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Bollens, Scott

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Scott A. Bollens

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Urban Planning and Intergroup Conflict

Confronting a Fractured Public Interest

Scott A. Bollens

Cities across the world are confronted by a growing ethnic and racial diversity that challenges the traditional model of urban planning intervention focused on individual, not group, differences. This article examines urban planning in three ethnically polarized settings—Belfast, Jerusalem, and Johannesburg—to ascertain how planners treat complex and emotional issues of ethnic identity and group-based claims. Four models of planning intervention—neutral, partisan, equity, and resolver—are examined through interviews with over 100 planners and policy officials. The article outlines the significant implications of these cases in terms of the limitations and potential contributions of American urban planning to effectively accommodate ethnic and cultural differences.

Bollens is a professor in and chair of the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of California, Irvine. He studies ethnicity and urban planning, intergovernmental planning, and regionalism. He is author of *On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast* (State University of New York Press, 2000) and *Urban Peace-Building in Divided Societies: Belfast and Johannesburg* (Westview, 1999).

> But you cannot show me—even supposing democracy is possible between victors and the people they have captured—what a democratic space looks like.
>
> What effect can the mere shape of a wall, the curve of a street, lights and plants, have in weakening the grip of power or shaping the desire for justice?
>
> <div align="right">Anwar Nusseibeh, quoted in Sennett (1999, p. 274)</div>

This article examines planners' roles and responsibilities in addressing issues of race and ethnicity and explores how planners think and act when working in ethnically or racially polarized societies. It is based on interviews with over 100 urban planners and policy officials in the politically contested cities of Belfast, Jerusalem, and Johannesburg.

In one sense, these cities are extreme in the magnitude and durability of their conflicts. A deep, intractable type of urban conflict—urban "polarization"—occurs in these cases where ethnic and nationalist claims overshadow distributional questions at the municipal level (Benvenisti, 1986; Boal & Douglas, 1982). In U.S. cities, there is a belief maintained by all groups that the existing system of governance is capable of producing fair outcomes, assuming political representation of minority interests. Coalition building that can defuse and moderate intergroup conflict remains possible across ethnic groups (Nordlinger, 1972). In contrast, governance in polarized cities is perceived by at least one ethnic community as either illegitimate or structurally incapable of producing fair societal outcomes to subordinated ethnic groups (Douglas & Boal, 1982; Romann & Weingrod, 1991). Compared to cities in liberal democracies where the socioeconomic dimension of conflict is primary, in polarized cities ethnocultural and territorial dimensions dominate (Yiftachel, 1998). In polarized cities, urban planners must contend with both broader ideological conflict and the specific planning issues of daily urban life.

Despite these differences in the nature of urban conflict, the assertion in this article is that North American planners can learn from overseas examples of deep ethnic conflict about how planners treat complex and emotional issues of ethnic and racial identity and group-based claims. The ethnic fracturing of many cities in North America and western Europe creates a public interest that bears signs of fragility and cleavage similar to the infamous polarized cities studied here. With American cities frequently divided geographically by ethnicity, race, and income, patterns of domination are expressed through physical and symbolic division and spatial fragmentation (Goldsmith & Blakely, 1992; Marcuse, 1995; Massey & Denton, 1993). Fear of "the other" is not only felt at the level of individual behavior but becomes intertwined in urban planning decisions (Sandercock, 1998). The terrorism of September 11, 2001, has brought violently into the foreground questions concerning the appropriate balance of urban security, individual freedom, and cultural diversity.

A commonality between most American and western European cities, on the one hand, and ethnically polarized cities, on the other, is that planners in both are responsible for coping with the manifestations of supraurban forces. In the case of polarized cities, these forces are historically based on conflicting political claims involving ideology, ethnicity, and nationalism. In other cities, these forces are unprecedented migration, globalization of economic production, and the rise of minorities and civil society (Sandercock, 1998). That many influences impacting cities are external—whether ideological in the case of polarized cities, or due to globalization or foreign immigration—can lead to the conclusion that local planning is impotent and derivative. Thus, urban planners were found to be silent on the urban impacts of foreign immigration, and the urban perspective was regarded as distinctly a secondary matter (Friedmann & Lehrer, 1997). The "low politics" of cities become dismissed as unimportant compared to the "high politics" of states and their promotion and protection of national interests (Rothman, 1992).

This article first reviews how American planning has approached issues of race and cultural difference. It then investigates how urban planners have addressed ethnic challenges in the cities of Belfast, Jerusalem, and Johannesburg. In the conclusion, I outline implications of these overseas case studies for American planners who want to deal with cultural difference more effectively.

Planning, Race, and Ethnicity

The record of urban planning and policy in the United States is stained by the fact that housing, zoning, and development policies have frequently excluded and distanced Blacks and other minorities from opportunity and wealth (Judd & Swanstrom, 2002; Massey & Denton, 1993; Thomas, 1994). Recent urban treatises point out lessons concerning race heard before. They describe policymakers' "ambivalent message on matters of race" (Sugrue, 1996, p. 18), the failure to "manage the process of racial succession in an effective and humane manner" (Cummings, 1998, p. 3), how racial prejudice and conflict stunted efforts to stop city decline (Thomas, 1997), and how the "specter of race" has fundamentally shaped urban policy (Gillette, 1995). Documentation of differential impacts of public actions across racial and ethnic subgroups has challenged conventional planning on the basis of environmental justice (United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 1987).

The planner's role in addressing racial and ethnic division has not been clearly articulated. Sennett (1999) observes that "the politics of conflict is hard to relate to urban design" (p. 274). The planning profession has at times sought to address the problems of racial division in America, in particular through efforts at advocacy planning beginning in the 1960s and equity planning more recently (Krumholz & Clavel, 1994). Yet, the racial issues that planners wrestled with in the 1960s haunt us still (Thomas, 1994). Hartman (1994) asserts that planning has had "little to do with the realities of current struggles around racism and poverty" (p. 158). Mier (1994) states that planners are "facilitators of social exclusion and economic isolation" (p. 239) unless they consider race and diversity as the first way to frame planning problems. Even the recent communication-based, critical pragmatic view of planning, states Beauregard (1999), is "silent about important tensions that emanate from multiculturalism" (p. 53) and group-based claims.

Professional organizational introspection about planners' roles amidst racial and ethnic difference is not lacking. A forum after the 1992 Los Angeles riot evaluated the roles of planners in addressing and shaping core social equity issues (American Planning Association, 1992.) The American Planning Association's (APA's) Agenda for America's Communities steering committee then produced a book that argued for a "new comprehensiveness" that explicitly includes the concept of community equity (APA, 1994). However, this notion of equity tended to be deprived of its color and cultural components.[1] Planners' professional stances regarding race and ethnicity have often been found to be detached, uncertain, and ambivalent. Hoch (1993) observes that the "professional protocol of the expert advice giver and dutiful public servant does not acknowledge the complexity of racial justice issues, and, in fact, seems to simplify the problem" (p. 459). The limitations of liberal re-

form seem unable to address the cultural differences that divide racial groups. Krumholz and Clavel (1994) observed the difficulties faced by politically left-of-center White professionals when they plan for communities of color. In the United Kingdom, planning has been criticized for being "insensitive to the systematically different needs and requirements of the population and, in particular...some black and ethnic communities" (Thomas & Krishnarayan, 1994, p. 1899).

Often, planners confronting an ethnically or racially fractured public interest use professional coping skills that distance them from the core issues. Baum (1999) finds that planners commonly view themselves as disinterested, objective, scientific observers who are outside culture, who bear no biases, and who use universal norms when making evaluations. When dealing with issues having strong value conflicts, Morley and Shachar (1986) assert that planners commonly adopt nonideological postures and seek to legitimize an objective methodology of planning. Krumholz and Clavell (1994) found that liberal planners had an inadequate language of race interaction and fell back on labels emphasizing class and neighborhood themes more than explicitly racial ones. In the face of ethnic change in neighborhoods or commercial areas, planners relied on urban design, traffic/parking, and occupancy standards to slow the pace and impacts of change and often assumed a neutral stance toward users' ethnicity (Qadeer, 1997). Discussions about racial difference can also produce an anxiety that stifles talk about other types of differences within the community (Baum, 1998).

Multiculturalism is challenging planning today even more fundamentally than did criticism in the 1960s and 1970s. It takes issue with the scientific approach of modernist planning and policymaking that uses a universal value system (Baum, 1999). While the need for advocacy and equity planning assuredly still exists, planning now is called upon to recognize different cultures and worldviews as authentic, enduring, and worthy of efforts to sustain them (Burayidi, 1999; Thomas, 1996). Such differing value systems are a defining characteristic of ethnically polarized cities and also appear to be an increasing attribute of planning and resource allocation debates in North American and western European cities.

In terms of planning and city building, multiculturalism poses significant challenges related to such issues as the ethnic character of urban design amidst neighborhood change, regulation of ethnic business and commercial enclaves, housing occupancy standards and cultural differences, and multilingual signage (Qadeer, 1997). Multicultural planning also implies an increased sensitivity toward the use and perception of urban space, including issues of residential self-segregation and public park use (Loukaitou-Sideris, 1995; Sen, 1999). It connotes the need to assess impacts of proposed plans across identifiable subgroups of the population (Pinel, 1994). Planning educators and researchers are also grappling with the issues of cultural diversity. The Planning Accreditation Board (2001) requires that the "multicultural and gender dimensions" (p. 23) of the city be taught, and that "respect for diversity of views and ideologies" (p. 25) be inculcated during planning study. And a survey of planning academics found the ability to plan in a multicultural environment to be a critical skill for planners (Friedmann & Kuester, 1994). Yet, planning educators face criticism for emphasizing quantitative methodologies that send the signal to students to keep their distance from communities and for neglecting courses that could help students learn about culture and individual, group, and community psychology (Baum, 1999). Cultural differentiation and change "remains a relatively understudied process in urban planning" (Friedmann, 1996, p. 97).

Studying Urban Planning Amidst a Fractured Public Interest

The cities of Belfast, Jerusalem, and Johannesburg encapsulate deep-rooted cleavages based on competing nationalisms and arguments over political control and group rights. Each provides multidecade accounts of urban planning and management in contested bicommunal environments.[2] Field research consisted of 3 months of interview-based research in each city.[3] Interviews focused on the influence of ethnic polarization on the city's institutional context, formulation of development goals, public agenda setting, decision making, and policy implementation, and on how urban policymaking in turn constrains or opens opportunities for conflict alleviation. The primary policies studied were land use planning, economic development, housing construction, capital facility planning, social service delivery, community participation, and municipal government organization. These policies can maintain or disrupt territorial claims, they can distribute economic benefits fairly or unfairly, they can provide or discourage access to policymaking and political power, and they can protect or erode collective ethnic and cultural rights.

The research dealt with the subjective as well as objective characteristics of planning amidst intense conflict. I was interested in how interviewees made sense of their everyday activities and professional roles. In particular, I observed closely the interplay between the professional norms and values of planning and the more emotion-filled ideological imperatives that impinge daily upon the professional's life. The distortions, the

omissions, the emphases on some issues and not others, and the definition of urban issues and constituents were all part of the story I wish to tell of urban policymaking amidst contested ethnicity.

I examine four planning strategies that urban regimes might adopt under conditions of political and ethnic polarization. (1) A *neutral* urban strategy distances itself from issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities, and political exclusion. In this strategy, planning acts as an ethnically neutral or "color-blind" mode of state intervention responsive to individual-level needs and differences. This approach is rooted in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and is commonly applied in liberal democratic settings (Yiftachel, 1995). Planners channel disagreements between ethnic groups away from sovereignty- and identity-related issues toward day-to-day service delivery issues solvable through planning procedures and professional norms (Forester, 1989; Rothman, 1992). (2) A *partisan* urban strategy, in contrast, furthers an empowered ethnic group's values and authority and rejects claims of the disenfranchised group (Yiftachel, 1995). Planners seek to entrench and expand territorial claims or enforce exclusionary control of access (Lustick, 1979; Sack, 1981). (3) An *equity* strategy gives primacy to ethnic affiliation in order to decrease intergroup inequalities. Criteria such as an ethnic group's relative size or need are used to allocate urban services and spending. Equity-based criteria will often be significantly different from the functional and technical criteria used by the ethnically neutral professional planner (Krumholz & Forester 1990.) An equity planner is much more aware than a neutral planner of group-based inequalities and political imbalances in the city and recognizes the need for remediation and affirmative action policies based on group identity. (4) The final model—a *resolver* strategy—seeks to connect urban issues to root causes of urban polarization: power imbalances, competitive ethnic group identities, and disempowerment. Planners challenge the impacts, and even authority, of government policy and attempt to link scientific and technical knowledge to processes of system transformation (Benvenisti, 1986; Friedmann, 1987).

Belfast: Neutral Planning and Ethnic Stability

Sectarian issues don't intrude into our considerations. We do land use planning, that's it. What difference would it make in land use planning terms in any event. Catholics need all the housing, schools, churches, shops, and facilities, just like Protestants do.

George Worthington (interview)
Head, Belfast Planning Service

Belfast is a city pervaded by an overlapping nationalist (Irish/British) and religious (Catholic/Protestant) conflict. Since 1969 it has been a violent city of sectarian (ethnic) warfare. The urban arena is hypersegregated and of strict sectarian territoriality, with antagonistic groups separate but proximate (see Figure 1). In 35 of the city's 51 electoral wards, 90% or more of the population share a single religion (Northern Ireland Registrar General, 1992). Intercommunity hostilities have required the building of 15 "peaceline" partitions—ranging from corrugated iron fences and steel palisade structures, to permanent brick or steel walls, to environmental barriers or buffers (see Figure 2). The city of Belfast, similar to Northern Ireland as a whole, has a majority Protestant population. The 1991 city population of 279,000 was about 57% Protestant and 43% Catholic (J. McPeake, interview). The Catholic percentage has been increasing over the last few decades due to higher birth rates and Protestant out-migration to adjoining towns.

Religious identities coincide strongly with political and national loyalties. The allegiances of Protestant

% Catholic
0 – 9
10 – 29
30 – 49
50 – 69
70 – 89
90 – 100

Source: Boal (1994). Reprinted by permission.

FIGURE 1. Percentage of population that is Catholic, electoral wards of Belfast urban area, 1991.

FIGURE 2. Cupar Way peaceline wall separating Catholic Falls and Protestant Shankill neighborhoods, 1995. (Photo by Scott A. Bollens)

"unionists" and "loyalists" are with Britain, which since 1972 has exercised direct rule over Northern Ireland. Catholic "nationalists" and "republicans," in contrast, consider themselves Irish and commit their personal and political loyalties to the country of Ireland. In addition to differences owing to political allegiance, Catholics criticize discrimination by Northern Irish governments in terms of access to jobs, housing, and social services. Since the imposition of British "direct rule" in the midst of sectarian conflict in 1972, legislative power for the province had been held by the British House of Commons, resulting in "an almost complete absence of representative participation and accountability" (Hadfield, 1992). A significant alteration of Northern Ireland governing institutions and constitutional status was specified in a 1998 political agreement. Some legislative and administrative authority in the province has been transferred from Britain to a directly-elected Northern Ireland Assembly, in which Protestants and Catholics share

power, but continuation of this devolution is dependent upon further progress on disarmament and police reform issues.

The primary urban policymaker in Belfast, under the Northern Ireland Act of 1974, has been the Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland (DOENI). Within or connected to the DOENI are three major entities. The *Town and Country Planning Service* is responsible for creating the policy framework within which growth takes place and for regulating development. Belfast Urban Area (BUA) plans have the force of law and establish a broad policy framework within which more detailed development proposals can be determined. Almost all planning and project applications are reviewed by the Planning Service for consistency with the area plan. The *Belfast Development Office* (BDO) promotes physical regeneration and implements revitalization grant programs. And the *Northern Ireland Housing Executive* (NIHE) is responsible for construction of public

housing, the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing units, and the allocation of public housing units to needy households and individuals.

Belfast Urban Policy Since 1972[4]

The operative principles for Belfast urban policy-makers and administrators have been (1) to manage ethnic space in a way that reflects residents' wishes and does not exacerbate sectarian tensions; and (2) to maintain the neutrality of the government's role and image in Belfast, not biased toward either "orange" (Protestant) or "green" (Catholic). Since 1972, strong efforts have been made to base policy decisions on rational, objective, and dispassionate measures. However, the imperatives of containing urban violence dictate that policymakers condone the strict territoriality of the city, one which imposes tight constraints on the growing Catholic population while protecting underutilized land of the declining Protestant majority. Although objective need dictates it, housing planners "simply cannot say there is to be a Catholic housing estate in an area that is traditionally Protestant" (J. Hendry, interview).

Planning efforts since the 1960s for the Belfast urban area have emphasized physical and spatial concerns, separating them from issues of localized ethnic conflict (Boal, 1990). The *Belfast Regional Survey and Plan of 1962* (Matthew, 1964) made no mention of the ethnically divided nature of Belfast. A subsequent detailed plan for the area did take note of ethnic divisions, but stated: "It would be presumptuous, however, to imagine that the Urban Area Plan could be expected to influence religious as well as economic, social and physical factors" (Building Design Partnership, 1969, p. 5)

The 1977 plan, *Northern Ireland: Regional Physical Development Strategy 1975–1995*, supported a government role accommodating of ethnic demarcations. It stated that

> A situation now exists where generally people are prepared to be housed only in what they regard as 'their own areas.' Whilst every effort will be made to break down these barriers, it will inevitably take many years to remove them completely. In the meantime the position as it now exists must be recognized and taken into account in the development of new housing areas. (DOENI, 1977, p. 41–42)

The *Belfast Urban Area Plan 2001* (DOENI, 1990) neglects issues of sectarianism by defining them outside the scope of planning. DOENI (1989) states that "it is not the purpose of a strategic land use plan to deal with the social, economic, and other aspects involved" (p. 2). The department stated that the contentious "non-planning"

issues of housing and social service delivery are outside the agency's specific domain (DOENI, 1988). Not one of the strategic objectives of the 2001 plan involves explicitly an ethnic or sectarian issue. Even the bread-and-butter of land use planning work—the forecasting of total and subgroup populations—is excluded from the plan, due likely to its ethnic and political sensitivity.

In contrast to town planning policy, development-oriented agencies by necessity address sectarian realities more directly. The NIHE acknowledges interfaces and peacelines as "locations where conflict can quite frequently occur and where the Housing Executive is seeking to manage and maintain homes on an impartial basis" (NIHE, 1988, p. 2). In building housing near these areas, the NIHE utilizes pragmatic tactics on a case-by-case basis within the limits set by sectarian geographies. At times, the NIHE has built walls or other physical barriers as part of a housing development if they are deemed necessary by national security agencies for stabilizing inter-communal conflict (NIHE, 1988.) The BDO also, by necessity, confronts sectarian issues more directly than the planning service. Two main physical tactics have been used: creation of neutral land uses between antagonistic sides and the justification of physical alterations in interface areas based on the forecasted economic benefits of BDO-sponsored projects. Whereas the first method seeks to distance opposing sides through neutral infrastructure, the second method seeks economic gains for both sides and could facilitate nontrivial alterations to sectarian territoriality (Murtagh, 1994).

Planners' neutral, hands-off approach to ethnicity has sacrificed the development of a strategic plan that could guide housing and development decisions. Accordingly, public actions by government units like NIHE and BDO have primarily been ad-hoc tactics rather than strategic acts, project-based rather than area-based, and reactive instead of proactive. Planning in the strategic and comprehensive sense has been marginalized; there has been "no coherent and strategic planning response to the [ethnic] Troubles" (K. Sterrett, interview). Instead of providing a guide for managing sectarian space, Belfast town planning "has entrenched itself behind the wall of the physical planning, where social, economic and sectarian issues are pushed outside the wall" (J. Hendry, interview).

Planners' Perceptions

The Belfast urban policy approach of color blindness has served organizational goals well in overcoming the discriminatory legacy of the pre-1972 Unionist-controlled Northern Ireland government. Operating within the most contentious policy arena of housing, the NIHE has maintained much integrity as a fair allocator of pub-

lic housing units through difficult times. W. McGivern (interview), former Belfast regional director of NIHE, states that "the main reason we exist is because we have credibility." Amidst intense conflict, the DOENI "is practicing the art of the possible, in a circumstance where they are in a sectarian trap and they know it" (J. Hendry, interview.) G. Mulligan (interview) acknowledges the inefficiencies of ethnic segmentation, but states that "planning does not want to say how the society or economy should change." Rather, government's proper role is to passively reflect in its policies the needs and demands of residents and neighborhoods. The principle underlying government involvement has been to "follow the wishes of the people" (D. McCoy, W. Neill, P. Sweeney, interviews). Divisions in society are viewed as based on deeprooted feelings and reinforced through terror. As such, "changes have to come from within people; government cannot change people's minds" (R. Spence, interview).

Government officials operating amidst ethnic polarization do not want to be seen as "social engineers." Benign efforts by government to "artificially" bring people together are viewed as stimulative of intercommunity tensions. D. McCoy (interview) states that in Belfast's sectarian complexity "government should not impose a top-down macro view of how the city should work; rather, it should be responsive and sensitive to the needs and abilities of local communities." G. Worthington (interview) claims that "We must recognize the realities of the situation. If we shifted color, the end result would clearly not work. We're not about making social engineering decisions, or ones that would be perceived as such." Government sticks as close as possible to objective standards and must watch the meanings behind their language in public documents because "words can cause a lot of trouble here" (W. McGivern, interview). D. McCoy (interview) describes the pressured bureaucratic environment of urban policymaking: "There are too many opportunities for mistakes. We are under the microscope all the time." The author found that internal discussions within government agencies show a greater sensitivity to ethnic realities than government's public stance would indicate. One planner (B. Morrison, interview) describes this internal recognition: "It was as if we were carrying out a plan for two cities that happened to overlap each other." Nevertheless, planners remain steadfast in not speaking explicitly in public forums about ethnicity and urban policy.[5]

Planners in Belfast defend their neutral posture of technical land use competence. Town planner B. Morrison (interview) views the stance as beneficial. "Planning works quite well behind the scenes," he states; more deterministic actions by government are best left to others. In contested public discussions, "it can be useful for planners to adopt the technical and professional role because it allows them the ability to avoid confrontation" (K. Sterrett, interview.) In the sectarian battleground of Belfast, "there is a sense of almost persecution where planners retreat into narrow technical roles" (W. Neill, interview). The town planning process becomes one viewed by planners as properly regulatory, not proactive and intervening. The comments of B. Morrison (interview) are illuminating:

> Our regulatory role is our reason for being. To do this cleanly and properly, you would have nothing to do whatsoever with anything proactive. This posture as regulator influences us in terms of what we can outwardly do, or be perceived as doing.

In the end, government's approach to urban policy in Belfast is characterized by a set of self-limiting features. There is separation of the town planning function from ethnic issues and the fragmentation of policy along division and department lines. Combined, these factors decrease government's ability to mount an ethnically sensitive strategy that would be multidimensional (physical, social-psychological, economic, and human development) and integrative of planning, housing, and development agencies. Thus, interventions by units such as BDO or NIHE are left adrift on the strong sectarian seas of Belfast, neither anchored nor navigated by an integrated set of city-building principles. P. Sweeney (interview), DOENI advisor, asks a disturbing question: "In a deeply fractured society, was there not a need for government to be more proactive, to be more progressive? Planners stand accused and guilty. They needed to manage the environment rather than simply reacting."

Jerusalem: Partisan Planning and Contested Space

> From the very first, all major development represented politically and strategically motivated planning.
>
> Israel Kimhi (interview)
> City Planner, Jerusalem (1963–1986)

Conflicting Israeli and Palestinian claims on territory intersect with Jewish and Muslim religious heritages in this city that defies exclusivity (Elon, 1989; I. Matar, interview). A politically undivided Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty is a fundamental Israeli position, while Palestinians speak of Jerusalem as the capital of a state of Palestine, staking claim to the city's eastern sector. These conflicting aspirations create a city of "intimate enemies"—a life of encounters, proximity, and interaction, yet remote, extraneous, and alienated (Benvenisti, 1995).

Having a 1996 population of 603,000 within its disputed borders, the city is a site of demographic and physical competition between two populations. The social and political geography of Jerusalem has included a multicultural mosaic under the 1920–1948 British Mandate and two-sided physical partitioning of Jerusalem into Israeli- and Jordanian-controlled components during the 1948–1967 period, the division demarcated by a 1949 armistice agreement. Since 1967, it has been a contested Israeli-controlled municipality three times the area of the pre-1967 city (due to unilateral annexation) and encompassing formerly Arab East Jerusalem. The international status of East Jerusalem today remains as occupied territory. Jewish demographic advantage (approximately 70% Jewish, 30% Arab) within the Israeli-defined borders of Jerusalem translates into Jewish control of the city council and mayor's office (Municipality of Jerusalem, 1997). This control is solidified by Arab resistance to participating in municipal elections they deem illegitimate. The West Bank, populated by approximately 1.7 million Palestinians and about 150,000 Jews, surrounds Jerusalem on three sides (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 1998; Peace Now, 1997).

Israeli Urban Policy Since 1967[6]

Since 1967, the Israeli central government has shaped or preempted the goals and strategies of local planning as sovereignty goals shape the built landscape. The primary goals have been to extend the Jewish city geographically, strengthen it demographically, and build Jewish neighborhoods so that political division of the city would never again be possible (B. Hyman, interview). Israeli urban policies based on issues of national security, the unification of the city, and immigrant absorption have overridden or contradicted municipal planning policies. The central government sets down the basic parameters of urban and metropolitan growth, and the local government is left with the application and translation of these national goals onto the municipal scale.

Such central government guidance of Jerusalem growth is facilitated by an Israeli regulatory planning system that is highly centralized (Alexander et al., 1983; Hill, 1980). Of particular significance, regional district commissions dominated by central government representatives have strong oversight power over local "outline" (statutory) plans prepared by municipalities, approval power over most local building permits, and hear appeals on local rejection. In contrast, local planning commissions have limited independent powers of areawide plan making and project review. National interests have frequently been implemented by active, development-oriented institutions and organizations and the

granting of powerful developmental budgets to development ministries. This aggressive developmental planning system involves a maze of agencies and organizations. The most important governmental body from the viewpoint of urban growth and development in the Jerusalem region is the Ministry of Housing and Construction, involved with the development of housing, infrastructure, and roads. Prominent among semigovernmental entities is the Israeli Lands Authority, which controls extensive public land holdings (93% of Israel proper is owned publicly) and influences development through land release.

Figure 3 displays the post-1967 growth and development patterns that follow from national political objectives. Large Jewish communities—Ramot Allon, Pisgat Zeev, Neve Yaakov (see Figure 4), East Talpiot, and Gilo—have been built in strategic locations throughout the annexed and disputed municipal area. Because Jewish security was an overriding concern, the establishment of a "critical mass" of Jewish residents after 1967 was viewed as essential to Jewish safety and self-confidence (Y. Golani, B. Hyman, interviews). Of the approximately 27 square miles annexed after the 1967 War, the Israeli government has expropriated about 33% and has used this land to build Jewish neighborhoods. Since 1967, 88% of all housing units built in contested East Jerusalem have been for the Jewish population (B'Tselem, 1995). Neighborhoods built in East Jerusalem are home today for over 160,000 Jewish residents.

Disproportionately low municipal spending in Arab neighborhoods cements Jewish advantage. Interviewees (both Israeli and Palestinian) cited consistently at least an 8-to-1 spending ratio in Jewish versus Arab neighborhoods. Amirav (1992) documents that no more than 4% of the infrastructure development budget ever flowed to Arab areas. These estimates are well below the expected share of spending based on the Arab population of the city (30%). A city report (Municipality of Jerusalem, 1994) acknowledges these huge gaps, documenting more than one half of Arab areas having inadequate water provision and no sewage system.

In addition to facilitating Jewish development in disputed areas, Israel has restricted the growth of the city's Palestinian communities to weaken their claims to Jerusalem. This has been achieved through land expropriation, zoning regulations that constrain Palestinian rights to development, use of road building to restrict and fragment Palestinian communities, restrictions on building volume in Palestinian areas, and an intentional absence of plans for Arab areas. The lack of outline plans, a "politically conscious" decision in part (I. Kimhi, interview), made it extremely difficult for Palestinians to gain building permits, because these plans are a neces-

Municipal boundary (1967)
Armistice line (1949–67)
Arab neighborhoods
Jewish neighborhoods within the Armistice line
Jewish neighborhoods beyond the Armistice line
Old City

Miles 0 — 3
Kilometers 0 — 5

Source: Benvenisti (1996). Reprinted by permission.

FIGURE 3. Jewish and Arab neighborhoods within Israeli-defined borders of Jerusalem, 1991.

sary condition for permit approval. As a result of these restrictions, only 11% of annexed East Jerusalem, at most, is vacant land where the Israeli government allows Palestinian development (S. Kaminker, 1995; K. Tufakji, interview). In the last 5 years, the Municipality of Jerusalem began to prepare outline plans for Arab sectors of the city. However, they often have incorporated "hidden guidelines" that restrict Arab growth (S. Kaminker, interview). Examples of these include intentionally wide road standards that close off development opportunities for rows of building lots consumed by the road, low floor area ratio requirements (.15–.25 is common in Arab areas, compared to up to 3.0 in Jewish communities), and strict height standards.

There also exists an ill fit between the Western standards incorporated into Israeli plans and the realities of Arab development processes and ownership patterns. Or, as former city engineer E. Barzacchi (interview) proclaims, "The answers we town planners give to the Arab population are technically 'right' and interesting, but are absolutely irrelevant." For example, development in the Israeli planning system is premised on there being clearly defined private ownership boundaries. However, about one half of the Arab areas in Jerusalem have unregistered land ownership patterns, a legacy of much land being held in community or state ownership under British and then Jordanian control. This allows the Israeli government to boast that, "yes, we have plans" (N. Sidi, interview) for the Arab sector, while knowing that most allowable growth will not come to fruition because implementation tools are lacking. According to J. de Jong (interview), Israel rationalizes, "Look, we gave you the possibilities. If you as a society don't make use of it, we have no responsibility." Former Deputy Mayor M. Benvenisti (interview) states that "Israelis did not plan for the Arab community, but planned just so there would be a plan." Rather than taking proactive responsibility for making their plans and reality meet, Israeli planners use built-in mechanisms that significantly disadvantage the Palestinian community in Jerusalem.

Planners' Perceptions

> The primary motivation behind my practice of urban planning has been the trauma of the holocaust and the lesson it taught that we cannot count on anybody but ourselves.
>
> Yehonathan Golani (interview), Director
> Planning Administration,
> Israeli Ministry of the Interior

Israeli planners were aware of the partisan nature of their practice, and there was seldom self-denial about the effects of their planning actions on the city landscape. I. Kimhi (interview) asserts, "We planners have harmed the co-existence of the two nations and peoples. If planned the right way, then both nations can develop here in Jerusalem." Y. Golani (interview) describes himself as an open-minded liberal; yet, "on this issue I cannot be indifferent. I cannot speak objectively. You cannot be about this situation." In his discussion of Jerusalem planning, B. Hyman (interview) jumps between functional arguments and political considerations and ultimately states, "It is hard to work out anything that resembles a 'natural solution'." In making professional choices between planning and political criteria, he states, "We are first of all Israelis and officers of the government of Israel. First and foremost." Similarly, E. Barzacchi (in-

FIGURE 4. Jewish neighborhood of Neve Yaakov in annexed part of Jerusalem, 1994. (Photo by Scott A. Bollens)

terview) reflects upon a 1992–1994 Israeli effort, which she co-directed, to plan for metropolitan Jerusalem: "We tried to be scholars, but we were all Israelis. And, I don't think you can be objective. You can try to be scientific; you cannot be objective."

Yet, within this partisan context, Israeli planners give weight to their ability to utilize professional planning expertise in the implementation of these goals. S. Moshkovits (interview), Israeli planning director for the West Bank administration, explains that his goal is to assure "that political expression is done in the most professional way possible." Similarly, B. Hyman (interview) asserts that "we try to make the political decisions sensible from the professional planning point of view." And, U. Ben-Asher (interview), Jerusalem District planner for the Ministry of the Interior, declares that his goal is to "maintain professional principles within this politically determined context." These professional planning techniques are thought to have a moderating effect. I. Kimhi

(interview) brings this perception forth: "For the last 27 years, we have made a very clear statement. Everything that was done, though, was done in a humane way. I know how it was done." Similarly, city planner N. Sidi (interview) recounts her distaste of efforts to penetrate Jewish growth into Arab sectors and describes how "sometimes I can find an elegant solution" by proposing alternative sites for proposed Jewish development. Similarly, A. Mazor (interview) recounts how Jerusalem metropolitan planners innovatively utilized the "potential model" to identify areas of greatest urban territorial conflict, describing it as "the use of technical and professional measures to try to resolve conflict."

It was striking that Israeli planners could live comfortably with two worlds—one political, the other stressing objective planning criteria. Planners' personal relationship to political contentiousness seemed an ambiguous one. On the one hand, there was frustration and impotence; on the other hand, attraction and intrigue.

Some interviewees were frustrated by the constant politicization of their work and compartmentalized their role by emphasizing professional methodologies and functional arguments. This provided them with a "safe space" within which to address emotion-laden controversial topics. For instance, I. Kimhi asserts the need to "postpone issues of sovereignty; instead, let's talk over the next 5–10 years on a practical level—how we can live together." In contrast, other planners (and frequently the same planners at different times) showed an attraction toward their politically contentious environment. I. Kimhi (interview) recounts planning for a newly unified Jerusalem after 1967:

> It was a most fortunate situation for a planner—that you are needed. We were needed by the politicians—what road to open, what wall to knock down, where is the sewerage, what to do. They simply came to us—we had all the information. We were prepared for this act of reunification. It was a glorious time.

Not all Israeli planners interviewed bought into the partisan style of planning. For example, S. Kaminker, former urban planner with the city, dealt with her frustration by leaving government: "If employed by government, you must be an agent of government. If you can't live within that framework, then you have to leave." She now provides technical planning assistance to Arab communities, but again faces a professional dilemma: "With a heavy heart, I must give away at times the planning principles that I was raised on to meet the political needs [of Palestinians] that are greater today."

Johannesburg: Equity Planning and Urban Reconstruction

> Planners have grown up providing services for a well-understood and familiar client—White and affluent.
>
> Tim Hart (interview)
> SRK Engineers

Johannesburg anchors a spatially disfigured urban region of enormous economic and social disparities. The region presents dual faces: one healthy, functional and White; the other stressed, dysfunctional, and Black. From 1948 to the early 1990s, the White National Party developed and implemented the policies of apartheid, or separate development. This crushingly exclusionist ideology was forcibly imposed upon the country's 70% Black majority seeking basic rights and a proportionate share of power. After the national democratic elections in 1994 brought the Black African National Congress party and Nelson Mandela to power, hope and opportunities for urban change co-existed with awareness by policymakers of the difficulties of bettering the stark conditions of many Black Africans.

The Johannesburg (or central Witwatersrand) metropolitan region contained 2.2 million people in 1991 and by 1997 was home to almost 4 million people (Central Statistical Service, 1992; Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, 1998). The city's population in the early 1990s was over 60% Black (Mabin & Hunter, 1993). Racially segregated townships, cities, and informal settlements/shantytowns characterize the urban landscape (see Figure 5). Income distribution is grossly skewed in Johannesburg's province of Gauteng. An enormous proportion of basic needs—housing, land tenure, and water and sanitation facilities—is presently unmet. There is an estimated shortfall of 500,000 formal housing units in the province (M. Narsoo, interview.) Black Africans inhabit several different "geographies of poverty" (Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, 1993). The two primary locations are Alexandra (see Figure 6) and Soweto townships, the latter an amalgamation of 29 townships spatially disconnected from central Johannesburg (South African Township Annual, 1993). Formal bricks-and-mortar housing was intentionally underbuilt since urban Blacks were considered temporary and unwanted. Rudimentary hostels were built to shelter workers in industrial and mining activities nearby and have been areas of significant tension politically, ethnically, and physically (Gauteng Provincial Government, 1995). In townships, backyard shacks and free-standing shacks on vacant land are characterized by near-inhuman conditions of living, lack of secure tenure, inadequate standards of shelter and sanitation, and lack of social facilities and services. Outside of townships beyond the urban fringe exist informal shack settlements, which are spatially disconnected from even the primitive services of townships and often erected in areas of geotechnical or political susceptibility (T. Mashinini, interview). Finally, significant "greying" (Black in-migration) has occurred since 1991 in several inner neighborhoods of Johannesburg city, concentrating both poverty and overcrowding.

Urban apartheid policy, anchored by the 1950 Group Areas Act, divided towns and cities into group areas for exclusive occupation by single racial groups. Races were separated by buffer strips of open land, ridges, industrial areas, or railroads in order to minimize intergroup contact (Davies, 1981). City centers, environmentally stable and otherwise prestigious areas were zoned White; peripheral areas were zoned non-White and restricted in scope (Christopher, 1994). Officially, there existed duality of planning processes—one based on group areas'

Source: Parnell & Pirie (1991). Reprinted by permission.

FIGURE 5. Racial "group areas" in apartheid Johannesburg, 1991.

racial delineations, the other on land use allocation. Yet, in practice, there was harmony between racial zoning and land use planning. Town planning's traditional emphases on efficiency, order, and control were effectively used for ethnic segregation and ordering. As such, the goals and methods of the Group Areas Act "both derived from established planning practices, and enticed town planners into the implementation of racial segregation" (Mabin, 1992, p. 407). In the end, "apartheid proved to be a seductive way of seeing the city for many practitioners and planners who were deeply involved in its implementation" (Parnell & Mabin, 1995, pp. 59–60). The town planning profession in Johannesburg went down "the long road of coercion and domination" (J. Muller, interview). "Apartheid planning was terribly effective in achieving its goals," states one interviewee (identity withheld upon request). Yet, the very success of this partisan planning erected functionally and economically unsustainable urban conditions that contributed over time to the downfall of the apartheid system that it worked so hard to support.

Reconstructing Urban Policy Since 1991[7]

From 1991 to 1995, urban leaders and planners engaged as resolvers of core political issues during the transformation of local and metropolitan governance. Officials of the old regime, nongovernmental representatives, and those from the formerly excluded Black communities collaborated in a self-transformative process that changed the basic parameters of local and metropolitan representation, decision making, participation, and organizational structure. City-building issues dealing with day-to-day existence and the Black boycotting of rent and service payments were successfully connected by nongovernmental and opposition groups to root issues of political empowerment and local government reorganization. Discussions transcended sole emphases on the urban symptoms of racial polarization and targeted the need to radically transform apartheid-based urban governance. After complex and difficult negotiations, local and metropolitan government in Johannesburg was restructured to politically combine formerly White local governments with adjacent Black townships. Since November 1995, there have been Black majorities in all four local governments and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council.

Concurrent with the political restructuring of local governance was the formulation of alternative urban policies to combat the spatial manifestations of apartheid. The Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber (CWMC) was established in 1991, in part to develop a vision for future development in the Johannesburg region. This vision—the Interim Strategic Framework (ISF)—indicts the planning profession for its emphasis on regulatory control that seeks order, compartmentalization, and uniformity. Taken to its most extreme form —the Group Areas Act—"mono-zoning creates islands of privilege, vested interest and ownership that residents defend vehemently from perceived 'invasions' from outsiders" (CWMC, 1993, p. 6). As an alternative, the ISF asserts that a spatial form that encourages urban diversity will moderate intergroup tension. The plan (CWMC, 1993) states:

> The ISF must thus seek to engender the patterns of urban complexity that undermine the strength of exclusionary areas (and hence conflict) and actively seek the blurring of zone boundaries and the integration of hitherto isolated areas into the mainstream of the urban system. (p. 11)

Equity-based, postapartheid city-building principles aspire to stitch together apartheid's urban distortions. Key facets of this city building are (1) *densification* and infill of the existing urban system and (2) *upgrading* and re-

FIGURE 6. Squatter shacks in Alexandra Township, Johannesburg, 1995. (Photo by Scott A. Bollens)

newal of those parts of the urban system under stress. The *densification* approach seeks to encourage growth inward to urbanized areas that have access to employment, services, and facilities, and to fill in apartheid buffer zones. This "compact city" approach would be a primary means to increase opportunities for Blacks to enter the residential and economic fabric of the "White" city (T. Hart, interview). The second policy approach focuses on the *upgrading* and renewal of those urban fringe areas under stress due to inadequate housing, poor water and sanitation services, and public health hazards. Whereas the first policy approach seeks to transform apartheid space, the upgrading approach aimed at alleviating the many crisis-related needs on the urban remote fringes may over time unintentionally reinforce apartheid racial separation. Another vexing problem in efforts to reconstruct Johannesburg is that although the old centralized apartheid state is gone, land market, economic, and class-based interests now shape urban geography in ways

that may produce similar spatial outcomes. In particular, high inner-city land costs, neighborhood opposition, and reliance on private sector housing provision are obstructing efforts to incorporate the majority into a compact city of urban opportunity.

Urban policy amidst societal transformation has demanded a critical self-evaluation of the basic assumptions of urban planning. A debate among urban policymakers about how best to engage in Johannesburg reconstruction highlights two paradigms having different historic bases and different proponents of dissimilar personal histories and contrasting views of planning goals and skills. The traditional model of town planning in South Africa, derived from British and European foundations, has been focused on regulatory control and spatial allocation and administered in a centralized, hierarchical fashion. Today, not only is this blueprint paradigm discredited due to its alignment with apartheid, but there appears a disconnection between the socio-

economic needs of Black areas and this model of development control. Where Black Africans seek changes in the basic conditions of livelihood, the traditional planning model offers reform-minded, yet ultimately conservative, prescriptions. In response, a new paradigm of "development planning" has emerged that represents a fundamental challenge to traditional town planning.

Development planning seeks to integrate traditional spatial planning with social and economic planning; coordinate development policy objectives across governments, sectors, and departments; and establish participatory processes that empower the poor and marginalized (L. Boya, interview). Development planners have distinctly different personal histories than traditional town planners. Many are Black Africans not trained in the legal and regulatory foundations of physical development control, but rather having experience in nongovernmental organizations and skills related to community development, social mobilization, and negotiation (L. Boya, interview). Development planning in South Africa connotes strongly the empowerment of the deprived majority, according to J. Muller (interview). Traditionally trained town planners fall short here. The lack of community consultation in the town planning model meant that such planners worked in closed rooms in developing spatial frameworks. "You did 'what was best for society' and society had to accept whatever you did," recalls P. Waanders (interview). In contrast, development planners emphasize their role as mediators in the development process between community needs and government resources (T. Maluleke, T. Mashinini, interviews). Development planning, however, remains embryonic in South Africa and its methods appear only broadly articulated. "Nobody has been trained in doing the work that we do," says T. Mashinini (interview).

Planners' Perceptions

Town planning and development planning are uneasy bedfellows in their common pursuit of a more humane Johannesburg. Town planning must contend with its image as "old guard," its past links to apartheid implementation, and its lack of connection to community. At the same time, it provides a methodology and technical capacity fundamental to city building. Development planning, meanwhile, is ascendant from community-based struggle and newly knighted as the way forward for urban South Africa. Yet, it is a young practice whose techniques are not clearly developed, and one that is burdened by demands for it to be all things to all people. When the two faces of postapartheid planning come in contact, one can detect a clash of personalities or comfort zones—town planners rooted to existing systems, rules, and regulations; development planners more

proactive and sympathetic to experimentation. L. Boya (interview) wonders "In the future, when we more radically change planning, we will be saying in a sense that 'there is no future in the town planning profession as it is currently structured.' How will they respond?"

Responses from traditional town planners range from defensive rigidity, to counter-attack, to uncertainty, to productive acceptance of the need to change. "Many planners cannot cross the river of change because of this little bible that they have," states P. Waanders, pointing to a thick statute book of planning and zoning regulations. Professional biases are impediments to change: "it is very difficult for many planners to get out of the groove of doing up nice maps and pictures on the wall. It is part of the education system they carry with them" (P. Waanders, interview). Other town planners, however, defend traditional planning's value. J. Eagle (interview) asserts that criticism of traditional planning too simplistically positions planners as technicians worthy of marginalization in the face of emergent community activists. Further, she redirects criticism back at development planning:

> Because development planners know about daily life, they feel they can deal with planning issues and problems. They know about certain aspects of development, and that is important. But we can't just hand all of planning over to them because they don't always have the bigger picture.

Traditional planning's defense of its unique contribution to city building is brought out in other observations. I. Kadungure (interview) states that "community specialists and social workers are needed for communication purposes, but at the end of the day someone else must come in to deal with technical issues such as water provision and engineering capacity." Similarly, J. Muller (interview) states that traditional planning is needed to supply a consciousness of the future to community revitalization efforts, which are commonly reactive and crisis related. A. Kotzee (interview) puts forth a not insignificant contribution of traditional planning—an ability to maintain property values and municipal tax bases, and to assure protection of property rights and investment. While many town planners surveyed expressed professional uncertainty amidst institutional transformation, other traditionally trained planners in government are rising to the challenge. For them, it is an invigorating time to develop new techniques of community consultation or to question assumptions and theories of the past (J. Erasmus, M. Gilbert, interviews.)

Ironically, the new development planning paradigm "is giving a certain credibility to what has been a discredited profession in this country" (J. Muller, interview.)

It provides town planning with an opportunity to resurrect itself by employing new techniques that support the ascending paradigm. But town planning must shift away from its control mode into a practice that enables empowerment and capacity building in the interests of social justice (J. Muller, interview). In addition, it must bring into its educational and professional tracks Black Africans whose local experiences come from community activism and facilitation. Development planning may represent a fundamental shift away from a rigid town planning approach aimed at maintenance and orderly development toward one that is aligned with socioeconomic and reconstruction objectives. It is an historic attempt to create a system of social guidance that utilizes the lessons of social mobilization. If the two faces of postapartheid planning were effectively combined, the result would likely be an altered and Africanized practice of community-based planning encompassing both social mobilization and rational governance.

Conclusions

Belfast, Jerusalem, and Johannesburg shed light on how urban planners and policymakers cope with rival urban communities that interact daily across ethnic divides. Four urban planning strategies are represented in the case study cities. In Belfast, the British government's strategy is to deal pragmatically on a *neutral* basis with the symptoms of political conflict. Protestant/Catholic equity issues are excluded from metropolitan plans, public housing allotment formulae utilize color-blind procedures, and town planning separates its spatial concerns from the broader social issues of housing, social services, and ethnic relations. In Jerusalem, the utilization of land use planning and regulation as territorial tools constitutes a *partisan* approach to urban planning and administration. Ethnic criteria overshadow functional factors in the distribution of urban benefits such as housing and building approvals, roads, and community facilities. Johannesburg illustrates two roles that postapartheid urban planners have played in reconstructing that city. As *resolvers*, they helped link urban symptoms to root political causes, recognizing that Black political empowerment and restructuring of urban governance were necessary prerequisites to effective urban policymaking. They have also focused on *equity* objectives, addressing the urban symptoms of past racial conflict in their efforts to lessen the gross racial disparities in urban opportunities and outcomes.

The challenges of urban planning in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and South Africa inform policymakers about the interaction between public policy and group-based claims in the urban setting. Lessons for planning and policymaking appear applicable to the growing number of American multiethnic cities that are not polarized, but come close at times to the ethnic breaking point. The common goal of urban management in both ethnically polarized and nonpolarized urban environments is to accommodate plural needs without sacrificing the soul or functionality of urban life. Policymakers and planners in both types of cities must address the complex spatial, social-psychological, and organizational attributes of potentially antagonistic urban communities. They must be sensitive to the multiethnic environments toward which their skills are applied and to the ways that empowered groups legitimate and extend their power. The problems and principles of city building in polarized cities provide guidance to all those who cope with multiple publics and contrasting ethnic views of city life and function.

Here is what this research implies for American urban planners in terms of how to effectively address group-based claims and multiple cultures in our cities.

Planning is not immune to being used for city-building objectives that are fundamentally at odds with professional ethics. Planning can be effectively used for partisan purposes in such ways that it exacerbates ethnic conflict, creates conditions of urban instability, and paradoxically constructs the perceived need for further partisanship due to its adverse effects on intergroup relations. In Jerusalem and apartheid Johannesburg, public sector planners have acted as agents of their governments who, even if they have individual qualms, do what is expected of them by their employer. The institutional and organizational context constrains individual planner choice and provides incentives, such as employment security, for continued adherence to politically-based city-building goals.

Neutral, "color-blind" planning, although seen as safe, is both inadequate and difficult to implement in urban circumstances of different group values and trajectories. Neutral planning applied in urban settings of structural inequality does not produce equitable outcomes. The Belfast case illustrates that urban policy that does not take into account the quantitatively and qualitatively different needs of groups will tend to reinforce, not lessen, urban inequalities. Governments must avoid the comfort of acting as benign outsider to racial and ethnic conflict. When urban inequalities of opportunity exist, equity does not imply replication of policy for each identifiable urban group nor numerical balance in government outputs. Rather, it means that policy should be sensitive to the unique needs of each community while keeping in mind the overall good of the city. As illustrated by Israeli planning for Palestinian areas and as brought forth by difficult choices facing postapartheid

planning in South Africa, planners should be aware that uniform requirements dealing with land ownership or development may have disparate effects across cultures having different values and customs.

Planners should seek coexistent viability of ethnic and racial groups. In each of the contentious cities studied, proposals to move away from ethnic spatial separation face attack as promoting an unrealistic pro-integration agenda. Yet, a middle approach must exist in such circumstances in order for intergroup tolerance to be nurtured in the urban setting. The goal of policy should not be integration per se, but a "porous" society, where diversity can co-exist and communities are free to interact, if they choose. The goal of urban policy should be accommodation, not necessarily assimilation. Urban policymakers should take stock of color (and ethnicity), not dismiss it, and seek to accommodate the unique needs of each ethnic group. In contrast to the traditional model of ethnic assimilation and its implied residential integration, this approach would seek to expand housing choice and residential differentiation so that diverse individual preferences and needs can be satisfied. In creating these urban environments, planners should take heed from all three cities studied that walls and boundaries (physical or psychological) provide feelings of safety but also tend to reinforce "the other" as threat.

Planning should incorporate social-psychological aspects of community identity into its professional repertoire. For members of an urban ethnic group, psychological needs pertaining to viability, group identity, and cultural symbolism can be as important as objective needs pertaining to land, housing, and economic opportunities. This is illuminated most acutely in the case of Belfast Protestants who feel they are sacrificing too much in current peacemaking efforts. Urban planning should incorporate the nontechnical, subjective aspects of community identity into its toolbox that heretofore has been oriented toward objective and rational methods. Urban planning should, in its methods of analysis and decision making, explicitly account for the importance of ethnic community identity, territoriality, and symbolism embedded in the urban landscape. At the same time, it must be able to address constructively the city's ethnicity when that ethnicity is obstructing the functionality of the urban region in terms of public health, shelter, public services, and economic opportunities. This means that city planners must both respect ethnic territoriality where it constitutes a healthy source of community cohesiveness and break ethnic territorial boundaries where they impose chains that constrain urban functionality and vitality.

Planning education and training should retool and reconceptualize the profession so it can more effectively address ethnic/racial difference. Education of planning students and training of mid-career professional planners should prepare planners to deal with the complex issues of planning amidst ethnic difference. In the case study cities, Israeli planners are restricted by political imperatives in their ability to reconceptualize methods and goals, those in Belfast show a sensitivity to ethnic group differences but are not yet bold enough to display this in public forums, and postapartheid Johannesburg planners are undergoing a critical self-reflection amidst the need to balance community mobilization and government regulation. Planners should be better educated in such topics, as identified by Friedmann (1996)—spatial segmentation, culturally specific forms of urban living, ethnic identity formation, and interethnic and interracial differences. This calls for studio-based workshops in planning schools to involve students in the multidimensional analysis and planning of ethnic neighborhoods. Students and practitioners should be exposed to the rudiments of ethnic impact analysis, qualitative surveying, conflict resolution, and community relations techniques.

Planners should confront the challenges posed by multiculturalism through processes of social learning, not through methodological certainty. In the face of multicultural complexity, the planning profession should not attempt to retreat through professional rigidity but rather engage in processes of social interaction with cultural groups so that their values and visions are incorporated into city planning. Postapartheid Johannesburg planners are highest on the social learning curve, incorporating participatory and human development aspects alongside its traditional spatial and regulatory emphasis. Belfast planners exhibit methodological experimentation but keep it in-house, while Israeli planners' openness to change must unfortunately await a lessening of political tensions.[8] Planning should attempt to understand the unfamiliar terrain of ethnic/racial difference and build new methods appreciative of diversity. Compared to professional detachment, this path poses greater risks to the profession, yet ultimately will provide for its growth, evolution, and enhanced relevance in this century.

Planning—through the spatial, economic, and social-psychological conditions it creates in the built landscape—can play a significant role in addressing the local manifestations of broader societal attitudes concerning ethnicity and race. Planners affect attributes of the urban system—such as viability of ethnic neighborhoods, economic opportunity, socioeconomic integration, and cultural symbolism—in ways that may independently produce or hinder mutually tolerable multiethnic living environments. City policies make a difference. They have intensified urban

instability in Jerusalem through their solidifying of relative group deprivation. They have hardened ethnic compartmentalization in Belfast through their emphasis on conflict abeyance and containment. And, after exposing the impractical logic of urban apartheid yesterday, city policies in Johannesburg's future will likely play instrumental roles in the success or failure of reparative social justice. Cities are likely not the primary or direct influence on the level of ethnic or racial tension between competing urban groups, yet they also do not appear to be inert and passive reflectors of larger societal processes and attitudes. Cities matter, and by the nature of the urban assets that they effect, planners have influence.

Planning has the capacity to connect urban issues to root societal problems. The Johannesburg case demonstrates how urban issues can be connected to broader societal ones as day-to-day city problems were connected to root political issues. This potential to connect urban and national issues also exists in Belfast; decision makers there must consider when local policies should be enacted that seek more assertively to build intergroup tolerance and through what means these efforts can be connected to the larger peace process.

This connection between urban and national problems is also evident in the United States. Here, there is mounting awareness that the ways metropolitan areas are structured—including many spatial components amenable to planning policy—are connected to many root problems in our society, including inequality of opportunity, a polarized and anemic democracy, and racial/ethnic anxiety. Urban racial and ethnic segregation, for example, has been indicted for its pervasive societal effects—for creating an inequality of opportunity that has a "long-term debilitating effect on the quality of American democracy" (Altshuler et al., 1999, p. 9), endangering the American dream of getting ahead based on one's own efforts (Hochschild, 1995), and constituting "the principal organizational feature of American society responsible for the creation of the urban underclass" (Massey & Denton, 1993, p. 9). Through progressive planning actions regarding housing, community and economic development, delivery of social services, and management of environmental pollution, metropolitan opportunities can be structured in more equitable ways such that today's separate societies can be connected and a more healthy and genuine democracy can function. Planning and development decisions in today's multicultural cities can establish bridges and links between racial/ethnic neighborhoods or they can build boundaries and figurative walls. The choices we make today will send emotive symbols to future generations about what we either aspire to in hope or accept in resignation.

NOTES

1. The broad label of community social and economic disparity is commonly used in the book to subsume ethnic and racial considerations; one indication of this treatment is that *race* and *ethnicity* cannot be found in the book's index. This bears a striking similarity to the lack of explicit reference to *Protestant* or *Catholic* in the *Belfast Urban Area Plan 2001*.

2. It is not possible here to address each ethnic or racial conflict in its full richness. To do so would require an account of Jewish/Muslim relations in Palestine over the last 1,300 years, Catholic/Protestant relations since the Protestant plantations in Ulster (Northern Ireland) more than 450 years ago, and Black/White relations in South Africa since the introduction of Europeans over 350 years ago (see Bollens, 1999, 2000).

3. The in-person interview was selected over other research techniques because it enables probing to obtain greater data. Thirty-four interviews were conducted in Belfast, 40 in Jerusalem, and 37 in Johannesburg, all between October 1994 and September 1995. Questions were open-ended, which allowed interviewees flexibility and depth in responding and facilitated responses not anticipated by the research design. Strong efforts were made to assure a fair distribution across ethnic groups, and across government and nongovernmental officials. In Belfast, 16 Protestants and 12 Catholics were interviewed (6 not reported); 19 were government officials and 15 were nongovernmental officials or academics. In Jerusalem, 24 Israelis and 15 Palestinians were surveyed; 12 were Israeli government officials, 11 were academics, and 17 were from the Palestinian Authority or nongovernmental organizations. In Johannesburg, 11 non-Whites and 26 Whites were interviewed; 21 were governmental officials and 14 were nongovernmental officials or academics. Interviewees gave written consent to be quoted and individually identified.

4. Assessment of Belfast policy is based on interviews with officials in the DOENI central office, the DOENI Town and Country Planning Service (Belfast Division), the NIHE Belfast Regional Office, the Central Community Relations Unit of the Northern Ireland Office, and with academics who have studied Belfast urban policy.

5. Internal documents that employ a sophisticated analysis

of the multiple facets of ethnic geography and how they might impact government action, such as DOENI's 1990 *Northgate Enterprise Park* report, are commonly not released to the public.

6. Assessment of Israeli policy is based on interviews with current and former government officials in the Municipality of Jerusalem and the Ministry of Interior (Jerusalem District and central government office), Israeli academics who have worked on government projects, and Palestinian officials and researchers in nongovernmental organizations.

7. Assessment of Johannesburg policy is based on interviews with current officials with the City of Johannesburg, the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council, Gauteng Province, and the South African central government. Many were involved from 1990 to 1995 in the negotiated transformation of Johannesburg local governance.

8. Even during times of great political tension, however, intergroup interaction can continue, at least at the level of professionals. In March 2001, amidst hostilities that began in November 2000, the author participated in a joint workshop of Israeli and Palestinian urban professionals examining the challenges and future options of planning a Jerusalem of mutual acceptance. The March 2001 workshop, held in the Netherlands, was an offshoot of a larger joint effort, begun in 1995, that contributed technical support to the 2000 Camp David peace negotiations. Each group in the Dutch workshop had unofficial connections with their respective governments rather than formal and explicit sponsorship.

INTERVIEWS CITED

Belfast

John Hendry, Professor of Town and Regional Planning, Department of Environmental Planning, Queen's University of Belfast

Dennis McCoy, Central Community Relations Unit, Central Secretariat, Northern Ireland Office

William McGivern, Regional Director—Belfast, Northern Ireland Housing Executive

John McPeake , Assistant Director for Strategy, Planning and Research, Northern Ireland Housing Executive

Bill Morrison, Superintending Planning Officer, Belfast Divisional Office, Town and Country Planning Service, Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland

Gerry Mulligan, Central Statistics and Research Branch, Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland

Bill Neill, Professor of Town Planning, Department of Environmental Planning, Queen's University; Head of Royal Town Planning Institute, Northern Ireland

Ronnie Spence, Permanent Secretary, Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland

Ken Sterrett, Town and Country Planning Services, Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland

Paul Sweeney, Advisor, Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland

George Worthington, Head, Belfast Divisional Office, Town and Country Planning Service, Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland

Jerusalem

Elinoar Barzacchi, City Engineer, Municipality of Jerusalem (1989–1994); Co-director, Steering Committee, Metropolitan Jerusalem Plan; Professor of Architecture, Tel Aviv University

Uri Ben-Asher, District Planner, Jerusalem District, Ministry of the Interior

Meron Benvenisti, Author; former City Councilman and Deputy Mayor, Municipality of Jerusalem; Director, West Bank Data Project

Yehonathan Golani, Director, Planning Administration, Ministry of Interior

Benjamin Hyman, Director, Department of Local Planning, Ministry of the Interior, Israel

Jan de Jong, Planning consultant, St. Yves Legal Resource and Development Center, Jerusalem

Sarah Kaminker, Chairperson, Jerusalem Information Center; former urban planner, Municipality of Jerusalem

Israel Kimhi, Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies; city planner, Municipality of Jerusalem (1963–1986)

Ibrahim Matar, Deputy Director, American Near East Refugee Aid, Jerusalem

Adam Mazor, Co-author, Metropolitan Jerusalem Master and Development Plan; Professor of Urban Planning, Technion Institute; Principal, Urban Institute Ltd. (Tel Aviv)

Shlomo Moshkovits, Director, Central Planning Department, Civil Administration for Judea and Samaria, Beit El, West Bank

Nira Sidi, Director, Urban Planning Policy, Municipality of Jerusalem

Khalil Tufakji, Geographer, Arab Studies Society; member, Palestinian-Israeli Security Committee

Johannesburg

Lawrence Boya, Chief Director, Development Planning, Department of Development Planning, Environment, and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government

Jane Eagle, Planner, Strategic Issues Division, City Planning Department, Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council

Jan Erasmus, Acting Deputy Director, Regional Land Use, Johannesburg Administration, Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council

Morag Gilbert, Deputy Director, Strategic Issues Division, City Planning Department, Johannesburg Administration

Tim Hart, Urban geographer, SRK Engineers, Johannesburg

Ivan Kadungure, Reconstruction and Development Programme Support Unit, Office of the Chief Executive; town planner, Soweto Administration, Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council

Alida Kotzee, Town and Regional Planner, Planning Services Directorate, Department of Development Planning, Environment, and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government

Themba Maluleke, Project Manager, KATORUS, Department

of Local Government and Housing, Gauteng Provincial Government

Tshipso Mashinini, Deputy Director, Urbanization Department, Johannesburg Administration, Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council

John Muller, Professor and Head, Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Monty Narsoo, Director of Housing, Department of Local Government and Housing, Gauteng Provincial Government

Paul Waanders, Chief Director, Planning Services, Department of Development Planning, Environment and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government

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