

UC San Diego

UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

El Mar de Extremadura: Irrigation, Colonization and Francoism in Southwestern Spain, 1898-1978

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6wk3w68p>

Author

Henderson, David

Publication Date

2017

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

El Mar de Extremadura: Irrigation, Colonization and Francoism in Southwestern Spain,
1898-1978

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor
of Philosophy

in

History

by

David Kenneth Henderson

Committee in charge:

Professor Pamela Radcliff, Chair
Professor Frank Biess
Professor Ivan Evans
Professor Thomas Gallant
Professor Matthew Vitz

2017

Copyright

David Kenneth Henderson, 2017

All rights reserved.

The Dissertation of David Kenneth Henderson is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

Chair

University of California, San Diego

2017

DEDICATION

To my family and to Kate

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SIGNATURE PAGE	iii
DEDICATION.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SPANISH WORDS.....	vii
LIST OF IMAGES.....	ix
LIST OF MAPS	x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	xi
VITAE.....	xiii
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION	xiv
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1 – Landscape and Irrigation: Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco and Territoriality.....	30
1.1. Introduction	30
1.2. Irrigation as the Redemption of Empire	35
1.3. The Wandering Life of Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco.....	42
1.3.1. The Canary Islands.....	45
1.3.2. Landscape and the Nation	52
1.3.3. Spain’s Landscape and the Cíjara Reservoir.....	64
1.3.4. Ifni	73
1.4. Conclusion.....	76
Chapter 2 – Tenancy and Local Colonization in Post-Civil War Badajoz	79
2.1. Introduction	79
2.2. The Social Question in Badajoz Province.....	85
2.2.1. Rural Society in Badajoz.....	85
2.2.2. The Social Question in Badajoz.....	89
2.2.3. Tenancy Laws of the Second Republic.....	92
2.3. Early Francoist Responses to the Social Question	97
2.3.1. Francoist Tenancy Laws.....	97
2.3.2. The Founding of the INC	102
2.3.3. Land As Political Reward	109
2.4 Case Study - Santos de Maimona.....	113
2.5. Conclusion.....	119
Chapter 3 – Unemployment, <i>Yunteros</i> and the Nature of Badajoz’s Social Problem ..	123
3.1. Introduction	123
3.2. Increased Scope for Action.....	125
3.2.1. Two Laws.....	125
3.2.2. Junta de Ordenación Económico-Social	131
3.2.3. The Correspondence of the Junta.....	136
3.3. Two Social Studies: Campanario and Cabeza del Buey.....	141
3.4. Conclusion.....	151

Chapter 4 – The Meaning of “Technical” in the Irrigation of Large Zones.....	154
4.1. Introduction	154
4.2. The INC’s Intellectuals.....	157
4.2.1 The Early Management of Colonists.....	157
4.2.2. Keynesian Colonization	164
4.3. A Plan Made of Plans: The Ambitions of the Plan Badajoz	172
4.3.1. Colonization Towns	174
4.3.2. Selecting Colonists.....	177
4.3.3. Colonist Applications and Complaints.....	182
4.3.4. The Response to Franco’s Promises.....	186
4.3.5. Colonias Penitenciarias Militarizadas	191
4.4. Conclusion	195
Chapter 5 – Tensions, Property and Independence: Miguel Siguán’s Study of the Plan Badajoz	197
5.1. Introduction	197
5.2. Miguel Siguán’s Study of Emigration	201
5.3. The Social Study of the Plan Badajoz	209
5.3.1. Shared Hopes for Rural Modernization	212
5.3.2. A Liberal View of Modernization.....	214
5.3.3. Colonist Rebellion.....	219
5.4. The Reaction to the Study	226
5.5. Conclusion	230
Conclusion	234
WORKS CITED	244

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SPANISH WORDS

AHCEA – Archivo Histórico del Centro de Estudios Agrarios, Fondo Instituto Nacional de Colonización

ACHG – Archivo de la Confederación Hidrográfica del Guadiana

ACMAPAMA – Archivo Central del Ministerio de Agricultura y Pesca, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente, Archivo Técnico Instituto Nacional de Colonización

AGM – Archivo General Militar de Ávila

ADPBA – Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Badajoz

AMNCN – Archivo del Museo Ciencias Naturales

Aparcería – Sharecropping

Arrendamiento – Leasing land through payment in cash

BOE – Boletín Oficial del Estado

Braceros – Day laborers

Cacique – A local clientelist leader

Colonización – Rural settlement, especially of newly irrigated land

Hermanidad – A local office of the state-led union for rural Spain

Instancia – A formal request

Jornaleros – See braceros

Labor Forzoso- Forced field cultivation to boost production

Latifundio – A large farm or collection of farms

Memoria – A justifying report

Regenerationism – Turn-of-the-century political movement obsessed with transcending Spain's backward economy and political system.

Secano – Dry lands, not irrigated

Yunteros – Ploughmen who were particularly revolutionary during the 1930s

LIST OF IMAGES

Image 1.1 The Orellana Reservoir.....	4
Image 1.2: The expedition to the canaries.....	48
Image 1.3: A synclinal valley	66
Image 1.4: The ancient lakebeds between Mérida and Badajoz in the Vegas Bajas near Lobon.....	68
Image 1.5: Quartz bands at the Portillo de Cíjara	70
Image 1.6: The valley of the Guadiana upstream from the Portillo de Cíjara.....	71
Image 2.1: <i>Dehesa</i> landscape in Extremadura.....	86
Image 3.1: The Rinconada Farm.....	149
Image 4.1: The Hermitage of San Isidro.....	175
Image 4.2: Town of Guadajira.....	178

LIST OF MAPS

Map 4.1: Towns of the Plan Badajoz..... 157

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I'd like to thank the two professors who advised me over the course of the project, Pamela Radcliff and Carolyn Boyd. Before she passed, Carolyn cannily steered my research towards the subject that would ultimately prove most fruitful, colonization. Her knowledge of Spanish history and disdain for unsubstantiated, inherited narratives continue to serve as an inspiration. Pamela Radcliff's unrivalled ability to make sense of the different currents of the historiography of modern Spain informed my research questions and made my overall portrayal of the Franco regime possible. Her patience, encouragement and careful editing and commentary, are responsible for any of the coherence this dissertation has attained. Frank Biess, Ivan Evans, Tom Gallant and Matthew Vitz each broadened the project's scope of reference and helped me emphasize its most salient details.

Archivists at several institutions in Spain, including the Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales, the Ministerio de Agricultura, and the Centro de Estudios Agrarios in Mérida, proved of invaluable assistance. In particular, the staff at the archive of Badajoz's Diputación provided a warm atmosphere for research and writing in the midst of the Extremaduran winter and guided me to document collections necessary to the dissertation's completion. Grants from the UCSD Department of History and Spain's Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte's HISPANEX program funded research trips to Spain.

I'd also like to express my gratitude to Professors Judith Hughes and Stanley Chodorow who both organized dissertation-writing seminars – it would be difficult to find two more exacting and precise editors. Foster Chamberlin forewent sleep, tirelessly

paddling out through the morass of early chapter drafts. The integrity of his scholarship along with his skills as an outdoorsman and weakness for oatmeal stout helped me through innumerable crises. Taylor Gray and Gene Fielden are a ruthlessly effective proofreading partnership. Brendan Cooper's well-timed visits, kindred travelling spirit and unique professional philosophy helped me find my feet in Spain and academia. The Thompsons, and their menagerie, welcomed me into the Robison Boulevard North County oasis. Chats with Patrick Adamiak, Benjamin Smuin, Jessica Weant and many others also made San Diego as much of a home as the Bay Area.

My parents, Ken and Donna, and my sisters, Malika, Jennifer and Kelly, have always supported me through academic achievements and misadventures. Each of them pushed, and prodded, me to follow my own interests while keeping me firmly grounded. My Aunt Nan, who finished her PhD after an already successful career, set a strong example. This project depended most of all upon Katherine Anne Merit Thompson, a formidable teacher and scholar who accompanied me on a providential hike in the Laguna Mountains.

VITAE

- 2008 Bachelor of Arts, University of California, Santa Cruz
- 2010 Teaching Assistant, History Department, University of California, San Diego
- 2012 Master of Arts, University of California, San Diego
- 2011-2017 Teaching Assistant, Revelle College Humanities Program, University of California, San Diego
- 2015-2017 Instructor, University of California, San Diego
- 2017 Doctor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Modern European History

First Minor Field: Early Modern European History
Professors Carolyn Boyd and Ulrike Strasser

Second Minor Field: Environmental History
Professor Thomas Gallant

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

El Mar de Extremadura: Irrigation, Colonization and Francoism in Southwestern Spain,
1898-1978

by

David Kenneth Henderson

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, San Diego, 2017

Professor Pamela Radcliff, Chair

This dissertation considers why the Franco regime pursued a policy of rural settlement, known as colonization, supported by irrigation. It argues that the agricultural engineers of the National Institute of Colonization (INC), rather than protecting the rights of landlords and enforcing a regressive status quo in the countryside or enacting a watered-down program of land reform to fulfill propaganda purposes inserted themselves

as new authorities in the countryside to actively manage a carefully chosen portion of the population. In doing this, they manipulated a legacy of irrigation politics inherited from the Regenerationist political movement that arose after the loss of much of Spain's empire in the Spanish-American War. The Franco regime took from the Regenerationists a romantic vision of the power of public works projects to incorporate citizens into the nation and sought to use that power ensure the existence of a limited number of upwardly mobile, politically loyal subjects in the countryside. This project subtly changed over time: in the immediate post-Civil War period, the tenancy laws of the regime along with the settlement projects of the INC rewarded politically loyal peasants and stabilized population of towns under the aegis of maximizing production. Laws passed in 1946 and 1949 gave the INC much more scope for action, and a Keynesian rationale for large-scale state investment to improve productivity (as a per-capita measure) was introduced. Nevertheless, the INC prioritized obedience and political loyalty over its stated goal of helping colonists become economically independent.

This dissertation takes a bottom-up approach to the regime's ideology borrowed from environmental history. It demonstrates that the regime's modernization plans kept its early political principles in mind, but also suggests the limits to these plans in their pretensions to control. These claims are based on research into the plans and correspondence of the INC in its own archives as well as that of the coordinating office of the Plan Badajoz.

Introduction

On March 1st, 1990 the King and Queen of Spain arrived in the Badajoz province of the autonomous region of Extremadura to preside over the inauguration of the La Serena reservoir, the largest in Western Europe at that time. The King opened the floodgates with the push of a button, and the monarchs oversaw “the release of 20,000 carp minnows.”¹ Their presence was a clear indication of the reservoir’s political importance. Its huge capacity, achieved by combining two smaller reservoirs constructed during the Franco regime, demonstrated the ability of the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), Spain’s socialist party, to outperform Franco in the modernization of Spain. Former Prime Minister Felipe González reminded readers of *El País*, Spain’s most widely circulated daily, twenty years later: “The curious, or those who don’t wish to forget, can find in the archives of the ministry of Public Works the percentage of reservoir capacity that was added during the period when I was president. There they will find the answer to the question of why Extremadura is not experiencing problems during this drought.”²

In fact, Spain has many reservoirs. Although this can be partially explained by the aridity of the country, the sheer number of reservoirs is impressive. Spain “holds the world record as the country with the largest proportion of its geographical area occupied

¹ “La suelta de 20.000 alevines de carpas.” Pedro Jara, “Los Reyes inauguran la presa de La Serena, la mayor de España,” *El País*, February 3, 1990.

² “Los curiosos, o los deseosos de no perder la memoria, pueden ver en las hemerotecas y en el ministerio de Fomento el porcentaje de capacidad de embalse sobre el total nacional que se construyó durante el periodo en que fui presidente del Gobierno. Encontrarán la respuesta a la pregunta de por qué Extremadura no tiene problemas en esta sequía.” Felipe González Márquez, “¡Agua Va!,” *El País*, April 22, 2008.

by man-made reservoirs.”³ Reservoirs were constructed during the governments of the Restoration period as well as those of Felipe González, Primo de Rivera, and the Second Republic. But during his nearly forty years in power Franco altered the country’s hydraulic landscape drastically enough to be called “*Paco Rana*” or “Frankie the Frog.”⁴ In several provinces, the construction of a network of reservoirs was meant to catalyze social and economic development in the mode of the Tennessee Valley Authority.⁵

The first question this dissertation seeks to answer is why public works, especially irrigation, were pursued so relentlessly in Spain. The second question, which helps to answer the first, is why was irrigation pursued in such a peculiar way, with towns being built to house “colonists” who were leant recently irrigated plots of land and supervised by Franco’s National Institute of Colonization (the INC).⁶ The INC was an agency within the Ministry of Agriculture created in 1939 as a response to the land reform programs of the left-wing governments of Spain’s Second Republic (1931-1936). The Institute carried out its operations until 1971 when it was merged with another agency⁷ into the National Institute of Agrarian Reform and Development and its activities were slowly wound down.⁸

³ Marina Frolova, “Landscapes, Water Policy and the Evolution of Discourses on Hydropower in Spain,” *Landscape Research* 35, no. 2 (2010): 235-257, citing José Manuel Naredo, *La Economía del Agua en España* (Madrid: Fundación Argenteria, 1997).

⁴ Erik Swyngedouw, “Technonatural revolutions: the scalar politics of Franco’s hydro-social dream for Spain, 1939-1975,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 32, no. 1 (2007): 9-28.

⁵ Ángel Martínez Borque, “La colonización de los Regadíos del Oeste de los Estados Unidos,” *Estudios* (Madrid: Instituto Nacional of Colonización, 1948).

⁶ “*Instituto Nacional de Colonización*.” Colonization, besides referring to overseas expansion, has also been used to describe the settlement of areas within Spain since at least the settlement of the Sierra Morena under Charles the Third. See Charles Nicholas Saenz, *National Reform and Municipal Revolt in a Revolutionary Spain: Political Culture in Western Andalusia, 1766-1823*. It also has the more informal meaning of establishing dwellings for workers or sharecroppers on large farms.

⁷ The Field Concentration and Rural Planning Service (Servicio de Concentración Parcelaria y Ordenación Rural.)

⁸ Instituto Nacional de Reforma y Desarrollo Agrario.

I have sought to explore the purpose of the regime's irrigation and colonization policy by looking to the Badajoz province in the region of Extremadura. Extremadura itself has been the site of many socially and politically ambitious hydraulic projects, proposed and realized, throughout the twentieth century. One of the emptiest and most arid regions of Spain, Extremadura today contains approximately 25% of the country's reservoir capacity, including its two largest reservoirs – making the “Mar de Extremadura” (the sea of Extremadura) a rival to the series of reservoirs built to provide electricity to Madrid known as the “Mar de Castilla” (the sea of Castile).⁹ The aridity and poverty of Extremadura's landscape have made it an ideal site to demonstrate dramatic modernizing accomplishments on par with those of other developed nations. Dams and reservoirs were not only meant to store water and generate electricity; they would lead to the irrigation of vast tracts of desolate land, which could then be farmed by formerly impoverished laborers. Rural provinces would become engines of economic growth and symbols of national progress. These goals animated the construction of monumental dams during Franco's dictatorship, including the Cíjara dam in Extremadura.

⁹ “Agua embalsada en España,” *Embalses.net*, last modified November 7, 2017, <https://www.embalses.net/cuenca-6-guadiana.html>.




Image 1.1: The Orellana Reservoir constructed as part of the Plan Badajoz. “Tomas aéreas de industria, ‘Pantano de Orellana N37285,’” ADPBA.

The Badajoz province emerged as a key location in the debates surrounding Spanish modernization because of its poverty, size, hydrography, social unrest and low population density. It was, and is, the largest province in Spain and one of the poorest by any measure. Located above Seville, it stretches from the border with Portugal to the edge of Castilla-La Mancha region at its Ciudad Real province. The Guadiana River runs east to west all the way across the province before plunging south at the city of Badajoz

and becoming the border with Portugal. The *dehesa* landscape of much of the area, made up of cork oaks and pasture, along with the dry farmland called *secano*, now adjoins several of the largest reservoirs in Spain that provide electricity and drinking water to much of the country. They also irrigate the Vegas Altas and the Vegas Bajas adjoining the Guadiana concentrated around the cities of Don Benito and Mérida. Eucalyptus forests and controlled rivers were much to be preferred over the *dehesa*.¹⁰

The Franco dictatorship made Badajoz the site of its most advertised regional development plan, the Plan Badajoz. In 1945 Franco, visiting the city of Badajoz proclaimed, “I have come to this province because it is the one with the deepest social problems among all the Spanish provinces. I have to announce to all these magnificent peasants, to these suffering laborers from these gray lands of Extremadura that we are going to begin their redemption.”¹¹ The “Plan of Public Works, Colonization, Industrialization and Electrification of the Province of Badajoz” passed through the Cortes in 1952 and led to the completion of the Orellana, the Cíjara, the Garcia Sola and the Zujar reservoirs as well as the canals and irrigation channels necessary to irrigate the Vegas Bajas and Altas.¹² The stated intention was to revive the impoverished province through a combined approach of reservoir construction, water regulation, reforestation, colonization, industrialization and hydro-electrification.¹³ Colonists farmed transformed *secano* plots around newly constructed villages. It was a monumental undertaking. The

¹⁰ Teresa Pinto-Correia, Nuna Almeida Ribeiro, and Paula Sá-Sousa, “Introducing the Montado: the Cork and Holm Oak Agroforestry System of Southern Portugal,” *Agroforestry Systems* 82, no. 2 (2011): 99-104.

¹¹ *Hacia la historia social del campo de Badajoz, 1229 a 1947. Desglosado de la memoria del plan general de ordenación económico-social de la provincia*, (Badajoz, 1948).

¹² “Ley de 7 de abril de 1952 sobre el Plan de obras, colonización, industrialización y electrificación de la provincia de Badajoz,” *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, April 8, 1952.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Cíjara is still today the second largest reservoir in the Guadiana basin, with a capacity of more than 1.5 billion cubic meters.¹⁴ The Orellana and Garcia de Sola reservoirs continue to be the third and fourth largest. Originally meant to be completed over fourteen years, from 1952 to 1966, the works were extended another nine years until 1975, ostensibly due to the possibility of irrigating more land.¹⁵ Its rhetoric was explicitly social, marrying the economic growth and social transformation of the province through renewed efforts at colonization.¹⁶ The continued emphasis on colonization and the project's monumentality made it into a spectacle of the modernity and capability of the regime. Relying on the legacy of "hydraulic politics," the Plan used irrigation to demonstrate the efficacy of the regime's social program.

Forty-four towns were built as part of the Plan Badajoz, primarily on the Vegas Altas and Bajas, and were populated with 4,951 colonists, 1,637 workers, and their families (colonists were always men). In total 40,406 hectares (about 10,000) acres were expropriated from large landowners. Colonists farmed their plots in two periods, one in which all economic decisions were overseen by the INC and one in which they could make farming decisions and begin to pay off the houses and lots that had been lent to them (and other debts to the INC for seeds and equipment). Its property was transferred to local and regional administrations in 1983 and the last colonization town in Badajoz

¹⁴ "Agua embalsada en la cuenca del Guadiana," *Embalses.net*, last modified November 7, 2017, <https://www.embalses.net/cuenca-6-guadiana.html>.

¹⁵ Secretaría Gestora del Plan de Badajoz, *El plan de Badajoz: un gran esfuerzo para un gran fin* (Madrid: Nacional de Industria, 1965).

¹⁶ *BOE*, "Plan de Obras Hidráulicas."

was populated in 1975 with those colonists being registered as the property owners of their lots in 1985.¹⁷

Historians have diverged on whether to treat the regime's colonization efforts as a program of public works with no real social agenda beyond propaganda or as an imposition of central authority to either shore up the power of landlords or extract natural resources. In the first volume of their directed research project into agrarian colonization in Spain, completed in the 1980s, Javier Monclús and José Luís Oyon state that the Francoist vision of colonization emerged from two traditions of land reform:

The formation of a new colonizing program takes off from two forms of conceiving modern agrarian reform. Generally, this expression [agrarian reform] refers to the 'classic' or 'social' versions of agrarian reform, that is to say, beginning with the redistribution of property. But there also exists a 'technical' version that can be defined as an agrarian politics that pursues goals, and uses methods, that are essentially economic and technical.¹⁸

Although the regime paid lip service to the classical idea of property redistribution with its colonization program, in Monclús' and Oyon's view the Franco regime essentially settled on a technical land reform, which emphasized increased economic productivity through investment in education, technology, and irrigation.

I will argue that Monclús' and Oyon's binary classification of land reform programs (land reform that aimed at property redistribution versus land reform efforts that ignored it), which also largely divides the historiography of Francoist agrarian policy

¹⁷ Pilar Monreal and Fernando Pérez del Olmo, "La Zona Regable de Montijo (Badajoz)," in Francisco Javier Monclús and José Luis Oyón, *Historia y evolución de la colonización en España* (Madrid: Instituto de estudios de administración local, 1988), 42.

¹⁸ "La formación de un nuevo programa colonizador arranca de dos formas de concebir las reformas agrarias modernas. Generalmente, con esta expresión se suele hacer referencia a la versión 'clásica' o 'social' de la reforma agraria, es decir, la que plantea la redistribución de la propiedad de la tierra por medios políticos. Pero también existe una reforma 'técnica' que puede definirse como una política agraria que persigue fines y emplea métodos básicamente económicos y técnicos." Monclús and Oyón, *Historia y evolución de la colonización*, 75.

(those who condemn the lack of land distribution versus those who laud economic growth) does not do justice to the importance attached to colonization in the Plan Badajoz, nor to the enthusiasm for irrigation throughout the twentieth century. Although the efforts of the INC were explicitly opposed to the land reform of the Second Republic, the regime had its own political project in the province, which was purposefully much more limited in nature than that of the Second Republic.

I contend that the regime's irrigation and colonization policies cannot be adequately understood without placing them in the context of a political current regarding irrigation that dated from 1898 or alongside the regime's broader social policies in the countryside. The Franco regime manipulated the great hopes placed in irrigation since 1898 to revive Spain as an international power and to create a feeling of nationalism in its rural periphery. The "technical" (which I, following Monclús and Oyón, take to mean aimed primarily at increasing productivity or production) version of land reform concealed a specific political project. The regime substituted the Second Republic's land redistribution program with one specifically targeted at protecting and supervising a small portion of the population who were to be a bastion for the regime in rural areas that had fallen into revolutionary ideology in the years before and during the Civil War of 1936-1939. The primary consideration of the INC, and thus of the Franco regime, was not increasing production or productivity in the countryside, but rather the guaranteeing of the presence of a desirable population there.

The principal cause of Spain's failure to modernize, of its own *Sonderweg* or special path to civil war, has long been identified as its unprofitable agriculture

conditioned by unfavorable geography. Raymond Carr, in his path-breaking history of Spain, writes that “the most reassuring explanation for the failure of liberal revolution in Spain is that political change was unaccompanied by those social and economic changes that give to political revolution its substance.”¹⁹ The culprit for social and economic lag was nature itself: “This coexistence of change and resistance owes something to the limits set by nature. In an agricultural society poor soil conditions, often the consequence of centuries of abusive cultivation, together with the amount and nature of the rainfall, set bounds to the possibilities of progress.”²⁰ For Gerald Brenan, whose lively introduction to the causes of Spain’s Civil War is still in print, the “fundamental problem in Spain” was the “agrarian question and its relation to industry.”²¹ The economic historian Jordi Nadal famously argued in the 1970s that Spain’s failure to industrialize caused by uncompetitive agriculture set it on a divergent path to modernity from the northern European countries.²² Gabriel Tortella agrees in his portrayal of Spain’s economic fortunes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: “In Spain, geography and culture have mutually reinforced each other as obstacles to progress since the seventeenth century.”²³ The “brake on the development of the Spanish economy,” and most of Mediterranean Europe, was a backward and oversized agricultural sector.²⁴ The subtitle of even James

¹⁹ Raymond Carr, *Spain: 1808-1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

²¹ Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth: The social and political background of the Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 87.

²² Jordi Nadal, *El fracaso de la revolución industrial en España, 1814-1913* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1984)

²³ “En España, la geografía y la cultura se han reforzado mutuamente como obstáculos a la modernización desde el siglo XVII.” Gabriel Tortella, *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea: Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX* (Madrid: Alianza, 1995), 6-7.

²⁴ “Es claro que la existencia de un sector agrícola tan grande constituyó freno al desarrollo de la economía española.”²⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

Simpson's revisionist history of Spanish agriculture says it all: *The Long Siesta*.²⁵ David Ringrose, recently surveying the histories of Spain's decline, has concluded: "Perhaps the most persistent theme in the litany of Spanish failure involves the image of a stagnant and unproductive Spanish agriculture."²⁶

These arguments have been disproven or nuanced by a number of authors who, comparing Spain to Europe as a whole rather than solely England or France, have come to a tentative consensus of steady but slow economic growth in the nineteenth century.²⁷ Edmund Burke III, among other authors has demonstrated, furthermore, that these views fall within the confines of a Mediterranean Orientalism, ascribing relative poverty in comparison to northern Europe to cultural or geographic factors.²⁸ However, it is not my purpose to undermine these views further here; I present them, rather, because they descend from an intellectual tradition – the ascribing of Spain's national decline to a mismanaged landscape – that drove many of the actors in this study and that still determines much of the debate concerning Spain's colonization program.

Those who followed Ruined Landscape Theory, identified by Oliver Rackham and A.T. Grove in their *Nature of Mediterranean Europe*, held the idea that the Mediterranean landscape was once lushly forested but had become irrevocably changed

²⁵ James Simpson, *Spanish Agriculture: The Long Siesta* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

²⁶ David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the "Spanish Miracle," 1700-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 17.

²⁷ See Pamela Radcliff, *Modern Spain: 1808 to the Present* (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2017); Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the "Spanish Miracle"*; Juan Pan Montojo, "El atraso económico y la regeneración" in *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo* eds., Pan Montojo and José Álvarez Junco (Madrid: Alianza, 1996).

²⁸ Edmund Burke III, "Towards a Comparative History of the Modern Mediterranean, 1750-1919," *Journal of World History* 23, no. 4 (December 2012).

by human practices.²⁹ Believers were convinced by the idealization of classical landscape by baroque painters and literarily inclined travelers. Other developments further contributed to this pernicious paradigm: early plant physiologists thought that trees brought more rain on their own and overestimated their ability to prevent erosion; the destruction of native fauna on islands colonized by European wildlife encouraged the belief in the human capacity to alter landscapes; and it was (and is) thought that poor land management and excessive shipbuilding caused irrevocable deforestation during the expansion of the Spanish empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The consequences assumed by Ruined Landscape Theory (harm to a landscape is cumulative and difficult to undo) were drastic.³⁰ Grove and Rackham write that proponents of the theory believed that damage “is increased by war and misgovernment, especially under political regimes the author disapproves. Recovery can be achieved only with difficulty, by deliberate and enlightened human intervention.”³¹ In this way, the environmental determinism of Ruined Landscape Theory can be very useful to authors in promoting specific policy agendas that include increased control, whether by private or public means, of rural areas. Their analysis is borne out by the case of French Morocco, where colonial administrators utilized a myth of desertification to justify their rule. Since the indigenous practice of transhumance had supposedly devastated a once

²⁹ A.T. Grove and Oliver Rackham, *The Nature of Mediterranean Europe: An Ecological History*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

³⁰ See J.R. McNeill, *Mountains of the Mediterranean: an Environmental History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

³¹ Grove and Rackham, *The Nature of Mediterranean Europe*, 10.

vibrant landscape by provoking the incursion of the Sahara desert, the French had to manage the land for French Morocco's own good.³²

Ruined Landscape Theory, according to Grove and Rackham, had some of its roots in Extremadura. The region proved to be a case in miniature of Spain's deforestation for enlightenment scientists, travelers and politicians whose ideas have been seized upon again and again by later reformers and academics. Antonio José Cavanilles, in the 1790s, made plans for "reforestation" (a term that continues to be in use and implies that Spain was originally forested) for all of Spain after a trip to Extremadura.³³ Badajoz served as a place of entry for travelers to Spain who entered from Portugal such as George Borrow who noted that forested, as well as arable, lands had been supposedly reduced while oak tree parkland, which they understood as unproductive, predominated.

The theory merged in Extremadura with one of the master tropes of Spanish history: the decline after its heyday as an imperial power. Antonio Ponz, a scientist who travelled to the region in eighteenth-century Spain, attributed its poverty to the privileges granted to the *Mesta*, the powerful guild of Spanish sheepherders who practiced transhumance. The *Mesta*'s lobbying against the enclosure of land to preserve its sheep paths, along with the overgrazing of flocks, made profitable agriculture impossible in Spain.³⁴ The decline of Extremadura was so poignant because of its Roman past. Ponz effectively contrasted the prosperity of Emerita Augusta, the Roman province with its capital at Mérida, with the city's current state of poverty and depopulation. The contrast

³² Diana K. Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: environmental history and French colonial expansion in North Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).

³³ Grove and Rackham, *The nature of Mediterranean Europe*, 180.

³⁴ Antonio Ponz, *Viage de España: en que se da noticia de las cosas mas apreciables, y dignas de saberse, que hay en ella* (Madrid: 1774).

between its archaeological remains, including theatres, temples, and of course, aqueducts, and its poverty from the sixteenth century onwards begged for an explanation that could seemingly only be supplied by irrigation or a vast change in climate.

For Grove and Rackham, Ruined Landscape Theory is flat-out wrong. By carefully comparing evidence drawn from earlier travel accounts and the wood from medieval homes to tree ring data, they conclude that Spain's landscape was mostly stable from the Neolithic until the nineteenth century. Furthermore, there was never much forest in Spain. The shipbuilding efforts supposedly responsible for much of Spain's deforestation occurred outside the peninsula or in areas where forests continue to exist.³⁵ Ironically, the industrial revolution's dependence on coal actually eased pressure on Spanish wood supplies. While Rackham and Grove have been criticized for their intense skepticism of human-caused landscape devastation before the industrial revolution, they succeed at illuminating the blind consensus behind the idea of ruined landscape causing national decline.³⁶ It was a trope fated to be invoked by Enlightenment reformers, the politicians behind Spain's various *desamortizaciones* (disentailments) of church and municipal lands, the creators of the Restoration political system, Francoist administrators, and subsequent scholars of Spain's response to the loss of colonies in the war of 1898.

For authors who subscribe to Ruined Landscape Theory, the need for irrigation seems unquestionable; if unkind geography is the principal cause of a country's poverty, why not transform that geography? Gerald Brenan called for irrigation as a means of

³⁵ Grove and Rackham, *The Nature of Mediterranean Europe*, 177.

³⁶ Karl Butzer, Review of *The Nature of Mediterranean Europe: an Ecological History* by Grove and Rackham, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 93 (2), 2003, pp. 494-530.

escaping backwardness. After describing the aridity and poverty of Castilla-La Mancha and Extremadura's landscape, he noted: "yet the rivers are full of water and have a steep fall. Large tracts of this country could be irrigated."³⁷ Scholars who have seized onto Ruined Landscape Theory have then been sympathetic to, if not supportive of, the Franco regime's modernization program, whose costs have emerged as a contentious point among scholars of post-Civil War Spain. Early interpretations of the transition to democracy saw its success as the almost inevitable consequence of the regime's economic liberalization and the unprecedented economic growth of the 1960s. During his visit to Spain in 1953, the British writer V.S. Pritchett (a close friend of Brenan) noted that in spite of a stifling political and intellectual atmosphere, the country was approaching the economic standards of the rest of Western Europe: "Industrialism and modern life come in, a quiet process of Europeanization goes fitfully on: the factories go up, the roads are built, the dams are constructed, the movement to study abroad – begun in the early years of this century – has not been stopped."³⁸ A weary stability had finally been established, allowing the Francoist regime to pursue the long-overdue modernization of the country.

Many other commentators have shared this idea, locating a significant shift away from the autarky and fascist political dominance of the 1940s and towards the economic openness and ideological diversity of the regime somewhere in the 1950s. This shift is epitomized in 1959 in the enactment of the "Economic Stabilization Plan," created by Opus Dei technocrats.³⁹ The eventual normalization of Spain within Europe, resulting

³⁷ Brenan, *Spanish Labyrinth*, 114.

³⁸ V.S. Pritchett, *The Spanish Temper* (New York: Knopf, 1955), 113.

³⁹ Richard Herr, *An Historical Essay on Modern Spain* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1971), 260.

from increasing international cooperation, the growth of industry and infrastructure, and the liberalization of the economy, represent a clear demarcation (a “parenthesis”) from the previous political repression. Ironically, this school of commentators has portrayed Franco as responsible for the growth of a middle class with democratic values that would guarantee the success of the Spanish transition to democracy.⁴⁰ In the historian Edward Malefakis’s estimation, “the major achievement of the regime was to preside over the greatest period of economic growth in Spanish history, which in turn produced extraordinary social transformations that established the foundations for Spain’s subsequent transition to democracy.”⁴¹

But it is not easy to square the portrayal of Franco as a pragmatic technocrat with the brutal actions of the Nationalists during the Civil War, and of the regime during the 1940s. It is estimated that in an attempt to “purify” Spain of dangerous foreign influences up to 50,000 suspected Republican or Marxist sympathizers were executed after the war’s end.⁴² How could a regime that was so violently repressive in its first years become the sponsor of far-seeing economic policies? For Malefakis, Stanley Payne and many others, the secret to Franco’s longevity was his ability to adapt, illustrated by his willingness to shed the influence of the Spanish fascist party, the Falange, when it became apparent Hitler would not win World War II, and to dismiss its members from most powerful government positions towards the end of the 1940s. This ideological flexibility led to drastic differences between the violence of the 1940s and the later

⁴⁰ Edward Malefakis, “The Franco Dictatorship: A Bifurcated Regime?,” in *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-75*, ed. Nigel Townson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 253.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

regime, where there were fewer and fewer political executions and arrests. But was Franco's own ideology so pliant as to encourage or allow liberalizing developments? Were the ideas of the early regime so easily left behind?

In his book *A Time of Silence*, a searing indictment of the 1940s policy of economic autarky, the historian Michael Richards grappled with these questions and attacked sympathetic understandings of the regime's modernization program.⁴³ For Richards, economic autarky was an extension of the Regime's reactionary ideology, designed to cut Spain off from foreign political ideas. The likelihood of food shortages resulting from the policy was well understood by its creators; the population was meant to meditate on sins committed during the Second Republic and Civil War, and ultimately, redeem itself through sacrifice. Pacified and purified citizens would then rally behind the greater Spanish national project directed by Franco. All the while, government officials covertly ran the black market, strategically funneling supplies where they wished. As official policy, autarky points to the fact that until the end of the regime, "Francoism's conception of nation, state and economy rested on militarism, war and blood."⁴⁴ In Richards' interpretation, the modernization of the country in the 1950s and 1960s was directed by fascist principles of social discipline.

The resistance to the idea of the regime's transformation has brought with it a productive skepticism of the regime's agricultural policy, but has often failed to dislodge the legacy of Ruined Landscape Theory. Historians have sought to expose the regime's sinister motives, and inadequacy, beneath the cloak of colonization and irrigation programs: the restoration of landlords' power, the regime's readiness to extract natural

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Nigel Townson, "Introduction," in *Spain Transformed*, 3.

resources, or its need to create the illusion of a social agenda. Carlos Barciela claims that the agency which preceded the National Institute of Colonization was responsible not for an agrarian counter-reform, but rather for an agrarian counter-revolution against the land reform of the Second Republic. For him, the disparity between the number of farms legally reoccupied and those who returned to the possession of their owners speaks to a violent revolutionary process “without the mediation of any legal process or any control from the State.”⁴⁵ In José Manuel Naredo’s estimation, the rhetoric of the regime was exactly that, rhetoric: “leaving behind the paternalist rhetoric that accompanied such programs [colonization and irrigation], the organization of the human settlements of the Plan Badajoz in fact constituted a huge archaic machine designed for the production of food.”⁴⁶ The social rhetoric surrounding colonization concealed its true purpose: the supply of cheap labor. For these authors who embrace the Second Republic’s land reform as a genuine land reform, irrigation could be beneficial, even necessary, but had to be subsumed in a program that prioritized the distribution of land over economic growth.

Susan Friend Harding offered a related take on the purposes of modernization in her anthropological study of one small Aragonese village, *Remaking Ibieca*.⁴⁷ For her, the capitalization of agriculture was an attack on a traditional way of life. By tracing various family stories, she shows how tractors and crop changes undermined the

⁴⁵ “*Sin que mediara ningún proceso legal y sin ningún control del Estado* [italics in original].” Carlos Barciela López, “La contrarreforma agraria y la política de colonización del primer Franquismo, 1936-1959” in *Reformas y políticas agrarias en la historia de España: de la ilustración al primer Franquismo*, eds. Ángel García Sanz and Jesús Sanz Fernández (Madrid: MAPAMA, 1996), 358.

⁴⁶ “Dejando a una lado la retórica paternalista que acompaño a esta serie de actuaciones, la organización de los asentamientos humanos del Plan Badajoz constituyó de hecho una gran máquina de trabajo arcaica orientada hacia la producción de alimentos.” José Manuel Naredo, “Notas introductorias sobre el Plan Badajoz,” in *Extremadura Saqueada*, eds. Mario Gaviria and José Manuel Naredo (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1978), 18.

⁴⁷ Susan Friend Harding, *Remaking Ibieca: Rural Life in Aragon Under Franco*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).

cohesive, hierarchical structure of the community that had survived countless episodes of political unrest. Indirect reforms, including road building, the subsidization of tractors and certain crops, were “Trojan horses,” which concealed “an army of social and political realignments in the countryside, between urban and rural elites and markets, and between rural subjects and the state.”⁴⁸ Landlords no longer needed to employ as much labor, and as crop diversity was no longer important, plots became larger and larger and landownership further concentrated. The most insidious part of the reforms was that they made the dissolution of the village community a product of its own members’ rational decisions. The village’s population soon dwindled and the family household lost much of its meaning. Younger members embraced “progressive” values and no longer venerated their parents and grandparents and disdained agricultural labor. Harding flips the assumptions about geographic modernization on their head. She acknowledged that economic growth, urbanization, and the modernization of agriculture were the result of the regime’s policies, but turned readers’ attention towards the sense of community identity that was lost in the process.

The best of these skeptical responses to the regime’s modernization of Spain immerse readers in Spanish rural life, capturing the force of postwar economic transformation. But the difficulty in these interpretations, especially those that berate the Francoist regime for not pursuing a program akin to the Second Republic’s, is that they do not explain why it did pursue colonization so doggedly and with so many resources. Why was the regime still struggling to settle colonists as late as 1977, for instance? Authors may lament what was lost in the process of modernization (Harding) or argue

⁴⁸ Ibid., 196.

that it was not accompanied by the social transformation promised (Naredo and Barciela) but they fail to question the adoption of irrigation and colonization in the first place.

This dissertation's approach to the debate surrounding modernization takes its inspiration from the emergence of dams, reservoirs and landscape transformation in general as relevant and fascinating subjects for historical analysis. In the history of the American West, especially California, a number of historians, environmentalists, journalists and social scientists have recognized the importance of the control of water to the region's history. Donald Worster, in his pioneering work *Rivers of Empire*, began by juxtaposing Henry David Thoreau's dreams for the West with the present reality of towns such as Barstow and Needles. He found the towns' derelict condition to be the result of a techno-economic order imposed for the purpose of mastering a difficult environment: "People here have been organized and induced to run, as the water in the canal does, in a straight line towards maximum yield, maximum profit." This vision of the American West can best be described as a modern *hydraulic society*, which is to say, "a social order based on the intensive, large-scale manipulation of water and its products in an arid setting."⁴⁹ Worster investigated the genesis of this society, focusing on the surveying and engineering activities of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which laid waste to a beautiful natural environment in its search for economic productivity and technocratic management.

Richard White took a subtler approach to the history of the Columbia River in *The Organic Machine*, exploring the history of the river, particularly the human uses of it,

⁴⁹ Donald Worster, *Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West* (Oxford, England: Oxford University, 1992), 7.

from its origins to the present.⁵⁰ His work called for an appreciation of the many benefits brought by the river and carefully considered long-term management strategies. Most importantly, White urged his readers to consider the Bonneville Power Authority's assertion of control over the electricity generated by the river not as an inevitability but as a story worthy of its own history. By combining these authors' attention to the connections between social, political and environmental changes with the insights of James C. Scott's *Seeing Like a State* into the "high modernist" ambitions of postwar states, I establish the landscape transformation policies of the Franco regime as an important aspect of both its political self-representation and its creation of new networks of power.⁵¹ All of these authors have recognized that reservoirs do not simply result from apolitical scientific and economic logic, but come from politically significant decisions, which carry their own social agenda.

Many environmental or world historians, along with Scott, take a bird's eye view of modernization projects, looking for common denominators between disparate projects across the globe. J.R. McNeill, in an environmental history of the twentieth century, has used this approach to great effect to make provocative generalizations regarding the roots of environmental degradation. He sees dam-building projects as particularly prevalent during the middle of the twentieth century because of a combination of technology and fragile states: "Ambitious, modernizing states, especially colonial and newly independent ones with legitimacy problems, showed great fondness for dam building. So did Cold War hegemony, keen to display the virtues of their social and political systems. Their

⁵⁰ Richard White, *The Organic Machine*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

⁵¹ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

political utility helps explain why so many uneconomic and ecologically dubious dams exist.”⁵² But how are these projects born and carried out on a micro-scale? Are “economic” dams simply explained by their commonsense utility? Francisco Franco certainly craved legitimacy, but this dissertation argues that the Franco regime’s use of Regenerationist ideas concerning the benefits of irrigation, which resulted in colonization, requires a national, if not regional history.

The geographer Erik Swyngedouw has pointed the way towards a cultural history of reservoirs in Spain by refusing to take the country’s aridity as an adequate explanation for reservoir construction.⁵³ Following Henri Lefevbre along with environmental historians like White and Worster, Swyngedouw posits a “production of nature” where nature is not an inert background for human action but a product of social interaction and discourse. He identifies the loss of Spain’s colonies in 1898 as a catalyst for an increasingly urgent search for the roots of Spain’s political and economic decline. For Regenerationists, Spain’s geography, notably its lack of rainfall, was the principal cause of poverty and the persistence of near-feudal relations in the countryside that the governments of Restoration era (1875-1923) depended upon to rig elections.⁵⁴ Joaquín Costa, founder of the *Unión Nacional* party and the most recognizable figure of the political current known as Regenerationism, seized onto Ruined Landscape Theory and argued for a “hydraulic politics” that would solve Spain’s aridity.⁵⁵ Rather than

⁵² J.R. McNeill, *Something New Under the Sun* (New York: Norton, 2000), 157.

⁵³ Erik Swyngedouw, “Modernity and Hybridity: Nature, Regeneracionismo, and the Production of the Spanish Waterscape, 1890-1930,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 89 no. 3 (September 1999) and Swyngedouw, *Liquid Power: Water and Contested Modernities in Spain, 1898-2010* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015).

⁵⁴ See José Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos: partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración, 1875-1900* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001).

⁵⁵ Swyngedouw, “Modernity and Hybridity,” 451.

implicitly justifying modernizing proposals, Swyngedouw takes apart the discourse of Joaquín Costa's Regenerationists. Their common vision of Spain's geographic problems led to the authoritarian manipulation of Spain's hydraulic landscape. The Regenerationists, created a "substratum" of discourse, which was then built upon by professional engineers and, eventually, the Franco regime. Swyngedouw is not alone in his identification of a significant but vague connection between the Regenerationists and the many later irrigation projects in twentieth-century Spain. For Marina Frolova, the Regenerationists created a "hydraulic paradigm" that made the benefits of large dams unquestionable until the end of the twentieth century.⁵⁶ For Frolova and Swyngedouw, the technocratic, state-centered solutions of the Regenerationists held great appeal to the nascent dictatorship, but the exact means of transmission of Regenerationist ideas to later governments remains an open question.

I will argue, here and in my first chapter, that using Charles Maier's version of territoriality to understand the Regenerationists' *mélange* of ideas concerning nation, irrigation, and the loss of empire, explains their appeal, and transfer, to the Franco regime. Maier argues that governing elites in the second half of the nineteenth century began to pursue security by establishing the state's presence within existing territories as much as following the time-honored method of expanding and fortifying borders. This novel approach, which Maier finds significant enough to propose as an alternative periodization of the twentieth century, sought to make maximum use of a state's physical resources and population. Numerous reform projects, epitomized by that of Meiji Japan, hoped to make "decision spaces" (the area which a government formally controlled)

⁵⁶ Marina Frolova, "Landscapes, Water Policy and the Evolution of Discourses," 238.

cohere with “identity spaces” (the area in which a populace identified with the state). In this way, “the area within [a state] will no longer be construed as a passive enclosure to be policed and kept orderly; it will be a source of resources, livelihood, output, and energy.”⁵⁷ In other words, space could not be empty; it had to be made profitable, energetic, national. As might be imagined, projects of territorial modernization took many different forms and reinforced many different political systems. The transformation of Badajoz took several proposed shapes, all including irrigation schemes to fix the landscape. Where romantic scientists advocated for the increase of the rural population and their incorporation into the Spanish nation, the Franco regime would aim to cultivate a limited and politically loyal troop of peasants.

While some might argue that the strength of states has for some time depended on domestic economic performance alongside the projection of military power abroad, the pursuit of national natural resources as an urgent end in itself to reinforce national identity, regardless of economic efficiency, has been convincingly demonstrated elsewhere.⁵⁸ The danger of ill-utilized space animated the advocacy for the Plan Badajoz’s centerpiece, the Cíjara dam, from 1898 until its completion in 1956.⁵⁹ As Lino Camprubí has eloquently argued, the regime’s ideology was “more than a superstructural disguise: it was made visible in laboratories, churches, and cities...Rather than surrendering technical rationality to an irrational preexisting regime, they [engineers]

⁵⁷ Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000), 801.

⁵⁸ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen, 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

⁵⁹ See chapter 1 of this dissertation

made their own interpretation of technical rationality a central part of the building of the new regime and of National Catholicism.”⁶⁰

By looking at the local genesis and functioning of large-scale hydraulic projects – direct, often state-sponsored, reforms as opposed to indirect ones – and by combining environmental with cultural history, I seek to definitively analyze the agenda of the regime in its regional transformation projects by approaching the history of colonization and irrigation schemes from the ground up, treating the state as an actor (or a series of actors) with independent interests⁶¹ rather than a mask for the interests of landlords or other powerful groups: “State autonomy and elite domination should be conceptualized as ideal types whose explanatory power varies depending on historical context.”⁶² In modern Spanish history, determining the degree of state autonomy vis-à-vis elites is complicated by the weird mixture of ideology at the heart of the regime. The two main ideological currents – fascism with its center of power in Spain’s only legal political party (created during the Civil War by combining various right-wing and fascist parties as the FET de las JONS⁶³ and later called the Movimiento) and National Catholicism centered in the Church and parts of the Army – were often in direct conflict over the sources of the regime’s legitimacy. National Catholicism, more traditionally conservative, shied away from popular legitimacy and favored the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. It located the heart of Spain in its Catholic history and destiny and

⁶⁰ Lino Camprubí, *Engineers and the Making of the Francoist Regime* (Cambridge: MIT, 2014), 160.

⁶¹ “Within particular historical circumstances, state managers might pursue their self-interest in ways that violate both the existing political rules and the normal constraints of class relations.” Fred Block, “Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects,” *The Socialist Register* 17, 1980.

⁶² Kate Willyard, “Historical Contingency Theory: Resolving the State-Centered/Society-Centered Debate,” *Academic Blog*, January 7, 2016, <http://www.katewillyard.com/academic-blog/historical-contingency-theory-resolving-the-state-centered-society-centered-debate>

⁶³ Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista.

protected the traditional rural hierarchy. The Falange, on the other hand, sought popular legitimacy through modernization and social programs, among which colonization was initially prominent, that threatened traditional elites.⁶⁴

These two strands of ideology were interpreted by the agricultural engineers at the heart of colonization efforts, who navigated the contradictions by relying on “ingenierismo” (“engineerism”), which emphasized their expertise and transcendence of politics.⁶⁵ But even as these engineers presented themselves as departing from previous land reform efforts by cutting out “extra-agricultural” considerations and emphasizing production over land redistribution, they pursued a specific political objectives.⁶⁶ Borrowing a careful approach to the “technical” pretensions of Spain’s territorial modernization from Swyngedouw, the environmental historians of the American West, Grove and Rackham’s exposure of Ruined Landscape Theory and the materialism of Camprubí, I demonstrate that security in the countryside was the principal concern of the Franco regime.

For Eric Hobsbawm, the “most dramatic and far-reaching social change of the second half of this century, and the one which cuts us off for ever from the world of the past, is the death of the peasantry.”⁶⁷ He was echoing the work of Pierre Nora on *Lieux de Memoire*, who argued that a severed connection to the past through living tradition

⁶⁴ Ismael Saz, “Mucho más que crisis políticas: el agotamiento de dos proyectos enfrentados,” *Ayer* no. 68 (2007): 137-163.

⁶⁵ For “ingenierismo” see Camprubí, *Engineers*, 5.

⁶⁶ Cristóbal Gómez Benito, “Una revisión y una reflexión sobre la política de colonización agraria en la España de Franco,” *Historia del presente*, no. 3 (2004): 73, citing R. Perpiña, “Emilio Gómez Ayau y la productividad al servicio de la comunidad,” in “Emilio Gómez Ayau: Su figura y sus obras” (Madrid, Asociación Española de Economía y Sociología Agrarias, 1983): 39-46.

⁶⁷ Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 289.

characterizes French modernity.⁶⁸ In lieu of this experience of tradition, citizens now clamber for memory, by which Nora means identity-bestowing narratives from the past, usually anchored in objects or rituals. In both cases, it is the departure of peasants to the city from the countryside that inspired a sea change in conscience, which in turn, makes the history of this transformation difficult to trace.

Hobsbawm and Nora were far from the first writers to note with either dismay or exhilaration the dissolution of the peasantry. One thinks of Karl Marx celebrating capitalism's destruction of the "idiocy of rural life" or of early psychoanalysis, pessimistic about the ability of humans to adapt to the speed, sound and regimentation of modern life.⁶⁹ This dissertation centers itself precisely on the fears, as well as hopes, surrounding modernity, particularly on the ramifications of an empty, or at least an unproductive countryside. The actors examined, authors, scientists, government officials, all understood modernity as an inevitable process that could nevertheless be controlled. Control had to be exerted for one overriding purpose: to strengthen Spain as a nation by mitigating social conflict and helping a select group of peasants adapt to modern life. From 1898 onwards, Spanish intellectuals and politicians, spurred by defeat in the Spanish-American War, called for vast irrigation schemes as the means of achieving this control. But, as we will see, even the Franco regime's pretensions to control were fraught with tensions and inadvertent consequences. The regime itself was divided between its

⁶⁸ Pierre Nora, *Les Lieux de mémoire*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).

⁶⁹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: International Publishers, 1948); Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents* (New York: Norton, 2010); and Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

different “families,” which included the Catholic Church, the army, the fascist Falange), and later, Opus Dei technocrats.⁷⁰

This dissertation will combine a number of approaches in its history of irrigation and colonization in the Badajoz province, borrowed from environmental, cultural, and intellectual history. Its fulcrum will be the coming to power of Franco after the Civil War. The first chapter will explore the legacy Regenerationism left for the Franco Regime. The centerpiece of the Plan Badajoz and the regime’s colonization efforts was the Cíjara reservoir, completed in 1956. But the advocacy for the reservoir began much earlier, in 1899 during the salad days of the Regenerationist movement. The chapter takes as its subject the geologist Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, who was one of the earliest proponents of a reservoir. He was also one of the most politically powerful and longest lasting, taking up a prestigious research position at Madrid’s Central University and serving in governments during the Second Republic. By looking at his career, and his ideas concerning the study of Spain’s landscape, I capture how the enthusiasm for irrigation from 1898 determined his research projects. Hernández-Pacheco’s ambitions not only show the lineage of 1898’s ideas, he also performed the geological tests necessary for the later construction of a dam at the Portillo de Cijara.

Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the early Franco Regime’s response to the land reform program of the Second Republic, arguing that it used the faith placed in irrigation by Regenerationists to pursue a purposefully limited social program directed at reducing unrest in the Badajoz province. Chapter Two introduces the land question in Badajoz,

⁷⁰ Radcliff, *Modern Spain*, 212.

which became of critical importance during the Second Republic as *yunteros* (ploughmen), rebelled against the slow pace of the Republic's agrarian reform program by forcibly occupying large estates in March of 1936. This chapter looks at the structure of rural society and the Francoist response to the land question. The regime took up one aspect of the Second Republic's legislation, the protection of tenants, especially of the *yunteros*, and used it to enforce stability and political loyalty within towns. The INC's local colonization efforts were a continuation of this policy. It protected a small portion of the population that had to prove its political loyalty. Chapter 3 further tracks the care taken for these *yunteros* by the INC and provincial authorities. As the INC began its large-scale colonization schemes, as opposed to its local colonization efforts, it worked with a provincial junta to determine which towns suffered from a "social problem," based principally on the unemployment of *yunteros*. Once the provincial junta recommended a troubled town, the INC would carry out a detailed social study, trying to figure out how to stabilize the town's population through local colonization or the settlement of the new large irrigated zones. I argue that the "social problem" was built not around general unemployment but around the unemployment of *yunteros* who were idealized as responsible property-owners who would naturally rally to the regime's cause.

Chapters 4 and 5 occupy themselves strictly with INC's colonization of large zones, which entailed the construction of *nuevos poblados* (new towns). Chapter 4 introduces the National Institute of Colonization (INC) further, entering into the debate over whether the regime transformed. While some have claimed that the increasing emphasis on "technical" and "economic" transformation of the countryside signaled a more impartial and economically rational economic policy that followed rapprochement

with America, I show that the local officials of the INC still specifically targeted a small portion of the population, seeking to cushion it from the larger forces causing emigration. Although the rationale for choosing the recipients of aid from the INC became more strictly economic (colonists needed to have more wealth than previously), political and moral considerations were still at the heart of the colonization project.

Finally, Chapter 5, similarly to Chapter 1, is constructed around an intellectual portrait of an influential figure, in this case the industrial sociologist Miguel de Siguán. Siguán was commissioned to perform a study of the colonists in the Plan Badajoz after his award-winning work on the adaptation to city, or really *banlieu*, life by immigrants from the countryside. His understanding of the purpose of colonization, creating economically and intellectually independent citizens, seemed to fit exactly with the social purposes of the INC. But the collision of his hopes with the reality of the Plan Badajoz left a compelling record of the conflicts within the INC's project. His work captured the INC's concern for enforcing obedience rather than independence. His interviews with colonists ironically capture the tensions within the colonization program of the distribution of property: the impatience to have control over their land and its produce had made colonists frustrated with the INC, and when the time came, ready adherents of the Socialist Party in Spain's elections

Chapter 1 – Landscape and Irrigation: Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco and Territoriality

1.1. Introduction

In 1899 Joaquín Castel, a pharmacist in the city of Cáceres and owner of Extremadura's first commercial ice machine, was perhaps the first to call for a dam and reservoir to be constructed at the narrowing of the Guadiana River near the town of Herrera del Duque, a rock formation called the Portillo de Cíjara.¹ He advocated for the project in three articles published in the journal he helped to found, the *Revista de Extremadura*, between 1899 and 1902, and it was subsequently included in the 1902 National Plan of Public Works as project number 30, much to his own surprise.² Preparatory geologic studies were carried out over the following decade and resumed seriously in the 1920s. Construction began during the Second Republic as a result of the impetus given by the socialist Minister of Public Works, Indalecio Prieto. The outbreak of the Civil War delayed the project until the 1940s. The Cíjara reservoir was completed in 1955 – more than fifty years after Castel's first article – as the centerpiece of the Plan Badajoz's colonization and irrigation efforts.

In spite of the long delay in the construction of the Cíjara dam, histories by Plan Badajoz officials have referred to Castel's efforts as the germ of the Plan. Francisco Hernández-Pacheco, a consulting geographer, and Manuel Martín Lobo, a forestry official employed by the Plan's *Secretaría Gestor* (responsible for public relations as well as coordinating the efforts of the various ministries involved) echo the official social

¹ Joaquín Castel, "Hidrografía de Extremadura y Medios de Mejorarla," *Revista de Extremadura* 1, no. 2 (1899): 101.

² Joaquín Castel, "El Pantano de Cíjara y los Pueblos del Guadiana," *Revista de Extremadura* 5, no. 44 (1902): 82.

history commissioned by the Plan Badajoz in telling a story of political morass delaying apolitical, always beneficial irrigation projects.³ Castel's ideas become for these authors one of a number of commonsense calls for irrigation, dating from the Spanish enlightenment's embrace of Ruined Landscape Theory, that always met rejection because of the meaningless conflicts engendered by liberal, republican, and socialist politicians. I begin with Castel, rather, because his arguments for the project and understanding of irrigation were taken up by another contributor to the *Revista de Extremadura*, Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco (1873-1965), a prominent geologist and public intellectual who performed the critical geologic surveys for the Cijara Dam and encouraged irrigation through his political activity and scientific works over the course of his life.⁴

Castel and Hernández-Pacheco's shared understanding of irrigation as a means of securing the nation, animated the construction of the Cijara dam and fits into the widespread anxiety within Spain over the loss of empire in 1898. Erik Swyngedouw, among a number of authors, has located the birth of a distinctly geographically-minded modernization project at this juncture, one created by the Regenerationist political movement and reinforced by the more diffuse literary Generation of 1898's re-discovery of Spain's impoverished interior regions.⁵ For the Regenerationists, the loss of Spain's American colonies began a mission of domestic resurrection through geographic

³ See Francisco Hernández Pacheco, *Características geográficas y geológicas de la Vega del Guadiana (zona de regadíos)* (Badajoz: Diputación Provincial, 1956); Manuel Martín Lobo, *Un luchador extremeño: La conquista del Guadiana, el plan de Badajoz: Artículos, charlas, conferencias sobre el tema* (Badajoz: Diputación Provincial, 1962); and *Hacia la historia social del campo de Badajoz*.

⁴ His son Francisco (1899-1976), a geographer, shared his enthusiasm and collaborated on a number of Eduardo's later projects. Even his son who became a doctor, Diego Hernández-Pacheco, would study malaria among the workers on dam-building projects.

⁵ Erik Swyngedouw, "Modernity and Hybridity: Nature, Regeneracionismo, and the Production of the Spanish Waterscape, 1890-1930," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 89, no. 3 (September 1999): 451.

manipulation. The chief cause of Spain's delay in modernizing, when compared to other European countries in possession of empires, was its geographical disadvantage. The aridity of the country was so dire that the proper geography had to be created not just enhanced, through large-scale hydraulic works.

Ominously for the geographer Erik Swyngedouw, in the face of reluctance by traditional agrarian elites, Regenerationists hoped to transcend politics through envisioned large-scale projects. Their ideas were adopted by the Spanish Corps of Engineers and, eventually, Spain's government bureaucracy. The observation of nature, when carried out by an expert, could tell you the most effective forms of political organization. The creation of the hydrographic confederations under Primo de Rivera, where the administration of water resources was re-organized around river basins, was one manifestation of the influence of Regenerationist doctrine. In Swyngedouw's estimation, in spite of the opposition of large landlords, the anti-democratic and anti-revolutionary nature of their modernization program provided a blueprint for the Franco regime to build on.

The modernization called for by the Regenerationists could easily lend itself to the violent agenda pursued by the Franco regime because of its inherent authoritarianism. Politicians, engineers, and writers all put their faith in strong-willed, independent men such as Costa's famous "iron surgeon" who could confront the opposition of traditionalists. In his telling, there is a direct transition from the discourse of the Regenerationists to the reality of the Franco regime. In spite of its violent rhetoric, the Regenerationist program was not threatening to elitist Restoration governments. The main assumption – that wealth could be generated by efficiently utilizing Spain's natural

resources – undermined the claims of Spain’s real revolutionary political parties, the anarchists and the socialists. The Regenerationist emphasis on a spiritual, national vision to rehabilitate Spain through irrigation could attract followers from all across the political spectrum.

Swyngedouw’s interpretation rests, however, on a historical account of 1898 that has become increasingly questioned. Historians have reached a consensus regarding the inaccuracies at the heart of Regenerationism: the economic damage caused by defeat was almost negligible (nowhere near as important as the loss of colonies in the first half of the nineteenth century), and much of the public reacted to defeat with indifference.⁶

Swyngedouw’s reliance on older historical literature, which accepted the diagnoses of the Regenerationists, raises questions about his arguments: the Regenerationists’ modernization rhetoric is conflated with the country’s actual modernization in spite of a significant time lag. In its time, the Regenerationist belief in a national mission to irrigate did not lead to a cohesive or coherent political agenda. The only strictly Regenerationist political party, Costa’s *Unión Nacional*, was dissolved within two years of its formation.

As a result, historians such as José Álvarez Junco doubt the strength of the relationship between the Regenerationists and Franco. He explains the violence of the reaction to the loss of colonies by a select coterie of intellectuals to Spain’s defeat by placing it within a wider European context of rising nationalism. Spanish intellectuals were horrified at the absence of patriotic feeling, which they juxtaposed with a successful German empire that was fueled by popular patriotism and a modern school system.

⁶ José Álvarez Junco, “La nación en duda” in Pan-Montojo and Álvarez Junco, *Más se perdió en Cuba*, 405-476.

Álvarez Junco, alongside other historians such as José Varela Ortega and Stanley Payne, finds that the consciousness of Spain's backwardness and urgent need to modernize were ideas that were shared all across the political spectrum. As might be expected in such a situation, the alumni of the Generation of 1898 split when the Civil War broke out, which seems to undermine Swyngedouw's view of continuity between the Regenerationists and the Franco regime.⁷

I share the identification of 1898 as a crucial point in Spain's modernization project with Swyngedouw, and argue that analyzing Hernández-Pacheco's career, beginning with his embrace of the regional program of Castel, exposes the linkages between 1898 and later dam construction, and adds nuance to notions of Regenerationists as dead-set against unexploited nature and fixated on domestic reform rather than imperial expansion. In fact, Castel and Hernández-Pacheco, both Regenerationists, viewed empire jealously and enthusiastically. And the latter's view of nature was as romantic as it was instrumental. Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco and Joaquín Castel's ideas concerning the necessity of irrigation within the Spanish empire firmly fit them within the *zeitgeist* of territorial modernization identified by Charles Maier with his concept of Territoriality.⁸ Modernizers understood undeveloped regions to be sources of weakness in a time of increased imperial competition. Irrigation secured a state's existing territory in two ways: it improved the economies of marginal areas and it incorporated their populations into the nation by creating productive, identity-giving landscapes. It ably

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century."

made underdeveloped far-flung, or near-at-hand, provinces “decision spaces” as well as “identity spaces.”⁹

Castel and Hernández-Pacheco shared a sense of romantic, and imperial, nationalism that was built on the full utilization of the nation’s landscape. The latter’s enthusiasm for geology (and also geography and history) stemmed from his desire to contribute to the economic and spiritual regeneration of Spain. Hernández-Pacheco was a geographical (or geological) determinist. The landscape of Spain was, for him, *the* important source of Spanish identity. The study of the landscape, and the presentation of it through description and photographs, fomented a sense of nationalism in readers. Knowledge of Spain’s geology further protected the nation from international competition and internal dissolution by encouraging the exploitation of its natural resources, the most important of which was water to be used for irrigation. Geology could determine where dams, reservoirs and canals could be most effectively placed. For Castel and Hernández-Pacheco, irrigation was the surest way to improve to strengthen Spain by reviving marginal or peripheral areas and imbuing their populations with a sense of Spanish identity.

1.2. Irrigation as the Redemption of Empire

One of the great problems that occupied Spanish intellectuals and politicians after the defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, in which Spain lost the great majority of its remaining colonies, was Spain’s weak domestic economic production, particularly in agriculture. The *latifundios*, the large estates that dominated Andalucía and Extremadura, were seen as a chief culprit. Rich absentee landlords, with only their own profit in mind,

⁹ Ibid, 816.

supposedly discouraged production by refusing to invest in new technologies, creating a life of misery and poverty for tenants or day laborers.¹⁰ Joaquín Costa, a politician and public intellectual from Aragon, led calls for the transformation of the Spanish countryside through irrigation as well as for the destruction of the clientelist *caciquismo* system that the Restoration government depended on.¹¹ While he had involved himself in a number of fields as a scholar and reformer – including history, colonial geography, economics and law – he became most well known as the leader of the Regenerationist movement, which spread through many progressive cultural and political milieus in the wake of Spanish defeat.¹²

Costa was the force behind a league of producers that brought together the different provincial Cámaras Agrarias. When this league joined a parallel union of chambers of commerce in the face of a new tax to finance the war against the United States, a new political party, *Unión Nacional*, was born.¹³ The Regenerationists sought solutions to the problems that led to the weakness and backwardness of Spain compared to the rest of Western Europe. Costa distinguished himself by envisioning the regeneration of Spain through “hydraulic politics.” Although Spain already had undergone a boom in railroad construction, usually the first step in modernizing elites’ territorial programs, irrigation proved to be another means of energizing a nation’s interior space. The irrigation of *secano* lands, and the resulting increase in production would lead to social harmony, national solidarity and “moral revival”: merging identity

¹⁰ See Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*.

¹¹ Joaquín Costa Martínez and Alfonso Ortí, *Oligarquía y caciquismo: como la forma actual de gobierno en España, urgencia y modo de cambiarla* (Madrid: Ediciones de la Revista de Trabajo, 1975).

¹² Swyngedouw, “Modernity and Hybridity,” 451.

¹³ José Varela Ortega, “Aftermath of a Splendid Disaster: Spanish Politics Before and After the Spanish American War of 1898,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, no. 2 (1980): 317-344.

space with decision space.¹⁴ The acceptance of Costa's ideas irrevocably tied the modernization of Spain to the exploitation of its water resources.

The *Revista de Extremadura* (1899-1911), founded by Joaquin Castel, Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco and others, enthusiastically presented Regenerationist ideas to the provinces of Badajoz and Cáceres, taking part in the nationwide scrutiny of the long-term causes of Spain's defeat. Although the *Revista* had been in gestation in the year before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, defeat galvanized its contributors. In an article published in its first issue, "Pro Patria," José Luis Gómez Santana lauded the widespread calls for national regeneration, which he saw as firmly in concordance with the journal's regionalism (not nationalism or separatism). His "regeneration" called for growing regional consciousness, which supported Spanish nationalism rather than challenging it, as well as for an increase in power for the *Sociedades Económicas de los Amigos del País*, an institution that dated to the enlightenment era and promoted liberal economic reforms.¹⁵ Following this general line of national spiritual and economic rebirth, the journal focused directly on the region of Extremadura as both a source of Spain's past greatness and a symbol of the country's current spiritual and political decline. Extremadura served as a potent symbol because of its relationship with Spain's imperial history and its contemporary poverty and depopulation. If Spain were to flourish again, according to the general arguments of the journal, and be prepared for an imperial role, Extremadura would have to be revived economically and recognized culturally.

¹⁴ Swyngedouw, "Modernity and Hybridity," 452.

¹⁵ José Luis Gómez Santana, "Pro Patria: Levántate y anda," *Revista de Extremadura* 1, no. 1 (1899): 35-36.

The founders of the *Revista de Extremadura* had an acute feeling of Spain's backwardness in comparison to other European countries that were militarily and economically more powerful. Unlike Spain, those countries were in the process of consolidating their empires instead of losing them, which was possible because of their domestic dynamism. Joaquín Castel's three articles concerning irrigation moved in a logical progression - in the first he presented a problem - the region's low population density - and in the second and third he presented the solution of ambitious reservoir construction. In the first of his articles, "Notes on the Repopulation of Upper Extremadura," Castel identified a series of poor national habits that had made the country dependent on wealth extracted from the colonies:

The definitive loss of the great colonial empire possessed by Spain makes it more important than ever today to bring our gaze back to the conditions of the soil of the Peninsula, where, in the future, the displaced population will have to live, who - during four centuries of departing the native land and populating the immense and rich territories on the other side of the ocean discovered and conquered by our ancestors - dreamed of the easy acquisition of fortunes the native country could only offer in exchange for strenuous work.¹⁶

The dream of "easy acquisition" facilitated by the prospect of emigration to the American colonies had weakened Spain by luring away those who sought to better their lot. Now the country confronted two problems. The first was that its domestic economy had been deprived of any impetus for innovation because of the dependence on extracted wealth.

The second was that there was no longer a physical destination for the population that the

¹⁶ "La pérdida definitiva del gran imperio colonial que poseyó España, hace necesario hoy con más oportunidad que nunca volver la vista sobre las condiciones del suelo de la Peninsula, en donde en el porvenir se verá obligado a vivir aquel sobrante de población que hasta aquí, durante cuatro siglos, abandonando el solar nativo, venia poblando los inmensos y ricos territorios que allende los mares [que] descubrieron y conquistaron nuestros antepasados, y donde las preocupaciones de nuestra raza hacían sonar en la fácil adquisición de medios y fortunas que el país natal solo podía ofrecer a cambio de ímprobo trabajo." Joaquín Castel, "Apuntes Sobre la Repoblación de la Alta Extremadura," *Revista de Extremadura* 1, no. 1 (1899): 49.

weakened economy could not support. To approach the achievements of other European nations, a space had to be found for this population that offered it room for living and opportunities for employment, which is why Castel began by demanding his readers turn their attention to the *soil* of the peninsula. The problems he identified neatly fit into the possibilities that he saw for Extremadura. It had given up a larger share of its population to the New World than any other region, it had contributed leadership and energy to the enterprise (many of the conquistadors were from Extremadura), and it had suffered disproportionately from the expulsions of Muslims and Jews.

In Castel's estimation the loss of the colonies had to be combated by making better use of the natural resources of the Iberian Peninsula. He understood all the wealth and energy poured into the colonies as now wasted: "How different would the economic situation of Spain be if the immense treasures that were sacrificed to conserve colonial power had been invested in promoting the development of the natural wealth of the Peninsula, educating the people at the same time to be dreamers of the practical?"¹⁷ The profligate spending of economic resources to support parts of the empire that did not identify with the metropole prevented the Peninsula from developing its resources. Modern nations such as France and England owed their economic power, and their empires, to the rational, scientific improvement of nature, which was demonstrated in such actions as the reforestation of Bordeaux following the French revolution. Spain had to embrace hydraulic projects, along with improved hygiene, to move its people out of a "primitive" state in both the countryside and the cities. For Castel the "the progress of

¹⁷ "¡Cuán distinta sería la situación económica de España si los inmensos tesoros que ha sacrificado sin fruto a la conservación de su poder colonial se hubieran invertido en promover el desarrollo de la riqueza natural de la Península, educando al propio tiempo al pueblo para convertirlo de soñador en verdaderamente practico!" Castel, "Apuntes," 50.

the rich and educated nations” was owed to the “rational selection” of technology that could manipulate nature. To find itself in the forefront of modern nations again, Spain would have to embrace irrigation as an avenue to empire, or at least international stature.¹⁸ More available energy in the form of steam could distribute the population evenly, bringing workers out of city slums. In this way, as later for Hernández-Pacheco, reservoir building served as a barometer of civilization.

Castel and the Regenerationists jealously viewed the conquests of other imperial nations. Castel asked that Spaniards “renounce the chimerical desires of foreign aggrandizement through the domination of the countries that, if one day our ancestors conquered and civilized at the cost of the blood of the mother country, we haven’t been able to exploit nor conserve.”¹⁹ Castel’s renouncement of empire plainly did not come out of any distaste for empire in general as he waxed nostalgic for the men of Spain’s past. If Spain still had the strength to dominate and civilize, it would deserve an empire. The empire was lost because of the pursuit of vain dreams abroad instead of attending to economic realities at home. In fact, in Castel’s plans, Extremadura was a substitute for Spain’s loss of colonies. In Castel’s estimation, Extremadura, with its two river valleys and low-population density, was the prime candidate to substitute the loss of crops (e.g. sugar beets for the sugar cane of Puerto Rico and Cuba). It was appropriate that a region that had supplied so many of the new world explorers and colonists could reinvigorate

¹⁸ As José Álvarez-Junco shrewdly notes, at this time in European intellectual life the ideas of progress and civilization included a sharp edge of imperialism. See José Álvarez-Junco, “La nación en duda.”

¹⁹ “Renunciando a los quiméricos deseos de engrandecimiento exterior con la dominación de los países que, si un día pudieron conquistar y civilizar nuestros mayores a costa del desangre de la madre patria, nosotros no hemos sabido ni explotarlos ni conservarlos y pensar seriamente ya en el desarrollo de la riqueza natural de la Península tan descuidada hasta aquí por atenderse antes al sostenimiento de las colonias con un dominio ilusorio, que a aprovechar los medios que la naturaleza ha puesto al alcance de los españoles en su propio suelo.” Castel, “Apuntes,” 50.

Spain domestically. Through the construction of a reservoir at the Portillo de Cijara near the town of Herrera del Duque, the fertile lower Guadiana River plain (the Vegas Bajas) could be irrigated for new crops.²⁰

To promote the construction of the dam and reservoir, Castel invoked the settlements of the Roman Empire in Extremadura and their adjoining reservoirs. For Castel, the recollection of Rome's glory served several purposes. It juxtaposed a successful empire to the laughable present-day state of Spanish government (much as Spain was constantly compared to Britain, France and Germany). It made clear that this area of Spain was indeed fertile and could be farmed efficiently – he noted that Roman soldiers were rewarded with farms in the area. Lastly, this use of Rome normalized a common Spanish history and destiny. The members of the generation of 1898 were largely idealists, and, as José Álvarez-Junco notes, understood the nation as permanent and immortal: it lay sleeping waiting to be awoken.²¹ When consciously unified, as under the Roman Empire, Spain could be prosperous and internationally powerful. And one of the first steps towards unification had to be the construction of a dam at the Portillo del Cijara.

As noted by Swyngedouw, the Regenerationists and the Generation of 1898 presented the geography of Spain as a problem to be overcome, as an impediment to national identity. Castel began his second article in the *Revista* by emphasizing the “inconstancy and lack” of rain that forced the inhabitants of Extremadura to emigrate. Unfortunately for Extremadura, its small hills were too far from any body of water to concentrate clouds and there were no high mountains; the prevailing winds also blew the

²⁰ Castel, “Hidrografía de Extremadura,” 101.

²¹ Álvarez Junco, “La nación en duda,” 413.

wrong way. The Guadiana River itself, the principal river running through the province of Badajoz, was “mysterious” because of its unknown source (he incorrectly identified it as the Lagunas de Ruidera) and its flat course over plains that once made up a giant lake. Because of this flat course, much of the Guadiana’s water evaporated. 40,000 of Spain’s hectares were wasted because of this combination of harsh meteorology and topography. One option for fixing the uneven flow of the Guadiana would be to build a tunnel that would bring in water from the Tagus River to the north.²² Because of the difficulty of doing this, he encouraged all the adjoining towns to consider funding a study of the possibility of placing a dam near Herrera del Duque as a remedy to Extremadura’s physical geography, since the Spanish government was clearly unable to pay for any with its outsized officer class and mismanaged budget. A canal running roughly parallel to the river through the towns of Villanueva de la Serena, Don Benito, Merida and Badajoz could double the agricultural wealth of Extremadura. Finally, the reservoir itself would prevent the Guadiana’s occasional floods.

1.3. The Wandering Life of Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco

Castel’s prescription for irrigation to remedy poverty and low-population density would be taken up more effectively by another founding member of the *Revista de Extremadura*, Eduardo Hernandez-Pacheco. He would work throughout his life to promote irrigation as a means to reinforce Spain’s national strength and unity. An accomplished geologist, geographer and paleontologist, Hernández-Pacheco’s fondness for his research did not prevent him from lending his services to the Confederación Hidrográfica del Guadiana in the first geological studies for the construction of the Cíjara

²² A solution that would be echoed in irrigation schemes in the second half of the twentieth century such as the Tajo-Segura Canal and the proposed Ebro Canal.

dam and consulting on a number of other hydraulic projects. He used his abilities and prestige to reinforce calls for irrigation, translating the ideas of the Regenerationists into action. Although most well known as a geologist, Hernández-Pacheco's curiosity led him into several other scientific disciplines, including anthropology, ecology and paleontology. He aimed for his work to have a "synthetic" quality – his work on geology always leaned towards geography.

Hernández-Pacheco was interested, perhaps above all else, in the Spanish landscape – its appearance and its history. For him, the Spanish landscape was what united Spain in terms of territory and identity, and he dedicated his career to presenting as many aspects of it as possible to his readers through a huge photographic archive compiled with his son that he drew on liberally in his publications. A geographical, or geological, determinist, Hernández-Pacheco firmly held that the landscape dictated the boundaries of nations and gave their inhabitants an identity. His understanding of the landscape as the source of the nation's security necessitated state intervention through irrigation just as Castel had believed. His geologic research provided the basic information for the construction of reservoirs throughout Spain, and his definition of landscape gave scientific backing to the claim that a properly developed landscape could serve to forge an identity space, or at least reveal and reinforce, the link between populace and nation.

Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco was born into a prominent military family in 1873 in the town of Alcuéscar in the province of Cáceres, almost exactly halfway between Mérida and the city of Cáceres. After studying with some of the most pioneering of

Spain's nineteenth-century geologists at Madrid's Central University,²³ he taught at a secondary school in Córdoba and the University of Valladolid, and received the Chair in Geology at his alma mater in 1909 at only age thirty-six. This last job carried with it a position on the board of the National Museum of Natural Sciences. He played a prominent role in many of the Spanish royal scientific societies and became vice president of the Commission of National Parks during the Second Republic period. Closely allied with the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, the stronghold of liberal thinking in Spain, he worked to reform Spain's education system, pushing for geography to be taken out of humanities departments and made a science. Politically, he began his career as an ally of Alejandro Lerroux's Radical Republican Party, running on its list of councilmembers when he was a secondary school instructor in Córdoba. After maintaining a friendship with Lerroux while he was prime minister in several governments in the Second Republic (1933-1935), Hernández-Pacheco fled to Nationalist Burgos at the onset of the Civil War and would serve in prestigious posts during the first years of the dictatorship before he retired. Throughout his life, he was driven to travel incessantly through the regions of the Peninsula and led scientific expeditions to the Canary Islands, Ifni and the Spanish Sahara. In all of his work, he pursued the objectives of detailing the natural resources of regions and promoting their development through irrigation.

²³ He studied with Francisco Quiroga Rodríguez and José Macpherson Hemas. See Julio Lozano Lozano, *Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco Estevan (1872-1965): apuntes biográficos y obra científica* (Cáceres: I.E.S. Profesor Hernández-Pacheco, 2004).

1.3.1. The Canary Islands

In 1907, Hernández-Pacheco caught a lucky break. He was meant to accompany the eminent geologist Salvador Calderón on a scientific tour of the less well-studied Canary Islands: Fuerteventura, Lanzarote and the small islands off of Lanzarote's coast. The trip was funded by the Junta de Ampliación de Estudios (JAE)²⁴ and the Junta de Estudios del Norte de África.²⁵ While German scientists had carried out recent studies of the Gran Canaria, it was hoped that the Spanish could catch up with the scientific exploration of their own territory by surveying the smaller islands. As the expedition departure approached, Calderón fell ill and, instead of delaying the expedition, placed Hernández-Pacheco in charge of what was thought to be the first of two trips to Lanzarote and its islands (there was never a return trip). Francisco Aranda Millán, a promising student of natural history who concentrated on the islands' zoology, took Hernández-Pacheco's original role as second-in-command and José Pereyra Galviati, an agricultural engineer and native of Lanzarote, joined them as an assistant.²⁶ The prestige given to Hernández-Pacheco by the expedition must have aided him in his appointment in 1909 to the Catedrático position at the Central University.²⁷ Almost thirty years later, he was placed in charge of the first scientific expedition to the territory of Ifni in present-day Morocco during the Second Republic in 1934 and made head of the Junta de Estudios Africanos under the Franco regime after the Civil War.²⁸

²⁴ The precursor of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC).

²⁵ Two institutions related to the Institución Libre de Enseñanza.

²⁶ He joined the others in Arrecife.

²⁷ Where he would work with his friend and mentor, the entomologist Ignacio Bolívar, who presided over JAE. For their friendship see "Correspondence between Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco and Ignacio Bolívar," Archivo Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales, 1899-03-10/1902-10-05, ACN0381/042.

²⁸ "Correspondencia dirigida a Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, Presidente de la Comisión Científica a Ifni, en el año 1935," Archivo Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales, CN0283/014.

Hernández-Pacheco published the geologic findings of his expedition in the *Bulletin of the Spanish Royal Society of Natural History*²⁹ in a 250-page article, which principally focused on the formation of the islands and the history of major volcanic events.³⁰ As an aid for preparing the article, he kept a diary during the trip that he turned into a remarkably polished narrative account that was not published until 2002.³¹ The narrative provides a remarkable, immediate perspective on the research trip: it demonstrates the purpose and feeling behind the drier findings reported to the Royal Society. The expedition members' cataloguing of Lanzarote and the smaller islands of the Canaries was driven by 1898's anxiety to fortify Spain's international power.

Hernández-Pacheco's goal on the journey was to update the accounts of previous geologists including Karl Sapper, Georg Hartung, and Oskar Simony.³² Like them, he sought to determine the nature of the formation of the Canaries, to date the various volcanic eruptions and to create an accurate map. At one point on the journey, the three scientists named the dishes of a particularly successful camp dinner after these luminaries ("roasted pigeons a la Hartung").³³ Hernández-Pacheco first led the scientists across Lanzarote before heading to the other islands. Most days (apart from the few days after Hernández-Pacheco cut his foot on a lava formation diving into the ocean on a swim)

²⁹ *Boletín de la Real Sociedad Española de Historia Natural*.

³⁰ Eduardo Hernández Pacheco, "Estudio Geológico de Lanzarote y de las Isletas Canarias", *Memorias de la Real Sociedad Española de Historia Natural* 6, no. 4 (1909): 107-342.

³¹ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, *Por los campos de lava: relatos de una expedición científica a Lanzarote y a las isletas canarias : descripción e historia geológica, 1907-1908*, (Lanzarote: Fundación César Manrique, 2002).

³² Oskar Simony, "Die Canarischen Inseln insbes. Lanzarote und die Isletas mit 10 Taf.," *Schriften Des Vereines Zur Verbreitung Naturwissenschaftlicher Kenntnisse*, 32 (1892), Georg Hartung, *Die geologischen Verhältnisse der Inseln Lanzarote und Fuertaventura* (Zürich: 1856), and Karl Sapper, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis von Palma und Lanzarote* (Petermanns Mitteilungen Aus Justus Perthes' Geographischer Anstalt: 1906).

³³ Hernández-Pacheco, *Por los campos de lava*, 162.

were spent hiking up to viewpoints or visiting geological curiosities, such as lava fields or domes. They spent most nights in small inns or in the houses of acquaintances of Pereyra and depended on a camel they came to loathe for transport. Because of a lack of supplies and the irregularity of ferry service between the other islands, they were forced to call an end to the expedition before they could visit Fuerteventura.

Hernández-Pacheco understood the impetus for the expedition to the Canary Islands as coming from the spirit of 1898. He explained that the funding he received from the Royal Society of Natural History and the Commission for the Study of North Africa came from: “a desire to escape the backwardness that we had lived in with respect to public education and scientific research” in the years before the trip.³⁴ His accounts of the trip displayed his ideas of applied geology – and his confidence that geology allowed him access to many other areas of knowledge such as agronomy and anthropology. Throughout the rest of his career, he would always keep an eye on the utility of the landscape, seeking out marginal areas of the Spanish empire that could be revived through state intervention. The literary flourishes of the romantic explorer also became a permanent part of his rhetorical tool belt, serving his agenda of encouraging state intervention and reinforcing an evocation of picturesque poverty and depopulation caused by inadequate landscape management.³⁵

³⁴ “En los años anteriores al que realicé el viaje que voy a referir, habíase despertado en España el deseo de salir del marasmo y atraso en que vivíamos respecto a instrucción pública y a investigaciones científicas, cuestiones en las que estábamos en la zaga de Europa.” Ibid., 31.

³⁵ See Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 2008).



Image 1.2: The expedition to Canaries, Hernández-Pacheco, *Por los campos de lava*.

The type of research carried out by the scientists represented a new generation of scholarship, romantic and imperial, in Spain. Hernández-Pacheco's diary, as opposed to his more subdued report to the Royal Society of Natural History, indulged in the dramatic language of the generation of 1898, reveling in the bohemian nature of the expedition:

Our wandering life has its charms that might not be appreciated by methodical, formal, and comfortable people – the respectable bourgeois who eat their meat and garbanzo stew at one o'clock sharp, take a two-hour walk to the same spot every afternoon, and end with an evening café session. They are incapable of understanding how our expeditions and unpredictable lives are pleasurable at all, and even less capable of understanding how our geologic investigations have any utility... This travel account is not written for them.³⁶

³⁶ “La vida errante que hacemos tiene encantos que quizá no son apreciados por las personas metódicas, formalistas y comodonas, los respetables burgueses de cocido a la una en punto, paseito de dos horas por la tarde siempre al mismo sitio y sesión nocturna en el café, son incapaces de comprender que en nuestras caminatas y vida irregular encontramos placer alguno y, mucho menos, reporten utilidad alguna nuestras investigaciones geológicas. Sigán ellos dando sus acostumbradas vueltas a la noria y tomando el agradable

Throughout the diary, Hernández-Pacheco makes clear that his and his comrades' work had to do with action, not staying at home. The scientists bathe in the sea. They forge ahead in the face of troublesome boat rides, sand storms, high peaks, difficult animals, uncomfortable sleeping arrangements, and Hernández-Pacheco's swimming injury. Like many a later action hero, he performs surgery on himself, ridding his foot of the bothersome lava fragments. What drove his zest for adventure is the sense of utility that the lazy bourgeois are missing, the desire to play a part in the social and spiritual reform called for by 1898 intellectuals. For Hernández-Pacheco and his comrades, their excursions were opportunities to better understand the possibilities of the Spanish landscape and to present all the features of Spain to readers through photographs (he brought a cumbersome amount of photographic equipment on the trip). Apart from his official large-scale trips, throughout his life he was known for leading his students on expeditions through the countryside.³⁷

Although Hernández-Pacheco principally concerned himself with the ages of the different geological formations, he always kept an eye out for possibilities for irrigation as a method of bringing Spain up to the level of other empires. He "transcribed" a conversation with a local official during the first days of the journey on Lanzarote that seems to suspiciously confirm his own opinions:

'An interesting question for this island,' said Mr. Doroeste, 'is that of water for irrigation. You geologists have a lot to study here and an important problem to resolve, since, with enough water, this land would be the richest in the world. Thanks to the fertility of the land and the ideal

pienso a sus horas. Esta relación de viaje no está dirigida a ellos." Hernández-Pacheco, *Por los Campos de Lava*, 207.

³⁷ S. Alvarado, "La personalidad del Prof. E. Hernández-Pacheco," in *Necrología del Prof. E(duardo) Hernández-Pacheco* (Madrid: Aguirre, 1966).

climate, the most desired fruits from tropical and temperate zones can both flourish to the point of competition with any country. Because of the small distance that separates the islands from Europe and the frequency and speed of transportation, our fruits can arrive at the markets of London when others can't.³⁸

The Canary Islands' underdevelopment made it a land of untapped possibility just as Castel had seen Extremadura. In this case, it was not the climate that made agriculture difficult, but the lava that made up the islands' fertile, but permeable, soil. He compared the islands in all of his works about the trip to floating sponges that absorbed rain and quickly let the water drain out into the ocean.³⁹ He constantly interested himself in wells, usually finding them empty or with water only accessible at great depths.

Water was vital to Hernández-Pacheco's vision of modern civilization. As the scientists toured the island, he took special care to remember the quality of water supplies at the dwellings they stayed at, particularly the family farm of his assistant Pereyra: "It's one of the best farms of Lanzarote. We visited the spacious patios and large terraces that gather rainwater. They showed us the tanks or 'aljibes' that are called 'maretas' when they are of any decent size. Well-tended gardens surround the house and, in a delightful bodega, we tried excellent wines produced by the farm."⁴⁰ The prosperity and beauty of

³⁸ "Una cuestión interesantísima en esta Isla, e decía el Sr. Doreste, es la del agua para riegos. Ustedes los geólogos, tienen aquí mucho que estudiar y un problema importante que resolver, pues, con agua abundante este país sería el más rico del mundo. Gracias a la fertilidad natural de las tierras y a lo ideal del clima, los frutos más preciados de los países tropicales y de las zonas templadas se dan aquí en una época del año que permite competir ventajosamente con todos los países, pues merced también a la relativamente pequeña distancia que separa las islas de Europa y a la frecuencia de comunicaciones rápidas, nuestros frutos llegan al mercado de Londres cuando de otros territorios no pueden enviárselos." Hernández-Pacheco, *Por los campos de lava*, 44.

³⁹ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, "Estudio Geológico de Lanzarote y de las Isletas Canarias," *Memorias de la Real Sociedad Española de Historia Natural* 6, no. 4 (1910): 107-342, 130.

⁴⁰ "La posesión que en Las Vegas tienen los Pereyra, y en cuya casa hemos pasado la noche, es una de las fincas mejores de Lanzarote. Hemos visitado el espacioso caserío de extensos patios y grandísimas terrazas para recoger las aguas pluviales. Nos han enseñado los depósitos o aljibes, que cuando son de alguna extensión y descubiertos se llaman *maretas*. Bien cuidados jardines rodean la casa y, en una hermosa bodega, hemos probado excelentes vinos de los que la finca produce. Después nos acercamos a un pozo

the farm all came from its water supply and the inhabitants' care. Because of the efficient systems of capturing rainwater, the farm produced wine and flowers. Unfortunately, the nearby spring was as difficult to access as the others tested throughout the islands. The implication of the paean to the farm was that if this farm could prosper by capturing rainwater, its wealth would be increased exponentially if groundwater were also available. Furthermore, if other farms on the island were able to manage themselves as efficiently, the Canary Islands' economy would explode.

The feeling of civilization provided by the Lanzarote farm was missing from many other places visited by the expedition. On his way to the ferry to Lanzarote at the beginning of the trip, Hernández-Pacheco crossed Gibraltar into the city of Tangier in northern Morocco, and did not like much of what he encountered. The city was a mixture of "modern European" and "atavistic Moroccan" civilizations.⁴¹ The "dirty" small streets of the old city were filled to the brim. However, in spite of this portrayal of Tangier, and later of El Jadida,⁴² with its Jewish quarter made up of "narrow streets, extremely tortuous and dirty,"⁴³ Hernández-Pacheco thought back to the Iberian Peninsula, particularly Andalucía and Extremadura. In Tangier, a tiny school open to the street reminded him of one in Extremadura that adjoined the town jail, and those twisting streets in El Jadida reminded him of streets in Córdoba, even if they weren't as "joyful" in their decoration.⁴⁴ He understood the primitive nature of these peripheral spaces not as opposed to Spanish culture, but as a sign of ripeness for redemption under modern

que se abrió en las cercanías, con el negativo resultado siempre." Hernández-Pacheco, *Por los campos de lava*, 81-82.

⁴¹ Ibid., 34.

⁴² Mazagán for the Spanish.

⁴³ Hernández-Pacheco, *Por los campos de lava*, 37.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

administration. The predominance of Castilian among the “Babel” of languages in Tangier, as well as the recollection of Spanish regions, made clear the superior claim of Spain to the territory. The subtle chauvinism was meaningful in this era of intense colonial competition: Spain and France partitioned Tangier in 1912. The comparisons between Morocco and Spain, and also between the Canary Islands and other Spanish regions, emphasized the presence of undeveloped territory not only on the periphery of Spanish power but within the Iberian Peninsula itself. The regions were not chosen accidentally; Extremadura and Andalusia were two regions that Hernández-Pacheco hoped to see developed through irrigation. Although his proposals for the Canaries were not acted upon, and the trip ended in somewhat of an ignominious fashion as the itinerary could never be completed and there never was a return trip, the spirit of the expedition animated Hernández-Pacheco until his death. He continued to promote the development of neglected spaces within Spain.

1.3.2. Landscape and the Nation

The crowning achievement of Hernández-Pacheco’s career was the publishing of *The Physiographic and Geologic Synthesis of Spain* in 1934, a comprehensive adumbration of the geology and geography of the Iberian Peninsula, or as he termed it, “Hesperia.”⁴⁵ The more than 700-page work published in two volumes proudly presented a multitude of photographs taken by the author and his son of all of the characteristic landscapes of Spain. Designed from the preparations of Hernández-Pacheco for two conferences organized for Spain’s secondary school instructors, it was meant to

⁴⁵ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, *Síntesis fisiográfica y geológica de España* (Madrid: Junta para Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas, 1932-1934).

synthesize the “fundamental aspects of the physiography of our Peninsula.”⁴⁶ More than a dry scientific text, it proved to be the perfect expression of Hernández-Pacheco’s romantic, active vision of science. *The Physiographic and Geologic Synthesis* had been preceded during the 1920s by a number of articles and conference presentations that led up to it, and it was succeeded by a number of political and scientific, even literary, interventions based on its ideas. All of these continued the generation of 1898’s program of responding to the loss of colonies by intensifying the exploitation of natural resources. Hernández-Pacheco’s geologic and geographic research was meant to be useful for Spain, especially by encouraging the constructions of dams and reservoirs.

The principal unifying element of Spain, for Hernández-Pacheco, was its landscape. In *The Physiographic and Geologic Synthesis* as well as in his coda to it published just afterwards, *Landscape in General and Characteristics of the Spanish Landscape*, he tackled a project of re-presenting the Spanish landscape’s most salient identity giving features to readers.⁴⁷ The overarching idea was to find a few common denominators for what made up the Spanish landscape, making the project much more than a scientific exploration of a given area of land. Both contributions have been named as candidates for his most important work.⁴⁸ The enthusiasm for exploring in person all of the areas presented as well the inclusion of a huge number of photographs was the same that possessed him in the Canaries: “nature is the principal laboratory for the natural

⁴⁶ “Los rasgos fundamentales de la Fisiografía de nuestra Península.” Ibid., 5.

⁴⁷ Based on his lecture for the opening of classes at the Academy of Exact, Physical and Natural Sciences in 1934. Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, *El Paisaje en general y las características del paisaje hispano: discurso* (Madrid: Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales, 1934).

⁴⁸ Carlos Vidal Box, “El Prof. Hernández-Pacheco y los estudios geográficos en España,” in *Necrología del Prof. E(duardo) Hernández-Pacheco*.

sciences.”⁴⁹ The photographs “followed one design,” which was to capture the essence of the Spanish landscape for readers and, especially, science teachers.⁵⁰

Each work began with a survey of the mountainscape of the Peninsula, which he located as the principal source of a nation’s natural unity.⁵¹ Hernández-Pacheco held a geosynclinal theory (the consensus understanding of mountain formation before the discovery of plate tectonics) as to the origins of the Iberian Peninsula, or as he called it, “Hesperia.” He followed what he saw as the school of Spanish orogeny (the study of the changes in the Earth’s crust that create mountain ranges) begun by Macpherson, which saw the Peninsula as formed from a series of older mountain ranges that radiated outwards and subsided over time as a result of erosion.⁵² The oldest mountains, the Hespéridas, had already disappeared. The theory required a renaming of the Iberian Peninsula as “Hesperia” since the geological process was also responsible for the formation of the Balearic Islands and, in his later work, parts of the African continent.⁵³

A central argument of *Landscape in General*, and also of the *Physiographic Synthesis*, is, paradoxically, what unifies the landscape of the Iberian Peninsula is its unrivalled diversity. Hernández-Pacheco particularly concerned himself with exemplary landscapes that he saw as anchoring Spanish identity. Along with many other members of the Generation of 1898 and followers of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, he shared the belief in a metaphysical nation that pre-existed any shared cultural or physical

⁴⁹ “Las ciencias de la Naturaleza tienen como principal laboratorio la Naturaleza misma; en este caso, el campo y la montaña.” Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, *Síntesis fisiográfica y geológica*, 6.

⁵⁰ “Son el resultado de la labor de ambos, tendente a un mismo fin, bajo un mismo plan.” *Ibid.*, 8.

⁵¹ Hernández-Pacheco would seem to have been sanguine about the possibility of Spain absorbing Portugal: “Al hablar de España entiéndase que me refiero a todo el conjunto peninsular.” *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 16.

⁵³ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, *Concepto y desarrollo histórico-geográfico de la hesperia africana* (Real Sociedad Española de Historia Natural, 1948).

characteristics.⁵⁴ In other words, there was never any possibility that his findings would cause him to doubt the existence of the Spanish nation – he began with the assumption that the nation existed and was “immortal” and looked for the most basic manifestations of its cohesiveness in the landscape.⁵⁵

Hernández-Pacheco disparaged purely aesthetic appreciations of landscape as well as scholars who drew reckless generalizations about the character of the inhabitants of certain landscapes. He understood his own methods to be more objective, careful and scientific. Inspiration came from the fathers of Spanish geology (for whom Hernández-Pacheco had just inaugurated a memorial fountain on one of the peaks of the Guadarrama mountains) who inspired him to find the “scientific basis of the landscape of our home country.”⁵⁶ His approach consisted in looking for the natural history of the most prominent landscape features as they appeared to a single observer.⁵⁷ Hernández-Pacheco disdained subjective understandings of landscape for their predilection towards simple description instead of the explanation of formations. He saw that a subjective approach did not deal with the possibility of varying responses to the same landscape. For instance, while “the great mass of peasants” finds a flat extension of cultivable land beautiful, a “free spirit” would prefer a rocky, forested landscape.⁵⁸ He also opposed the intrusion of human geographers into the study of landscape – an urban area was definitely

⁵⁴ Álvarez Junco, “La nación en duda,” 469. For the moderate and modernizing politics of the Institución see also *La Institución Libre de Enseñanza y Francisco Giner de los Ríos: nuevas perspectivas*, eds. Javier Moreno Luzón and Fernando Martínez López (Madrid: Fundación Francisco Giner de los Ríos, 2012).

⁵⁵ “La Hispania peninsular, pase lo que pase, podrá vivir y vivirá siempre, porque España es inmortal.” Hernández-Pacheco, *Síntesis geográfica y geológica*, 489.

⁵⁶ Hernández-Pacheco, *El Paisaje en general*, 10.

⁵⁷ The term *Hispanic* is used by Hernández-Pacheco uniquely to refer to the entirety of the Iberian Peninsula including Portugal, an area that he considered a small continent located between Africa and Europe.

⁵⁸ Hernández-Pacheco, *El Paisaje en general*, 8.

not appropriate to consider as a landscape – since modern construction techniques introduced an “artificial” element into nature and produced similar buildings and uniform landscapes across vastly different countries.

Hernández-Pacheco’s real landscapes are composed of two primary constitutive elements: rocks and vegetation. The predominance of either one of these ingredients, or their complete absence, makes the existence of landscape impossible because of the resultant uniformity as in a desert or jungle. What excludes the desert, or even the ocean, from Hernández-Pacheco’s idea of landscape is its lack of a sense of place, the lack of any contrast to give the observer a sense of perspective. Only variegated landscapes provided their inhabitants with a regional or national identity. Hernández-Pacheco focused on local particularity, and the natural history of that particularity, since particularity bestowed identity. It was no accident that Hernández-Pacheco served as the engine behind the resurgence of the National Commission of National Parks during the Second Republic. As vice president, he promoted national sites as necessary handmaids to national parks. Whereas national parks required a great deal of land expropriation and were difficult to reach for most of the population, smaller national sites were easy to create and often adjoined major transportation ways. He inaugurated a number of these sites, publishing cheap pamphlet guides to them.⁵⁹

The diversity of landscapes identified by Hernández-Pacheco reinforced Spanish national identity. He hoped that as many Spanish as possible could experience these landscapes through visits to national parks and sites, through his photographic archive or

⁵⁹ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, *La Comisaría de Parques Nacionales y la protección de la naturaleza en España. Guías de los Sitios Naturales de Interés Nacional 3* (Madrid: Comisaría de Parques Nacionales, 1933).

even through one of the many trips he led to the countryside, so that they would feel a part of this natural unity. This hope also led to a florid style of writing borrowed from romantic explorers that he first employed in his unpublished diary of the trip to the Canaries. The landscape, the key to a nation's identity, conjured numerous fanciful associations for him. He brought readers with him on his search for national and regional trees; he ended up deciding on two – the olive tree and the holm oak – that were prevalent in many regions, particularly in Extremadura:

The oak and the olive, the tree of Jupiter and the tree of Minerva. These are the two tree species, always leafy, native to, and typical of, Extremadura: the first spontaneous, the second cultivated; the oak, strong and with a royal comportment like the Olympian Zeus, father of gods; the olive, emblem of peace and culture, gift from Minerva, she of well-chosen words, resplendent and venerable goddess.⁶⁰

Hernández-Pacheco's overwrought enthusiasm for two trees surely was designed to bring readers out into the landscape. Furthermore, allusions to these gods established continuity of culture, and of an identity, over a long period of time. The landscape anchored the nation's, containing the traces of events and lives as it would in the draft of his later novel, *La Brigadiera*, where different aged trees serve as symbols for prominent eras or personalities in Spain's history.⁶¹

Hernández-Pacheco defined the landscape as "the synthesis of the manifestations of the geologic and physiographic conditions of *one country*" [italics mine].⁶² He then

⁶⁰ "La encina y el olivo, el árbol de Júpiter y el árbol de Minerva; estas son las dos especies arbóreas, siempre verdeantes, propios, típicas y características de la tierra extremeña: la primera espontánea, la segunda cultivada; la encina, fuerte y de porte majestuoso como el olímpico Zeus, padre de los dioses: el olivo, emblema de la paz y de la cultura, don de Minerva, la de las palabras aladas, diosa resplandeciente y venerable." Hernández-Pacheco, *El Paisaje en general*, 103.

⁶¹ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, "La Brigadiera (*historia novelada*)," *Revista Alcántara* 6, no. 27 and 28 (1954): 17-25 and 16-24.

⁶² "*La manifestación sintética de las condiciones y circunstancias geológicas y fisiográficas, que concurren en un país* [italics in the original]." Ibid, 10.

set off on his exploration of the determinants of these manifestations. He identifies a number of possible influences on vegetation and rockiness and provides a hierarchy of fundamental components, complementary components, and accessory components.⁶³ Geology and climate are fundamental, the sky and ocean are complementary, and humans, and other fauna, are accessory. The first part of Hernandez-Pacheco's talk, and of *The Physiographic Synthesis*, is a listing of all sorts of different rock formations, and, in a second section, types of vegetation. The formations emerge from both lithological (the composition of rocks) and orographic (concerning the creation of mountains⁶⁴) factors. For each type of rock formation, he names an exemplary location within the Iberian Peninsula such as the Ciudad Encantada or the Valle de Ordesa, both protected as National Sites of Interest with guides written during his time as vice president of the National Commission of National Parks.⁶⁵ In spite of his view of geology as the source of the natural unity of Hesperia, he favored vegetation as the most "decisive" characteristic of the regional landscapes.⁶⁶ The three principal types of vegetation were forest, bushes and grass, and it is only when combined that they produce the most beautiful, and distinctive, of landscapes for Hernández-Pacheco.

Climate and water play a supporting role to vegetation and rock formations in shaping the national landscape but do establish the most salient feature of the Spanish landscape for Hernández-Pacheco: its unique diversity. The climatic influences from the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, Africa and Europe contributed to a singular vegetation

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Not plate tectonics. Hernández-Pacheco followed the geosynclinal theories held by most geologists before the 1960s.

⁶⁵ Hernández-Pacheco, *El Paisaje en general*, 17-18.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 16.

distribution of Spain. Having Mediterranean vegetation flourish in an Atlantic climate made Spain a small “continent” apart from Europe. Hernández-Pacheco delighted at the summits of the Serranía de Ronda where there are “residues of vegetation from the Atlas and high Rif,” separating Spain from Europe. The complementary parts of the landscape, the atmosphere and water, were those that bestowed beauty on a landscape and, thus, made a unique landscape truly emblematic. The ocean is, again, too much of an “immense desert” to be a landscape on its own, but when adjoining a terrestrial landscape, it becomes almost as important as his two fundamental aspects (vegetation and rockiness) in composing a landscape.

His nationalism and his regionalism were intrinsic elements of his projects; as in his research into the Canaries, Hernández-Pacheco sought to make Spain an international power by developing the landscape. Concrete advantage could be drawn from the number of distinct landscapes: “this diversity of the Spanish soil makes Spain one of the world’s few countries that can support itself without colonies.”⁶⁷ Spain did not need an empire if it could only harness its domestic resources. He hoped, quoting the famed pathologist Santiago Ramón y Cajal, that Spain would “intensely cultivate the wastelands of our country and of our minds, rescuing for our national prosperity and glory all the rivers that are lost in the sea, all the talents that are lost in ignorance.”⁶⁸

In the end, his definition of landscape is one that seems to call for only certain types of human intervention that enhance the identity-bestowing properties of landscape.

⁶⁷ “Esta diversidad del solar hispano hace que España sea de los pocos países del mundo que pueda bastarse a si propio sin necesidad de colonias, y esto que digo no es gana de hablar.” Hernández-Pacheco, *Síntesis Fisiográfica y Geológica de España*, 488.

⁶⁸ “Cultivar intensamente los yermos de nuestra tierra y de nuestro cerebro, salvando para la prosperidad y enaltecimiento patrios, todos los ríos que se pierden en el mar, todos los talentos que se pierden en la ignorancia.” Hernández-Pacheco, *El Paisaje en general*, 31.

Human action often led to the landscape “losing its principal characteristics as established by nature.”⁶⁹ The last category of elements that contributed to a real landscape, “accessories,” included animals, and more importantly, humans and their buildings only insofar as they were “ethnographic.” The crops, as well as the customs, of an area that had developed over time interacted with the land’s physical features to create a landscape that would anchor Spanish identity. Other types of industrial intervention in the landscape promoted economic growth, but only irrigation, and the resulting agriculture, could accomplish this while maintaining the unique features of a regional landscape.⁷⁰

Irrigation, as opposed to industry, assuaged class-conflict as a truly national endeavor. In November of 1931, Hernández-Pacheco participated in the Madrid Athenaeum’s debate on the Second Republic’s first government’s draft proposal (*dictamen*) concerning land reform.⁷¹ Besides Hernández-Pacheco, other notable presenters included Pascual Carrión, the principal architect of the government’s project of land reform, in addition to the head of Spain’s central agronomic station and an assortment of parliamentary deputies.⁷² Since so many wished to present, debate had to be repeatedly extended by the Athenaeum until January, when the government retired the first version of the plan for modifications. Fundamental arguments charged the debate’s atmosphere, with raucous audiences intervening to support calls for more just distribution of property, or even complete state control of property.⁷³ Hernández-Pacheco took the

⁶⁹ “El paisaje pierde sus principales características fundamentadas en la Naturaleza.” *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁷¹ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, “La Naturaleza de España en relación con el problema agrario” in *Síntesis fisiográfica y geológica de España*, 479-493.

⁷² “Información pública en el Ateneo de Madrid,” *El Liberal*, November 11, 1931, 11.

⁷³ See debate between Doña Consuelo Álvarez and Don Fermín Aranda in “La discusión en torno a la Reforma Agraria,” *Luz*, January 9, 1932, 12.

“pro” position on the land reform draft, but advocated a cautious approach to land reform, preferring it to be based on the increase of available land through irrigation rather than large-scale redistribution, aligning himself with the policy that culminated in the Law on Extension of Irrigation of 1932.⁷⁴

Hernández-Pacheco began his speech humbly, claiming that he had only come to listen and had no expertise to contribute.⁷⁵ But his disavowals of knowledge were at least partly disingenuous. He argued that only the “human factor” had been under consideration so far with few interventions on the “nature factor”, which for him clearly defined the limits and possibilities of what could be accomplished through land reform. He repeatedly called on his experiences living on a farm and wandering across Spain where he had relied on constant questioning of workers, livestock raisers and other people of the countryside to gather his knowledge. He declared at the beginning of his speech: “What we’re missing in addressing the problem that brings us here [poor distribution of land], is the study of the characteristics of the nature of the Hispanic lands, of their variety, their circumstances and their diverse aspects.”⁷⁶ He warned lawmakers that their country was infinitely complex. Laws had to be crafted for an entire continent, and the proper size of land plots for different crops was difficult (*complejísima*) to determine. Emphasizing the diversity of the landscape could only delay a national land reform project.

⁷⁴ “Ley de Obras de Puesta en Riego of 1932,” *Gaceta de Madrid*, April 14, 1932.

⁷⁵ It was only after he was approached by an “affectionate disciple” and asked for his contribution that he decided to present to the entire Athenaeum. Hernández-Pacheco, “La Naturaleza de España en relación.”

⁷⁶ “Falta estudiar y presentar ante el problema, que aquí nos congrega, las características de la naturaleza del solar hispano, de su variedad, de sus circunstancias y de sus aspectos diversos.” *Ibid.*, 480.

Irrigation offered a much better alternative to divisive redistribution. Hernández-Pacheco indeed discounted reforms based on the restructuring of society by underlining the eternal (and presumably unsolvable) nature of the question of “rich and poor” that had existed since “man was man.”⁷⁷ No reform project could gain national support that began by addressing the nature of private property, or the question of what a just society looked like. Instead, the universal conflict that should determine the direction of land reform was that of man and nature: “if man is the son of the land and geography shapes man, man, in his time, shapes geography because he modifies and alters it, coming eventually, in certain aspects and in certain ways, to command in Nature, to dominate it: the most noble and elevated project that human activity can occupy itself in.”⁷⁸ Consulting on the Riegos of Alto Aragon, Spain’s first large-scale irrigation project, had convinced him that only these types of projects could disarm peasant unrest: “Wherever there is irrigation the agrarian problem sweetens or disappears,” claimed Pacheco, “irrigation is what really matters.”⁷⁹ He outlined two possible methods of land reform that could accompany irrigation schemes – direct and indirect. Excess lands from large landlords, as long as they were able to be divided up and maintain their productivity for the national economy, would be expropriated and redistributed in the first method. In the second, which he clearly favored, excessive individual property ownership would be discouraged through heavy taxation, and workers would be encouraged to buy land through favorable loans.

⁷⁷ “Una cuestión de principios que viene debatiéndose, desde que el hombre es hombre, a través de toda la historia, cual es la de pobres y ricos, empleando la frase tradicional campesina.” Ibid., 481.

⁷⁸ “Yo digo también que si el hombre es hijo de la tierra y si la geografía hace al hombre, el hombre, a su vez, hace a la geografía, porque la modifica, la altera y llega, en ciertos aspectos y en cierta manera, a mandar en la Naturaleza, a dominarla; empresa la más noble y la más elevada en que puede emplearse la actividad humana.” Ibid., 480.

⁷⁹ “Donde hay regadíos el problema agrario se dulcifica o se desvanece, y esto es lo que importa.” Ibid., 490.

Hernández-Pacheco's careful position on land reform made clear that he valued the unity and strength of the nation over that of justice in the distribution of wealth. He did align himself with those in favor of land reform, agreeing with their central assertion that "in Spain the land is not well (*bien*) distributed," but even here his wording was ambiguous.⁸⁰ Choosing "well" rather than any version of "unjustly" fit with the thrust of his intervention: that land ownership should be modified, but only cautiously, and with an eye towards improved production rather than fairness. For him, the extremely unequal distribution of land "causes perturbation and social injustice that hurt the national economy, creating a reduction in social and public wealth."⁸¹ Irrigation, with its ability to naturally encourage a wider distribution of property in a given region, was the only suitable tool for this task. To give an idea of its potential, he concluded by bringing his audience's attention to the fertile, but un-irrigated, Vegas Bajas of the Guadiana downstream from the Portillo del Cíjara, a project which had become a principal preoccupation for him over the preceding ten years.

For Erik Swyngedouw, these arguments for irrigation deliberately evaded the source of social and instability at this time, the unequal distribution of land ownership: "Water policy became the synecdoche and stand-in for dealing with the land and agrarian question that constituted the key nexus of Spain's lamentable socioeconomic condition."⁸² Indeed, a chapter draft of Hernández-Pacheco's novel seems to illustrate this. The hero Tío Rubio (Uncle Blondie), a virtuous and upwardly mobile sharecropper for a wealthy, landowning family (a fictionalized version of Hernández-Pacheco's own

⁸⁰ "Es que en España la tierra no está bien repartida." Ibid., 480.

⁸¹ "Ello arrastra a una perturbación y a una injusticia social que ocasiona un grave perjuicio en la economía nacional y una gran merma en la riqueza pública y social." Ibid., 481.

⁸² Swyngedouw, *Liquid Power*, 69.

ancestors), helps the widowed, kindhearted matriarch manage her water resources. As drought strikes, she wishes to make the water from her well freely available to all the inhabitants of the local town. Unfortunately, miscreants take charge of the pump and the water is wasted. Tío Rubio understands that this form of socialism will always fail, presumably as land reform aimed only at redistribution would, and he himself takes control of the well, keeping the riff-raff away by charging appropriate prices while still distributing water freely to those truly in need. Here, following Swyngedouw, Tío Rubio could be seen as a version of Costa's iron surgeon, taking charge of natural resources that are wasted because of silly political disagreements.

But Hernández-Pacheco's irrigation schemes, while calling for state intervention, were basically liberal, as was Tío Rubio's introduction of prices for use of the well. Irrigation brought economic and social benefits by itself; there was no need for the grand colonization schemes of the Franco dictatorship, which included the moral and political supervision of the settled peasants.⁸³ Tío Rubio had the wisdom of the peasantry rather than the expertise of the scientist. Irrigation would seduce the inhabitants of marginalized regions of Ifni, the Canaries and Extremadura with added riches and a deeper connection to the landscape; it would not force them to adopt particular moral or political views. Hernández-Pacheco's embrace of irrigation was not a disingenuous evasion, it was a lifetime project born out deep faith in irrigation's power.

1.3.3. Spain's Landscape and the Cijara Reservoir

His sense of irrigation as a national mission led Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco to draw on the research, articles and conferences that resulted in *The Physiographic*

⁸³ See Cristóbal Gómez Benito, "Una revisión y una reflexión," 76.

Synthesis to promote the development of the Spanish landscape. He consulted on irrigation projects – most notably the Cíjara reservoir – and published a series of works spelling out the ramifications of his geological studies for dam and reservoir construction. The project at the Portillo del Cíjara took on a totemic importance for him as a potential site of regional and national resurrection.

The knowledge of a landscape's formation could be used to construct strong and effective dams, and Hernández-Pacheco employed his knowledge as best as he could in this direction. The first series of articles he published on irrigation in 1923, titled "The Nature of Terrain in Relation to Hydraulic Projects," advertised what a geologist could offer to engineers.⁸⁴ Hernández-Pacheco advised engineers to keep in mind that the general conditions of a potential construction area (as opposed to only considering the strength of the rock to be built upon) were of the utmost importance. Some rocks could be strong but permeable, and the coherence of a rock formation as a whole could be liable to let water escape in spite of its apparent suitability for a dam. An expert's eye was needed to survey the scene, even if underground tests had been carried out. In general, three things always had to be considered: the type and age of rocks to be built on, the angles and cohesiveness of the rocks and the alternation of different types of rock. Permeability was the principal enemy of hydraulic works. It could result from building on the wrong types of rocks or from fissures within rock formations. After the permeability of a given type of rock was dealt with, the overall architecture of dam valleys had to be investigated. Were the cracks in rocks oriented parallel to the shape of

⁸⁴ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, "La naturaleza del terreno en relación con las obras hidráulicas," *Ingeniería y Construcción* 1, no. 1 (1923): 25-27 and Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, "La geotécnica en relación con las obras hidráulicas," *Ingeniería y Construcción* 1, no. 5 (1923): 212-15.

the valley (up and outward from its bottom, which was preferred) or perpendicular (much more dangerous) to it? Only a trained geologist could tell.




Image 1.3: A synclinal valley, Hernández-Pacheco, “La geotécnica en relacion,” 213.

Besides encouraging coordination between engineers and geologists, a number of Hernández-Pacheco’s ideas proved a spur to reservoir construction. In a series of articles, published in *Hormigón y Acero* in 1936, he explained the importance of the natural divisions within Spain that he had argued for in the *Physiographic and Geologic Synthesis, Landscape in General* and previous works to the construction of reservoirs.⁸⁵ As already stated, he saw the Peninsula as having been formed from the outward movement and erosion of mountains from the central plateau. Since the central plateau was much younger than the lower areas surrounding it, its rocks were much weaker and less watertight than those closer to the edges of the Peninsula. While the plains close to the coast were unsuitable for reservoirs because of the absence of valleys and sudden drops in altitude, the foothills of the central plateau were the most perfect location for dams. In his previous works, Hernández-Pacheco had divided up the Peninsula into three geological zones: limestone, granite, and clay. Here, he went through the advantages and disadvantages of placing hydraulic works in each lithographic environment. While

⁸⁵ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, “La Geología de España en Relación con las Obras Hidráulicas”, *Hormigón y Acero* 5, no. 13 (1935): 220-25, and Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, “La Geología de España en Relación con las Obras Hidráulicas” *Hormigón y Acero* 5, no. 14 (June 1935): 258-70.

limestone is permeable and susceptible to underground caverns, areas where it predominates are rife with valleys and cliffs. Granite is strong and impermeable, but wears down quickly. Clay is actually very good as an impermeable surface once it absorbs some reservoir water, but is mostly seen in the plains. The most promising sites, for Hernández-Pacheco, were those that mixed two different types of rock formations such as the Portillo de Cijara because of its alternation of quartz and clay bands.

Hernández-Pacheco had also carried out surveys of Spanish rivers to meet his obligations to the many international scientific congresses he participated in. His book on river terraces required him to survey the Guadiana River. The work traces the path of the Guadiana geologically, noting the transition between geological zones at the Portillo de Cijara. He also journeyed through the natural history of the river and its watershed, noting the existence of two giant lakes in Badajoz during the Pliocene, which he named Augustano (or Augustense) and Serenano (or Serenense). The ancient lakes' existence explained, and underlined, the fertility of the area's soil. They made Extremadura "the great reserve of national agricultural wealth" and the banks of the Guadiana even more fertile than the Guadalquivir because of its "fine sandy-clay sediments" that came from the lakebeds.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ "Extremadura es el gran reservorio de la riqueza agrícola nacional. Extremadura es tanto o más rica que Andalucía; el valle central del Guadiana es más feraz que el valle del Guadalquivir, si se consideran las dos vegas o ensanches - que fueron dos extensas zonas palustres durante el Plioceno y el Cuaternario - rellenas con los finos sedimentos arenáceo-arcillosos y con los fértiles limos del Guadiana." Hernández-Pacheco, *Síntesis fisiográfica y geológica de España*, 490.



Image 1.4: The ancient lakebeds between Mérida and Badajoz in the Vegas Bajas near Lobón. Hernández-Pacheco, *Síntesis Fisiográfica*.

As in all of Hernández-Pacheco's public writings the description and naming of landscape features followed both scientific and political objectives. One ancient lake was named for the district in which it was located (La Serena) and the other for the Roman capital of Emerita Augusta at present day Mérida. Highlighting the Roman past of the area accomplished for Hernández-Pacheco what it also had for Joaquín Castel, normalizing reservoir construction, as some of the most celebrated Roman accomplishments and remains concerned aqueducts and reservoirs. Francisco Hernández-Pacheco channeled the florid style of his father in two newspaper articles on the future of Extremadura that were also included as appendices to *The Physiographic and Geologic Synthesis* when personifying the Guadiana River that meandered "as if it wished to stop in the two ancient lakes and didn't wish to push its lazy waters onwards to the sea."⁸⁷ Reports and memoranda on the Cíjara reservoir commonly cited the ancient

⁸⁷ "Discorre lento y tranquilo por estos campos, enlazando sus meandros divagantes, sus extensas tablas y charcos ausentes de corriente y sus numerosos brazos y cauces que a veces se pierden en pandos arenales,

existence of these lakes as justification for the project well into the Franco period, testifying to the effectiveness of the tactics of the two Hernández-Pachecos.⁸⁸

Hernández-Pacheco himself worked on reports on the conditions of the soil for the reservoir and dam in 1926 and 1927 alongside the engineer Gumarsindo Gándara.⁸⁹ They analyzed the dam site and concluded that it was divided into three sections - a chalky zone upriver, a middle zone of quartz mixed with clay and chalk, and a downriver zone of chalk with small amounts of quartz.

como si el río quisiera terminar en el lugar de los antiguos lagos y no seguir empujando sus perezosas aguas camino del mar.” Francisco Hernández-Pacheco, “El porvenir de las cuencas del Tajo y del Guadiana medios” in Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, *Síntesis fisiográfica y geológica*, and Francisco Hernández-Pacheco, “El Portillo de Cijara y el porvenir de la Baja Extremadura,” *Luz*, September 3, 1932.

⁸⁸ Manuel Díaz Marta, “La obra hidráulica de la República,” *Le Socialiste*, December 11, 1969. Also see “Proyecto Reformado Pantano Cijara 1936,” quoting Rodrigo Catena Frices ACHG 644 and Joaquín Moreno Musso and Eusebio Elorrieta Artaza, “Memoria de los trabajos realizados cuenca Guadiana, 1939-1950”, ACHG 666.

⁸⁹ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco and Gumarsindo Gutiérrez Gándara, “Informe relativo al emplazamiento del embalse del ‘Portillo de Cijara’, en el río Guadiana, provincias de Badajoz, Cáceres, Ciudad-Real y Toledo,” 15 December, 1926, ACHG.



Image 1.5: “Detail of the quartz bands on the right side of the Portillo de Cíjara on which the dam will support itself. The hermetic union of the bands indicates the impermeability of the setting and the strength of bands, their excellent conditions of resistance.”⁹⁰ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco and Gumarsindo Gutiérrez Gándara, “Informe relativo a las condiciones, ACHG.”

These were good conditions for the construction of a large dam; Hernández-Pacheco concluded that the dam could be as high as necessary, even seventy meters, because of the strength of the rock at the Portillo, the impermeability of the reservoir floor and the lack of obstacles for the completion of the project. Because of the “boundless” potential for irrigation between Villanueva de la Serena and Merida, the project offered the possibility of long-term state action.⁹¹ The Cíjara project could double the population of the Vegas Bajas of the Guadiana, taking an area already powerful in

⁹⁰ “Detalle de los bancos de cuarcito de la ladera derecha del Portillo de Cíjara en los que se apoyará la presa. La unión hermética de los bancos indica la impermeabilidad del emplazamiento y la fortaleza de los cuarcitas, sus excelentes condiciones de Resistencia.”

⁹¹ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, Gumarsindo Gutiérrez Gándara, “Informe relativo a las condiciones del terreno en que se proyecta construir el ‘Pantano del Portillo de Cíjara en el río Guadiana,’” 15 July 1927, ACHG 604.

cereal production and boost its wealth by introducing cotton.⁹² Echoing his earliest hopes of rebuilding Spain's marginal areas in the Canaries, Hernández-Pacheco noted that the project was of "truly exceptional importance for Extremadura and, thus, for Spain."⁹³



Image 1.5: "The synclinal valley of the Guadiana running through quartz of the lesser Silurian. Seen from upriver near the mill of Camacho, close to Helechosa, the valley that will be filled by the reservoir's waters,"⁹⁴ Hernández-Pacheco and Gándara, "Informe relativo a las condiciones."

From the beginning, engineers argued for the Cíjara as a transformative project, one that could resurrect an entire region, because of its sheer size. The first preliminary plans from the turn of the century called for the creation of a canal originating at the reservoir that would irrigate the Vegas Bajas.⁹⁵ Subsequent plans envisioned a project

⁹² Only possible with irrigation.

⁹³ Hernández-Pacheco and Gutiérrez Gándara, "Informe relativo a las condiciones."

⁹⁴ "Valle sinclinal del Guadiana en los cuarcitas del Silurio inferior. Vista desde aguas arriba desde el molino de Camacho, cerca de Helechosa valle que ocuparán las aguas del embalse." ACHG 604.

⁹⁵ Rafael de la Escosura y Escosura, "Proyecto de Pantano Cíjara, 1921," ACHG 727.

that would surpass the Riegos de Aragon, the largest irrigation project in Spain until that time with the irrigation of both the Vegas Altas and the Vegas Bajas: “because of the magnitude of the project, the length of the canals, the extension of the affected zone, it has not been possible to determine, not even approximately, what its limits should be.”⁹⁶ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco’s confidence in the project was further proven by both of his sons’ participation: one as a consulting geographer and fellow public advocate, the other as a doctor hoping to rid laborers of malaria at the worksite. Francisco Hernández-Pacheco wrote: “It can be said that at the Portillo de Cíjara, in the place where the Old Guadiana changes direction and traces a sharp elbow turn at its middle valley, is the future, the complete transformation, the wealth and well-being of all of the zone that we call lower Extremadura.”⁹⁷ The size of the project would be more than just impressive, it would transform the interior space of Extremadura: “new towns will appear that quickly will become important, and currently existing cities will become centers of intense economic activity and wealth, all owed to the logical and intense exploitation of the natural geographic conditions of the region.”⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Por la magnitud de la obra, la longitud de los canales, y la extensión de la zona supuesta, no se ha podido determinar ni aproximadamente, cuales han de ser sus limites, ni la traza de los canales de riego a pesar de haber presentado en dos fechas anteriores para la aprobación de la Superioridad, un presupuesto a ese fin destinado.” Ibid.

⁹⁷ “En el Portillo de Cíjara, en el lugar donde el Viejo Guadiana, al cambiar de rumbo, traza el agudo codo de su valle medio, puede decirse que está el porvenir, la completa transformación, la riqueza y el bienestar de toda la zona que pudiéramos denominar Baja Extremadura.” Francisco Hernández-Pacheco, “El porvenir de las cuencas,” 501.

⁹⁸ “Cambiaría de tal modo la región que aparecerán nuevos núcleos de población que pronto alcanzarían importancia, y las ciudades actuales pronto llegarían a ser centros de intenso tráfico y gran riqueza, y todo debido solo a una lógica e intensa explotación de las condiciones naturales geográficas de la región.” Ibid., 505-506.

1.3.4. Ifni

In the midst of his work for the National Park Commission in the 1930s, Hernández-Pacheco embarked on an ambitious expedition to the recently conquered Spanish territory of Ifni, a small region to the south of French Morocco facing the Mar Pequeño, the section of the Atlantic between the Canary Islands and the coast of Morocco.⁹⁹ The conquest of Ifni, which took place in April of 1934, was a point of pride for the recently elected center-right government of Alejandro Lerroux of the Radical Republican Party. The president himself ordered preparations for a scientific mission that was aimed squarely at determining the economic possibilities of the region. Hernández-Pacheco, possibly through some behind-the-scenes maneuvering, was placed at the head of the expedition and was able to bring his son Francisco along as a member of the research team.¹⁰⁰ After the journey he published accounts in the *Boletín de la Real Sociedad de Geografía* and a monograph, and wrote a letter to Prime Minister Lerroux explaining the expedition's findings.¹⁰¹ The trip was another opportunity for him to put his geographic eye into the service of Spanish empire. For Hernández-Pacheco, there was a natural unity in Ifni, which gave it a promising future, tied it to Spanish history, and called for increased Spanish intervention.

The trip began when Ricardo Samper, the prime minister who took office after Lerroux in April 1934 (and was replaced by Lerroux again in October 1934), ordered the director general of the protectorates of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara to support an expedition to discover the natural conditions of Spain's new territory so that its economic

⁹⁹ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, "Expedición Científica a Ifni," *Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica Nacional* 75, no. 9 (September 1935).

¹⁰⁰ Luís Lozano to Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, April 29, 1934, AMNCN, ACN0282/001.

¹⁰¹ Hernández-Pacheco, "Expedición Científica a Ifni."

exploitation could be built on a strong basis. The mission was to take place in two parts: the first, led by Hernández-Pacheco, would be scientific in nature. The second, which never occurred, was to be a technical trip where specialists would act on the scientific facts established by the first. The scientists on the trip represented a wide variety of institutions including the national museum of natural sciences, the faculty of sciences at Madrid's Central University, the National Geographic Society, the Spanish Society of Natural History, the Geologic and Mining Institute and the Geographic and Cadastral Institute. It was specifically carried out in competition with a French expedition to the Anti-Atlas Mountains adjoining the Spanish territory (throughout his accounts Pacheco emphasizes the poverty of the French territories in comparison to Spanish Ifni). The scientists were allotted the same meager rations as Spanish soldiers in the region, though perhaps through extra funding from their institutions they were able to create a shopping list that included foie gras, fifty liters of boxed wine and an extra twenty-four bottles, ten bottles of liquor, and four ham legs.¹⁰²

In his account in the bulletin, Pacheco begins with the "orography" of the country, in the same fashion he did in his account of the Canary Islands and in his synthetic account of the peninsula. In his search for natural regions, he found one built on the plateau ("*macizo*") that set Ifni apart from the ocean below and the surrounding desert. Much as the central plateau of "Hesperia" tied it together, this plateau created a natural region that demanded political unification. Pacheco lamented that approximately one third of this natural region was in the hands of the French, who had overrun Spanish

¹⁰² Juan Bautista Martín de la Fé and Andrés García Déniz, "Facturas justificativas de los gastos por víveres y objetos de menaje, adquiridos por la Comisión Científica a Ifni en varias casas de Las Palmas," 19 June 1934, AMNCN, ACN0282/016.

claims during the nineteenth century and prevented the territory from reaching its full economic potential. The unity of the region did not just call for more Spanish territory; it also tied its destiny directly to Spain. While Pacheco allowed that the boundaries of the territory came from a series of nineteenth-century treaties with the French, he also made clear that it was from this land that the Almoravids had come to invade Spain, and more importantly, that the area's stature as a sort of island in the midst of desert and ocean made it a continuation of the Canary Islands rather than part of French Morocco.

As in all of his earlier work, Hernández-Pacheco sought to maximize the exploitation of natural resources. He personally surveyed the entire coast of Ifni with his son searching out suitable ports. Unfortunately, widely varying rains made the construction of reservoirs impossible, but this was not the only possible hydraulic improvement to be made. Hernández-Pacheco noted that the *aljibes* (wells) were poorly maintained by the native population (in the same way he saw them as neglecting their livestock and fields) and could be better protected by the Spanish. Furthermore, many more could be constructed using local stone and Spanish organization, which would be a prime inducement for the indigenous people to accept Spanish political control.

Again, Hernández-Pacheco had found himself searching for means of national economic and political renewal through his scientific research. The nationalism that served as an impulse to Hernandez-Pacheco's wide-ranging scientific work led him to an advocacy for a greater *Hispania* – a natural territorial unit in which he included the entire Iberian Peninsula, Spanish colonies in the Atlantic, and the entirety of Morocco. Irrigation was intimately connected to this vision of imperial and national strength. The control of nature represented the departure from a primitive dependence on it and

justified political authority. Throughout his career, from his trip to the Canary Islands in 1907 to his final years surveying Africa, he aimed at explaining not just geomorphology but also the manifestations of geology and vegetation, either the landscape or what he would later term the *solar* (something close to a homestead), which conveyed the deep connection between inhabitants and landscape.¹⁰³ It was his contribution to find in the physical territory of Spain a tangible foundation for the Spanish nation. His “synthetic” purpose, as several of his disciples have described it, was to connect Spain’s population to its landscape through detailed description and a photographic archive, and more importantly, through the strategic exploitation of Spain’s water resources.¹⁰⁴ Irrigation was truly a matter of national security.

1.4. Conclusion

So was Hernández-Pacheco’s agitation for irrigation proto-Francoist? Was the generation of 1898 connected, even if inadvertently, to the Franco regime? For Erik Swyngedouw, Hernández-Pacheco’s beliefs that the landscape determined national identity and that the exploitation of that landscape determined national strength should be considered anti-democratic at the very least. They leant themselves to state-led modernization projects that utilized claims to “expertise” by engineers and scientists to transcend political disagreement. Hernández-Pacheco’s intervention at the Madrid Athenaeum would seem to support this view – his demand that the varied geography of Spain be recognized by the government could only slow the commencement of land distribution and his faith in irrigation’s ability to soften conflict over land did fit

¹⁰³ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, *El solar en la historia hispana* (Madrid: Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales de Madrid, 1952).

¹⁰⁴ See *Necrología del Prof. E(duardo) Hernández-Pacheco*.

Swyngedouw's description of water politics as an alternative to land distribution.

Finally, Hernández-Pacheco broke with some of his closest personal and professional friends to flee to Franco's stronghold at Burgos after the outbreak of Civil War.

Nevertheless, it must be remembered that at the Athenaeum Hernández-Pacheco was speaking in support of the land reform of the left-wing government, even if he urged for changes in its execution. Swyngedouw's arguments essentially equate opposition to the land reform of the Second Republic with an anti-political, proto-Francoism. I would argue with Ismael Saz, on the other hand, that the ideas of the generally liberal and secular (but nationalist) Regenerationists and the generation of 1898 could be "sliced and manipulated" to fit the projects of the Franco's fascist ministers since both placed such weight on modernization and nationalism.¹⁰⁵ This more ambiguous relationship between Regenerationism and Francoism does justice to the varying political loyalties of Regenerationists as the Civil War broke out.¹⁰⁶ Hernández-Pacheco's great faith in irrigation's power to increase national wealth as well as allegiance to the nation in Spain's periphery proved appealing to a regime seeking to secure a politically radical countryside, but only after those ideas were altered and added to through the addition of a large-scale colonization program.

Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco served as the link between the dreams of Regenerationists for Extremadura, as seen in Castel, and the hydraulic projects of the Franco regime. He made his reputation by pursuing geology and geography as means of strengthening the Spanish nation. Beginning with his trip to the Canary Islands, he detailed, using affective rhetoric as well as scientific description, the landscapes of

¹⁰⁵ "Troceada y manipulada." Ismael Saz, "Mucho más que crisis políticas," 142.

¹⁰⁶ Álvarez-Junco, "La nación en duda," 469.

Spain's marginal areas with the aim of exploiting their natural resources. His "scientific" theory of landscape explicitly spelled out the purposes of the many trips he took until his retirement: the landscape anchored Spain's identity, and its proper exploitation forged internal ties and strengthened Spain in comparison to neighboring countries. Motivated by a faith, shared with Castel, in irrigation's ability to create national unity and prosperity, he used his reputation and ability to advocate for, and to assist in, hydraulic projects. His work on the geology of the Portillo de Cijara, and his description of the Guadiana River, played a crucial role in moving the construction of the Cijara Reservoir forward.

Chapter 2 – Tenancy and Local Colonization in Post-Civil War Badajoz

2.1. Introduction

In a Madrid conference in 1941 on the new regime's colonization plans, the first director of the National Institute of Colonization, Ángel Zorrilla Dorronsoro, addressed several dilemmas faced by the organization.¹ First of all, the INC had to explain the slow pace of colonization up until that point. The second dilemma was how to establish a cohesive colonization policy built on the contradictory ideas of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. José Antonio was the son of the former dictator of Spain, Manuel Primo de Rivera, from 1923-1930, and had founded Spain's most successful fascist party, the Falange. Executed during the Civil War, his martyrdom had become a pillar of the Franco regime's legitimizing propaganda. Last, but not least, Zorrilla had to articulate a policy that rejected the land reform of the Azaña government of the Second Republic without obviously turning towards capitalism, which the Falange, perhaps the most powerful faction in Franco's first governments portrayed as without spiritual or ethical values.

Zorrilla started his speech by noting the crisis in which Spanish peasants found themselves. The infusion of capital into the countryside in the form of roads, railroads, public works projects and investment had brought about a transformation of peasant life. There were two main alternatives for acclimating peasants to a modern economy: the government could carry out a land reform along the lines of Mexico's – for Zorrilla, that

¹ Ángel Zorrilla Dorronsoro, "Política de colonización del Nuevo Estado conferencia dada ante el II Consejo Sindical de la Falange, el día 18 de junio de 1941," (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Colonización, 1941).

meant the expropriation and redistribution of land that the governments of the Left during the Second Republic had pursued – or it could pursue a land reform along the lines of what occurred in California, by which he seems to have meant using irrigation to distribute land without any state expropriation or redistribution.² California had created model hard workers, although those same workers were liable to succumb to the materialism of capitalism, while Mexican workers, “rancheros” were spiritually bankrupt and morally corrupt in the eyes of Zorrilla. He advocated the national-syndicalism (where workers interests would be reconciled with capital by vertical unions organized by the state) of the Falange as an alternative to both of these schemas. While the INC would take the overall architecture and emphasis on private initiative from California, the fascist tenets of national-syndicalism would impart values that steered beneficiaries away from the moral emptiness of capitalism. Crucially, he understood the embrace of capitalism to mean the effective dissolution of the border with Portugal; the freedom of investment under capitalism threatened the integrity of Spain. He was above all concerned with the ability of the state to create nationalized citizens.³

For Zorrilla, the doctrine of the Falange, taken from José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s speeches, was the secret to long-term solutions. In other words, any sort of long-term solution to the unequal distribution of land in the countryside or to its unemployment had to be based on the fascist tenets of the Falange. It was easy for the Nationalist government to undo the land reform of the Second Republic; it was harder to formulate its own land reform that would follow Jose Antonio’s directives. José

² See Kevin Starr, *Golden Dreams: California in an Age of Abundance, 1950-1963* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

³ Zorrilla Dorronsoro, “Política de Colonización.”

Antonio's own contradictions made Zorrilla's task particularly difficult; as a deputy in parliament, he had demanded that the state respect property rights while also calling for large state-led expropriation projects in contradictory speeches. For Zorrilla, the solution was to embrace the productivism of José Antonio's fascist doctrine.

Zorrilla made clear his objections to liberalism: if a nation depended on others, as it would in a liberal capitalist system, Spain would lack self-sufficiency. Zorrilla argued that Spain should produce as much as possible for the happiness of its people and for self-defense. Under this autarkic system, which the regime pursued throughout the 1940s, the principal method of boosting agricultural productivity was through the "*unidad de cultivo*," a loose term that meant the determination of the minimal plot size of a given crop that would support a family. In the 1940s, the search for the *unidad de cultivo* meant that the INC closely studied the economies and living standards of small towns and large farms under the assumption that their agricultural engineers would find the optimal arrangement of a town's property to absorb the largest possible population. Seasonally unemployed workers could work for the state on public works projects until irrigation eventually increased the capacity of the land to support more families. The idea seems superficially similar to the moderate land reform proposals that Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco pronounced in the Athenaeum – state-sponsored irrigation schemes with little land expropriation – but there was a large difference.⁴ Where Hernández-Pacheco envisioned an irrigated landscape seducing local populations with increased prosperity and population, integration into a national market, and, most ineffably, a deeper connection to the nation's landscape, Zorrilla had a much more interventionist and

⁴ Hernández-Pacheco had indeed spoken in support of the Left-Republican and Socialist designed land reform of the Second Republic, even if he hoped to temper it.

authoritarian understanding of the state's relationship with peasants. The National Institute of Colonization was made an authority in the countryside with more than a mandate to increase agricultural production. The INC would guard *jornaleros* and *yunteros* against immorality and political activism by rewarding political adherents and stabilizing situations of drastic unemployment.

Zorrilla pursued a project of “economic nationalism,” which for him was different than economic development as it focused on spiritual as well as economic and political development. For him, the modernization of the nation consisted of “*grades of development*: spiritual, political, and, consequently, *economic*.”⁵ Only after a nation had matured politically (here he clearly had in mind the victory of the Nationalists in the Civil War), could it muster the strength for the spiritual and material colonization of its backward areas. The existence of this spiritual path to development paradoxically necessitated the slow pace of action by the INC in its first years. To begin the work of moving from one stage to another only concerted action would do; nothing provisional could be carried out until the spiritual strength of the nation had been secured. In spite of this grand goal, he noted that the primary mission of the INC and its predecessor, the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Económica y Social de la Tierra, both created during the Civil War by Franco's provisional government at Burgos, was always to “intensify cultivation,” rather than redistribute land. He was unwilling to ponder any type of expropriation without payment in full. The program he had laid out for intervening in Badajoz's social problem was ambiguous: the INC clearly would not go out of its way to antagonize landlords, but it also had an ambitious social agenda.

⁵ “Para el nacionalismo económico no hay naciones agrícolas ni industriales; lo que existe son únicamente *grados de desarrollo* espiritual, político y, consecuentemente, *económico*.” Ibid.

Economic and political historians of Spain have not quite known what to make of this rhetoric. Concerned with piercing the myths of the Franco dictatorship, many have claimed that early legislation along with the actions (or inactions) of the early INC were elaborate propaganda efforts – the regime could advertise its commitment to “revolutionary” land reform while little expropriation or land division was carried out. Besides giving the regime a false set of social credentials, the INC, along with its predecessor the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Económica y Social de la Tierra, protected the rights of landlords by evicting those who had occupied lands during the Civil War. Historians who take this view understand the Nationalist side to have followed up on its allegiance to landlords during the Civil War by protecting traditional rural power structures in Spain. Historians have even labeled the early Francoist rural policies “agrarian fascism” for their repression of political opponents.⁶ For Tim Rees, the regime gave “twenty extra years of untroubled life to the estates and to an autocratic rural order.”⁷ Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez has subtly departed from this view by arguing that the regime protected landlords against themselves. The regime did not allow unionization or anything close to it, which left labor extremely vulnerable to the whims of landlords. But such a disdain for labor drove peasants to emigrate to cities and imperiled the production of agricultural goods, a prime state concern during the starvation-filled early 1940s.⁸ So

⁶ Gómez Benito, “Una revisión y una reflexión,” 68. Citing Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán and Manuel González de Molina, “Política social agraria del primer franquismo,” in *El primer franquismo* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1989), ed. José Luis García Delgado.

⁷ Tim Rees, “Agrarian Power and Crisis in Southern Spain: The Province of Badajoz, 1875-1936,” in *Landownership and Power in Modern Europe*, eds. Martin Blinkhorn and Ralph Gibson (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), 249.

⁸ Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, *Desarrollo sin reformistas: dictadura y campesinado en el nacimiento de una nueva sociedad en Almería, 1939-1975* (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1999).

for Cazorla-Sánchez, what the INC aimed to accomplish was to protect peasants just enough to ensure the continued existence of an adequate labor pool.

Taking the true temperature of the regime's rural policy during its first years requires a close look at its reform of tenancy laws in conjunction with INC actions since the Institute was limited in its first years to "local colonization" ("*colonización local*") efforts, which consisted of the expropriation, transformation and settlement of individual farms (as opposed to the settlement of large tracts of irrigated land that began in 1946 and took off in the 1950s). The adaptation of the tenancy laws from the Second Republic, traditionally understood as abhorrent to landlords and friendly to tenants, has confounded historians in similar ways to colonization schemes. Were the tenancy laws a smokescreen for policies that encouraged emigration and eviction? Were they unenforceable in a climate of unchecked landlord power?⁹

I understand the early actions of the INC and the regime, however, as having a more multifarious impact than has been generally accepted. Carlos Barciela limits the INC to its devolution of properties to former owners, and Cazorla-Sánchez focuses on coordination with and against landlords to guarantee production. Both of these were objectives pursued by the regime, but neither does justice to its overall policy. Those who favor the idea of agrarian or rural fascism, take as a given that rural policies had a mostly punitive function. Looking at the rural policy of the regime during its first years, as expressed in actions of the INC and the reform of tenancy laws, I argue that Hernández-Pacheco's idea of a national landscape was changed in scope and meaning by the regime's vision of a Spanish nation under threat from within and without. More than

⁹ José Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros, braceros y colonos: la política agraria en Extremadura: 1940-1975* (Madrid: MAPAMA, 1995), 156.

just a matter of more efficient landscape-use serving to modernize a backwards periphery, the regime now understood the Spanish nation to be under severe threat from the same forces which had backed the Republican side in the Civil War. By looking at local colonization alongside tenancy laws, it becomes clear that the regime was both politically repressive as well as protective of tenants, at least certain ones. The INC, as well as the regime in its tenancy laws, aimed to secure the countryside by providing limited protections for those who it saw as potential sources of political support.

2.2. The Social Question in Badajoz Province

2.2.1. Rural Society in Badajoz

Before entering into the INC's activities in Badajoz an introduction is needed to Badajoz's rural society, the "social question" in Spain and the rebellious tradition of one segment of Badajoz's population, the *yunteros*, or ploughmen.

Unlike the *latifundio* areas of Andalusia where *jornalero* day labor predominated, the composition of the Badajoz rural proletariat was more complicated because mixed-use *dehesas* coexisted with, and merged into, *latifundios*. Edward Malefakis, in his study of the Second Republic's agrarian reform, identified the unique features of the *dehesa* system:

In many of the great estates of Badajoz and Caceres, particularly those in the less fertile areas, a unique pattern of land use had developed which blended stockbreeding activities with the raising of grain crops. The person in charge of the estate as a whole – either the owner himself or a single large tenant to whom it had been rented – acted primarily as a stockbreeder, but subleased to small tenants or sharecroppers portions of the land on which they grew a single crop, and then moved on to new sectors of the estate where they repeated the process while the land that they had earlier worked reverted to pasture.¹⁰

¹⁰ Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*,

On these *dehesas*, which made up a kind of European savanna, dispersed oak trees of two kinds, cork oak and acorn oak, provided the basis for a unique form of mixed-use agriculture.¹¹ These farms, which had to be carefully tended, gained revenue from cork production, the raising of pigs (which ate acorns), sheep and cattle, as well as crops that were farmed on a four-field rotation system. The division of responsibilities was even more complicated than is portrayed by Malefakis; not only were small areas leased for farming but the different productive activities on the farm were often “leased” out as well for either cash or a portion of the harvest.



Image 2.1: *Dehesa* landscape in Extremadura in the 1920s or 1930s.
Hernández-Pacheco, *Síntesis Fisiográfica*.

¹¹ A.T. Grove and Oliver Rackham, “Mediterranean Savanna: Trees without Forests,” in Grove and Rackham, *The Nature of Mediterranean Europe*, 190-216.

As a result of this system, almost half of the peasants of the Badajoz province owned or leased plots of land.¹² *Jornaleros* (also called *braceros*) still made up the largest section of the population along with *obreros fijos* (workers with fixed contracts). However, many peasants were *arrendatarios*, or land-lesers, whose total land could vary to a great degree. Some worked their own plots and hired themselves out as *jornaleros* at the same time. Others leased multiple plots and even subleased some of their lands. In Ronald Fraser's oral history *In Hiding: The Life of Manuel Cortés*, the protagonist's wife explains her family's landholdings: "My father worked the land, but he didn't own any land himself. When I was about nine months old, early in 1913, he rented the smallholding that Manolo's [the protagonist] father had owned and we moved to the house there. We lived there twelve years. Manolo's father was dead by then and the land in fact belonged to Manolo."¹³ Although this story took place in the Málaga province, the portrayal of tenancy holds true for Badajoz. Tenants could lease their land from large landowners or small ones, and often had agreements over land use that went beyond formal contracts.

Aparcería, sharecropping, was a common practice on larger farms where landlords invested in equipment and assistance to the sharecropper in return for an amount of harvest (most commonly a third) in lieu of cash payment.¹⁴ Both *arrendatarios*' and *aparceros*' contracts varied in length, and could apply to farming

¹² Martin Baumeister, *Campesinos sin tierra: supervivencia y Resistencia en Extremadura (1880-1923)* (Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz and MAPAMA, 1996), 141.

¹³ Ronald Fraser, *In Hiding: the Life of Manuel Cortés* (London: Verso, 2010), 90.

¹⁴ Theoretically, sharecropping could be more beneficial to peasants since the landlord shared in their risk by providing capital, but unfortunately for the sharecroppers, it was even more limiting to their power than leasing. See Francisca Rosique Navarro, *La reforma agraria en Badajoz durante la II República: la respuesta patronal* (Badajoz: Diputación Provincial, 1988), 136.

different sorts of land as well raising livestock. More prosperous *arrendatarios* tended to lease entire farms for a period of 3-8 years and subleased parts of them for contracts of at least three years (to fit with the schedule of field rotation).¹⁵ Those who cultivated vines could have much longer contracts, akin to the *Rabassa Mortas* of Catalunya, where the length of the contract was determined by the lifespan of vines. *Aparceros'* contracts were generally shorter but at least had to last one year. They almost always began on the day of San Miguel (September 29th).¹⁶ Contracts, particularly those of *aparceros*, were orally agreed upon, and could be dissolved especially easily by landowners or their managers in the chaotic years of the Civil War and early Franco Regime.¹⁷

Yunteros were the last category of peasant in Badajoz. Ostensibly, *yunteros* were ploughmen in possession of either a team of mules or oxen. Among the peasantry of Badajoz they were middling class – definitely better off than *jornaleros* and some *aparceros* (depending on the lengths of their contracts), but not as prosperous as some *arrendatarios*. As with the other categories, the boundaries were not strict. *Yunteros* could be *aparceros* or *arrendatarios*. They usually leased or owned land, but not all did. While it is likely that *yunteros* played a crucial role in putting more land under cultivation from roughly 1900 to 1930,¹⁸ they only became well known as a social category during the Second Republic when they acquired a reputation for occupying farms and leading protests.¹⁹ They often had shorter “floating” leases than the social other classes of the countryside, which Malefakis hypothesizes contributed to their revolutionary agitation.

¹⁵ Juan Carmona and James Simpson, “Los contratos de cesión de tierra y en Extremadura en el primer tercio del siglo XX,” *Historia Agraria* 63 (August 2014), 190.

¹⁶ Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 179.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 118.

¹⁸ Rosique Navarro, *La reforma agraria*, 134.

¹⁹ Baumeister, *Campesinos sin tierra*, 127.

As wheat prices fell in the early 1930s, they were more directly threatened by landowners' desires to reduce cultivated land (and increase pastureland) than either *aparceros* or *arrendatarios*.

2.2.2. The Social Question in Badajoz

The social question threatened the corrupt Restoration regime that relied upon controlled elections and popular disaffection, and became a subject of public debate from the 1880s until the end of Civil War in 1939. Encouraged by agricultural depression and popular political mobilization, workers and peasants increasingly “made claims to social equality and political power” in the words of David Ortiz. Social unrest was particularly acute in areas where large tracts of *latifundio* or *dehesa* land predominated.²⁰ The roots of the social question, and thus the solutions offered to it, varied a great deal. Some, following Joaquín Costa, saw the social question as one of a weak agricultural economy with not enough production. Socialists saw the problem as coming from the institution of private property, or at least an unjust distribution of property. Social Catholics, inspired by the papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), blamed irresponsible absentee landlords.²¹ Conservative landlords believed that threats to social order did not emerge from lack of production or injustice but instead from dangerous ideologies, such as socialism and anarchism, which were spreading throughout the countryside. The landowner José Pidal “affirmed that the so-called *yuntero* problem is a complete farce: a flag flown previously by socialists and communists and now picked up by these elements

²⁰ David Ortiz, *Paper Liberals: Press and Politics in Restoration Spain*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 76.

²¹ See Severino Aznar Embid, *Despoblación y Colonización* (Barcelona: Buenos Aires, 1930).

[farmers in Extremadura].”²² Solutions were just as varied – with those on the Left calling for large-scale land expropriation with little repayment as well as collectivized farms, contributors from all over the political spectrum demanding more state spending on public works and irrigation, and conservatives and landowners calling for order to be imposed more harshly.

In the *latifundio* areas, which included Badajoz, where social conflict was sharpest, the concentration of land into large estates had been encouraged over centuries by government land sales targeting provincial elites, population growth coupled with sudden agricultural crises, and the political repression of collective peasant action.²³ For many Marxist inflected scholars, the *latifundio* system was not only fundamentally unjust in the distribution of land; it systematically kept workers impoverished. David Ringrose has explained their lines of argument succinctly: “These aspects of the social and economic structure of the region were part of the historical pattern that has caused many observers to speak not only of dependence but of the progressive underdevelopment of the regional economy.”²⁴ That is to say, it was more than a backwards, agricultural system that depended on external markets and failed to adopt new technology and techniques, as Joaquín Costa would charge. Landlords actually enforced this backwardness as way to maintain a powerless labor pool with vast seasonal unemployment. The social and political power of landlords was reinforced by the illiteracy of the peasants and a day-labor system where disenfranchised agricultural

²² “*afirmando* que el llamado problema de yunteros es una completa *farsa*: una bandera desplegada antes por socialistas y comunistas, y recogida, con estos elementos.” Manuel Pidal, *La “Farsa” del llamado problema de yunteros en Extremadura o la nueva bandera de Acción Popular en Badajoz* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1934).

²³ Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the “Spanish Miracle”*, 294.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 297.

workers would await hiring in bars and town squares from workers with fixed jobs on estates.

This portrait of politically reactionary, often absentee, landlords has been reconsidered in a series of works. Previously the unwillingness of landlords to hire more laborers or to put more of their land under cultivation was blamed on their repression of workers. Now, authors have begun to emphasize how *latifundismo* as a system of cultivation responded ably to market imperatives.²⁵ While Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell emphasize the priority of social organization in determining the shape of regional capitalism following Robert Brenner, they caution that *latifundios* were not static at all and represented a Mediterranean-wide land-use strategy. Economically, as well as politically, large estates made sense for their owners. They decreased risk in times of crisis and guaranteed their owners local political power. Moreover, population booms and busts that contributed to a rising and falling population of landless laborers have been common across Mediterranean history.²⁶

However, the ability of the landscape to absorb sudden population growth and decrease proved to be the case until the late nineteenth century, when advances in nutrition and public health facilitated a boom in the rural population to heights never before seen.²⁷ Across the rural Mediterranean, more land was put under cultivation than ever before due to this rising population as well as to the increasing demand for agricultural goods. Newly settled land could often be of marginal fertility, formerly

²⁵ Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the "Spanish Miracle"*, 291-309.

²⁶ Nicholas Purcell and Peregrine Horden, *The Corrupting Sea: a Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 265.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 268.

unused land or pastureland (“*monte*” or “*baldío*”).²⁸ While prices stayed high, landlords were content to lease out more and more land, but as prices fell and landlords sought to curb cultivation, impoverished laborers looked angrily on empty plots of land that had recently been in service.

Crime, along with political unrest, exploded with the onset of the democratic Second Republic in 1931. Rising political expectations have been blamed as has increased political organization. Strikes and farm occupations struck fear in the hearts of landlords. While some authors, following Eric Hobsbawm’s pioneering studies of peasant society, have emphasized a sharp break between primitive (pre-political) and modern class-conscious forms of protest, these actions in Badajoz mixed objectives from both ideal types. Peasants were well coordinated by political parties and unions, but often made “primitive” demands for reduced food staple prices in their own localities.²⁹ The leaders of protests in Badajoz at this time were routinely *yunteros*.

2.2.3. Tenancy Laws of the Second Republic

The governments of the Second Republic adopted a series of strategies to combat the nation’s social problem – and along with Western Andalusia, Badajoz was an epicenter of the different measures’ focus and a site of tremendous conflict and controversy. Most famously, Manuel Azaña’s left-wing government of the first two years of the Second Republic, in the wake of General Sanjurjo’s failed rebellion, marshaled the political wherewithal to pass the Land Reform Law of 1932. It enabled the Institute of Agrarian Reform, a newly formed state agency, to study large farms and designate lands

²⁸ Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the “Economic Miracle”*, 289.

²⁹ Baumeister, *Campesinos sin tierra*, 378.

for expropriation (with payment) and redistribution.³⁰ Because of a combination of the difficulty of the project, shifting political winds and landowner resistance, the law's effects were muted but nevertheless polarizing.³¹ Only in 1936, when on March 25th hundreds of farms were occupied by as many as 30,000 *yunteros* and the government subsequently legalized the takeovers, was expropriation carried out on a significant scale.³²

The targeted measures of Francisco Largo Caballero, the Minister of Labor, had more of an immediate effect according to Malefakis, even if they were just as controversial. "Intensification of Cultivation" decrees began to be passed in November 1932 that forbid landowners from excluding lands from cultivation.³³ The different decrees often covered a mixture of provinces but Badajoz alone was always included. These decrees aimed to "absorb" unemployed labor. Using local censuses of unemployment, officials from the Institute of Agrarian Reform settled unemployed workers, particularly *yunteros*, on large farms to increase cultivation. Landlords complained that these placements ("*asentamientos*") upset their crop rotation systems and that these settled workers did not concern themselves with the long-term prospects of the farm, only short-term production.³⁴ According to Francisca Rosique Navarro, the decrees did lead to a growth in production, but at the cost of increasing the amount of hectares under cultivation when this was already at an all-time high and, thus, decreasing food prices even further.

³⁰ *Gaceta de Madrid*, August 21, 1932.

³¹ Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*, 6.

³² Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*, 130.

³³ For Badajoz see *Gaceta de Madrid*, November 30, 1932.

³⁴ Pidal, *La Farsa*. 4.

The socialist mayor of Badajoz, later to be executed after the town's capture by the Nationalists in the Civil War, issued a circular to all the mayors of the province as well as those of the adjoining Ciudad Real province asking for them to report on possible irrigation projects.³⁵ Other, more self-consciously moderate, measures also were pursued. In a provincial newspaper, Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco continued to lobby for increased irrigation as the solution, claiming that it would turn Extremadura into an "emporium of riches."³⁶ Indalecio Prieto, as Minister of Public Works, along with his chief engineer, Manuel Lorenzo Pardo, published the beginnings of a new National Water Plan in 1933. The Servicios del Cíjara, an association intended to spur the construction of the Cíjara reservoir was founded in 1934 and published an irrigation plan based around the new reservoir.³⁷ The prospects for the employment for Badajoz's politically restive population appealed to landlords, who made the construction of the Cíjara dam and accompanying canals part of the *Asociación de Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas* platform, the political organization of landowners that had a branch in Badajoz (APFRB).³⁸ A *Junta* was named to explore more public works projects in the region by the central government and consisted of Domingo Díaz Ambrona and Luis Bardají, an engineer and lawyer, the brother and father-in-law of Adolfo Díaz Ambrona who would serve as head of the Diputation of Badajoz as well as minister of agriculture in the later 1960s. He was a key lobbyist for the Plan Badajoz throughout its existence.

³⁵ Rosique Navarro, *La Reforma Agraria*, 139.

³⁶ Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco, "El portillo de Cíjara y el porvenir de la baja Extremadura" *Luz*, 3 September 1932.

³⁷ Rosique Navarro, *La Reforma*, 139.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 259

The massacre of the Jean Lafitte-like figure Seisdedos and his family in an anarchist uprising in the town of Casas Viejas in Andalucía in 1933 began the downfall of the Socialist and Left Republican government of Manuel Azaña. The center-right Radical Party, with the support of the far-right, landlord-supported CEDA (*Confederación de Derechas Autónomas*), eventually replaced it in power. Although the government dismantled or slowed much the activity of the Institute for Agrarian Reform, the CEDA minister of agriculture, Manuel Giménez Fernández, influenced by social Catholic currents of thought, pursued measures which would protect small rural tenants and *yunteros* who had benefitted from the decrees of the previous left-wing government.³⁹ His most important accomplishment was the Law of Rural Tenancy, which sought to regulate rental contracts.⁴⁰ The law codified obligations between both tenants and landowners, and banned subleasing. Larger contracts (those that exceeded 5,000 hectares) had to be publicly announced, while private ones still had to be overseen by a notary or judge and recorded in a special section of the province's registry of property. All contracts had to be written down. Rent prices were not regulated, but one year after a contract was agreed upon, either party could make a case for reducing or increasing rent to a local judge or state agronomist. Tenants and landowners could also create their contracts under the supervision of a judge, in which case the contracts could not be rescinded for at least three years except in cases of natural disaster. In general, contracts had to run at least four years. For a three-field system, at least two full crop rotations had to be completed, which meant a contract had to be at least 6 years. Tenants could not be evicted in such a way that landlords would unfairly benefit from their labor. Most

³⁹ *Gaceta de Madrid*, December 29, 1934

⁴⁰ *Gaceta de Madrid*, March 23, 1935.

importantly, and most disturbing to landlords, tenants had the ability to extend their contracts automatically for another cycle unless landlords proved that they were going to work their land directly for an equal length of time and improve its production through investment. Tenants could lose this right to extend if they were unwilling to update their sharecropping (*aparcería*) contract to one of renting (*arrendamiento*). Land sales would not end contracts; new buyers would have to inherit the old contracts and needed to be notified of them before the purchase of the land. Giménez Fernández's proposals were essentially moderate, as the government had stopped all land expropriation, but he was still antagonized by large landowners, referred to as the "white Bolshevik." They saw his regulatory measures, and protections of *yunteros*, as hidden avenues for contracts in perpetuity.⁴¹

The intensification of cultivation decrees and the Agrarian Reform Law, along with other decrees on the use of municipal lands and arbitration juries, may have bettered conditions for the province's unemployed peasantry, but none of the decrees, not even Giménez Fernández's protections of *yunteros* and tenants, was truly successful in allaying social and political unrest.⁴² Landlords became even more resistant to any kind of check on their hegemony in the countryside. 1934 saw important strikes in Badajoz as well as an attempt to join the October revolution of 1934 in Villanueva de la Serena led by an anarchist sergeant. In 1936, the Institute of Agrarian Reform, which had been

⁴¹ El Bachiller Cantalaro (Luis Chorot), "La Sonata de los Yunteros," *ABC*, December 2, 1934.

⁴² The decree of municipal lands made it difficult to follow long-held practices of bringing in labor to towns with large farms but small populations even if it made it more difficult to break strikes or gave labor more sway in negotiations. The mixed juries protected workers from exploitative labor practices but in the process alienated landlords who refused to participate.

revived after the victory of the Popular Front, faced with the mass occupation of farms in March of 1936, retroactively legalized them.⁴³

2.3. Early Francoist Responses to the Social Question

2.3.1. Francoist Tenancy Laws

The nascent regime's response to the social question in Badajoz consisted of a complicated dance of guaranteeing production, rewarding politically loyal peasants, and rolling back the occupation of farms that had occurred during the Civil War. The number of laws passed, and the forced halts of evictions, testify to a broken society in the countryside caused by the government's policy of enforcing of low wheat prices, the shortage of inputs (fertilizer, seeds and machinery) in the wake of the Civil War, and inflation.⁴⁴ But landlords did not enjoy as much power as they had before the Second Republic. Using Giménez Fernández's law as a template, the regime reformed tenancy contracts in such a way as to protect politically loyal tenants while dissuading landlords from mass eviction enough to guarantee order in the countryside.

The first regime *arrendamiento* law of June 1939 "regularized" different rural contracts in zones captured by the Nationalists towards the end of the Civil War, preventing the eviction of any tenant loyal to the regime.⁴⁵ The chief problem identified was reconciling the contracts of tenants supposedly evicted by the "reds" with the contracts of tenants who had moved in to take their places and "harmonized" their rights with those of landlords during the war. In order to take advantage of the provisions of the law, those who had allegedly lost their land under Republican rule had two months to

⁴³ Rosique Navarra, *Reforma Agraria*, 304.

⁴⁴ James Simpson, *The Long Siesta*, 247.

⁴⁵ "Ley de 5 de junio," *BOE*, June 15, 1939.

make a claim on their land. The needs of politically ambiguous tenants were placed behind those of landlords: if unable to pay the rent that they had missed during the war, they were given two years to pay back the rent from each year missing from their land. However, if the tenants' equipment or personal property had been stolen or if they had voluntarily left for the Nationalist areas of Spain (in both cases, presumably identifying them as Nationalists), their debt could be completely expunged.

Leftists, or even those who had simply cooperated with Republican authorities during the war, were excluded. A tenant would be disqualified from gaining the benefits of the law if there was any trace of cooperation with Republican authorities after the Nationalist uprising on July 18, 1936. If a tenant had made any formal complaints (“*denuncias*”) of a landlord to one of the Republican authorities he would similarly be disqualified. The regime further decreed that no one who had begun his lease or sharecropping contract in Republican territory after the elections of 1936 would have their contract protected past the current harvest date or be able to receive state assistance in repossessing their land if they had been evicted.

The complete halt to evictions was only intended as a temporary measure. One year after the conclusion of the war, the regime loosened the restrictions on eviction by putting Giménez Fernández's tenancy law of 1935 back in place, which still provided tenants with substantial protections.⁴⁶ Landlords were required, if they wished to evict their tenants, to farm their property “directly” – that is by not renting their land and taking on full economic responsibility for the farm (instead of distributing risk to *arrendatarios* and *aparceros*) – as long as they gave one year's notice and provided

⁴⁶ “Ley de 28 de junio de 1940 por la que se normaliza el régimen de arrendamientos rústicos,” *BOE*, July 13, 1940.

indemnified tenants with two years' rent. The law enforced contracts based on the price of rent. Renters who paid more than 5,000 pesetas were guaranteed contracts of six years and the renters would have the ability to automatically extend for another 6 years unless the landlord had decided to farm directly. When rent was below 5,000 pesetas, the renter would have right to extend the contract up to fifteen years as long as the landlord was notified more than a year in advance. If the owner failed to live up to his commitment to improve the production of the farm to the national economy the former tenant could sue for repossession and damages. Judges could add further penalties if fraud was proven. Lastly, the landowner could dissolve all sharecropping contracts, but the tenants would have the choice to become *arrendatarios* with more protections.⁴⁷

The law reiterated above all that it valued social harmony in the countryside. Already existing older contracts were placed in a much more favorable situation unless tenants owed that contract to the Popular Front or the Republican authorities during the Civil War. If an old contract were still in effect, the tenants would have the right to see it out. If the contract was to end less than a year after the new law was passed, an extra year was to be added onto the old contract. If a contract was already up, but tenants had stayed on the land due to state intervention, they would have until the end of the harvest. Farmers who had gained their plots from “invasions” during the Republican period would be able to see out the current harvest, but would then be evicted, so that production was not harmed.⁴⁸ Any tenants that had lived for more than fifteen years on one farm without any disputes would have the right to extend their contracts immediately by three or six

⁴⁷ Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 184.

⁴⁸ Depending on the type of farm this meant that they would have until the 30th of September or the 31st of December.

years depending on if they paid more or less than 5,000 pesetas. Only those landlords who had rents that combined to less than 6,000 pesetas a year and who had not increased rents after 1925 could propose an increase in rent.

Following the conservative ideas of the regime, which held that directly working the land made owners more conscious of the plight of poverty in the countryside, the law demanded that landlords who wished to evict tenants had to farm their lands directly themselves. Again, contracts for large plots were guaranteed for six years and would be automatically extended for the same amount of time if no complaint were lodged, while smaller properties could be extended up to fifteen years. If landlords desired to begin farming directly with a more lucrative crop (that was designated as such by the Ministry of Agriculture), they had to give one year's notice and indemnify their former tenants with two years' rent. If the owner evicted tenants but failed to plant the new crop the former tenant could sue for repossession and damages. Judges could add further penalties if fraud was proven. Lastly, if a landowner wished to evict sharecroppers he at first had to give them the choice to become tenants.

The later *arrendamiento* laws of the 1940s did not substantially alter the earlier legislation, continuing the regime's commitment to protect tenants "as long as the normal functioning of the national economy doesn't permit the solution, with guarantees of success, of the agrarian problem."⁴⁹ One subsequent law converted rents into wheat to further the regime's disastrous program of lowering wheat prices. As in previous legislation, the transfer of ownership of the farm could not serve as grounds for evicting

⁴⁹ "En tanto el normal desenvolvimiento de la Economía Nacional no permita acometer, con garantías de acierto, el problema agrario." "Ley de 23 de Julio de 1942 por la que se modifican algunas disposiciones vigentes sobre arrendamientos rústicos," *BOE*, August 1, 1942.

tenants; the contracts would be inherited and the new owner could only take full possession and evict tenants if he or she guaranteed direct farming for at least six years. Those tenants who had been on farms run by the Institute of Agrarian Reform (before 1936) that had been returned to their owners would now benefit from the protection of tenancy laws as well.⁵⁰

As might be imagined, the enforcement of the requirements landlords had to fill in order to evict tenants was not foolproof. “There have been many cases of cheating the spirit and letter of the law of 23 July 1942,” began the preamble to a 1944 revision of previous laws.⁵¹ Specifically, landlords were failing to improve their lands and farm directly after evicting tenants. Instead, seeking to take advantage of rising rents, they simply secured new tenants with higher rent payments. Now landlords would have to prove permanent residence in the nearest town and demonstrate an ability to purchase the necessary supplies for land improvement if they wished to evict. And a landlord could only evict as many small-scale tenants as he had working family members. Any landowner who, during the two months after the passing of this law, had begun to cultivate his land personally, had the option of returning his land to previous tenants without penalty if he feared that the land been obtained through fraud. After two months, investigations of landowners would begin.

According to José Pérez Rubio, these laws and decrees failed to eliminate the privileges enjoyed by landlords, negating their impact. Landlords could choose to disobey regulations and only particularly knowledgeable tenants, or a determined local

⁵⁰ The only excepted contracts were INC settlements

⁵¹ “Son muchos los casos en que se vienen burlando el espíritu y letra de la Ley de veintitrés de julio de mil novecientos cuarenta y dos.” “Ley sobre desahucios de fincas rústicas para cultivo directo y personal,” *BOE*, March 23, 1944.

administration, could stop them. The linking of the government's wheat policy with the regulation of tenancy contracts (by converting prices to amounts wheat), made landlords more determined to evict. Nevertheless, for the same author, these laws directly attacked landlords by preventing them from breaking contracts as easily as they would like: "these laws and decrees touched the epicenter of the interests of the landlord class."⁵² During a time when emigration was increasing because of rising rents, they helped to "avoid the radicalization of sharecroppers," slowing the expulsions of sharecroppers. These series of laws demonstrated a commitment to order in the countryside, intending to slow or halt the eviction of tenants who contributed to social harmony.

2.3.2. The Founding of the INC

The politicized nature of the government's response to the social problem, deliberately excluding Republican supporters and protecting tenants who had caused no trouble, was made even more explicit in the first years of the National Institute of Colonization. The INC, although designed as an instrument to help settle irrigated zones, was limited in its first years to local colonization, meaning the expropriation and management of individual farms. In these efforts, as well as in its own organization, the INC aimed at the protection of an exemplary minority of tenants to stabilize and pacify the countryside.

The government created the INC with a decree in October 1939 in order to address the social question in a way that the earlier Servicio Nacional de Reforma Económica y Social de la Tierra could not since it had merely served to sort out property

⁵² "Dichas disposiciones tocaban el punto neurálgico de los intereses de la clase terrateniente." Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 140.

claims during the Civil War.⁵³ The INC, on the other hand, was designed to settle land with colonists and supervise its farming. The decree organized the INC in the following manner: the top official was the Director General with a Secretary General serving under him in Madrid, coordinating a series of regional sections. There were also a series of distinct sections in Madrid for the education of colonists, the preparation of the soil, production, and “the improvement of rural life.”⁵⁴ For colonization projects to be confirmed they had to go through a National Council of Colonization presided over by the minister of agriculture and eventually be approved by Franco’s Council of Ministers.⁵⁵

The INC’s powers and scope were established in a law passed in December of 1939.⁵⁶ It directly tied colonization to irrigation. Invoking José Antonio immediately, the preamble declared that irrigation was the first step to solving Spain’s agrarian problem:

The clamor of soldiers and of the people and the blood spilled for the ideals of the new revolution demand the overcoming of obstacles, and also the collaboration of the different interests in order to carry out, at an accelerated pace, the colonization of large irrigable zones and immense extensions of wetlands, as well as the realization of other works of high national interest on *secano* lands.⁵⁷

⁵³ Where the old institution attempted to undo the actions of the *Instituto del Reforma Agraria* of the Second Republic, the INC, by focusing on colonization as well as balancing relations in the countryside, was planned as a new endeavor. “Decreto organizando el Instituto Nacional de Colonización,” *BOE*, October 27, 1939.

⁵⁴ “Embelllecimiento de la vida rural.” *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ The structure of the INC, as well as the councils that oversaw colonization, was changed in 1942, but only slightly.

⁵⁶ “Ley de bases de 26 de diciembre de 1939 para colonización de grandes zonas,” *BOE*, December 26, 1939.

⁵⁷ “El clamor de los combatientes y del pueblo y la sangre derramada por los ideales de la nueva revolución, exigen no sólo la separación de los obstáculos que a ello se opongan, sino la colaboración de los diferentes intereses para llevar a cabo con ritmo acelerado, la colonización de grandes zonas regables de inmensas extensiones de marismas y la realización de otros trabajos de alto interés nacional en el *secano*.” *Ibid.*

Irrigation was a tool to bring different interest groups together – the resultant increase in productivity would unite together labor, government, and rural and urban capital. The law framed irrigation as the “most revolutionary” solution to the country’s economic and social problems and as the continuation of the uprising of July 18th into the post-Civil War period. The interest groups of the “rural capitalism” that existed prior to the Civil War, some legitimate (referring to landowners) and some of them not (socialist and liberal organization), had delayed the “obtaining of immense economic and social benefits for the entire nation.”⁵⁸ The law called for colonization all over Spain, but “especially in those areas which already possessed water” but which lacked irrigation.⁵⁹ The social provisions of the law aimed at the “creation of thousands family plots where the free peasant could employ his freedom in sustaining and defending, if it is necessary, the freedom of the fatherland.”⁶⁰

The most important feature of the law was the definition of certain areas of land as “of national interest,” since this designation allowed the INC to begin the process of expropriation. At this early juncture in the INC’s history, voluntary private action was still much preferred to that of the state. The goal was to entice, through the prospect of irrigation, the cooperation of societies of colonization – private corporations that could be formed by those landowners who would pool portions of their lands to be settled by colonists in order to enjoy the benefits of receiving state aid in irrigating their farms. Only if there were no proposals for areas of high national interest would the INC take charge of the completion of the project.

⁵⁸ “Inmensos beneficios económicos y sociales para la nación entera.” Ibid.

⁵⁹ “Especialmente de las que ya dominadas por el agua.” Ibid.

⁶⁰ “La creación de miles de lotes familiares donde el campesino libre, emplee esta libertad en sostener, si es preciso, la de la Patria.” Ibid.

To be of high national interest, an area had to “profoundly transform economic and social conditions of large amounts of land,” usually through irrigation or land reclamation – not only did an area have to be impoverished to receive the designation, it had to offer the possibility of improved productivity to the national economy.⁶¹ Once an area was proposed, the minister of agriculture would bring the area before the Council of Ministers. The original proposition could come from either the minister of agriculture, acting on his own impetus, or from private groups interested in colonization that sent in a justifying proposal. If approved by the Council of Ministers, the INC would create a “general project of colonization.” “General projects” had to include a justification and description of works to be carried out by the state; guidelines and rules for agricultural transformation; justification of the crops to be planted; and rules to use to carry out the selection and education of new colonists.⁶²

The zone around the canal of Montijo in the Vegas Bajas of the Guadiana was included in the first group of INC projects.⁶³ The minister of agriculture granted this status to Montijo given the “necessity of improving the methods of energy use and the conditions of agricultural production of our soil.”⁶⁴ This was a “principal preoccupation” of the government. Although the law of 1939 granted high national interest to both *secano* lands and marshes (*marismas*), the first series was made up principally of irrigable lands. The government “depended” again on the “enthusiasm” of proprietors who had the “honorable duty” of participating in the reconstruction of Spain.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ “Decreto por el que se declara de interés nacional la colonización de la zona dominada por el Canal de la Vega de Montijo, en la provincia de Badajoz,” *BOE*, December 10, 1940.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Expropriation was the most delicate part of the law, and the most important since the societies of colonization never materialized.⁶⁵ In its first years, the INC had a very limited budget; it carefully limited its employees' use of gas and office supplies.⁶⁶ The Ministry of Agriculture could immediately begin to expropriate land once an area was declared of national interest, but landowners had to agree to prices. Expropriation was never to be carried out in an unpaid fashion. Until 1942, the INC's expropriation was limited by the reliance on the goodwill of landlords. After 1942, when prices offered by the INC for farms became more favorable, more farms were offered that the INC had the means to buy or colonize.⁶⁷ A tenancy regime (*arrendamiento forzoso*) unique to the INC could be imposed for up to six years on farms included in general projects. Two agricultural experts (*peritos*), one chosen by the owners of the farm to be expropriated, and one by the INC, would settle the price of expropriated farms. The Ministry of Agriculture decided the price in case of a dispute. In this stage, the granting of lots to farm was a clear method of providing stability to supporters of the regime. Families were the key unit of colonization from the very beginning. In order of preference, these colonists would be the previous tenants, veterans of the Civil War, or the descendants of veterans who "died for the Patria or were victims of Red persecution."⁶⁸

At this time, the INC was organized around a series of brigades across the provinces that responded to the direction of the Director General. INC workers, even office workers, had to be screened carefully for their political activities. The Institute offered previous office employees of its predecessor agencies, including the Institute of

⁶⁵ Barciela, "La contrarreforma agraria," 368.

⁶⁶ "Circular N. 5: Instrucciones a las brigadas de información general," 15 June 1940, ACMAPAMA.

⁶⁷ Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 379.

⁶⁸ "Circular N. 5," ACMAPAMA.

Agrarian Reform, the opportunity to reapply for jobs with preference to other applicants. However, they had to make sure to officially re-apply and also to provide documentation of their “political-social” conduct from the Ministry of Agriculture, other official state institutions, or the descendant of the Falange, the FET-JONS.⁶⁹ Franco had merged the Falange with other far right parties during the Civil War to better control them, and the result, the FET-JONS was the only political party allowed during the dictatorship. A handful of employees were immediately fired for a variety of causes including: serving in the Red Cross for the Institute of Agrarian Reform, fighting with the Republican side in the Civil War, being a member of Azaña’s Left Republican Party, being a freemason, and joining the Institute of Agrarian Reform after the Popular Front had triumphed at the polls.⁷⁰

The early INC was imagined as a military organization bringing political order to a chaotic countryside. The lettering of its reports was patterned on the Roman lettering used by Mussolini’s government and hearkened back to the Roman Empire’s presence in Spain. Its local chief engineers were ordered to maintain the highest moral standards in private as well as public matters, and local offices were called brigades. They also had to be sure to present themselves to local *alcaldes*, leaders of the FET-JONS and the regional governors. Pictures of Franco and José Antonio hung in every regional office. While the regime lauded the countryside as the heart of its strength, especially the idealized peasant-landlord relationship, the countryside was under suspicion by the INC. The

⁶⁹ Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista.

⁷⁰ “Desestimando instancias de los señores que se citan en solicitud de admisión a los cursillos y exámenes para administrativos de Instituto Nacional de Colonización” and “Desestimando instancias de doña Lucía Corrales Ferrás, en solicitud de admisión a los cursillos y exámenes para administrativos del Instituto Nacional de Colonización,” *BOE*, August 9, 1941.

director general asked brigades to visit as many of their districts as possible, but to always protect themselves from the countryside, which was the “anti-thesis” of the real Spain.⁷¹ The countryside threatened to “degenerate” the spiritual lives of his agricultural engineers. Instead brigades were encouraged to create a lifestyle in the countryside based on the harmony of all classes, based on hunting and sport.

The first significant *circular*, memorandums that guided brigade action, indicated what sort of preliminary information was needed before the Institute could settle colonists.⁷² Agricultural engineers had to first study the regions that needed state assistance, with special attention paid to the classification of land with an eye towards possibilities for irrigation. They also had to report on an area’s agronomy, the legal status of relevant properties, level of unemployment, and cultural (educational and religious) facilities. The *circular* made “the genial vision of the Founder of the Falange concrete through exact technical rules”⁷³ by determining the proper “*unidades de cultivo*,” the most productive possible placements of crops and sizes of properties to support families. In each national interest zone, the INC classified the different farms in the area – mixed oak and pasture, one-and-half year cultivation with seeded fallow fields, irrigation with orchards. Each of these farms was then added to an overall count of systems of

⁷¹ “El pueblo es la antítesis del campo y no se pretende por tanto sacar el servicio de las capitales de provincias para llevarlo a núcleos menores de población, donde la vida espiritual del Ingeniero y sus subordinados pueda degenerar en todos sus aspectos.” “Circular N. 15: Prestigio del instituto y relación con interesados y autoridades,” 13 February 1941, ACMAPAMA.

⁷² “Circular N. 5,” ACMAPAMA.

⁷³ “Concretando, por tanto, la genial visión del Fundador de la Falange, en normas técnicas exactas, el estudio económico y social de las zonas declaradas de interés nacional se efectuará con arreglo a las instrucciones que a continuación se expresan y que serán complementadas con otras referentes a datos económicos y sociales de tipo general que figurarán en circularse a sucesivas.” “Circular N. 27: Estudio de las unidades de cultivo,” 2 August 1941, ACMAPAMA.

cultivations as well as farm sizes. After the studies, the INC chose an exceptional farm for each type to then be used as a model for the farms set up through colonization.

2.3.3. Land As Political Reward

During the 1940s, the INC acted as a kind of last resort for tenants who had not been protected by the regime's tenancy laws. Although little large-scale expropriation was carried out, the INC had inherited farms to administer from both the Republican and Primo de Rivera governments and acquired a number of smaller farms. Until 1950, taken roughly as the beginning of the colonization of large irrigated zones through the construction of new towns, the INC settled 3,720 colonists on 42 farms in Badajoz.⁷⁴ Looking at the petitions (*instancias*) sent to the Guadiana office of the INC, it becomes clear that potential colonists saw the INC not so much as an institution meant to transform the countryside, but rather saw it as an instrument to reward those who had been loyal to the regime. Almost all applicants wrote to the INC to either reclaim property that was lost during the Civil War or to make claims for property based on their service in the Civil War.

In Jerez de los Caballeros, the INC was faced with the task of sorting out various claims to tenancy on the three farms under its control that had first been settled during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship: La Nava, Montelobo and Moriana.⁷⁵ During the Civil War, the tenancy contracts of the various holdings had been interrupted, and those who could demonstrate loyalty to Franco clamored for precedence in recouping their plots. Young men fighting on both sides of the conflict created a shortage of labor and the nominal

⁷⁴ See Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 457.

⁷⁵ Juan Carmona and James Simpson, "Organización y funcionamiento de los asentamientos de la reforma agraria. La comunidad de campesinos de La Pulgosa en Badajoz, 1933-1941," *Revista de Estudios Extremeños* 71, Número Extraordinario (2015), 105-28.

tenants had leant out their plots for years at a time. Manuel Carrasco Vazquez's family underwent quite an odyssey. He noted that he served under General García Valiño during the Civil War with "the enthusiasm for sacrifice proper to every Spaniard who felt the crisis and danger through which Spain passed in those days."⁷⁶ After the war his father died at the same time he was called upon to perform his compulsory military service, which involved serving in the Foreign Legion. Carrasco lent the family's plot to a neighbor in 1941 to plant because no one in his family was able to farm. On his return, he found that the farm's watchman ("*guarda*") had divided the plot between three neighbors. If the chief engineer were to reinstate his family as tenants, protecting Carrasco's mother, he would bring "consolation to a Spanish hearth and bread to a poor, sick old woman with no resources."⁷⁷

Eugenio Basilio de la Cruz claimed that although he had taken possession of a parcel in 1937, he had been harassed during all of the "red period," by which he must have meant the years of the Popular Front government or the first months of the Civil War since Jerez de los Caballeros was retaken soon after the outbreak of war.⁷⁸ In 1939, he could not participate in the season when crops were planted to refresh the soil ("*barbechera*") because of an illness. Supposedly he had not been allowed to retake his plot ("boycotted for being a man of order"). He needed the guard of the farm, Matías Gil,

⁷⁶ "Pues bien, por si ello influyese algo en mi favor, cosa que no creo, he de hacer constar que soy ex-combatiente de nuestro Glorioso Movimiento Nacional y que durante de nuestra Guerra de Liberación he servido a las ordenes del Excmo. Sr. General García Valiño con el entusiasmo y espíritu de sacrificio propio de todo español que sintió en aquellos momentos la crisis y los peligros por que atravesaba nuestra Patria en aquel entonces." Manuel Carrasco Vazquez to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, 27 November 1944, AHCEA.

⁷⁷ "Llevará V. a un hogar español el consuelo, y el pan a una pobre anciana enferma y carente de recursos." Ibid.

⁷⁸ Eugenio Basilio de la Cruz to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, February 9, 1943, AHCEA. See also José Hinojosa, *Tropas en un frente olvidado: el ejército republicano en Extremadura durante la Guerra Civil*, (Mérida: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 2009), 41.

to certify his previous tenancy.⁷⁹ The war interrupted Francisco García Adames' tenancy as well: he underlined that all his four sons fought in the war for the Nationalists and he was unable to participate in the fallow periods of the years from 1940-1943, but wanted to make sure that he would be included in the upcoming cycle."⁸⁰

The INC possessed two other farms near Lobón: the Castillo de Guadajira, expropriated during in 1941, and the La Orden farm, acquired in 1944.⁸¹ Six hopeful colonists – Alfonso Guerrero, Juan Antonio Álvarez, Dionisio Martín Calle, Juan Torres Cabañas, and Diego Torres Martín – all asked for land at La Orden and all were also careful to advertise their status as *ex-combatientes*.⁸² A few noted that they had been wounded, and others that they were fathers of large families (*padres de familia numerosa*), a designation created by the pro-natalist Francoist government, and a requirement for colonists. Diego Torres Martín claimed he “had heard that the Institute was dividing [the land of] the Castillo de Guadajira with wounded veterans preferred above all others,”⁸³ while Dionisio Martín wrote to the chief engineer that he had “news that *ex-combatientes* certified as fathers of numerous families were being given plots by

⁷⁹ Matías Gil to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, 28 October 1943, AHCEA.

⁸⁰ Francisco García Adames to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, 25 February 1943, AHCEA.

⁸¹ Juan Carmona and James Simpson, “¿Campesinos unidos o divididos? La acción colectiva y la revolución social entre los yunteros durante la Segunda Republica en España (1931-1936),” *Historia Social*, no. 85 2016: 123-144.

⁸² Alfonso Guerrero to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, 10 March 1943, Juan Antonio Álvarez Dorado to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, 10 March 1943, Dionisio Martín Calle to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, March 16 1943, Juan Torres Cabañas to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, March 23 1943, and Diego Torres Martín to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, March 29 1943, AHCEA.

⁸³ “Que teniendo entendido que ese Instituto adjudica, en arrendamiento tierras del Castillo Guadajira a los *ex-combatientes* heridos con preferencia a cualquier otro y encontrándose el solicitante en ese...” Diego Torres to Ingeniero Jefe.

the National Institute of Colonization, which you so ably manage.”⁸⁴ In June of 1943, twenty-nine year old Fernando Carvajal Dorado from Lobón, a small village just to the east of Badajoz, asked the chief engineer to be considered as a “colonist, a temporary farmer or a sharecropper” on the La Orden farm since he was an “*ex-combatiente* of Nationalist Spain.”⁸⁵ Santiago Sánchez Duran, “volunteer of the mixed brigade of the black arrows, decorated with the Cross of Military Merit,” also asked for a plot.⁸⁶

Of thirty *instancias* sent between the years 1943 and 1944 concerning these two farms only 5 were not from *ex-combatientes*. All of the applications demonstrate that INC assistance was targeted at specific sections of the population: those who had suffered at the hands of the “*rojos*,” veterans of the nationalist side (applicants were sure to advertise any medals they possessed or wounds they had received), and fathers of large families. They all had *cédulas personales* (acquired after the Civil War), a mixture of ID and tax certification issued by provincial authorities that predated the national identity cards introduced in 1944.⁸⁷ These must have been more difficult for former Republicans, or escaped prisoners, to acquire. Applicants were careful to include certifications of their conduct by persons in positions of authority – priests, city hall officials, civil guards or, in special cases, the watchmen of farms. The acting mayor of Lobón provided Juan

⁸⁴ “Que teniendo noticias que a los excombatientes encargados de familia numerosa, el instituto Nacional de Colonización que tan dignamente dirige (sic) adjudica tierras del “Castillo Guadajira...” Dionisio Martín to Ingeniero Jefe.

⁸⁵ “Colonos, o asentados o aparceros.” Fernando Carvajal Dorado to Ingeniero Jefe del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, June 3 1943, AHCEA. More than thirty-five years later, he would be given the deed to the house that he lived in as an employee (“mayoral”) of the INC. See Eleuterio Serrano López, Joaquín Sánchez Conejo, Félix de la Cruz Torres y Gabriel Muñoz García to Jefatura Provincial de Badajoz, 9 June 1978, ACMAPAMA.

⁸⁶ Santiago Sánchez Duran to Ingeniero Jefe, 21 July 1943, AHCEA.

⁸⁷ Martí Marín Corbera, “La gestación del Documento Nacional de Identidad: un proyecto de control totalitario para la España Franquista,” *Novísima: II Congreso Internacional de Historia de Nuestro Tiempo* coord. por Carlos Navajas Zubeldía, Diego Iturriaga Barco, (2010) págs. 323-338.

Fernández Hernández with a strong recommendation: “He has always observed perfect conduct, in the moral sphere as well as in the economic, without ever giving a motive for being reprimanded by the agents under my authority.”⁸⁸

These efforts make clear that potential colonists and those concerned for them saw an implicit political promise in the duties of the INC. It was designed to reward loyalty to the Nationalists. Carmé Molinero has written of how the regime framed its social proposals in terms of charity rather than duty to citizens.⁸⁹ State aid preserved the idea of a hierarchical society – Spanish subjects had more duties than they had rights. The same is true of colonization. The only segments of the population who felt they had the strength to make claims on the government were those who could demonstrate loyalty to the Nationalist cause. In the first years of the INC, the INC mostly met these expectations.

2.4 Case Study - Santos de Maimona

Santos de Maimona, a small town in the southeastern portion of the Badajoz province, provides a case study of the effects of the regime’s *arrendamiento* laws and the INC’s early efforts at local colonization. Tenants from a number of farms fought their evictions for more than seven years leading to the eventual intervention of the INC. In 1940, Lucio Dobón Soriano sought to evict the tenants from his Quejigales farm – some of whom had been on his farm since 1915.⁹⁰ The original contracts were given for

⁸⁸ “Ha observado siempre una conducta intachable, tanto en el orden moral como en el material, sin que nunca ni por motivo alguno, haya tenido que ser reprendido por los Agentes de mi Autoridad y sin que otra cosa en contrario conste a esta Alcaldía.” Manuel León Giraldo to Ingeniero Jefe, 30 April 1943, AHCEA.

⁸⁹ Carmé Molinero, *La Captación de las masas: política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista* (Madrid: Cátedra, 2005).

⁹⁰ Manuel García de Oteyza, “Estudio del problema social que puede tener planteado el pueblo de los Santos de Maimona, con motivo de la desavenencia existente entre los propietarios cedentes de terrenos

unused lands to be planted with vines and olives for durations between 10 and 20 years, making them closer to *rabassa mortas* than *aparcería* contracts. The tenants would not go along with his order and took their case to court in 1941, finally winning in 1943 through the provisions of the 1942 *arrendamiento* law although Dobón attempted to appeal the case at another venue. In 1945, in two other trials, one in Villafranca de los Barros and one in Zafra at the “Doña Juana” farm of José Maria Gutiérrez Flores resulted from the attempt to evict similar tenants. The judge in Zafra ruled in favor of the tenants, but Gutiérrez Flores appealed to the regional court in Cáceres.

Franco himself was informed of the cases by the mayor of Santos de Maimona in December of 1945, and, as a result, the evictions of all tenants who cultivated orchards were halted.⁹¹ Eventually the case, as well as all other pending disputes over olive, vine or orchard contracts in Spain, was dissolved and then regulated by a new law of December 1946 that continued to protect those special tenants but allowed for the recalculation of rents based on the productivity of the farm and normal rent prices in the locality.⁹² The passing of this law caused the case for eviction to be definitively thrown out, and the tenants were able to keep their land, but rents were raised. Two other farms in the Santos de Maimona area followed the same pattern as Doña Juana. The same judge in Zafra heard identical cases about the farms Malpunta and Valle del Mudo and, based on reports by the Chief Agricultural Engineer of the Agronomic Service of

baldíos y los colonos que efectuaron en ellos plantaciones asociadas de vides y olivos,” May 1948, AHCEA.

⁹¹ “Decreto-Ley de 28 de junio de 1946 por el que se suspende la tramitación de los juicios de desahucio de fincas rústicas dedicadas a plantaciones mixtas de viña y olivar u otras especies arbóreas,” *BOE*, July 3, 1946.

⁹² “Ley de diciembre de 1946 por la que se dictan normas para los contratos de cesión del suelo para plantaciones mixtas de viña y olivar u otras especies arbóreas,” *BOE*, December 20, 1946.

Badajoz, set new rents, which varied between 750-1000 pesetas per hectare. The rents had previously been placed at 77-124 pesetas per hectare during the Civil War so this was a significant increase, even if it matched inflation. The tenants from the three farms were unhappy with the ruling and appealed to the court at Cáceres, which lowered the rent to 879 pesetas per hectare. Still discontented, the renters appealed to the Spanish Supreme Court, which denied them a hearing.

To determine if INC local colonization in case the series of laws were not enough to protect tenants, the agricultural engineer Manuel García Oteyza of the INC (the future chief engineer of the Guadiana Delegation) carried out an intensive study of all three farms – Valle del Mudo owned by Dolores Rico Duran with 36 tenants; Malpunta owned by Carmen Carvajal y Gragera with 7 tenants; and Doña Juana owned by José Maria Gutiérrez Flores with 11 tenants.⁹³ All of the tenants on these properties were poor and many depended on help from state institutions. Only one, Juan Gordillo Gordillo, would have had enough means to live on without the plot. The 53 total tenants clearly could not pay the new rent according to the INC's report of 1948.⁹⁴ In the town, 35 other farms faced a similar problem with 217 total tenants – only seven had resolved their contract conflicts through mutual accords to either keep contracts until the death of tenants or by giving tenants access to property. The other 28 farms were charging more manageable rents than the three farms that had sought to go to court (and had not aimed to evict their tenants, indicating that the *arrendamiento* laws of the regime had some effect), but the

⁹³ García Oteyza, "Estudio del problema social que puede tener planteado el pueblo de los Santos de Maimona," AHCEA.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

INC predicted that they would soon raise rents once they became aware of the ruling of the court in Cáceres.

The first step in the study was a general description of the town. It was decently sized for the rural towns of the region with a population of 8,711 and 4,601 farms. As opposed to other towns, it had only three farms with over 100 hectares totaling 639, or just 60% of total land under cultivation. 1,331 people owned property; olives and wine competed with cereals for most of the crop space. García Oteyza noted the large number of landowners: “Santos de Maimona is one of the towns in the province where property is most widely distributed.”⁹⁵ It also had not had much of an unemployment problem in the past. For García Oteyza, the town represented an “almost complete” equilibrium with its only slight seasonal unemployment problem. García Oteyza warned that the decisions of the judges in Cáceres had damaged the cause of the “modest workers” from Santos de Maimona and would upset this ideal rural order.

In order to maintain the town’s equilibrium, which meant limiting unemployment, in the face of a large increase in rent, there were three possible solutions according to García Oteyza: expropriate the three farms directly affected by the rent raises, expropriate all farms where renters had installed their own vines (the expropriation of 344 hectares), or expropriate all 34 farms where no new agreement had been reached between tenants and landowners since the passing of the laws that had allowed for rent raises (the expropriation of 455 hectares). The chief engineer of the Guadiana delegation of the INC provided his own commentary on Garcia Oteyza’s report before sending it in to the INC

⁹⁵ “El término de Los Santos de Maimona es uno de los de la provincia de Badajoz en que más repartida se encuentra la propiedad, con valores muy distantes de la media provincial, en la que superficie ocupada por fincas mayores de 100 Has. representa un 60.5%.” Santos de Maimona had only 3 farms larger than 100 hectares. Ibid.

headquarters in Madrid, as per standard procedure. He made a key part of his report that the original disagreements between landlords and tenants had emerged out of the ceding of previously unfavorable land to tenants who had then improved the land by planting olives and vines. The *arrendamiento* law of 1946 had changed the tenants' contracts, which were nominally *aparcería* contracts (ones that granted substantial control over the land and guaranteed a long duration) into *arrendamiento* contracts that raised the land's value on the market. This implied that the owner hoped to sell or re-rent the farm rather than cultivating it himself. The chief engineer reinforced García Oteyza's report by affirming that the social problem in the area was not "circumstantial" since the adjustment of rents could impact up to 270 families (53 tenants from the first three farms and the other 217 from the 28 other farms with no new agreement). Moreover, there was no hope of these colonists finding a place on other farms in the region since the three nearby farms over 100 hectares were "pasture and labor" *dehesas* instead of vineyards with no new land to be put under cultivation. He repeated Oteyza's three proposals for varying amounts of expropriation.

In May 1949, eight years after the original lawsuit was filed, the INC expropriated the three original farms: Doña Juana, Malpunta and the Valle del Mudo.⁹⁶ For Doña Juana and Valle del Mudo, the parts of those farms under cultivation from tenants were expropriated while the rest of the farm was left in the owners' hands. At Doña Juana, 9 hectares were taken out of 12, at Valle del Mudo, 27 of 29. Malpunta was a different

⁹⁶ "Decreto de 20 de mayo de 1949 por el que se declara de interés social la expropiación por el Instituto Nacional de Colonización de la finca 'Doña Juana,'" "Decreto de 20 de mayo de 1949 por el que se declara de interés social la expropiación por el Instituto Nacional de Colonización de la finca 'Valle del Mudo'" and "Decreto de 20 de mayo de 1949 por el que se declara de interés social la expropiación por el Instituto Nacional de Colonización de la finca 'Malpuntas,'" *BOE*, June 17, 1949.

case. Carmen Carvajal, the owner, had chosen to have the entire farm confiscated by calling on an article of the 1946 expropriation law, which allowed owners who had had part of their farms targeted for expropriation to give up (and be paid for) the entire farm.⁹⁷ The formal occupation took place in November 1949 starting at 10:30 in the morning.⁹⁸ In all, the INC had expropriated 65 hectares – a significant amount but by no means enough to transform a village’s property structure.

The overall shape of the case provides an interesting view on how the INC enacted its commitment to small farmers caught in local disagreements. Both García Oteyza and the chief engineer of the Guadiana delegation clearly hoped to protect the tenants, but the overall actions that the government took, expropriating land from only 3 farms out of 34 considered, speaks to the INC’s commitment to push other landowners into treating their tenants fairly by setting an example rather than taking matters into its own hands. On the other hand, the regime acted determinedly in these three cases, expropriating one entire farm and the large majority (leaving owners only two hectares each) of the other two. Perhaps the three expropriations had a strong impact on the other landowners of the region, pushing them to compromise with their tenants, as was hoped by the head of the delegation. Overall, these actions confirm that the INC cared primarily to maintain, or restore, a sense of order in the areas where it intervened. Injustice or malfeasance did not motivate it to act, rather the possibility of an orderly situation devolving into chaos. These tenants were all “good workers” and “honest and humble” peasants of good political-social character. The INC, along with government legislation,

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ “Señalando fecha y horas en que se procederá al levantamiento de las actas previas de ocupación del as fincas ‘Malpuntas,’ ‘Valle del Mudo,’ y ‘Doña Juana,’ *BOE*, October 21, 1949.

aimed at the stabilization of villages, while keeping a strong hierarchical structure in the countryside. More importantly, these tenants had improved the land themselves through the planting of vines, confirming the ideology of INC and government that private initiative, when given a stake in the outcome, would naturally begin productive changes, and in the larger perspective, defend the nation under reconstruction.

2.5. Conclusion

In the previous chapter, I argued that Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco advocated a vision of landscape that demanded modernization through state intervention. A productive landscape civilized its inhabitants and strengthened the nation. It had to be organized and divided according to the dictates of topography and climate. For Hernández-Pacheco, moreover, agriculture had to be relied on especially to strengthen the nation in a spiritual sense. Labor that was unique to a natural landscape forged a strong connection between laborers and a region. In Hernández-Pacheco's conception of the spiritual and topographic unity of Spain, the relationship to a unique region (or of an exemplary landscape as made possible by visiting one of the national parks he administered) bound you to the greater Spanish nation.

Beginning with the Civil War, Franco's regime, particularly the INC, seized on the rhetoric of irrigation-fueled land reform, and the social value of working the land, to claim its own policies as much more economically sensible than those of the left-wing governments of the Second Republic. Franco's officials did not deny the existence of a social question, but lamented the haste and the socialist nature of the land reform carried out by the Second Republic. They proposed the "technical" version of land reform instead, aimed at increasing production in the countryside instead of dividing property in

a more just fashion. Employing the words of the founder of the Falange, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, this version of land reform was hailed as the only truly “revolutionary” one. The result in the 1940s was actually little irrigation even though hydraulic projects had begun. The INC did not have the means, or perhaps the will (given Zorrilla Dorronsoro’s argument that large projects had to wait until the nation had reached a point of political maturity) to carry out large settlement projects. But it did act to expropriate farms that contributed to dangerous social destabilization. The INC along with the regime’s tenancy laws ensured a limited degree of protection to those tenants who did not threaten social cohesion. Preferably, they protected veterans of the Nationalist cause, long-term tenants and tenants who proved responsible (such as the tenants of the Santos de Maimona farms who had installed vines and olives). The *arrendamiento* laws deliberately excluded tenants with a Republican past and the INC did not allow anyone with a Leftist past to work for it. Whether this makes for “agrarian fascism” or not depends on if the term implies that these measures had a strictly repressive purpose. The tenancy laws and the petitions and expropriations of the INC demonstrate that landlords could definitely be attacked by the regime in its quest to maintain social and political stability in the countryside.

Zorrilla Dorronsoro’s political and moral modernization plans sparked the imagination of local authorities and even concerned citizens. On the last day of 1943 Manuela Gómez y Gallardo, a novelist born into a privileged family, began a correspondence with the Guadiana section of the *Instituto Nacional de Colonización*.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ The INC was Franco’s answer to the land reform of the Second Republic, which continued on during the Civil War years. Created in 1939, the INC was meant to redistribute land by settling poor colonists on unused land. However, it had few actual powers until the second half of the 1940s, when several laws were

She had grand plans of opening a school for the education of women in Badajoz but required assistance with funding.¹⁰⁰ Gomez had already purchased a building and brought in nuns from Lichtenstein to teach women of all classes how to perform agricultural tasks. She herself had attended boarding school at a convent in Germany, and understood better education as one of the cornerstones of the more advanced economies of Holland, Germany and the United States. Extremadura was chosen as the location for the school not just because it was her home region, but because “I see in it the foundations of Spain, a privileged land whose economic possibilities are enormous, whose inhabitants have a great capacity for work, physical and intellectual.”¹⁰¹ Extremadura, for her, was the epicenter of Spain’s great accomplishments during the time of the Romans and the colonization of the New World. She understood Extremadurans as the heart of an essential Spanishness –honorable and communal – as the Regenerationists had.

Gómez’s plan was to facilitate the emergence of Extremadura’s hidden “talent” and “treasures” by teaching its inhabitants to work and love the land. In the same way that the Regenerationists called for a strengthening of the domestic economy, she hoped to contribute to “the rural resurgence of Extremadura and convince its people so that the land can be industrialized and bring profit like any other business.”¹⁰² The impetus for the industrialization needed to truly lift the region out of poverty and aid Spain in

passed giving it the ability to expropriate land. See Carlos Barciela López and Joaquín Melgarejo Moreno, *El agua en la historia de España*, (San Vicente del Raspeig: Universidad de Alicante, 2000).

¹⁰⁰ María Gómez Gallardo to Ingeniero Jefe, Delegacion de Gadiana, 31 December 1943, AHCEA.

¹⁰¹ “Veo en ella la reserva de España; tierra privilegiada, cuyas posibilidades económicas son enormes, cuyos habitantes tienen una gran capacidad de trabajo, intelectual y material.” Ibid.

¹⁰² “Al resurgimiento campero de Extremadura y convencer a las gentes que el campo puede industrializarse y rendir como cualquier otro negocio.” Ibid.

achieving parity with more advanced economies would come from the education of the rural masses. Giving the inhabitants of the land a sense of its productive capacities and teaching them improved techniques for the exploitation of the landscape would boost morale and morals—”here neither the spirit nor the land is cultivated adequately” stated Gómez.¹⁰³ The school would create a workforce loyal to the new state and its attendant industrialization and re-organization of the countryside.

Many of Gomez’s goals matched the rhetoric of Zorrilla. To arrive at industrialization, an increase in rural production was needed which would be accomplished by intervention and oversight from the state. More importantly, industrialization was more than an economic enterprise – peasants had to be prepared morally to deal with its affects. But in the end, the INC did not act upon Gomez’s proposals. The reason why remains unclear; the responses to her are not recorded in the INC archives. Maybe she demanded too much involvement for herself or maybe the INC was unwilling to take on a project aimed solely at women. Considering her demands in the light of the regime’s early rural initiatives, it seems likely that she misunderstood its objectives. Where she believed in a Regenerationist-inspired resurrection of the countryside through education (no matter how conservative) and state assistance, the regime cared much more for questions of immediate security. Only the right tenants might be protected from the ruthlessness of landlords using the tools provided by landscape management.

¹⁰³ “Aquí no se cultivan adecuadamente ni el espíritu ni la tierra.” Ibid.

Chapter 3 – Unemployment, *Yunteros* and the Nature of Badajoz's Social Problem

3.1. Introduction

During the Civil War, the city of Badajoz was the site of one of the most infamous Nationalist atrocities, where between 2,000-4,000 Republican fighters, sympathizers and bystanders were executed by the troops of General Yagüe.¹ As seen previously, it was the site of some of the most intense conflict over the pace of the Republic's land reform, with many peasants forcing the Popular Front government's hand on land reform law by forcibly occupying farms on March 25, 1936.² Eventually the Extremaduran front of the war settled in the sparsely populated eastern half of the province between Cabeza del Buey and Castuera (where the Nationalists had a concentration camp).³ Following the Civil War, one of Franco's goals was to revive the impoverished province through the construction of the Cijara reservoir and eliminate the conditions that he blamed for the political radicalism of the area. The Montijo area in the Vegas Bajas was among the first areas of Spain to be declared of high national interest, which meant it would receive privileged attention from the state, especially the National Institute of Colonization and the *Colonias Penitenciarias Militarizadas*, the organization that managed prison labor (mostly of former Republican soldiers).⁴

Before the INC could take action in a town it had to perform a study to determine the possibilities for improvement through landscape transformation. In Chapter 2, we

¹ Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust* (London: Harper Collins, 2008), 321.

² Rosique Navarro, *Reforma agraria en Badajoz*, 304.

³ Hinojosa, *Tropas en un frente olvidado*, 554.

⁴ "Decreto por el que se declaran urgentes las obras del Canal por la margen derecha de la Vega de Montijo y estableciendo las condiciones del convenio para la realización de estas obras entre la Dirección de Obras y Servicios del Cijara y el Servicio de Colonias Penitenciarias Militarizadas," *BOE*, December 23, 1940 and *Plan General de Obras Públicas* (Madrid: Talleres Penitenciarios Alcalá, 1940).

saw the INC allaying the eviction of tenants in the town of Santos de Maimona, but during the second half of the 1940s the INC would pursue a much more systematic study of the Badajoz province that accompanied two laws that increased the INC's scope for action in carrying out expropriation. In preparation for the colonization of large tracts of expropriated land, the INC performed social studies of towns that were nominated by a provincial Junta of Economic and Social Organization (Junta de Ordenación Económico-Social), made up of local notables. The INC sought to determine how large of a population each town could support with close to full employment and how much excess population would have to be settled in the INC's new projects. Because of the laws, before the INC could take action in a town, the town had to be declared to possess an ineffable "social problem," which grew from the feelings of anger and disaffection caused by large permanent or seasonal unemployment, especially the unemployment of *yunteros*. The INC also ranked the depth of towns' social problems to determine its order of action. Agricultural engineers were sent to collect information on the towns' demographic, cultural, geographic and economic situations, combining this information with that available in state, provincial and municipal archives.

Economic growth and social change would come from the INC's technical intervention, bolstered by the belief that the natural resources of the province were not adequately exploited. The "social problem" had to be met through the restructuring of rural life around the "intensification" of agriculture, achieved by irrigation. However, the technical framing of the problem did not mean that these studies were devoid of a particular political agenda. There was an anxiety shared by local elites and the technical officials who helped to shape and lobby for the plan about the political consequences

unemployment. To cure the disaffection, the immediate improvement of the province's economy was needed, but so was a distinct type of population.

From the studies an ideal rural landscape envisioned by the INC emerges: where ownership and cultivation of the land would unite the populace and lead to socially tightknit communities. The INC used this ideal community as a template to restructure towns and villages, believing that adjusting the inequality of land-ownership, jump-starting agriculture through the division of property and irrigation, and constructing hydraulic projects, would mitigate class-based discontent and halt emigration. Through state intervention, the regime sought to create the physical and economic circumstances for a conservative social harmony. The key to this harmony was the figure of the *yuntero*, the radical ploughmen of the Second Republic and the Civil War. The regime focused on *yunteros* since they had led unrest in the past, but also because they were understood as morally superior to *braceros*; their ownership of at least a plough made clear their economic responsibility. The INC sought solutions to keep them in the countryside while worrying much less for the rest of the peasant population.

3.2. Increased Scope for Action

3.2.1. Two Laws

Two laws established the context for interactions between state, provincial and municipal officials during the second half of the 1940s: the 1946 law of expropriation of rural farms, with proper repayment after the declaration of social interest⁵ and the 1949

⁵ “Ley de 27 de abril de 1946 sobre expropiación forzosa de fincas rústicas, con la debida indemnización, previa declaración de interés social,” *BOE*, April 28, 1946.

law of colonization and distribution of property in irrigable zones.⁶ These laws created a process by which land could be expropriated and divided up in leased plots among colonists, who were most often meant to be farmers from nearby towns or even from the expropriated farms themselves.

The 1946 law was built on a series of laws and decrees that began to be passed during the Civil War. These laws aimed at the redefinition and physical reconstruction of the Spanish Nation. The preamble to the law alluded to the *Fuero del Trabajo*⁷ (based on Mussolini's *Carta del Lavoro*) and the *Fuero de los Españoles*,⁸ two of the fundamental laws of Franco's state. The first made clear that individual wealth and property, and the national economy, had to serve the Spanish people, whose interest would of course be determined by the Francoist state. The second, a catalogue of Spanish rights and duties inspired by Italian fascism, explicitly protected property but gave the state the ability to expropriate for "social interest" (with proper payment). Each law subordinated particular interests to the national interests. The new 1946 law was meant to specify criteria for social interest further to set expropriation in motion. The countryside was the prime: "if the concept of the social has to be applied in the life of the nation, there is no room for doubt that it is precisely in the area of the Spanish countryside where it is most justified and needs to be most applied, facilitating the resolution of its old social problems."⁹

⁶ "Ley de 21 de abril de 1949 sobre colonización y distribución de la propiedad de las zonas regables," *BOE*, April 22, 1949.

⁷ *BOE*, "Ley de 27 de abril de 1946."

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ "Si el concepto de lo social ha de tener aplicación plena en la vida nacional, no cabe duda que es precisamente en al área del campo español donde ha de encontrar su máxima justificación y aplicación, facilitando la resolución de sus viejos problemas sociales." *Ibid.*

The solution to the problems in the Spanish countryside would not be anything close to the agrarian reform laws of the Second Republic. Rather, “this law does not attempt to undertake the numerous aspects of a deep agrarian reform and only constitutes an efficient and quick juridical instrument meant to – within the economic means made available by the public authority for this end – solve the social problems in the countryside through the expropriation of rural farms.”¹⁰ Class hierarchy would not be threatened; its object was “the division or colonization of lands, resolving social problems through the creation of new owners or colonists.”¹¹ Increasing land ownership, rather than transforming class relations or the nature of cultivation in the countryside, would presumably help to create a conservative peasantry with allegiance to the state.

The law sought to empower the INC to act through expropriation in the face of resistance from landowners. In order for the INC to expropriate a farm, the farm had to be declared of social interest. For this to happen, the INC would have to perform a social study of the locality where the farm was located. If the social problem in the locality was determined to be urgent (and not circumstantial), and the expropriation of a farm was seen as a viable solution, then it could be passed up to the Director General of the INC and then onto the minister of agriculture himself. Once “social interest” was declared, the expropriation had to be advertised in the *Boletín Oficial de la Provincia*. The owners would have eight days to respond with official legal protests, which would be looked over by the Council of Ministers. The declaration of social interest gave the INC the

¹⁰ “No se pretende con esta Ley abordar los numerosos aspectos de una honda reforma agraria y si solo constituir un instrumento jurídico rápido y eficaz para lograr—dentro de las disponibilidades económicas que Poder publico destina a estos fines—la solución de problemas sociales en el campo, mediante la expropiación forzosa de fincas rusticas.” Ibid.

¹¹ “Al objeto de su parcelación o colonización, y resolución, con ello de los problemas sociales mediante la creación de nuevos propietarios o colonos.” Ibid.

ability to begin the awkward process of expropriation quickly. If the occupation of the farm was truly urgent, the government could choose to expropriate immediately with no protest possible. In most cases, two agricultural engineers would determine the just price of the farm, one named by the owner and the other by the INC. If the two did not come to an agreement, the case went to local court, where a judge would appoint a third engineer to survey the property. The INC would then determine the price based on the three reports.

The farms to be especially targeted were those that had been neglected by their owners, particularly in terms of irrigation. If they were located near a state irrigation project, and had not begun to irrigate their farms within four years of its completion, they were prime targets. Farms were to be exempted from expropriation if they were cultivated directly by the owners (not absentee landlords) or if their cultivation was deemed “exemplary” by the Ministry of Agriculture. Although the law appeared to give the INC great powers to carry out expropriation projects, it was hindered in a number of important ways. The need for the Council of Ministers to approve projects meant that no expropriation could be carried out without its express approval. The INC was held hostage by the valuations of surveyors. But most importantly, the law almost encouraged landowners to legally challenge expropriation. Cases could be brought to a section of the Supreme Court based on claims of misevaluation, any mistake in carrying out the official process that left the landowner without defense, or misuse of jurisdiction. There was no penalty or risk for protest.

A new law in 1949 concerning the colonization of large zones immediately recognized the slow pace of expropriation. It began with a harsh admission: “reality has

demonstrated that colonization has been happening at a much slower rhythm than is needed to attend to the necessities of a growing population, and also that private initiative and effort are not enough by themselves to reach the desired goal,”¹² which was to install the largest number of colonists possible, harmonizing this objective with the interests of private property, and the achievement of maximum agricultural production.”¹³

The urgency of tone, and the emphasis on new priorities, was backed up by an increase in the power and duties of the INC as well as increased pressure on landlords. With the new law, small-scale expropriations, such as that of the three farms in Santos de Maimona from Chapter 2, were given less priority. Expropriation would now take place as part of large colonization projects. A finished area plan had to blueprint new towns, be subdivided into sectors (none larger than 2,000 hectares), classify different land types and evaluate the value of each, and have a program for the intensification of agriculture through irrigation and more efficient land-use. These projects could only take place alongside irrigation works, which would serve “individual, familial and social ends.” Immediately after a plan was passed, a mixed commission, consisting of officials from all of the required government institutions, would create a pre-plan for action. Tenants and sharecroppers on the lands expropriated were given priority for medium-sized plots over colonists from other municipalities. The INC was now given specific authority to buy and sell land, control local irrigation, expropriate machinery and other supplies on

¹² “La realidad ha puesto de manifiesto que la colonización se viene realizando a un ritmo mucho más lento del preciso para atender las necesidades de una población que crece de año en año, y que el esfuerzo y la iniciativa privada no son suficientes por si solas al fin perseguido.” *BOE*, “Ley de 21 de abril de 1949.”

¹³ “En todo caso será primordialmente tenida en cuenta la necesidad de instalar el mayor número posible de colonos, armonizando la consecución de este objetivo con los legítimos intereses de la propiedad privada y con el logro del máximo rendimiento de la producción Agrícola.” *Ibid.*

expropriated lands and given the ability to prosecute colonists who were unable to repay initial loans.

The 1949 law also set up a new system of “reservists.” Some excess lands would be granted back to their original owners after irrigation had taken place. These landowners, who had to present an application, would have five years to completely repay the original costs of the irrigation projects on their land. They could only repossess their land if they had followed the dictates of the INC during the interim period and reached the minimum level of agricultural exploitation set forth in the Plan. It became much more difficult for landlords to dispute expropriation. In this case, three engineers, all from different government agencies and with proper qualifications would check all the valuations from the plan before passing it to the minister of agriculture. The only two legal means to halt expropriation were the existence of a substantial crime in the proceedings or else the improper classification of land. If the landowner chose to dispute the classification, he or she would now have to put up 1/6 of the farm’s total value as collateral.

The 1949 law strengthened the provisions of the 1946 law. While the 1946 law still assumed cooperation by landowners, and sought to work on a farm-by-farm basis, the 1949 law did the opposite. It forced cooperation by landowners and was designed to encourage INC action on much larger projects that subsumed multiple farms, which could either be divided amongst colonists or returned to reservists. Both laws sought to pursue projects that would have an impact on provincial economies. The 1949 law, with its emphasis on larger projects and increased agricultural efficiency, called for “firm action by the institution taking responsibility for the profound transformation of lands, so

that the works, more than indirectly, benefit the community whose sacrifices were required.”¹⁴ The transformation of the landscape, from dry *secano* land to fertile, irrigated land, had to be accompanied by sharecroppers and tenants turning into small-scale property owners.

3.2.2. Junta de Ordenación Económico-Social

A decree in January of 1946, created the national secretariat of *ordenación económico-social* to assist the regime in coordinating the “reconstruction and resurgence and stimulus of the national wealth.”¹⁵ The secretariat’s job was to oversee “the programs of each province and assure vigilance over their execution in the time frame established by their studies.”¹⁶ The secretariat oversaw a number of provincial studies, which were then meant to lead to provincial development plans such as the Plan Badajoz. The result was a series of published studies in 1951, as well as the formation of provincial Juntas de Ordenación Económico-Social. Part of the process of creating the Plan Badajoz involved the gathering of information from across the province to determine the locations, and priority, of INC studies. The information collected, as well as the proposals and studies of the Junta itself (which reflected the interests of landlords more than tenants in its recommendations) capture the concern that local administrations had for the political consequences of the plight of *yunteros*.

¹⁴ “Decidida actuación del Organismo que asume la responsabilidad de la tarea conducente a la profunda transformación de los terrenos, para que reviertan en beneficio, no solo indirecto, de la comunidad los notables sacrificios que dichas ingentes obras han exigido y exigen de todos los contribuyentes.” Ibid.

¹⁵ “Reconstrucción y de resurgimiento y fomento de la riqueza nacional, y en ejecución también planes parciales de reforma social.” “Decreto de 21 de enero de 1946 por el que se crea la Secretaría General para la Ordenación económico-social y se fijan sus atribuciones.” *BOE*, January 24, 1946.

¹⁶ “Coordinando los de las distintas provincias y asegurando la vigilancia de su ejecución en los plazos que como consecuencia de su estudio se establezcan proponer el orden de prioridad de las obras a realizar previo estudio de las interdependencias entre las de distintas provincias.” Ibid.

The *Junta de Ordenacion Económico-Social* of Badajoz was composed of a handful of voting members. It served as a powerful lobbying group to entities that were represented on the Junta: the provincial government, municipal governments and the INC. The large Junta was divided up into different commissions, with one president and three or four voting members. These commissions – for such topics as “Agriculture and Livestock” and “Industrialization” – wrote research reports and presented them to the entire Junta during meetings.¹⁷ Members lobbied the INC especially hard for action, since for them the INC had the best resources for solving the social problem.¹⁸

The more ambitious of the Junta’s proposals were focused on the immediate reorganization of the countryside. Ricardo Carapeto Burgos, agricultural engineer and future mayor of Badajoz, authored two reports: “The Study of Methods to Reduce Unemployment and Redeploy Agricultural Workers” and a report on the current situation of sharecropping contracts.¹⁹ Both of these studies called for measures that capture anxiety of landlords as well as the nature of the regime’s plans for the province. For Carapeto, there was no way to eradicate unemployment without ridding the countryside of workers through industrialization (a similar sentiment to the officials responsible for an ostensible change in INC policy in the 1950s). But there were possibilities of getting rid of unemployment in irrigated zones, and individual actions of the INC could mitigate poverty and unemployment on *secano* lands. By increasing the amount of land under cultivation there was a prospect of “reducing unemployment to small enough numbers to

¹⁷ Mariano Dominguez García, “Acta,” March 1950, ADPBA.

¹⁸ As opposed to forcing landlords to increase cultivation by drawing on the cultivation intensification decrees.

¹⁹ Ricardo Carapeto Burgos, “Estudio realizado sobre forma de aminorar el paro y aprovechamiento de la desocupación del obrero agrícola,” 30 June 1950, ADPBA.

rid our province of the reputation that weighs on it and to rid our government of the constant preoccupation with its solution.”²⁰

The oncoming industrialization of the province would be the real solution to its economic woes, but would not take care of the social problem in the same way that agriculture could: “it is enough to consider the state of laborers in actual and future factories to comprehend this.”²¹ Carapeto feared factory labor, as much as unemployment in the countryside, as a source of political deviance. Factory work provided for material needs, not the social and moral needs that agriculture did. “We understand from a point of view, first social and then economic, it is advisable and necessary to achieve an increase, perfection and organization (“*tipificación*”) of agricultural production, in a socially and economically just form, guaranteeing markets and prices for this agricultural production.”²² For the social cohesion, if not the economic growth of the province, it was necessary to boost agricultural production. Carapeto, along with the Franco regime, understood this task as much more than an economic one. The reorganization of the countryside had to serve the political end of guaranteeing a politically desirable populace.

The most important step for Carapeto Burgos was “rationalizing” the countryside by limiting small-scale cultivation and placing peasants on large tracts devoted to individual crops.²³ The land in the hands of smallholders was being cultivated to its utmost; it had nothing else to offer. *Dehesas*, on the other hand, were still a mixture of

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ “El desarrollo (sic) industrial tiene una finalidad más de orden económico que social, bastando considerar la ocupación de mano de obra en las industrias actuales y futuras, para comprender esta razón.” Ibid.

²² “Entendemos que desde un punto de vista, primero social y posteriormente económico, es aconsejable y necesario lograr un aumento, perfección y tipificación de la producción agraria, en forma económico y socialmente justa, garantizando mercados y precios a esta producción agraria.” Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

cultivated land and inefficient, antique open space. Only the INC could remedy the situation by creating large and small irrigated properties in the proper balance. His desire was for Badajoz to look like the prosperous, industrialized Basque Country whose large and small industries absorbed a good deal of labor. The first step was better management of the population: “the fixing and concentration of workers in small towns would facilitate broad collective labor.”²⁴

The Junta’s study of sharecropping (*aparcería*) is another window into the purposes of the Junta and the INC in the province. The report’s authors clearly identified the problems of sharecroppers: their contracts were not regulated and they had little to no bargaining power with landlords over the terms or enforcement of their contracts.²⁵ There were three solutions to their difficulties: sending sharecroppers out of the countryside to more profitable industries, extending the total sharecropped area, or regulating the sharecropping contract by turning it into an *arrendamiento* (rental) contract as the regime’s tenancy laws did. The Junta saw the first option as the most ideal although it understood that it was difficult to enact in the short-term aside from employing laborers on irrigation projects. Transforming *aparcería* contracts into *arrendamiento* contracts was the most ineffective of the options for Carapeto. The conversion of the tenant-landlord relationship to one of cash payment irked the Junta, and it disdained how it would break up the countryside’s organic harmony. The second

²⁴ “En nuestra provincial, la fijeza y concentración de los obreros en los pueblos, facilitaría un trabajo colectivo amplio.” Ibid.

²⁵ “Podemos decir que el problema puede concretarse en la siguiente forma: Existe una intranquilidad manifiesta en los colonos y un temor al desahucio de las tierras que llevan en *aparcería*. Este temor se funda en la dificultad para asentarse en otras tierras, ya que lógicamente esto no sucedería en un saludable mercado contractual, en que convendría fácilmente un nuevo contrato con otro propietario para explotar su tierra en *aparcería*.” Francisco Corral Acero, Ricardo Carapeto Burgos, Julio Cienfuegos Linares and Francisco López Santamaría, “Situación actual de los contratos de *aparcería* en la provincia de Badajoz. Sus modalidades y regulación económica, y jurídica de la misma,” 11 September 1950, AHCEA.

option, the intensification of agriculture through irrigation, could prove a boon to sharecropping, supporting a larger number of sharecroppers. Landlords could even be compelled lease out large tracts of land for sharecropping by new intensification plans that would be enforced by INC.

Sharecropping principally appealed to the Junta because it was a labor of “mutual collaboration and effort to achieve a harvest that would be optimal.”²⁶ Each party was equally responsible for the harvest, and the division of profits could not be determined beforehand, as in a lease contract. A landlord was much less interested in the activity of someone who rented the land on a short-term basis. The two did not work together; the landlord stayed in the distance and was happy with his rent payment. The laborer would try to make maximum use of the plot, while owners discouraged this, fearing that the sharecropper would exhaust the soil and ruin the value of the land. Although these conflicting interests were somewhat mitigated by the government’s supervision of rental contracts, a system of *arrendamiento* would be “incapable of ensuring a minimal harvest for the national economy if the elements who should be collaborating have no interest in increasing production due to the distrust towards their counterparts.”²⁷ Another solution pondered by the Junta was the return to the feudal actions of the Catholic Monarchs who parceled out land to colonists with the hope of repopulating the south of Spain after the conquest of the Muslim kingdoms. Large landowners such as religious communities would offer effective ownership of land to those willing to farm it while retaining the

²⁶ “Una colaboración y esfuerzo mutuo entre ambas partes para el logro de una cosecha que se procura por los dos sea optima.” Ibid.

²⁷ “Incapaz asimismo de asegurar para la economía nacional una congrua cosecha si los elementos que a ella deben colaborar no participan del interés para conseguirla por el recelo hacia la otra parte.” Ibid.

land within their territory. Even the conservative Junta deemed this a reactionary and unworkable policy.

The report concluded that the exploitation of new lands that would take place after state expropriation was the ideal solution. Forcing tenancy contracts on landlords, which would fix workers on the land, was not an “adequate solution” to the problem of rural unemployment and emigration. The division of the land by the INC guaranteed appropriate sized plots of land, without violating individual rights. Landowners would not be alienated as long as the market for sharecroppers was made “propitious, inviting and comfortable,” meaning favorable to landlords.²⁸ In order to solve the mistreatment of these sharecroppers, a code of the countryside would be created.

The Junta’s reports demonstrate that it favored landlords’ interests – the actions of the Franco regime in protecting tenants had alienated some regional elites. But it did fear unemployment – the advocacy for irrigation and the division of land under the INC was meant to meet this challenge – by providing jobs that also tied workers to specific localities. The Junta also hoped for a better environment for sharecropping to place tenants firmly under the power of landlords or the INC. The meditation upon the possibility of a feudal-like land ownership system is telling – the junta was willing to entertain the idea of fixing men to the land in order to make them both productive and bonded to the state.

3.2.3. The Correspondence of the Junta

The Junta’s responsibility to create a prioritized list of towns in need of INC social studies elicited a correspondence from the municipal authorities of the Badajoz

²⁸ “Propicio, cálido y cómodo.” Ibid.

province. Mayors, more likely to be sympathetic to the social ideals of the Falange than provincial officials, urgently sought action to cure the unemployment of *yunteros*.²⁹ The correspondence makes clear that there were a number of conflicts between landlords and tenants that placed local government in difficult positions. These officials often worked to help tenants to stay on their land, but did not have the power or the desire to upset larger landowners. Local officials or priests proved themselves to be able interpreters of the Junta's concern for political disaffection as the key to the social problem.

The mayor of Don Benito, the largest city in the province east of Mérida, wrote to inform the Junta of his town's problems in April of 1950. He lamented that: "the working classes live in disgust at the lack of economic opportunities to attend to their families' needs and little by little are losing their respect (proverbial in this city) for private property."³⁰ He noticed that there was a jump in the number of property crimes, and respect for local security forces was waning. At the same time as the lower classes were becoming more and more unruly, the upper classes were failing the regime through political indifference and corruption. The most powerful in the city did little to attend to the problem. Of more concern was the lack of integrity of those in charge of the town's section of forced labor.³¹ This institution was designed to guarantee a certain amount of cultivation that would provide work to *yunteros*. Don Benito's mayor saw that those in charge often used the labor for clearing their own lands.

²⁹ Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 465. Saz, "Mucho más que crisis políticas," 16.

³⁰ "Las clases obreras viven disgustadas por falta de medios económicos para atender las indispensables necesidades del hogar y poca a poco se va faltando el respeto (proverbial en esta Ciudad) a la propiedad." J. Domínguez, "Memorias de las necesidades sociales y económicas del pueblo de Herrera del Duque," 14 April 1950, AHCEA.

³¹ Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 158.

In Herrera del Duque things were even worse. The mayor here was not afraid to side with the town's working classes in considering the government's promises as empty. For him, the policies of recent governments had "all been promise and no reality."³² While the new government seemed to have more potential, it was following earlier failures. He urged immediate action to regain credibility with the townspeople. They needed to see was that the policies of Franco were more than "the diseased words of socialism"³³ that deluded the masses. Franco's regime had to prove the fitness of its social program as an alternative to socialism by taking action to provide work for these unemployed men in a remote town.

Flaviano Villares, the mayor of Casas de Don Pedro, a small town on the far north eastern edge of the province, used the language of the 1946 law of expropriation and its references to the *Fuero de los Españoles* to lobby for a solution to the landlessness of his local *yunteros*. Their attainment of property (not that of *braceros*) would mean that the regime's promise of harnessing the economy to solve the social question would have been achieved. Supposedly, "THREE HUNDRED AND TEN" *yunteros* came to the local office of the *Hermandad*, the state-led union for all Spaniards involved in agriculture, to ask for land each day.³⁴ In May 1950 Villares wrote to the *Junta*: "this is the problem that we have seriously before us, to find land in order to go about converting these humble *yunteros* into property owners, rapidly lessening their numbers until they've disappeared, which will be the day when Franco's word will have come true and the land

³² "Pues regímenes anteriores, los cuales se les iba la fuerza por la boca, por mítines y promesas vanas." Ibid.

³³ "Palabrerías vanas de tipos socialstoides." J. Dominguez, "Memorias de las necesidades," AHCEA.

³⁴ "Estos últimos *yunteros* en numero de TRESCIENTOS DIEZ." Flaviano Villares to Minister of Agriculture, 22 March 1950, AHCEA.

will be at the service of the Spanish people, and a step will be taken towards the subordination of the economy to politics.”³⁵ If this subordination of the economy to politics was achieved, “the strength of rural workers’ bonds to the institutions of the state will increase exponentially, creating another tool to achieve social tranquility and peace.”³⁶

Mayors were not the only ones who advocated for economic assistance. In September 1950, the priest of Mirandilla, Ángel González Mora Haba, appealed directly to the chief engineer of the INC for the Guadiana region.³⁷ The priest wrote to remind him of the four hundred *yunteros* from Mirandilla who had been waiting for several farms to be parceled out to them. There had been a conflict running since 1946, when a landlord had sought to evict the tenants on his land, unilaterally ending their contracts. The tenants refused to leave and continued to farm the land while the landlord fought back by bringing in livestock to ruin their fields.³⁸ After a first hearing and a favorable response from the INC to their request for expropriation of the farm, “there was only the deepest and most impenetrable silence.” The *yunteros* had been “defrauded of their hopes of improvement.”³⁹ This was a question of national interest to the priest, who threatened to write to Madrid if the problem could not be solved by the local INC office

³⁵ “Este es el problema que tenemos gravemente planteado conseguir tierras para ir convirtiendo en propietarios a esos humildes *yunteros* haciendo que su número descienda rápidamente hasta conseguir su desaparición, fecha en la que conforme a las palabras de Franco la tierra (sic) se habrá puesto al servicio del pueblo español y se habrá dado un paso a la subordinación de la economía a la política.” Ibid.

³⁶ “Se multiplicará en mayor grado la adhesión de los trabajadores campesinos a la[s] Instituciones del Estado creándose con ello otro puntal para el logro de la paz y la tranquilidad sociales.” Ibid.

³⁷ “En primer lugar me dispense ni alguna de las cosas que le indico le sirve de molestia. A mi, como sacerdote me mueve solamente el mayor bien de mis hijos feligreses.” Ángel González Mora Haba to Ingeniero Jefe, 4 September 1950, AHCEA.

³⁸ Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 187.

³⁹ “Ha quedado solo en el más profundo e impenetrable silencio y unos 400 hombres que con sus familias se presentan la mitad del pueblo, o más, se han quedado defraudados en la esperanza de mejora.” González Mora Haba to Ingeniero Jefe.

and further claimed that if any “egoism” was behind the lack of action, he hoped that God would “eliminate it for the social good” of all of society.⁴⁰ The Spanish social question had to be solved “town by town.” He went on: “These robbed men who have an aptitude for work and the largest desire to elevate their quality of lives, will be converted, without a doubt, into our worst enemy, into revolutionaries. And I believe they have good reasons [to do this].”⁴¹ Signing as a servant of Christ, he told the chief engineer that he trusted in his good will. Knowing perhaps that action on the part of the INC might offend local interests; the priest added, “God is the only one who can reward our disinterested efforts.”⁴² Here in a tone that perhaps only a priest could confidently use when writing to the INC, González Mora Haba demonstrated that the real fears of local authorities were not questions of production, but politics. These towns needed intervention from provincial authorities to boost employment so that their inhabitants would not drift into dangerous political doctrines.

The Junta feared the *yunteros* as well. In one section of the provincial Plan published in 1848, the Junta presented a “social history” of the province. It identified the present-day social problem as the existence of “*thirty-five thousand yunteros* who do not possess sufficient land.” They were accompanied by “*sixty-six thousand simple braceros* [italics in original].”⁴³ The simple braceros couldn’t be counted on to lift themselves out of poverty; they had to wait for the industrialization of the province. But the 35,000

⁴⁰ “Si hay en todo este asunto algún egoísmo de algún particular, por Dios elimínelo por el bien social del cual los más altos como los más responsables.” Ibid.

⁴¹ “Estos hombres defraudados por otra parte con la mejor aptitud de trabajo y el mejor deseo de elevarse en su nivel de vida, se convertirán, sin duda ninguna en el peor enemigo y en revolucionarios. Y creo que con razón.” Ibid.

⁴² “Confía en su buena voluntad. Dios, que es el único que puedo premiar nuestras esfuerzos desinteresados, so lo pagará.” Ibid.

⁴³ “De estos productores directamente activos existen *treinta y cinco mil yunteros* que no tienen tierra suficiente y *sesenta y siete mil simples braceros*.” *Historia Social*, 215.

yunteros, on the other hand, had “tools, ploughs and mules.” Their small plots of land didn’t “absorb all of their labor capacity.”⁴⁴ It was this class, as under-utilized as Extremadura’s water resources had been, that had “the strength, perseverance, responsibility and initiative” to leave poverty behind.⁴⁵ The ostensible confidence of the Junta, though, was belied by the urgency with which it lobbied for INC action, as well as the number of rural police in the province. Of 75 Hermandades, 72 had police stations, making Badajoz the most comprehensively covered province in all of Spain.

3.3. Two Social Studies: Campanario and Cabeza del Buey

Under pressure from the Junta, the INC agricultural engineers began social studies of a number of towns.⁴⁶ The social problem, which consisted of a politically dangerous level of unemployment, had to be proposed by an engineer and confirmed by the Guadiana Delegation of the INC as well as its headquarters in Madrid. In most cases, the engineers aimed to expropriate and reorganize, an adequate number of farms (instances of local colonization, now made easier by the passage of the 1946, and then 1949 laws), to guarantee employment for *yunteros*. Leftover unemployed *braceros* would be absorbed by the large irrigation projects, but as we will see in Chapter 4, these projects were just as selective as local colonization efforts. In both Cabeza del Buey and Campanario, two rural towns in the province, agricultural engineers were sent to collect information on demographic, cultural, geographic and economic situations, combining

⁴⁴ “Son aquellos que disponiendo de algunos elementos de trabajo, yuntas y aperos, cultivan una pequeña superficie de terreno cedido en aparcería por un año, pero que en general no les absorbe por complete toda su capacidad de trabajo.” Ibid., 193.

⁴⁵ “Esta importante clase social representa, pus, el esfuerzo, el tesón, el ahorro y la iniciativa necesaria para salir, por su propio esfuerzo, de la condición de simples braceros.” Ibid.

⁴⁶ Junta de Ordenación Económica-Social, “Actas,” 10 March, 1950 and 17 June 1950, AHCEA.

this information with that available in state, provincial and municipal archives.⁴⁷ Jacinto Terrón was sent to Cabeza del Buey in 1947, Jesús Castañón to Campanario in 1949. From the two reports, an ideal rural landscape envisioned by the INC emerges: where employing more *yunteros*, and helping them gain property ownership, would create politically stable communities. More than an attempt to reform land tenure seriously in the province, the INC used this ideal community as a template to restructure towns and villages, believing that adjusting the inequality of land-ownership, intensifying agriculture through the division of property and irrigation, and constructing hydraulic projects, would mitigate class-based discontent. The two studies reveal that in spite of the technical trappings of the surveys, the INC was more concerned with defusing the possibility of class or political strife than with sparking the rural communities' economies.

The first sign of the engineers' anxiety at the prospect of disintegrating rural communities was their analysis of the towns' demographic data. Both engineers began their studies by charting population decline and growth over the years from 1935 to 1946. Although these years were nothing short of disastrous demographically, covering the entire Civil War and the years of famine in the 1940s, each agricultural engineer underlines population decline as a structural problem. Campanario was decreasing by 163 inhabitants per year and Cabeza del Buey by 50 inhabitants per year, leaving them with total populations of 8,992 and 12,417 at the time of the studies.⁴⁸ However, the loss of inhabitants due to both emigration and death was not at all consistent. Cabeza del

⁴⁷ Jesús Castañón, "Estudio Social de Terminó del Campanario," June 1949, and Jacinto Terrón, "Estudio Social del Terminó de Cabeza de Buey," June 1947, ACMAPAMA.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

Buey actually increased in size except in 1939 and 1941, when mortality was high, and 1945, when emigration suddenly skyrocketed. Campanario's population loss was more consistent, but several years, particularly 1939 and 1945, saw much higher emigration and mortality. The irregularity was not addressed in either case; instead the engineers saw a problem that demanded INC action to solve. Castañón noted that Campanario's population was "decreasing abnormally...a fact which is alone significant as testimony to the precarious conditions of local life."⁴⁹ As the studies go on to prove, the poverty of the two areas cannot be doubted. However, the hastiness of their conclusions demonstrates that the fears aroused by emigration went beyond the sphere of economics. The INC was very interested in keeping at least a portion of the rural poor in place.

In spite of the irregularity of population decline and the number of potential causes for it, the loss was assigned to the weakness of the local economies, particularly to high levels of unemployment. And because the majority of working men in each town was employed in activities related to agriculture, the agricultural economy was scrutinized exclusively. The agricultural workers were divided up into those who owned property and cultivated it, those who owned property but also had to augment the income from their property by working as *braceros* or leasing other land, those who worked in agriculture and had mules or other means of production but little or no property (*yunteros*), those who had permanent jobs as agricultural workers, and those who held no property (*simples braceros*). Between 380 and 500 men were unemployed depending on the season in Campanario, leaving at least 30% of the male working population

⁴⁹ "Que la población que resulta anormalmente decreciente, tiende a disminuir a razón de 163 individuos/año, hecho que por sí solo resulta significativo, como índice de las precarias condiciones de vida locales." Castañón, "Estudio Social del Termino de Campanario."

unemployed at these times. Some *braceros* visited other towns for work, but their number is discarded as negligible. Cabeza del Buey and its surrounding villages (it had a more substantial outlying population than Campanario) found itself in a similar state. It was mired in even worse permanent unemployment than Campanario with 44% unemployed in the town and 60% in the town's outlying villages.⁵⁰ All of this unemployment resulted from an "excess of labor for the capacity of the local market," caused by the insufficient distribution of property.⁵¹ For the INC, work and property were directly linked; the key to fixing the unemployment problem would be to increase property ownership, which would naturally boost overall production (or at least agricultural cultivation at the expense of livestock-raising).

To move towards its ideal community of local property owners, the surveys investigated the exact divisions of land, and also the histories of property ownership. Castañón and Terrón were in search of large concentrations of land, which they believed to be inherently inefficient and inappropriate for fighting unemployment. Landownership was concentrated in both Campanario and Cabeza del Buey proper (excluding its surrounding cities). In Campanario, those who owned more than 100 hectares (about 250 acres) were in possession of 75% of all property. Those owners averaged 465 hectares; those who owned less than 100 hectares averaged 3.9 hectares.⁵² The story was the same in Cabeza del Buey where only the land directly to the south of the town was divided up into small parcels. The 94 owners who possessed more than 100 hectares between them totaled almost 40,000 hectares leaving less than 7,000 for the remaining 1,555 owners.

⁵⁰ Terrón, "Estudio Social del Termino del Cabeza del Buey."

⁵¹ "El problema del paro agrícola se plantea con una acusada importancia del paro permanente, que revela un exceso de la mano de obra sobre la capacidad de absorción local." Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

Terrón also made sure to compare the numbers of absentee landlords to local ones. Although residents of Cabeza del Buey owned most of the largest farms, Terrón was keen to investigate the role of these absentee landlords in reinforcing the “social problem” of the town. In the outlying towns, the land was much more equally spread due to the nine cooperative societies sharing more than half of the area’s acreage between 1,349 owners. The engineer was preoccupied that they might actually control too much of the land. Interestingly, unemployment was even higher in these areas where property ownership was more equally shared, but this was largely ignored.⁵³

The quality of life in the two towns varied widely, but similar construction plans were called for. The housing and living situation of Campanario was less acute than its problem of unemployment. It had a train station, electricity and telephone service. There were 2,140 houses, well constructed in Castañón’s view but with “poor circulation” for the total population of 8,992. Schools and healthcare were also well provided-for with 19 schools (10 for boys and 7 for girls), three doctors and a handful of pharmacies as well as a dispensary for vaccinations. On the other hand, “religious assistance” was lacking. There were only two priests for the entire population.⁵⁴ Cabeza del Buey was much less well off. Electricity was available everywhere, but water quality was poor. Although it had a larger population than Campanario, there were fewer homes, only 1,989 along with 131 other buildings.⁵⁵

The solutions to the social problem were to be a combination of actions by the INC: expropriation of large farms (especially if irrigable), construction of hydraulic

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Terrón, “Estudio Social del Terminó del Cabeza del Buey.”

projects and new towns in the Vegas Bajas (whose construction would hopefully provide a lot of jobs), and resettlement of eligible colonists. The farms targeted for forcible state purchase, following the Law of April 27, 1946, had to meet a number of criteria. Preferably they would be owned by absentee landlords, located on good quality soil, close to potential hydraulic works, large enough to divide up into many plots and be currently devoted to a mix of livestock-raising and agriculture. Castañón proposed the expropriation of two farms, La Hoya and Umbriazo, totaling 1,017 hectares between them in order to settle 150 of the town's 186 *yunteros*.⁵⁶ The farms united a series of characteristics that made them particularly attractive for expropriation. Their soil was of secondary quality (as opposed to tertiary, which was non-irrigable and infertile). The owner of La Hoya, a woman of the petty nobility, was absent from the property and therefore not a contributor to the town's community life. The owner's absenteeism was highlighted several times; she could never be found and was contacted through a watchman. Land was leased or rented out, and livestock, seen as less productive and less labor-intensive, were a large part of the operation. Irrigation and property division would bring the desired intensification of agriculture to both farms. Irrigation canals needed labor, the construction of houses needed labor, and most importantly of all, the farms were 12 km away from central Campanario, necessitating the construction of a new urban area to accommodate the soon-to-be dense population. Laborers who had formerly left the town for work and recreation would be provided for locally. Neither farm was ever expropriated, although the worsening of the town's unemployment required another study

⁵⁶ Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 434.

in 1952 that led to some of its *yunteros* participating in the later colonization of the Vegas Altas.⁵⁷

Terrón's vision of the source of the social problem in Cabeza del Buey, unlike its surrounding towns, came down primarily to the concentration of property in a few (often absentee) landlords. These landlords focused their efforts on livestock, since it was much less demanding of their attention. Unfortunately, livestock were much less space-efficient in creating jobs than cultivation. In the surrounding lands, where property was distributed much more equally because of its possession by cooperatives formed between 1880 and 1920, the still-existing unemployment was ascribed to the low quality of the land. For these outlying lands, Terrón believed the hydraulic projects to be carried out in the Vegas Bajas would support the excess population along with the expropriation and colonization of one farm. The extra labor would simply be absorbed in construction, and many laborers would be eligible to be colonists in INC projects. In Cabeza del Buey, where the problem was more insurmountable, the expropriation and colonization of six farms was called for.⁵⁸ Here, unlike in Campanario, the expropriation of these six farms was carried out, and they were settled in 1950.⁵⁹

The studies, taken together, demonstrate the INC was acting in the Badajoz region in the interest of guaranteeing politically stable communities. The social problem itself was clearly related to the amount of unemployment in towns. But the problem did go beyond this. Both reports hint at the fear of unrest and anger on the part of the *yuntero* population. Terrón wrote: "there exists a discontent amongst the mass of agrarian

⁵⁷ Ibid., 436.

⁵⁸ Terrón, "Estudio Social del Terminó del Cabeza del Buey."

⁵⁹ Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 472.

workers, particularly those who possess some means of production [yunteros], caused by the excessive concentration of land.”⁶⁰ So although the root problem was unemployment, the INC really feared the emotional, or political, response to it. The understanding that absentee landlords would certainly be more concerned for the towns’ social problems if they were present confirms this. The landlords would not only become aware of the poverty of the province, but also of the burning anger directed at them.

The solution to this social problem was uniformly the intensification of agriculture combined with the prospects of future jobs provided by hydraulic projects on the Guadiana River. Organized, parceled up farms were more desirable than *dehesas*. Any farm not divided up into parcels, especially if it was owned by an absentee landlord, could be subject to expropriation. In photos attached to the appendix of the Cabeza del Buey study, Terrón pointed out the border between two farms, one with the scattered brush and trees of the *dehesa* landscape typical of the region, while the other was made up of neat lines of crops.

⁶⁰ “Existe un malestar entre la masa obrera campesina y, en particular, entre aquellos que cuentan con medios de producción, originado por la concentración excesiva de la propiedad.” Ibid.

ESTUDIO SOCIAL DE LA ZONA DE CABEZA DEL BUEY



Foto núm. 3: A la izquierda, zona parcelada próxima a Cabeza del Buey:— A la derecha, finca "La Rinconada".

Image 3.1: The Rinconada farm, declared to be of “national interest,” in February of 1949, compared to an organized farm. “Terron, Estudio social del Término de Cabeza del Buey,” AHCEA.

The preference for parceled land was not due primarily to its improved economic performance, rather, many more workers were required than for the raising of livestock. Livestock-raising “deprived those ploughmen of the only lands within the town’s limits where they could employ their energy.”⁶¹ In Cabeza del Buey, the Director General of the INC even ordered that, although the amount of land ultimately expropriated was less

⁶¹ “Privan a estos yunteros de las únicas tierras del término donde podrían emplear sus fuerzas.” Terrón, “Estudio Social del Terminó de Cabeza del Buey.”

than called for, the number of settled colonists be kept the same (decreasing lot size) to ensure the greatest number of property owners.⁶²

Direct cultivators would be a part of the community, aware of poverty and, perhaps, interested in the lot of their neighbors. The director of the INC noted, in his approval of the study of Cabeza del Buey, that the usual producer lives off of his own physical efforts and “is a hard worker and has great affection for the land, and along with it, enthusiasm for his profession.”⁶³ This statement implies several things – these workers were suitable for physical, as opposed to mental, labor, which would occupy them, and that the land, particularly when it was owned, elicited a sense of responsibility and care for the community. Keeping the workers occupied would keep them from any sort of organized social unrest. Still the expropriation proposed at the end of each study never aimed to employ the entire population. In each case, the population of unemployed *braceros* would be left in the same numbers or be assigned to future INC projects (for which *yunteros* would also be favored). This population also alarmed the INC and the Junta de Ordenación Económico-Social, but *braceros* did not appear responsible or hardworking enough to participate in local colonization projects. Their potential contribution to the Spain’s wealth was not being wasted as *yunteros*’ was. They also, perhaps, did not cause such anxiety to provincial officials since they had not been as prominent in political unrest in the past.

⁶² Fernando de Montero y García de Valdivia, Director General de Colonización, “Resolución de la Dirección General sobre el Estudio Social de la Comarca de Cabeza del Buey (Badajoz),” 30 June 1947 in Terrón, “Estudio Social del Termino de Cabeza del Buey.”

⁶³ “Que el productor de la comarca es trabajador y tiene gran cariño a la tierra y, por tanto, entusiasmo por su profesión.” Ibid.

The engineers both build their studies around the goal of creating a demographic equilibrium. The demographic studies are one of the most tenuous parts of each study. What is the point of a ten-year demographic study covering years of famine and Civil War? Why should the unemployment problem be framed first of all on a town-by-town basis? The answer was security. The studies assumed that the proper collection of demographic, economic, social (by which was meant employment as well as the presence of schools, churches and doctors) data could be used to fashion an all-encompassing response aimed at restoring the employment of politically reliable peasants. Fixed to the land through property ownership, *yunteros* could be incorporated into communities under the watch of larger, direct landowners, and attended to culturally and religiously. Their responsibility, exhibited by their ownership of “means of production,” made them preferred candidates to be converted into politically reliable supporters of the regime. The INC preserved the regime’s ability to act in an ad-hoc, targeted manner to preserve stability in a threatening countryside.

3.4. Conclusion

Following the summer of 1940, the Civil Guard was tasked with compiling a report on the behavior of each town and city in the province of Badajoz. The guardsmen were given a list of seven specific questions to find answers to: when did the town join the Nationalist uprising, or alternatively, when did it surrender? Which commander took it over? Was the town bombed, and were the Republican forces (referred to as Marxists or reds) responsible for any killing, robberies or other unsavory exploits? How did the Marxist forces flee the town, and specifically did they do anything embarrassing or dishonorable? Were there any extraordinary acts of heroism or philanthropy by those on

the Nationalist side?⁶⁴ The purpose of the survey was to compile a record of Republican misdeeds and Nationalist successes. But it also captured the legacy of the social revolutions that took place in many towns during the war; it testified to the strength of the Left in the Badajoz Province and the legacy of the Second Republic's land reform.⁶⁵ Just after Franco's victory, when political responsibilities commissions were in full operation, the political actions of a populace during the Civil War could have important consequences.

The military uprising of July 18, 1936, which began the Spanish Civil War, did not succeed in Cabeza del Buey or Campanario, and both remained in Republican hands for most of the war. Cabeza del Buey was bombed by Nationalists and then Republicans after its surrender in 1938. Although no specifics are provided, "during Red dominion, an infinity of murders, robberies, expropriations and all kinds delinquent acts were committed."⁶⁶ One civil guardsman in Campanario was killed as the force fled the town from the train station. Priests, veterinarians and lawyers were among some of the victims of Republican repression. The report documented the scope of Republican repression against forces of the Right, while eliding Nationalist reprisals. And, perhaps most importantly, it testified to the former strength of the "reds" in a province where social unrest had been visible for some time. The social studies of the late 1940s, which would pave the way for the ambitious Plan Badajoz, demonstrate that the consciousness of the

⁶⁴ Comandancia de Badajoz, 5th company of the 11th Division, "Resumen de las visitudes [sic] de los pueblos enclavados en la demarcación de expresada unidad, desde la iniciación del Movimiento Nacional hasta su liberación," AGMAV, Caja.1295, Carpeta 17.

⁶⁵ See Chris Ealham and Michael Richards, *The Splintering of Spain Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*.

⁶⁶ Comandancia de Badajoz, "Resumen de las visitudes [sic]."

possibility of class-conflict in the province had not waned. The INC would build its modernizing program for the region to allay this anxiety.

Chapter 4 – The Meaning of “Technical” in the Irrigation of Large Zones

4.1. Introduction

The Plan Badajoz seduced Henry Buckley, a British correspondent in Spain for Reuters. In his second article from his series on the Plan Badajoz in 1955, Henry Buckley began by describing the city of Badajoz as a “sleepy market town of 100,000 inhabitants.”¹ The regime was waking up this area with its “Tennessee Valley Administration in miniature.” For him, the goal of the project was to tame the “turbulent” Guadiana River and “bring social security” to a province rife with illiteracy and poverty. Irrigation was helping to bring agriculture to areas where only livestock grazing had been possible because of periodic flooding. In Valdelacalzada, the first and largest town built in the Vegas Bajas, “lean, hungry, thoroughly bewildered, peasant families from the ‘badlands’ of the province arrive. They are given a house and outhouse, for the Spanish peasant is accustomed to live in a village and not on his land, a yoke of two mules or draught-cattle, a milk cow, equipment, seeds, fertilisers and 5 hectares (12 1/2 acres) of irrigated land.”² The article argued that the Plan Badajoz changed Badajoz’s history; there was a before and an after: “Huge irrigation dams and great areas of newly-planted forests can be seen in wildernesses where, through the centuries, the peasants have lived in hovels and in great poverty.”³ Whether peasants could have survived for centuries in the wilderness is beside the question here; the Plan Badajoz’s vision of a rural transformation convinced Buckley.

¹ Henry Buckley to Rufino Beltrán, February 12, 1955, ADPDA, Secretaria Gestor del Plan Badajoz.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

The bill that made the Plan Badajoz official passed through the Cortes in 1953, but it simply coordinated works that had been under way for some time.⁴ The irrigation that came from the Cijara reservoir and the Canal de Montijo had been planned since the conclusion of the Civil War. The two largest areas to be colonized were the Vegas Bajas around the Lobón and Montijo Canals near Mérida and in the Vegas Altas around the Orellana Canal in the eastern portion of the province. Overall, the INC constructed forty-four towns in Badajoz, eighteen near Montijo and Lobón and twenty-two along the Orellana Canal, with several individual towns scattered throughout the rest province.⁵ It supervised and housed 4,951 colonists and another 1,637 agrarian laborers (*obrerros agrícolas*) who were given houses but not full plots of land. 40,406 hectares were expropriated, of which the towns themselves made up 3,534 hectares. Although the Plan was intended to last fourteen years after it passed through the *Cortes* in 1953, the last towns were populated in the 1970s and those colonists finally received the ownership titles of their plots in the early 1980s. The rhythm of construction was uneven, with the largest towns finished in the Vegas Bajas during the 1950s, while smaller colonization towns were finished in the Vegas Altas, in the emptier eastern portion of the province through the 1960s.

In a letter to the *Secretario Gestor* of the Plan, the coordinator of the Plan's different agencies and its public relations, Buckley recalled the "splendid attentions and hospitality" of his visit to the Vegas Bajas and wished that he could return the favors he received by "making the world know about the silent labor and sacrifice that has been


⁴ "Ley de 7 de abril de 1952 sobre el Plan de obras, colonización, industrialización y electrificación de Badajoz," *BOE*, April 8, 1952.

⁵ Monreal and Pérez del Olma, "La zona regable de Montijo," 41. I am counting the Entrerríos farm within the zone near Montijo and Lobón.

carried out, and continues, in the Vegas Altas and Bajas of the Rio Guadiana to bring improved quality of life and progress to this region which suffered and was forgotten in earlier times.”⁶ Perhaps Buckley was won over by the care he was given as a visiting press member on an organized trip. But he wrote as one who had studied the “problem of Extremadura” in some depth and was happy to see it being solved. For him the introduction of these peasants into modern life was enough to celebrate the Plan. And in this, he touched on the most important aspect of the “technical” Plan Badajoz. Solving the question of Extremadura for the regime required colonists to embody the benefits brought by state-led technical program – the social aspect of the Plan Badajoz consisted of supervising and modernizing a select group of deserving peasants from the province. The settlement of large zones did bring changes to local colonization projects. New towns were a departure from the quest for an equilibrium in older towns. The maximum number of colonists that could be supported by an area was not as much of a concern as meeting production goals.⁷ Nevertheless, in the design and enactment of the irrigation of large zones success was irrevocably tied to the transformation of colonists, turning them into responsible property owners. In reality, this modernization program continued on the track of earlier colonization policies. Irrigation’s benefits would be channeled to create an exemplary minority within the countryside.

⁶ Espero por lo menos poder contestar a todas estas atenciones haciendo saber en el mundo el labor silencioso y sacrificado que se ha hecho, y se sigue desarrollando, por las vegas altas y bajas del Rio Guadiana para llevar un bienestar y progreso a aquella región tan sufrida y olvidada en otros tiempos.” Henry Buckley to Rufino Beltrán, December 23 1955, ADPBA, Secretaria Gestor del Plan Badajoz.

⁷ See Carlos Romero Cuadrado, “Aspectos económicos ligados a las explotaciones creadas por el Plan Badajoz” Phd diss., (Madrid: Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, 2007).



Map 4.1 Towns of the Plan Badajoz. Carlos Romero Cuadrado, *Aspectos económicos ligados a las explotaciones creadas por el Plan Badajoz* (Madrid: Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, 2007), Appendix.

4.2. The INC's Intellectuals

4.2.1 The Early Management of Colonists

To explain and determine the mechanics of colonization, INC agricultural engineers wrote first for a yearly conference whose proceedings were published as part of the INC's *Estudios* series. Later, a broader base of agricultural experts and social scientists wrote for the quarterly *Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales* (Journal of Agro-Social Studies) published by the Ministry of Agriculture. Each served as a platform for the discussion and promotion of regime agricultural policy and as a vehicle for upward mobility within the Ministry of Agriculture – most of its articles originated from a yearly conference in Madrid. Writers for the each journal included Alejandro Torrejón, the Director General of the INC from 1950-1961; Ángel Martínez Borque, the Director

General of the INC from 1961-1965; Emilio Gómez Ayau, an agronomist and sociologist; and Luis García de Oteyza, the brother of the chief engineer of the Guadiana region, Manuel. Beginning as early as 1945, but picking up speed after the replacement of Ángel Zorrilla as Director General in 1946, the INC began to chart a new course in the regime's rural policy. The *Revista de Agro-Sociales*' authors strongly advocated a Keynesian-influenced increase in the state's involvement in agriculture, arguing for much more ambitious INC projects. A comparison with the earlier arguments made in *Estudios* shows that the definition of what made INC projects "technical" had changed. Throughout most of the 1940s in its town-by-town farm expropriations, the INC had sought to boost the amount of land under cultivation to provide work for unemployed *yunteros* (but not *braceros*). It had sought increased production. Now the INC was after something a slightly different, an increase in productivity as a per-capita measure. But if this was the ultimate target then why include colonists at all?

In practice this new policy led to little substantial change in the INC's goals. INC and provincial officials had long understood industrialization to be the ultimate destination for the province; its *jornaleros* would work in factories. The INC had always focused on specific portions of the population, political loyalists and unemployed *yunteros* in its first projects, leaving the excess population to be taken care of wishful thinking. In the 1950s and 1960s, the rules for the selection of colonists were applied more consistently, but in general the purpose of colonization remained largely the same. A small portion of the population would be given aid and guidance. Increased productivity would not be worth the large expenditure by the state unless the profits were

distributed a manner the state understood as useful. In the case of Francoist Spain, this meant creating economically self-sufficient and politically obedient subjects.

The continuity in overall goals for the INC is demonstrated by a consistency in the treatment of colonists. As it embarked on large-scale irrigation projects in the 1950s, it relied on a program for colonists created in the 1940s. In December of 1944, there were two crucial interventions by Ángel Martínez Borque and Emilio Gómez Ayau, which established the INC's relationship to colonists, which was one of unquestionable authority.

Martínez Borque wrote "El Hombre y la Colonización," to detail the "sociological work" that needed to be carried out by the INC, by which Martínez Borque meant the improvement of communities and individuals through INC intervention. This was what made the labor of colonization "deeply human, fundamentally social."⁸ He would argue in his contribution to the series of conferences that what the INC needed to facilitate in its lands in the countryside was the creation of a select group of farmers. This group, who would be independent, morally upright and have a number of skills, would bring stability to a society that had been in uproar.

He started by demanding that his readers not forget that the "goal of colonization, and at the same time its principal agent, is man."⁹ With this grand pronouncement, Martínez Borque actually had a very particular idea of man in mind. A man had to be individual, and had to be linked to his nation, his patria. Without a sense of his

⁸ "La colonización es tarea que inevitablemente apasiona, y apasiona por su contenido hondamente humano, fundamentalmente social." Ángel Martínez Borque, "El hombre y la colonización," *Estudios* 3, no. 14 (1944), 6.

⁹ "No podemos olvidar ni un instante que el fin de la colonización, y al mismo tiempo su agente esencialísimo, es el hombre." *Ibid.*

individuality, and his belonging to Spain, a man would lose his identity. The purpose of colonization then, was “rescuing socially useful men for the common destiny of the Nation; uniting men of the countryside to the land that absorbs their efforts; linking the laborer with his fields, allowing him a dignified and progressive individual and social life.”¹⁰ This property-owning life was much to be preferred for Martínez Borque to the “undifferentiated masses” that could carry out unskilled agricultural or factory labor. The difference between these men, and skilled agriculturists, was that those who owned their property had to be both skilled and responsible. Owning your own plot required a breadth of knowledge that was unnecessary for laborers. As opposed to the operation of machinery, the ownership of a plot of land by a true “*labrador*” (laborer) meant that he had to master the climate, the land, crops and the appropriate treatment of animals. These skills were “broader, noble and more humanistic” than the unthinking operation of machinery in a factory.¹¹ Not for Martínez Borque “those undifferentiated troops of population that fuel tumultuous mass movements.”¹²

However, the goal of colonization, as Martínez Borque saw it, was not to halt emigration from the countryside to the cities – the movement to factories was natural and desirable. It had been going on since the beginning of the century. What concerned him was the quality of the population left behind to perform necessary agricultural tasks. What he at all costs wanted to make sure of was that the population needed to maintain agricultural production wasn’t the “poorest or the least prepared.” It couldn’t be “an

¹⁰ “Rescatar hombres socialmente útiles para el destino común de la Nación; unir los hombres del campo a la tierra que absorbe sus desvelos; vincular al labrador con su solar, proporcionándole una vida individual y social digna y progresiva.” Ibid.

¹¹ “Son mucho más amplios, más nobles, más humanísticos.” Ibid., 7.

¹² “No sirven esos contingentes indiferenciados de población que nutren los movimientos tumultuosos de masas.” Ibid., 13

undifferentiated mass without any agricultural orientation” but should instead be “classified in adequate professional categories with determined utility and aptitudes.”¹³

To achieve the presence of desired colonists, the INC had to create an appropriate atmosphere in the countryside where the male colonists would be surrounded by close relationships with their families, their work, history, art, the nation, nature and God. Only in this atmosphere could colonists succeed in becoming responsible Spanish subjects and make worthwhile the financial outlay of the INC.

Not just anyone could be selected as a colonist of course. The list of preferred requirements for colonists was then the following (and would only be changed slightly later to require more capital from colonists): they had to know how to read and write, be between 23-50 years old (unless you had served in the military), be married or widowed with children, be able to demonstrate agricultural proficiency, have no hereditary illnesses or physical defects (syphilis, tuberculosis, alcoholism), and have a record of good conduct and morality. The more children you had, the more likely you were to be chosen as a colonist since you could do more than others to create this ideal community of property owners. These series of requirements again demanded that a careful selection of colonists be carried out, a selection that would do as much as possible to weed out lazy or unfit colonists.

The two obstacles faced by the INC in creating this morally reliable mass of agriculturalists were the colonists’ insufficient capital and insufficient instruction.

¹³ “Pero lo que si hemos de procurar, si queremos colonizar con hombres medianamente preparados, es que la parte de esa población que se necesita para el campo no sea ni la peor ni la menos preparada, que no constituya una masa indiferenciada profesionalmente y sin orientación agrícola, sino que forme una población clasificada en categorías profesionales adecuadas con una utilidad y una aptitud determinadas.” Ibid., 15.

Carefully selecting colonists and painstakingly instructing them could combat these deficiencies. Colonists, in order to move out of the system of “tutelage,” had to earn their freedom of decision. Applicants who already possessed experience, as well as some agricultural capital, were much more likely to be able to do this. Small-scale renters and tenants who had already mastered the cultivation of small plots of land would be ideal to participate in INC projects. Day laborers required much more professional supervision and instruction. In the “formation” classes for all colonists, they were not only to be taught practical agricultural skills, but moral and social lessons that would guarantee attention to the religious, health, and intellectual subjects necessary for a strong moral environment. These lessons would be reinforced by the spread of model farms – where successful families would be installed with the best supplies that the INC could afford to supply them with. Being in the presence of these model colonist families would give new colonists a sense of what was possible.

In December of 1944, Emilio Gómez Ayau justified the procedures by which a colonist could become a property owner. The process matched Martínez Borque’s attitude towards colonists and his goal of creating a model population in the countryside.¹⁴ To support this population the INC would have to determine “*unidades de cultivo*,” optimal field sizes that could support one family since the point was not just lowering unemployment or boosting an area’s production, it was to assist deserving colonists in establishing permanent homesteads. Gómez Ayau candidly stated that even after the most careful of selection of colonists, 40% should never make it through the preparation and settlement process to become true property owners. After the selection,

¹⁴ Emilio Gómez Ayau, “Tutela, Posesión y Propiedad,” *Estudios* 3, no. 14 (1944): 5-31.

then, potential colonists required a period of “vigilance” and “tutelage” when the INC would make decisions for them (envisioned as five years) until colonists’ had paid off their debts to the INC for assistance and irrigation.

The program that Gómez Ayau outlined, and was used by the INC, was one where the colonists were placed squarely under the authority of the INC in a situation akin to sharecropping (*aparcería*). Over the five years of the tutelage period the colonists had to pay back the capital lent to them by the INC in the form of livestock and equipment. The repayment schedule was not up to the colonist; he was to repay the INC in the form of 20% of the harvest during the first five years of land occupation. If the payment in terms of crops had exceeded that of the INC investment in equipment and livestock, then this amount would be counted as the first down payment towards the colonists’ real debt: the property itself. Once the five years were up, if the colonist had lived up to his obligations by caring for his plot of land, house, and animals and had paid off his debts to the INC (if he had not, then that debt would be added to the price of the property), the period of attaining property would begin when colonists gained the titles of their houses and lots. Now colonists made yearly mortgage payments. Total payment, it was hoped, would take between 25 and 30 years, and colonists were granted favorable interest rates. The degree of control over the plot of land also changed at this time. Although colonists were by no means full owners of their property, they were given a title of possession that allowed them to take full control of their fields as long as their payments to the INC were maintained. Gómez Ayau hoped that by making the payment amounts based on the production of the plot of land, colonists would be induced to produce the maximum

amount possible and agricultural engineers would not have to serve as rent collectors. Rather, as business partners, they would oversee and encourage colonist production.

Lest this system actually be seen as too generous to colonists, Gómez Ayau reminded his readers that the INC possessed an “unquestionable authority” over colonists. They could be fined or expelled for a number of reasons. And he also outlined the strict obligations that colonists had to care for their plot, as well as their equipment and livestock. In fact, each had to devote “all of his work, and his family’s” to the plot. It was prohibited to use capital from the INC to work on any other plots without express permission. Finally, besides the attention paid to their plot of land, the INC expected colonists to keep up a “strong sense of morality, completion of their family obligations, a sense of decorum in their lives, and noble usage of their home.”¹⁵ The INC prohibited them from subleasing or transferring the property in any way.

4.2.2. Keynesian Colonization

Rafael Cavestany, the minister of agriculture from 1951 to 1955, seemed to turn the earlier propositions on their head as he explicitly called for increased productivity and a reduction in the number of those who worked in agriculture. His speech on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the establishment of agronomy as a university discipline, published in the *Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales* in Spain was a startling rejoinder to both the ideas of the land reform of the Second Republic and of INC policies in the 1940s. He argued that when examined without the “blindness” of past ideas, without the “lash of prejudices,” the only sensible rural policy was to try boost productivity (as measured per person) as well as production – thus his title: “Fewer

¹⁵ “Un elevado concepto moral, cumplimiento de sus obligaciones familiares, decoro en su vida, noble utilización de la vivienda.” *Ibid.*, 28.

Farmers and Better Agriculture.”¹⁶ His version of increased productivity was far from any sort of economic liberalism, however. Instead it fit into a current of Keynesianism that had sparked the *Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales* from its beginnings. Increasing productivity still had to fulfill the social mandate of the INC. Several years earlier, Alejandro Torrejón and Emilio Gómez Ayau argued for the embrace by the state of large-scale projects. Each found a means of arguing that colonization could find a path between amoral capitalism and socialism by combining state investment through expropriation for large projects with the Catholicism of the Franco regime.

Large state investment needed a political as well as economic return. Gómez found the political benefit for the distribution of land to be in the predilection of the property-owning peasant to disdain communism on one hand and immorality on the other. Gómez’s work set the Spanish efforts at land reform in worldwide perspective, charting a course for Spain that was meant to run between the two Cold War powers.¹⁷ He began by aligning himself with the thinker David Mitrany, a Romanian-born British liberal scholar who specialized in studies of state-led economic planning.¹⁸ An emphasis on the natural opposition of peasants to Marxism made Mitrany appealing to Gómez; he latched onto Mitrany’s classification of agrarian reforms after WWI as definitively opposed to the communist expansion of state-owned property. Where communists needed to convert peasants into proletarians, these agrarian reforms (carried out in Central and Eastern Europe) contributed to the health of peasantries by distributing

¹⁶ Rafael Cavestany, “Menos agricultores y mejor agricultura”, *Revista de Estudios Agrosociales* 13 (1955), 7-34.

¹⁷ Emilio Gómez Ayau, “La Revolución Verde,” *Revisita de Estudios Agro-sociales*, 1 (1952), 9-32.

¹⁸ David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant: a study in social dogmatism* (New York: Collier Books, 1961).

property. These populist movements, which demonstrated how peasant thinking was inimical to communism, had utopian, moral pretensions, and their success helped to corral the USSR. State planning of the economy with an aim towards full employment was the only way to confront communism in Europe and in developing countries. But even Keynesianism made a mistake in imagining that proper economic planning was enough to support a unified population. Luckily, there was also a tradition of social Catholicism that could temper Keynesian legislation with “principles of respect for the human personality and spiritual goals.”¹⁹

In Gómez’s final classification of land reforms within free market countries, which depended on the balance between respect for private property and the need for expropriation, he situated Spain in two classes: in one with countries like the USA that pursued economic goals through large-scale state intervention and no expropriation and in one with countries like fascist Italy that expropriated land for social purposes. These countries that had pursued a full program of public works inspired by Keynes’ goal of full employment had blazed the trail that Gómez hoped to follow. The effect of Gómez’s argument was to justify state-intervention, while situating Spain firmly within the opposition to communism: “There is nothing more opposed to a proletarian parade than a peasant standing on his own land with a house behind him with his children playing in the doorway.”²⁰ The final emphasis on the Catholic values subtly differentiated Spain from the other western countries and showed that Spain’s agrarian

¹⁹ “Este principio de respeto a la personalidad humana y a sus fines espirituales da una superior calidad a la legislación que en ella se inspira y constituye la única justificación trascendente del aspecto económico.” Ibid.

²⁰ “Al fin y al cabo, no hay nada más opuesto a un desfile proletario que un campesino puesto en pie sobre su tierra, con una casa al fondo en cuya puerta juegan sus hijos.” Ibid, 32.

policy not only had to be social through state expenditure, but also through attention to property distribution and the moral development it would bring.

Following Gómez's article, Alejandro Torrejón, the Director General of the INC, reconsidered the role of the INC's relationship to colonists in view of the powers it drew from the laws of 1946 and 1949.²¹ Now that the state had the capacity to expropriate large amounts of land, the task of the INC had changed from rearranging property on already existing farms to building new towns – starting with Valdelacalzada and Guadiana del Caudillo in 1948 and 1949 – and distributing property in vast new irrigated zones. Where Gómez had a few qualms with Keynes' capitalism, Torrejón enthusiastically embraced the policies of other post-World War II western European states, as well as the New Deal in the United States of America. For him, irrigation was not at all empty of social content, it was spurred by four developments: the unequal distribution of rain, a growth of population, a reduction of available lands and technological advances. Referencing Gómez Ayau's comparison of different agrarian reforms, he counted two types of irrigation programs: those that respected and those that did not respect private property. The irrigation program that Spain deployed, a program that did not respect private property in Torrejón's estimation, had the clear goal not only of boosting economic productivity (achieving the "maximum intensity" of production) but also settling the largest number of families possible on this newly irrigated lands so long as they had enough land to "live in a dignified and decorous manner."²² The riches

²¹ Alejandro Torrejón Montero, "Colonización de las grandes zonas regables," *Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales* 1, 5 (1953).

²² *Ibid*, 23.

brought by irrigation would not lead to more wealth for current owners, but would be used to boost property ownership.

Torrejón entertained, but quickly discarded the idea that perhaps the state should not intervene at all. The reasons for state intervention were several. The “evolution of goals that has been represented by moving from merely constructive or hydrological projects to irrigation, and currently, to colonization with an emphasis on social preoccupations.”²³ Technological advances, the advent of Keynesianism, and the sheer scale of irrigation projects further made state intervention necessary. These types of projects could simply not be afforded by private businesses. Hydraulic projects could spur industrialization; however, “if a country found itself with an excess of population and a poor distribution of rain, policies of irrigation and colonization acquire a fundamental importance.” In these cases, irrigation was especially necessary because it led the way to full employment and increased demand, which supported industrialization. Priority had to be given to poor areas - those that had “worse land or climates” – to benefit their endangered populations.

Torrejón discounted other possibilities for state intervention. The state could avoid interfering with the distribution of property, and simply incentivize irrigation, but this would do no social good. The INC could seek to recoup funds from colonists who benefitted from state expenditure and cut ties with them immediately after a project’s conclusion. This carried the problem of colonist failure - what if they were unable to make a profit because of poor luck, or more likely to Torrejón’s mind, poor knowledge of agriculture? A solution was needed that would be “elastic enough to

²³ “En primer lugar, por la evolución de los fines, al pasar de los meramente constructivos o hidráulicos, a los de riego y, por último, a los de colonización, con una preferente preocupación social.” Ibid.

prevent letting adverse circumstances affect colonist morale.”²⁴ He meant that the INC had to protect colonist welfare from unfortunate economic developments and from a lack of training.

The principal objection of Rafael Cavestany to older reform programs was the emphasis on a broad distribution of property as the only measure of a healthy rural economy. For Cavestany, a *latifundio* was not a farm of a certain size, but an “economic concept,” by which he meant it was a form of cultivation defined by farming with the cheapest labor possible with almost no investment in technology. Smaller farms could be just as inefficient as large ones, the *minifundio* was just as much a problem as the *latifundio*. For him, the conventional wisdom of past land reforms that had to be forgotten: “‘Agriculture, more than an economic activity, is a way of life’; no, not in any way; agriculture is before anything else an economic activity and only after a noble manner of living.”²⁵ He argued that an outmoded form of agriculture had to be made into a profitable endeavor, and only then could it be morally uplifting.

It would seem here that Cavestany had adopted a much more classically liberal position than the previous authors in the *Revista*, but Cavestany argued just as forcefully for the departure from a liberal view of the economy. While he wished to see agriculture transformed from subsistence to profit bearing, he also saw a need for large-scale state intervention for social benefit. For him the study of agriculture now being done at university saw it as a “productive activity” rather than one of subsistence. This productivity was about efficiency, and had as its goal the exploitation of the nation’s

²⁴ “Con suficiente elasticidad para evitar que las circunstancias adversas repercuten gravemente en la moral del colono.” Ibid.

²⁵ “‘La agricultura, más que modo de vivir;’ no, de ninguna manera; la agricultura es ante todo una actividad económica y después una noble manera de vivir.” Ibid., 7.

natural resources and a more modern distribution of the population. He candidly admitted that agriculture was not the most desirable form of employment for the majority of the population. In Spain, only fishing brought in a worse per capita income. Industrialization depended on a smaller peasantry: “The shrinking of the percentage of the population involved in agriculture is a symbol of economic progress and the reduction of [agriculture’s] contribution to the national income is a consequence of strong industrial development.”²⁶ But the diminution of agriculture, and also the increase in its productivity, would not be achieved by limiting state expenditure; on the contrary, the state’s purchasing of tractors and investment in education would spur capitalization, increased productivity and a decrease in labor force.

For Cavestany, this increase in productivity, in spite of the workers who would be ejected from the countryside, had to serve a social end. Now, all of those involved in agriculture would be paid a decent wage, and more importantly, the increased productivity would benefit the country as a whole. Two specific goals for the countryside animated his vision, “the improvement of the standard of living to a comparable level to the rest of the population and the total absorption of their labor.” He saw that irrigation would help boost employment but made clear that 25% of the rural population would have to find work outside of agriculture. He called for the “rectification of the old agrarian policy of return to the land and creation of small economic zones of insufficient work that are inadaptable to the new agriculture. On the contrary, measures should be

²⁶ “Un símbolo de progreso económico es, precisamente, la disminución del porcentaje de la población ocupada en la agricultura y la reducción en su aportación relativa la renta nacional, como consecuencia de un alto desarrollo industrial.” *Ibid.*, 16.

encouraged that reduce the population active in primary agriculture, but not the rural population as a whole.”²⁷

Even in this unsentimental analysis of agriculture, there lurked a need to protect the population in the countryside. Cavestany still called for the rural population to stay at the same level (even if less of the population was to be directly involved in agriculture) and he also believed it a necessary objective to “create family-owned farms in the countryside with the means of production offered by the methods of today.”²⁸ State engineers, especially those of the INC, had to take on an “apostolic” (*labor de apostolado*) labor to educate those who continued to work in agriculture. The state itself had to “intervene, plan, and radically transform the conditions in which agriculture was developed.”²⁹

Torrejón, Gómez Ayau, and Cavestany had each proposed a break with the previous economic orthodoxy of autarky, which held Spain should work above all to be economically self-sufficient and maximize gross production. Along with these proposals and the pursuit of large-scale process, the INC adopted several new institutional methods. Now instead of operating on an ad-hoc, farm-by-farm basis as it did to settle *yunteros* in the 1940s, a series of clear steps was introduced for large-scale colonization projects. A focus on increasing productivity, abiding by a clear set of standards and rules – instead of patronage or the lobbying of local government – became the essence of what made the

²⁷ “Rectificación de la vieja política agraria de retorno a la tierra y creación de pequeñas unidades de economía de trabajo insuficiente que resultan inadaptables a la nueva agricultura. Por el contrario, se estimula y favorece cuanto permita reducir el volumen de la población activa agrícola primaria, no de la población que vive en zonas rurales.” Ibid., 28.

²⁸ “Es necesario crear una propiedad familiar en el campo con los medios de producción que la técnica de hoy proporciona.” Ibid., 31-32.

²⁹ “Interviene, planifica y transforma radicalmente las condiciones en que la agricultura se desarrolla.” Ibid., 31.

INC consider its actions to be technical. But, in spite of the embrace of Keynesianism, each author had returned to the salient features of the INC's program of the 1940s. The state could use its ability to take on debt (which came from the rapprochement with Eisenhower's America) to fund huge new projects, but these projects had been in the works for some time and could only be justified by serving a social purpose embodied by colonists. Furthermore, each author in seeking to carve out a path for Spain between the Soviet Union and America kept the same role for colonists that Martínez Borque had assigned to them in the 1940s: much of the rural population would be destined for industrialization, but a small minority would need to be educated and supervised by the INC to serve as examples of how peasants could become responsible, Francoist Spaniards.

4.3. A Plan Made of Plans: The Ambitions of the Plan Badajoz

The *Plan General de Colonización* was the first step towards the completion of a *Plan de Obras Coordinadas* (plan of coordinated works) for a recently expropriated large area. It had to be completed before any colonization began – it set out the goals and justification for the settlement of the area. It divided the area into various sectors based on “hydraulic independence,” which was determined by irrigation works.³⁰ The public works carried out by the state had to be one of three types: projects of general interest for the area apart from just the colonized zones (flood control, road-building, supply of potable water, reforestation), projects that would be of interest for the sectors to be colonized (the network of irrigation works, leveling of the soil), projects of private agricultural interest (work that benefitted what would become a colonist's property) and

³⁰ Plan General de Colonización Montijo, Feb 10 of 1953, ACMAPAMA.

extra projects (buildings stores in the new towns).³¹ After noting the location of the new towns to be constructed, the administrators of the *Plan General* then went through a classification of the various land types of the area from most valuable to least and set minimum and maximum prices for the various types of land. It also decided on the “typical plot” as well as ideal plot size for colonists – in the case of Montijo, it was to be four or five hectares. Rules for lands in reserve, that is lands that could remain in their owners’ hands who had made a commitment to boost productivity through irrigation, were set out.³² But even though dependence on consistent rules and guidelines laid out in innumerable “ante-projects”³³ and smaller plans did make for a departure from the relative *carte blanche* of the INC in the 1940s, the Plan Badajoz still has to be interpreted as contributing to the specific political project of guaranteeing that a portion of the peasantry would be responsible enough to support the regime.

The technical framing of these large plans, which saw colonists as the “human factor,” allowed the INC engineers to naturalize their authority over colonists even further. The ideology of the regime concerning the countryside, which included the primacy of the family and the value of owning property, was part of the technical expertise of INC “engineers.” The pretensions of colonization to improve colonists were understood as an inherent part of boosting productivity. The INC not only had to transform lands, boosting their productivity, it had to help colonists become better Spaniards.

³¹ “Ley de 21 de abril de 1949 sobre colonización,” *BOE*.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ “Ante-Proyectos”

4.3.1. Colonization Towns

Colonization towns themselves were statements of the INC's re-foundation of rural life. Each town placed a special emphasis on a plaza and church. For the architect José Luis Fernández del Amo, a town was designed as a "turbine" with the plaza as its fulcrum. Instead of having streets heading straight out from it to the edges of town, the towns' needed to be "closed spaces that promoted social harmony [*convivencia*]." ³⁴ However, while this design was meant to conjure up the idea of a traditional Spanish village, these towns were strikingly modernist. They adhered to a spare aesthetic that helped keep costs low: the INC had to only cover what was functional and all "decorative" ³⁵ touches were forbidden except on churches. ³⁶ It also fit with the regime's desire to force the colonists to become self-sufficient. A lack of decoration or of luxuries (such as indoor bathrooms) would induce colonists to collaborate in improvements, thus lowering costs for the INC. Houses had only to meet "elemental necessities." ³⁷ But at the same time as the financial outlay on colonists (and the admission that the government owed anything to colonists), churches were made into a statement of the regime's ability to meld its values with modernity. Uncanny, white bare concrete towers spiraled up into the empty sky or chunky brick windowless round pavilions anchored towns' central spaces. In the INC's techno-utopian vision, irrigation would bring the wealth required to make up the difference between the towns' public spaces and individual dwellings.

³⁴ "Espacios cerrados que fomenten la convivencia." Alfredo Villanueva Paredes and Jesús Leal Maldonado, "La planificación del regadío y los pueblos de colonización," in Monclús and Oyón, *Historia y Evolución*, 41.

³⁵ "Carácter suntuario." Torrejón Montero, "Colonización de las grandes zonas regables," *Estudios*, 33.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.




Image 4.1: The Hermitage of San Isidro, AHCEA, Colección de Fotografías.

The question of settlement patterns also demonstrated the limited social program of the INC. Some colonization officials involved in the design of the Plan wished to imitate US irrigation of the Western States by breaking with a general Mediterranean tendency by placing all colonists' houses on their plots of land. But in the end towns won out for a variety of reasons summarized by Alfredo Villanueva Paredes and Jesús Leal Maldonado: "It was fundamentally social considerations that tipped the balance towards towns: the need for Spanish farmers to share their experiences in bars, as well as the ease

of providing schooling and access to equipment, were the decisive reasons that corresponded to the ideology of colonization.”³⁸ In spite of INC engineers’ disdain for the increased difficulty brought to them by inexperienced and poorer colonists, they were in the business of founding a new type of community.

Colonists were to be made into proper Spaniards in the same way that the landscape would become more prosperous. They were indeed the “human factor” in the INC’s plans: “The Plan General de Colonización is conceived fundamentally as a ‘goal-driven’ or objective-driven plan. In it the model of the agrarian and territorial structure is proposed that is considered as optimal. But it’s also a plan that ‘programs’ the actions, that attempts to direct and control in time the process of transformation.”³⁹ The goal-driven nature of the Plan meant that colonists were pushed to fulfill the technical prognostications of the INC: Colonists were bussed to Valdelacalzada to stay in sheds (*barracones*) while their houses were completed. During the first winter there, bodies could not be buried because there was no cemetery, and inclement weather made it impossible to transport them to Badajoz.⁴⁰

Although tenants, and colonists from towns with a serious social problem were given priority, colonists were still expected to pull their own weight. The works that the state carried out on colonists’ houses were included in the Plan General de Colonización

³⁸ “Eran fundamentalmente consideraciones sociales las que inclinaban la balanza a favor de los pueblos: la necesidad de los agricultores españoles de comunicarse en el bar sus experiencias; la mayor facilidad para la escolarización de los niños y en general para el acceso al equipamiento, fueron las razones decisivas que entroncan directamente con la ideología de colonización.” Villanueva Paredes and Leal Maldonado, “La Planificación del regadío,” 39.

³⁹ “El Plan General de Colonización se concibe así, fundamentalmente, como un plan ‘finalista’ o de objetivos, en el que se propone un modelo de estructura agraria y territorial considerado como óptimo. Pero también es un plan que ‘programa’ las actuaciones, que pretende dirigir y controlar en el tiempo el proceso de transformación. Un proceso que se desarrolla en sucesivas escales y fases.” Monclús and Oyón, *Historia y Evolución*, 163.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 289.

of an area but listed as “private” works, meaning that they would have to be paid back. In the grand scheme of the financial outlay of the Plan, having colonists pay the INC back for seeds or works of construction was never about protecting the regime’s finances. The debt that INC held over colonists was a method of keeping them under the INC’s power (colonists’ account books were actually concealed from them⁴¹) and educating them into the financial responsibility the regime sought to inculcate.

4.3.2. Selecting Colonists

Once towns were constructed and irrigation works prepared, the key to the successful rural transformation envisioned by the regime were the carefully selected colonists. The conclusion of a *Plan General de Colonización* set up rules for the selection of colonists guided by the laws concerning expropriation of lands for the national interest as well as the *circulares* of the Institute. In Montijo, tenants on expropriated lands were given first priority, followed by colonists from the province who lived in areas designated as having a social problem, small property owners from the affected zones who had no rights for any land in reserve, and lastly, “modest colonists or laborers from other rural regions with means of production and a knowledge of irrigation farming, that they will have to demonstrate to INC personnel.”⁴² In a series of interviews conducted during the 1980s by a research team from the Ministry of Agriculture former colonization officials lamented the social nature of the Plan Badajoz: “In general, there is a significant criticism towards the criteria that decided the selection of colonists which

⁴¹ Miguel Siguán, *Colonización y desarrollo social: estudio en el marco del Plan de Badajoz*, (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Industria, Secretaria Gestora del Plan de Badajoz, 1963

⁴² “Colonos o labradores modestos de otras comarcas españoles con medios de producción y conocimiento del cultivo de regadío, que habrá de demostrar, mediante las pruebas correspondientes, ante el personal del INC.” “Memoria de Proyecto General de Colonización del a zona regable de Montijo,” 10 February 1953, AHCEA.

holds that these slowed down the functioning of the program.”⁴³ For the engineers, the first colonists were “the poorest from each town and the worst from each family,” “thieves and communists” who arrived with only “four coins.”⁴⁴ But even with this lament in mind, it is clear that the requirements for colonists were both protean and restrictive. Poorer colonists might have been preferred by the local administrations or Hermandades who vouched for them, but the INC was more selective and retained its authority over selections in the face of local pressure.



Image 4.2: Town of Guadajira. AHCEA, Colección Fotografías.

By scrutinizing the correspondence surrounding colonist selection, the difficulty in rigorously applying selection criteria becomes clear. The final selection was complicated by a number of factors. Through its social studies, the INC had to assign an appropriate number of colonist spots to each town; local Hermandades were given the ability to rank applicants and lobby for particular selections; mayors and other influential figures could also provide recommendations; and lastly, not all applicants wished to complete the process of accepting their lot once it was assigned and some who did not

⁴³ “En general existen bastantes criticas en las entrevistas hacia los criterios que rigieron la elección de los colonos, manifestando que eso retardó considerablemente la puesta en funcionamiento de todo el proceso.” Monreal and Pérez del Olma, “La Zona Regable de Montijo,” 45.

⁴⁴ “Los mas pobres de cada pueblo y lo peor de cada casa’, ‘ladrones y comunistas,’ ‘que llegaban con cuatro perras.’” Ibid., 78.

receive lots did not take their rejection lightly. The INC had to possess a certain flexibility in the face of the diversity of situations and political interests, which meant the ability to discriminate between colonists on decidedly non-technical criteria.⁴⁵

After the selection of colonists in Cabeza del Buey for the settlement of three expropriated farms took place in January of 1950, the INC responded on a case-by-case basis to those who appealed their rejections, providing a glimpse into the social criteria required.⁴⁶ The selection took place in the town itself, and the committee for selection was made up of a “*perito agrícola*” (an accredited agronomist close in knowledge to an agricultural engineer) from the Guadiana office of the INC, a representative from the mayor’s office, the president and secretary of the Hermandad and two local farmers who had not applied to be colonists. They sifted through the applications, double-checking information and ranking potential colonists based on the “merits that the institute has put in place for these cases,” giving preference to married men over single men.

376 colonists applied and there were 271 lots to be divided up on the expropriated farms so 105 applicants had to be eliminated. Nine applicants directly appealed their rejection. The INC underlined that these rejected applicants had “fewer merits” while admitting that this did not mean “they did not have necessity for land.”⁴⁷ Antonio Simancas was eliminated because he was single and under the authority of his father when he made his decision and did not have sufficient economic problems. Jacinto Torres was eliminated for the same set of reasons. Gabriel Torres did not present his

⁴⁵ Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros*, 486. This state of affairs lasted until the INC reformed the selection guidelines further in 1963.

⁴⁶ Ingeniero Jefe of the National Institute of Colonization to Delegado Provincial de Sindicatos, March 7 1951, AHCEA.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

application on time. Ezequiel Nieto was among the “least deserving” since he was single and his father was well off with a truck transportation business in which his son helped. His recent economic misfortune could not be taken into account since the divvying up of lots was based on the applicants’ circumstances at the time when the application was made. Félix Fernández, who also had difficulties turning in his application, should have objected to his rejection immediately since he did seem to meet the preferences of the INC. The same occurred for Alejandro Nieto. Julián Ruiz was eliminated as a result of his possession of both *secano* land and olive trees, and was therefore considered well off. Francisco Conde and Francisco Sereno owned too much land to be considered, both irrigated and *secano*, although Sereno’s son was conceded an INC plot. Especially at this early juncture, it would appear that the INC required applicants, after they had met a series of other criteria, to be poor enough to be worthy of economic aid.

A case of mistaken identity further illustrates this. In one instance, an applicant from Jerez de los Caballeros was confused with another resident of the same name (Juan González Romero).⁴⁸ The other González was too wealthy to be a colonist and the actual applicant was mistakenly disqualified on these grounds. However, after a protest, his information was reinvestigated, and it was found that he was actually in an extremely precarious situation.⁴⁹ Moreover, his political and moral conduct, agricultural skills and number of children placed him at the top of the *Hermandad*’s list for potential colonists.⁵⁰

One noteworthy aspect of the whole mix-up was that while the INC seemed to require a

⁴⁸ Jefe de la Hermandad de Jerez de los Caballeros to Ingeniero Jefe, January 21 1957.

⁴⁹ “No posee medios suficientes de vida.” Ibid.

⁵⁰ “En su consecuencia, rectificamos dicho informe, aclarando que el solicitante no posee medios suficientes de vida, y tanto por sus condiciones morales, como por su práctica agrícola en *secano* y regadío, así como por el número de hijos, datos todos estos que se desprenden de su expediente, esta clasificado entre los primeros para la asignación de parcelas.” Ibid.

certain amount of need; mayors and sometimes Hermandades saw the INC as an escape valve for the most impoverished inhabitants of their towns.

Calls for colonist applications were posted in targeted towns throughout the province after the INC finished constructing a town (or before in the case of Valdelacalzada). The 1957 call for colonists for two new large farms – Encomienda Nueva and Entrerríos both adjoining Villanueva de la Serena in the Vegas Altas – typifies the requirements of the INC up until 1963. Colonists were invited to apply who were married or widowed with children and who were residents where the announcement was made (in this case Villanueva de la Serena or Puebla de Alcocer, although the announcement also would have been made in several other nearby towns). The INC preferred colonists to have been working in agriculture for at least the last two years and possess some capital, which could include equipment, plough and tools. They could not have previously left a plot on either of the expropriated farms or have been expelled from them in the past. Nor could they have any hereditary conditions or physical disabilities that would limit their capacity for labor. And of course, they would have to prove an “acceptable” moral and political conduct.⁵¹ Preference would be given to those who could read and write, those who had knowledge of how to farm with irrigation and those who had more children. In Puebla de Alcocer it was also announced that those with more male children would be preferred.⁵² The application forms, one for *yunteros* and one for *jornaleros*, were then sent to the local Hermandades where they could be picked up.

⁵¹ Manuel García de Oteyza, “Concurso para la selección de colonos para su instalación en los lotes vacantes de patrimonio familiar de las fincas ‘Entrerríos’ y ‘Encomienda Nueva’,” December 6 1957, AHCEA.

⁵² “Concurso para adjudicar 31 lotes vacantes de la finca ‘Entrerríos’,” December 15 1956, AHCEA.

Rather than flexibility simply resulting in an inconsistent and incompetent selection, the selection process provides a clearer vision of the INC's purposes. To determine the suitability for membership in a new community, personal recommendations as well as capacity to demonstrate the regime's ability to complete a socio-economic transformation were as important as official criteria. Official INC criteria and the suggestions of local INC engineers and municipal notables often led to conflicting interpretations of the INC's colonization mission, but the discretion given to the INC to act flexibly reinforced its authority over those who did, or hoped to, participate in the Plan Badajoz and underlined the importance of social mission to the INC engineers.

4.3.3. Colonist Applications and Complaints

Petitions of applicants, and protests against rejection, captured the peasantry's hope for an expansion of the regime's limited social promises. In October 1956, Franco visited the towns, reservoirs and irrigated lands of the Plan Badajoz. While being filmed for one of the propaganda reels shown before films, he made his central speech in Valdelacalzada, the first town constructed and colonized by the INC in the region.⁵³ He stood in the center of the town and celebrated the recently inaugurated Cíjara reservoir as a continuation of the "revolution" he began during the Civil War.⁵⁴ All the actions of the Plan Badajoz "constituted the execution of a promise, they complete the true execution of a policy and the satisfaction of legitimate wishes."⁵⁵ For Franco, Badajoz would serve as

⁵³ Francisco Franco, "Discurso pronunciado con ocasión del acto de inauguración del Nuevo pueblo de Valdelacalzada," in *Discursos y Mensajes del Jefe del Estado* (Madrid: Dirección General de Información, 1960), 243-249. See also Noticiario y Documentales Cinematográficos, "N. 719 B: El Plan Badajoz," October 15 1956, <http://www.rtve.es/filmoteca/no-do/not-719/1487154/>

⁵⁴ "Como vamos llenando de contenido nuestra revolución, que habéis vivido un día tras otro en estas realizaciones durante estos quince años." Ibid.

⁵⁵ "Constituyen la ejecución de una promesa, encierran el cumplimiento fiel de una política y la satisfacción de unos legítimos anhelos." Ibid.

an example to the nation of what could be accomplished through a new sense of loyalty and discipline. There, the revolution proposed by Franco and his Falange would be “filled with content” by the transformation of the landscape. This true democracy, which was based on families and vertical syndicates, would result in the “growth of Spain, filling Spain with trees and crops, creating these new towns, irrigating these fierce lands, raising these factories, these huge power plants and all of this great work.”⁵⁶

Just in the year 1957, the Guadiana delegation of the INC, the central office of the INC, and the Ministry of Agriculture, received over 95 letters from hopeful colonists (apart from official application forms). Almost all of these were petitions to participate in the Plan Badajoz as colonists. These letters, brief though they were, provide a further glimpse of ordinary Spaniards’ vision of the promises of the Plan Badajoz, particularly its link to the rhetoric and personal interest of Franco. The letters to Franco in particular give us a sense of those who wished to participate but were unable (for they often wrote to Franco after an initial rejection by the INC). Not just anyone would be led to express indignation or disappointment to the government – a somewhat uniform group of petitioners emerge. They were usually middle-aged (over 40), often veterans and fathers of large families. In short, they were those who might expect to prosper from the triumph of Franco in the Civil War, but had been left out. They demonstrate that there were a series of shared strategies used by the petitioners that had as their foundation the Plan Badajoz as a mechanism to help those who found themselves impoverished through misfortune.

⁵⁶ “Ensanchando España, llenando España de arboles y de cultivos y creando estos nuevos pueblos, regando estas feraces tierras, levantando estas fabricas, estas grandes centrales eléctricas y toda esta obra ingente. Y ello es solo una faceta del resurgimiento de España.” Ibid.

While some of these petitions to the INC were written informally as letters, the large majority were formal *instancias*. The writer would identify himself (almost always a man), state his place of origin and residence, his marital status and number of children, and then make a request to be considered for a plot of land or *huerto familiar* (smaller plot of land with the house located there instead of in a nearby town). Before the application, the writer would also present any features that would especially qualify him for a plot. Within the strictures of this format, the letters vary in length, tone, qualifications and author. Priests, mayors and the presidents of Hermandades wrote a number of letters on behalf of colonists. Some were written or typed by a more literate acquaintance, or at least someone with clearer handwriting.

The letters generally capture what applicants thought would make them ideal candidates and also what strategies actually increased their chances. Many of the letters to the INC, or forwarded by the household of Franco or the minister of agriculture, were motivated by a lack of success in achieving a plot through the selection system employed by the INC, which often translated to dissatisfaction, if not outright anger. What becomes clear is that there was a general misunderstanding that the deeper the poverty you found yourself in, the more likely the INC was to help you. However, applicants correctly intuited that being a skilled farmer was not enough to make a good candidate. They had to prove themselves worthy of being part of an exclusive community and you had to embody the fulfillment of a promise by the regime, a promise to care for those wounded during the Civil War or impoverished by the eviction. What the letters demonstrate is that everyone involved, INC officials, local governments and potential colonists, understood colonization to be a project of restoration or resurrection of a

community. But who exactly got to capitalize on their wounds was a source of anxiety. Letter writers understood correctly that colonization was for “*Buenos Españoles*” and desperately tried to make their qualifications clear.

The most obvious qualification for the new community for these letter writers was to begin as extremely poor since Franco had seemed to portray the Plan Badajoz as a remedy for poverty. But the INC was only interested in those who were not too poor, such as *yunteros*. Ideal colonists would already possess some of the habits that would help them move from a dependent state (subject to false political ideas because of poverty) to an independent state (sharing the regime’s values). Applicants mistakenly believed they had to show the deepest poverty possible that was not their responsibility. One applicant did not own anything more than “the day and the night.”⁵⁷ The most common form of poverty was of course family poverty. It was not just that an applicant was poor; it was that he was supporting a substantial number of children who could not find work or a mother who was no longer able to take care of herself.

More successful petitioners might present themselves as subjects of a series of unfortunate circumstances besides poverty. Those who applied underlined their disabilities, wounds (especially wounds from the Civil War⁵⁸), mistreatment by landowners, poor family situations, or the fact that they had been affected by INC or other government intervention (such as being tenants on an expropriated farm) were much more likely to receive sympathy. The absence of applications from many other segments of the population made clear the nature of the INC’s political project. If you

⁵⁷ “Sin más capital que la noche y el día.” Eduardo Cáceres to Ingeniero Jefe, May 8 1957, AHCEA.

⁵⁸ See Mayor of Novelda del Guadiana to Ingeniero Jefe on behalf of Manuel Viera Cortes, February 12 1957, AHCEA.

were a former Republican, or if you could not get a favorable recommendation from your town hall, why even apply?

The wish of successful colonists had to be for a new beginning, and this was not meant simply metaphorically. To participate in the INC projects on irrigated lands, applicants would have to sell off whatever property they possessed and relocate unless they were one of those who rented or sharecropped on an expropriated farm. Those with a minimum of capital were targeted because colonists were expected to be able to support themselves through two months of schooling about irrigation farming before taking possession of their plot in either the fall or spring. Some colonists failed to move onto their land because they simply could not give up working their own land. Even those who were able to finish their classes could be unable to participate. Juan Vasco reassured the chief engineer of the Guadiana region that he had “finished the course on irrigation (of which I have a diploma) in the months of September and October” and requested to start in the spring, “since that was the best time for those lacking in capital and equipment.”⁵⁹

4.3.4. The Response to Franco’s Promises

Franco’s depiction of a revolutionary land reform had seemed as much of a promise to potential colonists as the Fuero de los Españoles had to local officials during the 1940s. From the conclusion of Franco’s visit until November of 1959, twenty-six letters were forwarded from the household of Franco through the Ministry of Agriculture to the Guadiana delegation, located in Badajoz. The letters to Franco followed very

⁵⁹ “Que habiendo [sic] echo el curso en la escuela de regantes (de la cual poseo diploma) en los meses de septiembre y Octubre; y debido a circunstancias económicas Les ruego me conceda el ingreso en la próxima primavera por ser la época mas favorable para empezar con pocos medios.” Juan Vasco Calderón to Ingeniero Jefe, February 10 1957, AHCEA.

similar tropes to those addressed to the INC. Except for one colonist who owned an uninsured farm that had burnt due to a spark from a tractor owned by the provincial government of Cáceres, all the petitioners wished to be considered for parcels of land in the Vegas Bajas. A few had written several times to Franco after being rejected by the INC. One wished for a larger parcel for his family rather than a *huerto familiar* (a house with small field attached), while another hoped just for a *huerto familiar*. Only two petitioners were from outside of Extremadura (both from Carcastillo, Navarra), and only a few were from the province of Cáceres, and they were from Miajadas and Madrigalejo, towns adjacent to the Vegas Bajas, just across the provincial border.

The large majority of applicants were from a smattering of small towns in rural Badajoz within a stone's throw of the irrigated Vegas Bajas or Altas. Only one was actually from the city itself.⁶⁰ These applicants knew that the INC focused on choosing local colonists. This was the case for Andrés Espada, who had moved from Sevilla to Montijo with the hopes of participating in the Plan: "Being a father of 11 children, seven of them males, the youngest 11, and having moved from the province of Sevilla to the Montijo area with the hope that the INC would give me a plot of land to work with my sons and to resolve the problem of their sustenance, I've become a resident of Puebla de la Calzada where I've lived for the last two years."⁶¹ What he was doing in the

⁶⁰ Two were from Hornachos, two from Montijo, two from Puebla de la Calzada and two were from Orellana la Vieja.

⁶¹ "Siendo padre de "once hijos" y entre ellos siete varones el menor de once años y habiéndome trasladado de la provincia de Sevilla a la Zona de Montijo con la ilusión de que el Instituto Nacional de Colonización me diera una parcela donde trabajar con ellos y tener asequiada [sic] el sustento de los mismos para lo cual me hice vecino de Puebla de la Calzada donde resido hace dos años." Andrés Espada to Francisco Franco, February 15 1957, AHCEA.

meantime, he did not state. But he had applied to the INC, attempting “in every possible way to achieve that small piece of land.”

Espada’s exceptionally large family was no accident since we know that the INC stressed number of children as a criterion in selecting colonists. Almost all of the petitioners to Franco possessed huge families. Of those that mention their children, three had families with more than ten children and another eight had at least five. Francisco Prieto had twelve children “living at my expense and in my house and unable to find work in the town where we are living as a result of its rural location and lack of industry or any other careers outside of agriculture.” He was angered that many families “of similar conditions or even better ones,” settled in the Vegas Bajas around Montijo.⁶² While he knew that that the national declaration of a social problem in a municipality was more important for a potential colonist than personal poverty, he hastened to add that Don Álvaro, the town from which he originated, had proportionally as large unemployment as many of the towns that were declared to have a social problem.

A few applicants were quite particular in their requests. These were most often men who had experience with irrigation agriculture. Armando León, a fruit-tree cultivator from Valencia, had specific demands. He wished to be:

Given an extension of six or seven hectares of bean-shaped irrigated land, preferably in the Vegas Altas since they are more apt for it [presumably growing fruit trees], with adjacent transport for the visits of buyers and the shipping of plants, in order to dedicate myself to the green house cultivation of fruit trees in distinct varieties with thoughts of extending this important cultivation throughout the province of Badajoz in the

⁶² “Que siendo padre de doce hijos, todos viviendo a mi costa y expensas y en mi domicilio, y no pudiéndose emplear ninguno en el pueblo donde residimos, por ser termino rural y no existir ni industrias ni otros medios de vidas que la agricultura...se están afincando a muchos padres de familias en mis condiciones o incluso mejores.” Francisco Prieto to Francisco Franco, August 1, 1957, AHCEA.

irrigated Vegas Altas and Bajas that, in spite being lands of excellent quality find themselves almost totally lacking fruit trees.⁶³

Armando, an applicant from Valencia, was only willing to move to the areas of the Plan Badajoz if a series of requirements were met. He also had a sense of his own prestige; tree cultivation was much trickier than the cultivation of most staple-crops, and the INC sought applicants with experience in it. Some applicants were angry. Román Millán Rodríguez wrote on behalf of himself and three other agricultural workers asking how others could have received parcels before them: “since we have in this town [Montijo] inhabitants who do not need it [land]...and who have had it conceded to them in the municipality without having any right, since they already have more than enough capital.”⁶⁴ Veterans of the Civil War could be particularly indignant that others had received plots before they did.

But in spite of the occasional assertive application, the general portrait that emerges from these letters is of a set of applicants who hoped for, and felt themselves deserving of, a bit of the social aid offered by the INC, even if they did not expect success. The colonists believed, at times mistakenly, that their suitability to serve as colonists would come from how well they embodied the social vision of landscape transformation laid out in regime propaganda and policies, including earlier INC

⁶³ “Adjudicarle una extensión de seis o siete Has. de terreno regadío formado de alubión, preferible en las vegas altas por ser más apto para ello, con buenas vías de comunicación para visita de compradores y salida de plantas, para dedicarlo al cultivo de vivero de árboles frutales en sus distintas variedades con miras a extender este importantísimo cultivo en las zonas altas y bajas de regadío de toda la provincia de Badajoz que, siendo tierras de excelente calidad, se hallan casi en su totalidad despobladas de árboles frutales.” Armando León Valero to Director General of Colonization, Alejandro Torrejón, October 22 1957, AHCEA.

⁶⁴ “Que habiendo en este pueblo vecinos que no le hacen falta, como lo que nosotros solicitamos y le han sido concedido unas parcelas de terreno para su cultivo en termino municipal de Montijo (Badajoz) sin tener derecho a ello, por contar con capital en cambio, los que antes mencionan, que cada cual tenemos de seis a siete hijos y nuestras respectivas esposas.” Román Millán Rodríguez to Francisco Franco, December 31 1956, AHCEA.

guidelines. 39-year old Juan José Motera Castaño from Nogales in Badajoz, a “veteran of the national crusade wounded at the battle of the Zujar”⁶⁵ in Extremadura wished to be considered as well as Jacinto Amarillo Pato, another veteran who, perhaps because of his age (he was 47) or because he only had one child, had been unsuccessfully applying for a parcel for three years. He was especially incensed that parcels had been given to people with no idea of what to do with them.⁶⁶ Pablo Blanco Rojo just wished for somewhere to settle down after working for three years in construction (INC officials complained that he was a poor worker).⁶⁷ All of the characteristics highlighted by the applicants (military service, misfortune in finding property, moral uprightness) would seem to make them ideal citizens of postwar Spain, but contrary to their expectations, they were left out of the more ambitious state actions in Badajoz because of their age or because they didn’t meet other requirements.

Although the Plan Badajoz privileged applicants from Badajoz, and especially those from expropriated lands or nearby areas, the INC filtered the provincial population. The criteria concerning age, and the requirement of a completely new start, must have discouraged older applicants. Furthermore, projects were never designed to take more than a small portion of applicants. Resettling 5,000 colonists with their families was not a small task, especially because the families were generally large, but it never made a dent in province with a population of 830,000. Even excluding the two largest cities

⁶⁵ “Excombatiente en la cruzada nacional, herido 25 agosto 1938 in the battle of the Zujar.” Juan José Motera Castaño to Francisco Franco, September 11 1957, AHCEA.

⁶⁶ Jacinto Amarillo Pato to Francisco Franco, April 23 1957, AHCEA.

⁶⁷ Pablo Blanco Rojo to Francisco Franco, June 1957, AHCEA.

(Badajoz, and Mérida) the rural population remained above 700,000.⁶⁸ After 1960, the population dropped precipitously in the province, particularly in rural areas. The colonization towns themselves were largely protected from this trend until the 1970s, but they achieved this stability by only bringing in selected colonists from all over the province.

4.3.5. Colonias Penitenciarias Militarizadas

The identity of the laborers involved in the building of the new towns and their hydraulic infrastructure confirmed that the INC's purpose remained a redemptive and exemplary transformation of rural Spain rather than increasing productivity for its own sake. The INC and the Confederation of the Guadiana depended on the Colonias Penitenciarias Militarizadas (CPM) – an organization founded during the Civil War to employ Republican prisoners of war and help them “redeem” their sin of fighting for the Republic through labor on public works projects – until 1960 when most of the Plan's infrastructure had been completed. There were six divisions (*agrupaciones*) of the CPM organized geographically with the second based in Montijo at the heart of the Vegas Bajas.⁶⁹ General Quiapo de Llano, who captured Sevilla at the outbreak of the Civil War and terrorized its population, first proposed prison labor be used for hydraulic works though the Colonias Penitenciarias Militarizadas was not officially formed until September of 1939.⁷⁰ The CPM *agrupación* at Montijo was principally responsible for the construction of the Montijo Canal, the first part of what would later be the Plan

⁶⁸ Instituto Nacional de Estadística, “Provincia de Badajoz: censo de población y viviendas de 1960,” accessed on November 9, 2017, <http://www.ine.es/inebaseweb/pdfDispacher.do?td=126706&ext=.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Gonzalo Acosta Bono, *El canal de los presos (1940-1962): trabajos forzados de la represión a la explotación*, (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004).

⁷⁰ “Ley creando las ‘Colonias Penitenciarias Militarizadas,’” *BOE*, September 17, 1939.

Badajoz. The pay was extremely low, only an average of 2.3 pesetas a day.⁷¹ Prisoners could earn their freedom faster through work. To be granted conditional liberty, the prisoners had to have the approval of the Local Junta of Parole (Junta Local of Libertad Vigilada), which consisted of a priest, a member of FET-JONS' Women's Section, and a local mayor. 1,470 prisoners worked in Montijo. Although work conditions were brutal, and many prisoners were declared to be unfit (*inútil*) for work, only three died while residents.⁷²

Before 1942 very few prisoners were released, but in that year 130 prisoners were granted their freedom, and after that prisoners were steadily released until 1946 when only 37 prisoners were left. After 1946, the government made an effort to rid the CPM of prisoners, conforming to international pressure.⁷³ Most of those who still had sentences to fulfill were sent to the prison at Dos Hermanas outside Sevilla. However, this did not mean that the CPM ceased to exist. Instead only free laborers could work for the organization. Many of the freed prisoners (although it seems impossible to determine how many) continued to work there since it was more complicated to find work elsewhere since prisoners' "social reinsertion could be very complicated, being the object of frequent rejections, in labor as well as social terrain, by a society that considered them disaffected and preferred to live apart from them."⁷⁴

⁷¹ José Luis Gutiérrez Casalá, *Colonias penitenciarias militarizadas de Montijo: represión franquista en el partido judicial de Mérida*, (Mérida: Regional de Extremadura, 2003).

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ "Su reinsertión social se tornaba de lo más complicada, siendo objeto de frecuentes rechazos, tanto en el terreno social como en el laboral, por una sociedad que los consideraba desafectos y prefería vivir alejados de ellos. Con el transcurso de los años, esa posición varió, produciéndose, aunque con ciertas reservas, su integración." Ibid.

As late as 1957 an employee of the CPM, Joaquín Nuñez, wrote to the INC engineer Angel Maqueda asking for a parcel through the INC:

Through the mediation of a few gentlemen I have filled out these forms in order to request (a parcel). I'm an agricultural laborer from Bienvenida, but for more than three years I've worked for the firm of colonias penitenciarias in the irrigation zones. I was in Montijo and am now in Jerez [de los caballeros], meaning that I'm a mobile worker, having no fixed residence. I work where the business sends me. I want to tell you with this that I'm not sure if I have the right to receive these benefits since I don't work in agriculture anymore...⁷⁵

The letter makes clear how much Nuñez depended on the CPM. He could make himself understood in writing but had a hard time spelling and explicitly depended on the impulse and guidance of others to make his application. Furthermore, he was without a fixed home to return to, he worked “wherever” the business sent him. Although the CPM might only depend on the labor of a few prisoners after 1946, the free laborers it did possess were clearly bound to it by more than the usual ties of a business to its employees.

The CPM worked closely with the INC in almost all of its irrigation projects until 1962. The heads of the two organizations made contracts together. The INC used the CPM as a means to keep costs down. The normal INC practice was to have private companies bid for construction projects, but if time was of the essence or if businesses rescinded their contracts, the CPM was called upon to finish jobs. It did not work for profit (“*lucro*”) since it was an institution of the state. This meant that disputes over

⁷⁵ Por mediación de unos señores, me é hecho de dichos impresos para poder solicitar. Soy un obrero Agrícola de Bienvenida, pero hace más de tres año trabajo en la Empresa de Colonias Penitenciarias en los zonales [sic] del regadío, estube en Montijo y ahora en Jerez, es decir obrero ambulante, y no tengo residencia fija. Tabajo donde me mande la empresa. Quiero decirle con esto que no se si tendré derecho a percibir dichos veneficios, por nó seguí actuando en la agricultura.” “Joaquín Nuñez to Ángel Maqueda,” February 16 1957, AHCEA.

contracts could be resolved between ministers of the state without the pressure of a company seeking profit, and also without the pressure of wage demands from employees since the CPM only offered very low wages.

The last projects for the CPM seem to have begun in 1959. The first irrigation works and accompanying towns in the Vegas Bajas were finished by then – only a few final small projects would be completed in the early 1970s (such as the town of Lácara), but the Orellana Canal still remained to be finished in the Vegas Altas. The CPM was given responsibility for more than half of the sectors of the new canal. It had to take over even more sectors when the director of a firm specializing in the supply of concrete, rescinded its contract with the INC.⁷⁶ The original contract depended upon the INC's assurance to the company that it could gather the materials for cement from the riverbanks near the construction site. These sites were soon exhausted, and the INC also changed its plans for the different sectors, increasing costs. With only 25% of the project done, the contract was terminated, which troubled the INC since it hoped to begin cultivation, which required irrigation, later in the year. The chief engineer of the Guadiana delegation wrote to the director general of the INC seeking approval for giving the works required for cultivation to the CPM and later gave it the rest of the works called for in the original contract.⁷⁷

In February of 1959, the colonel in charge of the Montijo *agrupación* wrote to the director general asking for more work. According to him, the CPM had assisted the INC in the conclusion of more than 5,000,000 pesetas worth of work since 1942, and had built

⁷⁶ Manuel de la Torre y Rousseau to Director General del Instituto Nacional de Colonización, 27 July 1959, AHCEA.

⁷⁷ Ingeniero Jefe de la delegación del Guadiana to Alejandro Torrejón, Director General of the INC, October 10 1959, AHCEA.

up a stable of skilled workers.⁷⁸ Perhaps since he sensed that most of the large-scale canal construction was over, he highlighted his “employees” skill in building and fixing drainages. He thought that the provision of work by the INC was urgent because, apart from some jobs that would conclude in April for the Confederación Hidrográfica del Guadiana, the Montijo section of the CPM had no other contracts for that year, and the state risked losing a group of skilled workers. But, the need for the organization had run its course. The regime may have kept employing the CPM, but the large-scale construction projects for which it was needed had been largely completed. Over its years working for the INC (and the Confederación Hidrográfica del Guadiana), the CPM had proved to be an invaluable resource for the meeting of objectives. The dependence on it demonstrated the INC’s hypocrisy – where colonists had to maintain account books, the INC could undercut the price of labor to meet its deadlines. The dependence on the CPM makes clear that the INC’s upper echelons embraced Keynesianism not solely to boost productivity, but to instill a sense of hierarchy. The INC used state spending to reinforce its authority over rural inhabitants and targeted its efforts at only those it found deserving.

4.4. Conclusion

The Keynesian justification for INC projects represented more of a change in tactics than a tack in course. The amount of acreage irrigated and settled increased exponentially in the 1950s, the INC’s period of peak prestige, but this had been anticipated since the end of the Civil War. The INC’s intellectuals confirmed this. They never broke with the social purpose of the INC that depended on its authority to transform a select group of colonists. The use of the Colonias Penitenciarias and the

⁷⁸ General Jefe de Colonias Penitenciarias to Director General of the National Institute of Colonization, February 4 1959, ACMAPAMA.

selections of colonists confirm the INC's familiar goals: stability and security. But how should we square this desire for stability with the grand modernist ambitions of the new towns and the revolutionary rhetoric of Franco, not to mention the dreams of potential colonists? One explanation for the great expectations incited by the irrigations of large zones is that they were the result of misleading propaganda. Franco may have believed in the existence of his rural revolution, but its functioning belied any interference in the overall structure in this view. I would argue, instead, that the ambitions of the projects coincided with the quest for control. The careful designs of towns, the financial assistance provided to colonists (even accounting for debts collected) and the careful responses to potential or rejected colonists came from a belief in the state's power to steer modernization through irrigation. The social promise to aid rural tenants at the heart of colonization was purposefully limited and exacted great costs (in price and especially labor⁷⁹), but it was still a social promise.

⁷⁹ Gómez Benito, *Una revisión y una reflexión*, 80.

Chapter 5 – Tensions, Property and Independence: Miguel Siguán’s Study of the Plan Badajoz

5.1. Introduction

The most comprehensive study of the Plan Badajoz’s colonization program, carried out by the National Institute of Colonization (INC), never quite saw the light of day. Following the success of his prize-winning analysis of the emigration from the countryside to the growing slums on the outskirts of Spain’s cities, the industrial psychologist Miguel Siguán was asked to investigate the social consequences of the Plan Badajoz.¹ He shared the INC’s understanding that the Plan, particularly its colonization program, should modernize a portion of the peasantry, transforming them into responsible citizens, making him a perfect hire for the Plan’s coordinating committee. Siguán wrote a compelling, balanced account of the INC’s management of colonists. He dearly hoped for general publication, but his pretension to objectivity made for a portrait that was too critical for the Plan’s oversight committee’s liking. It ruled that the study could only be distributed to government officials and carefully chosen experts.

Although it was never widely published, the study in fact reveals how colonists often escaped from the gaze of the INC or contravened its directives. More importantly, it reveals the tensions within the regime’s social engineering program in Badajoz. A faith in irrigation to revive rural life and rebuild a sense of nationalism in the countryside undergirded the process of colonization, which included close political and economic supervision of colonists. The distribution of irrigated property to colonists and the

¹ Miguel Siguán, *Del campo al suburbio: un estudio sobre la inmigración interior en España*, (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Junta de Estudios Económicos, Jurídicos y Sociales, 1959) and *Colonización y desarrollo social*.

construction of new towns was intended to boost production as well as to create social stability, guarantee adherence to the regime and develop responsible, modern citizens. Siguán's study captured the contradictions at the heart of colonization efforts precisely because he sympathized with the goals of this development project. In his previous work, and in his study of the colonists of the Plan Badajoz, he proved to be an enthusiastic proponent of the cultural modernization of Spain's peasantry. Like the INC, he saw traditional culture as backward and unsuitable for success in an industrialized country. The crucial difference between his own values and the INC's was his liberal emphasis on colonist independence and active citizenship. The INC aimed to modernize peasants, teaching them to be economically self-sufficient, but could not countenance disobedience.

Siguán pinpointed one of the principal difficulties for the INC: navigating its relationship to colonists. What were the obligations of the INC towards colonists and of colonists towards the INC? What would happen in the event of a colonist's failure to manage his plot properly? As colonists moved through the steps of the INC program (the period of "tutelage" and the period of "accession to property," each designed to last five years),² the INC was forced to consider these questions carefully. Serious colonization efforts, the large-scale management of colonists in newly constructed towns rather than in scattered independent farms, began with the settlement of Valdelacalzada in the Vegas Bajas 1948. In 1955, a circular was sent out to "update and adapt" the older guidelines regarding the relationship between the INC and colonists "to the new conditions created

² During the period of *tutela* the colonist was under the strict supervision of the local INC agronomist. During the period of *acceso a la propiedad* he enjoyed more independence.

by the colonization of large irrigated zones.”³ It attempted to set rules for the activities of INC officials in the new towns and incidentally captured the strains between the economic and social mandates of the INC.

The circular made clear that the first priority of the INC had to be the increase in agricultural production of the zone; the second was the social development of colonists. This seemed simple enough for INC officials – agricultural supervision was their first task, the oversight of colonist behavior could be taken care of later. However, as the circular acknowledged, separating social and economic goals proved difficult for an organization whose existence depended on a specific program of social uplift. Land could have easily been irrigated without being redistributed to poor provincial peasants. The general goal of the INC still “consisted in stimulating, improving and signaling the best path to achieve increased agricultural and livestock production in the area, and, to achieve this increase, an improved social harmony (*convivencia*) between the peasant families, which are, in reality, the active subjects of colonization.”⁴ Avoiding the supervision of social life was simply not possible; it was a “permanent” and “fundamental” task of the INC. The *convivencia* that the INC wished to create did not only come from peasant families working together; INC officials had to be ever present in the new towns working “elbow to elbow [with colonists] on everything that relates to

³ “Poner al día y adaptar a las nuevas condiciones creadas por la colonización de zonas regables las anteriormente dictadas sobre vigilancia técnica y económica de las fincas objeto de colonización directa por el Instituto.” Alejandro Torrejón, “Circular 330: Normas Provisionales para el desenvolvimiento agrícola y social de los nuevos pueblos y núcleos de colonización,” Madrid, January 5 1955, ACMAPAMA.

⁴ “Consiste en estimular, mejorar y en señalar [sic] el camino más adecuado para lograr la mayor explotación Agrícola y ganadera de la zona, y para lograr la mayor explotación asimismo, una mayor convivencia social entre las familias campesinas, que son en realidad los sujetos activos de la colonización.” Ibid.

the economic life of towns – on the repair and protection of buildings, streets and services.” They had to be present at all community “social and athletic events.”⁵

The purpose of the circular was not only to reaffirm the intertwining of the economic and social aspects of the INC’s mission. Social harmony was the only justification for the economic intervention of the INC. Working closely with colonists was meant to “convince [colonists] that they should be the first ones interested in broad economic improvement and that the Institute was in reality nothing more than a powerful support (“*auxiliar*”) that the State puts into their hands in order to show them the way and facilitate generously the necessary materials. In a word, the main role belongs to colonists and the supporting role to the Institute.”⁶ The INC alleged here that it held no obligations to colonists; it was only a benevolent supporter providing assistance and direction but holding no ultimate responsibility. This type of relationship would seem to allow colonists the room for maneuver that Siguán envisioned, but instead it set up what Siguán saw as a traditional relationship of dependence. The INC’s enormous power over the lives of colonists, combined with a lack of transparency, was a recipe for a dangerous amount of authority. Siguán did not criticize the INC’s power directly, but his idealism concerning the modernization of the peasantry led him to call attention to factors that reinforced a traditional skepticism towards state administration, as well as the possibility of upward mobility, throughout the study. This idealism emerged from a career devoted

⁵ “Hombre con hombre, con cuanta se relacione con la vida económica del pueblo, con la mejora y conservación de sus edificios, calles, servicios...en sus actas sociales y deportivos, en los servicios cooperativas que han de crear el espíritu indispensable para toda cooperación y en cuanto redunde en la mejora de la nueva vida rural.” Ibid.

⁶ “Convencimiento que son ellos y para su propia conveniencia, los primeros interesados en llevar a cabo la mayor explotación de sus tierra; que el Instituto no es en realidad más que un auxiliar poderoso que el Estado pone en sus manos para enseñarles el camino y facilitarles generosamente los medios necesarios. En una palabra, el papel principal corresponde a los colonos y el secundario al Instituto.” Ibid.

to investigating how the urban poor and peasants could adapt successfully to conditions created by industrialization.

5.2. Miguel Siguán's Study of Emigration

Miguel Siguán was born in Barcelona in 1918. He studied at the University of Barcelona to get his degree in philosophy during a time of enthusiasm for Catalan language, culture, and political autonomy. Under the supervision of the philosopher Joaquín Xirau, he took up an interest in phenomenology that would never leave him as he helped to establish psychology as a professional science and university discipline in Spain.⁷ Xirau introduced Siguán to works of psychology and also taught him that the “honest teaching work is the most dignified and satisfying lifestyle.”⁸ He first became interested in psychology during Spain's Second Republic while assisting at the Psychotechnical Institute (*Instituto Psicotécnico*) in Barcelona.⁹ The Psychotechnical Institute used applied psychology to help workers find the appropriate vocation based on tests and extensive interviews. After the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936, Siguán fought for the Republicans on the Teruel front, largely serving as a teacher to illiterate anarchist troops, and spent time afterwards in a concentration camp. It is unclear how he was able to fall on his feet, but he later stated that because of his determination to become a professor, he was able to teach classes and eventually become accredited as a secondary school (*Instituto de Segunda Enseñanza*) philosophy teacher in Santander on the northern coast of Spain.

⁷ Miguel Siguán, “Mi Vida Como Psicólogo,” *Revista de Historia de la Psicología* 5, no. 3 (1984), 5-36.

⁸ “Docencia honestamente ejercida es la forma más digna de vida y la más satisfactoria.” *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹ At the same time, he served as the secretary general of the Federació Nacional de Estudiants de Catalunya.

After four years, he had the opportunity to take a position as a full professor (*catedrático*) at the school in Santander, but felt a pulse of “panic” and left to try for a place at the University of Barcelona.¹⁰ He found himself working at another psychotechnical orientation office in one of the new suburbs of the city created by the influx of peasants from a countryside devastated by the war and the regime’s autarkic economic policies. He witnessed the efforts of some of the first worker-priests to alleviate poverty, later to become famous during the regime, and taught night classes. This new world demonstrated the inadequacy of his aptitude tests to help immigrants confront the destruction of traditional life caused by industrialization. He began reading social psychology and, after the conclusion of World War II, traveled to London where he contacted the personnel of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology.

His knowledge of industrial psychology allowed Siguán to take advantage of the economic growth of the 1950s as large companies anxious to manage their workforces moved into Spain.¹¹ The studies he performed for General Electric and Standard Eléctrica (a subsidiary of AT&T) launched his reputation. In 1954 he was able to make a successful study proposal to the *Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* (CSIC), where he had found a new position: an investigation of the causes and impact of accelerating immigration to cities from the countryside. The book that resulted, *From the Countryside to the Slum*, based on his summations and analysis of extensive interviews carried out by women social workers, won one a *Premio Nacional de Literatura* for 1958

¹⁰ Ibid. Siguán, “Mi Vida Como Psicólogo.”

¹¹ He worked for General Electric in Bilbao and Standard Eléctrica, a subsidiary of AT&T, in Madrid.

(the “Francisco Franco” award for a book that tackled a social topic).¹² The book’s success gave him the prestige to embark on a university career devoted to establishing psychology as an academic discipline in Spain.

While Siguán’s interests varied to a great degree during his career – from phenomenology to industrial psychology to bilingual education – two principles endured throughout his work: a humanist sense of the limitations of psychology as a science and a sympathy for those forced to suddenly adapt to the demands of industrial society even as it unquestionably brought them material benefits. He stated his understanding of the task of applied psychology in institutional contexts in his introduction to a translated industrial psychology textbook, written after he had found a permanent position at the University of Barcelona: “Applied psychology has for its object the study of human conduct at work and for its end the improvement of this behavior, making that conduct more enjoyable for the individual and more useful for society.”¹³ He was also always careful to underline that individual happiness depended on harmony with larger groups, rather than personal success: “*the personal meaning of work for a working man transforms itself into a more complicated and complete formulation: the relationship between the goals of the individual, the group and the organization* [italics in original].”¹⁴

In his *Del Campo al Suburbio (From the Countryside to the Slum)*, Siguán established the methodology and sympathies that also guided his later work on the Plan

¹² See Helio Carpintero, “Miguel Siguán y los Estudios sobre Emigración”, *Revista de Historia de la Psicología* 26, no. 2-3, 71-81 and “Concesión de los Premios Nacionales de Literatura,” *ABC*, December 23, 1959.

¹³ Miguel Siguán, “Selección del prologo al libro de M. Maier *Psicología Industrial*,” *Anuario de Psicología* no. extra (Homenaje al Profesor Miguel Siguán), 75-82.

¹⁴ “*El significado personal del trabajo para el hombre trabajador, se nos transforma en una formulación más compleja y completa, en la relación existente y posible entre objetivos del individuo, objetivos del grupo y objetivos de la organización.*” Ibid.

Badajoz. His understanding of modernization came from developmental psychology and matched well with the INC's own idea of creating morally and politically responsible peasants – the countryside was an infantile space, made secure by a combination of tradition and community. But in spite of its security, the word he continually used to characterize the situation in the contemporary countryside was “miserable” (*miseria*). Immigrants to the cities came with ambition and aspiration, but that had been the case for centuries and only explained a small trickle of migrants. The current flood of immigrants came to escape awful conditions – “the emigrant departs because the countryside kicks him out.”¹⁵

The typical immigrant examined in the study was a married man with kids who came to the city looking for factory or construction work but with experience exclusively in agriculture. This man “totally lacked the resources to take advantage of modern society.”¹⁶ For Siguán, immigrants (the term was only used in the study to refer to working men) could fail to adapt, adapt passively, or fully adapt. He began by noting three ways of viewing the new suburban dwellers who were arriving in greater and greater numbers: as a criminal class, as people deserving of charity or as victims of social injustice. He departed from all three of these views, arguing that the slum itself, by which he meant the *banlieu*-style suburbs spreading out from Barcelona and Madrid where recent arrivals to the city lived in self-constructed shacks (*chabolas*), was a “sub-product” of the immigrant’s “lack of adaption” to the city.¹⁷ Essentially, he claimed that

¹⁵ “El inmigrante se marcha porque el campo le echa.” Siguán, *Del Campo al Suburbio*, 19.

¹⁶ “Este hombre ni se hace ilusiones ni tiene ambiciones. Carece totalmente de medios para aprovechar las oportunidades de la sociedad moderna.” Ibid., 285.

¹⁷ “El suburbio no es, en efecto, la raíz de las dificultades del inmigrante, sino un subproducto de su falta de adaptación.” Ibid., 16.

immigrants were not prepared culturally for city life and could not be served effectively by charity or social reform unless they underwent a cultural transformation first.

The internal immigrants personified the distance between pre-modern and modern society. For Siguán, before he left the countryside the immigrant only dimly perceived the reality of city life: “the city is firstly the place where the rich (*señores*) live surrounded by the luxury of the comfortable life, a vague and difficult world to imagine, but in any case, diametrically opposed to the misery of the countryside.”¹⁸ The cultural gap faced by the immigrant was vast:

A few hours on the train devour the entire path that the city-dweller took at least three generations to go through. Without any hope of finding continuity, [the immigrant] passes directly from candles to electricity, from mule to the trolley, from plowed field to rationalized production, from recited romances to the panoramic screen, from medicinal herbs to penicillin, from an aristocratic and patriarchal society to an individualist and anonymous one.¹⁹

In the countryside peasants owed deference to a small wealthy class, were integrated into a close community from birth, and relied on tradition to guide them when faced with important decisions. This simply would not do in cities, where success depended on actively seeking out social services (especially healthcare and schools for children), community and employment. The principal defect the study identified in immigrants was a “passivity” that “was expressed in a certain fatalism...acquired from an ancestral

¹⁸ “La ciudad es, en primer término, el lugar donde viven los señores, el ambiente de la vida cómoda y del lujo, un mundo vago y difícil de imaginar, pero, en todo caso, diametralmente opuesto a la miseria del campo.” *Ibid.*, 231.

¹⁹ “En unas horas de tren devora el camino que el ciudadano ha invertido al menos tres generaciones en recorrer. Sin solución de continuidad pasa directamente del candil a la electricidad, del mulo al trolebús, del arado a la producción racionalizada, de los romances de ciego a la pantalla panorámica, de las hierbas medicinales a la penicilina, de una sociedad patriarcal y aristocrática a otra individualista y colectiva.” *Ibid.*, 268.

experience.”²⁰ Even when Siguán qualifies his portrayal of the vast gap between city and country, he underlines the ignorance of the immigrant:

It would be false to exaggerate this impression, believing that the immigrant faces the city as a monster that threatens to devour him. He has his own concerns, working and eating, that let him live. Most of what he sees, he doesn't understand or care about. The magnitude and the movement of the city can scare him, or the luxury can excite him, but, apart from accidental contacts, he establishes himself on the margin. Maybe he's crossed the *Gran Via* a couple of times, but his place is in the slum, that's not so different from the village.²¹

The keys that unlocked the process of adaptation were finding work and enrolling in social services, particularly medical insurance (a large number of the families had at least one case of illness or disability). Work and social services not only met basic needs, but also socialized the immigrant into his new urban living situation. Siguán advocated for a series of changes made to industrial businesses to give newly hired workers a sense of responsibility and control (such as making the process for deciding on raises and bonuses transparent), to educate them about social services and to better incorporate them into the social life of fellow employees. He also called for more state intervention in slums, which needed more schools for children and adults and improved social services, particularly health insurance.

The method of the study was based on his earlier experiences with applied psychology—he trusted qualitative assessments more than the collection of data and use of quantitative tests. Angela Femenía, a professor at the Santa María de la Almudena

²⁰ “Pasividad que se expresa en un cierto fatalismo, ante las inclemencia del tiempo como ante las injusticias de la sociedad, fatalismo adquirido en una experiencia ancestral.” Ibid., 248.

²¹ “Pero sería falso exagerar esta impresión, creer que el inmigrante se enfrenta con la ciudad como con un monstruo que amenaza devorarlo y que ha de conquistar. El va a lo suyo, a trabajar y a comer y a que le dejen vivir. La mayor parte de lo que ve ni lo comprende ni le importa. La magnitud y el movimiento de la ciudad puede asustarle o el lujo excitarle, pero, aparte algunos contactos accidentales, él se establece al margen. Quizá ha cruzado un par de veces la Gran Vía, pero su lugar está en el suburbio, que no es tan distinto del pueblo. La ciudad es como el monte del que hay que sacar la comida.” Ibid., 233.

school of social work in Madrid, helped Siguán generate the study's general questionnaire. She then coordinated the distribution of the questionnaire to the 100 families by a number of women social workers already employed by local companies.²² Then, Siguán analyzed small stories based on the experience of one hundred families. A single questionnaire was employed by the assistants – Siguán directed them to investigate how often the family returned to the town they migrated from as well as their state of employment, housing, childcare, education, free time activities, and use of social services. The assistants were encouraged to note any other observations they thought pertinent. The qualitative approach was further emphasized in the evocative titles given to each family write-up, titles such as: “Misery in the city compared to misery in the countryside” or “Although it doesn't happen very often, a construction laborer can ascend professionally through his own efforts.” A literary description of the members of the families followed: “Teodoro is a dependable and serious guy, and his appearance hints at having passed through great difficulties and labors.”²³

One aspect of the study that came from Siguán's emphasis on immigrant culture, or perhaps from the qualitative methodology that depended on home interviews, was a close attention to the wives of immigrants. As many section titles indicate, the wife was often blamed for a family's failure to adapt: “The terrible impediment caused by the ignorance of immigrants' wives, visible in so many stories, is well demonstrated in this one,” or “Illness and the character of the wife put in definitive danger the adaptation of

²² P. Hurtado Cubillas, “Dos Pueblos Extremeños: Valle de Santa Ana y Valdelacalzada,” *Anales de la Universidad de Murcia* 20, no. 1-2, 73-94.

²³ “La miseria en la ciudad, comparada con la miseria en el campo.” Siguán, *Del Campo al Suburbio*, 58.

this immigrant family, in other ways well oriented.”²⁴ A poor level of hygiene, a key criterion for the study’s researchers, is mostly ascribed to a wife’s passive or disconnected attitude. Her emotional fragility – seen in a desire to return to the countryside – could destroy the family’s hopes of staying in the city, “ruining all of the man’s efforts.”²⁵ Siguán believed that men on their own adapted much easier than men who brought their families along, but, he was also sensitive to the great responsibilities and difficulties faced by immigrant wives and to wives’ determinant influence on a family’s successful adaptation: “The equilibrium in morale and the material status of the family depends on her. And if her importance is similar to her husband, her job is much more difficult.”²⁶ While the male immigrant spent most of his time working, commuting, and going to bars, the wife usually had to take on the tasks of finding housing and schools, grocery shopping (a completely different experience in the city than in the country), incorporating the family into the neighborhood, and seeking out social services. In the opinion of Siguán and his assistants, the more control women exercised over the family, the more successful the family became. Because the wife had a much more accurate understanding of the family’s economic and social conditions, her advocacy became the chief impetus for ascending the social ladder through the purchases of a gas stove, linen, and a radio, and later, for upgrades in housing and neighborhood.

²⁴ “El terrible lastre que representa la ignorancia de la mujer inmigrante, visible en tantas historias, queda bien patente en esta (106),” “La enfermedad y el carácter de la esposa ponen en peligro definitivo la adaptación de esta familia inmigrante, por otra parte bien orientada,” “Teodoro es un hombre menudo, serio, y su aspecto denota haber pasado grandes privaciones y trabajos (108).” *Ibid.*, 106 and 108.

²⁵ “Arruina todos los esfuerzos masculinos y llega a hacer imposible la adaptación a una nueva forma de vida.” *Ibid.*, 252.

²⁶ “De ella depende en buena parte el equilibrio moral y la organización material de la familia en las nuevas condiciones. Y si su importancia es pareja, su función es más difícil.” *Ibid.*, 255.

Siguán's emphasis on immigrant culture, as well as the renown of his work, must have made him attractive to the *Secretaria Gestora* of the Plan Badajoz. He seemed to share in the paternalist ethos of the regime's regional development. Backwards peasants, for both Siguán and Plan officials, needed instruction on how to behave responsibly as industrialization transformed rural life. Moreover, Siguán was a champion of state intervention to balance the benefits of growth and combat the sense of dislocation caused by the disappearance of traditional communities.²⁷ However, in spite of these views in common, Plan officials misunderstood where Siguán's sympathies would lead him. While he saw nothing wrong with the INC's role as the supervisor of colonists, his own understanding of modernization, which involved replacing the deference and passivity of peasants with a consciousness of rights and responsibilities, caused him to condemn the INC's authoritarianism.

5.3. The Social Study of the Plan Badajoz

Between 1959 and 1963, Siguán completed a study of the Plan Badajoz colonists commissioned by its ruling committee. He worked with the INC's *Secretaria Gestora*, the agency responsible for coordinating the efforts of the various ministries and departments involved in the Plan and the publication of yearly progress reports. The major aim of the study, as defined by Siguán, was to "clarify the social evolution – individual and collective – of the colonists, understood as changes in conditions and attitudes." He also sought to grasp "the new problems that are produced by these changes

²⁷ He was, nevertheless, careful to state his opposition to totalitarianism. Ibid., 272-73.

and the probable future of this evolution in the colonized zone.”²⁸ Siguán intended to find the structural and the administrative causes to these problems.

As in his previous study, Siguán concerned himself with the culture and attitudes of colonists as much as with their material wellbeing. The task of the Plan, as understood by Siguán, was the “promotion of social development.” Economic growth was meaningless without social advancement.²⁹ Social development meant a change in attitude, discarding traditional passivity and deference for independence and participation. His appreciation for colonization as a communal and individual project of development would seem to have aligned him perfectly with the goals of the INC and the vision of the Plan Badajoz as a whole. The entire rationale for the Plan was predicated on colonization, the settlement of individual families and their subsequent modernization. They were meant to become self-sufficient farmers capable of managing the complications and business of irrigation-agriculture. However, as Siguán indicates, there was a contradiction at the heart of this process that he likened to parenting: how were colonists meant to become independent while following the orders of the INC to the letter? Over the course of the study, it became apparent that the INC held onto its authority over colonists jealously while shirking its responsibilities to them. The seriousness with which Siguán took the goal of social development, the hope that he invested in colonist independence in particular, led him to identify the INC’s failures.

²⁸ “En líneas generales el estudio intenta aclarar la evolución social - individual y colectiva - de los colonos, entendiendo por ello los cambios sucesivos en su situación y en sus actitudes, los nuevos problemas que así se producen y el futuro previsible de esta evolución en la zona colonizada.” Siguán, *Colonización y Desarrollo Social*, 3.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

Siguán borrowed the methodology from his previous study on emigration from the countryside. Again, he depended on the help of women social workers to collect information from families. This time, rather than one hundred families, each of the four Social Assistants took responsibility for visiting one town for two periods of two months and for carrying out in-depth interviews of ten families there.³⁰ The towns were chosen carefully: three from the Vegas Bajas, the first irrigated zone of the Plan Badajoz situated downriver between Mérida and Badajoz and the most densely settled, and one from the Vegas Altas, to the east of Villanueva de la Serena, much further upriver. In the Vegas Bajas, Valdelacalzada and Guadiana del Caudillo were chosen as the first-constructed and largest towns, while Villafranco del Guadiana was picked as the most recently constructed town. Valdivia was the largest town in the Vegas Altas. Siguán himself interviewed local and national officials involved with the Plan and visited representatives of colonist cooperatives. The final study was divided into four semi-independent volumes (*tomos*). The first, a 51-page introduction to the history of irrigation and agrarian reform, does not use any of the data collected during the study directly but instead presents Siguán's understanding of how the agricultural initiatives of the Franco regime differed from those of earlier Spanish governments. The second and third volumes, the economic and sociological sections of the book, closely analyze the study's data. The second volume examines the budgets of colonists and their families, while the third volume looks at the social structure and economies of the new towns. The last volume contains Siguán's conclusions about the successes and failures of the Plan, as well as his prognosis for its future.

³⁰ Ibid., 4 and Miguel Siguán, "Tercer informe sobre la investigación," February 16 1961, APDBA.

5.3.1. Shared Hopes for Rural Modernization

Siguán shared the INC's vision of a technical agrarian reform. He viewed colonization as being part of a series of actions by the nascent Francoist regime not only to re-instill order in the countryside following the land seizures that took place during the Civil War and the government of the Popular Front but also to begin a new kind of social revolution: "the consolidation of the new regime demanded a social program, destined to achieve a collective integration on the national plane."³¹ Where earlier efforts at agrarian reform sought property redistribution as an end in itself, the preoccupation of the Franco regime was increasing productivity through irrigation. The social ends came from redistributing this new land: "the social objective is met through the redistribution of irrigated lands since it wouldn't be logical for state efforts to only benefit existing landowners. Therefore, the agrarian reform, a term avoided for many years to prevent the associations it carries, is entrusted primarily to colonization."³² Siguán approved the rationale for INC actions in the countryside employed since its foundation in 1939: it was involved in a technical reform of the countryside that sought to increase production and the distribution of property through irrigation.

The modernization of the countryside brought about by this revolutionary rural program made possible its complete transformation. For Siguán, older towns, untouched by the INC, were a "dry stain" across the countryside.³³ Their locations, often on the

³¹ "La consolidación del nuevo régimen exigía un programa social, destinada a procurar una integración colectiva en el plano nacional." *Ibid.*, 37.

³² "El objetivo social inmediato se cifra entonces en la redistribución de la tierra así regada ya que no es lógico que la mejora producida por el esfuerzo estatal beneficie sólo a los antiguos propietarios. Así la reforma agraria, denominación que durante muchos años se evita por las reminiscencias que arrastra, se confía en primer lugar a la colonización." *Ibid.*, 39.

³³ "Mancha parda." *Ibid.*, 194.

summits of hills, owed more to the medieval need for protection from invasion than the efficient use of natural resources. Their streets were disorganized, “without order or space.”³⁴ Presenting an aspect of complete poverty, the towns had been stopped in time. The towns constructed by the INC, in contrast, were filled with wide spaces and clean white walls. Their “simple geometry and homogeneity” were clear signs that they had emerged from the conscious planning of the “ruler and drawing board.”³⁵ To halt the exodus from the countryside, or at least slow it down, a complete break with the past was required. The traditional landscape built around an antiquated mode of production had to be replaced by a landscape rationalized by experts from the INC.

For the INC and Siguán, the rural population needed to be transformed as much as the landscape. Siguán fixated on the “extremely low” (*bajísimo*) cultural level of the peasants in the study that justified the modernization efforts of the INC.³⁶ The Badajoz province proved to be fertile ground for Siguán’s disgust at the backwardness of peasants. They were illiterate, servile, without specialized knowledge of agriculture and, furthermore, they were plagued by a poor diet: “the nutrition of the Andalusian and Extremaduran peasant is traditionally deficient and unbalanced.”³⁷ Existence in the countryside was a permanent biological battle and had been for centuries – there was no mention that the devastating conditions could have been unique to the 1940s. Peasants were “resistant to misfortune,” “extraordinarily frugal,” but cursed by “apathy and scarce

³⁴ “Sin orden ni espacio.” Ibid.

³⁵ “Su ordenación simple, geométrica, y la homogeneidad de sus edificios revela inmediatamente que han sido deducidos directamente del plano y la maqueta, surgidos de una decisión en un pasado inmediato.” Ibid., 194.

³⁶ Ibid., 60, 65, 120, and 151.

³⁷ “La alimentación del campesino andaluz y extremeño es tradicionalmente deficiente y desequilibrada.” Ibid., 135.

ambition,” and a tendency towards ostentation.³⁸ All the peasants who became INC colonists were motivated by the direness of life in the countryside: all the testimony collected by the study “permits us to assume that the majority [of colonists] lived a miserable existence that barely surpassed biological subsistence.”³⁹

5.3.2. A Liberal View of Modernization

The first colonists were of particular concern for Siguán. They had been nominated by various provincial municipalities who understood the social project of colonization as to serve the poorest peasants, or perhaps as an opportunity to rid themselves of the most difficult segments of their populations (which may have been indicated by their clamoring for the INC social studies which made sending colonists much easier). He noted approvingly that it was now “possible to require some minimum cultural and professional conditions” because of the increased public knowledge of colonization, and therefore, the greater number of applications. Furthermore, where colonists were at first selected based on the seriousness of the “social problem” in their towns during most of the 1950s, now all applications were considered regardless of applicant origin, except in the cases of towns directly affected by state projects. For instance, the inhabitants of a town whose land was partially inundated because of the formation of a reservoir would be given preference if they met the minimum requirements of the INC. The guidelines for eligibility (colonists were still required to be older than 23 and younger than 50, free of disease and disability, and married or a widower with children) and for setting preferences (literacy, agricultural experience,

³⁸ Ibid., 149.

³⁹ “Todos los testimonios aducidos sobre la situación en el campo extremeño nos permiten suponer que la mayoría llevaban una existencia mísera que apenas sobrepasaba la subsistencia biológica.” Ibid., 69.

number of children able to work, amount of capital) could be much more rigorously applied. As a result, colonists began to be less prone to expulsion because of insolvency.

Being a colonist was indeed daunting. Each had five years to exit the period of “tutelage” during which he was under the strict supervision of the local INC agronomist and owed a portion of his harvest to the INC. Then came five years to pay off the debts owed to the INC for the parcel of land and any other extra assistance (tools, crops, repairs etc.). Siguán noted that this meant that although colonization became increasingly attractive as its fruits became known, it did not appeal to those who had already achieved a comfortable life. Becoming a colonist would seem to have been much less of a leap for a peasant than moving to the city – after all a colonist would still live in his province of origin and be involved in agriculture – but this was not the case. From his (and his reader’s) perspective, Siguán could predict success and see clearly that the colonist was presented with a “splendid opportunity.”⁴⁰ But from the colonist’s perspective (“ignorant and helpless” in Siguán’s words), nothing was certain at all, and his “hope was as big and vague as were his fears.”⁴¹ Moving to a new town meant losing the closeness of neighbors, friends, and relatives. Making it through to the first harvest forced colonists to rely on credit, and the income from that harvest was not enough to rid them of the debt. Often, irrigation works had not been completed, or seeds or tools had not arrived, at the time of settlement. Although the colonist was still located in the countryside, almost all had worked a series of jobs before (watchman, day laborer) rather than having been responsible for the care of their own piece of land. They had had little experience with agriculture (unless they were one of the few colonists brought in from Granada or

⁴⁰ Ibid., 77.

⁴¹ “Su esperanza es tan grande y tan vaga como sus temores.” Ibid.

Valencia to serve as examples to the others) and even less with livestock. Apparently, many feared their own cows.

For Siguán, though, successful adaptation went beyond material well-being. A colonist's ability to successfully take ownership of his own property, moving through both periods of INC supervision (tutelage and accession to property) depended on the able management of crops, livestock and finances, and could only emerge from a change in mentality. No longer could colonists be peasants dependent on external circumstances and favors (as peasants had needed to be under clientelist *caciquismo*), they would have had to prove themselves to be active managers of their own farms. Entering the second phase of colonization – the phase of “acceding to property” – demonstrated that colonists should be completely responsible for their own plots of land and had achieved financial independence, paying off their debts to the INC. Siguán understood the access to property as the most important signal that colonists had reached maturity in their relationships with the INC: “speaking in psychological language, we could say that we’re dealing with the passage from a situation of infantile dependence on paternal authority to a responsible, adult collaboration.”⁴² The hope was that each colonist would “slowly come to consider [the INC] as institution to which he owed duties but that also gave him rights.”⁴³ The traditional peasant attitude was inimical to this recognition, and throughout the work he highlighted its presence wherever he found it. Even during the phase of accession to property, which occurred after five years of being colonists, few colonists had any real expectation of obtaining property. Colonists seemed skeptical of the INC's

⁴² “Hablando un lenguaje psicológico podríamos decir que se trata de pasar de una situación de dependencia infantil frente a una autoridad paterna, a una colaboración adulta y responsable.” Ibid., 95.

⁴³ “Actitud puramente sumisiva del primer momento va pasando paulatinamente a considerarla como una institución frente a la que tiene deberes, pero también derechos.” Ibid.

efforts, lazy, quick to complain, loathe to work too closely together, and unconcerned about the future. Their critical attitude signaled to Siguán a “renouncement of responsibility,” a refusal to admit to agency in their own lives.⁴⁴ The cunning of colonists, the hope of outsmarting the INC, resulted from past experiences where effort did not necessarily result in appropriate rewards. Siguán’s entire report lamented this poor attitude, but at the same time highlighted its cause in the INC’s unwillingness to grant colonists independence. Perhaps the poor attitude that Siguán registered in the colonists’ relationship to the INC actually signaled their desire to take matters into their own hands.

Since researchers interviewed families at home, where “feminine influence was very visible,” the wives of colonists, just as in Siguán’s previous book on immigrants to the city, became the most important source of information for the social assistants: “the variety of feminine characters and personalities became much more apparent to investigators than those of men.”⁴⁵ According to Siguán, as opposed to in other regions, women in Extremadura only worked on the family’s land a few brief times during the year after they had left adolescence.⁴⁶ As in Siguán’s work on urban immigration, wives represented one of the keys, if not the main key, to the success of colonists. Illiteracy was greater in women, varying according to Siguán between 20% and 40% of the population (men’s illiteracy was somewhere between 10% and 20%), and their general

⁴⁴ “Una renuncia a la propia responsabilidad.” Ibid., 161.

⁴⁵ “Por la forma en que se ha efectuado la encuesta la variedad de los caracteres y personalidades femeninos se ha hecho más patente a los investigadores que la de los masculinos. Las entrevistas y los contactos se han mantenido por lo general en el hogar donde la influencia femenina es muy visible.” Ibid., 151.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 152.

level of education was lower.⁴⁷ For Siguán, the danger was that illiteracy made these women more dependent on traditions to make their decisions (in terms of childcare, animal care and budgeting), which may have been appropriate for peasant life but were inadequate to their new social role as part of a modernizing society in the countryside. Most dangerously, following tradition, they placed little emphasis on the education of their children. Like male colonists, the wives could be “suspicious and reclusive” (*recelosa*). They were also more suspicious than their husbands of the aims and results of the study and more likely to see it as an opportunity to bring personal concerns to superior officials.⁴⁸

But the wife was also the determining factor behind a family’s successful adaptation. The economic success of the entire farm depended on her intelligence, economic knowledge, organizing capacity, and ambition because of her broad influence on household decisions. She was “the principal pressuring factor for ascension in quality of life and social prestige.”⁴⁹ She was the one who acquired nicer clothes, curtains and sheets, furniture, pictures, and clocks. The hygiene of the children was the immediate sign of how effective the wife was at managing her new role. The first colonists, whose cultural level was lower, had children with poor appearances while newer ones had children who dressed well and had been immunized.

Finally, studying the behavior and complaints of wives made the mistakes and failures of the INC, as well as colonist initiative, apparent. Women entered into personal relationships with the female social assistants, confiding in them, while male colonists

⁴⁷ Ibid., 151.

⁴⁸ “Igual como el colono, su mujer tiende a ser recelosa y desconfiada.” Ibid., 152.

⁴⁹ “Finalmente, la mujer es, entre los colonos, como en general en todo grupo social, el principal factor de presión para el ascenso en el nivel de vida y en el prestigio social.” Ibid., 153.

appeared absorbed completely by their work and made visible efforts to appear distant, objective, and non-committal when faced with questions from the assistants. She “more than her husband, embodied the administrative dependence” on the INC. Wives noted a number of deficiencies with houses, beginning with the kitchen. The kitchen was not an independent room. The sink and the stove were located in the dining room. Any guest would immediately “recognize what was cooking.”⁵⁰ Some families combated this by constructing outdoor stoves or building one in another room. The INC also exacerbated the colonists’ problems with hygiene (already significant in the eyes of Siguán and INC officials) by only providing running water in the kitchen sink.⁵¹ Siguán called for showers and a bathroom sink in order to further the transition of the colonists from peasants into modern citizens.⁵² The number of rooms was also too small for the colonists, although they did not complain since they were used to sleeping three or four to a bed. Colonists did object heartily to the absence of adequate space for animals. The lack of space meant that stables were very difficult to keep clean and made it almost impossible to purchase new animals.

5.3.3. Colonist Rebellion

The complete dependence of colonists on the INC slowed the formation of the attitudes so prized by Siguán. For many years the steps necessary to complete the transition to ownership were not made known to colonists because the finer points were still being debated within the INC. Furthermore, colonists in the phase of attaining property ownership did not expect to purchase their property because, until the years of

⁵⁰ “El que va de visita, prácticamente todo el que entra en la casa (la puerta acostumbrada a estar adosada al comedor) se entera de lo que están guisando.” Ibid., 142.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² According to Siguán and his researchers, many peasants used the bathroom for storage. Ibid.

the study, their debt accounts were kept only at regional INC offices. Even long after the study had been completed, the INC still could not present colonists with their account books because of the difficulty of finding them in the INC archives.⁵³ Colonists were ill informed about the size of their debts. For example, colonists argued with administrators over whether colonists were required to pay for repairs on their houses before the title of ownership changed hands. Why should colonists pay for improvement when the possibility of ownership was in doubt? The valuation of their parcels, depending on the quality of the soil, was entirely up to the INC and could be hidden to colonists until they attempted to start closing their accounts. Colonists would be charged for the houses as if they were newly constructed when, in reality, they were at least five years old. Siguán was careful here to distance himself from these criticisms of the INC: “I don’t wish to discuss here the economic fundamentals of this opinion. I note this to demonstrate that the indefinite delay of the accession to property has negative psychological effects.”⁵⁴ Discontent was great enough for colonists to consider joining larger landowners in a lawsuit against the INC over a property survey the Institute carried out to establish rates for irrigation. The landowners thought the survey exaggerated the amount of water supplied and set prices too high.⁵⁵

The immature, critical attitude of colonists was further reinforced through the INC’s unwillingness to admit to mistakes. A few colonists were expelled over the course of the Plan Badajoz for their inability to pay their debts, but the reasons for expulsion

⁵³ Antonio Pizarro “Notas sobre las reuniones que han tenido lugar en Zurbarán (Badajoz) con colonos de las Vegas Altas durante los días 4 y 5 de Octubre de 1977,” 11 October 1977, ACMAPAMA.

⁵⁴ “No pretendo discutir el fundamente económico de esta opinión. Lo aduzco para comprobar con un argumento más, que el trasar (sic) indefinidamente el acceso a la propiedad tiene efectos psicológicos negativos.” *Ibid.*, 145.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 288.

were always ascribed to the failures of the colonist or their family, and the enforcement of the rules that determined expulsion was inconsistent. Siguán noted that there were a number of colonists who would most likely become insolvent if they were forced to start paying off their debts to obtain the property deeds of their plots and homes. The INC hesitated to expel these colonists, since much of their economic situation had been determined by INC decisions regarding farming and expulsion reflected badly on the project as a whole, but it also could not let them live on credit forever.⁵⁶ Siguán estimated the number of these colonists to be between ten and twenty percent of those in the second stage, that of attaining property ownership.

In spite of the INC's desire for villages to be egalitarian, a new sort of class structure was installed that Siguán feared reinforced traditional peasant habits. Local agronomists (*peritos*) made up a "superior class" over the colonists they directed and controlled their activities down to minute details. Agronomists were essentially versions of Restoration *caciques*, "reuniting in their positions the functions of the chief businessman, municipal authority and delegate of the government."⁵⁷ For years colonists depended on these agronomists and the INC for their seeds, credit, the organization of crops and the selling of the harvest. The monopolies enjoyed over particular products by companies set up under the Plan Badajoz, such as CEPANSA (cotton) and Central Lechera (milk), put colonists at a severe bargaining disadvantage. Instead of learning to make independent decisions, colonists had to curry favor with the agronomist as well as other representatives of the INC. Agronomists were reluctant to pass responsibilities

⁵⁶ Ibid., 126.

⁵⁷ "Así la competencia del perito en el pueblo es extraordinariamente grande y sin exagerar demasiado puede decirse que reúne en su figura funciones de empresario único (administrador de todas las tierras y de todas las viviendas), de autoridad municipal y de delegado gubernativo." Ibid., 203.

onto colonists even after they graduated from the first phase of tutelage. Instead serving as beacons of independence and achievement to other colonists, those who moved to the second phase became to Siguán “mere spectators of a process whose problems they could lament or criticize, but not steer.”⁵⁸ As a colonist reached independence and took control of his plots of land, the agronomist would be faced with the possibility of the colonist making poor decisions, perhaps endangering projects that the agronomist had set in motion.

Teachers and doctors made up an oddly positioned middle class in the new towns. In spite of their authority, colonists ultimately surpassed them in yearly income. For Siguán, “the teacher has the impression that, while colonists and the entire town rapidly progresses, his situation remains stationary.”⁵⁹ Whether it was right or wrong, Siguán noted that it was the “general opinion” among colonists that to receive proper attention from doctors and teachers, the town’s middle class, a special relationship had to be built through an informal system of payment. For proper instruction and attention from teachers, colonists had to pay for private classes; to get proper medical care an arrangement had to be made with the doctor.

The elements of culture that Siguán thought might bind colonist communities together and give them a means to deal with the loss of traditional ties were limited. Although all the colonists liked to read newspapers, there was a dearth of them besides the official INC publication “Plaza Mayor” and the *Sección Femenina*’s “Teresa y Bazar.” Book purchases were confined to the installments of young adult series. The

⁵⁸ “Así acaban por convertirse en meros espectadores de una evolución cuyos inconvenientes lamentan o critican, pero que no pueden orientar.” *Ibid.*, 207.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 240.

radio was the main form of culture for adult colonists, particularly the women who listened to serialized programs. A radio was usually the first purchase made as income became more regular.⁶⁰ Enthusiasm for the program *Ama Rosa*, about a nanny who ends up working for the family who adopted her son (put up for adoption because of her poverty), was so great that colonists in all the new towns cooperated to organize bus expeditions to the showings of a play adapted from the series that had come to Badajoz.⁶¹

Instead of learning to make independent decisions, colonists had to curry favor with the agronomist as well as other representatives of the INC. Agronomists were reluctant to pass responsibilities onto colonists even after they graduated from the first phase of tutelage. Instead of serving as beacons of independence and achievement to other colonists, those who moved to the second phase became to Siguán “mere spectators of a process whose problems they could lament or criticize, but not steer.”⁶²

The independence envisioned by Siguán required planning for the future. He chided colonists for failing to do this. But how could colonists be blamed for the failure to make provisions for the future when the INC had also not done so? Colonists feared the future, which Siguán saw as “perfectly well founded.”⁶³ No one knew which municipal administration he belonged to or would belong to once the INC ceased its activities in the area. This was a source of anxiety because it was unclear exactly how many taxes would have to be paid upon reaching independence from the INC. The INC had also failed to plan for any sort of organic town growth. The social equilibrium of the

⁶⁰ Ibid., 245.

⁶¹ Ibid., 246.

⁶² “Así acaban por convertirse en meros espectadores de una evolución cuyos inconvenientes lamentan o critican, pero que no pueden orientar.” Ibid., 207.

⁶³ Ibid., 97.

new towns was achieved by a freezing of social structure. The INC had constructed a very limited number of buildings for “*artesanías*” or other commercial ventures. Although the wealth of the new towns attracted immigration from the surrounding countryside, this made finding employment difficult unless it was in the fields. Since this would never lead to incomes that would allow the construction of new houses, immigrants could only stay in *chozos* (hovels) or sublease rooms in already-crowded dwellings of colonists. In Siguán’s estimation, “the colonization towns were planned to house a population of defined size, socially homogenous, and able to reach a satisfactory economic situation through the cultivation of equal-sized plots of land.”⁶⁴ The INC had distributed property in a way that it saw as most appropriate, but now this property could not be partitioned, meaning that only one child of each family could become a property owner – “For the rest, the simplest way to avoid social descent in the town would be emigration.”⁶⁵ The proper step for colonists facing the likely emigration of their children would have been to improve their education, but they failed to do this. School could not provide as much short-term benefit for farm families as having older children work on the farms, and very few evening classes were offered. The INC distributed property in this manner perhaps because of its understanding of the value of property ownership. The division of properties might allow families to stay together, but it would prevent the creation of the model colonists the INC wished to create. As late as 1977, 28 colonists appealed for more construction to the INC (now known as IRYDA) in a group letter:

⁶⁴ “Los pueblos de Colonización fueron planeados para albergar una población de volumen definido, socialmente homogénea y capaz de alcanzar una situación económica satisfactoria a través de explotaciones agrícolas sensiblemente iguales.” Ibid., 226.

⁶⁵ “Para el resto, la forma más simple de evitar el descenso social en el propio pueblo será también la emigración.” Ibid.

“those of us who don’t choose to emigrate to start a new household are obligated to share rooms with our parents.”⁶⁶ They lamented the “years and years” it took the agency to resolve appeals from colonists (presumably for parcels).

Colonists might have preferred to keep paying as sharecroppers rather than becoming property owners because they were smuggling out a significant amount of each year’s harvest. It’s not possible to determine how much was smuggled altogether but in the fall of 1958 the INC wrote to Badajoz’s provincial governor pleading for the Civil Guard to be used to patrol eight intersections that were frequented by truck drivers leaving the province.⁶⁷ It was concerned that the colonists’ chafing against an imposed contract with one of the factories set up as part of the Plan Badajoz to provide a market for the new crops that flourished on irrigated land (a vegetable canning facility) would lead to the smuggling of goods outside of the province. The suspicion proved correct. In August and October of that year at least eight truck drivers were caught smuggling produce. These eight were caught with almost 25,000 kilograms of bell peppers. One carried 3,000 kilograms of tomatoes but assured the INC that the man he had purchased them from had just sold another 13,000 kilograms to someone else.⁶⁸ Other instances of colonist revolt against the INC included the burning of fruit trees (on at least three separate occasions) and disobeying orders concerning crops or the system of irrigation. In 1957, more than 75 colonists supposedly signed contracts with a hemp company for

⁶⁶ “Los que no se deciden por la emigración, al formar un nuevo hogar se ven obligados a vivir con sus padres en una habitación o algo por el estilo.” Colonists from Pueblonuevo del Guadiana to IRYDA, 26 November 1977, ACMAPAMA.

⁶⁷ Ingeniero Jefe to Civil Governor, October 4 1958, AHCEA.

⁶⁸ Ingeniero Jefe to D. Felipe Corchero Jiménez, Industrias Agrícolas del Guadalquivir, and Hernández-Pérez Hermanos SRC, 24 October 1958, AHCEA.

27,000 pesetas, but only one colonist actually paid the company for seeds.⁶⁹ For all of these acts of petty resistance, as well as the inadvertently causing the deaths of animals, planting different crops, or generally being lazy, the colonists could be fined (by adding to their debt or reducing the aid they received that year from the INC in seeds or equipment) with no recourse.⁷⁰ To add insult to injury, the colonists would not have been able to consult their accounts to determine their total debt.

5.4. The Reaction to the Study

The INC reacted with extreme caution to Siguán's study. As early as August 1962, Adolfo Díaz Ambrona, then head of Badajoz's provincial *diputación*, sent a letter to Rufino Beltrán, the Secretaria Gestor of the Plan (the Plan's coordinating agency and public relations office), warning of the dangers of publication. He noted that he liked the study immediately, but that "I think it is appropriate, and maybe even necessary, that the commission discusses the study to decide if should be given more publicity beyond internal [circulation] within the participating institutions in the Plan, since it could produce significant confusion because it contains some information that could be erroneous."⁷¹ He chided Siguán for assuming that the INC had the task of changing the entire region as opposed to a small portion. Siguán, in his thinking, assumed that the Plan Badajoz should solve "all of the social and economic problems in the province of Badajoz, when in reality the object of the Plan was to utilize the waters of the Guadiana –

⁶⁹ Extremeña Textil Agave to Ángel Maqueda, 4 April 1958, AHCEA.

⁷⁰ Subdirector of Cultivation at Entreríos to Ingeniero Jefe, 6 December 1956 and 10 December 1956, AHCEA.

⁷¹ "Juzgo conveniente y casi necesario, que la Comisión de Dirección tratara del asunto, pues podría producir grandes confusiones si se mantuvieran algunos datos que tal vez correspondan a errónea información." Adolfo Díaz Ambrona to Rufino Beltrán, 30 August 1962, ADPBA.

because of this the Plan has a national character – and what it brings as a consequence, the well known *improvement* of the economic and social structures of Badajoz.”⁷²

In April of 1963, Beltrán forwarded a copy of Siguán’s study to Alejandro Torrejón, Director General of the INC.⁷³ The forwarded copy had already been subject to corrections made by the Plan’s Secretaria. These corrections and the changes made by Siguán were attached to the new document. Each of the members of the commission of the Plan Badajoz was asked to read the study in order to decide on its publication and circulation. Siguán naturally hoped for the widest possible circulation, but the contract between him and the INC gave the commission power to decide the study’s fate. Some of the corrections made were of small errors such as the names of towns, but the most substantial concerned its broader critiques. The Secretaria wanted Siguán’s work to be a piece of semi-propaganda rather than rigorous study. Beltrán acknowledged that Siguán was correct at a point where he noted that the INC had departed from some of José Antonio’s Falangist doctrines, but added that “I don’t know if it’s prudent to advertise it.”⁷⁴ The same went for the lack of sufficient personnel employed by the INC – it was true, but it was better for readers not to know. Beltrán thought that Siguán, perhaps, “excessively reiterated” the colonists’ lack of trust in the INC.⁷⁵ Clearly, Beltrán thought that Siguán sympathized with colonists too much. He did not believe that there were so many cases in which colonists would be unable to pay their mortgages. In the cases that

⁷² “Todos los problemas sociales y económicos de la provincia de Badajoz, cuándo la realidad es que el objetivo del Plan consiste en el aprovechamiento de las aguas del Guadiana - por eso el Plan tiene propiamente carácter nacional – y lo que llevaría como consecuencia, el mejorar de modo notorio las estructuras económicas y sociales de Badajoz.” Ibid.

⁷³ Rufino Beltrán to Alejandro Torrejón, 3 April 1963, ADBPA.

⁷⁴ “Es cierto pero no sé si será oportuno exponerlo.” Ibid.

⁷⁵ “Excesivo la reiteración.” Ibid.

did exist, he wished Siguán to make clear that it was not the fault of the INC but rather of the colonists that led to this inability. It was unfair to blame the INC entirely for the unfair valuation of lots, since colonists did participate in the process. Colonists should not be considered “tenants,” instead they leased their property. He didn’t like the general statement that colonists were “extraordinarily hardworking,” and he wanted the existence of subleasing and the building of *chozos* completely hidden.⁷⁶

After the commission had reached its decision that the study would only have a limited distribution within government agencies, Beltrán wrote to Siguán conveying the decision, taken in May of 1963. The commission understood the study as of “great interest and usefulness.”⁷⁷ It valued the study when it “represented an accurate systematization of the human problems that colonization brought with it.”⁷⁸ But it had decided that the readership of the study should be limited to institutions which “because of their competence, have the ability to judge it in a correct manner and to adopt the proper response to each of the highlighted issues with real-world possibilities in mind.”⁷⁹ Even Siguán, could not receive a copy of the study except through the good graces of Beltrán, who offered him his own personal copy.

Siguán objected heartily to the decision reached by the commission, and Beltrán responded one month later. Siguán said that he had written the study with publication in

⁷⁶ “Extraordinariamente trabajador.” Ibid.

⁷⁷ “Gran interés y utilidad.” Rufino Beltrán to Miguel Siguán, 29 May 1963, ADPBA.

⁷⁸ “La Comisión estimó de gran interés y utilidad el citado estudio valorándolo favorablemente en cuanto supone una acertada sistematización de los problemas humanos que el proceso de colonización lleva consigo.” Ibid.

⁷⁹ “Acordó la Comisión no era procedente se extendiese más allá de los organismos que, por razón de su competencia, están en condiciones de enjuiciarlo de manera correcta y en su caso adoptar las medidas procedentes en relación con cada una de las cuestiones puestas de manifiesto, en vista de las posibilidades reales.” Ibid.

mind and had tried to be “objective” for this reason.⁸⁰ The broad introductory chapters, which did not strictly have to do with the commissioned study, were included for the general reader. He understood that he had been critical, but he stated that he had always sought to be constructive and constantly looked for solutions – “I was moved by the hope that the study could be advantageously used.”⁸¹ He was aghast that the study would only be known by “higher-ups” (“*directivos superiores*”) since the solutions he advocated did not just have to do with broad policy decisions but aimed to “influence a mentality by causing readers to reflect on the social aspect of the technical transformations carried out by all of those involved with them.”⁸² Furthermore, he admitted that he had perhaps unwisely taken umbrage at the propaganda issued by the INC. For him, the Plan Badajoz had stirred up interest within Spain and abroad that could not be satisfied by “official publications that were fatally considered to be propaganda. For the advantage of the Plan itself, I believe it is necessary to promote the publication of works that give the impression of scientific objectivity and independence in their praise and critique of results.”⁸³ He even offered to arrange for private publication. To conclude, he recognized that it was up to the commission to decide but hoped that he might at least be able to use the study in articles.

⁸⁰ Miguel Siguán to Rufino Beltrán, Barcelona, June 1963, ADPBA.

⁸¹ “Me ha movido la ilusión de que sea aprovechada.” Ibid.

⁸² “No se trata de tomar decisiones de alto nivel sino de influir sobre una mentalidad llevando a reflexionar sobre el aspecto social de las transformaciones técnicas a todos los que de alguna manera intervienen en ellas.” Ibid.

⁸³ “Publicaciones oficiales que fatalmente son juzgados como propaganda. En beneficio del prestigio del propio Plan creo que sería necesario fomentar la publicación de trabajos que den impresión de objetividad científica e independencia en la valoración y crítica de los resultados.” Ibid.

Beltrán's response offered little comfort.⁸⁴ He denied that the study would be read only by those in positions of power. Instead it would be available to all the personnel of the INC as well as other ministries. He said the refusal to publish the work was owed to two factors. The first had to do with Siguán's lack of "objectivity." Not only had he underlined the objections of colonists, he had at times aimed to "justify" them. For Beltrán, "the reality was that these deficiencies could be used as a criticism for those who had a political interest in doing so."⁸⁵ The second reason was that it did not seem "reasonable" to have a work financed by the state used *inappropriately* against its interests. Siguán could perhaps show the study to specific experts who could judge it without giving into the temptation of easy criticism. Cruelly, in the final edition, a first page was added by the Secretaria, which dimly echoed Siguán's hopes. The Secretaria "understood that [the study] brought information that could be of utility to the organizations and people linked by function to tasks similar to those of the Plan."⁸⁶

5.5. Conclusion

Siguán himself was able to comfortably overcome the knock to his ambition that limited circulation represented. As a direct result of his work one of the officials of the INC recommended him to another rural land-management state organization, which asked him to perform a new study of rural life and the distribution of land in Castilla-La

⁸⁴ Rufino Beltrán to Miguel Siguán, 22 June 1963, ADPBA.

⁸⁵ "La realidad es que la existencia de tales deficiencias puede ser utilizada como base de crítica a la obra por quien tuviese interés político en ello." Ibid.

⁸⁶ "Estima que aporta para los organismos y personas ligadas en sus funciones a realizaciones análogas a las del Plan, información que puede ser de utilidad." Secretaria Gestora, preface to Miguel Siguán, *Colonización y Desarrollo Social*.

Mancha and Castilla y León.⁸⁷ He went on to become a well-known academic and administrator, renowned for establishing psychology as a department (*facultad*) at the University of Barcelona. But he still looked back in 1991 with a “bad taste” in his mouth on the arguments over the publication of his study of the Plan Badajoz. He believed that “it was one of the most accurate works” he had carried out, and he had not been able to find anyone else who took an objective view of the topic.⁸⁸

Without the obligation of writing for the Plan’s commission, he clarified his conclusions further. He believed that the Plan had been designed well “technically” and had its economic faults. However, the devastating problem that could not be overcome was social:

It didn’t function because socially – and I don’t mean in any revolutionary sense, but rather in terms of social structure – it wasn’t at all planned out. It seems to me that this is a perfectly valid diagnosis, but what happened is that [this judgment] pleased no one (not those who wanted me to say that the Plan was well done or those who wanted me to say that it was a piece of shit).⁸⁹

He blamed the engineers in charge of the Plan for its faults. He left disgusted with those who oversaw him. Their desire to protect the Plan’s reputation rather than consider the possibilities that his study offered for the correction of problems was irksome for someone who tried to harmonize the interests of workers and business organizations. In 1975, he outlined the cases where an industrial psychologist should not cooperate with a

⁸⁷ Miguel Siguán, *El medio rural castellano y sus posibilidades de ordenación*, (Madrid: Servicio Nacional de Concentración Parcelaria y Ordenación Rural, 1966), and *El medio rural en Andalucía oriental*, (Barcelona: Ariel, 1972).

⁸⁸ Jordi Royo i Isach, “Miguel Siguán Entrevista,” *Papeles del Psicólogo* no. 50, 1991, <http://www.papelesdelpsicologo.es/vernumero.asp?id=503>.

⁸⁹ “Y no funcionó porque socialmente -y no lo digo en el sentido revolucionario, sino de estructura social- aquello no estaba nada pensado. Me parece que era un diagnóstico perfectamente válido, lo que pasa es que no gustó a nadie (ni a los que querían que dijese que estaba bien hecho ni a los que querían que dijese que era una mierda).” Ibid.

business: “The activity of an industrial psychologist within the business is appropriate as long as the interests of the business coincide with its workers. If this isn’t the case, [the psychologist] has nothing to do. And if, at some point, management interferes in the activity of the psychologist or wishes him to do something that harms the individual or collective interests of others, the psychologist has to refuse.”⁹⁰ Inspired by other post-World War II national economies, Siguán thought that far-seeing businesses would recognize the need for worker satisfaction.

In the end, the fierceness of Siguán’s attachment to his liberal understanding of modernization and to treating his subjects with sympathy forced him into conflict with the INC, which proved not to be a responsible organization on his terms. He understood the industrial psychology he grew up with as an applied science, but took great care for how it was applied: “industrial psychology can help us improve human conduct only if we have a clear idea of what is good for individuals and society...An applied social science is always applied within the boundaries of a social system directed by a certain ideology.”⁹¹ The INC did not take enough care for the development colonists; it treated them in an authoritarian fashion. Siguán’s convictions, and subsequent judgments on the social outcome of the Plan Badajoz, ultimately demonstrate the intentional thinness of the regime’s program for the transformation of the countryside. The regime was much more

⁹⁰ “La actuación del psicólogo industrial en la empresa tiene sentido en el ámbito y en la medida en que los intereses de la empresa coincidan con los de sus miembros. Fuera de aquí no tiene nada que hacer. Y si alguna vez una decisión de la dirección entra en el campo de actividad del psicólogo o pretende de éste que haga algo que puede dañar los intereses individuales o colectivos de otras personas (y ya se entiende que no me estoy refiriendo a intereses económicos), el psicólogo debe negarse en nombre de unos objetivos más altos.” Miguel Siguán, “Selección del prologo al libro de M. Maier,” 81.

⁹¹ “La psicología industrial puede ayudarnos a mejorar la conducta humana en la medida en que dispongamos de una cierta idea sobre lo que es bueno para el hombre y para la sociedad...Una ciencia social aplicada se aplica siempre en el marco de un sistema social y orientada por una ideología determinada.” *Ibid.*, 79.

concerned with controlling colonists than in seeing them reach independence. Díaz Ambrona was right, to a degree, to say that Siguán had failed to understand the purposes of the Plan. It was a limited social program, not a comprehensive solution to the province's poverty. But Siguán had identified, sometimes unwittingly, that even such a limited social program contained serious contradictions. The INC could escape from Siguán's demand to be published since he was a hired hand, but as indicated in this chapter, it would have a much harder time managing, and escaping from, its obligations to colonists.

Conclusion

Seventy years before the King and Queen of Spain liberated the carp at the La Serena reservoir, the King's grandfather, Alfonso visited Las Hurdes in northern Extremadura alongside the public health advocate and doctor, Gregorio Marañón, and the Bishop of Coria and future Cardinal of Sevilla, Pedro Segura. The isolated and impoverished area had a reputation as the Appalachia of Spain, which was reinforced by Luís Buñuel's famous film, *Tierra sin Pan* (Land without Bread). A legion of press photographers and journalists also accompanied the monarch and his horse-drawn entourage. The reportage of the trip elicited a national outcry to resolve the public health catastrophe there, with the inhabitants suffering from a number of nutrition-related illnesses and a lack of education (and sensationalized incest).¹ The trip made Marañón into more than a public health advocate; it turned him into a public intellectual and set Pedro Segura on an upward trajectory in the Church that would culminate in his fierce advocacy for the Church's role in the state during the Second Republic and Francoist periods as the Cardinal of Sevilla.

Some voices dissented from the acclaim given to the monarch for his rugged reformism. The philosopher Miguel de Unamuno saw the *hurdano*, isolated in the inaccessible region, as making a choice against becoming part of the urban or rural proletariat. "The problem of Las Hurdes? It's nothing more than the general problem of the distribution of property in Spain. The *hurdano* prefers to think freely in the majesty of his indigence or live on the spoils of charity than to be a day laborer sleeping on the

¹ See Gregorio Marañón, *Viaje a Las Hurdes: el manuscrito inédito de Gregorio Marañón y las fotografías de la visita de Alfonso XIII* (Madrid: El País-Aguilar, 1998).

ground of his master.”² For him, the outskirts of every city were in just as bad of a situation as *Las Hurdes*.³ Unamuno romanticized the property-owning inhabitants of Las Hurdes, turning their backs on the indignities of modern civilization. But he also placed his finger on the appeal of the Hurdes problem to the King and the interested authorities, secular and clerical. By locating the problem of Spain out in an inaccessible region that modern life had passed by, and that was untouched by government policy, the King could avoid talk of global solutions that could prove politically divisive. Since it was a public health problem, there was no need to deal with the messier questions of land reform and exploitation. This political calculus has aged remarkably well. Part of the appeal of Felipe González’s giant La Serena reservoir was its location in the *Siberia* district (*comarca*) of Extremadura where little grows. The awakening of environmentalism in Spain has spelled the end of ambitious water projects there (such as the Ebro canal), but in 2002 the Alqueva reservoir on the Guadiana River, across the border from the Badajoz province in Portugal, overtook the La Serena as largest in Western Europe.⁴

For Unamuno, the trip was a sham, but it was a harbinger of the great changes that overtook Spain’s countryside in the 1950s and 1960s, which historians and social scientists have seen as crucial for the success of Spain’s transition to democracy and “normalization” within the European order. The historian Richard Herr claimed that the distance between rural and urban Spain was the salient factor in explaining political instability that ran from the nineteenth century until the Spanish Civil War:

² “¿Problema de Las Hurdes? No es más que el problema general del reparto de la propiedad en España. El hurdano prefiere pensar libre en la majestad de su indigencia o vivir del botín de la limosna a tener que ser jornalero durmiendo sobre suelo de un amo.” *El Liberal*, June 22, 1922.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Giles Tremlett, “Plans for Europe’s biggest reservoir cause controversy,” *The Guardian*, February 8, 2002, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/08/gilestremlett>.

I conclude that the alienation of the common people of rural Spain from the urban groups holding progressive doctrines, brought about by the process described above, was the most important cause for Spain's political instability in the last two centuries. This alienation arose after the Enlightenment introduced an ideological schism into the ruling groups, and it is disappearing with the integration of the countryside into modern urban culture. Accompanying this process was the rise and fall of the Moderado order [the conservative liberal faction in the mid nineteenth century], which rested on this alienation. If this is the case, it means that Spain is emerging from the era that it entered in the eighteenth century, from what we might call the age of rural urban disjuncture.⁵

Herr's view of Spanish history held that conservative factions in Spanish politics could always call upon the countryside as a source of strength when threatened by progressive proposals for more democracy. The failure of liberal modernizers to penetrate the countryside's traditional sympathies supported by the near-feudal power of rural *caciques* doomed the Progressives and the forces behind the revolutionary sexennium beginning with the overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy in 1868 as well as the Second Republic in the 1930s. Although the Franco regime had exacted huge costs with its economic and political repression, the entrance of technology – in the form of fertilizer, improved seeds, and tractors – into the countryside had made farming more productive and less labor-intensive, spurring a mass emigration to Spanish and European cities. Furthermore, television and radio now reached almost all rural households inculcating values contrary to the old rural order whose backbone was the Catholic Church. No longer was the peasantry so pliant to the ruthless power of landlords.

Pamela Radcliff sums up the case for the impact of rural transformation on the success of the transition to democracy in a more straightforward manner:

⁵ Herr, *Essay on Modern Spain*, 283.

As poor landless laborers deserted the countryside and moved to the cities, they unwittingly destroyed not only the *latifundia* system but the structure of *caciquismo* that had conflated economic and political power in the hands of large landowners able to impose their will on a dependent labor force. While the so-called economic miracle did not level class differences, the vast inequalities of rural society that had provoked such conflict—and revolutionary politics—in the 1930s had been greatly tempered by the 1970s. Rising standards of living don't automatically create the basis for democratic consensus, but huge income inequality is difficult to negotiate within a democratic system.⁶

The landless laborers from the countryside had perhaps adopted urban democratic values, and their departure had destroyed remaining rural client networks, but their rising standard of living was an even more important factor in the success of the transition. Now their own wealth inclined them to favor stability in a democratic European context as opposed to being seduced by the radicalism of the early twentieth century. The transformation of the countryside did not guarantee a democratic outcome, but it at least made for a much more favorable ecosystem for one.

My dissertation has demonstrated that this rural transformation had great human costs, and did not simply result from the adoption of “rational” economic policies after the autarky of the 1940s. Perhaps, since the reduction of the rural population is a feature of the economies of most wealthy countries, the rural exodus was a necessary condition of Spain's improved political and economic fortunes. But the INC's enactment of Francoism did no favors for the peasantry. It at first attempted to use social assistance as a form of political reward to augment its goal of enforcing stasis in rural communities. After 1946, the government significantly increased the amount of money it spent in the countryside, but the participation within the INC's projects was still restricted and carried

⁶ Radcliff, *Modern Spain*, 252.

with it close political oversight as well as the submission to arbitrary authority. The rural exodus to Spanish and foreign cities can be no surprise in the face of this narrow rural economic policy.

The costs of massive emigration in the 1960s and 1970s can be felt in letters written from abroad to the INC from emigrants wishing to return to their “*patria*” (fatherland). These emigrants had moved abroad, usually departing from the countryside, to work in foreign factories during postwar Europe’s “Golden Age.” They heard about the INC’s colonization projects, particularly the Plan Badajoz, by word of mouth or from popular magazines, and understood them as a means of returning to Spain. Emigrants wrote from places as various as Creitel outside of Paris and Saint Laurent in France, Wuppertal and Essen in Germany, Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and Hereford in England. Jesús Lao Vallejo wrote in rough spelling to the director general:

“Greetings from Germany hoping that you’re enjoying our beloved homeland with the grace of God. Dear esteemed sir, I request from you as the Chief of the Institute a favor that is necessary to me since I find myself in Germany with the strong desire to return to the country that saw my birth and that of my entire family. Since we don’t have enough savings to find a house in Spain, I can’t leave unless you concede one to me and, as soon as you do, I’ll depart for my country.”⁷

Manuel Acosta Cosmé, from Villanueva del Fresno in Badajoz but currently living at 10 Fischmarkt in Wetzlar, pleaded with the Director General of the INC for help: “after such a large and long separation from our shared fatherland as well as from my family I feel

⁷ “Les aludo desde Alemania deseándole dis frute este [illegible] en nuestra querida patria con la gracia de dios. Mui señor mio, lerruego encarecida mente como Jefe del Instituto un favor que me es necesario de usted pues llo me encuentro en Alemania con muchos deseos de volver? A mi patria la patria que me bio nacer tanto a mi como atoda mi familia y por no tener mayores ahorros para poder tener un piso para recojernos en España no puedo tratar de mar char me sin que te como jefe me pudiera conceder un piso llo me marcharia a mi patria tan pronto lo tuviera.” Jesús Lao Vallejo to Director General, September 27 1967, ACMAPAMA.

the human necessity of solving both problems, with the confidence that your assistance would help a family find happiness and develop a zone of potential riches in need of honorable persons that aren't looking out just for their own well-being but rather the improvement of the conditions of that zone and with it all of Spain.”⁸ Miguel Amayo's “only wish” was to be “installed as a colonist with my family of seven children.”⁹ He would be thrilled to return “anywhere in Spain” since his hopes of improving his lot in France had been *defraudados*.

These letters all testify to the sense of dislocation of emigrants who left Spain because of opportunity elsewhere and a distinct lack of opportunity and social assistance at home. And they show the enticement of owning property in the countryside to these men, most of whom had grown up there and now presumably worked in industry. The success of many, maybe even most, colonists who managed to obtain their property might have encouraged these men even further, since it demonstrated the capacity of the regime to assuage the impact of its sudden liberalization.¹⁰

The success of the state's assistance, or at least its success in pushing colonists to attain the independence so prized by Miguel Siguán, was represented by an overwhelming vote for the socialist PSOE throughout the 1980s. To this day, the communities built as part of the Plan Badajoz continue to benefit from a viable agricultural economy (although now former colonists have perhaps ascended to the roles

⁸ “Que tras largo alejamiento y separación tanto de la Patria como de su familia siente la humana necesidad de solucionar ambos problemas, con la seguridad de que con su aportación se lograrían la felicidad de una familia y el desarrollo de la riqueza potencial de una zona tan necesitada de la aportación honrada de personas, que no busquen solo su propio bienestar sino el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida de dicha zona y con ello el de toda España.” Manuel Acosta to Director General, 29 July 1967, ACMAPAMA.

⁹ “Mi único deseo sería de instalarme como colono con mi familia compuesta de siete hijos (7) no importa en que lugar de España.” Miguel Amayo to Director General, 1 February 1968, ACMAPAMA.

¹⁰ See Romero Cuadrado, “Aspectos económicos,” 338.

of earlier landlords with migrant labor from Eastern Europe and Portugal replacing the *jornaleros* of the 1940s). Nevertheless, in November of 1988 four hundred residents of Valdivia, one of the first colonization towns built in the Vegas Altas, set fire to the offices of the Encomienda farm with Molotov cocktails. It had been one of the largest farms to be divided up to colonists. The source of anger was that its current proprietor, Abengoa, SA was selling it to a cooperative in the neighboring town of Santa Amalia, costing the residents (probably former colonists who had sold their property) their jobs. There were rumors that the mayor of the PSOE in Santa Amalia had facilitated the deal (Valdivia's mayor was from the PCE, Spain's communist party).¹¹ So although the INC's distribution of plots of land may have awakened colonists' political sensibilities, it did not guarantee stability.

These brief anecdotes capture the mixture of ambitions, anger, and despair that colonists, and the agronomists who oversaw them and plotted out their futures, imbued these grand modernizing projects with. The INC might not have been as "high modernist" as the disastrous state projects detailed by James C. Scott or J.R. McNeill, but settling more than 20,000 colonists throughout Spain was certainly more than a propaganda effort. This dissertation suggests that more modest projects are just as much in need of careful explanation as grand ones, and can possibly tell us just as much about the governments that set them in motion. The Franco regime's faith in irrigation borrowed heavily from the territoriality of Regenerationism even as it transformed its legacy, targeting a specific population. The Plan Badajoz was more than a technical project aimed at an economic goal although it dressed itself in technical language. The

¹¹ Pedro Jara, "400 vecinos de un pueblo de Badajoz incendian para protestar por su venta," *El País*, November 8, 1988.

trappings of the technical concealed a political program expressed through the arbitrary power of the INC over colonists, and its supervision of their economic, political and moral decisions. The regime's desire to build a bastion of support in the countryside through geographical modernization proved to be illusory, but the pursuit of that desire by agricultural engineers made the meaning of Francoism clear to rural inhabitants.

In this dissertation I have argued that historiographical debates about the true nature of the Franco regime, of whether it should be considered fascist or not, should be supplemented, if not superseded by studies of what the regime's ideology meant to the individuals who constructed it and those who experienced it on a local level. I agree with Ismael Saz that "Francoism was neither a parenthesis nor a revelatory epiphenomenon of contemporary Spain, but rather the conscious product of a series of political and social actors who found in Spanish nationalism the best response possible to the challenges of modern society."¹² That is to say Francoism was built from the bottom up as well as the top down. Rather than claiming that Spanish nationalism served as a common denominator behind all the regime's programs, this dissertation argues with Lino Camprubí that the regime's language could obscure a variety of purposes and contradictory aims, as was the case in the INC's relationship with the Junta de Ordenación Económica-Social or Hermandades.¹³ Moreover, the idea that Francoism represented a "parenthesis" implies that the regime simply returned to a pre-Second Republic status quo, with landlords and traditional elites holding rural and state power. The study of colonization in the Plan Badajoz plainly demonstrates this not to be the case.

¹² Ismael Saz, "Was There Francoism in Spain?: Impertinent Reflections on the Historic Place of the Dictatorship," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 28, no. 3 (2005): 281-298.

¹³ Camprubí, *Engineers*, 164.

The targeted nature of the regime's modernizing program doesn't make it any less modernizing. The INC's promises motivated colonists and engineers, mayors and tenants.

Charles Maier has proposed that capital and labor made a strategic pact behind productivity after World War II in a number of countries. That is to say, labor agreed to mitigate the use of the strike and other mobilization techniques in return for substantial concessions from capital in terms of wages and working hours.¹⁴ The condition for this pact together was the shared agreement to pursue increased productivity and greater per capita income.¹⁵ The fact that this compact translated to Spain and can be seen in the INC's strategic embrace of Keynesianism may not be too surprising given Franco's acceptance of substantial American influence after the pact with Eisenhower over military bases. But the case of irrigation in Badajoz does capture how many types of objectives could underlie the pursuits of productivity and production – from Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco's dream of a densely-populated emporium of riches to the INC's plans for a technically sophisticated and politically conservative countryside to colonists' hopes for the independence of property ownership. The INC's version of the pact between capital and labor showed itself to be predicated on the imposition of a strict hierarchy in INC towns, and an absence of income redistribution in other rural areas. It would be fruitful to compare INC projects to those enacted in other post-World War II states. Was Spain an outlier in the repressive pursuit of order and stability, or its limited

¹⁴ Charles S. Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy After World War II," *International Organization* 31, no. 4 (1977): 607-33.

¹⁵ Labour Party, *Let Us Face the Future; A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation* (London: Labour Party, 1945).

social program? Or did other states similarly use technocratic procedures and language to target social benefits?

Both Maier's schema and Herr's interpretation of the transformation of rural Spain imply something of a resignation for labor, or in our case, rural tenants, in the postwar pact. But this dissertation suggests that the transition to democracy in Spain may have been supported more in a spirit of defiance than resignation in Badajoz's countryside. The votes for democracy, and then for the PSOE, could be interpreted less as the prudent promotion of stability, and more as the condemnation of its unkept social promises.

WORKS CITED

1. Archives and Archival Sources

Archivo Histórico del Centro de Estudios Agrarios (AHCEA)

-Fondo Instituto Nacional de Colonización

Archivo del Museo de Ciencias Naturales (AMCN)

Archivo General Militar de Ávila (AGM)

Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Badajoz (ADPBA)

-Fondo Secretaria Gestor del Plan de Badajoz

Archivo Central del Ministerio de Agricultura y Pesca, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente (ACMAPAMA)

-Archivo Técnico del Instituto Nacional de Colonización

Archivo del Confederación Hidrográfica del Guadiana

2a. Newspaper and Periodical Archives

ABC

-Hemeroteca Digital

Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado (Online)

Biblioteca Nacional de España

-Hemeroteca Digital

-Sala de Prensa y Revistas

El País

-Hemeroteca Digital

2b. Contemporary Newspapers, Periodicals, and Official Publications

ABC. Madrid.

Gaceta de Madrid. Madrid.

Hoy. Badajoz.

El Liberal. Madrid.

Luz. Madrid.

Le Socialiste. Paris.

3a. Research Libraries

Biblioteca Virtual de Prensa Histórica

Biblioteca del Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Badajoz

Biblioteca del Archivo del Centro de Estudios Agrarios

Biblioteca del Archivo del Ministerio de Agricultura

Biblioteca Nacional de España

Biblioteca del Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales (CSIC)

Centro de Estudios Extremeños

University of California – San Diego Library. Special Collections

3b. Contemporary Published Sources and Memoirs

Aznar Embid, Severino. *Despoblación y Colonización*. Barcelona: Buenos Aires, 1930.

Brenan, Gerald. *Spanish Labyrinth: The Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943.

Castel, Joaquín. "Apuntes sobre la repoblación de la Alta Extremadura." *Revista de Extremadura* 1, No. 1 (1899): 49-54.

———. "El Pantano de Cíjara y los Pueblos del Guadiana." *Revista de Extremadura* 5, No. 44 (1902): 82-84.

———. "Hidrografía de Extremadura y Medios de Mejorarla." *Revista de Extremadura* 1, No. 2 (1899): 97-104.

Cavestany, Rafael. "Menos agricultores y mejor agricultura." *Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales* 1, No. 13 (1955): 7-34.

Costa Martínez, Joaquín, and Alfonso Ortí. *Oligarquía y caciquismo: como la forma actual de gobierno en España, urgencia y modo de cambiarla*. Madrid: Ediciones de la Revista de Trabajo, 1975.

Franco, Francisco. "Discurso pronunciado con ocasión del acto de inauguración del nuevo pueblo de Valdelacalzada." In *Discursos y mensajes del Jefe del Estado*, by Francisco Franco. Madrid: Dirección General de Información, 1960.

Gómez Ayau, Emilio. "La revolución verde." *Revista de Estudios Agrosociales* 1, No. 1 (1952): 9-32.

———. "Tutela, Posesión y Propiedad." *Estudios* 3, No. 14 (1944): 5-31.

Gómez Santana, José Luis. "Pro Patria: Levántate y anda." *Revista de Extremadura* 1, No. 1 (1899): 35-37.

Hacia la historia social del campo de Badajoz, 1229 a 1947. Desglosado de la memoria del plan general de ordenación económico-social de la provincia. Badajoz: Gobierno Civil de Badajoz, 1948.

Hernández-Pacheco, Eduardo. *Concepto y Desarrollo histórico-geográfico de la hesperia africana*. Madrid: Real Sociedad Española de Historia Natural, 1949.

———. *El Paisaje en general y las características del paisaje hispano: discurso*. Madrid: Academia de la Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales, 1934.

- . *El solar en la historia hispana*. Madrid: Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales de Madrid, 1952.
- . “Estudio Geológico de Lanzarote y de las Isletas Canarias.” *Memorias de la Real Sociedad Española de Historia Natural* 6, No. 4 (1910): 107-342.
- . “Expedición Científica a Ifni.” *Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica Nacional* 75, No. 9 (1935).
- . *La Comisaría de Parques Nacionales y la protección de la naturaleza en España. Guías de los Sitios Naturales de Interés Nacional 3*. Madrid: Comaría de Parques Nacionales, 1933.
- . “La geología de España en relación con las obras hidráulicas.” *Hormigón y Acero* 5, No. 13 (1935): 220-225.
- . “La geología de España en relación con las obras hidráulicas.” *Hormigón y Acero* 5, No. 13: 258-270.
- . “La geotécnica en relación con las obras hidráulicas.” *Ingeniería y Construcción* 1, No. 5 (1923): 212-215.
- . “La naturaleza del terreno en relación con las obras hidráulicas.” *Ingeniería y Construcción* 1, No. 1 (1923): 25-27.
- . *Por los campos de lava: relatos de una expedición científica a Lanzarote y a las isletas canarias: descripción e historia geológica, 1907-1908*. Lanzarote: Fundación César Manrique, 2002.
- . *Síntesis fisiográfica y geológica de España*. Madrid: Junta para Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas, 1932-34.
- Hernández-Pacheco, Francisco. *Características geográficas y geológicas de la Vega del Guadiana (zona de regadíos)*. Badajoz: Diputación Provincial, 1956.
- . “El Portillo de Cíjara y el porvenir de la Baja Extremadura.” *Luz*, 3 de September de 1932.
- Hurtado Cubillas, P. “Dos Pueblos Extremeños: Valle de Santa Ana y Valdelacalzada.” *Anales de la Universidad de Murcia* 20, No. 1-2 (1962): 73-94.
- Labour Party. *Let Us Face the Future: A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation*. London: Labour Party, 1945.
- Martínez Borque, Ángel. “El Hombre y la Colonización.” *Estudios*. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Colonización, 1948.

- . “La colonización de los Regadíos del Oeste de los Estados Unidos.” *Estudios* Madrid: Instituto Nacional of Colonización, 1948.
- Martín Lobo, Manuel. *Un luchador extremeño: La conquista del Guadiana*. Badajoz: Diputación Provincial, 1962.
- Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. *Manifiesto of the Communist Party*. New York: International Publishers, 1948.
- Mitrany, David. *Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism*. New York: Collier Books, 1961.
- N. 719 B: *El Plan Badajoz*. Noticiario y Documentales Cinematográficos. October 15 1956. <http://www.rtve.es/filmoteca/no-do/not-719/1487154>.
- Necrología del Prof. E(duardo) Hernández-Pacheco*. Madrid: Aguirre, 1966.
- Pidal, Manuel. *La “Farsa” del llamado problema de yunteros en Extremadura o la nueva bandera de Acción Popular en Badajoz*. Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1934.
- Ponz, Antonio. *Viage de España: en que se da noticia de las cosas mas apreciables, y dignas de saberse que hay en ella*. Madrid, 1774.
- Pritchett, V.S. *Spanish Temper*. New York: Knopf, 1955.
- Royo i Isach, Jordi. “Miguel Siguán Entrevista.” *Papeles del Psicólogo*, No. 50 (1991).
- Secretaría Gestora del Plan de Badajoz. *El Plan de Badajoz: un gran esfuerzo para un gran fin*. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Industria, 1965.
- Siguán, Miguel. *Colonización y desarrollo social: estudio en el marco del Plan de Badajoz*. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Industria, Secretaria Gestor del Plan de Badajoz, 1963.
- . *Del campo al suburbio: un estudio sobre la inmigración interior en España*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas , 1959.
- . *El medio rural castellano y sus posibilidades de ordenación*. Madrid: Servicio Nacional de Concentración Parcelaria y Ordenación Rural, 1966.
- . *El medio rural en Andalucía oriental*. Barcelona: Ariel, 1972.
- . “Mi vida como psicólogo.” *Revista de Historia de la Psicología* 5, No. 3 (1984): 5-36.

———. “Selección del prologo al libro de M. Maier Psicología Industrial.” *Anuario de Psicología*, No. Homenaje al Profesor Miguel Siguán (1987): 75-82.

Torrejón Montero, Alejandro. “Colonización de las grandes zonas regables.” *Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales* 1, No. 5 (1953): 21-35.

Zorrilla Dorronsoro, Ángel. “Política de colonización del Nuevo Estado.” *Estudios* 1, No. 1 (1941): 1-35.

4. Secondary Sources

Álvarez Junco, Jose. “La nación en duda.” In *Más se perdió en Cuba*, edited by José Álvarez Junco and Juan Pan-Montojo, 405-476.

Acosta Bono, Gonzalo. *El canal de los presos (1940-1962)*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2004.

Barciela López, Carlos, and Joaquín Melgarejo MoreNo. *El agua en la historia de España*. San Vicente del Raspeig: Universidad de Alicante, 2000.

Barciela López, Carlos. “La contrarreforma agraria y la política de colonización del primer Franquismo, 1936-1959.” In *Reformas y Políticas agrarias en la historia de España: de la ilustración al primer Franquismo*, edited by Ángel Garía Sanz and Jesús San Fernández, 358. Madrid: MAPAMA, 1996.

Baumeister, Martin. *Campesinos sin tierra: supervivencia y resistencia en Extremadura (1880-1923)*. Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz, 1996.

Block, Fred. “Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects.” *The Socialist Register* 17, (1980): 227-41

Burke III, Edmund. “Towards a Comparative History of the Modern Mediterranean, 1750-1919.” *Journal of World History* 23, No. 4 (December 2012): 907-39.

Butzer, Karl. “Review of The Nature of Mediterranean Europe: An Ecological History.” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 93, No. 2 (2003): 494-530.

Carmona, Juan, and James Simpson. “Los contratos de cesión de tierra en Extremadura en el primer tercio del siglo XX.” *Historia Agraria*, No. 63 (2014): 183-213.

———. “¿Campesinos unidos o divididos? La acción colectiva y la revolución social entre los yunteros durante la Segunda República en España (1931-1936).” *Historia Social*, No. 85: 123-44.

- . “Organización y funcionamiento de los asentamientos de la reforma agraria: la comunidad de campesinos de La Pulgosa en Badajoz, 1933-1941.” *Revista de Estudios Extremeños*, No. 71: 105-28.
- Carpintero, Helio. “Miguel Siguán y los estudios sobre emigración.” *Revista de Historia de la Psicología* 26, No. 2-3 (2005): 71-81.
- Carr, Raymond. *Spain: 1808-1975*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Cazorla Sánchez, Antonio. *Desarrollo sin reformistas: dictadura y campesinado en el nacimiento de una nueva sociedad en Almería, 1939-1975*. Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1999.
- Davis, Diana K. *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007.
- Ealham, Chris, and Michael Richards. *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Fraser, Ronald. *In Hiding: The Life of Manuel Cortés*. London: Verso, 2010.
- Friend Harding, Susan. *Remaking Ibiaca: Rural Life in Aragon Under Franco*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.
- Frolova, Marina. “Landscapes, Water Policy and the Evolution of Discourses on Hydropower in Spain.” *Landscape Research* 35, No. 2 (2010): 235-57.
- Gómez Benito, Cristóbal. “Una revisión y una reflexión sobre la política de colonización agraria en la España de Franco.” *Historia del presente*, no. 3 (2004): 65-86.
- Grove, A.T. and Oliver Rackham. *The Nature of Mediterranean Europe: An Ecological History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
- Gutiérrez Casalá, José. *Colonias penitenciarias militarizadas de Montijo: represión franquista en el partido judicial de Mérida*. Mérida: Regional de Extremadura, 2003.
- Herr, Richard. *An Historical Essay on Modern Spain*. Berkeley: UC Press, 1971.
- Hinojosa, José. *Tropas en un frente olvidado: el ejército republicano en Extremadura durante la Guerra Civil*. Mérida: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 2009.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*. London: Michael Joseph, 1994.

- Kern, Stephen. *The Culture of Time and Space*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- La Institución Libre de Enseñanza y Francisco Giner de los Ríos: nuevas perspectivas*. Eds. Javier Moreno Luzón and Fernando Martínez López. Madrid: Fundación Francisco Giner de los Ríos, 2012.
- Lozano Lozano, Julio. *Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco Estevan (1872-1965): apuntes biográficos y obra científica*. Cáceres: I.E.S. Profesor Hernández-Pacheco, 2004.
- Maier, Charles S. "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era." *American History Review* 105, No. 3 (2000): 807-31.
- . "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy After World War II." *International Organization* 31, No. 4 (1977): 607-33.
- Malefakis, Edward. *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1970.
- . "The Franco Dictatorship: A Bifurcated Regime?" In *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-75*, edited by Nigel Townson. Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Marín Corbera, Martí. "La gestación del Documento Nacional de Identidad: un proyecto de control totalitario para la España Franquista." Edited by Carlos Navajas Zubeldía. *Novísima: II Congreso Internacional de Historia de Nuestro Tiempo*, 2010: 323-38.
- McNeill, J.R. *Mountains of the Mediterranean: An Environmental History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- . *Something New Under the Sun*. New York: Norton, 2000.
- Molinero, Carmé. *La captación de las masas: política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista*. Madrid: Cátedra, 2005.
- Monclús, Francisco Javier and José Luis Oyón. *Historia y evolución de la colonización en España*. 4 vols. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Industria, 1988.
- Nadal, Jordi. *El fracaso de la revolución industrial en España, 1814-1913*. Barcelona: Ariel, 1984.
- Naredo, José Manuel. "Notas introductorias sobre el Plan Badajoz." In *Extremadura Saqueada*, edited by Mario Gaviria y José Manuel Naredo, 18. Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1978.

- Nora, Pierre. *Les Lieux de mémoire*. Paris: Gallimard, 1984.
- Ortiz, David. *Paper Liberals: Press and Politics in Restoration Spain*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000.
- Pan-Montojo, Juan, and José Álvarez Junco. *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo*. Madrid: Alianza, 1996.
- Pérez Rubio, José. *Yunteros, braceros y colonos: la política agraria en Extremadura: 1940-1975*. Madrid: MAPAMA, 1995.
- Pinto-Correia, Teresa, Nuna Almeida Ribeiro, y Paula Sá-Sousa. "Introducing the Montado: the Cork and Holm Oak Agroforestry System of Souther Portugal." *Agroforestry Systems* 82, No. 2 (2011): 99-104.
- Pratt, Mary Louis. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Preston, Paul. *Spanish Holocaust*. London: Harper Collins, 2008.
- Purcell, Nicholas, y Peregrine Horden. *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
- Radcliff, Pamela. *Modern Spain: 1808 to the Present*. Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2017.
- Rees, Tim. "Agrarian Power and Crisis in Southern Spain: The Province of Badajoz, 1875-1936." In *Landownership and Power in Modern Europe*, edited by Martin Blinkhorn and Ralph Gibson, 235-253. London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991.
- Richards, Michael. *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Ringrose, David. *Spain, Europe and the "Spanish Miracle," 1700-1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Rosique Navarro, Francisca. *La Reforma Agraria en Badajoz durante la II República: la respuesta patronal*. Badajoz: Diputación de Badajoz, 1988.
- Saenz, Charles Nicholas. "National Reform and Municipal Revolt in Revolutionary Spain, 1766-1823." Phd dissertation. University of California, San Diego, 2013.
- Saz, Ismael. "Was There Francoism in Spain?: Impertinent Reflections on the Historic Place of the Dictatorship." *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 28, No. 3 (2005): 281-298.

———. “Mucho más que crisis políticas: el agotamiento de dos proyectos enfrentados.” *Ayer* no. 68 (2007): 137-163.

Scott, James. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

Simpson, James. *Spanish Agriculture: The Long Siesta*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Starr, Kevin. *Golden Dreams: California in an Age of Abundance, 1950-1963*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Swyngedouw, Erik. “Technonatural Revolutions: the Scalar Politics of Franco's Hydro-Social Dream for Spain, 1939-1975.” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 32, no. 1 (2007): 9-28.

———. “El Pantano de Cíjara y los Pueblos del Guadiana.” *Revista de Extremadura* 5, No. 44 (1902): 82-4.

———. *Liquid Power: Water and Contested Modernities in Spain, 1898-2010*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015.

———. “Modernity and Hybridity: Nature, Regeneracionismo, and the Production of the Spanish Waterscape, 1890-1930.” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 89, no. 3: 443-65

———. “Technonatural revolutions: the scalar politics of Franco's hydro-social dream for Spain, 1939-1975.” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 32, No. 1 (2007): 9-28.

Tortella, Gabriel. *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea: Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX*. Madrid: Alianza, 1995.

Townson, Nigel. “Introduction.” In *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-1975*, edited by Nigel Townson. Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Varela Ortega, José. “Aftermath of a Splendid Disaster: Spanish Politics Before and After the Spanish American War of 1898.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, No. 2 (1980): 317-344.

———. *Los amigos políticos: partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración, 1875-1900*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001.

Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen, 1870-1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.

White, Richard. *The Organic Machine*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995.

Worster, Donald. *Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.