

UCLA

UCLA Previously Published Works

Title

The Neighborhood Context of Eviction in Southern California

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6pd0313p>

Journal

City and Community, 19(4)

ISSN

1535-6841

Authors

Lens, Michael C
Nelson, Kyle
Gromis, Ashley
[et al.](#)

Publication Date

2020-12-01

DOI

10.1111/cico.12487

Copyright Information

This work is made available under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives License, available at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/>

Peer reviewed

The Neighborhood Context of Eviction in Southern California

Michael C. Lens* 
UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs

Kyle Nelson
UCLA Department of Sociology

Ashley Gromis
Department of Sociology, Princeton University

Yiwen Kuai 
UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs

Abstract

In the United States, soaring rent burdens and a dearth of affordable housing leave millions of renters at risk of eviction. The eviction epidemic is particularly pronounced in California where advocates estimate that approximately 500,000 renters are evicted annually. Research has looked at individual-level determinants of evictions, but we know much less about the spatial dynamics of eviction and associations across neighborhoods. This is largely because data on evictions are sporadic and incomplete. We utilize data from American Information Research Services, Inc., that consists of publicly available California eviction court records for Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego Counties between 2005 and 2015. We append eviction locations to two waves of the American Community Survey (ACS) to better understand the connection between concentrated disadvantage and neighborhood change and eviction. We find that evictions are much more likely to occur in neighborhoods with higher poverty rates and/or shares of African-American individuals than in neighborhoods with rising rent or income levels. These findings suggest that court-based evictions are much more likely to be found in areas with low-income households and racial minorities than in areas experiencing rapid neighborhood change as evidenced by rising rents or changing demographics.

INTRODUCTION

Metropolitan areas throughout the United States are in the midst of intensifying affordable housing crises. Costs of living are increasing relative to stagnating wages,

* Correspondence should be addressed to Michael C. Lens, UCLA, 3250 Public Affairs Building, Los Angeles, CA 90095; mlens@ucla.edu.

rent burdens continue to rise for the poorest Americans, and supplies of subsidized and affordable housing are dwindling (Marr 2017; McCue 2018). As a result, increasing numbers of renters nationally are at risk of receiving an eviction notice (Desmond et al. 2018). Despite once being labeled the “hidden housing problem” (Hartman and Robinson 2003), increasing media and policy attention to the nationwide eviction crisis have sparked public concern over its negative effects on renters (e.g., Badger and Bui 2018). Most recently, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, among other U.S. cities, enacted laws providing low-income renters a right to legal counsel in eviction proceedings (National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel 2019). Yet, we know very little about how eviction varies over space, as previous research has primarily focused on individual-level determinants of eviction. This paper helps address this gap in knowledge by examining how neighborhood demographics and housing markets affect trends in eviction filings.

A landmark study in Milwaukee revealed eviction’s causes and consequences as rooted in conditions of urban poverty (Desmond 2016). Desmond and Gershenson (2017), for example, summarize individual-, neighborhood-, and network-level variables that explain variation in the likelihood of experiencing an eviction. However, given the focus on one city (Milwaukee), we do not have a comparative examination of socio-demographic determinants and neighborhood correlates of eviction, the effects of local and national economic forces, and housing market contexts, which other researchers have suggested drive these relationships to a far greater degree than the literature acknowledges.¹

In Southern California, for example, housing market trends such as the foreclosure crisis and a lack of affordable housing supply put, among other groups, Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) holders at increased risk of displacement (Kurwa 2015). Meanwhile, large institutional investors gradually replaced “mom and pop” landlords, bringing with them a more “bureaucratic” style of eviction that differs significantly from landlord dynamics in cities (Abood 2018; Raymond et al. 2018; cf. Desmond 2016; Rosen 2014).

In this paper, we investigate how neighborhood and housing market characteristics relate to eviction rates and spatial dynamics within and across counties in Southern California. To do so, we draw on a data set of court-processed eviction filings compiled by American Information Research Services, Inc. (AIRS). Our data set includes over 700,000 eviction filings in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego counties between 2005 and 2015. We aggregate these data at the census tract-level and append housing and demographic characteristics from the American Community Survey (ACS). We then use ordinary least squares (OLS) and spatial regression models to analyze the spatial patterning of these eviction cases.

Specifically, given evictions are often about differentials between rents that landlords wish to receive and tenants are able to pay, we investigate the extent to which eviction filings tend to be more prevalent in areas with concentrated disadvantage or intense neighborhood housing markets. Our hypothesis is that these two forces are what most likely shape neighborhood filing rates and trends in this rate over time. Consistent with literature on eviction, we find that the most consistent variables associated with eviction filings are poverty rates and the presence of African American households. Housing market indicators, including gross rents, housing prices, and the size of the rental housing stock have less consistent relationships to eviction filing rates.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Although historical eviction data has always been incomplete and elusive (Desmond 2016; Hartman and Robinson 2003) suggests that eviction used to be a rare occurrence in American cities. Desmond points to the professionalization of the landlord industry, noting that “since 1970, the number of people primarily employed as property managers had more than quadrupled” to help explain the increasing prevalence of eviction over time (Desmond 2016:28; see also Raymond et al. 2018). More direct causes, however, may be found in steadily rising rent burdens and declining supply of affordable housing in recent decades. Quigley and Raphael (2004), for example, report that in 1960, 23 percent of all renters and 55 percent of poor renters devoted more than 30 percent of income to rent, a common threshold for undue housing cost burdens; by 1980, those percentages had risen to 34 and 68, respectively. These percentages rose consistently in the following decades. Authors calculations of the ACS estimate that about 52 percent of all renters and 81 percent of renters below the poverty line spend more than 30 percent of their income on rent. In essence, nearly all poor renters are rent burdened, and the greater population of renters is as cost-burdened as poor renters were in 1960.

Increasing rent burden puts renters at risk of eviction, which research has shown to be associated with myriad negative outcomes across the life course. Experiencing an eviction is correlated with negative physical and mental health outcomes (Desmond and An 2015; Desmond and Kimbro 2015; Fowler et al. 2015; Vasquez-Vera et al. 2017), the dissolution of strong network ties (Desmond 2012a), employment insecurity (Desmond and Gershenson 2016), and changes in household composition (Desmond and Perkins 2016). Evicted tenants are also more likely to be evicted in the future, resulting in both increased *and* downward residential mobility (Cusack and Montgomery 2017; Desmond 2012b; Desmond and Shollenberger 2015; Desmond, Gershenson, and Kiviat 2015). More generally, researchers identify eviction as a fundamental cause of urban poverty. Recent studies have shown that eviction disproportionately affects poor women of color, families with children, victims of domestic violence, and those who have been evicted before (Desmond 2012a; 2012b; 2016; Desmond and Valdez 2013; Desmond et al. 2013; Lundberg and Donnelly 2019). Scholars generally agree that Black women and poor renters comprise the majority of defendants on courthouse eviction dockets and have done so for decades (e.g., Bezdek 1992; Mosier and Soble 1973).

Furthermore, research shows that poor urban residents face eviction and displacement through public policies such as urban renewal and slum clearance that was targeted in predominantly Black neighborhoods (Gans 1962; Hunter 2013) and “poverty deconcentration” initiatives such as public housing demolition (Patillo 2007; Pittman and Oakley 2018). Not only do these processes disadvantage racial minorities, but African Americans in particular have and continue to experience racial discrimination in lending (Munnell et al. 1996) and searching for housing (Turner et al. 2013; Yinger 1986), although there is promising evidence that such discrimination is declining over time (Sander, Kucheva, and Zasloff 2018).

There is little consensus regarding the relationship between other forms of neighborhood change-based displacement, such as gentrification, and eviction. Some note that gentrification—and the rising rents that accompany this form of neighborhood change—causes increased rates of eviction and displacement (Brown-Saracino 2009; Smith 1996;

Zukin 1982 for a review). Establishing a causal link between gentrification and displacement, however, has been particularly contentious in the social sciences (Brown-Saracino 2017). Researchers in New York, for example, found that poor residents in gentrifying neighborhoods are less mobile than poor residents in neighborhoods with high poverty rates (Freeman 2005; Freeman and Braconi 2004; Ellen and O'Regan 2011).² Eviction researchers agree that gentrification-related displacement alone cannot explain higher levels of mobility among the urban poor (Desmond 2012b:89-90; Sullivan 2017:321; Shelton 2018). These claims are contentious, however, as critics note that survey definitions of displacement may inflate what social scientists understand to be “normal” mobility rates among the urban poor (Newman and Wylie 2006) and undercount informal forms of displacement such as cash-for-keys offers and illegal evictions (Desmond and Shollenberger 2015; McGahan 2017).

While debates over the relationship between gentrification and displacement are ongoing (e.g., Brown-Saracino, 2013, 2017; Lees, Slater, and Wylie 2013; Zukin 2016), a “diminishing supply of low cost rental housing remains in high demand,” putting rent burdened urban renters at risk of displacement in many of the country’s largest metropolises (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2017:25). In San Francisco, Diamond, McQuade, and Qian (2018) showed that rent controlled tenants were 10 percent-20 percent more likely to remain “in place” than tenants not protected by rent control. These findings match those of ethnographers’ that, while perhaps less diagnostically precise in terms of causality, displacement, and demographic turnover follow rising rents in gentrifying neighborhoods in a variety of cities (e.g., Bell 1994; Deener 2012; Freeman 2006; Kasinitz 1988; Pattillo 2007; Taylor 2002). Regardless of whether gentrification itself is the cause of high mobility rates among the urban poor, however, when poor residents do move out of gentrifying neighborhoods, they typically move to neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty and crime rates (Desmond and Shollenberger 2015:1763-65; Ding, Hwang, and Diviringi 2016:47-78).

While the empirical evidence is light, there is a direct mechanism connection tying eviction to gentrification. In this case, landlords are so convinced of their ability to obtain higher value (via increased rents or property or land sales) that they initiate an eviction proceeding with or without cause.³ This phenomenon can be especially pronounced when corporate landlords and institutional investors are involved (Immergluck et al. 2019; Raymond et al. 2018). However, court-based eviction is a distinct form of forced displacement that is likely to respond in particular ways to pressures from changing neighborhood economic and demographic contexts. There are multiple channels through which neighborhood housing market and demographic factors could relate to eviction filing rates, and this is what we investigate in this paper.

DATA AND METHODS

Eviction is challenging to study for several reasons. For one, reliable national-level data sets of court-based evictions are just coming to fruition (Desmond et al. 2018). Even when data are available, however, comparisons across jurisdictions are difficult due to variation in how courts process and document evictions (Gerchick 1994; Monsma and Lempert 1992). Likewise, definitions of other forms of eviction such as no-cause evictions—where tenants are evicted, but not legally at-fault—vary both across jurisdiction

and over time. The city of Los Angeles, for example, has several different forms of no-fault eviction. State housing bureaucracies may evict tenants without cause when landlords accrue excessive code violations. Landlords can evict tenants without cause by petitioning to remove rent controlled housing stock from the private rental market via “the Ellis Act” (Gross 2015). Other types may occur because of eminent domain (Becher 2014) or in the form of “third-party action evictions” in public housing (Mock 1998). Finally, scholars and advocates claim that administrative data and nationally representative surveys fail to accurately account for the prevalence of formal, court-based *and* informal forms of eviction (Hartman and Robinson 2003:463; Newman and Wiley 2006; Desmond and Shollenberger 2015). For these reasons, existing eviction data may significantly undercount evictions and paint a partial picture of its prevalence and spatial dynamics.

With these caveats in mind, we draw on administrative data on one particular type of eviction—court-based eviction filings. Our primary data set consists of addresses listed as premises in unsealed unlawful detainer (UD) lawsuits compiled by AIRS in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego Counties between 2005 and 2015. We verified the representativeness of our sample by comparing case counts in this data set to aggregate UD filings that we collected from each county’s superior court systems via public records requests. While comparisons across time and jurisdiction can be difficult, we have minimized issues inherent in comparing different jurisdictions by comparing cases that all fall under the same statewide judicial regime.

AIRS DATA

Our primary data set consists of addresses listed as premises in UD lawsuits between 2005–2015 in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego Counties.⁴ These data were generously provided to us by AIRS, a firm that uses web scraping and in-person data collection efforts to create a database of eviction case filings in the United States. Our AIRS dataset consists of point-level address data from 736,122 unsealed cases. As we are interested in how neighborhood dynamics influence eviction filings, we aggregate the point-level address data to the census tract level (our definition of neighborhoods). The aggregation in census tracts is done yearly, based on the date of case filing. To help reduce year-to-year fluctuation in eviction filing totals, we averaged filing counts across two five-year windows: 2005–2009 and 2011–2015.⁵

While extensive, our AIRS data only include a subset of the overall UD lawsuits filed over this period of time. There are two reasons why a case would be unlikely to appear in the AIRS data. First, pursuant to CCP 1161.2, litigants may request that their court records be sealed, rendering them inaccessible to the public. AB 2819 (2016) expanded these protections (Scheinin 2016). Until 2017, Riverside County was an exception to this rule, which explains its near complete coverage in our dataset (Appendix Figure A1). Second, AIRS does not consistently collect information on dismissed cases (as these cases did not result in evictions). For this reason, our dataset consists exclusively of unsealed UD lawsuits and is less likely to include cases that were dismissed.⁶ We provide further details on data coverage in the Appendix and Figure A1 shows the proportion of cases in our AIRS data set relative to the aggregate number of filings in each county per calendar year.⁷

To better understand the types of neighborhoods where eviction cases are filed and examine how neighborhood dynamics relate to eviction filing rates, we append data from two five-year waves of the ACS to our census tract-level counts of eviction filings. Specifically, we use demographic data from 2005 to 2009 and 2011 to 2015 waves. As we are interested in how changing neighborhood contexts affect eviction filings, we calculate a set of change measures by calculating the difference between variable values reported in these two waves. We are primarily concerned with capturing neighborhood constructs that represent housing markets and opportunities, population characteristics, concentrated disadvantage, and how these neighborhood attributes change over a relatively short period of time. Thus, we gathered the following variables from the ACS: number of renter-occupied housing units, percent of the population with a bachelor's degree, percent of the population without a high school diploma, percent of families in poverty, median household income, median rent, median home value, vacancy rate, unemployment rate, percent owner-occupied units, and population by age, race, and ethnicity. To capture the subsidized housing stock, which may insulate lower-income renters from eviction, we added HCV, public housing units, and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) units per census tract, obtained from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Given we use the five-year waves of the ACS in 2005–2009 and 2011–2015, we calculate five-year averages of these housing subsidy totals, and as mentioned, the eviction numbers are measured in the same manner. We also calculate a set of change variables between the two waves.

Using these data, we construct the following OLS model:

$$\text{Ln} \left(\frac{\text{Filings}_i}{\text{Rent1000}_i} \right) = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Housing}_i + \beta_2 \text{EdRace}_i + \beta_3 \text{IncPov}_i + \beta_4 \text{County}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Eviction Filings per 1,000 rental units in census tract i are regressed on a set of housing, education, race and income and poverty statistics for that tract. To deal with variation across counties in data reporting and petition filing processes, we add county fixed effects (County_i). To reduce heteroscedasticity in our standard errors, we take the natural log of the dependent variable. We estimate this equation for two cross-sectional models: the 2005–2009 period and the 2011–2015 period. The goal of these cross-sectional models is to better understand the types of neighborhood characteristics that are most frequently associated with higher eviction filings in a particular period. Cross-sectional models such as these are highly unlikely to isolate causal relationships—here we are simply trying to describe and isolate the neighborhood conditions that have the strongest association with neighborhood eviction filing rates. Using the 2005–2009 and 2011–2015 time periods, we have the advantage of observing five-year waves in which eviction totals were historically high (2005–2009) and considerably lower (2011–2015).

We then estimate first difference models. In these models, we regress the change in eviction filing rates between the five-year totals in t_1 (2005–2009) and t_2 (2011–2015) on the changes in the same set of covariates included in the cross-sectional models. These models put us in a better position to isolate what neighborhood attributes and dynamics cause increases in eviction filings at a local level as they examine changes in filings and covariates simultaneously (while time invariant neighborhood characteristics, including the county in which the census tract is located, are differenced out). We must acknowledge,

however, that even the first difference models are, at best, identifying strong associations between these conditions.

Given that housing markets are much larger in area than census tracts and that investors and home-seekers alike rarely even acknowledge census tract boundaries, effects of tract characteristics may spill over between neighboring census tracts. The race, income, and housing supply-and-demand features of a census tract—at a minimum—affect such features of neighboring census tracts. For this reason, as a robustness measure, we also estimate spatial autoregressive (SAR) models that include spatial lag terms for all covariates in the model. The spatial lag terms of the covariates are specified according to a continuity spatial weights matrix with spectral normalization (W). First order neighbors (census tracts that directly share borders) are assigned a weight of 1, while second order neighbors (census tracts that directly share borders with first order neighbors) are assigned weights of 0.5.

Our SAR models take the following form:

$$\text{Ln} \left(\frac{\text{Filings}_i}{\text{Rent1000}_i} \right) = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Housing}_i + \beta_2 \text{EdRace}_i + \beta_3 \text{IncPov}_i + \beta_4 \text{County}_i + WX\theta + \varepsilon_i$$

Here, we keep the same base model presented above, but also estimate the effects (θ) for the vector of spatially lagged covariates (X) from neighboring census tracts according to the spatial contiguity matrix described above (W). Our estimated SAR models also include a spatially lagged error term as a robustness measure. These models account for correlation among error terms in neighboring census tracts created by unmeasured, spatially correlated neighborhood characteristics that also affect filing rates. If spatial autocorrelation is present in the error terms, OLS estimation would still be unbiased, but inefficient. In all models, the coefficient for the spatially lagged error term was positive and significant, indicating that there are spatially correlated characteristics of neighborhoods that are associated with the prevalence of court-based eviction filings. Further, for some variables, the coefficients and standard errors differ in meaningful ways between the OLS and SAR models, leading us to prefer the latter, given the strong likelihood that effects spill over across administrative neighborhood boundaries.

RESULTS

We begin by looking at trends in eviction filings over time across Southern California. Figure 1 shows court-based eviction filings included in the AIRS data for the five counties. Eviction filings peaked in 2008, just as the Great Recession was at its worst. Filings remained high in the Recession years before returning to pre-Recession levels around 2013.

These trends in county filing aggregates provide a broad perspective on how many eviction cases are filed over time in the five counties under study and some evidence that large scale economic shocks explain some variation in eviction filings. They do not, however, reveal how filings vary across neighborhood contexts. As discussed above, previous research on eviction suggests that there could be multiple mechanisms underlying increases and decreases in a neighborhood's eviction rate. To recap, it could be that the most disadvantaged areas experience the most evictions due concentrated poverty. Alternatively, it




FIG 1. Five-county aggregated court-based eviction filings in AIRS data, 2005–2015. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

could be neighborhood change akin to gentrification driving evictions in certain neighborhoods. In the case of gentrification, it is not the most disadvantaged neighborhoods, but those that have rising rents and tighter rental markets that incentivize landlords to push out lower income, incumbent tenants.

Given the focus in the analyses on the 2005–2015 timeframe, Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for eviction filings and demographic variables for the 2005–2009 five-year averages and the change between 2005–2009 and 2011–2015. Eviction filings are summed across each of the five year periods. The average census tract had about 91 court-based eviction filings over the five year period from 2005 to 2009. This is equivalent to an average rate of 133 eviction filings per 1,000 renters. In other words, in an average year in an average tract, just under 3 percent of renter households had eviction filings initiated against them. We note, however, that this statistic represents a significant undercount of eviction filings given the AIRS data include only unsealed eviction cases (see Appendix). The standard deviations for these variables are roughly equivalent to their means, so we know that there is a great deal of variation; some census tracts had a very high number of filings, some very low. Between 2005–2009 and 2011–2015, the five-year average total of eviction filings declined on average by about 16 percent (a decline on average of about 16 filings from a baseline of 91).

To better understand the neighborhood correlates of eviction filings, we estimate regression models that examine which neighborhood attributes are most associated with filing totals and rates, and then look at what attributes are most associated with growth in those rates over time. Table 2 summarizes the results of our cross-sectional model for the 2011–2015 period assessing the relationships between neighborhood demographic and housing market characteristics and the number of filings (both the total and rate per 1,000 renters).⁸ We account for the number of renters in a census tract in two dif-

TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics: 2005–2009 averages and changes from 2005–2009 to 2011–2015, five county sample

| Variables | N | 2005–2009 | | Mean | SD |
|---|-------|-----------|--------|--|--|
| | | Mean | SD | Change 2005–2009 to 2011–2015 | Change 2005–2009 to 2011–2015 |
| No. of Evictions (5 Years) | 3,560 | 91.14 | 87.12 | –16.24 | 33.05 |
| No. of Evictions (5 Years) per 1,000 Renters | 3,560 | 134.14 | 118.52 | –38.57 | 66.97 |
| Rental Units (in 1,000) | 3,560 | 0.78 | 0.49 | 0.06 | 0.16 |
| Unemployment Rate | 3,560 | 4.60 | 1.99 | 0.56 | 2.43 |
| Pct. Age 25 & Older | 3,560 | 64.07 | 9.88 | 1.77 | 4.59 |
| Pct. Black | 3,560 | 7.17 | 11.40 | –0.22 | 4.04 |
| Pct. Hispanic | 3,560 | 44.52 | 27.84 | 1.62 | 6.64 |
| Pct. Asian | 3,560 | 11.73 | 14.01 | 0.43 | 4.45 |
| Pct. w/ College Degree | 3,560 | 26.11 | 19.04 | 1.36 | 5.45 |
| Poverty Rate | 3,560 | 15.62 | 10.83 | 2.92 | 6.90 |
| Pct. w/o HS Diploma | 3,560 | 14.47 | 9.73 | –0.40 | 3.74 |
| Household Income (in \$1,000) | 3,560 | 57.97 | 23.64 | 0.81 | 9.88 |
| Pct. Vacant | 3,560 | 7.30 | 6.78 | –0.31 | 4.58 |
| Median Gross Rent (in \$100) | 3,560 | 12.28 | 3.31 | 1.12 | 1.88 |
| Median Home Value (in \$1,000) | 3,560 | 466.58 | 196.95 | –43.13 | 114.36 |
| Pct. Owner Occupied Units | 3,560 | 49.80 | 23.12 | –2.75 | 6.88 |

ferent ways—in the first column as an independent control variable and in the second as the denominator in a calculation of eviction case filing rate (i.e., the number of filings divided by the number of rental units multiplied by 1,000). We do this because the role of rental units is both central and complex—you cannot have evictions without renters, so it can be expressed as a rate. But if there is significant measurement error in the number of rental units (and the ACS data are estimates), then the dependent variable would also suffer from measurement error. Thus, we use rental units as a control variable in half of our models to adjust for the presence of rental units without subjecting the dependent variable to this potential error.

In these models, a majority of variables are strongly associated with the number of eviction filings (or eviction filing rates) in both models. Household income, percent Black, percent Hispanic, and the poverty rate are positively associated with logged filings and filing rates. With the exception of household income, these associations suggest that more disadvantaged areas have higher filing rates. Median home value, percent population 25 and older, percent with a college degree, percent without a high school diploma, and public housing units are negatively associated with filings and rates. Areas with high or low educational attainment, higher home values, fewer children, and more public housing are places with fewer filings. A number of variables were also associated with either filings or filing rates. The number of rental units is positively associated and vacancy rates are negatively associated with the logged number of filings. In the models on logged filing rates, median rent, percent owner occupied, the unemployment rates, and LIHTC units are positively associated with filing rates.

TABLE 2. Neighborhood characteristics associated with court-based eviction filings in 2011–2015

| Variables | Logged Eviction Filings (5 Years) | | Logged No. of Eviction Filings (5 Years) per 1,000 Rental Units | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------|---|----------|
| | Coeff | SE | Coeff | SE |
| Rental Units (in 1,000) | 1.13*** | 0.033 | | |
| Household Income (in \$1,000) | 0.0056*** | 0.001 | 0.0062*** | 0.00099 |
| Pct. Vacant | −0.0032** | 0.0016 | −0.0023 | 0.0016 |
| Median Gross Rent (in \$100) | 0.00095 | 0.0041 | 0.014*** | 0.0039 |
| Median Home Value (in \$1,000) | −0.00031*** | 0.000069 | −0.00045*** | 0.000065 |
| Pct. Owner Occupied Units | −0.0010 | 0.00091 | 0.0015** | 0.0007 |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.0087* | 0.0052 | 0.013*** | 0.005 |
| Pct. Age 25 & Older | −0.011*** | 0.0018 | −0.0076*** | 0.0018 |
| Pct. Black | 0.010*** | 0.0011 | 0.010*** | 0.0011 |
| Pct. Hispanic | 0.0025** | 0.001 | 0.0037*** | 0.00096 |
| Pct. Asian | −0.00040 | 0.00084 | −0.00063 | 0.0008 |
| Pct. w/ College Degree | −0.024*** | 0.0015 | −0.022*** | 0.0014 |
| Poverty Rate | 0.0068*** | 0.0018 | 0.0080*** | 0.0017 |
| Pct. w/o HS Diploma | −0.030*** | 0.0028 | −0.030*** | 0.0027 |
| Housing Choice Vouchers | −0.00012 | 0.00024 | 0.00019 | 0.00022 |
| Public Housing Units | −0.0013*** | 0.0003 | −0.0012*** | 0.00029 |
| LIHTC Units | 0.00013 | 0.00012 | 0.00032*** | 0.00011 |
| Constant | 4.13*** | 0.19 | 4.74*** | 0.18 |
| County Fixed Effect | | Yes | | Yes |
| Observations | | 3,560 | | 3,560 |
| R-squared | | 0.62 | | 0.54 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Although these models do not control for spatial autocorrelation, as the subsequent models do, it is worth noting that public housing units appear to have a protective effect against eviction filings, while LIHTC units are positively associated with eviction filing rates per 1,000 rental units. Although each are forms of below market rate housing, LIHTC units are owned and managed by private entities, unlike the typical public housing unit. This initial set of results suggest that filings are more common in areas that are poorer and have higher proportions of Black and Latino households, which supports a hypothesis that evictions follow concentrated disadvantage. Desmond (2016) found in Milwaukee that eviction is highly racialized—African American women in particular seemed to disproportionately face eviction as opposed to other groups (Desmond 2012b). However, higher household income is positively linked to filings, and the results on educational attainment are inconclusive. Housing market characteristics such as vacancy, median rent or home values, and percent owner occupied units yielded inconclusive results. Desmond and colleagues (2013) also emphasizes that children frequently draw the ire of landlords and housing needs are often more acute for families with children, so the negative correlations with higher age groups are not surprising.

Given our concerns about spatial autocorrelation, the remaining three tables display results from SAR models. Table 3 displays the SAR version of the models from Table 2.

TABLE 3. Neighborhood characteristics associated with court-based eviction filings in 2011–2015, SAR Models

| Variables | Logged Eviction Filings (5 Years) | | Logged No. of Eviction Filings (5 Years) per 1,000 Rental Units | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------|---|---------|
| | Coeff | SE | Coeff | SE |
| Rental Units (in 1,000) | 1.22*** | 0.16 | | |
| Household Income (in \$1,000) | 0.016*** | 0.0046 | 0.015*** | 0.0045 |
| Pct. Vacant | -0.020*** | 0.0065 | -0.020*** | 0.0064 |
| Median Gross Rent (in \$100) | 0.015 | 0.019 | 0.030 | 0.018 |
| Median Home Value (in \$1,000) | -0.000093 | 0.00028 | -0.00026 | 0.00027 |
| Pct. Owner Occupied Units | -0.0060 | 0.0040 | -0.0052* | 0.0031 |
| Unemployment Rate | -0.013 | 0.024 | -0.0048 | 0.024 |
| Pct. Age 25 & Older | 0.0069 | 0.0052 | 0.012*** | 0.0044 |
| Pct. Black | 0.015*** | 0.0039 | 0.017*** | 0.0039 |
| Pct. Hispanic | 0.0020 | 0.0032 | 0.0029 | 0.0031 |
| Pct. Asian | 0.00081 | 0.0027 | 0.00057 | 0.0027 |
| Pct. w/ College Degree | -0.051*** | 0.0061 | -0.047*** | 0.0059 |
| Poverty Rate | 0.029*** | 0.0065 | 0.031*** | 0.0063 |
| Pct. w/o HS Diploma | -0.062*** | 0.011 | -0.062*** | 0.011 |
| Housing Choice Vouchers | -0.0016 | 0.0010 | -0.0041** | 0.0017 |
| Public Housing Units | -0.0038** | 0.0017 | -0.0015 | 0.00091 |
| LIHTC Units 5 | 0.0023*** | 0.00058 | 0.0028*** | 0.00055 |
| County Fixed Effects | | Yes | | Yes |
| Observations | | 3,560 | | 3,560 |
| Pseudo R-squared | | 0.63 | | 0.56 |

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

While there are some changes from Tables 2 to 3, a clearer story emerges. Four variables are positively associated with eviction filings and rates—household income, percent black, percent in poverty, and LIHTC units. With the exception of household income, these are all indicators of concentrated disadvantage. Three variables are negatively associated with eviction filings and rates—the percent vacant units, percent with college degree, and percent without high school diploma. Public housing units are associated with fewer filings and HCV units are associated with lower filing rates. Thus, the educational attainment results are again inconclusive, and the only indicators that housing characteristics matter are that LIHTC units are associated with more filings, public housing and HCV units are associated with fewer in one model, and vacancy rates are associated with fewer filings and lower filing rates. The latter finding is notable as higher vacancy rates tend to be an indicator of lower housing demand, meaning landlords should have lower leverage in these areas and make it less likely that they will proceed with court-based evictions. Rents and home values appear to have no association with filings.

In Table 4 we look at how neighborhood dynamics over time may be associated with the prevalence of eviction filings. Here, we keep the dependent variable the same, but use the change measures for the independent variables (difference in values from the 2005–2009 to the 2011–2015 ACS). We use this as a more explicit test of the role of dynamic processes of neighborhood change such as gentrification. Though our model is set up to account for the role of neighborhood change in determining eviction filing rates, we

TABLE 4. Associations between change neighborhood attributes from 2005–2009 to 2011–2015 and court-based eviction filings in 2011–2015, SAR Models

| Variables | Logged Eviction Filings (5 Years) | | Logged No. of Eviction Filings (5 Yrs) per 1,000 Rental Units | |
|--|--------------------------------------|---------|---|---------|
| | Coeff | SE | Coeff | SE |
| Change in Rental Units (in 1,000) | –0.66 | 0.72 | | |
| Change in Household Income (in \$1,000) | –0.0043 | 0.0088 | –0.0020 | 0.0069 |
| Change in Pct Vacant | –0.047** | 0.018 | –0.024* | 0.014 |
| Change in Median Gross Rent (in \$100) | –0.10*** | 0.040 | –0.048 | 0.031 |
| Change in Median Home Value (in \$1,000) | –0.0013*** | 0.00053 | –0.0011*** | 0.00043 |
| Change in Pct. Owner Occupied Units | –0.021 | 0.017 | 0.0085 | 0.0097 |
| Change in Unemployment Rate | –0.049* | 0.029 | –0.036 | 0.024 |
| Change in Pct. Age 25 & Older | 0.031* | 0.017 | 0.039*** | 0.013 |
| Change in Pct. Black | –0.0046 | 0.020 | –0.021 | 0.017 |
| Change in Pct. Hispanic | 0.010 | 0.013 | 0.0074 | 0.011 |
| Change in Pct. Asian | –0.028 | 0.019 | –0.014 | 0.015 |
| Change in Pct. w/ College Degree | –0.014 | 0.016 | –0.024* | 0.012 |
| Change in Poverty Rate | 0.025** | 0.012 | 0.026*** | 0.0093 |
| Change in Pct. w/o HS Diploma | –0.032 | 0.023 | –0.030 | 0.018 |
| Change in Housing Choice Vouchers | 0.012*** | 0.0041 | 0.0094*** | 0.0033 |
| Change in Public Housing Units | 0.0022 | 0.0093 | 0.0050 | 0.0072 |
| Change in LIHTC Units | 0.012*** | 0.0022 | 0.0063*** | 0.0016 |
| County Fixed Effect | | Yes | | Yes |
| Observations | | 3,560 | | 3,560 |
| Pseudo R-squared | | 0.29 | | 0.39 |

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

find more evidence that areas with increases in concentrated disadvantage are where you see a greater prevalence of filings. Increases in vacancy rates, median rents, and median home values are associated with fewer filings or rates (or both). Increases in the poverty rate, housing vouchers, and LIHTC units are associated with higher filings and rates. However, we no longer observe a connection between the presence of African Americans and filings.

In Table 5 we examine which neighborhood dynamics are concurrent with rises in eviction filings. This is a first difference model that has at least two advantages. First, this again treats neighborhood change as a dynamic process by estimating models that capture change in neighborhood attributes over time. Second, cross-sectional associations are more subject to omitted variable bias and other sources of endogeneity than first difference models. While first difference models do not entirely remove these sources of bias, they should reduce them. If two variables show associations in how they change over time, it is more likely (though not certain) that those associations are causal. In other words, looking at dynamics over time in a regression context *may* reduce threats to establishing causality.

Much is consistent from the earlier models, but two variables stand out here as having the strongest connection to increases in filings and filing rates: increases in vacancy and percent Black. While the percent Black was positively associated with filings in Tables 2 and 3, the sign on the vacancy rate has flipped—vacancy was previously negatively

TABLE 5. Associations between changes in neighborhood characteristics and court-based eviction filings, 2005–2009 to 2011–2015, SAR Models

| Variables | Change in No. of Eviction Filings | | Change in No. of Eviction Filings per 1,000 Rental Units | |
|--|-----------------------------------|-------|--|-------|
| | Coeff | SE | Coeff | SE |
| Change in Rental Units (in 1,000) | 50.63 ^{**} | 24.47 | | |
| Change in Household Income (in \$1,000) | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.97 | 0.60 |
| Change in Pct. Vacant | 1.44 ^{**} | 0.66 | 4.44 ^{***} | 1.19 |
| Change in Median Gross Rent (in \$100) | -0.92 | 1.43 | -3.18 | 2.64 |
| Change in Median Home Value (in \$1,000) | 0.016 | 0.017 | 0.026 | 0.033 |
| Change in Pct. Owner Occupied Units | 0.68 | 0.62 | 3.26 ^{***} | 0.83 |
| Change in Unemployment Rate | -0.74 | 1.05 | -0.61 | 1.94 |
| Change in Pct. Age 25 & Older | -1.22 ^{**} | 0.60 | -1.84 [*] | 1.12 |
| Change in Pct. Black | 2.20 ^{***} | 0.70 | 3.02 ^{**} | 1.30 |
| Change in Pct. Hispanic | 0.33 | 0.48 | -0.76 | 0.89 |
| Change in Pct. Asian | 0.91 | 0.68 | -0.65 | 1.26 |
| Change in Pct. w/ College Degree | -0.11 | 0.58 | 0.76 | 1.01 |
| Change in Poverty Rate | 0.52 | 0.43 | 2.14 ^{***} | 0.79 |
| Change in Pct. w/o HS Diploma | -0.69 | 0.85 | -0.35 | 1.57 |
| Change in Housing Choice Vouchers | -0.019 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.26 |
| Change in Public Housing Units | 0.39 | 0.37 | -0.057 | 0.68 |
| Change in LIHTC Units | 0.15 [*] | 0.081 | 0.088 | 0.14 |
| County Fixed Effect | Yes | | Yes | |
| Observations | 3,560 | | 3,560 | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.12 | | 0.31 | |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

associated with filings, and now we find that increases in vacancy have a positive connection to changes in filings. While this makes some intuitive sense given that other indicators of concentrated disadvantage appear to be associated with greater filings, this is counter to the notion that landlords have less bargaining power—and are thus less likely to seek eviction—when vacancy rates are increasing. Three other variables have a positive association with filing growth in one of the two models—percent owner-occupied, percent 25 and older, and the poverty rate. Consistent with the previous models, there is no evidence that rising housing markets or an increased presence of higher income households are leading to more eviction filings. To the contrary, places with more households in poverty and African Americans are where the filings are.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we focus on identifying trends in demographic and housing market characteristics in neighborhoods that have greater numbers of eviction filings. Explanations for eviction prevalence in a neighborhood generally fall under two categories—either neighborhood change explains eviction prevalence because residents cannot afford increasing rents or evictions are concentrated in neighborhoods with higher proportions of low-income residents and/or people of color. In our study, we find much stronger support for the latter explanation. In other words, court-based eviction filings are less likely

to occur in neighborhoods with rising rent or income levels than in neighborhoods with higher poverty rates or shares of African American individuals. Particularly notable is that this finding holds across five different counties, each with its own idiosyncratic housing market and particular history of segregation and urban change. It is thus possible that if researchers were to broaden their analyses' geographic scopes, they might find similar associations with eviction prevalence across geographic contexts. Furthermore, the neighborhood context of eviction filings remains the same during, and after the Great Recession—findings are the same in the 2005–2009 and 2011–2015 periods. However, as the foreclosure crisis of the 2000s gives way to the affordability crisis of the 2010s, even the poorest neighborhoods in Southern California are becoming progressively more expensive. Moving forward, we may see even more acute eviction crises in low-income neighborhoods as a result.

We note that our study has several limitations. First, given the data at our disposal, we necessarily must conflate eviction filings with actual evictions from rental housing. Not all tenants with an eviction petition filed against them are eventually evicted from their homes. If there are systematic differences in how eviction filings are resolved across neighborhoods, the results we present here likely do not reflect them.

Second, given the endogenous mechanisms at work in neighborhood demographics, housing markets, and eviction outcomes, we can only confirm these results as statistical associations. That being said, the relationships give us a strong sense of the types of neighborhoods where evictions (more specifically unsealed eviction filings) typically occur. Tenant advocates spend a lot of energy and resources fighting displacement by protecting renters from eviction. Our findings contribute to a literature that helps us better understand where evictions tend to occur in cities and the factors that move in concert with eviction trends over time. This is particularly important in cities that are experiencing rapid neighborhood and housing market change. Policymakers will similarly benefit from learning more about eviction dynamics, as interventions in housing and legal policy are rarely place-based despite the fact that evictions are unevenly distributed and, as we show, concentrated in the most economically disadvantaged areas within cities.

Third, we cannot control for the concentration of particular landlords in different neighborhoods. Desmond (2016) notes a certain degree of flexibility in “mom-and-pop” landlords' decisions to evict tenants and Raymond et al (2018) find that corporate landlords and institutional investors tend to evict more frequently because of their adherence to protocol and procedure. As scholars such as Abood (2018) have noted, corporate landlords have become more prominent features of Southern California's rental housing market since the Great Recession. Due to limitations in our data, it remains to be seen whether accounting for landlord-type would change the nature of our findings. In particular, we are unable to speak to the serial filing dynamic characteristic of evictions in other large metropolitan areas (Garboden and Rosen 2019; Immergluck et al. 2019). Our data lacked tenant names prior to 2014, limiting our ability to identify this pattern of repeated filings against tenants by landlords. For 2014 and 2015, repeated filings against the same household represented only an average of 3.5 percent of cases annually. The comparative lack of serial cases in our data could reflect differences in landlord behavior due to differences in state-level landlord tenant code (Hatch 2017) and the challenge of identifying these cases using only unsealed records in California. Interestingly, we tend to observe consistent findings inside and outside of Los Angeles County, suggesting that

the landlord role may not be as big a story since we see similar effects across geographies (cf. Desmond 2016; Greif 2018).

Our inability to account for landlord variation across space also extends to building characteristics. Rental housing stock varies by age, quality, size, and other characteristics across space. These factors relate to landlord-tenant disputes over plumbing, heating, and other issues, and may influence the likelihood that eviction cases are filed against tenants in particular neighborhoods as a result. To the extent that building characteristics are related to neighborhood demographics, we may be giving too much credit to the latter. If so, however, this points to another layer of disadvantage that low-income households experience in aging housing stock and disadvantaged neighborhoods.

Finally, the nature of ACS data limits the extent to which we can draw conclusions about the relationship between eviction filings and neighborhood. On one hand, ACS data is nationally representative and provides a way of capturing change over time. On the other, it is not possible to “follow” people who have moved out of census tracts and their reasons for moving. Furthermore, in this paper we assume a contemporaneous effect of neighborhood change on eviction filings: increases or decreases in the changes of demographic groups in neighborhoods may happen over larger or smaller periods of time than those we are capable of capturing in our data. Specifically, landlords in gentrifying neighborhoods may find it advantageous to wait until a lease expires rather than going through the expensive and time consuming process of filing an eviction case. Therefore, such an effect may be time-lagged, and while using five-year averages and changes between those time periods can help smooth out these timing challenges, full precision eludes us. Subsequent research will address these dynamics in the city of Los Angeles with a more diverse array of supplemental data, but the question of whether a relationship between neighborhood change and eviction prevalence exists remains open and an important topic of future research.

Notes

¹See Burawoy’s (2017) general critique of Desmond’s research; Raymond et al. (2018) on the role of institutional investors in Fulton County, Georgia; Sullivan (2017; 2018) on how public policy creates displacement pressures in Harris County, Texas trailer parks; Sims’s comparative analysis of eviction “hot spot” neighborhoods in Los Angeles County (2016); and Shelton’s analysis of eviction’s spatial dynamics in the inner ring suburbs surrounding Lexington, Kentucky (2018).

²Vigdor (2002) and Ding, Hwang, and Diviringi (2016) arrived at similar findings in Boston and Philadelphia, respectively.

³While substantive law and local housing policy may limit the extent to which landlords can successfully evict tenants without cause (Gordon 2018), it may be the case that landlords become less likely to accommodate tenants that miss a month’s rent when the rental market tightens.

⁴Although also considered part of Southern California, we elected to not include Imperial, Ventura, or Santa Barbara Counties in our study, given their lower numbers of eviction filings over time.

⁵We exclude 2010 from these analyses to create two separate and distinct five-year windows, one capturing the Recession (2005-2009) and one post-Recession (2011–2015).

⁶We also note that our data consists of UD filings rather than “effected” evictions (or court-ordered lockouts), a distinction that Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963) might suggest blurs the lines between rate-producing behavior (how courts collectively produce administrative data in eviction lawsuits) and studied behavior (eviction).

⁷Proportions were calculated using aggregate filings numbers from county superior court systems that were collected via Public Record Requests to county superior court systems pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 10.500. Although some counties have consistently lower coverage of cases in the AIRS dataset, the cases are likely to be missing for systematic reasons. For this reason, these results discussed here are largely informed by unsealed cases that were not dismissed by the courts (except for Riverside County, which did not systematically seal cases during this period). In counties which did systematically seal cases, the cases most likely to be represented in our sample are those in which the tenant defaulted by not filing an answer to the eviction notice, failed to appear in court, or the plaintiff prevailed in the courts. As an additional robustness check, we fit a Riverside County-only OLS model (comparable to the output in Table 2) to see if the results differed when we had a more inclusive sample of the population of eviction filings. Results did not differ substantively from the five county model presented here.

⁸We present only the model for 2011–2015 here as the associations were consistent for those in the 2005–2009 period (results available upon request).

⁹While Riverside County eviction case records are automatically sealed for 60 days from the date of filing, records could not be sealed indefinitely via a stipulation agreement until January 1, 2017 (Personal Communication with David Gutknecht, Deputy Executive Officer of Administration, 6/20/2017).

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the UCLA Institute on Inequality and Democracy for generous funding, the American Information Research Services for providing data, and audiences at the American Sociological Association, Urban Affairs Association, Association for Collegiate Schools of Planning, and Association for Public Policy and Management research conferences for providing feedback. We also thank colleagues at the University of Oregon, the California Center for Population Research and in Rebecca Jean Emigh's working group for their feedback. All errors or omissions are our own.

REFERENCES

- Abood, Maya. 2018. *Wall Street Landlords Turn American Dream Into American Nightmare*. ACCE Institute, Americans For Financial Reform, and Public Advocates. Accessed February 9, 2019 (<https://d3n8a8spro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/acceinstitute/pages/100/attachments/original/1516388955/WallstreetLandlordsFinalReport.pdf?1516388955>)
- Badger, Emily, and Quoc Trung Bui. 2018. "In 83 Million Eviction Records, a Sweeping and Intimate New look at Housing in America." *The New York Times* Accessed on February 9, 2019 (<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/07/upshot/millions-of-eviction-records-a-sweeping-new-look-at-housing-in-america.html>)
- Becher, Debbie. 2014. *Private Property and Public Power: Eminent Domain in Philadelphia*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Bell, Michael Mayerfeld. 1994. *Childerley: Nature and Morality in a Country Village*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Bezdek, Barbara. 1992. "Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process." *Hofstra Law Review* 20(3):533–608.
- Brown-Saracino, Japonica. 2009. *A Neighborhood That Never Changes: Gentrification, Social Preservationism and the Search for Authenticity*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- . 2013. *The Gentrification Debates: A Reader*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- . 2017. "Explicating Divided Approaches to Gentrification and Growing Income Inequality." *Annual Review of Sociology* 43:515–39.
- Burawoy, Michael. 2017. "On Desmond: The Limits of Spontaneous Sociology." *Theory and Society* 46(4):261–84.
- Cusack, Meagan, and Ann Elizabeth Montgomery. 2017. "The Role of Eviction in Veterans' Homelessness Recidivism." *Journal of Social Distress and the Homeless* 26(1):58–64.
- Deener, Andrew. 2012. *Venice: A Contested Bohemia in Los Angeles*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

- Desmond, Matthew. 2012a. "Disposable Ties and the Urban Poor." *American Journal of Sociology* 117(5):1295–335.
- . 2012b. "Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty." *American Journal of Sociology* 118(1):88–133.
- . 2016. *Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City*. New York, NY: Crown Books.
- Desmond, Matthew, and Weihua An. 2015. "Neighborhood and Network Disadvantage among Urban Renters." *Sociological Science* 2:329–50.
- Desmond, Matthew, and Carl Gershenson. 2016. "Housing and Employment Insecurity among the Working Poor." *Social Problems* 63(1):46–67.
- , and Carl Gershenson. 2017. "Who Gets Evicted? Assessing Individual, Neighborhood, and Network Factors." *Social Science Research* 62:362–77.
- Desmond, Matthew, and Rachel Tolbert Kimbro. 2015. "Eviction's Fallout: Housing, Hardship, and Health." *Social Forces* 94(1):295–324.
- Desmond, Matthew, and Kristin L. Perkins. 2016. "Housing and Household Instability." *Urban Affairs Review* 52(3):421–36.
- Desmond, Matthew, and Tracey Shollenberger. 2015. "Forced Displacement from Rental Housing: Prevalence and Neighborhood Consequences." *Demography* 52(5):1751–72.
- Desmond, Matthew, and Nicol Valdez. 2013. "Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women." *American Sociological Review* 78(1):117–41.
- Desmond, Matthew, Carl Gershenson, and Barbara Kiviat. 2015. "Forced Relocation and Residential Instability among Urban Renters." *Social Service Review* 89(2):227–62.
- Desmond, Matthew, Weihua An, Richelle Winkler, and Thomas Ferriss. 2013. "Evicting Children." *Social Forces* 92(1):303–27.
- Desmond, Matthew, Ashley Gromis, Lavar Edmonds, James Hendrickson, Katie Krywokulski, Lillian Leung, and Adam Porton. 2018. *Eviction Lab National Database: Version 1.0*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. www.evictionlab.org.
- Diamond, Rebecca, Timothy McQuade, and Franklin Qian. 2018. "The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco." *NBER Working Paper No. 24181*:1–64.
- Ding, Lei, Jackelyn Hwang, and Eileen Divringi. 2016. "Gentrification and Residential Mobility in Philadelphia." *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 61(1):38–51.
- Ellen, Ingrid Gould, and Katherine M. O'Regan. 2011. "How Low Income Neighborhoods Change: Entry, Exit, and Enhancement." *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 41(2):89–97.
- Fowler, Katherine A., R. Matthew Gladden, Kevin J. Vagi, James Barnes, and Leroy Frazier. 2015. "Increase in Suicides Associated with Home Eviction and Foreclosure During the US Housing Crisis: Findings from 16 National Violent Death Reporting System States, 2005–2010." *American Journal of Public Health* 105(2):311–6.
- Freeman, Lance. 2005. "Displacement or Succession? Residential Mobility in Gentrifying Neighborhoods." *Urban Affairs Review* 40(4):463–91.
- Freeman, Lance. 2006. *There Goes the 'Hood: Views of Gentrification from the Ground Up*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Freeman, Lance, and Frank Braconi. 2004. "Gentrification and Displacement in New York City in the 1990s." *Journal of the American Planning Association* 70(1):39–52.
- Gans, Herbert J. 1962. *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans*. New York, NY: The Free Press.
- Garboden, Philip ME, and Eva Rosen. 2019. "Serial Filing: How Landlords Use the Threat of Eviction." *City & Community* 18(2):638–61.
- Gerchick, Randy G. 1994. "No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help." *UCLA Law Review* 41:759–859.
- Gordon, Leslie. 2018. *Strengthening Communities Through Rent Control and Just-Cause Evictions: Case Studies from Berkeley, Santa Monica, and Richmond*. Oakland, CA: Urban Habitat.
- Greif, Meredith. 2018. "Regulating Landlords: Unintended Consequences for Poor Tenants." *City & Community* 17(3):658–74.
- Gross, Larry. 2015. "L.A.'s eviction game." *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved February 9, 2019 (<https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0609-gross-housing-ellis-act-20150609-story.html>)
- Hatch, Megan E. 2017. "Statutory Protection for Renters: Classification of State Landlord–Tenant Policy Approaches." *Housing Policy Debate* 27(1):98–119.

- Hartman, Chester, and David Robinson. 2003. "Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem." *Housing Policy Debate* 14 (4):461–501.
- Hunter, Marcus Anthony. 2013. *Black Citymakers: How The Philadelphia Negro Changed Urban America*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Immergluck, Dan, Jeff Ernsthausen, Stephanie Earl, and Allison Powell. 2019. "Evictions, Large Owners, and Serial Filings: Findings from Atlanta." *Housing Studies* <https://doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2019.1639635>
- Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University. 2017. "The State of the Nation's Housing 2017." Retrieved October 25, 2017 (<http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/state-nations-housing-2017>).
- Kasinitz, Phillip. 1988. "The Gentrification of 'Boerum Hill': Neighborhood Change and Conflicts over Definitions." *Qualitative Sociology* 11 (3):163–82.
- Kitsuse, John I. and Aaron V. Cicourel. 1963. "A Note on the Use of Official Statistics." *Social Problems* 11(2):131–9.
- Kurwa, Rahim. 2015. "Deconcentration without Integration: Examining the Social Outcomes of Housing Choice Voucher Movement in Los Angeles County." *City & Community* 14(4):364–91.
- Lees, Loretta, Tom Slater, and Elvin Wyly. 2013. *Gentrification*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Lundberg, Ian, and Louis Donnelly. 2019. "A Research Note on the Prevalence of Housing Eviction Among Children Born in U.S. Cities." *Demography* 56:391–404
- Marr, Taylor. 2017. "Millions of Renters Face Eviction—Why Today's Housing Market Is Partially to Blame - @Redfin." *Redfin Real-Time* Retrieved October 24, 2017 (<https://www.redfin.com/blog/2016/12/millions-of-renters-face- eviction-why-todays-housing-market-is-partially-to-blame.html>).
- McCue, Daniel. 2018. "Changes in Supply and Demand at Various Segments of the Rental Market: How Do They Match Up?" Housing Perspectives (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University). Retrieved on February 9, 2019 (<http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/changes-in-supply-and-demand-at-various-segments-of-the-rental-market-how-do-they-match-up/>)
- McGahan, Jason. 2017. "L.A. Is Losing Rent-Controlled Apartments at an Alarming Rate." *L.A. Weekly*. Retrieved October 28, 2017 (<http://www.laweekly.com/news/la-evictions-are-increasing-should-the-ellis-act-be-reformed-for-more-rent-controlled-apartments-8789726>).
- Mock, Nelson H. 1998. "Punishing the Innocent: No-Fault Eviction of Public Housing Tenants for the Actions of Third Parties." *Texas Law Review* 76:1495–531.
- Monsma, Karl, and Richard Lempert. 1992. "The Value of Counsel: 20 Years of Representation Before a Public Housing Eviction Board." *Law and Society Review* 26(3):627–68.
- Mosier, Marilyn Miller, and Richard A. Soble 1973. "Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court." *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform* 7(1):8–70.
- Munnell, Alicia H., Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, Lynn E. Browne, and James McEneaney. 1996. "Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data." *The American Economic Review*. 86(1):25–53.
- National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel. 2019. "Status Map." Retrieved January 9, 2019 (<http://civilrighttocounsel.org/map>)
- Newman, Kathe, and Elvin Wyly. 2006. "The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City." *Urban Studies* 43(1):23–57.
- Pattillo, Mary. 2007. *Black on the Block: The Politics of Race and Class in the City*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Pittman, LaShawnDa, and Deirdre Oakley. 2018. "'It Was All Love in the Buildings They Tore Down': How Caregiving Grandmothers Create and Experience a Sense of Community in Chicago Public Housing." *City & Community* 17(2):461–84.
- Quigley, John M., and Steven Raphael. 2004. "Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn't It More Affordable?" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18(1):191–214.
- Raymond, Elora, Richard Duckworth, Benjamin Miller, Michael Lucas, and Shiraj Pokharel. 2018. "From Foreclosure to Eviction: Housing Insecurity in Corporate-Owned Single Family Rentals." *Cityscape* 2(3):159–88.
- Rosen, Eva. 2014. "Rigging the Rules of the Game: How Landlords Geographically Sort Low-Income Renters." *City & Community* 13(4):310–40.
- Sander, Richard H., Yana Kucheva, and Jonathan M. Zasloff. 2018. *Moving Toward Integration: The Past and Future of Fair Housing*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Scheinin, Richard. 2016. "California's New Rules on Tenant Blacklists are Unpopular with Landlords." *The Mercury News*. Retrieved February 9, 2019 (<https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/09/14/new-law-protects-california-tenants-from-blacklists/>)

- Sims, J. Revel. 2016. "More than Gentrification: Geographies of Capitalist Displacement in Los Angeles 1994–1999." *Urban Geography* 37(1):26–56.
- Shelton, Taylor. 2018. "Mapping Dispossession: Eviction, Foreclosure and the Multiple Geographies of Housing Instability in Lexington, Kentucky." *Geoforum* 97(1):281–91.
- Smith, Neil. 1996. *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Sullivan, Esther. 2017. "Moving Out: Mapping Mobile Home Park Closures to Analyze Spatial Patterns of Low-Income Residential Displacement." *City & Community* 16(3):304–29.
- . 2018. *Manufactured Insecurity: Mobile Home Parks and Americans' Tenuous Right to Place*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Taylor, Monique M. 2002. *Harlem Between Heaven and Hell*. Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press.
- Turner, Margery, Rob Santos, Diane Levy, Doug Wissoker, Claudia Aranda, and Rob Pitingolo. 2013. "Housing Discrimination Against Racial And Ethnic Minorities 2012 — HUD USER." <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/fairhsg/hsg/discrimination%2012.html>.
- Vásquez-Vera, Hugo, Laia Palència, Ingrid Magna, Carlos Mena, Jaime Neira, and Carme Borrell. 2017. "The Threat Of Home Eviction and its Effects on Health Through the Equity Lens: A Systematic Review." *Social Science and Medicine* 175:199–208
- Vigdor, Jacob L. 2002. "Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?" *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs* 133-82.
- Yinger, John. 1986. "Measuring Racial Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act." *The American Economic Review* 76(5):881–93.
- Zukin, Sharon. 1982. *Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- . 2016. "Gentrification in Three Paradoxes." *City & Community* 15(3):202–7.

Bills and Codes Cited

- Assembly Bill 2819 (2016).
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161.2.

APPENDIX

Due to data limitations inherent in studying eviction, it is difficult to determine the population of eviction events with full precision in some jurisdictions (Desmond et al. 2018; Hartman and Robinson 2003). California is particularly challenging to study due to the state's laws regarding sealing court records in eviction cases. In addition to state sealing laws, two other factors may explain the low proportions of yearly aggregate case filings for some of the counties. The first is that AIRS does not typically include records involving cases that were dismissed, with and without prejudice, in its dataset. The second is that courts that necessitate in-person data collection (e.g., Stanley Mosk Courthouse in Los Angeles County) have both high volumes of eviction cases and limits on bulk collection of records that increase the difficulty of collecting all available case records. Still, we are confident that these records represent nearly all unsealed cases in which a defendant was formally evicted through California Superior Courts.

All unlawful detainer cases in California are sealed for 60 days following the filing of the complaint. For the years covered in these analyses, the California Code of Civil Procedure stated that eviction records automatically unsealed after the initial 60 day period, unless the defenant prevailed (CCP 1161.2). Cases could also be permanently sealed as a condition of judgment with the agreement of the defendant(s) and plaintiff(s). The most likely outcomes represented in unsealed cases then are default and trial judgments entered against defendants (tenants). The passage of California State Assembly Bill 2819 (2016) amended this policy to seal all eviction records unless the the landlord "prevails"




FIG A1. AIRS eviction records as a proportion of county aggregates. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Note: We do not believe that the aggregate filing numbers received from Orange County are reliable because they appear to significantly undercount in the 2005–2007 period, producing a coverage rate in excess of 1 in the chart. AIRS data on filings stays more or less consistent over this period of time, as do case proportions between 2007–2015, which suggest that the problem lies in aggregate filing data from the Orange County Superior Court system. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

within 60 days of filing the complaint or the landlord wins at trial after the initial 60 day period.

When court records are sealed, researchers are challenged to determine both the population of eviction records *and* the proportion of sealed and unsealed records. To address this first issue, we made administrative judicial records requests for yearly aggregate case filings from each county’s superior court system between 2005–2015. With the data collected through these requests, we compiled a data set of aggregated eviction filings for each county per calendar year. We then calculated the proportion of cases included in the AIRS data relative to each county’s aggregate annual filing total (Figure A1).

The AIRS data do not include sealed records or most of the cases that were dismissed by the courts (with or without prejudice). In Riverside County, very few cases were sealed during this period, which results in higher coverage of case filings by the AIRS data relative to other counties.⁹

To assess the completeness of our data in the remaining four counties, we requested aggregated case outcome statistics from the California Judicial Council to determine how many cases resulted in judgments likely to be included in unsealed records. The Judicial Council does not directly measure how many eviction cases are sealed in counties annually. The outcomes most likely to be represented in sealed cases were default judgments against tenants. We calculated the default judgment rate as the number of cases that resulted in a default judgment divided by the total number of filings. These data were available for Orange and Riverside Counties for 2012–2014 and San Bernardino County

for 2010-2014. We then compared the proportion of cases covered by the AIRS data to the proportion of case filings that ended in default judgments. If the AIRS data represent a complete set of these cases, we should expect the updated proportion of coverage to be approximately 1. The AIRS data met this threshold in 9 of the 11 available county-years. The exceptions were the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 fiscal years in San Bernardino County, which had 0.82 and 0.90 coverage proportions, respectively (full results available from authors upon request). This suggests that the AIRS data represent a nearly complete record of unsealed, non-dismissed eviction filings and the most comprehensive data set of eviction cases in Southern California to date.