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Psychological Research on International Conflict and Nuclear Arms Issues: Possible Directions

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Authors
Feshbach, Seymour
Singer, Robert

Publication Date
1986-05-01

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**University of California
Institute on Global Conflict
and Cooperation**

**PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
ON
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
AND NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUES:
POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS**

Edited by
Seymour Feshbach
and
Robert D. Singer

Report of a Conference Held
at Rancho Santa Fe, California

May 8-10, 1986

Psychological Research on International Conflict

and Nuclear Arms Issues: Possible Directions

edited by

Seymour Feshbach
Professor of Psychology
University of California, Los Angeles

Robert D. Singer
Professor of Psychology
University of California, Riverside

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Introduction

Seymour Feshbach

The stimulus and principal resources for the conference from which this publication has emerged was provided by the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The support of IGCC is gratefully acknowledged. In addition, we wish to express our appreciation to the American Psychology Association for providing a grant that helped defray the costs of the conference. The function of the conference and its proceedings is three-fold: 1) to stimulate interest on the part of psychologists at the University of California, and of psychologists more broadly, in research efforts that are addressed to problems of international conflict resolution, the prevention of war, and the fostering of peace; 2) to formulate research issues that are germane to the avoidance of war and the quest for peace; and 3) to stimulate greater support by foundations, institutes, and related organizations concerned with peace and conflict resolution, of psychological research in these areas.

Under the auspices of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, psychologists and psychiatrists in the University of California system who are interested in research on problems of war and peace were invited to participate in a two-day conference held in Rancho Santa Fe, California. The specific task of the conference was to formulate "requests for research proposals" (RFPs) addressed to psychological aspects of conflict reduction and the environment and maintenance of peaceful relations between nations. In essence, the formulation of an RFP entails the articulations of a research issue. To help initiate and facilitate this process, several psychologists were invited to address the conference. These included William Estes of Harvard University; Robert Holt of New York University; Irving Janis, professor emeritus at Yale University, currently at UC Berkeley; Thomas Milburn of Ohio State University; and Stuart Oskamp of the Claremont Graduate School.

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Attendees of the conference included the following participants:

Frank Barron, UC Santa Cruz
Richard Barthol, UC Los Angeles
Bruce Bridgeman, UC Santa Cruz
Diane Bridgeman, UC Santa Cruz
George Brown, UC Santa Barbara
Robert Dorn, UC Davis Medical Center
Seymour Feshbach, UC Los Angeles
Harold Kelley, UC Los Angeles
Steven Kull, Stanford University
Charles McClintock, UC Santa Barbara
James Sallis, UC San Diego
Gerald Shure, UC Los Angeles
Robert Singer, UC Riverside
Philip Tetlock, UC Berkeley
David Warren, UC Riverside
Leonard S. Zegans, UC San Francisco

In addition, Bonnie Strickland, the president-elect of the American Psychological Association, and Rosalind Lorwin of San Diego State University participated in the conference. Also present as a participant and overseer was James Skelly of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

The process of developing the "Requests for Proposals" entailed three phases. The conferees initially met as a group and each briefly reviewed past research relevant to peace and conflict resolution in which he or she had been engaged and/or research questions of particular interest. The invited consultants then presented brief papers. Following a discussion of these oral presentations, the group engaged in the process of categorizing the research questions that had been generated in the course of the presentation and discussion. This categorization provided the basis for the formation of smaller groups whose task was to develop RFPs germane to that category of research issues. The statements developed by each small group were then presented for comment at the final session of the entire group.

The categorization that was arrived at is not exhaustive. Nor does it represent the only way to order the rich and challenging array of research issues entailed in the study of the resolution of

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conflict between nations and the maintenance of peace. As one reviews the various categories and their articulation, it will be noted that there are several one-person as well as multi-authored statements. The authorship conveys who prepared the statement and does not carry any implications that the views expressed are unique and not shared by other participants. A number of participants contributed to more than one statement. In addition, statements, whether individually or group prepared, were formulated pursuant to group discussion and were commented on by the group. At the same time, the group did not attempt to vote for, endorse, or put into priority the various RFPs and their theoretical context that were developed. What we have in the following pages is an extensive array of research ideas from which individual researchers can choose to select for amplification or modification, and individual research agencies can examine for proposals they wish to solicit and support.

Nine categories or clusters of RFPs, as it were, are detailed in the ensuing statements. The first of these is addressed to the assessment of international relations and progress. It is concerned with delineating the dimensions, processes, and interactions that characterize international relations and how these variables and processes can reliably and validly be assessed. A research effort in this area clearly needs to be interdisciplinary, but it is one to which psychological theory and data bearing on interpersonal (and group) relationships and interactions and cognitions make a substantial contribution. Research efforts on these issues could have great utility not the least of which would be an index or "thermometer" or "markers" that would be indicative of likely deterioration or danger points in an international relationship.

The second domain of research issues entailed the personal and collective implications of the reality of the state of mutual vulnerability that exists between the superpowers. How do people and nations deal with what has become a "no win" situation with regard to accomplishing one's goals through the use of military force? Psychological research, in addition to delineating maladaptive reaction patterns, can also contribute to the development of more effective modes of adaptation through studies of alternatives to military force as a means of resolving conflicts

between nations. Other research efforts could be addressed to understanding the psychological obstacles that hinder the adaption of these alternatives to military action.

The third category of proposals is addressed to analyses of the kinds of errors in judgment to which policy makers are vulnerable, the sources of these errors, and the procedures or methods for rectifying or avoiding these errors. These "errors" are extraordinarily diverse in nature, and they touch upon or are intimately related to each of the other RFP domains that are elaborated here. There can be errors of assumption as well as errors of perception and inference. The former -- errors of assumption -- are closely linked to values and ideology and, as such, may be particularly resistant to rectification. Practically each type of error that is enumerated can provide the basis for an RFP. In addition, specific research suggestions are made at various points in the statement and in the concluding comments.

The fourth set of RFPs focuses on the negotiation process. First, there is the question of the attributes of an effective negotiator. A theoretical scheme or context is offered that suggests hypotheses as to the nature of these attributes. Attributes of the effective negotiators are, of course, intimately linked to features of the negotiating process. A related group of research issues has to do with the assessment of these qualities of the negotiator and the negotiating process. Among the approaches that can be taken to these issues is the identification and study of successful negotiators. Having explored in depth the attributes of successful negotiators and their specific negotiating practices, one can then introduce RFPs that are addressed to issues in the training of negotiators. It is of interest that the preparation of negotiators prior to their engagement in negotiation has primarily focused on content and has largely ignored process. But process is also significant, and psychological research can make, indeed has made, a substantial contribution to the art of effective negotiation.

Following this fourth RFP cluster we have included a more general paper by Robert Holt on psychological research bearing on peace studies. (An RFP prepared by Professor Holt is included at a later point.) In terms of the most appropriate organization of this presentation of the conference proceedings, it would have been

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preferable to have begun with Holt's paper and have the nine RFP statements follow. We did not do so because we felt that Holt's views, which we happen to share, might well elicit opposition and controversy in some readers that might color the response to the individual RFPs whose value should be determined on their individual merits. In particular, we were concerned that foundation representatives who share the position of those referred to by Holt as "the self-styled owls of Harvard," might tend to dismiss the RFPs in the belief that Professor Holt's position typified that of the other conference participants. Many of the RFPs could have been initiated by "owls."

Professor Holt's views regarding peace research are perhaps best exemplified in the RFP that he wrote. There is overlap between Professor Holt's RFP and the Feshback and Singer RFP, and we might note that we have encountered the kind of skepticism and resistance that Professor Holt alludes to in his paper. Many "realists" find it difficult to accept the possibility that policy recommendations of even "experts" can be significantly influenced by unverbalized value or non-cognitive considerations. It may be that these "value" factors that are referred to in the Feshbach and Singer RFP, in the Holt RFP, and also in the Estes RFP are minor or irrelevant variables that can be ignored. However, that is an empirical question of some importance and ought not to be resolved by fiat.

The fifth set of RFPs is addressed to an analysis of psychological factors that influence the nuclear arms race. Three clusters of questions are delineated. The first has to do with determination of motivations, other than the need for national defense, that influence support for increasing numbers of nuclear weapons. The assessment of values and meanings offers a useful methodology for the investigators of such motivations. It may be noted that while the specific issues differ, there is a relationship between this RFP component and the components of the RFPs developed respectively by Holt, and by Feshback and Singer. A second psychological factor that may influence the character of the arms race is the degree of knowledge concerning the consequences of a nuclear exchange. Not only is there variability in knowledge among the general public, but policy makers may also vary in this

regard. The relationship between knowledge and attitudes or action merits exploration. The relationship between knowledge and opinion and when expert knowledge becomes accepted by policy makers, are also of interest. In this regard, the factors determining the influence of different experts on public opinion and on policy makers warrant ramification.

The sixth RFP, on attitudes toward nuclear armament policies and related foreign policy issues, is concerned with value factors that are frequently unexpressed but that nevertheless may influence attitudes towards nuclear armament policy options. As Estes also suggests in his RFP, one promising research thrust for psychologists is the analysis of factors that contribute to the often sharp individual differences in nuclear armament policies advocated by experts who are equally knowledgeable and sophisticated. A question that may be raised regarding the analysis of values and related affective factors that are correlated with and may be mediating individual differences in attitudes towards nuclear armament policies is the implication of this approach for public policy. At the least, a discussion of the functions or values that we wish a nuclear armament policy to serve, and values that, while correlated, are viewed as secondary, or irrelevant, should help bring about a sharper articulation of the functions of particular armament policies, i.e., defense as compared to prestige, dominance, power, offense, and industrial stimulation.

The seventh RFP is guided by a more radical context than those characterizing the other requests for proposals. In this statement, Professor Holt asks that research be addressed to the mechanisms for transforming the current state of international attitudes, relations, and values to one which can truly be characterized as a "peace system." Two related sets of questions are requested to be explored: 1) facets of culture that directly and indirectly support violence and war, 2) the mechanisms for modifying cultural values and practices so as to promote a peace system. This proposal will undoubtedly be met with skepticism, especially from so-called "realists." However, it is important that it not be met with disregard. If the academic community has any advantage over the industrial and government communities, it is that of greater freedom in expressing and exploring ideas. It would be

sad, indeed, if the links between government, universities, and foundations would serve to bring about the same constraints in the range of academic research for which support can be obtained that characterized research conducted in these other contexts.

The eighth RFP formulation is a logical extension of the three prior sets of proposals. Here the focus is on attitude change, in particular towards nuclear armament and towards symbols, behaviors, and policies that are implicated in international conflict. As in the case for essentially all of the RFPs presented here, a rich set of researchable issues is delineated. These range from variations in the populations to be studied, to case studies of dramatic attitude changes, to modifications of group stereotypes, to a longitudinal panel study of attitudes and behavior. The statement concludes with a brief review of methodological considerations.

The ninth and concluding RFP statement focuses on the relationship between psychology and public policy formulation, and on the enhancement of psychology's contribution to public policy analysis. It notes that other behavior sciences have had a much stronger impact on public policy analysis than psychology, and suggests directions that psychological theory and research could take to make a more substantial contribution to policy. Some issues raised in other statements are also noted here, while the focus on public policy influence provides an important perspective from which to view these research questions as well as generating other research issues that can be meaningfully addressed by psychologists. The concluding request for research that will contribute to the development of a theory of international influence meshes well with the initial RFP statement on the measurement of international influence.

As one might anticipate, there is overlap among the nine sets of "Requests for Proposals." At the same time, each RFP presents unique issues while offering a particular perspective from which to examine an overlapping issue. Perhaps most importantly, these RFP statements, taken as a totality, make it evident that the field of psychology can make an important contribution to the amelioration of international tensions and the prevention of a nuclear conflict. If some psychologists who read these RFPs are encouraged to carry out research addressed to these issues, and/or if some foundations,

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institutes, and related organizations increase their support of psychological research of these issues in response to this document, then the conference and this product will have served their purpose.

Reassessment of the Prospect for the Systematic Measurement of International Process

Harold Kelley and Charles McClintock

Prologue:

1) This proposal for a proposal is made with due apologies to Worth, Holsti and other political scientists and other social scientists (e.g., Rosalind Lorwin) who have worked on developing political, economic, military, social and psychological indicators for the past 25 years.

2) What is proposed is to consider putting even more effort in this area using new conceptual models, to the extent they exist, new methodologies for aggregating data, and above all the rapidly increasing capability of computers for data retrieval, analysis, and storage.

There is a great need on the part of the public, its representatives, and policy makers for timely, systematic information about the state of international relations, as well as changes in these relations. Through the mass media and other information agencies, these various audiences are subjected to a steady flow of information about international events. At the same time, there exists other bodies of information that are not systematically processed or summarized, and hence remain basically unavailable to these various audiences. As a result, perceptions and judgments of international events and relations are often based upon incomplete data overly influenced by sporadic, dramatic happenings, and oversimplified according to current images and metaphors.

It is here requested that a research proposal be developed by an interdisciplinary team to: (1) review and assess past and current efforts to measure objectively the processes that constitute international relations; (2) to propose the development of new measures of important processes where they are not currently

available; and (3) to propose and assess both the feasibility and utility of establishing a standard battery of such measures that could be employed through time to track the status of international relations.

The project team would include expertise in economics, political science, psychology, and sociology. Through such a team effort, attention could be focused upon the complex variety of processes that are assumed to be central to the economic, military, political, social, and psychological functioning of the international system.

The psychological perspective is regarded as particularly important in such an endeavor. Psychologists have general expertise in the theory and practice of measurement and scaling, and a strong prior record of influencing public policy through developing and using various assessment procedures, e.g., intelligence and aptitude measures, attitude scales, achievement tests, personality measures, clinical assessments, and consumer and political surveys.

Several recent developments in psychology are of particular relevance to the proposed project: (1) Clinical and social psychologists have and continue to develop more powerful theoretical and empirical methods for characterizing interpersonal and intergroup relationships and processes; (2) cognitive and social psychologists have recently defined and measured a number of forms of misperception of interpersonal process that may influence the causal interpretation of relational events between individuals and groups; and (3) recently, social psychologists have begun to conceptualize those sequential processes that define and determine the actions of interdependent actors through time.

These developments within psychology illustrate the kinds of capabilities that are emerging within the behavioral sciences for the evaluation of rational behavior. Given these recent advances, it appears desirable at this time to reexamine the utility and feasibility of initiating a major and continuing effort to characterize international relationships in a more systematic, complete, and accurate manner.

It is also expected that the proposal would address specifically the problem of developing procedures for objectively measuring international transactions, measures that would be both reliable and valid in terms of conventional criteria. As consumers of economic data and indicators are generally left to their own ingenuity in interpreting them, so the evaluation and interpretation of data concerning national intentions, trustworthiness, commitment, tension levels, and other measures developed for the present project would be left primarily to the individual user of the data.

Such an emphasis upon the development of objective and valid measures does not need, of course, to preclude covariational, sequential, and trend analyses of the various indicators judged relevant to describing the state of international relationships. Indeed the focus of this present request is upon international process, and hence careful attention should be afforded to the nature and patterns of the interdependence relationships that obtain between international actors, and how these change through time.

Specific Procedures

The project team should first assemble and evaluate information about past efforts to measure and evaluate international process. This should include a careful review of how these efforts were undertaken, how they were received, and in what way their products have or have not been employed.

On the basis of this review, the team should propose a set of indicators and conduct trial uses to assess their feasibility, reliability, and likely costs. These indicators should permit the user to assess information about the nature of the relationships that exist between two or more nation states through time. Further, they should be designed to characterize various domains within an overall relationship, e.g., Soviet-U.S., or a subset of relationships, e.g., Soviet-U.S. vis-a-vis Central America, and Soviet-U.S. vis-a-vis the Middle East.

For purposes of illustration, one might propose that the above domain of relationship be described in terms of political, economic, military, and social psychological processes. For example, one might describe the various forms of political, economic, military, and

social exchange that obtains in terms of Foa's commodities of exchange, e.g., money, information, service, and status, as well as in terms of processes more directly related to rhetorical and overt behavioral acts of international coordination, cooperation, competition, and conflict.

Further, relationships might be characterized through time in terms of:

(1) The _magnitude_ of the exchange of various resources.

(2) The _symmetry_ of such exchange.

(3) The _commonality_ of ideology existing between participants.

(4) The _degree of tension_ in the relationship, as indicated by the nature and degree of rhetorical and overt behavioral conflict.

Examples of more specific indicators in the domain of social psychological process of relevance to each of the characteristics listed above might include:

(1) The magnitude of the exchange resources:

    (a) Number of communications between heads of state and top level officials.

    (b) Number of positive public assertions made by a specified sample of actors toward the other nation.

    (c) Number of negative public assertions made by a specified population toward the other nations.

(2) Symmetry of exchange:

Given the examples in (1) above, symmetry would be assessed by determining the numerical correspondence in the number of communicators, or the number of positive and negative public assertions by the two sides.

(3) Correspondence of ideology (common evaluative framework):

    (a) Correlation of content analyses of statements of general goals.

     (b) Correlation of content analyses of statements
          regarding strategies to be pursued in pursuit
          of goals.
     (c) Coding of commonality of positions taken on
          specific issues and events.
(4) Degree of tension:
     (a) Degree of polarization of evaluations
          (imagery and affect) as applied to own nation
          versus the other(s).
     (b) Level of interruption of normal, ongoing
          transactions.
     (c) Degree of use of threat and counterthreat as
          a means of attempted influence.

Conclusion

The major tasks of the research teams will be <u>first</u> to define conceptually those domains of process and transaction necessary to characterize the state of and the changes in international relationships, and <u>second,</u> to propose and evaluate the feasibility of adapting existing measures or creating new ones to provide reliable and valid indicators of these process domains.

This request recognizes the spotty history of earlier attempts to characterize and quantify international process. It is based on a sense of a past, present, and continuing need for such measurement, as well as of recent scientific developments that make such an effort more attainable now than heretofore. In summary then, the primary mission that the invited proposal would undertake would be to evaluate past successes and failures in developing objective and reliable measures of international process, and then finally assess the feasibility and desirability of instituting further efforts in this direction. Finally, it would be expected that this effort would be undertaken by a highly sophisticated group of behavioral scientists possessing the capability to communicate across disciplinary boundaries.

RFP II

Psychological Factors in the Collective Adaptation to the Condition of Mutual Vulnerability between the Superpowers

(A request for proposals germane to the effective adaptation and maladaptive responses of individuals and groups to the limitations on military dominance and to the inherent military vulnerability created by superpower possession of nuclear weapons arsenals.)

Steven Kull, Frank Barron, and Stuart Oskamp

As a group our starting point was the recognition that beginning two to three decades ago, there has been a fundamental change in the relations between the major powers derived from the existence of nuclear weapons. The most central feature of this change is that both powers have secure second-strike capabilities that put them in a condition of mutual vulnerability. The implications of this change are far reaching. Most fundamentally, it has drastically weakened the credibility of using force for resolving conflicts of vital interests because the costs of such action would be far out of proportion to any potential gains. Even the low level use of force to deal with peripheral interests becomes less viable and considerably more constrained because of the potential for escalation to the nuclear level. To adapt to this fundamental change (sometimes called the nuclear revolution), states must go through a variety of processes that are, at least in part, derived from and also interact with individual psychological processes, among members of the general public as well as elite policymakers.

Psychologists can play a unique role in this general process of adaptation by applying existing knowledge and generating new knowledge about the individual processes. If effectively disseminated, such knowledge may have a facilitating effect on this general adaptive process.

A key potential area for research is the process of initially grasping the condition of mutual vulnerability and its implications. This process has a cognitive component: seeking out and correlating key information; dealing with some of the paradoxes of nuclear strategy; grasping the implications for state behavior and the use of military force. It also has an affective component: dealing with the anxiety such awarenesses tend to elicit; adjusting to the constraints imposed on vicariously satisfying state behavior such as punitive revenge against other states. Naturally there are also psychological obstacles to this process: more maladaptive, involving defensive cognitive rigidity such as the tendency to conventionalize nuclear weapons, i.e., to assimilate nuclear weapons to schemas derived from a pre-nuclear context; defense mechanisms or their consequences, such as psychic numbing, ignoring relevant information, or partial integration wherein there is a recognition of the fact of mutual vulnerability but a failure to recognize its implications, or a sense of hopelessness leading to an unconscious or conscious effort to suppress awareness of fear.

Psychological knowledge can also be useful in the process of collectively adapting to the reality of mutual vulnerability. This does not mean that psychologists should necessarily take specific policy positions. There are a variety of possible forms for adapting to mutual vulnerability, though naturally individual psychologists will focus on those they find the most promising. A key general area involves means for resolving disputes between states that do not involve the use of force and minimize the use of threats of force. While there is presently much knowledge about resolving disputes between individuals and organizations, this must be adapted to inter-state negotiations that are carried out in the context of the still existing option of resorting to force. In addition to the area of negotiation, psychological research may offer insights about the potential use of sanctions as an alternative to force and of incentives as an alternative to threats. Studies such as of the integrative properties of leadership rhetoric may lead to prescriptions for enhancing cooperativeness.

Resolving conflicts and constraining the use of force are both integrally woven into a larger process leading to the evolution of more elaborate norms of state behavior. Psychologists know a

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good deal about the development of norms and morals re behavior within states. There is even some knowledge about how the moral development of children can be facilitated. Little is known about the development of concepts of the morality of behavior between states and whether such concepts go through a corresponding sequence of states.

One manifestation of the development of inter-state norms is the emergence of formal agreements such as treaties and international law. The potential for such agreements, though beneficial to all parties, is hampered by a variety of psychological processes such as the resistance to relinquishing any degree of state autonomy, the resistance to entering into formal agreements with a state that is seen as illegitimate and objectionable in a variety of ways, or a general mistrust of law and social organization. A deeper understanding of such obstacles can be useful to leaders and policymakers who may contend with them. Furthermore, by seeing the underlying roots of such resistances, members of the public can gain a greater insight into their own resistances, thus enhancing their options for dealing with them.

Addendum

Adaptation of individuals to the new nuclear arms reality is especially important, both as it touches upon quality of life for the person and upon the contribution of each to the larger community. Structural models for adaptation to life which have proved important in the study of the individual life span give us indications of relevant variables: adaptive as distinct from maladaptive, suppression, sense of humor, creativity, persistence towards meaningful goals, personal philosophy -- all these are relevant variables. New measurement efforts aimed specifically at adaptation to the new problems engendered by the nuclear revolution: changes in consciousness, both at the level of overt public opinion and perhaps more subtle underlying understandings of relations to other people and nations, while difficult to measure are nevertheless of great importance and should be studied by appropriately subjective as well as objective

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means. Relevant aspects of the changes in consciousness needed to cope with the new reality might include cognitive complexity, ways of dealing with paradox, breadth of time perspective and of empathic range.

RFP III

Types and Sources of Judgmental Errors by Policy Makers

Thomas W. Milburn, Richard Barthol, Irving Janis, and Gerald Shure

[Including such non-benign processes as the tendency of governments to contribute to the momentum of the arms race. This tendency may result from deficiencies in awareness of the whole system, the lack of integrative control from top, and too little effort as long-term strategic, policy-related decisions. Subsystems have built-in truncated perspectives for decision making.]

[An annotated catalog of these is needed.] Heuristics, such as those enumerated by Kahneman and Tversky, can often prove good and useful: they have constructive functions under some conditions; they handicap us in others.

Types of error/heuristics

1. Lack of clear goals; inconsistency of ends-means.
2. Attribution errors; illusory correlations.
3. Kahneman and Tversky heuristics as errors: e.g., availability, neglect of baseline information; inappropriate weighting of kinds of data using components.
4. Inappropriate time perspective (too long or, usually, too short, relative to the task).
5. Lack of flexibility of action or fine enough perceptual discrimination to make important distinctions.
6. Over-optimism re future -- (leading to the neglect of contingency planning for possible crises).
7. Lack of cross-cultural awareness -- especially re decision making as decision making is done in other cultures and societies.
8. Fear of seeming "weak" from "backing down" from commitments.

9. Stereotyping (high level abstractions to help to organize thinking and help to solve problems, lack of detail makes them remote from reality).
10. Less than optimum level of abstraction for effective problem diagnosis.
11. Misperception of <u>intent</u> of adversaries. (It is difficult to infer intent accurately.)
12. Whole belief systems may dominate short-term crises over looking at relevant data.

<u>Sources of biases/errors</u>

1. Increasing complexity and interdepence of the world.
2. Technological change and innovation.
3. Structural constraints on longer-term planning (someone's job) (1-year planning vs. 5- or 10-years) in organizations.
4. Lack of awareness of how errors occur.
5. Human nervous systems; some heuristics are built-in (we count well in a relative sense: we make comparisons or rank order fairly well; we estimate probabilities poorly).
6. Belief in progress and our own goodness; our tendency to think in mirror image ways concerning strangers and adversaries.
7. In part because they are so often functionally useful, heuristical biases are inevitable.
8. Multiple advocacy in policy situations. [A. George]

<u>Special heuristics [General Daugherty's linked set], e.g.,</u>

1. Small wars are inevitable.
2. They <u>can</u> (not will) go nuclear.
3. Nuclear escalation <u>can</u> occur.
4. Nuclear wars can mean end of civilization.
5. Cut our losses through preparedness -- the only **game in** town. (How do we change nature of the game?)

Note the military belief that capability predicts intentions: Soviets will do whatever they can. The assumption that capability

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predicts (an example of worst case thinking) is <u>not</u> shared by members of the intelligence community who asses intentions.

Examples of ways **nature of the game** has come to be viewed in new light:
1. China (PRC) -- formerly seen as much worse than USSR, now seen as relatively much better.
2. Sadat's courageous and dramatic gesture of going to Jerusalem.

<u>Non-cognitive biases</u>

Affective rules achieve dominance. Amplify effects.

Affiliative rules to get acceptance for your ideas in organizations: e.g., do not fight too many battles.

<u>On Ways to Avoid Errors</u>

1. Optimize in decision making when there are (a) very important problems, (b) adequate time, (c) cost is not too great.
2. Need for meta-decision making.
3. Training, e.g., via simulation.
4. Counter heuristics -- if we are wrong re Soviet intentions, how would we know? What data would change our perspective? (Our actions?) E.g., awareness of common interests?
5. Understand what constitutes rational, prudent behavior -- when should one satisfice, optimize? Costs of optimizing vs. satisficing.

We should try to understand the psychology of feuds such as a family feud described in <u>Huckleberry Finn</u>; what kinds of factors maintain (and end) such feuds?

We should study how we assess what **they** are up to. What psychological processes are involved? Note work of Tetlock, books on topic by intelligence community.

<u>The dangers</u>

  1. Intentions to fight.
  2. Capacity for first strike of a disarming sort.

<u>Methods</u> to teach awareness, get new skills:
  1. Simulations -- as one of a group of methods. Bases for
     predictions (that serve to train).
       a. Play with experts.
       b. Use booklets instead for scenarios.
  2. Sample survey -- interviews and questionnaires.
  3. Lab studies, e.g., K & T.
  4. Decision-making courses.
  5. Lloyd Etheredge (hardball politics).
  6. Case studies -- to learn our vulnerabilities to error (Iran
     rescue effort; Grenada).
  Explore for generational differences in perceptions by military
and State Department of WWIII, how might it start, etc.

<u>Needed research</u>

   Investigate ways to decrease vulnerability to schema biases.
   What signs indicate wars may be about to occur?
   Increased rate of transactions; gold flow, communication
rates, traffic flows, coordinated movements of embassy personnel,
troop or missile movements. Syria-Egypt 1973 war.
   <u>Errors</u> deciding that war is about to occur; i.e., overreact to
minimal signals (vs. react, by delay commitment).
   What signals adversary is ready to cooperate? E.g., the
Soviets stop attacking our proposals and accept "in principle."
   Ask Soviets about signs they use that we may cooperate.
Look at examples of others, e.g., Israeli tentative judgments
concerning Egypt after 1973 war.
   Criteria for discerning changes in other's intentions; what is
involved?

RFP IV

Individual and Group Processes in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution

Diane Bridgeman, George Brown, Bonnie Strickland, and David Warren
(Expanded from outline by Robert Singer)

Background

There is a rich literature on conflict resolution and negotiation of differences. The particular context in which the research questions that are articulated here and that can provide the basis for research proposals entails both clinical and social parameters. While many of the constructs employed are associated with humanistic psychology, the issues they generate can be addressed with rigor and often with quantitative methods.

The effective negotiator, from this perspective, has to have the capacity to cope with contradictions or paradoxes that are inherent features of the negotiating process.

Processes of Negotiation

Requiring research exploration, in terms of identifying the psychological stances or positions that best serve the negotiator, are a series of polarities. The question is under what circumstances and at what points in negotiations should the negotiator move to one side of the polarity or the other. Also, how can we assess that the negotiator has the flexibility to move appropriately to the optional position when needed? Among these positions or stances are ones which have to do with belonging:

1. How involved or detached should the negotiator be? At some times he or she must be actively involved as an energetic actor seeking to move the process vigorously in some direction or on some point. At other times the negotiator needs to be detached, to be able to stand noticeably aside from the discussion in order to

assess objectively the imput and significance of just what is being said and intended by both sides.

2. The negotiator must also find a place, which may need to be shifted from time to time, from an integral part of a collective team to a stance as an individual who stands out.

3. There is also a need to assess and to assert at times, or to submerge the similarities and differences a negotiator has with positions or individuals on the "other side" and with members of his or her own team.

4. When and how should the negotiator place boundaries demarcating "own position" from positions of the "other side" and where should he or she highlight similarities or identify meeting places of mutual common ground?

5. Also important to delineate through research are issues of the identity or role and place of the negotiator in the overall process including issues of belonging/not belonging as a part of overall identity.

Also of research importance are questions of the optimal modes of the way in which the negotiator might be engaged in the negotiating process:

1. To what extent should the negotiator engage in non-disclosure versus disclosure; that is to take or not take risks involved in revealing basic aims or possible compromises. Disclosure invites trust and movement but risks vulnerability and being taken advantage of. Non-disclosure assures a certain safety but may lead to lack of trust and possible stagnation. What represents the best stances in these regards at various points in negotiations?

2. More directly, research can confront the issue of trust versus fear and a stance of safety. To what extent and where is trust to be extended to the other side, and to what extent is fear to be paramount (distrust), with safety to be sought in not extending trust?

3. A subsidiary issue to the two raised above is one of the type of interpersonal position ranging from intimacy extended to the other side as opposed to keeping emotional distance. When is one more useful and when is the other, and how easy or difficult do negotiators find it to shift from one to the other?

4. In the above issues of engagement between two sides, where and how is progress possible or to be sought and when is regress likely or even possibly desirable?

In negotiations it is likely that some change is being sought. Both in terms of interacting with another side and in relating to his or her governmental superiors, a series of psychological processes are existent which need to be recognized and hopefully handled well. These include:

1. Conflicts including accepting or resisting authority.
2. Conflicts between independence and dependence.
3. Urges to create versus tendencies toward destruction.
4. Courage on the one hand and forces of uncertainty and ambiguity on the other.

In approaching all of the above in a research mode, it is important to consider dynamic system perspectives which focus on conditions of movement and changes as opposed to those conditions which tend to inflexibility and stagnation. The problems involving movement across opposites need to be understood. Also of salience are question of how negotiations can achieve insight, how one comes to comprehend a shared reality within one's own delegation and with the other side, and to come to accept differences and cope with them constructively.

Although it is a research question, it is a reasonable hypothesis that a major ability needed in negotiators is the ability to step back and examine the ongoing negotiating process. The ability must be maintained to both engage actively in negotiating and to be able to mentally disengage from it to form an accurate appraisal of what is going on. A name for this ability or process is metaprocessing. For purposes of negotiation, "masculine" abilities of active striving and forceful attempts to achieve change must be balanced by "feminine" perspectives of acceptance of equality, maintenance of nurturance, processing, and gatekeeping abilities.

Training of Negotiators

If research shows that certain types of negotiating positions, stances, flexibilities, shifts, and beta-processes are important and useful, the question arises of how to discover them and teach them.

First one has to discover what psychological abilities negotiators need. Then there is the question of being able to measure the extent to which individuals hold them and, perhaps more importantly, the extent and manner in which they can be learned.

The first approach should be to ascertain how much negotiators actually use the types of psychological principles discussed in this paper thus far. Second, to the extent to which they are used, are they explicit? That is, are negotiators explicitly aware of using them? Further, are negotiators aware of existing relevant psychological principles or data? Would negotiators accept psychologically oriented training and do negotiators take advantage of any such training which may be available now?

One useful research avenue, in addition to the question outlined earlier in this paper, would be to identify the implicit psychological principles involved in the approaches of negotiators who have proven to be successful? That is, what are the psychological principles utilized by successful negotiators and how aware are they of using them?

A whole series of questions can be raised which can receive at least some answer from research:

1. What works in negotiations?

2. What do negotiators need in terms of knowledge and skills to facilitate the process?

3. What are the most successful components of effective negotiation?

4. What do negotiators need other than psychological negotiating skills such as the type of setting, language facility, factual information, etc?

To better understand the type of training most useful to negotiators we need answers to several types of questions. Some of these have to do with the effect of internal psychological states on negotiations such as psychological stability and personal styles, ease of influencebility, handling of own opinions versus public opinion, ease or difficulty in working in adversarial relationships, toleration for ambiguity and slow progress, ability to put aside own convictions, willingness to take risks and to be vulnerable.

Other questions have less to do with internal psychological makeup or skills and more to do with the understanding and

appreciation of external factors. These include an understanding of the effects of previous and present relationships with members of the other side. They, by extension, include trust and credits with the other side. They include understanding of restrictions on or support concerning superiors, advisors, or colleagues. What should negotiators be taught about the support and often restrictions to be expected from your delegation and superiors? What can be taught about negotiating with your own side?

It would probably also be useful to take into account the availability of and restrictions on information, the activities of staff, and restrictions re secrecy and privacy.

Training can also include various types of negotiation processes such as one-on-one interpersonal, use of mediators in a formal or informal way, utilization of adversarial stances, purposeful escalation and deescalation of differences. Questions can also be raised and hopefully answered about the circumstances under which one type of negotiation approach versus another would be more useful.

Again, training would be enhanced if the practices of current and past negotiators would be more precisely understood. Do negotiators, for instance, experience and use a set or varying sets of principles and practices of negotiation? How do they respond to differences and disagreements? How do they approach the possibility of tradeoffs? What conditions do they believe facilitate or retard negotiations?

Of course, as raised earlier, it is important to assess the feelings of current negotiators and possible furture negotiators about desiring or accepting formal training. What approaches should be used to introduce formal training? What kinds of cognitive understanding, experience, background, and preparation would be most useful in those to be trained? Who should do the training and what should their background, knowledge, and experience be?

Content of What Is to Be Taught

We have already indicated that a vital source of determining what negotiating skills are useful is the study of the skills, strategies, and tactics of those who have proven to be successful negotiators.

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However, there is also enough known about negotiating that we can hypothesize that certain approaches are likely to be useful and can be taught. It is at least quite worth investigating that the following are useful stances or skills:

1. Being non-adversarial or non-competitive; taking a firm but conciliatory tone and looking for mutually acceptable and beneficial positions.

2. Assuming that shared goals can be developed.

3. Being able to tolerate ambiguity.

4. Being willing to assume that events can change: that systems are at least partly open.

5. Willingness to make reasonable disclosures; i.e., take some risks.

6. Attempt to create a problem-solving, cooperative environment.

7. Assume that the two sides are interdependent.

8. Be willing to engage in a dialectical process.

9. Be willing and able to respond to cognitive complexity.

10. Be willing and able to be positively responsive to paradoxical perspectives.

11. Be able to identify a continuation of possible options.

12. Be willing and able to engage in meta-processing; i.e., to be able to stand back and perceive what has been going on from own and others' perpective.

13. Learn how to test reality; taking active steps to test one's own hypotheses.

14. To be able to assess where one has been wrong about the other side. Be able to recognize and change stereotyping.

15. Understand the presence of diversity and differences and how to best deal with them.

Research Problems

Research in these areas has to be done in a manner that reduces a variety of biases. Researchers may have their own personal agendas and goals in various areas of negotiations and also personal agendas and goals about values involved in negotiations

processes, aims, or contents. These have to be made explicit and prevented from biasing the research.

Particularly when negotiation training involves eventual possible participation by "trainees" in areas dealing with nuclear armaments and issues, own personal investments and desires to be "helpers" or indirect determiners of outcomes has to be realised. Researchers and trainers must be aware of the possibility of mixing up their tasks and goals with that of the negotiator.

Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis testing obviously has to be done in a number of areas, as already indicated, before training begins. A number of hypotheses, skills, and stances, need to be evaluated. The relationship of these to situational factors, particularly causes of conditions driving negotiations, needs to be looked at. Replication of classical laboratory and field experimental studies about attempts to change the attitudes and behavior of others needs to be looked at in negotiation settings to test for their generalizability to and utility in negotiation situations.

Research on Training

Obviously, questions arise about the utility, the validity, of training. The effects of training need to be evaluated. First, do negotiators actually behave in significantly different ways after training? Do their negotiating styles change, show more flexibility? Do they respond differently to changing conditions? And perhaps more importantly, are there more positive and/or speedy outcomes hopefully attributable to training?

Pilot Data

A start needs to be made to gather pilot data, hopefully positive and substantial enough to warrant larger grant support from private and governmental sources and the development of larger-scale research and training programs. A variety of institutions and settings may be possible sites or supporters for pilot

work. These include IGCC, United Nations, Carter Center, Esakeu, and SPSSI.

Training Technique

A specific technique that would be used in our training of negotiators is the "cooperative, interdependent decision making model: (Jigsaw A)," which one of our 4 group members (D. Bridgeman) has had extensive experience in developing, researching, and in training others in its use. This theory and model has been used with school children, university students, teachers, administrators, and with managers and workers.
Also, the potential for utilizing moral dilemmas and a look at the development of morality as a framework for analysis was discussed.

Further techniques and strategies

1. Video taping sessions and feedback discussions with pre- and post-assessments.
2. Role play in simulations.
3. Use of clinical methods -- cognitive restructuring, disclosing, meta analysis.
4. Use of models of -- social cognition, information processing, educational tools, Piagetian -- active/constructionist paradigm, dialectical process and commitment to a multi-assessment approach.
An investigation of how or whether the Soviet negotiators are psychologically trained and/or exploration of cultural similarities and differences and possibly a cross-cultural study/exchange of information and possible joint study.

On Research Planning for "Psychology and Peace"

Robert R. Holt

As psychologists, we suffer from an occupational disease, none the less serious for being unrecognized, because it is almost always painless -- except in the long run. That is our preoccupation with the individual person as our level of analysis, a preoccupation often carried to reductionistic extremes. When we are studying the functions that usually concern experimental, clinical, and personality psychologists, the person is usually (though not always) the appropriate level. In social and organizational psychology, assuming that only what happens in individuals is real and causally efficacious often gets us into incorrectly diagnosed trouble.

When we concern ourselves with problems of attaining stable peace, I think it is especially important that we at least be aware of the dangers that lurk in our typical orientation. We don't have to become part-time sociologists, anthropologists, and/or political scientists in order to do fruitful work in this vital area; but we do need to recognize that each of these disciplines has its own legitimate level of observation and analysis (or theory). We must therefore recognize the reality of events and structures <u>larger</u> than the individual, as well as the reality of smaller systems contained in each of us -- the conscious mind and biological body, and within the latter others like the organ and the cell. Just as psychology can not be reduced, without significant loss, to molecular biology, the study of sociocultural systems is not reducible to psychology. More concretely, that implies that we should not expect to find sufficient explanations of war by psychological approaches alone; and we should try to remain open to political, economic, and sociocultural explanations, seeking ways to combine them with insights from our own level.

Before I get into some specific ideas about needed research, I'd like to express my conviction that the social goal toward which we should be working in this joint understanding is the abolition of war. Those who take the position of the self-styled owls of Harvard would have us "be realistic" and frame our research so as to help

people live with nuclear weapons, which they assure us will be around for the indefinite future. So much do they take war itself for granted that I doubt if any of them ever contemplated the possibility that war's immensely ramified roots in our whole socioeconomic, political, and cultural system could be withdrawn, and the present war system replaced with one structured to make peace permanent and inevitable. For if we don't envisage the possibility, we'll not get started on making it a reality. Surely we agree that nothing in human nature makes war inevitable. From an evolutionary perspective, it is a relatively recent social invention. I believe that people have made war on one another for less that 1 percent of the lifetime of our species; and it is surely evident that that lifetime will reach an early and abrupt end if we do not get rid of war. History records many other social inventions that had their hour, often a long one, and then were discarded. Notable among them are cannibalism, slavery, and duelling.

Hence, I suggest that a considerable part of psychology's research agenda needs to be devoted to tasks leading to the abolition of all forms of organized social violence. Quite possibly, if we can understand the manifold ways our social institutions and our way of life are organized to sustain and promote the systematic destruction of human beings, we can begin the enormous task of learning how to replace this war system with an organization of human affairs to nourish and sustain permanent peace. If we cannot succeed in that gigantic task, it will not be long -- perhaps a few generations -- until we put an end to the entire human enterprise.

We are here because we share some faith in the possibility of planning. Yet we should also undertake it in a realistic spirit, not with the blind optimism that characterized so many previous generations of social planners. We have to recognize that because they are living systems, nations and the world political system tend to grow and change in ways we do not wholly understand and cannot currently predict, let alone control. For example, it is tempting to suggest intensive study of the dozen or so truly peaceful peoples who still survive in backwaters of this world -- nations like Ladakh and Vanatu, subnational groups like the Tasaday and the Hutterites, comparing them with peoples at a similar level of

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development and culture regions who are more violent and warlike. One could find out, for example, how they raise their children, and then attempt to persuade others to adopt the methods that seem to produce pacific adults. Functional anthropology teaches us, however, that cultures are too integral, too tightly coupled, to make it possible simply to lift a culture trait from its setting, transplant it to quite another one and expect it to take root, flourish, and operate in an invariant way. The analogy to organ transplants is pretty close: rejection of the graft is to be expected unless exacting conditions are met. Yet a great deal of progress in organ transplanting has been made, indicating that the task is not impossible if we first understand enough about basic human biology. I have faith that the same will hold true on the larger systemic levels we are trying to deal with; but it presupposes a lot of basic work on understanding the structure and functioning of sociocultural systems and how they change.

In a small way, we are here attempting such a process ourselves. That is, we are trying to intervene in the normal process of psychological research, to influence it in certain desirable directions. I doubt that we understand well enough how the system works to be able to influence it very effectively. Surely we recognize that psychological researchers are a competitive, individualistic lot on the whole, not people who sit and wait for directions from others. Yet at the same time, it is obvious enough, especially when we look back a few years, how trendy an enterprise research is: topics become modish, sweep a generation of graduate students into the ranks, dominate the journals for a while, and then die out. The two images, of the researcher as rugged individualist and as conformist, are hard to reconcile, may be somewhat mutually exclusive, but may still both be true, if we only had an adequate social psychology of psychological research.

I believe that we know enough to permit two statements, however.

(1) If we do a first-rate job of laying out needed and feasible lines of investigation in the psychology of peace, our report will not be self-actualizing. Just publishing it won't ensure that the work gets done. To be sure, if it appears in the form of RFP's with indications that appropriate proposals to IGCC will be funded, that

should be a powerful motivation. At least some of us ought to think together about how to disseminate it and help along the process of influence outside of California, however.

(2) Some years ago, in a symposium on creativity in science, I heard Lord Adrian make a pregnant observation: that the discovery and promulgation of new <u>methods</u> of gathering and processing data was one of the most powerful means of changing science. The telescope, the microscope, the computer -- these hardware inventions have most obviously transformed the research of their time. But in psychology, it seems that many of our trends have been started by the development and publication of software instruments for gathering new types of data. Let me only remind you of the F-scale, Rotter's I-E scale, and Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale. For that reason, I want to suggest first the development of a series of instruments. Immodestly, I'll begin with a few I have been working on.

Like a number of others, I've been struck by the fact that we have two cultures in the realm of security studies, comparable to Snow's two cultures in that they are the preoccupation of two non-overlapping bodies of highly intelligent and cultivated people who construe reality in non-complementary ways and between whom there is little communication. Unlike Snow's dichotomy, that between hawks and doves -- those who seek security through better preparation for war and those who are trying to seek peace through negotiation, political settlement, better understanding, the like -- our dichotomy separates two groups of people who are ostensibly seeking the same goal (peace and security) and are addressing the same reality, not the different worlds of science and humanistic culture. So how can equally intelligent and well-informed people look at the same phenomena and see, on the one hand, a struggle between good and evil, or a free nation vs. one pursuing a dream of world domination, and on the other a cycle of mutual fear and suspicion without any underlying conflict of interest that would prevent peaceful coexistence?

A plausible hypothesis, I believe, is that these two sets of experts and policy elites differ in assumptions they make, beliefs about matters that are either non-empirical or extemely difficult to test with data. I have been working on two instruments to measure

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various kinds of assumption that may be involved, as well as some possibly related attitudinal and personality variables. One, which I rather colorlessly call the Assumptions Questionnaire, comprises several scales: belief about the nature and purposes of the Soviet Union, beliefs about human nature, a scale measuring attitudes thought to underlie traditional militarist-nationalist orientations in foreign affairs, a scale of cooperation vs. competitive interpersonal orientation, one of interpersonal trust vs. distrust, and one of religious fundamentalism. It also contains an abbreviated modification of Prescotts's Somatosensory Index, comprising a set of childhood experiences and adult authoritarian attitudes assumed to be based on them, conducing to violence. In a separate instrument, I have a scale which attempts to pit two conceptions of an ideal society against one another in a series of forced choices between a technocratic and a "Green" or humanistic vision of a desirable future.

Then, on a deeper level, I believe that divergent views of security policy stem from different sets of fundamental postulates or axioms about the nature of reality and how we know it, about the place of human beings in the universe and how it all developed, and about ultimate values. I am trying to measure people's degree of adherence to four major types of answers to these metaphysical questions with a World View Inventory, now in its third version.

On a less ambitiously deep level, I and my students are working out some measures of the tendency to stereotype other nations and peoples as "the enemy." Adopting a question from a Gallup poll used during and after World War II, we present subjects a list of 20 adjectives and ask them to choose five that best characterize a given people -- the Russians, the Americans, the Nicaraguans, or whomever. The list includes a group of pejorative terms like cruel, evil, treacherous, power-hungry, and warlike; some relatively neutral, like religious and happy-go-lucky, and some positive like decent, kind, and friendly. The subject's choice can be scored within terms of the number of words from the classical enemy image cluster, or by weighting each chosen adjective according to empirically determined degrees of positive or negative evaluation.

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In the borderland between personality and ideology, there are a number of promising concepts for which measures need to be produced: 1) Bakan's agency and communion (cf. Angyal's trends toward greater autonomy and toward homonomy, or Heath's egocentrism or allocentrism); 2) Mumford's Pentagon of Power, or values and motives corresponding to this cluster: power, profit, publicity, production, and property; 3) machismo; 4) a preference for technological solutions to social problems; and 5) the several varieties of patriotism. These domains need to be clearly delineated in relation to one another and to revised and updated measures of authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, and dogmatism. It would also be of considerable value to have an efficient instrument for measuring a person's adherence to such Green values as ecological balance, respect for all living things, and the preservation of their environments; in the political realm, social justice, nonviolence, participatory democracy, decentralization of all forms of power, civil liberties and rights, and the conservation of resources in a self-sustaining, steady-state economy. Here too is a big cluster, into which order may be introduced by some hard, sustained psychometric work with a variety of samples -- as many as possible of them non-American.

You can easily guess my hypothesis, I suspect -- that our culture of war has its metaphysical underpinnings in mechanism and in fundamentalist religion, that it takes the form of a glorification of violence and the macho virtues of the warrior code, jingoistic patriotism, and an ever more centralized military-industrial-political power complex. We need to use the measures of these orientations in developmental and personality studies, in studies of situation and social settings that foster and conduce to authoritarian or democratic forms of behavior -- competition vs. cooperation, trust vs. mistrust, violence vs. conciliatory and problem-solving forms of behavior, egocentric achievement striving vs. working for survival and common welfare of the whole human family.

In the above and a variety of other ways, psychological research can help to provide factual and theoretical underpinnings for one of the greatest enterprises in history -- a sustained and coordinated attempt to eradicate the scourge of war, which threatens all of us.

Psychological Factors in the Nuclear Arms Race

William Estes

In both the US and USSR, and to a lesser extent in several other countries, large portions of national budgets and commensurate expenditures of human energy and expert talent are devoted to building and stockpiling enormous stores of nuclear weapons. What motivates these continuing efforts on the part of the superpowers and the interest manifest by other countries to enter the race? Nuclear devices are presumably developed and stockpiled in the name of national defense, yet it is widely agreed among analysts, and even widely recognized among political leaders and the public that the accumulation of nuclear devices runs far beyond what possibly could be used in any defense against attack. Research is needed to explicate the motives and other psychological factors that dispose both political/military leaders and the public to support apparent overproduction and proliferation of nuclear devices. It is proposed that research programs be developed to focus on several different aspects of this complex ensemble of problems.

1. Study of motives, other than need for defense, that drive the nuclear arms race. This research might take several distinct directions. An important one is the assessment of meanings and values. Analysis of the problem from a psychological standpoint suggests the hypothesis that the possession of nuclear weapons constitutes a symbol of national power and influence. To the extent that the hypothesis is true, it is understandable that legislators are reluctant to vote against increases in nuclear armaments and why leaders of additional countries wish to obtain such armaments, even in the absence of demonstrable needs from the standpoint of defense. It appears, further, that nuclear weapons stand very differently in this respect from chemical and biological weapons. This hypothesis should be amenable to test by application of standard methods that have been developed for the measurement of

values (e.g., ratings and relative judgments) and the characterization of meanings of concepts in research or semantic memory and categorization. Although cooperative research among a number of institutions might be needed, it should be possible to carry out direct assessments for samples of the general population stratified on such factors as age, education, degree of expert knowlege, role in community and national affairs.

In order to get assessments for national leaders and policymakers, it might be necessary to replace direct interviews or questionnaires with analyses of texts of speeches, television interviews, and the like. Standard methods are not as well developed, but there has been considerable progress in text and discourse analysis by cognitive scientists, and some of the methods should be applicable. (See, for example, recent work of Tetlock).

2. Study of the state of knowledge, in the general public and in the poltical leadership, about the potential consequences of nuclear explosions on various scales. A two-volume report of a S.C.O.P.E. study of the immediate consequences of nuclear explosions of different magnitudes on the atmosphere and the potential longer-term effects on direct radiation hazards, genetic damage, and elimination of food supplies over large global areas has recently been published. The dissemination of this kind of knowledge through the public and the political leadership should be assessed, traced over time, and studied in relation to changes in attitudes or actions related to nuclear policies.

3. The role of expert opinion. Unlike the defense of one's home against burglars, defense of one's country against nulcear adversaries requires almost total dependence on advice from experts in the relevant technologies. The relationship between the technological experts and the public and its political leadership is complex and needs to be understood. One important question concerns the degree to which the influence of particular experts is related to their expertise. Most dramatically, in such highly publicized cases as the SDI, experts of apparently equivalent qualifications differ widely in their recommendations. At least two lines of research are indicated. One would be on the factors that determine the influence of particular experts. Both the relative expertise of individuals and their influence could be examined by

means of ratings or comparative judgments, obtained from different types of raters in the two cases, of course, and correlations of these measures obtained. The other question concerns the factors that lead experts with apparently equivalent technical qualifications to offer very different advice on issues and to support very different policies. Research is needed to assess the attitudes and values on which comparably expert individuals differ and to relate these individual differences to differential influence of the experts on the same or different populations. The research might well start on a local scale, dealing, for example, with experts whose views and advice frequently appear in newspapers, colloquium presentations, and the like within a single community (presumably a university community rich in relevant expertise). Depending on the results of this initial segment of research and the solution of methodological problems, the research might later be extended to a national scale.

RFP VI

Attitudes Towards Nuclear Armament Policies and Related Foreign Policy Issues

Seymour Feshbach and Robert D. Singer

Of particular interest are research proposals assessing or determining factors that may be mediators of individual differences in attitudes towards nuclear armament and related foreign policy issues. Also germane is the development of measuring instruments for assessment purposes in these areas. These attitude domains can be addressed in any of several populations of interest such as voters, experts, decision makers, or foreign nationals. Developmental studies would also be appropriate. In addition, we encourage the preparation of measures assessing amount and types of information about nulcear armaments and policy issues that are appropriate to these various groups. Also appropriate are proposals focusing on the relationship of attitudes and information and the linkage of attitudes and information to relevant actions, such as actual policy decisions, vote outcomes, or advocacy-group participation.

The objective of this Request for Proposal is to stimulate research that will deepen our understanding of the bases of attitudes toward critical nuclear armament and related policy issues in both the general community and decision makers. And, in so doing, to clarify how variations in attitudes and knowledge influence action outcomes and decisions.

Some of the problem areas that might be addressed include:

1. The relationship of values to nuclear armament policy attitudes; e.g., individual differences in values placed on human life, historical-cultural structures and animal life. Also value placed on political forms such as democracy, civil liberties, and on other major areas which could be significantly affected by a nuclear conflict. Also quite germane in this area are value areas of nationalism, patriotism, and internationalism.

2. Possible personality correlates of nuclear armament and related policy attitudes could be explored such as: risk taking, sensation seeking, power motiviation, and self-esteem, as examples. Here, as elsewhere, theoretical rationales should be provided for selecting the personality variables to be included. Of particular interest would be the investigation of these variables in decision makers.

3. The relationship between nuclear policy and nuclear armament attitudes and information (knowledge) about these areas can be explored in both the general population and decision makers. Perceptions of the public about the credibility of the sources of information and opinion regarding nuclear armaments and radiation can be investigated.

4. Causal model analyses, such as LISREL, of the relationship among values, information, and nuclear armament and policy attitudes would be useful to implement. In addition, causal analyses of the paths of values, information, and attitudes as they bear on decisions, actions, or other outcomes can be pursued.

5. Determination of major personality and value dimensions influencing nuclear arms policies and/or decisions may be an area of investigation.

6. In both types of populations, but particularly in decision makers, what levels and kinds of losses are perceived as acceptable, short of a total nuclear exchange, is an important area of study. Such studies can look at not only the levels of acceptability of immediate death, but also of long-term radiation illness leading to death, nonlethal serious radiation illness, birth defects, and undesirable mutations. It is important in determining the tolerability of losses to be as specific and as concrete as possible about the nature and probability of the loss. Relevant are distinctions between general acceptable levels of loss and probabilities of negative outcomes for the actual respondent.

7. Pertinent to study would be the depth of commitment to ideological positions in relation to the willingness to engage in military conflict, including nuclear war. This can include the depth of commitment to defending and/or promulgating religious, economic, political, cultural, or related ideological positions.

8. It would be useful to assess beliefs and opinions regarding the procedures and technology whose purpose is to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons.

9. The development of measures and determination of various dimensions of attitudes toward nuclear armament and policy issues is of importance.

10. Studies and analysis of a conception of a world without arms is a germane area of inquiry. This might include an analysis of perceived losses and gains in shifting from an armaments-centered to a peace-centered economy and society. Relevant here are also such questions as how acceptable would the public find a sharp reduction in weaponry by both the USA and USSR that might lead to a reduction of perceived international power?

RFP VII

Psychological Aspects of the Transition from a War System to a Peace System

Robert R. Holt

From a long-range standpoint, civilization and perhaps humanity itself will not survive for long if war is not abolished. The knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons and invulnerable means of delivering them cannot be uninvented, so even if total nuclear disarmament were to occur, the danger would remain that any war involving modern industrial nations might become nuclear. Therefore, humanity must find a way to manage its affairs without war.

Apart from the difficult political issues of how to institutionalize nonlethal means of managing and resolving conflicts between large groups of people, the task of converting the present war system into a peace system has many psychological aspects, some of them not obvious. War and the organization of society to prepare for it (defense) serve many functions; the already enormous task of replacing violent with nonviolent management of disputes would be made even more difficult if we do not discover these functions and find alternative means of satisfying them.

Because the task is so large, it is imperative to begin work now. Some of the directions of such needed work are the following:

- Analyze the ways in which contemporary cultural institutions presuppose and both directly and indirectly support war.

- What cultural functions are served by the pervasive emphasis on violence, danger, the malevolence and treachery of other nations, crime, etc. in our mass media?

- Quantify long range trends in the above content emphasis; study their psychological effects on individuals (including effects of TV violence on children but much more).

- If the internal unity and cohesion of a group are advanced by organizing to fight an enemy, what nonviolent and nondestructive means can achieve that goal?

- What misconceptions and myths support the war system (e.g., belief that war is intrinsic to human nature) and/or supply resistances to a peace system? Other resistances deserving exploration include negative images and connotations of peace, of world government, etc.

- Does a peace system need its own set of myths? If so, how can they be produced, framed so as to minimize maladaptive indirect effects, and be propagated?

- How can war-promoting content in the mass media be controlled without infringing on central aspects of freedom of information (First Amendment rights)?

- What changes in life styles might help produce a climate that supports peace and suppresses violence? What changes in child-rearing practices?

Attention is called particularly to the desirability of developing means of inducing cultural change that are noncoercive, educational, and that build on spontaneous grassroots movements. Experimental studies of the effectiveness of change-inducing methods (for example, of getting news editors to change their conception of the news value of destructive or constructive human activities; or of substituting other, more benign hobbies for gun-collecting and shooting) are invited. Applications by interdisciplinary teams (e.g., psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists) are especially appropriate.

RFP VIII

Mechanisms and Methods of Changing Attitudes Related to Nuclear Issues

James F. Sallis, Leonard Zegans, and Jerry Carlson

Objectives:

The objective of this Request for Proposal is to encourage proposals for empirical research relating to mechanisms and methods of altering knowledge, values, attitudes, and behaviors of various populations, relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear war and global conflict. This objective would include observational, survey, and experimental research aimed at understanding factors that influence attitudes, etc., of the general public, including adults and children, as well as officials of nations currently possessing, in the process of developing, or currently harboring nuclear weapons. Other populations worthy of study could be non-governmental opinion leaders such as religious leaders, media representatives, or other influential spokespersons. Investigations could include study of how attitudes, values, and beliefs related to nuclear war and global conflict are modified, and under what conditions these attitude changes may lead to alterations in overt behaviors, such as joining related organizations, voting, writing to elected representatives, writing letters to the editor, and providing financial support to campaigns related to arms reductions. Preference will be given to studies with the potential to make a substatial contribution to the reduction of risk of nuclear war and international conflict. Considerations of method are also important.

Potential Areas of Investigation

There are many research questions that could be considered appropriate for support. Some examples of potentially fruitful research, that uses psychological theories and methods, are listed below.

1. Causal modeling of the relationships among knowledge, attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors. This would include study of general (including non-nuclear related) attitudes, experiences, values, and beliefs that are associated with orientation toward nuclear war and/or global conflict. These findings could be useful in the development and assessment of the impact of natural or designed interventions.

2. Study of symbolic representations that are related to international conflict and peace. This might include study of symbols, frames of reference, and slogans, associated with group affiliation, international conflict, dependency and cooperation, patriotism, nuclear technology, and conceptions of humankind. Symbols can be used to develop, consolidate, and emotionally reinforce attitudes. An example might be the creation or manipulation of symbols by the national media, political leadership, and the arts, and their effects on, and use by, the general public (e.g., peace dove, "evil empire," mushroom cloud).

3. Case studies of dramatic attitude changes, such as racial integration of the armed forces, increased access of the handicapped, the opening of China, etc., with the goal of deriving principles and methods that would be applicable to nuclear arms reduction and international cooperation.

4. Studies of the mechanisms of development and change of group stereotypes that have salience for nuclear war and global conflict. Relevant groupings might include nationalities, racial/ethnic groups, hawks/doves, and political advocacy groups.

5. Studies of psychological and social factors that inhibit, suppress, constrain, or delay attitude and behavioral changes related to nuclear war and international conflict. For example, it may be useful to study fears, apprehensions, fantasies, and concerns related to the consequences of nuclear disarmament and conditions under which thses concerns may be alleviated. It would be interesting to discover factors that would decrease anxiety about nuclear disarmament in both advocates and opponents of disarmament.

6. A longitudinal panel study of knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors. The purpose of such a study would be to document the impact of unplanned events that have bearing on public

consciousness of nuclear issues. It would be particularly desirable to include multinational samples. Examples might include Chernobyl, non-nuclear international conflicts, and various political events such as summits.

7. Assessment of the effectiveness of various educational programs and materials on knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and actions, related to nuclear issues.

Methodological Considerations

It is apparent that a wide range of methodological approaches are appropriate in studying mechanisms and methods of attitude change. However, for any particular research question, some methods will be more appropriate than others. Innovative approaches to study design, data collection, measurement, and analysis are encouraged.

Hypotheses. Each proposal must contain specific and clearly stated hypotheses that are consistent with overall study objectives and the proposed study design and data.

Design. At this point in our knowledge, useful information can be gained from many types of designs. These would include: systematic in-depth interviews, cross-sectional surveys, retrospective case studies, content analysis of related materials (newspapers, books, speeches), longitudinal prospective surveys, quasi-experimental designs, carefully controlled laboratory studies, and field experiments. True experimental designs are especially encouraged when assessing educational materials or programs.

Population. There are a number of population subgroups which could be targeted for study. The choice of population should be very clearly defined and consistent with overall study objectives. Preference will be given to studies that investigate attitude and behavior change in the following populations: (1) political leaders/policy makers/nuclear and military experts, (2) the general public, (3) public opinion leaders, (4) nuclear activists (pro and con disarmament). Attention should be paid to the selection of subjects so that findings will have wide generalizability.

Measurement. While there is a value to narrative and impressionistic reports, preference will be given to studies with quantifiable results. The development and evaluation of new and innovative measurement strategies and techniques are encouraged.

Bruce Bridgeman, Robert Dorn, and Philip Tetlock
(Reported by Bruce Bridgeman)

Preamble:. The insights that Psychology can offer to public policy analysis are to a great degree methodological, in the use of empirical rigor in addressing research/policy questions. Common limitations of usual analyses include: overreliance on specific cases with inadequate statistical reliability; misperception of correlations (including overestimation of weak relationships and/or underestimation of strong ones); errors in extrapolating exponential trends; and inability to think about several variables simultaneously without statistical models. With these methodological constraints in mind, we propose the following four research areas:

Historical Study

I. What can be learned from previous efforts of behavioral and social scientists to influence policy-making? (Lesson from history.) E.g., uses of psychological theory, research, and activities in school desegregation, Operation Headstart, death qualification in capital cases, personnel selection and evaluation.

    Other social scientists -- in particular, economists and political scientists -- have had much more impact on national security and foreign policy than psychologists (e.g., Brodie, Kaufman, Kissinger, Schelling, Kirkpatrick). Why?

    Is it reasonable to hope that in the next 15-20 years the behavioral and social sciences will have an institutional mechanism for informing public policy analogous to the Council of Economic Advisors? What would have to be achieved to make that feasible? And is it desirable?

    Other mechanisms by which behavioral and social sciences have had or could have impact on policy:

(a) Development of policy-relevant theory (e.g., Osgood's GRIT, Janis' analysis of groupthink, the concept of mirror-imaging, emerging alternatives to deterrence theory). Importance of writing books that will be read by the alternative public and policy elite.

(b) Students.

(c) Personal contacts in policy-making community.

(d) Media presentations.

II. What forms do policy-relevant theory and research take?

    (a) Indentifying sources of error and bias in national security and foreign policy. Possible sources of deviation from rationality include:

        (i) cognitive (overconfidence, belief perseverance, insensitivity to world as it appears to other side, simplistic analogical reasoning from history, ideological filters on information processing, difficulty in coping with value trade-offs);

        (ii) small group (e.g., conformity pressures that prevent thoughtful analysis, polarization process);

        (iii) personality factors (e.g., ethnocentrism, protection of self-esteem, level of development);

        (iv) bureaucratic politics;

        (v) standard organizational operating routines;

        (vi) pressures to justify policies that one's role indicates one should adopt.

    (b) Corrective interventions. How to minimize these errors and biases.

        (i) formal decision analysis (e.g., Edwards, Raiffe, Slovic);

        (ii) multiple advocacy (Alex George) and other techniques for circumventing groupthink.

III. Developing a theory of international influence.

    (a) Dominant theory in policy-making world is deterrence in one or another of its variants. Key assumptions -- employ threats that are sufficiently credible and large so that a "rational" expansionist power will not attack (that

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is, Expected Utility of Aggression < Expected Utility of Status Quo).

    (b) Inadequacies of deterrence theory.
        (i) Theory presumes a definition of the problem that is at least debatable (debate over Soviet geopolitical intentions).
        (ii) Theory overemphasizes threats as means of social influence (insensitive to conditions under which threats backfire).
        (iii) Theory is vague on how to integrate threats with other forms of social influence (e.g., how to package "threats" in ways that elicit desired reactions from adversary? How to combine deterrence with reassurance?).

IV. Assessing the nature of a specific adversary in a specific situation.

    Applying any general psychopolitical theory of international influence requires assumptions about the nature of the specific nations with which policy-makers must deal. Different mixtures of influence tactics are undoubtedly appropriate for dealing with different states at different times and on different issues. These should be made explicit in psychological writings that intend to be influential on foreign policy. E.g., use of psychobiographic and content analysis indicators to infer likely reactions of leadership of particular nation to particular policy initiatives. For example, what can be learned of the new generation of Soviet leadership? What are the policy implications? What can be learned of the rhythm and flow of American-Soviet relations over time? (analyses of rhetoric)

    Possible regional conflicts that could trigger global wars (e.g., Persian Gulf, Mid-East, Southern Africa). Psychological theory and research may have insights to offer into: (a) perception (misperception of stakes one believes other side has in an area and of stakes that other side believes you have); (b) crisis management.