Audience project, individuals are selected at random from this panel and asked to take a survey. Participation is entirely voluntary, and informed consent is done prior to taking a survey. After completing the survey, participants get to donate \$0.50 to a participating charity of their choosing, such as Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Girls for Change, Teach for America, and the Humane Society of the United States. This incentive limits problems that can arise from offering cash rewards, and encourages respondents to provide honest, thoughtful opinions.

⁴⁴ As a point of comparison on partisanship, the Annual National election 2008-9 Panel was 2.9.

Table 3.2. Comparing U.S. Sample “Audience” to ANESP and U.S. Census

<i>Demographics</i>	Audience	ANESP	U.S. Census
Female	47.6 %	57.9 %	51.5 %
Age			
18-29	10.7 %	8.3 %	22.4 %
30-60	45.5 %	62.1 %	44.7 %
>60	30.3 %	29.6 %	23.8 %
(Mean on 3-point scale, 3 = >60)	2.22	2.13	2.02
Education			
Not a High School Graduate	2 %	3.3 %	12.9 %
High School Graduate	9.7 %	15.6 %	31.2 %
Some College, but No Degree	25.4 %	36.9 %	16.8 %
Associate’s or Bachelor’s Degree	33 %	24.6 %	28.5 %
Advanced Degree	28.3 %	19.6 %	10.5 %
(Mean on 5-point scale)	3.77	3.03	2.9
Household Income			
Less than \$15,000		5.5 %	13 %
Less Than \$20,000	7.2 %		
\$15,000 - \$24,999			11.9 %
\$15,000- \$29,999		10.7 %	
\$20,000 - \$34,999	10 %		
\$25,000 - \$34,999			11.1 %
\$30,000 - \$49,999		21.7 %	
\$35,000 - \$49,999	12.9 %		14.1 %
\$50,000 - \$74,999	20.4 %	22.5 %	20.6 %
\$75,000 - \$99,999	16.7 %	15.3 %	12.2 %
\$100,000 or more	31.1 %	24.3 %	20.1 %
Ideology			
Extremely Conservative	4 %	3 %	
Conservative	19.9 %	17 %	
Slightly Conservative	15.1 %	12 %	
Moderate, In the Middle	14.5 %	22 %	
Slightly Liberal	15.1 %	9 %	
Liberal	19.2 %	10 %	
Extremely Liberal	6.8 %	3 %	
(Mean on 7-point scale, 7 = Extremely Liberal)	4.07	3.77	
Party ID			
2008 Vote Cast for President Obama (Democrat)		65 %	52.9 %
Democrat	33.8 %	34.2 %	
Independent, Leans Democrat	15.9 %	10.6 %	
Independent	14.5 %	15.1 %	
Independent, Leans Republican	10.1 %	10.4 %	
Republican	24.3 %	29.8 %	
(Mean on 5-point scale, 5 = Republican)	2.76	2.9	
Region			
Northeast	20.5 %	16.9 %	18 %
Midwest	21.4 %	28.3 %	22 %
South	31.6 %	31.4 %	37 %
West	24.4 %	23.4 %	23 %

Note: Age and Party ID were aggregated on common components to generate comparable scales.

3.3 Results


3.3.1 *The Cost of Appeasement and Terrorism*

I begin by considering how government appeasement and terrorism affect approval of the U.S. President. Figure 3.1 shows the levels of leader approval at all outcomes of the terrorist crisis. The black lines above and below each point estimate are 95 percent confidence intervals.

As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, approval is high when the President does not make a concession, the attacks stop, and the leader receives praise from the opposition elites, a situation similar to the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In contrast, approval is low when the government makes a concession and when the aggrieved group executes a terrorist campaign against civilians. Averaging across all outcomes when the leader makes a concession, approval for the President is 29.6%. When the leader does not make a concession, approval is much higher for the President at 73.6%. Yet, the aggrieved group's decision to execute a terrorist campaign is also costly. If the President makes a concession and the group engages in more attacks, approval plummets by 12.8 percentage points (from 33.8% to 20.9%). If the President does not make a concession and the group engages in more attacks, approval declines by 13.3 percentage points (from 82.1 to 68.8%). All of these differences are highly significant at the 0.001 level.

On the open-ended portion of the survey, I asked respondents why they approved or disapproved of how the leader handled the crisis. Among those who approved of the prisoner release, the reason was almost always because it ended the current terrorist campaign. In the words of one respondent, "American safety is more important than one [prisoner]." For those who did not approve of concessions, the most common reason was overwhelmingly that it demonstrated weakness and would encourage future attacks. Other common reasons, though not

Figure 3.1. U.S. Presidential Approval in Coercive Terrorist Crisis



to the same extent, was that the United States should never negotiate with terrorists or the prisoner should not be released because he broke the law and thus should remain in prison.

To more formally test the hypotheses, I employ regression analysis. I model the binary measure of democratic leader approval as a function of the experimental manipulations and a series of demographic control variables – gender, age, education, income, perception of the national economy,⁴⁵ political ideology, partisanship, and respondent hawkishness. I calculated hawkishness according to a militarism disposition score based on how respondents answered the following four questions.⁴⁶ (1) Some people feel that in dealing with other nations the United States government should be strong and tough. Others feel that the U.S. government should be understanding and flexible. Which comes closer to the way you feel – that the U.S. government should be strong and tough or understanding and flexible? (2) Which do you think is the better way for us to keep the peace – by having a very strong military so other countries won't attack us, or by working out our disagreements at the bargaining table? (3) To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “The U.S. government should maintain its position as the world's most powerful nation, even if it means going to the brink of war.” (4) In your opinion, how important is it for the United States to have a strong military force in order to get our way with our adversaries? Respondents who answered “strong and tough,” “having a very strong military,” “agree strongly,” and “extremely important” for the four questions respectively had the highest militarism score (out of 14 possible points). Respondents who answered “understanding and flexible,” “working out our disagreements at the bargaining table,” “disagree strongly,” and

⁴⁵ Scholars have long found that perceptions of the national economy, so-called “sociotropic judgments,” often influence political attitudes. See Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Lau and Sears 1981; Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; Markus 1988; Mutz 1992, 1994; Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997.

⁴⁶ Hurwitz and Peffley (1988) have validated these questions as a good measure of militarism.

“extremely important” had the lowest militarism score. For simplicity, I deemed a respondent a “hawk” if they scored greater than 8. This threshold allows for individuals who answered “dovishly” on the first two questions, but demonstrated indifference on latter two questions to be counted as a dove. It also falls just below the sample mean of militarism, which was 8.9.

As is true with virtually all survey data, American respondents did not always answer every question in the questionnaire, which leads to a loss of valuable information and potentially could bias the estimates and inferences (King et al. 2001).⁴⁷ To account for these non-responses, I multiply imputed the missing values with a bootstrapping algorithm that imputes $m=5$ values for each missing cell in the data matrix, reflecting the uncertainty about the missing data.⁴⁸ By doing so, I was able to preserve all observations and avoid non-response estimation bias.

Table 3.3 provides the coefficient estimates and robust standard errors from three separate logistic regressions. The results demonstrate that each of the experimental manipulations have a strong statistically significant effect on approval, all in the expected direction. To interpret the substantive impact, Figure 3.2 provides the marginal effects for each of the main independent variables.⁴⁹ Controlling for all other variables, Model 1 reveals that a concession decreases approval of the President by 42 percentage points. Similarly, the group’s decision to execute a terrorist campaign decreases leader approval by 11 percentage points. Thus, the data provide overwhelming support for the *Concession Hypothesis* and the *Terrorist Campaign Hypothesis*.

⁴⁷ I have complete information on 93.5 % of the U.S. data.

⁴⁸ I used Amelia II to generate five imputed data sets with no missing records. See Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2009. Regression analysis without imputations does not affect the findings.

⁴⁹ I calculated all expected first differences by simulating changes in the expected value of each variable of interest while holding all other variables constant at their mean, $E(Y|X1)-E(Y|X)$. See King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000.

Table 3.3: Determinants of Approval in the United States

Explanatory Variable	Model 1 β / (SE)	Model 2 β / (SE)	Model 3 β / (SE)
Concession	-1.89 ^{***} (0.1)	—	-1.89 ^{***} (0.1)
Terrorist Campaign	-0.57 ^{***} (0.1)	-0.53 ^{***} (0.14)	-0.58 ^{***} (0.1)
Praise	0.19 [*] (0.09)	0.26 [*] (0.13)	0.02 (0.12)
Female	-0.32 ^{**} (0.1)	0.41 ^{**} (0.13)	-0.32 ^{**} (0.1)
Age	0.04 (0.05)	-0.19 ^{**} (0. 7)	0.03 (0.05)
Education	0.08 (0.05)	0.01 (0.07)	0.08 (0.05)
Income	-0.004 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.004 (0.03)
Economic Pessimism	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.04)
Ideology	-0.004 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.002 (0.03)
Militarism	0.1 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.14)	0.1 (0.11)
Incumbent Supporter	0.38 ^{**} (0.14)	0.25 (0.18)	0.38 ^{**} (0.14)
Opposition Supporter	-0.22 [·] (0.13)	-0.29 (0.18)	-0.44 ^{**} (0.17)
(Praise * Opposition)	—	—	0.4 [*] (0.18)
Intercept	0.7 [*] (0.35)	0.11 (0.47)	0.77 ^{***} (0.37)

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate logistic regression in which the dependent variable is the binary measure of presidential approval. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Model 2 only includes instances of presidential appeasement.

‘***’ p < 0.001; ‘**’ p < 0.01; ‘*’ p < 0.05; ‘·’ p < 0.1


An important extension to the current analysis is to consider who exactly supports the President when he or she makes a concession to extremist groups. Model 2 uses the same predictors as Model 1, but subsets the dataset to include only instances when the President makes a concession. Not surprising, the presence of a terrorist campaign decreases presidential approval by about the same magnitude as the previous model. In other words, populations will become outraged if the President makes a concession and attacks do not stop. The model also reveals, however, that military dispositions have no effect on approval. As Model 2 demonstrates, dovish voters are no more willing to consider appeasing terrorist groups than their hawkish counterparts. Thus, the *Military Disposition Hypothesis* is rejected.

It is also important to note that gender and age have a significant effect on respondent perceptions of appeasement. For a female, the odds of approving the President are 1.51 times higher than for a male approving. Similarly, young adults are more likely to approve of the President when he makes a concession than older Americans thereby suggesting a generational effect in the United States.

3.3.2 The Mediating Effect of Partisanship and Opposition Praise

Turning to the elite-cue hypotheses, the regression results in Model 1 demonstrate that partisanship and opposition praise play a very important role in shaping public perceptions in coercive terrorist crises. American respondents who support the President's party are 7.8% more likely to approve of presidential decision-making in the crisis. This swing in approval is nearly as large as the effect of a terrorist campaign. A Democratic respondent from California succinctly voiced the importance of partisanship on the open-ended portion of the survey that asked why they approved or disapproved of how the President handled the situation. He did not

Figure 3.2: Substantive Effects on Approval in the United States



approve of the President, even in the absence of government appeasement and a terrorist campaign, because of party politics. In his words, “I hate Republicans!” Thus, these findings provide strong support for the *Partisanship Hypothesis*.

The data also reveal that opposition praise provides leaders with a boost in popular support. Model 1 predicts that when the opposition responds favorably to the incumbent’s decision-making, leader approval increases by 4 percentage points in the United States. To better interpret these results, it is important to determine what constituency is most likely affected by opposition praise. As we have just seen, party alignment between the incumbent and respondent

provides an increase in approval across all crisis outcomes. Consequently, opposition praise is most likely affecting respondents who associate with the opposition party.

Model 3 reanalyzes the relationships in Model 1, but adds an important interaction variable: opposition praise multiplied by respondent party affiliation with the opposition. This variable tells us if opposition praise specifically affects individuals who affiliate with the opposition party or coalition. As the regression results demonstrate, the interaction variable is positive and statistically significant. Holding opposition praise constant, American respondents who affiliate with the opposition party are 8.1% more likely to approve of the President in all crisis outcomes. It is important to emphasize that this is a segment of a population generally unsupportive of the incumbent, and its aggregate effect largely depends on the proportional size of the opposition affiliates. Thus, an argument can be made that opposition praise is much more substantively important than its coefficient size suggests.

In addition, the data demonstrate that opposition praise operates in another very important way. It mediates public evaluations of government appeasement. Model 2 reveals that when the opposition praises the President when he or she makes a concession, the odds of a respondent approving the President are 1.3 times higher than when the opposition criticizes the President. This effect is especially strong when appeasement stops future extremist violence, which can be seen very clearly in Figure 3.1. If the leader makes a concession and the group does not engage in more attacks, approval of the President increases by 12.1 percentage points (from 26.5% to 38.6%). This result is highly significant at the 0.001 level. As an American female from Ohio put it, “The [opposition] leaders’ support did not fall on party lines but aligned for the greater good of the country.” Overall, these findings confirm the *Opposition Praise Hypothesis*.

Given the importance of opposition reactions in terrorist crises, it is important to consider when these elites have an incentive to praise the President. To get a handle on this issue, I asked respondents to gauge approval of how the opposition elites handled the crisis since they too are office-seeking. The data show four distinct patterns. First, the opposition has an incentive to praise the President when he makes a concession if it stops future terrorist violence. Opposition approval increased by 7.4 percentage points (from 31.2% to 39%) when they praised the President in this scenario. Second, the opposition has an incentive to criticize the President if the concession does not stop future. In this case, opposition approval decreased by 14 percentage points (from 37.4% to 23.3%). Third, the opposition has a large incentive to praise the President when he does not make a concession and terrorist violence stops. Here, opposition approval increased by 59.5 percentage points (from 10.4 to 70%). Lastly, the opposition does not have an incentive to criticize the President when he does not make a concession and the United States becomes the victim of a sustained terrorist campaign. Approval decreased by 55.5 percentage points (from 67.7% to 12.3%). These differences are all significant at the 0.05 level and beyond. Thus, the incentives of U.S. opposition elites are dependent on both the President's decision to appease extremists and whether attacks continue, but not quite in the way that the *Opposition Incentives with Attacks Hypothesis* and *Opposition Incentives with Appeasement Hypothesis* predict. If the President does not make a concession, the opposition should always praise the President even if it leads to a sustained terrorist campaign. If the President makes a concession, the opposition should only praise the President if it leads to a cessation of violence. If it does not, they should criticize. This follows the "hedging their bets" logic discussed in Chapter 2. Though, it is important to reiterate that this logic does not hold under all conditions.

3.3.3 The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in the United States


The data confirm that government concessions and terrorism are very costly to leaders in political terms, and at the same time, partisanship and elite cues mediate public reactions in coercive terrorist crises. This section now considers the extent to which terrorism is coercive in the United States. For terrorism to be coercive, a leader needs to have an incentive to make a concession to the aggrieved group. The costs of a terrorist campaign must outweigh the costs of government appeasement.

Figure 3.3 compares leader approval following a concession to leader approval following a terrorist campaign. The black lines above and below each point estimate are 95 percent confidence intervals. Averaging across all outcomes when the aggrieved group commits a terrorist campaign, approval for the President is 51.3%. Averaging across all outcomes when the American President makes a concession, approval is 30%. This difference of 21.3 percentage points is highly significant at the 0.001 level. Thus, American leaders do not face strenuous coercive pressure to make a concession to extremists.

This finding is robust, even when taking into account the possibility that a concession will end future violence. If the leader makes a concession and the group does not engage in more attacks, expected approval is 33.8% for the President. If the leader does not make a concession and the group engages in more attacks, approval is 68.8% for the President. Furthermore, taking opposition elite cues into account, approval following a concession, cessation of violence and opposition praise is still lower than approval following no concession, an escalation of terrorist violence and opposition criticism. This can be seen in Figure 3.1 by comparing the far left and far right columns.⁵⁰ What this demonstrates is that a commitment problem or the public's belief

⁵⁰ These differences are all highly significant beyond the 0.01 level.

Figure 3.3. The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in the United States



about the extremist group’s willingness to end the terror in exchange for a concession does not necessarily prevent leaders from granting concessions or negotiating with extremists. This outcome should occur anyway because approval of concessions is still comparatively lower than approval after a terrorist campaign even when terrorists credibly commit to a ceasefire.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter considered the consequences of coercive terrorism on public opinion in a strategic environment seldom exposed to terrorism. As this chapter demonstrates, the United States fits the bill as she has had sporadic terrorism throughout her history. Moreover, Americans largely view terrorism as an unusual phenomenon. From this perspective, it is not surprising that most

viewed terrorism as a new threat following the September 11 terrorist attacks. More than a decade since these heinous attacks, they still do not view terrorism as a major or imminent threat to their personal security.

The results from the U.S. experiment demonstrate that voter evaluations of leader performance are highly dependent on government concessions and intransigence, the level of terrorism, partisanship and the reactions of the opposition elites in parliament. A concession decreases presidential approval by 42 percentage points and a sustained terrorist campaign decreases approval by 11 percentage points, thereby supporting the *Concession Hypothesis* and *Terrorist Campaign Hypothesis*. American respondents who support the President's party are 8% more likely to approve of his decision-making across all crisis outcomes in support of the *Partisanship Hypothesis*. Opposition praise has a dramatic effect on public perceptions in terrorist crises, boosting public approval by 4 percentage points in the United States, thereby supporting the *Opposition Praise Hypothesis*. This effect is particularly strong in building support when a leader makes a concession. Moreover, opposition elites are incentivized by public opinion during terrorist crises. In particular, they have an incentive to praise the President when he does not concede to the demands of a terrorist group and when he makes a concession that stops future terrorist violence. Finally, and most importantly, there are no conditions that provide a strong political incentive for the President to make a concession to extremists even in the face of increasing violence. The next chapter turns to a strategic environment where the population is highly exposed to terrorism and political violence, Lebanon, to determine if public attitudes in coercive terrorist crises move in a similar way or present a stark contrast to the United States.

CHAPTER 4

Terrorism, Coercion, and Public Opinion in Lebanon

Rafiq al-Hariri, former Prime Minister of Lebanon, and Walid Jumblatt, the most prominent leader of the Druze community, used to debate which one of them would be the first to be assassinated.¹ Such discussions would seem like an exaggerated concern in most countries, but not in Lebanon. Since the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, terrorism had become an unfortunate and consistent phenomenon in the country's political culture. Indeed, fate would have it that Hariri would be the unlucky one. On 12 February 2005, a car bomb of around 1,000 kilograms exploded next to Hariri's motorcade in front of the St. George Hotel in west Beirut, killing the former Prime Minister and 21 others.

This chapter considers the extent to which terrorism generates coercive pressure on leaders through public opinion in a strategic environment highly exposed to terrorism, Lebanon. I begin by discussing Lebanon's turbulent contemporary history with respect to confessional politics and terrorism. I underscore that, while Lebanon had entered a period of relative stability following the Lebanese Civil War, politically motivated terrorism continues to be a serious threat to Lebanese security. In the next section, I present the survey design and methodology that I used to obtain a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Lebanese adults. I then report the results of the experiment and I explore the extent to which they differ from the United States.

¹ Michael Young, *The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon's Life Struggle* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 25.

4.1 Lebanon's Turbulent History

4.1.1 *Sectarianism and Civil Conflict*

Sectarianism and violence have stifled Lebanon's political development since her inception into the modern state system.² Following the San Remo Conference in 1920, the territory known as Greater Syria, which was formally part of the Ottoman Empire, became a mandate under French trusteeship. France immediately divided the territory into two separate states, Syria and Lebanon, and demarcated the borders of Lebanon to include the Syrian maritime coast, Tripoli in the north, Saida (Sidon) in the south, the Beqa'a Valley in the east, and Beirut as the capitol. The new geographical size created a precarious balance between the Christian and Muslim populations. Although it secured a Christian majority, which was the intention of France, it decreased their proportion to nearly one-half.

In 1926, Lebanon promulgated a democratic constitution that structured political power according to the principle of consociationalism, or "confessionalism" in the Lebanese context – the number of parliamentary seats needs to be proportional to the demographic size of each religious community. The government used the 1921 census, and later the 1932 census, to determine the number of representatives for each confession. From 1932 until 1972, the ratio of

² Even before statehood, Lebanon has been a unique experiment in multicultural and multireligious interdependence. Various confessional groups became dependent on foreign powers, including the Ottoman Empire, France, and Great Britain in order to resolve disputes and maintain the fragile political equilibrium. Moreover, the precarious balance between the sects led to major civil strife, as was the case with the 1860 Civil War. See Ussama Makdisi. *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000); and Hafeez Malik, "Lebanon as an Experiment in Multicultural Interdependence," in *Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Kail C. Ellis (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002), pp. 14-22.

Christian to Muslim seats in parliament was 6 to 5.³ In addition, the unwritten National Pact of 1943 necessitated that the Lebanese President needs to be from the Maronite community, the Prime Minister needs to be from the Sunni community, and the Speaker of Parliament needs to be from the Shi'i community.

The inflexibility of Lebanon's power sharing arrangement, in combination with the Palestinian refugee crisis that resulted from the 1948 War of Israeli Independence or Nakba (meaning "catastrophe" in Arabic), led to the eventual breakdown of Lebanese society.⁴ From 1975 to 1990, Lebanon underwent a devastating civil war that ravaged the population. Everyday life became riddled with targeted assassinations, kidnappings, robberies, and indiscriminate bombings and shootings. Throughout different phases of the conflict, Christians killed Muslims, Muslims killed Christians, Christians killed Christians, and Muslims killed Muslims. Moreover, Syrian and Israeli forces complicated things further. In 1976, Syrian troops entered Lebanon to curb the fighting in Damascus' favor. Likewise, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon (first in 1977, and later in 1982) in an attempt to stop Palestinian guerillas from launching raids into Israel, to convince the Lebanese government to take control of their state, as

³ It is important to note that the government has not taken another official census *even to this day* out of fear that it would delegitimize Christian dominance or greatly alter this power sharing arrangement.

⁴ In the wake of the 1948 war, approximately 100,000 Palestinian refugees, predominantly Sunnis, settled in Lebanon. The government did not offer citizenship or integrate the Muslim refugees into Lebanese society due to the sensitive demographic equilibrium. The isolated Palestinian refugee camps immediately became a hot bed of political activity and a staging ground for guerilla attacks into Israel. This prompted Israeli reprisal attacks targeting both the Palestinians for committing the attacks and the Lebanese government for not reigning in on the Palestinian guerillas. After the 1969 Cairo Agreement, the camps became *de facto* autonomous mini-states that fueled Lebanese resentment and suspicion over Palestinian grand designs for Lebanon.

well as an attempt to obtain a peace treaty with Lebanon. Israel remained in southern Lebanon until withdrawing in 2000. Syria continued to occupy the rest of Lebanon until 2005.

Throughout the 1980s, Lebanon became a lightning rod of terrorist activities. Lawlessness and anarchy allowed terrorist organizations, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Abu Nidal, to operate with complete impunity. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion, a radical Shi'i resistance movement called Hezbollah, meaning "Party of God," formed to defend Lebanon and act as an extended arm of Iranian foreign policy. Hezbollah was connected to the bombings of the U.S. embassy, the U.S. marine barracks, and the U.S. embassy annex between 1983 and 1984, which killed over 320 American servicemen. In addition, it was responsible for a series of kidnappings and executions of Westerners inside of Lebanon.

Beirut was also at the center of the infamous TWA 847 hijacking. In June 1985, Lebanese gunman affiliated with Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad hijacked a civilian airliner en route from Athens to Rome and diverted it to Beirut. The hijackers demanded the release of over 700 Arab prisoners held in Israeli jails, and they condemned U.S. operations in the Arab world, its financial aid to Israel, and the assassination attempt of Hezbollah's spiritual leader Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. Over the course of the standoff, the Boeing 727 shuttled back and forth between Algiers and Beirut exchanging several hostages for jet fuel. To demonstrate that the hijackers were serious about their demands, they shot passenger Navy Petty Officer Robert Stetham in the head and tossed his body onto the tarmac of the Beirut airport. On the third and final stop to Lebanon, the remaining hostages were taken to undisclosed locations in the Beirut suburbs. The hostages were eventually moved to Syria and released to U.S. custody on June 30. The following day, Israel released 300 Arab prisoners claiming that the decision to

free them had been made prior to the hijacking. The rest of the detainees were repatriated to Lebanon by September 10.⁵

In hope of ending the civil war, concerned Arab states intervened in 1989. The Arab League created the Tripartite High Commission, consisting of the leaders of Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. Under the auspices of the committee, 62 members of the Lebanese parliament reached an agreement in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia. According to the Ta'if Accord, Muslim-Christian representation in parliament would become equalized and the powers of the Maronite President would be greatly diminished – the cabinet would become the executive authority and the Sunni Prime Minister would become the single most important decision-maker, especially on foreign policy.⁶ In addition, all militias needed to disband and decommission their arms, with exception to Hezbollah because it was deemed as the protector against Israel.

The Prime Minister and commander of the Lebanese army at the time, Michel Aoun, rejected the agreement because it did not address the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. As a result, the Ta'if Accord was not immediately implemented and fighting continued for another year. Under the cover of the Persian Gulf crisis, the Syrians decisively routed General Aoun and forced him into exile. The Lebanese Civil War finally ended in October 1990, and Syria became the dominant

⁵ For an excellent discussion on these events, especially with regard to U.S. decision-making during the terrorist crisis, see David C. Wills, *The First War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy during the Reagan Administration* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), pp. 89-137.

⁶ Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, *Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and Change* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011): p.269. Also see Bassel F. Salloukh, "The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon," in *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: the Challenge of Globalization*, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Cairo: the University of Cairo Press, 2008), pp. 297-300.

power broker in Lebanese affairs for the next 15 years. Approximately 100,000 Lebanese were killed and 900,000 were displaced from their homes during the course of the civil war.⁷

4.1.2 Terrorism and Sectarianism in Post-Civil War Lebanon

Although Lebanon entered a new period of relative political stability, terrorism and sectarianism continued. The country weathered three major waves of political terrorism since 1990.⁸ The first wave occurred from November 1990 to March 1991 corresponding to operation Desert Storm in which 34 nations (including 9 Arab states) formed a coalition to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Saddam loyalists detonated over 25 bombs targeting embassies, banks and cultural centers affiliated with the countries in the coalition forces. The attacks caused severe property damage, but only a few casualties. At the end of this wave, there were two noteworthy attacks not connected to the Gulf War. On March 20, Lebanon's Defense Minister Michel Murr narrowly escaped a car bomb in Beirut that killed eight people and wounded 35 others. On March 29, another powerful car bomb exploded near an Armenian Orthodox church in Beirut, killing four people and wounding 22.

The second wave of terrorism corresponded to Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon between 1990 and 2000 as well as reverberations from the Lebanese Civil War. Rocket attacks, remote explosives and other retaliatory raids between Israel, its Lebanese proxy the South Lebanese Army, Palestinian guerillas, and Hezbollah often claimed the lives of civilians in the

⁷ "Background Note: Lebanon," The United States Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2011. Accessed 1 September 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm>.

⁸ Archives of major international news papers identified via Lexis Nexis and the Global Terrorism Database are the main sources for the data. See National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2012. Global Terrorism Database [GTD 1970-2008]. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.

south and the Beqa'a Valley, a territorial stronghold of Hezbollah. In addition, several attacks occurred unrelated to the Israeli presence. On 8 November 1991, a massive bomb exploded at the American University of Beirut, destroying the landmark administration building and clock tower, but causing no casualties. On 20 December 1991, a car bomb exploded on a crowded street in the Muslim district of Basta in Beirut, killing 30 people and wounding about 120. On 20 December 1993, an explosion ripped through the Christian Kata'ib (Phalange) Party headquarters in Beirut, killing 3 people and wounding 130 others. Then on 27 February 1994, a bomb detonated at a church in Jouniyeh, killing nine Sunday worshipers and wounding 53 others.

From 2004 to 2007, Lebanon underwent a third wave of terrorism in the form of political assassinations. The following list of high profile assassinations highlights how volatile Lebanon's political environment remains:

- 1 October 2004 – a 35 pound car bomb targeted Druze MP and Foreign Minister of Economy and Trade, Marwan Hamadeh. The attack killed his driver, but only seriously injured the minister.
- 14 February 2005 – a powerful car bomb exploded near the motorcade of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri killing him and 21 others, as well as injuring 100 people. Given the importance of this event in reshaping the political landscape of Lebanon, I will discuss it in more detail below.
- 2 June 2005 – a bomb exploded in the car of Samir Kassir, a columnist for the al-Nahar newspaper and vocal critic of the Syrian regime.

- 21 June 2005 – a car bomb killed George Hawi, a former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party and critic of Syria.
- 12 July 2005 – a bomb exploded next to the motorcade of the Deputy Prime Minister Elias Murr, killing one person and injuring 12 others.
- 12 December 2005 – a parked car exploded next to the vehicle of MP Jubran Tuwayni, killing him and 3 others.
- 21 June 2006 – unknown assailants gunned down Pierre Gemayel, a Lebanese cabinet minister and opponent to Syria.
- 13 June 2007 – a large car bomb killed MP Walid Eido and ten civilians, as well as injuring 11 others.
- 19 June 2007 – a car bomb explosion killed 7 people including Antoine Ghanem, a member of the Kata'ib party, and injured 56 others.
- 12 December 2007 – a 77-pound car bomb killed Brigadier General François al-Hajj and injured 6 others.

Although the above account highlights three idealized waves of terrorism, it is not exhaustive in fully characterizing Lebanon's turbulent environment. Other bombings and attacks targeted public, private, and government areas throughout the country at this time. Moreover, it is germane to mention two other violent episodes that do not neatly fit into the three waves. From July 12 to September 8, 2006, Israel and Hezbollah waged a devastating war against each other that killed 1,200 Lebanese (most of them civilian), injured 3,600, displaced 800,000, and

severely destroyed large parts of southern Lebanon and Beirut's eastern suburbs.⁹ Then from May 2007 to June 2007, the Lebanese army faced stiff resistance from Fatah al-Islam, a radical Salafist group with links to al-Qaeda, in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared just outside of Tripoli. Some Lebanese even suggest that Sunni political groups are aiding al-Qaeda linked groups in order to act as a counter-weight to Hezbollah.

4.1.3 The Hariri Assassination and Modern Lebanese Politics

The narrative so far has established that terrorism has been an integral part of Lebanon's history. Not only has it had a profound impact on the Lebanese consciousness, as I will demonstrate later, but it also has been a powerful factor in reshaping the contemporary politics in Lebanon. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri largely defines the current political landscape. Hariri was a prominent Sunni businessman who gained much of his wealth as a contractor in Saudi Arabia. Following the Lebanese Civil War, he became the Prime Minister, first from 1992 to 1998 and then from 2001 to 2004. Thus, he oversaw much of the post-civil war rebuilding of the country.

Hariri's biggest challenge was coordinating policy between Beirut and Damascus.¹⁰ Indeed, the relationship had been complicated. On the one hand, the Syrians needed Hariri to maintain an Arab consensus on the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Hariri was the Saudi Arabian confidant who would guarantee that consensus. On the other hand, Syria wanted to control Lebanese

⁹ Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, *A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 6th Ed. (New Jersey, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010), p. 375.

¹⁰ As discussed earlier, Syria had had troops in Lebanon since 1976 and had become the ultimate power broker in Lebanon since 1990.

decision-making from Damascus and attempted to block any overt expression of Lebanese sovereignty.¹¹

Tension between the two reached unprecedented levels in 2004. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad pressed for a constitutional amendment that would extend the term of the pro-Syrian President of Lebanon, Émile Lahoud.¹² Hariri firmly opposed the bill, and Syria was determined to change his mind through threats and intimidation. According to Walid Jumblatt, Assad threatened Hariri in an August meeting stating that “Lahoud is me, if you and Chirac want me out of Lebanon, I will break Lebanon.”¹³ The situation worsened after the United States and France co-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 on September 2. The resolution called for all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Damascus held Hariri directly responsible for UNSCR 1559 because he had sway over French President Jacques Chirac and arguably could have stopped the resolution. Despite the international effort, Syria ultimately prevailed. On September 3, a majority of parliament, including Rafiq al-Hariri, voted

¹¹ Young 2010, pp. 25-6.

¹² The Lebanese constitution stipulated that the president could only serve one six-year term, and al-Assad brazenly sought to amend it for his own political ends. By the end of his first term, Lahoud had major financial connections with the Assad family, and thus it would benefit both parties if he remained as President.

¹³ Young 2010, p. 26. New York Times reporter Neil MacFarquhar also documents this conversation. See Neil MacFarquhar, “Behind Lebanon Upheaval, 2 Men’s Fateful Clash,” *The New York Times*, 20 March 2005.

Accessed 23 August 2011.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/international/middleeast/20lebanon.html?ei=5094&en=441b692d8c0ef46a&hp=&ex=1111294800&partner=homepage&pagewanted=all&position>.

in favor of extending Lahoud's presidential term. The following month, Syria ordered the Prime Minister to resign, and shortly after he obliged.¹⁴

The relationship between Damascus and the former Prime Minister continued to unravel in the subsequent months. In December 2004, a small group of Lebanese politicians opposed to the Syrian occupation met at Le Bristol Hotel in Beirut. This "Bristol Gathering" consisted of traditionally anti-Syrian Christians, some formerly pro-Syrian allies, most prominent being Jumblatt, and several members of Hariri's Future Movement. On 2 February 2005, the Bristol Gathering demanded the complete withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon.¹⁵ Officially, Hariri remained neutral. But in the weeks before his assassination, he and his supporters began to voice support for the Bristol Gathering. Michael Young, the opinion editor for the *Daily Star* newspaper in Lebanon, argues that Assad feared what Hariri, backed by the international community, might do to Syrian domination in Lebanon. "[I]ts paranoia with regard to Lebanese Sunni mobilization, fortified by Christian and Druze antipathy, which risked giving the wrong ideas to Syria's own majority Sunni population ruled by a minority Alawite regime – all this made the former Prime Minister a premier target."¹⁶ Ten days later, Hariri was killed by a massive car bomb in west Beirut.

The Hariri assassination galvanized anti-Syrian sentiment and created the present political cleavage in Lebanon. In the following weeks, Martyrs Square in downtown Beirut became a tent

¹⁴Julia Choucair, "Lebanon's New Political Moment," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (March 2005).

¹⁵Nada Raad, "Opposition Demands Total Syrian Withdrawal from Lebanon," *The Daily Star*, 3 February 2005. Accessed 23 August 23 201. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Feb/03/Opposition-demands-total-Syrian-withdrawal-from-Lebanon.ashx#axzz1VtNr1ptO>.

¹⁶Young 2010, p. 26.

city for anti-Syrian protestors. Hezbollah initially remained neutral on the “Independence Intifada” or “Cedar Revolution” as it became to be known.¹⁷ Yet, the “Party of God” benefited from the Syrian occupation. It was the only militia allowed to retain its arms after the civil war. Damascus permitted the movement to maintain an independent and complex intelligence network. Moreover, areas controlled by Hezbollah became autonomous mini-states within the state. For these reasons, many observers suspected that Hezbollah was somehow responsible for the assassination. If it had not directly participated in the assassination, it certainly should have known about such an elaborate assassination plot.¹⁸

As opposition against Syria and Hezbollah grew, the Shi’i movement concluded that it needed to break the momentum of the Cedar Revolution. On March 8, Hezbollah organized a rally of hundreds of thousands of pro-Syrian protestors at Riad al-Solh Square, only a few blocks away from Martyrs Square. During the rally, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, publically thanked Syria for what it had done for Lebanon and “reminded” the international community that the Lebanese people wanted to safeguard their “historic and special ties with Syria.”¹⁹ On March 14, the anti-Syrian movement consisting of mainly Sunnis, Christians, and Druze responded with the largest rally in Lebanon’s history, calling for complete withdrawal of Syrian forces. Substantial pressure from the March 14th movement, in combination with help from the international community, forced Syria to withdraw in April 2005.

¹⁷ Adnan El-Ghoul, “Hizbollah Won’t Take Sides in Rift,” *The Daily Star*, 24 February 2005. Accessed 24 August 2011. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Feb/24/Hizbullah-wont-take-sides-in-rift.ashx#axzz1VtNr1ptO>.

¹⁸ Indeed, the UN Special Tribunal in Lebanon that investigated the assassination immediately implicated Syria and indicted four members of Hezbollah for their connection to the assassination in June 2011.

¹⁹ Young 2010, p. 51.

The March 8th and March 14th camps still define Lebanese politics today. The March 8th Alliance is pro-Syrian, anti-West, overwhelmingly Shi'i and led by Hezbollah. The March 14th Coalition is anti-Syrian, pro-West and Saudi Arabia, predominantly Sunni and led by the Future Movement, now under the leadership of Saad al-Hariri, the son of Rafiq al-Hariri. Although the Sunni-Shi'a rift best characterizes the March 8th and March 14th divide, other confessions have filtered into these camps. Two of these groups, the Maronites and the Druze, warrant further discussion due to their critical roles in Lebanese politics.

The Maronites, the largest Christian confession in Lebanon, had been anti-Syrian throughout the post-civil war period. The community, however, became divided after General Michel Aoun returned from exile in May 2005 and following the release of Samir Geagea from prison in July 2005. As mentioned earlier, Aoun is one of the most prominent politicians of the Maronite community. He was former commander of the Lebanese army, and following the constitutional crisis of 1988, he became the Prime Minister in violation of the National Pact, which reserved the position for a Sunni Muslim. In March 1989, Aoun declared a "liberation war" against the Syrian forces, but he was forced into exile in October 1990.²⁰ Within a year of his return, Aoun's political party, the Free Patriotic Movement, ironically sided with the March 8th Alliance, the bloc associated with Syrian and Iranian interests. Aoun most likely believed that siding with March 8 provided him the best chance of becoming the next president of Lebanon. It certainly helped to separate himself from his biggest Maronite political rival, Samir Geagea.

²⁰ This would not have been possible without American approval. In exchange for Syria's military support to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm, the United States agreed to give Syria a free-hand in Lebanon. Kail C. Ellis, "The Regional Struggle for Lebanon," in *Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Kail C. Ellis (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002), p. 38.

Geagea was the former head of the Lebanese Forces and, because of his anti-Syrian positions, was the only militia leader who did not receive amnesty as part of the post-war reconciliation process. After March 14 secured a majority of seats in the 2005 election, the government freed him from prison, and Geagea quickly joined the March 14th movement. As a result, the Maronite community split its support between him and Aoun. Thus, the Maronite community remains divided between the March 14th and March 8th coalitions.

Lastly, the Druze, a heterodox community with an exceptionally secretive system of religious beliefs that developed out of 11th century Ismailism, had been allies with Syria throughout the post-civil war period. Yet, Syrian arrogance over the Lahoud constitutional amendment angered prominent politicians from the Druze community, namely Jumblatt, the leader of the Socialist Progressive Party.²¹ Always keen on the changing political winds, Jumblatt joined the opposition and attended the Bristol Gathering. After the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, he brought the Druze into the March 14th Coalition.

Jumblatt stayed in the March 14th Coalition until the political winds once again began to change. On the international level, Saudi Arabia and the United States began to improve their relationship with Syria; and in March 2008, Britain, the Druze's strongest international ally, announced that she was willing to negotiate with Hezbollah's political wing. These moves sent a strong signal to the Druze leadership that they should also repair their relationship with Syria.

On the domestic level, Jumblatt worried about the rising power of Hezbollah and the possibility that the UN Special Tribunal in Lebanon (STL) would spark another civil war.²²

²¹ See Choucair 2005.

²² Michael Bluhm, "Analysts Attribute Jumblatt's Change of Heart to International shift toward Syria," 4 August 2009. Accessed 8 August 2011. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Aug/04/Analysts-attribute-Jumblatts-change-of-heart-to-international-shift-toward-Syria.ashx#axzz1VtNr1ptO>.

March 14 fervently supports the STL to uncover the truth about who assassinated Rafiq al-Hariri. Hezbollah condemns the STL as a western plot to undermine the party. As for the Druze community, they simply do not want to get caught in the middle of this Sunni-Shi'i tinderbox.²³ For example, Hezbollah fighters seized large parts of west Beirut and surrounded Jumblatt's compound in the Chouf Mountains in May 2008 while calling for a unity government. This show of force convinced Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri to give Hezbollah 11 of the 30 seats in his cabinet, enough to veto any policy unfavorable to the movement. Due these factors, the Druze leader formally switched from the March 14th Coalition to the March 8th Alliance in January 2010, bringing down the March 14th regime and replacing it with a March 8th government under the leadership of Prime Minister Najib Mikati.²⁴

To summarize, this section provided background on Lebanon's turbulent political history regarding terrorism and sectarianism. Although this young Arab nation entered a period of relative stability following the devastating civil war, violence and sectarianism still continue to affect her political development as a modern state. Just as I did in the United States, I asked Lebanese respondents how likely they thought that a terrorist attack would occur in Lebanon tomorrow. The results, presented in Table 4.1, demonstrate that the Lebanese do, in fact, perceive a heightened threat from terrorism as the above narrative suggests. One in three Lebanese believed that there would be an imminent attack in Lebanon. Recall only one in five Americans believed that an imminent terrorist attack was likely to occur in the United States. Thus, these data, in combination with the historical narratives, confirm that Lebanon is a fruitful

²³ Young 2010, p. 235. In June 2011, the STL indicted 4 members of Hezbollah renewing fear that the Sunni-Shi'a rift could erupt into conflict.

²⁴ The idea here is that the new government will prevent the STL from arresting members of Hezbollah, which has the potential to tear apart the country.

Table 4.1. Threat Perception of Terrorism in Lebanon

	All	March 14	March 8	Independent
Very Unlikely	36 %	34 %	40 %	37 %
Somewhat Unlikely	13 %	15 %	14 %	9 %
Neither Likely Nor Unlikely	9 %	7 %	9 %	7 %
Somewhat Likely	23.9 %	25 %	22 %	25 %
Very Likely	10.3 %	10 %	11 %	11 %

Lebanon Survey: In your opinion, what is the likelihood that there will be a major terrorist attack in Lebanon tomorrow?

case to understand the consequences of terrorism on public opinion and government decision-making in a violent and polarized political environment relative to other countries. The next section discusses the Lebanon survey experiment and the methodology that I used to obtain a large representative sample of the Lebanese adult population.

4.2 The Lebanese Survey Experiment

Following the same set up as the U.S. survey experiment, the questionnaire begins by telling respondents that “The following questions are about Lebanese foreign policy. You will read about a hypothetical situation similar to situations our country has faced in the past and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. I will describe one approach Lebanese leaders have taken and ask whether you approve or disapprove of that approach.”²⁵

All respondents were then presented the vignette about a deadly car bomb attack, this time in Lebanon, killing 10 people and injuring many others. They were shown the same image of a car


²⁵ Appendix B provides the full text of the Lebanon survey.

bombing that was shown in the United States to help increase the realism of the situation and evoke emotions related to coercive terrorist crises. The same perpetrator as before demands that the Lebanese government release one of its leaders from prison or it will commit more attacks. Likewise, all respondents received a description of immediate actions taken by the Lebanese Prime Minister, who is affiliated with the March 14th Coalition. “The Prime Minister, who is affiliated with the March 14th Coalition, immediately increased security at the Rafiq Hariri International Airport, government buildings and other major public spaces. The Prime Minister stated that additional intelligence and military resources would be brought to bear against this group and related threats.”

The respondents subsequently received the independently and randomly assigned treatments embedded in the vignette. In the first treatment, the Prime Minister does or does not concede to the perpetrator’s demand. Following this action the Prime Minister declares, “Lebanese citizens should go about their daily business. These measures will keep this country safe.” In the second treatment, the aggrieved group does not commit any more attacks, or it commits 9 additional attacks killing a total of 100 people within one year. This terrorist campaign is exactly the same magnitude as the U.S. survey experiment and, as the previous section demonstrates, still represents a significant campaign of violence in a very short period in Lebanon. In the final treatment, the political opposition, who is from the March 8th Alliance, either praises or criticizes the March 14th Prime Minister’s conduct of foreign policy. After reading the vignette, respondents are asked whether they approve or disapprove of how their leader handled the coercive terrorist crisis.²⁶

²⁶ Respondents gauged approval according to a 5 point ordinal scale. In the analysis below, I transform approval into a binary variable in which approval includes those who “strongly approve” and “somewhat approve.”

Figure 4.1. Distribution of Questionnaires (%) per Lebanese Qada



Information International, an independent regional research and consultancy firm based in Beirut, fielded the survey experiment from July 20 to August 05, 2011 on a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Lebanese adults. To obtain nationwide representation, the firm distributed the questionnaires across all 26 Lebanese Qadas or districts according to the number of registered voters and confessional distribution in each Qada as per the official statistics of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities for the year 2010. Figure 4.1 provides the percent of questionnaires distributed per Qada. Table 4.2 provides the distribution breakdown according to confession.

Table 4.2. Lebanon Survey Demographics

<i>Demographics</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Demographics (Cont'd)</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Female	48.1 %	Druze	5.5 %
		Catholic	5.2 %
		Armenian Orthodox	3 %
Age		Alawi	0.8 %
21-29	27.9 %	Armenian Catholic	0.7 %
30-60	64.9 %	Protestant	0.1 %
>60	7.2 %	Other	1 %
(Mean on 3-point scale, 3 = >60)	1.79		
Education		Ideology	
Illiterate	1.9 %	Extremely Conservative	6.2 %
Primary Education	9.9 %	Conservative	4.4 %
Intermediate Education	20.3 %	Slightly Conservative	5 %
Secondary School	25.5 %	Moderate, In the Middle	31.4 %
Vocational Studies/Technical School	5.2 %	Slightly Liberal	3.6 %
University (BA/BS)	30.8 %	Liberal	16.9 %
Graduate Studies (MA or Higher)	5.5 %	Extremely Liberal	28 %
(Mean on 7-point scale)	4.34	(Mean on 7-point scale, 7 = Extremely Liberal)	4.71
Household Income (Monthly)		Party ID	
Less than \$333	3.9 %	March 14 th Coalition	29.1 %
\$333 - 500	13.2 %	Independent, Leans March 14 th Coalition	4.1 %
\$501 - 1,000	30.3 %	Independent	25.5 %
\$1,001 - 1,500	23.2 %	Independent, Leans March 8 th Alliance	6.1 %
\$1,501 - 3,000	15 %	March 8 th Alliance	30.6 %
\$3,001 - 5,000	2.4 %	(Mean on 5-point scale, 5 = March 8 th Alliance)	2.91
\$5,000 or more	1.5 %	Region / Governorate	
Confession		Beirut	13.8 %
Shi'i	27 %	Békaa	16.3 %
Sunni	27 %	Mount Lebanon	24.1 %
Maronite	22 %	Nabatiyé	11.6 %
Greek Orthodox	7.7 %	North	23.1 %
		South	11.1 %

Note: A comparison with census data is not possible in Lebanon because the government has not taken a census since 1932. Political ideology does not have exactly the same meaning in Lebanon as it does in the United States.

Informational International adopted a multiple stage probability sample to ensure a truly randomized representative sample of households and respondents in Lebanon. The first stage involved selecting cities and villages in a way that accurately reflected the population size and confessional diversity. The second stage consisted of systematically selecting households at random in each neighborhood according to the estimated number of buildings in the neighborhood. The third stage involved selecting a primary respondent 21 years or older within each household based on the most recent birthday. If the relevant respondent was not home at the time of the interview, the fieldworker would return two times for a follow-up interview before declaring a non-response. In a few instances, cultural factors interfered with the selection methodology. For example, in some areas the head of the household refused to allow selected females to participate. The firm sampled 1,084 adults in order to obtain a sample of 1,000 adults with a gender distribution consistent with the voting-age population. In the fourth stage, the fieldworkers assigned each respondent one of the eight treatment groups according to a table of randomly generated numbers. This method ensured that every Lebanese adult had an equal chance of inclusion and placement into one of the treatment groups, with no one allowed to self-select into the sample. To account for non-responses in the survey, I multiply imputed the missing values using Amelia II.²⁷

4.3 Results

4.3.1 The Cost of Appeasement and Terrorism

Figure 4.2 provides a graphical summary of how terrorism, government concessions, and the reaction of the opposition elites affect leader approval ratings at each outcome of the coercive


²⁷ I have complete information on 97.5 % of the Lebanon data.

terrorist crisis. The percentage of Lebanese that approve of how the March 14th Prime Minister handled the terrorist crisis are within each bar graph. The black lines above and below each point estimate are 95 percent confidence intervals.

As was true in the U.S. survey experiment, approval is high when the leader does not make a concession, the attacks stop, and the leader receives praise from the opposition elites. Approval is low when the government makes a concession and when the aggrieved group executes a terrorist campaign against civilians. Averaging across all outcomes when the Lebanese Prime Minister makes a concession, approval is 25.4%. When the Prime Minister does not make a concession, approval is much higher at 70%. Yet, as before, the aggrieved group's decision to execute a terrorist campaign is also costly. If the Prime Minister makes a concession and the group engages in more attacks, approval plummets by 19.8 percentage points (from 33% to 13.5%). If he does not make a concession and the group engages in more attacks, approval declines by 14.2 percentage points (from 78.5% to 64.3%). All of these differences are highly significant at the 0.001 level.

On the open-ended portion of the survey, I asked respondents why they approved or disapproved of how the Prime Minister handled the situation. Among those who approved of the prisoner release, the reason was almost always because it ended the current terrorist campaign. In the words of one respondent, he supported the Prime Minister's decision because "if the terrorist stays in prison more attacks will occur." For those who did not approve of a concession, the most common reason had to do with the inherent quality of making a concession – that is, giving up something that he or she preferred to possess. In particular, the Lebanese emphasized justice, explaining that if the individual broke the law then he needs to be punished by the law. In most cases, respondents bluntly called for the prisoner to be "executed" without question. The

Figure 4.2. Lebanese Prime Minister Approval in Coercive Terrorist Crisis



second most common explanation, however, followed closely to that given in the United States. The Lebanese emphasized that releasing the prisoner showed weakness and encouraged other terrorist organizations to commit terrorist attacks in Lebanon.

To further test the hypotheses, I employ logistic regression analysis by which the binary measure of democratic leader approval in the coercive terrorist crisis is a function of the experimental manipulations as well as several demographic control variables – gender, age, education, income, perceptions of the national economy, political ideology, and partisanship.²⁸ Table 4.3 reports the coefficient estimates and robust standard errors. The results reinforce the findings in the United States. Each of the randomizations has a strong statistically significant effect on approval all in the expected direction. To interpret the substantive impact of these variables, Figure 4.3 provides the marginal effects for each of the main independent variables. Controlling for all other variables, Model 1 reveals that a concession decreases approval of the Lebanese Prime Minister by 47 percentage points. Similarly, the extremist group’s decision to execute a terrorist campaign decreases leader approval by 16 percentage points. Thus, the data once again provide overwhelming support for the *Concession Hypothesis* and *Terrorist Campaign Hypothesis*.

Considering the strong effect of a government concession on public approval, it is once again germane to consider who is most likely to support a leader who appeases terrorist demands. Model 2 subsets the data to include only incidents of when the Prime Minister makes a concession. This analysis provides several key insights. First, as was true in the United States, individuals become angry if their government makes a concession and the aggrieved group still

²⁸ In this case, I was unable to test for dispositions of militarism. Nevertheless, the U.S. case demonstrates that such concerns had no bearing on public evaluations of the terrorist crisis.

Table 4.3: Determinants of Approval in Lebanon

Explanatory Variable	Model 1 β / (SE)	Model 2 β / (SE)	Model 3 β / (SE)
Concession	-2.33 ^{***} (0.17)	—	-2.36 ^{***} (0.18)
Terrorist Campaign	-0.94 ^{***} (0.17)	-1.2 ^{***} (0.26)	-0.95 ^{***} (0.17)
Praise	0.55 ^{***} (0.15)	0.82 [*] (0.22)	0.2 (0.19)
Female	-0.19 (0.1)	-0.62 ^{**} (0.21)	-0.17 (0.15)
Age	0.01 [*] (0.006)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 [*] (0.006)
Education	0.13 [*] (0.06)	0.06 (0.08)	0.14 [*] (0.06)
Income	0.01 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.1)	0.01 (0.07)
Economic Pessimism	-0.11 [*] (0.05)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.11 [*] (0.05)
Ideology	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)
Incumbent Supporter	0.83 ^{***} (0.14)	0.62 (0.29)	0.83 ^{***} (0.2)
Opposition Supporter	-0.01 (0.19)	-0.01 (0.3)	-0.48 [•] (0.24)
(Praise * Opposition)	—	—	0.92 ^{**} (0.31)
Intercept	0.35 (0.53)	-1.64 [*] (0.74)	0.56 (0.53)

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate logistic regression in which the dependent variable is the binary measure of approval. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Model 2 is subsetted by concession.

‘***’ $p < 0.001$; ‘**’ $p < 0.01$; ‘*’ $p < 0.05$; ‘•’ $p < 0.1$


engages in a deadly terrorist campaign. Under this scenario, approval decreases by 19 percentage points. Secondly, gender has a strong effect on public approval, but in a different direction than in the United States. Women in Lebanon have a strong abhorrence to government appeasement relative to men. Specifically, changing gender from a man to a woman decreases approval by 10.2%. Thus, if there is a bias or a convention against granting a concession to extremists who employ terrorist tactics, it holds stronger for women than men in Lebanon. Lastly, opposition praise has a strong independent effect on support for concessions, increasing approval by 14 percentage points, an issue that will be discussed in the next section.

4.3.2 The Mediating Effect of Partisanship and Opposition Praise

Turning to the elite-cue hypotheses, the results in Table 4.3 demonstrate that coalition affiliation and opposition praise play a very important role in shaping public opinion in coercive terrorist crises. First, individuals who affiliate with the ruling coalition are much more likely to approve of the Prime Minister irrespective of how the crisis situation unfolds. Approval for the March 14th Prime Minister increases by 15% if an individual affiliates with the March 14th Coalition, an effect nearly as large as a sustained terrorist campaign. Several respondents succinctly voiced the importance of coalition affiliation on the open-ended portion of the survey. One male respondent from Zahlé stated that “Everything March 14 does serves the benefit of Lebanon.” Another respondent, a female from Tripoli, put it in even more straight forward terms, “We are with March 14 to death, even if they are wrong!” Thus, these data confirm the *Partisanship Hypothesis*.

Second, opposition praise for the Prime Minister provides a large boost in public support. Approval *increases* by 10 percentage points when the March 14th Prime Minister received praise

Figure 4.3. Substantive Effects on Approval in Lebanon



from the leaders of the March 8th Alliance. To better interpret this result, we must keep in mind what constituency opposition praise likely affects. Since party alignment between the Prime Minister and the respondent has a strong relationship irrespective of opposition praise, it is safe to say that this variable is not influencing affiliates of the incumbent coalition. Rather, opposition praise most likely affects supporters of the opposition coalition bloc. As one March 8th supporter from Tyre expressed, “I’m with Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.”²⁹

²⁹ Recall that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah is the leader of Hezbollah, the strongest party in the March 8th Alliance.

As I did with the U.S. data, Model 3 reanalyzes the relationships in Model 1, but adds the interaction variable opposition praise *multiplied by* support for the opposition coalition. The regression coefficient is positive, which demonstrates that opposition praise specifically affects the attitudes of individuals who affiliate with the opposition coalition. In fact, they are 15% more likely to approve of the March 14th Prime Minister when he receives praise from the leaders of the March 8th Alliance. Remember, this is a segment of a population that is generally hostile to the incumbent coalition, and its effect largely depends on the proportional size of the opposition affiliates. Thus, this variable is much more substantively important than its coefficient size suggests.

Third, the data reveal that opposition praise matters most when a leader makes a concession. Approval for a leader who makes a concession and receives opposition praise is 43%. Approval for a leader who makes a concession, but does not receive support is 24%. As a result, opposition praise provided a bump of 19 percentage points for the Prime Minister ($p < 0.001$). One Lebanese female from the Baqa'a Valley who affiliates with the March 8th Alliance expressed this sentiment. She supported the March 14 Prime Minister simply because "March 8 agreed with him." Another female respondent from El Metn explained that, "I generally agree with March 14, and what the March 8th leaders declared is a start for stability in Lebanon, where both sides can finally agree." Overall, these findings provide strong support for the *Opposition Praise Hypothesis*.

Now that I have established the political incentives of the Lebanese Prime Minister, it is important to turn to the political incentives of the opposition elites. When does public opinion motivate elites to praise or criticize the Prime Minister's decision-making in a coercive terrorist crisis? To get a handle on this issue, I gauged public approval of how the opposition elites


handled the situation. Just as in the United States, the results confirm that public opinion creates political incentives for the opposition that limits their freedom of reaction. This is not conditional on whether violence escalated, but rather on the basis of whether the Prime Minister makes a concession. The Lebanese population vehemently opposed March 8th elites criticizing the Prime Minister when he did not make a concession and attacks continued; approval was at 24 percent. As one female affiliate of March 8th from Tripoli explained, “There is no space for criticism because the criminal must be eliminated.” Compare that to how the Lebanese population reacted to opposition praise in the same exact scenario; approval was at 66.7 percent. A comparable outcome occurs when a Prime Minister makes a concession and attacks stop. March 8th leaders received only 36% approval when they praised the Prime Minister for stopping the attacks with a concession, and obtained 54.7% when they criticized him. In short, this finding supports the *Opposition Incentives with Appeasement Hypothesis*.

4.3.3 *The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in Lebanon*

Now we turn to the most pressing question: to what extent is terrorism effective at generating coercive pressure in Lebanon? For terrorism to be coercive, it must be the case that the Prime Minister has an incentive through public opinion to make a concession. Figure 4.4 compares leader approval following a concession to leader approval following a terrorist campaign. The black lines above and below each point estimate are 95 percent confidence intervals.

Averaging across all outcomes when the aggrieved group commits a terrorist campaign, approval for the Lebanese Prime Minister is 44%. Averaging across all outcomes when the Prime Minister makes a concession, approval is 25.4%. This difference of 18.6 percentage


Figure 4.4. The Coercive Effectiveness of Terrorism in Lebanon



points is highly significant at the 0.001 level. Therefore, as was the case in the United States, Lebanese leaders do not face strenuous coercive pressure to make a concession to extremists.

This finding holds even when taking into account the possibility that a concession will end future violence. If the leader makes a concession and the group does not engage in more attacks, expected approval is 33.3% for the Lebanese Prime Minister. If the leader does not make a concession and the group engages in more attacks, approval is 64.3% for the Lebanese Prime Minister. Furthermore, taking opposition elite cues into account, approval following a concession, a cessation of violence and opposition praise is still lower than approval following no concession, an escalation of terrorist violence and opposition criticism. Thus, a commitment problem does not seem to be the issue in Lebanon or the United States. Approval of

Figure 4.5. The Costliness of Terrorism in Lebanon and the United States



concessions after a group credibly commits to a ceasefire is still comparatively lower than approval of no concession and escalation of the terrorist campaign.

Finally, it is important to make a comparison between the costliness of a terrorist campaign in Lebanon to that in the United States. While Americans and the Lebanese both disapprove of concessions more than a terrorist campaign, Figure 4.5 reveals that a terrorist campaign is more unpopular in Lebanon than in the United States. Averaging across all outcomes with a terrorist campaign, approval for the Lebanese Prime Minister is 44% and approval for the American President is 51.3%, a difference of 7.3 percentage points ($p < 0.01$). This confirms that populations highly exposed to terrorism, like in Lebanon, seem to become sensitized to it. Testing these effects more formally with regression analysis provides a more incomplete picture, however. The coefficient for attacks in Lebanon (-0.94) is larger than the United States (-0.57),

but the confidence intervals overlap. This comparison can be seen more clearly by comparing the substantive effects of a terrorist campaign in the United States (Figure 3.2) and in Lebanon (Figure 4.3). Thus, the *Terrorism Fatigue Hypothesis* is partially accepted and the *Desensitization Hypothesis* is rejected.

4.4 Discussion

Overall, the results from the experiments demonstrate that voter evaluations of leader performance are highly dependent on government concessions and intransigence, the level of terrorism, prior population exposure to terrorism, partisanship, and the reactions of the opposition elites. These factors structure the incentives of leaders in coercive terrorist crises. They also help to reveal the effectiveness of terrorism as a coercive strategy.

Current research on coercive terrorism tends to focus on the costliness of terrorist violence or the costliness of concessions without fully exploring how both mechanisms simultaneously structure leader incentives through public opinion. This experimental research sought to bridge these approaches into one analytical framework. It finds that, as expected, both factors negatively affect leader approval in coercive terrorist crises. Yet, it sheds light on what is more costly. The costs of appeasement far outweigh the costs of a terrorist campaign. Thus, terrorism is not a very effective coercive strategy, and its impact on government policy should not be as large as commonly thought.

Three important caveats warrant further discussion. First, although the experiments did not reveal any condition by which terrorism can be said to be coercive, it does not mean that terrorism can never be coercive. Theoretically, there could have been a much more dramatic effect on public opinion if a terrorist campaign was more destructive than what was described in

the survey vignettes. If we assume, for instance, a linear impact on public opinion, the experimental results suggest that it would take a terrorist campaign three times more intense in Lebanon and four times more intense in the United States before the costs of terrorism surpass the costs of concessions. If the effect of each terrorist attack monotonically decreases (i.e. diminishing marginal returns), it would take substantially more attacks.³⁰ While this may be possible, even the most powerful terrorist organizations lack the capability or reach to produce such chaos.³¹ The historical record simply does not present a parallel scenario. At the very least this research reveals that the costs of a very intense and plausible terrorist campaign do not exceed the costs of government appeasement in both Lebanon and the United States.

Second, terrorism could be coercive if the costs of appeasement are somehow diminished. As the experimental results indicate, terrorism is still costly for leaders, and it very well could be the difference between a leader winning and losing an election (Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008). Consequently, it is in their political interest to prevent a terrorist campaign from happening, and a concession may be one way to do that if the costs of appeasement are low enough. It might be possible, for example, to spin the policy of appeasement and make it seem that the government is not relinquishing to terrorist threats. A government might also be able to hide a concession from the public eye, which may help to explain why terrorist groups often do not issue public demands. Many concessions, however, are difficult to spin or keep quiet, especially if it involves major shifts in foreign policy, such as the redeployment of military troops. Well-known terrorist groups, the type that would have the capability to execute a sustained terrorist campaign,

³⁰ Investigation into the cost functions of terrorism is a promising avenue of future experimental research.

³¹ Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups, however, would dramatically change this calculation (Allison 2004).

probably could not hide their demands even if they wanted to by the mere fact that they are known. Moreover, it is doubtful that terrorist groups would not want to publicize their victory as a way to help with membership recruitment (Lake 2002; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). If the public were to learn that a concession was in fact made, it would become a clear political liability and the opposition would likely seize on this vulnerability.

Third, although most citizens learn about a terrorist incident through the media, as the experiments capture, respondents did not have the option to learn about the crisis through alternative channels. For instance, witnessing an attack in person or losing a loved one in the incident may generate reactions different than those produced by learning about the event from the media (Hayes and McAllister 2001). Likewise, government reactions to the terror, such as increased security at public spaces or surveillance of citizens, could affect public evaluations of the government if they actually have to bear those costs. Expanding the analysis to investigate how these factors simultaneously impact leader approval provides a promising area for future research, albeit impossible to study through experimental design.

It is also important to emphasize the significant role of partisanship and the reactions of the opposition elites in shaping public attitudes in coercive terrorist crises. Coalition alignment between voters and the incumbent guarantees some approval even if there is an escalation of violence or if the leader makes a concession. Similarly, opposition praise provides a boost in approval, especially when leaders accommodate the demands of the aggrieved. This demonstrates that beliefs, particularly toward appeasement, are malleable, and they are not uniformly distributed across individuals. This finding, for example, might help to explain Israeli attitudes toward the 2011 agreement between Hamas and Israel to exchange over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for Gilad Shalit, a captured Israeli soldier held in Gaza since June 2006.

The political elites on the right and left were nearly united in support of the deal, and Israeli public opinion reflected this sentiment. In a poll conducted by the Dahaf Institute, 79% of Israelis supported the prisoner exchange and only 15% opposed it (Ynetnews 2012).

Finally, the findings make a significant contribution to our understanding of public opinion in international crises. “Rally-round-the-flag” events are common outcomes following instances of acute violence, such as the September 11 terrorist attacks. This outcome, however, is far from a foregone conclusion. The decisions of the incumbent government, the aggrieved challenger, and the opposition elites during the conflict process all contribute to whether the masses will rally or become utterly disapproving of their leaders. In fact, the results of the experiments indicate that the event-based variables, particularly the reaction of the government, may matter the most. This conclusion differs from that of scholars who emphasize that rally events are solely the product of the decision of opposition elites to support the incumbent’s decision-making in the crisis.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter considered the consequences of coercive terrorism on public opinion in a strategic environment highly exposed to terrorism. Lebanon is a prime example because it has been the epicenter of horrible bouts of terrorism for more than 35 years. Indeed, this strategic environment has influenced the public’s threat perception of terrorism. The Lebanese are much more likely to expect an imminent attack in Lebanon than their counterparts in the United States.

Interestingly, the results from the Lebanese experiment reinforce many of the findings from the experiment in the United States. Voter evaluations of leader performance are highly dependent on government concessions and intransigence, the level of terrorism, the strategic environment regarding prior population exposure to terrorism, partisanship and the reactions of

the opposition elites. A concession decreases approval of the Lebanese Prime Minister by 47 percentage points and a sustained terrorist campaign decreases approval by 16 percentage points, thereby supporting the *Concession Hypothesis* and *Terrorist Campaign Hypothesis*. Moreover, the data reveal that the costs of a terrorist campaign on approval are 7.3 percentage points higher in Lebanon, a high exposure case, than the United States, a low exposure case. This difference, however, could not be confirmed with regression analysis. Thus, the *Terrorism Fatigue Hypothesis* is partially accepted.

Public perceptions are also highly shaped by elite cues. Lebanese respondents who support the Prime Minister's coalition are 15% more likely to approve of government decision-making across all crisis outcomes confirming the *Partisanship Hypothesis*. Similarly, opposition praise boosts public approval by 10 percentage points in Lebanon thereby supporting the *Opposition Praise Hypothesis*. This effect is particularly strong in building support when a leader makes a concession. Unlike in the United States, however, opposition elites do not have an incentive to praise the Prime Minister when he concedes to the demands of a terrorist group if it stops future terrorist violence. This finding supports the *Opposition Incentives with Appeasement Hypothesis*.

In conclusion, the factors identified in chapter 2 structure the incentives of leaders in terrorist crises. They also help to reveal the effectiveness of terrorism as a coercive strategy. Overall, there are no conditions that provide a strong political incentive for leaders to make a concession to extremists even in the face of increasing violence. The next two chapters take these insights and apply them to the world's longest ongoing disputes in modern history, the Arab-Israeli conflict. In doing so, they will shed light one of the most important questions regarding coercive terrorism: to what extent can terrorism sabotage a peace process?

CHAPTER 5

Terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

On 13 September 1993, President Bill Clinton welcomed Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat at the historic signing ceremony of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government.¹ In his opening remarks he praised the Israeli and PLO leaders for their mutual agreement toward reconciliation and declared that a “peace of the brave is within our reach.” He also reflected on the tragic legacy of violence, which for too long characterized the relations between the Arab and Jewish people in the Middle East. “Throughout this century, bitterness...has robbed the entire region of its resources, its potential, and too many of its sons and daughters,” he said. “The land has been so drenched in warfare and hatred, the conflicting claims of history etched so deeply in the souls of the combatants there, that many believed the past would always have the upper hand.”

Clinton’s observation complements an important argument made in the previous chapters – memories of, and frequent exposure to, violence has the potential to affect future attitudes, especially on issues that pertain to war and peace. This chapter aims to demonstrate the first part of this story, that Israel is a prototypical high exposure environment to terrorism. The previous findings strongly suggest that the negative effect of terrorism on government approval ratings should be the highest in such strategic environments. Thus, this case acts as an empirical upper bound on the coercive effectiveness of terrorism in a non-experimental setting. The next chapter

¹ William Jefferson Clinton, “Remarks at the Signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement,” 13 September 1993. Accessed 20 June 2013. <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3925>.

will then return to the central question. To what extent did Palestinian extremists, who are operating in this high exposure environment, sabotage the Oslo Peace Process?

Because the focus will be on how Palestinian terrorism influenced Israeli attitudes toward the peace process, this chapter exclusively examines the Israeli experience with terrorism. Of course, there is another side to the narrative presented here. Palestinians also have been victims of Jewish extremism and state retaliatory actions, and the occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank has created tremendous hardships for Palestinians on a daily basis. These points are incredibly salient for understanding why peacemaking has been so difficult in this part of the world, but they remain outside the scope of this project.

5.1 The Origins of Conflict and Early Terrorism

Terrorism and other forms of violence have plagued the Holy Land for more than 100 years as a product of the Arab-Zionist conflict. Beginning in the 19th century in response to escalating anti-Semitism in Europe, Zionism was a nationalist movement that sought a homeland for the Jewish people. Palestine, which was controlled by the crumbling Ottoman Empire at the time, was a natural focal point because of the strong historic and religious connection to the land. The local Arab population, however, overwhelmingly outnumbered the Jewish population, and they sought to retain the Arab and Muslim character of the region. As Zionist pioneers began to buy land and immigrate to Palestine, the demographic balance started to change and the Arab population became afraid and highly suspicious of Jewish intentions.²

² On early Arab reactions to Zionism, see Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976).

Arab attacks against the Jewish population were fairly uncommon in this early period. Between 1881 and 1908, a reported 13 Jews were killed by Palestinian Arabs. Yet, the number of casualties grew over the next five years as Jewish settlements came under increasing attack.³ By 1913, violence had become routine in the north of Palestine and began to spread to the center and south of the country because of a lack of centralized authority. These early attacks were not “political” in the sense of being organized or part of a campaign. While they reflected resentment of the Jewish settlers, they were largely spontaneous and with local causes.⁴

The situation in Palestine intensified dramatically following World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France agreed to divide the Ottoman territory, and following the Treaty of Sévres of August 1920, and later ratified by the League of Nations in November 1922, Palestine became a British mandate. London would administer the territory like a trust under the supervision of the League of Nations until the inhabitants were deemed capable of independence and self-government.

The British takeover of Palestine initially delighted the Zionists because London endorsed the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine as indicated in the 1917 Balfour Declaration.⁵ For the same reason, the Arab population was outraged and resisted any British action that appeared to help the Zionist cause. As a result, rioting and violence broke out in the mandate. The first major episode occurred in 1920. Palestinian Arabs attacked several Jewish settlements in the Galilee region and anti-Jewish riots spread to Jerusalem. Then in 1921, the violence reached

³ Morris 2001, p. 59.

⁴ Mandel 1976, p. 217.

⁵ Arthur James Balfour, “The Balfour Declaration,” 2 November 1917, in *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi (Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 21-22.

Jaffa, Petach Tikvah, Hadera, and other Jewish communities throughout Palestine. 47 Jews and 48 Arabs died in the skirmishes and scores were wounded.⁶

In August 1929, communal violence broke out again in Jerusalem after right wing Zionists demanded Jewish control over the Western Wall (also known as “Wailing Wall”), the last remaining remnant of the Second Temple.⁷ While this event was certainly provocative, the British inquiry commission led by Sir Water Shaw found that “There can, in our view, be no doubt that racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment of their national political aspirations and fear for the economic future, was the fundamental cause of the outbreak of August last.”⁸ The rioting quickly spread to Tel Aviv, Haifa, Safad, and Hebron, and by the time the British restored order, 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded. On the Arab side, 116 were killed and 232 were wounded.⁹

London’s inability to satisfy Arab and Jewish demands in the mandate encouraged radicals in each community to take more drastic action. In the early 1930s, several Arab secret fighting societies formed, including Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas (Army of the Holy Struggle) headed by ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini, and al-Kaff al-Aswad (the Black Hand) headed by the fiery cleric Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam. On 15 April 1936, a Qassamite gang of armed Arabs set up a

⁶ Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, *A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Boston, MA: Prentice Hall, 2010), p. 48.

⁷ Morris 2001, p. 113.

⁸ “Report of the Shaw Commission” March 1930, in *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi (Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 67-69.

⁹ Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 235-236.

roadblock east of Tulkarm and shot dead two Jewish drivers and wounded another. In retaliation, members of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, a militant group of revisionist Zionists who called for a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan River, drove up to a shack near Petack Tikva and killed two Arab occupants. These events sparked a series of incidents by which Arabs and Jews attacked one another, looted, and set fire to each other's shops and homes. Soon the disturbances spread across Palestine (mainly targeting the British), and Arab groups and national committees started to organize major strikes and engaged in other forms of civil disobedience, such as nonpayment of taxes and the shutting down of municipal governments. This uprising is known as the "Great Arab Revolt" because it became the biggest and most protracted uprising against the British in any country of the Middle East. Between 1936 and 1939, several hundred Jews were killed and some property was damaged, but no Jewish settlement was destroyed.¹⁰

The British attempted to resolve the source of Arab and Jewish violence at the time, but to no avail. For instance, in 1937, the British sent Lord Robert Peel to investigate the cause of the Great Arab Revolt. Finding that the Arab-Zionist conflict was insoluble within the framework of one state ("a scheme of cantonization") and that the mandate was unworkable, the Peel Commission Report was the first to recommend that Palestine be partitioned into separate Jewish and Arab states.¹¹ The Jewish side was cautiously open to the idea because it would allow asylum for beleaguered Jews of Europe, particularly from Germany. The Arab side, however, insisted that Palestine was indissolubly Arab and rejected the Peel Commission proposal.¹²

¹⁰ Morris 2001, pp. 126, 155-160.

¹¹ "Report of the Palestine Royal Commission ('Peel Commission')," 7 July 1937, in *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi (Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 99-100.

¹² Tessler 1994, p. 244.

In 1938, the British once more reevaluated their Palestine policy. They concluded that partition was untenable, and worried that the creation of a Jewish state would push the Arabs, who already had shown sympathy toward fascism and anti-Semitism, into the arms of Nazi Germany and Italy in the event of another great war.¹³ On 17 May 1939, the British issued a White Paper proposing a ceiling of 75,000 Jewish immigrants for five years, and thereafter all immigration would require Arab agreement. Moreover, it limited Jewish land purchases and called for an independent Palestinian state with majority rule within ten years.¹⁴ The Zionists were outraged because the policy was a full reversal from the Balfour Declaration, as it effectively abandoned the idea of a Jewish state. The Arabs were also unhappy because it did not fully stop Jewish immigration or end the British occupation.

As it turned out, World War II greatly complicated the future of the mandate beyond what the British could have imagined. During the course of the war, approximately 6 million European Jews had been systematically murdered by Nazi Germany. By 1946, there were an astounding 250,000 Jews living in displaced persons camps. Two Anglo-American committees attempted to tackle the refugee problem in the aftermath of the war, but London rebuffed any recommendation to move Jewish refugees to Palestine, as they believed it would destabilize the situation even further.

Because no settlement could be reached under British leadership, London concluded that the Palestine question needed to go before the newly established United Nations. In 1947, the majority report of United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended that

¹³ Morris 2001, p. 155.

¹⁴ “The British White Paper (‘MacDonald White Paper’), 17 May 1939, in *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi (Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 111-112.

the mandate be partitioned into Arab and Jewish states.¹⁵ Although the Jewish leadership welcomed this proposal, the Arabs rejected it because, in their view, the report equated the claims of new Jewish immigrants to the Arabs who had ancestors living there for hundreds of years.¹⁶ With little room to negotiate on these terms, and because the costs of governing the mandate were unbearable as massacres, rioting, and Arab and Jewish terrorism escalated, the British decided to unilaterally withdraw from Palestine. On 14 May 1948, as the British made their final preparations to depart, Ben Gurion, the most important Zionist leader in Palestine at the time, proclaimed the State of Israel. The following day, the neighboring Arab states sent in their armies, commencing the first Arab-Israeli war.

It is outside the scope of this project to account for every aspect of the Israeli War of Independence (also known as the Nakba or “catastrophe” in Arabic). Historians continue to disagree on the claims made by both sides. For our purpose, it is sufficient to note the consequences of the Israeli victory. The Jewish people finally had a state of their own consisting of the coastal plain of Palestine and the Negev Desert. For the first time in modern history, Jews from around the world could freely immigrate to the Holy Land, which was especially important for Sephardic Jews who would be expelled from many Middle Eastern countries after the war. The territorial transfers were significant on the Arab side as well. Egypt took control of the Gaza Strip and Transjordan (soon to be called Jordan) occupied the West Bank, including the Old City of Jerusalem. The war also had a dramatic impact on the

¹⁵ “UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (‘Partition Plan’) on the Future Government of Palestine,” 29 November 1947, in *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi (Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 172-183.

¹⁶ Bickerton and Klausner 2010, p. 81.

Palestinian population. An estimated 600,000 to 760,000 refugees populated the surrounding areas of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Egypt.¹⁷ Only Transjordan offered citizenship to the Palestinians who resided in the West Bank. Lastly, the Arab military defeat brought upheaval across the Arab world. In July 1952, disgruntled Egyptian army officers led by Muhammad Naguib overthrew King Farouk, and in October 1954, the charismatic Gamal Abdul Nasser became president of the new Egyptian Republic. Similar events occurred in Syria as the army led the first of many coups, and the young Hussein Bin Talal became the King of Jordan after a Palestinian nationalist assassinated his grandfather King Abdullah I.

5.2 The Rise of Arab Guerrilla Activity and Terrorism

In the aftermath of the 1948 war, Palestinian fedayeen (meaning “those who sacrifice themselves” in Arabic) began to infiltrate Israel to reclaim their possessions, harvest their crops, steal, smuggle, and kill Israelis. Between 1948 and 1956, the fedayeen killed nearly two hundred Israeli civilians and scores of soldiers.¹⁸ In fact, this issue became a primary motivation for Israel’s participation in the 1956 Suez War. Although the war made Nasser a political hero for standing up to the western powers after he nationalized the Suez Canal, Israel temporarily acquired security on her southern border with the addition of UN troops stationed in Sinai and gained shipping access to the Gulf of Aqaba.

In 1964, Arab leaders met at the Arab League Headquarters in Cairo and agreed to sponsor the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) with the stated purpose of

¹⁷ Each side blames the other for the catastrophe that befell the Palestinian population.

¹⁸ Morris 2001, p. 271.

liberating Palestine and negating Israel's right to exist. In effect, the Arab states wanted to use the group to co-opt and restrain the Palestinian resistance movement in order to prevent the fedayeen from drawing them into another war with Israel.¹⁹ Ahmad al-Shuqayri, a Palestinian lawyer who served as Saudi Arabia's representative to the United Nations, was elected as chairman of the PLO, and he began to tour Arab capitals and Palestinian refugee camps to gain support and recruits. The movement also established the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) with units based in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. These efforts were largely a façade, as al-Shuqayri prevented the PLO from launching raids into Israel, and the Arab states kept the PLA under very tight control. For these reasons, it was not the PLO, but rather al-Fatah (a reversed acronym meaning "conquest," taken from Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Falastini) that emerged as the more important Palestinian nationalist movement at the time.

Fatah was founded in Kuwait in October 1957 (but did not fully crystallize until 1962), and its leaders included Yasir Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir, Farouq al-Qaddoumi, Khaled al-Hassan, and Salah Khalaf. The movement was secular and ideologically in favor of Pan-Arabism, but believed that this goal could not be achieved until all of Palestine was liberated through military action. Syria formed an alliance with Fatah in order to use the group as leverage against Israel, and soon Fatah established an armed militia called al-'Asifa (The Storm). In January 1965, the group carried out its first attack, targeting Israeli water installations. By the end of the year, Fatah claimed to have carried out at least 39 operations in Israel (a fact disputed by Israel), most of which were random bombings that inflicted few casualties. Shuqayri worried about the growing popularity of the movement, and in 1966, he signed an agreement with Syria for full coordination between the PLO and Fatah. Palestinian guerrillas, sponsored by their Arab

¹⁹ Tessler 1994, pp. 373-4.

patrons, struck at Israeli patrols and conducted numerous raids into Israel. Indeed, this became an important factor contributing to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and the neighboring Arab states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria.²⁰

The consequences of the Six Day War (al-Naksa or “setback” in Arabic) cannot be overstated. Most clearly, the territorial transfers were substantial. Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, as well as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, henceforth occupying the Palestinian territories. This meant that 1.3 million Palestinian were now living under Israeli control. The aftermath of the war also led to the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242 that established the formula of “land for peace” and secured and recognized borders as a framework for a peaceful settlement.²¹ The war had a profound impact on the PLO as well. Shuyqari resigned as chairman of the organization, and in 1968, the members of the Palestine National Council (PNC) amended the PLO covenant naming the fedayeen as the nucleus of the armed struggle (rather than the Arab states). In another resolution, the PNC called for Israel to be replaced with a secular democratic state in Palestine for Muslims, Christians, and Jews – though, many understood that this position was adopted for propaganda purposes. Moreover, Fatah emerged as the dominant player within the PLO following the Battle of Karamah in Jordan, and Arafat was elected as the chairman of the executive committee in 1969.²²

²⁰ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007), pp. 276-7.

²¹ The Arab states did not accept this approach at the time, declaring three no’s at the Arab League meeting in Khartoum: no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel.

²² Tessler 1994, pp. 425-6.

5.3 Terrorism Goes International

Fatah was not without rivals. In December 1967, George Habash and Ahmad Jabril founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Unlike Fatah, which did not want to get involved in inter-Arab state rivalries, this group sought to radicalize or overthrow the conservative Arab monarchies, particularly Jordan, as a first step toward liberating Palestine and establishing a secular Marxist Palestinian state. In their view, the struggle for Palestine was a critical step in the pan-Arab movement and ultimately for a worldwide socialist revolution. In early 1969, Nayif Hawatmah, who more closely followed Marxist-Leninist principles than Habash by arguing that a Palestinian state could only be accomplished via a working class revolution brought about through violence, split to form the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Similarly, Ahmad Jabril formed another splinter group called the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC), claiming that the PFLP was too focused on political issues and not enough on violence against Israel.²³ Although these groups were active members in the PLO, they often acted independently of the PLO decision-making structure.

These organizations began the tactic of hijacking commercial airliners and targeting Israeli and Jewish civilians outside the Middle East in order to gain attention to the Palestinian cause and free Arab prisoners. The first major event that set the tone for this period occurred in July 1968. Members of the PFLP hijacked an El Al (Israeli) plane en route from Rome to Israel and forced it to land in Algiers. After a month of negotiations, Israel agreed to release several imprisoned Arab guerrillas in exchange for the passengers.

²³ Aaron Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), pp. 309, 323-4.

The success of this operation encouraged a wave of similar terrorist activity abroad. In December 1968, two Palestinian youths machine-gunned an El Al plane in Rome, killing an Israeli passenger. In February 1969, another El Al plane was attacked at Zurich airport, killing one crew member and wounding another. In August of the same year, a TWA flight en route to Israel was hijacked and diverted to Damascus where four Israeli passengers were held for four months until Israel released some Syrian prisoners. Three months later, Palestinian terrorists threw grenades at the El Al office in Athens, injuring fourteen people. In Munich, an Israeli was killed after Arab guerrillas opened fire on passengers waiting to board an El Al flight. Then in February 1970, the PFLP-GC planted a bomb on a Swissair flight headed for Tel Aviv, which exploded in midair, killing everyone onboard.²⁴

One of the most stunning events in this new wave of terror occurred between 6 and 9 September 1970 when the PFLP hijacked four planes belonging to Swissair, Pan Am, TWA, and BOAC and forced them to land in the Jordanian desert. The hijackers demanded the release of several Palestinian prisoners held in various countries, including Sirhan Sirhan who assassinated Robert F. Kennedy in Los Angeles after he campaigned for an increase in military aid to Israel.²⁵ Britain, West Germany, and Switzerland agreed to release Palestinians convicted for earlier airport assaults on Israelis, and subsequently the hijackers freed the passengers and exploded the empty aircrafts in a clear disregard of King Hussein's authority. This event led to a brief civil war in Jordan, known as Black September, and Jordanian forces violently expelled all Palestinian

²⁴ Sachar 1996, pp. 699-700.

²⁵ Although Sirhan was not a member of the PFLP or affiliated with any Palestinian terrorist organization, the PFLP wanted to free this young Palestinian because he fought on behalf of the nationalist cause. See Kameel B. Nasr, *Arab and Israeli Terrorism: The Causes and Effects of Political Violence, 1936-1993* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc, 1997), p. 55.

militant organizations from the Hashemite Kingdom. In search of a new base of operations, these groups turned to Lebanon, as they had gained autonomy in the Palestinian refugee camps following the 1969 Cairo Agreement (see Chapter 4).²⁶

Although Black September had been a major setback for the Palestinian guerrillas, international terrorism accelerated in the 1970s. The PFLP claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in London, Asunción, The Hague, Bonn, Brussels, and Washington. Moreover, non-Arab terrorists from around the world flocked to the Middle East for training. In some cases, they even executed terrorist attacks on behalf of specific Palestinian groups. For example, members of the Japanese Red Army who were recruited by the PFLP opened fire on civilians at Israel's Lod Airport in 1972. The event killed 26 people and injured dozens.

Not to be completely outdone by their PFLP counterparts, a new organization with links to Fatah known as Black September (named after the civil war in Jordan) also engaged in spectacular acts of international terror. In 1972, members of Black September captured and shot dead 11 Israeli wrestlers at the Munich Olympics. The following year, the same group took 10 diplomats hostage at the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum demanding the release of Palestinian prisoners, including Sirhan. During the course of this incident, the terrorists killed U.S. Ambassador to Sudan, Cleo Allen Noel Jr., U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission to Sudan, George Curtis Moore, and Belgium Chargé d'affaires to Sudan, Guy Eid.²⁷

While Palestinian terrorism had become internationalized at this point, it is important to emphasize that Israel still weathered major incidents within her borders. For example, in April 1974, members of the PFLP indiscriminately machine-gunned an apartment house in the

²⁶ Smith 2007, pp. 320-2.

²⁷ Nasr 1997, pp. 62-63.

northern Israeli town of Qiryana Shemona in an attempt to derail U.S. efforts to broker the Syrian-Israeli disengagement accords following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The attack killed 18 Israelis, 8 of whom were children. Then, one month later, the DFLP seized control of an Israeli school in the Galilee village of Ma'alot, taking 115 people hostage, and threatened to blow up the building unless the Israeli government released 26 imprisoned guerrillas. The hostage crisis ended tragically with the death of 22 children and 3 teachers.²⁸

These events did nothing to change the status quo for the Palestinians, and consequently convinced some moderates in the PLO that they needed to consider negotiating with Israel for a Palestinian state. This would not be an easy task, however. On the one hand, Arafat's inability or unwillingness to control extremists in the PLO discredited the organization. On the other hand, many nations around the world were sympathetic to the movement due to its anti-colonial position, because of religious affinity (as was the case for many newly formed Muslim countries), or out of fear of their dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Ultimately, it was these international concerns that provided an opening for the PLO at the United Nations.

On 13 November 1974, Arafat spoke before the UN General Assembly calling for a democratic, secular state in Palestine and expressed a desire to negotiate: "Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand."²⁹ Israel did not see Arafat's olive branch, reiterated that the PLO was a terrorist group, and continued a policy of military engagement. In the words of Israel's Delegate to the UN, Yosef Tekoah, "The murderers of

²⁸ Sachar 1996, p. 810.

²⁹ Arafat, Yasser, "Address to the UN General Assembly." 13 November 1974, in *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, ed. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1984).

athletes in the Olympic Games of Munich, the butchers of children in Ma'alot, the assassins of diplomats in Khartoum do not belong in the international community. They have no place in international diplomatic efforts. Israel shall see to it that they have no place in them. Israel will pursue the PLO murderers until justice is meted out to them. It will continue to take action against their organization and against their bases until a definitive end is put to their atrocities....”³⁰

The PLO's growing adventurism in Lebanon seemed to corroborate Israel's position. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the PLO formed alliances with various Lebanese factions, and Israeli retaliation following Palestinian raids into Israel built sympathy among Lebanese Marxists and Sunni Muslims, but outraged the Christian Maronites. Once the Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975, the PLO became a major force in the fighting. The Lebanese Christians, who worried about the movement's influence, turned to Damascus for assistance. Syria, who worried that the formation of a radical government in Lebanon would diminish its leverage in the country, agreed and entered the conflict in 1976.

Two years later, it was Israel's turn to enter Lebanon. The impetus was a Fatah attack aimed at derailing peace talks between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.³¹ On 11 March, eleven members of Fatah entered Israel by sea near Tel Aviv and commandeered a bus south of Haifa. The IDF stopped the bus at a roadblock, and the inevitable shootout killed nine of the Palestinian guerrillas, two Israeli soldiers, and thirty Israeli civilians. Two days later, Prime Minister Begin ordered the IDF to invade southern Lebanon

³⁰ Yosef Tekoah, "Speech by Yosef Tekoah, Israel, to the General Assembly," 13 November 1974, in T.G. Fraser, *The Middle East, 1914-1979* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1980).

³¹ Mark Ensalaco, *Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 109.

(known as “Operation Litani”). Although Israel withdrew three months later, the operation created a security zone between Israel and the Litani River, which was controlled by Israel’s proxy militia in Lebanon, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), and supervised by the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Arafat’s overtures toward peace negotiations in the mid-1970s were not only rejected by Israel. Even President Jimmy Carter, who was eager to include Palestinian representation for a new Geneva Conference, found Arafat’s conditions impossible.³² It also created a significant negative reaction on the Palestinian side, crystallizing the rise of one of the most notorious Palestinian terrorists, Sabri al-Banna, whose *nom de guerre* was Abu Nidal. Once a Fatah representative in Jordan and Iraq, Abu Nidal formed a new movement in 1973 called Fatah: The Revolutionary Council (FRC), a name carefully selected as a jab against Arafat’s Fatah: the Executive Committee, which he deemed was not revolutionary or the true Fatah. This group committed savage attacks on European Jews in the early 1980s, which helped to undermine international sympathy for the Palestinian cause. There are many examples of the group’s brutality. On 27 July 1980, a grenade attack on a Jewish school in Antwerp killed one student and wounded 19 others. The following year, FRC assailants opened fire and lobbed a grenade in a Jewish synagogue in Vienna, killing 2 and wounding 19 worshippers. On 9 August 1982, Abu Nidal gunmen attacked a Parisian Jewish restaurant, wounding several of its patrons. Then in October, the group struck another synagogue, this time in Rome, killing one child and injuring 10 other people.

³² Steven L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1985): pp. 335-6.

The most politically consequential Abu Nidal attack occurred on 3 June 1982. Three FRC gunmen shot Shlomo Argov, the Israeli envoy to London, as he was getting into his car following a banquet. The ambassador survived the assassination attempt, but the bullet that struck his head paralyzed him. This incident provided Israel another pretext to invade Lebanon with the goal of evicting the PLO from the region (even though the PLO did not authorize the London attack). In this respect, “Operation Peace for Galilee” was successful because it forced the PLO to move their headquarters from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982. Israel had to pay a hefty price, however, as the IDF became deeply drawn into Lebanon’s civil war, and would not withdraw from southern Lebanon until 2000.

To be sure, other Palestinian militants continued their international terrorist campaign throughout the 1980s. For instance, the day before the PLO withdrew from Lebanon, a new Palestinian group with links to the PFLP called the 15 May Organization (commemorating the date of Israel’s founding) placed a bomb on a Pan Am flight from Tokyo to Honolulu. The explosion put a hole in the plane’s fuselage, but only killed one passenger, a fifteen-year-old Japanese boy. On 25 September 1985, Fatah attacked an Israeli yacht tied up in Larnaca, Cyprus, killing 3 Israelis. Abu Jihad, Fatah’s military commander at the time, ordered the operation because he believed that the three Israelis were agents of the Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency. In retaliation, the Israeli Air Force struck Arafat’s compound in Tunis, killing 58 Palestinians and 14 Tunisians. Then the following month, a splinter group from Ahmed Jabril’s PFLP-GC called the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), hijacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* (see chapter 3) as revenge for Israel’s attack on the PLO headquarters.

Still, Abu Nidal’s organization committed some of the most gruesome attacks and hijackings during this period. The historical record provides many more examples. On 23 November, the

FRC hijacked Egypt Air 648 from Athens to Cairo and diverted the plane to Malta. Following a disastrous rescue attempt by Egyptian Special Forces, 59 passengers were killed. A month later, two of Abu Nidal's terror squads attacked the El Al, TWA, and Pan Am ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna international airports. A note found on one of terrorists explained that they deliberately wanted to kill children in order to make the victims feel the sadness of their children. On 5 September 1986, four FRC terrorists wearing official Pakistani security uniforms rushed aboard Pan Am 73 while on the runway in Karachi. The hijackers demanded that Israeli and Cypriot authorities release members of the group who had been captured in previous terror operations. The standoff ended after the gunmen opened fire and hurled grenades at the passengers, killing 21 people and wounding 200 others. The remaining hostages escaped out the emergency exits as Pakistani commandos stormed the plane. The next day, Abu Nidal's men opened fire at another Jewish synagogue in Istanbul, killing two worshipers.³³

5.4 The First Palestinian Intifada

As the PLO and other Palestinian groups engaged in international terror and fought Israel from abroad, frustration and anger mounted inside the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The Palestinians felt abandoned by the PLO, as the organization had spent more than a decade away from Palestine, primarily operating from Jordan, Lebanon, and then Tunisia. They also felt abandoned after the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. In this new regional environment, the Arab states would be unable to exert much pressure on Israel militarily. The hope of a negotiated solution for a Palestinian state seemed like an even more remote possibility without the carrot of Egypt as part of a comprehensive peace settlement.

³³ Ensalaco 2008, pp. 136, 163-8, 173-4.

Meanwhile, the occupation consumed nearly every aspect of life in the occupied territories. The economy, although arguably better than what it had been under the Egyptian and Jordanian occupations, was dependent on Israel's economy. Government regulations stymied Palestinian agriculture to the point that less land was under cultivation in 1987 than had been in 1947. Palestinian workers did not enjoy the same benefits as Israeli workers. A lack of public investment hurt infrastructure and little money went to education and welfare support in the territories following the 1983 Israeli economic crisis. Military authorities expropriated Arab land, offering the owners little to no legal recourse. There was severe overcrowding in Gaza, and over half of the Palestinian population was under the age of fifteen. More importantly, settlements were erected abut to Arab communities across the occupied territories, and the settler population swelled to more than 60,000 in 1986. In comparison, it was only about 20,000 in the fall of 1982 and about 35,000 in July 1984. This demographic shift led to frequent altercations between the settlers and the Palestinians, and Israeli security concerns often led to an "iron fist" policy, including administrative detentions, curfews, deportations, house demolitions, press censorship, school closings, and travel restrictions.³⁴

Such was the context of the Intifada (meaning "shaking off" in Arabic), the most sustained uprising of the Palestinian population since the 1936 Great Arab Revolt. On 8 December 1987, an IDF tank transport crashed into a line of cars and vans filled with Gazans returning home from a day's work in Israel, killing four and injuring seven others. Believing that the collision

³⁴ For background on the Palestinian Intifada, see Bickerton and Klausner 2010, p. 218; Tessler 1994, p. 671; James Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 215-16.

was deliberate,³⁵ thousands of Palestinians took to the streets to express their anger and frustration over the occupation. The demonstrators, most of them teenagers, chanted nationalist slogans, waved Palestinian flags, and hurled stones at advancing Israeli soldiers, refusing to disperse even as the IDF fired tear gas and live ammunition.

The protests quickly spread to the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The initial organizing force behind the Intifada was the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), a loose confederation of local, primarily leftist groups favoring a strategy of civil disobedience and nonviolent resistance. Yet, the ideological distance between the UNLU leadership and various Islamist organizations created a split in the unified leadership structure. One important group that operated independently of the UNLU was Islamic Jihad, a clandestine organization that came into existence in the mid-1980s. Seeing itself as part of a larger Islamic revolution, its members advocated armed conflict to recover all of Palestine and establish an Islamic state in the place of Israel. Islamic Jihad was unable to gather broad support within the Palestinian constituency, particularly because Israel had deported many of its key leaders in the spring of 1988. Its main competitor Hamas, however, was much more successful in building wide-spread popularity after its establishment in December 1987.

Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Resistance Movement), better known by its acronym Hamas (meaning “zeal” in Arabic), is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. It was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the head of a large Brotherhood faction in Gaza, and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, an instructor at the Islamic University of Gaza. Similar to Islamic Jihad, Hamas views Islam as being central to Palestinian nationalist efforts, and believes that no parcel

³⁵ An Israeli businessman had been stabbed in Gaza the previous day, and the Palestinians suspected that this incident was an Israeli retaliation.

of Palestine can be ceded because it is “Islamic land that has been entrusted to generations of Muslims until Judgment Day.” Therefore, the movement rejects any peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calling international initiatives and conferences “a waste of time, a kind of child’s play.” In their view, the only acceptable approach to the Palestinian question is violent jihad, an “obligatory” duty for all Muslims.³⁶ To increase the movement’s popularity and encourage new recruits, Hamas is committed to extensive social services, such as financial subsidies, food, clothing, and shelter to impoverished Palestinians. The philosophy behind this strategy is well-articulated in Article 21 of the Hamas Charter: “When this spirit becomes dominant, love will be deepened, cooperation and compassion will prevail, and the ranks will be strengthened in the confrontation with the enemies.”³⁷

In the early years of the Intifada, Hamas carried out its armed struggle against Israel by targeting Israeli soldiers and settlers. In 1990, Hamas established a military wing called the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade, a name honoring the fiery sheikh who temporarily led the Palestinian resistance in the British mandate period. The Brigade’s first major campaign came in October following an incident in which Israeli soldiers fired upon Palestinians who were throwing stones at the police and Jewish worshippers as they prayed at the Wailing Wall. Altogether, 19 Arabs were killed and another 100 wounded. On the Israeli side, 34 civilians and policeman were injured. In retaliation, members of the al-Qassam Brigade initiated a campaign of stabbings, known as the “War of the Knives.” Within two months, 19 incidents resulted in the deaths of 8

³⁶ See Articles 11, 12, 13, and 15 of the Hamas Charter. For a full English translation of the Charter, see Hamas, “Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” in Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000), pp. 267-291.

³⁷ The Hamas Charter, Article 21.

Israelis and wounded more than a dozen.³⁸ Hamas would become much more violent in the coming years, adopting snipings, remote bombs, and explosive suicide belts into its tactical repertoire. These events demonstrate that the intifada was not entirely non-violent. Armed attacks, while perhaps smaller in comparison to widespread civil disobedience, also played a prominent role in the uprising.

5.5 The Road to Oslo

The PLO recognized that their monopoly on the Palestinian nationalist movement was slipping in the midst of the Palestinian Intifada. Not only did the uprising erupt without any PLO involvement, but the growing popularity of Hamas came at their expense and threatened their influence. To reverse this trend, the PLO tried different strategies to boost their relevancy on the domestic and international levels.

On the domestic level, Arafat attempted to co-opt Hamas by asking them to join the Palestine National Council in April 1990. As historian Gilles Kepel points out, “The PLO’s hope was that Hamas could be transformed into a minority opposition that would submit to the will of the majority and be more easily controlled, like the PFLP, the DFLP, and the Communist party.”³⁹ Yet, this strategy did not work as Hamas demanded almost half of the seats in the council, called for a renewed pledge to destroy Israel, and insisted that jihad was the only way to liberate Palestine. Arafat was unwilling to accept these terms and the talks immediately collapsed. As a result, Hamas would continue to challenge the PLO as the spokesman of the Palestinian people.

³⁸ Morris 2001, pp. 584-5.

³⁹ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 157.

On the international level, Arafat unilaterally proclaimed a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital in 1988. The Algiers declaration attracted immediate worldwide attention, even gaining recognition from many Arab and Muslim states as well as the Soviet Union. The United States dismissed the symbolic move, and refused to open dialogue with PLO until it unequivocally renounced terrorism and accepted UNSCR 242 and UNSCR 338.⁴⁰ Arafat eventually satisfied the American pre-conditions the following month in Geneva, and Secretary of State George Schultz approved direct talks with the PLO. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir accused Arafat of deception and stated that Israel will never talk to the PLO.

The PLO's diplomatic victory with the United States quickly unraveled, however. On 30 May 1990, Israel foiled a speedboat attack orchestrated by the Palestine Liberation Front, a pro-Iraqi constituent of the PLO, near the beaches of Tel Aviv. Because Arafat refused to condemn the operation or punish the faction responsible, the United States ended the U.S.-PLO dialogue.⁴¹ Then on 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait, and Arafat defended Saddam Hussein because of his substantial support for the Palestinian cause. He chose poorly. Economic assistance from the other Gulf nations dried up, and following the highly successful Persian Gulf War that reversed the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait expelled 300,000 Palestinian workers

⁴⁰ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, Washington, DC: Brookings University Press and University of California Press, 2001), pp. 277-85.

⁴¹ Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Israel Reports Foiling a Speedboat Attack on Beach," *New York Times*, 31 May 1991. Also see Daniel C. Kurtzer, Scott B. Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Steven L. Spiegel, and Shibley Z. Telahmi, *The Peace Puzzle: America's Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 22.

who had been sending money back to their families in the occupied territories.⁴² On top of the financial crisis that this created, President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker sought to make headway on the Arab-Israeli conflict following Iraq's defeat. In October 1991, the United States co-sponsored the Madrid Peace Summit with the Soviet Union, bringing almost all of the Middle East actors together for the first true regional conference. Arafat was not invited. Not even an official PLO representative was allowed to attend because of the organization's support for Iraq. Instead, a joint delegation of Jordanians and Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank without formal association with the PLO participated. The Madrid talks adjourned without any serious discussion on substantive issues, though more rounds of talks would occur in Washington.

Although Arafat did not participate directly in the Madrid talks, it was clear that the Palestinian delegation still received instructions from Tunis. Thus, if Israel wanted to take peace negotiations seriously, it seemed that there was no choice but to talk to the PLO directly.⁴³ This logic became an important cornerstone to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's foreign policy after he defeated Shamir in the 1992 Israeli elections. For the first time in 15 years, the dovish Labor Party formed a coalition government without having to share power with the hawkish Likud Party, and many believed there would be a real chance to achieve peace with the Palestinians.

Rabin brought a new outlook to the peacemaking efforts. He rallied against the idea of turning Israel into a bi-national state, an inevitable outcome with serious demographic ramifications for Israel's democracy and Jewish character if she were to hold onto the occupied

⁴² David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), p. 108.

⁴³ For example, Rabin's Deputy Foreign Minister Yosef Beilin held this view. See, Clyde Haberman, "Israel Proposes Letting Citizens Meet with PLO," *New York Times*, 10 August 1992.

territories. He saw the settlements as a burden, arguing that Israel needed to separate herself from the Palestinians in order to guarantee personal security. Further, he worried about the growing influence of the rejectionist Islamic groups, particularly Hamas, in the occupied territories. In December 1992, Rabin emphasized that “[Islamic fundamentalism] is the real and serious danger which threatens the peace of the world in the forthcoming years. The danger of death is at our doorstep.”⁴⁴

These concerns provided Arafat the opening that he needed to reemerge as the top political player in Palestinian affairs. Rabin viewed the PLO as the more moderate option relative to the Islamists and decided to authorize secret back channel talks between Israeli academics and PLO representatives. For the Israelis, the purpose of a peace track was to provide personal security to the Israeli public, and the PLO recognized this concern from the outset. During the Oslo talks, for example, Abu Alaa stressed to the Israeli representatives that Arafat was uniquely suited to end terror against Israel, and that he could turn Palestinian public opinion against the Islamic rejectionist groups.⁴⁵ From December 1992 to August 1993, the clandestine negotiations occurred in the locales of Oslo, Norway. To the surprise of almost everyone, the talks led to the most important breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, known as the Oslo Accords.

On 9 September 1993, Arafat signed a letter recognizing the state of Israel, renouncing terrorism, and declaring that the PLO would strive to control elements that might engage in terrorism. Prime Minister Rabin reciprocated in a letter to Arafat recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and accepting the PLO as a negotiating partner. The

⁴⁴ Quoted in Makovsky 1996, p. 113.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 53.

Letters of Mutual Recognition and the Declaration of Principles (DOP), which outlined the interim self-government arrangements for the Palestinians, began the Oslo Peace Process.

Within a month, the Israelis and the Palestinians began to negotiate over the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The 1994 Cairo Accord and the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, also known as Oslo II, established how the 5 year interim period of Palestinian self-rule would be implemented. The agreement allowed Arafat and the PLO to relocate to the occupied territories and established 3 areas of control in the West Bank. Area A is territory completely controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and security services. Area B is territory jointly controlled by the PA and Israel by which the Palestinians would exercise civil and police authority and Israel would retain security responsibilities. And Area C is territory exclusively controlled by Israel. The agreement also called for three redeployments of the IDF, the details of which would be negotiated as time and security permitted. The aim of this piecemeal approach was to build confidence between the two parties, culminating in final status negotiations that would resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Oslo agreement caught the Islamic and secular groups opposed to a peace settlement with Israel off-guard. Within a few months of the signing of the DOP, however, the rejectionists joined together to form the Alliance of Palestinian Forces with the stated purpose of undermining the Oslo Peace Process. In December 1993, Hamas released an important proposal that became the basis for the alliance. In addition to outlining the movement's organizational structure and relations with the Arab world, Islamic nations and international community, the document reveals the alliance's political vision and strategy in the post-Oslo period:

(1) Upholding the inalienable national rights of our people in their homeland of Palestine and their right to liberation, return, self-determination, and full national independence; (2) emphasizing the unity of our people and our land, and unity of their cause, goals, and national destiny, and upholding their full national and historical rights – no one has the right to give up any part of it; (3) maintaining armed struggle and jihad as the main method in the fight for liberation; (4) the alliance considers the document of recognition and the Arafat and Rabin agreement to be national treason requiring action to overthrow them by all possible means – they are not binding to the Palestinian people; (5) maintaining Palestine is a historic nation and irreplaceable to the Palestinian people, and to resist all projects of an alternative homeland, displacement, resettlement, compensation or attempts to blur its national identity; (6) refusing to participate in parliamentary elections of self-rule or participate in recruitment, and boycotting all bodies emanating from it and responsible for the implementation of self-government; (7) cutting the link with all institutions that Arafat and his team lead or share in and that impersonate the name of the Palestinian Liberation Organization; (8) having firm determination to continue and escalate the armed struggle and all forms of political and popular resistance, especially inside the occupied territories in order to perpetuate the popular intifada as the main field of conflict with the Zionist enemy and to achieve national and full historical rights that are inalienable to the Palestinian people.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Hamas, “Tasawwur Muqtarah min Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas) Hawol Tahaluf al-Quwa al-Filastiniyah” [Conceiving the Proposal of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) on the Alliance of Palestinian

The rejectionist groups also understood how coercive terrorism could spoil the process. After the 'Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades carried out two suicide missions in Afula and Hadera, the Political Bureau of Hamas released a very revealing statement. "Rabin's measures failed to stop our heroic operations, carried out amidst his efforts to implement the Oslo Agreement with all the shameful concessions on the part of the PLO leadership that it entails, and failed to fulfill the longing of the Zionist masses for peace and security. In the face of sharpening Likud opposition to the agreement, this devastating failure caused Rabin to feel deep frustration and frightful floundering."⁴⁷ If terrorism was going to sabotage the peace process, it is clear that these groups were thinking in terms of domestic politics and public opinion.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter chronicled the Israeli experience with terrorism and provided an introduction to the Oslo Peace Process. In the earliest phase of the Arab-Zionist conflict, Palestinian attacks were relatively minor and with local causes. Bloodshed escalated during the British Mandate, however, and guerilla warfare and cross border raids characterized Palestinian nationalist aspirations following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Armed attacks soon became more organized with the advent of Fatah and the PLO. After the 1967 Six Day War, Palestinian terrorism went global, primarily targeting neighboring Arab states and Israelis abroad to bring attention to the Palestinian cause. Recognizing that terrorism was not changing the status quo, moderate PLO leaders began calling for negotiations with Israel to establish a

Forces], December 1993, in Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: al-Fekr wal Mamarasa al-Siyasiyya* [Hamas: Ideology and Political Practice] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996), p. 334.

⁴⁷ Hamas, "Important Statement by the Political Bureau," 16 April 1994, in Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000), pp. 302-3.

Palestinian state. Not only did Israel reject these overtures at the time, but Palestinian radicals sought to undermine any peace initiative with violence. For example, Abu Nidal's organization gruesomely killed western and Jewish civilians around the world.

By the end of the 1980s, frustration over the status quo led to the largest sustained Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. The Intifada not only captured the world's attention, but it became clear to many Israelis that holding onto the territories would be financially, militarily, and psychologically difficult, if not impossible. Equally significant, the PLO recognized that their monopoly on the symbolic representation of the Palestinian people was evaporating in the midst of the Intifada. Islamic rejectionist groups, particularly Islamic Jihad and Hamas, strengthened their influence and credibility at the expense of the PLO. These groups sought to resurrect the struggle against Israel, which the PLO seemingly lost sight of while drawn into Jordanian and Lebanese affairs, culminating in the organization's expulsion from both countries. In addition, Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War created a serious financial crisis for the PLO and international isolation. For these reasons, both Israel and the PLO found mutual motivation to enter into the Oslo Peace Process, and the Islamist and secular rejectionist groups sought to undermine these peacemaking efforts with coercive terrorism.

In short, the Holy Land is a prototypical security environment with high exposure to terrorism. The negative effect of terrorism on public opinion should be the highest in such strategic environments, thereby providing an opening for aspiring spoilers to undermine the peace process. Would Palestinian terror substantially alter Israeli attitudes? Would this attitudinal change generate enough coercive pressure on Israeli negotiators to derail peace talks? The next chapter gets a handle on this issue by evaluating the consequences of Palestinian terrorism on Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process.

CHAPTER 6

Sabotaging the Peace? Coercive Terrorism in the Oslo Peace Process

The handshake between Yasir Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin appeared to be the beginning of a long awaited peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. As quick as the flurry of hope crested on the political landscape, however, the tide of cooperation receded into reciprocal violence and escalation. Within eight years, the Oslo Peace Process was in shambles. Final status negotiations at Camp David failed to produce an end of conflict in July 2000. Two months later, Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount helped to spark the al-Aqsa Intifada, the most violent uprising in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. President Bill Clinton attempted to salvage the peace process with his bridging proposals, known as the Clinton Parameters, and the Israeli and Palestinian teams negotiated over their contents at the Taba' conference in January 2001. Despite substantial progress in these discussions, the February Israeli election precluded the possibility of any deal, and the electoral victory of the hawkish Sharon guaranteed the end of high-level talks. With the new American President, George W. Bush, disinterested in jump starting the negotiations, the Oslo Peace Process had come to a dead-end.

A substantial literature has been written on why the Oslo Peace Process failed to produce an end of conflict agreement. Some blame Palestinian Chairman Yasir Arafat for the failure. For example, President Clinton, U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross, and Prime Minister Ehud Barak point to Arafat's inability to make the necessary transformation for peace – delegitimizing violence, giving up Palestinian myths, preparing the Palestinian people for

compromise, and making concessions and counteroffers.¹ This version continues that Arafat rejected a generous Israeli offer, choosing violence instead of diplomacy.

Others, such as Special Assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli Affairs Robert Malley, Palestinian advisor Hussein Agha, and various academics, disagree with this interpretation, citing American and Israeli missteps as the major culprit.² In their view, Barak wrongfully prioritized the Israeli-Syrian talks. Once the Syrian track unraveled, Israel and the United States rushed the Palestinians into final status negotiations creating an ultimatum of “all-or-nothing.” While the Israeli offer at Camp David was unprecedented, the Palestinians believed it would not leave them with a viable state; thus, both sides were left with nothing. What is more, they argue that the United States failed to be an honest and unbiased mediator throughout the entire process.³

¹ See, for example, Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004); Benny Morris, “Camp David and After: An Interview with Ehud Barak,” *New York Review of Books* 49(2002): pp. 42-45; Dennis Ross, Gidi Grinstein, Hussein Agha, and Robert Malley, “Camp David: An Exchange,” *New York Review of Books* 48(2001): p. 90.

² Robert Malley, “Israel and the Arafat Question,” *New York Review of Books* 51(2004): pp. 19-23; Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors,” *New York Review of Books* 48(2001): p. 59; Jeremy Pressman, “Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?” *International Security* 28(2003): pp. 5-43; Ron Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” *Survival* 43(2001): pp. 31-45; Jerome Slater, “What went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” *Political Science Quarterly* 116(2001): pp. 171-199. Also see Deborah Sontag, “And Yet So Far: A Special Report; Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why it Failed.” *New York Times*, 26 July 2001.

³ These two versions are not absolute. For instance, Charles Enderlin, a French journalist who conducted interview with participants on all sides, argues that responsibility for the failure of Oslo Peace Process is widely shared. See Charles Enderlin, *Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002*, trans. Susan Fairfield (New York, NY: Other Press LLC, 2002).

Another claim puts the focus on the Oslo Peace Process itself.⁴ According to this logic, the piecemeal approach guaranteed the collapse of the peace talks because it did not prohibit each side from taking controversial actions that appeased their own domestic constituencies but undermined trust and confidence building between them. For instance, Israel continued a policy of settlement expansion and the Palestinian leadership preferred to co-opt radical terrorist groups rather than dismantle them. Furthermore, the piecemeal approach that characterized the interim negotiations did not require each side to moderate their demands on the final status issues. As a result, both sides were able to hold onto their maximalist positions going into the high-level talks that aimed to end the conflict.

This chapter is concerned with a different claim that is also pervasive in the literature and far less disputed – that terrorist violence, particularly from the Palestinian side, was instrumental in sabotaging the peace process. As the last chapter discussed, extremist groups within the Alliance of Palestinian Forces sought to spoil the process through violence, and many believe that it had worked. For instance, Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel’s Minister of Internal Security and acting Foreign Minister at the time, reflected that “ Hamas and [Islamic] Jihad lost no time in unleashing a campaign of terror in the hope that this would lead to the radicalization of Israeli public opinion and, consequently, to a shift to the right, which they expected would undermine and cripple Rabin’s peace policies.” In his view, “The Israeli public could not stomach a policy whereby the victims of terrorist attacks were buried in the morning and negotiations were resumed in the afternoon.”⁵

⁴ For example, see Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006): pp. 210-212.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-5.

Dennis Ross witnessed the impact of these attacks on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations first-hand. “The acts of terror...always seemed to occur whenever we were making progress; they were not only sickening but tended to destroy whatever tentative steps forward we were taking.” He also notes that terrorism “reduced the ability and the willingness to make possible concessions for peace, and at time undercut those perceived as too accommodating.”⁶

Gilead Sher, Bureau Chief and Policy Coordinator under Prime Minister Barak, comes to a similar conclusion. “There was a reasonable chance of promoting permanent peace and ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It did not work out, but we believe we were not to blame. Murderous Palestinian terrorism...set the negotiations table ablaze, leaving it in smoking ruins.”⁷

In the pages that follow, I evaluate the veracity of this claim – that terrorism undermined the Oslo Peace Process – by examining the extent to which Palestinian terrorist attacks affected Israeli public support for the peace process between 1994 and 2001. I emphasize short-term effects in order to determine the level of coercive pressure exerted on Israeli leaders as active and serious negotiations were taking place. Potential long-term effects, such as major realignments of mainstream opinion, while also important, are outside the scope of this research.

The findings provide several contributions that are central to our understanding of coercive terrorism and its effect on public opinion and government decision-making. As expected, each terrorist incident chipped away at popular support among the political left, Israeli centrists and those “in the middle.”⁸ Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom, the net effect was a very slight

⁶ Ross 2004, p. 9 and p. 762.

⁷ Gilead Sher, *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 199-2001* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), p. 231.

⁸ The term centrist refers to individuals who have moderate political leanings (between the left and right on the political spectrum). The term “in the middle” refers to individuals with weak political preferences on a policy issue or individuals who are ambivalent regarding a policy issue.

decrease in Israeli approval for the peace process. Overall, these results cast serious doubt on the popular argument that terrorism sabotaged the peace process through public opinion. If terrorism was allowed to obstruct the process, it was likely the result of inaccurate leader perceptions rather than being grounded in strong empirical reality.

6.1 The Role of Public Opinion in the Oslo Peace Process

As discussed in Chapter 1, for terrorism to be coercive, it must be the case that extremist violence causes substantial changes in public opinion and leaders care about such changes. Therefore, it is imperative to first establish that public opinion played a prominent role in the thinking of Israeli leaders during the Oslo period.

Research into this issue provides mounting evidence that Israeli prime ministers were in fact motivated by such domestic concerns. For example, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin feared that negotiations based on the formula “land for peace” would lead to a civil war in Israel. A conversation held between Dennis Ross and Prime Minister Rabin at the time of the Oslo talks is particularly revealing. “It sounds like you are talking about civil war – do you really believe that you will face something that extreme from the settlers and others?” Rabin was unequivocal in his response. “Yes and that is why it is so important that I have people I can count on in the IDF.”⁹

To avoid this dangerous situation and guarantee the confidence of the electorate, Israeli prime ministers frequently checked public opinion surveys while gauging policy options. The fact that Rabin was the first prime minister to nominate a special advisor for surveys, Kalman

⁹ Ross 2005, p. 90.

Gayer, is particularly telling.¹⁰ This concern consumed other Israeli prime ministers as well. Oded Eran, former Israeli Ambassador to Jordan and head of Israel's negotiations team with the Palestinians from 1999 to 2000, observed that Israeli prime ministers were briefed every day on the mood of the Israeli public. Prime Minister Barak even read these briefs before any of the other reports during the 2000 Camp David Summit because "he was very sensitive to what the public thought about [the peace talks]."¹¹

Israeli leaders also adopted several hawkish policies as they negotiated with the Palestinians in order to reassure the Israeli public that they were not soft on security. The historical record is full of examples. In December 1992, Rabin deported leaders of Hamas to Lebanon in response to a series of terror acts. Three months later, he closed the Palestinian territories after a wave of fatal stabbings. Then in July 1993, he launched "Operation Accountability" in Lebanon as a reprisal for Katyusha rocket attacks on population centers in northern Israel.¹² After the assassination of Rabin in 1995, his successor Shimon Peres sought to flex his security credentials

¹⁰ Yehudith Auerbach and Charles W. Greenbaum, "Assessing Leader Credibility during a Peace Process: Rabin's Private Polls," *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (2000), pp. 34-36. Auerbach and Greenbaum point out that Rabin himself denied the impact of surveys as have most U.S. presidents. Scholars in American political behavior, however, argue that the institutionalization of polling operations is evidence on the importance attributed by U.S. presidents to public opinion surveys. See Ronald H. Hinckly, *People, Polls, and Policymakers: Public Opinion and National Security* (New York: Lexington Books, 1992): p. 4; and Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," *Mershon International Studies Review, supplement to the international Studies Quarterly* 42(1998), p. 46.

¹¹ Oded Eran. Interview by author. 2 September 2012.

¹² Auerbach and Greenbaum 2000, pp. 40-48.

in much the same way. In April 1996, he ordered “Operation Grapes of Wrath” in retaliation for more Hezbollah rockets raining down from the north.¹³

Lastly, Israeli law requires that any decision to relinquish territory annexed after 1967 must be ratified by the Knesset and then submitted to a referendum. Consequently, any final status agreement would accentuate public preferences by necessity, constraining the options available to Israeli negotiators. For this reason, Dennis Ross argues that Barak attempted to condition his public on potential concessions in final status talks. For example, he allegedly leaked to the press that “Israel would give up more than 90 percent of the territories, divide East Jerusalem, permit Palestinians to return in small numbers, and accept international forces in place of the IDF in the Jordan Valley.”¹⁴ This effort would have been baseless if Barak was not concerned with his public.

In short, a profusion of evidence indicates that Israeli leaders were in fact very worried about public opinion during the Oslo period. As result, a sudden negative shift in mass approval following a Palestinian terrorist attack could generate coercive pressure on Israeli leaders to break off negotiations. In the words of Dore Gold, former Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “[Terrorism] will make someone who is initiating a peace process

¹³ It is important to note that this military response had the opposite effect. The accidental shelling of a UN compound in Qana, which killed over a hundred Lebanese civilians, convinced many Arab Israelis not to vote for Peres in the 1996 election. Benny Morris, “Israel’s Elections and Their Implications,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26(1996): p. 73. Also see Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America* (New York, NY: Random House): pp. 279-280.

¹⁴ Ross 2005: 769.

look like a fool or naïve.”¹⁵ The next two sections present a research design to determine how much coercive pressure resulted from this extremist violence.

6.2 The Data

To leverage the effects of terrorism on Israeli public support of the peace process, it is important to address several key questions that were raised in chapter 2. First, how did terrorist violence affect general Israeli attitudes over time? Second, to what extent did public opinion shift systematically in a certain direction or generate a polarizing effect? Third, how did the strength of political attitudes affect the propensity of attitudinal change? Lastly, how did partisanship and other demographic factors mediate attitudinal change in these acute terrorist crises?

Public opinion data from the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research is particularly well-suited to answer these questions. After the signing of the Oslo agreements, the Center’s Peace Index Project began monitoring Israeli public support for the peace process with monthly public opinion surveys. In particular, their questionnaires consisted of a very important repeated, permanent question: What is your opinion on the agreement that was signed in Oslo between Israel and the PLO (Agreement of Principles)? Roughly 500 people completed surveys each month by telephone – a representative sample of the adult population in Israel and inside of the Israeli settlements. The impressive frequency of these surveys and the consistency of this approval question provide a unique opportunity to map how the Israeli public’s support for the peace process changed over time.¹⁶ Moreover, the data include fine grained demographic

¹⁵ Dore Gold, Interview by author. 1 September 2012.

¹⁶ The Tami Steinmetz surveys were the only Gallup-like poll in Israel that interviewed the public frequently with repeated questions. The data range from the first public opinion survey conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution of Tel Aviv University and

information allowing examination into how individual attributes and partisanship mediate public reactions in coercive terrorist crises.

Because a universally accepted definition of terrorism remains elusive, it is useful to consider the effect of multiple tactical variants.¹⁷ For example, suicide terrorism may have a larger effect than other types of terrorism (Pape 2005), the location of the attack may matter (Berribi and Klor 2008; Fielding and Penny 2009), as well as whether the attacks primarily targeted civilians or military targets (Ganor 2002; Goodwin 2006; Abrahms 2006). To obtain nuanced data of this sort, I construct an original dataset that records all Palestinian terrorist incidents during the Oslo period. Since most people learn about major events, such as a terrorist attack, indirectly from the media (Mutz 1992; Zaller and Price 1993), I identified the various attacks, their location, and primary target using archives of major international newspapers (e.g., the BBC, the Boston Globe, Der Spiegel, Ha'aretz, the Jerusalem Post, and the New York Times) and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. I counted an event as a terrorist attack if it involved a Palestinian or group of Palestinians attacking or killing an Israeli or group of Israelis.¹⁸ These attacks include shootings, stabbings, vehicle attacks (e.g., a car driving into bystanders), car

conclude with 2 January 2002. This end date provides variation during the first year of the Second Intifada and the first 9 months of Ariel Sharon's government, who came to power on 7 March 2001. Changing the end date (such as 29 March 2001, 31 January 2001, 25 December 2000 or 26 September 2000) does not change the results of this study.

¹⁷ Israeli policymakers argue that the most important factor is whether or not a terrorist incident occurred rather than casualties. Oded Eran. Interview with author. 2 September 2012.

¹⁸ The events and typologies used in this study are consistent with other terrorist databases such as "International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE)" and the "World Incident Tracking System" of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Failed or foiled terrorist attacks are not included.

bombs, grenades, mortars, and suicide bombings. If multiple devices or attacks occurred at the same time and location, I coded the incident as one event.¹⁹ To keep the unit of measurement the same as the monthly public opinion surveys, I needed to aggregate the incidents into larger time units. Thus, each tactic includes the number of incidents that occurred 30 days preceding a survey.²⁰

Next, I created a variable for the frequency of all types of terrorist incidents in a month and separate variables for the frequency of all suicide and non-suicide attacks in a month. I also coded them according to three locations: Israel, Jerusalem, and the occupied territories. Jerusalem, which includes both East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem, is given its own variable because it is one of the major points of contention in negotiations and holds tremendous religious and nationalist symbolism for Israel and the Palestinian people. Lastly, I coded the incidents as either “military” or “civilian” based on who the majority of victims were in each attack.

As discussed in chapter 2, the party of the prime minister can act as a powerful cue to the public in coercive terrorist crises. For example, prime ministers from the hawkish Likud Party could convince its members, who are traditionally opposed to the peace process, to approve of peace talks as they advance negotiations and reach agreements (Schultz 2005). The novelty of this situation could also strengthen support among the political left, those who are cautiously optimistic about the prospects of peace.

¹⁹ As a check on the intensity of the attacks, I also tallied the number of casualties per incident.

²⁰ Aggregating the data into larger time units such as 60 or 90 days preceding a survey do not change the results in this study. Although equal weight is given to each attack irrespective of their proximity to a survey, this potential interference is captured by the error term in each regression model and averaged out across time thereby marginalizing the effect.


In addition, the previous chapters discussed the importance of unified elite messages. While the Likud Party vehemently opposed the Oslo Accords, this criticism moderated publically once Prime Minister Netanyahu was in office. For instance, in an interview with Larry King, Netanyahu stated that “we’re keeping Oslo” and that he was optimistic about it. He added, “I am personally committed to it because there’s no Israeli who has not felt the pain of war or lost loved ones. And it is something that I feel right now as being one of the great tasks ahead of me now, to move the country, Israel and its neighbors, towards a genuine and lasting peace. And I will do my utmost to achieve this goal.”²¹ Thus, the presence of a Likud prime minister can act as a proxy for unified rhetoric in support of the Oslo Peace Process. To capture these elite cue effects, all models therefore include an indicator variable for whether or not the incumbent prime minister is from the Likud Party.

Finally, it is essential to control for Israel’s economic situation during the Oslo period. Political scientists have long found that perceptions of the national economy heavily drive political attitudes (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Lau and Sears 1981; Fiorina 1981; Lewis Beck 1988; Markus 1988; Mutz 1992, 1994; Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997).²² If the masses believe that the government’s policies are connected to changes in the economy, these so-called sociotropic judgments can affect public evaluations of government performance and its policies (Kernell 1978; Jonung and Wadensjö 1979; Lau and Sears 1981). Specific to the Israeli-Palestinian case, Al-Haj et al. (1993) and Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) find that Israelis largely

²¹ Larry King. Interview with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. *Larry King Live*. CNN, 3 July 1996.

²² This finding is not only limited to American politics, but also has been generalized to other Western democracies (Jonung and Wadensjö 1979; Clarke et al. 1993).

Figure 6.1. Israeli Public Support for Oslo and Palestinian Terrorism



believed that peace with the Palestinians would generate economic benefits for the Jewish state. Therefore, all of the models include Israel's monthly inflation and unemployment rates.²³

Figure 6.1 displays monthly Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process and the frequency of terrorist attacks by type, location, and target. The average support was 38.9% during this period. The sharp increase between October 1995 and November 1995 highlights the "rally-round-the-flag" effect that occurred after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin.²⁴ Public opinion remained stable with modest variation until another sharp increase during the election campaign of Ehud Barak in March 1999. It then began to decline steadily, especially after the outbreak of the Palestinian al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. By the end of the Oslo period, Israeli public support settled around 27 percent.

The frequency of attacks reveals several interesting patterns. Israel witnessed a mean of 2.22 attacks for all types of terrorism within 30 days of a survey, and this violence tended to spike around many important events in the Oslo Peace Process: (1) the October 1994 signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, (2) the February/March 1996 period, which was two to three months prior to the May Israeli election,²⁵ (3) the October 1998 signing of the Wye Agreement,

²³ To account for these factors, I gathered data on the monthly unemployment level (%) and inflation rate (%) taken from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. Since the IMF only documents the quarter unemployment level in Israel, I interpolated the data in order to generate monthly rates, a reasonable approach given the stability of the quarterly level during the period of investigation. I calculated the monthly inflation rate by finding the rate of change in the monthly Israeli consumer price index.

²⁴ On 4 November 1995, Yigal Amir, a Jewish law student with ultra-nationalist beliefs, shot and killed the Prime Minister while he was attending a peace rally in Tel Aviv. Following the assassination, Israeli public support for the peace process increased from 37.2 percent in October 1995 to 51.6 percent in November 1995.

²⁵ These were revenge attacks for the assassination of Yahya Ayyash, Hamas' chief bomb-maker and leader of the of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade in the West Bank.

(4) the September 2000 controversial visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, and (5) the March 2001 post-Israeli election period. Thus, these data provide support that Palestinian extremists strategically timed their attacks to correspond to elections and progress on the peace process (Kydd and Walter 2002; Braithwaite et al. 2010). Although suicide terrorism occurred infrequently across the entire Oslo period (a mean of 0.39 suicide attacks per 30 days), this type of attack tended to occur around these same important events. The location of the attacks have a similar pattern, but tended to occur more frequently in the occupied territories (a mean of 1.22 attacks per 30 days), than in Israel proper (a mean of 0.52 per 30 days), and Jerusalem (a mean of 0.46 attacks per 30 days). It is important to note, however, that the number of attacks in Jerusalem is much higher than in any other city in Israel. Lastly, attacks on civilians (a mean of 1.7 attacks per 30 days) occurred nearly three times as high as attacks on military personnel (a mean of 0.48 attacks per 30 days).

In the next section, I describe the research design that analyzes how the multiple variants of terrorism, the state of the Israeli economy and the party of the prime minister affected Israel public support for the peace process. I then present and discuss the results.

6.3 Empirical Strategy and Results

This section introduces three different statistical models that focus on three levels of aggregation of the dependent variable. The first statistical model applies a regression model with temporally correlated errors (AR(1)) to average Israeli public support for the peace process. This model reveals how the variables of interest affect general Israeli attitudes over time. The second statistical model applies compositional time series analysis to the disaggregated distribution of Israeli attitudes – the proportion that “strongly support,” “somewhat support,” are “in the

middle,” “somewhat oppose,” “strongly oppose,” or are “uncertain” toward the peace process. This determines whether terrorism generates a systematic shift in a certain direction or a polarizing effect among Israelis. It also reveals how the strength of political attitudes affects the propensity of attitudinal change. The third statistical model applies a two-stage feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression to the individual-level data. This provides a nuanced analysis on how partisanship and demographic factors mediate individual-level attitudes in coercive terrorist crises.

6.3.1 Determinants of Average Israeli Approval

I begin by considering how the multiple variants of terrorism, the state of the Israeli economy and the party of the prime minister affected average Israeli support for the peace process. Serial correlation is a concern because shocks in one month might spill over into the subsequent month (Beck 1991; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005/2006; De Boef and Keele 2008). Thus, it is essential to first investigate the presence of autocorrelation by adopting a simple linear model, $Y_t = \beta_1 + \sum_{j=2}^k \beta_j x_{jt} + \epsilon_t$. The dependent variable Y_t is average Israeli approval of the Oslo peace process at time t . The covariates x_{jt} are the monthly-level predictors indexed by j , and ϵ is the error term in the regression model.²⁶

As suspected, the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the residuals detect an autoregressive process of order 1. A Durbin-Watson Test confirms the presence of first-order autocorrelation, generating a test statistic that ranges from 1.24 to 1.45 depending on the model

²⁶ A Phillips-Perron test indicates that Israeli approval of the Oslo Peace Process is stationary in the period of investigation (Dickey-Fuller $Z(\alpha) = -32.61$, $p < 0.01$).

specification. In order to take into account the dependence between terms, I adopt the following AR(1) model.

$$Y_t = \beta \mathbf{1} + \sum_{j=2}^k \beta_j x_{jt} + \mu_t \text{ for } t = 1, \dots, T$$

$$\mu_t = \rho \mu_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \text{ where } -1 < \rho < 1$$

The second equation underscores that the disturbance in period t depends on the disturbance in period $t - 1$, plus some additional amount of error. The parameter ρ is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient, and can be interpreted as the correlation coefficient between μ_t and μ_{t-1} . In turn, the generalized linear model can be estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. The model specifies that all movement in the covariates translates to instantaneous changes in support for the peace process. In other words, individuals adjust to new information as it becomes available in the current period. The data demonstrate that the predictors, including terrorism, do not have a lagged effect beyond the initial shock, thus supporting this assumption.²⁷

Results

Table 6.1 summarizes the relationship between average monthly Israeli approval for the Oslo Peace Process and the monthly-level predictors. Specifically, Model 1 investigates how changes in the frequency of all types of terrorist attacks (*Terrorism*) affect support for the Oslo Peace Process. Model 2 disaggregates these attacks, looking at the effect of suicide attacks (*Suicide*)

²⁷ Alternatively, one could adopt an autoregressive distributed lag or ADL model (De Boef and Keele 2008).

The ADL general dynamic model assumes that shocks in one period persist into the future. This model, however, is inconsistent with the data generating mechanism, as a series of t-tests demonstrate that the coefficients of the lagged regressors are indistinguishable from zero (see appendix C). A partial adjustment or Koyck model is more appropriate based on the AIC and BIC. The results, which are available in appendix D, reproduce the main findings of the autoregressive models used in this study, thus providing additional confidence in the reported estimates.

Table 6.1. Determinants of Monthly Support for Oslo

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Terrorism	-0.39 (0.17) *	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Suicide	—	-0.26 (0.18)	—	—	—	—
Suicide	—	-1.99 (0.61) **	—	—	—	—
Civilian	—	—	-0.95 (0.22) *	—	—	—
Military	—	—	0.75 (0.45)	—	—	—
Israel	—	—	—	-1.48 (0.62) *	—	—
Occupied	—	—	—	-0.17 (0.23) ***	—	—
Jerusalem	—	—	—	-0.64 (0.54)	—	—
Casualties	—	—	—	—	-0.12 (0.05) *	—
No Terrorism	—	—	—	—	—	1.71 (0.83) *
Unemployment	-1.69 (0.75) *	-1.35 (0.67) *	-1.54 (0.63) *	-1.42 (0.69) *	-1.93 (0.79) *	-2.09 (0.82) *
Inflation	0.3 (0.8)	0.85 (0.79)	0.61 (0.77)	0.6 (0.8)	0.37 (0.8)	0.14 (0.8)
Likud	1.4 (1.41)	1.9 (1.24)	2.36 (1.19) ·	1.95 (1.27)	1.09 (1.5)	0.75 (1.57)
Constant	52.28 (6.12) ***	49.41 (5.46) ***	50.74 (5.14) ***	50.05 (5.58) ***	54.04 (6.45) ***	54.23 (6.75) ***
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	91

Note: Each column reports the maximum likelihood estimates of a separate generalized least squares (GLS) regression with an AR(1) correlation structure. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

‘***’ significant at 0.001; ‘**’ significant at 0.01; ‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant 0.1

and other types of violence (*Non-Suicide*). Model 3 investigates how the location of the attacks impacted public approval. *Israel* includes all types of terrorist attacks that occurred inside of Israel. *Occupied* includes all types of terrorist attacks that occurred in the occupied territories. *Jerusalem* includes all types of terrorist attacks that occurred in Jerusalem. Model 4 then compares the effect of all types of attacks that primarily targeted civilians and those that targeted the Israeli military. All four models control for the state of the Israeli economy and the party of the prime minister. *Unemployment* is the unemployment level (%) in Israel. *Inflation* is the inflation rate (%). *Likud* is an indicator variable for whether the incumbent prime minister was from the Likud Party.

As expected, the data decisively demonstrate that the multiple variants of terrorism decrease popular approval for the peace process. The substantive impact, however, is not very large. Model 1 finds that for each terrorist attack (regardless of whether it is a shooting, stabbing, car bombing, or suicide attack), the estimated net effect on public approval is a decrease of 0.39 percentage points. If the number of attacks reaches the observed mean of 2.22 attacks per month, public approval would decrease by less than 1 percentage point.

The effect of suicide terrorism is larger than all other types of terrorism, but its impact is still surprisingly mild. Model 2 demonstrates that the expected effect of each suicide attack is a decrease of less than 2 percentage points in Israeli support for the peace process. Putting this number in perspective, the average number of suicide attacks per month during the Oslo period was 0.39. If the number of suicide attacks reaches this observed mean, public support for the peace process would dwindle by 0.78 percentage points. Moreover, the number of suicide attacks never exceeded 4 incidents in one month, which was unusual and only occurred during

the al-Aqsa Intifada. Yet, even an acute month of terror of this sort would decrease public approval by less than 8 percentage points.

The Israeli public makes a distinction between Palestinian attacks that primarily targeted civilians and those that targeted the Israeli military. Model 3 finds that the expected effect of each attack on civilians is a decrease in public approval of less than 1 percentage point. If the number civilian attacks reaches the observed mean of 1.7 attacks per month, public approval would decrease by about 1.6 percentage points. While the coefficient for military targets is positive, suggesting that these types of attacks increase public approval, there is not enough data to be certain that this effect is statistically different than 0 at this level of aggregation.

In addition, the location of the terrorism seems to matter to the Israeli public. As Model 4 demonstrates, attacks in Israel have the largest impact, decreasing public approval by 1.48 percentage points. In contrast, terrorist incidents in the occupied territories decrease public approval by 0.17 percentage points per attack and have no distinguishable effect when they occur in Jerusalem. If the number of attacks in Israel reaches the observed mean of 0.52 per month, public approval would decrease by 0.77 percentage points. If the number of attacks in the occupied territories reaches the observed mean of 1.22 attacks per month, approval would decrease by 0.21 percentage points.

It is important to note, however, that it is difficult to parse out the effect of location on public approval from that of target selection. A concern is that Palestinian militants disproportionately targeted the Israeli military in the occupied territories (82% of all military incidents). Indeed, these variables become statistically insignificant when simultaneously modeling public approval as a function of both target selection and location. This demonstrates that it is difficult to

conclude whether location or the target selection matters more to Israelis. Still, it does not change the fact that these variables have a small to no effect on public approval.

As a robustness check on the above findings, it is essential to consider how the magnitude of the terror, not just the number of events, affects Israeli perceptions. Model 5 in Table 6.1 investigates the effect of casualties on Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process. The coefficient for casualties demonstrates that for each Israeli victim, the expected effect on Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process is a decrease of 0.12 percentage points. If the number of casualties reaches the observed monthly mean of 4.95 victims, the expected decrease in approval would be about 0.6 percentage points. Thus, terrorism does not generate a dramatic change in average public support for the Oslo Peace Process even when taking into consideration both the frequency and the magnitude of attacks.

Another important extension is to consider how months without terrorism affect Israeli approval. Model 6 includes an indicator variable for months when no Palestinian terrorism occurred inside of Israel or the occupied territories. As Table 6.1 indicates, each month of calm increases Israeli support for the peace process by 1.71 percentage points. This effect is over four times as large as the effect of all types of terrorism and nearly as large as the effect of suicide terrorism. Given that there were 41 months of calm during the Oslo period, the effect of months without terrorism would have been substantial in offsetting the costs associated with terrorism.

The economic and political variables also reveal several important trends. Predictably, socio-tropic evaluations of the economy shape Israeli approval. Although the inflation rate appears to have no effect on Israeli perceptions, growing unemployment does have a statistically significant and negative effect. Specifically, a one percent change in the unemployment rate decreases public support by 1.35 to 1.9 percentage points, depending on the model specification. This

effect, however, is not too large when considering the average monthly change in unemployment, which was 0.036 percentage points during the Oslo period. A change of this magnitude would decrease Israeli approval by only 0.07 percentage points. Lastly, the presence of a Likud Prime Minister appears to increase the level of Israeli support, but there is not enough data to demonstrate if the effect is different than 0, at least at this level of aggregation of the dependent variable.

In summary, the time series models provide several important findings regarding public opinion in coercive terrorist crises. Overall, the effect of Palestinian terrorism on average Israeli opinion appears to be much smaller than conventional wisdom otherwise suggests. Thus, this tactic should not have generated much coercive pressure on Israeli leaders during active and serious negotiations, the type that would force leaders to suspend or end peace negotiations.

It is germane to note that aggregating the dependent variable into average public support for the peace process causes a loss of valuable information, however. For example, we cannot tell if public opinion is moving in a systematic direction or if there is a polarizing effect, moving Israeli attitudes into opposite ends of the spectrum. We also cannot tell how the strength of political attitudes mediates these changes in public opinion. The next section helps to get a handle on these issues.

6.3.2 Determinants of the Distribution of Israeli Approval

Recall that the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research asked the following permanent question: What is your opinion on the agreement that was signed in Oslo between Israel and the PLO (Agreement of Principles)? Israeli respondents could answer either “Strongly Support,” “Somewhat Support,” “In the Middle,” “Somewhat Oppose,” “Strongly Oppose,” or

“Uncertain.” Thus, the monthly Israeli responses are multinomial proportions bounded between 0 and 1, and sum-constrained to 1. In other words, they represent a composition with time series properties.

To determine how the independent variables affect these proportions, it is necessary to apply compositional time series analysis (Brunsdon and Smith 1998; also see Atchison 1986; Tomz, Tucker, and Wittenberg 2002). Let $\underline{\mathbf{r}}_t = (\mathbf{r}_{1t}, \mathbf{r}_{2t}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{Dt})$ denote a d -dimensional composition of survey responses $\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{d} + \mathbf{1}$ at time $t = 1, \dots, T$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^{d+1} \mathbf{r}_{it} = \mathbf{n}_t$. In this case, \mathbf{r}_1 is “Strongly Support,” \mathbf{r}_2 is “Somewhat Support,” \mathbf{r}_3 is “In the Middle,” \mathbf{r}_4 is “Somewhat Oppose,” \mathbf{r}_5 is “Strongly Oppose,” and \mathbf{r}_D is the fill-up value or reference category “uncertain.”²⁸ Let $\mathbf{x}_{it} = \mathbf{r}_{it}/\mathbf{n}_t$, $\underline{\mathbf{x}}_t = (\mathbf{x}_{1t}, \mathbf{x}_{2t}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{dt})$, then $\underline{\mathbf{x}}_t$ is a composition that lies in the simplex $\mathbf{S}^d = \{\mathbf{x}_{it}: \mathbf{0} < \mathbf{x}_{it} < 1, i = 1, \dots, d; \sum_{i=1}^d \mathbf{x}_{it} < 1; t = 1, \dots, T\}$, which form a multivariate time series. To take into account the boundary constraints of the simplex, it is necessary to map $\underline{\mathbf{x}}_t$ from \mathbf{S}^d onto \mathbb{R}^d and examine its statistical properties within \mathbb{R}^d . This can be done with the additive-logistic or $\mathbf{a}_d(\mathbf{x}_{it})$ transformation defined by:

$$\mathbf{y}_{it} = \mathbf{a}_d(\mathbf{x}_{it}) = \log\left(\frac{\mathbf{x}_{it}}{\mathbf{x}_{Dt}}\right), \quad (i = 1, \dots, d), (t = 1, \dots, T)$$

where

$$\mathbf{x}_{Dt} = \mathbf{1} - \sum_{i=1}^d \mathbf{x}_{it}$$

Transforming the data using the $\mathbf{a}_d(\mathbf{x}_{it})$ function produces a multivariate time series defined on the \mathbb{R}^d simplex at each time point t , which can be analyzed using standard time series methods. As a result, the effects of terrorism, the party of the prime minister and the state of the

²⁸ Smith and Brundson (1998) demonstrate that the model is invariant to the reference category.

Israeli economy on the log survey response ratios can be measured using maximum likelihood estimation with AR(1) disturbances.²⁹ The coefficients from the econometric models allow for empirical investigation in the \mathbb{R}^d simplex. The quantities of interest, however, are the changes in total percent shares of each categorical survey response, not the vector of log ratios. To recover these values, it is necessary to transform the predicted log survey response ratios back to response percentages. The inverse transformation of the additive logistic function for some reference category k is:

$$\begin{aligned} x_{it} &= \mathbf{a}_d^{(k)-1}(\mathbf{y}_{it}^{(k)}) = \frac{e^{y_{it}}}{\mathbf{1} + \sum_{j=1}^d e^{y_{jt}}}, \text{ if } (i = \mathbf{1}, \dots, \mathbf{d}) \\ &= \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\mathbf{1} + \sum_{j=1}^d e^{y_{jt}}}, \text{ if } (i = \mathbf{D}) \end{aligned}$$

Results

Table 6.2 through Table 6.7 report the results from six compositional time-series models using the same model specifications of terrorism as earlier. Because we are interested in the effects of the independent variables on the monthly survey response proportions, the tables include the expected first differences on the distribution of monthly Israeli support and 95 percent confidence intervals as recovered by the inverse of the additive logistic function. The specified unit changes for each independent variable are increases of 0 to 1 terrorist attack, the mean of the unemployment rate (8.02 percent) to its maximum value (10.6 percent), the mean of the inflation rate (0.48 percent) to its maximum value (3.02 percent), and no Likud Prime Minister (a value of 0) to the presence of a Likud Prime Minister (a value of 1). To interpret these effects visually,

²⁹ The estimated log survey response ratios are multivariate normal in the \mathbb{R}^d simplex.

Table 6.2. Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 1)

Survey Response (%)	Δ Terrorism (0 to 1 Attack)	Δ Unemployment (Mean to Max)	Δ Inflation (Mean to Max)	Δ Likud (0 to 1)
Strongly Support	-0.46 (-0.81 — -0.22)*	0.29 (-2.36 — 3.11)	2.32 (-0.67 — 6.48)	1.93 (0.27 — 3.46) *
Somewhat Support	-0.12 (-0.41 — 0.08)	-4.48 (-6.84 — -2.57) *	-0.97 (-5.13 — 2.61)	0.87 (-0.65 — 2.53)
In the Middle	-0.69 (-1.07 — -0.34)*	-2.01 (-5.1 — 0.83)	-0.38 (-5.9 — 4.1)	0.99 (-1.61 — 3.75)
Somewhat Oppose	0.18 (-0.02 — 0.41) ·	0.25 (-2.03 — 2.6)	-0.46 (-3.27 — 1.84)	-1.15 (-2.54 — -0.04) *
Strongly Oppose	0.99 (0.7 — 1.31)*	1.88 (-1.61 — 4.81)	-0.29 (-4.37 — 4.9)	-2.47 (-4.42 — -0.65) *
Uncertain	0.1 (-0.19 — 0.3)	4.07 (0.02 — 7.9) *	-0.21 (-3.56 — 3.64)	-0.18 (-1.79 — 1.55)

Note: Each column reports the estimated effect of first differences on the survey response proportions (%). The parentheses contain a 95% confidence interval for each expected first difference. While the expected first differences for some proportions are significant at the 0.1 level, the 90% confidence intervals are not included in order to promote consistency and clarity.

‘**’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant at 0.1.

Table 6.3. Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 2)

Survey Response (%)	Δ Non-Suicide (0 to 1 Attack)	Δ Suicide (0 to 1 Attack)	Δ Unemployment (Mean to Max)	Δ Inflation (Mean to Max)	Δ Likud (0 to 1)
Strongly Support	-0.24 (-0.45 — -0.01)*	-1.51 (-2.36 — -0.69) *	0.037 (-2.33 — 2.42)	3.05 (-1.57 — 6.55)	1.9 (0.12 — 3.6) *
Somewhat Support	-0.08 (-0.42 — 0.18)	-0.74 (-1.9 — 0.14) ·	-4.17 (-6.13 — -2.29)*	-0.5 (-3.4 — 3.09)	0.9 (-0.84 — 2.18)
In the Middle	-0.63 (-1.11 — -0.18)*	-0.89 (-1.99 — 0.33)	-2.42 (-5.67 — 0.09) ·	-0.82 (-4.21 — 3.54)	1.33 (-1.75 — 3.53)
Somewhat Oppose	0.1 (-0.15 — 0.3)	0.36 (-0.48 — 1.04)	0.34 (-0.15 — 0.3)	-0.55 (-3.18 — 3.19)	-1.11 (-2.56 — 0.15) ·
Strongly Oppose	0.74 (0.26 — 1.16)*	2.84 (1.49 — 3.89) *	1.48 (-1.45 — 4.26)	-1.41 (-4.98 — 1.68)	-2.89 (-5.18 — -0.91) *
Uncertain	0.11 (-0.25 — 0.37)	-0.058 (-0.97 — 0.79)	4.39 (0.73 — 8.94)*	0.22 (-2.87 — 4.25)	-0.14 (-2.28 — 1.46)

Note: Each column reports the estimated effect of first differences on the survey response proportions (%). The parentheses contain a 95% confidence interval for each expected first difference. While the expected first differences for some proportions are significant at the 0.1 level, the 90% confidence intervals are not included in order to promote consistency and clarity.

‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant at 0.1.

Table 6.4. Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 3)

Survey Response (%)	Δ Civilian (0 to 1 Attack)	Δ Military (0 to 1 Attack)	Δ Unemployment (Mean to Max)	Δ Inflation (Mean to Max)	Δ Likud (0 to 1)
Strongly Support	-0.6 (-0.92 — -0.29)*	0.06 (-0.73— 0.72)	0.04 (-2.33— 2.11)	2.02 (-1.28 — 6.18)	2.05 (0.21 — 3.74) *
Somewhat Support	-0.42 (-0.75 — -0.07)*	0.75 (-0.03 — 1.43) ·	-4.32 (-5.89 — -2.56)*	-0.64 (-3.63 — 1.98)	1.26 (-0.57 — 2.57)
In the Middle	-0.86 (-1.47 — -0.33)*	-0.06 (-1.19 — 0.96)	-2.43 (-5.26 — -0.12)*	-0.71 (-4.43 — 3.55)	1.36 (-1.08 — 3.24)
Somewhat Oppose	0.24 (-0.07 — 0.53) ·	-0.09 (-0.66— 0.52)	0.35 (-0.08 — 0.53) ·	-0.13 (-3.7 — 2.62)	-1.19 (1.37 — 0.18) ·
Strongly Oppose	1.38 (1.02— 1.79)*	-0.19 (-0.98 — 0.86)	2.04 (-1.18 — 4.81) ·	-0.36 (-3.93 — 2.39)	-3.08 (-4.96 — -1.15) *
Uncertain	0.26 (-0.05— 0.59)	-0.48 (-1.22— 0.28)	4.32 (0.34 — 8.91)*	-0.19 (-2.98 — 2.9)	-0.4 (-1.68 — 0.84)

Note: Each column reports the estimated effect of first differences on the survey response proportions (%). The parentheses contain a 95% confidence interval for each expected first difference. While the expected first differences for some proportions are significant at the 0.1 level, the 90% confidence intervals are not included in order to promote consistency and clarity.

‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant at 0.1.

Table 6.5. Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 4)

Survey Response (%)	Δ Israel (0 to 1 Attack)	Δ Occupied (0 to 1 Attack)	Δ Jerusalem (0 to 1 Attack)	Δ Unemployment (Mean to Max)	Δ Inflation (Mean to Max)	Δ Likud (0 to 1)
Strongly Support	-0.95 (-1.97 — -0.17)*	-0.34 (-0.71 — -0.02) *	-0.3 (-1.6 — 0.72)	0.41 (-1.73 — 2.46)	2.14 (-1.59 — 4.89)	2.14 (-1.59 — 4.89)
Somewhat Support	-0.96 (-2.02 — -0.03)*	0.23 (-0.11 — 0.54)	-0.68 (-1.71 — 0.14)	-4.15 (-6.39 — -1.8)*	-0.08 (-2.97 — 2.83)	-0.08 (-2.97 — 2.83)
In the Middle	-0.3 (-1.96 — 1.1)	-1.01 (-1.52 — -0.31) *	-0.1 (-1.76 — 1.72)	-2.07 (-5.94 — 1.45)	-1.12 (-5.59 — 4.09)	-1.12 (-5.59 — 4.09)
Somewhat Oppose	0.07 (-0.8 — 0.92)	0.24 (-0.05 — 0.47)	-0.03 (-1.01 — 0.6)	0.36 (-1.76 — 2.3)	0.18 (-2.21 — 3.6)	0.18 (-2.21 — 3.6)
Strongly Oppose	2.07 (0.74 — 3.35)*	0.85 (0.35 — 1.29) *	0.84 (-0.6 — 2.41)	1.28 (-1.84 — 5.15)	-0.82 (-3.76 — 3.43)	-0.8 (-3.76 — 3.4)
Uncertain	0.1 (-1.14 — 1.21)	0.02 (-0.5 — 0.36)	0.27 (-1.06 — 1.38)	4.18 (1.01 — 8.56)*	-0.3 (-2.8 — 3.41)	-0.3 (-2.8 — 3.41)

Note: Each column reports the estimated effect of first differences on the survey response proportions (%). The parentheses contain a 95% confidence interval for each expected first difference. While the expected first differences for some proportions are significant at the 0.1 level, the 90% confidence intervals are not included in order to promote consistency and clarity.

*' significant at 0.05; '·' significant at 0.1.

Table 6.6. Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 5)

Survey Response (%)	Δ Casualties (0 to 1 Victim)	Δ Unemployment (Mean to Max)	Δ Inflation (Mean to Max)	Δ Likud (0 to 1)
Strongly Support	-0.19 (-0.28 — -0.11)*	-0.63 (-3.09 — 1.14)	2.94 (0.01 — 6.78)*	1.55 (-0.13 — 3.36)·
Somewhat Support	0.003 (-0.1 — 0.09)	-5.05 (-7.46 — -2.79) *	-0.97 (-4.23 — 1.99)	0.63 (-1.44 — 2.54)
In the Middle	-0.13 (-0.25 — -0.002)*	-3.84 (-6.77 — -0.95) *	-1.07 (-7.14 — 2.81)	0.35 (-2.65 — 3.12)
Somewhat Oppose	0.08 (0.03 — 0.14) *	0.55 (-1.43 — 2.12)	-0.48 (-2.98 — 2.05)	-1.03 (-2.21 — 0.15)·
Strongly Oppose	0.23 (0.1 — 0.35)*	4.55 (0.46 — 8.08)*	-0.66 (-4.5 — 4.12)	-1.52 (-4.74 — 0.74)
Uncertain	-0.004 (-0.09 — 0.08)	4.42 (0.46 — 8.8) *	0.25 (-2.54 — 3.73)	0.03 (-1.93 — 1.89)

Note: Each column reports the estimated effect of first differences on the survey response proportions (%). The parentheses contain a 95% confidence interval for each expected first difference. While the expected first differences for some proportions are significant at the 0.1 level, the 90% confidence intervals are not included in order to promote consistency and clarity.

‘**’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant at 0.1.

Table 6.7. Expected First Differences on Distribution of Monthly Support (Model 6)

Survey Response (%)	Δ No Terrorism (0 to 1)	Δ Unemployment (Mean to Max)	Δ Inflation (Mean to Max)	Δ Likud (0 to 1)
Strongly Support	1.67 (0.32 — 2.71)*	-1.13 (-3.69 — 1.18)	2.18 (-1.73 — 5.72)	1.35 (-0.45 — 3.37)
Somewhat Support	1.01 (-0.46 — 2.17)	-5.13 (-7.92 — -3.08) *	-1.52 (-4.77 — 1.32)	0.65 (-1.8 — 2.6)
In the Middle	0.04 (-2.46 — 2.09)	-4.01 (-6.91 — -0.63) *	-0.8 (-5.67 — 4.43)	0.42 (-2.3 — 3.42)
Somewhat Oppose	-1.16 (-2.24 — -0.13) *	0.63 (-1.42 — 2.91)	-0.27 (-3.07 — 2.45)	-0.93 (-2.48 — 0.54)
Strongly Oppose	-2.49 (-4.78 — 0.13) ·	5.29 (0.93 — 9.24)*	-0.15 (-3.75 — 4.09)	-1.52 (-4.16 — 0.49)
Uncertain	0.94 (-0.72 — 2.52)	4.34 (0.68 — 9.3) *	0.57 (-2.65 — 4.26)	0.04 (-1.44 — 1.98)

Note: Each column reports the estimated effect of first differences on the survey response proportions (%). The parentheses contain a 95% confidence interval for each expected first difference. While the expected first differences for some proportions are significant at the 0.1 level, the 90% confidence intervals are not included in order to promote consistency and clarity.

‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant at 0.1.


Figure 6.2 displays changes in the survey response proportions as each independent variable moves from its minimum value to its maximum.³⁰

The data demonstrate that the multiple variants of terrorism systematically decrease popular approval of the peace process and increase opposition to it. Moreover, individuals who are “in the middle” regarding support for the peace process are departing at a faster rate for nearly every model specification, suggesting ambivalent individuals are most likely to modify their opinions. Overall, these changes are still quite small based on individual terrorist attacks. Model 1 demonstrates that for each terrorist attack, the percentage of Israelis strongly supporting the peace process and “in the middle” decrease by 0.46 and 0.69 percentage points respectively. In contrast, the proportion of Israelis who strongly oppose the peace process increases by 0.99 percentage points.

These effects are similar when disaggregating the terrorist incidents according to the type of attack, location, and target, though to different degrees. Model 2 reveals that suicide terrorism produces a larger substantive effect than all other types of attacks. Specifically, Israelis strongly supporting the peace process decrease by about 1.5 percentage points and those strongly opposed to the peace process increase by about 2.8 percentage points. In comparison, non-suicide attacks decrease the percentage strongly supporting the peace process by 0.24 percentage points and increase the percentage strongly opposed to the peace process by 0.74 percentage points. It is also germane to highlight that non-suicide attacks diminish the size of Israelis who are “in the middle” by 0.63 percentage points.

³⁰ Since the effects of the unemployment rate, inflation rate, and Likud Party are roughly the same across these models, Figure 6.2 only includes estimates based on Model 3.

Figure 6.2. Expected Proportion of Approval of Oslo Peace Process



*Note: the ticks directly above the x-axes are graphical rugs with a small amount of noise to illustrate the observed distribution of each independent variable.

Model 3 confirms the earlier finding that the Israeli public makes a distinction between Palestinian terrorist attacks that target civilians and those that target the military. For each attack primarily targeting civilians, Israelis who “strongly support,” “somewhat support,” and are “in the middle” decrease by 0.6, 0.41 and 0.86 percentage points respectively; the proportion that “strongly oppose” increases by 1.38 percentage points. In contrast, Israeli approval for the peace process appears to increase when Palestinian terrorist attacks target the military. Yet, these changes are not statistically significant, with exception to the increase of 0.75 percentage points among those who “somewhat support” the peace process, which is statistically significant at the 0.1 level.

Similarly, the location has a statistically significant effect on the distribution of Israeli attitudes. Just as the AR(1) models found, terrorism that occurs in Israel has a larger impact than those that occur in the occupied territories and Jerusalem. The proportion who “strongly support” the peace process and “somewhat support” the peace process decrease by 0.95 and 0.96 percentage points respectively when the attacks occur inside of Israel. Those who are strongly opposed to the peace process increase by about 2 percentage points. When the attacks occur in the occupied territories, the expected effect on Israelis who strongly support the peace process decreases by 0.34 percentage points, and the proportion strongly opposed increases by 0.85 percentage points. Under this same scenario, the percentage “in the middle” decrease by about 1 percentage points.

Examination into the magnitude of attacks confirms that terrorism causes a small systematic shift. Model 5 in Table 6.6 reveals that each Israeli victim of terrorism decreases the proportion of Israelis who “strongly support” the peace process by 0.19 percentage points and increases the proportion of those who “strongly oppose” by 0.23 percentage points. Israelis who are “in the

middle” decrease by 0.13 percentage points per Israeli victim. As can be seen in Figure 6.2, even a typically deadly month of 5 attacks does not have a large effect. Thus, both the number of attacks and casualties from terrorism should generate little coercive pressure.

It is also significant to highlight that months without terrorism increase the proportions in support of the peace process and decrease those in opposition. Model 6 in Table 6.7 finds that each month of calm increases the proportion of Israelis who “strongly support” the peace process by 1.67 percentage points and decreases the proportion of Israelis who “somewhat oppose” by 1.16 percentage points. The model also suggests that the proportion of Israelis who “strongly oppose” the peace process decreases by 2.49 percentage points, though this estimate is only significant at the 0.1 level. Overall, this supports the finding that’s months of calm will reverse the damage caused by episodes of terrorism.

Turning to the state of the Israeli economy, unemployment has a statistically significant and independent effect on several of the percent shares of approval. As the unemployment rate increases the proportion that “somewhat support” the peace process shrinks and the proportion feeling “uncertain” grows significantly for nearly every model specification. An increase in the inflation rate appears to generate strong support for the peace process, but this relationship is only statistically significant in Model 5. Overall, these findings demonstrate that sociotropic judgments factor into Israeli evaluations of the peace process.

Lastly, the models find that the party of the prime minister does in fact shape Israeli perceptions toward the peace process. Depending on the model specification, the presence of a Likud prime minister increases the proportion of Israelis who “strongly support” the peace process by about 2 percentage points. It also decreases the proportion of Israelis who “strongly oppose” the peace process by about 2.5 to 3 percentage points. This confirms that party cues can

play a powerful role in shaping public perceptions. It also supports Schultz's (2005) finding that hawkish leaders are better equipped to produce a sustainable and durable peace than their dovish counterparts.

To summarize, the analysis to this point has focused on how terrorism, the state of the Israeli economy and the party of the prime minister affect average Israeli opinion and the distribution of Israeli attitudes. In combination, the data provide overwhelming evidence that terrorism decreases public approval for the peace process and increases opposition to it. These changes, however, are not very large and should not generate much coercive pressure on Israeli leaders. It also finds that sociotropic judgments and the party of the prime minister can shape public evaluations of the peace process. The next section examines which segments of the Israeli population are most likely to be affected by these monthly-level predictors.

6.3.3 Determinants of Individual-Level Approval

To leverage the effects of terrorism, inflation, unemployment, and the party affiliation of the incumbent government on individual-level evaluations of the Oslo Peace Process, I apply a two-stage estimation process (Lewis and Linzer 2005; Gelman and Hill 2006). The first stage uses the individual-level demographic variables to predict approval in each month. The second stage regresses these estimates from the first stage on the monthly-level predictors. This tells us how the variables of interest affect the propensity of support within each specified demographic group.

Given the discrete nature of the dependent variable in the first stage – whether the Israeli respondent approves or disapproves of the Oslo Peace Process – I adopt the following logistic regression model:

$$\ln \left[\frac{\pi_{it}}{1 - \pi_{it}} \right] = \beta_{1t} + \sum_{j=2}^k \beta_j x_{ijt} + \epsilon_{it}$$


for individuals $i = 1, \dots, N$ and where π is the $\Pr(Y_{it} = 1|x_{ijt})$ at time $t = 1, \dots, T$. The dependent variable Y_{it} is 1 if an Israeli respondent approves of the Oslo Peace Process at time t and 0 otherwise. The covariates x_{ijt} are demographic predictors indexed by j , which include gender, age, education, how religious the respondent considers herself or himself, income, and a series of indicator variables for party identification (left-wing party, right-wing party, centrist party, or religious party). Thus, these regression models aim to predict who is most likely to support the Oslo Peace Process based on these demographic factors for each survey at time t .

To demonstrate trends across time, Figure 6.3 plots the regression coefficients for each survey at time t . The bars around each point estimate are 95% confidence intervals and the fitted cubic spline helps to reveal the trends visually. Values above and below 0 indicate whether the demographic variables positively or negatively predict Israeli approval.

Several patterns immediately become clear from these scatter plots. Secular and affluent Israelis who identify with a left-wing or centrist party are most likely to approve of the Oslo Peace Process. Israelis who are religious and identify with a right-wing or religious party are most likely to disapprove. It should be noted, however, that those affiliating with a religious party moved to the realm of indifference following the 1999 Israeli election. This outcome is likely the product of the ultraorthodox Shas party joining Prime Minister Barak's left-wing governing coalition. Lastly, gender, age, and education do not appear to predict approval.

Next, the following second stage regression is applied to the estimated regression coefficients from stage 1 in order to determine how the monthly-level factors affect individual-level evaluations of the Oslo Peace Process:

Figure 6.3. Demographic Features Predicting Support for Oslo Peace Process



$$y_t^* = \beta_1 \mathbf{1} + \sum_{j=2}^k \beta_j x_{jt} + u_t + \epsilon_t$$

for observations $t = 1, \dots, T$, $\mathbf{E}(u_t) = \mathbf{0}$, $\text{Var}(u_t) = w_t^2$ and $\text{var}(\epsilon_t) = \sigma^2$. y_t^* is the vector of the estimated regression coefficients from stage 1. u_t is the sampling error in y_t^* and w_t^2 is the variance of that sampling error. x_{jt} are the level-2 covariates, which include the monthly-levels of terrorism, inflation, unemployment, and the incumbent government's party affiliation (1 if the Prime Minister was from the Likud Party and 0 otherwise). Since the sampling variances of y_i^* are not constant (though small) across samples, Ordinary Least Squares will produce inconsistent standard error estimates. The OLS standard errors can be corrected, however, using heteroscedastic consistent standard errors.³¹ In cases where the estimates exhibit serial correlation due to a time series process, I apply heteroscedastic autocorrelation consistent standard errors.

Results

The results demonstrate that the effects of terrorism are highly dependent on the demographic features of the Israeli public. Palestinian terrorist attacks decrease approval of the peace process among older Israelis, voters who affiliate with left-leaning and centrist parties, but actually increase approval among females and those affiliating with a religious party. Although these effects are statistical significant at the 0.05 level, they are not substantively very large when considering the underlying probability of approval within each group.

³¹ Following the recommendation from Lewis and Linzer (2005), I apply Efron standard errors (also known as HC3 standard errors).

Holding all other independent variables constant at a fixed value, Model 1 finds that each attack increases the estimated probability of approval by an average amount of 0.003 (from 0.348 to 0.351) among women and 0.008 (from 0.272 to 0.281) among religious party affiliates during the period of investigation. In contrast, the estimated probability of approval decreases by 0.004 (from 0.353 to 0.349) for an average aged Israeli in the dataset (40.55 years), 0.011 (from 0.556 to 0.545) for a left-wing party affiliate, and 0.007 (from 0.615 to 0.608) for a centrist party affiliate. Even doubling these changes, which is approximately equivalent to an average month of violence during the Oslo period, does not produce a major shift in approval among this subset of the Israeli population.

Similarly, the type of terrorist attack, the location, and the primary target produce unique results on the Israeli demographic. Model 2 finds that suicide terrorism causes a larger effect among left-wing and right-wing Israelis compared to other types of violence. Substantively, each suicide attack causes an average decrease of 0.023 (from 0.556 to 0.533) for left-wing party affiliates and 0.025 (from 0.267 to 0.242) among right-wing party affiliates in the estimated probability of each group supporting the peace process. Recall the average number of suicide attacks during the Oslo period was 0.39 and never exceeded 4 incidents in one month. This implies that the substantive effect is still low even among these key demographic groups.

Model 3 demonstrates a sharp contrast between attacks primarily targeting civilians and those targeting the military. When Palestinian extremists targeted civilians, each attack decreases the estimated probability of approval by an average amount of 0.014 (from 0.556 to 0.542) among left-wing party affiliates, 0.007 (from 0.615 to 0.608) among centrist party affiliates, and 0.008 (from 0.353 to 0.346) for an average aged Israeli. Yet, the propensity to support the peace

Table 6.8. Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 1)

	Female	Age	Education	Religious	Income	Left-wing Party	Right-wing Party	Centrist Party	Religious Party	Constant
Terrorism	0.014 (0.007)*	-0.0005 (0.0002)*	0.0004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.047 (0.012)***	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.032 (0.013)*	0.045 (0.026)·	-0.001 (0.018)
Inflation	-0.037 (0.039)	0.001 (0.039)	-0.014 (0.023)	0.023 (0.021)	0.033 (0.017)·	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.063)	0.3 (0.078)***	-0.509 (0.176)**	-0.075 (0.133)
Unemployment	0.046 (0.029)	0.0001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.038 (0.015)*	0.009 (0.012)	0.114 (0.062)·	0.157 (0.052)**	-0.122 (0.065)·	0.345 (0.12)**	-0.135 (0.08)·
Likud	0.003 (0.051)	-0.0003 (0.002)	-0.069 (0.026)**	0.024 (0.026)	0.013 (0.021)	0.257 (0.088)**	0.073 (0.085)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.305 (0.2)	0.285 (0.141)*
Constant	-0.418 (0.235)·	0.006 (0.008)	0.095 (0.13)	-0.019 (0.119)	0.025 (0.1)	0.285 (0.522)	-1.827 (0.446)***	2.183 (0.548)***	-3.056 (0.982)**	0.011 (0.651)

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate second stage OLS regression with heteroscedastic consistent and heteroscedastic autocorrelation consistent standard errors (below each estimate in parentheses). Each dependent variable is the estimated regression coefficients for the specified demographic variable taken from the first stage logistic regressions. I omitted independents or “non-party affiliates” to avoid collinearity.
 ‘***’ significant at 0.001; ‘**’ significant at 0.01; ‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant 0.1

Table 6.9. Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 2)

	Female	Age	Education	Religious	Income	Left-wing Party	Right-wing Party	Centrist Party	Religious Party	Constant
Non-Suicide	0.009 (0.009)	-0.0004 (0.0003)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.038 (0.012)**	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.042 (0.013)**	0.041 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.027)
Suicide	0.045 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.0001)	-0.028 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.1 (0.042)*	-0.138 (0.046)**	0.031 (0.058)	0.068 (0.085)	0.066 (0.106)
Inflation	-0.045 (0.04)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.023)	0.023 (0.021)	0.033 (0.018)·	0.004 (0.058)	0.004 (0.059)	0.284 (0.08)***	-0.515 (0.178)**	-0.092 (0.133)
Unemployment	0.043 (0.028)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.038 (0.015)*	0.01 (0.012)	0.119 (0.061)·	0.168 (0.044)**	-0.129 (0.065)·	0.343 (0.12)**	-0.142 (0.083)·
Likud PM	-0.004 (0.052)	-0.0001 (0.002)	-0.063 (0.027)*	0.024 (0.027)	0.013 (.021)	0.269 (0.089)**	0.1 (0.085)	-0.064 (0.122)	-0.31 (0.206)	0.27 (0.145)·
Constant	-0.388 (0.233)·	0.005 (0.008)	0.067 (0.137)	-0.02 (0.121)	0.024 (0.1)	0.234 (0.518)	-1.938 (0.376)***	2.244 (0.557)***	-3.034 (0.988)**	0.076 (0.682)

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate second stage OLS regression with heteroscedastic consistent and heteroscedastic autocorrelation consistent standard errors (below each estimate in parentheses). Each dependent variable is the estimated regression coefficients for the specified demographic variable taken from the first stage logistic regressions. I omitted independents or “non-party affiliates” to avoid collinearity.

‘***’ significant at 0.001; ‘**’ significant at 0.01; ‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant 0.1

Table 6.10. Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 3)

	Female	Age	Education	Religious	Income	Left-wing Party	Right-wing Party	Centrist Party	Religious Party	Constant
Civilian	0.021 (0.009)*	-0.001 (0.0004)*	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.004)·	-0.062 (0.0148)***	-0.039 (0.0238)	-0.032 (0.02)**	0.06 (0.031)·	0.017 (0.035)
Military	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.009 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.0287)	-0.008 (0.009)	0.008 (0.0222)	0.029 (0.0363)	-0.032 (0.058)	-0.007 (0.059)	-0.065 (0.123)
Inflation	-0.04 (0.039)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.023 (0.021)	0.034 (0.017)·	-0.013 (0.0567)	-0.02 (0.062)	0.299 (0.078)***	-0.513 (0.173)**	-0.081 (0.13)
Unemployment	0.048 (0.029)	0.00001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.037 (0.016)*	0.008 (0.012)	0.109 (0.065)·	0.153 (0.051)**	-0.121 (0.065)·	0.35 (0.12)**	-0.129 (0.081)
Likud PM	-0.011 (0.053)	0.0004 (0.002)	-0.065 (0.028)*	0.023 (0.028)	0.019 (0.022)	0.287 (0.095)**	0.103 (0.086)	-0.05 (0.123)	-0.334 (0.205)	0.249 (0.144)·
Constant	-0.429 (0.239)·	0.006 (0.008)	0.1 (0.131)	-0.021 (0.121)	0.031 (0.099)	0.305 (0.546)	-1.814 (0.438)***	2.176 (0.552)***	-3.034 (0.988)**	-0.016 (0.658)

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate second stage OLS regression with heteroscedastic consistent and heteroscedastic autocorrelation consistent standard errors (below each estimate in parentheses). Each dependent variable is the estimated regression coefficients for the specified demographic variable taken from the first stage logistic regressions. I omitted independents or “non-party affiliates” to avoid collinearity.

‘***’ significant at 0.001; ‘**’ significant at 0.01; ‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant 0.1

Table 6.11. Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 4)

	Female	Age	Education	Religious	Income	Left-wing Party	Right-wing Party	Centrist Party	Religious Party	Constant
Israel	0.008 (0.027)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.035 (0.013)**	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.132 (0.046)**	-0.116 (0.0695)	-0.007 (0.048)	0.139 (0.096)	0.009 (0.109)
Occupied	0.01 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.0049)	-0.036 (0.015)*	-0.001 (0.0136)	-0.068 (0.026)*	0.038 (0.029)	0.023 (0.03)
Jerusalem	0.038 (0.038)	-0.002 (0.001)*	0.012 (0.02)	0.044 (0.016)**	-0.009 (0.0182)	0.03 (0.04)	0.007 (0.0443)	0.083 (0.056)	-0.055 (0.095)	-0.107 (0.101)
Inflation	-0.039 (0.039)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.027 (0.022)	0.034 (0.018) ·	-0.005 (0.058)	-0.006 (0.063)	0.28 (0.081)***	-0.521 (0.183)**	-0.065 (0.141)
Unemployment	0.048 (0.03)	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.00004 (0.015)	-0.031 (0.015)*	0.009 (0.012)	0.129 (0.062)*	0.17 (0.046)***	-0.116 (0.067) ·	0.327 (0.126)*	-0.145 (0.08) ·
Likud PM	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.069 (0.027)*	0.026 (0.026)	0.014 (0.022)	0.271 (0.089)**	0.101 (0.081)	-0.087 (0.127)	-0.316 (0.209)	0.308 (0.143)*
Constant	-0.439 (0.245) ·	0.009 (0.008)	0.079 (0.126)	-0.083 (0.116)	0.025 (0.102)	0.144 (0.523)	-1.954 (0.388)***	2.142 (0.568)***	-2.888 (1.038)**	0.087 (0.659)

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate second stage OLS regression with heteroscedastic consistent and heteroscedastic autocorrelation consistent standard errors (below each estimate in parentheses). Each dependent variable is the estimated regression coefficients for the specified demographic variable taken from the first stage logistic regressions. I omitted independents or “non-party affiliates” to avoid collinearity.

‘***’ significant at 0.001; ‘**’ significant at 0.01; ‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant 0.1

Table 6.12. Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 5)

	Female	Age	Education	Religious	Income	Left-wing Party	Right-wing Party	Centrist Party	Religious Party	Constant
Casualties	0.004 (0.003)	-0.0001 (0.00008)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.001)	0.0011 (0.002)	-0.01 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.0043)*	-0.003 (0.008)	0.014 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.007)
Inflation	-0.041 (0.039)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.01 (0.022)	0.023 (0.0207)	0.031 (0.02)	-0.008 (0.054)	-0.011 (0.062)	0.3 (0.083)***	-0.524 (0.179)**	-0.07 (0.134)
Unemployment	0.058 (0.0264)*	-0.0003 (0.0009)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.039 (0.014)**	0.003 (0.011)	0.07 (0.059)	0.143 (0.051)**	-0.157 (0.064)*	0.382 (0.107)***	-0.135 (0.079)
Likud PM	0.009 (0.052)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.068 (0.026)*	0.023 (0.026)	0.01 (0.022)	0.237 (0.104)*	0.066 (0.087)	-0.065 (0.121)	-0.287 (0.202)	0.286 (0.286)*
Constant	-0.505 (0.222)*	0.009 (0.008)	0.074 (0.128)	-0.009 (0.112)	0.066 (0.096)	0.589 (0.504)	-1.716 (0.448)***	2.415 (0.553)***	-3.323 (0.912)***	0.01 (0.222)

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate second stage OLS regression with heteroscedastic consistent and heteroscedastic autocorrelation consistent standard errors (below each estimate in parentheses). Each dependent variable is the estimated regression coefficients for the specified demographic variable taken from the first stage logistic regressions. I omitted independents or “non-party affiliates” to avoid collinearity.

‘***’ significant at 0.001; ‘**’ significant at 0.01; ‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘.’ significant 0.1

Table 6.13. Effect of Monthly-Level Factors on Demographic Indicators (Model 6)

	Female	Age	Education	Religious	Income	Left-wing Party	Right-wing Party	Centrist Party	Religious Party	Constant
No Terrorism	-0.017 (0.05)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.016 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.026)	0.008 (0.022)	0.227 (0.085)**	0.208 (0.088)*	-0.008 (0.121)	-0.027 (0.182)	0.266 (0.14)·
Inflation	-0.036 (0.038)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.015 (0.023)	0.021 (0.02)	0.033 (0.018)·	-0.01 (0.047)	-0.016 (0.063)	0.294 (0.084)***	-0.503 (0.192)*	-0.058 (0.137)
Unemployment	0.063 (0.027)*	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.04 (0.014)**	0.004 (0.011)	0.055 (0.058)	0.128 (0.053)*	-0.161 (0.067)*	0.401 (0.109)***	-0.137 (0.078)·
Likud	0.011 (0.052)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.069 (0.026)*	0.024 (0.026)	0.01 (0.021)	0.225 (0.1)*	0.054 (0.085)	-0.066 (0.124)	-0.28 (0.21)	0.278 (0.139)*
Constant	-0.523 (0.226)*	0.01 (0.006)·	0.099 (0.133)	0.004 (0.114)	0.055 (0.099)	0.56 (0.511)	-1.732 (0.441)***	2.439 (0.569)***	-3.4 (0.969)**	-0.099 (0.634)

Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate second stage OLS regression with heteroscedastic consistent and heteroscedastic autocorrelation consistent standard errors (below each estimate in parentheses). Each dependent variable is the estimated regression coefficients for the specified demographic variable taken from the first stage logistic regressions. I omitted independents or “non-party affiliates” to avoid collinearity.

‘***’ significant at 0.001; ‘**’ significant at 0.01; ‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant 0.1

process went up for women, but again by a small margin of 0.005. When Palestinian extremists targeted the IDF, these attacks had no effect across all of the demographic groups.

Model 4 underscores that the location of Palestinian terrorism has an independent effect on the various demographic groups as well. Each attack that occurred inside of Israel decreases the estimated probability of supporting the peace process by an average amount of 0.031 (from 0.556 to 0.525) for left-wing affiliates and 0.017 (from 0.353 to 0.337) for a typically religious Israeli (2.11 on a 5-point scale where 1 is very religious). Similarly, each attack in the occupied territories decreases the propensity of approval by 0.009 (from 0.556 to 0.548) for left-wing party affiliates and 0.015 (from 0.615 to 0.6) for centrist party affiliates. Attacks in Jerusalem lowered the probability of support according to age, albeit by a substantively small amount.

Each attack in the holy city decreases the probability of approval by 0.021 (from 0.353 to 0.332) for an average aged Israeli. Interestingly, the propensity to support the peace process increases by 0.021 (from 0.353 to 0.374) for a typically religious Israeli per attack in Jerusalem.

Once again as a robustness check, I consider how Israeli casualties impact the propensity of support among these different demographic groups. Table 6.12 reveals that casualties do have a small statistically significant effect on Israelis affiliating with a right-wing party. Within this demographic group, the probability of approval decreases by 0.002 (from 0.267 to 0.265). A similar sized decrease occurs for Israelis supporting a left-wing party, but this effect is only significant at the 0.1 level. Thus, these data confirm that the number of terrorist incidents as well as the magnitude of attacks has a very small independent effect on the Israeli demographic groups.

Next, I consider how a month without terrorism affects the various segments of the Israeli population. Model 6 in Table 6.13 demonstrates that months of calm increase support among the

Israeli left and right by a substantial amount. Specifically, each month without terrorism increases the estimated probability of approval by an average amount of 0.052 (from 0.556 to 0.608) among left-wing party affiliates and 0.041 (from 0.267 to 0.308) among right-wing party affiliates during the period of investigation. Note that these effects are substantially larger than those produced by individual terror attacks.

Also consistent with the earlier findings, sociotropic judgments matter to Israelis.³² A one-unit increase in the inflation rate increases the probability of supporting the peace process by 0.062 (from 0.615 to 0.677) for centrist party affiliates, but decreases approval by 0.081 (from 0.273 to 0.192) for religious party affiliates. Similarly, a one-unit increase in the unemployment rate increases the estimated probability of approval by 0.0645 (from 0.273 to 0.337) among religious party affiliates and 0.07 (from 0.267 to 0.337) among right-wing party supporters; an increase of the same magnitude decreases the probability by 0.0267 (from 0.615 to 0.588) among Israeli centrists. While these changes in the probability of approval appear large, it is important to point out that there was not much variation in these economic indicators during the Oslo period. The average monthly change in the unemployment rate was 0.035 percent and the average monthly change in the inflation rate was 0.0002 percent. It is unclear why Israel's inflation and unemployment rates generate effects in opposite directions among Israelis affiliating with a religious political party. Although this issue is outside the scope of this research project, it provides an interesting opening for future research.

Finally, the various models demonstrate that the party of the prime minister has a significant effect on various Israeli demographic groups. If the prime minister is from the Likud Party, the

³² For consistency, the reported estimates discussing the economic variables and the Likud Party variable come from Model 1.

estimated probability of supporting the Oslo Peace Process increases by 0.059 (from 0.556 to 0.615) for Israelis on the political left, but decreases by 0.052 (from 0.353 to 0.301) for an average educated Israeli (between high school and some college). Moreover, it has no effect among Israelis affiliating with the Likud party. Thus, I find that the party of the prime minister acts as an important informational cue to the public, but mostly toward individuals who affiliate with left-wing parties.

6.4 Discussion

This chapter aimed to shed light on the effect of coercive terrorism on government policies. As discussed earlier, two elements are needed for terrorism to be coercive. First, the incumbent government must care about public opinion. Second, there needs to be a shift in the attitudes of the targeted community, and this shift needs to be substantial in order to generate enough coercive pressure on leaders to reevaluate their policies.

Applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, mounting evidence provides support for the first criteria. That is, Israeli prime ministers were quite concerned over public perceptions of the Oslo Peace Process. Not only did each government frequently check opinion polls to gauge the mood of the public. They also took hawkish actions (albeit often provoked by their adversaries), such as “Operation Accountability” and “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” to reassure Israelis that the government was not soft on security. Furthermore, any peace agreement reached with the Palestinians would need to be approved by a popular referendum, thereby accentuating the importance of public opinion. Hence, any sudden change in Israeli attitudes toward the peace process as a result of terrorism potentially could generate coercive pressure on Israeli leaders to break off negotiations.

The data, however, cast doubt on the second criteria. Despite the potential trouble extremist groups posed for the Oslo Peace Process, I find that their impact on negotiations was, or at least should have been, quite negligible. Palestinian terrorism did decrease Israeli support for the peace process. Each attack did chip away at popular support among the political left, the Israeli centrists, and those “in the middle.” But the overall net effect on public opinion was surprisingly small. Specifically, average Israeli support for the Peace Process decreased by 0.39 percentage points for all types of violence, 1.99 percentage points for suicide terrorism, 0.95 percentage points for attacks targeting civilians, 1.48 percentage points for attacks in Israel, and 0.17 percentage points for attacks in the occupied territories. Moreover, months without terrorism increased Israeli support by 1.71 percentage points, thereby undoing much of the damage caused by extremist violence.

Of course, terrorism can produce larger swings in approval when there is an intense terror campaign as had occurred with the al-Aqsa Intifada. For example, Figure 6.2 highlights the expected changes in Israeli approval as terrorism moves from its lowest point to its highest point. This degree of violence, which could have generated serious pressure on the negotiators, was not typical during the Oslo period, however, and did not occur until after the collapse of the Camp David talks. What is more, this violence did not occur on the backs of one or even two Palestinian extremist groups. Quite to the contrary, the al-Aqsa Intifada achieved widespread participation, even among groups affiliated with the PLO, such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the type of terrorism that so-called “spoilers” are capable of producing during negotiations can achieve much in terms of shifting public opinion. This does not mean that Israelis were not concerned for their personal security. It simply means that their attitudes toward the peace process were largely unmoved.

It is important to note that some Palestinians believed that the violence from the al-Aqsa Intifada would have forced Israel's hand in negotiations. For example, Marwan Barghouti claimed that the Intifada would lead to "peace in the end" and that the Palestinians needed to "escalate the conflict."³³ Yet, violence had the opposite effect. The Israeli public preferred to endure the terrorist campaign than make the compromises necessary to end the conflict, just as the survey experiments in the United States and Lebanon found.

The results also illuminate why Palestinian terrorism had such a marginal effect. Nearly one-half of the Israeli population opposed to the Oslo Peace Process from the very beginning. Moreover, nearly one-third of the population was loyal to the peace track throughout the Oslo period. For both of these groups, terrorism provided no additional information and thus, did not affect their attitudes. That leaves roughly one-sixth of the population – a cohort consisting of the ambivalent, centrists and left-leaning Israelis – susceptible to attitudinal change as a result of terrorist events, sudden economic fluctuations and party politics. In other words, the potential for attitudinal change was coming from only a small fraction of the Israeli public.

This insight provides an important policy implication. Any left-leaning prime minister in favor of making peace must build the largest base of support as possible. Since nearly half of the population opposed the Oslo negotiations, it seems that his or her efforts should be exerted on persuading or changing the minds of these individuals. Yet, given the segment of the population influenced by terrorism, this should not necessarily be the priority. Rather, more focus should be placed on support maintenance. For example, Prime Minister Rabin tried this approach when he

³³ Ben Caspit, "You'll Miss Me Yet: Interview with Marwan Barghouti," *Ma'ariv*, 9 November 2001, in Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 5th ed. (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's Press, 2004), pp. 527-30.

attempted to prepare his public for inevitable extremist violence. In his words, "...we have no intention of shirking from the efforts toward peace, even if the acts of terrorism continue to harm us. We, on our side, will make every effort against the terrorists."³⁴ Similarly, as mentioned above, Israeli leaders took hawkish military actions to demonstrate that they were not soft on security. Other mechanisms could also help in maintaining this support. Counterintuitively, I find that the political left in Israel was more likely to maintain support for the peace process when the prime minister was from the Likud Party. As difficult as it might be to achieve an agreement with hawkish leaders (Ross 2004), this suggests that their tenure should be viewed as an opportunity for peace.³⁵ Future research must examine these mechanisms and other strategies that will help keep the supporters supporting.

Several caveats warrant further discussion. First, the above analysis does not examine long-term trends in public opinion, such as major political realignments. On the one hand, Israel eventually accepted the idea of negotiating with the PLO, a group that many had labeled as a terrorist organization. Even members of Likud, a traditional right-wing party hostile to the Oslo agreement, was willing to participate in the process once in power. This dramatic shift in policy may have been partly the result of terrorism and the growing influence of extremists during the first Palestinian Intifada (Makovsky 1996, pp. 112-13). On the other hand, following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the collapse of the peace process, Israel returned to the idea

³⁴ Yitzhak Rabin, "Remarks by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the Ratification of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 October 1995.

³⁵ Of course, not every political hawk is the same. Some right-wing leaders, such as Menachem Begin, have demonstrated flexibility for the sake of peace. Others, such as Yitzhak Shamir and thus far Benjamin Netanyahu, may not have the will or desire to take such steps. In this case, a hawkish leader would be a hindrance rather than an opportunity.

that she could not negotiate with the Palestinians, and resorted to unilateral measures like the Gaza disengagement plan of 2005. Terrorist violence may have had an independent influence on this foreign policy decision as well, though in the opposite direction as had occurred before Oslo. Yet, this sort of analysis is highly speculative, as it is difficult to determine if these relationships are merely spurious. The combination of the failure of negotiations, largely due to the unbridgeable demands on how to end the conflict, and the manifestation of terror as a result of this failure likely caused a hardening of Israeli opinion in the al-Aqsa Intifada period, not terrorism alone. While outside the scope of this research, such questions and issues provide another important avenue for future research.

Secondly, some might point out that terrorism seemed to have increased vote shares for right-wing parties in Israel (e.g. Berribi and Klor 2008). This observation could lead one to infer that terrorism substantially turned the Israeli public off to the peace process. Yet, as Gould and Klor (2010) demonstrate, this outcome was largely the result of right-wing politicians becoming more moderate and adopting a more favorable position toward the peace process. In other words, the Israeli political spectrum at the time shifted to the left. Thus, it is erroneous to conclude that the electoral success of right-wing parties meant that the Israeli public largely turned against the peace process, at least during the Oslo period. If the political spectrum shifts in a fundamental way on a certain policy issue, as had occurred in Israel, then labels such as “left” and “right” begin to lose their meaning and electoral outcomes of these groups cannot fully reveal the public’s policy preference.

Thirdly, terrorism can impact negotiations from channels other than public opinion. For instance, terrorist violence can encourage intervention from a third party mediator, which could increase pressure on the negotiating partners to cooperate and make concessions. Dore Gold

witnessed this mechanism while serving as Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu. In his view, “The violence got the United States more engaged in negotiations, and seemed to have served Arafat’s interests.”³⁶ Still, it is important to keep in mind that while this might have served the interests of Arafat in this respect, the negative impact on public opinion, albeit small, would have tightened the noose around the hands of Israeli leaders, making it somewhat harder for them to make concessions. Therefore, this strategy was a dangerous double-edged sword and left the Palestinian Authority empty handed after the United States disengaged from the peace process following George W. Bush’s electoral victory.

Lastly, I find that the state of the Israeli economy and the party of the prime minister have a profound effect in shaping public perceptions toward the peace process. Increases in the unemployment rate corresponded to a decrease in support for the peace process. In contrast, it is worth mentioning again that the public became more approving of the peace process when a Likud prime minister was in office. Interestingly, the mechanism driving this outcome was an increase in support among individuals affiliating with left-wing parties in Israel. As doubt about the peace process grew within this constituency, especially following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the Likud Party’s hawkish reputation on security as well as the more unified rhetoric favoring the Oslo process once Netanyahu was in office likely provided them with additional confidence in the peace talks.

6.5 Conclusion

The threat of terrorism will always loom in the background of peace negotiations. But how much coercive pressure does this tactic generate on governments pursuing peace policies? In

³⁶ Dore Gold. Interview by author. 1 September 2012.

this chapter, I addressed this issue by conducting extensive statistical analyses on the relationship between mass opinion and Palestinian terrorist attacks. Overall, I find that the effect of extremist violence on Israeli opinion was surprisingly mild and not of the sort that would likely sabotage peace negotiations. If Israeli leaders felt a need to break off or suspend negotiations following a terrorist incident, it is likely the result of inaccurate perceptions or as a pretext to pursue a new policy determined prior to the outbreak of the terror. This research, therefore, has added value by revealing the actual impact of terrorism on public approval, which will allow leaders and third party mediators to make more informed decisions.

These findings also have important implications on our understanding of the coercive effect of terrorist violence in general. As the survey experiment results from the previous chapters demonstrate, the effect of terrorism on public opinion should be the greatest in security environments with high exposure to terrorist violence, a place much like Israel. Yet, even in this case, terrorism should have failed to generate substantial coercive pressure on decision-makers to change their policies.

Conclusion:

The Stability of the Public Mood in Coercive Terrorist Crises

On 7 July 2005, Islamic fundamentalists detonated four bombs aboard several London Underground trains and a public bus in central London. The coordinated suicide attacks killed 52 civilians and injured over 700 more as commuters made their way to work in the morning. In a videotaped statement, one of the assailants, Muhammad Sidique Khan, explained his motivation through the lens of domestic politics:

“Your democratically-elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security you will be our targets and until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.”¹

Seven months after the crisis, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (and soon to be Prime Minister) Gordon Brown reflected on the domestic consequences of the incident. Although the

¹ Muhammad Sidique Khan, “London Bomber: Text in Full.” *BBC News*, 1 September 2005. Accessed 16 October 2013. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206800.stm.

terrorists hoped that the attacks would convince the British to turn against their government and its policies, Brown saw a different reaction. “On July 7...the British people stood as one, our emergency services, our police, our security services, our armed forces, the pride of our country. With Britain led by London standing firm and steadfast in the face of violence, our very calmness reverberated around the world. Though trains and buses were destroyed, our national resolve – the spirit of Britain – was indestructible.”²

This project demonstrates that Brown’s observation can be generalized beyond the British public. Mass opinion in Israel, Lebanon and the United States also proved to be incredibly resolute in coercive terrorist crises. At the same time, the results from these cases underscore that this is not an inevitable outcome. Terrorism does have the potential to generate costs and exert pressure on leaders. Moreover, governments can still make unpopular decisions during coercive terrorist crises opening them up to public backlash and political vulnerability. Thus, it is necessary to revisit the confirmed hypotheses from Chapter 2 and consider the theoretical conditions when terrorism is most likely to be coercive.

7.1 Under What Conditions is Terrorism Coercive?

The previous chapters established that public attitudes in coercive terrorist crises are highly dependent on the intensity of terrorist campaigns, government concessions and intransigence, prior population exposure to terrorism, prior attitudinal strength and ambivalence, partisanship, and the reaction of the political opposition. The effects of these variables on public opinion structure the incentives of leaders. They also help to reveal important conditions when terrorism is likely to be coercive.

² Gordon Brown, “Securing Our Future,” Speech to Royal United Services Institute, London, 13 February 2006.

The first, and most critical, condition is that terrorist attacks must be sufficiently high to offset the costs associated with concessions. The *Attacks Hypothesis* and *Concession Hypothesis* explain that public approval of the government and its policies will be low if terrorism increases and if the incumbent government makes a concession. The survey experiments confirmed this dynamic, demonstrating that a concession decreased leader approval by over 40 percentage points, and that a large, sustained terrorist campaign decreased approval by more than 10 percentage points. Similarly in Israel, each Palestinian terrorist attack decreased approval of the Oslo Peace Process by about 0.4 to 2 percentage points, depending on the type of attack. Thus, the intensity of the terrorist campaign must be incredibly large for it to give the government an incentive to grant a concession, or in the case of Israel, break off negotiations.

I find that these cost functions can be shaped by additional event-driven and elite-cue variables. The second condition follows from the *Terrorism Fatigue Hypothesis*. The survey experiments indicated that a terrorist campaign was 7.3 percentage points more costly on leader approval ratings in Lebanon, a place with high exposure to terrorism, than in the United States, a place with low exposure. This means that terrorist attacks of identical size will be more costly in weak states highly vulnerable to political terrorism than in stronger states with low susceptibility. Thus, terrorism is likely to be more coercive in weak states highly exposed to terrorism.³

The third condition is that terrorism is likely to be coercive in societies that contain a large proportion of individuals with ambivalent beliefs. As the *Attitudinal Strength Hypothesis* points out, terrorism is most likely to affect approval among individuals with ambivalent political

³ Equally important, this finding indicates that populations with seldom exposure to terrorism are not the most vulnerable to its effects. Moreover, people do not seem to be desensitized to its effects over time as exposure increases, as the *Desensitization Hypothesis* posited.

Table 7.1: When is Terrorism Likely to be Coercive?

Coercive	Not Coercive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leader Approval following Attacks is Lower than Leader Approval following Government Concessions • Population Exposure to Terrorism is High • High Proportion of Ambivalent Individuals in a Population • High Proportion of Incumbent Party/Coalition Supporters in a Population • Opposition Praises Government Concessions • Opposition Criticizes the Leader following Attacks • Opposition Approval Increases if Opposition Praises Government Concessions • Opposition Approval Increases if Opposition Criticizes the Leader following Attacks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leader Approval following Attacks is Higher than Leader Approval following Government Concessions • Population Exposure to Terrorism is Low • Low Proportion of Ambivalent Individuals in a Population • Low Proportion of Incumbent Party/Coalition Supporters in a Population • Opposition Criticizes Government Concessions • Opposition Praises the Leader following Attacks • Opposition Approval Decreases if Opposition Praises Government Concessions • Opposition Approval Decreases if Opposition Criticizes the Leader following Attacks

attitudes. This dynamic was partially corroborated in Chapter 6, as the proportion of Israelis “in the middle” tended to become disapproving of the Oslo Peace Process at the fastest rate. The implication is that the higher the proportion of individuals ambivalent to the incumbent government’s policies, the more likely terrorism will affect average public approval.

The fourth condition is that terrorism is likely to be coercive when the number of citizens loyal to the incumbent’s party or coalition exceeds the number of citizens loyal to the opposition party or coalition. This logic follows from the *Partisanship Hypothesis*, which states that voters from the same party or coalition as the incumbent will approve of the government and its policies regardless of the decisions made during the crisis. For instance, Lebanese voters who supported the same coalition as the incumbent were 15% more likely to approve of the leader across all crisis outcomes. American respondents who supported the president’s party were 8% more likely to approve. This implies that if there are many affiliates of the incumbent’s party or coalition, this mechanism would decrease the costs of concessions, as partisans would trust that the government is doing what is best for the nation.

The remaining conditions relate to the reaction and incentives of the political opposition. According to the *Opposition Praise Hypothesis*, leader approval ratings during a coercive terrorist crisis increase when the opposition praises the incumbent’s decision-making. This outcome occurs for three main reasons. First, individuals loyal to the opposition party or coalition often follow the lead of their party officials, thereby providing the incumbent a boost in approval. The survey experiments, for example, found that opposition praise increased public approval by 10 percentage points in Lebanon and 4 percentage points in the United States. Secondly, the novelty of opposition praise could strengthen approval among those already predisposed to approve in the first place. In Israel, for instance, the proportion of Israelis who strongly

supported the peace process increased by about 2 percentage points when the Prime Minister was from the hawkish Likud Party. This situation also decreased the proportion of Israelis strongly opposed to the peace process by about 2.5 to 3 percentage points. Interestingly, much of this support came from individuals affiliating with left-wing parties. Thirdly, opposition praise helps individuals overcome their dissonance regarding a concession if it stops the terror. For instance, leader approval increased by 18.7 percentage points in Lebanon and 12.1 percentage points in the United States when the opposition praised the incumbent's handling of the crisis in this scenario.

Taking these results into consideration, the fifth condition is that terrorism is likely to be coercive if the opposition party or coalition praises the incumbent's policy to grant concessions to terrorist groups. This decision would decrease the costs associated with concessions, thereby making it a more attractive policy than incurring a major terrorist campaign.

The sixth condition follows the same logic. Terrorism is likely to be coercive if the opposition party or coalition in parliament criticizes the government as violence increases. This decision would increase the costs of terrorism on the government and possibly make appeasement a more attractive policy. For example, the Republican decision to criticize how President Obama's Administration handled the 2012 Benghazi terrorist incident that killed U.S. Ambassador John Christopher Stevens would only increase the coercive pressures of terrorism, potentially generating incentives for future government appeasement.

These dynamics are highly dependent on how mass opinion incentivizes the opposition party or coalition. Remember, opposition elites are office-seeking and want to garner favorability among voters. Following the *Opposition Incentives with Appeasement Hypothesis*, the seventh condition is that terrorism is likely to be coercive if the public approves of the opposition praising the incumbent following government appeasement. The survey experiments find some

evidence for this condition. The opposition elites in the United States had an incentive to praise the leader's decision to make a concession if it stops future terrorist attacks, increasing their approval by 7.4 percentage points. Yet, this was not the case in Lebanon, where opposition approval decreased by 18.7 percentage points.

The eighth, and final, condition adopts the logic of the *Opposition Incentives with Attacks Hypothesis*. Terrorism is likely to be coercive if the public approves of the opposition criticizing the government as attacks increase. This decision would decrease the approval ratings of the incumbent and likely would enhance public outrage. While this is theoretically possible, it is important to emphasize that this research did not reveal any instance of opposition being incentivized in this way. The American and Lebanese publics demonstrate a high regard for unity in the face of national tragedy.

7.2 Implications and Conclusion

This project considered how coercive terrorism impacts the approval ratings of democratic leaders and their policies, and what leader incentives are induced by such concerns. Because these issues are difficult to study with observational data, I provide the first experimental analysis of an entire coercive terrorist crisis using two randomized survey experiments administered on 1,000 Lebanese adults and 2,794 U.S. adults. To demonstrate these results have real world applications, I conducted various statistical analyses and interviewed policymakers to discern how terrorism and party politics affected Israeli approval of the Oslo Peace Process.

The findings make several important contributions to our understanding of coercive terrorism and public opinion in times of international crisis. As the previous discussion indicates, terrorism is mostly likely to be coercive under eight conditions: (1) a terrorist campaign is

incredibly intense and sustained; (2) the security environment is highly exposed to terrorism; (3) there are a high proportion of ambivalent individuals in the population; (4) there are a high proportion of affiliates of the incumbent party or coalition; (5) the opposition praises the leader's decision to appease extremist groups; (6) the opposition criticizes the leader following a sustained terrorist campaign; (7) the opposition elites are incentivized by public opinion to praise the leader following appeasement; and (8) the opposition elites are incentivized to criticize him or her following a sustained terrorist campaign.

These conditions, however, are unlikely to adequately incentivize leaders to appease extremists who use terrorist violence for coercive purposes. The survey experiments find that a concession is substantially more costly than a sustained terrorist campaign with respect to public approval. This outcome was true even while taking into account the security environment, partisanship, and the reaction of the opposition elites. Thus, it is doubtful that even the strongest and most capable terrorist group could sustain an intense enough terrorist campaign to make the costliness of terrorism outweigh the costliness of concessions.

The survey experiments also reveal why populations strongly disapprove of government concessions in the face of terrorism. The most common explanation in the United States is that a concession in the current period demonstrates state weakness and will encourage other extremist groups to adopt similar tactics in the future. The Lebanese largely agree with this explanation, but for them, they also emphasize the inherent cost of the concession. That is, they do not want to give up something they prefer to possess – freeing someone who broke the law. Thus, both populations demonstrate a simple cost-benefit calculation between incurring a terrorist campaign and making a concession. It is not because of a commitment problem or the public's belief about the extremist group's willingness to end the terror in exchange for a concession.

The results in Israel reinforce this conclusion of ineffectiveness. Contrary to conventional wisdom, terrorism was unlikely to have sabotaged the Oslo Peace Process through the dynamics of public opinion. While this was the goal of Palestinian extremists opposed to a two-state solution, the decline in Israeli approval was not as large as commonly thought and should have generated little coercive pressure on Israeli negotiators. From this perspective, the Oslo Peace Process likely failed because of an inability of Israeli and Palestinian leaders to bridge the positions that lie at the heart of this conflict. Extremist attempts to sabotage the negotiations were only spuriously correlated with this reality.

The stability of public opinion in the face of terror complements findings in the public opinion literature. Political theorists have long been interested in the ebb and flow of public opinion on foreign policy. In particular, they feared that mass opinion could become an irrational force imposing a veto on informed and responsible leaders. With the rise of more reliable public opinion data, scholars began to find that the masses are much more “rational” than had previously been thought, or at the least, collective opinion reacts in sensible ways to events, elite rhetoric, and individual-level dispositions. These conclusions, however, speak to long-term foreign policy preferences and the tenor of support during times of war. Scholars neglected short-term changes in public opinion, such as during international crises, because they deemed them as ephemeral and of little political consequence. Yet, this research finds a similar pattern in coercive terrorist crises. Public attitudes are not highly malleable and swayed by small bouts of intense violence as many feared. To the contrary, public opinion is coherent and responds in sensible ways. Extremists are hardly able to mold the plastic mood of the public in their favor.

The findings from this study speak directly to international relations scholars who have made strong competing arguments for whether and why terrorism is effective or ineffective. This

research asserts that both groups reveal some truth. It is certainly the case that no leader prefers to make concessions. Similarly, no leader who values political survival or life would eagerly await a terrorist campaign. When thinking about the coercive effectiveness of terrorism, however, we need to keep in mind how both sets of variables are costly for leaders in terms of public approval and how party dynamics mediate these effects.

The results make an additional implication about government decision-making. Terrorism creates a national crisis in a country, and the public will judge how the incumbent handles the situation. In this way, public opinion incentivizes leaders on how to react and how not to react. For instance, while concessions and terrorism are both costly to leaders, mass opinion disapproves of concessions more than terrorist incidents. Therefore, the public views concessions as a mishandling of the crisis. Aside from concessions, other decisions not directly tested in this study could also be highly unpopular. For example, in the 2004 Spanish election, the incumbent government made the unpopular decision of accusing ETA for the train bombings even though the group was not responsible. What this demonstrates is that an incompetent government can be exposed in the course of coercive terrorist crises. Just because governments should not make unpopular decisions does not mean that they will not make those decisions.

Finally, these results have important implications on international security. Groups who choose to adopt terrorist tactics are unlikely to succeed because the domestic cost of government appeasement is incredibly high relative to the costs of terrorism. In this way, and contrary to conventional wisdom, public opinion proves to be incredibly resilient to the coercive pressures of terrorist violence. One would hope that extremists would recognize this reality, and try to find more moderate means to express their grievances.

Appendix A. Sample U.S. Survey Experiment

The following questions are about American foreign policy. You will read about a hypothetical situation similar to situations our country has faced in the past and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will describe one approach U.S. leaders have taken and ask whether you approve or disapprove of that approach.

The Situation:

A car bomb exploded in downtown Chicago at lunchtime killing 10 people and injuring others.¹



A group with links to al-Qaeda immediately claimed responsibility for the attack and issued the following statement:

“Pull back your dogs from our people, and release our leader from your prison – or else there will be no safe place for any crusader in America. If you do not free him, we will continue to tear your hearts out with explosives, and surround your every post with our bombs. We give you this final warning that an ocean of blood will be spilled.”

The concerned authorities confirmed that this group was indeed responsible for the attack.

The Republican President immediately increased security at airports, train stations, government buildings and other major public spaces. The President stated that additional intelligence and military resources would be brought to bear against this group and related threats. The President also released the leader of this group from prison and exiled him. “Americans should go about their daily business,” the President declared. “These measures will keep this country safe.”

¹ Image Source: *BBCNEWS*. See “Doctor Guilty of Car Bomb Attacks.” *BBCNEWS*, 16 December 2008.

Accessed 10 January 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7785816.stm.

Over the course of the next year, this group did not carry out any other attack in the United States. Congressional leaders of the Democratic Party strongly supported the President’s conduct of foreign policy, saying that his actions “strengthened U.S. national security.”

Summary

- A group with links to al-Qaeda exploded a car bomb in downtown Chicago at lunchtime killing 10 people and injuring others.
- The group demanded the release of its leader from U.S. prison.
- The Republican President increased security at airports, train stations, government buildings and major public spaces. The Republican President also released the leader of this group and exiled him.
- The group did not carry out any other attack in the United States.
- Congressional leaders of the Democratic Party strongly supported the president’s conduct of foreign policy.

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Republican President handled this situation?

Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	In the Middle/ Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove

2. In a few words, please state why you approve or disapprove of the way the Republican President handled this situation?

3. Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Congressional Democratic leaders handled this situation?

Strongly Approve	Somewhat Approve	In the Middle/ Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Somewhat Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove

4. In a few words, please state why you approve or disapprove of the way the Congressional Democratic leaders handled this situation?

Appendix B: Lebanon Survey Experiment

السياسة الخارجية اللبنانية

يتمحور القسم التالي حول السياسة الخارجية اللبنانية. سوف أقرأ لك عن حالة فرضية مثل الحالات التي واجهها بلدنا في الماضي وربما يواجهها مرة أخرى في المستقبل. عالج قادة وحكام مختلفون هذه الحالة بطرق مختلفة. سوف أصف لك نهجاً واحداً اتخذته زعماء لبنانيون لمعالجة هذه الحالة، ومن ثم سوف أسألك ما إذا كنت موافقاً أم معارضاً لأسلوب الزعماء اللبنانيين بمعالجة هذه الحالة.

الحالة الافتراضية

انفجرت سيارة مفخخة في فترة بعد الظهر في بيروت، مما أسفر عن مقتل 10 أشخاص وإصابة آخرين (أبرز البطاقة- الصورة)



أعلنت حركة مرتبطة بتنظيم القاعدة مسؤوليتها عن الهجوم وأصدرت البيان التالي: " اسحبوا كلابكم من شعبنا وحرروا قائدنا من السجن أو لن يكون هناك أي مكان آمن في لبنان! إذا لم تحرروه، فسنستمر بتقطيع قلوب اللبنانيين بالمتفجرات وسنحيط كل مواقعكم بقنابلنا! ونحذركم للمرة الأخيرة أننا سنسفك محيطاً من الدماء!"

وتأكد للجهات المختصة أن هذه الحركة كانت المسؤولة عن الهجوم.

بعد هذا الهجوم، زاد رئيس الوزراء، وهو من تحالف 14 آذار، عدد قوات الأمن في مطار بيروت والمباني الحكومية والأماكن العامة الأخرى على الفور وقال انه سيزيد الإجراءات العسكرية والأمنية ضد هذه الحركة وتهديدات أخرى.

ضع الفرد بطريقة عشوائية في واحدة من المجموعات التالية (حسب الجدول المرفق) ثم اقرأ له النص الذي يخص مجموعته:

1	مجموعة رقم 1	2	مجموعة رقم 2	3	مجموعة رقم 3	4	مجموعة رقم 4
5	مجموعة رقم 5	6	مجموعة رقم 6	7	مجموعة رقم 7	8	مجموعة رقم 8

مجموعة رقم 1	بعد ذلك، أطلق رئيس مجلس الوزراء سراح زعيم هذه الحركة ونفاه الى إحدى الدول. وصرّح في بيان خاص أن "الشعب اللبناني يجب أن ينصرف الى أعماله الطبيعية بشكل عادي" وأن "هذه الإجراءات من شأنها أن تحافظ على أمن البلد". وبعد سنة من هذا الهجوم، لم تنفذ هذه الحركة أي هجوم آخر على لبنان. كما أيدّ زعماء تحالف قوى 8 آذار بقوة تصرف رئيس الوزراء في السياسة الخارجية معلنين أنه "دعم الأمن الوطني اللبناني".
مجموعة رقم 2	بعد ذلك، أطلق رئيس مجلس الوزراء سراح زعيم هذه الحركة ونفاه الى إحدى الدول. وصرّح في بيان خاص أن "الشعب اللبناني يجب أن ينصرف الى أعماله الطبيعية بشكل عادي" وأن "هذه الإجراءات من شأنها أن تحافظ على أمن البلد". وبعد سنة من هذا الهجوم، لم تنفذ هذه الحركة أي هجوم آخر على لبنان. كما انتقد زعماء تحالف قوى 8 آذار بقوة تصرف رئيس الوزراء في السياسة الخارجية معلنين أنه "أضعف الأمن الوطني اللبناني".
مجموعة رقم 3	بعد ذلك، أطلق رئيس مجلس الوزراء سراح زعيم هذه الحركة ونفاه الى إحدى الدول. وصرّح في بيان خاص أن "الشعب اللبناني يجب أن ينصرف الى أعماله الطبيعية بشكل عادي" وأن "هذه الإجراءات من شأنها أن تحافظ على أمن البلد". وبعد سنة من هذا الهجوم، نفذت هذه الحركة 9 هجمات إضافية على لبنان أدت الى مصرع حوالي 100 شخص. وبعد الهجوم الأخير، أيدّ زعماء تحالف قوى 8 آذار بقوة تصرف رئيس الوزراء في السياسة الخارجية معلنين أنه "دعم الأمن الوطني اللبناني".
مجموعة رقم 4	بعد ذلك، أطلق رئيس مجلس الوزراء سراح زعيم هذه الحركة ونفاه الى إحدى الدول. وصرّح في بيان خاص أن "الشعب اللبناني يجب أن ينصرف الى أعماله الطبيعية بشكل عادي" وأن "هذه الإجراءات من شأنها أن تحافظ على أمن البلد". وبعد سنة من هذا الهجوم، نفذت هذه الحركة 9 هجمات إضافية على لبنان أدت الى مصرع حوالي 100 شخص. وبعد الهجوم الأخير، انتقد زعماء تحالف قوى 8 آذار بقوة تصرف رئيس الوزراء في السياسة الخارجية معلنين أنه "أضعف الأمن الوطني اللبناني".
مجموعة رقم 5	بعد ذلك، أعلن رئيس مجلس الوزراء أنه لن يطلق سراح زعيم هذه الحركة. وصرّح في بيان خاص أن "الشعب اللبناني يجب أن ينصرف الى أعماله الطبيعية بشكل عادي" وأن "هذه الإجراءات من شأنها أن تحافظ على أمن البلد". وبعد سنة من هذا الهجوم، لم تنفذ هذه الحركة أي هجوم آخر على لبنان. كما أيدّ زعماء تحالف قوى 8 آذار بقوة تصرف رئيس الوزراء في السياسة الخارجية معلنين أنه "دعم الأمن الوطني اللبناني".
مجموعة رقم 6	بعد ذلك، أعلن رئيس مجلس الوزراء أنه لن يطلق سراح زعيم هذه الحركة. وصرّح في بيان خاص أن "الشعب اللبناني يجب أن ينصرف الى أعماله الطبيعية بشكل عادي" وأن "هذه الإجراءات من شأنها أن تحافظ على أمن البلد". وبعد سنة من هذا الهجوم، لم تنفذ هذه الحركة أي هجوم آخر على لبنان. كما انتقد زعماء تحالف قوى 8 آذار بقوة تصرف رئيس الوزراء في السياسة الخارجية معلنين أنه "أضعف الأمن الوطني اللبناني".
مجموعة رقم 7	بعد ذلك، أعلن رئيس مجلس الوزراء أنه لن يطلق سراح زعيم هذه الحركة. وصرّح في بيان خاص أن "الشعب اللبناني يجب أن ينصرف الى أعماله الطبيعية بشكل عادي" وأن "هذه الإجراءات من شأنها أن تحافظ على أمن البلد". وبعد سنة من هذا الهجوم، نفذت هذه الحركة 9 هجمات إضافية على لبنان أدت الى مصرع حوالي 100 شخص. وبعد الهجوم الأخير، أيدّ زعماء تحالف قوى 8 آذار بقوة تصرف رئيس الوزراء في السياسة الخارجية معلنين أنه "دعم الأمن الوطني اللبناني".
مجموعة رقم 8	بعد ذلك، أعلن رئيس مجلس الوزراء أنه لن يطلق سراح زعيم هذه الحركة. وصرّح في بيان خاص أن "الشعب اللبناني يجب أن ينصرف الى أعماله الطبيعية بشكل عادي" وأن "هذه الإجراءات من شأنها أن تحافظ على أمن البلد". وبعد سنة من هذا الهجوم، نفذت هذه الحركة 9 هجمات إضافية على لبنان أدت الى مصرع حوالي 100 شخص. وبعد الهجوم الأخير، انتقد زعماء تحالف قوى 8 آذار بقوة تصرف رئيس الوزراء في السياسة الخارجية معلنين أنه "أضعف الأمن الوطني اللبناني".

17. ما هو موقفك من طريقة معالجة رئيس الوزراء التابع لـ 14 آذار لهذه الحالة الافتراضية؟

أؤيد بشدة	أؤيد الى حد ما	لا أؤيد ولا أعارض	أعارض الى حد ما	أعارض بشدة	لا جواب
1	2	3	4	5	97

18. اذا كنت مؤيداً لطريقة معالجة رئيس الوزراء لهذه الحالة، الرجاء تحديد سبب تأييدك: _____

19. اذا كنت معارضاً لطريقة معالجة رئيس الوزراء لهذه الحالة، الرجاء تحديد سبب معارضتك: _____

20. ما هو موقفك من موقف زعماء قوى 8 آذار في هذه الحالة الافتراضية؟

أؤيد بشدة	أؤيد الى حد ما	لا أؤيد ولا أعارض	أعارض الى حد ما	أعارض بشدة	لا جواب
1	2	3	4	5	97

21. اذا كنت مؤيداً لموقف زعماء قوى 8 آذار في هذه الحالة، الرجاء تحديد سبب تأييدك: _____

22. اذا كنت معارضاً لموقف زعماء قوى 8 آذار في هذه الحالة، الرجاء تحديد سبب معارضتك: _____

Appendix C. Determinants of Monthly Support for Oslo using General Dynamic Models

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Oslo Approval _{t-1}	0.36 (0.1) ***	0.33 (0.11) **	0.29 (0.11) **	0.3 (0.11) **	0.41 (0.1) ***	0.44 (0.1) ***
Terrorism	-0.33 (0.17) ·	—	—	—	—	—
Terrorism _{t-1}	-0.26 (0.17)	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Suicide	—	-0.21 (0.18)	—	—	—	—
Non-Suicide _{t-1}	—	-0.07 (0.2)	—	—	—	—
Suicide	—	-1.61 (0.66) *	—	—	—	—
Suicide _{t-1}	—	-0.56 (0.65)	—	—	—	—
Civilian	—	—	-0.66 (0.24) **	—	—	—
Civilian _{t-1}	—	—	-0.39 (0.27)	—	—	—
Military	—	—	0.8 (0.44) ·	—	—	—
Military _{t-1}	—	—	0.1 (0.46)	—	—	—
Israel	—	—	—	-1.08 (0.68)	—	—
Israel _{t-1}	—	—	—	-0.32 (0.67)	—	—
Occupied	—	—	—	-0.06 (0.23)	—	—
Occupied _{t-1}	—	—	—	-0.14 (0.23)	—	—
Jerusalem	—	—	—	-0.79 (0.65)	—	—
Jerusalem _{t-1}	—	—	—	-0.55 (0.63)	—	—
Casualties	—	—	—	—	-0.15 (0.05) **	—
Casualties _{t-1}	—	—	—	—	-0.08 (0.06)	—
No Terrorism	—	—	—	—	—	2.61 (0.87) **
No Terrorism _{t-1}	—	—	—	—	—	1.13 (0.9)
Unemployment	-1.93 (1.6)	-1.74 (1.57)	-1.47 (1.55)	-1.54 (1.61)	-2.05 (1.6)	-2.66 (1.62)
Unemployment _{t-1}	1.61 (1.64)	1.41 (1.61)	0.95 (1.59)	1.22 (1.65)	1.3 (1.64)	1.81 (1.65)
Inflation	0.19 (0.77)	0.6 (0.78)	0.52 (0.76)	0.42 (0.79)	0.59 (0.78)	0.34 (0.78)
Inflation _{t-1}	1.31 (0.81)	1.22 (0.81)	1.11 (0.79)	1.42 (0.82) ·	1.01 (0.81)	1.3 (0.81)
Likud	0.27 (2.3)	-0.45 (2.27)	1.14 (2.26)	0.81 (2.41)	-0.49 (2.26)	0.19 (2.3)
Likud _{t-1}	1.78 (2.31)	2.77 (2.31)	1.82 (2.23)	1.77 (2.4)	2.11 (2.3)	1.24 (2.33)
Constant	26.83 (6.06) ***	28 (6.03) ***	30.73 (6.05) ***	28.99 (6.27) ***	28.35 (6.24) ***	25.33 (6.09) ***
Observations	90	90	90	90	90	90

Note: Each column reports the estimates from separate ADL general dynamic models. Standard errors appear in parentheses. *** significant at 0.001; ** significant at 0.01; * significant at 0.05; · significant 0.1

Table D. Determinants of Monthly Support for Oslo using Partial Adjustment Dynamic Models

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Oslo Approval _{t-1}	0.45 (0.1) ***	0.4 (0.1) ***	0.38 (0.1) ***	0.39 (0.1) ***	0.5 (0.09) ***	0.52 (0.09) ***
Terrorism	-0.45 (0.14) **	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Suicide	—	-0.24 (0.16)	—	—	—	—
Suicide	—	-1.84 (0.57) **	—	—	—	—
Civilian	—	—	-0.87 (0.19) ***	—	—	—
Military	—	—	0.81 (0.42) ·	—	—	—
Israel	—	—	—	-1.27 (0.57) *	—	—
Occupied	—	—	—	-0.14 (0.21)	—	—
Jerusalem	—	—	—	-0.87 (0.6)	—	—
Casualties	—	—	—	—	-0.17 (0.05) **	—
No Terrorism	—	—	—	—	—	2.61 (0.84) **
Unemployment	-0.58 (0.47)	-0.47 (0.46)	-0.7 (0.45)	-0.54 (0.47)	-0.83 (0.46) ·	-0.97 (0.46) *
Inflation	0.68 (0.7)	1.09 (0.7)	0.86 (0.67)	0.96 (0.7)	0.86 (0.7)	0.72 (0.7)
Likud	1.45 (0.84) ·	1.73 (0.82) *	2.28 (0.85) **	1.91 (0.85) *	1.12 (0.82)	0.94 (0.82)
Constant	25.91 (5.94) ***	26.5 (5.46) ***	29.07 (5.75) ***	27.5 (5.93) ***	25.9 (5.88) ***	24.18 (5.85) ***
Observations	90	90	90	90	90	90

Note: Each column reports the estimates from separate partial dynamic models. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

‘***’ significant at 0.001; ‘**’ significant at 0.01; ‘*’ significant at 0.05; ‘·’ significant 0.1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrahms, Max. 2006. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security* 31(2): 42–78.
- Abrahms, Max. 2008. "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy." *International Security* 32(4): 78-105.
- Abrahms, Max. 2010. "Dying for Nothing? The Political Ineffectiveness of Suicide Terrorism." In *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses*, ed. Stuart Gottlieb. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Achen, Christopher H. 1975. "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response." *The American Political Science Review* 69(4): 1218-1231.
- Agha, Hussein, and Robert Malley. 2001. "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors." *New York Review of Books* 48(13): 59.
- Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan and Eugene Borgida. 1989. "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz before a Blind Audience?'" *The American Political Science Review* 83(1): 123-141.
- Al-Haj, Majid, Elihu Katz, and Samuel Shye. 1993. "Arab and Jewish Attitudes: Toward a Palestinian State." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(4): 619-632.
- Allison, Graham. 2004. *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company.
- Almond, Gabriel A. 1950. *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York: Hancourt, Brace and Company, Inc.
- "Ambassador: Car Bomb Destroyed Military Building." *CNN*, 13 November 1995. Accessed 3 December 2012. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/saudi_blast/11am/.

- Arafat, Yasser. 1974. "Address to the UN General Assembly." 13 November. In *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, ed. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1984.
- Atchison, John. 1986. *The Statistical Analysis of Compositional Data*. New York, NY: Chapman & Hall, Ltd.
- Auerbach, Yehudith, and Charles W. Greenbaum. 2000. "Assessing Leader Credibility during a Peace Process: Rabin's Private Polls," *Journal of Peace Research* 37(1): 31-50.
- Balfour, Arthur James. 1917. "The Balfour Declaration," 2 November. In *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi. Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997.
- Bali, Valentina A. 2007. "Terror and Elections: Lessons from Spain." *Electoral Studies* 26(3): 669-87.
- Barabas, Jason, and Jennifer Jerit. 2010. "Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?" *The American Political Science Review* 104(2): 226-242.
- Baum, Matthew A. 2002. "The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon." *International Studies Quarterly* 46(2): 263-298.
- Baum, Matthew A. 2004. "Going Private: Presidential Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(5): 603-631.
- Baum, Matthew A., and Tim J. Groeling. 2010. *War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public Views of War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Baum, Matthew A., and Samuel Kernell. 2001. "Economic Class and Popular Support for Franklin Roosevelt in War and Peace." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65(2): 198-229.
- Beck, Nathaniel. 1991. "Comparing Dynamic Specifications: The Case of Presidential Approval." *Political Analysis* 3(1): 51-87.
- Ben-Ami, Shlomo. 2006. *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Berinsky, Adam. 2010. *In Time of War: Understanding Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Berinsky, Adam J., Gregory A. Huber and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. "Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk." *Political Analysis* 20(3): 351-368.
- Berrebi, Claude, and Esteban F. Klor. 2006. "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(6): 899-925.
- Berrebi, Claude, and Esteban F. Klor. 2008. "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate." *The American Political Science Review* 102(3): 279-301.
- Bickerton, Ian J., and Carla L. Klausner, 2010. *A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. 6th ed. New Jersey, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Bin Ladin, Usama Bin Muhammad. 2002. "Azzam Exclusive: Letter from Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin to the American People," *Waaqiah.com*, 26 October 2002. In "Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994-January 2004," FBIS Report, GMP20040209000243, 9 February 2004.
- Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. *The Causes of War*. New York, NY: The Free Press.

- Blin, Arnaud. 2007. "The United States Confronting Terrorism." In *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda*, ed. Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bluhm, Michael. "Analysts Attribute Jumblatt's Change of Heart to International shift toward Syria." *The Daily Star*, 4 August 2009. Accessed 8 August 2011.
<http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Aug/04/Analysts-attribute-Jumblatts-change-of-heart-to-international-shift-toward-Syria.ashx#axzz1VtNr1ptO>.
- Braithwaite, Alex, Dennis M. Foster, and David A. Sobek. 2010. "Ballots, Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities." *International Interactions* 36(3): 294-305.
- Bremer, Stuart A. 1992. Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1986-1965. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2): 309-341.
- Brody, Richard. 1991. *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Brown, Gordon. "Securing Our Future." Speech to the Royal United Services Institute. London, 13 February 2006.
- Brunsdon, Teresa M., and T. M. F. Smith. 1998. "The Time-Series Analysis of Compositional Data." *Journal of Official Statistics* 14(3): 237-253.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bunn, Matthew, and Anthony Wier. 2006. "Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 607(1): 133-149.

- Bush, George W. "Address on the Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists." The East Room of the White House, Washington, D. C., 6 September 2006.
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.
- Bush, George W. "Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan," The Treaty Room of the White House, Washington, D. C., 7 October 2001.
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.
- Campbell Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- Campbell, James, and Michael Lewis-Beck. 2008. "U.S. Presidential Election Forecasting: An Introduction." *International Journal of Forecasting* 24(2): 189-192.
- "Car Bomb Attack Near Funeral in Baghdad Kills 32 People." *BBC News*, 27 January 2012.
Accessed 9 October 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16755347>.
- Casparly, William R. 1970. "The 'Mood Theory:' A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 64(2): 536-547.
- Caspit, Ben. 2001. "You'll Miss Me Yet: Interview with Marwan Barghouti," *Ma'ariv*, November 9. In Charles D. Smith. *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. 5th ed. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's Press, 2004: 527-30.
- Chalmers, David M. 1965. *Hooded Americanism: The First Century of the Klu Klux Klan, 1865-1965*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
- Chan, Steve. 1997. "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise." *Mershon International Studies Review* 41(1): 59-91.

- Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Choucair, Julia. 2005. "Lebanon's New Political Moment," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (March).
- Clarke, Harold D., Nitish Dutt, and Allen Kornberg. 1993. "The Political Economy of Attitudes Toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies." *Journal of Politics* 55(4): 998-1021.
- Clinton, William Jefferson. "Remarks at the Signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement," 13 September 1993. Accessed 20 June 2013.
<http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3925>.
- Cohen, Bernard C. 1995. *Democracies and Foreign Policy: Public Participation in the United States and the Netherlands*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cordes, Bonnie, Bruce Hoffman, and Brian Michael Jenkins. 1984. *Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
- Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13(4): 379-399.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1983. "Introduction: Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism." In *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence*, ed. Martha Crenshaw. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1986. "The Psychology of Political Terrorism." In *Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues*, ed. Margaret G. Hermann. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

- Crenshaw, Martha. 1990. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2009. *How Terrorism Ends*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Davis, Darren W., and Brian D. Silver. 2004. "The Threat of Terrorism, Presidential Approval, and the 2004 Election." Mimeo. Michigan State University, Department of Political Science.
- De Boef, Suzanna, and Luke Keele. 2008. "Taking Time Seriously." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(1): 184-200.
- DeNardo, James. 1985. *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dershowitz, Alan. 2002. *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- "Doctor Guilty of Car Bomb Attacks." *BBCNEWS*, 16 December 2008. Accessed 10 January 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7785816.stm.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers.
- Doyle, Michael W. 1983. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12(3): 205-235.
- Druckman, James N. 2001. "The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence." *Political Behavior* 23(3): 225-256.
- Druckman, James N., Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. 2006. "The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science." *The American Political Science Review* 100(4): 627-635.

- Edwards, George C., III. 1976. "Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power." *The American Political Science Review* 70(1): 101-113.
- El-Ghoul, Adnan. "Hizbollah Won't Take Sides in Rift." *The Daily Star*, 24 February 2005. Accessed 24 August 2011. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Feb/24/Hizbullah-wont-take-sides-in-rift.ashx#axzz1VtNr1ptO>.
- Ellis, Kail C. 2002. "The Regional Struggle for Lebanon." In *Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Kail C. Ellis. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Enderlin, Charles. 2002. *Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002*. Translated by Susan Fairfield. New York, NY: Other Press, LLC.
- Engene, Jan Oskar. 2004. *Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining trends since 1950*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Ensalaco, Mark. 2008. *Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Eran, Oded. Interview by author. September 2, 2012.
- Eubank, William Lee, and Leonard Weinberg. 1994. "Does democracy encourage terrorism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6(4): 417-435.
- Eubank, William Lee, and Leonard Weinberg. 1998. "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(1): 108-118.
- Eubank, William Lee, and Leonard Weinberg. 2001. "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(1): 155-164.
- Eyerman, Joe. 1998. Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems. *International Interactions* 24(2): 151-170.

- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.
- Feaver, Peter, and Christopher Gelpi. 2004. *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fielding, David, and Madeline Penny. 2009. "What Causes Changes in Opinion about the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process?" *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1): 99-118.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Freedman, Lawrence, and Christopher Hill. 1986. *Terrorism and International Order*. London: Routledge.
- Funk, Carolyn L., and Garcia-Monet, Patricia A. 1997. The Relationship between Personal and National Concerns in Public Perceptions about the Economy. *Political Research Quarterly* 50(2): 317-342.
- Gaibullov, Khusrav, and Todd Sandler. 2009. "Hostage Taking: Determinants of Logistical and Negotiation Success." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(6): 739-756.
- Ganor, Boaz. 2002. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?" *Police Practice and Research* 3(4): 287-304.
- Garnham, David. 1986. "War-Proneness, War-Weariness, and Regime Type: 1816-1980." *Journal of Peace Research* 23(3): 279-289.
- Gartner, Scott Sigmund, and Gary Segura. 2000. "Race, Opinion and Casualties in the Vietnam War." *Journal of Politics* 62(1):115-46.
- Gartzke, Erik. 1998. Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace. *American Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 1-27.

- Gelman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 2006. *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler. 2005/2006. "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq." *International Security* 30(3): 7-46.
- Gelvin, James. 2005. *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Gold, Dore. Interview by author. 1 September 2012.
- Goodwin, Jeff. 2006. "A Theory of Categorical Terrorism." *Social Forces* 84(4): 2027-2046.
- Gould, Eric D., and Esteban F. Klor. 2010. "Does Terrorism Work?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 125(4): 1459-1510.
- Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization* 32(4): 881-912.
- Groeling, Tim, and Matthew A. Baum. 2008. Crossing the Water's Edge: Elite Rhetoric, Media Coverage, and the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon. *Journal of Politics* 70(4): 1065-85.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1979. "Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960s." In *The Politics of Terrorism*, ed. Michael Stohl. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker.
- Haberman, Clyde. "Israel Proposes Letting Citizens Meet with PLO." *New York Times*, 10 August 1992.
- Hamas. 1988. "The Hamas Charter." 18 August. In Khaled Hroub. *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000.
- Hamas. 1994. "Important Statement by the Political Bureau." 16 April. In Khaled Hroub. *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000.

- Hamas. 1993. "Tasawwur Muqtarah min Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas) Hawol Tahaluf al-Quwa al-Filastiniyah" [Conceiving the Proposal of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) on the Alliance of Palestinian Forces]. In Khaled Hroub. *Hamas: Al-Fekr wal Mamarasa al-Siyasiyya* [Hamas: Ideology and Political Practice]. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996.
- Hamilton, Lawrence C., and James D. Hamilton. 1983. "Dynamics of Terrorism." *International Studies Quarterly* 27(1): 39-54.
- Hayes, Bernadette C. and Ian McAllister. 2001. "Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland." *Political Studies* 49(5): 901-922.
- Hermann, Richard K., Philip E. Tetlock, and Penny S. Visser. 1999. "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework." *The American Political Science Review* 93(3): 553-573.
- Hetherington, Mark J. and Michael Nelson. 2003. "Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism." *Political Science and Politics* 36(1): 37-42.
- Hetherington, Marc J. and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009. *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Hinckly, Ronald H. 1992. *People, Polls, and Policymakers: Public Opinion and National Security*. New York, NY: Lexington Books.
- Holsti, Ole R. 1996. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Honaker, James, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell. 2009. AMELIA II: A Program for Missing Data.

- Horowitz, Irving Louis. 1983. "The Routinization of Terrorism and Its Unanticipated Consequences." In *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence*, ed. Martha Crenshaw. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
- Horowitz, Michael C. and Matthew S. Levendusky. 2012. "When Backing Down is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs." *Journal of Politics* 74(2): 323-338.
- Hurwitz, Jon., and Mark Peffley. 1987. "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model." *The American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1099-1120.
- Hurwitz, Jon., and Mark Peffley. 1988. "Report to the NES Board of Overseers on New Militarism Items." National Election Studies: Ann Arbor, MI.
- Ibrahim, Youssef M. "Israel Reports Foiling Speedboat Attack on Beach." *New York Times*, 30 May 1990.
- Ismael, Tareq Y., and Jacqueline S. Ismael. 2011. *Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and Change*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. *News That Matters: Television & American Opinion*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Iyengar, Shanto and Adam Simon. 1994. "News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing." In *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, ed. W. Lance Bennett, and David L. Paletz. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Jackman, Simon, and Lynn Vavreck, "Americans and Australians Compared: Ten Years after 9/11," *The United States Studies Centre*, 2 June 2011. Accessed 4 December 2012.
http://ussc.edu.au/ussc/assets/media/docs/publications/1106_911Survey.pdf.

- Jaeger, David A., Esteban F. Klor, Sami H. Miaari, and M. Daniele Paserman. 2012. "The Struggle for Palestinian Heart and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada." *Journal of Public Economics* 96(3): 354-368.
- James, Patrick, and John R. Oneal. 1991. "The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(2): 307-332.
- Jensen, Richard Bach. 2001. "The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900-1914," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13 (1): 15-46.
- Jentleson, Bruce W. 1992. "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force." *International Studies Quarterly* 36(1): 49-73.
- Jentleson, Bruce W. and Rebecca L. Britton. 1998. "Still Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(4): 395-417.
- Johnson, Blair T., Gregory R. Maio, and Aaron Smith-McLallen. 2005. "Social Influence in Attitude Change." In *The Handbook of Attitudes*, eds. Dolores Albarracín, Blair T. Johnson, and Mark P. Zanna, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Jones, Seth, and Martin Libicki. 2008. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al-Qaeda*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
- Jonung, Lars, and Eskil Wadensjö. 1979. "The Effect of Unemployment, Inflation, and Real Income Growth on Government Popularity in Sweden." *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 81(2): 343-353.
- Jordan, Donald L., and Benjamin Page. 1992. "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2): 227-241.

- Kant, Immanuel. 1983. *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*.
Translated by Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.
- Karol, David and Edward Miguel. 2007. "The Electoral Cost of War: Iraq Casualties and the
2004 U.S. Presidential Election." *Journal of Politics* 69(3): 633-648.
- Kelley, Jr., Stanley, and Thad W. Mirer. 1974. "The Simple Act of Voting." *The American
Political Science Review* 68(2): 572-591.
- Kepel, Gilles. 2002. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Translated by Anthony F. Roberts.
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Kepel, Giles. 2004. *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. Translated by Pascale
Ghazaleh. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Kernell, Samuel. 1978. "Explaining Presidential Popularity: How Ad Hoc Theorizing, Misplaced
Emphasis, and Insufficient Care in Measuring One's Variables Refuted Common Sense and
Led Conventional Wisdom Down the Path of Anomalies." *The American Political Science
Review* 72(2): 506-522.
- Kernell, Samuel. 1997. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*. Washington,
DC: CQ Press.
- Khan, Muhammad Sidique. "London Bomber: Text in Full." *BBC News*, 1 September 2005.
Accessed 16 October 2013. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206800.stm.
- Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. "Economic Discontent and Political
Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in
Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 23(3): 495-527.

- King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. 2001. "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation." *The American Political Science Review* 95(1): 49-70.
- King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2): 341-355.
- King, Larry. Interview with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. *Larry King Live*. CNN, 3 July 1996.
- Kohlman, Evan. "Video Threat to Lebanon from 'Al Qaida in Greater Syria,'" *Global Terror Alert*, 25 May 2007. Accessed 5 April 2011.
<http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0607/qaidashams0607.pdf>.
- Kruglanski, Arie W., and Shira Fishman. 2006. "The Psychology of Terrorism: "Syndrome" Versus "Tool" Perspectives." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18(2): 193-215.
- Kull, Steven, and Clay Ramsay. 2001. "American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post-Cold War Period." In *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*, ed. Philip Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Kurtzer, Daniel C., Scott B. Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Steven L. Spiegel, and Shibley Z. Telhami. 2013. *The Peace Puzzle: America's Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence." *International Organization* 56(2): 263-96.
- Kydd, Andrew H., and Walter. 2006. "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31(1): 49-80.

- Lake, David A. 2002. "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century." *Dialogue IO* 1(1): 15-29.
- Larson, Eric V. 1996. *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for US Military Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
- Laqueur, Walter. 1987. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Lau, Richard R., and David O. Sears. 1981. "Cognitive Links between Economic Grievances and Political Responses." *Political Behavior* 3(4): 279-302.
- Leventoglu, Bahar and Ahmer Tarar. 2005. "Pre-Negotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining." *The American Political Science Review* 99(3): 419-433.
- Levi, Michael A. 2004. "Deterring Nuclear Terrorism." *Issues in Science and Technology* 20(3): 70-74.
- Levy, Jack S. 1982. "The Contagion of Great Power War Behavior, 1495-1975." *American Journal of Political Science* 26(3): 562-584.
- Levy, Jack S., and T. Clifton Morgan. 1986. "The War-Weariness Hypothesis: An Empirical Test." *American Journal of Political Science* 30(1): 26-49.
- Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Drew A. Linzer. 2005. "Estimating Regression Models in which the Dependent Variable is Based on Estimates." *Political Analysis* 13(4): 345-364.
- Lewis-Beck, M.S. 1988. *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Li, Quan. 2005. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 278-97.
- Li, Quan, and Drew Schaub. 2004. "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(2): 230-258.

- Lippman, Walter, 1925. *The Phantom Public*. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.
- Lippman, Walter. 1955. *The Public Philosophy*. Boston, MA: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Livingston, Steven. 1994. *The Terrorism Spectacle*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Lutz, Brenda J. and James M. Lutz. 2007. *Terrorism in America*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- MacFarquhar, Neil. "Behind Lebanon Upheaval, 2 Men's Fateful Clash." *New York Times*, 20 March 2005. Accessed on August 23, 2011.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/international/middleeast/20lebanon.html?ei=5094&en=441b692d8c0ef46a&hp=&ex=1111294800&partner=homepage&pagewanted=all&position>.
- Makdisi, Ussama. 2000. *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Makovsky, David. 1996. *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Rod to the Oslo Accord*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc.
- Malik, Hafeez. 2002. "Lebanon as an Experiment in Multicultural Interdependence." In *Lebanon's Second Republic: prospects for the twenty-first century*, ed. Kail C. Ellis. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Malley, Robert. 2004. "Israel and the Arafat Question." *New York Review of Books* 51(15): 19-23.
- Mandel, Neville J. 1976. *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Mandelbaum, Michael, and William Schneider. 1979. "The New Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy." In *Eagle Entangled: U.S. Policy in a Complex*

- World*, ed. Kenneth Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert E. Lieber. New York, NY: Longman.
- Mannes, Aaron. 2004. *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Maoz, Zeev, and Nasrin Abdolali. 1989. Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33(1): 3-35.
- Markus, Gregory B. 1988. "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(1): 137-154.
- Marra, Robin F. and Jr. Charles W. Ostrom. 1989. "Explaining Seat Change in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1950-86." *American Journal of Political Science* 33(3): 541-569.
- McCormick, Gordon H. 2003. "Terrorist Decision Making." *Annual Review of Political Science* 6(1): 473-507.
- McCormick, Gordon H., and Lindsay Fritz. 2010. "Is Suicide Terrorism an Effective Tactic?" In *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses*, ed. Stuart Gottlieb. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Merolla, Jennifer Lee, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- McVeigh, Rory. 2009. *The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Mickolus, E. F., Sandler, T., Murdock, J. M., & Flemming, P. 2006. *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-2005 (ITERATE 5)*. Dunn Loring, VA: Vinyard Software.

- Montalvo, José G. 2011. "Voting after the Bombings: A Natural Experiment on the Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Democratic Elections." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 93(4): 1146-1154.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining." In *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, ed. P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson, and R. D. Putnam. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Morris, Benny. 2002. "Camp David and After: An Interview with Ehud Barak." *New York Review of Books* 49(10): 42-45.
- Morris, Benny. 1996. "Israel's Elections and Their Implications." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26(1): 70-81.
- Morris, Benny. 2001. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1991-2001*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
- Most, Benjamin A., and Harvey Starr. 1980. "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War." *The American Political Science Review* 74(4): 932-946.
- Mueller, John E. 1973. *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Mutz, Diana C. 1992. "Impersonal Influence: Effects of Representations of Public Opinion on Political Attitudes." *Political Behavior* 14(2): 89-122.
- Mutz, Diana C. 1994. "Contextualizing Personal Experience: The Role of Mass Media." *The Journal of Politics* 56(3): 689-714.
- Nachtwey, Jodi, and Mark Tessler. 2002. "The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Peace among Palestinians and Israelis." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(2): 260-285.

- Nacos, Brigitte Lebens. 1994. "Presidential Leadership during the Persian Gulf Conflict." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24(3): 543-561.
- Nasr, Kameel B. 1997. *Arab and Israeli Terrorism: The Causes and Effects of Political Violence, 1936-1993*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc.
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Philip Zelikow, Executive Director; Bonnie D. Jenkins, Counsel; Ernest R. May, Senior Advisor). 2004. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2012. Global Terrorism Database [GTD 1970-2008]. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.
- "Nass Bayan al-Jabha al-Islamiyya al-'Aalimiya li-Jihad al-Yahud wa al-Salabeen." *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, 23 February 1998. Accessed 3 December 2012. <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm>. An English translation is available from the Federation of American Scientists at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>.
- Nelson, Thomas, and Jennifer Garst. 2005. "Values-Based Political Messages and Persuasion: Relationships among Speaker, Recipient, and Evoked Values." *Political Psychology* 26(4): 489-516.
- Nevin, John A. 1996. "War Initiation and Selection by Consequences." *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1): 99-108.
- O'Ballance, Edgar. 1998. *Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Oneal, John R., Brad Lian, and James H. Joyner Jr. 1996. "Are the American People" Pretty Prudent?" Public Responses to US uses of Force, 1950-1988." *International Studies Quarterly* 40(2): 261-279.

- Ostrom, Charles W., Jr. and Brian L. Job. 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force." *The American Political Science Review* 80(2): 541-566.
- Pape, Robert A. 2005. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York, NY: Random House.
- Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1982. "Changes in Americans' Policy Preferences, 1935-1979." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46(1): 24-42.
- Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. *The Rational Public*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Petrocik, John R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(2): 825-850.
- Pickering, Jeffrey. 2002. "War-Weariness and Cumulative Effects: Victors, Vanquished, and Subsequent Interstate Intervention." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(3): 313-337.
- Pollack, Kenneth M. 2004. *The Persian Puzzle: the Conflict between Iran and America*. New York, NY: Random House.
- Popkin, Samuel. 1994. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Elections*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Powlick, Philip J. and Andrew Z. Katz. 1998. "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus." *Mershon International Studies Review, Supplement to the International Studies Quarterly* 42(1): 29-61.
- "Premier MacDonald's Letter to Dr. Chaim Weizmann ('Black Letter')," 13 February 1931. In *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi. Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997.

- Pressman, Jeremy. 2003. "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?" *International Security* 28(2): 5-43.
- Price, Vincent, and John Zaller. 1993. "Who Gets the News? Alternative Measures of News Reception and Their Implications for Research." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57(2): 133-164.
- Pundak, Ron. 2001. "From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?" *Survival* 43(3): 31-45.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.
- Quandt, William B. 2001. *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*. Washington, DC: Brookings University Press and University of California Press.
- Quarles, Chester L. 1999. *The Ku Klux Klan and Related American Racist and Antisemitic Organizations: A History and Analysis*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc.
- Raad, Nada. "Opposition Demands Total Syrian Withdrawal from Lebanon," *The Daily Star Lebanon*, February 3, 2005. Accessed 23 August 2011.
<http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Feb/03/Opposition-demands-total-Syrian-withdrawal-from-Lebanon.ashx#axzz1VtNr1ptO> .
- Rabin, Yitzhak. "Remarks by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the Ratification of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 October 1995.
- Ragsdale, Lyn. 1984. "The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949-1980." *The American Political Science Review* 78(4): 971-984.
- Rahn, Wendy M. 1993. "The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 472-496.
- Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2004. "Politics at the Water's Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(4): 459-86.

- Rapoport, David C. 2004. "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism." In *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Kruth Cronin and James M. Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Ray, James Lee. 1993. "Wars between Democracies: Rare, or Nonexistent?" *International Interactions* 18(3): 251-76.
- Reagan, Ronald. "Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada," 27 October 1983. Accessed 4 December 2012.
<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/102783b.htm>.
- "Report of the Palestine Royal Commission ('Peel Commission')." 7 July 1937. In *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi. Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997.
- "Revenge! Workingmen to Arms!!" Single-page letterpress broadside, 4 May 1886.
- Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical study of the Causes and Origins of War*. Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood Press.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. "First Annual Message," 3 December 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>
- Rose, William, Rysia Murphy and Max Abrahms 2007. "Does Terrorism Ever Work? The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings." *International Security* 32(1): 185-192.
- Ross, Dennis. 2004. *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

- Ross, Dennis, Gidi Grinstein, Hussein Agha, and Robert Malley. 2001. "Camp David: An Exchange." *New York Review of Books* 48(14): 90.
- Rudolph, Eric. "Full Text of Eric Rudolph's Confession." *National Public Radio*. 14 April 2005. Accessed 28 November 2012.
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4600480>.
- Russett, Bruce M. 1990. *Controlling the Sword: the Democratic Governance of National Security*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Russett, Bruce M. 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sachar, Howard M. 1996. *A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
- Savun, Burcu, and Brian J. Phillips. 2009. "Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(6): 878-904.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1982. "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism." *International Security* 6(4): 61-77.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1991. "What Purposes Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" In *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, eds. R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Schmid, Alex P. 1992. "Terrorism and Democracy." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4(4): 14-25.
- Schmid, Alex P., and Janny de Graaf. 1982. *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

- Schmid, Alex and Albert Jongman. 1988. *Political Terrorism*. 2nd ed. Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *International Organization* 59(1): 1-38.
- Seale, Patrick. 1992. *Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire*. London, UK: Hutchinson.
- Shamir, Jacob and Khalil Shikaki. 2005. "Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Two-Level Game." *Journal of Peace Research* 42(3): 311-328.
- Shenon, Phillip. "23 U.S. Troops Die in Truck Bombing in Saudi Base," *The New York Times*, 26 June 1995. Accessed 3 December 2012.
<http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/062696binladen.html>.
- Sher, Gilead. 2006. *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 199-2001*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Shipler, David K. "Israeli Settlements Leader Criticizes Government," *New York Times*, 13 May 1984. Accessed 13 June 2013.
<http://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/13/world/israeli-settlements-leader-criticizes-government.html>.
- Silke, Andrew. 2004. "An Introduction to Terrorism Research" In *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*. ed. Andrew Silke. New York, NY: Frank Cass.
- Singer, Joel David, and Melvin Small. 1972. *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook*. New York, NY: Wiley.

- Slater, Jerome. 2001. "What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process." *Political Science Quarterly* 116(2): 171-199.
- Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1(4): 50-69.
- Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Sobel, Richard. 2001. *The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Salloukh, Bassel F. 2008. "The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon." In *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: the Challenge of Globalization*. ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessoouki. Cairo: the University of Cairo Press.
- Smith, Charles D. 2007. *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.
- Sontag, Deborah. "And Yet So Far: A Special Report; Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why it Failed." *New York Times*, 26 July 2001.
- Spiegel, Steven F. *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Stohl, Michael. 1979. "Introduction: Myths and Realities." In *The Politics of Terrorism*, ed. Michael Stohl. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker.
- Tekoah, Yosef. "Speech by Yosef Tekoah, Israel, to the General Assembly." 13 November 1974. In T.G. Fraser. *The Middle East, 1914-1979*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1980.
- Tessler, Mark. 1994. *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

“The British White Paper (‘Churchill White Paper’).” 3 June 1922. In *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi. Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997.

“The British White Paper (‘MacDonald White Paper’).” 17 May 1939. In *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi. Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997.

“The (‘Passfield’) White Paper.” 21 October 1930. In *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi. Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997.

The United States Department of State. 2002. “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001.”

The United States Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. 2011. “Background Note: Lebanon.” Accessed September 01, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm>.

The United States Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary. *The Weather Underground*. 94th Cong., 1st sess. 30 January 1975.

Tomz, Michael. 2007. “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach.” *International Organization* 61(4): 821-40.

Tomz, Michael, Joshua A. Tucker, and Jason Wittenberg. 2002. “An Easy and Accurate Regression Model for Multiparty Electoral Data.” *Political Analysis* 10(1): 68-83.

Toynbee, Arnold J. 1954. *A Study of History*. vol. 9. London: Oxford University Press.

- Trager, Robert and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. "The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3): 526-545.
- Trumbore, Peter F. 1998. "Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process." *International Studies Quarterly* 42(3): 545-565.
- Trumbore, Peter F., and Mark A. Boyer. 2000. "International Crisis Decisionmaking as a Two-Level Process." *Journal of Peace Research* 37(6): 679-697.
- "UN General Assembly Resolution 181 ('Partition Plan') on the Future Government of Palestine." 29 November 1947. In *Documents on Palestine: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference*, ed. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi. Jerusalem: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1997.
- Verba, Sidney, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black. 1967. "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam." *The American Political Science Review* 61(2): 317-333.
- Wade, Sara Jackson, and Dan Reiter. 2007. "Does Democracy Matter? Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(2): 329-348.
- Waltz, Kenneth. 1967. Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crises. In *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62(1): 35-64.
- Wilkinson, Paul. 1986. *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. 2nd ed. New York, NY: New York University Press.

- Wilkinson, Paul. 2001. *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
- Wills, David C. 2003. *The First War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy during the Reagan Administration*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1986. "On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence." *International Studies Quarterly* 30(4): 425-445.
- "Poll: 79% of Israelis Support Shalit Deal." *Ynetnews*, 17 October 2011. Accessed 4 February 2012. <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4135847,00.html>.
- Young, Michael. 2010. *The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon's Life Struggle*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Zaller, John R. 1994. "Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War." In *Taken by Storm*, ed. Lance Bennett and David Paletz. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Zaller, John, and Dennis Chiu. 2000. "Government's Little Helper: US Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crisis, 1946–1999." In *Decision Making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, ed. Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.