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Publication Date

2017

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

From the Bottom-Up: Policing and Sectarian Conflict in Divided Societies

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

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2017

The dissertation of Matthew Jacob Nanes is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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University of California, San Diego

2017

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

From the Bottom-Up: Policing and Sectarian Conflict in Divided Societies

by

Matthew Jacob Nanes

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2017

Professor Karen Ferree, Chair

How do political institutions affect violent conflict in divided societies? I argue that where identity-group divisions are highly politically salient, the extent to which marginalized groups are included in key government institutions affects individuals' motives for turning to violence. Integrating government from the "bottom-up," i.e. via the rank-and-file of institutions responsible for implementing policies and enforcing laws, addresses incentives for fighting.

I test this theory of bottom-up integration in the context of one critical policy-implementing institution, the police, and in two divided societies, Iraq and Israel. Using a combination original survey data, new data on police officer demographics, interviews, and a priming experiment, I show that individuals who

perceive the police as integrated are less willing to consider using violence against the government. I demonstrate that police integration reduces grievances over current conditions, including biases in police service provision and exclusion from desirable employment, as well of fears of future mistreatment by the police and government.

One of the key arguments is that institutional inclusiveness comes in many forms, and different configurations of inclusiveness predict different outcomes. For example, I demonstrate that integration, in which police officers from all groups work side by side to serve citizens from all groups, dramatically reduces fears of future repression among vulnerable minorities. On the other hand, local-level autonomy, in which citizens are policed by members of their own group, has no such effect. I suggest that the difference lies in the mechanisms integration provides to marginalized groups to impose costs on the state or the dominant group in the future. More generally, institutional inclusiveness matters not as an end unto itself but as a means for balancing power and affecting governance.

This dissertation speaks to the importance of institutions tasked with interpreting, implementing, and enforcing government policies. Institutional solutions to conflict cannot be limited to institutions which select leaders or make laws; they must also consider institutions that enforce the laws. By addressing a critical link in the chain of governance, bottom-up integration confronts the root causes that motivate fighting along sectarian lines.

Introduction: The Challenge of Institution-Building in Divided Societies

On August 25th, 2005, officers from the Iraqi National Police kidnapped 36 civilians from their homes in Baghdad, tortured them, executed them, and dumped their bodies near the Iranian border. The victims had one thing in common: they were Sunnis. The officers, like most in Baghdad at the time, were Shias. This incident was not an isolated one. In 2004 and 2005 alone, police units in Baghdad were accused of kidnapping and torturing 1,400 civilians, almost all of them Sunnis (Perito 2011). As Iraq spiraled into sectarian civil war, violence between Sunni and Shia Arabs became ubiquitous, with militias and fighters from both sides attacking one another seemingly indiscriminately. Government institutions, including the police and security forces, were also popular targets for Sunni insurgents. Fighters from al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State (IS) frequently attacked police stations, recruitment centers, and checkpoints in an effort to destabilize the Shia-dominated government. Shia militias like the Badr Brigade and Jaish al Mahdi responded by attacking Sunni mosques and neighborhoods. All-told, violence claimed the lives of more than a quarter of a million people between 2003 and 2016.

One of the many shocking aspects of Iraq's descent into ethno-religious civil war was policymakers' inability to prevent sectarian conflict *even when they anticipated its occurrence.* From the early days of the US invasion, those tasked with designing Iraq's institutions did so explicitly with an eye towards the country's fragmented sectarian landscape. Aside from the Sunni-Shia Arab cleavage,

which permeates much of the region, Iraq is also home to significant populations of ethnic Kurds and Turkomen, as well as religious minorities like Christians and Druze. The 2003 Transitional Administrative Law and the 2005 constitution attempted to account for this powderkeg by creating institutions which would ensure representation for multiple groups in an effort to assuage minorites' concerns that a majoritarian system would leave them out in the cold. Specifically, the Iraqi constitution allows for regional federalism for Kurds, a split executive branch to accommodate leaders from multiple groups, and parliamentary elections via proportional representation with low barriers to entry – all structures which should, on paper, promote healthy democratic contestation in a divided setting (Lijphart 1969). Yet, intense and long-lasting sectarian violence ensued. What went wrong? Did policymakers create the wrong types of institutions? Are Iraq's societal cleavages simply too severe to allow multiple groups to coexist within a single democratic state? Is Iraq doomed to either fragment into sectarian sub-states or be held together by a dictatorial strong man?

The sectarian conflict in Iraq and the questions it raises about the plausibility of peace in divided societies are not unique. Conflict along group lines plagues dozens of countries across all corners of the globe, from Lebanon to Northern Ireland, Nigeria to Bahrain, and China to the Philippines. These conflicts are often referred to as "ethnic" in nature, but all sources of ascriptive identity have the potential to be activated for political competition. Media reports describe individuals from different ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, and tribal groups committing violence in the name of group differences with alarming frequency. Do these groups require separate political institutions, and perhaps separate states entirely, or can a single set of institutions effectively govern diverse populations?

This dissertation argues that properly-constructed institutions can prevent intergroup competition from spilling over into violent conflict. I focus on a specific category of institutions, those that implement policies and enforce laws, and suggest that in divided societies altering the design of these institutions addresses individuals' motives for engaging in anti-government violence. Institutions like the education system, public works, and the focus of this dissertation, the police,

are responsible for interpreting, implementing, and enforcing government policies, and the bureaucrats and law enforcement officers who make up the rank-and-file of these institutions have considerable discretion over the way that policies are carried out. Thus, the policies that define citizens' relationships with the state are a function not only of the way that laws are written but also of the way that bureaucrats choose to implement them. Where tensions are already smoldering to the point that violence is possible, citizens who are upset about the way policies affect them, or who fear the way that policies will effect them in the future, may turn to violence. I argue that integrating policy-implementing institutions along group lines can prevent conflict by reducing people's grievances over their current situations and addressing their fears about future conditions.

Institutions and Violence in Divided Societies

Existing research identifies two broad categories of causes for civil conflict: opportunity and motives (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Opportunity-based explanations assume that there are always individuals who desire to engage in conflict against the state, and whether or not we observe conflict is a function of the costs of fighting (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Individuals fight when they expect to win, for example when terrain favors irregular insurgents over conventional state militaries, or when the opportunity costs of fighting are low. In contrast, motives-based explanations for conflict take a more optimistic view of human nature. They argue that individuals fight only when they have reason to do so, whether that reason is grievances over their current situation (Gurr 1970), fear of their future prospects (Lake and Rothchild 1996; de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast 1997), or the desire to capture wealth through fighting (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Ross 2012). The challenge for researchers and policymakers is to design institutions which address these causes of conflict.

The broad argument of this research is that carefully-structured inclusion in policy-implementing institutions, and especially the police, can allow for peaceful coexistence between groups in divided societies. Divided societies are those

in which ascriptive group affiliation, most often ethnicity or religion, significantly motivates political attitudes and behaviors. In such a setting, civil conflict frequently manifests along identity cleavages. I argue that certain configurations of inclusion within policy-implementing institutions addresses previously-excluded groups' motives for engaging in anti-state violence. I suggest that one particular configuration of inclusiveness, which I term "bottom-up integration," is especially effective at reducing the motives of individuals from marginalized groups for engaging in conflict in divided societies. The "bottom-up" portion refers to the positions to be integrated. Governance is the product of a chain of institutions, beginning with those that select leaders, continuing through those that make policies, and ending with those responsible for implementing policies. The vast majority of existing research on institutions in divided societies deals with institutions of leader selection (Horowitz 1985, 2004; Chandra 2005) or policy-making (Lijphart 1969, 1984; Norris 2008). These institutions are important, of course, but they do not constitute the entirety of the governance process. Bottom-up integration refers to policy-implementing institutions like schools, fire departments, public works, and law enforcement, and to the rank-and-file employees of these institutions who interpret and enforce government laws. These bureaucrats have significant discretion over the way that they implement policies (Lipsky 1980; Dincecco and Ravanilla 2016), therefore their preferences and behavior greatly influence citizens' experiences and relationships with the state (Pepinsky et al. 2017). Furthermore, the rank-and-file of the bureaucracy consists of large numbers of ordinary individuals, providing a mechanism for direct involvement in governance by many thousands of citizens. This direct involvement stands in contrast to the opportunities offered by policy-making institutions which include only a small number of individuals and tend to be dominated by elites.

"Integration" refers to a particular configuration of institutional inclusiveness defined by both the number of individuals included and the way those individuals are distributed. Integration means that institutions include individuals from relevant groups in sufficient numbers to allow them to significantly influence the operations of the institution. The threshold at which inclusion becomes integra-

tion varies by context, but this criteria implies that inclusion is not an end unto itself. Rather, inclusion matters because it creates balance within the institution and provides marginalized groups with influence over governance outcomes. Additionally, integration requires that bureaucrats and law enforcement officers from different groups work together and serve citizens from all groups. This distribution allows bureaucrats from different groups to monitor one another's behavior, and it makes the provision of government services dependent upon the participation of all groups. Integration is one configuration of what scholars of representative bureaucracy refer to as *passive representation*, meaning that the demographic makeup of the bureaucracy is based on the demographic makeup of the general population (Mosher 1982; Meier 1975; Kennedy et al. 2017). Integration differs from other configurations of passive representation in important ways. Autonomy, for example, distributes bureaucrats so that they serve only members of their own group, effectively segregating outgroups and preventing members of different groups from monitoring one another's behavior. In contrast, integration explicitly increases the frequency of contact between bureaucrats and citizens of different groups. Proportionality, another configuration of passive representation, views inclusiveness as an end unto itself. It implies that inclusion is valuable because it satisfies normative demands for fairness; the smallest of groups may not have any real influence over governance, but representing them proportionally to their share of the population satiates a desire for inclusion. One of the main arguments of this dissertation is that different configurations of passive representation have very different effects on conflict motives.

The Police as a Political Institution

I focus on one particular type of policy-implementing institution, the police. In many ways the police are an ideal-type policy-implementing institution. They employ large numbers of non-elites who are then responsible for interpreting and enforcing government laws. The police distribute perhaps the most important service that the state provides, security, and officers have broad discretion over the way the service is allocated to different segments of society. In other ways,

however, the police are exceptional, particularly when it comes to discussions of violent conflict. The police are typically the only institution authorized to use force against civilians in the course of carrying out their duties. Officers' access to weapons makes them particularly relevant in settings in which violence is a likely outcome and may intensify the importance of inclusion compared to other bureaucratic agencies. On one hand, these exceptional characteristics of the police make them an "easy" test of bottom-up integration in the sense that if these arguments hold for any institution, they should hold for the police. At the same time, however, the relevance of the police justifies their study regardless of whether bottom-up integration generalizes to other institutions. Indeed, I argue in Chapter 2 that the police warrant considerably more attention that they have thus-far received as a *political* institution that plays a critical role in governance.

Police Integration and Anti-Government Violence

Bottom-up police integration addresses a number of motives that existing research identifies for engaging in anti-government violence. Individuals may fight against the state if they are unhappy with their current conditions, and especially if they view their group's situation as worse off relative to the status of some other group (Gurr 1970). I look at two reasons why people may hold grievances against the state. First, they may believe that the police or the government provides services unfairly on the basis of group identity. If Iraqi Sunnis believe that the police expend greater effort towards providing security in Shia neighborhoods than in Sunni neighborhoods, or if they believe that they are targeted by police officers for harassment on the basis of their sectarian affiliation, they may be more willing to support or participate in violence against the state. Bottom-up integration of the police addresses this problem by reducing biases in police service provision, both by altering the preferences of officers whose daily interactions with non-coethnic colleagues change their attitudes towards outgroups and by constraining the behavior of officers who would engage in bias thanks to the presence of outgroup officers. Second, in many societies the police and other bureaucratic agencies provide attractive employment opportunities. Citizens who believe that they are excluded

from these positions on the basis of group identity may be motivated to turn to violence. Police integration ensures that employment opportunities are offered to members of all groups and combats the perception that anyone is excluded solely on the basis of group identity.

Individuals may also fight against the state if they are fearful of future conditions. The presence of a weaker group living within a state dominated by a more powerful group presents a commitment problem: by virtue of being more powerful, the state cannot commit to the future safety of the weaker group (de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast 1997; Lake and Rothchild 1996). In turn, members of the weaker group have an incentive to build up their defenses or engage in preemptive strikes in order to hedge against the possibility of future threats, which in turn may lead to conflict regardless of whether either side really wanted to fight. Integrating the police addresses these fears over future safety by raising the costs of government repression. When the police are integrated, members of the vulnerable group have access to weapons, resources, and information which make fighting back less costly. In turn, when individuals from the weaker group observe that the police are integrated, they are less fearful of future repression which reduces their motives for initiating conflict.

Of course, the effects of integrating bureaucratic institutions may not be solely conflict-reducing. Certain characteristics of integration may simultaneously increase the likelihood of conflict. First, even as bottom-up integration reduces the incentives of individuals from minority or excluded groups to participate in violent conflict, it may induce members of the dominant group to do so. One possible reason would be concern over a loss of jobs. Unless integration is achieved by creating new jobs, it will take jobs away from members of the dominant group. This loss could stoke resentment towards the state or towards the group whose members receive the jobs. Second, members of the dominant group might worry that integrating minorities into key bureaucratic institutions like the police will help them rebel against the state, prompting members of the dominant group to actively oppose integration. More generally, there is an inherent tradeoff between increasing the relative power of vulnerable groups in order to reduce fears of re-

pression, which is expected to reduce their *motives* for engaging in conflict, and decreasing the costs of *acting on* those motives. At the same time as integration reduces the incentives of members of vulnerable groups to build up their defenses or take preemptive actions against the state, integration increases their *opportunities* to rebel by organizing them and giving them access to state resources. Thus, this dissertation considers not only whether the integration of bureaucratic institutions affects conflict-reducing mechanisms but also to what degree it affects conflict-augmenting ones. Ultimately, the relative effects of each of these mechanisms will determine whether bottom-up integration should be expected to mitigate or exacerbate conflict in any given setting.

Identity and Policing in Iraq and Israel

I explore the effects of bottom-up police integration in two very different divided societies, Iraq and Israel. In Iraq, I look at conflict between Shia and Sunni Arabs, while in Israel I explore the relationship between Jewish and non-Jewish citizens.[1] The two cases share a propensity for group-based conflict. Both are democracies with a politically-dominant ethno-religious majority, and each has a large, well-equipped national police force. The similarities end there. Extreme violence dominates Iraq's narrative over the last decade and a half. Violence in Israel, while common enough to be relevant, does not match the levels seen in Iraq.Iraq has a short history of democratic rule, while Israel's spans seven decades. Iraq's institutions are young and weak, while Israel's are highly consolidated. Finally, the power configuration between Iraq's identity groups was turned on its head in 2003, with the Shia Arab majority taking control of the government after more than a century of political dominance by the Sunni Arab minority. In contrast, Jews have dominated Israeli politics since the creation of the state in 1948.[2] Most of my analysis focuses not on variation across these two cases but on variation within them.

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[1] I limit the Israeli case to territory governed by Israeli civil law. I do not study policing or institutions in Gaza or the West Bank, nor do I deal with Palestinians who are not Israeli citizens.

[2] Israeli Jews are themselves subdivided into ethnic and religious factions, of course, but these divisions are outside the scope of this project.

However, the vast differences between Iraq and Israel provide a critical test for the arguments that follow. Institutional arrangements which cause similar outcomes in these two cases must be applicable to a wide range of contexts, while those that have different effects in each case reveal important nuances about the limitations in scope of bottom-up integration.

The task of rebuilding Iraq's institutions following the 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein's regime motivates this project. When troops from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland made quick work of the Iraqi army in spring 2003, few predicted the extent of the state-building quagmire that would follow. For policymakers from the United States and the 35 other countries involved in reconstruction, the task was to rebuild, or in many cases simply *build*, Iraq's institutions. After decades of dictatorial rule, the country had little preexisting framework for effective and inclusive governing institutions. Iraq's complex ethno-religious cleavages exacerbated the challenge. Both religious sect and ethnic identity play important roles in the way that Iraqi citizens organize socially and politically. Sunni Arabs, who make up only about 1/3 of the Iraqi population, dominated the Baath party, in power from 1968 to 2003, as well as the Ottoman- and British-ruled governments before it (Dawisha 2009). Despite their status as the largest demographic group, Iraq's 20th century governments largely excluded Shia Arabs from power. This exclusion, and the inferior conditions it generated, motivated violent uprisings against the Iraqi regime in 1991 and 1999. These conflicts were political, not religious, in nature (Lawrence 2009; Polk 2005), yet they proved the relevance of sectarian identity in political organization. To complicate matters, Iraq's third-largest politically-relevant group is distinguished not by religion but by ethnicity. The Kurds, who make up about 20% of the Iraqi population, constitute a distinct identity group for the purposes of political organization despite most being Sunni Muslims (Lawrence 2009). Dozens of smaller religious and ethnic groups also dot Iraqi society. As discussed above, policymakers' attempts to design institutions capable of supporting Iraq's fragmented citizenry focused almost exclusively on policy-making institutions like the legislative and executive branches. In contrast, the bureaucracy and security forces were almost immediately coopted

by Shia militias and sectarian interests (Perito 2011). "De-baathification" purged Sunnis from the rank and file of the security forces and opened the door for cooptation by Shia militias during the mid-2000's. Beginning in 2008, the combined efforts of U.S. General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker convinced the Iraqi government to reform the police, crack down on sectarian abuse, and increase inclusion for Sunnis. These reforms continue since 2014 under the new government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

The Israeli case provides a very different perspective on policing in divided societies. Like Iraq, Israel hosts an ethno-religiously fragmented citizenry. Non-Jews make up about 20% of Israel's citizen population. The majority are Muslims, although the country has a sizable populations of Christians and Druze as well. An overwhelming majority of non-Jews are ethnic Arabs, while only a tiny minority of the Jewish population is Arab, leading to the shorthand terminology of "Jews and Arabs" as all-encompassing and mutually exclusive categories.

Israel's non-Jewish citizens tend to have ended up in the state as a result of wars. Most are descendants of individuals who lived in the British colony of Palestine when it declared independence in 1948. Similarly, Arabs living in the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem were offered citizenship after Israel took the territories by force in 1967, although only some accepted.[3] In Israel's early years, Arab citizens lived under martial law and had fewer rights than their Jewish countrymen. Since 1966, however, citizens have the same legal rights and responsibilities regardless of religious identity.[4] Despite Israel's self-proclaimed status as a Jewish state, non-Jewish citizens vote in elections, enjoy freedom of religion, and attend state-funded schools. Their status as full-fledged citizens is reflected in the makeup of lawmaking institutions as well. In 2016, seventeen of the 120 members of parliament (*Knesset*) were Arabs.

Despite the legal equality between Jews and non-Jews, tensions run high and frequently spill over into violence. When it does, the police often take center

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[3]Residents of Gaza and the West Bank also came under Israeli authority after the territory was taken from Jordan in the 1967 war. However, these individuals are not citizens and are beyond the scope of this study.

[4]There are a small number of exceptions to this statement, most notably that Jewish citizens are required to serve in the military while Muslims are not.

stage. The Temple Mount (*Haram ash-Sharif*) in Jerusalem is a frequent flashpoint for riots, leading to conflict between Muslim residents of Jerusalem and the almost-exclusively Jewish police force assigned to the area. For example, in September 2009 a large group of Muslim worshipers attacked several non-Muslim tourists and police officers, leading to at least 35 reported injuries.[5] Violence spilled over into the surrounding neighborhoods, and clashes between Arab residents and the police continued for several weeks. Similar outbreaks of violence, which typically involve stone throwing by rioters and the use of tear gas and stun grenades by police, occurred in 2015 and 2016.[6] Conflict between Arab and Jewish citizens, and between Arabs and the police, is not limited to Jerusalem. In July 2014, Arab rioters in the town of Qalansawe attacked cars belonging to Jewish drivers and protesters in the northern towns of Taibe, Tira, and Baqa al-Gharbiya clashed with police.[7] In the most extreme cases, masked men blocked a road with burning tires and demanded that drivers tell them their religion. The men dragged two drivers who responded in Hebrew from their cars and beat them. They also attacked a uniformed police officer.

Perhaps the most formative event in the relationship between Israeli Arabs and the police occurred in October 2000. Following weeks of protests, strikes, and riots by Arab citizens motivated by "the Israeli policy of discrimination, racism, occupation and attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque," the police initiated a violent crackdown against the protesters and rioters.[8] They deployed thousands of extra officers throughout the country, including sniper units with live ammunition in key areas.[9]

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[5] Weiss, Efratt. "35 Lightly Injured in Temple Mount Riots." *Ynet News,* 27 September 2009. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3782317,00.html

[6] Eisenbud, Daniel K., Ben Hartman, Khaled Abu Toameh, and Yaakov Lapin. "Riots Break Out on Jerusalem's Temple Mount for Third Straight Day." *Jerusalem Post,* 15 September 2015. http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Riots-breaks-out-on-Jerusalems-Temple-Mount-for-third-straight-day-416198. Also see Eisenbud, Daniel K. "Police Temporarily Close Temple Mount to Non-Muslim Visitors After Rioting Resumes." *Jerusalem Post,* 28 June 2016. http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Policec-temporarily-close-Temple-Mount-to-non-Muslim-visitors-457938

[7] Yaakov, Yifa and Itamar Sharon. "Israelis Attacked, Car Set on Fire During Riots in Arab Israeli Towns." *Times of Israel,* 5 July 2014. http://www.timesofisrael.com/israelis-attacked-car-set-on-fire-during-riots-in-arab-israeli-towns/

[8] Khoury, Jack. "Israeli Arabs Mark 16th Anniversary of October 2000 Riots." *Haaretz,* 1 October 2016. http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.745501

[9] Iraqi, Amjad. "Thirteen Killed, No One Punished: Remember-

In the first eight days of October, police killed twelve Israel-Arab citizens and one non-citizen Palestinian. A Jewish citizen was also killed when a rock thrown by protesters struck her car. The events heavily influenced Arab relations not just with the police but with the government more generally, which many citizens viewed as responsible for the heavy-handed police tactics. One journalist covering the events writes that "the scale and consistency of the brutality also made it clear that high-ranking Israeli officials were responsible for sanctioning the police's methods, including the use of sniper fire."[10] A report released in 2003 following an official inquiry into the clashes criticized the police for being unprepared for the riots and for using excessive force to quell them.[11] Although a number of police officers received disciplinary sanctions, the inquiry did not lead to any significant structural changes in the way that the Israel Police interacts with Arab citizens. Years later, Arabs frequently point to the October 2000 events as a prime example of heavy-handed police tactics against the non-Jewish population.[12] There is little question that these clashes between the Israeli police and Arab citizens shape attitudes and behaviors towards the state, illustrating the importance of law enforcement for the citizen-state relationship in divided societies.

Main Findings

I develop a number of hypotheses about the effects of bottom-up police integration on motives for conflict and the extent to which individuals from marginalized groups are willing to engage in anti-state violence. I test these hypotheses using data from two surveys with embedded experiments, one in nine cities across Israel and one in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. Broadly speaking, the results support my argument that bottom-up integration of the police reduces individuals' incentives to use violence against the state. In both Israel and Iraq, I find consis-

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ing October 2000." *972 Magazine,* 4 October 2015. https://972mag.com/thirteen-killed-no-one-punished-remembering-october-2000/112266/

[10] ibid

[11] "Official Summary of the Or Commission Report." Accessed 11 March 2017 via http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-official-summation-of-the-or-commission-report-september-2003

[12] Amjad (2015)

tent evidence that individuals who perceive the police as more integrated are less likely to perceive that service provision is biased, less likely to believe that they are excluded from employment in the police on the basis of group affiliation, and less afraid of future repression by either the police or the government. In Iraq, I find that individuals who receive an experimental prime about police integration are significantly less likely to express a willingness to use violence against the government compared to those who receive a control prime which says nothing about integration or identity. I do not find a corresponding effect in Israel, and I speculate that this non-finding is due to the country's highly-consolidated institutions and people's well-entrenched attitudes about those institutions relative to Iraq.

The empirical results in the chapters that follow yield a number of insights about institutional design in divided societies:

1. Perceptions of police integration differ between the local and national levels, and in many cases these perceptions predict different outcomes. In my surveys, I asked respondents about the extent to which they believe the police are integrated both nation-wide and specific to their neighborhood. In Iraq, the correlation between responses to these two questions is only .27; in Israel, it is .17. These differences in perceptions at different levels of government have important implications for conflict motives. For example, Israelis who perceive the police as more integrated nation-wide are less likely to say that government services are provided unfairly, while there is no apparent relationship between perceptions of integration *in the respondent's neighborhood* and the perceived fairness of service provision. Overall, I find that perceptions of integration at the national level consistently have the most explanatory power, suggesting that integration is not simply a story about the identity of the officers citizens interact with personally but rather the way that the institutional structure alters and constrains officer behavior and signals the government's intentions to citizens.

2. The dominant group does not always oppose integration, and in many cases supports it. One might reasonably assume that since members of the dominant group – Arab Shias in Iraq and Jews in Israel – benefit from the *status*

quo, they should oppose integration. This possibility poses a major threat to the use of integration as a solution to group-based conflict: Improvements in attitudes and behaviors among members of the marginalized group might be matched by opposition from members of the dominant group who see their position in society eroded. In turn, a reduction in conflict motives among marginalized groups may be negated by an increase in conflict motives among dominant group members. In reality, I find absolutely no evidence that the dominant group in either case opposes integration. For example, only a tiny minority of the Iraqi Shias and Israeli Jews I surveyed said that a potential loss of jobs represents an important enough problem that they might oppose integration. Far more Iraqi Shias and Israeli Jews said that integration "allows [minorities] to do their part in contributing to society" than said that including these groups in key state institutions "might allow them to disrupt the government." Furthermore, in most cases I unexpectedly found little or no difference in the effect that integration has on attitudes between members of the dominant and marginalized groups. For example, the positive association between perceived integration and the view that government services are provided fairly is just as strong among Iraqi Shias as it is among Sunnis. Bottom-up integration appears to avoid the zero-sum attitudes which frequently characterize group-based competition for influence within policy-making institutions.

3. Integration, but not autonomy, reduces conflict motives. As discussed above, integration is just one possible configuration of inclusiveness. I explicitly test the difference in effects between integration and autonomy by asking survey respondents whether police officers in their area are mostly people from their group, mostly people from other groups, or a mix between the two. A clear trend emerges. As expected, individuals who believe the police are mixed, i.e. integrated, are significantly less afraid of police and government repression and more likely to believe that the police and government distribute services fairly compared to those who believe police officers are mainly people from other groups. Somewhat surprisingly, however, there is little or no difference

between those who perceive officers as mostly people from their own group, i.e. those who experience autonomous policing, and those who perceive officers as mostly outgroup members. I explain this surprising phenomenon by noting that integration provides several mechanisms through which a group can protect itself that autonomy does not provide. For example, integration allows officers to monitor and report on the behaviors of outgroup officers, while autonomy does not provide this opportunity. Similarly, integration allows the minority group to impose costs on the dominant group by withholding participation necessary for service-providing institutions to function effectively, whereas under autonomy officers are only positioned to withhold services from civilians from their own group. The differentiation between various configurations of inclusiveness is one of the main contributions of this dissertation, and I suggest that future research must account for the different outcomes for conflict and governance that these configurations predict.

Northern Ireland: A Success Story

While the bulk of the evidence in this dissertation comes from Iraq and Israel, events in Northern Ireland during the 1990's and 2000's illustrate the implementation of police integration as solution to violent conflict along religious lines. Police reform was a major component of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement which ended the decades-long conflict between Catholics and the Protestant-dominated state, and integrating Catholic officers into the rank-and-file of the Police Services of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was central to this reform (McGarry 2000; Ellison 2007). I describe in this section how the PSNI implemented bottom-up integration and the ways in which integration contributed to a reduction in hostilities between Catholics and Protestants.

Before the British government, Sinn Fein, and other relevant factions signed the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998, Northern Ireland's police force was dominated both demographically and politically by Loyalist Protestants. The most relevant policing institution was the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Upon its establishment in 1922, the RUC included a considerable number of Catholics.

However, as sectarian conflict flared over the next several decades, most Catholic officers left the force, leading to an institution that was 8-10% Catholic throughout the second half of the 20th century, while at least 35% of the population was Catholic during the same period (McGarry 2000). This underrepresentation of Catholics persisted in spite of significant demand for more Catholic police officers. A 1990 poll showed that 63% of ordinary Catholics said that it would be better for Northern Ireland if there were more Catholics in the RUC (Weitzer 1995, 84). Intimidation by Catholic Nationalists aimed at preventing Catholics from joining the security forces and halfhearted recruiting efforts by the police in Catholic neighborhoods contributed to the domination of the police by Protestants (McGarry 2000; Weitzer 1995). During the same period, Catholic citizens held overwhelmingly negative attitudes towards the RUC. In a 1987 poll, approval raitings of the police were 16% lower among Catholics than they were among Protestants (Weitzer 1995).

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement contained a number of reforms to Northern Ireland's institutions intended to end violent conflict between Catholics and Protestants.[13] These reforms were far-reaching and included changes to many of Northern Ireland's political institutions. Central to the agreement was a significant overhaul of policing and security institutions. A report published in 1999 by the Patten Commission identified the RUC's main problem as its association with "unionism and the British state" (McGarry 2000, 173). The Patten Report recommended establishing a system of independent civilian oversight, removing British symbols and flags from police stations, and increasing focus on underserved communities (Smyth 2002). Most importantly for this analysis, the report called for the police to be "representative in terms of the make-up of the community as a whole" (McGarry 2000, 176). Specifically, 50% of recruits over the next 10 years should be drawn from Catholic communities (Ellison 2007). By early 2015, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) contained more than 30% Catholic officers,

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[13]Technically speaking, the conflict was between "Nationalists" who sought independence or unification with Ireland, and "Loyalists" who preferred to maintain the status quo attachment to the United Kingdom. Because Nationalists were overwhelmingly Catholic and Unionists were overwhelmingly protestant, I use the religious labels for simplicity.

less than the general population figure of 40% but dramatically higher than the mid-1990's figure of about 10%. The police achieved this major increase in participation by Catholics through a combination of targeted recruitment and early retirement incentives for eligible Protestant officers. In doing so, the PSNI was able to rapidly increase the proportion of Catholic officers without inflating the size of the police beyond what was necessary.

Before reforms, violence between Protestants and the police was intertwined with the quality of service provision. As one Republican Protestant explained, "We were at war with [the police] and they were at war with us. If you had someone belonging to you attacked by a rocket you are hardly going to be predisposed to police that community" (Byrne and Monaghan 2008, 41). Integration and reform therefore focused on both issues simultaneously.

The Unionist political establishment was initially hesitant to accept the Patten Commission's recommendations, particularly when it came to removing British symbols like the crown from police equipment and emblems. Unionist Party leader David Trimble argued that the RUC's symbols could not be considered political because the "crown is above politics" (Smyth 2002, 304). While the call for more Catholic officers met little explicit opposition, the RUC argued in front of Parliament that the historic low numbers of Catholic officers should be blamed on IRA intimidation, not unfair recruiting practices. With time, however, opposition to integration waned. Bayley (2008) notes that despite surely being the most scrutinized police force in the world, the PSNI has been highly cooperative with demands for transparency and policy change since most reforms were implemented in 2001.

While the major Nationalist players expressed initial skepticism over police reforms, they too came around after observing early successes. By 2000, Sinn Fein and the SDLP called for full implementation of the Patten Commission's recommendations, particularly 50:50 recruiting ratios (Byrne and Monaghan 2008). The IRA explicitly endorsed the PSNI in 2007, and Northern Ireland experienced an almost immediate drop in reported crime of about ten percentage points (Byrne and Monaghan 2008). Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, traditionally a staunch

opponent of the Protestant-dominated security institutions, made the following statement in support of the police:

> "Let me be very clear. If any citizen is the target of crime, whether it be death riders, drug pushers or rape, or attacks on our elderly, if there are crimes against the people, against citizens, Sinn Fin will be encouraging victims and citizens to cooperate with the police." (Byrne and Monaghan 2008)

While Catholic attitudes towards the police remain worse than those of Protestants, the hesitancy seems largely based on a desire for more services rather than on a lack of legitimacy by the police or the perception of discrimination (Byrne and Monaghan 2008). Overall, public support for the police overall retains room for improvement. Yet, the gap in approval between Catholics and Protestants has closed. In one survey, 49% of Catholics said the police are doing a good job in their area, compared to 54% of Protestants (Bayley 2008). In 2007, 75% of Catholics and 83% of Protestants said that they supported the police (Byrne and Monaghan 2008). Meanwhile, 63% of Catholics believed that the police treat Catholics and Protestants equally, a fairly significant figure in the context of the history of policing in Northern Ireland. The most telling evidence of Catholic support for the PSNI is in recruitment: Since 2001, about 35% of applicants each year have been Catholics, a sure sign that the community has bought in to the institution (Bayley 2008). All of this from a community which, before reforms, was widely harassed by the police and believed they received significantly worse service provision than did Protestants (Byrne and Monaghan 2008).

The PSNI's integration has played an important role in the overall improvement in Catholic relations with the police and the reduction in violent conflict more broadly. The threat of sectarian violence did not disappear entirely, of course. However, the implementation of police integration tracks with a dramatic reduction in conflict. Over the course of three decades, the Troubles claimed 3,532 lives including more than 300 police officers. An additional 47,000 individuals were wounded due to sectarian violence. As of October 2015, only about a dozen deaths, or less than one per year, had been attributed to sectarian violence since

the Good Friday agreement.[14] These figures and the preceding discussion high-lights the central role that police integration played in bringing about the end of the Troubles.

Chapter Summaries

The dissertation proceeds in two sections. First, Chapters 1 and 2 lay out the theory of bottom-up integration as a solution to sectarian violence and apply this theory to the police. Chapter 1 places bottom-up integration in the context of existing research on institutions in divided societies. It details the limitations of existing research and explains how bottom-up integration addresses these issues, especially when implemented *in conjunction with* top-down power sharing. The chapter then introduces three mechanisms through which bottom-up integration is expected to reduce conflict: by reducing grievances over unequal government service provision, providing access to desirable employment opportunities, and mitigating fears of future repression by members of weaker groups. Chapter 1 then details scope conditions that limit the application of bottom-up integration, including the presence of "sticky" identity groups around which politics are or-ganized, the existence of functional state institutions, and a minimum level of perceived state legitimacy.

Chapter 2 makes the case that the police are a critical link in the chain of governance, and that the police's level of inclusiveness greatly affects the citizen-state relationship in divided societies. I detail the specific ways in which bottom-up integration of the police reduces motives of previously-excluded groups to use violence against the government. The main argument of this chapter is that the police are a *political* institution whose composition has consequences not just for citizen-police relations but for citizen-state relations more generally. I test this argument using survey data from the Arab Barometer (Jamal and Tessler 2008). I first demonstrate that across the Arab world, citizens' attitudes towards the police are closely correlated with their attitudes towards the government. I then show

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[14]McCann, Eamonn (2015), "The Troubles Are Back." *New York Times* 5 October, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/opinion/the-troubles-are-back.html?_r=0

that this relationship is interrupted when the police operate outside the authority of the national government. While most Iraqis who have positive attitudes towards the police also have positive attitudes towards the government, there is no such relationship for Kurdish Iraqis, the majority of whom live in areas where the police are under the authority not of the national government but of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The otherwise robust link between citizens' attitudes towards the police and the government supports the argument that policing has important implications for governance, broadly construed. That this link is interrupted when police services are provided by another entity sets an important scope condition for the rest of this project: bottom-up integration should be effective only when the policy-implementing institution in question operates under the authority of the state.

The second section of the dissertation uses quantitative and qualitative data from a variety of sources to empirically test the effectiveness of bottom-up integration along several metrics. Chapter 3 introduces the Iraqi Police Services (IPS) as a case study. This chapter draws on extensive interviews with police trainers and advisors who worked with the Iraqi police during the rebuilding process, as well as media and policy reports. Chapter 4 uses an original survey with an embedded experiment of 800 Iraqis in Baghdad to test the link between perceived police integration and support for anti-government violence. I find that Iraqi Arabs – both Sunnis *and* Shias – who receive an informational prime that the IPS are integrated are significantly less willing to consider using violence against the government. Next, I use data from the same survey to test the relationship between perceived integration and three previously-identified motives for anti-government violence. I show that Iraqis who perceive the police as more integrated hold fewer grievances over unequal service provision and exclusion from employment, and are less fearful of future government repression.

Chapter 5 introduces the second case, the Israel Police. It provides context on the institution's role in Israeli society and conflict between Arab and Jewish citizens. I present extensive descriptive statistics on the demographic makeup of the Israeli police using original data on officer identity at each station from 2008 to

2014. Chapter 6 tests the relationship between perceived integration and support for violence among Israelis using a survey with a similar experiment to the one conducted in Iraq. While I do find a slight decrease in support for violence among Israelis who receive information that the police are integrated, the relationship does not reach statistical significance. I explain that unlike in Iraq, where attitudes towards institutions are quite malleable, Israelis have deeply entrenched attitudes about the country's thoroughly-consolidated institutions. Therefore, while the informational prime caused significant shifts in attitudes among Iraqis, it did not cause similar shifts in attitudes among Israelis. I do, however, find robust evidence linking Israelis' perceptions of integration with their perceptions of police fairness, access to jobs, and fears of future repression.

Chapter 7 moves beyond conflict as an outcome to ask how bottom-up integration of the police affects the overall quality of police service provision. Drawing once again on an original survey of Israeli citizens, I show that integration reduces inefficient identity-based biases in police resource allocation and increases flows of information from citizens to the police, both of which should improve the police's ability to prevent criminal activity. Then, using data on the religious makeup of Israeli police officers at every station in the country over a six year period, I find that increases in local-level police integration are associated with decreases in crime victimization. This chapter demonstrates that police integration has real implications for the quality of governance. Consistent with the findings in the previous chapters, I also find that integration improves the quality of service provision not just for Arab citizens but also for Jewish citizens. In other words, integration improves governance in absolute terms. Integration does not simply allow officers from new groups to engage in biased behavior that privileges their coethnics; it changes officer behavior overall and leads to more efficient crime prevention.

Overall, this dissertation challenges the way that researchers think about institutional design in divided societies. Governance is provided by a set of institutions working in concert with one another, from leader selection to policy-making to policy-implementation. Even the most carefully-crafted policy-making institutions may not lead to effective governance for all citizens if outputs are manipulated

by bureaucrats and law enforcement officers. Thus, where group-based conflict is motivated at least in part by concerns over governance, policy-implementing institutions are critical for creating sustainable peace. Institutional solutions to group-based conflict must account not just for the institutions that make laws but also the ones that enforce them.

Chapter 1

From the Bottom-Up: Rank-And-File Integration in Divided Societies

Policymakers' failure to prevent Iraq's descent into sectarian violence raises a somber question: can political institutions support effective governance in highly-fragmented societies, or are some cases simply too divided to succeed? After all, the Iraqi constitution follows the blueprint for institutions in divided societies nearly to a "T," with a proportional representation electoral system, multiparty system with low barriers to entry, split executive, and regional autonomy for Kurds. Yet, these institutions were unable to prevent a brutal sectarian civil war. In divided societies, or those in which ascriptive identities like ethnicity or religion are significant motivators of political attitudes and behaviors, is peaceful coexistence possible. Can institutions in divided societies foster peaceful competition between groups and minimize the likelihood of sectarian violence? If so, how, and why did institution-building fail in this regard in Iraq?

I argue that the makeup of policy-implementing institutions plays a critical and under-explored role in determining the likelihood of sectarian violence in divided societies. Integrating members of minority, vulnerable, or previously-excluded groups into the rank-and-file of institutions that implement policies and enforce laws reduces the likelihood that political competition between groups will

spill over into violent conflict by addressing a number of common reasons why individuals choose to fight. This chapter lays out a theory of what I refer to as "bottom-up integration," a means of fostering institutional inclusiveness that focuses on balance and exposure between members of different groups in rank-and-file positions of policy-implementing institutions. The focus on policy-implementing institutions stands in contrast to most existing research on institutions in divided societies, which tends to deal exclusively with institutions of leader selection and policy-making. Yet, institutions like education, healthcare, trash collection, and law enforcement provide critical public services that constitute important products of governance. Bureaucrats and law enforcement officers have broad discretion over the way in which these services are distributed (Lipsky 1980; Dincecco and Ravanilla 2016; Pepinsky et al. 2017). It stands to reason that when politics and society are already organized along identity lines, the demographic makeup of the rank-and-file service providers will have a significant impact on the citizen-state relationship.

My main argument is that bottom-up integration affects governance in a way that reduces the incentives of individuals from marginalized groups to fight against the state. I identify two types of motives, grievances over current conditions (Gurr 1970) and fears over future conditions (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Posen 1993). First, the integration of bureaucratic institutions reduces identity-based biases in service provision by allowing bureaucrats from different groups to monitor one another's behavior and by altering the attitudes of bureaucrats towards outgroups. Fairer service provision reduces conflict-inducing grievances among those who are under-served. Also related to grievances over current conditions, bureaucratic institutions employ large numbers of non-elites, providing desirable employment and direct involvement in the governing process. Bottom-up integration provides individuals from marginalized groups with access to employment and reduces exclusion from the state. Second, bottom-up integration reduces the fears of vulnerable group members that they will be taken advantage of in the future. Bottom-up integration empowers previously-excluded groups and makes future repression by the state more costly, reducing their incentives for building up their

defenses or engaging in preemptive strikes in anticipation of future conflict.

This chapter develops the theory of bottom-up integration. It begins by discussing the importance of policy-implementing institutions in divided societies, and the way that the integration of non-elites into these types of institutions affects the citizen-state relationship. It then places bottom-up integration in the context of existing research on institutions in divided societies and explains how bottom-up integration avoids many of the pitfalls of existing strategies. The next section differentiates integration from two other configurations of inclusiveness, autonomy and proportionality. I argue that integration holds a number of advantages over both when it comes to preventing violence along identity group lines. I then discuss in detail the mechanisms linking bottom-up integration with motives for group-based, anti-state violence. In doing so, I note that these mechanisms depend on citizens' reactions to knowledge or beliefs that policy-implementing institutions are integrated, making perceptions of integration (rather than *actual* integration) the relevant construct. Finally, I lay out a number of scope conditions which determine the generalizability of my arguments.

Institutional Arrangements in Divided Societies

Discussions of political institutions infrequently include the bureaucracy. Yet, bureaucrats provide a wide range of services, including healthcare, education, food safety, and firefighting that are inherently political. First, the goods and services that bureaucrats provide are the tangible product of governance. In many cases, the government may point to the provision of these goods and services to justify taxation, limits on individual freedoms, and other costs associated with allowing oneself to be governed. Second, civil servants have considerable discretion over the way that goods and services are delivered to the public, making them *de facto* policymakers (Dincecco and Ravanilla 2016). Government service delivery depends on bureaucrats' interpretations of government policies, giving these individuals considerable influence over citizens' experiences with the state (Lipsky 1980; Evans 1995; Pepinsky et al. 2017). These two functions make the bureaucracy critical for the day-to-day functioning of the state. It stands to reason, then, that

in societies in which identity is a significant motivator of political attitudes and behaviors, the demographic makeup of the bureaucracy should play an important role in shaping the citizen-state relationship.

Bureaucratic institutions are also important because they engage large numbers of citizens in the day-to-day functioning of the state. Policy-implementing institutions employ large segments of the population and directly involve them in public life, providing a sense of ownership and accountability for government service provision which fosters attachment to the state. Civil servants who play a critical role in providing government goods and services are likely to internalize the successes and failures of their agency, and perhaps of the government more broadly. This sense of engagement should extend to their family, friends, and, where group identity is highly salient, coethnics who observe this contribution. Relatedly, whereas policy-making institutions tend to be the domain of the upper class or political elites, the bureaucracy is staffed by ordinary individuals. Barriers to entry tend to be low, and the institutions frequently provide any specialized skills that are required for employment. For example, most large police departments provide extensive training for new officers, allowing the recruitment of individuals with no experience in law enforcement. The low barriers for entry make participation in the state via bureaucratic institutions attainable for the vast majority of citizens.

Finally, civil servants are highly-visible symbols of the state. They wear government uniforms, interact with citizens, and spend even more time than elected officials in the public eye. Because of their critical role in providing government services, civil servants' visibility enhances the extent to which they influence attitudes about the state. Positive interactions between citizens and customs officers at the airport, for example, reflect well on the government more generally, while negative interactions with bureaucrats at the department of motor vehicles leave citizens complaining of government inefficiency. The nature of the bureaucracy creates many more opportunities for direct citizen interaction with government representatives than they have with elected officials, providing yet another reason why the bureaucracy is an important political institution.

Existing Research on Institutions and Sectarian Conflict

A rich line of research asks how institutions affect violent sectarian conflict in divided societies (Fearon 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Horowitz 1985; Laitin 2007; Cederman et al. 2010; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Typical institutional solutions to group-based conflict seek to design a single set of institutions that adequately represents the interests of all relevant groups, which in turn reduces individuals' motives for engaging in violence. Much of this research begins with the proposition that majoritarian democratic processes are inappropriate for highly fragmented societies because they risk excluding minority groups from the decision-making process (Lijphart 1969). This exclusion simultaneously produces policies that are unacceptable to a segment of the population and leaves that segment without a means of competing for political influence through non-violent channels. Thus, institutional solutions to conflict tend to focus on creating alternatives to majority-rule institutions of leader selection and policymaking. Power sharing strategies like Lijphart's *consociationalism* attempt to include as many voices as possible in the decision-making process (Lijphart 1969, 1984). Consociationalism is often applied in the form of reserved legislative or executive positions for each relevant group (Norris 2008). The Taif Agreement which ended Lebanon's bloody civil war in 1989 mandates a 50/50 ratio of Christian and Muslim members of parliament, and explicitly divides power between the Sunni-held prime ministerial position and the Christian-held presidency. Similarly, the Transitional Administrative Law implemented in Iraq by the United States and its allies between 2004 and 2005 divided the executive branch into three positions, and distributed one of these positions to each of Iraq's three largest sects, Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds. Manipulation of electoral systems can be an effective method of altering the inclusiveness of government without overtly reserving positions on the basis of identity (Horowitz 2004; Wimmer 2003). For instance, changing from first-past-the-post to proportional representation tends to increase the number of parties (Cox 1997), and therefore the diversity of voices, in the legislature.

Power dividing (Roeder and Rothchild 2005) shares consociationalism's goal of designing democratic institutions that protect demographic minorities from po-

litical irrelevance. Rather than focusing on inclusion within state institutions, however, power dividing seeks to remove power from these institutions so that the question of institutional inclusiveness is less contentious. Power dividing distributes authority in a way that balances power across institutions, and then allocates institutional control across groups. Issue areas are allocated across many institutions, and the rules for representation differ from one institution to the next. A power dividing government might have multiple jurisdictions that do not coincide with preexisting cleavages, for example.

While not explicitly designed as a solution to sectarian conflict, scholars and policymakers often recommend federalism as an appropriate structure for divided societies (Riker 1964; McGarry 2005; Cederman et al. 2015; Wimmer 2003; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Federalism diffuses power by creating additional levels of government that operate closer to citizens. Both consociationalism and power dividing are compatible with federalism. Scholars debate whether federal boundaries should coincide with or cross-cut ethnic boundaries (McGarry 2005). Providing each relevant sect with its own autonomous region allows for some measure of self-government and addresses fears of majority dominance by members of vulnerable groups. The autonomy provided to Iraq's Kurdish region under the country's 2005 constitution is illustrative of ethnic federalism. The Iraqi constitution recognizes the autonomy of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) over the provision of infrastructure and basic government services. Most tellingly, the KRG also holds autonomy over security, with a standing paramilitary force made up of Kurds responsible for both maintaining domestic security within the region and defending its borders. Meanwhile, the Iraqi military is officially barred from entering the Kurdish region. Despite the intuitive appeal of ethnic federalism, the creation of autonomous regions along ethnic lines may actually height divisions by highlighting intergroup differences and implicitly supporting a policy of separation rather than reconciliation (Wimmer 2003; Brancati 2004). Furthermore, when one or more groups has a tendency towards secessionism, there is concern that providing them with autonomy may strengthen these claims by creating institutions of self-government (Brancati 2004; Roeder 2007). Thus, federalism is caught in

the middle between two competing mechanisms for reducing conflict: promoting self-rule and de-emphasizing group identity.

While broad discussions of institutional design in divided societies tend to overlook the bureaucracy, there is no shortage of evidence that bureaucratic inclusiveness matters for policy implementation in divided societies. Looking at courts in Israel, Shayo and Zussman (2011) find that Israeli court claims are more likely to be accepted when the claimant is from the same ethnic group as the judge, while Grossman et al. (2015) show that Arab defendants receive more lenient sentences when there is at least one Arab judge on an appeals panel. While not responsible for direct interactions with citizens in the same way as traditional bureaucracies, research on military integration also provides insight into the effects of rank and file integration in divided settings. Evidence from the militaries in Burundi (Samii 2013) and Malaysia (Ostwald 2013) suggests that increased ethnic representation decreases prejudicial behavior against non-coethnics and increases expressions of civic identity. More broadly, Wilkinson (2015) argues that the process of integrating individuals from all of India's provinces into the Indian army prevented the army from posing a threat to democratization following independence. Finally, Lyall (2010) finds that military units are more effective at preventing insurgent activity when soldiers come from the same ethnic group as the insurgents. The effects of bureaucratic inclusiveness on attitudes and service provision suggest that the makeup of policy-implementing institutions is likely to have implications for conflict as well.

Challenges of Existing Strategies

Existing research on institutions in divided societies tends to take a top-down approach to inclusion. These approaches have two primary characteristics: They foster inclusion at the group level by ensuring inclusion of a leader or leaders from each relevant group, and they work through policy-making institutions like the executive and legislative branches or government. This research deals with the allocation of leadership positions (Lijphart 1969, 2012), control over institutions (Roeder and Rothchild 2005), and elites' management of their non-elite coethnics

(Nordlinger 1972). These strategies implicitly assume that power allocation matters at the elite level, and that the concerns of the masses can be addressed by inclusiveness across ethnic elites. The implication of this assumption is that if the masses do not trust their elites, or if they cannot agree on who the relevant elites are, the institutional arrangement may break down. Yet, despite shared ascriptive identity, there is no guarantee that elites will be perceived as representatives of their ethnic communities, nor will they necessarily act in the interest of their non-elite coethnics. Top-down arrangements provide little insight into how an identity group that is internally divided, for example Iraqi Kurds who for years have been deeply divided between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), might be effectively represented by a single leader in a power sharing national government. In more explicitly constructivist terms, how do we know which groups to represent (Chandra 2001)?

Second, top-down approaches tend to focus almost exclusively on institutions responsible for aggregating preferences into policies, particularly electoral rules and policy-making institutions. The expectation is that increasing inclusiveness in this process will lead to governance favorable to members of all groups. Policy-making institutions, however, are only one part of the governing process. Laws crafted by policymakers are enforced and implemented by bureaucrats and law enforcement officers. Civil servants have considerable discretion over the ways in which government policies affect citizens in real terms (Lipsky 1980). Laws that do not discriminate on the basis of identity do not prevent bureaucrats from favoring members of their own group when distributing goods and services. Top-down approaches to institutional design fail to account for this final step in the governing process, leaving space for policies written with an eye towards peaceful coexistence to be implemented in a way that favors one group over another.

Finally, top-down approaches do not engage ordinary citizens. In most applications of power sharing, integration into the state apparatus is exclusively for elites (Nordlinger 1972; Norris 2008). Elite-focused inclusiveness does little to foster attachment to the state among ordinary individuals who remain beholden to their ethnic representative. Yet, attachment to the state may be a powerful anti-

dote to sectarian conflict. Nationality cuts across other ascriptive group divisions and reduces their political salience Laitin (2007). Loyalty to the state rather than to ethnic elites may reduce the tendency for citizens to organize politically around ascriptive identity. Increased attachment to the state may be an especially powerful tool where the political situation mandates that multiple groups continue to coexist within a political system for the foreseeable future. For example, the apparent indivisability of Jerusalem's holy sites makes the separation of Jews and non-Jews into different states difficult (Hassner 2009), eliminating partition as a plausible avenue towards conflict resolution. Conflict under these types of situations may be mitigated more effectively by replacing to ascriptive groups with attachment to the state. Yet, by generating representation and engagement through ethnic elites rather than directly through ordinary citizens, top-down approaches risk reinforcing these identities.

Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Integration

Bottom-up integration addresses many of the weaknesses associated with top-down power sharing. First, by working through ordinary individuals rather than ethnic elites, it avoids relying on the very individuals who have the most to gain by perpetuating group-based conflict. By definition, ethnic elites' power derives from the relevance of group identity. Thus, they have a personal incentive to avoid conflict-reducing strategies which de-emphasize group identity in favor of national identity. Bottom-up integration also does not assume that ethnic elites are able to determine the behaviors of their coethnic masses, allowing for inclusion even in the absence of a strong leader.

Second, the focus on inclusion via entry level positions allows bottom-up integration to provide a fairer integrative process than does top-down power sharing. Under a bottom-up arrangement, integration is achieved through increased minority recruitment for low level positions. These positions require minimal qualifications, with extensive training provided by the institution after hiring, so that preexisting inequalities in education or socioeconomic status are unlikely to exclude members of a particular group *en masse*. Once new recruits are hired, trained, and

distributed, advancement through the ranks of the institution occurs on the basis of merit and not identity. Over time, institutional leadership should naturally approach representativeness as qualified individuals advance from an integrated pool of candidates. A frequent objection to identity-based integration schemes is that they dilute the quality of potential employees by recruiting on a criteria other than merit, or by allowing elites to parachute into important positions without working their way up through the ranks. The focus on low-level positions that require minimal qualifications addresses this critique because there is likely to be a surplus of qualified candidates from all groups.

Finally, integration through large numbers of non-elites reduces the likelihood that citizens will perceive representation as zero-sum. The sheer number of bureaucrats and low-level state employees provides each individual position with minimal political value. Groups in conflict may fight tooth and nail for each legislative seat, but they are unlikely to struggle with the same vigor over the hiring decision for each trash collector or firefighter. The political power of policy-implementing institutions is dispersed widely across hundreds or thousands of employees, making balancing and compromising between the interests of competing groups possible. The large number of positions that exist, along with the state's ability to temporarily expand and contract the size of the bureaucracy, allows the state to allay fears of job loss by incumbent civil servants as well.

Institutional Arrangements in Divided Societies: Dominance, Autonomy, and Integration

Integration is one possible configuration of institutional inclusiveness. It refers to the inclusion of individuals from each group in sufficient numbers that the functioning of the institution depends on the participation of all groups, and the distribution of these individuals so that bureaucrats from all groups work with and serve members of all groups. An institution is integrated not when it includes representatives from each group, but when there are enough representatives from each group to significantly influence the operations of the institution. Thus, integration fosters inclusiveness not as a means unto itself but as a mechanism for

balancing influence within the institution. In some sense, this configuration is similar to the allocation of veto powers across groups in a legislature, with each group able to significantly affect service provision should it withdraw its support (Lijphart 1969). Under an integrated institutional arrangement, a single set of institutions is responsible for serving all citizens, regardless of identity, and bureaucrats are responsible for serving and representing all citizens, again regardless of identity. Thus, similarly to federal regions that cut across ethnic boundaries, integration is expected to redistribute power in a way that avoids reinforcing existing ethnic cleavages.

Integration is only one possible institutional arrangement in a divided society. It makes up the middle ground on a continuum of institutional arrangements, with autonomy and dominance at the two opposing extremes. It is important to emphasize that these categories are ideal types placed along a continuous spectrum. Most real-world cases will fall somewhere between the extremes. Figure 1.1 illustrates how these three arrangements vary in the diversity of an institution's members. At either extreme, dominance and autonomy mean that all members of an institution belong to the same identity group. In the center, an integrated institution maximizes institutional diversity.

A dominant arrangement is one in which a single group or a coalition of groups uses its power advantage to retain total decision-making power within an institution, and members of other groups are excluded from participating in the institution in any meaningful way. A group need not have a demographic majority in the general population to dominate government institutions. A minority group with a power advantage may dominate an institution or a government, as in the case of the Baathists in Iraq or the Sunni monarchy in Shia-majority Bahrain. Applied to policy-implementing institutions, dominance means that both the rank-and-file and the leadership are drawn almost exclusively from a particular group or coalition of groups.

Dominant arrangements are differentiated from integrated ones by more than simple numbers. Under a dominant institutional arrangement, any members of minority groups who participate within state institutions are likely to be seen

Figure 1.1: Institutional Structure and Diversity

by their coethnics as collaborators with the enemy rather than as representatives of their group. At what point does a dominant institutional arrangement become an integrated one? A "tipping point" explanation would suggest that below some threshold of inclusion, an institution is dominant and minority members are viewed as collaborators, while past that point the institution is integrated and minorities are perceived as representatives of their group. In contrast, I argue that the key distinction is not how many members of each group are included but rather how much influence their inclusion gives them over the operations of the institution. *Inclusion* is cheap to the extent that it is reversible by the dominant group. *Integration* is effective when previously excluded groups are included to the point that their participation matters for the operation of the institution, and consequently the state, which makes inclusion costly to reverse. When the inclusion of minorities in an institution is sufficient to cause severe disruptions to service provision if minorities were to withdraw their support, members of marginalized groups should perceive the institution as integrated. In turn, when minorities perceive the institution as integrated, they will view civil servants from their group as repre-

sentatives and not as collaborators. In an integrated institution, members of each group possess considerable tools for imposing costs on the state. Teachers could manipulate classroom curricula, firefighters could allow certain neighborhoods to burn, and the police could turn their guns against other groups. The ability to disrupt from within the institution is an important delimiter because this capacity is what makes integration a costly action for the state, and consequently what allows the government to use integration as a credible signal of its commitment to cooperation.

Autonomy resides at the opposite end of the spectrum from dominance. Under a system of autonomy, each relevant group is given total control over governing institutions as they apply to that group, resulting in multiple parallel institutions that perform similar roles but whose services are targeted towards different groups of citizens on the basis of ascriptive identity. The rank-and-file of policy-implementing institutions is homogeneous and matches the demographic makeup of the citizens it serves. Autonomy is particularly likely to occur under a system of ethnic federalism in which ethnic and federal boundaries coincide (McGarry 2005). For example, the Iraqi constitution gives the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq almost complete autonomy over the governing process in Northern Iraq, with Kurds responsible for the provision of virtually all government goods and services in the region. Given the considerable geographic sorting of Iraq's sectarian groups, this system closely resembles one in which Kurds provide government services for Kurds, and Arabs provide government services for Arabs. Of course, from the perspective of the Kurdish region's minority Turkoman and Christian populations, this is actually a dominant arrangement. The provision of security in the West Bank provides another example. The Oslo Agreement divides this territory into Areas A, B, and C. Area A is under full control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its security forces. Area C is under Israeli military control. In Area B, however, the PA security forces have authority over Palestinian residents, while the Israeli military maintains authority over the settler population and Israeli citizens. Thus, in Area B, the provision of a key public good, security, is dependent upon the identity of the individual receiving the good.

At first glance, autonomy appears to be an appealing arrangement for minorities in a divided society. However, it may prove problematic in conflict and post-conflict settings. First, autonomy concessions may be insufficient for mitigating grievances caused by previous mistreatment. Such an arrangement may be viewed by minorities as "too little, too late" (Cederman et al. 2015). If autonomy does not address the underlying grievances, it may not be effective in preventing further violence and conflict. Second, ethnic autonomy and the concurrent ethnic capture of key institutions could fan the flames of secessionism (Roeder 2007). The perception that key government services are now effectively provided for coethnics, by coethnics, along with the realization that much of the groundwork for state building has already been laid, could lower the perceived costs of rebellion in hopes of achieving independence. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an arrangement of ethnic autonomy over certain institutions does not necessarily address the underlying power asymmetries between groups. There is little to prevent the state or the dominant group from reneging on the provision of autonomy at any point in the future (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Power sharing will only remain effective if it is perceived as irreversible; any arrangement that leaves certain groups indefensible against the whims of more powerful groups is unlikely to serve as a long-term solution to conflict. In the case of Palestinian security autonomy in the West Bank, Israel can (and does) renege on the Palestinian Authority's "autonomy" by pursuing suspects unilaterally or re-occupying parts of the West Bank. The key difference between ethnic autonomy and integration is the minority group's ability to impose costs on the dominant group. Whereas under integration, the minority group may impose costs by going on strike or otherwise disrupting the provision of services to the entire population, under autonomy members of previously excluded groups do not have these opportunities.

Proportional representation is another configuration of inclusiveness, one that is tangential to the continuum between dominance and autonomy. Whereas integration focuses on balancing influence between groups within an institution, proportionality views inclusiveness as an end unto itself based on a normative desire for inclusion. Proportionality implicitly assumes that very small groups will

be satisfied by inclusion in government equal to their population share even if that inclusion does not give them any real influence over policy outcomes. Yet, if conflict is the result not just of grievances over exclusion but of grievances over the way that governance affects individuals' welfare, well-being, and security, then proportionality will be insufficient to reduce conflict motives as it fails to provide small groups with real influence over the governance process. Furthermore, groups may disagree over how much representation each is entitled to. Historical allocations of power may lead some groups to desire representation in government that is greater than their population share. Post-2003 Iraq illustrates this predicament. Hashim (2005) questions whether proportionality within Iraqi politics, including the bureaucracy, would be sufficient to allay the fears of the Sunni minority given their historical dominance of Iraq's political sphere. Sunnis view politics from the perspective of a group that dominated the political process for the better part of a century, then suddenly had their country taken away from them by foreign fighters. The overthrow of the Baath regime represented a fundamental blow to the Iraqi Sunni identity. Rebuilding this identity and reincorporating Sunni Arabs into the Iraqi community might not be achieved by simple proportional representation within government, as it still represents a significant loss of power and influence for the group.

Mechanisms: Bottom-Up Integration and Conflict Mitigation

This dissertation argues that bottom-up integration can reduce the likelihood of violence in divided societies by reducing the incentives of individuals to support or participate in violence. Research on sub-national conflict identifies several mechanisms that increase individuals' desire to participate in violent conflict. I deal with two categories of motives: grievances over current conditions, including unequal service provision and exclusion from jobs (Gurr 1970), and concerns over future conditions, including fear of repression by more powerful groups (Lake and Rothchild 1996; de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast 1997). This section details these mechanisms through which integration of the rank-and-file of policy-implementing

institutions affects individuals' incentives to participate in conflict. While most of these mechanisms point towards a reduction in violence, certain characteristics of integration may counteract these effects and increase the likelihood of conflict.

Grievances Over Current Conditions

I divide relevant conflict-reducing mechanisms into two categories, those that address grievances over current conditions and those that mitigate fears about future conditions. One explanation for sub-national violence argues that individuals or groups will rebel when they hold grievances against the state or, in a divided society, against the dominant group that controls the state. Grievances occur when members of a group perceive that their group's position in society is lower than it otherwise would be due to the actions of others (Gurr 1970). The sources of grievances may be economic, including real or perceived economic inequalities (Muller 1985; Paige 1975; Russett 1964), or due to political exclusion or unequal levels of government service provision. Evidence in support of these explanations is mixed. Using data on 40 years of civil wars, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that while some sources of grievances, particularly political repression and exclusion, appear to explain consequential variation in conflict occurrence, other variables have far greater explanatory power.

Bottom-up integration of bureaucratic institutions addresses grievances by decreasing identity-based inequalities in the distribution of government goods and services. There are two concurrent mechanisms through which integration reduces biases in service provision. The first is by reducing government employees' preferences for bias. New recruits go through training together, which helps build interpersonal bonds between individuals who share the experience. Working side by side with non-coethnics towards a common goal gives members a set of shared experiences they can draw on and identify with throughout their careers, regardless of personal identity or background. For individuals in the most divided societies, working in an integrated state institution may be their first opportunity to interact with non-coethnics as equals and members of the same "team." There is reason to believe that building these personal relationships between individual members

from different communities will affect not only their attitudes towards one another but also their attitudes towards non-coethnics more generally. Lipsky (1980, 41) argues that "differences in class backgrounds of recruits tend to disappear in training and trainee socialization." Perhaps the same can be said for ethnic and religious differences, at least to the degree that these differences inform attitudes towards outgroups. Research from social psychology suggests that increased exposure to non-coethnics in this type of environment should improve individuals' attitudes towards outgroups (Allport 1954). Humans have a natural predisposition towards the familiar and a dislike of the unfamiliar, and merely increasing the frequency of exposure to individuals from a group often improves attitudes towards the entire group (Zajonc 1968). Ball and Cantor (1974) perform an experiment in which white school children are shown photos of other children and then asked how much they would like to spend time with these individuals. They find that increased exposure to photos of black children was associated with an increase in favorability of blacks more generally.[1] By forcing interactions between non-coethnics, and doing so in the context of working as equals towards a common goal, bottom-up integration replaces negative stereotypes with positive personal experiences as the basis for attitudes towards outgroups. As a result, employees of integrated participatory institutions should be less likely to exhibit biases in their performance, leading to a fairer distribution of government goods and services and, consequently, a reduction in grievances against the government.

Second, integration constrains the ability of civil servants to engage in bias by allowing non-coethnic bureaucrats to monitor and sanction each other's behavior. Police officers who serve side by side with non-coethnics will have less opportunity to harass or ignore non-coethnics without being observed and sanctioned by a fellow officer. Sanctions for biased actions may be formal, for example being suspended or fired from work, or even arrested for particularly egregious offenses. Sanctions may also work through informal pressure among peers. Regardless, even

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[1]This "mere exposure effect" is not limited to issues of racial discrimination, of course. Other studies find evidence of its effects in advertising (Sawyer 1981), social perceptions (Saegert et al. 1973), food preferences (Pliner 1982), attitudinal formation (Grush 1976), and a wide variety of other phenomena.

if integration fails to alter the preferences of government employees, it may still alter their actions, leading to a reduction in identity-based biases in service provision. In turn, we should observe a reduction in conflict-inducing grievances.

Another way that bottom-up integration may reduce grievances over current conditions is by providing access to desirable employment opportunities that were previously unavailable to members of certain groups. Conflict may be motivated by the perception that one has been unfairly excluded from employment (Collier and Hoeffler 1998) or from government (Cederman et al. 2010). It is not for nothing that a subset of anti-government insurgents in Iraq were informally referred to as "POIs," or "pissed-off Iraqis" (Patel 2015). When exclusion from employment, real or perceived, coincides with identity-based cleavages, the resulting motives for conflict take on ethnic overtones. Integration creates an influx of employment opportunities for previously-excluded individuals, potentially improving their economic status. Lawful employment may also decrease incentives for participating in illicit activities like crime or insurgency as it raises the opportunity costs from doing so (Berman et al. 2011a). Existing research on whether employment decreases participation in conflict is inconclusive (Berman et al. 2011a; Blattman and Annan 2016), but the argument that providing employment opportunities within the state should improve attitudes towards the state seems reasonable. Indeed, Marr (2007) cites the "loss of jobs, income, and status of former arm officers, civil servants, and others" as a significant motivator of Sunni Iraqis' acquiescence to and participation in insurgency against the US and the newly-elected Iraqi government.

The obvious challenge to the claim that providing jobs to minorities reduces conflict is that unless the size of the institution in question is increased, every job that is offered to a minority is a job taken away from a member of the dominant group. Thus, while bottom-up integration is expected to reduce the grievances of minorities, it may simultaneously increase the grievances of members of the dominant or privileged group. Those who benefit from employment in bureaucratic institutions under the status quo may view integration as a threat to their current position. Members of the dominant societal group who hold entry-level positions are particularly likely to view bottom-up integration as a threat.

Reducing Fears Over Future Conditions

Grievances explain how integration reduces support for anti-government violence based on current conditions. Individuals from excluded groups may also decide to participate in conflict due to fears of future conditions. Power asymmetries across groups create a commitment problem: even if the dominant group has no intention of using its power to take advantage of weaker groups, it has no way to commit not to do so. As a result, the weaker group has an incentive to increase its defenses or launch a preemptive attack, actions which can lead to conflict (Fearon 1995a; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Posen 1993; de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast 1997). These incentives are exacerbated by a history of negative interactions between the groups in question (Wendt 1992). Indeed, the inability of one group to commit to the future security of a weaker one may explain why civil conflict is so persistent once it begins (Fearon and Laitin 2003): in the absence of some sort of credible commitment for security, combatants are unwilling to relinquish their capabilities for unilateral protection (Walter 1997). Asymmetric power across groups characterizes conflict between Iraq's dominant Shias and minority Sunnis, Jews and Arabs in Israel, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Turks and Kurds in Turkey, and dozens of other ethnic or religious groups in conflict across the globe. In each case, even if the dominant group has no intention of harming the weaker group, the impossibility of committing not to do so provides the weaker group with reason to keep its guard up, creating an environment ripe for conflict.

Bottom-up integration reduces the likelihood of violence by allowing the dominant group or the state to credibly commit not to repress weaker groups. Integration creates opportunities by which members of previously excluded groups could impose costs on the state in the event of a conflict. The state would be unable to function effectively if teachers, health care workers, firefighters, and tax collectors withdrew their participation, for example by going on strike, which severely reduces the capacity of the state to deliver the services that citizens expect. Arab-Israeli citizens frequently use strikes in opposition to state policies or in reaction to state actions against the Palestinian community. In November 2015, Arab-Israeli employees of schools, municipality governments, and the trash collection agency

participated in a strike in response to what they called a discriminatory action by Israel's cabinet.[2] A similar protest affected Arab educational institutions in Israel the month before over Israel's management of the Temple Mount.[3]

Bottom-up integration also raises the costs of future repression by organizing individuals from previously excluded groups, aiding coordination and making fighting easier. Institutional membership typically provides access to resources, training, or information. These opportunities are specific to each type of institution. Teachers, for example, have considerable discretion over the content of material that is presented in their classrooms and can manipulate educational materials in a way that is harmful to the state. Healthcare workers could refuse to treat members of the dominant group, or even use their medical training to harm certain individuals. In an extreme example, police officers and members of the security forces could turn their weapons against the government. The costliness of integrating policy-implementing institutions to a state that intended to foment conflict makes bottom-up integration a credible signal of the state's benign intentions. In equilibrium, however, we should not expect bureaucrats from previously-excluded groups to actually use their new-found powers in these ways. Given the expectation that only a government not intending to repress would allow integration in the first place, these individuals should interpret integration as a credible commitment to peace, giving them little incentive to resist against the state.

Increasing Opportunity for Rebellion

The arguments discussed thus far deal with variation in individuals' *motives* for initiating or participating in conflict. They address the question of why people want to rebel rather than why they actually rebel. An alternative explanation, *opportunity*, asks why people who desire to engage in conflict sometimes act on this

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[2]Times of Israel, 19 November 2015. "High Follow-Up Committee Protests Decision to Outlaw Northern Branch of Islamist Organization". http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-arabs-on-strike-after-islamic-movement-ban/

[3]Weiner, Stuart. Times of Israel, 11 October 2015. "Israeli Arabs to strike over move to keep Muslims from Temple Mount". http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-arabs-to-strike-over-move-to-keep-muslims-from-temple-mount

desire and other times do not. Opportunity-based explanations assume that the desire to rebel is common enough not to be the limiting factor in the occurrence of conflict. Rather, variation in conflict is determined by the costs of initiating or participating in it (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). For example, mountainous terrain favors insurgency-style violence over traditional military capabilities and therefore should lower the threshold for rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Low state capacity and poor transportation infrastructure similarly increase the chances that an insurgency will succeed (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Groups should also be less likely to initiate conflict against other groups when doing so would damage an existing profitable relationship. Jha (2013) suggests that Hindu-Muslim violence was exceedingly rare in medieval port cities because each group relied on the other to sustain a profitable trading network.

The two opposing explanations – minimizing the desire for conflict versus minimizing the opportunities for participating in it – have very different implications for bottom-up integration. Whereas the integration of policy-implementing institutions is expected to decrease minorities' *motives* for participating in conflict, it may simultaneously increase their *opportunity* for conflict by empowering members of these previously marginalized individuals. There is an inherent tradeoff between between reducing the power asymmetries between groups as a mechanism for reducing fear on the one hand, and making it easier for that group to rebel against the state on the other hand. By empowering members of minority groups, bottom-up integration increases the likelihood that group members will rebel *if they have the desire to do so.*

Conflict-Mitigating versus Conflict-Augmenting Mechanisms

Bottom-up integration's ability to address grievances over current conditions and fears of future conditions suggests that it will reduce violence by reducing individual's motives to fight. On the other hand, corresponding increases in the dominant group's grievances due to a loss of jobs, as well as and increases in the minority group's opportunity for rebellion, suggest that integration may exacerbate

conflict. Which mechanisms are strongest is an empirical question to be tested in the remainder of this dissertation. However, certain characteristics of bottom-up integration and of bureaucratic institutions suggest that the conflict-mitigating mechanisms should be stronger than those that would augment conflict.

With regard to the possibility that integration might increase the grievances of the dominant group by taking away jobs, integration need not be achieved by removing and replacing members of the dominant group with minorities. Rather, integration can occur gradually over time by enhancing recruitment efforts in underrepresented communities. Attrition and turnover in low-level positions are relatively high, providing an opportunity to increase the number of employees who are minorities as part of the natural hiring process. Those who already hold positions within these institutions will not necessarily lose under an integrative policy.

Second, as I show in Chapter 7, bottom-up integration may actually yield improved service provision in absolute terms, giving members of all groups reason to support policies of integration. Biased service provision is inherently inefficient, as institutional resources are distributed in a way that is not intended to maximize the quality of service provision. To the degree that integration is successful in reducing bias, resources will be reallocated more efficiently, creating a positive-sum outcome with regard to service provision that benefits all citizens, regardless of identity. An integrative policy, then, may benefit all citizens, even those who were not previously underserved.

Finally, the ultimate goal of decreasing the frequency and intensity of ethnic conflict benefits members of all groups, including those privileged by the status quo. Conflict is negative-sum (Fearon 1995b); reducing conflict benefits all involved parties. Conflict is inefficient because resources are expended in fighting that could otherwise be used for more productive means. Even with their dominant societal position, there is no doubt that Israeli Jews would prefer not to live under the threat of rocket attacks. Iraqi Shias would similarly benefit from reducing the likelihood of suicide bombings in their neighborhoods. Thus, even those who benefit from the status quo may have something to gain under a policy of integration.

The restructuring and integration of the police in Northern Ireland as part

of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement provides an example of bottom-up integration being implemented in a way that avoided casting groups as political winners and losers, leading to little resistance against integration by the dominant group. Reforms focused on replacing the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which had very few Catholic officers and was perceived by many as a tool of Protestant oppression (Weitzer 1995; McGarry 2000), with a more inclusive force. At the same time, policymakers sought to demilitarize and reduce the size of the force. Thus, policymakers faced the dual challenges of increasing the number of Catholics while decreasing the overall number of officers, making this a particularly hard case for retaining the support of the dominant societal group. The policy enacted was that 50% of new recruits should be drawn from Catholic communities over the next 10 years, and that force reduction should be achieved gradually by offering generous early retirement packages to the (overwhelmingly Protestant) officers closest to retirement. The new Police Services of Northern Ireland (PSNI) increased the percentage of Catholic officers from roughly 10% in the mid-1990's to 30% in 2015 while simultaneously decreasing the overall size of the force by one-fourth. By implementing integration from the bottom-up gradually over time, and by focusing on retirement incentives rather than outright firing senior officers, these changes were achieved without losing the cooperation or support of the Protestant community.

Increases in marginalized groups' opportunity for rebellion pose a serious threat to the argument that reducing power asymmetries will reduce conflict. Particularly if we believe that intergroup divisions run too deep to be healed, and that partition is the only real solution to a conflict, empowering previously-marginalized groups may increase the likelihood that these groups act on their desire to fight for independence. Which force is stronger – the decrease in fear or the increase in opportunity – depends on whether variation in conflict initiation depends on groups' *desire* to rebel, or whether groups always want to rebel but are constrained in their ability to do so. This root cause of conflict is likely to vary across contexts. In some societies, marginalized groups may be willing to lay down their arms if they are treated better or if their political position is solidified. In others, marginalized groups may simply be biding their time, waiting for an opportunity to take up

arms. Bottom-up integration of bureaucratic institutions should reduce conflict in the former but may exacerbate conflict in the latter.

Reality, Perceptions, and Reactions to Integration

Many of the conflict-reducing effects described here are the result of citizens' *reactions* to information about police integration. Thus, integration should only affect support for violence if citizens know about integration or if they perceive the police to be integrated. Perceptions of police integration come from a number of sources, including direct experiences, news media reports, and communication with other civilians about their experiences and perceptions. In fact, given the high visibility of rank and file police officers in everyday life, it is unlikely that perceptions about officer demographics would stray far from reality over the long term, at least where identity is salient.[4] Regardless of how perceptions are formed, however, the link between police integration and support for violence depends heavily on citizens' reactions to *perceptions* about integration.

Finally, this link between police integration and overall levels of conflict depends on the reactions of ordinary civilians, not ideological extremists. Hard-line insurgents are unlikely to be swayed by information that the police are integrated, especially when their motives are based in deep-seated ideology rather than the types of concerns or grievances discussed here. Rather, we are concerned with ordinary civilians who support violence for pragmatic reasons. This support may include direct participation in conflict, but it may also take the form of providing shelter for insurgents or simply withholding information from anti-insurgent forces. At the margins, the actions of these ordinary civilians may be the difference between manageable conflict and full-blown civil war (Berman et al. 2011b; Lyall et al. 2013).

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[4]According to Iraqis interviewed for this project, sect can be determined using cues like an individual's name, facial hair style, and manner of dress. While it is not be possible to determine an individual officer's sectarian identity with certainty in every case, interviewees reported receiving enough cues like these to form a general impression of the police's level of inclusiveness.

Assumptions and Scope Conditions

Under what conditions is the bottom-up integration of bureaucratic institutions likely to have an effect on identity group-based violence? First, this dissertation deals only with divided societies, those in which group identity significantly motivates citizens' political attitudes and behaviors. Group identities must be sticky enough that citizens cannot simply switch back and forth between groups as it suits them, and they must be sufficiently politically relevant to influence individuals' political fortunes. Indeed, the theory described in this chapter does not allow individuals to exist without belonging to groups classified as either dominant or vulnerable. It assumes that all individuals belong to exactly one politically-relevant group, and that all groups are either dominant or vulnerable. This depiction of the world is obviously an oversimplification. Yet, if individual political behavior is independent from group identity, then society is not divided and the arguments laid out here may not apply. Furthermore, while the theory supports the possibility of multiple minority or excluded groups, it considers interactions only between the dominant group and a minority group. Interactions between minority groups are beyond the scope of this project.

Second, bottom-up integration assumes that there is a coherent state with functional institutions and set borders. If the policy-implementing institutions in question are incompetent to the point of irrelevance, their level of integration should be unimportant in determining intergroup violence. For example, citizens in rural areas of Somalia are unlikely to care about the sectarian makeup of state institutions since the state has little control over the territory and provides few services. Additionally, if policy-implementing institutions operate beyond the control of the state, then attitudes towards the institution are unlikely to be correlated with attitudes towards the state. In such a situation, integration may be important for the relationship between citizens and the institution but not for the citizen-state relationship. Such a situation is particularly likely to occur when institutional control is sub-national. As is discussed in the next chapter, citizens of Iraq's Kurdish region have no reason to link attitudes towards their local police with attitudes towards the central government in Baghdad, since the Kurdish police are controlled

by the regional government. Similarly, the integration of local police in the United States may affect citizen attitudes towards the local government but are unlikely to affect trust in or perceived legitimacy of the government in Washington.

Third, citizens must view the state as legitimate. If members of marginalized groups do not recognize the state's right to govern them, then no amount of inclusion in policy-implementing institutions will mitigate the desire to rebel. This bar is relatively low, however. It does not mean that the *actions* of the state must be viewed as desirable. For example, if opposition to the state focuses on the poor quality of governance, integration can overcome this opposition by improving the quality of government service provision. Rather, the legitimacy scope condition means that at a fundamental level, citizens recognize the right of the state to govern.

Despite these limitations in scope, bottom-up integration is applicable to an unusually broad set of circumstances. Two characteristics are worth noting. First, bottom-up integration provides a mechanism for inclusion in non-democratic states. The legislative authority of "policy-making" institutions is often severely curtailed under autocratic rule, making group-based inclusion somewhat irrelevant. Yet, even the most competent autocrat cannot govern without an effective bureaucracy, and the discretionary powers of civil servants are just as strong under autocracy as they are under democracy. Thus, bottom-up integration provides a much stronger mechanism for conflict mitigation in non-democracies than does top-down representation.

Second, bottom-up integration is self-enforcing and therefore does not rely on a conciliatory dominant group for initiation or guarantees of a commitment to integration in the future. Because it increases the relative power of marginalized groups and makes the functioning of the state dependent on their participation, bottom-up integration is less costly to do than to undo. Once a marginalized group has been integrated into the rank-and-file of policy-implementing institutions, removing those individuals from their positions would lead to service interruptions and require costly hiring and training of new civil servants. Furthermore, any resources that integration provides to marginalized groups, including weapons in

the case of the police, can be turned against the state if the state tries to reverse integration. Thus, if bottom-up integration is imposed on a state by a third party, perhaps as part of a peace agreement, the effects of integration do not rely on the continued involvement of the third party.

Conclusion

This chapter argues that in divided societies, the integration of non-elites into the rank-and-file of policy-implementing institutions should contribute to a reduction in group-based violence. This reduction in conflict works by reducing individuals' motives for fighting against the state, both by addressing their grievances over current conditions and mitigating their fears of future conditions. At the same time, bottom-up integration might aggravate conflict by creating grievances among those who are privileged by the existing system, particularly civil servants who belong to the dominant group who worry that integration will cost them their jobs, which in turn might motivate them to push back against the state or the beneficiaries of integration. However, a variety of strategies exist for implementing bottom-up integration in a way that can mitigate these concerns. A second concern is that by reducing the power asymmetries across groups, bottom-up integration increases the opportunity for members of previously marginalized groups to rebel. This second concern represents an alternative hypothesis which I test in subsequent chapters.

Bottom-up integration diverges from most research on institutions in divided societies by dealing with institutions responsible for policy-implementation rather than those responsible for policy-making. The discretionary authority of bureaucrats and law enforcement officers allows them to shape the citizen-state relationship in important ways. I note that bottom-up integration is one particular configuration of institutional inclusiveness. It contrasts with other configurations by focusing in balance between groups within an institution. Whereas proportionality views inclusiveness as a means unto itself, integration views it as a mechanism for affecting the way that government goods and services are provided and altering the balance of power between groups. Similarly, whereas arrangements like

federalism and autonomy focus on separating the fortunes of different groups from one another, integration reinforces the linkages between groups living side by side within a state, increasing the extent to which they are codependent and emphasizing national identities. In doing so, bottom-up integration provides a self-enforcing mechanism for conflict mitigation which is costly to undo, paving a path for sustainable peace.

Chapter 2

The Police as a Political Institution

The previous chapter argued that the bottom-up integration of institutions responsible for implementing policies should reduce violent intergroup conflict. This chapter applies bottom-up integration to the police. It argues that the police are an especially critical institution, and that the demographic makeup of the rank-and-file of the police has important ramifications for politics in divided societies. The police employ large numbers of non-elites within the state and are responsible for providing a key public good, security. The actions of police officers are inherently political because of their capacity to influence the way that government laws and policies are enforced in the real world. While the discretion of civil servants over service provision makes all policy-implementing institutions politically relevant, the police are especially important because of their role in enforcing laws and their capacity for the use of violence.

The primary argument of this chapter is that the police are a *political* institution whose actions are important for the broader citizen-state relationship. I argue that citizens view the police not just as a body acting in isolation but as an arm of the state. I test this argument using data from the Arab Barometer survey in 12 Arab countries. I show that citizens' attitudes towards the police are closely linked with their attitudes towards the national government. However, this link breaks when another entity, in this case the Kurdish Regional Government,

controls the police. These findings support the argument that citizens recognize the police as a political institution and form attitudes towards the state based in part on their experiences with the police.

The Police and Security Forces as a Political Institution

Like all policy-implementing institutions, the police employ large numbers of non-elites and are responsible for implementing government policies. A typical police force is made up primarily of beat officers and rank-and-file employees. The requirements for joining the police at this level vary considerably from one department to another, but the individuals who fill these positions can generally be considered non-elites. For example, police departments in the United States rarely require new recruits to have education beyond a high school diploma (Kennedy et al. 2017). The ubiquitous nature of policing means that all citizens should be aware of policing as a possible career path, and there should be no geographic barriers preventing individuals from traveling to work as officers. Of course, police officers must demonstrate a variety of specialized skills to be hired and to serve effectively. Unlike many professions that require potential employees to demonstrate skills before being hired, however, most large police departments provide the necessary training for new recruits. Barriers to entry, in other words, are relatively low.

Two factors make the police especially critical in shaping the citizen-state relationship. First, the police are responsible for providing security and promoting the rule of law, a key *raison d'etre* of the state (Olson 1993). Crime prevention clearly falls into this category, as does combating militias or organized violence in countries where such problems exist. The more mundane activities of the police like traffic enforcement or enforcing drug laws also are typically described as contributions to "public safety." Even the enforcement of so-called 'victimless' laws, for example the requirement to wear a seat belt, are intended to protect society as a whole from inefficient outcomes. A society in which the state fails to provide public safety, or in which public safety is provided by someone other than the state, risks deterioration into a "weak" state, which in turn is associated with

heightened risk of civil conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The police are the arm of the government directly tasked with distributing this critical good.

Second, the police serve as the coercive apparatus of the state, and they are one of the only domestic institutions with the capacity for the use of force. If the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Weber 1965), then the police are the institution empowered with the legal right to make use of this power. The physical capacity and legal authority to use force against civilians raises the stakes considerably in the design of the police and ensures that in divided societies, citizens should care deeply about the way that their group is represented.

Existing social science research on the police as an institution is extensive, covering everything from the effectiveness of various policing tactics (Bayley and Weisburd 2011), to the way that neighborhood design affects crime (Newman 1973), to the relationship between police officers and citizens in divided societies (Weitzer and Hasisi 2008). However, with a few notable exceptions (Bayley 1971; Weitzer 1995; Levitt 1997; Blair et al. 2016; Ungar 2011) researchers have not engaged the police as a *political* institution. The police are inherently political because of their ability to interpret laws and influence the way that government policies are applied on a day to day basis. In the context of policing in a divided society, while the law may afford equal rights and protections to all citizens, these laws are not worth the proverbial parchment on which they are written if the police do not enforce them. The police are political for symbolic reasons as well, as they wear government uniforms and draw a government salary. Thus, not only do the police affect the provision of government goods and services, but the way that they are perceived by citizens should also influence citizens' attitudes towards the state. Citizens may perceive a police force that is ineffective at providing public safety as symptomatic of a government that is unwilling or unable to govern effectively. Particularly relevant for the argument of this dissertation, a police force that provides unequal services or harasses citizens on the basis of their ascriptive identity may be viewed as a signal that the state is hostile to certain groups. In contrast, a police force which publicly rejects sectarianism and fosters cooperation between members of different ethnic or religious groups can reduce perceptions

of group-based biases and shift the attitudes of citizens towards the state more broadly.

Reducing Biases in Service Provision

Inequalities across groups in the provision of public safety can exacerbate social and economic inequalities, causing a cycle in which sectarian behaviors increase due to the expectation of ethnic or racial discrimination in law enforcement (Tyler 2004). Individuals who expect to be treated poorly by the police because of their group identity are more likely to view law enforcement as illegitimate and engage in criminal, sectarian, or anti-government behavior as a result (Tyler 1990). Indeed, referencing a related arm of the judicial system, Grossman et al. (2015, 2) argue that unequal treatment by the courts can damage the legitimacy of the justice system, and thereby minorities attitudes toward the state institutions and their duties and responsibilities as law-abiding citizens. Thus, citizens' interactions and experiences with the police should significantly influence their attitudes towards the state and their future behavior. To the extent that bottom-up integration of the police affects service provision in marginalized communities, then, it will influence the future behavior of members of those communities.

Bottom-up integration of the police may reduce biased police service provision in two ways, by improving officers' attitudes towards outgroups and by constraining the behaviors of officers who seek to engage in bias. In divided societies, individuals tend to have limited interaction with non-coethnics, and attitudes towards outgroups are formed largely on the basis of stereotypes and received wisdom. Working for an integrated police force provides significant exposure to non-coethnics, first during training and then as colleagues and partners. In conflict or post-conflict settings, training for new police recruits that includes officers from multiple groups may be the first time any of these individuals have interacted with outgroup members on a personal level, and almost certainly the first time they have done so as professional equals. Training can be lengthy and rigorous, providing ample opportunities for attitude formation. For example, new police officers in the United States average about 19 weeks of classroom training,

as well as additional field training, before being deployed.[1] Training and serving together with non-coethnics generates interactions in the context of equal-status individuals working together towards a common goal, conditions which lead to improved attitudes towards outgroup members (Allport 1954; Zajonc 1968; Ball and Cantor 1974; Blair et al. 2016). By forcing interactions between officers from different groups, integration provides them with shared experiences that replace stereotypes as the basis for attitudes towards outgroups. In turn, officers who have more positive attitudes towards outgroup members are less likely to harass or withhold service from citizens based on their sectarian identity. Existing research finds evidence of this effect on attitudes towards outgroups in the context of civil service institutions. Using a novel research design that relies on an arbitrary age cutoff for exposure to integration, Samii (2013) shows that integrating Burundi's military led to decreased prejudicial behavior among soldiers. Similarly, Ostwald (2013) provides evidence that assigning military conscripts in Singapore to live-in units, and consequently increasing their exposure to non-coethnics, reduces the salience of ethnicity and increases the salience of shared national identity compared to conscripts who live off-base.

Despite the evidence in support this process, we might reasonably be skeptical that integration will alter attitudes in such a powerful way. Particularly in the hardest cases, those with a deep history of violence between groups, it is difficult to imagine that attitudes will change simply by forcing interactions between non-coethnics. At the very least, we might expect this process to take years, or perhaps generations, before members of opposing groups are fully able to bury the hatchet. However, a second way in which bottom-up integration of the police reduces biases in service provision deals not with officers' intentions but with constraints on their behavior. In an integrated police department, officers from different identity groups work side by side to serve citizens of all groups. Non-coethnic police officers go on patrol and respond to service calls together, which allows officers from different groups to monitor one another's behavior. When one officer treats a citizen poorly based on his or her identity, other officers can intervene or report

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[1]United States Bureau of Justice Statistics (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=77

the officer to the appropriate authorities. If biased activities persist, problematic officers can be reassigned or fired. In many cases, the knowledge that they are being monitored may be sufficient to alter officers' behavior. A conversation with a volunteer officer with the Israel National Police illustrates this effect:[2]

> **MJN:** Is there a difference in the way that Jewish and Arab police officers treat people? Do officers tend to treat people who are like them differently? Or is ethnicity totally irrelevant?
>
> **Officer:** There are some offenses that I will ticket you for no matter what. Things related to safety. If you're talking on the phone while driving, or if you're not wearing a seat belt, you know you're not supposed to do that. I write them a ticket.
>
> But there are other things that are different. Like if someone has a headlight out, if they're Jewish I'll probably give them a pass. If they're a Jew, you know they're probably going to go get it fixed. But Arabs, they'll just let the car fall apart. So I give them a fine or else they won't get it fixed.
>
> [pause] But if I have an Arab officer with me I won't. I won't stop them unless the other guy [the Arab officer] says to, and then I will.

It is clear from this officer's statement that the integrated nature of the Israeli Police in this neighborhood has a significant effect on the quality of services that citizens receive. The presence of an Arab officer alongside this Jewish officer changes the way that Arabs are treated and decreases the likelihood that Arabs will be over-policed.

Beyond reducing biases in police activities, there is reason to believe that integration might improve the overall quality of service provision in absolute terms. Biased policing is inherently inefficient with regard to service provision as it prioritizes the distribution of police resources, activities, and personnel on the basis of something other than providing public safety. Over- and under-policing are two types of biased policing. Over-policing is the extra police attention paid to areas or members of a certain group that is not paid to another area or group. It typically contributes little to public safety in relation to the inconvenience that it causes

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[2]Author interview, 31 July 2014.

to citizens. The example above about Jewish police officers in Israel stopping an Arab, but not a Jew, for having a tail light out might constitute over-policing of Arabs. A common complaint voiced by minority citizens both in Israel (Saunders et al. 2013) and in the United States (Khan 2014) is that the police harass them because of their identity. Indeed, data from traffic stops in the US indicates that officers are more likely to both stop and, once stopped, search citizens who are black (Antonovics and Knight 2009). Other forms of over-policing may have more extreme consequences. The Royal Ulster Constabulary, made up of well over 90% Protestants for the majority of its existence, was frequently accused of being a tool of Protestant oppression and harassing Catholic citizens without cause. The force's alleged use of a "shoot to kill" policy for suspected members of Republican paramilitaries only exacerbated this perception (Weitzer 1995). Other cases are not so ambiguous. As Iraq descended into chaos in the years following the 2003 US invasion, Iraqi security forces controlled almost exclusively by Shia politicians and made up of Shia officers were coopted by sectarian leaders and turned into roving death squads and sectarian militias (Perito 2011). Rather than providing public safety and security services in Sunni neighborhoods, Shia police officers participated in extrajudicial killings of Sunni civilians.

Closely related to overpolicing is "underpolicing," a relative lack of police presence in minority communities that leads to lower levels of service provision (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012; Weitzer 1995; Saunders et al. 2013). In Israel, complaints of under-policing are especially prevalent in Arab communities (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012), where a sparse police presence contributes to elevated crime rates and the perception that the police only exist to exert control, not to serve and protect. Similar accusations were levied towards the RUC, who failed to patrol or respond to service calls in Catholic neighborhoods (Weitzer 1995). Both over- and under-policing contribute to a lack of police effectiveness by distracting officers from the job at hand. In an abstract sense, we might think of over-policing as an inefficient allocation of resources, as limited police personnel and equipment are wasted on unnecessary stops or searches of minority citizens without cause. Under-policing, on the other hand, allows crime to flourish in areas ignored by the

police. As a result, there is good reason to think that reducing bias in policing will lead to a general improvement in the quality of police service provision by allowing scarce police resources to be allocated based on where they will be most efficient in preventing crime. This improvement should occur not only in the areas that were previously harmed by biased service provision, but also in other areas as police resources are allocated more efficiently. This expectation of improved service provision for all citizens is one example of the way in which integration of participatory institutions may not be zero-sum. Improving the overall satisfaction of one segment of the population does not necessarily have to coincide with imposing costs on another segment. At least when it comes to public safety, everyone stands to benefit from integrating the police.

The efficiency argument assumes that the minority officers who are integrated into the police are as qualified as their non-coethnic colleagues. A decrease in average officer quality, whether on the basis of intelligence, training, physical fitness, or other relevant characteristics, would negatively affect the overall quality of service provision. Here, bottom-up integration's focus on non-elite, ordinary individuals comes into play. Required qualifications for entry-level bureaucratic institutions are generally achievable by ordinary individuals. That is not to say that anyone could effectively take these jobs. A certain level of intelligence and physical fitness is required to be a successful police officer. However, the baseline requirements are reasonable so that even if there are baseline differences in qualifications across groups,[3] there should be a sufficient number of minorities who are qualified for the entry-level positions that are to be integrated. In most cases, the pool of potential recruits from a previously excluded group will be sufficient to maintain the overall quality of the police force. Furthermore, recruitment policies and procedures may account for societal inequalities across groups. For example, in Chapter 7 I explain that while Arab Israeli citizens have, on average, lower educational attainment than Jewish citizens, the Israel Police recruits heavily among Arabs who recently graduated from university which mitigates this inequality.

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[3]Baseline differences may be the result of historical inequalities in the opportunities provided on the basis of identity, for example.

Providing Jobs, Reducing Exclusion, and Improving Welfare

Another way in which police integration reduces grievances over current conditions is by providing jobs to individuals from previously excluded groups. Policy-implementing institutions like the police provide stable employment for large numbers of individuals. Worldwide, a typical community has about three police officers for every thousand civilians (United Nations 2010, 19). The Israeli Police employ more than 28,000 officers in a country of about 8 million, for example. These officers and their families benefit directly from jobs in the police which improve their economic welfare in a way that is attributable to the state. More broadly, integration reduces the perception that an entire segment of the population is excluded from these desirable jobs, affecting attitudes not just of those who benefit financially but of other members of the previously-excluded group as well. Just as bottom-up integration reduces grievances over unequal service provision, it also addresses grievances over exclusion from employment.

Unlike the improvement in police service provision, the creation of job opportunities due to integration risks becoming zero-sum. Unless the size of the police force is expanded to accommodate new minority recruits, these recruits must displace existing officers. In turn, officers from the dominant group who fear that their jobs are vulnerable under integration are likely to resist such a move. The displacement of existing officers poses a greater challenge in departments with low natural turnover but should be less problematic in departments where officers tend to change jobs regularly. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, integrating gradually over time, and providing generous early retirement packages as an incentive for older officers to make space for new recruits, can minimize the pain of officer replacement.

Reducing Fear, Solving Commitment Problems

In addition to addressing grievances over unequal police service provision and access to employment within the police, bottom-up integration also reduces

conflict motives by mitigating fears of future repression by members of vulnerable groups. The previous chapter argues that bottom-up integration reduces fears of future repression by allowing the state to credibly commit not to repress the vulnerable group in the future (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Posen 1993; Weingast 1997). The commitment is credible because integrating the rank-and-file of the police makes future repression costly.

Bottom-up integration of the police allows vulnerable groups to impose costs on the state in several ways. First, as with all bureaucratic institutions, integration makes the functioning of the state dependent on the participation on members of other groups. Police officers have the ability to protest against the state by refusing to work. In May 2015, police officers in Baltimore, Maryland engaged in a "slowdown" in which they refused to carry out basic tasks like writing traffic tickets or responding to calls to protest the arrest of six of their fellow officers for alleged misconduct. A slowdown has consequences for both the state and its citizens, with the state losing revenue from unwritten citations and citizens suffering from reduced service provision. In Baltimore, arrests dropped 43% and the city suffered its most violent month in more than 35 years.[4] A riskier strategy for withdrawing support would be a strike, with officers refusing to show up for work at all. Both of these options severely reduce the capacity of the state to engage in policing and to deliver the services that citizens expect. The resulting weakening of the state makes them powerful tools that minorities can use to impose costs on the state.

In a more extreme scenario, minority officers could make repression more costly by actively opposing the state. Integration arms and organizes members of previously excluded groups. Officers from the minority group may turn their weapons against the state if they feel threatened. Integration into the police also gives these groups access to critical information about state security operations, including details about ongoing operations and knowledge of the state's awareness of opposition activities. In the event of a conflict, police officers from repressed groups could pass this information on to their coethnics. The police's capacity

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[4]Bouie, Jamelle. "Criminal Neglect." *Slate.com* 18 June 2015. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/06/baltimore_police_are_virtually_on_strike_the_city_deserves_something_better.html

for the use of force therefore makes them especially important in divided societies. While bottom-up integration of all bureaucratic institutions creates opportunities for previously-excluded groups to impose costs on the state, the integration of the police provides perhaps the most significant opportunities because it places weapons in the hands of the potential opposition.

Members of previously-excluded groups should recognize integration as a credible signal that the government does not intend to repress them, reducing their expectations of future repression and reducing their incentives for taking the types of defensive measures which make conflict more likely. In equilibrium, then, we should not expect minorities to actually use any of these tools to impose costs on the government. Because members of integrated groups have reason to believe that future repression is unlikely, they have less reason to use their new-found powers to take action against the state. Therefore, we should not observe a group that was integrated into the police using its newfound powers to attack the state so long as the state does not initiate hostilities.

Linking Attitudes Towards the Police with Attitudes Towards the State: Evidence from Iraqi Kurdistan

The primary argument of this chapter is that citizens recognize the police as a political institution, and therefore their attitudes towards the police are linked with their attitudes towards the government. In order for this link to hold, policing services must be provided primarily by the state. This condition may be broken for a number of reasons. First, policing services might be provided at the sub-national level. When policing occurs primarily at the city or county level, as in the United States, we should expect citizens' attitudes towards the police to influence their feelings primarily towards the local government, and less so towards the federal (national) government. In most countries in the Middle East, including Israel and Iraq, policing is the domain of the national government and falls under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.[5] Second, in weak or failed states which

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[5]Iraq has "local" police forces in many urban areas in the sense that officers are tied to the specific area, but these forces remain under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.

lack capacity to provide public safety, the demographic makeup of the police force may be politically irrelevant. If non-governmental groups, for example private security, ethnic militias, or perhaps the mafia, step in to provide some of the services normally provided by the police, the demographic makeup of the state police forces will have little effect on attitudes towards the state.

Ethnic autonomy over the provision of public safety also breaks this condition. When policing services are provided by or associated with an ethnic group rather than with the national government, citizens are not likely to alter their opinions of the state based on the performance of the police. That is not to say that changing from a system of dominance and exclusion to one of ethnic autonomy should not affect minorities' attitudes towards the state. However, once ethnic autonomy is in place, we should not expect the performance of the police or other "ethnic" institutions to be associated with the state. Rather, changes in police performance should be associated with the ethnic group or regional government which controls the institution. The police remain a *political* institution under ethnic autonomy, but citizens' attitudes towards the police should have little bearing on their attitudes towards the national government since the national government has ceded control over the domain of public safety.

This section tests the argument that citizen attitudes towards the police are linked with their attitudes towards the state using survey data from 12 Arab countries.[6] The data comes from round 3 of the Arab Barometer surveys and was collected between 2012 and 2014. The surveys ask citizens to evaluate the performance of "the police (security forces)," as well as the "ease of receiving services" from the police and security forces. The survey also asks respondents to evaluate the performance of the federal government. In general, we should expect to observe a positive correlation between evaluations of the police and evaluations of the federal government. Table 2.1 shows that across all countries in the Arab Barometer survey, there is a positive and robust association between evaluations of the police and evaluations of the federal government. As expected, citizens who report that the police and security forces are doing a good job are more likely to say that the

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[6]Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen

federal government is doing a good job as well. An alternative possibility is that certain personal characteristics may affect an individual's baseline likelihood of responding positively to these types of survey questions. In particular, individuals who are better-off should evaluate government institutions of all types more positively. Model 3 controls for respondents' levels of education, employment status, and self-reported economic well-being, in addition to basic demographic information. The relationship between police and government approval ratings remains substantively large and statistically significant. This finding makes sense given the role that police and security forces play as the government's enforcement arm. Citizens who have positive opinions of the police should also have positive opinions of the national government, and vice versa. Of course, this relationship is not necessary causal. Directionality is particularly difficult to pinpoint. We cannot say whether positive attitudes about the police lead to positive attitudes about the government, or the other way around. Intuition suggests that the relationship likely works in both directions simultaneously. However, these results do support the general claim that, under normal circumstances, attitudes towards the police and the national government should be associated with one another.

How does the removal of policing and security from the national government's domain affect this association? The 2005 Iraqi constitution recognizes the right of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) to maintain its own security forces called the *Peshmerga*. Formed in the 1970's as a resistance group against the Baathist regime in Baghdad, the Peshmerga assisted the United States in planning the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Lawrence 2009). Today the force is made up of almost 200,000 fighters, the vast majority of whom are ethnic Kurds.[7] The Peshmerga succeeded in maintaining security and stability in Northern Iraq even during periods of extreme violence in the rest of the country, and were instrumental in stemming the expansion of the "Islamic State" (IS) since 2013. At first glance, the success of the Peshmerga would seem to provide support in favor of autonomous policing through mono-ethnic security forces in divided societies. Indeed, if the long-term plan for peace in Iraq involved a fully autonomous Kurdish region, or

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[7]http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28738975

Table 2.1: Arab Evaluations of the Federal Government

	(1) Eval Federal Gov	(2) Eval Federal Gov	(3) Eval Federal Gov
Eval Police	0.560*** (0.00657)	0.484*** (0.0395)	0.455*** (0.0469)
Male			0.0499** (0.0205)
Education			0.0168 (0.0101)
Employed			0.0386 (0.0343)
Muslim			0.329 (0.437)
Christian			0.413 (0.463)
Econ. Well-Being			0.128*** (0.0169)
Constant	1.700*** (0.0209)	1.901*** (0.104)	1.222** (0.478)
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	14358	14358	11671

OLS with robust standard errors.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

even an independent Kurdish state, there would seem to be little down side to the assignment of Northern Iraq's security to an all-Kurdish force. Yet, Baghdad appears intent on maintaining control over the Kurdish region, and Turkey's opposition to Kurdish independence makes the issue a non-starter for the United States and its allies. Given the likelihood that Iraqi Kurdistan will remain part of Iraq for the foreseeable future, the relevant question is not only whether the Peshmerga are successful in providing security, but also how their existence affects Kurdish attitudes towards the government in Baghdad. The KRG sees its monopoly on the provision of security as critical to its future political interests. Kurdish politicians vehemently opposed a law proposed in early 2015 that would have establish a multi-ethnic National Guard presence in Northern Iraq. Their concern is that the National Guard may encroach on territories that some Kurds hope will someday be part of an independent Kurdish state. One Kurdish MP in the national parliament is quoted as saying, "The National Guard law should stipulate clearly that the Peshmerga is in charge in the disputed territories," demonstrating the stiff resistance aimed at non-Kurdish involvement in the defense of the Kurdish region.[8]

Does the provision of security by sources other than the national government affect the way that Kurds view the Iraqi state? It may be that the success of the Peshmerga decreases the perceived value among Kurds of a political association with the national government in Baghdad. The transfer of the job of security provision, typically the domain of the nation-state, from the national to the local level removes one of the primary responsibilities of public goods provision from the national government, potentially decreasing the perceived value of the national government. Thus, whereas in the rest of the Middle East, citizens attitudes towards the police and the national government tend to have a positive association, we should expect this relationship to be weakened or non-existent among Iraqi Kurds.

Table 2.2 again uses the Arab Barometer data but this time restricts the sample to Iraqi respondents and adds interaction terms between the Kurdish in-

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[8]http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/iraq-national-guard-shiite-peshmerga-kurds.html

dicator variable and the three independent variables of interest: evaluation of the police, ease of receiving police services, and evaluation of the local government. The baseline relationship between evaluations of the police and and evaluations of the federal government for non-Kurds is indeed positive and significant, indicating that for Arab Iraqis, evaluations of the police are linked to evaluations of the federal government. The coefficients on the key interaction terms are negative and significant. The attitudinal link between the police and the national government is substantively smaller for Kurdish Iraqis than for Arab Iraqis, and the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. In other words, Kurdish respondents are less likely to link their evaluations of the police and local government with their evaluations of the federal government compared to Arab Iraqis. Once again, it is impossible to say whether attitudes towards the police affect attitudes towards the government or vice-versa, but we can say with confidence that the association between the two variables is weaker for Iraqi Kurds than it is for Iraqi Arabs.

Table 2.2: Iraqi Evaluations of the Federal Government

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Fed Gov	Fed Gov	Fed Gov	Fed Gov	Fed Gov	Fed Gov
Kurdish	1.209***	0.984***	1.797***	1.014***	2.014***	1.522***
	(0.203)	(0.228)	(0.216)	(0.257)	(0.258)	(0.293)
Eval Police	0.638***	0.585***				
	(0.0248)	(0.0306)				
Eval Police*Kurd	-0.418***	-0.365***				
	(0.0647)	(0.0685)				
Police Service			0.718***	0.583***		
			(0.0434)	(0.0491)		
Police Service*Kurd			-0.638***	-0.454***		
			(0.107)	(0.118)		
Eval Local Gov					0.577***	0.509***
					(0.0292)	(0.0306)
Eval Loc Gov*Kurd					-0.572***	-0.532***
					(0.0765)	(0.0834)

Table 2.2: Iraqi Evaluations of the Federal Government, Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Fed Gov	Fed Gov	Fed Gov	Fed Gov	Fed Gov	Fed Gov
Male		0.0842		0.161**		0.121*
		(0.0621)		(0.0752)		(0.0627)
Education		-0.00145		-0.0189		-0.000880
		(0.0196)		(0.0243)		(0.0206)
Employed		-0.0162		-0.0215		-0.0128
		(0.0668)		(0.0812)		(0.0678)
Economic Well-Being		0.173***		0.146***		0.126***
		(0.0319)		(0.0398)		(0.0349)
Shia		-0.262***		-0.685***		-0.644***
		(0.0809)		(0.0970)		(0.0757)
Constant	1.551***	1.383***	1.421***	1.832***	1.365***	1.654***
	(0.0672)	(0.157)	(0.107)	(0.199)	(0.0962)	(0.160)
Observations	1195	1138	926	881	1189	1127

OLS with robust standard errors.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 2.3 shows first differences calculated on Models 2, 4, and 6. Calculations move evaluations of the police and local government from most negative to most positive, holding education and economic well-being at their means, for respondents who are male and employed. The table clearly shows that the association between evaluations of the police and evaluations of the federal government are much larger for Arabs than for Kurds, and that the link between evaluations of the local government and the federal government is significant for Arabs but not for Kurds. Taken together, these results should be interpreted as evidence that Arab Iraqis, but not Kurdish Iraqis, associate successes of the police and local government with successes of the federal government. It is difficult to say whether the broken link for Kurds is due to the ethnic makeup of the Peshmerga or the fact that they are under the authority of the regional government; the Peshmerga might be thought of as *both* a subnational security force and an ethnic militia, and we cannot say which characteristic is driving the observed relationships. Of course, in the case of the KRG, the borders of the sub-national government in question were drawn explicitly on the basis of the sectarian identity of those within them. Regardless, the most important takeaway is that citizens generally tend to recognize the police and domestic security forces as a political institution, and their attitudes towards these institutions are linked with the political entity that controls them.

Table 2.3: First Differences, Arab versus Kurdish Respondents

Ind. Var.	Δ Ind. Var.	Group	Δ Eval. Federal Gov.	95% CI
Eval. Police	1 to 5	Arab	2.34	(2.09, 2.57)
Eval. Police	1 to 5	Kurd	0.88	(0.41, 1.37)
Police Service	1 to 4	Arab	1.75	(1.47, 2.02)
Police Service	1 to 4	Kurd	0.40	(-0.22, 1.04)
Local Gov.	1 to 5	Arab	2.03	(1.79, 2.28)
Local Gov.	1 to 5	Kurd	-0.10	(-0.70, 0.52)

Conclusion

This chapter argues that the police and domestic security forces are inherently political institutions. The police deliver one of the most important public goods, security, while serving as the enforcement arm of the state. Thus, in divided societies where ascriptive identity is highly politically relevant, we should expect the demographic makeup of the police to matter for the citizen-state relationship more broadly. Survey data from 12 Arab countries suggests that citizens recognize the political nature of the police, and attitudes towards the police tend to be closely linked with attitudes towards the government. However, this association breaks down when the police are not viewed as a tool of the state, for example in the case of subnational police forces or ethnic militias.

Because of the political nature of the police, we should expect that in divided societies its integration should affect citizen attachment to the state, as well as the likelihood and intensity of sectarian conflict. Three mechanisms are proposed by which integration of the police may mitigate conflict. First, integration should reduce the degree of bias in police service provision, addressing an important source of conflict-inducing grievances. Integrated police forces increase contact between non-coethnic officers in ways that should alter their attitudes towards outgroup members. Integrated police forces also allow officers from different groups to monitor one another and sanction improper behavior. Second, integration of the police provides members of marginalized groups with access to jobs, reducing grievances over unemployment or exclusion. Finally, integration reduces the concerns by vulnerable group members that they will be taken advantage of by the state. Bottom-up integration of the police would be costly for a state that intended to repress because it arms and organizes the potential opposition and makes the provision of law enforcement contingent upon the participation of all groups. These three mechanisms are expected to work concurrently with one another to reduce the incentives of individuals from vulnerable groups to support or participate in violent sectarian conflict.

Chapter 3

Sectarianism and Conflict in the Iraqi Police

In May 2003, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) sent a team of 25 civilian contractors to Iraq. Their task was to evaluate the state of the Iraqi criminal justice system and to report back on the steps required to ensure that these institutions would be effective in post-Saddam Iraq. Upon their arrival, the team realized that there was not much to assess. When the fighting started, the vast majority of police officers simply took off their uniforms and went home. Police stations and municipal buildings were looted, records and databases destroyed, and service weapons stolen, sold, or kept for personal use. The state of other branches of the criminal justice system was similar. In the words of Gerald Burke, a former Major in the Massachusetts State Police and member of the DOJ team, the report could be summarized in three words: "They need everything."[1]

Over the course of the next decade, various agencies from the US Departments of Defense (DOD), Justice, and State, along with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI), were tasked with rebuilding a functional police force from the ground up. Like the country's political situation more generally, the role and importance of sectarian identity in the police varied both over time and from one part of the country to another. Out of necessity, the transitional government constructed the new police force first and foremost to provide security, with "or-

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[1] Author interview 22 January 2016

dinary" or service-oriented policing relegated to a secondary status at best.[2] As post-war Iraq transitioned through different phases, from US direct control to a democratically-elected government, and from an anti-US insurgency to a full-blown civil war, so too changed the role of the police. The politicization of sectarian identity increased as violence burgeoned into a full-scale civil war in 2006. The more violence occurred along identity lines, the more fiercely sectarian militias competed for control over state institutions, including the police. At the peak of the conflict, Shia sectarian interests dominated the police, and Sunnis viewed the police more as a repressive force to be feared than a vehicle for the distribution of public services (Perito 2011). However, reforms to the security establishment forced through in 2008 by US General General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker put an end to the most blatant incidences of sectarian aggression by the police. More recently, the Iraqi government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has increased both the professionalization and inclusiveness of the Iraqi security forces. Since al-Abadi's election in the second half of 2014, the Iraqi government – still dominated by Shias – has made a conscious effort to reconcile with Sunnis and to increase their participation within the day to day operations of the government. While the police and security forces remain plagued by their sectarian past, progress towards inclusion and improved service provision is occurring.

The goal of this chapter is to introduce the key independent variable of police integration in the context of Iraq. Perhaps not surprisingly given the sensitivity of the topic and the rapidly changing political environment, hard numbers on the sectarian makeup of the Iraqi police are difficult to come by. News reports provide sporadic and isolated estimates of the proportion of officers from different religious groups, but neither the Iraqi Ministry of Interior or the US Department of Defense collect systematic data on the religious and ethnic makeup of the police. This chapter, and the analyses in the chapters that follow, rely on three sources of information about officer demographics: news reports that describe the makeup and inclusiveness of the police in different locations at various points in

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[2]Sam Juett, adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in 2003 and Provost-Registrar at the Jordan International Police Training Center between 2003 and 2006. Author Interview 22 February 2016

time, interviews with police trainers and policymakers involved in the rebuilding of the Iraqi police, and a survey of Baghdad residents carried out in 2016 which measures perceptions of Iraq's domestic security institutions in both Baghdad and throughout the rest of the country.

The policing and security institutions I analyze in Iraq differ in an important way from those analyzed in Israel in Chapter 5. In Israel, I deal exclusively with the "blue" police: civilian officers responsible for ordinary crime-fighting and public safety issues. These police are distinguishable by their blue or (since 2015) black uniforms. Just like most large police departments in the United States, they have special weapons and tactical (SWAT) and counterterrorism units, but their primary purpose is day-to-day policing. Not included in the analysis of the Israeli police is the Border Guard, a civilian (i.e. non-military) force whose primary goal is to combat violence and terrorism, especially when motivated by Palestinian nationalism.[3] The Israeli Border Guard are less relevant for this study because they are associated almost exclusively with combating Palestinian terrorism, which means that the services citizens expect to receive from them varies dramatically based on citizens' sectarian affiliation and location of residence. A Jewish Israeli living in Jerusalem should expect the Border Guard to provide him or her with the service of security, while an Arab Israeli citizen living in an East Jerusalem neighborhood has no such expectation. Furthermore, the activities of the Border Guard are concentrated in certain areas; a resident of Tel Aviv may go weeks without seeing a Border Guard officer in his or her neighborhood. These drastically different baseline experiences and expectations make it difficult to draw useful comparisons between citizens of different backgrounds with regard to the Border Guard.

In contrast, in Iraq I consider both the police and paramilitary forces (referred to here as "domestic security forces" or "security forces"). The domestic security forces in Iraq are active throughout the country and are responsible for providing the service of security to all citizens, regardless of ethnic affiliation.[4] All

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[3]The Border Guard are unlikely to engage in enforcement of ordinary laws. I witnessed dozens of minor legal infractions, for example pedestrians jaywalking or drivers running red lights, occurring in plain view of disinterested Border Guard officers with no repercussions.

[4]The exception to this statement is the three Kurdish governorates, but this region is not included in the study because of its political and security autonomy.

Iraqi citizens face a significant threat from sectarian violence, therefore all citizens have an expectation that the domestic security forces should provide them with a critical government service: security. Whereas in Israel the Border Guard work almost exclusively to prevent "Arab on Jewish" violence, Iraq's domestic security forces are tasked with preventing sectarian violence in all directions. Two scope conditions delineate the Iraqi security institutions to be included in this study. First, the institution must be controlled by the central government. Second, it must have only a domestic security mandate. In other words, all branches of the military are excluded, as are the Kurdish Peshmerga and other ethnic militias whose chain of command does not run through Baghdad. The Federal Police and other agencies responsible for combating domestic insurgencies are included, as are the local police responsible for basic public safety duties.

The discussion of the Iraqi police reveals several trends. Today, sectarian identity is not necessarily the most important factor in determining attitudes towards the police. Specifically, the attitudes of Sunni and Shia Iraqi citizens with regards to the police are far more similar than they are different. Support for integration of the police is high, not just among minority or vulnerable groups but also among the politically-dominant Shia. Yet, perceptions of police integration vary significantly across space, institutions, and time. Perceived police inclusiveness varies from one neighborhood to another, and between policing at the local level and policing in the country more generally. Finally, despite the way in which Iraq's conflict is posed in the Western media, ordinary Iraqis strongly reject sectarianism as a basis for governance. In April 2016, thousands of Shia Arabs staged a sit-in at the Iraqi parliament building to protest against sectarian politics and call for the replacement of partisan government ministers with technocrats.[5] These demands came despite Shia dominance of these very government ministries. The evidence presented in the next two chapters reveals similar attitudes towards the Iraqi police. Even those Iraqis who would seem to benefit from sectarianism because they belong to the dominant group tend to prefer more, not less, integration of the Iraqi police. These attitudes reveal a deep-seated suspicion by Iraqis of the use of

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[5] "Iraqi Shia Protesters Storm Baghdad Parliament." *New York Times* 30 April 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36176910

identity as a political tool after decades of dictatorial in which loyalty was judged in part based on tribal and sectarian identities.

Structure of the Iraqi Police and Security Forces

Iraq divides its domestic security forces into several branches, all of which fall under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. The Iraqi Police Service, sometimes called the "local police," is responsible for ordinary policing tasks like traffic enforcement, crime prevention, and criminal investigations. Local police officers are assigned to a specific station and are responsible for the surrounding community. They also play a role in security and counterinsurgency, but they tend to be lightly armed. The local police are comparable to a typical municipal police force in the United States, except that they fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government.

The largest branch of the domestic security forces is the Federal Police, a national police force responsible for everything from ordinary policing to counterinsurgency. The Federal Police was established in 2004 as the Special Police, a small force responsible for assisting the military in security operations. Over time, the force transitioned towards a more full-service policing role. It became the National Police in 2006, and was renamed as the Federal Police in 2009. The Federal Police is divided into brigades responsible for specific geographic areas. Compared to police forces in most developed countries, the training and expertise of the Federal Police is skewed towards security and gendarmerie-style policing. Depending on the unit in question, Federal Police officers may be armed with handguns or rifles. Most Federal Police units use normal civilian-style police cars, but some special units use light armored vehicles much like an American-style SWAT unit. Whereas in most of Iraq the Federal Police supplement the local police primarily on security issues or criminal investigations requiring enhanced resources, in Baghdad the Federal Police serve as more of a "full service" police force, blurring the lines between the two groups within the capital.[6] The Federal Police's emphasis on security over ordinary policing is reflected in its uniforms, which are blue camouflage.

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[6] "MD," an Iraqi citizen who lives and works in Baghdad. Author interview 21 February 2016

A handful of other law enforcement agencies operate under the MOI's authority. The Iraqi Prison Service runs and maintains the country's detention facilities. The Department of Border Enforcement guards international borders and points of entry against non-military threats, while the Facilities Protection Service guards embassies and government buildings. Finally, the Iraqi National Intelligence Services, a force of about 12,000 officers, collects information about domestic threats to national security.[7] This project does not deal directly with these ancillary agencies as they provide highly specialized services which affect citizens differently.

Iraqi police officers are distributed across 1,200 police stations,[8] including 38 in Baghdad (Spain and Turchie 2013). When the current government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi took office in 2014, the Ministry of Interior employed seven million Iraqis, 660,000 of whom are police officers.[9] Interior Minister Mohammed al-Ghabban made it his goal to slim down the bloated ranks of the police to a smaller but more effective force; between 2014 and 2016, he cut the number of Brigadier Generals from 230 to 110 and placed a hiring freeze on rank-and-file officers.[10] Even so, the rank-and-file of the Iraqi police remains bloated with thousands of officers who collect paychecks but never show up to work. Pinpointing the precise strength of the force is difficult, as the vast majority of the officers are the payroll either do not exist or never show up to work. However, even a conservative estimate in which only one quarter of paid officers actually report for duty would mean a massive police force which includes one out of every twenty Iraqis.[11] In other words, police presence across Iraq is ubiquitous.

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[7] *GlobalSecurity.org*, "Iraq Police Service (IPS)." http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/ips.htm

[8] *GlobalSecurity.org*, "Iraq Police Service (IPS)." http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/ips.htm

[9] Cockburn, Patrick. "Iraq's Interior Minister on why state corruption is helping the murderous campaign of Isis." *The Independent* 1 March 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-iraq-s-interior-minister-on-why-his-country-is-impotent-against-the-militants-a6905941.html

[10] ibid

[11] This figure is consistent with the finding in my survey that 1 in 8 Baghdad households includes a current or former police officer.

History

Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime distributed the domain of security across a handful of different agencies in an attempt to avoid concentrating power in a way that might threaten the regime (Quinlivan 1999). Because the autocratic regime's priority was survival, not providing services to a broad base of citizens, the security agencies responsible for intelligence and defense were better-funded and better-developed than the police (Pfaff 2008). Corruption among police officers was high, while standards for performance were low (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). An ordinary rank-and-file officer, of whom their were about 60,000, received the equivalent of $5.50 US per month (Spain and Turchie 2013). Most senior officers graduated from the national police academy, but the rank and file of the force was largely uneducated and poorly trained (Perito 2011).

The United States and a coalition of allies invaded Iraq in March 2003. The Iraqi government fell quickly, and military resistance against the invasion faded away within a matter of months. The sudden elimination of the Baath regime, which had ruled Iraq with an iron fist since 1968, left a power vacuum in Iraqi politics. The most developed civic and political associations were those organized along sectarian lines, and these institutions quickly stepped into the political arena. In the absence of strong state institutions, Iraqis turned to tribal and sectarian identities for political organization and, increasingly, security (Robinson 2009). Militias, many associated with sectarian organizations like the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) or cleric Muqtada as-Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi ("Mahdi Army," or JAM), sprung up along preexisting tribal or sectarian lines, leading to a broader political organization around these identity-based cleavages. The division between Sunni and Shia Arabs quickly became the most relevant societal and political division. Shias outnumber Sunnis about two to one nationwide, with Shias dominating the southern half of the country and Sunnis residing primarily to the north of Baghdad. Shias dominated the newly-elected government, in part because of their demographic majority and in part because policies of "debathification" purged the ranks of the previous Sunni-dominated government (Robinson 2009; Spain and Turchie 2013). The violence that followed

was the result of a sudden and dramatic shift in power, after which the social and political institutions left standing aligned cleavages of political power with those of sectarian identity (Wimmer 2003).

Sectarian identity was rarely a source of conflict in and of itself during the 20th century. There were certainly instances of violence along sectarian lines under Saddam Hussein, most notably following anti-regime uprisings in 1991 and 1999, but violent conflict between sects did not become an everyday occurrence until the fall of the Baath regime in 2003. Sunnis dominated the Iraqi government, and particularly high-level political positions, for much of the 20th century. Iraqi society, however, was comparatively integrated. For example, under British rule in the 1920's, religious celebrations were attended by members of both groups. There was an

> ...increasing tendency of Sunnis and Shiites to attend these [religious] events and celebrate them together, symbolizing a unity of purpose against the outsider...During the holy month of Ramadan, a large procession would leave the Baghdad Shiite neighborhood of Kadhmiya and go to the Sunni neighborhood of Adhamiya, which lay on the opposite side of the Tigris river, where the senior clerics of the two communities would embrace to signal their unity in Islam, and the two communities would pray together. The following week, the same would happen, this time in reverse direction (Dawisha 2009, 77).

Similar events occurred on the anniversaries of the Shia martyrs Ali and Husayn, with Sunni Iraqis emulating their Shia countrymen in mourning their deaths. The emphasis on nationalism and de-emphasis of sectarian identity was helped by certain government policies. For example, Sati al-Husri, charged with reforming Iraq's education system in the 1920's, located all of the teacher training colleges in Baghdad out of concern that disbursing them throughout the country would allow them to be dominated by the local sect and consequently weaken the national identity. Thus, he placed them in the capital "where students from all parts of the country can attend together to develop a spirit of community, or national, rather than parochial, identity" (Dawisha 2009, 86).

The thin societal divisions between Sunnis and Shias were entrenched within the halls of government by the regime of Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Arab. Hus-

sein stocked his regime with individuals whose backgrounds made them seem more trustworthy. That meant first people from his hometown of Tikrit, and then members of his own tribe, and finally Sunni Arabs. Even so, a significant number of Baath party members were Shias, while the majority of Sunnis had little to do with the regime (Blaydes 2013). While there is no doubt that Sunni Arabs held a privileged position within the Iraqi government for the better part of the 20th century, sectarian divisions were far from the most important political issue.

When the Baath regime fell, the United States and its allies fired all members of the regime's security forces. They were simply told to turn in their weapons and go home. This policy did not differentiate between soldiers and police officers, meaning that the ranks of the police, already decimated by desertion, were purged.[12] In June, 2003, the US military reversed course. All officers with a rank of colonel or higher before the way were forcibly retired, but rank-and-file officers were told to return to work (Spain and Turchie 2013). Some returned, but most did not. Ted Spain, a US Army Military Police Colonel whose troops played a role in rebuilding the Baghad police in 2003-2004, says of the decision to disband the Iraqi police: "The removal of senior levels of the Baath party resulted in a loss of manpower of the high level leaders within the Iraqi police. Although they had served under Saddam, most did so out of necessity to avoid losing their heads. They would have been loyal to a more independent Iraqi state when Saddam was overthrown and extremely helpful in rebuilding the police force. In fact, they were desperately needed if the job was to ever get done" (Spain and Turchie 2013, 169). Looting in police stations and government offices caused the loss of most police records, making it virtually impossible for the US forces to determine who was a legitimate police officer (and at what rank), who was unqualified but saw an opportunity to claim a job with a stable paycheck, and who sought to infiltrate the police for nefarious purposes (DePue 2007). Thus, a new police force had to be built virtually from the ground up.

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[12]Gerald Burke, working in 2003 as a police trainer in Baghdad, notes that under the Baath regime soldiers and police officers often wore the same uniforms, differentiated only by a removable patch. An Iraqi could move seamlessly between police and army as needed by the regime, or as the individual in question saw fit. Thus, the lack of differentiation between army and police by the initial US policy may not have been so absurd. (Author interview, 22 January 2016)

The US exerted direct control over Iraqi politics between April 2003 and June 2004, including over decision-making about the police. Bureaucrats at Iraq's Ministry of Interior during the first year were mostly holdovers from the previous regime, but as the US got around to installing its preferred politicians in important ministry positions, it did so almost exclusively with Shias.[13] The police operated in a limited capacity under US direct control. Attempts by the US military to delegate real responsibility to the police were often stymied by the Iraqi police's poor training, poor equipment, and poor motivation (DePue 2007). Recruitment and training stepped up rapidly in late 2003. The US DOD and Iraqi MOI were responsible for recruitment, while civilians contractors from over a dozen countries, funded and overseen by the United States Departments of Justice and State, oversaw the training of new officers. The force grew by about 10,000 officers, from 65,000 to 75,000, between November 2003 and February 2004. One estimate pegged the number of local police officers on the MOI payroll at about 300,000 in 2010,[14] and the figure grew to an astonishing 660,000 officers by 2014.[15] These numbers certainly over-represent the true number of available officers at any given time. Officers tend to rotate on and off duty, with approximately 1/3 on duty at any given time. Furthermore, officers and bureaucrats throughout the chain of command have an incentive to inflate the reported ranks in order to secure greater resources from the central government. Despite these caveats, the Iraqi Police was, and remains today, one of the largest government agencies in Iraq.

US involvement in Iraqi law enforcement and security dwindled to near zero with the end of combat operations in 2010. In June 2014, insurgents allied with the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" (IS) captured Mosul, a religiously-mixed city in northern Iraq. The fighters then continued their push south towards Baghdad, at one point controlling a crescent of territory spanning from Ramadi, only 100 kilometers from the capital, all the way to the northern border with Syria. Iraqi

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[13]Gerald Burke, Author interview 22 January 2016

[14]Globalsecurity.org (2012), "Iraqi Police Service (IPS)." http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/ips.htm

[15]Cockburn, Patrick. "Iraq's Interior Minister on why state corruption is helping the murderous campaign of Isis." *The Independent* 1 March 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-iraq-s-interior-minister-on-why-his-country-is-impotent-against-the-militants-a6905941.html

forces have since retaken significant territory in Anbar province and began fighting to re-take Mosul in October 2016, but IS remains in control of a significant portion of the country. The renewed insurgency led to the re-involvement of US military forces, which in 2014 sent hundreds of military personnel back to Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government. These troops are involved in training and advising Iraqi and Peshmerga forces, servicing US-provided equipment being used by these forces, and participating in air strikes against IS targets on Iraqi soil.

Sectarianism and Identity in the Iraqi Security Forces

The political relevance of ascriptive identity in the Iraqi security forces long pre-dates the 2003 US invasion. In the 1920's, the newly-established Iraqi Army filled its rank-and-file with Shia Arabs, the demographic majority. However, education requirements for officers caused most soldiers in leadership positions to be recruited from the Sunni minority due to educational inequalities which persisted from Ottoman rule (Dawisha 2009; Wimmer 2003). By the time these requirements were relaxed in the 1950's, it was too late. Prominant Shiite Abd al-Karim al-Uzri complained "that the Shiite youth had become so disheartened with the prejudical policies of the Military College that they no longer bothered to apply" (Dawisha 2009, 143). With the Baath party's rise to power, the state relied increasingly on trusted tribes, primarily those from Tikrit, to fill the ranks of the police and intelligence agencies (Quinlivan 1999). Members of these tribes were entrusted with weapons, training, and access to the government, while the majority of citizens were barred from employment in such sensitive positions that were so critical to the safety of the regime. It is worth noting, however, that the primary cleavage of interest under the Baath regime was tribal, not religious. While it is true that most of the privileged tribes were Sunni Muslims, there were numerous practicing Shias who belonged to the Baath party as well (Blaydes 2013).

The actual distribution of sectarian identities within the police post-2003 is unclear. The US government did not, or at least claimed not to, keep track of the sectarian makeup of the Iraqi security forces while it was involved in their reconstruction (Biddle 2006; Sharp 2005). The lack of systematic record keeping

by the US does not necessarily indicate a lack of relevance, however. According to Gerald Burke, a former Massachusetts State Police officer who was involved in training the Iraqi police from 2003 to 2006, the US initially tried to implement a policy of sectarian integration in the police in 2003-04 to ensure some degree of representation for all communities.[16] However, the Iraqi MOI told the US that it did not have the necessary information about recruits to engage in any sort of sectarian integration, either with regard to recruitment or to assignment. Such a claim is almost certainly false, as sectarian affiliation can usually be determined on the basis of name or hometown. Burke speculates that the real motivation behind withholding this information was to provide Iraqi politicians and bureaucrats with greater leeway for distributing police positions as patronage. In any event, the result was a "sect blind" recruitment process as long as the DOD was in charge. Today, the police leadership at the station or regional levels almost certainly has an idea of the sectarian makeup of the officers under their control, but there is no indication that the MOI aggregates this information in any centralized database, making it impossible for the federal government to account for officer demographics in policy design and implementation.

Despite the lack of available systematic data on officer affiliation, broad trends in inclusiveness are apparent, both over time and across regions. Between 2004 and 2007, the vast majority of the police, and virtually all of the Special or National Police, were Shia (Hashim 2005). The United States' policy of de-Baathification purged many Sunnis from the police (Spain and Turchie 2013). The subsequent domination of the 2005 elections by Shia parties allowed for heavy recruitment from party strongholds, including among members of Shia militias like the Badr Corps (Cole 2007; Rayburn 2014). After the 2005 elections, the MOI changed hands from Falah Hassan al-Naqib, a Sunni, to Bayan Jabr, a former officer in the military wing of Shia party Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Jabr became infamous for employing Shia militiamen within the security forces, especially the Special Police, allowing them to carry out a sectarian agenda while wearing government uniforms (Perito 2011). In his book about

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[16]Author interview 22 January 2016.

the Iraq war, US Lieutenant Colonel Joel Rayburn goes so far as to refer to the Iraqi police by their partisan affiliation: "The Badr officers who took command of much of the Ministry of Interior in 2005 unleashed the police machinery on the population of greater Baghdad" (Rayburn 2014, 81). In some cases, sectarianism manifested as neglect. In the upper-class, mixed-sect Baghdad neighborhood of Mansour, citizens perceived that the predominantly-Shia police force never left their station to patrol or provide any services to citizens (Robinson 2009). In other cases, sectarian behavior by police was more overt. Following the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006, "police units in the city had a direct role in pushing hundreds of thousands of Sunnis out of mixed-sect neighborhoods, especially on the west side of the city" (Rayburn 2014, 81). In Basra, the largest city in southern Iraq, the police chief "admitted that much of his force was of dubious loyalty and mainly oriented to militias and religious parties" (Cole 2007, 116).[17]

At the height of Iraq's sectarian civil war in the mid-2000's, the police was complicit in numerous instances of sectarian violence. In August 2005, police officers dragged 36 men from their homes in the Huriya neighborhood of Baghdad. The men were tortured and killed, and their bodies dumped near the Iranian border (Perito 2011). In a separate incident, police units associated with the Badr Organization, a Shia political organization that sometimes doubled as a militia, were accused of acting as deaths quads against Sunnis. "Men dressed as police commandos kidnapped men from Sunni neighborhoods. These men later turned up dead, often from a bullet to the back of the head" (Cole 2007, 116). There are numerous reports of Shia imagery and slogans posted at police checkpoints and around police stations.[18] In 2015, the government launched an investigation over accusations that Iraqi forces, including Shia "popular mobilization forces," had executed 80 unarmed civilians who they suspected of sympathizing with the "Islamic State" in Diyala province, an area with an ethnically and religiously

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[17]It was not just the police and security forces which were coopted by sectarianism. In May 2006, the Health Ministry came under the control of the Sadrists, leading to the denial of services in Sunni areas of Baghdad. "Some of the most egregious abuses were occurring in Baghdads hospitals. The Sadrist health minister had packed the ministry and hospitals with militia members. Sunnis were going in and not coming out" (Robinson 2009, 154).

[18]Damon, Arwa. "Iraq at Crossroads as Bombs Explode." *CNN,* 30 April 2013. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/30/world/meast/iraq-violence-qa/

diverse population.[19]

The Iraqi police and security forces were attractive targets for insurgents (Rayburn 2014). After the Coalition forces handed power over to the new Iraqi government, insurgents began targeting Iraqis they deemed as collaborators with the foreign occupation, particularly Iraqi members of the state security forces. In a particularly bloody attack in September 2004, 47 people, primarily police officers or recruits, were killed by a car bomb outside the Al-Karkh police station (Hashim 2005, 39).[20]

During the first years of reconstruction, Sunnis were reluctant to sign up for the National Police because of concerns over how they would be treated by the Shia-dominated institution. There were some exceptions, however. The 202nd Battalion in Falluja, for example, was made up primarily of Sunni Arabs (Hashim 2005, 311). As of 2005, security forces in Tal Afar, a town about 75 kilometers west of Mosul with a religiously and ethnically mixed population, were primarily Kurdish, along with some Sunni Arabs. Mixed units were considered problematic for the command structure, however, with soldiers or officers refusing to take orders from non-coethnic superiors (Hashim 2005). In the end, despite a handful of cases of Sunni inclusion, within months of the new Iraqi regime being handed power, the state security apparatus was largely coopted by sectarian interests, with the Kurds dominating the Ministry of Defense and the Shia dominating the MOI.

The prevalence of sectarianism within the Iraqi police, and the MOI in general, began to subside in mid-2006. The police created an internal affairs department in Spring 2006 in response to incidents of sectarian violence by Shia police officers. With General David Petraeus at the helm, the US military exerted great effort towards increasing the participation of Sunnis in anti-insurgency activities

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[19]Arraf, Jane. 2015. "Iraq PM Orders Urgent Probe into Military 'Massacre'." *al-Jazeera,* 29 January. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/01/iraq-pm-orders-urgent-probe-military-massacre-150129132719377.html

[20]While there is no doubt that the insurgents disproportionately targeted officers, not everyone agrees that their actions were motivated by sectarianism. Deflem and Sutphin (2006) argue that a functioning police force represents a normalized society. Insurgents opposed to the status-quo government, regardless of the reasons for their opposition, seek to undermine the perception of normality by preventing the consolidation of the civilian police force and distracting them from their duties of "ordinary" policing.

2006-07. The coalition forces recruited fighters from the primarily-Sunni tribes in Anbar and formed them into militias known as the Sons of Iraq (SOI). These militias were not technically part of the Iraqi security forces, but they operated in conjunction with US and coalition forces fighting against insurgents. While the focus was primarily on the counterinsurgency branches of the security forces, the recruitment drive trickled down to the ordinary police as well. Prime Minister Maliki's government had little opposition to hiring former SOI fighters into the local police in Anbar province, but the US DOD preferred a larger scale integration of these men into the security forces throughout the country. Operation Blue Shield, launched in 2007, intended to integrate more than 12,000 former militia members, mostly Sunnis, into the state security forces within six months. "Acceptance of a substantial number of volunteers would convince many Sunnis that there was a place for them in the system, and the many safeguards [surrounding recruitment] would reassure the government" of the fighters' loyalty (Robinson 2009, 254). Maliki agreed to expand the size of Anbar's police force to make room for the new recruits. Around the same time, the Iraqi government agreed to offer jobs or pensions to 46,800 former members of Saddam's army who had lost their posts after the invasion. These soldiers were overwhelmingly Sunnis. Finally, the Iraqi Defense Ministry created a review board to ensure that promotion within the Iraqi army occurred based on "professional criteria" rather than sectarianism (Robinson 2009, 335). The government's actions represented a major step towards reconciliation with the Sunni community (Robinson 2009, 298).

The integration of Sunnis into the state security forces had its share of hiccups. The coalition forces turned the Sons of Iraq program over to the Iraqi government in 2008, at which point a lack of government support for these forces cut into their resources and left them vulnerable to reprisal attacks (Jabar 2014). In some cases, the government actively suppressed members of the Anbar tribal militias. In August 2008, the Maliki government attempted to arrest several hundred SOI fighters, arguing that the state could not accept the presence of militias operating outside the authority of the government. Entrance requirements for physical fitness and literacy, which a majority of SOI fighters were unable to pass,

also hampered integration of state security forces (Jabar 2014). Thus, despite the success of the Sons of Iraq program in pushing back al-Qaida from the Anbar governorate, the program did not lead to a sustained increase in participation of Sunnis within the state security forces in the long term.

Rather, the current makeup of the Iraqi police and security forces is shaped primarily by the efforts of the current government. Issues of sectarianism, participation, and inclusion within the police took a significant turn following Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's inauguration in September 2014. In December 2014, President Fuad Massoum made a public statement calling for government action "to achieve national reconciliation and bring security and welfare."[21] President Massoum's reconciliation project takes two parallel tracks, one which emphasizes bridge-building with members of Iraq's minority groups, and a second that is reviewing legislation in an effort to break down barriers to integration. Vice President Iyad Allawi, himself both a Shia and the former Prime Minister from 2004 to 2005, held a series of meetings with tribal leaders from many different communities in pursuit of national reconciliation. Interior Minister Mohammed al-Ghabban made it his mission to combat corruption and patronage within the police by reducing the size of the force and firing ineffective officers.[22]

Today, mixed Sunni Arab and Kurdish police units have taken on a high-profile role in operating against the Islamic State (IS) in Nineveh province.[23] In nearby Kirkuk, one report from 2014 describes the city's police force as ethnically-mixed, citing 40% Kurds, 27% Arabs, 25% Turkmen, and the rest from other minority groups among the city's 5,000 officers.[24] Officers are generally allocated

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[21]Mustafa, Hamza. 2014. "Iraqi President Announces Steps Towards National Reconciliation." *aawsat.net,* 17 December http://www.aawsat.net/2014/12/article55339569/iraqi-president-announces-steps-towards-national-reconciliation

[22]Cockburn (2016)

[23]Morris, Loveday. 2015. "Iraqi Police at Nineveh Liberation Camp Aim to Help Free Mosul but Lack Food and Guns." *Washington Post,* 15 January. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/these-iraqis-are-preparing-to-liberate-mosul--as-soon-as-they-have-guns-and-food/2015/01/14/297efc30-95be-11e4-8385-866293322c2f_story.html

[24]Author Unknown. "Kirkuk Police Can't Escape from Iraqi Politics." *Washington Post,* 14 June. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40219-2004Jun14_2.html?sections=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world. It is not clear how the article arrived at these figures.

so that they serve members of their own ethno-religious group. However, all officers serve under the same chain of command and are responsible for the city as a whole. Integration of the Kirkuk police is not just based on numbers; the local chief created a training program to encourage officers to "think like policemen, not as members of a certain ethnic community."[25] The general impression of the Iraqi police today is that the local police tend to be representative of the local population, but the more militarized Federal Police continue to be dominated by Shia. While the police and security forces remain plagued by their sectarian past, progress towards inclusion and improved service provision is occurring.

Recruitment and Training

Between 2003 and 2010, the United States spent $7.3 billion on training and assistance for the Iraqi police (SIGIR 2010).[26] Over 400,000 officers were trained during the same period. The US Department of Justice's (DOJ) International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) bureau took initial responsibility for training the new Iraqi police. However, they transferred authority to the Department of Defense in May 2004 due to the deteriorating security situation. INL maintained responsibility for the majority of the hands-on training, especially in combat zones.[27] The Iraqi Ministry of Interior took control of training activities between 2006 and 2008, with some foreign trainers remaining involved under the command of the Iraqi government. Authority over the US assistance program was transferred to the Department of State in 2011.

The first priority for the trainers was to establish a new police academy. An initial report by the DOJ's evaluation team called for as many as 6,000 foreign police trainers to rapidly build a police force from virtually nothing. Due to lim-

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[25]ibid

[26]Other countries also contributed significant sums to police training. The United Kingdom spent $229 million on forensics equipment and investigative training, Australia spent $21 on training, and the European Union spent $54 million on "training in such areas as confidence building, mutual respect, and operational cooperation between different branches of the Iraqi criminal justice system" (SIGIR 2010, 6).

[27]Gerald Burke, Author interview 22 January 2016

ited resources, the State Department cut the number to 1,500 private contractors, the bulk of whom were provided by security consultant DynCorp. Budget issues limited more than just personnel. Planners turned an initial recommendation for a 16 week training course into only 8 weeks, four for classroom training and four for "hard skills" like firearms training.[28] According to one trainer, resources were incredibly constrained. Recruits had insufficient weapons and ammunition, or even the wrong type of ammunition for the weapons that they did have.[29] The US agencies responsible for training appear to have been totally unequipped for operating in Iraq. Training materials were heavily recycled from previous operations in Kosovo but ill-adapted to the Iraqi context. Illustrating just how poorly prepared trainers were, powerpoint slides used during classroom training occasionally contained location and agency labels from the Kosovo mission.[30] Language barriers presented another set of problems, as virtually none of the trainers spoke Arabic and the training force did not include enough translators. Instead, Iraqi recruits who happened to speak English played the role of translator when necessary. The presence of Kurdish recruits often necessitated a double translation from English to Arabic, and then from Arabic to Kurdish, with the predictable loss in accuracy that such a game of telephone tends to incur.

The provincial government makes most hiring and firing decisions over the police (Pfaff 2008). At first the DOD, and then later the Iraqi MOI or local governor, would approach a sheikh or tribal leader and request that an effort be made to sign up new police officers from the area. The DOD then vetted new recruits before sending them to one of several police academies. The stable paycheck officers received motivated most new recruits, regardless of sectarian affiliation (Deflem and Sutphin 2006; DePue 2007). Particularly while the Americans financed the recruitment and training efforts, officers viewed employment in the police as a way to make a solid, stable living and to support one's family. A former soldier under the Baath regime said upon joining the new security forces, "I am coming back for the money of course. There are no other jobs, and I don't know how I will feed

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[28]Author interviews, Gerald Burke (22 January 2016) and Sam Juett (22 February 2016)

[29]Gerald Burke, Author interview 22 January 2016

[30]Sam Juett, Author interview 22 February 2016

my family" (Hashim 2005, 302).[31] After a particularly brutal bombing on an Iraqi police station in al-Karkh, a witness expressed consternation over insurgents' attacks on the security forces. "Why are these people targeting Iraqi police recruits? They just want to get a salary because they are unemployed" (Hashim 2005, 39). Additionally, many recruits joined because they saw participation in the police as a way to ensure their own safety, both because of the status that comes from being a police officer and also because employment in the police provides access to a weapon.[32]

Training in Baghdad was impossible because the existing facility was too small. Training in other parts of Iraq was impossible because of the lack of security. An initial plan to train Iraqi police recruits in Hungary fell apart early on due to political disagreements. Instead, the Jordanian government built a large training center just outside the capital of Amman in November 2003. The Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) became one of the most important police academies for the first several years of rebuilding. JIPTC provided a comparatively stable environment in which to train new officers that was removed from combat operations, insurgent activities, and tribal pressures. In total, about 53,000 Iraqi police officers graduated from the JIPTC training course between the end of 2003 and the end of 2007. For comparison, as of October 2005, 67,500 officers in total had been trained between JIPTC, the Baghdad Police College, and a handful of regional police academies (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). While only a portion of Iraqi police officers were trained at JIPTC, its operations provide a window into standard training procedures which were similar all US-supported police academies. After selection and vetting, new recruits arrived at JIPTC in classes of 1,500. Trainers distributed these recruits randomly into platoons of 50 officers each. According to Sam Juett, who filled a registrar-type role at the JIPTC for several years, it was literally a case of "you go this way, you go that way." Thus, while there was no explicit policy at the center which led to a mixing of recruits from different backgrounds, communities, or religious sects, the result was consid-

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[31] Also see Daniszewski, John, Hundreds Line Up to Join New Iraqi Army. Los Angeles Time 22 July 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jul/22/world/fg-recruits22

[32] Sam Juett, Author interview 22 February 2016

erable interaction between members of different sectarian groups. With one class completing classroom lessons and a second learning hands-on skills, approximately 3,000 trainees resided at the academy at any given time. Recruits lived and trained with other recruits who arrived at the same time as them, providing eight weeks during which they got to know one another as members of a team. Training activities and living quarters were shared with individuals from other tribes and different parts of the country.[33] Recruits socialized primarily with other members of their platoon, if for no other reason than because they did not know anyone else.[34]

Training content focused almost exclusively on security and counterinsurgency, with little attention paid to ordinary crime fighting or service-oriented policing. Juett notes the absurdity of creating law enforcement under a situation in which there were no laws (the Iraqi constitution was not approved until 2005, and even the Transitional Administrative Law was not drafted until after police training had begun). He says that the new officers were essentially "trigger pullers." The new police force existed to provide armed, somewhat trained men capable of fighting against threats to the state.

In addition to the staff of international trainers, command-level Iraqi police officers oversaw operations at the training center. These officers included Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds.[35] Conflicts among trainees, and between trainees and the trainers, existed, but they were rarely motivated by sectarian affiliation. Rather, they tended to be the result of pulling people out of their element and putting them in a totally unfamiliar situation. Trainers also cite laziness, perhaps the result of recruiting classes filled with individuals only interested in a paycheck, as a source of trouble.[36] JIPTC trainers did take basic measures to prevent sectarian discord, for example by preventing recruits from hanging religious or sectarian posters in the barracks (pictures of Sadr, for example), but for the most part there was little obvious sectarian tension among trainees. The general theme that emerges from conversations with former trainers and administrators from JIPTC

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[33]Gerald Burke, Author interview 22 January 2016
[34]Author interview 12 April 2016
[35]Author interview 12 April 2016
[36]Gerald Burke, Author interview 22 January 2016

is that sectarianism was not a first-order issue during training. "In general you had these guys acting very nationalist."[37]

Officer Assignment and Distribution

Officers in the local police generally serve in the same area from which they were recruited (O'Leary et al. 2007), giving local politicians considerable influence over the composition of the police force. This was true even when the US was in charge of training. Just as the police academies and training centers have no role in recruitment, the distribution and assignment of officers after completing the eight week training course is out of their hands. Newly-graduated officers are turned over to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior where they receive assignments. While the MOI is nominally in charge of distributing officers across the country, the process is heavily influenced by the provincial governors who have an incentive to maintain as much discretion over police officer assignments as possible because the jobs, and particularly the position of police chief in each city, can be distributed as valuable patronage. Wherever possible, governors give police officer positions to family members, friends, and politically-connected contacts. One local sheikh asked coalition forces to set up a police force of 200 officers in his town of 3,000 residents – a police-civilian ratio fifteen time higher than is typical in most societies. The sheikh's goal was clearly not to use the police to maintain order but to provide "employment, salaries and brand new Glock pistols to the young men of his tribe" (Hashim 2005, 106). Ordinary officers have little say on their first posting, but with experience and promotions are able to influence their future assignments. Burke estimates that most officers have a preference for serving close to home.[38]

Conclusion

The Iraq case presents a useful setting in which to test the theory of bottom-up integration. The country's diverse ethnic and religious groups, along with the highly politicized nature of these sources of identities in the current political cli-

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[37]Sam Juett, Author interview 22 February 2016
[38]Author interview 22 January 2016

mate, makes top-down integration problematic (Wimmer 2003). Standard approaches to democratic power sharing in Iraq have emphasized existing religious and ethnic cleavages by invoking political competition between parties affiliated with sectarian identities, heightening tensions rather than subduing them. The dominance of the police and security forces by Shia Arabs contributed to fear of the government and poor service provision between 2004 and 2007. However, explicit policies of integration, first imposed from the outside by the US military in 2007 and later implemented by the government of Haidar al-Abadi beginning in 2014, have increased the inclusiveness of these institutions.

Chapter 4

Sectarian Integration in the Police and Support for Anti-Government Violence: Evidence from Iraq

This chapter tests the link between citizens' perceptions of police integration and their support for anti-state violence in Baghdad, Iraq. I use an experiment embedded within a survey to prime respondents with varying information about the degree to which the Iraqi Police Services are integrated. Then, using an item count technique to obtain a reliable measure of support for violence, I find that providing Iraqi Sunnis with information that the police are integrated significantly reduces their willingness to consider using violence against the government. Next, I use survey data to test the effects of perceived police integration on several mechanisms that existing research links with participation in anti-state violence, grievances over current conditions and fears of future conditions. Consistent with the argument that bottom-up integration reduces grievances, I find that Sunni Arabs in Baghdad who perceive the police as more integrated are less likely to view police and government service provision as biased on the basis of identity. These individuals are also less likely to believe that their group is excluded from employment in the police. With regard to fears of future conditions, Sunni Arab respondents who perceive the police as integrated are less fearful of future repression, which in turn reduces their incentives to engage in preemptive strikes or take

other actions that may lead to conflict. In all, these findings support the argument that bottom-up integration of the police reduces the motives of individuals from previously-marginalized groups to engage in anti-state conflict.

In addition to providing evidence that integrating the rank-and-file of the police reduces motives for conflict, this chapter also speaks to the ongoing debate over whether *motives* or *opportunity* are more powerful in predicting civil conflict. By empowering members of previously-excluded groups, integrating the rank-and-file of the police simultaneously reduces motives for engaging in violence while also increasing opportunity for fighting against the state. Yet, I find that Sunnis living in Baghdad who perceive that the police are more integrated are less willing to consider using anti-government violence, suggesting that at least in this context, motives outweigh opportunity.

This chapter also provides empirical evidence that different configurations of institutional inclusiveness affect conflict motives in different ways. In particular, I show that while the perception that officers are mixed between different groups reduces conflict motives like fear of future repression, the belief that police officers in the respondent's area are largely members of the respondent's own group has no such fear-reducing effect. In other words, at the local level officer integration reduces conflict motives, while sect-based autonomy does not. I argue that integration, but not autonomy, provides a number of tools through which vulnerable groups can prevent mistreatment and impose costs on the dominant group, including monitoring the actions of non-coethnic officers and withholding services from dominant-group citizens. Furthermore, autonomy perpetuates barriers between sects and the primacy of sectarian identity as a cleavage of conflict, while integration breaks down these barriers, provides exposure to non-coethnics in a positive light, and enhances the role of national identity in state service provision. Finally, autonomy allows the state to underequip or withhold information from officers from certain groups groups, potentially undoing many of the safeguards created by integration.

In addition to the effects of police integration among members of the Sunni minority, I also evaluate support for police integration among politically-dominant

Shia Arabs. Somewhat unexpectedly, many of police integration's conflict-reducing and trust-increasing effects occur not just for Sunnis but also for Shias. Shias who believe the police are more integrated are also less likely to fear government repression and less willing to consider using anti-state violence. I argue that these results are a function of the harm that sectarian conflict has imposed on all Iraqi citizens, regardless of sect, and may also be influenced by the unstable balance of power between identity groups in Iraq. Integration also appears to ease the concern of dominant-group members that minorities seek to undermine the status-quo. Survey results show that Shias believe that the benefits of bottom-up integration, for example allowing minority groups to do their part in contributing to society, outweigh negative outcomes like a potential loss of jobs for their own group. The positive reactions to integration by members of the dominant group indicate a rejection of sectarianism and a commitment to intergroup cooperation among Iraqi Arabs of all sects.

Police Integration and Conflict: Mechanisms and Hypotheses

Broadly speaking, bottom-up integration of the police should reduce individuals' motives for engaging in anti-state violence by reducing grievances over current conditions (Gurr 1970) and decreasing fears of future conditions (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Weingast 1997; Posen 1993). In Chapters 1 and 2, I propose two mechanisms that contribute to grievances over current conditions, unequal police and government service provision and exclusion from desirable employment. These mechanisms should lead to lower overall support for anti-government violence. On the other hand, certain characteristics of police integration suggest a possible increase in the likelihood of conflict. First, integrating members of the vulnerable group into the police may increase the likelihood that they rebel against the state by making it less costly for them to do so (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Second, integrating the police may be opposed by members of the dominant group who fear a loss of employment opportunities or predict that integration will spur rebellion by the previously excluded group. Shia Arabs may

therefore oppose a government, perhaps violently, that pursues integration. This chapter tests each of these mechanisms in turn, as well as the overall effect of perceived integration on support for violence.

H_1: Individuals from the vulnerable group (Sunnis) who perceive the police and security forces as more integrated will be *less* likely to consider using anti-government violence.

H_1a: Individuals from the dominant group (Shias) who perceive the police and security forces as more integrated will be *more* likely to consider using anti-government violence.

The first mechanism linking integration with conflict attitudes among the vulnerable group is grievances caused by unequal service provision, either real or perceived. Citizens who believe that the distribution of police services is biased on the basis of identity may be more likely to support or engage in anti-government violence. I assume that biased service provision disproportionately harms Sunnis, and reductions in bias are assumed to reduce conflict among Sunnis. However, Shias may also recognize when services are distributed in a biased manner even if they are not personally harmed by it. Thus, the expected relationship between perceived integration and perceived bias should hold for all respondents regardless of sectarian identity.

H_2: Individuals who perceive the police and security forces as more integrated will be less likely to perceive police/government service provision as biased.

The next mechanism also deals with grievances over current conditions. Iraq's Ministry of Interior, which includes the police and domestic security forces, employs more than half a million citizens. When a segment of the population is effectively barred from employment in these positions due to ethnic or religious identity, these individuals may be more likely to participate in or support the use

of violence.

H_3: Individuals from the vulnerable group (Sunnis) who perceive the police and security forces as more integrated will be more likely to believe that if a member of their family were to apply for a job with the police, the application would be considered fairly.

Finally, integrating the police may reduce conflict by reducing fears of future repression, which in turn reduces incentives for building up defenses or engaging in preemptive strikes against the state.

H_4: Individuals from the vulnerable group (Sunnis) who perceive the police and security forces as more integrated will express less fear of the police/government.

Data and Survey Design

I test the above hypotheses using data from a survey carried out in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad in spring, 2016. I contracted a local survey firm to carry out the enumeration. The survey provides several benefits over other data sources. First, it provides individual-level measures of the outcomes of interest, namely support for anti-government violence, grievances, and fear of repression. It also measures Iraqis' perceptions about police integration. Survey measures of this key predictor were employed for two reasons. First, the effect of integration on support for violence is explicitly theorized to work via *information* about integration and the way individuals react to that information. Second, reliable data on officer demographics is not available for the Iraqi police. Thus, the survey provides a unique opportunity to illuminate the degree of sectarianism in the Iraqi police, including the way in which officers of different identities are distributed across Baghdad.

The sample includes 800 Baghdad residents. All ethnic Arabs at least 18

years old were eligible to participate. I limited the sample to Baghdad for several reasons. First, ongoing conflict against the Islamic State would have made surveying in most Sunni areas of Iraq impossible, meaning that the majority of Sunni respondents would have had to come from Baghdad anyway. Limiting Shia respondents to Baghdad allows for more valid comparisons between the two groups. Second, limiting enumerator travel time and exposure while traveling between sites reduced risks to their safety. Finally, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Iraqi Police are organized slightly differently between Baghdad and the rest of the country. Whereas in most of Iraq there is a significant distinction between the federal and local police forces, within Baghdad these forces operate interchangeably, simplifying both citizen perceptions and the questions needed to accurately measure those perceptions.

Enumerators were primarily part-time employees of the survey company, and most serve regularly as enumerators on projects for this company. Enumerators worked in teams of 5 to 8, with each team overseen by a supervisor. Where possible, the supervisor assigned enumerators to their home neighborhoods. Each team included female enumerators to interview female respondents. Each interview was conducted by a single enumerator, sometimes overseen by a field supervisor, to minimize conspicuousness.

I used a multi-stage proportional probability sample to select respondents. Baghdad Governorate is divided into nine administrative districts, which are further divided into subdistricts and census blocks. A 2010-11 household census served as the sampling frame. Subdistricts were chosen proportionally based on population, and then blocks were chosen within each subdistrict again proportionally based on population. Enumerators carried out the survey in 22 different neighborhoods, with between 10 and 90 interviews per neighborhood proportional to population size. Within each neighborhood, streets were selected using a simple random sample from a list maintained by the survey company. The final sample included 67 streets, typically with between 5 and 25 streets per neighborhood. The survey firm provided enumerator teams with the sample at the street level, and then the team leader selected households randomly based on an a map of occupied

households. Within each household, the interview was conducted with the adult who had the next birthday.

In addition to the 800 successfully-completed interviews, enumerators attempted but failed to complete 132 interviews, for a completion rate of 85.8%. If enumerators failed to reach a resident at a selected location after several attempts, or if the resident declined to participate, the supervisor selected another household from the remaining occupied households on the street. Among respondents who completed the survey, item non-response rates were low. Response rates were at least 85% for all of the questions used in this analysis.

As in all survey-based research, social desirability bias presents a challenge to validity. Respondents may not answer sensitive items truthfully if they do not want to reveal their preferences to the interviewer. While it is impossible to rule out social desirability bias entirely, several factors guard against it here. First, Adida et al. (2016) note that bias may be exacerbated when respondents and enumerators come from groups in conflict with one another. While interviewers in Baghdad were not assigned explicitly on the basis of sectarian affiliation, every effort was made to assign interviewers to their home neighborhoods. This means that in the most segregated neighborhoods, i.e. where sectarianism is likely to be highest, interviewers most likely shared the same sectarian identity as the respondents. Second, the most sensitive questions about support for anti-government violence were asked using a technique that shields respondents' answers from the interviewer. Finally, the survey team conducted interviews in respondents' homes in an effort to place them at ease and ensure a low-pressure environment.

Sample Characteristics

A blocked design yielded 400 Sunni-Arabs and 400 Shia-Arabs, which roughly matches Baghdad's Sunni-Shia makeup. Because of the sensitive nature of sectarian identity in Iraq, respondents were not asked directly about their sectarian identity. Instead, enumerators coded whether they believed the respondent to be Sunni or Shia based on factors like name, manner of dress, facial hair, and visible items around the home. Enumerators then listed how confident they were in their

coding. In total, 85.5% of codings were labeled "completely certain," 14.25% were "fairly certain," 0.25% were "more likely than not," and none were "unsure."

Fifty-two percent of respondents in the sample are male. The youngest respondents were 18 (by design), while the oldest was 72, with an average age of 35.5. Respondents' ages are particularly important in the context of Iraq because of the dramatic shifts in political power that occurred with the fall of the Baath regime in 2003. Older respondents have experienced periods of both Sunni and Shia political dominance during their lifetimes. In contrast, respondents in their 20's were very young when Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq, and their political and social attitudes formed primarily during the post-Saddam civil war. About 42% of respondents have lived their entire adult lives under a Shia-dominanted government. The other 58% were adults during the Baath regime and have experienced both a Sunni-dominated dictatorship and a Shia-dominated democratic government.

In terms of education, just over half had at least 11 years of formal schooling. More than 82% of respondents report living in the same neighborhood now as they did ten years ago.[1] Most respondents were displeased with their current economic situation, with only 32% either "somewhat satisfied" or "very satisfied." As an objective measure of government service provision and a general indicator of neighborhood characteristics, they survey asked respondents how many hours of electricity their household receives each day. Respondents reported receiving between 10 and 22 hours of electricity per day, with a median of 16 hours. Sunnis reported receiving about half an hour *more* per day than Shia, a small but statistically-significant difference which contradicts arguments that the Shia-dominated government biases the distribution of services in favor of Shias.

Finally, 44% of respondents either work or have worked in the public sector, or have someone else in their household who works or has worked in the public sector. Of those, 100 (out of 800 total respondents) work or have worked for the police. These numbers may seem high; however, in the context of Iraqi society

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[1]This figure is likely inflated by the fact that many Iraqis who were forced to flee their neighborhood due to security may have left Baghdad entirely, removing them from the sampling frame.

they are quite reasonable. Iraq's public sector is very large. A report published in 2016 estimates that the bureaucracy employs 7 million people[2] for a population of about 33 million people. Considering that bureaucrats are disproportionately likely to reside in Baghdad, and that Iraqi families tend to be quite large, it is not surprising that nearly half of respondents have a member of their household who works in the public sector. The high number of households with a current or former police officer – one in eight – speaks directly to the sources of information Iraqis have about the makeup of the police, information which no doubt shapes their perceptions of the institution.

Support for Police Integration

Chapters 1 and 2 assume that there is sufficient demand for inclusion in the police for integration to occur, and that the actual sectarian makeup of the rank-and-file is limited only by the policies of the government and the police. However, if enough citizens from the marginalized group oppose integration, there may not be a sufficient pool of qualified candidates from the minority community to allow for integration. To what extent do Iraqis actually support the sectarian integration of the police and security forces? The survey asks respondents,

> "Do you think that greater sectarian integration of the Iraqi Police Services would make citizens like you better off, worse off, or about the same?"

Overall, just under two-thirds of respondents believe that integration would make people like them better off, while less than 10% believe that integration would make people like them worse off. What is particularly interesting is that responses varied little between Sunnis and Shias. Figure 4.1 shows that despite being the politically-dominant group, Shia Iraqis give little indication that they would oppose a change to the status quo. On the contrary, more than two-thirds

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[2]Cockburn, Patrick. "Iraq's Interior Minister on why state corruption is helping the murderous campaign of Isis." *Independent*, 1 March 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-iraq-s-interior-minister-on-why-his-country-is-impotent-against-the-militants-a6905941.html

of Shia respondents believe they would be better off if the police were integrated – a higher proportion than among Sunni respondents. I suggest that the high levels of support for integration among Shias are driven by two factors. First, although Shias are a demographic majority, Sunnis dominated the government from the Ottoman period until 2003. It was only after significant foreign military intervention that the majority Shias took their current role as the politically-dominant group. Shias, then, may consider the current balance of power to be somewhat fragile, and view integration as a safeguard against future changes in this balance. Second, Sunnis and Shias alike experienced considerable harm during Iraq's sectarian civil war. Members of both groups likely view sectarianism in government institutions as a negative outcome and prefer a government committed to serving all citizens over one that engages in sectarian politics.

Figure 4.1: Do you think that greater sectarian integration of the Iraqi Police Services would make citizens like you better off, worse off, or about the same?

Measuring Police Integration

I measure the primary independent variable, perceptions of police integration, in a number of ways. First, the survey asks respondents about their

perceptions of the Iraqi Police at the national or institutional level:

> "Throughout Iraq in general, would you say that the police fairly include members of all different ethnic and religious groups? Please answer from 1 to 5, with 1 being not at all fairly and 5 being completely fairly."

Respondents were then asked about the level of integration specific to their neighborhood:

> "In your neighborhood, how often do you see ordinary police officers from different ethnic or religious groups working together side by side? Often, sometimes, rarely, or never?"

A third question disaggregates inclusiveness into three possible forms: police dominance by an outgroup, police dominance by one's own group (autonomy), and mixed policing (integration):

> "Would you say that security forces in your area are mostly people like you, mostly people from other groups, or a mix between the two?"

Perceptions of Police Integration

How do Iraqis' perceptions of police integration vary? Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of responses to questions about perceived police integration, and Figure 4.3 shows neighborhood-level averages regarding perceived local police integration alongside neighborhood demographics. Several trends are immediately clear. First, perceptions of the extent to which the police are integrated vary considerably from one respondent to the next. While this variation is expected at the local level (since actual levels of integration vary from one location to the next), variation in perceptions of how integrated the police are nation-wide means that citizens have different beliefs about the extent of integration even at a level at which there is no variation in reality. Second, there is no evidence that perceived integration at the local level is determined by neighborhood-level demographics. The maps in Figure 4.3 show that there is considerable variation in levels of perceived integration for Sunni, Shia, and mixed neighborhoods.[3]

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[3]The correlation between perceived local police integration and neighborhood demographics is .0445.

Figure 4.2: Iraq: Perceived Integration

Baghdad: Perceived Police Integration

Legend

Least Integrated

Most Integrated

"In your neighborhood, how often do you see ordinary police officres from different ethnic
or religious groups working together side by side? Often, sometimes, rarely, or never?"

Baghdad: District Sectarian Demographics

Proportion
Sunni

0

0.5

1.0

Figure 4.3: Local Police Integration and Population Demographics

While we do not have data on officer demographics to compare against these perceptions, we can begin to determine the extent to which perceptions match reality by looking at the way that local-level perceptions within a particular neighborhood are consistent with one another. The more individuals' perceptions are based in reality, the more that responses by individuals exposed to the same police officers, i.e. respondents who live in the same neighborhood, should cluster with one another.[4] Across the 22 surveyed neighborhoods, the neighborhood-level standard deviation for perceived location integration ranges from 0.53 to 1.27, with an average neighborhood standard deviation of .86 (recall that the local integration variable ranges from 1 to 4). In other words, while there is some variation in the extent to which individuals perceive the same group of officers as being integrated, responses tend to cluster within neighborhoods which is consistent with the argument that actual officer demographics influence perceptions of integration.

Broadly speaking, we should expect individuals' perceptions of the police to be influenced by a variety of sources. Personal experiences and observations surely play a role. Police officers are highly visible as they go about their duties, and Iraqi citizens are able to identify officers' sectarian identity with some degree of confidence using the same criteria that my survey enumerators used to identity citizens: name (displayed on the uniform), facial hair, and any religious or sectarian symbols that might be present on a police vehicle, at a checkpoint, or in a police station. This is not to say that civilians can identify an individual officer's sectarian identity with certainty in any given interaction, but rather citizens receive enough information from personal observations to form a general impression of the extent to which the police in their neighborhood include officers from various groups. The personal connections that citizens have with police officers provide further information; as mentioned above, 1 in 8 survey respondents live in the same house as a police officer. Finally, perceptions of the police are also shaped by the media, allowing respondents to form perceptions about policing beyond their own neighborhood even if they do not travel extensively throughout the country.

Perceptions of police integration correlate with a number of individual-level

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[4]I thank Sharan Grewal for this suggestion.

characteristics. Shias and those who are less educated are more likely to believe that the Iraqi police are integrated nation-wide, while individuals who are older and *more* educated are more likely to believe the police are integrated in their neighborhoods. Those who live in a household with a public servant are more likely to perceive the police as integrated both nationally and locally.[5] There are no apparent differences across gender.

Randomizing Information about Police Integration

A major barrier to accurately gauging the effects of police integration is the likely possibility that variation in local integration is correlated with the outcomes of interest. For example, if the police are more likely to send minority officers to safer areas, perhaps because these officers are viewed as less competent, then it may appear that integration decreases violence when in fact the relationship is spurious. The previous chapter provides qualitative evidence that officer assignment, while far from random, is not determined on the basis of how conflict-prone an area is, citizens' perceptions of the police, or other factors that would bias the tests below.

Even so, to gain traction on the causal relationship between perceived police integration and support for anti-government violence I embedded an experiment within the survey to prime respondents to varying levels of police integration. I randomly assigned respondents to treatment or control groups. The enumerator then read what they claimed to be an excerpt from a recent news report. The report, which is fake, describes the recent success in crime fighting by a police unit in Kirkuk, an ethnically- and religiously-mixed city in Northern Iraq.[6] In the treatment group, the success of the unit is attributed to the mixed ethnic and religious identities of its officers.

> "When citizens see us patrolling together, they trust us. They see
> Kurds and Arabs, Sunnis and Shia working side by side and know that

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[5]Effects determined by regressing each individual characteristic on perceived integration using ordered logistic regression with enumerator fixed effects and neighborhood-clustered standard errors.

[6]A "successful policing" prime was used to avoid ethical challenges associated with providing a negative framing of the security forces, which in the Iraqi context could contribute to violence. Since both the treatment and control primes describe the police as effective, this aspect of the prime should not contribute to observed differences between the treatment and control groups.

> we are not a force belonging to one community or another. We are the
> Iraqi police, and we serve Iraqi citizens."

In the control group, the unit's success is attributed to new technology that allows them to track crime and allocate resources more efficiently. The full text of both vignettes is reproduced in Appendix 4.A. A balance table is also presented in the appendix; treatment and control groups are statistically indistinguishable on all observable characteristics.

Measuring Support for Anti-Government Violence

The main test is whether individuals from vulnerable groups who perceive the police as more integrated are less likely to support anti-government violence. Concerns about respondent safety made it impossible to ask respondents directly whether they would support the use of violence against the state. Asking about this sensitive topic directly also would have made respondents exceedingly uncomfortable, likely leading to high rates of item non-response and dropouts and raising concerns about untruthful responses. Instead, I used an item-count technique to estimate the proportion of respondents who support the use of violence while maintaining confidentiality. I randomly assigned respondents to either a "short list" or "long list" group, and then asked both groups the same question:

> I am going to read you a list of [4 or 5] strategies that citizens sometimes
> use when the government does not seem to be listening to them. Please
> tell me how many of these strategies you would consider using if you
> felt the government was ignoring your needs. Remember, I don't need
> to know which ones you would use, only how many of these [4 or 5] you
> would consider.

Subjects in the "short list" group received a list of four non-controversial items: voting against the government, writing letters to the government, writing letters to an international organization, and protesting peacefully. The "long list" group received the same four items, as well as an additional item, "using non-peaceful methods." I calculate the proportion of respondents who would consider using violence as the difference in means between the short list and long list groups.

Table 4.1: Iraq: Support for Anti-Government Violence

Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Difference	95% CI
2.155 (.056) 400	2.455 (.067) 400	.300*** (.087)	[-.470, -.129]

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

    Table 4.1 shows that the mean for the long list group is .300 higher than the mean for the short list group, and this difference is significant at the $p < .01$ level, indicating that on average about 30% of Iraqis would consider using non-peaceful methods against the government. Disaggregating by sect, an estimated 24% of Shias and 36% of Sunnis would consider using violence. Both estimates are significant at the $p < .01$ level. Appendix 4.C presents balance tables to check randomization, shows the distribution of responses, and discusses several issues related to the mechanics and interpretation of the item count measurement strategy.

Results: Integration Reduces Support for Violence

    To test whether increasing information about police integration reduces support for anti-government violence among minorities, I cross-randomized the item-count groups within the vignette treatment and control groups to create four versions of the survey: long-treatment, long-control, short-treatment, and short-control, with equal probability of selection into each. This cross-randomization between the two experiments solves two problems simultaneously. Randomization of the vignette allows measurement of the causal effect of information about police integration, while the item-count measuring support for violence provides a reliable estimate of a difficult-to-measure outcome. Table 4.2 estimates the proportion of Sunni Arab respondents who would support violence for the treatment and control groups. Among Sunnis who received the control vignette, 66% would consider using violence against the government, whereas the proportion who would consider using violence among those who received the integration treatment vignette is

about 6% (and is not significantly different from 0). The difference between the two estimates is significant at the $p < .05$ level using a difference-in-differences estimator with standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit. In other words, being primed that the police are integrated reduces support for violence from about two-thirds of respondents to practically zero. This finding strongly supports the hypothesis that individuals from vulnerable minority groups are less likely to engage in anti-government violence if they believe that the police are integrated.

Figure 4.4: Support for Anti-Government Violence (Sunnis)

How can a simple informational cue cause such a large change in support for violence? Several characteristics of the Iraqi case likely increase the magnitude of this effect. First, extreme levels of violence in Baghdad over the past decade

Table 4.2: Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence (Sunnis)

	4 item	5 item	*Difference*
Vignette Control	1.92 (.10)	2.58 (.14)	.66 (.17)***
	100	100	
Vignette Treatment	2.09 (.10)	2.15 (.13)	.06 (.17)
	100	100	

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

and a half almost certainly make Iraqis more willing than most to express willingness to use violence. In other words, the upper bound here is likely to be higher than we might observe in a less violent setting, allowing greater room for variation. The observed shift is amplified by Iraq's young, relatively weak institutions and the highly-malleable perceptions that citizens hold about those institutions. The Iraqi Police Services, and indeed all of Iraq's democratic institutions, are creations of post-Saddam Iraq. These institutions have evolved considerably over the past decade, as has the role of sectarian identity in the Iraqi government and security forces. As a result, citizens' attitudes about these institutions should be less entrenched in Iraq than they are elsewhere, and perceptions about them should be more susceptible to new information. Thus, the large reduction in support for violence due to an informational cue is plausible in this context, but we should expect a much smaller effect where institutions are more consolidated. More generally, the timing of the treatment also plays a role in the magnitude of the observed outcome. The survey measures support for violence within about ten minutes of providing respondents with information about the degree of police integration. As temporal distance from this cue increases, individuals have more time to weigh the information against their existing perceptions of the police and to integrate new information into their perceptions. Any contradictory information will mitigate the effect of this informational prime on support for violence. Thus, we should expect the effects of a news report about the police being integrated to dissipate over time. The more the news report contradicts with other information about police integration, the faster its effects should dissipate. Despite these caveats, however, the

clear causal relationship between information about police integration and support for anti-government violence leaves little doubt that police integration is a substantial factor for Iraqi Sunnis in determining willingness to use violence. Indeed, in a case in which information about integration were coming from actual changes in officer demographics, citizens would be exposed to repeated informational cues about increasing integration, leading to a durable shift in conflict attitudes.

Mechanisms: Grievances over Present Conditions, Fears of Future Repression

I now turn to direct tests of perceived integration's effects on two categories of conflict-inducing motives identified in existing scholarship: grievances over current conditions and fear of future safety. Evidence for these mechanisms comes primarily from observational survey responses, which again raises the possible issue of endogeneity. If police officers are assigned to a location non-randomly based on both officer sect and civilians' relationships with the police, the observed links between perceived integration and attitudinal outcomes of interest may be spurious. For example, if the Iraqi Police systematically assign minority police officers to areas where citizens already have a better relationship with the police, then an observed relationship between perceived integration and grievances would tell us very little about the effects of integration on conflict motives.

Two items should mitigate such concerns. First, there is little evidence that officers are assigned based on these criteria. According to Gerald Burke, advisor to the Baghdad police chief from 2003 to 2004 and to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior from 2005 to 2006, officers' first assignments tend to be dictated exclusively by where they are needed most. Subsequent transfers account for officers' preferences, with most favoring an assignment close to their home town.[7] This preference aligns with the police's priorities as well, since living at home decreases the time officers spend commuting, a costly and often dangerous activity.[8] These criteria may well

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[7]Author interview, 22 January 2016

[8]Sam Juett, an administrator at the Jordan International Police Training Center where tens of thousands of Iraqi officers were trained, notes that aside from need, assigning officers close to home was probably the most common criteria. Officer interview, 22 February 2016.

be correlated with officer sect, but they have little to do with the conflict motives discussed in this article. Furthermore, the lack of systematic data collection on officer sect by the Ministry of Interior suggests that even if the police wanted to use sect as a criteria for assignment, they would have difficulty in doing so.

Second, the results below hold even when asking about perceptions of police integration at the *national* level. No doubt citizens' perceptions of police integration are influenced by their observations of the local police, but they are also influenced by media reports and conversations with friends and family. Among the Baghdad residents surveyed for this project, the correlation between perceptions of police integration at the local and national levels is only .273. Non-random officer distribution therefore cannot explain the observed relationships between perceptions of national-level police integration and the outcomes of interest.

Integration Affects Perceived Distribution of Services

The first way police integration affects grievances, and consequently support for violence, is by decreasing identity-based inequalities in service provision. As discussed in Chapter 2, police integration may reduce biases in service provision by changing officers' attitudes towards outgroup members or by constraining officers' abilities to engage in bias. Whether or not inequalities in service provision motivate violence depends not on the *actual* distribution of services but on the extent to which citizens *perceive* services as distributed. Thus, the survey provides direct measures of the construct of interest. On police service provision, it asks "Do you think the Iraqi Police treat citizens fairly regardless of their religious or ethnic identity? Please answer from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least fair and 5 being the most fair." With regard to government service provision, the question is, "Do you think that the government distributes goods and services fairly to members of your community?" Models control for respondent sect, gender, age, highest educational degree attained, whether the respondent or a member of his or her household works in the public sector, and the number of hours per day of electricity the respondent's household receives. A question about economic satisfaction serves as a control for baseline positivity. Finally, dummy variables control for whether the respondent's

district is primarily Sunni or primarily Shia (versus a mix between the two).

Table 4.3: Perceived Integration and Fairness of Service Provision

	(1) Police	(2) Police	(3) Police	(4) Gov.	(5) Gov.	(6) Gov.
Integration (Nat'l)	1.582*** (0.181)			1.263*** (0.302)		
Sunni*Int. (Nat'l)	-0.0489 (0.211)			-0.640 (0.444)		
Police Mix		1.079*** (0.321)			0.499 (0.403)	
Police Same		-0.0396 (0.324)			-0.442 (0.496)	
Vignette Treatment			0.198 (0.199)			0.488* (0.278)
Sunni*Vignette			-0.287 (0.324)			-0.348 (0.507)
Sunni	-1.026	-2.390***	-2.159***	1.367	-1.873***	-1.347***

Table 4.3: Perceived Integration and Fairness of Service Provision, Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Police	Police	Police	Gov.	Gov.	Gov.
	(0.708)	(0.254)	(0.245)	(1.405)	(0.406)	(0.501)
Male	-0.0687	-0.0878	-0.107	0.252	0.0912	0.182
	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.119)	(0.318)	(0.312)	(0.305)
Age	-1.293	0.543	2.890	13.82	23.68**	23.13**
	(6.056)	(6.715)	(5.496)	(10.73)	(11.15)	(10.04)
Degree	-0.170*	-0.352***	-0.351***	-0.470**	-0.528***	-0.530***
	(0.0901)	(0.0963)	(0.0876)	(0.204)	(0.183)	(0.178)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.535***	0.825***	0.908***	0.322	0.545***	0.594***
	(0.0916)	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.217)	(0.182)	(0.167)
Work Public	0.474**	0.577***	0.577***	0.309	0.330	0.453
	(0.192)	(0.190)	(0.180)	(0.299)	(0.319)	(0.292)
Electricity	-1.019	1.784	0.973	0.224	4.807	1.735
	(3.280)	(3.976)	(3.121)	(4.781)	(5.633)	(4.850)

Table 4.3: Perceived Integration and Fairness of Service Provision, Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Police	Police	Police	Gov.	Gov.	Gov.
District Sunni	0.758***	0.704***	0.767***	-0.197	-0.170	-0.145
	(0.257)	(0.226)	(0.211)	(0.388)	(0.374)	(0.370)
District Shia	0.345	0.260	0.237	0.134	0.0827	0.0795
	(0.225)	(0.231)	(0.205)	(0.506)	(0.439)	(0.446)
Observations	742	700	778	626	599	657
Pseudo R^2	0.316	0.226	0.205	0.313	0.282	0.255

Logistic regression with standard errors clustered by street. Enumerator fixed effects.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 4.3 shows that respondents who see the police as more integrated at the national level are more likely to believe that services are provided fairly with regard to sectarian identity by both the police (Column 1) and the government (Column 4). As expected, there is no significant difference in this effect between Sunnis and Shias, since Shias can recognize biases in service provision even if they themselves are not targeted by it. Perceived integration at the local level also affects beliefs about the fairness of police service provision (Column 2), but not about government service provision (Column 4). Respondents who say that the police in their neighborhood are mixed between officers from their group and officers from other groups are more likely to believe that the Iraqi police treat citizens fairly, regardless of identity.

The news story experiment largely fails to move attitudes about the fairness of service provision. There is no statistically-significant effect on perceived police service provision, while the treatment story's effect on beliefs about government service provision is significant only at the $p < .10$ level. It seems, then, that while perceptions of police integration do influence beliefs about the fairness of police service provision, we cannot attribute the experimental prime's reduction in support for anti-government violence to this mechanism.

Control variables generally have the expected effects. Consistent with their status as a marginalized group, Sunnis are less likely to perceive service provision as fair, as are respondents with higher levels of educational attainment. On the other hand, economic satisfaction is positively correlated with perceived fairness. Finally, respondents who live in a household with a public servant are more likely to perceive police service provision, but not government service provision, as fair.

Integration Reduces Exclusion from Employment

Grievances may also be caused by exclusion from desirable employment opportunities within the police. The police provide jobs that are lucrative, stable, and influential compared to other opportunities for employment in Iraq. The survey asks respondents, "Do you think that if someone from your family applied for a job with the Iraqi Police, his or her application would be considered fairly?" Table

4.4 tests perceptions about police integration against responses to this question. Once again, models are logistic regression with standard errors clustered by street, a full set of control variables, and enumerator fixed effects.

Table 4.4: Ability to Get a Job with the Iraqi Police

	(1) Job	(2) Job	(3) Job
Integration (Nat'l)	0.933***		
	(0.194)		
Sunni*Int. (Nat'l)	0.317		
	(0.409)		
Police Mix		1.013**	
		(0.442)	
Police Same		-0.849*	
		(0.498)	
Vignette Treatment			-0.00404
			(0.238)
Sunni*Vignette			-0.236
			(0.445)
Sunni	-2.130*	-2.339***	-1.870***
	(1.207)	(0.579)	(0.529)
Male	-0.325	-0.290	-0.258
	(0.241)	(0.246)	(0.196)
Age	12.66	10.02	11.81
	(8.911)	(9.207)	(7.767)
Degree	-0.284*	-0.461***	-0.453***
	(0.152)	(0.165)	(0.156)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.150	0.366**	0.476***
	(0.143)	(0.167)	(0.140)

Table 4.4: Ability to Get a Job with the Iraqi Police, Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Job	Job	Job
Work Public	0.702**	0.729**	0.753***
	(0.275)	(0.299)	(0.272)
Electricity	-7.682	-4.455	-5.121
	(4.713)	(5.024)	(4.286)
District Sunni	0.499	0.695	0.641
	(0.430)	(0.430)	(0.390)
District Shia	0.417	0.773**	0.461
	(0.370)	(0.312)	(0.294)
Observations	628	604	653
Pseudo R^2	0.335	0.333	0.260

Logistic regression with standard errors clustered by street.

Enumerator fixed effects.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Greater perceived police integration increases citizens' beliefs that they or a family member would have their application fairly considered. At the national level, the effect is constant for both Sunnis and Shias. At the local level, mixed-group policing is associated with an increase in the belief that job applications will be considered fairly, while same-group policing (meaning local officers are primarily from the same group as the respondent) is actually associated with a *decrease* in the extent to which the respondent believes job applications are considered fairly. Finally, there is no significant relationship between the experimental prime and beliefs about job prospects in the police, meaning that while integration may well influence employment opportunities, this increase in employment opportunities does not explain the conflict-reducing effects of integration observed in this project. As expected, Sunnis are less likely than Shias to believe that their job application would be considered fairly. Respondents with a higher educational degree are less

likely to believe their job application would be considered fairly, while those who have higher economic satisfaction or live in a household with a public servant are more likely to believe they could get a job with the police.

Integration Reduces Fears of Future Repression

The second way that integration reduces support for conflict is by alleviating concerns of future mistreatment. Bottom-up integration allows the government to credibly commit to the safety of vulnerable groups, reducing the incentives of vulnerable group members to engage in preemptive violence against the government. If this is the case, Sunni Iraqis who perceive the police as more integrated should be less fearful of repression by either the police or the government. Table 4.5 shows the results from several models testing this hypothesis. To measure fear of repression by the police, the survey asks "Do you ever feel afraid of the Iraqi Police? Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning that you are not afraid at all, and 5 meaning that you are very afraid." Fear of the government is measured by asking, "Do you ever worry that the government might do something to harm you or other members of your religious group?"

Results in Table 4.5 are consistent with the fear-reducing mechanism. Respondents who perceive the police as integrated nation-wide are less afraid of future repression by the police (Column 1). Similarly, Column 2 shows that those who say the police in their neighborhood are mixed between Sunnis and Shias are less afraid of police repression than those who say that the police are "mostly people from other groups." Columns 4-6 test the same models against fear of repression by the government. Once again, perceptions of integration at the national level are associated with reduced fear of repression by the government. At the local level, mixed policing, but not in-group policing, is associated with reduced fears of government repression (Column 5). Finally, the experimental prime caused a slight increase in fear of the government by Shias, but led to an even larger decline in fear of the government by Sunnis. This last finding is consistent with the results of the experiment showing Sunnis are less willing to consider anti-government violence when they are primed with information about integrated policing. Controls

generally have the expected effects. In particular, Sunnis tend to be more afraid of repression than Shias, while economic satisfaction is negatively correlated with fear of repression.

Table 4.5: Perceived Integration and Fear of Repression

	(1) Police	(2) Police	(3) Police	(4) Gov.	(5) Gov.	(6) Gov.
Integration (Nat'l)	-0.870*** (0.131)			-0.785*** (0.168)		
Sunni*Int. (Nat'l)	-0.0696 (0.209)			-0.148 (0.343)		
Police Mix		-0.667** (0.288)			-1.204*** (0.294)	
Police Same		0.0510 (0.261)			-0.451 (0.321)	
Vignette Treatment			-0.182 (0.173)			0.434* (0.226)
Sunni*Vignette			0.417* (0.232)			-0.737** (0.361)
Sunni	1.127*	1.881***	1.516***	1.662*	2.031***	2.428***

Table 4.5: Perceived Integration and Fear of Repression, Continued

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
	Police	Police	Police	Gov.	Gov.	Gov.
	(0.581)	(0.296)	(0.294)	(0.932)	(0.406)	(0.337)
Male	-0.648***	-0.571***	-0.499***	0.307	0.431*	0.325
	(0.156)	(0.163)	(0.152)	(0.241)	(0.229)	(0.207)
Age	0.00241	-2.914	-2.757	9.986	10.90*	6.912
	(5.340)	(6.236)	(5.239)	(6.187)	(6.351)	(5.879)
Degree	0.0197	0.147	0.146	0.221**	0.306***	0.309***
	(0.0921)	(0.113)	(0.0976)	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.102)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.322***	-0.505***	-0.552***	-0.263**	-0.486***	-0.530***
	(0.0900)	(0.0999)	(0.0934)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Work Public	0.0398	-0.136	-0.150	-0.210	-0.349	-0.364*
	(0.171)	(0.175)	(0.161)	(0.194)	(0.220)	(0.214)
Electricity	-3.262	-3.147	-3.441	0.771	-1.365	-0.858
	(2.936)	(3.490)	(3.081)	(3.814)	(4.080)	(3.776)
District Sunni	-0.162	-0.268	-0.289*	0.439	0.392	0.287

Table 4.5: Perceived Integration and Fear of Repression, Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Police	Police	Police	Gov.	Gov.	Gov.
	(0.177)	(0.181)	(0.167)	(0.271)	(0.301)	(0.224)
District Shia	-0.204	-0.289	-0.151	-0.112	-0.183	-0.0972
	(0.255)	(0.250)	(0.252)	(0.361)	(0.360)	(0.320)
Observations	755	711	800	687	651	726
R^2	0.238	0.202	0.191	0.242	0.226	0.192

Logistic regression with standard errors clustered by street. Enumerator fixed effects.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

On the whole, results are consistent with the argument that police integration addresses common motives for supporting or participating in conflict. Two particularly striking trends stand out. First, at the local level, respondents who believe that officers in their neighborhood are primarily members of their own group are *not* less fearful of repression, do not hold fewer grievances over service provision, and are not more likely to believe they could get a job in the police compared to those who believe their local officers are mainly from other groups. In other words, integration but not autonomy is associated with a reduction in conflict motives. This finding suggests that the key mechanism is not just inclusion but the particular configuration of inclusion, integration. Conflict attitudes are not addressed by allowing individuals to be governed or served by members of their own group (Wimmer 2012) but by creating balance within the institution. Integration provides previously-excluded groups with means for imposing costs on the dominant group that are not provided by autonomy, for instance by withholding policing services from members of the dominant group or by monitoring dominant group officers. Autonomy also makes it easier for the state to control the information available to officers from marginalized groups since they are isolated from other officers. Finally, policing along sectarian lines does not lead to engagement with the state in the same way as integration, preventing the realization of any attitude shifts from this increased intergroup contact.

The second important trend is that the effects of perceptions of integration, particularly at the national level, are largely consistent between Sunnis and Shias. We might have expected Shias to oppose integration given their dominance of the government. Yet, Shias are also are less fearful of future repression when the police are integrated. I suggest that this finding is likely a function of Iraq's recent history. Despite their status as a demographic minority, Sunnis dominated the government from the Ottoman period until 2003. It was only after significant foreign military intervention that the majority Shias took their current role as the politically-dominant group. Shias, then, may consider the current balance of power to be somewhat fragile and view integration as a safeguard against future changes in this balance. Furthermore, Sunnis and Shias alike have experienced

considerable harm from Iraq's sectarian civil war. Members of both groups likely view sectarianism in government institutions as a negative outcome and prefer a government committed to serving all citizens over one that engages in sectarian politics. The positive reaction of Shias to police integration bodes well for the use of integration to mitigate violent sectarian conflict. Indeed, opposition to integration by the dominant group could undo any positive effects of integration on overall levels of conflict. The finding that perceived integration reduces conflict motives not just among Sunnis but also among Shias means that, at least in Iraq, such opposition is unlikely occur. The next section looks more closely at Shias' attitudes towards police integration and the way that their perceptions of integration affect the likelihood of violent conflict.

Shia Attitudes Towards Police Integration

Thus far, the arguments connecting bottom-up integration with conflict have focused on the attitudes and behaviors of members of the marginalized group. However, a major concern about the implementation of bottom-up integration is that it may be opposed by members of the dominant group who benefit from the status quo. Depending on the intensity of opposition, reactions against integration by members of the dominant group may actually *increase* the likelihood of conflict. I identify two possible sources of opposition among dominant group members. First, integration reduces the relative power of the dominant group, making it vulnerable to future attacks by the dominant group. I suggested previously that this concern should be mitigated because participation in policy-implementing institutions signals a willingness to contribute to society and participate in politics within the current set of institutions. Thus, Shias who observe Sunnis contributing to society as police officers should be less concerned that Sunnis seek to undermine existing societal structures, which in turn reduces incentives to use violence to oppose integration. Second, if the size of the police force does not increase along with integration, then integration takes employment opportunities away from members of the dominant group. Citizens may oppose integration if they believe that it will take jobs away from them or from members of their family, and may turn to

violence for precisely the same reasons that motivate members of the historically marginalized group. Chapter 2 notes several procedures that can minimize the zero-sum nature of integration, including early retirement incentives and gradual shifts in hiring patterns rather than changing practices all at once. Nevertheless, we should be genuinely concerned about the likely reactions of the dominant group to integration.

The survey asks Shia respondents about their attitudes on these two issues. While we cannot be certain that respondents are telling the truth, the use of local enumerators means that Shia respondents were generally interviewed by Shia enumerators, especially in Shia-dominated neighborhoods, which mitigates concerns that social desirability bias would prevent respondents from admitting to opposing police integration. First, on the issue of concern over changing the balance of power:

> Some people worry that including all ethnic and religious groups into public sector jobs like the police, education, and public services might allow them to disrupt the government. Other people say that including minorities in these jobs allows them to do their part in contributing to society. Which view do you think is more accurate?

Among Shias, approximately 83% said that integration allows for minority contribution, while 11% believe that inclusion is dangerous. Only 25 out of 400 respondents (6.25%) selected "don't know" or declined to answer. Thus, at least in the Iraqi case there is evidence that dominant group concerns of subversion by minority police officers are drastically outweighed by the perception that minority officers are providing a service to society.

On the issue of taking jobs away from Shias, the survey asked,

> Some people worry that a policy of integrating all ethnicities and religions into the police would take jobs away from citizens like you. Do you believe that this is an important concern?

Fifteen percent of Shias believe that the loss of jobs is an important concern, while 81% do not. 4% of subjects declined to answer the question. Here too we can say with a fair amount of confidence that concerns over a loss of jobs will not

Figure 4.5: Shia Opposition to Integration – Fear of Subversion

motivate Shias to use violence to oppose integration of the police. More generally, these responses, along with those regarding integration's affects on grievances and fear among Shias, suggest that we should *not* observe an increase in support for violence among Shias exposed to police integration. If anything, integration should *reduce* support for anti-government violence among Shia Arabs. I test the relationship between perceived integration and support for violence among Shia Arabs using the same experiment described earlier. Respondents received either a news story which primes on police integration or one which is silent on matters of identity, and then answered an item count question to measure support for violence. Table 4.6 calculates the effect of the news story treatment on support for violence among Shia respondents. Just as it did among Sunnis, the news story about the Iraqi Police being integrated reduces support for anti-government violence. Among respondents who received the 5-item list, those who viewed the integration prime had a significantly lower mean item response than those who viewed the control prime. Hearing the prime which highlighted the integrated nature of the Iraqi Police led to a significant decrease in support for the use of non-violent methods against the government not just among minority Sunnis but also among dominant Shias.

Figure 4.6: Shia Opposition to Integration – Jobs

Table 4.6: Integration and Support for Non-Peaceful Methods (Shias)

	4 item	5 item	*Difference*
Vignette Control	2.14 (.12) 100	2.85 (.13) 100	.71 (.17)***
Vignette Treatment	2.47 (.12) 100	2.24 (.13) 100	-.23 (.18)

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Conclusion

Evidence from Iraq strongly supports the argument that bottom-up integration of the police reduces the likelihood of anti-state violence along sectarian lines. Sunni Arab residents of Baghdad who perceive the Iraqi Police as more integrated hold fewer grievances over the distribution of government services, feel less excluded from jobs in the police, and are less fearful of future government repression, all of which existing research links with participation in violent conflict. Indeed, I use an experiment to show that providing residents of Baghdad with information that the Iraqi National Police are integrated caused them to be less supportive of using anti-government violence. These results come in the context of an exceptionally divided society. Baghdad, and Iraq as a whole, has been plagued

by a decade and a half of bloody civil conflict largely along sectarian lines, and domination of the state by a single group for the half-century prior. If changes in police demographics or the extent to which citizens perceive the police as integrated can shift attitudes towards the state even in such a divided setting, then there is reason to believe that police integration may be an effective policy to combat sectarian conflict in other cases as well.

One of the more interesting findings is that the positive effects of police integration on attitudes towards the government and support for violence holds not just for members of the Sunni minority but also for members of the dominant Shia sect as well. There is no evidence that Shias oppose police integration, which could potentially cancel out any reduction in conflict motives among Sunnis by increasing conflict motives among Shias. On the contrary, Shias express less fear of future repression and less support for the use of anti-government violence when the police are more integrated despite holding a dominant position in Iraqi politics under the status quo. No doubt this attitude is shaped in part by Iraq's history of dominance by the Sunni minority, with Shias only taking control of the government after significant international intervention. Most adult Iraqis experienced a very different distribution of power under Sadaam Hussein's regime, and perhaps they view their current dominant position as temporary and vulnerable.

It is also possible, however, that Iraqis view integration and inclusiveness as more generally indicative of a trustworthy, reliable government that focuses on providing for its citizens rather than profiting from sectarian divisiveness. Thinking of Sunni and Shia Iraqis as groups in competition within a political system that must necessarily favor one group or the other is a poor representation of Iraqi politics. The vast majority of both Sunni and Shia Iraqis almost certainly want the same thing from their government: reliable provision of public goods, including safety and security, and a political environment which fosters a wellbeing. It really should not be so surprising that Shias, despite their favored position in politics today, value inclusiveness and reject government policies based in sectarianism. The finding that perceptions of police integration are related to attitudes about the government in similar ways for members of both groups is a useful reminder

that most groups coexist peacefully most of the time.

The effects of integration at the local level shed light on the distinction between integration and autonomy over service-providing institutions. In nearly every case, Sunni respondents who believe that the police in their area are mixed between Sunnis and Shias are less fearful of repression, hold fewer grievances over service provision, and are more likely to believe that employment in the police is a viable option than a Sunni who believes that local officers as mostly Shias. Yet, the same Sunni respondent who thinks that most local officers are Sunnis is *not* more likely to hold these attitudes. Integration, then, reduces motives for conflict in ways that autonomy does not.

This pattern reveals the true power of bottom-up integration. Citizens do not value representation as an end unto itself. Nor is representation in government institutions simply a matter of providing self-determination or allowing coethnics to police (literally) one another. Rather, bottom-up integration works by balancing power within service-providing institutions, providing weaker groups with the capacity to impose costs on more powerful groups by withholding services from them, and distributing bureaucrats so that they can monitor and sanction each other's behavior. Autonomy fails to provide the same conflict-reducing effect because it emphasizes divisions, prevents productive intergroup interactions, and allows the government to limit the influence of police officers from vulnerable groups. Under autonomy, officers from the vulnerable group can easily be underfunded and underequiped, kept in the dark about ongoing security operations, and isolated in the event of intergroup conflict. Integration prevents these forms of repression, making it a more effective mechanism for mitigating conflict.

Finally, these results provide broad support for motives-based explanations for civil and intergroup conflict. Attitudes and responses by Baghdad residents suggest that conflict should be most likely to occur when the political and social context provides motives for fighting, in this case fear of repression, grievances about service provision, or barriers to employment. In contrast, opportunity-based explanations for conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) imply that police integration should lead minorities to be more, not less, willing to

engage in conflict, as it raises the likelihood that a rebellion would be successful. The findings in Baghdad suggest that attempts at reconciliation which increase one group's opportunity to rebel are not doomed to fail so long as they sufficiently reduce motives for rebellion.

Note: Material from this chapter has been submitted for publication as a journal article and is currently under review.

4.A Vignettes

Treatment:

I would like to read you a few paragraphs from a news story that was in a newspaper just the other day. The story is about a police unit in Kirkuk. The title of the article is, "Police Break Sectarian Barriers to Serve Citizens."

Unit 218 of the Iraqi Police Service has been receiving attention lately thanks to its successes in maintaining order in the Arrapha neighborhood of Kirkuk. The secret to the unit's success, according to one Lieutenant, lies in its officers' diversity:

"Of the 140 officers in my unit, we have individuals from all different religious and ethnic groups of Iraq. We are Shias, Kurds, Sunnis, Turkmen, and we all work together to serve the community."

"When citizens see us patrolling together, they trust us. They see Kurds and Arabs, Shia and Sunni working side by side and they know that we are not a force belonging to once community or another. We are the Iraqi Police, and we serve Iraqi citizens."

According to a high-level official in Baghdad, unit 218 is serving as a new model for policing across the country. The Ministry of the Interior has announced an initiative to increase the diversity of police recruits from each of Iraq's sects in the coming months in an effort to improve the quality of service.

This is the end of the news story.

Control:

I would like to read you a few paragraphs from a news story that was in a newspaper just the other day. The story is about a police unit in Kirkuk. The title of the article is, "Police Use Technology to Serve Citizens."

Unit 218 of the Iraqi Police Service has been receiving attention lately thanks to its successes in maintaining order in the Arrapha neighborhood of Kirkuk. The secret to the unit's success, according to one Lieutenant, lies in its officers' use of technology:

"We have adopted a computerized reporting system. The system allows us to record crimes and incidents in a centralized database. We can use all of the information to find patterns and decide where to send resources."

"Instead of waiting for citizens to call us after a problem has already happened, this new technology helps us know where to go to prevent incidents from happening in the first place."

According to a high-level official in Baghdad, unit 218 is serving as a new model for policing across the country. The Ministry of the Interior has announced an initiative to increase the police's use of technology in the coming months in an effort to improve the quality of service.

This is the end of the news story.

4.B   Vignette Experiment Balance Table

Table 4.7: Balance Table: Vignette Experiment

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	$Pr\lvert T\rvert > \lvert t\rvert$
Male	.50	.51	.322
Age	35.97	34.99	.258
Degree	.87	.79	.167
Economic Satisfaction	2.85	2.76	.281
Electricity (hours/day)	15.75	15.72	.907
n	400	400	

4.C   List Experiment Mechanics and Interpretation

Table 4.8: Balance Table: List Experiment

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	$Pr|T| > |t|$
Male	.55	.50	.157
Age	35.61	35.35	.757
Degree	.82	.84	.665
Economic Satisfaction	2.79	2.82	.675
Electricity (hours/day)	15.74	15.73	.963
n	400	400	

Table 4.9 shows the frequency of responses by group for the item count technique in Iraq and Israel, respectively. The logic behind a list experiment is that subjects do not reveal their individual response – it is possible for the researcher to determine only how many items on the list a respondent would choose, but not which one(s) he or she would choose. Of course, anonymity breaks down if respondents select all of the items on the treatment list. Such a "ceiling effect" makes it obvious that the respondent has selected the controversial item. Table 4.9 shows that 25 subjects in the treatment group said they would consider using all 5 of the methods listed if they felt the government was ignoring their needs.

One possibility is that these 25 subjects were being honest, and either did not understand that answering this way revealed their response or simply did not

Table 4.9: List Experiment: Support for Non-Peaceful Methods

Number of Items	Control	Treatment	Total
0	4	3	7
1	135	128	263
2	134	95	229
3	49	57	106
4	78	92	170
5		25	25
Total	400	400	800

care. If this is the case, it is also likely to be true that other subjects also would have considered all five but did not say so for fear of revealing their answer on the controversial item. This scenario would cause us to underestimate the proportion of respondents who support the use of non-peaceful methods. A second possibility is that these 25 subjects, or some subset of them, either were not paying careful attention to the survey question or did not understand the question and simply picked an answer. As long as these subjects arrived at the answer of "5" randomly, then we are simply observing noise in the data. Finally, the proportion calculated in Table 4.1 should be considered a conservative estimate. It may under-count the proportion of respondents who would consider using violence if some would have answered "5" but declined to do so for fear of revealing their support for violence. While this ceiling effect decreases the confidence with which we can estimate the proportion of respondents would use non-peaceful methods, it should not affect our ability to draw inferences about the difference between the vignette treatment and control groups (news article primes about integration), since these were randomly assigned.

Chapter 5

Religious Identity, Inclusion, and the Israeli Police

This chapter introduces the project's second country case, Israel. Israel's highly salient ethno-religious divisions, existing institutional structures which attempt to account for those divisions with limited success, and variation in police integration both over time and across sub-national units make it an excellent case for analysis. Group identities motivate political attitudes and behaviors, with ethnic and religious groups making up distinct partisan blocs.[1] I focus on the broadest and most salient of these cleavages, the division between Jewish and non-Jewish, primarily Arab, citizens. Israel's democratic institutions nominally provide equal rights and benefits to all citizens, regardless of identity. Yet in practice, government service provision remains highly unequal. Schools in Arab areas receive only a fraction of the funding of schools in Jewish areas (New Israel Fund 2005), and Arab citizens complain that the police dedicate insufficient resources to providing services in their neighborhoods (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012; Abraham Fund Initiatives 2013). These complaints illustrate one of the main arguments of this dissertation, that government services are provided inadequately in minority areas not because of the way policies are written but because of how they are enforced.

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[1]For example, the right bloc of parties garners most of its support from Ashkenazi Jews, the so-called "Arab" bloc is supported almost exclusively by Arab citizens, while Haredi Jews support a number of "religious" parties.

Historically, the Israel Police have dramatically under-represented the country's non-Jewish population (Weitzer and Hasisi 2008). Between 2008 and 2016, however, the number of non-Jewish officers increased thanks to explicit attempts by police leadership to increase recruitment in Arab, and especially Muslim, towns. Furthermore, the degree to which the rank-and-file of the police includes minorities varies considerably from one locality to the next. This temporal and cross-sectional variation in police inclusiveness provides useful variation for analysis. This chapter first addresses the historical role of sectarianism in Israel's police force, including the use of the police for sectarian purposes and the degree to which these experiences shaped both the institutions in question and the way that they are perceived by citizens. Second, it asks how Israel's ethnic and religious divisions affect the police today. To what extent are the police inclusive of all relevant ethnic and religious groups, and how does the level of inclusion vary across different parts of the country? I provide extensive descriptive statistics from new data on the religious makeup of every Israeli police officer in each station between 2008 and 2014. These figures show remarkable variation in local-level integration across different parts of the country, variation which the next two chapters leverage to determine the effects of integration on conflict and police service provision. Finally, what factors influence the demographic makeup of the police? Are there official policies regarding the hiring and distribution of officers on the basis of identity, or are questions of sectarianism left to informal norms (or ignored altogether)? I address these questions using a combination of interviews with policymakers and police officers, quantitative data on officer identity at the police station level, original survey data, and a review of existing research.

Two overarching themes pervade the discussion of the Israel Police. First, the Israel Police is more inclusive of ethnic and religious minorities than one might expect given Israel's status as a "Jewish" state. Non-Jews make up more than 10% of the force – less than the 20-25% in the civilian population, but a large enough share to have significant influence over the operations of the institution. Yet, the degree of inclusion varies considerably across groups. Some minorities, like Druze, are over-represented in the police, while Muslims remain significantly

under-represented. Second, the relationship between officer identity and citizen perceptions is shaped by multiple generations of police-citizen interactions. Mistreatment, whether perceived, real, or a bit of both, in a political setting dominated by one religious group has taken a toll on intergroup and minority-state relations. Good intentions by both the dominant and vulnerable groups are met with skepticism and doubt, and even where the police include many Arab officers citizens do not necessarily perceive the police as integrated. A long history of negative relations between the police and the Arab community shapes Arabs' attitudes towards law enforcement and the state. Thus, attempts by the police to boost inclusion and improve relations with minority communities face major challenges, making Israel a particularly difficult case for the bottom-up integration.

The Israel Police

The Israel Police is a national police department under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security. The country is divided into six policing districts: Central, which includes the coastal and plains areas around Tel Aviv; Southern, which includes the desert and Eilat; Northern, including Haifa, Nazareth, and the Golan Heights; Tel Aviv; Jerusalem; and Judea and Samaria. The Judea and Samaria district covers the West Bank where the Israel Police share authority with the military as well as the Palestinian security forces. Because the legal and security situations in the West Bank, as well as the role played by the Israeli police, are so different from those in the rest of the country, I exclude the Judea and Samaria district from this analysis.

The Israel Police is a full-service police department. Its officers handle traffic enforcement, organized crime, and counterterrorism in addition to ordinary crime prevention. The force consists of approximately 28,000 full-time sworn officers supported by more than 30,000 volunteers.[2] About one quarter of the full-time officers are short-term recruits who elect to perform their mandatory national service in the police rather than in the military (Saunders et al. 2013). Additionally,

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[2]http://www.police.gov.il/GraphSkifout.aspx?mid=67

one quarter of the police (overlapping with the previously-mentioned one-quarter) are members of the Boarder Guard, leaving a force of "ordinary" police of about 21,000 for Israel's 8 million citizens. Like police in the United States, but unlike in many European departments, all officers are armed.

Despite the police's high levels of competence on objective measures, police-community relations in Israel are generally poor, and Israeli citizens express less trust in their police than do citizens in countries with similarly-effective police forces (Yogev 2010; Saunders et al. 2013). Israelis' attitudes towards the police are significantly informed by both their perceptions of identity-based conflict and their personal ethnic and religious affiliations. Arab and other non-Jewish citizens tend to have less trust in the police than do their Jewish counterparts (Saunders et al. 2013; Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). Differential rates of trust between Jews and non-Jews have real implications for police-community cooperation. In one survey carried out in 2008 (Hasisi and Weisburd 2014), 70.1% of Jews said they would call the police if they witnessed a crime, compared to 50.6% of non-Jews. Survey results presented throughout the next three chapters show similar differences in attitudes and behavior towards the police between Jews and non-Jews on issues like crime reporting, perceived fairness, and trust.

Identity and Conflict in Israeli Policing

During the British Mandate, the Palestine Police Force provided public safety and security. Most high ranking officers were British, but the majority of the patrolmen were locals – both Arab and Jewish.[3] As a colonial police force, the Palestine Police focused more on maintaining order than on providing services to citizens. When Israel gained its independence in 1948, the operating procedures, organizational structure, and even uniforms of the new state's police force were based largely on its colonial predecessor.

The Israel Police's modern history is inextricably linked with the conflict between the state and the Palestinian population. As early as 1951, the police began

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[3]http://mops.gov.il/English/PolicingENG/Police/History/Pages/default.aspx

to assist the military in securing the country's Arab refugee population.[4] When terrorism by Palestinian nationalists spiked in 1967, the police worked side by side with the military to prevent attacks. The police became officially responsible for domestic security in 1974 following a terrorist attack in Ma'alot in which attackers who had infiltrated from across the Lebanese border murdered 22 children.[5] Thus, the Israeli police serve two roles: the provision of "ordinary" policing services and crime prevention, and the provision of domestic security. While the police's role in domestic security is hardly unique among police forces in the developed world, the fact that most threats against Israel's security come from individuals of a particular identity group contributes to the perception of the police as a participant in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The police's involvement in preventing suicide terror attacks during the Second Intifada further enhanced this perception (Hasisi and Weisburd 2014).

The association of the police as a participant in sectarian conflict is moderated somewhat by the distinction between the "blue" police, ordinary officers responsible for basic tasks of public safety like crime prevention and traffic enforcement, and the Border Guard.[6] The Border Guard is a paramilitary force that provides security and counterterrorism services. They are most active in and around Arab towns and neighborhoods, near the border with the West Bank, and in East Jerusalem. The presence of Border Guard officers responsible primarily for preventing nationalist-motivated violence frees the regular police to focus on ordinary issues of public safety and deflects some of this sectarian association away from them.

As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, periodic conflicts between the police and non-Jews defines relations between Arab citizens and law enforcement. The October 2000 events were particularly formative. Arabs in northern Israel rioted in response to a series of deaths caused by police, including

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[4]http://mops.gov.il/English/PolicingENG/Police/History/Pages/default.aspx

[5]ibid

[6]The term "blue police" refers to the light blue uniforms worn by patrol officers, in contrast with the green uniforms worn by Border Guard officers. Although the police phased out the blue uniforms around 2015 in favor of black ones, the police are (at least for now) still referred to colloquially as "blue."

the killing of five Arab protesters in Jerusalem on September 29th and the acci-
dental shooting of 12 year old Muhammad al-Durrah the following day. Police
responded to the riots using tear gas and live ammunition, drawing claims from
citizens of excessive force.[7] Jewish Israelis living in nearby towns participated in
violent counter-riots. By the time the riots subsided, 13 Arabs – 12 of them Israeli
citizens – had been shot and killed by the police.[8] The government created the
Or Commission to evaluate both the events leading up the riots and the broader
relationship between the police and Arab citizens. The commission found that the
Israeli police were unprepared for large-scale rioting and responded with exces-
sive force. However, the report's release led to few consequential actions against
the officers and political leaders responsible for the violence. Similar, though less
deadly, clashes between police and Arab protesters occur periodically throughout
the country, especially in Jerusalem. Protests occasionally spill over into other
parts of the country, as they did in October 2015 when protests by Arab citizens
of normally-peaceful Jaffa resulted in confrontations with the police and left a
number of officers injured.[9] Not all violence between the police and Israeli Arabs
is sparked by protests. In May 2016, bystanders used cellphone cameras to record
a plainclothes border guard officer beating an Arab citizen in the heart of one of
Tel Aviv's most cosmopolitan neighborhoods. Although a non-uniformed officer
initiated the attack, on-duty police soon joined the assault, and the injured citizen
was eventually taken away in a police car.[10] The citizen's only crime, according
to police, was that he refused to provide identification when the plainclothes of-
ficer demanded. Finally, while beyond the scope of this study, it is important to
note that Arab Israelis are not the only group with a poor relationship with the
Israel Police. For example, Jews of Ethiopian descent, who make up about 1.2%

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[7]http://www.haaretz.com/the-or-inquiry-summary-of-events-1.291940

[8]Iraqi, Amjad. "Thirteen Killed, No One Punished: Remembering October 2000."
972mag.com, 4 October 2015 http://972mag.com/thirteen-killed-no-one-punished-remembering-
october-2000/112266/

[9]Hartman, Ben. "Morning After Violent Riots, Jaffa Residents Take Stock."
Jerusalem Post, 8 October 2015. http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/
Morning-after-violent-riots-Jaffa-residents-take-stock-421227

[10]Zonszein, Mairav. "Border Police Assault Arab Supermarket Employee
in Central Tel Aviv." *972 Magazine.* 22 May 2016, https://972mag.com/
plainclothes-border-policemen-beat-arab-worker-in-central-tel-aviv/119492/

of the citizen population, also complain of systematic mistreatment by the police. An especially noteworthy incident occurred in April-May 2015. A police officer attacked an Ethiopian-Jewish soldier on leave in Holon, just outside of Tel Aviv. A security camera captured the officer hitting and kicking the soldier repeatedly after the soldier allegedly refused an order to disperse. Protests in Tel Aviv over the incident injured 57 officers and at least 12 protesters.

Perceptions of neglect also characterize relations between Arabs and the police, with Arab citizens expressing frustration at the lack of policing services their communities receive (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). Following a spike in violent crime in their town in 2012, residents of the predominantly Arab village of Tira demanded a greater police presence.[11] Despite the animosity between Arab citizens and the police described above, Tira's citizens said the only solution to their crime problem was a greater police presence. "There's no other solution anymore," Tira Mayor Mamoun Abdul Hai said. "We can't handle it anymore. We don't have the money and resources to do it ourselves."[12] At a 2013 conference on policing held in the Knesset (Parliament), Arab Member of the Knesset (MK) Esawi Frij said, "In terms of [policing] results, the Arab sector lags behind. There is a gap and distance between the Arab citizen and the police. Violence and illegal firearms are extensive, and personal security is deteriorating. The police take action, but not enough" (Abraham Fund Initiatives 2013, 1). Arab Israelis are concerned about both under- and over-policing. According to Salim Salibi, head of Majd al-Krum local council: "When there is violence or fighting in the village, we wait hours for the police but they don't arrive. But when a company comes to collect debts, it is accompanied by police officers from the Special Patrol Unit. This creates a lack of trust with the police." Salem Abu Ayash, mayor of the predominantly-Arab town of Laqiya, says, "When they demolish a home or a shack, we see a whole convoy of police cars – two or three hundred, you can't see the end of the convoy. When there is a fight in the village, they barely send a patrol car."[13] This desire for an

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[11]Sanders, Edumund. "Arab Citizens in Israel Bemoan Lack of Policing." Los Angeles Times. 29 October 2012 http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/29/world/la-fg-israel-police-arabs-20121024

[12]ibid

[13]While the claim of "two or three hundred" patrol cars is hyperbole, I observed a line of

increase in police involvement in their communities conflicts with the stereotype that Arab citizens would prefer that the police simply leave them alone.

There are, of course, instances of positive relations between Israel's non-Jewish community and the police. These positive interactions frequently revolve around participation by non-Jews in the police. On November 14th, 2014 two gunmen attacked a synagogue in the Har Nof neighborhood of Jerusalem. Master Sergeant Zidan Saif, a Druze Arab, was one of the first officers to respond. The attackers shot and killed Saif in an exchange of gunfire. In an extremely rare move, the ultra-orthodox Jewish community to whom the synagogue belonged put out a call on social media for its members to attend Saif's funeral, and even provided transportation to it. Israel's President, Minister of Public Security, and Police Commissioner also attended the funeral, hailing Saif as a hero. President Reuven Rivlin's speech at the funeral highlighted Saif's non-Jewish identity. "Terror has struck Jerusalem once more. Terror that does not distinguish between people. Terrorists turned a house of prayer into a house of slaughter. Your son did not hesitate or waver...He stood fearlessly against the terrorists and risked his life to protect the people of Jerusalem." The terrorist attack, and the role played by a non-Jew in helping to stop the attackers, appeared to galvanize parts of the Jewish community in the immediate aftermath. An ultra-orthodox Jewish activist from the Har Nof neighborhood told reporters, "We are calling for widespread solidarity throughout Israel, with an emphasis on gratitude. We will not be ungrateful and will show our thanks for those who sacrificed their lives for us."[14] A few days later, religious leaders from the Jewish, Muslim, Greek Orthodox, and Druze communities gathered outside the site of the attack to denounce terrorism, a highly infrequent show of solidarity across religious groups in a country that has suffered hundreds of deadly attacks in recent decades. It seems that the sacrifice of a non-Jew protecting Jews made a significant impression on the community. The

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several dozen police cars entering an Arab town in Northern Israel to oversee an eviction. I was informed by a (Jewish) local that such a show of force for evictions or home demolitions in Arab towns is quite common.

[14]Nachshoni, Kobi. "Thousands of Israeli Druze and Jews grieve at funeral for policeman slain in terror attack" *Ynet News,* 19 November 2014. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4593823,00.html

effect is long-lasting. More than a year after the terrorist attack on the Har Nof synagogue, dozens of members of the neighborhood's Jewish community invited Druze members from Saif's hometown to share a Shabbat dinner with them.

> Three buses brought some 160 people from four Druze villages in the Galilee to the Shai Agnon synagogue in Arnona on Saturday afternoon. Sheikhs with elegant mustaches and tarbooshes, elderly women whose heads are covered by thin white shawls, young people, teenage girls, and children, all get off the bus one after the other, shaking the hands of their hosts with embarrassed hesitation. Their hosts were waiting for them outside the synagogue with flags combining the Israeli and Druze flags, made by the meeting's organizer, Rabbi Yaakov Kermaier."[15]

Saif's selflessness in carrying out his duties as a police officer appear to have forged a lasting bond between two communities separated by both geography and religion.

Minority Inclusion and Officer Distribution in the Israel Police

In general, the Israel Police over-represent Jews and under-represent non-Jews. In 2014, the most recent year for which data is available, about 87% of all officers were Jewish, compared to 80% of the general population. This figure actually represents a small increase in representation for non-Jews; in 1967 10.3% of officers were Arabs, and by 2003 the figure had crept up only marginally to 10.5% (Weitzer and Hasisi 2008). According to figures provided by the Israel Police, it was not until 2011 that the proportion of non-Jewish officers began edging upwards. Thus, in terms of the Jewish, non-Jewish division, the police are somewhat unrepresentative of the population, although the degree of underrepresentation has decreased in the recent years.

How are officers distributed across different parts of the country? Between about one-third and two-thirds of Israeli police officers patrol out of a specific station on a permanent basis.[16] The police distribute the remaining officers through-

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[15]Erlich, Yifat. "Druze and Jews Forge Special Bond in Memory of Brave Policeman. *Ynet News,* 6 Feburary 2016, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4762603,00.html.

[16]Author interview with CB, an expert on domestic security in Israel, 1 July 2014. Also see (Saunders et al. 2013)

out the country as needed on short-term assignments. The Israel Police provided me with data on the number of officers by religious group among those assigned permanently to a specific station for the years 2008-2009 and 2011-2014. Among these officers, the proportion who are Jewish decreased from 92% in 2008 to 83% in 2014, once again indicating a recent increase in the representativeness of the force. Compared with the publicly-available figures for the force as a whole, Figure 5.1 shows that non-Jews are somewhat more likely to be permanently attached to a station compared to Jews, with Jews making up 83% versus 90%, respectively. Figure 5.2 shows that the number of officers assigned to a station on a permanent basis has increased over the last decade, likely due to an increased emphasis on community policing.

Figure 5.1: Israel Police Demographics by Assignment

The question of representation becomes more complicated when we break the non-Jewish category into its constituent religious groups. Some groups are significantly over-represented, while others are under-represented. Most notably, in 2014 Muslims[17] made up only about 4% of full-time officers despite being more

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[17]Calculated by combining the "Muslim" and "Bedouin" categories listed in the Police data. The vast majority of Bedouins in Israel are Muslim. Despite the labels used in the official police

than 17% of the population. Druze,[18] on the other hand, are over-represented with 7.4% of police officers compared to only 1.6% of the population. Figure 5.2 shows that while the number of officers has increased for all non-Jewish religious groups, the changes are driven by a disproportionately large increase in the number of Druze officers. Finally, in terms of political leadership of the police, every Minister of Police (the position's title until 1992) and Minister of Public Security (the current title) since 1948 has been Jewish. Thus, while the proportion of non-Jewish officers indicates a moderate degree of inclusion in the police, a closer look reveals that inequalities in representation persist at both the rank-and-file and leadership levels.

Figure 5.2: Israel Police Demographics by Religion

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data, the distinction between the two groups is ethnic or tribal, not religious. When dealing with religious demographics, then, it makes sense to consider these as a single group.

[18]Druze are ethnic Arabs who follow a religion similar to, but distinct from, Islam. In Israel they are often considered by Jews to be a "special" minority, one that is more politically-integrated than others. As a community, the Druze have largely accepted the Israeli government as legitimate and participate widely in state institutions. Unlike other Arabs, the Druze serve in the military in large numbers, including in combat units. Despite their political attachment to the state, the Druze community remains culturally distinct from Jewish Israelis.

Regional Variation in Police Demographics

How do officer demographics differ across regions? This section presents detailed descriptive statistics from 2014, the most recent year for which data on officer demographics is available. All figures come from data that the Israel Police provided to me in response to a freedom of information request. Officers are distributed across 70 stations (excluding the West Bank district). A handful of these are small substations with only a few officers, for example the Bialik station in Tel Aviv, the French Hill station near Hebrew University's Mount Scopus campus in Jerusalem, and the Mount of Olives station overlooking the Old City of Jerusalem. The majority of police stations, however, have between 50 and 450 officers assigned to them. The largest stations are Haifa, Ayalon (in Holon), Dan (in the Tel Aviv suburb of Bnei Brak), and Yiftah (near Jaffah), each of which has more than 300 officers. Larger stations like these tend to include a higher proportion of administrative officers in addition to full-time patrol officers.[19]

The median proportion of Jewish officers at a station is 87%. To measure integration in a way that accounts for all religious groups, I calculate officer fractionalization using the Herfindahl-Hirschman formula. Originally developed as a measure of market concentration and frequently used by political scientists to calculate ethno-religious fractionalization (ELF), the formula produces a figure ranging from zero to one that indicates the probability that two randomly-selected officers will come from different groups. A measure of 1.00 on *Officer Fractionalization* indicates that all officers are from different religious groups, while a measure of 0.00 means that all officers are from the same group. Station-level officer fractionalization ranges from 0.00 to 0.74, with a mean of 0.27.

Officer fractionalization varies widely from station to station. Figure 5.3 shows that fractionalization is skewed towards the low end of the scale, meaning that there are more stations with low levels of integration than with high levels of integration. Even so, a considerable number of stations house a diverse group of officers. The most diverse stations are Um al-Faham, David (central Jerusalem),

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[19]Unlike in most police departments in the United States, even those officers who are administrative specialists are sworn officers and are required to conduct beat patrols periodically, making them relevant for this research.

East Jerusalem Downtown, Mishgav (east of Haifa), and Nazareth, all of which are within easy commuting distance of Israel's main Arab population centers. At the other end of the spectrum are stations in the southern coastal cities of Ashkelon and Ashdod, the desert city of Sderot, and the Tel Aviv suburbs of Rishon Letzion and Rehovot which have very low officer fractionalization. The location of the most and least diverse police stations makes sense given that such a large proportion of non-Jewish officers are Druze. The majority of Israeli Druze live in the north, near the Nazareth, Mishgav, and Um al-Faham stations. In contrast, the non-Jews who live near the least integrated stations tend to be Muslims, a group with hardly any representation in the police. Lastly, Figure 5.4 shows no apparent relationship between station size (measured by total number of officers) and officer fractionalization.

Figure 5.3: Officer Fractionalization by Station

To better visualize the distribution of officers across space, Table 5.1 lists

Figure 5.4: Officer Fractionalization and Station Size

officer demographics and the fractionalization measure by subdistrict.[20] We see that the northern subdistricts of Akko, Jezreel, and Kineret have the most diverse police officers. All in all, the regional patterns suggest that officers generally serve within commuting distance of their homes. Thus, since most non-Jewish police officers are Christians and Druze who come from the northern part of the country, the police stations in the north tend to be the most diverse.

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[20]Israel is divided into 16 subdistricts.

Table 5.1: Officer Demographics by Subdistrict (2014)

Subdistrict	Fract.	Other	Bedouin	Druze	Jewish	Muslim	Christian	Circassian	Total
Akko	0.51	7	4	61	168	6	10	0	256
Ashkelon	0.02	3	0	0	531	1	2	0	537
Beer Sheva	0.09	3	24	4	906	6	8	0	951
Golan	0.32	0	0	12	48	0	0	0	60
Hadera	0.45	13	36	33	370	19	30	3	504
Haifa	0.34	9	16	66	565	11	34	1	702
Jerusalem	0.46	53	32	176	885	48	34	1	1229
Jezreel	0.59	15	31	105	457	65	76	3	752
Kineret	0.51	9	8	80	308	17	32	5	459
Petah Tikva	0.08	3	0	3	274	2	3	0	285
Ramleh	0.08	12	0	4	469	0	4	0	489
Rehovot	0.05	2	0	0	251	1	3	0	257
Sharon	0.17	13	0	24	608	20	5	0	670
Tel Aviv	0.17	35	11	90	1706	11	22	0	1875
Tzfat	0.51	1	1	34	97	1	5	8	147
Yehuda and Shamron	0.15	4	0	8	216	6	1	0	235

Determinants of Police Integration

How do official recruiting policies affect police integration? The recent increase in the proportion of non-Jewish officers coincides with a series of recruiting programs by the police in non-Jewish towns and neighborhoods. These drives are an explicit attempt by the police to diversify the rank-and-file based on the belief that citizens in minority communities will respond positively to officers from their own community.[21] For example, in 2014 the police launched a major recruitment effort which put special focus on increasing the number of Arabs in the police. Speaking on this topic, Police Commissioner Yohanan Danino told a conference of Arab mayors, "I urge the Arab leadership to call on [Arab citizens] in every possible forum to join the Israel Police" (Kubovich 2007). This recruitment drive followed a similar effort in 2005.[22] The police launched a third drive specifically targeting Muslims in 2016.[23] Yet, Arabs and other minorities (including some sects of Jews) face an uphill battle in gaining employment with the police. For instance, the hiring process for new officers typically privileges those with military combat experience, something that virtually no Muslim or Christian citizens have. In terms of official policy, then, the police's desire to increase the number of Arabs on the force is undercut by a preference for hiring former combat soldiers. In practice, however, the police make frequent exceptions to this policy, accepting minority applicants without combat experience so long as they are otherwise highly qualified. According to one high-ranking officer I talked to who is involved in officer recruitment and training, the police recognize that there are advantages to having officers from minority communities and therefore go out of their way to recruit them. The police engage in a type of affirmative action in recognition of the different qualifications of recruits from minority communities. When asked specifically about the relevance of combat experience, and whether its use as a hiring criteria is justified, the officer explained that the desire for recruits with combat

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[21]Author interview with a high-ranking police officer in charge of recruitment, 24 July 2014.

[22]Nahmias, Roee. "Police Recruit Arabs to Boost Equality." Ynetnews. 23 December 2005 http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3189198,00.html

[23]Hadida, Diaa (2016), "Israel Seeking Police Recruits: Eager, and Arab." *New York Times* 3 September. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/world/middleeast/israeli-police-recruiting-arabs-to-join-the-force-not-resist-it.html?_r=0

experience is not about practical skills, which they will learn at the police academy anyway, but because these individuals tend to have a "higher level of maturity" from their experiences. Since this screening mechanism is not a viable criteria for Muslim applicants, the police instead try to recruit Arabs with university degrees which they view as a signal that the applicant is able to follow through on tasks and thrive in a competitive environment.[24]

The police's degree of representativeness is affected not only by police policies and practices but also by the willingness of minority citizens to join the police. Despite policies aimed at inclusion, the police struggle to recruit significant numbers of qualified candidates from certain communities, especially Muslim ones. It may be that regardless of whether hiring policies and practices present barriers for minority recruitment, the perception that they do so stops Arab job-seekers from applying. Indeed, a survey conducted in 2003 found that 31% of Israeli Arabs believe that Arabs are prevented from joining the police because of their ethnic background (Hasisi and Weitzer 2007). This belief is part of a larger atmosphere of lukewarm support for joining the police among Arabs. One common argument against joining is that the system discriminates against Arabs, so Arabs should not become part of the system (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). Others worry that joining the police will lead to undesired assimilation. Finally, those who question they legitimacy of the state may view joining the police as akin to collaborating with the enemy. Yet, there does appear to be sufficient willingness to participate to make the police reasonably representative of the Arab population. A survey of Arabs in Northern Israel finds that 60% of respondents support the recruitment of Arab police officers. Twenty-nine percent say that they would consider taking a job with the police if they were looking for a job. Considering the challenges of a career in policing, regardless of identity, this response seems quite positive. Only one quarter of respondents surveyed would actively object to a family member who decided to join the police(Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). Thus, while support for joining is mixed, there does seem to be a sufficient supply of recruits to make integration possible.

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[24]Author interview, 24 July 2014

Officer Assignment and Distribution

Previously, I showed that stations in northern Israel tend to be the most diverse, while those in the southern and western parts of the country tend to have the fewest non-Jewish officers. What explains this variation in officer demographics from one station to the next? What criteria do the Israel Police use to distribute officers? These questions are important not only for understanding the Israel Police but also for drawing valid inferences about the effects of police demographics on support for violence, service provision, and other outcomes. In order to determine whether police integration is *causing* a change in these outcomes, the relationship between the two variables must not be caused by some third variable. For example, Chapter 7 asks whether police integration leads to more effective crime prevention. If the Israel Police assign minority officers to safer areas as a matter of policy, it might appear as though integration is causing a reduction in crime when in reality the relationship is spurious.

According to the same high-ranking officer in the Israel Police referenced above, the police do not systematically assign minority officers based on a location's propensity for criminal activity. Rather, one of the most important criteria for locating officers is to assign them close to, but not in, their hometown.[25] Assigning officers close to home saves commuting and relocation expenses. This explanation is consistent with the observation that the most diverse stations are in the north, and most non-Jewish officers are from religious groups concentrated in the northern part of the country. At the same time, the police try to avoid assigning officers directly in their hometowns as an anti-corruption measure. Similarly, the assignments do not allow for too high a percentage of Arab officers in Arab communities so that the police are not coopted by the *hamula* (tribal) system. Thus, the area in which a new officer is likely to be assigned is essentially a donut shape surrounding his or her home town, with low probability inside the hole or outside of the ring. Women and minority officers (including Jewish ethnic minorities) are split up when possible so that any given interaction is likely to have "at least one real

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[25] Author interview, 24 July 2014. Also see Ratner, David. "Civil Guard Bridges Arab Community Police Gap." Haaretz, 1 November 2004 http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/civil-guard-bridges-arab-community-police-gap-1.138924

policeman," i.e. a full-time Jewish male officer with experience.[26] The concern, according to the officer I spoke with, is not with the abilities of minority or female officers but with the way that citizens react to them. If police leadership believes that a community will respond better to officers who are from a particular ethnic group, then they account for officer identity when deciding which officers to send to that community. There are a few notable exceptions to this practice. For example, although the Old City of Jerusalem has entire neighborhoods which are exclusively non-Jewish, only Jewish officers are assigned there as a political show of control.[27] For the most part, the assignment criteria discussed here are standard practices but not official policies.[28] Thus, while officer assignment is far from random and the police do consider officer demographics when making assignments, there is no evidence that the police systematically integrate (or avoid integrating) officers in areas that are more or less susceptible to crime or to anti-state violence.

The distribution of officers at the patrol level is also important. Chapter 2 tells the anecdote of the Jewish officer in the West Bank who treats Arab drivers differently depending on whether he has an Arab officer patrolling with him. The presence of an Arab colleague reduces over-policing and leads to more lenient outcomes for Arab citizens. How common is this sort of mixed patrol compared to all-Jewish or all-Arab officer patrols? The policy described above of splitting up minority officers from one another so that any given incident always has "at least one 'real' policeman," i.e. a Jewish male officer, suggests that it is fairly common for citizens to encounter all-Jewish or mixed Jewish and Arab policing units, but rare for citizens to interact with only minority officers.

Conclusion

This chapter presents new insights into the religious makeup of the Israel Police using previously-unexplored data on officer demographics. I show that while

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[26]ibid

[27]Author interview, 1 July 2014. The veracity of this statement could not be confirmed. However, in many, many hours of wandering all four quarters of the Old City, this author has never noticed a police officer who appeared to be non-Jewish.

[28]Author interview, 21 July 2014

the police's level of minority inclusion remained constant for much of the state's history, recruitment policies which target Arab, and especially Muslim, neighborhoods over the last decade resulted in a considerable increase in the proportion of officers from religious minority groups. I also note that when it comes to police inclusiveness in Israel, the Jewish, non-Jewish dichotomy that pervades discussions of identity-based conflict is misleading. Some non-Jewish groups, including Druze Arabs, are dramatically over-represented in the police while other, especially Muslims, are under-represented. This nuance is represented in the geographical distribution of non-Jewish Israeli police officers. In northern Israel, where most Arab Druze and Christians live, the rank-and-file of the police is very diverse. In contrast, in the southern part of the country where most non-Jews are Muslims, the police tend to be almost exclusively Jewish. All of these trends and observations are based on original data provided by the Israel Police for this project that has not previously been available to researchers.

I also detail the policies and procedures that the police use for recruitment and officer distribution. The police use a separate criteria, university completion, when recruiting Muslim officers to make up for the fact that other criteria like military combat experience exclude Muslims. This policy illustrates a broader recognition by the Israel Police that traditional recruiting practices lead to the exclusion of certain politically-salient religious groups even if they do not explicitly target those groups. Over the past decade, police leadership attempted to counteract those practices and increase inclusion for marginalized groups based on the expectation that an integrated police force will lead to more effective crime prevention and public safety. Chapter 7 tests whether evidence supports these expectations.

In anticipation of the following chapters' use of regional variation in police integration as a predictor of attitudes and experiences, I ask two questions. First, what criteria do the police use to distribute officers across the country? If the police explicitly consider both officer identity and the "toughness" of policing as a criteria for assignment, any observed relationships may be spurious. Through interviews with several police officers involved in the assignment process, I demonstrate that

while officer distribution is certainly non-random with regards to identity, there is little reason to think that it is also correlated with outcomes like crime rates or attitudes about violence.

Finally, the long history of under-representation, mistreatment, and neglect by the police towards certain segments of society, and the highly entrenched attitudes and perceptions that result from this seventy-year history, provide an important contrast to the fluidity of attitudes in the Iraqi case. Public safety institutions in Israel are highly consolidated. They underwent few structural changes during the 20th century, and while the police today make considerable efforts to include under-represented groups, these efforts are relatively new. This consistency contrasts with the Iraqi Police Service's short history, the dramatic changes in structure and composition experienced by the police since its formation, and the abrupt change in Iraq's sectarian power configuration in 2003. While the survey measures I use for analysis throughout this dissertation do not allow us to observe the "stickiness" of perceptions over time, these structural differences between the two cases suggest that attitudes and perceptions should be much more entrenched in Israel than in Iraq. It follows that efforts at reform in Israel, including the Arab and Muslim recruitment drives of the past 15 years, are likely to be met with skepticism by members of those communities. Changing attitudes is likely to be a slow process, and policymakers in search of reform face an uphill battle.

Chapter 6

Police Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence in Israel

Chapter 4 showed that in Iraq, bottom-up integration reduces support for anti-government violence by addressing common motives for participating in conflict. This chapter tests the effects of bottom-up police integration on support for violence in another divided society, Israel. Like Iraq, Israel is plagued by significant ethno-religious divisions. While Israel's ethnic and religious landscape is complex, this project focuses on the division between Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. Non-Jews, who are primarily Arab, make up about 20% of the citizen population but are under-represented within government institutions. How does the exclusion of minorities from key policy-implementing institutions like the Israel Police affect the likelihood of violent conflict? Once again, I test the overall relationship between police integration and support for violence as well as two common motives for conflict: grievances over current conditions, including unequal service provision and exclusion from employment, and fears of future conditions. Data comes from a survey with an embedded experiment carried out across 15 Israeli cities and neighborhoods in spring 2016.

The findings in Israel are less conclusive than those in Iraq. Non-Jewish respondents who are read a news story which primes them with information about

the Israel Police being integrated are slightly less likely to say they would consider using violence against the government compared to those who receive no information about the police being integrated. However, the difference is not statistically significant. Furthermore, this experimental prime fails to shift attitudes towards the three conflict-inducing mechanisms: fear of repression, grievances over service provision, or exclusion from employment.

I do find evidence that perceived integration affects conflict motives. Consistent with my hypotheses, respondents who say that the police are integrated at the national-institutional level are less likely to perceive service provision as biased in terms of identity, more likely to believe that someone from their family could get a job with the police if they wanted one, and less likely to express fear of repression by the police and government. On the other hand, perceptions of integration at the local level, meaning how often Israelis report seeing officers of different ethnic or religious groups working together in their neighborhoods, have limited effects on attitudes towards the citizen-state relationship. Taken together, these findings suggest that bottom-up integration shapes attitudes not through micro-level interactions between citizens and police officers but rather through broad shifts in the perception that the government is committed to inclusiveness and fairness. Whether an individual is policed by officers who look like him or her matters less than the perception that power and influence are balanced within the institution by members of many different groups working together side by side.

I attribute the non-findings of the experiment to Israelis' deeply-entrenched attitudes about the police and group-based conflict. Unlike the Iraqi institutions discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Israel's institutions are highly consolidated. Israelis draw on a lifetime of consistent interactions and information when forming attitudes about these institutions. In this context, the newspaper article prime was not a strong enough signal to change perceptions about the Israeli police's level of integration. In turn, changes in perceptions were too small to cause a measurable effect on support for anti-government violence. This is not to say that bottom-up integration cannot mitigate conflict where institutions are highly consolidated. The experiment failed to shift attitudes, but I show quite clearly

that actual changes in perceptions of police integration are associated with the expected changes in conflict motives. Thus, police integration may reduce violent conflict along ethno-religious lines in Israel, but the required shift in attitudes may take more significant instances of repeated exposure to police integration to have a measurable effect.

Police Integration and Conflict: Mechanisms and Hypotheses

I test three mechanisms through which police integration may reduce the likelihood of violent conflict in a divided society. The first two, perceptions of unequal service provision and exclusion from employment in the police, invoke grievances over current conditions among members of marginalized groups (Gurr 1970; Blattman and Annan 2016). The third deals with concerns over future conditions, and specifically fears of repression (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Weingast 1997; Posen 1993). These mechanisms implicitly assume that violence is a function of individuals' incentives to rebel, and that violence can be reduced by addressing these motives. An alternative hypothesis suggests that violence is a function primarily of opportunity for rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Factors that decrease the costs of violence, for example mountainous terrain which provides cover for insurgents or a weak state that is unable to quell uprisings, make violence more likely. The opportunity argument suggests that police integration should make individuals from vulnerable groups *more* willing to use anti-government violence as it lowers their costs for doing so. Finally, I again consider the reaction of dominant-group members to integration. If Jewish Israelis believe that integration of the police will harm them, they may be motivated to engage in violence to prevent its implementation.

H_1: Individuals from the vulnerable group (non-Jews) who perceive the police as more integrated will be *less* likely to consider using anti-government violence.

H_1a: Individuals from the dominant group (Jews) who perceive the police as more

integrated will be *more* likely to consider using anti-government violence.

The first mechanism linking integration with conflict among the vulnerable group is grievances caused by unequal service provision, either real or perceived. Citizens who believe that the distribution of police services is biased on the basis of identity may be more likely to support or engage in anti-government violence. While I assume that biased service provision will disproportionately harm minorities, Jewish Israelis may also recognize that integration reduces bias even if it is not a conflict-motivator for them. Thus, Hypothesis 2 should hold across members all religious groups.

H_2: Individuals who perceive the police as more integrated will be less likely to perceive police/government service provision as biased.

The next mechanism also deals with grievances over current conditions. Individuals who believe that they are unfairly barred from desirable jobs in the police or other government institutions due to their group identity should be more likely to fight against the government.

H_3: Individuals who perceive the police and security forces as more integrated will be more likely to believe that if a member of his or her family were to apply for a job with the police, the application would be considered fairly.

Finally, integrating the police may reduce conflict by reducing fears of future repression, which in turn reduces incentives for building up defenses or engaging in preemptive strikes against the state.

H_4: Individuals from the vulnerable group (non-Jews) who perceive the police as more integrated will express less fear of future repression by the police/government.

Data and Survey Design

To measure perceived police integration, support for anti-government violence, and attitudes regarding the hypothesized mechanisms I conducted a survey of Israeli citizens in March and April 2016. The survey, which is quite similar to the survey in Baghdad that I described in Chapter 4, was carried out by an Israeli survey research firm. I surveyed 804 Israeli citizens in spring 2016 across nine cities. Sampling yielded approximately 50% each Jews and non-Jews by selecting cities based on known religious demographics and then selecting a simple random sample within each city. I selected city pairs to achieve both Jewish and non-Jewish units with comparable characteristics. Table 6.1 shows the distribution of respondents by religious identity from each city.

Interviews in eight of the nine cities were carried out by phone, with respondents choosing whether to take the survey in Hebrew or Arabic. The survey firm maintains an exhaustive list of phone numbers in Israel from which I randomly selected numbers to be called. The enumerator interviewed the individual who answered the phone so long as s/he was at least 18 years of age and willing to take the survey. If there was no answer, the number was dialed up to three additional times at a later date. If, after the third call-back, there was no answer, or if the individual who answered was not willing to take the survey, enumerators selected another number until the pre-determined number of respondents was achieved in each city. R

Interviews in the ninth city, East Jerusalem were conducted via door-to-door enumeration as no suitable sampling frame of phone numbers was available. I selected neighborhoods[1] to ensure variation in both exposure to police integration (based on officer data provided by the Israeli police) and political attitudes (based on author interviews). I randomly sampled streets from each neighborhood using a simple random sample. Houses were then selected from a set starting point on each street, and interviewers continued contacting every second house from this starting point. In multi-home buildings, each apartment was considered to be an individual unit for sampling purposes. Sampling continued on the selected

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[1]Old City, French Hill and Sheikh Jarah, Shuafat and Isawiyya, Mount of Olives

Table 6.1: Distribution of Respondents

City	Non-Jews	Jews
Akko	34	36
East Jerusalem	104	0
Haifa	65	65
Jerusalem	0	100
Nazareth	123	2
Nazareth Illit	0	50
Rahat	50	0
Sderot	0	50
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	25	100

street until the specified number of households were reached. If at that time a sufficient number of households had not been reach within the neighborhood in question, another street was chosen and interviews were conducted using the same method. Within each household, enumerators selected the resident with the most recent previous birthday. If the selected resident was unavailable, two additional attempts were made to contact them on future dates. If the enumerator could not reach the selected resident, or if the resident refused to participate, the enumerator continued to the next household on the street.

Certain characteristics of this survey guard against social desirability bias. First, Adida et al. (2016) note that bias may be exacerbated when respondents and enumerators come from groups in conflict with one another. To avoid this possibility, phone interviews took place in the language selected by the subject with a fluent speaker of that language, and in-person interviews in Arab East Jerusalem used Arab enumerators. Enumerators conducted interviews in respondents' homes in an effort to minimize discomfort and ensure a low-pressure environment. Finally, the design of the survey ensured that subjects' responses, as well as their participation in the survey, remained confidential, decreasing their incentives to answer untruthfully in the face of social pressures.

Sample Characteristics

The sample is, by design, approximately half Jewish and half non-Jewish. Within the non-Jewish subgroup, 72.5% are Muslim, 26.5% Christian, and less than 1% Druze. Druze, who make up about 6.5% of the actual population, are underrepresented because they tend to reside outside of the major cities from which the sample was drawn. Respondents were also asked whether they identify with a particular ethnic group and given some examples of commonly-used ethnic categories in Israel. The most common responses were Arab (just under 27%), Palestinian (17.5%), Ashkenazi (21%), and Sephardic (21%). While the terms "Arab," "Bedouin," and "Palestinian" are generally considered different groups in Israel, they are all technically Arab. The combined total for the three groups is 46.3%. Ages of respondents range from 18 (by design) to 91, with a median of 40. Respondents are neutral on their degree of economic satisfaction of average, with slightly more reporting that they are satisfied than unsatisfied. Just over one-third of respondents say that they or a family member work in the public sector, including 26% of non-Jews and 41.5% of Jews.

Measuring Police Integration

I measure the primary independent variable, police integration, several different ways. First, the survey asks respondents about their perceptions of the Israeli Police in nation-wide.

> "In general, how integrated would you say the Israeli police are? By integrated I mean that members of many different ethnic and religious groups serve together side by side. Throughout Israel in general, would you say that the police are very integrated, somewhat integrated, or not at all integrated?"

Respondents were then asked about the level of integration specific to their neighborhood:

> "Now please think specifically about your neighborhood. How often do you see or hear about Jewish and non-Jewish officers working together? Often, sometimes, rarely, or never?"

Figure 6.1: Perceived National and Local Police Integration

Figure 6.1 shows a fairly even distribution of perceptions about integration at both the national and local levels. The correlation between the two measures is surprisingly low, at only 17.2%. Respondents clearly differentiate between perceptions about how integrated the police is in general compared to how integrated it is in their neighborhood.

A third measure looks again at perceived integration at the local level but this time disaggregates between non-integrated areas in which the police come from the respondent's group and those in which the police come from an outgroup. The question asks,

> "Would you say that the police officers in your area are mostly Jews or non-Jews?"

Responses to this question were combined with the respondent's religious identity to determine whether the police are perceived as mostly from the respondent's group, mostly from the outgroup, or mixed. The distribution of this variable is shown in Figure 6.2.

These three questions provide a direct measure of the construct of interest, *perceptions* of police integration. I note in Chapter 1 that the expected relationship between bottom-up integration and sectarian violence depends on citizens' *reactions* to integration, therefore we should be most interested in the extent to which citizens *perceive* the police to be integrated. Where do these perceptions come from?

Figure 6.2: Perceived Local Police Demographics

The most obvious source of information from which citizens form perceptions of the police is direct observations of officers. That is, individuals should be more likely to perceive the police as integrated when officers they come into contact with are, in fact, integrated. How closely do Israeli citizens' perceptions match reality on the issue of police integration? I geolocated survey responses to the nearest city in most of Israel, and to the specific neighborhood in East Jerusalem, allowing me to compare perceptions about integration with actual officer fractionalization. Unfortunately, location data on survey respondents is much less specific than the station-level data available for officer demographics, which necessitated aggregating officer data from the 70 police stations to the 15 cities and neighborhoods that are used as sampling units. Figure 6.3 shows relative integration across three measures: perceived integration at the local level, perceived integration at the national level, and actual officer demographics for each of the 15 sampled cities and neighborhoods. Darker colors indicate higher relative integration. Perceived integration at the local level is correlated with actual local integration with an r^2 of .21. This correlations sounds low until we remember that a great deal of precision is lost because respondents' locations are recorded only at the city level in most cases. In other words, a respondent who lives near the Harel police station in Jerusalem may correctly perceive that the police in her

neighborhood are not very integrated. Yet, since the police in Jerusalem overall are very diverse, this respondent's accurate perception would appear as incorrect in the aggregated data. In contrast to perceptions about police integration at the local level, perceived integration at the national level is not at all tied to actual officer demographics. The r^2 of -.09 indicates a slight *negative* relationship between officer fractaionlization at the city level and perceptions of national integration. These relationships suggest that citizens' are able to identify the degree to which the police are integrated in their neighborhood with some degree of accuracy, and that citizens form distinct perceptions about the police in their immediate vicinity and the police as a national institution.

Figure 6.3: Perceived National and Local Police Integration

Other personal and environmental factors also correlated with perceptions of police integration. Respondents in cities with more non-Jewish civilians, particularly Nazareth, Akko, and Rahat, perceive local police integration to be higher, while individuals in predominantly-Jewish cities like Tel Aviv and Sderot perceive local integration as lower. Perceptions of national integration do not follow this trend, however. Individuals in Tel Aviv and Sderot believe that while the police are not very integrated in their areas, the institution is quite integrated nation-wide. On the other hand, individuals in predominantly-Muslim towns and neighborhoods like Rahat, Mount of Olives, and Shuafat believe that the Israel Police are not at all integrated across the country.

These trends become even more striking when we look at differences in perceptions across religious groups. At the national-level, Jews tend to believe the police are quite integrated, Muslims believe the police are not particularly integrated, and Christians fall somewhere in between. Yet, locally, Jews rarely report seeing Jewish and non-Jewish officers working together in their neighborhood while Muslims report seeing mixed policing fairly frequently. Taking the geographical and religious trends together, it seems that Israelis accurately identify the level of police integration among officers they observe directly, but these observations do not necessarily form perceptions of the institution nation-wide. At the national-level, perceptions of integration correlate with each religious group's political status. Jews, who occupy a privileged position in society, perceive that the police are generally integrated even though they rarely observe integration personally. Muslims, who are exposed to considerable police integration, still do not believe that the institution as a whole is integrated.

Respondents who are older, voted in the last election, are more satisfied with their economic situation, and live in a household with a public sector employee are more likely to perceive the police as integrated at the national-level. Ethnic Ashkenazis and Sephardics, both of whom are Jewish, as well as Bedouins, perceive the police as most-integrated at the national-level. At the local level, younger people and those who do *not* have a member of their household who work in the public sector are more likely to perceive the police as integrated.

Figure 6.4: Throughout Israel in general, would you say that the police are very integrated, somewhat integrated, or not at all integrated?

Figure 6.5: Now please think specifically about your neighborhood. How often do you see or hear about Jewish and non-Jewish officers working together?

Support for Police Integration

As mentioned in the previous chapter, institutions can only become integrated if members of all groups are willing to participate. How much demand is there from underrepresented groups for greater police integration? The survey asks Arab respondents,

> "Do you think that greater integration of the Israeli police would lead citizens like you to be better off, worse off, or about the same?"

As a group, non-Jewish Israelis are somewhat indifferent about police integration. About 27% of non-Jewish respondents say that citizens like them would be better off if the police were more integrated, compared with 18% who say they would be worse off. The majority, 55%, say they would be about the same. Breaking non-Jews into their constituent groups reveals that among Christians, many more respondents support police integration than oppose it (37% compared to 8%). Support among Muslims is lower, with 24% saying they would be better off and 22% saying they would be worse off. In both cases, however, the modal answer is "about the same." Thus, while demand for police integration among religious minorities in Israel is tepid, there also is not significant opposition, meaning that the degree of integration should be primarily a function of police policies on recruitment and hiring.

Randomizing Information About Integration

To address concerns about the possible endogeneity of police integration, I embedded an experiment within the survey that randomly primes respondents with varying information about police's degree of integration. The enumerator read respondents what they claimed to be an excerpt from a recent news report. The report describes the promotion of a police officer to deputy-chief of the traffic department. In the treatment story, which comes from a real news report published in 2014 by YnetNews, the officer is identified as a Muslim. The article is titled, "Muslim Police Officer Ascends to New Heights," and quotes the officer who is the subject of the article:

> I am proud of the Israel Police for choosing me based on my qualifications and nothing else...My religion and origin are facts I do not ignore, but I have never, in all my years of service, felt discriminated against or hurt by it.

In the control group the article title is changed to, "Local Police Officer Ascends to New Heights." The officer's name is changed to be identity-neutral (Inspector-General Halu) and he is said to be the first officer promoted to the rank in question from the town of Karmiel, a town in a region with significant Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze populations. The full text of both vignettes is available in Appendix 6.A. A balance table is also presented in Appendix 6.C; treatment and control groups are statistically indistinguishable on all observable characteristics.

Measuring Support for Anti-Government Violence

Once again, the primary question is whether perceived police integration reduces support for anti-government violence among marginalized group members. As in Iraq, measuring support for violence in Israel is challenging because of its sensitivity. Despite the anonymity provided by the survey's design, respondents may still be unwilling to admit to supporting violence against the government, either because they fear reprisals from the government, because they fear the judgment of the enumerator, or both. The problem is compounded by the likely possibility that which respondents lie about their support for violence is correlated with other things we care about. For example, members of society's most vulnerable groups may be least likely to admit when they would support violence against the government, introducing considerable bias into the results. Finally, asking survey respondents about their willingness to support violence against the government poses a significant threat to the safety of both the respondents and the enumerators. Even in Israel, where rule of law and freedom of speech are widely recognized, voicing support for anti-government violence generates risks of arrest by the government or violence from competing groups.

Thus, like the survey in Iraq, this survey employs an item-count technique to measure support for violence. I use the same procedure described in Chapter 4.

Enumerators first read respondents the following text:

> Governments are not always responsive to the needs and requests of
> their citizens. I am going to read you a list of [4 / 5] strategies that
> individuals sometimes use when the government does not seem to be
> listening to them. Please tell me how many of these strategies you
> would consider using if you felt the government was ignoring your needs.
> Remember, I don't need to know which ones you would use, only how
> many of these [4 / 5] you would consider. You may wish to keep track
> of the number of items using the fingers on your hand as I list them
> off.

Respondents are randomly assigned to either a a short-list or a long-list group.
Individuals in the short-list group receive a list of four non-controversial actions:
voting against the government, writing letters to the government, writing letters
to an international organization, and protesting peacefully. Respondents in the
long-list group receive the same list of four non-controversial items, as well as a
fifth item: "using non-peaceful methods." Because assignment into the two groups
is random, respondents in each group should be the same on average. The only
difference between them is that the long-list group had one additional option to
choose from, the use of violence. Therefore, the proportion of the sample that
would consider using violence can be calculated as the mean number of items
selected by the long-list group minus the mean number of items selected by the
short-list group. Appendix 6.B shows the distribution of responses and discusses
several methodological issues related to the item-count technique.

Table 6.2 calculates the proportion of respondents what would consider
using non-peaceful methods against a government that was ignoring their need.
Approximately 24.4% of the 800 respondents would consider using anti-government
violence. Given that respondents are asked only whether they would *consider* using
violence (rather than whether they have used it or definitely would use it), this
estimate does not seem unreasonably high. Table 6.3 shows that the number is
slightly higher among non-Jewish respondents, at 26.3%.

Table 6.2: Support for Anti-Government Violence (All Respondents)

Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Difference	95% CI
2.097 (.062) 401	2.341 (.066) 402	.244*** (.091)	[-.422, -.065]

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 6.3: Support for Anti-Government Violence (Non-Jewish Respondents)

Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Difference	95% CI
2.446 (.080) 202	2.709 (.081) 199	.263*** (.114)	[-.487, -.039]

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Results: Integration and Support for Violence

How do perceptions of police integration affect support for anti-government violence? I cross-randomized the item-count short and long list groups and the vignette experiment treatment and control groups, allowing me to calculate the proportion of respondents who would consider using violence the treatment and control groups. If the belief that the police are integrated causes a reduction in support for violence, then respondents who received the news story about the Arab officer's promotion should be less likely to say they would use violence than those in the control group. I find weak evidence of this effect. About 29% of non-Jewish respondents who received the control vignette with no mention of identity would support the use of non-peaceful methods against the government. This estimate is significant at the $p < .10$ level. Among those who received the integration treatment story, 21% of respondents would use violence, and this estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In other words, almost one in three respondents in the baseline group would consider using anti-government violence, but providing respondents with information that the police are integrated reduced support for violence. However, the estimates for the treatment and control groups are not significantly different from one another (using a difference-in-differences estimator).

Table 6.4: Police Integration and Support for Violence (Non-Jews)

	List Control	List Treatment	*Difference*
Vignette Control	2.30 (.11) 106	2.59 (.11) 96	0.29 (.16)*
Vignette Treatment	2.60 (.11) 96	2.82 (.11) 103	0.21 (.16)

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure 6.6 shows that while the treatment estimate is lower than the control group estimate, the difference is quite small in relation to the estimates' standard errors.

Three possible explanations could account for this non-finding. The first, of course, is that there may not be a relationship between police integration and support for anti-government violence, and the result of the experiment simply reflects reality. A second possibility is there is a small but real effect, but the experimental design did not provide sufficient power to capture it. Indeed, we do observe higher support for anti-government violence in the control group than in the treatment group, as expected, but the estimates are not sufficiently precise to claim a relationship. By the time the sample is subset to include only non-Jewish respondents and divided between the four combinations of experiment and item-count groups, there are only about 100 respondents in each group. Perhaps a larger sample would have found the expected trends in support for violence.

The third possibility is that perceptions of police integration do have an effect on support for violence, but the experimental prime failed to move perceptions of police integration in a consequential manner. This outcome would be likely if perceptions about the police are deeply-ingrained and not easily manipulated. Evidence in the previous chapter suggests that attitudes towards the Israeli police are especially sticky due to decades of negative, high-profile conflict between the police and Arab citizens, along with a history of excluding non-Jews from participation within the police. In this context, reading a short news article that mentions the promotion of an Arab officer may be insufficient to shift attitudes and perceptions towards the police. The sections that follow will show that beliefs about police

Figure 6.6: Police Integration and Support for Violence (Non-Jews)

integration are strongly associated with several motives for anti-government violence. However, results presented in Appendix 6.D show no relationship between the experimental prime and any of these outcomes. Thus, it seems that perceived integration *does* affect conflict motives, but the news story about the Arab police officer failed to shift respondents' beliefs about the degree to which the Israel Police are integrated.

Integration Reduces Perceived Biases

Table 6.5 tests Hypothesis 2, that bottom-up integration reduces grievances over unequal police and government service provision. The survey asks, "Do you think the Israeli Police generally treat all citizens fairly, regardless of a citizen's ethnic or religious identity? Again please answer from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least fair and 5 being the most fair." It then asks, "Do you think that the Is-

raeli government distributes goods and services fairly to you and other members of your community?" Columns 1 through 3 test the effects of perceived integration on perceptions of police service provision, while columns 4 through 6 deal with perceptions of government service provision. Regression models include controls for a number of other possible predictors of attitudes towards the police. Basic demographic controls include religion, age, and gender. *Vote* is a dummy variable for whether the respondent voted in the most recent election (self-reported). *Econ. Satisfaction* asks how satisfied respondents are with their current economic satisfaction, and is intended to control for respondents' baseline positivity. *Work Public* asks whether the respondent or a family member works or has worked in the public sector. Finally, the dummy variation *In Person* notes interviews which were conducted by door-to-door enumeration rather than by phone. Not shown due to space constraints are dummy variables for self-reported ethnic identity.

All of the models used in this chapter cluster standard errors at the primary sampling unit, the city in most cases and the neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Because this provides a maximum of 15 clusters, we might be concerned about the possibility of false positives (Green and Vavreck 2008; Harden 2011; Esarey and Menger 2015). I therefore replicate all analyses using a wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al. 2008). Results are shown in Appendix 6.E. On balance, the bulk of the key findings hold, with those related to integration's effects of the perceived fairness of police and government service provision proving to be especially robust to this alternative specification.

Table 6.5: Perceived Fairness of Police/Government Service Provision

	(1) Police	(2) Police	(3) Police	(4) Gov.	(5) Gov.	(6) Gov.
Integration (Nat'l)	0.779*** (0.187)			0.662*** (0.129)		
Int. (Nat'l)*Non-Jew	-0.206 (0.212)			-0.110 (0.379)		
Integration (Local)		0.162** (0.0725)			0.115 (0.111)	
Int. (Local)*Non-Jew		0.167 (0.102)			0.0361 (0.161)	
Police Same			0.346 (0.258)			0.529** (0.209)
Police Mix			0.682*** (0.193)			0.604*** (0.225)
Non-Jewish	0.430 (0.521)	-0.371 (0.461)	0.134 (0.342)	-0.0158 (1.170)	-0.166 (0.759)	0.0501 (0.592)
Age	0.0123** (0.00511)	0.0107** (0.00445)	0.0103* (0.00604)	0.00787 (0.00977)	0.00567 (0.00934)	0.00850 (0.00985)

Table 6.5: Perceived Fairness of Police/Government Service Provision, Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Police	Police	Police	Gov.	Gov.	Gov.
Male	-0.255***	-0.202*	-0.253*	0.284*	0.248	0.0789
	(0.0914)	(0.117)	(0.149)	(0.155)	(0.197)	(0.234)
Vote	0.222	0.181	0.178	-0.238	-0.110	-0.275
	(0.280)	(0.347)	(0.386)	(0.280)	(0.312)	(0.315)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.228***	0.260***	0.254***	0.271**	0.274***	0.247**
	(0.0685)	(0.0672)	(0.0677)	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.103)
Work Public	0.219	0.289	0.335	0.400	0.320	0.401
	(0.160)	(0.181)	(0.206)	(0.280)	(0.246)	(0.253)
In Person	0.475**	-0.0719	0.0296	0	0	0
	(0.235)	(0.320)	(0.332)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Observations	648	677	620	537	556	499
Pseudo R^2	0.076	0.062	0.071	0.099	0.078	0.076

1-3 ordered logistic regression, 4-6 logistic regression. Standard errors clustered by PSU.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Results reveal a robust relationship between police integration and the perceived fairness of service provision. Perceived police integration at both the national (Column 1) and local (Column 2) levels is associated with the belief that police services are provided fairly without regard to ethnic or religious identity. As expected, there is no significant difference between Jewish and non-Jewish respondents. Column 3 shows that mixed-identity policing, but not same-group policing, is associated with greater perceived fairness of police service provision. With regard to service provision by the government more broadly, integration at the national level is associated with greater perceived fairness (Column 4), as are both mixed-identity and same-group policing at the local level (Column 6). Across the board, there is strong evidence that citizens who believe the police are integrated hold fewer grievances over police and government service provision.

Integration Reduces Exclusion from Employment

The second mechanism I test is exclusion from employment. Existing research links employment with the likelihood of conflict, either because it raises the costs of participating in conflict (Grossman (1991); Blattman and Annan (2016), but see Berman et al. (2011a) for contradictory evidence) or because it improves the overall welfare of a group relative to other groups, reducing grievances. Hypothesis 3 predicts that individuals who perceive the police as more integrated should be more likely to believe that they or a family member could get a job with the police if they wanted to do so. Table 6.6 shows results from several models testing the relationship between perceived police integration and the belief that employment in the police is a viable option. Respondents were asked, "Do you think that someone from your family could get a job with the police or security forces if they wanted one?" As above, the models include controls for a variety of possible confounds like religious identity, economic satisfaction, and participation in the previous election. All models use logistic regression with standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit.

Evidence of police integration's effects on attitudes towards employment in the police are weak, although generally in the expected direction. Israelis who

Table 6.6: Do you think that someone from your family could get a job with the police or security forces if they wanted one?

	(1) Job	(2) Job	(3) Job (Non-Jews)
Integration (Nat'l)	0.638*		
	(0.387)		
Int. (Nat'l)*Non-Jew	-0.539		
	(0.440)		
Integration (Local)		-0.200*	
		(0.113)	
Int. (Local)*Non-Jew		0.412***	
		(0.106)	
Police Same			0.295
			(0.417)
Police Mix			0.593*
			(0.352)
Non-Jewish	-1.477	-3.354***	
	(1.414)	(0.920)	
Age	-0.00902	-0.00389	0.00900
	(0.0137)	(0.0109)	(0.0161)
Male	0.335	0.219	0.490***
	(0.211)	(0.171)	(0.179)
Vote	0.987***	0.944***	0.852***
	(0.321)	(0.216)	(0.314)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.00359	0.101	-0.0979
	(0.190)	(0.175)	(0.142)
Work Public	0.478**	0.556***	0.512**
	(0.210)	(0.203)	(0.252)
In Person	-1.453	-1.513*	-1.398*
	(0.900)	(0.819)	(0.849)
Observations	629	658	359
Pseudo R^2	0.463	0.431	0.129

Logistic regression. Standard errors clustered by PSU.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

perceive that the police are more integrated at the national level are indeed more likely to believe that they or a family member could get a job with the police, although this relationship is significant only at the $p < .10$ level. Somewhat oddly, this relationship is driven by Jewish respondents despite the fact that integration would almost certainly mean *fewer* jobs for Jewish citizens in the police. Findings at the local level are more intuitive, where non-Jews, but not Jews, who believe their local police are integrated are more likely to believe they could find employment with the police. Finally, non-Jewish respondents who believe the police in their area are mostly mixed-identity are more likely to say they could get a job with the police than respondents who believe their local officers are mostly outgroup members. This finding seems reasonable enough. On the other hand, the same model shows that non-Jews who believe the police are mostly non-Jews are *not* more likely to say they could get a job with the police than those who say their local officers are mostly Jews.

Several of these findings about respondents' expectations run counter to what we would logically expect when the police are integrated. Jews should expect national-level integration of the police to reduce their job opportunities, as they are over-represented under the status-quo. Similarly, non-Jews should be more likely to find employment in the police when local officers are also non-Jews, but I fail to find evidence of any expectation to this effect. As in the positive reactions of Iraqi Shias to police integration in Baghdad, these results may represent an ideological rejection of sectarian politics rather than expectations about personal wellbeing. Negative attitudes towards ethno-religious favoratism might be overpowering the perceived value of a pure numbers game, Jews might view an integrated institution as one that is more likely to consider all applications fairly. After all, religious identity is hardly the only criteria on which hiring decisions may be made unfairly. Similarly, non-Jewish Israelis might view a police force that is truly integrated as one that will give them a fair shot, while a force that provides local-level autonomy may be perceived as a means of providing differing qualities of service provision to different religious groups.

Integration Reduces Fears of Future Repression

The previous hypotheses looked at grievances over present conditions as motives for conflict. Hypothesis 4 suggests that individuals who perceive the police as more integrated should be less afraid of repression by the police and the government in the future, which in turn reduces their incentives for engaging in preemptive strikes or taking other actions that lead to conflict. Table 6.7 tests the effects of perceptions of police integration against fears of future repression. With regard to the police, respondents are asked, "Some citizens say they are afraid of the Israeli police, even if they have done nothing wrong. Are you afraid of the police?" Responses range from 1 (least afraid) to 5 (most afraid). On fear of repression by the government, the question used is "How secure do you feel in your political and human rights here in Israel?" Once again, responses are on a 5 point scale, with 5 representing the least secure and 1 representing the most secure. While the question measuring fear of repression by the police was asked of all respondents, the survey asked about feelings of security in political and human rights only for members of vulnerable groups, in this case non-Jewish respondents.

Table 6.7: Fear of Repression by the Police/Government

	(1) Police	(2) Police	(3) Police	(4) Gov.	(5) Gov.	(6) Gov.
Integration (Nat'l)	-0.516*** (0.197)			-0.501*** (0.186)		
Int. (Nat'l)*Non-Jew	0.164 (0.172)					
Integration (Local)		-0.102 (0.108)			-0.202* (0.120)	
Int. (Local)*Non-Jew		-0.0258 (0.113)				
Police Same			0.0413 (0.277)			0.952*** (0.214)
Police Mix			-0.311** (0.142)			-0.0768 (0.216)
Non-Jewish	-0.217 (0.733)	0.132 (0.683)	0.0348 (0.672)			
Age	-0.0108** (0.00493)	-0.0104** (0.00407)	-0.00858** (0.00397)	-0.00120 (0.00464)	-0.00466 (0.00438)	-0.00404 (0.00431)

Table 6.7: Fear of Repression by the Police/Government, Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Police	Police	Police	Gov.	Gov.	Gov.
Male	-0.379***	-0.397***	-0.409***	0.121	0.161	0.114
	(0.115)	(0.0929)	(0.107)	(0.201)	(0.168)	(0.204)
Vote	-0.0145	-0.180	-0.0945	-0.556*	-0.544	-0.565*
	(0.254)	(0.253)	(0.264)	(0.319)	(0.352)	(0.311)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.176**	-0.170**	-0.165**	-0.278**	-0.291**	-0.287**
	(0.0833)	(0.0719)	(0.0670)	(0.128)	(0.116)	(0.114)
Work Public	-0.155	-0.0305	-0.0377	-0.572**	-0.659***	-0.687***
	(0.114)	(0.140)	(0.166)	(0.226)	(0.173)	(0.182)
In Person	1.892***	1.931***	1.992***	0.915**	1.195***	1.320***
	(0.263)	(0.310)	(0.346)	(0.356)	(0.388)	(0.382)
Observations	672	702	636	345	370	367
Pseudo R^2	0.091	0.087	0.092	0.100	0.099	0.104

Ordered logistic regression. Standard errors clustered by PSU.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Israelis who perceive the police as integrated at the national lever are significantly less fearful of repression by the police (Column 1). In keeping with most other results in this dissertation, there is no significant difference in the effect between Jewish and non-Jewish respondents. Columns 2 and 3 suggest a nuanced interpretation of the effects of integration at the local level. Respondents who perceive the police in their neighborhood as more integrated are neither more nor less likely to fear the police (Column 2). However, Column 3 distinguishes between same-group policing and out-group policing (both of which are *not* integration). We see that mixed-identity policing, or policing by both Jews and Non-Jews, is associated with less fear of the police than both same-group policing and out-group policing.

Fear of the police is important in its own right, but the theory of bottom-up integration suggests that the effects of police integration should extend to attitudes towards the government more broadly. Columns 4 through 6 test integration against fear of repression by the government. Among Non-Jewish Israeli citizens, those who perceive the police as more integrated at the national level are significantly less afraid that their political or human rights will be violated (Column 4). A somewhat weaker, but still negative, relationship exists between perceived integration at the local level and fear of repression (Column 5). Finally, Column 6 shows that Arab-Israelis who believe their local police are made up mostly of officers like them – that is, officers who are non-Jews – are *more* afraid that their rights will be violated. While this finding seems counterintuitive, existing research on policing in divided societies finds similar opposition to policing by coethnics among minorities and suggests a number of possible explanations (Weitzer and Hasisi 2008; Weitzer 1995). First, police officers from the minority group may try to prove their strength to non-coethnic colleagues by being extra tough on members of their own group. Second, members of the minority group who choose to join the police may be viewed as traitors or collaborators rather than representatives of their group. This is particularly likely to be the case if the institution as a whole is not considered to be "integrated" despite local-level officer demographics. In either case, the finding that Arab-Israelis are more afraid of repression when their

local police are made up entirely of Arab officers is not completely unexpected.

What about Jewish Israelis?

To this point, this chapter (and much of this dissertation) has argued that bottom-up integration of the police will reduce violent sectarian conflict by reducing the incentives of minorities or vulnerable group members to engage in anti-government violence. However, if members of the dominant group oppose integration to the extent that it makes *them* want to engage in conflict, integration may not have the claimed conflict-reducing effect. The majority of the evidence presented above suggests that these concerns are not borne out, at least not in Israel. In nearly every case, perceived police integration is associated with a decrease in the conflict-inducing mechanism not just for non-Jewish respondents but also for Jewish ones. Even so, it may be useful to look more explicitly at the attitudes of Jewish Israelis towards police integration. As with the Baghdad survey presented in Chapter 4, the Israel survey asked direct questions about two possible sources of dominant group opposition to integration. First, Jews might be concerned that integrating non-Jews into the police will provide them with an opportunity to harm the state.

> Some people worry that including members of minority groups in government jobs like the police, schools, and public services might allow them to oppose the government from the inside. Other people say that including minorities in the government allows members of these groups to do their part in contributing to society. Which view do you think is more accurate?

Second, Jewish Israelis may worry about a loss of employment opportunities due to integration.

> Some people worry that a policy of integrating minorities into the police would take jobs away from citizens like you. Do you believe that this concern is important enough that you might oppose integration?

Among Israeli Jews, 75.8% responded that it is more accurate that integration allows minorities to contribute to society, while less than one-quarter say that it

could be dangerous. Meanwhile, only 20.8% of respondents said they might oppose integration because of the potential loss of employment opportunities. These answers, along with the findings presented above that Jews who perceive the police tend to hold fewer, not more, grievances against the state, suggests that police integration does not motivate Israeli Jews to engage in conflict.

Figure 6.7: Experimental Priming on Police Integration and Support for Violence

To measure the relationship between perceived integration and support for violence among Jewish Israelis, I re-ran the experiment described above on the half of the sample that is Jewish. Table 6.8 shows that support for violence among Jews in the control group, i.e. those who received the identity-neutral news article, is statistically indistinguishable from zero. On the other hand, about 33% Jews in the treatment would consider using anti-state violence. However, the estimates for the treatment and control groups are not significantly different from one another (using a difference-in-differences estimation). I find no evidence, then, that providing Jewish Israelis with information that the Israeli police are integrated affects their willingness to use violence against the state. Just as with the non-Jewish subsample, there are three possible explanations for this non-finding: first, there may be no relationship between perceived integration and support for violence; second, the relationship may exist but my study did not have sufficient power to capture it; or third, the experimental vignette may have failed to shift Jewish Israelis' deeply-entrenched perceptions about the extent to which the police are integrated.

Table 6.8: Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence (Jews)

	4 item	5 item	Difference
Vignette Control	1.79 (.14) 91	1.94 (.13) 110	.15 (.19)
Vignette Treatment	1.70 (.12) 108	2.03 (.15) 93	.33 (.19)*

Conclusion

This chapter presents evidence that in Israel, like in Iraq, bottom-up police integration reduces the motives of citizens from marginalized groups to engage in conflict. Israeli Arabs who perceive the police as more integrated are hold fewer grievances over current conditions and are less fearful of future repression. The evidence falls short, however, of supporting the claim that information about police integration causes a reduction in support for violence. I suggest that this non-finding is due to the experiment's failure to shift perceptions of the Israel Police's degree of integration. Israelis hold well-entrenched attitudes about the national police, and exposure to a short news article was insufficient to significantly shift the degree to which they believe the police are integrated. As a result, the experiment fails to find an effect on support for violence even though perceptions about the police's degree of integration are, in fact, negatively correlated with several mechanisms linked with conflict.

The findings on all three mechanisms follow the trend from Iraq in showing little evidence that police integration affects Jewish and non-Jewish citizens differently. In Chapter 4, I speculate that the similar effects between Iraqi Shias and Sunnis might be attributed to Iraq's relatively unstable ethnic power structure. In Israel, however, Jews have been the politically-dominant group since the state was created in 1948, and there is little reason to perceive this arrangement as unstable. How can we explain the observation that Jews and non-Jews are similarly likely to perceive that police and government service provision are fairer when the police are integrated? In the case of perceptions about police and government service provision, respondents indicated that they believe services are distributed more fairly

in terms of religious and ethnic identity when the police are integrated. This response says nothing about their *personal experiences*, however. Jewish Israelis do not need to benefit personally from police integration to believe that service distribution is done more fairly. On this outcome, then, it makes sense that Jewish and non-Jewish respondents should have similar attitudes about the effects of police integration on the fairness of service provision. Attitudes about fear of repression are harder to explain. The finding that non-Jews are less afraid of the police when the police are integrated is relatively intuitive. The finding that Jewish Israelis are also less afraid of the police when the police are integrated is puzzling. It may be that Jewish Israelis view non-Jewish officers as more professional or less likely to harass them. After all, tensions between citizens and the police are not limited to non-Jewish citizens, nor are all tensions caused by politically-salient religious divisions. Given that Israelis tend to have quite negative attitudes towards the police (compared to citizens in similarly-developed Western countries), along with the fact that most Jewish Israelis have little interaction with non-Jewish officers, it may be that Jewish Israelis view institutional reform as a positive move even if it leads to less representation for them on religious lines. Regardless, this project set out to test a set of hypotheses about the relationship between police integration and support for violence among citizens from marginalized groups, and the evidence largely supports the argument that bottom-up integration reduces conflict motives in these segments of societies. The surprising findings about integration's effects on dominant group attitudes deserve attention in future research, but they do not detract from the powerful findings about members of the dominant group.

The results from Israel also provide evidence of the important differences between different configurations of inclusiveness. Whereas mixed-group policing, i.e. integration, is consistently associated with fewer grievances against the state, local-level autonomy over policing has no such effect. Indeed, when it comes to fear of future mistreatment, police autonomy exacerbates the problem, with Arab citizens who say police officers are mostly other Arabs expressing *more* fear of government repression that either those who say police officers are mostly Jews or those who say officers are a mix between the two. These striking differences in

outcomes between integration and autonomy speak to the importance of inclusion not for normative reasons or as an end unto itself, but because of the way that integration ties the fortunes of different groups to one another and balances power within important policy-implementing institutions.

Finally, the findings in Israel tell a story about the importance of the police as the point of contact between politics and ordinary citizens. Police officers are ubiquitous in everyday life. Citizens see them patrolling streets, enforcing laws, and providing services as they go about their daily lives. Thus, perhaps even more than the political institutions that make the laws, the police who enforce them have the power to shape citizens' relationships with the state. Police officers have broad discretion over the way that laws are applied to individual citizens, and how security is distributed to different segments of society. It is not surprising, then, that in a society like Israel which is deeply divided along religious lines, perceptions of the degree to which members of different religious groups are integrated into the police have a profound effect on citizens' attitudes not just towards the police but towards the government.

6.A   Vignettes

Treatment:

I would like to read you a very short newspaper article that was published recently on an Israeli news website.

The title of the article is, "Muslim Police Officer Ascends to New Heights"

Deputy Inspector-General Jamal Hakroush on Wednesday became the first Muslim police officer to ascend to his rank in Israel. He was recently nominated to the office of deputy cheif of the Traffic Department.

"It's a position I have been waiting for, and it offers many challenges," Hakroush told reporters. "I am proud of the Israel Police for choosing me based on my qualifications and nothing else."

The officer added, "My religion and origin are facts I do not ignore, but I have never, in all my years of service, felt discriminated against or hurt by it."

Hakroush says his home village of Kfar Kana has offered a lot of support. "People from all over the village called to congratulate me. I am proud to be the first Muslim officer to carry the rank of deputy inspector-general in Israel Police," he told his associates Wednesday."

Control:

I would like to read you a very short newspaper article that was published recently on an Israeli news website.

The title of the article is, "Local Police Officer Ascends to New Heights"

Deputy Inspector-General Halu on Wednesday became the first police officer from Karmiel to ascend to his rank in Israel. He was recently nominated to the office of deputy-director of the Traffic Department.

"It's a position I have been waiting for, and it offers many challenges," Halu told reporters. "I am proud of Israel Police for choosing me based on my qualifications and nothing else."

Halu says his home town of Karmiel has offered a lot of support. "People I have not talked to since school called to congratulate me. I am proud to serve in the Israel Police and look forward to contributing to the police in my new role," he told reporters.

6.B   Item-Count Response Methodological Concerns

Table 6.9 shows balance on several observable characteristics between the item-count short and long list groups. The mean for just one variable, respondents' age, is significantly different across groups. It appears that randomization was successful in creating groups with similar average characteristics.

Table 6.9: Item Count Balance Table

Variable	Short List Mean	Long List Mean	$Pr|T| > |t|$
Male	.457	.507	.159
Age	45.1	40.1	.001**
Vote	.791	.774	.563
Economic Satisfaction	3.15	3.26	.167
Work Public Sector	.341	.334	.843
Police Integration (Nat'l)	2.03	2.03	.997
n	402	402	

Table 6.10 shows the distribution of responses to the item-count measure on support for anti-government violence. The logic behind the item-count measurement strategy is that subjects do not reveal their individual response – it is possible for the researcher to determine only how many items on the list a respondent would choose, but not which one(s) he or she would choose. Of course, anonymity breaks down if respondents select all of the items on the treatment list. Such a "ceiling effect" makes it obvious that the respondent has selected the controversial item. Table 6.10 shows that 13 Israelis in the long-list group said they would consider using all 5 of the methods listed if they felt the government was ignoring their needs. In doing so, they revealed their willingness to consider using violence against the government.

One possibility is that these 13 subjects were being honest, and either did not understand that answering this way revealed their response or simply did not care. If this is the case, it is also likely to be true that other subjects also would have considered all five but did not say so for fear of revealing their answer on the

controversial item. This scenario would cause me to underestimate the proportion of respondents who support the use of non-peaceful methods. A second possibility is that these subjects, or some subset of them, either were not paying careful attention to the survey question or did not understand the question and simply picked an answer. As long as they arrived at the answer of "5" randomly, then we are simply observing noise in the data. In neither case, however, would the ceiling effect result in higher mean responses. Therefore, the proportion of the sample estimated to support anti-government violence should be considered a conservative estimate. It may under-count the proportion of respondents who would consider using violence but is unlikely to over-count them. Finally, while this ceiling effect decreases the confidence with which we can estimate the proportion of respondents would use non-peaceful methods, it should not affect our ability to draw inferences about the difference between the vignette treatment and control groups (news article primes about integration), since these were randomly assigned.

Table 6.10: Item-Count: Distribution of Responses

Number of Items	Control	Treatment	Total
0	32	33	65
1	114	83	197
2	125	111	236
3	43	77	120
4	87	85	172
5		13	13
Total	401	402	803

6.C   Vignette Prime Balance Table

Table 6.11: Balance Table: Vignette Treatment

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	$Pr|T| > |t|$
Male	.459	.506	.181
Age	43.3	42.6	.580
Vote	.779	.785	.841
Economic Satisfaction	3.18	3.22	.591
Work Public Sector	.337	.338	.999
Police Integration (Nat'l)	1.99	2.06	.165
n	403	401	

6.D Effects of Experimental Treatment on Attitudes Towards Police and Government

Table 6.12: Effects of Integration News Story Treatment

	(1) Fear Police	(2) Fear Gov	(3) Police Fair	(4) Gov Fair	(5) Job
Treatment	0.0995	0.0351	-0.0363	0.0283	-0.0943
	(0.331)	(0.184)	(0.175)	(0.157)	(0.151)
Treat*Non-Jew	-0.159		-0.321	-0.427	-0.174
	(0.378)		(0.219)	(0.451)	(0.243)
Non-Jewish	0.0198		0.167	-0.111	-2.391**
	(0.468)		(0.269)	(0.600)	(1.087)
Age	-0.0122***	-0.00333	0.00733*	-0.000874	-0.00513
	(0.00346)	(0.00365)	(0.00429)	(0.00941)	(0.0102)
Male	-0.322***	0.110	-0.170	0.251	0.264
	(0.118)	(0.198)	(0.104)	(0.187)	(0.179)
Vote	-0.104	-0.553	0.212	0.0233	0.970***
	(0.221)	(0.337)	(0.318)	(0.323)	(0.213)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.181**	-0.256**	0.241***	0.284**	0.0833
	(0.0736)	(0.125)	(0.0633)	(0.115)	(0.162)
Work Public	-0.0671	-0.666***	0.281*	0.306	0.652***
	(0.119)	(0.174)	(0.153)	(0.205)	(0.170)
In Person	1.983***	1.228***	-0.0875	0	-1.657**
	(0.294)	(0.369)	(0.321)	(.)	(0.799)
Observations	776	378	737	615	724
Pseudo R^2	0.078	0.092	0.060	0.073	0.428

Standard errors clustered by PSU.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

6.E   Robustness Tests and Alternative Model Specifications

Standard errors for the models in Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 are clustered by the primary sampling unit, either the city for most respondents or the neighborhood for those in East Jerusalem. Because this provides a maximum of 15 clusters, we might be concerned about the possibility of false positives (Green and Vavreck 2008; Harden 2011; Esarey and Menger 2015). I therefore replicate all analyses using a wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al. 2008). Although the main models use ordered logistic regression to fit the structure of the survey response options, computing limitations necessitate the use of linear models with the wild cluster bootstrap. I use the cgmwildboot command package to execute this analysis in STATA (Cameron et al. 2008). Replication code is available on the author's website. Tables 6.13, 6.14, and 6.15 report the coefficients and p-values from these models.

Table 6.13: Wild Cluster Bootstrap Replication – Integration and Fear of Repression

	(1) Police	(2) Police	(3) Police	(4) Gov.	(5) Gov.	(6) Gov.
Integration (Nat'l)	-0.263 (.253)			-0.259 (.067)		
Int. (Nat'l)*Non-Jew	.0123 (.267)					
Integration (Local)		-0.040 (.42)			-0.115 (.253)	
Int. (Local)*Non-Jew		0.016 (.74)				
Police Same			0.143 (.047)			0.529 (0)
Police Mix			-0.039 (.587)			-0.028 (.76)
Non-Jewish	-0.280 (.38)	-0.007 (1)	-0.016 (.94)			
Age	-0.004 (.127)	-0.004 (.087)	-0.004 (.027)	-0.001 (.64)	-0.003 (.367)	-0.002 (.373)
Male	-0.173 (.04)	-0.189 (.02)	-0.162 (.08)	0.039 (.687)	0.071 (.373)	0.051 (.64)
Vote	-0.116 (.533)	-0.178 (.333)	-0.139 (.48)	-0.250 (.353)	-0.248 (.393)	-0.236 (.4)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.103 (.033)	-0.102 (.047)	-0.111 (.033)	-0.128 (.08)	-0.130 (.047)	-0.113 (.14)
Work Public	-0.074 (.14)	-0.011 (.733)	-0.031 (.6)	-0.310 (.053)	-0.361 (.007)	-0.372 (.007)
In Person	1.149 (0)	1.168 (0)	1.224 (0)	0.467 (.067)	0.610 (.013)	0.715 (.013)
Observations	672	702	776	345	370	378

p-values based on wild cluster bootsrapped standard errors in parentheses

Table 6.14: Wild Cluster Bootstrap Replication – Integration and Perceived Fairness

	(1) Police	(2) Police	(3) Police	(4) Police	(5) Police	(6) Police
Integration (Nat'l)	0.465 (0)			0.154 (0)		
Int. (Nat'l)*Non-Jew	-0.107 (.353)			-0.076 (.213)		
Integration (Local)		0.099 (.08)			0.027 (.487)	
Int. (Local)*Non-Jew		0.103 (.113)			-0.002 (.907)	
Police Same			0.102 (.38)			0.015 (.793)
Police Mix			0.342 (.007)			0.048 (.173)
Non-Jewish	0.228 (.52)	-0.308 (.253)	-0.122 (.307)	0.089 (.653)	-0.014 (.967)	-0.082 (.6)
Age	0.008 (.047)	0.008 (.04)	0.007 (.053)	0.002 (.407)	0.001 (.46)	0.001 (.893)
Male	-0.117 (.047)	-0.097 (.127)	-0.085 (0.173)	0.050 (.08)	0.044 (.273)	0.044 (.227)
Vote	0.050 (.847)	-0.003 (.993)	-0.006 (.947)	-0.040 (.487)	-0.024 (.667)	-0.010 (.82)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.098 (.027)	0.120 (0)	0.115 (0)	0.050 (.053)	0.052 (.013)	0.053 (.053)
Work Public	0.114 (.267)	0.135 (.28)	0.141 (.207)	0.067 (.247)	0.052 (.327)	0.052 (.273)
In Person	0.140 (.387)	-0.201 (.393)	-0.159 (.5)	-0.175 (.12)	-0.221 (.007)	-0.205 (.007)
Observations	648	677	737	619	646	705

p-values based on wild cluster bootsrapped standard errors in parentheses

Table 6.15: Wild Cluster Bootstrap Replication – Integration and Employment

	(1) Job	(2) Job	(3) Job (Non-Jews)
Integration (Nat'l)	0.064 (.14)		
Int. (Nat'l)*Non-Jew	-0.043 (.413)		
Integration (Local)		-0.024 (.333)	
Int. (Local)*Non-Jew		0.060 (0)	
Police Same			0.019 (.747)
Police Mix			0.064 (.12)
Age	-0.001 (.6)	-0.001 (.82)	0.001 (.54)
Male	0.037 (.193)	0.025 (.28)	0.058 (0)
Vote	0.121 (.033)	0.116 (.027)	0.096 (.107)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.001 (1)	0.012 (0.653)	-0.009 (.647)
Work Public	0.052 (.173)	0.064 (.14)	0.064 (.207)
In Person	-0.090 (.353)	-0.092 (.107)	-0.096 (.167)
Observations	629	658	370

p-values based on wild cluster bootsrapped standard errors in parentheses

Chapter 7

Bottom-Up Integration and Police Service Provision: Evidence from Israel

Thus far, I have focused on the effects of bottom-up integration on violent conflict. I now turn to another outcome of police integration, changes in the quality of police service provision, and specifically crime prevention. The quality of service provision is, of course, related to the likelihood of conflict. Individuals who feel that important government services are not provided adequately may become angry with the state. If tensions are already simmering to the point that violence is a possible reaction, poor quality service provision may motivate citizens to fight. If citizens perceive that the state provides services poorly because of their group identity, then this violence may break out along identity group lines.

Yet, crime prevention matters not just as a motive for violent conflict but as an important outcome of governance in its own right. Public safety, of which crime prevention is a major component, is a key *raison d'etre* of the modern state (Olson 1993). A society in which the state fails to provide public safety, or in which public safety is provided by someone other than the state, risks deterioration into a "weak" state. A lack of public safety leads to broader societal problems and a loss of productivity (Olson 1993). Finally, the actions of police officers affect perceptions of the state more broadly. The visibility of police officers as they

go about their duties makes them a concrete symbol of the state and a constant reminder to citizens about the state's role in their daily lives. Thus, the quality of police service provision affects not just citizens' relationships with the police but their relationships with the state more broadly. Poor quality service provision from this key government institution undermines the very legitimacy of the state.

This chapter asks whether police integration affects the police's effectiveness at preventing crime. Anecdotes and survey evidence presented in previous chapters show that citizens' perceptions about police integration are strongly associated with the way they view the police and the state, including the way that they perceive the quality and distribution of police services. Are these perceptions of service provision borne out in reality? Does integrating the police make officers more effective at combating criminal activity? If so, how are these effects distributed across different religious groups?

Police integration may affect service provision through two interrelated mechanisms. The first affects the allocation of police resources. When relations between groups are strained and the police are dominated by a particular group, police resources may be allocated inefficiently due to officer biases (Weitzer 1995; Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). Over-policing, or harassment on the basis of identity, and under-policing, the failure to provide adequate police resources to certain communities, assign scarce personnel and equipiment on the basis of identity rather than where they are most needed. Integration reduces officers' preferences for bias by generating repeated contacts between outgroup officers (Allport 1954), and it constrains officers' ability to engage in bias by positioning outgroup officers to monitor one another, leading to more efficient uses of police resources and consequently more effective crime prevention.

Second, integrating the police increases information flows from citizens to the police. Effective policing relies on community cooperation (Weitzer and Tuch 2006; Skogan 1986). The police cannot be everywhere at all times, so officers depend on members of the community to provide them with information about suspicious activities, tips regarding potential suspects, and reports of crimes that have occurred. Citizens in divided societies are more likely to cooperate with the

police when they believe that the police are integrated, either because they have had more positive interactions with the police due to decreases in officer bias, because they prefer being by coethnics (Donohue III and Levitt 2001), or because they perceive the integrated institution as more legitimate (Tyler 2005). In turn, the police use information provided by citizens to identify crime hotspots, track down suspects, and allocate resources in a way that deters future crime.

I test whether local-level police integration affects crime victimization in Israel using data from the Israel Police on the demographic makeup of officers at each police station along with a large crime-victimization survey run each year. I find that between 2008 and 2014, increases in local-level police integration are associated with a lower probability of crime victimization. I then use data from the original survey described in Chapter 6 to test the resource distribution and information flows mechanisms. Respondents who believe the police are integrated are also more likely to perceive police activities as equitable with in terms of identity. Meanwhile, increases in perceived police integration also lead to greater willingness to report crimes to the police.

The results in this chapter highlight the role of rank-and-file police officers as *de facto* policymakers because of the discretion they have over law enforcement. I find that increases in local integration reduce crime victimization only for minor crimes like petty theft and vehicle break-ins; that is, crimes over which officers have discretion regarding how much effort to devote to solving. On the other hand, local integration has little or no effect on more serious crimes like violent assault or grand theft auto, crimes over which rank-and-file officers have considerably less discretion in investigating. The critical link between integration and the quality of police service provision, in other words, is the discretion that officers have over law enforcement.

Critically, the findings in this chapter suggest that the concrete policy outcomes of bottom-up integration are not zero-sum across groups. Local increases in police integration are associated with reduced crime victimization among both Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. This finding is consistent with the argument that reductions in inefficient police actions motivated by identity-based biases im-

prove the police's ability to fight crime. Increasing the efficiency of police resource distribution allows for improvements in crime prevention in some areas without necessarily creating a corresponding reduction in service provision in other communities. Thus, this chapter provides two broader insights. First, it demonstrates that the effects of bottom-up integration are not restricted to attitudes but extend to concrete policy outcomes as well. Second, it reinforces the argument that the outcomes of bottom-up integration are not necessarily a zero-sum across groups, providing additional evidence that integration represents a viable policy option for reducing conflict in deeply divided societies.

Police Integration and Crime Prevention

How does the integration of minority groups into the police affect police service provision? After all, while the inclusion of members of all groups within the institution responsible for enforcing laws may be normatively desirable in its own right, police integration would also be desirable if it led to higher quality service provision. Indeed, when the Israel Police announced in April 2016 that they were initiating a drive to recruit more Muslim officers, their justification was that a more representative police force would improve service provision for Muslim citizens.[1] Existing research suggests that the demographic makeup of policy-implementing institutions has important implications for service provision in divided societies. For example, military integration is argued to affect the attitudes of soldiers towards the state and towards non-coethnics (Samii 2013), their effectiveness in combatting insurgents (Lyall 2010), and their relationship with the state (Enloe 1980; Wilkinson 2015). Courts may provide different rulings depending on the demographic makeup of judges and the identity of the defendant (Shayo and Zussman 2011; Grossman et al. 2015). On the other hand, some research indicates that the presence of minority police officers leads to *greater* discrimination against citizens from minority groups (Blair et al. 2016; Weitzer and Hasisi 2008). For example, police officers from minority groups might treat

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[1]Kamisher, Eliyahu (2016), "Help Wanted: Police Seek Arab Recruits for Force." *Jerusalem Post,* 12 September.

coethnics worse in an effort to prove how "tough" they are.

Research on top-down power sharing in lawmaking institutions also suggests a link between institutional inclusiveness and service provision. Scholars argue that power sharing leads to improved governance outcomes for minority groups by ensuring that minority voices are heard in the policymaking process (Lijphart 1969; Norris 2008). In top-down power sharing, the improvement in service provision is largely distributive; it transfers policymaking authority from the dominant group to minority representatives. It is not necessarily expected to affect the overall quality of government service provision. Rather, it changes the distribution of services by ensuring that the legislative process does not ignore the preferences of minorities. Bottom-up integration, on the other hand, might affects not only the distribution of services by policy-implementing institutions but also the overall quality of services they provide. I argue that integration can make service provision more efficient, therefore leading to improved service provision in some areas without necessarily reducing the quality of service provision in others. Applied to the police, bottom-up integration may lead to more effective crime prevention and lower crime rates. Two possible mechanisms might link police integration with a reduction in crime. The first deals with the allocation of limited police resources. The second deals with community cooperation and information flows from citizens to the police.

Efficient Resource Allocation

The link between police integration and crime prevention begins with changes in the way that officers treat citizens from marginalized groups. When a single group dominates the police, officers may engage in bias like over-policing, for example harassment, or under-policing, allocating police resources away from minority areas without regard for criminal activity (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). Over-policing might take the form of an officer stopping minority drivers for insignificant or entirely fabricated offenses which do not affect public safety. Under-policing takes the form of police officers refusing to patrol on certain streets or in certain neighborhoods, or the department allocating resources away from those

neighborhoods, on the basis of identity. Both under- and over-policing are ineffi-cient distributions of police resources with regard to crime fighting, as they divert officers and equipment away from their intended purpose. Chapter 2 details two reasons why integration should reduce biases in officer behavior. First, integration may decrease officers' preferences for engaging in bias by improving their attitudes towards outgroup members. Individuals in divided societies tend to have limited personal contact with members of "opposing" groups. As a result, attitudes are formed on the basis of stereotypes and received wisdom. Integration of the police increases the frequency of interactions between officers of different groups, provid-ing opportunities for positive personal experiences to replace negative stereotypes as the basis for attitudes towards outgroup members. Training and serving to-gether with non-coethnics generates interactions in the context of equal-status individuals working together towards a common goal, conditions which lead to im-proved attitudes towards outgroup members (Allport 1954; Zajonc 1968; Ball and Cantor 1974; Blair et al. 2016). The change in officer attitudes should reduce their preference for engaging in biased service provision in favor of their own group at the expense of others.

Second, even if police integration fails to alter officers' preferences for en-gaging in bias, it may constrain their ability to do so. When officers work in pairs or groups, non-coethnic officers working together can monitor one another's be-havior and prevent or sanction biased behavior. Sanctioning may mean reporting behavior to a superior, exerting social pressure among fellow officers, or making the actions of the wayward officer public. In many cases, the knowledge that they are being monitored is sufficient to alter officers' behavior. The conversation with a Jewish Israeli police officer discussed in Chapter 2, in which the officer tells how he lets his Arab partner decide whether or not to fine Arab motorists for a bro-ken tail light, illustrates the way that police integration constrains the behavior of officers towards outgroup citizens.

Distributing police resources on the basis of identity rather than need is inherently inefficient. When personnel and equipment are distributed with a pref-erence toward a particular group, their allocation deviates from the intended crime-

fighting purpose. Sending patrol cars to a certain neighborhood because the people who live there belong to a certain group should lead to less effective crime prevention compared to allocating patrol cars to areas most susceptible to crime. Reducing biases in resource allocation and officer behavior should therefore increase the efficiency of the police and allow them to fight crime more effectively.

Citizen-Police Information Flows

Integration also improves crime prevention by increasing community cooperation. Community cooperation, and particularly the flow of information between citizens and the police, is critical for effective policing (Weitzer and Tuch 2006; Wilson 2013; Skogan 1986; Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Akerlof and Yellen 1994). Police officers cannot be everywhere all the time (Becker 1968). They rely on information from citizens to determine where problem spots exist, identify suspicious people or behavior, and collect evidence after a crime has occurred. Citizens who trust the police are more willing to ask them for help and more likely to assist them in identifying suspects or offenders (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011). The information citizens provide about the location, timing, and nature of crimes that have occurred in the past can be used by the police to identify patterns and develop deterrents against future crimes. If integrating the police in a divided setting improves police-citizen relations (Weitzer 1995; Bayley 2008), then citizens should be more willing to provide the police with useful information that can be used to fight crime.

Increases in willingness to provide information may be a reaction to the reduction in identity-based biases in service provision described above. Biased policing harms procedural justice, or the belief that the system is fair, which in turn affects the way that citizens interact with law enforcement (Tyler 1990, 2004; Hasisi and Weisburd 2011). These biases may be real (Tyler 2005), but *perceived* biases may be just as important. Some researchers go so far as to argue that procedural justice has a larger effect on attitudes towards the police than does the actual outcome of an encounter (Tyler and Huo 2002; Hasisi and Weisburd 2011). If citizens believe that integration is a component of procedural justice, then it should generate trust in the police, which in turn may lead to increased informa-

tion flows from citizens to the police. Additionally, shared cultural identity breaks down barriers in trust and communication between citizens and officers. Existing research argues that we should observe increased community acceptance when the police and the citizens they protect share a common identity (Donohue III and Levitt 2001). Language is an obvious factor, but shared culture may also be sufficient to induce trust, as it frequently comes with shared norms and understandings (Hardin 1997; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Laitin 2007). Thus, citizens who perceive that the police represent their group should be more willing to cooperate with the police or provide them with information.

Analysis

The arguments detailed above lead to several expectations about the relationship between police integration and crime.

H_1: Areas in which the police are more integrated will have lower crime rates.

H_2: Identity-based biases in the distribution of police services will decrease when the police are integrated.

H_3: Citizens will be more willing to report crimes to the police when they perceive the police as more integrated.

Integration, Citizen Trust, and Crime in Israel

Despite the police's high levels of competence on objective measures, police-community relations in Israel are generally poor, and Israeli citizens express less trust in their police than do citizens in countries with similarly-effective police forces (Yogev 2010; Saunders et al. 2013). Israelis' attitudes towards the police are significantly informed by both their perceptions of identity-based conflict and their personal ethnic and religious affiliations. Arab and other non-Jewish citizens tend to have less trust in the police than do their Jewish counterparts (Saunders et al. 2013; Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). Differential rates of trust between Jews and non-Jews appear to have real implications for crime reporting rates. In one survey carried out in 2008 (Hasisi and Weisburd 2014), 70.1% of Jews said they would call the police if they witnessed a crime, compared to 50.6% of non-Jews. The survey I

carried out for this project paints a similar picture. Figure 7.1 shows that among respondents surveyed for this project, Jews were much more likely than non-Jews to say that they would contact the police if they witnessed someone stealing from a shop.

Figure 7.1: Willingness to Report Crimes

There is also evidence that police resources are distributed differently between Jewish and Arab neighborhoods, with Arab citizens expressing frustration at the lack of policing services their communities receive (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). At a 2013 conference on policing held in the Knesset (Parliament), Arab Member of the Knesset (MK) Esawi Frij said, "In terms of [policing] results, the Arab sector lags behind. There is a gap and distance between the Arab citizen and the police. Violence and illegal firearms are extensive, and personal security is deteriorating. The police take action, but not enough." (Abraham Fund Initiatives 2013, 1). Arab Israelis are concerned about both under- and over-policing. According to Salim Salibi, head of Majd al-Krum local council: "When there is violence or fighting in the village, we wait hours for the police but they dont arrive. But when a company comes to collect debts, it is accompanied by police officers from the Special Patrol Unit. This creates a lack of trust with the police." Salem

Abu Ayash, mayor of the predominantly-Arab town of Laqiya, says, "When they demolish a home or a shack, we see a whole convoy of police cars – two or three hundred, you cant see the end of the convoy. When there is a fight in the village, they barely send a patrol car."[2]

Crime rates in Israel are on par with most Western European countries (Saunders et al. 2013). As in most places, crime is more common in less affluent cities and neighborhoods.[3] Publicly available crime statistics are difficult to come by at the sub-national level, but according to the Israel Police crime in Jerusalem has declined over the past several years.[4] On the other hand, in large cities like Ashkelon, Modi'in, and Beer Sheva, residents have experienced increases in crime. Tel Aviv is Israel's most dangerous city in terms of crimes per capita.[5] According to a victimization survey carried out by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2013 5.4% of Israelis were victims of a home break-in and 4.7% of non-violent theft. Reporting rates for these crimes were 58.1% and 38.8%, respectively. 2.1% of Israelis had their vehicles stolen, and 1.2% were the victim of a violent crime. Jews were more likely to be the victim of some crimes, including home break-ins and non-violent crimes, while Arabs were more likely to experience vehicle break-ins and assaults.[6]

Data and Methods

I use data from several sources to test the relationship between police integration and crime. Information on crime victimization comes from Israel's Social

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[2]While the claim of "two or three hundred" patrol cars is hyperbole, I observed a line of several dozen police cars entering an Arab town in Northern Israel to oversee an eviction. I was informed by a (Jewish) local that such a show of force for evictions or home demolitions in Arab towns is quite common.

[3]US Department of State (2014), "Israel 2014 Crime and Safety Report: Tel Aviv." https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15230

[4]Eisenbud, Daniel K. "Non-Terror-Related Jerusalem Crime Rate Drops Amid Heightened Police Presence." 23 November 2015, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Jerusalem-crime-rate-drops-434997

[5]Levi, Yaakov. "Secret Crime Stats: Tel Aviv 'Most Dangerous' Town." 19 October 2014, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/186302#.Vvm2nuIrKM8

[6]Annual Statistical Abstract, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2014), "Victims of Criminal Activities Aged 20 and Over, by Type of Offence and Selected Characteristics." Publication 11.4, http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton66/st11_04.pdf

Survey, a nationally-representative survey of approximately 7,000 respondents carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics each year. All individuals ages 20 and over living in Israel are eligible to be included in the survey. The Social Survey covers a wide range of topics, including economic and employment status, language and technological abilities, education, and basic household information. Most relevant to this chapter, the survey asks a set of questions about crime victimization, including whether the respondent experienced a vehicle break-in, home break-in, or non-violent theft in the past year. Responses to these questions are used to create an additive index of victimization by minor crimes. The variable ranges from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating that the respondent was not the victim of any of these crimes in the past year and 3 indicating that the respondent experienced all three types of crimes. Unfortunately the victimization survey did not ask *how many* times each type of crime occurred; however, to test whether findings are sensitive to this coding, an additional model uses as the dependent variable an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent experienced *any* of these crimes in the past year, or 0 if they did not.

The use of survey data to measure crime victimization is in many ways preferable to official crime statistics reported by law enforcement (Banerjee et al. 2012). Official crime statistics include only the subset of crimes that were brought to the attention of the police, in most cases by being reported by citizens. The problem with using these numbers for analysis is that many of the same factors which make the police more effective at crime-fighting, for example increased citizen cooperation, also increase the proportion of crimes that are reported to the police. Thus, when citizen trust increases, actual crime may decrease while increased reporting gives the appearance that crime is increasing. To the extent that respondents are willing to answer questions about victimization truthfully, the victimization survey achieves a more accurate measure of criminal activity. No doubt some respondents will still conceal the occurrence of a crime, but answering a direct "yes or no" question from a person to whom they are already speaking requires considerably less effort than contacting the police to file an official report, making it more likely that respondents will reveal crimes that have occurred.

I test crime victimization against the key independent variable, integration of the police. I use yearly data on the number of police officers from each religious group at each police station in Israel between the years 2008 and 2014.[7] I aggregated station-level data on officer demographics to the subdistrict level to match the smallest available geographical unit on crime victimization from the Social Survey data. Israel is divided into 16 subdistricts.[8] The Judea and Samaria subdistrict, more commonly known as the "West Bank," is excluded from this analysis because of its different legal status from the rest of the country, leaving 15 subdistricts for analysis. I then calculated police integration using the formula for ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) (Alesina et al. 2003). The resulting measure is the probability that any two randomly-selected police officers would be members of different religious groups. A measure of 1.00 on *Police Integration* indicates that all officers are from different religious groups, while a measure of 0.00 means that all officers are from the same group. Subdistrict-level *Police Integration* ranges from .014 to .611, with a mean of .211.

The models on crime victimization include several covariates that may influence the likelihood of being the victim of a crime. Individual-level controls come from the Social Survey and include gender, home ownership, religious affiliation (a proxy for both economic status and neighborhood type), and military service. A dummy variable for urban-rural characteristics of the respondent's neighborhood also comes from the Social Survey. District-level unemployment estimates were collected from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics. Finally, and most importantly, all models include subdistrict indicator variables to account for systematic differences between subdistricts. The test, then, is whether changes in integration over time *within a given subdistrict* affect the likelihood of crime. Variations on the base model add controls for subdistrict-level religious heterogeneity (*ELF*) and

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[7]The data was provided to the author by the Israel Police in response to the author's freedom of information request. It includes the number of Jews, Christians, Muslims, Bedouins, Druze, Circassians, and "others." For this analysis, Circassians, who make up considerably less than 1% of total officers, were grouped with "others" since the Social Survey does not use Circassian as a category for respondents. The "Bedouin" category was combined with Muslims because the vast majority of Bedouins are Muslim.

[8]Akko, Ashkelon, Beer Sheva, Golan, Hadera, Haifa, Jerusalem, Jezreel, Judea and Samaria, Kineret Petah Tikva, Ramleh, Rehovot, Sharon, Tel Aviv, and Tzfat

the percentage of the subdistrict population that is Jewish, in the event that local population demographics have an effect on baseline crime rates. Finally, an interaction term between police integration and respondent religion tests whether the effects of integration on crime victimization are conditional on a respondent's religious identity. Summary statistics for all variables are available in Appendix 7.A.

Results: Integration Reduces Crime

As Table 7.1 shows, the results of several regression models corroborate the hypothesis that local-level police integration is negatively associated with crime victimization. The analysis covers the years 2008 through 2014, but excludes 2010 due to concerns about data quality.[9] Standard errors are clustered by subdistrict-year, the level of measurement for police integration, providing 76 clusters. The first four models regress the additive crime index on integration. These models use negative binomial regression as the dependent variable is skewed towards 0 (i.e. most respondents where not the victim of any crimes). Model 5 uses the alternative specification of crime victimization, a dummy indicator of whether or not the respondent experienced at least one crime in the past year. This model uses logistic regression.

The results show that an increase in the degree of police integration within a subdistrict is associated with a decrease in the probability that an individual will be the victim of a vehicle break-in, home break-in, or non-violent theft. This finding is robust to the inclusion of various controls for standard determinants of crime victimization. Subdistrict-level fractionalization is associated with a decreased likelihood of crime victimization (Column 2), while the proportion of the subdistrict population that is Jewish is associated with an increase in victimization (Column 3). Column 4 shows that while police integration reduces the probability of victimization among both Jews and non-Jews, the effect is slightly larger among Jews. Model 5, which uses the alternative specification of crime as the

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[9]The file I received from the Israel Police was missing several critical variable labels, making it impossible to accurately match figures on officer demographics with subdistricts for 2010.

Table 7.1: Police Integration and Crime

	(1) Crime	(2) Crime	(3) Crime	(4) Crime	(5) Crime (alt.)
Police Integration	-3.449**	-2.049*	-3.424***	-3.471**	-4.083**
	(1.635)	(1.144)	(1.303)	(1.635)	(1.720)
ELF		-46.49***			
		(5.476)			
Pct. Pop. Jewish			32.76***		
			(5.033)		
Pol. Int.*Non-Jew				0.742*	
				(0.403)	
Urban SD	0.0574	0.0621	0.0613	0.0613	0.0889*
	(0.0498)	(0.0505)	(0.0503)	(0.0498)	(0.0540)
Male	0.0646**	0.0649**	0.0647**	0.0638**	0.0703*
	(0.0319)	(0.0318)	(0.0319)	(0.0320)	(0.0362)
Home Owner	-0.171***	-0.176***	-0.174***	-0.174***	-0.187***
	(0.0296)	(0.0297)	(0.0299)	(0.0298)	(0.0354)
Jewish	-0.0254	-0.0268	-0.0238	0.136	-0.0732
	(0.0724)	(0.0719)	(0.0722)	(0.119)	(0.0786)
Military	0.0589*	0.0611*	0.0588*	0.0585*	0.0662*
	(0.0336)	(0.0336)	(0.0337)	(0.0335)	(0.0398)
Dist. Unemployment	5.916	2.930	3.588	5.859	6.883
	(4.399)	(3.533)	(4.031)	(4.403)	(4.572)
Observations	22904	22904	22904	22904	22904

Models 1-4 use negative binomial regression. Model 5 uses logistic regression.

Standard errors clustered by subdistrict-year. Models include subdistrict dummies.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

dependent variable, confirms these results. Calculating first differences on Model 5 reveals that increasing police integration from the least-integrated subdistrict to the most-integrated subdistrict is associated with a 33% decrease in the likelihood of experiencing at least one crime, while going from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile is associated with a 22% decrease in the likelihood of victimization. Appendix 7.B explores the claim that officer selection might be correlated with crime rates and shows that police integration is most likely to occur in areas that are *more* predisposed to crime. In other words, the finding of a negative relationship between police integration and crime rates is not caused by officer selection and distribution.

Officer Discretion in Policing Activities

The two mechanisms described above, information flows and service distribution, depend on police officers exercising discretion over the way they carry out their duties. There must be some slippage between the stated goals of the police, i.e. preventing crime, and the way that officers pursue that goal. This slippage constitutes an important scope condition. In determining integration's effects on crime, the type of crime in question is likely to effect this slippage. Major crimes like murder, violent assault, and grand theft auto are difficult to ignore. These crimes are likely to come to the attention of the police even if citizens do not report them, and the police are less likely to ignore them simply based on the neighborhood in which they occur. Their severity limits officers' ability to manipulate the way that cases are handled. In contrast, minor crimes like petty theft, vehicle or home break-ins, and vandalism are lower on the police's list of priorities and are unlikely to receive the same attention or resources that are devoted to more serious crimes. The discretionary nature of policing minor crimes makes them more susceptible to officer biases. I test the difference between major and minor crimes in Appendix 7.B. Whereas the main results in this chapter show a robust relationship between integration and minor crimes, I find no relationship between integration and the frequency of major crimes. This difference suggests that officer discretion plays an important role in the effects of integration on service

provision.

Alternative Arguments: Officer Quality and Institutional Heterogeneity

The arguments linking integration with a reduction in crime assume that changes in police demographics do not coincide with changes in the average quality of police officers. However, if officers from one group are more effective at crime fighting than officers from another group, the effects of integration proposed above may be endogenous to changes in the quality of police officers. Variation in officer quality across groups need not be due to inherent primordial differences between groups. For instance, a police department may have difficulty recruiting officers from certain groups and therefore use lower hiring standards in order to meet recruiting targets (Lott 2000). Systematic discrimination in social or economic opportunities may also lead to lower educational attainment for some groups compared to others.

However, recruitment strategies used by the Israel Police counteract these societal inequalities. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Israel Police gives hiring preference for university completion, which they view as a signal of maturity, independence, and the ability to follow through on tasks.[10] This criteria is especially important when evaluating Muslim applicants, since other favored criteria like military experience are not relevant. The explicit use of university completion and other high-skills indicators as a hiring qualification should narrow the educational gap between recruits of different religious groups.

Another possibility is that even if officers from different groups do not differ in baseline quality, forcing officers to work with outgroup members may lead to inefficiencies. Ethnic or religious heterogeneity within an institution is sometimes argued to have adverse effects for collective action (Banerjee et al. 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Laitin 2007). Group membership may help solve collective action problems by improving community members' abilities to monitor and sanction noncompliance (Berman 2000; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Besley et al.

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[10]Author interview with a high-ranking officer in the Israel Police whose jobs include managing the recruitment of new officers. 24 July 2014

1993) or by providing a common language to aid communication (Hardin 1997). Furthermore, if members of different groups have divergent preferences about the distribution of government services (Alesina et al. 1999), integrating the police could create disagreements between officers about how to engage in policing. I suggest that these concerns, while valid, are mitigated by the rigid structures of policing. With regard to language, all Israeli officers must speak Hebrew and are capable of coordinating with fellow officers. Existing evidence suggests that training and working closely with other officers on a regular basis counteracts the negative effects of heterogeneity on coordination. An experiment among police officers in Liberia finds no adverse effects of heterogeneity on collective action (Blair et al. 2016). Similarly, analysis of a survey of 2,800 officers in the Los Angeles Police Department concludes that "police officer attitudes toward the community are more likely a product of occupational socialization than demographic background," suggesting that the benefits of institutional socialization outweigh the costs to collective action (Lasley 1994, 95-96).

Testing the Mechanisms

I now turn to testing the two mechanisms proposed above, reductions in bias and increases in information flows. Rather than using the same subdistrict-level measure of police integration as above, I use individual-level measures of respondents' perceptions about police integration from my survey. This measure has several advantages. First, it avoids the noisiness caused by aggregation and therefore increases measurement precision. Second, because willingness to report a crime is argued to be based on citizens' *beliefs* that the police are integrated, in this case perceptions about police integration represent a more precise measure of the mechanism in question than does *actual* integration. Respondents are asked about their perceptions of police integration at both the national and local levels. At the national level, respondents were asked: "In general, how integrated would you say the Israeli police are? By integrated I mean that members of many different ethnic and religious groups serve together side by side. Throughout Israel in general, would you say that the police are very integrated, somewhat integrated, or not at

all integrated?" Respondents were then asked about their perceptions of the police at the local level: "Now please think specifically about your neighborhood. How often do you see or hear about Jewish and non-Jewish officers working together? Often, sometimes, rarely, or never?" Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of responses to these two questions.

Figure 7.2: Perceived Police Integration

Results: Integration Reduces Biases in Service Provision

To what extent does integration affect biases in police behavior? Ideally, we would like to know whether integration is associated with changes in the actual distribution of police resources. Unfortunately, such fine-grained data on police resource distribution is not available. Instead, I use survey data on perceptions about the fairness of police service provision. The survey asks, "Do you think the Israeli police generally treat citizens fairly, regardless of a citizen's ethnic or religious identity?" Responses range from 1 to 5, with 1 being "least fair" and 5 being "most fair." Control variables are especially important for these tests given the potential endogeneity between various attitudinal measures about the police. For example, people who are more positively predisposed in general may be more likely to perceive the police as fair *and* more likely to believe that hiring practices are fair, i.e. that the police are integrated. Regression models control for respondents' religion, age, gender, whether they voted in the last election, economic satisfaction, whether they work in the public sector, and the method of enumeration in

hopes of accounting for some of these baseline differences between respondents. Of these, I expect economic satisfaction to be a particularly important measure of an individual's general outlook and positivity. All models include respondent ethnic group dummy variables, and standard errors are clustered at the primary sampling unit. Because this provides only 15 clusters, I replicate the analysis in Appendix 7.B using a wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al. 2008). Results are largely consistent.

The results shown in Table 7.2 indicate that, consistent with the service distribution mechanism, perceived police integration is associated with greater perceived fairness of treatment by the police. Column 1 shows a positive association between perceived police integration at the national level and perceived police fairness. Column 2 shows that across all respondents, individuals who perceive their local police as more integrated in their neighborhood are more likely to say that the police treat citizens fairly with regard to identity. Column 3 adds an interaction term between local integration and religion. There is no significant difference between Jewish and non-Jewish respondents in terms of the way that police integration affects their perceptions of police fairness. Columns 4 and 5 use an additional measure of local police integration which disaggregates officer demographics into three categories: primarily officers of the same religious group as the respondent, primarily officers from a different group than the respondent, or officers from a mix of groups. Whereas the previous measure of integration found no difference between Jews and non-Jews, this measure suggests that integration affects non-Jewish respondents, but not Jewish respondents. Column 4 reveals that for non-Jews, increasing the number of non-Jewish officers is associated with increases in perceived fairness. Both same-group policing and mixed-group policing are associated with higher perceived police fairness compared to out-group policing. Column 5 fails to find any relationship between officer demographics and perceptions of police fairness among Jewish respondents. Note, however, that while the evidence linking integration with the perceived fairness of integration is mixed for Jewish respondents, there is no indication that they perceive service provision as *less* fair when the police are integrated. In other words, there is no correspond-

Table 7.2: Do you think the Israeli Police genereally treat all citizens fairly, regardless of a citizen's ethnic or religious identity?

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) Non-Jews	(5) Jews
Integration (Nat'l)	0.675***				
	(0.130)				
Integration (Local)		0.227***	0.162**		
		(0.0755)	(0.0725)		
Int. (Local)*Non-Jew			0.167		
			(0.102)		
Police Same (Local)				0.696***	-0.504
				(0.224)	(0.729)
Police Mix (Local)				0.776***	-0.153
				(0.254)	(0.767)
Non-Jewish	0.0170	0.0820	-0.371		
	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.461)		
Age	0.0125**	0.0104**	0.0107**	0.0104	0.0151
	(0.00504)	(0.00436)	(0.00445)	(0.0104)	(0.0104)
Male	-0.255***	-0.188	-0.202*	-0.473***	-0.0193
	(0.0915)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.168)	(0.285)
Vote	0.208	0.205	0.181	0.340	-0.539
	(0.284)	(0.337)	(0.347)	(0.470)	(0.844)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.225***	0.263***	0.260***	0.427***	0.0209
	(0.0668)	(0.0677)	(0.0672)	(0.101)	(0.160)
Work Public	0.221	0.291	0.289	0.800***	-0.232
	(0.162)	(0.177)	(0.181)	(0.172)	(0.327)
In Person	0.545**	-0.0756	-0.0719	0.0679	
	(0.223)	(0.315)	(0.320)	(0.357)	
Observations	648	677	677	380	240

Ordered logistic regression. Standard errors clustered by PSU. Ethnic group dummies.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

ing decrease in the quality of service provision for Jews even as it improves for non-Jews.

Results: Integration Increases Reporting Rates

The information flows mechanism suggests that when citizens believe that the police are integrated, they are more likely to provide officers with information that is useful for crime fighting and prevention. The survey asks respondents about their willingness to report a hypothetical crime to the police: "If you witnessed someone stealing money from a shop, would you contact the police?" Enumerators grouped responses into three categories: "*yes*" with no caveat, "*maybe*," including "probably" or similar responses, and "*no*," including "probably not" or similar.[11] I use ordered logistic regression models to test the relationship between perceived integration and willingness to report a crime. The analysis includes controls for respondents' religion, age, gender, satisfaction with their economic situation, whether they voted in the last election, and whether they or a family member work in the public sector. I include dummy variables for ethnic groups as well as for phone versus in-person enumeration. Standard errors are clustered at the primary sampling unit, the sub-district in most of Israel and the neighborhood for respondents in East Jerusalem. The analysis is again replicated using a wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al. 2008). Results shown in Appendix 7.B largely confirm the relationship between perceived national-level integration and willingness to report a crime, although the results for local integration are less robust.

Table 7.3 shows that respondents who perceive the police as more integrated at the national level (Columns 1 and 2) are indeed significantly more likely to say that they would report a minor crime. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect does not appear to be conditional on religious identity. While Non-Jews have a significantly lower baseline probability of reporting the crime at all, the interaction term between perceived integration and religion is not statistically significant. In other words, Jews and non-Jews are both more likely to report a minor crime to the police when they perceive the police as integrated nation-wide. Looking at

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[11]Categories were selected in an effort to ensure a wide distribution of responses.

perceived integration in the respondent's own neighborhood, non-Jews are more likely to report the shop theft to the police when they perceive their local police to be integrated (Column 3). Jewish respondents, on the other hand, are neither more nor less likely to report the crime depending on their perceptions of local police integration (Column 4).

Controls generally have the expected effects. Non-Jews are less likely to report crimes than Jews. Those who voted in the previous election (a measure of political involvement) are more likely to report a crime, as are those who work in the public sector or have a family member who works in the public sector. Finally, non-Jewish respondents surveyed in-person rather than by phone are less likely to say they would report the crime to the police (*In Person*). I suggest that this effect is not actually caused by the survey method but by the location: respondents surveyed in person are residents of East Jerusalem, where people tend to have a worse relationship with the police than respondents in other parts of Israel.

The strong, positive association between perceptions of integration and willingness to report crimes suggests that citizens care deeply about the level of police integration. Integration may provide a signal that recruitment and hiring policies reject sectarianism. Alternatively, non-Jews may be more willing to contact the police when they believe there is a higher likelihood that responding officers will come from their group. Either way, the increase in reporting rates for non-Jews who perceive the police as more integrated at the local level is consistent with the finding that police integration is associated with reduced crime rates, as increases in information flows from citizens to the police allow the police to combat crime more effectively.

Discussion and Conclusion

I find that increases in local-level police integration are associated with decreases in crime victimization. I present evidence consistent with two possible explanations for this relationship. First, individuals who believe that the police are more integrated are more willing to provide the police with information, which in turn makes the police more effective at solving and deterring crime. Second,

Table 7.3: If you witnessed someone stealing money from a shop, would you contact the police?

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Non-Jews	(4) Jews
Integration (Nat'l)	0.342*** (0.126)	0.458*** (0.130)		
Int. (Nat'l)*Non-Jew		-0.200 (0.237)		
Integration (Local)			0.249** (0.107)	0.0518 (0.112)
Non-Jewish	-1.429** (0.624)	-1.042 (0.806)		
Age	0.00427 (0.00685)	0.00420 (0.00683)	0.0129* (0.00771)	-0.000487 (0.0145)
Male	-0.00794 (0.190)	-0.0101 (0.189)	0.176 (0.248)	-0.705*** (0.253)
Vote	0.413* (0.223)	0.417* (0.225)	0.333 (0.218)	-0.0714 (0.381)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.0687 (0.0743)	0.0688 (0.0751)	0.0970 (0.0843)	0.102 (0.129)
Work Public	0.494* (0.264)	0.499* (0.263)	0.814*** (0.233)	-0.0222 (0.464)
In Person	-0.650** (0.325)	-0.711** (0.332)	-0.992*** (0.347)	
Observations	659	659	374	314

Ordered logistic regression. Standard errors clustered by PSU. Ethnic group dummies.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

when the police are perceived as more integrated, they are less likely to engage in biased resource allocation, leading to a more efficient use of scarce police resources in terms of crime prevention.

These findings have broad implication for the study of institutions and governance in divided societies. First, the integration of policy-implementing institutions in divided societies impacts the way that government goods and services are provided. Thus, efforts to design institutions in divided settings to improve governance cannot focus solely on the makeup of policy-making institutions. In a representative democracy, the quality of governance is influenced by a chain of institutions that begins with those responsible for selecting representatives, continues through the institutions that make policies, and ends with the institutions that interpret and enforce those policies. It stands to reason that where ascriptive group identities are highly politically salient, the demographic makeup of each of these institutions, including the final link responsible for implementation, will greatly impact governance.

Second, this chapter shows that the effects of bureaucratic integration are not zero-sum across groups.Both Jews and non-Jews are less likely to experience a crime when their local police are more integrated. In fact, increased integration – which in Israel means increasing the number of non-Jewish officers – is associated with a slightly larger reduction in crime victimization among Jews than non-Jews. Far from being harmed by integration, members of the dominant group appear to be helped by it. This insight has important implications for institutional solutions to intergroup conflict. Many of the strongest arguments against the use of power sharing via policy-making institutions as a solution to sectarian conflict focus on opposition by the dominant group who, fearful of their loss of influence due to power sharing, may oppose policies of inclusion. On the other hand, there appears to be a net benefit from integrating policy-implementing institutions. Even if integration of the bureaucracy disproportionately benefits members of previously-excluded groups, it does not mean that the dominant group will be made worse off. Thus, integration of policy-implementing institutions may represent a plausible first step towards resolving hostilities where tensions between groups are too

high to allow for the integration of policy-making institutions. By demonstrating that institutional integration need not harm those privileged by the status quo, bureaucratic integration can open the door for future reforms, ultimately leading to a decrease in tensions and improvements in governance for all segments of society.

Finally, the link between police integration and the quality of service provision relates to bottom-up integration as a solution to group-based conflict. Poor quality service provision may motivate individuals to take up arms against the state. In a divided society, this violence may occur along group lines. Thus, by improving the quality of public safety, police integration reduces motives for violence. The finding that improvements in service provision represent a *net benefit* across all groups differentiates bottom-up integration from traditional power sharing. In top-down arrangements of institutional inclusiveness, political influence is zero-sum. By definition, power *sharing* implies a reduction in relative power for the dominant group. Top-down strategies include marginalized groups in the policy-making process in hopes that giving them more influence over lawmaking will reduce their incentives to compete for influence outside of the lawmaking process. However, allocating policy-making power in this way necessarily reduces the relative influence of other groups; a group whose share of legislative seats is reduced by a power sharing arrangement has lost influence over policy-making. By improving governance for marginalized groups not by giving them a share of the dominant group's power but by improving the efficiency of service provision, bottom-up integration produces superior political outcomes without providing any group with an incentive to use violence.

Note: Material from this chapter has been submitted for publication as a journal article and is currently under review.

7.A Summary Statistics

Table 7.4: Summary Statistics: Independent Variables (Crime Models)

Variable	Obs	μ	σ	Min.	Max.
Police Integration	39,117	0.211	0.179	0.015	0.612
Urban (Subdistrict)	39,117	0.603	0.489	0	1
Male	39,117	0.483	0.500	0	1
Home Owner	39,054	0.690	0.462	0	1
Jewish	39,117	0.817	0.387	0	1
Military	34,153	0.589	0.492	0	1
Unemployment (District)	37,585	0.063	0.012	0.048	0.098
ELF	37,585	0.310	0.189	0.096	0.672

Table 7.5: Summary Statistics: Crime

Variable	Obs	μ	σ	Min.	Max.
Crime	27,579	.171	.434	0	3

Table 7.6: Summary Statistics: Mechanisms

Variable	Obs	μ	σ	Min.	Max.
Report Crime	780	1.46	.72	0	2
Police Fair	749	2.46	1.29	1	5
Integration (Nat'l)	682	2.03	.65	1	3
Integration (Local)	718	2.38	1.05	1	4
Non-Jewish	804	.50	.50	0	1
Age	801	42.77	18.00	18	91
Male	804	.48	.50	0	1
Vote	803	.78	.41	0	1
Econ. Satisfaction	790	3.20	1.11	1	5
Work Public	803	.34	.47	0	1
In Person	804	.13	.34	0	1

7.B   Robustness Checks

We can explore the claim that officer selection is not systematically correlated with crime rates by looking at the relationship between community-level factors associated with crime and a location's level of police integration. I test the relationship between subdistrict-year police integration and three likely predictors of crime: unemployment (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001), the proportion of the population that is male, and the proportion of the population that is Jewish. The first two are expected to be positively associated with crime, while the third is likely to be negatively associated with crime. I find a strong *positive* relationship between unemployment and police integration, as well as percent male and integration, and a strong *negative* relationship between percent Jewish and police integration. In other words, based on these predictors, police integration is more likely in areas that should have *more* crime, which biases against the hypothesis that integration should lead to more effective crime prevention.

I suggest that if the effects of integration on crime are driven by ordinary officers' discretion over the way they handle observed and reported crimes, as well as their general discretion over interactions with citizens, then we should see a stronger effect of integration on minor crimes than on major ones. The police do not posses the resources to thoroughly follow up on all minor crimes, for example

Table 7.7: Predictors of Crime and Integration

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unemployment	8.017***		
	(1.009)		
Pct. Male		1.846**	
		(0.765)	
Pct. Jewish			-0.721***
			(0.0970)
Constant	-0.285***	-0.668*	0.809***
	(0.0634)	(0.377)	(0.0811)
Observations	76	82	82

OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

home break-ins, creating space for officers to decide whether or not to devote serious resources to a particular incident. This discretion allows officer bias to affect results. On the other hand, officers have less discretion over how to handle more serious crimes, for example assault, so integration's constraints on bias should have less of an effect. To test this argument, Table 7.8 reproduces the main model from Table 7.1 using major and minor crimes as dependent variables. Minor crimes once again consist of home break-ins, vehicle break-ins, and non-violent thefts, while major crimes include vehicle thefts, assaults, and harassment. As expected, I find that integration is associated with a significant reduction in minor crimes, but there is no significant relationship between integration and major crimes.

The results presented below use a linear regression with wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors (Cameron et al. 2008) to replicate the findings regarding willingness to report a crime (Table 7.3) and perceived fairness of the police (Table 7.2). Estimated coefficients are presented with the *p-value* in parentheses. Replication code is available on the author's website.

Table 7.8: Minor and Major Crimes

| | (1) | (2) |
	Minor	Major
Police Integration	-3.449**	3.184
	(1.635)	(2.146)
Urban SD	0.0574	0.0173
	(0.0498)	(0.0644)
Male	0.0646**	-0.448***
	(0.0319)	(0.0583)
Home Owner	-0.171***	-0.307***
	(0.0296)	(0.0556)
Jewish	-0.0254	-0.331**
	(0.0724)	(0.138)
Military	0.0589*	0.226***
	(0.0336)	(0.0697)
Dist. Unemployment	5.916	3.359
	(4.399)	(5.058)
Observations	22904	22904

Negative binomial regression. Standard errors clustered by subdistrict-year.
Models include subdistrict dummies.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 7.9: Willingness to Report a Crime (Table 7.3)

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Non-Jews	(4) Jews
Integration (Nat'l)	.103 (0)	.107 (0)		
Int. (Nat'l)*Non-Jew		-.007 (.927)		
Integration (Local)			.086 (.113)	.003 (.827)
Non-Jewish	-.303 (.007)	-.287 (.087)		
Age	.001 (.493)	.001 (.507)	.003 (.247)	.001 (.907)
Male	-.016 (.873)	-.016 (.88)	.050 (.527)	-.170 (.033)
Vote	.165 (.033)	.165 (.047)	.118 (.254)	.029 (.787)
Econ. Satisfaction	.013 (.487)	.013 (.487)	.024 (.8)	.022 (.533)
Work Public	.136 (.113)	.136 (.113)	.289 (0)	-.010 (.887)
In Person	-.303 (.013)	-.305 (.013)	-.423 (.013)	
Observations	659	659	374	314

p-values based on wild cluster bootsrapped standard errors in parentheses

Table 7.10: Perceived Fairness of Police Service Provision (Table 7.2)

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) Non-Jews	(5) Jews
Integration (Nat'l)	.401 (0)				
Integration (Local)		.134 (.047)	.094 (.073)		
Int. (Local)*Non-Jew			.104 (.107)		
Police Same (Local)				.405 (0)	-.016 (.793)
Police Mix (Local)				.382 (.027)	.255 (.093)
Non-Jewish	.989 (0)	1.06 (0)	.774 (.067)		
Age	.006 (.16)	.006 (.087)	.006 (.087)	.006 (.327)	.006 (.38)
Male	-.158 (.007)	-.139 (.067)	-.149 (.027)	-.263 (.02)	-.030 (.713)
Vote	.092 (.713)	.088 (.8)	.075 (.86)	.078 (.88)	.042 (.84)
Econ. Satisfaction	.115 (.02)	.114 (0)	.113 (0)	.160 (0)	.077 (.32)
Workpublic	.067 (.433)	.095 (.373)	.094 (.373)	.372 (0)	-.146 (.173)
In Person	.202 (.14)	-.172 (.493)	-.168 (.513)	-.101 (.607)	
Observations	609	639	639	371	317

p-values based on wild cluster bootsrapped standard errors in parentheses

Chapter 8

Conclusion: The Consequences of Police Integration in Divided Societies

In April 2016, Israeli Minister of Public Security Gilad Eldan announced that the Israel Police would begin a massive recruitment drive to increase the number of Muslim officers on the force. All told, the police sought to hire 1,350 additional Muslim officers, which would raise the group's proportion on the force from about 1.5% in 2014 to nearly 6%.[1] The recruitment drive, which is expected to cost two billion shekels (about 600 million USD), would coincide with the opening of seven new police stations in predominantly-Arab towns. The increased emphasis on recruiting Arabs appears to be working: as of September, the police had received 1,420 applications from Arabs in 2016, compared to 543 in 2015 and 687 in 2014.[2]

The goal of the recruitment drive is to provide more effective policing services in Arab communities, and to increase trust between Arab citizens and the police.[3] Should we expect increases in the number of Arab officers to have the de-

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[1] Hadida, Diaa (2016), "Israel Seeking Police Recruits: Eager, and Arab." *New York Times* 3 September. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/world/middleeast/israeli-police-recruiting-arabs-to-join-the-force-not-resist-it.html?_r=0

[2] Kamisher, Eliyahu (2016), "Help Wanted: Police Seek Arab Recruits for Force." *Jerusalem Post,* 12 September. http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Help-wanted-Police-seek-Arab-recruits-for-force-467490

[3] ibid

sired effects on service provision and the citizen-police relationship? What about Muslim relations with the government more broadly? What effect will the influx of Muslim police officers have on the frequency of ethno-religious violence? The recruitment drive has many of the hallmarks of integration: It aims to increase the proportion of Muslim officers several-fold, giving Muslims considerably more influence over the behavior of the police. New recruits are incorporated into the existing policing structure, serving side by side with non-Muslim officers. The evidence presented in this dissertation, not just from Israel but also from Iraq, suggests that these increases in Muslim inclusion in the police should indeed have the desired effects by improving police service provision, decreasing crime, and increasing trust in the police among Muslim citizens. While politicians and police officials do not go so far as to claim that the recruitment drive will have broader impacts on reducing conflict between Muslim-Israelis and the Jewish-dominated government, the research in the preceding chapters suggests that integrating the Israel Police is likely to affect the frequency of sectarian conflict and anti-state violence. To the extent that integrating the police addresses motives for conflict like reducing inequalities in service provision, addressing exclusion from employment, and mitigating fears of future repression, we should expect Arab-Israelis to be less motivated to engage in anti-government violence.

Summing Up: Key Findings and Takeaways

The primary argument in this dissertation is that where ethnic and religious identities are highly politically salient, integrating the rank-and-file of the police will reduce violent conflict along group lines. Police integration reduces the incentives of vulnerable or marginalized groups to use violence against the government. The main evidence in support of this claim comes from a survey experiment in Baghdad. Sunni Arabs, vulnerable both because of their status as a demographic minority and their exclusion from influence within the current regime, are significantly less likely to report that they would consider using violence against the government when given information that the Iraqi Police Services are integrated. This result is particularly noteworthy because of the size of the observed effect:

the experimental prime about the police being integrated reduced Sunnis' support for violence by 60 percentage points. I speculate that the effect's size is unusually large because attitudes and perceptions about Iraq's young institutions, and especially its security institutions, are poorly established and highly malleable. The same experiment in Israel, where institutions are consolidated and attitudes more entrenched, finds a much smaller and statistically insignificant decrease in support for violence among Israeli Arabs who receive the integration prime.

Chapters 4, 6, and 7 present a number of findings beyond this main effect of police integration on support for anti-government violence. For example, Chapters 4 and 6 find that perceptions of police integration are associated with a reduction in a variety of conflict motives. In general, Iraqi Sunnis and Israeli Arabs who believe their respective police forces are more integrated hold fewer grievances about unequal service provision, are more likely to believe that they could obtain a job in the police if they wanted one, and are less fearful of future repression by the police or the government. Taken together, these findings suggest that police integration reduces conflict by reducing the motives of individuals from marginalized groups to use or support violence against the state. Chapter 7 hones in on the relationship between bottom-up integration and police service provision in Israel. I use new data panel data on officer demographics to show that within a given subdistrict, increases in police integration are associated with decreases in crime. I present survey evidence which shows that this crime-reducing effect is the result of decreases in biased distributions of police resources and increases in information flows from citizens to the police.

A number of patterns stand out beyond these main findings. Some deal with nuances in citizens' perceptions of integration. People differentiate between integration at the local level, i.e. their city or neighborhood, and integration at the national level. Importantly, perceptions at different levels have different relationships with conflict mechanisms. Similarly, different configurations of inclusiveness yield very different results. Perceptions that police officers are mixed between different groups reduces conflict motives, while perceptions that the police are predominantly members of one's own group do not. Other patterns have to do with

the dominant group's reaction to integration, which suggest that dominant-group members tend support police integration even though the status quo privileges them. The following sections discuss these patterns in detail and consider how they fit with the theory of bottom-up integration.

Citizens Differentiate Between Local and National Integration

One of the most striking findings across survey responses in Baghdad and Israel is the extent to which citizens differentiate between integration at the local level and integration at the national level. For example, Israelis who perceive the police as more integrated at the national level are less afraid of police repression, while those who perceive the police as integrated at the local level are not. Similarly, Iraqis who perceive the police as integrated at the national level are more likely to perceive government service provision as fair, while those who say the police in their neighborhood are mixed are neither more nor less likely to believe government service provision is fair.

In general terms, these differences make perfect sense. From a citizen's perspective, integration at different levels provides different signals. Integration at the national or institutional level provides insight into the government's intentions. It signals to citizens that the government rejects sectarian recruitment policies and is committed to inclusiveness, or at least will not allow one group to dominate law enforcement institutions. While national integration shapes expectations about the officers a citizen is likely to interact with in broad terms, the primary implication is that it reveals the government's intentions with regard to sectarianism.

In contrast, integration at the local level shapes citizens' expectations about the officers they are most likely to come into contact with. If the police are integrated in a citizen's neighborhood, she knows that if she were to interact with the police, there would likely be a coethnic involved in the interaction. In divided societies in which group membership is closely aligned with political behavior or personal safety, the presence of the coethnic officer should assuage concerns that the police will mistreat the civilian. However, local integration does not necessarily indicate that the government has rejected sectarian politics or that the police

as an institution is not dominated by another group, especially when members of different groups are geographically segregated from one another. The police may be integrated at the local level but still dominated by a particular group at the national or institutional level. In such a scenario, police officers from the vulnerable group are unlikely to have significant influence over policing policies more broadly, and the police leadership may be able to prevent minority officers from protecting members of their own group by withholding resources and information.

When it comes to police integration's conflict-reducing effects, the patterns we observe between national and local integration on one hand and the specific conflict-inducing mechanisms on the other are generally consistent with this distinction between national and local integration. The argument that integration should reduce fears of repression relies in part on the government's ability to credibly signal that it intends to provide services fairly and does not intend to harm members of vulnerable groups. Particularly with regard to signaling future intentions, national integration is a credible signal because it makes future repression more costly. National integration includes large numbers of police officers from the vulnerable group, places them in a position to monitor the actions and behaviors of other officers, gives them resources which can be used to resist attempts at repression, and makes service provision in dominant-group areas dependent on the cooperation of these vulnerable-group officers. In contrast, integration at the local level may be achieved by hiring a trivial number of officers from the vulnerable group and isolating them only in certain neighborhoods. Local integration alone does not necessarily make repression more costly, therefore it does not provide a credible signal that the government will not attempt repression in the future. The finding that Israelis who believe the police are more integrated at the national level, but not the local level, are less fearful of future repression is consistent with the signaling logic.

Local integration matters for perceptions about service provision, but the effect is generally limited to the institution in question – in this case the police – and does not extend to perceptions about the services provided by other state institutions. In both Israel and Iraq, local and national integration of the police are

associated with increases in perceived fairness of the police. In contrast, national integration of the police affects whether respondents believe that "the government distributes goods and services fairly," while local integration does not. Again, this distinction suggests that police integration at the national level provides information about government policies more broadly, while the effects of local police integration are limited to perceptions about the behavior of the police.

This is not to say that local integration is inconsequential. On the contrary, Chapter 7 shows that integrating the police at the local level has important implications for the quality of service provision. Within a given subdistrict, increases in police integration are associated with a significant decrease in crime victimization among Israelis. The key takeaway, then, is that police integration has different expected outcomes at different levels. At the national or institutional level, integration provides information about the government's behavior and preferences. At the local level, police integration affects the way that goods and services are provided by the police, and consequently the relationship between citizens and the police in the area in question.

Bottom-Up Integration is not Zero-Sum

A second recurring pattern is that the effects of bottom-up integration of the police are largely similar across ethnic and religious groups. Despite the highly divided nature of politics in Israel and Iraq, in most cases there is no significant difference between integration's effects on the attitudes of Israeli Jews and those of Israeli Arabs, or the attitudes of Iraqi Shias and and Iraqi Sunnis. The conventional perspective on political competition in divided societies takes an adversarial, zero-sum approach to institutional design. Positions of power in state institutions held by one group are expected to detract from the power of other groups. Thus, the allocation of these positions is expected to be contentious, and the group that benefits from the status quo should oppose changes to state institutions which give power to other groups. However, the evidence I present suggests that citizens view the allocation of positions in policy-implementing institutions in a way that leads causes minimal opposition to integration by members of the dominant group.

An overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews and Iraqi Shias support the integration of the police, and members of these dominant groups are more apt to perceive service provision as fair when members of the "opposing" group are integrated into the police. I find that members of the dominant group are unlikely to view a loss of jobs for their group as a major concern under policies of integration. An overwhelming majority of dominant Israeli Jews and Iraqi Shias believe that the participation of minorities in an integrated government institution represents a valuable contribution to society, and only a small number of respondents worry that integrated the police provides more opportunities for rebellion. In neither case did the experimental prime about police integration cause an increase in support for violence among the dominant group; quite the contrary, in Iraq it significantly *reduced* Shias' willingness to consider using violence against an unresponsive state.

The positive reaction by dominant groups to bottom-up integration reveals perhaps the most significant difference between bottom-up integration and traditional top-down power sharing: the avoidance of a zero-sum approach to intergroup politics. Roeder and Rothchild (2005) point out that where interactions between groups are already contentious, top-down power sharing crystallizes divisions within political institutions. Power sharing makes each political leader a representative of a specific group, ensuring that competition over representation and between representatives will be organized along group lines. I argue in Chapter 1 that part of the problem is power sharing's reliance on a small number of disproportionately powerful positions. Bottom-up integration avoids this problem by working through the rank-and-file members of policy-implementing institutions. Each individual rank-and-file position is relatively inconsequential, both because of its limited authority and the large number of positions, meaning that groups are less likely to become invested in individual hiring and firing decisions. Furthermore, integration explicitly distributes police officers so that they must cooperate with officers from other groups and serve citizens from other groups. This intergroup cooperation prevents the institutionalization of ethnic or religious divisions within policy-implementing institutions that power sharing reinforces within policy-making institutions.

Different Configuration of Inclusiveness Yield Different Results

Integration is the inclusion of enough individuals from each group that they have a real impact on the operations of the institution in question, and the distribution of those individuals so that officers from all groups work together and serve civilians from all groups. Chapter 1 places integration on a continuum of institutional inclusiveness with single-group dominance at one extreme and autonomy at the other. Inclusive institutions take a number of different configurations, and the findings in this dissertation show that these configurations yield vastly different results when it comes to violent conflict.

Chapter 1 describes autonomy as an extreme version of inclusiveness in which each civilian is served exclusively by police officers from his or her own group. Autonomy creates a set of parallel policy-implementing institutions responsible for the same set of goods and services for each relevant group. In its ideal type, autonomy is the epitome of inclusiveness in the sense that the institution responsible for providing services to each civilian is made up entirely of members of his or her group, therefore there are no civilians who rely on other groups for the provision of government goods and services. In reality, autonomy tends to be implemented only to the extent that groups are geographically segregated from one another. For example, Iraq's 2005 constitution grants the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) autonomy over several policy areas, among them security. All policing and domestic security within the Kurdish region is done by forces controlled by the regional government, the majority of whom are ethnic Kurds (Galbraith 2005). For the approximately five million Kurds living under the authority of the KRG, policing services approximate a system of ethnic autonomy. However, the system is not autonomous from the perspective of non-Kurds living in the Kurdish region, nor for Kurds living in "Arab" Iraq.

The surveys in Israel and Iraq cover only respondents living in areas in which the national government controls the police. However, autonomy is approximated at the local level when the vast majority of officers come from the same group as the citizens living in that area. In general, respondents who say their local police are *mixed* between people like them and people from other groups are less likely

to exhibit conflict-motivating attitudes compared to those whose local police are mostly outgroups. However, those whose local police are mostly people *like them* are not less likely to exhibit conflict-motivating attitudes. In other words, even when all officers fall under the same command structure, integration has stronger conflict-reducing effects than ingroup policing.

Autonomy fails to provide vulnerable groups with several of the mechanisms for imposing costs on the government that integration provides. Generally speaking, integration prevents the institution in question from becoming dominated by a particular group. Eklund et al. (2005, 131) note that integrating Kurdish troops into the Iraqi army "would prevent the federal army from becoming an Arab army, so there may be a prudential case for partial integration." Specifically, integration allows non-coethnic officers to monitor one another's behavior, and it places officers from previously-excluded groups in a position to withhold valuable services from pro-government citizens in the event of a conflict. Because integration forces officers from different groups to work together, it positions them to monitor one another's behavior. If an officer mistreats a citizen from another group, there is likely to be an officer from that citizen's group present who can intervene or report the incident the the relevant authority. Additionally, integration makes it more difficult for officers from the dominant group to be used by the government to repress citizens from a vulnerable group, as vulnerable-group officers would likely get wind of preparations for such actions and tip off members of the targeted community. Autonomy, on the other hand, isolates officers from the vulnerable group, preventing them from observing the actions of officers from other groups. Second, since integration means that officers are responsible for serving non-coethnics, as it makes service provision in dominant-group areas dependent on the participation of vulnerable-group officers. In the event of a conflict, the vulnerable group could impose costs on the government and its supporters by withholding valuable policing services from certain neighborhoods. Autonomy does not provide this option, as it relegates vulnerable-group officers to communities in which their coethnics live.

For the same reasons listed above, autonomy may be reversed more eas-

ily than integration. By isolating police officers from the vulnerable group, the government makes it easier to provide them with inferior resources and withhold information about the state security apparatus. Furthermore, since service provision in dominant-group neighborhoods does not depend on these officers, they would not be missed if the government were to relieve them of their duties. The credibility of the government's commitment not to repress depends not just on the costliness of future repression but also on the costliness of reversing inclusiveness. Because autonomy is less costly to reverse, it is a less effective signal of the government's commitment not to harm vulnerable groups.

A third difference between integration and autonomy deals with the level of government associated with the police. In both Israel and Iraq, policing falls under the authority of the national government. Therefore, integration should affect not just citizens' attitudes towards the police, but also their attitudes towards the national government. Indeed, perceived police integration is associated with reduced fears of repression by the government among Israeli Arabs and Iraqi Sunnis. Similarly, minority groups in both countries associate police integration not just with fairer service provision by the police but with fairer service provision by the government more generally. These findings are consistent with the analysis of Arab Barometer data in Chapter 2, which demonstrates that across the Middle East attitudes towards the government and the police are closely correlated.

Autonomy, on the other hand, breaks this link by devolving control over the security forces to a level of government dominated by a particular group. Chapter 2 shows that while Arab Iraqis have closely-linked attitudes between the state security forces and the national government, this link is significantly weaker among Kurds – presumably because "their" security forces are autonomous. This broken link matters because bottom-up integration's conflict-reducing effects work by altering attitudes towards the government. If citizens do not associate the police with the government against which they might rebel, then we should not expect changes in police demographics to affect support for anti-government violence.

Reducing Motives for Violence Overshadows Increased Opportunities

Broadly speaking, integrating the police reduces support for violence by reducing people's motives for rebelling against the government. Fear of future repression, grievances over unequal service provision, and exclusion from employment in state institutions are all reasons why an individual might take up arms against the state. A second category of explanations for conflict focuses not on why people fight but on why they do not fight. "Opportunity" explanations for conflict *assume* that there are people motivated to fight against the state, and the limiting factor in whether rebellion occurs is the costliness of doing so. For instance, terrain that favors conventional armies over guerrilla fighters decreases the likelihood that a rebellion will succeed, making anti-government violence more costly.

Many institutional solutions to violent conflict face a tradeoff between reducing motives and reducing opportunity. Consociationalism, for instance, reduces motives for resorting to conflict by ensuring that a group's preferences are accounted for in the policymaking process. Yet, it simultaneously increases the opportunities for conflict by allowing included groups to subvert the government from the inside, either by using their legislative influence to prevent the government from responding effectively to a rebellion or by using their veto power to create gridlock and wreak havoc with the legislative process. Military power sharing creates similar opportunities for previously-excluded groups. At the same time as it reduces motives for rebellion by committing to these groups' safety, it provides them with weapons and organization, making fighting less costly.

Integrating the police and other policy-implementing institutions faces this same tradeoff. Police integration increases opportunity for rebellion by arming and organizing excluded groups, providing them with access to intelligence about state security operations, and making the provision of valuable government services dependent on their cooperation. Yet, we see a very large reduction in support for violence among Sunni Iraqis who believe the police are integrated. Israeli Arabs are also less likely to support violence when they are given information that the police are integrated, and although this effect is too small to reach statistical significance,

there is also no evidence of any *increase* in support for violence.

At least in these two cases, it appears that reduced motives trump increased opportunity. This is not to say that the costliness of fighting does not matter, but perhaps motives are a precondition for the influence of opportunity. The lower the motives for fighting, the lower the costs must be in order for conflict to occur. Police integration, it seems, reduces motives more than it increases opportunity, making it a viable solution for group-based conflict. More generally, institutional solutions for conflict need not avoid increasing opportunity for violence in order to be effective; they need only to reduce motives to a greater extent than they increase opportunity.

Police Integration as a Cure for Conflict? Policy Applications, Implications, and Challenges

The preceding chapters presented evidence from Iraq and Israel that under the right circumstances, integrating the police is an effective policy for mitigating group-based violent conflict. In particular, if the government fears that members of a marginalized group may rebel and it wishes to avoid a scenario in which fighting breaks out, it can reduce the likelihood of conflict occurrence by integrating members of that group into the rank-and-file of the police. Leaders can signal their commitment to peace, inclusiveness, and the provision of public safety by significantly increasing police officer recruitment from underrepresented communities. In turn, members of the integrated group should be less inclined to resort to violence. This section discusses several nuances of implementing police integration as a solution to conflict.

Challenges of Implementation

Even within the scope conditions laid out in Chapter 1, policymakers wishing to use bottom-up integration of the police to prevent anti-government violence face several challenges. The first is to convince members of the previously-excluded group to join the police. Particularly in the context of a history of exclusion, divi-

siveness, and conflict, members of this community may not wish to join the police or other state institutions. The Israeli police struggle in this respect. Hesitancy to join the police stems from a number of sources. One problem is the perception among Israeli Arabs that their applications will not be seriously considered, therefore there is no point in applying. In a 2003 survey of Arab citizens, 31% of respondents believe that Arabs are prevented from joining the police because of their ethnic background (Hasisi and Weitzer 2007). However, these perceptions should dissipate as inclusiveness increases. The more individuals observe officers from groups like them, the more they are likely to believe that their application would be considered fairly. Another challenge is the possibility that Arabs might view the police as a tool of repression (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012) and fear that by joining, they would be complicit in harming members of their community. Once again, however, the evidence I present suggests that these attitudes fade as individuals perceive the police as more integrated. The major hurdle for policymakers, then, comes at the very beginning of the process of integration. The first few recruits may prove to be the most difficult to secure. Once this first challenge is overcome, subsequent rounds of recruitment will be less difficult. Indeed, despite Arab Israelis' skepticism of the Israel Police and the questioning of the state's legitimacy, the Arab community appears sufficiently willing to participate to make integration possible. One survey of Arabs in Northern Israel finds that 60% of respondents support the recruitment of Arab police officers, and 29% say that they would consider taking a job with the police if they were looking for a job. Considering the challenges of a career in policing, regardless of identity, this response seems quite positive. Similarly, 34% would support a family member who decided to join the police, and an additional 41% would not object to it (Ben-Porat and Yuval 2012). I find consistent attitudes on this point as well. My survey asked Arab Israelis, "Do you think greater integration of the Israeli police would make citizens like you better off, worse off, or about the same?" Only 17.8% of respondents said "worse," compared to 27.5% "better" and 54.8% "worse," suggesting that opposition to recruitment from their community is unlikely to be a major impediment to implementing integration. Ultimately, however, the proof is in actual

recruitment numbers: In the first nine months of 2016, the Israel Police received nearly 1,500 applications from Arabs, almost twice as many as they received in all of 2015.[4] The difference was simply the police's renewed effort to recruit from within the Arab community.

Even if the previously-excluded group is willing to participate in integration, the policy may fail if it meets significant opposition from the dominant group. The dominant group's incentives for opposing police integration are readily apparent: by virtue of being the *dominant* group, they necessarily benefit from the status quo, and the demographic makeup of the police is a part of the political status quo. However, as is noted throughout this dissertation, police integration is likely to provide net benefits for the dominant group as well, including more effective policing services in some cases, giving dominant-group members reason to support integration. From a security perspective, Chapters 4 and 6 note that Iraqi Shias and Israeli Jews are not particularly concerned that including Arabs and Sunnis within the police will allow those groups to subvert the state more easily. Quite the contrary, these dominant-group members view participation in the police by minorities as willingness to contribute to society and willingness to work within the existing political system. In both Israel and Iraq, it is quite clear that opposition from the dominant group is unlikely to pose be a serious obstacle.

Finally, policymakers must communicate to a skeptical audience that the police are actually being integrated. After all, vulnerable-group members' reactions to integration link police integration with violent conflict, therefore their *perceptions* of integration are critical. Integration should have little effect on support for violence unless citizens believe that the police are integrated. The evidence from Iraq and Israel provides reason for both optimism and caution on this point. In Iraq, simply presenting Sunnis with a short news story – and a fake one, at that – was sufficient to dramatically alter their attitudes on a number of issues related to the police and the government, and caused a large reduction in willingness to consider using violence against the Iraqi government. While the survey design did not allow for a direct measure of "uptake," or the degree to which these shifts were

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[4]Kamisher, Eliyahu (2016)

due to the news story changing perceptions of integration, it is difficult to imagine a more convincing explanation. Yet, in Israel, the news story appears to have little effect on perceptions of integration. Direct questions about the extent to which respondents perceive the police as integrated are indeed correlated with attitudes about the police and government, but the news story about integration had little effect on these attitudes, suggesting that it failed to change the degree to which respondents believe the Israeli police are integrated. In other words, very similar sources of information had very different effects on perceptions.

As discussed in Chapter 6, the most likely explanation is that Iraq's political institutions, and its political context more generally, are newer, less developed, and more fluid compared to institutions in Israel. As a result, Iraqis' perceptions of those institutions are less entrenched and more susceptible to new information. The importance of attitude entrenchment is especially important when the new information conflicts with existing beliefs. An Arab Israeli who has forty years of interactions with police officers and has rarely seen officers from his own community will be justifiably skeptical if he reads in the news that the police are integrated. Empty statements by political leaders – claims of integration or representation not backed by actual changes in officer demographics – are unlikely to change perceptions or attitudes.

The real question is how members of previously-excluded groups will react to *actual* changes in officer demographics. Do they update their perceptions of integration based on new information? While it is impossible to directly test this question with the available data, the information that is available suggests that real changes in officer demographics do influence perceptions of integration. Chapter 5 shows that real officer demographics aggregated to the city level are correlated with how often a respondent "see[s] or hear[s] about officers from different ethnic or religious groups working together" with an r^2 of .21. Considering the coarseness of the data on officer demographics[5] and simplistic manner of calculating police integration from those officer demographics,[6] this relationship is not trivial. Clearly

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[5]Survey respondents are only geolocated by city, which meant that station-level officer demographic data had to be aggregated to the city level to match with the survey responses

[6]The formula only includes religious groups, not ethnic ones, and each group is given equal

more research is needed, but it seems that perceptions of police integration are influenced by actual officer demographics.

What does all of this mean for policymakers seeking to implement bottom-up integration in the police? First, the most difficult step is likely to be from "not at all integrated" to "a little integrated." During this stage, the police may struggle to find recruits from underrepresented communities. Meaningful political reform in other areas may be useful in convincing previously-excluded groups to participate at this stage. Once officer recruitment is settled, the police and the government must find a way to credibly communicate the extent of the changes to members of the public. Empty rhetoric, public relations campaigns, and token appointments are unlikely to have lasting impacts. Substantial changes to the makeup and structure of the police are required. Furthermore, this stage will be most difficult where the history of exclusion is strongest, and where institutions are most developed. Yet, over time, this challenge may be overcome.

Bottom-up Integration is Self-Enforcing

Institutions cause, predict, and explain outcomes only to the extent that they are difficult to change. That is, if the dominant group can alter an institution at-will, then no possible design of that institution should have any effect on the attitudes and behaviors of other groups. For example, the Turkish government could allow for increased representation of Kurds in the National Assembly (parliament), and Kurds would likely respond positively to this newfound inclusiveness. However, if Ankara can revoke this representation just as easily as it allows it, then it will have little effect on Kurds' perceptions of security. This problem is particularly acute when thinking not about grievances over present conditions but about fears over future conditions. The key, then, is to design institutions that not only affect policy implementation in the present but also makes it difficult for the state or dominant group to renege on these arrangements in the future.

Bottom-up integration achieves this goal because it shifts the balance of power in favor of the newly-integrated group. Once officers from a minority group

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weight regardless of political connotations

are armed, organized, provided with access to information, and relied upon for service provision throughout the country, attempts to remove them from their posts would be quite difficult. Police officers are well-positioned to resist reverse integration. Even if officers do not resist, reverse integration is costly because these officers and bureaucrats are necessary for providing desirable government goods and services. Firing officers *en masse* necessitates rapid replacement by large numbers of individuals who are unlikely to have similar levels of experience and expertise, leading to gaps in service provision that anger citizens. The costliness of reversing bottom-up integration explains why it is so effective at mitigating fears of the future by vulnerable group members.

Bottom-Up Integration in Non-Democracies

Finally, most research on institutions in divided societies deals with democratic institutions, particularly electoral rules and representative legislatures. Policy-making institutions are unlikely to serve as plausible settings for integration under autocracy for one of two reasons. First, if these institutions are largely powerless then integrating them will have no effect on attitudes and behaviors among individuals from marginalized groups. The relevance of legislatures and other policy-making institutions varies across autocracies. However, the bureaucracy, law enforcement, and policy-implementing institutions are necessary components of all governments. Even the most competent autocrat relies on bureaucrats to carry out policies. Thus, rank-and-file policy implementers are relevant in all states, and in divided societies their composition should matter greatly for the citizen-state relationship. Second, in autocracies in which policy-implementing institutions have real power, autocrats may resist integrating them for fear of appearing weak or initiating an erosion of their hold on power. Bottom-up integration of policy-implementing institutions is a more palatable option for autocrats because it does not create symbolic 'cracks in the wall' regarding the autocrats hold on policy-making. Autocrats maintain the appearance of iron-fist control over the state while allowing marginalized groups sufficient influence over policy-implementation to placate their grievances and fears. Furthermore, whereas top-down power shar-

ing may provide outspoken critics of the regime with a pulpit, creating a coordination point which may lead to rebellion, bottom-up integration allows the regime to keep opposition leaders out of the public eye while still allowing for rank-and-file inclusiveness. Thus, bottom-up integration represents a more plausible path to inclusiveness in non-democracies than does top-down power sharing.

Extension: Integration Imposed by a Third Party

The model of integration I lay out in this dissertation assumes that the state government, or the dominant group that controls the government, is the first-mover. The state implements a policy of police integration, and then members of vulnerable or previously-excluded groups respond to that policy. This version of events assumes that the government desires integration, most likely because it sees it as a path towards ending costly conflict. In an alternative scenario, a third party may impose bottom-up integration on a state. In this case, the state may not want to integrate the police, but a powerful outside actor, perhaps another state or an international peacekeeping mission, may force the state to implement integration. Should we still expect integration to be a successful solution to sectarian conflict under these circumstances?

I suggest that police integration imposed by a third party will still have the same conflict-reducing effects as integration implemented willingly by the host state. The reason is that once bottom-up integration is implemented, it is costly to undo. Once outgroup members are organized, trained, and equipped, and once state service provision in pro-government areas is dependent on the participation of the integrated group, its members are empowered to impose considerable costs on the government if it attempted to roll back integration. Thus, the government's preferences for integration are secondary to its actions, and integration imposed by a third party on a begrudging government should remain effective even after the third party leaves.

Integration of the Iraqi security forces in 2007 illustrates the durability of foreign-imposed bottom-up integration. Shias dominated the Iraqi police and security forces throughout the first years of democratic rule. However, when General

David Petraeus took command of the coalition forces in Iraqi in February 2007, and Ryan Crocker became the US ambassador in Baghdad the following month, the two leaders pressured the Iraqi government to integrate Sunnis into the state security forces fighting against the Al-Qaeda insurgency. Prime Minister Maliki resisted the creation of a truly integrated force because positions in the police and military provided valuable patronage which could be used to reward political supporters (Robinson 2009; Pfaff 2008). Petraeus and Crocker, however, insisted on significant integration of Sunnis. Their plan, labeled Operation Blue Shield, called for more than 12,000 Sunni recruits to be integrated into the security forces within six months.

Petraeus convinced Maliki to hire thousands of Sunni militia members into the Iraqi police and military in Anbar so long as the fighters pledged allegiance to the Iraqi government (Robinson 2009). Convincing Maliki to integrate the police in other provinces proved more difficult. "The idea of bringing large numbers of former opponents back into the government, particularly under arms, set off all the alarm bells of the Shia politicians who lay awake at nights fearing the return of a repressive Sunni-dominated regime" (Robinson 2009, 253). Under Operation Blue Shield, new recruits underwent a significant vetting process. Both Coalition and Iraqi forces conducted background checks, fitness and literacy tests, and a medical exam. To avoid meddling in the process by the Shia-dominated Ministry of Interior, local councils or tribes provided endorsements for candidates (Robinson 2009, 254). The extensive vetting process was designed to convince the Iraqi government that the new recruits could be trusted.

The Americans tried to convince Maliki to integrate the police and military over the course of several meetings in summer 2007. Brigadier General John Campbell, a key player in Baghdad's security plan, managed to secure the endorsement of Iraqi head of Baghdad Operations Lieutenant General Abboud Qanbar. Yet even then, Maliki was not swayed. After several unsuccessful meetings between Petraeus, Qanbar, and Maliki in which Petreaus failed to convince Maliki that the Sunni recruits could be trusted, Petraeus switched tactics.

> Petraeus had learned over the past year that he would occasionally
> have to show the 'full range of emotion, something other than an even

temperament,' to prevail in such disagreements. At times he feigned anger to convince Iraqi officials to do what he felt was necessary – particularly when he suspected a sectarian agenda was at work. Other times, the vein in his temple stood out and his emotion was authentic. This was one of the latter moments.

"It's make or break time. These guys used to point their guns at us and you. Now they are pointing their guns at [Al Qaeda in Iraq]," he said, turning up the emotional pitch. "Do you want them to point their guns back at us, to shoot and kill our soldiers and yours?"...It took the commander of all U.S. Forces in Iraq to overcome the prime minister's dogged resistance; no one else could budge him. (Robinson 2009, 260)

Finally, in late summer 2007, Maliki agreed to allow the integration of Sunni militia members into the police in parts of Baghdad. To avoid further opposition from the interior ministry and existing security forces, the US forces arranged to air lift hundreds of recruits to the Baghdad Police College so their arrival would not be impeded. Slowly but surely, the former Awakening fighters were integrated into the Iraqi police and security forces. Integration, however, required significant pressure from the Americans and would not have occurred had Maliki had his way, making it a clear example of a policy imposed by a third party.

By and large, imposed integration in Iraq was successful in areas where it was implemented. Within central Baghdad, the Iraqi Police integrated most extensively in the A'amiriya neighborhood, an upper-class neighborhood home to both Sunnis and Shias. Before integration, A'amiriya was one of Baghdad's most violent neighborhoods, with most violence instigated by Sunni militias seeking to push out Shia residents.[7] In the first half of 2007, the Iraqi government claimed that the area was too dangerous to provide public services like trash removal, and electricity was only available for a few hours per day.[8] Today, while sectarian violence certainly still exists, A'amiriya is relatively safe, and its largely-Sunni population exhibits considerable trust in both the police and the government. In the 2016 survey conducted for this project, residents of A'ameriya reported similar levels of trust in the police as did Sunnis elsewhere in Baghdad, were similarly

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[7]Cave, Damien (2007), "Amiriya: Walls and Checkpoints Bring Hope and Frustration." *New York Times* 6 September. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2007/09/06/world/middleeast/20070907_BUILDUP_DETAIL_GRAPHIC.html?neighborhood=amiriya

[8]ibid

likely to say that the police treat members of different religious groups fairly, and were slightly more likely to indicate willingness to report criminal activity to the police.[9] Electricity is now provided for about 14 hours a day, compared to the 15.7 hour per day average reported across the rest of the city. In what was one of Baghdad's worst neighborhoods only 10 years ago, these numbers indicate success.

There is little doubt that Maliki's resistance to police integration prevailed in many, if not most, parts of Iraq. The majority of the Anbar militias were never integrated into the state security security forces, and it was not until the administration of Haider al-Abadi took control of the Iraqi government in 2014 that the government began widespread, *voluntary* efforts to integrate the Iraqi police. However, areas like A'Amiriya in which the police were integrated under pressure from the US and Coalition forces did see significant improvements in security, service provision, and citizens' relationships with the state. Despite Maliki's resistance to empowering Sunni militia members by including them in state security institutions, the policy imposed from the outside was successful in mitigating violent conflict.

Beyond Policing: Bottom-Up Integration in Other Policy-Implementing Institutions

The main focus of this dissertation, along with all of the empirical evidence I present, is on the police. However, the theory of bottom-up integration is a general one and should be applicable to many bureaucratic institutions responsible for implementing policies or enforcing laws. Four scope conditions govern whether an institution may serve as an effective setting for bottom-up integration. First, citizens must have information about the demographic makeup of the institution's rank-and-file. This information is likely to come from direct observation of employees or from media reports. Second, the institution in question must be responsible for distributing a good or service of value. The police, of course, distribute public

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[9]I report only general trends here to avoid leaning too heavily on a very small sample. The survey included only 30 residents of A'ameriya, providing an insufficient number of responses to claim representativeness with any precision.

safety. Third, the rank-and-file employees of that institution must have significant discretion over the way the good or service is distributed. As discussed at length, police officers have broad leeway in how laws are applied and enforced to different segments of the population, as well as how scarce police resources are distributed throughout communities. Finally, the rank-and-file of the institution must be in a position to use their discretion to impose costs on the state. The police can impose costs by turning their weapons against the government. Other institutions, however, are more likely to impose costs simply by withholding their participation, leading to inferior service provision to citizens to whom the government is accountable.

Several policy-implementing institutions present suitable candidates for implementing bottom-up integration. Policymakers seeking to build bridges with previously-excluded groups may implement bottom-up integration in the public education system, for example. Schoolteachers and professors work in the public eye, and their group membership will be quite apparent to their students. The collective interactions between a student and his or her teachers form perceptions of the degree to which the education system is integrated. Teachers are, of course, responsible for providing a very important service, education, and they certainly have the ability to influence the quality of education that their students receive. Perhaps more importantly, teachers are in a position to determine the *content* of the education that students receive. This ability to determine the perspective from which history is taught and influence the information to which students are exposed gives teachers significant political power. Teachers can impose costs on the government by manipulating the information they transmit to students in a way that subverts government support. Integration of the education system, then, is a credible signal of the government's intention not to harm the integrated group.

The healthcare system provides another likely setting for bottom-up integration. Citizens from all groups depend on nurses and hospital workers to provide healthcare. Especially in countries in which the government provides most healthcare services, integrating these positions gives power to previously-excluded groups, places their members in a position to prevent biases in healthcare provision, and

provides desirable jobs for many people. At the very least, integration of the healthcare system can help prevent the dominant group from abusing its power, as occurred in Iraq shortly after democratization. Referring to sectarian violence against civilians, Robinson (2009, 154) writes, "Some of the most egregious abuses were occurring in Baghdads hospitals. The Sadrist health minister had packed the ministry and hospitals with militia members. Sunnis were going in and not coming out." The presence of large numbers of Sunni doctors, nurses, and staff might have prevented hospitals from being used in this way.

Even less glamorous institutions like public works and sanitation may be effective settings for bottom-up integration. Public works employees work in the public eye, maintaining infrastructure and providing services. Citizens value the goods and services these institutions provide, for example smooth highways and clean streets. Workers have some discretion because they are difficult to monitor, making shirking a possibility. Shirking may simply mean not working as hard as one should, or it may mean intentionally doing substandard work out of malice. In either case, shirking is possible because the nature of the work makes monitoring costly: public works projects are scattered throughout the country, their evaluation requires specialized knowledge and expertise, and it is difficult to say with certainty whether poor quality or inefficient work is the result of shirking or environmental factors. For example, in his quest to directly observe corruption on road-building projects, Olken (2007) hired a team of engineers to extract and analyze core samples from newly-built roads. Such an extensive procedure is hardly feasible on a regular basis, meaning road workers have leeway as to the quality of work they choose to do. If road workers in a divided society are more likely to shirk when they are building roads in outgroup neighborhoods, then integration allows workers with different preferences for shirking to monitor one another's behavior and prevent biased behavior.

The failure by public works employees to provide desirable services can lead to real costs for the government. Events surrounding trash collection in Beirut in winter 2015-16 are illustrative of how politically significant seemingly mundane services can be. The city's waste removal contractor suspended trash

collection after its contract expired in early 2015.[10] Over the next eight months, trash piled up throughout the city's streets and sidewalks. The trash piles became so extensive that they blocked traffic, and residents complained that the unsanitary conditions were leading to health problems.[11] The lack of trash removal turned into a major political crisis for the Lebanese government. What began in July as a small protest outside of the parliament building grew into major anti-government demonstrations, along with a social media campaign under the hashtag "You Stink" aimed at politicians viewed as responsible for failing to provide basic services. Some protesters explicitly demanded the government's resignation.[12] By August, protests became sufficiently violent that the government called on the army to maintain order in the streets of the capital.[13] Beirut's trash crisis illustrates the political importance of basic public services. Although this crisis was not caused by sectarian divisiveness, it illustrates that rank-and-file bureaucratic employees have the power to impose significant costs on the government should they choose to withhold service provision. The cessation of trash collection was significant enough for citizens that it led to violent anti-government protests and calls for the government to resign, demonstrating the political importance of seemingly-insignificant positions like trash collectors.

While bottom-up integration may be effective in a wide range of policy-implementing institutions, it remains true that is likely to have an especially strong effect when applied to the police. Public safety is arguably the most important service that the modern state provides. As such, the demographic makeup of the institution responsible for providing public safety is likely more important than the makeup of other policy-implementing institutions. Furthermore, the police's capacity for using force amplifies any effects that institutional changes may have on

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[10]Bulos, Nabih (2015), "Beirut garbage crisis has Lebanese telling government: 'You stink!'." *Los Angeles Times,* 26 July. http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-lebanon-trash-20150727-story.html

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[12]AlJazeera.com (2015), "Lebanese Protest Against Waste Disposal Crisis." *Al Jazeera.com,* 26 July. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/lebanon-beirut-trash-rubbish-crisis-150725060723178.html

[13]Conlon, Kevin (2015), "Army deployed to Beirut after anti-government anger boils over." *CNN.com,* 30 August. http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/23/asia/beirut-lebanon-garbage-clashes/

society. If bottom-up integration of other policy-implementing institutions generally reduces citizens' fears of being harmed by government, bottom-up integration of the police should do so to an even greater extent. Nevertheless, the police are hardly unique in providing good and services that citizens care about, and the discretion of bureaucrats from a wide range of institutions over policy implementation means that in divided societies citizens should care greatly about the integration of these institutions.

The Way Forward

Group politics are here to stay. Individuals have organized around group lines for millennia, and so long as power, influence, and treasure are at stake, they will continue to do so. Yet, the vast majority of intergroup cleavages are peaceful. Organization and competition along group lines need not become violence along group lines. This dissertation builds on a large body of research that suggests that institutions which incorporate group cleavages into their design, ensure access to influence for each group, and mitigate fears that today's vulnerabilities will lead to future exclusion allow states to govern diverse populations peacefully and effectively. Indeed, the peaceful coexistence of diverse groups in Canada, Iran, Switzerland, Brazil, and countless other states illustrates that borders need not be redrawn to accommodate societal differences.

This dissertation began with two basic propositions about conflict and representation. First, individuals fight because they have reason to do so, not simply because they can. This assumption implies that institutions should focus not on raising the costs of conflict, for example by separating members of groups in conflict or ensuring hegemony by a particular group, but by addressing the underlying motives that drive individuals to violence in the first place. I investigate the effects of institutions on a handful of motives, including grievances over service provision, exclusion from employment, and fear of future repression, but in no way do I suggest that these are the only things that drive people to fight. Institutional solutions to conflict must focus on the unique conditions of the conflict in question. Thus, while the general framework of bottom-up integration should generalize to a wide

range of contexts, the details of integration must address the unique drivers of conflict in each setting.

The second proposition is that inclusion in political institutions is a means to an end, not an end unto itself. Bottom-up integration works not simply by increasing the number of individuals from each group in government institutions but by increasing the *influence* of each group over policy outcomes. The location of policy-implementing institutions at the end of the chain of governance makes these institutions especially important for influencing the outcomes of governance that individuals care most about and, in fact, are most likely to fight about. Symbolic inclusion in lawmaking institutions may be normatively desirable, but so long as policies affect individuals in a way that generates grievances, or so long as individuals do not feel secure in their future prospects, symbolic inclusion alone is unlikely to prevent or solve group-based conflict. Inclusion in government matters because the actions of the state affects people's well-being and quality of life, and in divided societies, an individual's well-being is tied closely to that of his or her group. Bottom-up integration addresses not just some innate desire for inclusion but a more basic desire to be treated in a certain way. By creating balance within institutions which determine how laws actually affect citizens on a day to day basis, bottom-up integration prevents biases, exclusion, and fear that motivate conflict while allowing members of different groups to coexist under the umbrella of a shared state.

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