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Los Angeles

The Homeowner Revolution:  
Democracy, Land Use and the Los Angeles Slow-Growth Movement, 1965-1992

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN URBAN PLANNING

by

Greg Morrow

2013



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2013

## ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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The Homeowner Revolution:  
Democracy, Land Use and the Los Angeles Slow-Growth Movement, 1965-1992

BY  
G R E G M O R R O W

Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Planning  
University of California, Los Angeles, 2013  
Professor Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Chair

Using mixed-methods – spatial analysis, regression modeling, and historical evidence – this dissertation explains the origins and impact of Los Angeles’s slow-growth, community planning era between the Watts (1965) and Rodney King (1992) civil unrests. Part planning history and part land use analysis, the dissertation explores how land use policy both impacts, and is impacted by, social, economic, and environmental forces through the machinations of local politics. As such, it provides a detailed empirical case study of the relationship between democracy, social capital, and urban planning.

The dissertation explains how the slow-growth movement was facilitated by the shift from top-down planning during the pro-growth, post-war period to a more bottom-up community planning

process post-Watts. The project illustrates the dramatic land use changes that occurred during this period – first, the down-zoning of the City by 60% in the initial community plans in the 1970s, and the subsequent shifts in residential densities as homeowners shaped local community plans. These shifts were strongly correlated to socio-economic characteristics and homeowner activity, such that areas with well-organized homeowner groups with strong social capital were able to dramatically decrease density as a means of controlling population growth, and areas with few to no homeowner groups (strongly correlated with Latinos, non-citizens, and large family sizes) dramatically increased in density. As such, density followed the path of least resistance.

## ABSTRACT (continued)

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The changes meant the future growth of Los Angeles was absorbed by low-income, minority communities – communities that were least able to accommodate that growth since they already had overcrowded housing, under-performing schools, lacked park space and other amenities, and in many cases were not served by mass transit. These findings are illustrated not only by a citywide mapping of changes in density and regression analysis, but by historical case studies of the motivations and activities of three local groups (L.A. Urban League, L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce, Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations) – whose different scales and interests determined their relative influence on land use policy. The project also explores how both local and macro social, economic and environmental forces, in turn, shaped the transformation of two specific communities (Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw and Woodland Hills/Canoga Park) in very different ways after Watts.

At heart, the findings illustrate the dark side of social capital and the dangers of equating local planning with more democratic planning. It also illustrates in vivid detail the motivations and impacts of adopting restrictive land use policies. As this case demonstrates, exclusively local planning may empower those with the loudest voices and strongest political connections, at the expense of the silent

majority, leading to unexpected outcomes, including a less socially just, economically secure, and environmentally healthy city. This, in turn, has important implications for planning theory, which has long positioned planners as adjudicators of communicative action. The homeowner revolution in Los Angeles and the devastating impacts it has had on the City's social, economic, and environmental sustainability, demonstrates the need for the re-assertion of a professional role for planners, a better balance between local and regional concerns, and the critical importance of implementing a planning process that reflects the will of the majority of a City's residents, rather than empower only its most strident voices.

*Keywords:*

*Los Angeles, land use, zoning, social capital, democracy, homeowners, sustainability, planning history, urban politics.*

The dissertation of Greg Morrow is approved.

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2013

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

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<p>Abstract of the Dissertation ..... ii</p> <p>Table of Contents ..... v</p> <p>List of Figures ..... ix</p> <p>Acknowledgements ..... xii</p> <p>Vita ..... xiii</p> <p><b>1 INTRODUCTION ..... 1</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">From Happy Days to Training Day ..... 1</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Why Land Use Policies? ..... 6</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Research Questions ..... 9</p> <p><b>2 RESEARCH DESIGN &amp; METHODS ..... 21</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Part 1 Methods ..... 25</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Part 2 Methods ..... 34</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Part 3 Methods ..... 38</p> <p><b>3 LOS ANGELES: A LAND USE BACKGROUND ..... 46</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Social &amp; Spatial Change ..... 46</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">From Central to Bottom-Up Planning ..... 49</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The Rise of Environmentalism ..... 56</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The L.A. Housing Crisis Today ..... 58</p>	<p>4</p> <p>5</p>	<p><b>LITERATURE REVIEW ..... 66</b></p> <p><b>1. Democracy and Planning ..... 67</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Rational Planning &amp; Its Critique ..... 67</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Support From the Left &amp; Right ..... 70</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Communicative Action &amp; Regime Theory ..... 74</p> <p><b>2. Social Capital &amp; Property ..... 77</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Social Capital as Universal Good ..... 77</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The Dark Side of Social Capital ..... 81</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Neighborhood Associations ..... 84</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Localization vs Democratization ..... 87</p> <p><b>3. Motivations &amp; Impacts of Land Use Policy ..... 91</b></p> <p><b>4. Land Uses &amp; Sustainability ..... 99</b></p> <p><b>PART 1</b></p> <p><b>5 LAND USE CHANGES IN LOS ANGELES ..... 117</b></p> <p><b>1. Land Use Changes Over Time ..... 119</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Eastside ..... 126</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">East Valley ..... 129</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">West Valley ..... 134</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Westside ..... 136</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Spatial Distribution ..... 139</p>
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

---

2. Residential Density Changes Over Time .....	147	Racial Covenants .....	242
Eastside .....	153	Public Housing .....	243
East Valley .....	156	The Battle of Blight .....	247
West Valley .....	159	Civil Rights Movement .....	250
Westside .....	162	Fair Housing .....	252
Spatial Distribution .....	164	B. Slow-Growth Era (1965-1992) .....	253
3. Area Characteristics & Land Use Change .....	171	Voting Rights .....	253
Results .....	179	Watts & the War on Poverty .....	255
Total Residential Change .....	180	The Goals Program .....	259
Single-Family Residential Change .....	190	The New Thrust .....	262
Multi-Family Residential Change .....	194	Community Development .....	266
Discussion .....	197	2. Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce .....	270
Multiple Regression .....	199	A. Pro-Growth Era (1943-1965) .....	273
4. Homeowner Activity & Land Use Change .....	202	Industrial Expansion .....	273
5. Implications & Discussion of Findings .....	216	Mass Transit .....	275
		Dispersal of Industry to Suburbs .....	281
		The Impact of Industry .....	288
		Private Planning .....	291
		B. Slow-Growth Era (1965-1992) .....	295
		Transit Redux .....	295
		Fighting the Environmentalists .....	300
PART 2			
6 MOTIVATIONS OF LOCAL GROUPS .....	230		
1. Los Angeles Urban League .....	238		
A. Pro-Growth Era (1943-1965) .....	240		
A Housing Crisis .....	240		

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

---

Clean Air Redux .....	302	7	PART 3	
Freeways Redux.....	304		A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES.....	374
Community Plans .....	306		1. Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw .....	378
3. Federation of Hillside & Canyon Associations .....	308		A. Modern Origins (before 1943) .....	378
A. Pro-Growth Era (1943-1965) .....	311		Lucky Land.....	378
Environmental Origins .....	311		Olympic Village.....	382
Conservation Movement .....	314		Leimert Park and View Park.....	384
Encroachment of Multi-Family.....	316		Village Green.....	391
B. Slow-Growth Era (1965-1992) .....	320		B. Post-War Period (1943-1965) .....	393
CEQA .....	320		Broadway-Crenshaw Center.....	393
The Sanctity of Single-Family.....	322		Baldwin Hills and Baldwin Vista.....	395
Racism?.....	324		“The Jungle”.....	399
Zoning Rollbacks .....	327		Transition and Change .....	402
Zero Population Growth.....	332		Crenshaw Square.....	405
Community Plans .....	334		Crenshaw Neighbors.....	406
Zoning Consistency & Prop U .....	338		Signs of Decline.....	414
Tax Revolt.....	341		C. Community Planning (1965-1992).....	419
Conclusion.....	343		Planning for Social Change .....	419
			Commercial Center and Jungle .....	423
			Proposed Zoning Changes .....	426
			Revitalization & Redevelopment .....	430

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Transit Oriented Development .....	436	8	CONCLUSION .....	544
Historic Preservation .....	437		A. The Homeowner Revolution .....	544
Fight for Justice .....	442		B. Problems With the Revolution.....	554
2. Woodland Hills/Canoga Park.....	447		Not Representative .....	554
A. Modern Origins (before 1943) .....	447		Ignorance of Regional Concerns .....	558
Agricultural Beginnings .....	447		Lack of Coordination .....	560
The Arrival of Water .....	449		Racial Segregation .....	561
B. Post-War Period (1943-1965) .....	452		Exacerbation of Disparities.....	562
Rise of a Tech Cluster .....	452		Lack of Affordable Housing .....	564
Corbin Palms.....	455		Stifling of Economic Growth .....	566
Warner Ranch, Part 1 .....	464		Negative Environmental Impact .....	568
Growth Accelerates .....	469		Planning & Sustainability.....	570
C. Community Planning (1965-1992) .....	471		C. New Directions for Los Angeles .....	573
Planning for Rapid Growth .....	471		Hollywood Community Plan .....	574
Warner Ranch Urban Center.....	478		Cornfields Arroyo Seco Plan .....	576
Environmental Impacts .....	485		Policy Recommendations .....	577
Low-Income Housing .....	490		D. Implications for Planning Theory .....	583
Preserving the HillsideS .....	499		APPENDIX A (Community Plan Area Summaries) .....	593
The Battle for Warner Ridge .....	503		APPENDIX B (Ordered Summary of Changes).....	629
The Rise of Homeowners.....	510		APPENDIX C (Summary of Area Characteristics).....	634
Environmentalism Re-Framed .....	513		APPENDIX D (List of Homeowner Cases).....	641
Conclusion.....	516		BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	652



## LIST OF FIGURES

---

1-1	Down-Zoning versus Population Growth .....	3	5-10	Map of Industrial Land Area Changes .....	145
1-2	Three Axes of Dissertation .....	10	5-11	Map of Open Space Land Area Changes .....	146
1-3	Diagram of 3 Place Scales .....	11	5-12	Summary of Citywide Population Capacity.....	148
1-4	Dynamic Between Different Groups .....	13	5-13	Planned versus Actual Population Change .....	150
2-1	Timeline of Community Plan Adoptions .....	26	5-14	Eastside Residential Density Change.....	154
2-2	Sample Summary of Land Use Table .....	28	5-15	East Valley Residential Density Change .....	157
2-3	Sample Population & Dwelling Unit Capacity Table .....	28	5-16	West Valley Residential Density Change .....	160
2-4	Land Uses for the Two Study Areas in Part 3 .....	39	5-17	Westside Residential Density Change .....	163
2-5	The Four Quarters of L.A. ....	40	5-18	Map of Single-Family Density Change .....	165
3-1	Transformation of Different Groups in L.A. ....	47	5-19	Map of Multi-Family Density Change .....	166
3-2	Concept L.A. Overall Plan, Centers Concept .....	52	5-20	Map of Total Density Change .....	167
3-3	Center Hierarchy, Rendering of Center Concept .....	53	5-21	Classification of 4 Types of Density Change .....	168
5-1	Summary of Total Land Areas by Use .....	119	5-22	Descriptive Statistics of 14 area characteristics .....	171
5-2	Characteristics of L.A.'s Four Quarters .....	124	5-23	Plot of WHITE vs TOTAL Density Change .....	176
5-3	Summary of Eastside Land Use Changes .....	125	5-24	Plot of LATINO vs TOTAL Density Change .....	176
5-4	Summary of East Valley Land Use Changes .....	130	5-25	Plot of BLACK vs TOTAL Density Change .....	176
5-5	Summary of West Valley Land Use Changes .....	133	5-26	Plot of ASIAN vs TOTAL Density Change.....	176
5-6	Summary of Westside Land Use Changes .....	137	5-27	Plot of FOREIGN vs TOTAL Density Change .....	177
5-7	Map of Single-Family Land Area Changes .....	140	5-28	Plot of HHSIZE vs TOTAL Density Change.....	177
5-8	Map of Multi-Family Land Area Changes .....	142	5-29	Plot of DENSITY vs TOTAL Density Change.....	177
5-9	Map of Commercial Land Area Changes .....	144	5-30	Plot of DRIVERS vs TOTAL Density Change .....	177

**LIST OF FIGURES (continued)**

---

5-31	Plot of SFD vs TOTAL Density Change.....	178	5-52	Plot of POVERTY vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	188
5-32	Plot of HOUSING vs TOTAL Density Change .....	178	5-53	Plot of JOBLESS vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	189
5-33	Plot of RENTERS vs TOTAL Density Change .....	178	5-54	Plot of INCOME vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	189
5-34	Plot of POVERTY vs TOTAL Density Change .....	178	5-55	Regression Results for MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	190
5-35	Plot of JOBLESS vs TOTAL Density Change .....	179	5-56	Plot of WHITE vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	191
5-36	Plot of INCOME vs TOTAL Density Change.....	179	5-57	Plot of LATINO vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	191
5-37	Regression Results for TOTAL Change.....	180	5-58	Plot of BLACK vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	191
5-38	Comparison of % Density Change vs % White .....	181	5-59	Plot of ASIAN vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	191
5-39	Maps of Total Density Change and Race .....	182	5-60	Plot of FOREIGN vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	192
5-40	Regression Results for SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	185	5-61	Plot of HHSIZE vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	192
5-41	Plot of WHITE vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change.....	186	5-62	Plot of DENSITY vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	192
5-42	Plot of LATINO vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	186	5-63	Plot of DRIVERS vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	192
5-43	Plot of BLACK vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change.....	186	5-64	Plot of SFD vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	193
5-44	Plot of ASIAN vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change.....	186	5-65	Plot of HOUSING vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	193
5-45	Plot of FOREIGN vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change.....	187	5-66	Plot of RENTERS vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	193
5-46	Plot of HHSIZE vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	187	5-67	Plot of POVERTY vs MULTI-FAMILY Change.....	193
5-47	Plot of DENSITY vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	187	5-68	Plot of JOBLESS vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	194
5-48	Plot of DRIVERS vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change.....	187	5-69	Plot of INCOME vs MULTI-FAMILY Change .....	194
5-49	Plot of SFD vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	188	5-70	Multiple Regression Results for Five Variables .....	200
5-50	Plot of HOUSING vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	188	5-71	Multiple Regression Results for Two Variables .....	200
5-51	Plot of RENTERS vs SINGLE-FAMILY Change .....	188	5-72	Summary of Neighborhood Association Cases .....	205

**LIST OF FIGURES (continued)**

---

5-73	Comparison of 8 Most Active Areas .....	206	7-10	Aerial Plan of Village Green, 1956 .....	391
5-74	Diagram Showing the 8 Most Active Areas .....	207	7-11	View of Broadway-Crenshaw Center, c1952 .....	394
5-75	Location of All Active Associations .....	208	7-12	View of Baldwin Hills Estates, 1954 .....	396
5-76	Map of All Active Associations by Area .....	209	7-13	View of Crenshaw Village, 1954 .....	400
5-77	Location of Land Use Active Associations .....	210	7-14	Drawing of Holiday Bowl, 1956 .....	405
5-78	Map of Land Use Active Associations by Area.....	211	7-15	View of Baldwin Reservoir Collapse, 1963 .....	417
5-79	Scaled Map of Land Use Active Associations .....	213	7-16	Aftermath of Rodney King Civil Unrest, 1992 .....	446
5-80	Summary of Findings by L.A. Quarter .....	217	7-17	Map of Key Places in Woodland Hills/Canoga Park.....	448
5-81	Map of Findings by L.A. Quarter .....	218	7-18	Automobile Club Map of Valley, 1917.....	450
6-1	1947 RTAG Transit Plan .....	277	7-19	View of Persian Building in Girard, c1924 .....	451
6-2	1951 LAMTA Monorail Plan .....	279	7-20	View of Rocketdyne Facility, 1960 .....	453
6-3	1960 LAMTA Monorail Plan .....	280	7-21	Ads for Rocketdyne Jobs, 1950s .....	454
7-1	Map of Key Places in Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw .....	379	7-22	Original Corbin Palms Marketing Literature, 1953 .....	456
7-2	View of Rancho la Cienega, c1880s .....	380	7-23	Case Study House #8 (Eames House), 1950 .....	458
7-3	View of Baldwin Hills Oil Derricks, 1940 .....	381	7-24	Case Study House #22 (Stahl House), 1960 .....	458
7-4	View of the Olympic Village, 1932 .....	382	7-25	Photos of William Krisel House, 1954 .....	463
7-5	Olympic Village Administration Building, 1932 .....	383	7-26	View of Warner Ranch Prior to Development, 1961.....	465
7-6	View of Leimert Park, c1938 .....	386	7-29	Images of Warner Ranch Urban Center Plan, 1972.....	479
7-7	Perry's Neighborhood Unit Concept, 1929 .....	387			
7-8	View of Sunset Fields Golf Course, 1928.....	388			
7-9	View of View Park, 1937.....	390			

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# 1

## INTRODUCTION

---

*Come to Los Angeles! The sun shines bright, the beaches are wide and inviting, and the orange groves stretch as far as the eye can see. There are jobs a-plenty, and land is cheap. Every working man can have his own house, and inside every house, a happy, all-American family... Life is good in Los Angeles ... It's paradise on Earth."*

- Sid Huggens, *L.A. Confidential* (1997)

### FROM HAPPY DAYS TO TRAINING DAY

Following the Second World War, returning G.I.'s, mid-Westerners, southern blacks and Latino immigrants migrated to Los Angeles, fueling one of the greatest economic booms in American history. Los Angeles was the poster-child of post-war suburbanization, made possible by its cheap, plentiful land and a frontier attitude where it seemed that almost anything was possible. The entrepreneurialism and optimism that drove L.A.'s growth made it a beacon of hope and opportunity that created a particular version of the American Dream defined by suburbia, cars, and eternal sunshine. It was indeed *Happy Days* (1974-84) in L.A., as it was depicted in the television sitcom

that celebrated 1950s Southern California culture.

A half-century later, for many, the image of Los Angeles is a far cry from its post-war zenith as the "land of sunshine". As the center of the American film and television industry, images of violent uprisings, smog, and endless freeways have left the impression of L.A. as a polyglot of social unrest and injustice, as depicted in films like *Training Day* (2001). Gone is the cheap land and "jobs a-plenty"; Los Angeles today is prohibitively expensive, faces severe environmental challenges, has high unemployment, and is marked by dramatic economic and social disparities across different neighborhoods.<sup>1</sup>

The 1970s brought many changes in how Los Angeles was planned, but two, in particular, would have dramatic consequences on the social and spatial form of the city: (1) the shift from citywide to local planning – 35 community plans, which would be created in concert with Citizens Advisory Committees (CACs); and (2) the introduction of CEQA (the California Environmental Quality Act), a state-level directive that requires all projects be assessed as to their impact on the environment - a directive whose interpretation by the courts has expanded over the years well beyond its original intent.

The introduction of grassroots community planning in the 1960s reflected both the changing theories and practices in planning at the time. The new emphasis on citizen-driven urban planning greatly empowered well-organized local groups, especially single-family homeowners. But this shift also meant that local concerns were prioritized above regional concerns. After 1969, the Land Use Element of L.A.'s General Plan would be comprised of 35 community plans, without any meaningful

framework or plan to guide the city's overall growth. Meanwhile, CEQA became the homeowner's most powerful tool to contest environmental impact statements and hold up development through years of litigation.

As a result of their influence, homeowners who mobilized around "slow growth" sought and won significant downzoning of the city. After 1970, through zoning rollbacks, the City's planned population was reduced by 60%, from 10 million down to roughly 4 million (see Fig. 1-1).<sup>2</sup> The hope was that growth would be controlled through more restrictive land use policies – for example, by lowering allowable densities (typically by changing land use designations), increasing minimum lot sizes, increasing parking requirements, mandating larger building setbacks, and so on. Despite this 60% rollback, L.A.'s growth continued unabated, with nearly a million new people moving into the City. The 35 community plans that comprise the City's Land Use Element allowed for an increase of roughly 390,000 people between the 1970 and 2000, but the actual population






Fig. 1-1: Down-Zoning versus Population Growth

Data Sources: Census and all 104 Community Plans (cumulative population capacity)

increase was almost 900,000;<sup>3</sup> L.A. saw more growth than it planned. Moreover, how this growth was distributed – shifting away from affluent, largely white areas and towards lower-income, minority areas, exacerbated social and spatial disparities.

On the one hand, this dissertation explores the role that land use policies played in contributing to these socio-spatial disparities during the period between the Watts (1965) and Rodney King (1992) civil disturbances – a period of tremendous change in L.A.’s land use regime. But it is also, in part, a study of the intersection of democracy and urban planning – in particular, how single-family homeowners in Los Angeles seized control of a new bottom-up planning process in the pursuit of their own local interests, often with tragic consequences. That just one-third of Angelenos live in single-family, owner-occupied, houses – despite L.A.’s image as a “city of homes” – begs the question, in whose interest are L.A.’s land use policies? Do they reflect the will of the majority or do they reflect a minority of

vocal single-family homeowners?

The dissertation uses the case of Los Angeles to demonstrate an important paradox between increasing democratic participation in urban planning and the ability for cities to plan sustainably – that is, to grow equitably while also protecting valued natural resources. The central argument advanced in this dissertation is that by establishing a planning regime that almost exclusively placed the concerns of local homeowners above all others, far from creating a more just and ecologically healthy city, it has empowered narrow interests, exacerbated socio-spatial disparities, and challenged the ability to create a more compact, walkable, and ultimately, more sustainable, city.

I argue that this process has produced a phenomenon of “planning by resistance” – where those communities with time, money, and resources (including social capital) can resist change while those unable to mobilize bear the burden of future growth. This pattern of growth is striking in Los Angeles,

as it closely aligns with demographic patterns and reflects the will of those with the loudest voice. This has resulted, on the one hand, in dramatic *increases* in density in low-income, largely minority communities where there are scant local groups mobilized around land use issues and, on the other hand, dramatic *decreases* in density in affluent, largely white communities, where powerful homeowner groups exist.

These findings have important implications for planning theory and practice. Since the 1970s, planning theory has held that empowering residents at the local level would mitigate the excesses of top-down planning and the injustices caused by profit-seeking developers. The evidence from this study suggests a more complex situation unfolded on the ground that requires a more critical reflection of well-established planning doctrines. The evidence reveals just how ineffective bureaucratic planning processes have been in creating a more just city. These results suggest the need for planners to be more assertive in actively working towards and advocating

sustainable practices – both social justice and ecological health – but also the need for a greater balance between local and regional scales of planning. As the pendulum swung away from the top-down/physical planning of the 1950s and 60s towards a more community-driven approach to development, the problems of lack of resident input and displacement were replaced with the uneven impacts of a “go it alone” planning where resistance to change was driven largely by who screamed the loudest. This is no way to plan cities – not only because these voices favor environmentally damaging low-density policies over more compact city-making, but also because they exacerbate the very social-spatial disparities that fostered the shift away from central planning in the first place. We can and we must do better.

### WHY LAND USE POLICIES?

While restrictive land use policies are a significant contributor to the economic, social, and environmental problems L.A. faces – stagnant growth, pollution, traffic congestion, the lack of affordable housing, overcrowding, the lack of transit choice, etc – they are by no means the only contributor. Demographic factors shape the very demand for housing, which in turn impacts housing costs. Clearly, if population continues to rise but the market does not supply enough housing to meet the demand, this will drive up prices (due to the fundamental economic law of supply and demand). But affordability is also determined many other factors. Even if housing meets demand, if wages do not keep pace with costs of living, then there will still be an affordability problem. The opening up of global labor markets has resulted in many jobs (particularly in manufacturing) being outsourced, which in turn has put downward pressure on wages. Likewise, the general

state of the global and U.S. economies also factors into labor demand, which in turn impacts the unemployment rate. As such, we might expect more affordability problems during an economic downturn than during up-swings. Stagnant wages, even in the absence of restrictive land use policies, would constrain one's ability to pay. Interest rates and the availability of credit also determine how many housing units are produced, even if zoning was less restrictive. For example, after the housing bubble burst in August 2008, the credit market was virtually frozen, as banks assessed their exposure to sub-prime mortgages.

Land and local labor costs also influence the ability of developers to feasibly develop housing. State and local environmental and planning procedures also have significant influence on a municipality's ability to address pressing concerns. These and many other factors (and their impact of housing prices) are all important considerations to understanding why Los Angeles has been unable to meet its housing needs (the

principal by-product of the downzoning of L.A.), and are fruitful avenues for future research.

So why study land use policies? I would argue land use policies play a fundamental role in what kind of city is possible. Land use policies include a wide range of rules and regulations that govern how land can be developed and used. In their most basic form, land use policies determine a jurisdiction's potential population capacity. So while other factors can limit housing supply, a municipality that restricts housing to low densities has, by definition, limited its potential population (since the supply of land within a jurisdiction is constrained, in the absence of its ability to expand through annexation). While land use control was (and remains) a local matter and jurisdictions had already begun to adopt a patchwork of legislation by the 1920s, two model pieces of federal legislation standardized land use practices across the country. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), developed between 1921 and 1924 and published in revised form in 1926, enabled municipalities

to divide their territory into districts according to different uses, thereby establishing zoning as the basis of adjudicating perceived incompatibility.<sup>4</sup> This practice was given further credence with the landmark *Euclid v. Ambler* Supreme Court ruling handed down in 1926, that legitimized zoning as a form of nuisance control within the police power of the state.

A second act, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA), published in final form in 1928, went a step further than zoning by recommending cities prepare master plans to guide future growth and control the private subdivision of land (with zoning being one element of these comprehensive plans). That these enabling acts were advanced by the U.S. Department of Commerce under Herbert Hoover suggests the motivations of zoning and master planning were rooted as much in economic motives related to the stability of property values as addressing social problems of the industrial city. Both acts were highly influential. SZEA would go on to be adopted by all 50 states and is still in effect in 47 states.<sup>5</sup> SCPEA was not as

popular, but by 1930 had been adopted by 20% of states.<sup>6</sup>

These universal planning and zoning standards were strengthened by the creation of the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) in 1934, as part of the National Housing Act. Projects qualifying for FHA loans had to comply with FHA standards that governed not only unit plans, but how they were sited, setbacks, parking, and so on. Enabling acts, FHA standards and a shift to the mass production of housing after the Second World War combined to make comprehensive planning and zoning the backbone of modern city planning in the latter half of the twentieth century. And despite efforts by New Urbanists to replace them with form-based codes, land use plans have remained remarkably resilient. Even as planning shifted away from its physical roots, comprehensive plans and zoning have expanded in scope and complexity.

Frontier towns like Los Angeles had traditionally taken a more laissez-faire approach to regulation as compared to the heavier hand of government typical of east coast cities. But even

Los Angeles quickly adopted zoning. The earliest zoning efforts in L.A. date from 1908, with significant revisions in 1921, 1930, and more comprehensively in 1946 (to accommodate the influx of people working in the defense industry, which had become a key regional economic engine).<sup>7</sup> Master planning and zoning, however, had an uneasy relationship in postwar L.A., as rapid growth proceeded faster than plans could be produced, leading to the widespread use of conditional use permits. This, in turn, led to charges of “spot zoning”, where isolated parcels of land did not adhere to the prevailing surrounding uses.

Despite the patchwork of local district plans governing land uses, with the completion of the San Fernando Valley master plan in 1955, every parcel of land in L.A. had been planned.<sup>8</sup> And at this time, planning was not seen as a means to limit growth, but rather as a means of facilitating it in a more orderly fashion, to ensure infrastructure and services were keeping pace with population growth. As the boom times began to slow in the 1960s, and development began creeping into

the hills, efforts to use planning to constrain growth began to emerge, beginning with the Santa Monica Mountains Master Plan, published in 1963.<sup>9</sup> Land use policies would be the tool of choice to limit growth – a strategy that lasted into the 1990s, when a nascent counter-revolutionary movement towards urban infill and transit-oriented development began to question the slow-growth hegemony. That L.A. today has effectively grown to reach its planned population has sparked a heated debate over what kind of growth Angelenos are willing to accept – if any.

### RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The shift towards more restrictive land use policies, the on-going housing affordability crisis, and the associated problems it has exacerbated (pollution, congestion, social/spatial disparities), forms the backdrop to this dissertation. Certainly an avenue for future research is to understand the specific relationship between the changing land use policies

in L.A. and the resultant affordability crisis. However, this research project is limited to understanding how and why L.A. downzoned itself so radically after 1965, and moreover, how land use policies were used as a means of controlling growth. Specifically, it is organized around three inter-related research questions that form the basis of the three parts of the study:

- (1) How and why did land use policies change so radically post-Watts (1965)?
- (2) Who were the key players advocating for land use changes and what were their motivations for doing so?
- (3) What impact did these changes have on different areas and how does this relate to their socio-economic composition?

In particular, I am interested in understanding how the changes in land use policy after 1965 were distributed spatially. I am also interested in understanding how these changes

relate to the activity of local groups, in particular, homeowner associations.


The above questions are organized into three parts that roughly correspond to the “what, why, and how” of land

use changes in Los Angeles between roughly 1965 and 1992 (see Chapter 2 for an explanation of research design and methods):

Part 1: How land use changed in L.A. after 1965 citywide and across the 35 different community plan areas.

Part 2: The motivations for change of different groups via three group cases

Part 3: How these changes played out in two place cases



The dissertation operates on three axes (see Fig. 1-2): (1) time: tracing land use changes from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s; (2) place: operating at three scales – citywide, community plan areas, and individual places within these plan areas; and (3) people: exploring the intersection of three groups – homeowners, chambers of commerce, and civil rights groups.

Fig. 1-2: Three Axes of Dissertation






Fig. 1-3: Diagram of 3 Place Scales

The three group cases provide a detailed window into how three different type of interest groups intersected with the planning and land use issues both in the pro-growth, post-war boom and the slow-growth period after Watts. Spatially, the project is organized around three scales (see Fig. 1-3): (1) a *macro* analysis that quantifies how land uses have changed over time – both across the 35 community plan areas and in the aggregated citywide, (2) a *meso* analysis that compares two areas with very different spatial and socio-economic characteristics that were impacted by the community planning process in different ways, and (3) within these two areas, a *micro* scale analysis of individual places or projects are explored in detail to understand in concrete detail the issues and concerns of different actors.

In Part 1 (Land Use Changes in Los Angeles), I analyze the overall pattern of land use change across L.A.'s 35 community plan areas – documenting *what* changes took place and where. This analysis marks the first historical study of L.A.'s 35

community plan areas, documenting how land uses changed across the city over three iterations of community plans (1970s, 1980s, 1990s). The land use analysis itself is broken down into two parts: (1) changes in the overall land use areas (across single- and multi-family, commerce, industry, open space) and (2) given the particular interest in how residential areas were down-zoned, a more detailed analysis of how residential densities were changed over time and space.

As will be discussed in Part 1, there were substantial differences in how the 35 community plan areas changed over time – with some areas dramatically increasing in density – e.g. Arleta, an increase of 84%; conversely, other areas dramatically decreased in density – e.g. Venice, a decrease of 41%. These changes in land uses and density are then compared to: (1) social characteristics (race, family size, etc), economic characteristics (income, poverty, unemployment, etc) and physical characteristics (single-family, density, etc) and (2) compare against how active homeowner groups were in given




Fig. 1-4: Dynamic Between Homeowner, Business and Civil Rights Groups

areas with respect to land use cases. What emerges is strong evidence that local groups of largely affluent, white homeowners used the community planning process to effectively re-direct growth away from their communities towards lower-income, minority areas that did not have strong local organizations to resist these changes.

In Part 2 (Motivations of Local Groups), I explore the motivations behind these changes – *why* different interest groups mobilized and around what issues. Since I am looking at land use changes through the lens of sustainability, I principally focused on groups concerned about environmental, social, and economic issues; as such, three kinds of organizations form the basis of my analysis in Part 2: homeowner associations (more properly called neighborhood associations), chambers of commerce, and civil rights organizations. The motivations of three representative organizations are explored (supplemented by evidence from similar groups), drawn from a detailed analysis of organizational records, meeting minutes, and

correspondence. These organizations are: (1) the Association of Hillside and Canyon Associations (also known as the Hillside Federation), (2) the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce, and (3) the Los Angeles Urban League. As will be discussed in Chapter 2 (Research Design & Methods), these three represent exemplars among civil rights, business, and homeowner groups – that are more organized, with more resources, and more political influence than similar like-minded groups in the city.

As we will see, the dynamic between these groups was complex, with contingent and shifting alliances between them (see Fig. 1-4). Civil rights, business and homeowner groups responded to three primary forces (the ovals in Fig. 1-4): economic expansion, social exclusion, and natural ecology. For all three forces, two groups tended to be aligned (to varying degrees) and one was opposed.

For example, business and civil rights groups both supported economic growth, but for different reasons and in different places. Chambers tended to focus on policies that

would allow sufficient industrial expansion, typically on the City's periphery, where land was more plentiful and cheaper. Civil Rights groups also supported pro-growth policies, but were principally concerned with job creation in the inner city (but also gaining access to suburban jobs). By contrast, homeowner groups were decidedly anti-growth. They viewed growth as a threat to the image of the city they held, and one that only served to generate negative consequences (pressure on schools, parks, roads, water systems, property values, etc).

Similarly, while they tended to be on opposite sides of the growth debate, both civil rights and homeowners groups championed stronger environmental protection, but from very different perspectives, reflecting the two sides of the environmental movement. As will be discussed in Part 2, the contemporary conservation movement grew out of the suburbs, even though this may come as a surprise given how the suburbs are today viewed as more or less the antithesis of environmentalism. This conservation movement,

spearheaded by groups such as the Sierra Club and the Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, was principally concerned with preserving open space in and around the Santa Monica Mountains. By the 1980s, another wing of the environmental movement was born: the environmental justice movement, championed by civil rights organizations concerned with airborne and waterborne contaminants in inner-city communities. Pushing back against these ecological concerns were business groups, who largely viewed strict environmental regulations as impediments to growth.

Finally, while civil rights groups were fighting for racial integration through fair housing laws as part of a broader movement towards racial equality, business and homeowner groups were defending segregationist practices. While it is difficult to prove racist motives to these actions (although there is no doubt racism played a key part), homeowners and business groups typically defended segregationist policies on other grounds.

For example, homeowners fought against the intrusion of multi-family housing into single-family areas, especially housing set aside for low-income households, on the grounds that they were protecting the integrity of zoning and preserving their semi-rural way of life. Likewise, business groups wanted to preserve the prestige and maximize their return on investment in business areas like Warner Center (in the San Fernando Valley), and therefore fought against mandatory inclusionary housing requirements that would have opened up these areas to minorities.

The picture that emerges is complex. All three groups were motivated by issues of expansion, exclusion, and ecology, but not in equal measures, and that impacted the degree to which they were active in shaping changes to land use policy. The evidence clearly shows that homeowner associations – far more than the business or civil rights groups – were primarily concerned with land use issues. Chambers of Commerce took a much broader view than did homeowners groups, concerned

more generally with policies (at the local, state and federal levels) that impacted L.A.'s business climate and continued growth. In some cases, this intersected with homeowners' concerns about land uses, but their concerns were often less about the particulars of place and more about general tax policies and environmental regulations. Civil rights groups were principally concerned with expanding opportunities for minorities. This typically meant access to fair housing, expanded social services, and job opportunities for non-whites. While in theory land use decisions impacted these concerns, in general, civil rights groups were not directly involved in re-shaping land use policy, to the detriment of their mission.

In Part 3 (A Tale of Two Communities), I explore *how* this dynamic between groups and changes to land use played out in two very different areas of the city: Woodland Hills/Canoga Park and Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw. As is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 (Research Design & Methods), these areas were chosen not because they represented the most extreme

cases but because they are illustrative of the complex dynamic between environmental, economic, and equity forces at play between Watts (1965) and Rodney King (1992). They are also very different in demographics (Woodland Hills being predominantly white and Baldwin Hills predominantly black), in location (Woodland Hills is at the City's periphery, while Baldwin Hills is at its urban core), and typology (Woodland Hills being predominantly low-density and suburban, while Baldwin Hills is higher-density and more urban).

In many ways, Woodland Hills and Baldwin Hills are two sides of the same coin – influenced by the same environmental, economic and social forces, but moving in opposite directions and with dramatically different results. Part 3 tells a story of how the influence of different groups and changing land use policies transformed these two parts of the city in very different ways – with Woodland Hills enjoying tremendous growth, while Baldwin Hills falling into decline.

As racially restrictive covenants were gradually struck

down and ultimately eliminated with the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and Fair Housing Act in 1968, African-Americans in L.A. finally had the residential mobility they had been previously denied. But as blacks moved westward, out of the confines of South Central (Central Avenue) and Watts, whites began moving out of Baldwin Hills to the new subdivisions of single-family homes in Woodland Hills (and other San Fernando Valley communities) – a classic example of “white flight”.

This story is told in Part 3 by tracing the evolution of places and issues shaped by inter-related economic, environmental, and social forces. The economic story here is told through the differing fates of Warner Center and the Crenshaw Corridor. The development of Warner Center, a new economic center on the former ranch of movie tycoon Harry Warner (Warner Brothers Pictures) in Woodland Hills – complete with industrial facilities, hotels, shopping malls, offices, and condominiums – is contrasted with the decline of the once-thriving Crenshaw Corridor. The once-vaunted Broadway-Crenshaw Shopping

Center at the center of the Crenshaw Corridor, opened with fanfare in 1947 but would soon be overshadowed by a new prototype regional shopping center – Topanga Plaza – that opened in 1964 as the economic base shifted to the West Valley.

The environmental story is told by the contrast of the hillsides in Woodland and Baldwin Hills. While the Baldwin Hills would be developed into the Inglewood Oilfield, an environmental nuisance that continues today, the hillsides in Woodland Hills were preserved as part of a broader strategy to limit (if not eliminate) development in sensitive hillside areas. This part of the story illustrates how the mobilization of homeowners was able to champion the conservation movement (and block oil drilling) in a predominately white area while at the same time showing the less successful struggle for environmental justice in Baldwin Hills.

The social equity story is told by the contrast between “The Jungle” area of apartments in Baldwin Hills and a typical

suburban housing tract called Corbin Palms in Woodland Hills. Corbin Palms was developed as an exemplar of Los Angeles mid-century modern vernacular, catering to middle class workers in the thriving aerospace industry in Woodland Hills/Canoga Park. “The Jungle”, by contrast, was developed as upscale apartments for upwardly mobile professionals near the Crenshaw Corridor. But as the exodus of whites began, “The Jungle” by the 1970s would begin its transformation into one of the country’s most notorious gang enclaves (famously featured as the backdrop in the denouement of Antoine Fuqua’s *Training Day*, starring Denzel Washington as a corrupt narcotics cop).

Collectively, the three parts of the study – 1) a city-level analysis of how land uses changed relative to race, income and homeowner activity, 2) an analysis of motivations using three different groups, and 3) a detailed exploration of the spatial and social transformation of two communities – provide a vivid picture of a city planned by local, often parochial interests.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup> As of July 2011, L.A.'s official unemployment rate was 14.5%, more than 50% higher than New York's 9.3% (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). The differences across communities is often stark, for example, within a distance of 10 miles, there is a 10-fold difference in median household income – Downtown L.A.'s \$14,054 versus Bel Air's \$139,885. And almost one-quarter of L.A. renters spend more than half of their income on housing – far above the federal affordability standard of 30%. Beth Steckler and Adam Garcia, *Affordability Matters: A Look at Housing Construction & Affordability in Los Angeles* (Los Angeles: Livable Places, 2008), 9, 12.

<sup>2</sup> In 1972, the Department of City Planning estimated the City's zoning capacity at 9.9 million. Los Angeles Department of City Planning, *Density Adjustment Study: An Examination of Multiple Residential Zoning in the City of Los Angeles* (Los Angeles, 1972), i. The 3.9 and 4.3 million estimates are derived from adding the sum total of population capacity for the 1980s and 1990s updates of the 35 community plans. The zoning, however, was inconsistent until the late 1980s, when homeowners sued the City to force compliance (discussed in Chapter 6).

<sup>3</sup> The population of the City of Los Angeles was 2,812,099 in 1970. By 2000, it had grown to 3,694,820, an increase of 882,721. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 and 2000.

<sup>4</sup> See Ruth Knack, Stuart Meck and Israel Stollman, "The Real Story Behind the Standard Planning and Zoning Acts of the 1920s," *Land Use Law & Zoning Digest* (Feb 1996): 3-9, and Stuart Meck, "Model Planning and Zoning Legislation: A Short History," *Modernizing State Planning Statutes: The Growing Smart Working Papers*, Vol 1, Planning Advisory Service Report No. 462/463 (1996), 1-18.

<sup>5</sup> Meck, 2.

<sup>6</sup> Knack, Meck and Stollman, 8.

<sup>7</sup> In 1908, the City created six industrial and six residential zones that established basic parameters for the kinds of uses that were allowed (Ordinances 16948 and 16170, adopted by City Council in February and August 1908, respectively). In 1921, the City established five zones – A through F – and established a system of zoning administration (Ordinance 42666, adopted in October 1921). In 1930, the City established R (residential), C (commercial) and M (manufacturing) zones and distinguished between different levels

of intensity between them – with four sub-categories of residential, and two each for commercial and manufacturing (Ordinance 66750, adopted in May 1930). In 1946, the City adopted a comprehensive zoning code that included not only use restrictions, but also setbacks, parking requirements, supplemental uses, and a process to allow conditional uses. Collectively, the City by this time had 16 zones (Ordinance 90500, adopted February 1946). L.A.’s current zoning code remains based on this 1946 code, with thousands of pages of amendments. At the time of writing, the City has initiated a process to re-write the zoning code to be more stream-lined. For a detailed study of L.A.’s zoning and land use regulations, see Andrew Whittemore, “The Regulated City: The Politics of Land Use Regulation in Los Angeles, 1909-2009,” PhD Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2010.

<sup>8</sup> L.A. City Planning Department, *Annual Report, 1954-55*, 20.

<sup>9</sup> L.A. City Planning Department, *General Plan, Santa Monica Mountain Area*; a portion of the Master Plan of the City of Los Angeles. Los Angeles, 1963.

Any study of Los Angeles inevitably must confront the question of what scale is most appropriate – the entire Southland, L.A. County, smaller cities within Los Angeles County, or only the City of Los Angeles itself? Los Angeles sits within a vast and largely continuous urbanized area spanning five counties (Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside, Orange) with an estimated population of 18 million (2011).<sup>1</sup>

While I considered a comparative study across municipalities, initial investigations quickly illustrated the limitations of this approach. First, many municipalities have not kept detailed historical records, making it impossible to re-construct a picture of how land uses changed over time, or who were the key participants. In effect, any selection of case

cities would be biased towards those with the most complete records. Given the financial and human resources this requires, indications were that such a study would be biased towards more affluent (and more white) communities within the region.

Second, different municipalities have structural differences in how planning is organized. For example, most smaller cities are planned more centrally, but large cities like Los Angeles are broken down into dozens of smaller planning areas. Moreover, there are significant differences in who is involved in the planning process and which actors have the most influence. For example, given its size and relatively few number of Council Districts, L.A.'s Council members exert a significant influence on planning within their districts, which is

not the case in smaller cities, or cities with a larger number of districts. Comparing across municipalities with very different planning regimes – while an interesting study in the influence of planning structure on outcomes – would complicate my study of how different groups influenced land use policies, in effect introducing confounding influences that would make it difficult to draw reliable conclusions.

Different cities across the region (even within L.A. County) also have very different economic bases. So a comparison over time across different municipalities would introduce many more factors – for example, a city heavily dependent on the aerospace industry was hard hit by the defense cuts in the 1990s, while a city more dependent on the television and film industries was not. This makes it difficult to assess the motivations for land use changes from city to city, since many changes might be the result of explicit choices, while others may have been outcomes of necessity. While this may also be true to some extent across different areas of L.A., its highly diversified economy compared

to most cities in the region mitigate these confounding economic factors.

At roughly 4 million people, L.A. is, by far, the largest and arguably most influential municipality in the Southland, comprising almost  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the population of the entire region and 40% of L.A. County's population.<sup>2</sup> L.A. is also both large (nearly 500 square miles) and diverse, both racially and ethnically, but containing some of the region's most and least affluent areas. In terms of demographics and economy, it is broadly representative of the region. Given its representativeness, a consistent planning regime, and similar economic conditions, I determined a study limited to the City of Los Angeles itself offered the best choice.

Having settled on the City of L.A. as the focus of the dissertation, a second question that I needed to answer was what scale within the City would be the most appropriate unit of comparison? Should I compare across City Council Districts, Area Planning Commissions, Community Plan Areas, or Self-

Identified Neighborhoods? (for example, those identified by *L.A. Times's Mapping L.A.* project) I considered each of these. Comparing across Council Districts was immediately discounted since the Districts have changed considerably over time and are also highly gerrymandered, so much so that they rarely reflect genuine communities of interest. I also considered the Area Planning Commissions – the City is divided into 7 such areas – but these divisions were only introduced in 2000 to relieve pressure on the single city planning commission, and thus are unhelpful for a study whose primary focus ends with the Rodney King unrest in 1992. The Area Planning Commissions are also too coarse a grain – being more than twice the size of Council Districts (there are 15 Council Districts, as compared with only 7 Area Planning Commission). Moreover, the Area Planning Commissions are also arbitrary geographic divisions – for example, the arbitrary decision to split the San Fernando Valley into North and South Area Planning Commissions. Demographically, an East/West split of the Valley makes more

sense from the perspective of shared interests. While the 114 neighborhoods identified by *Mapping L.A.* best capture shared local interests, they suffer from “border wars” – their centers are easily defined but there are significant disputes over whether some areas are a part of one neighborhood or another. And while *Mapping L.A.* has compiled demographic data for these areas, no historical data exists to understand how they’ve changed over time. Being “crowd-sourced” they also suffer from some clear errors – for example, an area bordered by Corbin, Victory, Winnetka and the L.A. River is considered part of Winnetka by *Mapping L.A.*, but it is within Woodland Hills’s 91367 zip code and has a formal Woodland Hills postal address.

For these reasons, I settled on the 35 Community Plan Areas as the ideal unit of analysis. Not only have these 35 areas remained constant since their creation in 1969, the City Planning Department’s Demographic Research Unit has compiled detailed census data information for these areas for 1990 and 2000, as well as basic population data going back

to 1960. Most importantly, the Community Plan Areas are the scale at which planning in L.A. has operated for the past 40+ years, which provides a consistent metric against which to measure changes.

This study attempts to understand how different organizations shaped changes in land use. There are, of course, many ways to structure such a study. As will be discussed in the literature review in Chapter 4, studies of the motivations and impacts of land use are typically very general, operating at a macro scale across a metropolitan region and usually employ statistical methods to understand the significance of different variables on outcomes. While not without their value, in their attempt to describe a general market condition, they often entirely miss the essential details that make such cases relevant.

They are also very often ahistorical – they are snapshots in time, rather than an attempt to understand what happens in

practice, which are cumulative land use changes that frequently are layered upon one another. Seeking to address these shortcomings, this study is designed to explore how groups shape land use by using a comparative historical approach (although in Part 1, I test the statistical significance of different factors on the observed land use changes).

Throughout the three parts of the dissertation, I employ three primary methods:

- 1) quantitative and spatial analysis of changes in land uses and residential zoning over time
- 2) comparative historical methods using organizational records, meeting minutes, correspondence, etc.
- 3) archives of the popular press (*Los Angeles Times*, *Los Angeles Sentinel*, etc.).

By combining different sources and methods, I employ

triangulation to improve the reliability of the findings and identify common themes.

## PART 1 METHODS

In Part 1, data related to the changing allocation of land uses and residential categories was obtained from a detailed review of 104 community plans adopted by City Council since the inception of the community plan program in 1969. There were 3 “waves” of community plans – the initial plans in the 1970s, a second update in the 1980s, and a third update in the 1990s.<sup>3</sup> In only one case – Chatsworth – are there only two plan updates, a consequence of its second update not being adopted until several years after the others (it wasn’t adopted until 1993, while all other areas were completed by 1989). Another exception is Hollywood, whose third iteration proved so controversial that it wasn’t adopted until 2012. Silver Lake’s initial community plan was not adopted until 1984, although

it’s second iteration was adopted on schedule in 1988. Apart from these minor variations, all other plans follow the typical 1970s/1980s/1990s pattern (the average year adopted for all plans was 1976, 1988, and 1999). A diagram showing the adoption year of each community plan is provided in Fig. 2-1 (the black square represents the adoption year and gray represents the years in which the preceding plan was in effect).

It is fortunate that the 35 community plan areas have remained constant since their inception in 1969, thus providing a unit of analysis that has remained consistent over time, allowing for clear comparison. Moreover, the land use categories (housing, commerce, industry, open space) and residential categories (from minimum to high density) have also remained the same since 1969.<sup>4</sup> This provides us with a unique opportunity to compare how plans at a local level have changed over time and at whose request.




Fig. 2-1: Timeline of Community Plan Adoptions

Data Sources: All 104 Community Plans



## COMMUNITY PLANS

The original community plan documents are held at Los Angeles City Planning Automated Records & Files, City Hall, Room 575. The 35 most recent community plan updates (from the 1990s) are also available on the City Planning website, under the General Plan / Land Use Element Section, but the 1970s and 1980s community plans are only available in hardcopy form. I was particularly interested in extracting data from two key tables from each of these plan updates:<sup>5</sup> (1) the Summary of Land Use table, found at the end of Chapter 3 of the plans (see Fig. 2-2 for sample), and (2) the Plan Population and Dwelling Unit Capacity table, found at the beginning of Chapter 3 of the plans (see Fig. 2-3 for sample). Comparing this data across three iterations of community plan updates allows us to document, for the first time, how land uses have changed over time in Los Angeles. It should be noted at this point that land uses and zoning in L.A. have not always been in alignment.

For example, the community plans in the 1970s expressed the will of each community, but they were not the legal enforceable “law of the land”. Zoning determined what could or could not be built and it wasn’t until homeowners sued the City in 1984 – a process that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 – that zoning was brought into compliance with the community plans. In a few cases, these community plans were subsequently revised – that is, small changes were made within the same plan update. In these cases, data from the first plan update was used (since these typically minor changes would be picked up in the following plan update). This data was then compiled into a master spreadsheet for analysis.

## DATA ANALYSIS

Using the data from the Summary of Land Use tables in the 104 community plans, I calculated the net and percentage changes for all four uses (single- and multi-family housing,

WEST ADAMS- BALDWIN HILLS - LEIMERT  
SUMMARY OF LAND USE

CATEGORY	LAND USE	CORRESPONDING ZONES	NET ACRES	%AREA	TOTAL NET ACRES	TOTAL % AREA
<b>RESIDENTIAL</b>						
<b>Single Family</b>						
	Minimum	OS, A1, A2, RE40,	21.78	1.0	2,283	29.0
	Low	RE9, RS, R1, RU, RD5, RD6				
<b>Multiple Family</b>						
	Low Medium I	R2, RD3, RD4, RZ3, RZ4, RU, RW1	361.15	18.9	1,911	24.2
	Low Medium II	RD1.5, RD2, RW2, RZ2.5	1,257.74	65.8		
	Medium	R3	648.66	34.0		
	High Medium	R4	4.23	0.2		
<b>COMMERCIAL</b>						
	Neighborhood	C1, C1.5, C2, C4, P	80.00	13.3	597	7.6
	General (F)	C1.5, C2, C4, P	299.04	50.1		
	Community	CR, C2, C4, P, PB	156.00	26.1		
	Regional	CR, C1.5, C2, C4, R3, R4,	62.00	10.4		
<b>INDUSTRIAL</b>						
	Commercial	CM, P	171.51	48.7	353	4.5
	Limited	CM, MR1, M1, P	181.00	51.3		
<b>OPEN SPACE/PUBLIC FACILITIES</b>						
	Open Space	OS, A1	199.82	31.0	645	8.2
	Public Facilities	PF	445.67	69.0		
<b>STREETS</b>						
	Private Street		2.02	0.1	2,092	26.5
	Public Street		2,089.85	99.9		
<b>TOTAL</b>					<b>7,881</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Fig. 2-2: Sample Summary of Land Use Table  
West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert Community Plan (May 1998)

commerce, industry, and open space). One challenge that had to be overcome was a change between the earlier (1970s and 1980s) and later (1990s) community plans in how area was calculated. In the earlier plans, gross acreage was used – that is, the streets and rights-of-way accessing given uses were included in the areas for each use. In the later plans, net acreage was used – i.e. streets were broken out separately and listed under the Open Space category. So a direct comparison of gross to net acreage would over-estimate the percent change for each use.

PLAN POPULATION AND DWELLING UNIT CAPACITY

Residential Land Use Category	Dwelling Units Per Net Acre Midpoint (Range)	Number of Dwelling Units	Net Acres	Persons Per Dwelling Unit (2010)	Reasonable Exp. Population (2010)
Minimum	0.5 (0 to 1)	11	22.09	2.74	30
Low	4.8 (4+ to 9)	14,803	2,277.50	2.74	40,560
Low Medium I	13.5 (9+ to 18)	4,862	360.17	2.74	13,321
Low Medium II	23.5 (18+ to 29)	29,507	1,255.65	2.60	76,718
Medium	42.0 (29+ to -55)	26,877	639.93	2.60	69,880
High Medium*	82 (55+ to 109)	346	4.23	2.60	899
<b>TOTALS</b>		<b>76,406</b>	<b>4,559.57</b>		<b>201,408</b>

Fig. 2-3: Sample Plan Population and Dwelling Unit Capacity Table  
West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert Community Plan (May 1998)

To avoid this conflict, I simply compared the percentage change of each area for each use. In the summary tables for the 1990s era plans, I simply note that the acreage is gross acreage. But since the comparison is based on the change in percentage, we can still conduct a direct comparison.

A second, and arguably more important, analysis was undertaken specifically for residential uses. The data was organized into a matrix by community plan area (see Appendix A). The data was broken down into the 10 residential categories that have been consistently used since 1969:

#### Single-Family Categories

Minimum – 0 to 1 dwelling units per acre (du/ac)

Very Low I – 1+ to 3

Very Low II – 3+ to 4

Low I – 4+ to 5

Low II – 5+ to 9

#### Multi-Family Categories

Low Medium I – 9+ to 18

Low Medium II – 18+ to 29

Medium – 29+ to 55

High-Medium – 55+ to 109

High<sup>6</sup> - 109+ to 218

In some cases, the Very Low and Low I and II categories were given as a single category (e.g. Very Low from 1 to 4 du/ac and Low from 4 to 9 du/ac). This practice prevents a direct comparison of these sub-categories, but still allows comparison of the overall Very Low and Low categories. In other specific cases, for example, the 1970s and 1980s plans for Central City, Central City North, South L.A. and Southeast L.A., do not provide a breakdown of the multi-family categories, instead indicating only the overall allocation of multi-family. This, of course, prevents a detailed analysis of the different categories, so in these cases, only an analysis of changes in the overall

multi-family are possible. Notwithstanding these particular limitations, the data is substantially complete and provides a detailed breakdown of how different communities were planned over time.

Armed with the raw data from the 104 community plans, I was faced with a question as to which metric to use to trace the changes in density – total number of units for each residential land use category, total area (acreage) allocated to each, or the planned population for each? Number of units was immediately rejected because not all of the community plans explicitly broke out the number of units for each residential land use category. Acreage could have been used similarly to the overall land use patterns in the first analysis, but since this requires estimating net acreage and gross acreage was only provided in the 1990s plans (which would have introduced error into the calculation), it was clear that using population would be a more reliable metric of density. It also had the advantage of allowing for a direct comparison to actual population changes and, moreover,

includes variations in number of people per household allocated to different uses. For example, in Wilshire, while low-density households are estimated to have a household size of 2.98 per unit, high-density households are estimated to be 2.51 per unit. So using acreage alone would ignore these differences in household size in different land use categories and therefore have a tendency to overstate the density for higher intensity uses. Since population capacity includes both household size and area, it provides a clearer picture of the anticipated density.

#### HOMEOWNER ACTIVITY

I was also interested in understanding how these changes related to homeowner group activity at the city-wide level. However, it is very difficult to conduct a detailed analysis of all 35 community plan areas. This would mean consulting the City Planning Commission and City Council Files for each of

these plans and read through every piece of correspondence for 104 community plans. Nevertheless, I wanted to understand at the citywide scale how homeowner activity has impacted overall land use changes.

So the research design is set up so that Part 1 provides a macro perspective on these changes, while Part 3, zooms into two particular cases to study in detail (Part 2 looks at three group cases at the citywide level, but touches on examples in different plan areas). I wanted to understand if areas that were significantly downzoned were those where homeowners groups were most active. Fortunately, the L.A. City Council Files are available and searchable through the City Clerk's Office. This allowed me to conduct an extensive search of all cases where homeowner groups in some way had petitioned City Council.<sup>7</sup> This provides an inventory not of every single neighborhood association in the City, but rather of the most active groups (those organized enough to request something of City Council). In fact, it also provided the most comprehensive way to identify these

neighborhood groups, since most are not incorporated entities and do not appear in state or local directories, for example, the Attorney General's Registry of Non-Profit Organizations. These associations also come and go over time, and are often very informal, making their identification sometimes challenging.

Using the Council File system therefore served the dual purpose of providing a metric of homeowner activity while also providing the most comprehensive inventory of associations available. Various search terms were used (e.g. neighborhood association, homeowner association, town council, residents association, "friends of...", etc.) and various abbreviations (ass'n, ass, assoc, etc) to ensure I captured as many groups as possible. Some judgment was required to determine if similar named organizations were, in fact, the same organization – for example, sometimes an organizations will be called "X neighborhood association" and sometimes "X community association". One limitation of the Council File System is that it only goes back to 1980, so does not pick up the groups active in

the 1970s. Still, it does document over 30 years of searchable records, providing a good sense of which groups were active, where, and around what issues.

### MAPPING

Once population changes were calculated (net and percentage), a series of maps were generated to illustrate these changes. Shape files for the 35 community plan areas were obtained from the Los Angeles City Planning Department. Since these maps do not need to be georeferenced, I created them in Adobe Illustrator to have greater graphic control than can be obtained using ArcGIS. Since the inclusion of L.A.'s "tail" – the 3 community plan areas in the thin strip of land that connects South L.A. to the Port of L.A. – would reduce the size of the maps by 40%, I decided to only map the upper 32 community plans, which contain 95% of L.A.'s population. I felt this was an acceptable compromise. I also created a series

of maps that compared these changes to the demographics of the community plan areas, obtained from the City Planning Demographic Research Unit. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the resulting data and maps show a clear pattern: areas that are predominately white were significantly downzoned and areas predominately non-white were significantly upzoned, while diverse areas tended to be in the middle.

Through the search of the City Clerk's Council Files system, I identified over 200 distinct neighborhood associations involved in almost 650 cases. Fortunately, the vast majority of these associations are named after the specific neighborhood they serve, which makes locating them fairly straight forward (e.g. the Spaulding Square Homeowners Association being in Spaulding Square in Hollywood, which is a well known area centered on De Longpre and Genesee Avenues). In some cases, it was necessary to read through some of the case files to determine their geographic location. I then used a Google Fusion Table – which is a spreadsheet formatted with address

information for each association (one per row) uploaded and geo-referenced by Google – to map the locations of all associations, which was then imported into the Illustrator base maps.

One might say this produced a map of social capital – demonstrating where the most active neighborhood groups in L.A. were. But this included all cases, not only land use cases. Fortunately, the City Clerk’s database allows for easy identification of whether a case number is land use related or not – if it was not clear from the case file name (most are titled but some of the earlier cases did not have titles, the title was simply the case number) – then the case summary did. This allowed me to determine whether a case was land use-related or not. Examples of land use cases might include: input on a community plan update, appealing a zoning or subdivision ruling for a particular project, appealing a zoning board of administration determination, and the like. Non-land use cases include requests for street closures, requests to fund special

events, requests for dedicated street parking, and the like. Screening out the non-land use cases left 104 associations involving 286 cases – roughly 44% of the cases being land use-related. This data was likewise mapped.

While this provided an indication of where neighborhood associations were most active in land use affairs – and there were areas such as South L.A. where associations were very active but not on land use matters – but it doesn’t indicate the relative strength of each association. So a third layer was generated that plotted each association, scaled relative to the number of cases with which it was involved. In some cases, the City creates a second or third case number that might be related to a previous case (typically designated –S1 or –S2). For the purposes of this analysis, I treated these as distinct cases, since the City itself created a new case number for each – that is, I simply followed the City’s lead. This produced a map that reinforced the findings of a strong correlation between where homeowners were active and where land uses were

significantly downzoned (and vice versa for areas with little homeowner activity).

## PART 2 METHODS

In Part 2, I explore the motivations of different actors. To get a broad understanding of who were the key players, I began this part of the study with a survey of historical news articles. The *ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Los Angeles Times* digital archives served as the primary backbone for this initial query, which includes the full text of articles up until 1989. A second database, the *ProQuest Newspapers: Los Angeles Times* database includes the full text of articles after 1989. I conducted searches related to “land use”, “zoning”, “housing”, etc and various permutations of “homeowners association”, “neighborhood association”, etc. in the “document text” search field to determine which specific organizations were most active. These queries were limited to articles, editorials, and letters to

the editor after 1943 (although the period of particular interest to me was post-Watts, i.e. 1965, I wanted to understand the history of actions leading up to that point). Similar searches were performed for business and civil rights groups.

What became quickly apparent was how much more involved homeowner groups were in land use affairs than were business and civil rights groups. In particular, the Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations (or Hillside Federation) was especially well-represented in these popular press articles, along with the Sherman Oaks Homeowners Association, Northridge Civic Association and Los Feliz Civic Association. Among business groups, the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce, Van Nuys Chamber of Commerce and Associated Chambers of Commerce of the San Fernando Valley were most prevalent, although to a much lesser extent than homeowners. Few civil rights groups appeared directly in discussions about land use, although intersected with issues of fair housing very frequently. Among the most prevalent were the Los Angeles



Urban League, the San Fernando Valley Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Brotherhood Crusade.

Based on this survey of popular press articles, I chose one group from each – the Hillside Federation, the L.A. Urban League, and Associated Chambers of the San Fernando Valley (changed later, as discussed below) – as my principal case studies. These three were the most frequently mentioned within their respective types of groups, which I felt was indicative of their relative involvement in the planning process. I decided to partially employ the somewhat unconventional “primary case informed by multiple secondary cases” method advanced by Vinit Mukhija – which he calls “N of One plus Some.”<sup>8</sup> In this case, the three principal cases would be supplemented by less detailed analysis of supplementary cases that would allow me to understand if issues in the three primary cases were common to others, or exceptional to the particular case.

## HOMEOWNERS

The exhaustive records of the Hillside Federation are housed at UCLA Special Collections (Collection Number 1244). This collection represents the detailed files left by former Federation President Betty Dearing, covering largely the period between 1963 and 1977, although records extend back to its founding in 1952. Additions have since been contributed by John Weaver (1979), Harriett Weaver (1986) and Alan Kishbaugh (1997). A detailed guide for the collection is available through the Online Archive of California (OAC) of which UCLA Special Collections is a participating institution. The collection includes agendas, meeting minutes, correspondence, and subject files on a wide range of topics of interest to the Federation. Supplementary research was conducted of the Northridge and Los Feliz Civic Associations, housed at the California State Northridge (CSUN) Special Collection & Archives (Collections

NCA and LFIA, respectively). The NCA collection covers the period 1951-1983 and LFIA covers 1922-2002 (although I was concerned only with records after 1943).

### BUSINESS GROUPS

Records of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the San Fernando Valley or ACCSFV (originally called the Associated Chambers of the West San Fernando Valley) are housed at CSUN Special Collection & Archives (Collection ACCSFV). This collection covers the period 1955-1978 and “documents the expansion of business, industry and suburban consumer culture throughout the San Fernando Valley during its post-war period of rapid growth from the 1950s through the 1970s.”<sup>9</sup> The collection is not as extensive as the Hillside Federation, but likewise contains correspondence, minutes, agendas and an issues and topics series. A detailed finding guide is available in hardcopy at CSUN. ACCSFV minutes were not as complete

or detailed as the Hillside Federation’s. So I decided instead to consider ACCSFV a secondary case and instead investigate the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce (LAACC) as my primary business group case.

LAACC records are housed at USC Regional History Collection. A detailed finding guide is available in hardcopy from USC. Particularly helpful in this collection are the stenographers’ reports of meetings from the 1960s, which provide a word-for-word account of meetings. Since the LAACC collection provided a more detailed picture, I used LAACC as my primary case and ACCSFV as a secondary case.

### CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS

The L.A. Urban League records proved more difficult. Some records are available in a small collection at the USC Regional History Collection. It was here that some information was gathered about the LAUL activities. Additional records from

the various Urban League chapters is centralized in the National Urban League Papers, housed at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. Records from the L.A. Urban League chapter, however, were sparse, based on a review of the online finding aid. However, detailed information about the LAUL was gathered from a search of the archives of the *Los Angeles Sentinel*, a black newspaper based in L.A. (available through ProQuest's *Historical Newspapers* database).

## INTERVIEWS

Part 2 is primarily based on these written documents, especially the organizational records in special collections, as well as press accounts. However, I also supplemented these findings with two in-depth in-person interviews with people who were involved with land use battles in the 1980s and 1990s – Sandy Brown and Alan Kishbaugh. I originally intended to conduct as many as a dozen interviews, but after conducting

a few interviews, found that they were not revealing much information beyond what the records already indicated. Given the time commitment required to interview, transcribe, and code the interviews, I felt it was not worth the investment. As such, the Brown and Kishbaugh interviews are the only two interviews referenced in the dissertation. These interviews were conducted in their homes and lasted two hours each. As the purpose of these interviews was to provide more in-depth supplementary understanding of the issues, rather than as a comprehensive data source, the interviews were recorded, reviewed and only specific sections transcribed, rather than a complete verbatim transcription, coding and analysis (using, for example, *Atlas.ti*) that might be more common if the interview data was more primary source material.

Since these were key-informant interviews, not randomly selected samples of people involved, they were identified based on their affiliation with especially active organizations - the Friends of Westwood (in the case of Brown) and the Hillside

Federation (in the case of Kishbaugh). A standard recruitment script, approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board, was emailed to each (email addresses were obtained from organization websites). Since interviewees were not randomly sampled, the degree to which interviewees' responses are representative of all homeowner groups is necessarily unclear. Further avenues of research, including the creation of survey instruments sent to a randomly selected population and the use of descriptive and analytical statistics to quantify the survey findings, would provide a broader perspective. The focus here, however, was on teasing out the details of the homeowner perspectives and the spatial cases. The interviews generally involved open-ended questions, in most cases driven by the interviewees' responses. That said, all subjects were asked questions related to why they became involved in land use battles and what they felt were the most problematic issues. Likewise, I asked for specific examples of controversial cases, some of which were investigated further in Part 3 of the study.

## PART 3 METHODS

The two case studies in Part 3 – Woodland Hills/Canoga Park and Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw (see Fig. 2-4) – were selected in part, following a review of the demographics of the 35 community plan areas, and were influenced by the findings from Parts 1 and 2.

Given one of my research questions was to what degree land use changes reflected the demographics of different areas – in particular race and income – the intent of the spatial cases in Part 3 was to compare areas with very different characteristics. I compiled data from L.A. City Planning's Demographic Research Unit into a spreadsheet and grouped the 32 community plan areas (excluding the 3 areas in the "tail") into four zones based on the similarity of socio-economic demographics – Eastside, East Valley, West Valley, and Westside (see Fig. 2-5). While none are demographically monolithic, the summaries (2000 Census) below illustrate

WOODLAND HILLS / CANOGA PARK

BALDWIN HILLS / CRENSHAW





Fig. 2-4: Land Uses for the Two Study Areas in Part 3

Canoga Park (August 1999) and West Adams Community Plans (May 1998)

# 4 QUARTERS OF L.A.




Fig. 2-5: The Four Quarters of L.A.

Data from L.A. City Planning Demographic Research Unit Community Profiles

that these four zones, taken as a whole, roughly correspond to lower-income (Eastside), working-class (East Valley), upper middle-class (West Valley), and affluent (Westside). They also have progressively more whites from lower-income to affluent.

Since a detailed case from all four areas was deemed too ambitious, and quite possibly redundant, I settled on comparing two cases – one from the lower-income Eastside and one from the upper middle-class West Valley. Initially, I considered the two extreme cases – Westlake (an area with a median income of just \$14,000) and Bel Air (an area with a median income of almost \$140,000), but determined such extremes would miss the complexity of forces at play. Based on my demographic analysis, coupled with the results from Parts 1 and 2, I concluded a comparison of Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw and Woodland Hills/Canoga Park was ideal. A comparison of their basic socio-economic profile is below.

#### West Adams-Baldwin Hills

Average income = \$41,741 per year

Race: Black 52.3%, Latino 37.9%, White 3.8%, Asian 3.2%

Density: 13,459 people per square mile

Unemployment: 15.0%

#### Canoga Park-Woodland Hills

Average income = \$76,410 per year

Race: White 56.2%, Latino 26.6%, Asian 10.3%, Black 3.3%

Density: 6,592 people per square mile

Unemployment: 8.4%

As the data above suggests, Woodland Hills is almost twice as affluent, with almost half the unemployment rate, is half as dense and is as white as West Adams is black.

Much of the source material for Part 3 comes from City Planning Commission (CPC) and City Council Files (CF). Planning Commission records are housed at City Planning

Automated Records, while the Council Files are located at the City of Los Angeles Archives, 555 Ramirez Street, Space 320. Of particular interest are CPC and CF numbers related to the various community plan updates for Woodland Hills and Baldwin Hills.

#### Canoga Park-Woodland Hills

Update 1: adopted 9/15/72; CF 72-78 and 72-78-S1

Update 2: adopted 2/9/88; CF 87-2132

Update 3: adopted 8/17/99; CF 98-1957

#### West Adams-Baldwin Hills

Update 1: adopted 1/7/80; CF 75-3955

Update 2: adopted 8/31/88; CF 85-2116-S4

Update 3: adopted 5/6/98; CF 95-0534 and 97-0534

In Los Angeles, there are several opportunities for residents and organizations to get involved in land use cases.

There are City Planning hearings conducted by city planning staff for each project and very often developers will hold additional community meetings. For significant cases (such as community plan updates), once a project is recommended by staff, it goes to the City Planning Commission, which provides another opportunity to be heard – here a City Planning Commissioner hears testimony and produces a report with recommendations. The full CPC then takes up the case and makes its recommendations. It then goes to the City Council’s Planning Committee, which holds its own hearings and makes recommendations. Finally, it goes to the full Council, where it can be approved, denied, or referred back to the Planning Committee or staff. So there are many points at which input is heard.

The CPC and Council Files related to the community plan updates were key starting points for the research in Part 3, informed by related CPC and CF cases where applicants requested variations from the community plan (general plan



amendments) or zone changes. In many cases, these files also contain Environmental Impact Reports (EIRs), both in draft and final forms (often with supplements), where full reports are required by CEQA.<sup>10</sup> Final reports typically contain responses from staff to the issues raised in organization or resident letters, representing a rich source of information.

The CPC files, CF files and EIRs for the community plans and related projects within the community plan areas provide a detailed picture of how each area evolved, but also who was active in shaping the areas and why. Contained in the records are CPC examiner reports, planning committee reports, city planning department reports, and letters and/or statements of testimony from individuals and communal organizations outlining their objections (typically) to what is being proposed, often in great detail. The records often contain responses from applicants by their lawyers countering the claims of residents or organizations. These records also contain staff reports that likewise assess the conditions and make recommendations for

approval or denial. Special areas within the community plan areas – for example, Warner Center – may also have Specific Plans, which are more detailed studies and controls for these areas. They, too, must undergo the CEQA review process, so generate their own files, staff reports, EIRs, etc.

This primary material from public sector records forms the backbone of Part 3. However, this information is supplemented by related studies (for example, in West Adams, reports related to the Crenshaw Redevelopment Area), popular press accounts, and information gathered from the Brown and Kishbaugh interviews.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> United States Census Bureau, Population Division. Table 2. Annual Estimates of the Population of Combined Statistical Areas: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2011,” *2011 Population Estimates*. April 2012. Retrieved August 10, 2012.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> The first community plan (Venice) was adopted by City Council in October 1970. By the end of the 1970s, 30 of the 35 community plans had been adopted. Four of the remaining five (San Pedro, Southeast L.A., Sunland and West Adams) were adopted in 1980, while Silver Lake’s initial community plan was not adopted until 1984.

<sup>4</sup> The land use categories have remained constant, with one caveat: the Planning Department changed the range of densities for its Low, Low-Medium, and Medium density categories slightly for the third iteration of plan updates in the 1990s. For the 1970s and 80s plans, Low was considered 3-7 dwelling units per acre (du/ac), but this increased to 4-9 du/ac in the 1990s. Likewise, Low-Medium I changed from 7-12 to 9-18 du/ac, Low-Medium II changed from 12-24 to 18-29 du/ac and Medium changed from 24-40 to 29-55 du/ac. These differences in and of themselves are relatively small, but

moreover, since the metric I am used as my basis of comparison is population, these changes are automatically reflected in the different planned population numbers.

<sup>5</sup> To speed the extraction of this data from the 104 hardcopy community plans at Automated Records, I took digital photos of each relevant table, and logged each in a spreadsheet record to keep track of each image. While reviewing each community plan, I also recorded the City Planning Commission number, City Council File Number, and adoption dates of each plan update. In some cases, the initial community plans were missing the relevant Planning Commission and Council File numbers, but the second iterations have an “activity log” that usually noted all the related file numbers, so a complete record could be built for future researchers.

<sup>6</sup> In the inaugural Hollywood and Central City Community Plans, the city used a “Very High” category – the only instances of this category being used – but this was removed when it was updated in 1988.

<sup>7</sup> For each Council action, a case file is created wherein the first two numbers are the year and the last four numbers are the case number, e.g. 87-1536 being the 1536<sup>th</sup> case from 1987.

<sup>8</sup> Vinit Mukhija, “N of One plus Some: An Alternative Strategy for Conducting Single Case Research,” *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 29, Vol 4 (2010): 416-426.

<sup>9</sup> Finding Guide Abstract for the records of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the San Fernando Valley, 1955-1978, California State University Northridge Special Collections, Collection ACCSFV.

<sup>10</sup> Where an action is deemed a “project” under CEQA, it must be reviewed. But depending on staff’s initial assessment, a project could be granted a Negative Declaration (no significant impacts), a Mitigated Negative Declaration (has impacts but which can be mitigated to less than significant impact), or a full EIR required for projects that have impacts that cannot be mitigated to less than significant impact.

## LOS ANGELES: A LAND USE BACKGROUND

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### SOCIAL & SPATIAL CHANGE

Los Angeles has undergone a dramatic social transformation over the past half-century. By the end of the Second World War, Los Angeles was an overwhelmingly white city – almost 94%.<sup>1</sup> While post-war migration began to weaken this white hegemony, by 1960, L.A. still remained 80% white. A half-century later (2010), L.A. was less than 30% white – a remarkable change (see Fig. 3-1). An important catalyst for this social change was the 1965 Immigration Act, which dramatically altered U.S. immigration policy.<sup>2</sup> The new law eliminated race as a factor, removing quotas that prioritized Western European immigrants, instead favoring close relatives of citizens already

in the U.S. This had the effect of increasing immigration of Asians and Latinos, who were sponsored by their relatives in Los Angeles.

Likewise, significant differences in fertility rates have impacted ethnic change, with Latino fertility rates in L.A. County more than double that of non-Hispanic whites.<sup>3</sup> As a result, the Latino population in L.A. has grown by roughly 5 times since 1960 (see Fig. 3-2) – from just over 9% to nearly 49% by 2010.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, the Asian population has grown from roughly 3% to 11%.<sup>5</sup> And while L.A.'s black population rose to a peak of 17% by 1970, out-migration to peripheral areas (e.g.




Fig. 3-1: Transformation of Different Racial and Ethnic Groups in L.A. Data source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960-2010.

Palmdale, the Inland Empire) has resulted in a steady decline to roughly 9% today.<sup>6</sup> In short, Los Angeles is a far more racially and ethnically diverse city than it was after the initial wave of post-war suburbanization.

As L.A.'s demographics changed, so too did its spatial form. Los Angeles emerged from the Second World War as the archetype of suburban growth, propelled by the mass production of standardized housing. War-time industrialists such as Henry Kaiser turned their Fordist production techniques to mass produce a vernacular modernism across L.A.'s San Fernando Valley and beyond.<sup>7</sup> The City's pattern of growth was quintessentially modern, both in its segregation of uses, its urban renewal downtown, and its network of freeways providing easy access to bedroom suburbs of single-family homes, creating a very different kind of urbanism than its east-coast counterparts. It was less a unified city and more a collection of distinct neighborhoods tied together by freeways.

Between 1945 and 1965, Los Angeles added roughly

a million people. And yet, even more dramatic growth was envisioned – nearly a four-fold increase, according to its land use policies – a surplus that was in keeping with the pro-growth orientation of the city of the era. But by the mid-1960s, after 20 years of boom times, as the economy slowed and with the social fabric of the city rapidly changing, growth was no longer seen as inevitable or desirable. A “slow growth” movement began to take hold among those who settled in post-war Los Angeles. The plentiful land that drove L.A.’s post-war growth was quickly disappearing and by the 1970s, few large tracts of vacant land remained. The migrants who came to L.A. in search of a better life for themselves and their families after the War were soon confronted by a city that had out-grown its small-town feel.

By the mid-1970s, the simplicity of L.A. modernist landscape had begun to give way to a more complex matrix of geographies than were driven by an increasingly globalized economy undergoing significant re-structuring. The Fordism and military Keynesianism that drove home-building and

the jobs that supported it, had begun to give way to a postmodernism driven by flexible specialization and distinct agglomeration economies that would soon be championed by the self-anointed “L.A. School” of urbanism. By the 1980s, Mike Davis, Michael Dear, Edward Soja, Allen Scott, Michael Storper and others associated with the L.A. School began to position L.A. as the paradigmatic city of late capitalism – a direct challenge to the distinctly modern urbanism of its Chicago School rival.<sup>8</sup> According to their logic, the simultaneous forces of rapid migration, gentrification, participatory planning, a burgeoning preservation movement, and experimentation in architecture led to an eclecticism of edge cities, privatopias (e.g. gated communities), heterotopias, simulacra (i.e. themed environments), and abandoned or interstitial spaces that have come to define postmodern urbanism.<sup>9</sup> While the importance of the L.A. School to urban theory is debatable, there is little doubt that the spatial form of L.A. had undergone a dramatic shift since the immediate post-war period.

## FROM CENTRALIZED TO BOTTOM-UP PLANNING

It is in this space – after the initial wave of modernist suburbanization (roughly 1945-65), but before L.A.’s postmodernist eclecticism became apparent – that this dissertation begins. The period between 1968 and 1972 was an especially dynamic period in L.A., as citizen groups mobilized, new state laws were passed, and the fruits of the civil rights movement began to grow. By the mid-1960s, the suburban homeowners who came to L.A. in search of the American Dream began to mobilize to slow the pace of change and demand a greater voice in the planning of their city. This call for greater citizen participation in urban planning became louder following a scandal involving Chatsworth developer Bryan E. Gibson, who had bribed planning officials to gain favorable zoning decisions, leading to a 1966 Grand Jury inquiry and a 1967 Citizens Committee on Zoning Practices and Procedures to study how to reform planning.<sup>10</sup>

The zoning scandal in L.A. coincided with an existential crisis within urban planning more generally. The heavy-handedness of large-scale urban renewal, federal highway building, and public housing projects in the 1940s and 50s had caused widespread displacement and destroyed countless inner-city communities. In response, people began to rise up against what they saw as government-sponsored class warfare as it was poor, largely minority communities that were being razed. It wasn’t just the social injustice of these actions that spawned this counter-cultural push-back, but rather a rejection of the modernist ethos that favored an orderly, even sterile, landscape of segregated uses – where everything was in its proper place. Powerful voices from outside planning circles gained prominence, for example Jane Jacobs, following the publication of her landmark book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* in 1961.<sup>11</sup> A scathing critique of 1950s urban planning theory and action, Jacobs instead championed the “messiness”, scale and diversity of the traditional city, but also

the importance of everyday residents' voices in the planning of their city.

The 1960s were a period of great social activism, both within planning and otherwise. In planning, this activism led to the rise of advocacy planning and more citizen-led community planning.<sup>12</sup> But the anti-war movement, the sexual revolution, the Civil Rights movement, and the environmental movement all coalesced in an age where the status quo was under assault. By the mid-1960s, urban planning was being pulled in different directions – still looked to for guidance in structuring the physical city, but with demands that these plans reflect the will of “the people” (who those people were, however, was of some debate – should it reflect the least advantaged or those with the most political leverage?).

It was in this context that in 1964, L.A. hired Calvin Hamilton as City Planning Director, a post he had held in Pittsburgh. Hamilton's over 20 year tenure from 1964 to late 1985 spans much of my study period, providing a consistent

approach to planning that in many ways helped facilitate the ascendance of homeowner power.<sup>13</sup> Among the most ambitious of Hamilton's projects was the “Goals Program”, initiated in 1965 – a concerted effort to cast as wide a net as possible to map out a comprehensive approach to guide L.A.'s growth between 1970 and 1990.<sup>14</sup> Although a product of central planning, Hamilton understood by the mid-1960s that “a valid plan must reflect the needs and desires of citizens”.<sup>15</sup> An extensive resident survey concluded in 1968 showed that 40% of Angelenos favored little or no growth – a clear signal that the pro-growth days of the previous 20 years were coming to an end; by it also mean that a majority still favored growth.<sup>16</sup>

By 1969, following the passage of the federal Fair Housing Act, the state legislature enacted a requirement that General Plans in California include a Housing Element, to ensure that municipalities planned sufficient housing for all income levels.<sup>17</sup> It was also the time when the Secretary of the federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD), former Michigan



Governor George Romney was calling for “open suburbs”, a euphemism that sought to undo the segregation of American suburbs (land use policies being widely seen to contribute to this segregation). So planning departments, including L.A.’s, faced the twin goals of greater democratic participation and greater social justice, which were often in conflict as suburban homeowners mobilized to preserve the status quo (both socially and spatially) of their piece of paradise.

In 1972, a survey of 616 L.A. residents found that 57% favored the “slow growth” approach, a jump of over 40% relative to just four years earlier, illustrating just how tumultuous the late 1960s to early 1970s period was in L.A. City Planning. But these sentiments were not evenly distributed across the city. A majority of inner-city dwellers did not agree with the slow growth approach, but 77% to 78% of residents in the western Santa Monica Mountains, mid-Valley, and Sherman Oaks areas favored limiting growth through zoning.<sup>18</sup>

Armed with the results of the Goals Program, Hamilton

and the City Planning Department drafted a comprehensive strategy to guide the 20-year growth of the city – a framework for the Land Use Element of the General Plan – which was outlined in the “Concept L.A.” plan, otherwise known as the “Centers concept”, released in final form in January 1970 (see Fig. 3-2). The Planning Department felt it had struck a balance between accommodating future population and job growth by directing new development to high-density centers that would be connected by rapid transit, thus allowing the majority of the city to remain as low-density single-family homes. Although the terms “smart growth” and “transit-oriented development” were not used in the early 1970s, planners today would easily recognize the Centers concept as supporting these concepts. In the years leading up to the Concept L.A. Plan, the City Planning Department had proposed four concept scenarios: (1) “Centers”, (2) “Dispersion”, (3) “Corridors” and (4) “Low Density”; Concept L.A. most closely resembled the “Centers” concept, but also drew from the other three.<sup>19</sup>

# CONCEPT LOS ANGELES

THE CONCEPT FOR THE LOS ANGELES GENERAL PLAN





Fig. 3-2: Concept L.A. Overall Plan and Centers Concept



Los Angeles Department of City Planning, Concept Los Angeles, 1970

# CONCEPT LOS ANGELES

THE CONCEPT FOR THE LOS ANGELES GENERAL PLAN





Fig. 3-3: Hierarchy of Center and Rendering of Center Concept



Los Angeles Department of City Planning, Concept Los Angeles, 1970



Many of the centers were already intensively developed, such as in Hollywood or Downtown L.A. – 22 of the 37 centers were in already built-up central neighborhoods, three were on the affluent Westside, one in the Harbor area, and 11 in the largely middle-class San Fernando Valley.<sup>20</sup> The centers would be the most intensively developed but sub-centers and satellites would feed into these centers along secondary transit corridors. Collectively, the centers, sub-centers, and satellites would comprise roughly one-quarter of the city, allowing the remainder to be preserved as single-family neighborhoods and strategically placed industrial centers where compatible with surrounding uses. But renderings of the centers (see Fig. 3-3) were not well received by homeowners, who feared the “Manhattanization” of L.A. – i.e. high-densities, high crime, lower property values.<sup>21</sup>

Concept L.A., in essence, marked a “last hurrah” of centralized planning in L.A. Among the recommendations that grew out of the 1968 Citizens Report was the suggestion that

the city be planned at the local level. The Planning Department had up to this point organized studies on an area-by-area basis and had begun creating what were then called “district plans” for the roughly 70 recognized neighborhoods in the city. But homeowner groups, in particular, seized upon the Citizens Committee recommendations to turn these top-down district plans into bottom-up community plans. In 1969, the 70 neighborhoods were combined into 35 community plan areas, which would be jointly planned by the Planning Department and Citizens Advisory Committees (CACs). This area-by-area planning was envisioned by Concept L.A., but rather than accept the recommendation of high density centers, CACs felt empowered to plan their communities as they saw fit.

By 1972, recognizing that a majority of people favored limiting growth, the City Planning Department conducted a study of zoning rollbacks, and proposed a reduction in planned population from roughly 10 million to 5 million.<sup>22</sup> Much of this zoning rollback would be in multi-family zones – 35% in

medium-density (R3) zones and 50% in high-density (R4 and R5) zones.<sup>23</sup> Overall, the Planning Department proposed rolling back density by about one-third. The City Planning Commission (CPC), responding to pressure by citizens groups, pushed for more – a rollback to about 3.7 million capacity.<sup>24</sup> The City Council, seeking to bridge the extremes between the 3.7 million CPC and 5 million Planning Department extremes, settled on 4.1 million.<sup>25</sup> According to Calvin Hamilton, the 9.9 million capacity at the time would be reduced to 4.1 million as follows: the 6.1 million capacity in residential areas would be reduced by 2 million (roughly by one-third), all public lands would be re-designated to prohibit housing (another 1.3 million reduction) and residential uses would no longer be allowed in commercial zones (another 2.5 million reduction).<sup>26</sup>

While the CACs were purportedly advisory to the Planning Department, city planners largely deferred to the wishes of the CACs with relatively weak efforts to push back (e.g. less dramatic rollbacks, as indicated above). Part of this was the mentality of

City Planning Director Hamilton who reluctantly saw planners' role to be responsive to the wishes of constituents and their political representatives. In a speech given just prior to his appointment as L.A. Planning Director, Hamilton remarked:

“When a number of owners of property in a particular area come clamoring for changes in zoning then we say, “Something must be wrong with our zoning district map in that area; we better give it some consideration.” Or a councilman comes in and says, “Look, boys, in my ward many or all of my constituents say the zoning ordinance is unrealistic.” But the planner himself often finds that he is not out in front of the changes that should be made. He waits for the next guy to tell him.”<sup>27</sup>

Hamilton was also keenly aware that L.A.'s political apparatus placed a tremendous power with the 15 Council Districts – essentially making each Council member a “mini-

mayor”. Savvy groups such as homeowners and chambers of commerce understood that it was in their interest to establish close ties with the Council offices. Likewise, Council members understood their political prospects were tied to gaining the support of powerful interest groups. The Citizens Advisory Committees – appointed by the Councilors whose districts overlapped with the community plan areas – were therefore comprised largely of business but especially homeowner group members. And it was these homeowner groups that had a powerful voice in re-shaping L.A. as part of a broader “slow growth” movement.

#### THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

During early days of the community plan program – the early 1970s – the environmental movement was also in ascendance. The publication of Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* in 1962 had begun to raise awareness about the unintended

consequences of industrial development – in this case, that the pesticide DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) was a carcinogen, a shocking revelation, given it was widely seen as a major advance in modern chemistry and Paul Müller was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1948 for its invention.<sup>28</sup> With the rise of environmentalism came the concern about exponential population growth on a planet with finite resources. Two influential texts – Paul Erhlich’s *The Population Bomb* (1968) and the Club of Rome’s *The Limits of Growth* (1972) – were widely cited by homeowner groups as reasons to limit population growth, and led to the rise of the Zero Population Growth (ZPG) movement.<sup>29</sup> While many of the arguments advanced by the movement were alarmist and led to inaccurate forecasts of food shortages and mass starvation (since they failed to predict the increase in productivity within agriculture), it did shape the discourse of urban growth in the early 1970s.

Homeowner groups saw zoning rollbacks as the key tool to control population growth. And these homeowners, at least

initially, were largely progressive aligned with the environmental movement. The success of the emerging environmental movement (which was aligning itself with theories about a steady-state economy) informed this new no growth attitude as studies began to look at the carrying capacity of the basin's natural resources – air, land and water – which provided support for the rollbacks homeowners sought. Central to these discussions were population projections to the year 1990, the assumption being that future iterations of the general plan would make necessary adjustments (they did not).

As we will see in Chapter 5, the degree to which an area was comprised of homeowners and how organized they were using voluntary neighborhood associations to mobilize support, had a critical role in determining whether areas were planned for increased or decreased density. In some cases, homeowner were able to change land use designations from multi- to single-family, but the most popular approach was to change those areas left as multi-family to lower-density classifications

(for example, from R3 to a new “reduced density” RD zone, i.e. RD1.5 or RD2), which would lower the number of allowable units.

The reduction in planned density further squeezed a housing market that was already tight in the early 1970s, driving up prices and negatively effecting low-income minorities the most. This created an alliance between civil rights groups and business groups to push back against the loss of multi-family housing. Business groups argued that zoning rollbacks were hurting property value. But in areas where homeowner groups were numerous and politically connected, the community plans called for large rollbacks. But the precise role of the community plans was unclear in the early 1970s; were they to be precise prescriptions of what would be allowed or merely guides for the key decision-makers (planners, zoning administrators, City Planning Commission, City Council)? And were they, in and of themselves, legally enforceable or did the underlying zoning also need to be changed? President of the City Planning

Commissioner David Moir in 1971 argued: “if the community plans suddenly turn from zoning guides into ‘a gospel’, then I say there’s going to be trouble and lots of it.”<sup>30</sup> This suggested the community plans would be merely guidelines. Chief Planner Calvin Hamilton, on the other hand, felt the City needed enabling legislation to change the underlying zoning to match the community plans (“it is probably questionable what the strength of the law is stemming from the Community Plan without a change in zoning to conform to it.”<sup>31</sup>) But City Council did not pass enabling legislation to change the underlying zoning, leaving the community plans as largely visions of what homeowners wanted, but zoning regulations still allowed for more density.

So the 1970s were characterized by a bizarre divorce between the community plans and the underlying zoning. Community planning was moving forward with citizen participation, but without commensurate zone changes – an inconsistency that would last into the 1980s and ultimately be

decided by the courts due to lawsuits launched by homeowners (as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6).<sup>32</sup> Homeowners won the lawsuit, which forced the City to quickly downzone wide swaths of land to bring the zoning into compliance with the Land Use Element of the City’s General Plan (i.e. the 35 community plans). This process of homeowner-supported zoning rollbacks continued in 1986, with the passage of Proposition U, which cut density along most of the City’s commercial corridors.<sup>33</sup> So, ironically, by the late 1980s, homeowners who were motivated by environmental concerns had helped change land use policies to block the very urban infill development that could have limited L.A.’s sprawl and yielded positive environmental benefits.

#### THE L.A. HOUSING CRISIS TODAY

Among the consequences of this era of downzoning has been L.A.’s inability to produce enough housing to meet its



needs. While the suburban ranch house on 7,500 square foot lots fueled the growth of L.A. in the 1950s, today few vacant plots remain. New developments are being built where politically feasible, but land both large enough to mass-produce houses and cheap enough to be profitable tends to lie far beyond L.A.'s city limits in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. To the extent housing is being built in L.A., it is largely multi-family – and at a pace far below that which is needed. The difficulty that many Angelenos have in finding affordable housing underpins a wide range of regional problems – from traffic congestion and air pollution (as workers seek more affordable options further afield) to unprecedented disparities in schools, policing, and public health outcomes, as the area becomes increasingly economically polarized. In a November 2011 article titled “Waiving California Goodbye,” the Los Angeles Times claimed that for the first time, more people were leaving California than coming. As Brookings demographer William Frey noted, the state’s demographics today more closely resemble 1900 than

1950.<sup>34</sup> The reasons for this exodus are many, but exorbitant housing prices are a central factor. For over a half-century, dynamic demographic change has defined California, leading author D.J. Waldie to ask, “how do we understand California when it’s not Californian anymore?”<sup>35</sup>

This new net out-migration, however, is not universal. According to Jed Kolko, chief economist for Trulia (a real estate company), California still has an in-migration of households earning over \$200,000 even as out-migration continues among lower-income groups.<sup>36</sup> That is, California remains attractive to those who can afford it. The irony, then, is that more conservative states like Texas with a less restrictive housing market are providing more affordable housing than more progressive states like California. Simply put, California is not meeting the housing needs of the full range of its population.

According to the state’s Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), housing production has not kept pace with the State’s housing needs. While the state

needs on average 220,000 new housing units per year (at all income levels), over the past decade, less than 150,000 housing unit permits were issued.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, more than two-thirds of units built were single-family homes, most beyond the financial reach of those in need. The bursting of the housing bubble in 2008, despite leading to lower prices, exacerbated the supply problem, as permits plummeted to roughly 35,000, the lowest level of permits in 55 years of historical records. And the Continuing Study of the California Economy (CCSCE) argues that the decline of housing production has had a devastating effect on the state's economy, including the loss of nearly 500,000 construction-related jobs, which has put downward pressure on wages.<sup>38</sup>

The housing shortage that exists state-wide is magnified in Los Angeles. Between 1990 and 2006, L.A.'s population increased by 490,514 but only 75,854 additional housing units were built – at an average of 2.68 people per unit, that represents an unmet demand of 107,103 units (and that

doesn't even include the unmet demand that had built up prior to 1990).<sup>39</sup> This means that one new unit was built for every 6.5 people who needed housing, almost 2.5 times the average L.A. household size.<sup>40</sup> Even during the boom years between 1998 and 2005, L.A. failed to meet its housing needs. Of the roughly 65,000 total units constructed during this period, almost 45,000 (about 70%) were accessible only to those earning more than 120% of the area median income (AMI), while only 16,000 (about 25%) were accessible to low income households (50-80% AMI) and a mere 4,000 (about 6%) to very low income households (less 50% AMI); no units at all were accessible to moderate income households (80-120% AMI).<sup>41</sup>

To compound matters, while roughly 20,000 affordable units were built during this 8-year period (an average of 2,500 per year – a tiny amount for a city of nearly 4 million people), over 9,000 rent controlled apartments were demolished or converted to condominiums<sup>42</sup> – literally meaning for every two steps forward in affordable housing, L.A. took one step

backwards. As Edward Soja remarked in 2007, the L.A. region, “has the worst housing crisis anywhere in the developed world. It’s not being addressed with the urgency it needs to be addressed.”<sup>43</sup>

The chronic housing shortage in L.A. begs an important question: why are we not producing enough housing, and in particular affordable housing?<sup>44</sup> The traditional economic view is that the cost of housing (like other non-public goods in a market economy) reflects the relative demand compared to supply. While this might offer a partial explanation for the high costs of housing in California generally and Los Angeles specifically, it doesn’t tell us why supply is constrained compared to demand. Some economists (for example, Glaeser and Gyourko) argue that high-cost cities like Los Angeles can be explained by zoning and other land-use controls and not by intrinsic land values.<sup>45</sup> Specifically, they conclude that an emphasis on low-density housing at the expense of multi-family housing results in an artificial restriction of building permits

and commensurate increase in housing prices. They go on to argue that homeowners who prefer low-density housing use their political power to block higher-density projects concluding that “the evidence points to a man-made scarcity of housing in the sense that the housing supply has been constrained by government regulations as opposed to fundamental geographic limitations.”<sup>46</sup> The implication is that if policymakers are interested in reducing housing costs, they should start with land use reform. This dissertation explores how homeowners were able to so radically change L.A.’s land use policies, contributing to the housing crisis and its associated environmental and social problems.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Schedule, 1940.

<sup>2</sup> James Paul Allen and Eugene Turner, *The Ethnic Quilt: Population Diversity in Southern California* (Los Angeles: Center for Geographical Studies, California State University, Northridge, 1997), 38.

<sup>3</sup> In 1986, L.A. County Latino fertility rate was 3.19 (average number of babies per woman), as compared to 1.49 for non-Hispanic whites. Black fertility was 2.45 and Asian fertility was 2.10. County of Los Angeles, Department of Health and Human Services, 1986.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Schedule, 1960 and 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of Kaiser and the role of post-war home builders, see Greg Hise, *Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth-Century Metropolis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, the descriptions given in Michael Dear and Steven Flusty, "The Iron Lotus: Los Angeles and Postmodern Urbanism," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol 551 (May 1997), 151-163.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> The 7-member committee was chaired by Fletcher Bowron, Mayor of L.A. from 1935-53, and comprised of the following members: Rudolph Ostengaard (Vice Chair), Vice President of United California Bank; Dr John C. Bollens, a UCLA Political Science Professor; J. Robert King, President of King Neutronics in Van Nuys; Mrs. Robert Kingsley, who was a member of 1966 grand jury; Averill H. Munger, who was foreman of 1966 grand jury; and Gordon Whitnall, L.A.'s first City Planning Director. Between April 25 and September 21, 1967, the Committee held 19 public meetings and over 60 hours of hearings, which included "several homeowners' groups, chambers of commerce, the Los Angeles Headquarters City Development Association, the Regional Plan Association, and the League of Women Voters." Letter from Fletcher Bowron, President of Citizens Committee on Zoning Practices and Procedures to Mayor Yorty and City Council, September 28, 1967. Records of the Hillside Federation, UCLA Special Collections, Collection 1244, Box 3, Bowron Report folder.

<sup>11</sup> Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Randon House, 1961).

<sup>12</sup> Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," *Journal of*

*the American Planning Association* vol 31, no 4 (1965): 331-338. For a discussion of the emergence of community planning, see Gary Paul Green and Anna Haines, "History of Community Development in America," in *Asset Building & Community Development* (London and Los Angeles: Sage, 2008), 23-40.

<sup>13</sup> Myrna Oliver, "Calvin Hamilton, 72: L.A.'s Former Planning Chief Led Agency 20 Years," *Los Angeles Times*, May 28, 1997.

<sup>14</sup> Los Angeles Department of City Planning, *Concept L.A.: The Concept for the Los Angeles General Plan*, January 1970, 10.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> John Pastier, "City Plan Concept 'Predicate Upon Dangerous Gamble,'" *Los Angeles Times*, Feb 15, 1970.

<sup>17</sup> Paul G. Lewis, *California's Housing Element Law: The Issue of Local Noncompliance* (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute, 2003).

<sup>18</sup> Irv Burleigh, "Residents Favor Strict Zoning Controls, City Survey Shows," *Los Angeles Times*, Dec 25, 1972.

<sup>19</sup> *Concept L.A.*, 7.

<sup>20</sup> Los Angeles Department of City Planning, *Land Use Element of the Los Angeles City General Plan* (1970): 22-23.

<sup>21</sup> By the end of the 1960s, New York was deep in debt. New York

of the 1970s was considered dangerous, dirty and in decline, a condition, so suggestions of replicating the density of Manhattan were not well received in L.A.

<sup>22</sup> There is some confusion about what the planned population capacity was by 1972. Zone changes in the 1960s and master plans for the Santa Monica Mountains had almost certainly reduced this number by 1972, but no official tallies were conducted to confirm this. Popular estimates – for example, as provided by L.A. Times (Ray Hebert, "City Planners Seek Population Growth Control by Zoning," *Los Angeles Times*, Jun 5, 1970) – suggested capacity by this time was about 7.5 million. However, the Planning Department's official estimate given in its 1972 rollback study was 9.9 million, but this may not have reflected more recent changes. See Los Angeles Department of City Planning, *Density Adjustment Study: An Examination of Multiple Residential Zoning in the City of Los Angeles*, 1972.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 31.

<sup>24</sup> Ray Hebert, "City Planners Seek Population Growth Control by Zoning," *Los Angeles Times*, June 5, 1970

<sup>25</sup> Ray Hebert, "City Planners Urge 4.1 Million Ceiling on Population by 1990," *Los Angeles Times*, July 17, 1972.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Calvin Hamilton, "Monitor System for Urban Planning," speech given while Executive Director of the Pittsburgh City Planning Commission and faculty member at the University of Pittsburgh, 1964.

<sup>28</sup> Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

<sup>29</sup> Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb: Population Control or Race to Oblivion?* (San Francisco: Sierra Club-Ballantine Books, 1968) and Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Signet, 1972).

<sup>30</sup> Irv Burleigh, "Planner Trapped in Middle of Zoning Battle," *Los Angeles Times*, November 28, 1971.

<sup>31</sup> Letter by Calvin Hamilton to Howard L. Cleveland, President, Hollywood Knolls Community Club, Inc., December 4, 1973. Box 6, Hollywood Community Plan folder, Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations Records.

<sup>32</sup> *Federation of Hillside and Canyon Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles*, No. C 526,616 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. filed Dec 13, 1984).

<sup>33</sup> Rich Connell, "Prop. U Backers See It as Start of Land-Use Revolt," *Los Angeles Times*, October 12, 1986.

<sup>34</sup> Gale Holland and Sam Quinones, "Waving California Goodbye: California Demographics Shift, More People Leaving than Moving In," *Los Angeles Times*, November 27, 2011.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Josh Barro, "Home Prices Drive People Out of California," *Bloomberg*, February 13, 2013.

<sup>37</sup> California Department of Housing and Community Development, *State of Housing in California 2012: Affordability Worsens, Supply Problems Remains* (Sacramento, 2012).

<sup>38</sup> Stephen Levy, "Why is California's Unemployment Rate so High and What Does it Mean for the State's Economic Future?," *Continuing Study of the California Economy*, 2010.

<sup>39</sup> California Department of Housing and Community Development, *Update of California's Deepening Housing Crisis* (Sacramento, 2004).

<sup>40</sup> Gregory Freeman et al, *Meeting the Housing Challenge in L.A. and Ventura* (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation, 2007).

<sup>41</sup> Beth Steckler and Adam Garcia, *Affordability Matters: A Look at Housing Construction and Affordability in Los Angeles* (Los Angeles:

Livable Places and UCLA Partnerships for a Greater Los Angeles, 2008), 21.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>43</sup> Cara Mia DiMassa, “L.A. climbs past 4 million,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 2, 2007.

<sup>44</sup> When I refer to affordable housing, I mean housing that is within the financial means of the majority of people, as opposed to the more limited definition of units that are set-aside specifically for low-income households.

<sup>45</sup> Edward L. Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko, “The Impact Of Building Restrictions On Housing Affordability,” *Economic Policy Review* Vol 9, No 2 (2003): 21-39.

<sup>46</sup> Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko and Raven E. Saks, “Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?” *American Economic Review* Vol 95, No 2 (2005): 329-333.

“Urban politics is above all the politics of land use.”

- Paul Peterson, *City Limits* (1981)<sup>1</sup>

This research project is concerned with the how and why L.A. downzoned itself after Watts (1965); in particular, it investigates what motivated homeowners to take advantage of community planning to further their own local interests, at the expense of regional (or at least citywide) concerns. As Paul Peterson reminds us in the quote above, most often local politics revolves around land uses. As such, the dissertation intersects four “bundles” of literature that center on the relationship between:

1. Democracy and Planning
2. Social Capital and Property
3. Motivations and Impacts of Land Use
4. Land Uses and Sustainability

The dissertation uses the Los Angeles case to not only add to our understanding of L.A. planning history, but also to question some of the assumptions that underlie theories of democracy and social capital and to illustrate how land use policies advanced by homeowners have potentially harmful effects. The project fills important gaps in each body of literature but also attempts to draw connections between them in new ways. In this chapter I review some of the salient findings from the literature and highlight contributions this projects makes to these fields.



## 1. DEMOCRACY AND PLANNING

### RATIONAL PLANNING AND ITS CRITIQUE

Throughout much of the twentieth century, owing to its origins in positive science, urban planning was a field dominated by technical experts and professionals – rational planning based on scientific studies and principles. This planning doctrine, with its origins in the Chicago School of the 1920s, was codified in Harvey Perloff’s *Education for Planning* (1957), which advocated objective standards to bring natural resources under the control of the expert planner in “the service of man’s own needs.”<sup>2</sup> Backed by scientific data about traffic flows and standards that would guide future development, planners, so it seemed, could diagnose the ills of the city, and prescribe remedies – remedies that would serve “the public interest”. The early 1960s represented the high water mark of rational planning and the quantitative basis of comprehensive planning and modeling.<sup>3</sup>

But by the mid-1960s, the consequences of this heavy-handed planning was apparent in the mass displacement of African-Americans as a result of urban renewal (colloquially called “Negro removal”), the bifurcation if not outright destruction of low-income neighborhoods as Interstate highways were carved through the core of American cities, and the concentration of the poor into increasingly dangerous housing “projects”.

The impact of Jane Jacobs cannot be understated in undermining the *raison d’être* of planning at the time.<sup>4</sup> This Jacobsian turn meant the epistemology of positivism that had grounded modernist planning was no longer a given. Central to this critique was the sense that a great many were being excluded from a planning process designed to meet the needs of an ill-defined universal “public”. As Patsy Healey reminds:

Evidence of this seemed to be everywhere, from the disaster of high-rise towers for the poor to the dominance of economic criteria justifying road building and the

functional categorization of activity zones, which worked for large industrial companies and those working in them, but not for women (with their necessarily complex life-styles), the elderly, the disabled, and the many ethnic groups forced to discover ways of surviving on the edge of established economic practices.<sup>5</sup>

By the mid-1960s, as the status quo came under direct attack, urban planning began to shift away from this professional/expert-driven process towards a model of greater public participation. The student-worker rebellion in Paris in 1968 captured the sentiment of many at the time who were frustrated by their lack of voice in democratic decision-making. People were losing faith in *representative* democracy and in its place, began calling for *greater direct* democracy that would redistribute power. As part of the public sector, large-scale, centralized urban planning came under attack from across the political spectrum – from the left for its disproportionate impact

on minority communities and from the right for its expansion of the role of government.

This questioning of the dominant paradigm in planning also came at a time when long-held paradigms of scientific thought were under attack. The impact of Thomas Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) captured the spirit of the time; in place of a positivism that emphasized rigorous scientific methods in the search for "truth", Kuhn understood that scientific inquiry occurred within an historical context dominated by paradigms of accepted wisdom.<sup>6</sup> In many ways, Kuhn foreshadowed the rise of postmodernism and post-structuralism over the ensuing decade. Roland Barthes's "Death of the Author" (1967) reflected a growing sense that knowledge was not merely imparted upon a feckless audience by experts (or "scriptors", as Barthes called them), but rather depends on the audience itself to impart meaning.<sup>7</sup> Barthes's work emphasized a new role that *agency* (i.e. the capacity of an individual to act in the world) played in cultural artifacts.

This mentality impacted scholarship and practice within the built environment fields from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s. For example, Bernard Rudofsky's *Architecture Without Architects* (1964) questioned the privileged position of design specialists and Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown's *Learning From Las Vegas* (1972) glorified the popular and "ugly" vernacular over the high-mindedness of the design intelligentsia.<sup>8</sup> As Charles Jencks famously argued, the demolition of the once-revered Pruitt-Igoe public housing project in St. Louis in 1972, less than 20 years after its construction, came to mark the symbolic end of modernism.<sup>9</sup>

Within urban planning, the paradigm of top-down technocratic planning dominated by master plans and zoning also came under fire. In 1964, John Reps famously critiqued land use planning, zoning especially, for its inflexibility and inability to anticipate problems in advance of development, balkanizing cities into use districts, and preventing the creation of more vibrant mixed-use communities.<sup>10</sup> Critics lamented

zoning as a poor tool to envision future change, being more process-oriented than outcome-oriented (i.e. giving prescriptive measures without any evaluation whether such measures produced desirable outcomes). In many cases, zoning was designated for very low-intensity uses as a means of exacting concessions in exchange for granting re-zonings; the results of these individual re-zonings often bore little resemblance to the original land use map, leaving residents with the impression that zoning was corrupt, with developers able to change the rules in return for financial favors.

If developers were "corrupting" the rationality of zoning, so too were residents and homeowners. In *The Zoning Game* (1966), Richard Babcock famously unravels the perverse contradictions of different actors, each seeking to shape zoning to suit their own ends. Suburbanites, in particular, are singled out as being motivated by social considerations: "when they protest that a change in dwelling type will cause a decline in the value of their property, their economic conclusion is based

upon a social judgment” that reflect exclusionary attitudes.<sup>11</sup> Whether due to the misplaced goals of the state or the narrow interests of particular stakeholders, by the 1970s, the impact of urban planning on the social and economic circumstances of low-income residents was becoming a topic of increasing concern, leading to an explosion of neo-Marxist geography from the likes of David Harvey and Manuel Castells that explored how the “normal workings of the city” were leading to greater social injustice.<sup>12</sup>

Backed by quantitative reasoning and mathematical modeling, comprehensive planning and zoning were also critiqued as being “designed to replicate too complex a system in a single shot” and “expected to serve too many purposes at the same time.”<sup>13</sup> The charge here was that a simple set of prescriptive rules would lead to sterile environments devoid of the richness and complexity of more organic city-making. Moreover, cities planned by experts were not based on the real-world experiences of people on the ground. By this time,

Paul Davidoff and others had rejected the universal public (which typically reflected the preferences of the white men who dominated planning) in favor of planning processes that actively sought a broader diversity of perspectives that had been largely underrepresented in planning to that point.<sup>14</sup> Drawing upon the work of Jurgen Habermas, planning theorists such as John Forester would later call for a new “communicative” approach that based on collaboration, consensus building, debate and discussion.<sup>15</sup> So by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the arc of planning was moving clearly towards more “bottom-up” planning processes – a call for more democratic urban planning.

#### SUPPORT FOR LOCAL PLANNING FROM THE LEFT AND RIGHT

The shift towards more grassroots, local planning processes was (and is) supported by both the left and the right. This support stems from a growing sense of alienation from government at all levels, sparking an interest in integrating

voluntary neighborhood-level organizations into policy-making processes.<sup>16</sup> For progressives, it was seen as a means to be more inclusive – to give voice to underrepresented groups and, as Leonie Sandercock suggests, reflect “other ways of knowing”:

Local communities have experiential, grounded, intuitive knowledges, which are manifested through speech, songs, stories, and various visual forms (from cartoons to graffiti, from bark paintings to videos), rather than the more familiar kinds of planning ‘sources’ (census data, simulation models, etc.)<sup>17</sup>

Progressives embraced the opening up of planning to below as part of peoples’ “right to the city” – not merely to share its resources equitably but rather, as Harvey puts it, the “right to change ourselves by changing the city... a common rather than an individual right since this transformation

inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.”<sup>18</sup> This Lefebvrian view embraces a “radical restructuring of social, political, and economic relations, both in the city and beyond.”<sup>19</sup> This meant transformation of decision-making power away from the exclusive domain of the state and into the hands of the people. In so doing, this shift towards the grassroots, it was hoped, would empower the powerless.

For conservatives, the localization of planning was seen as counteracting the widening reach of government and promoting a form of self-governance that aligned with their ideological preferences. This view is Lockean – a belief that property predates government, so the role of government should be to protect property, with everyday citizens retaining an expansive view of property rights. As Bob Ellickson has argued, the heavy-handedness of centralized government crowds out

social capital, and therefore should be replaced with more localized decision-making.<sup>20</sup> Conservatives embraced down-scaling not because it empowered the powerless, but because it was a check against the expansion of the welfare state and its growing reach of pervasive regulations.

This support for local decision-making among conservatives has been extended to include calls to devolve the provision of public goods to resident groups. For example, Ellickson has called for Block Improvement Districts (BLIDs) in existing neighborhoods as a more responsive means of providing public goods locally.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, Robert Nelson has called for private neighborhood associations, similar to the process of incorporating new municipalities, whereby responsibility for regulating land uses would be transferred from the local municipal government to the neighborhood association.<sup>22</sup> In effect, volunteerism and social capital provides conservatives with a justification for privatization – as a substitute for government and the expansion of the role of civil society.

As should be clear from the breadth of its support from left to right, there is a wide range of activities that could reasonably fall under the general rubric of grassroots/bottom-up/local planning. But we need to be careful to distinguish between various forms of participation. In her famous “ladder of participation”, Sherry Arnstein argued there is a gradation of types and motivations of public participation, from de facto non-participation (manipulation, therapy), to tokenism (informing, consultation, placation), to genuine citizen power (partnership, delegated power, citizen control) – a ladder by which we can judge the distribution of power from state to citizenry.<sup>23</sup> Of particular importance to this research project are the “rungs” of citizen power. And as Arnstein sees it, in most cases this sharing of power was “taken by the citizens, not given by the city.”<sup>24</sup>

By the 1960s, as Davidoff claimed, low-income, minority, and neighborhood groups could not be adequately represented by bureaucratic planners – and a new breed of planners

had to specifically advocate on their behalf. The hope was to advance pluralist planning which empowered local citizens and therefore compensated for the deficiencies in the top-down model, namely: (1) the lack of representation of low-income minorities, (2) the lack of alternative political mechanisms to articulate their demands, and (3) the biases of centralized public planners. At the time, some feared this would make planning processes inherently adversarial.<sup>25</sup> Others felt that dissent without actual decision-making power would drain resources from creating more substantive community organizations and not be sufficient to counter the powerful alliance of politicians, planners, and developers.<sup>26</sup>

Despite these reservations, advocacy and pluralist planning did lay the foundations for a more democratic form of planning that was built upon the principles of “diversity, variety, and responsiveness to the preferences of constituents.”<sup>27</sup> By the 1970s, there was evidence of bottom-up organizations forming – from ACORN to the Citizens Action League – not only

(or even especially) around land use issues, but around many social issues of importance to urban residents.<sup>28</sup> The formation of local groups was no doubt aided by the shift under the Nixon administration away from direct involvement in cities to community development block grants (CDBGs), which fueled the growth of community development corporations and allied service providers.<sup>29</sup> This process accelerated under Reagan, who downloaded authority for CDBGs to the states, who in turn responded to political pressure from smaller cities to distribute these limited funds more evenly throughout the states, rather than focus on the most critical problems in the big cities.

Yet despite this evidence of change in the 1970s, these grassroots organizations needed resources to organize and the most common means of support proved to be direct door-to-door and by-mail solicitation of residents. While advocacy planning grew out of the struggles of minority communities to insert themselves into the planning process, among the largest beneficiaries of this shift were middle-class and upper middle-

class suburban communities who created a vast network of neighborhood associations to advocate for their interests. For example, of the 229 representative community organizations John Mollenkopf sampled from 1970-71 in over 100 cities that were over 50,000 population, 45% were homeowner or civic associations, as compared to 16% civil rights groups.<sup>30</sup> In fact, it could be argued that “the most important and successful American social movement of the last quarter century – the anti-tax movement – emerged as a homeowner movement in California and spread from there, bringing Ronald Reagan to power,” which suggests that grassroots mobilization did not always work to benefit the most vulnerable among us.<sup>31</sup>

#### COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND REGIME THEORY

The shift towards local planning emerged in parallel with Jurgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action (TCA). Habermas argued that actors in society could reach common

understanding and coordinate actions by reasoned argument, consensus, and cooperation rather than strictly pursuing their own goals.<sup>32</sup> Planners were attracted to TCA because it provided a theoretical basis for a view of planning that emphasized widespread public participation, information sharing and reaching consensus through dialogue rather than the traditional exercise of public sector power and technocratic planning.<sup>33</sup> As such, planning theory today is “deeply embedded within social theory generally – communicative planning and critical theory are an example of how both normative and empirical/positive theories have been fused into planning thought.”<sup>34</sup>

Habermas was concerned with the positivism being advanced by the state (which would include urban planning), what he called the “instrumental reason” of the public sphere, which he believed hid the interests of classes and groups that actually determine the function, direction and pace of technological and social development.<sup>35</sup> So Habermas sought an approach that would lead to a normative self-emancipation



of people from domination by promoting a critical self-reflection of what he called “distorted communication” (the use by the state of communication meant to convince the public of its virtues without question). For Habermas, the most fundamental type of social action was always orientated towards reaching understanding – situations being clarified as speakers and listeners define and redefine their understanding through dialogue. Habermas explained that this was a process of defining the boundaries of the ‘lifeworld’ and aligning them with personal perspectives such as values and beliefs, which were capable of being changed through the interactions between different stakeholders.

By proposing, challenging and validating claims, every person in each situation requires co-operation, an ability to view situations from another’s perspective, a willingness to reach shared understanding and background knowledge of the cultural expectations and strategic influences affecting a situation; Habermas felt this would empower bottom up

change. But TCA has been criticized for ignoring the role of power. Whether this is primarily a critique of TCA theory or the particular form of collaborative planning as a mode of practice derived from that theory is of some debate. This critique of TCA draws from Michel Foucault’s ideas of how power is reified in society:

“This Foucauldian critique leads to the conclusion that policy making developed from communicative theory of planning, contrary to expectations, is likely to be vulnerable to the workings of power, allowing manipulation and control, confusion and exclusion, and other distortions, to disrupt the process.”<sup>36</sup>

Yet, despite the charge that TCA is blind to power, no substitute theory to communicative action has sufficiently filled the void, which has left a crisis in planning theory. While the vast majority of planning theory of the last several decades

rejects the Modernist basis of planning, everyday practice operates very much within the same comprehensive and zoning paradigm of the past. It's as if simply ensuring greater public participation within the same rational planning regime can "fix" its biases, without recognizing that TCA's blindness to abuses of power may well exacerbate rather than alleviate the uneven effects of planning institutions and processes.

The critique of TCA has led to a growing body of more empirical research within a urban political economy and urban regime theory framework. A central critique here is that TCA over-emphasizes the capacity of individual agency and lacks a sophisticated understanding of the institutional context of planning or issues of space and place.<sup>37</sup> Urban regime theory – more a model than a theory – evolved as a tool to examine whether or how various interests are incorporated into governing coalitions. It has developed inductively, through the accumulation and comparison of cases.<sup>38</sup> This dissertation adds to this body of literature by providing a detailed case of Los

Angeles and how interest groups shaped land use policy after 1970. It synthesizes elements of political economy, pluralism and institutionalism. By combining a macro-level analysis of the impacts of homeowners with a detailed examination of the motivations of different organizations and how these efforts played out spatially in two areas of L.A., this dissertation provides a vivid illustration of the role of homeowners within the L.A. urban regime.

Central to regime analysis is the assumption that power is fragmented between government and non-government actors (including both business and civil society) because all parties have something necessary to govern, be it legitimacy, policy-making authority, or capital (financial or social). Regime theory rejects both the assumption that governments by themselves are adequate to make and carry out policies, but also structuralist assumptions that economic and social forces alone determine policy.<sup>39</sup>

## 2. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND PROPERTY

### SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A UNIVERSAL GOOD

Underpinning this shift towards the democratization and expansion of public participation in urban planning (facilitated by its faith in communicative action) is a belief in the positive benefits of social capital, defined as “the aggregate value of citizen participation in associations and organizations, social ties and networks, civic engagement, trust, and norms of reciprocity.”<sup>40</sup> If communicative action is meant to promote common understanding and cooperation within a group, then social capital is the *vehicle* to help achieve these ends. While the links between communicative action and social capital within the planning literature are not as well developed as one might expect, Putnam draws the two closer together when he claims that social capital “allow[s] people to resolve collective problems” and “grease[s] the wheels that allow communities

to advance smoothly.”<sup>41</sup> As such, social capital might be seen as an important link between individual and collective action – that is, greater or lesser social capital can either help or hinder collaboration and the ability to reach common understanding.

According to theories of social capital, greater public participation at the local level is a measure of a community’s social capital, but strong social capital can, in turn, also help create strong social bonds within the community. This duality derives from two types of social capital Putnam outlines: (1) *bridging* capital – the ability of a group to establish and maintain relations with other groups, and (2) *bonding* capital – the ability of individuals to establish and maintain relations within a group. Social capital, constructed as such, is seen as a universal good that should be promoted if not reconstructed given Putnam’s observation of its recent decline.<sup>42</sup>

Putnam points to various metrics to show that Americans are becoming less engaged – voter turnout is down 25% since the 1960s; attendance at public meetings has fallen by 1/3;

membership in associations, clubs, and groups is also in steep decline; union membership has dropped from 32.5% (1958) to 15.8% (1992); PTA membership has dropped from 12 million (1964) to 7 million (1995); membership in women's clubs is down 42% since 1964; Boy Scout membership is down 26% from 1970; Red Cross membership is down by 61% since 1970; the Masons are down 39% since 1959, and – the genesis of the title of his book – despite an increase of 10% in bowlers, league bowling is down 40%, suggesting more people “bowling alone”; meanwhile, distrust of the federal government has increased from 30% in 1966 to 75% in 1992.<sup>43</sup> Putnam argues this is all due to a decline of social capital.

While Putnam popularized social capital, the concept has a much longer history. As early as 1887, German sociologist and philosopher Ferdinand Tönnies distinguished between two types of social groups: (1) tight-knit, ideologically homogeneous collectives that were regulated by informal social norms, i.e. *gemeinschaft* (often thought of as *community*) – and most

closely aligned with the concept of social capital, and (2) diverse associations governed by rules and regulated competition in the pursuit of individual interests, i.e. *gesellschaft* (often thought of as *society*).<sup>44</sup> This duality reflected Tönnies's view of two basic impulses: the “essential will” (*Wesenwille*), where an individual's action serves the goals of a social group, and the “arbitrary will” (*Kürwille*), where an actor sees the social group as a means to further his or her individual interests. Order with *gemeinschaft* is enforced through implicit social norms and customs while *gesellschaft* relies upon explicit laws and policing. Of course, these pure forms are rarely observed in the real world but social capitalists have faith in the *wesenwille* of individuals who participate in voluntary organizations.

While he did not use the term “social capital”, Emile Durkheim also explored the related concepts of social cohesion and solidarity and greatly influenced the thinking on social capital (although social cohesion tends to refer to the unity of a group of system as a whole, rather than social relations

that result from interactions between individuals, as in social capital). Durkheim argued that all groups of people have practices and beliefs that are held in common by the aggregate of that society.<sup>45</sup> Likewise, Pierre Bourdieu also theorized about social capital, in particular with respect to the production of social classes and class divisions.<sup>46</sup>

Alexis de Tocqueville – who Putnam calls the “patron saint of contemporary social capitalists” – observed in 1835 that Americans exhibited a high degree of voluntary activity, which fostered civil society and allowed democracy to flourish.<sup>47</sup> In particular, de Tocqueville was fascinated by American “public associations in civil life”, contrasting them with the tendency in France to rely on government to solve problems:

“Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand

other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society.”<sup>48</sup>

To de Tocqueville, these civic associations were the foundation of self-governance, and where the interests of these associations combined with common interests and values, they could become importance political institutions. Indeed this is how Puritan communities were imagined; even today, small New England towns gather once a year for town meetings to decide matters of importance to the town through direct democracy – a tradition that Henry David Thoreau called

“the true Congress, and the most respectable one that is ever assembled in the United States.”<sup>49</sup> Indeed, it was these examples of direct democracy that Thomas Jefferson had in mind when he proposed the concept of “ward republics”, whereby counties would be subdivided into small wards limited in size (“hundreds”) such that everyone knew one another, as a restraint on the other three levels of government (judicial, executive, legislative). Said Jefferson: “the true foundation of republican government is the equal right of every citizen in his person and property, and in their management.”<sup>50</sup>

The connection between social capital, voluntary organizations and democratic traditions has lent the shift towards greater public participation in urban planning an air of inherent superiority. Social capital has become a catch-all for the many good things about local, grassroots participation – and for some, “the glue that holds society together.”<sup>51</sup> An international foundation – the Social Capital Foundation (TSCF) – actively promotes its growth around the world. Social

capital theory underlies recent experiments in neighborhood self-governance, including the introduction of Neighborhood Councils in Los Angeles – the largest of its kind in America. Among their responsibilities are their advisory role to the City Planning Department on land use and zoning requests.<sup>52</sup> We might think of these experiments as a response to the tension between the homogenizing legacy of Progressivism, which advocated standardization as a defense against politics, and the increasingly pluralist American society.

Land use planning has fully embraced the universal good of social capital, not just as a means of fostering greater public participation but also as an outcome in and of itself. In many official plans, these are made explicit; for example, in Forsyth County, North Carolina, “social capital is important as a planning concept because, as Putnam argues, places that are not increasing their social capital will struggle to provide their residents with the types of economic and social opportunities that make a place a truly health and vibrant ‘community’.”<sup>53</sup>

## THE DARK SIDE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

The faith in social capital as a panacea for what ails our communities has more recently been called into question. For example, Putnam has published new research that suggests that diversity is associated with a decline in social capital; these findings predictably caused a firestorm of commentary from both the right and left.<sup>54</sup> Conservatives lauded this work as proof of the failures of “social engineering” (promotion of racial and ethnic integration).<sup>55</sup> Progressives reacted by calling his methods into question and re-analyzing his data, arguing that the statistical significance of his findings was small and depends on individual and neighborhood characteristics, such as segregation or equity.<sup>56</sup>

Yet, despite this torrent of controversy, as Stephanie Stern points out, “no one questioned whether the problem was social capital itself.”<sup>57</sup> In her well-reasoned argument, Stern asks whether social capital actually excludes on the basis of

race or class, since communities with strong social capital are able to mobilize more effectively against change. It’s a compelling argument that cuts both ways. On the one hand, in affluent areas, preferences for homogeneity or perceived advantages with respect to property values may lead to support for exclusionary land use policies. And on the other hand, in predominantly minority, low-income areas, concerns that white gentrification will make housing unaffordable and change the character of the neighborhood may also lead to efforts to support more restrictive land use policies as a means of blocking development. And to the extent the literature suggests that communities with high social capital are better able to mobilize (and conversely communities with low social capital are not), there is evidence to suggest that social capital has a “dark side”. In particular, social capital may block access to housing by reducing or constraining its supply. As Stern notes, “rather than worrying about diversity’s harm to social capital, perhaps we should be concerned about social capital’s harm

to diversity.”<sup>58</sup>

Social ties, cooperation, and altruism within social groups certainly can and does have social value, but adopting an urban planning process that *depends* on a community’s extant social capital may actually contribute to exclusionary policies. This dissertation contributes to the social capital literature by providing empirical evidence of precisely this phenomenon. Despite planners’ efforts to ensure that participation is representative of the community, evidence suggests there are biases in participation due to a clear link between socioeconomic status and political participation.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, this is also correlated with race and ethnicity; while dependent on the type of participation, a study by the Brookings Institution suggests lower participation rates among African Americans and Latinos.<sup>60</sup> So urban democracy is not simply about encouraging *more* participation but how *representative* that participation is. This research project illustrates the consequences for urban planning when that participation is not representative, using

the case of homeowners in Los Angeles with respect to changes in land use policy.

Putnam extols the virtues of social capital for economic growth, educational outcomes, child welfare, health outcomes, and crime control. But there is little empirical evidence to support these claims. Rather than reducing crime, research suggests communities with strong social capital merely displace it to adjacent areas.<sup>61</sup> Studies show no correlation between social capital and economic growth.<sup>62</sup> And the impact on health outcomes has been shown to be inconsistent.<sup>63</sup> There is, however, evidence to suggest that social capital can be used in deleterious ways. For example, Morris Fiorina questions whether groups who claim to represent high-minded civic virtues really have the interests of the broader community at heart; in particular, he claims that these groups often represent insular interests that represent a minority of people.<sup>64</sup> J. Eric Oliver asks whether suburbanization can be blamed for the apparent decline in civic engagement. What he finds is that suburban



areas are not especially devoid of social capital, but that the groups who are mobilized by social capital are particularly prone to pursuing narrow interests, in part, because of greater homogeneity, which creates a “group think” mentality.<sup>65</sup>

This “dark side” of social capital can lead to exclusion and can create (and advance) factions whose interests are contrary to the public interest. The problem of factions is as old as America herself. In the Federalist papers, James Madison warns of “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse, passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or the permanent and aggregated interests of the community.”<sup>66</sup> It is for this reason that Madison believed in the protective power of diverse interests. Even the father of capitalism, Adam Smith, warned that networks and trust can lead to monopolization and therefore outcomes contrary to the majority.<sup>67</sup> While not well developed in the literature, this economic argument about the effects of “group collusion”

to restrain housing supply is worth further study, particularly when such restraint is harmful to the overall market (i.e. raising costs) or leads to an unequal distribution of property (which appears to be the case).

If social capital underpins the creation of factions, then it is entirely possible, if not probable, that neighborhoods with strong social capital strengthen factional groups rather than furthering the interests of the broader community. There is also an interesting line of thinking, although not especially well developed in the literature, that suggests that scale plays a role in the degree to which social capital strengthens factions or the community – that social capital depends on a relatively constrained geographic territory. A planning regime organized around smaller units of planning is therefore built on the back of social capital. But this also implies how difficult it is to both democratize planning while also furthering the interests of a large-scale region like the City of Los Angeles as a whole.

## NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

Among the strongest factions to emerge at the neighborhood scale are neighborhood associations (sometimes called civic or residents associations and often called, but must be distinguished from, homeowner associations). Properly speaking, homeowners associations are formal, *non-voluntary* private management entities of common interest communities (CICs) – such as gated communities and condominiums. This project, however, is concerned with informal, *voluntary* associations of homeowners not within a single project, but within a given geographic area. These neighborhood associations are not the only voluntary organizations that strive to maintain or enhance the quality of life in their communities – political parties, churches, unions, ethnic clubs and so on also play an important role to greater or lesser degrees in different areas. But neighborhood associations are the most common means of intervening in the political process to protect local

interests, particularly as they relate to land use issues. A number of previous studies of neighborhood associations provide important background for the present study.

Some studies of neighborhood associations have explored the motivations for their creation and what issues are of most concern to them. Logan and Rabrenovic, for example, conducted a comprehensive study of neighborhood associations in the New York Capital District (Albany, Schenectady, Troy).<sup>68</sup> They found that most associations in the District were formed after 1975, which is later than we find in Los Angeles (in the Albany case, they suggest the strength of the Democratic party machine in the area meant that many issues of concern to neighborhood associations were taken up by the local political party itself and only once this stranglehold lifted in the 1970s did grassroots organizations begin to form). They found that the interests and concerns of suburban neighborhood associations were quite different from those of central city associations. While inner-city associations were

mostly concerned with cleanliness, parks, playgrounds, and police protection, suburban associations were more concerned with land development, specifically industrial and commercial encroachment on residential uses.<sup>69</sup>

By far the most important influence on neighborhood associations in the Albany area was local government (interestingly, even in the Capital, state government plays little role). But whether local government was seen as an ally or an opponent depended on the issue; on development issues, local government was often seen as an opponent, but it was seen as cooperating on safety and life-style issues (overall, associations saw local government as an ally 53% of the time, while an opponent 43%). Business groups and developers were largely seen as opponents to neighborhood associations, particularly in the suburbs. But inner-city associations were more likely to see them as allies, particularly on historic preservation and construction of low-income housing.<sup>70</sup> This broadly reflects the differing support for community change between inner-city

and suburban areas – while only 3% of suburban associations sought major changes in their neighborhoods, over 20% did in central-city areas. In inner-city areas, controlling growth wasn't the issue, it was abandonment, and these neighborhoods tended to embrace developers more frequently because in an age of public sector scarcity (and within a political system that may disadvantage them), their only hope for change was often through private investment.<sup>71</sup>

Another insightful case of relevance to this study is Barton's study of the emergence of neighborhood movement in San Francisco in the 1960s.<sup>72</sup> Born out of the fight against urban renewal, neighborhood associations blossomed in San Francisco, particularly in activist communities like Haight-Ashbury. By the mid-1970s, these organizations, together with a sympathetic planning department, downzoned most residential neighborhoods as a protection against development. But downzoning was not enough in the face of widespread gentrification in the 1970s, which led to a split in the movement

between those in favor of upgrading their communities and those hoping to maintain the status quo. Mollenkopf's study of the conflicts between neighborhood groups and administrators in Boston and San Francisco, which led to greater public participation, is also a useful study in this genre.<sup>73</sup>

Despite these and other studies, most scholars are focused on the conflict that surrounds "downtown" politics and urban renewal in central city areas. Few studies focus on the role of neighborhood associations in suburban peripheral areas. This dissertation begins to fill that gap by exploring citizen mobilization not due to central-city redevelopment, but over concerns suburban homeowners had about change in the semi-rural areas of the city. The study provides a detailed analysis of the changing motivations of homeowners – often with surprising and sometimes conflicting goals. Moreover, these motivations are set against those of other interest groups – namely business and civil rights groups – to illustrate why homeowners became the most powerful influence on land use

policy in Los Angeles. The dynamic between these groups also illustrates a much more complex narrative than the one that has traditionally been told of L.A.

Typically, the L.A. story has been told as a clear transition from pro-growth business politics (a so-called "growth machine" that prioritized the "exchange value" of land over its "use value"<sup>74</sup>) to slow-growth homeowner politics by the 1970s and 80s.<sup>75</sup> I argue the story is far more complex; instead, I position L.A.'s downzoning as an intersection between the environmental movement with the civil rights movement and a shift towards suburban neo-conservatism, during a period of great social change. By the time Proposition 13 (a homeowner revolt, that capped property taxes) passed in 1978, all three forces – ecological conservation, social exclusion, and constraining expansion – were running in parallel. So this study makes a unique contribution by showing that the downzoning of L.A. had as much to do with ecology and resisting capitalist expansion – traditionally progressive causes – as it had with regressive

social exclusion.

Homeowner concerns about property values and latent exclusionary motives are typically wrapped up with the perception that a given use (e.g. a toxic use or merely one that generates different “kinds” of users) will lower their property values or change the “character” of their neighborhood. While homeowners, especially in suburban areas, are often said to actively exclude those people and practices that differ from them<sup>76</sup>, it could be argued that these issues are better explained as a politics of space than a politics of race or class.<sup>77</sup> This politics of space stems from homeowners’ normative vision of their communities, both the physical space itself (what Lefebvre called material space) and more abstract ideas about what those spaces mean or imply (conceived space). The production of space (lived space) is therefore both material and conceptual.<sup>78</sup> For homeowners, defense of the suburban ideal is both a spatial and social goal, but “homeowners do not see their project as designed to maintain a certain class, race, or

gender regime in the city. Rather, they see it as a struggle over space.”<sup>79</sup>

#### LOCALIZATION VERSUS DEMOCRATIZATION

The central role of neighborhood associations raises an important consequence of democratizing planning. As Mark Purcell adroitly warns, it’s important to not fall into what he calls “the local trap”, where the local scale is assumed to be inherently more democratic (and therefore *a priori* superior) than other scales, an assumption often found in academia and activism.<sup>80</sup> This preference for the local is assumed in much of the aforementioned literature on the shift towards more grassroots forms of planning. The local trap prioritizes the interests of local residents over wider publics, to equate “the local” with “the good”. By conflating localization with democratization, we endanger both democracy and social justice.

This danger arises by failing to recognize that localizing

planning processes can just as easily lead to tyranny and oppression as greater participation and democracy. It also leaves open the question of whether local people who become involved in planning are representative of the broader community (even at the neighborhood level, let alone larger scales of community). The local trap is founded on the assumption that devolving planning authority will produce greater democracy – i.e. the more autonomy local people have over their area, the more democratic and therefore just decisions about that area will be. This emphasis on decentralization derives from the normative theory of participatory democracy that Putnam advanced (i.e. that direct democracy is superior to representative democracy, and therefore a withdrawal from participation signals a decline of democracy). Since a larger scale community makes face-to-face interaction less effective (or less likely), democratic theory tends to assume that the local scale is more democratic than other scales. For example, as Charles Lummis notes:

‘Democratic centralism’ is an expression like ‘hot ice’ or ‘diverse unity’... in general, democracy depends on localism: the local areas where the people live. Democracy doesn’t mean putting power some place other than where people are.<sup>81</sup>

This argument also plays out in practice. For example, attempts by residents of the San Fernando Valley to secede from the City of L.A. have been grounded in the belief that local control would make it more responsive to their needs and more democratic. For these residents, localization is the ends in and of itself, rather than a means to an end (i.e. a more sustainable, just city). But localization can produce more or less sustainable practices, more or less economic or social justice and so on, depending on which groups are empowered by that shift in scale. This dissertation illustrates the dangers of the local trap by demonstrating how some groups (in this case, homeowners) were more empowered by a downloading of planning

responsibility to the local scale – and the consequences of that shift on regional problems.

There is a wealth of research that looks at how parochialism may result when community-based organizations have a disproportionate voice in urban governance. Even David Harvey warned that the local scale is not entirely neutral.<sup>82</sup> Others worry that local organizations are not necessarily themselves run democratically.<sup>83</sup> Still others think that there is a tendency to exacerbate existing discrimination and disparities of power.<sup>84</sup> There is a sense that while neighborhood-level organizations do a good job of reading what issues matter to local citizens, “their perspective is by definition parochial.”<sup>85</sup> The danger, of course, is that local interests trump broader regional goals, turning each community into independent “islands”. While there is broad theoretical literature about these parochial tendencies, there have been fewer empirical studies. In this sense, my study of the motivations of local groups (Chapter 6) provides a detailed empirical case to begin to evaluate whether different groups

have more or less parochial tendencies.

One empirical study of particular interest to my research is Jun’s analysis of neighborhood councils (NCs) in Los Angeles.<sup>86</sup> NCs grew out of the aforementioned threat of secession by the Valley residents and the centerpiece of a new L.A. City Charter that was approved by voters in June 1999.<sup>87</sup> Jun’s study shows that NC members – like members of neighborhood associations – are older, more educated, and have more U.S. citizens and native English speaking members than Los Angeles as a whole. Importantly, they are also predominately long-time property owners in their area and much wealthier than most Angelenos (41% of neighborhood council board members make over \$100,000 versus only 14% of Angelenos overall).

Also of relevance is that not all areas of L.A. have NCs – while they are administered by (and receive \$45,000 in annual funds from) the City of L.A., their formation depends on local organization. Jun compares areas with and without NCs to L.A. as a whole:<sup>88</sup>

	L.A.	no NCs	with NCs
Income > \$100k	13.6%	16.9%	41.4%
% Bachelors+	30.1%	25.5%	72.4%
% Latino	46.5%	44.7%	11.7%
% White	29.5%	35.1%	64.0%
% Black	10.9%	4.9%	13.3%
% Asian	9.9%	11.8%	4.1%

As you can see from the table above, areas with neighborhood councils (as of 2005) are more than three times wealthier, almost three times more likely to have a college degree, and more than twice as White and only one-quarter as Latino as than L.A. as a whole – that is, not representative of L.A. Jun also compared concerns of NCs to those of L.A. County as a whole (using data from a Public Policy Institute of California survey around the same time) – while public safety was the top concern of County residents (38%), it was only 25% for NC board members. Conversely, while land use issues registered

as the most important concern to NC boards members (46%), it was only the top concern of 18% of County residents. While education ranked as the second biggest concern for County residents (20%), this was the lowest concern for NC members (3%). This evidence suggests that local group concerns are quite different from regional concerns.

Moreover, the emphasis on land use suggests a convergence of interests between neighborhood councils and neighborhood associations. Los Angeles’s NCs have an uneasy relationship with neighborhood associations, as homeowner groups see them as an attempt to co-opt and control activities that neighborhood associations have always done.<sup>89</sup> There is a sense that NCs are “taking over” and neighborhood associations are losing their autonomy. The result is that homeowners feel their revolution is not as strong today as it once was as a result.



### 3. MOTIVATIONS & IMPACTS OF LAND USE POLICY

The literature of democracy, planning and social capital intersects with a third body of literature that attempts to understand why local governments adopt different regulations, and in turn, the impacts of these regulations. Underlying these motivations (or determinants) and impacts of land use policy is a concern about what actors play a role in shaping land use policy and in response to what political forces and for what reasons. In what follows, I review some of the most salient threads to these two sets of literature and highlight why looking at both dimensions of a given case offers greater insight into the influence of land use policy on our cities.

The literature on the determinants of land use policy has identified four main theories to explain why certain land use regulations are adopted; they can be summarized as follows:<sup>90</sup>

**1. Externality Zoning** – zoning is a defensive measure to mitigate the external costs generated by proximate “incompatible” uses.

**2. Fiscal Zoning** – zoning encourages people to choose their desirable level of public goods, thereby matching desired public goods with one’s ability to pay.

**3. High-and-Best-Use Zoning** – zoning tries to maximize land value (and therefore the tax revenue flowing to the municipality) by responding to market demand.

**4. Exclusionary Zoning** – zoning bars the “abject other” from a given place – those people, places and practices that are seen as generating negative impacts.

It's worth reviewing some of the most significant findings in the literature, as they form a background to this research project. The methods of "thick" explanation I use in this dissertation provide sufficient depth and complexity to evaluate whether the down-zoning of L.A. corresponds to one or more of these theories of zoning. The motivations and impacts literatures have largely been developed in isolation.<sup>91</sup> This has led to a weakness in both sets of literature – namely, a tendency to conflate the *effects* of zoning with the underlying *intent* – that is, to look at the impacts of zoning to explain their motivations.<sup>92</sup> One of the unique contributions of this dissertation is to assess within the context of a single case both the motivations and impacts of changing land use regulations, so as to distinguish between the two.

*Public interest theory* has long held that "all zoning restrictions – use, height, area, and density regulations – can be viewed as an effort to eliminate possible external diseconomies which the construction of "undesirable" property features might

impose upon other properties in any given district."<sup>93</sup> This has traditionally been accomplished by separating land uses (the favorite tool of externality zoning). Of course, what constitutes "undesirable" is of considerable debate and often depends on the values of those rendering the judgment (be it professional planners or "the public"). But there is, no doubt, an underlying economic rationale to the adoption of land use regulations. As such, much of the literature on the determinants of land use policy often takes an economic perspective – that is, it explores the economic effect of externalities (or "spill overs") of location decisions; typically, the chief concerns are negative externalities, but it's worth acknowledging that both positive and negative externalities occur with respect to land use decisions.

Land use decisions, however, are not merely the result of market efficiency. They are inherently political; according to *special interest group theory*, to the extent that City Council members want to be re-elected, they must respond to the desires of the electorate, which are often motivated by fiscal or

exclusionary objectives.<sup>94</sup> So even if a “rational” designation of land uses could achieve a perfect *Pareto Optimality* (i.e. where it is impossible to make any individual better off without making another individual worse off), land use decisions may not be rational, since different parts of the electorate have different values and interests and incomplete information about the changing nature of the market.

For nearby land, single-family homeowners have every interest in advocating for policies not merely in line with their own properties, but actually *more* restrictive policies than their own; this would mean new construction would be of “higher” quality – larger yards, more expensive, etc – which would have a positive impact on the value of their properties. As such, they would be inclined to support more restrictive land policies (that is, policies that result in less intensive land uses). But for renters, the opposite is true – the positive externality created by more restrictive land use policies would have the effect of driving up rents, not only because the adjacent uses are “more desirable”

but also because housing supply would be more constrained. If so, renters may be inclined to support less restrictive land policies (i.e. resulting in more intensive land uses).

But cities are dynamic – what might be the best use for a given place at a given time, due to the passage of time and surrounding change, may not be the same at some point in the future. And it is these transitions that provoke the most conflict over land uses. Property owners in transitional places typically respond by mobilizing to preserve the status quo. But some owners may welcome the change as an opportunity to “cash out” their investment and allow more intensive development to occur. In this case, renters would likely be displaced, so in this case, renters might not be in favor of more intensive development. If so, they might outnumber those property owners who want to cash out. So clearly the political machinations of land use policy depend not only on the demographic make-up of the area (or more precisely, the electorate as perceived by those who have ultimate authority, i.e. City Council members) and the relative

position of the area vis-à-vis the forces of change within the city (i.e. stable, in decline, or rapidly growing).

Complicating matters, however, is who participates in these land use battles (and local elections) – and this is highly variable. For example, renters are often (though not always) more transitory than owners and therefore might not become involved in the land use politics at all; this effect may be exaggerated in areas with a high percentage of non-citizens. What makes Los Angeles unique is that, despite its image as a “city of homes”, only about one-third of its population live in owner-occupied single-family homes. More than 60% are renters and the remaining owners live in multi-family condominiums or co-ops. Under this situation, if Council members are responding primarily to homeowner concerns, it opens up the possibility that progressive land use changes (i.e. higher densities) might be possible if the majority of renting Angelenos more closely reflected the turnout of home-owning Angelenos in local elections. That is, progressive land use change may depend on

the political mobilization of non-homeowners.

While the above discussion concerns differences between homeowners and renters, land use policies also respond to the needs and wants of business. To the extent that municipalities depend on businesses for tax revenues – and, especially since Proposition 13 (1978), sales tax revenue – then cities also have an economic incentive to ensure there is adequate supply of non-residential land. Past studies have attempted to understand how cities balance these competing needs, drawing upon *community site supply theory*, which explores the relationship between fiscal variables, zoning, and business location. At heart, this theory compares the self-interest of firms to maximize profit against the self-interest of residents to maximize quality of life characteristics. Like many economic models, community site supply theory rests on simple assumptions that don't always hold in reality.

For example, it assumes that the presence of firms (or even multi-family housing) degrades environmental quality and

therefore residents must (or should) be compensated in other ways, which assumes an implicit market for environmental quality.<sup>95</sup> The case of multi-family housing is especially problematic – while the perception is that it poses an adjacent negative environmental impact (creating a burden on schools and parks, generating traffic, shadows, etc), in the aggregate, an increase in multi-family housing, especially along transit corridors, typically has a positive environmental impact since it increases transit usage, creates a smaller ecological footprint, promotes walkability, and so on.

The case for fiscal zoning was made most forcefully by Bill Fischel in *The Homevoter Hypothesis* (2001); he argues that since peoples' homes are typically their largest asset, they become active in local politics (and land use debates, specifically) to protect the value of their homes.<sup>96</sup> Fischel argues that local tax rates and services are capitalized into housing values, but this only occurs if housing supply is inelastic so others cannot move into their neighborhood and dissipate the benefits, hence

not only homeowner interest in local zoning, but homeowner interest in restricting future housing supply in their community. Fischel's broader argument draws upon Tiebout's concept of people "voting with their feet", where people choose to live in different communities based on their valuation of different services to maximize their personal utility.<sup>97</sup> In the aggregate, this theoretically sorts people into like-minded communities, based on individual preferences (but of course assumes that everyone has equal choice about where to live, which is simply not the case).

Fischel extends this logic to land use policy, arguing that if the benefits of attracting development contribute more in taxes than they absorb in services, communities will accept these uses, but if the benefits are less, they won't. However, what Fischel does not consider, or perhaps he is happy to accept, is that zoning can be used to exclude land uses that don't generate revenues, such as affordable housing. This creates barriers to entry that inflate home values and create significant spatial

disparities as risk-averse homeowners protect their advantaged position. Fischel is silent about these equity considerations. In fact, Fischel's model *depends* on homogeneity to work, for he assumes resultant decisions will reflect the "median voter". Diversity – be it racial, income, cultural, etc. within residential communities or even mixes of uses (commercial, industrial, residential, etc.) – makes this "median voter" hypothesis much more suspect, and unlikely to play out as smoothly in practice as Fischel suggests. By comparing two areas with differing levels of diversity, my study adds to this on-going conversation by exploring what role diversity plays in shaping local land use policies.

Evidence from the determinants of land use policy literature generally supports the view that lower-income communities have relatively more industrial land uses, while higher-income areas are weighted more towards commercial uses.<sup>98</sup> But it is unclear if that is because affluent areas zone out industrial uses or whether industry demands more sites in

lower-income communities (for example, because land or labor may be cheaper, or is closer to major transportation corridors). Much of the literature has instead focused on whether more permissive zoning yields net benefits to residents in the form of lower tax burdens to offset their environmental burden – and, in general, that theory is supported.<sup>99</sup> While no doubt of central concern to economists who often see restrictive zoning as a form of "land tax", these findings don't go very far in explaining why most homeowners still oppose industrial uses despite the positive economic benefit.

Adding further complexity to the determinants literature is the argument that it isn't fiscal or exclusionary motives *per se* that drive residents to seek more restrictive land use policies, but rather as a way of controlling future population growth.<sup>100</sup> An area may appear to be welcoming growth by designating a high percentage of land for residential uses, but use highly restrictive zoning to control the density of those residential areas. The motivations for controlling population growth may

be environmental, even ideological. But growth-limiting policies may be the product of practical considerations or expected increases in taxes to support additional municipal services such as additional fire fighters, municipal infrastructure, capacity of streets, schools, and water supply, and so on. The use of zoning to control population growth appears to be especially prevalent when recent population growth has been very rapid.<sup>101</sup>

Much of the literature on the determinants and impacts of land use is based on economics, regional science and other quantitative fields. These studies are useful in isolating the impacts of particular determinants. For example, evidence suggests mixed-use areas are more likely to zone vacant land for non-residential use, while bedroom suburbs tend to designate vacant land for additional residential uses (i.e. to mitigate against the possibility that different uses would pose a negative externality).<sup>102</sup> Likewise, older communities (in terms of when built), tend to have more non-residential development.<sup>103</sup>

Despite these helpful findings, the determinants

literature suffers from a lack of understanding of what groups are most important in shaping land use policies and for what reasons. Instead, they tend to be macro-scale, variable-driven, and highly reductive of the complexities that entail the politics of urban development in practice. In many cases, researchers in these fields are well aware of these limitations; for example, despite one of the most quantitatively rigorous studies of the determinants of zoning, Rolleston notes:

(Nonresidential) development within suburban communities may be particularly sensitive to the political power of special interest groups, whether they are developers, business people, homeowners, environmental groups, and/or local zoning planning boards. The political determinants of zoning are likely to be quite diverse, however, and not easily captured using a cross-sectional approach.<sup>104</sup>

Quantitative studies also tend to be snapshots in time, without understanding the cumulative effect of land use decisions over time. These studies also tend to ignore a community's demographic composition, in particular, race. There are some exceptions; for example, one study found a positive correlation between income and lot sizes (high-income areas tend to set large minimum lot sizes) but this doesn't support the claim that affluent areas use minimum lot sizes to exclude lower-income households; most likely, the affluent could afford and preferred areas that already had large lots. But, by and large, demographic motivations are under-studied. This dissertation addresses these omissions by adding an important temporal dimension to the literature by studying how land uses have changed over time, and at the behest of what groups and why. But it also brings issues of race and ethnicity to the foreground – in particular, Part 3 compares the motivations and impacts of land use change in a predominately white area (Woodland Hills/Canoga Park) versus a predominately black

area (Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw).

Among the more serious impacts of exclusionary zoning practices is racial segregation, particularly of blacks and Latinos. It's important to note that racial segregation occurs for many reasons apart from land use regulation – for example, what Leah Boustan calls “self-segregation”, i.e. the preference to live in an area with shared values and cultural amenities, or white collective action – legal or extralegal means to exclude minorities.<sup>105</sup> My interest here, however, is the way that land use policy and especially the one promoted by bottom-up planning contributes to racial segregation. There is some empirical evidence to suggest that communities with smaller minority populations and higher incomes tend to practice more restrictive zoning, supporting the exclusionary zoning hypothesis identified in the determinants of land use literature.<sup>106</sup>



#### 4. LAND USES AND SUSTAINABILITY

There is a wide body of empirical research to suggest that restrictive land uses distort property markets (i.e. artificially raises housing prices)<sup>107</sup>, obstruct residential mobility<sup>108</sup>, thwart economic and social integration<sup>109</sup>, and create disparities in access to public and private services.<sup>110</sup> Moreover, restrictive land uses drive development away from already built-up areas to low-density peripheries (which, in turn, exacerbates environmental problems). So restrictive land use policies have far-reaching social, economic, and environmental effects and negative implications for a region's sustainability.

Sustainability, of course, is a highly contested if not problematic term. My use of the term does not stem from the classic Brundtland Commission's 1987 definition of "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."<sup>111</sup> The Brundtland definition doesn't get us

very far; at best, it is a call for inter-generational equity. This anthropomorphic perspective is silent about relationship to the planet, other species, or to each other in the present for that matter. Nor do I take it to mean a "misty-eyed vision of a peaceful ecotopia", to borrow Scott Campbell's words.<sup>112</sup>

Instead, we might think of sustainability as a "three-legged stool", with each leg being an essential component, lest the stool will collapse. These legs are bundles of choices that relate to three broad goals – (1) our relationship with the planet and its resources (which we might call "environmental" goals), (2) our relationship with systems of exchange, work, and resource allocation (which we might call "economic" goals), and (3) our relationship with each other (which we might call "equity" goals). It is these "3 Es" that form the intellectual basis for our understanding of this nebulous concept of sustainability.

Despite its definitional problems, sustainability remains a useful concept to evaluate the impacts of different policy choices. Years of industrialization and urbanization have had

a tremendous impact on the planet – from climate change to resource depletion to air and water pollution. Urban industrial society driven by consumption of fossil fuels has been especially detrimental, and there is a growing consensus that we must reverse the present collision course. How we build (and re-build) our cities will determine to what degree we can mitigate or adapt to these challenges. Over the last century, we’ve become a much more urbanized planet – in 1900, only 15% of people lived in cities, today over half do.<sup>113</sup> In 1900, there were only 4 cities that topped one million (Beijing, Tokyo, Delhi, London). Today, there are over 200 that are over two million, and about 30 mega-cities of 10 million or more. By 2030, 60% of humanity will live in urban areas. This rapid urbanization is changing our relationship to the earth – while cities occupy just 2% of the world’s land surface, they use 75% of its resources.<sup>114</sup> The impact of urbanization has been masked, however, by changes in food productivity – a six-fold increase over the last 50 years, which has given us the false sense that we can control nature

and that cities are somehow independent of it. Patrick Geddes provides a useful reminder that cities are intimately connected to their hinterland, and thus require a regional perspective.<sup>115</sup> As we continue to urbanize (especially countries like China and India), we may well increase living standards but also increase our resource consumption.

Despite false media portrayals of a divided climate science community, the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a consortium of leading climate scientists, is “unequivocal” that human activities have contributed to the problem, primarily through the burning of fossil fuels and urbanization (which converts land from carbon-absorbing to carbon-producing uses).<sup>116</sup> That our cities depend on fossil fuels is indisputable. Moving people and goods across vast distances is now the norm, expanding each city’s hinterland ever further, with devastating consequences for air quality in both the lower atmosphere (smog and particulate matter) and upper atmosphere (climate change). This is especially true in

Greater Los Angeles, a vast region that spans nearly 34,000 square miles. But there is a price to pay in pollution – not only particulate matter but also increases in greenhouse gases.<sup>117</sup>

The link between urban form and sustainability has prompted responses from the international community since the 1990s – from Agenda 21 (1992) to the Aalborg Charter (1994) to the Istanbul Declaration (1996).<sup>118</sup> While admirable as statements of intent, exactly *how* to reform land use practices to achieve the sustainability goals is of considerable debate. For example, a central tension is whether it is more sustainable to concentrate people into more compact cities or to de-centralize people into smaller-scale patterns of settlement. Which approach can best meet the twin challenges of making city-regions both economically competitive in an era of increasing global competition while also raising the quality of life in those regions? There is also strong disagreement about whether perpetual economic growth is desirable or even possible on a planet with finite resources. While “deep greens” believe in

a steady-state economy, mainstream practice still relies upon economic growth to fund social and environmental investments. The challenge for mainstream governments – especially under pressure from global competition to lower taxes and shrink the role of government in the market – is how to grow but also redistribute incomes, reduce social inequalities, promote social political integration, and protect the environment.

There has been no shortage of efforts to outline what a “sustainable city” should look like. Peter Hall, for example, outlines six basic objectives: (1) increasing resource efficiency, (2) pollute and deplete less (i.e. eliminate waste), (3) internalize real costs in the pursuit of profit, (4) harness the market – get the private sector to do more to achieve sustainable goals, (5) make smart investments in small-scale, more resilient infrastructure, and (6) create jobs equitably.<sup>119</sup> And in a world where labor and capital are increasingly mobile, urban livability, not lowest tax rates, is determining where they go.

Yet even accepting livability as a central goal, how do

we achieve it? Traditionally, we've made plans to guide future growth, but these plans tend to be static with imagined fixed end states that don't reflect the dynamic (ever-changing) nature of cities, so it is likely new planning techniques must be devised to anticipate change in real time. Implicit in this discussion is the central role that city form plays. But no consensus has emerged as what patterns of urban form offer the best chance of putting us on a more sustainable path – for some, Manhattan-like densities are the answer; for others, it's de-centralized moderate density centers in the Garden City tradition. And despite a general consensus that urban infill (i.e. “brownfield” development, investing in areas where infrastructure and amenities already exist) is more economically, environmentally, and social beneficial, growth pressures continue to spawn “greenfield” development (even if given a New Urbanist facade).

Evidence suggests these overall patterns of urban growth significantly impact a region's environmental footprint.

The United States scores particularly poorly on this front; despite only 5% of the world's population, it emits over 20% of the world's greenhouse gases; to prevent runaway greenhouse gas emissions, scientists say the U.S. must reduce CO<sub>2</sub> by 33% (below 1990 levels) by 2030 and 60-80% by 2050.<sup>120</sup> Ewing et al argue that this will require a three-pronged approach of increasing vehicle fuel economy, reducing the carbon content of the fuel itself, and mostly importantly, reducing vehicle miles traveled (VMT). While the first two are challenges for the car and gas industries, the third is the purview of planners. The problem, of course, is that growth in vehicles has outpaced population growth and, compounding matters, the growth in VMT has outpaced the growth of vehicles. Gains made in fuel economy are more than offset by the increased distanced we are now driving; under the present course, VMT is expected to rise by 48% by 2030 while the gains made by improved fuel economy is only 23% and reduction in fuel carbon content is only 10%.<sup>121</sup>

The rise in VMT is due to land use policies that have encouraged – even required – low-density patterns of development. On average, land is being consumed at three times the rate of population growth (U.S. population is expected to rise from 314 million today to 420 million by 2050). This suggests the need to build more compact cities, at higher densities that can support mass transit in order to require less driving in the first place. Evidence suggest that people who live in more compact regions drive less – by about 30%, controlling for income and other socioeconomic differences, while also reaping other economic, health and environmental benefits (i.e. reduced infrastructure costs, greater energy security from lower usage, preservation of farmland, improved water quality, etc).<sup>122</sup> Some argue that Americans prefer low-density development, but evidence from real estate advisor RCLCO suggest that more than one-third of Americans prefer to live in a compact (“smart growth”) communities and another one-quarter would if it meant shorter commute times – so almost 60% prefer compact

communities that reduce commute times).

VMT and the dependence on fossil fuels make us vulnerable to system shocks, both long-term (such as the oil embargoes of the 1970s) and short-term (such as the 2003 blackout in the Northeast U.S. and Canada). In general, U.S. cities are ill-prepared and not very resilient to these events, in large part because so few Americans use public transit. For example, Newman argues that New York is the best-prepared American city. But even here, only 9% of motorized transportation is public transit, as compared with 14% in Toronto, 35% in Barcelona and Rome, 40% in Singapore and Seoul, 50% in Beijing, 60% in Tokyo, 73% in Hong Kong and 84% in Mumbai.<sup>123</sup> Put another way, while Chinese cities consume around 13 gallons of oil per person on average, car-dependent American cities like Atlanta use 782 gallons per person – over 60 times more. This evidence highlights the important role that mass transit plays – and transit can only work to the extent land uses allow enough density to support it. Yet, when presented with an opportunity

to invest in transit, in the 2009 stimulus package, Congress allocated just \$8.4 billion out of \$100 billion in infrastructure funds for public transit (as compared with \$27.5 billion for roads and highways).<sup>124</sup>

While demand for smart growth, transit-oriented development and reduced VMT is growing, there is also evidence to suggest that we may not have any choice, given the decline of *traditional* sources of oil. Paul Robert's *End of Oil* (2004), an eye-opening exposé of the growing energy crisis, brought the twin crises of climate change and dwindling supply of fossil fuels into the popular consciousness. Reaching peak oil (crossing over the "Hubbard's Peak"), unlike when gas in your fuel tank runs out, does not mean the end of oil, but it means the rate of extraction decreases geometrically, making each barrel of oil cost increasingly more. Traditional reserves are running out, but new technologies – from oil sands to "fracking" for natural gas (extraction by cracking open shale deposits) – have given false comfort that supply is endless, but these techniques are

only viable if oil and gas are expensive.

So while technological advances can stretch out our dependency on fossil fuels, they do so only at the expense of perpetually high prices, which still warrant a shift to alternatives. Moreover, unlike in the past, the U.S. now faces stiff competition from emerging superpowers China and India for the same scarce oil resources, driving prices up further. And as Roberts points out, natural gas – the resource politicians and oil & gas industry executives hold up as a "bridge" between oil and whatever comes next – is also in decline. Likewise, hydrogen fuel cells and a ready supply of hydrogen are decades away from mass deployment. Nuclear energy is problematic due to safety concerns and the problem of disposing of radioactive coolant. Most hydroelectric sources are already tapped out. And the remaining renewables (solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, tidal) account for less than 1% of the total world energy supply; while growth in these areas is needed and expected, "there is no alternative technique of nonfossil energy conversion that

could take over a large share of the supply we now derive from coal and from hydrocarbons in just a few decades.”<sup>125</sup>

Given the limited ability of renewables and improved fuel economy standards to stem the tide of rising VMT and energy consumption, it is clear that more fundamental solutions are needed – changing how we build our cities. Fortunately, more than two-thirds of the development that will be on the ground in 2050 is expected to be built after 2007, which suggests that shifting away from business-as-usual urban planning could have a significant impact going forward.<sup>126</sup> Since the 1980s, New Urbanists have been vocal in criticizing the low-density patterns of “sprawl”. But their objections, at least initially, were largely about the “placelessness” of suburban areas that, far from being unplanned as popular sentiment would have us believe, were the precise build-out of the rational standardization and use segregation of modern zoning. New Urbanists hoped to re-create traditional forms of cities, with grids, lanes, stoops and ample public spaces. More nefariously, they argued this also

required the recovery of traditional architectural forms. While there was always an underlying concern about the environmental impacts of sprawl, New Urbanists have more recently used this to strengthen their case, tying the project of re-creating the past (or an image thereof) to calls for “smart growth”, which includes urban infill, transit-oriented development, compact, higher-density pedestrian-friendly communities. Unfortunately, while some do largely fulfill these objectives, many New Urbanist communities have been criticized for just being a different form of greenfield development, equally “elite” and auto-dependent as the suburbs they were meant to replace. So, it is perhaps useful to distinguish between two motivations within New Urbanism: the superficial historicist project of re-claiming a simulacrum of the past, and perhaps more legitimate calls to build in more resource-efficient ways, including embracing smart growth and regionalism (a dimension that is more associated with the Peter Calthorpe wing of New Urbanism).

Given the association between urban form and

environmental sustainability, energy consumption, and climate change, the preference among homeowner groups for low-densities, segregated uses, and automobile dependence calls into question what environmental (let alone social or economic) impact the homeowner revolution in Los Angeles has had.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Paul Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 25.

<sup>2</sup> Harvey S. Perloff, *Education for Planning: City, State & Regional* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957), 141.

<sup>3</sup> Nigel Taylor, *Urban Planning Theory Since 1945* (London: Sage, 1998).

<sup>4</sup> Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Randon House, 1961).

<sup>5</sup> Patsy Healey, "Planning through debate: the communicative turn in planning theory," in Frank Fischer and John Forester, eds., *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning* (London: UCL Press Ltd), 233–253.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)

<sup>7</sup> Roland Barthes, "Death of the Author," *Aspen* vol 5/6 (1967).

<sup>8</sup> Bernard Rudofsky, *Architecture Without Architects: A Short Introduction to Non-Pedigreed Architecture* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1964); Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, *Learning From Las Vegas* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972).



- <sup>9</sup> Charles Jencks, *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1984).
- <sup>10</sup> John Reys, "Requiem for Zoning," *Zoning Digest* vol 16, no 2 (1964): 33-56. Similar arguments, of course, would be made by proponents of New Urbanism two decades later.
- <sup>11</sup> Richard F. Babcock, *The Zoning Game* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press), 31.
- <sup>12</sup> David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) and Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977).
- <sup>13</sup> Douglass B. Lee, Jr, "Requiem for Large-Scale Models," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* vol 39, no 3 (May 1973): 163-178.
- <sup>14</sup> Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," *Journal of the American Planning Association* vol 31, no 4 (1965): 331-338.
- <sup>15</sup> See John Forrester, *Planning in the Face of Power* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).
- <sup>16</sup> Peter Berger and Richard John Newhouse, *To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy* (Washington, DC: Enterprise Institute, 1977).
- <sup>17</sup> Leonie Sandercock, *Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities* (Seattle: Academy Press, 1998), 30.
- <sup>18</sup> David Harvey, "The Right to the City," *New Left Review* 53 (2008), 23-40 at 23-24.
- <sup>19</sup> Mark Purcell, "Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and its urban politics of the inhabitant," *Geojournal* vol 58 (2002): 99-108 at 101.
- <sup>20</sup> Robert C. Ellickson, *Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
- <sup>21</sup> Robert C. Ellickson, "New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods," *Duke Law Journal* vol 48, no 1 (October 1998): 75-110.
- <sup>22</sup> Robert H. Nelson, *Private Neighborhoods and the Transformation of Local Government* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2005).
- <sup>23</sup> Sherry R. Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* vol 35, no 4 (July 1969): 216-224.
- <sup>24</sup> Arnstein, 217.
- <sup>25</sup> Roger Starr, "Advocators or Planners," *American Society of Planning Officials Newsletter*, vol 33, no 11 (December 1967).
- <sup>26</sup> Alan S. Kravitz, "Advocacy and beyond," in *Planning 1968*, Selected

papers from the ASPO national planning conference, May 4-9, 1968 (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, 1968), 41 and Robert Goodman, *After the Planners* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971), 173.

<sup>27</sup> Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., "Special districts and urban services," in Elinor Ostrom, ed., *The Delivery of Urban Services, Outcomes of Change*, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews vol 10 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976), 185.

<sup>28</sup> Janice E. Perlman, "Grassrooting the System," *Social Policy*, vol 7, no 2 (September/October 1976), 4-20 at 4.

<sup>29</sup> Gary Paul Green and Anna Haines, "History of Community Development in America," in *Asset Building & Community Development* (London and Los Angeles: Sage, 2008), 23-40.

<sup>30</sup> John Mollenkopf, *Community Organization and City Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Department of Government, Harvard University, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 1973) as cited in Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 55.

<sup>31</sup> James DeFilippis and Peter North, "The Emancipatory Community?"

Place, politics and collection action in cities," in Loretta Lees, *The Emancipatory City? Paradoxes and Possibilities* (London: Sage, 2004), 75.

<sup>32</sup> Jurgen Habermas, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society, The Theory of Communicative Action* vol 1 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 86. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Originally published as *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* in 1981.

<sup>33</sup> Roger Bolton, "Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action and the Theory of Social Capital," paper presented at the meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Denver CO (April 2005), 2.

<sup>34</sup> Philip Allmendinger, "The Post-Positivist Landscape of Planning Theory," in Philip Allmendinger and Mark Tewdwr-Jones, *Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 3.

<sup>35</sup> For a summary of Habermas's motivations for the Theory of Communicative Action, see David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).

<sup>36</sup> Tim Richardson, "Foucauldian discourse: power and truth in urban and regional policy making," *European Planning Studies* vol 4, no 3

(1996): 279–292 at 280.

<sup>37</sup> Mickey Lauria and Robert K. Whelan, “Planning theory and political economy: the need for reintegration,” *Planning Theory* 14 (1995): 8–13.

<sup>38</sup> For a review of the history of Urban Regime Theory, see Karen Mossberger and Gerry Stoker, “The Evolution of Urban Regime Theory: The Challenge of Conceptualization,” *Urban Affairs* vol 36, no 6 (July 2001): 810-835.

<sup>39</sup> Mossberger and Stoker, 812.

<sup>40</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 19.

<sup>41</sup> Putnam, 288.

<sup>42</sup> For example, Putnam uses membership in voluntary associations, familial traditions, even friendships as metrics of social capital. He has observed that over the past 25 years (prior to 2000), memberships in clubs was down 58%, family dinners were down 33%, and having friends over was down 45%.

<sup>43</sup> For a synthesis of these metrics, see Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” *Journal of Democracy* vol 6, no 1 (1995): 65-78.

<sup>44</sup> Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957), translated by Charles Price Loomis. Originally published in 1887 as *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Leipzig: Fues’s Verlag) with a 2nd edition published in 1912.

<sup>45</sup> Melinda Rea-Holloway, *What’s the Matter with Social Capital? An Induction Examination* (Proquest: UMI Dissertation Publishing, 2011), 7.

<sup>46</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in John Richardson, ed., *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (New York: Greenwood, 1985): 241-258.

<sup>47</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: George Dearborn & Co, 1838), translated by Henry Reeve. Originally published as *De la démocratie en Amérique* in 1835.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, book II, chapter 5.

<sup>49</sup> Henry David Thoreau, “Slavery in Massachusetts,” Speech delivered at an anti-slavery meeting in Framingham, MA on July 4, 1854. [http://www.transcendentalists.com/slavery\\_in\\_ma.htm](http://www.transcendentalists.com/slavery_in_ma.htm)

<sup>50</sup> Thomas Jefferson, *Political Writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 212. Ward Republics were originally proposed by Jefferson in a letter to Sam Kercheval in July 1816.

<sup>51</sup> Ichiro Kawachi, Bruce P. Kennedy and Kimberly Lochner, “Long live community: social capital as public health,” *The American Prospect* vol 8, no 35 (November–December 1997): 56–59.

<sup>52</sup> Matt Leighninger, *The Promise and Challenge of Neighborhood Democracy: Lessons from the Intersection of Government and Community*, A report on the “Democratic Governance at the Neighborhood Level” meeting, organized by Grassroots Grantmakers and the Deliberative Democracy Consortium, with assistance from the National League of Cities and NeighborWorks America (Orlando, FL: November 2008): 7-8. While officially advisory, planning officers are increasingly requiring neighborhood council support as a condition of approval of discretionary actions (which, in California, includes all condominium projects).

<sup>53</sup> Forsyth County, North Carolina, *North Suburban Area Plan* (March 2006), 18 as cited in Stern, 828.

<sup>54</sup> Robert D. Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century - The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture,” *Scandinavian Political Studies* vol 30, no 2 (June 2007): 137-174. Putnam originally published the data in 2001, but, recognizing the controversy it would create, withheld publishing the full article for six

year until he could “develop proposals to compensate for the negative effects of diversity” (John Lloyd, “Study Paints Bleak Picture of Ethnic Diversity,” *The Financial Times*, October 8, 2006), a decision for which he has been criticized.

<sup>55</sup> Ilana Mercer, “Greater Diversity Equals More Misery,” *Orange County Register*, July, 22, 2007.

<sup>56</sup> Edward Fieldhouse and David Cutts, “Does Diversity Damage Social Capital? A Comparative Study of Neighbourhood Diversity and Social Capital in the US and Britain,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* vol 43, no 2 (June 2010): 289-318.

<sup>57</sup> Stephanie M. Stern, “The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in Property Law,” *Virginia Law Review* vol 99 (2013): 811-877.

<sup>58</sup> Stern, 815.

<sup>59</sup> See, for example, Jeffrey Berry, Ken Thomson and Kent Portney, “More Participation?” in *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993), 71-98 at 81.

<sup>60</sup> Berry et al, 85.

<sup>61</sup> Susan Saefert et al, “Social Capital and Crime in New York City’s Low-Income Housing,” *Housing Policy Debate* vol 13, no 1 (2002):

189-224.

<sup>62</sup> James DeFilippis, "The Myth of Social Capital in Community Development," *Housing Policy Debate* vol 12, no 4 (2001): 781-792.

<sup>63</sup> Megan Perry et al, "Social Capital and Health Care Experiences Among Low-Income Individuals," *American Journal of Public Health* vol 98, no 2 (February 2008): 330-336.

<sup>64</sup> Morris P. Fiorina, "Extreme Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement," in Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., *Civic Engagement in American Democracy* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999): 395-426.

<sup>65</sup> J. Eric Oliver, *Democracy in Suburbia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

<sup>66</sup> James Madison, "The Federalist, No 10," in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Bantam Dell, 2003 [1787]), 51 as cited in Stern, 835.

<sup>67</sup> Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Oxford University Press, 1993 [1776]), 307.

<sup>68</sup> John R. Logan and Gordana Rabrenovic, "Neighborhood Associations: Their Issues, their Allies, and their Opponents," *Urban*

*Affairs Review* vol 26, no. 1 (1990): 68-94.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, 79.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, 86.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 91.

<sup>72</sup> Stephen E. Barton, "A History of the Neighborhood Movement in San Francisco," *Berkeley Planning Journal* vol 2, no 1-2 (Spring/Fall 1985): 85-105.

<sup>73</sup> John H. Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

<sup>74</sup> For an explanation of the concept of "growth machines", see Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place," *The American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 2 (1976): 309-32, and John R. Logan and Harvey Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

<sup>75</sup> For an overview of the shift away from "growth machine" politics in 1980s L.A. see Andrew H. Whittemore, "Requiem for a Growth Machine: Homeowner Preeminence in 1980s Los Angeles," *Journal of Planning History*, 11 (2): 124-140. Whittemore documents some of the later outcomes of the homeowner action in the 1980s -

specifically the General Plan Zoning Code Consistency Program and Proposition U, a measure that downzoned many of L.A. commercial corridors.

<sup>76</sup> For an explanation of homeowners class interests, see William Fulton, *The Reluctant Metropolis: The Politics of Urban Growth in Los Angeles* (Point Arena, CA: Solano Press Books, 1997) and John Horton, "The politics of ethnic change: Grass-roots Responses to Economic and Demographic Restructuring in California," *Urban Geography* 10, no. 6 (1989): 578-92.

<sup>77</sup> This argument was put forward by Mark Purcell, "Neighborhood Activism among Homeowners as a Politics of Space," *Professional Geographer*, 53, no. 2 (2001): 178-194. Purcell's study is based on participant observation and interviews with six L.A. homeowners associations and two federations, including the Hillside Federation. Purcell identified neighborhood development as the chief concern of these groups.

<sup>78</sup> This conception of the "production of space" originated with Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (London: Blackwell, 1991), originally written in French in 1974, but his ideas were not widely known until the 1991 English translation and their adaptation in

Soja's trilogy (see note 3).

<sup>79</sup> Purcell, *Neighborhood Activism*, 179.

<sup>80</sup> Mark Purcell, "Urban Democracy and the Local Trap," *Urban Studies* vol 43, no 11 (October 2006): 1921-1941.

<sup>81</sup> Charles Lummis, *Radical Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 18 as cited in Purcell, 1926.

<sup>82</sup> David Harvey, *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

<sup>83</sup> David Swindell, "Issue Representation in Neighborhood Organizations: Questing for Democracy at the Grassroots," *Journal of Urban Affairs* vol 22, no 2 (2000): 123-137.

<sup>84</sup> See for example the work of Paul Knox: Paul L. Knox, "Community Councils, Electoral Districts and Social Geography," *Area* vol 10, no 5 (1978): 387-391 and *The Geography of Western Europe: A Socio-Economic Survey* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1984).

<sup>85</sup> Robert J. Chaskin and Ali Abunimah, "A View from the City: Local Government Perspectives on Neighborhood-Based Governance in Community-Building Initiatives," *Journal of Urban Affairs* vol 21, no 1 (1999): 57-78.

<sup>86</sup> Kyu-Nahm Jun, "Escaping the Local Trap? The Role of Community-

Representing Organizations in Urban Governance,” *Journal of Urban Affairs*, advance online publication (2012): 1-22. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9906.2012.00620.x.

<sup>87</sup> See, for example, Jim Faught, “Breaking up is hard to do: Explaining the 2002 San Fernando Valley secession vote,” *Journal of Urban Affairs* vol 28, no 4 (2006): 375–398 and Richard C. Box and Juliet Ann Musso, “Experiments with Local Federalism: Secession and the Neighborhood Council Movement in Los Angeles,” *American Review of Public Administration* vol 34, no 3 (2004): 259–276.

<sup>88</sup> Jun, 8.

<sup>89</sup> Sandy Brown, Founder of the Friends of Westwood and long-time President of the Holmby Westwood Property Owners Association, personal interview, January 31, 2013.

<sup>90</sup> For a more detailed explanation of these four theories, see J.M. Pogodzinski and Tim R. Sass, “The theory and estimation of endogenous zoning,” *Regional Science and Urban Economics* vol 24 (1994): 601-630.

<sup>91</sup> Pogodzinski and Sass, 602.

<sup>92</sup> Barbara Sherman Rolleston, “Determinants of Restrictive Suburban

Zoning: An Empirical Analysis,” *Journal of Urban Economics* vol 21, no 1 (January 1987): 1-21 at 3.

<sup>93</sup> Otto Davis, “Economic Elements in Municipal Zoning Decisions,” *Land Economics* vol 39, no 4 (November 1963): 375-386 at 375.

<sup>94</sup> For more on how local governments seek to maximize political support, see Duane Windsor, *Fiscal Zoning in the Suburban Communities* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1979) and Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer, “Economic and political foundations of tax structure,” *American Economic Review* 78 (1988): 701-712.

<sup>95</sup> Rodney A. Erickson and David R. Wollover, “Local Tax Burdens and the Supply of Business Sites in Suburban Municipalities,” *Journal of Regional Science* vol 27, no 1 (1987): 25-37 at 26.

<sup>96</sup> William A. Fischel, *The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

<sup>97</sup> Charles Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” *Journal of Political Economy* vol 64, no 5 (1956): 416–424.

<sup>98</sup> William A. Fischel, “Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban



Communities,” in Edwin S. Mills and Wallace E. Oates, eds., *Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975): 119-173.

<sup>99</sup> Erickson and Wollover, 36.

<sup>100</sup> This argument is advanced in Laurie J. Bates and Rexford E. Santerre, “The Determinants of Restrictive Residential Zoning: Some Empirical Findings,” *Journal of Regional Science* vol 34, no 2 (1994): 253-264. Of particular interest is inter-play between the overall amount of land that an area designates as residential versus controls of density within that area (be in through maximum density, minimum lot sizes, etc).

<sup>101</sup> Bates and Santerre, 260.

<sup>102</sup> Rolleston, 3.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Rolleston, 18.

<sup>105</sup> Leah Platt Boustan, “Residential Segregation in American Cities,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 19045 (Cambridge, MA: NBER, May 2013).

<sup>106</sup> Rolleston, 17.

<sup>107</sup> William A. Fischel, “A Property Rights Approach to Municipal

Zoning,” *Land Economics* vol 54 no 1 (February 1978): 64-81.

<sup>108</sup> Anne B. Shlay and Peter H. Rossi, “Keeping Up the Neighborhood: Estimating Net Effects of Zoning,” *American Sociological Review* vol 46, no 6 (December 1981): 703-719.

<sup>109</sup> Eric J. Branfman, Benjamin I. Cohen, and David M. Trubek, “Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of the Poor,” *Yale Law Journal* vol 82, no 3 (January 1973): 483-508.

<sup>110</sup> John R. Logan, “Industrialization and the Stratification of Cities in Suburban Regions,” *American Journal of Sociology* vol 82, no 2 (September 1976): 333-348 and “Growth, Politics and the Stratification of Places,” *American Journal Sociology* vol 84, no 2 (September 1978): 404-416.

<sup>111</sup> World Commission on Environment and Development, “Our Common Future,” Annex to General Assembly Document A/42/427, Development and International Co-operation: Environment (August 1987).

<sup>112</sup> Scott Campbell, “Green Cities, Growing Cities, Just Cities?,” *Journal of the American Planning Association* vol 62, no 3 (1996): 296-312 at 297.



<sup>113</sup> Herbert Girardet, "Big Feet, Small Planet," in *Cities People Planet: Liveable Cities for a Sustainable World* (London and New York: Wiley, 2004), 1-19.

<sup>114</sup> Girardet, 4.

<sup>115</sup> Patrick Geddes, *Cities in Evolution* (London: Williams, 1912).

<sup>116</sup> United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), "Summary for Policymakers," *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report* (2007). [http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4\\_syr\\_spm.pdf](http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf)

<sup>117</sup> Carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) is, by far, the most important greenhouse gas (GHG) that contributes to climate change; since the industrial revolution, CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations have increased 30% from 280 to 370 parts per million (scientists believe we should exceed no more than 350 to avoid runaway climate change, so we are already well within the danger zone). Just between 1970 and 2004 alone, CO<sub>2</sub> increased 80% (IPCC 2007). By 2100, average temperatures are expected to rise by up to 5.8 degrees centigrade, with devastating effects for coastal areas (Girardet, 10). But the impact of climate change goes beyond rising temperatures and sea levels to include ocean acidification, extreme weather (drought, hurricanes, etc), loss

of arctic ice sheets, and species extinction. The economic costs of severe weather are becoming more apparent. In the 1960s, there were about 20 major disasters, resulting in roughly \$30 billion in claims; by the 1990s, there were about 70 major disasters, with claims of roughly \$250 billion (Adrian Pitts, "Drivers for Change," in *Planning and Design Strategies for Sustainability and Profit* (London and New York: Architectural Press, 2004), 12-23). The IPCC is clear that mitigation policies are insufficient to slow increases in global greenhouse gas emissions.

<sup>118</sup> Created by the United Nations's Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, Agenda 21 is a voluntary action plan to promote sustainable development at national, regional and local scales (which has provoked a strong backlash among American conservatives as infringing on U.S. sovereignty and property rights). The Aalborg Charter was adopted by the first European Conference on Sustainable Cities and Towns in Aalborg, Denmark in 1994 and accepted the fundamental premise that urban form has contributed to many of the present environmental challenges and commits signatories to reforming their growth patterns. The Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements is the product of the U.N.'s 1996

City Summit and commits signatories to making human settlements more equitable, livable, and sustainable.

<sup>119</sup> Peter Hall, “The Sustainable City in an Age of Globalization,” in Luigi Fusco Girard et al, eds, *The Human Sustainable City: Challenges and Perspectives from the Habitat Agenda* (Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 55-69.

<sup>120</sup> Reid Ewing et al. “Overview,” in *Growing Cooler: The Evidence on Urban Development and Climate Change* (Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute, 2008), 1-16.

<sup>121</sup> Ewing et al, 3-4.

<sup>122</sup> Anne Vernez Moudon, Paul M. Hess, Mary Catherine Snyder, and Kiril Stanilov. “Effects of Site Design on Pedestrian Travel in Mixed-Use, Medium-Density Environments,” *Transportation Research Record* vol 1578 (August 1997): 48–55.

<sup>123</sup> Peter Newman, Timothy Beatley, and Heather Boyer, “Hope for Resilient Cities: Transport,” in *Resilient Cities: Responding to Peak Oil and Climate Change* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2009), 86-111 at 86-87.

<sup>124</sup> Siobhan O’Connor, “Infra What?,” in *Reinventing Our Wheels: Visionary ideas for the coming transportation revolution*, *GOOD*

*Magazine* 015 (Spring 2009): 25-79 at 30.

<sup>125</sup> For a more detailed discussion of these problems, see Paul Roberts, “And Now For Something Completely Different,” in *The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World* (Boston: Houghtlin Mifflin, 2004), 188-214.

<sup>126</sup> Ewing et al, 8.

This chapter provides an overview of how land use policies in L.A.'s 35 community plan areas have changed over time; no other studies have quantified and analyzed how L.A.'s land use policies have changed since the inception of community planning in 1969. Of particular interest to me is how land use changes differ across the 35 areas and if these changes relate to their demographic, economic, or built environment characteristics. I am especially interested in whether there is a correlation with demographic measures, economic metrics, and even qualities of the built environment itself. As noted in Chapter 2 (Research Design & Methods), since 1970 onwards (when the first community plan was adopted), the City of L.A. has been planned at the local level, with 35 community plans collectively constituting the Land Use Element of the Los

Angeles General Plan. There have been 104 community plans adopted by L.A. City Council, divided into three "eras" – the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.<sup>1</sup> It is these 104 plans that form the basis of my analysis in this chapter. Since no prior research on L.A.'s community plans exists, as a resource for future researchers, I have provided a succinct quantitative summary of the land uses changes and area characteristics in each community plan area in Appendix A. These plans largely reflect the recommendations of Citizens Advisory Committees (CACs), which were comprised of local community members appointed by City Council members whose districts overlapped with the plan areas. As such, the plans reflect the goals, wishes and priorities of CAC members. The analysis proceeds as follows:

### 5.1. HOW LAND USE AREAS HAVE CHANGED OVER TIME

I first present an overview of how the areage of the City was allocated to five different uses – single-family residential, multi-family residential, commercial, industrial, and open space – across the 35 different community plans over time.

### 5.2. HOW RESIDENTIAL DENSITY HAS CHANGED OVER TIME

I then proceed to a second analysis of how residential categories changed over time. I summarize the overall changes in residential land uses, but also break them down into single- and multi-family.<sup>2</sup>

### 5.3. AREA CHARACTERISTICS AND LAND USE CHANGE

While 5.1 and 5.2 largely use descriptive statistics to paint a picture of how land uses changed (in particular residential uses), I then turn to more analytical methods to test whether these changes bear any relationship to the demographic, economic, and built environment characteristics of the 35 community plan

areas. This involves the use of regression modeling to test the significance of various characteristics.

### 5.4 HOMEOWNER ACTIVITY AND LAND USE CHANGE

The results of section 5.3 suggest a relationship between homeowner activity and resultant land use changes. Section 5.4 tests this hypothesis examining where homeowner groups have been most active city-wide and the patterns of land use change.

### 5.5 IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

I then summarize the key findings from this part of the research project, drawing general conclusions about not only how land uses have changed, but the spatial distribution of these changes, especially as they relate to homeowner activity and area characteristics. Why homeowners became so active is then covered in Chapter 6.

### 5.1. HOW LAND USE AREAS HAVE CHANGED OVER TIME

How a given community divides its land area into different uses says a lot about its goals and priorities. To some extent, the composition of a community’s land uses is determined by past decisions. For example, an area that has been developed as an industrial center is unlikely to suddenly become an area of single-family homes. This is not only because the investment in infrastructure required to serve such an industrial zone would make its conversion economically challenging, but also the politics of land use strongly shapes the discourse about the future of a community. An area comprised of businesses

is more likely to mobilize around concerns of importance to business interests. By contrast, an area comprised mostly of single-family homes is more likely to advocate for quality of life issues. This dynamic also suggests that the degree to which an area changes is strongly influenced by how well mobilized an area’s stakeholders are. Highly organized areas that are attuned to land use issues are unlikely to see radical changes in land uses, on the one hand, while areas with little to no organized resistance to change are more likely to see changes in land use, provided there is a market demand for change.

	1970s		1980s		1990s		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	<b>48.9%</b>	139,001	<b>47.0%</b>	131,283	<b>48.6%</b>	117,662	<b>-0.3%</b>	<b>-0.6%</b>
Multi-Family	<b>14.5%</b>	41,283	<b>16.1%</b>	44,882	<b>13.2%</b>	31,997	<b>-1.3%</b>	<b>-9.0%</b>
Commercial	<b>5.8%</b>	16,482	<b>6.5%</b>	18,205	<b>5.7%</b>	13,822	<b>-0.1%</b>	<b>-1.5%</b>
Industrial	<b>8.3%</b>	23,497	<b>7.8%</b>	21,898	<b>7.8%</b>	18,854	<b>-0.5%</b>	<b>-5.8%</b>
Open Space	<b>22.4%</b>	63,733	<b>22.6%</b>	63,278	<b>24.6%</b>	59,527	<b>2.2%</b>	<b>9.7%</b>

<sup>1</sup> change is the difference between 1990s and 1970s.

<sup>2</sup> 1990s plans report net (not gross) acreage, i.e. street areas deducted

Fig. 5-1: Summary of Total Land Areas by Use

In this section, I begin by documenting how land use areas have been allocated within L.A.'s 35 community plan areas roughly between 1970 and 2000. The raw data for each community plan area is summarized in Appendix A. Below, I aggregate this data to understand how land uses have changed for the City of Los Angeles as a whole.<sup>3</sup> The results are summarized in Fig. 5-1.

What is readily apparent from Fig. 5-1 is that in the City as a whole, the area allocated to different uses has not radically changed over 30 years. This could be partially explained by the fact that much of L.A.'s buildable land area had already been developed by the 1970s. Prior to the 1970s, we saw a much greater change in land area as many areas on the City's periphery were still designated (and used) for agricultural purposes. The San Fernando Valley, in particular, saw dramatic change over this period as lemon and orange groves were rapidly converted to single-family suburban housing.<sup>4</sup> The more urbanized core of the City, too, saw dramatic change during this

period as older single-family homes were converted to multi-family apartments and entire residential areas (i.e. Bunker Hill, Chavez Ravine) were razed in the name of urban renewal.<sup>5</sup> But after 1970, the planning of L.A. shifted to local community plan areas. In addition to the lack of developable land, we might hypothesize that the relatively small changes we saw in land use designations thereafter reflected a stronger tendency to prefer the status quo in the local planning process – which marked a clear departure from the post-war, pro-growth period. That said, establishing causality between the shift towards local community planning (which empowered local groups) and the relative stability of land use areas is difficult, given the complexity of social forces at play.

As Fig. 5-1 illustrates, land was not converted to other uses very much in the community planning era. In fact, single-family uses were virtually unchanged, from 48.9% of land area in the 1970s-era plans down to 47.0% in the 1980s and back up to 48.6% in the 1990s. It is perhaps a little surprising that the

area for single-family housing did not drop more, considering the population of Los Angeles increased from about 2.8 million in 1970 to roughly 3.7 million in 2000 – an increase of almost 900,000.<sup>6</sup> One might have expected more single-family land to be converted to multi-family to absorb this increased population, but the overall area changes do not suggest this was the case.

In contrast – and even more surprisingly – is that the area allocated to multi-family housing, after initially rising in the 1980s, actually dropped between the 1970s-era plans and 1990s plans – from 14.5% in the 1970s to 16.1% in the 1980s down to 13.2% in the 1990s (although, as we will see later in this study, by the 2000s, in part due to the arrival of mass transit, a movement towards urban infill and transit-oriented development had emerged, which likely at least halted the decline in multi-family land). While this overall decrease is small in net terms (1.3%), it does represent a 9% decline over a period when L.A.’s population increased by 30%. This suggests an important finding: **that changes to land uses were**

**not necessarily dramatic *between* different use types; rather a change of the allowable density *within* the residential category was more likely occurring.**

For example, to illustrate how this might work, a single-family area could be significantly downzoned by changing its designation within the single-family category from one that allowed smaller 5,000 square-foot lots such as Low II (5 to 9 dwelling units per acre, for an average density of 7 du/ac) to one that required much larger “estate” lots of at least 40,000 square feet, as is the case with the Minimum designation (0 to 1 dwelling units per acre, for an average density of 0.5 du/ac).<sup>7</sup> Smaller steps within any of the three other single-family categories – Low I (4 to 5 du/ac, averaging 4.5), Very Low II (3 to 4 du/ac, averaging 3.5), and Very Low I (1 to 3 du/ac, averaging 2.5) – were also possible. So even if the area within a given community plan designated for single-family use remained unchanged, the allowable density could be increased or decreased by an average of 14 times (i.e. 0.5 to 7 du/ac if

or even more if densities were closer to 0 du/ac on the low end and/or closer to 9 du/ac on the high end. Within multi-family areas, shifting from higher density categories to lower density categories (and vice versa) appears to be even more prevalent since the reduction in area for multi-family land uses was more significant for multi-family than for single-family (i.e. 9% vs. 0.6% reduction). The variation of density changes within multi-family is just as great as within single-family – ranging from Low-Medium I (9 to 18 du/ac, averaging 13.5 du/ac) to High (109 to 218, averaging 163.5 du/ac) – a potential average 12-fold difference in density, and much more if densities approached the margins of the categories (closer to 9 du/ac on the low end and/or closer to 218 du/ac on the high end). It is for this reason that changes to residential density must be examined more closely within the categories of the residential uses, rather than draw conclusions based on changes to land area alone (I take up this analysis in section 5.2 below).

Differences within the Commercial and Industrial

designations are less significant to the present study. Commercial zones include a range of sub-designations such as Limited, Neighborhood, General, Community, and Regional Center that reflected the type of commercial (which corresponds to whether it was of a local/convenience nature or a regional attraction). Changes within these Commercial designations are important, but not for answering the research questions proposed for this study. So I have limited my analysis here to simply the overall changes within the Commercial designation.

It is widely known that Proposition 13 (1978) had a negative impact on city revenues in California by capping and freezing property taxes at one percent of the market value of property, until it is significantly altered or a change in ownership occurs, at which time it is re-assessed.<sup>8</sup> Among the strategies California cities adopted to mitigate the impact of Prop 13 was to encourage more commercial development, so the municipality could capture a portion of the sales taxes generated.<sup>9</sup> For this reason, we might have expected to see an increase in area



allocated to Commercial uses in the 1980s and 1990s plans. While there was an initial increase in the 1980s – from 5.8% to 6.5% – this was short-lived, as Commercial area dropped to 5.7% by the 1990s, returning more or less to where it was in the 1970s (a 1.5% decrease).

Similar to Commercial, the distinctions between Commercial Manufacturing and Limited Industrial are not as important to this study as the overall allocation of Industrial uses. As we might expect due to economic restructuring, the reduction of military aerospace spending in the 1990s, and the conversion of former industrial facilities downtown into lofts, we saw a modest 5.8% decrease in Industrial land uses – from 8.3% in the 1970s to 7.8% in the 1990s. In some ways, it is surprising that they did not decline further.

While all other uses declined, Open Space and Public Facilities was the only use to increase in land area, but still modestly (almost 10%) – from 22.4% to 24.6%. Since many plans do not report the two as distinct, it is impossible to know

how much of this increase is genuinely open space and how much are new public facilities (for example, expansions of public universities and colleges, new public schools, etc.). This increase in Open Space marks a shift as prior to 1970, open space (which includes agricultural land) was routinely converted to more intensive uses.<sup>10</sup> One potential factor for this increase is the introduction of the Open Space Element in General Plans in 1973.

What distinguishes these other means of influencing density from explicit land use changes is the scale and scope of their application. Increasing setbacks and parking requirements, changing whether kitchens counted as rooms or not, changing setback requirements, or whether setback area could be included in allowable unit calculations were, by and large, applied citywide. Certainly the effects of this were not uniform, given the variation of physical characteristics of different areas. Areas with larger unit sizes would require more parking. Areas with taller buildings would require greater

setbacks. Slope-density requirements would impact only hillside areas. Quantifying the uneven impact of each of these city-wide regulatory changes is a worthy subject of future research. But I expect the impact on density of these variables to be far less than the explicit changes to density made as a result of the community planning process identified in this study.

LAND USE AREA CHANGES ACROSS L.A.'S FOUR QUARTERS

In Chapter 2 (Research Design and Methods), I explained how L.A. could be conceived into four quarters (leaving aside the “tail” that connects South L.A. to the Port<sup>11</sup>) based on demographic and spatial characteristics (see Fig 2-3): (1) The Eastside – which is predominately non-white and lower-income, (2) The East Valley – which is also mostly non-white and middle-class, (3) The West Valley – which is more mixed, but majority white and upper-middle class, and (4) The Westside – which is heavily white and affluent. A comparison of area characteristics is provided in Fig 5-2. While the overall pattern of land use area change (Fig. 5-1) shows little variation, a closer examination of L.A.’s four quarters illustrates the overall patterns conceal important variations among the different quarters.

	EASTSIDE	E. VALLEY	W. VALLEY	WESTSIDE
AREA	130.7	78.6	94.1	124.3
POPULATION	1,752,228	683,622	469,671	537,906
DENSITY	14,478	9,446	5,491	4,678
INCOME	\$41,805	\$49,559	\$71,083	\$97,309
LATINO	55.3%	60.6%	27.6%	14.8%
WHITE	14.2%	25.0%	52.2%	65.8%
BLACK	17.6%	4.6%	3.8%	4.8%
ASIAN	10.6%	6.7%	12.7%	10.5%
NON-CITIZENS	32.9%	30.6%	18.1%	14.4%
JOBLESS	15.3%	11.7%	8.9%	4.0%
POVERTY	29.6%	20.0%	11.2%	6.6%
RENTERS	71.0%	54.1%	37.4%	30.6%
DRIVERS	48.0%	60.4%	72.7%	72.7%
HH SIZE	3.09	3.41	2.83	2.13

Fig. 5-2: Characteristics of L.A.’s Four Quarters

LAND AREA CHANGE - EASTSIDE

TOTAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 Single-Family	32.1%	30.0%	29.8%	-2.3%	-7.2%
2 Multi-Family	30.1%	30.3%	27.7%	-2.4%	-8.0%
3 Commercial	9.3%	11.0%	10.1%	0.8%	8.8%
4 Industrial	9.9%	10.1%	9.4%	-0.5%	-4.9%
5 Open Space	18.6%	18.6%	23.0%	4.4%	23.6%

SINGLE-FAMILY	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 BOYLE HEIGHTS	1.6%	0.8%	0.9%	-0.7%	-42.7%
2 SOUTH L.A.	44.3%	42.7%	35.7%	-8.6%	-19.4%
3 HOLLYWOOD	41.3%	34.8%	33.7%	-7.6%	-18.3%
4 SOUTHEAST L.A.	12.6%	12.5%	11.8%	-0.8%	-6.0%
5 SILVER LAKE	75.2%	73.8%	71.7%	-3.5%	-4.6%
6 WEST ADAMS	39.8%	37.1%	39.4%	-0.3%	-0.9%
7 CENTRAL CITY	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
8 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
9 WESTLAKE	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
10 WILSHIRE	31.2%	30.7%	31.8%	0.6%	1.9%
11 NORTHEAST L.A.	45.0%	46.6%	47.8%	2.8%	6.1%
<b>EASTSIDE</b>	<b>32.1%</b>	<b>30.0%</b>	<b>29.8%</b>	<b>-2.3%</b>	<b>-7.2%</b>

MULTI-FAMILY	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 NORTHEAST L.A.	18.9%	19.5%	14.5%	-4.4%	-23.0%
2 WEST ADAMS	39.7%	40.3%	33.0%	-6.6%	-16.8%
3 HOLLYWOOD	17.6%	17.6%	15.7%	-1.9%	-10.9%
4 SOUTHEAST L.A.	51.0%	50.0%	46.6%	-4.4%	-8.6%
5 BOYLE HEIGHTS	41.3%	41.7%	41.3%	0.0%	-0.1%
6 WILSHIRE	42.6%	42.8%	42.6%	0.0%	0.0%
7 WESTLAKE	45.9%	44.4%	47.4%	1.5%	3.4%
8 SILVER LAKE	8.4%	11.0%	9.0%	0.6%	7.2%
9 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	6.6%	6.5%	7.2%	0.6%	9.2%
10 SOUTH L.A.	29.3%	27.8%	32.8%	3.4%	11.7%
11 CENTRAL CITY	1.5%	7.8%	8.4%	6.8%	441%
<b>EASTSIDE</b>	<b>30.1%</b>	<b>30.3%</b>	<b>27.7%</b>	<b>-2.4%</b>	<b>-8.0%</b>

COMMERCIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 BOYLE HEIGHTS	8.9%	9.5%	8.0%	-1.0%	-10.7%
2 SILVER LAKE	7.3%	7.3%	6.7%	-0.6%	-8.2%
3 NORTHEAST L.A.	5.3%	5.5%	5.0%	-0.3%	-5.8%
4 WESTLAKE	39.2%	42.3%	38.9%	-0.3%	-0.8%
5 HOLLYWOOD	6.0%	7.3%	6.0%	0.0%	-0.2%
6 WILSHIRE	17.2%	17.8%	18.7%	1.4%	8.4%
7 WEST ADAMS	8.6%	10.3%	10.3%	1.7%	19.3%
8 SOUTH L.A.	11.6%	14.5%	14.4%	2.8%	23.7%
9 SOUTHEAST L.A.	6.5%	7.4%	8.7%	2.2%	33.8%
10 CENTRAL CITY	21.8%	38.3%	34.1%	12.3%	56.4%
11 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	5.7%	7.1%	10.3%	4.6%	81.2%
<b>EASTSIDE</b>	<b>9.3%</b>	<b>11.0%</b>	<b>10.1%</b>	<b>0.8%</b>	<b>8.8%</b>

INDUSTRIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 HOLLYWOOD	3.3%	2.2%	2.0%	-1.3%	-39.3%
2 WESTLAKE	6.0%	5.9%	4.2%	-1.8%	-30.5%
3 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	69.9%	75.7%	55.9%	-13.9%	-19.9%
4 NORTHEAST L.A.	10.3%	10.2%	8.8%	-1.4%	-14.1%
5 CENTRAL CITY	50.0%	40.4%	43.2%	-6.8%	-13.6%
6 WEST ADAMS	6.3%	6.3%	6.1%	-0.2%	-2.7%
7 SOUTHEAST L.A.	19.4%	19.4%	20.0%	0.7%	3.4%
8 WILSHIRE	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%	0.0%	6.9%
9 BOYLE HEIGHTS	24.1%	23.4%	26.2%	2.0%	8.4%
10 SILVER LAKE	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%	0.1%	11.6%
11 SOUTH L.A.	3.7%	3.8%	4.6%	0.9%	25.2%
<b>EASTSIDE</b>	<b>9.9%</b>	<b>10.1%</b>	<b>9.4%</b>	<b>-0.5%</b>	<b>-4.9%</b>

OPEN SPACE	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 CENTRAL CITY	26.7%	13.5%	14.4%	-12.3%	-46.1%
2 WILSHIRE	8.4%	8.0%	6.3%	-2.1%	-24.7%
3 BOYLE HEIGHTS	24.0%	24.6%	23.6%	-0.4%	-1.5%
4 WESTLAKE	8.9%	7.4%	9.5%	0.6%	6.8%
5 SOUTH L.A.	11.1%	11.3%	12.6%	1.5%	13.3%
6 NORTHEAST L.A.	20.5%	18.2%	23.8%	3.3%	16.3%
7 SOUTHEAST L.A.	10.5%	10.7%	12.8%	2.3%	21.6%
8 HOLLYWOOD	31.9%	38.1%	42.7%	10.8%	33.8%
9 SILVER LAKE	8.6%	7.5%	12.0%	3.4%	39.6%
10 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	17.9%	10.7%	26.6%	8.7%	48.8%
11 WEST ADAMS	5.7%	6.0%	11.1%	5.5%	97.1%
<b>EASTSIDE</b>	<b>18.6%</b>	<b>18.6%</b>	<b>23.0%</b>	<b>4.4%</b>	<b>23.6%</b>

<sup>1</sup> change is the difference between 1990s and 1970s.

Fig. 5-3: Summary of Land Area Changes on the Eastside

## EASTSIDE

### SINGLE-FAMILY

The observed Eastside land use area changes in Fig. 5-3 show some important differences from the City of L.A. as a whole. The Eastside contains the three communities that have no land designated for single-family land uses (Central City, Central City North, Westlake). The remaining areas saw fairly consistent decline in single-family area. Wilshire was largely unchanged (slight increase of 1.9%). Boyle Heights appears to have experienced a significant decline of single-family uses of over 40%, but very little of this area was single-family to begin with (just 60 acres), so the steep decline here does not have a great impact on the total Eastside numbers. Northeast Los Angeles (NELA) is an exception here with a 6.1% increase in single-family uses, because a few areas in Montecito Heights and Monterey Hills were converted from multi-family to single-family. But overall, area designated for single-family homes

is not only notably lower in the Eastside as compared to L.A. overall, but has also decreased more significantly – dropping from 32.1% to 29.8% (as compared to 48.9% to 48.6% overall), a decline of 7.2% (as compared to 0.6% overall). While the difference in single-family area is roughly 1.6 times greater city-wide than in the Eastside, the decrease in single-family zoning was 12 times greater in the Eastside than L.A. as a whole. By itself, we cannot draw many conclusions, but *prima facie* we do see that an area with fewer single-family homeowners has converted single-family land to other uses at a much higher rate than areas with more single-family homeowners. Why this is an important observation will become clear in Chapter 6.

### MULTI-FAMILY

If the 9% reduction of multi-family land uses in the City as a whole was surprising given a 30% increase in population, it is perhaps even more surprising that the high-density core of the City has converted land away from multi-family uses at an

almost equal rate – decreasing from 30.1% to 27.7%, a decline of 8%. The conversion of multi- to single-family in Northeast L.A. noted above is confirmed in a 23% decline in multi-family area. West Adams also shows a notable decline of 16.8%. Perhaps surprisingly, given its recent renaissance, Hollywood has experienced a nearly 11% drop in multi-housing land area. On the flip side, Southeast L.A. went up by almost 12%. Downtown L.A. (Central City) is a clear exception, with a nearly 4.5 times increase in multi-family area. This is consistent with efforts to attract a resident population downtown after so many years of it being seen as exclusively a job center. Still, the increase here in net acres is small.

#### COMMERCIAL

The decline in multi-family housing land area could, in part, be explained by a commensurate increase (8.8%) in commercial land use, which is different from the citywide decline of 1.5%. This increase in commercial zoning could indicate that land

previously designated for multi-family has been converted to commercial to allow for more mixed-use projects. That the magnitude of the decline in multi-family is close to the increase in commercial may support this theory, although a specific study of which properties were converted would need to be completed to test this assumption. An examination of changes in Central City and Central City North, appear to confirm this. For example, many properties in the South Park area of downtown (south of 8<sup>th</sup> Street) previously zoned multi-family have been converted to commercial. This area has experienced dramatic changes in recent years as mixed-use mid- and high-rise mixed-use projects have been developed around the new L.A. Live entertainment center.

Likewise, properties in Skid Row (between Los Angeles and San Pedro Streets, north of 5<sup>th</sup> Street) have been converted from multi-family to commercial uses, controversially sparking conversions of SROs (single-room occupancies) into loft condominiums. Likewise, areas around Chinatown, including

Union Station (Central City North) have been converted to commercial zoning. The lack of increase in commercial area in Hollywood is surprising, given the decline in multi-family uses. But overall, that commercially zoned property has been more accepted in the lower-income, predominately minority Eastside is notable in and of itself, as we will see in my analysis of motivations of local groups (Chapter 6).

#### INDUSTRIAL

Industrial zoning was reduced at a comparable rate to those of the City as a whole (4.9% in the Eastside vs. 5.8% citywide). Hollywood is notable for its near 40% decline in industrial zoning, almost certainly due to the continued loss of film industry firms to the San Fernando Valley and other regions outside of California (and conversion of many of these lots into multi-family lofts and condos). This loss of industrial land in Hollywood has prompted an effort to preserve an enclave of film production through the City's creation of the Media District, a

business improvement district consisting of nearly 500 parcels in Central Hollywood.<sup>12</sup> These efforts and those in and around the eastside of downtown to preserve industrial land close to lower-income households could explain the slightly smaller decrease of industrial land in the Eastside, as compared with the City as a whole.

#### OPEN SPACE

There was, however, a marked increase in open space in the Eastside – an increase from 18.6% to 23.0%, a rise of 23.6% (as compared with a 9.7% rise citywide). We could speculate that this increase (of roughly 3,500 acres) was a response to the recognition that inner-city L.A. neighborhoods are “park poor”;<sup>13</sup> addressing this need could be a response to the environmental justice movement, which is strong and active in the Eastside. For example, looking at the Central City North community plan area we see a dramatic increase in open space – from 17.9% to 26.6%, an increase of nearly 50% (due to the designation

of the Los Angeles State Historic Park, i.e. the Cornfields Park, as open space). This represents area reclaimed from industrial uses adjacent to the L.A. River.

West Adams is also notable for a near doubling of its open space and public facilities. Some of this area stems from the creation of Jim Gilliam Park as a response to increased poverty and gang activity in the “Jungle” area of Crenshaw (an area that is discussed in detail in the Baldwin Hills case study in Chapter 7). On the other hand, despite the recent addition of more pocket parks downtown, the general pattern has been a loss of Open Space and Public Facilities – from 27% in 1974 to 14% in 2003. This reflects the conversion of public land into commercial land in Bunker Hill and the loss of several open spaces in the southeastern part of downtown (the Industrial District). But overall, the Eastside has experienced a significant increase in open space.

## EAST VALLEY

### SINGLE-FAMILY

As Fig. 5-4 shows, conversion of land away from single-family uses was slightly higher in the East Valley than the City as a whole, although not dramatically (3.3% decline vs 0.6% citywide). Arleta stands out as a community where single-family uses were rapidly converted to more intensive uses – from 68% in 1976 to 46% in 1996 – a decline of more than 30%. North Hollywood and Van Nuys also saw notable declines (10% and 9%, respectively) in single-family area. Mission Hills is an unusual case worthy of study for future researchers – sharply declining from 1975 to 1987 (63% to 37%) before rising back up to 62% in 1999.

The Sunland/Tujunga/Shadow Hills area stands out as a clear outlier with respect to the East Valley in that it experienced a sizeable increase in single-family area of almost 20%. Sunland is, in many ways, its own area – it is physically separated from the rest of the East Valley by the Verdugo Hills

LAND AREA CHANGE - EAST VALLEY

TOTAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 SINGLE-FAMILY	56.7%	51.6%	54.8%	-1.9%	-3.3%
2 MULTI-FAMILY	8.9%	14.4%	10.2%	1.3%	14.9%
3 COMMERCIAL	4.5%	5.1%	4.5%	0.0%	0.5%
4 INDUSTRIAL	8.6%	8.5%	9.2%	0.6%	6.5%
5 OPEN SPACE	21.3%	20.4%	21.3%	0.0%	-0.1%

SINGLE-FAMILY	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 ARLETA	68.0%	*	46.3%	-21.7%	-31.9%
2 NORTH HOLLYWOOD	46.5%	44.6%	41.9%	-4.6%	-10.0%
3 VAN NUYS	53.7%	53.5%	48.9%	-4.8%	-9.0%
4 SYLMAR	68.6%	66.9%	65.0%	-3.5%	-5.2%
5 SUN VALLEY	47.9%	48.4%	47.2%	-0.7%	-1.5%
6 MISSION HILLS	62.7%	37.2%	62.4%	-0.3%	-0.4%
7 SUNLAND	54.8%	56.9%	65.3%	10.5%	19.1%
<b>EAST VALLEY</b>	<b>56.7%</b>	<b>51.6%</b>	<b>54.8%</b>	<b>-1.9%</b>	<b>-3.3%</b>

MULTI-FAMILY	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 SYLMAR	5.9%	5.8%	5.8%	-0.1%	-1.9%
2 NORTH HOLLYWOOD	24.8%	25.9%	26.1%	1.3%	5.3%
3 VAN NUYS	18.0%	19.7%	19.2%	1.3%	7.0%
4 SUNLAND	3.2%	2.6%	3.8%	0.6%	18.2%
5 SUN VALLEY	2.7%	2.9%	3.9%	1.2%	43.6%
6 MISSION HILLS	11.1%	40.3%	17.0%	5.9%	52.6%
7 ARLETA	3.1%	*	6.4%	3.3%	104.2%
<b>EAST VALLEY</b>	<b>8.9%</b>	<b>14.4%</b>	<b>10.2%</b>	<b>1.3%</b>	<b>14.9%</b>

COMMERCIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 ARLETA	4.8%	*	3.6%	-1.2%	-24.9%
2 SYLMAR	2.6%	2.5%	2.3%	-0.3%	-10.2%
3 SUNLAND	1.4%	1.5%	1.3%	-0.1%	-9.1%
4 MISSION HILLS	8.4%	10.3%	8.2%	-0.2%	-2.9%
5 SUN VALLEY	1.7%	1.9%	1.9%	0.2%	9.5%
6 NORTH HOLLYWOOD	8.8%	10.1%	10.4%	1.6%	18.4%
7 VAN NUYS	7.7%	7.8%	9.1%	1.4%	18.4%
<b>EAST VALLEY</b>	<b>4.5%</b>	<b>5.1%</b>	<b>4.5%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0.5%</b>

INDUSTRIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 SUNLAND	2.6%	0.4%	0.3%	-2.4%	-89.9%
2 VAN NUYS	11.0%	10.7%	9.5%	-1.5%	-13.6%
3 SUN VALLEY	19.5%	19.7%	20.1%	0.6%	3.1%
4 ARLETA	9.4%	*	10.0%	0.7%	7.3%
5 NORTH HOLLYWOOD	6.6%	7.0%	8.0%	1.5%	22.2%
6 MISSION HILLS	4.3%	6.3%	5.7%	1.4%	33.8%
7 SYLMAR	6.4%	7.5%	11.0%	4.6%	72.2%
<b>EAST VALLEY</b>	<b>8.6%</b>	<b>8.5%</b>	<b>9.2%</b>	<b>0.6%</b>	<b>6.5%</b>

OPEN SPACE	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 MISSION HILLS	13.5%	6.0%	6.7%	-6.8%	-50.2%
2 SUNLAND	37.9%	38.7%	29.3%	-8.6%	-22.6%
3 SUN VALLEY	28.1%	27.1%	26.9%	-1.2%	-4.4%
4 SYLMAR	16.6%	17.4%	15.9%	-0.7%	-4.2%
5 NORTH HOLLYWOOD	13.4%	12.4%	13.6%	0.3%	1.9%
6 VAN NUYS	9.6%	8.2%	13.2%	3.6%	37.9%
7 ARLETA	14.8%	*	33.7%	19.0%	128.2%
<b>EAST VALLEY</b>	<b>21.3%</b>	<b>20.4%</b>	<b>21.3%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>-0.1%</b>

<sup>1</sup> change is the difference between 1990s and 1970s.

Fig. 5-4: Summary of Land Area Changes in the East Valley



that separate the San Fernando Valley from the Crescenta Valley, where Sunland is located. Its high elevation also gives it a distinct climate. Demographically, it looks more like the West Valley, in that it is 54% white and only 30% Latino (compared with 25% white and 60% for the rest of the East Valley). Since Sunland was one of the few areas of the City with undeveloped land by 1970, new single-family housing developments were still being built in the area in the 1970s and 1980s. If Sunland was not included in the calculation, the loss of single-family land in the East Valley would have been more apparent – a decline of 8% instead of 3.3%.

#### MULTI-FAMILY

Changes in multi-family area in the East Valley show a clear difference from L.A. as a whole. In the East Valley, multi-family land use area increased from 8.9% to 14.4% before coming back down to 10.2% in the 1990s – a nearly 15% *increase* compared with a 9% *decrease* citywide. As with single-family, Mission

Hills experienced a dramatic increase in multi-family area before dropping again in the 1990s – from 11% to 40% to 17%. Despite these erratic swings, the net increase in multi-family area in Mission Hills from 11% to 17% represents an increase of over 50%, sending a clear signal that this community was intended to absorb a good deal of growth. Arleta, however, saw the biggest increase in multi-family area – more than doubling from 3.1% to 6.4%, while Sun Valley was also notable for its 44% increase in multi-family. Overall, six of the seven areas in the East Valley saw increases in multi-family area. Sylmar, with a modest decline of 1.9%, stands out as the exception here. Outside of Sylmar, the increase in multi-family area in the East Valley increased by 27%, a clear shift in land use area.

#### COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL

Commercial zoning in the East Valley as a whole was essentially unchanged, in keeping with the City as a whole, but this conceals a wide variation across the seven communities –

with three areas (Arleta, Sylmar, Sunland) experiencing a notable decline, three areas (Van Nuys, North Hollywood, Sun Valley) a notable increase and one area (Mission Hills) largely unchanged. The change in industrial area in the East Valley was different from the City. While industrial land *decreased* by 5.8% in L.A., it actually *increased* by 6.5% in the East Valley. As with commercial land, changes in industrial land varied widely across the East Valley. As with single- and multi-family changes, Sunland (90% *decrease*) and Sylmar (72% *increase*) are clear outliers in the region.

#### OPEN SPACE

Open Space, too, shows a different pattern – while this use saw the biggest increase citywide (about 10%), the East Valley did not allocate any new area to Open Space and Public Facilities. This absence of new Open Space is especially surprising given the dramatic increase in population in the East Valley over this period – rising from roughly 475,000 in 1970 to almost

750,000 in 2000, an increase of nearly 50%.<sup>14</sup> Arleta's Open Space and Public Facilities uses appear to have more than doubled, but this is misleading, since this is due to the re-designation of the Whiteman Airport from Industrial to Public Facilities, even though its use has not changed. Likewise, while it appears that Mission Hills lost over half of its Open Space, this is misleading because it is due to the re-designation of the San Fernando Mission Cemetery from Open Space to Residential, even though it remains a cemetery. Sunland's 23% loss of open space is explained by the aforementioned conversion of agriculturally designated land into new single- and multi-family housing. Excluding Mission Hills and Arleta from the calculation would reveal an even greater disparity relative to the City as a whole – a decline of 6.5% (instead of essentially unchanged), as compared to an increase of 10% city-wide.

LAND AREA CHANGE - WEST VALLEY

TOTAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 Single-Family	65.7%	65.3%	64.3%	-1.4%	-2.1%
2 Multi-Family	5.1%	5.5%	5.8%	0.7%	13.8%
3 Commercial	4.4%	4.7%	4.9%	0.4%	9.7%
4 Industrial	6.5%	6.4%	7.6%	1.1%	17.6%
5 Open Space	18.3%	18.0%	17.4%	-0.9%	-4.7%

SINGLE-FAMILY	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 NORTHRIDGE	73.7%	73.0%	70.6%	-3.1%	-4.2%
2 GRANADA HILLS	67.5%	66.3%	64.9%	-2.6%	-3.9%
3 RESEDA	59.3%	56.4%	57.3%	-2.0%	-3.3%
4 CANOGA PARK	69.1%	70.4%	68.2%	-0.9%	-1.3%
5 CHATSWORTH	60.6%	60.6%	60.8%	0.3%	0.4%
<b>WEST VALLEY</b>	<b>65.7%</b>	<b>65.3%</b>	<b>64.3%</b>	<b>-1.4%</b>	<b>-2.1%</b>

MULTI-FAMILY	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 CANOGA PARK	6.7%	6.4%	5.7%	-1.0%	-14.3%
2 RESEDA	7.2%	9.6%	8.3%	1.1%	15.1%
3 GRANADA HILLS	2.2%	2.3%	2.6%	0.4%	16.5%
4 NORTHRIDGE	5.7%	6.5%	6.7%	1.0%	16.8%
5 CHATSWORTH	3.8%	3.8%	6.5%	2.7%	69.7%
<b>WEST VALLEY</b>	<b>5.1%</b>	<b>5.5%</b>	<b>5.8%</b>	<b>0.7%</b>	<b>13.8%</b>

COMMERCIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 NORTHRIDGE	4.3%	4.7%	4.4%	0.1%	2.3%
2 CANOGA PARK	6.2%	6.6%	6.7%	0.5%	7.9%
3 GRANADA HILLS	3.0%	3.0%	3.2%	0.2%	8.1%
4 RESEDA	4.7%	5.2%	5.1%	0.4%	8.5%
5 CHATSWORTH	3.2%	3.2%	4.1%	0.8%	26.0%
<b>WEST VALLEY</b>	<b>4.4%</b>	<b>4.7%</b>	<b>4.9%</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>9.7%</b>

INDUSTRIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 CANOGA PARK	5.2%	5.3%	4.7%	-0.5%	-9.7%
2 CHATSWORTH	12.9%	12.9%	12.0%	-0.9%	-7.3%
3 GRANADA HILLS	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	-
4 NORTHRIDGE	3.3%	2.9%	3.7%	0.5%	14.9%
5 RESEDA	7.8%	7.9%	17.3%	9.5%	120.7%
<b>WEST VALLEY</b>	<b>6.5%</b>	<b>6.4%</b>	<b>7.6%</b>	<b>1.1%</b>	<b>17.6%</b>

OPEN SPACE	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 RESEDA	21.0%	20.8%	12.0%	-9.0%	-42.8%
2 CHATSWORTH	19.5%	19.5%	16.6%	-2.8%	-14.5%
3 GRANADA HILLS	27.2%	28.4%	29.2%	2.0%	7.5%
4 NORTHRIDGE	13.0%	12.9%	14.6%	1.6%	12.1%
5 CANOGA PARK	12.8%	11.2%	14.6%	1.9%	14.6%
<b>WEST VALLEY</b>	<b>18.3%</b>	<b>18.0%</b>	<b>17.4%</b>	<b>-0.9%</b>	<b>-4.7%</b>

<sup>1</sup> change is the difference between 1990s and 1970s.

Fig. 5-5: Summary of Land Area Changes in the West Valley

## WEST VALLEY

### SINGLE-FAMILY

As Fig. 5-5 shows, the West Valley closely mirrored the City as a whole in its decrease in single-family area (2.1% vs 0.6% city-wide). And this was quite consistent across the five communities of the West Valley (which are, in land area, notably larger than most – West Valley communities average roughly 18.8 acres, while Eastside communities average about 11.9 acres, more than 50% larger). Chatsworth is the only area that experienced an increase in single family, albeit only slightly, likely due to the conversion of agricultural land in Porter Ranch to housing, which was one of the last areas of the Valley to be developed.

### MULTI-FAMILY

Similar to the East Valley, the West Valley saw a notable increase in multi-family housing. Much of this housing was due to the development of many townhouse complexes in Chatsworth

and the development of Porter Ranch. The roughly 375 acres of additional multi-family housing in Chatsworth represented a 70% increase over this period. But Reseda, Granada Hills and Northridge also saw increases in multi-family townhouse development, resulting in a 15-17% increase in land area. Canoga Park is notable for its 14% decline in multi-family housing. This is somewhat surprising given the development of Warner Center, a large mixed-use center that included considerable multi-family housing. However, a comparison of the original 1972 land use map with the most recent (1999) land use map suggests that many of these multi-family properties were converted to commercial zoning, to accommodate a greater mix of uses in Warner Center. Overall, the West Valley saw an increase of 13.8% in multi-family housing, similar to the 14.9% in the East Valley.

## COMMERCIAL

The West Valley has been exceptional relative to the City as whole in its relative acceptance of new commercial development – a roughly 10% increase, as compared with a 1.5% decline city-wide. While it would be tempting to attribute this to Warner Center, Canoga Park itself only increased by 7.9%. The clear stand-out here is Chatsworth, with a 26% increase in commercial land use, mostly due to the commercial portion of Porter Ranch as well as a conversion of properties from industrial to commercial just west of the Northridge Fashion Center to accommodate a mix of “big box” retail (Lowe’s home center), apartments and commercial strip stores.

## INDUSTRIAL

The West Valley is also exceptional in its increase of industrial land – a 17.6% increase as compared with a 5.8% decrease city-wide. At first glance, this might seem reasonable since Warner Center was developed as a mixed-use area including industrial

facilities related to the aerospace industry (for example, Rocketdyne and Litton Industries). But the 1972 Canoga Park community plan already allocated this land to industrial use and in fact, Canoga Park experienced the largest decline in the West Valley (almost 10%). The increase in the West Valley appears to be misleading. As Fig. 5-5 shows, almost all of this increase is in Reseda/West Van Nuys, which more than doubled from 7.8% industrial to 17.3%. While this might be explained by an expansion of the Van Nuys airport, an inspection of the original 1974 Reseda Community Plan shows that airport-related activities have been contained within the area originally designated for industrial use. It appears that the city, however, re-designated the airport itself (runways, taxi areas) to industrial use, from previously being considered a public use.

So while technically a change in use, for practical purposes, it is not consequential. Removing Reseda from the calculation produces a very different result – a decline of roughly 6%, consistent with the citywide 6% decline. So we should treat

**WESTSIDE**

the 17.6% increase with caution.

**OPEN SPACE**

The aforementioned re-assignment of the airport runways and taxi areas from public to industrial use also distorts the Open Space and Public Facilities calculations in Reseda (which shows a more than 40% decline). Including Reseda, open space appears to have declined by roughly 5%, quite at odds with the City as a whole (roughly 10% increase). But excluding Reseda shows a roughly 3% increase, still less than the City as a whole. The development of Porter Ranch helps explain the near 15% loss of open space in Chatsworth.

**SINGLE-FAMILY**

As Fig. 5-6 shows, while overall it appears there was an increase in single-family zoning on the Westside (1.4% increase) as compared with a 0.6% decrease city-wide, this is strongly influenced by Brentwood/Pacific Palisades. Brentwood experienced a 25% increase in single-family area, as some areas that were previously undeveloped hillsides were converted to single-family homes in the 1980s. This was clearly an anomaly, however, as most areas on the Westside were reduced more or less across the board. Since Brentwood is easily the largest community plan area, this had a disproportionate impact. If we exclude Brentwood from the calculation, the rest of the Westside had roughly a 6% decrease in single-family, notably larger than the city as a whole.

LAND AREA CHANGE - WESTSIDE

TOTAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
Single-Family	53.0%	52.3%	53.8%	0.8%	1.4%
Multi-Family	7.9%	8.6%	6.9%	-1.0%	-12.8%
Commercial	3.9%	4.0%	3.1%	-0.8%	-19.3%
Industrial	2.2%	2.3%	1.8%	-0.4%	-16.2%
Open Space	33.0%	32.8%	34.4%	1.4%	4.1%

SINGLE-FAMILY	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 BEL AIR	78.0%	78.0%	66.6%	-11.4%	-14.7%
2 WESTCHESTER	45.1%	39.1%	39.0%	-6.1%	-13.5%
3 VENICE	25.8%	24.7%	23.7%	-2.1%	-8.3%
4 SHERMAN OAKS	75.2%	73.8%	71.7%	-3.5%	-4.6%
5 PALMS	50.7%	48.5%	48.4%	-2.3%	-4.5%
6 WESTWOOD	32.3%	32.5%	31.1%	-1.2%	-3.9%
7 WEST L.A.	44.2%	44.0%	43.6%	-0.6%	-1.4%
8 ENCINO	60.3%	60.4%	60.6%	0.2%	0.4%
9 BRENTWOOD	39.0%	39.5%	49.0%	9.9%	25.4%
<b>WESTSIDE</b>	<b>53.0%</b>	<b>52.3%</b>	<b>53.8%</b>	<b>0.8%</b>	<b>1.4%</b>

MULTI-FAMILY	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 VENICE	50.9%	48.8%	41.6%	-9.3%	-18.3%
2 WEST L.A.	23.0%	22.8%	20.4%	-2.6%	-11.4%
3 BRENTWOOD	1.7%	1.9%	1.6%	-0.1%	-5.8%
4 ENCINO	3.7%	3.8%	3.7%	0.0%	-1.2%
5 WESTCHESTER	14.2%	17.3%	14.1%	-0.1%	-0.7%
6 PALMS	21.8%	23.5%	22.8%	1.0%	4.5%
7 WESTWOOD	14.1%	13.7%	14.9%	0.9%	6.1%
8 SHERMAN OAKS	8.4%	11.0%	9.0%	0.6%	7.2%
9 BEL AIR	0.2%	0.1%	0.6%	0.4%	234%
<b>WESTSIDE</b>	<b>7.9%</b>	<b>8.6%</b>	<b>6.9%</b>	<b>-1.0%</b>	<b>-12.8%</b>

COMMERCIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 BEL AIR	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	-0.1%	-49.9%
2 VENICE	9.9%	10.2%	6.6%	-3.3%	-33.5%
3 BRENTWOOD	0.7%	0.7%	0.5%	-0.2%	-22.1%
4 ENCINO	3.6%	3.0%	3.0%	-0.7%	-18.5%
5 WEST L.A.	11.1%	11.1%	9.3%	-1.8%	-16.0%
6 WESTWOOD	4.2%	4.6%	3.7%	-0.4%	-10.1%
7 WESTCHESTER	11.2%	12.2%	10.2%	-1.0%	-9.2%
8 SHERMAN OAKS	7.3%	7.3%	6.7%	-0.6%	-8.2%
9 PALMS	5.4%	6.1%	6.1%	0.7%	12.8%
<b>WESTSIDE</b>	<b>3.9%</b>	<b>4.0%</b>	<b>3.1%</b>	<b>-0.8%</b>	<b>-19.3%</b>

INDUSTRIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 VENICE	5.6%	5.1%	2.7%	-2.9%	-51.6%
2 ENCINO	0.3%	0.4%	0.2%	-0.1%	-25.2%
3 WESTCHESTER	14.1%	14.3%	11.0%	-3.1%	-22.3%
4 BEL AIR	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-
5 BRENTWOOD	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-
6 WESTWOOD	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	-
7 WEST L.A.	7.9%	7.8%	8.4%	0.5%	6.5%
8 SHERMAN OAKS	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%	0.1%	11.6%
9 PALMS	7.6%	8.0%	9.2%	1.6%	20.6%
<b>WESTSIDE</b>	<b>2.2%</b>	<b>2.3%</b>	<b>1.8%</b>	<b>-0.4%</b>	<b>-16.2%</b>

OPEN SPACE	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 BRENTWOOD	58.5%	57.9%	48.9%	-9.7%	-16.5%
2 PALMS	14.5%	13.8%	13.5%	-1.0%	-6.6%
3 WESTWOOD	49.4%	49.1%	50.2%	0.8%	1.6%
4 ENCINO	32.0%	32.5%	32.6%	0.5%	1.7%
5 WEST L.A.	13.9%	14.2%	18.4%	4.5%	32.6%
6 SHERMAN OAKS	8.6%	7.5%	12.0%	3.4%	39.6%
7 BEL AIR	21.6%	21.7%	32.7%	11.1%	51.4%
8 WESTCHESTER	15.4%	17.1%	25.8%	10.4%	67.4%
9 VENICE	7.8%	11.2%	25.4%	17.7%	227.0%
<b>WESTSIDE</b>	<b>33.0%</b>	<b>32.8%</b>	<b>34.4%</b>	<b>1.4%</b>	<b>4.1%</b>

<sup>1</sup> change is the difference between 1990s and 1970s.

Fig. 5-6: Summary of Land Area Changes on the Westside

## MULTI-FAMILY

Areas on the Westside decreased multi-family land use by almost 13% overall, as compared with 9% citywide. Bel Air/Beverly Crest appears as an outlier – a 234% increase – but this is over-stated since there is almost no multi-family zoning in Bel Air and the change was made only to accommodate a single high-end boutique hotel (the Hotel Bel-Air). The decline in Venice of almost 20% represents the most on the Westside. Given the high cost of land on the Westside, multi-family housing is also quite different here from elsewhere in the city – a higher share being high-priced condos rather than lower-cost rentals.<sup>15</sup>

## COMMERCIAL

Commercial land was dramatically reduced on the Westside by almost 20% between the 1970s and 1990s. In fact, this is probably under-stated because Palms is an outlier for both commercial zoning (an increase of almost 13%) and demographically for the Westside. Palms-Mar Vista-Del Rey is an

unusual Community Plan area – existing almost as the remainder of other, more well-defined communities. It is bordered on three sides by other municipalities – Santa Monica, Culver City, and Marina Del Rey (which is unincorporated L.A. County). In fact, Culver City literally bisects it into two separate pieces. It is also demographically distinct from the rest of the Westside. For example, its mean household income of \$58,311 is almost half of the mean household income of the entire Westside's, which is \$101,206.<sup>16</sup> But because Palms is the most populous of the Westside areas, it drags down the Westside average (without Palms, the mean Westside household income rises to \$106,311). Excluding Palms, the rest of the Westside had a decrease of closer to 25% in commercial area.

## INDUSTRIAL

The Westside contains the only three areas with no industrially zoned land in the city (Bel Air, Brentwood, Westwood). But the Westside in general has much less industrial land than the City



as a whole – only 1.8% as compared with 7.8% for L.A. But it also experienced a greater decline than the city overall (about 16% vs 5.8% overall). Even this is understated, again because Palms is an outlier, having experienced a 20% increase in industrial land. Exclusive of Palms, Westside industrial zoning decreased by roughly 25%.

#### OPEN SPACE

On the whole, it appears the Westside did not add as much open space as the city overall (about 4% vs 10% overall). But this includes Brentwood, which is an outlier due to its large amount of previously undeveloped land (and therefore a 16% decrease in open space). Excluding Brentwood has the dramatic effect of increasing open space in the rest of the Westside by almost 25%, 2.5 times that of the City as a whole. Venice features a particularly dramatic increase, from 7.8% to 17.7% since it converted its entire beach front from residential to public and open space uses.

#### SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION

We can conclude from the above descriptive summary of changes that, in general, the Westside appears to have reduced all four types of uses – with the exception of open space – by more than the City as a whole. The Eastside is marked by its greater acceptance of commercial land. Meanwhile, the East and West Valleys are characterized by their significant increase in multi-family housing. Mapping land use area changes, we can see that there are not especially distinct spatial patterns to land area changes.

#### SINGLE FAMILY

From Fig. 5-7 (where black is an increase in land area for single family uses and red is a decrease), we can see that single-family areas were fairly consistently reduced across the city. Two areas stand out in their significant increase in land area for single-family – Brentwood (+25.4%) and Sunland (+19.1%), two

### SINGLE-FAMILY land area change

- 1 Brentwood (+25.4%)
- 2 Sunland (+19.1%)
- 3 Northeast L.A. (+6.1%)
- 4 Wilshire (+1.9%)
- 5 Chatsworth (+0.4%)
- 6 Encino (+0.4%)
- 7 Central City (0)
- 8 Central City North (0)
- 9 Westlake (0)
- 10 Mission Hills (-0.4%)
- 11 West Adams (-0.9%)
- 12 Canoga Park (-1.3%)
- 13 West L.A. (-1.4%)
- 14 Sun Valley (-1.5%)
- 15 Reseda (-3.3%)
- 16 Westwood (-3.9%)
- 17 Granada Hills (-3.9%)
- 18 Northridge (-4.2%)
- 19 Palms (-4.5%)
- 20 Sherman Oaks (-4.6%)
- 21 Sylmar (-5.2%)
- 22 Southeast L.A. (-6.0%)
- 23 Silver Lake (-7.8%)
- 24 Venice (-8.3%)
- 25 Van Nuys (-9.0%)
- 26 North Hollywood (-10.0%)
- 27 Westchester (-13.5%)
- 28 Bel Air (-14.7%)
- 29 Hollywood (-18.3%)
- 30 South L.A. (-19.4%)
- 31 Arleta (+31.9%)
- 32 Boyle Heights (-42.7%)

0 to 4.9%	< -15%
5 to 9.9%	-14.9 to -10%
10 to 14.9%	-9.9 to -5%
15%+	-4.9 to 0%

**LOS ANGELES**  
**-0.6%**  
**overall**




Fig. 5-7: Map of Single-Family Land Area Changes

areas that still had undeveloped land by 1970. Only one other area is even above 2% (Northeast L.A., +6.1%), while three saw negligible increases (Wilshire, Chatsworth, and Encino). Since Brentwood (1<sup>st</sup> in area, 38.05 square miles) and Sunland (6<sup>th</sup> in area, 21.90 square miles) are two of the larger areas, they have the effect of skewing the overall calculation. While single-family area declined by 0.6% overall, if Brentwood and Sunland were excluded, the decline would have been 3.5%. But overall, there isn't a strong spatial pattern. This is likely because a decline in single-family represents two confounding tendencies: (1) areas where single-family area is being converted to multi-family, which tend to be lower-income and less white, but also (2) areas that are being downzoned across the board, which tend to be more affluent and more white. Given these complex interactions, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the spatial pattern of single family land area change.

#### MULTI-FAMILY

From Fig. 5-8 (again, black represents an increase, red a decrease), we can see that with the exception of Sylmar (-1.9%) the North part of the San Fernando Valley saw significant (over 15%) increases in multi-family land areas. This is likely because the early settlements of these areas were initially converted from agricultural to single-family uses and only by the 1970s was there a demand for multi-family housing there. But this is the only readily apparent pattern. The rest of the City shows a range of increases and decreases. We could possibly make an argument that areas with significant hillside areas -- Canoga Park (the Woodland Hills portion), Encino, Brentwood, Hollywood, and Northeast L.A. saw more significant decreases in multi-family area.

Bel Air stands out as an exception, but as previously noted its high increase is due to extremely low area set aside for multi-family, such that one hotel project (Hotel Bel-Air) being re-designated for multi-family use produces a dramatic increase.

### MULTI-FAMILY land area change

- 1 Central City (+441%)
- 2 Bel Air (+234%)
- 3 Arleta (+104%)
- 4 Chatsworth (+69.7%)
- 5 Mission Hills (+52.6%)
- 6 Sun Valley (+43.6%)
- 7 Sunland (+18.2%)
- 8 Northridge (+16.8%)
- 9 Granada Hills (+16.5%)
- 10 Reseda (+15.1%)
- 11 South L.A. (+11.7%)
- 12 Central City North (+9.2%)
- 13 Sherman Oaks (+7.2%)
- 14 Silver Lake (+7.2%)
- 15 Van Nuys (+7.0%)
- 16 Westwood (+6.1%)
- 17 North Hollywood (+5.3%)
- 18 Palms (+4.5%)
- 19 Westlake (+3.4%)
- 20 Wilshire (0)
- 21 Boyle Heights (-0.1%)
- 22 Westchester (-0.7%)
- 23 Encino (-1.2%)
- 24 Sylmar (-1.9%)
- 25 Brentwood (-5.8%)
- 26 Southeast L.A. (-8.6%)
- 27 Hollywood (-10.9%)
- 28 West L.A. (-11.4%)
- 29 Canoga Park (-14.3%)
- 30 West Adams (-16.8%)
- 31 Venice (-18.3%)
- 32 Northeast L.A. (-23.0%)

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0 to 4.9%</li> <li>5 to 9.9%</li> <li>10 to 14.9%</li> <li>15%+</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&lt; -15%</li> <li>-14.9 to -10%</li> <li>-9.9 to -5%</li> <li>-4.9 to 0%</li> </ul> |
|---|---|




Fig. 5-8: Map of Multi-Family Land Area Changes

Sherman Oaks would need further study, as it shows a small increase (+7.2%) in multi-family area, despite being a heavily hillside area. But a comparison of the 1974 and 1998 Sherman Oaks community plans show that the increase in multi-family was in the Toluca Lake portion of the plan area, which is not a hillside area. Overall, there are no clear spatial patterns to multi-family land use area change.

#### COMMERCIAL

From Fig. 5-9, it is clear that areas in and around downtown saw significant (over 15%) increases in commercial land area, with five of the highest six being in the contiguous area that includes Central City, Central City North, Southeast L.A., South L.A. and West Adams. Among the findings following the 1965 Watts unrest (and again following the 1992 Rodney King uprising) was the lack of commercial areas, particularly the absence of grocery stores, in and around South L.A.<sup>17</sup> Certainly there has been a greater effort to attract more commercial uses in this area. The

increase in commercial land use here is also, in part, explained by the large number of local community redevelopment areas or CRAs (prior to the dismantling of CRAs in 2011), California state enterprise zones, and federal empowerment zones, each of which use incentives to attract businesses to areas that traditionally have had low private sector investment.<sup>18</sup> It is also clear that the affluent Westside area saw significant (over 10%) decreases in commercial land area – in Encino, Brentwood, Bel Air, Westwood, West L.A. and Venice.

#### INDUSTRIAL AND OPEN SPACE

Fig. 5-10 shows little discernable spatial pattern to changes in industrial land area change. Likewise, Fig. 5-11 does not demonstrate a significant distribution of changes in open space and public facilities. We might perhaps observe that areas connected to the Hollywood Hills (Hollywood, Bel Air, Sherman Oaks) saw an increase in open space. Indeed, several new parks were added since the 1970s in the Hollywood Hills,

### COMMERCIAL land area change

- 1 Central City North (+81.2%)
- 2 Central City (+56.4%)
- 3 Southeast L.A. (+33.8%)
- 4 Chatsworth (+26.0%)
- 5 South L.A. (+23.7%)
- 6 West Adams (+19.3%)
- 7 Van Nuys (+18.4%)
- 8 North Hollywood (+18.4%)
- 9 Palms (+12.8%)
- 10 Sun Valley (+9.5%)
- 11 Reseda (+8.5%)
- 12 Wilshire (+8.4%)
- 13 Granada Hills (+8.1%)
- 14 Canoga Park (+7.9%)
- 15 Northridge (+2.3%)
- 16 Hollywood (-0.2%)
- 17 Westlake (-0.8%)
- 18 Mission Hills (-2.9%)
- 19 Northeast L.A. (-5.8%)
- 20 Sherman Oaks (-8.2%)
- 21 Silver Lake (-8.2%)
- 22 Sunland (-9.1%)
- 23 Westchester (-9.2%)
- 24 Westwood (-10.1%)
- 25 Sylmar (-10.2%)
- 26 Boyle Heights (-10.7%)
- 27 West L.A. (-16.0%)
- 28 Encino (-18.1%)
- 29 Brentwood (-22.1%)
- 30 Arleta (-24.9%)
- 31 Venice (-33.5%)
- 32 Bel Air (-49.9%)

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0 to 4.9%</li> <li>5 to 9.9%</li> <li>10 to 14.9%</li> <li>15%+</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&lt; -15%</li> <li>-14.9 to -10%</li> <li>-9.9 to -5%</li> <li>-4.9 to 0%</li> </ul> |
|---|---|

**LOS ANGELES**  
**-1.5%**  
**overall**




Fig. 5-9: Map of Commercial Land Area Changes

# INDUSTRIAL land area change

- 1 Reseda (+121%)
- 2 Sylmar (+72.2%)
- 3 Mission Hills (+33.8%)
- 4 South L.A. (+25.2%)
- 5 North Hollywood (+22.2%)
- 6 Palms (+20.6%)
- 7 Northridge (+14.9%)
- 8 Sherman Oaks (+11.6%)
- 9 Silver Lake (+11.6%)
- 10 Boyle Heights (+8.4%)
- 11 Arleta (+7.3%)
- 12 Wilshire (+6.9%)
- 13 West L.A. (+6.5%)
- 14 Southeast L.A. (+3.4%)
- 15 Sun Valley (+3.1%)
- 16 Granada Hills (0)
- 17 Westwood (0)
- 18 Brentwood (0)
- 19 Bel Air (0)
- 20 West Adams (-2.7%)
- 21 Chatsworth (-7.3%)
- 22 Canoga Park (-9.7%)
- 23 Van Nuys (-13.6%)
- 24 Central City (-13.6%)
- 25 Northeast L.A. (-14.1%)
- 26 Central City North (-19.9%)
- 27 Westchester (-22.3%)
- 28 Encino (-25.2%)
- 29 Westlake (-30.5%)
- 30 Hollywood (-39.3%)
- 31 Venice (-51.6%)
- 32 Sunland (-89.9%)

<div style="display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #e0e0e0; border: 1px solid #ccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> 0 to 9.9%	<div style="display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #ff0000; border: 1px solid #ccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> < -30%
<div style="display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #a0a0a0; border: 1px solid #ccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> 10 to 19.9%	<div style="display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #ff6666; border: 1px solid #ccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> -29.9 to -20%
<div style="display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #606060; border: 1px solid #ccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> 20 to 29.9%	<div style="display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #ff9999; border: 1px solid #ccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> -19.9 to -10%
<div style="display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #303030; border: 1px solid #ccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> 30%+	<div style="display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #ffcccc; border: 1px solid #ccc; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> -9.9 to 0%





Fig. 5-10: Map of Industrial Land Area Changes

### OPEN SPACE land area change

- 1 Venice (+227%)
- 2 Arleta (+128%)
- 3 West Adams (+97.1%)
- 4 Westchester (+67.4%)
- 5 Bel Air (+51.4%)
- 6 Central City North (+48.8%)
- 7 Sherman Oaks (+39.6%)
- 8 Silver Lake (+39.6%)
- 9 Van Nuys (+37.9%)
- 10 Hollywood (+33.8%)
- 11 West L.A. (+32.6%)
- 12 Southeast L.A. (+21.6%)
- 13 Northeast L.A. (+16.3%)
- 14 Canoga Park (+14.6%)
- 15 South L.A. (+13.3%)
- 16 Northridge (+12.1%)
- 17 Granada Hills (+7.5%)
- 18 Westlake (+6.8%)
- 19 North Hollywood (+1.9%)
- 20 Encino (+1.7%)
- 21 Westwood (+1.6%)
- 22 Boyle Heights (-1.5%)
- 23 Sylmar (-4.2%)
- 24 Sun Valley (-4.4%)
- 25 Palms (-6.6%)
- 26 Chatsworth (-14.5%)
- 27 Brentwood (-16.5%)
- 28 Sunland (-22.6%)
- 29 Wilshire (-24.7%)
- 30 Reseda (-42.8%)
- 31 Central City (-46.1%)
- 32 Mission Hills (-50.2%)



**LOS ANGELES  
+9.7%  
overall**




Fig. 5-11: Map of Open Space Land Area Changes



including the creation of the popular Runyon Canyon Park on the former estate of Huntington Hartford, after a bitter battle with homeowners over a proposed luxury subdivision on the site.<sup>19</sup>

The above summary of changes to land use illustrates that changes to overall land use areas conceal as much as they inform. For example, how was it possible for a city that grew by 30% to actually decrease its multi-family land area by 9% while increasing open space by 10%? And why did this happen? Where was growth accepted and planned for? And how did that line up with the growth that actually occurred? To begin to understand these questions, we must dig deeper into the residential land use categories to understand how these changed not only over time, but also across space. But otherwise, there is not a strong spatial distribution to the increase or decrease of land uses.

## 5.2. HOW RESIDENTIAL DENSITY HAS CHANGED OVER TIME

By now, it should be clear that changes to land use area do not tell the whole story. In this section, we look within residential land uses to explore population capacity changes between single- and multi-family, but also within each sub-category. Fig. 5-12 provides a summary of how planned population capacity changed between the 1970s and 1990s. So planned population capacity is the anticipated total population in a given area (or for a given sub-category within the area). As noted in Chapter 2 (Research Design & Methods), I use population as a metric for density. This metric provides a consistent basis of comparison across and within each community plan area.

Among the first observations from Fig. 5-12 is how Los Angeles has increasingly become a city of apartments and condos. In the 1970s, 41% of the population was planned for single-family homes, decreasing to 40% in the 1980s and down to 34% in the 1990s – an overall decrease of about 10%. The

DENSITY CHANGE - CITYWIDE

	1970s		1980s		1990s		CHANGE*	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	<b>31,071</b>	0.8%	<b>28,888</b>	0.7%	<b>29,835</b>	0.7%	<b>-1,236</b>	<b>-4.0%</b>
Very Low I	<b>181,608</b>	4.6%	<b>151,746</b>	3.7%	<b>126,898</b>	2.9%	<b>-54,710</b>	<b>-30.1%</b>
Very Low II	<b>105,754</b>	2.7%	<b>113,675</b>	2.8%	<b>101,936</b>	2.3%	<b>-3,818</b>	<b>-3.6%</b>
Low I	<b>1,221,485</b>	30.9%	<b>1,149,037</b>	27.9%	<b>1,105,256</b>	25.4%	<b>-116,229</b>	<b>-9.5%</b>
Low II	<b>84,720</b>	2.1%	<b>128,200</b>	3.1%	<b>58,084</b>	1.3%	<b>-26,636</b>	<b>-31.4%</b>
Unknown SF*	<b>0</b>	0.0%	<b>63,820</b>	1.6%	<b>45,442</b>	1.0%	<b>45,442</b>	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>1,624,638</b>	41.1%	<b>1,635,366</b>	39.7%	<b>1,467,451</b>	33.8%	<b>-157,187</b>	<b>-9.7%</b>
Low Medium I	<b>295,347</b>	7.5%	<b>188,681</b>	4.6%	<b>449,492</b>	10.3%	<b>154,145</b>	52.2%
Low Medium II	<b>335,408</b>	8.5%	<b>407,112</b>	9.9%	<b>780,364</b>	18.0%	<b>444,956</b>	132.7%
Medium	<b>863,477</b>	21.8%	<b>1,001,814</b>	24.3%	<b>1,016,057</b>	23.4%	<b>152,580</b>	17.7%
High-Medium	<b>282,410</b>	7.1%	<b>242,339</b>	5.9%	<b>354,567</b>	8.2%	<b>72,157</b>	25.6%
High	<b>79,680</b>	2.0%	<b>47,741</b>	1.2%	<b>72,522</b>	1.7%	<b>-7,158</b>	<b>-9.0%</b>
Very High	<b>62,265</b>	1.6%	<b>0</b>	0.0%	<b>0</b>	0.0%	<b>-62,265</b>	<b>-100.0%</b>
Unknown MF*	<b>410,950</b>	10.4%	<b>592,459</b>	23.9%	<b>203,620</b>	7.1%	<b>-207,330</b>	<b>-50.5%</b>
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>2,329,537</b>	58.9%	<b>2,480,146</b>	60.3%	<b>2,876,622</b>	66.2%	<b>547,085</b>	23.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,954,175</b>		<b>4,115,512</b>		<b>4,344,073</b>		<b>389,898</b>	9.9%

\*some plans did not break down single- and multi-family population by residential category

Fig. 5-12: Summary of City-Wide Change in Population Capacity

planned multi-family population in L.A. has increased by 24% – from 59% in the 1970s to 66% in the 1990s. So while single-family land use decreased citywide by only 0.6%, the planned population capacity of this area decreased by almost 10%, which indicates a clear trend towards down-zoning even within single-family zones. On the contrary, despite a 9% decrease in multi-family land area, the planned population in these areas increased by 24%, indicating very clearly that multi-family areas have significantly increased in density. So low-density areas became even lower density and high-density areas became even higher density.

This study's analysis of the distribution of population within the different single- and multi-family categories is somewhat compromised by the lack of breakdown in some plans. This was less of a problem in single-family areas, where more than 98% of population can be broken down into the five different density sub-categories. Expected population was decreased across all single-family categories, but especially

the Very Low I (-30%) and Low II (-31%) categories.

The lack of breakdown of population is more problematic in multi-family areas, where we cannot account for almost 24% of multi-family population in the 1980s. Fortunately, the 1970s and 1990s are more accurate, with 90% and 93% of the population, respectively, accounted for. Even with this caveat, we can see clear trends. First, in the 1970s, in two instances (Hollywood and Central City), a "Very High" multi-family density category was used, but by the 1990s, this entire category was eliminated and population shifted to lower densities. Similarly, population capacity in High density areas decreased by 9% from the 1970s to 1990s.

So what we see is that medium densities have become more popular as population is shifted into these categories from both sides – as planned population has been shifted from single-family up into medium density multi-family on the one hand, and population shifted downwards from high to medium density multi-family on the other. This has resulted in a dramatic

increase in the low-medium density I and II categories – more than 50% increase in the former, and more than doubling of the latter. Medium and High-Medium categories have also witnessed significant increases – 18% and 26%, respectively. So, by the 1990s, more than 50% of L.A.’s population was planned for medium densities (Low-Medium and Medium), between 9 and 29 dwelling units per acre. So we have seen two trends: a shift away from lower-densities but at the same a shift away from higher-densities.

While the overall shift towards more multi-family, and medium density in particular, seems to suggest at least a tacit acceptance of population growth, a comparison of planned versus actual growth (see Fig. 5-13) suggests otherwise.

Fig. 5-13 shows that L.A. simply did not plan for the growth that actually occurred. Between the 1970s- and 1990s-era plans, adding the total population capacities of all 35 community plan areas, we see that L.A. planned for a population increase from 3.95 million (1970s plans) to 4.34 million (1990s

	planned change	actual change	population difference	% capacity 1980 <sup>1</sup>	% capacity 2000 <sup>2</sup>	% capacity 2009 <sup>3</sup>
1 VAN NUYS	39,091	1,612	-37,479	83.8%	94.2%	98.6%
2 ARLETA	66,800	34,197	-32,603	85.5%	66.9%	71.2%
3 SOUTH L.A.	55,694	40,534	-15,160	93.4%	89.0%	94.4%
4 BOYLE HEIGHTS	22,586	10,809	-11,777	92.5%	78.5%	82.8%
5 SOUTHEAST L.A.	77,162	69,188	-7,974	87.9%	88.5%	96.0%
6 WESTLAKE	45,316	39,237	-6,079	100.6%	79.6%	91.1%
7 WILSHIRE	100,044	97,105	-2,939	95.4%	86.8%	93.9%
8 BEL AIR	5,480	2,582	-2,898	81.0%	67.1%	74.0%
9 WESTCHESTER	-5,221	-2,908	2,313	47.0%	58.4%	61.8%
10 CENTRAL CITY	3,990	7,369	3,379	89.3%	72.5%	100.0%
11 GRANADA HILLS	-4,684	-1,106	3,578	72.3%	82.6%	88.1%
12 HARBOR GATEWAY	4,016	8,115	4,099	77.1%	92.5%	96.3%
13 SYLMAR	25,092	29,275	4,183	56.3%	70.0%	79.2%
14 SUN VALLEY	22,748	27,777	5,029	80.5%	88.4%	94.2%
15 BRENTWOOD	-5,522	415	5,937	74.0%	80.6%	86.8%
16 SUNLAND	4,101	11,699	7,598	67.4%	80.8%	86.6%
17 NO. HOLLYWOOD	37,289	45,814	8,525	80.5%	87.0%	94.6%
18 NORTHRIDGE	2,351	11,980	9,629	84.2%	94.5%	101.0%
19 SILVER LAKE	583	10,431	9,848	80.6%	81.1%	87.0%
20 CENTRAL CITY NO	2,230	15,539	13,309	79.1%	125.2%	171.5%
21 RESEDA	3,430	19,737	16,307	72.8%	90.3%	96.0%
22 MISSION HILLS	46,664	63,494	16,830	72.3%	86.7%	93.2%
23 CHATSWORTH	18,650	37,917	19,267	58.4%	62.8%	71.5%
24 WILMINGTON	1,225	24,068	22,843	76.9%	94.3%	100.1%
25 ENCINO	-12,264	11,239	23,503	67.5%	81.5%	87.2%
26 CANOGA PARK	7,931	35,594	27,663	69.9%	82.8%	92.3%
27 WEST L.A.	-24,034	6,277	30,311	61.2%	91.6%	99.1%
28 SAN PEDRO	-25,673	5,779	31,452	61.7%	100.9%	108.4%
29 WESTWOOD	-16,471	15,528	31,999	52.6%	100.2%	109.9%
30 SHERMAN OAKS	-28,387	4,328	32,715	54.1%	80.6%	87.8%
31 PALMS	-17,558	15,698	33,256	72.2%	96.6%	107.3%
32 HOLLYWOOD	8,582	54,489	45,907	75.3%	84.6%	91.5%
33 NORTHEAST L.A.	1,473	57,551	56,078	74.4%	90.1%	96.5%
34 WEST ADAMS	-47,792	13,823	61,615	60.8%	85.9%	90.4%
35 VENICE	-25,024	55,604	80,628	59.6%	104.1%	116.5%
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>	<b>389,898</b>	<b>880,790</b>	<b>490,892</b>	<b>75.0%</b>	<b>85.0%</b>	<b>92.1%</b>

<sup>1</sup> 1980 population divided by 1970s-era plan capacity

<sup>2</sup> 2000 population divided by 1990s-era plan capacity

<sup>3</sup> 2009 population divided by 1990s-era plan capacity

Fig. 5-13: Summary of Planned versus Actual Population Change

plans) – an increase of roughly 390,000.<sup>20</sup> But the population of L.A. actually increased from 2.81 million to 3.69 million between 1970 and 2000 – an increase of roughly 880,000. In other words, Los Angeles received roughly a half million more people than was planned for.<sup>21</sup> But where did this population go and how does it compare to where it was planned?

As Fig. 5-13 shows, the community plans did not do a very good job in directing growth to where it was planned. It may be a bit unfair to directly compare the change in planned population capacity with actual population growth, since some plan areas might have been seen in the 1970s as having far more planned population than expected, so in some cases, this may simply reflect a “correction” from zoning that had previously allowed a much larger population capacity. An example of this might be West Adams, whose 1970s-era plan anticipated a population of 249,200, yet by 1980 its population was only 151,528, meaning the plan allowed for another 100,000 people. In the 1990s, the plan capacity was reduced to 201,408 and by 2000,

its population was 172,913, meaning it was at roughly 85% capacity, putting it on par with the city average. West Adams is an interesting case that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.

Likewise, a significant increase in population capacity might have reflected the underestimated growth of previous planning. An example of this might be Boyle Heights, whose 1980 population of 81,279 was already at roughly 93% of its planned capacity, well above the citywide average of 75%. The subsequent increase in planned capacity to 110,486 could be viewed as a correction to its earlier underestimation, rather than as an indication of expected growth. That it only increased in population by 5,456 people over the 20 years between 1980 and 2000 makes this thesis possible, although a more detailed examination of the Boyle Heights case would need to be conducted to test this.

Even with keeping in mind the possibility of corrective measures built into some plans, the data clearly shows

that while growth was anticipated in some areas, it did not materialize. For example, Arleta was planned for a significant increase in population. In 1970, Arleta had a population of 63,875. And its 1976 community plan called for an anticipated population of 79,900. By 1980, with a population of 68,345 (a gain of 4,470 people in the 1970s), it was at roughly 85% of its planned capacity. The area experienced significant growth in the 1980s, with its population jumping to 91,367 by 1990 (a gain of a whopping 23,022 in the 1980s). But the community plan in the 1980s (adopted in March 1989) did not recognize this growth, planning a capacity of just 95,606, meaning by 1990, it was already at 96% capacity. Perhaps recognizing this mistake, in the 1990s the plan capacity was increased to 146,700 in anticipation (and implicit acceptance) of continued growth. However, that growth did not come, as only 6,705 new residents were added during the 1990s (for a total of 98,072), such that by 2000, Arleta was only at 67% of its planned capacity. And nearly a decade later (in 2009, the last year L.A. City Planning

has compiled population estimates for the community plan areas), it had only risen to 71% capacity.

There were also areas for which population was simply not adequately planned – here, the rollbacks reflected the desire to limit population growth in their area, and direct it to other areas. But growth occurred despite this desire (in part because zoning was not changed to match the community plan, as will be discussed in Chapter 6). A good example of this is Westwood, where planned population was reduced from 65,669 in 1972 to 49,168 in 1999, a decrease of over 25%. Yet, population increased from 33,770 in 1970 to 49,298 in 2000, an increase of 46%. What is puzzling is that if the Westwood Citizens Advisory Committee wanted to reduce its planned capacity in its 1972 plan, we might have expected a capacity much lower than 65,669 if the 1970 population was only 33,770 (roughly 51% capacity).

Very little growth occurred in Westwood in the 1970s (a gain of only 764 people), yet the planned capacity of the

1980s plan (began in the early 1980s and adopted in 1987) was radically reduced to 45,626 – a more than 30% reduction at a time when population had increased by only 2.2%. Despite this implicit will to reduce growth, there was significant high-rise development in Westwood in the 1980s and 1990s – with 6,784 and 7,980 new residents added in those decades. So by 2000, its population of 49,298 was already over its planned capacity of 49,198. And since the Westwood community plan has not been updated since, this over-capacity has continued to rise – standing at 110% by 2009. We see similar patterns in Westside areas such as Venice, Palms, Sherman Oaks, West L.A. and Encino, each of which had large reductions in planned capacity, yet has seen increases in population. In fact, where we see a large difference in population capacity change versus actual population change suggests a desire to use land use planning as a tool to control growth, but often with poor results.

There are also areas where growth was planned for, but

underestimated, such as downtown L.A. While a 13% growth in population was planned for Central City between the 1970s and 1990s (from 30,775 to 34,765), actual population growth has nearly doubled by 2009 and is now at its plan capacity. The situation in Central City North (which includes the Arts District and Chinatown) is even worse. Its 13% planned population increase is dwarfed by its nearly four-fold increase in population; by 2009, its population was 1.75 times the capacity of the community plan.

## RESIDENTIAL DENSITY CHANGE ACROSS L.A.'S 4 QUARTERS

### EASTSIDE

It is clear from comparing the city-wide (Fig. 5-12) and Eastside data (Fig. 5-14) that more people on the Eastside live in multi-family housing units than in L.A. as whole. Los Angeles was 41% single-family in the 1970s, while the Eastside was roughly half of that (21%); by the 1990s, the single-family population

DENSITY CHANGE - EASTSIDE

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
Minimum	1,950	4,129	373	-1,577	-80.9%
Very Low I	40,310	4,500	4,109	-36,201	-89.8%
Very Low II	5,000	19,900	2,992	-2,008	-40.2%
Low I	296,864	278,099	250,772	-46,092	-15.5%
Low II	32,000	75,300	31,164	-836	-2.6%
Unknown SF*	0	0	45,442	45,442	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>376,124</b>	<b>381,928</b>	<b>334,852</b>	<b>-41,272</b>	<b>-11.0%</b>
Low Medium I	197,712	72,952	331,563	133,851	67.7%
Low Medium II	170,800	201,754	485,901	315,101	184.5%
Medium	361,631	372,478	369,447	7,816	2.2%
High-Medium	165,660	120,709	240,051	74,391	44.9%
High	60,780	36,350	63,306	2,526	4.2%
Very High	62,265	0	0	-62,265	-100.0%
Unknown MF*	363,900	580,079	203,620	-160,280	-44.0%
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>1,382,748</b>	<b>1,384,322</b>	<b>1,693,888</b>	<b>311,140</b>	<b>22.5%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,758,872</b>	<b>1,766,250</b>	<b>2,028,740</b>	<b>269,868</b>	<b>15.3%</b>

\*some plans did not break down single- and multi-family population by residential category

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 BOYLE HEIGHTS	1,550	872	630	-920	-59.4%
2 SOUTH L.A.	79,800	77,320	48,779	-31,021	-38.9%
3 SILVER LAKE	19,034	17,026	12,722	-6,312	-33.2%
4 WEST ADAMS	58,100	54,855	40,590	-17,510	-30.1%
5 HOLLYWOOD	51,240	66,860	45,442	-5,798	-11.3%
6 WILSHIRE	39,300	38,900	35,786	-3,514	-8.9%
7 CENTRAL CITY	0	0	0	0	-
8 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	0	0	0	0	-
9 WESTLAKE	0	0	0	0	-
10 SOUTHEAST L.A.	21,000	20,895	24,071	3,071	14.6%
11 NORTHEAST L.A.	106,100	105,200	126,832	20,732	19.5%

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 WEST ADAMS	191,100	188,928	160,818	-30,282	-15.8%
2 NORTHEAST L.A.	160,400	164,700	141,141	-19,259	-12.0%
3 HOLLYWOOD	189,240	164,535	203,620	14,380	7.6%
4 SILVER LAKE	75,283	79,154	82,178	6,895	9.2%
5 CENTRAL CITY	30,775	35,235	34,765	3,990	13.0%
6 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	17,000	17,745	19,230	2,230	13.1%
7 BOYLE HEIGHTS	86,350	97,450	109,856	23,506	27.2%
8 SOUTHEAST L.A.	190,000	188,615	264,091	74,091	39.0%
9 WESTLAKE	88,700	85,680	134,016	45,316	51.1%
10 WILSHIRE	197,000	200,400	300,558	103,558	52.6%
11 SOUTH L.A.	156,900	161,880	243,615	86,715	55.3%

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 WEST ADAMS	249,200	243,783	201,408	-47,792	-19.2%
2 NORTHEAST L.A.	266,500	269,900	267,973	1,473	0.6%
3 SILVER LAKE	94,317	96,180	94,900	583	0.6%
4 HOLLYWOOD	240,480	231,395	249,062	8,582	3.6%
5 CENTRAL CITY	30,775	35,235	34,765	3,990	13.0%
6 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	17,000	17,745	19,230	2,230	13.1%
7 SOUTH L.A.	236,700	239,200	292,394	55,694	23.5%
8 BOYLE HEIGHTS	87,900	98,322	110,486	22,586	25.7%
9 SOUTHEAST L.A.	211,000	209,510	288,162	77,162	36.6%
10 WILSHIRE	236,300	239,300	336,344	100,044	42.3%
11 WESTLAKE	88,700	85,680	134,016	45,316	51.1%

<sup>1</sup> change is the difference between 1990s and 1970s.

Fig. 5-14: Summary of Residential Density Change on the Eastside



dropped to 34% city-wide, with again the Eastside being about half of that (16%). This suggests the shift away from single-family towards more multi-family on the Eastside was similar to the city as a whole – 11% decline for single-family vs 10% citywide and a 23% increase for multi-family vs 24% citywide. Even within the different sub-categories, the Eastside largely mirrors the citywide pattern of shifting away from low- and high-densities towards medium-densities. The use of the Low-Medium category is slightly higher on the Eastside (an increase of 68% and 185% for I and II) than for the city as a whole (52% and 133%), but the pattern remains the same. The shift to the Medium density category is not as apparent – just 2.2% vs 18% citywide. All of the previously Very High density area was on the Eastside, which was transferred to lower density categories, which helps explain why the High density category is slightly higher (+4.2%) on the Eastside whereas city-wide it declined by 9%. The total population increase on the Eastside, however, is roughly 50% higher than L.A. as a whole – 15.3% vs 9.9%.

#### SINGLE-FAMILY

Comparing the changes in single-family density across the Eastside shows that Southeast L.A. and Northeast L.A. are exceptions, being the only two communities on the Eastside to increase single-family density (roughly 15% and 20% respectively). That the three communities with no single-family zoning (Central City, Central City North, Westlake) are on the Eastside – therefore registering as no change – probably underestimates the overall shift, which is clearly away from single-family in 6 of the other 8 communities. Boyle Heights (decrease of 59%) is a bit misleading since there was very little single-family to begin with, but the other areas range from a decrease of 9 to 39% (averaging about 25%), considerably more than the 10% decline citywide.

#### MULTI-FAMILY

West Adams is a clear outlier with respect to changes in multi-family density, it being the only one of the 11 communities on

the Eastside to show a decrease, and a significant one at that (-19%). Northeast L.A., Silver Lake, and Hollywood – increasingly becoming an area of young urban professionals with no kids – are largely unchanged (0.6%, 0.6% and 3.6% respectively). The remaining 7 communities show significant increases ranging from 13% (Central City) to 51% (Westlake), averaging about +30%, slightly more than the citywide average.

### EAST VALLEY

As we can see from Fig. 5-15, the East Valley shows a clear difference from the rest of the city in its increase in multi-family population. Across the city as a whole, multi-family increased by 24%, but in the East Valley, it more than doubled (102% increase)– roughly four times the rate as the city overall – from roughly 250,000 people to roughly 500,000. Moreover, the preferred sub-categories within multi-family are also notable different. While the Low-Medium density category

experienced significant increases citywide (52% and 133% for I and II), in the East Valley these increased by only 69% and 55% – still significant, but far less than the city overall. Instead, most of the change in population density is directed to the Medium and High-Medium categories – 143% and 98% increases, respectively, as compared to just 17% and 26% city-wide. So not only is the East Valley becoming increasingly multi-family, it is utilizing much higher density categories of multi-family. This helps explain the differences between land area changes observed in Section 5.1 above and changes in density seen here. While multi-family land area only increased by roughly 15% in the East Valley, residential density increased by over 100%. This is only possible if that population is being shifted to much higher densities. Overall, population density increased significantly more in the East Valley than L.A. as a whole – 37% compared to 10% city-wide, almost four times as much.

DENSITY CHANGE - EAST VALLEY

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
Minimum	13,754	10,826	13,151	-603	-4.4%
Very Low I	33,200	42,983	32,818	-382	-1.2%
Very Low II	13,344	12,970	3,331	-10,013	-75.0%
Low I	345,042	371,040	342,676	-2,366	-0.7%
Low II	0	0	0	0	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>405,340</b>	<b>437,819</b>	<b>391,976</b>	<b>-13,364</b>	<b>-3.3%</b>
Low Medium I	29,830	32,237	50,300	20,470	68.6%
Low Medium II	80,693	95,022	124,686	43,993	54.5%
Medium	122,639	182,568	297,686	175,047	142.7%
High-Medium	16,030	18,628	31,669	15,639	97.6%
High	0	0	0	0	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>249,192</b>	<b>328,455</b>	<b>504,341</b>	<b>255,149</b>	<b>102.4%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>654,532</b>	<b>766,274</b>	<b>896,317</b>	<b>241,785</b>	<b>36.9%</b>
	586,532	691,813	824,216	237,684	0.4052362
<b>SINGLE-FAMILY</b>					
	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 ARLETA	72,300	70,861	58,091	-14,209	-19.7%
2 NORTH HOLLYWOOD	45,300	45,161	36,947	-8,353	-18.4%
3 SUNLAND	51,700	58,222	47,869	-3,831	-7.4%
4 VAN NUYS	59,810	61,658	57,041	-2,769	-4.6%
5 SUN VALLEY	59,500	61,312	59,825	325	0.5%
6 MISSION HILLS	63,400	85,581	64,402	1,002	1.6%
7 SYLMAR	53,330	55,024	67,801	14,471	27.1%

<b>MULTI-FAMILY</b>		1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
		pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1	SUNLAND	16,300	16,239	24,232	7,932	48.7%
2	SYLMAR	21,070	21,619	31,691	10,621	50.4%
3	VAN NUYS	69,530	91,405	111,390	41,860	60.2%
4	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	73,592	85,246	119,234	45,642	62.0%
5	MISSION HILLS	45,600	74,313	91,262	45,662	100.1%
6	SUN VALLEY	15,500	14,888	37,923	22,423	144.7%
7	ARLETA	7,600	24,745	88,609	81,009	1065.9%
<b>TOTAL</b>						
		1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
		pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1	SUNLAND	68,000	74,461	72,101	4,101	6.0%
2	VAN NUYS	129,340	153,063	168,431	39,091	30.2%
3	SUN VALLEY	75,000	76,200	97,748	22,748	30.3%
4	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	118,892	130,407	156,181	37,289	31.4%
5	SYLMAR	74,400	76,643	99,492	25,092	33.7%
6	MISSION HILLS	109,000	159,894	155,664	46,664	42.8%
7	ARLETA	79,900	95,606	146,700	66,800	83.6%

Fig. 5-15: Summary of Residential Density Change in the East Valley

### SINGLE-FAMILY

Changes to single-family density vary widely across the East Valley, with no consistent pattern. Quite clearly, residential population in Arleta and North Hollywood were intended to shift away from single-family towards multi-family use, as these two areas show significant decreases in single-family (20% and 18%, respectively). This makes sense for North Hollywood, since it would become the terminus for the Metro Red Line that links the Valley to downtown (and in the 2000s, would become an important interchange between the Red Line and the new Orange bus rapid transit line that runs westward across the Valley). So a shift towards multi-family densities is in keeping with a transit-oriented development approach.

The radical changes away from single-family and towards multi-family are harder to explain in Arleta-Pacoima. This area has a rich history of Latino and African-American activism<sup>22</sup>, but as we will see in Chapter 6, the focus of these groups tended to be more on social services than land use issues. Planning for

significant increases in multi-family housing is not influenced by a desire for transit-oriented development since Arleta-Pacoima is poorly served by mass transit (Metrolink commuter rail, for example passes through the community without stopping). At the opposite extreme in the East Valley is Sylmar, which saw a significant increase of 27% in single-family population. Again, a large increase in single-family here defies the logic of wishing to concentrate density around transit stops since, unlike Arleta, Sylmar is connected to the Metrolink rail system.

### MULTI-FAMILY

The East Valley saw consistently large increase in multi-family density across the area. The smallest increases were seen in Sunland and Sylmar (which are also the two areas with the largest share of single-family population), but even these communities saw increases of roughly 50%. Mission Hills multi-family density doubled, while Sun Valley's was nearly 1.5 times greater. As was the case with its decrease in single-family,

Arleta stands out for its radical increase in multi-family zoning – a more than ten-fold increase between 1976 and 1996, from a multi-family population of just 7,600 to over 88,000.

### WEST VALLEY

From Fig. 5-16, we can see that, on the one hand, changes in multi-family population in the West Valley are largely in line with citywide trends – increasing by 20% vs 24% city-wide. On the other hand, there has been almost no change in population capacity in single-family zones, displaying remarkable stability over a 30+ year period (representing a less than 1% decline). This is considerably different than citywide, where single-family has experienced a 10% decline. While the increase in land area for multi-family in the West Valley (+13.8%) was similar to that of the East Valley (+14.9%), looking at the density changes illustrates that this growth in multi-family took a very different form. While increases in multi-family density was more than 6.5

times that of the increase in land area in the East Valley (102% increase in density, as compared to 15% increase in land area), it was only 1.4 times in the West Valley (20% increase in density, as compared to 14% increase in land area). Clearly, new multi-family housing in the West Valley was intended to be at far less density than in the East Valley. Inspection of the distribution between the multi-family sub-categories confirms this. Some 18% of the West Valley population was allocated to Medium or higher density in the 1970s; by the 1990s, this had risen to 22% (an increase of about 22%). By contrast, in the East Valley, the proportion allocated to Medium or higher went from a similar 21% in the 1970s to 37% by the 1990s (an increase of about 74% – or roughly three times that of the West Valley). Overall, population density increased by roughly half as much in the West Valley (5.0%) as city-wide (9.9%).

DENSITY CHANGE - WEST VALLEY

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
Minimum	3,730	2,366	4,700	970	26.0%
Very Low I	61,907	59,157	59,472	-2,435	-3.9%
Very Low II	42,410	34,600	41,048	-1,362	-3.2%
Low I	263,049	201,754	259,324	-3,725	-1.4%
Low II	23,670	23,800	26,920	3,250	-
Unknown SF*	0	63,820	0	0	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>394,766</b>	<b>385,497</b>	<b>391,464</b>	<b>-3,302</b>	<b>-0.8%</b>
Low Medium I	17,764	16,624	26,038	8,274	46.6%
Low Medium II	39,885	37,664	34,027	-5,858	-14.7%
Medium	76,296	104,434	115,513	39,217	51.4%
High-Medium	24,370	8,620	13,717	-10,653	-43.7%
High	0	0	0	0	-
Unknown MF*	0	12,380	0	0	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>158,315</b>	<b>179,722</b>	<b>189,295</b>	<b>30,980</b>	<b>19.6%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>553,081</b>	<b>565,219</b>	<b>580,759</b>	<b>27,678</b>	<b>5.0%</b>

\*some plans did not break down single- and multi-family population by residential category

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 RESEDA	74,536	78,160	64,431	-10,105	-13.6%
2 GRANADA HILLS	62,430	63,820	58,075	-4,355	-7.0%
3 NORTHRIDGE	44,000	43,800	42,740	-1,260	-2.9%
4 CHATSWORTH	89,400	89,400	92,710	3,310	3.7%
5 CANOGA PARK	124,400	110,317	133,508	9,108	7.3%

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 GRANADA HILLS	11,550	12,380	11,221	-329	-2.8%
2 CANOGA PARK	68,600	69,452	67,423	-1,177	-1.7%
3 NORTHRIDGE	20,000	24,300	23,611	3,611	18.1%
4 RESEDA	31,265	46,690	44,800	13,535	43.3%
5 CHATSWORTH	26,900	26,900	42,240	15,340	57.0%

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 GRANADA HILLS	73,980	76,200	69,296	-4,684	-6.3%
2 RESEDA	105,801	124,850	109,231	3,430	3.2%
3 NORTHRIDGE	64,000	68,100	66,351	2,351	3.7%
4 CANOGA PARK	193,000	179,769	200,931	7,931	4.1%
5 CHATSWORTH	116,300	116,300	134,950	18,650	16.0%

Fig. 5-16: Summary of Residential Density Change in the West Valley

### SINGLE-FAMILY

While the overall changes to single-family are negligible, there is some variation within the West Valley. Reseda stands out as experiencing a greater decline in single-family (about 14%) than the area as a whole. This might reflect the different demographic make-up of Reseda, as compared with the rest of the West Valley. Reseda is notably less affluent than the other four West Valley communities. While Chatsworth (\$80,032), Canoga Park (\$76,410), Granada Hills (\$74,113) and Northridge (\$71,384) are very consistent in household income, averaging roughly \$75,000 (solidly upper-middle class), Reseda's mean household income is about 30% less (\$52,464), on par with the East Valley average.

Likewise, Reseda is more Latino (41% vs. 24% in the other four communities) and less white (41% vs 55%) than the rest of the West Valley. I will explore whether factors such as income or race relate to changes in residential density in section 5.3 below, but at least in the West Valley, Reseda appears to

be somewhat different from the other four communities in both demographics and land use changes. The other four areas did not change much – from a decline of 7% in Granada Hills to an increase of 7% in Canoga Park.

### MULTI-FAMILY

There was a wide disparity in change to multi-family zoning in the West Valley. Granada Hills and Canoga Park were essentially unchanged (-2.8% and -1.7%, respectively). The decline in Canoga Park is perhaps surprising, given the prominence of Warner Center, a mixed-use center that includes a significant amount of multi-family housing. Reasons for this decline are explored in the Canoga Park case, discussed in Chapter 7. Changes in Northridge (+18%) are about average for the city, but Reseda and Chatsworth had much larger increases in multi-family population (43% and 57%, respectively). It is possible the Reseda Citizens Advisory Committee was more receptive to multi-family housing, given its different demographic

characteristics, but a detailed exploration of the Reseda would need to be done to confirm this. Chatsworth, on the other hand, was among the more undeveloped areas of the city in the early 1970s, so increases to multi-family are consistent with the general increase in the area. While the other four areas did not have significant overall population change (from -6% in Granada Hills to +4% in Canoga Park), Chatsworth was significantly higher (+16%).

## WESTSIDE

As Fig. 5-17 shows, the Westside differs dramatically from the City as a whole in its changes to multi-family density. While this *increased* by 24% city-wide, on the Westside, multi-family density actually *decreased* by 13%. Interestingly, this decline in residential multi-family density on the Westside was in line with the decline in multi-family land area (-13%). The only multi-family sub-category to show an increase is Low-

Medium II, which doubled (not far from the city-wide increase of 133%). But all others – Low Medium I, Medium, High-Medium and High – went down by 38%, 21%, and 12%, respectively (as compared with *increases* of 52%, 18% and 26% city-wide). Single-family residential densities were reduced even more – by 22%, even though land area for single-family was *increased* by 1.4%. Overall, residential density on the Westside is at odds with the trends in the rest of the City – while city-wide, density *increased* by 10% overall, on the Westside, it *declined* by 17%.

## SINGLE-FAMILY

Single-family population was consistently decreased across the area, with the exception of Bel Air. Bel Air and Brentwood had a fair amount of hillside area still undeveloped in the early 1970s, which explains why they appear at odds with the rest of the area. As these hillside areas were developed into large, single-family areas – often through significant re-grading of the hillsides to create level “pads” – neighboring homeowners



DENSITY CHANGE - WESTSIDE

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
Minimum	11,637	11,567	11,611	-26	-0.2%
Very Low I	46,191	45,106	30,499	-15,692	-34.0%
Very Low II	45,000	46,205	54,565	9,565	21.3%
Low I	223,809	214,945	182,073	-41,736	-18.6%
Low II	29,050	29,100	0	-29,050	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>355,687</b>	<b>346,923</b>	<b>278,748</b>	<b>-76,939</b>	<b>-21.6%</b>
Low Medium I	34,141	35,262	21,168	-12,973	-38.0%
Low Medium II	32,230	36,570	64,712	32,482	100.8%
Medium	251,611	274,880	199,154	-52,457	-20.8%
High-Medium	76,350	94,382	66,920	-9,430	-12.4%
High	18,900	11,391	9,216	-9,684	-51.2%
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>413,232</b>	<b>452,485</b>	<b>361,170</b>	<b>-52,062</b>	<b>-12.6%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>768,919</b>	<b>799,408</b>	<b>639,918</b>	<b>-129,001</b>	<b>-16.8%</b>

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 VENICE	8,500	8,400	5,380	-3,120	-36.7%
2 WESTCHESTER	39,500	38,530	27,265	-12,235	-31.0%
3 PALMS	47,500	46,300	33,569	-13,931	-29.3%
4 SHERMAN OAKS	65,868	64,117	47,403	-18,465	-28.0%
5 WEST L.A.	34,535	34,525	25,260	-9,275	-26.9%
6 WESTWOOD	14,354	10,791	10,669	-3,685	-25.7%
7 ENCINO	71,530	71,905	55,750	-15,780	-22.1%
8 BRENTWOOD	50,200	48,400	45,232	-4,968	-9.9%
9 BEL AIR	23,700	23,955	28,220	4,520	19.1%

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 VENICE	52,800	53,300	30,896	-21,904	-41.5%
2 WESTWOOD	51,315	34,835	38,529	-12,786	-24.9%
3 WEST L.A.	68,065	70,362	53,306	-14,759	-21.7%
4 SHERMAN OAKS	53,102	72,198	43,180	-9,922	-18.7%
5 PALMS	84,000	92,200	80,373	-3,627	-4.3%
6 BRENTWOOD	22,500	22,900	21,946	-554	-2.5%
7 ENCINO	26,950	30,880	30,466	3,516	13.0%
8 WESTCHESTER	53,500	74,810	60,514	7,014	13.1%
9 BEL AIR	1,000	1,000	1,960	960	96.0%

	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1 VENICE	61,300	61,700	36,276	-25,024	-40.8%
2 WESTWOOD	65,669	45,626	49,198	-16,471	-25.1%
3 SHERMAN OAKS	118,970	136,315	90,583	-28,387	-23.9%
4 WEST L.A.	102,600	104,887	78,566	-24,034	-23.4%
5 PALMS	131,500	138,500	113,942	-17,558	-13.4%
6 ENCINO	98,480	102,785	86,216	-12,264	-12.5%
7 BRENTWOOD	72,700	71,300	67,178	-5,522	-7.6%
8 WESTCHESTER	93,000	113,340	87,779	-5,221	-5.6%
9 BEL AIR	24,700	24,955	30,180	5,480	22.2%

Fig. 5-17: Summary of Residential Density Change on the Westside

increasingly mobilized to prevent this practice, such that by the 1980s and 1990s, most of the remaining undeveloped area was preserved as open space.<sup>23</sup> But the other seven Westside areas demonstrate a clear and large decrease in single-family population capacity, ranging from -22% (Encino) to -37% (Venice).

#### MULTI-FAMILY

Likewise, the Westside also saw significant decreases in multi-family population. Bel Air's 96% increase can be dismissed for the reasons discussed above in the land use area discussion (i.e. the result of a single hotel project). Encino and Westchester are unusual in that they increased in multi-family population by about 13%. Palms and Brentwood were largely unchanged (-2.5% and -4.3%, respectively). The remaining four saw decreases ranging from 19% (Sherman Oaks) to 42% (Venice).

In other parts of the city, decreases in single-family population typically result in even larger increases in multi-

family population, as population is shifted from single- to multi-family use. The Westside is different. First, decreases in single-family area were much larger than in other areas (22% decline compared with declines of 0.8%, 3.3% and 11% in the West Valley, East Valley, and Eastside, respectively). Moreover, this decrease was not compensated with increases in multi-family (its 13% *decline* is far different from the 20%, 102%, and 23% *increase* in multi-family in the West Valley, East Valley, and Eastside, respectively). Unlike other areas, where we see varying degrees of shifts from single- to multi-family, the Westside appears that have adopted down-zoning across-the-board as a means of controlling population growth.

#### SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION

Mapping the changes in residential density (population capacity) – single-family, multi-family, and overall changes – begins to suggest clear patterns.

### SINGLE-FAMILY population density change

- 1 Sylmar (+27.1%)
- 2 Northeast L.A. (+19.5%)
- 3 Bel Air (+19.1%)
- 4 Southeast L.A. (+14.6%)
- 5 Canoga Park (+7.3%)
- 6 Chatsworth (+3.7%)
- 7 Mission Hills (+1.6%)
- 8 Sun Valley (+0.5%)
- 9 Westlake (0)
- 10 Central City North (0)
- 11 Central City (0)
- 12 Northridge (-2.9%)
- 13 Van Nuys (-4.6%)
- 14 Granada Hills (-7.0%)
- 15 Sunland (-7.4%)
- 16 Wilshire (-8.9%)
- 17 Brentwood (-9.9%)
- 18 Hollywood (-11.3%)
- 19 Reseda (-13.6%)
- 20 North Hollywood (-18.4%)
- 21 Arleta (-19.7%)
- 22 Encino (-22.1%)
- 23 Westwood (-25.7%)
- 24 West L.A. (-26.9%)
- 25 Sherman Oaks (-28.0%)
- 26 Palms (-29.3%)
- 27 West Adams (-30.1%)
- 28 Westchester (+13.1%)
- 29 Silver Lake (-33.2%)
- 30 Venice (-36.7%)
- 31 South L.A. (-38.9%)
- 32 Boyle Heights (-59.4%)

	0 to 7.4%		< -22.5%
	7.5 to 14.9%		-22.4 to -15%
	15 to 22.4%		-14.9 to -7.5%
	22.5%+		-7.4 to 0%

**LOS ANGELES**  
**-9.7%**  
**overall**




Fig. 5-18: Map of Single-Family Population Density Change

### MULTI-FAMILY population density change

- 1 Arleta (+1066%)
- 2 Sun Valley (+145%)
- 3 Mission Hills (+100%)
- 4 Bel Air (+96.0%)
- 5 North Hollywood (+62.0%)
- 6 Van Nuys (+60.2%)
- 7 Chatsworth (+57.0%)
- 8 South L.A. (+55.3%)
- 9 Wilshire (+52.6%)
- 10 Westlake (+51.1%)
- 11 Sylmar (+50.4%)
- 12 Sunland (+48.7%)
- 13 Reseda (+43.3%)
- 14 Southeast L.A. (+39.0%)
- 15 Boyle Heights (+27.2%)
- 16 Northridge (+18.1%)
- 17 Westchester (+13.1%)
- 18 Central City North (+13.1%)
- 19 Encino (+13.0%)
- 20 Central City (+13.0%)
- 21 Silver Lake (+9.2%)
- 22 Hollywood (+7.6%)
- 23 Canoga Park (-1.7%)
- 24 Brentwood (-2.5%)
- 25 Granada Hills (-2.8%)
- 26 Palms (-4.3%)
- 27 Northeast L.A. (-12.0%)
- 28 West Adams (-15.8%)
- 29 Sherman Oaks (-18.7%)
- 30 West L.A. (-21.7%)
- 31 Westwood (-24.9%)
- 32 Venice (-41.5%)

- |              |                |
|--------------|----------------|
| 0 to 7.4%    | < -22.5%       |
| 7.5 to 14.9% | -22.4 to -15%  |
| 15 to 22.4%  | -14.9 to -7.5% |
| 22.5%+       | -7.4 to 0%     |

**LOS ANGELES  
+23.5%  
overall**




Fig. 5-19: Map of Multi-Family Population Density Change

### TOTAL population density change

- 1 Arleta (+83.6%)
- 2 Westlake (+51.1%)
- 3 Mission Hills (+42.8%)
- 4 Wilshire (+42.3%)
- 5 Southeast L.A. (+36.6%)
- 6 Sylmar (+33.7%)
- 7 North Hollywood (+31.4%)
- 8 Sun Valley (+30.3%)
- 9 Van Nuys (+30.2%)
- 10 Boyle Heights (+25.7%)
- 11 South L.A. (+23.5%)
- 12 Bel Air (+22.2%)
- 13 Chatsworth (+16.0%)
- 14 Central City North (+13.1%)
- 15 Central City (+13.0%)
- 16 Sunland (+6.0%)
- 17 Canoga Park (+4.1%)
- 18 Northridge (+3.7%)
- 19 Hollywood (+3.6%)
- 20 Reseda (+3.2%)
- 21 Silver Lake (+0.6%)
- 22 Northeast L.A. (+0.6%)
- 23 Westchester (-5.6%)
- 24 Granada Hills (-6.3%)
- 25 Brentwood (-7.6%)
- 26 Encino (-12.5%)
- 27 Palms (-13.4%)
- 28 West Adams (-19.2%)
- 29 West L.A. (-23.4%)
- 30 Sherman Oaks (-23.9%)
- 31 Westwood (-25.1%)
- 32 Venice (-40.8%)

- |              |                |
|--------------|----------------|
| 0 to 7.4%    | < -22.5%       |
| 7.5 to 14.9% | -22.4 to -15%  |
| 15 to 22.4%  | -14.9 to -7.5% |
| 22.5%+       | -7.4 to 0%     |

**LOS ANGELES  
+9.9%  
overall**




Fig. 5-20: Map of Total Population Density Change

### CLASSIFICATION population density change

- SINGLE (+) / MULTI (-)**
- 1 Canoga Park
  - 2 Northeast L.A.

- SINGLE AND MULTI (-)**
- 3 Brentwood
  - 4 Granada Hills
  - 5 Palms
  - 6 Sherman Oaks
  - 7 West Adams
  - 8 West L.A.
  - 9 Westwood
  - 10 Venice

- SINGLE (-) / MULTI (+)**
- 11 Arleta
  - 12 Boyle Heights
  - 13 Encino
  - 14 Hollywood
  - 15 North Hollywood
  - 16 Northridge
  - 17 Reseda
  - 18 Silver Lake
  - 19 South L.A.
  - 20 Sunland
  - 21 Van Nuys
  - 22 Westchester
  - 23 Wilshire

- SINGLE AND MULTI (+)**
- 24 Bel Air
  - 25 Central City
  - 26 Central City North
  - 27 Chatsworth
  - 28 Mission Hills
  - 29 Southeast L.A.
  - 30 Sun Valley
  - 31 Sylmar
  - 32 Westlake




Fig. 5-21: Classification of Four Types of Density Change

SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DENSITY CHANGE

It is apparent from Fig. 5-18 (where red means decrease and black means increase), that most communities in L.A. experienced a clear shift away from single-family towards multi-family – 26 of 35 areas experienced a decline and another three have no single-family (therefore no change), leaving just six areas with an increase in single-family population capacity. Half of these (Wilshire, Encino, and Chatsworth) had negligible increases and another (Northeast L.A.) saw only a 6% increase. Only two areas (Brentwood and Sunland) show significant increases. As the map shows, there is not a very distinctive spatial pattern to these changes.

MULTI-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DENSITY CHANGE

Fig. 5-19 readily shows the general trend towards increased multi-family in the City, but also a clearer pattern. We can see the Eastside (with the exception of Northeast L.A. and West Adams) registering significant increases. Clearer still is the

increase in multi-family across the San Fernando Valley, but particularly in the East Valley, where all seven communities show strong increases. We also see that most communities on the Westside show significant decreases.

TOTAL RESIDENTIAL DENSITY CHANGE

Fig. 5-20 shows the total changes in residential density. The overall spatial distribution strongly reflects changes in multi-family, but in some areas – particularly on the Westside – these effects are amplified once changes to single-family are added because these areas also significantly reduced single-family capacity. The interaction between single- and multi-family produce four possible combinations (Fig. 5-21):

		SINGLE-FAMILY	
		INCREASED	DECREASED
MULTI-FAMILY	INCREASED	TYPE 4 (diagram 4)	TYPE 3 (diagram 3)
	DECREASED	TYPE 1 (diagram 1)	TYPE 2 (diagram 2)

(1) Communities where single-family density increased, but multi-family decreased (Fig 5-21, Diagram 1). Only two communities had this pattern (Canoga Park and Northeast L.A.). These trends are decidedly at odds with the overall pattern in L.A.

(2) Communities where both single- and multi-family decreased (Fig 5-21, Diagram 2). We might think of these as communities that downzoned across-the-board – the goal here is not to shift from one type to another, but rather to simply lower population density, period. Eight communities fall into this category.

(3) Communities where single-family density decreased and multi-family increased (Fig 5-21, Diagram 3). We might think of these as fairly typical of the general shift in L.A. over this period. Thirteen communities displayed this pattern.

(4) Communities where both single- and multi-family increased (Fig 5-21, Diagram 4). We might think of these as the most “pro-growth” communities – areas that experienced an across-the-board increase in density. Nine communities fall into this category. It should be noted that while Bel Air is in this category, it is an outlier. Likewise, Chatsworth was so undeveloped by its first plan that it appears as a high-growth area. More typical are the three areas in the East Valley (Sylmar, Mission Hills and Sun Valley) and on the Eastside (Central City, Central City North, Southeast L.A.), areas that have absorbed a significant amount of L.A.’s growth between 1970-2000.



### 5.3. AREA CHARACTERISTICS AND LAND USE CHANGE

The above sections used descriptive statistics to quantify how land uses have changed across L.A.'s 35 community plan areas over time. But I was interested in analyzing if there was a relationship between these changes and different qualities of place (and the people who live there). To test these relationships, I ran a series of simple regressions on three dependent variables: (a) the total change in residential density,

	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	IQR	Q1	Q3
1 WHITE	36.8%	26.3%	43.4%	12.9%	56.3%
2 LATINO	40.4%	24.6%	42.3%	21.8%	64.1%
3 BLACK	8.5%	11.0%	4.0%	3.2%	7.2%
4 ASIAN	10.6%	7.7%	10.8%	5.2%	15.9%
5 SFD	42.5%	19.9%	26.2%	30.8%	57.0%
6 RENTERS	55.5%	20.0%	27.9%	40.6%	68.5%
7 POVERTY	19.9%	10.6%	13.0%	12.0%	25.0%
8 FOREIGN	23.8%	10.6%	16.3%	14.9%	31.2%
9 JOBLESS	11.8%	5.6%	5.2%	8.7%	13.9%
10 DRIVERS	61.4%	14.6%	16.4%	56.2%	72.7%
11 SIZE	2.84	0.71	1.04	2.32	3.36
12 DENSITY	10,315	6,939	7,365	6,122	13,487
13 INCOME	\$65,666	\$40,494	\$30,915	\$46,778	\$77,692
14 HOUSING	88.4%	13.8%	5.6%	89.9%	95.4%

Fig. 5-22: Descriptive Statistics of 14 area characteristics

as measured by changes in population capacity in each of the 35 community plan areas (recognizing that these changes reflect the changes in the underlying land use categories), (b) changes in single-family residential density, and (c) changes in multi-family residential density.

To understand the relationship between change in density and area characteristics (using 2000 Census data, as compiled by the L.A. City Planning Demographic Research Unit), I began with 14 independent variables that represent a cross-section of different social, economic and spatial attributes.<sup>24</sup> Fig. 5-22 provides descriptive statistics of these 14 variables across the 35 community plan areas. The goal was to see if these independent variables were a good predictor of the change in residential density. These variables were chosen to test the impact of social, physical and economic characteristics, as follows.

## SOCIAL FACTORS

1. Percent of non-Hispanic Whites (WHITE)
2. Percent of Latinos (LATINO)
3. Percent of African-Americans (BLACK)
4. Percent of Asian-Americans (ASIAN)
5. Percent of non-U.S. citizens (FOREIGN)
6. Average number of people per household (HHSIZE)

## PHYSICAL FACTORS

7. Area Density in people per square mile (DENSITY)
8. Percent of people who commute by car (DRIVERS)
9. Percent of single family detached homes (SFD)
10. Percent of residential land uses (HOUSING)

## ECONOMIC FACTORS

11. Percent of households that are renters (RENTERS)
12. Percent living below the poverty line (POVERTY)
13. Percent of population unemployed (JOBLESS)
14. Average yearly household income (INCOME)

Why these variables specifically? From the descriptive summary of land use changes above, it appeared as those many of the areas that had initiated an across-the-board reduction in residential density were located on the city's Westside, an area whose demographics are very different from the city as a whole – it is much whiter (66% vs 29% in L.A.) and far more affluent (mean income of \$101,000 vs \$59,000 in L.A.). Likewise, areas where more growth seemed to be directed, appeared to be areas with a large minority populations and generally low-income. So testing percentage Latino, white, black and Asian could reveal if race appears to be a predictor of increases or decreases in density. I would expect areas with high white populations to have either net decreases in density or only very small increases. By contrast, I would expect areas with high Latino, black, and Asian populations to have large increases in density.

Even if minority population does appear significant, we cannot be sure that race is the important factor. Areas with

high Latino and Asian population (but non African-American population) also tend to be areas with many non-U.S. citizens, and quite possibly a high number of illegal immigrants. Since I would expect non-citizens are less likely to be participants in land use politics, race may not be the more important determinant. While I expect Latino and non-citizen populations to be strongly correlated, testing the relative strength of their predictive value could begin to answer this question. Likewise, we might also expect areas where people have large families to be more supportive of increased density. Therefore, testing household size against changes in density could illustrate the importance of this factor. As with citizenship, family size is also correlated with race, with white and black populations typically having smaller family sizes than Asian and especially Latino populations, which typically have larger family sizes.<sup>25</sup> Collectively these six variables allow us to understand the degree to which social factors, at least from a macro perspective, appear to have positive correlations with density change. It should be

noted, however, that these factors may exhibit multicollinearity, which is discussed below.

I also wanted to test whether the underlying economic condition of areas appears to be related to relative increases or decreases in density. It is reasonable to expect that low-income areas and those with high unemployment might be more inclined to support significant change in their communities – that is, to use real estate as an economic development tool. These communities might see the benefits of increased density – potential job opportunities in the construction industry or permanent commercial or retail jobs in areas where mixed-uses and more affordable housing are encouraged. As discussed in the literature review (Chapter 4), whether an area is comprised largely of homeowners or renters may also impact the degree to which increases in density are supported. Homeowners may perceive increased density as a threat to property values, whereas renters may see it as an opportunity to provide much-needed affordable housing, or more generally, put downward

pressure on market rents due to increased supply. As such, I test whether the share of renters and homeowners seems to impact land use change.

While correlated with owner/renter status, household income more generally may or may not be a more important predictor of change. Not all areas with a high percentage of renters are low-income. For example, roughly 62% of Westwood residents are renters, yet it has one of the highest mean household incomes in the City (\$104,000). The data, however, could be masking a strong divide within the community between very high-income homeowners and very low-income renters (in the case of Westwood, UCLA students). Likewise, some areas with high homeownership rates are low-income, for example in Arleta-Pacoima, where only 36% of residents are renters, yet its the mean household income of \$48,000 is almost 20% below the City average. So testing income as a separate variable might reveal important differences. Testing the percentage of population living below the poverty line might

also answer a slightly different question than income alone. For example, an area like Sunland is exactly average for L.A. in household income (\$59,400), but has a very low poverty rate – 12%, almost half the City average of 22%. On the other hand, Hollywood with an only marginally less average income of \$54,800, has an average poverty rate (23%), more than double Sunland’s, despite similar average incomes.

In addition to these social and economic factors, I also wanted to understand how the character of the built environment itself might influence observed changes in density. While it seems intuitive that the underlying density would be strongly correlated with future changes in density – for example, that high-density areas would be more welcoming of future growth than low-density areas – but the evidence does not appear to support that claim. Depending on the circumstances of a community, a high-density area may be experiencing high traffic congestion or other inconveniences that might motivate people to seek reductions in future density. By contrast, areas that are

low-density but low-income might welcome increased density if it means new economic investment. So testing whether underlying density is a good predictor of density change may lead to interesting results.

The percentage of workers who commute by car could be considered a social, economic or physical factor. Certainly, the preference to drive or take transit is informed by one's experiences and culture. It is also an economic decision – those who can afford to own and operate a car, often do, while low-income households often don't have the luxury of making that decision. But perhaps most importantly, transportation choice depends on whether there are actually choices available. Many communities are simply not served by rapid transit. Others are located at far distances to job centers, making transit impractical. Alternatives like walking and biking are also strongly influenced by how comfortable, safe, or attractive a given area is. So in this sense, while economic and social forces influence mobility, the underlying characteristics of the built environment

determine whether these choices are even possible.

I also wanted to explicitly test whether the percentage of households living in single-family detached homes was a more important predictor than ownership rates. There are a couple of reasons why these don't necessarily test the same things. First, many people who are homeowners don't own single-family homes, but rather apartment or attached (townhouse) condominiums. But also, in many areas of Los Angeles, single-family homes are not owner-occupied and instead are rental properties. Los Angeles mirrors the national average where roughly one-third of rental properties are single-family homes.<sup>26</sup> So homeowners and single-family detached housing are clearly not the same thing, although they are correlated.

Finally, I also wanted to test how sensitive the overall land use categories are to changes in density. For example, are areas that are overwhelmingly zoned for housing less likely to see increases in density and vice versa? This may not prove useful in the case of Los Angeles, since the vast majority of

Fig. 5-23: Scatterplot of WHITE vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-25: Scatterplot of BLACK vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-24: Scatterplot of LATINO vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-26: Scatterplot of ASIAN vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-27: Scatterplot of FOREIGN vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-29: Scatterplot of DENSITY vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-28: Scatterplot of HHSIZE vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-30: Scatterplot of DRIVERS vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-31: Scatterplot of SFD vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-33: Scatterplot of RENTERS vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-32: Scatterplot of HOUSING vs TOTAL Density Change




Fig. 5-34: Scatterplot of POVERTY vs TOTAL Density Change






Fig. 5-35: Scatterplot of JOBLESS vs TOTAL Density Change





Fig. 5-36: Scatterplot of INCOME vs TOTAL Density Change



land area is reserved for residential uses. In fact, only two communities (Central City and Central City North) are less than 73% housing – and they are considerably less (36% and 42%, respectively). So it is possible that the range is too narrow relative to the range of differences in density changes for this to be a useful factor.

## RESULTS

Each of the above variables was tested independently. I created scatter plots for each then ran a simple ordinary least squares regression for each variable to test the significance of the observed variation. In each case, a null hypothesis was tested that the regression coefficient (i.e. slope) was equal to zero. The data was screened for violations of basic regression assumptions (linearity, normalcy, independence, homogeneity); in a few cases (noted below), outliers were identified and removed from the calculations. Each variable was

tested against changes in single-family density (SFCHANGE), multi-family density (MFCHANGE), and total change in density (TOTCHANGE).

Scatterplots of the relationship between different area characteristics and single-family, multi-family, and total residential density change allow us to see how strong (or if) there is a relationship. On each graph, a trendline (regression line) is shown; the steeper the line, the stronger the relation between

the variable and land use changes (and commensurately, relatively flat lines indicate a weak relationship). The results for total, single- and multi-family are given below, followed by discussion.

**TOTAL RESIDENTIAL CHANGE**

SOCIAL FACTORS

It is clear that percent white (Fig. 5-23) and Latino (Fig. 5-24) are relatively strongly correlated with overall changes in residential density. Moreover, they are inversely proportional to each other, almost in equal measures; as Fig. 5-38 shows, with a couple of exceptions (West Adams and Bel Air), the whitest areas saw the largest decreases in density and vice versa. Fig. 5-39 also illustrates the apparent relationship between total density change and race. Of the 11 communities that saw a net decline in density, 10 have greater than 40% white population (the City average is 29%). A lone outlier here is West Adams, which has

		REGR COEFF.	STD ERROR	t	p	R <sup>2</sup>
SOCIAL	1 WHITE	-0.552	0.143	-3.874 ***	0.000	0.292
	2 LATINO	0.693	0.138	5.003 ***	0.000	0.431
	3 BLACK	0.529	0.558	0.948	0.350	0.027
	4 ASIAN	-0.242	0.584	-0.415	0.681	0.005
	5 FOREIGN	1.635	0.316	5.165 ***	0.000	0.447
	6 HHSIZE	0.251	0.046	5.410 ***	0.000	0.470
PHYSICAL	7 DENSITY	0.000	0.000	1.328	0.194	0.052
	8 DRIVERS	-0.897	0.266	-3.368 ***	0.002	0.256
	9 SFD	0.125	0.226	0.555	0.582	0.009
	10 HOUSING	-0.637	2.037	-0.313	0.775	0.032
ECONOMIC	11 RENTERS	0.091	0.225	0.407	0.687	0.005
	12 POVERTY	0.888	0.399	2.228 **	0.033	0.131
	13 JOBLESS	3.061	1.140	2.685 **	0.011	0.184
	14 INCOME	0.000	0.000	-4.023 ***	0.000	0.343

\*\*\* significant at p < .01; \*\* significant at p < .05; \* significant at p < .10


Fig. 5-37: Summary of Regression Results for TOTAL Residential Change

### % DENSITY CHANGE vs. % WHITE 2000 Census




Fig. 5-38: Comparison of % Density Change with % White


**% DENSITY CHANGE**



**% LATINO**



**% WHITE**



**% BLACK**




Fig. 5-39: Maps of Total Density Change and Race

a very low white population (3.8%), yet saw a decline of 19.4% in overall density (this case is discussed in depth in Chapter 7). A high outlier is Bel Air, due to the hotel project referenced above. We see an inverse relationship with respect to percent Latino, i.e. in general, areas with low Latino populations saw significant declines and areas with high Latino population saw notable increases. Interestingly, percent black (Fig. 5-25) and percent Asian (Fig. 5-26) do not show a significant relationship to density changes. The trendline for African-Americans is almost flat, with only a slight positive slope (the same direction as Latino); likewise, the trendline for Asian-Americans is very flat, with a very slightly negative slope (the same direction as whites). The regression models confirm these results, as WHITE,  $t(33) = -3.87$ ,  $p < .001$ , and LATINO,  $t(33) = 5.00$ ,  $p < .001$ , both showed a significant effect on total density change. By contrast, BLACK,  $t(32) = .95$ ,  $p = .35$ , and ASIAN,  $t(33) = -.41$ ,  $p = .68$ , were not significant.<sup>27</sup>

Even in the cases of WHITE and LATINO, however, only

a relatively small proportion of the variation in total density change can be explained by these factors alone (with  $r^2$  values of .29 and .43), although given the complex forces at play, these results should be considered significant. The scatterplots for the other two social factors – FOREIGN (Fig. 5-27) and HHSIZE (Fig. 5-28) show a positive relationship. The regression model supports this, as FOREIGN,  $t(33) = 5.16$ ,  $p < .001$ , and HHSIZE,  $t(33) = 5.41$ ,  $p < .001$ , were both significant (with  $r^2$  values of .45 and .47, respectively). Overall, four of the six social factors have significant explanatory value with respect to total density change.

#### PHYSICAL FACTORS

Interestingly, there is only a very weak relationship between underlying density and overall residential density change (Fig. 5-29), with only a slightly positive regression line. This is perhaps surprising, since we might have expected areas with higher density to have greater increases in density, and low-

density areas to have either reduced density or experienced only small increases in density. But the regression confirms that DENSITY,  $t(33) = 1.33$ ,  $p = .19$  is not significant even at the  $p < .10$  confidence level.<sup>28</sup>

The relationship between percent of single-family detached housing (Fig. 5-31) and total density change is weaker still, producing a nearly flat regression line, and confirmed by the regression results,  $t(33) = .56$ ,  $p = .58$ . This suggests there is little evidence to support the claim higher-density areas are more likely to result in increases in density, and vice versa, that lower-density areas are more likely to result in decreases in density. This result is somewhat surprising since ordinarily we might expect to see areas with many single-family homes more strongly associated with decreases in density. But as noted above, L.A.'s landscape is quite complex, with many low-income single-family areas that might be more receptive to increases in density.

Similarly, the percentage of land dedicated to housing

(Fig. 5-32) does not appear to be significant, although as noted above, the variance between communities in HOUSING is so small (with all but two greater than 73%), there simply may not be enough difference to detect a measurable influence. The regression confirms this insignificant result,  $t(33) = -.31$ ,  $p = .78$ . Conversely, the percentage of drivers (Fig. 5-30) does appear to have a negative relationship with total density change, although at a slightly lower level of confidence that the social factors identified above. While this might seem, at first, a bizarre if not spurious relationship, it is supported by anecdotal evidence that suggests Angelenos are concerned that more apartments and condos mean more traffic congestion. The regression result of  $t(33) = -3.37$ ,  $p = .0019$  is significant at the .02 level, although DRIVERS ( $r^2 = .26$ ) explains a smaller amount of the variation in TOTCHANGE than did WHITE, LATINO, FOREIGN, or HHSIZE. Overall, only one of the four physical factors can significantly explain the variation in density change, although at a moderately lower level of confidence.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

There is no apparent relationship between the percentage of renters in communities and density changes (Fig. 5-33), with the regression show  $t(33) = .41, p = .69$ . The evidence in this case does not appear to support that theory that areas with more renters are more inclined to support increases in density. The other three economic variables appear more promising, with POVERTY (Fig. 5-34) and JOBLESS (Fig. 5-35) showing positive relationships (i.e. the more lower-income and high unemployment an area is, in general, the higher the increase in density) and INCOME (Fig. 5-36) showing a negative relationship (i.e. the higher income an area, the higher the reduction in density). Of the four economic variables, poverty rate appears to be the most significant,  $t(33) = 2.23, p < .05$ , although at much lower confidence than any of the social factors or the one physical factor deemed to be significant. This appears to be a very small factor, however, in explaining the total variation in density change ( $r^2 = .13$ ). Still, it does suggest that areas

with a high concentration of poverty may be more receptive to increases in density. Household income (Fig. 5-36) is also a significant factor in predicting total density change, as the regression reinforces,  $t(31) = -4.02, p < .001$ .<sup>29</sup> This results confirms our theory that more affluent areas are strongly associated with overall reductions in density. Likewise, an area’s jobless rate (Fig. 5-35) also appears to be significant predictor

		REGR COEFF.	STD ERROR	t	p	R <sup>2</sup>
SOCIAL	1 WHITE	-0.029	0.127	-0.228	0.821	0.002
	2 LATINO	0.054	0.135	0.402	0.690	0.005
	3 BLACK	-0.126	0.420	-0.300	0.766	0.003
	4 ASIAN	0.392	0.428	0.916	0.366	0.025
	5 FOREIGN	0.147	0.314	0.467	0.643	0.007
	6 HHSIZE	0.058	0.046	1.259	0.217	0.046
PHYSICAL	7 DENSITY	0.000	0.000	-1.482	0.148	0.064
	8 DRIVERS	-0.069	0.228	-0.305	0.762	0.003
	9 SFD	0.303	0.159	1.907 *	0.065	0.099
	10 HOUSING	-0.127	0.241	-0.529	0.600	0.008
ECONOMIC	11 RENTERS	-0.254	0.161	-1.580	0.124	0.070
	12 POVERTY	-0.081	0.316	-0.256	0.800	0.002
	13 JOBLESS	0.099	0.596	0.165	0.870	0.001
	14 INCOME	0.000	0.000	-0.864	0.394	0.024

\*\*\* significant at  $p < .01$ ; \*\* significant at  $p < .05$ ; \* significant at  $p < .10$

Fig. 5-40: Summary of Regression Results for SINGLE-FAMILY Change

Fig. 5-41: Scatterplot of WHITE vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-43: Scatterplot of BLACK vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-42: Scatterplot of LATINO vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-44: Scatterplot of ASIAN vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change






Fig. 5-45: Scatterplot of FOREIGN vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-47: Scatterplot of DENSITY vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-46: Scatterplot of HHSIZE vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-48: Scatterplot of DRIVERS vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-49: Scatterplot of SFD vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-51: Scatterplot of RENTERS vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-50: Scatterplot of HOUSING vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-52: Scatterplot of POVERTY vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-53: Scatterplot of JOBLESS vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change





Fig. 5-54: Scatterplot of INCOME vs SINGLE-FAMILY Density Change



of density change,  $t(32) = 2.69$ ,  $p = .011$ , although not at a lower confidence level than income.<sup>30</sup> Overall, just three of the four economic factors are significant, although income is the most important ( $p < .001$ ), while poverty and unemployment rates are less important ( $p < .05$ ).

To sum, of the 14 variables tested, six were deemed insignificant (BLACK, ASIAN, DENSITY, SFD, HOUSING, RENTERS), while eight are significant to varying degrees. Two factors (POVERTY, JOBLESS) are moderately significant at the  $p < .05$  level and one factor (DRIVERS) is significant at the  $p < .01$  level. Five factors, however, appear to be highly significant (at the  $p < .001$  level) – LATINO, WHITE, FOREIGN, HHSIZE and INCOME.

**SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CHANGE**

A summary of the results of the simple regressions is given in Fig. 5-40 followed by scatterplots of the 14 different variables against single-family residential change. As the map of single family change shows (Fig. 5-18), there does not appear to be a strong pattern to single-family density changes. By the 1970s, most areas within the City of L.A. had been developed, leaving only a few places where single-family tracts could be reasonably built. The process of urbanization from the 1970s onward, then, can be largely seen in the context of a city reducing its population capacity in single-family zones and increasing its population capacity in multi-family zones. So I did not expect that the regression modeling of single family change over density changes to reveal strong relationships with area characteristics. The summary of results (Fig. 5-40) confirms this. Virtually all variables are insignificant predictors of changes to single-family changes. Two factors, DENSITY and

RENTERS show slightly more promise,  $t(32) = -1.48, p = .15$  and  $t(33) = -1.58, p = .12$ , respectively, but neither are significant at even the  $p < .10$  level. Only one variable, the percentage of single-family detached homes (SFD), is even moderately significant,  $t(33) = 1.91, p = .065$ , although this is at a fairly low level of confidence. This suggests that areas with lower percentage of single-family homes saw greater decreases in

		REGR COEFF.	STD ERROR	t	p	R <sup>2</sup>
SOCIAL	1 WHITE	-0.608	0.255	-2.388 **	0.023	0.155
	2 LATINO	0.820	0.259	3.170 ***	0.003	0.245
	3 BLACK	0.507	0.850	0.596	0.556	0.012
	4 ASIAN	-0.492	0.888	-0.554	0.584	0.010
	5 FOREIGN	1.839	0.576	3.193 ***	0.003	0.247
	6 HHSIZE	0.339	0.086	3.932 ***	0.000	0.333
PHYSICAL	7 DENSITY	0.000	0.000	0.232	0.818	0.002
	8 DRIVERS	-0.639	0.452	-1.416	0.167	0.061
	9 SFD	0.390	0.379	1.030	0.311	0.033
	10 HOUSING	-0.092	0.490	-0.188	0.852	0.001
ECONOMIC	11 RENTERS	-0.099	0.374	-0.266	0.792	0.002
	12 POVERTY	0.624	0.648	0.963	0.343	0.029
	13 JOBLESS	3.462	1.857	1.864 *	0.072	0.104
	14 INCOME	0.000	0.000	-2.343 **	0.026	0.155

\*\*\* significant at  $p < .01$ ; \*\* significant at  $p < .05$ ; \* significant at  $p < .10$

Fig. 5-55: Summary of Regression Results for MULTI-FAMILY Change

Fig. 5-56: Scatterplot of WHITE vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-58: Scatterplot of BLACK vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-57: Scatterplot of LATINO vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-59: Scatterplot of ASIAN vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-60: Scatterplot of FOREIGN vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-62: Scatterplot of DENSITY vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-61: Scatterplot of HHSIZE vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-63: Scatterplot of DRIVERS vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-64: Scatterplot of SFD vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-66: Scatterplot of RENTERS vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-65: Scatterplot of HOUSING vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-67: Scatterplot of POVERTY vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change




Fig. 5-68: Scatterplot of JOBLESS vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change





Fig. 5-69: Scatterplot of INCOME vs MULTI-FAMILY Density Change



single-family density, but this factor only explained roughly 10% of the variation in single-family density change, which suggests that there are other factors at play. Of the 14 factors considered, only one (SFD) was significant, and even here, only at the weakest ( $p < .10$ ) level of confidence.

### MULTI-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CHANGE

Scatterplots of the 14 different variables against multi-family residential change are below, followed by a summary of the results of the simple regressions in Fig. 5-55. Overall, the trends with respect to multi-family change broadly reflect the total density changes, but with weaker influences.<sup>31</sup> This is a somewhat surprising finding. I would have expected area characteristics to be more influential for changes in multi-family than overall, on the theory that changes in single-family would have muted the overall effect. For example, I would have thought that a white, affluent area would have large decreases



in multi-family density and only moderate to no decreases in single-family density. This does not appear to be the case. The evidence suggests that areas with large decreases in multi-family housing are also the areas that saw the largest decreases in single-family housing – these are the areas identified in Fig. 5-21, diagram 2.

The effect then of adding single-family changes to multi-family changes is not to mute changes to multi-family as expected, but rather to amplify them. This provides strong evidence that in these areas, the *modus operandi* was not to shift growth away from multi-family towards single-family, but rather to institute downzoning across-the-board – that is, to use the subsequent community plans as a means to restrict growth of all kinds. And indeed, as Fig. 5-21, diagram 2 shows, these areas are largely in predominately white, affluent areas on the City's Westside, which is consistent with the results in the total change regressions above.

With respect to multi-family density changes, it appears

that household size (Fig. 5-61) has the strongest impact on changes to multi-family housing, which is confirmed by the regression,  $t(33) = 3.93$ ,  $p < .001$ , although only about one-third of the variation in multi-family change is explained by this factor. The next strongest factors were the percentage of non-citizens (Fig. 5-60) and the percentage of Latinos (Fig. 5-57). As with household size, they show a moderately strong influence on multi-family,  $t(33) = 3.19$ ,  $p = .003$  and  $t(33) = 3.17$ ,  $p = .003$ , respectively. While not significant at the  $p < .001$  level, a confidence of  $p < .01$  is also highly significant result.

Two factors were significant at the  $p < .05$  level – household income (Fig. 5-69) and percentage white (Fig. 5-56), with the regression showing a negative influence on multi-family density change:  $t(31) = -2.34$ ,  $p = .026$  for INCOME and  $t(33) = -2.39$ ,  $p = .023$  for WHITE, although in each these factors only explain roughly 15% of the variation. Finally, unemployment rate (Fig. 5-68) appears to have very modest predictive value with respect to multi-family changes,  $t(32) = 1.86$ ,  $p = .07$ , although

accounting for only 10% of the variation and significant at only the  $p < .10$  level.

Of the 14 variables considered, six were significant for explaining changes in multi-family density (as compared with eight of significance for the overall density changes). Of particular note, four of the six were social factors, two were economic factors and none were physical factors. This is broadly consistent with the influences in total changes – where four were social (the same four as for multi-family), three were economic, and only one was physical.

The two factors that were different between multi-family and overall changes were: (1) poverty rate, and (2) the percentage of commuters who drive (both considered significant to overall changes but not for multi-family changes). That these factors were less important for multi-family change than overall changes (once single-family changes were added) is somewhat surprising. If drivers are concerned that additional multi-family will increase traffic congestion, then we might expect DRIVERS

to be more significant for multi-family than overall. In fact, multi-family is more strongly associated with a reduction of driving (see literature review, part 4 in chapter 4) than an increase, since higher-densities tend to be associated with increased transit use. By contrast, we might expect an expansion of single-family housing is more of a factor for increased traffic, since these areas are typically more auto-dependent. Whether or not this can account for the stronger influence of drivers in the overall change than in multi-family change is difficult to say.

Just as the lower influence of drivers on multi-family, the lower influence of POVERTY on multi-family than overall is equally surprising. We might have expected areas with high poverty rates to be more strongly associated with increases in multi-family, on the theory that increased multi-family density would increase market supply and drive down rents, while also potentially delivering additional affordable housing units. But this does not appear to be the case, although the reasons for this would need further study.

## DISCUSSION

Taken collectively, five variables are significant at the  $p < .001$  level for both multi-family and overall density changes: WHITE, LATINO, FOREIGN, SIZE, and INCOME. Area jobless rate (JOBLESS) was deemed significant in both multi-family and overall changes, although at far less confidence ( $p < .05$  and  $p < .10$ , respectively). This suggests that predominately white, affluent areas are more strongly associated with significant downzoning, while areas with high concentrations of Latinos, non-citizens, and large families are associated with significant upzoning. This is broadly consistent with my expectations.

While this provides sound quantitative evidence to demonstrate the association between particular (but by no means all) area characteristics, it does not explain why these characteristics might be important. The association between increased density and areas with large populations of Latinos (and by contrast, small white populations) and non-citizens,

with large households and low-income households could be explained by the invisible hand of the market, coupled with the City Planning Department appropriately responding to the need for more housing (and more affordable housing) in areas where it is needed most. Looking only at where density increased, that might be a plausible explanation. But this doesn't go very far to explain the radical decreases in density in predominately white, affluent areas. If demand for housing is greatest in low-income, minority communities, why would white/affluent communities need to not merely grow more slowly, but actually institute significant reductions across-the-board, in both single- and multi-family density? I delve into some of these questions in my case studies of local groups in Chapter 6.

Two additional variables appear to be somewhat significant, but to a lesser degree than the above five highly significant variables: DRIVERS and POVERTY, but only for overall changes, not for multi-family changes. Poverty is only significant at the  $p < .05$  level for overall changes, which may

not be a high enough threshold for a straight-up comparison between the percentage of people living below the poverty line and more intensive land uses, although the result makes intuitive sense – areas with low poverty rates are likely to be pushed for lower densities than areas with high poverty rates (on the theory that restricting development, especially for multi-family housing, is likely to increase prices). The percentage of drivers appears to be more significant, falling just below the  $p < .001$  level ( $p = 0.0019$ ). This supports the view that people who drive are concerned about the impact of further development on traffic congestion, but this is not supported by the multi-family results.

Of note are the variables that were not significant. Black and Asian populations were not significant as is clear from the near horizontal regression lines in the scatterplots (Fig 5-25 and Fig 5-26). The Asian population in Los Angeles tends not to be as highly concentrated as the Latino or White population. While the Black population in L.A. is highly concentrated (only

seven of 35 with more than 9% Black population and only nine with more than 6%), since the vast majority of areas have very little Black population, the variations in total residential density change does not appear to be significantly impacted by the percentage of Black population. It should also be noted that West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert appears to be an anomaly, not only because it is the only community plan area that is majority Black (52.3%), but also because it witnessed a net decline in total density of 19.4%, a rate that is similar to much more White and affluent areas in the Westside. The reasons for this are explored in the West Adams case study in Chapter 7 (A Tale of Two Communities).

Perhaps more surprising are the insignificance of single-family homes, underlying density, the percentage of renters, or the percentage of land uses dedicated to residential uses. If the expectation is that single-family homeowners fight density, we might expect to see these variables be significant. That the regression indicates they are not significant suggests that

*something else* is at work. As I will argue later in the chapter, it is not simply how many single-family homes are in a given area, but rather how *active* those homeowners are that matters. This also reflects the peculiar idiosyncrasies of Los Angeles. For example, although Arleta-Pacoima, which has a housing stock of 67.2% single-family homes and only 35.8% rentals, would appear to support more restrictive land uses (if the hypothesis that homeowners fight density holds), it is also overwhelmingly Latino (83.4%), in the bottom third for income, top quintile for non-citizens (31.9%), and easily has the highest household size (4.57) in the City, factors that appear to be associated with shifts to more intensive land uses. So areas like Arleta-Pacoima are not monolithic – sharing some characteristics of higher-income areas as well as lower-income areas.

Similarly, we might expect areas with a low percentage of renters to be more supportive of restrictive policies. This is not apparent at the level of the community plans, but may be more apparent at a finer grain unit of analysis. For example,

Wilshire is an area that overall has a high percentage of renters (81.4%, 4<sup>th</sup> highest in the City), but Wilshire has easily the largest population (292,163) of the community plan areas and includes a few of the City's most affluent single-family areas (Hancock Park and Windsor Square, for example). Likewise, low unemployment rates do not appear to be a significant predictor of more restrictive land uses.

### MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Given the results of the simple regressions and the strong influence of the five significant factors (WHITE, LATINO, FOREIGN, HHSIZE, INCOME), it is tempting to test whether these five factors collectively can reliably explain observed land uses changes in Los Angeles. The creation of a multiple regression model in this case is challenged by two potential difficulties. First is that small number of observations (n); there are only 35 community plan areas, so this limits how reliable

testing multiple variables will be. In general, it is advisable that there be 10-15 observation for each x number of independent variables in a multiple regression model; with a maximum of 33 observations – 35 areas less the two income outliers (Bel Air and Brentwood); for multi-family, there are 32 observations once the dependent variable outlier (Arleta) is excluded. This suggests a regression model with only two (and perhaps up to three) independent variables is most desirable. A second problem is the multicollinearity of the five variables themselves. There is no question that household size, income, and percentage non-citizens is correlated with percentages of Latinos and whites.

	REGR COEFF.	STD ERROR	t	p	VIF
1 HHSIZE	0.294	0.085	3.456 ***	0.002	4.75
2 LATINO	-0.541	0.381	-1.419	0.167	10.33
3 WHITE	0.362	0.359	1.009	0.322	9.44
4 FOREIGN	1.883	0.548	3.435 ***	0.002	3.93
5 INCOME	0.000	0.000	-1.076	0.291	6.85

\*\*\* significant at p < .01

R<sup>2</sup> 0.700 F-STATISTIC 12.611  
 ADJUSTED R<sup>2</sup> 0.645 P (OF F-STAT) 0.000  
 STD ERROR 0.158 # OF CASES 33

Fig. 5-70: Summary of Multiple Regression Results for Five Variables

But whether these variables are very highly or only moderately correlated among themselves requires some judgment.

To test this, I run a multiple regression of all five significant factors, but then calculate Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for each independent variable. VIFs quantify the severity of multicollinearity of the regression and is defined as 1 / (1 - R<sup>2</sup>).<sup>32</sup> As such, I modeled change in density as a function of these five variables such that:

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1x_1 + \dots + \beta_kx_k + \epsilon$$

	REGR COEFF.	STD ERROR	t	p	VIF
1 HHSIZE	0.161	0.046	3.483 ***	0.002	1.388
2 FOREIGN	1.292	0.329	3.924 ***	0.000	1.388

\*\*\* significant at p < .01

R<sup>2</sup> 0.660 F-STATISTIC 29.132  
 ADJUSTED R<sup>2</sup> 0.637 P (OF F-STAT) 0.000  
 STD ERROR 0.159 # OF CASES 33

Fig. 5-71: Summary of Multiple Regression Results for Two Variables

where the response variable  $y$  is change in total residential density and  $x_i$  are the above independent variables,  $\beta_i$  are the regression coefficients and  $\epsilon$  is the error of the model. The results of the full regression are shown below.

While the model (see Fig. 5-68 for full results) produces a relatively high adjusted  $r$ -squared of .64, three of the five variables, LATINO, WHITE and INCOME are not significant at any level. Moreover, these three variables display a relatively high degree of multicollinearity, with VIFs over 5, and in the case of LATINO, greater than 10 (which is often used a rule of thumb for high collinearity). That is, the percentage of Latinos, whites and household income are strongly correlated with household income and household size, but the latter two variables appear to be better predictors of changes in density. Both HHSIZE,  $t(31) = 3.46$  and FOREIGN,  $t(31) = 3.44$  are significant at the  $p < .01$  level. Given the insignificance and collinearity of LATINO,

WHITE and INCOME, a second model was created using only HHSIZE and FOREIGN.

As we can see, the elimination of LATINO, WHITE and INCOME did not significantly change the predictive value of the model, as the adjusted  $r$ -square was essentially unchanged; in both cases, almost two-thirds (64%) of the variation in total density change can be explained by household size and percentage of non-citizens in a given area. However, in the second model, the problem of collinearity has been eliminated, as both variables have a VIF of 1.39 (a VIF of 1 means the variables are perfectly non-correlated). So while there is clearly a relationship between density change and household income and percentage of Latinos/Whites, it turns out that household size and the percentage of non-citizens in an area are the most significant factors.

#### 5.4 HOMEOWNER ACTIVITY AND LAND USE CHANGE

It is clear from the above findings that certain area characteristics appear to be associated with patterns of density change – average household income and the percentage of whites and Latinos generally, and average household size and the percentage of non-citizens in a given area, more specifically. The findings suggest that predominately Latino, low-income areas, with large family sizes, and a high number of non-citizens are more likely to see large increases in density, while more affluent, white areas with small family sizes and a high percentage of U.S. citizens are more likely to see large decreases in density.

While these results may not be surprising, they do suggest that the spatial transformation of Los Angeles, to a large extent, reflects the changing social fabric of the City. It also suggests the burden of growth being born disproportionately by largely low-income, minority areas and growing disparity in land use

patterns between these areas and their more affluent, whiter counterparts.

These findings are interesting, especially as they relate to conceptions of social capital and voluntary organizations. Robert Putnam distinguished between two types of horizontal social capital – *bridging* and *bonding* – bonding being that which strengthens ties *within* a given community and bridging being that which strengthens ties *between* different communities.<sup>33</sup> But we might also think of a third type of capital, *linking* social capital, as the vertical relations that help individuals and groups gain access to formal institutions.<sup>34</sup> Linking social capital is especially important with respect to land use policy, because land uses can ultimately only be changed by government action (in the case of L.A., a vote of City Council, which takes into account political pressures as well as recommendations of the City Planning Commission, its own Land Use Committee, and staff recommendations by the Department of City Planning). So land use changes might be thought of as an intersection of both



what municipal institutions and local communities want. Linking social capital is important in this context because it highlights how power and politics shapes outcomes, and in particular the quality of the relationships between voluntary groups at the community plan level and their municipal representatives.

The process of building social capital has been described by some as a linear progression of stages, with bonding capital as being the first step to build bonds within a given community, bridging capital as being the second stage to build horizontal networks of like-minded groups, and finally linking capital as a third stage, whereby groups mobilize vertically to pressure formal institutions.<sup>35</sup> While it is debatable whether achieving these three forms of capital is such a clear linear process, it is not hard to see why a community that lacks linking capital, and to a lesser extent bridging capital, would be at a disadvantage with respect to land use changes, since it lacks the political power to influence land use decisions.

The discussion of social capital and land use is

important because it is strongly embedded within a discourse of homeownership and citizenship. Homeownership is encouraged in the U.S. by providing an economic incentive – the home mortgage interest deduction in the U.S. tax code – on the assumption, as Denise DiPasquale and Ed Glaeser put it that “homeowners make better citizens.”<sup>36</sup> Their research finds positive effects of homeownership on citizenship and community, since high transaction costs make homeowners less mobile and therefore increase investment in social capital and local amenities. The implication here is that areas with high homeownership rates have strong social capital, and in turn, areas with high social capital have a greater ability to shape land use decisions by mobilizing to influence the municipal institutions that enact change.

But homeownership alone does not tell the whole story. If it did, we would have expected stronger ties between our variables for renters and single-family detached homes and resultant land use changes, as discussed in section 5.3 above.

As Manuel Pastor's work on where noxious uses are sited in Los Angeles County tells us, undergoing dramatic social change – "ethnic churning", as he calls it – weakens a community's social capital and therefore its political power, making community mobilization more difficult and increasing its susceptibility to polluters.<sup>37</sup> While Pastor's work focuses on the most egregious cases of environmental injustice, I would argue the underlying logic remains the same for the distribution of land uses more generally. The important point about Pastor's work for my work is the connection between demographic characteristics of a given community, its social capital, and the extent to which it is able to shape land use decisions. Among the important findings in Pastor's work is the correlation between immigrant communities and environmental injustice. While immigrant communities often have strong bonding social capital – through the development of robust informal networks and local institutions – they often lack bridging social capital that connect these networks and institutions to others outside of

the community. Moreover, most damaging is the lack of linking social capital necessary to mobilize against noxious land use decisions.

Exacerbating this unevenness of social capital is the fragmentation of land use decisions. This is especially true in Los Angeles, where the City is, in effect, planned as 35 mini-cities, with little to no coordination between the different community plans. Gerald Frug argues this fragmentation impacts how social and economic resources are distributed within our cities, but also impacts the networks and relationships between people.<sup>38</sup>

This nexus of demographics, homeownership and resultant land use change can be seen in the formation and relative strength of local neighborhood associations. Generally speaking, I would argue that communities with active neighborhood associations have high social capital. Neighborhood associations can form for many reasons, but most often in response to some perceived crisis, either generally

(e.g. high crime in the area) or specifically (e.g. the threat posed by a proposed development). In addition to addressing specific threats, neighborhood associations can also play an important role in connecting communities by sponsoring social events, block parties, festivals, town halls, and other activities. They provide an informal, voluntary mechanism to facilitate collective action. The face-to-face interactions and outreach necessary to facilitate these activities, in turn, strengthen social capital. And in many cases, well-organized associations act as an important link between local concerns and their elected representatives. This is especially true in a large city like Los Angeles, where City Council members have a high degree of autonomy over their areas.

I propose that the presence or absence of neighborhood associations (and by extension, social capital) can partly help to explain the patterns of land use change we observed above. I theorize that community plan areas with a high level of neighborhood association activity will be associated

	TOTAL CASES	LAND USE CASES	% LAND USE
1 ARLETA	3	0	0%
2 BEL AIR	30	27	90%
3 BOYLE HEIGHTS	2	1	50%
4 BRENTWOOD	65	44	68%
5 CANOGA PARK	24	18	75%
6 CENTRAL CITY	12	0	0%
7 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	0	0	-
8 CHATSWORTH	3	0	0%
9 ENCINO	20	17	85%
10 GRANADA HILLS	13	0	0%
11 HARBOR GATEWAY	1	0	0%
12 HOLLYWOOD	92	25	27%
13 MISSION HILLS	1	1	100%
14 NORTH HOLLYWOOD	5	2	40%
15 NORTHEAST L.A.	41	9	22%
16 NORTHRIDGE	9	3	33%
17 PALMS	3	1	33%
18 RESEDA	6	1	17%
19 SAN PEDRO	0	0	-
20 SHERMAN OAKS	54	29	54%
21 SILVER LAKE	16	0	0%
22 SOUTH L.A.	19	4	21%
23 SOUTHEAST L.A.	1	1	100%
24 SUN VALLEY	2	2	100%
25 SUNLAND	34	21	62%
26 SYLMAR	3	2	67%
27 VAN NUYS	5	5	100%
28 VENICE	13	6	46%
29 WEST ADAMS	58	10	17%
30 WEST L.A.	34	24	71%
31 WESTLAKE	0	0	-
32 WESTCHESTER	11	1	9%
33 WESTWOOD	28	23	82%
34 WILMINGTON	5	3	60%
35 WILSHIRE	31	6	19%
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>	<b>644</b>	<b>286</b>	<b>44%</b>

Fig. 5-72: Summary of Neighborhood Association Cases

with substantial decreases in overall density (or at least very small increases), while areas with low levels of neighborhood association activity will be associated with substantial increases in overall density. In particular, I suggest that these patterns are strongly correlated with neighborhood associations that organize around land use issues. As we will see, not all neighborhood associations are equally active, nor are all associations chiefly concerned with land use issues. A subject of future research would be to conduct a detailed survey of L.A. neighborhood associations to better understand their primary concerns, and how these concerns related to land use changes.

That said, we can get a sense of how active neighborhood associations have been (and therefore their linking social capital) by studying their interactions with the Los Angeles City Council. This will certainly not provide a comprehensive accounting of all neighborhood associations in the City; this may never be possible, since many associations are highly informal and very often a temporary response to an immediate

crisis, so may lie dormant for years or disappear altogether. But looking at associations that came into contact with City Council is some way does paint a good picture of where the most active neighborhood associations have been and regarding what issues. Combining this analysis with my study of land use changes above, therefore, we can test the theory that land use changes are strongly associated with the relative strength of neighborhood associations in a given area.

To accomplish this, I conducted a comprehensive search

	8 ACTIVE	27 INACTIVE	DIFFERENCE
LAND USE CASES	70.1%	22.0%	0.31
LATINO	16.3%	53.3%	3.27
WHITE	67.3%	23.0%	0.34
BLACK	3.1%	12.3%	3.97
ASIAN	9.5%	9.9%	1.04
DENSITY	3,796	9,516	2.51
AVERAGE INCOME	\$97,763	\$48,182	0.49
NON-CITIZENS	14.3%	29.4%	2.06
POVERTY	11.6%	24.2%	2.09
JOBLESS	7.8%	13.3%	1.71
HOUSEHOLD SIZE	2.38	3.08	1.29
RENTERS	41.8%	62.6%	1.50

Fig. 5-73: Comparison of 8 Most Active Ares with Rest of L.A.

of the Los Angeles City Council Files, a database maintained by the L.A. City Clerk's Office (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of methods). Through this exhaustive search, I identified 202 neighborhood associations that had made a request from the City Council, involving 644 cases between 1980 and 2012. Of

these, 105 associations were involved with land use cases, totaling 286 cases, or roughly 44% of all cases involving a neighborhood association. A detailed breakdown of these associations and the relevant Council File case numbers is provided in Appendix B. Fig. 5-70 provides a summary by community plan area of the total number of cases and the number of land use cases.

From Fig. 5-70, it is apparent that there is a wide disparity in the number of active neighborhood associations across the City. Three areas have had no cases involving neighborhood associations between 1980 and 2012, a period of 32 years (Central City North, Westlake, and San Pedro). A number of areas have had a few cases, but none involving land uses and in a couple of cases, there have been active associations (more than 10 cases), but with either no or very few land use cases. Overall, nine of the 35 areas (roughly one-quarter) have had no land use cases, another six had just one case, six had between two and five cases, and four had between six and ten cases.




Fig. 5-74: Diagram Showing the Eight Most Active Areas

# NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS # of groups (all cases)

- 1 Central City North (0)
- 1 Westlake (0)
- 3 Boyle Heights (1)
- 3 Central City (1)
- 3 Mission Hills (1)
- 3 Van Nuys (1)
- 7 Arleta (2)
- 7 Chatsworth (2)
- 7 Southeast L.A. (2)
- 7 Sun Valley (2)
- 11 Granada Hills (3)
- 11 Northridge (3)
- 11 Reseda (3)
- 11 Sylmar (3)
- 11 Westchester (3)
- 16 Canoga Park (4)
- 16 North Hollywood (4)
- 16 Palms (4)
- 16 Silver Lake (4)
- 20 Westwood (5)
- 21 Encino (6)
- 21 Sunland (6)
- 23 Bel Air (7)
- 24 Venice (8)
- 25 Sherman Oaks (9)
- 26 South L.A. (9)
- 27 West L.A. (11)
- 28 West Adams (14)
- 29 Northeast L.A. (15)
- 29 Wilshire (15)
- 31 Hollywood (24)
- 31 Brentwood (27)

- |     |       |
|-----|-------|
| 4   | > 15  |
| 3   | 10-15 |
| 2   | 7-9   |
| 0-1 | 5-6   |




Fig. 5-75: Location of All Active Neighborhood Associations

# NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS all cases

- 1 Central City North (0)
- 2 Westlake (0)
- 3 Mission Hills (1)
- 4 Southeast L.A. (1)
- 5 Boyle Heights (2)
- 6 Sun Valley (2)
- 7 Arleta (3)
- 8 Chatsworth (3)
- 9 Palms (3)
- 10 Sylmar (3)
- 11 North Hollywood (5)
- 12 Van Nuys (5)
- 13 Reseda (6)
- 14 Northridge (9)
- 15 Westchester (11)
- 16 Central City (12)
- 17 Granada Hills (13)
- 18 Venice (13)
- 19 Silver Lake (16)
- 20 South L.A. (19)
- 21 Encino (20)
- 22 Canoga Park (24)
- 23 Westwood (28)
- 24 Bel Air (30)
- 25 Wilshire (31)
- 26 Sunland (34)
- 27 West L.A. (34)
- 28 Northeast L.A. (41)
- 29 Sherman Oaks (54)
- 30 West Adams (58)
- 31 Brentwood (65)
- 32 Hollywood (92)

- |      |       |
|------|-------|
|      |       |
| 7-12 | 50+   |
|      |       |
| 4-6  | 37-49 |
|      |       |
| 2-3  | 25-36 |
|      |       |
| 0-1  | 13-24 |




Fig. 5-76: Map of All Active Neighborhood Associations by Area

# NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS # of groups (land use cases)





Fig. 5-77: Location of Neighborhood Associations Involved in Land Use Cases



### NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS # of land use cases

- 1 Arleta (0)
- 2 Central City (0)
- 3 Central City North (0)
- 4 Chatsworth (0)
- 5 Granada Hills (0)
- 6 Silver Lake (0)
- 7 Westlake (0)
- 8 Boyle Heights (1)
- 9 Mission Hills (1)
- 10 Palms (1)
- 11 Reseda (1)
- 12 Southeast L.A. (1)
- 13 Westchester (1)
- 14 North Hollywood (2)
- 15 Sun Valley (2)
- 16 Sylmar (2)
- 17 Northridge (3)
- 18 South L.A. (4)
- 19 Van Nuys (5)
- 20 Venice (6)
- 21 Northeast L.A. (9)
- 22 Wilshire (9)
- 23 West Adams (10)
- 24 Encino (17)
- 25 Canoga Park (18)
- 26 West L.A. (19)
- 27 Sunland (21)
- 28 Bel Air (22)
- 29 Westwood (22)
- 30 Hollywood (25)
- 31 Sherman Oaks (29)
- 32 Brentwood (44)

	3-5		> 20
	2		16-20
	1		11-15
	0		6-10




Fig. 5-78: Map of Neighborhood Associations Involved in Land Use Cases by Area

In another case (Hollywood), there have been a large number of land use cases (25), but these represent only about one-quarter of the cases in the area.<sup>39</sup> This means that the majority of neighborhood associations actively involved in land use cases are concentrated in eight community plan areas. These eight communities represent only 15% of L.A.'s population, yet brought forward more than 70% of the land use cases. Clearly, neighborhood association activity has been very high in some areas, and almost nonexistent in others.

As Fig. 5-71 shows, these eight areas, while certainly not monolithic, have very different characteristics than the other 27 areas. In the eight active areas, 70% of cases involved land uses, notably higher than the 22% in the other areas. Demographically, the active areas are radically different from the inactive areas. The active areas have only 30% as many Latinos (16% vs 53%) and only 25% as many African-Americans (3.1% vs 12.3%) and nearly three times as many whites (67.3% vs 23.0%). Active areas are only about 40% as dense (3,800 vs

9,500 people per square mile) and have double the household income (\$97,800 vs \$48,200). They also have half as many non-citizens (14.3% vs 29.4%) and half as much poverty (11.6% vs 24.2%). They also have a notably lower unemployment rate (7.8% vs 13.3%), smaller household sizes (2.38 vs 3.08 – this despite more than 2.5 times the land area per person), and fewer renters (41.8% vs 62.6%).


As Fig. 5-72 shows, seven of the eight areas form a contiguous area largely on the City's Westside (Canoga Park-Woodland Hills is included in my West Valley quarter but it's southern portion is in the Santa Monica Mountains and has much in common with other Westside areas). The other highly active area is Sunland-Tujunga, which is, as noted earlier is an anomaly for the East Valley, being physically separated by the Verdugo Hills.

To understand the spatial geography of homeowner activity, I mapped all 202 identified neighborhood associations (Fig. 5-73). Each dot represents a neighborhood association

### NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS scaled by # of land use cases

- 1 Arleta (0)
- 2 Central City (0)
- 3 Central City North (0)
- 4 Chatsworth (0)
- 5 Granada Hills (0)
- 6 Silver Lake (0)
- 7 Westlake (0)
- 8 Boyle Heights (1)
- 9 Mission Hills (1)
- 10 Palms (1)
- 11 Reseda (1)
- 12 Southeast L.A. (1)
- 13 Westchester (1)
- 14 North Hollywood (2)
- 15 Sun Valley (2)
- 16 Sylmar (2)
- 17 Northridge (3)
- 18 South L.A. (4)
- 19 Van Nuys (5)
- 20 Venice (6)
- 21 Northeast L.A. (9)
- 22 Wilshire (9)
- 23 West Adams (10)
- 24 Encino (17)
- 25 Canoga Park (18)
- 26 West L.A. (19)
- 27 Sunland (21)
- 28 Bel Air (22)
- 29 Westwood (22)
- 30 Hollywood (25)
- 31 Sherman Oaks (29)
- 32 Brentwood (44)

- |     |   |   |   |      |       |       |      |
|-----|---|---|---|------|-------|-------|------|
|     |   |   |   |      |       |       |      |
| 3-5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | > 28 | 21-28 | 13-20 | 6-12 |



**104 associations**  
**286 cases**  
**44% land use**

Fig. 5-79: Map of Neighborhood Associations Most Active in Land Use Cases

that brought a case before City Council.

Aggregating these associations into community plan areas (Fig. 5-74; red represents high activity, black represents low activity) we can see that half of all areas had more than a dozen cases, with a relatively broad distribution, with two notable exceptions: areas around downtown L.A. and areas in the Northeast Valley.

In a sense, Fig. 5-73 is something of a social capital map, as it relates to neighborhood associations. But of course, not all of these associations were involved with land use cases, so I then filtered out associations that were not involved with non-land use cases (Fig. 5-75), leaving the 105 associations that were involved with land use cases.

Again aggregating this into community plan areas (Fig. 5-76), the overall pattern becomes clearer still. The two areas identified in Fig. 5-74 have become more strongly delineated. There is a cluster of seven plan areas in the Southeast quadrant of the City (Central City, Central City North, Westlake, Boyle

Heights, Silver Lake, South L.A., Southeast L.A.) that stands out for having little to no neighborhood association land use cases. Likewise, the North and East Valley (with the exception of the unusual Sunland case) also show little homeowner activity. By contrast, areas in and adjacent to the Hollywood Hills and on the Westside show significant homeowner activity.

While these maps demonstrate in general which communities had the most homeowner activity, they don't tell us the distribution of neighborhood association activity within a given area, nor do they explain the strength of particular associations. To discern this, I then scale the data points in Fig 5-74 according to the number of land use cases that each neighborhood association was involved with, as shown in Fig. 5-77.

Now, we can very easily see that most of the homeowner activity was concentrated into the eight community plan areas identified above. Additionally, the majority of these cases are brought forward by only a handful of neighborhood associations

active within these eight areas. From the map and data in Appendix B, we can identify a dozen associations that were most active in land use matters:

- Pacific Palisades Residents Association (17 cases)
- Woodland Hills Homeowners Association (17)
- Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations (16)
- Sherman Oaks Homeowners Association (16)
- Holmby-Westwood Property Owners Association (11)
- Friends of Westwood (10)
- Homeowners of Encino (10)
- Studio City Residents Association (9)
- Shadow Hills Property Owners Association (8)
- Brentwood Homeowners Association (7)
- Sunland-Tujunga Association of Residents (7)
- Cheviot Hills Homeowners Association (6)

These dozen associations account for 134 land use cases, almost half the 286 land use cases brought forward by neighborhood associations in the City of L.A.

By comparing where homeowners have been most active to the changes in land use, it is readily apparent that there is a strong association with density change. But how significant is the number of land use cases brought forward by neighborhood associations in a given community in predicting overall all density changes? To test this, I ran a regression with land use cases as the independent variable and total density change as the dependent variable. The regression shows a significant result,  $t(32) = -2.68$ ,  $p = .01152$ , a very high confidence level, although slightly less than for household size and percentage of non-citizens.<sup>40</sup> This suggests a strong association between active neighborhood associations and overall changes in residential density. This is, of course, a generalization that will not hold in every case. To understand the particulars of every community plan area would require a

more detailed case analysis of each plan area, which is beyond the scope of this study. However, to understand the complexity of the dynamics at play, I selected two plan areas (Canoga Park and West Adams) to study in detail in Chapter 7, looking more specifically at the actors involved, their motivations, and the outcomes of these forces.

### 5.5 IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

It is clear that land uses in Los Angeles changed after 1970 in a very uneven fashion. Looking at the four quarters of Los Angeles, we can see a link between neighborhood association activity and overall changes in density. This is especially the case if we control for population in each area. While the Westside has, by far, the most land use cases (172) and the East Valley has easily the fewest (12), this difference becomes even greater if we divide the population by the number of cases, to account for population differences (in effect, this

ratio provides a measure of how concentrated homeowner activity is). Controlling for population in the four quarters, the findings are shown in Fig. 5-78 and mapped in Fig. 5-79. What we see is a clear pattern.

To recap, the statistical modeling above suggests that areas with (1) low incomes, (2) high numbers of Latino population, (3) low numbers of white population, (4) large household sizes, (5) high numbers of non-citizen population, and (6) few neighborhood associations mobilized around land use issues, are associated with large *increases* in residential density. By contrast, areas with (1) high incomes, (2) high numbers of white population, (3) low numbers of Latino population, (4) small household sizes, (5) low numbers of non-citizen population, and (6) a high concentration of neighborhood associations mobilized around land use issues, are associated with large *decreases* in residential density. Of these factors, race and income, while strongly associated, do not predict density change as strongly as percent non-citizens, household

## FINDINGS




Fig. 5-80: Summary of Findings by L.A. Quarter

# FINDINGS




Fig. 5-81: Map of Findings by L.A. Quarter



size, and neighborhood association activity.

Looking at the results from 5-78, we can see this pattern very clearly. The East Valley is a predominately lower-income area, with a high percentage of non-citizens, large household sizes and very few neighborhood associations that have mobilized around land use issues. Controlling for population, there was only one case for every 56,968 people, easily the lowest concentration of homeowner activity of the four quarters. The East Valley also experienced, by far, the largest increase (+40.5%) in density in the City, more than four times the increase in density for the City as a whole (+9.9%).

The Eastside is also a low-income area with many non-citizens, but it also has fewer Latinos, more whites, and smaller household sizes, which could help explain why it did not see as significant an increase in density as the East Valley. Neighborhood association activity here is also low (and heavily concentrated in the more affluent hillside areas of Hollywood), amounting to one case for every 31,286 people, the second

lowest in the City. The Eastside also had the second highest increase in density (+15.3%), roughly 50% greater than the city-wide increase.

The West Valley is a predominately upper-middle class area, with roughly double the white and half the Latino population as the City. Household sizes are typical for L.A., but the area has fewer non-citizens than L.A. as a whole (18% vs 27% city-wide). Neighborhood association activity is moderate, representing one case for every 21,346 people. Density increase was also moderate (+5.0%), roughly half that of the City as a whole.

Finally, the Westside is a very affluent area with low Latino (15% vs 47% city-wide) and high white (66% vs 29% city-wide) populations; it has roughly half the non-citizens as the City as a whole and very low household sizes. Neighborhood associations are very active in land use cases – representing one case for every 3,127 people, roughly 18 times more activity than the East Valley. The Westside enacted only minimal or no density increases, but planned for a density reduction of almost

17%.

Of particular interest to us is how the downloading of planning responsibility to the local level through the community plans helped facilitate this process. Prior to the 1970s, land use policies were generally used to promote growth; in 1970, at a time when the City was 2.8 million, the City's zoning allowed for 10 million in anticipation of continued rapid growth. Following a series of planning crises, both within the profession generally and in L.A. specifically (see Chapter 3), a slow-growth movement began to emerge in the early 1970s, particularly as the environmental movement became part of the mainstream discourse.

Based on my analysis, I would argue that the unevenness of social capital and organizing capacity within the 35 community plan areas allowed largely white, affluent neighborhood associations to use the community plans to implement a slow-growth vision through zoning rollbacks. Initially, the community plans were more expressions of will than legally enforceable

documents, because the City did not pass enabling legislation to bring zoning into compliance with the community plans. As discussed in Chapter 3, this ultimately led homeowners to sue the City and forced the City to downzone to be in compliance with the community plans. So while the 1970s era community plans lacked "teeth", they did provide a clear expression of what the Citizen Advisory Committees (CACs) wanted for their communities. And these early plans formed the basis of the 1980s plans that finally put zoning and planning on the same page. And these "zoning consistency" plans of the 1980s, in turn, were the baseline for plan updates in the 1990s that continued the trends I have identified.

This chapter documents for the first time exactly how land uses and density changed over this 30-year period. While downzoning can and did take many forms, the evidence from section 5.1 suggests that areas did not undergo radical changes from one land use to another. The area set aside for single-family was largely unchanged. Multi-family land area was reduced by

9% city-wide (a net change of 1.3%), indicating a stronger will to curtail multi-family housing. Even still, a 9% reduction over 30 years is hardly a radical change. Commercial and industrial land areas were likewise reduced, by 1.5% and 5.8% respectively (0.1% and 0.5% net decline). So land allocated to housing, commerce, and industry were all reduced; the beneficiary was open space and public facilities, which increased by roughly 10% city-wide. In net terms, only 2.2% of the City's land area changed from one land use to another – a very small number over a 30-year period when Los Angeles added nearly 900,000 people.

This stability in land use designation reflects the fact that much of the City had been developed by 1970, with only very select areas able to absorb large areas of new tract housing or industrial expansion (hillside areas or areas on the very periphery of the City, e.g. Porter Ranch in the northern-most section of the San Fernando Valley; Tujunga, located beyond the Verdugo Hills; Warner Ranch in Woodland Hills). Rather

than re-designate land to different uses, it is clear that the most important change during this period was to residential densities. City-wide, the overwhelming trend was to shift population growth from single-family to multi-family housing. Given the land constraints of the City, there was hardly a choice but to accommodate population growth through multi-family housing. But this future growth would be distributed in highly uneven ways. On the one extreme, residential density *increased* in Arleta-Pacoima, a low-income largely Latino area, by 84%. On the other extreme, total density was *decreased* in Venice, an affluent, largely white area, by 41%.

Changing the residential designation could have dramatic impacts on allowable density. Even within single-family category, density could be increased or decreased by as much as 14 times, comparable to the magnitude of change that was possible by changing designations within the multi-family category. Even greater changes were possible by switching between single- and multi-family categories.

The 1970s-era community plans allowed for a future population of 3.95 million people. Having added roughly 150,000 people during the economically troubled 1970s, by 1980, the city was at roughly 75% of its planned population (2.97 million population versus 3.95 million capacity) – far above the 28% capacity it was at a decade earlier (2.8 million population versus 10 million capacity). Some of this shift was achieved by reducing the land area set aside for residential uses, but as the above numbers demonstrate (a net decline of 1.6% for housing), this was very minor. The majority was accomplished by changing land use designations within residential categories. Between the 1970s plans and 1990s plans, the community plans allowed for an increase of roughly 390,000 people. While broadly informed by population projections by the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG), in practice, each of the 35 communities determined how much growth they were willing to accommodate. So the 390,000 net increase was the result of 35 communities making individual decisions, rather

than an overall expression of anticipated growth. And in fact, as it turned out, population growth between 1970 and 2000 far exceeded this, with the city adding roughly 880,000 new people over this period.

This analysis suggests that the patterns of land use changes in Los Angeles between 1970 and 2000 reflect the social geography of the city. Areas that were white, affluent, and with well-organized neighborhood associations, used the community planning process to win significant reductions in density. By contrast, predominately Latino areas with large family sizes and high immigrant (non-citizen) populations – areas without neighborhood associations involved in land use cases – overwhelmingly saw significant increases in density.

On the one hand, one could argue that this makes sense – areas with more poor people with larger families were planned for greater increases in density. This is a plausible explanation, although as we will see in Chapter 6, low-income minority communities with active neighborhood associations

also fought for density reductions, but for different reasons than did white, affluent communities. Even still, this does not explain the net reductions in density on the Westside. In fact, it could be argued that there is a greater need for increased housing supply on the Westside, to put downward pressure on rents and house prices and provide much-needed affordable housing. But as we have seen, growth of any kind has been an anathema to the Westside.

What this analysis suggests is a phenomenon of “planning by resistance”. Where communities were well-organized (strongly correlated with affluent white areas), community plans were downzoned. Where communities did not have strong neighborhood associations (strongly correlated with low-income Latino areas), community plans were upzoned. That is, the communities already burdened the most – areas with high overcrowding, little open space, the weakest schools, the most taxed police precincts, etc – were expected to bear the burden of growth.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The only exception is Chatsworth, which has only two plans, since the second plan was not adopted until the early stages of the third era in 1993. So the 104 number comes from 34 areas x 3 plans + 1 area (Chatsworth) x 2 plans.

<sup>2</sup> In Los Angeles, during the period between 1970 and 2000, there were five land use categories reserved for single-family uses (minimum, very low I, very low II, low I and low II) and five for multi-family uses (low-medium I, low-medium II, medium, high-medium, and high). In two instances in the 1970s – in Hollywood and Central City – a sixth “very high” multi-family category was used, but this was eliminated in subsequent plans.

<sup>3</sup> I simply added the acreage for each of the five land use categories for the 35 plan areas and divided by the total gross acreage of the 35 areas. In the case of the third iterations (1990s plans), I used the same method, but using net instead of gross acreage (for the 1990s plans, the City broke out streets as a separate area and therefore shifted from gross to net acreage). In some cases, a distinct Parking category was reported separately from Commercial but in most cases Commercial & Parking was reported together. So for plans

where Parking was reported separately, this area was added to and reported under Commercial in my tables. In a few rare instances, a distinct “Parking Buffer” category was reported, adjacent to industrial uses (so as to provide, as the name suggests, a buffer between this more noxious use and adjacent uses). In these few cases, they were added to and reported under Industrial in my tables.

<sup>4</sup> For a summary of the transformation of the San Fernando Valley, see for example, Kevin Roderick, *The San Fernando Valley: America’s Suburb* (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Times Books, 2001) and Laura R. Barraclough, *Making the San Fernando Valley: Rural Landscapes, Urban Development, and White Privilege* (Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 2011).

<sup>5</sup> For an overview of the Chavez Ravine’s transformation, see for example, Dana Cuff, “Chavez Ravine and the End of Public Housing,” in *The Provisional City: Los Angeles Stories of Architecture and Urbanism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 272-309 and Eric Avila, “Suburbanizing the City Center: The Dodgers Move West,” in *Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear and Fantasy in Suburban Los Angeles* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), 145-184.

<sup>6</sup> Census 1970 and 2000, Los Angeles City Planning Department, Demographic Research Unit.

<sup>7</sup> As the urging of homeowner groups, the City expanded the repertoire of single-family zones in the 1960s with the additional of Estate Lots. Council File 115144 (Box A-1796 Los Angeles City Archives, LACA); Council File 117977 (Box A-1829 LACA); Council File 117977 SI (Box A-1829 LACA); Ordinance 127777 adopted June 16, 1964; Ordinance 130132 adopted May 17, 1965.

<sup>8</sup> Daniel A. Smith, “Howard Jarvis, Populist Entrepreneur: Reevaluating the Causes of Proposition 13,” *Social Science History* vol 23, no 2 (1999): 173–210.

<sup>9</sup> Jonathan Schwartz, “Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions,” *Southern California Law Review* vol 71 (1997-98): 183-217.

<sup>10</sup> Los Angeles Department of City Planning, *Annual Report, 1953-54, 1954-57, 1956-57*.

<sup>11</sup> Although I leave out of the four quarter model the three community plan areas in the “tail” that connects South L.A. to the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach, the data from these areas is included in the overall city-wide calculations. This Harbor area closely resembles

the East Valley in its demographics – majority Latino (56.6% vs. 60.6% for the East Valley) and minority white (25.2% vs 25.0% in the East Valley), and largely middle-class (mean household income of \$49,900 vs \$49,600 in the East Valley). 95% of L.A.’s population lives in the four quarters and 5% lives in the “tail”. Los Angeles City Planning Demographic Research Unit.

<sup>12</sup> Hollywood Media District, <http://www.mediadistrict.org/>. Access May 25, 2013.

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, Jennifer Wolch, John P. Wilson, and Jef Fedrenbach, “Parks and Park Funding in Los Angeles: An Equity Mapping Analysis,” University of Southern California, 2002; Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, “Urban Form and Social Context: Cultural Differentiation in the Uses of Urban Parks,” *Journal of Planning Education & Research*, vol 14 (1995): 89-102, and Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Orit Stieglitz, “Children in Los Angeles Parks: A Study of Equity, Quality, and Children Satisfaction with Neighborhood Parks,” *Town Planning Review*, vol 73, no 4 (2002): 1-6.

<sup>14</sup> Los Angeles City Planning Department, Demographic Research Unit.

<sup>15</sup> Beth Steckler and Adam Garcia, *Affordability Matters: A Look at*

*Housing Construction & Affordability in Los Angeles* (Los Angeles: Livable Places, 2008).

<sup>16</sup> Census 2000, Los Angeles City Planning Department, Demographic Research Unit.

<sup>17</sup> See the Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, *Violence in the City –An End or a Beginning?* (Los Angeles: The Commission, 1965) and Paul Bullock, *Watts: The Aftermath: An Inside View of the Ghetto* (New York: Grove, 1969).

<sup>18</sup> Joel A. Elvery, “The Impact of Enterprise Zones on Resident Employment An Evaluation of the Enterprise Zone Programs of California and Florida,” *Economic Development Quarterly* vol 23, no 1 (February 1999): 44-59.

<sup>19</sup> Federation Minutes, April 7, 1976, Box 10, vol 2, part 3, Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations Records (Collection Number 1244). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.

<sup>20</sup> This planned increase of 390,000 should be treated as a ballpark. The creation of community plans is, of course, a moving target as different plans are created and adopted at different times. The 1970s-era plans were adopted over a decade – and in one case

(Silver Lake), not until 1984. That said, these plans tended to use 1970 census data as their baseline, so direct comparison with 1970 makes most sense, but the reader should be aware that some areas had already experienced significant population growth in the early 1970s by the time their plans were adopted, which could have impact the planned population capacity.

<sup>21</sup> As above, this near half million in unplanned growth should be treated as a ballpark. While it does reflect the difference between the actual population increase between 1970 and 2000 and planned increase of the first generation of community plans, as noted above these plans were not created at a fixed point in time. Due to this, it may be unfair to compare the 2000 population against 1970 population, since some of this growth would have already occurred by the time some plans were adopted. On the other hand, comparing to 1980 population of 2.97 million (representing an increase of 725,000 or 25% increase since 1980, resulting in an unplanned population of 335,000) – no doubt significantly underestimates the unplanned growth since it does not consider the 1970 census data from which the 1970s plans used.

<sup>22</sup> Roderick, 137-150.

<sup>23</sup> Federation Minutes, September 7, 1977, Box 10, vol 2, part 3.

<sup>24</sup> I used 2000 Census data for both practical and theoretical reasons. On the practical side, due to budget constraints, 2010 census data has not yet been aggregated into the 35 community plan areas by the L.A. City Planning Demographic Research Unit. But more importantly, since the focus on my study is the period between 1970 and 2000, I felt that using the resultant demographics and area characteristics from the end of my study period would be most consistent. By 2000, 29 of the 35 community plan areas had completed their third plans – Chatsworth only has two plans (it's last being in 1993), so only 5 were completed after 2000: Hollywood (2012), Silver Lake (2004), Westchester (2004), Central City (2003), and Wilshire (2001). I expect demographic changes in these areas to be relatively significant given the physical changes taking place in these areas in the 2000s. Hollywood has undergone a dramatic resurgence, Silver Lake has experienced significant gentrification, as has Central City (in large part due to the Adaptive Re-Use ordinance that has significantly increased the number of residential units downtown), Wilshire has seen significant foreign investment (much from South Korea) and Westchester has seen the development of the Playa Vista



mega-project on the site of the former Howard Hughes airfield. This analysis does not account for these changes, so an interesting future study would be to compare these recent “high change” areas to the findings in this study.

<sup>25</sup> In 1986, L.A. County Latino fertility rate was 3.19 (average number of babies per woman), as compared to 1.49 for non-Hispanic whites. Black fertility was 2.45 and Asian fertility was 2.10. County of Los Angeles, Department of Health and Human Services, 1986.

<sup>26</sup> MHC tabulations of 2012 Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, U.S. Census Bureau (<http://www.census.gov/cps>). Updated October 2012.

<sup>27</sup> Regression analysis is, of course, highly sensitive to outliers. An effective way of identifying outliers is to compare the 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles (Q1 and Q3) to some multiple of the inter-quartile range (IQR). What multiple of the IQR would be considered an outlier requires some judgment and depends on the distribution of the data. In many cases, a multiple of 1.5 can identify problematic data, and a multiple of 3 can identify serious outliers. But In the case of BLACK, there are a few communities with very high concentrations of African-Americans with a relatively even (and low) distribution outside of

these areas. This suggests allowing for a very high multiple would be appropriate so as not to exclude all of the highly concentrated areas, but still exclude extremely high numbers that would distort the results. In this case, a multiple of three would be considered high, but this would exclude all areas over 20% black, which would itself distort the results. So in this case, I felt a multiple of eight (i.e.  $Q3 + 8 * IQR$  or  $7.2\% + 8 * 4.0\% = 39.2\%$ ) would balance the need to include highly African-American areas, while protecting against extremely high outliers. This resulted in West Adams (52.3% black) being excluded from the calculations.

<sup>28</sup> One outlier was identified for DENSITY, using a standard  $Q3 + 1.5 * IQR$ , in this case higher than 24,535 people per square mile. This excluded Westlake (38,111) from the calculation. Only one other community (Wilshire, 22,695) is even half as dense as Westlake.

<sup>29</sup> Two plan areas (Bel Air and Brentwood) were excluded from the calculation as they have extraordinarily high household incomes (\$235,680 and \$171,811), which would otherwise have skewed the analysis. These exclusions were made using a standard  $Q3 + 1.5 * IQR$ , in this case higher than \$124,064.

<sup>30</sup> Central City was excluded from the calculation since its

unemployment rate of 36.3% is an outlier. This is based on a standard  $Q3 + 1.5 \cdot IQR$ , in this case higher than 21.7%. No other areas jobless rate was higher than 20%.

<sup>31</sup> Two areas were excluded from all multi-family calculations – Arleta and Bel Air. Bel Air was excluded because its 96% increase in multi-family density give a false impression of the dynamic within the community, since this increase is entirely due to the special re-designation of one property to accommodate a boutique hotel. Arleta was excluded because its remarkably 1066% increase in multi-family density is a clear outlier. This increase is not due to an unusually low starting point – its 1976 multi-family population capacity of 7,600 is not insignificant, so its increase to 88,609 by 1996 is a very significant result. That said, the next highest increase in multi-family density change was 1.45 times its 1970s plan, far below the 10.66 times change in Arleta. Putting this in terms of inter-quartile ranges, Arleta would require a multiple of 18 times the IQR, so is a clear outlier whose inclusion would distort the results. That said, the exclusion of Arleta may slightly underestimate the results.

<sup>32</sup> Calculating VIFs is generally considered superior to calculating bivariate correlations as a measure of multicollinearity. Bivariate

correlations, however, serve as a more intuitive check on these inter-relationships. These are given below:

	TOTCHANGE	HHSIZE	LATINO	WHITE	FOREIGN	INCOME
TOTCHANGE	1	0.697	0.707	-0.629	0.723	-0.586
HHSIZE	0.697	1	0.837	-0.681	0.529	-0.501
LATINO	0.707	0.837	1	-0.853	0.806	-0.753
WHITE	-0.629	-0.681	-0.853	1	-0.776	0.904
FOREIGN	0.723	0.529	0.806	-0.776	1	-0.765
INCOME	-0.586	-0.501	-0.753	0.904	-0.765	1

<sup>33</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

<sup>34</sup> See for example, Michael Woolcock, “Social Capital and Economic Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework,” *Theory and Society* vol 27, no 2 (1998): 151–208 and Michael Woolcock and Deepa Narayan, “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy,” *World Bank Research Observer* vol 15, no 2 (2000): 225–249.

<sup>35</sup> Kristof Titeca, “The Dynamics of Social Capital and Community Associations in Uganda: Linking Capital and Its Consequences,”

*World Development* vol 36, no 11 (2008): 2205-2222.

<sup>36</sup> Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, "Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?," *Journal of Urban Economics* vol 45, no 2 (March 1999): 354-384.

<sup>37</sup> Manuel Pastor, Jr., Jim Sadd, and John Hipp "Which Came First? Toxic Facilities, Minority Move-In, and Environmental Justice," *Journal of Urban Affairs* vol 23, no 1 (2001): 1-21.

<sup>38</sup> Gerald E. Frug, *City Making: Building Communities with Building Walls* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). It should be noted that Frug talks specifically about the fragmentation of jurisdictions within a metropolitan region, but the logic and argument is the same for city planning at the community level within a large municipality such as Los Angeles.

<sup>39</sup> Hollywood, more so than any other area, has a very complex social geography. Its population has a vast range, from the largely white, very rich homeowners in the Hollywood Hills to a very low-income minority population in the flats (particularly on the eastern half of the area). So Hollywood really is a special case that does not fit neatly within either the active nor inactive groups. From the mapping of neighborhood associations involved in land uses (Fig. 5-75), it is

clear that the vast majority are in or adjacent to the Hollywood Hills, which is not representative of the demographics of the Hollywood community plan areas as a whole.

<sup>40</sup> Bel Air was not included in the regression model as the scatterplot demonstrated it was a clear outlier.

## 6

### MOTIVATIONS OF LOCAL GROUPS

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*“A homeowner who has chosen to live in an area zoned for single family residences is entitled to the same protection of his investment from the Planning Department as he receives from the Fire and Police Departments in protecting his property and his person.”*

- Hillside Federation President John Weaver, 1966.

In the previous chapter, we explored how land use policies changed over time through the community plan process. Among the findings was an association between density changes, area socio-demographic characteristics and neighborhood association activity. While this suggests a link between the social capital of homeowner groups and land use policy, it doesn't tell us why these relationships might exist or why homeowners became more involved in land use issues than other groups. In this chapter, I take up these questions, exploring the motivations of three kinds of civic groups – homeowner, business and civil rights groups.

As previously noted (Chapter 2, Research Design & Methods), this discussion will center on three primary cases –

the Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations or Hillside Federation (homeowner), the L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce (business) and the L.A. Urban League (civil rights). I selected these groups after a review of historical *L.A. Times* and *L.A. Sentinel* articles; these groups were most frequently referenced in popular press accounts related to planning and housing issues. However, while each was involved in planning issues, as will become clear in this chapter, they varied considerably in the extent to which they used land use policy to fulfill their respective missions. For example, housing was a major issue for the Urban League, but was seen through the lens of equal access as part of a broader fight for civil rights, rather than a concern of how land use policies impact housing supply. The

Chamber was more attuned to land use issues than the Urban League, but their perspective was very broad and they typically addressed planning issues that had broad implications across the city as a whole. By contrast, since homeowner interests were locally-based, they were highly motivated to become involved in land use policy debates at the neighborhood level.

These three groups should not be seen as a *representative* sample of group activity, but are rather *illustrative* of the motivations that led to their participation (or not, as the case may be) in the heated planning and land use debates that emerged after the Second World War. So the motives and actions taken by these three primary groups should not necessarily be seen as *typical* of all similar groups. Indeed, these three groups are exemplars of their type of group – being more organized, with more financial resources, and more influence than the typical homeowner, business, and civil rights groups in Los Angeles. A study of exemplars has its advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, their activities are well documented, which

allowed me to explore such activities in depth. These groups also, no doubt, had a disproportionate voice in their respective fields of interest, which allows us to see the relative strength of homeowner, business, and civil rights groups on land use issues in Los Angeles.

Exemplar organizations such as these are also among the most stable of their respective type. Indeed, all three have a long history that spans the entire post-war period (or nearly so in the case of the Hillside Federation, which was founded in 1952). Given how often local groups form and disband over the years, this long tenure also allows us to see how their interests and strategies changed over time and how this, in turn, shaped the planning and land use policies of Los Angeles. Looking at exemplars allows us to see how and why homeowner groups emerged as the strongest force. If the largest and most influential business and civil rights organizations had not as powerful a voice as homeowners, it is unlikely that smaller ones would have been more influential. This is conjecture, of course; only

a comprehensive (random sample) survey of smaller business, homeowner, and civil rights groups that were active at various points from 1943 to 1992 (the bookends of this chapter) could confirm to what degree they were involved in land use issues. However, since this is a historical study, many of the smaller homeowner, business, and civil rights groups either no longer exist or their records do not exist and many (if not most) of the people who were involved with them are no longer with us. This makes a survey approach to determine the generalizability of my three cases extremely difficult, if not impossible.

With that said, as explained in Chapter 2 (Research Design & Methods), while the chapter is organized around three primary cases, I use a variation of Vinit Mukhija's "n of one plus some" methodology, whereby primary cases are supplemented with evidence from secondary cases.<sup>1</sup> While the civil rights group case centers upon the activities of the Los Angeles Urban League, I also checked these efforts against those of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples

(NAACP). While the business group case revolves around the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce, I also reference the activities of the Associated Chambers of the San Fernando Valley, another well-organized business group. And while the homeowner group case is grounded in the work of the Hillside Federation, I also consulted the records of the Northridge Civic Association. These secondary cases also allow me to test whether there were radical differences in approach in the San Fernando Valley, where these secondary groups were more active. In general, I found that the secondary cases largely mirror the concerns of my three primary cases (although they sometimes used different methods), giving me confidence that my study of exemplars has hit the major themes and motives of civil rights, business, and homeowner groups with respect to planning and land use issues during both the pro-growth, post-war era and slow-growth, community planning era that emerged in the mid-1960s.

The cases are, in part, histories of each group as they

relate to urban planning in Los Angeles. But they also play an important role in understanding the broader debates centered on planning, and give us greater insight into why Los Angeles down-zoned itself during the community plan era (1965 to 1992). Following a brief introduction to each organization, the three cases are divided into two eras: (a) the pro-growth, post-war “boom” (1943-1965) and (b) the “slow-growth” community planning era (1965-1992). Those familiar with the history of Los Angeles might recognize the significance of 1943 and would certainly recognize the importance of 1965 and 1992: they represent, respectively, the years of the Zoot Suit, Watts and Rodney King riots/rebellions/civil unrests.<sup>2</sup> These events were highly charged culminations of real or perceived racial and social injustices at various points in L.A.’s history. While the events themselves were undoubtedly sensationalized violent confrontations, the conditions that sparked them reflected broader injustices. As such, they are important markers of race relations in the City – markers that have left a lasting legacy on

the collective consciousness of Los Angeles.

In addition to their social significance, the different periods, prior to 1943, 1943 to 1965, 1965 to 1992, and post-1992 also represent, roughly speaking, different “eras” in L.A.’s urban planning. Prior to 1943, while zoning had been enacted, there was little comprehensive planning in Los Angeles, and no planning had been initiated of the San Fernando Valley. The 1943 to 1965 period, of course, represents the L.A.’s post-war heyday. Although the war didn’t end until 1945, by 1943, the “boom” in L.A. was already well underway, with the influx of migrants from Mexico and Central America. It was in this context of social change that, on the evening of June 3, 1943, a group of sailors got into a fight with Mexican youths wearing zoot suits, provoking what would come to be known as the ‘Zoot Suit Riots’. As Carey McWilliams described it at the time:

“Marching through the streets of downtown Los Angeles, a mob of several thousand soldiers, sailors, and civilians, proceeded to beat up every zoot suiter they could find. Pushing

its way into the important motion picture theaters, the mob ordered the management to turn on the house lights and then ran up and down the aisles dragging Mexicans out of their seats. Streetcars were halted while Mexicans, and some Filipinos and Negroes, were jerked from their seats, pushed into the streets and beaten with a sadistic frenzy.”<sup>3</sup>

When police intervened, they focused their attention not on the white aggressors but on the Mexicans for disturbing the peace. While several hundred Mexicans were arrested, just nine sailors were arrested. Eight sailors were subsequently released and the ninth paid a small fine. The Mexicans were not so lucky. Many died in jail from their injuries and others were charged for crimes they did not commit. The press, for their part, blamed the Mexican youth: “riotous disturbances of the past week in Los Angeles by zoot suit hoodlums have inflicted a deep and humiliating wound on the reputation of the city.”<sup>4</sup> The Zoot Suit Riots, and the so-called Sleepy Lagoon trials the preceding year, illustrate what L.A. County supervisor John Ford labeled

Southern California’s “difficult days of racial readjustment.”<sup>5</sup> Many of the Zoot Suit Riots took place in Boyle Heights, where, by 1943, a sizeable Mexican population had emerged. These riots and the scorn they brought upon Boyle Heights, in turn, prompted the exodus of many whites (mostly Jewish) to the Westside, a phenomenon that would be repeated both after 1965 and, to a lesser extent, after 1992.

From a planning perspective, the post-war boom – lasting until the mid-1960s – was characterized by pro-growth policies, liberal re-zoning, and decidedly top-down urban planning, directed first by Charles Bennett (from 1941 to 1954) then John Roberts (from 1954 to 1964). The hiring of Calvin Hamilton as City Planning Director in late 1964 brought to L.A. a new method of planning for Los Angeles that gave a stronger role to everyday citizens in planning decisions. Despite substantive practical experience – including Director of the Marion County’s (Indianapolis) Metropolitan Planning Agency (1955-60) and Director of Pittsburgh Planning Department (1960-64), Hamilton



was seen as more theoretical and visionary rather than focused on the “nitty-gritty” details of implementation at the community level, despite his championing of citizen participation in the planning process.<sup>6</sup> Former L.A. City Planning Director Gordon Whitnall (from 1920 to 1930) described Hamilton as “articulate but lacks understanding of our Government. HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT A GENERAL PLAN IS! If he had his way, he would DO AWAY WITH ZONING.”<sup>7</sup> And while he was vilified equally by homeowner and Council adversaries – he was described as a “visionary but controversial” planning director<sup>8</sup> – he would become L.A.’s longest serving Planning Director, from 1964 until 1985, when he was unceremoniously forced to resign due to questions of whether he used his position for personal advantage.

Soon after his appointment, in 1965, Hamilton initiated the controversial Goals Program – an ambitious attempt to consult with residents and interest groups in the City about their hopes, aspirations, and preferred planning models to

guide the growth of the City through the year 1990. So 1965 is significant not only because of the civil unrest in Watts, but also because it began the shift towards a more consultative, “bottom-up” approach to urban planning. Concurrent with the Goals Program consultations (which occurred between 1965 and 1970, two years longer than anticipated) were the deliberations of the Citizens Committee on Zoning Practices, led by former Mayor Fletcher Bowron, which had resulted from a grand jury investigation of questionable dealings between a San Fernando Valley developer and zoning administrator. One of the recommendations of the 1968 Citizen’s Committee Report was the requirement of area-by-area plans, updated at regular intervals – this would become the basis of the Community Plan program initiated after 1970. The result of the Goals Program was the Concept L.A. plan (the “Centers Concept”), which, as discussed in Chapter 3 (A Backgrounder on L.A. Land Use), was a hybrid between top-down and bottom-up planning. Although the Centers Concept was never fully embraced by Angelenos,

the combined efforts of the Goals and Community Plan programs ushered in a more local planning process that greatly empowered local groups. Armed with the ability to change L.A.'s land uses through Citizen Advisory Committees, this period after 1965 (and especially after 1970, when the new Community Plans began to be approved) is characterized by a "slow-growth" movement that down-zoned L.A. in an attempt to slow population growth and curb its associated problems (pollution, congestion, etc).

The year 1992 is significant because of the civil unrest following the acquittal of four LAPD officers who were filmed beating Rodney King following a car chase in the North San Fernando Valley. Despite the worldwide press coverage it received, many believe this event was more of a "last straw", given the pattern of LAPD police brutality towards African-Americans generally, but specifically, due to the acquittal five months earlier of Korean store owner Soon Da Ju, who had shot a 15-year-old black girl named Latisha Harlins for shoplifting).

But the early 1990s were also significant for the planning of Los Angeles, as the long-awaited Metro Rail system became operational – with the Blue line opening in 1991 and the Red Line in 1993. I would argue that the arrival of mass transit in Los Angeles began a new era in L.A.'s planning history, one that brought a counter-balance – though by no means an end – to the long-running slow growth movement. Central to homeowners' arguments for down-zoning and curtailing L.A.'s growth over the years was the lack of mass transit to support high densities and population growth (although as we will see in section 6.2 below, homeowners also paradoxically fought mass transit due to perceived impacts on their immediate neighborhoods).

So when mass transit arrived in the early 1990s, the seeds of a new countervailing movement towards "transit-oriented development" or TOD were planted (by this time, the TOD movement had moved into the mainstream, particularly after Peter Calthorpe codified the concept in *The Next American Metropolis* in 1993<sup>9</sup>). In Los Angeles, this new approach was

encouraged through the publication by the City and Metropolitan Transit Authority's (MTA) 1993 TOD guide "A Transportation/Land Use Policy for Los Angeles," the City's first attempt to unify land use and transportation planning. These seeds began to bear fruit later in the decade, with a number of reforms that stimulated urban infill, including the Adaptive Re-Use Ordinance, which was passed to allow existing commercial buildings in the historic core to be converted into lofts and apartments, bringing a much needed resident population to Downtown.

By the late 1990s, the Neighborhood Council system had been born in L.A. as a means of strengthening local communities' role in city politics, including land use issues. Some homeowners have said, however, that Neighborhood Councils (NCs) were simply a way for the City to gain control over homeowners, whose voices had been organized into hundreds of independent neighborhood associations. Since the City provided administrative support and funds for NCs many members of homeowner groups became involved,

weakening many long-standing neighborhood associations.<sup>10</sup> By this time, a new generation of political leaders had begun to emerge, such as Eric Garcetti and Ed Reyes (both of whom were elected as Councilors on L.A.'s Eastside, with Garcetti going on to become Mayor in May 2013). These new leaders championed TOD and urban infill as an economic development strategy revolving around ideas that had long been anathema to L.A.: walkability, higher density, and less auto dependence. This shift after 1992 to a new model of economic development was, in part, driven by the poor economic conditions following Rodney King civil unrest, which had – like the events in Watts almost 30 years earlier, although to a lesser degree – prompted an exodus from the city. Therefore, 1965 and 1992 can be seen not only as important events in L.A.'s social history, but also bookends of the "slow growth" era. This chapter therefore explores the motivations both before and after 1965. Although centered on the three groups, the discussion references events both within and outside of L.A. that were important influences

on the motivations of each group, which allows us to see the land use changes taking place in L.A. within the broader context of social and racial change.

## 6.1 THE LOS ANGELES URBAN LEAGUE

### AN INTEGRATION LEAGUE

Founded in 1921 as an affiliate of the National Urban League (which was founded in 1910), the Los Angeles Urban League (LAUL)'s mission was "to work on employment and social welfare programs with the objective of integrating the Negro into all areas of community life."<sup>11</sup> This objective – and the emphasis on social welfare – foreshadows why the LAUL (and like-minded civil rights groups) were not as strong a voice in the land use debates as one might think, especially given how important housing issues were to their constituency. That social welfare issues were the top priority for the LAUL

is highlighted by a public exchange in the editorial pages of the L.A. Times in the late 1950s, when two L.A. residents charged the Urban League with engaging in political activity and therefore shouldn't be supported by the local Community Chest (now called the United Way).<sup>12</sup> LAUL President Bernard S. Jefferson took exception explaining that the League is a "social work agency" that at times makes recommendations on social welfare legislation.<sup>13</sup>

The spatial segregation and discrimination of blacks and other minorities was seen by the LAUL through the lens of social, not spatial, policy. This segregation reflected the "separate and unequal" doctrine that was enforced by the repression and discrimination of Jim Crow laws that touched on every aspect of daily life throughout the country. Conceptually, there were two very different responses by civil rights organizations to this repression.<sup>14</sup> The first, a more conservative "social work" approach, was grounded in the promise of social science to bring about greater economic (and therefore social) equality;

the strategy here was to work with progressive whites to deal with the effects of the system – to improve living and working conditions, increase wages, obtain better housing and health care, etc – rather than try to fundamentally change the system itself. By contrast, the second, more “radical” approach emphasized self-help and racial solidarity; here, blacks alone would determine their own future by fighting for fundamental, systemic change, including using the legal system to bring about social equality. The Urban League was firmly grounded in the social work tradition, while the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), which was formed around the same time (1909) as the Urban League, became the preeminent organization of the self-help tradition.

As an advocate of the social work tradition, the National Urban League emphasized three principles – interracial cooperation, integration of blacks and other minorities, and economic advancement through education and skills training.<sup>15</sup> The LAUL took pains to distinguish itself from organizations of

the self-help tradition such as the NAACP. In a 1956 report, the LAUL noted that they shared only one board member with the Los Angeles NAACP. They also described the NAACP’s approach as “militant demand for immediate action, now, by force and pressure if necessary,” which they contrasted with their own approach which uses “conference, persuasion (sic), and negotiation, and the attitude is that if things can’t be changed now, maybe they can be changed next year or the year after.”<sup>16</sup> This helps explain their slogan: “Rays of light without sparks of heat”. So the Urban League was a moderate, bi-racial organization that developed connections to the white establishment to advance the concerns of African Americans.

Central to the LAUL’s mission was to place educated, middle-class blacks into well-paying jobs. To this end, its board members were drawn from area businesses such as North American Aviation, Litton Industries, and Northrup. They also were a strong voice for racial integration, as reflected by the racial composition of its board (as of the 1950s): 13 blacks, 13

whites and one Japanese-American.<sup>17</sup>

### A. PRO-GROWTH, POST-WAR ERA (1943-1965)

#### A HOUSING CRISIS

At the beginning of the Second World War, Los Angeles was an overwhelmingly white city – officially over 93% white, although this likely somewhat understates the Latino population.<sup>18</sup> In fact, as historian Carey McWilliams noted, Los Angeles was not only more white than most U.S. cities of its size, but even its white population was more homogeneous, being a heavily Protestant city, without the large Jewish or even Catholic populations of cities like New York, Boston, or Chicago.<sup>19</sup> Wartime demand for industrial production, however, began to unsettle this white, Protestant hegemony, as minority workers, especially African-Americans from the South, came to L.A. to fill the insatiable demand for labor. During the 1950s

alone, it has been estimated that nearly 1.5 million blacks had left the South in search of urban jobs.<sup>20</sup> In the Los Angeles-Long Beach metropolitan area, the black population more than doubled (112% increase) during the 1950s.<sup>21</sup>

In an attempt to accommodate wartime industrial production, in 1942, the City Council adopted an emergency ordinance allowing temporary variances for war-related activity in any zone without a public hearing required.<sup>22</sup> By this time, the influx of new wartime workers into Los Angeles had created a serious housing shortage. Despite this, the City was not willing to make the same kind of variances for new housing as it did for new industry, arguing that the population surge was only temporary and rationalizing that if high-density emergency housing was allowed, it would create slum-like conditions after the war.<sup>23</sup> But the demand for housing (and therefore the profit motive) was so great that landowners began illegally subdividing homes to accommodate the demand, leading to conflicts with homeowners who opposed this practice.<sup>24</sup> Chambers of

Commerce, however, were generally aligned with industry and therefore lobbied City Council for occasional variances to accommodate the wartime workforce. These wartime battles and temporary alliances would foreshadow the political economy of land use in the decades to come, with business and civil rights groups generally supporting pro-growth policies and homeowners generally opposing them.

These accommodations for war-time activity had only exacerbated a planning system that, by the war's end, was outdated and disorganized, leading to efforts to create a new comprehensive zoning code in 1946, which would chart the City's low-density suburban direction for the next several decades.<sup>25</sup> Contrary to City administrators' beliefs that the influx of workers into the City would be reversed once the war ended, by the War's end, Los Angeles was firmly established as a center of the aerospace and defense industries. Industry not only stayed in L.A., but expanded as the United States, beginning in 1947, adopted a containment strategy against the rising

Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union (leading to the 42-year Cold War period that came to an end in 1989). This post-war military expansion aggravated an already worsening housing situation in Los Angeles by the end of the Second World War.

A City housing survey conducted in 1947 revealed the magnitude of the challenge. While the City estimated that roughly 136,000 housing units were needed to accommodate wartime growth, only about 91,000 units were built— still a large number but representing a deficit of over 45,000 units. Moreover, the City estimated that another 123,000 units would be needed by 1950.<sup>26</sup> The housing shortage was not merely an economic problem, but a moral one, since much of the demand for new housing came from returning G.I.'s who had served their country so bravely. The LAUL was especially interested in finding African-American G.I.s housing. While the bulk of federal programs for returning G.I.'s were aimed at whites, one in 13 Second World War veterans were black.<sup>27</sup> Still, the demand for the rapid construction of housing was at odds

with the City Planning Department's desire for a low-density City, leading Planning Director Charles Bennett to ask – and not rhetorically – if people wanted L.A. to become another New York or Chicago.<sup>28</sup>

### RACIAL COVENANTS

The housing shortage hit minority communities especially hard, in large part because much of Los Angeles was off-limits to non-Caucasians due to racially restrictive covenants. Wendy Plotkin has traced the first use of racial restrictions to the 1880s in California, where Chinese immigrants challenged their use.<sup>29</sup> The 1892 California Superior Court ruling of *Gandolfo v. Hartman* actually ruled such restrictions were unconstitutional, but did not establish a precedent in California or elsewhere, so racial restrictions continued to be used. After 1917, when the U.S. Supreme Court in *Buchanan v. Warley* ruled that municipal racial zoning violated the fourteenth amendment,

developers turned to private deed restrictions to maintain racial homogeneity – and the growth of racial restrictive covenants ballooned. In 1919, the California Superior court would endorse the legality of racial restrictive covenants, making their use in the Golden State especially widespread.<sup>30</sup>

Historian Robert Fogelson argues that the advent of covenants generally (and racial covenants specifically) was a response to fear of others, of racial minorities and poor people, who were once referred to as the “dangerous classes”.<sup>31</sup> These covenants were by the 1920s widely used in outlying areas to prevent minorities from living in suburbanizing areas. But they were also used extensively even in central areas of cities like Chicago and Los Angeles. Allan Spear's work on early racial covenants in Chicago provides a rich anthropological illustration of how these covenants impacted the daily lives of African-Americans.<sup>32</sup> More locally here in L.A., Josh Sides's work on the L.A. African-American community demonstrates the social circumstances that these covenants created, both



negative (overcrowding, crime) and positive (the emergence of the South-Central Jazz scene in the 1940s).<sup>33</sup> But testimonies such as these are largely unconnected to questions of planning and urban transformation; among the contributions of this research project is to better understand how, precisely, these social conditions shaped land use policies in Los Angeles over time.

It wasn't until 1948 that racial covenants were deemed unenforceable in the Supreme Court's *Shelley v Kraemer* ruling, arguing that their public enforcement would violate the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment's equal protection clause. But housing discrimination continued by informal means from payoffs to neighbors to prevent selling to blacks, to efforts by real estate agents to simply not show listings to blacks, to outright violence (bombings, cross burnings, vandalism, and death threats). Progressive members of Congress tried to pass a ban on racial segregation in public housing as part of the 1949 Housing Act, but were defeated.<sup>34</sup> Only with the 1968 Fair Housing Act

(Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act) were such covenants finally made illegal, but even this only addressed one of the two key problems identified by President Johnson's 1968 Kerner Commission: (1) the need for a national "open occupancy" law and (2) the need to change federal policies to build more low- and moderate-income housing units outside of "ghetto" areas. The Fair Housing Act addressed the first, but not the second. As a result of covenants, 95% of Los Angeles was simply off-limits to black Angelenos (as well as other minorities).<sup>35</sup> African-Americans were confined to a dense area along Central Avenue in South Los Angeles and the community of Watts on its extreme Southeastern border.

## PUBLIC HOUSING

By the end of the War in 1945, the housing situation had reached a breaking point, with some families having to double and even triple-up in the same unit. The dominant means of

providing affordable housing at the time was public housing, but community groups often resisted public housing, instead favoring privately financed construction.<sup>36</sup> The L.A. Urban League was deeply concerned about the housing problem. For example, the LAUL hosted a forum titled “Housing – Our No 1 Problem,” in April 1948, with the president of the City Planning Commission Robert Alexander and lawyer Loren Miller (who would go on to argue an important case against covenants in 1953) among the participants.<sup>37</sup> By 1950, the LAUL began using its connections with business to host workshops for people in the real estate industry of how to develop privately financed housing projects.<sup>38</sup> By 1955, housing had become the highest priority for the National Urban League as its President Winthrop Rockefeller noted: “Housing is actually the No. 1 objective right now.”<sup>39</sup> But the Urban League seemed to see the housing problem as two *distinct* issues: (1) a problem of general supply and (2) a problem of access by blacks to existing housing (which they largely saw as one of economic discrimination). The solution was therefore

two-fold: (1) encourage private development of more housing, and (2) increase the economic fortunes of blacks through job training and connecting skilled blacks to well-paying jobs. The problem of using zoning to restrict multifamily housing was not among their chief concerns.

So despite a clear interest in fair housing, the LAUL was not involved in land use policy debates. Part of this is due to the interests of the LAUL’s leaders. During this post-war period, the LAUL was lead by Floyd Covington, whose primary goal was to increase the visibility of the LAUL. To that end, the LAUL published a newsletter (Urban Light) and produced its own radio broadcast, which had 36 programs that presented weekly Urban League reports.<sup>40</sup> This visibility paid off, as Mayor Bowron appointed Covington to the Mayor’s Committee on Home Front Unity, whose goal was to reduce racial tensions in the City.<sup>41</sup> But by 1950, Covington left the LAUL to accept a position as race relations director for the Federal Housing Administration. Wesley Brazier replaced Covington and he served as the LAUL’s

Executive Director from 1950 until his resignation in 1968.<sup>42</sup> Brazier had previously been the head of the League's Industrial Relations Department under Covington, so his interests were primarily related to job training programs.

Forexample, in 1950, Brazier organized an Apprenticeship and On-the-Job Training Month that was designed to create 1,000 job opportunities for black Angelenos.<sup>43</sup> Access to better-paying jobs was a top priority for Brazier given the rampant wage discrimination at the time; in 1951, the average black income was only 62% that of whites and dropped even further – to 55% – by 1955.<sup>44</sup> In fact, suggestive of why the LAUL did not use its influence to shape land use policies during this time, Brazier saw job discrimination as key to solving other problems facing the black community: “I have long been a believer in the fact that if equality in employment is achieved, many of the other problems will work themselves out.”<sup>45</sup> Self-sufficiency was Brazier's mantra: “it's better to teach a poor man how to fish, than to give him a fish.”<sup>46</sup>

So, Brazier directed the LAUL towards combating discrimination, while ensuring that blacks would be prepared for the jobs that would be opened up if gains were made in that battle. The activities of the LAUL in the 1950s reflected this strategy. For example, in 1950, the LAUL submitted an anti-discrimination ordinance to the City, designed to prevent discrimination in urban redevelopment projects – which the City adopted in December 1950.<sup>47</sup> Brazier was also one of the organizers of the Assembly of Community Organizations (ACO), an umbrella group meant to coordinate the actions of various black groups.<sup>48</sup> But the ACO never took off because local groups feared the loss of autonomy and influence. After the 1943 Zoot Suit Riots, Brazier helped create the L.A. Human Relations Commission and led racial integration efforts. And in 1952, Brazier had the LAUL join with the newly formed Welfare Planning Council Committee to focus on institutional care for black children by social service agencies.<sup>49</sup> In the months leading up to the *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling in May 1954, the

LAUL organized a membership drive using education and health care as its central focus, attracting 3,150 new members, with the largest number of new recruits coming from South Los Angeles (in the days following the Brown decision, the National Urban League called for immediate public school integration).<sup>50</sup> So despite a clear interest in fair housing generally, most of the LAUL's efforts in the post-war period reflected Brazier's interests, which lay in job training and social work.

To the extent that housing supply was an issue for the LAUL, it was centered not on how land use policies were restricting multi-family housing (ironically, as we will see in section 6.2 below, it was business groups which made that argument), but rather centered on the provision of government-subsidized public housing. By the early 1950s, public housing had become a highly contentious issue because it was conflated with communism (at a time when the Cold War with the Soviet Union was a central concern). The issue had been bubbling in the 1940s, as housing projects were built in L.A, but the debate

came to a boil at Chavez Ravine, a heavily working-class Latino area that the Housing Authority labeled as "blight". Voters appeared to agree with such "slum removal", giving the Housing Authority the right of eminent domain to expropriate the Mexican families' homes with plans to build public housing.

But leading the charge against public housing was Fritz Burns and his coalition of developers, who organized as the Committee Against Social Housing (CASH). In December 1951 City Council voted to cancel the public housing contracts to which they had previously committed.<sup>51</sup> The vote, however, was tarnished by charges that CASH had bribed City Councilors into reversing their previous support.<sup>52</sup> With the help of the *L.A. Times*, who was at war with Mayor Bowron, CASH waged a public relations campaign against Bowron and his support for public housing.<sup>53</sup> Due to their efforts, in a June 1952 referendum, 60% of Angelenos rejected the City's previously approved contract with the federal government to build 10,000 units of public housing. When a key member of the Housing Authority (Frank

Wilkinson) was said to have communist sympathies, the City Council asked the House Un-American Activities Committee (which had, in 1947, blacklisted many Hollywood actors, writers and directors for communist ties) to investigate the L.A. Housing Authority.<sup>54</sup>

In an attempt to strike a compromise on public housing, Mayor Bowron formed a Citizen's Committee in 1952, with representatives on both sides of the issue. Lining up against public housing were the L.A. Chamber of Commerce, the L.A. Realty Board, the Home Builders Institute, and the Merchants and Manufacturers Association – a clear signal that L.A.'s business community was opposed to it. In favor of public housing on the Committee were members from the American Federation of Labor, the Jewish Community Council, the Veterans Organization Coordinating Council, the L.A. County Conference on Community Relations, the League of Women Voters, representations from the Mexican-American community, and the Los Angeles Urban League (represented by Brazier).<sup>55</sup>

Ultimately, the effort failed, and in 1953, with the help of the *Times*, Bowron was defeated by Norris Poulson, and Chavez Ravine was given over to the Parks and Recreation Department. But this proved temporary. By 1957, an agreement had been reached to use the site for a new stadium to lure the Brooklyn Dodgers to L.A. And despite former residents forming the Citizens Committee to Save Chavez Ravine to fight the deal, in June 1958, voters narrowly supported the city's agreement with the Dodgers.<sup>56</sup> On May 9, 1959, the last residents (the Arechigas family) were forcibly removed from their home of 36 years, which was bulldozed before their eyes.<sup>57</sup>

#### THE BATTLE OF BLIGHT

Despite Brazier's latent support for public housing, he was not vocal, preferring to maintain strong ties to the L.A. business community that was necessary for the LAUL's jobs programs to be successful. Instead, the League took a more

behind-the-scenes approach to the housing problem. For example, in 1959, the LAUL partnered with UCLA, Occidental College, and California State University Los Angeles to conduct a study of minority housing in the region. This study was probably as much about the LAUL's mission of promoting racial integration throughout the City, as it was specifically about housing. As the study's final report concluded: "an increase in the number of residential areas open to Negroes and other non-whites would lessen the necessity for them to concentrate in the few desirable ones open by 'block-busting' tactics; and that unless leaders of the housing industry, government, and the general community work and plan seriously towards the common goal of equality of opportunity in housing, intergroup tensions and community disruption are likely to increase."<sup>58</sup> As noted in the study, "by and large, non-whites live in central Los Angeles communities. This is more true of Negroes than of any other minority group."<sup>59</sup> So to Brazier and the LAUL, the problem remained one of discrimination, not one of housing supply.

The 1949 Housing Act, among other things, ushered the era of urban renewal in L.A. and elsewhere. In signing the law, President Truman lauded that "it opens up the prospect of decent homes in wholesome surroundings for low-income families now living in the squalor of the slums."<sup>60</sup> While the original intent was to replace substandard housing units with modern housing units (the idea being that residents of the area would remain in the neighborhood), in practice – for a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this study – housing was rarely built; instead, the public expropriation of land most often resulted in private development of commercial centers and the mass displacement of neighborhood residents. The triad of urban renewal combined with federal highway programs (fueled by the 1956 Act that funded the interstate system) and public housing programs decimated many inner-city neighbors. In L.A., the most high-profile – and longest-running – of these redevelopment areas was Bunker Hill. Once an affluent neighborhood of Victorian homes, by the 1950s most houses

were in disrepair and subdivided into apartments. Planners determined, as was *de rigueur* at the time, nothing short of a clean-slate “slum clearance” project would rehabilitate the area. The houses were leveled and replaced with modern, but sterile, office towers and a cultural district that now includes Frank Gehry’s Disney Concert Hall. Nearly 60 years later, the Bunker Hill redevelopment project continues (although scheduled to end by 2015).

While championed by planners, urban renewal projects were widely panned – by homeowners (who didn’t like their taxes going to fund inner-city redevelopment), by civil rights groups (who deplored the devastating impact on minority communities), and even by some business groups (who did not like the expansion of the federal government). So by September 1959, an updated Housing Act was passed that authorized the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide grants to cities to prevent, arrest, and eliminate blight not by clearance but by conservation and rehabilitation

of existing structures. Established in 1960, the resultant Community Renewal Program (CRP), which was administered by the Urban Renewal Administration proved to be a source of great contention in Los Angeles. Los Angeles planners proposed to take advantage of the CRP to conduct a three-year \$4 million program (two-thirds of which would be funded by the federal government) to survey blight, although officially it was meant to promote city-wide long-term slum prevention.<sup>61</sup> Planners had hoped to use the data from the program as a basis for land-use planning. But business groups, including the Chamber of Commerce, vehemently opposed the use of federal subsidies, while local residents derided it as merely an extension of urban renewal, calling the CRP a “community removal program”.

The battle over the CRP marked the beginning of a tumultuous period of confrontation and change in Los Angeles. By 1962, automation in industry, and the rapid opening up of the San Fernando Valley to industry had left many African Americans without jobs. And while by the mid-1950s, the housing

crisis overall had largely subsided due to the construction of suburban housing tracts in the Valley, housing conditions in South-Central remained poor, since the FHA programs that fueled housing construction applied only to peripheral areas. So by this time, tensions were high.

#### CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

On Memorial Day 1961, a riot broke out in Griffith Park when LAPD officers tried to arrest a 17-year-old black boy for reportedly not paying for his ride on the Park's Merry-Go-Round.<sup>62</sup> A crowd swarmed the officers, with one witness saying he heard someone yell "this is not Alabama". Five officers were hurt in the melee that involved approximately 200 people, prompting 75 police reinforcements and mass arrests; the majority of those arrested were young black men from South Los Angeles. Police Chief Parker attributed the crowd's behavior to the actions of southern "Freedom Riders" and the bitterness of the

Mayoral campaign. The Freedom Rides were demonstrations organized by the Congress of Racial Equity (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in 1961 to call attention to civil rights abuses in the south.<sup>63</sup>

By 1963, the political climate across the country was changing and a greater awareness of the problems in black neighborhoods was being felt. In spring 1963, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), led by Dr Martin Luther King Jr, led a series of demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama to bring attention to the segregation and discrimination blacks were subjected to in that city (one of the most racially divided cities in the U.S. by the 1960s). The SCLC had organized a mass boycott of downtown businesses, which resulted in a 40% decline in business, prompting the City to cut funds for a surplus food program used mostly by blacks.<sup>64</sup> Faced with declining sales, some businesses took down the "whites only" and "colored only" signs, prompting the Police Commissioner to threaten them losing their business licenses. In April and May 1963, non-



violent actions, like sit-ins at segregated lunch counters and kneel-ins at white churches, prompted white violence, mass arrests, and a court injunction to stop the protests. When King and the Birmingham protesters defied the injunction, King was arrested, attracting national media attention. But King did not relent and protests continued, including using school children, which gained even more attention. The images of police using dogs and water cannons against people (including children) were broadcast around the world.

By the end of May 1963, the press began to cover the rising anger, not in Southern cities, but in “black ghettos” in the North, which was a relatively new phenomenon at that point. Citing the sermon of one black leader in New York who reportedly said that “we’ve got the white man on the run; let’s keep him running,” one commentator wondered if there was becoming a “competition in extremism” among black leaders.<sup>65</sup> The summer of 1963 (being the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation) was an important one for the civil

rights movement, as King and a five other prominent black leaders (including National Urban League President Whitney Young), helped organized and lead the August 28<sup>th</sup> March on Washington – one of the largest political rallies the nation had ever seen, with estimated of between 200,000 and 300,000 participants; it was here that King delivered his historic “I Have a Dream” speech.

As elsewhere across the country, racial tensions were rising in Los Angeles at the time. By mid-1963, L.A. officials had called a joint City-County conference to avert the spread of racial tension. The L.A. NAACP organized a committee to present their demands “to formulate a united program and strategy for an all-out assault upon segregation and racial discrimination” in Los Angeles, specifically related to job opportunities, housing, schools and police abuse. The County’s human relations committee, for their part, brought leaders from government, industry, commerce, schools, banking and religion to the table. The growing militancy of the civil rights movement, however,

was concerning to the LAUL's Executive Director Wesley Brazier, who felt that too much emphasis was placed on promises of equality and not enough was being done by the black community itself to ensure that its youth acquired skills: "My one concern now is that all of the civil rights organizations are demanding freedom and equality now but not one has made it a major part of its program to see that the Negro becomes prepared for these opportunities which will eventually come."<sup>66</sup> In other words, Brazier felt that the non-violent protest movement led by Dr King could only go so far in achieving racial equality – that the "dreams" of Dr. King needed to be balanced with the realities of job training so that blacks could fill the jobs of the future.

#### FAIR HOUSING

By 1963, progressives in California appeared to make progress towards fair housing with the passage by the

California legislature of the California Fair Housing Act (better known as the Rumford Act, after the black Berkeley state legislator who sponsored the bill) in response to calls to end housing discrimination across the state; 44 Democrats and 3 Republicans voted for it; all 25 nays were from Republicans.<sup>67</sup> The Act called for an end to racial discrimination in all public and private housing properties with five or more units (Republicans were successful in exempting all single family homes and apartment houses with 4 or less units). It was a limited achievement, but still, a step towards greater equality. But it was short-lived. Soon after its passage, Republicans, with the support of the powerful California Real Estate Association (CREA) launched a campaign to have the law overturned on the grounds that it infringed on property rights.

On November 22, 1963, the world came to a standstill with the news that President Kennedy had been assassinated in Dallas. With the nation unified over the loss, President Johnson, in his January 1964 State of the Union address, unveiled his

intent to wage a “War on Poverty”, which led to the August 1964 creation of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which would distribute funds to cities to fund projects aimed at reducing poverty. The selection of projects, however, proved to be highly controversial in Los Angeles. In fact, even which local agency should be allowed to make recommendations was in dispute. At issue was whether a new agency with community-wide representation should be formed to screen applications (i.e. the County’s Economic Opportunities Federation, which was being pushed by the Welfare Planning Council) or whether the Youth Opportunities Board (YOB), which had been operating for more than two years, should have that role.<sup>68</sup> Mayor Sam Yorty favored the YOB, but many civic leaders favored a new, more representative agency.

By late 1964, the CREA’s campaign against the Rumford Act was successful in getting Proposition 14 on the November 1964 ballot. African-Americans were outraged when Californians overwhelmingly voted to repeal the Rumford Act with 65%

support. Los Angeles, too, voted for racial discrimination by a 57-43% margin. The vote broke along racial lines, with the white San Fernando Valley, which included the most heavily Republican districts, voting overwhelmingly in favor of Prop 14, black districts heavily against it, and Jewish Westside areas evenly divided.<sup>69</sup> The incremental gains for equality made in the early 1960s in Los Angeles had been wiped away by the white majority.

## **B. SLOW-GROWTH, COMMUNITY PLANNING ERA (1965-92)**

### VOTING RIGHTS

The Year 1965 was a difficult one for the American black community. To protest California’s explicit endorsement of racial discrimination, the Kennedy administration cut off all housing funds to California, prompting Governor Pat Brown to challenge the constitutionality of Prop 14, which ironically hurt

the black community even more. After years of advocating black supremacy and a radical separation of races, controversial black leader Malcolm X publicly repudiated the Nation of Islam in March 1964, for which he was assassinated on February 21, 1965.

By this time, black activists began a drive to register black voters in Selma, Alabama, but state and local officials, the White Citizens' Council, and the Klu Klux Klan blocked their registration by imposing literacy tests, economic pressure and outright violence. On February 18, 1965, as black protestors in Marion, Alabama marched from church one night, state troopers intervened, beating the protestors with billy clubs. When the fight spread to Mack's Café, and officers beat 82-year-old Cager Lee and his daughter Viola Jackson, Viola's son Jimmie Lee was shot and killed by white officer James Bonard Fowler.<sup>70</sup> In response to the on-going abuses and the killing of Jimmie Lee Jackson, 600 voting rights activists organized a march from Selma to Montgomery, home of the state capitol on

March 7, 1965. But the scene quickly turned violent as state and local police attacked the marchers with billy clubs and tear gas (the day would become known as "Bloody Sunday"). Two more marches were organized, the last begun on March 16, this time with the protection of U.S. Army soldiers, Alabama National Guard (under federal command), FBI agents and U.S. Marshalls. In light of these high-profile events, on March 17, President Johnson sent the controversial Voting Rights Act to Congress, which would ban poll taxes, literacy tests and fluency in English as requirements for voting. Southern Democrats filibustered, defending the discriminatory regulations (which had the effect of disenfranchising minority voters).<sup>71</sup> But, on August 6, 1965, President Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into law, with Martin Luther King Jr, Rosa Parks, and other civil rights leaders in attendance.

## WATTS &amp; THE WAR ON POVERTY

Despite the contentious battle for civil rights being waged elsewhere, the L.A. Urban League continued its moderate programs aimed at educated, middle-class blacks. For example, in March 1965, the Urban League and the L.A. Chamber of Commerce held a joint press conference announcing a Skills Bank for minorities who were unemployed or underemployed.<sup>72</sup> The program involved the deployment of more than 50 centers in predominately minority areas, where people looking for work could register, and Urban League employees would try to match people to jobs. While such programs strengthened ties between the Urban League and the business community, they did not address the larger problem of poverty in poor, black areas like South-Central and Watts.

Part of the impetus of the War on Poverty was not merely to hand out more federal dollars to poor areas but to ensure that decision-making about how those dollars would be spent

should lie with the community itself. As such they advocated “maximum feasible community participation” in the selection of funded projects. But Mayor Yorty saw this as advancing the “black power” agenda and therefore opposed community participation in the administration of the anti-poverty funds. Given the increasing militancy of the civil rights movement, this position solidified his support among white Angelenos. As a result, by 1965, L.A. had lost out on millions of federal dollars due to conflicts between Yorty, community residents, and federal officials.<sup>73</sup> This prompted Rev. Martin Luther King Jr to come to L.A. to call on L.A. to increase minority participation in the administration of anti-poverty funds.<sup>74</sup> More than anything, this probably helped Yorty and his white base defeat a black-liberal coalition in April 1965 and get re-elected as Mayor.

Just five days after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, on August 11, 1965, 21-year-old African-American Marquette Fry was pulled over by a white LAPD officer on the suspicion of drunk driving. This was consistent with LAPD Chief William

Parker's "Thin Blue Line" policy of establishing a strong police presence by engaging as many young blacks as possible. The incident escalated and over the next few days, unrest grew, damaging nearly 1,000 buildings and killing 34 people. While it is generally accepted that the Fry incident triggered the violence, there is much debate about the underlying causes. An investigation into the riot by former CIA director John McCone indicted high unemployment, poor schools, and inferior living conditions, and many saw Prop 14 as the final straw.<sup>75</sup>

Despite the widely held view that Watts drove a wedge between black and white Angelenos, polling conducted immediately after showed that reaction among whites was decidedly mixed with 54% of whites sympathizing with the rioters, as compared to 42% who did not.<sup>76</sup> But as isolated violent incidents spilled out of South L.A. into Hollywood, Pasadena, and even Beverly Hills, many reacted with fear, as evidenced by the record number of guns sold "nearly all to whites...in a five day period after" the rebellion.<sup>77</sup> While the 1965 Watts events

attracted the most national attention, the City also witnessed civil disturbances each of the next three summers (1966, 1967, 1968), mirroring more dramatic "race riots" across the country. Whether Watts and subsequent disturbances in the streets of L.A. exacerbated race relations or brought greater understanding is debatable, but combined with media and popular culture portrayals, it served to further cement the perception of a growing gulf between the safe suburbs of single-family homes and the dangerous city of apartments. This, in turn, fueled an exodus of whites to the safety of the suburbs in search of "domesticity, class harmony, racial and ethnic homogeneity, and the brand of 'suburban respectability.'"<sup>78</sup>

A week after the riots, on August 18<sup>th</sup>, the LAPD exacerbated tensions by raiding a black Muslim mosque located at 5605 South Broadway (at 56<sup>th</sup> Street), in the heart of South L.A., believing they had orchestrated the Watts events; the Mosque was damaged in the raid. Despite their obvious religious differences, black Baptists came to the aid of the 19

black Muslims arrested that day, and hosted a rally on the 2<sup>nd</sup> Baptist Church.

The civil unrest in Watts marked a period when blacks in L.A. felt especially disempowered. Not only had Yorty rejected anti-poverty funds – which was, according to the McCone Commission investigating reasons for the unrest, one of many contributing factors – but blacks were largely excluded from Yorty’s administration. After Watts, a new anti-poverty program called the Community Analysis Program (CAP) – ostensibly to create a database to document conditions in order to prevent “blight” – was under consideration in Los Angeles. But this only exacerbated divisions over anti-poverty programs in the City that had begun the previous year. The LAUL was one of many organizations that submitted funding requests for anti-poverty programs, but by this time the federal government wanted to ensure that the people making the decisions at the local level were representative of the community. Sargent Shriver Jr, who was in charge of implementing federal anti-poverty

programs, stressed the need for “maximum feasible community participation” in the process. This opened up a new front in the battle over anti-poverty funds, leading to an open dispute between Yorty and Augustus “Gus” Hawkins, who represented South Los Angeles (he was the first black state representative west of the Mississippi). Hawkins drew upon a local power base that included, among others, the highly influential Rev. H.H. Brookins of the First African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, who was a close ally of black Councilor Tom Bradley.

In the re-building of Watts, the Urban League noted that among the problems with attracting industry to Watts was the land use – more specifically, the difficulty in assembling large enough parcels since Watts lots were typically very small.<sup>79</sup> The League felt that attracting employers to Watts would provide jobs without the transportation problems blacks experienced by the mid-1960s with manufacturing jobs leaving for the Valley. New employers would also raise the local tax base and stimulate much-needed new stores and services in the area. According

to Brazier, what was needed was a “Marshall Plan” (like what the U.S. did after the bombing of Japan) to solve the problems in Watts. Among the initiatives Brazier advocated was low-cost, federally financed housing, more efficient implementation of the War on Poverty programs, and improved police and government relations with blacks.<sup>80</sup>

The L.A. Chamber of Commerce (LACC) agreed with the LAUL, noting that the McCone Commission, upon hearing the testimony of business leaders, came to the conclusion that one of the things Watts needed was industry. To business groups like the LACC, the area was ripe for redevelopment. They believed the area was blighted so needed to be re-built: “the houses are run down and will have to be moved out anyway... it is the worst section of town anyway. It is a natural. So that is our pitch.”<sup>81</sup> The problem was that 25,000 people lived in the area they wanted to turn into industry, which they were aware of, but felt this was necessary to bring much needed jobs to Watts. And according to the Chamber, the idea of bringing in

industry was almost universally supported – at a community meeting held in February 1967, 117 people attended and 95% supported bringing industrial jobs to Watts.<sup>82</sup>

By 1966, the California Supreme Court would rule that Prop 13 was unconstitutional, on the grounds it violated the equal protection clause.<sup>83</sup> But Governor Brown’s defiance of the electorate’s strong support for Prop 13 cost him the 1966 election, losing to Ronald Reagan, launching what would become a populist conservative movement that would eventually see Reagan elected President in 1980. Los Angeles County went strongly for Reagan by a 57% to 43% margin in the 1966 Governor election. So while the Urban League and the black community had managed to make progress on the fair housing agenda, in doing so, they provoked a white backlash that would have important consequences for housing policies in the 1970s, as it was these white homeowners who pushed for the widespread down-zoning of Los Angeles in local community plans.



## THE GOALS PROGRAM

After Watts, Calvin Hamilton's Goals Program took on new significance. The Goals Program was Hamilton's attempt to inject citizen participation into the planning process, and while it began before the civil unrest, it was framed as part of the City's response to it. The Los Angeles Urban League was well aware of the project, and Brazier used his weekly column in the *Los Angeles Sentinel* to encourage people to get involved, although the League itself was not active in organizing any collective response to the Program.<sup>84</sup> At the urging of the City Planning Department, in early 1966, a multi-faith citizens group emerged in the South Central area to bring a unified voice to the religious community's vision for the City. In many respects, it reflected the views of many within the black community. By March 1968, this Inter-Religious Committee produced a document called "Why Not?" outlining important social and human goals for L.A. that came out of their discussions. But this document also was

highly critical of how L.A. politics worked.

For example, it suggested City Council (among other public bodies) was unduly influenced by lobbyists and questioned its responsiveness to the peoples' voices. For example, in questioning whether only 15 Councilmen could represent a city so vast as L.A., the report said "It is difficult to find another metropolis of comparable size where the government is so far removed from the people".<sup>85</sup> The report went on to say "aggravating this situation is the extraordinary influence of lobbies and special interests, due primarily to the lack of effective limits on, and disclosure of, campaign funds."<sup>86</sup> Council was already concerned about possible links between the Inter-Religious Committee and militant civil rights groups, so the incendiary language of their report infuriated Councilors. They responded by subjecting Planning Director Hamilton to "the severest attack a city official has been forced to take – in public here – in many years," and ordered the Department to stop distributing the booklet.<sup>87</sup> It also led to

an inquiry by Council's Planning Committee that cast the very future of the Goals Project into doubt, since some Councilors felt that Hamilton should not have initiated a city-wide public consultation and instead concentrated on community-level master plans.<sup>88</sup> For example, by April 1968, only 25 of the 62 identified neighborhoods had master plans.<sup>89</sup>

The dispute eventually dissipated and the Goals Program was given a stay of execution, but the incident was just one of many setbacks for Hamilton's Goals Program. One of the principle aims of the goals project was to give citizens a choice in the way they wanted Los Angeles to grow. Hamilton had set a high benchmark, hoping to get feedback from 100,000, but "only" collected 40,000, leading to comments that the Goals Program had not lived up to expectations (despite it being the largest planning consultation ever conducted).<sup>90</sup> It was also clear that the questions were too general to everyday citizens to make a clear choice for a planning model, so the City Planning Department hired a consultant, Behavior Science Corporation

(BSC) of Panorama City, to do another detailed survey of 2,000 people – 1,600 at-large surveys and 400 specific to black and Latino households.

Among the most surprising outcome of the BSC survey was that almost two-thirds of those surveyed wanted Los Angeles to continue to grow, which suggests that the vocal homeowner groups (see section 6.3 below) may not have been representative of people in general.<sup>91</sup> This finding was consistent with another revelation – 91% of those surveyed would prefer to live in a single-family home. So it was clear that the majority of Angelenos wished to live the American Dream just like those people who benefitted from the post-war suburban boom. But the survey also revealed important racial differences in attitudes towards growth. While overall roughly 60% favored continued growth, among blacks this number was almost 90%.<sup>92</sup>

With the public consultation phase of the Goal Program complete by 1967, the 63-member Goals Council was formed

to make recommendations. Among the Goals Council's recommendations was a call for increased community participation in planning, but also to ensure that citizen commissions represent the public interest, an objective that would prove elusive in the subsequent community plan process that emerged in the 1970s. Among other recommendations the Goals Council made were to "hold open space land inviolate in perpetuity, protected by law against invasion or inappropriate uses," to "end stratification in the housing and residential environment," and to "seek attitudinal changes in race relations to reverse the 'suicidal drift' toward separation and apartheid."<sup>93</sup>

By 1967, despite urgent problems in Watts, the Urban League continued its traditional focus of trying to get skilled blacks high-paying jobs, which at that time were in the aerospace industry. To this end, in 1967, with the San Fernando Valley having experienced more than a decade of rapid growth, the Urban League organized a month-long campaign (led by William

Wagner of Litton Industries) to enroll 2,000 Valley members.<sup>94</sup> By this time no substantive changes had been made in Watts, so the decision by the LAUL to focus on expansion to the Valley while largely turning its back on the problems in Watts was curious, but reflected the priorities of the organization at the time.

It was actions such as these that reflected a growing uneasiness by the 1960s among black communities that blacks were too dependent on whites. As a first generation civil rights organization, the National Urban League was attacked as a symbol of that dependent relationship, particularly due to its close relationship with white business elites. Brazier was well aware of this growing resentment of the Urban League, but held firm to his belief in the Urban League's focus on racial integration and working within existing power structures to advance their cause. As he said in 1963, "The Urban League has for many years been overlooked, misunderstood and criticized because of the lack of understanding. With the more militant

action now being driven by organizations, the league could very well slip into oblivion.”<sup>95</sup> It was during this turbulent period that the National Urban League appointed a new executive director, Whitney Young, who would direct the NUL from 1961 until his accidental drowning death in 1971. Although the NUL expanded the number of local affiliates from 63 to 102 during his tenure, especially after 1963, it was largely paralyzed by its inability to connect with local black groups who were organizing more confrontational demonstrations, which in turn, made white business groups less comfortable partnering with black groups.

So as the civil rights movement became more “militant” (i.e. using more confrontational tactics in its demands for equal rights), the Urban League’s influence waned. But the events of April 4, 1968 proved pivotal, not only for the civil rights movement, but for changing the direction of the Urban League – in Memphis, Tennessee, Dr Martin Luther King Jr was assassinated.

## THE NEW THRUST

The assassination of MLK Jr caused a profound rethinking of the Urban League’s mission. By June of 1968, the Urban League had drafted a new organizational strategy, which they called “The New Thrust”. Rather than act as a conduit between skilled blacks and the white business establishment, the Urban League re-oriented its focus to the problem of the “black ghetto”. As this new doctrine declared:

“The burning and looting that have ravaged our cities are due in large measure to the unanswered cry from the people of the ghetto for a fair shake in becoming part of the larger American society. The Urban League must heed that cry with a renewed effort to turn its own resources, and indeed the resources and concern of all America, to that all-important task... This new thrust recognizes our contributions of the past while addressing itself to the challenges of the present and opportunities for larger service in the future.”<sup>96</sup>

After 1968, the Urban League's focus shifted from issues of job training and health services to more community organization. In 1968, they applied for and received a \$1 million Ford Foundation grant to fund the New Thrust.<sup>97</sup> This shift away from its traditional focus to embrace what was by then the mainstream of the civil rights movement was particularly challenging for local affiliates like the LAUL, since it required a wide range of new local programs, often the re-location of affiliate offices to areas most in need, but at the same time, came with an increase in oversight from the National Urban League's central office in Washington, DC.

Difficulties transitioning to the New Thrust threw the LAUL into a year of confusion. In early 1968, long-time Executive Director Wesley Brazier resigned to continue his interest in job training, joining the federal government as equal employment officer for the Defense Contract Administration Services Agency.<sup>98</sup> The League hired Frank Stanley who was previously editor of a Louisville newspaper and by this time the

Executive Assistant to NUL President Whitney Young.<sup>99</sup> But after the MLK assassination, the black community was becoming highly fragmented, with different factions arguing alternatively for calm and confrontation. New black organizations were quickly forming, such as the Brotherhood Crusade and Black Alternative in late 1968, who were at odds with each other with the Alternative saying the Brotherhood was exploiting whites for personal gain.<sup>100</sup> At the same time, the Black Panthers (a black revolutionary socialist party formed in 1966) and its rival US Organization (a black nationalist group formed in 1965) were at odds. And in January 1969, two Black Panthers, John Huggins and Alprentice (Bunchy) Carter, were killed on the UCLA campus by members of US Organization. The killings added to perception that the civil rights movement had become increasingly radicalized. Stanley appeared not to fully appreciate the growing divide between the more conservative approach of the Urban League and the more militant groups in ascendance after MLK's assassination. Nor did his focus differ

significantly from Brazier's, preferring to focus on health and welfare, housing, and political action programs. Within a year, Stanley had resigned.

In June 1969, the LAUL named a new Executive Director, 32-year-old John Mack, who would run the organization until his retirement in 2005.<sup>101</sup> A one-time psychiatric social worker for the California Department of Mental Health, Mack had previously been the director of the Urban League in Flint, Michigan, but at the time of his hire was the key person in the NUL's Washington, DC office charged with implementing New Thrust programs.<sup>102</sup> While acknowledging that the LAUL had under Brazier been largely a job placement agency, Mack wanted to see it expand into the economic development field – a 'black capitalism' attack on ghetto problems.<sup>103</sup> Central to the LAUL's shift towards helping poor blacks in largely minority areas would be a more bottom-up approach. As Mack said, "I support the concept of community control. People who are the victims of problems must have a greater voice in control...

working with people at the neighborhood level and helping them do their own thing."<sup>104</sup>

The National Urban League, had long been funded through local charity organizations such as the United Way (at the time known as the Community Chest) – for example, in 1957, 83% of the LAUL's operations were funded by the United Way.<sup>105</sup> But by the late 1960s, if their ambitious New Thrust agenda was to be successful, National Urban League Director Whitney Young felt they needed to increase their funding by appealing directly to the federal government. But with the Vietnam War and a more conservative Nixon administration in power after 1968, this would be difficult. In August 1969, while expressing disappointment at federal cutbacks, Young said "Mr. Nixon is intelligent and sensitive and I believe wants to be president over a unified country."<sup>106</sup> Young's more positive view of President Nixon contrasted sharply with NAACP President Bishop Spottswood's view that Nixon was simply anti-black. So in 1970, Young approached the Nixon administration to fund

programming for the New Thrust.<sup>107</sup> Young met with President Nixon and key members of his cabinet on December 22, 1970 and Whitney proposed that the administration channel federal programming through private agencies with an existing presence in black communities, like the National Urban League.<sup>108</sup>

Young argued that the government does contracts with private sector for the provision of military hardware (in places such as Canoga Park, as discussed in section 7.2), but few such relationships existed in the private, non-profit sector for “software” – programs that cater to human needs.<sup>109</sup> Nixon agreed. The channeling of funds to private non-profit groups like the NUL fit the Nixon administration’s preference for smaller government. In fact, it set the precedent for the Nixon administration’s withdrawal of direct government involvement in cities, and by 1974, Nixon re-structured the federal role into Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs) administered by the states. After the 1971 meeting with Nixon, the Urban League submitted proposals for programs related to daycare,

family planning, and minority employment and began receiving federal funding in 1971.<sup>110</sup> Just as federal money began flowing to the NUL, in March 1971, Whitney Young accidentally drowned while vacationing in Nigeria and he never saw the fruits of his labor. In 1971 and 1972, the NUL received over \$21 million in contracts from eight federal departments. As a result of new sources of funds, the United Way’s portion of the LAUL’s operations dropped from 83% in 1957 to just 10% by 1973.<sup>111</sup>

So by the 1970s, the Urban League had adopted a more militant stance, even as the NAACP took a more moderate approach, leading to something of a role reversal for the two organizations.<sup>112</sup> National Director Vernon Jordan stressed that the Urban League would not abandon its traditional role as a bridge between blacks and whites, but outlined a four-part plan going forward: (1) voter registration drives, (2) drug prevention programs in “black ghettos”, (3) a national corporate responsibility program, and, most importantly for planning, (4) an ‘action-oriented’ research program on issues such as city

## COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

planning “to help black people decide for themselves how to deal with terribly complicated issues”.<sup>113</sup> Shifting away from its social work approach, the NUL by this time began seeking “system change” – the underlying social, economic and institutional causes of black suffering. Despite this call for change, the LAUL’s activities remained largely the same as before 1968, although with a more narrow geographic focus in poor minority neighborhoods. In 1978, the LAUL began construction of a Youth Center to provide job training and employment opportunities. But where the Urban League’s constituency was 95% black when Mack arrived in 1969, 25 years later, 40% were Latino.<sup>114</sup> Despite the apparent emphasis on underlying causes, the LAUL was almost entirely absent from the debates about growth and zoning that dominated the Los Angeles political battles at the onset of the Community Plan process in the early 1970s.

By the 1970s, a disproportionate number of blacks were in jobs that paid little for long hours and hard work. Consequently, the National Urban League felt that the alignment of the civil rights movement with the labor movement was a key to improving the material welfare of African Americans.<sup>115</sup> But the labor movement was also seen as a key to breaking the housing barriers that confined blacks to the inner city and away from jobs in the suburbs. The NUL’s thinking was that if the big unions fought for agreements that their parent company’s not locate in cities or towns whose zoning laws keep blacks (and low-income whites) out, then significant progress could be made towards ending economic discrimination. What began happening in the 1960s was that industries would move to more affluent suburban areas, which would then receive an increase to their tax base, but because the workers could not afford those areas, these areas didn’t have to bear the burden



of additional population.

By the late 1970s, the Urban League became active in what would, in the 1980s, become the environmental justice movement (what Australians called “the smoggies”). To this point, white middle-class homeowners who had been the champions of the land conservation movement (“the greenies”) had largely taken an apathetic, if not adversarial, position with respect to the concerns of inner-city minorities, often favoring positions towards the environment at the expense of jobs. But in 1979, the smoggies and greenies joined forces, as the National Urban League, Sierra Club, and Urban Environmental Conference jointly sponsored a symposium in Detroit titled “City Care: Towards a Coalition for the Urban Environment”, with support from the EPA, HUD, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Agriculture.<sup>116</sup> The idea was to begin building a national agenda of cooperation between labor, environmental, and minority groups around social, economic, and physical issues, including land use policies. But the divisions between the smoggies and

greenies were readily apparent. As then NUL President Vernon Jordan told delegates, the black community harbors “absolute hostility to anything smacking of... limits to growth,” in direct conflict with Sierra Club’s mission.<sup>117</sup> But they did agree on an agenda of sharing interests that included promoting mass transit, more park space for inner city neighborhoods, stopping suburban malls that encourage driving while harming inner-city commercial areas, and preventing government subsidized highway projects.

Some local Urban League chapters took up this planning challenge, but the LAUL largely did not. For example, in 1980, the San Diego Urban League (SDUL) filed an *amicus curiae* on behalf of San Diego Gas & Electric Company, which sued the City of San Diego for down-zoning its land from industrial to open space. SDUL argued that damages should be awarded for such down-zoning to prevent similar “arbitrary and discriminatory land use regulations” that push housing prices up and exclude people from better living conditions.<sup>118</sup> This

was part of a broader effort by the SDUL to increase housing supply to accommodate the rapidly growing population, as well as stimulate industrial and commercial development to create job opportunities for minorities. As SDUL president Clarence Pendleton argued, “Every time government restricts land use, that lessens housing opportunities... zoning holds land off the development rolls and when housing production is constrained, the low- and moderate-income person takes both the brunt of the shortage and the limiting of our opportunities.”<sup>119</sup> The SDUL even engaged in its own affordable housing development.

However, the Los Angeles Urban League affiliate, by and large, did not pursue this direct involvement in planning and redevelopment. Only in one case did they undertake a more community development approach—in 1980, they were awarded a \$174,000 contract by the City to lead the revitalization of the Crenshaw district, a once affluent area that by 1980 was in steep decline.<sup>120</sup> After the New Thrust was initiated, the LAUL moved from Mid-City (2107 West Washington Boulevard) to Crenshaw

(3450 Mount Vernon Drive, just west of Crenshaw). So the LAUL took on the task of revitalizing their immediate neighborhood. But the selection of the Urban League was a curious one. First, economic development was not the LAUL’s expertise; its focus had been on job training and promoting civil rights. The LAUL and L.A. Community Development Department secured a \$168,000 block grant to upgrade commercial storefronts in the Leimert Park section of Crenshaw; by coordinating with the Crenshaw Commercial Center Merchants Association over 98% of merchants participated.<sup>121</sup> The LAUL and Crenshaw Chamber also jointly sponsored a street festival that raised awareness of the need to buy local.<sup>122</sup> The League also encouraged Crenshaw Center to hire private security, advocated for a “buy Crenshaw” week, and persuaded banks to offer below-market loans for renovations. But these efforts were largely about positioning Crenshaw as a place for affluent shoppers from the nearby Baldwin Hills (as discussed in detail in section 7.1). They did little to combat the rising crime and poverty in the area.

The LAUL's Richard McNish, who was project manager for the Crenshaw Revitalization Project, was active in the fight for transit in the Crenshaw area. He complained about the lack of Westside Metro station at Crenshaw, noting that 28,000 people at the time depended on the buses in the Wilshire/Crenshaw area.<sup>123</sup> Despite the stations being located at one-mile intervals, the lack of Crenshaw station meant a 2.7-mile gap, illustrating how notable the absence of a station at Crenshaw was. The Crenshaw Station was omitted due to homeowner protests from the affluent Hancock Park neighborhood to the north and west of the Wilshire/Crenshaw intersection. These homeowners argued that the station would spur high-density commercial development. But others, including McNish and State Senate president pro tem David Roberti, said "there is serious speculation that the reason for such a concerted effort to forestall the building of a Crenshaw station is to keep Blacks out of the Hancock Park area."<sup>124</sup> That there was already a 144,000 square foot commercial building

under construction in the area seemed to reinforce this view. The omission of the Crenshaw station appeared to people in the Crenshaw area as a clear sign of the imbalance of power between affluent whites and poor blacks. Despite the LAUL's efforts, the fortunes of Crenshaw did not turn around. In part, this was due to the influence of local homeowner groups who had fought for widespread down-zoning in the area, including rollbacks of commercial zoning, beginning in the 1970s. The Los Angeles Urban League was simply not involved in these land use debates.

## 6.2 – THE L.A. (AREA) CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Founded in 1888, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce was (and remains) the oldest and most influential business group in Southern California.<sup>125</sup> Unlike African-American affiliated groups like the Urban League and NAACP, who leaned Democrat, the Chamber's politics were decidedly Republican. The majority of its members were GOP members and they often privately supported Republicans running for office. For example, in discussing the 1960 election results, which saw the historical election of Democrat John F. Kennedy, the Chamber was "concerned that labor groups with Negroes and Mexicans have a ticket with Kennedy and will use it."<sup>126</sup> The Chamber viewed this progressive coalition of labor and minorities as a threat to their mission of limited government; specifically, they were concerned that minority groups would use their leverage to press for new housing programs and programs aimed at "depressed areas" (i.e. ghettos). As the Chamber

warned its Directors, "we need to keep our Congressmen alert so we are supporting, as we have in the past, more reasonable approaches to these problems and not be overwhelmed."<sup>127</sup> Likewise, in 1961, the Chamber opposed the proposed Federal Department of Urban Affairs (what would eventually become the Department of Housing and Urban Development), and urged its members to "communicate this to our friends in Congress" to try to defeat it.<sup>128</sup> And when rigorous standards for auto emissions were being developed in the early 1960s, the Chamber organized a conference that questioned the impact of sulfur dioxide on air pollution and sent delegations to Detroit to enlist the support of auto manufacturers.<sup>129</sup>

The organization was also overwhelmingly white and took a paternalistic attitude towards minorities. The Chamber was against the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which banned voting discrimination. The LACC also argued that the right to vote should not be extended to people of Chinese, Japanese and Malay descent, because they were concerned about their ability

to read English.<sup>130</sup> Their attitude towards blacks was reflected in the months following the Watts Riots (see section 6.1 above). As Chamber director Chad McClelland of the Management Council for Employment Training & Research said: “There are two problems involved in 50% or more of these people which make it impossible for them to go to work. One is aptitude. They are not able, they don’t know enough and they have no training or skill to qualify. The other is attitude and attitude is almost equally important... this is something the Negroes have to develop for themselves. We can’t do it for them. The McCone Commission Report recites this fact.”<sup>131</sup> Certainly, the Chamber wanted to help people in South L.A. gain skills and become productive members of society. But they were not motivated by civil rights in this pursuit; instead, Chamber directors said if they could get jobs, they would be able to go off relief rolls, which aligned with their goal of reducing the size of government.<sup>132</sup> They were clear that industry needed blacks and was willing to train and promote blacks who had “the right attitude”.

The Chamber also held positions that we have come to expect of mainstream business groups. For example, the LACC was opposed to collective bargaining, generally, and collective bargaining for public employment specifically, fearing it would result in higher taxes.<sup>133</sup> They were also proponents of the 1958 Proposition 18, the so-called “right-to-work” legislation that would prohibit membership in a union or payment of dues as a condition of employment (essentially making union membership optional for companies with unionized labor). Opponents argued Prop 18 was anti-democratic, since it violated the majority rule principle. The Chamber argued it would help fuel industrial growth, but Californians disagreed, defeating the measure. Another issue that would become a core principle of the Chamber was their opposition to all federal subsidies – a position that gained them a national reputation by 1962.<sup>134</sup> Taken collectively, the Chamber was the embodiment of a set of right-of-center principles that would become popularized in the 1980s under President Reagan.

That said, the LACC also took a leadership role on issues that would put Los Angeles on a more sustainable path. They were among the strongest advocates for a regional mass transit system as early as the 1940s. And while they deplored public housing, they have consistently advocated for more liberal zoning regulations to allow for the construction of multi-family housing generally, and privately financed affordable housing specifically. They also advocated for mixed use – on the grounds that each community should be economically self-sufficient – and in general have been supportive of higher density development as a means of combating urban sprawl. So, the LACC’s record with respect to progressive land use policies is decidedly mixed.

It is difficult to understate just how much political influence the Chamber had in state and federal legislation. For example, when Governor Pat Brown (a Democrat), needed support for Proposition 1 (the Burns-Porter Act) – which would authorize \$1.75 million for the construction of the proposed

State Water Project (SWP)<sup>135</sup>, a conveyance system that would supply water and generate electricity for the Central Valley and Southern California – he came to the Chamber in person to ask for their support in getting it passed by voters, which they did. Likewise, given their shared belief in limited government and low taxes the Chamber had the ear of Governor Ronald Reagan after he was elected in 1967. Sworn in on January 2, 1967, by February, the Chamber had arranged for a meeting with the new Governor, noting “we feel we have several things the Governor would like to hear from the Chamber of Commerce and he has indicated a great interest in having our views.”<sup>136</sup> After their tête-à-tête, the Chamber reported “this is the first of what we expect will be several meetings with him. We feel he probably will ask us for advice from time to time and will listen to us on our recommendations.”<sup>137</sup> For example, in their first meeting, Reagan asked the Chamber if the State should charge tuition at the University of California campuses. Even after the 1966 federal mid-term election wins for the GOP – which the Chamber

said was “white backlash against civil rights programs” – the LACC Board warned members not to let up on its programs to end big government just because Republicans won.<sup>138</sup>

### A. PRO-GROWTH, POST-WAR ERA (1943-1965)

#### INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION

Prior to the Second World War, L.A. was a “sprawling city of small homes, sunshine, magnet for the world’s greatest tourist trade – perhaps the world’s greatest suburb.”<sup>139</sup> But almost overnight, it became an industrial powerhouse. The war brought to L.A. industry on a large-scale, particularly revolving around the aerospace industry. But fears of a letdown after the war proved unfounded, as more industrial investment was made the five years after the war than during it. By 1947, L.A. had the third largest number of industrial facilities in the nation. And by 1953, it was second only to Detroit in automobile production.

Central to this growth was the role of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, whose members used their connections to east coast industries to sell Los Angeles as a city of industry. The rise of L.A. as an industrial center also re-shaped its culture.<sup>140</sup>

City planners tried to keep up with the pace of growth, in part, by adopting a new comprehensive zoning code in 1946. But almost immediately after it was adopted, questions began to surface from business, veterans, and minority groups about whether the new code was a barrier to building apartments. Vincent Palmer, President of the California Council of Architects, argued that area and height limitations in the new code greatly hindered the construction of multi-family housing.<sup>141</sup> As a result, in late 1947, the Chamber of Commerce, with the support of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) and Los Angeles Realty Board, brought forward amendments to the zoning code to increase the density in apartment and hotel zones. The proposed amendments were rejected by the City Planning Commission, but recommended for approval by City Council’s

Planning Committee and subsequently adopted by the full City Council. The changes reduced the lot area per unit in R-4 zones from 800 square feet to 600 square feet for apartments with more than three rooms (effectively a 25% increase in density); maximum allowable densities in R-3 zones were also relaxed and eliminated altogether in R-5 zones (instead allowing height limits to cap the size of buildings).<sup>142</sup>

However, the measure was vetoed by Mayor Fletcher Bowron, who argued that the changes “would permit almost unlimited population densities in R-5 zones, limiting light, air, and space between buildings to such an extent that multiple unit structures could be legally constructed of such kind and character that they would be virtual tenements in apartment house areas; soon obsolete, making an entire area later blighted, ultimately slums.”<sup>143</sup> This sparked a public feud between Council and the Mayor over multi-family housing, with the Mayor taking to the radio waves to press his case (which Council disliked, since they didn’t have an opportunity to refute

him publicly). Council had already overridden the Mayor’s veto of a zoning ordinance a few months earlier (aimed at sand and gravel operations), so the housing amendments were just the latest zoning dispute.<sup>144</sup>

On the housing issue, Council said Bowron had his facts wrong – that the amendment made no changes to setbacks at all, only allowing more and smaller units in otherwise identical sized buildings. But an amendment earlier in 1947 signed by Bowron had already reduced setbacks; it was the combination of reduced setbacks and increased density that prompted Bowron to veto the latter.<sup>145</sup> But veterans groups, including the American Legion, objected to Bowron’s veto, and requested that Council override the veto, arguing that smaller apartments were an answer to veterans’ housing problems. Ultimately, a compromise was reached which would allow increased densities in some areas, but by 1950, the issue resurfaced when Council overrode Bowron’s veto of re-zonings in the Reseda and Crenshaw districts, with Bowron even writing



a letter to President Truman complaining about lobbying by Veterans Administration officials.<sup>146</sup> While homeowner groups were largely in their infancy in the 1940s, they too, objected to the permissive zone changes and re-zonings, arguing that City Council had gone against the “expressed will of the people” that would result in “use of land repugnant to the owners of adjoining land.”<sup>147</sup>

While the Chamber was a strong advocate of multi-family housing – motivated by their desire to maintain the pace of growth – they were the most vocal opponents of public housing. On June 27, 1951, City Council approved by a vote of 10-5 nine sites to build \$100 million of low-rent, federally subsidized housing projects.<sup>148</sup> The Chamber opposed the projects and the very principle of government-subsidized housing, saying “our local housing problems should be solved in the American way, without subsidies, without regimentation in political housing.” They felt spending on public housing was taking away from defense needs and would raise taxes. They

also objected to the destruction of privately-owned homes in the areas. The Chamber was instrumental in having the \$100 million public housing agenda curtailed. They helped not only block public housing in Chavez Ravine, but were instrumental in getting Dodger Stadium built there by 1962 (see section 6.1 above).

#### MASS TRANSIT

By the 1930s, traffic in Los Angeles was already congested, but the war derailed plans for a comprehensive freeway and mass transit system. While this research project is not primarily focused on transit, that the Chamber was intimately involved in transportation planning, but not land use planning, helps explain why homeowners (and not business groups like the Chamber) had such a powerful influence over land use policy after the community planning process began. After the War, Mayor Bowron convened a citizens’ workshop

on how to deal with the traffic situation, out of which emerged the LACC's Metropolitan Traffic and Transit Committee, headed by Neil Petree.<sup>149</sup> Petree's committee, with the aid of City traffic engineers, conducted research and created exhibits documenting the state of the problem in Los Angeles, which Petree presented to a Sacramento legislative committee in April 1946. In addition to the LACC, this effort was supported by a wide range of business interests including the Automobile Club of Southern California, the Central Business District Association, the Downtown Business Men's Association, the Western Oil & Gas Association, and the Downtown Parking Association, each of which sent representatives to Sacramento to testify.<sup>150</sup> By 1947, the work of the LACC's Traffic and Transit Committee had proved "instrumental in obtaining passing of the Collier-Burns Highway Act of 1947,"<sup>151</sup> which provided funds to build freeways (including \$20 million annually for L.A.), resulting in a 10-year, 165-mile freeway construction program in Los Angeles.<sup>152</sup> The Collier-Burns Act increased the fuel tax by 50% and quadrupled

vehicle registration fees – although the Chamber argued these should be lower than what was proposed<sup>153</sup> – and created a central bureaucracy to oversee the construction of new freeways, the California Division of Highways (later becoming Caltrans). Within five years, California had increased its freeway mileage by almost five times.<sup>154</sup>

But the Chamber recognized that L.A.'s growth could not be sustained through the construction of freeways alone; it needed a mass transit system and corresponding density to support it. But mass transit proved more difficult to achieve than freeways. Under the leadership of Leroy Edwards, immediately after the War, the LACC helped form the Rapid Transit Action Group (RTAG). Different people had their own idea about what kind of rapid transit system would be best. Some favored running rail lines down the center of freeways. But this was criticized because it would require wider rights-of-way purchases, which would be more costly and delay the construction of the freeway system. Others favored buses instead of fixed rail, arguing this

was more flexible. Still others wanted a subway, which would not cause as much congestion, but would cost far more. Some instead advocated for a monorail, arguing this would be cheaper and faster to construct than subways.

After hearing the wide range of opinion, RTAG came up with an amalgamated plan (Fig. 6-1) in February 1947 that consisted of three parts: (1) subways in the downtown core that would lead to (2) bus rapid transit (green lines on map) and (3) rail lines running down the center of freeways (red lines on map). But there was dispute about whether the system should be publicly or privately owned, which held up the formation of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit District (RTD), which, like the Metropolitan Water District, would issue bonds, supervise planning, and grant franchises (the idea being that private transit companies would operate the system). Initially expected to cost \$68 million when first conceived in 1945, by early 1948, the RTAG had pegged the cost of their system at \$310 million – a system the Chamber of Commerce considered




Fig. 6-1: 1974 RTAG Transit Plan (LACMTA Archives)

vital to L.A.'s future.<sup>155</sup> In 1948, the LACC submitted the Rapid Transit Action Program to the state legislature.

But not everyone was happy with the proposed freeway and transit plan. People disagreed over what type of system it should be – with many believing that monorails should have been the preferred option. Of particular concern was the location of the routes. The Hollywood Freeway (route 101), in particular, was criticized. Hollywood Bowl representatives objected to its location so near the facility, arguing it would endanger the amphitheater's acoustics.<sup>156</sup> Labor groups, including the C.I.O. (Congress of Industrial Organizations) objected to financing the system by raising gas taxes and vehicle registration fees, arguing this would hit the average working man hard, instead favoring increased corporate taxes to fund the project.<sup>157</sup> Others felt the entire project should be left to private hands. So by April 1948, the proposed RTD was voted down in Sacramento, in large part because L.A. area Assemblymen voted 15-14 against it.<sup>158</sup> By April 1949, the Chamber tried again, asking City Council to

endorse AB 2023, which would create RTD in Los Angeles (the Chamber sent representatives to Sacramento for the April 27<sup>th</sup> hearing).<sup>159</sup> But it too failed to get enough support for passage, thus killing the comprehensive planned system.

But even as the Chamber pushed for the creation of a regional mass transit system, paradoxically, the dismantling of L.A.'s extensive rail network was well underway. By this time, Pacific Electric had proposed to substitute its trolley cars for buses, and abandon some lines in the Valley that were not profitable enough – actions that the San Fernando Valley Transportation Committee opposed (among their arguments was that buses would contribute to the pollution problem).<sup>160</sup> With the many conflicting opinions about how to achieve mobility in L.A., but recognizing that something had to be done, the state legislature created the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (LAMTA) in 1951. By 1951, the Metropolitan Coach Lines had taken over passenger service of both the Pacific Electric and L.A. Transit Lines (successor to the Los Angeles



Railway or LARY). Even the creation of the LAMTA in 1951 was extremely limited, its mandate not being to create a rapid transit network, but rather to study the feasibility of a single monorail line from Panorama City in the Valley to Long Beach, roughly following the L.A. River (Fig. 6-2). Two reports were published, in December 1953 and January 1954, by LAMTA consultants enthusiastically endorsing the monorail solution.<sup>161</sup> This system was to span over 45 miles and cost roughly \$165 million, half as much as RTAG's earlier proposal. But this, too, failed to win support, since it served so few communities, and was also viewed by some as closer to science fiction than reality. LAMTA was only granted a more expansive mandate to unify the area's disparate transit systems in 1954. But it wasn't until March 3, 1958, that it finally purchased the successors to Pacific Electric Railway and Los Angeles Railway, Metropolitan Coach Lines and Los Angeles Transit Lines, thus putting into public hands what had been to this point a collection of private companies.

By 1960, a new monorail plan was proposed that would




Fig. 6-2: 1951 LAMTA Monorail Plan (LACMTA Archives)

create a hub and spoke model centered on downtown L.A. (Fig. 6-3): 51 miles of overhead lines, 21 miles at grade, and 2.3 miles in tunnels, at a cost of \$530 million. By this time, with its battle for mass transit entering its second decade, the Chamber began to recognize that part of the problem was the lack of population density necessary to support it in Los Angeles. As A.J. Eyraud, Chair of LAMTA, reminded the Chamber, Los Angeles's density of roughly 5,000 people per square mile at the time was almost seven times less dense than Manhattan (34,000 people per square mile).<sup>162</sup> A significant barrier, they noted, was that they couldn't lay out routes for the system without the approval of different communities along it, and that many of them (for example, Beverly Hills) were opposed. Indeed, property owners along Wilshire Boulevard – one of the few major arterials in Los Angeles with sufficient density to support a subway – formed the Wilshire Boulevard Protective Association to defeat a proposal to run an elevated rail line down Wilshire or 6<sup>th</sup> Street. A second Protective Association was forming on 8<sup>th</sup> Street for the same



Fig. 6-3: 1960 LAMTA Monorail Plan (LACMTA Archives)

purpose. As the Chamber noted, foreshadowing the NIMBYism (not-in-my-backyard-ism) that would become widespread later in the decade, “nobody wants it down his street”.<sup>163</sup>

#### DISPERSAL OF INDUSTRY TO THE SUBURBS

By April 1950, the Chamber had launched Operation Payroll to promote industrial development in L.A. County, arguing “each factory employing 150 people generates about \$250,000 worth of retail and service business annually.”<sup>164</sup> The Chamber aggressively sold L.A. County generally, and the San Fernando Valley, in particular, as a region ripe for industrial development. Prior to the Second World War, Burbank (a separate city) was the only industrialized area of the Valley, primarily driven by aircraft manufacturers Lockheed and Vega, and related parts companies such as Bendix, Trumbell, and Adel. Even during the War, most of the Valley remained agricultural, as the bulk of wartime production was located south and west of the central

core of Los Angeles (including Douglas Aircraft, North American Aviation and Northrup) or in Burbank (Lockheed and Vega).

But the construction of a new highway through the Cahuenga Pass (in the Hollywood Hills between Hollywood and North Hollywood) made the Valley more accessible. Despite its largely agricultural footprint, three rail corridors across the Valley aided its industrial growth. Locating industry adjacent to these lines would prove advantageous. So in 1945, General Motors bought a 100-acre parcel adjacent to the railway at Van Nuys Boulevard, where they would construct their second largest plant in the country; the Chevrolet facility opened in February 1948, with a five-day gala sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce.<sup>165</sup> Between 1940 and 1950, the Valley’s population (including the towns of Burbank and San Fernando) increased from 155,443 to 402,538 – an increase of more than 2.5 times.<sup>166</sup> And despite the impression of the Valley as a bedroom community of Los Angeles, the Valley itself added almost 100,000 jobs – increasing from 29,000 to 120,000



during the 1940s.<sup>167</sup> Much of this job growth was concentrated in the southeast of the Valley, in and around Burbank.

During the war, the Planning Commission recognized that if not planned, the San Fernando Valley would be inundated with growth after the war, so began drawing up plans for its development. In 1943, planners began surveying the Valley and found that most of the land remained as large landholdings, and agriculture remained the dominant industry (66% of all Valley land and 81% of what planners classified as useable land), with only 33 of the Valley's 212 square miles (about 15%) being platted into town lots.<sup>168</sup> Planners at this time wanted to preserve this agricultural asset, with industry, commerce and residential development meant to supplement it. At the same time, planners were revisiting the City's zoning code, which would go into effect in January 1946 – the majority of the Valley was designated as RA (suburban), A2 (agriculture, 2 acre minimum lots) and A1 (agriculture, 5 acre minimum lots).

The resulting 1944 Valley plan – drawn up by planners Simon Eisner and Karl Dekker, who were hired by Planning Director Charles Bennett using funds from the business-backed Greater Los Angeles Plans, Inc. (GLAP) – doubled urban uses from 33 to 66 acres (of which just 6 acres were designated as industrial), organized into 16 centers or “nuclei”. This reflected the pattern of development favorable by Bennett: “a number of well-planned and moderately sized communities of reasonable density, separated by agricultural areas.”<sup>169</sup> The plan was meant to catalyze growth to prevent a post-war slump, which worried Bennett and Mayor Fletcher Bowron, while also preserving a high quality of life by the use of “green belts” that would keep urban areas from expanding. To gain the support of the business community, including the LACC, Bennett agreed to provide four-corner commercial zoning at major intersections at one-mile increments throughout the Valley.<sup>170</sup>

In April 1947, with the GM plant under construction, Kaiser Community Homes – a joint venture of Fritz Burns



(who headed the Committee Against Socialist Housing fight against Chavez Ravine – see section 6.1 above) and Henry Kaiser (a well-known industrialist) – bought a large portion of the Panorama Ranch adjacent to the Chevrolet plant for their Panorama City master-planned community. As head of the National Association of Home Builders and co-chair of National Association of Real Estate Boards, Burns was well connected and used his influence to advance his own projects (in addition to Panorama City, he also developed the Westchester suburb near LAX). With direct ties to President Eisenhower, by 1953, Burns would be appointed to an advisory committee to the FHA.

But the early 1950s, it was becoming clear that Valley growth could not be sustained by merely building bedroom communities, because the fiscal impact of these new subdivisions far exceeded the revenue they generated. This created a vicious cycle of having to approve more and more subdivisions to keep city revenues up. Compounding

matters were the tax rebates the City gave to returning GIs. For example, in one San Fernando Valley housing tract, of the 2,200 moderately priced homes sold, 1,500 were to veterans who each received a \$1,000 tax exemption. By 1953, those 1,500 households had 1,240 school-aged children (with more on the way). After exemptions and costs, the City received just \$14 per home of tax revenue per year, but it cost \$145 per child for school, let alone the cost of police, fire, sewers, garbage collection, street lights, street cleaning, libraries and other public infrastructure and services.<sup>171</sup> The negative fiscal impact of purely housing in the Valley could clearly not be sustained. To counteract this, the Chamber of Commerce recommended that each community could become self-sufficient if industry was dispersed throughout the City. This proposal would serve the Chamber's dual-purpose of making the City more fiscally sound, while also expanding industrial growth. Industry generated 10 to 20 times more per acre in tax revenues than residential uses, they argued, and yet required fewer services (no schools,

libraries, fewer streets, etc). Therefore, adding industry in the Valley would offset the negative cost of suburban housing and therefore keep local taxes low.

Planning Director Charles Bennett was well aware of the fiscal imbalance and said the City was moving more towards greater dispersal of industry, noting – perhaps underestimating the resistance to the plan – that this would require “some readjustments on the part of people living in suburban areas.”<sup>172</sup> But this was an age of top-down planning and homeowners had little leverage to change policy at this time. To Bennett, the decision to disperse industry to the suburbs – which were not as congested – would give L.A. a strategic advantage over east coast cities, whose industries were largely located in dense, urban centers. This would, in turn, perpetuate growth, which was the paradigm shared by the Chamber, the Planning Department, and City Council. This expansion of industry, however, would represent a rather different vision for L.A. than before the War – one that imagined “self contained communities”, each with

housing, ample employment, recreation, clean air, surrounded by agriculture.

By 1954, this L.A.-area industrial expansion was showing no signs of letting up – in fact, it was accelerating. In all of 1953, \$191 million was spent on new plants and upgrading existing plants; in the first 11 months of 1954, \$202 million had been spent to date.<sup>173</sup> To the Chamber, this was good news because it meant that the 175,000 new people moving to L.A. County from all across the country would find jobs. The sheer magnitude of the change and growth necessitated locating industry in suburban areas. By this time, L.A.’s vast network of freeways was also under construction (which as noted above, the Chamber helped create), which would make the dispersion of industry viable, fueling a dramatic increase in car ownership, which doubled in the decade from 1944 to 1954 (from 1.1 million to 2.2 million vehicle registrations).<sup>174</sup>

The federal government also encouraged cities to disperse industry to the suburbs in the 1950s. By the 1950s,

firmly entrenched in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the fear of atomic warfare was very real. Dispersal of population was felt to be a safeguard against the devastating losses that would be felt in highly concentrated areas. The nation's industrial capacity, too, was a target and federal officials made it known to states and cities that a concentration of industry would make good targets for enemy missiles. As Jack Gorrie, chairman of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), said: "the most effective measure that we know of for assuring the continuity of production in event of attack on this country is the dispersion of new manufacturing facilities."<sup>175</sup>

Almost as soon as the 1944 Valley zoning plan was approved, it began to be amended, reflecting its inability to contain growth. Instead of developing in the nuclei, as planners expected, developers bought up large parcels of agricultural land – since it was cheaper – and applied for re-zonings. In part, these subdivisions in what was supposed to be an agricultural reserve were driven by the policies of the County tax assessor,

who assessed the land for its highest and best use (which they considered residential), regardless of the zoning or the master plan.<sup>176</sup> Over objections from the City Planning Department and Planning Commission and over-turning Mayor Bowron's veto, City Council approved some 40,000 new lots that would create 98,000 new housing units between 1945 and 1949.<sup>177</sup>

The early 1950s saw a number of changes in city politics. In 1953, L.A. had a contentious Mayoral battle between incumbent Fletcher Bowron and challenger Norris Poulson, who used Bowron's support for public housing as a wedge issue (even though both were Republican). In particular, with the support of the Citizens Against Socialist Housing (CASH) group, Norris used the Elysian Park Heights project (see section 6.1 above) to rail against communists in the L.A. Housing Department, promising to fire those suspected of communist sympathies. Poulson's election was, in part, seen as the public's endorsement of the private provision of housing. By 1954, with his vision of tightly controlled urban centers surrounded by agriculture slipping

away, City Planning chief Charles Bennett retired, and was replaced by John Roberts.

Recognizing that individual re-zonings were taking place without regard to any comprehensive plan, by 1954, the City Planning Department began a new Master Plan for the San Fernando Valley under Roberts's direction. A radical departure from the 1944 plan that envisioned towns surrounded by agriculture, the resultant 1955 plan called for widespread conversion of agricultural zoning into not only suburban housing, but also industry and commerce. The proposed changes were drastic, with land zoned for agriculture cut in half, and a 50% increase in land zoned for manufacturing.<sup>178</sup> At the time, the estimated population of the L.A. portion of the Valley was 517,000, and Planning Chief Roberts estimated that the area would grow to 1.13 million by 1965 or 1970.<sup>179</sup> At the time, the area was zoned for a population capacity of 798,500, so the 1955 plan represented a significant increase in density – by roughly 40%.

By the mid-1950s, a new model began to emerge that looked less and less like Bennett's self-contained communities. While the Valley has been held up as the archetypal bedroom suburb, even as early as the 1950s, it was being developed into more of the "edge city" model that Joel Garreau later popularized in the 1990s<sup>180</sup>, characterized not only by suburban housing, but also job centers, industry, and commerce – essentially all the constituent parts of a more dense traditional city, but here spread out horizontally. The 1955 Master Plan, in large part, represented the vision of the Valley held by groups such as the LACC.

Naturally, homeowners who were beginning to flee the urban core and its ills for the Valley, along with incumbent farmers, were not at all happy with the incursion of industry into their bedroom and agricultural communities. For example, in 1955, Ted Robinson, Vice-President of the West Valley Property Owners Protective Association protested the City's plan, saying it would result in, among other things, air pollution.<sup>181</sup> Complaints

were leveled against the plan because one of the planners working on it, Jack W. Simons, owned property in the Valley, which homeowners argued constituted a conflict of interest since he would benefit financially from the new plan (Simons was suspended but the plan stood).<sup>182</sup> But the drums of growth drowned out these homeowner voices and the 1955 Plan was adopted.

In 1960, the Chamber supported the Warner Company's plans for the development of the old Harry Warner Ranch in Woodland Hills (see section 7.2) into a new industrial and commercial center, calling it "an ideal setting for industry to locate and prosper."<sup>183</sup> In reality, it was less than ideal, being located at the extreme edge of the City, far from where the majority of people lived. But the Chamber viewed the expansion to the Valley as highly desirable because it had good schools, plenty of land, water, power, gas, and a vigorous young labor supply. In particular, the LACC supported the mission of the Industrial Association of the San Fernando Valley (IASFV), which

was formed in 1949 by a group of retailers, professionals, service organizations, chambers of commerce, banks, and government agencies to attract industry to the San Fernando Valley. Particularly attractive to the LACC was the fact the Valley consisted of many smaller communities, unlike the "big city" and "big government" of Los Angeles. As one IASFV spokesman noted, businessmen wanted to know the Mayor, Council and local organizations – no doubt because they would have more political influence over them – so the IASFV didn't sell the Valley as a part of L.A., but rather sold it as 10 different communities.<sup>184</sup> As much as business groups like the LACC and IASFV supported industrial expansion into the San Fernando Valley, they were also concerned that their workforce could find moderately priced housing near their plants. For example, the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the San Fernando Valley (ACCSFV)<sup>185</sup>, whose geographic focus was narrower than the LACC (limited to the San Fernando Valley), worked with managers of North American Aviation's Santa Susana Field

## THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRY

Laboratory (see Chapter 7.2) to help its employees find nearby housing.<sup>186</sup>

To the Chamber, no amount of growth was too great. By 1960, observers predicted Southern California would become a megalopolis of 35 million people by 1990, stretching from Santa Barbara to the Mexican border, from Santa Monica to Riverside and San Bernardino.<sup>187</sup> Clearly, people in 1960 thought the tremendous population growth that L.A. County had witnessed since the Second World War – from 2.8 million in 1940 to 6 million by 1960 – would continue unabated, with predictions that L.A. County’s population (6 million in 1960) would double to 12 million people by 1980 (in fact, new growth slowed by half in each decade – from almost 2 million in the 1950s, to 1 million in the 1960s, to less than 500,000 in the 1970s, so by 1980, L.A. County’s population was only 7.5 million, far less than the 12 million envisioned).<sup>188</sup>

As industrial production grew in L.A., so too, did air pollution. When Angelenos awoke on July 26, 1943 – 20 months after the attack on Pearl Harbor – a thick fog blanketed the L.A. Basin, cutting visibility to three blocks and causing residents’ eyes to sting and noses to run. People prepared for the worst, as they feared the Japanese had launched a chemical attack on the city. But the Japanese were not the culprits; as Angelenos would later find out, it was their own cars and factories that had caused the “gas attack” (in particular, city officials identified Southern California Gas’s Aliso Street Plant as the primary source). The era of smog had officially begun.

Initially, it was accepted that smoke from area factories was the source of L.A.’s “bad air”, but as early as August 1945, L.A. County Health Officer Dr. H.O. Swartout argued that smog was the result of many different sources – trucks, burning trash, and correctly implicated the region’s unique geography

(mountains, stagnant winds, and atmosphere inversion) as contributing factors.<sup>189</sup> But authority for dealing with air pollution was divided between the City of Los Angeles, L.A. County, and the many other incorporated towns in the County, so little collective action was taken.

In 1945, the California legislature attempted to amend the State's Civil Code to make it easier for public officials to prosecute companies for smoke and fume nuisances. Seeing this as a threat to industry, the Los Angeles Chamber – demonstrating the significant political influence it had not only in Los Angeles but also with State officials – mobilized business forces to defeat the amendment.<sup>190</sup> But by December 1946, on the heels of a particularly smoggy “Friday the 13<sup>th</sup>” of September and again over Thanksgiving weekend, the *L.A. Times* hired an air pollution expert from St. Louis to study L.A.'s smog problem. By this time, the *Times* had been running a series of articles on the “smog menace” and the public was becoming increasingly concerned about it. Professor Raymond Tucker of Washington

University had served as “Smoke Commissioner” of St. Louis from 1937 to 1942, and was seen as the man who helped bring about relief to St. Louis's air problems.<sup>191</sup> As a stop-gap measure, three dumps around Normandie and 120<sup>th</sup> Avenues were ordered closed because of their suspected contribution to the smog problem while Tucker conducted his work. For two weeks, Tucker toured the City, talked to civic leaders, and studied the problem, before returning to St. Louis on December 22.

Recognizing the potential of air pollution to diminish the desirability of the area – and to also slow industrial growth – by mid-December 1946, even the Chamber's position began to change, as it formed an emergency committee of its Board of Directors to study the problem.<sup>192</sup> Meanwhile, the *Times* formed its own Smog Advisory Committee, in anticipation of Tucker's report, which was due January 15, 1947. By this time, efforts were underway in Sacramento to establish a unified air pollution control district in the region. Tucker's full report was printed in

the *Times*, which cited industrial growth and population growth as the chief culprits. The Chamber of Commerce estimated industry had grown by 85% between 1939 and 1943 (with 1942 and 1943 alone accounting for 50% more growth than the previous decade combined).<sup>193</sup> Meanwhile, the population of L.A. County grew by a staggering 33% in just five years between 1940 and 1945 – an increase of nearly one million people (from roughly 2.85 million to 3.7 million).<sup>194</sup>

Tucker's report cited many sources of the air pollution – the burning of trash, dumps, diesel trucks, etc – but cars and buses were mostly absolved of blame. On April 15, 1947, the California legislature passed AB 1, establishing air pollution boards in every county in the state (which would go into effect once county supervisors voted to move forward). By the end of April, the Chamber not only formally reversed its previous opposition to amending the Civil Code to allow prosecution of polluters – a reversal that the *L.A. Times* called “a momentous step” in the anti-smog war<sup>195</sup> – but also endorsed AB 1. But,

foreshadowing its efforts in the coming decade, the Chamber warned “changes may be found to be required after we have experience in its practical applications as law.”<sup>196</sup> A year later, the Chamber asked for delay of the enforcement until further research was done to pinpoint the exact sources of smog, drawing the ire of Dr Louis McCabe, director of the L.A County Air Pollution Control District.<sup>197</sup>

Undeterred, the Chamber established the Stanford Research Institute based in L.A. and funded with industry money, to begin studying the problem. The Chamber did not believe McCabe's assertion that sulfur dioxide was a significant contributor to the problem. But the Chamber understood that the smog problem would impact support for industry, so even as they fought implementation of AB 1, it launched a Smoke and Fumes Abatement Campaign.<sup>198</sup> The Chamber's skepticism about the role of sulfur dioxide continued throughout the 1950s.

By 1958, the L.A. County Board of Supervisors had



adopted rule 62, which limited the sulfur content of fuel to 0.5% during the summer months. The Chamber opposed Rule 62 “on the grounds that we were not convinced of the harmful effects of oil burning,” more specifically disagreeing that “a major portion of these emissions, namely, sulpher (sic) dioxide, caused a significant percentage of our smog problem.”<sup>199</sup> So the Chamber pressed the County to re-visit Rule 62, since they were concerned that there be enough fuel to meet the significant growth demands of the time. The Chamber argued that because the L.A. County Supervisors sit on the Air Pollution Control Board, they passed rule 62 – without the approval of the County’s technical advisory – for political reasons (“arbitrary and unreasonable,” as one LACC director put it).<sup>200</sup> Instead, citing the Oil & Gas industry’s wishes, the Chamber wanted to make reduction of sulfur content voluntary, arguing this was more practical and would have less serious economic consequences. By March 1961, they proposed an amendment to rule 62, changing its application from a fixed calendar to

when atmospheric conditions make sense, in theory extending its application all year, but making it voluntary.<sup>201</sup> By 1961, even the Chamber was beginning to see the wisdom in controlling sources of smog, 15 years after intervening in the legislature to advocate for more permissive rules on industrial pollutants.<sup>202</sup>

#### PRIVATE PLANNING

Throughout the booming 1950s, Los Angeles grew faster than it could be planned. As a result, by 1960, the L.A. region was mired with a wide range of problems, from inadequate infrastructure in some areas (the Valley), to crushing congestion in others (downtown), to debilitating pollution across the City, to a growing disparity between poor inner-city black areas and more affluent suburban white areas. Worried that the growing list of problems might begin to curtail the region’s economic growth, the L.A. Chamber of Commerce took it upon itself to come up with a 10-year plan to chart the City’s course

through the 1960s. Work began on this effort in 1960 and by May 1961, the Chamber unveiled its 10-year plan for the Southland, what then President Harold McClellan called “the most comprehensive blueprint for the future in the 73-year history of the chamber.”<sup>203</sup>

The plan – called Destination ’70 (as it was meant to guide growth through 1970) – demonstrated both the organizational strength and the breadth of interests of the Chamber. The Chamber surveyed an impressive 5,000 firms (all Chamber members) and based on the results of this poll, the plan was organized into 10 areas that were seen as the top priorities (the top problems to address) for the L.A. region during the 1960s:

1. Jobs – ensuring there were enough jobs to meet demand
2. Mass Rapid Transit – developing a mass transit system
3. Clean Air – addressing the growing pollution problem
4. Water Supply – ensuring a secure source for future growth

5. Good Government – controlling the size of the public sector
6. Traffic – solving problems of traffic congestion
7. Education – ensuring new residents are highly educated
8. Crime – reducing crime and drug activity
9. Regional Planning – coordinating efforts among cities
10. Culture, Recreation & Beautification – preserving L.A.

Interestingly, affordable housing was not one of the top 10 concerns (since the private “community builders” were largely successful in providing mass-produced housing in the Valley). These 10 areas – many of which are influenced by land use policy – formed the basis for the Chamber’s short- and long-term goals. Unlike the L.A. City Planning Department, however, its scope was not limited to the City of Los Angeles; it was distinctly regional in perspective. This regional focus is broader than the Urban League’s citywide focus, and as we will see in section 6.3 below, far greater than that of homeowners, whose interests were typically hyper-local.

Destination '70 shaped the actions of all of the LACC's 35 committees (consisting of a remarkable 3,500 members) in the years ahead.<sup>204</sup> To give a sense of the breadth of interests of the Chamber, the following is a complete list of the Chamber's 35 committees at the time:

- |                                       |                              |                               |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Agriculture                        | 13. Domestic Trade           | 25. Maritime & Harbor Affairs |
| 2. Armed Services Civilian Advisory   | 14. Economic Survey          | 26. Natural Resources         |
| 3. Aerospace                          | 15. Education                | 27. Personnel Managers        |
| 4. Air Transportation                 | 16. Electronics              | 28. Public Relations          |
| 5. Beach and Harbor Development       | 17. Federal Affairs          | 29. Public Safety             |
| 6. Business & Industrial Consultants  | 18. Freight Traffic          | 30. Research                  |
| 7. Business Climate                   | 19. General Insurance        | 31. State & Local Government  |
| 8. Civic Development                  | 20. Health & Hospital        | 32. Traffic & Transit         |
| 9. Clean Air                          | 21. Industrial Development   | 33. Water & Power             |
| 10. Construction Industries           | 22. Industrial Security      | 34. Women's Division          |
| 11. Consulting Engineers & Architects | 23. Life Insurance           | 35. World Trade               |
| 12. Defense Industries                | 24. Manufacturing Industries |                               |

Conspicuously absent from a list that includes some seemingly secondary interests (Personnel Managers, Life Insurance, etc.) is the absence of a Planning & Land Use Committee, which was subsumed into the broader State & Local Government Committee. This absence reflected the Chamber's view that private voluntary organizations such as theirs were best placed to determine policies to manage city growth, rather than a large public bureaucracy. It also reflected their low opinion of city planning in general and L.A. City Planning Department in particular.

For example, when L.A. City Planning Director Calvin Hamilton visited the Chamber's Board of Governors in 1966 to rally support for his Goals and Community Analysis Programs (CAP) (see section 6.1 above), anticipating that the Board of Directors would chastise him, President Daniel Bryant had to warn Directors to be civil ("I hope there will be 'light and not heat'").<sup>205</sup> Of particular concern to the Chamber was the City's request of federal dollars to fund two-thirds of the cost of

these programs, which not only went against the LACC's long-standing principle of not accepting federal money, but also – since the federal money came from the urban renewal portion of the Urban Affairs Department's funds – they feared it would lead to government-led urban renewal.

Hamilton, sensitive to the Chamber's views on limited government, argued that the "clearance" approach to urban renewal was not the only strategy; conservation – to prevent an area from becoming blighted – was also a valid approach. Hamilton also promoted a planning process that would be bottom-up, foreshadowing his proposed community planning process a few years later. Reflecting on his time as Pittsburgh's Planning Director, Hamilton argued they created block clubs, so that local organizations could help themselves. As Hamilton said, "I have become convinced that we will never solve the problems by the allocation of public funds. We have to do it by allowing citizens to help themselves and use our resources most effectively to do it," articulating what would ultimately become

policy for the creation of local Community Plans beginning in the 1970s.<sup>206</sup>

The Chamber was unconvinced by Hamilton's arguments and felt the CAP was just a replay of 1962's Community Renewal Program (CRP) (see section 6.1 above). The Chamber had taken a strong stance against the CRP, repeating a long-standing position against federal subsidies: "the citizens of other cities should not be asked to pay taxes to help Los Angeles gather its own facts about its own problems."<sup>207</sup> As a result, the LACC recommended to City Council that they oppose the CRP and the Council followed suit, voting 15-0 against it. The LACC said they "would like to think our Chamber's report to the City Council had some effect."<sup>208</sup> On the CRP, the Chamber and community activists had common cause – the Chamber because of its advocacy of small government and activists because of the devastating displacement caused by earlier rounds of urban renewal. So when Hamilton came back with the CAP proposal, the LACC recommended Council vote it down, arguing that L.A.

had a lower percentage of sub-standard buildings that any other major city in the world. But the Chamber was not unanimous in its opposition, with 10 directors voting for and 15 voting against.<sup>209</sup> Fearing that "we have the reputation not only with the City Council but with the [County] Board of Supervisors as being pure obstructionists," they wanted to make other more positive suggestions to Council.<sup>210</sup> But this time, Council voted 14-1 in favor of CAP, a rare defeat for the LACC, given its allies on Council.

## **B. SLOW-GROWTH, COMMUNITY PLANNING ERA (1965-92)**

### TRANSIT REDUX

By August 1964, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (LAMTA) was nearly bankrupt – since its operations were financed entirely from fares – so the state legislature replaced it with the Southern California Rapid Transit District

(RTD) which had more fiscal tools at its disposal, in order to put the system on more stable financial footing. Still determined to create a regional mass transit system – it being the #2 goal of their Destination '70 plan (second only to jobs) – in 1967, the LAACC<sup>211</sup> formed the Citizens Advisory Council on Public Transportation, backed by businesses such as Automobile Club of Southern California, Western Oil and Gas Association, and the Trucking Association. As odd as it was for a group of businessmen that clearly had more to gain from freeways than mass transit, their interest in the subject related as much to its funding as anything. In particular, they objected to the appropriation of \$3.6 million of state funds from the California tidelands oil and dry gas revenues to finance RTD operations, so they set about to devise a plan to finance the RTD more sustainably, and not exclusively on the backs of the oil and gas industry.

The Citizens Advisory Report, *Improving Public Transportation in Los Angeles*, was even more futuristic than

earlier monorail proposals, suggesting such solutions as air-cushion vehicles (a hovercraft-like propulsion system) and trains that would be propelled through tubes by massive fans or gravity vacuums.<sup>212</sup> These forays into science fiction did little to advance the cause, but the Chamber's discussion of how to finance the system proved more helpful. In 1968, the Chamber – by this time with 14,000 area firms as members – put forward recommendations to help speed up construction of the proposed four-corridor, 62-mile, \$1.5 billion RTD. By this point, the RTD was relying entirely on property taxes to fund its construction.<sup>213</sup> Naturally, since they were more likely to drive cars and would be asked to bear the entire cost burden of the project, homeowners were skeptical about the RTD. The Chamber's plan, instead, spread the burden more broadly to have motorists, homeowners, LAX, the City and State share its cost.<sup>214</sup> First, they called for a reduction from 60% to 50% of the threshold required by voters to approve RTD bonds, which would make their passage more likely. Moreover, they recommended a

portion of the gas tax or motor vehicle tax be allocated towards transit (meaning drivers would also pay, since they would benefit from less congestion). They also proposed a transit tax on all L.A. residents since they would derive the most benefits from the system. They also called on the State to recognize the importance of transit to L.A. and help fund its development. That the Chamber would call upon using such a wide range of public tax measures – which had traditionally been anathema to the LAACC – indicates how important they felt a viable transit system was to the region’s economic health.

The Chamber’s leadership in pushing for rapid transit did not go unnoticed, as the *L.A. Times* noted in 1968 “the Los Angeles business community is establishing itself as a major catalyst for development of a rapid transit system here.”<sup>215</sup> At issue was the Chamber’s concern that the over-reliance on cars would choke off economic growth in the area: “we are convinced that the present and planned system of freeways alone cannot serve our total needs...that a major supplementary

and complementary of mass public transportation must be built as soon as possible.”<sup>216</sup> By August 1968, the RTD settled on a five-corridor, 89-mile, \$2.5 billion plan. But homeowners came out against financing the system through property taxes: “public response to the preliminary report also indicates strong public demand that means other than the property tax be found to finance construction of the rapid transit system.”<sup>217</sup> The RTD opted for Proposition A, a half-cent sales tax, to go on the November 1968 ballot. Despite a wide range of proponents across the political spectrum – including Governor Reagan, the L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce, the California League of Women Voters, the AFL-CIO Central Labor Council, the L.A. County Board of Supervisors, and Mayor Yorty – the measure was soundly defeated, with just 44.73% of voters supporting it (60% was needed).<sup>218</sup> Disagreement about how to fund mass transit, along with conflicting ideas about where it should go and what form it should take, paralyzed the debate for more than a decade, as various plans were proposed and rejected. In

1976, the state created the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC), which gave the agency authority over both transit and highways in the County.

In 1980, with traffic congestion reaching critical levels, L.A. County voters finally approved a sustainable funding mechanism for transit – a 0.5% sales tax (Proposition A). This set in motion competition in different areas of the County for which line would be funded first. By 1983, consideration of a light rail line across the Valley split business and homeowner groups. Homeowners rallied against the plan, exhibiting what chair of the Los Angeles Transportation Committee’s Light Rail sub-committee Jacki Bacharach called a classic case of “not-in-my-back-yard syndrome.”<sup>219</sup> The route was supposed to run along the Southern Pacific’s line that ran east-west across the Valley. Homeowners near the line feared a loss of peace and privacy and a drop in the home values (with some suggesting just the proposal to build it had already lowered house prices). As one homeowner said, “commuters are going to drive over here

and park in front of my house.”<sup>220</sup> Homeowners near Chandler Boulevard – a heavily orthodox Jewish area at the eastern end of the route between Van Nuys and North Hollywood – were particularly opposed, forming the Eastern Sector Transition Coalition, citing safety concerns because worshippers were required to walk on the Sabbath.<sup>221</sup> Councilors Joel Wachs and Zev Yaroslavsky (who were both Jewish) sided with the Eastern Coalition in opposing the Chandler alignment, even though the only other alternatives – along Victory and Burbank Boulevards – would be more costly and less practical, since it would require either elevating the route or widening the right-of-way (meaning a loss of businesses).<sup>222</sup> Despite the Transportation Committee’s recommendation to use the east-west route (including Chandler), homeowner pressure caused them to examine alternatives.

Meanwhile, the Encino Residents Inc. homeowners association was equally opposed to light rail through their community (in the center of the route), citing fears that light



rail would mean more intensive development and growth, as well as more users of Balboa Park, through which the route would pass. And homeowners near the western end of the route said a loop through Warner Center (this area is discussed in detail in section 7.2) would aggravate already bad traffic congestion.<sup>223</sup> Many homeowners and politicians would have preferred to see the line run along the Southern Pacific Coast Main Line, which ran diagonally across the Valley from North Hollywood to Chatsworth, but this was problematic because its eastern alignment was not near the proposed North Hollywood Metro Station, and it also would not serve Warner Center on the western end, which was by then a major employment center. To homeowners, the Main Line had the advantage of not being near homes, since most of the areas along the Main Line were industrial (but of course, this meant that it was less useful to residents – ridership projections showed the Main Line would serve fewer passengers).

By this time, Gerald Silver of the Encino Residents

had organized 12 homeowner groups into the All Valley Transportation Coalition to halt all work on the light rail project. While hyper-local concerns about noise, vibration and “visual blight” were cited, opposition to light rail was also part of the broader slow-growth homeowner movement. Silver, who moved to the Valley in 1956, argued that builders would use the existence of mass transit to argue for larger development, which he said “threatens to engulf us all” and make congestion “at least 95% worse”.<sup>224</sup> Silver was candid about this approach, arguing that public officials respond best to constituents who are “strident and persistent,” arguing that “it’s their job to do what we want.”<sup>225</sup> And by the mid-1980s, politicians did respond to the concerns of homeowners above all others. As Councilwoman Joy Picus stated, “it has become plain that people don’t want light rail.”<sup>226</sup>

Business groups, including the Valley Industry and Commerce Association (VICA), were strong supporters of light rail and favored the Chandler alignment because it was the

least costly and most practical. By 1987, the battle raged on, with over 700 residents turning up to one hearing to fight the project.<sup>227</sup> A few business people braved a chorus of boos in urging the immediate construction of the line through North Hollywood to relieve traffic congestion. Frustrated by the fear tactics homeowner groups were using to build up opposition to the project, by August 1987, business groups, including the LACC, the Woodland Hills Chamber of Commerce and Warner Center Association began their own campaign to combat “loud, strident voices [that] have screamed misinformation into homeowners’ ears.”<sup>228</sup> By this time, homeowners had convinced local Assemblyman Alan Robbins (D-Van Nuys) to introduce legislation that would ban the light rail for a decade and postpone construction of the two proposed Valley Metro stops (in Universal City and North Hollywood) by two years.<sup>229</sup> Another business group organized in North Hollywood, called Fair Alignment is Right (FAIR) to counteract the Eastern Transit Coalition. Opposition also came from VICA and the United

Chambers of Commerce – “virtually every major Valley business group”; collectively, business efforts were successful in stalling the light rail ban.<sup>230</sup>

But, illustrative of how much the politics of development had shifted from business to homeowner groups by the 1980s, this delay proved temporary as the light rail ban was passed 41-30 in early September 1987, with votes falling along party lines – with Democrats siding with homeowners and Republicans siding with business groups.<sup>231</sup> Homeowners’ parochial fears of growth, noise, vibration and “visual blight” had derailed transit once again.

#### FIGHTING THE ENVIRONMENTALISTS

Even in the 1950s, business groups were at odds with homeowner groups over land use matters. John Kirkham, chair of the ACCSFV’s Zoning and Planning Committee felt that homeowners had a disproportionate voice in the 1955 San

Fernando Valley Master Plan, saying that they felt, especially in areas like Chatsworth and Northridge, that “a small group known as the Protective Property Owners Association has been able to wield influence out of proportion to their importance in effecting changes in zoning plans.”<sup>232</sup> These homeowners and farmers wanted to preserve the remaining open space in the Valley. To counteract the influence of these groups, in areas of particular importance to business interests, the ACCSFV sent letters to Planning Director John Roberts requesting that more “urban” zoning be designated with ¼ mile of industrial zones. Even here, the Associated Chamber was not specific about what it meant by “urban”, only that it not be “suburban”, illustrating how business groups typically did not focus on the minutiae of zoning details.

Even the L.A. Chamber of Commerce, which took a more regional perspective relative to the ACCSFV or community-level Chambers of Commerce, used its influence in Sacramento to fight the emerging conservation movement. For example, a

significant issue for both sides emerged in 1962 with Proposition 4, the Assessment of Agricultural Land ballot initiative that instructed tax assessors to assess agricultural land only on the basis of its agricultural value (rather than its highest and best use, as was the case at the time). Homeowners felt this would encourage the preservation of open space if taxed at a lower level. The LACC opposed it and California voters supported their position that it amounted to giving tax favoritism to one sector at the expense of others.

By 1966, the issue resurfaced as Proposition 3, the Open Space Conservation ballot initiative, which would give the legislature power to set aside land for recreation, scenic beauty, or use of natural resources. Homeowners, particularly in the hillside areas of the Santa Monica Mountains supported it, as a means of controlling population growth and once again preserving open space. But again the Chamber opposed. They argued that setting aside large amounts of land would increase property taxes elsewhere, since so much property (those lands

designated by the legislature) would be taken off the tax rolls.<sup>233</sup> As Jim Doherty, an LACC Director who was also L.A.'s Assistant City Attorney, argued, it would be a gift to speculators, since they could simply hold land as agriculture virtually cost-free (enjoying a reduced tax rate) then withdraw the agricultural uses later and reap the benefits. He also argued it would lead to "leap-frog" subdivisions – pushing development further afield. Doherty instead argued "what is needed is stronger planning laws... amendments to the subdivision map act which will give local planners authority to have orderly development."<sup>234</sup>

The Chamber was not against open space preservation *per se*, but did not think the State Legislature should determine what should or should not be taken off the market. They also felt there were laws that could accomplish the same thing, pointing to the 1965 California Land Conservation Act (Williamson Act), which promoted voluntary farmland conservation, by allowing property owners to voluntarily agree to restrict the use of their land to agriculture or open space in exchange for a reduced

tax rate.<sup>235</sup> They also felt that preservation of open space could just as easily be accomplished through zoning; in fact, they argued for a more regional approach: "I don't think any of us feel we can go on blindly and expect to use all of our land up in any direction we want to. We do have to have some planning and over-all guidance."<sup>236</sup> But Californians this time endorsed the explicit preservation of open space, and Prop 3 passed. While the Chamber's interests remained centered on how such legislation impacted the area's growth, they were largely proven correct that setting aside open space in the backyards of the rich hillsiders would lead to leapfrog development, as urban growth jumped over the preserves into Thousand Oaks and Santa Clarita.

#### CLEAN AIR REDUX

Open space was not the only front to their battle with homeowners and environmentalists over growth – clean air

was also a point of contention. While the Chamber generally supported pollution controls, it was opposed to the federal Clean Air Act in 1970.<sup>237</sup> The Chamber argued that the final Act was adopted without public hearings and that it required 90% reductions across the board suggested a “less than scientific” approach.<sup>238</sup> By 1973, EPA Chief William Ruckelshaus suggested that it would be necessary to institute gas rationing by up to 82% from May to October in order to meet the required reductions in emissions under the Clean Air Act in the South Coast Air Basin (the five-county L.A. region, plus Santa Barbara County) – a suggestion that the Chamber called “irresponsible” and “ridiculous”.<sup>239</sup> Some observers suggested Ruckelshaus’s comments were meant to encourage public support for mass transit and environmentally friendly land use planning, which did not happen.<sup>240</sup> To avoid rationing – which the Chamber felt would be catastrophic for the region – the LAACC requested that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) postpone 1975 clean air standards to around 1980. But the EPA rejected the

Chamber’s demands.<sup>241</sup> The Chamber had also argued against the mandatory conversion of fleets to natural gas, arguing it was in short supply.

In the 1980s, the LAACC once again called for a delay in adopting clean air standards in the South Basin area, this time with the support of L.A. County officials; both argued that implementation would lead to an economic downturn and job losses.<sup>242</sup> The Chamber wanted a delay so it could review alternative proposals by Southern California Edison and the Western Oil & Gas Association, which environmentalists worried would be used to weaken the plan (what environmentalists called weakening, the Chamber called injecting a dose of reality). By this time, the clean air plan – which provided a 20-year strategy for bringing L.A.’s air quality into compliance with the federal Clean Air Act by controlling factory and auto emissions, aerosol sprays, etc. – had already been delayed twice, since it was to be adopted in 1987. But after five years of debate, the South Basin Air Quality Management District (AQMD) finally approved

## FREEWAYS REDUX

the plan in March 1989. The next step was supposed to be approval by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) before being forwarded to the EPA for its approval. But, in June 1989, CARB delayed approval in part due to pressure from Republican Governor George Deukmejian, who worried the plan would hurt the economy. More generally, CARB officials worried that the animosity between AQMD and the business community would derail its implementation.<sup>243</sup> AQMD felt that the Chambers and its allies would use the delay to further weaken the plan. There was wide disagreement of the costs associated with implementing the plan – AQMD pegged the cost at \$2.6 billion per year, while business estimated it at closer to \$12 billion per year.<sup>244</sup> Although the Chamber said it backed the March 1989 plan in principle, it still pressed for flexibility in implementing it.

By the 1960s, the construction of freeways was met with stiff resident opposition, due to both the rise of the environmental movement and the backlash against the destruction of countless inner-city neighborhoods to accommodate the Interstate system. The location of freeways were also controversial in Los Angeles, none more so than the proposed Whitnall Freeway (named after City Planning Director Gordon Whitnall), which was to run through the heart of the San Fernando Valley (near Parthenia Street), before turning south and running across the Santa Monica Mountains to Malibu.<sup>245</sup> While different routes were considered, a route was selected in 1966, over the vehement opposition of homeowners. In 1970, citing environmental and economic concerns, Malibu residents were able to delete the 7.5-mile section over the Mountains from the plan. By 1975, plans were finally abandoned and land accumulated over the years for the project was put up for sale.

The State Division of Highways also proposed to extend Reseda Boulevard as a highway across the Santa Monica Mountains. But during the drafting of the Encino-Tarzana Community Plan in 1974, the City Planning Commission – under pressure from homeowners – removed it from consideration, arguing that it would be detrimental to the community. This prompted the ACCSFV, along with the Northeast Valley Associated Chambers and the local Encino Chamber, to begin a petition drive to have it restored.<sup>246</sup> Chamber groups argued that removing the road would give a “private park playground” for hillside homeowners while denying more than a million Valley residents access to the 7,500 state park in the mountains.<sup>247</sup> The Chambers had the support of District 3 (Woodland Hills) Councilor Don Lorenzen, City Planning Director Calvin Hamilton, and city engineers. But by this time, homeowners drove the planning process through Citizens Advisory Committees for each area. By the mid-1970s, these homeowner groups had largely been successful in ousting pro-growth City Councilors,

in favor of those more responsive to homeowner concerns. So plans for a Reseda-to-the-Sea highway never materialized.

When the long-debated Century Freeway (route 105, running from LAX to Norwalk) came before the California Highway Commission in 1977, the L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce testified urging the Commission to give the project high priority. But resident groups and the Sierra Club argued against the proposal, saying it was both too costly and environmentally unsound.<sup>248</sup> Unlike the affluent homeowners who fought freeways through the Santa Monica Mountains, opposition to the Century Freeway came from the predominantly African-American communities that were being torn apart from the land expropriation process that had already begun. The Chamber identified this route as one of 11 missing links in the area’s highway network and felt its connection to the airport made it a priority. The Sierra Club sued the Century Freeway project, arguing its Environmental Impact Report was insufficient. Unlike the affluent homeowners, the poor minority

residents near the Century Freeway could only delay, not block, the freeway – while plagued by problems throughout the 1980s, the Century Freeway opened in 1993. The battle over freeways was a case over which affluent white homeowners and minority groups were united against business groups. But the results reflected the disparity in power between white and black residents. All the proposed freeways through affluent area (Whitnall, Reseda, Laurel Canyon, Beverly Hills) were blocked. But black communities were torn apart with the construction of the Century, Santa Monica, and Harbor Freeways.

#### COMMUNITY PLANS

The Chamber was a strong supporter of Concept L.A., not because they had great admiration for Hamilton and the Planning Department, but because they felt the city would be “rudderless” without an overall plan. As Chamber affiliate Albert Martin Jr (of AC Martin Architects & Engineers) remarked: “it

seems unbelievable but it’s true that the City Council has been approving community plans without a citywide plan.”<sup>249</sup> They also believed that L.A. needed to stop growing outward and become denser. As Chamber Vice-President Preston Hotchkis said, “We are spread out as much in this city as we can be. We now have to reorganize a little bit. We don’t see spreading the city out any more but organizing and rejuvenating the areas we have.”<sup>250</sup> But the Centers Concept sparked intense debate on Council. Councilors who were aligned with homeowners, such as Pat Russell, were concerned that the Concept assumed continued population growth, which she (and homeowners) did not like. Others with a more business orientation, like Louis Nowell, thought it might impact free enterprise – that the general plan could be changed as they went along. Ultimately, Council adopted the Centers Concept in 1974, but this proved more symbolic than anything, since by this time, the planning of Los Angeles was being done at the local level with the help of homeowner groups. With the exception of Warner Center (see



section 7.2), the Centers Concept never materialized in Los Angeles.

The Chamber was also an advocate for high-density buildings with smaller units located near the center of Los Angeles. The LAACC undertook a study of housing conditions beginning in 1973, which resulted in a 1975 report that indicated that some 270,000 people were living in overcrowded conditions or paying too much of their income on rent.<sup>251</sup> More than 60% of those were single, mostly elderly. But in general, the LAACC was not directly involved in the individual battles over community plans. They did, however, generally support the efforts of local Chambers of Commerce who opposed the zoning rollbacks advocated by homeowner groups. For example, when drastic rollback and height limits were proposed in the 1971 Westwood Community Plan, the Westwood Chamber of Commerce launched a challenge. Under the proposed change, the floor-area-ratio for commercial buildings would be reduced from 10-to-1 down to 3-to-1. For

Planning Director Calvin Hamilton and area homeowners, the issue was as much (if not more) about traffic congestion as it was shadows on neighboring property.<sup>252</sup> But by the 1970s, the political dynamic on City Council had shifted, and the weight that Chamber groups once carried had been supplanted by the “strident and persistent” voice of homeowners.

### 6.3 THE HILLSIDE FEDERATION

As the results began rolling in on June 6, 1978, it was clear a dramatic shift had taken place in California. Proposition 13 – the ballot initiative that rolled back and capped property taxes and instituted super-majorities for any future tax increases – had been approved by voters in a landslide by a 2-to-1 margin.<sup>253</sup> The sojourners that had fueled the great expansion of the Golden State after the Second World War on the promise of upward mobility, individual freedom, and the stability of the nuclear family had formed a new collective consciousness that would forever change the future of California.<sup>254</sup> This taxpayer revolt was part of several movements that grew out of the new center of American life – the suburbs. While the particulars of this story are unique to California, the homeowner revolution re-shaping the physical and social form of cities and foreshadowed the broader Reagan revolution of the 1980s.

Especially during the 1960s, these homeowners

formed associations to speak with a unified voice for their neighborhoods. In many cases, these associations joined federations – umbrella groups composed of many neighborhood associations – to amplify their voice. In Los Angeles, one such federation – the Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations (henceforth Hillside Federation) – a coalition of as many as 50 homeowners groups<sup>255</sup>, was particularly influential in shaping land use policy. While the Federation has been criticized as an elitist NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) group, this does not entirely do justice to the historical record. From its environmental origins in the 1950s, its motives shifted towards protecting their single family way-of-life as L.A. began to experience rapid social change and civil unrest in the 1960s, and by the 1970s, it became concerned with larger economic questions about economic growth and property taxes. That said, the Federation's efforts, along with the vast majority of homeowner associations, have resulted in land use policies that advantage the rich and disadvantage the poor.

While it is tempting to see the down-zoning of L.A. as a clear transition from a pro-growth business politics (a so-called “growth machine” that prioritized the “exchange value” of land over its “use value”<sup>256</sup>) to slow-growth homeowner politics by the 1970s and 80s, the story is more complex.<sup>257</sup> Instead, L.A.’s down-zoning was the result of the intersection of the environmental movement with effects of the civil rights movement and a shift towards suburban neo-conservatism during a period of great social change. By the time Prop 13 passed in 1978, all three forces – ecological conservation, social exclusion, and constraining economic expansion – were running in parallel. While the Hillside Federation was a significant contributor to down-zoning of L.A., the reasons for this down-zoning are surprisingly as much about ecology and anti-capitalism as they are about social exclusion.

Homeowners were (and are) understandably concerned about how urban change impacted their property values. Typically, this was rooted in the perception that a given use

(e.g. a toxic use or merely one that generates different “kinds” of users, such as apartments) would lower their property values or change the “character” of their neighborhood. While homeowners, especially in suburban areas, are often said to actively exclude those people and practices that differ from them<sup>258</sup>, these issues are better explained as a politics of space than a politics of race or class.<sup>259</sup> This politics of space stems from homeowners’ normative vision of their communities, both the physical space itself (what Henri Lefebvre called material space) and more abstract ideas about what those spaces mean or imply (conceived space).<sup>260</sup> So for homeowners, defense of the suburban ideal is both a spatial and social goal, but “homeowners do not see their project as designed to maintain a certain class, race, or gender regime in the city. Rather, they see it as a struggle over space.”<sup>261</sup> So the appropriate use of land is largely seen through the lens of what ensures the net utility of individual landowners to enjoy their property in quiet comfort. In effect, homeowners see the public interest as their

own collective interests, without necessarily seeing how those interests may deny the rights and opportunities of other non-homeowners – for example, access to new suburban jobs, better public schools and safer neighborhoods. The privileging of suburban homeowners interests is especially problematic in L.A., where only one-third of households are single-family owner-occupied homes.<sup>262</sup>

The caricature of the Hillside Federation as a white, wealthy NIMBY group only interested in preserving its suburban bourgeois utopia<sup>263</sup> certainly has an element of truth, but also does injustice to the complex motives within the organization and the broader homeowner movement. These homeowners' groups were criticized from both the right and left, suggesting they cannot be easily reduced to tidy stereotypes.<sup>264</sup> To conservative commentators like George Will, the attempt by Southland homeowners' associations to expand the reach of government by broadening land use regulations in order to protect what they viewed as a cherished resource (e.g. the

Santa Monica Mountains, in the case of the Hillside Federation) suggested a form of "Sun Belt Bolshevism".<sup>265</sup>

Critics on the left were even more visceral in their critique. To Marxists like Mike Davis, the Hillside Federation could not be further from Bolshevism; rather, it represented an overt attempt by the privileged to wall themselves off from poor minorities and city more generally ("at the very moment when the Anglo middle classes have demographically declined to a minority within the city, their organized social power waves at a maximum, even if dispersed into nimby-type protests."<sup>266</sup>). William Fulton described the Federation as "classic NIMBY, people to whom 'Not In My Back Yard' was not just a phrase, but a mantra."<sup>267</sup> Even outside observers at the time questioned whether the Federation's environmental goals were merely a front for excluding the poor; as one editorial in 1971 noted: "Influential hillside homeowners – who have one of City Halls' most powerful lobbies – didn't approve of the master plan because they naturally wanted to keep the mountains

for themselves... Hillsiders then would be able to keep the less affluent out of their neighborhoods in the name of the Environment.”<sup>268</sup>

These critics speak to different dimensions of the rise of the homeowner-consciousness, but don't tell the whole story. Hillsiders were motivated by many conflicting goals – environmental, economic and social. A detailed excavation of these different motives over time reveals a much more complex political and social agenda that was paradoxically anti-capitalist, ecologically sensitive, and socially exclusionary.

#### **A. PRO-GROWTH, POST-WAR PERIOD (1943-1965)**

##### ENVIRONMENTAL ORIGINS

As the growth of the city flourished during and after the Second World War, by the 1950s, housing subdivisions were beginning to push upward into the Hills that divided the Valley

from the rest of Los Angeles. In a City largely devoid of the famed landmarks of its Northeastern counterparts, the one truly iconic image of Los Angeles is the Hollywood sign set against the backdrop of the Hollywood Hills (which are part of Santa Mountain Mountains). These Hills mark an important physical and psychological barrier within L.A.; not only do they run (and represent a spectrum of wealth) from west-to-east in the geographic center of the City, they divide the affluent Westside (Pacific Palisades, Brentwood, Bel Air, Beverly Hills, West Hollywood) from the middle-class San Fernando Valley. When British architectural critic Reyner Banham visited L.A., he saw L.A. as four distinct “ecologies”: Surfurbia (the bohemian beach communities), the Plains of Id (the poorer flats between the surrounding mountains), and the Foothills (the affluent hillside areas) – connected, of course, by Autopia (the freeways).<sup>269</sup> It is within the Foothills of the Santa Monica Mountains that the rise of landowner consciousness took root.

There is little doubt that the topographic and

demographic contours of L.A. are a near perfect match, with the affluent in the Hills perched high above the masses in the Flats. The Hills have a peculiar character – highly privileged in the scarcity of buildable land owing to their steep and undulating terrain, but the properties range from narrow 25-foot bohemian townhouses in the canyons (a result of developers squeezing every penny of value out of them) to the grotesque compounds where the dramas of the fat lives of the rich and famous play out atop their peaks. And yet they each back onto untamed wilderness set within the middle of the second largest city in the country. At one extreme, houses sacrifice privacy for utility, literally looming over the street as they are sited on the front property line to minimize their footprint in the steeply rising hillside; at the other are exceedingly private behemoths complete with tennis courts, pools, and multi-car garages shielded from public view by towering and impeccably trimmed boxwood hedges. To say that man and nature live in delicate balance is an understatement. Houses sit on stilts tip-toe-ing

between the highly flammable native chaparral and anchored through a thin layer of dirt to notoriously ill-tempered tectonic plates in a climate that hoards its rains for months until finally releasing a torrent of fury.

This delicate balance was made readily apparent on January 15, 1952, when the skies opened their bounty upon the Hills, out of which launched a new coalition of homeowners determined to “save the hills”. Among those whose property was submerged in mud was Richard Lillard, whose modest canyon home was within the means of a junior English professor at UCLA.<sup>270</sup> As an avid naturalist, Lillard was well aware of the balance between man and nature in the Hills, but “scanning the hills, Richard early on surmised that only those streets and houses over-hung by new construction, like his own, had suffered landslides.”<sup>271</sup> As a result, Lillard organized his friends and neighbors into the Residents of Beverly Glen, a group to speak on behalf of the local community, and he became its first president. Over the ensuing weeks, Lillard’s group joined

with other groups to form the Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations.<sup>272</sup>

Given that suburban areas like the Federation's territory are today seen as car- and fossil-fuel dependent – the very antithesis of environmentalism – it is perhaps surprising to recognize that the environmental movement originated and was fertilized by homeowners in newly-found suburbs. As “hybrid landscapes”, suburbanites feared losing the qualities and natural environment that had attracted them in the first place, helping to spark the beginnings of American environmentalism.<sup>273</sup> While perhaps counterintuitive, it is important to remember that Rachel Carson's famed *Silent Spring* (1962) – widely seen as providing fuel for a new environmental ethic – grew out of a 1957 lawsuit in the New York suburbs (Long Island) over the use of DDT.<sup>274</sup> Starting from the very local concerns of water safety and air pollution, the environmental consciousness grew in the kitchens of suburbia, often with the aid of women's groups. By 1970, Americans ranked pollution as the country's #1 problem

– more than Vietnam or Civil Rights.<sup>275</sup>

This was as true in the bucolic Hills above Los Angeles as it was the flats of Long Island. The central role that Lillard played in forming the Hillside Federation is important, given his own writings in *Eden in Jeopardy* (1966), a direct commentary on the rapid transformation of the Southland. Lillard's jeremiad was a warning of rampant growth, overpopulation and exploitation of natural resources in California. Lillard warned of the consequences of what was happening in the early 1960s, as California converted 375 acres of rural land into urban uses each day.<sup>276</sup> To Lillard, the path of “progress” was not inevitable, contrary to the High Modernist ethos of the time. In particular, Lillard lamented that in its pursuit of more and better, society had lost the respect of the intrinsic value of nature (“the past of nature, though lovely, [is] unprofitable ‘raw’ land and rivers that ‘waste’ their waters into the sea.”<sup>277</sup>)

There is a strong anti-capitalist sentiment in his writing. Contrasting the greedy developer are the benign and selfless

## CONSERVATION MOVEMENT

conservationists, utopists, and idealists who “believe in saving good agricultural land for agriculture and good beaches for those who love beaches. They have some absolute non-monetary values, they accept the limitations of man, they believe in living amid nature, and they say that one place for progress is in ‘protection of vital and aesthetic resources that cannot be restored once they are destroyed.’<sup>278</sup> Lillard’s concern about runaway growth, especially in ecologically sensitive areas, took on more grave importance when, on November 6, 1961, Lillard’s home was among over 400 lost in the great Bel Air fire, which influenced his decision to write *Eden in Jeopardy*.<sup>279</sup> Lillard blamed inadequate clearance between native brushes and homes, failures of the water supply, and the difficulty firefighters faced in reaching the fire due to narrow streets and steep topography.<sup>280</sup> For Lillard and others like him, the development of the Hills was a threat to nature itself.

The Federation’s early environmental mission was reflected in its priorities and activities, which revolved around conserving the Hills. As 1958 Federation President James Hartzell reminded its members: “perhaps the most important single responsibility placed upon the Federation by its member associations is the watchful preservation and protection of our area from the man-inflicted damage of indiscriminate, ignorant or wanton bull-doing and grading operations.”<sup>281</sup> The desire to enact grading controls was not because they feared apartments would infiltrate the Hills; in the 1950s, the extensive re-grading operations were to create more level pads for single-family homes for the rich, not apartments for the poor. Rather, Hillsiders were concerned that entire peaks were being cut off to create developable land and undermining the stability of the hillside further down. The Federation’s first victory was a grading ordinance that would introduce for the



first time control and supervision of all grading activities. While this slowed the bulldozers to some degree, hillside grading continued. But when heavy rains hit in winter of 1961-62, 1,700 homes were damaged at a cost of over \$5.4 million, prompting Hillside residents and the City to make the grading ordinance more stringent.<sup>282</sup> Thereafter, slope angles would be regulated, soils and geological reports would be required, and all grading work had to be certified by a licensed engineer.

By the late 1950s, the Federation also began to see planning as part of the problem. In October 1959, Roger Pettitt, Chair of the Federation's new Zoning and Grading Committee proposed to Council a moratorium of all re-zoning until an area Master Plan was done. Lemoine Blanchard, the area's local Councilor supported the measure and asked Federation members to make a strong showing at hearings to convince his fellow Councilors.<sup>283</sup> Subdivision ordinances, too, became a tool for the Federation to regulate the amount of grading and land-filling in the Hills. This led to a Federation campaign to revise

subdivision ordinances to change R-1 zoning (minimum lot size of 5,000 sf) to a new single-family zone, the Residential Estate Zone (RE-1), which would greatly increase the minimum lot size (15,000 sf).<sup>284</sup> Anticipating pushback from developers, in an urgent Bulletin to its members in March 1960, the Federation called on its members to write and/or be in person at the March 22 hearing.<sup>285</sup> While the use of large minimum lot sizes would become an important strategy later to "preserve the character of community" (widely known to be code for keeping out poor people), at this time, Federation members saw it as a land preservation tool. In fact, the Federation still envisioned future development in the Hills: "Our objective is to insist upon and strive for sensible and orderly development of the hills."<sup>286</sup>

The Hillside Federation's environmental concerns went beyond grading, brush clearance and conservation of the Santa Monica Mountains. They were also active in blocking the expansion of Mulholland Drive into a six-lane freeway (given the precariousness of this famously narrow, winding street atop

the Hollywood Hills, that traffic engineers envisioned it as a freeway suggests the cartoonish nature of 1950s planning).<sup>287</sup> They were against proposals to widen the existing San Diego freeway through the Sepulveda pass and a new freeway in Nichols Canyon.<sup>288</sup>

Federation members also attended meetings of the State Highway Commission to fight the conversion of Santa Monica Boulevard (which was not within their territory) into the Beverly Hills freeway and gathered 13,000 signatures on a petition against the proposed Laurel Canyon freeway.<sup>289</sup> By 1970, they passed a motion opposing all freeways through the Santa Monica Mountains between the Hollywood freeway and the San Diego freeway.<sup>290</sup> In this way, they were not unlike grassroots efforts across the country that rose up against traffic engineers' grand plans in the 1950s and 60s. And perhaps surprisingly, Hillsiders also actively campaigned for public transit options through the Hills, favoring minibuses, as a way to cut down on traffic.<sup>291</sup> Likewise, the Federation was active in

fighting smog, illustrating their environmental concerns were not limited to their own backyards.<sup>292</sup>

#### ENCROACHMENT OF MULTI-FAMILY

As early as the late 1950s, the Hillside Federation had raised questions about multiple dwellings and high-rises in their area, but these were in response to isolated one-off projects, and tended to reflect practical concern that large projects would threaten the ecology of the Hills and over-burden their narrow streets and already tenuous water supply. By the 1960s, however, fighting multi-family housing soon became the dominant activity of the Federation. In late 1965, just a couple months after Watts, one board member (Mrs. Jacobs) suggested, "the Federation try for an ordinance against any (use) other than single family construction in the hills."<sup>293</sup> This new focus on keeping multi-family out of the Hills became an all-out war after Calvin Hamilton was appointed the City's New

Planning Chief in 1964 and advocated for “Residential Planned Developments” (RPDs).

RPDs, what are now commonly called Planned Unit Developments (PUDs) were an innovative form of development that clustered units into a more compact footprint in order to preserve more open space, as long as the overall density remained the same.<sup>294</sup> Hamilton favored a new paradigm that would rely less on the static (and often outdated) zoning ordinances, but rather more direct negotiation with developers, but at the same time he advocated greater involvement from residents in the planning of their communities.<sup>295</sup> In this sense, Hamilton was consistent with the emerging direction of planning practice that had learned from the mistakes of “top-down” planning that resulted in entire communities being lost to urban renewal, federal highway and public housing projects throughout the 1950s. While Hamilton saw a greater role for the citizenry, he did not quite reach the level of “advocacy planning” that would become the norm in the 1970s; Hamilton

saw his role as more of a mediator between local and city-wide concerns. Combined with his less doctrinaire approach to zoning, homeowners perceived Hamilton to be largely ineffectual.<sup>296</sup>

Since RPDs involved negotiating with the City as to the site design, they were treated as conditional uses, which homeowners did not like. From the beginning homeowners worried that RPDs were an attempt by the building industry to circumvent the zoning regulations by creating houses on smaller lots than allowed. In particular, they argued that much of the open space that was being set aside by these developments was unbuildable anyway (due to the steepness of the terrain), and therefore allowing developers to cluster the units on smaller lots amounted to a giveaway. The critical issue was not so much the actual density but rather the perceived density (since the units would be more compact on the site). The clustering concept was already contentious, but its use in combination with multi-family units in the Hills sparked vicious debate.

The more compact footprint of the developments – with townhouses as narrow as 16 feet or lots as small as 1,400 sf – was much denser than the R-1 zoning allowed (which had a minimum lot size of 5,000 sf); of course, this was misleading since the overall density including the open space was the same. The Federation took a strong stand against RPDs and warned its members to prepare for a “full-scale battle”: “The Federation is opposed to R.P.D.’s which include multiple-type residences in single-family zoned residential areas, or which violate the fundamental zoning integrity or density established for such areas.<sup>297</sup> The gravity of the perceived “threat” to Hillside residents was conveyed in a call of arms to members:

You are undoubtedly aware by this time of the extensive planning and work that has gone into preparing our all-out campaign against RPDs in residential zones. It is probably the largest singly-directed effort the Federation has ever undertaken and the earnest cooperation of each member organization is of the utmost importance in assuring its success.<sup>298</sup>

Among the fiercest RPD battles the Federation waged was against a proposed residential project by U.S. Plywood Corporation called “Glenwood” at Beverly Glen Boulevard and Mulholland Drive. Of the 1100 proposed units, 700 were to be 3-to-4 unit attached multiple dwellings and roughly 100 duplexes, with the remaining 300 being single-family houses.<sup>299</sup> Up until the 1960s, the Federation acted as a clearinghouse of information, bringing in experts and relying upon quantifiable evidence to advance their conservation goals. To this point, they had largely stayed out of Council politics, but the threat of RPDs prompted them to enlist the help of Councilmen James Potter (District 2) and Edmund Edelman (District 5), and urge their members to write letters to other Councilmen.<sup>300</sup> But these early attempts to influence City Council came up short, as Potter and Edelman, both relative newcomers to Council, had limited influence and Glenwood was approved 8-7.

Going forward, the Federation was more determined to break what they perceived as an alliance between City Council

and the development industry – that is, placing economic growth above the concerns of homeowners – by broadening its appeal to other Councilors, helping to defeat those who were not sympathetic to their concerns, and fighting to have Federation members appointed to commissions and boards (which they observed “would give the Federation an entrée to the Establishment.”<sup>301</sup>). As board member Lil Melograno argued, “we need ‘muscle’ at City Hall, [and] that we should unite with others to carry weight and elect friendly Councilmen at City Hall.”<sup>302</sup> And they did, helping to elect several new Councilors who took up their cause, three in particular between 1965-1975.

The first was Marvin Braude’s 1965 election in District 11 (which covers the affluent areas of Pacific Palisades, Brentwood, West L.A., Tarzana and Encino), defeating conservative Karl Rundberg. While Braude trailed Rundberg by a 2-to-1 margin in the initial election, Braude rode a wave of widespread discontent over the proposal to carve freeways through the Santa Monica

Mountains.<sup>303</sup> Braude would later be instrumental in fighting the Mulholland Freeway and was a central figure in the slow-growth movement that would take hold by the mid-1970s. Braude was president of his local homeowners association (Crestwood Hills) and would later become the first President of the Santa Monica Mountains Regional Park Association. A second Councilor who the Federation would count on was Joel Wachs, who defeated Potter in 1971, after Potter was involved in a scandal surrounding the Beverly Ridge development in the Hills.<sup>304</sup> Wachs, a liberal who was closeted until coming out in the 1990s, fought for greater local input into City decisions, organizing several Citizens committees in the early 1970s, a pre-cursor to the contemporary Neighborhood Council system.<sup>305</sup> Wachs became the go-to guy for the Federation, as his 2<sup>nd</sup> District covered the Santa Monica Mountains, including Sherman Oaks, Studio City and the canyon areas north of Beverly Hills. The third advocate was Zev Yaroslavsky, whose election in 1975 in District 5 (covering the affluent Westside, including Bel-

Air and Westwood) stunned the City's political establishment.<sup>306</sup> Yaroslavsky had run a grassroots anti-establishment campaign and at his swearing-in, then-Mayor Tom Bradley taunted him by saying "Congratulations. Now you're part of the establishment," to which Yaroslavsky replied, "Yes, but the establishment is not part of me."<sup>307</sup> These three men would become the conduit the Hillside Federation needed to City Hall over the coming years.

### **B. SLOW-GROWTH, COMMUNITY PLANNING ERA (1965-92)**

#### CEQA

As homeowner groups like the Hillside Federation became more politically sophisticated and began electing Council members who were sympathetic to their concerns, they became more powerful players in the planning of Los Angeles. Their cause was strengthened in 1970, with the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and

the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Just four months after NEPA, California followed suit, passing the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). By declaring "every citizen has a responsibility to contribute to preservation and enhancement of the environment," CEQA took the clear position that conservation was a collective responsibility.<sup>308</sup> Originally, CEQA was to apply only to public projects, but in its September 1972 *Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors* decision, the California Supreme Court interpreted the statute to apply to all projects.<sup>309</sup>

In the late 1960s, the Occidental Petroleum Company (Oxy) began exploring the possibility of sinking oil wells in the Temescal Canyon area of the Pacific Palisades (within the Santa Monica Mountains). In 1973, area residents formed the Pacific Palisades Community Council, and with the support of the Hillside Federation, organized "No Oil, Inc.". No Oil's mission was to block Oxy's plans, believing it threatened the nearby beach and the unstable adjacent hillside (where a landslide occurred

in 1958).<sup>310</sup> The *Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors* decision proved decisive for No Oil. In February 1973, following the logic in *Mammoth* to err on the side of environmental protection, the California Supreme Court disagreed with the City of L.A.'s decision not to require Oxy to complete a full environmental impact report (EIR) for drilling.<sup>311</sup>

This proved to be an important case, because it established a precedent that an environmental group only had to make a reasonable case that the environment would be impacted by a project to force a project to complete a full EIR, thus placing the burden of proof on prospective developers to show how impacts would be avoided or mitigated. No Oil was politically astute, using the 1969 oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara to rally support.<sup>312</sup> But this fight would be a drawn-out battle well into the 1980s, a battle that highlighted racial and classes differences. While oil drilling was commonplace across the poorer and/or blacker parts of L.A. (Watts, San Pedro, Baldwin Hills), that it could be blocked in a wealthy area

threatened to undo the black-Jewish coalition that elected Mayor Bradley in 1973. As former civil rights lawyer turned Oxy spokesman Mickey Kantor explained, "there is a difference between a civil-rights liberal and environmental liberals," suggesting the not-yet-reconciled division between conservation and environmental justice wings of the green movement.<sup>313</sup> Even today, one could argue the two sides of the environmental movement remain antagonistic towards one another.<sup>314</sup>

This split made it difficult for either side to fully appreciate the other – rich communities seeking to protect the open space that poor neighborhoods beseeched by industrial pollutants could only dream of and vice versa. But given the history of the Federation's environmental efforts and the central role that committed conservationists like Richard Lillard played, it is hard to dismiss these efforts as merely window-dressing for a self-serving campaign of exclusion, as Mike Davis attests. The Federation would later become vigilant in fighting the intrusion of apartments into the Hills by the mid-1960s – a position that

certainly could be interpreted as elitist and exclusionary – but Hillside Federation saw this as entirely consistent with their environmental mission of protecting the sensitive ecology of the Santa Monica Mountains. The unintended consequences (for the poor and minorities) of the policy changes they later sought did not appear to enter into the Federation’s thinking at the time. While we can retrospectively argue that it was an “elitist” movement – and there’s no doubt the Federation is an affluent group – it’s worth remembering that environmental justice as we know it today only emerged as a cohesive movement in the 1980s.

While the early efforts of the Hillside Federation were motivated by genuine environmental concerns, by the mid-1960s, these early concerns took on a new dimension following the Watts Riots of 1965, the Fair Housing laws won by Civil Rights activists, and the large waves of immigrants flooding into L.A. From its environmental roots, the Hillside Federation’s efforts by the mid-1960s increasingly turned to protecting not the sensitive ecology of the Hills, but the character and way of

life of the suburban single-family home.

### THE SANCTITY OF THE SINGLE-FAMILY HOME

The Hillside Federation’s defeat over Glenwood did not dissuade the homeowners; instead, it began exploring the possibility of suing the City over the validity of using a Conditional Use Permit for RPDs. They stepped up their efforts, soliciting funds from their members for its pending legal battle:

IS YOUR HOME AND YOUR WAY OF LIFE WORTH \$25.00? ... Never before in the history of your Property Owner’s Association or its affiliation with the Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations has a more challenging crisis confronted us as homeowners. This crisis, called RPD, is a proposed ordinance soon to reach City Council level and which, if permitted to become law, may well destroy the established character of our entire mountain community. Consistent with the long-established policy of resisting any dilution or destruction of



single-family zoning, it is the unanimous decision of both the Directors of the Federation and those of your Association that RPD constitutes a real and present danger to us all... There will be property value dilution, loss of privacy, loss of prestige, abnormally increased traffic, overcrowding of utilities, facilities, schools, etc., and a definite change in the ecology of the single-family residential neighborhood as we now know it.<sup>315</sup>

Despite their efforts, U.S. Plywood filed a tract map (#27241) to subdivide 96 of their 307 acres into 21 lots on January 27, 1967.<sup>316</sup> By March 1967, Lillard's Beverly Glen Residents association had organized a "Save the Glen" campaign against Glenwood; meanwhile, through mutual contacts, one Federation member had a meeting with Calvin Hamilton who largely dismissed her suggestions and said to put her concerns in writing and send them to his office.<sup>317</sup> Meanwhile, because of their efforts to mobilize residents against Glenwood, U.S. Plywood had sued the Federation, the Residents of Beverly Glen, Jack Thompson, and Lillian Melograno for \$2 million; they

counter-sued for \$4 million, seeking punitive damages, arguing that U.S. Plywood had the "ulterior motive and design of stifling their opposition through the fear of such a lawsuit, and for the further purpose of using the lawsuit as a club of coercion to compel the residents to stop making certain of the statements which the corporation contended were untrue."<sup>318</sup>

By 1968, U.S. Plywood, facing opposition and in litigation with the Residents of Beverly Glen, had abandoned including townhouses in its plan and reduced its plan to 900 units, which, according to the Federation was still twice as many as allowed under a conventional plan.<sup>319</sup> Beverly Glen and the Federation's fight over Glenwood would continue until 1974, after 8 years of litigation, when a settlement was reached to build 600 units, just over half the 1,100 they originally proposed. Moreover, the Federation won covenants, conditions and restrictions on the open space portion of the plan, reduced the shopping center portion of the project, and won a \$400,000 landscaping budget to screen the project from view of Beverly Glen Boulevard.<sup>320</sup>

## RACISM?

By the late 1960s, the Federation became concerned about its image. They acknowledged critics were spreading the word that they were “against everything” and agreed they should take “definite steps to present a positive image of the Federation’s activities and philosophy.”<sup>321</sup> Meanwhile, Hamilton and the Planning department began to link RPD to the provision of affordable housing, a connection that some Federation members rejected.<sup>322</sup> This posed a political challenge for the Federation, because minority groups such as the Urban League began criticizing the Federation for its obstruction. The Federation clearly rejected the accusation that they were trying to thwart the production of affordable housing (“it was urged that we project our problems and fight the ‘bill of goods for whites’ that has seemed to have been sold to the Urban League”). But its President, John Weaver suggested “there was enough truth to make us vulnerable.”<sup>323</sup>

Given their opposition to multi-family housing and feud with the Urban League – and especially since the Hillside Federation was all-white – it is a valid question to ask if the Federation was motivated by racism. There is little evidence to suggest this. In fact, some board members actively fought for racial justice. Ed Mosk, the Federation’s Air Pollution Committee Chair at the time, was a key figure of Progressive Citizens of America (which later became the Independent Progressive Party), a left-liberal coalition with a pro-labor and pro-civil rights agenda.<sup>324</sup> Jerry Fadem, Chair of the Tax Committee progressive Democrats’ campaigns.<sup>325</sup> Roger Pettit, the Federation’s Zoning and Grading Committee Chair, was a Regent of the University of California and founding member of the UCLA Foundation. And Federation President John Weaver published a book in 1970 (*The Brownsville Raid*), which helped exonerate 167 black soldiers who had been dishonorably discharged for being falsely

accused attacking the town of Brownsville, Texas in 1906.<sup>326</sup> As a result of Weaver's investigation, the Army found the men innocent and they were posthumously pardoned and honorably discharged.

While board members lamented that others did not think Federation concerns were legitimate, such as the high rates of insurance they paid due to inadequate fire protection in the Hills, they seemed to bristle at the suggestion they were racists. As Weaver noted, "we are being put in categories with Watts now, and most unfairly, because the answer to our problems is in brushing of areas, not riot control. Immediately we are tagged 'white racists' and our problems are not solved. There is a demagogic opposition to our problems."<sup>327</sup> But the Federation board seemed to acknowledge that the problem of "white racism", while not shared among Federation members, may have existed in the Hills, which seemed to provoke a moment of self-reflection, although it reads as paternalistic, if not tokenism:

The meeting considered steps the Federation might take to eliminate white racism in our communities. Suggestions included establishing liaison with property owner groups in minority areas, making available to associations a bumper sticker such as 'Good Neighbors Come In All Colors,' taking the initiative in contacting organizations that have responsible minority people interested in renting or buying in the hills, establishing a library or some other charity in the ghetto areas, or attempting to involve in association activities the minority people who already live in our areas.<sup>328</sup>

While there is no doubt the Hills and Canyons were overwhelmingly white, it cannot be said that they were especially conservative or a bastion of bigotry, as we might expect. In a magazine article, President John Weaver wrote an article that provides some insight into the area's politics:

"[San Fernando Valley] owners tend to be middle-class conservatives unashamedly in love with the aging boy

next door, Ronald Reagan. In the hills, especially in the uninhibited reaches of Laurel Canyon and Beverly Glen, sports cars tool around, flaunting the impudent bumper stick, HAPPINESS IS A NEW GOVERNOR. When a black city councilman ran for mayor of Los Angeles [Tom Bradley] against a shopworn white incumbent [Sam Yorty] last year, he did well in the hills but lost the valley, and with it, the election. In the tolerant atmosphere of the canyons, a man is free to live as nature intended, where it be as a white hustler or a black artist... Not every hill-country breast is certifiably free of bigotry, but it is the price of land rather than prejudice that keeps the canyon pre dominantly Caucasian.”<sup>329</sup>

Despite Weaver’s depiction, the fight to keep multi-family housing out of the Hills was framed by other Federation members as the preservation of a way of life. The prevailing view seemed to be one of “everything in its place” – i.e. that

multi-family may be fine in some places but not in single-family areas. As then Hillside Federation President Albert Bodine wrote in a letter to Mayor Yorty in 1966:

“Now condominiums and other crowded together types of structure treatments are really wonderful in their place. However they seem to be an extremely disrupting factor when they are shoved down the throats of the citizens in a single-family individual home area... this desire on the part of middle management people to have zoning stability is true of all types of middle management people, no matter what be their ethnic background, whether family ties be Oriental, Celtic, Negro, Gallic, Hebrew, Nordic, etc.”<sup>330</sup>

So as homeowners like Bodine saw it, the problem wasn’t about keeping out racial minorities, but rather, keeping out apartments (although the implication was that apartments

brought with them unnamed nuisances). Other board members were more strident in their opposition to multi-family. As then President H.J. Froelinger said in a Speech before the Sherman Oaks Highlands Association in 1969:

“We are, ourselves, involved in a tale of two cities: The city which is – and the city which is to be. The city we see – and the city seen by the developers. The city in which planning strives towards, emulates, and seeks to increase the Best – or the city in which planning reduces all to the lowest common denominator. For here lies the dicotomy (sic): The city of lasting value – versus the city of tomorrow’s slums. This is what the Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations is all about.”<sup>331</sup>

Invocating the “slums” to describe the threat posed by apartments suggests a clear shift in the motives of the Hillside Federation by this time. Gone were the earlier efforts to

merely preserve the sensitive ecology of the Hills. By this time, the Federation’s interests began to extend far beyond its own boundaries as they began to take a more city-wide approach to the problems associated with rapid growth. And grow L.A. did – between 1940 and 1970, L.A. nearly doubled in population, as over 1.3 million people moved into the City limits.<sup>332</sup> The Save Mulholland Committee (a sub-group within the Federation) “urged a push for [a] regional approach to our problems... The Federation and other groups such as the Woodland Hills people realize that all our problems are inter-related.”<sup>333</sup>

### ZONING ROLLBACKS

As the 1960s drew to a close, zoning – not just within the Hills, but across the City – became the central front in the Federation’s war against the establishment. Meanwhile, by summer 1970, Hamilton had won over Council (by a vote of 10-5) on RPDs; the Federation had lost this battle and, echoing

Bodine's comments, felt that RPDs were "a classic example of the law which when applied to one area as, for instance, the crowded, run down economically disadvantaged areas, might be of some help in developing green belts," but in the Hills, "it is an open hunting license for greedy corporate developers."<sup>334</sup> They threatened the character of their suburban community, so if the Federation could not win the individual battles of specific ordinances, they would use the Community Plan process to make more systemic change.

By the late 1960s, the question of suburban zoning was being debated across the country. Federation board members discussed a recent article from the National Observer that suggested overly restrictive suburban zoning could be seen as a form of discrimination.<sup>335</sup> At the federal level, two commissions began investigating whether suburban zoning was really "racial zoning", intended to bar minorities from access to the schools, amenities, and single-family homes in the suburbs. In early 1967, Lyndon Johnson appointed former Illinois Senator Paul

Douglas to lead the National Commission on Urban Problems, which produced a series of some 50 reports on the subject. The Commission was highly critical of suburban zoning and Douglas concluded: "economic segregation – with racial overtones – resulted from zoning laws that required extra large lots, wide streets, high lighting standards and other standards that raised site costs," with the overall effect that "land-use controls often have the unfortunate consequences, if not the intent, of making it difficult for low-income minority families to live in many urban places."<sup>336</sup> Given the political make-up of the Federation, it's difficult to support the claim that its battle against multi-family was an explicit attempt to prevent low-income minorities from moving into their neighborhoods (even though that was the result of their efforts). Rather, the Federation's campaign to prohibit apartments was an attempt to maintain the semi-rural character of the area and motivated by their desire to conserve property values, curb traffic congestion, and have adequate fire protection in an area with narrow roads and flammable flora.

In response to the Douglas Commission reports and other mounting evidence that blacks were increasingly being excluded from the suburbs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the leadership of George Romney (father of former Massachusetts Governor and 2012 Republican Presidential nominee Mitt Romney) initiated a series of aggressive reforms to open up the suburbs. Romney warned that, “if suburbanites refuse to recognize their obligation to help create balanced communities, the courts may force their hand,” arguing that suburbanites should be reminded that their retreat to suburbia was heavily subsidized by federal and state governments.<sup>337</sup> As a former Governor of Michigan, he was troubled by the segregation he saw in Detroit and considered racial and economic segregation the fundamental issue facing the country (“I believe the greatest threat to the future of this nation – physically, socially, and politically – is the confrontation in our states and cities between the poor and the minority groups, who are concentrated in great numbers in the central

core of our cities, and the middle income and affluent families who live in the surrounding and separate communities.”<sup>338</sup>)

Romney’s push for “balanced communities” – code for racially integrated – led to two programs: Open Communities and Operation Breakthrough. Launched in 1969, Operation Breakthrough was meant to use the know-how of industry to construct factory-built housing within the means of every American; as the former head of American Motors, Romney had faith that Fordism could be deployed to house the poor. But Breakthrough ran into local opposition from suburbanites once they realized it would involve subsidized housing and blacks, and in the end, only one Breakthrough site was developed in the suburbs nationally.<sup>339</sup> Likewise, Open Communities ambition far exceeded its accomplishments. The plan was to use federal grants as a stick to force exclusionary communities into accepting their fair share of low-income housing. In particular, HUD gave more weight to local inclusion of subsidized housing when awarding infrastructure grants for water and sewer, and

site selection criteria for such housing was revised to avoid racial concentration. But when local communities began to protest “forced integration”, including a tumultuous reaction in Warren, Michigan, Romney was forced to back off. Even in L.A., developers and homeowners resisted efforts to include low-income housing in suburban development. For example, in 1970, planners wanted 15% of units in the mega Warner Center plan set aside for affordable housing, but it was rejected by the developer (Kaiser-Aetna) and the Planning Commission.<sup>340</sup>

This concern for meeting the needs of low-income households was shared by Los Angeles planners by the mid-1960s. They worried that housing production was not keeping pace with growth and the City was becoming segregated by income (and by association, race). To this end, Council initiated the “Goals Program” with an all-important goal: “That we end stratification (the clustering of residents into homogenous neighborhoods) in the housing and residential environments.”<sup>341</sup> Council and the Planning Department wanted to both improve

the quality of existing housing and to expand opportunities for minorities throughout the City. But they recognized that they would face homeowner opposition:

“It is mandatory that programs be instituted to educate residents to accept these small developments in their neighborhoods...Unless the current attitudes of the homebuying public are changed towards more social consciousness, the intended spirit of housing programs cannot be carried out. Even if the builder wants to do a good job he will be stymied. A house is the largest investment a family makes, but buyers are wary of their future neighbors. These attitudes die hard.”<sup>342</sup>

As the Federation entered its second decade of existence, it was fighting a battle on two fronts: conservation of the Mountain ecology on the one hand, and excluding multi-family housing in order to protect their single-family communities on



the other. This was soon joined by a broader concern about perpetual economic growth, rising property taxes, and the size of government generally.

After Calvin Hamilton unveiled the Centers Concept in 1970, the City began revising its General Plan, whose Land Use Element would become the sum total of 35 community plans. Although the Centers Concept called for zoning rollbacks in residential areas, it was not well received by homeowners because it didn't reduce residential densities enough, and actually envisioned higher densities at particular nodes. To suburbanites, accommodating density was akin to promoting it, setting off an intense battle over the desired level of growth in Los Angeles: "excess zoning capacity is undesirable, not because it leads to overpopulation, but because it encourages speculative real estate ownership and development as well as undermining the stability of residential areas."<sup>343</sup> The accepted wisdom of growth that had fueled a 20-year boom following the Second World War was now being strongly resisted by the

very constituency that had answered the call to populate Eden during this period. The confluence of a growing environmental movement (at least its conservation dimension) and a growing anxiety over the changing social fabric of the city due to immigration and very public civil disturbances had launched a new "slow growth" movement that would transform not only the planning of L.A. but also lead to a taxpayers revolt.

By the early 1970s, the Federation was clear in its intent to use zoning reform as a tool to protect the ecology of the Hills, ward off undesired multi-family housing, and curtail growth. As board members noted: "population explosions, water projects and other dangers might not happen if properly planned out of our lives."<sup>344</sup> If Federation efforts between the mid-50s and mid-60s were primarily about conservation, and those between the mid-60s and mid-70s were about protecting a single-family way-of-life, by the mid-1970s, economic motives began to play out along side these other reasons. It wasn't just that an expansion of multi-family housing in L.A. would change the

character of communities, there was a sense – still prevalent today, despite studies to the contrary – that apartments would significantly destroy property values. By 1970, the Federation began studying this effect, even inviting Philip Watson of the tax assessor’s office to address the board; what Watson told them confirmed their view:

“If an apartment house or other such living gets into a district the further development of single-family homes comes to an immediate halt. In fact, the appraisers advise us that home sale prices get ‘soft’. This is the nature of people, and the trend is very much that way today... if the remaining 10,000 living units (33,000 people) [of remaining zoning capacity in the Hills] in 1962 had started a trend of apartments instead of homes, the loss in assessed valuation would have been \$70 million.”<sup>345</sup>

If ecology or social reasons didn’t compel Hillsiders to block multiple housing, fear of declining property values would. Zoning changes and new plans (such as the Santa

Monica Mountains Plan and especially the decision to prohibit residential uses by right in all commercially zoned property) had reduced the projected planned population of L.A. from 10 million to 7.5 million. But this was not nearly enough for homeowners, given that L.A.’s 1970 population was only 2.8 million. The question of L.A.’s optimum population informed much of the debate.

#### ZERO POPULATION GROWTH

The Federation and homeowners groups in general seized upon an emerging environmental rhetoric proselytized by Paul Ehrlich and his Zero Population Growth (ZPG) movement (which still exists today as Population Connection). Ehrlich’s 1968 book *The Population Bomb* warned of the dangers to the planet of overpopulation and advocated immediate action to curb population growth, both in the U.S. and worldwide.<sup>346</sup> While largely discredited due to its alarmism and inaccurate

forecasts of food shortages and mass starvation, the book was a bestseller and shaped the discourse around growth in the early 1970s. It was given further support with the Club of Rome's 1972 report *The Limits of Growth*, in which MIT scientists modeled how exponential growth could not be sustained on a planet with finite resources.<sup>347</sup> Ehrlich was in contact with the Hillside Federation, as he sent then-President Betty Dearing a pamphlet outlining ZPG's objectives.<sup>348</sup> And ZPG surrogates such as UCLA Professor Fred Abraham (President of ZPG of L.A.) took an active role in pushing for growth limits: "we need fewer people here – a quality of life, not a quantity of life. We must request a moratorium on growth and recognize that growth should be stopped."<sup>349</sup> The Sierra Club (L. Douglas DeNike) agreed and suggested "limiting residential housing is one approach to lower birth rates" and recommended "a freeze on zoning to limit new residential construction."<sup>350</sup>

With these debates running in the background, the logic of zoning rollbacks that the Federation and other homeowner

groups demanded was almost universally accepted. The question wasn't *whether* to rollback zoning, but by how much? When Councilman Tom Bradley tried to curry favor with Hillside in his first Mayoral run in 1969 and proposed freezing all zoning in areas to conform to the existing land uses in the area ("I do not believe that 'growth for growth's sake' is a good thing"), Federation President Lil Melograno said "here's something we can support! Let's get on record."<sup>351</sup> Citizens Advisory Committee reports are littered with calls to control population growth. For example, the Sherman Oaks committee's comments were typical:

"Uncontrolled population growth in the district is detrimental to the quality of life and is not essential to economic stability. Uncontrolled population increases are not a prerequisite for present or future planning. The rate of population growth in the district should be reduced as much as possible...Many of the present

problems of the City of Los Angeles stem from essentially uncontrolled growth which is permitted by an overzoning of the city. A redefinition of the various zones within the city, particularly the multiple residential zones, is needed to reduce the permitted density.”<sup>352</sup>

The success of the emerging environmental movement (which was aligning itself with theories about a steady-state economy) informed this new slow growth attitude as studies began to look at the carrying capacity of the basin’s natural resources – air, land and water – which provided support for the rollbacks they sought. In this sense, environmental and social objectives had a common goal: to use zoning to cut growth.

#### COMMUNITY PLANS

Zoning became an important political battle after 1966, when a Chatsworth land developer was thought to have bribed

officials for favorable zoning variances. This led to a Grand Jury investigation and the formation of a 1967 Citizen’s Committee on Zoning Practices and Procedures, headed by former Mayor Fletcher Bowron. Through September 1967, the Committee had held 19 public meetings with homeowners’ groups, chambers of commerce, the Regional Plan Association, and the League of Women Voters, along with private citizens.<sup>353</sup> The Committee’s 1968 report (A Program to Improve Planning and Zoning in Los Angeles) shaped the public discourse around zoning in the ensuing years. Among the 36 recommendations the Committee made was the devolution of planning to smaller districts, which would be updated on a regular basis.<sup>354</sup> This set in motion a process that enlisted greater citizen participation at the local level. Rather than be planned predominately by professionals from City Hall, the City would be divided into 35 community plans, which would be created in concert with Citizens Advisory Committees in each area. In practice, the level of input from each advisory committee reflected the degree to which single-

family communities were organized. This meant that areas with strong homeowners associations were able to have a greater impact in shaping future land use policy.

But the precise role of the community plans was unclear from the beginning; were they to be precise prescriptions of what would and would not be allowed or merely guides for the key decision-makers (planners, zoning administrators, City Planning Commission, City Council)? There was no consensus. On the one hand David Moir, the President of the City Planning Commission in 1971 argued: “if the community plans suddenly turn from zoning guides into ‘a gospel’, then I say there’s going to be trouble and lots of it.”<sup>355</sup> Chief Planner Calvin Hamilton, on the other hand, said it was their intention to bring zoning into compliance with the community plans, although it would take time (“It’s true it may take 40 years to implement portions of it because the city won’t have enough money.”)<sup>356</sup> Hamilton was conflicted in his twin goals of greater citizen participation, but also ensuring the City could accommodate expected growth.

What was clear was that planning and zoning administration had been divorced, such that community planning involving homeowners could move forward, but without changing the underlying zoning, these plans took on an advisory role – an inconsistency that would last into the 1980s and ultimately be decided by the courts due to lawsuits launched by the Hillside Federation. While community groups volunteered many hours laying out a vision for their respective communities, divergent views on how much to rollback zoning emerged within the City itself. The City Planning Commission was most sympathetic to homeowners in calling for a 50% rollback (from a planned population of 7.5 million to about 3.7 million). The City Planning Department proposed a one-third rollback (to a planned population of 5 million). The City Council was in between these extremes, favoring rollbacks that would plan for about 4 million people.<sup>357</sup> Central to these discussions were population projections to the year 1990, the assumption being that future iterations of the general plan would make

necessary adjustments. But neither Council nor the City Planning Department anticipated the decade-long battle over the degree to which the underlying zoning regulations – which actually governed what got built – aligned with the community plans that homeowners wanted.

Homeowners groups across the city, and especially the associations affiliated with the Hillside Federation, seized upon the recommendation by the 1968 Citizens' Committee Report (Bowron Report) that planning responsibility be down-loaded to 35 smaller areas and district plans be created in collaboration with residents. As part of the new community planning process, local Councilors could appoint residents to the Citizens Advisory Committee for each of the 35 areas. Given the close ties between Joel Wachs and the Federation, he put forward former Federation President Betty Dearing for the Beverly Crest-Bel Air Community Plan committee in 1971.<sup>358</sup> When the Citizens committee issued its verdict the following year, it expressed a common sentiment of the time: “we support the idea that the

majority of the remaining vacant lands should be preserved as open space... we recommend as low densities and zoning as possible.”<sup>359</sup>

Unfortunately for homeowners, work on the City's Open Space Element (a new requirement by the state legislature for General Plans) diverted staff and many of the early community plan efforts lay dormant in between 1972-74 (for example, only one community plan – Hollywood – was adopted between October 1972 and February 1974). When work resumed by the mid-1970s, there were signs that the Planning Department did not always agree with the Citizens Committees. For example, a controversy ensued when, in its background report for the Bel Air plan, planners said “the affluence of the district has resulted in an economic ghetto. The imaginary walls that surround this exclusive residential area are as real as those which surround the ghettos of the poor. However, these walls function in reverse. Instead of socio-economic walls that keep people in, Beverly Crest-Bel Air has economic walls that keep people out.”<sup>360</sup>

When Bel Air Federation homeowners complained to Councilor Yaroslavsky, he had the language struck from the report.<sup>361</sup>

Details of these early community plans reveal a consistent effort to reduce multi-family zoning, often by re-designating them to lower-density categories (i.e. from R3 to RD1.5). For example, the Brentwood Plan largely left the area for multi-family zoning as it was, but reduced their designation from Medium/High density to Low Medium density; according to the Environmental Impact Report (EIR), “this in effect will reduce the potential population capacity by 50% in the multiple residential areas.”<sup>362</sup> But single-family zones were also changed to require larger minimum lot sizes. As the EIR notes, “substantial rollbacks of zoning in both apartments and single-family areas... will result in a substantial growth inhibition, especially in the apartment areas. These actions, if effectuated, will change the existing trends... to a limited no growth trend.”<sup>363</sup>

Not everyone was happy about these zoning rollbacks. The Encino Chamber of Commerce, for example, warned that

adopting no growth zoning would lead Encino to deteriorate like Van Nuys.<sup>364</sup> Developers also complained that they were losing property value. For example, developer Charles Chastain noted he had already volunteered to reduce the density on his project from 2,100 to 1,850 units, but the Brentwood plan would allow less than 1,000 units. While homeowners were crafting these plans, it was clear that developers were still negotiating directly with the City; Chastain’s company was “shocked to be confronted by a proposal made without its knowledge, not to mention its consent, after years of such close cooperation between [his company] and the City during which [it] has met all of its commitments to the City and at all times conducted itself as an organization keenly aware of its responsibilities to the public.”<sup>365</sup> But these protests against the tide of down-zoning were easily drowned out by the slow-growth consensus; homeowners groups had successfully used the community planning process to institute massive zoning rollbacks.

## ZONING CONSISTENCY &amp; PROP U

Despite these victories, there was widespread confusion about whether the down-zoned community plans were, in and of themselves, legally enforceable. Councilman Wachs originally felt they were, citing the L.A. Municipal Code Section 17.05C (which governed land division). But Councilman Edelman felt that they needed a separate enabling ordinance to officially change the zoning. In a letter to one of the Hillside Federation's affiliates, Planning Director Hamilton suggested the zoning itself would need to be changed ("it is probably questionable what the strength of the law is stemming from the Community Plan without a change in zoning to conform to it."<sup>366</sup>) By 1976, it was clear that the community plans did not have the effect of law, leading one Councilor to declare, "citizen involvement is a precious community in our system of government, and we should not lightly cast aside the product of that participation."<sup>367</sup> Homeowners were even more livid. As one Federation member

put it:

"We submit that the taxpaying citizens of this city have been the victims of, as well as innocent participants in, a series of totally senseless, time-consuming, expensive games... The way will once again be left open for promoters and developers to convert what is left of our residential and open-spaces areas, to high-density urban ghettos."<sup>368</sup>

Since the City did not actually pass implementing ordinances to change the underlying zoning, the status of the community plans was uncertain. A 1971 state law required that a city's zoning and General Plan must be consistent by 1974. But L.A., as a charter city, took the view that it was not required to comply with this directive, as it infringed upon the



City's home rule.<sup>369</sup> After a San Pedro Assemblyman disputed a zoning ruling by the City, he took it upon himself to force L.A. to comply with the local community plan by introducing AB 283 in 1979, which singled out L.A. by requiring charter cities over 2 million people to comply (L.A. being the only one).<sup>370</sup> Of course, by 1979, many of the community plans were already outdated with respect to what had been built in the decade since the start of the Community Plan program in 1969. The City pushed back, challenging AB 283 in court.<sup>371</sup> The Superior Court sided with L.A. but it was reversed on appeal, but compliance was extended to July 1982.<sup>372</sup> By this time, the City had only completed 25% of the required re-zoning.<sup>373</sup>

By 1984, the City had still not complied with AB 283. Tired of the City's lack of progress, the Hillside Federation joined with the Center for Law in the Public Interest in December 1984 and sued the City to force compliance between zoning and the Community Plans.<sup>374</sup> Showing perhaps a lack of understanding of the magnitude of the task of re-zoning much of L.A., the

Federation asked for, and was awarded, compliance within four months; the Federation also sought an injunction prohibiting the issuance of building permits for those inconsistent with the General Plan, but the court did not grant this.<sup>375</sup> Given the impossibility of complying, a new judgment was issued in July 1985, giving the City three years to bring all of its zoning into compliance with the Community Plans. The difficulty of changing the zoning on over 200,000 parcels meant the City had to down-zone large areas at once, with little attention given to nuances of individual parcels. Ironically, most of these parcels were not on the Westside or the Valley, areas where the Federation had a direct interest, but rather were in the poorer Central, East, and Southern parts of the City. The Federation's victory cemented the organization as a major force in L.A. planning. As one Federation affiliate said after the victory:

If there's a development coming in that's going to be asking for some kind of change we know about it right away... we check and see if it applies to the community plan properly. If

it doesn't, we get busy. It has grown to the extent that now, the councilman's office suggests that these people come and see us before they put their application in.<sup>376</sup>

The influence of the Federation continued in 1986, when they helped Council allies Yaroslavsky and Braude gather over 100,000 signatures for a ballot initiative (Proposition U) that would cut in half (from a floor-area-ratio of 3 to 1.5) the size of new buildings along 70% of L.A.'s major commercial corridors (exemptions were granted for specific areas such as Downtown and Century City).<sup>377</sup> Homeowners on the Westside and Southern Valley (for example, in Westwood, Sherman Oaks and Encino) were concerned about the impact of tall office buildings and shopping centers near their homes. Fears over density, while always hyperbolic in L.A., sparked the creation of off-shoot grassroots groups as "Not Yet New York". Proponents of Prop U had the benefit of some \$200,000 in campaign contributions from Yaroslavsky and Braude. Richard Close, President of the Sherman Oaks Homeowners Association (the

largest association in the Hillside Federation) and leading spokesman for Prop U, argued it was a way to reduce density rapidly: "It takes too long to do it the normal way. If you're going to limit growth, it's going to take you two or three years per area to do it the normal way [i.e. through community plans]. On Nov. 5, we'll have the job done."<sup>378</sup> Prop U was carried by a more than 2-to-1 margin, as Braude hailed it as the "dawn of a new era," and Hillsideers proclaimed it would bring land-use decisions into the public eye "where people have a chance to comment on their own destiny and property values."<sup>379</sup> While more compact higher-density development could limit L.A.'s sprawl and make transit more feasible, by the mid-1980s, the Federation had traveled far from its environmental roots.

The new focus on limiting growth put the conservation movement on a collision course with minority groups who wanted better housing and residential integration. Already by the 1970s, the poor were being squeezed out of L.A.'s tight housing market – in 1970, vacancy rates were between 1

and 1.5%, which, in combination with greater restrictions on multi-family housing, was driving up prices and exacerbating the problem for the poor, and disproportionately affecting African Americans, Latinos, Asians and other minorities.<sup>380</sup> But following the Civil Rights Act, including Fair Housing Laws, it became more difficult to selectively exclude – “the attack on exclusionary zoning has in part led to the growth control movement. If selective exclusion is unenforceable, then the next-best approach may be wholesale exclusion.”<sup>381</sup>

Minority groups argued that no (or slow) growth would drive up prices beyond the reach of a major segment of the population. As L.A. real estate developer and philanthropist Eli Broad said in 1972: “We are faced here with two time bombs. A rapidly deteriorating environment and a growing population of underhoused, seemingly unrepresented people who become more frustrated and disillusioned every day. Which bomb will explode first?”<sup>382</sup> The devolution of planning power to local communities who were clamoring for density rollbacks prompted

prominent national black organizations to attack the emerging slow growth movement as a thinly veiled attempt to keep black and the poor out. Given the mass migration of whites to L.A.’s suburbs in the 1950s and 60s, the City by 1970 was heavily suburban and remained overwhelmingly white.<sup>383</sup>

#### TAX REVOLT

Along with the Federation’s entry into debates about economic growth by the early 1970s, it also abandoned its previous resistance to getting involved in tax issues. In fact, the Federation took a lead role in what would become the battle over Proposition 13. Homeowners did not like the fact that only 20% of property taxes went to property-related services (sanitation, sewer, fire, etc.); the bulk went to welfare, schools, health programs and the like. Homeowners felt this should come from income taxes, not property taxes.<sup>384</sup> School funding, in particular drew the ire of homeowners, following a watershed

California Supreme Court ruling (*Serrano v. Priest*, initiated in 1968) that challenged how public schools were funded in the state. Schools in California were funded primarily through property taxes, which meant property owners in poor areas had to pay a much higher rate to fund their schools, and even with higher rates, still did not have as many financial resources as schools in affluent areas.<sup>385</sup>

The Court ruled in 1971 that the inequality of school funding violated the Equal Protection Clause and ordered the State to create a more equitable funding scheme, saying that, “affluent districts can have their cake and eat it too; they can provide a high quality education for their children while paying lower taxes.”<sup>386</sup> On the one hand, while Serrano unloaded some of school funding to the state in a complicated top-up system, thus directing property taxes away from non-property costs, which should have made homeowners happy. But, by doing so, it made property taxes a “deadweight loss”, meaning that increased assessments did not lead to increases to public

goods.<sup>387</sup> During this period in the mid-1970s, property values were rising rapidly, but instead of the additional tax revenue generated by those rising property values being directed to better public services (e.g. school improvements), Serrano mandated that those additional revenues be transferred to poor areas (municipalities could not lower tax rates to compensate because Serrano ordered that per student spending be roughly equal across the state). So homeowners faced increased property taxes without receiving anything in return, creating a nexus around school funding and property tax reform.

Ironically, efforts to curb multi-family housing in the late 1960s and early 1970s contributed to the problem of rising property taxes, since it restricted the supply of housing at a time when population continued to rise, thereby increasing property values and therefore property taxes. By the mid-1970s, rising property taxes became a chief concern of homeowners: “The threat that the property tax is making endangered species out of the home owners leads to the formation of new home owners

associations.”<sup>388</sup> Nationally, due to inflationary pressures and widespread land use reforms, between 1970 and 1980, house prices rose between 19 and 32 percent, depending on which index is used.<sup>389</sup> The situation in L.A. was arguably worse, as Yaroslavsky claimed property taxes on homes had risen 26% by 1976.<sup>390</sup> Homeowners were particularly concerned that rising property taxes would force seniors (who were on fixed incomes) out of their homes. Conspicuously absent from their discussions was the impact that rising property values (in part a result of restricting multi-family housing supply) had on low-income minorities.

The shift from ecological to taxation concerns reflected the mood of the State as a whole. By 1977, the Hillside Federation had met with Orange County Republican businessman Howard Jarvis, who was gathering signatures for an anti-tax ballot initiative (which would later become Prop 13). The Federation helped organize a “brown bag” campaign, in which citizen letters were gathered in brown bags at supermarkets and other

public places to be delivered to Democratic Governor Jerry Brown (after serving from 1975-83, Brown was elected again as California’s Governor in 2011). Jarvis was a lobbyist for the L.A. Apartment Owners Association, and used his platform to encourage renters to support Prop 13, saying their rents would go down (they did not; landlords pocketed the tax savings). Jarvis’s mission was bigger than reducing property taxes; he wanted to see smaller government (as he told the Federation in January 1977: “Unlimited government means unlimited taxes.”)<sup>391</sup> It was this call for a more limited government (“Government is not the solution to our problem. Government is the problem”) that would help Ronald Reagan win the White House three years later.

## CONCLUSION

From the exploration of these three groups, it should be clear that, while each had varying degrees of interest in planning

issues, the Hillside Federation (and indeed homeowner groups generally) was the group most focused on local zoning and land use policies specifically. The L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce was certainly active in many issues related to L.A.'s planning – housing, industrial expansion, freeways, mass transit, air pollution. But these interests were set within a broader agenda of economic development and interest in state- and federal-level policymaking. The L.A. Urban League was also concerned about issues related to planning – housing and revitalization of poor black areas like South-Central and Watts – but these interests were subsumed within a more fundamental battle of civil rights and ending discrimination. Given the enormity of their task in fundamentally changing the attitudes during the long struggle for equal rights, it is certainly understandable that land use policies were of secondary importance to them. Nevertheless, the absence of a strong voice on behalf of the poor and minorities in the community planning process meant there was little discussion of the implications that widespread

down-zoning would have on them. While local Chamber groups tried to counter the homeowners' zoning rollbacks in some community plans, the big area-wide business groups like the L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce had little direct voice in community plans.

In part, the different levels of engagement with land use policy in the community planning era can be attributed to the differences of scale between the three groups. As the local affiliate of a national civil rights organization, the L.A. Urban League's geographic scope was the entire L.A. region. This meant that they were advocating for broad policies not only within the City of Los Angeles but also other area cities. To the extent that they had a specific geographic focus, it was the predominately black areas of South Los Angeles. But even here, they did not have a strong voice in the development of three most heavily black community plan areas (Southeast L.A., South L.A., and West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert). As we will see in section 7.1, the West Adams-Baldwin Hills community

plan process was dominated by local issues related to crime, historic preservation, and community revitalization. As we saw in the overview in Chapter 5, local homeowner groups were active in South L.A., but the cases they were involved in were typically not land use related. In other words, the local homeowner groups in South L.A. tended to mirror the concerns of the LAUL, with a focus on social welfare and social services.

The L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce's geographic scale, in many ways, was even larger than the LAUL. Its concerns were the entire five-county Southland (including L.A., Ventura, Riverside, San Bernardino and Orange Counties). And while it certainly carried a lot of weight with L.A. City Council (at least until the homeowner revolution in the 1970s), its sphere of influence was often felt at the state level. Since it was chiefly concerned with how policies of all types (economic, environmental, planning, social, etc) impacted economic growth and the general business climate, it rarely focused on the minutiae of details at the community plan level. This was

left to the local Chambers, but without the institutional and organizational support of an umbrella group like the LAACC, these local business groups were often overwhelmed by larger homeowner groups like the Hillside Federation, who had better relations with City Council by the mid-1970s.

Of the three, the Hillside Federation – and the local neighborhood groups it represented – had by far the narrowest geographic focus: the neighborhood level. Their geographic focus was so narrow that Federation affiliates existed within each community plan area, which gave the Federation a powerful voice in shaping these plans, especially since many of its members were also Citizen Advisory Committee members. They also knew the areas extremely well, and could point out inconsistencies and subtleties in the plans that even the City planners could not. So the planners – especially given Hamilton's emphasis on citizen-led planning – leaned heavily on local homeowner groups to direct the community plans.

But scale was not the only factor in why homeowners

became the most important force in the community plan era. Politics also played a key role. Since the Urban League's mission was one of racial integration, it was – by definition – a coalition of progressive whites and blacks (and, later, Latinos and Asians). As such, its politics, like that of the African-American community generally – leaned heavily Democratic. This meant the League had strong connections to local and state level Democrat political machinery, but also meant it was largely excluded among Republican circles. Given L.A. had a Republican Mayor for much of the post-war boom period (Fletcher Bowron from 1938 until 1953, and Norris Poulson from 1953 to 1961), followed by a conservative Democrat who had few ties with the black community (Sam Yorty, from 1961 to 1973), the Urban League did not have a strong connection to the Mayor's office. Even after Tom Bradley was elected as the City's first black Mayor (1973 to 1993), given his desire to maintain strong ties with the city's business elite, he was not as strong an advocate for blacks as many would have hoped.

Likewise, many City Council members were business-oriented until the mid-1960s (and in some cases, mid-1970s).

The L.A. Chamber, by contrast, leaned Republican. This meant it was well connected to the Mayor's office and City Council for much of the post-war boom. However, beginning in the mid-1960s, as homeowner groups gained ascendance and began electing homeowner-friendly City Councilors, the influence of the Chamber began to wane. By the mid-1970s, the Chamber no longer had as much sway as it once did.

Among the principle achievements of the homeowner revolution was its ability to span both Democratic and Republican constituencies. Many of the affluent Federation members in the Hillside were progressive Democrats (and often Jewish). It was this group that was largely responsible for the emergence of the environmental (or at least conservation) movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. But more conservative homeowners in the San Fernando Valley were also drawn into the movement. They were attracted by the desire to preserve the sanctity of



single-family neighborhoods and the fears that rapid growth was significantly increasing property taxes (which ultimately lead to the tax revolt of the late 1970s). Homeowners cast their battles in terms of protecting their neighborhoods and, in this sense, were less partisan than either civil rights or business groups.

Beyond issues of scale and politics, the three groups also took very different positions on the central questions of economic growth, ecological protection and social integration. This led to complex, contingent, and sometimes perverse positions and alliances between the Federation, Urban League, and Chamber. For example, with respect to economic growth, business groups and homeowners were clearly adversaries, as the LAACC championed growth while the Hillside Federation was firmly in the “slow-growth” camp. The Urban League was aligned with the Chamber. As National Urban League President Vernon Jordan made clear in 1979, they were opposed to growth limits, since for many African-Americans, jobs and economic

development of poor inner-city neighborhoods were the top priority. In general, homeowners were unsympathetic to these concerns, instead focusing on the negative attributes of growth (pressure on infrastructure, water resources, air pollution, etc).

With respect to environmental protection, the Hillside Federation was a champion of open space preservation, protecting the hillsides from over-development, and a fierce opponent of oil drilling. The Urban League initially were not supportive of environmental concerns, but by the 1980s, it began to recognize the environmental injustice that minority communities bore due to the location of noxious uses in their communities. By this time, the lack of park space in poor, black communities was also a big concern not only for the Urban League but also national conservation groups like the Sierra Club. So by the 1980s, the Urban League and Hillside Federation were largely on the same page with respect to environmental concerns. The Chamber was clearly on the opposing sides of

these issues, arguing that homeowners were endangering economic growth.

Since racial integration was the primary mission of the Urban League, it fought for access to white suburbs and industries alike. The Federation's and Chamber's position on integration was complex, but more often than not, the Urban League (and like-minded civil rights groups) found themselves on the opposing side. Certainly, white homeowner groups in the 1940s and 1950s engaged in overt racism, using intimidation and violence to keep neighborhoods segregated. While the Federation was more progressive and there is no evidence that they perpetrated similar acts, by the 1960s they fought the intrusion of multi-family housing into their communities, which had the effect of excluding minorities. On the one hand, the business community in general (and the Chamber in particular) partnered with the Urban League to help get educated blacks into middle-class jobs. But when it came to the question of integrated communities, the Chamber vigorously fought against

public housing and especially its intrusion into the suburbs. There is also evidence that business groups fought mandatory affordable housing in new business centers (discussed in detail in section 7.2).

So what implications did each group have on a progressive urban agenda for Los Angeles – that is, for its ability to create a racially integrated, environmentally friendly, and economically healthy city? The evidence suggests that the heroes and villains of this story are difficult to discern. On some issues, for example, the preservation of sensitive ecologies, the Federation was clearly on the progressive side. But its campaign against growth – and in particular, multi-family housing – was a significant factor in what would become a housing crisis by the 1980s, a crisis that disproportionately affected minorities. This fight against higher density and urban infill would also contribute to the outward expansion of the region, with devastating impacts for the region's ecology (not only loss of space, but in aggravating its auto dependency and

corresponding problems of traffic congestion and air pollution). Homeowners also took a paradoxical position with respect to transit. On the one hand, they argued that dense, multi-family housing should not be built because there was not adequate transit to serve it, but when such transit was proposed, they blocked it on the grounds that it created noise, vibrations, and would reduce property values.

Likewise, the Chamber was neither entirely a proponent nor opponent of a progressive urbanism. Certainly their opposition to public housing and federal subsidies for anti-poverty programs hurt the African-American community. They were also generally obstructionist with respect to implementing environmental regulations, and certainly promoted the loss of agriculture in the San Fernando Valley. But by the 1970s, they recognized the need for urban infill, and generally fought back against attempts to cut multi-family housing. And since the Second World War, they were among the most aggressive promoters of a regional mass transit system, often betraying

long-time believers in lower taxes and private provision, since they recognized the dire need for a publicly-financed, publicly built system.

It is hard to see the Urban League as an opponent in this story. Their century-long fight for racial equality and civil rights can only be seen as admirable. But they simply were not engaged in how land use policies ultimately affected their constituency. It is surprising that an organization that purportedly was concerned about equal access to housing was not a participant in the community planning battles that played out in the 1970s and 1980s. Combined with the Chamber's macro focus, this allowed powerful homeowner groups to dominate the community planning process. Between 1965 and 1992, a homeowner revolution seized control of the planning and land use agenda in Los Angeles, outmaneuvering both civil rights and business groups in the process.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Vinit Mukhija, “N of One plus Some: An Alternative Strategy for Conducting Single Case Research,” *Journal of Planning Education and Research* vol 29, no 4 (2010): 416-426.

<sup>2</sup> The 1965 and 1992 events have variously been termed riot, rebellion, or civil unrest. Each carries with it connotations along a spectrum of blame (riot) to justice (rebellion). In general, throughout the text, I use the more neutral term “civil unrest” as a descriptor of events.

<sup>3</sup> Carey McWilliams, *North from Mexico: the Spanish-speaking people of the United States* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1990). First published in 1949.

<sup>4</sup> “Police Must Clean Up L.A. Hoodlumism,” *Los Angeles Examiner*, June 10, 1943.

<sup>5</sup> John Anson Ford, *Thirty Explosive Years in Los Angeles County* (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1961): 137. The Sleepy Lagoon case involved the brutal murder of José Gallardo Diaz near a local swimming hole in East L.A. (called the Sleepy Lagoon). Despite weak evidence, the LAPD arrested 17 Mexican youths, and on January 13, 1943, nine were convicted of murder and sent to San Quentin

Prison, and the remaining eight convicted of lesser crimes and held at the L.A. County jail. The Sleepy Lagoon trials are widely believed to have been a contributor to the Zoot Suit Riots in late May and early June 1943. Carlos Larralde, “Josefina Fierro and the Sleepy Lagoon Crusade, 1942-1945,” *Southern California Quarterly* vol 2, no 92 (Summer 2010): 117–160

<sup>6</sup> Los Angeles Department of City Planning, *City Planners and Planning in Los Angeles, 1781-1998* (Los Angeles: Central Publications Unit, 1998), 20.

<sup>7</sup> Federation Minutes, May 7, 1969, Box 10, vol 1, part 1, *Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations Records* (Collection Number 1244). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA. Federation Minutes (henceforth Federation records).

<sup>8</sup> Myrna Oliver, “Calvin Hamilton, 72; L.A.’s Former Planning Chief Led Agency 20 Years,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 28, 1997.

<sup>9</sup> Peter Calthorpe, *The Next American Metropolis: Ecology, Community, and the American Dream* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>10</sup> Personal Interview, Alan Kishbaugh, Past Vice-President and

President of the Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations (1990-1995), January 24, 2013. Kishbaugh also served on the Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy for 20 years and currently chairs the Mulholland Drive Scenic Corridor Design Review Board.

<sup>11</sup> John J. McDonough et al, "Los Angeles Urban League: Organization Study," The Joint Center for Community Studies (Los Angeles, CA: June 1974), 2, citing an October 1956 LAUL report, Los Angeles Urban League Collection #0479, Special Collections, Social Welfare Archives, University of Southern California.

<sup>12</sup> Chico Ramos, "Letters to the Times: Charity Fund?" *Los Angeles Times*, April 3, 1959, B4 and John Allan, "Politics Disclaimer Attacked," *Los Angeles Times*, April 20, 1959, B4.

<sup>13</sup> Bernard S. Jefferson, "Urban League's Aims Told," *Los Angeles Times*, May 4, 1959, B4.

<sup>14</sup> These two approaches are outlined in Catherine M. Paden, *Civil Rights Advocacy on Behalf of the Poor* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 118-133.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> McDonough et al, 2.

<sup>17</sup> McDonough et al, 5.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1940. It should be noted that, except for a one-time "Mexican" category in the 1930 Census, there was no systemic effort to identify Hispanic residents until the 1970 Census, and even here only on the long form (and it did not fully capture all Latinos due to the wording of the question), not the short form distributed to all households. So the "white" population cited prior to 1970 includes person of Hispanic origins, therefore the 93% likely exaggerates what we now think of as the non-Latino white population. Etherington et al, however, provide a break-down of L.A. County estimates at the time: 1940 L.A. County data: 2,620,450 white, 75,206 black, 61,248 Hispanic, 52,911 Asian. Philip J. Etherington, William H. Frey, and Dowell Myers, "The Racial Resegregation of Los Angeles County, 1940-2000," Public Research Report No. 2001-04, Race Contours 2000 Study (May 2001), 10.

<sup>19</sup> Carey McWilliams, *Southern California: An Island on the Land* (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1946), 80.

<sup>20</sup> Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the Making of America* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1969), 261.

<sup>21</sup> Marion Louise Beaver and Jacquelyn Susan Brooks, "An Operational Account of the Los Angeles Urban League," part of USC Masters in

Social Work (June 1970), 81, Los Angeles Urban League Collection #0479 (henceforth LAUL archive), Special Collections, Social Welfare Archives, University of Southern California.

<sup>22</sup> Communication No. 11492, Box A-806, Los Angeles City Archives. Ordinance 86509 was adopted on May 14, 1942.

<sup>23</sup> Department of City Planning *Annual Report 1943-1944*: 44.

<sup>24</sup> Department of City Planning *Annual Report 1944-1945*: 48.

<sup>25</sup> "Board Approves Proposed Zoning Changes," *Southern California Business* vol 7 No 8 (1945): 2.

<sup>26</sup> Department of City Planning *Annual Report 1946-1947*: 10

<sup>27</sup> Charles Bolte and Louis Harris, *Our Negro Veterans* (New York: The Public Affairs Committee Inc, 1947), 4.

<sup>28</sup> "Housing Plans Key Factor in Zoning Problem" *Los Angeles Times*, October 7, 1947.

<sup>29</sup> See Wendy Plotkin, "Deeds of Mistrust: Racial Restrictive Covenants in Chicago, 1900-1953," PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1999.

<sup>30</sup> *Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary* (1919), 181 Cal. 680, 683-684 [186 P. 596, 9 A.L.R. 115].

<sup>31</sup> Robert M. Fogelson, *Bourgeois Nightmares: Suburbia 1870-1930*

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).

<sup>32</sup> Allan H. Spear, *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto 1890-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

<sup>33</sup> While beyond the scope of this study, these racial covenants – by creating a densely populated African-American community along Central Avenue in South Los Angeles – spawned one of the most prolific jazz scenes in the nation. An excellent resource for understanding South Central during this period is Clora Bryant et al, *Central Avenue Sounds: Jazz in Los Angeles* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), a publication of the UCLA Oral History project.

<sup>34</sup> Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf and Todd Swanstrom, *Place Matters: Metropolitcs for the Twenty-First Century* (Kansas City: University of Kansas Press, 2001), 111.

<sup>35</sup> Keith Collins, *Black Los Angeles: The Maturing of the Ghetto, 1940-1950* (Saratoga, CA: Century 21 Publishing, 1980).

<sup>36</sup> Andrew F. Rolle, *California – A History* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1963), 570.

<sup>37</sup> "Housing Problem Will be Discussed," *Los Angeles Times*, April 23, 1948, 2.

<sup>38</sup> Beaver and Brooks, 71.

<sup>39</sup> “Winthrop Rockefeller Cites Urban League Aim,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 29, 1955, A32.

<sup>40</sup> Los Angeles Urban League, “History: More Than 90 Years of Serving Our Community,” <http://www.laul.org/history-article>.

<sup>41</sup> Karl E. Downs, *Meet the Negro* (Pasadena, CA: Login Press, 1943).

<sup>42</sup> Myrna Oliver, “Wesley R.B. Brazier, 74; Led Integration Efforts,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 28, 1991.

<sup>43</sup> “Urban League Pioneers,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, Feb 16, 1950, A1.

<sup>44</sup> Beaver and Brooks, 84.

<sup>45</sup> A.S. ‘Doc’ Young, “Are Negro Leaders Ignoring Reality?” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, October 31, 1963, C1.

<sup>46</sup> Wesley R. Brazier, “Your Urban League,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, June 10, 1965, A6.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> William E. Pollard, “Labor’s Side,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, March 25, 1954, A8.

<sup>49</sup> “History: More Than 90 Years...”, op-cit.

<sup>50</sup> “Urban League ‘Over the Top’ in ‘54 Membership Drive,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, February 25, 1954, B1.

<sup>51</sup> “Mayor Calls Citizens Group so Seek End to Housing Row,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 16, 1952, 2.

<sup>52</sup> Don Parson, “The Darling of the Town’s Neo-Fascists’: The Bombastic Political Career of Councilman Ed J. Davenport,” *Southern California Quarterly* vol 81, no 4 (Winter 1999), 467-505.

<sup>53</sup> Robert E. Alexander, “Architecture, Planning and Social Responsibility,” Oral History Transcript 1986-1987: Alexander, Robert E. Interviewed by Marlene L. Laskey. Los Angeles: Oral History Program, University of California, Los Angeles.

<sup>54</sup> Frank Wilkinson, “And Now the Bill Comes Due,” *Frontier* (October 1965): 10-12.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Dana Cuff, “A Dodger Victory,” in *The Provisional City: Los Angeles Stories of Architecture and Urbanism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 297.

<sup>57</sup> Cuff, 299.

<sup>58</sup> Los Angeles Urban League, Health and Welfare Department, *Minority Housing in Metropolitan Los Angeles* (Los Angeles: LAUL,

1959), 2.

<sup>59</sup> LAUL, *Minority Housing*, 23.

<sup>60</sup> Harry S. Truman, "Statement by the President Upon Signing the Housing Act of 1949," statement no. 157, Truman Library & Museum.

<sup>61</sup> Ray Hebert, "Angry Foes Hit Urban Renewal," *Los Angeles Times*, August 15, 1962, A1.

<sup>62</sup> "75 Policemen Quell Riot in Griffith Park," *Los Angeles Times*, May 31, 1961, 1.

<sup>63</sup> See, for example, Raymond Arsenault, *Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice* (London: Oxford University Press, 2006).

<sup>64</sup> Adam Fairclough, *To redeem the soul of America: the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr.* (University of Georgia Press, 1987).

<sup>65</sup> Joseph Alsop, "U.S. Negro Leaders Run the Risk of Defeating Their Own Purpose," *Los Angeles Times*, May 31, 1963, A6.

<sup>66</sup> Young, "Are Negro Leaders Ignoring Reality?" op-cit.

<sup>67</sup> "Fair Housing Bill Passed in Assembly," *Los Angeles Times*, April 26, 1963, 2.

<sup>68</sup> "Poverty Funds Control Problem Stirs Dispute," *Los Angeles Times*, October 26, 1964, A1.

<sup>69</sup> *Los Angeles Newsletter*, January 2, 1965.

<sup>70</sup> John Fleming, "The Death of Jimmie Lee Jackson," *The Anniston Star*, March 6, 2005.

<sup>71</sup> "Johnson Urges Congress at Joint Session to Pass Law Insuring Negro Vote," *The New York Times*, March 16, 1965.

<sup>72</sup> "Urban League to Aid Skilled Minority Groups," *Los Angeles Times*, March 17, 1965, A2.

<sup>73</sup> David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Relations and the War on Poverty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 276.

<sup>74</sup> Raphael J. Sonenshein, *Politics in Black and White: Race and Power in Los Angeles* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 72-73.

<sup>75</sup> John A. McCone, *Report of the California Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots* (Los Angeles: Kimtex, 1965).

<sup>76</sup> Dennis Loo, "The 'Moral Panic' That Wasn't: the Sixties Crime Issue in the US," in Stephen Farrall, ed., *Fear of Crime: Critical Voices in an Age of Anxiety* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 20.

<sup>77</sup> *LA Herald Examiner*, August 24, 1965, as quoted in Gerald Horne,



*Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1997), 340.

<sup>78</sup> Eric Avila, *Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear and Fantasy in Suburban Los Angeles* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), 24.

<sup>79</sup> Wesley R. Brazier, "Your Urban League: No Place for Discrimination," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, November 30, 1967, A6.

<sup>80</sup> "'Marshall Plan' to Solve Watts Problems Urged," *Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 1965, B20.

<sup>81</sup> LACC Board of Governor Minutes, February 9, 1967, Box 37, *California Historical Society collection of Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce records and photographs*, Collection no. 0245.1, Regional History Collections, Special Collections, USC Libraries, University of Southern California (henceforth LACC/LAACC Records).

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> 64 Cal. 2d 529 (1966).

<sup>84</sup> Wesley R. Brazier, "Your Urban League: The Planning Department's 'Goals' Project," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, July 28, 1966, A6.

<sup>85</sup> "Councilmen Aroused by Attacks on Government," *Los Angeles Times*, March 31, 1968, G3.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ray Hebert, "Angered By Goals Project Booklet: Council Flays City Planning Chief," *Los Angeles Times*, March 31, 1968, G1.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> "Towards a Better 'Goals' Program," *Los Angeles Times*, April 9, 1968, A4.

<sup>90</sup> Ray Hebert, "96-Page Report by L.A. Goals Council Released," *Los Angeles Times*, February 2, 1970, A1.

<sup>91</sup> Ray Hebert, "2 of 3 Here Want a Bigger L.A.," *Los Angeles Times*, December 1, 1969, SF1.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Hebert, "96-Page Report..." op-cit.

<sup>94</sup> "Urban League to Open in Valley," *Los Angeles Times*, March 7, 1967.

<sup>95</sup> "Threat to Fair-Housing Law Upsets Racial Leaders Here," *Los Angeles Times*, November 11, 1963, F7.

<sup>96</sup> National Urban League (NUL), *A New Thrust for the Urban League Movement*, June 5, 1968, Part III: The Records of the National Urban League, 1967-1979, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (henceforth NUL Records), Box 35.

<sup>97</sup> Letter to Whitney Young from the Ford Foundation, October 4, 1968, NUL Records, Box 60.

<sup>98</sup> Oliver, "Wesley R. Brazier...", op-cit.

<sup>99</sup> "New Urban League Director Outlines Goals," *Los Angeles Times*, February 2, 1968.

<sup>100</sup> Jack Jones, "New Negro Group Attacks \$3 Million Brotherhood Drive," *Los Angeles Times*, January 4, 1969, B1.

<sup>101</sup> Upon his retirement in 2005, Mack was appointed to the LAPD Police Commission by Antonio Villaraigosa.

<sup>102</sup> Jack Jones, "Urban League Chief Cites L.A. Extremes," *Los Angeles Times*, September 1, 1969.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> McDonough, IV-3.

<sup>106</sup> Ethyl L. Payne, "Young Says He Hasn't Written Off Nixon Yet," *Chicago Dailey Defender*, August 9, 1969, 6.

<sup>107</sup> Rudy Johnson, "Whitney Young Scores Nixon's Policy," *New York Times*, July 29, 1969.

<sup>108</sup> National Urban League, Progress Report, 1971, January 1972, NUL Records, Box 14.

<sup>109</sup> Report by Harold R. Sims before the 1971 NUL Delegate Assembly, July 28, 1971, NUL Records, Box 212.

<sup>110</sup> Letter to Whitney Young from Frank Calucci, Acting Director, OEO, January 12, 1971, NUL Records, Box 233.

<sup>111</sup> McDonough, IV-3.

<sup>112</sup> Francis Ward, "Urban League Adopts More Militant Stance," *Los Angeles Times*, August 10, 1971, A14.

<sup>113</sup> "Urban League Nominee Tells of 4-Part Goal," *Los Angeles Times*, October 14, 1971, C3.

<sup>114</sup> Gayle Pollard Terry, "Los Angeles Times Interview: John Mack : Fighting for Affirmative Action, Urban League Takes Off the Gloves," *Los Angeles Times*, July 16, 1995.

<sup>115</sup> Vernon E. Jordan Jr., "Labor Movement Still Holds Key to Change," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, December 2, 1971, A7.

<sup>116</sup> "Environmental Confab Slated," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, February 22, 1979, A8.

<sup>117</sup> Neal R. Peirce, "Greenies, Smoggies Mix It Up, Find Areas of Common Care," *Los Angeles Times*, May 9, 1979, D7.

<sup>118</sup> Barbara Taylor, "Arguments Over Zoning: Property Rights and Freedom Linked," *Los Angeles Times*, November 9, 1980, J45.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Austin Scott, "Urban League Takes Task of Spurring Crenshaw Revival," *Los Angeles Times*, March 6, 1982, A33.

<sup>121</sup> "Crenshaw Façade Program Started," *Los Angeles Times*, July 10, 1983, K22.

<sup>122</sup> "Merchants Hope to Revitalize..."

<sup>123</sup> James H. Cleaver, "Subway May Omit Crenshaw Station," *Los Angeles Sentinel*, August 19, 1982, A1.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> In 1967, the L.A. Chamber of Commerce changed its name to the L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce. Reflecting this change, in discussing events up to 1967, I will refer to the organization as LACC and thereafter as LAACC.

<sup>126</sup> LACC Minutes, November 10, 1960, LACC Records.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> LACC Minutes, June 15, 1961, LACC Records.

<sup>129</sup> LACC Minutes, September 14, 1961, LACC Records.

<sup>130</sup> LACC Minutes, May 12, 1966, LACC Records.

<sup>131</sup> LACC Minutes, February 17, 1966, LACC Records

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> LACC Minutes, December 8, 1960, LACC Records.

<sup>134</sup> LACC Minutes, October 25, 1962, LACC Records.

<sup>135</sup> The SWP has long been a source of dispute between Northern and Southern California. Northern Californians viewed (and largely still view) the project as stealing Northern California's water resources to aid the unsustainable growth of Southern California.

<sup>136</sup> LACC Minutes, February 23, 1967, LACC Records.

<sup>137</sup> LACC Minutes, March 2, 1967, LACC Records.

<sup>138</sup> LACC Minutes, December 1, 1966, LACC Records.

<sup>139</sup> Herb Brin, "City's Industrial Greatness Created in Only 10 Years," *Los Angeles Times*, March 22, 1953, B1.

<sup>140</sup> Robert E. G. Harris, "Influence of Industry in Los Angeles Area," *Los Angeles Times*, October 4, 1949, A4.

<sup>141</sup> "Zoning Laws Viewed as Bar to Building," *Los Angeles Times*, June 12, 1947, A1.

<sup>142</sup> "Mayor Expected to Veto Ordinance Easing Zoning," *Los Angeles Times*, March 18, 1948, A1.

<sup>143</sup> "Council Postpones Action on Zoning Ordinance Veto," *Los Angeles Times*, April 6, 1948, A1.

<sup>144</sup> "Scrap Between Mayor and Council Over Radio Talks Flares Up

Again,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 9, 1948, A1.

<sup>145</sup> “Housing Plans Key Factor...”, op-cit.

<sup>146</sup> “Veto on Zoning Changes Overridden by Council,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 13, 1950, A1.

<sup>147</sup> Helen Churchwood, “Shifts in Zoning Policies Denounced,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 15, 1948, A4.

<sup>148</sup> “Council Votes for Low-Rent Housing Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 27, 1951, 1. The projects approved were in Aliso Village, Rose Hill, Jordan Downs, Elysian Park Heights (i.e. Chavez Ravine), Pacoima, West Los Angeles, Imperial-Compton, Imperial Courts and Pueblo del Rio.

<sup>149</sup> Petree was very active in L.A civic and cultural affairs, even though he was busy as President of Barker Brothers furniture company. At various times he lead the California Chamber of Commerce, the Los Angeles Central City Association, Los Angeles United Crusade, Hollywood Bowl Association, Los Angeles Civic Light Opera Association, among others. He also chaired the Major Highway Development Committee helping to plan California’s freeways, and later, head of the Southern California Auto Club. Myrna Oliver, “Neil Petree; Business and Civic Leader,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 6, 1991.

<sup>150</sup> “Business and Civic Officials Plan Freeways Plea Before Legislators,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 30, 1946, A1.

<sup>151</sup> James Bassett, “C of C Plans Five-Pronged Assault to Uncork Bottlenecks in Transit,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 30, 1948, A1.

<sup>152</sup> “Neil Petree to Retire as Traffic Group Chief,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 18, 1950, A1.

<sup>153</sup> “Chamber Proposes Lower Taxes for Road Program,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 14, 1947, 6.

<sup>154</sup> Jeremy Rosenberg, “My Way or the Highway: Why Mega-Roads Rule the City,” KCET, Laws That Shaped L.A., October 8, 2012.

<sup>155</sup> Bassett, op-cit.

<sup>156</sup> “Freeway Plan Protest Heard,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 6, 1946, A1.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> “Two Strikes is Not Out,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 20, 1949, A4.

<sup>159</sup> “Proposed State Highway Bills Come Under Fire,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 15, 1949, 17.

<sup>160</sup> “New Hearing Ordered on Rapid Transit Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 18, 1949, A1.

<sup>161</sup> Kevin Starr, *Golden Dreams: California in an Age of Abundance*,

1950-1963 (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 263.

<sup>162</sup> LACC Minutes, June 30, 1960, LACC Records.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> "Chamber Program to Spark Industrial Growth of County," *Los Angeles Times*, April 24, 1950, A1.

<sup>165</sup> Production at the Van Nuys plant continued until 1992, when this production was transferred to GM's plant in Sainte-Thérèse, Québec (Canada). The plant was torn down in 1998 to make way for the Plant, a 365,000 square foot retail complex.

<sup>166</sup> Richard E. Preston, "The Changing Landscape of the San Fernando Valley Between 1930 and 1964," *California Geographer* vol 6 (1965): 59-72.

<sup>167</sup> Security First National Bank, *The Growth and Economic Structure of the San Fernando Valley, 1960* (Los Angeles: Security First National Bank, 1960), 26.

<sup>168</sup> Greg Hise, "Building a City Where a City Belong," in *Magnetic L.A.: Planning the Twentieth-Century Metropolis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 191.

<sup>169</sup> Charles Bennett and Milton Breivogel, "The Plan for the San

Fernando Valley Developed by the Los Angeles Planning Commission," *Pencil Points* vol 26 (June 1945), 94.

<sup>170</sup> *City Planners and Planning in Los Angeles*, 18.

<sup>171</sup> Brin, op-cit.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> "Industrial Growth Reported Greater Than All of 1953," *Los Angeles Times*, December 16, 1954, A1.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> "Defense Dispersion Urged on Industry," *Los Angeles Times*, June 21, 1952, A1.

<sup>176</sup> *City Planners and Planning in Los Angeles*, 19.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Department of City Planning, *Annual Report, 1954-1955*, 20.

<sup>179</sup> "Zone Changes Outlined for San Fernando Valley," *Los Angeles Times*, June 7, 1955, 10.

<sup>180</sup> See Joel Garreau, *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier* (New York: Anchor, 1991).

<sup>181</sup> "San Fernando Valley Zoning Hearing Held," *Los Angeles Times*, December 2, 1955, 21.

<sup>182</sup> "Recommendations Due on West Valley Zoning," *Los Angeles*

*Times*, June 3, 1956, 13.

<sup>183</sup> LACC Minutes, January 5, 1961, LACC Records.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> The Associated Chambers of the San Fernando Valley was founded in 1927 by the federation of four chambers: Canoga Park, Chatsworth, Northridge, and Reseda. Granada Hills was admitted in 1928, Tarzana in 1930, Encino in 1931, Winnetka in 1935, Woodland Hills in 1936, and East Woodland Hills in 1953. West Van Nuys was admitted in 1956. These 11 Chambers therefore comprised the ACCSFV by the mid-1950s. Valley Chambers in the East Valley applied – such as Panorama City (in 1957), but at this time, the ACCSFV wanted to keep its membership limited to the West Valley. ACCSFV Minutes, July 9, 1956, Box 3, Folder 03-02 (1956), February 11, 1957, Box 3, Folder 03-03 (1956), *Associated Chambers of Commerce of the San Fernando Valley Collection*, Special Collections and Archives, Oviatt Library, California State University, Northridge (henceforth ACCSFV records).

<sup>186</sup> ACCSFV Minutes, February 14, 1955, Box 3, Folder 03-01 (1955), ACCSFV records.

<sup>187</sup> Al Johns, “Megalopolis Exploding Over Southland Scene,” *Los*

*Angeles Times*, January 10, 1960, F1.

<sup>188</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990*.

<sup>189</sup> South Coast Air Quality Management District, “The Southland’s War on Smog: Fifty Years of Progress Toward Clean Air,” May 1997.

<sup>190</sup> C. of C. Joins ‘Times’ Fight for Elimination of Smog,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 13, 1946, A1.

<sup>191</sup> Ed Ainsworth, “‘Times’ Bringing Smog Expert Here,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 1, 1946, 1.

<sup>192</sup> “C. of C. Joins Times...”, op-cit.

<sup>193</sup> “Text of Report and Conclusions of Smog Expert,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 19, 1947, 1.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> Ed Ainsworth, “Chamber Drops Opposition to Law Revision to Spur Battle on Smog,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 25, 1947, A1.

<sup>196</sup> “City Council and C. of C. Indorse Anti-Smog Bill,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 30, 1947, 1.

<sup>197</sup> “New Smog Proposal Hit,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 27, 1948, A1.

<sup>198</sup> “Industries form Smog Committees” *Southern California Business* vol 9, no 35 (1947): 1.

<sup>199</sup> LACC Board of Governor Minutes, June 23, 1960, Box 37 (1960), *California Historical Society collection of Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce records and photographs*, Collection no. 0245.1, Regional History Collections, Special Collections, USC Libraries, University of Southern California (henceforth LACC/LAACC Records).

<sup>200</sup> LACC Minutes, February 23, 1961, LACC Records.

<sup>201</sup> LACC Minutes, March 9, 1961, LACC Records.

<sup>202</sup> "Air Pollution is a Dangerous Menace Now," *Los Angeles Times*, January 8, 1961, I7.

<sup>203</sup> Ray Hebert, "Chamber Charts 10-Year Blueprint for Southland," *Los Angeles Times*, May 10, 1961, B1.

<sup>204</sup> Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, *Destination '70: Plan of Action for a Great Metropolis* (Los Angeles: LACC, 1961).

<sup>205</sup> LACC Minutes, February 24, 1966, LACC Records.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> "C of C Fights Subsidies for Slum Work," *Los Angeles Times*, December 5, 1962, B15.

<sup>208</sup> LACC Minutes, March 10, 1966, LACC Records.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> In September 1967, recognizing the growth of the region had expanded its geographic scope, the Chamber officially changed its name to the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce (henceforth LAACC).

<sup>212</sup> Starr, 263.

<sup>213</sup> "Transit: 'The Critical Need'," *Los Angeles Times*, January 8, 1968, A4.

<sup>214</sup> "'Multiburden' Transit Plan Offered by C of C," *Los Angeles Times*, January 6, 1968, A11.

<sup>215</sup> Ray Hebert, "L.A. Chamber Moving Toward Major Role on Rapid Transit," *Los Angeles Times*, January 7, 1968, H1.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Herbert K. Krauch, "Response of the RTD: The Case for Rail Rapid Transit," *Los Angeles Times*, May 2, 1968, C5. Krauch was the Director or President of the Southern California Rapid Transit District for eight years, from 1965 to 1973. Burt A. Folkart, "Herbert Krauch; Longtime L.A. Newspaperman," *Los Angeles Times*, January 12, 1993.

<sup>218</sup> Ray Hebert, "Transit Officials Say They'll Offer New Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, November 7, 1968, 3.

<sup>219</sup> Myron Levin, "Light Rail Route Proposals Spark Debate, Protests," *Los Angeles Times*, March 10, 1986, A6B.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> "Businessmen, Homeowners Disagree: Valley Rail Plan Praised, Deplored," *Los Angeles Times*, July 23, 1986, V\_A8.

<sup>222</sup> James Quinn, "Panel Bows to Pressure, Backs Off Chandler Trolley Route," *Los Angeles Times*, November 22, 1986, V8.

<sup>223</sup> Myron Levin, "Trolley's Planners Steer Clear of Victory," *Los Angeles Times*, March 29, 1986, V\_A6.

<sup>224</sup> James Quinn, "Homeowner Leader Proves Formidable Enemy of Growth," *Los Angeles Times*, November 22, 1987, V11.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> James Quinn, "Light Rail Plan for Valley Hits a Dead End," *Los Angeles Times*, November 20, 1987, C7.

<sup>227</sup> James Quinn, "No Easy Route," *Los Angeles Times*, February 8, 1987, V6.

<sup>228</sup> Bob Pool, "Businesses Try to Get Light Rail Rolling," *Los Angeles Times*, August 12, 1987, V7.

<sup>229</sup> James Quinn, "Opposition Builds to Legislation: Transit Agency Opposes Light-Rail Ban," *Los Angeles Times*, August 27, 1987, V6.

<sup>230</sup> James Quinn, "Light Rail Ban Jumps the Track; Key Vote Set for Today," *Los Angeles Times*, September 3, 1987, VY\_A6.

<sup>231</sup> James Quinn, "Assembly Passes Measure Banning 2 Light Rail Routes," *Los Angeles Times*, September 4, 1987, VY\_A6.

<sup>232</sup> ACCSFV Minutes, October 10, 1955, Box 3, Folder 03-01 (1955), ACCSFV Records.

<sup>233</sup> LACC Minutes, September 29, 1966, LACC Records.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>235</sup> LACC Minutes, October 13, 1966, LACC Records.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid.

<sup>237</sup> LAACC Minutes, January 29, 1970, LAACC Records.

<sup>238</sup> Frederick Llewellyn, "Air Pollution Can Be Cut Without Gas Rationing," *Los Angeles Times*, February 10, 1973, B4.

<sup>239</sup> John Dreyfuss, "No Easing of Clean Air Rules Permitted – Yet," *Los Angeles Times*, March 3, 1973, 23.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> Larry B. Stammer, "L.A. County Seeks Delay in Adoption of Clean Air Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, December 14, 1988, T14.

<sup>243</sup> "Clean-Air Plan Vote Delayed for 60 Days," *Los Angeles Times*,



June 24, 1989, 1.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> The original Whitnall Highway was to connect where the Whitney Freeway began, at the intersection of the 170 and 5 freeways, running diagonally across the eastern Valley before running through a tunnel under Griffith Park to Normandie Avenue. Land was partially assembled for it before protests blocked it in the 1930s. Today, this section is a utility corridor.

<sup>246</sup> Irv Burleigh, "C of Cs Join Push for Cross-Mountain Road," *Los Angeles Times*, November 21, 1974, SF1.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Barbara Baird, "Reaction Mixed at Meeting on Century Freeway Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, September 4, 1977, CS3.

<sup>249</sup> Irv Burleigh, "City Needs to OK Planning Concept, Chamber Declares," *Los Angeles Times*, August 17, 1973, C1.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> "L.A. Report Cites Need for Less Costly Housing," *Los Angeles Times*, August 31, 1975, H1.

<sup>252</sup> Irv Burleigh, "High-Rise Challenged in Westwood and Valley," *Los Angeles Times*, January 31, 1971, WS10.

<sup>253</sup> Prop 13 was approved with 62.6% voting in favor and 34.0% against. A majority of voters in 55 of 58 counties voted in favor.

<sup>254</sup> For an illustration of postwar suburban growth in L.A., and in particular dispelling the myth of L.A.'s "unplanned" sprawl, see Greg Hise, *Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth-Century Metropolis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

<sup>255</sup> Original affiliate associations included the Bel Air Ass'n, Benedict Canyon Ass'n, Residents of Beverly Glen, Briarcliff Improvement Ass'n, Hollywood Knolls Community Club, Inc., Hollywood Manor Improvement Ass'n, Laurel Canyon Area Ass'n, Los Feliz Improvement Ass'n, Inc., North Doherty Drive Ass'n, Roscomare Valley Ass'n, Sunset Plaza Area Ass'n. Over the years, the Federation would grow to as many 50 associations. The Federation remains the most powerful homeowners group in the City. Today, it has 40 associations. Federation By-Laws, March 1952, Federation Records.

<sup>256</sup> For an explanation of the concept of "growth machines", see Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place," *The American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 2 (1976): 309–32, and John R. Logan and Harvey Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley and Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 1987).

<sup>257</sup> For an overview of the shift away from “growth machine” politics in 1980s L.A. see Andrew H. Whittemore, “Requiem for a Growth Machine: Homeowner Preeminence in 1980s Los Angeles,” *Journal of Planning History*, vol 11, no 2 (2012): 124-140. Whittemore documents some of the later outcomes of the homeowner action in the 1980s – specifically the General Plan Zoning Code Consistency Program and Proposition U, a measure that down-zoned many of L.A. commercial corridors.

<sup>258</sup> For an explanation of homeowners class interests, see William Fulton, *The Reluctant Metropolis: The Politics of Urban Growth in Los Angeles* (Point Arena, CA: Solano Press Books, 1997) and John Horton, “The politics of ethnic change: Grass-roots Responses to Economic and Demographic Restructuring in California,” *Urban Geography* 10, no. 6 (1989): 578-92.

<sup>259</sup> This argument was put forward by Mark Purcell, “Neighborhood Activism among Homeowners as a Politics of Space,” *Professional Geographer* vol 53, no. 2 (2001): 178-194. Purcell’s study is based on participant observation and interviews with six L.A. homeowners associations and two federations, including the Hillside Federation.

Purcell identified neighborhood development as the chief concern of these groups.

<sup>260</sup> Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992). Originally published in French in 1974.

<sup>261</sup> Purcell, “Neighborhood Activism...” 179.

<sup>262</sup> Only 38.9% of households in L.A. are owner-occupied (thus 61.1% of households are non-owners). Of these, almost 20% are condominium owners, not single-family owners. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2010.

<sup>263</sup> See Robert Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

<sup>264</sup> The Hillside Federation’s outlined its purpose was “primarily to protect, promote and further the interests and welfare of residents and property owners, to preserve and enhance property values, to encourage architectural and horticultural improvement and development, to maintain building and zoning restrictions and to take any other such action deemed beneficial to this area.” Federation Minutes, Hillside Federation newsletter, n.d. (between March 1952 and Nov 1954), Federation Records.

<sup>265</sup> George F. Will, “‘Slow Growth’ is the Liberalism Of The Privileged,”

*Los Angeles Times*, August 30, 1987.

<sup>266</sup> Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 212-13.

<sup>267</sup> Fulton, 48.

<sup>268</sup> “Power Play in the Mountains,” *Civic Center Observer* vol 1, no 11, July 7, 1971.

<sup>269</sup> Reyner Banham. *Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971).

<sup>270</sup> Lillard was a native Angeleno, who taught from 1933-42 and 1947-74 at LA City College, UCLA and Cal State LA. In addition to *Eden in Jeopardy*, he authored other nature-based works including *Desert Challenge: an Interpretation of Nevada* (1942), *The Great Forest* (1947), and *My Urban Wilderness in the Hollywood Hills* (1983). Richard Gordon Lillard papers (1940-1988) at the UCLA Young Research Library, Special Collections.

<sup>271</sup> Christopher C. Sellers, *Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 199.

<sup>272</sup> That the Hillside Federation sees itself as principally an environmental group is confirmed by its designation by the National

Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) in the C50 “Environmental Quality” and C99 “Protection and Beautification: Pollution Abatement and Control Services” categories (National Center for Charitable Statistics). That said, its mission statement suggests more than environmental goals: “to protect, promote and further the interests and welfare of residents and property owners, to preserve and enhance property values, to encourage architectural and horticultural improvement and development, to maintain building and zoning restrictions and to take any other such action deemed beneficial to this area.” Federation Minutes, Federation By-Laws, March 1952, Federation Records.

<sup>273</sup> Sellers, *Crabgrass Crucible*, 1.

<sup>274</sup> Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

<sup>275</sup> Christopher Sellers, “How Green Was My Lawn?,” *New York Times*, September 20, 2012.

<sup>276</sup> Richard G. Lillard, *Eden in Jeopardy: Man’s Prodigal Meddling With His Environment: The Southern California Experience* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966).

<sup>277</sup> Lillard, 18.

<sup>278</sup> California Fish and Game, Forty-Sixth Biennial Reports (1958-

1960), 59, as quoted in Lillard (1966), 20.

<sup>279</sup> Kevin Starr, *Golden Dreams: California in an Age of Abundance, 1950–1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>280</sup> Richard G. Lillard, “Brush Fires,” in John and LaRee Caughey, eds., *Los Angeles: Biography of a City* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 454.

<sup>281</sup> Federation Minutes, Letter from James Hartzell to HF members, 24 Feb 1958, Federation Records.

<sup>282</sup> Geological Survey Professional Paper, Vol. 942-945 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 4.

<sup>283</sup> “Mr. Pettitt further reported on conferences with Mr. Blanchard and received the Board’s authority to proceed in such conferences, on an informal basis, looking toward the establishment of common ground on which Councilman Blanchard could expect to have the Federation’s support.” Federation Minutes, 15 October 1959, Federation Records.

<sup>284</sup> Federation Minutes, January 4, 1960, Federation Records.

<sup>285</sup> Federation Minutes, Bulletin to Members #100 re: 15,000 sf Interim zoning ordinance, 7 March 1960, Federation Records.

<sup>286</sup> Federation Minutes, Memo to Members, March 7, 1960, Federation

Records.

<sup>287</sup> Federation Minutes, March 23, 1963, Federation Records.

<sup>288</sup> Federation Minutes, June 12, 1968, and Memo to Member Associations from Executive Committee re: Traffic Committee Report, October 15, 1959, Federation Records.

<sup>289</sup> Federation Minutes, September 7, 1965 and December 2, 1970, Federation Records.

<sup>290</sup> Federation Minutes, August 5, 1970, Federation Records.

<sup>291</sup> Fighting freeways and pushing for transit went hand-in-hand, as some board members argued they would mean a less effective Rapid Transit system. Federation Minutes, June 4, 1974, Federation Records.

<sup>292</sup> Among their efforts was a campaign to reduce the olefin content of gas – they wanted a cap of 12.5%. The Federation also held a roundtable for area members that brought together the Hillside L.A. County supervisor (Ernest Debs), their local councilman Lemoine Blanchard, the head of the County’s Air Pollution Control District (S. Smith Griswold) and Mrs. Michael Levee Jr, whose organization (“SOS”, Stamp Out Smog, a grassroots women’s group) was the first to organize to clean up smog and used its connections to

lobby Sacramento for stricter pollution controls. And in late 1959, the Federation's Air Pollution Committee Chair, Ed Mosk, met with Griswold and agreed to lobby the Governor to call a special session to take up the air pollution problem. It helps that Mosk's brother Stanley was the State Attorney General. The Federation's lobbying efforts proved successful when in 1959, the state began requiring air quality standards and controls on motor vehicle emissions and formed the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board the following year. This would later (in 1967) be merged with the Bureau of Air Sanitation to form what is still today the powerful California Air Resources Board (CARB). Federation Records, Federation Minutes, October 15, 1959; Memo to Members, May 22, 1959 and Federation announcement of 'Important Federation Meeting' at the Bel Air Country Club, July 28, 1959, Federation Records.

<sup>293</sup> Federation Minutes, November 9, 1965, Federation Records.

<sup>294</sup> Council File 115293, Box A-1797 (Los Angeles City Archives); Ordinance 126977 passed March 6, 1964.

<sup>295</sup> "Homeowners vs. Industry: Contest for Right to Land Envisaged," *Los Angeles Times*, January 29, 1961.

<sup>296</sup> Speaking as a guest at a Hillside Federation meeting, Gordon

Whitnall, who was a member of the Citizens Committee on zoning practice and procedures and the former City Planning Director, said that Hamilton "was academistic (sic), from Pittsburgh, (and) not responsible for the good work done there (Golden Triangle)," Federation Minutes, May 7, 1969, Federation Records.

<sup>297</sup> Federation Minutes, June 28, 1966, Federation Records.

<sup>298</sup> Federation Minutes, Letter to Member Organizations from Lillian Melograno (President), October 10, 1966, Federation Records.

<sup>299</sup> Federation Minutes, March 8, 1966, Federation Records.

<sup>300</sup> Federation Minutes, October 5, 1966, Federation Records. Edelman, 36 at the time, was had been elected the year prior; he was considered an unabashed liberal with great appeal to Democrats. Potter, 34 at the time, had defeated Blanchard in 1963, so was also a relative newcomer to Council.

<sup>301</sup> Federation Minutes, January 7, 1970, Federation Records. For more on how the Federation worked to get its members appointed to area commissions, see William Robert James McQueen, "Community Groups in the Eastern Santa Monica Mountains: With Special Reference to the Beverly Glen Residents Association," M.A. thesis, Dept. of Geography, University of California at Los Angeles, 1979.

<sup>302</sup> Federation Minutes, July 1, 1970, Federation Records.

<sup>303</sup> Jeffrey L. Rabin, "Elections L.A. City Council: Crime, Not the Environment, Is Issue This Time," *Los Angeles Times*, March 28, 1993. Note: L.A. uses a run-off system where the top 2 candidates face-off if no single candidate receives 50%+1 in the initial election.

<sup>304</sup> Beverly Ridge was a 300-acre subdivision and golf course in the Santa Monica Mountains north of Beverly Hills and Potter's sister was part of the development team (Beverly Ridge Estates). Potter voted in favor of the project. This prompted a backlash against him, including a probe by the state attorney-general of possible "conflict of interest, malfeasance and bribery." See John Kendall, "State Petitions Bank Records of Councilman Potter," *Los Angeles Times*, September 4, 1969 and George Reasons, "State Inquiry Links Potter, Overseas Firm," *Los Angeles Times*, December 5, 1969.

<sup>305</sup> Pat Bryant, "Wachs 'Working Hard', Enjoying It," *Los Angeles Times*, October 17, 1971.

<sup>306</sup> Erwin Baker, "Yaroslavsky, 26, Sworn In; Council at Full Strength," *Los Angeles Times*, June 11, 1975.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid.

<sup>308</sup> Public Resource Code Section 21000, subd. (e) (1986).

<sup>309</sup> *Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors*, 8 Cal.3d 247 (1972).

<sup>310</sup> Bill Boyarsky, "Westside Crude: The Political War Over Palisades Oil Drilling and an Analysis of What's at Stake for L.A.," *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, September 25, 1988.

<sup>311</sup> *No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles*, 529 P. 2d 66 (1974).

<sup>312</sup> For a detailed explanation of the Oxy battle, see Malcolm J. Abzug, *Palisades Oil: A Community Battles Over Oil Drilling* (Los Angeles: Pacific Hill Press, 1991).

<sup>313</sup> Boyarsky, 14.

<sup>314</sup> For a history of this division between "mainstream" and "alternative" environmental movements, see Robert Gottlieb, *Forcing the Spring* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1995). While Gottlieb rightfully champions the grassroots efforts of the environmental justice movement, his characterization of the conservation movement as predominantly a top-down effort directed by the likes of the Sierra Club and Environmental Defense Fund from Washington, DC, ignores the efforts of homeowners like the Federation. So the difference is less top-down vs. bottom-up than it is between upper- and lower-income groups.

<sup>315</sup> Federation Minutes, Letter to Member Organizations from Melograno, November 1966, Federation Records.

<sup>316</sup> Federation Minutes, Letter to Member Organizations from Melograno, February 6, 1966.

<sup>317</sup> Federation Minutes, March 1, 1967, Federation Records.

<sup>318</sup> Federation Minutes, April 5, 1967, Federation Records.

<sup>319</sup> Federation Minutes, February 7, 1968, Federation Records.

<sup>320</sup> Federation Minutes, April 3, 1974, Federation Records.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid.

<sup>322</sup> Melograno “deplored the coupling of low cost housing with this (RPD) ordinance, starting that there is no connection between this ordinance and low cost housing.” Federal Minutes, September 18, 1968.

<sup>323</sup> Federation Minutes, November 6, 1968, Federation Records.

<sup>324</sup> Collection Summary, Edward Mosk Papers 1934-1961, Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research, Los Angeles, California.

<sup>325</sup> Including Evan Braude for California district 38 and Glen Anderson for California district 32. Federal Election Commission.

<sup>326</sup> “John D. Weaver, 90; Author Righted a Racial Injustice,” *Los*

*Angeles Times*, December 7, 2002.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid.

<sup>328</sup> Federation Minutes, December 4, 1968, Federation Records.

<sup>329</sup> John Weaver, “A Good Life in the Hollywood Hills,” *Holiday*, April 1970.

<sup>330</sup> Federation Records, Box 3, Bowron Report Folder, Letter from Albert G. Bodine (Chair of Hillside Federation) to Mayor Yorty, December 28, 1966, Federation Records.

<sup>331</sup> Federation Minutes, An Address Before SOHA Annual Meeting by H.J. Groelinger (President), May 13, 1969, Federation Records.

<sup>332</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census.

<sup>333</sup> Federation Minutes, May 5, 1970, Federation Records.

<sup>334</sup> Federation Minutes, July 1, 1970, Federation Records.

<sup>335</sup> Mark R. Arnold, “Courts May Rule on Challenge to Suburban Zoning,” *National Observer*, October 20, 1969.

<sup>336</sup> “Suburban Zoning Laws Held Bar to Negroes,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 14, 1968.

<sup>337</sup> Ray Hebert, “Suburbs Must Be Open to All, Romney Warns,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 1970.

<sup>338</sup> “Towards a National Urban Policy,” in National League of Cities,

Cities in the '70s, *Proceedings*, 46<sup>th</sup> Annual Congress of Cities, San Diego, CA, Dec 1-5, 1969 (Washington 1970): 8 as quoted in Michael N. Danielson, *The Politics of Exclusion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 218.

<sup>339</sup> Danielson, 217.

<sup>340</sup> Irv Burleigh, "Developers See No Low Income Homes," *Los Angeles Times*, February 10, 1970.

<sup>341</sup> Los Angeles Department of City Planning, *Background Report for the Housing Plan*, Summary Report of the Los Angeles Goals Council, May 1971, 25. Northridge Civic Association, Housing folder, Box NCA 5, California State University Northridge Special Collections and Archives.

<sup>342</sup> Background Report for the Housing Plan, 32.

<sup>343</sup> John Pastier, "'Rollback' of Zoning Capacity a Toehold for Good Planning," *Los Angeles Times*, December 20, 1970.

<sup>344</sup> Federation Minutes, February 4, 1970, Federation Records.

<sup>345</sup> "Population Density as a Major Factor in Planning for the Santa Monica Mountains in the area Lying East of Sepulveda," Federation memo, n.d. (although undated, the figures are based off of the 1968 Population Estimate and Housing Inventory, and all other materials in

this folder date from 1970-72). Growth & Population folder, Box 13, Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations Records (Collection Number 1244). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.

<sup>346</sup> Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb: Population Control or Race to Oblivion?* (San Francisco: Sierra Club-Ballantine Books, 1968).

<sup>347</sup> Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Signet, 1972).

<sup>348</sup> Zero Population Growth pamphlet, sent by Paul R. Ehrlich (4080 Fabian Way, Palo Alto, CA 94303) to Betty Dearing, n.d.

<sup>349</sup> Ray Hebert, "L.A. Plan Rapped for Accepting Growth Instead of Inhibiting It," *Los Angeles Times*, April 1970

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

<sup>351</sup> Federation Records, Community Plans, Studio City-Sherman Oaks Community Plan folder, Press Release from Councilman Thomas Bradley, March 30, 1970.

<sup>352</sup> Federation Records, Community Plans, Sherman Oaks-Studio City Community Plan, Report of the Sherman Oaks-Studio City-Toluca Lake District Plan Citizens' Advisory Committee, March 1973, 3.



<sup>353</sup> Federation Records, Bowron Report, Letter from Fletcher Bowron, President of Citizens Committee on Zoning Practices and Procedures to Mayor Yorty, September 28, 1967.

<sup>354</sup> George Reasons, "Sweeping Reforms in Zoning System Urged," *Los Angeles Times*, July 31, 1968.

<sup>355</sup> Irv Burleigh, "Planner Trapped in Middle of Zoning Battle" *Los Angeles Times*, November 28, 1971.

<sup>356</sup> Ibid.

<sup>357</sup> Ray Hebert, "City Planners Seek Population Growth Control by Zoning," *Los Angeles Times*, June 5, 1970.

<sup>358</sup> Federation Records, Box 6, Community Plans, Beverly Crest-Bel Air, Letter from Joel Wachs (Council District 2) to Mrs. Betty Dearing, October 8, 1971.

<sup>359</sup> Federation Records, Community Plans, Memo from Bel Air Citizens Committee, June 17, 1972.

<sup>360</sup> Bel Air-Beverly Crest District Preliminary Plan and Background Report, April 1975, 17.

<sup>361</sup> Irv Burleigh, "Councilman Erases 'Rich Ghetto' Label," *Los Angeles Times*, July 31, 1975.

<sup>362</sup> Federation Records, Community Plans, Brentwood-Pacific

Palisades Community Preliminary Plan, EIR, September 1974, 37.

<sup>363</sup> Brentwood-Pacific Palisades Community Preliminary Plan, 43.

<sup>364</sup> "Hearing set on controversial Encino 'plan'," *Valley News*, April 25, 1979.

<sup>365</sup> Brentwood Preliminary Plan EIR Supplement, Appendix F (comments received and staff responses), letter from W. Charles Chastain, Executive Vice-President, Headland Properties, Inc., October 7, 1975.

<sup>366</sup> Federation Records, Community Plans, Hollywood Community Plan folder, Letter by Calvin Hamilton to Howard L. Cleveland, President, Hollywood Knolls Community Club, Inc., December 4, 1973.

<sup>367</sup> Pat Russell (Council District 6), "Guest Opinion," *Canyon Crier*, February 16, 1976.

<sup>368</sup> Tarzana Property Owners Association Newsletter as quoted in "Art Snyder Blasted for Gutting Community Plans," *Canyon Crier*, March 1, 1976.

<sup>369</sup> City of Los Angeles, Intergovernmental Relations Committee, "Report," May 19, 1978, Council File 77-2800-S14 (Box B-826 LACA).

<sup>370</sup> Kevin Roderick, "L.A. Building Ban Weighed to Avert Zoning Law

Suits,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 27, 1984.

<sup>371</sup> *City of Los Angeles v State of California*, 138 Cal. App. 3d 526, 187 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1982).

<sup>372</sup> Anthony Saul Alperin, “AB 283 – A Zoning Consistency Odyssey,” *Southeastern University Law Review* 17 (1987), 4. According to Alperin, the court re-wrote the state statute to change the language to force compliance between the Community Plans and zoning ordinances adopted prior to January 1, 1979 (as written by the statute) to all ordinances enacted by L.A., including those in the future.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>374</sup> *Federation of Hillside and Canyon Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles*, No. C 526,616 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. filed Dec 13, 1984).

<sup>375</sup> Alperin, 7.

<sup>376</sup> Clarence Lo interview with Irma Dobbyn, President of the Tarzana Property Owners Association, February 4, 1987, in Clarence, Y.H. Lo, *Small Property Versus Big Government: Social Origins of the Property Tax Revolt* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 147.

<sup>377</sup> Rich Connell, “Prop. U Backers See It as Start of Land-Use Revolt,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 12, 1986.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>379</sup> Rich Connell, “The State Election: Growth-Control Victory Hailed as ‘Dawn of New Era’,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 6, 1986.

<sup>380</sup> William A. Fischel, *The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Approach to American Land Use Controls* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 329.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>382</sup> John F. Lawrence, “Housing Clash: Ecologists vs Minority Groups: No Growth Concept Halts Low-Income Construction, Drives Up Home Prices,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 23, 1972.

<sup>383</sup> Demographics of Los Angeles, 1970 vs 2010. U.S. Bureau of the Census.

White – 60.1% vs 28.7% (-31.4)

Latino – 18.5% vs 48.5% (+30.0)

Black – 17.3% vs 9.6% (-7.7)

Asian – 3.7% vs 11.3% (+7.6)

<sup>384</sup> Federation Minutes, October 6, 1976, Federation Records.

<sup>385</sup> *Serrano v. Priest*, 5 Cal.3d 584 (1971). For example, Baldwin Hills School District spent \$577.49 per student, while Beverly Hills spent \$1231.72.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid.

<sup>387</sup> Williams A. Fischel, "Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?," *National Tax Journal* 4, no. 2 (December 1989): 465-73.

<sup>388</sup> Federation Minutes, December 1, 1976. Zev Yaroslavsky was in attendance.

<sup>389</sup> N. Gregory Mankiw and David N. Weil, "The Baby Boom, The Baby Bust, and the Housing Market," *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 19 (1989): 235-58.

<sup>390</sup> Federation Minutes, December 1, 1976, Federation Records.

<sup>391</sup> Federation Minutes, January 5, 1977, Federation Records.

In the previous chapter, we explored some of the key motivations of homeowner, business, and civil rights groups (focusing on one central case for each) and illustrated how they had different levels of involvement in land use issues – homeowners being highly involved, business groups only peripherally involved, and civil rights groups having very little involvement in land use issues. These varying degrees of interest in land use issues, of course, resulted from the different nature of their priorities. The Hillside Federation’s concerns were hyper-local and very spatial; as such, they were more directly aligned with planning issues, especially within a process that emphasized local participation. The L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce’s concerns were more regional, less spatial, and limited to particular areas where industry and

commerce were located. And the L.A. Urban League’s concerns were both hyper-local and regional (concentrated in particular areas with large minority populations, but also they looked to open up opportunities for minorities across the region), but largely revolving around social services and civil rights, not land use.

Naturally, these different motivations and their commensurate varying degrees of involvement in the planning process had important implications on the kinds of land use policies that were adopted in the post-1970 community plans. As we saw in the previous chapters, in the aggregate, the land use policy changes witnessed after 1970 largely reflected the will of white, affluent homeowners. But these changes were by no means monolithic, nor did the mobilization of homeowners

occur at the same time in different areas. So the process played out very differently in each area. While a detailed analysis of all 35 community plan areas is not possible within the space and time constraints of this research project, we can look closely at a couple areas to gain a better understanding of how different forces and different groups shaped the city (literally).

So this chapter is meant to illustrate in concrete detail how two areas – Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw (or simply Baldwin Hills for short) and Woodland Hills/Canoga Park (or simply Woodland Hills for short) – that were very similar up until the 1960s, transformed in very different ways thereafter. The social, economic, and environmental forces at play in these two areas were very different, so the divergent paths they took post-1970 cannot and should not be entirely attributed to the different roles of homeowner, business, and civil rights groups in their planning. But it should become clear that the varying degrees of political influence these groups had – and at different times – did contribute to the adoption of land use policies that had

important consequences in shaping the direction of each area.

The two areas should not be seen as representative of a hypothetical “median” Community Plan Area; in fact, I would argue that no such median exists – that there is no typical case in Los Angeles. There are many reasons for this, both social and spatial. The mere location and geography of the 35 plan areas meant that each had important strategic advantages or disadvantages – some are hillside areas, others are beach communities, still others lie in the flatlands. Different areas were either advantaged or disadvantaged by varying access to transportation (both freeway and mass transit). Demographically, the 35 areas run the gamut from very poor to very rich, from nearly all white or nearly all Latino or predominately black to virtually none. The 35 community plan areas have different economic bases, from industry to commerce to tourism to professional services. In short, no Community Plan Areas can perfectly capture the essential dynamic of L.A. as a whole.

So the two areas chosen for detailed exploration in this chapter are more illustrative, rather than representative, of the forces and changes that took place in L.A. both before 1965 and during the 1965 to 1992 community planning period.<sup>1</sup> The 1965 and 1992 dates, as discussed in Chapter 6, were the years of the Watts and Rodney King uprising, respectively – two important events in L.A.’s history that were arguably catalysts for change. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how two areas of the cities transformed in very different ways as a result of this land use dynamic. In both cases, while a part of larger Community Plan Areas (West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert and Canoga Park-Winnetka-Woodland Hills-West Hills, respectively), I will limit my discussion to a smaller spatially contiguous portion at the center of these plan areas. The goal is to illustrate how the emergence of community planning intersected with the social, economic, and environmental forces at play, and how the involvement (or lack thereof) of homeowner, business, and civil rights groups shaped the planning discourse and ultimate

outcomes in two very different areas.

In some ways, Baldwin Hills and Woodland Hills are more exceptional than typical. From my analysis in Chapter 5, Woodland Hills stood out as one of only two areas (Northeast L.A. being the other) in which multi-family density was reduced and single-family density was increased overall between 1970 and 2000. Likewise, Baldwin Hills (listed in the maps and tables as West Adams, since it is the plan area’s first name) is unusual in that it was an area with low homeownership and almost no white population, yet dramatically reduced population density, contrary to the general trend. Certainly, these anomalies warranted further study, which is part of the reason for their selection in this chapter. These areas (see demographics below) also represented two very different typologies, but importantly were sufficiently complex as neither one has extreme poverty or affluence, or is entirely multi- or single-family.

West Adams-Baldwin Hills

Average income = \$41,741 per year

Race: Black 52.3%, Latino 37.9%, White 3.8%, Asian 3.2%

Density: 13,459 people per square mile

Unemployment: 15.0%

Canoga Park-Woodland Hills

Average income = \$76,410 per year

Race: White 56.2%, Latino 26.6%, Asian 10.3%, Black 3.3%

Density: 6,592 people per square mile

Unemployment: 8.4%

Both areas have pockets of poverty and affluence and a mix of multi- and single-family land uses, although not in equal measures. As of the 2000 census, Woodland Hills/Canoga Park is significantly more affluent than Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw. It is also much whiter. And certainly, Woodland Hills/Canoga Park is far more suburban in character than Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw,

which is more urban (with twice the density). Woodland Hills is on the extreme periphery of L.A. (which means it developed later), while Baldwin Hills lies closer to the city's core (meaning its development began much earlier).

In the following, I explore the transformation of Baldwin and Woodland Hills over time. In each case, the analysis is divided into the area's early history (prior to 1943), the post-war period (1943-1965) and the Community Planning era (1965-1992). As will become clear, the forces that shaped them touch on some of the most important ones shaping Los Angeles generally (racial politics, land use politics, the development of the oil and aerospace industries, historic preservation, and so on). But they also are detailed cases of how different groups and different motivations helped shape Los Angeles in different ways in the Community Planning era. They provide concrete examples of how groups like those explored in Chapter 6 intersected with a bottom-up planning process.

## 7.1 - BALDWIN HILLS / CRENSHAW

### A. MODERN ORIGINS (BEFORE 1943)

*What are we doing here?*

*We'll get killed.*

*You know about this place?*

*It's the Jungle, right?*

*They say don't come with anything less than a platoon.*

*This is the heart of it.*

*Jungle. Damu headquarters.*

*Stoners.*

*A lot of murder investigations lead here.*

*One way in, one way out.*

- Alonzo Harris and Jake Hoyt

*Training Day* (2001)

### LUCKY LAND

The modern history of Baldwin Hills (Fig. 7-1, map of key places in the Baldwin Hills area) can be traced back to the fortunes of Elias Jackson "Lucky" Baldwin, who came to L.A. (via San Francisco) from the mid-west to become one of California's most prominent 19<sup>th</sup> century businessmen. In August 1853, after a five-month journey from Wisconsin, 25-year-old Baldwin arrived shoeless in Placerville and onward to San Francisco, as so many before and after him, in search of gold.<sup>2</sup> Arriving in San Francisco, he would soon begin to amass wealth through diverse investments such as hotels, a brick-making plant, real estate, and mining.<sup>3</sup> It was Baldwin's astute business sense and fortune in the mining business that earned him the name






Fig. 7-1: Map of Key Places in Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw

By Author

“Lucky” Baldwin; while yields were low, Baldwin bought as many shares as he could of the Orphir mining company, and when the great Comstock Lode was discovered in 1859 in Nevada, his shares increased a hundred-fold in value, netting him millions.<sup>4</sup>

Having already earned a vast fortune, in April 1875, Baldwin purchased the 8,000-acre Rancho Santa Anita in the San Gabriel Valley, northeast of Los Angeles for \$200,000, soon acquiring enough surrounding property to create a vast estate on

which he ran livestock, grew crops, raised thoroughbred horses (founding the famed Santa Anita racetrack), and managed a vineyard.<sup>5</sup> A small portion of the rancho, including his house, is preserved as part of Los Angeles County Arboretum and Botanic Garden. Over time, Baldwin sold off portions of his estate to create house lots in what would become Monrovia, Sierra Madre, and Arcadia.<sup>6</sup> By the 1880s, Baldwin was the largest employer and taxpayer in Los Angeles County.<sup>7</sup> Notable was Baldwin’s progressive hiring of Chinese, African-American, and Native-American workers.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the Santa Anita estate, on December 2, 1875, Baldwin acquired half of the Rancho la Cienega o Paso de la Tijera (henceforth Rancho La Cienega) southwest of Los Angeles for \$35,000, when one of its owners had financial difficulty.<sup>9</sup> He subsequently acquired the other half in 1886 for \$60,000.<sup>10</sup> At the time, it was not considered prime real estate (*ciénega* in Spanish meaning swamp or marshland) and it was not profitable for Baldwin. It was used primarily as a pasture for



Fig. 7-2: View of Rancho la Cienega, c1880s.  
LAPL Herald-Examiner Collection (00078973)

sheep and later, under the direction of Baldwin's cousin, as a more successful dairy farm (Fig. 7-2, view of Baldwin Hills in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century).<sup>11</sup> By the 1880s, Baldwin had acquired vast holdings around Los Angeles – in addition to Santa Anita and La Cienega, he owned Rancho San Francisco, Rancho La Merced, Rancho Potrero Grande, Rancho Potrero Chico, Rancho Potrero Felipe Lugo, Rancho Potrero Mission Vieja de San Gabriel, half



Fig. 7-3: View of Baldwin Hills Oil Derricks, 1940

USC Digital Library, Dick Whittington Collection (DW-C1-12-18)

of Rancho La Puente and numerous lots in Los Angeles.<sup>12</sup> In the 1880s, Baldwin began subdividing his ranchos, but not Rancho la Cienega. By the turn of the century, with the Redondo Electric Railway and Southern Pacific Railroad traversing the ranch, the land was rapidly increasing in value as demand for transit-accessible city lots grew. But Baldwin did not sell.

In 1909, Baldwin died of pneumonia at Santa Anita and left Rancho la Cienega to his daughters, Clara Baldwin Stocker and Anita Baldwin McClaughry.<sup>13</sup> Lucky's fortune apparently extended beyond the grave, for it was soon discovered that under the Rancho's hills west of Crenshaw Boulevard (then known as Angeles Mesa Drive until June 1930) was a vast oil reserve, attracting big oil companies to the area (Getty, Standard, Texaco, Shell). By 1924, drills were sunk on the ranch, and soon gushers of black gold erupted, giving birth to the Inglewood Oil Field (Fig. 7-3, view of Baldwin Hills oil derricks).<sup>14</sup> Over protests from Baldwin's executor, his daughters began subdividing and selling parts of Rancho la Cienega through the Los Angeles

Investment Company (LAIC) for residential neighborhoods east of Crenshaw Boulevard. LAIC was “one of the most extensive and most daring adventurers during the subdivision boom,” acquiring over 3,000 acres of the Rancho la Cienega for some \$6.2 million, more than twice what real estate dealers at the time felt it was worth.<sup>15</sup> While LAIC saw its shares increase from \$1 a share to \$4.50 before the Baldwin purchase, over-



Fig. 7-4: View of Olympic Village, 1932

LAPL Security First National Bank Collection (00098668)

speculation and a declining market led to share price drop by half thereafter.

### OLYMPIC VILLAGE

Development picked up again in the 1920s, and by 1928, LAIC began subdividing land on the eastern edge of what would later be called View Park, just west of Crenshaw.<sup>16</sup> But the stock market crash on October 29, 1929 had an immediate chilling effect on real estate development. By 1932, with the market still slumping, the Baldwin heirs lent a portion of their holdings to be temporarily transformed into one of the best-kept secrets in L.A. history – the 1932 Olympic Village. It was the first time that a specially designed athletes’ village was constructed for the Olympic Games. Because of the Depression, L.A. was the only bid for the Olympics, and most expected it would be a financial disaster, but it proved profitable for the city. Located at the end of West Vernon Place, the Village consisted of 500



portable 24-foot by 10-foot pink and white bungalows housing four men each, designed by H.O. Davis (Fig 7-4, view of Olympic Village).<sup>17</sup> The location was ideal – while four other sites were considered, its high elevation made it 10 degrees cooler than the rest of the city, and it was located just four miles from the Olympic Stadium, with views over the Pacific Ocean to the west. As Mark Dyreson describes it (citing *New York Times* reporter Duncan Aikman at the time):



Fig. 7-5: View of Olympic Village Administration Building, 1932  
LAPL Security First National Bank Collection (00098667)

“The village had been erected in the pastoral magnificence of Baldwin Hills which overlooked the blue Pacific and “cooled by morning fog and afternoon trade winds,” escaped the fury of Southern California’s summer sun. Oil derricks dotted the lower slopes and gullies of this particular paradise, symbols of America’s wounded but still great industrial strength. On the hilltop nearest to Los Angeles there had “sprung up an enormous spread of pink and cream-colored bungalows” which were in Aikman’s estimation “not unpleasing to the eye”... a miniature city on a hill, with “everything but department stores and city hall politics.” It had miles of sewers and paved roads. California evergreens and palm trees gave it the look of “a baronial motion picture estate.”<sup>18</sup>

A 158-acre mini-city, the Village had five dining halls, a post office, radio station, hospital, dentist, fire station, movie theater, bank, and a 800-foot long administration building that housed a barber, restaurant, travel bureau, laundry rooms, press rooms and more.<sup>19</sup> Lying just beyond L.A.’s borders in

unincorporated L.A. County, the site was entirely unimproved – no water, no power, no sewers, no telephone lines, no gas – so temporary services had to be brought in. The Village plan was very formal, with a forecourt where the Spanish Colonial style administration building greeted visitors (Fig. 7-5, view of administration building). This entrance area was connected to the main space, which consisted of a long, thin oval lawn around which were lined three rows of bungalows along five miles of streets lined with seven acres of newly planted flowers. Dining halls were located in the center of the oval, which had a practice track around its perimeter. The site was designed to follow the contour of the hills, so as to not disfigure the terrain.

As impressive as it was, no trace of the Olympic Village remains today as it was completely dismantled and the bungalows sold off and shipped across the country and world. Everything used was re-sold – towels and linens, dishes and silver, stoves and pots, roof tiles, furniture and doors. Only the names of two minor streets – Olympiad Drive and Athenian Way

– stand as a reminder of this forgotten place. The agreement with the Baldwin daughters required the site be returned within 60 days in the same barren hillside it was before.<sup>20</sup> As quickly as it went up – construction started on April 1, 1932, less than four months before the July 30<sup>th</sup> opening ceremony – this piece of fleeting history was gone.

#### LEIMERT PARK and VIEW PARK

While the Olympic Village site was returned to barren hillside after 1932, by 1927, work had already begun on the affluent Leimert Park neighborhood immediately to the east (named after its developer, Charles W. Leimert and his Leimert Investment Company). Leimert, who had already developed 1,700 acres in Los Angeles by this time, bought the 231-acre site from Clara Baldwin Stocker in December 1926 for \$2 million; the area had been used as a horse training track and dairy farm by Baldwin.<sup>21</sup> Leimert Park was heavily promoted,

with some houses being built in time for the 1932 Olympics. By September 1933, the Baldwin heirs sold an additional tract of land to Leimert's West Side Land Company, in what would become the second phase of Leimert Park (north of Santa Barbara Boulevard, now known as Martin Luther King Jr Boulevard). This second phase would become one of the first subdivisions to be FHA-approved, following the creation of the FHA in 1934. One house (3892 Tenth Avenue, now 3892 Olmsted Avenue) would be famously featured on the cover (with spread inside) of the September 25, 1938 Life Magazine. Leimert Park's Art Deco theatre – a joint venture between Leimert and maverick filmmaker and pilot Howard Hughes – was, at the time, a regional draw.

Reflecting the sensibilities of the inter-war years – modern in its rationality, but still adhering to the formalism and beauty of the earlier City Beautiful tradition of civic design – Leimert Park was planned by the Olmsted brothers (sons of famed Central Park designer Frederick Law Olmsted), and

was one of the first master-planned communities in Southern California (Fig. 7-6, view of Leimert Park). It was a model of urban planning in its time: with minimal car traffic, utility lines buried or out of sight in rear alleys, and organized around two schools and a town square with theatre and shopping. It was also a very urban prototype, with minimal front yard setbacks, consistent and lush tree plantings on every street, and both single-family houses and multi-family apartments, all designed in a consistent traditional architectural Spanish Colonial and Mediterranean style.

Leimert Park was a streetcar suburb, with the narrow-gauge Los Angeles Railway (LARY or yellow car) line #5 (although then known as the E line) running from Eagle Rock through Downtown L.A., along Santa Barbara Boulevard to Leimert Boulevard (where it ran on a dedicated landscaped center right-of-way), before turning south and running along Crenshaw Boulevard into Inglewood and on to Hawthorne.<sup>22</sup> Leimert was well aware that the white professional class that he courted





Fig. 7-6: View of Leimert Park, c1938

*USC Digital Library, Dick Whittington Collection (DW-C1-12-7)*



for Leimert Park would eventually own automobiles, but also recognized that placing the commercial center of Leimert Park

commercial center as “one of the greatest future shopping sub-centers of Los Angeles!” that would “reap a harvest of profit” claiming it would be the “principal shopping place of 85,000 people.”<sup>23</sup> There was a Pacific Electric (“red car”) line that ran from downtown along Exposition Boulevard to Santa Monica—then known as the Santa Monica Air Line – running along the northern border of Leimert Park (this line was discontinued in 1953, but the new light-rail Exposition Line opened along this route in 2012).<sup>24</sup> Later, the #85 motor coach also ran up and down Crenshaw connecting Leimert Park to Wilshire Boulevard. So it was well connected to the rest of the City.

Leimert Park was designed as a prototypical “Neighborhood Unit” as first proposed by Clarence Perry in the mid-1920s (Fig 7-7, neighborhood unit model). Perry’s neighborhood unit accepted the theory advanced by the Chicago School of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess that urban problems could be linked to the lack of cohesive community at the local neighborhood level. The neighborhood unit, such




Fig. 7-7: Clarence Perry’s Neighborhood Unit Concept, 1929. *New York Regional Survey, Vol 7. 1929*

as the one conceived at Leimert Park, would recreate village-like conditions in the modern city by bringing together a homogeneous group of people and uniting them around a set of neighborhood services. While Chicago School sociologists did not agree with imposing village values in the modern city, they agreed that the basis for reform would be bringing together like-minded groups into neighborhood units. In effect, sociologists advocated separating people according to their class, using social distance as a means to ensure social order in the city.

Leimert was one of California's leading subdivision developers, and a leader of the powerful California Real Estate



Fig. 7-8: View of Sunset Fields Golf Course, 1928  
*Exum and Guiza-Leimert, 61 (courtesy Leimert Investment Co.)*

Association who encouraged not only high-quality development standards but also “intelligent restrictions” so that a developer “has protected those who already live there and his tract is becoming a stronger and stronger magnet to home seekers.”<sup>25</sup> These deed restrictions, written into the private contract of sale between the original seller (in this case, the Leimert Investment Co.) and buyers, mandated and prohibited certain types of behavior and “served as both the physical and political model for zoning laws and subdivision regulations.”<sup>26</sup> While restricting property owners’ rights and controlling certain design features of the neighborhood to prevent undesirable alterations, they also were used to bar so-called undesirable people.

And so it was with Leimert Park, which was, like most residential areas in Los Angeles in the 1920s, restricted to whites in an age of racially restrictive covenants (see Chapter 6). Adding to the appeal and stature of Leimert Park to upper-middle class whites was the Sunset Fields Golf Course at 3701 West Stocker Street, which opened on Labor Day, 1927 (Fig.

7-8, view of Sunset Fields Golf Course).<sup>27</sup> The Sunset Golf Association took out a 20-year lease on the land from the Baldwin heirs and used the rancho's original adobe – one of the oldest still-standing structures in L.A. County (built between 1790 and 1795) – as the golf course clubhouse.<sup>28</sup> The area was also home to the American Airport (3809 Crenshaw Boulevard, just north of the Sunset Field golf course).<sup>29</sup>

If Leimert Park represents a 1920s formal response to the desire for an ordered modern city, the development of the former Olympic Village site in View Park moves closer to, and indeed anticipates, the more suburban response that would appear after the Second World War. The Olympic Village site, restored to its barren state after the Games, sat idle for a few years until 1936, when the Clara Baldwin Stocker estate sold the land to the Los Angeles Investment Company, which subdivided it into single-family lots. These lots were not developed en masse as would become the norm after the war, but rather sold one-by-one to individual families who chose their

own architects to design homes to meet their individual tastes, resulting in an eclectic mix of traditional styles – Spanish, Colonial, Mediterranean, Ranch, and Tudor.<sup>30</sup> The View Park/Windsor Hills development was aimed at middle-class families and became the first subdivision in Southern California for which the newly created Federal Housing Administration (FHA) provided mortgage insurance. Since lots were sold one at a time, View Park developed more slowly (between the late 1930s and early 1950s) than the more uniform post-war suburban housing tracts in the San Fernando Valley. By 1937, only a few houses were beginning to be built in View Park (Fig. 7-9, view of View Park in the 1930s). But with curvilinear streets, large setbacks, spacious yards, sizeable square footages, and consisting entirely of single-family homes with no center and no commercial component, the neighborhood provided a template for later suburban areas.





Fig. 7-9: View of View Park, 1937

USC Digital Library, Dick Whittington Collection (DW-910-206-2)

## VILLAGE GREEN



Fig. 7-10: Aerial Plan of Village Green (Baldwin Vista below), 1956  
Cornell University Archives, Clarence Stein Papers (RMC2011\_0284)

Adding to the cutting edge appeal of the Baldwin Hills area, in 1941, construction began on the modernist Baldwin Hills Village, or Thousand Gardens, as it was originally known (it would be re-named after its central park – the Village Green – when it was converted to condominiums in the 1970s). Developed by the Rancho Cienega Corporation, the \$7 million project received FHA mortgage insurance as outlined for large-scale private projects in the National Housing Act of 1937.<sup>31</sup>

Drawing on the principles advocated by CIAM (Congrès Internationaux D'architecture Moderne), Village Green had a thoroughly forward-looking design by Wilson, Johnson & Merrill, planner Reginald Johnson, with famed architect/urban planner Clarence Stein as consultant, and Fred Barlow Jr responsible for the landscape design. Its 627 units were arranged in compact clusters of 97 long, thin two-story buildings oriented towards a central 50-acre park (Fig. 7-10, plan of Village Green). This



layout meant that only 14% of the land area was occupied by buildings, creating a park-like setting within a roughly 2,500 by 1,100 foot, 105-acre super-block (equivalent to 10 regular city blocks), which was considered the ideal at the time.<sup>32</sup> This arrangement was conceived to ensure that more than half the units had corners and three exposures (the remaining units went through the entire width of the building to ensure cross-ventilation). As was customary at the time, a section of the project was reserved for families with children, distinct from apartments meant for singles and young couples.

Meant to create a “country club atmosphere” with seclusion and privacy being key selling features of the development, it had a 24-hour switchboard and maid services to emulate living in a hotel. Tennis and croquet courts and a softball field were located adjacent to the main administration building in the center and badminton courts, fenced-in playgrounds, and sand boxes were sprinkled throughout. And the development provided, free of charge, a bus service to area

shopping centers, and helped organize ride sharing programs among tenants. It also had an on-site nursery school and a social hall for community functions. And of course, the Sunset Fields Golf Course was still operating across the street (La Brea Avenue), adding to the “country club” feeling. Roughly half the apartments had their own addresses, due to the unique low-rise design, and all lower units had their own enclosed private patio, and all families were given a garden area. The buildings were arranged in clusters to create distinct communities within the overall development, which allowed people to get to know their neighbors. It was also designed with the goal of keeping cars to the periphery, to maximize safety and privacy.

Lauded as a “reasonably-priced” alternative to government-financed public housing projects since it was entirely privately financed and managed, it was held up as an example of why “government has no business competing in the essentially private field of home building.”<sup>33</sup> And it was very popular, with initial rentals going quickly and a long wait time to

get a unit after it was fully leased. As Ben Leroy remarked when he and his wife Estelle moved into Village Green in the early 1950s, “it was like finding Shangri-La.”<sup>34</sup> With no cars running through the community, it was sold on its safety for children, peaceful atmosphere (from the absence of traffic), and sense of place. As resident Marsha Rood said, it “was a design with very much a utopian social goal.”<sup>35</sup>

### **B. THE POST-WAR PERIOD (1943-1965)**

So by the time the U.S. entered the War, Baldwin Hills was a posh area consisting of a fashionable mixed-use neighborhood, an emerging hillside of stately homes, a world-class golf course (and adjacent airstrip), and the pre-eminent apartment community in the nation. It was a highly desirable community whose potential seemed limitless. And when hostilities ended in September 1945, Baldwin Hills continued where it had left off.

### **BROADWAY-CRENSHAW CENTER**

With the influx of population into the area in the 1930s and 40s, after the Second World War, there was a great demand for local retail in the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area. The demand for new retail led to the construction (in 1946-47) of the Broadway-Crenshaw Center shopping center at the intersection of Crenshaw and Santa Barbara as the first post-war retail complex in California, and considered by some to be the oldest regional shopping center in the United States (Fig. 7-11, view of Broadway-Crenshaw Center).<sup>36</sup> The new mall would result in the loss of nine holes of the Sunset Fields Golf Course.<sup>37</sup> The 555,000-square foot Center was anchored by Broadway and May Company department stores (both over 200,000 square feet), a 45,000-square foot Vons grocery store, and a 48,000-square foot Woolworth variety store. It also included stores for children’s clothes (Bond), women’s clothes (Lerner’s), men’s clothes (Silverwood’s), shoes (Chandler’s), fabrics (Alpert’s),

drugs (Owl and Savon), banking (Security-First), and car repairs (Mobil).<sup>38</sup>

In many ways, the Broadway-Crenshaw Center was analogous to View Park, in that it represented a bridge between the traditional past and the modern future. Despite being a new regional shopping center prototype catering to the automobile, its designer (Albert B. Garner) orientated the Streamline modern



Fig. 7-11: View of the Broadway-Crenshaw Center, c1952  
LAPL Ralph Morris Collection (00031926)

building so storefronts faced and were built right up against Crenshaw Avenue and Santa Barbara Boulevard, reflecting the traditional streetscape of the past. Yet, behind the stores there was a vast sea (13 acres) of parking, large enough to hold 2,500 cars. They believed that having dual entrances – one facing the street, and one facing the parking lot (with both facades looking identical)– would allow them to cater to both local pedestrian traffic and car traffic from further afield. This was not without its challenges, of course. For one, it required tunneling under the entire length of the shopping center as a service space for deliveries. But it also meant the additional expense of creating twice as much outdoor display space as usual, and the difficulty of policing two exits. Unlike most retail centers at the time, which were intended as a complement to a city center, the Broadway-Crenshaw Center was designed as a mass merchandizing destination unto itself – not aimed at a high-end clientele such as the Miracle Mile or Westwood, but more upscale than Downtown – precisely for the middle-class



households settling around it.

Even the gruesome discovery of Elizabeth Short's body (of the famed unsolved "Black Dahlia" case<sup>39</sup>) – which had been brutalized, cut in half and staged – just across Crenshaw Boulevard opposite the Center (at approximately 3825 South Norton Avenue) on January 15, 1947 – just months before it opened – did not slow down the area's growth. To meet the growing demand for water in the immediate area and beyond, between 1947 and 1951, the Department of Water and Power constructed the Baldwin Hills Reservoir just west of La Brea Avenue in the Baldwin Hills – which would later prove to be an ominous choice. After it opened in November 1947, the Broadway-Crenshaw Center was highly successful, demonstrating a new retail model of combining large and small stores in partnership and ushering in the obsolescence of the stand-alone department store.<sup>40</sup> The May Company store was not part of the Broadway-Crenshaw Center, but they located immediately across Santa Barbara to create the impression of

a single project (in fact, most people thought it was designed as a single complex); this ironically set a new precedent in retail of having a shopping center with two anchors (to this point, they would never be located at the same location).<sup>41</sup> The Broadway-Crenshaw Center was a catalyst for the entire Crenshaw corridor, with new development springing up across the street and further north on Crenshaw and another along Santa Barbara (Santa Barbara Plaza), creating a thriving shopping district.

#### BALDWIN HILLS ESTATES and BALDWIN VISTA

By the late 1940s, with middle- and upper-class neighborhoods like Leimert Park, View Park, and the Village Green and one of the most successful shopping districts in the country, the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area was firmly established a desirable area in clear ascendance – centrally located, with views of the Pacific Ocean and Hollywood Hills, with well-built homes lining carefully along the streets. Los



Fig. 7-12: View of Baldwin Hills Estates (hills, upper right), 1954

USC Digital Library, Dick Whittington Collection (DW-V6-1-6)

Angeles was booming and Baldwin Hills was at the center of that activity. Between January 1<sup>st</sup> and August 31<sup>st</sup>, 1948, 12,013 permits were issued in Los Angeles for single-family homes (totaling roughly \$100.8 million in construction costs), 1,027 (\$11.7 million) for multi-family homes, and 831 (\$70.8 million) for apartments – so while the majority (55%) were single-family homes, almost half (45%) were for multiple dwellings; collectively these permits housed some 85,000 people.<sup>42</sup> The demand for housing was so great that both single- and multiple family housing were welcomed.

Despite the feverish activity in the area, the area immediately to the west of the Broadway-Crenshaw Center remained vacant, as did the hillsides behind it. This didn't last long, as the hillside area would soon be developed into Baldwin Hills Estates. Leimert Park was wholly traditional in its form – highly ordered and coherent in its urban typologies and architectural styles – and View Park was a bridge between the traditional and modern city – suburban in urban form, but

employing traditional architectural styles. Baldwin Hills Estates (often just referred to more generically today as simply Baldwin Hills) moved closer to the suburban ideal, adding a minimalist mid-century modern architectural language to its suburban typology (Fig. 7-12, view of Baldwin Hills Estates). Located to the North of View Park, the 300-acre hillside site was purchased by Howard F. Ahmanson and subdivided into 1,030 lots for an estimated investment of \$25 million.<sup>43</sup> Construction began in June 1951 in this triangular area, sandwiched between Stocker Street, the *Paso de la Tijera* (meaning passage of the scissors it represented) which was La Brea Avenue, and the flats west of Crenshaw Center to the north.

The development offered buyers two choices: complete pre-designed homes that ranged between \$26,500 and \$39,500 or lots that ranged between \$6,000 and \$8,000 on which people could build their own designs.<sup>44</sup> Among the features of the Estates was the creation of an architectural board to ensure the quality of house designs for the vacant



sites.<sup>45</sup> A selling feature of the luxury homes of Baldwin Hills Estates was its proximity to the new Broadway-Crenshaw Center (which by this time was being called simply the Crenshaw Center).<sup>46</sup> So too was its central location – within a 7-mile radius of the neighborhood were Downtown, Hollywood, Playa del Rey beaches, LAX, Beverly Hills, Culver City, Inglewood, Huntington Park, Loyola Marymount, USC and UCLA. The desirability of the area was clear from its advertising:

...wouldn't you like to have your home dollar invested in an area known to be the most stable of all? Wouldn't you like to live in a dream world high above the city yet minutes from Downtown, Beverly Hills, Hollywood, the Beaches... with fine schools, churches, and fabulous Crenshaw Shopping District literally at your feet, in a district already established as one of the finest in California?... smog free... almost every estate has an unobstructed, unbelievable panorama from Beverly

Hills to Whittier.... no expense has been spared... all underground utilities... wide, winding avenues..."<sup>47</sup>

The development proved very popular, with an average of 500 cars visiting every weekend to view the three model homes constructed. Baldwin Hills Estates would become a bastion of privilege, known as "Pill Hill" because of the number of doctors who lived there.<sup>48</sup>

Similar to Baldwin Hills Estates, the area west of the Sunset Fields Golf Course and south of the Village Green would soon be subdivided and a 380 single-family home neighborhood known as Baldwin Vista was constructed.<sup>49</sup> A 17-acre hillside portion of the area, south of Sanchez Drive, was acquired from the Baldwin Hills Company by a consortium of 53 University of Southern California (USC) professors known as the University Housing Association, Inc and subdivided it into lots – an area that would become known as "Troydale" (after the USC mascot, the Trojan).<sup>50</sup>

## “THE JUNGLE”

(CRENSHAW VILLAGE, SUNSET FIELDS, BALDWIN PLAZA)

Despite the intense period of building in the 1930s and 40s, the area between Baldwin Hills and Santa Barbara Boulevard remained largely vacant, a remnant of Lucky Baldwin’s decision to hold the land as long as possible. After the Crenshaw Center had opened (in 1947) and proved successful, developers saw an opportunity to meet the demand of a neglected market – upwardly mobile young individuals and couples who did not have kids and could not yet afford to buy a single-family house. Some of these were returning G.I.s, who contributed to a massive housing shortage in Los Angeles after the war. Over the next few years, the area immediately west of the Broadway-Crenshaw Center began to be developed to meet this need. While single-family development was exploding in the area, so too was multi-family housing with the construction of the Village Green and the vast apartment area west of

Crenshaw Center.

With the Broadway-Crenshaw Center under construction, land west of the new mall began to be developed. Paul W. Trousdale<sup>51</sup> and his Crenshaw-La Brea Company bought a large 640-acre piece of land from the Anita Baldwin estate for \$3.5 million west of the shopping center.<sup>52</sup> At the time of purchase in April 1947, the Crenshaw-La Brea Company planned a massive development (to be designed by Allen G. Siple) with some 8,000 rental units in 800 buildings, costing a total of \$50 million – a development project that Trousdale claimed would be the biggest in the country.<sup>53</sup> Trousdale’s acquisition included the entire area north of Stocker, east of La Brea, south of Santa Barbara and west of the new Broadway-Crenshaw Center. Trousdale envisioned a future for the entire area that would take five years to build – complete with 50 acres of commercial, an elaborate hill-top hotel, a number of 13-story tower apartment buildings, 800 residential homesites, 6,000 two- and three-story apartments (for a total of 35,000

residents).<sup>54</sup> By May 1947, Trousdale had sold a fifth of the land (120 acres) to the Prudential Life Insurance Company for \$1.5 million to build 2,000 apartments. Trousdale also sold a parcel to the Barker Bros. store on the southwest corner of Marlton and Santa Barbara (Martin Luther King Jr) for their largest (45,000-square foot) store, designed by Claud Beelman<sup>55</sup> and



Fig. 7-13: View Crenshaw Village (middle right), 1954  
*USC Digital Library, L.A. Examiner Collection (3-1275-02805-4626)*

built by C.L. Peck.<sup>56</sup> Trousdale also sold a portion of his holdings in April 1949 adjacent to the Broadway-Crenshaw Center to the Capital Company for \$2 million.<sup>57</sup> And of course he would later sell off the hillside portion (Baldwin Hills Estates).

In one year (1948), the Crenshaw-La Brea Company built 104 two-story apartment buildings each with 8, 12 or 16 units, totaling 1,207 units, at a cost of \$15 million in a project that was known as “Crenshaw Village”, with landscaped pathways and generous lawns between Hillcrest Drive and Buckingham Road (Fig. 7-13, view of Crenshaw Village).<sup>58</sup> The buildings were U- and L-shaped, sheathed in stucco, with low-pitched hipped roofs and a consistent architectural language, steel casement windows, sections of horizontal siding, and parking areas accessed from rear alleys. At the time, they were advertised as “new, modern”, “private”, “garden-type”, apartments with “unusually large rooms”, “a distinctive address”, “70 acres in beautiful Crenshaw Village,” and “within walking distance of newest Broadway and May Co stores.”<sup>59</sup> The development played

up its beauty and location: “Crenshaw Village is situated in a beautiful panoramic area. It offers all of the facilities of excellent shopping centers, banks, theaters, etc. Bus transportation is right at your door. Beautifully landscaped grounds surround these garden-type apartments.”<sup>60</sup>

These apartments attracted young white professionals; city directories at the time indicate that many of the residents of Crenshaw Village were Jewish.<sup>61</sup> This, in turn, attracted other Jewish Angelenos to the area, creating a thriving Jewish community in the flats of Baldwin Hills until the 1960s. The Crenshaw-La Brea Company sold these buildings to investors after they were leased up, for as little as \$12,000 down; as of April 1950, the Junior Realty Company, exclusive agents for Crenshaw Village, reported sales volume of \$1 million, far exceeding their expectations.<sup>62</sup> Many of these apartment buildings have today been designated as contributing historic structures and a Crenshaw Village Historic District has been proposed to protect them.<sup>63</sup>

After Crenshaw Village was constructed and proved lucrative, immediately to the west, two additional developments were built between 1954 and 1962, comprising about 300 two story multi-family buildings, between La Brea Avenue, Coliseum Street, Santa Tomas Drive and Hillcrest Drive; both developments use the same typology and architectural language, making them indistinguishable.<sup>64</sup> The eastern portion of this area was known as Sunset Fields (after the golf course previously on the site) and consisted of 48 acres and 149 lots and developed by the Prudential Insurance Company in the mid-1950s.<sup>65</sup> Prudential had previously developed another 93-lot project just north of Sunset Fields, which they subdivided and sold to seven different builders.<sup>66</sup>

The western 70 acres (west of Nicolet Avenue), was developed after the Sunset Fields project by a syndicate lead by Edwin G. Bunjes and James R. Eubank (who bought the land from Prudential) and named their development Baldwin Plaza.<sup>67</sup> The buildings retain many original features, including

jalousie windows, steel windows, stone cladding, patterned concrete blocks, and period railings. Baldwin Plaza was planned for a population of about 10,000 people and the project was estimated at the time to be worth \$25 million.<sup>68</sup> Bunjes and Eubank would subdivide the area and sell to over fifty builders. The ensued development consisted of stylish mid-century courtyard apartment buildings, many designed by Charles Wong and Robert Charles Lesser (who later founded the successful RCLCO real estate advisor firm) and built by Samuel Klein, with stucco exteriors, flat roofs, and characteristic mid-century fonts (with the building names) adorning their exteriors.<sup>69</sup> The “remarkably beautiful Baldwin Plaza development” buildings featured lush tropical trees and foliage – palms, banana trees, birds of paradise, and begonias – and swimming pools filling the courts.<sup>70</sup> Due to this landscaping it became known informally as “The Jungle”. This tropical theme was reinforced by the names of many of the buildings – “The Bahamas”, “The Tahiti”, “The Lanai”, and so on.

## TRANSITION AND CHANGE

By 1955, the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area had cemented a reputation as one of the most desirable areas in the City and highly attractive to middle- and upper-middle class Angelenos. Given its more recent history, it is difficult to understate just how desirable an area it was, but at the time it had a plethora of luxury single-family neighborhoods (Leimert Park, View Park, Baldwin Hills Estates, Baldwin Vista) and upscale multi-family neighborhoods (Crenshaw Village, Sunset Fields, Baldwin Plaza) surrounding a vibrant shopping area (Broadway-Crenshaw Center). But by the mid-1950s, the area’s white hegemony slowly changed as racial barriers to minorities began to fall.

With racially restrictive covenants now unenforceable as a result of the 1948 *Shelley v. Kraemer* ruling, African-Americans in Los Angeles finally had reason to hope for the freedom and residential mobility that whites had always enjoyed.<sup>71</sup> But these freedoms did not immediately follow after 1948. First,



the Shelley case did not settle the issue of racial covenant enforcement; a second case, *Barrows et al v. Jackson* (1953), was needed to address a potential loophole in the Shelley ruling – this time based in the West Adams neighborhood of Los Angeles. The case involved a group of property owners who sued their neighbor for selling her home to an African-American family in February 1950, thus violating the racially restrictive covenant on the land that was recorded in 1945. While the 1948 ruling said that states could not enforce such covenants (although they were not at that time deemed unconstitutional, in and of themselves), it was silent about whether owners had recourse if such covenants were violated. So when Mrs. Leola Jackson (who was white) sold her house to a black family and also didn't incorporate the covenant into the deed of sale, three neighboring white property owners – Mr. and Mrs. Edward Barrows, Richard Pikaar and M.M. O'Gara – sued her, arguing their property had “materially depreciated in value” and had become “less attractive as a residential area.”<sup>72</sup>

The L.A. Superior Court in March 1951, citing *Shelley v. Kraemer*, ruled in favor of Mrs. Jackson, as did the District Court of Appeal in August 1952, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in March 1953. It was a unique case since technically the injured party (Mrs. Jackson) was being sued for violating a contract, but if successful, the suit would deny the constitutional rights of a third party, i.e. African-Americans generally, which raised questions of legal standing. The case had broad implications not only for African-Americans, but other minorities singled out by racial covenants; as such, many local and national organizations filed *amici curiae* on behalf of Mrs. Jackson in both the Appeal and Supreme Court case – including the Japanese-American Citizens League, labor groups, Jewish groups, veterans groups, the ACLU, the Santa Monica YMCA, the Eagle Rock Council for Civic Unity, the Women's International Club, and many more.<sup>73</sup> On the flip side, (white) property owners' groups came to the aid of Mrs. Jackson's neighbors, for example, Vermont Square Neighbors, Angeles Mesa

Neighborhood Association, Lafayette Improvement Association, Hancock Park Neighbors, the L.A. Realty Board, among others both in L.A. and in cities across the country, arguing – among other things – that the voiding of racial covenants would lead to intermarriage of blacks and whites.<sup>74</sup> With the NAACP’s help, the Court ruled in favor of Mrs. Jackson, strengthening the case law against racial covenants.

With the legality of racial covenants clearly waning after the 1953, African-Americans with means began to move outside of their previously restricted areas (primarily South Central Avenue and Watts). But change did not come peacefully. With legal avenues increasingly closing for them, whites turned to fear, intimidation, and outright violence to maintain segregated communities. Crosses were burned on lawns and doorways with regularity. Specific homes were targeted. For example, one owner at 2130 South Dunsmuir Avenue in the West Adams (just north of the Crenshaw district), was threatened in August 1951 that his home would be blown up if he tried to sell to African-

Americans (as one note warned: “sell to colored we bomb your home... if you that crazy for \$ we make you sorry... we have bombs ready and eye on you.”)<sup>75</sup> He did not heed the warning and sold to William Bailey, head of the science department at Carver Junior High School, who moved in March 1952. Early on Sunday morning of March 16<sup>th</sup>, the house was bombed but no one was ever arrested.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, Mr and Mrs Preston Wilson bought a house at 3913 Sixth Avenue in Leimert Park in early 1950 and felt very happy and secure until a real estate agent named Craig called on them, informing them that the neighborhood was for whites only. After the Wilsons returned from church one Sunday evening, white neighbors descended upon the house flashing spotlights into the windows and pelted the house with stones, breaking up only after police arrived.<sup>77</sup> Incidents such as these were sadly all too common in 1950s Los Angeles.

## CRENSHAW SQUARE

African-Americans were not the only minorities who began moving into the Crenshaw area in the 1950s. The area also became home to small but significant Japanese community. Arriving in the aftermath of the Second World War – after thousands of Japanese-Americans were interned in isolation camps – Japanese families began moving into single-family homes in previously all-white neighborhoods west of




Fig. 7-14: Holiday Bowl Cafe, 1956  
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division (HABS CA-2775)

Arlington Avenue and north of Santa Barbara Boulevard. All of the apartments along South Bronson Street were owned and rented by Japanese.<sup>78</sup> By the late 1950s, there was a significant enough Japanese community that plans began on Crenshaw Square, a 90,000 square foot shopping and office center occupying two blocks on the west side of Crenshaw Boulevard, just north of Crenshaw Center. Developed by Yo Takagaki of Cren-Star Realty, it was originally conceived as the “Little Tokyo” of Mid-City.<sup>79</sup> It housed a Food Giant Market, Sumitomo Bank, the Ping restaurant, and included Japanese landscaping and gardens. It became the center of Japanese life in the area, hosting an annual Obon festival and carnival. The first Miss Sansei Pageant and Oriental Summer Festival were hosted in its parking lot in 1962, and the American Japanese National Literary Award was presented at Crenshaw Square each year.<sup>80</sup> As Katsumi Kunitsuga recalled, “At one time, Crenshaw Square was like the second little Tokyo. All the stores and professional men in that were Japanese. They used to have–what’s Miss

Nikkei Pageant now started out as a Miss Teen Sansei, and it was like a rivalry between Little Tokyo and Crenshaw.”<sup>81</sup>

Immediately to the north of Crenshaw Square was a “third space” that became a center of not only the Japanese community, but the entire Crenshaw area – the Holiday Bowl and Coffee Shop (Fig. 7-14, drawing of the Holiday Bowl). By December 1957, construction was underway of the \$1.25 million 36-lane bowling alley designed by Louis Armet and Eldon Davis, which also included the Sakiba lounge/restaurant, a billiards room, nursery, and parking for 200 cars.<sup>82</sup> The Holiday Bowl was 1950s “googie” architecture *par excellence*, a style that Armet and Davis helped formulate (they designed the original 1950s Denny’s restaurants). The project was initiated by four Japanese men (Harry Oshiro, Hanko Okuda, Paul Uyemura, and Harley Kusumoto) who invested \$50,000 of the \$300,000 needed to secure financing; to make up the difference, they sold shares of the business in the community in blocks of \$400-500 (preferred stock) and \$100 (common stock).<sup>83</sup> So it was truly

a community enterprise. And it catered to the local clientele, operating around the clock to accommodate the shift-work of people working at local aerospace plants, and food served was geared towards its Japanese and African-American clientele (e.g. char siu pork, Louisiana hot links).<sup>84</sup> For about a decade between 1955 and 1965, Caucasians, African-Americans and Asian-Americans came together to create a unique, diverse integrated community that co-existed peacefully. As Judy Heimlich recalled, “at Dorsey [High School] I’d say at the time it was a third African American, a third Japanese, and a third white or Anglo. The cheerleading groups would be two girls, you know, [representing each group] there were six of us.”<sup>85</sup>

#### CRENSHAW NEIGHBORS

But this racial harmony proved fleeting, like ships passing in the night. By the late-1950s, as blacks and Japanese began moving into the area, whites began to leave due to the

use of “blockbusting” techniques. Blockbusting was a practice used by realtors to encourage whites to sell their property by exploiting fears that racial change within their neighborhood would depress real estate values, increase crime, or lead to mixed relationships. An infamous 1962 article in the Saturday Evening Post entitled “Confessions of a Block-Buster,” outlined some of the tactics used, including using *agents provocateurs* (non-whites hired to walk the streets to give the impression to whites that blacks were moving in).<sup>86</sup> The Los Angeles Urban League documented some 26 different tactics used by white homeowners and real estate agents to exclude blacks, including payoffs by neighbors to discourage home sales to prospective black buyers, vandalism, cross burnings, bombings, and death threats.<sup>87</sup>

That there was not a single black member of the L.A. Realty Board was telling. White realtor’s had gentlemen’s agreements to only show to other whites. Another tactic was to vary the price according to the race of the buyer; for example,

in one case, a white seller in Leimert Park asked \$18,500 from whites, \$19,500 from Asians and \$21,500 from blacks.<sup>88</sup> As Josh Sides claims, “In the postwar era many individual white homeowners, and virtually all the public and private institutions in the housing market, did everything possible to prevent African Americans from living outside areas that were already predominantly black.”<sup>89</sup> Ironically, black real estate agents like Deloy Edwards (who was notorious in Baldwin Hills) also perpetuated blockbusting, not as a means of preventing blacks from migrating into Baldwin Hills, but precisely in order to encourage whites to sell, i.e. blockbusting to get blacks into better neighborhoods.<sup>90</sup> The argument was simple: before the area became all black and property values dropped, white homeowners should take advantage of the high demand and sell their homes above market value. Edwards became a millionaire securing homes in Baldwin Hills for celebrities and high-profile black clients such as Ike and Tina Turner, Ray Charles and Della Robinson, Dionne Warwick, and Bernard C. Parks. This was no

easy task, as cross burning occurred on lawns of houses he had secured for clients and in one case, a swimming pool was filled with sand in protest.<sup>91</sup>

These incidents, from intimidation to violence, were commonplace in Los Angeles in the 1950s – in the Baldwin Hills area, but also in other white communities such as Compton, Huntington Park, and throughout the San Fernando Valley. These tactics were encouraged, if not perpetrated, by the real estate industry, which feared that racial integration would substantially destroy property values. After the Dunsmuir bombing, Loren Miller, a prominent Los Angeles lawyer (who would later argue the 1953 *Barrows v. Jackson* case on behalf of the NAACP) and by then owner of the black *California Eagle* newspaper, led a demonstration of some 2,000 people and blamed the Los Angeles Realty Board for creating an atmosphere of fear on both sides.<sup>92</sup> As racial tensions worsened, incidents began to spread to the schools. In 1961, concerns about these race-related conflicts between black and white students at Dorsey

High in Leimert Park prompted a group of twenty mothers, both black and white, to begin informal meetings to think of ways to counteract the violence.<sup>93</sup> A year later, the group had expanded to more than 100 men and women; about two thirds were white and one third were black.<sup>94</sup> As blacks moved into the Baldwin Hills area in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they teamed up with liberal whites. But these liberal whites were the exception to the rule; most tried to block racial integration of schools, even after the landmark 1954 Supreme Court *Brown v Board of Education* ruling had ordered school boards to do so.<sup>95</sup>

The Los Angeles School Board did not abide by the Brown ruling, instead gerrymandering school districts to perpetuate racial segregation.<sup>96</sup> Baldwin Hills was no exception. The dispute came to a head at the start of the 1962 school year at Baldwin Hills Elementary (5421 Rodeo Road in the Baldwin Vista neighborhood, west of La Brea). At the time, other “black” schools in the area (La Cienega Avenue Elementary – 95% black, and Marvin Avenue Elementary – 94% black) were

overcrowded, so parents of 18 black and Japanese students attempted to enroll their kids at Baldwin Hills but were turned away.<sup>97</sup> Only when the NAACP stepped in and threatened legal action did the School Board settle, allowing a token 50 minority kids to attend.<sup>98</sup> It was incidents like this that prompted the informal group of parents to formalize their organization, in July 1964 creating the Crenshaw Neighbors (CN) whose mission was “dedicated to building a balanced community.”<sup>99</sup>

The Crenshaw Neighbors were an amazing organization, but highly exceptional in both their goal (a “balanced” or mixed-race community) and the tactics they used relative to other homeowner groups (who were fighting to keep neighborhoods segregated). As the Crenshaw Neighbors explained in the October 1965 edition of their *Crenshaw Notes* newsletter:

We didn’t really have any precise concept of balance. Instead, we had a very definite picture of imbalance, and we knew we didn’t want that. An unbalanced community, we felt, was one in which only one kind of people lived. We knew that

in Crenshaw we had people of all races, all ages, and through a wide economic range. We felt this was good, and we wanted to keep it.<sup>100</sup>

So to fight back against blockbusting, the Crenshaw Neighbors in February 1965 created its own non-profit real estate sales business, with John Laing as their agent; other real estate firms in the area protested, arguing their non-profit status gave them an unfair advantage (prompting them to drop “non-profit” from its ads).<sup>101</sup> This led to a paradoxical position, however, as their real estate agents would only sell to whites, in order to maintain the racial balance of the community, which appeared to perpetuate racial discrimination. They rationalized this seemingly perverse position as follows:

CN’s policy of encouraging white buyers for our area may seem discriminatory to some. The explanation is simple. Minorities know they can buy here, whereas whites have doubts that this area is for them. Therefore, CN will concentrate on the latter, while at the same time always making sure that every

home is available to anyone who wishes to purchase it.<sup>102</sup>

In addition to their real estate business, the Crenshaw Neighbors mailed their newsletter to thousands of homes outside of the area and encouraged apartment tenants to support their efforts, stay in the area, and when they were ready to buy a house, to use their real estate agency.<sup>103</sup> They used the profits from their real estate business to fund their other activities, including recruiting new members; from the

100 initial members in July 1964, they grew to 400 members by March 1965 and 850 by 1967.<sup>104</sup>

Despite their efforts, they were fighting a losing battle. The 1960s brought with them dramatic racial change in Baldwin Hills. It is difficult to appreciate just how rapidly the area changed, but the table below provides a picture of the racial transformation in the three hillside neighborhoods in the area.<sup>105</sup>

#### View Park/Windsor Hills

Year	Population	White	Black	Med. Income (% of LA Med.)
1950	10,555	10,520 (99.7%)	25 (0.2%)	\$5,962 (207%)
1960	12,206	11,543 (94.6%)	512 (4.2%)	\$11,000 (160%)
1970	12,268	4,112 (33.5%)	7,678 (62.6%)	\$14,000 (133%)
1980	12,101	1,556 (12.9%)	10,031 (82.9%)	\$23,980 (152%)



**Baldwin Hills Estates**

Year	Population	White	Black	Med. Income (% of LA Med.)
1950	4,364	4,356 (99.8%)	1 (0.02%)	-
1960	3,693	3,523 (95.4%)	110 (3.0%)	\$11,873 (172%)
1970	4,365	823 (18.9%)	3,263 (74.8%)	\$14,907 (141%)
1980	4,303	266 (6.2%)	3,865 (89.8%)	\$21,432 (136%)

**Baldwin Vista**

Year	Population	White	Black	Med. Income (% of LA Med.)
1950	2,655	2,651 (99.9%)	2 (0.1%)	-
1960	4,424	4,390 (99.2%)	6 (1.0%)	\$9,307 (135%)
1970	4,392	2,310 (52.6%)	1,502 (34.2%)	\$13,000 (123%)
1980	3,337	474 (14.2%)	2,531 (75.9%)	\$28,274 (180%)

The black population in the hillside neighborhoods in 1950 was virtually zero – 28 people out of a population of 17,574 (0.16%). Even in 1960, the area remained roughly 96% white and only 3% black. By 1970, the area was 60% black – a remarkable 1900% increase within 10 years. By 1980, the black population was over 83%. This rapid rise in black population went hand-in-hand with a precipitous drop in white population – from almost entirely white (99.73%) in 1950 to

less than 12% in 1980. This process took longer and was not quite as pronounced in Baldwin Vista but the change in Baldwin Hills Estates was especially dramatic – from 3% black to 75% black during the 1960s alone.

But even as this dramatic racial change took place, these hillside neighborhoods remained affluent; even by 1980, the median annual family income in the neighborhoods was about 1.5 times more than that of L.A. as a whole. According to the 1970 Census, 57% of blacks in Baldwin Hills had lived in the central city in 1965. But the African-Americans who moved from South Central were more affluent than those left behind, with more than 71% working in white-collar jobs.<sup>106</sup> Indeed, Baldwin Hills (which today become a catch-all name for the three hillside neighborhoods) became known as the “Black Beverly Hills” because of its concentration of black celebrities. Renowned as one of the most affluent black neighborhoods in America, Baldwin Hills was the name of a 2000s reality television series on Black Entertainment Television (BET), which

documented the lives of rich black teens in the hills. It was in Baldwin Vista that singer-songwriter Lenny Kravitz (son of Roxie Roker, star of *The Jeffersons*) was raised. Other black celebrities who called Baldwin Hills home at various times included Redd Foxx (*Sanford and Son*), Estelle Rolle (*Good Times*), director John Singleton (*Boyz N the Hood*), rapper Ice Cube, and L.A. Lakers stars A.C. Green and Byron Scott.<sup>107</sup> But mostly, African-American Baldwin Hill homeowners were upwardly mobile professionals, who had found a piece of the American Dream left behind by white flight.

The demographic change was so radical by the mid-1960s, the Crenshaw Neighbors conducted their own census of the community in order to reassure prospective white buyers that the area remained predominately white; of 4,453 single-family homes in the area, 2,823 (63.4%) were white, 1,257 (28.2%) were black, 275 (6.2%) were Asian, and 37 (0.8%) were mixed-race.<sup>108</sup> Their difficult battle to keep Baldwin Hills a balanced community turned virtually impossible after the

events of August 11, 1965, which precipitated the Watts Riots (see Chapter 6). A month after the Watts Riots, in September 1965, Crenshaw Neighbors joined with eight other L.A.-area mixed-race organizations (a ninth joined soon thereafter) to form an umbrella organization called the Council of Integrated Neighborhoods (COIN); Jean Gregg, the Crenshaw Neighbors' Executive Director, served as its Vice-Chair.<sup>109</sup>

While Crenshaw Neighbors was clearly an exception (one of only nine similar organizations in Greater L.A.) in advocating for integration, in other ways, they were very typical of homeowner associations. They organized various neighborhood activities – parties, block clubs, and clean-up campaigns. They also organized a “Shop Crenshaw” drive. As the area became less white in the 1960s, retailers began changing the products offered to suit a more diverse audience, which prompted many white families to shop outside the area (including the new Fox Hills Mall in Culver City), which in turn, contributed to the decline of the Crenshaw Center mall and surrounding retail areas.

By 1968, the Crenshaw Neighbors had also begun work on a new 7-acre park in the area, which was initially to be called Crenshaw Neighborhood Park (but ultimately named Jim Gilliam Park), in the southwest corner of the Jungle, along La Brea Avenue. The Crenshaw Association had acquired the site for a lease of one dollar per year given by Alex Deutch.<sup>110</sup> It was a volunteer effort, with manpower, equipment, and design services all donated. And like their counterparts in the affluent Hillside areas of Brentwood, Encino, Bel Air, Sherman Oaks, and Hollywood, the Crenshaw Neighbors fought against a Freeway that would have cut the neighborhood in half.<sup>111</sup> They also organized a concerted effort to reduce the number of liquor licenses in the area. All of these other activities were fairly typical for a well-organized homeowners association.

Due to her role as CN Executive Director, Jean Gregg was asked to testify before the McCone Commission, which was investigating the causes of the Watts Riots and made recommendations for future action. Gregg (who was white)

would go on to become a national figure in advocating for racial integration. By 1967, the Crenshaw Neighbors published the first issue of its nationally distributed quarterly journal *The Integrator*; the introduction to each issue outlined its goals:

This journal is dedicated to integration, recognizing it as an idea attacked from all sides. Blacks have lost faith that it can come to pass in America. Many white people see it as a sinister plot of Communism or at the very least a mongrelization of the white race. Integration is looked upon here as the hope, and the only answer, for America's racial problem. Only by really living with people of a different race can we overcome the fear of previously taught differences. This is our commitment.<sup>112</sup>

By 1968, the signs of decline were clear, particularly given the rise in the number of white absentee landlords, many of whom were allowing their properties to deteriorate. As Ann Post, a Baldwin Vista resident and one of the white founders of CN said, "the real racial problem is the apartment house area," because it was ill-equipped to handle children but absentee

landlords did, which lead to people hanging out in the streets and an increase in crime.<sup>113</sup> By 1969, perhaps sensing that the local fight for racial integration in Baldwin Hills was lost, Gregg moved to Philadelphia to focus on the national effort. Comparing the 1965 Crenshaw Neighbors survey (just prior to the riots) with the 1970 census data illustrates that white flight did indeed increase after 1965, although not radically so. In 1960, the area was 96% white and by 1965 it was 63% white (a decline of 34% between 1960 and 1965); by 1970, it was 34% white (a decline of 46% between 1965 and 1970).

#### SIGNS OF DECLINE

As those with means created the "Black Beverly Hills" in Baldwin Hills during the 1960s, they left behind an area (South Central, now known as simply "South L.A.") that was falling on hard times not only due to the exodus of the wealthiest members of the community, but also the broader economic changes that

were taking place there at the time. By the 1960s, conditions in South Central were deteriorating rapidly, in part due to the opening of new industrial areas in the San Fernando Valley (as I will discuss in detail in the Woodland Hills case in section 7.2 below). As a result, many blue-collar manufacturing jobs had moved to the Valley as early as 1963; between mid-1963 and mid-1964, 28 manufacturing firms left South Central and parts of East Los Angeles, many relocating in the Valley – four metal shops, eight furniture factories, one electrical machinery factory, one food processing plant, four textile plants, and two oil refineries.<sup>114</sup>

What began in the 1960s accelerated in the 1970s. Faced with increased global competition, many of the former blue-collar jobs were not just leaving South Central, but leaving the region and United States altogether in an age of deindustrialization as the country shifted toward more service-sector, white-collar jobs. The 1970s brought a wave of plant closures in and around South Central, one after the other –

Chrysler (1971), B.F. Goodrich (1975), Uniroyal (1978), U.S. Steel (1979), Norris Industries (1979), Ford (1980), Firestone (1980), Goodyear (1980), Bethlehem Steel (1982) and General Motors (1982). Faced with not only local changes in land use that encouraged growth on L.A.'s periphery at the expense of investment in the central core, but this broader economic restructuring, many blue-collar African-Americans lacked the skills to compete for new jobs in the aerospace industry that were opening up in places like Canoga Park and Chatsworth.

As would later be outlined in research about the “spatial mismatch” between low-income workers and blue-collar jobs<sup>115</sup>, the relocation of these industries far from South Central was a hardship, especially since, according to a 1964 survey of unemployed blacks, 58% did not own a car and there were no viable transportation options between South Central and new Valley industrial sites (and Realty Board practices discouraged relocation to these largely white areas).<sup>116</sup> Moreover, the migration of poorer African-Americans from the

South to Los Angeles was still high throughout the 1960s. So the combination of affluent blacks leaving South Central, the in-migration of poor blacks from the South, and the loss of its industrial base exacerbated an already difficult employment and housing situation. It was in this context that the “race riots” of the mid- to late-1960s took place.

While the hillside areas remained affluent as they became more black, the same cannot be said of the flats – and in particular the Jungle, an apartment area just north of Baldwin Hills Estates that was so-called because of the lush tropical vegetation originally planted (although later the term became associated with “the urban jungle”, due to its rising gang and crime problem). By 1960, the Jungle, like the hills, was almost entirely white and largely well off, with the exception of a small number of professional blacks and a pocket of Japanese in the northeastern part of the Jungle.<sup>117</sup> In the mid-1950s, young, upwardly mobile black individuals and couples without children began moving into the Jungle; the rents were medium to high

and managers did not at that time rent to tenants with children. Since there were no parks in the area or recreational facilities nearby, the area was not seen as suitable for children. By the mid-1960s, particularly after Watts, the remaining whites left the Jungle and the young blacks who arrived in the 1950s either bought houses in the Baldwin Hills or relocated to more desirable integrated rentals areas (e.g. Marina del Rey, Ladera Heights, or Inglewood). With the rise of vacancy rates, landlords sought to fill the apartments by ignoring their own “no children” policies and renting to lower-income black families who were beginning to move out of South Central.

While Watts may have provided an extra push for whites to leave the area (although a self-induced one, due to their own fears), the influx of blacks and blockbusting had already begun the exodus by then. This process was well underway when, just after noon on December 14, 1963 – three weeks after the assassination of President Kennedy – Revere G. Wells, caretaker of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir, noticed cracks in the

reservoir and sounded the evacuation alarm.<sup>118</sup> Over the next three hours, people began vacating and half of the reservoir was drained, but at 3:38 pm, with television helicopters capturing it live overhead, the dam collapsed, sending 292 million gallons through a 75-foot wide gash and down the hill onto the Baldwin Vista neighborhood below (Fig. 7-15, view of reservoir collapse).<sup>119</sup> Especially hard hit was the Troydale neighborhood



Fig. 7-15: View of the Baldwin Reservoir Collapse, 1963  
*LAPL Herald-Examiner Collection (00060008)*

and the Village Green, both of which sat immediately below the reservoir. The disaster in many ways marked as much a turning point in the area's history as the Watts Riots would two years later. It took 77 minutes for the reservoir to empty, and when the water slowed to a trickle, people returned to survey the damage: 65 homes destroyed, another 210 badly damaged. But miraculously, only five people died thanks to Wells's warning. But many whose homes were destroyed never returned.

Why the reservoir – opened with much fanfare in 1951 – collapsed was the subject of much debate over the ensuing decade. The City sued the oil companies operating in Inglewood Oil Field that surrounded the site, claiming their drilling had caused the ground to subside. The oil companies blamed a shift in the Newport-Inglewood fault that ran through the site. Standard Oil sponsored a study by Harvard geologist Arthur Casagrande, who – not surprisingly – held that oilfield operations were not a significant factor (thus exonerating Standard Oil), but rather the failure was due to poor siting and the heavy

weight of the dam.<sup>120</sup> Subsequent studies, however, revealed that Casagrande did not consider ground movements unrelated to the reservoir. It was later discovered that there was ground movement far beyond the immediate reservoir site, meaning that Casagrande's conclusions were erroneous that the siting and weight of the reservoir was the primary cause.<sup>121</sup> In 1969, the U.S. Geology Survey documented that oilfield operations had caused substantial – as much as 12 feet – ground subsidence in the area.<sup>122</sup> In 1971, it was determined that an important factor was that oilfield operations had aggravated movements along the fault that traversed the reservoir.<sup>123</sup> So the reservoir failed due to two main factors: its location proximate to a fault line and the effects of years of oil extraction in the area.

So when the race riots erupted east of the Crenshaw area in the mid-1960s, it was just the latest setback for an area whose fortune appeared to be turning. By the mid-1960s, the Jungle in particular was in decline. It was then that a young man named “T. Rodgers” moved to the Jungle from the

notorious south side of Chicago, and later, to West Adams. By the end of the decade, 16-year-old Rodgers, with the consent of the Black Stone Nation (gang) in Chicago, formed the Almighty Black Peace Stone Nation (or Black P Stones) in West Adams (at 2924 Ninth Avenue).<sup>124</sup> They soon moved to the corner of Jefferson and Ninth Avenue, in a storefront they shared with the Yellow Brotherhood, an Asian organization. Originally, it was meant as a community-based organization to give direction to troubled young black men in the community. But after being attacked by rival gangs, it became increasingly more militant, and ultimately affiliated with the Bloods. By 1970, they had established control of five parks and nine schools in the two areas most familiar to Rodgers – the Jungle (“Jungles” as they called it) and the Jefferson/Ninth area of West Adams (which they called “the City” or “Bity”). In the immediate area, Rodgers and his now 500-member gang took control of Jim Gilliam Park and the adjacent Jungle area (especially the west side, the once fashionable Baldwin Plaza and Sunset Fields projects).



As Bloods (who wear red), Rodgers' gang were mortal enemies of the Crips (who wear blue), and throughout the 1970s and 80s, they waged a bloody turf battle not only in and around Crenshaw but across South L.A. generally. John Singleton's *Boyz N the Hood* (1991) captured the spirit of this feud, as it was set in – and reflected Singleton's own experience of – the Crenshaw district. The Jungle's fate was (even to this day) fundamentally altered, as it would subsequently descend into one of the nation's most notorious gang strongholds.

### C. THE COMMUNITY PLAN ERA (1965-1992)

#### PLANNING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

As its wholesale transformation from white to black was virtually complete by the late 1960s, the Crenshaw area became the new center of the Los Angeles black community, a shift westward from its Central Avenue origins. It was here

that African-Americans from South Central came to shop, since few commercial enterprises (including basics like grocery stores) operated in their own neighborhoods. It was here, too – especially in Leimert Park – the black arts scene would flourish beginning in the 1970s, with many blues, jazz, and hip hop venues opening in the area. It was, as John Singleton has often called it, “the black Greenwich Village.”

It was in this context of social change in Baldwin Hills that, in April 1971, the Department of City Planning initiated the Baldwin Hills Community Plan process to plan for the future growth of the area.<sup>125</sup> Prior to the launch of the Community Plan process, the City had been working on “District Plans” for areas that were typically smaller than what would become the Community Plan areas. For example, as of August 1970, the City was working on a district plan for just the Baldwin Hills portion of the community plan area. City Planning staff spent the better part of a year doing background and field research as well as mapping.<sup>126</sup> In May 1972, the Citizens Advisory Committee was

appointed by the four Councilors whose districts overlapped with the Community Plan area – Pat Russell, Edmund D. Edelman, Tom Bradley, and Billy G. Mills. The Citizens Advisory Committee consisted of eight people:

- Lettie Butler
- Harold Dennard,
- Emily Edelman<sup>127</sup>
- Margery H. Ferrier<sup>128</sup>
- Mary E. Potts<sup>129</sup>
- J.A. Rencher
- Harold Spiker
- Barry Siegel<sup>130</sup>

While we don't have complete biographic records of all CAC members, it is clear that white (often Jewish), education professionals in the hills were over-represented, given the changing character of the area, which by the early 1970s,

was majority black (both affluent hillsiders and low-income residents of the flats). As such, the citizens group responsible for planning the area's future growth largely reflected the community of the past, not as it was by the 1970s. This, in turn, would have an important impact on the priorities and strategies going forward.

This Citizens Advisory Committee, with the assistance of City Planning staff, worked for over a year to produce a Preliminary Plan. Some 4,500 copies of the Preliminary Plan and 1,000 copies of the Background Report were circulated to residents, property owners, and businesses for comment.<sup>131</sup> But by 1973, the City was in the midst of an election cycle, with important consequences for the Baldwin Hills area (or so they thought), since one of the area's Councilors, Tom Bradley (who was black), was making his second run for Mayor against incumbent Sam Yorty, a conservative Democrat (and later Republican). Bradley had run against Yorty in 1969 and while Bradley finished 15 points ahead of him in the primary, Yorty

ran a dirty run-off campaign by playing the race card, calling Bradley a threat to the city, suggesting he was a radical aligned with the Black Power movement. Bradley lost. But he would ultimately win the re-match in 1973. While many within the black community saw Bradley's election as a sign of a new direction in the City's racial politics, Bradley's approach was low-key, preferring to not take strong positions on controversial issues (including issues of particular importance to blacks), so as to not rock the boat, and maintain influence with the City's business elites.

Due to elections and the City shifting resources to other priorities (e.g. the new Open Space Element of the General Plan), it wasn't until April 1974 when public meetings for the preliminary plan were held, including three all-day workshops, which were announced in newspapers, radio and television and special presentations were made to homeowner, business, and social groups (collectively, a total of 950 residents attended these meetings).<sup>132</sup> City planners noted that, despite being

widely publicized, the three workshops had low attendance and direct engagement with already well-established groups was most effective.<sup>133</sup> In total, 25 meetings were held, as below:

March 28	Crenshaw Chamber of Commerce
April 8	Leimert Park Community Association
April 11	10 <sup>th</sup> Avenue Block Club
April 16	Crenshaw Neighbors Board of Directors
April 23	Lower Don Felipe Drive Block Club
April 24	Preliminary Plan Open House
May 4	Preliminary Plan Workshop #1
May 11	Preliminary Plan Workshop #2
May 14	Leimert Community Association
May 15	Realty Board of Southern California
May 25	CD10 Women's Steering Committee
May 30	Upper Don Felipe Drive Block Club
May 31	74 <sup>th</sup> Street Block Club
June 1	Preliminary Plan Workshop #3

June 5	CD 5 Preliminary Plan Presentation
June 12	Citizens Group
July 8	Leimert Park Community Association
July 10	Jefferson Businessmen Group
July 17	Hamilton High Advisory Council
July 26	Citizens Group on Terraza Drive
July 31	Citizens Group on Buckingham Road
August 2	Citizens Group (Baptist Church)
August 15	Mayor's Citywide Advisory Committee
August 28	Cloverdale Homeowners Group
Sept 16	Citizens Group on Buckingham Road

It is clear from this list that homeowners were the most frequently consulted groups. Of the 25 meetings, five were with general audiences. But of the remaining 20, one was with a citywide committee, one was with a school group, one was a women's group, and three were business groups. The vast majority (13 meetings) were with homeowner groups. In

general, the business groups (Crenshaw Chamber, Realty Board and Jefferson Businessmen Group) were very supportive of the plan. Homeowners, on the other hand, were more critical.

For example, homeowners were alarmed at certain streets being designated secondary highways (e.g. 8<sup>th</sup> Avenue-Westside Avenue and Buckingham Road-West Boulevard).<sup>134</sup> In general, homeowners were opposed to street widening, understanding that this might increase traffic congestion, but unwilling to lose mature street trees or front yards. The 10<sup>th</sup> Avenue and 74<sup>th</sup> Street Block Clubs also took major exception to the proposed Slauson Freeway, which was to connect from the Marina Freeway to Marina Del Rey eastward through Crenshaw/Baldwin Hills to the L.A./Orange County border. Specific proposals were opposed, such as the Leimert Association's objection to a proposed neighborhood park at 39<sup>th</sup> Street. The Crenshaw Neighbors were concerned with the amount of commercial zoning in the plan, which they argued would allow such uses as liquor stores and pool halls. Both

## COMMERCIAL CENTER and THE JUNGLE

the Upper and Lower Don Felipe Block Clubs were concerned about the density in the Jungle area west of Crenshaw Center (the Don Felipe areas are located in the hills just south of the Jungle). Residents in the unincorporated county portion were alarmed at the annexation proposal, arguing that it would lead to higher taxes. There was some concern about the quantity and quality of schools in the District. Some were concerned about “half-way houses” in the northern part of the District. But in general, residents were supportive of the density rollbacks throughout the plan – especially the re-designation of some areas from High- to Low-Medium density – and the protections of single-family areas. So collectively, homeowner groups were very active and vocal in their opposition to specific elements of the draft plan.

By the mid-1970s, it was clear that both the Crenshaw commercial area (the Crenshaw Center and Crenshaw Boulevard) and the Jungle (west of the Crenshaw Center) were in rapid decline, as both were singled out as the first and second priorities of the entire Community Plan area (which was much larger than the Crenshaw district) and were identified as areas for future study and/or Specific Plans.<sup>135</sup> For example, the Crenshaw commercial area (Fig. 7-18, view of Crenshaw Center in decline) was described as:

“...suffer[ing] from many of the ills associated with strip commercial centers including: 1) the generally unattractive appearance of older shopping areas, much of which is attributed to natural aging and lack of proper maintenance; 2) the lack of new major retail developments which could serve as major attracting

forces in the core area, and 3) vacant stores and/or marginally improved properties which may be a detracting factor for potential customers.”<sup>136</sup>

The goal of the Baldwin Hills Community Plan for the Crenshaw commercial area was therefore “to assist in arresting the existing pattern of decline,” and “renew confidence and interest of residents and business owners and tenants.”<sup>137</sup> Seen through the eyes of a Citizens Advisory Committee that was more affluent and white than the area as a whole, the transformation of the Crenshaw commercial area into an area that served the needs of lower income blacks was a clear sign of decline.

The Jungle was, in particular, singled out as an “emergent problem area” (Fig. 7-19, view of the Jungle in decline). While the area originally known to residents as the Jungle was west of Hillcrest Drive (i.e. the original Sunset Fields and Baldwin Plaza developments that had lush tropical vegetation), by the

mid-1970s, this moniker had grown to include the entire area between Crenshaw Center and La Brea Avenue (i.e. including the original Crenshaw Village project as well as other smaller projects in the area). This expansion of the Jungle in the minds of the people in the hills left them with a perception that its problems were expanding and threatened to infect the entire area, like a disease. By this time, the “Jungle” was no longer associated with the lush plantings of the past, but rather the “urban jungle” associated with the dangers of the city, including gang and drug activity (and perhaps justifiably so, due to Rodgers and the Black P Stones gang claiming the area as their territory).

City Planning Staff noted that the City Planning Commission, in addition to preserving the Village Green, was in particular concerned about “preservation of the quality of the high-density apartment area west of the Crenshaw Center, known in the District as the ‘jungle’” as well as “the potential of the Baldwin Hills-Leimert portion of the District becoming

a 'Black Ghetto'.<sup>138</sup> The CAC and planners were clear to point out that the actual buildings in the Jungle were of high quality, but that the changing social conditions made it problematic. The reference to the emergence of a "Black Ghetto" signifies the concern about the rapid exodus of whites and influx of blacks into the area. Among staff recommendations for the Jungle were "maintenance and rehabilitation of the area, and social programs directed toward employment, delinquency and crime."<sup>139</sup> Staff suggested that a special study of the Jungle be conducted and application for funding for the study be made under Title IV of the Housing and Community Development Act, in anticipation of making it a redevelopment area.

The CAC declared that the preliminary plan "does not seek to promote nor to hinder growth; rather it accepts the likelihood that growth will take place and must be provided for,"<sup>140</sup> which appears to suggest less of a "slow growth" mentality than areas on the Westside at the time. But an examination of proposed zoning changes in the preliminary plan does not suggest that

growth was welcomed here. Even its recommendation to annex the portion of unincorporated L.A. County just outside of the City limit (which included Baldwin Hills, View Park and the Inglewood Oil Field) did not appear to be motivated by a desire for economic growth. Certainly, annexing this land would be a goldmine of additional revenues from the lucrative oil fields, and could be used to build additional housing in the future. But there is no reference in the historical record to this being the motivation for the annexation proposal. Rather, the plan notes that the "oil fields in the county area are designated as private open space and are proposed to become a Regional Park when the oil production has been completed."<sup>141</sup> So planners and the CAC saw annexation not as a tool of economic development but rather as a means to provide much-needed open space in what was increasingly becoming in their minds a crowded area.

## PROPOSED ZONING CHANGES

With public consultations complete and input incorporated into the Plan, in early 1975 (February 24), the City Planning Commission held a public hearing on the proposed Plan before commissioner Dr. Fred Case at Dorsey High School, with approximately 300 people attending.<sup>142</sup> In his commissioner's report (approved by the City Planning Commission on March 6, 1975), Dr Case echoed the concerns of residents: (1) protections to preserve the Village Green, (2) concerns about the Jungle, which he described as "deteriorating rapidly and is a distinct threat to the social and economic future of the entire community. Vigorous programs on several fronts are needed. If the Planning Department cannot, then another department should, study ways of halting the deterioration of human and property values and bringing quality into the area," and (3) the Baldwin Hills-Leimert section of the plan area "shows signs of becoming a 'black ghetto'. If this trend is occurring or if the

potential of its occurrence exists, steps should be taken to cooperate more closely with the residents in maintaining the area's quality and the life-style mix... the high incidence of crime – robbery, mugging, break-ins, vandalism – and other social problems will destroy the area if not controlled."<sup>143</sup> The commissioner's comments seem to suggest that a "black ghetto" (by which he means an all- or nearly all-black area) automatically would lead to crime.

To be sure, the area was undergoing dramatic demographic change. But there was little attempt to understand the socio-spatial difference between the areas in the flats (Jungle, Leimert Park) that were increasingly becoming African-American put poorer – where crime was an issue, although more related to income than race – and the areas in the hills (Baldwin Hills, Baldwin Vista, View Park) that were becoming more African-American but wealthy – and where crime was not a problem. To Dr Case and others, the fact that the area was becoming all or nearly all black seemed to be a problem in and



of itself.

The Planning Commission criticized the Plan for not having a specific recommendation “to prevent the Black Ghetto situation from occurring” but did expect that “the proposed zoning redesignation would stabilize development in the area. Development stabilization plus other studies, and socio-economic type programs proposed in the Plan, should be a positive factor in stabilizing the area’s population mix.”<sup>144</sup> In other words, land use policy, specifically zoning rollbacks (“redesignations”) were seen by the Planning Department, Citizens Advisory Committee, and City Planning Commission as the primary tool to control demographic change and help revitalize the area. It is clear that people thought that reducing the density of multi-family housing areas (as well as cutting back commercial zoning, which allowed bars and liquor stores) would slow the influx of poor blacks into the area, thus stabilizing it socially and economically. As such, the Plan recommended down-zoning large portions of the area. Of the 183 sub-areas

identified in the Plan, 157 (86%) were designated for “intensity decreases” (i.e. down-zonings) and just 26 (14%) for “intensity increases” (i.e. up-zonings).<sup>145</sup> So despite their rhetoric that the Plan did not set out to encourage nor discourage growth, the recommended land use changes were consistent with those of affluent white areas on the City’s Westside during this period in that they recommended dramatic reductions in density. The existing zoning in the plan area prior to the beginning of the Community Plan process allowed for a population capacity of 432,500. But the new proposed Community Plan allowed for a population capacity of 249,200 – a 43% decrease in density.<sup>146</sup> In addition to reducing higher-density multi-family, arguing that the percentage of commercial uses in the Plan area was twice that of the rest of the city, the 1974 preliminary plan also recommended scaling back commercial land by 60% – from about 1,000 acres to roughly 400.<sup>147</sup>

The Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) for the Plan was used to justify these rollbacks. Although no evidence

was presented to support it, the DEIR claimed, “there is far more land zoned for apartments than is needed to satisfy the demand for apartments both in the District and the rest of the City.”<sup>148</sup> Moreover, “any increase in residential density is bound to have a deleterious environmental impact”; to support this claim, the DEIR only looked at the impact of the total population, rather than on a per-capita basis, arguing that an acre of low-density housing generates only 30 to 75 trips per day, while an acre of high-density housing would generate 150 to 350 trips per day, thus the 880 acres of medium density residential proposed in the plan would generate 158,400 trips per day while the same amount of low density would generate only 40,920 trips per day.<sup>149</sup> That higher densities would support alternative transportation options and generate fewer trips per capita, as is understood by smart growth advocates today, was not discussed. The DEIR leaves the distinct impression as being less of an objective (scientifically grounded) document of environmental impacts and more of an expression of values.

For example, again without any evidence to support it, the DEIR claims that “the sporadic development of apartment houses in predominately single family residential areas may have a number of deleterious effects on adjacent single family dwelling units and on predominately single family neighborhoods. These may manifest themselves in both environmental and economic forms.”<sup>150</sup>

And yet the multi-family Jungle area was not viewed this way when it was new and upwardly mobile whites who were moving into these luxury apartments; but by the 1970s, with a now poor, black population moving into the Jungle, its very presence posed a threat to the more affluent hillside areas. Why? As the DEIR explains, “as apartments are developed sporadically throughout a neighborhood, the desirability of the area for single family residents deteriorates, which may make it difficult for residents to sell their homes to anyone but apartment developers.”<sup>151</sup> Statements such as these in the DEIR echo similar statements by area residents, who feared the

encroachment of apartments into single-family areas. Indeed the fear of “encroachment” of multi-family into single-family zones was a hotly debated issue by the late 1960s. But as we saw earlier, the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area was always a mix of multi-family and single-family, and there were no proposals for apartments to be built in the affluent single-family areas (View Park, Baldwin Hills Estates, Baldwin Vista). Single-family homeowners did not complain about the upscale apartments in the Jungle in the late 1940s and 1950s, because its tenants were white professionals. So what was effectively a problem of poverty (the associated problems of drugs, crime, lack of maintenance) became conflated with race and multi-family housing generally.

The case against multi-family was also made on the grounds of safety and impact on infrastructure. As the DEIR argued, “multiple family units create greater demands on public service systems, such as the fire and police, waste disposal, public utilities, such as gas, electric and circulation systems,

etc. These, combined with the inevitable increase in noise and congestion due to the higher density of people, tend to make the area less desirable as a single family residential area.” Moreover, “increased traffic circulation creates greater hazards for small children playing, going to and from school, and bicycle riding in the streets.”<sup>152</sup> The DEIR goes on to explain how multi-family housing would also burden street maintenance, create more air pollution, and discourage homeowners from maintaining their homes (since they would believe that the value of their property was in the land, not the house, and would eventually sell it to be torn down for apartments). Despite the claims that higher density meant higher environmental impact, smart growth advocates today often argue precisely the opposite – that higher-density, compact development is more environmentally friendly. Therein lies the paradox of CEQA – while a tool born out of the concern of the environmental impact of growth, it is often used – in the 1970s as it is now – as a tool to reduce densities. And if growth continues – and it does – that has the effect

of directing lower-density growth to the periphery, resulting in more vehicle miles traveled, more consumption of land, more energy and water usage, and so on. None of these aggregate effects can be accounted for by CEQA, since it is done on a project-by-project basis.

Given all of the apparent “evils” of multi-family housing, it is no surprise that the area was down-zoned by 43%. Even that was seen as too generous, as the Southern California Association of Governments argued that it should be reduced even further – to no more than 20% in excess of projected 1990 population or roughly 208,000 (which would have been a 52% reduction instead of 43%).<sup>153</sup> Throughout the 1970s Community Plan process, there was no consideration for what would happen after 1990. Apparently, the assumption was that if additional capacity was needed by 1990 as population continued to grow then areas could be up-zoned (despite obvious challenges from homeowners). It appears that planners and the Citizens Advisory Committee were simply “kicking the can down the

road”, that the inevitable problem of having to increase density as the area filled out would be someone else’s problem to be solved later.

#### REVITALIZATION and REDEVELOPMENT

In some ways, Baldwin Hills’s central location within the region proved as much a curse as a blessing, allowing affluent residents easy access to recreational and shopping areas outside the area (such as Fox Hills Mall in Culver City or Marina del Rey). This led to a paradoxical situation of a rapidly deteriorating economic base within an area that remained well above average in income. By 1977, a group called the Greater Crenshaw Revitalization Agency (GCRA) had formed, and with local Councilor Pat Russell’s help, obtained funding to commission a study of the area (which was done by Gruen & Associates). There was disagreement, however, about how best to bring life back to the Crenshaw corridor – to encourage

the affluent residents in the hills to invest more in their own community or whether public sector redevelopment funds would be necessary to stimulate investment. The Gruen study (published March 1979) documented that retail sales in Crenshaw dropped by 50% between 1972 and 1977; according to the Gruen report, the reason for this was clear – more than 60% of the disposable income in the entire Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area was being spent outside of the area.<sup>154</sup> While Gruen & Associates were optimistic that the solution to creeping decline lay in retaining more local money, by 1977, a Crenshaw Community Development Program was established with the L.A. Community Development Department (CDD) leading the efforts to combat “economic blight and decay which have afflicted the area around the Crenshaw Shopping Center.”<sup>155</sup>

To combat the decline of the area, rather than make investments to benefit the low-income people moving into the area (jobs, education, public space, social services, etc), GCRA and homeowners instead decided to invest in making

the commercial core more upscale. But the thinking was that a major revitalization of the Crenshaw Center would help lure affluent blacks in the hillsides back. On the surface, this seems like a perverse strategy – the solution to growing poverty being to make investments targeted at the rich. It was an approach that put its faith in trickle-down economics, on the theory that if the rich spent more money in the area, it would create more jobs and generally lift up economic prospects of the poor. The problem was that the May and Broadway Companies, the two anchor tenants in the Crenshaw Center, were not interested in making a new investment in their stores, believing that crime in the area would not make the sale of upscale merchandise a viable market.<sup>156</sup>

And despite good intentions, GCRA was plagued by administrative problems and in-fighting. Its ever-optimistic Executive Director Matthew Jenkins (former director the Crenshaw YMCA) was at odds with GCRA board members – in particular, board president Lou Jones. While Jenkins kept

reassuring everyone that things were going well, there was no tangible evidence.<sup>157</sup> Even the small task of posting signs branding the area proved too great a challenge. By 1981, GCRA was out of business, having never spent \$250,000 out of the \$400,000 it was granted for revitalization efforts.<sup>158</sup> The uncertainty that surrounded the area's revitalization held up official adoption of the Community Plan. While approved by the City Planning Commission on May 22, 1975, the Plan was not adopted by City Council until January 7, 1980, some four-and-a-half years later.<sup>159</sup>

The failed efforts of the GCRA cost the area precious years of redevelopment, although people in the community preferred to call it “revitalization” instead of “redevelopment”, feeling the area wasn't so bad that it needed major physical restructuring. But by the late 1970s, people began openly wondering if the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area could survive the “creeping urban blight that threatens, if not checked, to change the character of the whole area.”<sup>160</sup> In a 1979 L.A. Times article,

Austin Scott imagined two alternative futures for the area, one where the exodus of wealth continued and the area became an extension of the poverty seen in South Central, and another future where whites gentrify the area and it becomes another Westwood.<sup>161</sup> Neither future was desirable for the community but, in fact, both occurred to varying degrees in the next few years – but in different areas. Professional whites, attracted by the central location, low cost, and historic charm of older houses, began buying up property in the West Adams area and restoring them, realizing the community's gentrification fears. But at the same time, in the Jungle, poverty grew and conditions ever worsened.

Despite the apparent powerlessness to stop the social and economic forces that were changing the community, this was not an area lacking social capital. In fact, the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area had many well-organized groups with strong social capital – political activists well connected to Council, dozens of block clubs, active local Democratic Party clubs, and

a strong presence of African-American churches. Crenshaw was also home to the Los Angeles Urban League and Southern Christian Leadership Conference. But, importantly, many of these groups were not involved in the Community Planning efforts, at least initially. The Citizens Advisory Committee and homeowner groups were largely comprised of whites who, when it came down to it, were more likely to support gentrification in order to restore the glory of the area's past.

Even by 1980, the area's median income remained well above average for the City (as noted above, 1.5 times the city average). But this statistic concealed the reality that lay beneath the surface – it was a community that was becoming increasingly polarized. While black celebrities and affluent professionals lived in the hills, the flats were becoming ever poorer, such that by 1977, one quarter of residents were on some form of public assistance.<sup>162</sup> So by 1980, the area was a paradox – with the so-called “Black Beverly Hills” on the one hand, but becoming ever more poor in the flats on the other. By

this time, it was 80% black, 10% white and 10% Asian – a far cry from 1950, when the area was nearly 100% white. Despite this affluence in the hills, the flats were struggling. So there was mismatch between residents in the hillsides who could invest more in the community, but the retailers in the area not supplying what they wanted.

That was because the center of the broader African-American community in L.A. by this time had shifted from Central Avenue to Crenshaw Boulevard. People traveled from the older South Central and Watts black communities to shop at Crenshaw commercial centers. It was a self-reinforcing cycle. As housing tracts and employment centers developed in places like Woodland Hills, it drew whites out of the area, replaced by affluent blacks. But as upscale commercial areas developed just outside of Baldwin Hills, they drew money out of the community, and retailers shifted to more down-market goods to fill the void, drawing lower-income customers from outside the area. This also attracted a poorer, more transient population in areas like

the Jungle, which in turn, had a negative impact on gang and drug activity, which further tarnished the area's image.

By 1980, the western part of the Jungle (west of Hillcrest) housed about 11,000 people – not significantly more than the 10,000 that it was planned for. But many were African-Americans on welfare who had moved in during the federal rent-subsidy programs of the late 1960s and early 1970s (when federal money was shifting from direct public housing to market subsidies and community block grants).<sup>163</sup> The cycle of poverty was self-reinforcing, as young men turned to gangs as a means of making money. In the three-block notorious PCP area known as “Sherm Alley” (near Santa Barbara and Coliseum), in the first four months of 1980, there were 148 robberies and 82 assaults with a deadly weapon, three murders, and 13 rapes.<sup>164</sup> Rising crime, in turn, prompted landlords to stop making upgrades to their buildings.

To combat this negative image, the CDD initiated the CARE program (Commercial Area Revitalization Effort), which

provided money for local merchants to make improvements to their buildings (a direct 20% rebate on up to \$25,000 worth of improvements), in addition to \$300,000 in public realm improvements by the City itself.<sup>165</sup> Once again, rather than invest in people, the City invested in place, which did not fundamentally change the area's fortunes. But even this support was tenuous. By 1982, faced with budget shortfalls, L.A. City Council cut funding for revitalization programs by half. In part, slashing revitalization efforts followed from the reductions in federal money for cities under the Reagan administration. But poor management of the programs was also cited – more than half of the \$8 million allocated for revitalization between 1978-1981 was consumed by administration costs or siphoned off for Council District pet projects. Since Crenshaw was not considered among the worst areas of the City, its CARE program was postponed.

With redevelopment efforts failing, the City turned to the Los Angeles Urban League (LAUL) for help, awarding it a



\$174,000 contract to bring economic growth and community pride back to the area.<sup>166</sup> But the selection of the Urban League was a curious one. First, economic development was not LAUL's expertise; its focus had been on job training and promoting civil rights (only four of its 118 local chapters had undertaken major economic development programs). But secondly, as a first-generation civil rights organization, the LAUL was primarily a conduit for middle-class blacks to find well-paying professional jobs. Only after the adoption of its "new thrust" approach (see Chapter 6) did it become more centrally concerned with problems in low-income black communities. But by that time, more radical black community leaders did not feel the Urban League spoke for their concerns; they were seen as being too close to, and in service of, whites. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the LAUL was selected to use its connections to the business community to help revive Crenshaw. The LAUL and CDD secured a \$168,000 block grant to upgrade commercial storefronts in the Leimert Park section of Crenshaw; by coordinating with the

Crenshaw Commercial Center Merchants Association over 98% of merchants participated.<sup>167</sup> The LAUL and Crenshaw Chamber also jointly sponsored a street festival that raised awareness of the need to buy local.<sup>168</sup> The LAUL also encouraged Crenshaw Center to hire private security, advocated for a "buy Crenshaw" week, and persuaded banks to offer below-market loans for renovations.

Even still, these efforts largely continued the top-down strategy of trying to attract the rich back into the area, rather than target the root of the problem – poverty. And despite these efforts, by mid-1983, the commercial core remained stagnant. It didn't help that the U.S. economy in the early 1980s was lackluster due to "stagflation" (low economic growth and high unemployment and yet high inflation in consumer prices) – enduring two back-to-back recessions from January to June 1980, then again from July 1981 to November 1982, by which time national unemployment was 10.8% – the highest since the Great Depression.<sup>169</sup> By this time, the *L.A. Times* called the

Crenshaw Center “the faltering flagship of a decaying business center,” that looked ever more like South Central Avenue with its thrift shops, discos, and nail salons; as one merchant described it, “too many down-scale businesses in the midst of up-scale residents”.<sup>170</sup>

#### TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT

By 1984, with efforts to “revitalize” the economic core of Baldwin Hills faltering, plans began to unfold for the long-discussed Metro system. Residents in the Crenshaw area mobilized with their Inglewood neighbors to the south, forming the Southwest Transportation Coalition to advocate for a transit line (the Southwest Corridor) along Crenshaw that would link LAX (the Los Angeles International airport) to the City’s core (Fig. 7-20, map of proposed Southwest Corridor).<sup>171</sup> The Southwest Corridor had been studied back when plans for a regional rapid transit network were first explored in the 1960s. That original

proposal called for a line that ran along Exposition Boulevard to Leimert Boulevard and Crenshaw to the Sante Fe Railroad right-of-way to El Segundo Boulevard (with a branch connect to LAX).<sup>172</sup> This was never acted upon and by the 1980s, it was a long shot, since the proposed line would cost an estimated \$3 billion, more than the planned Metro line connecting North Hollywood to Downtown (which would serve more people). The plan was to branch off the proposed Crenshaw station that would be on the Westside subway underneath Wilshire Boulevard.

But after a methane gas explosion at a clothing store near Fairfax Avenue and 3<sup>rd</sup> Street and at the urging of homeowners, local Congressman Henry Waxman was able to win a federal designation of the area as a “methane zone”, from Hancock Park to west of Fairfax along either side of Wilshire Boulevard, conveniently the areas where opposition to the subway was strongest; as a result, tunneling through the methane zone was banned, effectively killing the subway. And

after a sinkhole emerged on Hollywood Boulevard during the construction of the Metro line to the Valley, County Supervisor (and former Councilman) Zev Yaroslavsky sponsored a measure (which passed) that blocked the use of sales tax funds for any tunneling in L.A. County, which deferred any subway plans indefinitely.<sup>173</sup> As a result, just two stations were built along the Westside line (at Vermont and Western), and it therefore did not extend as far as Crenshaw Boulevard.

The transit line was seen as supporting Crenshaw revitalization efforts. As Elvin Moon, manager of engineering at Northrup and a member of the Southwest Transportation Coalition, said “there is tremendous community support for this line. They don’t want to be left out. They’re also concerned about department stores and businesses that may leave the Crenshaw area if that area is not revitalized. The corridor could accomplish that revitalization.”<sup>174</sup> But this Westside subway was not built due to homeowner opposition. Many homeowners on the affluent Westside (which included bastions of privilege

such as Beverly Hills and Hancock Park) objected to the subway because it would make it more accessible to lower-income residents from the Eastside and South Los Angeles.<sup>175</sup> This once-desirable area by the mid-1980s, was seen as an extension of South Central, and the rich whites on the Westside did not want people from South Central having easy access to their home turf.

#### HISTORIC PRESERVATION

As the economy began picking up in 1983 and 1984, developers began to look for opportunities to invest. Business-friendly areas such as Warner Center in Woodland Hills, Century City, Westwood, and Downtown L.A. were attractive because of their ample commercial zoning and high allowable densities. Since they wanted to “revitalize” rather than “redevelop” the Crenshaw area, homeowners and planners in the 1970s Community Plan had dramatically down-zoned

the area, including a 60% reduction in commercial land area. This had the effect of freezing development envelopes at their present levels, which made development in the Crenshaw area unattractive since developers could not replace buildings with more intensive development.

By the early 1980s, as white historic preservationists began moving into the area, these zoning rollbacks gained another ally. Leading the charge was the West Adams Heritage Association (WAHA), which was founded in 1983, representing an area in the northeast portion of the Community Plan area (Crenshaw on the West, Pico on the North, Jefferson on the South and Arlington on the East, although the West Adams area also spills over further east into the South L.A. plan area). The preservationists were typically young, professional “urban pioneers” attracted by the central location and character of the historic houses. And they were overwhelmingly white, while the majority of existing residents in West Adams were older, middle-class blacks. Of WAHA’s 100 members in December

1985, three-quarters were white, in an area that was only about 5% white.<sup>176</sup> The differences in race and income made the preservationists’ goals very different from the largely lower-income, African-American residents who had moved to the area in the 1950s and 60s, setting up a tension, if not outright hostility, between the two groups.<sup>177</sup> Some residents welcomed the preservationists, hoping the improvement made to their homes will increase property values – and anecdotal evidence suggests this did happen, as average sales prices increased from \$81,500 in 1981 to \$122,500 by 1985 (a roughly 50% increase).<sup>178</sup> And initially relations were warm as residents invited newcomers to join existing block clubs.

But things soured when the preservationists began talking about “their” neighborhood and wanted to improve the area by bringing in more people dedicated to preserving the architectural heritage at the expense of the social community that had been built over the previous 30 years. As one black resident, Marion Downs Smith (a Julliard-trained classical

musician) remarked, “At first we thought they were coming in to be neighborly. Now we see they are out to exploit and take advantage of us... We’re not going to sit idly by and let them take over like we’re dummies... I’ve seen preservationist movements in other places, what they do to the neighborhoods. They raise the property values so much, blacks can’t afford to buy the homes.”<sup>179</sup> The tension came to a head in late 1985, when some residents protested WAHA’s annual historic homes tour and street fair, forcing them to scale it back. Relations between white preservationists and black residents were so bad that local Councilor requested mediation by the City’s Human Relations Committee.<sup>180</sup> At issue was the belief among long-time residents that they were being pressured to sell their homes at below-market prices and took issue with WAHA over its talk of them coming in and “rescuing” the area, which didn’t sit well with existing residents, leading to charges of racism on both sides. As Dolores Hammond, a 20-year homeowner said: “It’s a kind of reverse block-busting. You never see a ‘For Sale’ sign go

up; then suddenly there are new [white] owners. The blacks are being moved out and they’re only selling to whites.”<sup>181</sup>

While WAHA’s mission was historic preservation, it was highly involved in broader land use cases. Among the tensions between preservationists and black residents was the desire to restore the many largely, stately houses that had been converted into apartment houses back into single-family homes. While certainly a laudable preservation goal, this meant the loss of affordable housing for many low-income people. WAHA were also active in broader city-wide initiatives to reduce density – for example, in 1986, hosting a talk by Councilor Zev Yaroslavsky to promote his initiative of cutting commercial zoning densities (Prop U).<sup>182</sup> Most importantly, WAHA took a very active role in shaping the 1988 Baldwin Hills Community Plan.

Despite further zoning rollbacks in the draft 1980s Community Plan, WAHA did not think that the West Adams portion of the plan was down-zoned enough and made specific recommendations that would down-zone the area further.<sup>183</sup>

As then-President Kathleen Salisbury argued, higher density zoning “would inevitably lead to destruction of neighborhoods and demolition of the structurally [sound] and architecturally significant homes, to be perhaps replaced by larger and less distinguished apartments so detrimental to low-density neighborhoods.”<sup>184</sup> To make their case to city planners, WAHA conducted their own survey of the entire area (between Arlington, Pico, Crenshaw and Adams) and made recommendations of how to realign sub-areas identified in the Plan or otherwise change the proposed amendments. The WAHA’s testimony was highlighted specifically in Kenneth Topping’s (by then, the City’s Planning Director) presentation to the City Planning Commission: “speakers representing the West Adams Historic Association provided extensive research supporting their recommendations for additional density reductions of areas where they feel that the staff recommendations did not go far enough. Staff has evaluated these proposals and has incorporated them to the extent possible in the revised recommendations.”<sup>185</sup>

Their recommendations were very specific and meant to reduce densities to the level of existing historic buildings, thereby eliminating the incentive for developers to buy them up and replace them with higher-density buildings: “WAHA has identified eight individual areas [in] West Adams with which it has serious concerns regarding your proposed zone changes. Each area is less dense than your recommendation, and we have proposed some plan amendments to better reflect actual usage and to protect streetscapes and architecturally significant structures from demolition.”<sup>186</sup> For example, in five subareas, they strenuously objected to their designation as R3 (medium density), “particularly since current usage conforms to either RD1.5 or RD2. Specifically, subareas 1610, 1615 and 1620 each have fewer than 25% of buildings which exceed 4 units. RD1.5 allows 5 units. In subareas 1690 and 1705, 80% and 82%, respectively, of the structures are three units or fewer, which conforms to RD2.”<sup>187</sup> This is only one example of scores of recommendations. Backed with hard data, WAHA was able

to have these areas re-designated to match the prevailing uses. Importantly, they did not use the maximum existing uses in a given area, but rather used percentages to illustrate the density of the majority of existing uses, and argued that this lower level should be used as the benchmark.

In many ways, preservation efforts were central to the general preference for revitalization over redevelopment. Preservationists and long-time residents in the area had no desire to see large parts of the community torn down and replaced with larger, modern buildings. Buildings were falling into disrepair – no doubt due to lower rents that were the maximum that could be afforded by lower income tenants moving into the area. Preservationists wanted these buildings repaired, not replaced. Indeed, that was the goal of the Crenshaw Apartment Improvement Program that the City initiated in 1985 using federal dollars. The goal was to rehabilitate between 150 and 200 units per year; by January 1986, it had helped fix up 641 units.<sup>188</sup>

By 1987, the draft revised Community Plan was ready for public consultations but the City was in the midst of an election cycle where growth and development were hot button issues. The previous year (1986), responding to homeowner calls for “slow growth”, Councilmen Marvin Braude and Zev Yaroslavsky were successful in advocating for the passage of their Prop U, which rolled back density along major commercial corridors in the City (as discussed in Chapter 2). By 1987, the two councilmen were seeking further curbs to development that would give City Council veto power over commercial projects – not only automatically requiring that projects over 50,000 square feet undergo a full EIR, but also then allowing Council the ability to overturn approvals for such projects.

But such efforts opened up disputes within the Crenshaw area because the area by that time had been stagnating, if not declining, for the better part of two decades. The problem here was not the negative effects of development (traffic, congestion, pressure on services and infrastructure), but rather precisely

the opposite – a lack of investment. These issues came to the fore in the 10<sup>th</sup> District race. Tenth district candidate Arthur Song argued that if Mayor Bradley didn't support Braude/Yaroslavsky's slow-growth movement, then he "has lost touch with the people in the 10<sup>th</sup> district" but other candidates such as Kenneth Orduna argued "the 10<sup>th</sup> Councilmanic District needs revitalization, we don't need over-development."<sup>189</sup> Despite the economic boom of the mid-1980s, black areas like Crenshaw and South Central did not share in the economic success. By 1986, with Mayor Bradley making his second run at California Governor (he lost in 1982), Bradley's coalition of affluent Westside Jews and low-income inner-city blacks had begun to crack. Prop U, the slow growth initiative that scaled back density along commercial corridors, received more votes than Bradley did.<sup>190</sup> And in Crenshaw, which overlapped with his previous Council district, Bradley had previously enjoyed strong support. But here his support dropped 15 points (from 64% to 49%) from four years earlier. Similar declines were seen in

Baldwin Hills (from 76% to 64%). Prop U was particularly tricky for Bradley. It was widely supported across the city, including in both affluent Jewish areas on the Westside and low-income South L.A. areas, but two of his biggest constituencies (big business and labor) didn't support it, illustrating the complex politics of land use in L.A.

#### FIGHT FOR JUSTICE

By the late 1980s, what was a "creeping decline" in certain areas (i.e. the Jungle) a decade earlier had become widespread poverty throughout the flats (the Hills remained affluent). And by this time, the Jungle had descended into one of the nation's most notorious gang neighborhoods, immortalized in rap songs, and in films like *Training Day* (2001). By the 1980s, the Jungle was firmly under the control of the Black P Stones gang. On February 20, 1988, 14-year-old William Adams was gunned down in the Jungle – an innocent bystander in the on-



going war between the Bloods and Crips.<sup>191</sup> Adams's death was just one of many such violent incidents in the neighborhood – just six days before, a resident of Gibraltar Street was attacked after arguing with a drug dealer. Although a tiny fragment of the Southwest LAPD Division's nine square mile area, crime in the Jungle far outweighed its size – 20 of 87 drug arrests in January 1988 were in the Jungle, as were 62 of 365 assaults with a deadly weapon.<sup>192</sup>

By 1984, the Crenshaw Center was in such dire straits and the surrounding area so crime ridden that security guards patrolled the parking lot on foot and surveyed the area from a security tower. By 1985, City Council voted to condemn buildings in the area – which carried with it the dreaded “blight” label – including the Crenshaw Center mall itself to pave the way for the area's revival. Gone were the days of revitalization; redevelopment was now deemed necessary to avoid further decline.<sup>193</sup> The \$50 million in redevelopment funds would be the biggest in the city for a shopping center and would help

fund the \$150 million project. It was a unique arrangement, as the developer and the City's Community Redevelopment Agency were to split the proceeds from the project, but, as seemed to be the norm in Crenshaw, the project ran into roadblocks, notably a required earthquake study that threatened to kill the project.<sup>194</sup> And the community was counting on the mall's redevelopment. As one commenter noted, it was hoped that the new mall “can do for the area... what the Topanga Plaza and the Promenade Mall did for the west San Fernando Valley.”<sup>195</sup> Despite its importance, the NAACP and the L.A. Urban League were upset because they argued there were not enough contracting, retail, or job opportunities for local blacks who were still moving into the area in the 1980s.<sup>196</sup>

Despite being increasingly affordable because of the exodus of people with means, the Community Plan area experienced a net decline in population in the 1970s – from 159,090 in 1970 to 151,528 in 1980.<sup>197</sup> But with the continued migration of blacks into the area and the influx of immigrants

to L.A. from Latin America, the population of the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area rose by 12% in the 1980s, from 151,528 in 1980 to 169,397 in 1990.<sup>198</sup> By this time, the area was one of the most park-poor areas in all of California, with less than one acre of park space per 1,000 people, below the State benchmark for “park poor” areas (three acres per 1,000 people) and far below the nationally recommended standard (six acres per 1,000 people).<sup>199</sup> As is well documented, the lack of park space has a detrimental effect on the physical health and social development of children, even acting as a deterrent for juvenile delinquency.<sup>200</sup> The Council Districts covered by the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area are two of the most park-poor districts in the City for children, with CD8 (which includes Baldwin Hills and Leimert Park) having just 1.37 acres per 1,000 children, and CD10 (which includes the Jungle) having just 1.22 acres per 1,000 children – both lower than every other Council District except CD9 (which includes South Central).<sup>201</sup> Within a five-mile radius of Baldwin Hills, there is just one picnic table for every

10,000 people, one playground for every 23,000 children, one soccer field for every 34,000 people, and one basketball court for every 40,000 people.<sup>202</sup>

Despite the documented need for park space in the area, plans in the 1980 Baldwin Hills Community Plan to convert the Inglewood Oil Field into a park did not come to fruition (and still have not, as of 2013) because oil companies have developed new ways (i.e. horizontal fracturing or “fracking”) to extend the life of the field.<sup>203</sup> In addition to the continued lack of open space, these new techniques have also raised health and safety concerns, due to fears that chemicals used in the process are contaminating underground aquifers. This “double whammy” of being park-poor and more highly exposed to environmental contaminants led to the Inglewood Oil Field becoming a critical battleground for environmental justice, given that the area immediately to the east of the oilfield is 90% black. In fact, Greater Los Angeles has the highest concentration of people of color living near hazardous waste facilities, with 1.2

million people living less than two miles from 17 hazardous waste facilities – 91% of these (over 1.1 million) are people of color.<sup>204</sup> While beyond the scope of this research project, land use policies and politics have played a role in producing such a landscape of injustice. But suffice to say, by the 1990s, as one L.A. Times reporter put it, “much of the Baldwin Hills resemble[d] a conservationist’s nightmare.”<sup>205</sup>

In the Jungle at the bottom of the Hills, life was indeed quickly becoming a nightmare, a place where “a gram of cocaine could be bought as easily as a loaf of bread, where drug-dealers provide curb-side service to motorists, where purse snatches, robberies and car thefts are commonplace.”<sup>206</sup> The area had deteriorated to the point where many of the swimming pools in the courtyards of the once-revered buildings had been filled in and the lush plantings that gave the Jungle its name had been trimmed back or cut down because they were being used to hide drug stashes. Jim Gilliam Park, once a part of the solution to the deteriorating area, was now highly dangerous.<sup>207</sup> The

lush jungle of the past had truly become the concrete jungle. The decline of Crenshaw was, in part, seen as a contributing factor in Pat Russell’s Council defeat in 1987; new Councilor (and urban planner) Ruth Galanter was seen as being more responsive and Russell’s opposition to Prop U angered many homeowners.<sup>208</sup> Typical of the sentiment at the time, View Park Resident Eudora Russell said, “I have viewed the apartment area [the Jungle] and the shopping areas on Crenshaw as two blights in our community.”<sup>209</sup> In an effort to change the image of the Jungle (which it was called even among city employees and the LAPD), the area was renamed Baldwin Village to borrow from the cache of adjacent (and more affluent) Baldwin Hills. But changing its name did not change its nature.

In a scene eerily similar to the 1965 Watts Riots, on April 29, 1992, after the acquittal of four LAPD officers charged with assault and use of excessive force in the beating of Rodney King the previous year, South Central L.A. became the epicenter of the most violent civil disturbance since the 1960s.

The flashpoint of violence began at the intersection of Florence and Normandie Avenues, just to the southeast of the Crenshaw area, with the attack on white truck driver Reginald Denny, and quickly spread to other parts of the city, beginning six days of looting, assault, arson, and murder in protest of the unjust acquittals. In all, 53 people were killed, more than 2,000 injured, and as much as \$1 billion in property damages.<sup>210</sup> The next day, Mayor Bradley put a curfew into effect for a large portion of South L.A., including the Crenshaw District. As the crowd came up Crenshaw Boulevard, patrons of the Holiday Bowl, including Rodney King himself, fought back looters, telling them “this was our place” (i.e. it wasn’t a white establishment).<sup>211</sup> Despite their efforts, the Crenshaw district was one of the hardest hit neighborhoods (Fig. 7-21, view of Crenshaw after 1992 unrest). Nearly 30 years after Watts, the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area would once again have to re-build.




Fig. 7-16: Aftermath of the Rodney King civil unrest, 1992  
Paul Sakuma / AP

## 7.2 - WOODLAND HILLS / CANOGA PARK

*Oh, I'm packin' my grip and I'm leavin' today  
'Cause I'm takin' a trip, California way  
I'm gonna settle down and never more roam  
And make the San Fernando Valley my home*

*I'll forget my sins, yes, yes, I'll be makin' new friends  
Where the West begins and the sunset ends  
'Cause I've decided where yours truly really oughta be  
And it's the San Fernando Valley for me*

- Bing Crosby, *San Fernando Valley* (1944)

### A. MODERN ORIGINS (BEFORE 1943)

#### AGRICULTURAL BEGINNINGS

Part of the vast Rancho Ex-Mission San Fernando, Woodland Hills (Fig. 7-17, map of key places in Woodland Hills) remained undeveloped until after the Second World War due to its early history.<sup>212</sup> In July 1869, the San Fernando Farm Homestead Association syndicate led by Isaac Lankershim and Issac Newton Van Nuys bought the entire southern half of the San Fernando Valley – from a ploughed furrow that would become Roscoe Boulevard to the Hollywood Hills (with the exception of the Rancho Encino, which was a distinct tract).<sup>213</sup> While Lankershim and Van Nuys originally intended to raise sheep on the land, they quickly turned to growing wheat, dividing up their territory into six self-sustaining ranches.




Fig. 7-17: Map of Key Places in Woodland Hills/Canoga Park

By Author



While they were successful growing wheat, the Valley did not have a dependable water supply, since the L.A. River that ran through it was often dry, and land grants prohibited farmers from extracting water from it in any case. This changed in 1908, when construction began on the Los Angeles Aqueduct, forever changing the nature of Valley agriculture. The brainchild of self-taught Public Works engineer William Mulholland, the 233-mile aqueduct was a marvel of engineering, bringing cool Sierra Mountain snowmelt through 142 tunnels and crossing the Mojave Desert before entering the San Fernando Valley.

With the aqueduct under construction, in September 1909, the L.A. Suburban Home Company bought the entirety of the Van Nuys holdings (with the exception of the town of Lankershim, now North Hollywood) – some 47,500 acres, for \$2.5 million, and began making plans for its subdivision (called tract 1000) in anticipation of the completion of the aqueduct. The L.A. Suburban Home Company was a veritable who's who of Los Angeles elites – Harrison Gray Otis and his son-in-law

Harry Chandler (owners of the Los Angeles Times), Moses Sherman (a streetcar line builder), Otto Grant (who was in the title insurance business) and Hobart Johnstone Whitley (the Canadian who subdivided 140 towns from the Mid-West to the Pacific, including Hollywood). And on back-to-back weekends in November 1910, the Van Nuys farm animals and equipment were auctioned off in the “sale of the century”, ushering in a new era of town settlements surrounded by now irrigated farmland in the Valley.<sup>214</sup>

#### THE ARRIVAL OF WATER

By 1910, the entire Valley was home to just 3,300 people.<sup>215</sup> This would soon change after the L.A. Suburban Home sale, as it platted three new towns between 1911 and 1913 – from east to west, they were Van Nuys, Marian (later Reseda), and Owensmouth (later Canoga Park) (Fig. 7-18, automobile club map of Valley, 1917). With Otis and Chandler's

L.A. Times as its booster, a roadway (Sherman Way) and Pacific Electric streetcar (red car) line through the Cahuenga Pass from Hollywood were soon built in anticipation of its development. Since Owensmouth didn't have its own water supply, it was annexed by Los Angeles in 1917, and its name changed to Canoga Park in 1930.<sup>216</sup> So throughout the 1920s, the Valley was a series of towns (which were by then a part of the City of Los Angeles) separated by miles of orchards irrigated with water from the aqueduct. Valley agriculture thrived – tomatoes,

grapes, lima beans, sugar beets, olives, and orchards of walnuts, oranges and lemons were its staples and the population of the Valley doubled during the 1920s due to the growth of the towns. Agriculture was not the only industry to thrive in the Valley in the 1920s. By this time, Los Angeles had emerged as the center of the new film industry and the Valley was a favorite filming location, due to its authentic western feel and plentiful sunshine. Hollywood legends like Cecil B. DeMille and D.W. Griffith had even established ranches in the Valley.




Fig. 7-18: Automobile Club Map of San Fernando Valley, 1917

USC Digital Library, Automobile Club of Southern California Collection, SMC Box 2 (0310)



the Woodland Hills area), in 1922, a syndicate that included Victor Girard (who had changed his name from Victor Kleinberger during the War because of its German origin), bought 2,886 acres in an area known at different times as the Brant or West Ranch – from New York millionaire William Crawford for \$700,000.<sup>217</sup> By 1923, work had begun on the town of Girard, with the planting of 120,000 shade trees and shrubs (eucalyptus, acacia, Arizona elms, Monterey pines) and at the corner of what is now Ventura Boulevard and Topanga Canyon Boulevard in Woodland Hills. Girard also constructed




Fig. 7-19: View of Persian Building in Girard, c1924  
*SFV History Digital Library, CSUN (WVM170)*

storefronts and Persian-style towers to give the impression of an established place (Fig. 7-19, view of Persian building in Girard).<sup>218</sup> Here, he built a golf course, swimming pool, stables and a riding club and tennis courts, all to court would-be buyers of his 6,826 lots.<sup>219</sup> But Girard was a financial disaster, in part because of its distant location that was difficult to reach at the time, but also due to the onset of the Great Depression; by 1931, only 75 families remained.<sup>220</sup>

By 1930, the Valley had grown to 51,000 people but half of those lived in the towns of Van Nuys and Lankershim (which by then had been renamed North Hollywood, to capitalize on the name of its more famous neighborhood on the other side of the hills).<sup>221</sup> In 1937, film pioneer Harry B. Warner, one of four brothers who owned Warner Brothers Studios – began acquiring land outside of Owensmouth. The first acquisition was 20 acres at the corner of Victory Boulevard and Fallbrook Avenue; his holdings would eventually grow to a vast 1,700-

acre ranch, where he would race thoroughbred horses.<sup>222</sup> On the northeast corner of De Soto and Oxnard Avenues, he would build a house on a knoll (Warner Ridge), which overlooked his sprawling homestead. Warner pioneered the use of sound in motion pictures, through his Vitaphone firm, producing *The Jazz Singer* (1927), which is widely recognized as the first talking picture.

## B. THE POST-WAR PERIOD (1943-1965)

### RISE OF A TECH CLUSTER

By 1940, the Valley had doubled again to 112,000.<sup>223</sup> By 1941, interest in the West Valley began to grow as the East Valley had undergone urbanization by this point; due to Girard's vast trees, the area (including the original Girard tract) was renamed Woodland Hills in 1941. By the end of the Second World War, the Valley had grown to 176,000.<sup>224</sup> By

1950, the population of the entire Woodland Hills area was still only 4,500, so it very much remained an agricultural area.<sup>225</sup> Reflecting this agricultural character, in September 1947, the Clarence W. Pierce School of Agriculture (a junior high school) was opened on 400 acres immediately to the north and east of Warner ranch house – the first agricultural junior college in the United States.<sup>226</sup> By 1950, 788 students were attending the school.<sup>227</sup>

The establishment of the Pierce College was in some ways both prescient and hind-sighted. While the Board of Education correctly predicted the need for innovative food production technologies to feed a booming post-war population, the College was at odds with the direction of growth that would come to this part of the Valley in the decade after the War. While they believed that “the field of agriculture will provide important life vocations in the new mode of living,” they did not anticipate the area's future would not lie in its agricultural past.<sup>228</sup> Indeed, when the Board of Education (now the Los

Angeles United School District) bought the land in 1944, it cost \$127/acre; by 1947, growth pressures in the area had forced prices up to \$2,800/acre.<sup>229</sup>

The expansion of commercial television after 1948, when CBS and ABC joined NBC, established the era of the major networks. This, in turn, put pressure on the film industry, so as television began cutting into Warner Brothers' business,

Harry gradually retired from day-to-day operations of the studio to focus on raising thoroughbred horses and raising livestock on his Woodland Hills ranch.<sup>230</sup> With the Korean War nearing its end, in a move that some said to be motivated more by patriotism than by profit, in 1953, Warner sold a portion of his ranch to North American Aviation, who would develop military aircraft systems on the site, using a part of the ranch as an



Fig. 7-20: View of Rocketdyne Facility, 1960  
USC Digital Library, Valley Times Collection (00031348)




USC Digital Library, California Historical Society Collection (CHS-44718)

airstrip. Warner stepped down as President of Warner Brothers in 1956 and died in July 1958.<sup>231</sup>

By 1955, North American Aviation had formed a new division called Rocketdyne that would carry out research, development, and production of rocket engines for the U.S. and U.K. air forces. By November of that year, Rocketdyne's new \$3.5 million headquarters had opened in Warner Center at Victory Boulevard at Canoga Avenue (Fig. 7-20, view of Rocketdyne facility).<sup>232</sup> In job advertisements to attract its much needed skilled labor force, Rocketdyne boasted that it was "the most modern and complete facility of its type in the Free World, more than 4000 engineers, scientists, technicians, skilled craftsmen, and administrative personnel will eventually staff this vital headquarters."<sup>233</sup> By May 1956, Rocketdyne had added a 50,000 square foot office annex to the plant and by October 1956, it added a third plant across the street (southeast corner of Canoga Avenue and Vanowen Street) on land purchased from Harry Warner and the Southern Pacific

apply now for  
**POSITIONS** in  
 the design and  
 development of  
**ROCKET ENGINES**



AT ROCKETDYNE'S NEW HEADQUARTERS IN CANOGA PARK

Rocketdyne, a division of North American Aviation, Inc.—already foremost in research, design, development and manufacture of large, liquid-propellant rocket engines—will soon begin full-scale operations at its new headquarters. This is the most modern and complete facility of its type in the Free World. More than 4000 engineers,

scientists, technicians, skilled craftsmen and administrative personnel will eventually staff this vital headquarters. You may be one of these people. Investigate your opportunities in this vast, modern, space-challenging field. Discover not only fascinating work, but also salaries and employee benefits that are among the best in industry.

<p><b>THESE POSITIONS NOW OPEN AT ROCKETDYNE:</b></p> <p><b>DESIGN &amp; DEVELOPMENT ENGINEERS</b>—Mechanical, Chemical, Electrical, Standards, Structural and Stress. For Rocket Engine Systems Design or Development—Turbine, Pump and Combustion Device experience preferred.</p> <p><b>DYNAMICS ENGINEERS</b>—To analyze Rocket Engine Control Systems utilizing Electronic Analog and Digital Computers. B.S., M.E. or B.S.E.E. necessary. Prefer graduate degree. Experience in Servomechanisms. Systems Analysis desired.</p> <p><b>COMPUTER APPLICATION ENGINEER</b>—Application of Automatic Computers to Investigate new methods of Numerical Analysis.</p> <p><b>TEST ENGINEERS</b>—Experienced on engine systems, combustion devices, turbines, pumps and engine instrumentation.</p> <p><b>EQUIPMENT DESIGN ENGINEERS</b>—Electrical, Mechanical, Structural.</p> <p><b>ELECTRONICS TECHNICIANS</b>—Experienced in Instrumentation and Controls.</p> <p><b>ENGINEERING DRAWINGS CHECKERS</b>—Experienced.</p> <p><b>TECHNICAL WRITERS</b>—Experienced. Career Jobs.</p>	<p>See Rocketdyne's other job opportunities in the classified section of this paper.</p> <p>Contact Mr. Harry Maloin, Diamond 7-5461, Rocketdyne Engineering Personnel Dept. 406-T, 6633 Canoga Ave. (bet. Vanowen and Ventura Blvd.), Canoga Park-Interviews, Mon. to Fri. 8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.</p>
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**ROCKETDYNE**

A DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC.

Fig. 7-21: Ads for Rocketdyne Jobs, 1950s  
 Los Angeles Times Classified Ads

Railway (whose tracks ran beside the land) – a materials and purchasing group that would employ 375 people.<sup>234</sup>

By the mid-1950s, other firms in the aerospace, electronics, and energy fields had also established a presence in the Canoga Park/Woodland Hills area, including Atomics International, Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Hughes Aircraft, Rockwell International, Boeing and Teledyne. Following the Second World War, nuclear energy captured the interest of the federal government and public at large. As early as 1948, North American Aviation created an Atomic Energy Research Department to explore the potential for commercializing this new technology, which was renamed Atomics International in 1955. By this time, Atomics International's reactor design was one of several chosen by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to test the viability of nuclear power. By 1957, Atomics International had constructed a nuclear sodium reactor in the Santa Susana hills above Canoga Park, known as Area IV or the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, which was shared by Atomics International

and Rocketdyne. It was front-page news of the L.A. Times and a special report by Edward R. Murrow aired on November 24, 1957, when the facility became the first commercially successful nuclear power generator, supplying power to the nearby city of Moorpark, just west of Simi Valley. But in July 1959, 13 of the reactor's 43 fuel rods partially melted down, releasing radioactive gas into the air. The debate continues to this day as to how much radioactive material was released and whether it posed a threat to nearby residents.

#### CORBIN PALMS

So by the mid-1950s, the Woodland Hills/Canoga Park area was beginning to emerge as a technology cluster. By this time, with the striking down of racially restrictive covenants and the migration of African-Americans out of South Central into Baldwin Hills, whites (many of whom were Jewish) began leaving the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area because they feared



a presentation of contemporary modern Bermuda type homes

# Corbin Palms homes

## Contour PLANNING

- Conceived and landscaped as though it were one huge garden area, the entire community is harmoniously pattern-blended with full-grown Palms, Olive trees and shrubbery. This beautifully varied planting, which is in all ways a striking complement to the fine homes it surrounds, assures you of the "finished" appearance of artistic grandeur such as is usually found only in luxurious estate areas. It was made possible only because it was planned years in advance. Devised and developed under the watchful eyes of the most scientific method ever employed to give you an unsurpassed park-like setting!

**Now Comes The Fourth Stage**

Home building has evolved through three distinct stages since the end of World War II . . . **STAGE ONE**, the "shelter" stage, in which virtually any four walls that supported a roof was called a "home" . . . **STAGE TWO**, the intermediate stage, in which government surveillance ushered in a more stable development calling for the observance of certain minimum standards . . . and **STAGE THREE**, the luxury stage, in which there was marked improvement in construction and decor and three-bedroom, two-bath homes became the standard . . . **THE FOURTH STAGE NOW MAKES ITS DRAMATIC DEBUT AT CORBIN PALMS HOMES!** "The Coordination of Space-design," introduction to the expansive interior-exterior living stage. Spacious four-bedroom, (or 3 bedrooms and den) two or three bath homes of the finest design and construction to ever come from the drawing board . . . scientific "air space" placement of homes on every lot to give you roominess outside as well as in . . . exquisite contour planning, all combine to bring you a level of perfection never before equaled!

<b>DECORATIVE REDWOOD FENCING</b>	Entire rear yard completely enclosed.	<b>LAWN SPRINKLERS</b>	Full coverage Sprinkler System.
<b>WOOD BURNING FIREPLACE</b>	Interesting decorative ruffile brick and wood facings.	<b>COLOR</b>	Partial shades selected by color consultants to blend harmoniously with the rose base exterior tile in master baths and kitchens.
<b>FORCED AIR HEATING</b>	Year-round comfort with finger-tip thermostatic control. 75,000 B. T. U.	<b>BATH FIXTURES</b>	Modern deep restful tones have been carefully selected. Selection of colors from our stock available in kitchen and bath to early purchasers.
<b>WIDE FACETS</b>	Low sweeping angles and patterns add dramatic touch to exteriors.	<b>"IN-AND-OUT" COLOR PLANNING</b>	In much of the construction 4 x 4 or 4 x 6 was used instead of the conventional 2 x 4. We know of no other builder using No. 1 grade lumber at a minimum standard.
<b>OVERHANGING EAVES</b>	2 foot overhangs give cooling shade, protection against rain spatter.	<b>HEAVY GRADE LUMBER</b>	Interesting pattern arrangement in the way home is placed on the lot gives "many yards" instead of just front and back.
<b>COLOR-ED ROCK ROOFS</b>	For rugged, individualized charm and maximum durability.	<b>PRIVATE PATIO AREAS</b>	Planned for "parking flexibility." Carpets are either attached or detached.
<b>ROOF INSULATION</b>	Full "two-inch Celotex" insulation; cooler in summer, warmer in winter. TV antenna and plugs in every home.	<b>PORTE COCHERES, CARPORTS, OR GARAGES</b>	Big enclosed closets in garage for storing miscellaneous items.
<b>SLIDING GLASS WINDOWS</b>	A floor-to-ceiling threshold for indoor-outdoor integration.	<b>CIRCULAR DRIVEWAYS</b>	Some full, some half square, for backing and turning to enter street footpaths. Ample guest parking.
<b>FRENCH DOORS</b>	The "continental touch," permitting easy access to the patio.	<b>VARIED "SET BACK"</b>	Desirable, practical separation of as much as 45 feet between homes enhances atmosphere of relaxed suburban living.
<b>WINDOW AREAS</b>	Brings abundant light and scenic beauty into the home.	<b>PICTURESQUE LANDSCAPING</b>	Six times the "normal" amount has been spent on shrubbery. Full grown Palm or Olive tree in every lot.
<b>HARDWOOD FLOORS</b>	Beautiful parquet hardwood floors.	<b>TREE SPOTLIGHTING</b>	An "oasis" feature usually found only in luxurious estate areas.
<b>LARGE WARDROBES</b>	An exceptionally large amount of storage space for all the family.		
<b>ENTRY PARTITIONS</b>	Decorative, modern screen separates entry in some models.		
<b>INTERIOR LIGHTING</b>	Modern design of its kind is expressed in unusual lighting fixtures.		
<b>"EFFICIENCY KITCHENS"</b>	Attractive birch kitchen cabinets. Electric exhaust fans.		

# Corbin Palms homes

An exhibit of the many interesting features of Corbin Palms Homes is on display at the tract office. Every home-seeker is cordially invited to see this "preview to pleasurable living" at any time between the hours of 10 A.M. and 8 P.M.

priced from **\$14,950** to **\$16,250**

low down payments

Furnished Model Homes open for visitors, featuring Freedom Gas Kitchens.

George Alexander Construction Company, Builders

EXECUTIVE OFFICES • 8283 West Third Street, Los Angeles  
SALES OFFICE at West side of Corbin just north of Toham

Open 10 A.M. till 8 P.M. daily

LOT NO.	
PRICE	
MONTHLY PAYMENT (including principal and interest)	
DOWN PAYMENT (plus impounds and closing costs)	
SALESMAN	
SALES OFFICE PHONE:	

**FIRST CHOICE**

—relax in the joyous freedom that gives you what you want when you want it—whether it be congenial social activity or secluded privacy. Completely modern features include low, exciting lines topped with rock roofs that boast wide, overhanging eaves—handsome bricked-in fireplaces—small breeze ways—porte cocheres and car ports, some with circular drives—everything that guarantees you luxury living at its finest.

ARCHITECTS  
Palmer and Kriest, A. I. A.

plan h

and LOOK INSIDE!

George Alexander Company

Fig. 7-22: Original Marketing Literature for Corbin Palms, 1953

the effects of social change on their property values. As the Los Angeles Times noted after the 1965 Watts Riots, “the whites panic and run for Palos Verdes or Woodland Hills.”<sup>235</sup>

Meanwhile, the arrival of Rocketdyne, Atomics International and other aerospace firms in Canoga Park between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s, drove demand for housing in the area. If the weakening of racial barriers was the fuel that kick-started white flight to suburban areas like Woodland Hills, the development of new industry on the City’s periphery was the stick that stoked the flames. So there was both a *push* and a *pull* dimension to the rise of Woodland Hills and the fall of Baldwin Hills. Among the earliest housing tracts to capture this white flight was Corbin Palms, built between 1953 and 1955, the first of hundreds of tracts designed by William Krisel of Palmer & Krisel, AIA – located just east of Pierce College on either side of Victory Boulevard (Fig. 7-22, original marketing literature for Corbin Palms).<sup>236</sup> Corbin Palms became home to many of these white transplants; as long-time Corbin Palms homeowner June

Jones said, the tract included “many engineers who worked in nearby aerospace plants.”<sup>237</sup> Many of these new residents were ex-servicemen, who qualified for zero-down loans financed through the Veterans Administration.

As an architecture student at the University of Southern California in 1946, William Krisel would pass Baldwin Hills Village (Village Green) on his way to campus every day.<sup>238</sup> So enamored of it was Krisel that the project would be his first USC study project.<sup>239</sup> At the time, it was only five years old and much talked about within the design community. With the likes of Le Corbusier and his CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne) followers aligning the interests of the design community with those of planners and politicians, architects were keen to help solve the post-war housing crisis. Most of this design energy, however, went into public housing and large-scale private-sector multi-family housing projects like Village Green or Park La Brea (in the Fairfax/Wilshire area). But with the opening up of the suburbs and the mass-production of





Fig. 7-23: Case Study House #8 (Eames House), 1950  
*Amy Park (Kopeikin Gallery)*




Fig. 7-24: Case Study House #22 (Stahl House), 1960  
*Julius Shulman (J. Paul Getty Trust)*



single-family houses, the architecture community began to see an opportunity to help shape the post-war suburbanization of America.

The idea that high-minded architects who were used to serving affluent clients could design stylish homes for the middle-class was the basis of the *Arts & Architecture* magazine's Case Study House program, which was launched in 1945 with mid-century architectural luminaries such as Richard Neutra, Charles and Ray Eames, Walter Koenig, and Eero Saarinen commissioned to design prototypes. While highly influential with young architects for their originality and achieving something of a cult status, in part due to Julius Shulman's striking black-and-white photographs, the program was not a commercial success and did not spawn the mass production that was envisioned. Of the 36 houses designed, only 25 were built, most famous among them being Case Study House #8, the Eames house (1949) in the Pacific Palisades designed by Charles and Ray Eames (Fig. 7-23, image of Eames house) and Case Study

House #22, the Stahl house (1960) in the Hollywood Hills designed by Walter Koenig (Fig. 7-24, image of Stahl house). By the time Corbin Palms was under construction (1953), just 15 Case Study houses had been built. But educated during this period and sharing the enthusiasm of the Case Study program, young architects William Krisel and colleague Dan Palmer (who he had met while briefly working together at Victor Gruen & Associates), saw an opportunity to go beyond the Case Study program.

Among Krisel's friends at USC was Robert (Bob) Alexander, son of George Alexander, who owned a construction company that was making money building low-cost apartments throughout the City, known locally (and pejoratively) as "dingbats". While Robert was not especially interested in design, he was eager to prove to his father that he was a keen businessman, and together with Krisel, convinced his father to let them develop a small "test" tract of ten homes that Krisel would design for \$5 an hour.<sup>240</sup> The project proved so successful, in 1952, Alexander

gave Palmer & Krisel the commission for Corbin Palms to build the first 287 houses of what would eventually become a portfolio of over 40,000 tract homes in Southern California. Krisel was especially interested in building well-designed houses for the masses. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Krisel enlisted and served in the Pacific Theater as an interpreter since he spoke fluent Mandarin, having lived in Shanghai until his teens. Having lived a privileged upbringing, the experience exposed Krisel to men from all walks of life like never before.<sup>241</sup> So when he returned from the War, he was determined to help address the housing crisis. Interestingly, homes in Corbin Palms were not FHA (Federal Housing Administration) approved because Krisel believed that FHA's standardized specifications wasted money compared to Palmer & Krisel's non-standard modular system.

In theory, since Corbin Palms was not subjected to FHA mortgage insurance standards, there was a greater opportunity for non-whites to buy homes in Corbin Palms. Between 1934 and 1968, the FHA's *Underwriting Handbook* established

mortgage lending requirements, which included the overt practice of denying mortgages based upon race and ethnicity, thus institutionalizing racism, particularly in suburban areas. The FHA explicitly practiced "redlining" – refusing to back mortgages in certain neighborhoods based on racial or ethnic composition. They literally used red lines on maps (hence "redlining") to demarcate areas where mortgages could not be issued – these were called "residential security maps".<sup>242</sup> Developed by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) – a New Deal agency created by the Roosevelt administration in 1933 – and incorporated into the FHA's 1934 *Handbook*; it was an attempt to remove appraiser's subjectivity, but had the effect of marginalizing entire areas. The maps had four colors: green (where "American Business and Professional Men" lived), blue (areas that were "still desirable" although had "reached their peak, but otherwise stable), yellow (areas that were "definitely declining", typically on the edge of black neighborhoods), and red (areas in which "things taking place in 3 [yellow] had already

happened”, which included black and low-income areas). The FHA went even further as, in 1938, reflecting the sociology of the Chicago School and the neighborhood unit model of the time, held that mixing nationalities and social classes was detrimental to neighborhood stability, listing “inharmonious racial or national groups” in the same class of noxious impacts as smoke and odors.<sup>243</sup> And until the striking down of racial restrictive covenants in *Shelley v. Kraemer* (1948), the FHA’s manual endorsed an explicit racial covenant against blacks. As a result, of the \$120 billion in home loans backed by the federal government (through the FHA and VA) between 1934 and 1962, a stunning 98% went to whites only.<sup>244</sup>

Despite Corbin Palms being constructed after not only the *Shelley v. Kraemer* (1948) but also *Barrows et al v. Jackson* (1953) (see section 7.1), the deeds for every house in the tract contained the original L.A. Suburban Home Company “tract 1000” restrictions (of which Corbin Palms was a part) that ran with the land, including the following racial covenant:

“No part of said premise shall be sold to, conveyed to, leased to or rented to, nor shall the same ever be used or occupied by any person of either the Negro, African or Asiatic race, or any person not of the Caucasian race, whether by the owner, tenant or any other person, except, however, that these covenants and conditions shall not prevent the employment upon said premises of Negro, African, or Asiatic servants.”<sup>245</sup>

These were unenforceable after 1953 but as noted in section 7.1 above, realtors used many strategies to block African-Americans (and other minorities) from new suburban housing tracts. So even though Corbin Palms in theory was more accessible than FHA-backed developments, the original buyers were overwhelmingly white. Even today, the area is exceptionally white relative to the 28% city average – census tract 1349.01 (which includes the north part of the tract) is 80.5% white, while census tract 1393.01 (including the south

part of the tract) is 88.5% white.<sup>246</sup>

Architecturally, Krisel understood what the Case Study luminaries apparently did not – that the key to mass-producing architecture was working hand-in-hand with builders and understanding that they were in the business to make money. As Krisel explained, the ten test houses they built “cost less per square foot than what Bob’s father sold as dingbats, and they sold at a higher price – so they made a bigger profit per house... we had developed a system of post-and-beam houses, developed our own windows, our own walls. We found out what cost money in a home, and we figured out how to do it better and cheaper.”<sup>247</sup> The stylish houses were very much of their era – based on a 32-inch module, post-and-beam construction, open floor plans, low-pitched gables with clerestory windows, broad overhangs, and floor-to-ceiling windows in every room, which created a strong indoor-outdoor connection that typified mid-century Southern California. So simple were they to construct they could be built in 10-12 days, and could use less skilled labor,

which reduced costs. The expanses of glass, indoor-outdoor connections, and high ceilings also gave a perception that they were bigger than they were, which allowed for smaller footprints (about 1,400 square feet). The “Bermuda-style” homes (much like the Jungle, reflecting the tropical associations popular of the era) were designed to fit into the landscape (Krisel was also a landscape architect), and each house had two Washingtonian palm trees on broad front lawns. So striking was Corbin Palms in its modernity that it captured the attention of Walt Disney, who filmed the neighborhood as part of his ‘American the Beautiful’ movie that was shown at Disneyland’s Cyclorama.<sup>248</sup>

Krisel liked the houses so much he bought his first house in Corbin Palms, living at 6440 Jumilla Avenue with his wife Corinne and two children between 1954 and 1956.<sup>249</sup> Among the selling features of the homes were their affordability compared to more centrally located housing; while houses in the new Baldwin Hills Estates (built at the same time) were selling for \$28,000, Corbin Palms houses started at \$14,950



Fig. 7-25: Krisel House Photos, 1954  
*William Krisel Papers, Getty Research Institute*



with just \$2,500 down.<sup>250</sup> Krisel's own house was featured in the *L.A. Times* in 1957, highlighting its "oriental influence".<sup>251</sup> The home was very minimalist from the street, but inside featured a Mondrian-like entry screen, white-painted posts and beams, and custom designed furniture (Fig. 7-32, photos of Krisel house).

Of Krisel's 40,000 tract homes, 4,000 were built in the San Fernando Valley alone.<sup>252</sup> By 1958, Palmer & Krisel were one of the country's top 100 largest architectural firms, with an estimated \$18 million a year in current work and were named one of the nation's top firms in a 1959 Progressive Architecture survey;<sup>253</sup> by 1962, they were doing between \$35-\$50 million a year (by comparison, the more famous Richard Neutra did between \$16-\$20 million the same year).<sup>254</sup> The firm would also win the National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB) certificate of merit in residential planning and design for four straight years for "recognition of good architectural design, skill in achieving economies in plan, design and equipment, and for meritorious

design reflecting suitability and adaptability for a home builder's development."<sup>255</sup> As architectural critic Alan Hess concludes, "it can be argued that architects Dan Palmer and William Krisel fulfilled many of the goals of the Case Study Program – namely, to bring modern spaces and building technology to the mass housing audience – more successfully than did any of the houses actually included in the program."<sup>256</sup>

#### WARNER RANCH, PART 1

So by the late 1950s, mid-century housing tracts like Corbin Palms were being built at a record pace in Woodland Hills to house the largely white population that worked in the aerospace industry, which by this time was firmly established in the West Valley. Chambers of Commerce helped consolidate these efforts by marketing the area within their business networks. In 1959, Litton Industries announced plans to build a new research, development and production facility for its

electronics division on 63 acres in Warner Center (at 5500 Canoga Avenue), to be designed by A.C. Martin & Associates.<sup>257</sup> The fledgling homeowner community in Woodland Hills was opposed to the intrusion of industry into the area, and the Woodland Hills Civic Association (WHCA), by then formed from 500 property owners in the area, launched a petition opposing the rezoning of the Litton site from R1 and RA (residential and

agricultural) to M1 (limited manufacturing).<sup>258</sup> According to Woodrow Hattic of the WHCA, homeowners had moved into the community to get away from industry and they wanted to keep it that way. But homeowners at this time proved no match for the pro-growth City Council of the 1950s. By mid-1960, the 180,000 square foot facility had been built, with plans to expand to 750,000 square feet to accommodate Litton's new defense subsidiary, Litton Systems, Inc.<sup>259</sup> The Woodland Hills facility would become the headquarters for the new company, which expected to employ 6,000 people, producing guidance systems for military defense weapons.<sup>260</sup>

With Litton and Rocketdyne firmly in place (Fig. 7-25, view of Warner Center prior to its development) and burgeoning housing tracts around it, the demand for commercial and retail space surged. Plans for a major shopping center in what would become Warner Center began as early as 1956.<sup>261</sup> Soon after, a more comprehensive vision of a business and commercial park was being contemplated. By 1959, Albert C. Martin Jr of



Fig. 7-26: Warner Ranch Prior to its Development, 1961  
LAPL Valley Times Collection (00083093)

A.C. Martin and Associates had begun drawing up plans for a city comparable in size to Seattle, with an expected population of over 500,000 by 1975.<sup>262</sup> Public presentation of the Martin preliminary plan was unveiled on May 8, 1960. The plan included a 100-acre shopping center (which had already been rezoned for by this point), a possible technical college, a major hotel, multiple-story office and apartment buildings, a single-family house tract, and selected industries.<sup>263</sup> The Woodland Hills Civic Association had plans of their own which called for no industry and, despite the already zoned parcel for the shopping center in the northwest part of the ranch, they wanted it in the south portion, closer to the Freeway.<sup>264</sup> Since Canoga High School was located immediately opposite the shopping center site, they wanted residential uses in the north (although this would mean being located adjacent to Rocketdyne immediately to the east).

By the late 1950s, the City Planning Department (under the direction of John Roberts) was completing its Woodland

Hills district plan, and it was still a very top-down planning approach at this time. Complicating matters, the ranch was split between the Woodland Hills and Canoga Park district areas; that the Planning Department's Canoga Park district plan had already been completed (December 1957) meant the shopping center site just inside the Canoga Park area, could be (and was) rezoned. But the area south of Victory Boulevard had to wait until planners completed their district plan (which would be released in January 1961). In a testament to how much business interests were driving planning at the time, planning officials said that they would amend their district plan in light of the Warner Company's master plan, which called for a 15-year development starting in 1961.<sup>265</sup> In addition to the shopping center in the northwest of the ranch, an industrial park would be in the northeast, a technical college in the southeast, R&D and apartments in the central east part, apartments and a 150-bed hospital south and west of the shopping center, and office buildings in the center, with another mall to its south,



and a hotel in the southwest portion. There would also be a cultural center (including museum and auditorium) and bus, helicopter, and rapid transit terminal south of the hotel. In all, the plan called for a resident population of 15,000 plus 68,000 workers.<sup>266</sup>

By this time (1960), the Ventura Freeway running the length of the Valley had finally been completed, which greatly improved Warner Center's access to the region. This access would be furthered in the years ahead as work began in 1960 on the construction of the San Diego Freeway through the Sepulveda Pass between Sherman Oaks and West Los Angeles. By this time, the City Planning Department had divided the Valley into 21 districts and had completed district plans for Canoga Park (December 1957) with Woodland Hills completed in January 1961.<sup>267</sup> Growth was proceeding so quickly that the Canoga Park district plan was amended in 1961, 1962, and 1963, and the Woodland Hills plan was also amended in 1963.<sup>268</sup> Recognizing that piecemeal planning within very

local districts might lead to incompatibilities, in 1964, the Woodland Hills, Canoga Park, and Winnetka district plans were incorporated into the Generalized Land Use Plan – West San Fernando Valley (adopted by City Council on November 5, 1964), which was amended the following year. And by this time, the Santa Monica Mountains Area General Plan covering the hillside portion of Woodland Hills had also been adopted (July 30, 1964), completing a flurry of overlapping plans in an effort to keep up with the pace of growth between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s.

But the 1960 master plan hit a snag as it was held up by the City Planning Commission, on the grounds that it should wait until the Woodland Hills district plan was finished, a sentiment that Hattic echoed (who by then was also President of the Federation of Valley Property Owners).<sup>269</sup> With community groups having their own ideas that differed dramatically from the Warner Co. plan, by June 1960, everyone was waiting in anticipation of the city's zone plan. Homeowners were livid

when Harry Jobe, head of the city's master plan division, gave the Woodland Hills Chamber of Commerce a preview of the plan in a closed-door meeting before it was released for public consumption (although Hattic was also invited to the meeting).<sup>270</sup> More distressing for the homeowners, as Hattic said, was that "the city's proposed map 'almost perfectly conforms' with the Warner Co's plan."<sup>271</sup> In his defense of showing the plan to the Chamber first, Jobe encapsulated the reality of land use planning at the time: "We deal with the chambers very closely because they are usually the best organized groups in the communities. I can see no reason why I shouldn't have shown them the map when they asked."<sup>272</sup> It was clear at this time that business groups, and not homeowners, were seen by the planners as the groups with the most sway.

The battle lines between homeowners and business groups reflected fundamentally different visions for Woodland Hills. In the Chamber's view, the area needed to be self-sufficient – to have its own economic base, included industry (building

upon Rocketdyne and Litton's presence). Homeowners, by contrast, saw the area as largely a bedroom community and felt that there was enough industry in the Valley as a whole, and wanted the majority of the ranch developed with single-family housing, and didn't feel there were enough public facilities in the plan. The City agreed with the Chamber, although the City's zoning plan called for less commercial zoning than Warner Company wanted. The Woodland Hills Civic Association pressed for delays until adequate sewers, streets, and building height limits could be set up.<sup>273</sup> Also opposing the plan were the Canoga Park Civic Association, the Chalk Hills Homeowners Association, and Woodland Hills Coordinating Council.<sup>274</sup> Area City Councilman Tom Shepard, however, favored industrial development of the ranch, "to create additional employment opportunities and to strengthen the city tax base," but proposed a "green belt" around the development to buffer it from surrounding residential uses.<sup>275</sup> Both the Canoga Park and Woodland Hills Chambers of Commerce were in support

of the plan, as was the Industrial Association of the San Fernando Valley, setting up a clear divide between homeowner and business groups. Due to the controversy, the City Planning Commission, rather than act on the Woodland Hills plan, asked planners to revise the portion of the Canoga Park plan within Warner Ranch.<sup>276</sup> When the planners did so, the City Planning Commission approved the updated plans but excluded the Warner Ranch portion so it could look at it further (including touring the area by helicopter).

On September 30, 1961, the City Planning Commission approved the new Warner Ranch plan without the proposed “green belt” but changed a strip of land east of Variel, along the ranch’s eastern side to multi-family residential to provide a transition to neighboring residential uses. The decision was a clear victory for business groups, the Warner Company, and the City Planning Department. Despite a delay of over a year, homeowner groups argued they did not have an opportunity to be fully heard (since they did not receive an advance copy of

the Planning Department’s final report).<sup>277</sup> By January 1962, City Council had signed off, ending five years of negotiation and planning.

### GROWTH ACCELERATES

When President John F. Kennedy went before a special joint session of Congress on May 25, 1961 to announce the ambitious goal of sending an American to the Moon before the end of the decade, the implications for Canoga Park/Woodland Hills proved enormous. It would be here in Warner Center’s Rocketdyne that the propulsion systems for NASA rockets and later, the main engine for the Space Shuttle program and power system for the International Space Station would be engineered and built. If the 1950s to 1970s were the Atomic and Space Ages, then Canoga Park was literally the engine that drove it. So in 1962, Rocketdyne announced plans to build new factories on its site to produce the F-1 and J-2 rockets for the Saturn

and Nova programs.<sup>278</sup> Once again A.C. Martin would be the designer of the \$2.5 million, 293,000 square foot expansion. With the additions, Rocketdyne's campus would then consist of eight buildings, totaling more than 1.6 million square feet.

Meanwhile, with zoning approvals in hand by this time, the Topanga Plaza Shopping Center had begun construction at Topanga Canyon and Victory Boulevards. Famous was its Rain Fountain sculpture by Torrance inventor Vic Chatten (Fig. 7-34, view of Topanga Plaza and Rain Fountain), consisting of transparent nylon beaded strings that dropped from the ceiling, casting a half million artificial oil-like raindrops downward.<sup>279</sup> Ironically, Topanga Plaza became something of a civic center for the West Valley, supplanting traditional downtown Canoga Park (Sherman Way), which began to fall into decline because of the new modern facilities in the area. Opened in 1963, Topanga Plaza became a place to hang out, a place to vote, to meet candidates, a place to protest the Vietnam War, or participate in teachers' strikes.<sup>280</sup> The \$30 million, 950,000 square foot

shopping center designed by Victor Gruen and Associates (for whom Krisel had briefly worked) was said to be the largest two-story shopping center in the world at the time and the first enclosed mall in Southern California.<sup>281</sup> Adding to the shopping opportunities in the area was the opening of Fallbrook Square Shopping Center in 1964 just down the street from Topanga Plaza (at Fallbrook and Shoup Avenue), although it was more traditional, smaller, and struggled to compete with the distinctly modern Topanga mall.

By this time, an 800-unit non-profit cooperative housing project called Fountain Park was being planned for Topanga Canyon Boulevard and Oxnard, developed by the Doric Development Company and designed by Leon Gluckman and Robert Charles Lesser (who designed many buildings in the Jungle, and later, founded RCLCO).<sup>282</sup> By summer 1964, the project proposed to build 221 units of one to three bedroom garden apartments and townhomes, which were 90% sold by November.<sup>283</sup> The project had to wait until summer 1965 for

financing and wasn't completed until 1966.<sup>284</sup> Among the selling features of the co-op was that everything was taken care of within a landscaped oasis, including two pools, a putting green, a recreation center, and "walking distance to America's 2 finest shopping centers: Topanga Plaza and Fallbrook Square."<sup>285</sup> Fountain Park was in the same spirit as the two-story tropical apartments being built in the Jungle (specifically Baldwin Plaza) as late as 1962, only a couple years earlier. The selling features – landscaping, pools, proximity to shopping – were identical. They were even designed by the same architect (Robert Lesser). And yet despite their similarity, Fountain Park would go on to become a desirable address next to a thriving center, while the Baldwin Plaza would become one of the most notorious gang areas in the country, next to a dying retail corridor.

So when the race riots of the mid-1960s hit, the early signs of change in the two areas were exacerbated. Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw, once considered a fashionable "suburban" area, by 1965, was quickly becoming outdated and undesirable.

Meanwhile, Woodland Hills/Canoga Park, despite being located on the City's periphery, was at the center of not only its economic growth, but the center of its now-apparent suburban cultural life.

### C. THE COMMUNITY PLAN ERA (1965-1992)

#### PLANNING FOR RAPID GROWTH

By 1965, Woodland Hills had already experienced a period of tremendous growth, but with the Warner Ranch poised to become a major regional center, this growth was expected to continue, if not accelerate. So by 1965, Woodland and Baldwin Hills were heading in opposite directions, with Woodland Hills reaping the rewards as middle-class whites were leaving Baldwin Hills in droves, bringing their consumer dollars with them. Between 1956 and 1971, the population of the West San Fernando Valley doubled and was now a veritable

city of its own, home to a half million residents drawn to jobs in the aerospace, electronics, and film industries. It was a bastion of young families – remarkably, more than half of the 500,000 people in the West Valley were under the age of 18 by 1970.<sup>286</sup>

The Warner Ranch development drove the vast majority of growth in the West Valley. But what people meant by “Warner Ranch” changed over time (Fig. 7-35, diagram showing different ranch areas). Originally the ranch consisted of 1,699 acres bounded by Shoup Avenue on the west, Vanowen Street on the North, De Soto Avenue on the East and the Ventura Freeway on the South (at one point, it even extended further south to Ventura Boulevard). With the exception of a small 20-acre parcel along Shoup, the area west of Topanga was not as controversial, in part because much of it was developed as single-family housing. So by the 1960s, what was considered “Warner Ranch” was the 1,136 acres east of Topanga – this was the area that A.C. Martin planned for the Warner Company in 1960-61, which was

hotly contested by homeowners. But by the late 1960s, roughly half of this area, 570 acres north of Victory Boulevard and east of Canoga Avenue had been substantially developed (including Topanga Plaza, Litton Industries, Rocketdyne, and other smaller developments), leaving a prime 630-acre area vacant at the core of the ranch. This parcel was highly valuable, lying at the center of an area with shopping, industry, offices and housing surrounding it. This area would eventually be called the “Warner Ranch Urban Center” and was synonymous with what would become the Warner Ranch Specific Plan, adopted in 1971.<sup>287</sup>

In August 1968, Aetna Life and Casualty acquired this parcel from the Warner Company for \$30 million, which was subsequently transferred the following year to a partnership they established with Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company (with Coldwell Banker acting as its Development and Marketing Agent).<sup>288</sup> In early 1969, Kaiser-Aetna announced plans for a major \$300 million industrial-commercial-residential complex, which built upon the earlier ideas first proposed by A.C. Martin.

By this time, Kaiser-Aetna added “Urban Center” to the Warner Ranch name to distinguish this new core development, which was referred to as “the Century City of the San Fernando Valley”, in reference to the high-density mixed-use center developed on a portion of the Twentieth Century Fox Studios in West Los Angeles.<sup>289</sup>

Kaiser-Aetna’s timing was perfect, since Calvin Hamilton and the Planning Department were at the time preparing the “Centers Concept” – a comprehensive framework to guide L.A.’s development between 1970 and 1990. In the Concept LA plan, Warner Ranch Urban Center was identified as one of the high-density “centers” that would be linked to other centers through rapid transit. The growth strategy was to direct the majority of future growth into these centers, both as a means of building a viable public transit system, but also as a way to preserve the single-family areas outside of the centers. As such, Kaiser-Aetna’s ambitions aligned with the City Planning Department’s and the two worked hand-in-hand to make it a reality; when

unveiled a few years later, Planning Director Calvin Hamilton would call it “a tremendous plan and what we would like to see in other centers.”<sup>290</sup> Lawyers for Kaiser-Aetna reinforced this by arguing that the Warner Ranch Urban Center “represents a significant opportunity for the embodiment of the ‘Centers Concept’ of the City of Los Angeles.”<sup>291</sup>

Having lost the battle over the original Warner Ranch area plan, homeowners became concerned that traffic in and around the new Urban Center would exceed the capacity of the existing infrastructure, including its streets. Kaiser-Aetna responded by planning street upgrades. But by May 1969, homeowners were concerned that these upgrades would result in the removal of a double row of old-growth pepper trees along Canoga Avenue, just south of Victory Boulevard.<sup>292</sup> Damned if they upgraded the streets, and damned if they didn’t, Kaiser-Aetna won the backing of the City’s transportation department and the trees were removed, but Kaiser-Aetna promised an elaborate landscape plan for all the streets in the new

development. By summer 1970, having failed to save the pepper trees, the newly formed Woodland Hills Improvement Association (WHIA) – which by then had supplanted the Woodland Hills Civic Association as the preeminent homeowners voice – called for a freeze of the Warner Ranch development, until biologists and conservationists had been consulted. WHIA three main goals were to preserve the Santa Monica Mountains (including fighting the proposed Malibu Freeway and preserving Mulholland Boulevard as a scenic route), protect the remaining pepper trees on Canoga Avenue (south of Ventura Boulevard), and advocate for larger green areas in the Warner Ranch Urban Center plan.<sup>293</sup>

The rapid pace of change in the West Valley, however, prompted a re-study of the West San Fernando Valley Plan in 1969. By this time, the new Community Plan program had been adopted following recommendations set out by the 1968 Citizens Committee on Zoning Reform report. As such, a Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) was established in late 1969, and

they worked on the new Woodland Hills Community Plan during 1970; public commentary and revisions took place during 1971, and the Plan was adopted by City Council on September 15, 1972. The Committee consisted of the following 23 people:<sup>294</sup>

- Phil B. Anderson, Brentwood Savings & Loan
- James M. Baker, Bank of America
- Larry J. Calemine, Warner Industries
- Charles D. Carpenter, securities
- Kennard G. Chamberlain, retired businessman
- Carleton E. Chase, administrative assistant
- Ray K. Church, Valley Federal Savings & Loan
- Albert Criz, real estate broker
- Rudolph V. De Chellis, architect
- William M. Gary, contractor
- Lester C. Jones, distributor
- Jesse F. McHan, Amco Cosmetics
- Lewis Meskimen, Imperial Savings & Loan



- Monty M. Miller, insurance broker
- Warren E. Miller, contractor
- Charles Podmore, contractor
- John M. Praisewater, funeral director
- Allen T. Richardson, realtor
- Ted Rubin, American Metal Product Corp.
- Glen Shea, carrier, U.S. Postal Service
- Arthur T. Smith, minister, First Baptist Church
- Phil Zeller, music writer and publisher
- Chuck Cecil, radio and TV announcer

Two things are readily apparent from the above list: (1) the CAC was almost entirely composed of members of the business community and (2) all 23 members were men. In Baldwin Hills, not only was the CAC smaller (8 members), but it was half men and half women. While gender balanced, the Baldwin Hills CAC was not representative of the community by the 1970s – it was largely white and professional (representative

of the “old” Baldwin Hills, prior to the influx of both affluent and low-income African-Americans). But neither was the Woodland Hills CAC representative, although in a different sense. Unlike in Baldwin Hills, where homeowners trumped business interests, in Woodland Hills business interests trumped homeowner interests.

The dominance of business interests on the Woodland Hills CAC was also largely mirrored in the public presentations held for the draft plan. Ten meetings were held in April 1971, as follows:<sup>295</sup>

April 5	Winnetka Chamber of Commerce
April 7	Open Public Meeting (Sutter Junior High)
April 13	Woodland Hills Chamber of Commerce
April 14	Canoga & Woodland Hills Rotary Club
April 15	Open Public Meeting
April 20	Open Public Meeting
April 21	Woodland Hills Improvement Association

April 22	Canoga Park Chamber of Commerce
April 28	Woodland Hills Kiwanis Club
April 29	Open Public Meeting

First, there were far fewer public presentations in Woodland Hills (10) than in Baldwin Hills (25). But also, in direct contrast to the public meetings in Baldwin Hills, where 13 of 25 (52%) of presentations were made specifically to homeowner groups, just one presentation (10%) was made to homeowners in Woodland Hills (the April 21 WHIA meeting). Instead, homeowners were expected to come to four general meetings, held at local schools. In a virtual mirror of Baldwin Hills, 50% (5 of 10) presentations were made to business groups in Woodland Hills.

So if the 1972 Woodland Hills Community Plan largely represented business interests in the area, this was largely because both the CAC and the consultation process emphasized the input of business groups. As a result, the proposed plan

had more sub-areas up-zoned (56%, 20 of 36) than down-zoned (44%, 16 of 36). This is a clear contrast to Baldwin Hills, where the vast majority of sub-areas (86%) were down-zoned. Without a detailed analysis of all community plan areas, we cannot say for certain if this pattern holds across the entire City, but clearly in the case of Baldwin and Woodland Hills, the composition of the Citizens Advisory Committee – i.e. which groups and interests were most strongly represented – had a strong influence in shaping the resultant land use policies.

While the CAC and presentations in Woodland Hills favored business interests, in early 1971, community planners did mail a survey to residents of the area asking for their feedback, although it appears that these were only sent to homeowner association members, since less than 120 surveys were completed.<sup>296</sup> This is a small sample that likely represented only the most vigorous defenders of homeowner interests. Even still, when asked what they felt were the “major considerations” of the plan, 80% (90 of 113) said “distribution

of recreation and park facilities”, 87% (102 of 117) agreed with “preserving single family housing as it is now” and 95% agreed with “prescribing minimum density development in the steeper mountain areas.” These results are consistent with what we might expect of homeowners (as we saw with Hillside Federation in Chapter 6), i.e. concerned about development of the hillsides, with preserving single-family areas and open space. Perhaps more surprising is that even these highly vigilant homeowners were split over whether Warner Center was a major concern, with just 48% (54 of 112) saying it was. While we must be careful not to overstate this finding given the small sample size, the considerably lower level of concern about Warner Center might suggest that those who spoke in opposition to it (as will be discussed below) might not have been representative of homeowners in the area generally – at least in the early 1970s (as we will see, things changed by the 1980s).

When asked to rank the importance of eight issues, the top concerns, in order of the percentage of homeowners saying

it was important or moderately important, were:<sup>297</sup>

- (1) air pollution (93%)
- (2) traffic congestion (85%)
- (3) lack of recreational facilities (82%)
- (4) threat of freeways through neighborhoods (74%)
- (5) problems with the Center development (71%)
- (6) apartments replacing single family homes (70%)
- (7) deterioration of housing (64%)
- (8) lack of convenient shopping facilities (7%)

That air pollution (and by association congestion) was of most concern is not surprising, given the high degree of environmental consciousness in the early 1970s – after all, in 1970, the EPA was created and NEPA (National Environmental Protection Act) and CEQA (California Environmental Quality Act) were passed. While a majority of homeowners felt Warner Center and the more general problem of apartments replacing homes

were problems, these ranked only 5 and 6 out of 8 problems surveyed. When asked what they felt were the most effective solutions to these problems, two strategies were most popular: restricting population growth and density, and implementing rapid transit.

#### WARNER RANCH URBAN CENTER

By the second half of 1969, complete plans for the entire Warner Ranch Urban Center (Fig. 7-29, images of Warner Ranch Urban Center plan) were unveiled for the remaining 630 acres of undeveloped farmland where rows of corn at that time sat awkwardly beside a rapidly urbanizing area around it. The development, which was expected to be complete by 1980, would create some 40,000 jobs in addition to 8,000 housing units, making Warner Center a major employment center within Los Angeles.<sup>298</sup> The master plan was lauded by professional planners, awarding its planner (still A.C. Martin &

Associates), an American Institute of Planners award of merit in 1970.<sup>299</sup> The idea was that Kaiser-Aetna would, in turn, sell off individual blocks to different developers who would develop them according to strict guidelines imposed by Kaiser-Aetna. That Kaiser-Aetna retained A.C. Martin (who had created the Warner Company master plan) made sense not only because of their familiarity with the area, but it was also one of L.A.'s – and indeed the nation's – most prominent firms, combining both architectural and engineering services. By the mid-1970s, three generations of Martins had run the practice and many of L.A.'s most important buildings were designed by the firm – from City Hall to the Department of Water and Power Building.<sup>300</sup>

The Warner Ranch Urban Center plan was designed to be a “verdant oasis” to “provide a sense of quiet shelter.”<sup>301</sup> Elevated pedestrian bridges would not only provide separation and safety, but, combined with angular roof forms and distinct landscaping, would create interesting vistas in an otherwise flat site. The planning of the site was distinctly modern, organized



around several super-blocks that limited vehicular traffic to the periphery and allowed the interior of the block to be reserved for pedestrians. While in vogue at the time, we recognize this type of planning as out of human scale and largely pedestrian unfriendly.

However, the plan did depart from the modern practice

of strictly separating different uses. While individual buildings were not mixed-use per se, each of the different super-blocks were dedicated to different uses, such that within the area, there were blocks of multi-family housing, shopping centers, office complexes, and light industrial manufacturing/research & development. The developers placed great importance on



Fig. 7-29: Warner Ranch Urban Center Plan, 1972

*Warner Ranch Urban Center Environmental Guidelines*

establishing a consistent, unifying language such that it felt as “one total environmental entity.” Water was a central amenity to the plan, with residential areas clustered around ponds and brooks, and office towers including elaborate fountains (although these water features were largely unbuilt). A detailed landscape plan was developed that created a consistent street trees along each street and “green belt” setbacks surrounding each super-block (although the large scale and lack of relationship of buildings to the street meant the area was not pedestrian friendly, despite the pleasant landscaping).

Before the area master plan was even complete, Kaiser-Aetna applied to rezone a 20-acre parcel on the south side of Victory Boulevard between Canoga and Owensmouth Avenues to commercial to build a department store. Although broadly in agreement with developing Warner Ranch, the Valley Industrial Association, disagreed with the rezoning and proposed prohibiting commercial uses on areas planned for industry (which included the Kaiser-Aetna land along Victory).<sup>302</sup> Kaiser-

Aetna argued that with a population of 3.5 million living within 25 miles of Warner Center, and with only 3.15 square feet per capita of commercial space, the Valley had only half the commercial space per capita as Orange County. By contrast, the Industrial Association argued that the Valley had only 3,200 acres of vacant industrial land (which homeowners felt was a lot – hence their opposition to industry on Warner Ranch), compared to 46,000 acres in L.A. County and 34,000 acres in Orange County, suggesting L.A. would be displaced as a center of industry if this industrial land was further converted to commercial use.<sup>303</sup> This was a relatively rare dispute between two factions of the business community – commerce versus industry. In this case, commerce prevailed, with the Planning Commission approving the rezoning on May 15, 1969.<sup>304</sup>

This case brought up the difficulty that planners faced at the time, since the area was growing faster than it could be planned. In order to deal with individual cases before the area master plan could be made, at the urging of Kaiser-Aetna, the

Planning Department requested and won a temporary rezoning guide of the broader 1,699-acre ranch area in June 1969.<sup>305</sup> Planning Department and A.C. Martin jointly created the guide, but City Council's Planning Committee was unimpressed when it later learned that other departments, such as the Transportation Department, were not consulted.<sup>306</sup> So when Kaiser-Aetna tried to use the rezoning guide to rezone a 20-acre parcel of the ranch on the east side of Shoup Avenue (between Sylvan and Erwin Streets) to build 900 apartments (the guide allowed R4 high-density apartments), 200 homeowners from Canoga Park showed up at a meeting to discuss the proposed plan and expressed concern that schools in the area would become overcrowded if the apartments were approved. The project was put off until approval of the new Community Plan for the area.<sup>307</sup> This marked one of the rare early victories for homeowners against the urbanization of the Warner Ranch area. It is perhaps not surprising, given the apartments did not create the same kind of economic impact as commercial

or industrial development, that the City Planning Commission and City Council denied rezoning for apartments but allowed rezoning for industrial and commercial uses on Warner Ranch.

Projects such as these reflected the fact that zoning applications were being requested before planning was complete. This put pressure on all parties (City Planning Department, City Planning Commission, City Council) to get a land use plan in place for the area. So over protests by the Woodland Hills Improvement Association (WHIA), the City Planning Commission approved zoning for the broader 1,699-acre Warner Ranch area in May 1970.<sup>308</sup> The plan designated 402 acres for single-family housing – all west of Topanga Canyon Boulevard – and 416 acres for multi-family housing, for a total population capacity of 60,456 with residential land accounting for 48% of the total area. Another 121 acres (7%) was allocated to commercial uses, 734 acres (43%) for industrial uses and 26 acres (1.6%) for parks and a school. Despite the inclusion of as much acreage for single-family housing as multi-family

housing, the WHIA condemned the plan, saying that their organization “does not feel that Warner Center will be an asset to Woodland Hills; it in fact destroys a suburb.”<sup>309</sup> The Citizens Advisory Committee for the Woodland Hills Community Plan, while in wide agreement with the plan, felt there needed to be more open space east of Canoga Avenue, to provide a buffer between the industrial development on the east side of Warner Center and residential communities east of De Soto Avenue.

Homeowners were especially upset over the multi-family housing included in the plan. Kaiser-Aetna felt the inclusion of multi-family was central to Warner Ranch fulfilling its role as a “center”. Their market studies also indicated strong demand for it. As Kaiser-Aetna lawyers argued, “it is desirable and logical from a planning standpoint that a portion of the demand be met by locating multiple housing in reasonable proximity to the industrial and commercial areas, in order to provide a balanced and coordinated development plan for the Urban Center, thereby furthering the opportunities for residents to live

near their places of work and their recreation and shopping areas.”<sup>310</sup>

With the Planning Commission having approved the broader Warner Ranch land use plan and with Kaiser committed to meeting the demand for multi-family housing, by June 1970, the Shoup Avenue apartment project rejected the previous year came back before Council. Once again, homeowners (particularly those on the west side of Shoup) mobilized against it, arguing that “high-rise” housing would destroy their privacy (“high-rise” and “high-density” were often used by homeowners interchangeably, but in this case, the proposed project was a mix of two- and three-story townhouses). Although barely one per cent of the Warner Ranch area (20 acres out of 1,699), the project revealed a split between the Planning Commission, which was increasingly siding with homeowners, and City Council, which was more aligned with business interests. One commissioner, Melville Branch, called it “big boy planning”, and despite the recommended approval of the project by two



of its own hearing examiners, the Planning Commission voted against it.<sup>311</sup> The Shoup homeowners showed up at the June 10, 1970 Council meeting in full force, with the Woodland Hills Improvement Association's Mrs. Eugene Dvorin making an emotional protest, arguing that the apartments "would destroy home values for the benefit of developers who want another downtown Los Angeles... We do not want our lives and property traded for Warner Ranch profit. We do not want to live in downtown Los Angeles... We are being sold out to developers."<sup>312</sup>

This argument that the city was putting profit before people would become a calling card of homeowners, although it required a good deal of cognitive dissonance, since their own homes were, of course, built by developers only a few years earlier (and presumably for the same profit motive). They also argued that it would overburden local schools, parks, streets, and recreational facilities. Looking at the historical record, it is clear that homeowners did not see the aggregate environmental

impact that building low-density single-family housing at the City's periphery had. To them, single-family housing preserved more open space (even if most of it was private) and preserved a pseudo semi-rural way of life. Apartments, commerce and industry were distinctly "city" uses, which they felt were antithetical to the suburbs, so when these uses were proposed in their backyard, they were predictably met with resistance.

As a compromise on the Shoup Avenue project, the City Council Planning Committee reversed the City Planning Commission's denial of the project, but imposed so-called "Q" conditions<sup>313</sup> on the land to restrict the density – scaling the project back from 1,950 units to 900 – mandated more parking spaces than required (two per unit), as well as a larger 25-foot setback along Shoup Avenue. In addition to denying the apartment project, homeowners demanded a freeze on all rezoning within Warner Ranch until after the entire Woodlands Hills-Canoga Park Community Plan was completed. But this was a battle that the homeowners and Planning Commission

would lose, as the full Council approved the project by a 11-3 vote when it came back before them the following week (with Marvin Braude, Tom Bradley, and Pat Russell voting against and local Councilor Donald Lorenzen voting in favor).<sup>314</sup> So as of 1970, political power remained firmly within the hands of business interests in Warner Center, with homeowners not yet able to stop the urbanization of the area.

Interestingly, another front of the battle between homeowners and business groups in Warner Center was the proposed cultural center, which had been discussed ever since the original 1960 A.C. Martin plan. The \$20 million Cultural Center was to include a 2,600-seat theater and exhibition space. Homeowners did not feel that the Warner Ranch area was an appropriate place for it, as they felt it would overburden the area. But after a specific commission and study was conducted to look at various Valley locations, the Warner Center area was deemed as most appropriate.<sup>315</sup> Two specific sites within the area were considered – on the campus of Pierce College and

Warner Park, a 20-acre park east of Topanga Canyon Boulevard (between Califa and Marlee Streets) that had been donated to the City by the Warner family back in 1967.

The Cultural Center became a lightning rod of controversy, pitting those in favor of development with those aiming to preserve open space. The Woodland Hills Residents Association (WHRA) – another homeowner group in the area – opposed locating the facility in Warner Center because it would eat into valuable open space but also generate traffic and congestion. The Woodland Hills Chamber of Commerce, however, favored the Warner Center location, arguing it would have a positive impact on area businesses, and would give the area a cultural amenity it lacked. The Cultural Center was just another front in the war against Warner Ranch Urban Center, a battle that homeowners had largely been losing up until 1973.<sup>316</sup>

Residents did not like the location nor the plan to finance three-quarters of the facility through public funds, arguing that money could be better spent on acquiring land to

preserve as open space. As the Woodland Hills Improvement Association said, “the Warner Ranch still leaves a bad taste in people’s mouths. The reaction to the [cultural] center could be an extension of existing animosities which are a result of the increasing urbanization of Woodland Hills... We need a [downtown] center here about as badly as we need all of the problems of downtown Los Angeles.”<sup>317</sup> Interestingly, part of the selection of Warner Center as a possible location was based on a survey sent to 10,000 Valley residents, and the greatest support was in the Woodland Hills-Tarzana area, which suggests that the WHRA’s position may not have been representative of area residents.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

The central concern about open space conservation that homeowners feared with the cultural center reflected the ascendance of the environmental movement in the early

1970s. However, the City Council had approved the Warner Ranch master plan, the Woodland Hills Community Plan, and rezoned some of the parcels prior to the requirement that the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) apply to all private sector projects (prior to 1972, it applied only to public sector projects). By 1973, then, there was great confusion about how to implement CEQA. It was unclear if the Warner Ranch Urban Center would have to go through the full CEQA process, and even if it did, would the overall EIR be sufficient to cover individual projects within it, or whether each individual parcel would need its own EIR. The process was so new that nobody knew what the legal requirements were. As a way of trying to address the environmental impacts, in May 1973, Kaiser-Aetna unveiled a glossy brochure documenting the environmental guidelines that developers of individual parcels would follow. It was essentially the same as the 1970 plan, but with more detail about how the project would be implemented. But the City did not see this as satisfying CEQA requirements, and rejected it as

an EIR because it was in the words of one city planner, merely “an architectural public relations statement.”<sup>318</sup>

Meanwhile, by 1973, Tom Bradley – who had often cast his vote on the side of homeowners – had been elected Mayor on the strength of a coalition of African-American and Westside Jewish voters, many of whom were vocal “slow growth” advocates.<sup>319</sup> So when the Warner Ranch environmental review came before the City Planning Commission, Bradley was quick to notify them that “he was hearing from concerned residents” about the impact of the project.<sup>320</sup> As the Deputy City Attorney advised the City Planning Commission, “there will be a number of people who will want to talk and I would hope they will let them talk. The project has significant environmental impact in the Valley and there is a lot of interest and controversy.”<sup>321</sup> In exchange for their support in electing Bradley, white homeowners expected to be heard – and by and large they were, even though Bradley was notorious for trying to please all sides. But when the President of the Valley Associated Chambers of Commerce

Ruth Richter asked Bradley “isn’t there any way we can speed up the Warner Center thing? Let’s replace the commissioners,” Bradley gave a firm, “No... All we can do is try to have them be as fair and as responsive as possible to both sides.”<sup>322</sup>

This tension between development (and the jobs and tax revenue it generated) and ecology was at the center of the battle of the February 1974 Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the Warner Ranch project, prepared by Ultrasystems, Inc. for Kaiser-Aetna.<sup>323</sup> The controversy of the Draft EIR related to findings that the development would generate some 94,000 daily car trips by 1990, which was more than either the surrounding streets or Ventura Freeway could handle, prompting City traffic engineers to recommend reducing the density of the proposed development by 45%.<sup>324</sup> These recommendations, however, did not count on a rapid transit system being developed that would reach Warner Ranch Urban Center. In deference to homeowners, Bradley called for a joint meeting of the City Planning and Environmental Quality Commissions at which

time it was decided that a public hearing would be required on the EIR, even though at that time it was not required – a decision that angered Kaiser-Aetna.<sup>325</sup>

Regulations at the time called for developers to prepare their own EIRs, but it was unclear what role the lead agency (in this case, the Planning Commission, acting on the advice of the City Planning Department and public testimony) should play in ensuring the completeness or accuracy of the developer's own EIR. As such, the EIR that was circulated in February 1974 was highly contested, with City Planning Commissioner and UCLA Professor Peter Marcuse demanding to know if it reflected the opinion of the City Planning Department or just the viewpoint of the developers.<sup>326</sup> The Planning Department said that it did not reflect their perspective, which cast the validity of the report into question. Also of concern to commissioners were reports that Kaiser-Aetna had been lobbying “upper-echelon civil servants” (possibly Planning Director Calvin Hamilton) – efforts that were “canceling out recommendations made at the

working staff level.”<sup>327</sup>

By 1975, the confusion over the environmental impact report had caused the Warner Ranch Urban Center project to be delayed. Councilor Donald Lorenzen, who represented the area (District 3) and supported the Warner Ranch project, charged the Planning Commission and Woodland Hills Residents Association (WHRA) with “obstructionist tactics”, which he argued would cost the City millions of dollars.<sup>328</sup> The Commission and residents argued that the master plan was too generic to guide future development and demanded a new one be created, pointing to Council's approval of the Blue Cross Headquarters building on a site where the master plan called for a lake. WHRA threatened to sue, demanding Kaiser-Aetna withdraw their plans for the Blue Cross building to “avoid unnecessary litigation”.<sup>329</sup> By the mid-1970s, threatening developers with lawsuits was a popular tactic used by homeowners to force developers to comply with their wishes. Although originally intended as a tool to ensure public projects took into account the impact on wildlife and

ecology, CEQA's reinterpretation by the courts made it the most powerful tool homeowners had. By CEQA definition, any project that altered the built environment in any way was deemed to have an impact on the environment. But by the mid-1970s, environment was not interpreted in the narrower sense it was originally conceived as, but rather very broadly to include highly subjective dimensions like neighborhood character and aesthetics. Moreover, there were no universal standards to determine what a "significant" impact was. The open-ended nature of CEQA therefore led to a highly charged climate which hardened the positions of both developers and homeowners, as each believed their own interpretation of the legislation.

Lorenzen's opposition to area homeowners was unusual at the time. By the mid-1970s, an earlier generation of City Councilors that tended to side with business interests had largely been replaced with Councilors more responsive to the populist concerns of homeowners. But Lorenzen was aligned with the business community, having previously been the

President of the West Valley Associated Chambers of Commerce. He had also been (as of 1962), chairman of the Valleywide Better Government Committee, in which he led a drive to have the Valley secede from the City of Los Angeles;<sup>330</sup> although unsuccessful, it made him a household name. And Lorenzen was President of the City Council from 1969 to 1977, which perhaps gave him a stronger voice and public presence than might otherwise be the case, allowing him to narrowly escape defeat in a 1973 race that required a recount with Joy Picus. Picus was heavily involved in homeowner and women's groups at the time, so the 1973 race was seen as a battle between business and homeowner interests. But when that four-year term was up in 1977, Picus ousted Lorenzen in the re-match. So in many ways, the replacement of Lorenzen with Picus in 1977 can be seen as marking the shift away from business interests and towards homeowner interests in the West Valley. But by this time, the die was cast; Warner Center was already being built. The next phase of the land use war in the 1980s,

then, was less about whether the area was to be a business center or housing (homeowners had already lost that battle), but rather how they could scale back further development.

This shift from business to homeowner interests had taken place earlier on the City's Westside and hillside areas where homeowners were more organized and had more financial resources. For example, as early as 1965, homeowner-friendly Marvin Braude had ousted his business-backed rival Karl Rundberg in District 11 (covering Pacific Palisades, Brentwood, West L.A., Tarzana, and Encino), on the strength of homeowner opposition to a planned freeway across the Santa Monica Mountains.<sup>331</sup> Likewise, in 1971, Joel Wachs beat incumbent James Potter Jr in District 2 (covering the Santa Monica Mountains, Sherman Oaks, and Studio City), in part due to his opposition to a multi-million dollar development in the Santa Monica Mountains.<sup>332</sup> And by 1975, Zev Yaroslavsky would upset the establishment-backed Frances Savitch in District 5 (covering Bel Air and Westwood) with the support of local

homeowner groups. The fact that this shift didn't take place until 1977 – 12 years after it did on the Westside – indicates that the West Valley homeowners were not as strong as their counterparts until much later.

By 1975, the tremendous post-war economic boom that fueled the rapid growth of Los Angeles had given way to recession after OPEC's oil embargo of 1973. Lorenzen used the weak economic climate as leverage against homeowners, arguing that their obstructionism in delaying the development of Warner Center:

“...has directly resulted in the loss of one million man days of construction which would put countless workers back on job payrolls... The direct loss to the city alone caused by the Planning Commission is around \$3 million in revenues that would be generated by property taxes, sales and business license taxes. An additional \$3.5 million has been lost for schools... Although the

commission espouses great interest in ecological aspects of Warner Center, their inaction has also denied the City \$450,000 in Quimby fees that could provide funding for desperately needed West Valley parks.”<sup>333</sup>

Lorenzen was backed not only by local Chambers, but also by the group he formerly led, the Associated Valley Chambers of Commerce. These groups also backed the extension of Reseda Boulevard across the Santa Monica Mountains because it would help the Warner Center development. By then Peter Marcuse, a well-known advocate for the poor and social justice and son of leftist critical theorist Herbert Marcuse, had become President of the Planning Commission and questioned Lorenzen’s independence, saying he was getting his information from the developers (who he described as “less than fully cooperative”).<sup>334</sup> The Commission was also concerned that the Warner Ranch Urban Center plan did not provide adequate accommodation for lower-income people who would be working there.

## LOW-INCOME HOUSING

The question of low-income housing in Warner Center proved to be one of the most contentious issues of the development. In the draft Woodland Hills Community Plan, city planners included a provision that required “that the proposed development include at least 15 percent of its dwelling units for low and moderate income housing”, a provision supported by the City Planning Commission.<sup>335</sup> Warner Center business interests, especially Kaiser-Aetna, did not support having a mandatory low-income housing requirement, feeling that “such housing would be inappropriate in this area,” and commissioned a study to demonstrate it was not feasible.<sup>336</sup> By contrast, a broad coalition of social welfare agencies, area housing commissions, religious groups, women’s groups, and even many homeowners, argued in favor of it.

Land at the core of the new Warner Ranch Urban Center was of course highly valuable, and the developers did not want



to lose potential return on their investment by having to set aside almost 1 in 6 units for low-income individual or families. Developers also felt that the inclusion of low-income housing tarnished the prestige they were trying to achieve to attract multi-national tenants for their commercial properties in the area. For example, the developers stated they were “not willing to accept rent supplement housing within the Specific Plan area even if it were available from the Housing Authority”, suggesting that rent subsidies (what would eventually become Section 8 vouchers) would not be compatible with the vision they had for the area.<sup>337</sup> As a compromise, the developers offered to set aside a 7.7-acre site at De Soto Avenue and Burbank Boulevard on the periphery of Warner Center, not for low-income, but for moderate-income families (at that time, only the land west of Canoga Avenue was being considered for inclusion in the Warner Center Specific Plan).

But to many people, pushing the poor to the periphery was segregationist – perpetuating the concentration of low-

income (often minority) households into the least desirable parts of an area. At the time (1969-1970), the question of integration of the suburbs was on the top of everyone’s mind due to HUD Secretary George Romney’s open call for desegregation. In the days following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr, on April 4, 1968 (and the riots that ensued), President Johnson pressed for and won passage of the landmark Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act. One of the goals of the Fair Housing Act was to open up the suburbs to blacks, particularly since many of the new jobs that were being created in the late 1960s were in the suburbs.<sup>338</sup> Although President Nixon was staunchly opposed to racial integration in the suburbs, since it was here that he drew his popularity, Romney interpreted the Fair Housing Act as a mandate for integration.<sup>339</sup> To this end, he proposed an “Open Communities” program that would make HUD financial assistance to municipalities conditional on them accepting subsidized housing. As a test of this program, HUD

launched several pilot projects, including an 80-unit project in the Sylmar section of the San Fernando Valley (at 13080 Dronefield Avenue, between Astoria and Sayre Streets).<sup>340</sup> The Sylmar housing project proved to be highly controversial, as the Sylmar Civic Association collected 4,000 signatures opposing the project.<sup>341</sup> A hostile crowd of over 1,000 residents packed into Sylmar High School to protest the project, prompting its ultimate cancelation.<sup>342</sup>

Kaiser-Aetna and Coldwell Banker argued that HUD would not finance or subsidize low and moderate income housing within the Specific Plan area because the densities were too high and because the land costs allocated to the housing areas exceeded HUD guidelines.<sup>343</sup> But, in fact, the area would go on to be built at a density lower than what it was approved for. Supporters of the low-income housing provision also suggested that if low-income housing was built in Warner Center, then there would be more children and the present schools could not accommodate the increase, in which case,

the developers would be responsible for building a new school – a suggestion that Kaiser-Aetna was opposing the low-income provision to avoid having to pay for the new school.<sup>344</sup> By this time, Kaiser-Aetna had already commissioned a study of area school capacity that concluded that no additional schools were necessary, but that assumed there was no low-income housing provision.

It was also unclear at the time if HUD actually would allow low-income housing within the Warner Ranch Urban Center area, or whether it would not allow it only under the particular program that the developers wanted to use, FHA's 221(d)(4) program, which was reserved for moderate income housing and only for use by for-profit developers.<sup>345</sup> In an attempt to clarify HUD's position, City Planning Director Calvin Hamilton met with HUD officials on November 24, 1970; HUD indicated that they had changed their policy within the last two weeks to encourage this type of housing throughout Los Angeles.<sup>346</sup> But HUD did confirm that rent supplements were unlikely to be permitted

in the Specific Plan area because market rents would exceed the maximum allowed by the subsidy and densities exceeded HUD guidelines. However, they indicated that housing for low-income seniors would be allowed within the Plan area.

On May 20, 1971, City Council voted to remove the 15% affordable housing requirement in the Plan and replace it with text that read “that low income housing be encouraged within the subject plan amendment area,” thus making the provision of affordable housing at all (let alone at a specific level, i.e. 15%) entirely at the discretion of Kaiser-Aetna. This was met with fierce opposition by a wide range of non-profit interests, who were already upset at the cancelation of the Sylmar project.

For example, the American Association of University Women (AAUW), citing the Douglas Commission (the National Commission on Urban Problems) and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, argued that low-income housing should not be concentrated in poor areas but rather dispersed throughout the city, located near employment, and,

in particular, within suburban areas.<sup>347</sup> As its representative Lily Aurich argued, housing for low-income people must be “one of the major objectives of new community and large-scale planned development,” and as such “enforceable provisions for low and moderate income housing should be included in this land use plan.”<sup>348</sup> She went on to suggest that if local government failed in its responsibility to plan for low-income households, then state and federal governments may be required to step in.

The AAUW position echoed the sentiment of representatives of the L.A. League of Women Voters. For example, speaking on behalf of the Women’s League, Lucy Hixon stated that “our members believe that adequate housing opportunities for the diverse population within a community is as important to the community’s development, as are streets, sewers and pedestrian walkways.”<sup>349</sup> The League was particularly pointed in its criticism of the City Council changing the plan from its original requirement for mandatory inclusionary low-income housing requirements to merely “encouraging”

low-income housing: “implementing the principle of balanced residential development which affords housing opportunity for low, moderate and upper income citizens should not be left to chance. Rather, it should be included within the requirements of this land use plan amendment. Indeed, such a provision should be basic for major development in any community.”<sup>350</sup>

Housing task forces and commissions in the area were also in favor of the low-income housing provision. For example, the San Fernando Valley Task Force was pointed in their criticism of the direction that the Council was heading by making such housing optional: “to start with bare ground and spend years planning a financial, industrial, residential, and commercial development – a most modern urban center – and deliberately refrain from planning housing for the people who must service that center, is unforgivable.”<sup>351</sup> They were particularly critical of Kaiser-Aetna’s offer to set aside a 7.7 acre site on the periphery of Warner Center for 234 units of moderate-income housing, arguing that such a small number of units could not be called

balanced housing since it represented only 4% of the residential units planned for the first phase and noted that almost half the Valley’s population at the time could not afford current housing prices or lived in sub-standard housing.<sup>352</sup>

The Valley Task Force’s Joy Picus<sup>353</sup> – who would go on to become the area’s City Councilor from 1977 to 1993 – had earlier testified before the Planning Committee, reminding Councilors that it was not just the working poor, but also young married couples, the elderly, returning servicemen, or people who had suffered a serious illness or divorce who were all in need for affordable housing, and that they, in particular, needed to live near public transportation, jobs, shopping and services – exactly what Warner Center purported to offer.<sup>354</sup> To Picus, “when the city grants a zone change, it makes it possible for the developer to realize a profit on this investment. In return, he has a social responsibility to build in a way that will be an asset to the community.”<sup>355</sup>

The City’s Human Relations Commission was equally

unmoved by Kaiser-Aetna's claim that it was not financially feasible to put low-income housing in Warner Center. As Celes King II stated "as chairman of the Commission's Housing, Health and Welfare sub-committee, I cannot accept this kind of thinking... we contend that any planning concept which arbitrarily discriminates against one segment of our population is completely void of justification... we cannot afford to regress just when we are on the brink of the kind of action that is long overdue."<sup>356</sup> He went to cite a UCLA report that claimed that over 100,000 families (not individuals) were inadequately housed at that time, which he called "a mandate for action" and that "your Human Relations Commission asks for that action now."<sup>357</sup>

Religious leaders pressed for the inclusion of the low-income housing requirement on moral grounds. As Rev John G Simmons argued to his local Councilor, "I believe it is essential, if we are not to continue the segregation policy which limits the movement of minority citizens... that every sub-division and every land use include specific requirements for low and

moderate income housing. This is not only Federal policy, but it also moral policy." As such, he felt that "we need to make sure that the full range of housing for community needs be a part of any land use plan by any developer in any part of the city."<sup>358</sup> Likewise, members of the Westwood United Methodist Church Race and Religion committee also weighed in, letting their Councilor know that "we are surprised and discouraged that such a plan would be adopted and hope that you can help us realize our goal of fair housing."<sup>359</sup>

Representatives from the Housing Opportunities Center of Greater Los Angeles went ever further, arguing that the consultant's report that Kaiser-Aetna/Coldwell Banker used to justify its case was "woefully inadequate" and called into question the veracity of the developers' claims. As Executive Director George Parks argued, "there is – to our mind – no indication that serious attempts were made to evaluate the feasibility (sic) of low and moderate income housing development in the Warner Ranch area. No creative or innovative approaches

were suggested; obvious approaches were omitted.”<sup>360</sup> Parks reminded Council that by this time, dispersal of low-income housing was the national policy of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and clearly spelled out in HUD’s *Low Rent Preconstruction Handbook*. The Housing Opportunity Center gave specific reasons why low-income housing should be required in the new mixed-use center. Among those reasons were:<sup>361</sup>

- (a) the development would provide 40,000 job opportunities, many of which were in the service sector,
- (b) is near a vocational training center, allowing for the possibility that low-income workers could receive job training,
- (c) some 46% of the development population earns less than \$10,000 per year, 27% less than \$8,000 per year, and 14% less than \$6,000 per year (meaning only 13% earned more than \$10,000 per year),

(d) it was in an area of the City where the Regional Planning Commission has recommended that 25% of all new housing should be for low and moderate income persons, and,

(e) inclusion of low-income housing would be in direct agreement with HUD Secretary George Romney’s public position on how governmental subsidies should be utilized.

Parks also contended that the 221(d)(4) program that Kaiser-Aetna wanted to use on the 7.7-acre site doesn’t help low-income families because it allows for rents up to 150% of the maximum rent under the 221(d)(3) program (which was for non-profit developers). This would result in rents as high as \$187 per month (equivalent to \$1,125 per month today) for two bedroom units and \$216 per month (equivalent to \$1,300 per month today) for three bedrooms, which Parks said was neither low nor moderate income.<sup>362</sup> Moreover, use of the 221(d)(4)

program precluded the possibility of local non-profit groups of developing the site. And concentrating the poor into one site, rather than dispersing low-income units throughout the project, would be “contrary to everything that has been learned from experiences building for lower income groups.”<sup>363</sup> Instead, he argued that the higher profits made from the luxury units could offset the costs of providing affordable units throughout the project.

Organizations like the Woodland Hills Residents Association (WHRA) and Woodland Hills Homeowners Organization (WHHO) were opposed to multi-family housing and higher densities generally in Warner Center. But not all individual homeowners opposed the low-income provision. As Woodland Hills homeowner Matilda Rummage argued to District 7 Councilor Ernani Bernardi:

“Anyone who has studied urban problems at any length is aware that a good many of our problems arise from

the fact that we have divided out people, both physically and spiritually, by placing people of different economic levels in widely separated areas for the most part and, in effect, have made strangers of people with different economic and cultural backgrounds. As a result of this there is very little understanding between different groups of the problems and needs of the other.... We also have the problem of a lack of integration in our schools which would be greatly helped by dispersing low-income housing throughout the city. A good many people seem to feel strongly that bussing of school-children is a waste of time; so why not work toward integrating of neighborhoods so that schools will be naturally integrated, which is what a lot of people have indicated they want.”<sup>364</sup>

Mrs Rummage’s views were not alone. Bernardi also received a petition signed by 36 families supporting the

15% provision for low-income housing, and especially for the elderly.<sup>365</sup> Another letter from Florence Webster to City Council also expressed concern about the removal of the affordable housing provision: “We are hoping that our Councilman will back the motion to restore the Commission’s recommendation, which regards the Warner Ranch... You will certainly admit that the need is great that the developers adhere to the original statement of the Planning Department asking that 15% of all the housing fall within the low and moderate price ranges.”<sup>366</sup>

The debate over the 15% inclusionary requirement cost Kaiser-Aetna. During 1973, agreements with other companies to purchase and develop three residential parcels were rescinded because of the prospect of the low- and moderate-income provision.<sup>367</sup> This, combined with delays due to the controversy over the Environmental Impact Report, pushed development back until 1975, by which time economic conditions had deteriorated, making housing starts financially unfeasible. Due to these delays, Kaiser-Aetna requested a series of extensions

of its approvals – first to 1973, then to 1974, and again to 1975. The Woodland Hills Residents Association opposed these extensions, instead wanting the EIR to be completed and the developer to re-submit.<sup>368</sup>

City Planning staff, for their part, was initially sympathetic to the coalition’s arguments: “staff is of the opinion that assurance should be given that low and moderate income housing will be provided somewhere in the subject Plan Amendment area. The staff’s reasoning is that the owner is willing to provide such housing, and anticipates that a joint meeting with HUD will clarify the availability or non-availability of funds for meeting this requirement.”<sup>369</sup> But this sentiment was not strong enough to go against the will of Council and Planning Director Calvin Hamilton, perhaps sensing that political forces were lined up behind the economic interests in this case, recommended approval of the Council substitution, even though it merely “encouraged” rather than “required” low-income housing. By the time they wrote their staff report, the planners agreed that



“the core area of the Warner Ranch center is an inappropriate place to attempt to locate [low income housing].”<sup>370</sup>

### PRESERVING THE HILLSIDES

Multi-family housing and density generally was seen as antithetical to the suburban lifestyle emerging in Woodland Hills. But development in the hillsides of the Santa Monica Mountains was a particular concern of the homeowner groups. The City Council’s Planning Committee, in summarizing the reports of Planning Director Hamilton, noted that there were three major issues that concerned homeowners in testimony related to the Woodland Hills Community Plan: (1) the intensity of development of Warner Center, (2) the planning of public facilities (especially schools and parks), and (3) the preservation of hillside areas (in the Santa Monica Mountains).<sup>371</sup> As Hamilton himself noted, “many people were opposed to further intensification anywhere in the District. They expressed a desire to maintain

the present population level. They felt that the Plan encouraged additional population, congestion, pollution, and overloading of facilities, etc... Other people questioned the very philosophy of concentrating the future growth in a specific area instead of scattering corresponding uses throughout the district.”<sup>372</sup>

The Planning Department was sensitive to preserving the hillside areas, but was at odds with homeowners on how best to achieve this. Homeowners wanted Minimum density land use categories across the Santa Monica Mountains, which would only allow large-lot single-family homes. The Planning Department wanted more flexibility, including the possibility for developers to cluster housing – what they called “residential planned development” or RPD – thus preserving more hillside areas as open space and eliminating the cost and intrusion of the many streets and roads that would be necessary to service large-lot single-family homes in the hills. However, homeowners viewed this as an attempt to increase higher-density development in the hills, arguing that many of the steeper hillsides were

unbuildable anyway, so allowing developers to count that land area, but cluster housing amounted to a giveaway for developers.

The issue came to a head when the Sherman Oaks-Studio City Community Plan came before the City Planning Commission in spring 1970. The policy adopted was to designate all areas with a slope of 15% or more as Minimum density (0.5 to 1 unit per acre) and those hillside areas less than 15% as Very Low density (1 to 3 units per acre).<sup>373</sup> And after much heated debate and opposition by homeowner groups, the RPD ordinance was adopted by City Council in January 1971. The Planning Department's policy after that point was that all undeveloped hillside areas would be designated as RPD, and clustering of homes would be encouraged to minimize grading to preserve natural terrain (the alternative being to grade the hillsides to create building "pads" and more streets to service the individual lots, which the Planning Department viewed as less desirable).

The battle over the hillsides manifested itself in many ways, but two projects in particular illustrate the nature of the conflict. The first was a proposed development west of Warner Center in the foothills above Canoga Park (what is today known as West Hills) on the former Orcutt Ranch. Homeowner mobilization in the area first began when L.A. County proposed to build a flood control project in the area, prompting residents in June 1971 to form Save Orcutt Community (SOC) to fight it. They were successful, as they won a temporary restraining order to stop the project for failing to comply with CEQA, after which the project was canceled.<sup>374</sup> So a well-organized group of homeowners was already in place when a project first approved in 1966 (but not built) sought to take advantage of the new RPD ordinance in 1971.

The original 150-acre subdivision was approved in November 1966 but modified and re-approved in 1969 after the developer (Richgart Inc) formed a joint venture with INA Corporation.<sup>375</sup> After the 1969 approval, the developer had

paid the City \$530,000 in fees and spent \$43,000 on plans, \$236,000 on engineering and grading and posted \$1.5 million in bonds. A model home site was also graded, the property cleared and engineering plans were approved. But after the RPD ordinance was approved in January 1971, the developers re-submitted the project again as an RPD, adding an additional 125 units but also setting aside an extra 70 acres as open space, thus reducing the overall density by almost 20% (from 594 units on 150 acres, i.e. 4 units/acre, to 720 units on 220 acres, i.e. 3.3 units/acre). But by this time, homeowners were pushing for hillside areas to be designated as Minimum land use, which allowed less than one unit per acre.

It was at this point that SOC mobilized against the project. SOC's opposition to the project was based on four points: (1) that the burden from residential development far exceeded the tax revenues generated from the project, therefore amounted to a subsidy to provide infrastructure and services<sup>376</sup>, (2) that it would overburden existing schools, (3) that it was a fire-life

hazard due to the flammable native chaparral in the area, and (4) that RPDs "circumvent City policies re: density in steep hillside areas."<sup>377</sup>

It was this last point about RFDs that was especially problematic to SOC. In testimony before the City Planning Commission, SOC members argued that

"the density of the proposed development is much too high. The effect of the residential planned development is to allow the developer to include unusable areas in the development in order to increase the density on the usable areas, thereby lowering his costs and increasing his profits... the proposed development for this area would have an adverse impact on property values of the existing residential neighborhoods nearby, and the problems which would be created by the additional population in the area would be exacerbated by the unwarranted density sought by the applicant."<sup>378</sup>

The developer noted the overall density of the project was 3.3 units per acre, in keeping with the four units per acre typical of the area. But SOC argued that this included roughly 100 acres of steep mountains that were unusable, so the “true density” of the project was more like 7 units per acre.

The Orcutt project was a high-profile test case of what was by then prevailing wisdom among homeowners – that hillside areas were under threat and needed to be protected by downzoning to large-lot single-family homes. Echoing the SOC’s rationale against Orcutt, homeowners made several distinct arguments to justify downzoning: (1) conservation: it was necessary to preserve the sensitive ecology of the area (i.e. the environmental rationale), (2) safety: it was necessary to because higher-density posed a fire hazard, and (3) character: it was necessary to preserve the single-family character of these communities. Homeowners in other hillside Community Plan areas lobbied to have the Woodland Hills Plan deferred because they felt that the Santa Monica Mountains should

be treated as one area, and did not feel the Woodland Hills Citizens Advisory Committee was representative of homeowner or mountain area groups (since it was comprised of business interests, not homeowners).<sup>379</sup>

A second case involving protection of the hillsides in Woodland Hills occurred when GAC (Gulf American Corporation) Properties Inc and the Braewood Corporation proposed to develop a large portion (1,700 acres) of the Santa Monica Mountain hillside south of Ventura Boulevard in 1972 (prior to the adoption of the Woodland Hills Community Plan). They proposed a modified clustering approach – still with single-family homes but at higher density than the Minimum desired by homeowners, but proposed to give over 100 acres of parkland in the mountains to the City. They would engineer (once again by Victor Gruen & Associates) and pay for the street system necessary to service the subdivision. GAC/Braewood argued that housing built at Minimum densities (0 to 1 unit/acre) would give preference to the very rich. They argued that using

cluster housing “will serve a broader section of the public than is presently available in the Mountains.”<sup>380</sup> Likewise, GAC’s West Coast Manager argued that the area needed reasonably priced housing, not estates, which he argued did not solve the then-current housing shortages of the area.<sup>381</sup> In this case, the interests of the developers were aligned with those of civil rights groups who argued that large-lot zoning was a way to keep the poor (and minorities) out of the suburbs and desirable hillside areas. GAC argued that the existing Santa Monica Mountain Plan would allow an average density of 2.5 units per acre and that GAC needed a minimum of 1.7 units per acre to make the project pencil.

#### THE BATTLE FOR WARNER RIDGE

After the delay of Warner Center through the late 1970s, when the economy was struggling, by the early 1980s, the economy was picking up and the 1970s projects were finally

starting to get underway. Due to the delay in building much of what was planned in the early 1970s (the original Woodland Hills Community Plan was adopted in 1972), officials began a process to amend the plan in October 1981. Among the amendments adopted in 1984 was the site where Harry Warner’s old farmhouse stood, on the northeast corner of Oxnard and De Soto Avenues – a knoll known as Warner Ridge.

The 21.5-acre site (referred to by planners as Parcel 306) adjacent to Pierce College had a complex zoning history. During the original 1972 Woodland Hills Community Plan process, the site was designated as low-medium II to reflect the RD2-1 zoning (reduced density multiple-family) adopted by City Council for the site in 1971.<sup>382</sup> But since the site was not developed within the three-year time limit on zone changes, in 1974, it temporarily reverted to its original agricultural zoning. In 1977, the Mayer Group (which would later become Casden Properties, one of Southern California’s largest homebuilders) proposed 278 condominium townhouses, 12 single-family

homes and reinstatement of the previous RD2-1 zoning. The Mayer Group had been very active in Warner Center, building the 266-unit Warner Woodlands, 250-unit Warner Creek, and 134-unit Warner Village townhouse and apartment projects in the area.<sup>383</sup> Demand for their housing units was immense in the tight housing market of the late 1970s; when the first 54 townhouses of Warner Woodlands came on the market, they had to institute a lottery, as more than 625 families registered to buy one.<sup>384</sup>

Despite the need for housing at the time, the condominium project sparked angry community protests. It was essentially a replaying of the battle over the core of the Warner Ranch in the 1970s, with homeowners arguing that the open space should be preserved. Being adjacent to Pierce College (whose farm operations were on the western side of campus, adjacent to Warner Ridge), homeowners and agriculture school officials argued it would tarnish the pastoral setting.<sup>385</sup> But it wasn't just the loss of the grassy hillside to which they objected; they also

objected to it being multi-family. When Mayer officials argued it would open up opportunities for Pierce students to find housing within walking distance to school (since vacancy rates by this time were around one percent), Pierce instructor Leland Shapiro said, "there is a shortage of housing in the Valley – single-family homes for middle class families, not condominiums starting at \$175,000-\$200,000."<sup>386</sup> Local Councilor Joy Picus joined the homeowners in opposition.<sup>387</sup>

Homeowners and the newly formed Friends of Pierce College Farm also argued it would increase traffic and disturb wildlife (which won opponents the backing of the Sierra Club and Audubon Society). Pierce officials used the proximity of their livestock to residential uses (which were to be kept at least 75 feet from houses) as a justification for denying the project.<sup>388</sup> They also worried that new residents would complain about the smell and general habits of livestock once they moved in, since the development would be downwind from the stables and pastures. They argued that this would lead to the

end of the Pierce Farm. That Pierce officials suggested building single-family homes instead illustrates that their concerns over proximity to residential were more likely rooted in their distaste for multi-family, since of course the same problems they outlined would be equally true of single-family homes. Pierce officials worried that townhouses would constitute a “big bloc voice” to rally political opposition against the College farm.<sup>389</sup> The opposition from Pierce officials came as a surprise to the developer because when they bought the land, the previous College president supported the project.<sup>390</sup>

By December 1979, the Friends of Pierce College Farm had collected an astounding 16,000 signatures against the project, and more than 150 came out in protest at the Environmental Quality Board meeting.<sup>391</sup> As a result, the Mayer Group withdrew their application. Given the strong community opposition to multi-family housing on Warner Ridge, after the Community Plan Update process began in October 1981, the Planning Department and Citizens Advisory Committee began

to explore alternatives for the site and, since the community felt the farm and residential uses were incompatible, “commercial development with high-quality office buildings emerged as a means of resolving the impasse.”<sup>392</sup> They recommended the site be designated as Neighborhood and Office Commerce (with a portion being Privately Owned Open Space). So the Mayer Group proposed to build six 3 to 11 story commercial buildings on the site, totaling roughly 950,000 square feet; an application to rezone the land to C1.5-1 was made and approved. The Community Plan amendment process occurred between October 1981 and October 1984 (under CEQA definitions, the Plan amendment constituted a project and therefore an EIR was produced in July 1983). Recognizing the previous controversy over the site, Council required a Specific Plan be prepared for the site.

Unwilling to go through the Specific Plan process, the owner of the site (by this time, Alan Casden had taken over the Mayer Group), sold the land in spring 1985 to Century City-

based developer Jack Spound (Spound Co.) and Johnson Wax Development Co. (a real estate arm of the S.C. Johnson Co., makers of household cleaning supplies). They formed Warner Ridge Associates with the intent of building a \$150 million, 950,000 square foot complex of eight story buildings, which was allowed by its commercial zoning.<sup>393</sup>

In December 1985, Council initiated the Warner Ridge Specific Plan process and formed a new Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) for that process. Since the area was entirely within Joy Picus's Council District, and Councilors appointed the CAC, Picus hand-picked all seven CAC members. Between January and July 1986, the CAC worked on the Specific Plan (a draft had been done by the Planning Department by that point) and recommended land use that would allow up to 810,000 square feet of commercial. In August 1986, Warner Ridge Associates scaled back their proposal to match the 810,000 square feet allowed but applied for a zone change to C4. The change from C1.5 to C4 would not have changed the

size of the project – in both cases, height was unlimited and commercial zoning was limited by a floor-area-ratio of 1.5 to 1. The difference between C1.5 and C4 was that C1.5 limited the type of commercial establishment to retail, theaters, hotels, broadcasting centers, and parking structures, whereas C4 allowed for offices.

The application for a zone change was predictably met with community opposition. For the next two years (November 1986 to November 1988), the Woodland Hills Homeowners Organizations (WHHO) undertook “dramatic growth and community involvement... attendance at public hearings, and massive numbers of sincere letters written by the community.”<sup>394</sup> Homeowners were very specific in their criticisms of the project, but also used grandiose rhetoric to illustrate the tremendous burden it would place on their lives. Typical of this opposition was the letter written by Arthur and Alice Yuwiler to the Planning and Environmental Committee as part of the EIR process; among their criticisms were increased traffic, noise, safety of



school children, the loss of Pierce College, loss of views, the incompatibility of commercial with residential nearby, and the burden it would place on police and fire protection.<sup>395</sup> Ironically, to strengthen their case for a commercial development, Warner Ridge Associates used the same arguments that opponents of the late 1970s multi-family project used – that housing on the site would lead to conflicts between residents who might be offended by farm odors (hence, why a commercial project made more sense). Paradoxically, this time, homeowners like Mr and Mrs Yuwiler called those arguments “imaginative but absurd. Clearly those now living near Pierce are not struggling to leave.” Clearly, the arguments against had changed, but neither commercial nor multi-family were welcomed by homeowners; to them, only single-family zoning would do.

This effort to change the zoning to low-density suburban residential was backed by many letters to City Council by homeowners in the area. The letters written to planners by homeowners used dramatic language to not merely convey

a sense that commercial development was inappropriate but a betrayal and sell-out to corporate interests – a kind of anti-capitalist sentiment that pervaded much of the slow growth movement. For example, Roy and Anita Steffensen argued “the quality of life of the citizens should not be allowed to suffer, in order to fill the coffers of developers and other persons who have vested interests.”<sup>396</sup> As a Mrs. Coyle scolded planners: “We came to W[oodland] Hills to retire 11 years ago, thinking it was a bedroom community. Now you are letting “Big Business” invade our residential area. You just won’t let the little people rest. Anything west of De Soto we don’t object to, Warner Center is fine, so keep it within its’ (sic) bounds. Please don’t let Big Business into our area. There is enough congestion & smog as it is.”<sup>397</sup>

In arguing against the Warner Ridge project (what he called a “rape of our environment”), another homeowner said “after they (the builders) are dead, the damage they do goes on and on, visited on their descendants forevermore. Their great-

grandchildren will live in a world that is drab, dirty, ugly and dangerous – a world composed of an unending Los Angeles, Miami, Calcutta, or Djakarta, sick and stinking.”<sup>398</sup> Similarly, another homeowner called the Warner Ridge project a “sad, sad commentary on how big-money interests can go into a neighborhood and destroy it in every conceivable way.”<sup>399</sup> These are but a sample of scores of similar letters. Consistent among them is how corporate interests are placed above those of homeowners, invoking how long they’ve lived in the area to demonstrate their interests should come first, and the dramatic consequences if the project is approved.

As a result of this community pressure, in November 1988, Councilor Joy Picus announced she had reversed her support for the project and would try to rezone the property to only permit low-density single-family houses. By January 1989, the final supplemental EIR was complete and public hearings were initiated on the C4 zone change. The Planning Commission, which had in the 1970s increasingly sided with

homeowners, by the late 1980s was more independent and, in June 1989, approved the C4 zone change and the Warner Ridge Specific Plan. In a further reversal of 1970s politics, when the City Council generally sided with developers, on December 1989, the Council’s Planning Committee voted to overturn the Planning Commission’s zone change and recommended RS-1 zoning (suburban large-lot, single-family zoning). Due to Picus’s efforts, in January 1990, City Council agreed with its Planning Committee and adopted RS-1 zoning, which would allow only 65 single-family houses on the site.<sup>400</sup>

Needless to say, the developers were furious with the re-zoning to single-family and in April 1990, Warner Ridge Associates filed a \$100 million lawsuit against the City (and also named Picus in the suit), claiming that the rezoning not only deprived them of the value of the land, but was also illegal since the General Plan (i.e. the Woodland Hills Community Plan) designated the land for commercial use. In June 1990, an L.A. Superior Court judge ruled in favor of the developers and

ordered City Council to rezone the land commercial, to bring it into consistency with the General Plan by August (later extended to December). Rather than abide by the Court's ruling, however, at the urging of the Woodland Hills Homeowner Organization (WHHO), City Council voted in August 1990 to authorize \$250,000 to prepare a study of a single-family alternative for the site, with an eye of completing a general plan amendment (that is, instead of changing the zoning to match the general plan, they instead decided to simply change the general plan, which they did in October 1990).

There is an irony of course in homeowners pushing (and the City complying) to have the land changed in the Community Plan, since the slow-growth movement up until that point had always considered the community plans sacrosanct. The argument was always that zoning should be changed to match the community plan, not the other way around (as discussed in Chapter 3, this was the key argument in the Hillside Federation's lawsuit against the City, which ultimately forced the City to

downzone vast areas to bring them into compliance).

But, in the case of Warner Ridge, homeowners didn't like the commercial designation that the Citizens Advisory Committee recommended (and what Council approved). Even in the 1980s, despite evidence (e.g. Joy Picus's 1978 election) that political power in Woodland Hills was shifting away from business interests, homeowners even by the early 1990s felt the CAC didn't represent their interests.

In an attempt to broker a compromise to the impasse, the developers offered to scale back the size of the project by 20%, from 810,000 square feet to 650,000 square feet. The compromise was rejected by Council, which by then had appealed the Superior Court ruling. But the Appeals court unanimously upheld the Superior Court's ruling saying that Council had illegally rezoned the plan, since the General Plan (i.e. the Woodland Hills Community Plan) had designated the site commercial. This ruling was confirmed on January 7, 1992, when a Superior Court judge ruled that the rezoning had stripped

the land of its economic value and the City would be required to pay damages. But City Council dug in, voting on January 10<sup>th</sup> to appeal to the State Supreme Court, despite being warned by its own City Attorney that it would in all likelihood lose. By January 29<sup>th</sup>, seeing the writing on the wall, City Council finally caved, agreeing to a 690,000 square foot project and 125 condominiums, and waving \$20 million in city fees. Once again, despite a valiant effort by homeowners, the developers won. But in an ironic twist of fate, for reasons unrelated to the lawsuits, the developers were forced to abandon the project. After several more years of approvals, a multi-family project similar to the one first proposed in 1977 was ultimately built on the site in two phases beginning in 2002. The 25-year battle for Warner Ridge was over and, as was the case with Warner Center, the homeowners lost.

## THE RISE OF HOMEOWNERS

Despite losing Warner Ridge, the battle highlights how the balance of power began to shift by the late 1970s/early 1980s from the business interests that had been successful in establishing the Warner Ranch as a new mixed-use center towards increasingly empowered homeowner groups. With the population of the Woodland Hills Community Plan area having only increased by 3% during the 1970s, well below the pace of growth in the 1950s and 1960s, Woodland Hills's pro-growth era by the mid-1980s had passed.<sup>401</sup> In part, the deceleration of population growth reflected an area that was becoming older. By 1980, the children of families who moved to Woodland Hills in the 1950s and 1960s had moved out, resulting in declining school enrolment, invalidating a popular argument against development in the 1970s (i.e. overcrowded schools). People who flocked to the mid-century housing tracts like Corbin Palms were growing older; as such, the percentage of population aged

55 and older almost tripled, from 6.2% in 1970 to 17.3% in 1980.<sup>402</sup> Racially, however, the area was virtually unchanged and overwhelmingly white – from 86.6% white in 1970 to 85.2% in 1980.

By the time the 1988 Woodland Hills plan was adopted, more than 70% of the land area of the Woodland Hills Community Plan area was reserved for single-family uses (well above the 47% average city-wide in the 1980s) and just 6% for multi-family (well below the 16% average). Likewise, despite the efforts of business groups to expand commercial and industrial land in the West Valley, the plan area remained below the city average – 6% commercial (versus 6.5% city-wide) and 5% industrial (versus 7.8% city-wide).<sup>403</sup> Despite the overall low level of commercial zoning in the area, Warner Center itself was over-represented – with 7.7 acres of commercial per 1,000 dwelling units, as compared to the city standard of 2.4 acres per 1,000.<sup>404</sup> Warner Center had achieved what its promoters had set out to do – create something of a downtown for the

West Valley. The flip side of the success of Warner Center was the downfall of downtown Canoga Park, whose main street (Sherman Way) had experienced a sharp decline and by then was the focus of redevelopment efforts. Ventura Boulevard did not suffer to the same extent because income levels in the Santa Monica Mountains (which Ventura served) were much higher than in the flats of Canoga Park. But despite demand for growth along Ventura, in February 1982, the City enacted a partial moratorium on building heights along the Boulevard due to concerns over traffic and congestion.

Work began on an amendment of the 1972 Community Plan as early as 1978, with Councilors Braude and Picus appointing the Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) – this time comprised of a majority of homeowners – which met 29 times over the next two years, completing its recommendations in February 1980.<sup>405</sup> Despite the concerns in the 1970s that the residential areas in Warner Center were too high density, as it turns out, developers of these areas did not build to the

maximum density, but rather responded to market demand. As such, Warner Center was built at lower densities than were allowed. Recognizing this, the Citizens Advisory Committee recommended widespread down-zoning of Warner Center to prevent its density being increased in the future. In essence, they down-zoned the area to match the existing density (in much the same way that homeowners in Baldwin Hills did) – from R4 zoning (40 to 60 dwelling units per acre) to R3 zoning (24 to 40 du/ac). Despite this work, the Plan sat idle for three years, which upset homeowners who argued that many of the areas that the CAC was concerned about had been built in the meantime.<sup>406</sup> A public hearing of the revised community plan was delayed until January 18, 1983 with approximately 400 people attending.<sup>407</sup>

Even by the 1980s, it was clear that homeowners still had lingering resentments over how Warner Ranch was planned and developed. Many members of the CAC resented Calvin Hamilton for pushing the “centers” concept on them; as one CAC member

said, “we all felt strongly about our document even though we knew Calvin Hamilton, City Director of Planning, had far different ideas about the intensity of growth and ultimate complexion of that growth should be for our own neighborhoods.”<sup>408</sup> But despite the growing influence of homeowners in Woodland Hills, business interests still remained strong, if only because so much of Warner Center had already been built. The die was already cast – Warner Center was going to be a major center, and to some extent the CAC’s recommendations for the 1984 Plan update was a case of closing the barn door after the horses have already got out. It was clear that, as one of the only examples of a “center” to come out of his 1970 Concept L.A. plan, Hamilton – in an apparently rare show of backbone – did not fully embrace the CAC’s recommendations. The Planning Department produced its own document, which he agreed would be printed side-by-side with the CAC’s in the Plan. But this commitment only applied to the preliminary plan. By the time the draft plan was complete, only Hamilton’s version was

included.

Needless to say, homeowners and in particular, members of the CAC were livid: “Consequent to this deception in this published document, I am angry, frustrated and disillusioned. I naively spent my time, knowledge and good intentions over a long period on a document that has been totally altered and in no way reflects the CAC’s work. I hate for my community to see my name as a committee member listed on this document and think that I had given my approval to it. I plan to oppose the many negative aspects of this document in great detail at the public hearings which follow.”<sup>409</sup> Among the disagreements were height limits in the Warner Center core; the CAC wanted a cap of 11 stories, but the Planning Department wanted no height limit (since it felt commercial property would be limited by FAR). The CAC wanted even lowered heights in the commercial areas outside the core, but the Planning Department proposed 11 stories, essentially transferring the CAC’s recommendation for the core to the more peripheral commercial areas. The planners

also introduced a new MR zone (restricted manufacturing) that would cap heights in industrial areas at three stories.

#### ENVIRONMENTALISM RE-FRAMED

Despite the CAC’s charge that the Planning Department ignored their recommendations, the Planning Department was attempting to strike a balance between competing interests. Homeowners on the CAC clearly believed the City should adopt all of their recommendations uncritically and was upset when only some of them were accepted or accepted in modified form. But the business community was equally upset at the Planning Department, arguing that its recommendations for height limits outside the core area were not justified. The Woodland Hills Chamber of Commerce objected to the new height limitations.<sup>410</sup> The Valley Industry and Commerce Association (VICA) also protested the changes, arguing “the current form of MR zoning ordinance is discriminatory to the San Fernando Valley, where

virtually all MR zoning exists. It is unworkable in that a variance or conditional use permit is the only means to meet the reality of the marketplace,” since the new restrictions limited office space to 50% of total square footage, despite the fact that most new light industrial complexes by this point were predominately office space.<sup>411</sup> Likewise, Rocketdyne’s President Norman Ryker argued that they envisioned future need for office space and requested that their holdings be re-designated from Restricted Manufacturing to Regional Commercial.<sup>412</sup>

Kaiser-Aetna also disagreed over the new 1VL height district (3-story limit) east of Canoga Avenue, although they suggested that the Planning Department viewed this as a temporary measure to induce more high intensity development in the Warner Center core first.<sup>413</sup> Lawyers for Kaiser-Aetna complained that there was no analysis of the impact of new limits on sprawl, arguing that by limiting density in Warner Center, “it would appear that the proposed plan would encourage urban sprawl into other areas.”<sup>414</sup> They also concurred with VICA about

the MR zone. Interestingly, however, they disagreed with the plan for Warner Ridge (parcel 306), called the mid-rise office campus “the worst kind of planning for this Parcel,” instead saying it should be low-rise office or industrial.

Kaiser-Aetna pointed to a 1981 article by UCLA Law Professor Donald Hagman (who had recently died) who argued that downzoning in Los Angeles has “unleashed the developer upon the agricultural plains from Thousand Oaks to Oxnard. Such lands, which were once good for other than residential uses for some two generations who will find that they can get to and from there only by automobile.”<sup>415</sup> Hagman’s prescient critique drew the ire of homeowners and environmentalists alike. In essence, he argued that the fervor of environmentalism of the early 1970s had created land use policies that paradoxically actually do serious harm to the environment. Instead of downzoning (i.e. promoting single-family housing), which induced further outward expansion, Hagman argued that “purged of its environmental imposters”, land use policies that



encourage compact growth could advance the environmental agenda by lowering energy consumption, increase government tax revenues, and advance the quest for social justice.<sup>416</sup> Hagman's reference to "environmental imposters" was an evisceration of the use of environmental goals in the name of self-interest. So visceral was Hagman's contempt for the homeowner takeover of the environmental agenda, it is worth quoting at length; to Hagman these imposters were:

"the elitists, the excluders, the protectors of the status quo, the pseudo-panteists, and the open-spacers (in our backyard at your expense). These folks, who worship in born-again simplicity on the altar of low-density (the lower the better), are really antithetical to true environmentalists in whose ranks one would number the waste-not, want-notists, the good neighbor anti-litterists who internalize their own adverse externalities, and the conservationists (so there is something around for

future generations)... caught between the environmental imposters and the political power and constitutional rights of private property holders, [government entities] arranged an unholy compromise – large minimum lot size... [that has] left us with ostentatious consumption of land and unprecedented sprawl."<sup>417</sup>

Hagman also critiqued homeowners for using land use policy to segregate residential areas by economic class and critiqued Prop 13 for making property taxes so low as to propagate land consumption for ever more single-family houses and would actually penalize empty-nesters for downsizing (since they property taxes would go up if they moved). Smart growth advocates today would accept Hagman's critique of sprawl (and homeowners' role in promoting it), along with his land use reforms: high-density, mixed use, automobile independence, retrofitting older areas with mass transit, economic and racial diversity. A mixing of uses in close proximity and at higher density,

as envisioned by Hamilton and largely accepted in the planning of Warner Center, would generate enormous energy savings and yield greater environmental benefits than the “governmentally required single-family housing in sprawlsville.”<sup>418</sup> By invoking Hagman, Kaiser-Aetna was trying to convey that homeowners’ interests were not in L.A.’s long-term interest. Clearly, Kaiser-Aetna was driven by its profit motive to maximize its land value, but seen retrospectively, it is hard to argue with them (and Hagman) because the sprawl that the L.A. area has experienced in the 30 years since has done more environmental harm than good.

### CONCLUSION

It is clear that Baldwin and Woodland Hills transformed in very different ways after the 1965 Watts unrest (which also effectively marked the beginning of the community plan era). Different social, economic and political factors shaped the

transformation of Baldwin and Woodland Hills post-Watts. But importantly, the community planning process itself played out in very different ways because of the relative political influence of homeowner and business groups.

As a more centrally located community, Baldwin Hills was earlier to develop than Woodland Hills. Even so, that it was held in trust by Lucky Baldwin as an agricultural area for so long meant that the City grew around the former Rancho La Cienega, such that by the late 1920s, it remained largely undeveloped, save for oil derricks on its western half. But despite the weak economy, the area grew during the 1930s, in part because it was seen as so desirable. By the Second World War, Baldwin Hills was already home to several innovative residential communities (Leimert Park, View Park, Village Green), so when hostilities ceased, the area was well positioned to see tremendous economic growth in both single- and multi-family housing and commercial development. By contrast, the West Valley remained largely undeveloped agricultural

land through the Second World War. However, given the rise of large-scale single-family housing tracts after the war, the relatively untouched Woodland Hills area would soon be ripe for development as a bedroom community of Los Angeles.

Both areas were still growing strongly but beginning in the mid-1950s, they began to see unwelcomed changes that would strongly influence their post-Watts transformation. In Baldwin Hills, the strongest changes were social – the striking down of racially restrictive covenants allowing affluent blacks to move beyond the traditional confines of South Central L.A. and Watts and into the Baldwin Hills area. The demographics of the area began to change – slowly at first, then remarkably quickly during the 1960s as a result of block-busting and white flight. Woodland Hills (and other similar areas in the Valley) was on the receiving end of this white flight, as the previously agricultural area was transformed into stylish mid-century suburbs. But something else happened in Woodland Hills – business interests promoting L.A.’s continued post-war boom

argued that Woodland Hills should be allowed to develop as a bedroom community, but rather needed commerce and industry to be self-sufficient.

Given the top-down nature of planning in the 1950s, these business interests had a powerful influence on planning the Valley. Moreover, much like Lucky Baldwin’s estate, Harry Warner owned a large undeveloped agricultural reserve around which tract housing was growing. This provided a unique opportunity to envision a total community, complete with multi-family housing and job-generating uses.

So when the civil unrest in Watts broke out in 1965, the two communities were beginning to head in different directions. Baldwin Hills’s growth was beginning to decline due to a mass exodus of whites who were being replaced by lower-income blacks. But Woodland Hills, fueled by the business lobby, was beginning to witness rapid growth. It was at this point that L.A. began to move towards a more bottom-up community planning process with local citizens working hand-in-hand with

planners.

Due to its earlier development of housing, homeowners emerged as the most powerful voice in the Baldwin Hills community planning process. However, when the Baldwin Hills community plan process began in 1971, these vocal homeowners were the earlier generation of largely white, affluent residents who lived in the Hills, rather than the lower-income, African-American population that had migrated to the area during the 1960s. By contrast, due to the relatively newness of housing tracts in the area, homeowners were not well organized in Woodland Hills by the mid-1960s and it was businessmen (and indeed they were men) who emerged as the strongest influence on planning. These differences were reflected both in the composition of the Citizens Advisory Committees and in the groups who were consulted during the planning process. These differences, in turn, helped shape the kinds of planning approaches and land use policies in the two areas.

In Baldwin Hills, concerned about the slow deterioration

of the commercial core and “Jungle” apartment area, homeowners initially took a two-pronged approach: to roll back zoning to stabilize population change on the one hand, while advocating investments that would make the central area more attractive to affluent homeowners in the Hills. But the growing crime and poverty in the flats made this “trickle-down” approach untenable. By the 1980s, a new front emerged as white “yuppies” (young, urban professionals) began acquiring historic houses in the area. This led to the juxtaposition of pockets of white gentrification within a broader area in clear decline, and opened up a clear split between newcomers who advocated historic preservation (including further down-zoning) and a long-time population who was more interested in new investment than preservation. The combined effect of different waves of zoning rollbacks left the area largely unattractive to developers by the time the economy picked back up in the 1980s. So the tremendous growth of “Reaganomics” largely by-passed the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area.

By contrast, in Woodland Hills, business groups used their position on the Citizens Advisory Committee to transform large areas in Warner Center into industrial and commercial land, building upon a nascent tech cluster than had begun to emerge in the mid-1950s. Here, the concerns were very different from homeowners. Instead of the slow-growth approach homeowners advocated in Baldwin Hills, businessmen in Woodland Hills were decidedly pro-growth. This, in turn, manifest itself in different concerns – for example, resisting the inclusion of low-income housing in Warner Center, despite a broad coalition of support among non-business groups. It was only by the late 1970s, with the election of a homeowner-friendly local Councilor, did the tide begin to turn towards homeowners. The twenty year battle over the tiny Warner Ridge parcel illustrated the resentment homeowners felt about their bedroom community being turned into a major employment center.

The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate just how differently not only macro socio-economic forces shaped

different parts of Los Angeles, but also to illustrate how the influence of different groups within a local community planning process lead to very different outcomes. Arguably, the slow-growth policies adopted by homeowners beginning in the 1970s and continuing in the 1980s in the Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw area contributed to its further decline, since it not only directly removed large areas of commercial land, but also withdrew the incentive for developers to redevelop the area. By contrast, the pro-growth policies of the early 1970s helped fuel growth in Woodland Hills.

While this chapter studies just two of L.A.'s 35 community plan areas (future detailed research on other areas would be necessary to determine if the experiences in Baldwin and Woodland Hills were typical), we can begin to see how the process of planning the City from the bottom up in the 1970s began to shape the City in different and important ways. Clearly, the interests and political persuasion of local Councilors and, in turn, Citizens Advisory Committees, influenced the kinds of

land use policies that were adopted for each area.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> My analysis in Chapter 5 focuses on the community plans created in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, representing the three “eras” of plans that have been completed to date. While the community plan program was officially enacted in 1969 and the first plans adopted in 1970, the process of shifting to a more bottom-up planning process began earlier. Arguably, this shift began with the hiring of Calvin Hamilton in 1964; Hamilton brought a more consultative approach to planning than his predecessor, John Roberts. We might also locate this shift – from a more substantive perspective – with the launch of the Goals Program in 1967, which began the process of soliciting public input into what ultimately became Concept L.A. in 1970. So the beginning of the Community Planning era is best seen as a transition that began in the mid-1960s, rather than a single fixed date.

<sup>2</sup> Hubert Howe Bancroft, *Chronicles of the Builders of the Commonwealth* Vol. 3, (San Francisco: History Co., 1892), 335-336. [http://ia700400.us.archive.org/33/items/cihm\\_14088/cihm\\_14088.pdf](http://ia700400.us.archive.org/33/items/cihm_14088/cihm_14088.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> Bancroft, 337-339.

<sup>4</sup> Bancroft, 344-347.

<sup>5</sup> Bancroft, 353.

<sup>6</sup> Bancroft, 359-60.

<sup>7</sup> *Los Angeles County Directory 1886-87* (A. A. Bynon & Co., Pasadena, 1886).

<sup>8</sup> "Colored Labor: E.J. Baldwin Imports Seventy Negro Laborers," *Los Angeles Herald*, January 17, 1886. In fact, one-third of Baldwin's workforce was Chinese, "Luck of Lucky Baldwin Keeps Wealth of Heirs on Increase," *Los Angeles Times*, April 13, 1924.

<sup>9</sup> Virginia Fonseca French, *Rancho La Cienega O Paso De La Tijera* (J. D. Roche, Los Angeles, 1970).

<sup>10</sup> John R. Kielbasa, *Historic Abodes of Los Angeles County* (Pittsburgh: Dorrance Publishing Co, 1998).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> "Luck of Lucky Baldwin Keeps Wealth of Heirs on Increase," *Los Angeles Times*, April 13, 1924.

<sup>14</sup> Kielbasa, op-cit.

<sup>15</sup> James Miller Guinn, *A History of California and an Extended History of Los Angeles and Environs*, Vol 2 (Los Angeles: Historic Record Company, 1915), 371.

<sup>16</sup> "Community Development: Active Summer in Subdivision," *Los Angeles Times*, July 29, 1928, E4.

<sup>17</sup> Abby Chin-Martin, "The First-Ever Olympic Village was Built in Los Angeles," KCET Land of Sunshine, July 26, 2012. <http://www.kcet.org/socal/departures/landofsunshine/history/the-first-ever-olympic-village-was-built-in-los-angeles.html>.

<sup>18</sup> Mark Dyreson, "Marketing National Identity: The Olympic Games of 1932 and American Culture," *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies* Vol 4 (1995): 23-48.

<sup>19</sup> Terrel Delapp, "End of Olympic Village Near," *Los Angeles Times*, August 14, 1932.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> "Acreage Brings Millions," *Los Angeles Times*, Jan 6, 1927, A1.

<sup>22</sup> Tom Wetzel, "Los Angeles Railway in Brief," Uncanny, 2003. <http://www.uncanny.net/~wetzel/lary.htm>

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Nathan Masters, "Rail Returns to the Westside: The Expo Line's Historical Precursors," LA as Subject, KCET, March 28, 2012. [http://www.kcet.org/updaily/socal\\_focus/history/la-as-subject/rail-to-the-westside-the-expo-lines-historical-precursors.html](http://www.kcet.org/updaily/socal_focus/history/la-as-subject/rail-to-the-westside-the-expo-lines-historical-precursors.html).

<sup>25</sup> Walter H. Leimert, "Selection of Property: Improvement and Development Program," in Harrison R. Baker, ed., *Subdivision Principles and Practices* (Los Angeles: California Real Estate Association, 1936), 30.

<sup>26</sup> Marc A. Weiss, *The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Planning* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 4.

<sup>27</sup> "New Links to be Opened," *Los Angeles Times*, Aug 28, 1927, A7.

<sup>28</sup> Cynthia E. Exum and Maty Guiza-Leimert, *Leimert Park* (Los Angeles: Arcadia Publishing, 2012), 61.

<sup>29</sup> Map of Los Angeles airport, prepared by the Research Department of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, 1927, USC Special Collections, Doheny Memorial Library.

<sup>30</sup> Sue McAllister, "L.A.'s Hilltop Oasis," *Los Angeles Times*, December 27, 1988.

<sup>31</sup> Charles C. Cohan, "Nation's Greatest Housing Project Announced for City," *Los Angeles Times*, September 29, 1939, A1.

<sup>32</sup> "Picturesque Little City Rising at Baldwin Hills," *Los Angeles Times*, October 5, 1941, E1. The development also included a commercial strip mall facing La Brea Avenue, separated from the residential

portion by an alley.

<sup>33</sup> "A Housing Contrast," *Los Angeles Times*, September 30, 1939, A4. Two of its sponsors were the estate of Anita M. Baldwin and Norman Chandler (who by 1941 was President of the L.A. Times).

<sup>34</sup> Sam Hall Kaplan, "Urban Idylls," *Los Angeles Times*, January 28, 1986, V22B.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Richard W. Longstreth, *City Center to Regional Mall: Architecture, the Automobile, and Retailing in Los Angeles, 1920-1950* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 230.

<sup>37</sup> "Sunset Fields Links to Close," *Los Angeles Times*, March 19, 1946, A8.

<sup>38</sup> Longstreth, 232.

<sup>39</sup> The L.A. Times ran a series of stories in the months after the discovery describing in detail the facts of the case and sensationalizing the case. See, for example, "'Black Dahlia's' Love Life Traced in Search for Her Fiendish Murderer," *Los Angeles Times*, January 19, 1947, 3., the Times first reference to Short as the Black Dahlia.

<sup>40</sup> Longstreth, 233.

<sup>41</sup> Longstreth, 235-236.



<sup>42</sup> Charles C. Cohan, "Home Are Being Built and at a Record Rate," *Los Angeles Times*, September 11, 1948, A4.

<sup>43</sup> "Baldwin Hills Plot Sold; Will Yield 1030 Sites," *Los Angeles Times*, June 11, 1950, E1.

<sup>44</sup> "Third Unit of Historic Rancho Being Offered," *Los Angeles Times*, March 9, 1952, F2.

<sup>45</sup> "27 Dwellings With \$675,000 Value Rising at Development," *Los Angeles Times*, May 11, 1952, F6.

<sup>46</sup> "Sales of Homes Hit \$1,500,000," *Los Angeles Times*, August 3, 1952, E12.

<sup>47</sup> "Display Ad 94 – No Title," *Los Angeles Times*, September 24, 1950, E2.

<sup>48</sup> Darnell Hunt and Ana-Christina Ramon, *Black Los Angeles: American Dreams and Racial Realities* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 7.

<sup>49</sup> "More Than 1000 Dwellings Scheduled in New Project," *Los Angeles Times*, March 10, 1946, A3.

<sup>50</sup> Charles C. Cohan, "University Faculty Group Owns Tract," *Los Angeles Times*, May 20, 1951, E1.

<sup>51</sup> Trousdale would go on to become a well-known developer in

Southern California, where he would build 25,000 homes. A classic rags-to-riches story, Trousdale established the Trousdale Construction Company in 1946 and began building tract home communities, often in minority areas. But by 1955, he had bought the 410-acre Doheny Ranch, convinced Beverly Hills to annex it, subdivided it into 532 lots and built the high-end Trousdale Estates, famous for its concentration of celebrity residents (including Frank Sinatra and Elvis Presley) and extravagant mid-century architecture. Myrna Oliver, "Paul Trousdale, Developer and Innovator, Dies," *Los Angeles Times*, April 12, 1990.

<sup>52</sup> West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert Community Plan, Draft Environmental Impact Report, Appendix D, *SurveyLA Historic Resources Survey Report* (Pasadena, CA: Architectural Resources Group, Inc., 2012), 322.

<sup>53</sup> "Gigantic Baldwin Hills Homes Project Launched," *Los Angeles Times*, April 6, 1947, 2.

<sup>54</sup> "These are Multi-Million Dollar Developments," *Los Angeles Times*, January 3, 1949, G10.

<sup>55</sup> Beelman was a well-known architect in Los Angeles, having designed many notable buildings downtown including the Eastern Columbia Building, the Superior Oil building, the Bank of California

building (now The Standard hotel), among others. “Services for Architect Claud Beelman Set”, *Los Angeles Times*, Feb 2, 1963, 6.

<sup>56</sup> “Ceremony to Launch New Barker Bros Unit,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 22, 1948, 9.

<sup>57</sup> “Crenshaw Center Deal Involves \$2,000,000,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 27, 1949, 17.

<sup>58</sup> Construction dates for each building can be confirmed through the City of Los Angeles Zone Information and Map Access System (ZIMAS), <http://zimas.lacity.org/>. See also “Multiple Dwellings: the Demand is Being Met,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 3, 1949.

<sup>59</sup> “Classified Ad 9 – No Title,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 30, 1948, B12; “Display Ad 8 – No Title,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 30, 1948, 10; “Display Ad 5 – No Title,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 11, 1949, 8.

<sup>60</sup> “Display Ad 49 – No Title,” *Los Angeles Times*, Jan 7, 1951, A26.

<sup>61</sup> *Los Angeles Street Address Directory*, May 1956 (Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company).

<sup>62</sup> “Volume of Sales Tops \$1,000,000,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 9, 1950, D3.

<sup>63</sup> A complete inventory of these buildings is provided in the *SurveyLA*

*Historic Resources Survey Report*, 323-337.

<sup>64</sup> *SurveyLA Historic Resources Survey Report*, 152.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> “48-Acre Tract to Open in Baldwin Hills Area,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 8, 1955, E2.

<sup>67</sup> *SurveyLA Report*, op-cit.

<sup>68</sup> “Syndicate Buys 70 Acres for West Side Development,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 7, 1956, E10.

<sup>69</sup> “Article 4 – No Title,” *Los Angeles Times*, Nov 18, 1956, F9.

<sup>70</sup> “Display Ad 279 – No Title,” *L.A. Times*, April 14, 1957, Q11.

<sup>71</sup> *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

<sup>72</sup> Clement E. Vose, *Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1959), 234.

<sup>73</sup> Vose, 241.

<sup>74</sup> Vose, 246.

<sup>75</sup> Stephen Grant Meyer, *As Long As They Don’t Move Next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in American Neighborhoods* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 127.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> Charlotta A. Bass, "On The Sidewalk," *California Eagle*, February 2, 1950.

<sup>78</sup> Emy Murakawa, "Have you ever wonder about Crenshaw Square?" Venice Japanese Community Center, Inc., July 2003. [http://www.vjcc.com/cc\\_07-03.htm](http://www.vjcc.com/cc_07-03.htm)

<sup>79</sup> "Food Market Marks Center's Final Stage," *Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 1961, 14.

<sup>80</sup> "Yo Takagaki, 94; Real Estate Agent Developed Crenshaw Square," *Los Angeles Times*, November 19, 2011.

<sup>81</sup> Katsumi (Hiraoka) Kunitsugu, *REgenerations Oral History Project: Rebuilding Japanese American Families, Communities, and Civil Rights in the Resettlement Era* (Los Angeles: Japanese American National Museum, 2000), 259-260.

<sup>82</sup> "Article 10 – No Title," *Los Angeles Times*, December 1, 1957, F7.

<sup>83</sup> John Saito, Jr., "End of an Era: Holiday Bowl, 1958-2000," *The Rafu Shimpo*, May 12, 2000.

<sup>84</sup> Lauren Weiss Bricker, "History in Motion: A Glance at Historic Preservation in California," *Future Anterior* Vol 1, No 2 (Fall 2004), 7.

<sup>85</sup> Sharon Shekon, interview with July Heimlich, "Why the Holiday

Bowl Matters," unpublished essay, <http://www.holidaybowlcrenshaw.com/essay.pdf>.

<sup>86</sup> Norris Vitcheck (as told to Alfred Balk), "Confessions of a Block-Buster," *Saturday Evening Post*, July 14, 1962, 15. Norris Vitcheck was a pseudonym to protect his identity. Balk was sued to compel him to reveal his source, but the courts sided with Balk.

<sup>87</sup> Josh Sides, *L.A. City Limits: African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 110.

<sup>88</sup> Gene Sherman, "The Negro's Role: Housing Is Key to Aspirations," *Los Angeles Times*, July 4, 1962.

<sup>89</sup> Sides, 108.

<sup>90</sup> Jennifer Mandel, Making a "Black Beverly Hills": The Struggle for Housing Equality in Modern Los Angeles, unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of New Hampshire (2010), 192.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Meyer, op-cit.

<sup>93</sup> Jean Gregg, "Statement to the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots" in *Transcripts, Depositions, Consultants' Reports, and Selected Documents of the Governor's Commission on the Los*

*Angeles Riots* vol. 7 (Los Angeles: Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, 1966), 4.

<sup>94</sup> "The Crenshaw Neighbors Story," *Crenshaw Notes* (May 1965): 1.

<sup>95</sup> *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

<sup>96</sup> Mandel, 183.

<sup>97</sup> "Baldwin Hills School Rejects 20 Pupils; Picketing Planned," *California Eagle*, September 13, 1962, 1 and "Negroes Try to Place 15 in School: Fail in Effort to Change District in Baldwin Hills," *Los Angeles Times*, September, 12, 1962, A1-2.

<sup>98</sup> Loren Miller, "NAACP Calls Off Boycott as Negroes Enter 'White' School," *California Eagle*, September 20, 1962, 1.

<sup>99</sup> Gregg, 6-8.

<sup>100</sup> "A Story of Balance," *Crenshaw Notes* (October 1965): 2, JSP, Box 5, Folder 4, Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research.

<sup>101</sup> "The Crenshaw Neighbors Story," op-cit.

<sup>102</sup> *Crenshaw Notes* (May 1965): 1.

<sup>103</sup> "We Send Letters" and "Come and See," *Crenshaw Notes* (May 1965): 3.

<sup>104</sup> Ann Post, "Crenshaw Neighbors – A Lesson in Integration," *The*

*California Voter* (November 1968) and Jack Jones, "Fight to Stabilize Integrated Parts of City Showing Gain," *Los Angeles Times*, September 5, 1966, 8.

<sup>105</sup> Mandel, 335, 337. Based on data from U.S. Census of Population: 1950, vol. 3, Census Tract Statistics, ch. 28 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952); U.S. Census of Population and Housing: 1960, Census Tracts, Final Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing: 1970, Census Tracts, Final Report, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Calif pt. 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing: 1980, Census Tracts, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Calif. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983).

<sup>106</sup> Sides, 190.

<sup>107</sup> Hunt and Ramon, 8.

<sup>108</sup> "Survey Starts," *Crenshaw Notes* (May 1965): 6

<sup>109</sup> "Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations: A 25 Year History, 1944-1969 & Biennial Report 1967-1969," Kenneth Hahn Collection, Box 1.25.1-1.25.4, Folder 1970 (#1), Huntington Library. The nine original organizations of COIN included Altadena Neighbors, Alta-Pasa Human Relations Committee, Compton Council on Human

Relations, Crenshaw Neighbors, Inc., Hollypark Information and Education Committee, Morningside Park Neighbors, Inc., Neighbors Unlimited, Inc., Westside Homeowners of Long Beach, and West Imperial Neighbors.

<sup>110</sup> Ellen Shulte, "Crenshaw Area Puts Faith in Power of Greenery," *Los Angeles Times*, November 7, 1968, D1.

<sup>111</sup> Barry Siegel, "'Rethinking in Order': Foes of Freeways Tell Stand," *Los Angeles Times*, May 1, 1966.

<sup>112</sup> *The Integrator*, Winter 1967-1968, Summer 1968, Fall 1968, Spring 1969, Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research.

<sup>113</sup> Jack Jones, "Inner-City Integration Hope Survives Setbacks," *Los Angeles Times*, July 15, 1968, A1.

<sup>114</sup> Sides, 179.

<sup>115</sup> For example, see John F. Kain, "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* vol 82, no 2 (May 1968), 175-197 and William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

<sup>116</sup> Sides, 180.

<sup>117</sup> *West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert Community Plan*, adopted January 7, 1980, 10 (henceforth BHCP 1980), Council File 75-3955 (Box B648, Los Angeles City Archives).

<sup>118</sup> Steve Harvey, "First the Flood in Baldwin Hills, now the Fire," *Los Angeles Times*, July 3, 1985, 21.

<sup>119</sup> Bob Pool, "Serene Hilltop Marks Site of Landmark Disaster," *Los Angeles Times*, December 11, 2003.

<sup>120</sup> Arthur Casagrande, SD Wilson and ED Schwantes, "The Baldwin Hills Reservoir failure in retrospect," *Proceedings of the ASCE Specialty Conference on the Performance of Earth and Earth-Supported Structures* (Purdue University, 1972).

<sup>121</sup> RF Scott, "Baldwin Hills reservoir failure in review," *Engineering Geology* vol 24 (1987), 1-4.

<sup>122</sup> RO Castle and RF Yerkes, "A Study of Surface Deformations Associated with Oil-Field Operations," *Report of the U.S. Geological Survey* (Menlo Park, CA, 1969).

<sup>123</sup> DH Hamilton and RL Meehan, "Ground Rupture in the Baldwin Hills," *Science* vol 172, no 3981 (April 23, 1971): 333-344.

<sup>124</sup> Yusuf Jah and Sister Shah'Keyah, *Uprising* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 203.

<sup>125</sup> BHCP 1980, *Implementation Report*, March 1978.

<sup>126</sup> BHCP 1980, *Supplement Staff Report – Background*, n.d.

<sup>127</sup> Born in 1938, Edelman (who is white and Jewish) was 34 years old in 1972 and active with both the Crenshaw Neighbors (on its Board of Directors) and the left-leaning League of Women Voters of Los Angeles (its Finance and Metropolitan Area Director). She received her undergraduate from Columbia University in 1960 and a Masters from the College of the City of New York in 1965. She would go on to become a lawyer, attending Whittier Law School, and being admitted to the California bar in 1976. She is still a practicing lawyer in Beverly Hills, specializing in family law. She lived at 4104 Kenway Avenue in View Park. <http://www.superlawyers.com/california-southern/lawyer/Emily-Shappell-Edelman/>; Letter from Barry Siegel to Arthur K. Synder, March 18, 1976, BHCP.

<sup>128</sup> Born Margery Heffron in Washington in 1910 and died in 2006. Also white and Jewish, she was married to Roy R. Ferrier and worked as advertising secretary, and the senior citizen coordinator for CD10 Dave Cunningham (as of 1976). Her estate donated \$89,000 to Ventura County Habitat for Humanity in 2007. United States Census, 1940. <https://familysearch.org/pal:/MM9.3.1/TH-1961->

<http://www.toacorn.com/news/2007-12-20/Community>; “Elderly Crime Victims: Personal Accounts and Fears,” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Consumer Interests, 94<sup>th</sup> Congress, Los Angeles, September 18, 1976; <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/40471NCJRS.pdf>

<sup>129</sup> Mary was born in 1913 and died in 1998. Her husband Kenneth H. Potts, a veteran, died in November 1968. Both are buried at Los Angeles National Cemetery, <http://www.locategrave.org/l/580573/Kenneth-H-Potts-CA>, <http://www.locategrave.org/l/580572/Mary-Elizabeth-Potts-CA>.

<sup>130</sup> Barry was born in 1933 and died in 2007. Also white and Jewish, he grew up in Brooklyn. He was very active with Crenshaw Neighbors, and in particular, the fight against the Slauson Freeway. He lived at 4533 Orchid Drive in the southwest corner of View Park/Windsor Hills. “Montage Remembers Barry Siegel,” Santa Barbara Independent, September 21, 2007. <http://www.independent.com/news/2007/sep/21/montage-remembers-barry-siegel/>

<sup>131</sup> BHCP 1980, “Background,” *Supplemental Staff Report*, May 22, 1975.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> BHCP 1980, *Appendix C, Preliminary Plan Public Discussion Meetings*, v.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid, v to ix. Subsequent accounts in this paragraph are also from this source.

<sup>135</sup> BHCP 1980, *Implementation Report*, March 1978.

<sup>136</sup> BHCP 1980, *Implementation Report*, March 1978, 11-12.

<sup>137</sup> *Implementation Report*, 12.

<sup>138</sup> BHCP 1980, Transmittal Letter, *Staff Report*, August 15, 1975.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> BHCP, GP-2.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> BHCP 1980, *Supplemental Staff Report*, May 22, 1975.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> BHCP 1980, *Appendix B, Listing of Proposed Zone Redesignations for the West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert District Plan*.

<sup>146</sup> BHCP 1980, District Population Capacity Comparison.

<sup>147</sup> Doug Smith, "Southwest Area Plan Completed," *Los Angeles Times*, March 22, 1974, C1.

<sup>148</sup> BHCP 1980, *Draft Environmental Impact Report*, January 1975, 20.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid, 21-24.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>152</sup> BHCP 1980, *Draft Environmental Impact Report*, January 1975.

<sup>153</sup> BHCP 1980, Letter from Richard Spicer, Senior Planner (SCAG) to Charles Zeman (LA City Planning), March 28, 1975.

<sup>154</sup> William Overend, "Problems Stall Proposed Crenshaw Redevelopment," *Los Angeles Times*, November 20, 1980, I1.

<sup>155</sup> "Lead Agency for Crenshaw Area Revitalization Chosen," *Los Angeles Times*, November 27, 1977, L6.

<sup>156</sup> Overend, "Problems Stall..." op-cit.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Austin Scott, "Urban League Takes Task of Spurring Crenshaw Revival," *Los Angeles Times*, March 6, 1982, A33.

<sup>159</sup> BHCP 1980.

<sup>160</sup> Austin Scott, "Crenshaw Given Warning on Seeds of Urban Blight," *Los Angeles Times*, September 23, 1979, B1.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Scott, "Urban League Takes Task...", op-cit.

<sup>167</sup> "Crenshaw Façade Program Started," *Los Angeles Times*, July 10, 1983, K22.

<sup>168</sup> "Merchants Hope to Revitalize..."

<sup>169</sup> National Bureau of Economic Research, U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, <http://www.nber.org/cycles.html>.

<sup>170</sup> Dave Smith, "Merchants Hope to Revitalize Their Faltering Flagship," *Los Angeles Times*, May 29, 1983, B1.

<sup>171</sup> Patricia Manisco, "Metro Rail Boosters Don't Intend to Be Left at the Station," *Los Angeles Times*, May 27, 1984, SB1.

<sup>172</sup> "Priority Construction Listed in Proposal for Transit Routes," *Los Angeles Times*, October 31, 1967, A1.

<sup>173</sup> By 2005, Waxman, responding to new political pressures in favor of the subway and now convinced of the safety of tunneling through the area, won reversal of its ban 20 years earlier. As of 2013, plans are once again proceeding to extend the line across the Westside,

although once again, opposition in Beverly Hills is threatening to "de-rail" the project.

<sup>174</sup> Manisco, "Metro Rail Boosters...", op-cit.

<sup>175</sup> Eric Birkowitz, "The Subway Mayor," *L.A. Weekly*, Aug 18, 2005.

<sup>176</sup> "For the Record," *Los Angeles Times*, December 6, 1985, OC2.

The original story on the subject (see Banks, "The 'Battle' of West Adams" below) reported that only 3 of 100 WAHA members were black, but this was incorrect.

<sup>177</sup> It should be noted that certainly not all black residents of West Adams were lower income. Many affluent blacks moved to the area from South Central before the Baldwin Hills area to the southwest became the more fashionable area.

<sup>178</sup> Sandy Banks, "The 'Battle' of West Adams," *Los Angeles Times*, December 1, 1985, B1.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> "Blending Change with Harmony," *Los Angeles Times*, December 4, 1985, B6.

<sup>181</sup> Banks, "The 'Battle of West Adams," op-cit.

<sup>182</sup> "Zev Yaroslavsky to Speak," *Los Angeles Times*, May 4, 1986, L20.



<sup>183</sup> Letter to the LA City Planning Department from Kathleen Salisbury, President, West Adams Heritage Association, August 31, 1987, 1, *West Adams-Baldwin Hills-Leimert Community Plan*, adopted August 31, 1988 (henceforth BHCP 1988), Council File 85-2116-S4 (Box C1163, Los Angeles City Archives).

<sup>184</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>185</sup> BHCP 1988, Summary from Kenneth C. Topping, Director of Planning, to the City Planning Commission, Decision Date November 5, 1987, Council File 85-2116-S4 (LACA).

<sup>186</sup> BHCP 1988, Letter from Harry Anderson, Vice President, West Adams Heritage Association, to Department of City Planning, reflecting testimony given before examiner Ed Barr on August 26, 1987.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> “Comeback for Crenshaw,” *L.A. Times*, January 17, 1986, B4.

<sup>189</sup> Victor Merina, “Candidates Critical of Mayor on Development,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 15, 1987, B1.

<sup>190</sup> Janet, Clayton, “Support by Blacks, Jews Eroding,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 21, 1986, 1.

<sup>191</sup> Edmund Netwon, “Rule of the Jungle,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 29, 1988, OC B7.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Janet Clayton, “Shopping Mall Gets Second Chance,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 3, 1984, F1.

<sup>194</sup> Ray Hebert, “Quake Study Clouds Plan for Complex,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 12, 1985, B1. See also Cathleen Decker, “Sears Planned; Crenshaw Mall on Rebound,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 22, 1986 and “Crenshaw: A Fresh Start,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 15, 1985.

<sup>195</sup> Melanie Lomax, “Crenshaw Plaza Projects Must Deliver For Blacks,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 6, 1987, C9.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> L.A. City Planning Department, Demographic Research Unit.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Robert Garcia, Elise Meerkatz, and Seth Strongin, “Keep Baldwin Hills Clean and Green for Generations to Come,” *The City Project and Concerned Citizens of South L.A.*, May 2010, 10.

<sup>200</sup> For an overview of the relationship between park space and impacts, particularly in L.A., see Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Orit Stieglitz, “Children in Los Angeles Parks: A Study of Equity, Quality, and Children’s Satisfaction with Neighborhood Parks,” *The Town*

Planning Review vol 73, no 4 (October 2002), 467-488. After the civil unrest resulting from the Rodney King trial, gang members even pointed to the lack of park space as one of their major concerns.

<sup>201</sup> Loukaitou-Sideris and Stieglitz, 475.

<sup>202</sup> *Baldwin Hills Park Master Plan* (May 2002), 32-33, 40. [www.bhc.ca.gov/documents/Baldwin\\_Hills\\_\\_Master\\_Plan\\_Final.pdf](http://www.bhc.ca.gov/documents/Baldwin_Hills__Master_Plan_Final.pdf). S

<sup>203</sup> The former site of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir, after sitting barren for 20 years – even being used for motorcross races (earning it the nickname motorcycle hill) – was, in 1983, converted into the Kenneth Hahn State Recreational Area.

<sup>204</sup> Robert D. Bullard et al., *Toxics Waste and Race at Twenty 1987-2007: A Report Prepared for the United Church of Christ Justice & Witness Ministries* (United Church of Christ, 2007), 61. <http://www.ucc.org/justice/pdfs/toxic20.pdf>

<sup>205</sup> John McKinney, “Bring your imagination to see the future of Baldwin Hills,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 24, 2002, 15.

<sup>206</sup> John L. Mitchell, “Community Wants More Than Name Change,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 2, 1987, WS1.

<sup>207</sup> Alan Citron, “6<sup>th</sup> District Anticipates Sweeping Changes in the Wake of Galanther’s Victory,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 7, 1987, WS1.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Madison Gray, “The L.A. Riots: 15 Years After Rodney King,” *TIME Magazine*, April 25, 2007.

<sup>211</sup> Ryan Reft, “Not Bowling Alone: How the Holiday Bowl in Crenshaw Became an Integrated Leisure Space,” KCET, Land of Sunshine, August 22, 2013.

<sup>212</sup> A small portion of my study area – north of Victory Boulevard in Warner Center – lies in Canoga Park, but for simplicity, throughout the text I will simply refer to the area as Woodland Hills.

<sup>213</sup> Kevin Roderick, *The San Fernando Valley: America’s Suburb* (Los Angeles: LA Times Books, 2001), 32.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid, 49-50.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid, 48.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid, 62.

<sup>217</sup> “New Town of Girard Conceived,” *L.A. Times*, August 8, 1922, I9.

<sup>218</sup> Roderick, 78.

<sup>219</sup> Marty Altschul, “Woodland Hills is as Old as its Trees,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 23, 1969, SF\_A2.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> Roderick, 103.

<sup>222</sup> “Topanga Story: Ranch to \$30 Million Center,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 30, 1963, C10; Jerry Berns, “Warner a leading man in Valley development,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 19, 1984, N20.

<sup>223</sup> Roderick, 108.

<sup>224</sup> Roderick, 113.

<sup>225</sup> Altschul, op-cit.

<sup>226</sup> “New School Will Teach Latest Farming Methods,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 22, 1947, A3.

<sup>227</sup> Ed Ainsworth, “Huge Junior College Expansion Started,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 26, 1950, B1.

<sup>228</sup> “Kersey Outlines Farm Training School Program,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 11, 1944, 10.

<sup>229</sup> “New School Will Teach...”, op-cit.

<sup>230</sup> “Harry Warner, Film Pioneer, Dies at 76,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 26, 1958, 1.

<sup>231</sup> “Ibid.

<sup>232</sup> “No. Am. Forms New Division,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 8, 1955, A6.

<sup>233</sup> This ad ran between November 1955 and March 1956. It first

appeared in “Display Ad – No Title,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 8, 1955, 14.

<sup>234</sup> “Firm to Occupy Third Plant in Canoga Park,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 3, 1956, E9.

<sup>235</sup> “Negro Residents Rapidly Spreading Westward,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 21, 1967, A1.

<sup>236</sup> Krisel was born in Shanghai, China in 1924. His father was the United Artists distributor in China and hosted many movie stars at their home in Shanghai (Mary Pickford, Charlie Chaplin, Douglas Fairbanks). At age 13, the family returned to the U.S., settling in Beverly Hills. During his studies, Krisel worked for Paul Laszlo and Victor Gruen. See Sian Wlnship, “Quantity and Quality: Architects Working for Developers in Southern California, 1960-1973,” Master of Historic Preservation thesis, University of Southern California (December 2011), 171-228.

<sup>237</sup> “Dave Weinstein, “The Elite Moderns of Corbin Palms – Woodland Hills,” Eichler Network, October 2006. <http://www.eichlernetwork.com/article/elite-modern-corbin-palms-woodland-hills>.

<sup>238</sup> “Palmer and Krisel,” n.d., William Krisel papers (henceforth Krisel papers), Getty Research Institute, Box 14, Folder 1.

<sup>239</sup> Krisel papers, "Biography", Box 14, Folder 1.

<sup>240</sup> Krisel papers, "Article – No Title," May 1956, Box 14, Folder 6.

<sup>241</sup> Winship, 176-177.

<sup>242</sup> Rachel Bratt, *A Right to Housing: Foundation for a New Social Agenda* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 66.

<sup>243</sup> James W. Loewen, *Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American Racism* (New York: Touchstone, 2006).

<sup>244</sup> George Lipsitz, *The Possessive Investment in Whiteness* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 6.

<sup>245</sup> Title Search, 19737 Hamlin Street, Woodland Hills, 91367, Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions, originally recorded in 1915.

<sup>246</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census.

<sup>247</sup> Weinstein, op-cit.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> "A Brief Biography of William Krisel, AIA, Architect," Krisel papers, Box 14, Folder 1.

<sup>250</sup> "Corbin Palms homes," Marketing Brochure, Fall 1953, 9-10. Built simultaneously with the homes was Calvert Street School, which was funded with 1952 bond funds and opened on May 1, 1956; "New Schools in San Fernando Valley to Open," *Los Angeles Times*, April

23, 1956, 34 and "Calvert Street School Due to Open May 1," *Los Angeles Times*, April 8, 1956, 11.

<sup>251</sup> "The Oriental Influence," *Los Angeles Times*, Mar 31, 1957, N6.

<sup>252</sup> Weinstein, op-cit.

<sup>253</sup> "Architecture's Biggest Firms," *Forum* (September 1958) and, "Article – No Title," *Concrete Masonry 'Age'* (January 1959), 10, Krisel papers, Articles, Box 14, Folder 6.

<sup>254</sup> "Architecture's Biggest Firms," *Forum* (September 1962)), Ibid.

<sup>255</sup> Krisel papers, Box 14, Folder 2.

<sup>256</sup> Alan Hess, "The Ranch House at the Peak: the Tract," in Alan Hess and Noah Sheldon, *The Ranch House* (New York: Abrams, 2004), 51-80.

<sup>257</sup> "Litton Plans New Facility in Valley," *Los Angeles Times*, January 25, 1959, A15.

<sup>258</sup> "Woodland Hills Asks Industry Ban," *Los Angeles Times*, April 12, 1959, SF1.

<sup>259</sup> "Litton Ind. Forms Defense Subsidiary," *Los Angeles Times*, July 28, 1960, C10.

<sup>260</sup> "New Plant Dedicated for Litton Systems," *Los Angeles Times*, August 19, 1960, B28.

<sup>261</sup> “West Valley Trade Center Plans Aired,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 6, 1956, B1.

<sup>262</sup> “Big Modern City Seen for West Valley,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 14, 1959, SF1.

<sup>263</sup> “Public Will See Warner Ranch Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 8, 1960, SF1.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> “City Master Plan May Stir Fight Over Warner Ranch,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 15, 1960, SF1.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

<sup>267</sup> Ray Kovitz, “City Agencies Claim Nearly Half Their Activities Devoted to Valley,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 5, 1960, F7 and Canoga Park-Winnetka-Woodland Hills-West Hills Community Plan, adopted February 9, 1988 (henceforth WHCP 1988), “Prior Planning,” *Staff Report*, January 1983.

<sup>268</sup> WHCP 1988, *Staff Report*.

<sup>269</sup> “Snags May Hit Warner Ranch Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 2, 1960, E1.

<sup>270</sup> “Four Groups Charge Bias in Zone Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 30, 1960, D1

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid.

<sup>273</sup> “Woodland Hills Zoning Fight in Final Stage,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 18, 1960, SF1.

<sup>274</sup> Jack McCurdy, “Communities Split on Warner Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 27, 1961, SF1.

<sup>275</sup> “Warner Ranch Zone Hearing Set,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 24, 1961, B1.

<sup>276</sup> “Two Communities Get Revised Master Plans,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 19, 1961, E1.

<sup>277</sup> “Groups Ask for Re-Hearing on Warner Ranch Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 5, 1961, E1.

<sup>278</sup> “Rocketdyne to Build Two Additional Units,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 21, 1962, N9.

<sup>279</sup> Michael Fessier, Jr., “L.A.: In Search of a City, Part 6; Topanga Plaza, Our Town, 1971,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 14, 1971, 14.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

<sup>281</sup> “Giant Shopping Center Starts in Canoga Park,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 10, 1963, O6.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

<sup>283</sup> “Commitment Obtained for New Co-Op,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 9, 1964, M3; “221-Unit Apartment for Woodland Hills,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 8, 1964, SF\_C2.

<sup>284</sup> “Woodland Hills Co-op Financing Set,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 25, 1965, 17.

<sup>285</sup> Advertisements to this effect ran throughout 1964 and 1965. For example, see “Display Ad 311 – No Title,” *Los Angeles Times*,

<sup>286</sup> Fessier Jr, op-cit.

<sup>287</sup> City Ordinance No. 142,281.

<sup>288</sup> The Kaiser-Aetna partnership created one of the largest real estate development organizations in the country, bringing together the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation and Aetna Life & Casualty, with total assets of roughly \$250 million. WHCP 1972, Warner Ranch Urban Center, Environmental Guidelines for Warner Center, n.d., Box 46531, Folder CPC 23275 (LACA).

<sup>289</sup> “Trees Must Go For \$1.5 Million Job,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 27, 1969, SF\_C1.

<sup>290</sup> Irv Burleigh, “Rezoning Guide OKd for West Valley Core,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 22, 1969, SF\_C1.

<sup>291</sup> WHCP 1972, Letter from H. Randall Stoke (Latham & Watkins) to

Roy Bundick, City Planning Commission, October 28, 1970.

<sup>292</sup> “Trees Must Go,” op-cit.

<sup>293</sup> “Group Urging Freeze on Development Plans,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 27, 1970, SF7.

<sup>294</sup> WHCP 1972, Canoga Park-Winnetka-Woodland Hills Citizen’s Advisory Committee.

<sup>295</sup> WHCP 1972, Presentation Schedule.

<sup>296</sup> WHCP 1972, Questionnaire.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>298</sup> “Warner Ranch Urban Center to Provide Jobs for 40,000,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 28, 1970, SF\_B1.

<sup>299</sup> “Planning Group Wins Praise,” *L.A. Times*, April 18, 1971, I10.

<sup>300</sup> Dick Turpin, “Martin Firm Reaches Remarkable Milestone,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 4, 1975, G2.

<sup>301</sup> David G. Stringer & Associates, AIA, *Environmental Guidelines for Warner Center* (Los Angeles, 1973), 6. Subsequent descriptions of the Warner Ranch Urban Center plan also come from this document.

<sup>302</sup> Irv Burleigh, “Industry vs. Commerce: Decision Seen Today,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 27, 1969, SF1.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid.

<sup>304</sup> “Rezoning Guide OKd,” op-cit.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> Irv Burleigh, “Bernardi Hits Planners on Valley Urban Plan,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 17, 1969, SF8.

<sup>307</sup> “Apartments Rejected Pending Plans Study,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 26, 1970, SF8.

<sup>308</sup> Kenneth Hansen, “Land Use Plan Approved for Warner Ranch,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 22, 1970, SF6.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid.

<sup>310</sup> Letter by H. Randall Stoke, op-cit.

<sup>311</sup> Irv Burleigh, “Apartment Plan’s Fate Up to Council Today,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 1970, SF6.

<sup>312</sup> Irv Burleigh, “Protests Persuade Councilmen to Delay Vote on Apartments,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 11, 1970, SF1.

<sup>313</sup> The City passed the “Q” (qualified) condition ordinance in early 1970, as a way to achieve site-specific outcomes beyond what the generic zoning ordinances would allow (Ordinance 139,901; adopted January 9, 1970). The Q condition ordinance was controversial because it gave City Council discretion that many believed amounted to spot or contract zoning. It was these kind of site-specific exemptions that the

1968 Citizens Report was concerned about (the Citizens Committee came out of the grand jury investigation of zoning corruption case). On the one hand, shifting power away from unelected staff and towards accountable representatives was an improvement in democracy, but there was no assurances that Councilors would act in the interests of homeowners. In the case of this project, Council used Q conditions to address homeowner concerns while still approving the project.

<sup>314</sup> Kenneth J. Fanucchi, “City Approves Apartments on Former Warner Ranch,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 18, 1970, SF1.

<sup>315</sup> “Two Sites Discussed for Cultural Center,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 15, 1973, SF3.

<sup>316</sup> “Dispute Flares Anew Over Cultural Center,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 22, 1973, SF8.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> John Pastier, “Digging Into the Warner Ranch,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 25, 1974, D1.

<sup>319</sup> Bradley had been previously elected in 1963 in the biracial 10<sup>th</sup> Council District with a similar coalition. 1963 was a watershed election for African-Americans in Los Angeles, as Bradley was one of three black Councilors elected – the first three blacks ever elected to

Council in L.A. When Bradley was elected Mayor in 1973, it marked the first time a black politician had been elected Mayor in major city in which the African-American population was a minority.

<sup>320</sup> “Ecology Report Key to \$300 Million Projects,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 2, 1974, SF1.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid.

<sup>322</sup> Irv Burleigh, “Bradley Favors Police Focus on Felonies,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 18, 1975, SF\_A1.

<sup>323</sup> Pastier, op-cit.

<sup>324</sup> “Ecology Report,” op-cit.

<sup>325</sup> Martha L. Willman, “Status of Developed-Ordered EIR May Delay Urban Center,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 9, 1974, SF1.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid.

<sup>327</sup> Pastier, op-cit.

<sup>328</sup> Irv Burleigh, “Warner Center Delay Blamed on Planners,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 11, 1975, SF\_A1.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid.

<sup>330</sup> “Backers Say Reaction to Secession Move ‘All Good’,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 21, 1962, B8.

<sup>331</sup> Jeffrey L. Rabin, “Elections L.A. City Council: Crime, Not the

Environment, Is Issue This Time,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 28, 1993.

<sup>332</sup> Janet Clayton, “Wachs: Right Place, Right Time,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 31, 1982, B1.

<sup>333</sup> Burleigh, op-cit. Quimby fees are a recreational impact fee charged on all development in California, to be used in close proximity to the projects from which they are exacted.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

<sup>335</sup> WHCP 1972, City Planning Commission Case #22771, Item 1.3, Box 46531, Folder 23275 (Los Angeles City Archives). Affordable units were defined as “any housing, whether rental or sale or single family or multiple dwelling units, the occupancy of which is limited to persons or families qualifying for housing under Section 236 of the National Housing Act as now and henceforth amended.”

<sup>336</sup> WHCP 1972, Planning Department Analysis, Amendment to Generalized Land Use Plan – West San Fernando Valley, City Planning Commission File 5648-I and 5648-B.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid. Rent subsidies were similar to the section 8 voucher program, which was passed in 1974. Section 236 was passed in 1968 and provided a federal subsidy to lower interest rates for affordable



housing projects. Those earning 80% of area median income (AMI) or less qualified and could not pay more than 25% of income on rent. For more, see Charles L. Edson, "Sections 235 and 236 – The First Year," *The Urban Lawyer* Vol 2, no 1 (Winter 1970), 14-28.

<sup>338</sup> Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, "Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective," *Washburn Law Journal* vol 8 (1969), 149.

<sup>339</sup> Dean J. Kotlowski, *Nixon's Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 55.

<sup>340</sup> Erwin Baker, "Council Blocks U.S. Low-Cost Housing Project, Calls Hearing," *Los Angeles Times*, May 16, 1969, SF1.

<sup>341</sup> "Hearing on Sylmar Housing May Test Community Opinion," *Los Angeles Times*, June 2, 1969, SF1.

<sup>342</sup> Kenneth J. Fanucci, "Housing Authority May Abandon Sylmar Plans," *Los Angeles Times*, June 5, 1969, SF1.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid.

<sup>344</sup> WHCP 1972, City Planning Staff Report, n.d. CPC 2271, Box 46531, Folder CPC 23275 (Los Angeles City Archives).

<sup>345</sup> HUD's 221(d)(3) and 221(d)(4) programs insured mortgage loans to facilitate the construction or rehabilitation of multi-family housing for moderate-income, elderly, and handicapped persons. 221(d)

(3) was for non-profits while 221(d)(4) was for for-profit companies. [http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program\\_offices/housing/mfh/progdesc/rentcoopshg221d3n4](http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/mfh/progdesc/rentcoopshg221d3n4)

<sup>346</sup> WHCP 1972, City Planning Commission Agenda re: Low Income Housing, November 25, 1970, Council File 70-2548.

<sup>347</sup> WHCP 1972, Statement to City Council on behalf of the San Fernando Valley branch of the American Association of University Women by Lila Aurich, (24013 Hartland Street, Canoga Park), November 5, 1970, Council File 70-2548 (Los Angeles City Archives).

<sup>348</sup> Ibid.

<sup>349</sup> WHCP 1972, Statement to City Council on behalf of the League of Women Voters of Los Angeles by Lucy Hixon, Vice President and Housing Consultant, November 5, 1970, Council File 70-2548.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

<sup>351</sup> WHCP 1972, Statement to City Council on behalf of the San Fernando Valley Housing Task Force by Judy Borden, November 5, 1970, Council File 70-2548.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid.

<sup>353</sup> Picus was also the Vice President of the Los Angeles League of Women Voters at the time and was active in the Parent-Teacher

Association, President of the American Association of University Women, and Community Relations Director for the Jewish Federation Council.

<sup>354</sup> WHCP 1972, Statement before Planning Committee by the San Fernando Valley Housing Task Force, August 18, 1970, City Council File 70-2548.

<sup>355</sup> Ibid.

<sup>356</sup> WHCP 1972, Statement to City Council on behalf of the Human Relations Commission of the City of Los Angeles by Celes King II, Chair of the Housing, Health and Welfare Subcommittee, November 5, 1970, City Council File 70-2548.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid.

<sup>358</sup> WHCP 1972, Letter from Rev John G Simmons (4351 Beck Ave, Studio City) to Louis R. Nowell, District 1 Councilor, October 6, 1970, City Council File 70-2548.

<sup>359</sup> WHCP 1972, Letter from Virginia E. Bird (200 Alberta Avenue, Apt 24, Venice, 90291) to Louis R. Nowell, September 11, 1970, City Council File 70-2548.

<sup>360</sup> WHCP 1972, Statement to City Council on behalf of the Housing Opportunities Center of Greater Los Angeles by George B. Parks,

Executive Director, November 5, 1970, City Council File 70-2548. Mrs Carol Shiller of the Center also testified before Council on November 5, 1970, urging the low-income housing provision be provided in the Plan and filed a statement with the City Clerk to that effect.

<sup>361</sup> Ibid.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid.

<sup>364</sup> WHCP 1972, Letter from Mrs. Matilda H. Rummage (4710 Larkwood Avenue, Woodland Hills, 91364) to District 7 Councilor Ernani Bernardi, June 29, 1970, City Council File 70-2548.

<sup>365</sup> WHCP 1972, Petition to District 7 Councilor Ernani Bernardi from Mrs. Harry Kalkin (7148 Rock Ridge Terrance, Canoga Park, 91304), n.d., City Council File 70-2548.

<sup>366</sup> WHCP 1972, Letter from Mrs. Florence E. Webster (7445 Canby Avenue, Reseda, 91335) to City Council, October 6, 1970, City Council File 70-2548.

<sup>367</sup> WHCP 1972, Staff Report.

<sup>368</sup> WHCP 1972, Letter by Antonio Rossmann (609 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, 90017; clearly his office address as this is downtown), August 5, 1974.

<sup>369</sup> WHCP 1972, Planning Department Analysis.

<sup>370</sup> WHCP 1972, Staff Report, 8.

<sup>371</sup> WHCP 1972, *Planning Committee Report*, July 13, 1972.

<sup>372</sup> WHCP 1972, *Calvin Hamilton Report to City Council*, February 6, 1972.

<sup>373</sup> WHCP 1972, Planning Department Response to Comments at the March 28, 1972 hearing re: Canoga Park District Plan.

<sup>374</sup> WHCP 1972, Letter from Helen Treend, President, and Nancy Woogerd, Secretary, Save Orcutt Community via Mr. A. Beckham (their lawyer) to City Council, September 13, 1972.

<sup>375</sup> Council File 72-78-S, Letter from R.C. Chenoweth, President of Richgart, Inc., to Ernani Bernardi, District 7 Councilor, re tentative tract no 26509, May 16, 1972.

<sup>376</sup> SOC pointed to numerous studies to show that low-density development did not pay for itself. They cited three reports: “Livingston and Blayney, “Open Spaces Vs. Development,” Final Report to the City of Palo Alto, February 25, 1971; Robert Sculley, “Costs and Benefits of Additional Developments,” University of California, Davis, prepared for the San Joaquin County Planning Department, n.d.; James T. Paul, “Do New Residential Developments Pay Their Own Way? A Case Study

in Half Moon Bay, California,” San Mateo County Coastside Project, Stanford Law School, 1970. For example, Blayney says “the cost-revenue study revealed that there is no combination of development alternatives that does not result in a net cost to the taxpayer over 20 years” (132). This process of “chasing revenue” has been typical of Southern California municipalities, approving one single-family tract to make up for losses on the previous one. But the irony of the SOC position was apparently lost on them, since they wanted to reduce the density of the project further.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>378</sup> WHCP 1972, Statement Before the City Planning Commission by SOC, September 15, 1972, 6-7.

<sup>379</sup> WHCP 1972, Statement to City Council Planning Committee by the Pacific Palisades Property Owners Association and the Temescal Canyon Association, May 2, 1972; see also Letter from Brentwood-Pacific Palisades Community Plan Area Citizens Advisory Committee to City Council, May 1, 1972.

<sup>380</sup> WHCP 1972, Letter from H Randall Stoke, Latham & Watkins, to City Council Planning Committee, March 23, 1972.

<sup>381</sup> WHCP 1972, Letter from J.M. Moore, West Coast Manager of GAC

Properties Inc, a unit of GAC Corporation, to Calvin Hamilton, City Planning Director, March 23, 1972.

<sup>382</sup> Canoga Park-Winnetka-Woodland Hills-West Hills Community Plan Amendment, Adopted October 24, 1984 (henceforth WHCP 1984), Box 705108, CPC 22771 Folder, "History", *Staff Report* (Los Angeles City Archives). Subsequent references to the site's history in the ensuing paragraphs are also from this report.

<sup>383</sup> "\$65 Million in Housing Set for Warner Center," *Los Angeles Times*, January 16, 1977, H2.

<sup>384</sup> "Lotteries Spread to San Fernando Valley," *Los Angeles Times*, May 1, 1977, M5.

<sup>385</sup> Al Drooz, "Controversy Grows in Plan to Develop Warner Estate," *Los Angeles Times*, April 8, 1979, SF\_A1.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid.

<sup>387</sup> Paula Selleck, "Picus Attacks Condo Plan Next to Pierce," *Los Angeles Times*, August 9, 1979, SF1.

<sup>388</sup> "Controversy Grows...", op-cit.

<sup>389</sup> Paula Selleck, "Farm College Fights Urban Condo Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, August 19, 1979, SF1.

<sup>390</sup> Mark Stein, "Condo Development Foes, Builder Ready to do

Battle," *Los Angeles Times*, December 27, 1979, V1.

<sup>391</sup> Ibid.

<sup>392</sup> WHCP 1984, Warner Ridge Specific Plan, Box 705108, CPC 22771 Folder (LACA).

<sup>393</sup> Daniel Akst, "Big Projects Testify to Warner Center's Lure for Business," *Los Angeles Times*, December 7, 1985, V8.

<sup>394</sup> Woodland Hills Homeowners Organization Newsletter, August 1990, in "History", op-cit.

<sup>395</sup> WHCP 1984, Warner Ridge Specific Plan, *Environmental Impact Report*, Letter from Arthur and Alice Yuwiler to Aram Elmassian, Legislative Assistant, Planning and Environmental Committee, September 1, 1987.

<sup>396</sup> WHCP 1984, Letter from Roy Y. Steffensen and Anita E. Steffensen to City Council, January 20, 1990.

<sup>397</sup> WHCP 1984, *Draft Environmental Impact Report*, Letter from Mrs. Coyle (no return address given) to City of Los Angeles Environmental Unit, received August 14, 1990.

<sup>398</sup> WHCP 1984, *Draft Environmental Impact Report*, Letter from Jack D. Prosen (Canoga Park) to Robert Heredia, Project Coordinator, Environmental Review Section, Department of City Planning, August

10, 1990.

<sup>399</sup> WHCP 1984, *Draft Environmental Impact Report*, Letter from Miriam Rubin (20432 Tiara Street, Woodland Hills, 91367) to Robert Heredia, September 2, 1990.

<sup>400</sup> Ordinance 165,492, published February 9, 1990.

<sup>401</sup> WHCP 1984, *Staff Report*, January 1983.

<sup>402</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>403</sup> See Chapter 5 for the city-wide numbers. Woodland Hills data is from the January 1983 Staff Report.

<sup>404</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>405</sup> WHCP 1984, *Staff Report*, op-cit.

<sup>406</sup> WHCP 1984, *Draft Environmental Impact Report*, Letter from Jayne Hazard (4788 Regale Road, Woodland Hills, 91364), CAC member, to Marc Woersching, Associate Planner, n.d. (but probably late 1982).

<sup>407</sup> WHCP 1984, *Supplemental Staff Report*. from City Planning Director Calvin Hamilton to the City Planning Commission, April 28, 1983.

<sup>408</sup> WCP 1984, *Draft Environmental Impact Report*, Letter from Sandy Enfield, CAC member, to Marc Woersching, Associate Planner, August 10, 1982.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>410</sup> WHCP 1984, *Draft Environmental Impact Report*, Letter from Marcia I. Peterson, President, Woodland Hills Chamber of Commerce, to Marc Woersching, Associate Planner, July 26, 1982.

<sup>411</sup> WHCP 1984, Letter Gerald L. Katell, Chair, Land Use Committee, Valley Industry and Commerce Association to City Planning Commission, January 13, 1983.

<sup>412</sup> WHCP 1984, Letter from Norman J. Ryker, President, Rockeydyne, a division of Rockwell International, to City Council, Jan 14, 1983.

<sup>413</sup> WHCP 1984, Letter from Dale K. Neal, Latham & Watkins, on behalf of Warner Center Properties, to City Planning Commission, January 18, 1983.

<sup>414</sup> WHCP 1984, *Draft Environmental Impact Report*, Letter from Stephen L. Jones, lawyer at Latham & Watkins, to Marc Woersching, Associate Planner, July 26, 1982.

<sup>415</sup> Donald G. Hagman, "Santa Monicas Called Elitist Preserve," *Los Angeles Times*, June 14, 1981, I25.

<sup>416</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>417</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>418</sup> *Ibid.*

## 8 CONCLUSION

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“Nothing is concrete in L.A. except the river”

- Richard Montoya, *Water and Power* (2006)

### A. THE HOMEOWNER REVOLUTION

This research project has sought to understand land use policy changes in Los Angeles during the period between the Watts (1965) and Rodney King (1992) civil unrests. After Watts, L.A. experienced a homeowner revolution that institutionalize, a slow growth agenda in land use policy, in direct contrast to the 20-year post-war boom. This was made possible by the shift in urban planning from a more centralized planning model that gave business interests a powerful voice in the post-war years, to a more decentralized, bottom-up community planning model advocated after 1965 by new City Planning Director Calvin Hamilton and the Citizens Committee on Zoning Practices. This,

in turn, resulted in a new community planning process from the 1970s onward, with Los Angeles henceforth being planned as 35 “mini-cities” (the sum total of which would constitute the City’s General Plan Land Use Element).

This shift in planning process was paralleled by a change in the City’s politics. While the Mayor and much of City Council prior to 1965 were conservative, business oriented, and pro-growth, by the late 1960s, the tide began to turn towards civic leaders who responded more to the City’s new middle-class affluent homeowners who settled in L.A. during the post-war boom. By 1973, the City had elected its first black mayor (Tom

Bradley) through a coalition of blacks and progressive white (including many Jewish) homeowners. Bradley's election marked a clear shift away from the "growth for growth's sake" mentality of the past, towards the new "slow-growth" or even "no growth" sentiment. Even more important were the changes taking place on City Council, where homeowner groups mobilized in support of a new generation of Councilors who were more responsive to local concerns.

These homeowners coalesced around common perceived fears – over-population, the loss of open space, traffic congestion, air pollution, encroachment of multi-family and commercial into single-family areas, and so on. These fears became the rallying points to organize homeowners into geographically delineated neighborhood associations, whose collective voices became one of the city's most powerful lobbies. This created a virtuous circle for homeowners. Areas with strong homeowner groups were successful in placing their members on the bodies responsible for drafting the local

community plans (Citizens Advisory Committees), since these committees were appointed by the Councilors who represented the different community plan areas.

But the homeowner revolution was very uneven across the City. In some areas, where single-family housing tracts were later to develop, for example in Woodland Hills/Canoga Park (see section 7.2), business interests remained influential well into the mid-1970s, which allowed pockets of high-intensive development (such as Warner Center) to evade homeowner pressure. But by the late 1970s, even in these peripheral areas of the City, the political tide had turned towards a prominence of homeowner interests. Although the die had been cast for areas like Warner Center, homeowners mobilized to mitigate the "damage" by scaling back the size of individual projects. And by then, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was well entrenched as the primary tool homeowners used to do so.

In other areas, for example, in predominately black

South L.A., there were well-organized homeowner groups, but these homeowners were focused on issues of social welfare and community safety, not land use issues. The defense of the sanctity of the single-family home did not materialize in these areas. By contrast, well-organized homeowner groups on the City's Westside and in hillside areas were deeply involved in land use debates. These areas were especially successful in using the community planning process to advance their goals. As such, as we saw in Chapter 5, areas with neighborhood associations that were heavily involved in land use cases experienced dramatic rollbacks in density – in some cases, by over 40%. Conversely, areas with either no or few associations, or those that were not actively involved in land use cases, experienced dramatic increases in density – in some cases, by over 80%.

This led to a phenomenon I call “planning by resistance”, with density following the path of least resistance. City planners consistently deferred to the Citizen Advisory Committees (CACs)

– and they really had no other choice, since City Councilors appointed the CACs and had final authority over planning decisions. As such, the initial wave of community plans in the 1970s dramatically rolled back density by some 60% – from a planned population of 10 million people down to roughly 4.1 million. The Planning Department fought for slightly less dramatic rollbacks (aiming for a 1990 population of 5 million, instead of 4 million) and the more homeowner-friendly City Planning Commission fought for slightly more down-zoning (to 3.7 million), but the prevailing sentiment from all sides was that massive zoning rollbacks were desirable. And when the City was slow to pass enabling legislation to roll back the zoning to match the community plans – as was required by state law (AB 283) – the Hillside Federation sued the City to force it to down-zone large swaths of the City *en masse*. Similarly, the Federation and like-minded homeowner groups became an important catalyst for Prop U, which down-zoned the majority of L.A.'s arterial corridors. So even areas without strong homeowner groups



were ultimately impacted by the homeowner revolution.

While neighborhood associations were united in their quest to slow growth, we should resist the temptation to reduce the movement to simple caricature; the motivations of homeowners were often complex and, at times, contradictory. Often characterized as simply a reactionary NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) phenomenon that resisted any and all change in order to protect homeowners' self-interests (property values, views, congestion-free roads, etc), homeowners had many motivations, some of which are perhaps surprising. For example, the early efforts of homeowner groups like the Hillside Federation were strongly tied to the emergence of the environmental movement – including preserving open space, reduction air pollution, ensuring adequate water supply, protecting hillside areas from fires and mudslides. This ecological agenda aligned with the zero growth movement of the early 1970s that recognized that perpetual economic and population growth on a planet with finite resources could not

be sustained. This also complemented a leftist anti-capitalist sentiment that deplored the destruction of L.A.'s open spaces merely to line the pockets of developers and business interests. All three of these motivations – environmental protection, curbing growth, and resisting capitalist exploitation of the land – placed homeowners firmly on the progressive side of the political ledger.

But not all of homeowners' motives were progressive. Homeowners' fierce defense of the sanctity of the single-family detached home – to the exclusion of all others – revealed the movement's darker side. While overt motives of racial exclusion were rare, homeowners associated apartments and commercial development with the turmoil in the inner city (“ghettos”) that many had consciously decided to leave behind. Therefore the perceived encroachment of non single-family uses in their neighborhoods was viewed as bringing crime, depressing property values, traffic, and a wide range of other perceived urban ills. In an era when the suburbs were deeply

segregated by race – in no small part, due to institutional racism of discriminatory FHA policies and previously allowed racially restrictive covenants – this had the effect of walling off areas of white privilege from minorities.

Moreover, homeowners' advocacy of dramatic zoning rollbacks, particularly for multi-family zoning, disproportionately impacted minorities. To homeowners, strict use segregation was a means of preserving the quasi-rural way of life they envisioned for themselves. But homeowners were indifferent to the cumulative effects of down-zoning. By the late 1970s, it was already clear that more compact, mixed-use, less auto-dependent communities had less of an environmental impact than suburban sprawl, yet homeowners continued to defend the low-density status quo, despite their professed interest in environmentalism. Worse still, homeowners fought – on questionable grounds – the very mass transit system they had used in part to justify zoning rollbacks, but which would have gone a long way towards achieving many of the environmental

goals they purported to support.

As homeowner power ascended, the influence of the City's once-mighty business elite, represented by groups such as the L.A. Area Chamber of Commerce, began to wane. The Chamber's obstruction to implementing environmental controls – on the grounds it would curtail growth – pit business and homeowner groups against one another. And despite the Chamber's conservatism on issues such as public housing and civil rights, it was consistently in favor of greater multi-family housing and one of the region's strongest backers of mass transit. So like homeowners, members of the business elite were both heroes and villains to progressive urbanism.

Civil rights and social justice groups were essentially caught in the middle of this protracted battle. They were fighting a more fundamental battle against racial discrimination that demanded a range of interests that extended well beyond the land use arena. In the face of such overt racism, it is understandable that the L.A. Urban League's priorities

centered on social welfare issues, rather than the minutiae of block-by-block community planning. Even still, given the central importance that economic independence and fair housing was to their mission, it is surprising that the Urban League and its civil rights contemporaries were so fundamentally absent from the land use conversation.

In short, the homeowner revolution arose as a reaction to the rapid pace of change in post-war Los Angeles (and its discontents), but was enabled by a planning process that elevated homeowners' hyper-local concerns above all others.

### SO WHAT?

Why should we be concerned about this homeowner revolution in Los Angeles? Did this empowerment of homeowner groups not result in a more democratic planning process? Doesn't the down-zoning of rich, white areas and up-zoning of poor, minority areas simply reflect a rational re-allocation

of multi-family housing to areas most in need of it or where it was most appropriate? These are all fair questions, but a close examination illustrates the revolution and the land use policies it promoted were neither rational nor just – indeed, the homeowner revolution has had a detrimental impact on the majority of Angelenos.

First, we must dispel the notion that the down-zoning of rich/white areas and commensurate up-zoning of poor/minority areas was simply about providing multi-family housing where it was needed the most or where it was most appropriate (for example, in close proximity to mass transit, or where infrastructure, schools, or public space could accommodate it). Simply put, there was no way for city planners to even comprehend the shifts in density that were taking place, let alone control the process, because these changes were being made on an area-by-area basis without any coordination between them. And since community plans were started and finished at different times – with wide variations in how long it took to complete

plans, depending on how controversial they were – there was no mechanism to control how much density was being cumulatively added or removed. Each community plan operated unto its own logic, primarily driven by the CACs who drafted them, and further pushed and pulled by homeowners who attended hearings by the Planning Department, the City Planning Commission, and City Council, affording homeowners multiple opportunities to enact ever more rollbacks and restrictions. As such, the overall shifts in density can only be detected after the fact. That this study represents the first attempt to quantify how these shifts took place demonstrates that the relative changes in density between different areas was not of particular importance to planners. Their goal was simply to ensure the overall numbers added up to roughly what they expected in terms of overall population growth, as recommended by the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG).

In part, this inability to tightly control changes in density is due to the weakness of the State’s Housing Element law, but

it is also endemic to the bottom-up process itself. Enacted in 1969, the Housing Element mandated cities make “adequate provision for the existing and projected housing needs of all economic segments of the community”<sup>1</sup> (i.e. that sufficient low and moderate income housing be planned), but this law applies only at the level of the City as a whole. There is no requirement that multi-family housing, much less affordable housing, be distributed across a city in any particular fashion. A city can concentrate all of its multi-family housing – and indeed all of its set-aside affordable units – into one area and still satisfy the Housing Element’s fair share provision. In fact, the fair share provision does not even require a city to actually *build* this affordable housing, only that they demonstrate that they have identified sufficient acreage in their jurisdiction that could *possibly* be developed for affordable housing, i.e. that they show they have *planned* for it. Moreover, the extraordinarily high percentage of California cities that are not in compliance of even this meager requirement illustrates how inept the Housing

Element's "fair share" actually provision is. For example, a 2002 Public Policy Institute of California study showed that literally only half (51%) of municipalities in the state were in compliance.<sup>2</sup>

More importantly, the bottom-up community planning that divided Los Angeles into 35 separate mini-cities also prohibited the Planning Department from ensuring the community plans accommodated a fair share of either multi-family housing generally, or affordable housing specifically. In fact, the planning process virtually guaranteed the 35 communities did not each have a mix of housing options for different income levels. As we've seen, areas with a strong homeowner presence reduced multi-family housing density between the 1970s and 1990s community plans, often dramatically. It was virtually impossible for the Planning Department to go against the recommendations of the CACs by re-allocating multi-family to where it was most needed or best suited because City Council had veto power. And since City Council appointed the CAC members, who came

from their political base, to defy the CAC would mean reprisals at the ballot box, which no Councilor would risk.

So density was not allocated where it was needed most, it instead was the result of the political machinations taking place on an area-by-area basis. But neither was density increased in areas that were best suited to receive it. If traffic congestion was a chief motivation for homeowners to down-zone, then surely it would make sense to direct future growth to areas best served by mass transit. In some cases that did happen, although not because land use and transportation planning were coordinated – in fact, the location of transit routes in L.A. mirrors the politics of community planning, in that routes were ultimately determined by what was politically feasible. Only in a number of select cases have land uses been up-zoned around transit-rich areas – for example, central Hollywood, Koreatown, Westlake, and Downtown. But even here, affluent homeowners nearby (particularly in the Hollywood Hills and Hancock Park) fought these increases in density. And it is debatable whether

density was increased here because they were proximate to transit, since the Metro was not built until the 1990s, and densities were increased in these areas before that time. Even still, many of the greatest increases in density were in areas not served by mass transit at all – for example, Arleta (83.6% increase in density), Mission Hills (+42.8%), and Sun Valley (+30.3%). So there is little evidence that the changes in density identified in Chapter 5 reflect an overall strategy to either direct growth to areas most in need of multi-family housing or best served by transit.

Even if we accept the theory that densities were increased in poor, mostly Latino areas because the need here was greatest (and there is no evidence to support that theory), that still does not explain why rich, white areas experienced a net decline in density. If the City was expected to grow, we might expect rich/white areas to increase in density at a slower rate than poor/Latino areas (again, assuming a coordinated need-based process was in place), but rich/white areas actually

reduced population capacity, often dramatically. In other words, not only did homeowners in these affluent areas wanted to see small or no increases in density, they didn't even want to see the existing zoning capacity built out – which had already been reduced by roughly 40% in the first community plans; as such, they moved to continually reduce densities in the 1980s and 1990s plan updates to remove any additional zoning capacity above and beyond what the existing built fabric already had. As we saw in section 6.3, homeowners were motivated to institute these rollbacks for many reasons, but halting population growth was chief among them.

Some might argue that these changes in density that were taking place through the community planning process were merely rational choices by the CACs to reflect market realities, i.e. reflecting the inherent value of land. It is certainly true that rich, white areas generally had higher land values, which made it less likely that affordable housing could be feasibly built in those areas (since the cost to acquire land

would be prohibitively high). By contrast, land in poorer areas was less costly, making the provision of affordable housing more feasible. But of course, down-zoning made this market differential self-reinforcing, and in fact exacerbated it. Shifting more single-family land to lower density categories meant larger minimum lot sizes, which made these areas more exclusive (a higher barrier to entry for lower income households). By contrast, concentrating more poor people into already poor areas no doubt put further downward pressure on land values. So while there is certainly a market dimension to where affordable housing can be feasibly built, the changes in land uses taking place as a result of the community planning process made it even less likely that affordable housing would be built in affluent, predominately white areas. Still, the rationale for down-zoning was not limited to set-aside affordable units. The active homeowner communities were down-zoning *all forms* of multi-family, to exclude not only affordable units, but also market-rate apartments and even high-end condominiums. So

it wasn't simply about keeping poor people out (although no doubt that was a motivation), it was about keeping *all* people out – to preserve the community as it then existed.

Within this context of individual affluent communities rolling back zoning, planners understood that they had to accommodate *growth somewhere* – including planning for enough affordable housing to meet the Housing Element's fair share provision. Embedded within a bottom-up planning process that they had endorsed, planners had little choice but to follow the path of least resistance – i.e. areas where the Citizens Advisory Committees were not stacked with homeowner groups who were opposed to multi-family. Invariably, that meant areas that were already poor, predominately Latino, with high non-citizen populations, and which already had a high percentage of multi-family land. This is not to suggest that CACs in poor, minority areas were universally opposed to increases in density and the prospect of more affordable housing – in many cases, more affordable housing was welcomed – but the net effect was

that the entire future growth of the City was expected to be born by these poor, largely minority communities. And since areas with strong homeowner groups had mobilized to not only hold densities constant but to actually reduce them, this actually meant poor areas had to absorb even more growth than would otherwise be required.

## **B. PROBLEMS WITH THE HOMEOWNER REVOLUTION**

So we can see that the process by which densities were reduced in some areas and increased in others was anything but rational. But more than just producing an uncoordinated and haphazard planning that reflected the politics of land use, the resultant pattern was problematic for a wide variety of reasons that I outline below.

### NOT REPRESENTATIVE

Among the most serious concerns about an exclusively bottom-up planning process is whether the sentiment captured is representative of the community as a whole. This is a problem widely seen in community-based planning and was certainly apparent in Los Angeles. To be sure, the policies adopted through the community planning process reflected the will of active members of neighborhood associations. But were these association members representative of even all homeowners, let alone all residents of L.A.? It's debatable whether those who became involved in neighborhood associations were typical of most homeowners; these paying members were the most "diehard" of homeowners – for whom land use issues were more important than the average homeowner.

But there is also the question of whether the views of homeowners generally are representative of the views of the majority of Angelenos. The evidence suggests they are not. For



example, when the Goals Project surveyed a representative sample of Angelenos in 1968, it found that nearly two-thirds of people wanted to continue with pro-growth policies, a position decidedly at odds with neighborhood associations. Moreover, single-family homeowners are a minority within Los Angeles – just one-third of Angelenos live in owner-occupied single-family homes. And only a tiny fraction of these homeowners are members of neighborhood associations – a typical neighborhood association might have 100 members in a neighborhood of 10,000 adults (so only about one percent of homeowners were paying association members). In many ways, the adoption of policies favored by neighborhood association members is akin to the delegates of a Democratic or Republican convention having power to directly enact legislation (in that only a small percentage of voters are paying members of parties, and of these, only a tiny fraction are actively involved in party affairs).

To further demonstrate the point, the areas where homeowner groups were most active were not typical of L.A.

as a whole. The socio-economic demographics between these areas was made clear in Chapter 5 when we compared the demographics of the eight areas with the most active neighborhood associations with the 27 other areas (see Fig. 5-71). We found that inactive areas were only one-third as white, over three times more Latino, four times more black, two-and-a-half times more dense, twice as poor, and with double the poverty and double the share of non-citizens. That largely white, affluent areas have disproportionately dictated land use policy is not only unrepresentative, it is unjust. It has resulted in a kind of “land use apartheid” regime, where the vast majority of residents are subjected to the policy preferences of a very small number of vocal white, affluent, single-family homeowners.

So even though the majority of Angelenos at the time wanted a continuation of pro-growth policies, by 1970, homeowner groups were already shaping City Council. This helps explain why the slow-growth movement began to take root. Seen this way, the 1970 Centers Concept was an attempt

## THE HOMEOWNER PERSPECTIVE

to strike a balance between vocal homeowners who wanted to preserve their neighborhoods as is, and the majority of people who wanted L.A. to continue growing (which would be accommodated by directing growth to well-defined centers). Although City Council eventually (in 1974) adopted the Centers Concept in principle, it had no practical application, because each community was planned independently. And to the extent that a community had strong homeowner groups, the “centers” were resisted because they operated on a premise of continued growth that homeowners did not accept. But the preferences of neighborhood association members simply did not represent the will of the majority of residents of Los Angeles. So it is easy to see why the community planning process that privileged the preferences of an unrepresentative minority over all others was simply not democratic (in that the will of the silent (?) majority was ignored).

Homeowners, of course, see it differently. For most, a home is a family’s most important financial investment. They rightfully feel entitled to a say in how adjacent land use policies might impact the value of their home. But how far from one’s home should that sphere of influence be? Should it be measured in distance? Should it be measured by places people frequent in the course of their day? Should they have a say in the design of each street on which they travel in their daily lives? These are difficult questions, but if homeowners’ concerns are primarily about the exchange value of their houses, the sphere of influence is actually quite narrow. A house’s exchange (market) value is broadly influenced by the quality of its neighborhood, its physical condition, its (and its lot’s) size, its amenities, and so on. While the addition of a mixed-use building immediately adjacent to a single-family house may impact its market value, if that mixed-use building was located a half-mile away, it would

not.

Homeowners often exaggerate perceived negative impacts and ignore potentially positive impacts. The impact on traffic and fire protection of that mixed-used building a half-mile away is almost universally over-stated, for example. Likewise, the local effects of light rail – vibrations and noise – are also typically exaggerated (especially since the design of a transit corridor can easily mitigate these effects). On the flip side, the amenities offered by that mixed-use building a half-mile away – a coffee shop, a grocery store, a pharmacy, etc – are often ignored. Likewise, proximity to a transit stop often has a positive impact for many prospective buyers. Public amenities included in projects are also often not seen as a benefit. But these are often not part of the conversation, in part, because the environmental review of such projects – the process mandated by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) – inherently assumes that the status quo is always the most optimal environment, in that building nothing causes no environmental

impacts. This process inherently assumes that anything built has a negative impact that must be mitigated. It is therefore easy to see why CEQA is such a powerful tool for homeowners, since any impact – traffic, shadows, even aesthetics – can be the basis for legal challenge.

Some homeowner concerns are legitimate, but many are simply legal chicanery used to delay, scale back, or stop unwanted change. Even still, these highly localized impacts are not the only considerations when making planning decisions. As discussed above, these concerns may not be broadly representative of people’s concerns (it is a truism of L.A. development politics that people who oppose show up at hearings, while the silent majority who may support a given project do not). Beyond reaching out to as many different constituencies in multiple languages and through different means, planners often have little control over who shows up at community meetings. The process also privileges those who “get there first” – while future residents of a project will

## IGNORANCE OF REGIONAL CONCERNS

become part of a community, they are not present when the project is being proposed, so existing residents essentially have a veto over whether they are allowed to join the community or not. And since new people are seen as inherently bad, there is little incentive for the existing community to endorse change. Whether the existing community mobilizes against a project or not reflects the level of social capital in a given community, as social networks are a far more effective means of mobilization than direct contacts by planning bureaucracies. And typically, this means that those with greater social capital and leisure time participate (which is strongly correlated with rich and white), while those working multiple jobs just to get by do not (which is strongly correlated with poor and minority). So it's not that homeowners don't have the right to help shape land use policies – they do – but if the process is democratic and fair, these concerns cannot be the only valid considerations.

This leads to another reason why we should be concerned about the homeowner revolution in Los Angeles (and the exclusively bottom-up planning system that empowered it) – its prioritizing of local over regional concerns. This is not to say that Los Angeles should – or even can – be planned as a single entity, at anywhere near the level of detail of a community plan. That is neither feasible nor desirable, since there is much to be valued by bottom-up planning. On a basic level, local residents virtually always know more about their community than professional planners at City Hall. But this faith in the supremacy of local knowledge can and often does run amuck. For example, local residents almost always overestimate traffic and the scarcity of parking in their neighborhood. This data tends to be well known by planners, who have a comparative basis for judging whether a given neighborhood's perceived traffic and parking problems are significant or not. So both local and professional knowledge

have value.

At this point it would be understandable to think that my critique of the homeowner revolution in L.A. reflects a desire to return to the days of top-down planning. To be clear, that is not what I am advocating. Having planning processes that empower local residents and organizations to have a direct voice in drafting policies that shape their neighborhood is critically important. But as essential as local concerns are, it is important to acknowledge that they are not the *only* concerns at stake. To homeowners, such a statement is sacrilege. But if we are to have better planning – and more sustainable cities – we must balance local *and* regional concerns. For example, homeowners in the San Fernando Valley used exaggerated claims about the local impacts of light rail – as the Eastern Transit Coalition did to thwart the light rail along Chandler Boulevard in the 1980s (see section 6.2) – to devastating regional effects on traffic congestion. Certainly, planners must implement local mitigation measures to address local concerns, but a process that allows

such claims to prevent the implementation of a regional rail system with documented social, economic, and environmental benefits is one that has not found an appropriate balance between the local and the regional.

By ignoring regional concerns, L.A.'s community planning process not only fails to implement vital regional transportation planning (and coordinate this with land uses), but fails to consider many other regional concerns. For example, regional economic development is almost entirely absent in L.A.'s community planning process. Affluent communities typically neither need nor want economic development. Within an exclusively bottom-up process, economic development is only desired where a community is struggling, which may or may not be where commercial or retail development is best served. Likewise, the community planning process has little ability to ensure there is a jobs-housing balance in each community plan area. In fact, the process may explicitly work against this. Affluent homeowners may prefer their community

to be a bedroom community, without the negative externalities of commercial development. In this sense, it is ideal for them to have their home in one area and job in another. Regional open space planning is also challenged by the balkanizing of planning into 35 mini-cities, which makes responses to the regional imbalance in access to park space difficult to address. So on a fundamental level, L.A.'s community planning process prioritizes local concerns, while handcuffing L.A.'s ability to meet its regional challenges.

#### LACK OF COORDINATION

Closely related to the the inability of the L.A. community planning process to account for regional concerns is the lack of coordination between the 35 community plans. The problem of "boundary wars" – where one community plans for a use on its boundary that is incompatible with a use planned in the adjacent community – is common. This problem is less extreme

between L.A.'s 35 community plans than it might be between different municipalities, but it remains a problem. For example, the Reseda community plan contains the Van Nuys airport along its eastern boundary, which is zoned industrial. Immediately to the north is the Mission Hills community plan. While the south side of Roscoe (in Reseda) is zoned industrial, the north side (in Mission Hills) is zoned single-family residential, creating a strange and unfortunate condition where single-family homes look immediately across the street to the smokestacks and hideousness of the massive Budweiser/Anheuser-Busch brewery. Similarly, the Encino community plan designates a long stretch of land south of the Orange Line right-of-way (the northern boundary of the Encino plan area), between Wilbur and Etiwanda as industrial land, but the Reseda plan on the north side of the tracks is single-family residential. There are many such unusual conditions found in the city. For example, many streets have commercial zoning on one side, but the other side (in a different community plan area) are zoned single-family, or

single-family on one side and multi-family on the other.

### RACIAL SEGREGATION

Racially, the City of Los Angeles is much more diverse than when the first community plan was adopted in 1970. It would be tempting to look at the demographic change and conclude that L.A. has become a more racially integrated city. But this is misleading. Certainly, the City is far more diverse: in 1970, it was 60% non-Latino white; by 2000, it was less than half that (commensurately, the Latino population increased from roughly 18% in 1970 to roughly 47% by 2000).<sup>3</sup> So in both cases, the white and Latino population has changed by roughly 30 points in 30 years (negatively for whites, and positively for Latinos). But a closer look at racial changes by community plan area show a clear pattern – that areas with high concentrations of white, affluent homeowners (areas that experienced widespread down-zoning) are virtually unchanged in racial

composition, while poorer, minority areas (areas that were up-zoned) receiving most of the new non-white population.

For example, if we look at the community plan areas identified in Chapter 5 as having the most active homeowner groups (with respect to land uses), we see a clear pattern. Comparing the change in Latino population in these areas between 1970 and 1990 illustrates the point. In Brentwood, the Latino population increased from 1.6% to 2.6% between 1970 and 2000 – an increase of just one point. In Sherman Oaks, the increase was just 2.1 points, in Encino, it was 2.5 points and in West L.A. it was 3.5 points. These increases over a 30-year period are almost negligible, considering the Latino population in the City increased by 30 points over this period.

By contrast, areas that had even a modest Latino base in 1970 (even if they were still in the minority, as compared to whites) have dramatically increased in Latino population. For example, Sun Valley increased from 18.7% Latino in 1970 to 65.9% in 2000 – a 47-point increase. Sylmar went from 20.0%

to 69.9% – a 50-point increase (consequently, the non-Latino white population in Sun Valley and Sylmar, which were both roughly 77% white in 1970, have decreased by 56 points). So despite the City as a whole becoming more diverse, the communities within it have actually become in many ways more polarized.

#### EXACERBATION OF SPATIAL DISPARITIES

It isn't just the racial composition of changes in population between different areas that matters, but the sheer magnitude of the population changes. These shifts in population – underpinned by the changes in land use policy – have also increased the burden on public services and infrastructure in many areas, and exacerbated spatial disparities between rich and poor areas.

For example, many Westside areas have experience little or no population growth (and in some case, population

has decreased). In Brentwood, an affluent area with strong homeowner associations that were active in land use cases, the population has gone from 53,703 in 1970 to 54,118 in 2000 – an increase of just 415 people (0.8%) in 30 years. The population in Sherman Oaks increased from 68,660 to 72,988 – an increase of only 4,328 (6.3%). In Westchester, the population has actually decreased – from 54,163 to 51,255 (-5.4%). By contrast, areas with few homeowner groups showed dramatic increases in population. Mission Hills increased from 71,466 to 134,960 – an increase of 63,494 (88.8%). Sun Valley increased from 58,614 to 86,391 – an increase of 27,777 (47.4%). Sylmar went from 40,349 to 69,624 – an increase of 29,275 (72.6%). So the contrast between low-income areas and the affluent Westside areas is startling.

The irony is that these poor areas were in the worst position to accommodate further growth, since they were the areas that already had overcrowded housing, scarce park facilities, overstretched police divisions, and underperforming



schools. So by directing growth to these areas, the planning process contributed to a widening of the gap between rich and poor.

For example, as population flooded into poor areas (increasing population density), it caused enrollment in schools to exceed capacity. This widened the student-to-teacher ratios between schools in rich/white and poor/minority areas. Not only is this unjust, in that it structurally burdens predominately minority schools, it is also a waste of taxpayer dollars. Between 1997 and 2007, the Los Angeles United School District (LAUSD) built 130 new facilities at a cost of \$19 billion.<sup>4</sup> The impetus for this construction program was, of course, not entirely due to overcrowding (in part, it was mandated to ensure schools met post-Northridge earthquake resistance regulations). But the reality is that L.A. finds itself in the strange position of having built 130 new schools for not a single new student in the system. LAUSD's enrollment in between 1998/99 and 2007/08, for example, went from 695,885 to 694,288, a net *decline* of

roughly 1,600 students, despite this ambitious construction program.<sup>5</sup> And enrollment has continued to drop. And this is because public schools in affluent areas are emptying out (as affluent parents divert their kids to private or charter schools), while schools in poor areas are running over capacity, in part due to the underlying land use policy changes.

Just as schools became more overcrowded in many poor neighborhoods, so too, did housing units. This was, in part, because not enough housing units were built to accommodate population growth in these areas. And since demand exceeded supply, this also drove up rents – at a time when wages were stagnant, if not in decline. In their 2008 study of housing in L.A., *Livable Places* found that nearly 1 in 5 households were “severely overcrowded” (defined by the U.S. Census as more than 1.5 people per room).<sup>6</sup> But in areas that received the lion's share of population growth, this number was much higher – in Westlake (which added almost 40,000 people, an increase of almost 60%, between 1970 and 2000), 44% of units were

severely overcrowded. In Southeast L.A. (70,000 new people, a near 40% increase), severe overcrowding was at 34%, and in Arleta-Pacoima (35,000 new people, a 50% increase), the number was around 30%.

It's also no surprise that these "receiving" areas are L.A.'s most park-poor areas. For example, the most park poor Council Districts in the City as of 2002 were Districts 1, 8, 9, 10 and 13 – covering inner-city areas like Westlake, Downtown, South L.A. – which range from 0.98 acres to 2.65 acres per 1,000 children.<sup>7</sup> By contrast, Council Districts 5, 11 and 12 – covering the Westside and West Valley – range from 8.00 to 9.81 acres per 1,000 children, roughly eight times more. Of course land use policies were not the only factor at play – immigrant settlement patterns, differences in employment/wages, educational attainment, and so on are powerful forces shaping these differences – but the fact is, rather than distribute population more evenly throughout the city or to lower-density areas that could better absorb increases in population, land

use policies made a bad situation that much worse.

#### LACK OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING

Among the most serious consequences of the initial zoning rollbacks in the 1970s – but also the continual reduction of multi-family housing in affluent areas – was the impact on housing supply and, consequently, housing cost. As with the above, we must be careful not to attribute gross undersupply of affordable housing in L.A. strictly to changes in land use policy. But a planning process that empowered the slow growth movement's desire to curtail multi-family zoning was a significant factor. This contributed to the housing crisis in two ways – it constrained the overall supply of housing, but also virtually assured that set-aside affordable units would not be built in affluent areas (both because it drove land values up and because homeowner groups mobilized against subsidized housing projects). For example, during the housing

boom between 1998 and 2005, only about 20,000 affordable housing units were built in Los Angeles.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, due to condo conversions or demolitions for new projects, the City actually lost roughly 9,000 rent-controlled units. So the net gain in affordable units was only about 11,000 units (20,000 new units minus the 9,000 lost). Spread over a seven-year period, this presents a net production of just 1,600 affordable units per year in a city of roughly four million people.

Worst still is the distribution of these affordable units. The most affordable units were built in Westlake (3,373 units), South L.A. (2,007), Downtown (1,781), Wilshire (1,379) and Southeast L.A. (1,366) – that is, the poorest areas of the City. By contrast, some Westside areas (e.g. Encino, Bel Air, and Brentwood) produced literally zero affordable units over this seven-year period, while others produced only a handful of units: West L.A. (26 units), Westwood (40), and Sherman Oaks (84). Worse still: these Westside areas lost the most affordable units – with 5,861 of the roughly rent-stabilized 9,000 units

lost – roughly two-thirds – were in Council Districts 5 and 11, on the City’s Westside. As such the Westside actually experienced a net loss of affordable units. The effect was to reinforce the concentration of poverty that has been prescribed by land use policy during this era of community planning.

Overall, the affordability crisis has become dire, particularly given the economic downturn between 2008 and 2012. By 2012, literally half (51%) of all L.A. workers now qualify for affordable housing (defined as 80% or less of area median income or AMI) – 16% are “very low” income (< 30% of AMI), 16% are “low” income (31 to 50% of AMI), and 19% are “moderate” income (51 to 80% of AMI).<sup>9</sup> But the income disparities between different areas of the City are significant. For example, in West L.A., less than 30% of households are moderate income or less, while in South L.A. this number is almost 75%.<sup>10</sup> Given that literally half the City residents cannot afford market-rate housing, it is clear that the slow-growth policies that have purposefully constrained housing production

have contributed to a growing divide between rich and poor in Los Angeles.

#### STIFLING OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

The lack of affordable housing supply is matched by falling wages and rising poverty rates. In part, this is due to the lack of job growth in the City. The official unemployment rate rose from 7.1% to 12.2% between 2008 and 2012, an increase of more than 70% (and the unofficial rate – including those who have stopped looking or who are underemployed – is much higher).<sup>11</sup> Rising unemployment has predictably resulted in declining wages; the median income in the City of Los Angeles fell from \$52,044 to \$46,803 between 2008 and 2012 – a decline of over 10%. And of course, this combination of rising unemployment and falling wages has led to an increase in poverty. Between 2008 and 2012, the poverty rate has risen from 19.5% to 23.3% – so nearly 1 in 4 households now live in

poverty.

Naturally, L.A.’s economic climate is influenced by many more factors than land use policy – tax policies, availability of skilled labor, the cost of business, the global economic climate and so on. For example, Los Angeles was especially hard hit by the end of the Cold War, resulting in the contraction of the region’s defense industry; between 1990 and 1993, L.A. County lost 500,000 jobs, although a 400,000 gain between 1993 and 1999 recouped 80% of them.<sup>12</sup> Still, since 1990, L.A. has lost over 150,000 manufacturing jobs.<sup>13</sup> These losses lead suburban apologist Joel Kotkin to call L.A. “one of the most rapid–and largely unnecessary–municipal reversals in fortune in American urban history.”<sup>14</sup>

So while broader forces have been at play, the decline in job-producing land – in particular, area zoned for industrial uses – has also contributed to the problem. Since land use policies in the community planning era largely reflect the will of homeowners, and since homeowners view industrial uses

in their community as having a negative impact on property values, areas with active homeowner groups have slowly converted industrial zoning to less noxious uses. The results from section 5.1 demonstrate this trend. The homeowner-rich Westside as a whole experienced a net reduction of 18.5% in industrial land – and that was in an area that already had very little industrial zoning. Conversely, areas without such strong advocacy witnessed an increase in industrial use; for example, the East Valley area increased in industrial land by 8.5%. Overall, about six per cent of industrial land in L.A. has disappeared over the last 30 years, but what remains industrial has also been converted from heavy to light industry, and down-zoned for less intensive use. As Fig. 8-1 shows, this industrial land is concentrated into a select few locations in L.A. – predominately southeast of Downtown and along two rail corridors in the San Fernando Valley.

Much of this industrial-zoned land – 26% – is actually used by non-industrial uses such as big-box retail, residential,

schools, and open space.<sup>15</sup> So although roughly 8% of the City's area is designated for industrial use, only about 6% is actually used for industrial purposes. This represents a dramatic change from the immediate post-war era, when L.A. was an industrial powerhouse. Certainly, this decline reflects the general shift towards the information and service sectors in American society, as manufacturing jobs have been off-shored to countries with much lower labor costs and more lax environmental regulations. But adding fuel to this exodus has been a planning process that empowers homeowner groups who are happy to see industry be replaced in their communities.

The trend away from job-producing land has serious economic consequences for wages and employment – L.A. lost almost 1 in 5 of its manufacturing jobs between 2007 and 2012.<sup>16</sup> But this loss also impacts the City's finances, since industrial land produces far higher tax revenues for the City, which is used to maintain infrastructure, police and fire services, libraries, trash collection, and more. Residential uses

draw down roughly 65-75% of General Fund revenues for city services, while only contributing roughly 25% back, so are a net economic drain on the City (which also helps explain why there are few champions for multi-family housing at City Hall).<sup>17</sup> Industrial uses, by contrast, not only generate more tax revenue per acre, but also require fewer services.

Consequently, between 1990 and 2010, the City's budget grew by only 1.2% annually – one-quarter the rate it had between 1980 and 1990.<sup>18</sup> But the City's structural fiscal problems were masked by the booming real estate sector, prior to the financial collapse in 2008. Combined with unfunded pension liabilities, even as it cuts its workforce (which in turn, negatively impacts City services), the City of Los Angeles had a budget deficit of \$222 million in 2012/13, a figure that is expected to rise to \$427 million by 2014/15.<sup>19</sup> As a result of weak job growth, high cost of living, and declining public services, many are simply leaving Los Angeles. Between 2001 and 2009, L.A.'s out-migration rate was 11.7%, the highest of

any major city in the U.S.<sup>20</sup> Slow-growth policies that discouraged economic growth cannot be held responsible for the full breadth of the city's economic and fiscal problems, but it's clear that the withdrawal of job-producing land has significantly handicapped L.A.'s economic fortunes.

#### NEGATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

Perhaps the most devastating impact that the slow-growth movement has had in L.A. is its environmental impact. This is ironic, since the primary reason homeowners gave for rolling back zoning and curbing population growth was to protect its natural resources. But by restricting land to less intensive uses in many areas of Los Angeles, the slow growth movement did not stop growth, but rather pushed it further outward – leapfrogging to Thousands Oaks to the West, Santa Clarita to the North, and the Inland Empire to the East.

Critics will point to Los Angeles's overall density of 27.3

people per hectare – which is higher than even the greater New York region’s 20.5 people per hectare – to argue that L.A. is actually very dense.<sup>21</sup> In a technical sense, this is true, but only if you take a wide enough swath of New York’s region. The reality is that New York’s density is far higher at its core, but becomes less dense more quickly than Los Angeles. A more meaningful measure of comparison is how much of the region is built at densities that could reasonably support mass transit. On this score, L.A. compares poorly to New York. And that’s because transit depends on the density immediately around its stations, not the aggregate density across the entire metropolitan region. And even this doesn’t quite capture the feasibility of transit because it also depends on a well-connected pedestrian network to connect people from neighborhoods to the transit stations, a characteristic that many neighborhoods in L.A. do not have.

Since only a select number of neighborhoods are both dense enough and pedestrian-friendly enough to support

transit – and where homeowners did not block it – it still serves a relatively low percentage of the population, despite the significant expansion of light rail transit in the last decades. This, in turn, has expanded L.A.’s famous over-reliance on cars. But it is the lack of affordable housing, in part due to the reductions in density in areas close to jobs – that is perhaps the greatest contributor to L.A.’s environmental problems. Many of the biggest job centers in the Los Angeles region are not yet on the Metro subway or light rail system – for example, Santa Monica, Westwood, Century City, LAX, and Beverly Hills. Moreover, these centers are also located in areas with very high land values, making it impossible for the vast majority of workers to live near where they work. This has been exacerbated by the decrease in residential densities on the Westside as a result of the community planning process. Consequently, workers are traveling from great distances across the region – often as far away as Riverside (a 2 hour commute each way) – to reach their jobs. In turn, this adds to the traffic congestion problem

and, by association, the air pollution problem.

Homeowners' preference of low-density zoning also means the L.A. region is among the most energy and water intensive regions in the country. Partly, this is due to its warm climate and the high demand for air conditioning, but it is clear that single-family homes use relatively more water and energy than more compact housing forms. As a result, according to the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE), Los Angeles ranked 28<sup>th</sup> out of 34 major U.S. cities in its energy efficiency.<sup>22</sup>

#### COMMUNITY PLANNING and SUSTAINABILITY

Taken collectively, the above problems paint a picture of a planning process that, while greatly empowering some stakeholders (i.e. homeowners), falls well short in many other respects. In sum, the community planning process in L.A. has not created a sustainable city in any sense of the word

in regards to environmental quality, social equity, or economic self-sufficiency. Partly, the problem is the planning process itself and partly, it is the specific slow-growth policies that have resulted from it, i.e. restrictive land use policies purposefully intended to curb growth. As the above discussion illustrates, the slow growth movement that resulted from the homeowner revolution has worsened, rather than improved the region's environmental health, while also curtailing economic growth and significantly hindering social mobility.

The greatest failure of L.A.'s community planning has been its failure to recognize the inter-connectedness of the region – social, economically, and environmentally. Peter Calthorpe and William Fulton articulated this position most clearly in *The Regional City* (2001), illustrating how jurisdictional fragmentation is a barrier to creating economically competitive, environmentally healthy, and socially just regions.<sup>23</sup> While Calthorpe and Fulton were talking about *inter-municipal* fragmentation – a problem that the L.A. region also suffers from,



given the many different cities that comprise what we generally call “L.A.” – I would argue that *intra*-municipal fragmentation creates the same problem. That L.A. is planned like 35 mini-cities at the community level, without any substantive citywide framework, results in the same fragmentation and lack of coordination seen between different cities.

Clearly, economic activity doesn’t obey the arbitrary lines of community plan areas, but this is how constituents within each area often thought about it. If jobs were not seen as a priority in a given area, then industrial or commercial land was not allocated. In fact, job centers were often located as the result of random events. In the case of Warner Center, it was because a movie mogul had a farm that remained undeveloped or in the case of Century City, because a movie (*Cleopatra*, 1961) went so far over budget, that 20<sup>th</sup> Century Fox was forced to sell part of its back lot to recover its losses. The result is that job centers are often located far from transit hubs, rather than where transportation and housing density

can best accommodate them.<sup>24</sup> In an age when city-regions, rather than nations, are the economic building blocks of the global economy – what Neil Brenner refers to as “the re-scaling of state space”<sup>25</sup> – this approach to planning puts L.A. at an economic disadvantage relative to other world regions.

Just as economic activity does not acknowledge arbitrary planning boundaries, natural systems (watersheds, agricultural landscapes, ecosystems) are also regional – regions are in fact interconnected habitats. Actions in different jurisdictions impact air and water pollution across the region; this requires respecting the natural geographies of watersheds and biospheres. In other regions, such as Portland, concerns about the loss of local farmland (local food) have prompted regional cooperation to preserve open space. Yet, such regional thinking is rare in Los Angeles. While people often like to think they are isolated from the social problems of less fortunate neighborhoods, we all have a stake in the success of the entire city-region – that it is, in fact, a shared social space. Cultural

amenities tend not to be distributed equally across a region, which necessitates some communities to rely on others. While poverty was once viewed as an “inner-city” problem, we are increasingly recognizing that there are poor suburbs too – as the East Valley in L.A. attests. On the flip side, some of the most affluent areas of L.A. are now in the central city (central Hollywood, South Park, Koreatown), as people have returned to live in vibrant, 24-hour neighborhoods.

The restrictive land use policies of the slow-growth movement have encouraged low-density peripheral expansion and leap-frog development at the expense of higher-density urban fill in Los Angeles. We’ve explored some of the economic and environmental implications of this above. But there is also a very clear link between the physical characteristics of suburbia and negative health outcomes, highlighting how important land use policies are for public health. While the impact of the slow-growth movement on health outcomes is beyond the scope of this study, it’s important to acknowledge the relationship

between less intensive land uses and negative health outcomes. For example, the lack of physical activity associated with low-density development has spawned an epidemic of diabetes, obesity and so-called “clogged artery diseases (stroke, heart disease, etc).<sup>26</sup> Sedentary lifestyles threaten health both directly and indirectly; non-sedentary lifestyles decrease the risk of cardiovascular disease while also protecting against certain cancers, depression, osteoporosis and others. Lack of activity causes weight gain, which increases the risk of high blood pressure, high cholesterol, type 2 diabetes, and heart attacks.

There is clear evidence of a link between physical activity and the built environment. Researchers identify land use patterns, design characteristics, and transportation systems as the three dimensions of the built environment that impact physical activity the most.<sup>27</sup> It’s important to note that there are other important factors, many of which are confounding – i.e. social isolation may lead to sedentary activities like watching

TV or playing video games or cultural factors may influence perceptions of what constitutes a long walk. But among the design characteristics with positive correlations with health outcomes are:<sup>28</sup>

- (1) overall neighborhood design (walkability, location)
- (2) density (higher is better)
- (3) mix of land uses (more is better)
- (4) good walking infrastructure (sidewalks, footpaths)
- (5) enjoyable scenery (trees, rivers, views, parks)
- (6) people (other people being active)
- (7) safety (a prerequisite for using public space)

These characteristics are, in turn, strongly correlated with neighborhoods that have a mix of uses and a variety of transportation choices. In other words, these are precisely the characteristics of place that have largely been blocked by L.A.'s community planning process over the past 40 years.

### C. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LOS ANGELES

The Rodney King uprising in 1992 reflected a City pushed to its limits. It also arguably marked the beginning of the decline of the slow growth movement that effectively entrenched the preferences of single-family homeowners, but had worsened conditions for the majority. The early 1990s saw the emergence of a counter-cultural movement away from the suburbanizing policies of the previous 30 years towards mass transit, density, and urban life. This new direction was captured with the 1996 adoption of the General Plan Framework, which replaced the 1974 Centers Concept, although largely affirming its key principle of directing growth to higher-density, mixed-use centers. Planners estimated that the Framework would direct 75% of future growth to just 5% of its land area.<sup>29</sup>

This was an anathema to homeowners, because it encouraged more intensive development in particular places. As the Hillside Federation's Barbara Fine said, "Why are we all

so upset about this? We see this as an attack on the single-family residence.”<sup>30</sup> So the Hillside Federation sued.<sup>31</sup> The Federation argued that because the City did not have enough money to implement the proposed traffic mitigation measures, it could not be enforced and therefore required restricting development. While the Federation scored some technical points in the 10-year court battle (which included a second suit), the Framework ultimately cleared the legal hurdles in 2005. Although affirming the direction towards transit-oriented, mixed-used, higher-density development in certain places, the Framework was largely toothless, because the community plan process still determined the City’s land use policies.

#### HOLLYWOOD COMMUNITY PLAN

A step towards a more sustainable Los Angeles was taken with the June 2012 adoption of the Hollywood Community Plan (HCP). Remarkably, the HCP is the only new community

plan adopted in L.A. in the past decade (since 2004). Fully 26 of 35 community plan areas have not been updated since the 1990s, so most are now over 15 years old. A lightning rod of controversy, the HCP takes the highly unusual step (for L.A.) of up-zoning land around transit stations and encouraging mixed-use. As a testament of homeowner resolve, since its adoption a year ago, no less than three lawsuits have been filed to challenge it.

Opponents call increases in density proximate to transit “a short-term gift to real estate developers and a long-term formula for planned failure and neighborhood blight.”<sup>32</sup> They say the Hollywood Plan is symptomatic of a formerly dynamic Los Angeles that is now firmly in decay and decline. The reaction by homeowner groups to the HCP is consistent with the actions of the past 30 years of slow-growth fervor. Opponents to change in Los Angeles equate smart growth and transit-oriented development to “de-regulation”, linking it explicitly to the neo-liberalist policies of Reagan. This is interesting because

it characterizes defenders of the low-density status quo as progressives seeking to protect the City from profit-seeking developers. According to their logic, those seeking to allow more compact, higher-density development in L.A. are in the pockets of business interests and only low-density zoning can save L.A. This echoes the views of the conservation movement that emerged in the 1970s, which held that zoning could be used to control population growth. But as we've seen, more restrictive zoning didn't constrain population growth – despite allowing for an increase of only 390,000 people from the 1970 to 2000, the actual population of L.A. increased by 880,000. Reducing densities in the face of continued population growth is more wishful thinking than rational planning. Reducing densities did not stop people from moving to L.A. or having babies, it merely reduced the quality of life for these new Angelenos, who have struggled to find adequate affordable housing.

To these opponents, all proposed reforms are part of a conspiracy to line the pockets of developers. Efforts to

transition from use- to form-based zoning codes, they argue, is really a means to eliminate the need for variances to allow formerly restricted uses, which they say would lead to a horror of incompatibilities. They argue that efforts to streamline the zoning code – which has not been updated since 1946 – are simply meant to reduce zoning requirements.<sup>33</sup> They claim that the initiative to streamline the approvals process from consulting 14 departments to only two (City Planning and Building and Safety) would endanger public welfare. And then there's this:

“And, let's not forget the contribution that the Updates of Los Angeles's 35 community plans make to deregulation. Their slow but steady preparation and adoption is always accompanied by implementation ordinances amending the General Plan's land use designations and their closely related zoning categories. Since most of these General Plan and zoning code amendments will increase permitted, by-right densities, future investors will be able to obtain up-front administrative and legislative relief from the zoning code.”<sup>34</sup>

To slow-growth advocates, land use changes to community plan updates are progressive giveaways to developers. Of course, as we've seen, nothing could be further from reality, as slow-growth homeowners have used the community plan process remarkably effectively to re-direct growth away from their back yards.

#### CORNFIELD ARROYO SECO SPECIFIC PLAN

Despite very different social, economical and environmental forces shaping the City today – and even during the period between Watts and Rodney King that represented the height of the slow-growth movement – the City is still working off its 1946 zoning code (albeit now with thousands of pages of amendments over the last 67 years). But a new model will be tested in the near future with the June 2013 adoption of the Cornfield Arroyo Seco Specific Plan (CASP). The 650-acre CASP introduces several innovations intended to create a

more vibrant, sustainable community than has been proposed in the past. Among its innovations are four new permissive zones based on typologies of place, rather than prescriptive rules: greenway, urban village, urban innovation, and urban center. These new zones allow, by right, a mix of residential, commercial, and light industrial uses.

Importantly, for the first time in the City of Los Angeles's history, the Cornfields Plan has neither maximum nor minimum parking requirements, instead letting the market decide how much parking should be provided – a major victory in a city that has long been derided for its excessively high parking requirements.<sup>35</sup> The density of residential projects is also exempt from the minimum lot area per unit requirements of the L.A. Municipal Code, which will allow the development of more, but smaller units (the scale and massing is governed by floor-area-ratios or FAR). Individual projects proposed within the area are also covered by CASP's overall Environmental Impact Report, which will speed approvals without jeopardizing

environmental quality. CASP also provides density bonuses for affordable housing and allows unused FAR to be transferred to other sites within the district. These innovations were only possible because the area has no homeowner presence, being comprised mostly of low-rise industrial buildings. While homeowners will no doubt recoil in horror at these innovations, they mark an important step towards a more sustainable planning model.

#### POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The steps towards greater social, environmental, and economic sustainability made by the recent Hollywood and Cornfields Plans should be expanded. Below I outline several recommended policy changes that would address the limitations of the current community planning process. They are made in the spirit of L.A.'s General Plan Framework – to preserve single-family neighborhoods but also to begin the necessary process

of putting L.A. on a more sustainable footing. By definition, this requires change, so it is understandable that homeowner groups will no doubt find such proposals objectionable. The goal here, however, is to balance both local and regional concerns and to realize not only environmental but also social and economic goals.

#### CITIZENS ADVISORY COMMITTEES

It is clear that the process that allows City Councilors to hand pick citizens for the CACs has entrenched homeowner interests in the creation of the community plans. Homeowners should be well represented on the CACs, but so too should business groups, social justice groups, environmental groups, women, seniors, youth, and so on. In other words, CACs must be representative of the interests of the entire city, not simply one particularly well-connected subset of the population. Since Councilors have final authority over the adoption of community

## FEDERATED CITYWIDE FRAMEWORK

plans, they should not also select the CAC members. A more fair and representative process would be to institute a lottery. Under such a system, residents would submit their names into the pool of prospective candidates (and planners should ensure that the pool of candidates is broadly representative), and members would be randomly chosen from among those interested. This would result in a more representative planning committee that would allow City Councilors more independence in making decisions. A more radical proposal would be to require a super-majority threshold on Council to overturn the recommendations of the City Planning Commissions. This would give planning staff and Planning Commissioners more independence, and restore some of the professionalism that has been lost in the politicking that occurs when Council makes planning changes (while still allowing Council to overrule the Commissions when dramatic disagreement occurs).

While the 1996 General Plan Framework is laudable in its goals to direct growth to where it is best accommodated, it will do little to change the primacy of the community plans without the ability to implement citywide objectives. The current community planning process allows local concerns to trump regional needs. What is needed is a better balance between local and regional planning. Rather than the General Plan Framework operating as merely a statement of objectives, it must have genuine consequence. One way of achieving this local-regional balance would be a federated planning model that allows local communities (and their CACs) to plan the majority of the community area, but allow city planners to determine built form characteristics for corridors of regional importance.

For example, one application of such a local-regional federated system would be to subject the city's major arterials that are served by rapid buses (e.g. Santa Monica, Beverly,



Wilshire, Olympic, Pico running east-west and Vermont, Western, Crenshaw, Fairfax, La Cienega running north-south) to a city-wide overlay, allowing planners greater flexibility in planning for higher densities along these corridors. This would have the effect of directing growth into the major mixed-use, high-density arterials in order to achieve a better regional housing-jobs balance, increase affordable housing, and improve the coordination between land use and transportation planning. CACs at the local community plan level would still be responsible for planning 95% of their districts, but City Planning department staff would make recommendations for land use designations along the major corridors. Such a two-tier system of planning existed, for example, in Toronto between 1954 and 1972, which allowed local communities to retain primary responsibility for planning, while still allowing regional planning for particular areas.

#### HOUSING ELEMENT FAIR SHARE PROVISION

Another recommendation is to significantly reform the Housing Element's Fair Share provision. Currently, the regional association of government for each area (for L.A., that is the Southern California Association of Governments or SCAG) allocates to each city and county the amount of very low, low, moderate, and above moderate housing units for which it must plan.<sup>36</sup> While a good idea in theory, in practice it has not been very effective. For large cities like Los Angeles that are planned at the community level, there is no mandate to match the fair share provision to the scale of the planning. Certainly, stricter enforcement of the fair share provision is necessary. But I suggest that the fair share provision should also be applied at the level of each community plan. This would ensure that multi-family housing (including affordable housing) would be built across the city, rather than concentrated into the City's poorest areas.

## TYPOLOGICAL ZONING

Efforts to reform L.A.'s antiquated zoning code should continue. Zoning based on urban typologies (similar to form-based code) should replace the current inflexible and prescriptive zoning which requires a complex variance process to accomplish many common-sense adjustments. Typological zones, such as those adopted as part of the Cornfields Arroya Seco Specific Plan, focus on what matters – the built form and urban design characteristics, and allow for a mix of uses by right. This shift to typological zoning would also allow for a far simpler and understandable zoning regime, eliminating the many confusing Q, D, and T conditions that amount to little more than spot zoning. It would also eliminate the absurd duplication and contradictions that occur as a result of a plethora of overlays, often subjecting a single area or property to multiple sets of requirements – Historic Preservation Overlay Zones, Community Design Overlay Districts, Pedestrian Overlay

Districts, Station Area Neighborhood Plans, Community Plan Implementation Overlays, and Residential Floor Area Overlays. These overlays are required only because L.A.'s municipal code is so cumbersome and outdated that it is easier to add an overlay than to revise the thousands of amendments to the Zoning Code.

## CEQA REFORM

Signed into law by Governor Reagan in 1970, CEQA was enacted with the hope that it would disclose and help mitigate the impacts of development on the environment. But its broad interpretation has yielded perverse results. Part of the problem is that CEQA is enabling legislation, but does not define what constitutes a “significant” impact, which is left up to individual jurisdictions. While purportedly meant to protect natural ecology, since it is driven by citizen enforcement, it has become primarily a tool to block development. And since the relative controversy

of a given project is determined by how a proposed project is viewed by citizens (most often homeowners), a proposed project is often viewed in relation to what currently exists. Since homeowners prefer single-family homes above all other types of housing, this means that a large-scale greenfield development of individual homes is often viewed as non-controversial since this matches the typical pattern of development of the past. By contrast, a higher-density, mixed-use urban infill project – to the extent that it represents a relatively newer prototype for L.A. – is seen as more problematic. Such projects are universally derided for being too tall (typically anything over three stories is seen as too tall in L.A.), having too many units, not enough parking, generating too much traffic, bringing in the wrong kind of people, and otherwise contributing to the “paving of paradise”.

Yet, as we now know, low-density tract housing on the City’s periphery has a far greater environmental impact than compact urban infill that recycles previously developed

land and utilizes already existing infrastructure. So CEQA, California’s landmark environmental law, is now widely seen as obstructing the very kind of development that would put it on a more sustainable footing. That is, environmentally “bad” projects often go unchallenged while environmentally “good” projects are routinely obstructed, simply because they depart from the low-density norm. This has resulted in some bizarre cases. For example, when San Francisco adopted a Bike Plan in 2005, a group of homeowners and car owners sued to block the Plan, arguing that the plan to add bike lanes to some city streets should be subject to a full environmental impact report. A judge agreed, which sent the plan through five years of review and litigation. So even a plan to promote bike usage – with demonstrable environmental benefits – was ensnared by CEQA’s jaws.

Moreover, mitigation measures often required by CEQA have adverse environmental effects. For example, a project may be found to have an impact on traffic speed (i.e. Level

of Service). This often results in mitigation measures that have adverse environmental effects, such as road widening or reductions in a project's density. Likewise, alternative transportation options, as in the case of San Francisco's Bike Plan, but also dedicated bus lanes and pedestrian infrastructure improvements, can also be subjected to CEQA requirements. Likewise, opponents often claim insufficient parking to derail projects, even though a surplus of free parking can harm the environment by encouraging driving. Even a project's aesthetics can be grounds for a CEQA challenge. And CEQA abuses are common: unions often use the threat of litigation to force developers to cave to labor demands. And rival developers use it to ward off competition. Most commonly, however, it is used by NIMBYs (not-in-my-back-yard) to prevent projects that are not environmentally damaging, but simply unwanted in their communities – such as affordable housing.

Due to the unintended consequences of CEQA, there is a broad movement within the state to reform it, led by the L.A.

Area Chamber of Commerce. But every major environmental organization in the state – the Sierra Club, the California League of Conservation Voters, the Natural Resource Defense Council, opposes CEQA reform. Labor groups are equally opposed. These are important bases of support for the California Democratic Party, so despite the widespread abuse of CEQA – and negative consequences on urban infill and affordable housing – progressives are fighting for the status quo. This is unfortunate. Intelligent CEQA reform would certainly not hinder its ability to block harmful projects. But it would prevent smart growth projects from being blocked due to aesthetics or lack of parking (even as they paradoxically complain that the project – which they think has too little parking – would generate too much traffic). It would also help alleviate the housing shortage in L.A. and have a net positive environmental impact.

Collectively, these five basic reforms at both the state and local level – reforming how citizens advisory committees are formed, creating a two-tier federated local-regional

planning model, revising the Housing Element's fair share housing provision, moving away from stilted use zoning towards typological zoning, and reforming CEQA to prevent the obstruction of environmentally positive smart growth projects – would begin to address the most egregious problems that have plagued L.A.'s community planning process for the last 40 years. Certainly, there are many more specific reforms to land use policy that could be adopted – eliminate parking requirements altogether, increase densities by right in areas proximate to transit, and so on. But the above five reforms target the systemic problems that have plagued L.A.'s planning for far too long.

#### **D. IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING THEORY**

The case of the Los Angeles homeowner revolution and the negative implications it had on the social, economic and environmental health of the City is, in many ways, a troubling

case for planners to comprehend. The shift from top-down to bottom-up planning in L.A. from the 1970s onward is precisely the kind of community empowerment that planning theorists advocated beginning in the 1960s. But it's difficult to ignore the reality that by empowering rich, white homeowners with narrow interests at the expense of the interests of the less politically powerful and the poor, the outcomes challenge planning's commitment to social justice. So this study has important implications for planning theory and practice beyond the Los Angeles case.

#### **DARK SIDE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL / COMMUNICATIVE ACTION**

On a basic level, the case provides empirical evidence in support of criticism of communicative action. To the current generation of urban planners, communicative action is something of a Magna Carta, a guiding principle introduced on day one and which permeates the profession's very soul. By

the 1990s, communication action theory was seen as a new paradigm.<sup>37</sup> John Forester's *Planning in the Face of Power* (1989), which explains planners' roles in light of communicative theory, remains standard reading in introductory planning courses.

But communicative action is grounded in a bourgeois conception of the public sphere that purports that one's status is unimportant, that it can deal with any subject of common concern, and that only the best argument shall prevail.<sup>38</sup> The claim that the public sphere was (and is) accessible to all, of course, has not been realized – women, racial minorities, the non-propertied classes have all been excluded from equal participation. As Habermas critic Nancy Fraser argues, cultural values that give rise to these exclusions are amplified, not mitigated, by participation in the political economy of the bourgeois public sphere – that is, political economy enforces structurally what culture accomplishes informally.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, communicative action is predicated on the theory that different

actors are trying to reach understanding rather than being oriented towards their own success (i.e. convincing others that their view is correct), a view decidedly at odds with the evidence of homeowner actions in Los Angeles.

Communicative action may well be a theory taught to planners to manage the inherent conflicts that arise between different interests. But as the evidence from Los Angeles suggests, homeowners were not so modest in their aims. That we found in Chapter 5 a strong correlation between areas that were asked to absorb L.A.'s future growth and the percentage of non-citizens is telling. A more comprehensive analysis would be necessary to confirm this, but the cases studied in this project suggest that poor, native Spanish-speaking immigrants had virtually no voice in the planning process. And how could they? Until recently, hearings were conducted only in English, and usually at City Hall (sometimes satellite offices such as Van Nuys), and typically during the day. This privileged those with the time, if not flexibility in their work schedules, to attend. This

precluded low-income workers who often were holding down more than one job just to put food on the table.

### THE PLANNER'S ROLE

Grassroots participatory planning today is the predominant *paradigm* of planning theory and practice – paradigm here taken in the Kuhnian sense to mean “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given community.”<sup>40</sup> The “normal science” of planning research accepts this paradigm as a given without critically evaluating the assumptions upon which it is based. Among the contributions of this dissertation is to present a counter-factual case, based on evidence from Los Angeles, that illustrates the dangers of uncritically accepting the downloading of planning responsibility as a universal good. This dissertation does not attempt to conceal the paradox that grassroots planning has produced – that increasing democratic

participation may actually lead to less, not more, social justice. For example, we must recognize that the same theories and practices that work to empower a low-income neighborhood resisting a “planning bad”, such as an incinerator, are the very same processes that also empower those with the time, money and resources to resist a “planning good”, such as affordable housing.

Rather than dismiss these latter instances where neighborhood associations mobilize against a more just distribution of benefits and burdens in society as mere “anomalies”, this dissertation considers the possibility that the reverse may hold far more frequently – that “normal” is a planning regime that empowers the already empowered, and the rare victory of the poor is the exception rather than the rule. As Kuhn warns, unsettling the paradigm in this way will no doubt encounter resistance, for it questions the values we hold dear as planners. But if we care about advancing social justice, and if we are to deepen our knowledge of the forces that shape

our cities – if planning research is more than the ossification of long-held theories and practices – then we must be willing to see with clear eyes that things are not as they seem or as we may hope. This project attempts to do this not subjectively, but drawing upon historical evidence in Los Angeles.

This questioning of the epistemological basis of contemporary planning touches on a recent debate about whether planning is a “trivial” or “ineffective” profession.<sup>41</sup> This is, of course, a wide and open-ended debate, but those of us who care about the urban planning field must suspend disbelief long enough to consider it a possibility. It is hard to argue with Tom Campanella when he claims that urban planning’s embrace of Jane Jacobs did three things: (1) reduced the disciplinary identity of planning, (2) privileged the grassroots over planning expertise, thus losing professional agency, and (3) created a paucity of planners with courage and vision.<sup>42</sup> Harder is the recognition that opening up planning to the grassroots – that is, the democratizing of planning – may have aided this

process. This project has attempted to shed light on this debate – to demonstrate in concrete detail the paradox between increasing democratic planning and ensuring the outcomes from such a process actually led to greater social, economic, and environmental sustainability. As the case of Los Angeles illustrates, a purely bottom-up community planning process that empowers one set of actors over others may be neither democratic nor achieve positive outcomes for the region.

I would argue that in rightfully moving away from the top-down planning of the post-war era, the planning profession swung the pendulum from one extreme to the other, and in doing so has abdicated its professional responsibility. That planning pendulum continues to search for its equilibrium between its professional goal of shaping urban space and its social role of working towards greater social justice. Urban renewal, highway building and public housing were predicated on a naïve understanding of the forces that were effecting change in mid-century American cities. Without a sophisticated



understanding of the complexity of factors at play, the “solution” was an equally naïve spatial determinism that would be funny if it wasn’t so tragic. But the reaction was a nearly complete abandonment of spatial thinking and professional expertise, in favor of processes that, while holding the laudable goal of empowering local communities, ultimately removed planners from having any ability to affect change. Planning was effectively reduced to policy-making and enforcement. Today, 86% of the hours logged by L.A. City Planning staff are spent on case processing (61%) and administration (25%) – with just 10% spent on community planning and a mere 4% on citywide planning.<sup>43</sup> This ratio must be reversed and with it, a focus on outcomes, rather than merely processes.

So what is the recourse, both as a profession generally, and specifically in Los Angeles? First, planners must re-capture their professional agency. This certainly does *not* mean abandoning the democratization of planning. But it does mean that it must do a better job of ensuring that who participates in

grassroots planning is broadly representative of the community. Any process where a minority of a minority (not just homeowners, but those activist homeowners who pay to be members of neighborhood associations) can determine policies for the silent majority is simply not democratic. This suggests that planners must be careful not to fall into the “local trap” – the belief that localization is synonymous with democratization. It is not. In many cases, localization is less democratic and allows parochial interests to gain control over institutional processes. Re-asserting professional agency means to not only provide technical data in the community planning process but also asserting their values, rather than be merely neutral facilitators of communicative action. Planners must be prepared to explain why walkability, transit-accessibility, compactness, mixed uses, and other characteristics of place are desirable attributes and back up these claims. For far too long, planners have been emasculated to believe that “whatever the people want” is the best solution. As the L.A. case has shown, this is not always

the case. This is not to say planners should impose their ideas on communities, but must take a more assertive role to keep the focus on positive social, economic, and environmental outcomes.

This first step is related to a second – refining the disciplinary identity of planning. While planning in the post-war era had a clear – if misguided – identity, today planning does not know what it is. Depending on the institution, planning could either be closely aligned with architecture and design, or completely removed from it, instead embedded with the aspatial policy-making world of public policy schools. In some cases, planning looks very much like social activism and community organizing. In other cases, it is little more than a technocratic review of rules and procedures. While statistics and microeconomics are required courses of professional planners, spatial thinking and place-making are most often optional. This demonstrates a profession still bound by its positivist roots, but not having come full circle to its central role of literally shaping

urban space. A planning identity grounded in place-making, and more assured of its professional expertise in this world, would greatly enrich the grassroots community planning process.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, planning must cultivate a new generation of planners with courage and vision. This means discarding the façade that planners are merely neutral actors of a benevolent state. This is disingenuous. Planners have – or should have – a much stronger sense of purpose than to simply process paper. The gulf between expectations and real-world reality has been a shock for many would-be planners, as the high hopes of making the world a better place meet the mundane reality of boilerplate case processing. Planners must accept that their work is, and always will be, political. Urban politics is the politics of land use. Rather than teach planners to conceal their politics in a guise of objectivity, planners should be encouraged to deploy their social activism in their work.

These qualities of planning – professional agency, a

strong sense of identity, vision, and courage – were absent as the homeowner revolution seized control of L.A.’s planning apparatus during the height of the slow-growth movement between Watts (1965) and Rodney King (1992). The consequences for social justice, environmental quality, and economic health in Los Angeles have been devastating. The evidence from L.A. supports Tom Campanella’s claim that planning has been largely unsuccessful over the last half century at its own game: bringing about more just, sustainable, healthful, efficient and beautiful city and region.<sup>44</sup> Even Jane Jacobs, late in her life, lamented the paucity of courage among the planning profession. In a 1993 speech published in the *Ontario Planning Journal*, after listing a wide range of innovative planning initiatives in Toronto, went on to say that “Not one of these forward looking and important policies and ideas – not ONE – was the intellectual product of an official planning department, whether in Toronto, Metro, or the province... our official planning departments seem to be brain-dead in the sense that we cannot depend on them in

any way, shape, or form for providing intellectual leadership in addressing urgent problems involving the physical future of the city.”<sup>45</sup> Here we have the mother of the grassroots collaborative planning paradigm of the last 40 years mourning the feckless state of the profession. It was, and is, a call for a new planning paradigm to emerge.

**Notes**

<sup>1</sup> California Government Code §65583. See also §65302(c) and §65580. <http://law.onecle.com/california/government/65583.html>

<sup>2</sup> Public Policy Institute of California, “Is it Time to Review California’s Housing Element Law?” *Research Brief*, issue 68 (February 2003).

<sup>3</sup> Los Angeles City Planning Department, Demographic Research Unit, Summary of Population, 1970 and 2000. Subsequent references in this section to community plan area demographics come from the the 1990s era community plans (it should be noted that only about half of the 1990s era community plans contained this 30-year breakdown of racial change).

<sup>4</sup> William Welsh, Erin Coghlan, Bruce Fuller and Luke Dauter, “New Schools, Overcrowding Relief, and Achievement Gains in Los Angeles,” *Policy Brief 8*, Policy Analysis for California Education (August 2012).

<sup>5</sup> Los Angeles Unified School District, K-12 Student Enrollment, 1998/99, 2007/08.

<sup>6</sup> Beth Steckler and Adam Garcia, *Affordability Matters: A Look at Housing Construction and Affordability in Los Angeles* (Los Angeles: Livable Places, 2008), 10. Subsequent overcrowding data in this

section also comes from this source.

<sup>7</sup> Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, “Urban Parks,” in UCLA Institute of the Environment, *Southern California Environmental Report Card* (2006), 14.

<sup>8</sup> Steckler and Garcia, 20-21.

<sup>9</sup> Daniel Flaming, Patrick Burns, Michael Matsunaga, Yasmin Tong, and Ken Baar, *Affordable Housing Benefit Fee Study: The Nexus Between New Market-Rate Development and the Subsequent Increase in Demand for Affordable Housing in the City of Los Angeles* (Los Angeles: Economic Roundtable, 2011), 9.

<sup>10</sup> Flaming et al, 10.

<sup>11</sup> Brenda Gazaar, “Poverty Strikes more in Southland each year despite recovering economy,” Los Angeles Daily News, September 18, 2013.

<sup>12</sup> Joel Kotkin, “The Decline Of Los Angeles,” *Forbes*, February 24, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> Joel Kotkin, “Lost Angeles,” *City Journal* vol 21, no 3 (Summer 2011).

<sup>14</sup> Kotkin, “The Decline of Los Angeles,” op-cit.

<sup>15</sup> Los Angeles City Planning Department and Community

Redevelopment Agency, *Los Angeles' Industrial Land: Sustaining a Dynamic City Economy* (Los Angeles: DCP and CRA, 2007), 4.

<sup>16</sup> Joel Kotkin, "Southern California Economy Not Keeping Up," *New Geography*, May 27, 2013.

<sup>17</sup> Keyser Marston Associates, *Industrial to Residential Land Use Conversions: Fiscal and Economic Considerations* (May 2007), 2.

<sup>18</sup> David Zahnizer, Jessica Garrison, and Ralph Vartabedian, "L.A.'s next mayor will face stark budget problems," *Los Angeles Times*, February 24, 2013.

<sup>19</sup> Kate Linthicum, "L.A. budget chief warns of bankruptcy without tax hikes, layoffs," *Los Angeles Times*, April 7, 2012.

<sup>20</sup> Kotkn, "The Decline of Los Angeles," op-cit.

<sup>21</sup> Paul Mees, *Transport for Suburbia: Beyond the Automobile Age* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 60.

<sup>22</sup> American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, 2013 City Energy Efficiency Scorecard (September 2013). <http://aceee.org/files/pdf/summary/e13g-summary.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> Peter Calthorpe and William Fulton, "Living in the Regional World, in *The Regional City: Planning for the End of Sprawl* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2001), 15-30.

<sup>24</sup> Although to be fair, the Metro Purple line subway will eventually have a stop at Century City and the Orange line busway line now has a limited spur to Warner Center.

<sup>25</sup> Neil Brenner, "Urban Governance and the Production of New State Spaces in Western Europe, 1960-2000," *Review of International Political Economy* vol 11, no 3 (August 2004): 447-488.

<sup>26</sup> Howard Frumkin, Lawrence Frank, and Richard Joseph Jackson, "Physical Activity, Sprawl, and Health," in *Urban Sprawl and Public Health: Designing, Planning, and Building for Healthy Communities* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2004), 90-108 at 91.

<sup>27</sup> Lawrence Frank, Peter Engelke, and Thomas Schmid, *Health and Community Design: The Impact of the Built Environment on Physical Activity* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003).

<sup>28</sup> Frumkin et al, 100-105.

<sup>29</sup> Aaron Curtiss, "Panel Adopts Blueprint for 21<sup>st</sup> Century," *Los Angeles Times*, July 28, 1995.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> *Federation of Hillside & Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles*, 83 Cal.App. 4th 1252.

<sup>32</sup> Dick Platkin, "Good Density or Bad Density, That is the Question,"

CityWatchLA, November 20, 2012.

<sup>33</sup> Since 1946, the L.A. Zoning Code has grown from 84 small-format pages to over 600 standard-format pages., with often vague, contradicting and complicated regulations, interpreted through thousands of Planning Department memos, that collectively doesn't promote good urban design. Over 60% of the City is covered by special overlays and site-specific conditions (Q, T, or D conditions) and the majority of properties have two or more different sets of regulations. As a result over 86% of staff resources are dedicated to case processing (61%) or administration (25%), and just 10% to community planning and a mere 4% to citywide planning. Los Angeles Department of City Planning, *Plan re:code: Comprehensive Zoning Code Revision*, Listening Sessions Presentation, July 2013.

<sup>34</sup> Dick Platkin, "The Antonio to Eric Handoff: LA's Quality of Life Disaster — Deregulating Planning, Zoning and Building Code Enforcement," *Plan-It Los Angeles*, June 3, 2011.

<sup>35</sup> See, for example, Donald C. Shoup, *The High Cost of Free Parking* (Washington, DC: Planners Press, 2005).

<sup>36</sup> For an overview of the six phases that California's Fair Share law had undergone, see William C. Baer, "California's Fair-Share Housing

1967-2004: The Planning Approach," *Journal of Urban History* vol 7, no 1 (February 2008): 48-71.

<sup>37</sup> Judith E. Innes, "Planning Theory's Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Action and Interactive Practice," *Journal of Planning Education and Research* vol 14 (1995): 183-189.

<sup>38</sup> Martin Plot, "Communicative Action's Democratic Deficit: A Critique of Habermas's Contribution to Democratic Theory," *International Journal of Communication* vol 3 (2009): 825-852.

<sup>39</sup> Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," *Social Text*, no 25/26 (1990): 56-80 at 64-65.

<sup>40</sup> Kuhn, 175.

<sup>41</sup> Thomas J. Campanella, "Jane Jacobs and the Death and Life of American Planning," *Places Magazine*, posted April 25, 2011. <http://places.designobserver.com/feature/jane-jacobs-and-the-death-and-life-of-american-planning/25188/>

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> L.A. DCP, *Plan re:code*, op-cit.

<sup>44</sup> Campanella, op-cit.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

## APPENDIX A COMMUNITY PLAN AREA SUMMARIES

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In this appendix are profiles of all 35 L.A. community plan areas.

Each profile contains the following:

- (1) latest (Plan 3) land use map
- (2) community plan file numbers and adoption dates
- (3) summary of changes to land use area over time
- (4) summary of changes to residential density over time
- (5) summary of area socio-economic characteristics

Information is organized by the three generations of plans for each area (with the exception of Chatsworth, which has only two plans). Land use areas shown for the 1990s era plans (i.e. Plan 3 in the table) are *gross* acres (i.e. not including street areas), while 1970s and 1980s era plans (i.e. Plan 1 and 2 in the table) are *net* acres (i.e. including street areas). In some cases the Very Low, Low and Low-Medium I and II were combined into a single value. All plan data comes from the 104 adopted community plans. Demographic data comes from 2000 Census Community Profiles created by the City Planning Department Demographic Research Unit.

### Notes to appendix tables

<sup>1</sup> change from plan 1 to 3

<sup>2</sup> net acres

<sup>3</sup> all data from 2000 Census

<sup>4</sup> persons per square mile

<sup>5</sup> average household income

<sup>6</sup> percent below poverty level

<sup>7</sup> percent existing land uses

<sup>8</sup> percent residential land uses

<sup>9</sup> percent non-citizens

<sup>10</sup> unemployment rate

<sup>11</sup> average household size

<sup>12</sup> percent who commute by car

\* = information not provided

# ARLETA - PACOIMA



Legend

- Single-Family Residential
- Multi-Family Residential
- Commercial
- Industrial
- Open Space
- Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23742	23742	94-0213 CPU
Council File #	74-4140	88-0766	95-1396
Adopted	6/25/76	3/3/89	11/5/96

### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	68.0%	4,140	*	*	46.3%	2,499	-21.7%	-31.9%
Multi-Family	3.1%	190	*	*	6.4%	344	3.3%	104.2%
Commercial	4.8%	290	*	*	3.6%	193	-1.2%	-24.9%
Industrial	9.4%	570	*	*	10.0%	542	0.7%	7.3%
Open Space	14.8%	900	*	*	33.7%	1,821	19.0%	128.2%

### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)



	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	1,700	2.1%	1,360	1.4%	4,816	3.3%	3,116	183%
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	70,600	88.4%	69,501	72.7%	53,275	36.3%	-17,325	-24.5%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>72,300</b>	<b>90.5%</b>	<b>70,861</b>	<b>74.1%</b>	<b>58,091</b>	<b>39.6%</b>	<b>-14,209</b>	<b>-19.7%</b>
Low Medium I	2,500	3.1%	4,485	4.7%	13,621	9.3%	11,121	445%
Low Medium II	2,300	2.9%	17,180	18.0%	18,370	12.5%	16,070	699%
Medium	2,800	3.5%	3,080	3.2%	50,904	34.7%	48,104	1718%
High-Medium	-	-	-	-	5,714	3.9%	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>7,600</b>	<b>9.5%</b>	<b>24,745</b>	<b>25.9%</b>	<b>88,609</b>	<b>60.4%</b>	<b>81,009</b>	<b>1066%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>79,900</b>		<b>95,606</b>		<b>146,700</b>		<b>66,800</b>	<b>83.6%</b>

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	98,073	10.53	10,005	\$47,716	19.8%	35.8%	67.5%	92.5%
rank (of 35)	14	24	18	25	18	28	4	18
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	83.4%	6.4%	5.5%	3.5%	31.9%	12.6%	4.57	56.4%
rank (of 35)	2	30	12	30	7	11	1	25



# BEL AIR - BEVERLY CREST



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23289	23289	94-0214 CPU
Council File #	75-1404, -S1	88-1081	95-1386
Adopted	1/13/77	9/9/88	11/6/96

### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	<b>78.0%</b>	7,746	<b>78.0%</b>	7,758	<b>66.6%</b>	6,593	<b>-11.4%</b>	<b>-14.7%</b>
Multi-Family	<b>0.2%</b>	18	<b>0.1%</b>	10	<b>0.6%</b>	60	<b>0.4%</b>	234%
Commercial	<b>0.2%</b>	16	<b>0.2%</b>	16	<b>0.1%</b>	8	<b>-0.1%</b>	<b>-49.9%</b>
Industrial	<b>0.0%</b>	0	<b>0.0%</b>	0	<b>0.0%</b>	0	<b>0.0%</b>	-
Open Space	<b>21.6%</b>	2,145	<b>21.7%</b>	2,156	<b>32.7%</b>	3,239	<b>11.1%</b>	51.4%


### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	<b>2,300</b>	9.3%	<b>2,285</b>	9.2%	<b>3,680</b>	411.2%	<b>1,380</b>	60%
Very Low I	<b>4,500</b>	18.2%	<b>4,643</b>	18.6%	<b>8,575</b>	958.1%	<b>4,075</b>	91%
Very Low II	<b>15,100</b>	61.1%	<b>15,227</b>	61.0%	<b>13,650</b>	1525.1%	<b>-1,450</b>	<b>-10%</b>
Low I	<b>1,800</b>	7.3%	<b>1,800</b>	7.2%	-	-	-	-
Low II	-	-	-	-	<b>2,315</b>	-	<b>515</b>	28.6%
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>23,700</b>	<b>96.0%</b>	<b>23,955</b>	<b>96.0%</b>	<b>28,220</b>	<b>93.5%</b>	<b>4,520</b>	<b>19.1%</b>
Low Medium I	<b>600</b>	2.4%	<b>600</b>	2.4%	<b>895</b>	3.0%	<b>295</b>	49%
Low Medium II	<b>400</b>	1.6%	<b>400</b>	1.6%	<b>630</b>	2.1%	<b>230</b>	58%
Medium	<b>0</b>	-	-	-	<b>435</b>	1.4%	<b>435</b>	-
High-Medium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>4.0%</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>4.0%</b>	<b>1,960</b>	<b>6.5%</b>	<b>960</b>	<b>96.0%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>24,700</b>		<b>24,955</b>		<b>30,180</b>		<b>5,480</b>	<b>22.2%</b>

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	20,254	15.41	1,405	\$235,680	5.3%	9.7%	90.2%	96.2%
rank (of 35)	35	11	35	1	34	35	1	5
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	4.1%	86.2%	1.6%	5.2%	7.7%	5.4%	2.41	73.4%
rank (of 35)	35	2	33	26	34	34	25	8

# BOYLE HEIGHTS



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23186	23186	94-0210 CPU
Council File #	79-2700	87-0879, 89-0149	95-1302
Adopted	8/14/79	3/2/88	11/10/98

### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	1.6%	60	0.8%	34	0.9%	27	-0.7%	-42.7%
Multi-Family	41.3%	1,581	41.7%	1,696	41.3%	1,241	0.0%	0%
Commercial	8.9%	342	9.5%	386	8.0%	240	-1.0%	-10.7%
Industrial	24.1%	923	23.4%	949	26.2%	786	2.0%	8.4%
Open Space	24.0%	918	24.6%	999	23.6%	710	-0.4%	-1.5%



### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	1,550	1.8%	872	0.9%	630	0.6%
Low II	1,550	1.8%	872	0.9%	630	0.6%
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>1,550</b>	<b>1.8%</b>	<b>872</b>	<b>0.9%</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>0.6%</b>
Low Medium I	72,350	82.3%	*	-	38,321	34.7%
Low Medium II	14,000	15.9%	*	-	48,881	44.2%
Medium	-	-	-	-	22,654	20.5%
High-Medium	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>86,350</b>	<b>98.2%</b>	<b>97,450</b>	<b>99.1%</b>	<b>109,856</b>	<b>99.4%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>87,900</b>		<b>98,322</b>		<b>110,486</b>	

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	86,872	6.67	13,922	\$33,940	33.4%	73.5%	34.8%	73.9%
rank (of 35)	15	29	7	31	5	6	24	32
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	93.7%	2.2%	0.9%	2.4%	40.0%	16.6%	3.97	39.0%
rank (of 35)	1	34	35	34	2	4	3	31

### BRENTWOOD - PACIFIC PALISADES



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	25141	25141	95-0351 CPU
Council File #	76-1923	86-0732	98-0771
Adopted	7/13/77	6/25/86	6/17/98

#### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	39.0%	9,270	39.5%	9,366	49.0%	11,831	9.9%	25.4%
Multi-Family	1.7%	410	1.9%	446	1.6%	393	-0.1%	-6%
Commercial	0.7%	164	0.7%	166	0.5%	130	-0.2%	-22.1%
Industrial	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	-
Open Space	58.5%	13,895	57.9%	13,721	48.9%	11,809	-9.7%	-16.5%

#### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)



	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	3,600	5.0%	3,700	5.2%	6,176	9.2%	2,576	72%
Very Low I	4,700	6.5%	3,400	4.8%	4,374	6.5%	-326	-7%
Very Low II	12,100	16.6%	12,100	17.0%	14,819	22.1%	2,719	22%
Low I	29,800	41.0%	29,200	41.0%	19,863	29.6%	-9,937	-33.3%
Low II	29,800	41.0%	29,200	41.0%	19,863	29.6%	-9,937	-33.3%
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>50,200</b>	<b>69.1%</b>	<b>48,400</b>	<b>67.9%</b>	<b>45,232</b>	<b>67.3%</b>	<b>-4,968</b>	<b>-9.9%</b>
Low Medium I	2,900	4.0%	2,300	3.2%	2,449	3.6%	-451	-16%
Low Medium II	1,300	1.8%	2,300	3.2%	3,208	4.8%	1,908	147%
Medium	17,000	23.4%	16,900	23.7%	14,327	21.3%	-2,673	-16%
High-Medium	1,300	1.8%	1,400	2.0%	1,962	2.9%	662	51%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>22,500</b>	<b>30.9%</b>	<b>22,900</b>	<b>32.1%</b>	<b>21,946</b>	<b>32.7%</b>	<b>-554</b>	<b>-2.5%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>72,700</b>		<b>71,300</b>		<b>67,178</b>		<b>-5,522</b>	<b>-7.6%</b>

#### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	55,308	38.05	1,541	\$171,811	4.8%	28.7%	53.4%	97.3%
rank (of 35)	28	1	34	2	35	33	11	1
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	4.2%	86.5%	0.9%	5.8%	7.0%	4.8%	2.15	78.5%
rank (of 35)	34	1	34	23	35	35	30	2

### CANOGA PARK - WEST HILLS - WINNETKA - WOODLAND HILLS

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	22771	22771	97-0041 CPU
Council File #	72-78, -S1, 83-2132	87-2132	98-1957
Adopted	9/15/72	2/9/88	8/17/99



- Legend**
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

#### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	69.1%	11,200	70.4%	11,665	68.2%	9,860	-0.9%	-1.3%
Multi-Family	6.7%	1,080	6.4%	1,060	5.7%	826	-1.0%	-14%
Commercial	6.2%	1,010	6.6%	1,102	6.7%	972	0.5%	7.9%
Industrial	5.2%	840	5.3%	884	4.7%	677	-0.5%	-9.7%
Open Space	12.8%	2,070	11.2%	1,862	14.6%	2,117	1.9%	14.6%


#### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	600	0.3%	1,166	0.6%	1,514	0.8%	914	152%
Very Low I	23,700	12.3%	29,167	16.2%	26,050	13.0%	2,350	10%
Very Low II								
Low I	100,100	51.9%	79,984	44.5%	105,944	52.7%	5,844	5.8%
Low II								
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>124,400</b>	<b>64.5%</b>	<b>110,317</b>	<b>61.4%</b>	<b>133,508</b>	<b>66.4%</b>	<b>9,108</b>	<b>7.3%</b>
Low Medium I	5,300	2.7%	4,444	2.5%	5,112	2.5%	-188	-4%
Low Medium II	14,600	7.6%	13,724	7.6%	8,690	4.3%	-5,910	-40%
Medium	28,100	14.6%	47,184	26.2%	45,805	22.8%	17,705	63%
High-Medium	20,600	10.7%	4,100	2.3%	7,816	3.9%	-12,784	-62%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>68,600</b>	<b>35.5%</b>	<b>69,452</b>	<b>38.6%</b>	<b>67,423</b>	<b>33.6%</b>	<b>-1,177</b>	<b>-1.7%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>193,000</b>		<b>179,769</b>		<b>200,931</b>		<b>7,931</b>	<b>4.1%</b>

#### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	166,788	28.22	6,592	\$76,410	11.2%	39.2%	59.2%	95.8%
rank (of 35)	7	2	25	10	28	27	7	8
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	26.6%	56.2%	3.3%	10.3%	18.8%	8.4%	2.78	71.6%
rank (of 35)	24	9	26	15	22	28	18	11

CENTRAL CITY



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	24270	24270	94-0225 CPU
Council File #	(RE-CHECK)	(RE-CHECK)	99-0138
Adopted	5/2/74	2/12/88	1/8/03

CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	-
Multi-Family	1.5%	25	7.8%	169	8.4%	108	6.8%	441%
Commercial	21.8%	352	38.3%	827	34.1%	440	12.3%	56.4%
Industrial	50.0%	808	40.4%	874	43.2%	558	-6.8%	-13.6%
Open Space	26.7%	432	13.5%	291	14.4%	186	-12.3%	-46.1%

CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.0%</b>
Low Medium I	-	-	*	-	-	-
Low Medium II	-	-	*	-	-	-
Medium	-	-	*	-	-	-
High-Medium	0	-	*	-	6,199	17.8%
High	0	-	*	-	28,566	82.2%
Very High*	30,775	-	*	-	0	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>30,775</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>35,235</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>34,765</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>30,775</b>		<b>35,235</b>		<b>34,765</b>	

\*note: the first Central City plan used a "very high" designation; 7,553 of plan 3


AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	25,200	2.98	10,315	\$30,198	44.3%	91.1%	5.3%	35.9%
rank (of 35)	33	34	17	33	1	2	35	35

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	33.4%	17.0%	23.6%	22.9%	26.0%	36.3%	1.54	29.5%
rank (of 35)	21	25	4	4	17	1	35	34



### CENTRAL CITY NORTH



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	24715	24715	95-0352 CPU
Council File #	77-2818	87-0835	97-0282
Adopted	2/9/79	1/5/88	12/5/00

#### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	-
Multi-Family	6.6%	127	6.5%	133	7.2%	118	0.6%	9.2%
Commercial	5.7%	109	7.1%	147	10.3%	168	4.6%	81.2%
Industrial	69.9%	1,342	75.7%	1,561	55.9%	914	-13.9%	-19.9%
Open Space	17.9%	343	10.7%	221	26.6%	434	8.7%	48.8%

#### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop/h	%	pop/h	%	pop/h	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-</b>
Low Medium I	*	-	*	-	-	-	-	-
Low Medium II	*	-	*	-	1,190	6.2%	-	-
Medium	*	-	*	-	5,206	27.1%	-	-
High-Medium	*	-	*	-	12,834	66.7%	-	-
High	*	-	*	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>17,000</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>17,745</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>19,230</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2,230</b>	<b>13.1%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>17,000</b>		<b>17,745</b>		<b>19,230</b>		<b>2,230</b>	<b>13.1%</b>

#### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>



	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	24,010	2.52	13,077	\$28,624	32.1%	89.3%	9.0%	41.7%
rank (of 35)	34	35	11	35	7	3	33	34

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	34.0%	11.1%	18.1%	35.3%	26.8%	14.3%	2.84	38.2%
rank (of 35)	20	29	5	1	16	8	15	32

# CHATSWORTH - PORTER RANCH

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2
CPC #	22772	22772
Council File #	72-3511, -S	91-1045-43
Adopted	3/25/74	9/4/93

\*note: only 2 plans have been adopted for Chatsworth



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	60.6%	8,420	60.8%	9,246	0.3%	0.4%
Multi-Family	3.8%	530	6.5%	983	2.7%	69.7%
Commercial	3.2%	450	4.1%	620	0.8%	26.0%
Industrial	12.9%	1,796	12.0%	1,821	-0.9%	-7.3%
Open Space	19.5%	2,704	16.6%	2,526	-2.8%	-14.5%

## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	1,200	1.0%	2,260	1.7%	1,060	88.3%
Very Low I	16,800	14.4%	16,520	12.2%	-280	-1.7%
Very Low II	23,600	20.3%	25,030	18.5%	1,430	6.1%
Low I	26,800	23.0%	21,980	16.3%	-4,820	-18.0%
Low II	21,000	18.1%	26,920	19.9%	5,920	28.2%
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>89,400</b>	<b>76.9%</b>	<b>92,710</b>	<b>68.7%</b>	<b>3,310</b>	<b>3.7%</b>
Low Medium I	5,800	5.0%	15,640	11.6%	9,840	169.7%
Low Medium II	2,100	1.8%	6,130	4.5%	4,030	191.9%
Medium	19,000	16.3%	20,470	15.2%	1,470	7.7%
High-Medium	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>26,900</b>	<b>23.1%</b>	<b>42,240</b>	<b>31.3%</b>	<b>15,340</b>	<b>57.0%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>116,300</b>		<b>134,950</b>		<b>18,650</b>	<b>16.0%</b>

## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	84,690	25.68	3,749	\$80,032	7.8%	31.5%	57.6%	94.1%
rank (of 35)	17	3	30	8	31	31	8	13

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	20.2%	55.9%	3.6%	16.7%	14.4%	6.7%	2.79	75.8%
rank (of 35)	28	10	25	6	27	30	17	6

# ENCINO - TARZANA

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	22774	22774	97-0042 CPU
Council File #	74-4754	87-0304	98-1823
Adopted	3/10/76	4/21/87	12/16/98

### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA



	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	60.3%	7,454	60.4%	7,460	60.6%	6,931	0.2%	0.4%
Multi-Family	3.7%	459	3.8%	470	3.7%	420	0.0%	-1.2%
Commercial	3.6%	449	3.0%	365	3.0%	339	-0.7%	-18.5%
Industrial	0.3%	39	0.4%	45	0.2%	27	-0.1%	-25.2%
Open Space	32.0%	3,958	32.5%	4,020	32.6%	3,728	0.5%	1.7%

### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	2,500	2.5%	2,325	2.3%	1,630	1.9%	-870	-34.8%
Very Low I	21,130	21.5%	21,080	20.5%	15,738	18.3%	-5,392	-25.5%
Very Low II	17,800	18.1%	18,590	18.1%	15,649	18.2%	-2,151	-12.1%
Low I	1,050	1.1%	810	0.8%	-	-	-	-
Low II	29,050	29.5%	29,100	28.3%	22,733	26.4%	-7,367	-24.5%
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>71,530</b>	<b>72.6%</b>	<b>71,905</b>	<b>70.0%</b>	<b>55,750</b>	<b>64.7%</b>	<b>-15,780</b>	<b>-22.1%</b>
Low Medium I	2,910	3.0%	920	0.9%	1,000	1.2%	-1,910	-65.6%
Low Medium II	4,730	4.8%	4,040	3.9%	3,055	3.5%	-1,675	-35.4%
Medium	19,310	19.6%	25,920	25.2%	26,411	30.6%	7,101	36.8%
High-Medium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>26,950</b>	<b>27.4%</b>	<b>30,880</b>	<b>30.0%</b>	<b>30,466</b>	<b>35.3%</b>	<b>3,516</b>	<b>13.0%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>98,480</b>		<b>102,785</b>		<b>86,216</b>		<b>-12,264</b>	<b>-12.5%</b>

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>


	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	70,228	20.51	3,662	\$101,042	9.7%	34.5%	52.0%	96.7%
rank (of 35)	23	7	31	4	29	30	13	3
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	9.9%	77.7%	2.8%	5.0%	14.4%	6.3%	2.34	78.2%
rank (of 35)	31	4	28	27	28	31	26	4



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities



# GRANADA HILLS - KNOLLWOOD



- Legend**
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23571	23571	94-0213 CPU
Council File #	74-4140	88-0766	95-1396
Adopted	6/25/76	3/3/89	11/5/96

### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	67.5%	6,320	66.3%	6,396	64.9%	5,460	-2.6%	-3.9%
Multi-Family	2.2%	210	2.3%	218	2.6%	220	0.4%	16.5%
Commercial	3.0%	281	3.0%	288	3.2%	273	0.2%	8.1%
Industrial	0.1%	6	0.1%	6	0.1%	6	0.0%	-
Open Space	27.2%	2,542	28.4%	2,743	29.2%	2,456	2.0%	7.5%



### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	1,670	2.3%	*	-	926	1.3%	-744	-44.6%
Very Low I	8,380	11.3%	*	-	4,890	7.1%	-3,490	-41.6%
Very Low II	7,670	10.4%	*	-	6,083	8.8%	-1,587	-20.7%
Low I			*	-				
Low II	44,710	60.4%	*	-	46,176	66.6%	1,466	3.3%
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>62,430</b>	<b>84.4%</b>	<b>63,820</b>	<b>83.8%</b>	<b>58,075</b>	<b>83.8%</b>	<b>-4,355</b>	<b>-7.0%</b>
Low Medium I	1,210	1.6%	*	-	809	1.2%	-401	-33.1%
Low Medium II	4,810	6.5%	*	-	3,387	4.9%	-1,423	-29.6%
Medium	5,530	7.5%	*	-	7,025	10.1%	1,495	27.0%
High-Medium	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>11,550</b>	<b>15.6%</b>	<b>12,380</b>	<b>16.2%</b>	<b>11,221</b>	<b>16.2%</b>	<b>-329</b>	<b>-2.8%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>73,980</b>		<b>76,200</b>		<b>69,296</b>		<b>-4,684</b>	<b>-6.3%</b>

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	57,461	18.10	3,362	\$74,113	7.5%	25.9%	75.5%	97.0%
rank (of 35)	27	9	32	11	32	34	2	2
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	21.6%	54.4%	3.7%	16.2%	12.5%	6.2%	2.91	78.3%
rank (of 35)	27	11	24	7	31	32	13	3

# HARBOR GATEWAY



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23482	23482	94-0356 CPU
Council File #	76-0256	86-2138	95-1394
Adopted	2/15/79	6/30/87	12/6/95

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	30.7%	1,016	30.5%	1,000	26.2%	692	-4.6%	-14.8%
Multi-Family	12.4%	410	12.8%	421	12.6%	332	0.2%	1.2%
Commercial	5.3%	175	4.1%	136	4.0%	107	-1.2%	-23.6%
Industrial	37.5%	1,241	38.7%	1,270	39.9%	1,056	2.4%	6.4%
Open Space	14.1%	465	13.9%	455	17.3%	458	3.3%	23.1%

## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	17,700	45.2%	18,158	44.3%	14,532	33.6%	-3,168	-17.9%
Low II	17,700	45.2%	18,158	44.3%	14,532	33.6%	-3,168	-17.9%
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>17,700</b>	<b>45.2%</b>	<b>18,158</b>	<b>44.3%</b>	<b>14,532</b>	<b>33.6%</b>	<b>-3,168</b>	<b>-17.9%</b>
Low Medium I	3,000	7.7%	2,527	6.2%	2,780	6.4%	-220	-7.3%
Low Medium II	11,800	30.1%	12,347	30.1%	13,157	30.4%	1,357	11.5%
Medium	6,700	17.1%	7,951	19.4%	12,747	29.5%	6,047	90.3%
High-Medium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>21,500</b>	<b>54.8%</b>	<b>22,825</b>	<b>55.7%</b>	<b>28,684</b>	<b>66.4%</b>	<b>7,184</b>	<b>33.4%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>39,200</b>		<b>40,983</b>		<b>43,216</b>		<b>4,016</b>	<b>10.2%</b>

## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	40,293	5.04	8,357	\$45,895	21.3%	60.2%	45.1%	92.2%
rank (of 35)	31	30	21	28	14	16	15	20

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	54.2%	11.7%	15.7%	15.0%	28.4%	12.5%	3.43	64.1%
rank (of 35)	11	28	6	11	12	12	8	17

# HOLLYWOOD

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	1873	1873	97-0043 CPU
Council File #	(RE-CHECK)	86-0695-S1	12-0303
Adopted	4/10/75	10/13/87	6/19/12



### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	41.3%	7,209	34.8%	5,395	33.7%	4,702	-7.6%	-18.3%
Multi-Family	17.6%	3,070	17.6%	2,735	15.7%	2,184	-1.9%	-10.9%
Commercial	6.0%	1,043	7.3%	1,139	6.0%	831	0.0%	-0.2%
Industrial	3.3%	576	2.2%	335	2.0%	279	-1.3%	-39.3%
Open Space	31.9%	5,572	38.1%	5,921	42.7%	5,954	10.8%	33.8%

### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	1,350	0.6%	2,835	1.2%	*	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-
Very Low II	35,610	14.8%	15,000	6.5%	*	-	-	-
Low I	-	-	5,125	2.2%	*	-	-	-
Low II	14,280	5.9%	43,900	19.0%	*	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>51,240</b>	<b>21.3%</b>	<b>66,860</b>	<b>28.9%</b>	<b>45,442</b>	<b>18.2%</b>	<b>-5,798</b>	<b>-11.3%</b>
Low Medium I	-	-	11,415	4.9%	*	-	-	-
Low Medium II	5,050	2.1%	38,360	16.6%	*	-	-	-
Medium	47,760	19.9%	77,330	33.4%	*	-	-	-
High-Medium	56,360	23.4%	11,590	5.0%	*	-	-	-
High	48,580	20.2%	25,840	11.2%	*	-	-	-
Very High*	31,490	13.1%	-	-	*	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>189,240</b>	<b>78.7%</b>	<b>164,535</b>	<b>71.1%</b>	<b>203,620</b>	<b>81.8%</b>	<b>14,380</b>	<b>7.6%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>240,480</b>		<b>231,395</b>		<b>249,062</b>		<b>8,582</b>	<b>3.6%</b>

\*note: the first Hollywood Community Plan used a "very high" designation




- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	210,841	25.24	8,907	\$54,836	23.3%	79.3%	20.6%	89.8%
rank (of 35)	5	4	19	17	11	5	30	27
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	34.5%	47.3%	4.0%	9.3%	31.3%	12.4%	2.17	57.2%
rank (of 35)	19	14	20	17	8	13	29	24

# MISSION HILLS - PANORAMA CITY - NORTH HILLS

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	24153	24153	95-0353 CPU
Council File #	74-1793, 81-1552	87-0749	98-0706
Adopted	4/10/75	10/13/87	6/9/99



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	62.7%	4,472	37.2%	3,077	62.4%	3,427	-0.3%	-0.4%
Multi-Family	11.1%	795	40.3%	3,334	17.0%	934	5.9%	52.6%
Commercial	8.4%	601	10.3%	852	8.2%	449	-0.2%	-2.9%
Industrial	4.3%	305	6.3%	525	5.7%	314	1.4%	33.8%
Open Space	13.5%	965	6.0%	493	6.7%	370	-6.8%	-50.2%

## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)



	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	6,270	5.8%	9,861	6.2%	5,271	3.4%	-999	-15.9%
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	57,130	52.4%	75,720	47.4%	59,131	38.0%	2,001	3.5%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>63,400</b>	<b>58.2%</b>	<b>85,581</b>	<b>53.5%</b>	<b>64,402</b>	<b>41.4%</b>	<b>1,002</b>	<b>1.6%</b>
Low Medium I	7,790	7.1%	11,545	7.2%	12,303	7.9%	4,513	57.9%
Low Medium II	6,090	5.6%	16,425	10.3%	18,865	12.1%	12,775	209.8%
Medium	29,720	27.3%	43,000	26.9%	53,890	34.6%	24,170	81.3%
High-Medium	2,000	1.8%	3,343	2.1%	6,204	4.0%	4,204	210.2%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>45,600</b>	<b>41.8%</b>	<b>74,313</b>	<b>46.5%</b>	<b>91,262</b>	<b>58.6%</b>	<b>45,662</b>	<b>100.1%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>109,000</b>		<b>159,894</b>		<b>155,664</b>		<b>46,664</b>	<b>42.8%</b>

## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	134,871	11.65	12,430	\$48,754	22.1%	54.2%	44.6%	95.3%
rank (of 35)	10	20	13	22	13	21	16	9

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	63.5%	18.1%	4.4%	11.8%	34.4%	11.2%	3.66	56.0%
rank (of 35)	9	24	18	14	5	19	6	27

# NORTH HOLLYWOOD - VALLEY VILLAGE



- Legend**
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23488	23488	94-0211 CPU
Council File #	74-2336, -S, -S1, -S2	88-0727	95-0830
Adopted	3/11/75	8/8/88	5/14/98

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	46.5%	3,113	44.6%	3,041	41.9%	2,193	-4.6%	-10.0%
Multi-Family	24.8%	1,656	25.9%	1,763	26.1%	1,365	1.3%	5.3%
Commercial	8.8%	588	10.1%	689	10.4%	545	1.6%	18.4%
Industrial	6.6%	439	7.0%	476	8.0%	420	1.5%	22.2%
Open Space	13.4%	893	12.4%	842	13.6%	712	0.3%	1.9%

## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)


	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	690	0.6%	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	44,610	37.5%	45,161	34.6%	36,947	23.7%	-7,663	-17.2%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>45,300</b>	<b>38.1%</b>	<b>45,161</b>	<b>34.6%</b>	<b>36,947</b>	<b>23.7%</b>	<b>-8,353</b>	<b>-18.4%</b>
Low Medium I	5,339	4.5%	3,726	2.9%	4,052	2.6%	-1,287	-24.1%
Low Medium II	27,863	23.4%	23,257	17.8%	29,894	19.1%	2,031	7.3%
Medium	30,310	25.5%	47,278	36.3%	68,883	44.1%	38,573	127.3%
High-Medium	10,080	8.5%	10,985	8.4%	16,405	10.5%	6,325	62.7%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>73,592</b>	<b>61.9%</b>	<b>85,246</b>	<b>65.4%</b>	<b>119,234</b>	<b>76.3%</b>	<b>45,642</b>	<b>62.0%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>118,892</b>		<b>130,407</b>		<b>156,181</b>		<b>37,289</b>	<b>31.4%</b>

## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	135,826	10.62	14,087	\$46,893	21.0%	69.3%	28.2%	89.9%
rank (of 35)	9	23	6	26	15	7	27	26

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	47.2%	37.4%	5.2%	5.8%	27.8%	11.8%	2.65	62.9%
rank (of 35)	14	18	17	22	14	17	22	18

NORTHEAST LOS ANGELES



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	22490	22490	87-0242 CPR
Council File #	75-2440	88-0316	99-0711
Adopted	7/8/79	12/8/89	6/15/99

CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	45.0%	7,033	46.6%	7,300	47.8%	6,098	2.8%	6.1%
Multi-Family	18.9%	2,952	19.5%	3,060	14.5%	1,856	-4.4%	-23.0%
Commercial	5.3%	829	5.5%	862	5.0%	638	-0.3%	-5.8%
Industrial	10.3%	1,607	10.2%	1,603	8.8%	1,128	-1.4%	-14.1%
Open Space	20.5%	3,198	18.2%	2,855	23.8%	3,038	3.3%	16.3%

CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	300	0.1%	1,100	0.4%	343	0.1%	43	-
Very Low I	4,400	1.7%	4,300	1.6%	3,966	1.5%	-434	-9.9%
Very Low II								
Low I								
Low II	101,400	38.0%	99,800	37.0%	122,523	45.7%	21,123	20.8%
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>106,100</b>	<b>39.8%</b>	<b>105,200</b>	<b>39.0%</b>	<b>126,832</b>	<b>47.3%</b>	<b>20,732</b>	<b>19.5%</b>
Low Medium I	18,800	7.1%	20,100	7.4%	24,407	9.1%	5,607	29.8%
Low Medium II	50,500	18.9%	54,000	20.0%	104,290	38.9%	53,790	106.5%
Medium	84,000	31.5%	83,500	30.9%	12,444	4.6%	-71,556	-85.2%
High-Medium	7,100	2.7%	7,100	2.6%	0	-	-7,100	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>160,400</b>	<b>60.2%</b>	<b>164,700</b>	<b>61.0%</b>	<b>141,141</b>	<b>52.7%</b>	<b>-19,259</b>	<b>-12.0%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>266,500</b>		<b>269,900</b>		<b>267,973</b>		<b>1,473</b>	<b>0.6%</b>



AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	241,371	24.15	10,705	\$48,215	21.0%	56.7%	52.7%	92.2%
rank (of 35)	4	5	16	24	17	20	12	19

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	67.3%	12.8%	1.9%	15.9%	27.7%	11.7%	3.31	58.8%
rank (of 35)	7	27	32	9	15	18	10	22



**NORTHRIDGE**



- Legend**
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23795	23795	95-0354 CPU
Council File #	74-3043, -S, -S2	86-2004	98-0027
Adopted	2/11/75	1/6/87	2/24/98

**CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA**

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	73.7%	4,525	73.0%	4,480	70.6%	3,582	-3.1%	-4.2%
Multi-Family	5.7%	350	6.5%	402	6.7%	338	1.0%	16.8%
Commercial	4.3%	265	4.7%	290	4.4%	224	0.1%	2.3%
Industrial	3.3%	200	2.9%	175	3.7%	190	0.5%	14.9%
Open Space	13.0%	800	12.9%	793	14.6%	741	1.6%	12.1%



**CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)**

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	260	0.4%	-	-	0	-	-260	-
Very Low I	12,030	18.8%	12,000	17.6%	9,484	14.3%	-2,546	-21.2%
Very Low II	11,140	17.4%	11,000	16.2%	9,935	15.0%	-1,205	-10.8%
Low I	17,900	28.0%	18,000	26.4%	23,321	35.1%	5,421	30.3%
Low II	2,670	4.2%	2,800	4.1%	0	-	-2,670	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>44,000</b>	<b>68.8%</b>	<b>43,800</b>	<b>64.3%</b>	<b>42,740</b>	<b>64.4%</b>	<b>-1,260</b>	<b>-2.9%</b>
Low Medium I	3,770	5.9%	3,300	4.8%	2,437	3.7%	-1,333	-35.4%
Low Medium II	3,700	5.8%	4,000	5.9%	2,523	3.8%	-1,177	-31.8%
Medium	12,530	19.6%	17,000	25.0%	18,651	28.1%	6,121	48.9%
High-Medium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>31.3%</b>	<b>24,300</b>	<b>35.7%</b>	<b>23,611</b>	<b>35.6%</b>	<b>3,611</b>	<b>18.1%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>64,000</b>		<b>68,100</b>		<b>66,351</b>		<b>2,351</b>	<b>3.7%</b>

**AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>**

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	62,577	10.08	6,698	\$71,384	14.0%	41.1%	53.7%	95.8%
rank (of 35)	25	25	24	12	23	26	10	6
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	24.4%	51.6%	5.2%	15.0%	16.7%	14.4%	2.74	72.4%
rank (of 35)	25	13	16	10	23	7	21	9

**PALMS - MAR VISTA - DEL REY**



	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23037	23037	95-0355 CPU
Council File #	74-5211	86-2303	97-0705
Adopted	8/25/76	6/9/87	9/16/97

**CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA**

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	50.7%	2,626	48.5%	2,561	48.4%	1,878	-2.3%	-4.5%
Multi-Family	21.8%	1,130	23.5%	1,241	22.8%	885	1.0%	4.5%
Commercial	5.4%	278	6.1%	323	6.1%	235	0.7%	12.8%
Industrial	7.6%	395	8.0%	422	9.2%	357	1.6%	20.6%
Open Space	14.5%	750	13.8%	729	13.5%	525	-1.0%	-6.6%

note: plan 3 commercial and open space estimated

**CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)**



	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	47,500	36.1%	46,300	33.4%	33,569	29.5%	-13,931	-29.3%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>47,500</b>	<b>36.1%</b>	<b>46,300</b>	<b>33.4%</b>	<b>33,569</b>	<b>29.5%</b>	<b>-13,931</b>	<b>-29.3%</b>
Low Medium I	5,000	3.8%	6,400	4.6%	5,382	4.7%	382	7.6%
Low Medium II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium	65,000	49.4%	69,100	49.9%	62,181	54.6%	-2,819	-4.3%
High-Medium	14,000	10.6%	16,700	12.1%	12,810	11.2%	-1,190	-8.5%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>84,000</b>	<b>63.9%</b>	<b>92,200</b>	<b>66.6%</b>	<b>80,373</b>	<b>70.5%</b>	<b>-3,627</b>	<b>-4.3%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>131,500</b>		<b>138,500</b>		<b>113,942</b>		<b>-17,558</b>	<b>-13.4%</b>

**AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>**

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	110,046	9.02	13,571	\$58,311	16.2%	68.0%	27.5%	94.3%
rank (of 35)	11	26	8	14	21	10	29	12
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	30.7%	42.3%	6.7%	16.0%	23.6%	8.4%	2.25	68.3%
rank (of 35)	22	16	9	8	19	29	27	15



# RESEDA - WEST VAN NUYS



	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	22773	22773	97-044 CPU
Council File #	72-2465, -S1, 2, 3	84-1717-S4	96-1597
Adopted	7/1/74	12/12/86	11/17/99

### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	59.3%	4,766	56.4%	4,630	57.3%	3,486	-2.0%	-3.3%
Multi-Family	7.2%	581	9.6%	790	8.3%	506	1.1%	15.1%
Commercial	4.7%	380	5.2%	430	5.1%	312	0.4%	8.5%
Industrial	7.8%	630	7.9%	650	17.3%	1,052	9.5%	120.7%
Open Space	21.0%	1,686	20.8%	1,710	12.0%	729	-9.0%	-42.8%



### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	997	0.9%	1,190	1.0%	2,528	2.3%	1,531	153.6%
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	73,539	69.5%	76,970	61.6%	61,903	56.7%	-11,636	-15.8%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>74,536</b>	<b>70.4%</b>	<b>78,160</b>	<b>62.6%</b>	<b>64,431</b>	<b>59.0%</b>	<b>-10,105</b>	<b>-13.6%</b>
Low Medium I	1,684	1.6%	3,080	2.5%	2,040	1.9%	356	21.1%
Low Medium II	14,675	13.9%	17,840	14.3%	13,297	12.2%	-1,378	-9.4%
Medium	11,136	10.5%	21,250	17.0%	23,562	21.6%	12,426	111.6%
High-Medium	3,770	3.6%	4,520	3.6%	5,901	5.4%	2,131	56.5%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>31,265</b>	<b>29.6%</b>	<b>46,690</b>	<b>37.4%</b>	<b>44,800</b>	<b>41.0%</b>	<b>13,535</b>	<b>43.3%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>105,801</b>		<b>124,850</b>		<b>109,231</b>		<b>3,430</b>	<b>3.2%</b>

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	98,655	12.03	8,818	\$52,464	14.3%	43.9%	56.8%	95.1%
rank (of 35)	13	19	20	18	22	24	9	11
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	41.0%	41.4%	3.9%	9.8%	24.1%	9.9%	2.98	68.9%
rank (of 35)	16	17	22	16	18	22	12	14

SAN PEDRO



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23923	23923	97-0045 CPU
Council File #	80-1472	86-0733	98-1771
Adopted	9/30/80	6/10/86	3/17/99

CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	42.0%	1,831	39.9%	1,743	39.1%	1,438	-2.9%	-6.9%
Multi-Family	26.2%	1,141	28.6%	1,250	24.7%	907	-1.5%	-5.8%
Commercial	6.5%	284	6.8%	296	5.9%	216	-0.6%	-9.9%
Industrial	3.3%	143	5.7%	249	7.5%	276	4.2%	128.7%
Open Space	22.0%	956	19.1%	834	22.8%	838	0.9%	3.9%

CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	43,500	43.1%	41,436	39.9%	26,243	34.8%	-17,257	-39.7%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>43,500</b>	<b>43.1%</b>	<b>41,436</b>	<b>39.9%</b>	<b>26,243</b>	<b>34.8%</b>	<b>-17,257</b>	<b>-39.7%</b>
Low Medium I	12,900	12.8%	18,059	17.4%	8,401	11.2%	-4,499	-34.9%
Low Medium II	0	-	-	-	37,097	-	37,097	-
Medium	44,600	44.2%	44,283	42.7%	1,376	1.8%	-43,224	-96.9%
High-Medium	0	-	-	-	2,210	-	2,210	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>57,500</b>	<b>56.9%</b>	<b>62,342</b>	<b>60.1%</b>	<b>49,084</b>	<b>65.2%</b>	<b>-8,416</b>	<b>-14.6%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>101,000</b>		<b>103,778</b>		<b>75,327</b>		<b>-25,673</b>	<b>-25.4%</b>

AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	75,911	11.28	7,281	\$55,484	16.7%	57.4%	39.6%	94.0%
rank (of 35)	19	22	22	16	20	19	20	15


	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	41.0%	44.6%	6.0%	4.6%	14.4%	8.9%	2.56	74.4%
rank (of 35)	17	15	11	28	29	25	23	7

# SHERMAN OAKS - STUDIO CITY - TOLUCA LAKE - CAHUENGA PASS

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	22770	22770	95-0356 CPU
Council File #	70-4921, -S1	87-0290, 88-0927	97-0704
Adopted	11/7/74	7/13/88	5/13/98


### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	75.2%	6,672	73.8%	6,543	71.7%	5,182	-3.5%	-4.6%
Multi-Family	8.4%	748	11.0%	973	9.0%	653	0.6%	7.2%
Commercial	7.3%	646	7.3%	648	6.7%	483	-0.6%	-8.2%
Industrial	0.5%	44	0.5%	44	0.6%	40	0.1%	11.6%
Open Space	8.6%	762	7.5%	663	12.0%	866	3.4%	39.6%



### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	3,237	2.7%	3,113	2.3%	0	-	-3,237	-
Very Low I	14,967	12.6%	15,917	11.7%	1,740	1.9%	-13,227	-88.4%
Very Low II	0	-	-	-	10,447	11.5%	10,447	-
Low I	47,664	40.1%	45,087	33.1%	35,216	38.9%	-12,448	-26.1%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>65,868</b>	<b>55.4%</b>	<b>64,117</b>	<b>47.0%</b>	<b>47,403</b>	<b>52.3%</b>	<b>-18,465</b>	<b>-28.0%</b>
Low Medium I	8,634	7.3%	10,165	7.5%	3,743	4.1%	-4,891	-56.6%
Low Medium II	0	-	-	-	34,558	38.2%	34,558	-
Medium	40,283	33.9%	50,836	37.3%	4,879	5.4%	-35,404	-87.9%
High-Medium	4,185	3.5%	11,197	8.2%	0	-	-4,185	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>53,102</b>	<b>44.6%</b>	<b>72,198</b>	<b>53.0%</b>	<b>43,180</b>	<b>47.7%</b>	<b>-9,922</b>	<b>-18.7%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>118,970</b>		<b>136,315</b>		<b>90,583</b>		<b>-28,387</b>	<b>-23.9%</b>




- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	72,989	13.58	5,827	\$89,683	7.0%	49.6%	39.1%	94.0%
rank (of 35)	21	16	27	5	33	22	21	14
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	8.5%	78.6%	3.8%	5.3%	8.8%	8.5%	1.90	80.0%
rank (of 35)	32	3	23	25	33	27	34	1

# SILVER LAKE - ECHO PARK - ELYSIAN VALLEY



- Legend**
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23305	23305	95-0357 CPU
Council File #	83-0071, -S1	87-1380	00-2217
Adopted	2/17/84	3/5/88	8/11/04

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	19.4%	902	18.6%	868	17.9%	648	-1.5%	-7.8%
Multi-Family	37.3%	1,734	37.8%	1,768	36.6%	1,327	-0.7%	-1.8%
Commercial	6.3%	294	6.7%	312	6.5%	235	0.2%	2.5%
Industrial	2.8%	132	3.1%	144	2.6%	93	-0.3%	-9.6%
Open Space	34.2%	1,588	33.8%	1,581	36.5%	1,322	2.3%	6.8%




## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	19,034	20.2%	17,026	17.7%	12,722	13.4%	-6,312	-33.2%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>19,034</b>	<b>20.2%</b>	<b>17,026</b>	<b>17.7%</b>	<b>12,722</b>	<b>13.4%</b>	<b>-6,312</b>	<b>-33.2%</b>
Low Medium I	63,812	67.7%	*	-	25,932	27.3%	-37,880	-59.4%
Low Medium II	0	-	*	-	36,751	38.7%	36,751	-
Medium	11,471	12.2%	*	-	19,495	20.5%	8,024	70.0%
High-Medium	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>75,283</b>	<b>79.8%</b>	<b>79,154</b>	<b>82.3%</b>	<b>82,178</b>	<b>86.6%</b>	<b>6,895</b>	<b>9.2%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>94,317</b>		<b>96,180</b>		<b>94,900</b>		<b>583</b>	<b>0.6%</b>

## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	76,949	7.34	11,183	\$50,766	23.3%	68.3%	38.8%	91.8%
rank (of 35)	18	27	14	20	12	9	22	22
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	55.0%	20.6%	2.1%	19.7%	30.3%	13.1%	2.75	55.1%
rank (of 35)	10	22	29	5	11	10	20	28

# SOUTH LOS ANGELES



	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23679	23679	96-0399 CPR
Council File #	78-336, -S1	87-1380	98-1192
Adopted	10/26/79	9/29/87	3/22/00

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	<b>44.3%</b>	4,387	<b>42.7%</b>	4,250	<b>35.7%</b>	2,146	<b>-8.6%</b>	<b>-19.4%</b>
Multi-Family	<b>29.3%</b>	2,903	<b>27.8%</b>	2,763	<b>32.8%</b>	1,967	<b>3.4%</b>	<b>11.7%</b>
Commercial	<b>11.6%</b>	1,150	<b>14.5%</b>	1,445	<b>14.4%</b>	863	<b>2.8%</b>	<b>23.7%</b>
Industrial	<b>3.7%</b>	362	<b>3.8%</b>	374	<b>4.6%</b>	275	<b>0.9%</b>	<b>25.2%</b>
Open Space	<b>11.1%</b>	1,097	<b>11.3%</b>	1,124	<b>12.6%</b>	754	<b>1.5%</b>	<b>13.3%</b>

## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)


	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	<b>79,800</b>	<b>33.7%</b>	<b>77,320</b>	<b>32.3%</b>	<b>48,779</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>-31,021</b>	<b>-38.9%</b>
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>79,800</b>	<b>33.7%</b>	<b>77,320</b>	<b>32.3%</b>	<b>48,779</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>-31,021</b>	<b>-38.9%</b>
Low Medium I	*	-	*	-	<b>67,721</b>	<b>23.2%</b>	-	-
Low Medium II	*	-	*	-	<b>114,659</b>	<b>39.2%</b>	-	-
Medium	*	-	*	-	<b>52,766</b>	<b>18.0%</b>	-	-
High-Medium	*	-	*	-	<b>8,469</b>	<b>2.9%</b>	-	-
High	*	-	*	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>156,900</b>	<b>66.3%</b>	<b>161,880</b>	<b>67.7%</b>	<b>243,615</b>	<b>83.3%</b>	<b>86,715</b>	<b>55.3%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>236,700</b>		<b>239,200</b>		<b>292,394</b>		<b>55,694</b>	<b>23.5%</b>

## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	260,003	15.39	17,942	\$34,391	34.2%	63.9%	41.2%	90.9%
rank (of 35)	2	12	3	30	4	13	19	25

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	53.6%	4.1%	37.6%	2.8%	28.3%	19.1%	3.33	45.1%
rank (of 35)	12	32	2	33	13	3	9	30

# SOUTHEAST LOS ANGELES



	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	22015	22015	96-0398 CPR
Council File #	79-876, -S1	88-1634	99-0496
Adopted	1/7/80	1/4/89	3/22/00

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	12.6%	1,187	12.5%	1,181	11.8%	864	-0.8%	-6.0%
Multi-Family	51.0%	4,811	50.0%	4,703	46.6%	3,403	-4.4%	-8.6%
Commercial	6.5%	613	7.4%	697	8.7%	635	2.2%	33.8%
Industrial	19.4%	1,826	19.4%	1,827	20.0%	1,462	0.7%	3.4%
Open Space	10.5%	993	10.7%	1,006	12.8%	935	2.3%	21.6%

## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	21,000	10.0%	20,895	10.0%	24,071	8.4%	3,071	14.6%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>21,000</b>	<b>10.0%</b>	<b>20,895</b>	<b>10.0%</b>	<b>24,071</b>	<b>8.4%</b>	<b>3,071</b>	<b>14.6%</b>
Low Medium I	*	-	*	-	135,119	46.9%	-	-
Low Medium II	*	-	*	-	86,112	29.9%	-	-
Medium	*	-	*	-	42,860	14.9%	-	-
High-Medium	*	-	*	-	-	-	-	-
High	*	-	*	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>190,000</b>	<b>90.0%</b>	<b>188,615</b>	<b>90.0%</b>	<b>264,091</b>	<b>91.6%</b>	<b>74,091</b>	<b>39.0%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>211,000</b>		<b>209,510</b>		<b>288,162</b>		<b>77,162</b>	<b>36.6%</b>



## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	255,168	15.74	17,441	\$32,625	41.1%	65.5%	46.7%	82.7%
rank (of 35)	3	10	4	32	2	12	14	39
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	72.6%	1.0%	25.2%	0.4%	36.9%	19.7%	4.22	37.7%
rank (of 35)	5	35	3	35	4	2	2	33



# SUN VALLEY - LA TUNA CANYON

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	25271	25271	97-0046 CPU
Council File #	75-5425, -S1, -S2	87-1175	98-2025
Adopted	9/23/77	12/14/88	8/13/99



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	47.9%	5,005	48.4%	5,056	47.2%	4,479	-0.7%	-1.5%
Multi-Family	2.7%	286	2.9%	299	3.9%	373	1.2%	43.6%
Commercial	1.7%	181	1.9%	200	1.9%	180	0.2%	9.5%
Industrial	19.5%	2,041	19.7%	2,058	20.1%	1,911	0.6%	3.1%
Open Space	28.1%	2,936	27.1%	2,836	26.9%	2,550	-1.2%	-4.4%

note: plan 3 commercial and open space estimated

## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	4,800	6.4%	4,892	6.4%	3,189	3.3%	-1,611	-33.6%
Very Low I	4,500	6.0%	4,714	6.2%	3,120	3.2%	-1,380	-30.7%
Very Low II	0	-	-	-	279	0.3%	279	-
Low I	50,200	66.9%	51,706	67.9%	53,237	54.5%	3,037	6.0%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>59,500</b>	<b>79.3%</b>	<b>61,312</b>	<b>80.5%</b>	<b>59,825</b>	<b>61.2%</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>0.5%</b>
Low Medium I	2,900	3.9%	2,867	3.8%	5,858	6.0%	2,958	102.0%
Low Medium II	6,700	8.9%	5,650	7.4%	9,939	10.2%	3,239	48.3%
Medium	5,900	7.9%	6,371	8.4%	22,126	22.6%	16,226	275.0%
High-Medium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>15,500</b>	<b>20.7%</b>	<b>14,888</b>	<b>19.5%</b>	<b>37,923</b>	<b>38.8%</b>	<b>22,423</b>	<b>144.7%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>75,000</b>		<b>76,200</b>		<b>97,748</b>		<b>22,748</b>	<b>30.3%</b>

## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	86,391	20.08	4,654	\$51,750	19.4%	42.6%	59.8%	87.0%
rank (of 35)	16	8	28	19	19	25	6	29
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	65.9%	21.5%	1.9%	7.9%	31.1%	13.8%	3.78	60.8%
rank (of 35)	8	21	31	19	9	9	4	21


# SUNLAND - TUJUNGA - SHADOW HILLS - LAKEVIEW TERRACE - EAST LA TUNA CANYON

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	25824	25824	95-0358 CPU
Council File #	79-2718, -S1A	87-0744	97-0703
Adopted	7/15/80	6/26/87	11/17/97

### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA


	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	54.8%	6,800	56.9%	6,900	65.3%	7,129	10.5%	19.1%
Multi-Family	3.2%	400	2.6%	313	3.8%	416	0.6%	18.2%
Commercial	1.4%	175	1.5%	181	1.3%	140	-0.1%	-9.1%
Industrial	2.6%	325	0.4%	47	0.3%	29	-2.4%	-89.9%
Open Space	37.9%	4,700	38.7%	4,688	29.3%	3,200	-8.6%	-22.6%

note: plan 3 commercial and open space estimated



### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	6,100	9.0%	3,360	4.5%	6,891	9.6%	791	13.0%
Very Low I	10,700	15.7%	19,450	26.1%	3,524	4.9%	-7,176	-67.1%
Very Low II	7,600	11.2%	7,366	9.9%	3,052	4.2%	-4,548	-59.8%
Low I	27,300	40.1%	28,046	37.7%	34,402	47.7%	7,102	26.0%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>51,700</b>	<b>76.0%</b>	<b>58,222</b>	<b>78.2%</b>	<b>47,869</b>	<b>66.4%</b>	<b>-3,831</b>	<b>-7.4%</b>
Low Medium I	3,100	4.6%	3,220	4.3%	6,023	8.4%	2,923	94.3%
Low Medium II	4,300	6.3%	4,944	6.6%	9,001	12.5%	4,701	109.3%
Medium	7,700	11.3%	8,075	10.8%	9,208	12.8%	1,508	19.6%
High-Medium	1,200	1.8%	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>16,300</b>	<b>24.0%</b>	<b>16,239</b>	<b>21.8%</b>	<b>24,232</b>	<b>33.6%</b>	<b>7,932</b>	<b>48.7%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>68,000</b>		<b>74,461</b>		<b>72,101</b>		<b>4,101</b>	<b>6.0%</b>



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	58,231	21.90	2,859	\$59,389	11.9%	34.9%	70.7%	95.3%
rank (of 35)	26	6	33	13	27	29	3	10
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	30.5%	54.0%	5.5%	6.0%	15.0%	9.2%	2.86	71.9%
rank (of 35)	23	12	13	20	26	23	14	10




**SYLMAR**

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23602	23602	93-0345 CPU
Council File #	72-2720, -S1	86-2003, -S1	96-0429
Adopted	7/25/74	5/13/87	8/8/97

CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA


	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	68.6%	5,370	66.9%	5,342	65.0%	4,253	-3.5%	-5.2%
Multi-Family	5.9%	460	5.8%	465	5.8%	377	-0.1%	-1.9%
Commercial	2.6%	200	2.5%	200	2.3%	150	-0.3%	-10.2%
Industrial	6.4%	500	7.5%	596	11.0%	719	4.6%	72.2%
Open Space	16.6%	1,300	17.4%	1,387	15.9%	1,040	-0.7%	-4.2%

note: plan 3 commercial and open space estimated



CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	2,854	3.8%	2,574	3.4%	3,071	3.1%	217	7.6%
Very Low I	5,350	7.2%	5,139	6.7%	14,131	14.2%	8,781	164.1%
Very Low II	5,744	7.7%	5,604	7.3%	0	-	-5,744	-
Low I	39,382	52.9%	41,707	54.4%	50,599	50.9%	11,217	28.5%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>53,330</b>	<b>71.7%</b>	<b>55,024</b>	<b>71.8%</b>	<b>67,801</b>	<b>68.1%</b>	<b>14,471</b>	<b>27.1%</b>
Low Medium I	6,051	8.1%	5,859	7.6%	7,555	7.6%	1,504	24.9%
Low Medium II	5,240	7.0%	5,550	7.2%	7,832	7.9%	2,592	49.5%
Medium	9,779	13.1%	10,210	13.3%	16,304	16.4%	6,525	66.7%
High-Medium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>21,070</b>	<b>28.3%</b>	<b>21,619</b>	<b>28.2%</b>	<b>31,691</b>	<b>31.9%</b>	<b>10,621</b>	<b>50.4%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>74,400</b>		<b>76,643</b>		<b>99,492</b>		<b>25,092</b>	<b>33.7%</b>





- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	69,674	12.83	6,220	\$67,623	13.1%	29.9%	64.6%	95.8%
rank (of 35)	24	18	26	15	24	32	5	7
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	69.9%	20.5%	4.2%	3.4%	23.3%	10.5%	3.75	67.3%
rank (of 35)	6	23	19	31	20	21	5	16

### VAN NUYS - NORTH SHERMAN OAKS

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	24090	24090	95-0359 CPU
Council File #	76-1403, -S1, -S2	86-0878	98-0572
Adopted	10/26/77	8/20/86	9/8/98



- Legend**
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

#### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	53.7%	4,143	53.5%	4,131	48.9%	3,141	-4.8%	-9.0%
Multi-Family	18.0%	1,388	19.7%	1,522	19.2%	1,237	1.3%	7.0%
Commercial	7.7%	594	7.8%	605	9.1%	586	1.4%	18.4%
Industrial	11.0%	850	10.7%	824	9.5%	612	-1.5%	-13.6%
Open Space	9.6%	740	8.2%	634	13.2%	850	3.6%	37.9%

#### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	3,990	3.1%	2,459	1.6%	1,956	1.2%	-2,034	-51.0%
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	55,820	43.2%	59,199	38.7%	55,085	32.7%	-735	-1.3%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>59,810</b>	<b>46.2%</b>	<b>61,658</b>	<b>40.3%</b>	<b>57,041</b>	<b>33.9%</b>	<b>-2,769</b>	<b>-4.6%</b>
Low Medium I	2,150	1.7%	535	0.3%	888	0.5%	-1,262	-58.7%
Low Medium II	28,200	21.8%	22,016	14.4%	30,785	18.3%	2,585	9.2%
Medium	36,430	28.2%	64,554	42.2%	76,371	45.3%	39,941	109.6%
High-Medium	2,750	2.1%	4,300	2.8%	3,346	2.0%	596	21.7%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>69,530</b>	<b>53.8%</b>	<b>91,405</b>	<b>59.7%</b>	<b>111,390</b>	<b>66.1%</b>	<b>41,860</b>	<b>60.2%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>129,340</b>		<b>153,063</b>		<b>168,431</b>		<b>39,091</b>	<b>30.2%</b>

#### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	158,787	12.89	13,141	\$48,930	21.0%	69.0%	31.7%	91.4%
rank (of 35)	8	17	10	21	16	8	26	23
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	48.7%	35.8%	5.5%	6.0%	32.0%	10.9%	2.77	61.3%
rank (of 35)	13	19	14	21	6	20	19	20

VENICE



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	14311	14311	97-0047 CPU
Council File #	(RE-CHECK)	88-0719, 87-0589	00-1505
Adopted	10/14/70	6/26/87	9/29/00

CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	25.8%	464	24.7%	461	23.7%	343	-2.1%	-8.3%
Multi-Family	50.9%	916	48.8%	913	41.6%	603	-9.3%	-18.3%
Commercial	9.9%	179	10.2%	190	6.6%	96	-3.3%	-33.5%
Industrial	5.6%	100	5.1%	96	2.7%	39	-2.9%	-51.6%
Open Space	7.8%	140	11.2%	209	25.4%	369	17.7%	227.0%



CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	8,500	13.9%	8,400	13.6%	5,380	14.8%	-3,120	-36.7%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>8,500</b>	<b>13.9%</b>	<b>8,400</b>	<b>13.6%</b>	<b>5,380</b>	<b>14.8%</b>	<b>-3,120</b>	<b>-36.7%</b>
Low Medium I	7,100	11.6%	6,500	10.5%	3,481	9.6%	-3,619	-51.0%
Low Medium II	25,800	42.1%	26,000	42.1%	15,447	42.6%	-10,353	-40.1%
Medium	12,000	19.6%	12,800	20.7%	7,864	21.7%	-4,136	-34.5%
High-Medium	7,900	12.9%	8,000	13.0%	4,104	11.3%	-3,796	-48.1%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>52,800</b>	<b>86.1%</b>	<b>53,300</b>	<b>86.4%</b>	<b>30,896</b>	<b>85.2%</b>	<b>-21,904</b>	<b>-41.5%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>61,300</b>		<b>61,700</b>		<b>36,276</b>		<b>-25,024</b>	<b>-40.8%</b>

AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	37,762	3.21	12,760	\$81,357	12.3%	65.5%	32.8%	91.8%
rank (of 35)	32	32	12	7	25	11	25	21
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	21.9%	64.1%	6.0%	4.1%	15.1%	8.8%	1.93	70.8%
rank (of 35)	26	6	10	29	25	26	33	13

### WEST ADAMS - BALDWIN HILLS - LEIMERT



	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	23259	23259	95-0080 CPR
Council File #	75-3955	85-2116-S4	95-, 97-0534
Adopted	1/7/80	8/31/88	5/6/98

#### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	39.8%	3,287	37.1%	3,076	39.4%	2,283	-0.3%	-0.9%
Multi-Family	39.7%	3,277	40.3%	3,334	33.0%	1,911	-6.6%	-16.8%
Commercial	8.6%	714	10.3%	852	10.3%	597	1.7%	19.3%
Industrial	6.3%	518	6.3%	525	6.1%	353	-0.2%	-2.7%
Open Space	5.7%	467	6.0%	493	11.1%	645	5.5%	97.1%

#### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	300	0.1%	194	0.1%	30	0.0%	-270	-90.0%
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	57,800	23.2%	54,661	22.4%	40,560	20.1%	-17,240	-29.8%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>58,100</b>	<b>23.3%</b>	<b>54,855</b>	<b>22.5%</b>	<b>40,590</b>	<b>20.2%</b>	<b>-17,510</b>	<b>-30.1%</b>
Low Medium I	10,000	4.0%	15,117	6.2%	13,321	6.6%	3,321	33.2%
Low Medium II	106,300	42.7%	94,494	38.8%	76,718	38.1%	-29,582	-27.8%
Medium	63,200	25.4%	77,338	31.7%	69,880	34.7%	6,680	10.6%
High-Medium	11,600	4.7%	1,979	0.8%	899	0.4%	-10,701	-92.3%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>191,100</b>	<b>76.7%</b>	<b>188,928</b>	<b>77.5%</b>	<b>160,818</b>	<b>79.8%</b>	<b>-30,282</b>	<b>-15.8%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>249,200</b>		<b>243,783</b>		<b>201,408</b>		<b>-47,792</b>	<b>-19.2%</b>

#### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	172,937	13.58	13,459	\$41,741	25.6%	62.0%	37.4%	91.4%
rank (of 35)	6	15	9	29	8	15	23	24
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	37.9%	3.8%	52.3%	3.2%	20.2%	15.0%	2.80	57.8%
rank (of 35)	18	33	1	32	21	6	16	23

WEST LOS ANGELES

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	22839	22839	97-0048 CPU
Council File #	73-2225	87-0590-S1	98-2024
Adopted	3/21/74	2/24/88	7/27/99

CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	44.2%	2,006	44.0%	2,005	43.6%	1,472	-0.6%	-1.4%
Multi-Family	23.0%	1,045	22.8%	1,036	20.4%	689	-2.6%	-11.4%
Commercial	11.1%	502	11.1%	507	9.3%	314	-1.8%	-16.0%
Industrial	7.9%	357	7.8%	356	8.4%	283	0.5%	6.5%
Open Space	13.9%	629	14.2%	648	18.4%	621	4.5%	32.6%


CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	34,535	33.7%	34,525	32.9%	25,260	32.2%	-9,275	-26.9%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>34,535</b>	<b>33.7%</b>	<b>34,525</b>	<b>32.9%</b>	<b>25,260</b>	<b>32.2%</b>	<b>-9,275</b>	<b>-26.9%</b>
Low Medium I	3,177	3.1%	3,177	3.0%	2,449	3.1%	-728	-22.9%
Low Medium II	0	-	-	-	2,000	2.5%	2,000	-
Medium	52,648	51.3%	52,648	50.2%	36,130	46.0%	-16,518	-31.4%
High-Medium	12,240	11.9%	12,240	11.7%	12,727	16.2%	487	4.0%
High	-	-	2,297	2.2%	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>68,065</b>	<b>66.3%</b>	<b>70,362</b>	<b>67.1%</b>	<b>53,306</b>	<b>67.8%</b>	<b>-14,759</b>	<b>-21.7%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>102,600</b>		<b>104,887</b>		<b>78,566</b>		<b>-24,034</b>	<b>-23.4%</b>

AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	71,944	7.06	10,835	\$83,277	12.0%	57.8%	27.7%	92.8%
rank (of 35)	22	28	15	6	26	18	28	17


	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	13.7%	65.1%	2.9%	13.9%	16.6%	5.9%	2.02	70.9%
rank (of 35)	30	5	27	12	24	33	31	12



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities



# WESTLAKE



	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	22884	22884	94-0212 CPU
Council File #	72-1711-S1	86-0534-S2	04-0297
Adopted	7/25/72	12/17/87	7/27/99

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	-	-
Multi-Family	45.9%	934	44.4%	903	47.4%	649	1.5%	3.4%
Commercial	39.2%	798	42.3%	861	38.9%	532	-0.3%	-0.8%
Industrial	6.0%	122	5.9%	121	4.2%	57	-1.8%	-30.5%
Open Space	8.9%	181	7.4%	150	9.5%	130	0.6%	6.8%

## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)



	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>
Low Medium I	8,200	9.2%	6,820	8.0%	7,957	5.9%	-243	-3.0%
Low Medium II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium	18,700	21.1%	19,910	23.2%	34,965	26.1%	16,265	87.0%
High-Medium	49,600	55.9%	48,440	56.5%	56,354	42.1%	6,754	13.6%
High	12,200	13.8%	10,510	12.3%	34,740	25.9%	22,540	184.8%
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>88,700</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>85,680</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>134,016</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>45,316</b>	<b>51.1%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>88,700</b>		<b>85,680</b>		<b>134,016</b>		<b>45,316</b>	<b>51.1%</b>

## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>5</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	106,714	3.16	38,111	\$29,265	40.4%	93.9%	6.8%	72.5%
rank (of 35)	12	33	1	34	3	1	34	33

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	77.6%	4.2%	4.0%	12.8%	54.0%	15.1%	3.12	22.8%
rank (of 35)	3	31	21	13	1	5	11	35

# WESTCHESTER - PLAYA DEL REY



	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	22884	22884	94-0212 CPU
Council File #	72-1711-S1	86-0534-S2	04-0297
Adopted	7/25/72	12/17/87	7/27/99

### CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	45.1%	2,164	43.9%	2,108	36.5%	1,754	-8.5%	-18.9%
Multi-Family	14.2%	682	17.3%	936	14.1%	635	-0.1%	-0.7%
Commercial	11.2%	537	12.2%	659	10.2%	457	-1.0%	-9.2%
Industrial	14.1%	678	14.3%	770	11.0%	494	-3.1%	-22.3%
Open Space	15.4%	739	17.1%	922	25.8%	1,160	10.4%	67.4%

### CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	39,500	42.5%	38,530	34.0%	27,265	31.1%	-12,235	-31.0%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>39,500</b>	<b>42.5%</b>	<b>38,530</b>	<b>34.0%</b>	<b>27,265</b>	<b>31.1%</b>	<b>-12,235</b>	<b>-31.0%</b>
Low Medium I	3,500	3.8%	4,920	4.3%	1,561	1.8%	-1,939	-55.4%
Low Medium II	0	-	-	-	3,183	3.6%	3,183	-
Medium	32,000	34.4%	41,690	36.8%	37,929	43.2%	5,929	18.5%
High-Medium	18,000	19.4%	28,200	24.9%	17,841	20.3%	-1,59	-0.9%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>53,500</b>	<b>57.5%</b>	<b>74,810</b>	<b>66.0%</b>	<b>60,514</b>	<b>68.9%</b>	<b>7,014</b>	<b>13.1%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>93,000</b>		<b>113,340</b>		<b>87,779</b>		<b>-5,221</b>	<b>-5.6%</b>

### AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	51,255	13.77	3,962	\$76,912	9.1%	45.5%	42.7%	93.4%
rank (of 35)	29	14	29	9	30	23	17	16

	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	15.5%	56.4%	14.7%	8.8%	9.8%	8.9%	2.22	77.1%
rank (of 35)	29	8	7	18	32	24	28	5

WESTWOOD

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	12142	12142	97-0049 CPU
Council File #	72-175, -A	84-1635, -S1	98-1534
Adopted	7/25/72	12/17/87	7/27/99

CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	32.3%	996	32.5%	1,002	31.1%	699	-1.2%	-3.9%
Multi-Family	14.1%	434	13.7%	423	14.9%	336	0.9%	6.1%
Commercial	4.2%	128	4.6%	143	3.7%	84	-0.4%	-10.1%
Industrial	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0.0%	-
Open Space	49.4%	1,523	49.1%	1,513	50.2%	1,130	0.8%	1.6%

CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)


	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	0	-	144	0.3%	125	0.3%	125	-
Very Low I	894	1.4%	66	0.1%	72	0.1%	-822	-91.9%
Very Low II	-	-	288	0.6%	-	-	-	-
Low I	13,460	20.5%	10,293	22.6%	10,472	21.3%	-2,988	-22.2%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>14,354</b>	<b>21.9%</b>	<b>10,791</b>	<b>23.7%</b>	<b>10,669</b>	<b>21.7%</b>	<b>-3,685</b>	<b>-25.7%</b>
Low Medium I	320	0.5%	280	0.6%	208	0.4%	-112	-35.0%
Low Medium II	0	-	3,830	8.4%	2,631	5.3%	2,631	-
Medium	13,370	20.4%	4,986	10.9%	8,998	18.3%	-4,372	-32.7%
High-Medium	18,725	28.5%	16,645	36.5%	17,476	35.5%	-1,249	-6.7%
High	18,900	28.8%	9,094	19.9%	9,216	18.7%	-9,684	-51.2%
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>51,315</b>	<b>78.1%</b>	<b>34,835</b>	<b>76.3%</b>	<b>38,529</b>	<b>78.3%</b>	<b>-12,786</b>	<b>-24.9%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>65,669</b>		<b>45,626</b>		<b>49,198</b>		<b>-16,471</b>	<b>-25.1%</b>

AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	48,130	3.67	14,301	\$103,959	32.5%	62.1%	16.1%	96.6%
rank (of 35)	30	31	5	3	6	14	31	4



	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	7.1%	62.6%	2.0%	22.9%	14.3%	11.9%	1.98	56.3%
rank (of 35)	33	7	30	3	30	16	32	26



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities



# WILMINGTON - HARBOR CITY



	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	17234	17234	97-0050 CPU
Council File #	70-170, -S1	90-0307	98-1619
Adopted	11/17/70	6/15/89	7/14/99

## CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	25.4%	1,638	20.8%	1,297	23.3%	1,248	-2.1%	-8.4%
Multi-Family	11.6%	750	15.9%	991	11.4%	613	-0.2%	-1.8%
Commercial	5.1%	329	5.7%	358	5.7%	308	0.6%	12.5%
Industrial	57.9%	3,731	35.8%	2,232	38.1%	2,044	-19.8%	-34.2%
Open Space	0.0%	0	21.8%	1,360	21.5%	1,152	21.5%	-


## CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Low I	31,521	40.1%	23,605	32.1%	29,636	37.1%	-1,885	-6.0%
Low II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>31,521</b>	<b>40.1%</b>	<b>23,605</b>	<b>32.1%</b>	<b>29,636</b>	<b>37.1%</b>	<b>-1,885</b>	<b>-6.0%</b>
Low Medium I	*	-	11,020	15.0%	9,242	11.6%	-	-
Low Medium II	*	-	23,755	32.3%	20,784	26.0%	-	-
Medium	*	-	15,220	20.7%	20,134	25.2%	-	-
High-Medium	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
High	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>47,050</b>	<b>59.9%</b>	<b>49,995</b>	<b>67.9%</b>	<b>50,160</b>	<b>62.9%</b>	<b>3,110</b>	<b>6.6%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>78,571</b>		<b>73,600</b>		<b>79,796</b>		<b>1,225</b>	<b>1.6%</b>

## AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	74,948	11.34	7,158	\$46,431	24.4%	59.5%	42.7%	76.9%
rank (of 35)	20	21	23	27	10	17	18	31
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
	73.7%	12.9%	5.4%	5.5%	30.4%	12.3%	3.53	61.7%
rank (of 35)	4	26	15	24	10	14	7	19

WILSHIRE



- Legend
- Single-Family Residential
  - Multi-Family Residential
  - Commercial
  - Industrial
  - Open Space
  - Public Facilities

	PLAN 1	PLAN 2	PLAN 3
CPC #	21327	21327	97-0051 CPU
Council File #	75-2824, -S1	84-1750, 88-0896	01-01366
Adopted	5/17/76	7/13/88	9/19/01

CHANGES IN LAND USE AREA

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	acres	%	acres	%	acres <sup>2</sup>	net	% diff
Single-Family	31.2%	2,779	30.7%	2,737	31.8%	2,078	0.6%	1.9%
Multi-Family	42.6%	3,800	42.8%	3,812	42.6%	2,788	0.0%	0.0%
Commercial	17.2%	1,536	17.8%	1,583	18.7%	1,222	1.4%	8.4%
Industrial	0.6%	51	0.7%	64	0.6%	40	0.0%	6.9%
Open Space	8.4%	746	8.0%	715	6.3%	412	-2.1%	-24.7%

CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL DENSITY (POPULATION CAPACITY)

	PLAN 1		PLAN 2		PLAN 3		CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	pop'n	%	net	% diff
Minimum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Very Low I	300	0.1%	200	0.1%	143	0.0%	-157	-52.3%
Very Low II	5,000	2.1%	4,900	2.0%	2,992	0.9%	-2,008	-40.2%
Low I	2,000	0.8%	2,400	1.0%	1,487	0.4%	-513	-25.7%
Low II	32,000	13.5%	31,400	13.1%	31,164	9.3%	-836	-2.6%
<b>Single-Family</b>	<b>39,300</b>	<b>16.6%</b>	<b>38,900</b>	<b>16.3%</b>	<b>35,786</b>	<b>10.6%</b>	<b>-3,514</b>	<b>-8.9%</b>
Low Medium I	19,500	8.3%	19,500	8.1%	18,785	5.6%	-715	-3.7%
Low Medium II	14,000	5.9%	14,900	6.2%	17,300	5.1%	3,300	23.6%
Medium	122,500	51.8%	114,400	47.8%	109,177	32.5%	-13,323	-10.9%
High-Medium	41,000	17.4%	51,600	21.6%	155,296	46.2%	114,296	278.8%
High	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Multi-Family</b>	<b>197,000</b>	<b>83.4%</b>	<b>200,400</b>	<b>83.7%</b>	<b>300,558</b>	<b>89.4%</b>	<b>103,558</b>	<b>52.6%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>236,300</b>		<b>239,300</b>		<b>336,344</b>		<b>100,044</b>	<b>42.3%</b>

AREA CHARACTERISTICS<sup>3</sup>

	Population	Area (mi <sup>2</sup> )	Density <sup>4</sup>	Income <sup>5</sup>	Poverty <sup>6</sup>	Renters	SFD <sup>7</sup>	Housing <sup>8</sup>
	292,163	13.97	22,695	\$48,401	24.8%	81.7%	14.2%	88.5%
rank (of 35)	1	13	2	23	9	4	32	28
	Latino	White	Black	Asian	Foreign <sup>9</sup>	Jobless <sup>10</sup>	#/Unit <sup>11</sup>	Drivers <sup>12</sup>
rank (of 35)	41.3%	23.7%	8.8%	23.3%	38.5%	12.0%	2.50	50.8%
	15	20	8	2	3	15	24	29

## APPENDIX B

### ORDERED SUMMARY OF LAND USE CHANGES

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In this appendix is a summary of the area and density land use changes discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2.

Included are the following:

- (1) Land Area Change - Single-Family Residential
- (2) Land Area Change - Multi-Family Residential
- (3) Land Area Change - Commercial
- (4) Land Area Change - Industrial
- (5) Land Area Change - Open Space & Public Facilities
- (6) Density Change - Total
- (7) Density Change - Single-Family
- (8) Density Change - Multi-Family

All data comes from the 104 community plans adopted by the City of Los Angeles.

LAND AREA CHANGE - SINGLE-FAMILY

LAND AREA CHANGE - MULTI-FAMILY

SINGLE-FAMILY		1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
		%	%	%	net	% diff
1	BOYLE HEIGHTS	1.6%	0.8%	0.9%	-0.7%	-42.7%
2	ARLETA	68.0%	*	46.3%	-21.7%	-31.9%
3	SOUTH L.A.	44.3%	42.7%	35.7%	-8.6%	-19.4%
4	HOLLYWOOD	41.3%	34.8%	33.7%	-7.6%	-18.3%
5	HARBOR GATEWAY	30.7%	30.5%	26.2%	-4.6%	-14.8%
6	BEL AIR	78.0%	78.0%	66.6%	-11.4%	-14.7%
7	WESTCHESTER	45.1%	39.1%	39.0%	-6.1%	-13.5%
8	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	46.5%	44.6%	41.9%	-4.6%	-10.0%
9	VAN NUYS	53.7%	53.5%	48.9%	-4.8%	-9.0%
10	WILMINGTON	25.4%	20.8%	23.3%	-2.1%	-8.4%
11	VENICE	25.8%	24.7%	23.7%	-2.1%	-8.3%
12	SILVER LAKE	19.4%	18.6%	17.9%	-1.5%	-7.8%
13	SAN PEDRO	42.0%	39.9%	39.1%	-2.9%	-6.9%
14	SOUTHEAST L.A.	12.6%	12.5%	11.8%	-0.8%	-6.0%
15	SYLMAR	68.6%	66.9%	65.0%	-3.5%	-5.2%
16	SHERMAN OAKS	75.2%	73.8%	71.7%	-3.5%	-4.6%
17	PALMS	50.7%	48.5%	48.4%	-2.3%	-4.5%
18	NORTHRIDGE	73.7%	73.0%	70.6%	-3.1%	-4.2%
19	GRANADA HILLS	67.5%	66.3%	64.9%	-2.6%	-3.9%
20	WESTWOOD	32.3%	32.5%	31.1%	-1.2%	-3.9%
21	RESEDA	59.3%	56.4%	57.3%	-2.0%	-3.3%
22	SUN VALLEY	47.9%	48.4%	47.2%	-0.7%	-1.5%
23	WEST L.A.	44.2%	44.0%	43.6%	-0.6%	-1.4%
24	CANOGA PARK	69.1%	70.4%	68.2%	-0.9%	-1.3%
25	WEST ADAMS	39.8%	37.1%	39.4%	-0.3%	-0.9%
26	MISSION HILLS	62.7%	37.2%	62.4%	-0.3%	-0.4%
27	CENTRAL CITY	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
28	CENTRAL CITY NORTH	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
29	WESTLAKE	0%	0%	0%	0%	-
30	ENCINO	60.3%	60.4%	60.6%	0.2%	0.4%
31	CHATSWORTH	60.6%	60.6%	60.8%	0.3%	0.4%
32	WILSHIRE	31.2%	30.7%	31.8%	0.6%	1.9%
33	NORTHEAST L.A.	45.0%	46.6%	47.8%	2.8%	6.1%
34	SUNLAND	54.8%	56.9%	65.3%	10.5%	19.1%
35	BRENTWOOD	39.0%	39.5%	49.0%	9.9%	25.4%
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>		<b>48.9%</b>	<b>47.0%</b>	<b>48.6%</b>	<b>-0.3%</b>	<b>-0.6%</b>

MULTI-FAMILY		1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
		%	%	%	net	% diff
1	NORTHEAST L.A.	18.9%	19.5%	14.5%	-4.4%	-23.0%
2	VENICE	50.9%	48.8%	41.6%	-9.3%	-18.3%
3	WEST ADAMS	39.7%	40.3%	33.0%	-6.6%	-16.8%
4	CANOGA PARK	6.7%	6.4%	5.7%	-1.0%	-14.3%
5	WEST L.A.	23.0%	22.8%	20.4%	-2.6%	-11.4%
6	HOLLYWOOD	17.6%	17.6%	15.7%	-1.9%	-10.9%
7	SOUTHEAST L.A.	51.0%	50.0%	46.6%	-4.4%	-8.6%
8	BRENTWOOD	1.7%	1.9%	1.6%	-0.1%	-5.8%
9	SAN PEDRO	26.2%	28.6%	24.7%	-1.5%	-5.8%
10	SYLMAR	5.9%	5.8%	5.8%	-0.1%	-1.9%
11	WILMINGTON	11.6%	15.9%	11.4%	-0.2%	-1.8%
12	ENCINO	3.7%	3.8%	3.7%	0.0%	-1.2%
13	WESTCHESTER	14.2%	17.3%	14.1%	-0.1%	-0.7%
14	BOYLE HEIGHTS	41.3%	41.7%	41.3%	0.0%	-0.1%
15	WILSHIRE	42.6%	42.8%	42.6%	0.0%	0.0%
16	HARBOR GATEWAY	12.4%	12.8%	12.6%	0.2%	1.2%
17	WESTLAKE	45.9%	44.4%	47.4%	1.5%	3.4%
18	PALMS	21.8%	23.5%	22.8%	1.0%	4.5%
19	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	24.8%	25.9%	26.1%	1.3%	5.3%
20	WESTWOOD	14.1%	13.7%	14.9%	0.9%	6.1%
21	VAN NUYS	18.0%	19.7%	19.2%	1.3%	7.0%
22	SILVER LAKE	8.4%	11.0%	9.0%	0.6%	7.2%
23	SHERMAN OAKS	8.4%	11.0%	9.0%	0.6%	7.2%
24	CENTRAL CITY NORTH	6.6%	6.5%	7.2%	0.6%	9.2%
25	SOUTH L.A.	29.3%	27.8%	32.8%	3.4%	11.7%
26	RESEDA	7.2%	9.6%	8.3%	1.1%	15.1%
27	GRANADA HILLS	2.2%	2.3%	2.6%	0.4%	16.5%
28	NORTHRIDGE	5.7%	6.5%	6.7%	1.0%	16.8%
29	SUNLAND	3.2%	2.6%	3.8%	0.6%	18.2%
30	SUN VALLEY	2.7%	2.9%	3.9%	1.2%	43.6%
31	MISSION HILLS	11.1%	40.3%	17.0%	5.9%	52.6%
32	CHATSWORTH	3.8%	3.8%	6.5%	2.7%	69.7%
33	ARLETA	3.1%	*	6.4%	3.3%	104%
34	BEL AIR	0.2%	0.1%	0.6%	0.4%	234%
35	CENTRAL CITY	1.5%	7.8%	8.4%	6.8%	441%
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>		<b>14.5%</b>	<b>16.1%</b>	<b>13.2%</b>	<b>-1.3%</b>	<b>-9.0%</b>

## LAND AREA CHANGE - COMMERCIAL

COMMERCIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 BEL AIR	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	-0.1%	-49.9%
2 VENICE	9.9%	10.2%	6.6%	-3.3%	-33.5%
3 ARLETA	4.8%	*	3.6%	-1.2%	-24.9%
4 HARBOR GATEWAY	5.3%	4.1%	4.0%	-1.2%	-23.6%
5 BRENTWOOD	0.7%	0.7%	0.5%	-0.2%	-22.1%
6 ENCINO	3.6%	3.0%	3.0%	-0.7%	-18.5%
7 WEST L.A.	11.1%	11.1%	9.3%	-1.8%	-16.0%
8 BOYLE HEIGHTS	8.9%	9.5%	8.0%	-1.0%	-10.7%
9 SYLMAR	2.6%	2.5%	2.3%	-0.3%	-10.2%
10 WESTWOOD	4.2%	4.6%	3.7%	-0.4%	-10.1%
11 SAN PEDRO	6.5%	6.8%	5.9%	-0.6%	-9.9%
12 WESTCHESTER	11.2%	12.2%	10.2%	-1.0%	-9.2%
13 SUNLAND	1.4%	1.5%	1.3%	-0.1%	-9.1%
14 SILVER LAKE	7.3%	7.3%	6.7%	-0.6%	-8.2%
15 SHERMAN OAKS	7.3%	7.3%	6.7%	-0.6%	-8.2%
16 NORTHEAST L.A.	5.3%	5.5%	5.0%	-0.3%	-5.8%
17 MISSION HILLS	8.4%	10.3%	8.2%	-0.2%	-2.9%
18 WESTLAKE	39.2%	42.3%	38.9%	-0.3%	-0.8%
19 HOLLYWOOD	6.0%	7.3%	6.0%	0.0%	-0.2%
20 NORTHRIDGE	4.3%	4.7%	4.4%	0.1%	2.3%
21 CANOGA PARK	6.2%	6.6%	6.7%	0.5%	7.9%
22 GRANADA HILLS	3.0%	3.0%	3.2%	0.2%	8.1%
23 WILSHIRE	17.2%	17.8%	18.7%	1.4%	8.4%
24 RESEDA	4.7%	5.2%	5.1%	0.4%	8.5%
25 SUN VALLEY	1.7%	1.9%	1.9%	0.2%	9.5%
26 WILMINGTON	5.1%	5.7%	5.7%	0.6%	12.5%
27 PALMS	5.4%	6.1%	6.1%	0.7%	12.8%
28 NORTH HOLLYWOOD	8.8%	10.1%	10.4%	1.6%	18.4%
29 VAN NUYS	7.7%	7.8%	9.1%	1.4%	18.4%
30 WEST ADAMS	8.6%	10.3%	10.3%	1.7%	19.3%
31 SOUTH L.A.	11.6%	14.5%	14.4%	2.8%	23.7%
32 CHATSWORTH	3.2%	3.2%	4.1%	0.8%	26.0%
33 SOUTHEAST L.A.	6.5%	7.4%	8.7%	2.2%	33.8%
34 CENTRAL CITY	21.8%	38.3%	34.1%	12.3%	56.4%
35 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	5.7%	7.1%	10.3%	4.6%	81.2%
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>	<b>5.8%</b>	<b>6.5%</b>	<b>5.7%</b>	<b>-0.1%</b>	<b>-1.5%</b>

## LAND AREA CHANGE - INDUSTRIAL

INDUSTRIAL	1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
	%	%	%	net	% diff
1 SUNLAND	2.6%	0.4%	0.3%	-2.4%	-89.9%
2 VENICE	5.6%	5.1%	2.7%	-2.9%	-51.6%
3 HOLLYWOOD	3.3%	2.2%	2.0%	-1.3%	-39.3%
4 WILMINGTON	57.9%	35.8%	38.1%	-19.8%	-34.2%
5 WESTLAKE	6.0%	5.9%	4.2%	-1.8%	-30.5%
6 ENCINO	0.3%	0.4%	0.2%	-0.1%	-25.2%
7 WESTCHESTER	14.1%	14.3%	11.0%	-3.1%	-22.3%
8 CENTRAL CITY NORTH	69.9%	75.7%	55.9%	-13.9%	-19.9%
9 NORTHEAST L.A.	10.3%	10.2%	8.8%	-1.4%	-14.1%
10 CENTRAL CITY	50.0%	40.4%	43.2%	-6.8%	-13.6%
11 VAN NUYS	11.0%	10.7%	9.5%	-1.5%	-13.6%
12 CANOGA PARK	5.2%	5.3%	4.7%	-0.5%	-9.7%
13 CHATSWORTH	12.9%	12.9%	12.0%	-0.9%	-7.3%
14 WEST ADAMS	6.3%	6.3%	6.1%	-0.2%	-2.7%
15 BEL AIR	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-
16 BRENTWOOD	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-
17 WESTWOOD	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	-
18 GRANADA HILLS	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	-
19 SUN VALLEY	19.5%	19.7%	20.1%	0.6%	3.1%
20 SOUTHEAST L.A.	19.4%	19.4%	20.0%	0.7%	3.4%
21 HARBOR GATEWAY	37.5%	38.7%	39.9%	2.4%	6.4%
22 WEST L.A.	7.9%	7.8%	8.4%	0.5%	6.5%
23 WILSHIRE	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%	0.0%	6.9%
24 ARLETA	9.4%	*	10.0%	0.7%	7.3%
25 BOYLE HEIGHTS	24.1%	23.4%	26.2%	2.0%	8.4%
26 SILVER LAKE	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%	0.1%	11.6%
27 SHERMAN OAKS	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%	0.1%	11.6%
28 NORTHRIDGE	3.3%	2.9%	3.7%	0.5%	14.9%
29 PALMS	7.6%	8.0%	9.2%	1.6%	20.6%
30 NORTH HOLLYWOOD	6.6%	7.0%	8.0%	1.5%	22.2%
31 SOUTH L.A.	3.7%	3.8%	4.6%	0.9%	25.2%
32 MISSION HILLS	4.3%	6.3%	5.7%	1.4%	33.8%
33 SYLMAR	6.4%	7.5%	11.0%	4.6%	72.2%
34 RESEDA	7.8%	7.9%	17.3%	9.5%	120.7%
35 SAN PEDRO	3.3%	5.7%	7.5%	4.2%	128.7%
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>	<b>8.3%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>	<b>-0.5%</b>	<b>-5.8%</b>

LAND AREA CHANGE - OPEN SPACE & PUBLIC FACILITIES

DENSITY CHANGE - TOTAL

OPEN SPACE		1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
		%	%	%	net	% diff
1	MISSION HILLS	13.5%	6.0%	6.7%	-6.8%	-50.2%
2	CENTRAL CITY	26.7%	13.5%	14.4%	-12.3%	-46.1%
3	RESEDA	21.0%	20.8%	12.0%	-9.0%	-42.8%
4	WILSHIRE	8.4%	8.0%	6.3%	-2.1%	-24.7%
5	SUNLAND	37.9%	38.7%	29.3%	-8.6%	-22.6%
6	BRENTWOOD	58.5%	57.9%	48.9%	-9.7%	-16.5%
7	CHATSWORTH	19.5%	19.5%	16.6%	-2.8%	-14.5%
8	PALMS	14.5%	13.8%	13.5%	-1.0%	-6.6%
9	SUN VALLEY	28.1%	27.1%	26.9%	-1.2%	-4.4%
10	SYLMAR	16.6%	17.4%	15.9%	-0.7%	-4.2%
11	BOYLE HEIGHTS	24.0%	24.6%	23.6%	-0.4%	-1.5%
12	WESTWOOD	49.4%	49.1%	50.2%	0.8%	1.6%
13	ENCINO	32.0%	32.5%	32.6%	0.5%	1.7%
14	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	13.4%	12.4%	13.6%	0.3%	1.9%
15	SAN PEDRO	22.0%	19.1%	22.8%	0.9%	3.9%
16	WESTLAKE	8.9%	7.4%	9.5%	0.6%	6.8%
17	GRANADA HILLS	27.2%	28.4%	29.2%	2.0%	7.5%
18	NORTHRIDGE	13.0%	12.9%	14.6%	1.6%	12.1%
19	SOUTH L.A.	11.1%	11.3%	12.6%	1.5%	13.3%
20	CANOGA PARK	12.8%	11.2%	14.6%	1.9%	14.6%
21	NORTHEAST L.A.	20.5%	18.2%	23.8%	3.3%	16.3%
22	SOUTHEAST L.A.	10.5%	10.7%	12.8%	2.3%	21.6%
23	HARBOR GATEWAY	14.1%	13.9%	17.3%	3.3%	23.1%
24	WEST L.A.	13.9%	14.2%	18.4%	4.5%	32.6%
25	HOLLYWOOD	31.9%	38.1%	42.7%	10.8%	33.8%
26	VAN NUYS	9.6%	8.2%	13.2%	3.6%	37.9%
27	SILVER LAKE	8.6%	7.5%	12.0%	3.4%	39.6%
28	SHERMAN OAKS	8.6%	7.5%	12.0%	3.4%	39.6%
29	CENTRAL CITY NORTH	17.9%	10.7%	26.6%	8.7%	48.8%
30	BEL AIR	21.6%	21.7%	32.7%	11.1%	51.4%
31	WESTCHESTER	15.4%	17.1%	25.8%	10.4%	67.4%
32	WEST ADAMS	5.7%	6.0%	11.1%	5.5%	97.1%
33	ARLETA	14.8%	*	33.7%	19.0%	128%
34	VENICE	7.8%	11.2%	25.4%	17.7%	227%
35	WILMINGTON	0.0%	21.8%	21.5%	21.5%	∞
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>		<b>22.4%</b>	<b>22.6%</b>	<b>24.6%</b>	<b>2.2%</b>	<b>9.7%</b>

TOTAL		1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
		pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1	VENICE	61,300	61,700	36,276	-25,024	-40.8%
2	SAN PEDRO	101,000	103,778	75,327	-25,673	-25.4%
3	WESTWOOD	65,669	45,626	49,198	-16,471	-25.1%
4	SHERMAN OAKS	118,970	136,315	90,583	-28,387	-23.9%
5	WEST L.A.	102,600	104,887	78,566	-24,034	-23.4%
6	WEST ADAMS	249,200	243,783	201,408	-47,792	-19.2%
7	PALMS	131,500	138,500	113,942	-17,558	-13.4%
8	ENCINO	98,480	102,785	86,216	-12,264	-12.5%
9	BRENTWOOD	72,700	71,300	67,178	-5,522	-7.6%
10	GRANADA HILLS	73,980	76,200	69,296	-4,684	-6.3%
11	WESTCHESTER	93,000	113,340	87,779	-5,221	-5.6%
12	NORTHEAST L.A.	266,500	269,900	267,973	1,473	0.6%
13	SILVER LAKE	94,317	96,180	94,900	583	0.6%
14	WILMINGTON	78,571	73,600	79,796	1,225	1.6%
15	RESEDA	105,801	124,850	109,231	3,430	3.2%
16	HOLLYWOOD	240,480	231,395	249,062	8,582	3.6%
17	NORTHRIDGE	64,000	68,100	66,351	2,351	3.7%
18	CANOGA PARK	193,000	179,769	200,931	7,931	4.1%
19	SUNLAND	68,000	74,461	72,101	4,101	6.0%
20	HARBOR GATEWAY	39,200	40,983	43,216	4,016	10.2%
21	CENTRAL CITY	30,775	35,235	34,765	3,990	13.0%
22	CENTRAL CITY NORTH	17,000	17,745	19,230	2,230	13.1%
23	CHATSWORTH	116,300	116,300	134,950	18,650	16.0%
24	BEL AIR	24,700	24,955	30,180	5,480	22.2%
25	SOUTH L.A.	236,700	239,200	292,394	55,694	23.5%
26	BOYLE HEIGHTS	87,900	98,322	110,486	22,586	25.7%
27	VAN NUYS	129,340	153,063	168,431	39,091	30.2%
28	SUN VALLEY	75,000	76,200	97,748	22,748	30.3%
29	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	118,892	130,407	156,181	37,289	31.4%
30	SYLMAR	74,400	76,643	99,492	25,092	33.7%
31	SOUTHEAST L.A.	211,000	209,510	288,162	77,162	36.6%
32	WILSHIRE	236,300	239,300	336,344	100,044	42.3%
33	MISSION HILLS	109,000	159,894	155,664	46,664	42.8%
34	WESTLAKE	88,700	85,680	134,016	45,316	51.1%
35	ARLETA	79,900	95,606	146,700	66,800	83.6%
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>		<b>3,954,175</b>	<b>4,115,512</b>	<b>4,344,073</b>	<b>389,898</b>	<b>9.9%</b>



DENSITY CHANGE - SINGLE-FAMILY

DENSITY CHANGE - MULTI-FAMILY

SINGLE-FAMILY		1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
		pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1	BOYLE HEIGHTS	1,550	872	630	-920	-59.4%
2	SAN PEDRO	43,500	41,436	26,243	-17,257	-39.7%
3	SOUTH L.A.	79,800	77,320	48,779	-31,021	-38.9%
4	VENICE	8,500	8,400	5,380	-3,120	-36.7%
5	SILVER LAKE	19,034	17,026	12,722	-6,312	-33.2%
6	WESTCHESTER	39,500	38,530	27,265	-12,235	-31.0%
7	WEST ADAMS	58,100	54,855	40,590	-17,510	-30.1%
8	PALMS	47,500	46,300	33,569	-13,931	-29.3%
9	SHERMAN OAKS	65,868	64,117	47,403	-18,465	-28.0%
10	WEST L.A.	34,535	34,525	25,260	-9,275	-26.9%
11	WESTWOOD	14,354	10,791	10,669	-3,685	-25.7%
12	ENCINO	71,530	71,905	55,750	-15,780	-22.1%
13	ARLETA	72,300	70,861	58,091	-14,209	-19.7%
14	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	45,300	45,161	36,947	-8,353	-18.4%
15	HARBOR GATEWAY	17,700	18,158	14,532	-3,168	-17.9%
16	RESEDA	74,536	78,160	64,431	-10,105	-13.6%
17	HOLLYWOOD	51,240	66,860	45,442	-5,798	-11.3%
18	BRENTWOOD	50,200	48,400	45,232	-4,968	-9.9%
19	WILSHIRE	39,300	38,900	35,786	-3,514	-8.9%
20	SUNLAND	51,700	58,222	47,869	-3,831	-7.4%
21	GRANADA HILLS	62,430	63,820	58,075	-4,355	-7.0%
22	WILMINGTON	31,521	23,605	29,636	-1,885	-6.0%
23	VAN NUYS	59,810	61,658	57,041	-2,769	-4.6%
24	NORTHRIDGE	44,000	43,800	42,740	-1,260	-2.9%
25	CENTRAL CITY	0	0	0	0	-
26	CENTRAL CITY NORTH	0	0	0	0	-
27	WESTLAKE	0	0	0	0	-
28	SUN VALLEY	59,500	61,312	59,825	325	0.5%
29	MISSION HILLS	63,400	85,581	64,402	1,002	1.6%
30	CHATSWORTH	89,400	89,400	92,710	3,310	3.7%
31	CANOGA PARK	124,400	110,317	133,508	9,108	7.3%
32	SOUTHEAST L.A.	21,000	20,895	24,071	3,071	14.6%
33	BEL AIR	23,700	23,955	28,220	4,520	19.1%
34	NORTHEAST L.A.	106,100	105,200	126,832	20,732	19.5%
35	SYLMAR	53,330	55,024	67,801	14,471	27.1%
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>		<b>1,624,638</b>	<b>1,635,366</b>	<b>1,467,451</b>	<b>-157,187</b>	<b>-9.7%</b>

MULTI-FAMILY		1970s	1980s	1990s	CHANGE <sup>1</sup>	
		pop'n	pop'n	pop'n	net	% diff
1	VENICE	52,800	53,300	30,896	-21,904	-41.5%
2	WESTWOOD	51,315	34,835	38,529	-12,786	-24.9%
3	WEST L.A.	68,065	70,362	53,306	-14,759	-21.7%
4	SHERMAN OAKS	53,102	72,198	43,180	-9,922	-18.7%
5	WEST ADAMS	191,100	188,928	160,818	-30,282	-15.8%
6	SAN PEDRO	57,500	62,342	49,084	-8,416	-14.6%
7	NORTHEAST L.A.	160,400	164,700	141,141	-19,259	-12.0%
8	PALMS	84,000	92,200	80,373	-3,627	-4.3%
9	GRANADA HILLS	11,550	12,380	11,221	-329	-2.8%
10	BRENTWOOD	22,500	22,900	21,946	-554	-2.5%
11	CANOGA PARK	68,600	69,452	67,423	-1,177	-1.7%
12	WILMINGTON	47,050	49,995	50,160	3,110	6.6%
13	HOLLYWOOD	189,240	164,535	203,620	14,380	7.6%
14	SILVER LAKE	75,283	79,154	82,178	6,895	9.2%
15	CENTRAL CITY	30,775	35,235	34,765	3,990	13.0%
16	ENCINO	26,950	30,880	30,466	3,516	13.0%
17	CENTRAL CITY NORTH	17,000	17,745	19,230	2,230	13.1%
18	WESTCHESTER	53,500	74,810	60,514	7,014	13.1%
19	NORTHRIDGE	20,000	24,300	23,611	3,611	18.1%
20	BOYLE HEIGHTS	86,350	97,450	109,856	23,506	27.2%
21	HARBOR GATEWAY	21,500	22,825	28,684	7,184	33.4%
22	SOUTHEAST L.A.	190,000	188,615	264,091	74,091	39.0%
23	RESEDA	31,265	46,690	44,800	13,535	43.3%
24	SUNLAND	16,300	16,239	24,232	7,932	48.7%
25	SYLMAR	21,070	21,619	31,691	10,621	50.4%
26	WESTLAKE	88,700	85,680	134,016	45,316	51.1%
27	WILSHIRE	197,000	200,400	300,558	103,558	52.6%
28	SOUTH L.A.	156,900	161,880	243,615	86,715	55.3%
29	CHATSWORTH	26,900	26,900	42,240	15,340	57.0%
30	VAN NUYS	69,530	91,405	111,390	41,860	60.2%
31	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	73,592	85,246	119,234	45,642	62.0%
32	BEL AIR	1,000	1,000	1,960	960	96.0%
33	MISSION HILLS	45,600	74,313	91,262	45,662	100%
34	SUN VALLEY	15,500	14,888	37,923	22,423	145%
35	ARLETA	7,600	24,745	88,609	81,009	1066%
<b>CITY-WIDE</b>		<b>2,329,537</b>	<b>2,480,146</b>	<b>2,876,622</b>	<b>547,085</b>	<b>23.5%</b>

## APPENDIX C

### SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY PLAN AREA CHARACTERISTICS

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This appendix contains data about the socio-economic and physical characteristics of each community plan area, sorted in order from most to least. Included are the following characteristics:

% Latino	Mean Household Income
% White	Total Population
% Black	Total Area (sq. mi)
% Asian	Density (people/sq. mi)
% Non-Citizens	Poverty Rate
% Unemployment	% Renters
Household Size	% Single-Family Homes
% Commute by Car	% Housing Uses

All data comes from the L.A. City Planning Department Demographic Research Unit, based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000.



<b>LATINO</b>		<b>WHITE</b>		<b>BLACK</b>				
1	Boyle Heights	93.7%	1	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	86.5%	1	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	52.3%
2	Arleta - Pacoima	83.4%	2	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	86.2%	2	South Los Angeles	37.6%
3	Westlake	77.6%	3	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	78.6%	3	Southeast Los Angeles	25.2%
4	Wilmington - Harbor City	73.7%	4	Encino - Tarzana	77.7%	4	Central City	23.6%
5	Southeast Los Angeles	72.6%	5	West L.A.	65.1%	5	Central City North	18.1%
6	Sylmar	69.9%	6	Venice	64.1%	6	Harbor Gateway	15.7%
7	Northeast Los Angeles	67.3%	7	Westwood	62.6%	7	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	14.7%
8	Sun Valley	65.9%	8	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	56.4%	8	Wilshire	8.8%
9	Mission Hills - Panorama City	63.5%	9	Canoga Park - Winnetka	56.2%	9	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	6.7%
10	Silver Lake - Echo Park	55.0%	10	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	55.9%	10	Venice	6.0%
11	Harbor Gateway	54.2%	11	Granada Hills - Knollwood	54.4%	11	San Pedro	6.0%
12	South Los Angeles	53.6%	12	Sunland-Tujunga	54.0%	12	Arleta - Pacoima	5.5%
13	Van Nuys	48.7%	13	Northridge	51.6%	13	Sunland-Tujunga	5.5%
14	North Hollywood	47.2%	14	Hollywood	47.3%	14	Van Nuys	5.5%
15	Wilshire	41.3%	15	San Pedro	44.6%	15	Wilmington - Harbor City	5.4%
16	Reseda	41.0%	16	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	42.3%	16	Northridge	5.2%
17	San Pedro	41.0%	17	Reseda	41.4%	17	North Hollywood	5.2%
18	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	37.9%	18	North Hollywood	37.4%	18	Mission Hills - Panorama City	4.4%
19	Hollywood	34.5%	19	Van Nuys	35.8%	19	Sylmar	4.2%
20	Central City North	34.0%	20	Wilshire	23.7%	20	Hollywood	4.0%
21	Central City	33.4%	21	Sun Valley	21.5%	21	Westlake	4.0%
22	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	30.7%	22	Silver Lake - Echo Park	20.6%	22	Reseda	3.9%
23	Sunland-Tujunga	30.5%	23	Sylmar	20.5%	23	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	3.8%
24	Canoga Park - Winnetka	26.6%	24	Mission Hills - Panorama City	18.1%	24	Granada Hills - Knollwood	3.7%
25	Northridge	24.4%	25	Central City	17.0%	25	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	3.6%
26	Venice	21.9%	26	Wilmington - Harbor City	12.9%	26	Canoga Park - Winnetka	3.3%
27	Granada Hills - Knollwood	21.6%	27	Northeast Los Angeles	12.8%	27	West L.A.	2.9%
28	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	20.2%	28	Harbor Gateway	11.7%	28	Encino - Tarzana	2.8%
29	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	15.5%	29	Central City North	11.1%	29	Silver Lake - Echo Park	2.1%
30	West L.A.	13.7%	30	Arleta - Pacoima	6.4%	30	Westwood	2.0%
31	Encino - Tarzana	9.9%	31	Westlake	4.2%	31	Sun Valley	1.9%
32	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	8.5%	32	South Los Angeles	4.1%	32	Northeast Los Angeles	1.9%
33	Westwood	7.1%	33	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	3.8%	33	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	1.6%
34	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	4.2%	34	Boyle Heights	2.2%	34	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	0.9%
35	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	4.1%	35	Southeast Los Angeles	1.0%	35	Boyle Heights	0.9%

<b>ASIAN</b>		<b>FOREIGN</b>		<b>JOBLESS</b>				
1	Central City North	35.3%	1	Westlake	54.0%	1	Central City	36.3%
2	Wilshire	23.3%	2	Boyle Heights	40.0%	2	Southeast Los Angeles	19.7%
3	Westwood	22.9%	3	Wilshire	38.5%	3	South Los Angeles	19.1%
4	Central City	22.9%	4	Southeast Los Angeles	36.9%	4	Boyle Heights	16.6%
5	Silver Lake - Echo Park	19.7%	5	Mission Hills - Panorama City	34.4%	5	Westlake	15.1%
6	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	16.7%	6	Van Nuys	32.0%	6	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	15.0%
7	Granada Hills - Knollwood	16.2%	7	Arleta - Pacoima	31.9%	7	Northridge	14.4%
8	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	16.0%	8	Hollywood	31.3%	8	Central City North	14.3%
9	Northeast Los Angeles	15.9%	9	Sun Valley	31.1%	9	Sun Valley	13.8%
10	Northridge	15.0%	10	Wilmington - Harbor City	30.4%	10	Silver Lake - Echo Park	13.1%
11	Harbor Gateway	15.0%	11	Silver Lake - Echo Park	30.3%	11	Arleta - Pacoima	12.6%
12	West L.A.	13.9%	12	Harbor Gateway	28.4%	12	Harbor Gateway	12.5%
13	Westlake	12.8%	13	South Los Angeles	28.3%	13	Hollywood	12.4%
14	Mission Hills - Panorama City	11.8%	14	North Hollywood	27.8%	14	Wilmington - Harbor City	12.3%
15	Canoga Park - Winnetka	10.3%	15	Northeast Los Angeles	27.7%	15	Wilshire	12.0%
16	Reseda	9.8%	16	Central City North	26.8%	16	Westwood	11.9%
17	Hollywood	9.3%	17	Central City	26.0%	17	North Hollywood	11.8%
18	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	8.8%	18	Reseda	24.1%	18	Northeast Los Angeles	11.7%
19	Sun Valley	7.9%	19	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	23.6%	19	Mission Hills - Panorama City	11.2%
20	Sunland-Tujunga	6.0%	20	Sylmar	23.3%	20	Van Nuys	10.9%
21	Van Nuys	6.0%	21	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	20.2%	21	Sylmar	10.5%
22	North Hollywood	5.8%	22	Canoga Park - Winnetka	18.8%	22	Reseda	9.9%
23	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	5.8%	23	Northridge	16.7%	23	Sunland-Tujunga	9.2%
24	Wilmington - Harbor City	5.5%	24	West L.A.	16.6%	24	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	8.9%
25	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	5.3%	25	Venice	15.1%	25	San Pedro	8.9%
26	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	5.2%	26	Sunland-Tujunga	15.0%	26	Venice	8.8%
27	Encino - Tarzana	5.0%	27	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	14.4%	27	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	8.5%
28	San Pedro	4.6%	28	Encino - Tarzana	14.4%	28	Canoga Park - Winnetka	8.4%
29	Venice	4.1%	29	San Pedro	14.4%	29	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	8.4%
30	Arleta - Pacoima	3.5%	30	Westwood	14.3%	30	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	6.7%
31	Sylmar	3.4%	31	Granada Hills - Knollwood	12.5%	31	Encino - Tarzana	6.3%
32	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	3.2%	32	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	9.8%	32	Granada Hills - Knollwood	6.2%
33	South Los Angeles	2.8%	33	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	8.8%	33	West L.A.	5.9%
34	Boyle Heights	2.4%	34	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	7.7%	34	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	5.4%
35	Southeast Los Angeles	0.4%	35	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	7.0%	35	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	4.8%

SIZE		DRIVERS		INCOME		
1	Arleta - Pacoima	4.57	1 Sherman Oaks - Studio City	80.0%	1 Bel Air - Beverly Crest	\$235,680
2	Southeast Los Angeles	4.22	2 Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	78.5%	2 Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	\$171,811
3	Boyle Heights	3.97	3 Granada Hills - Knollwood	78.3%	3 Westwood	\$103,959
4	Sun Valley	3.78	4 Encino - Tarzana	78.2%	4 Encino - Tarzana	\$101,042
5	Sylmar	3.75	5 Westchester - Playa Del Rey	77.1%	5 Sherman Oaks - Studio City	\$89,683
6	Mission Hills - Panorama City	3.66	6 Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	75.8%	6 West L.A.	\$83,277
7	Wilmington - Harbor City	3.53	7 San Pedro	74.4%	7 Venice	\$81,357
8	Harbor Gateway	3.43	8 Bel Air - Beverly Crest	73.4%	8 Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	\$80,032
9	South Los Angeles	3.33	9 Northridge	72.4%	9 Westchester - Playa Del Rey	\$76,912
10	Northeast Los Angeles	3.31	10 Sunland-Tujunga	71.9%	10 Canoga Park - Winnetka	\$76,410
11	Westlake	3.12	11 Canoga Park - Winnetka	71.6%	11 Granada Hills - Knollwood	\$74,113
12	Reseda	2.98	12 West L.A.	70.9%	12 Northridge	\$71,384
13	Granada Hills - Knollwood	2.91	13 Venice	70.8%	13 Sunland-Tujunga	\$59,389
14	Sunland-Tujunga	2.86	14 Reseda	68.9%	14 Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	\$58,311
15	Central City North	2.84	15 Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	68.3%	15 Sylmar	\$57,623
16	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	2.80	16 Sylmar	67.3%	16 San Pedro	\$55,484
17	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	2.79	17 Harbor Gateway	64.1%	17 Hollywood	\$54,836
18	Canoga Park - Winnetka	2.78	18 North Hollywood	62.9%	18 Reseda	\$52,464
19	Van Nuys	2.77	19 Wilmington - Harbor City	61.7%	19 Sun Valley	\$51,750
20	Silver Lake - Echo Park	2.75	20 Van Nuys	61.3%	20 Silver Lake - Echo Park	\$50,766
21	Northridge	2.74	21 Sun Valley	60.8%	21 Van Nuys	\$48,930
22	North Hollywood	2.65	22 Northeast Los Angeles	58.8%	22 Mission Hills - Panorama City	\$48,754
23	San Pedro	2.56	23 West Adams - Baldwin Hills	57.8%	23 Wilshire	\$48,401
24	Wilshire	2.50	24 Hollywood	57.2%	24 Northeast Los Angeles	\$48,215
25	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	2.41	25 Arleta - Pacoima	56.4%	25 Arleta - Pacoima	\$47,716
26	Encino - Tarzana	2.34	26 Westwood	56.3%	26 North Hollywood	\$46,893
27	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	2.25	27 Mission Hills - Panorama City	56.0%	27 Wilmington - Harbor City	\$46,431
28	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	2.22	28 Silver Lake - Echo Park	55.1%	28 Harbor Gateway	\$45,895
29	Hollywood	2.17	29 Wilshire	50.8%	29 West Adams - Baldwin Hills	\$41,741
30	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	2.15	30 South Los Angeles	45.1%	30 South Los Angeles	\$34,391
31	West L.A.	2.02	31 Boyle Heights	39.0%	31 Boyle Heights	\$33,940
32	Westwood	1.98	32 Central City North	38.2%	32 Southeast Los Angeles	\$32,625
33	Venice	1.93	33 Southeast Los Angeles	37.7%	33 Central City	\$30,198
34	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	1.90	34 Central City	29.5%	34 Westlake	\$29,265
35	Central City	1.54	35 Westlake	22.8%	35 Central City North	\$28,624

POPULATION		AREA		DENSITY		
1	Wilshire	292,163	1 Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	38.05	1 Westlake	38,111
2	South Los Angeles	260,003	2 Canoga Park - Winnetka	28.22	2 Wilshire	22,695
3	Southeast Los Angeles	255,168	3 Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	25.68	3 South Los Angeles	17,942
4	Northeast Los Angeles	241,371	4 Hollywood	25.24	4 Southeast Los Angeles	17,441
5	Hollywood	210,841	5 Northeast Los Angeles	24.15	5 Westwood	14,301
6	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	172,937	6 Sunland-Tujunga	21.90	6 North Hollywood	14,087
7	Canoga Park - Winnetka	166,288	7 Encino - Tarzana	20.51	7 Boyle Heights	13,922
8	Van Nuys	158,787	8 Sun Valley	20.08	8 Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	13,571
9	North Hollywood	135,826	9 Granada Hills - Knollwood	18.10	9 West Adams - Baldwin Hills	13,459
10	Mission Hills - Panorama City	134,871	10 Southeast Los Angeles	15.74	10 Van Nuys	13,141
11	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	110,046	11 Bel Air - Beverly Crest	15.41	11 Central City North	13,077
12	Westlake	106,714	12 South Los Angeles	15.39	12 Venice	12,760
13	Reseda	98,655	13 Wilshire	13.97	13 Mission Hills - Panorama City	12,430
14	Arleta - Pacoima	98,073	14 Westchester - Playa Del Rey	13.77	14 Silver Lake - Echo Park	11,183
15	Boyle Heights	86,872	15 West Adams - Baldwin Hills	13.58	15 West L.A.	10,835
16	Sun Valley	86,391	16 Sherman Oaks - Studio City	13.58	16 Northeast Los Angeles	10,705
17	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	84,690	17 Van Nuys	12.89	17 Central City	10,315
18	Silver Lake - Echo Park	76,949	18 Sylmar	12.83	18 Arleta - Pacoima	10,005
19	San Pedro	75,911	19 Reseda	12.03	19 Hollywood	8,907
20	Wilmington - Harbor City	74,948	20 Mission Hills - Panorama City	11.65	20 Reseda	8,818
21	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	72,989	21 Wilmington - Harbor City	11.34	21 Harbor Gateway	8,357
22	West L.A.	71,944	22 San Pedro	11.28	22 San Pedro	7,281
23	Encino - Tarzana	70,228	23 North Hollywood	10.62	23 Wilmington - Harbor City	7,158
24	Sylmar	69,674	24 Arleta - Pacoima	10.53	24 Northridge	6,698
25	Northridge	62,577	25 Northridge	10.08	25 Canoga Park - Winnetka	6,592
26	Sunland-Tujunga	58,231	26 Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	9.02	26 Sylmar	6,220
27	Granada Hills - Knollwood	57,461	27 Silver Lake - Echo Park	7.34	27 Sherman Oaks - Studio City	5,827
28	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	55,308	28 West L.A.	7.06	28 Sun Valley	4,654
29	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	51,255	29 Boyle Heights	6.67	29 Westchester - Playa Del Rey	3,962
30	Westwood	48,120	30 Harbor Gateway	5.04	30 Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	3,749
31	Harbor Gateway	40,293	31 Westwood	3.67	31 Encino - Tarzana	3,662
32	Venice	37,762	32 Venice	3.21	32 Granada Hills - Knollwood	3,362
33	Central City	25,200	33 Westlake	3.16	33 Sunland-Tujunga	2,859
34	Central City North	24,010	34 Central City	2.98	34 Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	1,541
35	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	20,254	35 Central City North	2.52	35 Bel Air - Beverly Crest	1,405

<b>POVERTY</b>		<b>RENTERS</b>		<b>SFD</b>				
1	Central City	44.3%	1	Westlake	93.9%	1	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	90.2%
2	Southeast Los Angeles	41.1%	2	Central City	91.1%	2	Granada Hills - Knollwood	75.5%
3	Westlake	40.4%	3	Central City North	89.3%	3	Sunland-Tujunga	70.7%
4	South Los Angeles	34.2%	4	Wilshire	81.7%	4	Arleta - Pacoima	67.5%
5	Boyle Heights	33.4%	5	Hollywood	79.3%	5	Sylmar	64.6%
6	Westwood	32.5%	6	Boyle Heights	73.5%	6	Sun Valley	59.8%
7	Central City North	32.1%	7	North Hollywood	69.3%	7	Canoga Park - Winnetka	59.2%
8	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	25.6%	8	Van Nuys	69.0%	8	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	57.6%
9	Wilshire	24.8%	9	Silver Lake - Echo Park	68.3%	9	Reseda	56.8%
10	Wilmington - Harbor City	24.4%	10	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	68.0%	10	Northridge	53.7%
11	Hollywood	23.3%	11	Venice	65.5%	11	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	53.4%
12	Silver Lake - Echo Park	23.3%	12	Southeast Los Angeles	65.5%	12	Northeast Los Angeles	52.7%
13	Mission Hills - Panorama City	22.1%	13	South Los Angeles	63.9%	13	Encino - Tarzana	52.0%
14	Harbor Gateway	21.3%	14	Westwood	62.1%	14	Southeast Los Angeles	46.7%
15	North Hollywood	21.0%	15	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	62.0%	15	Harbor Gateway	45.1%
16	Van Nuys	21.0%	16	Harbor Gateway	60.2%	16	Mission Hills - Panorama City	44.6%
17	Northeast Los Angeles	21.0%	17	Wilmington - Harbor City	59.5%	17	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	42.7%
18	Arleta - Pacoima	19.8%	18	West L.A.	57.8%	18	Wilmington - Harbor City	42.7%
19	Sun Valley	19.4%	19	San Pedro	57.4%	19	South Los Angeles	41.2%
20	San Pedro	16.7%	20	Northeast Los Angeles	56.7%	20	San Pedro	39.6%
21	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	16.2%	21	Mission Hills - Panorama City	54.2%	21	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	39.1%
22	Reseda	14.3%	22	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	49.6%	22	Silver Lake - Echo Park	38.8%
23	Northridge	14.0%	23	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	45.5%	23	West Adams - Baldwin Hills	37.4%
24	Sylmar	13.1%	24	Reseda	43.9%	24	Boyle Heights	34.8%
25	Venice	12.3%	25	Sun Valley	42.6%	25	Venice	32.8%
26	West L.A.	12.0%	26	Northridge	41.1%	26	Van Nuys	31.7%
27	Sunland-Tujunga	11.9%	27	Canoga Park - Winnetka	39.2%	27	North Hollywood	28.2%
28	Canoga Park - Winnetka	11.2%	28	Arleta - Pacoima	35.8%	28	West L.A.	27.7%
29	Encino - Tarzana	9.7%	29	Sunland-Tujunga	34.9%	29	Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	27.5%
30	Westchester - Playa Del Rey	9.1%	30	Encino - Tarzana	34.5%	30	Hollywood	20.6%
31	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	7.8%	31	Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	31.5%	31	Westwood	16.1%
32	Granada Hills - Knollwood	7.5%	32	Sylmar	29.9%	32	Wilshire	14.2%
33	Sherman Oaks - Studio City	7.0%	33	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	28.7%	33	Central City North	9.0%
34	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	5.3%	34	Granada Hills - Knollwood	25.9%	34	Westlake	6.8%
35	Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	4.8%	35	Bel Air - Beverly Crest	9.7%	35	Central City	5.3%

<b>HOUSING</b>	
1 Brentwood - Pacific Palisades	97.3%
2 Granada Hills - Knollwood	97.0%
3 Encino - Tarzana	96.7%
4 Westwood	96.6%
5 Bel Air - Beverly Crest	96.2%
6 Northridge	95.8%
7 Sylmar	95.8%
8 Canoga Park - Winnetka	95.8%
9 Mission Hills - Panorama City	95.3%
10 Sunland-Tujunga	95.3%
11 Reseda	95.1%
12 Palms - Mar Vista - Del Rey	94.3%
13 Chatsworth - Porter Ranch	94.1%
14 Sherman Oaks - Studio City	94.0%
15 San Pedro	94.0%
16 Westchester - Playa Del Rey	93.4%
17 West L.A.	92.8%
18 Arleta - Pacoima	92.5%
19 Northeast Los Angeles	92.2%
20 Harbor Gateway	92.2%
21 Venice	91.8%
22 Silver Lake - Echo Park	91.8%
23 Van Nuys	91.4%
24 West Adams - Baldwin Hills	91.4%
25 South Los Angeles	90.9%
26 North Hollywood	89.9%
27 Hollywood	89.8%
28 Wilshire	88.5%
29 Sun Valley	87.0%
30 Southeast Los Angeles	82.7%
31 Wilmington - Harbor City	76.9%
32 Boyle Heights	73.9%
33 Westlake	72.5%
34 Central City North	41.7%
35 Central City	35.9%

## APPENDIX D LIST OF HOMEOWNER CASES

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In this appendix are the list of homeowners associations identified in Section 5.4 (Homeowner Activity and Land Use Change).

In the first column are the total number of cases involving the particular homeowner association. The second column is the number of cases related to land use issues. The third column is the association name. The fourth column is the community plan area for the association. The fifth column are all the Council File numbers for the respective cases. Cases marked in **BOLD** are the land use cases.

Not included in the tables are the Google addresses used in the Fusion Table for each association.

The table is sorted alphabetically, first by Community Plan Area, then by Association name. All data comes from the L.A. City Clerk, City Council Files, <http://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/>.

TOTAL	LAND USE	NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION	PLAN AREA	COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS
1	0	Haddon-Mercer Neighborhood Ass'n	ARLETA	00-1828
2	0	Pacoima Property Owners Ass'n	ARLETA	82-1429, 85-0091
1	1	Bel Air Knolls Property Owners' Ass'n	BEL AIR	<b>05-0970</b>
6	5	Bel Air Skycrest Property Owners Ass'n	BEL AIR	87-1049, <b>93-1680, 05-0970, 05-0970-S2, 05-0970-S1, 12-1287</b>
4	4	Benedict Canyon Ass'n	BEL AIR	<b>80-0810, 81-6000, 83-0711, 99-1861</b>
1	0	Beverly Glen Park Homeowners Ass'n	BEL AIR	78-5308
1	1	Bowmont Homeowners Ass'n	BEL AIR	<b>01-2189</b>
16	16	Federation of Hillside & Canyon Ass'ns	BEL AIR	<b>83-0710, 06-1373, 06-0879, 85-0103, 85-1026, 85-1526, 95-0330, 95-0645, 96-0384, 00-0160, 80-0989, 83-0003-S19D, 95-1823, 96-0385, 99-2121, 06-0017</b>
1	0	North Beverly Drive / Franklin Canyon Homeowners Ass'n	BEL AIR	87-0403
2	1	Boyle Heights Homeowners Ass'n	BOYLE HEIGHTS	99-1120, <b>00-1093</b>
1	1	Brentwood Circle Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>05-2285</b>
2	2	Brentwood Community Federation	BRENTWOOD	<b>80-0989, 83-0215</b>
2	2	Brentwood Hills Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>06-1058, 11-1893</b>
8	7	Brentwood Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>82-0332, 94-0397, 95-0370, 94-1149, 98-2181, 04-1570, 06-1058, 07-0592</b>
2	0	Brentwood Park Property Owners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	88-0959, 96-1189
1	1	Brentwood Terrace Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>89-2483</b>
1	0	Brentwood Town Council	BRENTWOOD	92-0992
5	0	California Riviera Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	99-1686, 94-1565, 00-1745, 05-1606, 08-2626
1	1	Canyon Back Alliance	BRENTWOOD	<b>06-1058</b>
1	1	Castellammare Mesa Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>05-0672</b>
4	0	Crestwood Hills Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	73-4441, 80-2785, 11-7714, 97-0031-S19, 06-2978-S1
1	0	Crown Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	95-2339
2	2	Greater Brentwood Residents Coalition	BRENTWOOD	<b>90-2421, 90-2421-S2</b>



TOTAL	LAND USE	NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION	PLAN AREA	COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS
1	0	Huntington Palisades Property Owners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	04-2634
3	2	Mulholland Property Owners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>80-0989, 83-0710, 86-1214</b>
1	1	Ocean Neighborhood Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>83-1613</b>
1	0	Pacific Palisades Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	82-0364
1	1	Pacific Palisades Property Owners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>80-6003</b>
18	17	Pacific Palisades Residents Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>82-1871, 83-1844, 88-1303, 90-0134, 91-1882, 96-0533, 96-1171, 00-0829, 96-1828-S1, 99-1999, 05-0672</b>
1	1	Pacific View Estates Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>08-1245</b>
2	0	San Vicente Improvement Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	96-0915, 01-0548
1	0	South Brentwood Park Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	95-0535
2	2	Southern Brentwood Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>90-1686, 99-1770</b>
1	1	Temescal Canyon Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>82-1871</b>
1	1	Upper Mandeville Canyon Property Owners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>06-1058</b>
1	1	West Sunset Homeowners Ass'n	BRENTWOOD	<b>83-1038</b>
4	0	Canoga Park Improvement Ass'n	CANOGA PARK	00-1823, 04-1211, 08-1295, 08-1667
1	1	Keswick Homeowners' Ass'n	CANOGA PARK	<b>02-1884</b>
1	0	West Hills Property Owners Ass'n	CANOGA PARK	00-2169
18	17	Woodland Hills Homeowners Ass'n	CANOGA PARK	<b>88-0684, 89-1123, 90-0211, 92-0024-S1, 92-0024-S2, 92-0024-S3, 92-0203, 95-0757, 95-0330, 96-1109, 97-0624, 97-0829, 00-0438, 02-1601, 02-1868, 92-2420, 02-1492, 99-2184</b>
12	0	Downtown Property Owners Ass'n	CENTRAL CITY	95-2231, 94-0866-S2, 94-0866-S1, 96-0935, 94-0866, 94-0866-S3, 97-1277, 99-1572-S2, 02-1068, 99-1571-S1, 96-1929-S1, 98-0061
3	0	Rockpointe Homeowner's Ass'n	CHATSWORTH	97-1906, 89-1512, 90-0959
1	1	Encino Civic Ass'n	ENCINO	<b>93-0977</b>

TOTAL	LAND USE	NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION	PLAN AREA	COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS
1	1	Encino Prop Owners Ass'n	ENCINO	<b>80-1723</b>
1	0	Encino Village Homeowners' Ass'n	ENCINO	02-1469
10	10	Homeowners of Encino	ENCINO	<b>93-0634, 93-0634-S1, 93-0635, 96-0196, 96-0196-S1, 93-0977, 02-0957, 04-1425, 06-2063, 05-1345</b>
1	0	Newcastle Homeowners Ass'n	ENCINO	81-4542
6	5	Tarzana Property Owners Ass'n	ENCINO	<b>90-1822, 00-1790, 04-0361, 05-1345, 07-3427, 06-1293</b>
1	0	Bull Creek Community Ass'n	GRANADA HILLS	03-1707
6	0	Granada Hills Improvement Ass'n	GRANADA HILLS	97-0886, 00-1818, 04-1406, 11-0469, 10-0689, 11-1180
6	0	Knollwood Property Owners Ass'n	GRANADA HILLS	96-1542, 96-2112-S1, 01-1765, 06-2120, 07-3452, 07-3452-S1
1	0	Athens Heights Community Ass'n	HARBOR GATEWAY	89-1329
1	0	Argyle Corridor Civic Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	98-0978
1	1	Briarcliff Improvement Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	<b>85-1026</b>
5	3	East Hollywood Community Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	02-1835, 02-0804, <b>04-2071, 07-0351, 11-1735</b>
5	1	Franklin Hills Residents Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	95-2152, 98-0636, 01-1086, <b>02-2695</b> , 04-0662
1	0	Genessee Neighborhood Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	91-1510
1	1	Greater Hollywood Civic Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	<b>86-2077</b>
6	0	Hollywood Dell Civic Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	97-1674, 01-2311, 05-2178, 07-3450, 07-2270, 09-2147
1	1	Hollywood Foothills Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	<b>86-2077</b>
4	2	Hollywood Heights Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	89-1513, 97-0361, <b>98-1766-S1, 98-1766-S2</b>
1	1	Hollywood Homeowners & Tenants Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	<b>86-2077</b>
10	2	Hollywoodland Homeowners Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	<b>89-2421, 89-2421-S1</b> , 96-2077, 03-1455, 04-1515, 08-1997, 08-0600, 09-1028, 10-1392
1	0	Ivar Hill Community Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	94-2073
1	0	La Vista Neighborhood Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	98-0734
1	0	Lake Hollywood Homeowners' Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	86-0362-S1

TOTAL	LAND USE	NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION	PLAN AREA	COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS
1	0	Laughlin Park Homeowners Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	04-0945
5	2	Laurel Canyon Homeowners Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	04-1618, 03-0508, 03-2112, <b>05-2597, 06-1373</b>
1	0	Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	06-1654
2	1	Lookout Mountain Alliance / Homeowners Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	92-1502-S2, <b>06-1373</b>
8	0	Los Feliz Improvement Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	86-1820, 90-1629, 91-1182, 93-2080, 97-1338, 97-2289, 02-0918, 08-0600
9	3	Melrose Hill Neighborhood Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	83-0625, <b>87-1766</b> , 88-2108, 92-1513-S1, 02-1755, 03-2184, 07-3370, <b>08-0547, 08-0454</b>
7	4	Melrose Neighborhood Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	<b>97-0084, 97-2126</b> , 00-0285, 00-0285-S1, 05-1073-S24, <b>07-0995, 08-0454-S1</b>
1	0	Mount Olympus Property Owners Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	10-0300
3	0	Outpost Estates Homeowners Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	05-1611, 03-0705, 03-1546
8	1	Spaulding Square Neighborhood Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	<b>96-0383</b> , 01-1028, 94-1779, 99-2017, 04-2213, 07-3142, 07-3142-S1, 07-3142-S2
1	1	Vine Street Property Owners Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	<b>95-2299</b>
7	1	Whitley Heights Civic Ass'n	HOLLYWOOD	83-1210, <b>88-1549</b> , 91-1340, 94-0030, 83-0505, 02-2053, 04-0326
1	1	Nordell Park Homeowner's Ass'n	MISSION HILLS	<b>87-1302</b>
2	1	North Hollywood Residents Ass'n	NO. HOLLYWOOD	<b>94-1148</b> , 97-0366-S1
1	0	North Village Homeowners Ass'n	NO. HOLLYWOOD	03-1257
2	1	Valley Village Homeowners Ass'n	NO. HOLLYWOOD	93-0948, <b>04-0287</b>
2	2	Atwater Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	<b>86-0771, 86-1485</b>
2	0	Atwater Village Residents Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	93-1513-S2, 95-1513-S1
1	0	Berkshire Community Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	06-0619
3	0	Cypress Park Improvement Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	03-2357, 06-2718, 07-3649
6	3	Eagle Rock Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	99-1120, <b>02-2834, 03-0337</b> , 07-0011-S30, 10-0011-S38, <b>12-1638</b>
1	0	Eagle Rock Community Preservation/Revitalization	NORTHEAST L.A.	03-1176

TOTAL	LAND USE	NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION	PLAN AREA	COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS
1	0	Garvanza Improvement Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	02-0141
12	1	Glassell Park Improvement Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	90-1501, 90-1501-S2, 90-1514-S1, 95-1513-S1, 95-1513-S3, 96-1513, <b>99-0019</b> , 02-0644, 94-1513-S2, 03-1176, 07-2643, 07-0011-S40
3	0	Highland Park Improvement Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	80-4547, 81-0411, 82-0594
1	0	Hillside Village Property Owner's Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	01-1454
1	0	Montecito Heights Improvement Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	99-2150
1	0	Mount Angelus Concerned Residents Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	87-0084
4	2	Mount Washington Homeowners Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	92-1513-S1, <b>07-0616</b> , <b>07-3935</b> , 11-1060
2	0	University Hills Community Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	96-1514, 00-2121
1	1	West Ave 43 Homeowners Ass'n	NORTHEAST L.A.	<b>80-4572</b>
1	0	Belcourt Homeowners Ass'n	NORTHRIDGE	09-1220
1	1	Northridge Homeowners Ass'n	NORTHRIDGE	<b>93-0961</b>
1	0	Northridge Heights Community Ass'n	NORTHRIDGE	01-1773
5	1	Sherwood Forest Homeowners Ass'n	NORTHRIDGE	<b>01-0242</b> , 01-2049, 07-3164, 07-3164-S2, 07-3164-S1
1	1	White Oak / Roscoe Homeowners' Ass'n	NORTHRIDGE	<b>93-0961</b>
1	1	Villa Marina Homeowners Ass'n	PALMS	<b>07-2442</b>
2	0	Westdale Homeowners Ass'n	PALMS	96-1611, 08-2802-S1
5	0	Reseda Community Ass'n	RESEDA	91-1503-S1, 92-1503, 95-0090, 90-1503, 00-1762
1	1	West Van Nuys Home Owners Ass'n	RESEDA	<b>93-0977</b>
1	1	Cahuenga Pass Property Owners Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	<b>00-0160</b>
1	0	Fairburn Lencrest Homeowners Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	81-2431
18	16	Sherman Oaks Homeowners Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	<b>83-0710</b> , <b>83-0711</b> , <b>86-1558</b> , <b>88-0628</b> , <b>88-2145</b> , <b>90-0042</b> , <b>90-0192</b> , <b>96-0196</b> , <b>96-0196-S1</b> , <b>98-1655</b> , 98-0266, 00-1805, <b>00-0561-S1</b> , <b>02-0957</b> , <b>05-0869</b> , <b>05-2194</b> , <b>06-2063</b> , <b>08-1383</b>
1	1	Sherman Oaks Residential Property Owners Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	81-4547

TOTAL	LAND USE	NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION	PLAN AREA	COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS
2	0	Sherman Oaks Town Council	SHERMAN OAKS	97-0802, 98-0266
1	0	Stoneridge Lane Homeowners Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	01-2376
7	2	Studio City Beautification Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	86-0548, 86-0548-S1, <b>87-0234</b> , 91-1502, 05-1073-S2, <b>00-0561-S1</b> , 09-0629
20	9	Studio City Residents Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	<b>88-0034</b> , <b>91-0010</b> , 92-1502-S1, 92-1505, 92-1505-S1, 94-1502-S2, <b>96-1720</b> , 97-0146-S2, <b>99-2121</b> , <b>00-0941</b> , <b>01-2398</b> , 02-1701, 04-0941, 98-0895, <b>06-1704</b> , <b>07-0444</b> , 07-3795-S1, 09-0629, 07-2018, <b>08-2332</b>
1	0	Toluca Estates Drive Homeowners Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	05-2345
1	0	Toluca Lake Homeowners Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	01-2533
1	0	Toluca Terrace Woods Homeowners Ass'n	SHERMAN OAKS	04-1787
1	0	Coronado Community Ass'n	SILVER LAKE	03-1969
8	0	Echo Park Improvement Ass'n	SILVER LAKE	91-1501-S2, 91-1513-S4, 91-1513-S1, 92-2149, 96-1513, 93-1293, 99-0987, 01-2694
2	0	Silverlake Residents Ass'n	SILVER LAKE	92-1513-S1, 94-1513
5	0	Silverlake Improvement Ass'n	SILVER LAKE	89-1513, 91-1513, 93-1513-S6, 93-1985, 94-1513
1	0	108th Hoover Neighborhood Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	92-1508-S3
1	0	119th Street Neighborhood Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	97-1958
1	0	186th Street Area Homeowner's Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	94-1515
1	0	Adams Normandie Neighborhood Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	98-0533
6	0	East 60th Street Community Improvement Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	92-2205, 97-0381, 98-1039, 83-0357, 90-2585, 02-2708
1	1	Gramercy Park Homeowners Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	<b>84-0567-S1</b>
1	0	Harvard Heights Neighborhood Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	93-1348
3	0	Normandie - Halldale Community Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	02-1294, 07-2427, 07-2427-S1
3	3	North University Park Community Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	<b>97-2252</b> , <b>96-0764</b> , <b>96-0764-S1</b>
1	0	Norwood Community Ass'n	SOUTH L.A.	82-1520
1	1	South East Central Homeowners Ass'n	SOUTHEAST L.A.	<b>90-0102-S2</b>

TOTAL	LAND USE	NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION	PLAN AREA	COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS
2	2	La Tuna Canyon Community Awareness Ass'n	SUN VALLEY	<b>88-0422, 92-0452</b>
1	0	Allegheny St Homeowners Ass'n	SUNLAND	99-2332
1	1	Alpine Village Homeowners Ass'n	SUNLAND	<b>89-0273</b>
10	4	Lake View Terrace Improvement Ass'n	SUNLAND	<b>81-5009, 81-5773, 89-1507, 89-0124, 90-1502, 91-1502, 91-1507, 92-1507, 95-1945, 01-0453, 91-0381</b>
1	1	Oakdale Homeowners Ass'n	SUNLAND	<b>92-0452, 91-1502, 80-0989, 89-1573, 00-0980, 03-0731, 97-0469, 05-1333, 05-01388, 07-1535, 06-2564-S1, 06-1786</b>
12	8	Shadow Hills Property Owners Ass'n	SUNLAND	<b>92-0452, 91-1502, 80-0989, 89-1573, 00-0980, 03-0731, 97-0469, 05-1333, 05-01388, 07-1535, 06-2564-S1, 06-1786</b>
2	0	Shadow Hills Estates Homeowners Ass'n	SUNLAND	96-2019, 01-2192
7	7	Sunland Tujunga Ass'n of Residents	SUNLAND	<b>82-1411, 86-0004, 89-0273, 90-0041, 91-0754, 91-1988</b>
1	0	Saddletree Ranch Homeowners Ass'n	SYLMAR	01-1909
1	1	Sylmar Acres Homeowners Ass'n	SYLMAR	<b>95-1253</b>
1	1	Tessera Sylmar Homeowners Ass'n	SYLMAR	<b>07-1117</b>
5	5	Van Nuys Homeowners Ass'n	VAN NUYS	<b>93-1413, 93-2212, 94-0226, 93-0977, 96-0193</b>
2	0	Isthmus Landowners Ass'n	VENICE	80-0573, 96-1817
1	0	Marina Peninsula Property Owners Ass'n	VENICE	12-0054
2	2	Navy Estates Homeowner Ass'n	VENICE	<b>85-0762, 99-0676</b>
1	1	Oakwood Property Owners Ass'n	VENICE	<b>94-2178</b>
1	0	Presidents Row Homeowners Ass'n	VENICE	05-1127
1	0	Silver Strand Marina Homeowners Ass'n	VENICE	02-2046
1	1	Silver Triangle Neighborhood Ass'n	VENICE	<b>94-0992</b>
4	2	Venice Town Council	VENICE	<b>85-0762, 98-0255, 02-0198, 05-0672</b>
1	0	7th Avenue Homeowners Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	04-2200
1	1	Baldwin Estates Homeowners Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	<b>86-1919</b>
3	0	Baldwin Hills Homeowners Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	89-1510-S1
4	2	Baldwin Hills Estates Homeowners Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	<b>86-1919, 88-1201, 04-1305, 08-2100</b>

TOTAL	LAND USE	NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION	PLAN AREA	COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS
1	0	Baldwin Hills Village Gardens Homes Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	04-1624
3	2	Baldwin Neighborhood Homeowners Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	<b>87-1941</b> , 97-0786, <b>12-1132</b>
18	0	Jefferson Park Improvement Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	90-1508, 90-1506-S1, 91-0088, 91-1508, 91-1510-S2, 92-1510-S2, 93-1510-S1, 94-1510-S1, 94-1510, 95-1510-S3, 95-1510-S1, 96-1501, 96-1508, 95-0063, 98-0344, 98-0717, 98-2263, 98-2336
1	0	La Brea Vista Homeowners Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	08-2473
2	0	La Fayette Square Homeowners /Improvement Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	98-1317-S2
11	4	Leimert Park Community Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	96-1784, 96-2374, <b>98-2366</b> , <b>98-2366-S1</b> , 98-2037, 02-1477, 00-0217, 04-0955, <b>02-2484</b> , 00-0883, <b>07-3078</b>
1	0	Ridgeley Drive Homeowners Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	02-1664
1	0	Victoria Circle Homeowners Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	89-1276
1	0	Victoria Park Neighborhood Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	90-1247
10	1	West Adams Heritage Ass'n	WEST ADAMS	<b>90-1059-S1</b> , 90-1510, 90-2136, 01-2532, 07-0926, 07-0927, 07-1941
3	3	Burton Way Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>88-1274</b> , <b>95-0383</b> , <b>05-2841</b>
4	2	California Country Club Homes Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>93-0909</b> , <b>98-0672</b> , 02-2051, 06-3250
1	1	Century Woods Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>98-0672</b>
4	4	Century Westwood Watch and Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>84-1635</b> , <b>86-0278</b> , <b>86-0278-S1</b> , <b>02-1699</b>
7	6	Cheviot Hills Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>93-0909</b> , <b>98-0672</b> , <b>03-0591</b> , <b>06-2574</b> , <b>05-2574-S1</b> , <b>05-1345</b> , 07-1199
1	1	Granvilla Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>07-1511</b>
1	0	Midvale Estates Neighborhood Ass'n	WEST L.A.	91-1502
1	1	Roxbury/Beverwil Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>86-1406</b>
1	1	Tract 7260 Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>06-2574</b>
5	2	Westside Village Civic/Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	90-1510, <b>97-0137</b> , 89-1280, <b>86-2203</b> , 89-1510



TOTAL	LAND USE	NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION	PLAN AREA	COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS
2	2	Westwood Gardens Civic Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>06-2574, 06-2574-S1</b>
1	1	Westwood South of Santa Monica Blvd Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	<b>86-1679</b>
3	0	West of Westwood Homeowners Ass'n	WEST L.A.	95-1511-S1, 95-1506-S1, 01-1312
1	0	Campion Drive Neighborhood Ass'n	WESTCHESTER	99-2260
1	1	Esplanada Del Rey Homeowners Ass'n	WESTCHESTER	<b>01-1014</b>
9	0	West Beach Playa Del Rey Property Owners Ass'n	WESTCHESTER	91-1506-S1, 91-1506-S2, 94-1506-S2, 95-1506-S1, 96-1996, 96-1506-S2, 97-1502-S1, 02-2258, 05-2064
1	0	Brookhaven / Bentley Neighborhood Ass'n	WESTWOOD	86-1940
1	0	Comstock Hills Homeowners Ass'n	WESTWOOD	07-0592
10	10	Friends of Westwood	WESTWOOD	<b>85-1594, 85-1595, 87-0537, 88-1141, 88-1557, 89-0318, 91-2089, 92-0352, 99-1242, 97-2149</b>
1	1	Holmby Hills Homeowners Ass'n	WESTWOOD	<b>05-0276</b>
14	11	Holmby - Westwood Property Owners Ass'n	WESTWOOD	<b>91-2089, 92-0352, 92-1538-S1, 92-1538-S3, 92-1538-S4, 95-2041, 97-2149, 92-2320, 01-1889, 05-1639, 06-1303, 07-0080, 07-3905, 07-3905-S1</b>
1	1	Westwood Homeowners Ass'n	WESTWOOD	<b>92-0352</b>
5	3	Banning Park Neighborhood Ass'n	WILMINGTON	<b>86-0309-S1, 88-1406, 89-1570, 99-0931, 01-0690</b>
5	0	Brookside Homeowners Ass'n	WILSHIRE	99-1087, 04-1415, 05-1234, 08-1479, 09-0740
1	0	Carthay Circle Homeowners Ass'n	WILSHIRE	87-1157
6	2	Country Club Park Neighborhood Ass'n	WILSHIRE	86-1775, 07-1775, <b>06-2368-S12, 06-2368, 10-0870-S1, 11-1811</b>
6	1	Crestview Neighborhood Ass'n	WILSHIRE	90-1505, 90-2044, 91-1505-S1, 92-1505, 97-0877, <b>05-1547</b>
3	1	Hancock Park Homeowners Ass'n	WILSHIRE	92-2016, 99-1887, <b>06-1293</b>
1	1	Korea-Town Community Ass'n	WILSHIRE	<b>06-0467</b>
1	0	La Brea Hancock Homeowners' Ass'n	WILSHIRE	06-2737



<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>LAND USE</b>	<b>NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION</b>	<b>PLAN AREA</b>	<b>COUNCIL FILE NUMBERS</b>
1	0	Larchmont Village Homeowners Ass'n	WILSHIRE	89-0147
2	0	Longwood Area Neighborhood Ass'n	WILSHIRE	96-1416, 08-3027
2	0	PicFair Village Community Ass'n	WILSHIRE	02-1367, 05-1593
1	0	South Carthay Homeowners Ass'n	WILSHIRE	92-1505-S1
1	0	St. Andrews Square Neighborhood Ass'n	WILSHIRE	00-0452
1	1	Windsor Village Community Ass'n	WILSHIRE	<b>08-0407</b>

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