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Airport Modern:
The Space between International Departures and Arrivals in Modern Korean National
Imaginings

By

Alice S. Kim

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Rhetoric

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Pheng Cheah, Chair

Professor Judith Butler

Professor John Lie

Fall 2013

Abstract

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Alice S. Kim

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Challenging the Eurocentric discourse of Modernization, Modernity and Modernism and the reified notions of space that underpin them and which linger in contemporary theories of globalization, this dissertation argues that the examination of the historical, social and political economic processes and experiences of modernization and modernity at the intersection of particular national sites and the uneven geography of the global capitalist system is fundamental to grappling with how we can begin to talk about globalization in South Korea or East Asia and its corresponding social and cultural changes. In an attempt to read what is new about South Korea's Incheon International airport (2001) and the symbolism of the new 'global' aesthetic that prominently shapes the sensational form of this strategic social space, I situate Incheon airport within the historical lineage of modern South Korean airports from the first International Style Kimpo terminal (1960) to the subsequent two traditional-styled *kiwa* Kimpo terminals (1980, 1988), which preceded the development of Incheon in 1989 as the largest-scale expansion of Kimpo airport. In addition, I trace back the historically produced cultural imaginary of the airport as a crucial space and symbolic marker of a highly ambivalent and contradictory experience of modernity to its linkage with early colonial era railroads and railway journeys. Like the contradictory character of modern postcolonial airports and air travel, the colonial railroads, appearing at the turn of the 20th century Korea, functioned as a significant international gateway and modern technology of long-distance transportation which doubled as the vehicle of the repressive and exploitative processes of colonial statecraft, as well as the vehicle of Korean nationalists seeking to re-appropriate modern ideas and technologies in anticolonial struggles for national independence.

I thus situate the new turn to 'globalization' within the historically changing cosmopolitan-national discourses, practices and landscapes of Korean modernity from late 19th century 'enlightenment and civilization,' to postwar Cold War internationalism, and developmental national capitalism—linked through the commanding modern trope and technology of railroads and airports. In part a rejoinder to the view of airports as 'non-places' vacated of historical meaning or 'flow spaces' homogenously aligning airports and cities from Tokyo to New York, I argue that the postcolonial airport in South Korea, like other airports in East Asia I would imagine, are embedded within situated historical-geographies of modernization and development which inscribe the airport not only as a product of uneven global processes but also a vehicle with which to maneuver the uneven terrain of global capitalism.

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Introduction - Airport Modern

In much of the literature on globalization, the airport has come to stand in as an ideal type of homogenous global capitalist space. For sociologist and urban theorist Manuel Castells, the “postmodern” architecture of Barcelona airport is the physical expression of “the end of history and the supersession of *places* in the *space of flows*.”¹ The ‘generic city’ of architect and critic Rem Koolhaas is likewise modeled on the uniform identity and placeless character of the airport.² And Marc Augé’s anthropology of supermodernity takes as its exemplary object of study the intensely alienating, even ‘solipsistic’ ‘non-place’ of the airport lounge.³ Airports have become synonymous with the homogenous space of global capitalism (or the reified concept of the ‘global’) itself because both are conceived of as abstract, de-territorialized, universal matrices transcending the concrete, rooted, particularism of ‘places’ within a discrete dualistic conception of capitalist spatiality.⁴ Consequently, stemming from the logic of global connection (of a global network society of ‘spaces’) and local disconnection (of ‘places’ from spaces) of ‘flow’ theories, the aesthetic form and social geography of airports are thought to be both ‘postmodern’ and ‘post-national’—where historical referents are either absent or rendered into meaningless fragments and a network of ‘global’ or ‘generic’ cities has replaced a world-system of nation-states. But are airports and ‘global cities’ merely the result of a new transnational or post-national economic organization of deterritorialized material (capital, commodities, etc.) and symbolic (meaning, value) flows? Do ‘places’ really lose their internal contradictions and cultural heterogeneity when they are absorbed into the global network society as one of its nodes? Is the alienating effect of spaces like airports simply an expression of the ideology of disembodied ‘flows’ orchestrated by an equally deterritorialized cosmopolitan managerial elite? In short, is the airport really an index of a new meta-geography of globalization that is now “postmodern” and “post-national”?

Amidst the airport boom in many parts of East Asia at the turn of the 21st century, South Korea’s new Incheon International airport which opened in 2001 after a decade of planning and construction is undoubtedly one the most ambitious airport projects of this “age of air terminals.” Like many of its neighbors, South Korea’s ‘global’ turn is spectacularly visible in the new Incheon airport’s high-tech modern terminal supported by exposed steel trusses and sheathed in glass curtain walls, as well as through its highly publicized ‘global’ auteur architects Fentress and Bradburn.⁵ Indeed, the modernized variations on the traditional-style Korean *kiwa* roof that

¹ Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 419.

² Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, *S,M,L,XL: Small, Medium, Large, Extra Large* (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1995).

³ Marc Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*, Translated by John Howe (London: Verso, 1995).

⁴ For an in-depth discussion of the difference between a dialectical conceptualization of space/place based on Henri Lefebvre’s theory of social-space, and a dualistic conception of spaces vs. places based on a Cartesian understandings of space as a discrete homogenous object, see Andrew Merrifield, “Place and Space: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation,” *Trans. Br. Inst. Geogr.* 18 (1993): 516-531. The logic of global connection and local disconnection of Castells’ network theory of globalization relies on the conceptualization of two distinct types of spaces, the ‘space of flows’ and the ‘space of places.’ Castells, p. 419.

⁵ Fentress, Bradburn & Associates, P.C., is a firm with a global resume of projects but located in Denver, Colorado. The project was actually jointly headed by Fentress, Bradburn and KACI, a consortium of Korean corporate

symbolized national identity and culture in the Kimpo international airport terminals of the 1970s and 80s—which had themselves displaced the International Style modernism of the 1960 Kimpo terminal—appear to have now given way to yet a new representational paradigm aligned with a new global market friendly image of ‘Dynamic Korea’ in a post cold-war landscape of globalization.⁶ At the same time, while shorn of conspicuous signifiers of traditional Korean national culture in the architectural form of Incheon terminal, its global architects are at pains to attribute both national and local specificity to the buildings. According to Curt Fentress, “the swooping rooflines [of Incheon terminal] are a modern interpretation of historic Korean architecture,” while “the masts supporting the roof are an echo of the ships in Incheon harbor.”⁷ The national identity of Incheon airport is moreover clearly alluded to in the multiple rows of Korean Air Lines and ASIANA ticket counters of the two national carriers, which dominate close to fifty percent of the check-in area, large illuminated light-box advertisements featuring Korean companies and celebrities, Hyundai and KIA cars on display in carefully constructed exhibits along terminal concourses, as well as alternating Samsung and LG flat-screen monitors placed at every 30-meters. And while the airport terminal departs from stylistic similarity to national museums, which taking on the form of ancient palaces much like the previous Kimpo terminals proliferated since the late 1960s, Incheon airport now hosts the Culture Museum of Korea featuring Korean art and artifacts on loan from the National Museum, as well as 65 feet tall ‘native’ pine trees looming at the center of the airport. In addition, prominently displayed at the center of the departures level, a few feet away from the Korean pines and placed above the Hyundai car ‘Genesis,’ is a large illuminated advertisement for the Korean bank KB (Kookmin Bank) featuring the Korean figure skater and Olympic darling Kim Yeon-Ah under the ubiquitous catchphrase “The Republic of Korea—Reaching Beyond Number One” (*Taehanminguk Idŭng ũl nuhmuh*).

Such telling shifts in representation, perceptible from within the historical lineage of the continuous expansions and construction of new airport terminals since the first International Style Kimpo terminal in 1960, which inaugurated the new South Korean nation-state’s aspirations to a new postwar international modernity, cannot simply be dismissed as ahistorical elements or historical pastiche as per their ‘postmodern’ advocates.⁸ Controlled spectacles they

architecture firms as well as McClier Aviation, though the latter two are rarely publicized. The singular publicity of Fentress and Bradburn is even more revealing when we consider that Lee Sang Joon of KACI was the chief architect in charge of the project. Moreover the design competition mandated the collaboration of a Korean and foreign firm to enter the design competition, largely setting up a model for partnerships among Korean and foreign firms.

⁶ This is one the most visible national brand campaigns, which was coined for the 2002 World Cup and can be seen everywhere from subway cars, TV commercials, to riot police buses across Seoul.

⁷ Curt Fentress quoted in Marcus Binney, *Airport Builders* (London: Academy Editions, 1999), p. 187.

⁸ Aside from Castells, Koolhaas, and Augé, Frederic Jameson’s theory of postmodernism as the expression of the latest stage of capitalism as well as David Harvey, for whom postmodernism is a symptom of flexible accumulation, also share this view. While David Harvey’s treatise on postmodernism is itself a rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard’s totalizing claims about postmodernism as the end of grand narratives, his theory also exhibits the tendency of making totalizing claims as to postmodernism without taking into account how other social and political-economic factors might account for the ostensible postmodern aesthetic or ethos aside from flexible accumulation. Both Harvey and Jameson’s accounts of the postmodern seem limited in explaining what might appear to be ‘postmodern’ outside of the Euro-American context. Castells’ view of the postmodern is heavily influenced by Harvey’s account. For a critique of Jameson’s theory of postmodernism by examining the mediation of the ‘local’ history of urbanization in Los Angeles see Mike Davis, “Urban Renaissance and the Spirit of Postmodernism,” *New Left Review* no. 151 (May-June 1985): 106-113. Situating the Bonaventure Hotel within the urban planning practices of downtown L.A. since the early 1980s, Davis sees in the mirror-glass Bonaventure Hotel a fortified bunker (against the encroaching immigrant population in the downtown area) rather than a de-centered “hyperspace.”

may be, but they are hard to interpret in terms of ‘postmodern pastiche’ or ‘cultural vernacularism’ of the American corporatist type as theorized from exclusively Western cities. Unlike the silence and nudity Castells ascribes to the ‘postmodern’ character of Barcelona Airport, Incheon Airport clamors to announce national progress on the world stage closer to the ethos of modernist monumentality than a postmodern ahistorical vernacularism, not least perhaps because of its geo-economic and political history of development in an uneven world system.

Rather than heralding a new post-national geography or the end of modernism—defined in terms of Eurocentric cultural and economic developments—these futuristic airports might be seen to index transformations of national modernity and development in East Asia while complicating the commonly perceived opposition between globalization and nationalism, as well as the easy confluence between postmodernism and globalization. The common narrative of modernity/postmodernity that accompanies these globalization theories ignores legacies of colonialism, post-independence nationalism, diverse paths of industrialization, and the situated experiences and responses to uneven global accumulation as well as their particular contradictions, all of which are crucial to understanding what is happening in the East Asian cultural sphere. Henri Lefebvre’s philosophy and science of space has become a touchstone for many theories of postmodernist art and culture as well as that of flows and networks. However, at the same time that Lefebvre introduced many of these concepts in his exposition of the ‘abstract space’ produced of capitalism, he also warned against the fetishism of these concepts following from the fetishism of abstract space:

The ‘commodity world,’ which is an abstraction, cannot be conceived of apart from the world market, which is defined territorially (in terms of flows and networks) and politically (in terms of centres and peripheries). The notion of flows—a strictly economic notion that has been mistakenly generalized by some philosophers—is still not clearly understood; along with their spatial interconnections, flows, by reasons of their complexity, still lie beyond the analytic and programming capacities of the computer. The fetishism of an abstract economics is being transformed into the fetishism of an abstract economic space.⁹

The problematic basis of various aesthetic and political economic paradigms of “postmodernist” culture rests on the naturalization of modernization and modernism through the generalization of historically and geographically specific experiences of Europe and America to the rest of the world. We see this in the ordering of the heterogeneity of these experiences through chronological stages derived from historical political economic conditions of capitalist development in Western capitalist nations. Of course the resounding effect of these processes of the West certainly touches and even shapes the experiences and conceptualization of modernity across many non-Western, colonial, post-colonial, underdeveloped or late-developing nations, but they do so with significant differences arising from the particular conditions of their contact, including the unevenness of their economic, political and social encounters, as well as the relation to local or regional circumstances that also circumscribe these encounters. But it is precisely these encounters that filter, or ‘translate’ the experiences and ideas of modernity and modernization that have earlier proceeded in the West in the production of related yet differentiated processes with new forms of contradictions. Acknowledging the processes of

⁹ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 350-1.

cultural hegemony should make us more vigilant to interrogating rather than assuming or propagating cultural universality. At the same time, examining their historical-geographical located-ness does not ensure a reading of these airports 'local' or 'national' attributes as authentic manifestations of national culture any more than it ensures their 'naked' or cosmopolitan forms as representative of a post-nationalist era of homogenous globalization. Instead, it aims to rectify what has been too simply conceptualized as "postmodern," and open up new understandings of global forms by taking into account the historically and geographically differentiated experiences of modernity and modernization outside the Euro-American context.

Thus challenging the Eurocentric discourse of modernity and modernization and the reified notions of space that underpin them and which linger in contemporary theories of globalization, this dissertation argues that the examination of the historical, social and political economic processes and experiences of modernization and modernity at the intersection of particular national sites and the uneven geography of the global capitalist system is fundamental to grappling with how we can begin to talk about globalization in South Korea or East Asia and its corresponding social and cultural changes. In an attempt to read what is new about South Korea's Incheon International airport (2001) and the symbolism of the new 'global' aesthetic that prominently shapes the sensational form of this strategic social space, I situate Incheon airport within the historical lineage of modern South Korean airports from the first International Style Kimpo terminal (1960) to the subsequent two traditional-styled *kiwa* Kimpo terminals (1980, 1988), which preceded the development of Incheon in 1989 as the largest-scale expansion of Kimpo airport. In addition, I trace back the historically produced cultural imaginary of the airport as a crucial space and symbolic marker of a highly ambivalent and contradictory experience of modernity to its linkage with early colonial era railroads and railway journeys. Like the contradictory character of modern postcolonial airports and air travel, the colonial railroads, appearing at the turn of the 20th century Korea, functioned as a significant international gateway and modern technology of long-distance transportation which doubled as the vehicle of the repressive and exploitative processes of colonial statecraft, as well as the vehicle of Korean nationalists seeking to re-appropriate modern ideas and technologies in their anticolonial struggle for national(ist) independence.

More than any other element of the new urban landscape, the colonial era railway was a distinctive signifier of 'colonial modernity' because it spatialized the (temporal) gap between colonized pre-modern non-industrialized Korea and modern near-industrialized Imperial Japan as well as the industrialized West, generating contradictions in the narrative of colonial modernization as teleological progress. By interrupting the "boundless" "irresistible" force of historical progression of the "homogenous, empty time"¹⁰ of clock-synchronized railroads through the spatial intersection of heterogeneous geographical landscapes and social temporalities of uneven modernization and imperial-colony hierarchies, the railways also triggered the consciousness of the distinct positionality of colonial Korea in a modern, uneven interconnected world. The railways that linked colonial occupied Korea to not only Tokyo and other outlying colonies of imperial Japan through a rail and sea network but also to the sought-after modern destination of the United States, was a contradictory space, for it was both one of the most powerful agents and symbols of industrial modernity or capitalism's "constant revolutionizing of production...chas[ing] the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe,"¹¹

¹⁰ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991).

¹¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto (1888)* (NY: Penguin Books, 2002 edition), p. 223.

taking the form of imperial subjugation and expansion in the context of colonial Korea, but also a crucial symbol and vehicle of modern national consciousness and nationalist journeys towards anti-colonial national modernization.¹² The railway made visible the asymmetric power relations of the colony-metropolitan relationship that lay implicit in other modern industrial symbols of progress like factories, hotels, department stores, cinemas or cafes in colonial Korea by *spatializing* (bringing into consciousness) the temporal distance between a “backward” Korea and a developed Japan and the U.S. Doubling as the vehicle of colonial domination and a threshold of global (universal) modernity, with Imperial Japan and the industrialized US as central destinations, the railroad became a complex locus of modern consciousness and national identity through a comparative consciousness with ambivalent and contradictory connotations.

This dissertation also argues that, like these earlier railroads and railway journeys, the postwar Cold War international airport in South Korea is a crucial lens with which to examine the contradictions of postcolonial national development because it *spatializes* the story of South Korean national development and modernization in an interlinked though uneven global historical context. Like the pan-imperial railways of the colonial era, the airport in the postwar period became the primary passage between the developing nation and the developed world (or from the non or industrializing nation to the advanced industrialized nation)¹³ “generat[ing] a provocation to interaction” by “bringing into contact distinct temporalities” and “set[ting] off new social processes.”¹⁴ When transpacific air routes replaced colonial-era transcontinental railways in the postwar period as the primary transportation network of a new bi-polar Cold War international system under American hegemony, the airport inserted a divided postcolonial South Korean nation-state into a new more expansive spatial configuration of dominance and dependence through a new technological form of mediation, altering the trajectory of the nation’s modern industrialization. As part of the serial grammar (where identity or equivalence is based on a rule governed system) of international capitalism, the airport, linked South Korea to the new bounded sphere of postwar capitalist states. Air travel far surpassed the speed of railroads, was far more luxurious, and made point-to-point connections between cities and nations rather than through contiguous linkages. It shrank the perception of the world, making it more abstract

¹² As Bruce Cumings writes: “Railways in Korea and Manchuria had this same penetrative and integrative effect...The rails symbolized permanence and integrity—the permanence of industry (if not of Japan), and the integrity of the Japanese empire, within which national boundaries were increasingly less relevant. But above all, railways development in Korea and Manchuria advanced the commercialization of agriculture and drew the two regions not just into market relations with the Japanese metropole but also into the world market system.” Bruce Cumings, quoted in Daqing Yang, “Japanese Colonial Infrastructure in Northeast Asia: Realities, Fantasies, Legacies,” in *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia*, Charles K. Armstrong et al., eds. (NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), p. 94.

¹³ In Korean *sōnjingūk* is the comparative term, which can be translated as the “advanced country” or “developed country” that is often used synonymously with the capitalist West and the U.S. in particular. This term is a regular term in articles relating to airport development. Moreover, the Korean name and translation of “America/United States” is *mikūk*, whose Chinese characters signify “beautiful country.”

¹⁴ Doreen Massey, “Imagining Globalization: Power-Geometries of Time-Space,” in Avtar Brah et al. eds., *Global Futures: Migration, Environment and Globalization*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Ltd., 1999), p. 32. Massey argues, “the spatial, crucially, is the realm of the juxtaposition of dissonant narratives. Places and spaces, rather than being locations of distinct coherence, becomes precisely the foci of the meeting of the unrelated. Moreover, if this is so, then the spatial itself becomes generative of narrative” (32). Massey’s theory of the generative potential of spatiality, which sees places and spaces not as self-contained products but the event or interaction of differences, allows us to both dislocate the “self-producing story of Europe” as the generalized narrative of modernity, as well as to *locate* stories of modernization of the world periphery through their asymmetric power relations and interactions with the West as well as the non-West.

(visualized into a two-dimensional plane) but also more easily folding its constituent national units into a tightly knit network within a larger bifurcated world geography. In this way, its truncated other half, though geographically contiguous with South Korea, lay outside of the divided nation's new world orbit. In the shift from Korea's colonized position in the Japanese imperial 'Greater East Asian Co-prosperity sphere' to its position within Pax Americana as a postcolonial dependent client state, the airport served as a new intersection of distinct temporalities, "setting off new social processes" in the trajectory of South Korean development and modernization in the postwar Cold War internationalist order.

I thus situate the new turn to 'globalization' within the historically changing cosmopolitan national discourses, practices and landscapes of Korean modernity, from 19th century 'enlightenment and civilization' to postwar Cold War internationalism, and developmental national capitalism—linked through the commanding modern trope and technology of railroads and airports. In part a rejoinder to the view of airports as 'non-places' vacated of historical meaning or 'flow spaces' homogenously aligning airports and cities from Tokyo to New York, I argue that the postcolonial airport in South Korea, like other airports in East Asia I would imagine, are embedded within situated historical-geographies of modernization and development which inscribe the airport not only as a product of uneven global processes but also a vehicle of the state with which to maneuver the uneven terrain of global capitalism. As such, rather than signaling a postmodern or post-national homogenizing ethos, I argue that Incheon airport signals instead new globalist strategies for continuing national modernization and development in response to new exigencies of neoliberal global capitalism. At the same time, it also signals new responses and challenges to not only the changed geopolitics of the post-Cold War landscape but also to the developmental and modernizations strategies of the state, arising from historically produced contradictions of national development. Thus if even the most paradigmatic spaces of global capitalism, such as airports, are products of situated social and political histories and practices and cannot be read off of abstract capitalist logics, then in re-thinking airports we might also be able to rethink the pervasive view of globalization as a natural force or law to show how it is always socially and politically produced (and reproduced) in both time and space at multiple scales, within uneven relations of power, and how it is accompanied by differentiated and paradoxical forms and reproductions of emancipation and repression.

Chapter Précis

This dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I examines the colonial railroad as a forerunner to the postcolonial airport and postwar air travel as a premier technology and touchstone for the introduction and evolution of the experience of modernization and modernity in Korea as well as modern Korean nationalist thought and experience. Part II examines the development of postwar South Korean airports and air travel and the attendant transformations of aesthetic, discursive and urban practices of national modernity, informed as much by the historically produced desire for national modernization and independence as by the changing international context of their productions.

Chapter One examines the historical formation of modern ethnic and diasporic Korean nationalism in the late 19th century vis-à-vis Korea's abrupt and hostile encounter with Imperialist powers and transgressions, examining its parallels and differences from Benedict

Anderson's theory of anticolonial nationalism and long-distance nationalism as discussed in *Imagined Communities* and *The Spectre of Comparisons*. Whereas for Anderson, official nationalism arose in response to vernacular linguistic nationalisms of 1848, in the Korean case, it arises in response to Japanese imperialism. As I look at how these differences presented a different dynamic to the formation of a defensive anti-colonial official and popular nationalism in Korea in the face of an uneven world system, I argue that the role of modern technologies such as print-capitalism as well as technologies of long-distance travel and human migrations took on different meanings and uses in the Korean context.

Chapter Two looks at the systematized yet hierarchical and heterogeneous time-space of railroads in an oblique relation to the homogenous, empty time of print-technologies.¹⁵ Here I argue that while railroads also produce a standardized vocabulary and 'quotidian universals' similar to Anderson's newspapers, the spaces produced by railroads were circumscribed by uneven hierarchies of capitalist accumulation. I then look at this abstract and universal but hierarchically differentiated space of railroads as a problematic for how we might approach the ruptures and deviations to the ostensibly homogenous, empty time and abstract space of modernization, modernism and modernity within a highly uneven global capitalist world. I argue that material innovations in long-distance transportation (19th railroads/train stations and later 20th century airplanes/airports) supply a prominent structuring condition and ideological symbol for late 19th century/early 20th century anti-colonial nationalism as well as 20th century post-colonial nationalism in Korea—through which nations were also formally being apprehended as synchronous, comparable and contiguous (thus abstracted or decontextualized) yet also *hierarchically* differentiated communities within the context of an uneven interconnected systematized global capitalist space.

Chapter Three examines how the railroad came to function as a paradoxical symbol of modernity in colonial Korea as both a site and structuring condition for colonial expropriations as well as national awakenings qua 'enlightenment' and modernization. Through historically informed readings of two early modern Korean novels, Yi Injik's *Tears of Blood* (1906) and Yi Kwangsu's *The Heartless* (1917) serialized in the nation's early vernacular presses, I look at how the railway journeys mediated the new hierarchical landscape of a simultaneously tragic and liberating modernity. As the railway journey served as a site of fateful encounters between 'modernized' and 'modernizing' characters, 'modern' conversions became linked to national awakenings and international migrations in the effort to rescue the nation from its traditional 'backwardness,' and secure national independence. I argue that the 'modern' character of colonial railroads was profoundly bound up with the uneven hierarchical cosmopolitan geography of modernization qua national awakening in the Korean cultural nationalist imaginary of train travel. As such, the railroad, like other modernizing technologies, such as the newspaper and the novel, came to be seen as an object to be possessed by the nation as well as the conduit for such attainment as part of the legacy of colonial experience. At the same time, and as a consequence of this historical desire, conception and use of railroads, the railroad and railway journey became pregnant with its own contradictions and dangers of hierarchical and essentializing ideologies.

Chapter Four moves from colonial railroads to the emergence of the modern postcolonial airport as the new international gateway in postwar South Korea stemming from both the territorial division of the peninsula, and South Korea's entry into a new U.S. led Cold War

¹⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991), p. 24.

international system. I argue that the first International Style Kimpo airport terminal built in 1960 served as a charged site and symbol of the state's integration into a new, similarly uneven, but differentially bounded Cold War internationalist order, as manifest in its spectral formation as an 'international stage' of a predominantly American-dominated modernity and anticommunism.

Chapter Five examines the shift in representation from the first International Style Kimpo (1960) to the new traditional-styled kiwa Kimpo terminal (1972-1980) in relation to how the airport became harnessed as a tool of the developmental state beginning in the 1960s, including its control and regulation over airlines and passengers. Presenting an icon for Korea, Inc., the new terminal reflected both the state's repressive politics and cultural ideological deployments of traditional national culture and national identity—towards national economic development.

Chapter Six looks at how the postcolonial airport was imagined in popular Korean postwar cinema and literature. I argue that in contrast to the official discourse which produced Kimpo terminal as the gateway to a new unified universalist international Cold War modernity, popular cinematic and literary representations of Kimpo of the period present this new cosmopolitan postwar modernity as a discrepant, dislocating, and contradictory experience haunted as much by the trauma of national division as by the trauma of dislocations and divisions created by postwar industrial development. Taking the place of railway travel of colonial literature, as the airport formed the new site of international emigrations, both the airport and air travel in postwar film and literature came to figure new narratives of migration and 'exile' interpolated with new conditions, sentiments, and paradoxes stemming from the heterogeneous and factious experience and space of postwar/postcolonial modernity.

Chapter Seven turns to the third and last Kimpo international terminal (1980-1988), built in part to accommodate and showcase the 'economic miracle' of South Korea on the international stage of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, as an important transition between Cold War internationalist Kimpo and 'globalized' Incheon airport. I also argue that this third and last terminal to be built at Kimpo, whose similarly state-mandated kiwa-style roof evolved as a 'Korean' correction to the more ambiguously cross-Asian kiwa of the 1980 terminal, marked the beginning of yet a new role for the airport as well as the cultural nationalism that developed alongside the previous 1980 kiwa terminal in the shift towards both political and economic liberalization in a new post-Cold War international landscape and the development of Korean consumption and the consumption of Korea and Korean products across an expanded globe.

The Concluding chapter gestures towards both significant changes and continuities accompanying the new 'global' aesthetic of Incheon airport, informed through an engagement with Incheon's historical precedents and changes to the state's economic development policies and a new geopolitical context.

PART I

The Skein of National(ist) Journeys: Transcontinental Railroads, the Uneven Terrain of 19th Century Global Imperialism, and Modern National(ist) Imaginings

For early generations of modern nationalists in Korea, the desire for national independence was intimately linked with the desire for modernity. The first part of this dissertation examines the complex and contradictory experience of modernity as this is embodied in the cosmopolitan cultural imaginary of railroads and transnational rail and steamship journeys of various temporary and more permanent Korean exiles. This cultural imaginary regularly appears as a trope of the new modernizing discourse of Korean enlightenment treatises, calls for modernization in the nationalist press and the new modern novels of the period. I argue that this cultural imaginary also provides the structuring conditions for anticolonial ethnic and diasporic imaginings of the modern nation.

If Parisian modernity was figured primarily by Napoleon and Haussmann's new boulevards and modern streets, Korean modernity took shape on imperial transcontinental railway journeys and transpacific steamships. In place of the new bourgeois dandy, there were new students, new women, new journalists, new educators—various elements of a youthful intelligentsia, all of whom, called upon by patriotic duty to the 'new learning' and 'civilization' departed on periodic sojourns to the world's 'modern' metropolitan centers—Tokyo, Shanghai, San Francisco, Hawaii, and even Haussmann and Baudelaire's Paris—to 'enlighten' themselves and their compatriots and ultimately their nation. While forming one of the most consistent motifs in early modern Korean literature, the railway journey was also close to the experience of many early nationalists, for whom periods of voluntary exile—for diplomatic and training missions dispatched by the Chosŏn state (1392-1910) in the last decades of the Chosŏn dynasty, then for political organization to regain national independence after the colonial Protectorate in 1905, as well as for education in the new modern learning continuous throughout since the 1880s—was also a shared motif. Not surprisingly the two strains commonly overlapped, best epitomized in the figure of Yi Kwangsu (1892-1950), one of the foremost proponents of Korean cultural nationalism as well as one of the most celebrated modern Korean novelists.¹

During 1913-14 Yi traveled extensively across the transcontinental railroads from Korea to Manchuria, then to Shanghai, Vladivostok and across the trans-Siberian rail to Chita where he awaited funds from the Korean National Association in Hawaii, a nationalist exile group, to continue on to San Francisco as a journalist for *Shinhan minbo*, a diasporic nationalist paper.² While originally having embarked on a tour of the Asian and North African colonies to learn

¹ Yi Kwangsu also later went on to become notorious as a traitor—vilified by both the North and South Korea, for his collaboration with the Japanese in recruiting Koreans for the Japanese war effort during the final years of Korea's colonization.

² See Yi's early travels recounted by Ann Sung-hi Lee in *Yi Kwang-su and Modern Korean Literature: Mujŏng*, (Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Series, 2005), pp. 18-19.

about their independence struggles, the exigencies of travel and the network of Korean exiles through which Yi's journey progressed altered his destination. Both personal and political circumstance and the start of World War I however ultimately redirected Yi back to Korea in 1914, and then once again to Tokyo in September 1915 as a philosophy student at Waseda University. A key organizer in the exile nationalist student movement in Tokyo, Yi traveled in 1918 on the eve of the momentous March 1st Korean independence movement from Tokyo to Seoul, then from Korea to Siberia, Manchuria, Beijing and back to Japan informing these dispersed communities and nationalist movements of plans to coordinate actions with preparations of the exile movement in the U.S. and Shanghai to send delegates to the Versailles Peace Conference³ to formally petition the emergent League of Nations for Korean national independence from Japan.⁴ While Yi's later travels significantly contributed to the March 1st 1919 mass demonstrations for independence in Korea, the largest anticolonial nationalist uprising in Korean history (which was significantly a coordinated effort among Koreans in colonial Korea with a network of exile nationalists abroad),⁵ Yi's earlier travels contributed to his celebrated, and what is regarded as the nation's first 'modern' novel, *Mujöng*, (The Heartless, 1917), as well as a number of short stories such as "Tonggyöngyung esö Kyöngsöng kkaji" (From Tokyo to Seoul, 1917) and "Örin pöt ege" ("To My Young Friend, 1917) published the same year—which fictionalized as well as historicized, thematized, and aestheticized these transcontinental train journeys as both vehicles and emblems of national awakenings.⁶

The birth of modern Korea in the last few decades of the 19th century came in a bewildering and abrupt onslaught of new ideas (replete with new Western style schools), new technologies, new people, indeed a new civilizational paradigm—but also with a new imperialist international system in which semi-imperial infringements on Korean territory, economy, and politics by Western industrial powers as well as by a newly industrializing Meiji Japan posed a pronounced threat to national political sovereignty. Dominating the patchy urban landscape of Korea's main cities, the sudden arrival of railroads was one of the most visible manifestations of the dramatic changes that beset Korea in the 1890s. The first new railroad commenced operation in 1900 alongside the appearance of newspapers, telephone lines, electric streetcars, and electric street lights all within a span of less than a decade, and all built by and operated through various imperial concessions. These were also accompanied by the arrival of a host of foreigners—Japanese traders and diplomats, Chinese merchants, American missionaries, American and French railroad technicians, Russian mining technicians, etc. who brought with them new languages, cultural practices, and social, political and religious ideas—as well as by the

³ As the proposed delegation led by Syngman Rhee of the Korean nationalist exile movement in Hawaii was denied passports on account of being colonial subjects of Japan, Kim Kyusik from the New Korean Young Men's Association, the nationalist exile organization in Shanghai was dispatched instead as the lone delegate to the Paris Peace Conference in the summer of 1919. Sadly, as King Kojong's diplomatic pleas in 1905 to the great Western powers (US, Britain and France) to intervene on behalf of Korea's independence against the Japanese protectorate had fallen on deaf ears, Kim Kyusik was likewise told that the Wilsonian humanist declaration of the self-determination of nations was intended for and limited to Europe and did not apply to Asian colonies, especially those of which belonged to Japan which was now included as a member of the great Western alliance—championing world peace!

⁴ I refer to Kenneth Wells' lecture on the March 1st movement (given during his Modern Korean History course at UC Berkeley, Fall 2009) for Yi's travels in late 1918 on the eve of the March 1st movement.

⁵ The February 8th Independence Movement in Tokyo organized by Korean students preceded the March 1st movement and provided impetus towards its organization.

⁶ Its predecessor the 'new novel' appeared earlier around 1905.

unprecedented international departures of a number of Koreans on educational and diplomatic journeys abroad as well as the first groups of Korean labor migrants to the new world.⁷

In the early Korean cultural national imagination, the railroad was symbolic of all these changes, indeed of the new ‘enlightenment and civilization’—the rallying cry of modern Korean reformers. However, coexistent with the threat of imperialism palpable from Korea’s first ‘modern’ treaty with a foreign industrial power and the uneven terrain of the new Western interstate system, they were not unambiguous signs of progress.⁸ With the 1905 imposition of the Japanese ‘Protectorate’ in which Korea forfeited diplomatic sovereignty and its command of the state military, finance, and national infrastructure, including all of its railway lines (which were already built primarily by Japanese companies and financed by its imperial government during the concessionary period), the railways proceeded to incorporate Korean territory into the Japanese imperium as Korea was being transformed into a political economic appendage of Japan. At the same time, building upon three previous decades of various diplomatic, armed, domestic and international agitation for modern reform to safeguard national sovereignty, various forms of resistance erupted in response to the Protectorate with renewed calls for the nation to both ‘awaken’ and ‘arise’ against Japan to regain national sovereignty. Amidst this tumult, the railroads were likewise renewed as a charged locus for imagining national independence now doubling as the backbone of the Japanese empire and as the threshold of national modernity via nationalist political organization in exile, and armed struggle against Japan—with Tokyo, Hawaii, San Francisco, Shanghai, Manchuria, and Siberia as its top destinations. As one of the first and foremost modern writers and nationalists, Ch’oe Nam-son⁹ wrote in his “Ode to Kyungbu Railway” (1908):¹⁰

With the roaring burst of the whistle
and its back turned against Namdaemun¹¹
it departs like the swift wind
and even a bird may not catch it...

The train I ride from morning to night
I ride as it were mine but in truth it is that of the other
When shall we grow strong

⁷ Organized through Horace A. Allen, American missionary, doctor, diplomat, and advisor to King Kojong, roughly 7000 Koreans, a large number being new Christian converts, were recruited as agricultural laborers to Hawaii—as strikebreakers for the Japanese plantation workers.

⁸ One of the first breaches by Japan into Korean internal sovereignty was new laws commanding death for those who destroyed railway lines. See Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910* (Berkeley, UC Press, 1995), p. 186. As much as the new railways were optimistic signs of Korean modernization/ progress, however ambivalently, in the eyes of Korean national reformers, they were likewise a signal target for the orthodox Confucian literati led “Righteous armies” from the 1890s until early years of colonialism after 1910 as well as the later nationalist guerilla forces active along the Manchurian border against Japanese imperialism.

⁹ Ch’oe Nam-son is also another tragic figure of modern Korean nationalism—who shared both a similar path and similar fate as Yi Kwangsu in the last decades of colonial rule and in postcolonial Korea.

¹⁰ Cited in Hyungmin Pai, “Modernism, Development, and the Transformation of Seoul: A Study of the Development of Sae’oon Sang’ga and Yoido,” in Won Bae Kim et al, ed. *Culture and the City in East Asia*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 113-114.

¹¹ Namdaemun is the South Gate of Seoul, where the first train station was located. Originally called Hanyang, what is now contemporary Seoul became the capital of the Chosŏn dynasty in 1394.

So that we may run it with our own bare arms.

The following three chapters of Part I examine the railroad as a forerunner to the postcolonial airport and postwar air travel as a premier technology and touchstone for the introduction and evolution of the experience of modernization and modernity in Korea as well as modern Korean nationalist thought and experience. The first chapter examines the historical formation of modern ethnic and diasporic Korean nationalism, examining its parallels and differences from Benedict Anderson's theory of anticolonial nationalism and long-distance nationalism as discussed in *Imagined Communities* and *The Spectre of Comparisons*. The second chapter looks at the systematized yet hierarchical and heterogeneous space-time of railroads in an oblique relation to the homogenous, empty time of print-technologies¹² as a problematic of how we approach the ruptures and deviations to the ostensibly homogenous, empty time and abstract space of modernization, modernism and modernity within a highly uneven global capitalist world. And the last chapter examines how the railroad came to function as a paradoxical symbol of modernity in colonial Korea as both a site and structuring condition for colonial expropriations as well as national awakenings qua 'enlightenment' and modernization. Through these chapters, I argue that material innovations in long-distance transportation (19th railroads/train stations and later 20th century airplanes/airports) supply a prominent structuring condition and ideological symbol for late 19th century to early 20th century anti-colonial nationalism as well as 20th century post-colonial nationalism in Korea—through which nations were also being apprehended as synchronous, comparable and contiguous (thus abstracted or decontextualized) yet also *hierarchically* differentiated communities within the context of an uneven interconnected global capitalist space.

¹² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991), p. 24.

Chapter One

Discrepant Migrations: Anticolonial Ethnic-Diasporic Nationalism and Classical 19th Century Nationalism (Nationalism and Modernity)

The March 1st 1919 Korean Independence Movement: Anti-colonialism, Diasporic Nationalism, and Universal Aspirations

Many Korean nationalists had gone into self-imposed exile after 1910 across Asia, the Russian Far East and the U.S. to continue independence movements free from the restrictive confinement of colonial rule in the peninsula as well as engage in armed struggle against imperial Japan. At the same time, a steady stream of Korean migrant-students regularly traveled to Japan and less frequently to the U.S. to study for lack of universities in colonial Korea as well as to politically organize. These growing diasporic communities of Koreans came to play a key role in instigating and facilitating anticolonial nationalist movements throughout the colonial period, including the momentous March 1st 1919 Korean independence movement. As John Lie asserts, not only were “diasporic Koreans in Japan and China...central in the imagination and organization of anti-colonial, nationalist aspirations of the Korean people,” but these “epic nationalist struggles—the dream of an independent Korea—occurred mostly outside of the Korean peninsula.”¹³ If the March 1st movement brought together the “two separate streams” of elite national activism and mass nationalism—which had since the late 19th century largely evolved into “separate and poorly coordinated movements”—into “a purposeful mass nationalist movement” in both a remarkable and historically unprecedented way,¹⁴ the domestic coordination with and inspiration from international networks of Korean exile movements and the amalgamation of historical Confucian state legacies with contemporary Western modern political ideas and activism also presents a unique model of nationalism and nationalist organization in which diasporic communities of Korean nationals and historical state legacies articulated with contemporaneous developments in the broader international arena provide important structuring conditions for national consciousness and activism.

Korean Diasporic Nationalism in Tokyo, Hawaii, and Shanghai

The March 1st movement began not in Seoul but in Tokyo a month earlier, and was not confined to Korean territory but encompassed simultaneously activities in Tokyo, Shanghai, Hawaii and Paris. As Korean nationalist leaders dispersed across various exile communities across Asia, Siberia, and the US closely followed the conclusion of World War I and the developments of the Paris Peace Conference, exile communities were first to seize upon Woodrow Wilson’s principle of national autonomy and self-determination as a renewed basis on which to appeal for Korean independence from Japan. Emboldened by the knowledge of the participation of both non-Western and exile nationalist groups in the Peace Conference, the

¹³ John Lie, “Diasporic Nationalism,” *Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies*, Vol.1 no.3 (2001), p. 360.

¹⁴ Carter J. Eckert et al, *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990, published for the Korea Institute, Harvard University), p. 280.

Korean National Association in Hawaii began to make preparations as early as November 1918 to send a Korean delegation led by Syngman Rhee to Paris.¹⁵ “In the same month, in Shanghai, the New Korea Youth Party under Chang Toksu, published a forceful letter in the Shanghai, English-language *Millard's Review*, in which they appealed to America to act in line with Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination and prevent Japan from swallowing up the freedom of all East Asia.”¹⁶ As the proposed delegation from Hawaii was denied passports on account of being colonial subjects of Japan, Kim Kyusik from the New Korean Young Men's Association, the nationalist exile organization in Shanghai was dispatched instead in early February as the lone delegate traveling a circuitous route to Versailles to lobby the League of Nations for Korean independence.¹⁷

Meanwhile in Tokyo, which by 1918 had become a hotbed of Korean nationalism, the Wilsonian doctrine was also enthusiastically taken up by Korean nationalist student groups. Benefitting from the comparative freedom enjoyed by Koreans in Japan to their domestic counterparts, Korean students had been relatively free to discuss and nurture Korean independence thought via Korean Student Fraternities and the YMCA in Tokyo.¹⁸ In this political and intellectual environment, the Wilsonian doctrine began to transform these debates into demands for immediate independence. At the same time, as the students also became aware of the preparations among fellow Koreans in Hawaii and Shanghai to send delegates to Versailles, writer and novelist Yi Kwangsu, then studying philosophy at Waseda University and a key participant of Tokyo's nationalist student groups traveled to “northern China, Manchuria, Siberia, and Korea to inform nationalist leaders of pending action.”¹⁹ Returning to Japan, the Korean students in Tokyo formed a committee in January 1919 to prepare a Declaration of Independence and plan a demonstration. Yi himself composed the Declaration in Korean, Japanese, and English, which began “As representatives of the 20 million Korean people, the Korean Youth Independence Association declares before those nations of the world which have secured victory for freedom and justice, the realisation of independence,” followed by 11 clauses which applied the doctrine of the right to self determination to the Korean and Asian context.²⁰ Yi also composed a Petition and Resolution which concluded thus: “Should our demands be refused, we shall declare an eternal, bloody war against Japan, and we Koreans will hear no responsibility for any calamities such as may arise from it.”²¹ Yi then departed for Shanghai on January 30th, from where he planned to coordinate the launch of the Tokyo demonstration with the nationalists exile group in Shanghai.²² However, with the arrest of a student on February 7, the students moved up their demonstration plans fearing police discovery and on February 8th sent a copy of the Declaration, Resolution and Petition to each Japanese Government minister and member of Parliament, to each Consulate, to the Government-General in Korea, and to newspapers, magazines, scholars, as well as Wilson, Clemenceau and Llyod-George at

¹⁵ Eckert et al., p. 276.

¹⁶ Kenneth Wells lecture (UC Berkeley, Fall 2009).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Kenneth Wells lecture (UC Berkeley, Fall 2009). The following account of the Tokyo movement refers to this lecture and his article: “Background to the March First Movement: Koreans in Japan, 1905-1919,” in *Korean Studies* vol. 13 (1989), pp. 5-21.

¹⁹ Kenneth M. Wells, “Background to the March First Movement: Koreans in Japan, 1905-1919,” in *Korean Studies* vol. 13 (1989), p. 12.

²⁰ Ibid. Kenneth Wells lecture (UC Berkeley, Fall 2009).

²¹ Ibid., p. 6; Kenneth Wells lecture (UC Berkeley, Fall 2009).

²² Kenneth Wells lecture (UC Berkeley, Fall 2009).

Versailles.²³ On that day “400 Koreans assembled at a YMCA in Tokyo where the Declaration of Independence was read out. The police arrived amid wild cheering and arrested 30 demonstrators before the meeting was dispersed. The following days in Tokyo witnessed scattered demonstrations, but the manpower for a sustained movement was lacking. The February Eighth Movement was designed to prompt similar activity in Korea, and to strengthen the hand of Kim Kyusik, who had been sent to Versailles to press Korea's case for independence early in February.”²⁴

March 1st 1919 in Korea

The March 1st 1919 independence movement in Korea, which grew into the largest national anticolonial uprising in Korean history, was both a watershed in the development of modern Korean nationalism as well as a milestone for anticolonial nationalist movements in East Asia.²⁵ When the May Fourth Movement erupted in Beijing two months later, “in their speeches, the leaders of the Chinese movement paid tribute to the Korean movement and acknowledged it as an inspiration for their own action...prais[ing] it as ushering in ‘a new epoch in the history of the world's revolutions.’”²⁶ While these two anti-imperialist movements evolved in distinct historical contexts, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference—the birthplace of the new League of Nations—and Japanese imperialism in East Asia provided the shared impetus for both.²⁷ Inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s famous fourteen points which championed national autonomy and self-determination, and prompted by the Korean Students’ Declaration of Independence in Tokyo on February 8th as well as plans by self-exiled nationalist leaders in Shanghai to dispatch a Korean delegate to Versailles, nationalist leaders of the Protestant, Ch’ondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way),²⁸ and Buddhist religions in Korea came together with the prodding of younger nationalists and other intermediaries to covertly organize a domestic movement to appeal for national independence.²⁹ In addition to the religious leaders, many of the students in Tokyo had returned to Korea in February 1919 to help organize the Seoul movement.³⁰

The organizers planned for another Declaration of Independence to be drawn up, this time by the leading nationalist poet, publisher, and historian Ch’oe Nam-son who had also been a student in Tokyo but since returned to Korea, “petitions to foreign representatives in Tokyo, as

²³ Ibid.; Kenneth M. Wells, “Background to the March First Movement: Koreans in Japan, 1905-1919,” P. 12.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Korea was formally colonized by Japan in 1910, but de facto colonization came earlier in 1905 with the Japanese Protectorate Treaty, which took away Korean diplomatic sovereignty and forfeited control of national infrastructure, finances etc. Colonial rule which lasted from 1910 – 1945 is commonly divided into three periods: 1910-1919: the dark period of harsh militaristic colonial rule; 1920 – mid 1930s: the more permissive and co-optative period of Cultural Rule; late 1930s – 1945: war mobilization period.

²⁶ I rely on much of the details of the background and events of the March 1st movement on Korean historian Kenneth Wells lecture on the March 1st movement (given during his Modern Korean History course at UC Berkeley, Fall 2009).

²⁷ The Treaty of Versailles, which handed over German possessions in Chinese territory to Japan was a crucial stimulant for the Chinese May Fourth Movement.

²⁸ Ch’ondogyo was an offshoot of the indigenous syncretic Tonghak religion that combined Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity and originated in the 1860s.

²⁹ Carter J. Eckert et al., p. 277. As to the significance of church leaders during the first decade of militaristic colonial rule in Korea, Eckert et al writes: “With most radical leaders were either in exile or in jail, what remained of the nationalist leadership in the colony was centered in the religious community. Church related assembly and organization had been guaranteed in the name of religious freedom and thus became a shelter for covert political activity” (277).

³⁰ Kenneth Wells lecture (UC Berkeley, Fall 2009).

message to President Wilson, and for all documents to be submitted over the signatures of representatives of the people and former Chosŏn dynasty officials.”³¹ They also planned the movement to coincide with the date of King Kojong’s state funeral set for March 3rd (Kojong was the last monarch of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) to harness the mourners flocking to Seoul for the funeral to widen participation in the demonstrations as well as utilize the Japanese concession to the free right of travel without a travel pass for those attending the funeral at Pagoda Palace in Seoul. With the date advanced for fear of police discovery, on March 1st 1919 the thirty-three ‘national representatives,’ signers of the Declaration of Independence gathered at a Seoul restaurant at 2pm. Upon reading aloud the Declaration, followed by a speech and a toast, they dispatched the Declaration to the Japanese colonial Governor-General, notified the police and waited for their arrest. Simultaneously in downtown Seoul, the Declaration was being leafleted around the Palace grounds by college and middle school students and read aloud at Pagoda Park in front of an amassing crowd and the Korean flag. As the crowd then dispersed moving in three directions towards the foreign consulates, the Army headquarters, and the offices of the Governor-General, widespread nonviolent demonstrations ensued throughout the day with hundreds of thousands of people pouring onto the streets chanting, “long live independent Korea.”³² Outside of Seoul mass rallies were also staged in five other provinces with the largest in Pyongyang.³³ The events of this day sparked a spontaneous mass uprising of anticolonial demonstrations nationwide in the following months. Over a million people are said to have participated in these demonstrations, “with the Japanese police reporting ‘disturbances’ in all but seven of Korea’s 218 counties.”³⁴ The Japanese suppressed the movement with brutal force, and “frequent, bloody clashes between crowds and police” ensued as Japanese brutality was met with Korean reprisals. Estimates of casualties and arrests between March and December range from 553 killed, 1,409 injured, and 12,522 arrests according to the official Japanese count to over 7,500 deaths, 15,000 injured, and 45,000 arrests according to Korean estimates.³⁵ While the movement failed to bring about independence, shocked and unprepared by the mass uprising, as well as concerned with world opinion, the Japanese premier appointed a new Governor-General and overhauled the militaristic colonial policy of the 1910s with a new Cultural Policy (Bunka Seiji) inaugurating a new colonial era of cultural and political cooptation in place of overt military oppression. Mass mobilization on such a scale would not be seen again until after the end of the colonial period in postwar South Korea when the pro-democracy mass student demonstrations in April 1960 brought down the authoritarian regime of Syngman Rhee (ironically a central figure of the March 1st independence movement).

Versailles 1919, Before and After the ‘Universal’ Right to National Self-Determination

As Kim Kyusik made his way to Paris, he submitted numerous petitions in his campaign for Korean independence in accordance with the principle of national self-determination to the world powers constituting the new League of Nations. Sadly, however, as King Kojong’s diplomatic pleas in 1905 to the great Western powers (US, Britain and France) to intervene on behalf of Korea’s independence against the Japanese Protectorate, unbeknownst of the Taft-

³¹ Eckert et al., p. 278.

³² Kenneth Wells lecture (UC Berkeley, Fall 2009).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

Katsura Agreement,³⁶ had fallen on deaf ears, Kim Kyusik's petitions were met with equal indifference. Kim was moreover effectively told by the assistant to the American delegate to Paris that the Wilsonian humanist declaration of the self-determination of nations was intended for and limited to the European situation and did not apply to Asian colonies, especially those of which, belonging to Imperial Japan, which was now a member of the great Western alliance—championing world peace!³⁷ Not unlike Korea's encounter with the contradictions and hypocrisy of the 'universalist' model of civilization in the hostile uneven imperialist system of the late 19th century, which spurred national reform movements by both the Korean state and society and sparked nationalist consciousness among Korean intellectuals in and out of Korea since the 1880s, the contradiction and failure of the so-called 'universal' humanist principle of national self-determination likewise led to the expansion and radicalization of the nationalist movement as well as new revolutionary directions in nationalist thought and activism in and out of the colony after 1919. One such development, articulated with the 1917 Bolshevik revolution and Lenin's support for the right to national self-determination by oppressed nations, was a turn to socialism and communism by Korean nationalists in exile communities as well as in the colony reflecting the growing disillusionment with Western liberalism.³⁸ Also spearheaded by exile groups, "Korean militants in China and Russia founded early communist and nationalist resistance groups" in the early 1920s while "the Korean Communist Party (KCP) was founded within Korea in 1925."³⁹ Yi Tong-hwi formed the Korean Communist Party in Shanghai in 1919, which was later joined by Kim Kyusik, our delegate to Paris.⁴⁰ However, in the context of colonial rule, "socialists and communists were always Korean nationalists as well."⁴¹ As Robinson underscores: "It is impossible to separate nationalists from social revolutionary internationalists in the 1920s because Koreans who were studying radical ideas were doing so as patriots, intensely concerned with the issue of nationalist liberation."⁴²

The centrality of national liberation to the adoption of both Western liberal and radical political models—which oriented both gradualist cultural nationalists and Korean socialists in the colony *as well as* exile nationalists such as those engaged in diplomatic methods and those pursuing armed struggle for liberation outside of the colony—coupled with the crucial importance of diasporic nationalist communities and activism abroad, is illustrated in the emergence of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG). KPG was established in Shanghai on April 19, 1919 as a mixed coalition of leading exile nationalists from both liberal and socialist political persuasions. The new government in exile was formed on the republican model of government with both liberal nationalists such as Syngman Rhee and Ahn Ch'angho as well as communist nationalists Yi Tong-hwi and Kim Kyusik given top cabinet positions (many in abstentia), bringing together many of the leaders of exile organizations in China, Manchuria,

³⁶ The Taft-Katsura Agreement was a confidential agreement between Japan and the US in 1905 following Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War whereby the US gave Japan the green light to colonize Korea in exchange for Japan's non-interference in US's plans to colonize the Philippines.

³⁷ Kenneth Wells lecture (UC Berkeley, Fall 2009).

³⁸ At the same time, these exiles were also split between those who supported diplomatic methods and those who supported armed struggle to secure independence.

³⁹ Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 159.

⁴⁰ Kenneth Wells lecture (UC Berkeley, Fall 2009).

⁴¹ Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 158.

⁴² Michael E. Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925*, p. 108.

Siberia, and the United States alongside western political models.⁴³ As I examine in this chapter, the primacy of national liberation and the vital importance of diasporic nationalism to this goal presents two essential features of the historical formation and defining characteristics of modern Korean anticolonial nationalism within an uneven imperialist global capitalist system, both of which are highlighted by this uneven historical-geographical context of encounter and the material technologies or structuring conditions of its development. The first is the intersection of cosmopolitan yearnings, experiences and journeys with national imaginings for nonwestern unindustrialized nations like Korea—as exemplified in the intensely cosmopolitan organization of the March First nationalist movement as well as the formation of the KPG in its aftermath—arising from this uneven imperialist political-economic world system of the late 19th and early 20th century and facilitated by new modern technologies of communication and transportation. The second is how this diasporic or cosmopolitan character of national imagining is a reflection of both the double standards and contradictions of political ‘universalist’ principles—such as that of political sovereignty or the right to national self-determination—vis-à-vis nonwestern, non-industrialized and non-military powers like Korea in this uneven imperialist world order, as well as a reflection of the necessity of such nonwestern, non-industrialized nations like Korea to continue to engage with Western political ideas and institutions in the face of their blatant exclusions from these modern political universalist frameworks. Thus the formation of the linkage between cosmopolitan yearnings and experiences with national imaginings can be seen to be historically bound up with the desire and attempt to be included in these so-called universalist political paradigms—including that of the paradigm of the classical 19th century project of nationalism—and the failure to be so included in these paradigms corresponding to the failure to be *recognized* as a nation-state with equal rights and freedoms by Western imperialist powers qua guardians of this political order.

Premodern Traditions, A New Imperialist International System, and Modern Nationalist Consciousness in Korea

As many historians of Korea have noted, Korea’s colonial experience presents an anomalous case from many of the Asian and African colonies of European Imperial powers. Unlike most European colonies, Korea had existed for over a millennium of history as a unified independent nation/polity with stable geographical boundaries and linguistic and ethnic homogeneity.⁴⁴ Also, a shared premodern cultural heritage between Korea and Japan stemming

⁴³ Bruce Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 159. The Singanhoe that formed in the mid 1920s inside Korea was also a united front organization that tried to bring together liberal cultural nationalists and Korean communists. As the gradualist program of the cultural nationalist movement strengthened in the more relaxed cultural and political milieu of post 1919 Cultural Rule, while any hint of communist activity was suppressed outright, a permanent split between the cultural nationalist gradualists (who advocated preparing for independence through cultural and educational activities) and the radical communist (who agitated for immediate independence) emerged within and outside the colony that set the stage for ideological divisions in the postcolonial period

⁴⁴ See for example, Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-47* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 3-10; Carter J. Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*; and Carter Eckert, “Korea’s Transition to Modernity: A Will to Greatness,” in Merle Goldman and Andrew Gordon, eds., *Historical Perspectives on Contemporary East Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 119-154. The name Korea comes from the Koryo dynasty (936-1392 AD), which preceded the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910) and followed the Unified Silla Dynasty (676-935 AD). It’s worth noting that Korea is more

from their joint participation in Sinitic civilization and the Chinese world order as tribute states presented more parity than disparity in cultural and linguistic backgrounds.⁴⁵ At the same time, the geographic proximity between the two countries, in addition to a shared cultural system, facilitated a long history of diplomatic and cultural exchanges between the two countries for centuries prior to colonization as well as earlier episodes of militaristic aggressions, reinforcing distinct identities between Japan and Korea during peacetime and in war.⁴⁶ Thus unlike other colonial experiences, historian Bruce Cumings argues, “Japanese colonial policies did not have the usual effect of creating both a new nation and a new elite among the colonized that then became conscious of the potentialities of nationhood:”⁴⁷

...the metropolitan power did not carve a new nation out of a welter of geographic units divided along ethnic, racial, religious, or tribal lines; it imposed its control upon an ancient political system with stable well-established geographical boundaries and an astonishing homogeneity in language, culture, and ethnicity. Such conditions had provided Korea with

ethnically homogenous than even Japan, which is usually the type-case comparison to primarily polyglot and ethnically diverse empires and colonies in nationalist studies.

⁴⁵ Korea and Japan shared the classical Chinese ideographic script. It is important to note that the Chinese world order in the Korean perspective was a universal-cosmological world order which while “radiat[ing] outward from China, it was by no means seen as something exclusive to China.” (Eckert, 2000, p. 121) This is particularly evident in the Korean Neo-Confucian court’s initial resistance to the Manchu Qing dynasty, who were viewed as ‘barbarian’ in the Chinese world order, and upon acceptance, the widespread sense among Korean Neo-Confucians that with the fall of the Ming and in face of Manchu China that Korea now held the mantle of Chinese civilization over Manchu China in so far as they were closer to the classical ideal of Confucian teaching located in the ancient past. Moreover, unlike the political and economic primacy of the industrial capitalist system, Chinese suzerainty or “revering China” was seen “primarily as a cultural phenomenon” whereby: “political relationships were embedded with a certain cultural orientation centered on the cosmological primacy of the Chinese emperor. The Koreans honored this vision in the form of regular tribute missions and solicitation of the emperor’s formal recognition in the investiture of kings. But apart from these infrequent ceremonial occasions, they paid little attention to their imperial suzerain in the conduct of their own internal affairs” (121). In this system, the Korean state was autonomous in governing both internal and foreign affairs.

⁴⁶ As Cumings, among others have noted about Japan and Korea’s unusual colonial relationship: “their relationship is more akin to that between Germany and France or England and Ireland than to that between Belgium and Zaire or Portugal and Mozambique” (1997, p. 140). The Hideyoshi invasions of Korea 1592 and 1597 had become part of the national lore, in which the Korean naval commander Admiral Yi Sunshin who victoriously fought against the Japanese became celebrated as a national hero and his armored battleship praised as an exemplar of national greatness. As for the unique geographical proximity, after colonization it granted Koreans easier access to the Japanese metropole for education, travel, and commerce, while conversely, it also facilitated a large influx of Japanese colonists and settlers into Korea. For example, as Cumings points out, “By the last decade of the colonial period some 246,000 Japanese civil servants and professionals ruled about 21 million Koreans; about 46 percent of the colonizer population was in government service. In 1937, by way of contrast, the French ruled a Vietnamese population of 17 million with 2,920 administrative personnel and about 11,000 regular French troops” (Cumings, 1997, p. 153). Proximity also endowed strategic significance to Korean territory in Japan’s military expansion into continental Asia and the integration of imperial and colonial economies, and also enabled forced mass mobilization of Korean labor to Japan. “In 1941, some 1.4 million Koreans were in Japan, of whom 770,000 were in the labor force: 220,000 were in construction work, 208,000 in manufacturing, 94,000 in mining, and the remainder in agriculture. Yet at least half a million more were sent to Japan thereafter, such that by the end of the war Koreans made up one-third of the industrial labor force in Japan” (Cumings, 1997, p. 177). The greater access between metropole and colony, moreover reinforced their distinctive ethno-linguistic identities, as these crossings were structured under discriminatory and racist policies of colonialism.

⁴⁷ Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, p. 10.

most of the prerequisites of nationhood long before the peoples of Europe attained them.⁴⁸

Rather, the colonization process in Korea more resembled a series of “colonial substitutions” in place of “colonial creations,” whereby “the Japanese, in colonizing Korea, had to co-opt, pension off, or destroy the rulers of an agrarian bureaucratic dynasty that had administered Korea for five hundred years and that had long considered itself superior to Japan.”⁴⁹

...exchanging a Japanese ruling elite for the Korean yangban⁵⁰ scholar-officials, most of whom were either co-opted or dismissed; instituting colonial imperative coordination for the old central state administration; exchanging Japanese modern education for the Confucian classics; building Japanese capital and expertise in place of incipient Korean versions, Japanese talent for Korean talent; eventually even replacing the Korean language with Japanese.⁵¹

Thus based on Korea’s particular premodern lineage and early modern historical experience, Cumings contends, “A distinct sense of Koreanness, if not nationalism, had set Koreans apart from Japanese all along; and it stimulated the Korean resistance to Japanese colonialism at the time of Annexation [1905-1910], in the 1919 independence movement, and in the tenancy disputes, worker and peasant unions, and exile movements of the 1920s and 1930s.”⁵²

Indeed, taking up Hobsbawm’s suggestion that unlike European cases there might be a possibility for “an organic relationship between proto-nationalism and modern nationalism” in countries such as China, Japan, and Korea “which were historic states with largely homogenous populations,” John Duncan has argued towards “the existence in premodern Korea of a proto-nationalism that could, and probably did, provide the basis for modern nationalism on all four of Hobsbawm’s criteria: language, ethnicity, religion and historical state.”⁵³ Examining in particular the longstanding “organizational, educational, and ritual activities of the state—of the Koryo [918-1392 AD) and Chosŏn [1392-1910 AD] dynasties,” Duncan contends: “Not only does the

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁹ Cumings, *Korea’s Place Under the Sun*, p. 141

⁵⁰ *Yangban* refers the landed aristocracy/oligarchy in Korea, which commanded significant power over the state much more so than their counterparts in China: “Aristocracy and state in Korea competed for available surplus resources, with the latter often losing out...The landed class used the state to perpetuate itself and to dominate the peasant mass” (Cumings, 1981, p. 10). All of the scholar-bureaucrats came from this class as *yangban* lineage was a requirement for taking the Confucian civil examinations adopted from the Chinese system.

⁵¹ Cumings, *Korea’s Place Under the Sun*, p. 141. This is not to minimize the difference between the relative weak centralized bureaucracy of the Chosŏn state which was “superficially strong at the center, but with weak and tenuous links to the periphery” whereas the Japanese colonial state was “comprehensive, autonomous, and penetrating,” even totalitarian in its function “to organize, mobilize, and exploit Koreans in the interests of the metropole...shrewdly manipulating tensions within the Korean upper class, finding important collaborators within the old bureaucracy and mobilizing others into pro-Japanese organizations such as the Ilchinhoe” (Cumings, 1981, p. 20). The Ilchinhoe was a mass pro-Japanese political organization, infamous for their memorial to King Sunjong to abdicate the throne and merge with Japan just before formal Annexation in 1910.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ John Duncan, “Proto-Nationalism in Premodern Korea,” in Sang-oak Lee and Duk-soo Park, Eds. *Perspectives on Korea* (Sydney, Australia: Wild Peony Press, 1998), pp. 201; 217. See also, Remco E. Breuker, “The Three in One, the One in Three: The Koryo Three Han as a Pre-modern Nation,” *Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies*, vol. 2.2 (2006), pp. 143-168.

remarkable endurance of the Korean state imply some sort of social and cultural basis for unity, but the nature of the premodern Korean state as a centralized bureaucratic polity also suggests the possibility that the organizational activities of the state may have created a homogenous collectivity with a sense of shared identity much earlier than happened in the countries of Western Europe that provide the model for “modernist” scholarship.”⁵⁴ Furthermore, he suggests, “one could perhaps argue that the Korean acceptance of a strongly statist version of nationalism was not simply a matter of imitation of the German-Japanese model, but was largely conditioned by a pre-existing sense of identification with a larger collectivity defined and symbolized by the state.”⁵⁵

On this suggestion, one could glimpse an oblique relation to what Anderson has described as 19th century official nationalism⁵⁶ among European dynastic states which played a significant role in shaping colonial nationalisms through its overseas imperial capitalist aberrations—in the appearance of a centralized state and unified territory in Korea as early as the 10th century with the Koryo dynasty, and the various consolidating top-down activities ranging from government civil examinations open to state-wide participation (though reserved for those with aristocratic lineage), corvée and military mobilizations during various invasions (Mongol, Japanese, Manchu, etc.), state-organized population movements, as well as host of Confucian court rituals during the Chosŏn dynasty which demanded popular participation as Duncan has outlined—combined with Korea’s unusually homogenous population and naturally delimited territory (Korea doesn’t even have its Okinawans or Ainu ethnic groups, and the Korean peninsula is surrounded by water on three sides), as well as the state’s participation in the Chinese cultural system which produced a distinct sense of place or position for the Korean polity within the Sino-centric East Asian world order as much as it fostered a shared cosmopolitan Confucian cultural identity.⁵⁷ However, this type of official nationalism did not form in response to popular nationalism and was not grounded in print-capitalism, mercantile capitalism or industrial capitalism (there was no capitalism). Thus, if the premodern Koryo⁵⁸ and Chosŏn states could be seen to present alternative structuring conditions and historical lineage-models of state-centered nationalism or rather statism for Korea appearing *avant-la-lettre* of European official nationalism, then the historical context, lineage and memory of the official nationalist-like centralizing processes of Koryo and Chosŏn states and their participation and mode of participation in the Sinitic cultural system, in addition to their encounter with the 19th century Western imperial nation-state system, could be called into account for ostensibly similar but different characteristics of modern nation-state development and nationalist consciousness and discourse in early modern Korea.

⁵⁴ Duncan, pp. 221, 200-201.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 221. This is an interesting idea—that provides a premodern supplement (which could also apply to Japan) to the other two more modern similarities among the three nations: relative economic underdevelopment and the fostering of spiritual or cultural nationalist thought, which develops in response to French economic and cultural imperialism (Germany), Western semi-imperialism/discrimination within imperialist hierarchy (Japan), and Western and Japanese semi-imperialism and later Japanese imperialism (Korea).

⁵⁶ For Anderson, European official nationalism arose in the period of 19th century high imperialism in response to popular vernacular ethno-linguistic nationalisms and is exemplified by the reactionary character of the Czarist Russification of Russia. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991), chapters on ‘Official Nationalism’ and ‘The Last Wave.’

⁵⁷ Refer to footnote 32.

⁵⁸ Remco E. Breucker argues that the concept of *samhan* from the early Koryo dynasty did indicate such a premodern collective identity of the state and its people in “The Three in One, the One in Three: The Koryo Three Han as a Pre-modern Nation,” *Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies*, vol. 2.2 (2006), pp. 143-168.

Naturally, this is not to eschew the historical development of modern Korean nationalism in the late 19th century in the face of intense domestic disquiet and foreign threats or the significance of American and European experiences and models of nationalism as well as more contemporaneous Chinese and Japanese versions on this development.⁵⁹ But rather, as Duncan emphasizes in his discussion of proto-nationalism and modern nationalism in Korea, the inadequacy of both the “primordialist” view of nations as “natural and universal units of history” as well as the “modernist” claim that nations are created “either through the propagandizing efforts of activist intellectuals and the homogenizing organizational activities of the modern state” spurred by the rise of industrial capitalism—in the Korean context.⁶⁰ While Duncan is largely in agreement with the “modernist” position that “the depiction of premodern Korean history as the history of the nation is a projection into the past of a twentieth-century nationalist discourse which functions, for purposes of power and politics, to elide other potentially competitive forms of identification such as class, region, or gender in favor of a totalizing national identity,” he also asserts that this politicization of national identity in modern Korean nationalist discourse, which can also be seen to parallel similar processes in other East Asian countries, was not “strictly a modern phenomenon.”⁶¹ As Prasenjit Duara has argued in the case of early twentieth century Chinese nationalism, Duncan insists that on the one hand “the sense of identification among Korean people, both elites and commoners, with a larger collectivity represented by the state is not a twentieth century novelty...[but] dates back hundreds of years,” on the other he also emphasizes that “the state-defined collectivity was not the only, or even the primary, locus of identification” but “only one of several levels of identity.”⁶²

The Korean *yangban* elites also identified with other East Asian literati, with their clans, their religions and their class. The peasants, in turn, probably also identified with their locales, their regions and with their class—not only vis-à-vis the *yangban*, but also vis-à-vis slaves and other menials. Which

⁵⁹ I find it strange that in every other social realm, the way in which new ideas and institutions from the West affect nativist counterparts and vice versa is a common line of inquiry, yet in the realm of politics/state institutions—modernist theories of nationalism and the nation-state are largely understood as tabula rasa formations, colonial creations, or mere Western imitations.

⁶⁰ Duncan, pp. 199-200. Duncan attributes the popularity of the primordialist view primarily to mainstream Korean historians and the modernist view to younger Western Koreanists. The main contention among Korean primordialists is “whether ‘the first national unification’ was achieved under Shilla or the early Koryo [dynasties]” (198). As for the modernist view, Duncan takes Henry Em’s argument in “Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’aeho’s Historiography” as representative. Duncan writes: “They note that the very word for nation in Korean, *minjok* is a neologism first employed by Japanese scholars as a translation of the Western concept and that it was first appropriated by Korean activists in the early twentieth century. They argue, therefore, that a Korean ‘nation’ only came into being after that time in response to, and in imitation of, Western and Japanese nationalism and imperialism” (200). I take up Em’s discussion in relation to Anderson below. Also, it is worth noting that before ‘minjok’ (ethnic nation) which started appearing in the nationalist newspapers and texts after 1905, as Kyung Moon Hwang points out, the Chinese compound for state ‘kukka’ which can be translated as ‘state’ or ‘country’ was primarily used (interchangeably with the native word ‘nara’) by these reformers translated/reconceptualized from common Chosŏn usage to refer to ‘dynastic government’ to a “broader collectivity including monarch, govt. and people occupying a defined territory;” and often conceptualized as “kukka-as-family” aligned with Confucian political theory by Korean enlightenment thinkers since the mid 1890s. See Kyung Moon Hwang, “Country or State? Reconceptualizing Kukka in the Korean Enlightenment Period, 1896-1910,” *Korean Studies* 24 (2000): pp. 1-24.

⁶¹ Duncan, p. 220.

⁶² Ibid.

identity took precedence at any given time was dependent on historically contingent circumstances. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, those circumstances were Korea's unhappy encounter with the imperialist nation-state system.⁶³

Cumings and Duncan, then, point us to two key interrelated aspects of modern Korean nationalism forged in the context of Korea's late 19th century transition to modernity and integration into a new industrial capitalist semi-imperialist/imperialist international order. First, there is a significant difference between certain Asian and African nationalisms structured through colonial capitalism vs. the structuring conditions for modern Korean nationalism in which precolonial governmentality⁶⁴ connected to an uneven imperialist international order structured different forms of modern collective imagining—as linguistic and territorial but also as ethnic and as deterritorialized community including diasporic Korean exiles residing beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation. Moreover, as these precolonial processes of governmentality largely took shape in state and popular self-strengthening programs, often modeled on those used by China and Japan in their earlier encounter with Western imperialist powers, we need to align modern Korean nationalism with early forms of these East Asian parallels. This leads us to a second distinguishing aspect of modern Korean nationalism, which relates to Duncan and Duara's claims as to the importance of premodern or proto-national constructs for modern nationalism in both the Korean and Chinese cases. Much like China and Japan, the impact of the historical legacy of the premodern Korean state and its Sinitic and native state-centered cultural and political paradigms came to structure various levels/scales of comparative national positioning—national, regional or Pan-Asian, and global—in ways both similar and different from the history of nation and nationalism in these other East Asian countries.

As both of these facets bear upon two important distinctions between Benedict Anderson's discussion of anti-colonial nationalism and the Korean case, I elaborate on these aspects of modern Korean nationalism in this chapter through a close engagement with Anderson's theory and genealogy of nationalism in *Imagined Communities* and *The Spectre of Comparisons*. First, I examine how Anderson's model of anticolonial nationalism, while supposedly modular, relies on certain conditions provided by colonial capitalism through a discussion of the parallelism between creole and colonial pilgrimages in Anderson's genealogy and their resemblance to Anderson's theory of print-capitalism. I then turn to the Korean case and argue that the difference between modern Korean anticolonial nationalism and Anderson's model of anticolonial nationalism is linked to the non-correspondence of official nationalism in the Korean case and Anderson's conception and genealogy of official nationalism of European dynastic states qua emerging world imperialist powers. For Anderson, official nationalism evolved in response to vernacular linguistic nationalisms of 1848, however in Korea, it arises in response to both Western and Japanese imperialist transgressions. Because of the European origins of Anderson's theory of official nationalism, it does not take into account defensive anticolonial forms of official nationalism related to the state's positioning on the receiving side rather than the commanding side of the uneven world system within which this comes to take shape. Second, this difference has important implications for how the nation comes to be

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ I am not using the term governmentality in Foucault's sense. What I mean by governmentality is state practices of governance.

imagined as a horizontal community in that this imagining is inextricably linked to a hierarchical world system. I explore this difference through a close examination of the cultural discourse of enlightenment that emerges in the vernacular press that links nationalism to cosmopolitan Western modernity, authored by official Korean state bureaucrats as well as popular intellectuals. I highlight how this cultural discourse was as much the embrace of a new Western civilization as well as at the same time a crucial engagement with premodern Sinitic and native cultural-political paradigms of Confucian civilization—by varying forms of re-evaluation and rejection. At the same time, even while this paradigm was actively rejected, the Korean enlightenment reformers’ approach to new Western ideas were often informed by this premodern Confucian worldview and new Western concepts apprehended through ‘translations’ of Confucian or native equivalents. I then turn to how this difference posed by both modern official and vernacular Korean nationalisms complicates the distinction Anderson draws between the politics of bound and unbound seriality in the case of anticolonial modern Korean ethnic and diasporic nationalisms. For Anderson, unbound seriality is associated with the *good* pluralistic/universal imagining of national community and structured by the formal structure of newspapers, whereas bound seriality is associated with the *bad* finite hybridized imagining of ethnicities based on the logic of governmentality and facilitated by the technologies of the census and long distance transportation. In the Korean case, this distinction is complicated by the very different dynamic by which ethnic nationalism comes to be articulated—as a defensive anticolonial activist discourse—much like the formation of diasporic nationalism. As both ethnic nationalism and diasporic nationalism were related to the democratic politics of instigating the horizontal imagining of nation among Koreans in the face of colonial takeover—produced as a response to Japanese colonialism and its colonializing discourse—they do not exactly correspond to the census-like classifying and totalizing ethos and identitarian politics based on entitlement that Anderson attributes to bound seriality. I look at how these Korean discourses harbored its own pitfalls and essentialisms although these were not the same as those discussed in Anderson’s model of bound seriality. These differences are then laid out by the difference between print-capitalism in Korea and Anderson’s model. Lastly, I turn to the difference between Anderson’s model of migration—as presented in both the creole and colonial pilgrimages in *Imagined Communities* and that presented in relation to long distance nationalism in *The Spectre of Comparisons*—and diasporic migrations in the Korean case. I argue that based on the uneven imperialist world system within which modern Korean nationalism was shaped, diasporic migrations in the early Korean case were not merely economic movements but linked to anticolonial political activism, thus presenting a different model of a *good* diasporic nationalism contra Anderson. In so far as what generates Anderson’s universalistic categories are mass migrations and displacements across the uneven world system, diasporic nationalism should not be dismissed.

Both Anderson’s general theoretical insights on the modular but also genealogical-structuring of national imaginings via the invisible hand of print-capitalism in *Imagined Communities* as well as the distinction Anderson draws between the seriality or universality of anticolonial nationalism structured via colonial capitalism and that of long distance or diasporic nationalisms structured via the economics of uneven global capitalism—and their material technological analogues—are I believe both indispensable to but also limited in examining Korean nationalism and the role of modern material technologies in shaping Korea’s modernist visions and its simultaneously national and cosmopolitan imaginaries.

Print-capitalism, Colonial Pilgrimages and the Invisible Hand of Colonial Capitalism

In his discussion of the “last wave” of anticolonial nationalism, Benedict Anderson has argued that in many Southeast Asian and African cases imperial official nationalist policies of colonial governmentality and colonial capitalism brought into being both the territorial boundaries and the linguistic unity of the future nation as well as a new cadre of bilingual native nationalist intelligentsia among ethno-linguistically diverse colonial populations. Modern Korean nationalism cannot be understood by this conception of anticolonial nationalism because it was neither solely a product of modern colonial creations of 19th century official imperial nationalist policies or primarily structured by ideological and governmental technologies of colonial capitalism. Modern Korean nationalism developed decades prior to Japanese colonization, spurred by Korea’s abrupt encounter with a highly uneven imperialist 19th century global capitalist system of nation-states in which Japanese and European imperial powers’ demands for treaty ports, concessions and other extraterritorial rights began to erode Korean political and territorial sovereignty. The first stirring of national consciousness which laid the basis for modern anticolonial nationalist discourse and activity after colonization was linked to various modernizing reform and nation building efforts by both the Korean state and society to safeguard Korean political sovereignty, which was significantly connected to cosmopolitan travels linked to diplomatic and training missions to industrialized countries, and undertaken in the absence of native capitalism.

This difference is significant because while on the one hand, Anderson stresses the modular character of nationalism by the time of anticolonial nationalism arguing that by the time of this “last wave” of anticolonial nationalism—following creole nationalism, European popular vernacular nationalism, and European dynastic official nationalism—nationalism as a political form had acquired “a profoundly modular character,”⁶⁵ whereby “models of nation, nation-ness, and nationalism distilled from the turbulent, chaotic experiences of more than a century of American and European history...[could be] copied, adapted, and improved upon,” by a new group of bilingual anticolonial nationalist intelligentsia. But at the same time, according to Anderson’s genealogy of nationalism, which presents an extended historical process of the reproduction of the classical nationalist project of popular sovereignty,⁶⁶ across different periods through certain historical socio-political conditions, the way in which such models are encountered in Anderson’s model of anticolonial nationalism relies on certain historical conditions and contradictions supplied by colonial capitalism. Moreover this classical nationalist project which is reproduced in each historical iteration, even in an illegitimate form in European official nationalism, is for Anderson modeled on the process by which he sees print-capitalism to have unselfconsciously fixed administrative vernaculars into new print-languages across Europe around the 16th century.⁶⁷ In the anticolonial nationalist case this process is structured through the technology of travel—colonial pilgrimages—and print-capitalist technologies and their intersection with the contradictions of colonial capitalism, replicating the formation of an earlier creole nationalism by which colonial capitalism came to unintentionally structure new nations

⁶⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991), p. 135. Hereafter referred to as IC.

⁶⁶ Important to this political model of nationalism is the subordination of the politics of racism or ethnicity.

⁶⁷ I refer to the argument that Anderson makes in the chapter on “The Origins of National Consciousness” in *Imagined Communities*, pp. 37-46.

and new nationalist intelligentsia. In the same way that Anderson sees the socially leveling and abstracting qualities of print-capitalism in its “unselfconscious process” of “fixing print-languages” to essentially provide a creative and protective function against the destructive effects of capitalism or capitalist modernization—as evinced in its unintended effect of providing the structuring condition for the nation form as a new anonymous horizontal community—Anderson also sees 19th century colonial capitalism, infused with its nationalizing or Russifying policies adopted from popular vernacular nationalisms, to have a similar generative character as print-capitalism in unintentionally supplying the conditions for a particular kind of national consciousness and anti-colonial nationalism through the production of a new bilingual native intelligentsia, new territorial boundaries, linguistic access to European languages as well as linguistic unity across distinct cultural ethno-linguistic groups and even ethnic solidarity among these groups.⁶⁸ This linkage between the creative process of print capitalism and colonial capitalism is first established in the way administrative pilgrimages of creole functionaries and the arrival of newspapers provide the material conditions for creole nationalism which also serves as the paradigmatic style of national imagining for all subsequent nationalisms.

Creole Functionaries, Creole Printmen and the Creole Origins of Classical European Nationalism

As Anderson locates the first stirring of nationalism with a new historical group of creole functionaries in the Americas, he draws attention to a new socio-spatial condition, arising from the historical advent of unprecedented large-scale migrations of Europeans to the Americas beginning in the 1500s and their early colonial settlements, whereby “new” colonial spaces that were coming into being at remote distances from and “alongside” “old” European imperial ones were being conceived of in a spatially synchronous manner, much like the temporal synchronicity of “meanwhile” characteristic of the novel: “already in the sixteenth century Europeans had begun the strange habit of naming remote places, first in the Americas and Africa, later in Asia, Australia and Oceania as ‘new’ versions of (thereby) ‘old’ toponyms in their lands of origin.”⁶⁹ In a manner similar to the horizontal simultaneity of print capitalist technologies that replaced old conceptions of time conceived of as vertical “prefiguring and fulfillment,” what was distinctive about these namings, according to Anderson, was that ‘new’ and ‘old’ were likewise not “aligned diachronically” wherein the ‘new’ is used to carry the “meaning of ‘successor’ to, or ‘inheritor’ of, something vanished”; instead the “‘new’ and the ‘old’ places were understood synchronically, coexisting within homogenous, empty time.”⁷⁰

Anderson locates the origin of this new synchronic novelty in a new mode of socio-political journeying or *pilgrimages* of creole functionaries—produced from the centralized, uneven imperial political power structure emanating from Europe out to the peripheries which at the same time that it produced a new colonial geography it also limited the new group of creole functionaries and their descendants’ political advancement to the new territories by virtue of their birth in the Americas—and the arrival of the relative primitive state of print-capitalist

⁶⁸ Anderson’s theory of nationalism as a universalist project of popular sovereignty can be seen as part of the culture of modernism in Marshall Berman’s dialectic of modernization/modernism in *All that is Solid Melts into Air*, much like Berman’s reading of Marx’s Manifesto in which the similarly universalist project of the proletarian revolution provides both a radical challenge to the destructive effects of capitalist modernization and an instance of its internal contradiction.

⁶⁹ Anderson, *IC*, p. 187.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

technologies that created anonymous reading publics which were mapped along the same administrative boundaries of the pilgrimages of colonial functionaries. As the combination of these two processes enabled the “territorial stretch...[to be] imagined as nations,” it generated a new and unique socio-spatial condition of “territory linked with fatality” (in lieu of ‘human linguistic diversity’) for the first nationalist imaginings. In Anderson’s genealogy of nationalisms, these colonial pilgrimages and the first republican nationalist movements in the Spanish Americas of the 18th century inaugurate or prefigure the subsequent lineage of 19th century European nationalisms and 20th century colonial nationalism because the resulting link between territory and fatality of creole nationalism—taking the place of human linguistic diversity in Anderson’s general theory of nationalism as the emergence of national consciousness via the “largely unselfconscious process” of “fixing print-languages” “resulting from the explosive interaction between capitalism, technology and human linguistic diversity”⁷¹—nonetheless encapsulates the classical 19th century nationalist project “which aimed for the fullest alignment of habitus, culture, attachment and exclusive political participation.”⁷²

Colonial Educational Pilgrimages, Colonial Capitalism, and 20th Century Anticolonial Nationalism

Arising within a different context, and some generations removed from the first creole nationalists and nationalism, Anderson attributes a socio-spatial condition similar to that of the geographically creative yet politically limiting conditions faced by creole functionaries in the Americas to the constitution of the “last wave” of “colonial nationalisms”⁷³ of the early 20th century. Among a number of differences to the context and character of these colonial nationalisms, “most of them in the colonial territories of Asia and Africa,” which came about “in response to the new-style global imperialism made possible by the achievements of industrial capitalism” (as opposed to the pre-industrial mercantile capitalist context of print-capitalism) were the new improved methods of long distance travel (i.e. railways and air travel) and communication technologies, the deployment of indigenous colonial functionaries (i.e. the native intelligentsia rather than European migrants and their creole descendants), and the institutionalization and spread of modern Western-style and -themed education (which often consisted of new European official nationalist histories).⁷⁴

In this context, the new educational and administrative journeys of native colonial intelligentsia, articulated with new ideological constructs as well as practical exigencies of 19th century official imperial nationalist⁷⁵ policies of colonial governmentality comes to mirror both the creative yet limiting qualities characteristic of earlier administrative pilgrimages of creole functionaries. As the educational and administrative journeys of the new indigenous colonial

⁷¹ Anderson, *IC*, p. 45.

⁷² Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*, (London: Verso, 1998; reprinted 2002), p. 70. Hereafter referred to as SC.

⁷³ While “colonial nationalism” appears to be an oxymoron for the more accurate “anti-colonial nationalism,” in the context of Anderson’s discussion, it appears to indicate the conditions of emergence for this last wave of nationalisms within late 19th century and early 20th century colonial frameworks. As such it can be considered a synonym for “anti-colonial nationalism” but places emphasis on such nationalism in-situ.

⁷⁴ Anderson, *IC*, pp. 139, 118, 116.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p. 110. As Anderson argues, official and imperial nationalisms were of a reactionary character because they were responses by power groups “threatened with exclusion from, or marginalization in, popular imagined communities...Such official nationalism were conservative, not to say reactionary, policies, adapted from the model of largely spontaneous popular nationalism that preceded them.”

pilgrims were similarly circumscribed both politically and geographically, in which the new “apex” of these journeys were limited by discriminatory colonial hierarchies, they likewise presaged the territorial boundaries of the future national state, now mapped along the “colossal, highly rationalized, tightly centralized hierarchy”⁷⁶ of the new colonial educational system.”⁷⁷ In the case of Indonesia under Dutch rule, Anderson writes:

Standardized elementary schools came to be scattered about in villages and small townships of the colony; junior and senior middle-schools in larger towns and towns and provincial centers; while tertiary education (the pyramid’s apex) was confined to the colonial capital of Batavia and the Dutch-built city of Bandung, 100 miles southwest in the cool Priangan islands. Thus the twentieth-century colonial school-system brought into being pilgrimages which paralleled longer-established functionary journeys. The Rome of these pilgrimages was Batavia; not Singapore, not Manila, not Rangoon, not even the old Javanese royal capitals of Jogjakarta and Surakarta.⁷⁸

At the same time, much like the way in which creole pilgrimages fostered camaraderie among “traveling-companions, who came to sense that their fellowship was based not only on that pilgrimage’s particular stretch, but on the shared fatality of trans-Atlantic birth,”⁷⁹ Anderson maintains that these colonial educational pilgrimages undertaken by native intelligentsia “from all over the vast colony, but nowhere outside of it” structured alongside their collective exposure to official European languages of state and other epistemic frameworks of the colonial school system also created new solidarities among “fellow-pilgrims from different, perhaps once hostile villages in primary school; from different ethnolinguistic groups in middle school; and from every part of the realm in the tertiary institutions of the capital” facilitating new forms of horizontal imaginings of unity and identification among heretofore distinct and even hostile ethno-linguistic groups:⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Anderson, *IC*, p. 121.

⁷⁷ In the additional chapters of the revised edition of *IC*, Anderson says that he was hasty to consider the official nationalisms to arise in “the colonized worlds of Asia and Africa” as “modeled directly on that of the dynastic states of nineteenth century Europe” (163). He corrects this to say that instead “the immediate genealogy should be traced to the imaginings of the colonial state.” For while “colonial states were typically anti-nationalist, and violently so...if one looks beneath colonial ideologues and policies to the grammar in which, from the mid-nineteenth century, they were deployed, the lineage becomes decidedly more clear.” More specifically, Anderson points to the census, the map, and the museum as three “institutions of power” which though invented prior to the 19th century “changed their form and function as the colonized zones entered the age of mechanical reproduction” (163). Thus Anderson includes the colonial state and these three institutions as important mediations between official imperial nationalism of Europe and the official nationalisms of the colonized worlds. This mediation is important—but it does not change the influence of official imperial nationalism, even if more indirect, on colonial governance and the formation of colonial nationalism in Anderson’s genealogy of the last wave of anticolonial nationalism which I use here to reconstruct the spatial aspects of Anderson’s colonial nationalist imagining in relation to both differences and similarities of these creole and colonial pilgrimages and Anderson’s more explicit theorization of this seriality in *SC* in his discussion of the newspaper, census, and long-distance nationalism.

⁷⁸ Anderson, *IC*, p. 121.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

Their common experience, and the amiably competitive comradeship of the classroom, gave the maps of the colony which they studied (always coloured differently from British Malaya or the American Philippines) *a territorially specific imagined reality which was every day confirmed by the accents and physiognomies of their classmates.*⁸¹

Thus paralleling the function of the earlier journeys of creole functionaries, Anderson writes that out of these new colonial educational pilgrimages “came that subtle, half-concealed transformation, step by step, of the colonial-state into the national-state, a transformation made possible not only by a solid community of personnel, but by the established skein of journeys through which each state was experienced by its functionaries.”⁸² As creole pilgrimages supplied the territorial geography of the future national state alongside the advent of newspapers by generating the material conditions for national consciousness among creole functionaries in which territory became linked with fatality, the colonial educational pilgrimages structured through the centralizing bureaucratic educational policies and the new educational/administrative geography of the colonial state not only figured the future national geography *and the national vernacular language* via the European language of state⁸³ among bilingual native colonial functionaries/intelligentsia hailing from diverse ethno-linguistic groups, but even new *horizontal* forms of ethnic/cultural solidarity or cross-ethnic identification among fellow pilgrims through their collective ethno-racial discrimination. Anderson argues that these journeys were accompanied by hierarchical social-spatial ethnic/racial forms of colonial classification and discrimination such as the Dutch appellation of “inlanders” much like “the English ‘natives’” given to all such pilgrims regardless of the ethno-linguistic differences among them to ascribe their “common inferiority” vis-à-vis the Dutch colonizers.⁸⁴ As defined against the “superiority” of the ruling Dutch, linked with their extraterritorial status of “not-belonging-there” which served to both distinguish their political authority as well and racial/cultural identity, ‘inlanders’ carrying the connotation of “both ‘inferior’ *and* ‘belonged there’” ascribed to all the pilgrims

⁸¹ Anderson, *IC*, p. 122. Emphasis mine. I love how Anderson reads the particular Indonesian accent when speaking Dutch as substitute for ethnic specificity in the new framework—this is like Konglish (Korean-english) in Korea. But as Konglish does not eradicate Korean, I doubt the Indonesian-English eradicated earlier languages. Thus an important question is whether Konglish becomes a subset of Korean or if it becomes a subset of English—in the larger cultural context. In early modern Korea, something like Konglish formed parallel to the production of vernacular Korean script as the national language, displacing Chinese script long used by the Korean court.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 115. To illustrate this point of comparison, Anderson points to the new synchronic novelty that structures the geographic imaginary of Rizal’s early nationalist novel, *Noli Me Tangere*:

Though some of the most important characters in Rizal’s text are Spanish, and some of the Filipino characters have been to Spain (off the novel’s stage), *the circumambience of travel by and of the characters is confined to what, eleven years after its publication and two years after the author’s execution, would become the Republic of the Philippines.* (Anderson, *IC*, footnote text p. 115. Emphasis mine)

⁸³ As Anderson highlights, these new pilgrims were unlike the earlier creole functionaries in that they did not share cultural, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds with their colonial oppressors, and in that they now had access to historical precedents of previous nationalisms. Hence Anderson stresses the significance of literacy and bilingualism of the native intelligentsia as the root cause of their vanguard role in imagining anticolonial nationalism. Anderson thus ascribes a modification to the model of popular European vernacular linguistic nationalism in the way that the official European vernacular even if by imperial imposition operated as a medium for new horizontal solidarity for the invention of Indonesia and Indonesians as an imagined community.

⁸⁴ Anderson, *IC*, p.122

within the territorial boundaries of the colonial geography a common ethno-racial identity, however negatively defined.⁸⁵

Anderson's genealogy of historically differentiated yet structurally similar colonial *journeys* relies on an important structural parallelism between creole nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism, based on the dialectical contradiction inherent in imperial or colonial capitalism, which both instigates national consciousness and unintentionally supplies the social material substrate for the horizontal imaginings of anticolonial nationalism. In the way that the pilgrimages of creole functionaries and the activities of new creole printmen, emerging from the combination of 16th century European colonial discrimination and the arrival of print-capitalism, generated the structuring conditions for the first horizontal nationalist imaginings in the Americas, the practical creative aspects of the "Janus faced" official nationalism of 19th century colonial capitalism and the colonial school system also provide significant structuring conditions that brought into being both a new nation and a new native bilingual intelligentsia of 20th century anticolonial nationalisms, whose vanguard nationalist role is connected to their access inside and out of the colonial classrooms to "European-languages-of-state" which also granted them access to print-mediated imagined communities "floating in homogenous empty time" as well as "modern Western culture in the broadest sense, and in particular, to the models of nationalism, nation-ness, and nation-state produced elsewhere in the course of the nineteenth century."⁸⁶ Like the creole case, the dialectical contradiction between the imperative of colonial political-territorial centralization/control which as Anderson states "invited 'natives' into schools and offices, and of colonial capitalism," and colonial political-territorial discrimination/hierarchy subordinated to European imperial centers which at the same time "excluded them from the boardrooms" supplies not only the conditions for revolutionary consciousness of national imagining among "lonely, bilingual intelligentsias unattached to sturdy local bourgeois" but also the socio-spatial material constructs of the territorial boundaries, ethno-cultural identity and linguistic unity of the imagined nation.⁸⁷

For Anderson, the legacy of the classical nationalist project that is inherited by 20th century anticolonial nationalisms is also related to the legacy of the modularity of the paradigmatic style of national imagining associated with print-capitalism, which although having developed in the European historical context of mercantile capitalism can be found in the workings of 19th century colonial capitalism as the structuring condition for anticolonial nationalisms. Thus while Anderson points to the modularity of nationalism by the time of 20th century anti-colonial nationalism, whereby various models of nation, nationness, and nationalism are available for pirating, as replicas without originals, at the same time, he also links the origins of nationalist consciousness, or the style of nationalist imagining in the colonies to material structuring conditions of the invisible hand of colonial capitalism, in which the formal constructs of print capitalism is passed on through the genealogical evolution of historical nationalisms-- creole, vernacular, and official nationalist—necessary to transmit the universal project of classical nationalism intact. As Anderson writes:

The "last wave" of nationalism, most of them in the colonial territories of Asia and Africa, was in its origins a response to the new style global imperialism made possible by the achievements of industrial capitalism. As

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 116.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 140.

Marx put it in his inimitable way: ‘The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole face of the globe.’ But capitalism had also, not least by its dissemination of print, helped to create popular, vernacular-based nationalism in Europe, which to different degrees undermined the age-old dynastic principle, and egged into self-naturalization every dynasty positioned to do so. Official nationalism—weld of the new national and old dynastic principles (the British Empire)—led in turn to what, for convenience, one can call ‘Russification’ in the extra-European colonies... Combined, these forces generated “Russifying” school-systems intended in part to produce the required subordinate cadres for state and corporate bureaucracies. These school-systems, centralized and standardized, created quite new pilgrimages which typically had their Romes in the various colonial capitals, for the nations hidden at the core of empire would permit no more inward ascension... The interlock between particular educational and administrative pilgrimages provided the territorial base for the new ‘imagined communities’ in which natives could come to see themselves as ‘nationals’.⁸⁸

Imperialist Threat, Uneven Capitalist Development, Anticolonial Governmentality and the Origins of Modern Korean Anticolonial Nationalism

In the Korean case, such a logic of print-capitalism (in which new horizontal affinities are produced through “unselfconscious” processes of standardization and social leveling modeled on the fixing print languages) transmogrified in the creative processes and institutions of colonial capitalism did not bring the Korean nation, its territorial boundaries, its largely homogenous ethno-linguistic population, its new activist nationalist intelligentsia, and modern Korean nationalism into being. Illustrated in the organization and historical background of the March First Independence Movement by domestic and diasporic nationalist groups, which planned and initiated the movement across international borders within a highly uneven and discriminatory international system and political paradigm, modern Korean nationalism was as much rooted in the lineage and historical structures of precolonial statist and popular governmental reform movements as much as influenced by events developing in the broader contemporary international situation and in the absence of capitalist structures, either colonial or native. As the eventual colonization of Korea by Japan occurred through a gradual process of economic and political encroachments on Korean political and territorial sovereignty not only by Japan but also Western imperial powers as well as a steady stream of international interventions buttressed by the quasi-legalistic framework of the Western imperialist international system, nationalist consciousness in Korea first emerged in these decades prior to colonization (from the 1870s to 1910) spurred instead by Korea’s abrupt encounter with a new hostile Western imperialist international system of nation-states and the desire to safeguard national sovereignty. Hence departing from Anderson’s genealogy of Asian and African anticolonial nationalism, as incipient nationalist imagining and activity first arose alongside and in response to its entry into the new uneven international system as early as the late 1870s, the structuring conditions leading to

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 140.

Korea's colonization and colonial capitalism is as significant to the understanding of modern Korean nationalism as those which developed under Japanese colonial capitalism after 1910.

The threat of imperialist aggression was discernible from Korea's first 'modern' commercial treaty, the Kanghai Treaty⁸⁹ of 1876 with Japan, which was fast becoming the preeminent industrialized nation and imperial power in the region. As the treaty presaged the demise of an old agrarian dynastic state, the erosion of territorial sovereignty, and the loss of political independence and its historic cultural-civilization paradigm, it instigated by the late 1870s the self-conscious yet crisscrossing and conflicting attempts by both state and society to reimagine and materially transform an old historical state and dynastic political system and its territorially bounded ethno-linguistic community into a modern nation-state.⁹⁰ Thus faced with "the twofold task of advancing modernization while struggling to preserve their national independence," new reform measures such as the self-strengthening programs adopted by the dynastic government as well as more radical reforms proposed by new enlightenment advocates both inside and outside officialdom inextricably linked modernization with the desire to safeguard national sovereignty.⁹¹

To be sure, modern Korean nationalism developed out of a broader intellectual movement referred to as the Korean enlightenment in which modern reform minded intellectuals both in and out of politics experimented with new cultural and political ideas originating in the West. But as these ideas were filtered through significant mediations stemming from Korea's domestic as well as regional and global situation, for Korean self-strengtheners and enlightenment thinkers alike—"models of nation, nation-ness, and nationalism" became linked not only with models of particular modern imperialist nation-states (both Western and Japanese) but also with a classificatory scheme of interstate relations emanating from Korea's encounter with an intensely hierarchical and hostile new international order. At the same time, premodern structures such as the historical dynastic state—which initiated new defensive anti-imperial⁹² governmental policies in the face of foreign imperial threats—and legacies of Sinitic and native state-centered cultural and political paradigms—which provided powerful Korean and Sinitic equivalents as well as alternatives to new Western political models—became both resources and

⁸⁹ Korea had earlier militaristically repulsed English, French and American warships in 1832, 1846, 1866, and 1871 sticking to its isolationist policy. The Kanghai Treaty which first opened up Korea to trade with Japan came about after Japan provoked a similar militaristic confrontation with the Unyo incident where it sent a navy vessel into the waters near Kanghai, which was also fired upon on Koreans. (Eckert et al., p. 200). Typical of unequal treaties with imperial powers and signed by Korea under pressure of military threat, it was weighed heavily towards Japan's favor with the initial opening of three Korean trading ports and the right to search for others, the right to survey Korean waters, and extraterritorial privileges in conducting business and trade in Korean ports, while Korea received no such privileges in Japan in return. Moreover, as the treaty "recognized Korea as an 'autonomous' state with sovereign rights the same as Japan's," the political significance of this, Korea's first, 'modern' treaty according to Cumings, was to alter the centuries long relationship of parity under the Sinitic cultural-political system with a new grammar of international relations modeled on the Western imperial system: "Concluded in the name of sovereign equality and against the putative hierarchy of the Chinese world order, the real effect of the treaty was to erase the centuries of essential equality between Japan and Korea." (Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 102.)

⁹⁰ The Kanghai Treaty paved the way for a series of similarly unequal treaties with Western powers—U.S. (1882), Britain (1883), Germany (1883), Italy (1884), Russia (1884), France (1886) and Austria-Hungary (1889)—which were strategically pursued by the state to balance the power of Japanese influence in Korea. At the same time, they inaugurated a period of imperialist rivalries for concessions and political and economic dominance over the peninsula.

⁹¹ Eckert et. al., p. 201.

⁹² It was anti-imperial in the sense that it was a defensive governmentality linked to protecting the nation from imperial takeover in a hostile imperialist international political environment.

obstacles as structuring conditions for the growth of various incipient nationalist impulses encompassing both statist and popular visions of national reform.

Defensive Anti-imperial Statecraft and the Statist Imagining of the Modern Nation-State

In a shift from the steadfast isolationist policy of the 1860s, the dynastic state took the first steps toward modernizing state reforms shortly after the Kanhwa treaty in the face of its deteriorating position in the international environment.⁹³ The state's tentative self-strengthening program was primarily undertaken in a conservative attempt to protect the social and political social order of the Chosŏn dynasty and largely encapsulated the Confucian reform motto of "Eastern ways, western machines," to garner support from leading Confucian officials and literati whose longstanding opposition to the heterodox ways of Western civilization continued to exert a powerful force in Korean officialdom.⁹⁴ As such the state's self-strengthening program focused on the build up of military defense with Western technology imports, personnel training, and the establishment of a new government office in 1881 (The Office for the Management of State Affairs) closely modeled the Chinese contemporary office of Tsungli Yamen to oversee foreign diplomatic relations, military affairs, foreign trade, arms buildup and foreign language education. At the same time, the state also dispatched a series of foreign exploratory missions, the first of which was sent to Japan upon concluding the Kanhwa treaty in 1876 to report on Japan's adoption of Western ways.⁹⁵ Another mission to Tokyo in 1880 by Kim Hong-jip yielded Chinese treatises advocating increased diplomatic alliances with foreign nations and the intensification of self-strengthening measures to adopt not only Western technologies but also Western political and social institutions.⁹⁶ In 1881, twelve younger officials were dispatched on a secret study mission to Japan (for fear of conservative Confucian backlash), known as the Gentlemen's Observation Mission, to inspect Meiji Japan's modern institutions and industrial infrastructure, whereupon Yu Kilchun and Yun Ch'ihŏ—soon to become two of the most ardent advocates of modern reform and Korean enlightenment—remained in Tokyo to become the first students to study in modern Japan.⁹⁷ The same year, another group of thirty-eight students and artisans left on a training mission to Chinese schools and factories to study modern weapons manufacturing, led by the reform-minded official Kim Yun-sik.⁹⁸ And upon concluding the Korean-American Treaty in 1882, the first treaty with a Western nation, eight officials were dispatched to the United States in 1883 on a diplomatic and training mission led by envoys Min Yong-ik and Hong Yong-sik. Once again, Yu Kilchun remained behind to study at the Governor Dummer Academy in Massachusetts to become the first Korean to study in the United States.⁹⁹ While Korean diplomatic missions to China and Japan had been a mainstay of the premodern Chosŏn court, a crucial element of the state's self-strengthening reform plans were new observation and training missions to modernizing China and Japan, which differed from the ethos of earlier diplomatic missions as well as to entirely new cosmopolitan destinations such as the United States.

⁹³ Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea*, p. 19.

⁹⁴ Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, p. 208.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

The Early Enlightenment Party: The Kapsin Coup of 1884

Although the state's self-strengthening program was politically conservative, practically timid, and regularly disrupted by factional rivalry among the *yangban* aristocracy and foreign intervention, the new bureaucratic offices and diplomatic missions initiated by the state's anti-imperialist governmental efforts became a significant force in shaping new responses from various social groups in which different visions and claims to the nation came to be attached to the desire to safeguard Korean sovereignty. Following from both an increasing knowledge of the outside world and the steady erosion of Korean political and territorial sovereignty, a small group of radical modern reformers, variously referred to as the Enlightenment Party,¹⁰⁰ the Independence Party, or the Progressive party appeared from within *yangban* officialdom challenging the state's self-strengthening stance and other more moderate 'enlightenment' proponents whose gradualist approach to modernization had primarily sought to "both preserve its traditional values while at the same time mastering Western technology" and to "carry out their plans with the aid of Ch'ing China."¹⁰¹ In contrast, these progressives, many of whom had been part of the state's diplomatic and training missions abroad like their more moderate brethren took a more iconoclastic approach to Chosŏn politics and social structures and "sought to abolish class distinctions, reform the political process by following the model of Japan's Meiji Restoration, and achieve genuine national independence for Korea by ending China's interference in Korean affairs."¹⁰² They advocated reform proposals such as the establishment of an Office of Culture and Information (established in 1883), which published the first Korean newspaper *Hansŏng Sinbo* as an organ of the government.¹⁰³ They also agitated for the establishment of a Postal Administration, the formation of a modern army unit near Seoul, and dispatched more student missions to Japan.¹⁰⁴ Some of these progressives led by Kim Ok-kyun took more radical measures—planning and executing the ill-fated Kapsin coup of 1884. After kidnapping the King with the aid of Japanese legation troops and executing a number of senior state officials, these nine men attempted to transform top-down the oligarchic *yangban* structure of the Chosŏn state instituting a fourteen point reform plan on the model of Japan's Meiji Restoration. Without military or popular support, the coup lasted three days before it was put down by Chinese troops restoring King Kojong to power, who promptly nullified their reform plan. The leaders of the coup absconded to Japan in exile along with the dispersal of the Japanese legation, to return a decade later during the Sino-Japanese war under the pro-Japanese

¹⁰⁰ 'Korean enlightenment' thought is traced back to the Sirhak (Practical Learning) school of thought that developed in the late 18th century linked to early reform politicians and intellectuals of the Chosŏn court who advocated modernizing reforms and opening up of Korea against the isolationist policy of the Korean court even before the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876. Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, p. 199; Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925*, p. 28; Schmid, *Korea Between Empires 1895-1919*, p. 3.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 208. For a discussion of the iconoclasm of Korean enlightenment reformers, see Michael Robinson, "Nationalism and the Korean Tradition, 1896-1920: Iconoclasm, Reform, and National Identity," *Korean Studies* vol. 10 (1986), pp. 35-53.

¹⁰³ *Hansŏng Sinbo* was published three times a month, and later reborn as the *Hansŏng Chubo* in 1886 also published by the state which published weekly. The first newspaper in Korea was a Japanese paper published in 1881 by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce for Japanese settlers in the treaty port city of Pusan (much like Western nations had done in Japan just decades earlier). See Albert A. Altman, "Korea's First Newspaper: The Japanese *Chosen Shinpo*," in *The Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 43, no. 4 (August 1984), pp. 685-696

¹⁰⁴ Eckert et al., p. 209.

government installed by Japan to carry out the Kabo reforms also modeled on the Meiji Restoration.¹⁰⁵

The Tonghak Rebellion of 1894-5: "The people are the root of the nation"

If the small yet brutal Progressive party signaled the growing hold among some of the scholar-bureaucrats of a new world view or civilizational paradigm, and for whom Meiji Japan was their ultimate model on which to reform Korean state and society, the Tonghak¹⁰⁶ peasant rebellion of 1894, the largest Korean peasant rebellion in history, presented the "nascence of mass nationalism in Korea."¹⁰⁷ Although likewise spurred by disaffection with state corruption and its inefficacy in the face of national political infringements by external powers, the Tonghak peasant armies' demands for radical social egalitarian reforms brought the mass peasantry to the forefront of politics and appealed to the authority of Confucian political doctrines on the moral responsibility of the state to legitimate their claims. Popular peasant uprisings against the extractive taxes and the general corruption and exploitation characteristic of the landed aristocracy (yangban class) plagued much of the 19th century. However, as the burden of opening the treaty ports was passed onto the already emiserated peasantry with even more extractive tax levies in addition to new forms of exploitation accompanying Japanese, Western, and Chinese merchants and traders these peasant uprisings became transformed into a patriotic armed insurrection "to protect the nation against foreign aggression" combined "with the egalitarian dream of abolishing the yangban class system" in the Tonghak rebellion of 1894.¹⁰⁸ Shortly after the first assault in February of 1894, the Tonghak Peasant Army Command issued the following proclamation:

The reason for taking up arms is none other than to save the people from unbearable suffering and to place the nation on a firm foundation. Our aims are to exterminate the greedy and cruel officials at home and to expel the arrogant enemies from abroad. We share the grievances of the people who suffer at the hands of the literati and the wealthy. We are with the petty

¹⁰⁵ Moreover, their conspiracy with Japanese troops branded them as traitors among the state and Confucian literati and delegitimized the value of reform plan in much of public opinion as well as contributing to the worsening of anti-Japanese sentiment among the populace.

¹⁰⁶ Tonghak (Eastern Learning) emerged as an indigenous syncretic religious and social movement in the 1860s combining elements of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism as well as Christianity as a challenge to both "Western Learning" (Catholicism) and orthodox Confucianism. The new syncretic religion's commitment to social equality found a rapid following among the large discontented peasant population who bore the brunt of financing the court's military and economic expenditures after Korea opened its ports in 1876 through increased tax levies as well as the exploitative conditions of Japanese commercial penetration. The Tonghak forces became politicized with its involvement in the peasant rebellion against the corruption of the Chosŏn court, mainly in the form of the powerful Min oligarchy that maneuvered behind Queen Min in 1894. When the Korean court appealed to the Chinese to intervene, Japan also landed its troops and seized the opportunity to wrench Korea from Chinese influence instigating the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5. By 1905, the Tonghak forces were largely scattered and fractured in leadership. Around the founding of *Mansebo* (*Long Live [Korea] Daily*) in 1906 under the leadership of Son Pyŏng-hi, the Tonghak religion was revived under the name of Ch'ondogyo ("the Religion of the Heavenly Way") and made up one faction of nationalist agitation against Japan's imperialist overtures.

¹⁰⁷ Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁸ Eckert et al., p. 221.

functionaries who are subjected to humiliating treatment by provincial governors and district magistrates. Arise at once without hesitation!¹⁰⁹

Like the “enlightenment party” whose reform ideas banded progressive elites across upper level social class distinctions, the Tonghak movement appealed to a similar unity among the lower classes. The Tonghak movement presented a unique combination of conservative political anti-foreign nationalism with firm loyalty to the monarch and the desire to restore the Confucian moral and political order by driving out the influx of Japanese and Western culture that appeared with Korea’s opening¹¹⁰—and progressive social egalitarianism in the demand for social and economic equality through the abolishment of the yangban-centered class system, a demand that was unprecedented in the history of Korean peasant rebellions.¹¹¹ The destitution of the people, as they saw it, was inseparable from the nation’s deviation from the “righteousness” of the moral and political order of the Heavenly Way, posed as much by external aggressions and the intrusion of heterodox Japanese and Western traders and culture as by internal decay brought upon by the venality of the native yangban class, exemplified by the corrupt Min oligarchy that held the court prostrate. Thus for the Tonghak armies, their revolt gave voice to as well as found justification in the consciousness and affirmation of the mass of commoners or the ‘people’ as a core constituent of the polity/state:

The people are the root of the nation. If the root withers, the nation will be enfeebled. Heedless of their responsibility for sustaining the state and providing for its people, the officials build lavish residences in the countryside... We are wretched village people far from the capital, yet we feed and clothe ourselves with the bounty from the sovereign’s land. We cannot sit by and watch our nation perish. The whole nation is as one, its multitudes united in their determination to raise the righteous standard of revolt... [W]hen all the people can enjoy the blessings of benevolent kingly rule, how immeasurably joyful will we be!¹¹²

As they waged their struggle for state reform in the name of the ‘people’ of the nation, they laid claim to their rightful place in the nation as core members of the polity. But while this was no doubt a popular national movement, their imagining of the rightful claim to freedom from domestic and foreign exploitation in the name of the popular nation was markedly different from the idea of popular sovereignty or political right associated with 18th century European liberal political theory inherited by 19th century classical nationalism. Lacking any demands for representative government, it appears aligned rather with Confucian political theory issuing from what John Duncan points out as a premodern conception of the state derived from “the Mencian idea that the people (min) are the basis of the state,” which is in itself “far removed from the European notion of the divine right of kings.”¹¹³ This classical Confucian concept which conceived of the state in terms of ‘kukka’ in the Chinese compound graph that combined the

¹⁰⁹ Tonghak proclamation issued in late April of 1894: A Call to Arms at Paeksan, reprinted in Young ho Ch’oe et al., eds., *Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 263-4.

¹¹⁰ Eckert et al., p. 221

¹¹¹ Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925*, p. 23.

¹¹² Tonghak leaflet text, cited in Bruce Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 117.

¹¹³ Duncan, p. 215.

character for ‘kuk’ (administrative or ruling authority) and ‘ka’ (family), embraced by Korean yangban scholar officials since the Koryo dynasty, and commonly used in memorials urging state reforms made clear that “not only did the state have the responsibility of providing for the welfare of the people, but that a strong and healthy state was dependent on the prosperity and well being of the peasantry.”¹¹⁴ At the same time, the Confucian political moral responsibility of the state vis-à-vis its subjects was likely augmented and even radicalized by the social egalitarian influence of Christian doctrine—which along with Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism formed the eclectic basis for the indigenous syncretic Tonghak religion—leading to the unprecedented call for the abolishment of the yangban oligarchs and reforms for social and economic equity.¹¹⁵

As Korean nationalist impulses diversified into various statist and popular reform movements and rebellions since the 1880s, they were indicative of internal fissures within Chosŏn society and state corruption as much as they were responses to the ineffectual policies of the state in the face of increasing international threat. But as these internal fissures based on disaffection from social and economic class discrimination and exploitation whether among fallen *yangban* and state officials of the upper echelons of society or from the mass of impoverished peasants from the lower social strata became aggravated by foreign imperial penetrations and infringements, they prompted different forms of incipient nationalist consciousness across social groups. Korea’s deepening engagement with the modern world and the new imperialist international system provided new social and political models that challenged the present Chosŏn dynastic order for both the enlightenment reformers and Tonghak revolutionaries alike. At the same time, the anti-imperial statecraft of the dynastic state and the nation’s legacy of a cosmopolitan Sinitic cultural past likewise provided both structuring conditions and political precepts and models rooted in the classical Confucian universal

¹¹⁴ Ibid. See also, Kyung Moon Hwang’s discussion of the genealogy of ‘kukka’ and its appropriation and transformation among Korean enlightenment reformers to approximate the idea of nation-state as an “‘assemblage of united people that’ that consisted of three components: a territory, a governing authority, and the people” resembling the native Korean word for country, *nara*, and which utilized Mencius’ conceptions of the state and the compound ‘kukka’ to conceptualize modern familiarized notions of the nation-state such as the “kukka-as-family” as competing conceptualizations of the nation and nation-state at this time. Kyung Moon Hwang, “Country or State? Reconceptualizing Kukka in the Korean Enlightenment Period, 1896-1910,” in *Korean Studies*, Volume 24 (2000), pp. 1-24.

¹¹⁵ The Tonghak rebellion was largest peasant insurrection in Korean history. It also set the stage for the Sino-Japanese war. As it took control of huge parts of the South Cholla province including its capital, the Chosŏn court called in the Chinese troops to help suppress the rebellion, who were quickly followed by the Japanese. When Japan captured the Korean palace during the War and put in place a modern reform-oriented government which instituted the Kabo reforms (also modeled on the Meiji restoration) instituting a wide array of political and social reforms of the governmental, educational, and judicial systems as well as social customs and traditional status hierarchies, it was manned by some of these enlightenment advocates who had participated in the failed Kapsin coup of 1884 and had since lived in exile in Japan or the United States. Although the Tonghak peasant armies had agreed to cease fighting with the court’s concession for a series of economic and social reforms, once the Japanese troops captured the Korean court, the Tonghak armies regrouped and rose up again this time as an anti-Japanese national resistance army called the Tonghak righteous army (uibyong). Rather than Chinese troops, which put down the Kapsin coup, this time the Tonghak righteous army was quelled by government troops and the Japanese army with thousands of casualties and many of its leaders put to death. (Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, p. 221.) With Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Japan finally wrenched Korea from Chinese influence and Japan continued their top-down state modernizing reforms. Ironically, the Min clan, reviled by the Tonghak armies, was replaced by the reinstatement of Taewŏnggun (King Kojong’s father), their main political rival, to be replaced by pro-Japanese enlightenment reformers, while a number of the social egalitarian reforms demanded by the Tonghak movement, such as the abolition of slavery, and the right of widows to remarry were subsequently instituted under the Japanese backed Kabo reforms. (Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, p. 222.)

civilizational paradigm for incipient nationalist impulses which both challenged the domestic dynastic order as well as foreign imperialism.

The Changing East Asian Regional Paradigm and the Cosmopolitan-Nationalism of Korean Enlightenment (1895-1905)

As the Tonghak rebellion inadvertently sparked the Sino-Japanese War, it also set the stage for a sea change in the East Asian regional political order and with it new developments in popular nationalist movements and renewed calls for modern reform as well as new ideas, methods and tools of imagining modern nationhood. Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and the Treaty of Shimonoseki ended Korea's centuries long participation in the Chinese world order as a tribute state, nominally bestowing independence to Korea while politically bringing Korea under Japan's sphere of influence, and allowing Japan to initiate a sweeping series of state-directed modern reforms modeled on the Meiji Restoration. The Kabo reforms, like the previously attempted Kapsin reforms, were largely ineffective and likewise prematurely came to an end in 1895, in part due to the murder of the Queen by a Japanese general and the King's flight to the Russian legation, and in part arising from the strong resistance by orthodox Confucian officials and literati to the reforms and outrage over the murder of Queen Min, some of whom also raised up new righteous armies against the Japanese in 1896. While the Kabo reforms and Japanese political domination of peninsular domestic and foreign affairs were thwarted by the Korean monarch's escape from Japan's grip by his flight to the Russian legation in 1896, Korean modernization nonetheless advanced with renewed vigor with a cosmopolitan-imperialist air through a series of modern infrastructural works built through concessionary diplomacy with various Western powers in part to balance out the dominance of Japanese commercial and political penetration. This dramatically altered regional and domestic political context, marked by the end of Chinese suzerainty, partial realization of Japanese instigated state-mandated modernizing social and political reforms, and the dawning of industrial modern infrastructure primarily in the form of foreign concessions drastically intensified nationalist agitation and sentiment among the Korean intelligentsia and sparked a certain revival for the enlightenment party reform movement as well as a broader intellectual and cultural movement known as the Korean enlightenment.

Historian Michael E. Robinson locates the origins of modern Korean nationalism with the Independence Club active from 1896-8 established by Korean enlightenment advocates and modern reformers, highlighting their propagation of new ideas and symbols of modern Korean nationalism and their efforts to cultivate public participation and patriotism such as the creation of a new vernacular press and reading public.¹¹⁶ Likewise spearheaded by a returning exile Sŏ Chaep'il (also known as Philip Jaisohn), modern Korean nationalism, like the broader Korean enlightenment, was in its material construct, technologies and internal models an indubitably cosmopolitan undertaking. Having returned from his ten-year stay in the United States as a medical doctor and also a Christian convert, Sŏ Chaep'il established the Independence Club in 1896 as a small patriotic intellectual association to champion both government and public support for a renewed attempt to reform the state based now primarily on the modern Western nation-state model. Their cultural and political activism seeking to reimagine Korea as a modern

¹¹⁶ Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925*, pp. 24-37.

nation-state interlinked the propagation of a unique historical Korean national identity, not unlike the popular vernacular ethnolinguistic nationalisms of Europe, with Western cultural models and technologies of nationhood, such as the promotion of Korean vernacular script, the compilation of national history, and the introduction of western ideas and culture, including translations of western texts. These activities were chiefly articulated with symbolic and practical efforts to disassociate the nation from its Confucian cultural heritage and long political history of Chinese suzerainty as testimony to Korea's independent status.¹¹⁷ They promoted the construction of the Independence Arch, modeled on the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, at the site of the gate used by Chinese envoys, the construction and renaming of the Chinese embassy into Independence Hall, and headed the movement urging King Kojong to elevate his title to Emperor, and the Kingdom of Korea to the Empire of Korea (Taehan Cheguk), symbolically marking Korea's withdrawal from the Sinitic system. They also established the first vernacular national press (building upon the state's first establishment of a modern newspaper in the previous decade) the *Tongnip Sinmun* (Independence News), using the vernacular script *hangŭl*¹¹⁸ for both national symbolic reasons and wider domestic access which actively and rather self-consciously displaced the standard official Chinese script long used by the state and the literati.¹¹⁹ This popular attempt to institute a new national vernacular script and create a new national reading public was augmented by their emphasis on the "new learning" with the proliferation at this time of more western style schools replacing Confucian classics with western curricula following from the model of technical and foreign language schools first established under earlier government educational reforms as well as missionary schools established after 1890.¹²⁰

While Korea's Confucian traditions occupied the primary locus of attack and target for eradication to make way for the creation of a more bounded cultural-national-political entity apropos of the classical 19th century nationalist project "which aimed for the fullest alignment of habitus, culture, attachment and exclusive political participation,"¹²¹ the club's ideological emphasis on both the symbolic and political independence of the modern nation-state, stemming from Korea's precarious political and economic position surrounded by hostile imperializing powers, also instigated harsh criticism of the King's residence in the Russian legation and the spate of concessions granted to Russians among other imperial powers. Thus pointing to their deployment of new national symbols and technologies as well as political models borrowed from the West, Robinson argues that: "The club's advocacy of an independent foreign policy was not a repeat of the shrill xenophobia and isolationism of previous decades. Its critique was grounded on a cosmopolitanism that sought to join, not exclude, the modern world of nation-states."¹²²

¹¹⁷ Ibid.; See also Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires: 1895-1919* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2002).

¹¹⁸ *Hangŭl* is the Korean vernacular phonetic script invented under King Sejong in the 15th century—but not used by the court or literati.

¹¹⁹ The symbolic and activist aspect of instituting the vernacular script as the national script appears primary to their efforts considering the general lack of literacy among the Korean peasants which made up the majority of the population. Thus rather than the unselfconscious development of new print languages from administrative vernaculars seen in European popular vernacular nationalism, the self-conscious efforts to both institute a new national script and create a reading public with the corresponding advocacy of new western style schools situates the Independence club's nationalism uneasily between European vernacular and official nationalisms.

¹²⁰ Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925*, pp. 24-37. As these schools were generally located in cities, it also generated domestic migration to major cities from the countryside.

¹²¹ Anderson, *SC*, p. 70

¹²² Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925*, p. 26.

At the same time their pro-Western cosmopolitanism was both a selective and specifically directional cosmopolitanism that presented a contradiction to the symbolic and political independence it sought from Sinitic culture and its resistance to political-economic concessions to Russia and other powers. The new vernacular *hangŭl* paper, while jettisoning Chinese script incorporated full English language pages, as well as the zealous and high-handed promotion of American liberal thought and culture. As seen in their endless editorials in *Independence News*, at the same time that they recast/reimagined Korea's historical ritual subservience to China as a form of "lackeyism" or "toadyism" in the discourse of *sadaejjuui* and denigrated their shared Confucian culture as embodiments of backwardness and obstacles to Korean modernization and development, they embraced Western 'civilization' extolling the virtues of various elements of western culture, society, economy, and politics, namely American as well as Japanese, as a model for Koreans to follow.¹²³ As Andre Schmid has argued, the dissociation of Chinese civilization culturally and politically from the nation's new self-identity was also a process of "de-centering the middle kingdom," debunking the universality of the Sinitic civilizational paradigm.¹²⁴ Moreover, as Japan had done with the creation of 'Asia' as its non-modern other vis-à-vis the modern West, Korean enlightenment advocates not only "de-centered the Middle Kingdom," but they also turned China into the epitome of backwardness as the antipode of the modern West in their adoption of a new Western 'universal' paradigm of modern civilization.¹²⁵ The introduction of western civilization and Korean enlightenment concepts, primarily through the newly adopted modern western technology of print newspapers and books, to goad Koreans into adopting new cultural standards, political ideas and social customs and attitudes in order to nurture the cultural and social basis for modern capitalism was a central tactic of early modern reformers in their attempt to maintain the sovereignty of their nation-state from foreign imperial threats.¹²⁶ Heavily promoted in the early vernacular presses from the late 1890s through the first decade of the 20th century, 'civilization and enlightenment' (*munmyŏng kaehwa*) adopted from the Japanese 'bunmei kaika' was the dominant discourse of modern reform nationalists that linked cosmopolitan western modernity with nationalism, providing the legitimating principle for their calls for sweeping reforms in all areas of political, economic, social and cultural life for national self-strengthening.¹²⁷

¹²³ Michael Robinson, "Nationalism and the Korean Tradition, 1896-1920: Iconoclasm, Reform, and National Identity," *Korean Studies* vol. 10 (1986), p. 40; See also Schmid, *Korea Between Empires: 1895-1919*, on the pro-Western ideological orientation of *Independence News* (as well as its strong Christian bent) and the politics of the West and China in these editorials.

¹²⁴ Schmid, *Korea Between Empires: 1895-1919*, Chapter Two. While primarily their attack seemed aimed at Korea's participation in the Chinese civilization, it also crept into anti-Chinese sentiment. This process of "decentering" China is also similar to what Rumi Sakamoto has described as the production of the other's other in reference to Japan's construction of a civilizing discourse in which in inserting itself it produced not only China but all of Asia as its inferior other thus replacing the West/Japan dichotomy with the Japan/Asia one. See Rumi Sakamoto's discussion of Fukuzawa Yukichi's early Meiji discourse of 'civilization and enlightenment' in "Japan, Hybridity and the Creation of Colonialist Discourse," in *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 13 no. 3 (1996), pp. 113-128.

¹²⁵ See Rumi Sakamoto's discussion of Japan's production of 'Asia' in their self-positioning within the western civilizational paradigm of modernity vis-à-vis the West in "Japan, Hybridity and the Creation of Colonialist Discourse," in *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 13 no. 3 (1996), pp. 113-128.

¹²⁶ See Schmid's various examples of such attempts in the Korean presses of this time. Also this discourse was not specific to Korea, with similar rhetorics embraced by Chinese modern reformers and proponents of Meiji Japan.

¹²⁷ Schmid, Chapter One.

Sapere Aude!, Enlightenment Hierarchy and the Neo-Confucian Worldview

For the Independence Club as well as other enlightenment thinkers and reformers of the period, nationalism was inextricably intertwined with a selective and hierarchically inflected cosmopolitanism in which the new civilizational paradigm was mapped onto the uneven imperialist inter-state system, and which provided the material ground and motive for their defensive nationalist creations. This hierarchical conception of modern civilization is epitomized in the Korean enlightenment thought of Yu Kilchun, the scholar-bureaucrat who was the first to study in Tokyo and the US via state organized diplomatic and study missions abroad. Composed in the late 1880s during a period of house arrest upon the state's suspicion of his sympathy with the 1884 coup, Yu's *Sōyu kyōnmun* (Observations on a Journey to the West) written in a mixed style of hangŭl and Chinese script lay forth an exposition of enlightenment which was classified into three levels—the enlightened, the semi-enlightened, and the unenlightened—and mapped onto societal-national and individual units of analysis and further elaborated through the metaphor of “master,” “guests,” and “slaves” of enlightenment.¹²⁸ Significantly influenced by the thought of the Japanese advocate of “civilization and enlightenment” Fukuzawa Yukichi and his “Brief History of Civilization” originally published in 1875,¹²⁹ Yu presented the three levels of enlightenment as both measurable dispositions of societies that comprise the objective world as well as stages that progress from slavery to freedom grounded on both moral and political modern principles of social equality, compassion and adherence to the rule of law. However, similar to Yukichi's civilizational paradigm, while Yu classified societies into these three levels of enlightenment, he did not consider these classifications to be fixed or somehow essentially related to the nature or character of particular societies, or race as often seen in colonial civilizing discourse of Western imperialist powers.¹³⁰ Along the lines of Western liberal thought, as Yu argued, “the semi-enlightened and the unenlightened can reach the level of the enlightened if they make ceaseless efforts.”¹³¹ Nor was each society an homogenous entity in so far as there were likely to be “enlightened persons in semi-enlightened or even in unenlightened nations” and vice versa for if “a person neglects the ethical norms of life and fails to study the universal principles, he is unenlightened even though he may live in an enlightened nation.”¹³² As for nations: “a nation is enlightened if there are many individuals who are enlightened; it is semi-enlightened if there are many individuals who are semi-enlightened” and so on.¹³³ More importantly, Yu saw as “the task and responsibility of the enlightened individuals to encourage

¹²⁸ Yu Kilchun, “Levels of Enlightenment,” from *Sōyu Kyōnmun* in Yu Kilchun chonso 1, reprinted in Yongho Ch'oe et al., *Sources of Korean Tradition Volume II: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, (New York: Columbia University Press: 2000), pp. 248-253.

¹²⁹ As a member of the first Korean diplomatic/study mission to Japan in 1881, Yu Kilchun studied with and stayed in Fukuzawa Yukichi's house until he entered Keio University in 1882. From the introduction to Yu Kilchun's text in Yongho Ch'oe et al., *Sources of Korean Tradition Volume II: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, p. 249. For a discussion of Fukuzawa Yukichi's writings, see Rumi Sakamoto, “Japan, Hybridity and the Creation of Colonialist Discourse,” in *Theory, Culture & Society* vol. 13. No. 3 (1996), pp. 113-128.

¹³⁰ I rely on Rumi Sakamoto's reading of Fukuzawa Yukichi's text “Brief History of Civilization” (1875) to discern the similarities in Yu's treatise. It is important to note however, that while Yu, influenced by Yukichi, also defined modern civilization in non-essentialist terms, Yu's text also differs from Yukichi's in so far as Yukichi's conception of civilization reproduced a colonizing discourse with its construction of ‘Asia’ as its non-modern other in essentializing terms, stemming from Japan's powerful political economic position and its imperializing ambitions while Yu's text was written from the more defensive anti-imperialist position of Korea.

¹³¹ Yu Kilchun, p. 250.

¹³² Ibid., p. 250.

¹³³ Ibid.

the semi-enlightened and teach the unenlightened,” a role that likely reflects Yu’s idealized approach to precolonizing Japan as well as precolonizing US before Japan takes over Korea and the US colonizes the Philippine islands.¹³⁴ In addition, Yu also points to the heterogeneity of the composition and character of enlightenment for nations as for individuals, the determination of which is a critically reflective and comparative endeavor whereby in the “enlightenment of politics and other aspects,” “standards may vary according to the time and the locality.” “What was appropriate in the past may not be so now, and what is good for one may not be so for another. Therefore, enlightenment requires scrutiny of the circumstances of the past and the present, and comparison of situations here and elsewhere, in order to adopt what is good and discard what is bad.”¹³⁵ Thus according to Yu, the task of distinguishing “the genuine and the illusory in enlightenment” is as important as the progression from unenlightened or semi-enlightened to enlightened status:

Genuine enlightenment is based upon a thorough investigation of the principles and foundations of reality and is in accord with the conditions and circumstances of the nation. Illusory enlightenment lacks knowledge of reality and envies others’ enlightenment; it either fears or advocates adoption of what others have accomplished without knowledge of the surrounding conditions, thereby wasting much treasure without a corresponding return in practical use. A person who is exposed to a foreign country for the first time experiences illusory enlightenment initially but will progress to genuine enlightenment after a long time and a great deal of experience. In adopting the advanced skills of others, one should never buy foreign-made machines or employ foreign technicians; instead, one’s own nationals should study and acquire such skills. Human talents are limitless, but material wealth is limited. When one’s own nationals learn the skills, they are not only of immediate benefit but will be disseminated throughout the nation with lasting benefit for future years.¹³⁶

At the same time,

Enlightenment entails not only learning the advanced skills of others but also preserving what is good and admirable in one’s own society. The purpose of learning others’ skills is to improve what is already good and admirable in one’s own society. The talents of others, when emulated and put to practical use, becomes one’s own. In this process of emulation, the circumstances of the time, one’s own situation, the importance and consequences of the process, all must be assessed and a step-by-step sequence followed. An overzealous person without any discretion may claim that everything about the foreign country is good and nothing about his own country is admirable. In extreme cases, he praises conditions in the foreign country and displays

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ *ibid.*, p. 251.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 251-2.

contempt for his own country. He is said to be a progressive. But how could he be a progressive? He is really a criminal of enlightenment.¹³⁷

Yu's emphasis on the process of individuals and societies striving for enlightenment as necessarily a critical and comparative endeavor of the application of new political and social standards through the "scrutiny of the circumstances of the past and present, and comparison of situations here and elsewhere," and his cautioning against the dangers of illusory forms of enlightenment characterized by the uncritical adoption of foreign accomplishments and the dogmatic and ill-fitting reproduction of those standards undertaken "without knowledge of the surrounding conditions" is in some ways remarkably similar to the ethos of Western enlightenment thought. Captured in Immanuel Kant's famous enlightenment dictum *Sapere Aude!*, Kant defined the spirit and task of enlightenment as the striving towards intellectual and thus also political maturity qua freedom through the "courage to use [one's] own intelligence without "the guidance of another."¹³⁸ As Kant argued, in so far as "enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity" what is required for "enlightenment of this kind" is the "most innocuous form of" freedom—"freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters."¹³⁹ Importantly, Kant's idea of freedom relies on the distinction between public and private use of reason, whereby "the public use of man's reason must always be free," which "alone can bring about enlightenment among men," while the "private use of reason may quite often be very narrowly restricted, however, without undue hindrance to the process of enlightenment."¹⁴⁰ Yu Kilchun's text presents a similar distinction in the difference between the adoption of new and circumstance-appropriate skills linked to the limitlessness of human talents vs. the adoption of foreign made machines linked to material wealth. Like Kant's understanding of the necessity of following certain rules and the "imperative" of obedience to social mechanisms in which individuals act "as part of the machine" encapsulated in the restricted nature of the private use of reason, but which does not deter the process of enlightenment, Yu also sees the imperative of accepting the nation's role or position within a larger global social mechanism and hierarchy of development as well as the practical adoption of new foreign derived technologies as a kind of private or practical use of reason within determined circumstances. However, like Kant's public use of reason whereby "the same citizen does not contravene his civil obligations if, as a learned individual, he publicly voices his thoughts on the impropriety or even injustice of such fiscal measures" or "offer suggestions for a better arrangement of religious or ecclesiastical affairs," what is essential for genuine Korean enlightenment for Yu is the critical adoption of human skills and social and political standards, "based upon a thorough investigation of the principles and foundations of reality...in accord with the conditions and circumstances of the nation."¹⁴¹ As in Yu's quote above, where he imagines the lasting effect of genuine enlightenment in which as "one's own nationals learn the skills, they are not only of immediate benefit but will be disseminated throughout the nation with lasting

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 252. It would be curious to see how much of the ideas in Yu's text aside from the non-essentialist understanding of enlightenment are taken from Yukichi's text, such as Yu's Confucian approach to enlightenment and what appear to be nascent articulations of economic nationalism.

¹³⁸ Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" in *Kant: Political Writings*, Ed. H.S. Reiss, Trans. H.S. Nisbet (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1970, 1991), p. 54.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 56.

benefit for future years,” Kant also imagined that progenitors of enlightened thinking—those “few who think for themselves, even among those appointed as guardians of the common mass...once they have themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will disseminate the spirit of rational respect for personal value and for the duty of all them to think for themselves.”¹⁴²

What is salient about the resemblance of the enlightenment spirit that characterizes Yu’s understanding and approach to late 19th century Western-dominated cosmopolitan industrial civilization and the thoughts of a late 18th century European philosopher written on the cusp of industrial modernity, whether or not Yu was influenced by Kant’s enlightenment writings or not, is that in each of their writing, while distanced by a century, they were facing much of the same political and social upheavals which spurred a reevaluation of past social formations in light of the dramatic changes of their present. However, as reflected in the temporal dissonance and geopolitical distance of the two texts, it highlights the significant differences in their content, including how due the late 19th semi-imperial geopolitical conditions of Yu’s writing and Korea’s position within this system, new cosmopolitan paradigms of social and political thought as well material civilization were essential/integral to Yu’s considerations of domestic social and political changes—in a way it was not for Kant—for whom thoughts on cosmopolitanism could appear in separate political treatises,¹⁴³ and rather than concerns over the freedom of opinion and the public sphere as an avenue of social and political change, Yu’s enlightenment discourse was motivated by concerns over social and political strategies of national survival in an effort to maintain national independence.

This brings us to another distinctive and peculiar aspect of Yu’s Korean enlightenment treatise (in relation to 18th century Western enlightenment discourse as well as in relation to 19th century Western discourse of modernity) in that its understanding of modern western industrial civilization is at base approached as a universal humanist cultural and ethical paradigm encompassing new social and political ideas and processes rooted in the creative capacity of human ingenuity or ‘talents,’ rather than as a political economic system. As Carter Eckert has argued, for many of the Korean reformers of this time, their approach to the new western civilization was largely structured by their “background and perspective within the still existing Sinitic framework” and thus:

tended to view the new world primarily as a cultural entity centered on the ideas of Western rationality and science (and, in some cases, Christianity), and they envisioned participation largely in cultural terms. They were not, of course, entirely oblivious to the political, economic, and even military aspects of the new order, but in good Neo-Confucian fashion, they tended to see these as natural manifestations of an essentialized cultural orientation that was diffused throughout the West.¹⁴⁴

As Eckert explains, “the Sinitic world order as understood by the Korean elite” was “primarily as a cultural phenomenon,” which “in contrast to modern industrial capitalism, economics did not play a significant role in defining and maintaining the Sinitic world system,” and “political

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁴³ For example, Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace.

¹⁴⁴ Carter Eckert, *Korea’s Transition to Modernity: A Will to Greatness*, in Merle Goldman and Andrew Gordon, eds. *Historical Perspectives on Contemporary East Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 121.

relationships among member nations were...more important.”¹⁴⁵ Nor was the system formed “primarily on military might.” Rather, as Eckert continues, it was more like a cosmopolitan cultural-political cosmological paradigm, (like the European church):

the political relationships were embedded within a certain cultural orientation centered on the cosmological primacy of the Chinese emperor. Thus Koreans honored this shared cosmological vision in the form of regular tribute missions and solicitation of the emperor’s formal recognition in the investiture of their kings. But apart from these infrequent ceremonial occasions, they paid little attention to their imperial suzerain in the conduct of their own internal affairs.¹⁴⁶

Moreover, central to this shared cosmological vision of the Sinitic system,

was the common belief in the superiority of the traditional culture of China, especially that of the ancient Chou dynasty, as the summit of human knowledge and experience. When Koreans talked about “revering China,” what they really meant was revering this cosmopolitan culture that ultimately transcended the spatial and temporal boundaries of particular dynasties...In addition to paying homage by observing this formal political etiquette, the Korean elite expressed their respect for the culture by importing many of the laws and institutions of China, and above all by adopting the Chinese system of writing and making Chinese literature in the broadest sense the basis of their own educational system and intellectual life.¹⁴⁷

Thus with its classical apex rooted in an ancient Chinese dynasty which member nations and elites both revered and strove towards, “creative adaptations” of this classical cosmopolitan cultural paradigm as well as “interpretation” and “debate” [not unlike what we have seen in Yu’s prescription of genuine enlightenment], were a mainstay of Korean participation in Sinitic civilization.¹⁴⁸ As Eckert elaborates: “what was important to the Koreans in delineating themselves as a civilized people was not the extent to which they measured up against any particular contemporary Chinese society, but rather the extent to which they lived up to the spirit of the Chinese classics by embodying the ideals of the Chou society of ancient times which Confucius and his disciples had extolled as a model. Culture for the Koreans was thus not the culture of contemporary China, though many were willing to acknowledge that one might learn something from it as well. Rather, culture meant the culture of the Chinese classics, which for Koreans transcended any particular dynasty, and in a very real sense had little if anything to do with the physical or political China per se.”¹⁴⁹ Thus while China remained atop the cultural hierarchy of the Sinitic system, in so far as the Sinitic civilizational system was conceived of as a

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 121.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 122.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 124.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. For example, Eckert points out that with the conquering of Ming China with the advent of the Manchu Ch’ing dynasty, who were long conceived of as northern barbarians in the Sinitic civilizational paradigm, Neo-Confucians in Korea looked down on the Ch’ing state as culturally inferior and took “pride in the fact that Korea was the only country that remained to carry on the spirit of the fallen Ming dynasty.” (125-6.)

“universal” and “hierarchical” word order, “it was by no means seen as something exclusive to China,” and at the same time this cultural hierarchy was subject to change, “China could ‘stumble and fall’ and ‘lose its status.’”¹⁵⁰ Eckert thus argues that this cultural orientation structured from Korea’s long participation in Sinitic civilization also influenced the way Koreans approached the universal and hierarchical order of the new western civilization, whereby the “hierarchy of enlightenment was by no means regarded as static. If the ideal society of the Sinitic world lay in the distant, virtually unrecoverable past, the perfect society of enlightenment lay in an equally distant, almost unimaginable future. In this sense, the West represented only the highest stage of civilization at the moment. Just as China could lose the mantle of civilization, so too could the West forfeit its present exalted position. In the unceasing social Darwinian struggle for existence, masters could become slaves and slaves could aspire to be masters.”¹⁵¹

This developmentalist, competitive and also inherently cultural orientation as opposed to a political-economic historical materialist approach to the unevenness of the new western civilization is further highlighted by the emphasis Yu places on the historical continuity of past and present material inventions framed within a continuous knowledge paradigm and grounded on unchanging natural laws that underlies and connects all societies, both enlightened and non-enlightened:

As people accumulate knowledge and experience, many novel and marvelous things are produced...Novel and marvelous principles were not absent in the world of yesteryear, nor are they created anew today. The basic laws of nature have not changed. In the past, people failed to study them thoroughly, but the people of today have studied and uncovered them. It may appear, therefore, as if the talent and knowledge of today’s people are superior to those of our ancestors. The truth is, however, that there have been further elaborations on the innovations made by the people of the past. The steam vessel, although marvelous, cannot deviate entirely from the old method of building ships. The steam-driven vehicle, although novel, would not have materialized if not for the technique developed by men of the past in making vehicles. The same holds true in other things as well, the new methods could not have been developed without the accomplishment of past generations.¹⁵²

For Yu, the basis of the steam vessel, which is naturally connected to and evolves from the “old method of building ships,” is both rooted in the basic unchanging “laws of nature” and the ingenuity and constant striving or efforts of human beings to “study” and “uncover” these laws. What then characterizes the advancements of enlightened societies and the “the people of today” is their exceptional effort to study and examine and “uncover” what lays in potential, stemming from both their historical accumulation of knowledge and experience and the exceptional application of this knowledge. Moreover, this culturalist orientation and historical continuity allows Yu to both insert Korean historical ingenuity into this new universal paradigm of modern civilization challenging any exclusivist claims to modern civilization by presently enlightened

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 121, 125. This is not unlike the view in world systems theory that likewise sees change in the hierarchy of the nation-states within the system.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 131.

¹⁵² Yu Kilchun, p. 253.

nations and ensuring a path for Korea's participation in this new global cultural paradigm. As Yu states:

In our country too, the ceramics of Koryo are known throughout the world; the "turtle boat" invented by Yi Sunshin was the first armor-covered warship in the world; the cast iron type developed by the government printing office was the first in the world. Had our countrymen studied ceaselessly and implemented useful ways and principles, our nation today would enjoy fame all over the world. Unfortunately, the succeeding generations have failed to elaborate and build on the achievements of the past.¹⁵³

Although similarly universalist, this interpretation of modern industrial innovations cannot be further from the Western post-enlightenment conception of modernity as both socio-political rupture from the past and as a historical material distinctiveness of the present in a future oriented paradigm of progress, as exemplified in Marx's understanding of modernity as a distinct political economic rupture accompanying a new mode of production or in Wolfgang Schivelbusch's analysis of steam railroads as a revolutionary break from the traditional animal, human, or wind powered transport mechanisms of an earlier era, and thus part of a larger process of "denaturalization" or the "emancipation from nature" accompanying modern industrialization, literally tearing apart the continuity of the traveler and the landscape.¹⁵⁴ In the modernist perspective of Marx, modern capitalism, however exploitative and destructive, was a creative and progressive political-economic force that brought society out of the dark ages of the past as it freed it from the 'idiocy of rural life.' However, for Yu and other new neo-Confucian converts to Western civilization, while the linear progressivist vision from unenlightened to enlightened societies formed the external material form of enlightenment thought and path of enlightenment that was to guide and facilitate Korean modernization and nation building, this was also approached from within a universal cultural paradigm and conceptualized through an underlying logic of historical continuity and veneration of the past. Both this sense of historical continuity and veneration of the past including the achievements of ancestors were part of their longstanding Confucian heritage and key elements of Korea's participation in the universal Sinitic civilizational paradigm before the encounter with the new Western model.¹⁵⁵

The 'Double Bind' and 'Double Nature' of Korean Enlightenment

Nonetheless, despite this culturalist Neo-Confucian approach to civilization and enlightenment, the dangers of illusory enlightenment or what Yu referred to as the 'criminals of enlightenment,' were ever-present within the hierarchical and hybrid cosmopolitan imaginings of Korea as a modern nation-state by nationalist reformers in which the apex of civilization rested with Western imperialist nations. The intense iconoclasm of modern reformers to premodern,

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1977, 1986), pp. 53, 24.

¹⁵⁵ What I'm trying to point out is that while this progressive teleological vision of modernity was picked up by Korean enlightenment thinkers and reformers as the basis for their reevaluation of Korean identity and reconceptualization of it as a modern nation-state in an activist effort to maintain Korean sovereignty, their approach to this progressive time and space of modernity was also grounded on a philosophical orientation to seeing continuity in past and present and veneration of the past inherited from their Confucian lineage from which they encountered these new western modern paradigms.

both native and Confucian traditions, entailed in this civilizational re-orientation, such as seen in the Independence Club, however necessitated by the political practicalities of maintaining Korean sovereignty in this uneven and hostile new world order, also generated troubling cultural contradictions, a sort of “double bind” according to Robinson, which would haunt the evolution of postcolonial Korean nationalism.¹⁵⁶ This is best seen in Bruce Cumings’ critique of the Independence Club as a “small elite club” promoting “Westernization”: “Although many historians claim that the club was a champion of Korean independence and an avatar of democracy and modern civil society, its leaders were as captured by the rhetoric of American progressivism—right down to the denigration of the achievements of their own people—as the 1884 coup leaders had been by Japanese reformism.”¹⁵⁷ Robinson poses this problematic, highlighted in “the debate over *sadaejuui*” (Korea’s historical ritual subservience to China) as the following conundrum: “How were they to create and mobilize a strong national identity within the colonial context if the people themselves were ashamed of their past?”¹⁵⁸ Robinson argues that while “there was no doubt about the sincere desire for Koreans for independence and their hatred of the Japanese colonial masters,” there was also “no strong consensus as to what the positive aspects of the nation were. The very elitism of the cultural nationalist mainstream was informed by its contempt for the Korean masses; this contempt was part of a larger dissatisfaction with the folk tradition and the belief that new values were necessary to create truly “modern” citizens.”¹⁵⁹ Thus Robinson sees a “strong ambivalence” permeating the largely negatively defined nationalism in the nationalist writings of this early period.¹⁶⁰ Not unlike the “Meiji generation” in Japan, “Korean nationalists were struggling with the difficulty of being simultaneously both modern and Koreans.”¹⁶¹

On the other hand, the nationalist calls for civilization and enlightenment also harbored what Andre Schmid has referred to as the “double nature” of enlightenment vis-à-vis the early colonizing discourse of Japan.¹⁶² According to Schmid, while the Korean reformers’ representations and exhortations of lazy Korean *yangban* (landed gentry) or Koreans’ subservience to China in their *sadaejuui* critiques were presented with an activist impulse to support the national self-strengthening program urging compatriots to abandon such behavior and legacies in order to safeguard national sovereignty, Japanese writing on Korea used the same concepts to show Korea “as backward and unchanging” and by the time of the 1905 Protectorate to illustrate Koreans’ inability for self-rule and thus justifying colonization as a civilizing endeavor.¹⁶³ The liability of promoting ‘civilization and enlightenment’ whose apex was largely seen to be located in the West and Japan as a national reform discourse in the face of colonial civilizing discourses put forth by foreign imperialist powers, presented a particular problem for the Pan-Asianist conceptions of civilization that also developed as part of the Korean

¹⁵⁶ Robinson, “Nationalism and the Korean Tradition, 1896-1920: Iconoclasm, Reform, and National Identity,” p. 50.

¹⁵⁷ Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 124. Kim Ilsung was a prominent guerilla fighter active along the Korean Manchurian border composing part of a new wave of Korean nationalist communists who continued an armed struggle against the Japanese in the 1930s.

¹⁵⁸ Robinson, “Nationalism and the Korean Tradition, 1896-1920: Iconoclasm, Reform, and National Identity,” p. 50.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Schmid, p. 131.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

enlightenment, primarily promoted by *Hwangsŏng sinmun* (*Capital Gazette*).¹⁶⁴ While the Independence Club was shut down after two years by the government, their cultural and educational activities extended Korean enlightenment into a “truly nationwide movement, spurred by the growth of the Korean language press.”¹⁶⁵ The *Hwangsŏng sinmun* (1898-1910) and the *Cheguk sinmun* (Imperial Post, 1898-1910) were both established in 1898 and the *Taehan maeil sinbo* (Korea Daily News, 1904-1910) in 1904.¹⁶⁶ While enlightenment discourse was predominant in all of these papers, also established by modern reformist intellectuals, they presented differing visions and models of the modern independent nation, reflecting their different reading bases, that departed from the predominant Westernophile and Christian focus of *Independence News*. The Pan-Asian civilizational discourse prominently championed in *Hwangsŏng sinmun* seized upon the racial categories constructed in the West to advocate a racialized anti-imperialist vision of Asian unity that “built upon its earlier cultural vision of the East.”¹⁶⁷ As Schmid explains, part of a broader regional phenomenon, “yellowness” “promoted as a natural grouping of people...became the basis for several groups around East Asia to propose regional alliances as a means of resisting Western white imperialism.”¹⁶⁸ For the editors of *Hwangsŏng sinmun*, Pan-Asianism was utilized “to intertwine region and nation in a way that offered independence to the nation while guaranteeing security to the East.”¹⁶⁹ As the paper saw “the yellow race, the alliance of the three Eastern nations, and Korean independence” to be “mutually interdependent,” “solidarity offered the only salvation for each,” and the paper propagated the “East-Asian wide expression suggesting that the 400 million people of China, the 20 million people of Korea, and the 40 million people of Japan were ‘of the same continent, same race, and same culture.’”¹⁷⁰ Thus departing from the critical portrayal of China and Sinitic culture as an antithesis and obstacle of civilization and enlightenment, if not outright anti-Chinese sentiment in *Independence News*, *Hwangsŏng sinmun* took a more collectivist stance. While faced with China as the weakest link of the regional alliance, they reestablished the importance of China with the metaphor of the East as “a three-household neighborhood. If a fire in one house started as a fierce Western wind raged, the flames would soon engulf the house to the east. The owners of the eastern house should not merely blame their neighbor for their imprudence without stepping forward to help...Korea, as one nation in the East, they warned, faced no crisis more serious than the disintegration of China at the hands of the Western powers.”¹⁷¹ The editors were however, more ambivalent about Japan. While Japan’s wealth and power appeared crucial to regional security, having “taken the lead in opening the way to enlightenment,” in terms of civilization and enlightenment Japan “was seen as on par with and at times classified as a member of the rich and powerful countries of the West,” in addition to regular and troublesome stories of Japanese infringements on Korean rights and territory.¹⁷² This vision of the Pan-Asian anti-imperial alliance would ultimately fall apart with Japan’s imposition of the Protectorate in 1905.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925*, p. 28

¹⁶⁶ Schmid, p. 48.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 90.

¹⁷² Ibid., pp. 90-91.

Between 1895 and 1905, Korea's historical structures and legacies as well the context of Korea's encounter with western imperial powers and Japan's colonial overtures presented a particular force field of historical and modern forces for the emergence of an early modern cosmopolitan-nationalist consciousness encompassing distinct hierarchies and multiple scales of national identification and positioning that interlinked the nation with regional (Confucian, Pan-Asian), and global (Western Civilization) visions and models for Korea's participation in a new modern civilizational order. At the same time this occurred amidst competing and coexisting cultural paradigms exemplified in the unparadoxical/polysemic act in which Korea declares itself an empire as an act of modern nationalism in 1897—at the height of Korean enlightenment activity to reform Korea into a modern nation-state.¹⁷³ This is unparadoxical/polysemic because, as characterized by this period of cosmopolitan-nationalist activity, there are two civilizational codes at play. As the modern Western nationalist discourse necessitated the appearance of independence as a member of the modern nation-state system, this independence became expressed via and against the Sinitic civilizational code in the elevation of the Korean king to emperor, which both abandons and upholds to the Sinitic cultural paradigm. Thus quite unlike what Anderson has described as the “stretching of the short, tight skin of nation over the gigantic body of the empire” characteristic of European official nationalism, in the defensive nationalist governmentality of Korea, the Korean kingdom took on new imperial regalia as part of its national becoming.¹⁷⁴

However, as with the ‘double bind’ and ‘double nature’ of enlightenment nationalism at this time, there is also an ambiguity to the defensive anti-imperial governmentality. It was anti- or at least counter-imperialist in the sense that it was a defensive governmentality linked to protecting the nation from imperial takeover in a hostile imperialist international political environment. But for both the state and popular nationalist reformers, as reflected in their activities and hierarchical conceptions of civilization, however forged by their practical encounter with the new international system, this defensive stance was not void of an ‘imperial desire’ at the same time—which they came to understand as part of the political model of the new civilization.¹⁷⁵ At the same time the hierarchical understanding of civilization was long familiar to Koreans via its participation in the Sinitic world order—where empire was also a familiar construct yet with different characteristics—primarily being based on cultural-cosmological understandings and ritual observation rather than political-economic plunder and did not pose a threat to national sovereignty in regard to autonomous rule of both domestic and foreign affairs. The nation-empire problematic thus also appears to harbor a sort of ‘double bind’ of the ‘nation-state’ model, which can be aligned to the distinction that Anderson makes between the nation as the source of a good revolutionary force aligned with popular nationalism vs. the oppressive state form aligned with official nationalism that informs his theory and genealogy of nationalism.¹⁷⁶ But this distinction by Anderson does not present any room for the consideration

¹⁷³ This is completely different than what Anderson sees in the official nationalism of imperial dynastic states—which in a reactionary measure to popular nationalism “stretch the tight skin of nation across their large empire.” In the Korean case the aspiring nation takes on imperial garb—in order to testify to its independence from the Sinitic civilizational paradigm

¹⁷⁴ Anderson, *IC*, p. 86.

¹⁷⁵ See Lydia Liu's discussion of the relationship between imperial desire and ‘the sovereignty complex’ in “The Desire for the Sovereign and the Logic of Reciprocity in Family of Nations,” *Diacritics* vol. 29, no 4., (*Grounds of Comparison: Around the Work of Benedict Anderson*) (Winter 1999), pp. 150-177.

¹⁷⁶ See Pheng Cheah's discussion of how the good revolutionary nation vs. bad reactionary state distinction in a key element of Anderson's theory of the nationalism—from where the distinction between good universality of unbound

of governmental forms of defensive nationalism or discussion of the unevenness of the global capitalist system, which presents a heterogeneity of state forms and actions. This problematic is best encapsulated by Rosa Luxemburg's critique of the nation-state form where she extends Marx's critique of Franz List, by saying "the nation-state is also simultaneously that indispensable form in which the bourgeois passes over from the defensive to an offensive position, from protection and concentration of its own nationality to political conquest and domination over other nationalities."¹⁷⁷ Germany is her prime example. Because of this inevitable transformation of the weak state to an offensive one, Luxemburg argues that the proletarian national program conflicts with the "bourgeois policy to the extent that in its essence it is only defensive, never offensive; it depends on the harmony of interests of all nationalities, not on conquest and subjugation of one by another."¹⁷⁸ The danger of this potential transformation from defensive to offensive nationalism is thus already present in the contours of enlightenment and civilizational discourse of nascent Korean cosmopolitan-nationalist thought.

Moreover, Chinese and Japanese nationalisms present important historical and modern parallels and intersections with Korean nationalism, evinced in the numerous translations of Chinese and Japanese treatises on modern reform and the mediation of western thought through Chinese and Japanese sources and translations. Like their neighbors, modern nationalism was something that developed out of the competition and transition between one worldview and another—two universal paradigms of Chinese and Western civilization. As Leo Ou Fan Lee has discussed in reference to early modern China, 'new' ideas, cultures, knowledge, people, etc. took on a "qualitative" difference that linked the temporal present with a western modernity.¹⁷⁹ It thus relegated Chinese civilization as the 'old' tradition that was being displaced. In this context, the coexistence and conflict between tradition and modernity invariably inscribed the ideas, objects, and ideals of modernity. In Korea, similar transformations were apace and it was directly and perhaps more urgently in the Korean case linked to national survival—gaining shape upon Western and Japanese attempts to penetrate the nation. Also, as in China and Japan, Korea's self-strengthening programs and calls for 'civilization and enlightenment,' infused new political, cultural and economic ideas and models originating from the West with a focus on resistance and 'national survival' vis-à-vis Western powers.¹⁸⁰ In addition, as new conceptions of the nation became articulated with Confucian and native traditions and symbols it led to situated historical geographical cultural, universal hierarchical understandings of western civilization in hybrid cosmopolitan-nationalist discourses and regional Pan-Asianist conceptions, also a shared feature of Korea's East Asian neighbors. But at the same time, the belated development of Korean nationalism resulting from its late entry into the world system, its precarious political (in addition to geographic and temporal) position situated "between empires"—of China and Japan—and internal discord and rebellions among aristocrats and scholar-bureaucrats as well as peasant

seriality linked to print-capitalism vs. the bad cosmopolitan hybridity of bound seriality linked to governmentality arises. Pheng Cheah, *Grounds of Comparison, Diacritics* vol. 29, no 4 (*Grounds of Comparison: Around the Work of Benedict Anderson*) (Winter 1999), pp. 6-7; *Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of Liberation* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 226-9.

¹⁷⁷ Rosa Luxemburg, *The National Question: selected writings*, [1908] (Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 162.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

¹⁷⁹ Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 44.

¹⁸⁰ See Prasenjit Duara, "The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism," *Journal of World History* vol. 12., no.1 (Spring 2001), pp. 99-130.

masses resulting from the particular socio-political makeup of the Chosŏn state structured important differences.¹⁸¹

“We Wail Today”: The Protectorate, National Loss and New Awakenings - The *Minjok* (Ethnic Nation) and the Diaspora (1905-1910)

With Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 having defeated Russia’s rivalry for dominance over the peninsula, Japan reestablished its influence and quickly moved to impose a Protectorate Treaty in November 1905 which transferred full diplomatic sovereignty as well as command of the military, finance, ports, telegraph lines, railroads, etc. into Japanese hands.¹⁸² In the following years of de facto colonization until formal annexation, Ito Hirobumi, the newly imposed ‘Residency-General’ of Korea positioned just under the Korean emperor, appointed shadow ministers in every branch of the government, steadily taking over command of all of Korea’s internal affairs.¹⁸³ The formal annexation of Korea in 1910 brought to a close the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392-1910), which had governed the peninsula for 518 years, and Korea’s long history as an independent polity, commencing thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule.

For Korean nationalist reformers, if Japan’s imperialist ambitions in Korea were not evident earlier, the Protectorate treaty made it loud and clear. The initial sense of shock, indignation, and betrayal over the Protectorate Treaty that swept the nation is captured in this well-known editorial of November 20, 1905 in the *Hwangsŏng sinmun* (*Capital Gazette*).

When Marquis Ito came to Korea the other day, the innocent people of Korea said to one another that, since he had hitherto devoted himself to bringing about stability and peace among the three nations of the East, his visit this time would surely be for the purpose of recommending measures for strengthening our nation’s independence... There are, however, many unpredictable things in this world. How could these five totally unexpected articles of the [Protectorate] treaty be proposed? Since the proposed provisions will not only affect Korea but also cause division among the three nations, one wonders about Marquis Ito’s ultimate intention.

Nevertheless, the so-called ministers of our government, who are not even worthy of being compared to dogs and swine, sought their own rewards and gains, got frightened by momentary threats, and, to our consternation, became traitorous criminals. *They handed over to foreigners a nation with a*

¹⁸¹ Chinese suzerainty was brought to an end in 1895 with Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War, and Korea becomes a de facto colony of Japan in 1905 with the establishment of the Protectorate upon Japan’s victory over the Russo-Japanese War. The differences among the three East Asian nationalisms are especially significant after Japan imposes the Protectorate in 1905, which differentiates Korea from both China—whose main antagonists were Western imperial powers not Japan—and Japan, which radically alters the international scene by becoming the first non-Western imperialist nation. Prior to this, Japan colonized Taiwan upon its victory in the Sino-Japanese war.

¹⁸² Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 143.

¹⁸³ Ibid. King Kojong was declared Emperor in 1897 following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which put an end to the Chinese suzerainty, and with the urging of nationalist reformist modernizers assembled under the Independence Club. The country, which had hitherto been conceived and recognized as a Kingdom within the Chinese world order also underwent a name change to the Great Han Empire (Taehan Cheguk).

four-thousand-year history and a dynasty that has lasted five hundred years, thereby reducing twenty million souls to being the slaves of foreigners. Foreign Minister Pak Chesun and other ministers [those who signed the treaty] are beneath the level of dogs and swine and do not even deserve the honor of serious censure.

The man whose official title is supposed to be prime minister is the head of the government, yet he only cast a negative vote as if that alone were enough to discharge his official responsibility and save his honor. Unlike Kim Sanghon who tore up the document and wailed or Chong On who disemboweled himself in protest,¹⁸⁴ the prime minister is still alive and moves about. How dare he face His Majesty and his twenty million fellow countrymen?

Alas! How deplorable! Fellow countrymen, now slaves of foreigners, are you alive or dead? *Should we let the national spirit that has persevered for four thousand years since the days of Tangun and Kija (Chi Tzu) disintegrate overnight?* How deplorable! How deplorable! Fellow countrymen! Fellow countrymen!¹⁸⁵

Written by the paper's editor, Chang Chiyŏn, a Confucian reformist and foremost advocate of Korean enlightenment and who like most editors of the nascent vernacular presses of the time were modernizing nationalist reformers, this newsprint was delivered house to house free of charge for mass exposure and to avoid Japanese censorship.¹⁸⁶ Notable in Chang Chiyŏn's lament, alongside the dismay over the duplicity-cum-betrayal of the new Japanese residency-general and the horror expressed in the scathing invective towards the "seven traitors and five devils" of the Korean cabinet,¹⁸⁷ is his confidence in the existence of "twenty million fellow countrymen," most of whom, in the words of Anderson, he will never meet, but who are united in his mind as a political community who have been collectively wronged.¹⁸⁸ This confidence is moreover linked to his conviction in their shared belonging to both an enduring supra-dynastical and dynastical historical-political entity—"a nation with a four-thousand-year history and a dynasty that has lasted five hundred years"—which both appears to heighten and concretize the injustice over the Protectorate's sovereign infringement as well as be heightened by it. Enshrouded in a mixture of both ancient and modern ideological and lived constructs of

¹⁸⁴ These two figures were government officials who opposed the peace treaty with the Manchu invaders of 1636. Kim Sanghon was imprisoned for his act of defiance, while Chong On attempted suicide.

¹⁸⁵ Chang Chiyŏn, "We Wail Today," *Hwangŏng sinmun* [Imperial Capital News], November 20 1905, printed in Young ho Ch'oe et al., eds, *Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 312-13. Italics mine.

¹⁸⁶ Chang Chiyŏn was imprisoned for three months for his act of defiance. See Schmid, p. 95.

¹⁸⁷ The seven traitors refers to the seven ministers who partook in the treaty, the five devils designates the 5 ministers to agreed to the protectorate as opposed to the two, including the Prime Minister mentioned above who rejected it. It is worth noting that these negotiations were conducted under an armed escort of Japanese troops. The infamy of the 'seven traitors and five devils' will only be surpassed by the arch-traitor Yi Wanyŏng who as newly appointed prime minister under the protectorate signs the Annexation treaty in 1910.

¹⁸⁸ Anderson, *IC*, p. ; Chang Chiyŏn as chief editor of *Hwangŏng sinmun* had thus far been a key advocate of the Pan-Asian civilizational model.

collective belonging and myths of national identity, this stern and seemingly naturalized consciousness of Korea as a distinct historically enduring sociological entity, appearing most forcefully not inconsequently at the moment of its imminent loss—hypostatized into a “national spirit that has persevered for four thousand years”—emerged at this time as a key motif shared across the orthodox Confucian—pro-modern nationalist spectrum in new urgent calls for national anticolonial resistance as well as new discourses of the modern nation now largely retreating from the cosmopolitan-nationalist ethos of the 1890s.

Arise! “Fear Not the Enemy’s Strength”: The Righteous Army

Strong resistance to the Protectorate erupted in a frenzy of nationalist activity, taking shape in various forms such as the formation of clandestine political organizations, new self-strengthening cultural associations and the proliferation of private western style schools, a host of new vernacular nationalist papers as well as the revival of *uibyong* or righteous armies. Armed resistance to the Protectorate emerged almost immediately with the reappearance of “righteous armies” and continued through the early years of Annexation in 1910. Initiated by orthodox Confucian literati leading bands of peasant armies numbering no more than a few hundred men, the righteous armies were reinforced by the entry of newly decommissioned officers of the Korean army in 1907 which brought increased manpower, military discipline and weapons to the guerrilla forces. Prior to 1907, small bands of righteous armies “supported by the populace and familiar with the local terrain” operated within the most populous regions “from mountainous areas, attacking Japanese garrisons and destroying railways and telegraph facilities.”¹⁸⁹ With the reinforcement of soldiers and weapons after 1907, a force of close to 10,000 guerrilla troops came within eight miles of Seoul to attack the headquarters of the Residency-General in Seoul before retreating with heavy losses outmanned and outgunned by the Japanese military.¹⁹⁰ Japanese estimates of guerrilla forces number 69,832 in 1908, with close to 1,500 clashes between them and Japanese troops, dropping to around 25,000 in 1909 and 2,000 by 1910, by which time more than 17,600 guerrilla fighters gave their lives in struggle and many had moved into Manchuria.¹⁹¹

The ‘righteous army’ call to arms combined revolutionary militant nationalism with deep conservative anti-foreign nationalist undertones reminiscent of the nascent mass nationalism of the Tonghak rebellion. Confucian literati Ch’oe Ikhyŏn (1833-1906), “a stalwart defender of Confucian orthodoxy and former vice-minister” made this call for the nation to arise and fight at 73 years of age as he led a righteous army of a thousand men in the Cholla province in 1906.¹⁹²

Alas! At all times in history there have been traitors, but none so despicable as the traitors of today. No nation may have escaped the fate of being invaded by barbarians, but where would one find foreign invaders as repugnant as the Japanese today? Not many words need to be uttered to justify our patriotic undertaking.

¹⁸⁹ Eckert et. al., p. 243.

¹⁹⁰ Eckert et. al., p. 244. Cumings, p. 146.

¹⁹¹ Cumings, p. 146; Eckert, p. 244.

¹⁹² Ch’oe et al. eds., *Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 291. Ch’oe Ikhyŏn was eventually captured that same year and starved to death in a Japanese prison.

Our Korea has a long history dating back to Tangun. Since the days of T'aejo, a succession of wise monarchs have ruled in accord with the Confucian Way. The kings fulfilled their regal duties while the subjects carried out their obligations so that the ethical standards remained high...Every family adhered to the virtues of humaneness, rightness, filial piety, and brotherly affection. The Confucianism we uphold and the morality we stress are the very reasons for these accomplishments...

Japan has been our enemy for centuries. It pains us to mention the Japanese invasion of the 1590s when the enemy defiled two of our royal tombs. The Korean-Japanese treaty of amity signed in 1876 tempted other foreign powers to follow suit. Before long, we became vulnerable to threats and blackmail; our government became the object of brazen manipulation; the traitors who fled the country were given protection; our principles and standards were compromised; our clothes and headgear were altered; our queen was murdered; our king lost his traditional topknot; our officials were treated like slaves; our people were massacred; our cemeteries and homes were destroyed; and our lands were stolen...

Alas! In the tenth month of last year [November 1905], they penetrated an unprecedented act: we were coerced into signing a piece of paper that ended overnight *our five-hundred-year-old dynasty*. It astonished our gods and saddened the spirits of our ancestors. Our foreign minister Yi Chiyŏng and the others who sold the country to the enemy are incorrigible traitors to the nation...

Months have passed since the national disaster, yet no one has risen to attack the enemy. How can the subjects exist on their own if there is no king? How can the people survive if the nation perishes? A fish on the chopping block or in the cooking pot is to be pitied. If we are faced with a similar fate, how can we not fight? To die defending the king and the nation is preferable to living the life of a slave.

I, Ikhyŏn, am old, ailing, and lacking in talent and power to be of any help in the nation's survival. Nevertheless, as long as I live, I intend to repay my debt to our sovereign. When the vast building is about to collapse, a solitary pillar cannot save it; nor can a basket of dirt save a dike that is being washed away...*The royal household, the ministers and noblemen of the court, civil and military officials, and all classes of people, including local functionaries and servants, must arm themselves and rise up as one, putting to death the traitors and defeating and eradicating the Japanese enemies....*

Have faith in the cause of our Righteous Army and fear not the enemy's strength. Respond to this appeal and arise!¹⁹³

Ch'oe's nationalism, however reactionary (as judged from the modern vantage point) as it is patriotic, traditionalist as it is revolutionary (under the particular circumstances), reveals a particular worldview from which such denunciations of the new industrial power of Japan that had just defeated a major Western imperial power could be uttered. The powerful modern military and economic power of Japan as well as those of the Western industrial powers that had shifted the tide of cultural-political influence and hierarchy which had been in existence for millennia in a matter of decades could only be called 'barbarian' grounded on a firm belief in the "righteousness" of not only another world order but also another political-cultural-ethical civilizational paradigm. Although this traditional civilizational paradigm was largely approached by modern reformers as a target for elimination in their attempts to reimagine and materially transform Korea into an sovereign member of the new nation-state system, as seen in their Neo-Confucian cultural approach to their participation in the new system, not unlike the orthodox Confucians, they too had become naturalized members of this old civilization. At the same time, the centuries-long process of naturalization and assimilation into this universal world order also provided the basis for a sense of national identity and distinction from other members of the cosmopolitan Sinitic system, reinforced by the very differences entailed in the process of their adaptation of Chinese cultural legacies and political and legal systems, as seen in the distinct origin myths, dynastic histories, as well as indigenous religious and cultural practices of the Korean nation. Thus despite the significant differences among the nationalist proponents of the new 'civilization and enlightenment' such as Chang Chiyŏn, and the orthodox Confucian defenders of the Sino-centric civilization such as Ch'oe Ikyŏn (who became a regular target and symbol for the need for modern national reforms in the modern nationalist presses), both share the conviction of the long illustrious history of the state and nation in the historical memory of "our Korea" (however purified and romanticized in hindsight and in reflection of present circumstances), that was pivotal to the particular bitterness and injustice of the imposition of Japanese colonial rule as well as the confidence in a bounded community of compatriots in their call to unity and action in anti-colonial resistance.¹⁹⁴

As the tragic loss of sovereignty both intensified existing national reform movements and reoriented these activities toward regaining independence rather than trying to safeguard national sovereignty as in the preceding decades, the disillusion with cosmopolitan-nationalist conceptions whether pro-Western or Pan-Asian as well as a the emergence of an intensified national historical consciousness seen above came to characterize new developments in anti-colonial national resistance by both orthodox Confucian literati and modern enlightenment reformers at this time. For Chang Chiyŏn who had largely been a champion of Pan-Asianist

¹⁹³ Ch'oe Ikyŏn, "An Appeal to Arms," Myonam chip (Collected Works of Ch'oe Ikyŏn), reprinted in Young ho Ch'oe et al., eds., *Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, pp. 292-294. (italics mine)

¹⁹⁴ What I am trying to say is that the historical memory of a 'four thousand year old nation' and a horizontal community of fellow nationals—as seen in Neo-Confucian nationalist calls as well as those of the modernist reformers—was not something that was produced by colonial capitalist structures but was present before colonial rule structured through a long premodern history. This was however heightened and focused by anti-imperialist and popular governmentality in the face of imperialist incursions in the three or so decades prior to colonialism, through which process models of western nationalism was also introduced to shape the new formal outlines/categories of these premodern understandings and sentiments.

nationalism as a variant of the call to the new civilization and enlightenment, this regional cosmopolitan nationalist vision quickly became untenable after 1905 as with the substantial tempering of other civilization and enlightenment discourses of the 1890s with the civilizing narrative now turned against the Korean nation in the Japanese colonial discourse.¹⁹⁵ As illustrated by the *Hwangsŏng sinmun* editorial following in response to the summary of a Japanese legal expert's opinion which presented "a classic justification for colonial rule" arguing that in so far as Korea lacked the "wherewithal for independence, Korea would be protected and eventually guided toward sovereignty to Japan," the editors brought to the floor once again the discourse of *sadaejui*, however this time it was re-interpreted (away from the 1890s version of Korean lackeyism to China) to show that, in direct contrast to the Japanese Protectorate, Korea under the Sinitic system "had been autonomous for more than half a millennium."¹⁹⁶

Thus it was fittingly the Pan-Asianists for whom the difference between the cultural-political Sino-centric universalism and the political-economic system of the new imperial international world order became most evident. If the threat of Western imperialism as well as Western racism on the one hand and historical cultural contact across East Asia on the other had brought about a narrowing of the universal modern civilizational paradigm into racialized conceptions of a Pan-Asian civilization as a cosmopolitan and simultaneously anti-imperialist and nationalist discourse, then Japan's eventual colonialism was set to spur a retreat into the more narrow particularistic and protected conception of nation which also not only presented a resolution to the 'double nature of civilization and enlightenment but also the 'double bind' behind the universal-nationalist aspiration to modern civilization.¹⁹⁷ This is evident in the particularistic contraction of homogenous empty time into an evolutionary national time in the

¹⁹⁵ Schmid, *Korea Between Empires: 1895-1919* chapter on "engaging a Civilizing Japan." P. 95. Schmid argues that this editorial marked an end to the *Hwangsŏng sinmun*'s promotion of the Pan-Asianist ideology of nationalist thought that was most enthusiastically received by the editors of this paper. While always wary of Japan's intentions, faced with the contradictions between Japan's rhetoric of assisting Koreans to maintain its independence against the Western powers and assert it vis-à-vis Chinese suzerainty and Japan's increasing infringements and aggressions, up until this time, the *Hwangsŏng sinmun* (which was one of first privately run nationalist newspapers—established in 1898—published in a mixed Korean and Chinese script and catering to educated classes) had promoted, however cautiously a Pan-Asianist vision of a new Asian civilization united among the three neighbors and yellow race of the East Asia.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁹⁷ The escape into a nativist ethnicist definition of the nation from cosmopolitan imaginings with the onset of colonialism forms the narrative thread and one basic argument of Andre Schmid's book *Korea Between Empires*, where he sees the *minjok* discourse as the final manifestation of "de-centering the Middle Kingdom." This is also the main argument of Hahm Chaibong's "Civilization, Race, or Nation?: Korean Visions of Regional Order in the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia*, Ed. By Charles K Armstrong et al. (NY, M.E. Sharpe: 2006), pp. 35-50. However, Hahm is more explicit in arguing that Pan-Asianism as well as the partiality of many Korean nationalist reformers to Japan as a model for Korean modernization and civilization was a response to the racism of Western nations, as well as arguing that the logic behind the *minjok* concept was a racist, xenophobic construction (in stark contrast to Henry Em's reading of the *minjok* discourse as I examine below). As Hahm states: "Another reason that the Enlightenment Party almost invariably chose Japan as the role model was because of 'race.' Many of its members admired the United States as the best model of modern civilization. Yun Ch'i-ho, So Chae-p'il, Yu Kilchun, Syngman Rhee, and Yi Sang-jae were all baptized because, to them, Protestantism was what made America a great nation. However, what prevented them from wholeheartedly embracing the United States over and against Japan was American racism, which many of them had the opportunity to witness first-hand. When Pak Yong-hyo and Yun Ch'i-ho went to San Francisco after the failed coup of 1884, they walked straight into a region that was most directly affected by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882...Firsthand experience with racism in America convinced the Enlightenment Party members that their future lay with Japan" (46).

revisionist historiographic writing about the nation as an ethnic nation as well as the spatial expansion from conceiving a bounded territorialized nation to de-territorialized diasporic nationalism in the elevation of new diasporic communities abroad active in modern western centers of civilization as the new model of Korean ‘civilization and enlightenment’ and the new vanguard of nationalism after the imposition of colonial rule in Korea after 1905.

While new western and Chinese and Japanese mediated modern ideas of nationhood and new modern technologies of communication provided new models and media for national imagining, this was always also mediated through historical cultural and political structures of both Korean traditions and traditional cosmopolitan institutions as well as the material realities of uneven politic-economic and military structure of the new imperialist system. For Confucian literati and progressive reformers alike, the five-year period from the 1905 Protectorate to formal annexation raised national consciousness to a fever pitch, stimulating a charged period of armed struggle, nationalist imagining, codification, and invention in a variety of actions and efforts that distills key characteristics of early modern nationalism in Korea. What is important and unique about this moment is on the one hand the *continuity* between premodern legacies *as well as* pre-colonial modes of national imagining and activism, such as that which becomes distilled here in 1905 but which had been developing since the 1880s spurred by the increasing threat to national survival in the face of imperialist interventions. As we have seen incipient ideologies and institutions of modern Korean nationalism had already been developing for at least three decades in response foreign intervention and increasing infringements on Korean political autonomy. At the same time, as both an historical event and a symbolic apogee, the 1905 protectorate also marks the distinctiveness of the experience of Korea’s loss of sovereignty which both served to fortify the historical narrative of an enduring Korean polity and a distinct national identity spurring new conceptions of ethnic national identity corresponding to the heightened need for a unified and mass-level resistance, as well as the heightened importance of diasporic nationalism stemming from the territorial imposition of colonial rule, situated alongside and beyond/challenging linguistic and territorial conceptions of the nation. On the other hand, these precolonial forms of nationalism and the heightened responses and resistance of the Protectorate both precedes and is perpetuated in subsequent nationalist ideologies, movements and activities characteristic of the colonial period post 1910, that shifts into the desire to regain rather than maintain independence.

Minjok (Ethnic Nation) and Civilization

The turn to the defense of and production of a unique and autonomous historical national identity formed a key component of the nationalist undertaking of revisionist historiography of this period, which developed as a response to Japan’s colonial discourse as well as from the context of various national and cultural problematics posed by the embrace of ‘enlightenment and civilization’ and spelled a new direction in nationalist discourse. Henry Em has most forcefully argued towards the significance of the revisionist historiography of Korea by enlightenment reformers in the period after the 1905 Japanese Protectorate, centered on the new imported concept of *minjok* (ethnic nation) and undertaken as a form of national resistance to imminent colonial takeover as a signal event in the formation of Korean anticolonial nationalism as a “modern democratic construct.”¹⁹⁸ As Korea found itself on the brink of colonialism, modern

¹⁹⁸ Henry H. Em, “Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’aeho’s Historiography,” Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), pp. 336-361.

reformer and classically trained scholar Sin Ch'aeho undertook the writing of a new nationalist historiography in his essay "Toksa sillon" in 1908 which replaced Confucian Chosŏn state-centered history writing based on the dynastic lineage of Korean kings with a new epic-like genealogical history of Korea as an ethnic nation (*minjok*) descended from a common bloodline/ancestor. Deploying the historical myth figure of Tan'gun long conceived in premodern Korea as the ancestor of the Korean people, Sin constructed a mythic-historical national ethnic genealogy that traced a continuous bloodline from 2333 B.C. when Tang'un was purported to have descended from Heaven to the present on which to make claims for a distinct national identity "in terms of internal homogeneity and external autonomy" and delegitimize Japan's colonial overtures.¹⁹⁹ Conceptualizing an autonomous national identity was significant because as both Em and Schmid point out, Japan's colonial overtures were accompanied by Japanese revisionist histories of ancient Korea which claimed that Northern Korea was originally a Chinese colony and southern Korea a Japanese colony thus producing a history of Korea as "lacking the capacity for autonomous development" to justify colonialism.²⁰⁰ At the same time, the concept of Korean *minjok*, "a category inclusive of every Korean without regard to age, gender, or status distinctions," enabled all Koreans "to reclaim dignity and 'authentic' identity" and more importantly "arouse, unite, and mobilize the entire Korean population."²⁰¹ Building on modernist theoretical frameworks of nationalism such as Hobsbawm's 'invented tradition' in which nationalist histories are constructed retrospectively through presentist ideological constructs and Anderson's 'imagined community' in which nationalism is theorized as democratic horizontal type imaginings, Em argues that Sin's transformation of Korea into an ethnic nation in 1908 was something both invented and imagined—to historically justify Korean autonomy when it needed it most and to horizontalize and mobilize all Koreans to national resistance—in the face of imminent colonial takeover.

Hahm Chaibong has argued on the other hand that the logic behind Sin's constructed *minjok* nationalism was "xenophobic, nativist, and hence racist," providing Korea with a problematic and dangerous legacy of anti-foreign popular nationalism.²⁰² Focusing on the enlightenment nationalists' attempts to modernize the Chosŏn state on the modern Western or Japanese model, Hahm locates Sin's revisionist historiography in relation to the enlightenment party's efforts to articulate and promote new universal civilizational models on which their desired modern nation could be defined and measured against in opposition to the Sino-centric Confucian cultural paradigm, and as a solution to the problems for claims to national sovereignty posed by these discourses. Resonating with other historical interpretations of the period but

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 339.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 345.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 342.

²⁰² Hahm Chaibong, "Civilization, Race, or Nation: Korean Visions of Regional Order in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Charles K. Armstrong et al. eds., *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia* (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 49. ** I agree that the *minjok* nationalism could be xenophobic and nativist (which reflects the context of its writing) but I disagree that it is "racist." It is important to emphasize that this ethnic nationalism was NOT based on ethnic or racial typecasting based on theories of particular racial characteristics or claims to racialist or racist superiority. It was a genealogical history of a people/nation originating from a mythic-historical ancestor who was purported to have descended from heaven. Such an ethnic genealogical history could very well be found in less racially homogeneous populations which designate an origin myth figure as the founder of the county. That Korea happens to be one of the most racially homogenous populations, likely related to its geographical makeup surrounded by water on three sides and thus less prone to historical migrations and intermixing lends this chiefly historical genealogy a spurious racialist or 'racist' hue. The Pan-Asianist civilization theories were rather more racialist and even racist than this *minjok* nationalism.

establishing a more direct causal link, Hahm argues that Sin's conceptualization of the ethnic nation was a response to the infelicitous effects of earlier reformers' discursive attempts to envision a modern Korean nation-state rooted in the logic of western civilization or the racialized and regional conception of a Pan-Asian civilization which further compromised Korean sovereignty as they were turned against Korea in so far as they "provided a logic according to which an independent Chosŏn was deemed superfluous" and which ultimately backfired to justify Japan's colonial aggression.²⁰³ According to Hahm, "the logic of civilization and enlightenment, racial and regional harmony all compromised Chosŏn's political sovereignty and independence. All these discourses posited a standard outside Korea, be it China, Japan, or the West, to which Korea could not measure up. If it tried to, and asked for outside assistance in the process, the helping hand inevitably turned against it. What was necessary was a way to create a standard that was internal to Chosŏn by which it could be measured."²⁰⁴ Thus while *minjok* may have provided an inclusive category leveling distinctions among a highly stratified Korean society fostering "deep, horizontal comradeship" amongst all Koreans to agitate resistance against Japan as Em argued, according to Hahm, more importantly, the logic of *minjok*, largely conditioned by the failure of cosmopolitanism, "afforded its putative members...a way of looking at other civilizations without falling prey to the 'civilizationist' perspective of orthodox Confucians or Enlightenment Party members:"²⁰⁵

The logic of civilization was to want to become what one was not. It was to posit an objectively higher or better state of being for oneself and for one's people. The logic of nationalism, on the other hand, was to want to become what one was, an "authentic" Korean...The advantage of this nationalism was that it was a project in which only Koreans could participate. No one else, no matter how hard they tried could ever hope to become an authentic Korean. "Koreanness" was an identity secure from foreign invasion, political or intellectual. It was a standard to which only Koreans could aspire.²⁰⁶

What Hahm's focus on the exclusivist logic internal to Sin's historiography of *minjok* nationalism points to is the certain tension and paradox between what Em has posited as the defensive context and anti-imperial democratic and collectivizing or homogenizing intent of the construction and character of *minjok* nationalism—and its exclusivist, and ethnic character.²⁰⁷ It

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 47.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 48.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Both interpretations are similarly historically grounded and important, but exclusive emphasis on either the democratic motives that spawned the ethnic nation or the exclusivist logic of the ethnic nation prevents a full understanding of Korean nationalism and falls prey to different political and intellectual shortcomings. In Em's case, it is hard to account for new modern hierarchical distinctions among exile and peninsular Koreans that also accompanied this discourse of *minjok* nationalism as well as its continuing postwar manifestations in the South Korean developmental state's classed exploitation of the ethnic nation as well as in the case of Overseas Korean immigration policies in the late 90s as a form of differentiated instrumentalization of diasporic ethnic nationals (i.e. Chinese-Koreans vs. Korean-Americans). Hahm on the other hand conflates *minjok* and *minjung*, *minjok* being a concept that defines the subject of the nation as all those who share a bloodline through an evolutionary ethnic paradigm which subsumes all Koreans whether territorially situated within or outside Korea, while *minjung* was conceived as the oppressed subset of the nation. His conflation of these concepts leads to his skewed and narrow analysis of *minjung* and Korean worker movements against the Korean authoritarian nation-state since the 70s and

seems to me that these two related yet paradoxical aspects of Korean ethnic nationalism—which on the one hand, despite the adoption of the exclusivist *minjok* concept, corresponds to Anderson’s democratic horizontal-type national imaginings, in so far as it fostered horizontal collectivity among and democratic civic participation by heretofore vertically class/status differentiated Koreans in national anticolonial resistance apropos of the classical 19th century nationalist concept which sought the “fullest alignment of habitus, culture, and exclusive participation” structured in response to Japan’s colonizing discourse and Korea’s imminent loss of national sovereignty within an uneven hostile imperialist system—and on the other essentialized Koreanness to the exclusive participation of ethnic blood-related belonging corresponding to the failure of the desire and efforts at cosmopolitan participation in the new international global system of nation-states also amidst an uneven hostile global capitalist system—both of which together present a key dilemma and characteristic of Korean nationalism, that helps situate the politics of modern anticolonial Korean nationalism in relation to both similarities and departures from Anderson’s theory and genealogy of anticolonial nationalism and within the broader field of studies and theories of anticolonial modern nationalism in Asia and Africa—and keys into important implications for related yet different structuring conditions and forces of nationalism as well as alternative meanings and characteristic of material technologies.

Diaspora and Civilization

The transformation of national historical consciousness into *minjok*/ ethnic nationalism was also crucially linked to another key phenomenon that emerged with the Protectorate that also forms an important component of the meeting of these two paradoxical threads (the anticolonial democratic horizontal-type national imaginings of exclusive historical-genealogical ethnic national identity in the encounter with uneven imperialist cosmopolitanism) in modern Korean nationalism. While diasporic or exile experiences of Koreans whether diplomats, students or laborers were significant sources and elements of Korean nationalist consciousness from the beginning, likewise structured by the uneven spatio-temporal terrain of imperial capitalist cosmopolitanism, after the imposition of the colonial Protectorate in 1905, there was a large increase in the number of Koreans going into exile to the U.S., Manchuria, China, Siberia, etc. triggering the start of the modern Korean diaspora.²⁰⁸ It was in conjunction with these expatriations that, as Schmid points out, Korean diasporic communities also experienced an elevated status in Korean consciousness both as the new measure and model of modern ‘civilization and enlightenment,’ enhanced by their physical proximity to the new “civilization,” and as the vanguard of nationalist activism with their freedom of political organization, both of

80s as a mere manifestation of anti-Americanism based on the xenophobic character of *minjokjuui* ethnic nationalism—and as little different than North Korean *jucheism*. The *minjung* movements’ anti-Americanism was a facet of their protest against the national authoritarian military dictatorship which called the American govt. to account for their hypocritical liberalism which preached freedom and democracy yet propped up two dictatorships, mass murders and human rights violations. To see the emergence of *minjung* and workers movements under the oppressive (especially to labor) military dictatorships of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan as mere xenophobic racism is ridiculous and offensive.

²⁰⁸ See for example, Lee Houchins and Chang-su Houchins, “The Korean Experience in America, 1903-1924,” in *The Pacific Historical Review* vol. 43. no. 4 (Nov. 1974), pp. 548-575; Ilsoo Kim, *New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); and Nancy Ablemann and John Lie, *Blue Dreams: Korean Americans in the Los Angeles Riots* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

which were being met with significant difficulties within Korea with the colonial imposition.²⁰⁹ For example, as editors of the Seoul paper *Taehan maeil sinbo* extolled the virtues of the Korean diaspora as “a source of inspiration for those on the peninsula,” they averred that not only did the diaspora “show that the ‘true nature of the *minjok* had not disappeared,” but also that the diaspora “offered ‘a small ray of hope for independence.’”²¹⁰ As for the nationalist editors of new diasporic newspapers such as the *Sinhan minbo* (*New Korea Daily*) established by a patriotic Korean association in San Francisco in 1905, they “urged Korean students to come to the United States, arguing that a stay in that country was the best way for ‘breaking old ways and constructing the new.’”²¹¹ As Schmid observes:

This ability to express nationalist sentiment, the freedom to criticize Japan, and participate in the new Western learning—in short, the entire realm of knowledge that underlay the nationalist enterprise—were precisely the reasons that the domestic press had reported so favorably on the diaspora, except that the *Sinhan minbo* used them to claim a privileged status for diasporic Koreans. The standards and expectations of the nationalist movement in every way gave the paper a special function except for one: its distance from the nation itself. This dislocation was, however, turned to the paper’s advantage. Distance itself was to be celebrated insofar as true nationalism now lay beyond the bounds of the occupied nation... With their commitment to the nation, despite being thousands of miles away, overseas Koreans served as the representatives of those inside the country.²¹²

Thus at the same time that “Koreanness” was coming to be defined horizontally as open to the participation of all Koreans regardless of “actual divisions and inequalities that prevailed in Korean society,”²¹³ as well as exclusively encompassing all Koreans who share the same genealogical history of the Korean peninsula and ethnic link to Tan’gun, it also appears to have provided a foundation for the safe territorial dispersal of Korean *minjok* beyond the ancestral homeland as well as the creation of *new hierarchical relations* among Koreans in a deterritorialized geographical landscape of nationalism, whereby Korean diaspora come to fill the new model for Korean enlightenment and civilization. I believe these two threads of *minjok*/ethnic nationalism and deterritorialized diasporic nationalism both highlights and encapsulates the simultaneously horizontal and hierarchical constitution of modern Korean nationalism developing out of and alongside the logic of uneven capitalist development.

²⁰⁹ Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires: 1895-1919*, p. 247.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 249.

²¹³ *Em*, p. 339.

Korean Aspirations to ‘Universal’ Civilization and Enlightenment and the Bound Seriality of the Uneven Imperialist International System (in relation to Anderson’s Universality of Unbound Seriality and Cosmopolitan Hybridity of Bound Seriality)

This brings us to the next point of divergence between Anderson’s horizontal anti-colonial territorial and linguistic nationalist imaginings and the Korean case. While Anderson draws a distinction between the good universality characteristic of the logic of unbound seriality associated with newspapers and the bad pseudo-universal “cosmopolitan hybridity” of the logic of bound seriality of the census which Anderson finds epitomized in essentializing “‘diasporic’ collective subjectivities,” the exclusivist ethnic national imagining in Sin Ch’aeho’s national historiography and the deterritorialized national identity of Korean diasporic nationalism do not fit neatly into either side of this distinction. They both occupy an oblique relation to Anderson’s versions in that in the Korean case they are characterized by the *defensive* and *revolutionary* character of its anticolonial nationalist production stemming from the uneven terrain of global imperial capitalism and the contradictions and failures of universal aspirations to modern ‘civilization and enlightenment.’ National imagining of horizontal anti-colonial nationalism according to Anderson is principally the political participation in an open-to-the-world, universal paradigm organized through the universalist logic of unbound seriality stemming from the model of print-capitalism and differentiated from the essentialist ethnic identities associated with the logic of bound seriality stemming from technologies of governmentality.

In *The Spectre of Comparisons*, as Anderson develops the concept of ‘seriality’ into the basis of a new spatial grammar of representation for nationalism for both official *and* popular forms of nationalism, he delineates the logic of seriality into “bound” and “unbound” forms—corresponding to official and popular forms, respectively. While the two facets of classification and serialization were conjoined in Anderson’s discussion of the three colonial institutions of official nationalism (the map, census and the museum) in *Imagined Communities*—both of which can be seen in the map²¹⁴—here the *census* becomes the representative case of the bounded, totalizing, stratified, and quantifiable serial-classification of colonial governance, and the *newspaper* is introduced as the type-case of a universalist “unbound and unenumerated” form of serialization as well as the model for the generalized precondition for imagining the nation.²¹⁵ For Anderson, while the nation and nationalism always implies a form of comparison because its identity is always constituted from a world of plurals, through generative difference, this

²¹⁴ Having risen with the colonial state to be inherited in the official nationalism of postcolonial states, Anderson argues that the census, map, and museum are characterized by “systematic quantification,” “totalizing classification,” and “infinite quotidian replicability” (Anderson, *IC*, p. 168, 173, 183). Interwoven in a tapestry-like structure, these colonial institutions assumed two main principles: “a *totalizing classificatory grid*, which could be applied with endless flexibility to anything under the state’s real or contemplated control: peoples, regions, religions, languages, products, monuments, and so forth,” and “*serialization*: the assumption that the world was made up of replicable plurals” (184). While classification affixed identities and allotted them to particular spatial coordinates making everything “bounded, determinate and therefore—in principle—countable,” serialization turned everything particular into a “provisional representative of a series” (184). In the example of the European Mercatorian map introduced to the colonies, Anderson shows us how, on the one hand, it maps the whole world though a uniform classificatory system of longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates, and on the other, it visualizes heterogeneous spatial entities as a series of formal equivalents, de-contextualizing Cairo and Mecca from a “sacred Muslim geography,” and classifying and serializing Cairo along with Paris and Manila in a *universal geography of mathematics* (170). A key characteristic of the serialization embodied in the social technology of the map, Anderson states, is “its emptiness, contextlessness, visual memorableness, and infinite reproducibility” (185).

²¹⁵ Anderson, *SC*, p. 33.

comparative-based nationalism can take two different forms: an “open-to-the-world plurals” kind of “universality” characterized by action—exemplified by nationalists, anarchists, bureaucrats, and workers—and a closed group, boundary drawing “‘cosmopolitan’ hybridity” characterized by classification, enumeration and totalization.²¹⁶ It is, for example the seriality that makes the United Nations a normal, wholly unparadoxical institution.”²¹⁷ Anderson illustrates this logic in his discussion of the novelistic depiction of the transformation of consciousness of a young woman, Is, through the logic of seriality. In a passage by the Indonesian writer, Pramoeda Ananta Toer, the “revolutionary moment” that wholly transforms the consciousness of the young character Is, is marked by her imagination of herself “serially: as “a” woman, “a” typist, “a” free individual, “a” new human being:”²¹⁸

Furthermore, it is clear that she sees these series as of a kind, so that being a woman, a typist, and a new human being fulfill rather than counteract her commitment to the struggle for her country’s freedom... Tomorrow, she may become “a” revolutionary, “a” prisoner, “a” youth, “a” spy, indeed “a” nationalist in that boundless but grounded, universal series that included, in 1946 Clement Attlee and Jawaharlal Nehru, but only and always on a provisional basis. And if Is understands herself now as part of the world-in-motion, so to speak summoned by quotidian universals to battle, we too read her under the same signs. *We may not share her young womanhood, her typing skills, her native language, her religion, or her culture, but she speaks to us not ethnographically, as an informant, but as a member of a series that are open to us if we wish to act on them.*²¹⁹

As illustrated in the passage above, what is rather distinctive and significant about Anderson’s discussion of unbound seriality is that Anderson ascribes an essential positivity/creativity and “revolutionary” force to the process of decontextualization/abstraction that is the core operation of the logic of seriality—not unlike the creative force Marx attributes to the abstracting processes of capital to bring about the conditions for proletarian solidarity and political organization.²²⁰ Much like the abstraction entailed in homogenous empty time, which provides the structural condition for a new modern mode of belonging and community/collectivity, brought upon by disruptive socio-political and economic forces of change, the more spatialistic logic of seriality likewise opens up new modes of imagining and participating in the modern world (generating series of ‘quotidian universals’) within a deparicularized and desacralized abstracted and interconnected new geosocial and geopolitical framework—not unlike the creative aspect of colonial capitalism to generate the conditions for anticolonial national consciousness/imagining in his genealogy of nationalism also linked to the logic of print-capitalism that I discussed earlier.

In contradistinction to the “open-to-the-world plurals” kind of “universality” characterized by action, Anderson states that the logic of bound seriality takes the form of a

²¹⁶ Anderson, *SC*, p. 29.

²¹⁷ Anderson, *SC*, p. 29. I think Anderson and I have very different readings of the United Nations because I see it as an exceptional example of bound seriality and not unbound seriality especially when considering the proportional politics of select decision making bodies of the UN to the uneven world system.

²¹⁸ Anderson, *SC*, 41.

²¹⁹ Anderson, *SC*, 41-42. Italics mine. But Kim Kyusik acted on this and was told that the universal right to national self-determination did not apply to Asian colonies.

²²⁰ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto (1888)* (NY: Penguin Books, 2002 edition).

closed group, boundary drawing “‘cosmopolitan’ hybridity” characterized by classification, enumeration and totalization and that “these [unbound] series, in their plasticity and universality, can never appear in a census, and not merely because they cannot be enumerated and totaled.”²²¹ While Anderson considers the open pluralizing form of unbound seriality of popular nationalism a “boundless, but grounded, universal series” with transformative effects on our consciousness and located in the sphere of human action, the rigid, totalizing grammar of bound seriality—which operates more in the manner of “entitlement” within “overlapping, stratified, majoritarian/minoritarian matrices”—tends toward a specious or false form of universalism such as the “identitarian conception of ethnicity...[that] lacks any universal grounding,” with dangerous effects, irresponsible politics, and essentializing identities characteristic of what Anderson calls “‘cosmopolitan’ hybridity.”²²² For Anderson the type-case ‘cosmopolitan’ hybridity’ is “‘diasporic’ collective subjectivities” for which the world imaginary resembles “an ersatz historical atlas...[which] far from depicting historical subjectivities, actually represents a certain contemporary vision of cosmopolitanism based on a quasi-planetary dispersion of bounded identities.”²²³ Although categorization and abstraction is shared by both types of seriality, the basic operations of unbound seriality (abstraction via standardization and universalization) and that of bound seriality (abstraction via classification, enumeration, totalization, and stratification) are ascribed distinct forms of “politicization and political practice” as well as distinct technologies of the newspaper and the census.²²⁴ Moreover, in association with their sphere of operation, bound seriality is confined to state institutions and apparatuses of imperial/colonial governance like the census, while unbound seriality exemplified by the newspaper, which though similarly located both within the nation and at the interstice of different national communities constituting a larger interconnected world, is attributed to the popular domain.²²⁵

While Anderson’s theory of seriality provides an important comparative model for understanding national formations in a world that is constantly being shaped and reshaped by mass migrations aided by innovations in communications and long distance transportation that shifts the focus away from Europe as the “ground of comparison” for these “general processes of change” “rooted in industrial material civilization,” as Pheng Cheah points out, the “translatability of the comparative method, however, does not mean that the substantive theoretical conclusions that Anderson himself arrives at are universally translatable and uncontestable,” which appears “especially true with regard to his claims about diasporic identity politics and long-distance ethno-nationalism.”²²⁶ In this regard, I believe Partha Chatterjee, Harry Harootunian and Lydia Liu’s rejoinders to Anderson, speaking from historical studies of various Asian locations and times, postcolonial India, 20th century Japan, and late 19th century China are most relevant to the differences presented by the characteristics and structuring conditions of early ethnic and diasporic nationalism in the Korean case. As Chatterjee argues, Anderson’s privileging of “‘unbound serialities’ while rejecting ‘bound’ ones is in fact, to imagine

²²¹ Anderson, *SC*, 29, 41.

²²² Anderson, *SC*, p. 42, 45.

²²³ Anderson, *SC*, p. 45. It also bears a strong resemblance to what Anderson called the ‘map as logo’ in his discussion of the colonial map in *Imagined Communities*, where imperial states took to the practice of “coloring their colonies on maps with an imperial dye (Anderson, *IC*, p. 175).

²²⁴ Anderson, *SC*, p. 40.

²²⁵ Also, even within this new horizontal modern construct, the nations may be formally level, but uneven in terms of economic and military power relations.

²²⁶ Pheng Cheah, *Grounds of Comparison*, *Diacritics* vol. 29, no 4 (*Grounds of Comparison: Around the Work of Benedict Anderson*) (Winter 1999), p. 15.

nationalism without governmentality.”²²⁷ However, continuing his longstanding challenge to Anderson’s theory of nationalism, Chatterjee posits that the “universalist ideal” behind Anderson’s comparative vision grounded on his utopian perspective of the 19th century classical nationalist project and which informs his endorsement of unbound serialities is not available to the non-western scholar. As Chatterjee writes:

The universalist ideal that belongs to Anderson as part of the same inheritance that allows him to say “my Europe,” can continue *to encompass* its others as it moves from older national rigidities to newer cosmopolitan lifestyles. For those who cannot say “my Europe,” the choice seems to be to allow oneself *to be encompassed* within global cosmopolitan hybridities or to relapse into hateful ethnic particularities. For Anderson, and others like him, upholding the universalism of classical nationalism is still an ethically legitimate privilege. For those who now live in the postcolonial nations founded by the Bandung generation, charting a course that steers away from both global cosmopolitanism and ethnic chauvinism means necessarily to dirty one’s hands in the complicated business of the politics of governmentality. The asymmetries produced and legitimated by the universalisms of classical nationalism have not left room for any ethically neat choice. Even the patriotic absurdities of diasporic communities, which Anderson so dislikes, will seem, by this reckoning, less the examples of perverse nationalism and more those of a failed cosmopolitanism.²²⁸

As Chatterjee points to the salience of governmentality for nationalisms situated in the non-West and the link between diasporic patriotism and the inaccessibility or failure of cosmopolitanism, Harry Harootunian argues toward to significance of “the past and premodern culture of reference, which appear as ghosts, that have not yet died but have become repressed excess left behind, ready to return from this place outside of time to haunt and disturb the historical present.”²²⁹ Lastly, Lydia Liu, looking back at the patriotic longing of a diasporic Chinese official in Malaysia for the Qing emperor, argues that long-distance nationalism in early China must be seen through what she calls the “sovereignty complex of the colonized” and points to the significance of the desire for- and the traumatic experience of the loss of sovereignty behind the desire for independence in the imagining of both official and popular nationalisms.²³⁰ As Liu writes:

The roots of that desire [for sovereignty] are deeply historical and in some cases, traumatic because the loss of sovereignty (understood in the legal, historical sense) and yearning for its recovery are capable of producing its own repertoire of fixations. What it means for colonial and postcolonial subjects is that one cannot possibly live in a mythical state of ambiguity or

²²⁷ Partha Chatterjee, “Anderson’s Utopia,” *Diacritics* vol. 29, no 4 (*Grounds of Comparison: Around the Work of Benedict Anderson*) (Winter 1999), p. 132.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

²²⁹ H.D. Harootunian, “Ghostly Comparisons: Anderson’s Telescope,” *Diacritics* vol. 29, no 4 (*Grounds of Comparison: Around the Work of Benedict Anderson*) (Winter 1999), p. 148-9.

²³⁰ Lydia Liu, “The Desire for the Sovereign and the Logic of Reciprocity in Family of Nations,” *Diacritics* vol. 29, no 4., (*Grounds of Comparison: Around the Work of Benedict Anderson*) (Winter 1999), p. 154.

hybridity, except perhaps by denying or otherwise coping with that desire. The cosmopolitan sublimation of that desire for the sovereign is anything but freedom from the nation.²³¹

The significance of governmentality, premodern culture and the desire and loss of sovereignty that these scholars point to were all in various ways also salient to the formation of a modern ethnic and diasporic nationalism in the late 19th century and early twentieth century context of Korea—arising at the interstice of nation and the world through mass migrations and new innovations in communications and long-distance transport technologies.

Thus to return to Sin Ch'aeho's anticolonial ethnic nationalism and the formation of Korean diasporic nationalism in early modern Korea, I argue that these national imaginings of a horizontal if deterritorialized ethnic nation do appear rooted in and fostered by a single yet intensely hierarchical geography produced of a quantitative, totalizing and discriminatory logic of bound seriality, but this stems not from the logic of the colonial census but from the logic of the uneven hierarchical quasi-legalistic pseudo-universal framework of the Western imperialist international capitalist system and the failure of the desire and Korean aspirations to participate in this 'universal' modern civilizational paradigm stemming from imperial capitalist dispossession and sovereign infringements whereby something like primitive accumulation²³² also appears to operate on the level of nation-states in the form of unequal semi-imperialist treaties, territorial and economic concessions, imperial capitalism and imperial racism, which functions like the destruction of the commons on an international level. The politics of the bound seriality of the uneven nation-state hierarchy of the imperial system is likewise "a rigid, totalizing grammar" as Anderson ascribed to the technology/logic of the census, that is quantifying, classifying, and ranking, and also operates "in the manner of imperial "entitlement" within hierarchical "overlapping, stratified, majoritarian/ minoritarian matrices."²³³ It may also "tend toward a specious or false form of universalism" such as the "identitarian conception of ethnicity...[that] lacks any universal grounding," with potentially dangerous effects and irresponsible politics and essentializing identities characteristic of what Anderson calls "'cosmopolitan' hybridity" such as that which Hahm sees in Sin's anti-imperial ethnic nationalism.²³⁴

But at the same time, as Em points to the democratic revolutionary anti-colonial horizontal politics of Sin's ethnic nationalist imagining, anticolonial Korean ethnic and diasporic nationalism also presents significant differences to the schema of "politicization and political practice" that Anderson maps onto the difference between unbound (universality) and bound (cosmopolitan hybridity) seriality. Korean anticolonial democratic ethnic and diasporic nationalism thus presents us with an ambiguous and ill-fitting position in Anderson's schema in that while it corresponds to the bound seriality of governmental technologies of official

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² See Marx, *Capital: Volume 1*, last section. Primitive accumulation occupies a strange place in Marx's theory of capitalism, reflected by its location at the end of Capital Volume 1 which presents an alternative historical origin of capitalism—in which legalistic governmental measures to throw people off common land is part of the process of creating private property and the production of wage labor for capitalism. This governmental/legalistic origin presents a tension with the economic processes of abstraction and alienation which Marx develops throughout Capital as the economic science/system of capitalism. Moreover, Rosa Luxemburg has argued in *The Accumulation of Capital* that primitive accumulation is part of the logic of imperialism.

²³³ Anderson, *SC*, p. 42, 45.

²³⁴ Ibid.

nationalism, it emerges from both the official *and* popular domain also resembling vernacular popular ethno-linguistic nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism in a *defensive* context and reacting not to popular nationalisms but the aggressive colonial overtures of official imperial nationalism and the imperial nationalist capitalism of the uneven global imperialist system.²³⁵ Here the ground and grammar for political action was laid not by the logic of unbound seriality of print-capitalism or a creative colonial capitalism but the anti-imperial statist and popular forms of statecraft/governmentality (as seen in the self-strengthening programs of the state as well as the establishment of popular vernacular nationalist newspapers by native intelligentsia in order to indoctrinate Koreans into modern nationals), which was structured by and in response to the bound seriality of the uneven imperialist international nation-state system, including both imperial capitalism and pseudo-legalistic world governmentality. As evident in Korean enlightenment reformers' attempts to participate in this new 'universal' paradigm of modern civilization that was in actuality a distinctly uneven and hierarchical imperialist system, the bound seriality of the international world order led to Korea's self-definition and positioning as both a formally interchangeable part of a global series of nation-states while at the same time possessing a relative, quantitative, and temporal difference from this series—a difference that mapped spatial difference as temporal value.²³⁶ Or in other words, modern 'horizontal empty time' was for Korean modernizers always marked by the spatialized hierarchy of the imperialist system of nation-states (most obviously of the metropole/colony but also as Yu imagined metropole/semi-colony/colony). And thus the temporal-spatial discrepancy of an undeveloped Korea and the failure of Korean cosmopolitan universalist aspirations to modern 'civilization' resulted in and also followed from the likewise bound seriality of Korean anticolonial democratic ethnic nationalism, which eventually defined itself as a formally interchangeable part of a global series of nation-states while at the same time possessing an essential or exclusive (historico-ethnic) difference from this series—and with extraterritorial extensions.

Capitalism, Governmentality and Uneven Development

The similarity and difference between Anderson's theory of seriality and genealogy of colonial nationalisms and the formation of nationalism in the Korean case relies on two important distinctions which makes Anderson's models both indispensable but also limited in examining Korean nationalism. Anderson is able to separate out the two forms of seriality/universality because he is working under the assumption that nationalism follows modernization/capitalism as protection against the entropy of capitalism or modernity—but in the Korean case nationalist consciousness and nationalism was coincident with the desire for modernity and the attempt to instigate capitalism (or create social bases for capitalism to take hold). While Anderson points to the modularity of nationalism by the time of 20th century anti-

²³⁵ It is not as simple as just adding together anti-imperialist nationalism and official nationalism as Anderson has suggested in reference to the Chinese nationalism of Sun Yat Sen, for anti-imperialist nationalism in East Asia entails various factors and complex social, political and economic processes and thus important political implications. See Benedict Anderson, "Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism: Is there a difference that matters," *New Left Review* 9 (May June 2001), p. 37.

²³⁶ See Johannes Fabian's *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) where he argues that secular time was made meaningful as evolutionary time in evolutionary civilizational paradigms of 19th century social science whose temporalizing framework was fundamental to disciplines like anthropology and not only for social Darwinian theories—and was related to the inheritance of 18th century Enlightenment universal history writing which understood 'universal' as general applicability (of Western historical frameworks and content) and not as a histories with a real universal global reach.

colonial nationalism, his distinction between bound and unbound seriality and his attribution of anti-colonial nationalism within the unbound good universal type relies on the assumption that print-capitalism precedes nationalist consciousness in the colonies as a structuring condition for colonial capitalism. Perhaps or in part because Anderson is working under the assumption that nationalism and national consciousness is a colonial creation, he never addresses the discrepancy between the level of development of industrial capitalist imperialist powers and unindustrialized undeveloped agrarian nations or colonies, or the uneven mechanics of imperialist dispossession and transgressions of sovereignty, which appears to (somewhat) distinguish the East Asian cases from its Southeast Asian neighbors.²³⁷ In addition, this model precludes the ability to consider premodern historical constructs such as the state and the potential significance the state and governmental technologies can have as both anti-imperial statecraft and as structuring conditions for popular revolutionary democratic consciousness—especially in societies characterized by the absence of capitalist structures.²³⁸ What is not addressed is how these technologies carrying within them the seeds of official nationalism and capitalism—were combined with the exigencies of undevelopment or economic backwardness as well as indigenous structures and legacies where the need to industrialize composed a common dilemma for postcolonial nations as well as some anticolonial nationalist movements—and which could also alter the meaning and function of these colonial technologies (such as the map, census, and museum, but also newspapers and railroads) once again in the process of these nation-building movements.²³⁹ While the general frame and driving logic of Anderson’s anti-colonial nationalism is global capitalist industrialization—in Anderson’s theory and genealogy of nationalism, capitalism operates rather like the invisible hand (of print-capitalism) lurking behind official nationalist policies of imperialism to provide the basis for imperialism’s unintended consequences of creating the political conditions as well as the material structures (such as a unified territory and language) for nationalist consciousness. Much like the way that primitive accumulation occupies an uncomfortable place in Marx’s *Capital* and is largely eclipsed by Marx’s economic theory of capitalism, uneven capitalist development and imperial dispossession is also largely eclipsed by the logic of print- and colonial capitalism in Anderson’s theory and genealogy of anticolonial nationalism, whereby the workings of capitalism are premised but also naturalized and universally determined.

Actually Existing Print Capitalism: Anticolonial National Governmentality, Hierarchical Standardizations, and Diasporic Nationalism

Such differences are underscored by the difference between actually existing print-capitalism in the early modern Korean context and the model of print-capitalism in Anderson’s theory of nationalism in relation to their different structuring conditions and functions and the differentiated temporalities and spatial understandings to which they give rise. As we have seen from the first Korean newspaper *Hansŏng Sinbo* established in the 1880s as an organ of the government alongside the postal administration, etc., by early Enlightenment or Progressive

²³⁷ But I also think that imperial dispossession and sovereign transgressions were likely also an issue in nationalisms of Southeast Asian countries.

²³⁸ Even in his revised discussion of colonial governmentality in which the census, map, and museum provide alternative more direct constructs for anti-colonial or postcolonial nationalism, and in which we see the production of uneven majoritarian/ minoritarian constructs, these technologies likewise become technologies for the transplantation of official nationalist technologies in postcolonial official nationalisms.

²³⁹ See for example Pheng Cheah’s reading of Minke in *Spectral Nationality* where the revolutionary moment is mediated through the awareness of national backwardness and thus leads to his revolutionary nationalist activism.

party members-cum-scholar-bureaucrats of the Chosŏn dynasty returning from their diplomatic and study missions from abroad as well as the founding and operation of the first vernacular popular presses such as *Independence News* and *Hwangsŏng sinmun* (likewise spearheaded by returning exiles from America and Japan) in the late 1890s, in the Korean context, these technologies began their journeys as instruments of both state and popular governmentality rather than driven by economic processes of print-capitalism.²⁴⁰ As historians of early modern Korea have all pointed out, rather than primarily circulating as commodities, print-capitalism co-evolved with and was spurred by and harnessed to nationalist agitation in resistance to imperial encroachments on Korean political sovereignty. Resonating with Leo Ou-Fan Lee's observation that newspapers in early modern China were closely linked to the creation of a public sphere, Andre Schmid posits that along with other new print technologies such as books and textbooks, newspapers circulating in the decade prior to- and during the first decade of colonial rule, were primarily a means for debate, propagation, and dissemination of knowledge about the nation functioning as "the most powerful public medium of the time."²⁴¹ Much like the way that Anderson described the technologies of the census, map and museum to have been fundamentally altered in their travel from Europe to the colonies—"three institutions of power which, although invented before the mid-nineteenth century, changed their form and function as the colonized zones entered the age of mechanical reproduction...[and] profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion," the institution of the newspaper also took on novel functions and meanings in the context of their appearance in precolonial early modern Korea as both tools and symbols of the transformation of Korea into a modern nation. But unlike Anderson's colonial technologies, here the newspapers were technologies of anti-imperial popular and statist governmentality driven by the anguish of industrial backwardness and the absence of capitalism or modernity, as well as the threat of imperialism. The establishment of vernacular newspapers by nationalists in the late 1890s, arising out of political patriotic associations was as much an attempt to spur print-capitalist industries as well as the spirit of capitalism among the Confucianized Korean populace as it was to promote/institute a new national vernacular script and create a national reading public, supported by the founding of other modern institutions such as new western style schools.

Second, as the appropriation of newspapers as an instrument of national enlightenment and the desire to instigate capitalist modernization in Korea was conditioned by uneven imperial capitalism, this uneven geography was then reflected in the hierarchical and vertical adoption and westernized standardization of the newspaper. The incorporation of full English pages in the nation's first vernacular papers as well as the predominance of the West in the news content as embodiments of enlightened society reflected this cosmopolitan cultural hierarchy in the format as well as the message of the nationalist press in which the structure of temporality of homogenous empty time was always accompanied by and overshadowed by the temporality of heterogeneous and discrepant time-space (western modern vs. Korean tradition/backward) through a grammar of bound seriality, shaped by the desire and need for modernization as part of

²⁴⁰ As Andre Schmid notes in his in-depth study of these presses that most of these presses were all operating in the red and had to be originally financed and consistently bailed out from going under by the Korean King.

²⁴¹ Schmid, p. 3. Andre Schmid's wonderful book *Korea Between Empires* presents the most detailed engagement with popular Korean vernacular newspapers from the period 1895-1919; See also Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern*, p. 46.

the effort to maintain sovereignty among Korean nationalists.²⁴² Thus quite unlike the Anderson's "quotidian universals," more characteristic of this modernizing activist press were the juxtaposition of universal standards (i.e. Western enlightened woman suffragette) with Korean substandard counterparts whose deviation from the standard (i.e. uneducated backward Korean woman) was utilized to prod Koreans to adopting new modern ideas, habits and institutions in order to safeguard national sovereignty. While the newspapers did possess a natural universality taking the world as its domain, as Anderson has argued, in the Korean press, this world as reflected on the newspaper page as well as by the newspaper itself was intensely hierarchical and unidirectional, reinforced not only by the Western standardization of vocabulary but also the adoption of western words, concepts, texts (in translation) and full English language pages but also the predominance of a new referent for 'civilization' that ordered the newspaper as well as being embodied by the very new modern form/technology of the newspaper itself.

Lastly, the Korean presses and reading public was also almost from its beginning diasporic. As the Korean newspaper stretched out from Seoul to map a singular world, it was met with diasporic versions emanating out from San Francisco, Shanghai, and Tokyo. Within a decade of the establishment of the first vernacular presses in Korea, diasporic Korean presses appeared among new communities of intellectuals, activists, students and laborers etc. closely linked with the establishment of nationalist associations abroad as well as nationalist associations and presses in Korea. The San Francisco *SinHan minbo* (New Korea Daily) was founded in 1905 as an organ of the United Korean Association, a Korean patriotic organization started by nationalist leader An Ch'angho and maintained close links with "the underground patriotic association on the peninsula, the Sinminhoe (New People's Association), and after the Sinminhoe's dissolution by colonial authorities in 1911, the paper remained one of the few nationalist voices, continuing to publish until the end of WWII."²⁴³ Like the establishment of the first vernacular paper, *Independence News*, that grew out of the nationalist association the *Independence Club* as an organ of their political activities, diasporic papers likewise originated as extensions of patriotic organizations now dispersed across various exile communities that came into being after the loss of sovereignty in 1905. Moreover, benefiting from the freedom of the press deprived of their peninsular counterparts, the diasporic presses came to function along with the journalists and activists who ran the paper as the vanguard of national activism in the period after Korea's colonization, taking on the mantle of the new "organs of...Korean independence" in the eyes of these diasporic newsmen/activists as well as those of the peninsula.²⁴⁴

Discrepant Migrations: Ethnic-Diasporic/Long-Distance Nationalism and Classical 19th Century Nationalism

Anderson pointed out in his earlier genealogy of nationalisms in *Imagined Communities* that part of the distinguishing elements structuring anti-colonial nationalism was both the new composition of travel in which "the journeys were no longer made by a mere handful of travellers, but rather by huge variegated crowds" and the "enormous increase in physical

²⁴² See Schmid, Chapter One, for numerous examples of editorials, which juxtapose superior Western and inferior Korean counterparts in a didactic fashion.

²⁴³ Schmid, p. 248.

²⁴⁴ Schmid, p. 247.

mobility made possible by the astonishing achievements of industrial capitalism—railways and steamships in the last century, motor transport and aviation in this.”²⁴⁵ However, while both of these elements differentiated 20th century colonial nationalist journeys from earlier creole pilgrimages, making “the interminable journeys of the old Americas...things of the past,”²⁴⁶ this distinction and these new transport technologies do not really come into play with any noticeable effect in his discussion of 20th century colonial educational journeys and anticolonial national consciousness in his genealogy of nationalisms. Rather, these new technologies come to the fore in his essay on “long-distance nationalism” in the *Spectre of Comparisons*, which turns the focus from the colonies to Europe. This is also where Anderson first explicitly broaches uneven development as he elaborates the differences of 19th century industrial capitalism from earlier mercantile capitalism and elaborates on long-distance transportation as a new structuring technology that was largely eclipsed by print-communication technologies in *Imagined Communities*. But as he turns to the European metropolises broaching uneven development in relation to the advent of belated metropolitan exiles in his discussion of “long-distance nationalism” he associates these new transportation innovations with the “ethnicization of political life in the wealthy, postindustrial states” and examines both uneven development and new transport innovations under the transnational politics of economic mobility separated from the politics of anticolonial nationalism.²⁴⁷ If newspapers were the technology associated with the international migration of the 19th century classical nationalist model and desire for the congruence of territory, culture (language), and political participation, then the railroad and airplanes become for Anderson the privileged technology of mass migrations to rich metropolitan centers that structures the variant and deviant form of “long-distance nationalism” arising from “transnationalization of advanced capitalism” and the breakdown of the classical nationalist project.²⁴⁸ This is best illustrated by Anderson’s reading of the contemporary passport which he sees not as “attestations of citizenship, let alone of loyalty to a protective *Heimat* nation-state,” but “of claims to participation in labour markets. Portuguese and Bangladeshi passports, even when genuine, tell little about loyalties or habitus, but they reveal a great deal about the relative likelihood of their holders being permitted to seek jobs in Milan or Copenhagen. The segregated queues that all of us experience at airport immigration barricades mark economic status far more than any political attachment. In effect, they figure differential tariffs on human labour.”²⁴⁹

Here, situating these new industrial modes and technologies of travel within the lineage of earlier sailing ships that had conditioned the historically unprecedented large-scale and long-distance transatlantic migrations “from the later sixteenth century on”—by which “millions of at least nominally free Europeans” as well as “millions more enslaved Africans, went ‘into exile,’ as it were,” Anderson posits that in the 19th century “across the Atlantic, and subsequently all over the world a newly industrial capitalism was starting to create new and more local forms of exile.”²⁵⁰

The locomotive had begun its world-historical mission of transporting
millions of rural villagers into urban slums, a mission scarcely less epochal

²⁴⁵ Anderson, *IC*, 115.

²⁴⁶ Anderson, *IC*, 115.

²⁴⁷ Anderson, *SC*, chapter on “Long Distance Nationalism.”

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-63.

than that which the transatlantic sailing ship had performed over the preceding three centuries. Only a minority would return to end their days in those narrow cells where the rude forefathers of the hamlet lay. How the novel experience of industrial life radically transformed these people's lives and how this transformation made them, as it were, available for nationalism is splendidly described by Gellner, but his description should be read *under the sign of exile. It was beginning to become possible to see "English fields" in England—from the window of the railway carriage. Meanwhile, exile of another sort was emerging from the very wealth that industrial capitalism was producing for European states. For this wealth was making possible the spread of a centralized, standardized, steeply hierarchical system of public education...and children began to be compelled to migrate to schools.*²⁵¹

As Anderson points to how industrial railroads in European countries were both uprooting European laborers from the countryside in their mass migration to "urban slums" to man the industrial factories, while at the same time setting the new and old ruling classes off on pilgrimages to elite educational centers across Europe, he argues that these railroads were facilitating new belated and more local forms of national consciousness—making it "possible to see "English fields" in England—from the window of the railway carriage." However, unlike the transatlantic migrations of the past²⁵² which Anderson had previously attributed to the production of new *synchronic* perceptions of space "coexisting with homogenous, empty time" structured through a new socio-political spatial condition consisting of large geographical "distances between parallel groups" and the centralized, political power structure of European absolutism emanating from Europe out to the new colonial settlements to lay the grounds for the first nationalist imaginings among creole functionaries in which "territory became linked with fatality," here he attributes these new/belated metropolitan migrations to new *hierarchical* forms of socio-economic/class stratification structured through a "centralized, standardized, steeply hierarchical system of public education" made possible by the "very wealth that industrial capitalism was producing for European states."²⁵³ At the same time, Anderson introduces a new concept of 'exile,' which he identifies with the neologism of "the colonial" to denote a new type of displaced person and culture" characterized by an "unstable negativity"—and links this concept of the exile or displaced "colonial" to both forms of spatial dislocations/migrations or 'exile' on both sides of the Atlantic two centuries apart through the same workings of capitalism and the "nexus of long distance transport and print communications."²⁵⁴

Anderson illustrates this contradictory and doubling or haunted consciousness and condition of the displaced "colonial" in the nationalist imaginings of the creole exile—or the "non-English Englishwoman" Mary Rowlandson, who, while residing on the "harbours of 'New' England," is haunted by distant and imagined "English fields" of 'old' England.²⁵⁵ Situated in 1675 during the abduction of Mary Rowlandson from her Massachusetts home by "local Algonquin and Narragansett warriors," "her 'nationalizing' moment comes when, in the power of Algonquins and Narragansetts, she is torn out of the quotidian and—right in the midst of her

²⁵¹ Anderson, *SC*, 63-64. Italics mine.

²⁵² See earlier section on spatial synchronicity and creole pilgrimages.

²⁵³ Anderson, *IC*, p. 187-188; *SC*, p. 64.

²⁵⁴ Anderson, *SC*, 60.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-62.

native Massachusetts—finds herself in fearful exile. She struggles along a path that becomes English at the exact juncture where she is sure she may not lie down and die upon it. When she is finally ransomed and returns to her community of origin, her ‘nationalist’ frisson vanishes.”²⁵⁶ As Anderson goes on to explain, this figure of the displaced “colonial” provides the “real historical origins of the paradoxical condition of the “native:”

For the native is, like colonial and creole, a white-on-black negative. The nativeness of natives is always unmoored, *its real significance hybrid and oxymoronic*. It appears when Moors, heathens, Mohammedans, savages, Hindoos, and so forth are becoming obsolete, that is only when, in the proximity of real-print encounters, substantial numbers of Vietnamese read, write, and perhaps speak French but also when Czechs do the same with German and Jews with Hungarian. Nationalism’s purities (and thus also cleansings) are set to emerge from exactly this hybridity.”²⁵⁷

What set the conditions for Mary Rowlandson’s “nationalizing moment” qua ‘exile’ and brought about this “hybrid and oxymoronic” nativeness or nationalism characteristic of the displaced “colonial” into being, Anderson explains is “capitalism” (*mercantile preindustrial capitalism*):

the institutions of which enabled the transportation, from the mid-sixteenth century on, of millions of free, indentured, and enslaved bodies across thousands of miles of water. But the materialities of this transportation—ships, firearms, and navigational equipment—were guided by the mathematically inspired Mercatorian map and the vast, accumulating knowledge stored and disseminated in print. It was also through print moving back and forth that the unstable, imagined worlds of Englishness and Spanishness were created.²⁵⁸

More specifically it was “the essential nexus of long-distance transportation and print-capitalist communications” that “prepared the grounds on which, by the end of the eighteenth century, the first nationalist movements flowered.”²⁵⁹ Similarly, as “a newly *industrial capitalism*” in 19th century Europe made possible a “centralized...system of public education” by which the “state imposed...standardized vernacular” had the effect of “restratify[ing] and rationaliz[ing] the social and political hierarchy of vernaculars and dialects” in which “the new education was increasingly linked to employment possibilities and opportunities for social mobility,” the resulting self-consciousness over “linguistic practices” had the similar effect of “a kind of exile.”²⁶⁰

The more a standardized vernacular ceased to be merely the internal language of officials and became the official language of a propagandizing state, the more likely became the emergence in Old Europe of something reminiscent of the creole or native: the not-really-German German, the not-quite-Italian

²⁵⁶ Anderson, *SC*, p. 62.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

Italian...As in the Americas, a kind of unstable negativity appeared...How could a boy who learned Czech from his mother and German from his schooling unlearn a Czech that had left no contaminating traces on his German-speaking classmates? How could he not see his Czech as though in exile, through the inverted telescope of his German?²⁶¹

Thus as Anderson identifies the belated ‘exile’ of European educational migrants in 19th century Europe within this new lineage/genealogy of “unstable Englishness,” where “English fields” were coming to be seen in late 19th century old England “from the window of the railway carriage,” as it had been seen in 17th century New England by Mary Rowlandson “in fearful exile...torn out of the quotidian,” Anderson presents a new (altered) genealogy of nationalism now characterized as “unstable negativity” and a hybrid, doubling consciousness. This unstable negativity is linked to the long-distance transportation technology of the railroad and both parallels and departs from the more stable *horizontal* administrative pilgrimages of creole functionaries and the colonial educational journeys of African and Asian native intelligentsia, which presaged the future national territory (as well as the more horizontal function of European languages of state in creating the new unified national vernacular for anticolonial nationalism)—both of which were based on the horizontal unself-conscious model of print-capitalism. Here in both cases, while “nationalist movements and their...culmination in nation-states” now become equated with a “coming home from exile”—whether the exile of living under colonialism or the exile of German speaking Czechs in Europe—the classical nationalist project remains intact but serves to bring into alignment heretofore split “*cultural life* and political allegiance” representing “with its characteristically republican institutions, a new-found alignment of imagined home and imagined home-owners, and to guarantee the stabilization of that alignment through the organized deployment of its political powers and economic resources.”²⁶²

As Anderson moves on to the next stage of “*advanced capitalism*,” Anderson links new advancements in transportation and communications—autos replacing locomotives, and the advent of air travel which “was transnational from its earliest days”—to the breakdown of the “classical nation-state project” (which as we have seen with the creole and colonial pilgrimages were aligned with journeys within the national interior—producing and presaging the horizontal boundaries of the future nation-state) as “integral components of the transnationalization of *advanced capitalism* and of the steepening economic stratifications of the global economy:”²⁶³

...thanks to the airplane, the bus, the truck, and even the old locomotives, this inequality and misery is in all senses closer to privilege and wealth than ever before. Hence migration has moved not, as in earlier centuries, outwards to the peripheries in the New World or the Antipodes but inwards towards the metropolitan cores.²⁶⁴

From here, the “unraveling of the classical nineteenth century nationalist project—which aimed for the fullest alignment of habitus, culture, attachment and exclusive political participation” advances on two fronts—(1) the disentangling of residence and citizenship and its inverse in the

²⁶¹ Ibid., 64-65.

²⁶² Ibid., p. 66.

²⁶³ Ibid., p. 67.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

rise of ethnic nationalism; and (2) the emergence of “long-distance nationalism” as the “result of ethnicization of political life in the wealthy, postindustrial cores.”²⁶⁵ The politics of long-distance nationalism is “directed... towards the former Second and Third Worlds,” characterized as the funding of political movements in former homelands, often extremist, by wealthy diaspora living in economic exile in postindustrial cores, and “creates a serious politics that is at the same time radically unaccountable.”²⁶⁶ Thus Anderson brings together his new theorization of the “unstable negativity” and doubling consciousness of ‘the exile’ with the politics of bound seriality (earlier associated with the logic of the colonial census), as the ‘exile’ becomes transformed under “advanced capitalism” via technologies of long-distance transportation into the pseudo-universal figure of “‘cosmopolitan’ hybridity” and “diasporic collective subjectivity” embodying the essentialist ethnic and politically irresponsible “long-distance nationalist.”

It is hard not to notice that this contradictory and haunted “hybrid and oxymoronic” character of nationalist imagining not only diverges from the horizontal anticolonial nationalism of Anderson’s earlier genealogy emerging from the creative unintended consequences of colonial capitalism based on the model of print-capitalism,²⁶⁷ but also presents a stark contrast to the more stable, horizontal, and universalist anticolonial “revolutionary nationalizing moment” of Is in Anderson’s previous discussion of unbound seriality. Anderson’s new subjectivity of ‘exile’ arising from the political-geographical hierarchies associated with geographic displacement/exile and long distance nationalism presents a spatial grammar for the imagining of nationalism that is distinct from and in tension with the grammar of popular national imagining tied to the unbound seriality model of newspapers. Is’s revolutionary nationalizing moment in Pramoeda Ananta Toer’s novel presented the epitome of the universal logic of unbound seriality and the workings of the ‘quotidian universal.’

As Anderson argued that the newspaper provides two additional preconditions for national imagining in addition to homogenous empty time, he stated that it both encompassed “*natural universality*” because newspapers “everywhere take “this world of mankind” as their domain no matter how partially they read it,” and second, this “natural universality” is “reinforced—everywhere—by an unself-conscious *standardization of vocabulary* which radically overrides any formal division of the newspaper between local and foreign news” by the homogenized manner of reporting despite the differences of culture, people, and languages of its referents.²⁶⁸ Similar to the universalist logic of the revolutionary moment of Is, Anderson calls a particular context-specific term that has been turned into a term of general applicability—through a shift from a vertically imagined cosmology to a horizontally imagined world geography—across multiple contexts through a comparative perspective an instance of the “quotidian universals” which are “seeped through and across all print-languages.”²⁶⁹ Like series of this kind, “quotidian universals” were thus imagined as comparable, formally equivalent units of a “parallel series...stretching out across, and seamlessly mapping, a singular world.”²⁷⁰ “Quotidian universals” could thus be defined as similar though not identical, formally equivalent qua interchangeable units (of comparison) operating under a single categorical series through the interlinked processes of cross cultural comparison, decontextualization, abstraction and

²⁶⁵ Anderson, *SC*, p. 74.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

²⁶⁷ As outlined in Anderson, *IC*, chapter on “The Last Wave.”

²⁶⁸ Anderson, *SC*, p. 33.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

translation. The category functions as the rule-giving standard of measure by which a set of similar terms from diverse contexts (different particulars) is brought into a relationship of equivalence.²⁷¹ This new grammar of representation, stemming from the logic of seriality, moves away from context specific, essentialist, and “iconographic” logics of representation to a more open, interchangeable and intersecting representation of universal (social) types, whose identity is discernable by its relation to similar and different types assumed under the same category as well as other related types.²⁷²

If Mary Rowlandson is a figure of ‘exile’ national consciousness and imagining that arises from and is linked to being “torn out of the quotidian,” then Is is a figure of print-capitalist national imagining that follows from being at home in the world or natural participation in the “quotidian.” Anderson also attributes this disjunctive ‘exile’ national consciousness to European metropolitan exiles such as the German speaking Czechs and suggests that this was also at play in anticolonial nationalisms of Africa and Asia when he says: “Nothing, therefore, is less surprising than that the nationalist movements which transformed the map of Europe by 1919 were so often led by young bilinguals, a pattern to be followed after 1919 in Asia and Africa.”²⁷³ However as Anderson relates this ‘exile’ nationalist consciousness with the pre-conditions for creole nationalism and the new nationalism of European exiles and the pseudo-universal ethnic long-distance migrants via the “nexus of long-distance transport and print-capitalist communications,” what appears strangely missing in between is the migration/ nationalizing journeys of 20th century colonial educational pilgrims in Asia and Africa in which Anderson claimed “enormous increase in physical mobility made possible by the astonishing achievements of industrial capitalism—railways and steamships in the last century, motor transport and aviation in this,” was making “the interminable journeys of the old Americas...things of the past.”²⁷⁴ As Anderson stated in relation to colonial educational pilgrimages in his genealogy of 20th century anticolonial nationalism: “Official nationalism...led in turn to what, for convenience, one can call ‘Russification’ in the extra-European colonies...Combined, these forces generated “Russifying” school-systems intended in part to produce the required subordinate cadres for state and corporate bureaucracies. These *school-systems, centralized and standardized*, created quite new pilgrimages which typically had their Romes in the various colonial capitals, for the nations hidden at the core of empire would permit no more inward ascension...The interlock between particular educational and administrative pilgrimages provided the territorial base for the new ‘imagined communities’ in which natives could come to

²⁷¹ Although I think Anderson’s idea of seriality via quotidian universals, and comparative consciousness is very helpful to think about Korean modernization and nationalism—as well as South Korean airports in the postwar period—but I disagree with this idea of the transparency and equal translatability (that “languages are transparent to each other) that seems to underlie Anderson’s model. I think the airports are more aligned with Lydia Liu’s discussion of the power-laden process of translations between dominant and dominated languages based on a Saussurean structuralist and Derridean poststructuralist analysis. The airport, like the railroads and unlike the (Western) newspaper, bears more resemblance to bound seriality—which likewise underlies the formation of early anticolonial Korean ethnic and diasporic nationalism. The idea that everyone’s experience of such homogenizations would be simply liberating without all the problems brought about by the differentiated values produced of the actual universalism of uneven globalization and dominance of eurocentrism is problematic. Lydia Liu’s theory of nonequivalence between linguistic values across languages could be seen as a good critique against such a formulation.

²⁷² Ibid., pp. 34-35.

²⁷³ Ibid., 64-65.

²⁷⁴ Anderson, *IC*, 115.

see themselves as ‘nationals’.”²⁷⁵ Thus as Anderson relates the unstable “hybrid” identities of belated European “exiles” to the structuring conditions of a “centralized, standardized, steeply hierarchical system of public education” associated with European bourgeois educational *journeys* and ascribes them to the “very wealth that industrial capitalism was producing for European states,” such centralized and hierarchical forms of the “propagandizing state” was also characteristic of Anderson’s narrative of colonial nationalist educational *journeys* of the native intelligentsia of Asia and Africa.²⁷⁶ If the European pilgrimages “restratifi[ed] and rationaliz[ed] the social and political hierarchy of vernaculars and dialects” such as the standardization of “socially valorized” “King’s English” among European elites, then the educational pilgrimages in the colonies had the related effect of universalizing the “European language of state” as the official vernacular among colonial native intelligentsia.²⁷⁷ What historically and formally linked these two journeys were of course global industrial capitalism—a significant facet of which was the new global imperialism it enabled in Asia and Africa—and the journeys via new transportation technology of *railroads* albeit inserted into different socio-political geographies (like two homophones). For wasn’t it was the same railroads that uprooted European working classes from the countryside in their mass migration to “urban slums” to man the industrial factories as well as setting new and old ruling classes off on pilgrimages to elite educational institutions across Europe—which was also facilitating similarly *local* forms of exile in the colonies—and uprooting indigenous colonial functionaries from likewise rural native landscapes across colonized Asia and Africa and which in this case was also *culturally* displacing them from local and historical languages, cultures, as well as social and political hierarchies embedded in these landscapes? Thus from where does Is’s *non-*‘cosmopolitan hybrid’ quotidian universalism arise?²⁷⁸

As I have tried to show in this chapter, the uneven 19th century global imperial industrial capitalist system in which Anderson locates the new metropolitan exiles and directional migrations to the economically superior metropolitan cores was the very context in which modern Korean nationalism was inevitably formed—arising from its late entry into the capitalist world system and the particular historical conditions that characterized this hostile and traumatic encounter. In Korea, it was also this imperial industrial capitalist system and the new industrial railroads that uprooted Europeans which was also facilitating Korean exiles at the turn of the twentieth century alongside steamships—uprooting Korean nationalists, intellectuals, students, laborers, and political refugees from likewise rural native landscapes across Korea to world metropolitan centers—as well as inscribe upon the physical and cultural landscape of Korea new social and political ideas but also hierarchies of the uneven modern world system of nation states. These physical journeys were both experienced through and likewise reflected various cultural, social, and political displacements within Korea at this time.

In so far as civilization and modernity which Korea desperately sought in order to participate in this system as an equal sovereign member lay beyond Korea’s territorial reach in the far away metropolises of the West and modernizing Japan, extraterritoriality/transnationalism

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 140.

²⁷⁶ Anderson, SC, p. 64, 65.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 64.

²⁷⁸ As I have been trying to show—Anderson’s genealogy of nationalism read through his nationalizing journeys from the creole to the colonial cases can all be seen to harbor, even if suppressed, the spectre of a hybrid, doubling, long-distance nationalism in part b/c these are articulated with colonial hierarchical inscriptions upon the social-space of colonized territories.

and the new mode of journeying characterized by the “migration inward toward the metropolitan cores” facilitated by railroads and steamships formed an essential activist element of modern Korean nationalism from the beginning—whether in cosmopolitan aspirations and adoptions and imitations of foreign modern ideas, technologies, and religions or the international journeys of Korean government officials, intelligentsia, students or laborers who brought these ideas back to the country and utilized them in their modernizing national reform movements. Economic mobility was certainly an important aspect of these journeys as “modernity and mobility” were interlinked for Koreans on various economic, political, and social levels—whether individual, family, or national.²⁷⁹ But in contrast to Anderson’s long-distance nationalism, we cannot reduce these migrations to primarily or merely “the participation in labour markets,” which is inscribed in what Abelmann and Lie have described as the “historically deep and geographically wide displacement” of the Korean transnational diaspora but also embodied in the cultural imaginary of nationalizing railway journeys and modernizing migrations thematized in the first ‘new’ or ‘modern’ Korean novels of the turn of the century Korea, which I examine in Chapter Three.²⁸⁰ The difference between Anderson’s long-distance nationalism and Korea’s diasporic nationalism may also be highlighted by the fact that “the Korean diaspora in the modern era began with the loss of Korean sovereignty to the Japanese empire at the turn of the century,” when “some ten thousand laborers, political refugees, and students took steamships to American shores.”²⁸¹ For those Koreans that had left earlier, when they decided not to return after 1905 it was not because they now considered themselves a new hyphenated cosmopolitan-hybrid identity of ‘Korean-Americans’ but because many felt they did not have a country to return to and also believed that the U.S. presented more freedoms for organizing national liberation movements than colonized Korea as well as more social and economic opportunities for individual and collective development.²⁸² The deterritorialized national consciousness of such Koreans who lost their country while in transit encapsulates the general ‘exile’ consciousness of many Korean nationalists, which as Liu has remarked also birth certain “neurosis and fixations.” And as Chatterjee has suggested, it would be a travesty to see both these early modern Korean anticolonial ethnic and diasporic nationalisms as a deviant form of nationalism based on the standard of the 19th century classical nationalist model. Thus rather than a form of deviation of the classical nationalist model, I would argue that the same conditions (of uneven industrial capitalist development and imperialism, imperialist dispossessions, etc.) that Anderson identifies as signaling the breakdown of the classical 19th century national project were also the conditions that gave birth to alternative models of 20th century anti-imperial (ethnic and diasporic) nationalisms.

²⁷⁹ See Nancy Abelmann and John Lie, *Blue Dreams: Korean Americans in the Los Angeles Riots*, which examines the history of Korean emigration as a “twin quest for modernity and social mobility” in which political, economic and individual histories structured a complex transnational diasporic formation. (83-84).

²⁸⁰ Ibid. According to Abelmann and Lie, “twentieth century Korean history—colonialism, war and their legacies, including national division, military authoritarian political regimes, and class polarization—is an inextricable part of the structure and meaning of immigration” (83-4).

²⁸¹ Ilsoo Kim, *New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 17.

²⁸² Schmid shows us how newspaper editorials would even urge Koreans not to return to Korea after the 1905 protectorate.

Conclusion

John Lie has argued that “nationalism in Korea was fundamentally diasporic nationalism.”²⁸³ And as we have seen, Korea’s tumultuous encounter with the new world order in the three or so decades prior to colonialism set this diasporic formation in motion. For Lie, insofar as the “fundamental force of globalization in the last half millennium has been colonization,” whereby “globalization and nationalism evolved together,” “nationalism and diaspora did so as well.”²⁸⁴ What this goes to underscore is that “[t]here are no transhistorical essences and we are condemned to trace concrete historical developments.”²⁸⁵ Methodologically this calls on us to “to encompass the complex and expansive reality of concrete networks of people and ideas.”²⁸⁶ According to Lie the examination of diasporic nationalism is necessarily intertwined with the engagement and reevaluation of 19th century classical nationalism:

If nationalism itself is a product in part of diasporic imaginings...then we have no choice but to avoid the Hegelian temptation of seeking essences and to cast off the legacy of 19th century nationalism in which the social sciences remains so deeply steeped. We need to pierce through the reified exterior of the national frame and recover some of the fluxes of national construction and population movements.”²⁸⁷

Lie’s argument is particularly relevant to understanding the parallelism and disconnect between Anderson’s theory and genealogy of anticolonial nationalism and the ethnic diasporic formation of modern anticolonial Korean nationalism. For Anderson, the paradigmatic style of imagining nation is grounded on the entropy of capitalism produced through mass migrations and technological innovations in communication. The substance or substrate of the nation in Anderson’s general theory of nationalism, as Pheng Cheah explains, is not presented as “a stable solidity but as ‘a universal grammar,’ which in ‘our portion of homogenous empty time’” is characterized by the incessant movement and restless energy of ‘contemporary mass migrations and revolutions in communication and technology... This entropy is not easily arrestable as an empirical thing or presence because “it” is nothing other than the spectralizing processes of capital, forces of upheaval and change that destabilize what is at rest and break down what is organically whole. These forces are sometimes associated with the more general term, “modernity”... For Anderson, this entropy and its various technological by-products provide the fermentative conditions for the genesis of the nation-form and its ensuing modulations.²⁸⁸ Thus the link between “the nation-form and imagination” arises from Anderson’s concern “with the paradigmatic style of how the nation in general as a unique form of community is imagined and the material conditions that give rise to this new paradigm of imagining community.”²⁸⁹

While Anderson’s theory of national imagining posits the “nation-form as a chance product of print-capitalism”²⁹⁰ informed by a non-teleological materialism, Anderson’s

²⁸³ John Lie, “Diasporic Nationalism,” p. 360.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Cheah, “Grounds of Comparison,” p. 6

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

genealogy of anticolonial nationalism, which reproduces and trans-historicizes the unselfconscious conditions of print-capitalism in the unintended effects of industrial capitalism relies on the creative aspects or material structures of colonial capitalism and its dialectical contradictions, which bars political participation among the natives as it incorporates them into colonial capitalism as part of the colonial army of clerks and functionaries. This is not unlike Marx's contradiction of capitalism arising from a dialectical materialism wherein the emiseration of workers and the alienation of their labor by the forces and technologies of capital also strips them of their particular characteristics at the same time that it compels them to "face with sober senses [their] real conditions of life relations and [their] relations with [their] kind."²⁹¹ The way in which Marx narrates the contradictions of capitalism to lead to the possibility of new forms of social and political organization and groups is not unlike Anderson's theorization of the nation-form as one such new socio-political unit. Despite significant differences in content—such as Marx's cosmopolitanism, which argues that proletarians have no country as national allegiances are also stripped in the leveling process—the process of the emergence of a new politicized consciousness and organization of a socio-political group following from mechanistic capitalist processes takes a similar form.

The disconnect between Korean anticolonial (governmental, cosmopolitan, ethnic and diasporic) nationalist formation and Anderson's anticolonial nationalism (as seen in his genealogy) relates to the way that Anderson's modularity of revolutions in print capitalism gets reproduced into the revolutionary model of anticolonial nationalism in the genealogical transplantation of the unselfconscious consequences of print revolution into the telos of the unintended consequences of colonial capitalism. In other words, for Anderson, migration and communication technologies are read under the "reified exterior of the national frame" of 19th century classical nationalism as a "transhistorical" universalist paradigm and "transhistorical" universalizing process, regardless of differences and unevenness in the vastly differentiated social fields upon which these paradigms and technologies are implanted.²⁹² In the Korean context, the formation of an ethnic diasporic nationalism presents a significantly different form of migration than the creole administrative and colonial educational pilgrimages and different structuring conditions than the creative power of colonial capitalism (embodying the unselfconscious logic of print-capitalism) that Anderson attributes to the structuring conditions of anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa, as well as that of the long-distance nationalism that Anderson associates with advanced capitalism and transnational globalization. Rather, in Korea it was the processes and experiences of uneven capitalism articulated with anti-imperial statist and popular governmentality that drove similar processes of social and cultural abstraction and social and cultural leveling (such as the iconoclasm of modern reformers as well as the imperialist threat) into new horizontal imaginings of the nation as political and cultural forms of anti-colonial resistance. The political discourse and activism of modernizing and enlightening the Korean nation and the iconoclasm of modern reformers presented an important aspect of the leveling/horizontalizing processes rather than colonial capitalism.

At the same time, in so far as Korean state equivalents of Western political concepts operate as a kind of 'quotidian universals,' allowing for comparisons, they do not function as neutral equivalents, which can be subsumed under Western conceptions of politics and political models because they are not empty meaningless or value neutral concepts but present a historical memory and experience of a particular form of politics with its own ethical principles and

²⁹¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1888) (NY: Penguin Books, 2002 edition), p. 223.

²⁹² Lie, p. 360.

ascribed relationships and definitions that do not disappear when they enter the world stage dominated by the western political frame. Rather, these historical memories remain side by side and at the same time that they are appropriated and infused with new intensions and ideologies of the new dominant system (as in the process Barthes describes as stolen speech or the parasitic function of the myth as a second order signification), they can also, as Harootunian has suggested, take possession of the Western concepts—turning them into new hybrids which straddles both historical Confucian, nativist, etc. as well as contemporary Western political paradigms or frameworks. These ‘quotidian universals’ also cannot be seen a horizontal equivalents—as long as the legitimacy and strength of the Western-originated international world order maintains its hegemony, non Western political paradigms will also lurk in the shadow of their Western counterparts and always as hybrid constructs. For like the directionality of Korea’s modernizing and nationalizing journeys (to Japan, U.S., etc.) as well as the proportionality of Western influence reflected both in the form and content of the newspaper page, universalism for modern Korea came in bounded serial form. The universality that lies behind the horizontality of nation or migration in Anderson’s model which corresponds to the assumption that capitalism and modernization is going on and that this is a creative as much as destructive energy (with the power to conjure up whole new nations) was not available in the same way to the unindustrialized economically backward and culturally and socially discrepant nation of Korea entering a hostile uneven imperialist capitalist system.

This is similar to how we might see Korean ethnic diasporic nationalism as a new political hybrid that does not conform to Anderson’s concept of a bad ‘cosmopolitan hybridity’ based on the essentialist logic of ethnicity that he attributes to long-distance or diasporic nationalism based on the model of migration as strictly a phenomenon of economic mobility (as in his discussion of 20th century global migrations and long distance nationalism). Nor does it conform to Anderson’s concept of good ‘universalism’ based on the unselfconscious horizontal logic of print-capitalism that he attributes to the more local horizontal migrations of colonial educational pilgrimages. Rather while Korean ethnic diasporic nationalism is on the one hand oriented to the horizontality of national community, which is in part structured from creative (but also potentially dangerous) processes and responses of defensive statist and popular governmentality (developing in the absence of native capitalism) to the uneven hostile and hierarchical international capitalist system, it also harbors the exclusivity and hierarchy that is endemic to both the capitalist economic and political frame on which it arose and was nurtured.

Largely focused on Southeast Asian history and material culture, it is unfortunate that Anderson’s historical writings have only cursorily touched upon Southeast Asia’s northeastern neighbors, where both considerable differences but also similarities no doubt provide a fertile ground of comparison not only in relation to the national material cultures of these two regions but also vis-à-vis Europe and their European and Japanese colonial experiences. In a rare focus on East Asia, Anderson broaches a discussion of Western nationalism vs. Eastern nationalism vis-à-vis the Asian or Confucian values debate arguing that, “the most important distinctions among nationalisms...[do not] run along East-West lines.”²⁹³ Here Anderson states:

²⁹³ Benedict Anderson, “Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism: Is there a difference that matters,” *New Left Review* 9 (May June 2001): pp. 31-43. Unfortunately Anderson’s discussion is focused primarily on China and Japan with no discussion of Korea. However what Anderson says here of China also applies to the context of early modern Korean nationalism: “by far the most spectacular and ironical case is provided by the Celestial Empire, ruled from 1644 till its collapse, less than 90 years ago, by a Manchu—and also Manchu-speaking—dynasty...When Chinese nationalism did finally arise, it was rather late in world-historical time. This was what permitted the

It is fairly clear that its [the idea that there is a distinctively Asian form of nationalism] ultimate origins lie in the notorious insistence of a racist European imperialism that ‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.’ But this insistence on an irremediable racial dichotomy began to be used, early in the twentieth century, by a number of nationalists in different parts of Asia to mobilize popular resistance against a now-utterly-alien domination. Is such a radical dichotomy really justifiable, either theoretically or empirically?²⁹⁴

It is interesting that Anderson uncharacteristically takes up European imperial racism here which was largely eclipsed in *Imagined Communities* by his steadfast focus on the creative universalist capacities of official nationalist policies even in the guise of colonial capitalism to generate the conditions for civic anti-colonial nationalism rather than the potentiality of their dangerous particularistic ethnic variants. This potentiality of racism inflected ethnic nationalism also haunts *The Spectre of Comparisons* where unable to have fully exorcised it, Anderson creates a new and different genealogy and logic for its modern appearance in long distance or diasporic nationalisms, safely distanced from the lineage and legacy of classical popular/civic nationalism in anticolonial national imaginings.²⁹⁵ While I agree with Anderson’s attempt to both historicize and move away from the legacy of 19th century European imperialist (and American) racism, I also think that what may appear distinctive of Asian nationalism does in part stem from the racism of 19th century European and American imperialism (and also importantly that of 20th century Japanese imperialism in the Korean case). But more importantly, I believe that it is more its conjunction with 19th century Eurocentric cultural chauvinism and the exclusive claim to modern history (i.e. Modern civilization defined as Western civilization) and the imperial dispossessions of the uneven imperialist 19th century global industrial capitalism that has produced more lasting consequences with contemporary relevance to both Asian civic and ethnic

wonderful Li Ta-chao to write a famous article about China in its springtime, something entirely young and new. But it arose in a very peculiar situation, for which there are few world comparisons. China was deeply penetrated by the various imperialisms of the age, including Japanese, but it was not actually colonized. There were too many competing imperialisms by then...”(36). Modern Korean nationalism which originated during the last decade and a half of the Chosŏn dynasty (1895-1910) prior to Japanese colonization (1910-1945), and which laid the foundational ideological groundwork for anti-colonial nationalism, which it transformed into after 1910 with colonization— provides exactly such a world comparison.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ This legacy is particularly clear in the chapter on “The Last Wave” in *Imagined Communities*. I understand why Anderson downplays imperial racism in favor of linguistic and territorial creations of colonial capitalism, but I think in not taking full account of the role of racism, whether as part of the logic of colonial capitalism or arising from/with extra-economic grounds, it becomes a rarefied object in his theory of nationalism. This becomes especially evident in his essays on bound and unbound seriality and long distance nationalism in the *Spectre of Comparisons*. Of course I am reading Anderson with the big end the telescope in early modern Korea and Korean nationalism which began prior to colonization with a historical state under threat by imperialist powers, which unlike Anderson’s Southeast Asian cases do not have those very generative pluralistic constructs—of territorially and linguistically unifying colonial capitalism or a polyglot and multiethnic population awakening to nationhood. The formation of modern Korean nationalism holds up a less flattering mirror up to the imperialist powers and the uneven international system they were forging, and one in which racism is also reflected back alongside technical-economic disparity—in the shrinking imagination of the cosmopolitan modern world open to Koreans’ participation eventually retreating to the ethnic nation. Once I stopped blaming these historical Koreans for deviating from their Southeast Asian counterparts, I realized that we need to account for those experiences before we can begin to think of how to change them.

nationalisms as well as East Asian regionalisms, both of which have their antecedents in the early twentieth century, as I have attempted to show in this chapter.²⁹⁶ On the other hand, I also do not think, especially from the more contemporary vantage point that this distinction is primarily or solely an East-West one but spans the global North and South including both the peripheries and semi-peripheries of uneven capitalist development.

These legacies are also closely related to the alternative yet parallel cultural imagining of modern technologies, which I turn to in the following chapters.

²⁹⁶ Although East Asia's bitter legacies of Japanese imperialism and its unrealized pan-asian imperialist plan for a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" would likely obstruct the latter.

Chapter Two

Modernization, Modernism, Modernity and Long-distance Transportation: Situating the Space-Time of Development

Railroad Space-Time and Modernity

As I discussed in the last chapter, in his revised interpretation of national consciousness in *The Spectre of Comparisons* as related to a “hybrid and oxymoronic” and haunted doubling “exile” consciousness, Benedict Anderson introduces innovations in long-distance transportation as a new and corollary structuring condition for new forms of national imagining coincident with 19th century industrial capitalism (as opposed to the primacy of print-communications characteristic of mercantile capitalism). But while Anderson points to the railroad and railway journeys as a key component of the “novel experience of industrial life” and the “centralized, steeply hierarchical new educational system” in Europe that was facilitating belated European national exiles as well as transforming European society into new forms of urbanization and geographical, socio-political stratification, he does not examine how the particular characteristics of the material technology of industrial railroads and the new modes and experiences of *travelljourney* enabled by them may have itself provided structuring conditions for new socio-cultural perceptions of space making it possible for various classes of Englishmen and Englishwomen to imagine “English fields “in England,” or perhaps colonial nationalist pilgrims to imagine “Indonesia” in the Dutch East Indies as well as ethnic Koreans to imagine “Korean mountains” in Korea as well as Japan, Shanghai or San Francisco.

As Anderson introduces the “nexus of long-distance transport and print capitalism” as a key component of this new ‘exile’ consciousness of national belonging related to mass migration and cultural and political displacement, he does not attribute any structuring characteristics to the sailing ship, railroads or airplanes, uncharacteristic of his focus on the significance of material technologies in shaping social processes. Rather, as print-communications maintains its primacy as a formal analogue to the horizontal characteristics of national imagining, long-distance transportation appears merely to disrupt and distort the homogenizing and horizontal boundedness of habitus, culture and political participation of the classical nationalist project with hierarchical transnational fractures and fissures. In respect to sailing ships, while transatlantic migrations may have supplied the underlying condition for creole nationalism, Anderson claims that both it and the administrative pilgrimages of creole functionaries across the new colonial territory of the Americas were largely ineffectual (and do not factor into the horizontality of creole nationalism) until the arrival of print-capitalism, for the *horizontal* imagining necessary/essential for national consciousness rested with print-capitalist technologies like newspapers and maps that enabled the “immense stretch of the Spanish American Empire, and the isolation of its component parts” to be seen as a simultaneity or horizontal unity.²⁹⁷ Similarly, in his alternative discussion of the doubling, hybrid, unstable—not so horizontal—imaginings of the “hybrid and oxymoronic” creole exile produced under the frame of capitalist

²⁹⁷ Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*, (London: Verso, 1998; reprinted 2002), p. 65. Hereafter referred to as SC.

dislocations, facilitated by the ‘nexus’ of long-distance and communication technologies, it was also essentially “through print moving back and forth across the ocean that the unstable, imagined worlds of Englishness and Spanishness were created.”²⁹⁸

However, the new industrial railroads, which share with their print-related predecessors a kind of mechanical reproducibility in relation to the experience and perception of space, were quite different than sailing ships as structural constructs for spatial perception and relations.²⁹⁹ Wolfgang Schivelbusch has argued in *The Railway Journey* that as the new mechanical railroads presented a revolutionary break from traditional animal, human, or wind powered transport mechanisms of an earlier era, it also significantly altered how people experienced and perceived the space of the landscape, spatial distance and place-based or regional identities.³⁰⁰ According to Schivelbusch, both the unprecedented speed and mechanical regularity of railroad tracks as well as the new point to point travel it structured produced a novel “expanded” and “diminished,” systematized “geographical space,” as the railroads incorporated increasing stretches of once remote spaces of the nation and obliterated old modes of travel and its related experiences and perceptions of the preindustrial landscape.³⁰¹ Thus more resembling the print-capitalist technologies of mechanical reproduction like Anderson’s maps and newspapers than sailing ships in this respect, the new mode of rail travel and its corresponding transformations to our experience and consciousness of space-time were also enabling the imagining of a novel synchronicity of the nation form—in so far as the whole territorial expanse of the nation was both physically becoming linked by railroad networks and by the new perception of spatial distance emerging from the experience of regions/places as departure and destination points and the speed and mechanical regularity of the journey, rendering the perception of national spaces and the spaces beyond the nation both synchronic and serial.

As railroads came to both supplement and succeed older modes of long distance transportation within the new modern bourgeois epoch of industrial capitalism, their role in the development and spread of “Modern industry” and the “world market” exponentially surpassed its predecessors.³⁰² Emerging in the late 18th – early 19th century as both a new social historical product of modern industrialization and a crucial vehicle for the global integration of the capitalist economy, the railroads were intimately linked to changes in socio-spatial relations and concepts more generally in the context of globalizing industrial capitalism. For Marx, railroads and other transportation innovations were both essential elements and natural analogues of modern industrial capitalism. A central motif of the “constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation” in which “all that is solid melts into air” that characterize the modern epoch of industrial capitalism and the world market for Marx, was the innovation of new modes of industrial transportation.³⁰³ In Marx’s narrative of capitalist modernity, railroads in particular occupied a prominent position among technological innovations in that its development as a new productive force was not only aligned with the historical evolution of the modern European bourgeoisie as a revolutionary

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 62.

²⁹⁹ I refer to Schivelbusch’s discussion in *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century*, who makes this wonderful analogy of railroads to processes Walter Benjamin attributed to mechanical reproduction.

³⁰⁰ Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1977, 1986).

³⁰¹ See in particular Chapters Three and Five of Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey*.

³⁰² Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto (1888)* (NY: Penguin Books, 2002 edition), p. 220-1.

³⁰³ Ibid., p. 223.

world historical class whose domination of earth and human society was historically unprecedented—facilitating and facilitated by a new mode of production—but also in that it served as an essential vehicle or means for the global spread of the new capitalist mode of production through the economic and political domination/exploitation of the bourgeoisie across the space of the globe. The “world market” writes Marx,

has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; *and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.*³⁰⁴

In so far as railroads were a key vehicle for the transportation of people and the circulation of commodities across national borders facilitating the bourgeoisie’s “need of a constantly expanding market for its products,” the railroads were instrumental in creating a new global geography of political-economic interdependence and cultural integration dominated by a single world market and a universal industrial civilization:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces ‘the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.³⁰⁵

To be sure, Marx saw railroads and other transportation innovations as key loci and symbols for the global spread of the capitalist world economy, the political ascendance of the bourgeoisie and the corresponding changes to the “social relations of production” and the “whole relations of society” because of the new prominence and necessity of bringing goods to a spatially dispersed market—or what Marx calls the “spatial condition” or “locational movement”—within the new mode of production.³⁰⁶ Marx identified this “locational movement” of goods as “the transformation of the product into a commodity,” in so far as “the bringing of the product to market” was “a necessary condition of its circulation” in conditions of “production based on capital generally” and because “only on the market is [the product] a commodity.”³⁰⁷ As transport innovations provided the physical means for the circulation of commodities on the world market thus facilitating the movement of capital across national borders within the

³⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 221. Italics mine.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 223.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 222; *Grundrisse*, (Accessed from Marxist.org archive). Marx’s spatial condition of locational movement stresses ‘locational movement’ or the ability to move across and thus connect physically distanced locations across the world market. I expand here on the discussion of locational movement in Schivelbusch’ discussion of railroads. Schivelbusch, p. 25.

³⁰⁷ Marx, *Grundrisse*, (Accessed from Marxist.org archive).

exchange regime of the capitalist mode of production, they were becoming increasingly central to the transformation and integration of world space into a single albeit uneven modern world system. The railroads were for Marx both essential elements and natural analogues of global industrial capitalist modernity in a large part because the “the annihilation of space by time” was central to the radical economic and social changes accompanying the new epoch of global capitalism—including the creation of an increasingly politically centralized interdependent cosmopolitan world geography as well as the concomitant destruction of preindustrial local and national political economic and social structures and everyday life across Europe and imperial domination abroad.

At the same time, the bourgeoisie were not the only, nor the primary protagonists of Marx’s dialectic of capitalist industrial modernization. If the railroad developed symbiotically with the growth of modern industry and the bourgeoisie’s domination of world markets, then it also developed in parallel with “the modern working class, or the proletariat”— the “special and essential product” of Modern Industry and the primary element of the productive forces of the new mode of production. But in so far as the railroad facilitated the growth and mobility of capital, it simultaneously facilitated the dispossession and exploitation of workers, whose numbers grew in proportion to the former. Along with the bourgeois regime of private property, a corresponding condition for the accumulation of capital, the “extensive use of machinery” and “division of labor” characteristic of the new industrial capitalist mode of production destroyed the conditions by which the worker had traditionally cultivated his particular craft and reduced him to “a commodity,” who now sold his labour “piecemeal” for wages and likewise “exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition [and] all the fluctuations of the market.”³⁰⁸ According to Marx,

Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself.³⁰⁹

But at the same time, the growing exploitation and destitution of workers with the evolution of the capitalist world economy eventually also undercut “the essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois class” in so far as its existence depends on the “formation and augmentation of capital” and the “condition of capital is wage labour.”³¹⁰ As the oppressive rule of the bourgeoisie reach a point where it can no longer sustain the conditions for the continued “slavish existence” of the working class, the revolt of the working class against the bourgeoisie unfolds the contradiction arising between the development of the productive forces and the relations of production in the capitalist mode of production. Hence, presaging a new world historical juncture, Marx writes that “not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the modern working class—the proletarians.”³¹¹

...with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within

³⁰⁸ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* p. 227.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 233.

³¹¹ Ibid., p. 226.

*the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level... Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (Trades Unions) against the bourgeois... they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts... The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of workers. This union is helped by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years.*³¹²

Thus while the railroads may have emerged with the political ascendance of the bourgeoisie and facilitated their “exploitation of the world market,” as “the weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself,” Marx ultimately places them in the service of their world historical negation—the cosmopolitan proletarian revolution—as a vehicle for the political organization of the “ever-expanding union of workers.”³¹³ As the railroads eventually slide from one productive force to another, driven by the motor of dialectical materialism, what had been a premier vehicle of the development of *capital* becomes at the same time “the weapons” of its destruction, and as such, what had served as “the weapons” for the exploitation and enslavement of *labor*, appropriated as the very vehicle of its revolutionary emancipation; the means or vehicle of exploitation and emiseration—such as modern machinery and railroads—becomes at the same time a weapon/space of *appropriation and a locus of dis-alienation*. In the way that the bourgeoisie’s “exploitation of the world market” introduced a “cosmopolitan character” of “production and consumption in every country,” leveling all cultural, regional, and national distinctions, Marx saw the “the extensive use of machinery and division of labour” of modern industry to more and more level “all distinctions of labour,” “equaliz[ing]” “the various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat.”³¹⁴ Thus the railroads both appear as analogues for Marx’s historical materialist dialectical vision of capitalist modernity—of the alienation and re-appropriation of labor—in so far as the structuring conditions for the alienating and destructive forces of industrial modernization are the very conditions of possibility for the solidarity of workers across the world as a political force—while at the same time in a dual fashion appropriate a new cosmopolitan character, however structured through the dominating and uneven geographies of capital, as they become the very vehicle of the physical and political organization and union of workers across space.

Building on Marx, Schivelbusch sees in the creation of an expanded abstract space of geographical coordinates a dialectical relation to the destructive and geographically and socially homogenizing processes of the speed, point-to-point travel and spatial integration of the new

³¹² Ibid., pp. 228-230.

³¹³ Ibid., p. 229.

³¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 228-230.

machinery of industrial railroads and railroad networks.³¹⁵ And like the way workers became “an appendage of the machine,”³¹⁶ Schivelbusch attributes a parallel effect to the transformation of the landscape into “the product or appendage of the railroad.”³¹⁷ Thus as the transformation of pre-industrial workmen in industrial wage-laborers also relied on modern forms, processes, and technologies of abstraction, homogenization, leveling, destruction, or the profaning of “all that is sacred,” for Schivelbusch the railroads likewise enabled the disintegration and erosion of premodern boundaries, communities, and identities and leveled meaningful differences of concrete ‘places’ in the production of an expanded new geographical space. Like the *transformation of labor into a commodity* via the leveling effects of exploitation and dispossession of bourgeois rule which equalized the emiserated conditions of life among workers—analogous to the transformation of products into commodities—necessary as the structuring condition of a new international community of workers, we see the transformation of locally differentiated places into an integrated and expanded abstract geographical space by industrial innovations in transport and communications.

Thus as the new union of workers also becomes “a life and death question” for the proletariat much like the adoption of the new “cosmopolitan mode of production and consumption” for “all civilized nations” in the new capitalist world economy, at the same time that Marx saw innovations in transportation to have become part of the inner necessity of capital—constituting an essential element of the destructive forces of modernization—he also entertained the capacity of railroads (analogous to modern industry) to also enable new forms of social and political organization and consciousness. While transport innovations like railroads may occupy a central economic function as part of the inner necessity of capital that needs to move beyond spatial barriers (as well as a political function as this movement is intimately linked with state power and control), these technologies, which rip through and dissolve old social orders, traditional forms of sociality and the conditions of production, also serve as incubators for new forms of horizontal communities or social and political belonging to facilitate the emancipation of workers from the oppressive rule of capital. While Marx began with “all that is solid melts into air” he ends with “and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, *his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind*.”³¹⁸ This resembles *in form* Anderson’s narrative of anticolonial nationalism whereby the combination of colonial capitalism and print-technologies generates the very conditions and structures for national consciousness. The railroad was for Marx’s proletarians, what newspapers and novels were for Anderson’s nationalists, but also with important differences.

Bringing Anderson’s theory of seriality together with Schivelbusch’s analysis of the novel space-time and socio-cultural perceptions brought about by railroads, I argue in the first part of this chapter that the shifting perceptions and experiences of space, like the novel modality of homogenous empty time, is important to “imagining the nation” and that this involves different kinds of technologies than print-capitalism. Situated in an oblique relation to Anderson’s theory of the spatial ‘logic of seriality’ as based on the formal characteristics of print-capitalist communications that allowed the nation to be imagined “synchronically, coexisting within homogenous, empty time,”³¹⁹ the new *19th century material technology of railroads* and the new

³¹⁵ Schivelbusch, p. 38.

³¹⁶ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 227.

³¹⁷ Schivelbusch, p. 39

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

³¹⁹ Anderson, *IC*, p. 187.

modes of *traveling/journeying* it facilitated likewise presented novel perceptions and experiences of space, spatial distance and spatial relations more broadly giving rise to a new conception of a “depthless” and “panoramic” geographical space which was also synchronic and contiguous and thus essentially serial and comparable. However, possessing distinct material and technological characteristics as a transportation technology and emerging at a different historical juncture—19th century global imperial *industrial capitalism*—railroads also presented significant departures from the serial logics of communication technologies in their ordering of spatial perceptions and hierarchies. In so far as it was a *spatial* technology that transported people and circulated goods across the uneven physical and political-economic space of the capitalist world system, the seriality stemming from railroads was both intimately linked to the logic of state bureaucracy and its superstructures as well as capital and articulated with both socio-political (political centralization, colonialism, militarism) and spatial (urbanization) interests and ideologies of industrial capitalism. Moreover as such it both facilitated and was affected by its role in the circulation of commodities and the expansion of capitalist markets, including colonial expansion—for which railroad networks were central—alongside expanding the scope or range and modes of travel for passengers as well as changing the very experience, perception or mode of space and travel (i.e. comparable to how the newspaper changed our perception of time). Thus while railroad travel also entailed significant processes of abstraction—or a serial logic—that Anderson identifies as the precondition for imagining nations as spatially contiguous, standardized and replicable units, as well a standardized horizontal conception of time, at the same time, the abstracted character of the systematized “geographical space” of railroad networks presents significant departures from the spatial paradigm of “universality” of “quotidian universals” Anderson associates with the *newspaper* in so far as this seriality also occurred through both a dialectical process of expansion and destruction/alienation and was ordered through systematized, totalizing and hierarchical structurations.

In the second part of the chapter, I turn to how the questions and problematics of the railroad as a structuring condition for new perceptions and experiences of modern space and time are also the same questions put to the problematic or dialectic of ‘creative destruction’ or alienation and emancipation/revolution in the concomitant discourses of modernization and modernism in the broader context/condition of modern industrialization within capitalist modernity. On the one hand, they focus the discussion of the universal applicability not only of this model but also the particular conceptions of time or the periodization of the processes of capitalism that underlies it. On the other, they key into examining the relationship between new differentiated historical socio-spatial conditions of an increasingly globally interconnected geography, particular lineages and different modes of travel and exile generated by this new world imaginary, and different formations of freedom in nationalist and modernist imaginings. These two paths of inquiry are importantly interlinked for the way we consider the story or stories of modernity and modernization, and the conceptual tools we use to think these stories are significant to how we understand or interpret both interlinkages and differences among key concepts and elements of the shared experiences of modernity such as alienation, emancipation/freedom, nationalism and cosmopolitanism. This chapter both builds on my last chapter on discrepant formations of modern anticolonial nationalism based on uneven capitalist development and sets up my next chapter on the modern nationalist imagining of Korean railroad journeys by considering the serial logic of railroads as a heuristic for the structuration and imagination of differentiated forms of nationalism and national modernities arising from within the universalizing processes of global modernization across an interlinked yet uneven space of

global capitalist modernity. Thus as I link the problematic of seeing the discrepant space-time of railroads to the problematic of western universal paradigms of capitalist development based on Western-centric temporalities of homogenous empty time, I prepare the grounds for examining how the abstracted yet circumscribed character of railroad space brought about related but new different spatial and cultural logics and grammars as well as directionalities and modes of travel.

The Expanded and Diminished, Panoramic, Depthless Space of Railroads: The Destruction of the Space of Landscape and the Creation of Geographical Space

Industrial Railroads and the Expansion and Contraction of Space-Time

In his study of European and North American railroads in *The Railway Journey*, Wolfgang Schivelbusch argued that 19th century railroads were instrumental in altering traditional socio-cultural perceptions of space-time and thus facilitating a shift in consciousness of space from space as experienced as landscape to a new experience and perception of an artificial or man-made systematized “geographical space.”³²⁰ With steam replacing the traditional motive power of animals, and iron replacing the natural medium of wood, the mechanization of travel by railroads, was an integral part of the broader process of “denaturalization” or the “emancipation from nature” accompanying modern industrialization.³²¹ As railways cut through the European sub-continent with “speed and mathematical directness,” and the traveler came to perceive “the landscape as filtered through the machine ensemble,” it tore apart the continuity and “close relationship between the traveler and the traveled space.”³²²

If the material bases for the old perception of landscape and motion were the physical power of draught animals, the road that followed the contours of the terrain, and the ‘leeway’ given to the vehicle on the road, and if the old perception occurred via all these natural and only loosely connected elements of transportation technology, then the character of the new machine ensemble was one of tremendous technical discipline.³²³

For Schivelbusch, the dramatic changes brought upon by new transport technologies were central to new modern forms of consciousness of space and time because like Bergson’s concept of “durée...the time spent getting from one place to another on the road is not an objective mathematical time but a subjective perception of time” and this perception depends on the society’s “social rhythm and its territory”:³²⁴

What is decisive...‘is not the objectively measured distance, but the relation of such distance to potentiality.’ Transport technology is the material base of potentiality, and equally the material base of the traveler’s space-time perception. If an essential element of a given socio-cultural space-time

³²⁰ Schivelbusch, p. 53.

³²¹ Ibid., p. 2.

³²² Ibid., pp. 53, 24.

³²³ Ibid., p. 24.

³²⁴ Ibid., p. 36.

continuum undergoes change, this will affect the entire structure; our perception of space-time will also lose its accustomed orientation.³²⁵

Proceeding across a mechanically regularized terrain of iron rails in a fraction of the time covered by the stagecoach (or travel by foot), the new speed of the industrial railroads altered the perception of spatial relationships making space appear both newly “diminished *and* expanded.”³²⁶ At the same time that the speed of the railways appeared to shrink space via the diminished transport time—creating a “new, reduced geography” wherein the nation appeared contracted into a metropolis—this spatial shrinkage also “appeared as an expansion of the metropolis: by establishing transport lines to ever more outlying areas, the metropolis tended to incorporate the entire nation.”³²⁷ The oft remarked “annihilation of space and time,” according to Schivelbusch, entailed the annihilation of the experience of the “traditional space-time continuum” across the space of the natural landscape, in which old modes of transport had heretofore been organically embedded. As Schivelbusch writes:

Compared to the geotechnical space-time relationship, the one created by the railroad appears abstract and disorienting, because the railroad...negated all that characterized geotechnical traffic; the railroad did not appear embedded in the space of the landscape the way coach and highway are, but seemed to strike its way through it.³²⁸

Thus the new perception of both spatial expansion and reduction were “two contradictory sides of the same process: on the one hand, the railroad opened up new spaces that were not as easily accessible before” as the railroad-mediated metropolis stretched out “to incorporate *the entire nation*.”³²⁹ On the other,

*it did so by destroying space, namely the space between points. That in-between, or travel space, which it was possible to ‘savor’ while using the slow, work-intensive geotechnical form of transport, disappeared on the railroads. The railroad knows only points of departure and destination... As the space between the points—the traditional traveling space—was destroyed, those points moved into each other’s immediate vicinity: one might say they collided. They lost their old sense of local identity, formally determined by the spaces between them. The isolation of localities, which was created by spatial distance, was the very essence of their identity, their self-assured and complacent individuality.*³³⁰

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid., p. 37

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 38.

³³⁰ Ibid., p. 38. Emphasis mine. As a point of relation and contrast to Anderson’s discussion of the new horizontal alignment of “old” European spaces and “new” colonial ones, here we see how old European spaces were made into new spaces by industrial transport innovations. Thus as “new” spaces were appearing in remote areas from “old” ones these “old” ones were also undergoing a change in conception at the same time. This helps explain how the two were brought into relation in synchronic alignment and shorn of diachronic inheritance.

Thus as once remote regions became incorporated into the new industrialized transport network, the railroad altered the “consciousness of distance” that once kept the regions in mutual isolation and introduced a new “consciousness of distance” which brought these remote regions into intimate proximity, without physically altering their spatial location. According to Schivelbusch, “Even though the railroad was incapable of bringing the remote regions physically to Paris, the speedy and comfortable accessibility of those regions created” a new “consciousness of distance,” that was now a function of the speed and integrated network/circuitry of the new transport technology.³³¹ With the formation of a network of railway lines that stretched across all of Europe, “regardless of their geographical remoteness, the regions appeared as close and easily accessible as the railways made them”.³³²

The *region* that could be reached by train from Paris realized itself for the Parisians by means of the train. It then *appeared as the product or appendage of the railroad*, as in a phrase of Mallarmé’s: ‘Normandy, which, like Brittany, is part of the Western Railway. But if Normandy and Brittany, being its destinations, were part of the Western Railway, then the point of departure of that same railway, the station in Paris, became the entrance to those regions.’³³³

The perception of locally meaningful regional identity relied on the experience of their spatial distance through the *journey* to and from those localities. As different localities existed in relative isolation as experienced by the mediation of stagecoaches, their distinct spatial identities rested on the experience of their spatial distancing. But as the stagecoach gave way to railroads, it also wrested these remote regions from their previous isolation and incorporated them into the space of the new expansive transportation network, changing the way in which they were experienced and perceived. As railway travel restructured the consciousness of distance as “points of departure and destination,” Schivelbusch claims that it made the *journey* to and from these destination points insignificant.³³⁴ As the regions lost their meaningful historically evolved locally rooted identities, railway passengers likewise ceased being ‘travelers’ and became “human parcels who dispatched themselves to their destination by means of the railway, arriving as they left, untouched by the space traversed.”³³⁵

The Loss of Aura or Spatial-Temporal Singularity and ‘Quotidian Universals’

Schivelbusch argues that what was happening to the new perception of regions with the disappearance of the “in-between” or “travel space” of the *journey* in their incorporation into the new railroad network was similar to the process by which Marx saw the transformation of “a product *into a commodity*” via “locational movement: the bringing of things to the market.”³³⁶ Like the way the product “lost its local identity, its spatial presence” with the “spatial distance that the product covered on its way from its place of production to the market,” Schivelbusch posits that as the new railroad-mediated consciousness of spatial distance eradicated the sensual

³³¹ Ibid., p. 39.

³³² Ibid., p. 38.

³³³ Ibid., p. 39. Italics mine.

³³⁴ Ibid. As a point of contrast, in the colonies rather than diminishing the journey to and from destination points, these journeys were highlighted due to the hierarchical and politically oppressive/unequal position of the destination points.

³³⁵ Ibid., p. 38.

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 40.

space of the preindustrial *journey*, the regions were similarly being uprooted/alienated from their local identities:³³⁷

Its concretely sensual properties, which were experienced at the place of production as a result of the labor process (or, in the case of fruits of the land, as a result of natural growth), appeared quite different in the distant market-place. There, the product, now a commodity, could realize its economic value and simultaneously gain new qualities as an object of consumption. No longer was it seen in the context of the original locality of its place of production but in the new locality of the market-place: cherries offered for sale in the Paris market were seen as products of that market, just as Normandy seemed to be a product of the railroad that takes you there.³³⁸

In this analogy between the varying effects of spatial distance in the transformation of goods and regional/spatial identities, what was lost in both cases was their “spatial-temporal singularity” or “their aura”:³³⁹

The regions, joined to each other and to the metropolis by the railways, and the goods that are torn out of their local relation by modern transportation, shared the fate of losing their inherited place, their traditional spatial-temporal presence or, as Walter Benjamin sums it up in one word, ‘their aura.’...The aura of a work of art is ‘its unique existence at the place where it happens to be’. This spatial-temporal singularity, this ‘happening-but-onceness’ this genuineness of the object, is according to Benjamin, destroyed by reproduction...When *spatial distance* is no longer experienced, the differences between original and reproduction diminish. ‘The situations into which the product of mechanical reproduction can be brought may not touch the actual work of art, yet the quality of its presence is always depreciated.’³⁴⁰

As Schivelbusch sees the ‘aura’ of once remote regions or their ‘traditional spatial-temporal presence’ destroyed by the new railroad-mediated proximity to other regions and the metropolis analogous to the way Benjamin saw the ‘aura’ of a work of art destroyed by reproduction, he establishes a link between the loss of the experience of spatial distance and the diminishing relation between original and reproduction. In so far as “outlying regions” were being “made accessible by the railroad: while being opened up for tourism, they remained, initially at least, untouched in their physical actuality, but their easy, comfortable, and inexpensive accessibility robbed them of their previous value as remote out-of-the-way places.”³⁴¹ Thus the “devaluation of outlying regions by their exploitation for mass tourism by means of the railroad in the nineteenth and air traffic in the twentieth” was akin to the depreciation of the quality of presence of the product of mechanical reproduction.³⁴² As Benjamin had stated that “the desire of contemporary masses to bring things “closer” spatially

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 43.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 41-42.

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 42.

³⁴² Ibid.

and humanly...is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction,” Schivelbusch posits that the way the remote regions were being made accessible by the railroad “was merely a prelude, a preparation for making any unique thing available by means of reproduction.”³⁴³ And in addition to the regions being brought to the doorsteps of the masses through the mediation of railroads and tourism, the destruction of their “aura” was also aided by the corresponding standardization of local times. Schivelbusch notes that as the regions were torn out of isolation by the railroads, they were also “deprived” of their “local time” or “temporal identity,” as locally rooted and differentiated times were eliminated with the adoption of Greenwich Mean Time as the standard time used by all railway lines: “As the rail network grew denser, incorporating more and more regions, the retention of local times became untenable: in 1880, railroad time became general standard time in England. In Germany, official recognition came in 1893; as early as 1884, and international conference on time standards, held in Washington, DC, divided the world into time zones.”³⁴⁴

This process by which regions were losing their “traditional spatial-temporal presence” or “aura” by the ‘mechanical reproducibility’ (qua accessibility) of transportation technologies and the corresponding standardization of railroad times, is not unlike the process of *abstraction* entailed in Anderson’s logic of seriality as seen in the formal model of newspapers—which also principally occurred through the transformative process of decontextualization. For Anderson, “the unself-conscious *standardization of vocabulary* which radically overrides any formal division of the newspaper between local and foreign news,” generated “quotidian universals”—a series of decontextualized, comparable, formally equivalent terms organized under a single general category—found across various national newspapers. As Anderson writes, the Indonesian word *boeono* transformed into a “quotidian universal” on the newspaper page presented a “quite new sense of ‘world,’ [now conceived of as] *a horizontal universe of visible and invisible human beings from which volcanoes, demons, water buffalo, and divinities had vanished.*”³⁴⁵ Like the way in which the new railroad-mediated proximity to other regions and the metropolis deprived the remote regions of their uniqueness and “spatial-temporal presence,” the transformation of *boeono* into a “quotidian universal” by the formal “standardization of vocabulary” of newspapers likewise eradicated *boeono* of its “aura” or “spatial-temporal singularity” in the new decontextualized secular and horizontal conception of the word found on the newspaper page. Conversely, the establishment of formal equivalences through the dissolving processes of decontextualization and generalization encapsulated in the serial logic of the print capitalist technology of newspapers—giving rise to a new comparative sense of geographical interconnectedness, contiguity, and substitutability of world space—can also be seen as an effect of the mechanical reproducibility (qua accessibility) of railroads. In the way that the formal “standardization of vocabulary” of the newspaper format supplies a structuring condition for the spatial conception of the modern world as composed of “quotidian universals” in a “parallel series...stretching out across, and seamlessly mapping, a singular world,”³⁴⁶ the mechanical reproducibility (qua accessibility) of railroads likewise provides a structural model for the comparative imagining of the horizontal space of the modern world as composed of a series of interconnected regional geographical units shorn of their “spatial-temporal presence” or “aura.”

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 43-44.

³⁴⁵ Anderson, *SC*, p. 31. Italics mine.

³⁴⁶ Anderson, *SC*, p. 32.

Panoramic Depthless Space: Imagining a New Indiscriminate Synchronic Contiguous Global Geography

Schivelbusch' discussion of a new 'mechanized' mode of *visual perception* accompanying the expanded geography made accessible by railway travel helps delineate a corresponding spatial-visual paradigm for the way that distinct regions were also coming to be seen as a contiguous series of abstracted and decontextualized geographical units in synchronic contiguity. As the incorporation of more outlying territories into the space of the metropolis via railway lines expanded the geography of travel, Schivelbusch argues that the "quantitative increase of impressions that the perceptual apparatus ha[d] to receive and process" affected both an expansion and diminishing of human powers of perception. Thus at the same time that the speed and point to point travel of railways was destroying the *continuity* between the traveler and the temporal rhythms and physical contours of the natural landscape—and thus altering the perception of distinct historically singular regional identities, the vistas from the moving railway carriage was creating "a new landscape" which assimilated into consciousness/perceptual apparatus the very "velocity and linearity with which the train traversed the landscape," as new "sources of enrichment."³⁴⁷ The vistas of the new landscape mediated by the moving train across ever-expanded terrains "displayed in immediate succession objects and pieces of scenery that in their original spatiality belonged to separate realms."³⁴⁸ For the traveler who "gazed out the compartment window at such successive scenes," these vistas created the novel "ability to perceive the discrete, as it rolls past the window, indiscriminately."³⁴⁹ Like the new concept and visual technologies of the "panorama and panoramic" that encapsulated "European modes of perception in the nineteenth century," the new mechanized vistas of railways "made it possible to grasp the whole" or what amounted to a visual "panoramization of the world":³⁵⁰

'The railroad transformed the world of lands and seas into a panorama that could be experienced. Not only did it join previously distant localities by eliminating all resistance, difference, and adventure from the journey: now that traveling had become so comfortable and common, it turned the traveler's eyes outward and offered them the opulent nourishment of ever changing images that were the only possible thing that could be experienced during the journey.'³⁵¹

The speed and regularity of train travel so dramatically altered the traditional image or perception of the landscape that Schivelbusch posits: "what the opening of major railroads provided in reality—the easy accessibility of distant places"—was precisely what the "‘panoramic’ and ‘dioramic’ shows and gadgets" pioneered in the preceding decades had sought to manufacture via illusion."³⁵² At the same time, and as a corollary to the new expanded breadth of vision and continuously changing scenery, the panoramic vistas from the railway carriage

³⁴⁷ Schivelbusch, p. 60.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 62.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Dolf Sternberger, *Panorama, oder Ansichten von 19. Jahrhundert*, 3rd ed. (Hamburg, 1955), p. 50, quoted in Schivelbusch, p. 62.

³⁵² Schivelbusch, p. 62

destroyed the traditional “depth-perception of preindustrial consciousness.”³⁵³ In the preindustrial mode of perception, where the traveler was able to visually perceive a foreground, “he saw himself as part of the foreground, and that perception *joined* him to the landscape [akin to the traditional traveling space or in-between space of the journey], included him in it, regardless of all further distant views that the landscape presented.”³⁵⁴ But now as the velocity of the train travel blurred all foreground objects, effectively dissolving the foreground:

he was removed from that ‘total space’ which combined proximity and distance: he became separated from the landscape he saw by what Richard Lucae, speaking of ferro-vitreous architecture, has called an ‘almost immaterial barrier’. The glass separated the interior space of the Crystal Palace from the natural space outside without actually changing the atmospheric quality of the latter in any visible manner, just as the train’s speed separated the traveler from the space that he had previously been a part of. As the traveler stepped out of that space, *it became a stage setting*, or a series of such pictures or scenes created by the continuously changing perspective. *Panoramic perception, in contrast to traditional perception, no longer belonged to the same space of the perceived objects: the traveler saw the objects, landscapes, etc. through the apparatus which moved him through the world.* That machine and the motion it created became integrated into his visual perception: thus he could only see things in motion. That mobility of vision—for a traditionally oriented sensorium, such as Ruskin’s, an agent for the dissolution of reality—became a prerequisite for the ‘normality’ of panoramic vision.³⁵⁵

So as the new railway vista—structured through the combination of the speed and the machinery that moved the passenger across distant lands—brought into view an expanded vision of the new geographical landscape of evanescent images of the world of nature, landscape, and people on the other side of the window suffused together into a panoramic whole, it destroyed the perception of discrete elements much like the way the loss of the experience of spatial distance eliminated the “spatial-temporal singularity” or “aura” of discrete ‘places.’ At the same time, the corresponding loss of depth-perception or the inability to discern a foreground removed or uprooted the traveler from the “total space” of the landscape, making the new landscape of “fleeting” and “vanishing” images appear essentially detached/distanced or alienated from the seeing eye, as if a “stage setting” was unfolding in front of the traveler’s gaze. Schivelbusch attributes a close affinity between the new mechanized vistas occasioned by the new technology of travel and new photographic and cinematic technologies also appearing at the same time because—like the way that the “intensive experience of sensuous world, terminated by the industrial revolution, underwent a resurrection in the new institution of photography”—the railroads also provided a mediated perceptual apparatus that transformed the losses of “immediacy” and “foreground” into a new expanded and “esthetically pleasing perspective” of reality.³⁵⁶ As Schivelbusch described “the new reality of the annihilated in-between spaces” to

³⁵³ Ibid., p. 63.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 64. Italics mine.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 60, 63.

resemble “the filmic perception...of *montage*, the juxtaposition of the most disparate images into one unit,” the new panoramic perception of the world, likewise mediated through the “almost immaterial barrier” of the railway carriage like the separation provided by the filmic screen, brought the world “closer together” as well as “closer to the viewer.”³⁵⁷

Thus the filmic-like perception of the ‘mobility of vision’ provides a heuristic or template for the conceptualization of a contiguous synchronic world geography by bringing into view a geographical imaginary joining “previously distant localities” into a ‘panoramic’ totality of a new technologically mediated meta-landscape. On the one hand, the panoramic wide-angle range of vision enabled by the velocity of railway travel takes the place of perceiving particulars or historical depth, much like the emptiness of linear homogenous time. The inability to focus on particulars is the other side of the tendency towards an indiscriminate exhaustive visual perception—or a perceptual mode of visualizing ‘nation’ in which London Fields, mediated by railroads, could appear as “English” Fields. On the other, akin to the “synchronic novelty” of Anderson’s “old” metropolitan cities and “new” colonial replicas, the perception of metropolitan centers and remote outlying regions—filtered through the visual prosthetic of the speed and linearity of the ‘mobility of vision’—were likewise coming to appear both synchronically, positioned along the same horizon line or perspectival vanishing point of the moving train window, and contiguously, as part of an indiscriminate landscape unfolding before the viewer like a sequence of film stills. Like the way the new institutions/ media of film and photography was invested with the loss of the “intensive experience of the sensual world” these mechanized vistas also reinforced the ‘new reality’ of the railroad mediated geography composed of serial abstract substitutable geographical units associated with the loss of the intensive experience of the immediacy of the landscape.

Centralized, Hierarchical, and Systematized Urban Capitalist Standardizations

However, while the process of abstraction or the “loss of aura” forms the shared component underlying both Anderson’s horizontal synchronicity of the newspaper and Schivelbusch’s panoramic and depthless space of railroads, there is a significant difference to how Schivelbusch understands the mechanical reproducibility of railway travel and the loss of aura vis-à-vis Anderson. For Schivelbusch, the “devaluation” of remote regions in their incorporation into the metropolitan-centric railroad network to be exploited for mass tourism and the obliteration of historical locally rooted local times by the adoption of standardized railroad time—measured in relation to Greenwich Mean Time (operating like Anderson’s “category” for organizing quotidian universals) were integral aspects of the loss of local identity and autonomy of the ‘places’ of landscape in their abstraction/transformation into ‘spaces’ of *geography*. Thus as locally meaningful ‘places’ were freed from the restrictive immediacy of the natural landscape and turned into easily accessible departure and destination points through both liberating and alienating processes of abstraction of railroad travel, they were now also circumscribed by the self-conscious/motivated standardizations of space and time in relation to the dominant logics and hierarchies of capitalist accumulation and industrial urbanization of the restricted spatial economy of the new global or ‘universal’ space of industrial capitalism. Incorporated into the “closed” geographical space arranged/ classified/ positioned in relation to the “null point of the coordinate system,” places were coming to be structured through determinate directionalities of travel and dependent/differentiated identities. Thus for Schivelbusch, at the same time that we

³⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 42.

could now conceive of moving across the immense stretch of earth so fast and so far, the qualitative changes to our mode and directionalities of journeying—mediated through the alienating processes of transport technology and the organizing logics and differentiated values of the systematized railroad network—was in a significant respect also making such journeys that much more (socio-culturally and politically) limited.³⁵⁸

More specifically in terms of spatial relations within this system, Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre points out that the “transformation of the perimeter of the Mediterranean into a leisure-oriented space for industrialized Europe” can be seen as a “remarkable instance of *the production of space on the basis of a difference internal to the dominant mode of [capitalist] production.*”³⁵⁹

As such, and even in a sense as a ‘non-work’ space (set aside not just for vacations but also for convalescence, rest, retirement, and so on), *this area has acquired a specific role in the social division of labor.* Economically and socially, architecturally, urbanistically, it has been subjected to a sort of neocolonization...It has thus attained *a certain qualitative distinctiveness as compared with the major industrial agglomerations, where a pure culture of the quantitative reigns supreme...*The quasi-cultist focus of localities based on leisure would thus form a striking contrast to the productive focus of North European cities...What a travesty such a picture would be, however, *enshrining as it does both the illusion of transparency and the illusion of naturalness.* The truth is that all this seemingly non-productive expense is planned with the greatest care: *centralized, organized, hierarchized, symbolized and programmed to the nth degree, it serves the interests of the tour-operators, bankers and entrepreneurs of places such as London and Hamburg.* To be more precise, and to use the terminology introduced earlier: in the spatial practice of neocapitalism (complete with air transport), representations of space facilitate the manipulation of representational spaces (sun, sea, festival, waste, expense).³⁶⁰

Lefebvre sees spaces like the pseudo-remote or extra-urban Mediterranean as a “strategic space” of the interconnected global space of capitalism because it is where the spatial contradiction of capitalism of the universal/particular is particularly heightened—where while on the one hand “resources are always localized” in these spaces, “objectives and ‘targets,’ by contrast, are always globalizing in tendency, and effectively worldwide” as “dispersion and subdivision, often carried to the point of complete segregation, are controlled and dominated by strategic aims by wills-to-power of the highest order in terms of both the quantity of means employed and of the goals pursued,” leading to “the establishment of a concentrated centrality.”³⁶¹ In the context of the dominant social-spatial logics governing a single integrated capitalist world system, *geographical* space—structured/produced through the devaluations as well as super-valuations (as in added-value) of both peripheral and metropolitan spaces either

³⁵⁸ This is similar to the critique of modernity found in Rousseau’s Second Discourse.

³⁵⁹ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 58. My italics. Hereafter referred to as PS.

³⁶⁰ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 58-59. My italics

³⁶¹ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 365.

within the metropolitan core states such as those of Euro-America (or we can add between the metropolitan cores and the world's colonized or postcolonial peripheries)—was giving rise to serial geographical units of differentiated hierarchical-symbolized values (i.e. the space of waste, expense, non-productivity or simply 'vacation') within a "*centralized, organized, hierarchized, symbolized*" integrated economic socio-spatial system operating under the same capitalist logic and masked by the ideological "enshrining" of such values with the "illusion of transparency" and "naturalness."

Thus not unlike Lefebvre's analysis of the centralized and hierarchical (as well as symbolized in Lefebvre's case) ordering of spaces within the totalizing systematized interconnected network of global capitalist space, as Schivelbusch saw the new railroad-enabled proximity of once remote regions to the metropolis to devalue the 'aura' of outlying regions, while all spaces were coming into being as formally equivalent/comparable geographical units, these units were also coming into being as differentiated hierarchical values in accordance with the governing logics of metropolitan urbanization and economic and socio-political domination of the modern capitalist world system. Thus we could extrapolate that while all spaces were being turned into easily accessible departure and destination points, and regional identities were being leveled *qualitatively*, as these processes were being structured through the incorporation/integration of both peripheral spaces and metropolitan cores into a single spatial division of labor via 'strategic' standardizations within the capitalist-world system, their relative *values* produced of this system were not necessarily being homogeneously produced or as *quantitatively* equivalent. If for Anderson, the "unself-conscious standardization of vocabulary which radically overrides any formal division in the newspaper between local and foreign news" "reinforced" the boundless or open "natural universality" of 'quotidian universals,' then the motivated, strategic standardizations of geographical space which distinguished the values of formally equivalent geographical units—following from specific directionalities of travel structured through dominant urban/rural hierarchies of capitalist urbanization—reinforced the restricted spatial economy of the geographical space-time of railroads.

What I am trying to stress as the significant difference of railroad seriality is that within this uneven geography, the same spatial technology can produce both bound statist national forms, policies and responses as much as popular versions in different contexts and in relation to the state and society's position within the interconnected world-system. What the seriality of railroads demonstrates is that *formal equivalence* (by its variations in) related processes such as "universality" and "standardization" are not commensurate with *equivalence in value*. Thus the logic of seriality could enable or lead to the democratic, pluralistic, action-based "open to the world" *good* humanistic universals associated with popular and anti-colonial nationalism (and more specifically 'activism' in a broad sense). But they could also enable or lead to restrictive universals produced through site/system specific "universal standards" that stem from highly uneven imperial/colonial geographies of power that are *actively* either thrust upon or voluntarily embraced by (colonial or postcolonial) states, or even popular anti-colonial movements—within the uneven historico-political geography of development and modernization that constitutes the emerging single yet highly lopsided interconnected geography of the modern industrialized and industrializing world. While Anderson is able to divide and oppose the representative technologies of these two different forms of seriality in the separate technologies of newspapers (for unbound) vs. the census (for bound), the two appear inseparable in the double-edged social spatial technology of railroads. Distinguished from the communication media of earlier print capitalist technologies, the material specificities of railroad space which give rise to a mixture of

bound and unbound forms of seriality of railroads links/grounds it in intimate proximity to *the state* as much as *the popular or public domain*.³⁶²

From Landscape to Geography or Unbound to Bound Seriality: Openings and Closures

Ultimately, Schivelbusch describes the loss of the in-between space or the traveling space of the journey and the corresponding new consciousness of an expanded and diminished, panoramic, depthless space of railway travel as the transformation of the space of *landscape* into a new systematized “*geographical space*.”

‘In a landscape’, says Strauss, ‘we always get to one place from another place; each location is determined only by its relation to the neighboring place within the *circle of visibility*. But geographical space is closed, and is therefore in its entire structure transparent. Every place in such a space is determined by its position with respect to the whole and ultimately by its relation to the null point of the coordinate system by which this space obtains order. Geographical space is systematized.’³⁶³

Apparent in this conceptual framework, the identity of places in the ‘space of *landscape*’ as well as in ‘*geographical space*’ are relatively determined by their experiential *distance* to or isolation and proximity from other places. The “self-assured and complacent individuality” attributed to places within the “space of landscape” does not arise from a spatially bounded or self-enclosed identity but its isolation in “relation to the neighboring place within the *circle of visibility*.” Their mutual isolation from one another, as experienced through the slow geotechnical mode of journeying to or from “the neighboring place” along the contours of the natural landscape is the source of their relative autonomy and local identity or “spatial presence.” It is an experience of space enabled through face-to-face relations, where local and communal identity could be seen to derive from both an organic relationship with nature and intimate face-to-face contact with other individuals. Based on this organic relationship with living nature, the remoteness of regions as experienced through the journey across spatial distance imparts upon each specific region a particular identity with concrete specificity (or concrete particulars as opposed to quotidian universals): “we always get to *one place* from *another place*.” But while the restricted field of vision circumscribed by the “circle of visibility” may always be experienced as fragmentary as it is rooted in our limited human and animal-powered capacity to traverse spatial distance, it also implies a more *open* framework for action as compared to the “closed” system of geographical space created by railroads in that it bears a far greater potentiality of difference and change for regional identities and societies and for our boundless changing journeys across space—the spaces/paths we may not yet have traveled but could travel in the same way that we have traveled in our past and present journeys.

³⁶² This point is key—that this mixture of elements of both bound and unbound seriality stems from—is grounded on the fact that railroads are intimately linked to the state apparatus—as infrastructure—and thus party to political strategies and tactics (ultimately under the state’s control). But at the same time they are not totalized state apparatuses—like prisons or government organs. Unlike them, there is room to use these infrastructures—as human mobility is likewise under state discretion but not completely immobilized by the state—in ways other than and even counter to the directives and tactics of the state.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 53. Emphasis mine.

In contradistinction, as the 19th century railroad network incorporated once remote regions into an expanded metropolis, it brought the space of the whole nation of urban and rural areas into intimate proximity structured within a new systematized totality of formally equivalent departure and destination points, much like the formal “standardization” of Anderson’s “quotidian universals” on the newspaper page. At the same time, the speed and mechanical regularity of the industrialized railway journey, which destroyed the preindustrial organic experience of traveling to and from remote locations across the immediacy of the space of landscape, also gave rise to a new mechanically mediated consciousness of spatial distance that brought together distinct regions and distant lands of the nation and the world into a ‘panoramic’ vision of a depthless “indiscriminate” perceptual whole—akin to the emptiness of linear homogenous time and the “natural universality” of “quotidian universals.” Thus corresponding to the process of “transformation, enlargement, and contraction”³⁶⁴ that Anderson attributes to the “unbound seriality” of “quotidian universals,” the experiential and perceptual transformation of unique historically specific and locally meaningful ‘places’ (or concrete particulars) in the ‘space of landscape’ into abstracted geographical units of formal equivalence and inter-dependence by railroads presents on the one hand an exponentially enlarged *potentiality for the imagination* of an exhaustive new national and world geography. Like the “unbound seriality” of “quotidian universals,” the seriality of railroad space-time had the analogous function of expanding the scope and powers of consciousness through the process of abstracting or universalizing what was uniquely singular and bringing it into a spatial economy or system of comparable generalities. Rendering the experience and perception of discrete ‘places’ into abstract, substitutable units of a systematized whole within a synchronic contiguous ‘*geographical space*,’ the railroads occasioned a new mode of apprehending space beyond the “circle of visibility” of the old preindustrial landscape—in the same manner in which Anderson described the imagined linkages beyond face to face contact that is characteristic of the nation as a horizontal community “moving up or down history... calendrically across homogenous empty time.” You don’t have to travel to every destination point on the train to get a sense of the vast totality of the essentially comparable, formally equivalent spaces that comprise the new serialized, “systematized” and thus wholly “transparent” totality of “*geographical space*.”

However, despite this expanded capacity for spatial integration, movement, and imagining enabled by the serializing abstractions of railway space, the *potentiality* of our present and future journeys was in another sense becoming more limited by the very same structuring technology of the new enlarged geographic system. For Schivelbusch, in so far as the 19th century railroads were crucial instruments of spatial enlargement and interconnection, they were equally agents of physical denaturalization and the dissolution of social bonds and local communities associated with the industrialization and urbanization of rural life. As the new experience and perception of spatial distance uprooted both people and products from the landscape turning passengers into parcels shuttled between departure and destination points, it destroyed the organic union people once enjoyed with the natural landscape as well as the communal relations with one another via the traveling space of the journey, mirroring the way in which the iron rails allowed the new train cars to cut through the landscapes untouched. As the industrialized railway journey removed subjects from action as well as interaction, alienating people from one another as well as from the places of the immediate landscape, it also wrested pre-modern ‘places’ from their concrete locally meaningful identities analogous to the

³⁶⁴ Anderson, *SC*, pp. 41-42.

transformation of products into commodities and the eclipse of concrete definite useful labor by abstract labor with the development of the capitalist mode of production or the commodity economy. Moreover, akin to the process by which the new proximity of once remote regions to one another and the metropolis enabled by the expanded and integrated geography of railroad space destroyed the “spatial-temporal singularity” or “aura” of qualitatively unique places, as the moving train removed the passenger from the “total space” of the landscape, the new mechanized perception or ‘mobility of vision’ of panoramic vistas from the train carriage likewise rendered the expanded perception of space depthless in which the capacity to visually grasp an ever-broadening geography was accompanied by the inability to perceive the discrete or particular elements of the landscape.

Thus while the new “geographical” space-time of railroads shares with ‘quotidian universals’ the decontextualized, substitutable, and anonymous character grounding the expanded capacity for geographical imagination—the seriality of 19th century railroads presents significant departures from the ‘unbound seriality’³⁶⁵ of newspapers defined by action and a “boundless” universality (associated with the domain of popular nationalism/activism) that Anderson maintains is a generalized precondition for imagining the nation. While Anderson saw the abstracting serial logic of the ‘unbound seriality’ of the print capitalist technology of newspapers to enable “boundless” “open to the world plurals” which operated as an agent for new forms of belonging and communities to protect against the entropy of capitalism, for Schivelbusch, akin the universalizing process of market exchange which transformed concrete differentiated products into exchangeable commodities and concrete definite useful labor into abstract labor or “the expenditure of human labour in general,” the creative-productive capacity of the spatial expansion/ abstraction of railroad seriality was dialectically related to the destructive capacity and alienating processes of spatial distortion/abstraction of industrial capitalism.³⁶⁶ Much in line with the Marxist analysis of the industrial capitalist phenomenon of creative destruction through the relentless expansion of the commodity form, the abstracting seriality of industrial railroads transformed if not obliterated the meaningful identity of regions and places (i.e. qualitatively different use-values) into abstracted interchangeable units (i.e. quantifiable exchange values) as it incorporated these places into the new enlarged systematic totality of geographical space as “appendages” of the railroads, similar to the processes of the fetishism (of commodities) and alienation (of labor) accompanying the capitalist exchange economy and world markets; as Schivelbusch noted “cherries offered for sale in the Paris market were seen as products of that market, just as Normandy seemed to be a product of the railroad that takes you there.”³⁶⁷

What we gather from Schivelbusch’s analysis of the dialectical expansion and contraction of space under the impact of railway travel and its transformative effects on socio-cultural

³⁶⁵ Why only unbound—can’t bound seriality be a generalized precondition for imagining national communities as well? The census for Anderson leads to cosmopolitan hybridity or classifying essentializing identities—but why doesn’t he consider this seriality as embodied in the map as equally a precondition and model for horizontal national imagining as well—since they are both based on modern abstractions. This model, which though it departs from the humanist universalist ethos Anderson’s universality gestures to, I think is closer to the actual formal structure of the United Nations which is composed of the joining uneven proportionalities of distinct national units. It is also the model for the Olympics if you actually look at its practice rather than its ideals. In any case this is more the model of cosmopolitan national imagining that appears from the relational positioning of Korea within the new imperialist geography of early modern colonial Korea.

³⁶⁶ Marx, *Capital, Volume I* (London: Penguin Books, 1976, 1990), p. 136.

³⁶⁷ Schivelbusch, p. 41.

perceptions of space-time is that the space which can be conceptually associated with the *openness* of ‘unbound seriality’ in Anderson’s discussion of newspapers qua space of action via the liberating universality of the “boundless, but grounded, universal series” of “quotidian universals”—the space of *landscape* which entails the space of action as well as the openness of paths for potential action—could also be seen to have been in large part destroyed or displaced by the very same technology and forces of the modern capitalist industrial economy that brought into consciousness the expanded yet “closed” or *bound* space of the nation as serial units of a “systematized,” wholly transparent “geographical space.” Gone with the in-between space of the journey or the experience of spatial distance was thus also the loss of openness in determining our desired routes and passages or the boundless actionable paths and journeys that may have existed *in potentiality* alongside the “circle of visibility” of the space of landscape. Thus in the case of railroads, the actionable, liberating comparative imagining essential to the logic of seriality was in part circumscribed and determined by the alienating processes and restrictive confines concomitant with the loss of the actually traversed space of *landscape* in the new expanded yet *bound* geographical space railroads.

Thus to return to Schivelbusch’ initial analogy between the destruction of particular locally rooted regional identities and the transformation of products into commodities through railroad mediated changes to the experience and processes of spatial *distance*, and contextualize it within the bounded homogenizing yet differentiated universal space of globalizing industrial capitalism, the transformation of the space of landscape into the new bounded systematized and totalizing “geographical space” of railroads mirrored the commodification of products upon its entry into the world market and the corresponding eclipse of its use value with the triumph of exchange value. The resulting anonymous and interchangeable identity of regions stripped of their ‘aura’ as they are incorporated into the railway network can be seen to approximate the commodity form or the exchange value of commodities that is created through the exchange economy of the capitalist system. As with the dual character of the commodity, the new perception of serial space created by railroads reflects the exchange value or commodity form of the product—or what Marx identified as the “suprasensual” aspect of the “sensual-suprasensual” commodity. More specifically it is a socio-cultural perception that is rooted in the restricted spatial economy structured through new material technologies born of the capitalist system. Like the fetishized character of the commodity form, the new perception of regions as created by the railroad both obscures the particular regional identity (i.e. a kind of use-value) of the place/space that is brought into the railroad network while imparting on these places/spaces a new form and identity (a kind of exchange value) produced through the mediation of the railroads. Thus analogous to the transformation of products into commodities upon its entry into the world market, the incorporation of regions into the new universal interconnected space of railway networks can be seen as part and parcel of the transformation of concrete locally meaningful and differentiated regional identities and its corresponding sociality and sensibilities (i.e. use value) into anonymous, generalized, substitutable units (i.e. exchange value)—or what Lefebvre describes as transformation of ‘absolute space’ to ‘abstract space’ via the elimination of differences by the homogenizing and fragmenting processes of capitalism.³⁶⁸

So on the one hand, just as commodities are anonymous because they are infinitely substitutable since they are determined in terms of exchange-value, so too are the various units of geographical or abstract space; they are indistinguishable from each other unlike places, which

³⁶⁸ Lefebvre, *PS*, chapter four.

have their local uniqueness and meaning. But on the other hand, also like commodities the particular exchange value or price form of commodities depends on their relation or measure to the historically produced ‘universal equivalent’ commodity like the money commodity—whose value is “expressed relatively in the infinite series of all other physical commodities,” much like Lefebvre’s analysis of the “*centralized, organized, hierarchized, symbolized*” production of leisure and work spaces or metropolitan central and peripheral colonial spaces where space is produced “*on the basis of a difference internal to the dominant mode of [capitalist] production*”³⁶⁹ Therefore, while they are indistinguishable from each other in the sense of local uniqueness and meaning, they are distinguishable from each other by their difference in *values* measured in relation to the universal equivalent or what Schivelbusch calls the “null point of the coordinate system.” However *depthless* geographical space was being rendered by the abstracting processes of capitalist industrial modernization and its mechanical technologies, the centralized and systematized logic the capitalist world system was also bringing about significant forms of *unevenness* in spatial transformations in local, national as well as global development—as seen in the differentiated values of metropolitan/peripheral hierarchies stemming from their relational position to the centers or the core of the modern capitalist world system—in its production of a new ‘geographical space’ of an increasingly interconnected world.

This would imply that on the one hand, particular places everywhere, including both “old” European/metropolitan and “new” colonial/peripheral place alike were undergoing transformation as they were all being constituted in parallel or horizontal fashion as formally equivalent units of “geographical space” by industrial transport innovations. On the other, articulated with the political economic realities and logics of the restricted spatial economy of modern global imperial capitalism driving these transport innovations, these new destination points were at the same time being constituted (or de particularized/abstracted) into differentiated and hierarchically varied forms in relation to 19th century metropolitan/provincial or imperial/colonial hierarchies of global industrialization and urbanization governing the uneven centralized hierarchical ‘bounded’ universality of the spatial system. As Anderson argued with respect to the new horizontal alignment of “old” European spaces and “new” colonial ones, the railroads likewise enabled a distinct new serial imagining of the world as synchronically rather than diachronically constituted formally comparable units. But at the same time, in the case of geographical space, “old” European and “new” colonial spaces were also coming into being with differentiated values now defined/ identified and measured/determined (at multiple scales) in relation to each other as well as to the historically produced yet systemically dominant universal centers/spaces of the bounded system of the transnational urban-rural railway network.

The differences presented by the serial logic of “geographical space” is owed in part to the material specificity of railroads—which is in and of itself a form of physical space and also a spatial technology or means of physical circulation, transportation, and interconnection (of capital, commodities, and people)—and in part to the historical juncture of its emergence amidst the changing organization of world space within 19th century global industrial capitalism and

³⁶⁹ Marx, *Capital, Volume I*, p. 161. As Marx states on the one hand the “universal equivalent form is a form of value in general” and “can therefore be assumed by any commodity. On the other hand a commodity is only to be found in the universal equivalent form (form C) if, and only in so far as, it is excluded from the ranks of all other commodities, as being their equivalent.” Moreover, The commodity that assumes this role as the money commodity, like gold “becomes its specific function, and consequently its social monopoly, to play the part of universal equivalent within the world of commodities.” This position is “historically conquered” and socially validated. I deal with this more closely in my chapter on Kimpo airport and the Seoul Olympics.

imperialism. For Schivelbusch, like print-capitalist technologies, the railroad provided a revolutionary apparatus for the modern apprehension of geographical consciousness and spatial relations across an increasingly interconnected world. But unlike print-capitalist technologies, a key vehicle for the accumulation of capital and expansion of capitalism, the changing *socio-cultural perceptions of space-time* of railroads was also intimately linked to the changes in modern space and socio-spatial relations more generally in the context of a globalizing industrial capitalism. Thus while Anderson saw the abstracting serial logic of the ‘unbound seriality’ of the print capitalist technology of newspapers to enable positive “open to the world plurals” which operated as an agent for new forms of belonging and communities to protect against the entropy of capitalism, the serial logic of the expanded yet “closed” system of 19th century railroads—endowed with restrictive confines, self-conscious, motivated forms of standardization, regulated forms of use, and operating in intimate alignment with centralized hierarchical and inequitable socio-economic and political logics of capitalism and new urban geographies of domination under the exchange regime, presents an alternatively dominated *alienating and systematized form of bound seriality* which in part circumscribed or determined the liberating comparative *activity* essential to the ‘unbound seriality’ of Anderson’s “quotidian universals.”

Rather, this way in which particular spaces are incorporated into the systematic closed network of formal equivalence and hierarchical dependence as differentiated *values* in the “geographical space” of the railroad network is perhaps best illustrated by analogy to Anderson’s seriality of the map—which in my reading hovers between bound and unbound seriality, incorporating essential elements of both—and is better suited to the designation of “universal quodians” or universal particulars than “quotidian universals.”³⁷⁰ In the example of the European Mercatorian map introduced to the colonies, Anderson shows us how, on the one hand, it maps the whole world through a uniform classificatory system of longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates, and on the other, it visualizes heterogeneous spatial entities as a series of formal equivalents, de-contextualizing Cairo and Mecca from a “sacred Muslim geography,” and classifying and serializing Cairo along with Paris and Manila in a *universal geography of mathematics*.³⁷¹ I would emphasize however that this *universal geography of mathematics* is of course not a natural or transparent system but can be seen as analogous to the “historically

³⁷⁰ See my earlier discussion of the map on pp. 9-10. When Anderson wrote the “Census, Map and Museum” chapter of *Imagined Communities*, the relationship between totalization/ enumeration and serialization was not as opposed and polarized as it becomes in his subsequent discussion of the logic of seriality in “The Spectre of Comparisons.” It appears that as Anderson opened up the idea of seriality—as a general precondition of the nation-form like homogenous empty time and thus to suit political forms of popular nationalism via the form of the newspaper, he was led to delineate what was intermingled in his earlier discussion of the map in IC into two distinct aesthetic forms/ logics—unbound seriality and bound seriality. His representative case of the new delineation of bound seriality is the census—while the map and museum are left out of the picture. I believe that if Anderson were to bring the map back into the discussion of the newly delineated structure of unbound and bound seriality in *The Spectre of Comparisons*, he might be strained to locate it in one as opposed to the other category, as its form entails more less clear cut differences.

³⁷¹ Anderson, *IC*, p. 170. Anderson calls this process of decontextualization and abstract serialization the ‘map-as-logo.’ For Anderson, this logo is characterized by “its emptiness, contextlessness, visual memorableness, and infinite reproducibility.” (185) What is interesting is that the abstraction associated with the commodity form or exchange value of Marx’s analysis of the commodity form also appears to be the template for Anderson’s seriality and can be seen as the principle shared analytic that links Anderson and Schivelbusch but Anderson detaches this process of abstraction from reification or alienation.

conquered” position of gold as the money commodity or the “universal equivalent” commodity.³⁷²

Section Two: Modernization, Modernism, and Modernity: Situating the Space-Time of Development

‘*All That is Solid Melts into Air*’ or Does it?

The paradoxical condition of modern industrialization and its attendant social and cultural manifestations as a form of ‘creative destruction’ or an experience that is simultaneously alienating and destructive as it is liberating and creative, the defining form of Marx’s historical materialist narrative of modern capitalism and Schivelbusch’s analytic of the expanded yet diminished space of 19th century railways, is also the central motif of Marshall Berman’s *All That is Solid Melts Into Air*, which unfolds the dialectic of the destructive yet liberating forces of social, political economic *modernization* and the creative “visions and values” of *modernism*—developing in response to and challenging these forces and processes “to give [men and women] the power to change the world that is changing them, to make their way through the maelstrom and make it their own.”³⁷³ According to Berman,

There is a mode of vital experience—experience of space and time, of the self and others, of life’s possibilities and perils—that is shared by men and women all over the world today. I will call this body of experience “modernity.” To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformations of ourselves and the world—and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are. Modern environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish. To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, “All that is solid melts into air.”³⁷⁴

As explored throughout this capacious and captivating text, if the experience of “modernity” or being “modern” is the condition of being mired in the “paradoxical unity” of “perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish” brought upon by the transformative—both destructive and creative—“world-historical processes” of *modernization*, what emerges as the defining character of Berman’s “modernism”—understood apart from the canonical history of big ‘M’ Modernism whether in literary or other aesthetic disciplines such as art and architecture—is the dialectical response to

³⁷² I want to emphasize that it is the general Mercatorian map that I see as analogous to this second-order signification system and not just the map-as-logo in which colonial territories were colored according to different imperial dyes. This would appear to constitute a third-level semiological system.

³⁷³ Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (NY: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 16.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

these both destructive and creative processes of *modernization* which enthusiastically take up while at the same time passionately challenge the very contradictions, possibilities, and traumas that accompany this “maelstrom of modern life,”—which as examined through the figure of Goethe’s Faust is primarily seen as “the tragedy of development.”

For Berman, Marx is the archetypal “modernist,” and *The Communist Manifesto* is “the first great modernist work of art.”³⁷⁵ Wrestling Marx away from the narrow confines of theorists of modernization, Berman reads the “dialectical motion of modernity [that] turns ironically against its prime movers” in Marx’s Manifesto—as the progenitor of a modernist culture and sensibility, shared in the literature of Baudelaire, whereby the simultaneous experience and condition of emancipation and enlargement as well as alienation and atomization propels us into a perpetual state of—“agitation and turbulence, psychic dizziness and drunkenness, expansion of experiential possibilities and destruction of moral boundaries and personal bonds, self-enlargement and self-derangement, phantoms in the street and in the soul.”³⁷⁶ While Berman locates the stirring of this sensibility with an earlier phase of modernity, nineteenth century modernism is for Berman a kind of golden age, which loses its luster in the 20th century. As Berman characterizes 19th century modernism:

Marx, Baudelaire and many others strove to grasp this world-historical process and appropriate it for mankind: to transform the chaotic energies of economic and social change into new forms of meaning and beauty, of freedom and solidarity; to help their fellow men and help themselves to become the subjects as well as objects of modernization...from the fusion of empathy and irony, romantic surrender and critical perspective—modernist art and thought came into being.³⁷⁷

Thus Berman also takes up Marx’s dialectic of historical materialism as the model and touchstone for the very culture and sensibility of modernism. Moreover, in Berman’s text, Schivelbusch’ expanded and diminished space of modern industrial railroads could be seen not only writ-large as the paradoxical condition of modernity but also opened up as the very ground, however unstable as it is enabling, of new forms of modern “meaning, of freedom, dignity, beauty, joy, solidarity” and from where we may “be able to reach out further, to look and listen more closely, to see and feel beneath surfaces, to make comparisons over a wider range of space and time, to grasp hidden patterns and forces and connections, in order to show people who look and speak and think and feel differently from each other—who are oblivious to each other, or fearful of each other—that they have more in common than they think.”³⁷⁸

The Modernism of the Periodized Historical Time of Capitalism

Berman’s text has garnered various responses and critiques but I will focus below on the fairly well-known response by Perry Anderson in so far as it keys into the problematic of Marxist chronology and broader conceptions of space and time in an ostensibly interconnected global capitalist world system vis-à-vis Marxist interpretations, debates and critiques of modern society

³⁷⁵ Berman, p. 88.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 174.

³⁷⁸ Berman, “The Signs in the Street: A Response to Perry Anderson,” *New Left Review* vol. 144 (March-April 1984), p. 123.

and culture under capitalism. Perry Anderson begins by pointing out that ‘modernity’ for Berman can be seen as both the force/impact of objective social *development* and subjective *self-development* paradoxically united (in dramatic tension) in Berman’s text wherein “development” is conceived of as continuous social disruption and dissolution operating within a “planar” process of undifferentiated “homogenous historical time:”³⁷⁹

Note the three adjectives: constant, uninterrupted, everlasting. They denote a *homogenous* historical time, in which each moment is perpetually different from every other by virtue of being *next*, but—by the same token—is eternally *the same* as an interchangeable unit in a process of infinite recurrence. Extrapolated from the totality of Marx’s theory of capitalist development, this emphasis very quickly and easily yields the paradigm of modernization proper—an anti-Marxist theory, of course, politically...the relevant point is that the idea of modernization involves a conception of fundamentally *planar* development—a continuous-flow process in which there is not real differentiation of one conjuncture or epoch from another save in terms of mere chronological succession of old and new, earlier and later, categories themselves subject to unceasing permutation of positions in one direction, as time goes by and the later becomes earlier, the newer older.³⁸⁰

Alternatively, as Anderson lays out his objection to Berman’s reading of Marx’s *Manifesto*, he argues that there is another side to Marx’s theory of modern revolution—which importantly suggests an alternate conception of “development” and lays forth a different structure of time pertaining to “modernization” than the homogenous time implied in Berman’s account of “modernity” as a form of perpetual revolution. In contradistinction to the “*homogenous* historical time” extrapolated from Marx’s conception of capitalist accumulation underlying modernization as a “planar” mode of development, he states that “a complex and differential” structure of time can be found in Marx’s “own conception of the historical time of the capitalist mode of production” which is most obviously demonstrated in Marx’s analysis of a differentiated class society.³⁸¹ Once this differentiated structure and concept of (classed) “society” is brought into the picture in lieu of Berman’s similarly undifferentiated concept of “the culture of modernism” then we are led to a different and importantly temporally differentiated notion of “development”—namely the development of bourgeois modernity followed by its decline via the proletarian revolution.

Extending his reading beyond the *Manifesto* to the *Grundrisse* as well as *The German Ideology* and focusing in on the teleological narrative of proletarian revolution contained in these texts, Perry Anderson states that quite unlike the planar process of development implied in Berman’s reading:

...the trajectory of the bourgeois order is curvilinear. It traces, not a straight line ploughing endlessly forward, or a circle expanding infinitely outwards, but a marked parabola. Bourgeois society knows an ascent, a stabilization and a descent. In the very passages of *Grundrisse* which contain the most

³⁷⁹ Perry Anderson, “Modernity and Revolution,” *New Left Review* vol. 144 (March-April 1984), p. 101.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

lyrical and unconditional affirmations of the unity of economic development and individual development that provides the pivot of Berman's argument, when Marx writes of 'the point of flowering' of the basis of the capitalist mode of production, as 'the point at which it can be united with the highest development of productive forces, and thus also of the richest development of the individual' —he also stipulates expressly: 'It is nevertheless still this basis, this plant in flower, and therefore it fades after flowering.' 'As soon as this point has been reached,' he goes on, 'any further development takes the form of decline.' In other words, the history of capitalism is *periodized*, and its determinate *trajectory* reconstructed, if we are to have any sober understanding of what capitalist 'development' actually means. The concept of modernization occludes the very possibility of that.³⁸²

Hence to counter the ideology and politics of the concept of 'modernization' that Berman's definition of modernity uncomfortably straddles, Perry Anderson stresses the importance of the *differentiated concept of historical time* that becomes undeniable when looking through the concept of (classed) 'society' in Marx's grand teleological narrative of modernity and revolutionary emancipation. Perry Anderson challenges the concept of "homogenous historical time" implied in the concept of modernization (modern globalization) as a form of 'planar development' under capitalism and situates it as a *periodized* segment of Marx's broader differentiated "parabolic" conception of historical time. We might also note at this point that in *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson also takes up the concept of 'homogenous empty time' as a unique modern condition—and reinterprets the potential of this 'planar' condition as one that leads not only to incessant social dissolution but also to what is undeniably one of the most enduring forms of communities in modern society (like Marx's working class)—the nation as a new social and political unit/group. However, what both Perry Anderson's critique and Benedict Anderson's time of imagined communities appears to share along with Berman is a highly *a-spatial* conception of time and abstract/fetishized conception of space. Any conception of time necessarily implies space. But depending on the way time is being thought, it lays forth very distinct conceptions—from abstract and mutually exclusive passive envelopes to concrete dialectical social relations. While space is touched upon by both authors, and in some cases extensively dealt with, it is an abstract space (analogous to the homogenous empty time of modernization) conceived of as a passive container or envelope rather than a complex and differentiated interplay of past and present social relations that grounds these discussions.

Although Perry Anderson adamantly argues for a differentiated 'curvilinear' or 'parabolic' conception of historical time in Marx in an effort to contain or contextualize the political implications of modernity as form of 'planar development,' he does not give the differential constitution of space consideration as equally important of an internal principle to the history of capitalist development. Perry Anderson's critique of homogenous time proceeds by his rejection of Berman's undifferentiated concept of the "culture of modernism" in favor of a classed/differentiated understanding of 'society.' Arguing that "the most obviously way in which this differential temporality enters into the very construction of Marx's model of capitalism is, of course, at the level of the *class order* generated by it," Perry Anderson's critique of time is inextricably linked to his critique of Berman's undifferentiated (un-classed) concept of

³⁸² Ibid., pp. 101-102.

‘culture’.³⁸³ But he is unable to go beyond the mere rejection of homogenous empty time and push further and flesh out the implications of how a truly differentiated concept of (classed) society could then or in itself lead to a subversion of the very idea of ‘planar’ development—because of his focus on “periodization” and “reconstructing” the right “*determinate trajectory*” of the history of capitalism, which belies at base an a-spatial conception of (capitalist) history.³⁸⁴ By internal subversion, what I mean is that he is unable to consider *how the same forms or technologies of homogenous empty time—such as railroads—can affect and be affected by different class groups differently across the differentiated space of world capitalism leading to different forms of politics and political organization* as can be seen at least gestured to in Marx’s Manifesto in which as the railroads slide from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the proletarians to facilitate the physical union and political organization of the workers’ political struggle—the railroads simultaneously occupy the symbol and vehicle of the emiseration and social leveling of workers as well as the symbol and vehicle of the appropriation of their labor qua tool of revolution. As Perry Anderson challenges homogenous empty time principally within an *a-spatial* conception of Marxist periodization—he does not engage the idea of space as a truly differentiated socio-historical phenomena that is inextricable to considerations of time—which would require that he necessarily extend his critique/ critical glance *across societies differentiated spatially in time*—and to look at the uneven ‘classed’ nature of the modern world geography of nation-states which presents a significant structural feature of the modern interconnected capitalist world system. Any attempt to challenge Berman’s undifferentiated concept of “planar” development—qua “modernization” and a corresponding undifferentiated idea of the “culture of Modernism”—would have to inherently take up the uneven heterogeneous socio-political and cultural world geography of capitalist industrialization.

“*Multiple Modernisms*” or *Monolithic Modernism*?

Perry Anderson’s fetishized/abstract conception of space³⁸⁵ subordinated to the paramount concern with a linear differentiated parabolic time is best illustrated by his discussion of the “multiplicity of modernisms,” a rejoinder to Berman’s theory and chronology of modernism. Finding fault with the ostensible coherence of Berman’s examples of aesthetic modernism presented without any “internal principle of variation” and one which “keeps on reproducing itself,” Perry Anderson deconstructs Berman’s periodization of literary examples of modernism to point out that what Berman examines as key modernist texts are actually both temporally differentiated dating back to the 18th and 19th century or earlier rather than the 20th century and thus “preceding modernism proper.”³⁸⁶ As Anderson states “modernism”

as a specific set of aesthetic forms, is generally dated precisely *from* the 20th century, is indeed typically construed by way of contrast with realist and other classical forms of the 19th, 18th or earlier centuries. Virtually all of the actual literary texts analysed so well by Berman—whether by Goethe or Baudelaire, Pushkin or Dostoevsky—precede modernism proper in the usual sense of the word: the only exceptions are fictions by Bely and Mandelstam, which are 20th century artefacts. In other words, by more conventional criteria,

³⁸³ Ibid., p. 101.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 102.

³⁸⁵ I discuss this concept in my discussion of Lefebvre below.

³⁸⁶ Perry Anderson, p. 102.

modernism too needs to be framed within some more differential conception of historical time.³⁸⁷

In addition, reperiodized and reclassified this way, Anderson also points to the wide-ranging geographical distribution of modernisms and thus the “differential” “space of modernism” stating:³⁸⁸

Even within the European or Western world generally, there are major areas that scarcely generated any modernist momentum at all. My own country England, the pioneer of capitalist industrialization and master of the world market for a century, is a major case in point: beachhead for Eliot or Pound, offshore to Joyce, it produced no virtually significant native movement of a modernist type in the first decades of this century—unlike Germany or Italy, France or Russia, Holland or America. It is no accident that it should be the great absentee from Berman’s conspectus in *All that is Solid Melts into Air* itself.³⁸⁹

Though Anderson brings up the absence of English literature in Berman’s literary modernism—surprising, as it was the indisputable hub of capitalist industrialization—to argue towards and demonstrate the “differential” “space of modernism,” his eventual circumscribed geography (strictly determined by temporal chronology) and ultimate reconstruction of modernism’s periodization in his counterargument—where space is subordinated to an alternative though principally periodized “differential historical temporality”³⁹⁰ of western Modernism—indicates otherwise. At the same time, his reconstruction of a more detailed and more proper periodization of European Modernism also reasserts the big ‘M’ Modernism—the trajectory of canonical literary and aesthetic movements and works (that also proceeds by a particular European cultural frame and chronology which sees the development of art as the movement from realism to abstraction moving from European Impressionism (1880s), Post-Impressionism (1890s), Expressionism (1890s-1900), Cubism and Futurism (1910-1920), Dada and Surrealism (post WWI- 1940s) etc. leading ultimately to American Abstract Expressionism (1950s) that Berman sought to set aside.³⁹¹ This is illustrated in Anderson’s above comment regarding the lack of English literature in Berman’s modernism—which is strange if we consider as Berman did that Marx’s *Communist Manifesto* was “the first great modernist work of art.”³⁹²

As Anderson proceeds to lay out an alternative socio-political account of modernism—contra “Berman’s perennialism”—Anderson suggests that, “we should look rather for a

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ Ibid. But Berman considered *The Communist Manifesto* as an example of English literature.

³⁹⁰ Perry Anderson, p. 103.

³⁹¹ See for example an Art History survey text. I also think that Anderson is forcing the point about modernism proper beginning in the 20th century. At least in terms of canonical art history, one always begins with the late 19th century Impressionist and Post-Impressionist movements to chronologize the development of Modern Art.

³⁹² Moreover, Anderson also neglects the Arts and Crafts Movement associated with William Morris which began in the late 19th century Britain and spread out to the European continent with much influence on various budding “official” avant-garde movements until the 1930s—including the German Bauhaus. This neglect is not surprising considering the somewhat marginal position of the movement in the formalist art historical canon in part because of its impurities incorporating industrial design, furniture, and other decorative arts rather than the pure focus on painting and sculpture.

conjunctural explanation of the set of aesthetic practices and doctrines subsequently grouped together as ‘modernist’. Such an explanation would involve the intersection of different historical temporalities, to compose a typically overdetermined configuration.”³⁹³ But as he goes on to alternatively identify ‘modernism’ as “a cultural field of force *triangulated* by three decisive coordinates”—all three of which are extrapolated from within European history and confined to the space of Europe and North America—the differential “space of modernism” continues to narrow even more in scale and scope and becomes subsumed under the temporalized history of western capitalism proper. The three coordinates Anderson identifies are 1) academicism - “the codification of a highly formalized academicism...which itself was...still setting the political and cultural tone in country after country of pre-First World War Europe”; 2) “the still incipient, hence essentially *novel*, emergence within these societies of the key technologies or inventions of the second industrial revolution: telephone, radio, automobile, aircraft and so on”³⁹⁴; and 3) “the imaginative proximity of social revolution... In no European state was bourgeois democracy completed as a form, or the labour movement integrated or coopted as a force. The possible revolutionary outcomes of a downfall of the old order was thus still profoundly ambiguous.”³⁹⁵ As for their *triangulation*, the official academicism accompanying the “persistence of ‘anciens régimes’” formed the “common adversary” against which the “wide span of aesthetic practices” forged a unity of modernism as well as providing these new practices with “a set of available codes and resources” with which to resist “the ravages of the market as an organizing principle of culture and society—uniformly detested by every species of modernism.”³⁹⁶ Second, at the same time, “the energies and attractions of a new machine age” supplied “a powerful imaginative stimulus” “for a different kind of ‘modernist’ sensibility.”³⁹⁷ The incipient stage of the new technologies of the second industrial revolution was pertinent, which rested on the uncertainty of “where the new devices and inventions were going to lead.”³⁹⁸ And third “the haze of social revolution drifting across the horizon of this epoch” furnished yet other “currents of modernism most unremittingly and violently radical in their rejection of the social order as a whole” best exemplified in “German Expressionism.”³⁹⁹

However, as Perry Anderson continues, this fertile period of the early twentieth century was dramatically altered by the First World War, after which it was sustained “in a kind of hectic after-life” fueling these and additional “‘modernist’ forms” such as the architectural modernism of Bauhaus in Germany and surrealism in France, until the Second World War, which ultimately “destroyed all three of the historical coordinates...cut[ting] off the vitality of modernism.”⁴⁰⁰ With this trajectory Anderson corrects Berman’s periodization of modernism that located the demise of its vitality at the turn of the twentieth century. For Anderson it is the period after WWII, where “the old semi-aristocratic or agrarian order and its appurtenances was finished in, every country” and “bourgeois democracy was finally universalized” severing “critical links with a pre-capitalist past,” coupled with the arrival of “Fordism” in which “mass production and

³⁹³ Perry Anderson, p. 104.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104. Anderson continues: “Mass consumption industries based on new technologies had not yet been implanted anywhere in Europe, where clothing, food and furniture remained overwhelmingly the largest final-goods sectors in employment and turnover down to 1914.”

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

consumption transformed the West European economies along North American lines,” that the conditions which gave rise to the pregnant liminal state of uncertainty of social, technological and political futures perished taking away “the smallest doubt as to what kind of society this technology would consolidate: an oppressively stable, monolithically industrial, capitalist civilization.”⁴⁰¹ Gone with this “ambiguity” was:

an *openness* of horizon, where the shapes of the future could alternatively assume the shifting forms of either a new type of capitalism, or of the eruption of socialism—which was constitutive of so much of the original sensibility of what had come to be called modernism.⁴⁰²

The new environment of “post-industrial capitalism” replaced “small workshops and store counters” with department stores, “gasoline stations along American superhighways, the glossy photographs in the magazines, or the cellophane paradise of an American drugstore” and came to fully conceal and thus efface “the mark of human labour.”⁴⁰³ Drawing from the early writings of Frederic Jameson—which would later find full development in his magnum opus *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*—Anderson describes the essence of the change brought about in the post war period as the technological indeterminacy of earlier years became fixed under a matured or advanced capitalist system:

Henceforth, in what we may call post-industrial capitalism, the products with which we are furnished are utterly without depth: their plastic content is totally incapable of serving as a conductor of psychic energy. All libidinal investment in such objects is precluded from the outset, and we may well ask ourselves, if it is true that our object universe is henceforth unable to yield any ‘symbol apt at stirring human sensibility’, whether we are not here in the presence of cultural transformation of signal proportions, a historical break of an unexpectedly radical kind.⁴⁰⁴

In addition, post 1945 geopolitics—namely the “onset of the Cold War and the Sovietization of Eastern Europe” squelched the hope or possibility of revolution or “any realistic prospect of a socialist overthrow of advanced capitalism” in the West.⁴⁰⁵

The ambiguity of aristocracy, the absurdity of academicism, the gaiety of the first cars or movies, the palpability of a socialist alternative, were now all gone. In their place, there now reigned a routinized, bureaucratized economy of universal commodity production, in which mass consumption and mass culture had become virtually interchangeable terms. The post-war avant-gardes were to be essentially defined against this quite new backdrop...little

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid., p. 109.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., p. 107.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid. Quote from Frederic Jameson’s *Marxism and Form*, Princeton 1971 p. 96.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

of the literature, painting, music or architecture of this period can stand comparison with that of the antecedent epoch.⁴⁰⁶

Hence aside from a few exceptional and individual works like Jean Luc Godard's cinema in France—which is also contextually explained by its appearance in the liminal period of political transformation from the Fourth to the Fifth, Gaulist Republic—Perry Anderson posits that Modernism and the West finally settled into the sterile period of modernism where “the ideology and cult of modernism was born” characterized by “the closure of horizons: without an appropriable past, or imaginable future, in an interminably recurrent present.”⁴⁰⁷

Third World 'Modernism' as Undifferentiated Spatial and Temporal Parergon

If we were wondering what happened to the non-West during these years—where it appears Modernism was both not going on and had no effect on the apparently autonomous cultural-geographic internal Western development of Modernism—the “Third World” suddenly emerges in Anderson's narrative—donned with the halo of a romanticized postwar primitivism “as a shadow configuration of what once prevailed in the First World”⁴⁰⁸—at the juncture of the passing of the proper vital Western Modernism. Perry Anderson argues that the “closure of horizons” characteristic of post WWII First World Modernism was not true “of the Third World” from which so many of “Berman's examples of what he reckons to be the great modernist achievements of our time” are taken from:⁴⁰⁹

For in the Third World generally, a kind of *shadow configuration of what once prevailed in the First World* does exist today. Pre-capitalist oligarchies of various kinds, mostly of a landowning character, abound; capitalist development is typically far more rapid and dynamic, where it does occur, in these regions than in the metropolitan zones, but on the other hand is infinitely less stabilized or consolidated; socialist revolution haunts these societies as a permanent possibility, one indeed already realized in countries close to home—Cuba or Nicaragua, Angola or Vietnam. These are the conditions that produced the genuine masterpieces of recent years that conform to Berman's categories: novels like Gabriel Garcia Marquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, or Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children*, from Colombia or India, or films like Yilmiz Guney's *Yol* from Turkey. Works such as these, however, are not timeless expressions of an ever-expanding process of modernization, but emerge in quite delimited constellations, in societies still at definite historical crossroads. The Third World furnishes no fountain of eternal youth for modernism.⁴¹⁰

As Perry Anderson's reconstructed trajectory of Modernism resituates Modernism's break to the post WWII “post-industrial capitalism” and re-periodizes Berman's modernisms, he appears to argue towards a different status and understanding of “Third World” modernism—as

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 109.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

a historically situated phenomenon that is both similar and different from First World Modernism—in a somewhat contrast to Berman’s reading of 20th century Latin American literature. But while Anderson’s contextualization of Modernism’s vitality and development in specific capitalist driven political-economic and social events and contexts of Euro-America—which is to say a specific chronology of modernization—is supposed to present a more socially embedded theory of modernist aesthetic developments propelling his argument against a paradigm of perpetual modernization or a perennial modernism, as he moves to Latin America and Asia the categorical frame (which governs the three criteria which Anderson uses to socially embed and re-periodize Modernism) for the contextualization and periodization of Latin American and Asian M/modernisms follows from same model as that which developed from considerations of the European context. Thus as the contextualization follows from the generalization of Eurocentric chronology and narrative of capitalist development established in western Marxism enacted through the imposition of Western categorical frames for investigation as trans-historical phenomena, “Third World” M/modernism appears more like a modular repetition of the Western model—also appearing uniformly across an *undifferentiated* “Third World”—rather than socio-politically contextualized or any sort of ‘multiple modernism.’⁴¹¹ Thus while Perry Anderson’s critique of Berman’s ‘homogenous historical time’ of modernity and ‘planar development’ seeks to differentiate and redefine the temporality of European Modernisms with the parabolic form of Marx’s differentiated “historical time” (if only to reproduce the canonical Euro-American aesthetic paradigm) as a means toward producing a more stable and less ambiguous frame for conceptualizing revolution—it at the same time limits the scope of its universality and conceptual and practical applicability across the actually differentiated global landscape—stemming from its treatment of modern world space as kind of abstract passive envelope across which historical time actively lights up particular pockets of geographies or brings them to life as it passes across it—leaving other spaces untouched and outside of history proper until it is animated by the correct reconstituted trajectory of capitalist modernization history.⁴¹²

In Anderson’s analysis, the ‘multiplicity of modernism’ is primarily a sequential multiplicity (corresponding to different stages or ‘epochs’ of Modernism) and does not extend beyond the different forms of European Modernisms until the period or era where the vitality of Modernism itself is extinguished by the universalization of “Fordism” and “Bourgeois democracy in the West”—whereby mass culture is engulfed by mass consumption and people live without any real hope of political revolution such as the socialist overthrow of advanced

⁴¹¹ I align this critique with various other critiques of Western Marxist history that can be found as a significant thread of postcolonial history such as Dipesh Chakrabarty’s *Provincializing Europe*, Partha Chatterjee’s *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, and Timothy Mitchell’s *Colonizing Egypt*, challenging this historical narrative from cultural, sociological, philosophical and geographical angles. The spatial emphasis of my analysis here moreover intersects with the historical-geographical thought of Marxist social geographers such as Doreen Massey and Gillian Hart, whose critical theories and empirical analyses of space have extended Henri Lefebvre’s social theories of space into postcolonial thought. Perry Anderson’s points in the essay—are thus important as representative of an important but insufficient, I believe, knowledge paradigm of (western) modernity that is taken to be universally valid—and can be more politically limiting to actually assessing the differences among various political and cultural formations across the world (like nationalisms) from which we can start to think about where they can and do really intersect in order to build future political solidarities against capitalism.

⁴¹² Human Geographer Doreen Massey uses the passive envelope metaphor in *Space, Place, and Gender* to argue against such a-spatial treatments of space using Lefebvre. My critique of Perry Anderson here is essentially the same critique I make of Benedict Anderson—who makes a similar move to stabilize the politics of nationalism aligned to the classical 19th century nationalist project.

capitalism. At this point of Modernism's decline, *an undifferentiated* Third World suddenly appears on the scene encompassing Central and Latin Americas, Asia and Eastern Europe/Middle East—in an oddly Hegelian fashion activated by the trajectory of the historical progression of capitalism—to enlarge the geographical space under consideration beyond Europe. This is certainly the same Hegelian historical and geographical narrative of 'universal history' we find in the canonical trajectory of aesthetic Modernism, even outside Marxist discourse of capitalist development and revolution. In the aesthetic disciplinary narratives of Modernism such as Art History, the movement likewise begins in the late 19th century and proceed to Abstract Expressionism of the 1950s—which Anderson regards as the final frontier or "last genuine avant-garde of the West" and marks the passing or death of a genuine Modernism with a distinctive rift between Modernism and Postmodernism. And not only is the contemporary art of non-Western artists finally incorporated into the fray at the point of a real vital or classic Modernism's passing but this is also the entry point for feminist artists and movements as well as the retrospective inclusion of various non-Western immigrant or diasporic traditions in the story of Modernism. To consider this belated attention/spotlighting of the majority of the world's aesthetic and cultural developments as a "shadow configuration of what once prevailed in the First World" or to dismiss it as a symptom of a more perfected market system—"a function of a gallery-system necessitating regular output of new styles as materials for seasonal commercial display, along the lines of *haute-couture*: an economic pattern corresponding to the *non*-reproducible character of 'original' works in these particular fields"—is surely unsatisfactory and insufficient.⁴¹³ Perhaps most importantly because one, much of these shadows emerged from heretofore marginalized spaces of the "First World" as well as the "Third,"⁴¹⁴ and two because what ostensibly appear as mere shadows of European Modernist traditions in the "Third World" have significant elements that depart from and cannot be explained by the three factors that Perry Anderson isolates from European history.⁴¹⁵ As such, 'Postmodernism'—and the concomitant reconsideration of M/modernism/s—remain contested topics and ones which have inherently demanded both political engagement and a push beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries—challenging regnant narratives of Modernism, Modernism, and Modernity and its related concepts (such as time and space) including those of Marxism.

For a scholar interested in East Asian modernity—which cannot be understood without examining Western modernity, but also cannot be understood solely based on Western modernity—and thus trying to look at both similarities and differences, relationships and departures between Western and Korean developments in modern thought and culture both synchronically and diachronically, Anderson's differentiated periodization is more alienating and limiting to understanding—the first emergence of modern thought in 1890s Korean enlightenment nationalist discourse, its first 'modern' (Western-style) novels appearing at the start of the 20th century along anticolonial nationalism or its 'colonial modern' neoclassical train

⁴¹³ Perry Anderson, p. 108.

⁴¹⁴ For example, feminist art, postcolonial art, or the Act Up movement against AIDS which was an artistic, cultural and political movement led by the Gay Men's Health Crisis in the 1980s.

⁴¹⁵ For example, in non-Western societies which were introduced to European Modernism via late and colonial modernization, the codes of classical traditions could not play the same role as it did for emerging Modernisms in Europe—and these ulterior developments become significant elements of post WWII non Western modernist works. Moreover, the incorporation of the vocabulary and values of Western Modernism as part of colonial modernization and (jumbled with Western classical traditions)—and with the experience of fragmentary and uneven modernizations in colonial areas set the ground for different Modernist sensibilities in East Asia than Europe. These elements will be explored in the next chapter on the early modern literature of railway journeys in colonial Korea.

stations of the 1920s as much as it is to understanding post WWII “modern” International Style airports, films and novels—than the generality of Berman’s undifferentiated ‘culture of modernism.’ Oddly enough, it seems even if Berman’s spatially undifferentiated universalist little ‘m’ modernism sweeps aside differences across socio-political contexts of modernist movements⁴¹⁶—his corresponding move to open up the definition of cultural/aesthetic ‘modernism’—beyond the canonical formal and chronological standards of Western Modernism—also allows for openings for comparisons and connections between non-Western modernist thought and works such as the early anti-colonial modern nationalist manifestos, treatises as well as novels from early 20th century Korea and Marx’s *Communist Manifesto* or Baudelaire’s literature and essays which share a similar ‘modernist sensibility,’ if reflecting and responding to as well as challenging very different contexts and experiences of modernization. And while Berman’s discussion of Russian modernism as alternatively responding to and challenging “the anguish of underdevelopment”—unlike the modernisms of Marx and Baudelaire which responds to and challenges modernity from the experience of its excess or abundance—may fall short of fully grasping the particular contradictions behind the desire for modernity and the anguish of its absence in the alternative context of precolonial and colonial Korea, it opens up a way to think about different modernisms arising from the very unevenness and differentiated structure and experience of global capitalist modernization. I believe that these aspects of Berman’s model also key into my main objection to or difference from Benedict Anderson’s theory of nationalism vis-à-vis print-capitalism. For Anderson’s modular model of nationalism as something that became a replica without an original from the beginning available to the world for pirating is very appealing. But Benedict Anderson does not make the corresponding opening up move as Berman does (as seen in his non-traditional definitions and categorization of what counts as modernisms in his framework). Unlike Berman, in so far as Anderson maintains the classical 19th century definition/project of nationalism as a universal standard and the measure for the only good true universalism, and distinguishes a separate sensibility of nationalist imagining in the genealogy of long-distance nationalism as its deviant other (not unlike the way Perry Anderson dismisses postwar art as a “symptom of a more perfected market system” and devoid of the very vitality and political promise of Modernism proper—as they are both read off the same stagist chronology of capitalist development)—it limits the universality of Anderson’s framework as a model for examining various forms of historical anticolonial nationalisms arising in very different though interdependent/interrelated global contexts, and their contemporary legacies or manifestations.

To come back to considering the railroad as a ‘modern’ social time-space technology/construct yet appearing in different historical spaces and times, the spatial logic of the long eclipse and sudden appearance of non-western societies and geographies into the frame of an heretofore exclusive European history of capitalism and narrative of Modernization or Modernism in the post WWII period raises the following questions and objections for me. First, if those “Third World” Modernist works from the post-war period which Perry Anderson regards as “genuine” yet belated “masterpieces of recent years” are not to be considered “timeless expressions of an ever-expanding process of modernization, but emerge in quite delimited constellations” contra Berman, then how exactly are they then seamlessly brought into the historical narrative of Modernism all of a sudden—considering their social and geographical differences and distances from the historical trajectory of European Modernism which had

⁴¹⁶ Berman is at least more democratic about this in that he does not rigorously differentiate Western Modernist movements while leaving the non-Western ones in an indiscriminate lumpen-like mass.

occurred half a century earlier?⁴¹⁷ For example, are we to examine the Modernist form of the railroad station or airport appearing in the 1960s South Korea or a novel which uses the railroad or airport as a literary trope *in terms of* Modernist architecture as it evolved in Western Europe or Western novelistic tropes without recourse to considering the history of railroad stations of early twentieth century Korea which first introduced a motley of imported and hybridized classical and modern styles as part of the culture of colonial militaristic urban modernization and tourism or the way the railroad figured the site of a revolutionary new national consciousness in the first “new novels” at the turn of the century colonial Korea? What may ostensibly appear as “historical pastiche” in the Western Postmodernist framework and chronology, when situated in the postcolonial East, may alternatively reveal grand narratives of nation building and emancipation—what postmodernism supposedly calls an end to.

In other words, are these works, in so far as they are spatially distanced from the European centers of Modernism proper, *without history and without space*? Either the history/historical impact of those eventful and tumultuous events of the first decade of the twentieth century which Anderson narrated as the context of various European Modernist movements from Surrealism to Futurism such as the decline of European dynastic regimes which were also importantly Imperial powers or the Russian Revolution, as well as other more regional historical lineages ensuing from these “Third World” works’ particular social and geopolitical positioning—as European peripheries, colonies, or otherwise? What clearly emerges as an abstract centralized geographical *space* of Modernism and Modernization in Anderson’s narrative is a conception of world space composed of separate, passive, unrelated pockets or segments which have no concrete interconnections with one another. Of course European spaces are thoroughly interconnected into a unity that is on the other extreme taken for granted, but this space is disconnected from the rest of the world geography by virtue of the logic of a western capitalist (stagist) history—serving as the driving motor of historical progression. And following from this kind of disconnected spatial logic behind Anderson’s Modernism, these Third World works’ odd status as “shadow configurations,” which parallels their temporal positioning outside of the history/time of Modernism (only to appear at its passing or death), in effect deny them spatial presence as they are made to hover above and behind concrete European histories and Modernist movements grounded in differentiated and distinct historical space-times, both past and present. When these belated “Third World” works do finally appear they appear in “delimited constellations” which can neither touch/affect nor alter both the “genuine” and *general* history and narrative of Modernism proper recounted by Anderson’s trajectory in the past or the present except as existing as belated and imitative copies of First World Modernism.

Second, if all works appearing outside of the space-time of European Modernism, even if regarded as ahistorical abstractions or ghostly after-effects of Modernism, are at the same time considered as “genuine masterpieces”—as Anderson does not regard these as mere market symptoms, like their Western contemporaries—then would not the historical lineages and contexts of their production—which includes the space-times of Europe as much as those of Colombia or India, etc. *and their interconnections* from the early twentieth century and earlier to the present be significant factors for the very ‘modern’ identities of these post WWII works—and which may present important differences in relation to their Western originals? As the decline of ancient European powers set off imperial rivalries (i.e. the carving up Africa amongst old and new imperial powers, as well as China, Korea, etc.) consolidating power over much of

⁴¹⁷ Perry Anderson, p. 109.

the space non-European world, it was also interlinked to and set off a series of wars and social transformations in these places that do not have a place in Anderson's politico-historical narrative but presented important structuring mechanisms for modernization and modernity in Asia. The regional Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 turned the East Asian regional order upside down and stimulated and structured the approach and character of modernization in Korea. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, which erupted across Korea, China and Japan is another important example—and one which also old and new Western imperial powers Britain, France and the US were both directly and indirectly involved—which significantly altered the social and political landscapes of East Asia. Thus what is left out of the context of Anderson's spatially abstracted European Modernist history are a series of historical events and social sedimentations—directly related to the spatial development/progression of global industrial capitalism—beyond Europe that could have and undoubtedly *did* also stimulate and transform new forms of aesthetic and cultural practices—influences inherited from non-Western social traditions, as well as the direct and indirect effect and imports of Western traditions and technologies, and the combinatory and conflicting interactions between the two—in these places from before 1900 but also from 1900 to 1945 and beyond.

In particular, what is the status of European (and Japanese) *colonialism/imperialism* in the progression of capitalist history—which certainly looms large in the background of all the 'Third World' examples that Anderson identifies as recent Modernist masterpieces? How could the history of colonialism and the social spatial legacies that explode the boundaries of Europe stretching across the non-European world stitching together distant lands—in uneven geographies of “accumulation by dispossession” not be relevant at all to the generalized narrative of Modernization or Modernism in capitalist history?⁴¹⁸ How could they not constitute a significant and capacious frame—one that may encompass and expand the implications and possibilities of all three coordinates (academicism, new technology, and political revolution) that Anderson identifies? While the trajectory of colonialism certainly did arise in historical geographical “delimited constellations” it was also an integral and interconnected element of the larger generalized process of modernization or capitalist industrialization and thus could be seen as a significant factor for any consideration of Modernism as contextualized historical socio-geographically interconnected responses to modernization. Development not conceived of as linear temporal sequence but spatial-relationality would necessitate examining not only the “delimited constellations” but also the multiple scales of both historical forms of colonial dispossession as well as contemporary neoliberal imperial dispossession accompanying the progression of capitalist accumulation—and the continuities and differences in the actors and locations involved.

These questions and objections key into both the broader theoretical framework of this dissertation and the essence of my study of railroads as an interconnected but differentiated

⁴¹⁸ This concept can be traced back to Rosa Luxemburg's extension of Marx's concept of primitive accumulation, which unlike Marx, who located it as an incidental pre-stage of capitalism (or Lenin who located it as the last stage of capitalism), Luxemburg sees as inherent to the logic of capital accumulation. (Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951, 2003). It is also a key concept of Marxist social or human geographers which, combines Luxemburg's primitive accumulation with Lefebvrian conceptions of space and can be divided into two streams—one with a more systematic focus such as David Harvey's conception of the spatial fix as seen in *The Limits to Capital* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982) or *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)—and one with a more relational methodological ethnographic focus such as Doreen Massey's *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), or Gillian Hart's *Disabling Globalization: Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Berkeley: UC Press, 2002).

historical-symbolic figure and structuring condition for the multiple yet interconnected space-times of modernity.⁴¹⁹ This is also where we could also move beyond Berman, to see how paradoxical forces of modernization may also link up with paradoxical forces of colonialism or nationalism to produce more convoluted or colliding but always relational ‘cultures of modernisms’ —or the “tragedy of development” examined across space. While railroads and airports have certain shared globally abstracting and homogenizing elements, they do not unfold in the same way everywhere because the global space of modernization was not structured the same everywhere. In order to take up these questions, we need to first examine social geographer Henri Lefebvre’s conception of the production of space and the ‘abstract space’ produced of capitalism and consider why it has become so ‘natural’ to conceive of space in such an abstracted or homogenous manner especially vis-à-vis rigorous arguments for a *differentiated historical time* and how we might consider space other than as dead, passive, and static abstractions or envelopes subordinated to the onward march of a revolutionary historical time.

Deconstructing Spatial Fetishism: The Multiplicity, Interpenetration, and Superimposition of Abstract Space

As Marx argued in *Capital*, the commodity form, arising from the exchange relation, concealed the generalized social labor or congealed labor-time that lay at its origin and dissimulated these “definite social relations between men” as “objective characteristics of the products of labor themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things.”⁴²⁰ In a related vein, Schivelbusch looked upon the abstraction of local meaningful identities of place upon its incorporation into the modern alienating “geographical space” of railroads as an extension of this process of fetishism manifest in the objects’ or places’ loss of “aura” and leading to new identities or facets emanating from the process and medium of exchange: “cherries offered for sale in the Paris market were seen as products of that market, just as Normandy seemed to be a product of the railroad that takes you there.”⁴²¹ For Lefebvre, the ‘abstract space’ produced by modern industrial capitalism embodies a related problematic to the fetishism of commodities vis-à-vis the triumph of exchange value over use value. However the problematic of space takes on different characteristics. With the “growth of the productive forces themselves” accompanying industrial capitalism, and “the direct intervention of knowledge in material production...which eventually becomes knowledge about space,” Lefebvre argues that the “analysis of production” shows that “we have passed from the *production of things in space* to the *production of space itself*”.⁴²²

The problematic of space, which subsumes the problems of the urban sphere (the city and its extensions) and of everyday life (programmed consumption), has displaced the problematic of industrialization. It has not, however, destroyed that earlier set of problems: the social relationships that obtained

⁴¹⁹ The particular spatial-relational historical analysis of colonial Korean railroads and imperial-colony migrations which is integral to this concept will be explored in the next chapter.

⁴²⁰ Marx, *Capital, Volume I*, p. 165.

⁴²¹ Schivelbusch, p. 41.

⁴²² Henri Lefebvre, “Space: Social Product and Use Value,” excerpted in *Critical Sociology: European Perspectives*, ed. J.W. Freiberg, (New York: Irvington Publishers, Inc., 1979), p. 285.

previously still obtain; the new problem is, precisely, the problem of their reproduction.⁴²³

Making space into a prime figure of analysis as Marx had done with the commodity, Lefebvre argues that “any space implies, contains, and dissimulates social relationships,”⁴²⁴ and insists that the science or study of space calls for an immanent critique “which would analyze not things in space but space itself with a view to uncovering the social relationships embedded in it.”⁴²⁵ Like commodities, all “spaces are produced”, and the “‘raw material’ from which they are produced is nature.”⁴²⁶ But “space is never produced in the sense that a kilogram of sugar or a yard of cloth is produced. Nor is it an aggregate of the places or locations of such products as sugar, wheat or cloth.”⁴²⁷

Social space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity—their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object. At the same time there is nothing imagined, unreal or ‘ideal’ about it as compared, for example, with science, representations, ideas or dreams. *Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others.* Among these actions, some serve production, others consumption (the enjoyment of the fruits of production).⁴²⁸

For Lefebvre, social space is “a set of relations between things (objects and products).”⁴²⁹ More specifically space is a particular kind of social relationship that is:

inherent in the relation of property (the ownership of land, in particular), it is also linked to the productive forces that fashion this land. Space is permeated with social relations; it is not only supported by social relations, but it also is producing and produced by social relations.⁴³⁰

To say that “space is social” means that “it involves assigning more or less appropriated places to the social relations of reproduction, namely the biophysical relation between the sexes, the ages, the specified organization of the family, and to the relations of production, namely, the division of labor and its organization.”⁴³¹ Such *process* constituting social space:

is explained by neither nature (the climate and the topology), history, nor ‘culture.’ Furthermore, productive forces do not constitute a space or a

⁴²³ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 89.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 73. Italics mine.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁴³⁰ Lefebvre, “Space: Social Product and Use Value,” p. 286.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

time.⁴³² *Mediations and mediators interpose themselves; with their reasons derived from knowledge, from ideology, from meaning systems.*⁴³³

Thus firmly linked to the state and social superstructures, “they are products of an activity which involves the economic and technical realms but which extends well beyond them, for these are also *political products, and strategic spaces*. The term ‘strategy’ connotes a great variety of products and actions: it combines peace with war, the arms trade with deterrence in the event of crisis, and the use of resources form peripheral spaces with the use of riches from industrial, urban, state-dominated centers.”⁴³⁴ At the same time, issuing from the “polyvalence of social space,” it can be distinguished from social superstructures in that it is both a “precondition” and “a result” of social superstructures.⁴³⁵ Social space can thus be defined as a “reality” that is:

at once formal and material: Both a *product* to be used, to be consumed, it is also a *means of production*; networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it. Thus this means of production, produced as such, cannot be separated either from the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, or from the social division of labour which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of society.⁴³⁶

As social spaces are produced in connection with the forces of production, the relations of production, as well as those of their *social reproduction*—the modern space (of the bourgeoisie and capital) produced by capitalism is strongly beholden to the force, imperatives, policies, knowledges, ideologies, and values of the state. For Lefebvre, the formal and ideological functions of the fetishistic character of ‘abstract space’ is tied to the centralizing processes of and instrumental use of space by the *state*—which “cannot be separated either from the accumulation of capital or from the rational and political principle of *unification*, which subordinates and totalizes the various aspects of social practice—legislation, culture, knowledge, education—within determinate space; namely the space of the ruling class’s hegemony over its people and over the nationhood that it has arrogated...a space [of] a unified and hence homogenous society.”⁴³⁷ Lefebvre asserts that the nation or nationhood considered in relation to

⁴³² As Lefebvre reiterates, “the growth of the forces of production” do not “give rise in any direct causal fashion to a particular space or a particular time” (*PS*, p. 77). For example, the existence of railroads or airports in and of themselves do not constitute ‘abstract space’ which is a particular formation of social space—rather it is the existence of railroads and airports in connection with a political-economic system that have brought them into being, manages and maintains control over them, and utilizes them to reproduce the social relations that which brought them into being.

⁴³³ Lefebvre, “Space: Social Product and Use Value,” p. 286. As Lefebvre elaborates, “mediations and mediators” are germane to the constitution of a social space: “the action of groups, factors within knowledge, within ideology, or within the domain of representations. Social space contains a great diversity of objects, both natural and social, including the networks and pathways which facilitate exchange of material things and information. Such ‘objects’ are thus not only things but also relations. As objects, they possess discernible peculiarities, contour and form. Social labour transforms them, rearranging their positions within spatio-temporal configurations without necessarily affecting their materiality, their natural state (as in the case, for instance, of an island, gulf, river or mountain)” (*PS*, p. 77).

⁴³⁴ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 84.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

space implies both “*a market*” and “*violence*,”⁴³⁸ and “cannot be conceived of without reference to the instrumental space that [states] make use of” as “each new form of state... [or] political power, introduces its own particular way of partitioning space, its own particular administrative classification of discourses about space and about things and people in space” in order to “command” space and make it “serve its purposes.”⁴³⁹ It is through this instrumentalization of space by the state that we see the main elements for the fetishized “abstract space” of capitalism:

In this way the capitalist ‘trinity’ is established in space – that trinity of land-capital-labor which cannot remain abstract and which is assembled only within an equally tri-faceted institutional space: a space that is first of all *global, and maintained as such—the space of sovereignty*, where constraints are implemented, and hence a fetishized space, reductive of differences; a space, secondly, that is *fragmented, separating, disjunctive*, a space that locates specificities, places or localities, both in order to control them and in order to make them negotiable; and a space, finally, that is *hierarchical*, ranging from the lowliest places to the noblest, from the tabooed to the sovereign.⁴⁴⁰

Imbued with “violence and war,” *homogenizing* yet also *fragmenting* and intensely *hierarchical* the ‘abstract space’ that constitutes the “current totality” of social space in the capitalist mode of production is a “dominated” space with “repressive and oppressive capacities” manifest via its primary functions as *a means of production*: where space is used like a “machine” such as the way the “spatial arrangement of a city, region, a nation, or a continent increases productive forces” or more specifically space in its capacity as a means of production in relation to “the International division of social labor...nature, or...the state and other superstructures;” *an object of consumption*: where “space as a whole is consumed for production just as are industrial buildings and sites, machines, raw materials, and labor power”; and *a political instrument*: where space is used “in such a way that it ensures its control of places, its strict hierarchy, the homogeneity of the whole, and the segregation of the parts...an administratively controlled and even a policed space” whose “hierarchy of spaces corresponds to that of social classes...”⁴⁴¹ As explained by Lefebvre:

Capitalism and neocapitalism have produced an *abstract space* that is a reflection of the world of business on both a national and international level, as well as the power of money and the “politique” of the state. This abstract space depends on vast networks of banks, businesses, and great centers of production. There also is the spatial intervention of highways, airports, and

⁴³⁸ To elaborate, Lefebvre writes: “First, nationhood implies the existence of a market gradually built up over a historical period of varying length. Such a market is a complex ensemble of commercial relations and communication networks. It subordinates local or regional markets to the national one, and thus must have a hierarchy of levels...a focused space embodying a hierarchy of centres (commercial centres for the most part, but also religious ones, ‘cultural’ ones, and so on) and a main centre—i.e. the national capital. Secondly, nationhood implies violence—the violence of a military state, be it feudal, bourgeois, imperialist, or some other variety. It implies in other words, a political power controlling and exploiting the resources of the market or the growth of the productive forces in order to maintain and further its rule.” *PS*, p. 112.

⁴³⁹ Lefebvre, “Space: Social Product and Use Value,” p. 281.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

information networks. In this space, the cradle of accumulation, the place of richness, the subject of history, the center of historical space, in other words, the city, has exploded.

Space as a whole enters into the modernized mode of capitalist production: it is utilized to produce surplus value. The ground, the underground, the air, and even the light enter into both the productive forces and the products. The urban fabric, with its multiple networks of communication and exchange, is part of the means of production. The city and its various installations (ports, train stations, etc.) are part of capital.⁴⁴²

In addition to the material historicity of “abstract space,” there is also an important *formal* characteristic to this space. It is “a space oriented toward the reproducible” and which negates “differences.” On the one hand as ‘abstract space’ is “oriented toward the reproduction of the social relations of production,” the production of space enacts a “logic of homogeneity and a strategy of the repetitive” which shapes space into “interchangeable fragments.”⁴⁴³ As space is utilized towards the bureaucratic control and aims of “productive consumption”—wherein space follows the sequence of “the consumption of a space...that is doubly productive in that it produces both surplus value and another space”⁴⁴⁴ and which Lefebvre identifies as the chief logic or “strategy” (as opposed to dialectical movement) of abstract space—the “movement between the space of production and the space of reproduction...[is] underpinned by the reproducibility of things in space, as of space itself, which is broken up in order to facilitate this.”⁴⁴⁵ This reproducibility of space requires and entails the “proliferation of links and networks” which can “directly connect up diverse places...ending their isolation”—like the movement of commodity chains across differentiated societies and territories.⁴⁴⁶ And on the other hand, and closely related to the first, as abstract space’s need for interchangeable fragments requires the space to be anonymous, substitutable and comparable for their reproducibility, it also renders homogenous the actual heterogeneity of distinct spaces:

This formal and quantified abstract space negates all differences, those that come from nature and history as well as those that come from the body, ages, sexes, and ethnicities.⁴⁴⁷

Abstract Space, Spatial Fetishism and Concrete Abstractions

Inherently linked to the process of *reproduction* of the social relations of abstract space by the mediation of social superstructures like the state and normative social institutions, Lefebvre argues that the fetishism of space also comes about through the epistemological extension or “metaphorization” of the fragmentation or compartmentalization of ‘abstract space’

⁴⁴² Ibid., p. 288.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., p. 289.

⁴⁴⁴ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 374. Lefebvre provides the example given by Goodman which documents the circular relationship between the state’s tax on petrol sales used for highway construction, and highway construction then benefitting oil companies and auto makers in that “every additional mile of the highway translates into increased car sales, which in turn increase petrol consumption, hence also tax revenues and so on.”

⁴⁴⁵ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 354.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 378

⁴⁴⁷ Lefebvre, “Space: Social Product and Use Value,” p. 289.

under capitalism (i.e. state power and market exchange) in both mental and practical applications—which masquerades as “established knowledge.” The fetishism of space manifests in the “ideologically dominant tendency” to “divide space up into parts and parcels in accordance to the social division of labour,” to “enumerate [such compartmentalized] spaces” and to consider space “a passive receptacle.”⁴⁴⁸ But rather than “uncovering the social relationships (including class relationships) that are latent in spaces, instead of concentrating our attention on the production of space and the social relationships inherent to it—*relationships which introduce specific contradictions into production, so echoing the contradiction between the private ownership of the means of production and the social character of the productive forces*” its fetishism leads to the treatment of “space as space ‘in itself’ as space as such.”⁴⁴⁹ As critical human geographer Andrew Merrifield explains, like the commodity form that conceals the labor process that goes into its production, reified space is space taken as a “container or coordinate system of discrete and mutually exclusive locations” obscuring the social relations and processes that produce that space.⁴⁵⁰

As the socio-political and ideological fragmentation of space promotes “segmented representations of space” that can be enumerated ad infinitum, space tends to become viewed as a discrete, abstract, passive receptacle.⁴⁵¹ And this reified (fragmented and objectified) form of space “promote[s] (abstract) spatiality,” in which the underlying interconnection of a multiplicity of social spaces/social relations and the contradictions that lie therein are concealed and dissimulated by the appearance of homogeneity.⁴⁵² However, as Lefebvre underscores: “space is not homogenous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its lens.”⁴⁵³ While abstract space “renders homogenous...in itself it is multiform...Thus to look upon space as homogenous is to embrace a representation that takes the effect for the cause and the goal for the reason why that goal is pursued. A representation which passes itself off as a *concept* [in the Hegelian sense of the dialectical “movement of thought in its self-comprehension” with three moments of the universal, particular, and singular] when it is merely an image, a mirror, and a mirage; and which, instead of challenging, instead of refusing, merely reflects...the results sought.”⁴⁵⁴ Thus the reification of space, predominantly expressed through the mediating knowledge system of the “logic of visualization”⁴⁵⁵ hides the actual “interpenetration” and “superimposition” of *the diversity and multiplicity of social space*. For in social space, Lefebvre declares:

We are confronted not by one social space but by many—indeed, by an unlimited multiplicity or uncountable set of social spaces, which we refer to generically as ‘social space’. No space disappears in the course of growth and development: the *worldwide does not abolish the local*. This is not a consequence of the law of uneven development, but a law in its own right.

⁴⁴⁸ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 90.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁰ Andrew Merrifield, “Space and Place: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, vol. 18, no. 4 (1993), p. 519.

⁴⁵¹ Lefebvre, p. 90. The way capitalism tends to divide space into fragments and parcels/ fetishism via fragmentation is perhaps nowhere as vividly represented as evident in the way Schivelbusch observed the parcelization of people dispatched from one point on the railroad network to another—in which the spatial abstraction is mimicked in the disembodied subject moving through space as an appendage of the new technology and market.

⁴⁵² Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 91.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*,

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 259-261; 286-7.

The intertwining of social spaces is also a law. Considered in isolation, such spaces are mere abstractions. As *concrete abstractions*, however, they attain ‘real’ existence by virtue of networks and pathways, by virtue of bunches of clusters of relationships. Instances of this are the worldwide networks of communication, exchange and information. It is important to note that such newly developed networks do not eradicate from their social context those earlier ones, superimposed upon one another over the years, which constitute the various *markets*: local, regional, national and international markets...Each market, over the centuries, has been consolidated and has attained a concrete form by means of a network: a network of buying- and selling-points in the case of the circulation of capital, of labour exchanges in the case of the labour market and so on. The corresponding buildings, in the towns, bear material testimony to this evolution. Thus social space, and especially urban space, emerged in all its diversity—and with a structure far more reminiscent of flaky mille-feuille pastry than of the homogenous and isotropic space of classical (Euclidean/Cartesian) mathematics.⁴⁵⁶

As Lefebvre makes clear, dominant spatial practices and ideologies of state and capital—levelled by force or ideology which “promote (abstract) spatiality and segmented representations of space” in the form of “established knowledge”—do not just take over preexisting space obliterating its pre-existing historical superimposition of layers of market-like social interrelations.⁴⁵⁷ The unmasking of spatial fetishism thus begins by thinking together both the *diachronic* development of social space *and* its historically located production as a *synchronic* totality. Lefebvre states that while “all social space has a history that begins from [a] natural base” which “is always and everywhere characterized by peculiarities (climates, topologies, etc.),” there is also in the history of space a “specificity to space according to periods, societies, modes of relations of production” as “each society is born within the framework of a given mode of production, with the inherent peculiarities to this framework molding its space” with spatial practice defin[ing] its space...pos[ing] it and presuppos[ing] it in a dialectical interaction.”⁴⁵⁸ Hence while “the past has left its marks, its inscriptions...space is always a present space, a current totality, with its links and connections *to action*...[whereby]...the production and the product are inseparable sides of one process.”⁴⁵⁹ Within ‘abstract space’—or fetishized social space produced under conditions of industrial modern capitalism, Lefebvre posits that space is produced as a “concrete abstraction” via the networks and pathways of exchange (of commodities, etc.) which articulates space at a world scale, and which are both produced by and producing of space. By “concrete abstraction,” Lefebvre describes a space that is “both *abstract* and *concrete* in character:”

abstract inasmuch as it has no existence save by virtue of the exchangeability of all its component parts, and concrete inasmuch as it is socially real and as

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 86.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 90.

⁴⁵⁸ Lefebvre, “Space: Social Product and Use Value,” p. 286.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid. Italics mine.

such localized. This is a space, therefore, that is *homogenous yet at the same time broken up into fragments*.⁴⁶⁰

In other words, we understand that the actualization of social space into ‘real existence’ depends on the matrix of social relationships and interchange structured through various *mediating* social networks and pathways of commodity exchange—such as communication and transportation systems, labor, commodity and financial markets, and knowledge and thought systems that expound about them which bring the social relations of these spaces into relation or interconnection—however in a dominated and homogenizing manner. In the way that Marx saw the exchange process to transform concrete differentiated labor into abstract social labor which is dissimulated in the ‘thing form’ of the commodity, Lefebvre envisions the material networks of exchange such as transport networks and the mediation of ruling political ideologies to materialize this process—transforming differentiated historical spaces as it is brought into a (dominated) interconnected and multiform generalized social space, which is then concealed in the conception of segmented representations of “homogenous” abstract space or “space ‘in itself’ by the fetishization of space in both mental and social practical applications. For Lefebvre, analysis of the production of space and produced spaces of modern capitalism under the exchange regime allows him to see the production of generalized social space in ‘abstract space,’ much like the way Marx saw abstract social labor in the commodity form; abstract/generalized social space like abstract /generalized social labor embodied in the commodity is a ‘concrete abstraction’ in that it attains real existence through concrete social relations and processes of exchange, and namely mediating spatial interventions, networks and their surrounding knowledges in the case of space.⁴⁶¹ Thus while social spaces are actually “multiform” (like the differentiated labor that is subsumed in abstract labor in the exchange process) it is a principle function of the fetishism of space (both in mental and social practical operations), like the fetishism of commodities, to “homogenize” these spaces (which is also a form of domination over space) by primarily abolishing (or seeking to abolish) “distinctions and differences” of social spaces by the eclipse of the use-value of spaces (or subjective relation/use of space like subjective relation to labor) by their exchange value (or space conceived of as an objective entity or force as in the concept of “abstract spatiality”). And yet at the same time, particular to spatial fetishism, we see that this “same space is [also] fragmented and fractured, in accordance with the demands of the divisions of labor and the division of needs and functions.”⁴⁶² Lefebvre’s endeavor to examine capitalist space as a ‘totality’ or ‘unity’ opposed to the reified concept of space as “discrete and mutually exclusive” receptacles arises from the same endeavor by Marx to reattach the thing or commodity to the conditions of its production. For Lefebvre this ‘unified’ view of space allows him to see social spaces as multiform, heterogeneous, and dynamic “concrete abstractions” as with Marx’s analysis of labour, which is far from the sense of “abstract” space defined as or in opposition to “concreteness.”⁴⁶³

⁴⁶⁰ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 341-2.

⁴⁶¹ See Lukasz Stanek’s very helpful discussion of Lefebvre’s use of Hegel’s concept of ‘concrete universal’ as opposed to ‘abstract universal’ and Marx’s concept of ‘abstract labor’ in the dual sensual/supersensual aspect of the commodity to arrive at his conception of ‘concrete abstraction’ in “Space as Concrete Abstraction: Hegel, Marx, and Modern Urbanism in Henri Lefebvre,” in Kanisha Goonewardena, Stefan Kipfer, Richard Milgram, and Christian Schmid, eds., *Space, Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre* (Routledge, 2008), p. 62-79.

⁴⁶² Lefebvre, p. 355.

⁴⁶³ What is important here is how Lefebvre’s concept of “concrete universal” is quite different from Anderson’s concept of ‘quotidian universal.’

Thus in spite of and underneath the simultaneously homogenizing *and* fragmenting practices that produce and reproduce ‘abstract space’ and their corresponding ideologies of “abstract spatiality” or space conceived of as homogenous fragmented interchangeable “passive receptacles” whose social identities and meanings are subordinated to, determined by, and beholden solely to the march of historical time, there is a dynamic and enduring multiplicity of spaces constituted by a host of social relations that extend beyond any ‘punctual’ or “localized” point of social space. As Lefebvre underscores, “there is nothing imagined, unreal or ‘ideal’ about [social space] as compared, for example with science, representations, ideas or dreams.”⁴⁶⁴ Constitutive of superimposed layers of past social relationships and ‘actualized’ by its interconnections among various localized ‘places’ of their particular social relations via modern networks and pathways of exchange of the present synchronic totality, “space has its own reality in the current mode of production and society, with the same claims and in the same global processes as merchandise, money, and capital.”⁴⁶⁵

Quotidian Universals, Geographical Space and Concrete Abstractions

The production of space as ‘concrete abstractions’ in capitalist modernity, then, following the Lefebvrian understanding of historical geography occurs through “networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy,” and spatial pathways of exchange and flows such as transportation networks of exchange. As such pathways of networks of exchange we need to see railroads like “chains” of commodities—as embodying differences but which is also wiped out by standardization necessary for connection to other chains in the process of worldwide exchange. Also, in conditions of the expansion or social reproduction capitalism, these meditations such as “highways and airports, as well as all sorts of infrastructural elements,” which are “investments in space” become a form of “fixed capital” or what Marx considered “the measure of social wealth.”⁴⁶⁶ And like the “roads, canals, and railways of an earlier period” such “transportation grids exemplify productive consumption, in the first place because they serve to move people and things through the circuits of exchange, and secondly because they constitute worldwide investment of knowledge in social reality.”⁴⁶⁷

Such spatial interventions furnish the framework or structuring condition for both the actualization of the multiplicity and intertwinement of social spaces via concrete social relations *and* their domination into abstract space—by the centralized instrumentalization of these pathways and networks by the state and capital—leading to their ‘real’ existence as ‘concrete abstractions.’ Spaces are realized into “concrete *abstractions*” because their incorporation in and through these networks and pathways—like railroads—while not destroying them or obliterating them of their previous content will however likely transform these spaces of its preexisting social relations (like the transformation of concrete specific labor to abstract social labor)—decontextualizing or abstracting these spaces by a host of new conditions and values (both hardware and software) governing these networks and their technologies of incorporation, such as the way they interact or eclipse the physical nature or landscape upon which they are laid across, new vocabularies/languages and sentiments they elicit and demand, and the legal, practical, and unstated but de facto rules of engagement they entail that will reposition these spaces relative to the system’s *power dynamics* which organize or reorganize the centers and

⁴⁶⁴ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 73. Italics mine.

⁴⁶⁵ Lefebvre, “Space: Social Product and Use Value,” p. 286.

⁴⁶⁶ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 345.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

margins, the valued and devalued, as part of the hierarchy of the interconnected (capitalist) system. What aligns Schivelbusch's geographical space with Lefebvre's abstract space is that they are both produced as a form of meta-geography analogous to Marx's commodity form conceived of as a 'second nature' arising from the dialectical destruction of the qualitative identities of natural particularities, sociality, religion, tradition or what Marx referred to as "all fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices." But at the same time this space is relationally produced from within an interconnected system and is thus also a space of domination and dispossession. They both liken the historical material network-like construct/structure of railroad to the capitalist system driven by the exchange economy, which *destroys and degrades some values while creating or enabling others*.

Ideology, Representations, and Spatial Practice

Owing to the dual nature of space as both a product and a means of production and social reproduction, Lefebvre explains that, abstract space is a paradoxical space that:

can be at once the whole set of locations where contradictions are generated, the medium in which those contradictions evolve and which they tear apart, and lastly, the means whereby they are smothered and replaced by an appearance of consistency. This gives space a function, practically speaking (i.e. within spatial practice), which was formerly filled by ideology, and which is still to some extent felt to require an ideology.⁴⁶⁸

What this paradox of abstract space underscores then is a rethinking of ideology as something that also not only obtains in space but as that which is enacted through and by space via a broad notion of *representation* and *spatial practice*. As Lefebvre writes:

What is an ideology without a space to which it refers, a space which it describes, whose vocabulary and links it makes use of, and whose code it embodies? What would remain of religious ideology—the Judeo-Christian one, say—if it were not based on places and their names: church, confessional, altar, sanctuary, tabernacle? What would remain of the Church if there were no churches?...More generally speaking, what we call ideology only achieves consistency by intervening in social space and in its production, and by thus taking on body therein. Ideology *per se* might well be said to consist primarily in a discourse upon social space.⁴⁶⁹

Lefebvre argues that under capitalism ideology is closely bound up with both knowledge (*connaissance*) and logic "within a social-spatial practice," as the fetishism of space passes into perceived forms of "established knowledge" or operates under the rubric of rational or logical coherence.⁴⁷⁰ For example, Lefebvre sees the development of classical perspective of Italian

⁴⁶⁸ Lefebvre, *PS*, p. 363-4.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 45. Lefebvre adds that "Ideology, to the extent that it remains distinct from knowledge, is characterized by rhetoric, by metalanguage, hence by verbiage and lucubration (and no longer by philosophico-metaphysical systematizing, by 'culture' and 'values')" (44). Moreover, "Ideology and logic may even become indistinguishable—at least to the extent that a stubborn demand for coherence and cohesion manages to erase

Renaissance as an historical illustration of the combination of ideology and knowledge. Thus in the analysis of social space: “The area where ideology and knowledge are barely distinguishable is subsumed under the broader notion of *representation*, which thus supplants the concept of ideology and becomes a serviceable (operational) tool for the analysis of spaces, as of those societies which have given rise to them and recognized themselves in them.”⁴⁷¹ Abstract space is thus produced as a divided space of representation in current society—wherein the dominant space is a conceptualized space or “the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, and of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent—all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived,” and which Lefebvre refers to as *representations of space* or conceived space. On the other is the “dominated—hence passively experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate.”⁴⁷² This space is “directly *lived* through its associated images and symbols” and is “hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ or ‘users,’ but also of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who *describe* and aspire to do more than describe” which Lefebvre calls *representational space* or lived space. These two moments or *representations* are shaped by spatial practice, the third moment or aspect of the spatial triad, which “secretes” and shapes a society’s space.⁴⁷³ Within the ‘abstract space’ of capitalism, spatial practice is paramount to “the reproduction of social relations,” while:⁴⁷⁴

[t]he *representation of space*, in thrall to both knowledge and power, leaves only the narrowest leeway to *representational spaces*, which are limited to works, images, and memories whose content, whether sensory, sensual or sexual, so far displaced that it barely achieves symbolic force.”⁴⁷⁵

Thus in addition to the parceling out the various interconnected aspects of social reality, the reification of ‘abstract space’ also entails the domination of lived space by conceptualized space. For Lefebvre, a theory of space that challenges both the practical and ideological fetishism of spaces would need to “transcend *representational space* on the one hand and *representations of space* on the other,” and in lieu of masking over the contradictions of space would instead “be able properly to articulate contradictions (and in the first place the contradiction between these two aspects of representation).”⁴⁷⁶ The starting point of such a theory must see space both a product of and a means of production of *representations*—composed of a mixture of dominated and dominating social and spatial ideologies, knowledges and practices.

countervailing factors proceeding either from above (information and knowledge [savoir] or from below (the space of daily life)” (44-45).

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² Ibid., p. 39.

⁴⁷³ Ibid., p. 38.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 50.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 365.

Modern Time, Universal Histories, and the Spatialization of Time: From Salvation to Civilization

Modern Time and Universal Histories

A non-fetishized multiple, interconnected, and superimposed conception of space is moreover important as an epistemological foundation for the examination of historical-geographically interrelated *yet* differentiated experiences and analysis of modernity because, as we have seen, the concept of *time* (and ipso facto *history*)—laden with universalizing tendencies not unlike the homogenizing tendencies of abstract space is itself historically and epistemologically not innocent. As Johannes Fabian has argued in *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, the modern conceptualization of linear historical time which is also an evolutionary and hierarchically-spatialized concept of time that links anthropology and other human and social sciences not only morally or ethically but also epistemologically to colonialism and imperialism, emerged as an essentially temporalizing methodology for the secular history of the world or a ‘universal history’ of man.⁴⁷⁷ According to Fabian, the roots of this modern linear time that informs much of the social science and humanities disciplines’ temporal concepts lie in the “generalizing and universalizing” of the linear specificity of Judeo-Christian Time which celebrated “a series of specific events that befall a chosen people” into a “universal history” in the process of its modern secularization in premodern and modern Enlightenment thought.⁴⁷⁸ This universalizing process can be seen in transitional texts such as Bossuet’s late 17th century *Discours sur l’histoire universelle* presaging a new genre of Enlightenment era “universal history” writing or “philosophical history.”⁴⁷⁹ Bossuet’s *Discours* is distinguished from earlier Christian histories by a new methodology that is intended to “alleviate confusion caused by the multitude of historical fact” by instructing “the reader to ‘distinguish different times (*temps*) with the help of ‘universal history,’ a device which ‘is to the histories of every country and of every people what a general map is to particular maps’.”⁴⁸⁰ As Fabian notes:

In this analogy the universal is aligned with the general, which signals a certain ambiguity (one which, incidentally, is still with us in anthropology’s quest for universals). *Universal* appears to have two connotations. One is that of totality; in this sense, universal designates the whole world at all times. The other is one of generality: that which is applicable to a large number of instances. The most important point, borne out by the body of the *Discours*, is that Bossuet does not thematize the first connotation. His account does not cover the world, it never leaves the circum-Mediterranean. Writing within the horizon of history of Christian religion, he does not see this perspective, nor does he look beyond his horizon...Perspective and horizon of the *Discours* are tied together by the all-pervading intention to validate (albeit not

⁴⁷⁷ Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

uncritically) the political realities of his day by a history that is universal because it expresses the omnipresent signs of divine providence.⁴⁸¹

Thus much like the way Lefebvre saw the conceptual and material reification of space to homogenize the actual multiplicity of social space, ‘universal history’ likewise served as an organizing device for the classifying, ordering and enclosing into temporal envelopes the chaotic “multitude of historical fact.” By equating “universal” with “generally valid principles,” standardizing the second sense of the term, Bossuet’s ‘universal history’ is counter-posed to the very ‘totality’—or ‘universal’ in the first sense—that Lefebvre strives towards in his analysis of a global social space. This is apparent in Bossuet’s analogy of ‘universal history’ as a kind of general map that is an amalgamated image of particular maps, which can be used to organize or classify various particular maps. This relation follows from the typical type/token distinction where the type provides the organizing form and principle for the token while the tokens instantiate the type. In contrast, the relation between ‘space’ and ‘place’ or the general and the particular in the Lefebvrian framework is formed through their dialectical intertwinement or mutual relational constitution of space (the whole) and place (the punctual), wherein every instance of the particular (place) has the power to shape or alter the form and constitution of the general (space).⁴⁸² Thus as a temporalizing methodology that organized the development or evolution of the world through a process of generalizing a specific sequence of historical events into universally applicable temporal classifications or “epochs,” ‘universal history’ entailed the reification of time in the thematization of a universal time. Moreover, the ordering of ‘universal time’ into determinate “epochs” relied on a particular motivating or organizing principle. As Fabian elaborates:

A methodological device that opens the view over Time is the *epoch*, conceived, not in its currently most common understanding of a period or interval of time, but in a transitive sense derived from its Greek root. An epoch is a point at which one stops the journey through Time “to consider as from a place of rest, all that happened before or after, so that one may avoid anachronism, that is, a kind of error which results in confusing the times.” In exposing universal history one proceeds by treating a “small number of epochs” in secular and religious history, the outcome of which will be—and here Bossuet’s methodology rejoins his faith—to make visible the “PERPETUAL DURATION OF RELIGION, AND...THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT CHANGES IN EMPIRES.” Thus both the external, spatial boundaries of history and its inner continuity are of religion. Where mere sequence might cause confusion, the distinction of times in the light of divine providence creates order. It demonstrates the omnipresent work of salvation.⁴⁸³

Apart from “divine providence” forming the internal logic or organizing principle for the correct ordering of “epochs,” Bossuet’s thematization of this second sense of ‘universal’—as

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., p. 3-4.

⁴⁸² I understand Lefebvre’s space/ place distinction and relation along the lines of how Derrida deconstructs the type/token distinction in *Signature, Event, Context*.

⁴⁸³ Fabian, p. 4

generally valid principles for the periodizing or chronologizing methodology of ‘universal history’ in order to “discern in the ‘sequence of things’ the ‘order of times’”—contains in full outline the various “philosophical histories” of the following century—a veritable hallmark of Enlightenment epistemology.⁴⁸⁴ Fabian argues that it was thus a short step from this universalization of time in the “Christian myth” of Bossuet’s *Discours* in which a specific linear sequence of historical events of the Christian faith was turned into a generalized ‘universal history’ of the salvation of the world, to the production of a new secularized version of ‘universal history’ using these same “conventions and devices” but corresponding to the “the myth history of reason” as the guiding principle or motor of progression for the “order of times” in Enlightenment thought.⁴⁸⁵ As Fabian emphasizes, the essential characteristics of modern secular Time as it appeared since the eighteenth century and onward requires that we examine:

the transformation of the *message* of ‘universal history’ rather than on the elements of its code. The latter display a remarkable continuity with preceding periods down to the Greco-Roman canons of the arts of memory and rhetoric. The transformation of the message had to be operated on what we identified as the specificity of Christian “universality.” Change also had to occur on the level of political intent or “judgment.” It was on that level that the *philosophes* had to overcome Bossuet who “was never reluctant to judge all of the past in the light of the single most important event of all time: the brief passage of the man-god Jesus through a life on earth.”⁴⁸⁶

New Topos of Travel: the Spatialization of Time

Importantly, a signal element of the production of a modern secular temporality or the secularization of Bossuet’s ‘universal history’ was the way a new “topos of travel” conceptualized new modes and directionalities of movements across space and conceived of space in relation to or *in terms of* time in the 18th century. Fabian posits that departing from the sacred salvation journeys or religious pilgrimages characteristic of medieval crusades, a new “topos of travel” came into being as secular journeys in the service of scientific knowledge altering both the approach to and directionalities of travel⁴⁸⁷:

In the Christian tradition, the Savior’s and the saints’ passages on earth had been perceived as constituent events of a sacred history. To be sure, this had occasioned much travel to foreign parts in the form of pilgrimages, crusades, and missions. But for the established bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century, travel was to become (at least potentially) every man’s source of “philosophical,” secular knowledge. Religious travel had been *to* the centers of religion, or *to* the souls to be saved; now, secular travel was *from* the

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid. Hegel’s various philosophical histories of societies and art are emblematic. While the contents or objects of the histories may be different as in the case of art, peoples, or geographies, they share the same temporalizing organization of periods in their evolution (or actualization) through the three moments of his dialectic. For example, The first epoch of art is the period or moment of Symbolic art, followed by Greek art, and culminating in Romantic art.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

centers of learning and power to place where man was to find nothing but himself.⁴⁸⁸

With the shift from religious travel to “philosophical travel” and “travel as science,” which evolved in conjunction with European Enlightenment thought and military conquests of colonial and imperial territorial expansionism, the “achieved secularization of time” was signaled via a new discourse of travel as “a vehicle for the self-realization of man.”⁴⁸⁹ As travel became subsumed under the “reigning paradigm of natural history,” it became aligned with “the exercise of knowledge” in the “episteme of natural history”; the new mode of secular scientific travel operated analogously to “the filling of the spaces or slots in a table, or the marking of points in a system of coordinates in which all possible knowledge could be placed.”⁴⁹⁰ In her examination of the travelogues of the period, Mary Louise Pratt described this new topos of travel as the emergence of “Europe’s ‘planetary consciousness’” which was “marked by an orientation toward interior exploration and the construction of global-scale meaning through descriptive apparatuses of natural history.”⁴⁹¹ Thus if the message of Bossuet’s ‘universal history’ was the importance of an understanding of the past vis-à-vis the validation and universalization of the “history of salvation and divine providence,” the transformed “message” of the secularized ‘universal history’ of the Age of Enlightenment *philosophes* now based on the “new faith in reason” and emerging was the universalization of the past vis-à-vis or in terms of the knowledge of the ‘philosophical traveler’ or the validation of the superiority of the knowledge of the new educated (European) scientific traveler and ipso facto the Western centers of his learning.⁴⁹² Thus the secular universalization of time and history emerging with the “new science of travel” becomes the temporal practice of ordering the space of the world from past to present into the “complete history of man.”⁴⁹³ As Fabian illustrates with DeGerando’s quote from 1800: “The philosophical traveller, sailing to the ends of the earth, is in fact traveling in time; he is exploring his past; every step he makes is a passage of an age.”⁴⁹⁴

As this new ‘topos of travel’ signaled the crux of modern secular time as “the idea of a knowledge of Time which is a superior knowledge”—“prefigured in the Christian tradition, but crucially transformed in the Age of Enlightenment”—it posed important repercussions for the conceptualization and practice of social and spatial relations as well as laid the foundation for the naturalized “evolutionary temporalizing” of the 19th century social science as “an integral part of anthropology’s intellectual equipment.”⁴⁹⁵ First, while the ‘others’ to be saved had previously been conceived of as more inclusive members qua objects of salvation by potential religious conversions to Christianity, the ‘others’ became less incorporative and more classificatory, as objects to be studied.⁴⁹⁶ Second, it spatialized the vertical movements of time in the ‘universal history of man’ horizontally across the surface of the globe, or vice versa temporalized spatial relations and distances. It resulted in the conception of time understood as (1)–“immanent to, hence coextensive with, the world (or nature, or the universe, depending on the argument)” as

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴⁹¹ Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (Routledge, 1992), p. 15.

⁴⁹² Fabian, pp. 7, 10. Said’s Orientalism is of course intimately situated within this framework.

⁴⁹³ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 26.

well a new conceptualization of space in relation to as well as *in terms of* time wherein (2)-“relationships between parts of the world (in the widest sense of both natural and sociocultural entities) can be understood as temporal relations,” or “dispersal in space reflects directly, which is not to say simply or in obvious ways, sequence in Time.”⁴⁹⁷

Thus framed under scientific knowledge, the *spatialization of time* across and over geography with a new mode of travel instituting a temporalizing practice was an integral element of the secularization of time in Enlightenment era Europe. Fabian goes on to argue that it was based on these gradual steps toward the development of modern secular time from sacred time that 19th century social science went on to produce its “naturalized” form by “altering and emasculating” contemporary notions of evolutionary time in natural science and history with the “ideas of progress, improvement, and development...inherited from the *philosophes*” to form an essentially “evolutionary” conception of time.⁴⁹⁸ As Fabian writes:

Unlike old Sacred Time, or even its secularized form in the “myth-history of reason,” the new naturalized Time was no longer the vehicle of a continuous, meaningful story; it was a way to order an essentially discontinuous and fragmentary geological and paleontological record. The social evolutionists...had to emasculate the new vision on all three accounts in which it differed from earlier conceptions. They could not use its vastness because the history of mankind, recorded or reconstructed, occupied a negligible span on the scale of natural evolution...Nor could the social evolutionists accept the stark meaninglessness of mere physical duration. They were too full of the conviction that Time “accomplished” or brought about things in the course of evolution. And finally, they had, as yet, no use for a purely abstract methodological chronology; *theirs was a preoccupation with stages leading to civilization*, each of them as meaningful as a sentence leading toward the conclusion of a story.⁴⁹⁹

Thus a key element of modern time, which emerged as an epistemological instrument of the social sciences was the “naturalization” of an “essentially discontinuous and fragmentary” “meaningless” or empty linear time. Using the same “conventions and devices” of the ‘universal history’ of Christian salvation, though modified through the secularization of its message through the “classificatory schemes based on subsumption and hierarchy” of 18th century ‘civilizational’ discourse—or the belief or knowledge that time was equal to or indicative of human progress—modern time emerged based on a new faith in natural evolutionary science which supplied the alibi for the 19th century myth or ‘message’ of modernization.⁵⁰⁰ As Fabian remarks:

In fact little more had been done than to replace faith in salvation by faith in progress and industry, and the Mediterranean as the hub of history by

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

Victorian England. The cultural evolutionists became the Bossuets of Western imperialism.⁵⁰¹

What is salient about Fabian's analysis to our discussion of time vis-à-vis modernity, modernization, and modernism is that it shows us that even a 'differentiated historical time' can operate as a reifying concept because both 'time' and 'history' are not neutral concepts. Clearly seen in the continued use and determination of the temporal device of universalized 'epochs,' it is filled with the historically produced epistemological frames of Western knowledge, which emerged from the specific social intersections of secularization, industrialization, and imperialism since the late 17th century and the motivations and intentions of reigning paradigms produced therein. It has passed from "ordering of times" of "Christian universality" into the organizing principle for the myth of modernization and more recently globalization as a universal form of development unfolding in evolutionary stages across a passive horizontal world space. As Fabian argues, anthropology:

gave to politics and economics—both concerned with human Time—a firm belief in "natural," i.e. evolutionary Time. It promoted a scheme in terms of which not only past cultures, but all living societies were irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of Time—some upstream others downstream. Civilization, evolution, development, acculturation, modernization (and their cousins, industrialization, urbanization) are all terms whose conceptual content derives, in ways that can be specified, from evolutionary Time. They all have an epistemological dimension apart from whatever ethical, or unethical, intentions they may express. A discourse employing terms such as primitive, savage (but also tribal, traditional, Third World, or whatever euphemism is current) does not think, or observe, or critically study, the "primitive"; it thinks, observes, studies *in terms* of the primitive. Primitive being essentially a temporal concept, is a category, not an object, of Western thought.⁵⁰²

Modern secular linear time, thus viewed from its diachronic/ historicity of production as an epistemological device in Western thought, is also neither simply 'empty' nor 'homogenous.' For it is precisely "the same time" or what Fabian calls "coevalness" that is denied to non-Western 'Others' or those spatially distanced from the centers of modern knowledge production. Especially for those in dominated social and geographical spaces, this empty time, mediated through the dominant epistemological frameworks of evolutionary time underlying the universal discourse of civilization or modernization, is filled with the temporalized differences and discrepancies that *temporally define* their spatial distance from the 'centers' of civilization modernity. The evolutionary paradigm that epistemologically grounds modern time thus undercuts the 'simultaneity' essential to "empty, homogenous time"—framed in historical perspective—with evolutionary or developmentalist meanings in however naturalized and mythic forms. By extension, modern time is also not homogenous across space but hierarchically ranked and classified.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., p. 17.

⁵⁰² Ibid., p. 17-18.

Modern secular linear time is instead “universalizing” in the generalized or abstracted sense, which is also reifying as it implicitly makes space into a passive abstraction—robbing and emasculating its multiplicity and politicality—turning it into a *signifier* for the “message” (signified/myth) of modern development. As space is essentially robbed of its own or history or identity, activity, and complexity as it becomes a *value* of time and defined in terms of temporal categories, classifications, ordering and hierarchy. In the manner of myth or a second-order semiological system, described by Roland Barthes, modern secular time takes hold of space and “turns it suddenly into an empty, parasitical form.”⁵⁰³ As Barthes explains: “meaning” or the final term of the first order signification system is “*already* complete, it postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a comparative order of facts, ideas, decisions,” but “when it becomes, form [which is to say the *signifier* of the second-order signification], the meaning leaves its contingency behind; it empties itself, it becomes impoverished, history evaporates, only the letter remains.”⁵⁰⁴ But as “motivated speech” determined by history and intention, myth distorts but does not fully obliterate the “meaning” of space, which it “appropriates” in its service.⁵⁰⁵ Thus importantly, this reified spatial construct or geographical imaginary produced from socially situated epistemological practice of evolutionary temporalizing (or the tyranny of Western evolutionary time) can be seen to facilitate and contribute to spatial fetishism and the masking of social and spatial contradictions of the global/partial by tacitly enabling and perpetuating conceptions of a meta-geography of modernization or globalization in which space and societies are ordered across an abstract surface of the globe in hierarchical fashion from undeveloped to developed or traditional to modern societies.

Marxist Universalism, or the Stages of Modernization and Modernism

On the most obvious level, the universalizing and evolutionary temporality of modern secular time permeates the idea or ideology of modernization as ceaseless progress or development—perhaps best exemplified by the postwar American modernization theory of W.W. Rostow’s *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Perry Anderson initially begins his critique of Berman with the observation that the homogenous linear time that undergirds Berman’s theory of modernity comes dangerously too close to such ideologies of development. However, the modeling of a generalized history via universal time that structures the guiding principle for the correct sequencing or ordering of historical events or times is not unlike the universal historical time—or stages of modernization—also operative in the Marxist narrative of global industrial capitalist development such as seen in Perry Anderson’s critique. If we recall, Anderson’s contention with Berman’s concept of the linear time of capitalism was not its onward march across a passively determined surface of the globe and its various cultures and societies but the lack of a differentiated evolution or development of capitalist time (bourgeois decline and rise of the proletariat) and incorrect periodization or the act of “confusing the times” of modernism. In Anderson’s critique he basically argues that the time of the capitalist history of *Modernization* must be seen as differentiated into epochs, and it is the [correct] categorical determination and sequencing of which that is at issue for the analysis of a differentiated or multiple *Modernism*. But as with Bossuet’s early articulations of modern universal time, “the perspective and horizon” of the history or trajectory of capitalist Modernization prior to 1945 also never extends “beyond the “circum-Mediterranean” and similarly follows from the sense of generality at the expense of

⁵⁰³ Roland Barthes, “Myth Today,” *Mythologies* (NY: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 117.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

‘universal’ in the sense of ‘totality’ or “the whole world at all times.” Both “the external, spatial boundaries of [this] history and its inner continuity” are aligned with the Eurocentric narrative of Western capitalist development or Modernization as the logic of temporal ordering is focused on/deployed towards supporting the *single* historical premise/motor of class struggle. If Judeo-Christian European history was ordered and generalized into universal history via the guiding light/motor and telos of divine providence in Bossuet, the telos of Marxist revolution similarly orders and generalizes the growth and spread of an ostensibly global but empirically Western capitalism via the internal logics derived exclusively from the evolution of social conditions and contradictions of capitalist development from Euro-America to the rest of the world.

This temporalizing logic of Anderson’s critique has important implications for the problematic of “multiple modernisms” or the “culture of modernism” as presented in Berman’s text. Anderson takes issue with Berman’s uniform theory of modernism because he sees Berman’s “culture of modernism” as one, which lacks any “internal principle of variation” and thus “keeps reproducing itself.”⁵⁰⁶ Pointing to the temporal incongruities of Berman’s modernist examples and their wide-ranging spatial distribution and lack of coherence to the historical specificity of modernization, Anderson proceeds to argue against the lack of *specificity* or differentiation of Berman’s homogenous definition of the “culture of modernism” by reconstituting a temporally differentiated evolution of Western European *modernization* as the social, economic and political referents for the general characteristics of cultural or aesthetic *modernism* and its corresponding development over time. Thus what actually emerges as Anderson’s “multiple modernisms” is a chronologically differentiated modernism which orders different stages of a vital modernism from the turn of the century to its eventual passing after 1945 in postmodernism. Within the Eurocentric perspective and horizon of Anderson’s stages of modernization, which geographically corresponds to a movement out from the center from the West to the rest of the world, ‘modernism’ appears in non-Western spaces at the moment when “the West’s season ends” — occupying a ghostly presence as a “shadow effect” of Western modernism that occurred half a century earlier and has since perished under late capitalism or postmodernism in the West. Like the new directionality of travel introduced in the Enlightenment era, the movement from the center to the periphery is formulated as a movement into the past history of Europe. Anderson reincarnates the critical minded “philosophical traveler” — whose critical stance toward ‘late capitalism’ or ‘Fordism’ in the West is expressed through a romanticization of the “Third World” as Europe’s “past” which can presently be found at both a *temporal* and *spatial* distance from the center/Euro-America as “a sort of Archimedean point from which to change an otherwise hopeless present,” such as the late 18th century C.F. Volney reproached Enlightenment universalism.⁵⁰⁷

As in Fabian’s critique of how Anthropology produces its “Other” through a temporalizing practice of spatial distancing, this framework denies “coevalness” or simultaneity to non-western cultural or aesthetic processes developing with differently yet relationally constituted social, economic, and political phenomena of modernization linked through an interconnected world market or — non-Western modernisms of past and present. This evolutionary or developmental framework has important political implications because while Anderson invests these non-Western places and the belated and ghostly ‘modernist’ masterpieces of the “Third World” with political charge, this political charge is limited and potentially hindered by the restrictive social and cultural coordinates or categories of Modernization and

⁵⁰⁶ Perry Anderson, p. 104.

⁵⁰⁷ Fabian, p. 10

thus Modernism that were developed from specific conditions of turn of the century Western Europe and generalized into the coordinates for a universalized form of Modernization. In contradistinction, the sense of a global ‘universal’ in the first sense of the term temporally akin to Lefebvre’s call for an analysis of space as a diachronic and synchronic ‘totality’ that is eschewed here—as was in the universal histories of Bossuet to 19th century social evolutionists—would demand grappling with an expansion of perspective and horizon and the enhanced complexity and political openings this brings for the analysis of contemporary forms of class struggle. Rather than a singular logic of development and its ordered coherence of times and events, we could potentially see its “combinations” and “collisions” with other forms of struggle that also emerge from an actually spatialized globalizing capitalist modernization.

From Homogenous, Empty Time and Panoramic, Depthless Space to Hierarchical Differentiated Space-Times of Modernization, Modernism and Modernity

Spatial/Cultural Difference: Alternative Modernities, Discrepant Experiences and Eurocentrism

As Perry Anderson’s “modernism” is chiefly “multiple” in a temporal sense, it leaves untouched the problem of a culturally undifferentiated modernism in Berman’s text, and merely papers over it with the temporally differentiated specificity of Western modernization. What Anderson in effect has done is to replace Berman’s uniform “*culture* of modernism” with a temporally ordered and class-differentiated concept of *social* modernization; he replaces “culture” with “society” in the sense of ‘civilization.’ Raymond Williams notes that the term “culture” was both extended and generalized from specific uses such as in tending husbandry and cultivation of natural growth to a general process of human development in the 18 and 19th centuries. As “culture” passed into an independent noun it came to be used as a synonym for “civilization” in the sense “which had been established for civilization by the historians of enlightenment in the popular 18th century form of the universal histories, as a description of the secular process of human development.”⁵⁰⁸ More to the point, Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar has observed in his reading of the western tale of modernity that “culture is the capacious and contested middle term” for the “two intersecting visions of modernity in the West: the Weberian societal/cultural modernity and the Baudelarian cultural/aesthetic modernity:

In the Weberian vision, societal modernization fragments cultural meaning and unity. The Baudelarian vision, which is equally alert to the effects of modernization, seeks to redeem modern culture by aestheticizing it. Each has a bright side and a dark side...The bright side of the Baudelarian vision draws on a different aspect of the experience of modernity. It focuses affectively on the cultural patina of modernity as a spectacle of speed, novelty, and effervescence. It finds aesthetic pleasure and creative excitement in treading the surface and is unencumbered by the hermeneutic temptation of having to find meaning and unity hidden beneath surface experiences. The dark side suggests the absence of moral constraints in a world of appearances where the aesthetic pursuit can deteriorate from a disciplined Nietzschean

⁵⁰⁸ Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (Fontana: Great Britain, 1976), p. 77.

self-assertion against a seemingly meaningless and absurd world into narcissistic self-absorption and hedonism.⁵⁰⁹

If what Berman has done in his book is to meld these two visions of Western modernity—taking in both the benefits and perils of its bright and dark sides into a perpetual dialectic of modernity without telos, then Perry Anderson corrects this with the reassertion of a Western Marxist telos of revolution supported with a reconstructed trajectory of its evolution. As Anderson rejects “culture” in the cultural/aesthetic modernity sense and replaces it with “society” in the societal/cultural sense with society understood as class-differentiated society, he upholds the enlightenment narrative of progress while staving off meaningless alienation and repetition with the telos of proletarian emancipation. What he does not do is to challenge the homogenous and universalizing concept of “culture” in Berman’s “culture of modernism”—which is undifferentiated in terms of “culture” in so far as the “culture of modernism” is confined to Western Euro-American culture.

Thinking multiple modernisms or modernities in terms of differentiated socio-cultural space-times of modernization—or to “spatialize the story of modernity”⁵¹⁰—would entail seeing differentiated interconnected and relational developments and experiences of capitalist modernization across space, or in other words to see differently constituted non-Western modern experiences and forms as “coeval” with western cultural modernity.⁵¹¹ This is not to say that modernization occurred at the same time everywhere, or to deny Western Europe’s place as the historical industrial center of capitalist modernization. Rather it is to stress the concrete interlinkages, both direct and indirect, between the West and the rest in the global spread of capitalism via imperialism and colonialism including bureaucratic structures, various forms of migrations, and new, contingent, and hybrid ‘modern’ forms of emerging from these contacts that challenge and enrich our understanding of modern life, culture, and politics. To consider the uneven and spatially (and thus socially, politically and culturally) differentiated development of capitalist modernization *synchronously* in the multiplicity of cultural-specific emergent modernities and modernisms is to examine the way Western modernization processes and discourses traveled to the non-West from the late 19th century in the case of Asia and Africa or earlier in the case of the Americas and consider how it generated both similar and different transformations in these places—as well as how these processes in the peripheries affected and continue to affect those at the center. As Gaonkar argues in his introduction to the volume of essays on “alternative modernities:”

to think in terms of alternative modernities does not mean one blithely abandons the Western discourse on modernity...Modernity has traveled from the West to the rest of the world not only in terms of cultural forms, social practices, and institutional arrangements but also as a form of discourse that interrogates the present. That questioning of the present, whether in vernacular or in cosmopolitan idioms, which is taking place at every national

⁵⁰⁹ Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, “On Alternative Modernities,” *Public Culture*, 11, no. 1, p. 9.

⁵¹⁰ Doreen Massey, “Imagining Globalization: Power-Geometries of Time-Space,” in *Global Futures, Migration, Environment and Globalization*, Mary J. Mickman and Martin Mac an Ghaill, eds. (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1999), p. 27.

⁵¹¹ According to Fabian, the “denial of coevalness” is “a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse.” *Time and the Other*, p. 31.

and cultural site today cannot escape the legacy of Western discourse on modernity...[however] One can provincialize Western modernity only by thinking through and thinking against its self-understanding, which are frequently cast in universalist idioms. To think through and to think against means to think with a difference—a difference that would destabilize the universalist idioms, historicize the contexts, and pluralize the experiences of modernity.⁵¹²

For Gaonkar, a “minimal requirement for thinking in terms of alternative modernities” is the think in terms of a “‘cultural’ as opposed to an ‘acultural’ theory of modernity:”

An acultural theory describes the transition to modernity in terms of a set of culture-neutral operations, which are viewed as “input” that can transform any traditional society...an acultural theory is a theory of convergence: The inexorable march of modernity will end up making all cultures look alike. A cultural theory, in contrast, holds that modernity always unfolds within a specific cultural or civilizational context and that different starting points for the transition to modernity lead to different outcomes. Under the impact of modernity, all societies will undergo certain changes in both outlook and institutional arrangements. Different starting points ensure that new differences will emerge in response to relatively similar changes. A cultural theory directs one to examine how ‘the pull of sameness and the forces making for difference’ interact in specific ways under the exigencies of history and politics to produce alternative modernities at different national and cultural sites. In short, modernity is not one, but many.⁵¹³

And lastly, an alternative modernity approach foregrounds “that narrow but critical band of variations consisting of site-specific “creative adaptations” on the axis of convergence (or societal modernization):

[Creative adaptation] does not mean that one can freely choose whatever one likes from the offerings of modernity. It is delusional to think, as neoconservatives in the West and the cultural nationalists in the non-West seem to do, that one can take the good things (i.e. technology) and avoid the bad (i.e. excessive individualism)...While coming up with the indigenous and culturally informed ‘functional equivalents’ to meet the imperatives of modernization is an important task of creative adaptation, that sort of institutional innovation does not exhaust its scope or reveal its true spirit...rather, it points to the manifold ways in which a people question the present.”⁵¹⁴

With a familiar resemblance to Berman’s definition of little ‘m’ ‘modernism,’ Gaonkar posits that most importantly, “creative adaptation” “is the site where a people ‘make’ themselves’

⁵¹² Gaonkar, pp. 13-14.

⁵¹³ Gaonkar, p. 15-16.

⁵¹⁴ Gaonkar, p. 16.

modern, as opposed to being ‘made’ modern by alien and impersonal forces, and where they give themselves an identity and a destiny.”⁵¹⁵ Brought together through the focus on “a specific national/cultural site” which characterizes the writing of “alternative modernities,” though not all subscribing to that name, such studies of specific space-times of modernization examined in relation to as well as in difference to processes and discourses of Western modernity are calls for simultaneously *structural* and *cultural* analysis and have become a source for both new and revisionist concepts as well as critical conceptual openings into a variety of contemporary historical and theoretical discourses.

For example, in *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, as Dipesh Chakrabarty opens up Marxist narratives of capitalist modernity to issues of historical difference, presenting historical explorations of specific themes of modernity of upper caste Hindu Bengalis, he concretely demonstrates, similar to Gaonkar, that the “categories and strategies we have learned from European thought (including the strategy of historicizing)” are both “indispensable and inadequate in helping us to think through the experiences of political modernity in non-Western nations, and provincializing Europe becomes the task of exploring how this thought—which is now everybody’s heritage and which affect us all—may be renewed from and for the margins.”⁵¹⁶ More specifically Chakrabarty introduces the concept of “translation” as a corrective to “transition” that has long occupied the main “historicist” debate of capitalist modernity stating that:

what translation produces out of seeming “incommensurabilities” is neither an absence of relationship between dominant and dominating forms of knowledge nor equivalents that successfully mediate between differences, but precisely the partly opaque relationship we call “difference.” To write narratives and analyses that produce this translucence—and not transparency—in the relation between non-Western histories and European thought and its analytical categories is what I seek to both propose and illustrate in what follows.⁵¹⁷

Likewise, in *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China 1900-1937*, Lydia Liu challenges us to rethink “cross-cultural interpretation and forms of linguistic mediation between East and West” in an effort to “open up, rather than assume, the hypothetical equivalence of meanings between...languages.”⁵¹⁸ Extending Saussure’s theory of structural linguistics into the analysis of concrete cultural exchanges in her study of the conditions and discursive practices of translation in modern Chinese literature, ‘translation’ in Liu’s concept of “translingual practice”:

is no longer a neutral event untouched by the contending interests of political and ideological struggles. Instead, it becomes the very site of such struggles where the guest language is forced to encounter the host language, where the

⁵¹⁵ Ibid. In general, Gaonkar’s outlines of alternative modernity are remarkably similar to the form and ethos of Marshall Berman’s conception and exploration of modernity and modernism.

⁵¹⁶ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 16.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Lydia Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China 1900-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. xv, 19.

irreducible differences between them are fought out, authorities invoked or challenged, ambiguities dissolved or created, and so forth, until new meanings emerge in the host language itself.⁵¹⁹

A key element of these and other “alternative modernities” literature is the shared though “discrepant” experiences of modernization under *imperialism* and *colonialism*. If Gaonkar emphasizes “site-based readings” to examine the “modifications” or mediations that obtain between social modernization processes and cultural modernities in Western and non-Western contexts, Edward Said emphasizes the need for a “comparative” or “contrapuntal perspective in order to see a connection” between imperial cultural processes and their colonial counterparts that is “ideologically and culturally” kept apart:

In juxtaposing experiences with each other, in letting them play off each other, it is my interpretative political aim (in the broadest sense) *to make concurrent those views and experiences that are ideologically and culturally closed to each other and that attempt to distance or suppress other views and experiences. Far from seeking to reduce the significance of ideology, the exposure and dramatization of discrepancy highlights its cultural importance; this enables us to appreciate its power and understand its continuing influence.*⁵²⁰

With various points of emphasis, the shared call for a ‘concrete’ ‘comparative’ and approach to analyzing differentiated forms of social and cultural modernization and ‘creative adaptations’ in these texts also entails a core critique of Eurocentrism. An epistemological reorientation toward national or cultural specificity, the power dynamics and politics of “translation,” “translucence” or “discrepant experiences, all point to a critique of Eurocentric universalism and an appeal to decenter the European story of modernity which either assumes European centrality to represent all cultures or presumes and dissimulates a supposed neutrality or equivalence between cultures. Importantly, as Liu and Said both stress, this involves bringing to the fore dominant ideological and cultural forms that have passed for general methodologies and epistemological foundations of the Eurocentric narrative of world history and world or global culture and highlighting the discrepant relation and interaction between dominant and dominated ideologies and cultures that are both masked and kept apart by this epistemological framework.

Like Said, Samir Amin notes that behind the Eurocentric story of modernity there is also an ideological culturalist dimension to the invention of an “eternal West” which has been expressed for centuries by the dominant ideology “as a *particularly European*, rationalist, and secular ideology, while claiming *worldwide scope*” and that this is moreover connected to “a political project of homogenization through imitation and catching up.”⁵²¹ Although the *culture*

⁵¹⁹ Liu, p. 26. What is interesting and useful about Liu’s formulation is that it considers the struggle between two ideological systems of myth. Where Barthes described a process of myth in which a motivated second order semiological system takes over an arbitrary first order linguistic system—distorting it and deforming it, Liu imagines a struggle between the two systems. And while European languages and cultures take the role of a guest language—one with greater power, which operates a deformation on the host language, the host language is not a mute lion robbed of its history. Thus her focus does not bring us to a woodcutter’s language devoid of myth or myth on the Left but rather a focus on the struggles between two mythic systems operating at a power imbalance.

⁵²⁰ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (Vintage, 1994), p. 32-33. Emphasis mine.

⁵²¹ Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (Monthly Review Press, 1989), pp. 165, 183. My italics.

of modernity can be defined as the eternally new, up to date, producing tradition as its opposition, this culture of modernity is not free from all forms of ancient tradition.⁵²² The sanctioning of particular narratives of mythic continuity is a key form of its legitimacy to universal modernity in the present. This is clearly evident in how the mythical Eurocentric narrative of world history or civilization in social and humanities disciplines including those of cultural/aesthetic Modernism forges a continuous link between the golden age of classical Greece to a modern European secular industrial present. As classical Greece is established not only as the origin of western civilization but the Archimedean point of the modern industrialized world, the cultural narrative of European Modernity is also either passed on as the cultural inheritance (though in dispossessed form for non-Western countries—often signaling lack of authenticity or a cultural hierarchy of belonging) of all modern industrialized nations as the paradigm of ‘international’ or ‘world,’ culture.⁵²³ It is as Berman questions the universality of Goethe and Marx’s idea of a cosmopolitan “world literature” in his discussion of Russian modernism: “But what if this culture were not universal after all, as Marx thought it would be? What if it turned out to be an exclusively and parochially Western affair?”⁵²⁴ Thus we might see Eurocentrism to supply the ideological coordinates for the practical homogenization of cosmopolitan or world culture in so far as this paradigm defines modernity by means of participating in Western culture and its founding cultural myths as “international” or “global” culture, which at the same time eschews the similarly modern though discrepant multiplicity of cultures of modernity—either premodern, paramodern, or alternative modernities’—that have and continue to inform the experiences of the non-Western and Western world. This applies as much to universalizing ideologies of modernization on the right as well as Marxist theories of modernity and revolution on the left as seen in Marxist theories of capitalist modernity. As Samir Amin emphasizes Eurocentric universalism and Westernization plagues both the political Left and the Right for while they “claim to have, if not radically different conceptions of economic efficiency, social justice, and democracy, at least widely divergent views of the means necessary for progress in these areas,” “these differences nevertheless remain inscribed in [this] general framework.”⁵²⁵ This also applies for recent theories of “globalization” in which the premise of universal time and universal culture unfortunately underwrites these theories. Of course, with reference to all of the above, a different conception of “spatiality” than the one that has developed under the tyranny of modern linear secular time and universal histories is a basic requirement.

The concept of dialectical-relational space which stems from Lefebvre’s theory of social space and underpins the social and historical-geographical study of social and spatial phenomena is as significant for considering the seriality particular to the space-time of railroads as it is for way we look at the differential space-times of modernity, modernization, and modernism. As

⁵²² See Gyorgy Markus on the relationship between culture and modernity in “A Society of Culture: the Constitution of Modernity” in *Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity*, Gillian Robinson and John Rundell, eds., (London: Routledge, 1994).

⁵²³ This is perpetuated and supported by routine and concrete ritualizations of this myth such as international events like the Olympics which in part grew out of the universal expositions of the 19th century. But the basis of the Olympics was motivated by European imperial nationalism rather than cosmopolitanism as the modern Olympic games were revived from classical Greek origins and turned into a model for modern “internationalism” and “world” culture by small group of European aristocrats in the 19th century. I explore this history in detail in my subsequent chapter on the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

⁵²⁴ Berman, p. 124.

⁵²⁵ Amin, p. 181.

critical human geographer Doreen Massey has stated, to look upon space as a “dynamic simultaneity,” of differentially and relationally constituted mix of social relations rather than as ‘abstract homogenous space’ is to see that “social phenomena may be placed in relationship to one another in such a way that new social effects are provoked.”⁵²⁶ And “it is a view of space opposed to that which sees it as a flat, immobilized surface, as stasis, even as no more than threatening chaos – the opposite of stasis – which is to see space as the opposite of History, and as the (consequently) de-politicized.”⁵²⁷ This politically significant approach to space is precisely what is amiss in the idea of space as abstract passive, envelopes or containers—the reified notion of space—that complements the concept of linear time as well as undermines a differentiated historical time in canonical Western narratives of Modernity, Modernization and Modernism, and which have more recently passed into related narratives of globalization, and the discourses of “global cities” and “flow spaces.”⁵²⁸

To return to Benedict Anderson, Schivelbusch, and railroad space-time, these differences importantly key into examining their connected yet differentiated processes evinced in the similarity and differences between the new condition of a primarily class-differentiated *exile*⁵²⁹ appearing within the metropolitan centers of industrial society and their contemporary colonial counterparts where locomotives were introduced as a significant element of the apparatus of 19th century imperial/colonial statecraft within an evolving lineage of *journeys in exile* as a politicized form of both spatial and cultural displacement—*which as produced through railroads was as much a comparative and hybrid national consciousness as it was an alienating one.*⁵³⁰ For it was the same new industrial technology of transport, though evolving in interlinked but distinct socio-political contexts, that instigated new metropolitan forms of *exile* and enabled nationalist imaginings in England, through the hierarchical socio-political geographies of educational and labor migration, as those, placed in the context of the colonial state as an apparatus of discriminatory/racist colonial policies informed by the same official imperial nationalism of the colonizing power, that were simultaneously structuring colonial educational and administrative pilgrimages and enabling contemporaneous *racially/ethnically and linguistically culturalized* national imaginings of colonial exile.

⁵²⁶ Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, p. 4.

⁵²⁷ Ibid. Elaborating on Lefebvre’s social space, Doreen Massey lays forth the theoretical framework for a critical social geography in *Space, Place, and Gender* stating: “‘The spatial’ then, it is argued here, can be seen as constructed out of the multiplicity of social relations across all spatial scales, from the global reach of finance and telecommunications, through the geography of the tentacles of national political power, to the social relations within the town, the settlement, the household and the workplace. It is a way of thinking in terms of the ever-shifting geometry of social/power relations, and it forces into view the real multiplicities of space-time” (p. 4).

⁵²⁸ For example, Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, and Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); or Manuel Castells, *The Informational City: Economic Restructuring and Urban Development* (Wiley-Blackwell, 1992).

⁵²⁹ Exile is the common denominator related to early creole, colonial and European industrial nationalism.

⁵³⁰ Also, upon introducing the railroads as a new 19th century technology of transportation, Anderson moves too quickly from 19th century railroads to 20th century airplanes as signaling a shift from nationalization in Europe to “transnationalization of advanced capitalism” (*SC*, p. 67). Bringing the colonies back in, or bringing the locomotive into the colonies, we need to look at how the colonial era railroads may have been linked to the transformation of the colonial state to the national state—before we move to its transnationalization in the postcolonial era. Because he moves too quickly to airports, he disconnects this local European form of exile from the lineage which conditioned the first creole republican nationalisms as a forerunner to vernacular nationalisms and official nationalisms in Europe and followed by colonial nationalism as in his genealogy of nationalism developed in *Imagined Communities*--and sees it instead as the development of a different form of consciousness—what he calls long-distance nationalism—which signaled instead the unraveling of the 19th century national project.

As I turn to both the historical appearance and cultural imaginary of railroads and railway journeys in colonial Korea in the next chapter, I look at how these railroads and railway journeys both altered the physical landscapes of Korea with a complex symbolism of Western modernity, as well as how the railroads became appropriated as a key symbol and vehicle of national independence, arising from the confluence of the particular characteristics of Japanese colonialism and modern Korean nationalism, stemming from each of their differentiated positioning within an uneven cultural and political economic world hierarchy.

Chapter Three

Korean Railroads, Newspapers, Novels, and Exile: The Civilizational Geography of Colonial Modernity and Cosmopolitan Journeys of National Imagining (Modernity and Nationalism)

Railroads and the Dawn of Korean Modernity: A New Expanded and Diminished Imperial-Civilizational Geography and Cosmopolitan-National Journeys

As industrial modernization traveled from the West to the Rest via the uneven economic and political processes of global imperial capitalism, the steam railroads also passed from both the industrialized metropolitan centers of the West as well as the English, French, American countryside to the predominantly agrarian landscapes of Asia and Africa. However, if the late 18th and early 19th century European railroads had developed organically over centuries with the emergence of a new industrial class of bourgeoisie, whose transformation of nature and social relations appeared both revolutionary and absolute, the same railroads arose in much of the non-western and colonized world of the late 19th century—in a bewildering and abrupt onslaught of new ideas (replete with new Western style schools), new technologies, new people, indeed a new civilizational paradigm—mediated through the imposition of foreign capital and bourgeoisie buttressed by the unmitigated power of the imperial state via powerful foreign military economic and political interventions whether in the form of semi-imperial infringements and transgressions or as part of the governing apparatus of colonialism. When the steam railroad first appeared in the agricultural landscape of Korea in the final years of the 19th century, along with the electric street-car, street lamps and telephone lines, it was an optimistic, if ominous, harbinger of modern industrialization.⁵³¹ The first railway line opened in 1900 initially operating two trips a day across 32 km between Seoul and Incheon with four locomotives traveling from 22 to 55 km/hour.⁵³² Lacking domestic capital and technical expertise, the construction of railroads arose in a period of rampant foreign concessions as part of the state's early efforts to modernize the nation (and balance the power of Japanese economic and political power in the peninsula). The Chosŏn government granted rights to construct and run the inaugural Seoul-Incheon line to James R. Morse, an American businessman, in 1896, in part stemming from the much needed access to American technology and capital and in part as diplomatic measures to bring U.S. into Korean development in the face of the predominance of Japanese industries and concessions, aided by

⁵³¹ Korea at this period was referred to as the Great Han/Korean Empire as it was a period situated in between the end of Chinese suzerainty (with the Treaty of Shimonoseki resulting from Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5) and the beginning of Japanese occupation in 1905 (which formally began in 1910 but was in de facto operation since 1904 with the start of the Russo Japanese War and the imposition of the colonial Protectorate in 1905 upon Japan's victory)—and characterized by international imperial concessions.

⁵³² Prior to railroads, with the forced opening of Korean ports to foreign trade and diplomatic relations with the West in the late 19th century, new modes of transportation accompanied the inflow of Japanese and western goods, ideas and people. While foot traffic was the predominant mode of human transport for the masses, with human-powered sedan chairs and other carriages and horses available to the privileged “yangban” (gentry) classes, there was a gradual introduction of rickshaws, horse-drawn carriages, bicycles and automobiles. Seoul Development Institute, *Seoul, 20th Century: Growth and Change of the Last 100 Years* (Seoul: SDI, 2003), p. 164.

the lobbying efforts of American missionary and minister Horace Allen who served as a close confidant and advisor to the King.⁵³³ However in 1899, Morse sold the Seoul-Incheon railway concession to the Japanese government for 1.7 million yen, which had already been a significant investor for Morse's project, and Japan finished the Seoul-Incheon line reorganized under the Seoul-Inchon Railway Company run by a Japanese syndicate.⁵³⁴ By the time Japan completed construction of the Kyōng-bu line in 1905, running from the Seoul down to the southernmost city of Pusan, and the Kyōng-ŭi line in 1906 (which it developed for military purposes during the Russo-Japanese War), running from Seoul to the northern cities of P'yōngyang and Sinŭijŭ, the railways became a conspicuous sign of Japanese imperial economic, political, and militaristic designs on the Korean peninsula. From the southern tip of Korea, the Kyōng-bu line connected Korea to Japan through the regularly scheduled ferry service between Pusan and the Japanese port city of Shimonoseki as well as monthly steamships between Pusan and Nagasaki, while to the northern Korean border, the Kyōng-ŭi line was set to link Korea to Manchuria through connections with the Japanese controlled South Manchurian Railway.⁵³⁵ By the time Korea was formally colonized in 1910 and the railway came under the control of the Japanese colonial Governor-General of Korea, the chief colonial military and administrative authority, the "trunk railway" across Korea had already been laid and the Korean railroad was poised to become the backbone of Japan's imperial military expansion and commercial integration across the Asian continent. As the railway network continued to expand, it not only connected every major city in the country, but also linked the whole peninsula to the imperialist center of Tokyo, as well as outlying regions of the Japanese Empire as well as the larger international geography of nation-states through pan-imperial transcontinental rail and ferry connections.

Railroads as Colonial Infrastructure—Korea as "Land-bridge between Japan and Asia"

As it had been in Europe in the previous century, the belated emergence of railroads in Korea was an undeniable force and symbol of modern industrialization and integration into a global capitalist economic system. But in the Korean colonial context, at the same time that the railroads symbolized the constant innovations, "uninterrupted disturbance" and "everlasting uncertainty and agitation"⁵³⁶ of industrial modernity, it also symbolized, as Cumings has argued, "permanence and integrity—the permanence of industry (if not of Japan), and the integrity of the Japanese empire, within which national boundaries were increasingly less relevant."⁵³⁷ Like many parts of the colonized world, Japan's extensive investments in Korean railways followed in the tradition of other imperial powers, whereby railways were both one of the earliest (even

⁵³³ Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910*, (Berkeley: UC Press, 1995), p. 145; See also Andrei Lankov, *The Dawn of Modern Korea: The Transformation of Life and Cityscape* (Seoul: EunHaeng NaMu, 2007), p. 74. American firms also ran the electricity and water systems.

⁵³⁴ Duus, p. 145.

⁵³⁵ The shipping lines into Korean ports were likewise dominated by Japanese companies. See Kirk W. Larsen, "Trade, Dependency, and Colonialism: Foreign Trade and Korea's Regional Integration 1876-1910 in Charles K. Armstrong et al., eds., *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia* (NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), pp. 51-69. See also a very interesting article about the competition for freight lines by Korean and Japanese shipping companies along the railways during the colonial period by Jun Uchida, "A Scramble for Freight: The Politics of Collaboration along and Across the Railway Tracks of Korea under Japanese Rule," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* vol. 51, no. 1 (2009), pp.117-150.

⁵³⁶ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1888) (NY: Penguin Books, 2002 edition), p. 223.

⁵³⁷ Bruce Cumings, quoted in Daqing Yang, "Japanese Colonial Infrastructure in Northeast Asia: Realities, Fantasies, Legacies," in Charles K. Armstrong et al., eds., *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia*, (NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), p. 94.




Figure 1: Groundbreaking Ceremony of Gyeongbu (Seoul-Busan) Line at Busan, 1901 [Image from August 21, 1901: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Groundbreaking_ceremony_of_Gyeongbu_Line_at_Busan,_1901.jpg]

preceding colonialism) and most extensively developed elements of colonial infrastructure to serve the military and economic interests of empire.⁵³⁸ However, Japan's early interest in building and operating railroads in Korea beginning with railroad concessions a decade prior to its imposition of a colonial Protectorate in 1905 and then formal annexation in 1910, also had to do with its rather unique geographical proximity to Korea (unlike far flung trans-Atlantic colonies in the case of Europe) and was driven by both security and economic concerns of a late-developing relatively economically backward Japanese state rather than European commercial bourgeois interests backed by the world's imperial economic superpowers. It was only two decades prior to Japan's military quest for a trade treaty with Korea, that America had done the same to Japan in 1858.

The geographical proximity between Korea and Japan had structured a long history of diplomatic relations as well as occasional invasions between the two nations throughout the premodern period under the larger shared Sino-centric civilization paradigm.⁵³⁹ However with the ascendance of Japan as the premier modern industrial power in East Asia in the late 19th century, Korea's geographical proximity not only to Japan but also northern China made Korea into a strategic "land bridge between Japan proper and the [Asian] continent," whereby railroads became instrumental to Japanese military expansion not only into the Korean peninsula but also into the Asian continent and the spatial integration of Northeast Asia into Japan's later ultimate expansionist imperial vision of a 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere.'⁵⁴⁰ As Cumings notes: "The extension of rails into Korea and Manchuria facilitated Japanese development of these colonies, a circumstance quite unique in colonial relationships made possible because Japan colonized its next-door neighbors rather than faraway lands."⁵⁴¹ Thus at the same time that imperial railway development accelerated the commercialization of agriculture in Korea, it also did so in Manchuria, drawing "the two regions not just into market relations with the Japanese metropole but also into the world market system."⁵⁴² The spatial integration of northeast Asia by rail networks into an uneven regional colonial division of labor within the larger global economic system is well summarized by Bruce Cumings:

Korea and Manchuria were stitched together by rail networks, webs drawn by colonial spiders on a determined southeast (Japan) to northwest (Asian mainland) axis, thus to shrink space and time and to spill Korean rice and Manchurian soybeans all along the wharfs looking out to the Sea of Japan, then to bring back fruit-of-the-Toyoda-loom cotton clothes for the waiting backs of Koreans and Chinese.⁵⁴³

Like Cumings, various historians as well as post-colonial scholars of Asia and Africa have noted how modern technologies of colonial infrastructure such as railroads were crucial to developing colonial capitalist economies as a subset of the economic system of imperialist centers, shaped in

⁵³⁸ See Daqing Yang, "Japanese Colonial Infrastructure in Northeast Asia: Realities, Fantasies, Legacies," in Charles K. Armstrong et al., eds., *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia*, (NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), pp. 92-109.

⁵³⁹ See chapter One for a more detailed discussion of this.

⁵⁴⁰ Yang, pp. 102-3.

⁵⁴¹ Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-47* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 12.

⁵⁴² Bruce Cumings, quoted in Daqing Yang, p. 94.

⁵⁴³ Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 166.

relation to and in service of the metropolitan economies, with some sectors of industrial development being suppressed while other sectors such as raw material extraction and agriculture fostered, while at the same time creating a protected market for its goods.⁵⁴⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein and world systems theory has moreover emphasized both the distinctive functions assumed by as well as the interdependent nature “between respective peripheral colonies and metropolitan cores as all were incorporated into a single division of labour of the capitalist world-economy.”⁵⁴⁵ In addition, extending Wallerstein’s emphasis on both the difference and interdependence of imperial and peripheral economic systems to related asymmetries and linkages in urban development placing particular emphasis on the colonial city and the role of colonialism and imperialism in the modern urban system, Anthony D. King argues: “not only can colonial urban development not be understood separately from developments in the metropole but similarly, urbanism and urbanization in the metropole cannot be understood separately from developments in the colonial periphery. They are part of the same process.”⁵⁴⁶ Thus as the railroads came to function as a vehicle for the incorporation of Korea into a single world market economy—driven as much as by the logic of capital accumulation as by the political and military control, dominance, and expansion of the imperial state—the railroads became essential elements of the transformation of Korea’s economy, politics, society and culture embedded in its predominantly rural landscapes into a political-economic, territorial, and cultural appendage of the Japanese empire, with both hierarchically differentiated structures, processes and experiences of colonial modernization as well as parallel and interdependent processes as a subset of the imperial capitalist economy and territory.

Railroads and the Modern Colonial City

In the way that premodern material and conceptual structures as well as the anomalous relationship between Korea and Japan, including cultural parity and geographical proximity compared to European colonial cases—and the precolonial modern reform movements by both state and society developing within the circumstances of Korea’s hostile and traumatic encounter with the new imperialist international system—were crucial to the formation of early modern Korean nationalism as ethno-linguistically and territorially aligned but also diasporically constituted among deterritorialized ethno-national communities floating across an uneven hierarchical cosmopolitan world geography—these differences also importantly figure into Korea’s experience of colonial modernization in which Japan’s colonization of Korea was shaped through what Cumings has referred to as a series of “colonial substitutions” rather than

⁵⁴⁴ See for example Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁵⁴⁵ Anthony D. King, *Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 7.

⁵⁴⁶ Anthony D. King, *Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World Economy*, p. 7. While other world-system theories also discuss this phenomena such as the more periphery-focused Samir Amin, the work of Anthony D. King such as *Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System* (1990), and his edited volume *Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity* (1990) brings this structural historical examination to bear on the urban space. Moreover, King does not use Lefebvre but develops a related approach from general world systems literature such as Immanuel Wallerstein and other theorists working more specifically on urban histories and social formations, he also calls for “theoretically informed empirical research” that examines “the essentially integrated and interdependent nature of urbanization and urban processes (and in some cases urban forms) between respective peripheral colonies and metropolitan cores as all were incorporated into a single division of labour of the capitalist world-economy” (King, p. 7).

“colonial creations,” and in which both the historical ethnicization and deterritorialization of Korean nationalism also continued and became more politically charged/exacerbated.⁵⁴⁷ With Korea’s eventual fall into colonialism (proceeding between the years of the Protectorate and Annexation from 1905-1910)—the broader processes of “colonial substitutions” guided by new hierarchical rational and systematic imperatives of “colonial imperative coordination” of both economy and territory between the colony and the metropole via imperial statecraft aided by modern (Western) scientific principles and ideological symbols were perhaps most visible in its analogous material and symbolic transformations of the landscape.⁵⁴⁸ As architectural historian Hyungmin Pai notes, in the face of “typical modern urban problems” accompanying commercial development and the physical expansion of Hanyang [the name for Seoul during the Chosŏn dynasty] since the 18th century, “the need for rational methods of dealing with these problems, particularly the task of clearing main thoroughfares that had been illegally occupied by squatters and merchants, was discussed by reformists such as Park Young-ho and Kim Ok-kyun [early enlightenment party members and leaders of the 1884 Kapsin coup]” by the late nineteenth century. But characteristic of the various incomplete, failed modernization attempts by both the Yi state and modern reformers in the decades prior to colonization—in the face of domestic disquiet, orthodox Neo-Confucian opposition to the new civilization, and foreign political interventions—these efforts at urban reform were likewise unachieved and in this case “fundamentally limited because the city could not deal with the basic issue of land ownership.”⁵⁴⁹ However, the rationalization and systemization of Korean land began almost immediately after Japanese Annexation with an extensive colonial land survey, which “established clear boundaries of ownership that would facilitate the expropriation and exploitation of agricultural as well as urban land.”⁵⁵⁰ To redevelop and expand urban and rural space to facilitate colonial expropriation, the Japanese deployed new rational and systematic methods of land subdivisions “adopted from the German practice of *Umlegung*—the repartitioning of lots for city expansion and building,” replacing and distorting the traditional layout of Seoul which was derived from Confucian cosmological geomantic principles (*pungsu*) used to both select Seoul as the site of the Chosŏn capital city as well as the layout of the city in the early 1400s.⁵⁵¹ Thus at the same time, the colonial government’s plans for “the systematic transformation” of Seoul [now called Kyŏngsŏng by the colonial government] “to exploit fully the land resources of Korea,” was also accompanied by the reorganization of “the city centre of Seoul according to a new symbolic order.”⁵⁵²

Though never fully realized, the Japanese plan proposed to transform the main roads of the city into a grid system, overlap it with baroque diagonals, and place large symbolic buildings in the key nodal points. The key monument in this scheme was the headquarters of the colonial government. In 1924, Kanghwamoon [Seoul’s main gate originally placed at the entrance

⁵⁴⁷ See Cumings’ discussion of “colonial substitutions” in *The Origins of the Korean War*, p. 9.

⁵⁴⁸ Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 141.

⁵⁴⁹ Hyungmin Pai, “Modernism, Development, and the Transformation of Seoul: A Study of the Development of Sae’oon Sang’ga and Yoido,” in Won Bae Kim et al, eds., *Culture and the City in East Asia*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 109.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 110. By the end of colonial rule, the owners of the largest size agricultural holdings were Japanese. (Cumings, *The Origins of Korean War*, p. 11.)

⁵⁵¹ Pai, pp. 109-111.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*

of the royal Kyōngbok palace] was moved to the east of the Kyōngbok Palace,⁵⁵³ and a domed, proto-Renaissance building was erected in front of the main pavilion of the palace. The idea was that the new building would break the original, spiritual axis of the city, so carefully laid out during its foundation [at the start of the Chosŏn dynasty in the late 14th century]. The headquarters building was connected with City Hall [1926] built in a simple and heavy classical style, and then linked to Namdaemun, and further south-west to the Seoul railway station [also built in neo-classical renaissance style in 1925].⁵⁵⁴

As the technical rationalization of colonial territory became linked with and was operated through a new symbolic ideological re-ordering of space which “sought to undermine the traditional order of Seoul and, in the process introduc[e] a new set of urban principles,” Pai argues that the colonial transformation of the traditional Korean city introduced “a new symbolic order of perspectival vision and a scale controlled by monumental artefacts:”⁵⁵⁵

By the 1930s, the most visible monuments in Seoul had become the steep towers of Myeongdong cathedral, the massive presence of the colonial government building, and the mecca of new culture and commercialism: Mitsukoshi department store. These ‘Western-style’ buildings and the urban environment they created departed from the deep structure of Seoul’s traditional urbanism. The transformations they brought were sudden and violent. Rather than being additions to the existing fabric, they acted as the centre of a new order. They dominated the landscape, providing explicit, in the physical and visual sense, but incomprehensible environments. These new technologies, shapes, and symbols were to many embodiments of modernity itself.⁵⁵⁶

Moreover, as Pai adds, these twin technical and ideological objectives of colonial urbanism were brought together and simultaneously achieved by the construction of new transportation infrastructures linking “Seoul with the newly established industrial areas of the country:”

Though Seoul had already expanded well out of the inner wall [that surrounded the original Chosŏn city Hanyang which preceded Seoul] during the nineteenth century, the railway linked with inner-city tram-lines literally tore down the walls of the city, and with it a symbolism that had lasted for many centuries.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵³ Kyōngbok Palace was the main residence of the Chosŏn court in Seoul and Kwanghwamun was the gate placed in front of Kyōngbok Palace.

⁵⁵⁴ Pai, pp. 110-111.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 111.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 112-113.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid.



Figure 2: Japanese Troops Marching through Namdaemun (West gate), 1904 [Image source: <http://koreanhistory.info/japan.htm>]



Figure 3: Seoul Railway Station completed in 1925 [Image source: <http://koreanhistory.info/japan.htm>]

Thus as the integration of Korea into a new imperial geography by railroads rationalized the space of colonial territory and the colonial city in accordance with the abstract rationality of Western “perspectival vision,” they were in a sense structurally akin to the new rational technological schemes of urban planning—which can be seen to parallel what Schivelbusch pointed to as the way the new abstracted point-to-point travel of railways replaced the sensual in-between space of the landscape with a new abstract systematized ‘geographical space’—as well as what Henri Lefebvre has referred to as the “abstract space” produced of capitalism. At the same time, as the railroad “tore down” the old city walls razing the social historical meanings and cultural authority of the traditional city as well as traditional regional identities and spatial relationships embedded within these cities and the symbolic city walls, it presented a complex multi-layered sign or myth (in the Barthes-ean sense) replacing the old symbolic order with its expression of a new symbolic order and ideological meaning of ‘colonial modernity’ (like Barthes’ “passionified roses”)—which worked to both standardize and hierarchize Korean society and territory in line with and beneath the universal colonial order of Japanese empire as well as legitimate and fortify the new colonial cultural political and symbolic authority/order of the colonial state as the universal standard by recourse to what can be called ‘modern-ified colonialism’—which can be seen to parallel the hierarchical standardization of remote territories according to urban capitalist metropolitan hierarchies in Schivelbusch, as well as the dominating conceived space (or representation of space) aspect of ‘abstract space’ in Lefebvre.⁵⁵⁸ For in so far as the technological-industrial railroad embodied or epitomized the symbolism of (Western-authoritative) modernity—it was akin to the “Western-style” “monumental artefacts” bearing an eclectic mix of historicist European architectural styles typical of colonial architecture in Korea⁵⁵⁹ qua signs of modern civilization such as the neoclassical Seoul Station or the offices of the colonial Governor-General, which “controlled” or ordered the new rational perspectival vision by forming its very marking points. This Western-style symbolism or rather (first-order semiological sign) was moreover ideologically superimposed onto and made to speak for the ‘modernity’ qua universality/universal validity of the very destructions and transformations of

⁵⁵⁸ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). Lefebvre lays out a triad of spatial representation in his theory of capitalist space—the conceived space or representations of space is the space of planners, of rationality, systematicity often linked to the violence of techno-rationalism; the lived space or representational space is the space of inhabitants or a dominated space, the space of imagination, of contingency, of artists, that ‘overlays physical space and making symbolic use of its objects’ and tends ‘toward more or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs’; spatial practice is the dialectical interaction of the planned space and spatial structures of capitalism and its inhabitants. (See Lefebvre, pp. 38-39.) The triad can be seen to resemble Marx’s three aspects value of the commodity form: exchange value, use-value, and value.

⁵⁵⁹ It is curious that by the time these ‘modern’ railroad and colonial governmental buildings were going up in mid 1920s colonial Korea, the European vanguard was leaving behind the 19th century Victorian characteristic of building in heavy and historicist inspired neo-classical, neo-baroque, styles—toward geometric unadorned Bauhaus and “international style” derived modernist styles. The grandeur and historicist and symbolic spirit behind European 19th century’s recycling of historical building styles and its favored adoption by Japan as symbolic colonial architecture appears congruent. When 19th century Europeans used the classical 15th-16th century Renaissance style they were intentionally invoking the meaningful symbolism behind that style for whatever railroad station, post office, or government building it was used for. This was similar to Japan, but of course in Japan as in Korea or other Asian colonies, various historical styles—classical, neoclassical, gothic, baroque, etc.—had a more homogenous and less historically and aesthetically differentiated character in their identical connotation of “modernity”—in so far as the apex and standard of modernity and modernism was equated with the Western civilization. I think this also explains the eclecticism or stylistic play you see in Japanese use of European styles, which would blend stylistic components and orders in ways that you do not see in Europe.

traditional regional identities, spatial relationships and authorities and its colonial replacements as signs of ‘modern-ified colonialism’ (second-order signification or myth) attached to railroads and the new colonial urbanism to justify the standardization qua hierarchical subsumption of Korean space under imperial space—for purposes of colonial expropriation and exploitation.

Of course, in this context we have another level of complication in representation in regard to these Western historicist architectural styles appropriated as signs of modernity in the colonial setting to legitimate/signify (as alibi) the colonizing project as a civilizing and modernizing process in so far as these architectural styles were also, like the landscapes in which they were inscribed, both distorted and deformed—not unlike like Barthes’ example of the lion turned into a sign of grammaticality “drained of its contingency,” robbed of its “history” and made to speak for the mythic signified—colonialism qua modernization and civilizing project.⁵⁶⁰ This can be seen in both the differences and similarities in the way in which the symbolic reordering of space via Western style buildings as markers of ‘enlightenment and civilization’ was also the process by which the Meiji state had transformed Japanese cities in previous decades, and which stems from and relates to the uniqueness of imperial Japan, a non-Western and a belated and relatively backward economic power within predominantly Western 19th century imperialist powers. As Keichi Takeuchi has written of the modern transformation of the townscape in Meiji Japan:

With the ‘civilization and enlightenment’ movement, Western townscapes became the model, at least for the ruling class who were responsible for town planning. Monumental Western-style buildings were considered not only as a means of presenting a dignified face, as a nation, to foreign visitors, but also as symbols of the power of the ruling class in the eyes of the Japanese people. In 1871, the government began to construct Ginza Street, pulling down existing buildings belonging to merchants and artisans and lining it with Western style brick buildings. This scheme aimed, on the one hand, at the prevention of fires which several times devastated ancient Tokyo, or Edo as it was then called and, on the other hand, at a demonstration of the national power, again to foreign countries with which Japan had begun negotiations, as stipulated by the shogun, in order to revise the unequal commercial treaties. Moreover, the common people also accepted this new aesthetic criteria. Typical types of urban houses belonging to the common people, after the Meiji Restoration, were still built in the form of samurai houses of the past, using wood, mud and paper. In addition to this, to have one or two Western-style rooms was considered a status symbol, except in certain cities such as Kyoto where the inhabitants were extremely proud of their traditional townscape. The Japanese generally had no interest in conserving traditional townscapes, and had no compunction whatsoever about demolishing the traditional town quarters, and replacing them with structures that were a compromise blending of Western and Japanese styles.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁶⁰ Roland Barthes, “Myth Today,” *Mythologies* (NY: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 118-119.

⁵⁶¹ Keichi Takeuchi, “Landscape, Language and Nationalism in Meiji Japan,” in *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 20 (1988), pp. 36-37.

The discourse of ‘enlightenment and civilization’ (*bunmei kaika*), which first developed in Meiji Japan, made modernization “synonymous with Westernization.”⁵⁶² As this discourse was inscribed upon the traditional landscape in Japan, as Takeuchi notes, Western-style buildings came to serve as both “symbols of the power of the ruling class in the eyes of the Japanese people” and symbols “of the national power” geared towards the gaze of “foreign countries” which were largely imperial powers that had forced upon Japan “unequal commercial treaties” (as Japan subsequently did to Korea).⁵⁶³ In the face of similar imperial encroachments by the West *and Japan*, this discourse of ‘enlightenment and civilization,’ which was also active among early modern Chinese reform movements, was appropriated by the Korean state and modern enlightenment intelligentsia, as we have seen Chapter One, to promote modern reforms in precolonial Korea as an anti-colonial strategy for national survival. Now as Japan proceeded to formally colonize Korea, beginning with the Protectorate in 1905 and finalized with Korea’s Annexation in 1910, it likewise proceeded to transform Korean landscapes with the same symbols of ‘enlightenment and civilization’ of Meiji Japan (and early modern Korean reform discourse)—but with an altered symbolism arising from its new instrumentalization as a technology of colonial statecraft rather than national statecraft. Hence rather than symbolizing the emergence of a new *native* ruling class and national state as they had done “in the eyes of the Japanese people” in Meiji Japan, these Western-style buildings and urban reconstructions transposed to the colonial context of Korea as technologies of imperialism made them both symbols of the power of a “new” foreign ruling class which was at the same time synonymous with the power of the “national power” of imperial Japan. And at the same time, their symbolism of “national [Japanese] power” as a means of presenting “a dignified face, as a nation, to foreign visitors” was moreover altered—in its transplantation in colonial Korea—to now ideologically presenting the benevolent face of the civilizing project of colonial modernization vis-à-vis Koreans as well as foreign imperialist powers. Moreover, as these Western-style buildings and technologies such as railroads were deformed and distorted as symbols of colonial modernization and the power of the imperial state in the context of colonial urbanism in Korea, they were thus interposed with the deformation and distortion of the traditional symbolic and socio-political meanings, contingency and history of the premodern Korean landscape—in inaugurating a lasting legacy of an inherently hybrid, politically charged and ambivalent connotation of ‘western-style’ architecture and objects in Korea.

Thus as per the abstractions and hierarchical systematizations of “geographical space” arising from the dialectic of expansion and contraction Wolfgang Schivelbusch associates with the new space-time of railroads, the more the railroads integrated the remote territories of the Korean landscape into the expanded “geographical space” of empire, the more it continued the process of tearing Korea out of its traditional constitution and transforming the social, political and economic geography of Korea and the historical identity of the regions and cities vis-à-vis its function in relation to the hierarchical rationalized and systematized expanded space of the Japanese imperium.⁵⁶⁴ While Korea’s commerce (and with it the giving way of the longstanding Confucian distaste for commercial transactions) was slow to grow in comparison with Tokyo or Shanghai, it grew most rapidly along the “new railway centers and rice-exporting seaports.”⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶² Ibid., p. 35.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., pp. 36-37.

⁵⁶⁴ See Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1977, 1986). See my discussion of Schivelbusch in Chapter 2.

⁵⁶⁵ Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 162.

The rapid development of Seoul as the colonial administrative and commercial capital of Korea—but also the country’s main “rail junction, where trunk lines converged from Pusan in the South, Inchon in the west, and Sinŭiju in the north”—which nearly doubled its population from the start to the end of the colonial period from 277,711 “of which 238,499 were Koreans, 38,397 Japanese, 770 Chinese, and around 100 Americans” in 1912 to more than 500,000 in 1945,⁵⁶⁶ as well as the growth and growing importance of the port city of Pusan in Southeastern Korea (presently the second largest city of Korea) surrounded by agricultural rich Korean farmlands to its interior and Japan to its exterior is representative. The construction of the Seoul-Pusan rail line shortened the customary travel time between Seoul and Pusan from three days to seventeen hours.⁵⁶⁷ Consequently it transformed Pusan, which had long been the primary port of trade with Japan for centuries into the main Korean entrepot, squeezing out Chinese and western merchants who had been more active in other Korean treaty ports like Inchon and Wonsan during the open port period between 1875 and Korea’s colonization in 1910, as well as making the Japanese port city of Shimonoseki across the water from Pusan a Japanese gateway between the colony and metropole.⁵⁶⁸ Pusan, which had a mere 38,217 people in 1912 grew tenfold to about 200,000 by the end of the colonial period, with a substantial number of its residents being Japanese.⁵⁶⁹ The railroad network also spurred the development and transformation of once remote and landlocked Korean villages into bustling cities such as Daejeon located far in the country’s interior. In addition to the economic imperatives driving these urban transformations, they were also propelled by new social and political colonial governmental institutions both ideological and repressive such as the modern western style school system and the modern army and police force and rationalized with the propagation of European-derived yet Chinese and Japanese mediated social and political discourses of civilization and modernity—both substituting and augmenting the same institutions and discourses that were previously initiated by the Chosŏn state and the patriotic Korean enlightenment movement as part of native statist and popular self-strengthening programs of anti-imperial resistance in the precolonial period.

Railroads and Colonial Migrations

A key component of these urban transformations and the imperial orderings and hierarchical inscriptions of colonial space as well as the broader colonial policy in Korea was related to the enormous scale of mass migrations/ population movements into to colony from Japan also owing to the mix of the unique geographical proximity between colony and metropole and Japanese colonial governmentality. As historians of Japanese colonialism in Korea have noted, a key characteristic of the growing commerce along “new railway centers and rice-exporting seaports”⁵⁷⁰ was the substantial demographics of Japanese settlers along the railway routes (and rarely in the country’s interior).⁵⁷¹ Peter Duus for example observes that at the time of annexation in 1910 when “Japanese residents on the Korean peninsula had grown into the largest overseas community of Japanese in the world,” “only a few settlers had made their way to the station stops along the new trunk railway lines, and fewer still had ventured into the

⁵⁶⁶ Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 154

⁵⁶⁷ Lankov, p. 74.

⁵⁶⁸ Larsen, pp. 53-55.

⁵⁶⁹ Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 154

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁵⁷¹ Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, see last chapter on Japanese settlers. Also see Larsen (“Trade, Dependency, and Colonialism: Foreign Trade and Korea’s Regional Integration 1876-1910”) on the link from the Japanese settlers first agglomeration in the treaty ports—and then continuing along the railway routes after colonization.

countryside... Most Japanese—at least 70% and perhaps even more—were living in urban areas, settled into two dozen or so large towns and cities.”⁵⁷² Japanese in-migration had begun long before Annexation, starting in the late 1870s with the extraterritorial privileges Japan wrested from the Chosŏn dynasty with the Kanghwa treaty, Korea’s first ‘modern’ treaty. In 1880, the Japanese in Korea with a mere 835 residents accounted for the largest overseas Japanese community at the time up to 7,245 by 1890 coming in just behind Hawaii.⁵⁷³ Indeed, the first newspaper to be established in Korea in 1881 was a Japanese paper for the settler community founded near the treaty port of Pusan, as the first newspaper in Japan was an English language press founded by an American.⁵⁷⁴ As Peter Duss notes, the dramatic inflow of Japanese migrants to Korea began with Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and further swelled with the Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War. As the progression of imperial transgressions on Korean sovereignty ran from the Kanghwa Treaty throughout the two wars, at the same time shaping significant turning points and stimulants to Korean modernizing nationalist activity and reform movements, they also double the trajectory of large mass migrations of Japanese emigrants on the peninsula:

On the eve of the Sino-Japanese War there were altogether about 9,354 Japanese in Korea, most of them crowded into the two chief treaty ports, Pusan and Inchon. With the Japanese victory in 1895 the inflow of Japanese gathered force, and by the end of the Russo-Japanese War the trickle had become a flood, overflowing the boundaries of the foreign settlements, spilling out of the ports to interior towns and cities, following the channels carved by the expanded Japanese political presence. As surely as water flows downhill, Japanese settlers followed the spreading ambit of Japanese power. By 1910 their number had grown to 171,543.⁵⁷⁵

The early group of settlers were wartime migrants largely composed of “petty capitalists and carpetbaggers,” “construction workers, artisans, and porters” seeking to turn a profit by fleecing Japanese soldiers as much as Koreans.⁵⁷⁶ In general Japanese residents or ‘colonists’ and ‘emigrants’ a distinction made by the Japanese government for ideological reasons, were composed of high level colonial bureaucrats but also many more impoverished farmers, petty businessmen etc. seeking to take advantage of their elevated/privileged position in the colony.⁵⁷⁷ While a large number of migrants were voluntary migrants seeking better opportunities whether “pushed” or “pulled” by political, economic, or social circumstance, the Japanese state was a staunch promoter and facilitator of emigration to Korea since the 1890s whereby emigration to

⁵⁷² Duss, pp. 289, 324.

⁵⁷³ Ibid., p. 290.

⁵⁷⁴ See Albert A. Altman, “Korea’s First Newspaper: The Japanese Chosen Shinpo,” in *The Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 43, no. 4 (August 1984), pp. 685-696.

⁵⁷⁵ Duss, p. 289

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 290

⁵⁷⁷ Duss explains that Japanese government distinguished the ‘emigrant’ from ‘colonist’ to define emigrants “linked to occupations with low prestige” (299). By 1902, “the law was amended to exclude from the legal definition of “emigrant” those traveling to Korea or China, suggesting that those going to the continent were in a different category from those headed toward Hawaii, the United States, Canada, Australia, or Latin America,” whereby “the migrant heading east across the Pacific was a humble toiler, a transient, a person of low prestige; the migrant heading across the Straits of Korea and the Yellow Sea was a pioneer, a settler, a bearer of Japan’s destiny” (299).

Korea became an official part of government policy since the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.⁵⁷⁸ In 1894:

Yamagata Arimoto thought the dispatch of colonists to North Korea was, along with the building of the trunk line traversing the peninsula, one of the most urgent policies for Japan. Just as the railway would link Japan with the rest of continental Asia, so the colonists would set down roots for Japanese influence in Korea...The May 1904 cabinet decision committed the Katsura government to promoting migration of agricultural settlers. Sending large numbers of Japanese farmers to the interior of the peninsula would reduce the pressure of excess population at home while promoting the development of agricultural resources in Korea. Two birds could be killed with one stone.⁵⁷⁹

Moreover, a 1906 report by a “government mission of agricultural experts to investigate agriculture and land ownership in Korea...urged the Japanese government to do what it could to facilitate migration by confirming the right of Japanese to own land and settle in the interior, permitting wider use of government-owned land by Japanese, discounting train and steamship tickets for immigrants and setting up a mechanism to provide guidance for agricultural enterprises.”⁵⁸⁰ Also after the Russo-Japanese War, “General Kodama Gentaro, as head of the organizing committee if the South Manchuria Company, urged that 500,000 settlers be sent to Manchuria to discourage the Russians from starting a war of revenge, and Goto Shimpei, the first president of the line, advocated erecting a barricade of settlers in Manchuria as part of his policy of “military preparedness by civilian means.”⁵⁸¹ While, “others argued that it was especially urgent to move Japanese settlers into Korea to counterbalance residual Korean nationalism.”⁵⁸² By 1908, “the Japanese government had adopted a policy of ‘concentrating overseas migration in Manchuria and Korea:’”⁵⁸³

First and foremost, the government wished to prepare for possible resistance to Japanese expansion by Russia and China...But equally important, the policy would remove impediments to good relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries, with whom Japan was trying to develop trading and manufacturing ties...Obviously, the policy...also provided a graceful way to justify its acceptance of the humiliating American demand that Japan curb emigration. If it could be argued that emigration to Asia was in the national interest whereas emigration to Hawaii and the United States was not, then acceptance of these demands was a matter of statecraft, not a diplomatic failure or national humiliation.⁵⁸⁴

With the 1908 Manchurian and Korean emigration policy, the Oriental Development Company was established by the imperial state to both encourage and facilitate emigration of various

⁵⁷⁸ See Duus chapter 8.

⁵⁷⁹ Duus, pp. 301-2.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 302.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³ Ibid., p. 303.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

Japanese social groups as guided/dictated by economic and social crisis in imperial Japan as well as the exigencies of imperial rule in the colonies.⁵⁸⁵ As the Japanese imperial state instrumentalized its people in support of and in parallel with the techno-rationalization of colonialism and colonial urbanism, combining geographical proximity with imperial statecraft which formed a key para-economic governmental component of its economic capitalist development amidst stronger and more advanced economies in the larger world system, the development of the colonial city—shaped by people as much as machines and buildings as symbolic markers—evolved both distinct from the metropolitan city and economy as a hybrid but differentiated doubling of both imperial Japan and the larger capitalist world system and its metropolitan cities and economies. At the same time, this produced in the colonial urban context of Korea the identification or linkage between colonial modernity as visualized in the new (western modern) urban symbolic order with segregated Japanese ethno-linguistic and cultural landscapes or a little Japan or Japantown in colonial Korea that also signified the most-up-to-date or the very embodiment of modernity which was at the same time both physically and ethno-linguistic culturally segregated from both the upper and working classes of Koreans—for whom modernity would evolve both in response to and counter to the Japanese Western-style and ethno-linguistic cultural variant into its own hybridized yet distinct both physically and ethno-culturally segregated form linked to national liberation. Linking modernity and ethnic community/landscape, Duss notes:

The most conspicuous signs of modernity were to be found in the expanding Japanese section that stretched from the South Gate (Namdaemun) along the foot of Namsan [and also the location of Seoul/Kyōngsōng Station]. It very much resembled a town at home, with familiar looking shops and housefronts. The signboards were all in Japanese, and the shops purveyed the most-up-to-date consumer goods and fashions to be found in the city. There were also a middle school, a girl's school, and several elementary schools where lessons were taught in Japanese; and the residents, perhaps emulating British colonial habits, had founded their own Nihon Club. Following the urge to transform the unfamiliar, the Japanese staked out their own geography. The main thoroughfare through the Japanese settlement became Motomachi, and other areas where the Japanese residents lived were transformed into Nanzan-cho, Kotobuki-cho, Hayashi-cho, Sakurai-cho, and the like. The northern half of the city, where the *yangban* residences had concentrated, resisted the renaming.⁵⁸⁶

Moreover, these Japanese substitutions, presenting a direct parallel to the symbolic ordering of the material built environment of the new colonial city as discussed by Pai above where the integrative and abstracting/substitutive structure and symbol of railroads operated analogously to the rational-technical colonial urban designs and the symbolism of colonial-modern monumental artefacts, Duss endows the colonial railroad with a similar structuring condition in reference to the gridded geometrical symbolic parallel ordering of Japanese migrant ethno-cultural landscapes in Korea:

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 308.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 326.

In sum, we can think of the Japanese resident community at the time of annexation as grid of points and lines laid down on the traditional political economy. The points were the major ports and urban centers, and the lines were the new trunk railways system and the network of coastal shipping. In nearly every place the Japanese settled they constituted a community physically separated from the mass of the Korean population. In places like Pusan, Masan, Mokp'o, Inchon, or Sin-ŭijŭ, where they made up 40 to 50 percent of the population, they could keep the Koreans at bay simply by sheer force of number and density. But even in cities like P'yŏngyang, Seoul, Taegu, where the Koreans vastly outnumbered them, they clustered together in well-defined neighborhoods and communities, surrounded by familiar names, familiar faces, and familiar artifacts. With few exceptions, they remained strangers in a strange land.⁵⁸⁷

In addition to the large amount of Japanese settlers the huge number of Japanese colonists within Korea, disproportionate to European colonies has also been noted. For example, as Cumings points out, "By the last decade of the colonial period some 246,000 Japanese civil servants and professionals ruled about 21 million Koreans; about 46 percent of the colonizer population was in government service. In 1937, by way of contrast, the French ruled a Vietnamese population of 17 million with 2,920 administrative personnel and about 11,000 regular French troops, and the British had even smaller administrative military forces in most of their colonies (in proportion to the populations)."⁵⁸⁸ The human migrations characteristic of the colony-metropole relationship in Korea shaped through geographical proximity and imperial governmentality—both in relation to colonial bureaucrats and settlers—also shaped the colonial city in analogous ways to the structure and ideological symbolisms of imperial railroads—in a distinct yet interdependent formation from either western metropolitan cities or the Japanese imperial capital of Tokyo. Moreover, the greater frequency and magnitude of people flows between metropole and colony, yet structured through the unevenness of imperial hierarchy through political and economic discriminatory and racist policies of colonialism which significantly heightened socio-economic and political conflicts (as the competition for limited resources was necessarily channeled through ethno-cultural national dispossession/extraction and expressed through ethnic conflicts) reinforced the distinctive ethno-linguistic identities of the colonizer and colonized (where rather than nurturing potential cosmopolitan camaraderie among various colonized ethno-linguistic groups Anderson points to as typical of educational and administrative journeys in the colonized Dutch Indies, the opposition to the ethno-nationalist group of Japanese colonists and emigrants was more the primary effect of colonialism and colonial urbanism in Korea making anti-Japanese sentiment a key component of both elite and mass nationalism in Korea). These contradictions of imperial capitalism and governmentality in the context of colonial Korea—marking the intersection of colonialism, urbanism, and modernity—thus in turn nurtured particular contradictory and ambivalent developments in Korean nationalism infusing new meanings, understandings, and ideologies of modernity and the nation upon both the material technologies of the modern urban city, railroads/long-distance transportation and human migrations.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 334.

⁵⁸⁸ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 153.

Imperialism, The Desire for Modernity, and Cosmopolitan-Nationalist Journeys

As in many undeveloped colonial societies, a key modification to Marx's dialectic of capitalist modernity was the way the contradictions of imperial capitalism led to various forms of national consciousness on both the left and right, democratic and fascistic, traditionalist and modernist nationalist organizing and activism and accompanying conflicting and colliding visions/blueprints for national independence and modernization. As Leo Ou-Fan Lee has shown in *Shanghai Modern*, in the semi-colonial setting of 1930s Shanghai, Chinese intellectuals sought to fashion a modern Chinese nationhood by appropriating Western cultural forms, ideas and institutions.⁵⁸⁹ For Chinese nationalists and communists alike as well as their Korean counterparts (as well as imperial Japan we can add), as the imperative to modernize the nation was motivated by the uneven world system, namely anti-imperialist sentiment in relation to U.S. and Britain as well as Japan (in the case of China), the fashioning of modern nationhood also took recourse to various appropriations of Western material and epistemological technologies. Chinese nationalist-Marxist Li Ta-chao supported cosmopolitan socialism in order to emancipate China, which he considered a proletarian nation, from British imperialism, as Lenin supported national bourgeois revolutions (of oppressed nations) in order to foster cosmopolitan socialism.⁵⁹⁰ This was also the case with Korean nationalist-Marxists that would emerge in and out of Korea in the 1920s from the contradictions of colonial capitalism as well as that of Western liberalism in the face of the uneven and imperialist international world order. The understanding of freedom as political self-determination primarily took the form of both bourgeois and proletarian nationalisms whereby cosmopolitanism provided both the nurturing ground and often the means of national liberation qua modernization strategies—as well as cross border solidarities and organization, thus presenting East Asian nationalist-Marxists with altered priorities than their Western counterparts. As with early Chinese intellectuals, for many anti-colonial Korean nationalist reformers the desire for modernization and development from its nascency intimately connected nationalism with cosmopolitan modernization/modernism (i.e. Western culture, ideas, political theories, technologies, etc.)—vis-à-vis emancipation from imperial domination in an un-contradictory fashion.

As in other colonial territories where colonial polices of the respective European or (Japanese as in Taiwan and Manchuria and parts of China) imperial powers and the historical-geographic conditions of colonialism became the crucible for differentiated structures and experiences of capitalist modernization, at the same time that the colonial railways brought with it the shrinkage/eclipse of the Korean nation by the geographical and socio-political universalism of colonialism, it was through this new expanded uneven experience of geography that also nurtured and continued to facilitate among Koreans various forms of nationalism and nationalist consciousness. As colonialism intensified the desire for national independence and colonial modernization heightened the desire for independent national modernization—a desire that was continuous from the early infringements on Korea's sovereignty since its entry into the new world system prior to colonization—these hierarchical orderings and uneven inscriptions of the colonial landscape appeared especially pronounced in the transcontinental rail and steamship-

⁵⁸⁹ Leo Ou-Fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 44.

⁵⁹⁰ See Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); and V.I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," in *The Lenin Anthology*, Robert C. Tucker, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975), and *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (NY: International Publishers, 1939).

linked journeys between Korea and Japan which were accompanied by a heightened sense of geopolitical awareness where Koreans increasingly came to see themselves and their nation as differentially situated within, while comprising a part of the material industrial civilization centered in the West. Thus at the same time that the geographical proximity between Korea and Japan—colony and metropole—made Korea such an effective ‘land-bridge’ for Japan’s expansionist visions and imperialist governmentality, which inscribed these imperial desires upon the physical and human landscapes of the colony producing an imperial geographical space of Western colonial modern structures and modern Japanese settlers, it also significantly conditioned—with differing restraints and conditions—educational and political journeys of Korean exiles to the colonial metropole of Japan as well as world metropolises such as US and Europe seeking to appropriate the knowledge of modern industrial civilization as well as to Shanghai, Siberia and Manchuria to organize political resistance against colonialism for national independence. While the geographical proximity between colony and metropole granted Koreans easier access to the Japanese metropole for education (as there was no university level education in the colony and the closest universities was located in Japan), commerce, and national political organization among the more privileged Koreans (as well as the less privileged supported by religious or political nationalist organizations), the repressive military colonial rule especially characteristic of the first decade of colonialism before the March 1st independence uprising, the politically and ethno-nationally discriminative colonial policies and human and territorial forms of expropriation linked to colonial modernization and colonial civilizing discourses—heightening tensions and increasing anti-Japanese sentiment among various Korean social groups/classes within Korea as well as amplifying the desire and need for independent national modernization—also facilitated other forms of migration and destinations for exiles continuing in the trend and development of Korean expatriations to U.S., China, Manchuria, Russia, etc. that began prior to colonization.

Some of the earliest emigrants to the U.S. were a small number of students and political refugees following upon the signing of the Korea-US treaty that first opened Korea to the West in 1882.⁵⁹¹ Forming part of the Korean diplomatic mission dispatched to the U.S. in 1882, as Yu Kilchun remained behind in the U.S. to study at the Governor Dummer Academy in Massachusetts, he became the first Korean to study in America, and upon his return one of the foremost figures of Korean enlightenment. Three political refugees, those involved in the failed Kapsin coup of 1884 that sought to modernize the Chosŏn state in one fell swoop gained asylum in the U.S. including Sŏ Chaep’il (Philip Jaisohn) who returned to Korea after the Sino-Japanese War to start the Independence Club and the first vernacular paper *Tongnip sinmun* (*Independence News*). Two other members of the early enlightenment party and the coup who found asylum in the U.S., Pak Yong-ho and Sŏ Kwang-bŏm, had both earlier visited the U.S. as part of the diplomatic missions.⁵⁹² Moreover the opening of a Korean legation in the US in 1887 “facilitated the travel of a substantial number of Korean students, sixty-four in all, most of whom were encouraged by Christian missionaries in Korea to study Western life and thought at American colleges and universities.”⁵⁹³ “Included in this group were Ahn Ch’angho, Kim Kyu-

⁵⁹¹ Lee Houchins and Chang-su Houchins, “The Korean Experience in America, 1903-1924,” in *The Pacific Historical Review* vol. 43, no. 4 (Nov. 1974), p. 549.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

sik⁵⁹⁴, Pak Yong-man, and Yi Sung-man (Syngman Rhee)⁵⁹⁵ all of whom upon returning to Korea after their studies would depart again in the years surrounding Korea's fall into colonization to start up nationalist exile organizations in US, China, and Siberia—as well as take on chief cabinet posts of the exile Korean Provisional Government established in Shanghai in 1919 after the March 1st Independence Movement.⁵⁹⁶

Aside from the students, diplomats and “a few ginseng peddlers” that entered the U.S. from the turn of the century until 1905, “official Korean immigration to the United States and its territories began in 1903, when American sugar planters in the Hawaiian Islands imported Koreans as contract laborers [and as strikebreakers against Japanese workers] for their labor-intensive sugar plantations.”⁵⁹⁷ Many in this group were predominantly Christian converts, again, stemming from the influence and organization of their immigration by American missionaries. As American missionaries were instrumental in running some of the first Western-style schools in Korea, alongside the state and private academies, as well as the first modern hospitals as well as churches, these labor emigrants were not unlike their upper class diplomatic converts to Christianity—which was for both groups also a conversion to the new Western civilization whereby the missionary schools and churches provided direct access to English, Western science and culture for both upper and lower classes of Koreans alike, though perhaps in more politically instrumentalist form among the upper classes than the attraction to Christianity's social egalitarian ideals among the huge numbers of lower classes and social outcasts. As Cumings notes:

Men like Syngman Rhee and Kim Kyu-sik went to missionary schools like Pai Chai less for their Christianity than to look for political position through English. Enrollment at Pai Chai declined when English was de-emphasized; in 1905, within a day or two of enrollment, “half the school had gone elsewhere in search of English.”⁵⁹⁸

Following the lobbying efforts of American Minister Horace Allen and coordinated through a newly established Suminwon (Department of Immigration) in 1902 tasked with the issuing of passports and encouraging emigration “for purposes of education, observation, and to engage in commerce, industry, and agriculture” and the Tonga Kaebal Hoesa (Korean Development Company) founded by the American businessman Deshler, a partner in the American Trading Company in Incheon, acting as an agent of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) in Korea, between 1903 and 1905, 7,226 Koreans (6,048 male adults, 637 women, and 541 children) boarded steamships for the Hawaiian islands (as strikebreakers against Japanese workers who had previously been recruited to work in the Hawaiian plantations).⁵⁹⁹

Korean emigration to the U.S. was effectively halted in 1905 with the forfeiture of Korean diplomatic sovereignty and the strong anti-immigration (or rather out-migration) policy

⁵⁹⁴ Kim Kyu-sik was the delegate dispatched to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 from Shanghai, where he was in self-imposed exile, to lobby for Korean independence among the League of Nations.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁶ See chapter one for a more detailed discussion of the March 1st movement and the role of diasporic nationalist communities in the movement.

⁵⁹⁷ Ilsoo Kim, *New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 20.

⁵⁹⁸ Cumings, *Korea's Place Under the Sun*, p. 157.

⁵⁹⁹ Houchins and Houchins, pp. 551-554.

of the Japanese Protectorate (of course, this was simultaneous to Japan's strong pro-immigration policy for Japanese to Korea and Manchuria) as the "Japanese perceived further Korean immigration as a threat to their newly established political control over Korea"⁶⁰⁰ as well as not wanting "Korean immigrants to be competitive with Japanese immigrants [in the U.S.]."⁶⁰¹ For those Koreans in Hawaii who did not return to Korea (about a thousand returned), Hawaii became a stepping stone to the American mainland for many, where roughly 2,000 moved on to building American railroads (recruited from Honolulu by railroad companies) entering the mainland through San Francisco as the main depot, or to pursue migrant agricultural labor along the West Coast, entering through Seattle, Washington, "the western terminus of the expanding Great Northern railway system."⁶⁰² Among these first diasporic Korean communities in the U.S., many Koreans "found community and identity in patriotic organizations" whereby Korean "farmers, waiters, and domestic servants by day, observed scholar Elaine Kim, 'became independence workers by night.'"⁶⁰³ For many of these Koreans, as Ronald Takaki observes:

Though they were building "a new Korean society" in America, they could not allow themselves to become settlers. At the heart of their community was the struggle for Korean independence from Japan. Sojourners when they had left Chosŏn between 1903 and 1905, they had suddenly becoming *yumin*, drifting people, after their homeland had been annexed by Japan in 1910.⁶⁰⁴

Moreover the nationalist movement among diasporic Koreans in America was driven by the proliferation of political organizations within these communities:

As early as 1903, Korean migrants in Hawaii organized the Sinmin-hoe, or New People's Association, to support the independent sovereignty of Korea; two years later, Koreans in San Francisco organized the Kongnip Hyop-hoe. This mutual-assistance association helped fellow newcomers find housing and employment and also spearheaded the resistance against Japanese colonialism. Korean political organizations quickly proliferated in Hawaii and on the mainland. There were fifteen in the islands...and five on the mainland...In 1909, the patriots founded the Tae-Hanin Kungmin-hoe (THK), or Korean National Association of America, in order to consolidate and coordinate resistance efforts of the many nationalist organizations. The purpose of the new organization was the preservation of a Korean national identity and "the regaining of the independence of the fatherland by promoting education and business, advocating freedom and equality, and advancing the honor of our countrymen." Headquartered in San Francisco, Tae-Hanin Kungmin-hoe had chapters on the mainland and in Hawaii and

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁰¹ Kim, *New Urban Immigrants*, p. 20.

⁶⁰² Houchins and Houchins, p. 555.

⁶⁰³ Ronald Takaki, *A History of Asian Americans: Strangers from a Different Shore*, (Little, Brown, and Co: 1998), p. 278.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 277.

required all Korean migrants to become members and pay dues to the organization.⁶⁰⁵

The late 19th century Korean students to the U.S. formed the leaders of different factions of the nationalist movement in America as they returned to the U.S. for periodic stays in exile: “Park Yong-man represented the activist and militant approach, Syngman Rhee emphasized education and diplomacy, and Ahn Ch’ang-ho called for the development of a patriotic leadership” [with these last two factions becoming influential to the gradualist cultural nationalist movement that would consolidate in the Korean peninsula in the 1920s under the more relaxed cultural policy of colonial rule resulting from the March 1st Independence movement].⁶⁰⁶ The movement also “spawned numerous publications—the *Sinhan Minbo* (New Korea Daily), the *Kongnip Sinmun* (Korean News), the *T’aep’yongyang Chubo* (Korean Pacific Weekly), and the *Sin Han’guk po* (New Korean News). These newspapers and magazines informed Korean migrants about the nationalist activities in America and in the homeland and kept alive the spirit of *aeguk chongsin* (patriotism) and the dream of *kwangbok* (restoration of sovereignty for their homeland).”⁶⁰⁷

For new Korean students aspiring to study or emigrate abroad after Annexation in 1910, like the anti-immigration stance of the Protectorate government since 1905, they were met with

Japanese hostility toward student visa applications...maintained on the grounds that students might become involved in anti-Japanese political agitation; furthermore, any implication that Korean students might prefer an American rather than a Japanese education was highly annoying to the Japanese. By early 1909, however, the Japanese government entertained a willingness to issue passports to Korean students who could show evidence of welcome from the United States government as well as sufficient funds. The American consul-general in Seoul finally agreed to issue student visas to Korean students sponsored by American nationals, provided that the latter would vouch for the students’ qualifications and financial ability.⁶⁰⁸

As Duss earlier observed in ‘the statecraft’ of promoting Japanese migration to Korea and Manchuria as government policy and nationalist endeavor—largely in the face of or as a response to the calls by the U.S. government to curb Japanese emigrations to the U.S.—the reluctant consent to issuing Korean student visas for study in the U.S. was not unlikely also primarily motivated by its concern over diplomatic relations with the U.S. On the other hand, in the face of colonialism and the colonial government’s opposition to Koreans study or emigration abroad, for Koreans as both study abroad and emigration became politicized at this time with its linkage to national modernization and the desire for liberation, the U.S. became a charged political destination for Korean students—as we will see in the novelistic portrayals of exile journeys and their itineraries—on top of its spatio-geographical position as the apex of world modernity (over and above Japan’s semi-modern position)—even going beyond the pro-Americanism of the earlier Korean enlightenment party reformers of the 1890s. Thus during the first decade of Japanese colonialism, the militarily repressive dark years of colonial rule (1910-

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 280.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 280-281.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 281.

⁶⁰⁸ Houchins and Houchins, p. 558.

1919), “some 541 Korean students, known to Koreans in America as *sindo haksæng* (newly arrived students) were admitted for study at American schools and universities.”⁶⁰⁹ However, larger numbers of some 2000 Korean students and emigrants entered the U.S. more clandestinely and circuitously between 1910 and 1924, without passports or student visas, usually through Shanghai via American flagships:⁶¹⁰

Most claimed that they were not Japanese subjects, and thus exempt from any requirement to carry a Chosen Sotokufu (the Japanese Governor-General in Korea) passport, and furthermore, that they had left Korea before Japan assumed sovereignty over the peninsula. Classifying this group as “working students,” the U.S. commissioner of immigrations adopted a surprisingly sympathetic policy towards them.⁶¹¹

Once in the United States, “realizing that most *sindo haksæng* were essentially political refugees, the leadership of the budding Korean Independence movement in America welcomed them as a potentially useful addition to the Korean community.”⁶¹²

Thus as the transcontinental imperial railroad connected to steamships doubled as the vehicle of colonial domination *as well as* the threshold of modernity and conduit to national liberation whether by the study of the new western learning to foster national modern development or by the freedom of political organization for independence, or both, it was as much targeted by patriotic Neo-Confucian and patriotic guerilla forces for destruction, as harnessed by modern nationalist reformers seeking reappropriation of the national state as both a vehicle of anti-colonialism and national modernization. Much like the way Marx pointed to the dual character of railroads—as both a premier tool of bourgeois development and later the ascendancy of proletarian consciousness and political organization, arising from the contradictions of capitalism—the colonial railroads embodying the contradictions of imperialism and imperial capitalism also conditioned/enabled colonial domination as well as facilitated various anti-colonial nationalisms. For Marx, while the railroads may have emerged with the political ascendance of the bourgeoisie and facilitated their “exploitation of the world market,” as “the weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground become turned against the bourgeoisie itself,” Marx ultimately places them in the service of their world historical negation—the cosmopolitan proletarian revolution—as a vehicle for the political organization of the “ever-expanding union of workers.”⁶¹³ As the railroads eventually slide from the hands of one productive force to another, driven by the motor of dialectical materialism *but also importantly political organization or “the ever-expanding union of workers,”* what had been a premier vehicle of the development of *capital* becomes at the same time “the weapon” of its destruction, and as such, what had served as “the weapons” for the exploitation and enslavement of *labor*, appropriated as the very vehicle of its revolutionary emancipation; the means or vehicle of exploitation and emiseration—such as modern machinery and railroads—becomes at the same time for Marx, a weapon/space of *appropriation and a locus of dis-alienation*. In parallel to the proletarian ascension to train travel in the Europe of Marx’s *Manifesto*—in the Korean colony

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁶¹⁰ Kim, *New Urban Immigrants*, p. 21; Houchins and Houchins, p. 558.

⁶¹¹ Houchins and Houchins, p. 558.

⁶¹² Ibid., p. 21.

⁶¹³ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 229.

the colonized also began using the railways with the aims of political emancipation—thus marking the railroads a charged symbol and site of anti-colonial modernization and nationalism as much as it formed the vehicle of colonial exploitation. Indicated in the following lines of Ch’oe Nam-son, a pioneer of modern poetry in Korea, a national reformer, and a former exile-student who drafted the Declaration of Independence for the 1919 March First Independence Movement, the railroad infused the desire for modern technical mastery with national appropriation as the structure or model of national liberation—in a dialectic of modernity as colonial expropriation and national reappropriation:

With the roaring burst of the whistle
and its back turned against Namdaemun⁶¹⁴
it departs like the swift wind
and even a bird may not catch it...

The train I ride from morning to night
I ride as it were mine but in truth it is that of the other
When shall we grow strong
So that we may run it with our own bare arms
--Ch’oe Nam-Son, “Ode to Kyungbu Railway” (1908)⁶¹⁵

For modern reformist Korean nationalists, as illustrated by Ch’oe’s train on which he rides whose back is turned *against* Namdaemun—symbolizing the old world of premodern Korean tradition and authority as much as the restraints of nature—the appearance of railroads as part of the technological apparatus of colonialism was not simply perceived *as colonial technology* and thus an obstruction to freedom but constituted the transformative power not only of modern industry and modern civilization which held out the promise (both prior to and after colonization) of emancipating the nation’s forces of production not only from the constraints of nature but those of both Confucian and native traditions, and Japanese colonialism, bringing the nation into a modern industrial cosmopolitan civilization and ensuring Korea’s sovereignty (or regaining it after colonization). As Pai observes in the emergence of the colonial modern city “as the locus of modernity of technical dominance over the old world problems of medieval Korea, of modernization and democratization [at least in terms leveling the deep class striated structure of the traditional Korean city and social structures],” these modern transformations were precisely what “many of its reformist intellectuals had longed for,” and for whom “the ‘iron horses’ that traversed the urban landscape and the factory chimneys spewing spoke into Seoul’s air were regarded with awe and admiration.”⁶¹⁶ For these modern reformers, the power and seduction of new modern technologies like the ‘iron horse’ stemmed not only from its embodiment of the power of industry whereby the “constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, ever-lasting uncertainty and agitation

⁶¹⁴ Namdaemun is the South Gate of Seoul and the location of the train station in Seoul. Namdaemun was one of the original four gates to the walled city of Hanyang (now contemporary Seoul) when Hanyang became the capital of the Chosŏn dynasty in 1394.

⁶¹⁵ Ch’oe Nam-son, “Ode to Kyŏng-bu Railway” (1908), cited from Pai, “Modernism, Development, and the Transformation of Seoul,” pp. 113-114.

⁶¹⁶ Pai, p. 113.

distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all other ones,”⁶¹⁷ but perhaps more its embodiment of the power of *modern civilization*, science, and new techno-rational and socio-political, and cultural paradigms to revolutionize and transform both the natural landscapes and *the traditional cultural and social constitution of the Confucianized and largely agrarian Korean nation and populace* to allow for the social bases for modern national capital and national capitalist economy to take root—something that they had believed would enable both national independence and more enduring national security and independence in the new world order since Korea’s first misshapen encounter with the powerful and aggressive industrialized West and Japan. At the same time, in so far as these railroads appeared in Korea as part of the technological apparatus of *colonial modernization*, they were not even for these modern reformers unambiguous signs of progress. As Ch’oe’s poem laments, “the train I ride from morning to night/I ride as it were mine but in truth it is that of the other.” Thus at the same time that the modern colonial railroad embodied both the transformative power of modern civilization and modern industry—as the embodiment of the human mastery over nature and culture—it was also and always haunted by the power and domination of modern imperial Japan over Korea—a power that was transforming Korean space and its people into an appendage of the Japanese empire and economy as it reconfigured Korea’s national boundaries not under the universalizing process of a cosmopolitan mode of production and geography of global capitalism but in line with/towards Japan’s imperial economic-spatial geography. Thus as the colonial rails brought Korea into an expanded geography of global industrialization, while simultaneously diminishing Korea into an imperial appendage—it paradoxically symbolized the backbone of the Japanese empire as well as the threshold of nationalist journeys towards modernity with Tokyo and San Francisco as their top destinations. In so far as the contradictions of colonial modernization as embodied in the modern colonial railroad intensified the desire for both national independence and nationalist modernization, it also became harnessed to the desire to become both the subjects and masters of modernization operating as the focal point for “the power to change the world that was changing them, to make their way through the maelstrom and make it their own”⁶¹⁸ as reverberating in Ch’oe’s final line—“when shall we grow strong/so that we may run it with our own bare arms”—which at the same time heightened the awareness of the modern civilizational hierarchy of the industrial imperialist world order and Korea’s relative position within this system.

As the railroads came to structure a significant however contradictory and ambivalent cultural/political imaginary among Korean nationalists of the period, facilitating the formation of a modern Korean diaspora, political and economic migrations for study and political organizing to the worlds’ modern metropolitan centers, it also became a significant motif in the ‘modernist’ works of early modern novelists-cum-national reformers, journalists, historians, etc.—who were also the epitome of such pilgrims—with which to thematize the dual desire for national independence and modernization of Korean nation within the new spatial and temporal vision of a new globalizing modernity within the still powerful paradigm of “civilization and enlightenment.” As I examine in this chapter through the early ‘new’ and ‘modern’ novels of the period, Yi Injik’s *Hyöl ũi nu* (*Tears of Blood*, 1906), regarded as the first ‘new’ novel (*sinsosŏl*) in Korea and Yi Kwangsu’s *Mujŏng* (*The Heartless*, 1917), regarded as the first mature ‘modern’ Korean novel, the railroad becomes a key motif of the paradoxical experience of colonial ‘modernization’ and Korean ‘modernist’ nationalism. While *Tears of Blood*, written on the cusp

⁶¹⁷ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 223.

⁶¹⁸ Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (NY: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 16.

of colonial rule in the aftermath of the imposition of the colonial Protectorate in 1905 (which wrested Korean diplomatic sovereignty and control over Korean land and infrastructure as it made inroads all of the branches of Korean government slowly taking over its internal affairs), and *Heartless* written near the end of the first decade of a repressive militaristic colonial rule and on the cusp of the Korean Independence uprising in 1919, present important differences in ‘modern’ national imagining as well as differences arising from the evolution and maturation of the new Western-style ‘modern’ novel—the imperial railroad figures prominently in both novels as a structuring device for the novelistic plot of national awakening, primarily of young Korean students of a colonial cosmopolitan diaspora as well as a symbol of civilization and enlightenment which articulates nationalism, modernity, and migration/exile in both of these narratives.

Also shared in both novels is how the articulation of railroads with imperialism or colonial modernization as part of an *imperialist* reordering and recoding of the society and space of Korea significantly inflects the “new consciousness distance” associated with the hierarchical expanded and diminished space of the new imperial/world geographical space with the structure and experience of national consciousness and enlightenment or ‘modernization’ in the altered Korean colonial context of modernization. First, what was lost (or actively discarded) in this shift towards a new consciousness of distance and spatial relations/logics/hierarchies was the customary perception of distance associated with a whole system of spatial relationships that had governed the pre-modern Sino-centric global and regional order. Korea’s political and social identity had long been a correlate of its socio-political and spatial distance to the Middle Kingdom. What was created by the new geographical space of the modern world system was a new consciousness of the nation produced from and as well as defined by the temporal distance that underpinned spatial interconnection of the new modern nation-state system. Second, as the dialectic of expansion and contraction of colonial/world geographical space thus became linked with the colonial substitutions the railroad was facilitating in the transformation and destruction of the premodern landscapes, society and culture following from the new logic/experience of travel as point-to-point travel between destination and departure points, the altered context of railroads as part of the imperialist reordering and recoding of the society and space of Korea also brought about a key modification to the ‘creative destruction’ characteristic of European railway journeys. Unlike Europe where Schivelbusch observed that as railway travel restructured the “new consciousness of distance” as “points of departure and destination,” that it made the *journey* to and from these destination points insignificant,⁶¹⁹ as we will see in the Korean modern nationalist literature—this new “consciousness of distance” arising from the new abstracted point to point travel of the hierarchical systematized world geography—did not make the journey to and from these destination points insignificant but rather intensified it—producing it as the very revolutionizing nationalizing site of national consciousness and awakening. Stemming from Korea’s position within the uneven geography of imperialism and the capitalist world system, in the colonies this “new consciousness of distance” encompassed not only the journey between departure and destination points within the train car across national territory but also across the new expanded colonial geography as well as the broader global geography of industrial capitalism. Thus in colonial Korea, as these cosmopolitan journeys were both heightened and

⁶¹⁹ Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1977, 1986), p. 39. As a point of contrast, in the colonies rather than diminishing the journey to and from destination points, these journeys were highlighted due to the hierarchical and politically oppressive/unequal position of the destination points.

intensified due to the hierarchical and politically oppressive/unequal position of the departure and destination points, they were also linked with/formed the crucible/site/technology of both revolutionary modern and national consciousness, national activism and awakenings.

New ‘Modern’ Technologies of Nation-building: Newspapers, Novels, and Migration

The birth of the *sinsosŏl* or the ‘new novel’ in Korea followed much in the same manner as the birth of Korean newspapers—associated with new patriotic modern reformist political associations and at the hands of a new group of modern nationalist intelligentsia both from within and outside of Korean officialdom who became the new journalists and publishers as well as national historians, poets, and writers seeking to harness both new modern ideas and technologies to advocate ‘civilization and enlightenment’ of the Korean nation and populace, amidst a hostile and uneven new international environment. The ‘new novel’ first appeared as newspaper serials, written almost exclusively by journalists and newsmen, in part to enhance popularity and sales of the boom in the new nationalist presses that appeared between 1905 and 1910, and like these new presses emerging on the cusp of colonial rule, in the politically and culturally charged climate of the imposition of the colonial Protectorate of 1905, functioning as part of the expanding nationalist arsenal of the modernist reformers to instigate national enlightenment or modernization to regain and maintain what was left of national sovereignty.⁶²⁰

Yi Injik’s (1862-1919) *Hyŏl ūi nu* (*Tears of Blood*), serialized in fifty episodes from July through October, 1906 in *Mansebo* (*Long Live [Independent] Korea Daily*), which appeared as the organ of the Ch’ondogyo religion⁶²¹ in 1906 as one of a host of new vernacular nationalist dailies that blossomed between 1905 and 1910, is largely regarded as the first *sinsosŏl* or ‘new novel’ in Korea.⁶²² As Leo Ou-fan Lee has discussed in reference to early modern China, the adjective ‘new’ used in reference to ‘new’ ideas, cultures, knowledge, people, etc. took on a “qualitative” difference as it was linked to a linear conception of time in which the temporal present was located in Western modernity while relegating Chinese civilization as the ‘old’ tradition that was being displaced.⁶²³ In this context, the coexistence and conflict between tradition and modernity invariably inscribed the ideas, objects, and ideals of modern symbols and

⁶²⁰ See Suh Chung Woo, “Enlightenment Period Newspapers and Fiction,” translated by Bruce Fulton, in *Korean Studies* vol. 18 (1994), pp.13-22.

⁶²¹ See Chapter One for a detailed description of the Tonghak movement and the Tonghak rebellion of 1894—which figures prominently in the development of modern Korean nationalism.

⁶²² Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood* (1906), Trans. by W.E. Skillend in Chung Chong-wha, ed., *Korean Classical Literature: An Anthology*, (London: Paul International Ltd., 1989), pp. 156-221. Translated from the original version: Yi Injik, *Hyŏl ūi nu*, *Mansebo* (22 July-10 October, 1906). As W.E. Skillend and Ann Lee notes, there are several versions of Yi’s novel in significantly different editions. (See Ann Lee’s discussion of new novels in “Yi Kwangsu and Korean Literature: The Novel Mujŏng (1917),” p. 88.) In addition to the original *Mansebo* newspaper serial edition translated here by Skillend, two others were published in book form in 1907 and 1908. Skillend also notes in his introduction to his translation that “since Yi Injik wrote in the years immediately preceding the Japanese occupation of Korea, and even his first novel, ‘Tears of Blood,’ was emasculated under the Japanese as part of the policy to destroy Korea’s nationality, Yi has been regarded for most of the 20th century as at best misguided, but more commonly simply as a traitor. Yet we can see his patriotism clearly in the original version of ‘Tears of Blood’ and we dare to offer it here, since it is most striking the way it breaks with pas traditions, in construction, but above all in motive” (158).

⁶²³ Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 44.

technologies. In Korea, similar transformations/translations were apace in both the evolution of ‘new’ modern newspapers and the ‘new’ modern novels but these were directly linked to the production of a new bounded autonomous modern national identity if at the same time a de-territorialized national community, as well as formally and conceptually linked with one another—vis-à-vis the concern over national survival gaining shape upon hostile imperial transgressions of national sovereignty and independence. The ‘new’ which characterized both the ‘modern’ character of the newspapers and novels in early modern Korea also importantly illustrates the particular interlocking relationship between nationalism and modernization/modernism in the early Korean imagination amidst the threat of foreign aggression via capitalist penetrations in imperial guise—by which new approaches, functions and meanings of modern technologies and ideas took root.

In the case of the newspaper, before the publication of the first ‘modern’ Korean newspaper, *Hansǒng sunbo* as an organ of the Chosǒn state in 1883 under the newly created Office of Culture and Information by the prompting of progressive scholar-bureaucrats,⁶²⁴ it was preceded, according to Korean historian Suh Chung Woo, by the *Chobo*, a premodern Korean equivalent, which informed the *yangban* class of government matters.⁶²⁵ Dating back to 1178 (“or year 8 of the reign of King Myǒngjong”) of the Koryo dynasty, “the *Chobo*, handwritten by deputy functionaries” primarily carried “the particulars of proclamations by the Sungjongwon,” such as “decrees and orders from the king, appointments and dismissals of officials, palace affairs, and the particulars of reports from the countryside.”⁶²⁶ While the *Chobo* “coexisted with the modern newspapers” for a short while, it became obsolete by August 1894.⁶²⁷ As for the ‘modern’ newspapers, the *Hansǒng sunbo* first appeared in 1883 as a thrice-monthly gazette from mechanical printing presses, published entirely in the Chinese script, which was used by the Chosǒn court as the official script as it was in classical Korean literature by the literati.⁶²⁸ Upon suspension of the paper surrounding the tumult of the Kapsin coup in December of 1884, it was reborn as the *Hansǒng chubo* in January 1886 with a number of differences that would set the model for the growth of private vernacular Korean presses in the next decade. The *Hansǒng chubo* was now printed weekly and in a mixed Korean (*hangŭl*)⁶²⁹ and Chinese script, and with a more domestic-national focus. According to Suh, while the *Hansǒng sunbo*:

offered articles focusing on foreign relations, as was characteristic of a *sunbo*...the offering of the *Hansǒng chubo*, capitalizing on the characteristics

⁶²⁴ These progressive bureaucrats were the early enlightenment party members, Kim Ok-kyun and Pak Yong-hyo, etc.—who were one of the first officials to observe the ‘modern’ world via diplomatic and study missions to Japan and the US and who would lead the failed Kapsin coup in 1884 attempting to modernize the Chosǒn state on the model of Meiji Japan. Carter-Eckert et al, *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990, published for the Korea Institute, Harvard University), p. 209.

⁶²⁵ Suh Chung Woo, “Enlightenment Period Newspapers and Fiction,” p. 16.

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17; See also Eckert et al, *Korea Old and New* p. 209.

⁶²⁹ *Hangŭl* was the phonetic vernacular Korean script that was invented during the Chosǒn dynasty in the 1400s by King Sejong. However, it was not invented with the intention of replacing the Chinese script which had been long used by the Korean court as the official script as was largely deigned by Korean Confucian literati as a lowly script and rarely used until it’s elevation as national script during these modern nationalist reform movements in the late 19th century. A mixed Chinese-Korean script could however be found in various literary forms, and especially in some women’s literary genres.

of a *chubo*,⁶³⁰ focused on domestic affairs articles and opinion pieces...advertisements, absent in the *Hansǒng sunbo*, were carried by the *Hansǒng chubo*...[and while] the *Hansǒng sunbo* was similar to a magazine...the *Hansǒng chubo* offered a format and contents that were a bit closer to those of a newspaper.⁶³¹

While Suh points to the *Chobo* as a Korean premodern equivalent of the modern newspaper, he appears to leave out in a curious (nationalist?) omission the fact that a modern Japanese newspaper began publishing in 1881 as the first modern newspaper on Korean soil. As Albert A. Altman recounts, much like the way “Westerners pioneered newspapers in the treaty ports of China before and after the Opium war of 1840-42, and also in Japan in Nagasaki and Yokohama, after these ports were opened to foreign trade and settlement in 1859,” the Japanese *Chosen Shinpo* was the first newspaper to be established in Korea by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in December 1881 in the treaty port city of Pusan (the first port city opened up via the Kanghwa treaty of 1876) and was also initially published in more of a magazine-like format appearing three times a month.⁶³² Moreover, the first publication of the Korean state’s *Hansǒng sunbo* in October 1883 was assisted by Japanese-Korean scholar networks and newspaper experts.⁶³³ As Altman states:

After deciding in February 1883 to publish such a newspaper, the government gave the responsibility to an official, Yu Kilchun⁶³⁴ who had studied at Fukuzawa Yukichi’s academy in Tokyo. Yu was assisted by Inoue Kakugoro, another Fukuzawa student and agent in Korea, and Japanese newspaper experts. Publication was delayed by political changes in Seoul that led to the departure of Japanese newspaper experts. However, Inoue stayed on until December 1884, when the paper went out of existence after the political upheaval in Korea that month.⁶³⁵

In addition to the assistance of Japanese newspaper experts, the Japanese *Chosen Shinpo* could also have provided both a conceptual and formal model (even if in the negative) for the development of the Korean press in both its public and private manifestations. As Altman shows, the *Chosen shinpo* was divided into both Chinese and Japanese language/script sections catering to two different demographics—one being the new settler community of diasporic Japanese in the Korean treaty port city of Pusan which had grown from 800 in 1876 to 1,800 by 1881, and the other to the educated scholar-bureaucrat class of Koreans—separated by language/script and

⁶³⁰ *Chubo* is based on the Chinese ideographic compound for *chu* which means ‘weekly,’ and *bo* which means ‘report’. I am not familiar with the compound *sunbo* and the article doesn’t provide the Chinese character for *sun* which, could mean ‘the first’ or ‘lead/leader’ or a ‘cable or wire.’ It’s likely the second meaning.

⁶³¹ Suh, p. 17.

⁶³² Albert A. Altman, “Korea’s First Newspaper: The Japanese Chosen Shinpo,” in *The Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 43, no. 4 (August 1984), pp. 685-696.

⁶³³ *Ibid.*, p. 695.

⁶³⁴ Yu was of course the author of the Korean enlightenment treatise we saw in Chapter One, who was the first Korean to study in Japan and the US stemming from his diplomatic missions to these places for the Korean government.

⁶³⁵ Altman, p. 695. Of course Altman is here referring to the Kapsin coup when the paper was suspended, to be revived as Suh observes in 1886 as the *Hansǒng chubo*.

serving two different purposes.⁶³⁶ While the Japanese-language sections of the paper were primarily commercial facilitating the economic pursuits and transactions of the Japanese settler community carrying “information about prices, goods being exchanged [of which “rice, soybeans and ox-hides were the most important”], and arrivals and departures and ships in Pusan, as well as though in far less detail in Wonsan [the other Korean treaty port],” the Chinese script section of the paper served a more didactic political function “seeking to influence King Kojong’s policy of reform” and “written in the didactic style used in Japanese ‘enlightenment’ literature of the first decade of the Meiji period” appealing to persuade both the Korean neo-Confucian and enlightenment or progressive reformist literati of the virtues and desirability of the new economic mode of production and political institutions and ideas of the West as well as providing lessons from Japan’s experiences for Korea—such as Japan’s “self-strengthening” programs.⁶³⁷ But as Altman argues, these two formally and linguistic divided sections both revealed intimate connections and presented significant contradictions to the integrity of the claims of each separate section:

Although the *Chosen shinpo* had two tongues, each speaking to its own public on subjects presumed to be of interest, what was said in one language was intimately tied to what was said in the other. In the Chinese language, the paper assumed the role of mentor, knowledgeable and wise in the new ways essential for the survival in the contemporary world, instructing a stripling Korean pupil. The tone was respectful, the manner correct. In the Japanese language, the *Chosen shinpo* did not speak to Koreans; it spoke about them. Talking to each other in this manner, the Japanese voiced attitudes unuttered in the Chinese language; to have expressed them would have subverted the teacher’s role the Japanese had given themselves in that language. In Japanese, the *Chosen shinpo* was condescending towards Koreans and contemptuous of their culture. Praiseworthy Koreans are those most like Japanese in dress or speech, for example, or those who seek Japanese assistance. What is surprising is the assumption of the paper’s editor that the Japanese-language stories would not, or could not, be read by the Koreans whom he was trying to influence while wearing the hat of mentor.⁶³⁸

Considering that the *Chosen shinpo* was then the first medium of public discourse—“the sole public platform in Korea on which economic and public issues were discussed”—however contradictory and duplicitous as well as narrowly constituted by Japanese settlers and Korean state officials and other educated literati, but of course constituting the very social groups that led the modern press revolution in Korea, Altman’s attempt to view “this chapter in the history of the Korean press from the comparative perspective of similar chapters in the history of the press in China and Japan” and his question as to whether the *Chosen shinpo* [had produced] an echo among Koreans” I think constitutes an important and relevant perspective for the development of the Korean press.⁶³⁹ At the same time, we also can also see the parallel structuring of the

⁶³⁶ Ibid., pp. 685, 687.

⁶³⁷ Ibid., pp. 690, 687, 688.

⁶³⁸ Ibid., p. 694

⁶³⁹ Ibid., p. 695.

contradictory doubling of imperial aggression and modern transformation which inscribed the construction of imperial concessionary railroads in Korea and their nationalist appropriations.

As the modern Korean newspaper continued its development with the establishment of private presses in the period after the Sino-Japanese War and the partially realized Kabo reforms conducted under a pro-Japanese modern reform government (manned by Korean enlightenment reformers returning from exile after the failed Kapsin coup), the nation saw the development of the first private-run paper, *Tongnip sinmun* (*The Independent*), launched in April 1896 by the new patriotic intellectual association, the Independence Club, which was, like the state's newspaper enterprise, also led by a returning exile Sŏ Chaep'il from the U.S.⁶⁴⁰ The *Tongnip Sinmun*, "supported by the government and enlightenment circles," became "the first Korean newspaper operated by citizens and sustained by [though not entirely] proceeds from subscriptions and advertisements."⁶⁴¹ The *Tongnip sinmun* also spawned the establishment of other popular nationalist presses such as the *Hwangŏng sinmun* (Capital Gazette, 1898-1910) and the *Cheguk sinmun* (Imperial Post, 1898-1918) both in 1898 (a year before the *Tongnip sinmun* itself was eventually closed down along with Independence Club by the state for the political adventurism beyond monarchical rule of its enlightenment visions), targeting various popular audiences and social groups⁶⁴² as part of a larger cultural and political nation-wide enlightenment reform movement beginning in the mid-to-late 1890s also accompanied by the opening of private Western-style schools and other institutions.⁶⁴³

But as with the initial appropriation of the new foreign 'modern' technology of newspapers in Korea by the state as an organ of the government replacing the form and function of the handwritten *Chobo* and adopting the form and function of the modern Japanese *Chosen shinpo*, which then became naturalized as a more nation-bounded medium slowly erasing both the foreignness of its content and form as it evolved from the *Hansŏng sunbo* to the *Hansŏng chubo*, its appropriation by the modern reformist intelligentsia in the politically charged and economically backward Korean situation as a vehicle of popular nationalism and cultural-political development and indoctrination in the knowledge of a new western civilization—not unlike the function of modern schools whose development went hand in hand with that of the private newspapers, continued to produce print-capitalism in the Korean context as a form of primarily cultural nationalism or we might say 'national cultural developmentalism.'⁶⁴⁴ As

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid; see also Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires: 1895-1919* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2002); Michael E. Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988, and Eckert et al, *Korea Old and New*. See also my discussion of the Independence Club in Chapter one.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

⁶⁴² Schmid notes that the *Tongnip sinmun* combined their reform message [which was largely pro-American] with a pro-Christian message, while the *Hwangŏng sinmun* targeted the "Confucian-trained elite, urging them to participate in the renovation of government and society that both headed in new directions while remaining faithful to certain core practices of the past" and was run by Confucian reformists, while *Cheguk sinmun*, named in honor of the newly elevated Korean Emperor (from originally King status, following the Sino-Japanese War and end of Chinese suzerainty) had "the widest circulation among the uneducated and women." (*Korea Between Empires*, pp. 47-48). Moreover, the Christian Community began publishing the *Chosŏn Kurisdoin hoebo* in February 1897 (Suh, p. 18).

⁶⁴³ See for example, Michael E. Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988, pp. 28-37.

⁶⁴⁴ The developmental state is primarily seen as an economic technology as associated with the postwar postcolonial economic development of South Korea and other Asian economies (such as the so-called three tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) characterized by protected industries and markets against competition from powerful advanced Western and Japanese economic counterparts within the uneven terrain of monopolistic national-

Andre Schmid in his study of these presses has observed, while these new private newspapers “were commercial enterprises,” they were “for the most part undercapitalized, their ability to stay afloat indicating more their commitment to nationalist causes than an elusive profitability.”⁶⁴⁵ For example, “according to one likely exaggerated accounting, the *Tongnip sinmun* was owed the staggering sum of more than \$175,000 by delinquent officials,” which stemmed from “the common practice” of sending “off copies before payment,” as well as “distribution difficulties” such as non or late deliveries related to the likewise new “not always reliable postal system.”⁶⁴⁶ In the cases of *Cheguk sinmun* and the *Hwangsoŋg sinmun*, the two other private papers which opened in 1898, “the “*Cheguk sinmun* closed its offices on four occasions between 1899 and 1907 because of financial shortcomings, and readers of the *Hwangsoŋg sinmun* were constantly greeted with front-page notices warning of the paper’s imminent collapse.”⁶⁴⁷ Thus facing constant obstacles in procuring capital as well as in sustaining the dynamism of capitalist processes—observable in “the lack of capital and the difficulties in persuading readers to send in their subscription fees,” Schmid maintains that “most of the publications depended on the [both economic and extra-economic] largesse of their readers,” with the Chosŏn state being one important benefactor.⁶⁴⁸

On a number of occasions, Emperor Kojong made significant donations, in 1903 contributing five hundred wŏn to the *Hwangsoŋg sinmun*, in addition to two thousand wŏn and a new printing press to the *Cheguk sinmun*. Even the popular *Taehan maeil sinbo* is said to have depended on regular, secret contributions from the emperor to avoid bankruptcy. *Hwangsoŋg sinmun* at one point launched a subscription and donation drive, in which the names of all contributors were regularly printed under the title ‘A List of the Civilized’ (*Munmyŏngnok*).⁶⁴⁹

capitalism of the post WWII period. (See for example, Meredith Woo Cumings, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1991); John Lie, *Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); or Alice Amsden, *Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). However as Meredith Woo Cumings, John Lie and Bruce Cumings have in particular emphasized, the economic developmentalism of Japan and Japan’s developmental colonialism in Korea were significant models and structuring conditions for Korea’s postwar economic developmentalism. (See Chalmers Johnson, *Miti and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.) What I am trying to point to with the appropriation of the material technology of the newspaper by both the Korean dynastic state and popular nationalist intelligentsia and their evolution into both statist and popular governmental apparatuses—amidst their entry into a highly uneven imperialist capitalist world system—is how both cultural-political technologies and phenomena could be seen as both complementary and corresponding processes which operates at the intersection of political-economy and cultural society and is observable from the earliest adaptations of foreign cultural-material technology and phenomena as it is observable during and alongside Korea’s postwar economic developmentalism from the 1960s-1980s Korea—as I examine in my later Kimpo airport chapters. It is these supplementary processes of cultural developmentalism and their historical encapsulation that I see as the core characteristic of the national-globalism of Incheon airport.

⁶⁴⁵ Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires: 1895-1919* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 50.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

Part of the problem was due to insufficient advertising revenues and non-remittance of subscription fees, but they were also related to both an inadequate readership, measured in terms of circulation rates, as well as an excess in readership related to what might be called communal forms of readership stemming from old premodern Korean practices of oral and public readings, as newspapers “quickly [became] part of the oral culture of the cities and villages.”⁶⁵⁰ As Schmid writes:

“Every time one passes through the streets or markets,” described one observer of the *Cheguk sinmun*, “there is either a youth or a white-haired old man, holding a copy of a paper in his hands, reading aloud at the top of his voice.” Reform-minded county magistrates would have someone at public gatherings read from a paper such as the *Tongnip sinmun*, and at least one reader wrote letters to the paper, urging other officials to do the same. Still others noted how frequently newspapers exchanged hands, one hearing of a case in the countryside in which a single copy of the *Tongnip sinmun* was read by no fewer than eighty-five people. Another reader noted he received his copy of *Hwangsŏng sinmun* from his scholarly friends. Even a conservative scholar residing in the countryside noted that when the *Hwangsŏng sinmun* arrived in his locality, people in “all four directions” competed to be the first to buy and read it. A perhaps overly nostalgic former publisher of the *Tongnip sinmun* remembered that when a subscriber had “finished reading it [the paper], [he] turned it over to his neighbors, and in this way each copy was read by at least two hundred people.”⁶⁵¹

At the same time, “the small circulation of newspapers also belied their political influence” — as this communal hybrid oral-print culture was combined with the new importance of these newspapers in spreading new modern and nationalist thought and education.⁶⁵² Thus as the state served as an important benefactor for select private newspaper enterprises, as some of the popular presses also took to publicly divulging state affairs such as “Russian and Japanese attempts to exact concessions from the Korean government,” to “mobiliz[e] public opinion against the granting of special privileges” — the state also came to seek control over the flow of information and knowledge via censorship attempts, which aside from closing down *Tongnip sinmun* and the Independence Club in 1899, was eventually systematically realized by the Japanese colonial government after 1905 with the implementation of journalistic-wide censorship and then more absolutely after Annexation in 1910 where the presses were shut down outright.⁶⁵³

Thus appropriated as part of a popular nationalist arsenal, these new enlightenment period newspapers (those following the Sino Japanese War), now appearing under the neologistic Chinese character compound *sinmun* which can be broken down into *sin* referring to “new, novel, or up to date” and *mun* based on the character for a ‘question’ or a ‘problem,’ also expanded and extended the model and function of the official *Hansŏng chubo* with new ideas, vocabulary and visions of national modernizing reforms including those which even challenged

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid., p. 52.

⁶⁵² Ibid., p. 52-3.

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

the state's political commitments—centrally grounded on their shared message of adopting and embracing a new 'civilization and enlightenment,'—adopting the compound name of the same discourse from Meiji Japan⁶⁵⁴ as well as we might say much of the tactics of the *Chosen shinpo*'s didactic and condescending approach and tone—which was now turned on fellow Koreans now utilized as part of the nationalist movement to agitate their 'awakening' to new 'modern' attitudes, ideas and behaviors that would help transform Korea into a 'modern' nation-state and ensure the safeguarding of Korean national sovereignty amidst increasing infringements by Western and Japanese imperial powers.⁶⁵⁵ In addition to these popular papers' resemblances to the mix of didacticism and condescension characteristic of the Japanese published *Chosen shinbo*, we could also see them as functioning much like a technology toward cultivating economic discipline among Koreans (as with the payment of subscriptions) much like the *Chosen shinpo* (published by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce!) aided the financial activities of Japanese settlers in the treaty ports.

While the political models for Korea's modern transformation differed among the editorial boards of various modern reform nationalists of these presses, the formulation of a distinct modern national identity as well as autonomous political and ethno-nationalist history became integral to their shared enlightenment project of producing Korea as an independent modern nation-state among others in the new international system.⁶⁵⁶ As such some of these papers, like the *Tongnip sinmun* and the *Cheguk sinmun*, also now self-consciously replaced the mixed Chinese-*hangŭl* script of the earlier state paper with the exclusive use of *hangŭl*.⁶⁵⁷ At the same time, as per the cosmopolitan-nationalism inherent in the new pro-Western 'civilization and enlightenment' paradigm promoted by the modern reformers, the exclusive use of *hangŭl* vis-à-vis Chinese script was also accompanied by full English language pages. As Suh seems to

⁶⁵⁴ See for example, Rumi Sakamoto's discussion of Fukuzawa Yukichi's early Meiji discourse of 'civilization and enlightenment' in "Japan, Hybridity and the Creation of Colonialist Discourse," in *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 13 no. 3 (1996), pp. 113-128.

⁶⁵⁵ See Schmid, *Korean Between Empires* for an in-depth discussion and exploration of how 'civilization and enlightenment' was imagined in these new vernacular presses and used to goad and cudgel fellow Koreans with superior Western modern cultural and human counterparts toward nationalist agitation to maintain independence. What I think Altman and Suh importantly provide and Eckert et al. also alludes to—in adding to Schmid's study of Korean newspapers is the contextualization of the development of these vernacular presses within the Chosŏn state's first moves into modern newspaper publishing and the modern newspaper's continuity and differences from the premodern equivalent the *chobo*—in the way that Albert Altman's discussion of the first Japanese paper both contextualizes Suh's discussion of the Korean state's first papers and also introduces to the discussion of popular national presses by Schmid and Robinson an extra-national origin for Korean popular presses that interrupts the centrality or singularity of the Korean national press as the privileged material technology of Korean nationalism—which is not to deny that it was both a powerful and central medium for Korean national discourse. For all the excellent discussions of the modern popular Korean vernacular presses and their import in the development of modern Korean nationalism in both Schmid and Michael E. Robinson, their modernist (in the sociological rather than Berman's socio-cultural sense) orientation and approach to nationalism, unfortunately leads them to begin with the popular vernacular presses of the 1890s as the main subject and origin of modern Korean newspapers with any substantial value to modern Korean nationalism—without due emphasis on the various heteronomous determinations of the popular paper (and not just the colonial discourses that are filtered through the Korean nationalist papers) such as the first Japanese diasporic paper in Korea or the Chosŏn state-published newspapers that preceded the private versions. Although they focus on modern nationalist discourse among Koreans and see the newspapers as a key archive and discursive platform for nationalist thought—but interrogating the material technology that is structuring this discourse may reveal new insights into the form of nationalist discourse and thought in Korea.

⁶⁵⁶ See also my discussion of the nationalist enlightenment discourse in Chapter One.

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

suggest these vernacular presses both sought to bring a new world to Korea and Korea to a new world:

By reporting on world affairs, it brought about recognition of Korea's particular international standing and the place of the Korean people on the world stage. Last, through the *Tongnip sinmun*'s English-language section, *The Independent* [English name of the same paper], it served to apprise the world of Korean views.⁶⁵⁸

The Korean press underwent another significant stage of development around the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and the sudden imposition of the colonial Protectorate by the Japanese in 1905⁶⁵⁹ and continuing until Korea's formal annexation as Japan's colony in 1910—when all but one of the nationalist presses were shut down completely. As we saw in Chapter One, this period which formed the beginning of the denouement of colonial rule on the peninsula instigated various and spirited forms of resistance to the Protectorate and the imminent complete loss of Korean sovereignty—ranging from the armed struggles of Confucian literati-led *uibyong* or 'Righteous Armies' to the formation of new nationalist political organizations such as the Korean Association for Self-Strengthening (*Taehan Chaganghoe*) in March 1906,⁶⁶⁰ or the more clandestine New People's Association (*Sinminhoe*)⁶⁶¹ around the same time (which was organized through the union of both diasporic nationalists in America with those in the peninsula)—and their various crisscrossing nationalist manifestos. At the same time, these associations and organized activities were augmented by the intense proliferation of private modern Western style schools whereby “some 2,250 private schools were founded” between 1905 and 1910, with many located “in the northern half of the country,”⁶⁶² as well as the writing of revisionist historico-ethno-national historiographies such as Sin Ch'aeho's '*Toksa sillon*' of

⁶⁵⁸ Suh, p. 18.

⁶⁵⁹ The Protectorate wrested Korean diplomatic sovereignty and control over Korean land and infrastructure as it made inroads all of the branches of Korean government slowly taking over its internal affairs until formal colonial rule via The Annexation Treaty in 1910.

⁶⁶⁰ This association was formed by Yun Ch'ihō who was the past president of the Independence Club, and assisted by Chang Chiyōn (1864-1921), the chief editor of Hwangšōng sinmun and author of the famous editorial in response to the Protectorate, and Yun Hyojong. (Ch'oe et al, *Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two – From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, p. 295).

⁶⁶¹ The *Sinminhoe* was “proposed by well-known nationalist An Ch'angho (1878-1938) [an active leader of the budding nationalist movement among Korean expats in the U.S. as we saw in the previous section] and headed by the widely respected journalist Yang Kit'ak (1871-1938)” and included a number of anti-Japanese activists and nationalist movement leaders such as Yun Ch'ihō, Yi Tonghwi (1873-1928), Kim Ku (1876-1949), Sin Ch'aeho (1880-1936), in its roughly 800 members. (Ch'oe et al, p. 296). The organization “promoted the development of modern industry and education by establishing a ceramics factory and by founding schools, while also making preparations for armed operations outside the country to promote the cause of Korean independence. The activities of the Association were brought to a halt in 1911 when a majority of the organization's directors were arrested in connection with the so-called 'Korean Conspiracy Case.’” (Eckert et. al, p. 246).

⁶⁶² Eckert et al., p. 248. P'yōngyang and the northern half of the country is where Christianity also thrived. As Ch'oe et al. add that as “education became the subject of much public discourse” in “the years following the Protectorate,” in 1906 The Korean Association for Self-Strengthening (*Taehan Chaganghoe*) “proposed a system of compulsory education, and the Korean government gave its tentative approval, but the Japanese residency-general vetoed it [the Japanese residency-general, Ito Hirobumi, was positioned just under the Korean emperor with the imposition of the Protectorate]. Undaunted, various Korean groups established private schools at a phenomenal rate” (Ch'oe et al, *Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two – From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, p. 296).

1908.⁶⁶³ This period also saw the rapid growth of private vernacular nationalist presses, as well as the birth of the “new novel” (*sinsosŏl*), both of which actively contributed to as well as were expanded by its intersection with these various other nationalist movements and activities. The vernacular nationalist presses tripled in growth after 1905, but were now subjected to colonial censorship, beginning since August 1904,⁶⁶⁴ and was also accompanied by many pro-Japanese papers, which were divided “on the basis of whether they used the Korean or Japanese language and whether they were operated by Korean or by Japanese nationals.”⁶⁶⁵ According to Suh,

The representative newspapers of the Japanese who came to Korea immediately after the [Russo-Japanese] war were the *Taehan ilbo* and the *Taedong shinbo*. These newspapers aimed for Korean readers by publishing in Korea, but were mouthpieces for the Japanese imperialists, on whom they relied for financial support. They rationalized encroachment on the Korean peninsula and trumpeted the Japanese triumph in the Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese imperialists’ first attempt to mold public opinion through newspapers was the *Hansŏng sinbo*, launched in 1895. Then, after the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, they published the Japanese-language *Kyŏngsŏng ilbo* and the English-language *Seoul Press*, and worked to guide political propaganda and foreign opinion.⁶⁶⁶

Thus similar to the competing Japanese colonialist revisionist historiographies of Korea that produced ancient Korea as a colony of Japan and the Korean nationalist counter-revisionist historiographies that produced Korea as an autonomous ethno-nation historically evolving out of the same bloodline of a mythic-historical figure Tang’un some four thousand years ago, new popular presses from this period also emerged along two distinct and opposed ideological lines. More than seventeen new papers were founded after Russo-Japanese War, including both new nationalist presses such as the *Taehan maeil sinbo* (*Korea Daily News*, 1904-1910), *Mansebo* (*Long Live [Independent] Korea News*, 1906), and the *Taehan Minbo* (*Korea People’s Press*, 1909), as well as pro-Japanese mouthpieces, such as the *Taehan ilbo* (*Korea Daily*, 1904), the *Taedong sinbo* (*Korea News*, 1904), and the *Kyŏngsŏng ilbo* (*Seoul*⁶⁶⁷ *Daily*, 1906).⁶⁶⁸ In this strange doubling of the utilization of newspapers for Japanese colonialist propaganda as for Korean anti-colonial nationalist ideology, it is difficult to see keep track of which constitutes the original and which the copy. The first modern newspaper was no doubt started by and for a new Japanese settler community in the treaty ports and as a political and didactic tool to encourage the Korea state and its intellectual leaders to embrace modern reforms and Japan’s guiding role. Both the Korean state and popular presses appear to have been thereafter assisted and influenced by the Japanese example both visible in the homeland as well as observable in their journeys to Japan and harnessed toward both the state’s self-strengthening reforms as well as those initiated

⁶⁶³ See Henry H. Em, “Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’aeho’s Historiography,” in Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), p. 336-362; and Schmid, *Korea Between Empires*, chapter five.

⁶⁶⁴ Schmid, p. 53.

⁶⁶⁵ Suh, p. 18.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ Kyŏngsŏng was the new name for Seoul used by the colonial government, which replaced the Chosŏn name of Hanyang.

⁶⁶⁸ Suh, p. 18; See also Eckert et al., pp. 246-7.

outside of the state which both borrowed from and instrumentalized state support to challenge the state's conservative political visions and often ineffectual partial reform plans due to factious politics of the state and *yangban* oligarchs. They were no doubt also influenced by American and other Western papers from where comparative examples of superior American women, farmers, manners, education, etc. were taken and used to encourage Koreans to take up the enlightenment project. But then after 1904 as new popular papers coopted by Japanese imperial forces emerged alongside new anti-colonialist nationalist presses, these newspapers resembled not so much the structuring form of a horizontal national imagining but a hierarchical site of discursive cultural political struggle unevenly determined with new censorship regulations leveled against the nationalist presses by the colonial government. Ultimately by 1910, all but one of the Korean nationalist presses were forcibly shut down by the colonial government, and the single remaining Korean-language newspaper, the *Taehan maeil sinbo* (*Korea Daily News*) was effectively shut down and turned into an organ of the colonial authorities—as the *Maeil sinbo* (*Daily News*)—and maintained through even more repressive censorship and regulation.⁶⁶⁹

The bilingual *Taehan maeil sinbo* (*Korea Daily News*)—before it was turned into the *Maeil sinbo* in 1910—began publishing in 1904, and owned by an English journalist Ernest T. Bethell, who joined Yang Ki-t'ak (who also headed the new nationalist political organization *Sinminhoe*) after Japanese censorship prevented Korean newspapers from openly criticizing Japanese aggression, was the only peninsular paper able to remain free of censorship protected under extraterritorial laws owing to Bethell's control of the paper.⁶⁷⁰ With the sign “No Entry of Japanese” hung over the newspaper office, the paper “covered Japanese actions on the peninsula with more detail than another other paper of the period” and “proceeded to attack Japanese acts of aggression with impunity” and thus guaranteeing “its spot as the most popular paper of the day.”⁶⁷¹ For example, the paper “stunned the Japanese with the publication of Emperor Kojong's personal letter denying that he approved the Protectorate Treaty and appealing for the protection of Western powers” in the paper's February 1, 1906 issue of the English language edition for foreign readers.⁶⁷² The paper “was publishing three daily issues, one each in vernacular Korean, mixed script [Chinese-*hangŭl*], and English” by 1907.⁶⁷³ As the cosmopolitan solidarity of Bethell with Yi granted *Taehan maeil sinbo* in the years after the Protectorate a political bulwark from which to continue to speak out against Japanese colonial aggression free from overt Japanese censorship, another form of extraterritorial nationalism—that of new diasporic presses also ensured such freedoms if not the easy accessibility of a broad Korean audience as was the case of *Taehan maeil sinbo*. During this period and likewise prompted by the Protectorate, these new and older Korean nationalist presses were also accompanied by the emergence of a host of diasporic presses forming in the U.S. within a budding new nationalist movement among Korean

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁰ Eckert et al., p. 246. Ann Sung-hi Lee states in the introduction of her translation of *Mujŏng* that this move of bringing in Bethell was designed by the new nationalist political organization Sinminhoe (New People's Association).

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.; Schmid, p. 48.

⁶⁷² Eckert et al., p. 246. Emperor Kojong also secretly dispatched a Korean delegation to the Hague in 1907 coinciding with the Second Hague Peace Conference “to expose the injustice done Korea and to seek redress. Although the conference refused to seat the Korean delegates or accept its petition, the world-wide publicity the Korean question consequently received create considerable international furor” (240). This move however, rather than aiding Korean Independence got Kojong dethroned, with the installation of his son Sunjong, who was reputedly an ‘imbecile’ to the throne until 1910.

⁶⁷³ Schmid, p. 48.

expatriates. As we saw above, arising from the emigration of some 7,000 Korean laborers to the Hawaiian sugar plantations between 1903-1905 and a spattering of Korean students, diplomats, and political exiles that entered the U.S. from the 1880s through 1905, Korean communities in Hawaii as well as of those who had since moved on to San Francisco and primarily other cities along the West Coast had begun organizing political associations for Korean independence in the U.S. since as early as 1903. As the movement also “spawned numerous publications—the *Sinhan Minbo* (*New Korea Daily*), the *Kongnip Sinmun* (*Korean News*), the *T’aep’yongyang Chubo* (*Korean Pacific Weekly*), and the *Sin Han’guk po* (*New Korean News*)” which “informed Korean migrants about the nationalist activities in America and in the homeland,”⁶⁷⁴ these diasporic papers as well as the political associations supporting and staffing them headed by various exile nationalist leaders also gained influence not only in the U.S. but also in Korea—in a large part owing to the freedom of speech and political organization they enjoyed relative to their peninsular counterparts as well as their close links with presses and nationalist organizations in Korea. For example, as Schmid has written:

Even though published in San Francisco, the *SinHan minbo* [founded in 1905] was in many ways a transnational paper, written as much for its audience on the peninsula as for the one in the United States. Its own circulation figures show that in 1908, for every five hundred papers distributed in the United States and one hundred papers reaching Hawai’i, three thousand copies reached the peninsula. This transnational status was also reflected in its editorial perspective, which often assumed the readers were residents of the peninsula and addressed them accordingly. The press inside the peninsula regularly acknowledged its influence. Perhaps the highest testament to its power was offered by Japanese officials, who often blamed *SinHan minbo* and other overseas Korean media for stirring up trouble. Colonial authorities expended much effort to intercept the papers at the border “on the account of injuring public peace and good morals.”⁶⁷⁵

At the same time, the paper also “allied itself with the nationalist goals of its peninsular counterparts, frequently reprinting for American readers reports and editorials from the *Hwangsoŋg sinmun* and *Taehan maeil sinbo*.”⁶⁷⁶ It also maintained close links with “the underground patriotic association on the peninsula, the Sinminhoe (New People’s Association), and after the Sinminhoe’s dissolution by colonial authorities in 1911, the paper remained one of the few nationalist voices, continuing to publish until the end of WWII.”⁶⁷⁷

It was moreover to write as a journalist for the *Sinhan minbo* in San Francisco that Yi Kwangsu, author of *Mujöng! Heartless* and who was also instrumental to and wrote the Declaration of Independence for the Tokyo 8th Independence movement that preceded the March 1st uprising in Seoul, began preparing in January of 1914 a trans-continental journey from Shanghai, where he had temporarily been staying with members of the Shanghai Korean overseas nationalist community, through Russia and across the Trans-Siberian rail to Europe and

⁶⁷⁴ Takaki, p. 281.

⁶⁷⁵ Schmid, p. 248.

⁶⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

then the United States.⁶⁷⁸ Making it to the Russian city of Chita located along the Tran-Siberian rail, Yi ended up postponing his trip while waiting for funds to be dispatched from the Kungminhoe (Korean National Association of America--which formed in 1909 to coordinate organization across various nationalist groups across the U.S.) in San Francisco, and then with the outbreak of World War I, was ultimately redirected back to Korea.⁶⁷⁹ Thus in the face of the uneven restrictive environment of Korea after the Protectorate, the horizontality of Korean newspaper readership expanded across the hierarchical censored colonizing terrain of Korea through that of the uneven world geography beyond Korea to join the national peninsular reading public with that of its diasporic compatriots in the United States. As the United States had long been perceived as extolled in the popular Korean vernacular presses throughout the 1890s such as *Tongnip sinmun*, *Taehan maeil sinbo* etc. as the exemplar and standard of the new ‘modern’ ‘civilization and enlightenment’ and the model to which they strove to transform Korea, it now came to be seen to house a vanguard of Korean nationalist organizing as well as the popular ‘modern’ Korean press and beckoned Koreans from the peninsula to join them.⁶⁸⁰ Like the political charge that engulfed overseas travel and emigration for Korean ‘moderns’—students, activists, journalists, etc.—especially after the Protectorate made it a policy to restrict these movements, diasporic newspapers likewise became politicized with the Protectorate’s corresponding regulation of speech and journalism. U.S. was certainly not the only foreign destination, as many exile Korean communities could be found growing across China, Manchuria, and Siberia—as well as their diasporic papers especially after 1910.⁶⁸¹ But surely it was both the political and journalistic freedoms promised by the U.S. as well as its unsurpassable modernity and civilization, which combined to attract Yi Kwangsu to both *Sinhan minbo* and San Francisco. With the first modern newspapers appearing in Korea as largely a diasporic paper for a new Japanese settler community in the treaty ports which arrived with and as Korea’s first sovereign infringements by the new imperialist international system, and which at the same time became a model or impetus for the Korean state’s initiative in establishing the first modern newspaper and which then evolved into popular vernacular Korean newspapers, as these popular Korean presses continued its development some part of these presses thus proceeded to migrate with Korean diasporic communities and the exile nationalist movement abroad—not to return until the 1920s with the opening of new peninsular presses after the March 1st uprising with the change in colonial policy to a more militarily, and cultural-politically relaxed cultural rule.

The birth of the ‘new novel’ out of newspaper fiction was also a related development issuing in part from the new press censorship restrictions by Japanese since 1904.⁶⁸² According to Suh, these enlightenment period Korean papers were “a vehicle for enlightenment not merely in terms of their activities as newspapers but also in the sense that they included fiction as journalism” where “except for the *Hansŏng sunbo*, *Hansŏng chubo*, and *Tongnip sinmun*, almost all newspapers carried serialized novels.”⁶⁸³

⁶⁷⁸ See Yi’s early travels recounted by Ann Sung-hi Lee in *Yi Kwang-su and Modern Korean Literature: Mujŏng*, (Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Series, 2005), pp. 18-19.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁰ According to Schmid, the nationalist editors of new diasporic newspapers such as the *Sinhan minbo* (*New Korea Daily*) “urged Korean students to come to the United States, arguing that a stay in that country was the best way for ‘breaking old ways and constructing the new.’”

⁶⁸¹ See my more detailed discussion of diasporic papers in my section on Yi Kwangsu and Mujŏng below.

⁶⁸² Suh, p. 20.

⁶⁸³ Ibid.

And thus in this age of intense regulation by imperial Japan, journalism perhaps expressed its resistance by borrowing fictional methods rather than resorting to a formula of actual reports combined with critical comment. For although fiction possessed the powerful persistence of journalism, it lacked journalism's directness, its mass scale, its popularity. Journalism, therefore, perhaps borrowed from fiction in order to avoid regulation by the Japanese.⁶⁸⁴

At the same time, in addition to the link to censorship, Suh maintains that newspaper fiction was also “a means of promoting sales” of the fledgling modern newspaper enterprise.⁶⁸⁵ Suh thus seems to argue that the development of newspaper fiction was both importantly related to and reflected the powerful influence of Korean newspapers as a “social mechanism for guiding the age”—which “operated by leaders of the people...became a great means of autonomy, independence and education” and thus a preeminent medium of public discourse while playing a significant role in shaping knowledge about the nation and the world, as Schmid has argued as to the chief characteristic of the Korean enlightenment era presses—and that it was also utilized to both supplement and enhance the influence, popularity, and even the political effect of the these papers, especially as they faced more regulation and censorship as a form of veiled speech.⁶⁸⁶ In the concealed or commercialized fictions that appeared in these papers, Suh argues that fictions thus existed, “but not fiction writers as we know them...for all of the fiction published at this time were written by reporters,” and they did so either to “promote enlightenment and modernization” or “in order to promote sales.”⁶⁸⁷ And in either case, in so far as the papers were nationalist sounding boards for modern Korean enlightenment, they were both intimately linked to the ideological production of modern national consciousness, and the experience of modern Korean intellectuals qua reformers who were running these newspapers as well as writing these novels, in their attempt to safeguard or regain (after 1905) national sovereignty. Thus seen from this particular cultural-political context of development of the newspaper as well as fiction, as Suh argues that journalism played a decisive role in its “contribution to the emergence and development of fiction in Korean society,”⁶⁸⁸ he emphasizes that what then distinguishes Yi Injik's ‘Tears of Blood’ carried in *Mansebo* in 1906, which is largely claimed by critics as the first ‘new novel’ or *sinsosöl*, from these other anonymous journalistic fictions that preceded it, has to do with its being “the first work of (modern) Korean literature to exhibit an independent character, and not utterly subjugated to journalism.”⁶⁸⁹ Thus we can see Yi's novel as both growing out of *and* embedded within “the fiction of that time” which, arising from the context of various political and economical motivations linked to the development of modern Korean nationalism and the experience and history of modern intellectuals and the national reform movements “is thought by critics to have been derived from existing stories rather than freshly created by the authors...[where] the authors were not to be distinguished by individuality or creativeness.”⁶⁹⁰

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid.; Conversely, Suh observes that in addition to nationalist fiction appearing as a concealed form of “literary journalism” even pro-Japanese newspapers carried pro-Japanese propagandistic fiction (21).

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

Hyŏl ũi nu (Tears of Blood): A Short Modern Nationalist Epic as Journey

Like many of the enlightenment reformers of this period, Yi Injik (1862-1916) was educated in Japan graduating from the School of Politics in Tokyo returning to Korea in 1904. He was also a journalist—he wrote *Hyŏl ũi nu* (Tears of Blood) as the editor of the newly established *Mansebo* (*Long Live [an Independent] Korea News*), founded on June 16, 1906 by the Ch’ondogyo religion, which was the heir to the Tonghak religion that led the Tonghak rebellion on 1894 and whose leaders played a significant role in the organization of the March 1st Independence Movement along with Christian and Buddhist groups in 1919. *Mansebo* carried articles on the Ch’ondogyo faith, but also on politics and government and was printed in various styles where columns on government and current affairs were written almost entirely in literary Chinese with Korean articles and auxiliary verbs.⁶⁹¹ The Chinese characters were accompanied by side notations with either Korean pronunciation of the Chinese character or with a vernacular Korean equivalent, written in *hangŭl*, which was also used in its serialized fiction.⁶⁹² The paper continued to publish until August 1907, when it was turned into a pro-Japanese publication called the *Taehan sinmun*.⁶⁹³ Yi also wrote other short ‘new fictions’ *Pheasant Mountain* (1907), *Voice of the Devil* (1908), *Mount Ch’iak* (1908) and *Silver World* (1908), the last of which was based on a drama, *The Ballad of Ch’oe Phyongdo* (1908), which depicted an actual event in society at the time.⁶⁹⁴ In addition to laying the groundwork for the ‘new novel,’ Yi also founded modern Korean dramaturgy. Yi Injik’s first ‘new novel’ *Hyŏl ũi nu* (Tears of Blood) was serialized in *Mansebo* in fifty episodes from July through October 1906.⁶⁹⁵

The ‘new’ in the *sinsosŏl* or “new fiction” was based on the same character *sin* used in the name for the modern newspaper *sinmun*, while here it was combined with *sosŏl* meaning ‘a story, a tale, or romance’ to refer to a new kind of literature—significantly growing out of the new newspapers connoting and both a new ‘modern’ ‘innovative’ or ‘up to date-ness’ and linked to a new nationalist enterprise.⁶⁹⁶ As literary scholars have noted, the ‘new novel’ was a “transitional” form of literature between the classical or medieval novel grounded in both Chinese classicism, Korean appropriations of Chinese literary tradition mixed with indigenous Korean literary elements—and the Western novel based on both Western and modern Japanese literary models and harnessed to promote enlightenment and civilization.⁶⁹⁷ On the one hand,

⁶⁹¹ Ann Lee, “Yi Kwangsu and Korean Literature: The Novel *Mujŏng* (1917),” *Journal of Korean Studies*, vol. 8. (1992), p. 88.

⁶⁹² *Ibid.*

⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁴ Kim Hyungsu, *Understanding Korean Literature*, trans. Robert J. Foster (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 116-117.

⁶⁹⁵ Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood* (1906), trans. by W.E. Skillend in Chung Chong-wha, ed., *Korean Classical Literature: An Anthology*, (London: Paul International Ltd., 1989), pp. 156-221. Translated from the original version: Yi Injik, *Hyŏl ũi nu*, *Mansebo* (22 July-10 October, 1906).

⁶⁹⁶ The ‘sin’ has been discussed by various literary scholars—see for example Ann Lee’s recounting of the new novel and the reference lit she mentions in her introduction to *Mujŏng*, but she doesn’t talk about the term *sosŏl*. I don’t know if *sosŏl* which is also a Chinese character compound was used in premodern Korea and just underwent a transformation in meaning with the addition of *sin* in *sinsosŏl* or if *sosŏl* like *minjok* is one of these new late 19th century neologistic Chinese character compounds that was coming into Korea from Japan and China.

⁶⁹⁷ See for example, Cho Dong-il, *Korean Literature in Cultural Context and Comparative Perspective*, (Korean Studies Series No. 1) (Seoul: Jipmoondang Publishing Company, 1997); and Kim Hyungsu, *Understanding Korean Literature*, trans. Robert J. Foster (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 116-117.

emerging through and with the technology of the modern newspaper as newspaper serials, the ‘new novel’ shared the conceptual motivations and goals of the new modern nationalist newspapers and used to attract readers for the newspaper it primarily “dealt with topics that were of interest at the time, such as modernization, national strength, educational reform, and changes in social customs.”⁶⁹⁸ It was also conceptually organized like the newspaper whereby “unlike the classic novel, which was built around the life of one main character, the new novel was centered on the development and resolution of a particular problem,” most of which “were closely related to social and political problems of the time.”⁶⁹⁹ Moreover, as Korean literary historian Kim Hyunggyu observes:

The flow of time in the classical novel was strictly chronological, whereas in the new novel, time was given a more open interpretation. Retrospection was used to transport readers into the past. The new novel also used vernacular speech and portrayed events more realistically, changes that allowed the form to better reflect the real-life experience of contemporary readers.⁷⁰⁰

At the same time, “despite these innovations,” Kim adds,

The new novel was deeply rooted in the traditions of the classical novel. The traditional dichotomy between good and bad is clearly in the stance of the new novel: modern equals good; traditional equals bad. The new novel also relied on coincidence to move the plot along, and the crisis-salvation-victory plot of the heroic genre of the classical novel was incorporated into many new novels. In response to the pressures of a new era, the new novel drew on outside literary traditions to create a new form of literature while preserving many of the traditions of the classical novel.⁷⁰¹

In a more detailed interpretation, but encompassing the same general view of an inherent dichotomy that appears to characterize the ‘transitional’ nature of the ‘new novel,’ Cho Dong-il⁷⁰² argues that the ‘new novel’ like its oral Korean counterpart the *p’ansori* tales also evolving at this time from the traditional Korean oral literary tradition, presented an inconsistency between its “outer and inner themes.”⁷⁰³ In the case of *p’ansori* tales, Cho argues that:

Although Ch’unhyang-jŏn (*Tale of Ch’unhyang*) presents as an outer theme praise for the heroine, the inner theme is the rejection of the class-based

⁶⁹⁸ Kim Hyungsu, *Understanding Korean Literature*, p. 115.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 117. As I mentioned earlier, the neologistic Chinese character compound *sinmun* can be broken down into *sin* referring to “new, novel, or up to date” and *mun* based on the character for a ‘question’ or a ‘problem.’

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid. In my reading of *Tears of Blood*, I disagree with Kim on the supposed black and white dichotomy of good modern vs. bad tradition in the new novel—or at least *Tears of Blood*. I read a much more nuanced haunted presentation of modernity and tradition, Japan and Korea—and which develops into a more nuanced form in Yi Kwangsu’s *Mujŏng* from 1917.

⁷⁰² Cho Dong-il is famous in Korean literature as the first literary scholar to break from the formalist narrative of literary analysis in his writing of a modern social-structuralist history/survey of classical Korean literature. We might see him as a Korean equivalent of Perry Anderson.

⁷⁰³ Cho Dong-il, *Korean Literature in Cultural Context and Comparative Perspective*, (Korean Studies Series No. 1) (Seoul: Jipmoondang Publishing Company, 1997), p. 111.

restrictions applied to Ch'unhyang as a *kisaeng* female entertainer and the establishment of human relations on equal terms...If we look at the outer themes, then the p'ansori tales show us medieval values. But in their inner themes they approach modern realism...But between the outer themes, presented in terms of a concern with moral obligation, and the inner themes, which materialize from the essential meaning of the character's temperament and actions, the inner themes have naturally become the more persuasive.⁷⁰⁴

However, the "outer and inner themes" in the case of the 'new novel,' are positioned "opposite in direction from those of the *p'ansori* tales."⁷⁰⁵

Although either the narrator emerging directly or characters speaking on behalf of narrators propagate enlightenment thought, break tradition, reform customs, and assert the necessity of accepting a new type of education, the outlook that actually materializes in terms of the protagonist's temperament or the unfolding of events is conservative, short of autonomy, and bound by fatalism.⁷⁰⁶

Presenting an example, Cho continues:

Take Yi-Injik's *Ch'iak-san* (*Ch'iak-san Mountain*). At the same time that his wife's life is endangered by her stepmother's ill treatment the protagonist foes abroad to study in order to gain enlightenment. Even after he returns, he remains passive in the face of her misfortune. The author tried to draw our interest by reviving in exaggerated form the old tradition in the pre-modern novel of helplessness in the face of a step-mother's wrongdoing. To this he adds advocacy of enlightenment.⁷⁰⁷

But according to Cho, this dichotomous reading of a superficial 'modern' outer theme of enlightenment "contravening" the "conservative" and traditionalist inner theme of "fatalism" and "helplessness" does not characterize all "transitional" forms of literature arising from the contact with the Western modernity, imperialism and literature. For example, in the more properly nationalist literature of the period, Cho sees a different kind of blending:

The literature of the righteous armies in combat accentuated through the medium of classical Chinese verse a strong advocacy of opposition to the Japanese. The literature of the movement for awakening patriotism made good use of biographies of nationalist heroes. *Kasa*⁷⁰⁸ were held important in both of these areas. It was in such areas, we would have to say, that there appeared, in the extant form of medieval literature, modern nationalistic

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 110-111.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 112.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁸ *Kasa* is a song-like poem that was incorporated into premodern/ medieval Korean literature borrowing from the forms and methods of songs created in oral literature. The *kasa* is featured in Yi Injik's *Tears of Blood*.

thought, and because of this, it was not yet possible in these areas to do away with the transitional literature.⁷⁰⁹

In contrast, to return to the ‘transitional’ character of the ‘new novel’:

The group who advocated the more important task of achieving enlightenment than developing the struggle to recover nation created the new novel and new poetry. But they could not across [sic] the boundaries of the transitional literature and enter the realm of modern literature. *Because it overaccommodated itself to external influences*, this new literature did not mature as a result of domestic changes, but rather was harmed by those changes... In their outer themes the works embodied debate as to what should be done about crisis in the nation’s history and *they advocated autonomy*. This point has become the ultimate subject of discussion of affirmative appraisals of the new novel. But the plot in which the protagonist who is saved from the brink of death through the charity of an enlightened nation, and then reborn as an enlightened being would *lead us to understand the inner theme to be the desirability of foreign encroachments for the sake of enlightenment*. The *outer themes are the words of those other than the author, but the inner themes are the naked expression of the author’s outlook*. Because of this, we cannot evaluate the new novel as a modern novel. Rather, the new novel clearly carries with it characteristics that compel us to describe it as *reactionary literature* in which no progressive meaning may be recognized.⁷¹⁰

First, we see in Cho’s critique, a distinction between various types of the ‘new novels’ arising in this ‘transitional’ period, those of the combat narratives of “righteous armies” and of “awakening patriotism” via “nationalist biographies” vs. those like Yi-Injik’s *Ch’iak-san* which advocated enlightenment and which Cho singularly designates as ‘new novel’ and ‘new poetry.’ Second, the difference between these two types has to do with an opposition that Cho creates between nationalism vs. enlightenment, such as seen in his description of the ‘new novel’ as having “advocated the more important task of enlightenment than developing the struggle to recover nation.”⁷¹¹ And third, this opposition between advocacy of nationalism vs. enlightenment has to do with the new novel’s “overaccomoda[tion]...to external influences” which according to Cho “would lead us to understand the inner theme” not only as the “*naked expression of the author’s outlook*” but also this “*naked expression*” to mean “*the desirability of foreign encroachments for the sake of enlightenment*” and thus characteristic of a “*reactionary literature*.”⁷¹² While Cho’s critique may be useful in pointing to the dangers of the nationalist modern reformers’ embrace of ‘civilization and enlightenment’ in the broader discourse of modern Korean nationalism in what we have seen as described as its “double bind”⁷¹³ or “double nature”⁷¹⁴—arising from the intense

⁷⁰⁹ Cho, p. 109.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 113-114. Italics mine

⁷¹¹ Ibid.

⁷¹² Ibid.

⁷¹³ See Michael Robinson’s discussion of the iconoclasm of modern Korean nationalist discourse in “Nationalism and the Korean Tradition, 1896-1920: Iconoclasm, Reform, and National Identity,” *Korean Studies* vol. 10 (1986), p. 50.

iconoclasm involved in their modernization discourse as well as its similarity to the civilizing discourse of colonial Japan, however put to distinct and opposed political uses—Cho’s oppositional and dichotomous framing of these two types of new fictions as pro-nationalism vs. pro-foreignism or even pro-imperialism runs counter to the very co-habitation and co-mingling of the *desire for national autonomy* and the *desire for modernization/or ‘enlightenment and civilization’* that grew out of Korea’s hostile and uneven encounter with the new international capitalist system and Western and Japanese imperialist transgressions—and the appropriation of Western and other external influences for anticolonial nationalism—which can be seen in both the discourse of modern Korean nationalism as well as the dialectical function or usage of both imperial/nationalist railroads and the imperial/nationalist newspapers. To refer back to Chapter Two, there is a remarkable resemblance between the (cultural-national) purity that Cho ascribes to a proper nationalist literary expression and the (cultural-Western) purity, which Perry Anderson ascribes to a proper revolutionary Modernism. And also in conversation with Chapter One, the (political) purity that Benedict Anderson ascribes to a proper revolutionary anticolonial nationalism.

In contradistinction, I argue that like the ‘modern’ railroad journeys and ‘modern’ newspapers in which the novels were first serialized, the “transitional” character of the ‘new novel’ entailed both the transformation of the concept and form of the traditional Korean novel and premodern literary motifs as well as those of the Western novel (as mediated through modern Japanese and Chinese novels)—articulated through the aesthetic and political ‘translations’ or ‘transculturations’⁷¹⁵ stemming from the contradictory experience, understanding and condition of modernization/modernity in Korea—into the hybrid *paradoxical modernism* of the ‘modern’ ‘new novel,’ which to quote Marshall Berman could be seen as “the visions and ideas that aim to make men and women the subjects as well as objects of modernization, to give them the power to change the world that is changing them, to make their way through the maelstrom and make it their own.”⁷¹⁶ This approach departs from Cho’s problematic of the inconsistency of inner and outer themes, which relies on a conceptual Manichaeism in his analytic grounded on an either/or logic: the novel and novelist *either* advocates nationalism *or* enlightenment and civilization but not both. Instead, as I focus on the paradoxical doublings apparent in the novel between modernity and tradition as well as Japanese and Korean, I point to the complexity of the both/and: both *enlightenment/modernization* and *nationalism* which implies a different political reading of the text. The political implications stemming from this approach is not without the potential dangers of the double-bind or double-nature of this linkage in the Korean pre-colonial context, but it highlights this danger as potentially always haunting these necessary and activist national appropriations rather than dismissing this linkage/doubling outright by vilifying and rejecting these novels as not properly nationalist or anti-nationalist or hiding it away in some dark shameful corner of nationalist history.

Here we need to point to two key elements of these modern Korean ‘translations.’ First, as Karen Lauren Thorber argues in *Empire of Texts in Motion: Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese Transculturations*, “[from the late nineteenth century to] well into the 1910’s, Japanese political and allegorical novels served as springboards for Chinese and Koreans to further their own

⁷¹⁴ See Andre Schmid’s discussion of the mirroring of Korean anti-colonial nationalist embrace of civilization and the Japanese embrace of civilization as colonizing discourse in *Korean Between Empires*, p.131.

⁷¹⁵ This is Karen Lauren Thorber’s term, which I elaborate on below.

⁷¹⁶ Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air*, p. 16.

political agendas and to differentiate circumstances in Japan from those elsewhere in East Asia.”⁷¹⁷ Moreover, Thorber sees Yi Injik’s *Tears of Blood* as an example of how Korean and Chinese writers “also intertextualized Japanese non-fiction and translations of texts deeply engaged with political concerns.”⁷¹⁸ According to Thorber:

Ken’yusha (The Society of Friends of the Inkstone) leader Yamada Bimyo’s (1868-1919) translation of the Philippine writer and revolutionary José Rizal’s [*Noli Me Tangere*] *Touch Me Not* (1887) as *Chi no namida* (Tears of Blood, 1903) a title inspired by the Japanese writer Murai Gensai’s (1863-1927) own *Chi no namida* (Tears of Blood, 1896), prompted the creation of texts by this title by Chinese and Korean writers. In 1903, the *Hubei xuesheng jie* (Hubei Students World), a nationalistic Chinese student journal in Tokyo, carried a text entitled *Xieleihen* (Traces of Bloody Tears). Ironically, the protagonist of *Traces of Bloody Tears* becomes engrossed in *Revenge of the Red and Black Peoples*, a book depicting the plight of oppressed races written by a Filipino (perhaps José Rizal) who is studying at the University in Spain. Whereas the anonymous Chinese author of *Traces of Bloody Tears* broadens the focus of Rizal’s novel by including the history of oppression in Africa and the Americas, the Korean writer, Yi Injik turns the lens closer to home in *Hyŏl ūi nu* (Tears of Blood, 1906). This novel features a Korean family torn apart by the Sino-Japanese War and is less critical of Chinese and Japanese treatment of Korea than of Korean apathy; the oppressed, the narrator implies, are not necessarily helpless victims. Although very different texts, both the Chinese and Korean versions of *Tears of Blood* stoutly confront their Filipino and especially Japanese predecessors, highlighting the hardships facing Japan’s East Asian neighbors.⁷¹⁹

Thus much like the imperial railroads and the *Chosen shinpo*, the first Japanese newspaper in Korea, which presented not only an oppressive and exploitative force upon Korea but also became the very vehicles for nationalist journeys and both the state and popular nationalist presses, modern Japanese literature and Japanese translations such as that of Filipino revolutionary and nationalist writer José Rizal likewise served as “springboards” for Yi Injik as well as Chinese nationalist writers to also, as Thorber argues, “further their [nationalist] political agendas.”⁷²⁰ Thus contra- Cho, we could argue that external influences or models were not

⁷¹⁷ Karen Lauren Thorber, *Empire of Texts in Motion: Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese Transculturations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), p. 239.

⁷¹⁸ Ibid.

⁷¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 239-240.

⁷²⁰ Ibid. Yi Injik was studying in Tokyo in 1903 when the Japanese translation of *Noli Me Tangere* was translated into Japanese as ‘Tears of Blood.’ It might be interesting to examine these two texts more closely with that of the Japanese translation to see if there are more connections beyond the nationalist revolutionary ethos and political appropriation that Thorber suggests. For example, while the narratives are quite different I wonder if melodrama is shared in Rizal’s novel. Melodrama is rather pronounced in Yi’s work which no doubt has to do with his interest and work on developing modern Korean dramaturgy as well as developing the ‘new novel.’ While Korean literary scholars tend to criticize and look down upon the novel as “relying on coincidences to move the plot along” as a mark of lacking sophistication in the new novel, I think can be seen instead more an aesthetic technique—for these coincidences are a key mark of melodrama which dramatizes the mundane or what Peter Brooks in *The Melodramatic Imagination* has called the “drama of the ordinary.” Brooks also associates this both literary and

merely corruptive and deformative influences upon native literary or nationalist development or simply imported and applied without significant historical and material mediations of the context of the site of appropriation—which applies to both material technologies as for conceptual or intellectual knowledge—but their uses and meanings were altered through what both Gaonkar and Carter Eckert have both called ‘creative adaptations’ (Gaonkar referring to postcolonial modern encounters between the non-Western and Western societies and cultures [see Chapter Two]; and Eckert referring to premodern encounters between Koreans and Sino-centered civilization and culture [see Chapter One]) in specific cultural-political sites or locations. In the hybrid *mélange* of old and new, Korean, Japanese, Filipino, and Chinese influences that may have shaped the work, I see no room for what Cho refers to as the “naked expression of the author’s outlook” in the novel.⁷²¹ The story is full of doublings, where the old haunts the new as much as the new haunts the old, the Japanese the Korean, as the Korean, the Japanese. Mirroring the Korean ‘modern’ experience as much as the paradoxical technologies of the railroad, the newspaper, and migrations as we have seen, the novel’s main protagonist Ongnyŏn’s growth and enlightenment is also figured in the novel through the paradoxical processes of colonial ‘modernization’ and Korean ‘modernist’ nationalism.

Second, as Suh earlier pointed to the new fictions’ departure from the aesthetic model or standard of “individuality” or “creativity” owing to their context of production, we might add here then ‘didacticism’ as a guiding categorical imperative for the “creativity” of the ‘new novel.’ Didacticism, which both constituted a genre as well as underwrote the role of literature in Confucian culture, was also as we have seen a central function of modern newspapers in Korea—as it also became a salient part of these ‘new novels.’⁷²² This element of didacticism is best apparent in the new genres, which relate to the cultivation of national historical consciousness as well as dissemination of such national histories, by which the new novels took shape. Relating closely to what we have seen as to the form and the message of the modern nationalist newspapers in which the ‘new novels’ were serialized, Ann Lee identifies four typical genres of these new fictions of the 1905-1910 period as the novel of domestic intrigue, *t’oron sosŏl* or fiction of “debate,” historical fiction (including “vernacular adaptations of foreign histories or biographies considered relevant to the crisis of Korean national independence”), and the national reform/resistance novel (“that depicted aspects of the Korean nationalist movement before annexation”),⁷²³ Yi’s *Tears of blood* captures elements of all four genres to different degrees, which can be seen in the ways in which the novel transformed traditional plot lines of classical or medieval novels as it combined these and perhaps other ‘modern’ models with the experiences and exigencies of Korea’s particular historical and social experiences of

theatrical form with the tumultuous post-revolutionary environment of France, which was not unlike the post-Sacred social and political environment following the Sino-Japanese War and the passing of Chinese civilization as a universal cultural political and cosmological paradigm, in which modern reformists intellectuals in Korea tried to make sense of the changes in this post-Sacred world as well as chart new meanings and myths in the dramatizations of these changes. (Peter Brooks, *The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess* (New Haven: Yale, 1976) Moreover, this melodramatic imagination could be seen as particularly relevant to Yi Injik, who returned to Japan later to study ‘shinpa’ dramaturgy, a melodramatic theater genre, and which was formative in the development of Korean cinema in the postwar period.

⁷²¹ Cho, p. 114.

⁷²² Cho for example lists didacticism alongside lyric and narrative literature in reference to the prevailing genres of premodern Korean literature as well as that of China, Japan and Vietnam. Cho, p. 19; Cho Dong-il, *Han’guk Munhak-ŭi Kallae Iron* (Theory of Sub-divisions of Korean Literary Genres) (Seoul: Jipmoondang, 1992).

⁷²³ Ann Lee, “Yi Kwangsu and Korean Literature: The Novel *Mujŏng* (1917),” *Journal of Korean Studies*, vol. 8. (1992), p. 84.

modernization qua imperial aggressions and national reform and resistance—such as the age-old separation or lovers transformed into a separation of family/nation and transnational migration—or creation of unprecedented characters—Ongnyŏn figured as a radical ‘new woman’ and national reformer, the likes of which would have appeared both fantastic and provocative for many Korean readers of the period. Thus resembling the depiction of the “journey of the heroine from the limits of the ‘inner room’” foregrounded in novels of domestic intrigue, radical new enlightenment concepts of gender and modern education, such as the education of women, reform of traditional marriage customs, and free/romantic love also feature prominently in *Tears of Blood*. The development of Ongnyŏn, the main protagonist into a “new woman” is principally figured through her extensive education in the new learning and her modern engagement to Ku Wansŏ, a fellow expatriate student in America—both of which parallel the trajectory of her physical journey beyond Korea to the modern metropolitan center of the U.S. by way of Osaka Japan—and is reinforced by the contrast provided by the depiction of her mother as traditional, uneducated and homebound (but who also importantly provides the moral or virtue of maternal love significant to her development). Novels of historical fiction on the other hand provided models of nationalism adapted from foreign histories and biographies, such as “The Biography of [Italian nationalist and republican revolutionary Giuseppe] Mazzini” (1905), serialized anonymously in the *Taeil maeil sinbo* (in *hangŭl*), or the translation of the Chinese nationalist Liang Qi-chao’s *History of the Fall of Vietnam* (1907), while debate novels presented dialogic texts with fictionalized debates about current political events.⁷²⁴ These elements can also be seen in the historical realism of the Yi’s novel’s setting (the Sino-Japanese War), and the inclusion of historical personalities such as the associate of Kang Yu-wei of the Chinese Reform Party,⁷²⁵ who assists Ongnyŏn and Ku Wansŏ in San Francisco, as well the social and political dialogues between various characters—such as the those between the Ongnyŏn’s *yangban* grandfather and his servant (on issues of class and status distinctions) or between Ongnyŏn and Ku Wansŏ (on national reform)—littered throughout the text. But ultimately while Yi’s novel touches on aspects of these other genres, as Ann Lee designates, *Tears of Blood* falls squarely into the perhaps most explicit national reform/resistance genre or the “literature of reform and dissent,” which “unlike allegorical works...portrayed more or less contemporary characters in Korea, Japan, Manchuria, and even the United States during the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, and the period of Japanese ‘protectorate’ rule in Korea (1905-1910).”⁷²⁶ Novels of this genre could be seen to have fictionalized nationalism rather than nationalize fictions—where by the creativity followed from the way they retold or recast historical realities and experiences into fictional narratives. Such novels included *The Pine Harp* (1908) which “invoke[d] self reliance” and “dealt with the effects of the Russo-Japanese War on Korea, the early immigration to

⁷²⁴ Ibid., p. 85-6.

⁷²⁵ Kang Yu-wei (1858 – 1927) was a prominent Chinese Confucian scholar, political thinker, and reformer of the late Qing Dynasty. He was also the teacher of Liang Qichao (1873-1929), whose writings on western political and social thought, and especially those on Social Darwinism were of significant influence to Korean enlightenment thinkers and reformers. The writings of both Kang-Yuwei and Liang Quichao were widely circulated among the Korean intelligentsia through Korean students and intellectuals studying and residing in Japan and China as well as through early Korean newspapers, typically run by such intellectuals returning to Korea from abroad. In general, much of the new western learning that was at the center of the Korean enlightenment movement appeared in Korea through Chinese and Japanese translations. The novel’s use of the historical setting of the Sino-Japanese War and the mention of Kang Yu-wei are the two main key regionalist elements the author uses in creating a historically realist setting for the novel.

⁷²⁶ Ann Lee, “Yi Kwangsu and Korean Literature: The Novel *Mujŏng* (1917),” p. 87.

Hawaii, the issue of feminist social reform in Korea, the need for political reform, and nationalist efforts to strengthen Korea through economic development,” *An Empassioned Life* (1906) which portrayed the “enlightenment movement among Christian-influenced nationalists in the northern province of P’yŏngan,” or *Little Diamond Mountain* (1910), which “depicted the armed rebellion in Kangwŏn province, and the Korean overseas independence movement in China, in western Jin-dao” written anonymously “under the pseudonym of Pinghŏja (One who leans on the void).”⁷²⁷ Lee observes that novels corresponding to all four of these genres generally “assumed a contemporary setting,” “explored the theme of temporary exodus to countries like Japan, China, and the United States,” and turned women into “representations of the national struggle for liberation.”⁷²⁸

Like these reform/resistance novels, as well as we could add Rizal’s *Noli Me Tangere* whose Japanese translation Yi’s title references, *Tears of Blood* also historicizes its setting in the historically momentous and relatively contemporaneous past of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, roughly ten years prior to the writing of the novel from July through October, 1906. It also depicts, like many of these novels reform/resistance novels, “the theme of temporary exodus” and the use of women as “representations of the national struggle for liberation” in depicting the transnational journey/migration of Korean students from Korea to Japan and the U.S. in the fictionalized (short) bildungsroman-like developmental narrative of the growth and transformation of the main character Ongnyŏn from a seven-year old victim of the war into a ‘new woman’ and a radical national reformer. In the context of post-Protectorate, pre-Annexation Korea of 1906 when Yi’s *Tears of Blood* is written, much like the popular nationalist presses (in which this was printed), new political organizations, the proliferation of new schools, nationalist manifestos, and revisionist national histories, Yi’s new novel presented the same goal and related technology of national independence—which occurred (in the space of the novel) through the author’s and characters’ appropriation of historical forces, modern technologies of transportation and migrations, and modern education for national modernization and was figured through the story’s ultimate destination which was both the family’s reunion and the return to the nation from a long developmental educational journey abroad. It may not be the most innovative but it is articulated with the very realism and ‘modernism’ of the contradictory experience of Korean national modernists at this time.

Kim Kwani’s Awakening

The loss of sovereignty and the national outrage, various forms of resistance, and patriotic manifestos that erupted in the aftermath of the Japanese Protectorate in 1905, presents something like a ‘primal scene’⁷²⁹ of Korean nationalism that helps illuminate some of the key

⁷²⁷ Ibid., pp. 89, 91, 94.

⁷²⁸ Ibid., pp. 95-6.

⁷²⁹ Here I am thinking of Marshall Berman’s adaptation of Freud’s concept in his discussion of the modernism of Baudelaire. Berman’s use of ‘primal scenes’ which I borrow here thus indicates: “experiences that arise from the concrete everyday life of Bonaparte’s and Haussmann’s Paris but carry a mythic resonance and depth that propel them beyond their place and time and transform them into archetypes of modern life.” (Berman, p. 148.) I locate the primal scene of Korean modernity to the site of the loss of sovereignty because it is this experience that most forcefully shapes Koreans’ encounter with modernity and provides the context for the first experiments with Western modern ideas, forms and institutions, whether cultural or political, laying the ground for the development of modern life in Korea. In the way that Berman sees modernisms in the West, from Marx to Baudelaire as creative responses as well as challenges to the creative yet destructive processes of social-political and economic

characteristics of modern Korean nationalism, its neurosis and fixations, and its significance for the experience of modernity shaping enduring modern-national archetypes.⁷³⁰ In *Tears of Blood*, Yi Injik reconstructs this ‘primal scene’ of sovereign loss staged as a family torn apart on the war ravaged hills of P’yŏngyang during the Sino-Japanese of 1894-5 as the opening scene of the novel. While the use of the Sino-Japanese War, fought on Korean territory, including P’yŏngyang gives the novel a certain sense of historical realism, it also captures the abruptness and dislocating character of Korea’s traumatic encounter with modernity and doubles as a scene of mourning and betrayal characteristic of post-1905 Protectorate Korea in which it was written. Reminiscent of the lamentations for the loss of sovereignty in 1905 and the subsequent injunctions for the nation to arise and awaken to the nation’s plight, the war torn hillside of P’yŏngyang sets up the first scene of national awakening in the novel.

Sitting alone in his empty house, separated from his wife and daughter from the ensuing war, Kim Kwanil reflects on the scene of death and havoc along the hillside of Peony Peak earlier that day. Amidst the corpses of (foreign) soldiers fallen in the course of duty to their country he recalls with particular horror and despair the innocent “children who had been trampled to death and the refugee women...tripping and falling over them.”⁷³¹ As Kim imagines a similar fate for his wife and daughter, these women and children become transformed into metaphors of an innocent however unfortunate and feeble Korean nation that has fallen victim not only the selfishness and corruption of its leaders, but has also suffered the treachery and “impudence” of foreign nations (China and Japan) that has used the nation’s territory as its battleground:

...were they unlucky to be Koreans? Did they have the misfortune to be the common people of P’yŏngyang? The land is Korea and the people are Koreans. Are we Koreans suffering such distress in others’ wars, as a whale’s back might be injured in a battle between prawns?

‘We should not fail to listen to the rapids. Is it not P’yŏngyang people’s voice of lamentation and sorrow? The innocent who are punished are Koreans. The innocent who could not save their lives are Koreans too. Was this heaven’s doing or man’s doing? Human affairs are most likely to be man’s doing. Our people want to think only of themselves. Whether others fail or succeed, they seek to satisfy their own desires. Whether their country goes to ruin or prospers, the only thing they want is to get on in the world and grow fat themselves...I feel sorry for our people, who cannot enjoy freely what they have earned with their own hands and have mortgaged to others the lives which they were given. Now, on top of all this, other people have come from their countries and fought and raged here madly. By their impudence

modernization—I believe that in the Korean context, modern nationalism can be seen to have taken the role of ‘modernism’ in the face of ‘modernization’ that appeared in the guise of imperialist encroachments and colonialism.

⁷³⁰ I will tentatively identify these as love-loss-betrayal (the loss of a loved one figured through some mode of betrayal or love and loss suspended through some form of betrayal).

⁷³¹ Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood* (1906), trans. by W.E. Skillend in Chung Chong-wha, ed., *Korean Classical Literature: An Anthology*, (London: Paul International Ltd., 1989), p. 166 (Episode 6).

we are ruined. All these people have died simply because our country is not strong.⁷³²

Resembling both the Tonghak rebellion manifestos of 1894—which had inadvertently led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War—with its dualistic social egalitarian goal seeking to abolish the corrupt parasitic Korean *yangban* clans and its anti-foreign nationalist sentiment seeking to expel foreigners from Korea, as well as the lamentations over the 1905 Protectorate emerging from both Confucian literati and modern reformers bemoaning the death of Korea and the reduction of Koreans to “slaves of foreigners” arising from the treachery of the Protectorate—the traumatic experience of the war and the loss of his wife and child brings Kim Kwanil to similar conclusions, and more importantly moves him from despair to a conviction to act:

‘The most important thing is to see that the living do not have to face such things again. It is up to us to pull ourselves together. Our country must become bright and strong like other people’s countries, so that we, its people, may preserve life and property. We must not allow those vampires, the living Devils and living Demons, to get into the Governors’ offices in every province and all the other local offices. We must see that foreigners do not even think of coming to our country like tigers and bears and having the impudence to fight here. Only then will men be human. Only then will life be worth living... ‘What a terrible night this has been! The people of P’yöngyang are gone and may be dead. The vampire of a Devil is shut up in some corner. And what happened to my wife and child? Everyone knew how happy my wife and I were together, and our love for Ongnyön was quite exceptional. However, a man with ambitions cannot accomplish great things for his country if he wasted his efforts thinking only of his wife and child. I will set off at once, tour the whole world seeing other people’s countries, and get some real education. Then I shall be able to work for my country.’ He waited until it got light, and then left P’yöngyang for other lands ten leagues away.⁷³³

Setting aside the didacticism of the text, a holdover from classical Korean literature, this is still a strange passage. How oddly Kim Kwanil moves from the loss of his wife and child to a lamentation over the weakness of the country to his departure on an educational world tour, would only appear familiar to early modern Koreans and a Korean reading public who had by then encountered numerous such scenarios in the nationalist press as was experienced by many of those who were writing it—whereby both the nation’s weakness and suffering of as well as the fate of the nation’s survival had become inextricably linked with the adoption a new ‘modern’ knowledge and learning located far beyond Korean territory. Kim Kwanil presents one archetype of the typical modern nationalist reformer we are likely to encounter on the Korean newspaper page, penning the editorials urging Koreans to embrace ‘civilization and enlightenment,’ here fictionalized with a dramatic awakening. As he connects the calamity of foreign encroachments and national humiliation with the backwardness of the nation he is stirred

⁷³² Ibid., pp. 166-7 (episode 6).

⁷³³ Ibid., p. 167 (episode 6).

to become a new human being. And insofar as models of civilization resided outside of the nation, foremost in the West, this structures Kim Kwanil's 'national/ist' journey.

This scene of course resembles that of another of Yi's novels *Ch'iak-san* (Ch'iak-san Mountain), which Cho Dong-il earlier described thus: "At the same time that his wife's life is endangered by her stepmother's ill treatment the protagonist goes abroad to study in order to gain enlightenment. Even after he returns, he remains passive in the face of her misfortune. The author tried to draw our interest by reviving in exaggerated form the old tradition in the pre-modern novel of helplessness in the face of a stepmother's wrongdoing. To this he adds advocacy of enlightenment."⁷³⁴ I agree with Cho in pointing to the strangeness or roughness of the mix of tragedy and international departure, and perhaps the troubling ethical implications of this move. However, I see Kim Kwanil's awakening-qua-cosmopolitan departure, on the one hand, to logically follow from his previous assessment of the selfishness and greed of Korean officials and the impudence of boorish but stronger nations that brought about the death and calamity of the war and his imagining of the death of his wife and child, which precedes his departure, judged in terms of the internal coherence of the text—as well as formally in accordance with the heavy didacticism of the novel (visible in the tone and content of the novel throughout) which attempts to present a 'model' for national enlightenment and new learning as much as and perhaps even more importantly than to present an interesting story. Thus his departure to "get some real education" is presented as a form of selflessness—in putting the future survival of the nation above the more particularistic interests of continuing to look for his wife and child for whom he emphatically reveals his "love...was exceptional."⁷³⁵ More importantly, Yi here also seems to be using the premodern trope of "helplessness" in the face of "wrongdoing" as a scene that rises Kim Kwanil to action, but there is nothing passive about its effect on Kim Kwanil—rather it instigates him to be able to see and act on behalf of and for a larger physical and spiritual collective—the nation—from his experience of the loss of the particular—his wife and child, which also strips him of particular attachments. Moreover, Kim Kwanil is a peripheral character, whose awakening, which is both timely and most direct, sets up the tone of the novel, and whom we will only encounter again near the end of the novel in Washington, U.S. with the reunion with his daughter Ongnyŏn, our main protagonist as part of her more epic journey of awakening. Thus beginning with the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 which stages the separation of this P'yŏngyang family—Kim Kwanil, his wife Ch'unae and their seven-year old daughter Ongnyŏn (all of whom are alive unbeknownst to one another yet separated), the novel takes place over a span of about seven or eight years leading us to their eventual reunion in 1902.

Ongnyŏn's Journey/Awakening

While Kim Kwanil's awakening is certainly the most direct and most obviously didactic, for his daughter Ongnyŏn, our main protagonist, her journey to national awakening becomes both a gradual and developmental process and a physical international journey, which forms the main storyline of the novel and in which her growth and educational development comes to double as national awakening qua reunion with her family and homeland. For Ongnyŏn, her journey is likewise sparked by the trauma of war, loss and separation, but her physical wounding by a stray Japanese bullet inaugurates the less direct and more paradoxical journey towards national awakening and enlightenment metaphorically encapsulating the contradiction of

⁷³⁴ Cho Dong-il, *Korean Literature in Cultural Context and Comparative Perspective*, p. 111.

⁷³⁵ Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood*, p. 167 (episode 6).

colonial modernization—in both the colonial aggression that effects her traumatic separation with her family and home—as well as nationalist modernization/appropriation that enables her modern education and enlightenment which charts a course from Korea through Japan to the U.S. that doubles as her reunion with family and presages the return to her nation as a “new” enlightened and nationalist human being. Thus as the colonial railroads transformed the space and landscape of the traditional Korean city by integrating it into the space of empire, while at the same time it facilitated a new transnational geography of Korean nationalism, the historical forces and ‘modern’ material technologies (such as railroads, steamships and newspapers) and people that traumatically dislocates Ongnyŏn and proceeds to distance her from the nation, also becomes the structuring condition—which aided by the solidarity of traveling compatriots and cosmopolitan allies—both transforms her into a modern woman and new human being thus facilitating her national awakening.

The Double-edged Japanese Bullet

As Japanese colonial railroads and the first Japanese paper became key structuring mechanisms for both national journeys and the nationalist press, Japanese imperial aggression in the form of the Sino-Japanese War and a Japanese bullet also become an initial paradoxical force for Ongnyŏn’s development in the novel. As Ongnyŏn becomes wounded and semi-orphaned by the stray Japanese bullet, she is at the same time rescued by Major Inoue, a Japanese medical officer, who offers to send her to school in Japan until her parents can be found. Ongnyŏn agrees and soon boards a military steamer, which transports her from the rural devastated landscape of P’yŏngyang to the new urban landscape of Osaka, Japan to live under the care of Inoue’s wife. Arriving in Osaka, the novel urbanity of the Japanese landscape is presented in stark contrast to the rural landscape of P’yŏngyang that she has left behind, while signaling the dynamism of the new modern civilization and learning upon which she has embarked on a new and distant shore. As Ongnyŏn marvels at the new landscape of her modern journey she imagines an animating force behind the strange new industrial elements, a great vitality, rivaling the very forces of nature:

Everything Ongnyŏn saw she was seeing for the first time. In the harbor the masts of the ship seemed to stand up like growing hemp. In the shopping streets buildings of two and three storeys seemed to tower up to the clouds. A train which was going along like a centipede belched puffs of smoke from its mouth. It made the whole world shake as it went along on its belly, and it raced along as fast as rain before the wind. Her head reeled with the noise of the wheels of the rickshaws going back and forth along the broad straight lines.⁷³⁶

Characteristic of the exceptional nature of this intelligent and radiant child, reflected in the Chinese compound meaning of her name—“jewel lotus”—Ongnyŏn quickly acclimates to Japan, masters Japanese and excels in her studies at the Common Elementary School. Just after a few years in Japan Ongnyŏn graduates at the top of her class. She constantly garners praise from Japanese neighbors and teachers who are often surprised to find out that she is not a “Japanese girl.”⁷³⁷

⁷³⁶ Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood*, p. 184 (episode 21).

⁷³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 187 (Episode 23).

However, this Japanese phase of her journey however formative is an intermediary one, for larger historical forces bring about an important narrative/plot twist. As news of Major Inoue's death in the war reaches Osaka, the fondness Mrs. Inoue has shown for Ongnyŏn quickly transforms into resentment and a burden whereby she begins to mistreat Ongnyŏn and resolves to abandon her so that she may take up the 'modern' custom of remarrying—which as the narrator tells us, unlike Korean customs where “it is regarded as the finest thing for a young widow not to remarry, and her life is nothing but care...there is no such evil custom—moral crime, one might call it—in civilized countries, there is no shame anywhere else in the world in a young widow marrying again. So Mrs. Inoue found a good man to marry.”⁷³⁸ Thus we are presented with another contradiction of the force of Japanese 'modernization' vis-à-vis Koreans evinced in the opposition of the good selfless Mr. Inoue who first rescued Ongnyŏn and the bad selfish yet 'modern' or 'civilized' Mrs. Inoue who now abandons her—reincarnating the traditional literary figure of the evil “stepmother's ill treatment”—now figured in the Japanese stepmother.⁷³⁹ As Yi works with the traditional trope of the heroine who suffers at the wrongdoing of her stepmother, Yi rewrites or adapts this trope with the conditions of Korea's present and Korea's fraught relationship with its modern neighbor whose imperial overtures significantly instigated the novel of national reform in the first place. If Mr. Inoue represented the benevolence or the potential promise of Japan in aiding Korea's modernization and independence—as many of the early enlightenment thinkers believed and reflected in the early attempts to transform Korea on the model of Meiji Japan best embodied in the Pan-asianist discourse that saw Japan as heading the modernization and mutual security of a united East Asian region—the figure of Mrs. Inoue—figured as the bad stepmother—appears to represent the betrayal and shock in the face of the 1905 imposition of the colonial Protectorate such as that expressed in Chang Chiyŏn's famous newspaper editorial chastising Ito Hirobumi's sudden transmogrification from national ally to national enemy. Thus Yi interrupts any simple suggestion of a 'good' qua 'modern' Japan vs. (and which that saves/rescues) a 'bad' qua 'traditional' Korea with the divided image of Japan in the conflicting representation of a good stepfather (Mr. Inoue) vs. bad Mrs. Inoue (stepmother). Moreover, this is further reinforced by the strange doubling between Mrs. Inoue presented as the 'modern' but evil stepmother vs. Ch'unae, Ongnyŏn's mother, presented as the 'traditional' but good/loving mother.

Good Mother vs. Bad Mother: or the Evil Japanese Stepmother

Throughout the novel, Ch'unae has largely served to provide a foil or contrast to the modern image of Ongnyŏn. The early scenes of the novel presenting Ch'unae's rather traumatic departure from the “inner room” as she wanders disheveled along Peony hills distraught and screaming for her daughter Ongnyŏn—almost getting raped by a strange man—and the lament she sings for her daughter in the traditional song/poetic form of *kasa* as she resigns to throw herself in the Taedong River is representative:

‘Moon, I would ask you a question, You see far and wide.

⁷³⁸ Ibid., p. 189 (Episode 25). If we recall, one of the demands of the Tonghak rebellion was the abolishment of the laws that prevented widows from remarrying. This reform measure was undertaken in the partially realized Kabo reforms (modeled after the Meiji restoration) during the Sino-Japanese War under a modern reformist pro-Japanese Korean cabinet.

⁷³⁹ I refer to Cho's comments/analysis of Yi's other novel discussed above. Cho Dong-il, *Korean Literature in Cultural Context and Comparative Perspective*, p. 111.

'I have no news of my husband.
 'And I do not know where Ongnyŏn has gone.
 'If they were in this world,
 'They would have tried to find their home
 ...
 'They have surely found lodgings with Death.
 ...
 'My fifteen years of married bliss.
 'My seven years of mother's love.
 'When they were I do not know
 'Now they are like a dream.
 'Is only for today.
 'The deep green waters,
 'That is where I shall go.'⁷⁴⁰

However, despite Ch'unae's 'traditional' image, her maternal love embodied and transmitted through its ghostly presence in a dream which dissuades Ongnyŏn from committing suicide (who likewise resolves to throw herself in the Osaka harbor) distraught over her abandonment, as well as presented through the spectral doubling of Ch'unae's past and Ongnyŏn's present vis-à-vis a cruel stepmother also interrupts the strict opposition of what may be seen as a bad 'traditional' woman figure of Ch'unae vs. the good 'modern' daughter with another level or register of connection between Ch'unae and Ongnyŏn that is more a parallel and positive or good haunting rather than an opposed one. As the narrator tells us that Ch'unae was also raised in the hands of a spiteful stepmother, the image we are presented of Ch'unae's stepmother presents a somewhat veiled reference point for Mrs. Inoue and her relationship with Ongnyŏn.

Recounted on occasion of Ch'unae's father's arrival in P'yŏngyang in search of his daughter and granddaughter upon hearing of the devastation of the war and meeting with Kim Kwanil his son-in-law before his departure abroad, we find out that when Ch'unae was seven years old—the same age as Ongnyŏn when she is separated from her parents and sent to live with her Japanese stepmother—her mother had died and was thereupon raised by her stepmother. While this stepmother “was praised for all the wifely virtues,” she had “one failing:”

and that was that she behaved cruelly towards Ch'unae, the child of the first wife. If there was anything the former wife had used, even a single dish, she called the shamaness and had it burned or smashed. Only when this was done were her feelings relieved. This was her nature. But one thing the stepmother could neither burn nor break was Ch'unae, the child of the former wife. Mr. Ch'oe loved his daughter like a jewel and cherished her like gold, but if he showed the slightest sign of love towards her when his second wife was looking, Ch'unae would be in trouble with her stepmother. So, although Mr. Ch'oe often wanted to praise his daughter, many a time when the stepmother was looking he adopted an attitude of scolding her cruelly.⁷⁴¹

⁷⁴⁰ Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood*, pp. 171-2 (episode 10).

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 175 (Episode 13).

This doubling of a young Ch'unae with young Ongnyŏn and Ch'unae's virtuous but jealous and cruel stepmother and Mrs. Inoue whose main virtue may be her modernity qua Japan—but who also turns to mistreating and ultimately abandoning Ongnyŏn—significantly highlights both the virtue of maternal love—standing in both as a universal ethical or moral concept as well as marked by Korean “tradition”—missing in Mrs. Inoue's relationship with Ongnyŏn and which further highlights Ch'unae's love for and devotion to Ongnyŏn. It is possible to see in Mrs. Inoue figured as the bad stepmother, considering the writing of *Tears of Blood* just after the Protectorate, as representative of the new colonial face of Japan—the transformation of a modern guiding (if wary) ally (embodied in the good Mr. Inoue) to an outright aggressor (incarnated in Mrs. Inoue as the evil Japanese stepmother)—which for all its ‘modern’ virtues is also flawed with a major fault which like the evil Japanese stepmother cruelly mistreats and betrays Korea.

Modern Railroads and the Encounter with Ku Wansŏ: From a ‘Japanese girl’ to a ‘modern’ ‘Korean girl’, From Osaka to San Francisco

At the same time, this betrayal/abandonment of the bad Japanese stepmother, like the double-edged Japanese bullet (or the Sino-Japanese war), advances the plot facilitating Ongnyŏn's move to the next, higher stage of her journey bringing her closer to both her enlightenment qua national awakening and at the same time to the geographical apex of modernity (as the betrayal/aggression of the Protectorate had done for modern reformist Korean exile students and political refugees at this time). Distraught, Ongnyŏn, now eleven, departs from Mrs. Inoue's house (after she is dissuaded from jumping into Osaka harbor the previous night from her dream) and unthinkingly boards a train to Ibaragi. On the train, Ongnyŏn encounters an eighteen-year-old compatriot Ku Wansŏ, who is in transit from Korea to study in the United States:

There were too many people in the third class coach, and Ongnyŏn could not find a seat and had to stand. From behind her she heard a young man grumbling to himself in Korean. ‘There's some girl standing in front of me.’ When Ongnyŏn looked around, she saw that he was seventeen or eighteen, with a face the colour of a peach ripened in the sun, a fine handsome nose, and eyes full of life. He was dressed in western clothes, but so badly that it must have been the first time he had worn them. When he saw Ongnyŏn turn around, he said to himself, again in Korean,

‘What a fine girl! She's clever, I'm sure. If you take our Korean girls, girls like her just idle away all their time, but here girls like her all go to school, I believe. I wonder what she is.’⁷⁴²

None of the people round about understood what he was saying but Ongnyŏn not only understood, but since this was the first time she had heard her native language spoken in all the years since she had come to Osaka, her happiness knew no bounds. She was only a girl, and too polite to speak first. Without addressing him, she too spoke to herself, but just loudly enough for the young man to hear. ‘I must find somewhere to sit. I can't stand all the way.’ The young man behind her was surprised to hear this. ‘Is she a Korean? I took her

⁷⁴² Ibid., p. 198 (this ends episode 32, and continues with episode 33).

for a Japanese, but she spoke Korean!’ He asked her without any further ado. ‘Are you a Korean, my girl?’ ‘Yes, I am.’⁷⁴³

While Ku Wansŏ initially mistakes Ongnyŏn for a ‘Japanese girl’ due to her ‘modern’ (westernized and Japanized) appearance as was the case among Japanese in Osaka, (and in this case we might say was also reinforced by her riding a train), her use of *the Korean language*—prompted by his initial Korean self-mutterings—breaks through the superficial appearance of ‘modernity’ that cannot distinguish Japanese from Korean and brings about a mutual recognition of their Koreanness. Moreover, at the same time that Ku then facilitates the transformation of Ongnyŏn from a pseudo-Japanese girl to not only a Korean girl but also a ‘modern’ Korean girl or ‘new woman’ by Ku’s recognition of her Koreanness as well as modernity, the encounter also comes to facilitate Ku’s journey of enlightenment to the U.S. As Ku follows Ongnyŏn off the train in Ibaragi, who while younger than he is has more experience living abroad, he appeals for her help:

‘You know, I’ve only got as far as here and you see how helpless I am. What am I going to find things like when I get to America? You’ve been abroad for a long time, and I’m sure you know your way about very well. So there’s a lot I can learn from you for a start. Now that we’ve met like this by chance so far from home, let’s not separate without at least telling each other what we’re doing.

‘I’m Ku Wansŏ. I wanted an education, so I left Korea to go to America without telling my parents. But I’ve got no further than this before I feel so helpless, and I don’t know what to do for the best.’

‘As he went on like this, Ongnyŏn felt as if it were not just any fellow-countryman she had met, but one of her family.

‘She told her story in every detail...

‘If that’s the way things are, let’s go over to America together. We can go to school, and if you get any news of your parents, I’ll let you go home before me.’

Ongnyŏn looked doubtful, so he went on.

‘Now don’t worry about school fees. Look, we are Koreans. What use are our lives if we don’t study and get away from barbarism? I believe you think that you were the only one affected by the Sino-Japanese War, but it affected every one of our people. People who say “Everything’s all right. Nothing happened to me. I didn’t see anything” are weevils. If everyone takes that attitude and lives without a thought for the rest of the world, in another few years time there’s going to be another war like the Sino-Japanese War in our country. You must start studying now, without wasting a day. Then it will be up to you to undertake the education of the women of our country and open the road to civilization.

‘When he said this, all the cares which had been crowding Ongnyŏn’s mind disappeared as if they had been swept away, and the two of them went straight to Yokohama and boarded a ship.’⁷⁴⁴

⁷⁴³ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 201-2 (episode 35).

Thus providing for the mutual recognition and reinforcement of national identity as well as mutual solidarity and assistance, their encounter on the train, which initially bringing together individual journeyers become transformed through their union into a mutual and national endeavor, perhaps resembling the image of Marx's proletarians both united in their political organization and struggle expedited through modern bourgeois railroads. This encounter between Ongnyŏn and Ku Wansŏ is moreover significant in the structure of the novel in that it is a fellow Korean compatriot who ultimately 'rescues' the main protagonist (as the ghostly apparition of Ongnyŏn's mother in her dream had initially begun) and will finally bring Ongnyŏn to her ultimate destination which is the reunion with her father and mother—at the same time it physically brings her to the physical apex of modernity the U.S. At the same time, she is not merely the rescued—for it is her experience of having lived abroad for many years that the older and male Ku Wansŏ—contra Korean traditionalist age-defined and patriarchal social norms that structure 'teacher' and 'student'—confides of his feeling of "helplessness" amidst these foreign lands and appeals for *her* help and assistance on his own journey of enlightenment to study in the U.S., as much as he offers to rescue or help her. This turn of events thus departs from the commonly dismissive characterization of the passivity of 'new novel' characters and their reliance on "foreign powers" to save them which is also central to the analysis of Cho Dong-il's inner/outer dichotomy of 'new novels.' As Cho writes of the 'new novels' of Yi and other enlightenment advocates mere repetition of traditionalist tropes:

The author's practical intention in writing their works lay in the creation of interesting events and in turn the anticipation of a reading audience to which their works would sell. To this end they gave a concrete structure to the chivalrous novels whose general popularity and set themes had already been established in old-style novels; they further diminished the image of the fated hero who had lost the vitality to overcome obstacles, denied the transcendent order of the celestial realm, and treated release from suffering as a matter of blind chance. In place of the celestial realm and enlightened monks, they used people of enlightened nations as a mechanism to save the protagonist from death. Such dependency on foreign powers, led readers to think that there were no measures for national survival.⁷⁴⁵

As I have discussed above, this is *not* what happens in the mutual assistance and rescuing of our Korean compatriots in their journey towards national enlightenment in *Tears of Blood*. Rather than foreign dependency, the novel stresses solidarity and mutuality among fellow traveling Korean pilgrims, thus emphasizing the need for recognizing and identifying Koreanness for the development of enlightened Korean leaders who would then partake in the enlightening of the nation and ethno-linguistic cultural political solidarity and union/organization as the prime "measure for national survival."

Foreign and Diasporic Newspapers and National Awakening and/as Reunion with Family/Nation

Arriving by steamship in San Francisco, upon a more modern and more cosmopolitan urban landscape than Osaka, they travel to Washington, aided by a Chinese exile, who is an

⁷⁴⁵ Cho Dong-il, *Korean Literature in Cultural Context and Comparative Perspective*, p. 113.

associate of Kang Yu-wei⁷⁴⁶ of the Chinese Reform Party, with whom Ongnyŏn and Ku Wansŏ are able to communicate via their common use of written Chinese graphs as the two do not know any English. Here again the shared use of a written language/script facilitates their mutual recognition and the assistance to our characters by Chinese nationalist exiles in the U.S. At the same time that this scene further develops the historical realist aspects of the ‘new novel’—as there were Chinese reform party members living in exile in San Francisco—it also presents an important distinction being made between the “traditional” Korean and Sino-centric culture that is prominently being rejected in this novel for new Western ideas, approaches, and technologies, which was also the case with many Chinese modern reformist intellectuals—and these ‘modern’ Chinese nationalist intellectuals from whom Koreans had borrowed and read many of their enlightenment treatises and translations of Western ideas. Thus as the traditional technology of Chinese script which had become a naturalized element of Korean culture for a millennia of Korea’s participation on Sino-centric culture had allowed the import of ‘modern’ reform ideas developing among Chinese nationalists before Koreans for Koreans’ enlightenment thought and reform programs it also allows solidarity and assistance among Chinese and Korean exiles abroad.

As they make their way to Washington, “they went to school and studied with the Chinese students.”⁷⁴⁷ Ongnyŏn attends high school excelling in her studies, much faster than Ku Wansŏ, and once again graduates at the top of her class:

For five years in Washington in America, Ongnyŏn never missed a day at school, and she was so clever and diligent in her work that she was praised as the best girl in the school. In the final examination she was top of the high school, and so her name and her school record were mentioned in a Washington paper.⁷⁴⁸

Now Ongnyŏn’s abounding intelligence and diligence, as we have seen throughout the novel serves an important purpose—facilitated by the modern technology of newspapers—as much as it creates an exceptional and superhuman character to sustain novelistic interest. For

One man read the report with particular happiness. He was so happy that he could not help bursting into tears. He was overcome with happiness, but then he began to have his doubts and muttered to himself.

‘That’s the story of a Korean written in English, and it may not have been properly transcribed. It’s ten years since I came to America, but I am still confused in English, and I may not have read it properly.’

The name of the man who was being so overcautious was Kim Kwanil, and his daughter’s name was Ongnyŏn. When the Sino-Japanese War had broken out, he had not known whether his daughter had survived or not, and he had come to America. Now the Washington paper had a short article giving Ongnyŏn’s school record, and saying that she was from P’yŏngyang, and had gone to Osaka at the age of seven, gone through a Common Elementary School there, and then had come to Washington and finished at high school.

⁷⁴⁶ See footnote 197.

⁷⁴⁷ Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood*, p. 204 (episode 37).

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid.

Mr. Kim could not say for sure that was his daughter, but it said that her name was Ongnyŏn, that she was from P'yŏngyang, and that she had left home at the age of seven, and Mr. Kim could not help feeling positive in his own mind that it was his daughter.⁷⁴⁹

At the same time, Ongnyŏn's maturity and intellect also alters the course of her relationship with her compatriot Ku Wansŏ. As Ku comes to congratulate Ongnyŏn on finishing school, he confesses:

'...Ah, women are cleverer than men. A year after you came to America, you could understand what people were talking about in English. You even went to school, and now this year you've finished, but it took me two years after coming to America to get into middle school, and I'll only finish next year. All I can do is raise the white flag and surrender to you!' Ongnyŏn had grown up in Japan as a little girl, and so she used a lot of Japanese expressions in her reply.

'It is by your gracious favour that I have been able to study as I have, and I am deeply grateful.'

She was steeped in Japanese custom, which was shy she spoke the way she did, but Mr. Ku had been brought up in Korea. Ongnyŏn was a child, and he had used to her the form of speech one uses to a child in the Korean custom. But, he thought, he was a child too.

'Now, come on, if we are Koreans, let's chat in the Korean way. When we first met, you were only a little girl, so I spoke to you as I do to children, but now you're sixteen, and so big that I feel awkward talking to you as if you were a child.'

'If you say "let's speak in the Korean way," how can you feel awkward speaking to a child as if she were a child?'

This sent Mr. Ku into fits of laughter.

'I'm a child too. I'm still not married. We're both equally children. You should speak to me as if I were a child too, so just do that, and don't make a fuss. Then, I won't feel uneasy at speaking to you as if you were a child.'⁷⁵⁰

As Ku recounts his past and his views on Korean early marriage customs, his critique of early marriage closely resembles Kim Kwanil's opening thoughts and criticism of the selfishness and greed of Koreans that led to the calamity of the war and the importance of western education for national development:

When I was in Korea, my parents tried to marry me in my early teens, but I said no, Korean child marriages are not right. After I've been to college and have enough education and knowledge, however long it takes I'll look for a woman who is also educated for a wife, and marry her. If you marry someone with no education or knowledge, someone who just gets more and

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 204 (episode 37).

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 206 (episode 38).

more babyish in her speech, its just like animals mating. You know nothing but the physical pleasures of marriage. That is why we Koreans are like animals, thinking only of our own bodies and our own wives and children. We never think of doing anything for our country. In fact we are robbers and devourers of our country's wealth. We are so mad we go about turning everything upside down. And it's all because we get no education when we're young. People like us, who've been born in civilized world, and come so far from home to learn to be useful to our country, and to undertake work which will be a credit to our society, must keep grinding away at our studies. Every day I'm getting more and better education, such as they have in foreign countries. To get married now, and to waste all my energies on sexual pleasures is not the way of a man with ambitions as great as mine. I'm right aren't I, Ongnyŏn?'⁷⁵¹

Ku's reduction of Korean marriage customs to mere animalistic sexuality detached from the moral and ethical imperatives of Confucianism and the maintenance of the social and political order of Chosŏn society distills the strong iconoclasm of early enlightenment reformers in regard to traditional norms and cultures of Korean society, and as such also harbors the 'double bind' of Korean discourse of civilization and enlightenment whereby the wholesale rejection of the past presents a negative center/hole to what the new modern Korean national culture could entail in positive terms.⁷⁵² To return to Kim Kwanil, Ongnyŏn comes across a surprising advertisement in what appears a diasporic Korean newspaper, presented to her by the Korean boarding house agent:

She read it once in English and once in Korean, and finally translated it into proper written Korean with Chinese characters. It read:

'Notice.

'There was a report in the gossip columns of the popular press on the thirteenth last that a Korean girl, Kim Ongnyŏn, was top of a certain school, and the advertiser wishes to know the hotel where she is staying. Anyone telling the advertise the hotel where Ongnyŏn is staying is offered a suitable reward of ten dollars.

'Kim Kwanil, of P'yŏngyang, P'yŏngan Province, Korea.

'Present address...'⁷⁵³

Reunited with her father at last, "Ongnyŏn felt again as babyish as she had been at the age of seven. She sat on his knee with her head down and wept silently. Kim Kwanil's tears fell onto the back of the head, and her tears soaked her father's knees."⁷⁵⁴ Thereupon, Kim Kwanil presents Ongnyŏn with the letters he had received from his wife in Korea, thus presaging Ongnyŏn and Kim Kwanil's return to Korea and the reunion of the family.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., P. 207 (episode 39).

⁷⁵² See Michael E. Robinson, "Nationalism and the Korean Tradition, 1896-1920: Iconoclasm, Reform, and National Identity," *Korean Studies* vol. 10 (1986), pp. 35-53.

⁷⁵³ Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood*, pp. 210-11 (episode 43).

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 211 (episode 44).

However, the family reunion was to also include Ku Wansŏ, as Ongnyŏn's soon to be husband. As Kim Kwanil took to thank Ku for his assistance of his daughter, he also "said he wished that after Mr. Ku returned home he would take Ongnyŏn for better or worse and tie the eternal knot."⁷⁵⁵ Ku agreed, but as characteristic of his civilized ways, turned to Ongnyŏn for her approval:

'Ongnyŏn—oh, how rude of me, addressing another man's daughter by her personal name like that! We may speak in Korean, but our hearts are steeped in the civilized customs of the west. If we do get married, it would be as westerners do, not at the command of our parents. If we two are thinking of becoming man and wife, the right thing is for us to talk directly to each other. But let's make a start by talking in English. If we talk in Korean, we have this habit of my talking to you as if you were a child, which makes me feel awkward.'

So Mr. Ku talked to Ongnyŏn in English. He was much more highly educated than Ongnyŏn, but in English Ongnyŏn as almost as good enough to be his teacher. But while Mr. Ku talked in his untidy English, Ongnyŏn replied neatly and tidily in Korean.

Kim Kwanil had proposed his daughter's marriage, but when Mr. Ku insisted that he and Ongnyŏn should talk it over directly together in the western way, Mr. Kim sat quiet, having no right to make any decisions on his daughter's marriage.

Ongnyŏn, for all that she was a Korean girl, was educated and enlightened in her thinking, and had seen a lot of the world. So she answered without hesitation in this discussion of their marriage. Mr. Ku asked one thing, that he and Ongnyŏn should continue studying hard for several more years until they had all the education they wanted, before they went home and got married. Then Ongnyŏn could take upon herself the education of Korean women. What he asked showed his ambitions, and when Ongnyŏn heard what he proposed, she firmly made up her mind to educate Korean women, and contracted to marry Mr. Ku.⁷⁵⁶

While not the most romantic proposal, it was without a doubt the most 'modern' marriage proposal and one that was being modeled for the Korean readers of the novel/newspaper. Spoken in Ku's untidy English and all, which aside from the symbolic value of the modernity of 'English' and marking that this was a Western wedding proposal/engagement, it brought Ku down from his elevated status position within the Confucian social hierarchy as both male and as elder to the equal or even subordinate status vis-à-vis Ongnyŏn's masterful command of English. As Schmid observed in both the Korean peninsular and diasporic presses after 1905, diasporic Koreans were coming to take on the role of providing new models for Korean 'enlightenment and civilization' after foreign models located in modern Japan or the West became liabilities in the face of the 'double nature' of 'civilization' which was being mobilized as Japan's colonizing discourse.⁷⁵⁷ Even prior to the Protectorate, Schmid notes that in the 1890s, diasporic

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 213 (episode 44). (there are two episode 44's due a printing mistake by the *Mansebo* paper.)

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 213 (episode 45).

⁷⁵⁷ See Schmid, *Korea Between Empires*, p. 131.

communities (in Siberia) were presented in the pages of *Tongnip sinmun* “as a counterbalance for the situation inside the peninsula” whereby “editors implicitly suggested that crossing the border to move beyond the peninsula had merits—if only in the realm of self-improvement.”⁷⁵⁸

In linking the diasporic communities to the issue of national character, the editors were concerned not with the *kuksu* [national essence] later emphasized by Sin Ch’aeho but with the relationship between culture and reform. Written at a moment when self-strengthening dominated the nationalist movement and fears about Japanese encroachments had yet to be fully articulated in the vocabulary of spirit and essences, this editorial did not focus on culture as national distinctiveness but as the determinant of reformability. In its structure and use of distant immigrant communities as a counterbalance—where those outside could be represented as superior—this line of reasoning opened the possibility of questioning the isomorphic claims made for the nation, a potential that other writers later pursued [after 1905 in relation to “the growing community of Koreans on the West Coast of the United States, especially around San Francisco”].⁷⁵⁹

For the early ‘new novels’ like Yi Injik’s *Tears of Blood*, also written in the midst of a revival of self-strengthening associations, the establishment of new private western-style schools and new nationalist peninsular as well as diasporic presses we saw in the aftermath of the Protectorate, this connection between culture and reform and reformability was also the commanding message of the novel and which was figured through the growth and development of the main character Ongnyŏn—progressing spatially across a hierarchical geography of modern civilization as much as the temporal evolution of Ongnyŏn from a seven year old child victim of the Sino-Japanese War to a ‘new woman’ and radical national reformer. As Yi utilizes the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) as the originating event that socially conditions the protagonist’s journey of growth and development, he exploits the paradoxical effects the war had on Korea to frame the two main elements of the narrative plot. Mirroring the simultaneously *dislocating* and *relocating* process by which the Japanese victory in the war wrenched Korea from the traditional Sino-centric civilizational order as the centuries long tributary relationship with China came to an end, while at the same time it set the nation onto a new path of modern nationhood along western lines as an independent member of the world of nation-states, the war triggers the tragic separation of the child protagonist from her parents (as she is physically assailed with a stray Japanese bullet), which forms one element of the narrative plot (dislocation/separation/wounding trauma), while at the same time it opens the path to her cosmopolitan journey of modern education and development (relocation/modernization and development and eventual reunion) that forms the other main narrative thread. Her journey of development qua national awakening is moreover facilitated as much by the modern technologies of railroads, steamships and newspapers, as it is by the ‘traditional’ elements of Chinese script and dream apparitions of maternal love, as well as ‘modern’ Korean and Chinese fellow compatriots and journeyers in unfamiliar yet cosmopolitan modern foreign lands. As the novel ends with the anticipation of Ongnyŏn’s reunion with her mother upon her return to Korea, her taking on the ‘modern’ education of Korean women and

⁷⁵⁸ Schmid, p. 241.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

her ‘modern’ marriage to Ku Wansŏ, the narrator concludes: “The reader may look forward to the return of the girl to her homeland in the sequel.”⁷⁶⁰

The ‘Modern’ Landscape and Geopolitical Trajectory of National Awakening

While I do not wish to paper over the ambiguities of Yi’s *Tears of Blood*—which stems from this dual and paradoxical desire for and linkage of modernization/civilization and national independence in the context of Korea positioned on the precipice of colonial rule, my reading departs from Cho as well as Kim who like Cho argues that “Despite this boundless optimism for the Western way of life, many new novels ended up as shallow propaganda for modernization. The works by well-known authors, such as Yi Injik, projected Japan as a model for Korea to follow—ironically, just as Japan was about the subject Korea to harsh colonial rule (1910-45). This interpretation of Korea’s destiny contrasts sharply with the struggle against Japanese imperialism that was being waged at the time.”⁷⁶¹ As I have attempted to show with the various doublings and figuring of development qua nationalism in the text, I think the novel is not so simplistic as this and especially in relation to Japan. I think it is quite important, narratively and politically that the U.S. and not Japan is Ongnyŏn’s final destination and stage of enlightenment. This might be more so if we consider the text as a veiled form of speech under censorship regulations. The Japanese bullet and both the good Mr. Inoue and the evil Japanese stepmother may have inadvertently provided the conditions for Ongnyŏn’s journey, and Japan may have been a stepping-stone on this journey, but Japan is not the ultimate model of modernity for Ongnyŏn. And in so far as the larger or main thread/thrust of the novel is as much the reunion of Ongnyŏn with her family, it is quite important that it is not even the ‘good Japanese’ major Inoue but the Korean compatriot Ku Wansŏ who brings Ongnyŏn to the U.S. qua her ultimate destination—the reunion with her father which then leads to the reunion with her mother and the nation. The two legs of the journey also complicate the country vs. city dichotomy with a further differentiation and hierarchy to modern cities that is mapped geopolitically and through the national politics of Korean diaspora. While she first moves from a rural Korean landscape to an urban Japanese one, she proceeds on the second leg of her journey from Japanese urban to a more modern Western (San Francisco) urbanity, which is as distinguished by not only its tall buildings but also unfamiliar people and a greater cosmopolitanism (i.e. the Chinese exiles they meet). We see this also in the itinerary of Ku Wansŏ who meets Ongnyŏn as he is traveling from Korea *through* Japan for the U.S.

Thus in contrast to the horizontal national pilgrimages of Anderson’s colonial functionaries and intelligentsia whose apex of their journeys were the colonial metropolises internal to the colonies, for Ongnyŏn as for various Korean students and political exile nationalists, the apex of these journeys were a nationally politicized (vis-à-vis Japanese immigration embargos to the outside world) and geopolitically marked global economic apex. And as Anderson’s educational pilgrimages mapped the territorial nation as well as the new national body from the collective travels of fellow natives, here we see something both similar and different in Ongnyŏn’s transnational journey accompanied by Korean compatriots and aided by Chinese reform nationalists in the unfamiliar modern terrain of San Francisco, which likewise produces the desire for nationhood as well as cross-ethnic/national solidarities among fellow Korean and Chinese nationalist travelers in a cosmopolitan landscape of national imagining. Punctuated by both cosmopolitan international itineraries as well as national and foreign national

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 220 (episode 50).

⁷⁶¹ Kim Hyungsu, p. 118.

traveling companions--such as the Chinese nationalists in San Francisco for whom their national journeys are similarly geopolitically mapped, for those like Ongnyŏn emerging from dominated social and geographical peripheries and political conditions, the horizontal homogenous, empty time of modernity and the nation-form is produced/articulated through both spatio-temporalized differences and discrepancies—stemming from and reflecting the uneven geography of modern industrial capitalism—that *temporally defines* their spatial distance from the ‘centers’ of civilization/modernity.

Tears of Blood presents Ongnyŏn’s development as a theme of transnational migration as national modernization that is figured as both tragically dislocating and emancipatory. This is highlighted by the way in which Ongnyŏn is haunted by a Japaneseness—as her ‘modernity’ leads people to mistake her for a ‘Japanese girl’ as by Japanese in Osaka as well as initially by her compatriot Ku Wansŏ. Thus resembling more what Anderson calls the “hybrid” and “oxymoronic” haunted doubling like consciousness of the exile or colonial “torn out of the quotidian,” Ongnyŏn’s development and journey to national awakening/consciousness is presented as simultaneously tragic and emancipatory, dislocating and relocating—appearing both at a physical remove from the nation as well as at the moment of imminent national loss (or the fall into colonialism). The novel demonstrates through Ongnyŏn a particular archetype of the new ‘modern’ woman that crucially linked cosmopolitanism via migration with national independence, as well as a particular archetype of travel or migration via a new topos and directionality of travel—emerging in early modern Korea articulated through/ordered by a new differentiated geopolitical hierarchy of modernization in which the linear progressive time of “civilization and enlightenment” was spatialized across a hierarchical transnational geography in early Korean national journeys and imaginings. Ongnyŏn can thus be seen figured as an archetypal paradoxical figure of the new Korean national and nationalist diaspora, for whom the realization of Korean modernization and enlightenment necessitated for Korean independence was located far beyond the territorial boundaries of Korea and in the heart of the world metropolitan centers of the new civilization (whether in physical material, technological or intellectual forms) leading her like her father on nationalizing journeys of awakening with the departure from the nation (and national cultural traditions). Here the encounter and solidarity of Korean compatriots also becomes a significant mediating agent for these journeys of modernization and national awakenings taken across strange lands (both in terms of national or individual identity)—such as Ongnyŏn’s transformation from a ‘Japanese girl’ into a ‘Korean girl’ through her encounter with Ku Wansŏ—and her assistance of Ku Wansŏ and accompaniment to the U.S.

At the same time, this paradoxical cosmopolitan-nationalist cultural-political representation of ‘modernity’ via transnational migration, despite its tragic aspects, can also be seen to produce an ideological figuration of the heroism of the national exile, which entails its own both hierarchizing and homogenizing tendencies—both in regard to Koreans at home and abroad and of reinforcing the imagination/internalization of Korea’s low standing within an international hierarchy of nation-states. On the one hand, this ideological representation of cosmopolitan migration harbors the danger of introducing a hierarchical positioning of cosmopolitanism and the student above ‘modern’ Koreans in Korea and non-students among the new modern nationalist horizontal imaginings of all Koreans as inclusive to the modern concept

of the ethno-linguistic national concept of *minjok* (developing also at this time in revisionist Korean national histories).⁷⁶² This can be seen in the following passage of the novel:

There is nothing in the world so enjoyable as determining one's one aims oneself. They [Ongnyŏn and Ku Wansŏ] did not know that Koreans were so barbarous and so stupidly selfish. They both thought that when the day came for them to return to Korea there would be many ambitious people in Korea too who would listen to the words of educated and knowledgeable people, and approve of them, so that everything would turn out as Mr. Ku planned, and that, as Ongnyŏn planned, the women of Korea would all get her training, and that everywhere many people would arise with an education like hers. Their happiness knew no bounds, but they did not know the situation in their country, and their feelings were the product of the hopefulness of youthful students who had studied abroad.⁷⁶³

While Ongnyŏn and Ku Wansŏ's foreign education appears the collective property of the nation which they will propagate upon their return to Korea, the sober realities of the situation of Korea is assessed here with both the condescension of the Korean masses, and returning students positioned as natural leaders and teachers of Koreans—presented in contrast to the very horizontality and mutuality that was characteristic to the union of such fellow exile students as Ongnyŏn and Ku Wansŏ abroad. On the other hand it also harbors the potential ideological homogenization of the differentiated diasporic experience of Koreans.⁷⁶⁴ For these were not the only forms of migration or people migrating—as testified to by the largest migration of Koreans to the US being Hawaiian plantation laborers between 1903-5, or the migration of many Koreans into the new Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in the 1930s to take advantage of *their* elevated position in the newer Japanese colony (as Japanese settlers had done in Korea), as well as the significant mobilizations of Koreans (over two million by 1945) to labor in Japan during the war effort, including comfort women near the end of the 1930s.⁷⁶⁵ Thus these earlier ideological productions of international migration as a signal nationalist and modernist endeavor cannot be innocent in their unintended effect of both persuading voluntary Korean migrations as well as perhaps ideologically aiding the Japanese government's swindled, coerced, and forced mobilizations of millions of Korean laborers to Japan during the last decade of colonialism in Japan's total war effort.

In the postscript of the novel, Skillend writes: “Yi Injik started serializing the sequel under the title ‘Peony Peak’ in *Maeil sinbo* in 1913, but it never really took shape, and he abandoned it after a few episodes.”⁷⁶⁶ Instead, we find a decade after the publication of *Tears of Blood*, a sort of sequel presented by Yi Kwangsu, *Mujŏng* (The Heartless), serialized in the *Maeil sinbo* in 1917, which begins with the return of a Korean educator from his studies in Japan, and which introduces new approaches and figurations of the themes and motifs broached

⁷⁶² See Henry H. Em, “Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’ae-ho’s Historiography,” Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), pp. 336-362; and my discussion of minjok nationalism in Chapter One.

⁷⁶³ Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood*, p. 215 (episode 46).

⁷⁶⁴ See John Lie, “Diasporic Nationalism,” *Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies*, Vol.1 no.3 (2001); and my discussion in chapter one,

⁷⁶⁵ See Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, pp. 177-8.

⁷⁶⁶ Postscript to Yi Injik, *Tears of Blood*, by W.E. Skillend, p. 220.

in *Tears of Blood*, having evolved with both the experience of close to a decade of colonial rule as well as the development of nationalist thought and modern Korean literature.

***Mujǒng* (The Heartless): A ‘Modern’ Cosmopolitan Geography of National Awakening/Consciousness**

“All great literature is one of two stories; a man goes on a journey or a stranger comes to town.”
--Leo Tolstoy

Yi Kwangsu’s *Mujǒng* (*The Heartless*, 1917), widely considered the first mature ‘modern’ Korean novel, as opposed to the ‘transitional’ ‘new novels’ of the mid 1900s, appeared also as a newspaper serial from January 1 to June 14, 1917 in the *Maeil sinbo*, the only remaining Korean vernacular paper after 1910, operating under strict Japanese censorship and regulation—much like other facets of social, cultural and political life during this dark period of colonial military rule.⁷⁶⁷ Reputedly the father of modern Korean literature, Yi Kwangsu (1892-1950), like Yi Injik was also educated in Japan and wrote journalism, as well as political essays, and literary theory aside from prose (mainly novellas and short stories) and poetry.⁷⁶⁸ But like some of the characters in Yi’s novel *The Heartless*, Yi’s educational journeys initially began across the transforming landscapes of Korea. Born in North Pyǒngan province and orphaned at the age of ten, Yi went to work for Pak Ch’an-myong, a leader of the Tonghak religion,⁷⁶⁹ which was formative to his early development.⁷⁷⁰ He associated with Tonghak members “a spirit of humility and kindness, nationalism, and belief in equality and nonviolence,” which he saw as the principle behind the “nonviolent March First Independence Movement,” and “his Tonghak background provided a foundation for his later interest in Tolstoy and Ghandi’s beliefs in nonviolent resistance.”⁷⁷¹ Yi first traveled to Seoul in 1905 at the age of thirteen to teach Japanese at a school run by Pak in Sogong-dong and whose students were mainly sons of

⁷⁶⁷ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless*, translated by Ann Sung-hi Lee in *Yi Kwangsu and Modern Korean Literature: Mujǒng* (NY: Cornell East Asia Series, 2005), pp. 77-348. Translated from *Mujǒng*, *Maeil sinbo* (1 January-14 June 1917). Ann Sun-hi Lee is the granddaughter of Yi Kwangsu.

⁷⁶⁸ There are numerous English language articles and books on the literature and literary theories of Yi Kwangsu, as well as his political theories of ‘reconstructionism’ which forms the basis of the gradualist approach to national liberation from colonialism encapsulated in the discourse of cultural nationalism, which becomes both explicit and predominant in the 1920s of which Yi Kwangsu was a leading proponent. For the former see for example, Kichung Kim, “Mujǒng: An Introduction to Yi Kwangsu’s Fiction,” in *Korean Studies*, vol. 6 (1982), pp. 125-139; Michael D. Shin, “Interior Landscapes: Yi Kwangsu’s *The Heartless* and the Origins of Modern Literature,” in Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), pp. 249-287; and Ann Sun-hi Lee’s “Introduction” in *Yi Kwangsu and Modern Korean Literature: Mujǒng* (NY: Cornell East Asia Series, 2005), pp. 1-76. For the latter, see Michael E. Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).

⁷⁶⁹ Tonghak (Eastern Learning) emerged as an indigenous syncretic religious and social movement in the 1860s combining elements of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism as well as Christianity as a challenge to both “Western Learning” (Catholicism) and orthodox Confucianism. This was the same religion that founded the Mansebo newspaper in which Yi Injik’s *Tears of Blood* was serialized. See my discussion of the Tonghak rebellion of 1894 in Chapter One.

⁷⁷⁰ Ann Sun-hi Lee, “Introduction” in *Yi Kwangsu and Modern Korean Literature: Mujǒng* (NY: Cornell East Asia Series, 2005), p. 11.

⁷⁷¹ *Ibid.*

members of Chinbohoe a progressive organization run by Tonghak followers.⁷⁷² As Lee recounts from Yi's memoirs: "At the time there was no completed railroad between Seoul and Sinŭijŭ, so Yi walked from Chŏngju [in northern Korea near P'yŏngyang] to Chinnamp'o, then took a steamboat to Inch'on, then a train from Inch'on to Namdaemun in Seoul. In Seoul, Yi cut his hair short and wore Western clothes. The school was in a large traditional-style Korean house... The students studied Japanese and math. Their objective was to go to Japan to learn about 'railroads and steamboats.'" ⁷⁷³ Moreover, in Seoul "Yi and the students were devoted readers of newspapers, through which 'we were able to satisfy our thirst for information about the fate of our nation, the situation in the Russo-Japanese war, and overall circumstances throughout the world. We read editorials by Yu Kun, Chang Chi-yŏn, and Pak Un-sik as though they were the Bible. Sin Cha'eho ⁷⁷⁴ would set forth his incisive arguments in the *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (The Korea Daily News) ⁷⁷⁵ two or three years later. An Ch'ang-ho founded the *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* as the official newspaper of the Sinminhoe (New People's Association), which he organized after he returned from the United States.'" ⁷⁷⁶ From Seoul, Yi traveled to Japan in 1905, where on a scholarship provided by the Tonghak derived Chinbohoe association, Yi matriculated at "Tokai gijuku in 1905, and Taisei chugakko in 1906 while preparing to take entrance examinations for Meiji Gakuin, a Presbyterian school in Tokyo." ⁷⁷⁷ Like many Korean students abroad at this time, Yi's educational journey quickly became politicized. As Yi later recollects:

I used to boast that I would first become minister of education and then prime minister. But even before I'd been in Tokyo for a year, I witnessed the Annexation Proclamation put out by the Ilchinhoe [a pro-Japanese organization of the time], and soon afterward the signing of the treaty making Korea a Japanese protectorate and the disappearance of the Korean consulate from Tokyo. We all had to modify our goals then, to something quite a bit less glamorous. This produced in me a determination for the awakening of our people through writing and education. ⁷⁷⁸

Thus in Tokyo "in 1906, Yi also joined the T'aeguk Hakhoe (T'aeguk Academic Association), a nationalist association of overseas Koreans students in Japan, and heard nationalist activist An Ch'ang-ho ⁷⁷⁹ speak to a gathering of students in Tokyo." ⁷⁸⁰ Yi briefly returned Korea due to the

⁷⁷² Ibid. Although as Lee tells us "his only qualification was that he had memorized a book called *Iro Tokhak* (Self-taught Japanese)."

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ Yi is referring to Sin's revisionist history of Korea as an historical ethno-nation descending from the mythical figure of Tang'un. See my discussion in Chapter One.

⁷⁷⁵ This was the paper published with the English journalist Ernest T. Bethell protected under extraterritorial privileges from Japanese censorship, discussed in the earlier section. This political association between the *Taehan Maeil sinbo* and the *Sinminhoe* is not discussed in the usual historical accounts of the paper!

⁷⁷⁶ Yi Kwangsu, quoted in Ann Sun-hi Lee, "Introduction" in *Yi Kwangsu and Modern Korean Literature: Mujŏng* (NY: Cornell East Asia Series, 2005), p. 11. Yi adds that "Newspapers were delivered in the morning by dignified-looking men in traditional hats and *turumagi* [a traditional men's overcoat]," and that sometimes he "would go directly to the newspaper company and buy a paper, instead of waiting for delivery" (Lee, p. 12).

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

⁷⁷⁸ Yi Kwangsu quoted in Kichung Kim, "*Mujŏng*: An Introduction to Yi Kwangsu's Fiction," p. 127.

⁷⁷⁹ He is one of the leaders of various factions of the budding exile nationalist movement, and one of the nationalist leaders elected to the cabinet of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, which formed in 1919 after the March 1st movement.

suspension of the scholarship program, going back to Japan in 1907 to continue his preparations for the Meiji Gakuin entrance examination, with the Korean government taking over the scholarship program of the former students supported by the Ilchinhoe scholarship.⁷⁸¹ Yi entered the Meiji Gakuin in 1907 and studied there until his graduation in 1910.⁷⁸² Yi met the Korean poet, historian and publisher Ch'oe Nam-son in Tokyo and began to publish short stories in *Sonyŏn*, a new Korean journal of “poetry, fiction as well as articles on art, history, and economics,” which Ch'oe started up in Seoul in 1908 with a group of similarly teen-aged boys and ran for three years until it was shut down by Japanese authorities in 1911.⁷⁸³ Upon graduating from middle school, Yi was admitted to the Daichi High School, but returned to Korea to visit his sick grandfather, whereupon he was married in a traditional arranged marriage.⁷⁸⁴ He left for Tokyo again, “unhappy in his marriage,” but returned in a matter of days to Chŏngju after having accepted an offer to teach at the Osan school in Chŏngju county, North P'yŏngan province—which was founded by Namgang Yi Sung-hun, who was imprisoned shortly thereafter along with other members of the secret nationalist political organization, Sinminhoe (New People's Association) and brought up on conspiracy charges—and “specifically sought to nurture nationalist leaders,” in lieu of continuing his studies.⁷⁸⁵ Yi recalls that he “had no heart for studying. Our minds were troubled by the urgent awareness that the future of our country hung in the balance.”⁷⁸⁶ Moreover, “while traveling to Chŏngju, he witnessed the segregation of Korean and Japanese passengers in separate train cars. This made him indignant, and he strengthened his resolve to be a teacher and educate Koreans to better their lives. The incident further motivated Yi to help Koreans improve their lives and situation.”⁷⁸⁷ Korea had formally become a Japanese colony with the Annexation Treaty by 1910.

Upon controversy over his teaching of Tolstoy's anarchist brand of Christianity, which upset the Christian community of Chŏngju who accused Yi of corrupting the students, Yi left Osan school in 1913 to travel across China and Russia, influenced by “the fact that many Koreans had gone into exile outside of Korea because of the Japanese occupation,” and likewise feeling “compelled to leave by the increasingly pervasive presence of Japanese hegemony in Korea.”⁷⁸⁸ Yi first began his travels across Manchuria to China:

Yi left Chŏngju in November 1913, with hopes of traveling through China and then visiting the colonized nations such as Vietnam, Persia, and Egypt, to

⁷⁸⁰ Ann Sun-hi Lee, “Introduction” in *Yi Kwangsu and Modern Korean Literature: Mujŏng*, p. 12. An Ch'angho's gradualist cultural nationalist approach to national independence was influential to Yi's own political thought and treatises on cultural nationalism which appear in the 1920s.

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13. As Ann Sun-hi Lee explains the Tonghak association Chinbohoe joined up with the Ilchinhoe [what would become the infamous popular pro-Japanese organization] in December 1904 “when the Korean government tried to suppress the Chinbohoe because of its Tonghak origins” (12). Moreover, “Yi Kwangsu was one of several students selected by Son Pyŏng-hŭi to go to Tokyo on a fellowship from the Ilchinhoe in August 1905; this was after Son Pyŏng-hŭi and the Chinbohoe had joined forces with the Ilchinhoe, and three months before the Protectorate Treaty of 1905...Son and his followers left the Ilchinhoe after Yi Yong-gu and the organization openly supported the Protectorate Treaty, which was concluded in 1905” (p. 12).

⁷⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14. “Ch'oe was also a member of the Ch'ongnyon haguho (Youth Student Association), an organization inspired by An Ch'ang-ho” (Lee, p. 13).

⁷⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 16.

⁷⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁷⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

see the situation there and how the peoples there were seeking national independence. Yi's travel was motivated by the desire to overcome colonialism...At first, Yi planned on going to Mukden by train. He took a train from Chǒngju to Andong in Manchuria. He spent one night there, and happened to meet Chong In-bo, who was on his way from Shanghai to Seoul to seek funds...[who] advised him to go to Shanghai first. Yi used most of his money to buy a ticket for a boat to Shanghai, and an outfit of Chinese clothing, made of blue cotton. He took an English boat, which later became a secret meeting place for Koreans from the Shanghai Provisional Government, and from Korea. "Now I was outside of the jurisdiction of the Japanese police," he wrote in his memoirs...He met several Koreans all of whom were going to Shanghai...Yi had no money, so a Korean named Ch'a Kwan-ho paid for his food...At Pudong, they disembarked and boarded a small boat, crossed the Huangpu River, and got off at Huangpu tan...[In Shanghai] he went to the home of Wi Hye-rim, and received directions to where Hong Myǒng-hui was staying on Baierbulu...In January 1914, Yegwan Sin Song advised Yi that the overseas Korean newspaper in San Francisco, the *Sinhan Minbo* (New Korean People's Newspaper) was looking for a writer. The newspaper was published by the nationalist association, the Kungminhoe...Sin gave him five hundred wǒn, and told him to go to the United States. Yi gave up his plans of traveling through Asia, and decided to try to go to the United States through Europe. Sin wrote letters of introduction to Wolsong Yi Chong-ho in Vladivostok, and to Ch'ujǒng Yi Kap in Muling, Jilin Province. Yi left Shanghai in January 1914, after having stayed in Shanghai for a little over a month.⁷⁸⁹

From Shanghai, Yi traveled into Russia:

He took a Russian boat to Vladivostok, then traveled by train to Heilongjian Province, where he stayed with Yi Kap for a month. Continuing west, he then took the trans-Siberian railway to Chita...Yi stayed in Chita for a year, waiting to receive funds from the Kungminhoe to fund the rest of his trip to the United States. Yi postponed his plans to go to the United States after receiving a letter about a factional dispute in the United States among overseas Koreans...Yi stayed on in Chita until August 1914, when World War I began and Yi was forced to cancel his plans to travel to the United States through Europe. He returned instead to Korea.⁷⁹⁰

Yi's journeys across China and Russia were, like his earlier educational journeys to Seoul and to Japan, likewise linked both to the development of his political activism, as well as journalism, philosophical and literary thought, and his writing of literature. "In his narratives about China, he wrote about the Korean overseas nationalist community in Shanghai,"⁷⁹¹ and "the vast expanses

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁹¹ Ibid., p. 18.

of Siberia would later appear in Yi's novel *Yujŏng* (Emotion, 1933),⁷⁹² and in “*Na ui Kobaek* (My Confessions, 1948), Yi wrote about Korean nationalists in Vladivostok who were trying to organize nationalist movements outside of Korea to recover Korean national independence.”⁷⁹³ Yi also wrote for the diasporic newspapers in Russia, “the *Kwŏnŏp Sinmun*, which was published in Vladivostok, and the *Taehanin Chyŏnggyobo*, which was published in Chita.”⁷⁹⁴

The *Kwŏnŏp Sinmun* was the official newspaper of the Kwŏnŏphoe, and was published from May 5, 1912 to September 1, 1914. It was published completely in the Korean language, once a week on Sunday, until the paper was closed. In 1912, seven hundred to eight hundred copies were published; in 1913: 1,000—1,500; and in 1914: 2,000. The *Taehanin Chŏnggyobo* was the official newspaper of the Taehanin kungminhoe in Siberia chibang ch'onghoe (Korean National Association, Siberia Regional Assembly),⁷⁹⁵ and was published from January 2, 1912 to 1913, when it was shut down because of Russian compliance with Japanese opposition to the paper, and because the printer broke down. Yi's articles for the *Kwŏnŏp Sinmun* were published March 1, 8, 15, and 22, 1914... Writing under the literary name Oebae or “solitary boat,” Yi advocated the development of commerce, and tried to find precedents for such development.... Volume eleven of the *Taehanin Chŏnggyobo* included several poems written by Yi Kwang-su. “Nara lul Ttŏnanŭn Sŏrum’ (Sorrow Upon Leaving One’s Country) consists of two *sijo* poems. It was written in the tradition of *sijo* poetry about parting from a place. The narrator is leaving Korea to seek freedom. The poem uses traditional *sijo* prosody and motifs to write about nation.”⁷⁹⁶

We thus find in Yi Kwangsu's personal educational and political journeys across Korea as well to and from Japan and among Korean diasporic communities in China and Russia a strange doubling of the narrative of exile as both a form of individual and collectivized national awakening and nationalism, fostered by the contradictory forces of colonial modernization found in Yi Injik's *Tears of Blood*, perhaps even more convincingly than his novel *The Heartless*. Yi's formative experiences depict Yi as both the object and subject of the particular paradoxical process of colonial modernization that structured many early Korean ‘moderns’ as nationalist reformers and educators as well as the producers of literary and other cultural narratives of ‘modernity’ in Korea. Developing out of his own formative cosmopolitan journeys of development and his national awakening, we see in the development of the three main characters of *The Heartless*—Hyŏng-sik, Yŏng-ch'ae and Sŏn-hyŏng constituting both returning exiles and newly forming ones mediated through railway journeys across the Korean landscape as well as

⁷⁹² Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁹³ Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 55.

⁷⁹⁵ Lee explains that this Siberia Regional Assembly of the Korean National Association was initiated by the Taehanin Kungminhoe (Korean National Association) based in San Francisco. “In February 10, 1908, a decision was reached to organize branches in Vladivostok and Hawaii. The Vladivostok branch of KH started a company called the Asea Sirop Chusik Hoesa (Asia Manufacturing Company), to finance armed resistance to Japan” (Ibid, p. 55, footnote).

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

towards that of Japan and the U.S.—a narrative of national awakenings, which both shares in the previously explored meanings of national journeying and exile we have seen in *Tears of Blood* while also taking on new meanings linked to both the changed conditions of its writing— (appearing after close to a decade of military colonial rule), the evolution of modern literary experimentation and literary thought, as well the development of Yi’s personal political experience and thought as well as the nationalist discourse in colonial Korea.

While *Tears of Blood* was written in Korea shortly after Yi Injik’s return from Japan, *The Heartless* (1917) was written in Tokyo where Yi was both studying philosophy at Waseda University and active in the Korean student movement in Japan at a time when “Yi attempted a systemization of the students’ position, in contributions to Fraternity debates and its journal, *Hak Chi Kwang*,”⁷⁹⁷ thus paralleling much of nationalist activity in period—which was at this time of stifling colonialism a largely extraterritorial cosmopolitan undertaking.⁷⁹⁸ At the same time, like the “intertextualization” of “Japanese non-fiction and translations of texts” Thorber pointed to in *Tears of Blood*, the influence of Japanese modern literature and translations as both a model and platform for the inscription of oppositional political narratives as well as a conduit to cosmopolitan world literature can also be seen in *The Heartless* (*Mujöng*). As Ann Lee notes, “the title echoed that of Kuroiwa Ruiko’s 1902 Japanese translation of Victor Hugo’s *Les Miserables*, entitled *A Mujo!* (i.e. “mujo” And “mujöng” are the Japanese and Korean readings respectively for the Chinese compound “wu qing.”).⁷⁹⁹ Yi had read Kuroiwa Ruiko’s translation when it was serialized in a Japanese paper in 1903.⁸⁰⁰ Yi also later read an English translation of *Les Miserables*, as well as a complete Japanese translation of it, and “recalled also having seen a movie version of it in Seoul.”⁸⁰¹ Moreover, “Yi’s admiration for Hugo increased when he read Tolstoy’s praise of Hugo’s *Les Miserables* as the greatest work of literature,” as Tolstoy was greatly admired by Yi.⁸⁰² *Mujöng* “means to be ‘without emotion, without love’ and may also refer to the state of insentience. Its conventional meaning is close to “cruel, heartless.”⁸⁰³ We might also add “wretched” in reference to Hugo’s inspiration and link it to Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*, which can be seen to present as many parallels as differences to Yi’s formulation of national culture and revolutionary national consciousness. Thus here we might see that the Japanese translation of Hugo to have provided a springboard for Yi’s cultural nationalist thought embodied in the journeys of his characters, whereby the ethos of the French revolution mediated through Tolstoy’s liberal humanism and enlightenment romanticism became intertwined through the circuitous travel across media and languages to arrive as spectral echoes in Yi’s short novel. As Ann Lee points out, the plot structure of *Mujöng* resembles closely that of Tolstoy’s short story “*Resurrection*, a work mentioned in chapter fifty-seven of *Mujöng*.”⁸⁰⁴ If

⁷⁹⁷ Kenneth M. Wells, “Background to the March First Movement: Koreans in Japan, 1905-1919,” in *Korean Studies* vol. 13 (1989), p. 10.

⁷⁹⁸ Yi returned to Japan and matriculated in Waseda University in September 1915. He was financially supported from “Chungang High School, where An Chae-hong was dean, or from educator and entrepreneur Kim Söng-su (1891-1955)” (Ann Lee, “Introduction,” p. 21). Kim Söng-su came from a wealthy landowning family and became one of a handful of successful Korean industrial capitalists under the cooptative colonial policies after the 1920s and especially the 1930s.

⁷⁹⁹ Ann Lee, “Yi Kwangsu and Korean Literature: The Novel *Mujöng* (1917),” *Journal of Korean Studies*, vol. 8. (1992), p. 96.

⁸⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, footnote text, p. 96-97.

⁸⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰² *Ibid.*

⁸⁰³ Ann Lee, “Yi Kwangsu and Korean Literature: The Novel *Mujöng* (1917),” p. 96.

⁸⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

we look closely we might moreover see glimpses of the tragic-hero Jean Valjean⁸⁰⁵ as well as the daring iconoclasm of Anna Karenina in Yi's 'modern' cast of characters.⁸⁰⁶

On the other hand, related to the emergence and growth of the 'new novel' via the concomitant growth of the form and concept of modern nationalist newspapers as both a preeminent medium of public discourse while also playing a significant role in shaping knowledge about the nation and the world, or in other words both endowed with a didactic and activist function, another element of this new fiction is related to what I described as the 'cultural developmentalism'⁸⁰⁷ apparent in the ethos and practice of the nationalist papers—which in the context of novels can be seen in the 'translation' or transformation of the nature and task of literary fiction and literature more generally as it became harnessed to the advocacy of enlightenment for national liberation. According to Jin-Kyung Lee the transformation of the status of fiction (*sosŏl*) through the 1900s and 1910 was significantly related to the transforming task of literature in "educating emotion" in the emergence of a new modern subjectivity which began "with the reformist discourses of the nationalist elites of the 1910s aimed at producing self-reflexive, voluntaristic/ voluntarized and individualized subject" and which "from the 1910s...transition[s] from the holistic, quasi-religious Confucian cosmology to an individualized secular morality."⁸⁰⁸ As Lee writes:

The genre of fictional narrative (*sosŏl*) in premodern Korea, considered trivial and low, served, for the most part, as moral teaching and entertainment for women and the commoner class. Throughout the 1900s and 1910s, this stigma was being gradually removed and the status of the novel (*sosŏl*) was in the ascendancy, as the elites began to accord further importance to the genre in its ability to assist in building a modern nation. In the early part of the 1910s, the cultural elites' understanding of literature, at least partially,

⁸⁰⁵ I see something like Hugo's Jean Valjean in Yŏng-ch'ae's father, falsely imprisoned for his early enlightenment teaching and nationalism, and father-figure to Yi's other main character Hyŏng-sik (an orphan whom he raises and educates in his new school).

⁸⁰⁶ It is not surprising that Yi Kwangsu would have been attracted to and inspired from the historical realism and romanticism of 19th century Hugo's *Les Misérables* and Tolstoy's *War and Peace* or *Anna Karenina*, for these novels also take place and dramatizes the social upheavals and transformations taking place at the cusp of a dying old order and the emergence of the new. But while Yi may have admired Tolstoy (both his religious writings and novels)—Yi was also writing in the didactic tradition and function of modern literature to raise national consciousness and inculcate national identity—thus he foregoes Tolstoy's tragic endings for new activist national departures.

⁸⁰⁷ What I mean by 'cultural developmentalism' is essentially 'cultural nationalism' in Korea—which can be seen in the gradualist cultural developmental theories, narratives, and activities embodied in Yi Kwangsu's literary and theoretical writings. I prefer the term 'cultural developmentalism' because it clarifies and defines what 'nationalism' means in 'cultural nationalism' and also because it makes a more explicit connection to economic developmentalism of the 'developmental state' narratives of Korean post-war development. I see this cultural developmentalism or 'cultural nationalism' not only as a situated discourse that evolved out of the early Korean encounter with the uneven West/imperialism and solidified into the dominant discourse of nationalism in the 1920s colonial Korea but something like a logic that underlies modern Korean nationalism—whether manifest in economic or (more narrowly understood/defined) 'cultural' forms.

⁸⁰⁸ Jin-Kyung Lee, "Sovereign Aesthetics, Disciplining Emotion, and Racial Rehabilitation in Colonial Korea 1910-1922" in *Acta Koreana*, vol. 8, No.1 (January 2005), p. 89.

continued to maintain the Confucian utilitarian, instrumentalist perspective on literature as reforming people's morality, behavior and attitudes.⁸⁰⁹

However, Lee argues that “by the mid 1910s,” “new intellectuals assigned the task of educating emotion to the literary sphere. They reconceptualized the nature and function of literature along two political goals: the necessity of achieving hegemony of a modern mode of governance and producing the ethnonational collective.”⁸¹⁰

...by the mid 1910s, both the novel and literature are reconceived as performing a crucial role in forging ideological hegemony: Ch'oe Nam-son⁸¹¹ in an essay titled, “Art and Diligence,” likens art to an industry and the lofty value of art, just like wealth, is attainable only to those who work hard. For Ch'oe, the artistic achievement of a people is the result of their willingness to study the craft and gain knowledge in the given art: art embodies one of the fundamental principles of modern civilization, diligence. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Ch'oe pronounces, literature's ability to teach people rivals the power of the classics and serves to honor the country not unlike a powerful military.⁸¹²

As this newfound task of modern literature as “forging ideological hegemony” effected a reconceptualization of literature:

The impact of art and literature, emphatically liberated from their subordination to Confucian moral philosophy and political ideology, was to be exerted as an independent and even a transcendental sphere and as expressions of “free thought” (*chayu ūi sasang*). Furthermore, the new intellectuals of this era revised their conception of *how* literature effects change on individuals and the collective. In 1918, Ch'oe Nam-son declares that art, which expresses people's spirit and symbolizes the state of their culture, comforts people's heart and cultivates their mind...Literature functions by appealing to people's emotions, moving them, and challenging and improving their minds in contrast to the dictatorial and didactic mode of religion and morality.⁸¹³

I would suggest that this transformation and elevation of literature and its relation to the production of modern individual-national subjectivities, could be seen through the negotiation of new concepts like women's education and romantic love even in the first ‘new novel,’ Yi Injik's *Tears of Blood*, where the novel thematizes, while not explored with all too much emotional or psychological depth but certainly its beginnings, this process of individuation into a new modern individualized and national subject—in the figure of Ongnyŏn the main character as a ‘new woman’ and a modern reformer. However, this forms an especially significant component of Yi

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 92-93.

⁸¹⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹¹ This is the author of the poem I introduced in the first section on railroads and colonial migrations.

⁸¹² Jin-Kyung Lee, p. 93.

⁸¹³ Ibid., pp. 93-4 (episode 7).

Kwangsu's interpellation of the individual and the nation in *The Heartless*, which explores with significantly more psychological depth and the explicit thematization of national awakenings as both emotional individual and collective transformations qua the discovery of and betrayals of the 'modern' concept of romantic love among the characters. The basic narrative plot figures a love triangle, whereby the male protagonist Hyŏng-sik navigates between his feelings for Yŏng-ch'ae, his childhood sweetheart and the daughter of his childhood benefactor and teacher in P'yŏngyang who had by a tragic turn of fate become a *kisaeng*,⁸¹⁴ with whom he is abruptly reunited with after a decade, and those for Sŏn-hyŏng, the daughter of a wealthy and influential church leader in Seoul Elder Kim, whom he has been tasked to teach English in preparation for her study abroad in the United States, and to whom Elder Kim wishes to marry Sŏn-hyŏng and send him off to study with his daughter. Thus here, in place of Ku Wansŏ's modern gesture of asking Ongnyŏn if she would consent to marry him, as we saw in *Tears of Blood*, Hyŏng-sik asks Sŏn-hyŏng to whom has already been cursorily engaged, not only for her consent but if she "loves" him:

"I have to ask. We should have asked one another about this before getting engaged, but the order got reversed. I have to ask you, though, even if it's late."

Sŏn-hyŏng sat quietly.

"Please tell me clearly whether or not you love me."

Sŏn-hyŏng thought there was no need to ask or answer such a question.

Were they not a couple already? What was the use of asking?

"Why are you asking me such a question?" she said, laughing.

"The sooner I know, the better for both of us. Before the marriage is finalized."

"What? What do you mean 'before the marriage is finalized'?"

"We are only engaged. We are not married yet. We still have time to correct any mistakes."

These words frightened Sŏn-hyŏng even more, and made her hair stand on end. She could not understand what Hyŏng-sik was talking about.

"You mean break off the engagement?" she asked. Inexplicable tears rose in her eyes. When Hyŏng-sik saw her tears, he regretted having spoken.

"Yes," he said.

"Why?"

"If you do not love me, then..."

"Even though we are already engaged?"

"An engagement is not that important."

"Then what is?"

"Love is."

"What if we aren't in love?"

"Then the engagement is null."⁸¹⁵

⁸¹⁴ *Kisaeng* were female entertainers akin to but distinct from the Western prostitute or the Japanese geisha—historically going back to young women who were cultivated in the arts to entertain for the Korean court/state, and who occupied part of the lowest (slave) class of society in traditional status ascriptions.

⁸¹⁵ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 289 (episode 99).

But the same time, the question of romantic love in the novel is closely intertwined with the problematic of traditional moral obligations and loyalties and new ‘modern’ or ‘civilized’ subjectivities. As the scene continues:

Sŏn-hyŏng thought for a few moments. “How do *you* feel?” she asked.

“I love you. I love you more than my own life.”

“Isn’t that enough?”

“No. You have to love me too.”

“Would a wife not love her husband?”

Hyŏng-sik looked intently at Sŏn-hyŏng. She lowered her head.

“Whose words are those?” Hyŏng-sik asked.

“Aren’t those words in the Bible?” Sŏn-hyŏng replied.

“But what do *you* think, Sŏn-hyŏng? What are your true feelings?”

“I agree with the Bible.”

“That a wife loves her husband because she is a wife? Or that one becomes a wife because one loves?”

Sŏn-hyŏng heard these words too for the first time.

“Aren’t they the same? She said, bewildered. Hyŏng-sik was taken aback.

How could they be the same thing? This woman does not yet know how to think about such matters, he thought to himself.

“Please answer me yes or no. Do you love me?” There was a pleading tone to his voice. He thought he would die if she said no. Her tightly pursed lips seemed like those of a judge who was deciding whether or not Hyŏng-sik would live or die. Sŏn-hyŏng felt dazed and could not think any more. She just felt frightened when she looked at Hyŏng-sik’s miserable face.

That was shy she simply answered, “Yes.” Hyŏng-sik was going to ask one more time, but stopped himself, afraid that her answer might change to “no.” He suddenly clasped Sŏn-hyŏng’s hand. Her hand was soft and warm and seemed to melt in his own. She sat still. He squeezed her hand. He waited for her to squeeze back, but she hung her head and stayed still. Hyŏng-sik quickly put her hand down, and went home. He himself was not sure why he left so suddenly. Sŏn-hyŏng did not say goodbye, but just watched him leave. Sŏn-hyŏng leaned on her desk, closed her eyes and thought. She remembered clearly what Hyŏng-sik had said. She did not know what any of it meant, though...The word “love” seemed very sacred when speaking of love for God, or love of one’s countrymen, or how a husband and wife should love one another; but it seemed vulgar and undignified to ask someone to love oneself or to tell someone that one loved them. According to what Sŏn-hyŏng had heard at home and at church, all other kinds of love were holy and clean, but the love between young men and women were impure and sinful. Sŏn-hyŏng did not know that the notion of love, and the very word “love” originated in love between the sexes. Hyŏng-sik’s words were thus very unpleasant to her. Hyŏng-sik seemed like a sinner, saying such things without shame. He used the same behavior he uses with vile kisaeng, towards me, she thought, and grimaced. She looked at her hand, the one that Hyŏng-sik had held. She thought of how her hand had been buried in his big

hand, and how he had squeezed her hand. She wrung her hand three or four times as though shaking off something, and wiped it with her skirt.⁸¹⁶

As we see in the development of the novel, Sŏn-hyŏng will not come to know this modern concept of love, which doubles as the initial stage of her ‘modern’ awakening, until near the end of the novel—mediated through the feelings of jealousy or the “baptism of fire” in the surprise encounter with Yŏng-ch’ae on the train towards America. Similarly for Hyŏng-sik, despite his fervent declaration for his love for Sŏn-hyŏng, his torn affection for the beautiful *kisaeng* Yŏng-ch’ae (who symbolizes not only his past but also that of traditional Korean/Confucian morality as virtue), and Sŏn-hyŏng will continue to cast doubt on his own convictions and feelings of ‘modern’ love both haunting and corrupting his “love” for Sŏn-hyŏng. Upon finding out that Yŏng-ch’ae, whom he had believed committed suicide after she was raped by her suitors who sought to take her for a concubine, was aboard the same train as he and Sŏn-hyŏng, Hyŏng-sik reflects on his unresolved feelings and thus his likewise incomplete emotional transformation in love, which is also marked by extra-emotional material considerations:

Hyŏng-sik wanted to see Yŏng-ch’ae’s face immediately...Hyŏng-sik compared Yŏng-ch’ae to Sŏn-hyŏng again. Sŏn-hyŏng was the first young woman with whom he had come in contact. Her looks were such that anyone would be dazzled by her, and had left a very strong, profound impression on Hyŏng-sik. Like many a young man who encounters a young woman for the first time, Hyŏng-sik thus thought she was the most beautiful woman in the world...The evening of the day when he had received such a strong impression from Sŏn-hyŏng, he had seen Yŏng-ch’ae again. Yŏng-ch’ae had a beautiful appearance. To an impartial observer, Yŏng-ch’ae’s face would seem even prettier than Sŏn-hyŏng’s. Hyŏng-sik, however, believed that Sŏn-hyŏng was the best woman in the universe, and he could not think of Yŏng-ch’ae as anything but the second-best woman in the universe. Moreover, Sŏn-hyŏng had received a complete education, as the daughter of a rich family of good repute, whereas who knows where Yŏng-ch’ae had been over the years. Because of all these factors, Yŏng-ch’ae did not seem to be Sŏn-hyŏng’s equal. Sŏn-hyŏng was a branch of cinnamon tree in the moon, and beyond Hyŏng-sik’s reach, whereas Yŏng-ch’ae was a branch of plum blossom by the roadside that he could pluck if he wanted. Hyŏng-sik had thus abandoned Sŏn-hyŏng, whom he thought of as number one, and tried to get Yŏng-ch’ae, whom he thought of as number two. Then Yŏng-ch’ae had jumped into the Taedong River, and, moreover, Elder Kim had asked him to marry his daughter. Hyŏng-sik had gotten engaged without much hesitation and, without much sorrow, had tried to forget Yŏng-ch’ae. Hyŏng-sik never really loved Sŏn-hyŏng or Yŏng-ch’ae. His love was all about looks. Hyŏng-sik thought he loved Sŏn-hyŏng as dearly as his own life, but he knew nothing about her personality. He did not know whether or not she was a cold, intellectual type of person, or a passionate emotional type, or what her natural disposition was like, or her preferences, strengths and weaknesses, what he had in common with her, what contradictions they

⁸¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 289-290 (episode 99).

might have between them, or in what directions her personality and abilities would develop in the future. He blindly loved her. His love was a primitive love that had not yet evolved. His love was like that of children who grow fond of one another and do not want to be parted; or like that of uncivilized peoples who love only a pretty face. The only difference was that the love of uncivilized people was a physical love; Hyŏng-sik's love, though, had many spiritual elements. However, Hyŏng-sik knew only the concept of spiritual love, and did not know what it was really like. He did not know that true love arose from understanding one another spiritually. Hyŏng-sik's love was the kind of love that was common among youths—Korean youths—of the transitional period between the old era, an era that had not yet awakened, and a new era, an era of awakening. Once Hyŏng-sik realized this about his love, a great change would be inevitable in his future life.⁸¹⁷

I quote this passage at length here because I see in *The Heartless* important resonances with the transformation of literature as both part of a hegemonic project to forge a new national ideology and a new affective technology of ethnonational subjectivation as Lee argues in regard to theories of modern literature in the period after 1910 and Yi Kwang-su's literary and cultural-political theories in particular—but also important differences between these theories and their novelistic negotiations at least in *Mujŏng*. As Lee writes:

For many writers of the 1910s, national literature contained the very history of the emotional, intellectual spiritual life of a people (*minjok*) and was thus, by far the most significant emblem of their cultural uniqueness and identity. Literature is a direct expression of a set of singular traits that inhere in a race of people, i.e. national character (*minjoksŏng*), an idea many East Asian intellectuals accepted as universal truth at the time. An Hwak in “Literature of Korea” proposes, “Politics is what rules the exterior form (*oehyŏng*) of the people while literature is what rules the interior emotion (*naejŏng*) of the people...when trying to revive the political life of a people, one must first revive the ideals of the people...” An Hawk further develops this connection between literature and the ethnonation (*minjok*):

...today the so-called competition between races (*injong*) or ethnonations (*minjok*) can be regarded as a political phenomenon from one perspective but if one investigates the deeper roots, it is a competition of ethnonational character (*minjoksŏng kyŏngjaeng*)...in expressing our distinct characteristics (*t'ukchil*), Korean literature of a new era will arise...

As a human subject with his inherent and distinct psychological faculty constitutes a discrete entity, an ethnonation is also constituted as an entity because of its unique properties that inhere within it as a collective. Privileging the cultural sphere over political, social and economic sectors, Yi Kwang-su also defines ethnonation above all as being defined by the totality

⁸¹⁷ Ibid., p. 307-308 (episode 107).

of its intellectual spiritual and cultural life (*chongsin saengwhal*). For Yi Kwang-su, literature is the best vehicle through which a people can transmit the legacy of their “intellectual/spiritual civilization” (*chongsin munmyǒng*) that is particular to them. Aesthetic hegemony must be joined to ethnonationalist ideology: the modern ideology of aesthetic interpellation and hegemony came to mediate the relation between the modern individual and the modern ethnonational collective...Through the 1910s, Yi Kwang-su, the most prolific and the most influential intellectual of the period, emphasized equally the value of literature and the arts and that of the development of commerce and industries to the process of Korean modern nation-building and self strengthening. In the late 1910s he began to give more weight to the spiritual and cultural reforms.⁸¹⁸

While on the one hand we can see Lee’s observations that literature began to function more in appealing to one’s emotions and thus opening up a space for the figuring of the awakening to an ethnation—both in Yi’s engagement with psychological and emotional depth of his characters in *The Heartless* as well as its thematization of love and its doubling as national awakening—as well as the theoretical desire of modern Korean writers to “liberate” literature “from their subordination to Confucian moral philosophy and political ideology, to be exerted as an independent and even a transcendental sphere and as expressions of “free thought” (*chayu ŭi sasang*).” But on the other hand, we also see the operation of this affective/emotional technology through the very negotiation of both traditional Confucian moral philosophy and political ideology, as well as the spiritual conceptualizations, material considerations and technologies of modern civilization, whether the colonial Japanese or the Western variant, expressed through the modernizing didactic ethos of the novel, which it shares with *Tears of Blood*, but which is also innovated through the use of sarcasm and internal critique—and thus presenting significant heteronomous determinations of the production of ethnonational consciousness as well as interruptions to the exertion of art and literature as an “independent” or “transcendental sphere.” This is clearly apparent in the love triangle—which is not a mere aesthetic device in the novel—but used as a motif to negotiate traditional and modern western values and subjectivities and which is not simply placed in opposition or subsumption, but move along parallel paths until their eventual synthesis via the nation. At the same time, their parallel journeys, which eventually intersect are significantly figured through colonial rail journeys of national awakening. As I discuss below, the discovery of love, both physical and spiritual, which is closely related to the transformations of these and other characters into ‘new human beings’ and their awakening to national consciousness is importantly mediated through the very paradoxical technologies of civilization or modernity, and railway journeys in particular, as we have seen in *Tears of Blood*.

Railroads, Civilization, and Noise

For Yi Kwangsu, occupying the next generation of ‘modern’ writers, and whose formative years coincided with the first decade of colonial rule, the railroads shifted from the imperial metropolis to penetrate the colonial landscape of Korea. In *The Heartless*, while the train is still a key vehicle for transnational migrations for students either to the colonial

⁸¹⁸ Jin-Kyung Lee, “Sovereign Aesthetics, Disciplining Emotion, and Racial Rehabilitation in Colonial Korea 1910-1922,” pp. 94-95.

metropole of Tokyo or world metropolitan centers such as the U.S. for those who are able to make the journey, it is no longer a part of the exclusive terrain of modern Japan or the U.S. but becomes a prominent element of the new urban landscape of Korea. As the train brings Yŏngch'ae and Pyŏng-uk to Seoul Station on route to Japan to study, the narrator interrupts the story to burst into a didactic monologue:

The train arrived at Namdaemun.⁸¹⁹ It was not yet completely dark outside, but electric lights were twinkling in all directions. The sounds of the city—the train, the rickshaws—together with that of wooden shoes clattering on the wide station platform, were very unsettling to the ears of the two young women, who had been in the midst of quiet nature until then. The noises of the city were those of civilization. A nation prospered the louder those noises were. The sounds of wagon wheels, and steam and electric-powered engines combined to give rise to civilization in all its brilliance. Modern civilization was a civilization of noise. There was not yet enough noise in Seoul. It ought to be so noisy in Seoul that people could not hear one another speak if they stood on Chongno in the vicinity of Namdaemun. How pitiful, though. The three hundred thousand people who wore white clothes and lived in Seoul did not know the meaning of this noise. Nor did they care about the noise. It was necessary, however, that they learn to appreciate this noise, and rejoice, and contribute to this noise with their own hands. How many of those who were hurrying over the platform understood the meaning of their busy activity? How many of them knew why so many of those electric lights were lit, and why telegraph machines and telephone equipment made such a cacophony day and night, and why those monstrous trains and electric cars were always running. How many people understood the significance of all that?⁸²⁰

Like the two young women jostled by the strangeness of the city sounds, the answer in the mind of the narrator is of course definitely not enough. If the three thousand white clothed people in Seoul did know the significance of “those monstrous trains” then we could imagine there would be much more noise in Seoul and no need for the narrator’s exhortation. But what exactly is the relationship between the train and the nation that suffers the lack of such noise? As Yi explains elsewhere somewhat less cryptically:

Trains runs to and fro, telegraph wires cross the nation, asphalt roads are built, newspapers roll off modern machines in printing plants brightly lit by electricity. Yet the spiritual life of the nation remains rooted in the past. People ride trains to visit fortune tellers and ceremonies to household gods

⁸¹⁹ Recall Namdaemun which is the site of the main train station depot in Seoul and the historical South Gate of Seoul—as mentioned in Ch’oe’s poem and which Pai pointed out (the train station) was one of the new symbolic points of the new modern colonial city that guided the city’s reorganized urban axes of its spatial ordering. Before the neoclassical Kyŏngsŏng station was built in 1925, a small wooden shed served as the train’s passenger/waiting facilities of the station.

⁸²⁰ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), translated by Ann Sung-hi Lee in *Yi Kwangsu and Modern Korean Literature: Mujŏng* (NY: Cornell East Asia Series, 2005), p. 300. (Translated from *Mujŏng, Maeil sinbo* (1 January-14 June 1917).

are conducted under electric lights...The broad avenues facing the South Gate [Namdaemun] and City Hall represent the modern face of the twentieth century, but inside the gates of common dwellings the reality of our two-faced life is apparent.⁸²¹

On one level, as in *Tears of Blood* the train appears in *Mujöng* likewise both a symbol of civilization and a vehicle of modern national development. However lacking, the unsettling noises of the city—the sound of wooden shoes, wagon wheels, steam and electric engines—could best be heard in the train station. Likewise, the train car was a space in which colonial modernity was ever present. But here, the Japanese are no longer part of the cast of characters even if minor ones such as Major Inoue, or appearing in the guise of the virtuously ‘modern’ but ultimately unloving/disloyal and selfish/self-interested Japanese stepmother. In the all-Korean cast of characters of *Mujöng*, Japanese become largely anonymous emblems and apparitions of colonial modernity in Korea, appearing exclusively inside railways cars and train stations, or inscribed into new urban landscapes in the “large glass windows” of Japanese storefronts, “boxes of matches and kerosene” displayed in the windows,” or the all too familiar vision of Japanese hairstyles and kimonos or Japanese soldiers dressed in “black clothes, and hats with red lines on the edges.”⁸²² The noise of civilization mingled with the noise of Japanese conductors calling out the names of stations at each destination—“Heijo” (the Japanese pronunciation of P’yöngyang) or “Shariin! Shariin!”(the Japanese pronunciation of Sariwön)—as well as the “voice of a youth selling *bento* lunches,” accompanied by the constant glances of “military gendarmes” and the watchful gaze of Japanese passengers.⁸²³ These sounds, sights and gazes both pervaded and punctuated the experience of railway journeys of Korean travelers across national territory.

At the same time, although the narrator likewise exhorts the urgent need for more ‘civilization,’ in the form of national development, unlike *Tears of Blood*, ‘civilization’ leaves behind the less critical representation of progress in which its universal linear progression can simply be mapped onto the geographical progression from Seoul to San Francisco with a layover in Tokyo. As civilization takes on a more complex and contradictory character in Yi’s *Mujöng*, likely influenced in no small part by his travels in segregated train cars between the colony and the metropole and a decade of harsh militaristic colonial rule, as well as the further entrenchment of nationalist thought, history, literature and literary theory, the representation of the journey to national modernity also gains in complexity—reflected in the significantly deeper engagement with the psychological depth of the characters as well as with the material environment of the urban and rural landscapes of these journeys—moving both more inward toward spiritual awakenings as well as outward to the material constructs that enable them. This is reflected firstly in the very structure of the novel, as the eventual journeys to Tokyo and America, which also forms a key motif is preceded in this case by a series of transformative railway journeys across the national interior—where the train itself now structures multiple levels of awakening of both an individual subjective and national identity in varying ways. And secondly in the new ambiguity of the landscape in which the ‘traditional’ rural vs. ‘modern’ urban dichotomous progression is replaced with a more nuanced representation of landscape in which the city comes

⁸²¹ Yi Kwangsu, (The Life Views Based on Fatalism) *Kaebiyok* 2.8 (August 1921), p. 37, quoted in Michael E. Robinson, “Nationalism and the Korean Tradition, 1896-1920: Iconoclasm, Reform, and National Identity,” in *Korean Studies*, Volume 10, (1986), p. 48.

⁸²² Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 199-200 (episode 56).

⁸²³ *Ibid.*, p. 297 (episode 103).

to represent both the locus of civilization and noise, of train stations, electric cars and film houses, as well as the ever present gaze, language and culture of the Japanese, as well as modern spiritual and urban decay—“a world in which one could purchase someone’s body and even their soul if one had the money,” and what might be called criminals and fools of enlightenment — whereby both human dignity as well as one’s enlightened status comes to be judged by superficial appearances of wealth and status.⁸²⁴ Likewise, the rural natural terrains traversed by these railway journeys also become differentiated representing both an idyllic (precolonial) past and ideal (national) future as in the depiction of mountains as viewed through the train window as well as the realities of rural backwardness of the (national) present in the figure of the flood that brings the train to a standstill.⁸²⁵

“*All That is Solid Melts into Air*”

It is apparent throughout the extensive railway journeys of our main characters that frame their various stages and forms of awakening as new and “true human beings” and which

⁸²⁴ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 131 (episode 25). I refer to Yu Kilchun’s characterization of criminals and fools of enlightenment. See my discussion of Yu’s enlightenment treatise in Chapter One.

⁸²⁵ Both Michael D. Shin in “Interior Landscapes: Yi Kwangsu’s “The Heartless” and the Origins of Modern Literature,” in Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 248-287, and Ellie Choi in “Introduction to ‘From Tokyo to Seoul’ (Tonggyŏng eso Kyŏngsŏng kkaji, 1917) and ‘Record of Travels in the Diamond Mountains’ (Kumgangsan yugi, 1922),” in *Azalea: Journal of Korean Literature & Culture*, vol. 4 (2011), pp. 329-336, present interesting and related engagements with the concept of landscape in Yi Kwangsu’s literature, including Mujŏng and other short stories. As my reading of the heterogeneous landscapes of Mujŏng both departs from and intersects with some aspects of each of these readings, I hope to contribute to this interesting conversation. Primarily, Shin applies Karatani Kojin’s concept of “internal landscape” conceived in his reading of Japanese literature as the mutual discovery of landscape and ‘interiority’ to Yi’s literature in order to “use the trope of landscape and the concept of interiority to decode the secondary narratives on writing embedded within [Yi’s] stories” (p. 252). Shin argues that “landscapes functioned as a metonym for Japan” and the discovery of ‘interiority’ defined as “a form of identity...as unchanging essence” is attained in the “process of translation from Japan to Chosŏn--as a solution to both “an intense longing for love” or the “search for *chŏng*” by Yi’s main characters figured as “lonely, isolated men” and the search “for literary form (the ‘expression’ and ‘fulfillment’ of *chŏng*) within which [Yi] could narrate a character’s attainment of the desired object of love” (pp. 252-253). Thus Mujŏng is seen as “a Bildungsroman in which the characters gradually attain interiority” in so far as “the characters [find] *chŏng* [or love] in and projected their interiorities onto each other; another way of putting it is that the characters functioned as landscapes (and as love-objects for each other. In this way the discovery of interiority became natural, and its relation to landscape as well as its source as a performative effect of language became obscured.” (279). Rather than examining landscape as a trope of interiority or unchanging essence, I look at the production of the heterogeneity of the actual landscapes depicted in the text by looking at the role of the train and the railway journeys of the characters as the mediating agent of their various awakenings to national consciousness. I thus see the technology of their awakenings as a key narrative device and which, far from being obscured rather mediated their individual and national modern awakenings. On the other hand Ellie Choi argues that this interiority is unaccomplished in the short stories from 1917 and Mujŏng where the “cultural ground” is not “fertile enough for the cultivation of emotions” and whereby “for a space incomplete in its modernity, heartlessness (*mujŏng*) is a temporary requisite for the modern condition” (333). Choi sees instead in Yi’s travelogues after the 1920s thus importantly after the March 1st Independence movement with the relaxed more permissive cultural rule and Yi’s experience “living outside Japanese influence in Shanghai during his employment (1919-1921) at the exiled Korean Provisional offices in the French Concession” the “discovery of the authentic, deep in the heart of the famous Korean mountains” (335-336). In contrast, once again, I highlight the train as a non-transparent vehicle of the production of landscapes and awakenings to love and nation and relate Yi’s earlier travels across Russia and China as well as back and forth between the colony and periphery to locate both incomplete and heterogeneous landscapes of modernity as well as ideal ethnonationality in the idyllic mountains as well flooded plains in Mujŏng.

connects the rural and urban landscapes of Korea as much as to the outside world, that the train is not simply a symbol of modern western or colonial technology moving steadily across homogenous, empty time. As the novel depicts a modern world permeated with flux and ceaseless change where nothing appears stable or fixed—where “all that is solid melts into air,” we see this dynamism of modernity, as both doubled in and structured through the medium/technology of modern railroads. If according to Yi, the problem was that despite the appearance of new technologies of ‘civilization,’ the white-clothed people’s lives were still rooted in the spiritual life of the past—thus riding trains to go seek fortune-tellers like pouring old wine in new bottles, Yi needed to make these new bottles incubators/mediums for the conversion of old to new wine affecting transformations—both tragically destructive and creative—of both the landscapes it traversed as the people it transported. We first encounter this sense of uncertainty and the abruptness of change that characterizes the ‘modern’ environment of the novel in Hyŏng-sik’s reflections on the cataclysmic turn of fate that had befallen his childhood benefactor, Scholar Pak, a *yangban* modern educator who spent his life and all his money educating orphans and other children like Hyŏng-sik on the new learning, and his daughter Yŏng-ch’ae, Hyŏng-sik’s childhood sweetheart, versed in the Confucian classics of the *Elementary Learning*, *Biographies of Virtuous Women*, and the *Classic of Poetry*, who had since become a *kisaeng* in an effort to earn enough money to free her father and brothers from prison. As Hyŏng-sik listened to Yŏng-ch’ae’s story upon their sudden reunion after close to a decade:

Hyŏng-sik thought of Sŏn-hyŏng. She and Yŏng-ch’ae were both beautiful and had been adored by their parents, but why were their fates so different? One of them had parents, a home, and wealth, and could attend school in peace and ease, and was even going to the United States the next year, whereas the other had no parents or siblings [her father and brothers having been imprisoned on false charges brought about by one of Scholar Pak’s students having stolen money from a rich neighbor to give to Scholar Pak without his being aware and who have all since died in prison], no home, and no one to rely on, and spent her days in tears. If Sŏn-hyŏng had been shown Yŏng-ch’ae’s plight, she would most certainly have considered her a person from a different world. She would have thought she was someone who could never become like Yŏng-ch’ae, and that Yŏng-ch’ae could never become like herself. She was someone who had been especially favored by heaven, whereas Yŏng-ch’ae had incurred heaven’s divine wrath and punishment. Rich people thus ignored the poor and treated them with contempt. They considered the poor as unworthy of their notice. When people who lived by what was called their “own means” saw beggars on the street who were shivering from starvation, they would treat them with contempt, as if the beggars were dogs or pigs, and make fun of them, and spit at them, and kick them. But where is the beggar who does not have a rich ancestor, or a rich person, who does not have a beggar for an ancestor. Looking at a rich person, one would think they had been rich since creation, and would be rich until the end of the universe. But one of their ancestors once fought over cold, leftover rice with the dogs at the front door of another rich man’s house, and before long there would come a day when their own descendants would do the same. Looking at Scholar Pak eight years ago, who would have thought that Scholar Pak’s daughter would come to this? All people were human

beings alike; how much richer or nobler could one person be than others? It was like climbing a small rock and looking down at other people saying, “You there, I am above you.” How much higher can a person be than others? Someone else, moreover, had stood upon that very rock the day before, and someone else would be there the next day. To feed a cold spoonful of rice to a beggar today was to ask that beggar’s descendants to do the same favor to one’s own descendants; and likewise, to mistreat and ridicule a beggar today was to ask that beggar’s descendants to do the same to one’s own descendants. Who knew how wealthy and noble Yǒng-ch’ae might be in the future, and how poor and lowly Sǒn-hyǒng might become?⁸²⁶

As Hyǒng-sik here reflects on the unpredictable and incessant flux of people’s fate and fortunes forming the interconnected and potentially interchangeable yet self-consciously distanced ‘worlds’ of the rich and the poor, prompted by recollections of his past and the confrontation with Yǒng-ch’ae’s unbelievable present, he is likewise prompted by the train ride to P’yǒngyang from Seoul in search of Yǒng-ch’ae who had left to throw herself in the Taedong river upon being raped, to recognize similarly distanced and differentiated but potentially interchangeable worlds of himself and the brothel madam who was in part responsible for Yǒng-ch’ae’s rape and who had since awakened to her “true self” and was accompanying Hyǒng-sik to find her. As Hyǒng-sik ruminates on the contingency of individual circumstance and the fluidity of human disposition, he likewise arrives at the awareness of both the corruptibility and reformability of not only Koreans but also Japanese and Chinese, whom he sees as all constituting at base a universal world of human beings:

Hyǒng-sik eventually fell asleep for a while, but opened his eyes again with a start. Some passengers were leaning against the windows, some folded their arms over their chest, and some had fallen into an exhausted sleep, their heads thrown back. The only passenger awake was a man sitting in a seat across from Hyǒng-sik...He looked like a labor supervisor. He sat blinking his eyes and smoking. Eventually the light of dawn began to shine through the windows. Hyǒng-sik looked at the old woman, who sat in the seat opposite him. She was drooling as she slept. Disgusting woman he thought, and frowned. He thought about the old woman’s life. She had probably grown up in a lowly household, and had never seen good deeds or heard good words. After she was sold to be a *kisaeng*, she met no one but beastlike playboys, or beastlike *kisaeng*. All her life she had heard and spoken nothing but lascivious, vile language. If the old woman had learned to read and write, and had heard the wise teachings of the sages of antiquity, she might have had thoughts worthy of a human being...Since she had spent her entire life in a sordid world of sin, her beastlike mind had flourished, while her human mind had not had a chance to open its eyes. She had never heard of goodness or virtue, and had never met a good person or virtuous person. She therefore thought the whole world was like the society she knew, and that all people were like herself...She was no different from most people who consider

⁸²⁶ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), pp. 92-3 (episode 7).

themselves good. She had never had a chance to meet a “true human being,” nor did she try to meet such a person. She had likewise never tried to become a “true human being.” She thought she was a “true human being.” She had seen Yǒng-ch’ae morning and night for seven years, but had never seen the true human being that was Yǒng-ch’ae, only the flesh and bones of a *kisaeng* named Wor-hyang. When Yǒng-ch’ae tried to protect her chastity, the old woman thought she was foolish, naïve and stubborn. The old woman thought it was a good thing for a *kisaeng* to give herself to any man...Hyǒng-sik looked at the old woman’s face again. This time he felt sorry for her instead of hating her and thinking of her as disgusting. If he had been in her circumstances, he would have turned out the same as the old woman. And if she had received about fifteen years of education as had Hyǒng-sik, she would have been like Hyǒng-sik himself. He looked at the various individuals who were fast asleep in the train car. There were laborers, gentlemen, greedy-looking types and evil-looking characters. There were Koreans, Japanese, Chinese. If they had awoken and looked at one another, some might regard the others with contempt. Some might regard the others with envy. They might consider one another evil, or ignorant, or rude. *Had they grown up under the same circumstances, with the same education, the same moral influences, the same blessings, then, in spite of differences in heredity, they all would have turned out to be equally good people.* Hyǒng-sik looked at the old woman’s face again as she slept. Hyǒng-sik felt a kind of affection for the old woman this time. She too was a human being, just like Hyǒng-sik and Yǒng-ch’ae...Some people loved, some hated...Some became *yangban*, some became lowly people...They were all human beings to begin with, though...Hyǒng-sik was happy and thankful that the old woman had discovered her true self for the first time and thankful that her soul had awakened, when she saw Yǒng-ch’ae’s resolve to die. She had wept real tears for the first time in her life, and was going all the way to P’yǒngyang to save Yǒng-ch’ae. Unable to contain his feelings of affection for the old woman, Hyǒng-sik pulled the old woman’s blanket up over her stomach.⁸²⁷

Observing a sea of different people and their particular appearances in the train car, Hyǒng-sik comes to see an underlying unity among them as he strips away and relativizes the differences of their circumstances—allowing him to see most clearly what both separated as well as connected him and this old woman whom he originally detested for the fate of Yǒng-ch’ae. If the old woman’s particular provinciality had previously led her to see the world through the narrow perspective of her “beastlike mind” stemming from years of abuse and bad influence as well as the lack of education, then the awakening of her “human mind” instills in Hyǒng-sik (and the reader), both the awareness of the universal reformability of human character, as well as the significance of “education” and “moral influence” despite “differences in heredity”—which Hyǒng-sik applies across the class/status-striated society of Koreans but also extends to the Chinese and Japanese who occupy the train car. Thus we see in Hyǒng-sik’s realization as we

⁸²⁷ Ibid., p. 196 (episode 54). My emphasis

will with the other characters, whose individual awakenings likewise take on a universal leveling and relativizing function mediated by the modern integrative technology and space of railroads which enables human connectivity (empathy) as much the awakening of emotion and affect for the other, the awakening to identity that is neither racially defined nor fixed. As Kenneth Wells has written about the impact of Christianity upon Yi Kwangsu and other Korean reformers conceptualization of ethno-national identity:

Although the constant tension in Yun Ch'ih'o's relation to nationalism was more pronounced than most, Protestants more or less consistently urged that national identity be sought not in ethnic origin but in shared beliefs and values. This did not mean ethnicity was considered irrelevant to nationality. On the contrary, race was taken for granted. That a nation-state should form around an ethno-linguistic group was viewed as a natural fact, neither surprising nor debatable....Yi Kwangsu was convinced that race was inescapable, one of the fundamental elements of existence. Yet race was therefore merely a given, a tabula rasa: it needed to be molded into a form and this is where the focus had to be. Amid highly charged emotions, Protestants hoped to draw fellow Koreans back from the abyss of nationalism shaped by racial hatred.⁸²⁸

...Secondly, there was the associated theory that the nation as a cultural entity logically preceded the political state. On this basis, Yi Kwangsu in particular argued that on the historical plane also it was possible to develop the former where the latter was withdrawn, and in this way, indeed, the two would have to come together.⁸²⁹

Rather than identity as unchanging essence or a particular ethno-national character, it is its reformability grounded on a universal commonality of human beings that forms the basis for the very awakening to an ethnonation for Yi's characters: "Hyöng-sik believed that while all human beings were the same by nature, an individual or society could be improved and uplifted with the effort of that society or individual."⁸³⁰

As Hyöng-sik arrives in P'yöngyang, he observes a similar inconstancy in the abruptly altered landscape of P'yöngyang with the penetration of "railroads, telegraphs...torpedo boats" as well as new modern institutions of government and personnel. Here the enlarged and expanded vision of human connectedness and universality is also accompanied by the destruction and disconnection of a past 'world,' whose traces largely remain in human and architectural ruins linked through Hyöng-sik's memories. Walking through "Ch'ilsong Gate" the northern gate of the once walled city of P'yöngyang with the young *kisaeng* Kye-yang to visit the grave of Yöng-ch'ae' father Scholar Pak, Hyöng-sik likewise observes the 'worlds' of tradition and modernity that similarly both (spatially) coexist and remain profoundly (temporally) distanced:

⁸²⁸ Kenneth M. Wells, *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea 1896-1937* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), p. 175.

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

⁸³⁰ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917)," p. 209 (episode 60).

The streets were lined with deteriorating houses. There used to be passersby before the railroad was built, and shops would sell wine and rice cakes. Nowadays, though, there was not so much as the shadow of a person, except on market days. Outside the gate was a wooden platform bed made of a piece of wood that looked like a door...An old man sat idly on the bed, swaying his body back and forth, and watched them talk by. He wore an old t'anggon, or hat made of horsehair that was worn over his topknot, and dirty cotton clothing that seemed too heavy for the hot summer weather. His face was red, and there was a light in his eyes. There was something very righteous and dignified about him. Hyŏng-sik recognized the old man as one of the men who used to disport themselves joyfully in the provincial governor's offices, when Korea was still the Korea of the old...Then the world had changed abruptly ever since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, and the Kabo reforms, and many old men had fallen behind the times, and now passed their days in desolate loneliness...Before 1894, when the old man was in his prime, he must have thought the rivers and mountains of P'yŏngyang, and all the people in the world, existed for him. With the cannonfire from Ulmil Pavilion in 1894, though, the peaceful times he had dreamed of were shattered, and a new age began, like a flash of lightning in the darkness. He became a person abandoned by the world, and young people whom he did not know and had never seen before, took over. He knew nothing about railroads, telegraphs, telephones, submarines or torpedo boats. He lived outside of Ch'ilsongmun, less than five *li* away from Taedongmun Street, and yet he knew nothing about what took place everyday and every night within the city of P'yŏngyang. There was nothing in his head but the traditional provincial governor's hall of office (*Sŏnwhadang*); he knew nothing about the modern provincial government's offices (*toch'ong*). Since he would never realize what this new world was like, it was as though he were living outside of the world, even though he dwelled within it. Hyŏng-sik and the old man were people of different countries, who did not speak or write the same language, thought Hyŏng-sik. He is a man behind the times, a man living in the past. Hyŏng-sik thought of his late, paternal grand-uncle, who passed away never having understood the new world, no matter how Hyŏng-sik tried to talk to him about it. Hyŏng-sik felt an unspeakable sadness for the old man.⁸³¹

Like the old man “abandoned by the world” and outmoded by “railroads, telegraphs” and “torpedo boats,” Hyŏng-sik both recollects and quietly mourns the world of his youth and another Hyŏng-sik who was likewise both obliterated and transformed by the forces that transformed the physical and human landscapes of P'yŏngyang seemingly overnight. As in *Tears of Blood*, the Sino-Japanese War had presented a historical anchor and pivot for both an individual spiritual death/loss and awakening for Hyŏng-sik:

He thought of himself as a boy walking this very path, wearing leggings, and a white ribbon on his braid.⁸³² The boy knew the old man, he thought. The

⁸³¹ Ibid., pp. 214-5 (episode 63).

⁸³² White ribbons were/are worn in the hair by family members of the deceased as a sign of mourning in Korea.

boy who wondered at the large glass windows on Taedongmun Street and the steamboats that clanged on the Taedong River—he knew the old man. The boy had long since died, though. He had died when he saw the steamboats with the paddle wheel that turned and the horn that tooted. A new Yi Hyŏng-sik took his place, in the same way that the traditional provincial governor’s hall of office had given way to the offices of provincial government, and the provincial governor had become a provincial minister. Hyŏng-sik looked at Kye-hyang as she walked beside him. He thought of the distance between Kye-hyang and the old man. That distance was infinite.⁸³³

As the recognition of the “human being” of the old brothel madam had filled Hyŏng-sik with affection, Hyŏng-sik’s recollection and his personal past intertwined with the ruinous landscape of P’yŏngyang’s present fills him with a mournful sadness for the passing of the old world with its outmoded scholar-bureaucrats and the Hyŏng-sik of the past, embodied in the historical life of the old city walls:

They walked southward along the sloping path at the foot of the city walls. Small leaves of grass hung limply, slightly wilted in the hot sun. Hyŏng-sik looked at the crumbling walls, and thought about the ancestors who had built those walls, and the prosperity of the ancestors, witnessed by the walls. He wondered how many times those walls had been struck by bullets and cannonballs. The walls that stood above the sloping path seemed to have emotions and tears, like a human being. They looked sad, as though they had much to say but no one to listen to them.⁸³⁴

“All that is Sacred is Profaned”: Yŏng-ch’ae’s first Awakening

If the tragic development and the reversal of fortune of Yŏng-ch’ae set the tone for the unpredictable flux and instability of modern life which characterizes the novelistic landscape of both human and physical destruction and rebirth, then Yŏng-ch’ae’s goodness as embodied in the integrity of her old world values of filial piety and feminine chastity served as a touchstone and moral compass for Hyŏng-sik to see beyond the superficial and fleeting appearances of wealth and status, as well as disrepute and poverty, an underlying conviction that “all people were human beings alike,” and the potential reformability of the most abused and vile people into “true human beings.” Now as Hyŏng-sik read Yŏng-ch’ae letter after her being raped and her departure from Seoul, which informed him of her plans to join the virtuous *kisaeng* Kye Wor-hwa⁸³⁵ of P’yŏngyang in the waters of the Taedong river, he was both “moved by [her] chasteness...[and] even respected the pure, sanctified spirit with which she wanted to take her

⁸³³ Ibid, p. 216 (episode 63).

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ The *kisaeng* Kye Wor-hwa, who was Yŏng-ch’ae’s mentor in P’yŏngyang is an interesting tragic character. She both embodies the ideal feminine virtues of Confucian thought as well both embody and keeps alive the arts and letters of classical Tang Chinese culture (thus signifying a pre-Opium war/ pre Sino-Japanese War defeated China) as well as Korean literature and song. She was a lonely figure who lamented the fact that there were no such illustrious poets in present day P’yŏngyang, until she heard the poetry of the nationalist Principal Ham of P’aesong school, and upon finding out his identity and resigning herself to never being able to know him except in passing (due to their status difference), she jumps into the Taedong river and kills herself. (episodes 31-34).

own life” but thought “it was wrong of her to end of life with so many responsibilities.”⁸³⁶ For in the mind of Hyŏng-sik, “human life” went beyond the particular responsibility to any “one moral law, but existed for all the myriad responsibilities in human life.”⁸³⁷ As Marx had seen religion and ideology to function like the “upside-down” mechanism of the “camera obscura” as a power over the real lives and historical conditions of men,⁸³⁸ Hyŏng-sik likewise inverts Confucian morality as the particular conceptual creation of human life that could and needed to be both particularized and displaced:

Human life was not contained within concepts such as loyalty or filial piety, but rather, loyalty and filial piety derived from human life. Human life was not fixed to concepts such as “loyalty,” or “filial piety,” but embraced concepts such as loyalty, filial piety, chastity and honor. It was like the way the life of the universe did not consist only of the North Star (Polaris), or the White Star (Sirius), or the sun but included them along with other larger stars and smaller stars, and all microscopic things on earth...Human life would, of necessity, choose a few of these phenomena among the myriad human phenomena, depending on ethnicity, conditions of a specific nation, and era, and would make these the center of human activity. These are what are known as belief, morality, law and ethics. In order for the life of a society to be complete, each of its members must observe the moral rules and laws of that society. This was not however, the entirety of life. Life was absolute, morality and laws were relative...Heartless society had forced frail Yŏng-ch’ae to be unfilial and unchaste...Filial piety and chastity were only two of her responsibilities in life. Though they were important parts of her life, a part was smaller than the whole...she still had countless other responsibilities in her life. There was the responsibility of loyalty, and her responsibility to the world, and to animals, and to the mountains, and streams, and stars and to God, and to Buddha.⁸³⁹

Thus unlike the virtuous Kye Wor-hwa and her father Scholar Pak, who were both “ahead of their time” and “had awakened too early,”⁸⁴⁰ although Yŏng-ch’ae had resigned to throw herself in the Taedong River, as she boards a train to P’yŏngyang, she encounters a female student Pyŏng-uk, a like-minded ‘modern’ thinker as Hyŏng-sik (but we might say more radically ‘modern’), who becomes both a catalyst to and comrade in Yŏng-ch’ae new awakening and journey to a new life as well as the new ideas and responsibilities of a new civilization.⁸⁴¹

We might see a glimpse of Ongnyŏn in Pyŏng-uk, who is returning from studying music in Tokyo to visit her family in Hwangju. She is likewise misrecognized as Japanese due to her Japanese clothing, while at the same time Pyŏng-uk misrecognizes Yŏng-ch’ae as a fellow student. As Pyŏng-uk helps Yŏng-ch’ae remove a piece of coal dust from her eyes she comes to

⁸³⁶ Ibid., pp. 193-4 (episode 53).

⁸³⁷ Ibid.

⁸³⁸ Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* (NY: International Publishers, 2004), p. 47.

⁸³⁹ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 194.

⁸⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 217 (episode 64).

⁸⁴¹ In *Tears of Blood*, Ongnyŏn’s mother also threw herself in the Taedong River, but was saved by village fishermen. Similarly Ongnyŏn resigns to throw herself into Osaka Harbor but was saved by the dream apparition of her mother.

hear of Yǒng-ch'ae's story and her plans to kill herself. As Pyǒng-uk objects and persuades Yǒng-ch'ae otherwise, she opens her up to the concept of romantic love as part of an enlarged conception of what it means to be 'a woman' beyond her particularistic commitments and dictates of Confucian morality:

“First of all, you have been living an illusion. You saved your virginity for a name named Hyǒng-sik, even though you did not love him...If you do love Hyǒng-sik, then devote yourself mind and body to him from now on. If you do not love him, find another man.”

...

How can you regard someone whose face you scarcely know and whose mind you do not know, as your intended? Such are the shackles of outdated thought...Your past is a dream. Your true life begins from now on.”⁸⁴²

As Pyǒng-uk proceeds to debunk the various Confucian concepts that Yǒng-ch'ae had thus lived by, she challenges the concept of “the ‘three obediences,’”⁸⁴³ by pointing to its particularistic patriarchal construct and the potential contradiction it poses to other Confucian mores such as filial piety and respect for elders. Pyǒng-uk argues that: “these words express the capricious cruelty and violence of men. They show disregard for woman's character. It is only right that a mother should teach her son and have authority. It is a grievous injustice for a parent to have to be submissive towards their son or daughter.”⁸⁴⁴ Concluding her attack on Confucian morals, Pyǒng-uk asserts:

“You have been a slave of such outdated thought, and have tasted futile suffering. Free yourself from those shackles. Awake from your dream. Be a person who lives for herself. Attain freedom.”

“Then what should I do?” asked Yǒng-ch'ae...

“A woman is a human being, too,” the woman student said. “Since a woman is a human being, she has many roles. She can be a daughter, a wife, a mother. There are many ways she can fulfill her role in life, whether through religion, science, or art; or work for society or the state. In the past, though the only role for women has been that of wife, and even that was decided by others' intentions and others' words. Until now, women have been nothing but an accouterment for men, a possession. You were trying to go from being a possession of your father, to being a possession of Mr. Yi...We too must be human beings. We must be women, but we must first be human beings. There are many things for you to do. You were not born only for the sake of your father and Mr. Yi. You were born for the tens of millions of Koreans of past generations, our 1.6 billion fellow countrymen in the present, and the tens of millions of our descendants in future generations...”

“Then what should I do?”

“You must begin a new life from today.”

⁸⁴² Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 270 (episode 89).

⁸⁴³ The Neo-Confucian ethic for a woman to obey her father, her husband, and then her son after her husband's death.

⁸⁴⁴ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 272 (episode 89).

...
“Yes?” said Yǒng-ch’ae.
“From now on, you must live according to your own wishes.”
The train emerged from the mountains, and headed toward the fields of Sǒhǔng. A clear stream kept reappearing beside the train, now on the left, now on the right.⁸⁴⁵

Here in Yǒng-ch’ae’s awakening we might see something resembling what Benedict Anderson has described as the “revolutionary moment” of Is’s “imagining of collective seriality” in Prameodya Ananta Toer’s tale *Dia Jang Menjerah* (“She Who Gave Up”), which forms the model of politicization accorded to the universality of unbound seriality.⁸⁴⁶ As Anderson quotes from the story “which describes how Is, teenage elder sister of the tale’s heroine comes to join the radical organization Pesindo (Socialist Youth of Indonesia) in a revolutionary upsurge that followed immediately after the end of the brutal Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942-45):”

By now, Is knew the society she was entering. She had found a circle of acquaintances far wider than the circle of her brothers, sisters and parents. She now occupied a defined position in that society: as a woman, as a typist in a government office, as a free individual. She had become a new human being, with new understanding, new tales to tell, new perspectives, new attitudes, new interests—newness that she had managed to pluck and assemble from her acquaintance. And all of this proceeded, untouched, amid the suffering of day-to-day existence.⁸⁴⁷

As Anderson elaborates, “The circle of Is’ brothers, sisters, and parents is without series. But at the revolutionary moment, to which she makes her small contribution, she imagines herself, for the first time in her tender life, serially: as ‘a’ woman, ‘a’ typist, ‘a’ free individual, ‘a’ new human being. This serialization so transforms her consciousness that everything to her now glows new. But these series, in their plasticity and universality, can never appear in the census, and not merely because they cannot be enumerated and totaled. Furthermore, it is clear that she sees these series as of a kind, so that being a woman, a typist, and a new human being fulfill rather than counteract her commitment to the struggle for her country’s freedom. We understand, too, that the series mentioned are at any moment available for kaleidoscopic transformation, enlargement and contraction. Nothing is fixed or fated in stone. Tomorrow, she may become ‘a’ revolutionary, ‘a’ prisoner, ‘a’ youth, ‘a’ spy, indeed ‘a’ nationalist in that boundless, but grounded universal series that included in 1946, Clement Attlee, Jawaharlal Nehru, but only on a provisional basis... We may not share her young womanhood, her typing skills, her native language, her religion, or her culture, but she speaks to us not, ethnographically, as an informant, but as a member of series that are open to us if we wish to act on them.”⁸⁴⁸ As Pyǒng-uk frees Yǒng-ch’ae from her narrow Confucian conception of her position as a woman restricted by the particularistic relation to her father or Hyǒng-sik, she likewise brings her into a

⁸⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 273 (episode 90).

⁸⁴⁶ Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*, (London: Verso, 1998; reprinted 2002), p. 40.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 41.

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 41-2.

new conception of womanhood grounded on a universal serial conception of a human being, whereby she is not only confined to being a daughter, a mother, or a wife, but opens her up to new roles and responsibilities in her capacity as a human being potentially encompassing—a religious leader, a scientist, an artist, a government official or a social activist. However, in the structure of Yi’s novel, as Yǒng-ch’ae’s awakening moves from the very civilizational proxy of the modern train to the “wide open spaces” of nature where as “one’s body feel[s] free and relaxed,” it forms a sort of parenthesis much like the way the lush and fertile nature shields the girls from the “prison” like conditions of the city of Seoul or P’yǒngyang, where “even one’s mind begins to stink.”⁸⁴⁹ Thus in a structural parenthetical form, the modern railway journey opens up for the girls in this case the vast plains and fertile landscapes of the Korean countryside which appears largely untouched by the harsh realities of colonial modern Korea that we have seen permeated by the “uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation.”⁸⁵⁰

When the train arrived at Pyǒng-uk’s destination she takes Yǒng-ch’ae home with her to spend the following weeks in the idyllic countryside surrounded by Pyǒng-uk’s multi-generational loving family. The scenes of the girls’ harmonious union with each other and the beautiful and fertile nature in Hwangju markedly stands apart from the alternately tragic, farcical and awkward tableaux of the “maelstrom of modern life”⁸⁵¹ presented throughout the novel thus far. Nature is likewise imbued with an intense dynamism but it becomes both a positively creative force as well as maternalized. As Pyǒng-uk exclaims: “Rice, water, this honeydew melon: these are all mother’s milk... The sky is clear, the sun is warm, the mountains are green, the waters of the stream are flowing nearby, and those grasses are growing vigorously. And we are sitting in the midst of all this. It’s wonderful!”⁸⁵² The lush watermelon patches and clean “wide open spaces” of the “vastness of nature” moreover provide a space for the girls to cultivate and share their dreams and nurture each others talents:⁸⁵³

Yǒng-ch’ae learned new knowledge from Pyǒng-uk, and had a taste of Western emotions. Pyǒng-uk learned traditional knowledge from Yǒng-ch’ae, and had a taste for Eastern emotions. Pyǒng-uk had disliked anything that was outdated. After coming into contact with Yǒng-ch’ae’s thorough understanding of traditional thought, though, Pyǒng-uk realized that there were appealing aspects to even traditional thought.⁸⁵⁴

Through the budding friendship Pyǒng-uk and Yǒng-ch’ae, nestled in the quiet and idyllic countryside, the novel presents an ideal blending of Eastern and Western culture, thought and emotions as perhaps a model for ‘Korean’ modern art and literature.⁸⁵⁵ It also enables the remarkable conversion of the *kisaeng* to a student—fitting the liberating aspect of the sense of flux and dynamism of the novel. Like the solidarity and mutual assistance between Ongnyǒn

⁸⁴⁹ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 294 (episode 101).

⁸⁵⁰ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 223.

⁸⁵¹ Berman, p. 16.

⁸⁵² Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 294 (episode 101).

⁸⁵³ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 275 (episode 91).

⁸⁵⁵ Thus in contrast to Michael Shin’s reading, as I focus on the train’s mediatory role of opening up various landscapes in the novel, I see the initial opening to a modern Korean literature in this idyllic parenthesis bracketed from the colonial confines of modernity.

and Ku Wansŏ we saw in *Tears of Blood*, Yŏng-ch'ae and Pyŏng-uk present a parallel scenario but in a significantly more radical and iconoclastic fashion. The *kisaeng* and the female student at this time were both manifestations of most 'modern women' in Korea but their class/status distinctions also situated them at opposite poles and thus sociality worlds apart.⁸⁵⁶ Once again we see the horizontal leveling effect emphasized in national activist literature, but whereas in *Tears of Blood*, this occurred in the parenthetical encounters among diasporic Korean students in faraway lands, here it occurs nestled in the parenthesis of a beautiful, serene, and uncorrupted nature. As Yŏng-ch'ae decides to join Pyŏng-uk on her return to school in Japan to likewise study singing and voice, and the girls re-embark on the train, amidst drawn-out and tearful farewells with Pyŏng-uk's extended family, the novel brings us out of this idyllic parenthesis to the concluding train ride and the final stage of awakening—which confronts these two young women as well as their fellow compatriots with a less benevolent face of Mother Nature.

“...And Man is at Last Compelled to Face with Sober Senses, his Real Conditions of Life and his Relations with his Kind”: *The Collective Awakening to Nation*

As the train carrying the two women heading south from Hwangju towards Pusan⁸⁵⁷ reaches Namdaemun in Seoul, Hyŏng-sik and Sŏn-hyŏng also embark on their journey to study in the United States:

Hyŏng-sik thought that nothing but happiness awaited him. He felt nothing but happiness as he received his friend's farewells when leaving Namdaemun. His chest tightened with sorrow when he saw Hŭi-gyŏng and his friends standing behind the other well-wishers and looking at him. However, all of his sadness disappeared when he saw Sŏn-hyŏng standing beside him. Hyŏng-sik and Sŏn-hyŏng would be going to the other side of the earth, over twenty thousand li away, and when they had joyously finished their studies, they would return arm in arm to Namdaemun to cheering crowds. The people standing here would congratulate him with even greater emotion, and greet him with more respect. The mere thought made him feel affectionately towards Seoul and Namdaemun for the first time. Namdaemun seemed to exist only for the purpose of sending off and greeting happy, fortunate Hyŏng-sik.⁸⁵⁸

But as the train departs and the characters come to discover that they are all aboard the same train, the train throws them once again into an emotional and political “maelstrom of

⁸⁵⁶ See for example, in Hyŏn Jin-gŏn's short story “A Lucky Day” from 1924 of a rickshaw driver in colonial Seoul: “After a little while a train came, and quite a crowd of people poured out in the direction of the tramcar depot. Among them, a woman who looked like an ex-*kisaeng* or playgirl student, with a western hair-do and wearing high heel shoes and even a cape thrown over her shoulders, caught Kim Chŏmji's fare-searching eye. He stole up beside her. ‘Won't you take a rickshaw, ma'am?’ Whether she was a student or whatever she was, she put on a exceedingly haughty expression for a moment, her lips sealed tight, and she didn't even spare Kim Chŏmji a glance. Kim Chŏmji kept watching her expression closely like a beggar pleading.” Hyŏn Jin-gŏn, “A Lucky Day” (1924), in *A Washed Out Dream*, trans. by Kevin O'Rourke (NY: Larchwood Publications Ltd.), pp. 198-9.

⁸⁵⁷ The two women heading to Tokyo and Hyŏng-sik and Sŏn-hyŏng heading for the U.S. would both have to ride to Pusan together and transfer to a boat to Shimonoseki, Japan from where the women will proceed to Tokyo, and Hyŏng-sik and Sŏn-hyŏng would depart by ship from Yokohama to San Francisco.

⁸⁵⁸ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 310 (episode 109).

modernity.”⁸⁵⁹ For Hyŏng-sik, the realization that Yŏng-ch’ae is alive leads him to both reflect on his “heartless” behavior towards his never fully searching for her body in P’yŏngyang and thereafter quickly becoming engaged to Sŏn-hyŏng, as well as raise doubts about his professed ‘civilized’ love for Sŏn-hyŏng. As Hyŏng-sik desires to see Yŏng-ch’ae and feels torn over his affection for the two women, the narrator questions: “Was Hyŏng-sik’s love any different from that commonly felt by men who are infatuated with the looks of beautiful women such as *kisaeng*? Could he say after all that his love was a love baptized by civilization and one that involved all his character?”⁸⁶⁰ Hyŏng-sik comes to the realization that both his modern attitude towards love and his love for Sŏn-hyŏng, though it may be distinguished from “his fellow countrymen’s attitude that love was just a diversion, an amusement,” was nonetheless superficial, underdeveloped, and lacking a strong foundation.⁸⁶¹

Hyŏng-sik believed that love was one of the most important and most sacred aspects of human spirituality. His love for Sŏn-hyŏng thus was very meaningful and sacred to him, and he thought it a great spiritual revolution in comparison to the attitudes of his fellow countrymen. His attitude towards love was religiously fervent and reverent. Though he did not think that love was all there was to life, he did think that one could decide one’s views of life in accordance with one’s attitudes towards love. His love for Sŏn-hyŏng had been too naïve, though, now that he thought about it. It had been too weak in its foundations, and had been insubstantial.⁸⁶²

At the same time these doubts open up a Pandora’s box of skepticism over his presumption of his maturity and role as a leader qualified to “teach about civilization and life to students.”⁸⁶³ He was embarrassed to realize that while “he had tried to take on the role of an adult because he was in a society where there were no adults,” he himself “was still a child.”⁸⁶⁴

I thought I knew the road that Korea should take, he thought. I thought I had a firm grasp of the ideals that Korean people and Korean educators should have. However this too was nothing more than childish thinking. I still do not know Korea’s past or present, he thought. In order to learn about Korea’s past he would need to cultivate an expert understanding of history, and research Korean history in detail. Moreover, in order to learn about Korea’s present, he would need to understand modern civilization, the world situation, and cultivate the judgment necessary to understand society and civilization. Only then could he research in detail Korea’s present condition. He would have to have sufficient understanding of Korea’s past and present in order to know what direction Korea should take.⁸⁶⁵

⁸⁵⁹ Berman, p. 16.

⁸⁶⁰ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 322 (episode 114).

⁸⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 323 (episode 115).

⁸⁶² *Ibid.*

⁸⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

This both historical and comparative task and endeavor Hyŏng-sik realizes as necessary to the search for the “road that Korea should take” is remarkably similar to Yu Kilchun’s ideas of “genuine enlightenment” which he distinguished from “illusory enlightenment” in his 1890s Korean enlightenment treatise.⁸⁶⁶ For Hyŏng-sik, this realization also presents the project of Korea’s ‘enlightenment and civilization’ with an ethical dilemma: “I must have some standard with which to decide what is right and what is good. Do I have such a standard though? Am I indeed a person of self-awareness?”⁸⁶⁷ As we saw most clearly in the preceding section with Yŏng-ch’ae’s awakening, Yŏng-ch’ae’s goodness amidst her tragic developments had been a sort of moral compass for Hyŏng-sik to evaluate and see through the inherently unstable and superficial appearances and states of wealth and poverty, repute and disrepute to the common humanity beneath such differences which for Hyŏng-sik was both separable from and suspended within and contingent upon the unpredictable flux that characterized modern life—like a palimpsest that could be written and re-written according to the circumstances of life and history. But as Yŏng-ch’ae herself is awakening to the new civilization, the question arises as to where does one find the ethical and moral standards with which to evaluate the various new political, social, religious ideas of the new civilization that the new society seeks to adopt for modernization.

With these reflections, Hyŏng-sik comes to sense a more horizontal affinity with Sŏn-hyŏng, whom he had long regarded as a pupil rather than an equal, not unlike Ku Wansŏ’s self-depreciating gesture of proposing to Ongnyŏn in his inferior English. Moreover, for Hyŏng-sik, it also awakens in him new feelings of a brotherly rather than romantic love for Sŏn-hyŏng:

They seemed to be brother and sister who had lost the traditions of thought transmitted for generations by their ancestors, and were wandering about, not knowing what would be appropriate for them to choose from the confusion of Western thought. They had been thrown into a world without standards for life, or ideas of nation, and without someone to guide them in the world... She seemed to be his sister, rather than his wife, and they were both trying to find a way, hand in hand, bereaved of parents. We are on our way to learn, he thought. Since you and I are both children, we are going far way to a civilized nation in order to learn.⁸⁶⁸

Hyŏng-sik new feelings for Sŏn-hyŏng were moreover extended to Yŏng-ch’ae and Pyŏng-uk, who were likewise departing on similar journeys as himself and Sŏn-hyŏng:

He had feelings of affection for all three of the young women--Sŏn-hyŏng, Yŏng-ch’ae and Pyŏng-uk. His imagination took flight, and he thought of Yi Hŭi-gyŏng and his group, the students of the Kyŏngsŏng School, and innumerable students and children he had glimpsed on the streets of the capital and whose faces and names he did not recognize or know. They all seemed to be seeking and crying out for a path they should take, just like

⁸⁶⁶ See my Chapter One, pp. 28-34.

⁸⁶⁷ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 323-4 (episode 115).

⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 324 (episode 115).

himself, and he thought of them affectionately as brothers and sisters. In his mind, he spread his arms and embraced his young brothers and sisters.⁸⁶⁹

As Hyŏng-sik was awakening to these new horizontal relations between and his feelings of love and affection for his fellow traveling companions and countrymen, Sŏn-hyŏng was awakening to feelings of romantic love for Hyŏng-sik mediated through personal comparisons and feelings of jealousy for Yŏng-ch'ae:

Earlier, when she saw Yŏng-ch'ae, she had immediately compared Yŏng-ch'ae's face with her own... Sŏn-hyŏng had not particularly wanted to be loved by Hyŏng-sik until now... Thus she had not thought about how she would feel if another woman embraced Hyŏng-sik. Sŏn-hyŏng therefore did not know what it was that she was feeling. She knew the words "envy" and "jealousy." However she thought envy and jealousy were huge sins, and did not think they were emotions to be had by a nice young woman like herself who believed in Christ and was well educated... Sŏn-hyŏng's lessons in life were now gradually approaching middle school level. She was beginning to learn about love, jealousy, anger, hatred, and sadness. Human beings learn such lessons until their dying day so Sŏn-hyŏng had a long way to go before graduation. Yŏng-ch'ae and Hyŏng-sik were much more advanced upperclassmen in this respect. Moreover, Pyŏng-uk had learned much about life through literature and art, which mimic the Creator, and steal from the Creator's thoughts. People become adults the more they learn through such processes. They lose the pretty mien of the innocent child, and become what is referred to as an adult, with deliberate calculation, strength, stubbornness, and a sense of purpose... In other words, they become human beings.⁸⁷⁰

Yŏng-ch'ae was also emotionally troubled, plagued with feelings of sadness as well as anger and betrayal at Hyŏng-sik's "heartless" actions towards her, leading her to reflect on her tragic life and bringing her into a tailspin of fatalistic despair.⁸⁷¹ Pyŏng-uk once again wipes away her tears and reminds Yŏng-ch'ae's that she is not only the object of the heartless social forces of modernity but more importantly a subject of modernity and an inextricable part of the nation:

Stop crying. Why wouldn't this world give you happiness? If it doesn't, you should demand it. If it still doesn't give you happiness, then you should take it anyway. If you can't find a way to take it, then at least get even. Think about it. Are you the only person in the world who has suffered sorrow? There must be many people like you in our nation. You and I should change this wrongful social system, and help our descendants to live in happiness. If we do not, who will? However, if you die, unable to endure your suffering, you will be abandoning your responsibilities to our future descendants. Let's

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 327 (episode 117).

⁸⁷¹ Ibid., p. 315 (episode 111).

try to live as long as we can, and work as much as we can. Now stop crying and let's have some strawberries.⁸⁷²

It's hard not to see Pyŏng-uk's words as a sort of veiled double-speak, in the colonial context of its writing. While from the explicit narrative thus far, her attack appears focused on the Confucian social system that is holding Korean modernity back, it would equally give voice to the colonial modernity that is impeding an independent Korean modernization.

Thus their surprise reunion both prompts the reflection of a distinction between superficial carnal vs. spiritual fraternal love as seen in the case of Hyŏng-sik, which becomes closely linked to the question of national modernization—via the difference between superficial/immature and deeper approaches to or knowledges of Korea's path toward civilization—ultimately opening up an ethical dilemma in regard to the absence of a moral and ethical yardstick or measure with which to navigate the new world of ideas, technologies and belief systems in the face of the young reformers rejection of traditional Confucian and Korean norms. At the same time, we see with Yŏng-ch'ae and Pyŏng-uk a renewed sense of themselves as active members of this unstable and unjust world who not only see themselves as having the power to change this world but see their actions as part of a larger national collective.

Now the train that brings these characters and narratives together while at the same time it both threatens to unravel as well as fortify their journeys and awakenings—appears in this concluding journey most conspicuously as a symbol and vehicle of the paradoxical forces and experiences of modernity/civilization. At the same time, it is also here at this point that it is interjected into the particular landscape and contingency of Korea through which it travels via the convergence of the overwhelming force of Nature and the material realities of Korea. As the torrential downpour characteristic of Korean summers and its corresponding flooding damages the train and brings it to an abrupt halt around the southeastern farmlands of Kyŏngsang province, the landscape breaks through the “point-to-point travel” of railway time-space coming to both interrupt and fortify the production of an “expanded yet diminished” interconnected hierarchical systematized ‘geographical space time-space of the railway journey in Korea.’⁸⁷³ The concluding railway journey thus serves as the stage for both the collective consciousness of the plight of the nation and the incorporation of this national consciousness into the individualized emotional awakenings of the characters thus far as well as provide an ethical imperative if not a model for the production of an ethics to guide their prospective simultaneously individual and collective journeys of individual and national enlightenment.

As our four travelers disembark from the train to rest at a local Japanese inn near Samnangjin station as the tracks are being repaired, they come to witness the devastated landscape of the region:⁸⁷⁴

⁸⁷² Ibid., p. 317 (episode 112).

⁸⁷³ See my discussion of Schivelbusch in Chapter Two.

⁸⁷⁴ While some literary critics have dismissed the conclusion to the novel as “ill-conceived” “contrived,” “overly sentimental” and even attributes it to Yi's ill health at the time of writing, I do not think it is any more contrived or sentimental than the earlier parts of the story and as read through the lens of the railroad as a key motif of the story, I find it significant to bringing the emotional awakenings in the earlier part of the novel together with the national narrative that permeates these discussions and transformations of love and emotion as well as its inscriptions in the landscapes presented in the novel. Another difference is that I don't approach this novel as first and foremost a romance novel. See for example, Kichung Kim, “Mujŏng: An Introduction to Yi Kwangsu's Fiction,” *Korean Studies*, vol. 6 (1982), p. 138, for such a critique.

Muddy red water was everywhere, leaving only the mountains unsubmerged...The waters had lost their way, and invaded villages, driving away inhabitants, and occupying rooms, kitchens, shelves. People who lost their homes in the flood climbed up the mountains seeking higher ground, carrying children on their backs and pulling the elderly by hand...The stalks of grain that people had taken such pains to grow that summer were tossed about in the red waves and broken, or separated from their tender roots. Rice plant flowers that would have ripened with yellow grain and drooped their heavy heads in mists that filled the valleys during autumn nights—these flowers were now destroyed. The entire earth seemed to have come under the power of the red waters...The sound of the streams rushing down, gashing the flesh of the naked mountain and scraping at the mountains' bones, joined with the sound of the river's fearsome torrent, so that it was like listening to a resounding concert.⁸⁷⁵

As they spoke expressing concern that the flood might “ruin this year’s harvest,” “within them moved feelings of worry and fear that transcended the self. Thought of floods and a bad harvest, the sight of billowing clouds, the sound of water, and the sight of homeless people scrambling for safety made them forget about the self, and have common thoughts that all shared as human beings.”⁸⁷⁶ The floodwaters likewise wreaked havoc among the village population displacing many from their homes:

Crowds of homeless people were drenched in rain as they stood at the foot of the mountains, water running all over their bodies. Women holding children bent over the children and covered them with their bodies...Young men and women whose faces were sunburned from weeding all summer stood and looked helplessly at where the rice paddies that they had planted with such effort had been. The red waves gradually submerged even the little that had been left of the rice paddies...In the midst of the rain, at the foot of the mountain, was a straw mat propped up by an A-frame⁸⁷⁷ used for carrying loads on one’s back. Beneath the mat was an old, wrinkled woman in an apron, holding a young woman in her arms. The young woman was biting her lip and seemed to be in pain. A young man wearing grass-stained trousers, with his head bare with no covering for his topknot, stood holding down the corners of the straw sack.⁸⁷⁸

⁸⁷⁵ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 331 (episode 119) Again, the description of the wayward and invading floodwaters, can be read as double-speak for the Japanese invasion and occupation of Korea.

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 331 (episode 119).

⁸⁷⁷ The A-frame was a significant ideological locus of colonial discourse. In early Japanese travelogues of Korea, they were presented as a manifestation of Korea’s backwardness and barbarity. However as Japan sought to promote colonial tourism and colonial migrations to Korea, the A-frame was later seized as a unique cultural asset of Koreans. See Helen J.S. Lee, “Voices of ‘Colonists,’ Voices of ‘Immigrants’: ‘Korea’ in Japan’s Early Colonial Travel Narratives and Guides: 1894-1914,” in *Japanese Language and Literature*, vol. 41, no. 1 (April 2007), pp. 1-36. Also the A-frame is what Yong-ch’ae, Pyöng-uk and her family used to transport their bags to the train station in lieu of rickshaws when as they were departing on their trip.

⁸⁷⁸ Yi Kwangsu, *The Heartless* (1917), p. 333 (episode 120).

As Pyŏng-uk and the others come across the pregnant woman and her family, they move her and the old woman to the inn and as the women work together to wash the mud from the young woman's body, Hyŏng-sik goes to fetch a doctor. Relieved to find out from the doctor that the expectant mother and her baby are all right, they hear from the old woman how her son and daughter-in-law were tenant farmers and both their farm and their house were now submerged under the floodwaters. Moved by their plight, the three women arrange to hold a benefit concert for the flood victims at the waiting room of the railroad station. As the chairs filled up with passengers from the train and from the city, Pyŏng-uk made a short introduction saying: "We are not trying to have this concert because we know about music. We are only having the concert in the hope that you will sympathize with the flood victims... moreover, we will probably make many mistakes."⁸⁷⁹ She proceeded to play "a tragic melody from 'Aida'" on her violin, bringing the audience to tears, followed by Yŏng-ch'ae's recital of a song that Pyŏng-uk had recently taught her in Hwangju, and then all three women sang together "a song that Yŏng-ch'ae had just... written in classical Chinese and that Hyŏng-sik had translated into Korean. The song was about the pitiful people who had become homeless and were out in the rain."⁸⁸⁰ As the characters collectively work towards helping the villagers, whereby their personal differences become dissipated in the process, their actions thus provide an ethical model of assistance and solidarity.⁸⁸¹

As the women raised money in their attempt to help the flood victims, the experience of the flood and their collective efforts also had a profound effect on the four journeyers. While the four characters returned to the inn, moving along the "people who had lost their homes" hungry and starting to shiver" the narrator, who had earlier exhorted the lack of noise and civilization states the following—closely resembling the common reproach of fellow Koreans in the popular national presses to embrace the new learning of 'civilization.':

They were powerless. Though no one could stand against the violence of nature, these people were particularly powerless. They were so powerless that everything that they had built up through a lifetime of hard work could be washed away overnight. It was as though they had built their lives on a foundation of sand. When the rain stopped and the water receded, they would scrape together the scattered sands, and build the foundations anew. They were like ants making a nest in the sand by digging with their weak limbs. These people had lost everything overnight to rain and stood shivering in the rain, seemed pitiful, and yet weak and foolish too... All they did was farm with what little knowledge they had about farming. In this manner, they might accumulate a few sacks of rotten rice over the years—that is, if God let them. If there was a flood, all of it would be washed away. They thus never got any richer, but just got poorer... They needed to be empowered. They needed to be given knowledge. They needed to have their means of living thereby made complete.⁸⁸²

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 338 (episode 122).

⁸⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 339 (episode 122).

⁸⁸¹ These ethics can be seen to reflect Yi's strong Christian leanings, which we have seen infused into the various early nationalist reform movements and rebellions calling for social equality.

⁸⁸² Ibid., p. 340 (episode 123).

While modern life may be experienced as incessant flux, and the lack of a strong foundation may have plagued Hyŏng-sik's own understanding and relationship to civilization, as the narrator points out there is an inherent stagnancy to the fluidity and uncertainty that characterizes these farmers' condition due to their fundamental vulnerability to natural forces: "If there was a flood, all of it would be washed away. They thus never got any richer, but just poorer." Thus for Hyŏng-sik and others, their experience of the flood and the flood victims provides a renewed sense of purpose and power of position.

"Science! Science!" Hyŏng-sik exclaimed...return[ing] to the inn...

"We must first of all give the Korean people science. We must give them knowledge." He stood up clenching his fists, as he walked about the room.

"What are your thoughts, after having seen what you saw today?"

...After a while Pyŏng-uk spoke up.

"I felt sorry for them...Didn't you?" They had all grown closer while working together that day.

"Yes. One pities them. What is the cause of their pitiful situation?"

"It is that they do not know about modern civilization, of course. They are not empowered to make a living for themselves."

"Then what must we do to save them...to save ourselves?" Hyŏng-sik looked at Pyŏng-uk...

"We must give them strength! We must give them modern civilization."

Pyŏng-uk said confidently.

"And how can we do that?"

"We must teach them, guide them."

"How?"

"Through education, and through actual practice."

...

Yŏng-ch'ae thought about poetry in which Du Fu and Li Bo expressed concern about the world. She thought of the speech that she and Wor-hwa had heard five years ago, given by the principal of P'aesŏng School...she remembered that the principal had said, "Your ancestors were not as foolish as you."

...

"Who will do this?" Hyŏng-sik asked again more emphatically. He looked at each of them. The young women were spiritually moved, in a way that they had never experienced before and that they could not describe in words. Shivers ran over them all at the same time.

"Who will do this?" Hyŏng-sik asked again.

"We will!" The words dropped from the young women's lips in unison without their having planned it. Flames seemed to flash before their eyes.

The earth seemed to share as though there had been a great earthquake...

"Yes. We must do it. That is why we are going overseas to study. Who is giving us the money to take the train, and money for tuition? Korea. Why? So that we can acquire strength, knowledge and civilization, and bring them back with us. So that we can establish a solid foundation for the people's livelihood, based on modern civilization...."

“This train ticket contains the sweat of those people who are shivering in the rain, including the young man we saw. They are asking us to make sure that they are never put in such a needy situation again.”...

At that moment, each of them thought about “the work that I must do.” They seemed to have become one body and one mind, without distinctions of self and other...

“Let us work so hard that when we are old, we will see a better Korea. Let us think of how we resented our lazy, powerless predecessors, and let us work so that our grandchildren thank us.”⁸⁸³

If as the narrator earlier opined that the significance of the train, electric lights, and the noise of the city was unknown to the “three hundred thousand people who wore white clothes” in Seoul, and which appeared “unsettling to the ears of the two young women [Yǒng-ch’ae and Pyǒng-uk], who had been in the midst of quiet nature until then,” then it appears that it is through their encounter with the ravages of a hostile nature which intrudes upon these modern technologies and symbols of civilization—illuminating the material plight and consciousness of the nation and situating it squarely within a larger imperial and world geography of uneven development—that facilitates the awareness of the significance of modern ‘civilization’ as a national endeavor for these young women as well as Hyǒng-sik and Sǒn-hyǒng. To return to Anderson, as Yǒng-ch’ae’s initial awakening to womanhood was already in part inflected through her situated responsibility and connection to the past ancestors and future descendants of the nation, this second and final stage of collective awakening moreover departs from the unbound seriality of a universal humanism with its particular national positioning. We might then see more an affinity between these four characters awakening to revolutionary consciousness to that of Minke in Prameodya Ananta Toer’s third volume of *Buru Quartet*, which Pheng Cheah observes the transformation of the consciousness of a “universal humanism” to “national consciousness.”⁸⁸⁴

The special affinity between the nation-form and modern consciousness is determined by the foundational role of discourse and technomediation in the latter’s formation. Although modern consciousness may initially appear as universal humanism or cosmopolitanism (which Minke espouses in the first two books), it generally becomes a national consciousness or universal particular because the global reach of its vision is attained through comparative activity. This is especially so in colonized territories where the comparative gaze inevitably instills in the educated native an anxious restlessness. He is aware that his people have been subjected to a foreign people because of their comparative backwardness. Because ancestral culture is viewed as the cause of stagnation, the people’s uplifting is inevitably a spiritual affair involving the formation of a vital, modern, *national* spirit. This poignant (if condescending) comparison between the dynamism of his

⁸⁸³ Ibid., pp. 340-342 (episodes 123-4). The novel shortly concludes thereafter with its characteristically optimistic ending: “The world will not stay dark and cruel throughout our lifetime. Through our own strength, we will make the world brighter, more loving, more joyful, more prosperous, and stronger. And now, with happy smiles, and cries of “long live Korea!” let us bring to a close this novel, *The Heartless*, and its mourning for a world of the past” (348, episode 125).

⁸⁸⁴ Pheng Cheah, *Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of Liberation* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 279.

will to organize and the stagnant tranquility and childlike ignorance of “traditional” communal life pushes Minke to begin organizational activity in chapter 7 of *Jejak Langkah*.⁸⁸⁵

Similarly, in this last scene of *The Heartless*, as Pyŏng-uk had earlier acted as the catalyst for Yŏng-ch’ae’s initial awakening to ‘civilization,’ Hyŏng-sik serves to discursively transform their emotional energies arising from their collective experience and comparative insight vis-à-vis the flood into a collective awakening to national modernization. Thus on the one hand, more than any other element of the new urban landscape, the colonial era railways as seen through this novel (as well *Tears of Blood*) became a distinctive signifier of a paradoxical colonial modernity because it heightened the “consciousness of distance” between the colonized non-industrialized physical and socio-economic landscape of Korea and the near-industrialized imperial Japan as well as the industrialized West in a narrative of national modernization as teleological progress. By interrupting the “boundless” “irresistible” force of historical progression of the “homogenous, empty time” of clock synchronized railroads through the spatial intersection of heterogeneous geographical landscapes and social and cultural temporalities of modernization, the railways triggered the consciousness of the distinct positionality of colonial Korea in an uneven modern interconnected world. On the other, this consciousness of distance both facilitated national awakenings (as an extension of individual awakenings to modernization or as completions thereof), as well as the association of national consciousness with transnational (directional) migration—thus introducing or reinforcing hierarchical valuations among diasporic and peninsular Koreans.

Conclusion: The Hierarchical Synchronicity of ‘Old’ Metropolitan and ‘New’ Colonial Cities or the ‘Bound Seriality’ of Colonial Railroad Space-Time—and its Myths of ‘Modernity’ and ‘Nation’

The abstracting/substituting processes of the colonial railroad thus also presented this new transport technology with a logic of mechanical reproducibility characteristic of the loss of the “aura” and the concomitant distinction between original and reproduction that underlies the synchronicity behind Anderson’s print-technologies and Schivelbusch’s railroads in their parallel conceptual understanding of the modern synchronic character of “horizontal empty time” and panoramic *depthless space*. And as both Anderson and Schivelbusch observe in their respective arguments, the replicability of spaces was characteristic to both the production of ‘new’ spaces alongside ‘old’ ones, and the transformation of the “space of landscape” to “geographical spaces” into serial and synchronic alignment via new communication technologies and technologies of travel respectively. But in the case of the space-time of railroads, this reproducibility and synchronicity of space according to Schivelbusch occurred via the devaluation of space and their traditional identities via new forms of geographical and geopolitical hierarchy and particular political directionalities of power—there was both a definite spatial hierarchy and directionality of travel to the devaluation and exploitation of remote or “outlying spaces” being “made available to the masses by means of tourism.” We can see obvious parallels between the exploitation by tourism of remote and peripheral spaces in Europe

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid.

by the metropolitan bourgeois, as per Schivelbusch's observation, and the exploitation of the spaces of the world's peripheries by colonialism (including colonial tourism). As the outlying regions of Europe were being transformed into *spaces for an emerging urban modernity and the urban bourgeoisie*, the world peripheries were likewise becoming (colonial-proletarian) *spaces as appendages of Western/Japanese Imperial powers or bourgeois nations*. And like the product that is transformed into a commodity (as it appears as an appendage of the market rather than its locality of origin) by being brought to the market and into the global *economic* exchange relation, the colonial territories likewise lost their locality and identity (i.e. their "aura") via geographic deformations, as also occurred in the metropolitan centers but here this "aura" took the *political* form of *sovereignty* and socio-cultural value systems and traditions, as they were transformed/commandeered/expropriated into European (or Japanese) colonies. In a similar process of the expansion and contraction/diminishing/destruction of space, as these societies and states were opened up to an emerging enlarged and interconnected modern world-system via global industrial capitalism, their incorporation came about by their geographical and socio-cultural and political transformation into an appendage of the imperial power by which the colony was brought into an uneven yet interconnected world system.

We can also see this how this kind of spatial hierarchy and directionality, while shared among various European colonies in Southeast Asia and Korea, evolved in rather distinct formations. In Anderson's discussion of the colony-metropole relation that gradually structured the coming into being of Southeast Asia as a "remote, heterogeneous, and so to speak, imperially segmented" new geographical and political entity from the "mottled imperialism" that stretched from the "late feudal sixteenth century" to the "industrial nineteenth" and the "motorized twentieth," he states:⁸⁸⁶

Each imperial power, jealous of, and rivalrous with, its competitors, worked to close off its possessions from the rest, so that at the beginning of this century, young educated people in Batavia (Jakarta) knew more about Amsterdam than they did about a Cambodia with which their ultimate ancestors had once had close ties, while their cousins in Manila knew more about Madrid and New York than about the Vietnamese littoral a short step across the South China Sea. Furthermore, these colonies were, even in the age of the aeroplane, the telegraph, and the telephone, the most remote of them all. Vietnam was farther from Paris, the Philippines from either Madrid or Washington, East Timor from Lisbon, and Malaya from London (with the exception of mottled Australia and New Zealand) than any other of their domains.⁸⁸⁷

In both Southeast Asia and Korea, as new colonial spaces came into being politically attached and directionally oriented toward the various imperial powers, their classical territorial boundaries were altered to conform to new regional groupings or "imperial segmentations" and "the [imperial] heritage of Mercator."⁸⁸⁸ We can see here how in Southeast Asia the new political reality of colonialism imparted upon the colonies their particular commodity form or their new

⁸⁸⁶ Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*, (London: Verso, 1998; reprinted 2002), p. 5.

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid.

socially produced exchange value, as these identities were mapped along definite longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates in relation to their imperial powers in a process of standardization via the social fiction and “historically conquered”⁸⁸⁹ position of the Prime Meridian as the new universal spatial measure (i.e. like the money form which serves as the universal equivalent), derived from the Mercator map and other innovations in European Imperial navigational technology, which can best be seen in what Anderson refers to as the ‘map as logo’ where different imperial possessions are grouped by various colored ink. But in colonial Korea, without the stubbornness of great physical distances between the metropole and the colonies, like that between Vietnam and Paris, the Mercator map, but also the technology of railroads and steamships, however segregated, militarized and unevenly utilized, made the remote spaces of the colony available to imperial Japan for economic and territorial expansion and exploitation, depreciating/devaluing the “quality of [the colony’s] presence,”⁸⁹⁰ while at the same time making not only the ‘modern’ landscapes of imperial Japan but more ‘modern’ ones beyond Japan such as the cultural-politically charged destination of the U.S., as well as the regional, perhaps less modern but more politically free (from Japanese surveillance) landscapes of Manchuria, China, and Russia available to Koreans and Korean nationalism.

While I do not deny that the kind of leveling/ decontextualization/ dehistoricization, or what Anderson refers to as the operation of “quotidian universals,”⁸⁹¹ is a defining character of the new modern mode of synchronicity of the nation-space and nation-form—and potentially bears important and positive forms of transformative political agency, collective identification, and social consciousness—at the same time I want to emphasize the difference in value relation between what is historically and politically structured as original and copy, urban metropolises and remote provinces, imperial centers and colonial peripheries, apparent in the space-time of long-distance journeys like railway or steamship journeys, that not only obtain but are actively produced within the dependencies and directionalities that are built into the frame or standards of measure of this new serialized system.⁸⁹² Thus in much the same manner that the new technologies of transport like the railroad brought the space of the whole nation into relation as Schivelbusch observed, on a global scale, societies and landscapes of Asia and Africa, like that of Korea were also being incorporated into the *panoramic depthless* space of the modern world-system as socio-political and territorial “appendages” of imperial powers by technologies of 19th century global industrial capitalism and imperial rule. The same forces of industrial capitalism and its “materialities” which were bringing the world into a new modern horizontal (but not level) relation, both temporally and spatially, also brought into being new types of *relational and standardized yet heterogeneous and hierarchical spaces and times* across the uneven yet synchronic modern world system. And in the way that the systematized and transparent geographical space of railroads structured via departure and destination points destroyed the old experiential distance between localities (or the space of the journey) as well as unique spatial identities, the structuring of distinct national spaces into colonial territories as formal though not value equivalents of their respective imperial centers within the new expanded and diminished

⁸⁸⁹ As Marx says of gold as an historically conquered universal commodity.

⁸⁹⁰ See Schivelbusch’ discussion of Benjamin in *The Railway Journey*, p. 42.

⁸⁹¹ This process of the destruction of aura, and Anderson’s quotidian universals—is similar to the process Roland Barthes identifies as second order signification or motivated speech, where the myth operates in a parasitic manner on the meaning of the first order signification, robbing it of its history and context and while it utilizes it with a new intentioned/motivated signified.

⁸⁹² Standards of measure like the Paris meter in Wittgenstein’s discussion in (Philosophical Investigations), which as a universal standard of measure both does and does not exist.

socio-geopolitical space of the world system entailed processes of national physical, territorial and socio-cultural alienation, it at the same time produced/created new culturally inflected and politically charged experiences related to differentially situated new forms of consciousness of distance and new modes of social political and geographical belonging—corresponding to the abstracted, decontextualized, but also systematized bound forms of seriality.

Thus not unlike Lefebvre's analysis of the centralized and hierarchical (as well as symbolized in Lefebvre's case) ordering of spaces within the totalizing systematized interconnected network of global capitalist space, as Schivelbusch saw the new railroad-enabled proximity of once remote regions to the metropolis to devalue the 'aura' of outlying regions, while all spaces were coming into being as formally equivalent/comparable geographical units, these units were also coming into being as differentiated hierarchical values in accordance with the governing logics of metropolitan urbanization and economic and socio-political domination of the modern capitalist world system. Thus we could extrapolate for Schivelbusch via Lefebvre, and pace Anderson, that while all spaces were being turned into easily accessible departure and destination points, and regional identities were being leveled *qualitatively*, as these processes were being structured through the incorporation/integration of both peripheral spaces and metropolitan cores into a single spatial division of labor via 'strategic' standardizations within the capitalist-world system, their relative *values* produced of this system were not necessarily being homogenously produced or as *quantitatively* equivalent. If for Anderson, the "unself-conscious standardization of vocabulary which radically overrides any formal division in the newspaper between local and foreign news" "reinforced" the boundless or open "natural universality" of 'quotidian universals,' then the motivated, strategic standardizations of geographical space which distinguished the values of formally equivalent geographical units—following from specific directionalities of travel structured through/within dominant urban/rural hierarchies of capitalist urbanization—reinforced the restricted spatial economy or the bounded universality of the geographical space-time of railroads. As these values took the place of/eclipsed qualitatively differences between distinct places and came to structure spatial relations in quantitative hierarchical terms, they also led to important new spatialized, uneven hierarchical conceptions of linear homogenous empty, time corresponding to new directionalities and modes of travel as well as serial grammars of representation for emerging forms of late 19th and early 20th century nationalisms.

This revised schema is important because it lets us then consider the limits, contradictions and particular ideological inflections of differential yet interconnected processes of the appropriation of railroads for colonialism as for national reform and modernization.⁸⁹³ As the colonial railroads operated as the backbone of the Japanese empire, it was also appropriated by Korean nationalists as the threshold of national modernization, much in the same way new technologies of the newspaper and Japanese modern literature and translations of world literature provided a springboard for Korean nationalist creations. But as we have also seen, these nationalist appropriations of space also produced new symbolic hierarchies of territorial and extraterritorial Koreans, and homogenized and heroized the constitution and experience of heterogeneous Korean traveling populations and diasporic communities. Thus at the same time these ideological productions of nationalist journeys helped foster horizontal solidarities among fellow exiles, it also produced and reinforced the imaginary of cosmopolitan modernity vs.

⁸⁹³ Or in other words, we could question if the nationalist appropriation space of railroads could be seen to constitute a genuine a differential space as defined by Lefebvre?

provincial Koreanness, while also inflecting different diasporic communities with the geopolitical hierarchies of uneven global capitalist modernity.

It also hones in on a more global critique of modern Korean nationalism—which in the desperate desire for modernization saw the problem of modern technologies and rationalities in colonial Korea as merely something that needs to come into the right—nationalist—hands. The inherent danger, perhaps what we can call another double-bind, in the reformers’ embrace of modernity, even if in colonial form, which they may have thought too optimistically or naively that it was simply a matter of dislodging the tools and methods of modernity from the colonial master and bringing them in the rightful hands of the independent nation-state is perhaps tragically encapsulated in the later “collaboration”⁸⁹⁴ by Yi Injik as well as both Ch’oe Nam-son and Yi Kwangsu—the two drafters of the Korean Declaration of Independence for the February 8th Independence movement in Tokyo and the March 1st Independence Movement in Korea as well as compiling foundational works of nationalist history and historiography as well as national and nationalist literature and literary theory—with the Japanese government near the end of colonial rule where they recruited Koreans for the Japanese total war effort. While Cho Dong-il presents a textual-structural-systematic critique of pro-enlightenment ‘new novels’ in opposition to the workings of *p’ansori* tales or properly pro-nationalist righteous army resistance novels or novels presenting biographies of nationalist heroes, it would appear that this critique is also likely influenced by the reputed history of Yi Injik to have begun collaborating with the Japanese after 1910. We see this also in the more infamous cases of younger modern reformist nationalist writers such as Ch’oe Nam-sŏn and Yi Kwangsu later in colonial history in the late 1930s. Of course in the early modern Korean context, over-determined by various personal and political beliefs, allegiances and circumstances as well as the politics and realities of the world beyond the Korean colony and Japanese metropole relationship, there is nothing simple or black and white about the concept of “collaboration,” or the various degrees of “collaboration” which are accepted or at least treated with benign neglect in contemporary South Korean society. While the history of Yi Kwangsu and Ch’oe’s later “collaboration” with the Japanese—in which Yi advocated the adoption of Japanese language and recruited Koreans to labor in Japan’s war effort as soldiers and workers is important to but beyond the scope of analysis of this chapter, I want to merely point to the way that in these early literary productions of nationalist narratives, nationalism was articulated with a complex cosmopolitanism through which they were certainly shaped as well as to which they presented both a response and challenge with the deepening of both ethno-nationalist discourse as well the related peninsular and diasporic experiences of nationalist activism accompanying Korea’s particular pre-colonial and colonial history. From here, these early writers’ pro-modernization/enlightenment nationalist politics and position in which they surmised that even if Korea was freed tomorrow that it could be in danger of being colonized by another industrial modern imperialist power was not unreasonable considering Korea’s historical experience of first opening up to the international system and the imperialist global circumstance of their time. At the same time, this position did not contradict or was inconsistent with their desire for national independence—nor did it indicate the desire for foreign penetration. To reflect on Yi Kwangsu’s uncharacteristically militant approach to national independence (as opposed to his usual ethno-nationalist culturalist beliefs) as encapsulated in the

⁸⁹⁴ Collaboration is a complex and difficult concept in Korea as in other contexts—For a thoughtful discussion of Yi Kwangsu’s collaboration placed in a comparative perspective, See John Whittier Treat, “Choosing to Collaborate: Yi Kwangsu and the Moral Subject in Colonial Korea,” in *The Journal of Asian Studies* 71, no.1 (February 2012), pp. 81-102.

Declaration of Independence and related petitions ahead of the February 8th Independence Movement in Tokyo (geared towards the March 1st movement in Korea and the efforts of Kim Kyusik in Versailles), as Kenneth Wells has argued “if an opportunity arises for independence earlier than expected, what nationalist would pass it up?”⁸⁹⁵ I think because of this very problem of modern Korean nationalists/nationalism, which tends to guide and blind historical (nationalist) retrospection, we need to look more closely at these text and its ambiguities (linked to this desire for modernity and national independence) to try to understand this and heal from it. This is the very task that scholars in texts like Andre Schmid’s *Korea Between Empires* and the edited volume *Colonial Modernity in Korea* have undertaken. My examination of the consistent coupling of the train scene with Western-modern thought, international itineraries and dreams of nationhood, which is a ubiquitous though rarely discussed and critically ignored or dismissed feature of early modern nationalist Korean literature is my attempt to contribute to these efforts—and also to highlight the need for a historical consciousness with which to make visible, reflect on and challenge its repetitions and modifications in the present. It also points to the significant absence of a positive definition of the culture of modern nationalism arising from the intense iconoclasm of early modern reformers which Michael Robinson repeatedly emphasizes—and which still remains I would stress in the Korean nationalism of contemporary globalization. This ‘anti-’ aspect I think closely relates to what these early nationalists were grappling with.

The transformation of the most ardent modern nationalist reformers into “collaborators” is itself a traumatic and paradoxical element of Korean modern nationalism—and one, which not only affects the most notorious and tragic cases such as Ch’oe and Yi Kwangsu but also permeates the history of South Korea. Having entered the colonial period as leading nationalist thinkers and activists, they emerged upon Korea’s liberation with Japan’s defeat, as arch-traitors of the nation and vilified as such by the emerging South Korea state as well as the North. Perhaps it is both as ironic and tragic as the fact that the dictatorial authoritarian regimes that emerged in South Korea, upon picking up the very modern tools that the colonizers left behind—proceeded to utilize many of the same economic and social technological rationalistic-manipulations that the Japanese colonial authorities did—including the complementary use of long-distance transport technology and migration as tools of its developmentalism and expropriation, as well as reproduce the very stratifications and repressions characteristic of Japanese colonial discrimination and exploitation of Koreans—to its own ethnic national populations—and later others in their postcolonial “collaborations” with new neo-imperial powers.

We move on to this discussion in Part II of the dissertation with the succession from transcontinental imperial railroads to post-colonial transpacific air travel and airports.

⁸⁹⁵ Kenneth M. Wells, “Background to the March First Movement: Koreans in Japan, 1905-1919,” p. 13.

PART II

Airport Modern: Transcontinental Railways to Transpacific Airways, Cold War Internationalism, and Divided Modern Nationalist Imaginings



Figure 4: Sit-in Protest by Students of the Sŏngsŏ Technical High School in front of Kimpo Airport against the Korea-Japan Normalization Talks, March 28, 1964 [Donga Ilbo]

Chapter Four

The First Modern ‘International Style’ Kimpo Airport: Postcolonial Modernity as Rupture and Suture (1945-1960)

In this chapter I look at how the South Korean state’s first modern airport at Kimpo and the ‘Kimpo era’ came into being in the recently divided peninsula as both a form of *rupture* and *suture*, arising in tandem with the project of postcolonial nation-building vis-à-vis its membership in the new U.S. led Cold War capitalist international system. The ‘modernity’ of the new and now primary international gateway at Kimpo marked not only the passage from colonial transcontinental railways to transpacific airways, but also the connection of South Korea to a new geopolitical space/map of the so-called “free world” of the capitalist international. Both sides of Kimpo’s gateway presented drastically altered political and geographical entities; at the same time that Kimpo connected South Korea to a new bi-polar Cold War international map of capitalist “free states,” what was part of itself was not only without, but relegated outside of its permissible international orbit. Like a body cut in two and each half having become attached to two distinct and highly antagonistic organisms, the airport formed the very join between each half of Korea and its new hosts. Developing concurrently with the rise of air travel and the building boom in postwar American airports, while the new Kimpo terminal likewise indexed the rise of American cultural and economic hegemony across the capitalist world system, it took on quite different meanings in the postcolonial, divided post-Korean War context of South Korea. At the same time, the new (anticommunist) ideological associations of the ‘modern’ Korean airport, which linked it to its American counterparts, also haunted the nation with the ghostly presence of South Korea’s other half, which though geographically contiguous, now lay politically outside the divided nation’s new world orbit.

The New American ‘Jet Age’ and the Scopic Regime of Cold War Modernization

The profusion of bravura airports constructed in the past two decades inspired Paul Andreu, chief architect of Aeroports de Paris, to recently characterize our epoch the “age of air terminals,” a worthy successor to the resplendent railway stations of the nineteenth century and the magnificent gothic cathedrals of medieval Europe.¹ The airport is today heralded as the defining architectural symbol of our ‘jet age’, the “one unique building type of the latter half of the twentieth century,”² or even “the world’s most revolutionary structure.”³ But just thirty years ago, a consideration of airport design appeared as a mere postscript to the chapter on “Railway Stations” in architectural historian Sir Nikolaus Pevsner’s *A History of Building Types*.⁴ Finding

¹ Paul Andreu, in a preface to Marcus Binney, *Airport Builders* (London: Academy Editions, 1999): p. 7.

² Brian Edwards, *The Modern Terminal: New Approaches to Airport Architecture* (London and New York: E & FN SPON, 1998), p. 16.

³ Alastair Gordon, *Naked Airport: A Cultural History of the World’s Most Revolutionary Structure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁴ Nikolaus Pevsner, *A History of Building Types* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 234.

the architecture of most airports “indifferent,” Pevsner saw fit to remark on but three airports for the simple reason that:

very few have left visual memories. St. Louis is Yamasaki at his rare best or rather Helmuth, Yamasaki & Leinweber (completed in 1956), TWA New York (1959-62) is Eero Saarinen at his worst, though the sensational features may have been done under pressure from the clients eager to advertise themselves. Dulles near Washington is Saarinen at his best (1958-63).⁵

As illustrated by the terminals singled out by Pevsner, the first generation of airports entering the Western architectural canon as a recognized building type, however tentative, coincided with the postwar shift in the world center of air transportation and airport development from Europe to the U.S.⁶ Whether praised or censured, the mid-century Dulles and TWA terminals dramatically marked the beginning of American-led mass air travel and the inauguration of the jet plane, extending American tourists far beyond the landed boundaries of railroad tracks.

The ‘jet age’ was astir globally during the 1950s posturing to displace train travel as the principle mode of modern international transportation and charged cultural imaginary of postwar modernity. And it was technologically and ideologically spearheaded by the United States, the emergent postwar superpower. Coming at the heels of WWII, it was a period of widespread airport reconstruction and expansion, though with varied levels of access and participation across domestic regions as across uneven international nation-state hierarchies. Many of the great European airports, which had been major aviation centers prior to WWII, were under repairs, having suffered damages during the war, with millions of dollars of US economic aid.⁷ The decline of Germany as the preeminent leader of aviation is particularly illustrative of the postwar shift in the world order and its close reflection in aviation and airport development. Weimar Germany was the first to build a permanent airport in Koenigsberg (now Kalinigrad) in 1922, held world records in aviation and had the most advanced aircraft factories.⁸ Prominent airports in Germany “existed several years before comparable examples were built elsewhere in Europe and the United States” and Tempelhof airport in Berlin, Germany’s “showpiece of the 1930’s” and among the world’s busiest, led the world in passenger use and number of flights.⁹ But with its defeat in WWII, Germany was prohibited from even operating its own airliners and Lufthansa only resumed service in 1955.¹⁰ The heavily damaged Tempelhof came into the American sector and became a Cold War propaganda outpost.¹¹ When all land access to Berlin was blockaded by the Soviet Union in 1948, Tempelhof became the site of the famous Berlin airlifts of food and supplies leading other German airports under Allied control as the “airport of democracy.”¹²

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ For the history of Western civil aviation, See for example John Zukowsky ed., *Building for Air Travel: Architecture and Design for Commercial Aviation* (Munich and New York: Prestel-Verlag and The Art Institute of Chicago, 1996); and Alastair Gordon, *Naked Airport: A Cultural History of the World's Most Revolutionary Structure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁷ Alastair Gordon, *Naked Airport: A Cultural History of the World's Most Revolutionary Structure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 159.

⁸ John Zukowsky ed., *Building for Air Travel: Architecture and Design for Commercial Aviation* (Munich and New York: Prestel-Verlag and The Art Institute of Chicago, 1996), p. 15.

⁹ Zukowsky, pp. 14-15.

¹⁰ Gordon, p. 158.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 159.

¹² Ibid.

Though not as precipitous as Germany's decline, many of the illustrious terminals in the European Allied countries were destroyed or remained in a state of ruin.¹³ Even "the once-great air center of Paris was still operating out of the old 1930s terminal at Bourget" as the new airport at Orly would not be completed until 1961.¹⁴ As prewar European airports were being "pensioned off" as "ruins of a bygone era," the construction of London's new Heathrow airport, which had served as an important airbase for the Royal Air Force during the air defense of London inaugurated a new generation of European airport building and reconstruction.¹⁵ Equipped with new runways by 1946 to service transatlantic flights, Heathrow became the busiest airport in Europe.¹⁶ Heathrow operated out of "tents and trailers" for the following decade until the first permanent building, Terminal 2, "an undistinguished brick building with long boarding fingers" was built in 1955 "just in time to greet the hordes of American tourists that swarmed Europe that summer," with "more than eighty-two thousand arrivals and departures."¹⁷ Armed with "disposable income saved in war bonds" and "good jobs" and spurred in part by American soldiers who had served in WWII seeking to revisit Europe, "planeloads of Americans were streaming across the Atlantic" as well as elsewhere on family vacations.¹⁸ Air traffic in the U.S. now far outpaced the once great air centers of Europe. As Gordon points out, in 1955 "Paris had less air traffic than Louisville, Kentucky."¹⁹ "By 1955, more Americans were flying than riding on railroads, and by 1956, there were more than 40 million flying on American carriers."²⁰ As Americans quickly grew out of their prewar airports, airport construction and expansions were rapidly apace in the United States. Thus a new generation of terminals were being built in Baltimore, Pittsburg, Washington D.C., St. Louis, Chicago and New York during the 1950s to greet a new age of domestic and international mass air transit, as the United States arose as the new world center of air transportation development in the post-war period. With the introduction of jet planes in 1958, the trend continued with new innovations in building types for air terminals. By this time, as Chicago had replaced Berlin in air travel, New York and Detroit had also succeeded Paris and Manchester as cultural and industrial capitals in the 'new American century' of mass production and consumption.²¹

The passing of the splendor of 19th century railways stations to new sensational mid-century American airports thus coincided with the larger postwar geopolitical shift in the capitalist world system marking the passage from British imperial political-economic hegemony to the emergence of America as a foremost superpower leading the Allied countries in a new postwar bipolar Cold War political-economic landscape. And as military aviation had been central to the US-led allied victory in WWII, the US-led development of commercial aviation would come to play an integral role in shoring up America's newfound hegemony in the new world order. Reflecting the postwar trend of transitioning from military aviation to using the

¹³ Ibid., p. 158.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Koos Bosma, "European Airports, 1945-1995: Typology, Psychology, and Infrastructure," in John Zukowsky ed., *Building for Air Travel: Architecture and Design for Commercial Aviation* (Munich and New York: Prestel-Verlag and The Art Institute of Chicago, 1996), pp. 53-4.

¹⁶ Gordon, p. 160.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 159.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 142.

²¹ Peter Wollen, "Into the Future: Tourism, Language, Art," in *Raiding the Icebox: Reflections on Twentieth Century Culture* (Verso, 2008), p. 207.

“plane for peace,” Juan Trippe, CEO of Pan Am airlines declared “Mass travel by air may prove to be more significant to world destiny than the atom bomb.”²² Fittingly, Trippe also became the first to showcase a fleet of Boeing 707 jet planes, which “evolved from the B-52 bomber” as the first “jet prototype.”²³

On October 16, 1958, First Lady Mamie Eisenhower stood with Trippe on a wooden platform at Washington National and dribbled a bottle of water collected “from the seven seas” over the silver nose of the *Jet Clipper America*.²⁴

As aviation transitioned with peacetime to commercial development, the new air transportation revolution taking off in the United States would also come to facilitate a new brand of American material and cultural imperialism. Accompanying the new shift in the balance of power, Gordon writes:

An American empire was stretching around the globe ‘wherever airliners could deliver businessmen,’ bringing with it a consumer-friendly form of imperialism. ‘The modern airplane creates a new geographical dimension,’ wrote Wendell Willkie. ‘There are no distant places any longer: the world is small and the world is one.’ Gunboat diplomacy gave way to a kind of airport diplomacy. America’s isolationist tendencies would be overcome with expanded air routes and bigger, faster airplanes that could disgorge thousands of American tourists to every point of the compass.²⁵

Encapsulating both the new discursive and ideological (if not always practical) centrality of air travel in America and America’s centrality to it, a special issue of *Life* was published in 1956 “devoted to the wonders of the air age and America’s preeminent place in it,” just as “Soviet troops were marching into Hungary.”²⁶ In it, it carried “a passionate plea to the American public” by the former American military pilot and CEO of Eastern Airlines Eddie Rickenbacker:

Let us go forward boldly...making sure of our rightful place in the air, for freedom and for good.²⁷

Following upon Rickenbacker’s plea the special issue declared: “A genuine ‘revolution’ is under way...one that was as earthshattering as the Russian or French revolutions.”²⁸ In this variously technological, cultural and political-economic ‘revolution,’ Gordon writes:

Every overseas airport would serve as an outpost of American foreign policy, creating a context for free-market capitalism.²⁹

²² Gordon, pp. 142, 157.

²³ Gordon, p. 175. The B-52 bomber was the aircraft used to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

²⁵ Gordon, pp. 155-6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

For *Time/Life* publisher Henry Luce, American consumerism, imperialism and anticommunism became explicitly interlinked through air travel: “He understood that every tourist, armed with a Kodak camera and a Samsonite suitcase, was a solder against international communism.”³⁰ Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce, his wife, moreover:

...expressed the prevailing mood when she declared: “American postwar aviation policy is simple: we want to fly *everywhere*,” and with newly extended networks, U.S. citizens *could* fly almost anywhere. To emphasize the point, Luce’s *Life* sent artist Edward Reep on an air trip to capture the exotic allure of airports around the world. Reep returned with watercolor scenes of Buddhist monks strolling through Don Muang Airport in Bangkok, Punjabi women under the veil in Karachi, and fishermen working the waters near the airport in Tokyo. Airports, claimed *Life*, “were the new gateways to the wide world...bits of cosmopolitan swank set in tropical jungles, buttoned-up hutments of warmth on an arctic tundra, palaces of glass in central Europe.”³¹

In the eyes of both Mr. and Mrs. Luce, not only was air travel perceived to form an integral aspect of Washington’s postwar containment/integration policy, but also a network of international airports could be seen as a metonymic representation for the economic integration of their respective, however exoticized, nation-states across a multi-national and multicultural or multiracial (capitalist) globe. This simultaneous exoticism and inclusion of non-Western airports and nations into a new American-centered modern imperial economic and cultural international capitalist landscape encapsulates what Christina Klein has argued as a new form of “Orientalism” characteristic of representations of Asia in the American imagination in the postwar period.³² Klein writes that as “Cold War ideologues mobilized [the] idea of a racially and ethnically diverse America in the service of U.S. global expansion,” in contrast to the racial essentialisms and hierarchies of 19th century European imperial powers, “the United States...became the only Western nation that sought to legitimate its world-ordering ambitions by championing the idea (if not always the practice) of racial equality.”³³ While representations of the West and the East were still framed in terms of difference and hierarchy, in place of racial othering, the American discourse was grounded on the image of “knitting ties between the United States and non-communist Asia, and were infused with a structure of feeling that privileged precisely the values of interdependence, sympathy, and hybridity” to promote a discourse of forging bonds “across this divide of difference” through the universalizing mode of “sentimental affinities.”³⁴ We might see an example of this as much as its corresponding materialistic aims in the May 1967 Asia edition of *Life*, which featured as its cover story “Newest Stewardess Fads: a Japanese in Every Jet,” emphasizing the growing incorporation of Japanese stewardesses among American airliners induced by “the attributes of Japanese women” such as their “air of serenity and gift of grace” as well as the “the expanding corps of globe-trotting Japanese businessmen” who “still lack a comfortable command of foreign languages” not to mention the Japanese stewardesses’ “lower

³⁰ Ibid., p. 156.

³¹ Ibid., p. 157.

³² Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 10.

³³ Ibid., p. 11.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

pay scale.”³⁵ Thus at the same time, despite their difference, as Klein argues, much like the way that the European discourse of Orientalism facilitated the conquest of the Middle East, its American counterpart also facilitated American foreign policy objectives in the Asian region—as both a form of containment and integration. As Klein emphasizes: “Different kinds of expansion demand and produce different legitimating discourses. Because U.S. expansion into Asia was predicated on the principle of international integration rather than on territorial imperialism, it demanded an ideology of global interdependence rather than one of racial difference.”³⁶

We could also add that different *technologies* of expansion produce different forms of spatial apprehension, perception and practice. The rise of air travel as the new predominant mode of long-distance transportation as well as the cultural imaginary of modern airports and their close articulation with geopolitical shifts in the balance of power also brings with it a corresponding shift in space-time perception as well as spatial practice. As Wolfgang Schivelbusch had observed with respect to 19th century railroads, Eddie Rickenbacker, president of Eastern Airlines, wrote: “Aviation is removing barriers of distance and time which in the past partly isolated many lands from the rest of the world.”³⁷ While railroads served a similar integrative (as well as disjunctive) role as we saw in Schivelbusch’ dialectic of spatial expansion and contraction in its production of a new space-time of an abstract “geographical space,” air travel presents both important historical and technological-phenomenological differences. While the industrial revolution in Europe led the initial development of railroads in Europe, to be followed by American adoption, the revolution of air travel as a mass phenomenon and its elevation as the preeminent mode of long-distance travel is intimately linked to the ascendance of American economic and cultural hegemony in the postwar period. Moreover, air travel far surpasses the speed of railroads, is far more luxurious, and effects a complete rupture between the landscape and the traveler or passenger. As the point-to-point travel by airplanes further expands the scale and scope of geographical space and shrinks the perception of the world, it does so with a different and more extreme degree of abstraction whereby the world comes to be perceived as a two-dimensional plane—much like the perception corresponding to viewing the world through a map [figures 5-6]. We might see this cartographic mode of spatial perception and imagining characteristic of air travel as analogous to the “scopic drive” or the desire to “see the whole” that Michel de Certeau associates with the voyeuristic practices of “imaginary totalizations produced by the eye” that can be seen as much in the “erotics of knowledge” as urban and “architectural productions” which both look “down on, totalizing the most immoderate of human texts.”³⁸ As de Certeau describes:

To be lifted to the summit of the World Trade Center is to be lifted out of the city’s grasp. One’s body is no longer clasped by the streets that turn and return it according to an anonymous law; nor is it possessed whether as player or played, by the rumble of so many differences and by the nervousness of New York traffic. When one goes up there, he leaves behind the mass that carries off and mixes up in itself any identity of authors or spectators. An Icarus flying above these waters, he can ignore the devices of Daedalus in mobile and endless labyrinths far below. His elevation

³⁵ “A Japanese in Every Jet,” *Life* Asia Edition, May 1, 1967, pp. 43-47; and cover page.

³⁶ Klein, p. 16.

³⁷ Quoted in Gordon, p. 156.

³⁸ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1984), p. 92.

transfigures him into a voyeur. It puts him at a distance. It transforms the bewitching world by which one was “possessed” into a text that lies before one’s eyes. It allows one to read it, to be a solar Eye, looking down like a god. The exaltation of a scopic and gnostic drive: the fiction of knowledge is related to this lust to be a viewpoint and nothing more.³⁹

Like the god’s eye perception of de Certeau’s distanced and voyeuristic mode of vision, the new mode of perception and experience of the world arising with Cold War air travel also allows disparate and geographically embedded spaces to be folded as well as flattened into a totalizing viewpoint. This viewpoint can also be related to the ‘conceived space’ or the ‘representation of space’ Henri Lefebvre attributes to “the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, and of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent—all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived,” a space “in thrall to both knowledge and power” which relentlessly dominates the space of the lived in its production and reproduction of the city.⁴⁰ Elsewhere Lefebvre has similarly stated: “in the spatial practice of neocapitalism (complete with air transport), representations of space facilitate the manipulation of representational [or lived] spaces (sun, sea, festival, waste, expense).⁴¹ Examined from a more macroscopic or global perspective, Lefebvre writes:

Capitalism and neocapitalism have produced abstract space, which includes the ‘world of commodities,’ its ‘logic’ and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and that of the political state. This space is founded on the vast network of banks, business centres and major productive entities, as also on motorways, airports and information lattices. Within this space the town—once the forcing-house of accumulation, fountainhead of wealth and centre of historical space—has disintegrated.⁴²

And as Lefebvre emphasizes, in this abstract space produced of capitalism: “space is also being recast: in response to the growth of air transport, particularly in its geopolitical dimensions; in response to various new industries (computers, leisure, the extraction of petroleum and other resources); and in response to multinationals.”⁴³ We could thus say that the abstracted cartographic perception of space produced of the postwar ‘jet age’ also allows more easily for both the segregation/separation of contiguous, blurred and socio-culturally mired geographical spaces into distinct national units as well as the folding or suturing of these various spatially disparate and distanced national geographical units into tightly knit, however differentiated and hierarchical, politically ordered networks in the production of a larger bifurcated world geography of Cold War modernization—not unlike the multicolored maps of 19th century

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 39, 50.

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 59.

⁴² Ibid., p. 53.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 351.



Figure 5: The Trans-Asian Railway Map, United Nations, 2011



Figure 6: Korean Airlines Route Map, Korean Airlines, 2011

Imperialist powers, which distinguished various imperial possessions with its own particular dye.⁴⁴ If 19th railroads transformed, according to Schivelbusch, historically embedded and locally meaningful spaces of landscape into a new abstract and systematized “geographical space,” then air travel effected the transformation of the experience and space of landscape into a further abstracted, systemized and disfigured *geopolitical space*.

The ‘Kimpo Era’: Cold War Modernity as Rupture and Suture

For many newly emerging postcolonial nations in the postwar period, the transition from rail to air travel was likewise inextricably linked to the rise of American hegemony and the Cold War division of the world into competing spheres of influence—within which fledgling nation-states were being coerced, cajoled, or uncontrollably thrust into alignment. The birth of the modern airport terminal in South Korea at Kimpo (1958-1960) was as much a product of the evolution of these geopolitical blocs in the aftermath of WWII and the distant though central shifts in Euro-American aviation as it was the outcome of its related more local, national and regional manifestations issuing from Korea’s ‘liberation’ from thirty five-years of Japanese colonial rule (August 15, 1945) and the division of the peninsula, a three year occupation by the U.S. military government (1945-1948) and its continuing trusteeship, the evolution of two separate states (1948), and a cataclysmic internecine war (1950-1953)—thus emerging as both a process and symbol of geopolitical *rupture* and *suture* in a new international Cold War landscape of modernization.

On August 10, 1945, just days after the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and days before the Japanese surrender in WWII, a line across the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea was arbitrarily drawn by two young American colonels in Washington,⁴⁵ as the map of Africa was carved up into European colonial territories at the height of British led Imperialism at the turn of the 20th century. This powerful stroke of a new superpower was unilateral as it was arbitrary an exercise of the cartographic imagination: “Given thirty minutes...[American colonels of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee] Rusk and Bonesteel looked at a map and chose the thirty-eighth parallel because it ‘would place the capital city in the American zone,’” and upon being made public in “the General Order Number One for the Japanese surrender on August 15,” “the Russians accepted in silence this division into spheres.”⁴⁶ Needless to say “American officials consulted no Koreans coming to this decision.”⁴⁷ The 38th parallel both divided a territory that had been unified for over a millennium and inscribed a new geopolitical order onto the physical landscape of Korea alongside a new territorial occupation in the South—superimposed upon the spatial, political and cultural inscriptions and symbolic re-ordering of Korea under Japanese colonialism. It also set in motion an intense process of political and ideological division between the two sides of the newly delineated boundary, aggravating political and ideological left-right splits that had formed during the colonial period, bringing into being two separate and antagonistic states, led by two returning exiles from the U.S. and Manchuria. The Republic of Korea (ROK) was established on August

⁴⁴ See Benedict Anderson’s discussion of the ‘map-as-logo’ in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991), p.175.

⁴⁵ Bruce Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 187.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

15, 1948 on the southern half of the peninsula with the septuagenarian exile nationalist leader Syngman Rhee as the first president, whose intense anti-Japanese sentiment was only rivaled by his staunch anti-communism.⁴⁸ Rhee had returned from the U.S. three years earlier, where he had lived for over forty years since the time of Japanese Annexation, and quickly established himself as “the uncontested leader of the right”—supplying the nationalist credentials that the Korean conservatives sorely lacked—and aided by “the benediction of American invitation, [U.S. General and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers] MacArthur’s plane, [and] [U.S. Lieutenant General John Reed] Hodge’s introduction.”⁴⁹ The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established three weeks later in the North under the helm of another exile nationalist Kim Il Sung, who had also repatriated in 1945 with other Korean guerrillas from Manchuria. Kim Il Sung had begun “armed resistance in the Sino-Korean border shortly after Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932” as part of the joint Chinese Korean resistance to become a significant guerrilla leader.⁵⁰ “Kim was thirty-three years old when he returned, and represented a younger generation of revolutionary nationalists filled with contempt for the failures of their fathers [of Rhee’s generation] and determined to forge a Korea that could resist foreign domination—while at the same time opportunistically allying with Soviet forces.”⁵¹ The dividing line was further cemented into a national border after the Korean War (1950-1953) and structured new political-economic, cultural, and geographic realities on either side while aligning each to ideologically opposed international systems of the emergent Cold War international stage.⁵²

Korea had emerged from colonial rule primarily as an agrarian economy and society, with poor peasants living in the countryside making up the majority of the population, and a small minority of wealthy and politically powerful landowners (*yangban*).⁵³ Forty-five years of colonial rule, despite nascent industrialization and the appearance of some Korean enterprises especially during the “war effort” in the last decade of colonial rule,⁵⁴ nonetheless kept intact (and utilized/manipulated) the rigid economic and social class/status distinctions and disparities tied to *yangban* domination that characterized the Choson dynasty (1392-1910).⁵⁵ The South Korean rural structure was only transformed through the protracted and politically/ideologically induced process of land reform proceeding from 1946 through the Korean War, which destroyed “the fundamental source of wealth and influence” of Korean agrarian elites (*yangban*) alleviating their reactionary check on modern industrialization and freeing up both future capitalists and industrial workers.⁵⁶ Moreover, land reform was directly linked to anti-communism in South Korea and was undertaken as much by the North Korean people’s army and the U.S. military government and the State Department as it was by the new South Korean state, which constituted

⁴⁸ John Lie, *Han Unbound: the Political Economy of South Korea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 25.

⁴⁹ Cumings, p. 195; Gregory Henderson, *Korea: Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 152. Hodge was the top Commander of the US Army Forces in Korea.

⁵⁰ Cumings, p. 196.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² As the fateful mark of European Imperialism continue to delineate African countries well after decolonization despite their varied political and titular changes, the resilience and effects of the 38th parallel has likewise outlasted the Cold War in the rest of the world.

⁵³ Cumings, p. 193

⁵⁴ Interestingly some of these Korean entrepreneurs were also engaged in aviation parts manufacturing such as the notorious arch-traitor Pak Hŭng-sik who was singled out and brought up on charges after liberation for “devoting his airplane parts factory near Suwŏn to the war effort” (Cumings, p. 172).

⁵⁵ Cumings, p. 182.

⁵⁶ Lie, pp. 14-15.

its most reluctant party.⁵⁷ Land reform was initially prompted by news of the purging of landlords and redistribution of land by Kim Il Sung in the North in 1946, which “threatened the U.S. backed southern government” and spurred “the U.S. occupation force to...support land distribution measures in the South as well, in part to undermine the appeal of communism.”⁵⁸ The U.S. military government’s support for land reform was at odds with their general practice of suppressing leftists and “supporting landlords, collaborators, and capitalists” which largely constituted the South Korean rightist government.⁵⁹ However, it was strategic to their larger aim of suppressing communism. South Korea was plagued with large peasant rebellions and leftist guerrillas after liberation, for which the land question was central, such as the 1948 Cheju Rebellion which was led by people’s committees, initially in protest of the South Korean elections and the formation of a separate South Korean regime. People’s committees had formed after liberation to fill the void of power across local villages and whose violent suppression by Rhee’s police and military as well as the U.S. military led to a protracted guerilla insurgency known as the People’s Army.⁶⁰ In 1947, “30,000 alleged communists were in Rhee’s jails,”⁶¹ and by 1950, 80 percent of 60,000 prisoners were political prisoners, while political violence between liberation and the outbreak of the Korean War “claimed over 100,000 South Korean lives.”⁶² In addition to the overcrowded jails, the U.S. estimated 70,000 people in “Guidance Camps,” while “repentance” campaigns and “extermination weeks” in 1949 rounded up “as many as 1,000 people a day” led by government organized fascist youth squads.⁶³ People’s committees were also present across most of South Korea assuming functions as de facto local governments.⁶⁴ As Bruce Cumings has argued, the highly developed railroads and communication infrastructure from the colonial period went both ways in facilitating the radical activity of people’s committees and leftist insurgents as well as once taken over by the national police becoming “an indispensable element to their successful pacification.”⁶⁵ Moreover, the difficulty of suppressing guerrilla insurgency on Cheju island, Cumings observes, was related to the lack of railroads on the island.⁶⁶ [I can’t imagine that this tragic inaugural use of railroads by the South Korean state is what Ch’oe nam-sŏn had in mind when he wrote in his 1908 poem of the desire “to run it with our own hands.”] Thus stemming from both external and internal pressure, the National Assembly of Korea passed a land redistribution law in 1949, however the Rhee government was reluctant and impeded its implementation.⁶⁷ It only came into effect in 1952 during the Korean War, as:

The North Korean military, as it swept through the South in its initial drive to unify the country, liberated land for peasants. In effect, former tenant farmers exercised squatters’ rights over the land they had been working...The resurgence of local people’s committees in some instances facilitated land

⁵⁷ Ibid. pp. 9-10.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.; Cumings, p. 220-223.

⁶¹ Cumings, p. 223.

⁶² Lie, pp. 30, 8.

⁶³ Cumings, p. 221.

⁶⁴ Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-47* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 267.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 280.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 281.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

transfer. The actual threat of a communist regime, moreover, contributed to “breaking the back of landlord obstructionism”...The U.S. response to the North Korean liberation was to enforce preexisting land reform legislation. The United States goaded the Rhee government into pursuing land reform in the countryside in 1952, when the war was stalemated at the 38th parallel. Land reform generated support for the Rhee regime and thereby contributed to averting South Korea’s defeat.⁶⁸

While in different form, as the cadastral surveys were one of the first orders of business by the Japanese colonial government in order to expropriate and exploit Korean land, the technology of land via land reform was also a key component of both the U.S. occupation government and the South Korean state—united through their shared desire to contain communism in South Korea.

However even though land reform was finally carried out during and after the Korean War, it would take another decade and another regime in power to exploit its possibilities for economic development. The national political economy of South Korea under Rhee from the period after the Korean war until the early 1960s, according to John Lie, largely followed economic reconstruction through U.S. aid and was dominated by “the triple alliance,” a “hierarchical power structure...with the United States at the apex, Rhee and the subservient state bureaucracy in the middle, and dependent capitalists at the bottom,” in which the state was generally plagued with corruption and the economy static.⁶⁹ In general, South Korea “in the 1950s was a terribly depressing place, where extreme privation and degradation touched everyone.”⁷⁰ In this context, American wealth and influence was palpable across Korea generally in both fixed and circulating forms of U.S. aid materials and commodities, U.S. military personnel and accoutrements as well as American cultural-symbolic propaganda—whose ‘modernity’ were heightened by the juxtaposition of Korea’s devastated postwar life and landscape. As Bruce Cumings recounts British Prime Minister Vyvyan Holt’s observations of 1950s South Korea:

‘Radiating from the huge ten-storied Banto Hotel,’ American influence ‘penetrates into every branch of administration and is fortified by an immense outpouring of money.’ Americans kept the government, the army, the economy, the railroads, the airports, the mines, and the factories going, supplying money, electricity, expertise, and psychological succor. American gasoline fueled every motor vehicle in the country. American cultural influence was ‘exceedingly strong,’ ranging from scholarships to study in the United States, to several strong missionary denominations, to ‘a score of traveling cinemas’ and theaters that played mostly American films, to the Voice of America, to big-league baseball: ‘America is the dream-land’ to thousands if not millions of Koreans.⁷¹

In this context, the presence of American imperialism was not only or primarily visible via South Korea’s airports (which still largely remained makeshift military huts and shelters while more permanent buildings were under construction), forming an international interdependent network

⁶⁸ Lie, p. 11.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 26.

⁷⁰ Cumings, p. 303.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 255.

of American-led capitalist integration as per the American Cold War imaginary. Rather much like the heavily militarized and American controlled Kimpo airport in the 1950s which was jointly used for civilian air travel and as a military air force base, the presence of American power, wealth and influence was most palpable across the growing American military bases and its personnel. The towering 10-storied Bando hotel in downtown Seoul served as the temporary headquarters for the initial occupying U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) under Hodge's leadership arriving in Korea in September 1945.⁷² The Bando hotel, "a favorite of Japanese travelers" in the colonial period,⁷³ in addition to serving as the US military headquarters, was also an island of 'modernity' in a post-war recovery Seoul, and would become the natural complement to Kimpo airport as the typical passengers of the period—foreign diplomats, businessmen, high ranking US military officers, and the occasional celebrity—would be whisked from the airport to the hotel.⁷⁴ The Yongsan army base, also located in central Seoul, was likewise transformed from housing Japanese military headquarters during the colonial period to housing American military headquarters from September 1945 to 1949 as it was renamed Camp Sobinggo, and which was formally leased by the American military in 1948 remaining to this day.⁷⁵ Yongsan is also the area, which housed the colonial modern landscapes of Japanese settlers during the Japanese occupation.⁷⁶ After the Korean War more numerous and permanent American military installations were established. Five military camps were established in Dongducheon, a city north of Seoul in 1951 along with the corresponding growth of camptowns—where "Korean women worked in the sex industry while the men pimped and stole American goods for the Korean black market"—spurring the population growth of the area from 7,200 in 1950 to 21,387 by 1955 and over 50,000 by 1965.⁷⁷ As John Lie asserts, as "America came to stand for plenty and modernity *tout court*," the "embodiment of the United States in GIs and the impressive material culture they brought with them was crucial. The contact between U.S. military personnel and South Koreans reached its height among Katusas [Korean Army Troops with the U.S. army] and military base town prostitutes."⁷⁸ As Whitney Taejin Hwang notes: "in the immediate postwar year of 1955, there were about 110,642 prostitutes, of which 61,833 catered to American soldiers. Signaling the widespread existence of camptown prostitution, terms such as *wianbu* (comfort women), *yanggongju* (Western princess), or "UN madams" frequently appeared in the print media throughout the 1950s."⁷⁹ As the term "wianbu (comfort women)" indicates, the American military government also "maintained the remains of Japan's colonial infrastructures of clearly demarcated space for commercialized sex and a government-controlled registration system with compulsory venereal disease examinations. The women who worked in the clubs and brothels, often simple frame houses that had sprung up in a neighborhood adjacent to American military camps, were made up of former prostitutes who catered to the Japanese (wartime comfort women) and rural and urban poor."⁸⁰ Thus much like

⁷² Whitney Taejin Hwang, *Borderland Intimacies: GIs, Koreans, and Military Landscapes in Cold War Korea*, PhD Dissertation, UC Berkeley, Fall 2010, p. 20.

⁷³ Cumings, p. 192.

⁷⁴ These are usually the personalities that appear in the Korean papers reporting of comings and goings at Kimpo airport.

⁷⁵ Hwang, p. 18.

⁷⁶ See Chapter Three on Japanese in-migration and the colonial city.

⁷⁷ Hwang, p. 90.

⁷⁸ Lie, p. 40.

⁷⁹ Hwang, p. 91.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

the way Japanese settlements inscribed new ethno-cultural landscapes of colonial modernity upon the urban spaces of Seoul, Pusan, and other parts of colonial Korea and along railway stations with new Japanese place names—“Nanzan-cho, Kotobuki-cho” and the like—American military bases and camptowns were likewise the most ‘modern’ spaces of postwar Korea as well as certain enclaves of national-cultural landscapes themselves, both building on and introducing new connotations of modernity that was both ultimately cosmopolitan/extra-national and paradoxical.⁸¹ And much like the cosmopolitan modern spaces of colonial railways and postwar postcolonial airports, Hwang argues: “Clustered around American military camps within the geopolitical borders of postwar Korea, camptowns served as “borderlands” between two sovereign states.”⁸² These American military communities also inscribed once again new names/identities to the same physical landscapes of Korea. In place of “Motomachi” and “Nazan-cho,” Yongsan became Camp Sobinggo, Dongducheon came to be called “Little Chicago,” and parts of Itaewon “Hialeah” and “Texas.”⁸³

As Bishop et al. have stressed in reference to Korea’s neighbors, “the postcolonial moment in Southeast Asia is inextricable from the Cold War.”⁸⁴ For South Korea, the coupling of these global and local processes was even more acute and intimately linked than perhaps other post-colonial states emerging from European colonial rule considering the historical geography of Japanese colonialism on the peninsula and its charged geopolitical position after its partition as the Japanese surrender that ended WWII doubled as the liberation of the Korean peninsula from Japan, and the United States, leading the allied victors of WWII and emerging as the new world hegemon, simultaneously became its ‘liberator’ that went on to initially occupy the country and preside over the formation and trusteeship of the postcolonial South Korean state during the formative stages of the Cold War. With the U.S. division of Korea and the U.S. military government in the South from 1945-1948, as well as the continuing presence of the American military and government in South Korea, the Korea-U.S. relationship presented a different, more raw face of American containment and integration policy. Just as the cold war was intensely ‘hot’ on the peninsula, American imperialism on the peninsula departed from the more moderate rhetoric of interdependence and racial equality brought about the “knitting [of] ties between the United States and non-communist Asia” or forging bonds “across this divide of difference” through the universalizing mode of “sentimental affinities,” or these were at least trumped by direct and uneven encounters with a militarized American presence.⁸⁵ In Korea, there was direct military territorial occupation—which could be seen prominently in urban, ‘modern,’ national and international spaces, infrastructures, and interactions like airports as much as camptowns—which had been presaged, though perhaps not planned, with Washington’s peremptory division of Korea along the 38th parallel even before the actual ‘liberation’ of Korea from Japanese colonial rule. If Kimpo were to be included in the international Cold War airports special issue of *Life* we saw earlier—the watercolor would likely have to depict American

⁸¹ See Chapter Three.

⁸² Hwang, p. 87.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 90, 89.

⁸⁴ Ryan Bishop et al., *Postcolonial Urbanism: Southeast Asian Cities and Global Processes* (NY: Routledge, 2003), p. 25.

⁸⁵ Klein, p. 16.



Figure 7: Coronet Wasp with U.S. Air Force personnel at Kimpo Airbase, (with Kimpo airport in the Background), [U.S. Air Force photo, KE 34593 Coronet Wasp, RG 342-B, Box 1005 Records of Air Force Commands, Activities and Organizations: Prints U.S. Air Force Activities, Facilities and Personnel, Domestic and Foreign (1954-80), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD]

soldiers and military aircrafts in the background of ‘modern’ Kimpo airport as its particular flavor of local ‘modern’ exoticism [figure 7]. And while the U.S. military government did not function as or share the goals of the previous Japanese colonial government, their desire to contain communism presented much the same processes as well as prejudices and resonant discourses such as Korea’s being unfit for independent self-rule—not to mention violent suppressions of Korean guerrillas *alongside the new South Korean national-state’s brutal suppression of them*—piggybacking upon or appropriating Japanese colonial era institutions, structures, and technologies towards new uses of Cold War imperialism, thus giving rise to new symbolisms and associations of yet another paradoxical ‘cosmopolitan modernity’ which was likewise a militarized one.

From Colonial Transcontinental Railways to Postcolonial Cold-War Transpacific Airways

The passage from railroads to air travel for international travel, however restricted and heavily regulated until 1989, was a significant effect of post division and postwar⁸⁶ postcolonial South Korea.⁸⁷ In Korea, this passage entails momentous political shifts as well as particular historical symbolic and cultural associations and meanings. As I examined in Part I, the Korean railways grew concurrently with Japanese colonialism functioning as the chief mode of circulation of civilian and military personnel and goods within Korea and beyond, linking the country to outlying colonial cities in Manchuria as well as the Imperial center of Tokyo by train and ferry connections as well as the world beyond colony and empire. Conversely, the railways were also importantly a colonial spatial technology that regularly transported foreigners, especially a large population of Japanese colonists and settlers onto and across Korea as well as reconfigured the Korean city with new a symbolic and techno-rational ordering. The first ‘modern’ vehicle of mass transportation, train travel was from the beginning invested with a mixture of colonial ‘modern’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ qualities, which also mapped an uneven geopolitical hierarchy of development as part of the conceptualization of national modernization in the early modern Korean cultural imagination, further deepening and diversifying in the colonial period. Despite the keen awareness as to the extra-national propriety and imperial technology of colonial era trains on the part of its Korean admirers, or perhaps in part due to it, the railway journey in numerous literary texts conspicuously linked advocacy of modern western enlightenment thought and values with cosmopolitan itineraries to modern industrial metropolitan centers of early 20th century Korean nationalist journeys in early modern nationalist literature and general discourse. The train car was a prominent site of a paradoxical cosmopolitan modernity, inhabited by Japanese conductors and colonists and infused with the colonizing gaze, as well as ‘modern’ Korean ‘new women,’ students and national compatriots and fellow journeyers in early modern cultural-nationalist reformist novellas such as Yi Injik’s *Tears of Blood* (1906), and Yi Kwangsu’s *The Heartless* (1917) serialized in the early vernacular nationalist presses. In both texts, as the railway journeys mediated the new hierarchical landscape of a simultaneously tragic and liberating modernity, they served as the site of fateful encounters between ‘modernized’ and ‘modernizing’ characters, whose modern conversions were linked to national awakenings and international migrations in the effort to rescue the nation from its traditional ‘backwardness,’ and secure national independence. Thus as the modern character of the colonial railway system was profoundly bound up with the uneven hierarchical

⁸⁶ Hereafter, post-war refers to Post-Korean War.

⁸⁷ Although ships were also a significant medium transporting many Korean government and military personnel to train etc. in the US as well as large state-facilitated out emigrations such as farmers to Chile in 1953, etc.

cosmopolitan geography of modernization qua national awakening in the Korean cultural nationalist imaginary of train travel, the train, like other modernizing technologies, such as the newspaper and the novel, came to be associated as an object to be possessed by Koreans as well as the conduit for such attainment as part of the legacy of colonial experience and consequently pregnant with its own contradictions and dangers of hierarchical and essentializing ideologies.

“[S]mall islands of modern life in the still predominantly traditional, patriarchal and agricultural countryside,”⁸⁸ of postcolonial and postwar Korea, railway stations and train-cars remained an important trope of a paradoxical modernity in the postwar South Korean cultural imagination well into the seventies. However, the social, political and geographical displacements attending national division in addition to the rising importance of air travel in the U.S. as the preferred mode of global connection after WWII dislodged this crucial cosmopolitan character of South Korean railroads in the post-war period, coming to function significantly as a conduit for the alienating and dislocating rural to urban migrations during postwar Korea’s rapid industrialization.⁸⁹ As North and South Korea settled into opposing international alignments of Soviet centered communism and US centered capitalism, sea and air routes became the only ports of international entry and exit for South Korea. A predominantly agricultural South Korea resulted from the national division enveloped in substantial destruction. Cut off from its colonial-era industrial base in the North, which was even more heavily bombed during the Korean War, as well as from the trans-continental rail network that had previously connected the whole Korean peninsula to cities across Asia, Russia, and Europe, South Korea became a virtual island unto itself. As such the modern airport displaced an essential property of colonial railways as experienced and imagined prior to the national division as well as materialized a new site and technology for the inscription of new and broader postwar geopolitical shifts on the peninsula. As the colonial-era railways gave way to postcolonial air travel as the predominant mode of international travel, the airport became the primary national gateway within a profoundly altered political, social and physical geography of the nation and entry into a new post WWII international system, and a new site for the production of a new modern national cosmopolitan imaginary. While civilian air transport was slow to grow in the economically stagnant and politically tumultuous immediate postwar environment, the airport, heretofore a totally unfamiliar space for most Koreans, would be proclaimed *the* ‘modern’ international gateway for South Korea, only fifteen years after colonial liberation.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Andrei Lankov, *The Dawn of Modern Korea: The Transformation of Life and Cityscape* (Seoul: EunHaeng NaMu, 2007), p. 76. According to Lankov, because of the practically non-existent road network “with only 4.1% of all Korean roads...paved” as late as 1961, “rail remained the main mode of transport” (76). “In 1961, the Korean railroads were responsible for 53% of all passenger transport and 88% of cargo transport.”

⁸⁹ This is an especially prominent feature of postwar Korean films.

⁹⁰ Here it is interesting to consider Marilyn Ivy’s discussion of train travel in 1970s Japan as a space to exploit nostalgic dramas of self and nation. The railway in Japan (former empire) thus lost its cosmopolitan character in the same way that its colonies like Korea did as a result of the end of colonialism. I think that this shift from the train as a modern-cosmopolitan mode of transit to a remembrance of a time past or a national Japan is also a significant effect of post-colonial Japan. Japan’s train system, losing its continuous link to Korean and Chinese cities also appears to have undergone a shift in identity after WWII. We see how colony and empire continues to double each other in differentiated ways.

From Colonial Airfields to Postcolonial Airbases: Changing of the Guards

Unlike early European and U.S. airports, where civilian air transport evolved out of but also alongside and relatively autonomously from military aviation,⁹¹ air transport in South Korea was firmly grounded in colonial military origins. About ten years after the Wright Brothers' successful electric powered flight in the US, the first sighting of an airplane in colonial Korea occurred in 1913 at a public air show of a Japanese naval officer flying the *Narahara 4* above the Yongsan training ground for Korean soldiers of the Japanese Imperial army.⁹² As flight instruction was until the 1930s only available in Japan, for aspiring Korean pilots, their air journeys began on railways and steamships like many other Korean students. Among these early trainees, Ahn Chang Nam became the first Korean pilot to fly over Korea on December 10, 1922, and Shin Yong Wook established the first Korean flight school in 1930 at Yöüido airfield and Korea National Airlines (KNA), the first private civilian airline—and the only Korean airline—after liberation in 1946.⁹³ Although generally underdeveloped and highly militarized, the Korean airfields and civilian aviation also grew out of the need to transport military and civilian personnel and cargo across Japan's colonial territories, as did the railroads. The locations of the airfields and the air routes that linked them traced a map of Japan's East Asian Empire, stretching from its imperial center to Manchurian outposts with Korean airfields in between—roughly paralleling the Korean 'trunk railway' that stretched from the northern tip to southeastern coast of the peninsula serving as a "land-bridge" between Japan and the Asian continent.⁹⁴ The Japanese military initially began operating fixed military and civilian passenger flights from Seoul in April 1929 as a stopover between Tokyo and the Manchurian province of Dalian.⁹⁵ With the establishment of the colony of Manchukuo in 1932, more routes between Seoul and Manchuria were established as strategic bases for its ensuing continental expansion.⁹⁶

After liberation in 1945, the Japanese Imperial army left forty airfields dotted along the Korean peninsula, including Yöüido and Kimpo Airfields in the Seoul area. Yöüido island, now the site of the South Korean National Assembly complex, was the site of the first Korean airfield built in 1916, later turned into a formal airfield to service the Tokyo-Seoul-Dalian route in 1929. Kimpo airport, South Korea's main international airport since 1957, was first constructed as part of the total war effort in 1935, as a base[s] for the Japanese continental invasion, comprising a runway for training Korean and Japanese Kamikaze pilots.⁹⁷ With the North/South Division in

⁹¹ Although there were lots of back and forth in military and civil aviation development in the West, civil aviation developed more autonomously than the colonial military context of Korea. However, even in Europe, during wartime such as WWII, many of these civilian airports were seized for military use and civilian air transit suspended.

⁹² *Kimpo Kukjae Konghang Kaehang 30 Ju-nyön Yaksa* (Thirty-Year History of the Opening of Kimpo International Airport) (Seoul: Kimpo International Airport, 1992), p. 48.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-1. In spite of the name, KNA was a private company and not a government run airline. Shin operated a number of non-scheduled short distance flights in Korea from 1930-35 and then a regularly scheduled flight twice weekly from Seoul to Iksan on a hinged, twin motor 4 passenger plane via his *Chosön Aviation Company* from 1936 until 1945.

⁹⁴ Daqing Yang, "Japanese Colonial Infrastructure in Northeast Asia: Realities, Fantasies, Legacies," in Charles K. Armstrong et al. eds., *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia*, (NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), p. 102.

⁹⁵ *Kimpo Kukjae Konghang Kaehang 30 Ju-nyön Yaksa* (Thirty-Year History of the Opening of Kimpo International Airport), p. 50.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ "Ha-nül üi Kwanmün' Kimpo Konghang Insu, 5 il Kimpo Konghang Yiyangsik ül Köhaeng, (The Transfer of Kimpo Airport, 'Gateway to the Sky,' Transfer Ceremony takes place on the 5th)," *Chosön Ilbo*, 5 July 1961.

1945, airfields in the southern half of the peninsula, including Yöüido and Kimpo moved into the hands of the US Air force under the United States Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) (1945-1948), and then again in the control of the United Nations Command (UNC) under the leadership of U.S. military generals, and the US Air Force at the start of the Korean War on June 25, 1950.⁹⁸ As strategic battlegrounds, colonial-era airfields incurred massive damages during the war, while civilian air traffic was altogether suspended. After the hostilities subsided with the armistice in 1953 and the Rhee government returned to Seoul from the Southeastern port city of Pusan, civilian aviation also returned to Yöüido.

The overwhelming American influence, its military manifestations, and U.S. aid as well as the tripartite political economic structure were likewise characteristic of the development of South Korean airports and aviation. If airports across the non-communist world were imagined by American Cold War ideologues as operating as outposts for American foreign policy in the new American “free-market” ‘revolution’ through air travel, the U.S. military practically built its own outpost in South Korea. Moreover, the military force behind the “free-market” ideology was undeniable and conspicuous in the Korean context. It was five years after the armistice when domestic and international civil aviation operations were finally transferred to Kimpo Airport/Air Base in 1957 and plans for a new terminal at Kimpo commenced in 1958. At the time, not unlike Heathrow and other European airports in the decade after WWII, waiting rooms, administrative offices, VIP rooms, etc. were housed within eight rows of Quonset huts borrowed from the US Air Force comprising temporary terminal facilities, mirroring both the general destruction of Seoul at the time and American military and economic trusteeship.⁹⁹ The long-range development plans for Kimpo and the more immediate construction of the new terminal building was a joint US-ROK, military-civilian project. A master planning board was first created on October 13, 1953 consisting of representatives from the US Air Force, the ROK Air Force, the ROK Ministry of Transportation and the United Nations Office of the Economic Coordinator (OEC).¹⁰⁰ Following the customary model of institutional modernization under U.S. tutelage at this time, Shin Guk Bum, architect-cum-civil servant of the Architecture Office of the Facilities Department of the South Korean Transportation Ministry headed the design and construction of the terminal building alongside American airport construction and management advisors.¹⁰¹ In addition, between 1956 and 1960, thirty-four aviation-related technical trainees

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ *Kimpo Kukjae Konghang Kaehang 30 Ju-nyön Yaksa* (Thirty-Year History of the Opening of Kimpo International Airport), p. 55. The temporary terminal (chungsa – the Korean term denotes ‘government office building’) built at Yöüido in 1956, which served as the civilian domestic and international airport prior to the transfer to Kimpo also consisted of a Quonset hut with a pitched roof attached to the top.

¹⁰⁰ Warne, “Memo from Cincrep Seoul to International Cooperation Administration,” *TOICA 2186, February 4, 1959*. RG 469, Box 134 Korea Subject Files: Transportation-Air (1958-59), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. Kimpo airport referred to by its military alias K14, was in the complete control of the US Air Force at this time, with the exception of aeronautical telecommunication station, and immigration and customs involving commercial airlines. Two ROK Air Force squadrons with 48 fighter aircrafts, also under direct control of USAF was stationed on the Western side of the airport.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Shin Guk Bum, November 30, 2007, Seoul. This encapsulates two typical processes at the time. One, because of the general lack of capital, most of the ‘elite’ architects who were doing most of the designing and building during the fifties and into the early sixties were those working for government ministries. See Ahn Chang Mo, *Hankuk Hyöndaekunch’uk 50 Nyön* (Fifty Years of Modern Architecture in South Korea) (Seoul: Jaewon Misul Chongsö, 1996). The other is the ubiquity of American technocrats and advisors overseeing and advising Korean counterparts. Cumings calls them “American nannies.” See also Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South*

were dispatched to the US for four to fourteen month training programs under the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) aid program.¹⁰² One of these trainees, Won Se Chang of the Ministry of transportation, toured American airports as part of the airport design and construction component of the technical trainee program.¹⁰³ Hundreds of other South Korean aviation technicians were also being trained in the recently established aeronautical training academy run by Americans and Koreans returning from US training. The OEC also exerted quite a bit of pressure on Rhee, infamous for his lack of interest in infrastructural investments, to fund the airport terminal construction with 300,000,000 hwan in counterpart funds.¹⁰⁴ As Shin Guk Bum, the terminal architect, recalls with reluctance, in addition to US training and supervision, much of the construction materials for the airport such as concrete and the I-beams used in the control tower were mostly US aid commodities.¹⁰⁵ Additional U.S. military aid financed the reconstruction of the runway and facilities to be used by the U.S. Air Force. Echoing the vital role of U.S. aid in sustaining the Korean economy and postwar reconstruction projects during the eight years of Rhee's rule after the Korean War, the new airport was almost entirely financed, equipped, and trained by the U.S. state department and the U.S. military.¹⁰⁶

Kimpo airport was moreover still under the control of the US Air Force at the time of the initial phased terminal opening in 1960, and Northwest Airlines operated the only regularly scheduled transpacific route (Seoul-Tokyo-Seattle) which it had operated since 1949.¹⁰⁷ Seoul had only a handful of other international routes mostly in the Asian region—Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, serviced by foreign regional carriers such as Civil Air Transport (CAT) and Hong Kong Airlines (HKA)—and which like its telecommunications networks were limited to non-communist countries. Moreover, the national civilian airline KNA had by then established a Seoul-Taiwan-Hong Kong route with its *single* long-distance 72 passenger plane (a Douglas DC-4 propeller plane) but due to its small and low-technology fleet as well as the small number of air travelers, it never got out of the red and was on the brink of bankruptcy.¹⁰⁸ On the February 16, 1960 opening of Kimpo, like most construction groundbreaking or completion/opening ceremonies featured on government Newsreels throughout the fifties and sixties, the ubiquitous presence of high-ranking Americans military officers and bureaucrats could be seen among the

Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

¹⁰² *Hang'gong Yŏngam* (Aviation Almanac) (Seoul: Korean Civil Aviation Development Association, 2002), p. 58.

¹⁰³ Interview with Shin Guk Bum, November 30, 2007, Seoul.

¹⁰⁴ *Kimpo Kukjae Konghang Kaehang 30 Ju-nyŏn Yaksa* (Thirty-Year History of the Opening of Kimpo International Airport), p. 62. US military documents report this to be equivalent to about \$600,000 at the time. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Shin Guk Bum, November 30, 2007, Seoul. Shin's discomfort talking about the US aid financial and material sources for the airport, even asking me if I can leave out mention of US aid in the discussion of the terminal, is informative of Korean civil servants both reliance on as well as perception of US aid at the time and in the present.

¹⁰⁶ According to Light and Bonacich: "From 1953 to 1960 Korea received foreign aid, mainly from the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and the United States. UNKRA's aid totaled \$120 million during the eight-year period, while US aid amounted to \$1.745 billion (Frank et al., 1975: 12). Close to three-quarters of all South Korean investment at this time came from foreign aid (Frank et al., 1975:15)." Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, *Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 40.

¹⁰⁷ *Kimpo Kukjae Konghang Kaehang 30 Ju-nyŏn Yaksa* (Thirty-Year History of the Opening of Kimpo International Airport), p. 53, 54.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 52-3.

assembly of Korean bureaucrats accompanying the president, Syngman Rhee [figures 8-10].¹⁰⁹ Rhee presided over the opening ceremony together with American military general Carter B. Magruder of the United Nations Command and United States Operations Mission (USOM) Director Dr. Raymond Moyer.¹¹⁰

Thus the lead up to planning and construction as well as the multi-staged completion of the nation-state's first modern terminal at Kimpo emerged at the crossroads of major domestic and foreign shifts in political and economic power, social structures, and geographic boundaries. The end of Japanese colonialism and the beginning of a divided peninsula shaped within an emerging Cold War international order set up the modern airport to become a new [charged/complex] postwar sign of national vis-à-vis cosmopolitan modernity displacing the colonial railway to a domestic trope. But this transition was embedded in colonial legacies of railway and aviation development, the condition of national division, the Korean War, as well as local and distant pressures of the new polarized force field of Cold War internationalism. From Japanese colonial military origins of Yōūido and Kimpo airfields, the new Kimpo terminal emerged as the postcolonial nation-state's first 'modern' (and only) international airport, based on American models, funded by American economic aid, and under the full jurisdiction of the US Air Force. Another year would pass before jurisdiction over Kimpo was transferred into the hands of the South Korean government on July 5, 1961, with the new military junta of Park Chung Hee in power. Moreover, with the militaristic, political and economic restrictions affecting air travel ensuing from the recent 'hot' manifestation of the Cold war in the Korean context and the geographical proximity to North Korea, it would take another thirty years for the jet age to materialize as a form of both *free* and *mass* travel in postcolonial South Korea with the legal liberalization of international travel in 1989.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ "Sae-ro Tanjang Tūin Kimpo Konghang (A Newly Made-up Kimpo Airport)," Daehan newsreel (February 16, 1960) (newsreel of Airport opening ceremony). The Daehan Newsreels were government propaganda newsreels screened prior to the main feature at the cinema in South Korea.

¹¹⁰ Memo from USOM Seoul Korea to the International Cooperation Administration, *TOICA A 2840*, February 29, 1960. RG 469, Box 173 Korea Subject Files: Transportation-Air (1960-1961). National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹¹¹ As I explore in the next chapter, we see a different form of mass air travel with emigrations beginning in the mid to late 1960s. The longstanding international travel restrictions on Korean nationals were due to a combination of the state economic plans to accumulate foreign exchange as well as national security measures against Communism. The government allowed for only a tiny sum of money (initially \$500.00) to be legally taken out of the country and the mandatory exit interviews with extensive questions on Communism continued into the 1980s for all departing emigrants. See Ilsoo Kim, *New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).



Figure 8: Kimpo Airport (Syngman Rhee), February 16, 1960 [Daehan Newsreel]



Figure 9: Kimpo Airport tape cutting, February 16, 1960 [Daehan Newsreel]



Figure 10: Kimpo Airport inauguration ceremony, February 16, 1960 [Daehan Newsreel]

The First Kimpo Terminal (1960) and the Cold War ‘International Style’: Towards a New ‘Modern Civilization (Hyöndaehwa Munmyöng)’

Every colonized people—in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality—finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country. The colonized is elevated above his jungle standards in proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural standards.

--Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*

The construction and multi-staged completion of the nation-state’s first modern international airport terminal at Kimpo in 1960 placed it alongside the boom in mass air transit and airport building taking off in the US. And like its American contemporaries, such as the new TWA terminal in New York (1956-62) and the Washington Dulles terminal (1958-1962) which inaugurated the jet-age in the United States, the modern Kimpo terminal, fashioned in Modernist International Style trademarks, was celebrated as nothing less than the embodiment of “modernity and sophistication” in South Korea. However, quite unlike TWA and Dulles, which were shaped during the heyday of Fordism and the post-war US economic boom, the first Kimpo international airport terminal came at the heels of a fledgling state of a recently divided nation with diametrically opposed political-economic alignments, wracked by the physical destruction, psychological trauma, and economic impoverishment of civil war and great political instability. As such, its modernist aesthetic and modernity, while both indexing the rise of American cultural and economic hegemony across the capitalist world system, took on quite different meanings just as the ghostly presence of South Korea’s other half, while geographically contiguous, lying politically outside the divided nation’s new world orbit, would constantly become simultaneously evoked and exorcized through the new (anticommunist) ideological associations of the ‘modern’ airport.

The ‘International’ as ‘Modern’: Stage and Mirror

From its inception throughout its multi-phased construction process, Kimpo airport was consistently haunted and disciplined by an “international” mirror guiding its material and discursive production as an exemplary locus of South Korean modernity. Defined in connection with recognition and classification (both in the sense of categorize and to rank), “international” appeared regularly both as a synonym for “modern” or “modern style” which both directed and evaluated the shape and measure of the new Kimpo airport. During his address to the National Assembly on January 21, 1958, the president, Syngman Rhee, mandated the “design and construction of ‘modern style’ (*hyundae-sik*) buildings and facilities at Kimpo International Airport.”¹¹² In addition to ‘modern style’ buildings, he stressed in particular the need to “modernize the airport lobby and bathrooms,” the appearance of which, “bears upon our

¹¹² “Rhee Syngman Taet’ongnyung, K’impo Konghang Shisül Hyöndaehwa Rul Jisi (President Rhee Syngman Orders the Modernization of Kimpo Airport),” *Chosön Ilbo*, 22 January 1958.

international reputation/honor (*ch'emyŏn*).¹¹³ Several months later, the South Korean Minister of Transportation revealed plans for a new “modern style eight-story control tower” to be built alongside the terminal building, again in the context of “upgrading the *international* appearance/status (*myŏnmok*)¹¹⁴ of Kimpo airport.”¹¹⁵ When the new terminal finally opened its doors February 16, 1960, the new modern terminal, as assessed in the inaugural volume of *Transportation Society*: “Showing off the true vigorous condition of construction in South Korea,” it is of “utmost importance to [heightening] our national standing/position/prestige internationally.”¹¹⁶ In these various descriptions, ‘international’ was on the one hand being used to define a form of appearance, and on the other modern technologies and their symbolisms (flush toilets, tall buildings), and in respect to both, operating as a kind of standard or ground for recognition/evaluation or their ‘modern’ character.

A New ‘Modern’ ‘International Style’

The new “modern style/form” (*hyŏndae-sik*) of the airport terminal building, variously praised by the national press and official media outlets as “up-to-date,” “modern,” “elegant,” “luxurious,” as well as “endowed with/satisfying an international appearance,” was one significant locus of Kimpo airport’s embodiment of “modernity” and “sophistication.”¹¹⁷ Leaving behind emergency repairs that preoccupied the bulk of reconstruction efforts throughout the decade following the Korean War, the terminal was part of the first generation of a handful of newly designed ‘modern style’ (*hyŏndae-sik*) buildings of the postwar landscape appearing in late 1950s South Korea.¹¹⁸ Like the new construction housing the nation’s major train stations at Cheonryangli, Daejeon, and Cheonan (1959), the Metro Hotel (1959), as well as the United States Operations Mission (USOM) headquarters which accommodated the US aid offices (1962) (currently the US Embassy building in Seoul), among others—which appeared alongside the new terminal, Kimpo bore the Bauhaus, Corbusier, and Mies van der Rohe derived ‘International style’ of modernist architecture which had risen as the dominant style of modern

¹¹³ Ibid. The emphasis on the bathrooms should be considered within the context of the difference between Korean (Asian) squat toilets (modernized ones had flush function), which was the predominant type at the time, and Western sit-down toilets, which Rhee is calling for. Should check with the ‘Korean Toilet Association,’—which interestingly enough has become a prominent national association with an international presence advising developing countries on modernizing their toilets—to see if they have historical records or pictures of Kimpo’s toilets.

¹¹⁴ The Korean word ‘myŏnmok,’ based on the Chinese characters (面目), is difficult to translate into one word as it combines the concept of appearance and that of face/honor/dignity. Composed of the Chinese characters for ‘face’ and ‘eye,’ combined it takes on a meaning of an appearance (face) that is conscious of or formed in relation to an ‘eye.’ The word ‘ch’emyŏn,’ used above, which I’ve translated as ‘reputation’ also shares the same character for ‘face’ and has a similar meaning.

¹¹⁵ “Myŏnmok Ilsin hal Kukje Konghang Kimpo’ae 8-chŭng Gunmŭl ūl Shinchŭk (Upgrading the Appearance/status of the International Airport: the Construction of a New 8-story Building at Kimpo),” *Chosŏn Ilbo*, 3 June 1958.

¹¹⁶ “Kimpo Kukje Konghang Kyegwan Kwa Mugŭnghwa-ho ūi ūiyi (The Opening of Kimpo International Airport and the Significance of the Mugunghwa train line)” *Gyotonggye (Transportation Society)*, Inaugural volume (April 1960), p. 30.

¹¹⁷ “San-ttut Haejin Kimpo Konghang (A Revived Kimpo Airport),” *Donga Ilbo*, 18 February, 1960; “Kimpo Konghang Chonghap Ch’ongsa Naksŏng, Yi Syngman Taet’ong Nyŏng-i t’epu Kkunko (The Completion of Kimpo International Airport Terminal, President Rhee Syngman Cuts the Tape),” *Chosŏn Ilbo*, 18 February 1960; “Kimpo Kukje Konghang Kyegwan Kwa Mugŭnghwa-ho ūi ūiyi (The Opening of Kimpo International Airport and the Significance of the Mugunghwa train line)” *Gyotonggye (Transportation Society)*, Inaugural volume (April 1960).

¹¹⁸ The norm of “modern style” at this time (in this context) was synonymous with International Style Modernism. See various examples of new building emerging in 1950s Korea in Ahn Chang Mo, *Hankuk Hyŏndae Kunch’uk 50 Nyŏn* (Fifty Years of Modern Architecture in South Korea) (Seoul: Jaewon Misul Chongsŏ, 1996).




Figure 11: Kimpo Airport façade with *brise-soleil*, February 16, 1960, [Daehan Newsreel]



Figure 12: Kimpo Airport exterior *pilotis*, February 16, 1960 [Daehan Newsreel]



Figure 13: Kimpo Airport lobby, February 16, 1960 [Daehan Newsreel]




Figure 14: Kimpo Airport interior (lighting), February 16, 1960 [Daehan Newsreel]

architecture in Europe and the U.S. since the 1930s, as well as incorporated by postcolonial nations in Latin America and South Asia into the 1950s.¹¹⁹ In addition to shaping much of the urban landscapes across the West, it also became the norm for airport design before and after World War II.¹²⁰ Dulles and TWA appearing around the same time as Kimpo were also built in the International Style, however more glamorous and sensational than the modest three-story concrete structure of Kimpo.

The new terminal took the form of a plain white three-story reinforced concrete structure with a central façade that blended a prominent stylistic form of International Style architecture with a common Asian decorative design ubiquitous among Korean as well as Chinese traditional architecture [figures 11]. Overhanging the main entrance, the façade presented a pre-cast concrete *brise-soleil* or sun-screen pioneered by the French-Swiss architect Le Corbusier patterned with the *acha* (亞字) motif, a common design found among window and door lattices in premodern Korean architecture and design as well as elsewhere in East Asia. The *brise-soleil* shielded the glass curtain wall of the main airport lobby, while the structure rested atop a row of *pilotis*, or supporting columns, another signature trait of Le Corbusier's modern architecture [figure 12]. The *pilotis*, incorporated in Le Corbusier's five points for a new architecture, his manifesto-model for modern architecture from 1926, was designed for both function and form or following his credo "form follow[ing] function." The *pilotis* as seen in his signature residential design, the Villa Savoye, were load bearing columns which both raised the volume off the ground to give the structure a sense of lightness as well as allow for circulation underneath. Similarly, the *brise-soleil* was later developed for projects in warm climates, notably the Ministry of Education building in Rio de Janeiro (1935-1942), Brazil, which Le Corbusier consulted on for Lucio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer, and the Capitol buildings in Chandigarh, India (1951-1957) upon Jawaharlal Nehru's invitation—as functional/formal architectural elements of energy control.¹²¹

It seems appropriate that Kimpo would adopt the aesthetic vocabulary of the avant-garde architect who was an early champion of the virtues of concrete, and inspired by automobiles, airplanes and engineering while intensely iconoclastic in regard to the heavy ornamental and formalist historicist styles of the 19th century. As Le Corbusier transformed the machine aesthetic and the logic of mass production into an art form, variously declaring that the "house is a machine for living in," and "Let us look at things from the point of view of architecture, but in the state of mind of the inventor of airplanes," he sought to revolutionize modern life and the urban form with his consummate belief in the utopian power of technology.¹²² For Korean

¹¹⁹ The International Style of modern architecture first developed in the early twentieth century across Europe and America with Bauhaus artists/architects as key members, emerging as the predominant avant-garde style in the 20s and 30s and canonized with the name "International style" following from the NY MOMA exhibition in 1932. It spread throughout the world leading up to and following the Second World War. For a brief introduction of its history see William H. Jordy, "The International Style in the 1930s," *The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, Vol. 24, no.1 (March 1965), pp. 10-14.

¹²⁰ Zukowsky, p. 13. Interestingly, when I asked the architect why this style was chosen for the terminal design, he was initially baffled by my question. When I added that Korean vernacular aesthetics could have been a possibility (as seen in the 1980 and 1988 Kimpo terminals), he talked of the impossibility of Kiwa roofs withstanding terminal functions. It appears that there was an aesthetic correlation between the style of building and a particular aesthetic. The ability to mold Korean forms into modern architecture appears to have needed time to gestate as well as certain political economic and social conditions.

¹²¹ "Corbusier in the Sun," *Architectural Review* (February 1993), pp. 72-74.

¹²² Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture*, (NY: Dover, 1986), p. 110. Original published in 1923.

observers, the modern qua international level or appearance of the terminal building was in part intensely welcomed in replacing the “embarrassing” makeshift terminal buildings used since the Korean War that “drew stares from foreigners.” Indicated in part by the lack of discussion of the terminal design aside from its representatives of a ‘modern-style’ building—and overshadowed by the detailed ravings of the airports new technological accoutrements, it appears precisely to be its newness and unfamiliarity or “the revived/refreshed Kimpo airport” according to Donga Ilbo’s headline—and perhaps its nakedness—that appeared a significant component of its modern character. We can see this also in the completion/opening of a new control tower in June 1962, completed with the second storey of the terminal building as part of the multi-phased construction/opening process—which, as the press proclaimed the completion of this new ten-story (45 meters) control tower (*kontörol tawö*)—undeniably one of the tallest buildings in Seoul at this time—placed next to the modern terminal building finally “endowed Kimpo airport with an appearance/status (*myönmok*) appropriate for an international airport.”¹²³ Once again akin to Le Corbusier’s ethos, in addition to being one of the tallest buildings in Seoul at the time, the tower was made with structural steel columns, which was almost exclusively used for factory construction and displayed a wall of (simulated pseudo) curtain-glass walls.

It was of course at this time that American airports were also shedding old monumental gestures symbolized in neoclassical architectural vocabularies in favor of a new monumentality or even sensationalism of International style buildings like TWA and Washington Dulles best thought to capture the efficiency and functionality inherent in the essence of air travel.¹²⁴ It was when “the naked airport,” an aesthetic and social paradigm of the airport as machine expressed in the early fascinations and theories about airports from the early 1930s, such as Le Corbusier as we have seen, but also importantly the Italian Futurists, came into its own in the United States.¹²⁵ Albert F. Heino, a leading airport theorist of the period and chief architect for United Airlines, would declare: “It is hoped that we shall have no [more] baroque, renaissance, or classic air terminals,” for “an air terminal is a machine.”¹²⁶ Heino “believed that an air terminal should be treated as a functional machine, not a civic monument.”¹²⁷ But despite Heino’s distinction, the machine-inspired International Style modernism, however ‘naked’ in its unadulterated technophile ethos was nonetheless a distinctive aesthetic and architectural doctrine. At the same time, showcased in symbolic structures such as airports, banks, world trade centers, etc. across American cityscapes as well as exported abroad via transnational architects as much as transnational corporations, not to mention state bureaucrats and foreign embassies, this modernism was both forging a new symbolic order of postwar international ‘modernity’ and laden with social and ideological connotations. As Annabel Wharton has argued in regard to the ideological operation of the modern aesthetic and technological conveniences of the international Hilton hotel chain in the postwar period, “The Modernity of the Hiltons, though demanded by local owners, was a physical expression of American assurance in the truth, righteousness and stability of its economic and moral values at the beginning of the cold war.”¹²⁸ Likewise adorned in the machine aesthetic of the International Style—their modernist lines and towering heights as

¹²³ “Ha-nül üi Kyot’ong Sünkyöng düngjang: Kimpo Konghang’ae Nop’i 10 chüng Kwanjaetap (Traffic Police in the Sky: 10-story Control Tower at Kimpo Airport),” *Chosön Ilbo*, June 20 1962.

¹²⁴ Gordon, p. 164.

¹²⁵ See Gordon, chapters 3 and 5.

¹²⁶ Gordon, p. 164.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Annabel Wharton, *Building the Cold War: Hilton Hotels and Modern Architecture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 9.

well as the luxury of running water and central heating perched above an oasis of underdevelopment made them both embodiments of American wealth and power and ideological outposts of American capitalist hegemony.

The International Style modernity of Kimpo airport was also without a doubt a key civic monument—the national gateway—and also both ideologically charged and symbolically meaningful as constitutive of a select group of the most visible icons of the South Korean postwar built environment. Since the war, Seoul was filled with traces of destruction as well as temporary structures, whether built by the state or individuals in a rapidly overcrowding city stemming from displacement from the war as well as from the earlier colonial period, such that military-issue Quonset huts like those at Kimpo prior to the new terminal, as well as shantytowns enveloped the hilly landscape of Seoul. At the same time the teeming city was mixed with large swaths of agrarian landscapes, which was palpable in the drive to Kimpo surrounded by endless tracts of farmland. The South Korean urban population had been growing exponentially during this period, increasing threefold from 1940 to 1960, one-third of which was absorbed by Seoul.¹²⁹ As Gregory Henderson so vividly described the disjointed growth of Seoul during this period: “Half city, with mounting buildings, streetcars, electricity, taxis, and half macrocephalic monster, growing cancerously in hillside shacks and caves, noisome alleys and settlements without water or electricity...”¹³⁰ Thus like the handful of other ‘modern style’ buildings of the period, sparsely scattered in select parts of Seoul rather than taking part in a new uniform urban aesthetic, as the Korean press sighed in relief that Kimpo would finally replace the humiliating “shanty/makeshift terminal (panja chŭngsa) that solicited glares from foreigners,” its modern significance—both ideologically and symbolically ordering new monuments as well as domestic and international axes of postwar modernity, was also being produced as much as a form of rupture as suture.¹³¹

Much like Le Corbusier’s celebrated government complex at Chandigarh and Niemeyer’s Brasilia, this modernist aesthetic served to commemorate and testify to Kimpo and South Korea’s entrance into the league of ‘modern’ nation-states. In the particular historical geographical context of Korea, they also presented a significant departure from the ‘modern’ symbols of the eclectic Western historicist neo-classical, neo-baroque, neo-renaissance styles which had ordered the symbolic monuments of colonial modernity of Japanese occupation—such as the rail station, the offices of the colonial governor general and city hall—much like the same category of buildings that were donning the new International style at this time alongside Kimpo. The ‘acha’ pattern of the sun-screen, could perhaps lend a more familiar face to the new style among Koreans as well as other East Asians with a shared legacy of Sino-centered traditions.¹³² While conversely it can also be seen to attempt or blur/blend with the Constructivist¹³³ inspired designs of modernist architecture and design not unlike the sun-screen

¹²⁹ Henderson, p. 169.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ “Kimpo Konghang Se Chungsa 17-il Ha’oh Pŭtuh Sayong (New Terminal at Kimpo Airport Begins Operation on February 17th),” *Chosŏn Ilbo*, 11 February 1960. *Kŭndae-shik* and *hyŏndae-shik* for ‘modernist style’ or ‘modern’ are used interchangeably in all of the articles.

¹³² Aside from appearing on door and window lattice of common households to royal palaces and Buddhist temples, the motif was regularly used as a general decorative pattern.

¹³³ Constructivist artists of early 20th century Europe could be seen to included I.e. Dutch *Destijl*, Piet Mondrian, Theo Van Doesburg, Russian Suprematists, Vladimir Tatlin, Kasmir Malevich and Bauhaus: Walter Gropius, Mies Van der Rohe, Laslo Maholy Nagy, Kandinsky. Constructivist inspired geometric designs can be seen in Corbusier and other’s sun-screens. For example the law court building in Chandigarh.

patterns in Brazil or Chandigarh. As colonial railways and the Japanese-mediated Western neo-classicism of Seoul (train) station had become icons of a paradoxical ‘colonial modernity’ bringing Korea into an imperial international network of the so-called ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere,’ as well as paving a path for anticolonial nationalist journeys of ‘enlightenment and civilization’ beyond empire and often to highly coveted and politicized American destinations, postcolonial air travel and Kimpo’s new ‘International Style’ Modernism was coming to symbolize the integration of post-colonial South Korea into a more expansive international U.S.-centered ‘Pax Americana’ marking a new form of cultural and political-economic imperialism, and leading to new (and semiotically layered) contradictions, hierarchies and ambivalences to both the modern national airport and air travel in postcolonial Korea.

International Modern Technologies, Spaces, and Words

At the same time that the modern style/form terminal was to introduce a new vocabulary and grammar of postwar modernity, the consistent coupling of ‘international’ and ‘modern’ brought together as a gauge or index of ‘national prestige/reputation’ was moreover invoked by the modern facilities, spaces, and technological conveniences housed therein, as well as the ‘international language’ of the terminal building and air travel [figures 15-18]. As the press recounted in detail, the terminal was equipped with the “most up to date” technologies: “central heating,” “running water,” “sanitation facilities,” “electric lighting” and “communication technologies.”¹³⁴ Heeding the presidential decree, the bathrooms were modernized with Western style toilets and the spacious lobby, lined with “luxurious” or “glamorous” marble walls.¹³⁵ And sorely lacking in the previous terminal, “twenty-one direct telephone lines were installed” at Kimpo to “service foreign tourists and the general public.”¹³⁶ Thus homing in on the very luxurious modern conveniences inaccessible to the majority of the population, a new exclusive and exotically modern space was assiduously inventoried with their impressive measurements and costs for the national imagination. Moreover, these technologies and conveniences were coupled with an even more exotic vocabulary of spaces and objects constituting modern air travel, along with a selective grouping of corresponding English transliterations forming new Korean-English (or ‘Konglish’ as referred to by contemporary Koreans) pidgins. Inside the new terminal there were airline offices, a check-in/reception office, a departure and arrival hall (*hol*), customs and passport inspection rooms, the airport lobby (*lob’i*) with currency exchange and baggage facilities, airport administrative offices, a VIP room, a press conference room, a coffee shop (*k’öp’i ssyop*), Korean gift shops, and a greeting/observation deck (*songyöngjang*).¹³⁷ In addition, *Run-wa’i* (runway), *taeks’i wa’i* (taxi-way), *kontörol tawö* (control tower), *sshu-tu-arisu* (stewardess), and *tüminal bilding* (terminal building) were added to a growing list of English loan words instead of, or rather as a particular form of their translation into native Korean terms/language.

¹³⁴ “San-ttut Haejin Kimpo Konghang (A Revived Kimpo Airport),” *Donga Ilbo*, 18 February, 1960.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ “Kimpo Konghang Jiktong Jönhwa 15 il Putuh Kaet’ong, (The Opening of Direct Phone Lines at Kimpo Airport on the 15th),” *Chosön Ilbo*, 12 January 1960.

¹³⁷ “Kimpo Konghang Chonghap Ch’ongsa Naksöng, Yi Syngman Taet’ong Nyöng-i t’epu Kkunko (The Completion of Kimpo International Airport Terminal, President Rhee Syngman Cuts the Tape)” *Chosön Ilbo*, 18 February 1960. The term for observation deck, where family members would wave farewell to their loved ones boarding planes, is the only non-English transliteration in this group and an important space of the early South Korean airport.



Figure 15: Kimpo Airport counter, February 16, 1960 [Daehan Newsreel]



Figure 16: Kimpo Airport, CAT counter, February 16, 1960 (Daehan Newsreel)



Figure 17: Kimpo Airport KNA counter, February 16, 1960 [Daehan Newsreel]



Figure 18: Kimpo Airport gift shop, February 16, 1960 [Daehan Newsreel]

The host of imported cultural-technological amenities that furnished the ‘modern’ terminal as well as the insertion of a new English pidgin into the Korean language were importantly instruments of South Korean modernization. As new ‘international’ (read Western) modern spaces, like English (as a de facto “international” language) loan words, ‘translated’ or ‘invented’ new concepts which anchored new cultural ideas, activities, and values of a post-colonial transnational imaginary of modernity and prestige as well as interpellated new subjects thereof, it did so through its negotiation with the concepts and values of existing terms in the vernacular visual and linguistic systems.¹³⁸ At the most basic level of semiology, Saussure tells us that language is a structured totality of signs with vertical (signifier and signified) and horizontal (sign to sign) relationships of meaning (signification) and value. As the signified (concept) is the counterpart of the signifier (sound image) in the vertical relationship represented by the sign, the “sign itself is in turn the counterpart of the other signs of language.”¹³⁹ Hence the sign, in a manner similar to the arbitrary relationship of the signifier to the signified in signification (meaning), gains its *value* from structural differentiation from other signs within a closed system of interdependent units.¹⁴⁰ Saussure writes: “The value of just any term is accordingly determined by its environment; it is impossible to fix even the value of the word signifying “sun” without first considering its surroundings: in some languages it is not possible to say “sit in the *sun*...there is obviously no exact correspondence of values.”¹⁴¹ Developing this idea further in her study of the conditions and discursive practices of translation in modern Chinese literature, Lydia Liu challenges us to rethink “cross-cultural interpretation and forms of linguistic mediation between East and West” in an effort to “open up, rather than assume, the hypothetical equivalence of meanings between...languages.”¹⁴² Thus ‘translation’ in Liu’s concept of “translingual practice”:

is no longer a neutral event untouched by the contending interests of political and ideological struggles. Instead, it becomes the very site of such struggles where the guest language is forced to encounter the host language, where the irreducible differences between them are fought out, authorities invoked or challenged, ambiguities dissolved or created, and so forth, until new meanings emerge in the host language itself.¹⁴³

Extending Saussure’s theory of language into the analysis of concrete cultural exchanges, Liu’s concept of translation is quite useful in the interpretation of the official representation of the modern airport and has broader application than just its linguistic mediations. It helps us frame more generally how the overwhelming displays of US economic and cultural influence/power permeating South Korean society at the time (the condition of translation) was negotiated in the translation of Western (and more specifically American) cultural aesthetics, material and

¹³⁸ I highlight the term ‘invented’ in contradistinction to ‘transformed’ following Lydia Liu’s formulation of ‘translingual practice’ in order to “stress the agency of the host language [such as modern Chinese in Liu’s study and Korean in mine] in the meaning-making process of translation so that the guest language need not carry a signature of authenticity around in order to make sense in the new context.” Lydia Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China 1900-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 29.

¹³⁹ Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 116.

¹⁴⁰ Saussure, p. 114-117.

¹⁴¹ Saussure, p. 116.

¹⁴² Liu, pp. xv, 19.

¹⁴³ Liu, p. 26.

cultural/behavioral technologies and even words into the South Korean vernacular in the dominant discourse. What kinds of meanings and values resulted from this unevenly structured though agential cross-cultural appropriation, from aesthetic, to spatial and linguistic translations?

The process by which the *tabang* became a *k'ŏp'i ssyop* is a telling example of the legitimizing function of the airport's modernizing-westernizing translation process. There is no exact equivalence between *k'ŏp'i ssyop* and its local "hypothetical equivalent," the Korean (and Chinese) *tabang* or 'tea room.'¹⁴⁴ The Korean *tabang* originating as the court pharmacy had transformed into tea rooms which had long been popular as a modern space in its own right, and came to function as what Liu has termed the "hypothetical equivalent" of the new *k'ŏp'i ssyop* (you could get coffee as well as tea). The distinction between the new 'modernized' (or rather westernized) *k'ŏp'i ssyops* and old '*tabangs*' was primarily that of a nominal distinction as well as differential value. Within this cross-cultural encounter, the modern *tabang* was being devalued/demoted to an un-modern or "traditional" (as something that stood opposed to the modern or something that needed modernizing) sphere. Not only did the borrowing/adoption of Western culture/language raise the status and value of the space in relation to the local 'equivalent,' it also devalued those local terms of "hypothetical equivalence" by making them appear less modern. Similar processes of revaluations associated with English loan words can be seen in the transformation of *mijangwon* to *hayuh-salons* (hair salons), or *junggukjip* to Chinese restaurants.¹⁴⁵

If the *k'ŏp'i ssyop* occasioned a devaluation of the *tabang* in a primarily linguistic manner, the imposition of a western style toilet as an instrument of 'modern' hygiene elicited a form of corporeal estrangement. As existing squat toilets became 'un-modern' or 'less modern' in their encounter with western toilets, the effect of westernized-modernization penetrated deep into the knowledges and disciplines of the body. In the official representations, as selective 'Western' characteristics became defining attributes of the 'modern' standard in South Korea its principle location was the 'international' gateway. The airport, by virtue of its 'international' (read Western modern) character was the preeminent space of the most modern architecture, technology, language and even social customs being introduced and disseminated to the larger society.

This process of both uneven encounters and situated negotiations of an 'international' modern culture is also striking in Kimpo's architectural form and process. In its encounter with Western Modernist architectural language donned at the national gateway, the *acha*-symbol was transformed both in meaning—from a shared East Asian motif to an explicitly Korean symbol—and in value—what was a contemporaneously used as a form of ornament became a marker of Korean/Asian 'tradition,' as a distinguishing or exoticizing mark via its encounter with a new structural and formal vocabulary. In an alternative interpretation, we might see in the sun-screen a 'modernized' *acha* symbol, a stubborn challenge and struggle waged by *the ornament* that was being religiously purged in modernist architecture. Creative adaptation can certainly cut both ways. But looking at the architecture more holistically and contextually within a highly uneven cultural encounter articulated via the uneven relation of power and dependency between the guest and host environments, the force of meaning lies with the Western order, as it is articulated in terms of the dominant symbolism of modern Western International Style architecture. Modernist formalism was overdetermined as the reigning 'international' standard in

¹⁴⁴ *Tabang* combining the Chinese characters for 'tea' and 'room' originally referred to court pharmacies.

¹⁴⁵ I'd like to thank Dr. Yom Chanhee for her suggestion of the hair salon and Chinese restaurant cases and her discussions with me on this topic.

‘underdeveloped’ South Korea, rather appropriately and ironically (given the context of the name and its Western origin) named “International Style,” and privileged aesthetic of the South Korean vision of ‘modernization.’

The difference in the context and conditions of production of modern architecture in South Korea also complicates Le Corbusier’s ‘form follows function’ credo of modernist architecture. As Shin Guk Bum, architect of the Facilities Department of the South Korean Transportation Ministry¹⁴⁶ in charge of Kimpo’s design and construction recalls, while he and his architect-cum-civil servant colleagues made painstaking efforts to produce Kimpo facades in the Modernist forms surveyed from American architectural journals, (*Architectural Record* and *Architectural Forum*), as well as field research undertaken at select American airports, this presented a big challenge in the impoverished postwar landscape of Seoul.¹⁴⁷ In one instance, barring the use of steel H-beams as structural columns for the control tower due to the lack of domestic steel production capacity and foreign exchange in the face of their prohibitive cost, Shin recalls his crew joining together I-beams procured through USAID commodities grants to construct H-beam like columns for the control tower.¹⁴⁸ Likewise, the metal supports for the glass curtain walls did not come industrially prefabricated but were fitted onto the cut plate glass on-site.¹⁴⁹ What they were troubled with was the lack of functional capacities or conditions—the very machines that were central to the machine and industrial inspired design vocabulary and grammar of Corbusier’s technological utopian modernism. Instead, the modern Corbusier inspired forms, while providing a normative formal model for the ‘modern style’ of Kimpo—whether taken directly from Corbusier’s projects or its countless repetitions appearing in architectural journals or American airports—demanded a craftsman-like approach and practice to its industrial construction by Korean architects and construction workers. We might see this postwar craftsman modern as an early form of the ‘inventive’ process of “reverse engineering” characteristic of industrial process in developing countries which follows not a model of engineering that begins from base elements to its final construct/product but essentially begins with the fully industrially produced foreign product and proceeds backwards and sideways via local/national ‘substitutions’—and which importantly encapsulate both state and popular practices and experiences of postwar Korean modernization and development. As Hajoon Chang humorously recounts from his personal experiences of 1970s Korea:

My friends would buy ‘copy’ computers that were made by small workshops, which would take apart IBM machines, copy the parts, and put them together. It was the same with trademarks. At the time, the country was one of the ‘pirate capitals’ of the world, churning out fake Nike shoes and Louis Vuitton bags in huge quantities. Those who had more delicate consciences would settle for near-counterfeits. There were shoes that looked like Nike but were called Nice, or shoes that had the Nike swoosh but with an extra prong.

¹⁴⁶ Since the department of Tourism was affiliated with this Ministry and there was hardly any work available for private architectural firms, this housed a group of the most prolific and elite Korean architects of the period. Like many of his colleagues, Shin graduated with the first class of Korean trained architects from Seoul National University after the Korean War. But both Shin and the Transportation Ministry carry traces of colonial architectural heritage, as reflected in Shin’s educational history and the organizational continuity of the Japanese Governor-General Railroad Architectural department in the New South Korean Ministry of Transportation.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Shin Guk Bum, November 30, 2007, Seoul.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

Counterfeit goods were rarely sold as the genuine article. Those who bought them were perfectly aware that they were buying fakes; the point was to make a fashion statement, rather than to mislead. Copyrighted items were treated the same way. Today, Korea exports a large and increasing quantity of copyrighted materials (movies, TV soaps, popular songs), but at the time imported music (LP records) or films were so expensive that few people could afford the real thing. We grew up listening to pirate rock'n'roll records, which we called '*tempura* shop records', because their sound quality was so bad that it sounded as if someone was deep-frying in the background.¹⁵⁰

Lacking the industrial capability underlying the functionalism of the industrial aesthetic of International Style as in the West, the desire to reproduce its forms in the South Korean context as well as the distinctive formal code of modernism thus becomes conspicuously foregrounded in Shin's 'creative adaptations' and 'substitutions.' He and his colleagues in the Ministry of Transportation were also not intending to mislead—but were also intent on making a 'fashion statement' if only on a larger national-international scale. Such situational yet creative 'invention' or 'construction' of the belabored craftsman-like creation of a modern industrial aesthetic at Kimpo presents a strange twist to the 'form follows function' credo of the Modernist architectural imaginary. As the supposedly universal vocabulary of International Style Modernism traveled across the Pacific and became adopted into the South Korean social and architectural vernacular, these forms acquired new meanings and values than those in which it grew out of in the Euro-American context, while altering those of existing architectural forms.

Reaching Towards the Greenwich Meridian of Airports

The 'international style' monument functioned like a gauge of the nation's modernity in relation to a real and imaginary 'international' stage—a pre-existing international system with an established hierarchy according to which new entrants were measured. In a different context of global competition and membership, Pascale Casanova has discussed the implicit but necessary "existence of a common standard for measuring time, an absolute point of reference unconditionally recognized by all contestants:"¹⁵¹

It is at once a point in space, the center of all centers (which even literary rivals, by the very fact of their competition, are agreed in acknowledging), and a basis for measuring the time that is peculiar to literature...Literary space creates a present on the basis of which all positions can be measured, a point in relation to which all other points can be located.¹⁵²

What Casanova calls the "Greenwich meridian of literature" is a space characterized by artistic autonomy from national politics as well as the ability to invent "the independent laws of literature:"¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Ha-joon Chang, *Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism* (NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2008), p. 11.

¹⁵¹ Pascale Casanova, *The World Republic of Letters* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 88.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 83. "In the world republic of letters, the richest spaces are also the oldest, which is to say the ones that were the first to enter into literary competition and whose national classics came also to be regarded as universal

Just as the fictive line known as the prime meridian, arbitrarily chosen for the determination of longitude, contributes to the real organizations of the world and makes possible the measure of distances and the location of positions on the surface of the earth, so what might be called *the Greenwich meridian of literature makes it possible to estimate the relative aesthetic distance from the center of the world of letters of all those who belong to it*. This aesthetic distance is also measured in temporal terms, since the prime meridian determines the present of literary creation, which is to say modernity. The aesthetic distance of a work or corpus of works from the center may *thus be measured by their temporal remove from the canons that, at the precise moment of estimation, define the literary present*.¹⁵⁴

In the world competition of letters, “the richest spaces are also the oldest, which is to say the ones that were the first to enter into literary competition and whose national classics came also to be regarded as universal classics.”¹⁵⁵ As an autonomous, universalized or denationalized space stemming from its historically engendered structural position within world literary space, the “Greenwich meridian of literature” has the special ability “to manufacture a universal literature while consecrating works produced in outlying territories—impressing the stamp of *littéraité* upon texts that came from far-flung lands, thereby denationalizing and deparochializing them, declaring them to be acceptable as legal tender in all the countries under its literary jurisdiction.”¹⁵⁶

The nature of the airport as a government body and architectural object precludes the kind of political autonomy Casanova ascribes to the semi-autonomous unified space of world literature. Architecture in general may be more mobile and can be seen to follow more autonomous developments of globalizing architects and related communities and professional associations, competitions, etc. But they will always be embedded in cultural and political spaces—even as in opposition to that which surrounds them. Rather, the close connection between international politics and airport transportation development can be seen in the major shift in airport competition correlated with those resulting from WWII. Germany had historically been the leader in airport design, aircraft engineering, and passenger use prior to the war, but with its defeat in the Second World War, “the victors clearly took the lead, with new showcase airports at New York’s Idlewild [later renamed JFK] (1957), and Orly in Paris (1961).”¹⁵⁷ Nonetheless a kind of Greenwich meridian of airports equated with a universal standard and recognized (by reluctant or eager members) as the ultimate measure of Modernity or the temporal present of airport design can also be seen at work in the global competition of airports.

As the emergent Greenwich meridian of airports, American airports and those of its European allies constituted the very models for all ‘international’ airports inaugurating the jet age of the 1950s. For those countries positioned at a distance from the universal standard of

classics...It is a consequence of the unequal structure (to recall Ferdinand Braudel’s phrase once again) of literary space, the uneven distribution of resources among national literary spaces. In measuring themselves against one another, these spaces slowly establish hierarchies and relations of dependency that over time create a complex and durable design.”

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 88.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 83.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁵⁷ Zukowsky, p. 15.

airports, less free to explore the true nature of airports as a unique building type, the airport could not but be a civic monument. But at the same time, it had to dress itself as a machine. As seen in the explicit borrowings of International Style Modernism at Kimpo and its technological and linguistic adornments, there was also a denationalizing or deparicularizing procedure built into the process of international membership and recognition. In parallel fashion, its membership in and adherence to US-led or US-based aviation regulatory bodies like the International Civil Aviation Association (ICAO),¹⁵⁸ the International Air Transport Association (IATA),¹⁵⁹ and the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA),¹⁶⁰ were minimum requirements for international membership. These bodies conferred recognition as well as rank upon its members. Measured to the ‘international’ standard, *Chosun Ilbo* soberly assessed that Kimpo ranks within “the second class of international airports.”¹⁶¹ The ‘modern’ as articulated through Kimpo was first and foremost a relational process/event within a rigid though not fixed hierarchy.

The American Gaze and the Developmental Schema

The official representation of modern Kimpo constantly reminded the public of an all-powerful gaze of the foreign observer (embodied in the large presence of American bureaucrats, military officers, and soldiers entering and exiting the country) whose ‘international’ recognition was fervently sought. Aside from the enormous presence of Americans in South Korea and the mythic connotations associated with the United States and Americans in the domestic imaginary at the time, the South Korean government was aware of the new revolution in tourism via mass air transit in the West and hoped it would directly impact South Korea.¹⁶² But rather than tourists (which were sorely lacking), it was the arrivals of foreign passengers, primarily diplomats, businessmen, and other professionals who are highlighted as the primary subjects of the airport in both the press and official statements. Thus on the one hand, the perceived users or guests of the airport upon whom the modern airport would impress itself were primarily foreign visitors

¹⁵⁸ ICAO was formed by the initiative of the US and the Major Allies in 1944, when the US government invited 55 countries to attend the founding conference in Chicago. 52 out of 55 invited signed the Convention on International Aviation drafted at the meeting, also known as the Chicago Convention. This was the new foundation for international aviation laws. Historically this would be the third reincarnation of an international aviation body. The first international aviation conference convened in Paris in 1910 with 18 European states in attendance. Next, the International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN) also initiated by France at the end of WWI took up the principles of the 1910 convention in a new International Air Convention that was signed by 26 out of 32 Allied and Associated Powers present at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 (the Treaty of Versailles was another). The shift from Europe to US in international aviation development is also reflected in the organizational history of ICAO. Moreover, the Chicago convention also corresponded to the beginning of the Cold War. The ICAO is a UN body and currently has 190 member states (now including Communist and former communist states, such as the DPRK.) For ICAO history and publications, see http://www.icao.int/icao/en/m_about.html#. The successful membership into and the recognition conferred by these regulatory bodies are commemorated as important milestones in Korean aviation/airport history materials. Even Incheon airport has publicized its ICAO certificate.

¹⁵⁹ IATA was also formed in 1945 and is the governing international body for airlines. It is also successor to the Air Transport Association (ATA) founded in the Hague in 1919

¹⁶⁰ The FAA is a US government agency that oversees all aspects of civil aviation in the US. The FAA was an authority that played a large role in the development of Kimpo and South Korean civil aviation in the postwar period. For FAA history see: http://www.faa.gov/about/history/historical_perspective/

¹⁶¹ “Ha-nŭl ūi Kwanmŭn’ Kimpo Konghang Insu, 5 il Kimpo Konghang Yiyangsik ūl Kōhaeng. (The Transfer of Kimpo Airport, ‘Gateway to the Sky,’ Transfer Ceremony takes place on the 5th),” *Chosŏn Ilbo*, 5 July 1961.

¹⁶² The Daehan newsreel footage of the opening ceremony played up the up to date facilities and capability of the airport “to meet increasing numbers of tourists”.

rather than Korean nationals—thus a foreign gaze directed the self-representations of nation as a form of self-objectification, and on the other, the airport became a significant public space, like the nation’s foreign or international news desk—for the national audience.

On the occasion of the transfer of Kimpo to South Korean jurisdiction from U.S. control, *Chosun Ilbo* likened Kimpo airport to a “scale with which foreigners of all different colors could measure the hospitality, lifestyle, and culture of *koriüns*” (Koreans).¹⁶³ Nationals and the nation became objectified as *koriüns*, named through the gaze of the other and collectively interpellated through an ‘international’ English language.¹⁶⁴ A regular column in *Chosun Ilbo* appeared in 1963 cataloging “humiliating” airport mishaps elevated to the level of national disgrace. For example, when the terminal sprang various leaks during a heavy rainfall in March, the columnist opined: “the sight of umbrellas covering the stores inside the terminal was a humiliating sight.”¹⁶⁵ Worse still, “buckets and tin cans collected rain drops in the VIP room where the Foreign Affairs Minister held a press conference.”¹⁶⁶ The airport blackout in August inconveniencing a foreigner arriving on a CAT plane for the International Jehovah’s witness conference was particularly embarrassing and unfortunate as “it bears on our international reputation.”¹⁶⁷ And after a three-hour delay processing an American salesman through immigration and customs the columnist anxiously reported him as saying: “this makes me never want to come back to Korea.”¹⁶⁸

In domestic assessments and critiques of the airport, appraisals were consistently structured through the gaze of the foreign observer and passenger. It is hard to find mention of Korean travelers as traveling subjects of the international airport, aside from of course the South Korean president whose diplomatic travels the airport painstakingly documented and reported on like the state press room, among other notable South Korean diplomats or government officials. A subject who appeared newsworthy however was the caricature of the *pottari-kkun* or *ppottari-shinsa* (a kind of Korean ‘carpetbagger’), a neologism corresponding to a new kind of airport-era subject which depicts a particular type of South Korean traveler and generalized element of international travel in South Korea at this time.¹⁶⁹ At a time when “imported luxury goods became the most visceral marker of modernity and prestige” and “proved irresistible to most people in the Third World,” as Lie reminds us,¹⁷⁰ strict limitations and bans on imported goods made most of those elite members of South Korea who actually had occasion to travel internationally into amateur smugglers. Columnists would regularly lampoon and censure the engorged bags of Korean bureaucrats and professionals returning from trips abroad. But aside from the *pottari-kkun*, the foreign passenger was the principle subject of air travel, while Korean travelers were less notable and the presence of Koreans were relegated to the sidelines as passive

¹⁶³ “Sae Jilsuh Ch’ajün Hankuk üi Kwanmun, Kwanglikwön Insu hu üi Kimpo Konghang (A New found Order at Kimpo Airport, Kimpo Airport after Transfer of Jurisdiction)” *Chosun Ilbo*, 9 July 1961. The Korean word for Korea is ‘Hankuk.’

¹⁶⁴ This corresponds to Fanon’s discussion of the experience of self in the third-person, objectified in the presence of the white gaze or when in European cities. *Black Skin, White Masks*.

¹⁶⁵ *Chosön Ilbo*, (“SaekYönpil” [‘Colored Pencils’ Column]), 29 March, 1961.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁷ *Chosön Ilbo*, (“SaekYönpil” [‘Colored Pencils’ Column]), 28 August 1963.

¹⁶⁸ *Chosön Ilbo*, (“SaekYönpil” [‘Colored Pencils’ Column]), 25 January 1963.

¹⁶⁹ See for example, “*Kimpo Konghang Milsu Konghang? Pottari Milsu* (Kimpo Airport, Airport of Smugglers? Bundles of Contraband),” *Chosun Ilbo*, 8 December 1960; “Oeyu Kukhaewön Düli Gajö’on ‘Tü’rungskü (trunk)’ Sokae Mu öt’ I Düldö’issülka? (What is in the ‘trunks’ of the National Assembly Members Arriving from their International Trips?)” *Kyöngnyang Sinmun*, 25 August 1966.

¹⁷⁰ Lie, p. 41.

observers (or greeters). It was easy to see flocks of Korean school children on regular field trips to the airport, or unwieldy clusters of family members, friends, and every kind of professional associate bidding farewell to the lone international traveler.¹⁷¹ Kimpo airport was both an elite and highly regulated (and militarized) space. This dichotomy of foreign users to Korean observers appears to have produced an abstracted American gaze that became the underlying force of South Korean judgments about the airport's modernity.

The *American Gaze* might be seen as the flipside of the fantasies of the ubiquitous 'American Dream,' in which the United States was believed to be "a land of opportunity in which no major obstacles exist to individual success," where "inequalities and divides of class, gender, and race are ultimately meaningless," and "rugged individualism reigns supreme."¹⁷² The American gaze was almost exactly the opposite; in it the United States functioned as the apex of a rigid hierarchy of comparison and evaluation that both haunted and guided the definition of the successful modernization of both South Korean institutions and the nation, where inequalities between nations trumped inequalities of class or gender, and became the basis of the very measure of modernization in Korea. The American gaze thus operated as a formative construct of a relational developmental nationalism and racialism in the postwar South Korean modern imagination.

Thus on the one hand the airport's 'cosmopolitan' aspect—as a form of the international stage—was essential to its association with 'modernity.' The airport's ability to represent modernity relied for a large part on its being the very gateway to Modernity itself, which was *perceived as externally positioned*, located at a temporal and spatial remove from the peripheral position of the post-colonial nation. On the other hand, the airport as an 'international' mirror reflected the contours of a modern nation-ideal, which materially and discursively structured/composed the airport. In the process it altered the values of the existing meanings system in various cultural arenas forcing a recognition of its peripheral positioning as well as the distance towards the modern 'apex.' And as the airport as a symbol of national modernity disconnected Koreans from the South Korean local arts, corporeal knowledges, and linguistic practices, concrete manifestations of the conceived space of Kimpo (representation of space) enacted functions of geographical awareness and modern discipline. It presented an abstracted and objectified vision of the nation state within a universal teleology of development.

The rise and fall of Germany in international aviation history offers an interesting frame for Kimpo's development. Peter Fritzsche has examined the "integral nature of aviation and national consciousness in Wilhelmine, Weimar, and Nazi Germany, stating that this relatively new nation-state, regardless of political outlook, actively supported air travel—the symbol of modernity—so as not to play a subordinate role in the modern world order."¹⁷³ Given that Germany was a latecomer to economic development in Europe, it is interesting to consider the emphasis that was placed on aviation development for symbolic as well as material reasons. Though the context may be quite different—Germany was an early leader of world aviation—the connection between an 'underdeveloped' country and the symbolism of the modern airport as a

¹⁷¹ The airport farewell is perhaps the most common memory and experience of Kimpo in all of my interviews and discussions with Koreans up until the most recent college age generation. Its appearance as a common trope in South Korean postwar cinema and literature will be discussed in the next chapter. I thank John Lie for this recollection of the school trips to airport. Similarly, I would see Korean senior citizen groups coming to Incheon terminal for regular tours of the airport while I worked at the Information counter in 2008 for research.

¹⁷² Nancy Abelman and John Lie, *Blue Dreams: Korean Americans in the Los Angeles Riots* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 177.

¹⁷³ Zukowsky, p. 14.

desired national analogue is shared in the German and South Korean cases. As Fritzsche has claimed, airport development in Germany was spurred by its economic under-development, chosen for its exceptional signification of Modernity. In the South Korean case, taken as an ideal image of a modern South Korea itself, Kimpo became a testament of the nation's belonging to an international present within a spatial continuum, while also representing its temporal distance from it. Rather than Seoul time: "In the airport lobby, the steps of all foreigners naturally lead them to gaze at the various clocks of world cities *beginning* with the Greenwich mean time."¹⁷⁴

Simultaneously a form of national idealization and international comparison, the modern airport functioned as an 'international stage' in two senses of the term. The 'international stage' was both an evolutionary stage of (national) development. Like a form of national debut, it was like a temporal stage of identity formation in which the national self was spatialized within an international body. It was also an 'international stage' in a spatial sense where modernity was performed, garnered, and recognized in relation to pre-existing models and norms. This dual dynamic presents a particularly fraught paradox for the postcolonial, developing nation—encapsulated in the International style *acha motif* of the terminal façade. The airport necessarily takes on great national significance as it must present the most modern face of the nation, but as this occurs on an international stage—simultaneously directed towards the national populace and towards the international community as well as being structured within it—the image of the modern nation must in part be de-nationalized, as it is standardized into the universal standard—and fragmented from the messiness and differing codes of its geographical environment. The condition of possibility for the modern post-colonial national culture was also the impossibility of its full 'presence' as self-sufficient 'sign' of national sovereignty or independence. It is presented with the task of appearing national and cosmopolitan at the same time in the same image. Thus signified in the same image of modernity—of the modern airport as symbol of national modernity and international membership—is the face of modern South Korea formed in relation to other members of the international community and within highly uneven power relations between the nation and the regnant Center or the Greenwich meridian of airports. In this intensely 'unfree' context of postwar 'independent' South Korea, the nation's recognition of modernity was intensely bound up with its insertion/membership in an international system, a system that is historical and intensely hierarchical. But since the airport is signified as the most modern image of the nation, this (de-nationalized) image is disseminated back towards the interior/populace as the image or model of national modernity. Following from this, we cannot think of postwar modern South Korean identity and nationalism outside of the terms of the nation's initiation into the international community, or in other words having to define its modernity in terms of a more 'modern' national other. South Korea became national and international at the same time through the same process. This of course has significant implications for the kind of nationalism that arises in South Korea during and since the postwar period.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ "Sae Jilsuh Ch'ajün Hankuk üi Kwanmun, Kwanglikwön Insu hu üi Kimpo Konghang (A New found Order at Kimpo Airport, Kimpo Airport after Transfer of Jurisdiction)," *Chosun Ilbo*, 9 July 1961.

¹⁷⁵ My hypothesis is that 'ethnic nationalism' based on consanguinity in the idea of *minjok* is not the primary element of South Korean nationalism as it develops in the postwar period. Rather I think it is more like a complex relational-cultural nationalism that takes refuge in the historically inherited blood theories and *minjok* beliefs, combined with an unusually ethnically homogenous population that are strong among the populace and propagated by the state. This kind of relational and culturally produced/conditioned nationalism better explains South Korea's nationalism which so often appear at the interstice or contact between the national and the global. Also as we will see in the next chapter, the export of South Koreans abroad was also an important element of its development. With

Hence from Rhee's initial decree to the partial completion of the new terminal building (phase I) in February 1960 and the control tower (phase II) in June 1962 under a new post-junta Park Chung Hee regime, the construction of the first modern terminal at Kimpo was accompanied by a stream of news articles, government newsreels (i.e. Daehan news) and other official publications which discursively produced the airport as the most 'modern' and 'international' space in South Korea. This modernity was moreover conceived as representative of the progress of the new nation-state, measured in relation to a hierarchical Cold War geography of modernization. The 'modernity' of Kimpo was rather comprehensive, touching on everything from aesthetics, to everyday life, and even language, effecting value-added translations of vernacular 'hypothetical equivalents' where such existed and creating new concepts where none was available. The airport became the paradigm for an abstracted geopolitical image of the modern nation that was at once an urban space, a cultural phenomenon, and a discourse. It was moreover a unique 'monument' unconcerned with commemorating history but intent on rewriting it, oriented towards a vision of the desired future.

Modernity as Rupture: the Specter of Communism

As Kimpo looked toward capitalist America, it also bore the spectral imprint of the communist North—which much like the way 'traditional' Korea (and Chinese civilization) was being temporally relegated behind modern Japan and the U.S. in early modern nationalist discourse—came to be likewise positioned at opposing poles of both an evolutionary/linear timeline of development and as the dialectic of 'destruction' and 'construction.' As both the modern and national image of Kimpo was inextricably bound to the moral law of anti-communism, for the new *Transportation Society*, Kimpo became representative of a new 'modern culture/civilization' of South Korea associated with national recovery and development within international capitalism as well as the overcoming of the "barbarity" of Communism framed within a dialectic of "destruction and construction."¹⁷⁶

When the wretched sight of destruction appears in our minds and in front of our eyes, unable to contain the overwhelming hatred/grudge, we grind our teeth and our body shakes. It has been seven years since the barbarism of the Communists (*kongsan tobae*) reduced to ruins the breathtaking mountains and rivers of this country's famed landscape during the Korean War. Overcoming the poverty, ruin, and sadness of the early post-war period, our streets today reflect our worthwhile efforts in restoring and reconstructing demolished buildings and areas...one by one. Fortunately, our current streets, lined with tall buildings and large factories confidently exhibiting the appearance of 'modern civilization/culture' (*hyöndaemunmyöng*), have been transformed so completely as to make us wonder if such destruction had occurred at all. Until the completion of the first phase of the Kimpo integrated terminal building by our own hands, the destruction of the War lingered in the heartbreaking appearance of Kimpo airport, suffering the sadness of its destruction for seven years. With the opening of the new terminal building

10% of Koreans residing out of the country, and their interactions abroad the relational aspect of Korean nationalism is also highlighted here.

¹⁷⁶ *Gyotonggye (Transportation Society)*, April 1960, p. 29.

this past February 17th, South Korea's place in international aviation has been restored.¹⁷⁷

In a rather melodramatic representation of the airport co-mingling an ethos and pathos of war and recovery, the dialectic of destruction and construction maps onto two poles along a linear temporal span constructing a particular post-colonial amalgam of the colonial discourse of idea of 'a universal path of progress' stemming from American Modernization theory. At the most general level, new urban structures like Kimpo occupy the *present* 'construction' pole of '*modern civilization/culture*,' which has overcome the *past* destruction of the '*barbarism of Communism*.' In an asymmetric pairing of natural destruction and technological construction, the editorial laments the destruction of the breathtaking *nature* of all of Korea (*sam chun li gumsugangsang*), while lauding the *material culture* that is constructed in its place, comprised of urban buildings and neighborhoods in the divided South. A unified Korea categorized as nature appears fixed into the past, while South Korea emerges as the bearer of 'modern civilization/culture,' located in the present. It presents a modern material civilization that one half of a divided nation—South Korea—executes to rid the backwardness of the past (natural) nation tainted by Communism (currently maintained in the northern half). Here elements of modernization theory take over in that it is not inherent racial inadequacies or inferiority that lies behind the need and justification for reform (by modern culture) but the backwardness or sickness associated with the 'barbarism' of a competing political-economic system. Communism as it emerges within this confrontation between national and international discourses of modernization becomes the antithesis of modernization, occupying the placeholder for a past 'tradition'.¹⁷⁸ Construction as a key term of modernization is privileged as the activity of modern culture and clearly positioned on the emergent side of the dialectic, while destruction and barbarism recedes into the past with the erasure of both a natural-pre-modern-cultural Korea and Communism from view.

In his study of American concepts of modernization in postwar America, Michael Latham has written that Modernization "was not merely a social scientific formulation," but also "an ideology, a conceptual framework that articulated a common collection of assumptions about the nature of American society and its ability to transform a world perceived as both materially and culturally deficient."¹⁷⁹ Latham summarizes a series of overlapping assumptions, which form the core concepts of modernization theory:

- (1) "traditional" and "modern" societies are separated by a sharp dichotomy;
- (2) economic, political, and social changes are integrated and interdependent;
- (3) development tends to proceed toward the modern state along a common, linear path;
- and (4) the progress of developing societies can be dramatically accelerated through contact with developed ones.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ As Gi Wook Shin et al. argue in "The Politics of Ethnic Nationalism in Divided Korea," ethnic nationalism was equally shared/promoted in both North and South Korea. "The Politics of Ethnic Nationalism in Divided Korea," *Nations and Nationalism* vol. 5, no. 4 (1999), pp. 465-484.

¹⁷⁹ Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 5.

¹⁸⁰ Latham, p. 4.

Anti-communism was a key vehicle that aligned Cold War American modernization theory with Kimpo as symbol of the modern nation. Much like the anxiety about the “lack of identity and the lack of mission—in apparent contrast to ideologically fanatical enemies” that Nils Gilman sees as the internal counterpart to American Modernization theory’s “relentless optimism about the possibility for an improved world and...a smug sense of self-congratulation,” reflecting “both sides of the fifties in the US,” the national developmental anxiety underlying the discourse of Kimpo’s modernity was even more proximate, and the image of national recovery and modernization more zealous and both idealized and ideologized.¹⁸¹

Construction, Modernism, Anti-communism

‘Construction’ was a key term and practice by which South Korean postcolonial reconstruction was translated into a ‘formal’ discourse of modernization. Moreover, anxious about North Korea’s rapid industrialization during this period, which surpassed South Korea’s at the time, these monuments of modernity were also constitutive of the fervent competition with North Korea for political legitimacy of the South Korean government through visible signs of economic development. Kimpo thus foreshadows architectural design patterns and the metropolitan landscape of the coming 1960s in two important ways. First, the close interlinkage between anti-communism and Modernist architecture becomes even more pronounced in the modernist building boom in the sixties under Park’s developmentalism. Located at the geographically central and historically charged site of Namsan mountain¹⁸² the (Anti-Communist) ‘Freedom Center’ was one of the most expressively Modernist structures at the time bearing close resemblance to the work of Corbusier (Chandigarh Assembly building, 1941-62) and Kim’s mentor Kenzo Tange (Totsuka Country Club, Yokohama, Japan, 60-61).¹⁸³ Designed in 1964 by Kim Soo-geun, often referred to (in closed quarters) as the Albert Speer of Park Chung Hee, it was built to house the training and research center for the ‘Asian Anti-Communist Alliance,’ which was inaugurated in South Korea in July 1954 in order to spread the anti-communist movement internationally.¹⁸⁴ Although Modernist architecture in the West was associated with heterogeneous political and social positions vis-à-vis US led capitalism, which Sarah Williams Goldhagen divides into consensualists, reformists, and negative critics, in its South Korean reception, the modernist form was strongly monopolized by the government to aestheticize a homogenous vision of anti-Communist internationalist development.¹⁸⁵ The anti-communist ideological taint of Modernist aesthetics in the post-WWII era was not unique to South Korea, but due to the proximity and intimacy of North Korea and historical lineages of colonial era nationalism, anti-communism became a powerful element of the official nationalist discourse of South Korea which also facilitated the un-contradictory join between nationalism and a fervent internationalist pro-Americanism.

¹⁸¹ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 2003), p. x.

¹⁸² This is the site where the colonial Japanese government had erected a Shinto shrine.

¹⁸³ This building first sparked a debate on modernist form in architectural circles in South Korea. Ahn, p. 116.

¹⁸⁴ Ahn, p. 116. I think that this might have been South Korea’s parallel/answer/contrast to the Bandung conference. The Bandung appears to have been precluded from the start for SK.

¹⁸⁵ Sarah Goldhagen, *Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).

Conclusion

When the first modern international airport opened at Kimpo in 1960, this terminal symbolized the threshold to a new *international* modernity (however fragmented) vis-à-vis its membership in the capitalist ‘free world.’ An embodiment of “modern civilization/culture (*hyöndaе munmyöng*)”¹⁸⁶ in South Korea, the terminal stood as a testament to the twin Cold War American ideologies of communist containment and international integration. It wiped away the postwar traces of the “barbarity of Communism (*kongsan tobae ui manhaeng*)”¹⁸⁷ and replaced them with the most up to date and luxurious western technology, aesthetics, and culture from Modernist architecture to coffee shops and western style toilets. The international style terminal featuring the Euro-American Modernist trademarks—the Corbusian *brise-soleil* (sun screen) patterned in the *acha* (亞字) motif (a common decorative window and door lattice motif of classical Korean architecture), and *pilotis* (external supporting columns)—exemplified the wide-ranging standardizations according to the “international” norms of western culture and institutions which became synonymous with modernization and development in the immediate post-Korean War decade of the 1950s. From its first appearance in the South Korean context, Modernism was inherently political. It bore the spectral imprints of communist North Korea and capitalist America—positioned at opposing poles of an evolutionary timeline of development.

It may not be unusual that international signifiers became incorporated into the character of Kimpo airport, which was after all the national border, the very margin delineating inside from outside in their co-production. But it is rather peculiar and significant to the postcolonial historical geography of Kimpo that these appropriations of Western culture, under the filter of the ‘international’ became largely definitive and demonstrative of the exceptionally ‘modern’ image of the airport and by extension came to underlie the aspiring modern image/identity of the nation. The discourse of a modern international airport functioned like a tain of consciousness about national identity in terms of development vis-à-vis a measured relation to (developed) people and places existing beyond its national borders. In these official representations of modern Kimpo, a sense of modernity (the appearance of being Western) and the desire for modernization (national development) brought about a highly anxious ‘underdeveloped’ perception of South Korea vis-à-vis the developed West which was at the same time interchangeable with a normative definition of the ‘international’. Within a kind of international *developmental schema* occasioned by the nation’s modern identity formation produced in confrontation with a new international system, the International style Modernism of the terminal and the terminal’s technological facilities, as well as the foreign English loan words attached to them appeared to have function as interchangeable indexes of an ideology of hierarchical modernity tied to idealized visions of technological and scientific progress imagined to exist in distant places accessible from the other (air)side of Kimpo terminal. Within the commanding influence of American culture and economy on the South Korean landscape, coinciding with the formative stage of the nation’s postwar identity, it appears the ‘modern’ could only appear or appear best on the ‘international’ stage.

Like the early nationalist discourse of ‘civilization and enlightenment’ of the late 19th and early 20th century with which national reformers sought to awake the populace to adopt a new Western civilization, ‘international’ and ‘modern civilization’ was used as normative concepts of

¹⁸⁶ *Gyotonggye (Transportation Society)*, April 1960, p. 29.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

national development in the postwar postcolonial context. It also shared with the older discourse and absent center of ‘national culture’ as cultural development appeared intimately linked to adopting international technological, cultural, linguistic as well as political economic forms. This is reflected in the Transportation society editorial, which asserts that the airport and like infrastructures were “of utmost importance for *cultural development*” and even “the progress of our *national/ethnic culture (minjok munwha)*.”¹⁸⁸ Of course there is no indication of the identity of this ‘national culture’ and what can be seen to characterize the distinctiveness of the ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’ in this formulation.’ Aside from the modern industrial, international status-uplifting aspects of the new airport terminal, the only ‘Korean’ signifier at Kimpo is reported as the “marble lining the interior walls and floors of the terminal echoing the ancient image of Korea.”¹⁸⁹ The absent center of ‘national or ethnic culture’ appears aligned to the modernizing impulse of western technological mastery as well as submerged within it. It is interesting to note, from the benefit of hindsight, this kind of association resembles that of global auteur architects of new East Asian mega-airports in the 1990s, making loose connections between the shape of structural steel columns of the airport and the local identity of ship masts in the Incheon harbor.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 32, 33.

¹⁸⁹ “San-ttut Haejin Kimpo Konghang (A Revived Kimpo Airport) *Donga Ilbo*,” 18 February 1960. Despite instances of marble pagodas, this is clearly a stretch when we consider the predominance of wood in vernacular Korean architecture and see instead that it is the luxurious quality of marble that is really being mined for meaning.

Chapter Five

The Second International Kimpo Terminal (1972-80): Kiwa Modern and the Developmental State

“Modern” means being western without the onus of following the West. It is the model of the West detached in some way from its geographical origins and locus.

--Edward A. Shills, quoted in Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*¹⁹⁰

A New Era of Nationalization for Kimpo Airport: 1960-1980

From the time of the opening ceremony of Kimpo airport in February 1960 to the transfer of Kimpo from the US Air Force and the UN forces command to the South Korean government on July 7, 1961, state power changed hands three times. The Kimpo airport opening in 1960 coincided with a politically tumultuous period for Syngman Rhee, whose grip on power was fast eroding in the face of a discontented populace, comprised largely of a rapidly growing group of intellectuals and students. Since 1959, student demonstrations against Rhee had amassed to an alarming degree and eventually culminated in the historic student revolutionary uprising on April 19, 1960, the largest mass revolt since the March 1st Independence Movement in 1919, partly in response to the controversial results of the February 1960 elections, and which ousted Rhee from power. Rhee finally stepped down after thirteen-years of autocratic rule (1948-1960) and three consecutive terms in office, two months after the terminal's opening ceremony. The April 19 Student Revolution ushered in a democratically elected government under the Prime Minister Chang Myŏn (1960-1961) and President Yun Bo-seon. However, within a year, on May 16, 1961 the military coup of General Park Chung Hee overthrew the Chang Myŏn government and brought an end to the brief 'spring' of democracy, nestled between two extended authoritarian regimes. Following upon the heels of the April student revolution, the military revolution led by Park Chung Hee also sought significant changes to the political corruption and economic backwardness that plagued the thirteen-year rule under Rhee, but also to the democratic ideals, if chaotic practice, of the post student revolution government. Park would remain in power for the next eighteen years (1961-1979) as his rule transformed from a military dictatorship, to a civilian political party, to bureaucratic-authoritarianism.

As the Rhee era ended with his return to exile in the United States via his clandestine departure on a CAT plane from Kimpo airport on May 29, 1960, escorted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs,¹⁹¹ Park's military takeover of the state on May 16, the following year, began with the seizure of Kimpo airport, along with rest of the nation's airports, ports, and banks (all

¹⁹⁰ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2003), p.1.

¹⁹¹ “Yi Baksa Buch’ŏ Migŭk ūro Mangmyŏng (Dr. Syngman Rhee and his Wife Leave for the U.S. in Exile),” *Donga Ilbo*, 30 May 1960.

financial transactions).¹⁹² Despite the coup, the transfer of Kimpo airport from U.S. to Korean jurisdiction proceeded apace on July 5, 1961, just one month after the airport was reopened and the travel blockade lifted for Korean nationals to return to the normalcy of military occupation. The transfer ceremony presented both similarities and differences to the opening ceremony of the terminal the year prior. The ceremony was presided by high-ranking U.S. military generals as well as the Chief officer of the UN forces command on the American side, and by General Park Chung Hee under the title, Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, and Yun Bo-Seon, the now nominal head of state.¹⁹³ The transfer was likewise credited to the joint effort of South Korean and American government officials and military officers in bringing about the transfer, which had spanned over two years and gave occasion to a renewed promise of the continuing cooperation between the two countries towards “Kimpo’s realization of the appearance/status of an international airport.”¹⁹⁴ Moreover, state anti-communism was also reaffirmed as the ceremony concluded with the recital of the junta’s “Revolutionary pledge of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction,” in which the first line asserted the vow to uphold anticommunism.¹⁹⁵

While the commitment to anticommunism and the trajectory of development within a US-led international capitalist system remained just as much a significant factor, if not more so in the post-transfer discourse of the airport under the new military regime, there was also an important shift in the discourse of the airport, which gestured towards its new role not only as a sign and model of the nation-state’s cosmopolitan-national modernity but also as a key tool/vehicle of national economic development. As reported in the national press a few days after the transfer, Kimpo reflected a “new order” and orderliness, which was credited as much to the Airport’s coming into “our own hands” as to the new revolutionary government.¹⁹⁶ The article also highlighted the concern over the domination of foreign air carriers at Kimpo and the dire straits of KNA the single national airline.¹⁹⁷ After the reopening of Kimpo, which had been closed in the immediate period after Park’s May 16 coup,¹⁹⁸ the article observed, not only was air traffic back to normal, the airport lines were “well-organized” and the check-in process “more efficient.”¹⁹⁹ Even the troublesome *potarikk’un* or high-class smugglers, who had symbolized the rampant corruption of government officials and the abuse of their privileged international travels, were now under control. Along with the reining in of the *potarikk’un* problem, the prevailing corruption, which plagued the country as well as the airport, manifest in the mixture of “power with toadyism,” was “washed away by a strong wave to reveal a clean new sandy beach.”²⁰⁰ At the same time, the article raised alarm over the “practical monopoly of foreign airlines, NWA,

¹⁹² “5.16 Hyökmyöng hu üi pogo mit yöng 5wöl putö 5wöl 27il jöngö kk’aji (The Proclamation and Order following the May 16 Revolution, From May 16 to May 27),” *Kyöngnyang Sinmun* (Capital News) (28 May 1961).

¹⁹³ “Hanul ui Kwangmun: Kimpo Konghang Insu (Gateway to the Sky: The Transfer of Kimpo Airport),” *Chosun Ilbo*, July 5, 1961; “15 nyön manae üri sonüro (Into Our Own Hands after 15 Years),” *Chosun Ilbo*, 22 June 1961.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ “Sae Jilsuh Ch’ajün Hankuk üi Kwanmun, Kwanglikwön Insu hu üi Kimpo Konghang” (A New found Order at Kimpo Airport, Kimpo Airport after Transfer of Jurisdiction),” *Chosun Ilbo*, 9 July 1961.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ During the closure all Korean nationals were prohibited from leaving the nation, including Korean flight attendants and pilots.

¹⁹⁹ “Sae Jilsuh Ch’ajün Hankuk üi Kwanmun, Kwanglikwön Insu hu üi Kimpo Konghang (A New found Order at Kimpo Airport, Kimpo Airport after Transfer of Jurisdiction),” *Chosun Ilbo*, 9 July 1961.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

CAT, and CPA that made use of the gateway.”²⁰¹ Since the single Korean airline KNA “only operates a Seoul-Hong Kong flight once a week and cannot get itself out of debt” the article announced, “it either needs a helping hand from the government to expand its international routes or it will find itself in trouble.”²⁰² This new concern over the long existing monopoly of foreign carriers at Kimpo was moreover followed by a series of articles complaining about the difficulty of dealing of NWA in the following years.²⁰³ Within a year, KNA did go bankrupt, helped in part by the new government’s anti-corruption campaign, which indicted, fined, and jailed numerous Rhee-era “dependent capitalists,”²⁰⁴ and the airline was taken over by the government and nationalized.²⁰⁵ Thus while the joint South Korea-U.S. commitment to anti-communism as well as the nation’s insertion into a U.S.-led international capitalist system was not questioned, there was a discursive shift in tenor about South Korea’s position within it. As the “new order” of Kimpo functioned to herald the promising future of national reform and reconstruction under Park, concerns over foreign aviation monopolies presaged both a new era of state-led national economic development seeking to move away from foreign dependency toward economic self-sufficiency as well as the nationalization of Kimpo and South Korean air travel. These differences shed light on the momentous changes that were to shape both the new role as well as aesthetic form of Kimpo airport with the development of air travel and the continuous expansions of Kimpo terminal throughout the sixties and seventies and the construction of a new *kiwa*²⁰⁶ terminal building (1972-1980) as the new face of national capitalism [figures 19-20].

This chapter examines the shift in representation from the first International Style 1960 Kimpo terminal to the second traditional architecture inspired *kiwa* terminal at Kimpo that emerged in 1980 alongside and through the examination of the changing state-led spatial practice and development of the airport and aviation at the intersection of uneven global capitalist accumulation (and the new international division of labor) and national bureaucratic authoritarian economic development under the South Korean developmental state. As the state began to pursue a combination of export-oriented industrialization and import substitution industrialization policies for national economic growth in the 1960s, and the airport became a strategic site for the state mediation of the exchange and flows of capital, labor and commodities between national and global markets, it continued to expand following much the same processes of export industrialization and import substitution industrialization policies of the state.²⁰⁷ In addition to the expansion of the terminal building as both a product of and a means of production of national economic development, there were two laws passed in the spring of 1962 that also

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ For example, “NWA Mani kkadarowa (NWA is Difficult to Deal With),” *Chosun Ilbo*, 2 June 1960.

²⁰⁴ I refer to John Lie’s discussion of the political economy of the ‘triple alliance’ of the 1960s with the U.S. on top with Rhee and the state in between and dependent capitalists below. See John Lie, *Han Unbound: the Political Economy of South Korea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 26.

²⁰⁵ The president of KNA was one the hundreds of business leaders and politicians jailed on corruption and embezzlement charges as Park cleaned house during his early rule. The nationalized airline is sold later to Hanjin in 1969. Hanjin was however made to invest heavily in airport development by the state even before it acquired the airline.

²⁰⁶ *Kiwa* refers to the roof design of traditional upper class Korean residences called *hanoks*; Korean palaces feature large-scale elaborate *hanoks*.

²⁰⁷ As political economists have noted, in developing countries export-oriented industrialization and ISI were undertaken simultaneously. Under Park’s economic plans, EOI went “hand in hand with Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)...[which] requires foreign exchange to purchase capital goods and raw materials.” (Lie, p. 55.)



Figure 19: The Second International Kimpo Terminal, Kiwa Modern (1972-1980) [1990's photo] [Kimpo Airport 30-Year History]



Figure 20: The Second International Kimpo Terminal (1972-1980) Interior, [1990's photo] [Kimpo Airport 30-Year History]

situate the development and regulation of the airports two main constituents—airlines and passengers—at the intersection of these two aspects of South Korean development. The first is the law nationalizing Korean Airlines as a public corporation, which would structure the aviation infrastructure of these passenger flows much in the same manner of economic protections and the development of national industries that characterized state-led industrial development. Second was the new overseas emigration law, which would structure the flow of Korean air travel through Kimpo in alignment with the processes and goals of economic development. As emigration scholar Ilsoo Kim has pointed out, the goals of the first five-year economic plan were importantly accompanied by political policies for managing the growing population, whereby the state both promoted the use of contraception and encouraged a highly regulated form of emigration to curb population growth.²⁰⁸ The state emigration policy was a measure to simultaneously “export its surplus citizens” while also accumulating foreign exchange through remittances (as well as technical expertise from abroad).²⁰⁹ This broke down into different forms. On the one hand the export of labor emigrants functioned by a similar logic of the export of commodities—to accumulate much needed capital for national development. Thus the useful labor of Korean miners in Germany and nurses in the U.S. would be realized not only in Germany and the U.S. but also in South Korea through the form of remittances sent back to the family in Korea through Korean banks. On the other hand, South Korea also needed technological expertise and knowledge for industrial development. Thus technical trainees and students were a different set of human exports—whose use value would be realized through their repatriation. The second group did not resemble exports really but more accurately paralleled import substitution.

Thus continuing into the seventies with the Big Push for heavy and chemical industrialization and the politically repressive Yushin Constitution, as the developmental state set out to turn the nation from a predominantly agrarian and industrial processor nation to an industrialized producer nation within the international division of labor, the airport came to embody, on the one hand, the dual and paradoxical process of standardization (qua economic integration) and particularization (qua economic protections) that was characteristic of national industrialization and development seeking to ascend the ladder of the global hierarchy of an uneven global capitalist system. On the other hand, as the airport functioned as a key instrument of socio-cultural, economic and political processes of rapid national economic development, it also embodied the paradoxical process of structuring/ producing new processes and forms of exploitation and oppression of Korean citizens—through the regulated flow of capital, commodities, and people through repressive legalistic force and ideology—at the same time as, and as the flipside to its efforts to attain national economic independence. Both tragically and ironically, the paradoxical processes embodied in the use of the postcolonial airport as a form of national statecraft by the developmental state doubled the very processes that characterized Japan’s colonial era use of Korean railroads as a tool of colonial statecraft in manipulating and facilitating human migrations, social and urban transformations, and new ideological symbolic orderings according to Japanese colonial imperatives. Through this situated yet relational approach to and analysis of the production of Kimpo’s second terminal building—as a form of immanent critique—I look at how we might interpret the new aesthetic and symbolism of the airport’s architectural form in the global urban landscape as a discrepant formation produced

²⁰⁸ Ilsoo Kim, *New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 48.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

through and against the power geometries that govern the hierarchical, segmented yet interconnected space of global industrial capitalist modernity. The new kiwa terminal that emerged in 1980 was both a material and symbolic embodiment of two decades of intense social, political, and economic transformation, growth and exploitation in South Korea—and symbolic as much of the face of the ‘revolutionary’ desire for national economic independence vis-à-vis the uneven world system as of its corresponding face of national oppression that accompanied this process. Both sides of this dialectic were however securely anchored to the grand narrative of South Korean modernization/development and modernity²¹⁰—much like Marx’s creative/destructive dialectic of capitalist modernity and Marshall Berman’s “tragedy of development”—yet with important modifications to its content arising from the particular contradictions arising from the intersection of the uneven terrain of postwar Cold War national-capitalist competition and South Korean state-led anti-communist national development of the historical-geography of South Korean modernization and development.

Developmental Kimpo: Economic Strategies, Political Repressions and Cultural Ideologies (1961 – 1980)

Transitioning towards “Take off”: Kimpo Expansions (1961-1972)

Begun as a joint project in 1957 between the Rhee administration and the U.S. Military and the Department of State with copious amounts of U.S. aid, the modest but celebrated ‘modern’ International Style terminal came to constitute a strategic space that facilitated the nation’s developmental “take-off” under the military regime of Park Chung Hee throughout the 60s in conjunction with Washington’s policy change from Eisenhower type military-focused containment to Kennedy’s economic internationalism. As Meredith Woo-Cumings has observed, with modernization theory guru W.W. Rostow formally advising the new U.S. administration, Washington’s new Korea policy came to “read like an undergraduate textbook on...modernization theory” urging export-led development with a pledge of “technical and economic aid to bring the reforms to fruition,” as it scaled back its “predominant military focus” along with abundant U.S. aid and support for Rhee’s ISI policies that had been in place since 1953.²¹¹ At the same time, beginning with the early stages of Park’s junta in 1961, the airport was appropriated as an instrument/vehicle of new economic policies of the military regime as both a means and target of national industrial development.

Facilitating and facilitated by the nation’s export-led economic “take-off” during 1960s under the combined export-oriented industrialization and import substitution developmental policies of the Park regime, the airport underwent continuous expansions keeping pace with growth in air traffic, passengers and cargo, and innovations in aviation technology within the bounded sphere of international capitalism.²¹² The original style of Kimpo terminal continued to deform with terminal expansions occurring every two years—1963, 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968—reaching its saturation point by 1973 with two additional floors and measuring twice the

²¹⁰ I am thus distinguishing this from theories of ‘postmodernism’ conceived of in the Euro-American Marxist discourse of post WWII culture and aesthetic movements, grounded in the stage-ist theory/analysis of late-capitalism.

²¹¹ Jung-en Woo, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 75-76.

²¹² *Hang’gong Yöngam* (Aviation Almanac) (Seoul: Korean Civil Aviation Development Association, 2002), p. 65.

area of the 1960 terminal.²¹³ The runway was also expanded to handle long distance jet planes in 1971 and again to accommodate the Boeing 747 jumbo jet in 1973.²¹⁴ Reflecting the skyrocketing growth rates of the national economy, from 1963 – 1971, domestic passengers and cargo grew 9 times and 6 times, respectively, and international passengers and cargo 7.5 and 9.6 times.²¹⁵ By 1970, no longer able to accommodate the airport’s precipitous growth—averaging 100% yearly growth in passenger and cargo—with partial expansions, the Park regime commissioned the American aviation firm Airways Engineering Corporation (AEC) to conduct feasibility studies for the large-scale expansion of Kimpo with USAID DLF loans.²¹⁶ In 1972, a landmark year for the national political economy which began its transformation “from the final processor of export goods to one of the worlds’ major exporters of steel, ships, and other producer goods”²¹⁷ in the international division of labor, a new master plan for the airport’s comprehensive expansion was approved. Annexing large tracts of adjacent farmland, the expansion doubled Kimpo’s annual handling capacity of aircrafts, quadrupled cargo capacity, and increased passenger capacity sevenfold from 1.5 to 7.2 million people upon its final completion in 1980.²¹⁸ It also included the construction of a new international terminal building, initiating the obsolescence of the 1960 terminal, which was demoted to a domestic terminal in 1980.²¹⁹

Kimpo and Korea, Inc.: The Second Kimpo Terminal (1972-1980)

Initiated in 1972 and completed by 1980, the construction of the second international terminal at Kimpo spanned the “most triumphant [period of capital accumulation] and...most tragic period [of political authoritarianism]” of South Korean development, indexing the transformations in state economic policy toward rapid industrialization and the national capitalism of “Korea, Inc.”²²⁰ The 1970s was a watershed decade in South Korean political economy. As per the Third Five Year economic plan (1972-1976) and the 1973 Heavy and Chemical Industrialization plan the state’s developmental agenda shifted away from the its labor-intensive textiles industry and light manufacturing towards accelerated import substitution and the development of national heavy, chemical and defense industries—against the neoliberal economic prescriptions of Washington economic advisors.²²¹ Seeking industrial self-sufficiency

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ *Kimpo Kukjae Konghang Kaehang 30 Ju-nyŏn Yaksa* (Thirty-Year History of the Opening of Kimpo International Airport) (Seoul: Kimpo International Airport, 1992), p. 111. In 1959, international arrivals and departures totaled 25,065, while domestic air traffic totaled 67,562. International cargo totaled 1,104 tons, while domestic cargo totaled 362 tons. In 1971, Kimpo processed 1,150,346 international arrivals/departures and 1,370 tons of cargo, compared to 313,000 domestic arrivals/departures and 7,676 tons of domestic cargo. (Shipping took the greatest share of international cargo movements.) Hereafter referred to as *Kimpo 30-Year History*.

²¹⁶ The DLF loan was in the amount of \$216, 927 and the feasibility study conducted from September 1970 – February 1972. *Aviation Almanac*, p. 65

²¹⁷ Woo, p. 119.

²¹⁸ *Kimpo 30-Year History*, p. 146.

²¹⁹ In addition to the new terminal building, the expansion included substantial expansion of the mooring area, new construction of parallel runways and the taxi strip, new construction of the cargo terminal and hangar, expanded aviation security facilities, new design of the parking lot and military facilities. Passenger handling capacity increased from 1,500,000 to 7,200,000, cargo from 8,000 to 28,000 tons and the capacity to handle jet planes from 15 to 34. *Kimpo 30-Year History*, p. 111.

²²⁰ Lie, p. 76.

²²¹ Woo, p. 119; Lie, p. 79.

and national security amidst a less favorable US foreign policy under Nixon, which reduced US troops in South Korea, increased protectionism of U.S. industries, and devalued the dollar, not to mention Nixon's historic meeting with Mao Zedong in 1972, the South Korean state aggressively intervened in the market and society with "national capitalism."²²² The state made heavy investments in the development of capital and technologically intensive heavy and chemical import substituting industries and nurtured these infant industries with economic protections from foreign capital and competition.²²³ Eschewing foreign direct investment and imposing capital ceilings on such investments, the state primarily relied on an ample supply of foreign loans to finance both public and private ventures. Like its money supply, it imported the majority of technology for these ventures from the U.S. and Japan, through licensing agreements largely enabled by South Korea's strategic position in the Cold war.²²⁴ This was thus the period of consolidation of a particular set of economic practices that came to define the political economy of the South Korean Developmental state as "Korea, Inc."²²⁵ The state established the majority of these heavy industries as public corporations. For example the state established Pohang Steel in 1973, Ulsan Petrochemicals in 1974, and a host of machine-building industries in the Changwon Industrial complex, which included automobile plants. It also encouraged the growth and concentration of large family-owned enterprises with a number of subsidiaries called chaebol, such as Hyundai shipbuilding. The state kept these private firms in line with its development objectives, however, by controlling their access to both foreign and domestic capital.²²⁶ The state offered incentives as well as imposed sanctions on private firms by mediating foreign loans based on export quotas.²²⁷ The state integrated these mammoth public and private industries through backwards and forwards linkages. And most importantly the state kept wages low through sustained labor repression.

The material financing and the technical planning of the airport expansion also reflected the political-economic imprint of Korea, Inc. In addition to domestic capital, the 1972-80 terminal was financed with both private and public loans from Hanover Trust and the US Export and Import Bank (EXIM), which differed from the US AID counterpart funds used to finance the 1960 terminal under Rhee or the DLF loans that financed the feasibility study in 1970, and maps onto the general progression of state borrowing practices in financing South Korean development.²²⁸ Moreover, the technical execution of the new terminal reflects the general trend of state orchestrated technology transfers for nascent South Korean industries from the United States and Japan. Issuing from a stipulation in the US Export and Import Bank loan agreement used to capitalize the project, the terminal was designed by the American government contract architectural and engineering firm TAMS.²²⁹ Hence much like the import substituting heavy

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Woo, p. 122; Lie, p. 80. Moreover, the end of the Vietnam War was also an influential factor in the in US foreign policy towards South Korea.

²²⁴ Lie, p. 82.

²²⁵ Both Woo and Lie posit that a result of this defining structure of the South Korean developmental state was the lack of differentiation between public and private enterprises because of the heavy influence of Park's personal networks and the state's commanding power in the realm of finance. Woo has referred to this public-private state-chaebol nexus "Korea, Inc." Woo, p. 175; Lie, p. 91.

²²⁶ Woo, p. 159.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ *Kimpo 30-Year History*, pp. 111-112. This maps onto the exact progression of state finance of the developmental state as discussed by Woo in *Race to the Swift*.

²²⁹ *Kimpo A 30-Year History*, p. 112. The fact that the 1980 terminal building, initiated in 1972, was also headed by a US architecture firm TAMS, stemming from stipulations of the US loan agreement, which was used to fund the

industries of the decade, financed through government guaranteed foreign loans and designed with foreign technical expertise, the national capitalism that produced the second *kiwa* terminal did *not* signal disengagement with international capitalism. Rather, through economic protections of nascent national industries and import limits and barriers on foreign capital and commodities, the *kiwa* terminal presented, instead, the state's carefully controlled engagement with it. The airport constituted one prime example of national state industrial infrastructure targeted for development. But at the same time it was also a super- or meta-infrastructure in that it was a means for facilitating the development of major industries such as the nation's steel and chemical industries by circulating its related commodities, personnel, etc., as well as the broader aim of national development.

“Korean Style Democracy,” the First Five-year Cultural Plan (1974-1978), Urban Transformations, and National Culture

In order to ensure domestic compliance, the state's “Big push” for rapid industrialization was accompanied by political and cultural policies which established laws and promoted particular cultural values, institutions, and practices to ensure cooperation by both domestic businesses and workers. This included politically repressive measures such as martial law and Park's Yushin (“Revitalizing”) Constitution (1973-1979), which concentrated autocratic rule effectively guaranteeing Park's presidency for life, comprehensively robbed South Koreans of civil liberties, and enabled scores of human rights abuses stemming from the state's intense repression of workers, students, and political dissidents throughout the decade.²³⁰ Moreover, these policies were underpinned by the state's ideological promotion of a specific form of national cultural identity, which arose from the combination of premodern Confucian Korean traditions and the legacy of new concepts and discourses of national culture produced through Korea's early hostile encounter with Western imperialist powers and Japanese colonialism—with the present needs of economic development and anti-communism. The state's focus on national heritage and tradition had been in place since the establishment of the Republic.²³¹ The rebuilding of national cultural identity after the experience of Korean cultural denigration and eradication under Japanese racism and later assimilationist colonial policies constituted a key part of the postcolonial nation-building project. The issue of national culture and heritage was also embroiled in the struggle for legitimacy between the divided North and South Korean regimes.²³² For Park Chung Hee, securing legitimacy was more so a political issue due to his forcible seizure of state power.²³³

At the same time, culture, referred to by Park as “the second economy” (in the sense of an ideological supplementary sphere to political economy rather than constituting a market), was throughout Park's eighteen year rule, like the national economy, a highly regulated sphere that

project, gives the US architect of the Incheon terminal an historical grounding—but also highlights their difference. TAMS was a government contract firm used as part of the loan agreement, while the Incheon architects, Fentress and Bradburn is a private firm with a global reputation.

²³⁰ The Yushin constitution concentrated even more power in the hands of the president and allowed him to serve an unlimited number of six-year terms. Lie, p. 78.

²³¹ Hakwoon Yim, “Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea,” *The International Journal of Cultural Policy* 8, no. 1 (2002), p. 42.

²³² Yim, p. 42.

²³³ *Ibid.* Park's personal past was also an issue as he was part of the Japanese colonial police, as well as implicated in the (Leftist perceived) Yōsu Mutiny of 1948.

was mobilized towards the political-economic ends of national development.²³⁴ Through the creation of laws, institutions, and the allotment of public funds the state sought to cultivate the “value of the spirit of self-help, self-dependence and self-reliance, frugality, cooperation, and patriotism” through the promotion of primarily traditional culture and arts to serve economic development.²³⁵ In order to proscribe and “enact restrictions on art and everyday life,” the Ministry of Culture and Information was formed in 1968.²³⁶ The promotion of national identity via traditional culture and arts was approached as a form of spiritual nourishment and a “motivation factor” to mobilize Korean workers in the state’s export-led development plan and withstand the harsh working conditions and long hours this entailed.²³⁷ This “super-exploitation” of labor was especially prominent in the export-oriented light manufacturing and textile industries—crucial for amassing foreign exchange to fund the state’s import substitution of heavy industries—which were mainly staffed by young women and recent transplants from the countryside, and where the first workers’ struggles began to erupt by the mid-1970s.²³⁸ On the other hand, laws were established to prohibit certain forms of consumption for both moral and economic reasons. Despite the general pro-Americanism of the regime, Western popular culture became “synonymous with commercialism, materialism, violence, and sensuality” as well as posing a threat to national cultural identity, and Japanese cultural products were likewise deemed demoralizing and banned until the 1990s.²³⁹ And as per official statist anti-communism, socialist or communist cultural materials were banned outright under the National Security Law.²⁴⁰ The bans on certain types of external foreign cultural items also served to protect the market share of domestic cultural products and facilitated the growth of nascent cultural industries shielded from competition from the more developed culture industries of Japan and the U.S.²⁴¹ For example, the screen quota law established in 1966 made it mandatory for theaters to screen Korean films for 108 days out of the year.

Following from these political, economic, and spiritual deployments of cultural identity and both the propagandistic and prohibitive regulation of cultural products and practices, in 1973, the state laid down its first “comprehensive long-term plan for cultural policy” in “the First Five-Year Master Plan for Cultural Development” to be implemented from 1974-1978,²⁴² throughout the Big Push. The primary “objective of this plan was to establish a new cultural identity by highlighting a specific cultural tradition.”²⁴³ The state’s selective fashioning of traditional cultural values to cultivate “loyalty...patriotism and cooperation,” was deployed in a large part to create a cohesive national body politic as well as rationalize and legitimate the

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Hyungmin Pai, “Modernism, Development, and the Transformation of Seoul: A Study of the Development of Sae’oon Sang’ga and Yoido,” in Won Bae Kim et al, ed. *Culture and the City in East Asia*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 116.

²³⁷ Yim, p. 42.

²³⁸ Lie, p. 165.

²³⁹ Yim, p. 39. While Japanese cultural products were banned, colonial reparations of around 8 million dollars of grants and cheap loans resulting from the Korean-Japan Normalization Treaty in 1965 helped fund national development.

²⁴⁰ As Cumings has commented, by the 1980s anti-government dissident intellectuals and students were reading Marx religiously underground.

²⁴¹ Although as Yim notes, this market or exchange value aspect of culture does not really develop until the late 1980s and 1990s when the government turns the focus to developing cultural industries as a market.

²⁴² Ibid., p. 40.

²⁴³ Ibid.

authoritarian Yushin order as ‘Korean style democracy.’²⁴⁴ This is moreover reflected concretely in the distribution of “70% of the total public expenditure on the cultural sector...[in] folk arts and traditional culture.”²⁴⁵ Throughout this period the government heavily propagated traditional culture and folk arts as the basis of a “sound culture” to “enlighten and mobilize” the population to “anti-communism, nationalism, traditional morality, and state-led economic strategy.”²⁴⁶

The state’s political economic and cultural policies and the ideological ‘invention’ and deployment of national culture also significantly shaped transformations of the physical landscape of Seoul and South Korea. The urban transformations accompanying Park’s “drive toward the ‘modernization of the Fatherland,” began with the Second Five-Year Economic Plan in 1966.²⁴⁷ On the one hand, the modernization of the rapidly growing and expanding city of Seoul which had grown to three million inhabitants by 1963 and up to five million by 1970, proceeded by large scale urban planning, redevelopment and infrastructure projects such as “the building of major throughways,” “initial land subdivisions of the Kangnam area [a tabula rasa development of a new district of Seoul south of the Han river],” “CBD [central business district] redevelopment,” and the development of Sae’oon Sang’ga, one of the first modern multi-block mixed-use residential and commercial urban redevelopment projects in center Seoul.²⁴⁸ Many of these projects were undertaken by the infamous Seoul mayor Kim Hyun-Ok, who was widely known as the ‘bulldozer’ for demolishing and transforming large swaths of the city fabric into new modern districts and boulevards, not unlike Paris’s Baron Haussmann. The construction of Sae’oon Sang’ga located in the historic and main commercial district of Chongno accompanied the forcible clearing of large areas that were “occupied by squatters and refugees from North Korea” and red-light districts of “upper-class brothels,” in the same fashion as these and many other urban modernization projects.²⁴⁹

On the other hand, urban re-development modernization also went in hand with national modernization with the proliferation of new modern museums and cultural facilities consciously built to resemble traditional architectural styles: “Between 1966 and 1975, no less than ten major cultural facilities—the National Museum, Buyo Museum, Kungjoo Museum, Pusan Municipal Museum, Sejong Cultural Center, to name just a few—were either planned or built and, moreover, were to be designed to emulate traditional Korean architecture.”²⁵⁰ The state ensured the traditionalist form of these structures with direct prescriptions of a new aesthetic norm: “Announced in January 1966,” the “competition program for the new National Museum...specified that the new building take elements directly from existing ancient monuments.”²⁵¹ Moreover, many of these new architectural inscriptions of the new national cultural policy were direct responses and counter-measures “to the colonial transformation of Seoul.”²⁵² Kanghwamun, one of the traditional gates to the old precolonial Seoul or Hanyang that

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 44.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Hyungmin Pai, “Modernism, Development, and the Transformation of Seoul: A Study of the Development of Sae’oon Sang’ga and Yoido,” in Won Bae Kim et al, ed. *Culture and the City in East Asia*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 115.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 117. As Pai notes, the bulldozer was retired after one of his modern apartment buildings collapsed after a couple of months killing 33 people.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 115-6.

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 116.

²⁵² Ibid.

was removed by the Japanese when they erected the mammoth neo-classical building of the colonial Governor-General in front of Kyongbok Palace in the 1920s was returned “to the centre of the Kyongbok Palace axis, right in front of the former colonial government building.”²⁵³ Not only that, “a statue of Yi Sunshin, an admiral and hero of the Japanese invasion of 1592, was erected at the centre of the axis by the Committee for Erecting Sculptures of Patriotic Forefathers, one of many public sculptures that this organization commissioned during the late 1960s and early 1970s.”²⁵⁴

This was of course not the initial rise to prominence of admiral Yi Sunshin to Korean national consciousness. As we saw in Chapter One, Yi Sunshin was one of the many nationalist heroes who were summoned by Korean nationalist reformers of the late 19th and early 20th century in Korean enlightenment treatises and new revisionist histories in the face of both Western and Japanese imperialist aggressions. In Yu Kilchun’s late 1880s enlightenment treatise, we saw one of the earliest and most prominent evocations of Yi Sunshin not only as a national hero or symbol of national identity but more importantly as inventor of “the first armor-covered warship in the world” and thus evidence of Korea’s illustrious past which allowed Yu to both insert Korean historical ingenuity and the new universal paradigm of modern civilization within a historical continuum challenging any exclusivist claims to modern civilization by the then enlightened nations of the West and Japan and ensuring a path for Korea’s participation in the new global cultural paradigm.²⁵⁵ For Yu, just as the “steam vessel, although marvelous, cannot deviate entirely from the old method of building ships,” and “would not have materialized if not for the technique developed by men of the past in making vehicles” he asserted “had our countrymen studied ceaselessly and implemented useful ways and principles, our nation today would enjoy fame all over the world.”²⁵⁶ Thus while Korea’s unhappy situation in the face of late 19th century imperial transgressions stemmed from successive generations of Koreans having “failed to elaborate and build on the achievements of the past,” this could be remedied by exceptional effort to study and examine and “uncover” what lays in potential, stemming from both the historical accumulation of knowledge and experience and the exceptional application of this knowledge. Interestingly, we can see a remarkable echo of Yu’s Neo-Confucian cultural historical viewpoint and approach to modernization or enlightenment conceived of as the veneration of past accomplishments as a source for present and future progress in a statement by one of the jurors of the National Museum competition:

We had ancestors full of wisdom and because it is a fact that the modern architecture of Korea cannot build and has not built anything as sublime as they, it is the imperative truth that we should devote our magical powers (engineering) in continuing the wisdom of our ancestors.²⁵⁷

This strange doubling of the culturalist national reform discourse of pre-colonial 19th century Korean enlightenment advocates and the 1960s discourse of national culture keys into the various levels of complexities and contradictions of the discourse and ideology of national

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Yu Kilchun, “Levels of Enlightenment,” from *Sōyu Kyōnmun* in Yu Kilchun chonso 1, reprinted in Yongho Ch’oe et al., *Sources of Korean Tradition Volume II: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, (New York: Columbia University Press: 2000), p. 253.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Kook Chung cited in Pai, p. 121.

culture in Korea at this time. Much the way like Yu Kilchun's developmentalist, comparative, competitive, and culturalist approach to modernization developed in response to the unevenness of the new western civilization, the power of the state's ideological promotion of traditional cultural values and art forms, however selectively defined and motivated by political-economic imperatives of national development and anti-communism, was on the one hand articulated with the uneven capitalist system which at the time was characterized by competitive national-capitalism and cold war rivalries. On the other hand, the state discourse of national culture vis-à-vis national modernization and development was also articulated with and posed in response to Korea's recent colonial experience as evidenced in the placement of the Yi Sunshin statue in front of Kwanghwamun, which was restored to its precolonial site counteracting the Japanese distortions of the space and symbolism of the city and this historical monument. Here the nationalist symbolism of Yi Sunshin leans more toward Yi as the hero against the Japanese invasion of 1592 rather than as inventor—as he is called on to signify the successful overcoming or the desire to overcome the experience and legacy of colonialism. This desire is also evident in the superficial/titular nationalist symbolization of the large urban re-development projects, which while following in the general pattern of urban planning and modernization of the industrialized West as well as Japan, was distinguished by their naming. The main boulevard that ran along the North south axis from Kwanghwamun was named Sejong-ro after the Korean King who invented the Korean alphabet, while a major throughway was named the 3.1 expressway after the March 1st Independent Movement. These spatial interventions were also accompanied by cultural policies, which advocated pure hangŭl (Korean alphabet), which sought to eradicate not only Chinese characters but also English and Japanese words.²⁵⁸ While we saw a similar “decentering” of the Middle Kingdom and Chinese civilization in the innovation of vernacular hangŭl papers by the popular press of national reform movements of the 19th century newspapers²⁵⁹ at that time, this process was accompanied by the introduction of English language pages as both the English language and American culture became the model of the new civilization that many of the reformists were reaching toward and whose values and cultural forms it sought to instill among the largely Confucianized populace for national self-strengthening and modernization, as it turned its back on a post Opium war defeated China. Here, however, the state directed national language movement was even more inward looking in that it not only sought to purify Confucian traditions of a shared East Asian heritage of premodern Sino-centric civilization into *Korean traditions* in the production of national culture and identity but also to purify this national culture from English as well as Japanese. This modern iconoclasm of the state ‘invention’ of national culture alongside its more primarily political-economic (than cultural) ‘reform’ plan for national economic development—as represented in the traditional architectural style derived buildings, linguistic purifications, as well as symbolic namings of modern urban projects and infrastructures—thus posed both a decolonizing measure vis-à-vis Japanese colonialism and an anti-colonial measure against the more recent experience of American postwar occupation and neo-colonialism.

But of course these national cultural inscriptions were being implemented in the face of, or perhaps even due to, great contradictions to these inward-looking significations and processes. The bulk of financing in loans and grants central to Park's national economic development projects and policies originated from both the United States and Japan—the former arising from Korea's strategic position in the Cold War, and the latter stemming from colonial reparations

²⁵⁸ Pai, p. 116.

²⁵⁹ See chapter one.

after the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty, as well as Korea and Japan's integration within the U.S. led Cold War economic integration of non-communist countries. As we saw with the financing and technological transfer that went into the second airport terminal expansion, both the capital and the technology came from these Cold War linkages between Korea with the U.S. and Japan. These contradictions characteristic of the architectural and linguistic paradigm also resemble that of the cultural policy's moral 'ban' on American culture deemed corrupting and demoralizing with its characteristic materialism and consumerism, and the legal ban on Japanese cultural products deemed morally degenerative. Thus the inward looking national culture did not present a rupture with Cold War international capitalism, but as these contradictions indicate, a strategic state regulated process of *standardization* according to universal governing norms of the uneven capitalist system, and *particularization* according to the needs of national development/capitalism.

Moreover these 'decolonization' measures were met with contradictions of the 'recolonizing' processes by the state as these 'decolonizing' processes of national culture vis-à-vis national development were enacted through massive displacements of Korean people, as in the various relocations of the Korean poor further and further to the outskirts of the city as their homes were removed for urban redevelopment projects, as well as the extreme exploitation and repression of Korean workers and the brutal repression of political dissidents, students, and intellectuals. As evident in the ideological deployment of national culture to mobilize Koreans into national "industrial warriors who devote themselves to economic construction,"²⁶⁰ national culture was mobilized to super-exploit Korean workers both in export-oriented light industries like the female textile and electronics workers as well as later male industrial workers of the heavy steel and chemical industries. And through the government promotion of a 'sound culture' of national "cohesiveness, loyalty, and patriotism" selectively produced from traditional Confucian values, national culture became an alibi for "Korean style democracy" or the normalization and culturalization of general political repression under Yushin rule. Thus here we depart from the colonial era nationalist and writer Yi Kwangsu for whom the traditions of Korea's Confucian past had nothing to contribute to the new modern enlightenment he fervently sought to propagate among the nation's masses towards a gradualist cultural nationalist form of independence. Yi's modern nationalist characters were commonly depicted as 'children,' in so far as Korean society presented itself without any 'adults.' Yi's characters thus groped through a new world filled with new ideas, technologies and morals of western modern civilization in their journey towards becoming new human beings and nationalist reformers to save the nation. If this forward looking iconoclasm of Yi presented the problem of a new absent center of what kind of or aspects of culture was to substantively come to fill this new national culture and what morality would guide this process, the Park regime presented one solution as it looked to Yi's discarded past to mine it for selective aspects of traditional morality and cultural forms to mobilize national development. It is not that traditional Confucian culture or its values were completely eliminated from Korea as Yi had wished, and the Park regime reintroduced it during this time. Elements of this culture remained intertwined with modern conditions in the everyday lives of the Korean people. Rather it is that the Park regime reinscribed new referents for this living culture with selective appropriations in accord with the imperatives of economic development as part of national statecraft—in a process not unlike the inscription of Japanese colonial power upon the landscapes of Korea in the colonial era symbolic orderings and manipulations of western style

²⁶⁰ Park Chung Hee, *Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chun Hee* (Seoul: Sanhwa Pub. Co., 1974), p. 269.

techno-rational urban paradigms and western aesthetic architectural styles as part of colonial statecraft.²⁶¹

Nationalizing the Flag Carrier: Korean Air Lines as *Chaebol*

The political economic policies of the developmental state were also integral to the development of national civil aviation, which completes the national infrastructure of air transportation. Along with the development of the first terminal at Kimpo, the birth of South Korean civil air transportation proper also arose amidst the overwhelming American dominance and influence vis-à-vis South Korea's membership in the new Cold War capitalist international system. Beginning in September 1949, Northwest flew from Seoul to Seattle with a stopover in Tokyo three times a week, and remained the only regularly scheduled transpacific flight into the 1960s. As we will see in the next chapter, it was Northwest Airlines that was consistently featured in the melodramatic-realist airport scenes of postwar South Korean Golden Age films as a contradictory/complex trope of national modernization and social mobility, not KNA. Quite similar to the development of Imperial Japanese routes which connected the colonies to the Imperial center, the Northwest route likewise grew out of an initial chartered flight used to transport American civilians in military service, bureaucratic personnel and mail between South Korea and the U.S. Shadowed behind immense military force/power, the disjointed development of civilian aviation in South Korea, undergoing two different occupying powers and the Korean War remained in its embryonic stages well into the early mid-1960s. By 1959, the only international destinations other than the U.S. were East and Southeast Asian cities. CAT (Civil Air Transport) began regular service to Taiwan in 1954 and CPA (Cathay Pacific Airlines) began flying to Hong Kong in 1957. The majority of international flights were operated by foreign carriers, while the single Korean carrier Korea National Airlines (KNA), a private firm, primarily operated shorter distance domestic flights. KNA (estab. 1946), formerly known as Chosun Airlines (estab. 1936), was a holdover from the colonial period. KNA had initially begun international service with one flight a week to Hong Kong and Taiwan beginning in 1954, but these routes faced regular suspensions due to financial and political difficulties. KNA at this time was operating at a deficit struggling to survive and after a series of mishaps, including a reported North Korean hijacking of small fleet of aircrafts, and the confiscation of planes for the nonpayment of taxes. The fact that all aircraft repairs had to be undertaken in nearby Japan or Hong Kong also significantly drained KNA's budget. Following the arrest of Shin Yong Wook the president of the airline on corruption and embezzlement charges and his death, the airline eventually went bankrupt and was nationalized under the Park regime in 1962.²⁶²

The public-private nexus of Korea, Inc.—in which the state nurtured private firms as a form of ISI to create nascent national industries in place of dependency on foreign firms and industrial products, while keeping these nascent Korean firms in line with the state's development objectives by controlling their access to foreign and domestic capital—is likewise

²⁶¹ This statist appropriation of traditional national culture was moreover doubled/haunted by the *minjung* or people's anti-government pro-democracy and workers movements' counter-appropriation of traditional national culture. This is reflected in the fact that the state actively did not fund or support realist art b/c these were taken up by *minjung* artists and used to criticize the government (Yim, p. 45).

²⁶² Shin Yong Wook, the president of KNA was also arrested along with other businessmen and politicians for corruption and embezzlement in 1961 by the new military coup government of Park Chung Hee.

illustrated by the establishment of the quasi-public/private national flag carrier Korean Airlines (KAL) after the bankruptcy of KNA. In the face of the commanding presence of the American airline industry, which had dominated South Korea's international routes from the nation's inception, Park nationalized Korea National Airlines (KNA) to create Korean Airlines (KAL) as a public corporation in 1962. Although the government initially sought to create a 50/50 public-private partnership, due to the lack of private capital at the time, the state ended up starting a 100% government financed state airline corporation.²⁶³ KAL began operating six fixed route domestic routes with a new crew of Korean air captains replacing foreign pilots, while initiating commercial agreements with international carriers such as Japan Air Lines ahead of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics as well as reinstating routes to Hong Kong and Taiwan.²⁶⁴ After getting the carrier off the ground, the state sold KAL to the Hanjin group, one of the nation's emerging chaebols and shipping magnate, in 1968. Even though KAL was one of the earliest national airlines to be privatized among developing countries within the region, due to the state's thoroughgoing control of finance capital as well as civil aviation, which oversaw new air routes, pricing structures, as well as shelter it from foreign competition and completely preempt any form of domestic competition, KAL virtually operated as a national airline. The mandate for a second South Korean airline only appeared in 1988 under the Roh Tae Woo regime, and was handed to another chaebol, the Kumho group, which established Asiana Airlines in 1988.²⁶⁵

Developmental Emigration: New Nationalizing Journeys

Air travel among Koreans was slow to grow due to the recent war, poverty, and stringent regulations. If TWA and Washington Dulles inaugurated mass air travel as the new luxurious mode of domestic and international tourism with "more than 51 million passengers flying out of U.S. airports"²⁶⁶ in 1959, passenger traffic at Kimpo totaled 92,627 the same year with 67,562 of these being domestic travelers.²⁶⁷ However, as air travel in South Korea began to grow since the late 1960s, moving in lock-step with the economic, political, and cultural imperatives and regulatory functions of the developmental state, Kimpo terminal became the launching pad for post-war mass emigrations. As the South Korean military state reversed its postwar pro-natalist policy to control overpopulation and urbanization in South Korea, in addition to the widespread advocacy of birth control, the government adopted a "specific emigration policy designed to export its surplus people" in 1962.²⁶⁸ In addition to controlling overpopulation, the policy was designed to "secure remittances sent home by Koreans abroad" to earn much needed foreign currencies as part of the government's first five-year national economic development plan.²⁶⁹

²⁶³ *Kimpo Kukjae Konghang Kaehang 30 Ju-nyŏn Yaksa* (Thirty-Year History of the Opening of Kimpo International Airport), (Seoul: Kimpo International Airport, 1992), p. 67-8. Hereafter cited as Kimpo 30-Year History.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

²⁶⁵ *Kimpo 30-Year History*, pp. 65-70, 99-108; *Hankuk Konghang Kongsŏ 25 Nyŏn-sa 1980-2005* (Korean Airports Corporation 25-Year History) (Seoul: Korea Airports Corporation, 2005), pp. 212-213. On the finance structure of the developmental state and characterization of 'Korea, Inc.,' see Woo, pp. 148-175.

²⁶⁶ Alastair Gordon, *Naked Airport: A Cultural History of the World's Most Revolutionary Structure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 174.

²⁶⁷ *Aviation Almanac*, p. 61.

²⁶⁸ Ilsoo Kim, p. 48

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Thus beginning with the new overseas travel and emigration policies in 1962, the state likewise tightly regulated the international exit and entry of its citizens, permitting and even facilitating certain forms of overseas travel and emigration, which were deemed patriotic and served the goals of national development, while restricting others. Emigration scholars such as Ilsoo Kim and Bonacich and Light have shown how the government also shaped the pattern of emigration through laws which permitted and excluded certain forms of emigration and people as well as directly facilitating large ‘group emigrations’ of South Korean migrant workers through agreements within receiving nations as a form of modern postcolonial statecraft accompanying its export-oriented industrialization policy. Formulated toward and evolving with the state’s nation-building efforts to protect national interests and the “national prestige of Korea among the countries receiving its immigrants,” the extremely wealthy (determined in 1975 as those with assets valued over \$100,000) as well as the extremely poor including those who were considered “social outcasts such as ex-convicts, psychotics and alcoholics and those who cannot perform useful physical labor” were banned from emigration.²⁷⁰ Visas and passports were hard to come by save for the moderately wealthy, bureaucrats, students, and various groups of professionals and state facilitated labor migrants. In a highly regulated process, the state exported Korean laborers and emigrants across the globe through direct bilateral agreements with receiving nations—such as farmers and laborers to Latin American countries in the early 1960s, nurses, medical professionals, and miners to Germany, and construction workers to the Middle East in the 70s and 80s—and facilitated general occupational emigrations through the public Korea Overseas Development Corporation—such as nurses and medical professionals to the Middle East and the United States.

The state carefully controlled the international mobility of South Korean emigrants, students, and entrepreneurs through single-issue passports, restrictions on international travel based on assets, annual income, political status and age as well as export quotas for business-related travelers, proficiency exams for study abroad candidates, and an arduous process of political (anti-communist) education and exit interviews for everyone. In keeping with the national cultural policy of the period, leisure travel or tourism was banned outright and socially stigmatized as wasteful and unpatriotic—deemed incongruous with a developing nation.²⁷¹ According to the government, severe restrictions on international mobility were maintained for reasons of national security, to maintain a healthy balance of international payments [mainly to accumulate much needed foreign exchange], and to protect Korean corporations and citizens abroad as well as prevent unnecessary international conflicts.²⁷² A simultaneously repressive and permissive official internationalist policy was developed as a tool of postcolonial national development with which to maneuver within the uneven world system of international capitalism. The South Korean people became instruments to both national capitalism and global competition, which structured their bounded imagination and experience of the nation and the world filtered through the objectives of ‘national’ development and the emigration policies and labor needs of sending and receiving countries. Not unlike the state repression of domestic labor, the state management of out-migration of South Korean migrant labor and various emigrants were also put in service of the state industrialization program as one element of national

²⁷⁰ Ilsoo Kim, pp. 65, 52.

²⁷¹ “Haeoe Jinch’ul Jayuhwa Sidae-ro Yōhaeng Gyujae Daep’ok Wanhwa ūi Baekyung kwa Sil’tae (The Background and Actual Conditions behind Drastically Reducing Travel Restrictions for a New Age of Overseas Expansion and Liberalization),” *Donga Ilbo*, 10 June 1981.

²⁷² Ibid.

protectionism in the face of international competition through the ideological deployment of a “sound” national culture.

The government’s intensive involvement in overseas emigration of South Koreans and particularly labor migration from the early 1960s through the 1980s challenges the common division made between developing countries that develop via successful export-oriented industrialization and those which do not and thus resort to labor-exporting. In the same way that the South Korean developmental state pursued both EOI and ISI policies discussed earlier, it also utilized human labor-exports as well as restrictions on international mobility as part of its development program in conjunction with its export-oriented and import substitution development. During the late 1960s and early 1970s:

when the Korean economy was still in takeoff stage...the ratio of remittances to exports averaged about 20% (Hyun 1989). Kim (1983) calculates that remittances accounted for between 3% and 7% of Korea's GNP growth between 1976 and 1981, and Ro and Seo (1988) put the figure as high as 32% as late as 1982. Thus, remittances did provide a crucial source of investment capital and foreign exchange for South Korea at an earlier stage in its development.²⁷³

Moreover, among other labor exporting developing Asian countries, “only Korea has used mandatory requirements as an effective tool for attracting remittances to the domestic banking system. As a condition for issuing exit permits, the Korean government stipulated that at least 80 per cent of the earnings of migrant workers be remitted through the Korean banking system. Available estimates indicate that the average formal remittance ratio of Korean workers (about 90 per cent) usually exceeds the minimum legal limit.”²⁷⁴ Thousands of South Korean construction workers were exported to the Middle East well into the mid 1980s. Thus the South Korean state used a comprehensive and interlinked development approach, including the export of labor, which was directly linked to the banking sector, which was then linked to financing import substitution industrialization projects. The super-exploitation of labor within Korean factories that accompanied both the export-oriented processing of light industries and South Korean heavy industrialization (ISI) was also linked to the exploitation of Korean workers beyond South Korean territorial boundaries via human labor-exports of South Korea’s development strategy. South Korean development was always strategic but not very discriminating, its hyper-development appears to have used everything and everyone in the service of economic growth and national power, ISI and EOI, but EOI not only of products but also labor.

From the pervasive sense of shame shared among Koreans in relation to the recent history of Korean labor exports, it appears to have been made into a shared national secret in which the collective nation and the super-exploited victims bear the shame of the state’s national development policy—which at its most cynical can be seen as semi-voluntarized coerced versions of the massive forced migration of Koreans to Japan during the War effort. Considering the case of construction workers in the Middle East—it bears some likeness to labor camps—the

²⁷³ J. Edward Taylor et al., “International Migration and National Development,” *Population Index* 62, no.2 (Summer 1996), p. 188.

²⁷⁴ Premachandra Athukorala, “Improving the Contribution of Migrant Remittances to Development: The Experience of Asian Labor-Exporting Countries,” *Migration Review* vol. 24 (1993), p. 105.

men were housed in company barracks, had only a few days off a month, and 90% of their pay was directly sent back to Korea to their families through Korean banks. In addition, the export of South Korean soldiers to Vietnam during the Vietnam War was also a part of this lineage.²⁷⁵ They were also cold war exports of the same development strategy in that the Americans responded favorably to South Korean troop dispatchments, which alleviated the burden of deploying more American troops while the South Korean state benefited from the war related industries that resulted from their involvement in the war, which was a boom to financing national development. As for the soldiers who opted to serve in Vietnam for their mandatory military service, despite the risk to their lives, for many it was the relatively high financial compensation the soldiers received from their tour in Vietnam compared to the practically symbolic compensation for their mandatory military service that compelled them to enlist.²⁷⁶

While these labor emigrants weren't forced into these situations under the same duress as forced Korean laborers under Japanese colonialism sent to work in mining camps in Japan, their compulsion under the prevailing poverty of South Korea, the ideology of national development and the lure upward mobility, and the self-conscious position of Korean economic backwardness was not really 'free' either. This modern nationalist compulsion is perhaps best captured by the bittersweet airport farewells in the Korean popular literary and filmic imagination of the airport. Written at the height of national industrialization and the deployment of migrant workers to the Middle East construction boom in 1978, acclaimed novelist Pak Wanso captures the complexity of this experience in a harrowing depiction of a woman sending off her husband at Kimpo airport. As the middle-aged female narrator looks upon a group of uniformed construction workers assembled inside Kimpo saying goodbye to their extended families, amidst the chaotic atmosphere that transformed the airport departure hall into "an open-air marketplace," the narrator recounts a peculiar farewell between as a young woman and her soon to depart husband:

The woman seemed to be faced with some grave crisis requiring that she monopolize the man's attention, if only for a moment. Sunk deep behind eyelashes propped up straight and stiff as stakes with mascara, her eyes shone with the savagery of a kidnapper.

"What is it? Why are you acting like this?" the man asked vacantly his neck still craning toward the exit and the crowd thronging there...

The man was of average build, wore a uniform bearing his company's logo, and looked both earnest and able-bodied.

"You said if you work hard for a year you'll get a month's vacation and be able to come home, right?"

"Yes, we've already been over this."

The man was still preoccupied. The departure time must have been drawing near. His co-workers were passing in turns out the exit.

"Don't come back." The woman closed her eyes resolutely and spoke cruelly.

"What?" Only now did the man ignore the scene at the exit and turn to face the woman squarely as he spoke. But he seemed not to comprehend her message.

"I've heard you can also choose not to take your vacation."

²⁷⁵ Nancy Abelmann and John Lie, *Blue Dreams: Korean Americans in the Los Angeles Riots* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

²⁷⁶ I thank the anonymous Korean taxi driver in Gwangju for sharing his Vietnam story with me on a long ride to the airport.

“Yeah, but if they’re giving vacations, why wouldn’t I take one?”

“They say if you don’t take it and stay on site you can send back close to a million won extra. Where else would we ever see a million won?”

“What do you want me to say? You’re telling me that for a lousy million I should stay and work while everyone else is taking a vacation?”

“Oh my look at you. Haven’t earned a cent yet and already rich enough to talk about ‘a lousy million.’ I won’t have it. I’ll be working hard at saving, so you have to work hard at earning. Think for a moment what a rare opportunity this is.”

“All right. Fine, but I will be taking that vacation,” the man responded indulgently.

“You really don’t get what I’m trying to say? Then go ahead and see. Even if you take that vacation and come home, I won’t so much as look at you. Because you won’t be touching a single hair on my body. Because you won’t be able to get into our room. Because I’ll chase you right out the front gate.” The woman put teeth to lip and spoke in the tone of unveiled threat.

“Well, well. If it isn’t the reincarnation of Shin Saimdang.”²⁷⁷

...

“Do you think I’m acting this way because I want to? Don’t you know what a rare opportunity this is? It’s going to be hard anyway, so you might as well just endure it a bit longer so we can start living like humans too.” The woman’s voice cracked. She then quickly pulled out a handkerchief and mopped up her thick, black tears.²⁷⁸

Under Park’s military developmental regime, rather than inaugurating mass air travel as the new luxurious mode of tourism as occurred in the United States, the continuous expansions of Kimpo terminal which continued to disfigure the Corbusier inspired International style terminal of 1960 were part and parcel of the simultaneous transformation of the airport as a key technology of national economic development/nation-building as well as the launching pad for various forms of post-war emigration, long before it turned into a medium for tourism. As large quantities of US Aid, military and government personnel entered through its gates since the 1950s, large numbers of the population likewise began exiting the country under highly regulated yet encouraging new state emigration policies in the 1960s for temporary to more permanent political and economic emigrations, inaugurating a new form of technologically mediated dislocations in South Korea extending the dislocations of the Korean War and national division directly onto the international stage. On both fronts, the United States became a primary conduit and destination, as both its client state and world hegemon within the new international geography of the “free world.” These dislocations were likewise linked to earlier colonial era displacements—as many overseas Koreans returned to Seoul as well as those from the North. As in the colonial period, the U.S. became once again a coveted destination for Korean emigrants—linked to the longtime fostering of fantasies of the “American Dream” since liberation—as well as produced of the concrete linkages of the hierarchical Korea-U.S. military and economic

²⁷⁷ Shin Saimdang was an historical 16th poet and mother of a famous Confucian scholar who is upheld as the embodiment of Confucian ideals, and especially that of wise/virtuous mother.

²⁷⁸ Pak Wansō, “Encounter at the Airport” (1978), in Chun Kyung-Ja et al. ed., *My Very Last Possession and Other Stories by Pak Wansō* (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp.125-126.

relationship as Cold War allies. This is reflected in the predominance of military brides, as well as Korean and Amerasian adoptees, who were the earliest emigrants to the U.S. before the 1964 immigration act in the U.S. Here we are haunted by the doubling of the common trope of ‘orphans,’ and ‘children’ as international journeyers toward individual and national enlightenment/ modernization in the early modern literature of Yi Injik and Yi Kwangsu in the new children and orphans produced of the Cold war and exported abroad. Within this force field of national interests and those of other states in the Cold war bipolar interstate system that shaped particular constraints and freedoms on the international mobility of South Koreans, increasing numbers of the population began exiting the country for temporary to more permanent political and economic emigrations in search of personal freedoms and economic mobility, and a chance to “start living like humans too.” In this process, the airport facilitated new technologically and political-economically mediated dislocations in South Korea extending dislocations of the Korean War and national division directly onto a new international stage. Within the long and changing history of Korean emigrations since the 19th century, now assisted by the human arm of the national development strategy, by 1982, the Korean diaspora made up 10% of the total Korean population, “including communities throughout East Asia, Soviet Central Asia, Australia, the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas.”²⁷⁹

The Paradoxical Face of Korea, Inc.: The Modern Kiwa Terminal (1972-1980)

As we saw the political economic policies of the developmental state in the financing and construction of Kimpo’s second international terminal, the political and cultural ideological policies of the Yushin Constitution and the first Five-Year Cultural Plan that accompanied the Big Push and various urban and cultural imprints of the statist paradigm of national culture also inscribed the architectural form of the new terminal with a new cultural dominant. Introducing a new stylistic vocabulary, the commanding feature of the terminal presented a modernized version of the *kiwa* roof adopted from traditional *hanoks*,²⁸⁰ redolent of ancient Korean palaces and the rapidly proliferating modern national museums.²⁸¹ Signaling an abrupt departure from the Corbusian inspired *brise-soleil* and *pilotis* of the International Style modernism of the 1960 terminal and the U.S. embassy building in Seoul, the modernized variation on the *kiwa* roof, a representative figure of traditional ‘Korean’ architecture, reflected both the self-reflexive national cultural policy of the period and gave form to the bureaucratic authoritarian national

²⁷⁹ Abelmann and Lie, p. 50; Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, *Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles: 1965-1982* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 107.

²⁸⁰ Traditional Korean residences were called *hanoks*; Korean palaces feature large-scale elaborate *hanoks*. Although the *hanoks* in themselves, with their characteristic tiled roof, signaled status and wealth during the Chosun dynasty, as opposed to the straw-thatched roof residences, which were inhabited by people of low economic and social standing, in the modern postwar period, there were a diverse range of tiled *hanoks* from run-down clusters to upscale enclaves.

²⁸¹ For all of these airports, which span close to a decade from planning to groundbreaking to completion, it is important to look at the time of their initiation and building process to examine their symbolism. Although Park Chung Hee inherited the 1960 Kimpo terminal a year after its first opening, the international style building which was planned in 1957-58 reflects both Rhee Syngman’s political ethos and the architectural modernism in South Korea of the first generation of postwar modern buildings emerging in the late 1950s. Similarly, although Park never lived to see the completion of the second Kimpo terminal, it was initiated and built during the height of his developmentalism of the 1970s. The 1980 Kiwa terminal was undoubtedly Park Chung Hee-style.

capitalism of Korea, Inc.²⁸² As president Choi Gyu Hwa announced at the opening ceremony in August 1980, Kimpo airport is not only the country's gateway but also the "face of South Korea."²⁸³ The 'traditional' or classical form of the roof was at the same time one of the most modern and technologically innovative elements of the terminal. It incorporated the technically challenging method of 'waffle pan slab' construction, allowing the roof to be built without structural beams. This moreover gave the eaves of the roof a suspended, curving, aesthetic "enhancing its Korean beauty,"²⁸⁴ notwithstanding the technical expertise of an American architectural firm that designed it. In keeping with the dictate that modernity be always up to date, the greatly enlarged new terminal building incorporated a host of newer imported technologies, facilities, and more spacious and luxurious interiors that outpaced the most modern elements of its predecessor. A new loading bridge now seamlessly connected passengers to aircrafts without the bulky mediation of buses and ramps, while the terminal became equipped with a computerized electronic flight information display system and other electronic signage as well as centrally controlled air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems.²⁸⁵

Thus while anti-communism and global capitalist integration remained the leitmotif of Kimpo's international modernity, the new "Korean style"²⁸⁶ terminal foregrounded new particularizations of the developmental state's national capitalism in its search for economic self sufficiency within and uneven capitalist world system, and political autonomy and national security vis-à-vis the changing hegemonic policy under Nixon as the Vietnam war came to a close.²⁸⁷ At the same time, as key infrastructural components of the national economic growth machine, the terminal design also mirrored the iron grip of the South Korean developmental state via a bureaucratic authoritarian patriarchal nationalism on both the South Korean society and the market vis-à-vis the world beyond its borders. As the state instrumentalized traditional premodern cultural legacies and symbols—which had long been a source of ambivalence ever since Korea's unhappy encounter with modernity—rather than approaching this fraught cultural

²⁸² This imperative to represent national culture is highlighted by the fact that the building sparked criticism of the design of the terminal roof as appearing not Korean enough and too similar to the Japanese kiwa. This is in the context of a pre-existing discourse of traditional architecture, which differentiates Korean, Chinese, and Japanese kiwa by the degree or slope of the eaves of the roof. The kiwa roof is a shared element of Sino-centered East Asian civilization. (Interview with Lee Won-Shil, Korean architect for the 1980-1988 terminal, September 9, 2008, Seoul.) This stylistic controversy was not unique to the airport. The classical style Buyo museum designed by Kim Soo-geun, one of the premier architects of postwar Korea, was enveloped in the debate over its alleged resemblance to a Shinto shrine rather than a Korean structure.

²⁸³ "Kimpo Kukje Konghang Se Chungsa Gae'kwan (The Opening of the New Terminal at Kimpo Airport)," *Maeil Kyŏngjae*, 11 August 1980. The airport opened after the assassination of Park Chung Hee in December 1979 and three weeks prior to formal ascendance of another military general Chun Doo Hwan to power who had staged another military coup in April 1980, replacing the interim president Choi Gyu Hwa.

²⁸⁴ *Kimpo 30-Year History*, pp. 144-45.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 145. These systems had already been in use in developed nations. Similar to the fledgling state of the national airline industry, which was not in any sort of competitive position with most of the international air carriers that used Kimpo, the previous airport had likewise operated with a visible technology lag in relation to regional (i.e. Japan and Hong Kong) and international counterparts.

²⁸⁶ "Gaejang Apdugo Mamuri Jak'up Han'chang...Kimpo Konghang Sae Chungsa 'Mut' Sal'lin 'Hankuk ũi Ulgul (Much Left to Complete Before the Airport Opening...Showing the 'Beauty' of the 'Face of Korea')," *Kyŏngnyang Sinmun*, 15 July 1980.

²⁸⁷ Woo, p. 119.

lineage to ‘decolonize the mind’²⁸⁸ from Japanese colonial experience, it was deployed instead to recolonize it. Through the selective intermixing of traditional values with the desired values of patriarchal nationalism, anticommunism and developmentalism, the state effected yet another distortion of premodern cultural paradigms. Thus spawned alongside Yushin rule, including both repressive and ideological deployment of a “sound” ‘traditional’ ‘national culture’ —the *kiwa* terminal thus depicted the Janus-faced paradoxical nature of the statist paradigm of ‘national culture’ vis-à-vis national capitalism. Thus much like the import substituting heavy industries of the decade, financed through government guaranteed foreign loans, designed with foreign technical expertise, and managed through restrictive controls on both export-oriented-processing- and import-substitution-industrial labor, the inward-looking terminal did *not* signal disengagement with international capitalism. Rather, through government orchestrated foreign financing, technological transfers and economic protections of national airports and airlines, and the highly regulated mobility of commodities and people through import barriers on foreign commodities and selective emigration and labor migration policies, the *kiwa* terminal presented, instead, the state’s carefully controlled engagement with it.

The Politics of Particularization or De-linking

Samir Amin has argued that “the capitalist mode implies the predominance of exchange-value and, hence, standardization...the tendency toward standardization implies reinforcement of the adjustment of the superstructure to the demands of capitalist infrastructure...Moreover, this tendency toward standardization collides with the limits imposed by *unequal accumulation*. This unequal accumulation accelerates tendencies toward homogenization at the center, while it practically destroys them for the great mass of the people at the periphery, who are unable to gain access to the modern mode of consumption, reserved for a small minority. For these people, who are often deprived of the elementary means of basic survival, the result is not simply malaise, but tragedy.”²⁸⁹ And while this tendency toward standardization “diminishes the contradictions that drive the system forward and is, therefore, reactionary,” “spontaneous resistance to this standardization, thus, expresses a refusal to submit to the relationships of exploitation that underlie it.”²⁹⁰

The heterodox national economic development policies pursued by the South Korean state via state-led EOI and ISI strategies and heavy industrialization against the hegemonic free-market neoliberal economism of Washington could be seen as a form of what Amin has called “delinking...the subordination of outside relations to the logic of internal development and not the reverse” or more broadly “an active insertion capable of modifying the conditions of globalization.”²⁹¹ Spurred as much in response to uneven accumulation within global capitalism, as by its intense anti-communism vis-à-vis North Korea, which was also developing faster than the South into the 1960s—the developmental state sought to change its position in the international division of labor from a processor to producer nation—to transgress the “limits imposed by unequal accumulation.” However, at the national scale, the state’s pro-

²⁸⁸ I am making a differentiation between the Park regime’s use of national culture and language and Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s model in *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (Oxford: James Curry Ltd., 1986).

²⁸⁹ Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion, and Democracy A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 2009), pp. 207-208.

²⁹⁰ Amin, p. 208.

²⁹¹ Samir Amin, *Capitalism in the Age of Globalization* (London: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 40, 75.

capital/business (even if it also checked its freedoms) and anti-people/worker/poor developmental policies used to pursue national industrialization paradoxically reproduced and entrenched the structure of uneven accumulation and development onto the domestic political economy—complicating the representativeness of the “nation” in the so-called “national” modernization claimed by the state, as well as the legitimacy of ‘national culture’ which was ideologically deployed for such repressions. The state’s brutal suppression of Korean workers in order to artificially keep wages low, preventing the formation of an independent union federation until 1988, and its scores of human rights abuses, including kidnapping, torture, and murder of labor activists, opposition politicians, dissident intellectuals, writers and so on under the National Security Law is widely acknowledged as the infamous underside of South Korean development. A central tenet of critical and revisionist histories of South Korean modernization since the mid-1980s has been this people-state dialectic of social conflict arising from the contradictions of national bureaucratic-authoritarian development.²⁹² The politics of the postcolonial airport would also fall into this dialectic at the same time that its material and symbolic production makes visible this contradiction/dialectic of postwar national development in concentrated form.

In the South Korean periphery, these ostensibly contradictory but interlinked processes of standardization and particularization arose from the nexus of its incorporation in an uneven cold-war international capitalist system and anti-communist authoritarian national state developmentalism—as a response to the two specters that haunted South Korea since its founding in 1945—the specter of communism and the specter of development or modernization (i.e. developed American modernity/America as an advanced nation).²⁹³ It operated across numerous cultural, social, political, and economic domains of postwar South Korean modernity, emanating from public policies of the state to the practice of everyday life of its citizens. However, these processes were nowhere as concentrated and brought into focus as the postcolonial airport. As the airport operated simultaneously as a space of intimate proximity with the center of modernity *and* the space of disparity or distance from/to modernity (and ipso facto closer to communism), it became both the space/stage of standardization *and* the space/stage of fissure or particularization of South Korean modernization via nationalist capitalism and the agent of South Korean economic and cultural nationalism.

The state’s development of the technology of long-distance transportation and its carefully controlled management of the international mobility of its citizens constituted two complementary elements of a broad-spectrum technique of developmental statecraft. Thus within the system of national capitalism within an uneven bounded cold war capitalist world system, the evolution of the airport shows two distinct and ostensibly contradictory trends: *standardization* according to the ‘universal’ norms and governing institutions of U.S. centered international capitalism and *parochialization /particularization* according to the needs of national capitalism. While the South Korean airport continued to grow and expand overseas (however in a highly controlled manner) with increasing numbers of domestic and international routes and passengers nearing capacity during this period, on the other, it also sustained one of the most tightly regulated international borders in the world. Kimpo airport from the mid sixties to the mid

²⁹² Bruce Cumings’ *The Origin of the Korean War*, published in the mid 1980s might be seen to have inaugurated revisionist Korean studies. Meredith Woo Cumings study of South Korean finance and more explicitly John Lie’s *Han Unbound*, maintain this underlying narrative in their respective investigations of South Korean political economy.

²⁹³ These elements were significant to the power of the state ideology of national development as well as national culture.

eighties more closely resembled a well-fortified biological organism, with Park's two main pilots of national development, the Office of the Economic Planning Board and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), as well as their co-pilot, the Ministry of Culture, manning the control center/central nervous system, than a mere mechanical portal.²⁹⁴ Policed by armed soldiers, enforced by visa and passport restrictions, bilateral migrant labor agreements, remittance quotas, foreign currency limits, as well as capital ceilings on foreign direct investment, and tariffs on imported commodities, the airport let in foreign capital, arms, technology transfers, raw materials, American soldiers, technocrats and bureaucrats, while it carefully discharged capital goods, students and other technical trainees, migrant workers, and immigrants (primarily military brides and their extended families, and Korean and Amerasian adoptees).

Conclusion

At a global scale, the airport is an undeniable space and symbol of international flows toward the standardization of modern processes in the capitalist world system. However, situated in the global periphery of South Korea, not only did Kimpo airport serve as the national gateway to a *bound internationalism* of uneven accumulation of the capitalist world system of the cold war era, characterized by segmentation into cold war political and economic blocs centered on the two world superpowers, the contradictions of uneven accumulation of this capitalist geography also made this postcolonial airport into a crucial site and symbol of an official *nationalist modernity*. As such the airport indelibly reproduced the contradictions of the unevenness of global capitalist accumulation endemic to the international division of labor and center-periphery relationship in the new contradictions of freedom/repression characteristic of the experience of modernization and national development under national capitalism. Notwithstanding the significance of modern technologies of transportation and travel as an agent of change in the modern industrial world, the South Korean state's regulation and management of these technologies present a corrective to tendencies to overestimate their freedom and power in the more technological determinist variants of modernization and globalization theories.²⁹⁵ As national infrastructure, the new terminal was an integral element of the nation's rapid industrial transformation. As a globally produced national product, the airport presents a localized manifestation of the particular set of international economic, cultural, and human flows that produced the particular configuration of national capitalism vis-à-vis the capitalist global economy. And as both a social product and means of production, embodying the dual dynamic of standardizations—according to global capitalist infrastructures, norms, systems and hierarchies—and particularizations according to the needs of national development, the airport was a paradoxical site of the emancipatory and repressive process of “delinking” from the global economy. The postcolonial airport at Kimpo might be seen as what Lefebvre described as a “strategic site” “within the homogeneity of power's space” in which “everything that is dispersed and fragmented retains its unity” and “naturally takes account of the connections and links between those elements that it keeps paradoxically, united yet disunited, joined yet detached from one another, at once torn apart and squeezed together.”²⁹⁶

²⁹⁴ The National Intelligence Service (NIS) department housed at Incheon airport is the successor of the KCIA.

²⁹⁵ Manuel Castells Information Society is one example.

²⁹⁶ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 365.

Diverging from economic and aesthetic theories of postmodernism that ascribe vernacular departures from International Style Modernism during this period to the breakdown of grand narratives with the latest stage of capitalism or flexible accumulation based on European and American economic periodizations, the kiwa terminal belongs to a different historical-geographical location situated within asymmetric power relations between center and peripheral economies and embodies a different ethos. For the late-developing South Korea situated within the economically uneven and politically bounded context of international capitalism, the Korean kiwa was the expression of the grand narrative of national self-determination through a particular national form of modern industrialization. As both a social product and the means of production, the kiwa terminal signaled a distinct Korean modernity through the intersecting logics of economic and cultural “koreanization,” which, on both accounts followed from a production-based ethos rather than a consumption-related one, stemming from its economic position.²⁹⁷ As a multi-layered, polysemic symbolic marker however, it always conceals and dissimulates. As the bureaucratic authoritarian state pushed through its economic development plan in search of national economic and political autonomy, the particularization process entailed intense repressions on the Korean people. As both the material and symbolic gateway between the nation and the world, the social production of the airport shows us the combination of repressive and ideological processes that encapsulate the particularization process of national capitalism in the larger national economy and society.

²⁹⁷ As we saw with the travel ban on leisure travel, consumption was largely shunned in this process and at this time (as per Korea’s export-oriented policies implemented to procure foreign exchange). Rather, Koreans were called upon to *produce* enduring long hours and low pay as “industrial warriors” for the nation. This can’t be more different that the second Bush calling for Americans to go shopping as their patriotic duty in a different space-time of modernization.

Chapter Six

Farewell at Kimpo Airport: Kimpo in the Popular Cinematic and Literary Imagination

Situating representations of Kimpo terminal in South Korean postwar film and literature as a counterpart to the state production and official state-centered representations and utilization of the airport, this chapter looks at how the airport was imagined in popular postwar cinema and literature. In official representations, Kimpo was first and foremost a militarized state-space. In its built structure the first Kimpo International style terminal (1957-1960) primarily equated the national gateway with Cold War internationalist modernization/modernity and anti-communism, while the second kiwa terminal (1972-1980) presented the gateway as a symbol of a new nationalist modernity, as it was deployed for national economic development as much as anti-communism. As a space of circulation, Kimpo came to function as a highly regulated portal by which the South Korean developmental state controlled the ingress and egress of capital, commodities, and people in line with the imperatives of economic development. It was also the means by which diplomatic and trade relations between Cold War allies were forged as well as the site of the ideological representation of these alliances and the nation's development vis-à-vis this interdependent if hierarchical international anti-communist integration. Visible in mass media outlets, Kimpo was the privileged space of domestic and foreign bureaucrats, dignitaries, industrialists, and businessmen, and other political and cultural 'VIPS'²⁹⁸. Regularly featuring the international departures and arrivals of the South Korean presidents Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and Park Chung Hee's (1961-1979) state visits, the airport became signified as a key site of nation-building through the formation of diplomatic interstate ties across the 'free world' [figures 21-23].²⁹⁹ As discussed in the previous chapters, the airport represented not so much the *lived space* of South Koreans but the *conceived space* of the nation-state, whose entry into a unified capitalist inter-state system was presented as the possibility of national development.

The airport and air travel in post-liberation, postwar South Korea was as much the site of historical, social and political rupture as it was that of the post-colonial nation's suture into a new bipolar Cold War international system. With the division of the peninsula at the time of colonial liberation and the establishment of two separate antagonistic states in the North and South, the airport marked the passage from transcontinental railways of the colonial era to transpacific airways as the primary form of international travel as well as the signifier of a new era and process of modernity and modernization and its attendant contradictions within a drastically altered national and global context. While the official discourse produced Kimpo terminal as the gateway to a new unified universalist international Cold War modernity, the popular cinematic and literary representations of Kimpo of the period present the new cosmopolitan postwar modernity as a discrepant, dislocating, and contradictory experience haunted as much by the trauma of national division as by the trauma of dislocations and divisions created by postwar

²⁹⁸ See for example, *Kyŏngnyang Sinmun*, 17 March 1969; 21 May 1969; 4 November 1974, etc.

²⁹⁹ Countless news articles of the period report the comings and goings of state functionaries through their airport arrivals and departures. Press conferences were commonly held at the pressroom located in the airport terminal building or on the raised dais on the tarmac. A chronological new search of Kimpo and Incheon airports read like the international desk of a major news agency (or more precisely, the state PR desk).



Figure 21: Park Chung Hee at Kimpo Airport Departing for the U.S., November 11, 1961 [Chosun Ilbo]



Figure 22: Park Chung Hee at Kimpo Airport Arriving from the U.S., November 25, 1961 [Chosun Ilbo]



Figure 23: Park Chung Hee De-planing on Arrival from Manila, October 10, 1966 [Chosun Ilbo]

industrial development. Taking the place of railway travel of colonial literature, as the airport formed the new site of international emigrations, both the airport and air travel in postwar film and literature came to figure new narratives of migration and ‘exile’ interpolated with new conditions and paradoxes stemming from the experience of postwar/postcolonial modernity and nationalism. Much like the early modern national imaginary of colonial railroads, the airport and air travel in these works both mark and highlight the consciousness of a new center-periphery relationship attending the Cold War international landscape through a new circumscribed ‘postcolonial modernity,’ as these technologies likewise *spatialize* the uneven geography between Korea and the modern developed world beyond the nation’s borders as well the inequalities reproduced within. While international migrations in colonial narratives were linked to the creation of an enlightened nation and national independence, the postwar filmic and literary imagination of various forms of emigrations to regional developing (non-communist) countries as well as developed post-industrial cores point to the contradictions of patriarchal nationalism vis-à-vis new classed modern conversions—the haunting of the national division in the pathos of new family separations, the unfilled promises and betrayals of the patriarchal nationalist postcolonial nation-state—as well as ambivalent responses to American dominance in postwar South Korea.

What ties together the representations of Kimpo in the two main texts I examine in this chapter, the 1960 Golden Age Melodrama classic, *Pak Sōbang*, directed by Kang Daejin (1933-1987) and the novella *Farewell at Kimpo Airport* (1974) by the popularly acclaimed South Korean author Pak Wansō (1931-2011), is both the way Kimpo terminal is figured as the site of out-emigration in the context of a new global configuration and the way it is figured as a lived space—connected to the lives of the emigrating characters as well as the various discrepant and fragmented spaces of postwar Seoul and the historicity of these national spaces. In addition to these two texts, I briefly discuss two other postwar films, the 1964 film *Keep Silent When Leaving*, and the 1969 *shin’pa* melodrama *Bitter but Once Again*, which share both the final departure farewell scene as well as the interlinked theme of migration and mobility. In all of these texts, in lieu of the glorified images of presidential departures to and arrivals from state visits announcing new Cold War alliances, these texts visualize and narrate the ambivalent departures and tearful farewells of various South Korean emigrants—highlighting both cultural and physical dislocations accompanying the nation-state’s new internationalism. Departing from the official image of the nation-state moving through an homogenous and linear progressive time of modernity qua national development towards an American future, these narratives of emigration point to the ruptures, and deviations to the purported teleology of state nationalism presenting alternative popular nationalist claims which are embedded in multiple personal histories and connects to multiple sites and temporalities of division and dislocation, such as the war, community, family, and labor.

Immigrant Mobilities

Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has argued that social stratification characteristic of globalization in postmodern or late-modern society is measurable in terms of a person’s “degree

of mobility-their freedom to choose where to be.”³⁰⁰ While the shift from a producer-oriented society to a consumer-focused one has turned all people into existential ‘wanderers,’ Bauman asserts that there is “an abyss hard to bridge between the experiences at the top and the bottom of the freedom scale.”³⁰¹ The elite inhabitants of the “first world, the world of the globally mobile” are those unconstrained by state borders, of both the ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ variety, like the “world’s commodities, capital and finances”³⁰² The main typology of the businessmen, culture managers, and academics included in this category is that of the ‘tourist’, who experience time as a “perpetual present” as the “shrinking of space has abolished the flow of time” disconnecting the present from the past and the future.³⁰³ The inhabitants of the second world, on the other hand, are bound to exist in a “heavy, resilient, and untouchable” space “which ties down time and keeps it beyond [their] control.”³⁰⁴ Classified as ‘vagabonds’, they range from less successful to poverty-stricken versions of the ‘tourist’, and include immigrants and refugees with the prisoner at the most extreme end of the pole whose immobility signals the full mark of exclusion in today’s age of time-space compression.³⁰⁵ Unlike ‘tourists’ who “travel because *they want to*,” vagabonds “move because they find the world within their (local) reach unbearably *inhospitable*.”³⁰⁶ They travel because “they have no other bearable choice.”³⁰⁷

While Bauman’s theory of mobility in contemporary society is resonant with globalization theories that distinguish a global network of ‘flow spaces’ from localized ‘places’ in the discourse of global cities, his focus on the degree of freedom of people’s movement rather than characterizations of mobile and immobile spaces is more helpful toward examining the diverse forms of movement accompanying globalization in contemporary societies as well as observable changes from earlier periods. Going beyond the basic division between those who simply move across borders and those who do not, or spaces of mobility or immobility, Bauman’s more nuanced theory of mobility is able to consider the plight of emigrants and refugees, which have increased thirteen-fold within a span of two decades, and who cannot be allotted to either pole of the mobile-immobile opposition.

Like Bauman’s global ‘vagabonds,’ the kind of mobility associated with South Korean emigrants in the film and literature I examine presents an ambiguous category of mobility. In many cases, their movement is framed between the fantasies of American wealth and opportunity resulting from various forms of American intervention in postwar Korea, and the destitution as well as degradations that characterize their personal, familial, or social environments. The departures portrayed in these texts also run the gamut of different types of emigration—from more positive to negative scenarios. However, in all cases, it is hard to clearly discern the matter of choice in the mobility portrayed in these cases. In *Mr. Pak*, Yongbum’s occupational emigration to Thailand is an opportunity for his personal social and class mobility, and as the eldest son, that of his family. However, this mobility demands he forego his filial duties as the eldest son, leaving his aged parents in the care of his younger siblings. In *Bitter but Once Again*, the departure to Japan of Haeyŏng, through marriage migration, allows for her own social mobility in relation to her confinement vis-à-vis social patriarchal norms as well as her

³⁰⁰ Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 86.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 88-89.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 92-93.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

illegitimate son's mobility, as he is left to the legal care of his wealthy father and his wife. However, this comes at the cost of a great maternal sacrifice, as she bitterly gives up her young son, her lover, and her homeland. In the case of the grandmother in *Farewell at the Airport*, her emigration to the United States, of which she had dreamed of her whole life, comes at the cost of caustic family brawls, national depreciation and denigration and a personal sense of spiritual death even before the airplane takes off. They all entail various forms of renouncing, abandoning, or losing the self, family, and nation. Like the earlier colonial train narratives, nationalism entails one foot in and one foot out of the country and points to liminal, contradictory, and traumatized forms of consciousness.

In all these cases, the circumstances of emigration moreover crisscross multiple sites, histories, and temporalities. Their movements are difficult to understand within the frame of international migrations or emigrations as movements toward freedom or choice. It is hard to characterize their departures as their freely choosing to move, without vacating the meaning of choice. In a way their mobility lies somewhere between activity and passivity. Nancy Abelmann's reading of the father figure in *Mr. Pak* as "asserting himself even as he is depicted as being overshadowed by, the mere pawn of, larger social forces"—a key component of the 'melodrama of mobility' well describes this kind of mobility.³⁰⁸ It also bears a resemblance to the 'modernist' sensibility I explored in the colonial era railway journeys to national awakening. Moreover, the power that the larger world space exerts in these narratives is highlighted by the way in which these ambivalent and painful passages might be seen as success stories. Behind them I suppose were countless military brides, widows, and single mothers, as well as upwardly mobile workers who were not able to leave—who did not have the ability to seek better opportunities for themselves and their families and even reinvent their identities as possible in a new land, notwithstanding the difficulties of venturing into new cultures, languages, and geographies.

Pak Söbang: Postwar Transformations, Modern Divisions, and the Airport Farewell

Like a number of other films of the period, the 1960 South Korean Golden Age Melodrama classic *Mr. Pak/Neighbor Pak (Pak Söbang)* makes use of the new Kimpo terminal as a stage for an emotional farewell that functions as an ambivalent resolution to the modern transformation of the main character, Mr. Pak. *Mr. Pak* presents a story of an aging father whose dislocation within the rapidly modernizing society around him is negotiated as much through the conflicts that arise in his relationships with his three adult children, as his negotiations of the modernizing urban spaces, cultures, and social practices of Seoul. Pak is a proud father of three children, two of whom have been quite successfully incorporated into the emerging modern post-war society. His only son Yongbeom holds a managerial level position at an export-oriented pharmaceutical company just outside of Seoul, while his second daughter Myeongsun is a typist at the Seoul office of Northwest Airlines. The plot revolves around clashes, which arise within the Pak household in light of Pak's old-fashioned attitude towards his two daughters' modern budding romances and his son's impending opportunity to go abroad for his company to advance his career. Pak's recalcitrance toward these developments are highlighted throughout the film

³⁰⁸ Nancy Abelmann, "Melodramatic Texts and Contexts: Women's Lives, Movies, and Men," in *South Korean Melodrama: Gender, Genre, and National Cinema*, edited by Kathleen McHugh and Nancy Abelmann (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005), p. 58.

through the discrepant spaces that he and his children occupy—and their cosmopolitan/provincial and classed connotations—which spatially reinforce the sizable generation gap between Pak and his children as well as the acute sense of his anachronism which threatens his role as an able patriarch in a rapidly modernizing Seoul. As Nancy Abelmann has argued in her reading of *Pak Söbang*, she situates *Mr. Pak*, much like Shin Sang-ok's *Romance Papa* (1960), and Yu Hyön-mok's *Stray Bullet* (1961) as part of a group of quintessential Golden Age melodramas which explore the crisis of male subjectivity and patriarchy as a prominent narrative of the postwar experience of rapid social change in South Korea.³⁰⁹ I build on Abelmann's reading of this crisis of patriarchy through a focus on the airport farewell and thus the narrative of emigration and family division, which can be seen to echo the trauma and pathos of national division—so successfully obscured in official representations through the intensity of anti-communism—and a close engagement with the discrepant spaces of the novel.

While Pak's dislocation from modern Seoul as an anachronistic figure is portrayed through inter-generational conflict stemming from his outmoded values, it is also signified by the localized/provincial nature of his work and his class position as common laborer. Akin to the Western chimney sweep, Pak repairs flues of traditional ondol homes which use coal briquettes that would be phased out by the industrial advance of modern ondol floor systems designed with heated metal pipes. The ondol heating system itself is part of the vernacular architectural tradition, much like his modest traditional house. Despite Pak's class position, he is respected and liked in his poor hillside neighborhood (moon village)³¹⁰ of Haebangchon (Liberation village)—a shantytown that organically developed with the influx of refugees from North Korea surrounding the Korean War [figures 24-25]. He is moreover respected not only for his endearing nature but also in part because of his upright and upwardly mobile children. However, both his class position and his localized Korean yet anachronistic profession are essential to how he is figured as a dislocated figure of modernizing Seoul and allow for the particular staging of his modern conversion.

In both the narrative and visual structure of the film, the airport is presented as part of a transnational mise en scène that code particular spaces, people, or events as modern throughout the film. The signs of a transnational elsewhere, which are woven into urban Seoul, double as signs of the very modern forces that challenge Pak's traditional patriarchal role as they invade the sanctity of his neighborhood and home. They are predominantly Western, such as the displays of Western dress, furniture, liquor, airline company, and even new leisure activities like hiking, but not limited to it, as East and Southeast Asian locations also shape this cold war global imaginary [figures 26-30]. Yong-bum's pharmaceutical company exports to Thailand, where he also later emigrates and Japanese commodities decorate the cosmopolitan living room of Myeongsun's fiancé's Hawaiian aunt, who is presented as Pak's main antagonist as well as vehicle of transformation. Perhaps it is not surprising that a diasporic Korean from Hawaii would come to figure in the postwar period as paradoxical 'modern' yet antagonistic or evil characters that help instigate modern conversions. We saw this figure in the modern yet evil Japanese stepmother in Yi Injik's *Tears of Blood*, where we also saw diasporic Koreans being positioned

³⁰⁹ See Nancy Abelmann, "Melodramatic Texts and Contexts: Women's Lives, Movies, and Men," (pp. 43-64) and Eunsun Cho, "The Stray Bullet and the Crisis of Korean Masculinity," (pp. 99-116) in *South Korean Melodrama: Gender, Genre, and National Cinema*, edited by Kathleen McHugh and Nancy Abelmann (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005).

³¹⁰ Sprawling shantytowns that developed along the hillsides of Seoul in the postwar period were called *daldongnae* (moon villages).



Figure 24: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still - Mr. Pak walking up Haebangchon village



Figure 25: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Mr. Pak's house



Figure 26: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang* (*Neighbor Pak*), 1960, film still – Mr. Pak awkwardly drinking Western liquor at the home of a wealthy neighbor, whose wealth is signified by the modern Western style room of her otherwise traditional Korean house



Figure 27: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Myeongsun and finacé meeting with Yongbum at a *Tabang*



Figure 28: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Mr. Pak inside a *Tabang*



Figure 29: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Kimpo Airport lobby



Figure 30: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Modern house of Hawaiian aunt

above their peninsular less modern counterparts. However, here these differences are strongly coded along class lines. Wealth, status and upward mobility invariably belong to the realm of the transnational-modern, and which is positioned against Pak, bound to a more provincial realm linked to 'traditional' social mores and produced as modernity's other. Within his most intimate sphere, Pak's anachronism is brought into relief by the simultaneously modern-transnational commitments of his son, whose successful white-collar managerial career compels him to emigrate abroad to manage a branch of his company in Thailand, and his youngest daughter Myeongsun, perhaps the most modern character in the film, who works at Northwest Airlines and is planning to marry her co-worker whom she has been dating without the consent of her father.

Beholden to what would appear to be 'traditional' cultural and moral values, Pak is reluctant to give his blessing on both accounts as he cannot fathom the absence and loss of his eldest son on whom he heavily relies, and does not approve of Myeongsun's romance which forms part of her general modern lifestyle along with new forms of recreation (*rekkuriaessõn*) or leisure like hiking or working outside the home [figure 31], even though he regards her job with some admiration. In addition, his anachronism features prominently in one of the opening scenes where we see Pak appears both socially and culturally displaced awkwardly sitting on a chair sipping a glass of western liquor in the modern living room of one of his more well to do neighborhood clients, or his obvious unease as he steps into the modern tabang/coffee shop looking for his son.

Pak's temporal dislocation is visually highlighted by the disjunctive character of two sets of spaces cohabiting Seoul in the film. The hillside shantytown which opens the film with Pak meandering uphill two pails of water as well as his neighborhood tavern are contrasted to the pristine spaces of modern Seoul inhabited by his children, which also move at a faster speed. The orderly space of Myeongsun's Northwest office features a neat arrangement of desks while the walls are decorated with Northwest Airlines posters of Washington D.C., Florida, and New York [figure 32]. Yongbum's pharmaceutical export factory is a showcase of modern urban planning which features a rational integration of factory, office buildings, and dormitories, while inside a team of uniformed female workers operate a modern assembly line [figures 33-34]. As Gregory Henderson vividly described, Seoul at this time was "half city, with mounting buildings, streetcars, electricity, taxis, and half macrocephalic monster, growing cancerously in hillside shacks and caves, noisome alleys and settlements without water or electricity."³¹¹ The film maps the bifurcated landscape of postwar modern Seoul onto the discrepant temporalities of a belated Pak and his modern children.

The most dramatic staging of Pak's dislocation, which simultaneously marks him as pre-modern and threatens his mantle as family patriarch, is in the home of his future son-in-law's aunt, a diasporic Korean living in Hawaii who has returned to meddle in her nephew's affairs. The aunt's callous humiliation and denigration of Pak as an ignorant laborer, staged in melodramatic excess on numerous levels, triggers the climatic turning point of the film. In sharp contrast to the spare modest traditional style house of Pak, the luxurious home of the Hawaiian aunt teems with cosmopolitan excess. Her living room overflows with an abundance of western technology and culture to a degree unparalleled in any of Pak's prior encounters with 'modern' environments [figure 35]. The space of modern luxury is illustrated by western furniture, a television set, a radio, an electric fan, abstract paintings, Japanese dolls and flower arrangements,

³¹¹ Gregory Henderson, *Korea and the Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 169.



Figure 31: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Myeongsun and finacé in their recreation clothes and Mr. Pak



Figure 32: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Myeongsun working as a typist in the Northwest Airlines office



Figure 33: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Yongbum shows his mother the modern factory



Figure 34: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Modern Assembly line with female workers

as well as heightened by the barking of the English bulldog. The scene just before he goes to see the aunt, where he is sitting on the floor being fanned by his daughter and son, is clearly contrasted with Pak sitting in her living room as she walks over and switches on an electric fan. The aunt begins to denigrate Pak as soon as he sits down, but upon seeing Pak's unfamiliarity with a tea bag, she launches into a full tirade about how Pak daughter is not suitable marriage material for her college educated nephew of "*yangban*" (noble/high status) descent.

There is an important slippage in this scene that brings together the various signs through which the modern has been represented in the film thus far. When the maid serves Pak a teacup with a western teabag placed next to the cup, Pak is unfamiliar with the tea bag and proceeds to open it and sprinkle the loose tea into the water. Pak's unfamiliarity with the western teabag is equated with his lack of culture and refinement by the aunt, betraying his ignorance and low class position as a common laborer [figure 36]. His cultural faux pas, which was capitalized on by the aunt to humiliate him, was perhaps what he would have done while drinking loose tea in much of Asia. Theoretically, knowledge of another culture's rituals and delicacies do not function as a form of class differentiation. But the cosmopolitan imaginary in postwar South Korea appears to do exactly that. Knowledge and performance of cosmopolitan culture, though primarily Western or American, or the possession of foreign commodities are most explicitly conflated with a higher social status and class position in this scene as well as others throughout the film.

Before this turning point, while the spaces of the transnational modern and the spaces of Pak were clearly demarcated, Pak was quite at home in his non-modern half of Seoul, authoritative and respected in his sphere. In an earlier scene, as Pak drinks Korean rice liquor with his neighbor, Pak confides in him about the unpleasant taste of Western liquor, which he had tried at a client's house earlier that day. This friend assures him that rice liquor is what is best suited for Koreans. But after this turning point, the certainty of this cultural ground fractures from his recognition of his belatedness.

This humbling and traumatic encounter functions as a rude awakening for Pak. The most melodramatic scenes are deployed to visualize his emotional distress. The encounter that makes his life flash before his eyes and leads him to doubt for the first time the cultural ground that he has long stood upon and which legitimated his patriarchal authority. As scenes of thunder and lightning give expression to Pak consternation mixed with anger and a deeply wounded pride, he returns home and vows to send his daughter to college, and apologizes to his children for having been an obstacle to their success. He sees himself as having suddenly become a hindrance (by virtue of both being outmoded and poor). With wounded pride, Pak undergoes a general conversion, and he comes to relinquish his truculence toward his children's modern activities. He agrees to allow his son to accept the employment position abroad and he accepts both Myeongsun's and Yongsun's fiancés as future son-in-laws.

As the final scene of the film, the tearful airport farewell leaves us with a highly ambivalent ending, which stages the resolution of Pak's modern transformation with another form of dislocation/division. Gathered in the sleek modern lobby of Kimpo terminal, Pak stands beside his wife, eldest daughter Yongsun and her husband Jaechun to one side and his son's employer and coworker to the other surrounding his son and his new wife in a ceremonial farewell. As Yongbum receives a bouquet of flowers from his coworker he proceeds with personal farewells to everyone present [figure 37]. Featured throughout the film in traditional



Figure 35: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Mr. Pak sitting inside the Hawaiian aunt's house



Figure 36: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Teabag faux pas



Figure 37: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Yongbum receiving a farewell bouquet at Kimpo Airport



Figure 38: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Yongbum waving farewell



Figure 39: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Family waving farewell from the Observation deck



Figure 40: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Mother hunched over crying as Yongbum’s plane taxis for takeoff



Figure 41: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Yongbum crying on the plane



Figure 42: Kang Daejin, *Pak Sobang (Neighbor Pak)*, 1960, film still – Mr. Pak saying goodbye to Yongbum as he watches the plane takeoff

Korean dress, Pak is uncharacteristically dressed in a crisp western suit, like the other men present, while Yongbum even wears a corsage pinned to his suit jacket. His mother and sister are donned in simple but neat *hanboks*, as Yongbum's wife is dressed in a formal black dress. After Yongbum finishes his goodbyes he and his wife bow and proceed to the tarmac. The family and guests hurriedly climb the stairs to the observation deck. In a careful mimicry of the sensational images of the South Korean president's and high level bureaucrats heroic diplomatic departures ubiquitous in the national media, Yongbum walks aboard the Northwest plane, then pauses to turn and see his family wave goodbye [figures 38-39]. As they call out to him with a few last words, Yongbum sadly waves, then walks on board. In a dizzying series of cuts back and forth between the observation deck and the plane, the camera juxtaposes scenes of the distressed mother hunched over in tears [figure 40], while her son, weeps uncontrollably aboard the plane releasing all the grief he had carefully controlled until safely hidden from sight [figure 41]. The movie ends with crosscutting shots between Pak and his son. Walking along a neat tree-lined road,³¹² Pak looks up at the plane taking off and bids a private farewell to his dear son [figure 42].

Echoing the representation of family farewells we saw in colonial novels and prefiguring the ubiquitous scenes of lover's parting at the airport in contemporary South Korean films and television dramas, the particularly emotional farewell between Pak Söbang and his son dramatizes the larger family separation by foregrounding the sentiment of loss shared between two principle characters, the one who leaves and the one who is left behind. While Pak was portrayed as a loving father to all three of his children, he shares a particularly close relationship with his only son on whom he relies and regards as his pride and joy. The airport ending thus emphasizes the melancholic and bittersweet experience of modernity: as the farewell serves as the resolution of the narrative conflict of Pak's modernization, marking Pak's entry into modern time via his and his son's movement of mobility, it is marked with a heart-rending farewell of family separation. As in other modern melodramas of the period, such as *Keep Silent When Leaving* (1964) or *Bitter Once Again* (1969), as well as the Pak Wansö's short stories *Farewell at Kimpo Airport* (1974), and *Encounter at the Airport* (1978), Kimpo airport becomes the site of family division, staging a personalized echo of the national partition in the postwar production of the Korean diaspora, which doubles as both the path and wound of modernity. Simultaneously encoding hope and loss, the postwar airport is figured as a site of an ambivalent modernity, as it opens these stories to optimistic futures as well as uncertain future reunions.

Miwodo Dashi Hanbeon (Love Me Once Again)

*Love Me Once Again (Miwodo Dashi Hanbeon, Part 1:1968, Part 2: 1969; Part 3: 1970)*³¹³ directed by So-yeong Jeon is of a slightly different genre called 'shinpa melo' which stems from stage dramas of the colonial era. It is more like the emotionally overblown melodramas of contemporary television featuring Manichean characters enveloped in unbelievable plot twists and reversals, coincidences and chance meetings. The actress Moon

³¹² The different representations of nature in the film appear to function as signs of the stages of Pak's conversion. There is the comfortable wooded stream near Pak's house which he frequents to have private chats with his son; then the unwieldy nature of the mountain which he nearly rolls off when he accompanies his daughter hiking signified as a modern leisure activity; and lastly this manicured street where a two orderly rows of trees flank the wide concrete road.

³¹³ Two more remakes of this film were made in 1980-81 (part 1 and 2), and in 2002. The 1981 version collapses the ending scene with the melodramatic farewell between the mother and the son in the departure hall of the newly opened 1980 Kimpo terminal.

Hee, who played the controversial and tragic heroine, was regularly introduced on show programs as “Asia’s Queen of Tears.”³¹⁴ The moral universe created in this series of films is heavy-handed and closed, jealousy guarding the status quo. This story of a triangular relationship that develops between the male protagonist, his wife, his mistress and their illegitimate son broke all preceding box office records with 375,005 tickets sold in 1968, led to two sequels in 1969 and 1970 as well as remakes in 1980-81 and 2002.

The second to last scene of the 1969 version depicts another difficult parting between a parent and child, this time between mother and son, echoing the train separation of father and son in Part I of the film released in 1968 [figures 43-45]. Motivated out of concern for her child’s future, Haeyong leaves her six-year old son in the care of his father and his wife as she departs for Japan with her new husband as an act of maternal sacrifice. This farewell begins with the establishing shot of the 1960 Kimpo terminal façade where she greets her ex-lover’s wife who has come to bid her farewell. She pleads with her to take good care of her son. She turns to her brother saying: “I’m not coming back to my homeland so please take care of mother’s grave.” Like the closing in *Neighbor Pak*, the last scene of this film also leaves us with those who remain. Shin-ho holds his tearful son Young Sin as they both look up at sky to the sounds of a jet taking off.

Ttunalttaenŷn Mal up si [Keep Silent When Leaving]

In a slight variation, the farewell at Kimpo airport in *Keep Silent When Leaving* (1964) also begins with the establishing shot of the 1960 Kimpo terminal façade. The protagonist Myeong-Su says goodbye to his superiors from the ministry of foreign affairs who have come to see him off. After passing the civil servant examinations, he has been transferred to the Korean Embassy in the US and turns to board the plane when his girlfriend’s grandparents surprise him with his young daughter. After the sudden tragic death of his lover, his daughter had been in their care. They had originally refused his request to take her with him to the US, but allow the girl to leave with her father at the last minute. Delighted, Myeong-su picks up his daughter and boards the CAT plane while turning to wave goodbye to his deceased wife’s parents on the observation deck. *Keep Silent When Leaving* is also a family melodrama of social transformation and personal mobility. In a reversal of *Neighbor Pak*’s subtext of marriage mobility in the case of Myeongsu, this drama pivots around a poor but ambitious and hardworking man who falls in love with a rich industrialist’s daughter. The woman’s father’s strong opposition to their marriage and Myeongsu’s own sense of class inferiority supply the grounds on which this melodrama unfolds. With the sudden death of his wife, the finality of his departure is more firm in this ending airport scene than in *Neighbor Pak*.

In all of these films from the 1960s, as well as a number of others, the airport scene primarily functions as the site of family division, regularly coupled with the promise of social mobility. The global imaginary in these films are produced though necessity rather than choice, which is most marked in the uncertain promise of their return. This is visible in the successive sequence of the scene of departure and the closing shot of those who stay behind. Hae-young resigns herself to becoming a Korean expatriate in Japan (that is, until the making of the third sequel). In these films, the narrative device of the airport ending performs two conflicting roles; it serves as the symbolic resolution to the main text of the character’s negotiation and resolution

³¹⁴ *Hanguk Ilbo*, 8 January 1970, p. 23.



Figure 43: Soyeong Jeon, *Miwodo Dashi Hanbeon* [Love Me Once Again], 1968, film still, Train farewell



Figure 44: Soyeong Jeon, *Miwodo Dashi Hanbeon* [Love Me Once Again], 1969, film still – Haeyeong driving up to Kimpo for the airport farewell ending of the sequel



Figure 45: Soyeong Jeon, *Miwodo Dashi Hanbeon* [Love Me Once Again], 1969, film still – Son looking up at the sky saying farewell to his mother

of a moral dilemma on one level, while the content of that resolution unleashes the trauma of family division on another realm—which is also importantly as realm of affect. This structure can moreover be seen to resemble the paradoxical modernity of the developmental state we examined in chapter five.

Farewell at Kimpo Airport: the American Dream, Ruptured Families, and a Nation Betrayed

Like the iconic airport departure scene that brought the film *Pak Söbang* to a close, Pak Wansö's short story *Farewell at Kimpo Airport* also ends with the tearful farewell of an emigrating grandmother as she departs for her new life in the San Francisco home of her youngest daughter. However, unlike the tender goodbyes shared between Pak's emigrating son and his loving family, infused with anticipation of their reunion despite the sorrowful parting, the grandmother's abrupt farewell betrays the strained relations between the old woman and her extended family that circumscribe a different emigration narrative, which is haunted by both the effects of the Korean War and the fantasies and contradictions of the American Dream.

Arriving at the airport with her eldest son and her granddaughters on the morning of her flight, the old woman's heart was filled with "a dull pang of resentment."³¹⁵ She had wept all night hurt by the missed chance to spend her last night with her darling toddler grandson Kilnam. Her departure date had unfortunately coincided with the sixtieth birthday of her daughter-in-law's mother. Although fully aware of how much the old woman adored her only grandson, her disaffected daughter-in-law had taken Kilnam with her to spend the night at her mother's house, with the excuse that the old woman should get a good night's sleep.

The next day her daughter-in-law barely made it to the airport on time, then immediately began scurrying about urging her husband and daughters to see grandma off quickly because they had to get back to her parents' house to pay their respects at the birthday ceremony. With all of them in a rush, the old woman felt she had no choice but to hurry off, and this only worsened the bitterness she was feeling. Suddenly she flung her arms around Kilnam. He said it hurt and started crying. She let him go but tightly squeezed his little hand. Again he complained, tears welling up.³¹⁶

Her young school-age granddaughter, haunted by her memories of the equally discomfiting emigrations of her three uncles and her aunt, struggled to cope with the dreaded departure of another family member:

The young granddaughter scrutinized her grandmother. The spend old lady was dressed in a loud shiny skirt and a jacket of synthetic brocade. She had a silver hairpin askew in her small, unkempt bun of gray hair. A red bag on which the word "BONANZA" was embossed in white hung awkwardly around her neck and over her chest. As she realized that her grandmother's incongruous attire made

³¹⁵ Pak, Wansö, "Farewell at Kimpo Airport" (1974), in Chun Kyung-Ja et al. ed., *My Very Last Possession and Other Stories by Pak Wansö* (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 77. Hereafter referred to as *Farewell*.

³¹⁶ *Farewell*, p. 77.

her look ridiculous beside the other travelers, and that to the end she persisted in doting on Kilnam, the young girl's heart throbbed with an almost physical ache.

To her, both sides—the sending and the departing alike—seemed way out of line. She had felt more comfortable seeing her uncles go. They had strutted triumphantly away, ranting, “See if I ever come back” and “Whenever I take a piss I’ll aim it this goddamn way.”³¹⁷

“Saying there was no time to spare,” the daughter-in-law:

pressed her to board immediately. Never knowing whether she meant there was little time to reach the birthday party or before the plane took off, and with that same knot still burning in her chest, the old woman waded into the crowd, finished the emigration procedures, and proceeded to the tarmac from which the plane was visible.³¹⁸

Finding an excuse to “see her family, and especially Kilnam, one last time,” the old woman gets off the bus to the plane, and returns to the departure lounge.³¹⁹

The old woman ran to the escalator, looked up to the lounge and yelled, “Hey, you guys! I found someone to go with me to San Poriko. A very nice young man. Don’t worry about me.”

But there was no reply. She only saw strangers, who snickered at her. She stared a while longer, but among the crowd in the lounge there was not a single familiar face. Her family must already have left for the party.

She wanted to check once more but could not, for her vision kept blurring. She grew embarrassed under the gaze of strangers and, as if to hide from them, got back on the bus. From the time she got off the bus until she boarded the airplane, the old woman felt as if she were traveling through chaos itself. She hovered on the brink of unconsciousness, her vision so hazy she could not even make out her most immediate surroundings.³²⁰

Bereft of the customary ritual of waving to the boarding passenger, memorialized in *Pak Söbang*, as well as the pomp and circumstance of the dramatic send-off, which for some even included live bands serenading departing loved ones and professional colleagues, even for a dysfunctional family, this distressing portrayal of the airport farewell appears excessive. Teeming with “resentment,” “an aching heart,” and “bitterness,” on both sides of the sending and departing sides of the family, this harrowing farewell, encapsulates the estranged and dislocating phenomenon of emigration explored in this story. Narrated through the twin viewpoints of the emigrating grandmother and her young school-age granddaughter who remains behind, *Farewell*

³¹⁷ *Farewell*, pp. 77-78.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*

³¹⁹ *Farewell*, p. 78.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

presents the airport as a site of rupture and loss and offers a different account of the cultural and social dimensions of postwar South Korean out-migrations.

As air travel succeeded rail and automobile travel, international emigrations became an extension of the rural to urban migrations of social and economic mobility for many South Koreans.³²¹ For the old woman, who “grew up in Kup’abal as the daughter of a dirt-poor farmer, and first came to Seoul to marry a rootless day laborer,”³²² the old widow’s emigration to America from the modest hillside Hyönjo-dong neighborhood of Seoul where she had settled, incurred the war, and sent abroad three out of her four children, was at the same time an extended movement of mobility and yet another traumatic dislocation. In the absence of any signs of her future return or a welcoming family, her lonely international departure, as well as those of her children before her, differs from the deferred yet optimistic return of Pak Söbang’s son, which Pak Söbang eagerly anticipates, as well as the guaranteed return of development for the nation in the official ideology of internationalism. Rather than a path to an imagined future unity, whether in the form of family reunion or national development or a combination of both, her departure pictures a form of cosmopolitan dislocation (without the prospect of return) that presented another form of internationalism in the postwar period. Signifying foreign emigrations in the postwar period, *Farewell* presents air travel as a new technology of social mobility that extended the physical, emotional and social dislocation of individuals and ruptured families ensuing from national division onto an international arena.

This new extended mobility of migration across geo-political space was articulated, moreover, with new processes and imaginaries/ideologies of the postwar context under American Empire leading to new and more intensified forms of estrangement. The popular image of America among Koreans of the time—“a promised land, difficult to reach but, once attained, a place where everyone grew rich overnight”—solidified into an incontestable fact defining wealth and opportunity itself for the postwar poverty stricken nation.³²³ In the same vein as the super-valuation of Western/American modernity among the coexisting discrepant modernities in *Pak Söbang* and the official representation of the U.S. as the apex of development in the inter-state system, “to the old woman ‘America’ called to mind first an foremost a country of riches, a place where everybody had more to eat and wear than they could ever need.”³²⁴ Through the vicissitudes of personal circumstance, the Korean War, and geopolitical forces, three out of her four sons had also longed for America:

From the start they all had wanted nothing but to get to America. After losing their father in the war they began to haunt the American army bases from a tender age. They cut their teeth as shoeshine boys or houseboys and matured into handymen or waiters in the officers’ canteen. As time passed they grew fairly confident in English conversation and even mastered the peculiar Yankee gesture of shrugging the shoulders and raising a corner of the mouth when stymied by something. Over the years, however, most of the American forces were gradually withdrawn. Thus the boys’ base jobs did not last. When they tried to find work

³²¹ As Ilsoo Kim and other Korean emigration scholars observe, unlike earlier European immigrants to the US hailing from rural origins, one of the unique characteristics of Korean immigrants in NY is its composition by a largely urban class, as many of them had already migrated to Seoul from rural areas before their departures to the U.S.

³²² *Farewell*, p. 63.

³²³ *Ibid.*

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

with Korean organizations, their lack of schooling proved a constant cause of rejection. Perhaps the curious combination of a lack of educational credentials coupled with the ability to speak some English predestined them to yearn for America. When they were penniless children, the mysteries that first captivated their young minds were “made in America” and “the dollar.” It was only natural that they longed to make a pilgrimage to the origin of these wonders.³²⁵

Save for her only daughter who emigrated to the U.S. as a nurse,³²⁶ and who had arranged for the old woman’s emigration, all three of her sons fell short of their American Dream. After, being “repeatedly duped by conmen,” and piling up expenses that was passed off to other members of the family trying to buy their way to the U.S., her three sons ended up in Germany, Brazil, and Guam.³²⁷ In part shaped by her sons’ “frantic quest” to reach America, and in part due to her provincial background, her perception of America was so exaggerated that it was not only the center of the world, but encompassed the whole world outside of Korea itself: “In her mind, Germany, Brazil, and Guam were local districts in America, just as Nusan-dong, Ahyŏn-dong, and Ch’ongjin-dong were districts of Seoul.”³²⁸

Not only did her perception of America monopolize her imagination of world geography, it diminished the size and value of her own country in comparison. In the time leading up to her departure, everything about Korea became the epitome of backwardness. In response to her granddaughter’s offer to take her around town, she braggingly rebuffs: “What’s all this fuss about sightseeing? As if there is anything worth seeing in this place anyway...when I get to America, I’ll do plenty of sightseeing.”³²⁹ At the museum, when the granddaughter points out displays of ancient celadon and pots with different glazes, the old woman only saw “chipped clay pots and broken shards of earthen bowls.”³³⁰ Even when she was impressed by the “reproduction of an altar at Bulguksa, a Buddhist temple over a thousand years old,” unable to understand her granddaughter’s explanations, “she thought, snorting disdainfully, ‘this is nothing. In America there are lots of buildings over a hundred stories tall, and I’m about to become an American grandmother. Ha! You thought I’d be impressed by this?’”³³¹

“Overwhelmed by frustration and despair” at her grandmother’s “condescending pity,” the young granddaughter recalled the same look that “had surfaced as soon as her uncles and her aunt had bought plane tickets and stayed frozen on their faces till the day they left.” The grandmother’s impending departure reminded her of their “intolerable” behavior in the “drawn out period between the decision to leave and the actual exodus”:³³²

They affected a certain languishing attitude as if to underscore the disparity in their situations, and they never passed up a chance to express their pity for the rest of the family...At the same time [they] could no longer simply pass by the gangs of children playing in the alley. No, like those big-nosed strangers whose hobby

³²⁵ Ibid., p. 66.

³²⁶ Medical professionals made up one of the largest groups of South Korean emigrants to the U.S. due to American immigration quotas.

³²⁷ *Farewell*, p. 66.

³²⁸ Ibid., p. 63.

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 72.

³³⁰ Ibid., p. 65.

³³¹ Ibid., p. 62.

³³² Ibid., p. 65.

is to display their charity by calling on orphanages with donations and supplies in hand, they clicked their tongues and wore concerned looks in an effort to broadcast their pity. “Oh, dear! What were these poor wretches thinking, churning out so many children. The door to suffering is wide open, wide open...”³³³

Even before their emigrations were arranged, her restless uncles had already departed in spirit/undergone a change in identity: “Fuck, everything these goddamned Koreans do is screwed up! Shit, I can be stubborn too, stubborn as hell. And if I ever do get out I’m never coming back to this godforsaken place. No, but when I take a piss I’ll be sure to aim it in this direction.”³³⁴ Still haunted by these vivid memories, the young girl even seemed to recall the “clank of chains” fastened to the legs of each of her uncles.³³⁵

Emigration for the poor widowed grandmother is presented as an escape from her hapless existence amidst the constant conflict that plagued this multi-generational, overcrowded and under-earning home, as it was for her uneducated three sons and only daughter from the confining reality of social immobility in postwar South Korea. Entwined with the popular image of America of the period as the land of plenty and limitless opportunity, emigration for the members of this dysfunctional (though not so exceptional) postwar family, became a glorified *cosmopolitan escape* from the prospect-less and confining immobility of their lives. *Farewell* shows us how the *escape* of disenfranchised/excluded members of the nation was transformed into value-added *departures* through *international* emigrations. Emigration functioned in a way as a practical and emotional pressure valve for an overcrowded and poverty stricken postwar Korea. At the same time, it divulges the irreparable spiritual dislocations accompanying these economically, politically and physically displaced individuals and families.

These cosmopolitan escapes went hand in hand with national-cultural disaffection and alienation on multiple levels. For the grandmother’s underprivileged sons, their childhood experiences around American army bases not only instilled the desire to go abroad but the near necessity/compulsion to do so. Their limited capacity for social mobility within South Korea was produced not only in spite of but also due to the nation-state’s internationalist path to national development. They were twice betrayed, abandoned by their country, through the loss of their father to the fratricidal war, and by their surrogate father-nation, America, with the reduction of American bases. Their situation highlights the hypocrisy of the developmental narrative of the patriarchal nation-state from the standpoint of many South Koreans for whom a normative patriarchal family was made impossible due to the casualties of war. Even in cases where the patriarchal family structure remained intact, as illustrated in Pak Söbang and other family dramas which explored the crisis of male subjectivity, patriarchal power and by extension national sovereignty was often mitigated by the powerful shadow of American political and economic authority in affairs of the state as well as the everyday lives of its citizens. Excluded from the opportunities promised by the state’s national developmental narrative and mediated through the extra-patriarchal family, their estrangement from other “Koreans” and the nation took shape through their idealized visions of America.

The grandmother’s disaffection from the nation mediated through years of “ill-treatment at the hands of her family” is best illustrated through her estrangement from national culture. Her inability to understand the significance of ancient relics is veiled over by her depreciation of

³³³ Ibid., p. 71.

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 68.

³³⁵ Ibid.

them as lesser versions of American counterparts. Her dismissal of the thousand year old Korean alter in comparison with the incongruous hundred story-tall buildings in America reveals the presentist and directional nature (towards America as modern apex) of this form of cultural estrangement. Time (past) is separated from space, and disavowed in favor of an a-temporal spatiality. As a path to America, the airport was the very threshold to the modern present. Importantly, America in her mind was a crucial fantasy ideal that allowed her to assert a sense of dignity/self-pride that was taken from her by her circumstance. It was a quintessential escape or *elsewhere*—one more modern qua luxurious—that allowed her to endure the hardships of being *here*.

*Searching for Dignity - Airport as the Site of an Alienated Non-Patriarchal Nationalism*³³⁶

The old woman's excitement to realize her American dream and leave her miserable situation as her other children had done before her, however, had not prepared her for the shock and gravity of her departure. Inside the airplane, she awakens to the trauma of her displacement from her family and nation:

Finally, and with grave shock, the old woman became conscious of the plane's taking off. The jarring was not physical, such as anyone might feel, but a tremendous shock felt by the old woman alone and unfathomable to any other. If an ancient tree standing anchored for centuries were to be suddenly and totally uprooted by some titanic force, the shock to that tree at that moment might come closest to describing how she felt. Not until the old woman's senses had emerged from confusion did she become aware of herself as this uprooted and ancient tree...The old woman now realized how much she loved this land even down to its shabbiest parts, this land against which her sons had gnashed their teeth in loathing, and from which they had so desperately struggled to escape. As if peering at her own corpse, she imagined again the awful scene in which the giant tree was uprooted and toppled to the ground in a paralyzing terror, its thousands of roots exposed, dry, and withering. She wept in heart-rending grief.³³⁷

Her departure concludes with her simultaneous encounter with natural death and spiritual genesis. At the very moment she finds herself overwhelmed with the sensations of natural death, picturing herself as both an uprooted tree and a corpse, she wells with a spontaneous love for her country. To be sure, this surprising sentiment of nationalism from a woman whose disaffection from her country was molded through her illusory fantasy of America is distinct from the anti-colonial historical genealogical ethnic nationalism of the early twentieth century, which continued to be promoted through the nation-state's ideology of 'minjok' in postcolonial nationalist discourse. Evident in her alienation from any form of national tradition, except for her devotion to Buddhist deities and animistic spirits, she had little sense of herself as part of a national collectivity bound by blood-ties or shared legal rights. She had even less appreciation for past history or any sense of historical continuity, whether on the level of the family or the nation. Inundated with infighting, loss, and conflict, the past was something she'd rather forget,

³³⁶ We also see this concept of Korean dignity vis-à-vis American dominated postwar Seoul in Pak Wansö's other airport story: *Encounter at the Airport* (1978), in Chun Kyung-Ja et al. ed., *My Very Last Possession and Other Stories by Pak Wansö* (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

³³⁷ *Farewell*, p. 79.

and remained outside of her individual subjectivity, which was buoyed on fantasies of her desiring present and future. Like her fatherless sons, she had no ground for the autonomous/autochthonous development of love of country or the appreciation of national culture/national feeling.

Instead, it resembles that haunted “hybrid and oxymoronic” character of Benedict Anderson’s “exile” or the “colonial” arising from the experience of being “torn out of the quotidian.”³³⁸ In addition, the old woman’s nationalism also bears some important resemblances to the developmental nationalism of the official representation of the airport, which was likewise extra-nationally or trans-nationally constituted in the face of South Korea’s entry into the capitalist international/the US Empire. It was rather its negative mirror image. While this developmental nationalism associated nation building with South Korea’s entry and successful integration into the new postwar hierarchical inter-state system, the grandmother’s national feeling was produced at the site of her traumatic dislocation from her family and country. Unlike the official ideology of nationalism via inter-state unity, in which the nation’s capitalist development sutured the nation to the inter-state system as a path to its continued survival and future prosperity, the nationalism of the grandmother came about through her irrecoverable dislocation from the national body and was even experienced as a form of death.

The Lived Production of New Nationalisms as a Search for Individual and National Dignity

More than any other character, however, it is the young granddaughter, whose consciousness of national identity and the nation’s place in the world was most affected by the divisive emigrations that turned her home into a battleground and court of international judgment. In contrast to her present-bound grandmother, she was constantly haunted by past memories of “the chaos and pandemonium” that her uncles’ “determination to desert to America” “created in her home.”³³⁹ She painfully and quizzically recalled the repeated brawls between her uncles and her father, as well as between her grandmother and her mother, which always hinged on “America this, and America that,” though not fully understanding “why the combatants had taken the sides that they did”:³⁴⁰

Idiot, so you think America’s the be-all and the end-all? Even if our family’s pillars crumble and our roots wither, you imagine that if you can just reach America somebody there will feed you? If you can make money in America, why can’t you make it here? I’ve had it up to here! You’re America’s problem now! I’d like nothing better than to send you to America, but I’ve got children of my own to look after.”

‘Ha,’ said the second son. ‘Did you put me through school? What have you ever done to earn my respect as the older brother? All I’m asking if for you to send me to America. If I can just get there, what’s a little money? Whatever you loan me I’ll pay you back tenfold. Your acting like this only makes me more determined to go to America. Only in America can I live like a human being.’³⁴¹

³³⁸ Benedict Anderson, Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*, (London: Verso, 1998; reprinted 2002), p. 60.

³³⁹ Farewell, p. 66.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

Her aunt's departure, unlike her uncles,' went smoothly without any burden to the family finances. Like many South Korean professionals, she emigrated as a nurse, filling the high demand for medical professionals in the United States. Even then, her departure led to yet another fierce exchange between her grandmother and her mother. The girl's mother had,

promised to by a fancy outfit for her sister-in-law to wear on the trip. But the day before her aunt was due to leave, her mother came home with only one piece of clothing, a top that remotely resembled a short coat. It reeked of cheapness and shabbiness. Even the old woman saw this at a glance and immediately flew at her daughter-in-law, saying it was not just anywhere but to America her sister-in-law was going, and asking if she thought it proper to send her off dressed like a charwoman. The daughter in-law...shot back in a contemptuous tone,

“Mother, you keep harping on America, America, America. You think if someone just gets there, then they're a big success, but they're not. You think auntie is going to America on a state visit? If you must know, she's going to wipe up shit. Shit. Mother, you've got to get a hold of yourself.”

...If this were not enough, she went on at length to say assistant nurses were hired to do jobs nurses didn't want to do, and what could nurses hate more than cleaning up after patients who had shit on themselves? She capped her diatribe with her own theory that such work was so foul they couldn't find Americans to do it for any amount of money and so had to import foreigners.³⁴²

“Forever linked in her mind to troubling memories of the conflicts and deprivations their departure had occasioned,” America, loomed large in the young girl's imagination.³⁴³ It was also intimately intertwined with her perception of her home country. Obsessed with the search for personal and national dignity lost amidst her family conflicts, she develops a different image of America than that of wealth and opportunity cherished by her grandmother's and her uncles generation. She tries in vain to search for hints of why her uncles had left “their fatherland” and what Korea had meant to them. But in their letters, they only complained of missing the taste of kimchi. Her attempt to treat her grandmother to a movie prior to her departure proved more difficult due to the lack of non-Korean films available. She even doctors her grandmother's letters to her uncles, leaving out her pleas for money because she felt it undignified for “the Republic of Korea...[to] beg for aid from Brazil or Guam.”³⁴⁴

Witnessing the “excessive” behavior on the part of both the departing and sending members of her family, the girl was particularly struck by the evacuation of personal and national dignity on both sides of her warring family. For her grandmother and her uncles, their departures had become a ground, however external and illusory, by which to demand self-respect from their family. However, for the young girl, the specter of America that haunted these emigrations appeared instead to rob her family members not only their personal self-respect but also any sense of national esteem. Perhaps not fully understanding the disappointments entailed

³⁴² Ibid., p. 76.

³⁴³ Ibid., p. 68.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 69.

in their behavior, whether in the form of her uncles' desperation to leave and their 'condescending pity' toward their home country, or her parents' meanness and lack of generosity, these departures shaped the young girl's ruminations about national belonging and her perception of the world. By extension, America for the young girl was becoming the site of an unequal and divisive world in her nationalizing imagination.

In the same way that the new found nationalism of the grandmother was produced through the dislocating process of emigration, the young granddaughter's imaginary of America and her own nationalism was shaped by the disruptive emigrations of her family members. For both parties, their nationalism did not follow the model of identifying with the international unity promoted by the official ideology. For the grandmother, it was a nationalism borne of the disenfranchisement and marginalization from the national development narrative. It was a different sort of "long-distance nationalism," arising from her actually experienced modernization as a dislocated/displaced member of the national body. For the young girl, it was an attempt to preserve a sense of personal and national dignity. In both cases, key forms of cultural alienation produced at the intimate level of the family and reinforced by a larger Imperial presence and ideology mark the origins of a different kind of 'love' of country or sense of national belonging.

Thematizing family division as a component of the popular postwar global imaginary, the intimate portrait of international emigrations highlights the rupturing process entailed in all four of the airports narratives. The promise of social mobility via emigration came at the cost of broken families for many South Koreans, disrupting the family unit, considered a sacred old and new collectivity of South Korean modernization next to the state. In *Farewell*, the airport is part of the new technology of social mobility that extended the physical, emotional and social dislocation of individuals and ruptured families ensuing from colonial modernization and then national division unto an international arena in the postwar period. Interwoven into the American Dream, emigration became a cosmopolitan departure or escape—from both national poverty and personal misery, which seems inextricable in these characters' lives. But the decision to leave one's homeland, culture, and language by people who rarely had the experience of leaving their hometown, except perhaps during the war, to depart for this foreign paradise, it was also aided by an extra form of persuasion. For the immigrating grandmother in *Farewell*, US was above all the most 'modern' and revered destination as well as escape route from her miserable situation in the unwelcome home of her eldest son and daughter in law, as it was for her (father-less) two sons and daughter who had also dreamt of leaving and emigrated before her. In this narrative of emigration, the airport is the site of a disruptive and dislocating phenomenon, as well as the site of the production of different kinds of national feeling and international perceptions—arising from the experience of the state's patriarchal nationalist modernization—for those who leave as well as those left behind.

Conclusion

These representations of the airport visualize the near ritualized airport farewells experienced by many South Koreans as an integral component of national development. Moreover, they point to the global movements of people within an uneven world system as a differentiated forms of mobility and which for many exceeds the concept of choice as simply equated with freedom. While the emigration narratives I have explored present a diverse array of

personal, familial, and national histories, they share a number of themes, which destabilize the state ideology of modernization that was affixed to Kimpo airport in official representations explored in the previous chapter. While the official representations of Kimpo were overwhelmed by a masculinist, patriarchal nationalism, the popular cultural representations explored in this chapter are all either plagued with ineffective or absent patriarchs. The crisis of male subjectivity is depicted through the figure of the anachronistic father in *Mr. Pak*, the poor husband in *Keep Silent When Leaving*, and the duplicitous adulterer in *Bitter But Once Again*. In *Farewell at the Airport*, the hypocrisy of patriarchy is portrayed in the absent husband of the emigrating grandmother who was killed in the Korean War as well as her fatherless sons. In addition, as seen in a number of other Golden Age Melodramas such as *Stray Bullet* and *Madame Freedom*, all of these narratives display a strong ambivalence toward America. On the one hand, American commodities, leisure activities, as well as English words form ready signs of wealth, status, and mobility in *Mr. Pak*. In *Farewell at the Airport*, fantasies of America as a place of boundless wealth and opportunity take on a near religious quality in the imagination of the grandmother and her sons. However, neither of these stories presents these symbols and fantasies as unequivocally desirable. Instead, the largely Western coded modernity in *Mr. Pak* is depicted as the very forces that threaten Pak's patriarchal authority, as well as personal and cultural dignity. Likewise, in *Farewell*, once the old woman's sons' emigrations are arranged, they are filled with conceit and exploit every opportunity to look down upon the rest of the family. In response, the family responds with excessive scorn. In addition, for the young girl, her view of America, haunted by caustic family brawls that accompanied every emigration in her family, and which forced her to witness intense desperation, disappointments and the loss of dignity, becomes a springboard for yet new nationalist imaginings.

Lastly, in addition to signifying an ambivalent and contradictory modernity on the level of concepts, the cultural imaginary of modern Kimpo airport reveals Kimpo as an important *affective* sign, revealing a crucial *emotional* mode of the experience and culture of South Korean modernization. These post-war South Korean films, literature, and personal memories of Kimpo are saturated with a deep sense of sorrow, longing, encapsulated by the tearful farewells that characterize the airport in the collective national psyche. The *farewell* at Kimpo airport may be a charged symbol in the South Korean cultural unconscious of the grief and longing accompanying the innumerable separations of South Korean families and friends, much like the post-national division, which expanded the modern historical production of the Korean diaspora since the mid to late 19th century to the present resulting in the spread over 10% of the Korean population across six continents by 1980. This melancholia points to a crucial component of South Korean modernization and development in which individual social mobility and national development were triangulated with multiple and variegated experiences of overseas emigration. As Jonathan Flatley has argued, an important lacuna in modernity studies is how it ignores how “the social forces of modernity work *through* emotions, the ways we become the subjects that we are by the structuring of our affective attachments.”³⁴⁵ I would argue that South Koreans' affective relation to the airport is one important location of the modern subjectivity of South Korean postcolonial nationhood —for South Koreans who did not emigrate as much as those who did as it touched the majority of nation through the departures of their family and friends as well as represented through popular postwar film and literature as a commanding trope of modernity—albeit one that was hijacked by dominant state ideologies of nationalism.

³⁴⁵ Jonathan Flatley, *Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 4.

Chapter Seven

The Third International Kimpo Terminal (1980-1988) and the Seoul Olympics: Seoul to the World and the World to Seoul

There is *one* thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris...But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language game of measuring with a metre rule...It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made.
--Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*³⁴⁶

This chapter turns to the last Kimpo international terminal (1980-1988), built and designed in a large part to accommodate and showcase the ‘economic miracle’ of South Korea on the international stage of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, as an important transition between Cold War internationalist Kimpo and ‘globalized’ Incheon airport. Initiated in 1980 immediately upon the opening of the new kiwa international terminal and at the height of national capitalism and intense political upheaval, the planning and completion of this second (improved) kiwa terminal in 1988, which was also the third and last terminal to be built at Kimpo, marked the beginning of yet a new role for the airport as well as the cultural nationalism that developed alongside the previous 1980 kiwa terminal in the shift towards both political and economic liberalization in a new post-cold war international landscape³⁴⁷ and the development of Korean consumption and the consumption of Korea and Korean products across an expanded globe. From the first 1960 International Style Kimpo airport terminal until its most recent incarnation at Incheon in 2001, the national gateway evolved in lockstep with the dizzying tumult of social, economic and political changes that transformed the nation from a predominantly agricultural nation devastated by a fratricidal war into one of the celebrated NIC tiger/dragon economies.³⁴⁸ As the developmental state sought to use the Olympic games to showcase its economic ‘arrival’, the developmental Olympic project also reveals new departures and changing strategies of the state—namely *cultural developmentalism* as a counterpart and successor to economic developmentalism—adjusting to the changing geopolitical climate. For this new strategy and project of cultural developmentalism which signals both the state’s continuing use of culture as an ideological supplement to economic development but also the early development of the

³⁴⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, (Blackwell, 2001), p. 21.

³⁴⁷ The Cold War however continues to this day between the two Koreas.

³⁴⁸ The progression from postwar poverty to the South Korean economic ‘miracle’ as a national/global success story is one genealogy of South Korean development, the official one. As my previous chapters have attempted to show, alongside the growing field of revisionist Korean studies scholarship, aside from South Korea’s rising GNP rates, there were numerous not so celebratory transformations to the social fabric along with this rise. For example, South Korea reported one of the highest suicide rates for the elderly population among OECD countries soon after it joined the club in the 1990s, which is even more alarming because of South Korea’s Confucian heritage which holds filial piety as one of its main tenets. As of 2010, South Korea has graduated to ‘boasting’ the highest suicide rate *period*, of all OECD countries.

Korea's culture industry, the dialectic of standardization and particularization that characterized the developmental state's engagement with and response to uneven global accumulation was amended with the dialectic of liberalization and nationalism. This period also signaled the democratic departure of a country after decades of military authoritarian rule.

The first part of this chapter examines the co-development of the Seoul Olympic games and the third Kimpo international terminal from 1980-1988 alongside major transformations in civil aviation and air travel including the emergence of a second South Korean air carrier and the initiation of travel liberalization for South Koreans. Building upon my discussion of the standardizations and particularizations characteristic of the evolution of national capitalism in Chapter Five, this section looks at new transformations to the continuing production of contradictions of the postcolonial airport as a vehicle of emancipation and repression through the airport-Seoul Olympic games affinity. The second part of this chapter focuses on the cultural nationalist representation shared by the 1988 Kimpo terminal and the Seoul Olympic Games as both the continuing process of the state's *ideological* 'invention' of national cultural tradition as well as the product of the nexus of cultural imperialism, uneven modern industrialization and national competition. This chapter approaches both the *kiwa* terminal and the Seoul Olympic Games as analogous manifestations of the *relational and standardized yet heterogeneously and hierarchically produced space-time* of Korean modernity as a complement to the differentiated space-times of uneven global modernity. If the modern postcolonial airport and the Seoul Olympic Games provide a grammar for the bound seriality of the *relational and standardized yet heterogeneous and hierarchical spaces and times of world space*, then the structural logic and cultural historical narrative of the Olympic games supply an analogue of the restricted spatial economy of the bounded synchronous-whole of the modern world system or the bounded universality of the differentiated/discrepant yet synchronic geographical space-time of the uneven modern world system that was constitutive of the process of imagining the nation within uneven postcolonial modernization.

Kimpo (1980-1988) and the Seoul Olympics

Park Chung Hee never lived to see the completion of the 1980 *kiwa* terminal. Between 1979 and 1981, South Korea was swept into a political maelstrom including the darkest days of South Korean political history. Park was assassinated by his KCIA chief on October 26, 1979, replaced by Choi Gyu Hwa as acting president. By April 1980, another high-ranking military general, Chun Doo Hwan, had consolidated power by a staged military coup. Huge student and popular demonstrations erupted all over the country in response. In May, Chun dispatched troops to forcibly put down a popular uprising in Gwangju, a city in the politically and economically disenfranchised Cheolla province where students and the local community had barricaded the city into a commune. Anywhere from 300-2000 people were killed, according to varying official and popular accounts.³⁴⁹ With the deadly suppression of this pro-democracy movement also known as the Gwangju massacre, all hopes for democracy in the brief civilian interim were terminated, securing an additional seven years of authoritarian rule under another military dictatorship. When the new international terminal opened on August 1, 1980, the

³⁴⁹ See for example, Lee Jae-eui, *Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age*, translated by Kap Su Seol and Nick Mamatas, (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, University of California Press, 1999).

transfer of power into Chun's hands was nearly complete. Three weeks after presiding at the opening ceremony, Choi Gyu Hwa formally resigned and Chun was elected to replace him by his junta.

One of the first things Chun did in office was to take up Park's plan to bid for the 1988 Olympic games. In 1979, a few months prior to Park Chung Hee's assassination, Park had approved the proposal by Park Jong-kyue, then president of the Korean Olympic Committee, to host the Olympics in Seoul based on the following reasons: "First, a turning point had been reached in Korea because of high economic growth, and the Japanese experience with the Olympics could be a model for Korea. Second, South Korea might be able to seize a very practical opportunity through the games to terminate the state of confrontation with North Korea. And third, staging the Olympics in Seoul would provide an opportunity for Korea to join the ranks of the advanced nations."³⁵⁰ The 'turning point' had to do with new externally imposed limits on South Korea's export-oriented economic development policy arising from changes in the structure of international capitalism. If the rising protectionism and commodity prices under the Nixon doctrine alongside the détente presented an impetus for Park to pursue a path towards economic and military self-sufficiency at the beginning of the decade, then, by 1979, the high rates of economic growth stemming from successes of the heavy and chemical industries led to increasing pressure from U.S. and Western European countries to liberalize its markets. Amidst concerns about the high cost of hosting the games, "arguments were made from the start that ongoing development projects could be adapted to the requirements of hosting the Olympics, thereby avoiding large outlays on infrastructure for the Games per se that could not be used later."³⁵¹ Thus the Olympics were seized upon by the bureaucratic-authoritarian government not only to showcase the "arrival" of Korea, Inc. as a global economic force on the international stage and further promote its new national conglomerates and their nascent electronics and automotive industries, but also contribute to new directions and processes of development vis-à-vis South Korea's economic maturity and a changing international climate. Chun's promotion of the bid in December 1980 shared these interests and sought to "use the Seoul Olympics to pursue diplomatic, security, social and economic development."³⁵²

Meanwhile, in keeping with the dictate that modernity be always up to date and embodying the very pathways of global capital circulation, the next expansion of Kimpo commenced immediately upon the completion of the 1980 terminal. However, amidst the political turmoil that enshrouded this period, it commenced under the new, even more repressive dictatorship, and in close proximity to the new regime's bid to host the 1988 Summer Olympic games. With one eye to the rapidly growing aviation market in South Korea and the broader Asia-pacific region and South Korea's building boom in the Middle East from the mid-seventies, and another to the Olympic project, the new Chun government ordered the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) to conduct feasibility studies of both the expansion of Kimpo airport and the construction of a new airport in 1980.³⁵³ Based on these reports, the government

³⁵⁰ James F. Larson and Heung-Soo Park, *Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics*, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), p. 151. Larson and Park also indicate that memories of the state having to forfeit hosting the 1976 Asian Games because "it could not afford the estimated \$34 million required for facilities" also played a role in the decision (151).

³⁵¹ Larson and Park, p. 151.

³⁵² Jong-gie Kim et al., *Impact of the Seoul Olympic Games on National Development* (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1989), p. 70. Hereafter referred to as KDI.

³⁵³ *Hankuk Konghang Kongsu 25 Nyŏn-sa 1980-2005* (Korean Airports Corporation 25-Year History) (Seoul: Korea Airports Corporation, 2005), pp. 216. Hereafter referred to as KAC 25-Year History.

opted for the expansion of Kimpo, which could be completed by 1988 for the Olympic games, as opposed to the construction of a new airport that would not be ready until 1991.³⁵⁴ In July 1981, work began on a basic master plan for the expansion of Kimpo airport, which included the construction of a parallel runway and a second international terminal building, doubling its capacity passenger and cargo capacity.³⁵⁵ When the Olympic bid was secured in September 1981, the expansion of Kimpo airport, an elemental component of social infrastructure necessary for the Olympic games and the tourism industry, became incorporated into the Olympic program as one of its largest indirect-investment infrastructure projects.³⁵⁶ The airport expansion spanning from 1980-1988 totaled 226 billion Korean won amounting to 22% of total Olympic indirect-investment projects and close to 10% of the total Olympic budget.³⁵⁷

As Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott's study of the Olympic program reveals, its extended duration and character closely resembles that of large state infrastructure development programs such as the airport: "It could be said that the Games have become a genuine public policy aiming to develop the city and its region, or even the country as a whole, for a period of around 10 years (if the candidature phase is included)."³⁵⁸ In the case of the 1964 Tokyo games, the Japanese government's heavy investments in infrastructural development accounted for 97% of its Olympic-related projects.³⁵⁹ South Korea's indirect-investments in social and physical infrastructure such as subway, highway and airport expansions also amounted to a substantial 53% of the total Olympic-related expenses.³⁶⁰ Situated between the state's Fourth Five Year economic plan and the Olympic program, the strategic incorporation of the expansion of Kimpo airport spanning 1980-1988 in the joint state-international Olympic Committee ten-year urban, social and cultural development program in preparation for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games could be seen as following a familiar pattern of state-foreign cooperation as evinced from the initial development/modernization of Kimpo airport, which was a joint state-U.S. military enterprise in the late 50s. However, it also signals significant differences. At the same time that Kimpo frees itself from its formative American tutelage with the first non-American financed and designed terminal, it becomes aligned with a different international partner. However the difference that characterizes the international relationship between the South Korean state and the Olympics and that of the client-patron relationship with the US is pivotal to the new 'globalism' of South Korea, which emanates from this turning point.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Kim et al., *KDI*, p. 41.

³⁵⁶ Indirect-investment projects were strategically distinguished from the direct investment projects in that many of these were "government invested, already slated from construction in accordance with the Five-year Economic and Social Development Plan which had been drafted before the Olympic Games were awarded to Seoul." Kim et al., *KDI*, 46. The authors are most likely referring the Fourth Five Year Plan (1977-1981). This is true for the airport expansion project, which needed to be expanded to handle the traffic forecasts for the 1990s.

³⁵⁷ *Korean Airport Authority: 25 Year History (1980-2005)*, p. 216; Kim et. al, *Impact of the Seoul Olympic Games on National Development*, pp. 42-43.

³⁵⁸ Jean-Loup Chappelet and Brenda Kubler-Mabbott, *The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The Governance of World Sport*, (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 91

³⁵⁹ Kim et al., *KDI*, pp. 46-47.

³⁶⁰ Out of a total of 2,382.6 billion won (or 2.38 trillion won) spent on Olympic projects, indirect-investment projects such as social infrastructure investments accounted for 12,742 billion won (or 1.27 trillion won) or 53% of the total expenses. The Japanese government spent 1/14th of its GDP on Olympic related projects. (Kim et al., *KDI*, pp. 46-47.) Of the total Olympic budget, roughly 50% was government financed, 25% raised by the Seoul Olympics Organization Committee (SLOOC), and 25% raised from private investments.

Olympic Image Making and post-Cold War Globalism

The modern Olympic Games are not only the largest international multi-sport event, but also the largest universal exhibition of any kind in the 20th century. This ambulatory quadrennial multi-sport event carries great political, economic, and cultural weight for the selected host city and operates at a gigantic scale. The 24th Olympiad in Seoul anticipated the potential participation of athletes from 161 National Olympic Committees (NOCs), representing more nation-states than the members of the United Nations General Assembly at the time, as well its sizable popular international following constituting both physical and virtual spectators worldwide.³⁶¹ When the International Olympic Committee (IOC), voting in Baden-Baden, another country divided by cold war internationalism, awarded the 1988 Olympics to Seoul in September 1981, South Korea became the second developing country and the second Asian country to ever host the Olympic games. This was no small task for a developing aviation industry and a recently developed country like South Korea. As the second Asian country next to Japan (1964) and the second developing country after Mexico (1968) to ever host the Olympic games, the stakes were greater than for more regular Western host cities. Like the Japanese and Mexican miracles before it, the so-called ‘South Korean economic miracle,’ which materially enabled the country to host the financially costly and logistically complex games in the first place, was on the line. And like the Tokyo and the Mexican Olympics before it, the Seoul Olympics was lauded and appraised as the nation’s “coming out party” or its “arrival as a global economic power.”³⁶² The Olympics marked a significant turning point for South Korean national capitalism, both in terms of arrivals and departures. The Olympics were both a product of South Korean economic development as well as a means of its continuation in a changing geopolitical and world economic context.³⁶³

The Olympic games were a strategic event and site for the nation’s *arrival* as a new global economic power because it has long operated as a *stage of modernity* for Western industrialized nations and more recently since the postwar period as a *threshold of modernity* for developing/industrializing nations. Hosting the Olympic Games, heretofore monopolized by the Western industrialized centers, was widely viewed as South Korea’s “coming out” or “arrival” as it had been for Japan in 1964 and Mexico in 1968, because it was not only a cultural but largely economics-based symbolic induction into this “small minority” of industrialized or advanced economies. Considering the high cost of the games and extensive preparations, the reason why states bidding to host the games are few in number (there were only two bids for the 88 summer games—Seoul and Nagano) and the regular opposition from within the citizenry of the host country as evident in both the Mexican and Seoul cases stems from the same reasons. As South Korea’s former experience with having to forfeit the 1972 Asian Games due to its exorbitant cost

³⁶¹ Unlike the Cold War boycotts of the Moscow and Los Angeles Games, almost all Soviet bloc and Communist countries participated in the Seoul games with the exception of North Korea and Cuba. In the initial planning stages there were talks of North and South Korea co-hosting the games.

³⁶² Jarol B. Manheim, “Rites of Passage: the 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy,” *The Western Political Quarterly*, 43, no. 2 (June 1990), p. 281.

³⁶³ Various scholars have associated the Olympics with the government’s “desire to call attention to, and, not incidentally, to associate the new [Chun] government with, the Korean economic miracle” referring to the Olympics as a “rite of passage” or “coming out party.” Jarol B. Manheim, p. 281. While this was true, as Larson and Park show, the Olympics were also from its inception “intertwined in the minds of key government officials with the potential impact of the Games on Korea’s national development.” (150). This was especially true for the government’s changing direction toward international travel and tourism in relation to the development of various culture industries.

vis-à-vis more pressing development projects show, a certain level of ‘development’ is a basic material requirement to host these large-scale multi-sport games which have been steadily increasing in size since their inception. Thus hosting the Olympic games has been referred to as a “coming out” party or an “arrival” for all three non-Western cases because it operated as a popular form consecration into the league of developed or industrialized nations.

For South Korea the Olympic hosting was both an expression and agent of the *changing* nature of the South Korean developmental state, which arose in response to its changing position in the global economy and thus changes in the world system itself. Hosting the Olympics was likewise importantly a cultural strategy for economic expansion. The nation’s rapid economic growth throughout the 1970s and the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union left South Korea with increasing pressure to liberalize, and thus dismantle some of the key mechanisms of the developmental state. As national capitalism characteristic of the 1960s and 70s had reached an impasse requiring a more open liberalized engagement with world capitalism, new strategies for development were called upon to maneuver this uneven terrain of global capitalism.³⁶⁴ This potential loss of protections pushed South Korea to diversify its markets moving beyond the dynamic of its postwar international framework centered on client-patron dependency on the United States. The thawing of the Cold War, which was one reason for the pressure to liberalize, since South Korea’s importance as a security state had waned (along with the favoritism from wealthy Cold War countries that it had enjoyed), also provided the state with an inroad to new economic partnerships. South Korea needed to promote its nascent industries within existing markets but also open up new ones. One of the top priorities of the hosting the games was to develop economic and diplomatic partnerships with former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe as well as with developing nations—two geopolitical entities that have thus far been completely outside of South Korea’s orbit much like its North Korean half.³⁶⁵ The bounded internationalism of the postwar period had walled off these areas from South Korea, literally depicted in the (lack and prohibition from the) circulation paths of Kimpo airport—they were, like North Korea, places non-grata. The state had hoped that cultural exchanges with these nations, thus far unimaginable to South Koreans, through sporting competitions but more emphatically through the arts and cultural programming—or the cultural Olympiad would open doors to future economic partnerships. Exactly such partnerships were part of the largest gains or successes to result from the Olympic games. In addition there were also more narrow political interests in holding the games. The military dictatorship which gained power through a military coup and the massacre of pro-democracy protestors sought to attain domestic legitimacy through both international recognition of the successful hosting of the games and through the economic benefits of the above to national development.

Thus the Olympics were not only an opportunity to showcase its economic growth, it also became an agent by which the nation could forge a new international framework with which to expand its markets. South Korea needed to rework its image of nationhood—and the Olympic games were a grand, if risky stage, for both elevating and circulating the national image across a world audience. As Gold and Gold have shown the hosting of the Olympic games was a gold

³⁶⁴ As Bruce Cumings has argued, with South Korea’s strategic position as a security state of the cold war lessening in importance vis-à-vis the U.S.-Soviet Union détente, South Korea’s economic partners were less willing to put up with many of the protectionist mechanisms that characterized South Korea’s mercantilist form of capitalism. Bruce Cumings, “The Korean Crisis and the End of ‘Late’ Development,” *New Left Review* 231 (1998), pp. 43-72.

³⁶⁵ Jong-gie Kim et al., *KDI*, pp. 7-15.

medal in place promotion.³⁶⁶ Both structurally and historically, the ambulatory structure of the modern Olympics, taking place in select host city/nations has lent itself to showcasing national prestige via development through consciously constructed narratives of national identity. The Olympics can be seen as a crucial socio-cultural technology, which expresses economic relations (and hierarchies) in cultural terms. While the material conditions for its hosting are largely an economic matter—grounded on huge investments in modern industrial infrastructure—the recognition of the host city is largely encased in a discourse of cultural value. We might say that there is an inherent fetishism of the character of the Olympic festival, which presents material economic relations of nations in the world system as the cultural relations between nations.

Poised at the turning point from postwar cold war internationalism to globalization, the Olympic games also provided a sensational stage to reinvent the image of the nation at this threshold to globalization—a new international modernity for the nation.³⁶⁷ The Olympics provided the opportunity to display its economic power through a new national cultural identity that had been mobilized throughout the Park era but had been geared toward the Korean populace as developmental state ideology rather than the outside world. To the outside world, South Korea had an image problem in relation to both the familiar West and the unexplored global East and South. South Korea had to undo its Cold War image in the face of the Soviet Bloc and left leaning third world countries as well as the West in its appearance as a capitalist puppet state or as a poor war torn nation such as depicted in the American TV series *M.A.S.H.*, or as part of a backwards Asia in general. Or worse, its lack of identity or invisibility; South Koreans knew American culture intimately but most Americans did not know anything about South Korea. The articulation of national identity in the case of Asian countries was also filtered through the context of Cold war Orientalism.³⁶⁸ But this was not just an issue for South Korea; the same politics or burden of representation can be seen in the case of Mexico and Japan, the two other non-Western nations to ever host the games in its 100-year history. For non-Western hosts, there was a burden of representation to overcome the lingering Orientalist otherings of difference and hierarchical cultural evaluations. And like the South Korean case, both the Mexican and Tokyo Olympics featured extensive cultural programs, which showcased their difference through representations of indigenous or traditional culture that was non-Western in origin. Thus like these other countries, for Korea, the Olympics were as much an engagement and negotiation with Western cultural universalism or the notion of Western civilization spanning from classical Greece to the advanced industrial present, as per the Eurocentric Olympic historical-symbolic narrative—as much as they were a threshold to industrial modernity via its consecration as a world historical nation to properly enter modern time.

The Olympics thus came at a significant turning point in the juncture of national and world capitalism introducing important shifts in the dialectic of standardizations and particularization. The nationalist or particularistic aspect of the dialectic of national development within global capitalism as discussed in Chapter Five relied on the ability to harness various international and domestic forces and institutions toward the development of national industries or the state's controlled engagement with such forces to this end. Many of the state protections

³⁶⁶ John R. Gold and Margaret M. Gold, *Cities of Culture: Staging International Festivals and the Urban Agenda, 1851-2000*, (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2005).

³⁶⁷ As Jarol Manheim argues, the Olympics became an opportunity for the largest public relations project in international relations, both economically and politically.

³⁶⁸ See Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

like commodity import quotas, capital and investment ceilings in national markets, etc. were used to offset the uneven competition between large established western European, American and Japanese firms and nascent national industries. With the increased pressure to liberalize economically from abroad and politically liberalize from within, the existing forms of economic developmentalism became difficult to sustain in the changing international and domestic contexts and new measures and directions for development appear to have been utilized by the state. As such the cultural arena became a new locus of developmental activity. What I call ‘cultural developmentalism,’ is evident in the decision to host the Olympic games as well as the various nationalist activities undertaken to carry out the project. It is also amply illustrated in the development of the 1988 Kimpo terminal constructed for the Olympic Games. As the method of nationalist capitalism evident in this ‘cultural developmentalism’ was consistent with the tactics of the developmental state in evidence since the 1960s, it can be seen as a close counterpart to economic developmentalism. However, the confident display of Korean traditional culture as well as its commodification illustrated in the restructuring of the craftworks industry, the kiwa roof adorning the nation’s foremost international gateway—on the international stage was a new development shaped at this new juncture of the South Korean “turning point” from a segmented and bounded cold war internationalist globalism to a post-cold war liberalized globalization.

Political Liberalization

The Chun regime’s decision to pick up Park’s plans to host the Olympics was also “closely related to domestic political conflicts over such things as democratization, unity and welfare,” not least among which was Chun’s “legitimacy crisis...rooted in the fact that the Fifth Republic maintained power through a process which did not meet the norms of democracy,” not to mention his armed repression of the Gwangju pro-democracy uprising.³⁶⁹ This was not unlike Park’s fervor for national economic development throughout his decades rule—as rising GNP rates and growing South Korean industries supplied legitimacy to his extended politically illegitimate presidency first attained through a military coup and sustained through authoritarian policies. Seoul sought to emulate the successful economic example of the Japanese 1964 Tokyo Olympics, which helped catapult nascent Japanese electronics and auto industries in the global market and symbolically reintegrate the former Axis power into the postwar US-led international community. However, it was also haunted by the less appealing political precedent of the 1968 Mexico City Games.³⁷⁰ The “first ‘developing nation to host an Olympics,” the Mexican government, like that of Seoul, planned the Games as an opportunity to showcase the “Mexican miracle.”³⁷¹ However, the Mexican Olympics “are generally remembered either for the tragic

³⁶⁹ Kim et al., *KDI*, p. 70.

³⁷⁰ Manheim, pp. 287-292.

³⁷¹ Eric Zolov, “Showcasing the ‘Land of Tomorrow’: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics,” *The Americas* 61, no. 2 (October 2004), p. 160. We could say that the 1964 Tokyo Games also marked a certain level of development via Japan’s integration in the postwar international system notwithstanding its former position as an imperial power, as it did for Mexico in 1968 and Seoul in 1988. When it was defeated in the Second World War and occupied by the United States, it entered a phase of institutional restructuring grounded upon an existing industrial base. Relative to industrialized Europe and America, Japan was one of the first of the late developers, whose economy was successfully integrated with capitalist world markets in the postwar period under American foreign policy. Mexico, gaining independence in the late 19th century from Spain developed in a different Euro-American imperial framework, but within the same world system. The three trajectories converged in the postwar period, albeit with different internal historical socio-economic structures and relationships under American political and economic hegemony.

massacre of unarmed students on the eve of the Opening Ceremony or alternatively, for the image of silent protest by U.S. black athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos at their awards ceremony five days into the Games.”³⁷² The student-led protest movement against then Mexican president Diaz Ordaz and “the authoritarian nature of Mexican society” dominated by a single political party, which intensified in the months prior to the opening of the Games is resonant with the mass protests and political instability that threatened the Seoul Games.³⁷³ As Eric Zolov has argued, the Mexican government’s proactive efforts to incorporate students and intellectuals into the planning process through the Cultural Olympiad “had helped ameliorate criticism of government spending” and “there was no explicit reference to the Olympics in the six-point platform of the student-led *Comite Nacional de Huelga (CNH)*.”³⁷⁴ The appointment of Pedro Ramirez Vazquez to the Olympic Organizing Committee and his efforts to finance the “Olympics on the cheap” maximizing the use of existing infrastructures and avoiding onerous expenditures “that cannot be fully justified in terms of its social utility in the life and development of [the] country” departed from the extravagant spending and infrastructural investments of the Japanese example of 1964 and his emphasis on the Cultural Olympiad helped incorporate dissident students and politicians into the Olympic programming.³⁷⁵ Nonetheless, “the issue of financial costs and government spending priorities continued to resonate as a political issue for the Left” and fueled the eruption of a massive student movement just before the Olympic opening.³⁷⁶ When the state ordered the army to fire upon 10,000 unarmed protesters assembled in Tlateloco plaza on October 2, ten days before the opening in order “to avoid any further loss of prestige,” the protests ended in bloodshed.³⁷⁷ Anywhere from 32 to 350 protesters were killed according to varying official and popular accounts, in addition to thousands wounded and scores of opposition politicians and students arrested to never reappear.³⁷⁸

Likewise, ahead of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the growing anti-government movement that persistently streaked the streets of Seoul with tear gas throughout Chun’s rule reached a peak in the spring of 1987, when tens of thousands of South Koreans joined university students in mass demonstrations in Seoul and across the country to demand direct presidential elections and other democratic reforms. The June 1987 People’s uprising followed by intense labor unrest in the following months was closely related to the domestic political situation reaching back to Chun’s illegitimate seizure of power in 1980 and his armed suppression of the Gwangju uprising that arose in response. Not unlike the Mexican government’s massacre of Tlateloco protesters, Chun’s military junta unleashed the South Korean army upon tens of thousands of pro-democracy protesters in Gwangju during the two-week rebellion in May 1980. Chun’s military coup d’état and his violent suppression of the Gwangju uprising were at the center of his legitimacy crisis throughout his rule and had direct bearing on the 1987 events. These events were also pivotal to the genealogy of the popular resistance movement of a broad coalition of students, intellectuals, workers, opposition politicians and clergy assembled under the *minjung* (people’s) anti-government nationalist movement that emerged in the mid to late 70s. They also

³⁷² Zolov, pp. 159-60.

³⁷³ Zolov, p. 183.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 167. The Mexican government’s “\$167 million investment amounted to a fraction of that expended by Japan on the 1964 Games” (167).

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 183.

³⁷⁷ Larry Rhoter, “20 Years After a Massacre, Mexico Still Seeks Healing for its Wounds,” *New York Times*, October 2, 1988

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

marked a significant turning point in popular opinion, or a culmination of a long amassing antagonism, toward the nation's long-time Cold War ally and patron state, the United States, which was implicated in the Gwangju massacre.³⁷⁹ When Chun came into office he vowed he would step down after eight years. University students and opposition politicians agitated for direct presidential elections, which were suspended since 1972 under the Park Chung Hee's Yushin constitution, but Chun's April announcement to suspend talks about constitutional reform until after the Olympics and the widely publicized government torture and murder of the Seoul National University student Chong Chul Park ignited mass protests with broad base support from clergy, labor and the urban middle class.³⁸⁰

The historic June 29 declaration by military general Roh Tae Woo, former Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee president and handpicked successor to Chun's presidency, announcing the acceptance of the opposition's demands including direct presidential elections defused the volatile situation. It is generally agreed upon that the forthcoming Olympics as well as the intense international scrutiny over the domestic conflict due to the impending Olympic games were a significant factor to these government concessions.³⁸¹ To add to the pressure, the president of the IOC, Samaranch, made several trips Seoul during the upheaval and South Korea received offers from Berlin, Los Angeles and New York to take over the games if South Korea found itself unable to do so due to civil unrest.³⁸² That December, the first direct presidential elections in fifteen years were held with Roh Tae Woo from the ruling military Democratic Justice Party elected president due to the two opposition leaders Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung having split the opposition votes. Although Roh was slated to take office under the auspices of Chun, the Olympics functioned as a catalyst for the transition to democratization and a path towards political change in South Korea, even if as the case may be it resulted in, "the right to choose our own dictator."³⁸³ While June 1987 could have gone the Tlateloco route, doubly haunted by Gwangju and Tlateloco, the democratic departure of South Korea became a prime legacy of the 1988 Olympics.

The Olympic Games and Cultural Developmentalism: Standardizations and Particularizations and the Cultural Turn

The Olympics marked a significant turning point for South Korean national capitalism, both in terms of arrivals and departures, but it was especially a watershed for the development of Kimpo airport and South Korea's international travel and tourism industry as well as various

³⁷⁹ In addition to the perceived complicity in the Gwangju massacre, the continued support for the Chun regime, exemplified by president Reagan's invitation to Chun as the first head of state to visit the White House in February 1981, contributed to the growing sense of anti-Americanism in South Korea. See Jinwung Kim, "Recent Anti-Americanism in Korea: the Causes," *Asian Survey* vol. 29, no. 8 (August 1989), pp. 749-763.

³⁸⁰ Su-Hoon Lee, "Transitional Politics of Korea 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society," *Pacific Affairs* vol. 33, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), p. 355.

³⁸¹ As Larson and Park write, Roh commented thus on the Seoul Olympics: "At a time when the Olympics are around the corner, all of us should be responsible for preventing the national disgrace of being mocked and derided by the international community because of a division in the national consensus" (161). See also, David R. Black and Shona Bezanson, "The Olympic Games, Human Rights and Democratization: Lesson from Seoul and Implications for Beijing," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 25, no.7 (2004), pp. 1245-1261.

³⁸² Larson and Park, p. 160.

³⁸³ Unnamed source quoted in Michael Breen, "Democratic Outcry: Demise of Military Rule in the 1980s," *Korea Times* (Century of Turbulence series), July 11, 2010, p. 4. Accessed online September 5, 2011.

other culture industries.³⁸⁴ Much like the objectives behind airport development, the aim of the extensive state managed development project for the Olympic games was likewise “to develop infrastructures and external image, i.e. the city and region’s competitiveness with others.”³⁸⁵ Reminiscent of the modernization of Kimpo terminal since the early 1960s but at a scale more resembling Park Chung Hee’s ‘New Village Movement’ (*saemaul undong*),³⁸⁶ mobilized as a concrete manifestation of the authoritarian Yushin order in the early 1970s, the government-initiated projects and campaigns in preparation for the Olympics throughout the 1980s permeated all aspects of South Korean life. In the same way that Kimpo airport became a premier site for the legal, physical, social and cultural standardizations befitting “international” norms for entry into the modern world system in the postwar period, the Olympics did so on a country-wide scale, and in the comprehensive top-down fashion of the ‘New Village Movement.’ In terms of physical-social standardizations, strategic parts of Seoul became earmarked for ‘international’ facelifts via major urban redevelopment projects. In addition to new construction of the Olympic stadium and other sports facilities, there were extensive improvements to the existing social infrastructure including the Han River Development Project, the construction of modern high rise apartment blocks often replacing cramped *hanoks*,³⁸⁷ beautification and roadside improvement projects along the railway and torch relay course, the creation of public gardens and reforestation, equipping public restrooms with flush toilets,³⁸⁸ as well as expansion of communication and transportation networks—television, radio, subway and the airport.³⁸⁹ Alternatively, the state-organized mass participation drive operated as a pedagogical and disciplinary mechanism to standardize South Korean behavior with ‘international’ social and cultural norms. The state mobilized “massive rallies, foreign language education programs, organization of cheering squads for each participating nation, publicity to encourage desirable behavior by sports spectators, and campaigns calling for kindness and cleanness.”³⁹⁰ As all

³⁸⁴ The preparations for the Olympics were a boon in particular to nascent tourism and craftworks industries in addition to the established heavy industries such as electronics and automobiles. Kim et al, *Impact of the Seoul Olympic Games on National Development*, pp. 38-67 (“Chapter 4: The Economic Impact of the Olympic Games”).

³⁸⁵ Chappelet and Kubler-Mabbott, p. 91.

³⁸⁶ The *Saemaul Undong* or the ‘New Village Movement’ was state-run do-it-yourself mass mobilization program devised by the Park regime in 1970 to primarily deal with the rural-urban divide in postwar South Korea but also to develop the political and social culture necessary for the government’s intense development goals. Most of the popular mobilizations targeted rural development programs but it was a pan-national program comprehensively affecting various school, business, domestic and political cultures in Seoul. In addition to instilling “a strong sense of common national interest and identity,” Moore states: “one important feature of Saemaul ideology and practice is a kind of populism which bears more than a passing resemblance to Maoism—an insistence that, under the influence of wise leadership and correct thinking, the people, treated as an undifferentiated mass, can overcome underdevelopment through collective striving.” Mick Moore, “Mobilization and Disillusion in Rural Korea: The Saemaul Movement in Retrospect,” *Pacific Affairs* vol. 57, no. 4 (Winter 1984-85), p. 580.

³⁸⁷ *Hanoks* are traditional Korean residences with a kiwa roof—which we saw depicted in the 1980 Kimpo terminal.

³⁸⁸ Recall that in the publicized mandate for the construction of the new Kimpo terminal in 1957, Rhee emphasized in particular the modernization of toilets in the terminal. See Chapter Four.

³⁸⁹ Larson and Park, pp. 152-156; Kim et al, *KDI*, pp. 44-67.

³⁹⁰ In quantified terms: “161 schools and business firms, 15 construction firms, 40 trading companies, 20 sponsors and suppliers, 50 middle schools, and 36 high schools—organized cheering squads and visited athletes from the 26 participating nations to offer encouragement. The press carried a total of 3,800 programs. In addition, the campaign involved the distribution and display of 8.9 million stickers, 3.6 million slogan placards, 8.4 million leaflets, 2.9 million pamphlets, 3,280 banners, 99,000 ribbons, 540,000 matches, 520 slides, and 200 videotapes” (Larson and Park, p. 155). The official banning of dog meat under the law banning “disturbing foods” was part of this standardization.

aspects of South Korean society and culture came under scrutiny, it became an opportunity for a wholesale evaluation and adjustment of South Korean culture befitting international norms.

But at the same time, the corresponding move towards particularization in the form of official nationalism also came to a head at this time. As the move to particularization took a cultural turn vis-à-vis Olympic preparations, the traditionalist national cultural identity promoted under the Park regime went beyond its primary ideological function towards new large-scale institutional developmental practices and subsidies in various areas of culture and arts. This is reflected in the Chun era cultural policies, which was no doubt planned with the Olympic bid in view. Both The New Plan for Cultural Development (1981), and The Cultural Plan in the Sixth Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986) presented an expansion of publicly subsidized culture to include “contemporary arts and the everyday life of the people” in addition to Park’s earlier focus on “cultural heritage and traditional arts.”³⁹¹ The new cultural policy objectives were focused on: “establishing cultural identity, promoting excellence in the arts, improving cultural welfare, promoting regional culture, and expanding cultural exchange with other countries.”³⁹² Thus the cultural life of the people became a concrete area for state developmentalist practices much like economic developmentalism and the instrumentalization of emigration and international mobility. The most extreme case could be seen in the *cultural developmentalism* of the newfound national sports industry, which hand-picked national athletes and trained them for medals in both the Asian Games, which South Korea hosted in 1986 (as a “dress rehearsal”), and the 1988 Olympics. In preparation for these mega-sporting events, the South Korean government established various national sports associations, introducing many Olympic sports to the country for the first time, as well as a government-level managerial body, the Ministry of Sports, in 1982.³⁹³ Under the new Ministry, “a nation-wide scouting drive was launched in which 6.2 million young people were put through athletic aptitude tests. Out of these tests, 4,300 athletes were identified as promising. They were given intensive training under the supervision of the Korea Sports Science Institute, beginning in elementary school. Some were sent overseas for training.”³⁹⁴ Moreover, a pension system for medalists had already been established under Park’s Chung Hee’s National Sports Promotion Foundation in 1972.³⁹⁵ Under this financial incentive system for athletic performance, different amounts of pension payments were attached to each medal standing.³⁹⁶ The fact that South Korea placed 5th in overall medal standings in the Seoul Games after the two superpowers and East and West Germany, though remarkable, was not a ‘miracle’ in any sense. As Woo has commented in reference to the South Korean development model, “a diachronic approach to political economy, denies, a fortiori, the possibility of a miracle.”³⁹⁷ More to the point, “16 of the 33 Olympic medals won by

³⁹¹ Hakwoon Yim, “Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea,” *The International Journal of Cultural Policy*, vo. 8, no. 1 (2002), p. 40.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Larson and Park, 156.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., 157.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Ibid. In the 1990s, this pension system was extended beyond financial incentives to granting exemptions to male athletes from the mandatory two-year military service. This addition highlights the relation between international competition and nationalism as athletic honors in international sporting events are materialized as acts of patriotism—the gold medalists are exempt from military service because they have already served the country.

³⁹⁷ Jung-en Woo, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 176.

Korean athletes went to those who had gone through the government scouting and training program.”³⁹⁸

In addition, the government’s intensive investments in reviving and commodifying local regional traditional craftworks industries can be seen as another form of *cultural developmentalism*. Craftworks are a strategic industry for the promotion of national or cultural heritage, operating as guardians of local artistic materials, techniques and iconography. As core living resources for museums and monuments, they can also be deployed as a particular way of “imagining history and power.”³⁹⁹ As Benedict Anderson has argued in reference to the process of “political museumizing” in colonial governmentality, the “infinite quotidian reproducibility of [the state’s] regalia...revealed the real power of the state:”⁴⁰⁰

Monumental archaeology, increasingly linked to tourism, allowed the state to appear as the guardian of a generalized, but also local, Tradition. The old sacred sites were to be incorporated into the map of the colony, and their ancient prestige (which, if this had disappeared, as it often had, the state would attempt to revive) draped around the mappers. This paradoxical situation is nicely illustrated by the fact that the reconstructed monuments often had smartly laid-out lawns around them, and always explanatory tablets, complete with datings, planted here and there. Moreover, they were to be kept empty of people, except for perambulatory tourists (no longer religious ceremonies or pilgrimages, so far as possible). Museumized this way, they were repositioned as regalia for a *secular* colonial state.⁴⁰¹

The *cultural developmentalism* of local craftworks during the Olympics is an exemplary case of this kind of logic operating in the grammar of official postcolonial nationalism. In 1985 the South Korean government “selected 50 items as special objects and designated manufacturers of those items as eligible for promotional funds and technological guidance.”⁴⁰² Specially designated local companies for official Olympic souvenirs by the SLOOC produced “1,000 pieces each of 7 kinds of folk art” as well as souvenirs with Olympic emblems, resulting in “200 billion won in the domestic market and \$US 50 million in overseas markets.”⁴⁰³ In addition, “the government worked on the *preservation* of each region’s traditional craftworks, connecting craftworks-producing areas to major tourist areas, conducting joint businesses involving craftworks and tourism.”⁴⁰⁴ ‘Preservation’ in this process cannot be seen apart from both processes of standardization and commodification. Overall, craftworks business showed outstanding growth due to the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics and plugged portions of underdeveloped outlying regions of South Korea and their economies into the national economy as a subset of the national manufacturing sector, generating some jobs and

³⁹⁸ Larson and Park, p. 157.

³⁹⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991), p. 185.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-82. We’ll see in Incheon airport how the airport space itself adopts this kind of museumized display of official cultural nationalism with the labeling of indigenous Korean trees along the concourse, etc.

⁴⁰² Kim et al., *KDI*, p. 53.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.* Italics mine.

contributing to reproducing forms of cultural and national branding and disseminating “the state’s regalia” to ready-made international audiences at these mega-sporting events.⁴⁰⁵

In the same way that the state’s nationalist development of competitive national athletes also required the introduction of culturally Western Olympic sports to Korea as well as internationally viable sporting associations able to facilitate their training and entry into foreign competitions, the government’s ‘nationalist’ ‘preservation’ of traditional craftworks by industrializing its production methods and interlinking it with the tourism industry cannot be seen apart from both the processes of “international” standardization and capitalist commodification. Much like the postcolonial evolution of the national airport under the developmental state, the manner of nationalization in the face of the Olympic Games was in no way opposed to internationalization or globalization. In light of the state’s geopolitically peripheral position in the world system, and its chosen path of capitalist modernization, the state could not say “no” to international or global forces and its attendant standardizations. The state’s bid to host the Olympic Games, an international sporting event with high symbolic and material value, was both a significant expression of its international commitments, and at the same time, a strategy for both economic and now cultural national development, as the Chun regime’s new cultural policy had anticipated.

The Era of Mass Air Travel in South Korea: ‘Korea to the World’⁴⁰⁶

More than any other industry, “the Olympic Games were a turning point in the development of Korea’s tourism industry,”⁴⁰⁷ and it is here that both the new series of international standardizations and national particularizations can be seen most dramatically in the new processes of liberalization and national *cultural developmentalism* of Kimpo airport and South Korean aviation. Akin to South Korea’s decision to host the Olympic games, the 1980-88 expansion of Kimpo reflected a number of changes to the national and international aviation industry, South Korea’s changing position in the world system due to its rapid economic growth and the attendant international pressures to liberalize its industries and markets. In addition to the expansion of the airport, a number of changes to the aviation industry was spurred by the intersection of a growing regional aviation market and the far-reaching effects of the liberalization of the American aviation market, including the increase of foreign air carriers at Kimpo and the launch of a second national air carrier. First, despite the world recession arising from the 2nd oil crisis at the end of the 1970s and in part due to the rise of the Asian NIC’s and

⁴⁰⁵ The establishment of the Gwangju Art Biennale in the historically underdeveloped region of Jeolla province and the politically marred city of the Gwangju massacre might be seen as one pinnacle of South Korean cultural developmentalism, which came about in 1995 through agitation of local Gwangju politicians as well as the support of the central government which primarily funds the Biennale, and following the model of the Cultural Olympiad of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The biennale is importantly a tool for the development of contemporary art in South Korea, not just an international art market. Thus it presents more a resemblance to the origins of the Venice biennale in the late 19th century as a national promotional project rather than the ethos of the global art biennale circuit of characteristic of the contemporary evolution of the Venice Biennale and Germany’s Documenta. Of course it’s evolution since 1995 to the present has been transforming it more towards the global art biennale Documenta model but with important differences.

⁴⁰⁶ One of the Olympic mottos as announced by the IOC president A Samaranch in Korean at the Olympic ceremony was “Seoul to the World, the World to Seoul.” Chun Doo Hwan also announces the liberalization of travel as part of a new image of “Korea to the world.”

⁴⁰⁷ Kim et al., *KDI*, p. 51.

the Middle East construction boom, the Asia-pacific region registered the highest growth rates becoming the fastest growing region in the world aviation market. From 1978-88 the Asia-pacific aviation market exhibited an average annual 10.4% growth as opposed to the average 7% growth in the Western European and American dominated markets.⁴⁰⁸ In addition, the percentage of the Asia-pacific aviation market rose from 13.4% of the world market in 1978 to 18.2% in 1988.⁴⁰⁹ In South Korea, the travel and tourism infrastructure constructed for the Olympic games was one crucial source of such growth. As the historically dominant centers, the North American region still accounted for 50% of the world aviation market, and based on international carriers only, the European market accounted for the highest share of 43% of the world market.⁴¹⁰ When world airlines stagnated with a 2.8% growth rate from 1980-1983 during the second oil crisis, the regional transportation market in the Asia-pacific region and the Middle East took possession of a comparative high proportion of the market due in part to the building boom in the Middle East. With the Middle East construction market climaxing during the oil crisis, air routes to this region became a “golden road,” and led off a battle by a number of foreign carriers to operate these routes. From 1979-1983, Malaysia Airlines, Saudi Airlines, Air France, Philippine Airlines and the US Braniff Airlines all entered the South Korean aviation market seeking to transport Korean labor to the Middle East.⁴¹¹

Second, the 1978 U.S. Airline Deregulation Act, the first among many public utilities to be deregulated by the urging of neoliberal economists in the United States, opened to market forces domestic and international air routes and pricing structures, leading to repeated rounds of consolidation entailing “more than 200 bankruptcies and 50 mergers” resulting in a small number of American mega-carriers which then sought to centralize their operations in a single large airport called ‘hubbing.’⁴¹² Due to the commanding presence of the American airline industry in the world market, the resulting mega-carriers and its tendency to dominate single airports (hubbing) had a great effect on world airlines and airports. Moreover with the “Open Skies” policy, the U.S. pushed for deregulation and the opening of national aviation markets worldwide. The effects of the U.S. deregulation in South Korea saw increasing competition for international air routes to Seoul’s Kimpo airport via foreign carriers. It thus led to a restructuring of the aviation industry in South Korea as well as other developing nations, seeking to improve the competitiveness of their national airlines and protect their aviation markets. In addition, the international free trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1986 included an aviation related service industry clause further requiring a more competitive aviation policy.⁴¹³ These liberalizing forces led to the adoption of a plural air carrier system. The sole flag carrier, Korean Airlines, served nine major domestic routes in 1988 and also offered international service

⁴⁰⁸ *KAC 25-Year History*, pp. 211-212.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹¹ *Kimpo Kukjae Konghang Kaehang 30 Ju-nyŏn Yaksa* (Thirty-Year History of the Opening of Kimpo International Airport), (Seoul: Kimpo International Airport, 1992), p. 130. Hereafter referred to as Kimpo 30-Year History.

⁴¹² For a discussion of the effects of deregulation on airport terminal design, see Thomas Fisher, “P/A Inquiry: Airport Terminals: the Effect of Deregulation and Terrorism on Airport Design.” *Progressive Architecture* v. 68 (March 1987): 96-103. For a more extended discussion of the Deregulation Act itself, see Paul S. Dempsey & Andrew Goetz, *Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology* (Westport, CN and London: Quorum Books, 1992). Air routes grew throughout the 1960s and 70s through bilateral agreements between nation-states. The US airline deregulation act of 1978 resulted in a new multilateral structure of air routes under the Open-skies agreement from the early 1980s as well as the changes in competition.

⁴¹³ *KAC 25-Year History*, p. 212.

to Japan, the United States, Canada, West Germany, France, Hong Kong, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates.⁴¹⁴ In February 1988, the government introduced a bill for the establishment of a second national civilian airline. The Kumho group, another South Korean chaebol⁴¹⁵ inaugurated Asiana Airlines in December 1988 as part of the nation's adjustment to world economic forces and the far-reaching effects of American airline liberalization.⁴¹⁶

The changes to the nation's aviation industry—regional market growth and liberalization—were also accompanied by a major turning point in South Korean air travel. In late May of 1981, when the Chun government announced a graduated plan to lift restrictions on overseas travel, it presaged one of the most 'epoch making' and enduring legacies of the Olympic Games.⁴¹⁷ The Chun regime's multi-staged liberalization of overseas travel between 1981-1989, which comprehensively transformed international travel for South Koreans, also keys into the shifting process of *cultural developmentalism* that accompanies the bounded internationalism of the capitalist world system that came into being in the postwar period. Chun's overseas travel liberalization policy was prepared in relation to external liberalization pressures already mentioned—constituting the new form of international standardizations in the economic order—as well as South Korea's changing position within the international system and in view of the balance of international payments problem South Korea would face with its trade surpluses in the mid-eighties.⁴¹⁸ As discussed in Chapter Five, South Koreans' first opening onto the world occurred with the restrictive overseas travel and emigration policy enacted by the Park regime in 1962 when the state reversed its pro-natalist policy in order to deal with overpopulation and urban sprawl. Under this policy, the state permitted certain forms of overseas travel, which were deemed patriotic and served the goals of national development and restricted others.⁴¹⁹ According to the government, severe restrictions on international mobility were maintained for reasons of national security, to maintain a healthy balance of international payments [mainly to accumulate much needed foreign exchange], and to protect Korean corporations and citizens abroad as well as prevent unnecessary international conflicts.⁴²⁰ Restricting Koreans' overseas travel was part of the ruling logic of South Korea's tourism industry to "increase foreign currency revenues."⁴²¹ The government's overseas liberalization policy was thus part of a larger shift in South Korea's longtime tourism policy oriented toward national development. Under the plan, the seven-day character/identity reference system would be changed to immediate processing, the mandatory political education/training procedure would be greatly curtailed or even eradicated, and restrictions on visiting relatives or friends abroad,

⁴¹⁴ These routes reflected both the historically produced path of the South Korea's national capitalism and the imagined world of the bounded sphere of postwar international world from the South Korean perspective.

⁴¹⁵ Since Kumho at the time was seen as one of the underdog or smaller chaebols among the chaebol hierarchy it was viewed as a somewhat democratic choice.

⁴¹⁶ *KAC 25-Year History*, p. 213.

⁴¹⁷ "Haeoe Jinch'ul Jayuhwa Sidae-ro Yōhaeng Gyujae Daep'ok Wanhwa ūi Baekyung kwa Sil'tae (The Background and Actual Conditions behind Drastically Reducing Travel Restrictions for a New Age of Overseas Expansion and Liberalization)," *Donga Ilbo*, 10 June 1981.

⁴¹⁸ Kim et al., *KDI*, p. 50.

⁴¹⁹ See Ilsoo Kim, *New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

⁴²⁰ *Donga Ilbo*, 10 June 1981.

⁴²¹ Kim et al., *KDI*, p. 52.

foreign employment, and immigration would all be greatly relaxed.⁴²² The ban on leisure travel would also be lifted in a gradual process through age classifications. In 1981, leisure travel would be open to couples over 50 years of age. It was to be gradually enlarged in age increments throughout the decade, to 40 years, then 35, then 30, until the age restriction would be completely phased out by 1990.⁴²³ The most dramatic transformation entailed the implementation of multiple-use passports valid for up to 3-5 years, replacing the existing single-use passport system, allowing “Korean citizens to freely travel to any country with appropriate visas excepting the 22 enemy states of the communist bloc.”⁴²⁴

Negotiated amongst high-level members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and supervised by the office of the Prime Minister, the management of international mobility had long been a comprehensive tool of political, economic and social governmentality of the South Korean developmental state.⁴²⁵ The new liberalization measures, must also be seen as such a tool, used to make adjustments to the national economy in the face of South Korea’s economic growth and pressures by the international community to liberalize. As Chun declared, “in keeping with the world trend towards internationalization and liberalization, it has become time to boldly scrap restrictive policies and present a new image of Korea to the world.”⁴²⁶ However, at the very moment that the South Korean state took one of the biggest steps toward “liberalization” and “internationalization,” it was characterized as a new socio-cultural design for *nationalism*. Chun emphasized that this momentous opening “should be harnessed to fully realize individual citizen’s potentiality and development through liberalization and self-regulation, as the acquisition of advance knowledge and skills, increased international cooperation and the expansion of employment opportunities abroad make up a new design for national development and the strengthening of national power.”⁴²⁷ The move from confinement/restriction to opening up/liberalization is accompanied by the shift in rhetoric from economic to *cultural developmentalism*. The restrictive emigration policies during rapid development had highlighted economic national development via the social production of national industries. While many people went abroad to work or live for a myriad of individual reasons, they did so at the same time to make money. The bottom line of the restrictive overseas travel and selective immigration policies was the accumulation of foreign exchange necessary for these huge national industrial investments. The common denominator between South Korean out migration in the form of immigrations and migrant labor and the industrial labor at home was to serve as a significant means to this end. The use value of both forms of South Korean labor—was primarily rooted in the international currency exchange value. However, in the face of liberalization, as Chun calls attention to the cultural, social and technical development of “individual citizens” vis-à-vis internationalism, he points to a radically altered conception of the use value of South Korean labor and its potential correspondence to other perhaps more value-added forms of exchange value. He stresses the development of this potential. In support of this view, the government reminded South Koreans of the objective positionality of the nation within the larger world

⁴²² Ibid.; “The government prepares for the liberalization of overseas travel to all countries excepting 22 enemy states,” *Maeil Kyeongjae*, 20 May 1981.

⁴²³ “Overseas Travel to be Completely Liberalized by 1990,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, 12 March 1988.

⁴²⁴ *Maeil Kyeongjae*, 20 May 1981.

⁴²⁵ *Donga Ilbo*, 10 June 1981.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

system. They explained “the country ranks third in the world in terms of population density due to its small landmass and a limited amount of cultivatable land. Moreover, lacking natural resources South Korea must import raw materials like oil and pulp, thus necessitating the acquisition of advanced technology through overseas expansion.”⁴²⁸ While it is clear that South Korea is no longer the war torn nation of the 1950s, the nation’s small landmass and lack of resources reinforces the significance of South Korean *labor* in the 1980s and beyond. However, it has now become necessary and/or strategic to harness new (more value added) aspects of South Korea’s labor force.

The state further noted that, “compared to the Japanese and Taiwanese cases of liberalization,” the South Korean economy was mature enough handle liberalization. Japan liberalized overseas travel in 1965 when their GNP was only \$932 and their exports were \$8.5 billion, while Taiwan liberalized in 1979 with a \$1,866 GNP and \$16 billion in exports, while currently South Korea’s GNP is \$1,732 and its exports have reached \$20.5 billion.⁴²⁹ The government was no doubt also aware that Japanese economy actually encouraged its citizens to travel the globe, as the trade deficit arising from Japanese tourism was used to balance its high trade surpluses with key trading nations like the United States and Europe. With the South Korean economy reaching its first trade surplus with the U.S. in 1986 continuing through the late 80s, the graduated plan for travel liberalization could be seen as an important measure to offset this imbalance. Moreover, the government had its sights on obtaining OECD membership in the near future, which also required undoing such developmental controls as a basis of membership.⁴³⁰ In parallel fashion, Kimpo not only became a member of the two leading postwar ‘international’ airport institutions—the Airport Operators Council International (AOCI) based in Washington, D.C. and the International Civil Airports Association (ICAA) based in Paris, France—in 1980, but also hosted the ICAA and AOCI Asian regional meetings in 1984 and the ICAA world congress in 1989.⁴³¹ These international rule-making institutions of world governance like the UN affiliate the ICAO (which governs world air space) were all European and American based products of post WWII internationalism—like the slightly older International Olympic Committee for the aviation industry.

Thus, amidst a series of grave adjustments to new international norms demanding liberalization vis-à-vis South Korea’s development and a new age of ‘globalization’ emanating out of the Washington consensus, the Olympic games also provided both tangible and intangible opportunities, which could be harnessed toward easing the transition toward travel liberalization as well the opening up of various other sectors of the national economy demanded by its international trade partners. Tangibly, from the US\$690 million in total foreign currency revenue earned through the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC), “\$227 million was spent by Olympics-related businesses on imports necessary for the success of the Games,” which

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Kim et al, *KDI*, p. 66.

⁴³¹ The U.S.-based AOCI was established in 1948 in Washington, D.C. and the European based ICAA was established in 1962 in Paris. Kimpo International Airport applied for and was accepted membership to ICAA in August 1980, joining over 660 international airports in 100 countries. Kimpo also became a member of AOCI in October 1980. *Hang’gong Yōngam* (Aviation Almanac) (Seoul: Korean Civil Aviation Development Association, 2002), pp. 79-80. AOCI and ICAA merged to form the Airports Council International (ACI) in 1991, as the leading trade representative of the world’s airports with 580 members operating 1650 airports from 179 countries as of 2011.

thereby resulted “in an estimated improvement in the balance of payments of \$434 million.”⁴³² Also, “revenue from the tourism sector reached \$140 million in 1988.”⁴³³ Intangibly, the 180 hours of continuous TV coverage “showcasing Korea’s development to the world, elevat[ed] the images of Korean products in the international community”⁴³⁴ through the value-added prestige conferred upon them by the Olympic games as well as providing a significant opportunity to “present a new image of Korea to the world.”⁴³⁵ As such it was a strategic site of cultural development in various domains.

At the same time, the airport had long operated as a threshold to modernity in its own right. The airport, like the Olympics has always been a charged socio-spatial interstice and contact zone between politically, economically, and socially uneven national units, but within which these units were became structured into formally equivalent units of a universal series that potentially mapped the whole world. Spatially, they were the interstice or passage connecting concrete national or local entities to other concrete national and local entities from one viewpoint (*place*), and the concrete amalgamation of localities or nations into a global entity (*space*), from another.⁴³⁶ As outlined in Part II, Chapter Four, the postcolonial airport in South Korea, and many others I would imagine in the bipolar cold war era, hedged in by two world superpowers, which functioned as the respective centers or apexes of modernity and modernization for its segmented domains of influence, was a paradoxical form of “natural universality” standing in an oblique relation to the unbound seriality of Benedict Anderson’s newspaper.⁴³⁷ The airport also presupposes a “natural universality” with the whole world as its domain as the preeminent long-distance transportation technology that has the capacity to connect all cities and nations in the postwar period. Like the newspaper and the map, the airport is also a technology operating by a serial logic furnishing a structural analogue for the *synchronic* and *comparative perspective* necessary to imagine the nation as one community among others in a parallel series in an interconnected world. However, due to the differential position of South Korea within and uneven hierarchy of global capitalist accumulation, the serial logic of the postcolonial South Korean airport presented crucial differences to the unbound seriality or universality of Anderson’s newspapers. Instead, the postcolonial airport more resembled the activist vernacular newspapers of the late 19th century Korea which propagated a new unique national identity, history, and script alongside English and American political cultural ideas, institutions as part of a new civilizational paradigm tethered to national self-strengthening discourses and programs, which appeared amidst both Western and Japanese imperialist transgressions on Korean sovereignty. At the same time it also bore the imprint of the paradoxical role of colonial railroads, instrumentalized as crucial technologies of colonial statecraft incorporating Korea into the Japanese empire as an appendage, but also appropriated by Korean nationalists toward efforts at national modernization and anti-colonial political organization.

Similarly for the postcolonial airport in South Korea, despite its “natural universality” which forms the defining trait of the airport and air travel, stemming from the geopolitical context of its emergence, the world accessible through these international gateways of nascent

⁴³² Kim et al, *KDI*, p. 50.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., p. 62.

⁴³⁵ *Donga Ilbo*, 10 June 1981.

⁴³⁶ This relational conception of space stems from Henri Lefebvre.

⁴³⁷ Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*, (London: Verso, 1998; reprinted 2002), p. 33.

postcolonial states was severely truncated and bounded to its particular bipolar Cold War sphere of influence. This bounded internationalism structured both the nation's imagining of itself and the world in its purview according to both distinctly bounded and hierarchical forms of universalism, which rather than resembling the structure of Anderson's newspapers resemble instead what he refers to as the standardized 'heterogeneous,' 'segmented,' space of the colony to imperial metropole relationship in reference to Southeast Asian colonies and their distant European metropolises.⁴³⁸ The 'bounded seriality' of the postwar capitalist world order under US imperialism that circumscribed the postcolonial airport, also ruptured South Korea from not only neighboring communist states like China and pro-communist regimes in Southeast Asia but also its geographically contiguous other half, the Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea, which was walled off by the new flight paths of cold war capitalist integration.⁴³⁹ At the same time, the airport brought the US and South Korea into a relationship of intimate proximity, making the power differential and various forms of disparity between the center/patron-periphery/client states glaringly visible in the space of the airport in the process. Moreover, akin to the cultural aesthetic and political institutions which standardized colonial knowledge and practices to imperial models and imperatives such as the urban-technologies of partitioning colonial space and the colonial Western style architectural symbolic re-ordering of space—shot through with railroads—or the U.S. Cold War militarized imperialist cartographic logic that divided the peninsula and the South Korean state's symbolic re-ordering of postwar Korean space via International Style architectural models and cultural and social norms as seen in the first 1960 Kimpo terminal—postwar international aviation institutions like the American-dominated ICAO, a subset of the UN, that governed this bounded internationalism and determined the universal standards of modernity, were essential to the production and imagining of a "free world."⁴⁴⁰ Paradoxically, these 'international' bodies that structured heterogeneous units into formally equivalent units of comparison and determined membership into the postwar world order—the ICAO that governed free world aviation, the ICAA and the AOCI that regulated the free world airports, and the Bretton woods international economic regulatory institutions of the World Bank, the IMF and the GATT—were and continue to be part of the apparatus of the hegemonic powers of this bounded seriality—standardizing, classifying and consecrating technologies/institutions tethered to capitalist modernization—even while in principle (or at least at their origin) they may aspire to the ideal of unbound seriality.

While the Cold war would remain between the two Koreas as well the uneven terrain of capitalist accumulation, the liberalization of travel and contact with Communist bloc and neighboring developing nations initiated with the Olympics and the 1988 Kimpo airport opened up a new expanded world geography for South Korea as well as South Korea's new position within this post-cold war landscape. Thus on one level the postcolonial airport amalgamated the duality of colonial railroads, as both repressive state apparatus and vehicle of anticolonial liberation in its repressive instrumentalization of Korean people—as much as commodities, capital, and land, through the regulation of people's international movements as much as markets—as a means of national development and thus a vehicle with which to challenge the uneven structure of the postwar capitalist system in an effort to secure autonomy for its nascent

⁴³⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴³⁹ North Korea could only be both known/unknowable through the overblown anticommunist propaganda of the South Korean state and the 'free world.'

⁴⁴⁰ We might see these institutions of postwar capitalist modernization as analogous to Anderson's colonial era census, map, and museum.

national industries. These processes were similarly accompanied by grand state and local government urban planning project displacing people from their homes as well as yet another symbolic reordering with traditional style national museums as well as the new *kiwa* terminal at Kimpo airport constituting ideological monuments of a new aesthetic norm. Moreover, insofar as the limits of the conceivable world of South Koreans as well as the method of its representation that infused the larger society's modern national and global consciousness was largely drawn through the policies of patriarchal state capitalism vis-à-vis uneven globalization, the South Korean imaginary of the nation and the world changed with the shifting state policies accompanying national development and its changing position in the world system. The liberalization of overseas travel during and after the Olympic games, which inaugurated mass air travel for South Korea, twenty years after its American counterpart, altered the imaginable world beyond national borders as well how it could be imagined. In effect, it altered the outlines of the bounded internationalism instituted in the postwar period. When the liberalization of travel began in the early 1980s, the division of the cold war blocs maintained the segmented view of the world making the "22 enemy states" of the communist world, including North Korea, still unimaginable as part of the accessible world of South Koreans. However by end of the Olympics and the subsequent collapse of the USSR, this would change, creating a drastically altered world imaginary. As the state leveraged the liberalization of travel through the developmentalist use of the Olympic games especially towards the cultivation of the tourism and other culture industries, in addition to the promotion of its growing conglomerates and electronic and auto industries, South Korea's international arrival both signaled the phasing out of the developmental mechanisms it had utilized towards its arrival and the introduction of modified mechanisms, including cultural developmentalist strategies with which to maneuver this altered geography. As Woo-Cumings has remarked in reference to the political economy of South Korean finance: "the 1980s were really a slow beginning of the end of the Korean variant of late industrialization."⁴⁴¹

The Olympic Games, the Kiwa Roof and the Traditional Cultural Revival of Official Cultural Nationalism

While development projects like the expansion of the aviation and travel industries were initiated before the Olympic bid, the Olympic games became an important factor that affected the shape of ongoing development projects. The new airport expansion was independently necessary of the Olympic games due to the skyrocketing forecasts for air travel in the 1990s, however the construction of a new airport was deferred until 1989, and a second *kiwa* terminal was planned immediately after the opening of the 1980 terminal as a stopgap measure to accommodate the arrival of the international stage/(the world republic of athletes) in South Korea, as well as the "arrival" of Korea Inc. on the international stage. As thousands of international athletes and sports related professionals landed in South Korea, "television networks and newspapers...all but abandoned mention of any other news, filling screens and pages with pictures of athletes arriving at Kimpo airport."⁴⁴² Kimpo became the first stage of the

⁴⁴¹ Woo, p. 202.

⁴⁴² Susan Chira, "Among South Koreans, Olympics Foster True Believers and Infidels," *New York Times*, September 16, 1988. (Accessed on October 1, 2011). As discussed in previous two chapters, the airport has historically functioned as a main national press stage, which is not the case in other countries like the US.

Olympics. Like other forms of infrastructure built for the Olympic games, the airport was part of the national showcase—laden with technical and aesthetic meanings and judgments. If the Olympic games were approached as both a strategic event and stage for South Korea’s symbolic-material consecration into the league of modern industrialized nations—a threshold to world modernity/modern time, then the airport was a significant threshold to this threshold or the more immediate threshold to this international stage. In their extended preparations for the Olympics, the Korean Airports Authority were “keenly aware of the fact that the very first place that the Olympic participants will recognize our country was the airport.”⁴⁴³

An important part of the “new image of Korea” presented at its international arrival can be glimpsed in the affinity between the politics of the *kiwa* roof of the airport terminal, which symbolized the historic new international departures of many South Koreans, and the overwhelming displays of traditional culture in the formal Olympic ceremonies as well as the months long arts and culture festival that accompanied the games. Much like the cultural programming of the opening ceremonies which presented both traditional Korean culture and showed off the modern industrialization of South Korea, the Korea Airports Authority saw the airport’s symbolic task in relation to the two-fold significance of the Seoul Olympics as a “chance to display our nation’s (minjok) excellence and that of our 5,000 year old cultural legacy to the world most effectively” and at the same time an “opportunity to test/display/place of judgment of our nation’s economic strength and the consciousness befitting the citizens of an advanced/developed nation, as we reach toward the status of an advanced/developed nation.”⁴⁴⁴ In July 1981 when the Ministry of Transportation began work on a basic master plan for the expansion of Kimpo airport it selected three *domestic* public and private engineering and architecture firms—Korea Engineering Consultants Corporation (public/gong-sa), Yooshin Engineering Corporation and Kyo-woo Architecture and Design.⁴⁴⁵ For the first time in history the terminal was designed and constructed with domestic technical expertise and fully funded by Korean capital. The expansion also doubled the capacity to process up to 9 million passengers and 540 thousand tons of cargo annually and included the construction of a parallel runway and a second *and improved* *kiwa* international terminal building.⁴⁴⁶ The terminal roof maintained the iconography of ‘traditional’ Korean culture like the previous 1972-80 international terminal (and departing from the 60s terminal) but with a slight deviation. In place of the curving ends of the pitched roof, the eaves of this roof came down straight and angular [figure 46]. It was however not a deviation but an intentional correction. The previous terminal roof had come under criticism from architecturally sensitive observers because its curving ends too closely resembled the Japanese *kiwa* rather than the Korean *kiwa*.⁴⁴⁷ The new terminal and its more authenticated Korean traditional national cultural aesthetic could likewise be seen in the new Seoul Olympic Stadium designed by the most preeminent modern architect in the postwar period, Kim Soo-geun in the Jamsil Olympic complex in southern Seoul to evoke the elegant curves of a Chosŏn dynasty porcelain [figure 47]. This improved Korean *kiwa*, moreover, symbolized an important

⁴⁴³ KAC 25-Year History, p. 228.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 228.

⁴⁴⁵ ROK Ministry of Transportation, *Kimpo International Airport Master Plan Report*, February 1982 (Seoul, Ministry of Transportation, 1982). Yooshin Engineering Corporation was established in 1966 to head major public infrastructure projects throughout the developmental regime of Park Chung Hee and beyond.

⁴⁴⁶ Kim et al., *KDI*, p. 41.

⁴⁴⁷ Interview with Lee Won-Shil, Korean architect for the 1980-1988 terminal, September 9, 2008, Seoul. Also, this discourse of the angle of the *kiwa* was not uncommon among architectural circles as South Korean architects sought an aesthetic vocabulary for modern Korean architecture in the postwar period.



Figure 46: Kimpo International Airport, the Second Kiwa Terminal, (1980-88) [Kimpo Airport 30-Year History]



Figure 47: Seoul Olympic Stadium designed by Kim Swoo Geun, 1988 [Seoul Olympic Stadium from the Han River in Seoul, Image from August 17, 2005: <http://flickr.com/photos/nagy/34798584/>]

turning point in the history of the airports' development—it was the first terminal designed and constructed with domestic skills and technology as well as the first to be built without foreign financing. The 1988 terminal was both a visible icon and product of 'Korea, Inc.'

The new and improved kiwa terminal fell in line with the official traditional national cultural revival since the Park regime, and which went into overdrive in the 1980s in preparation of the Olympic games that was highlighted throughout the Seoul Olympics. On September 17, 1988, close to 100,000 spectators filled the Jamsil Olympic stadium in Seoul joined by millions worldwide through global broadcast television to watch the opening ceremony of the largest sporting event and international festival in the world—the 24th Summer Olympic games. But for South Korean and international audiences alike the 24th Olympiad in Seoul presented significant departures in relation to its historical development and its founding traditions. Out of 24 repetitions, the Seoul Olympics marked the fourth Olympics to be held outside Europe and North America, the second to be held in an Asian country, after Japan in 1964, and the first to be held by a newly independent nation emerging after World War II. We can see these departures in the opening ceremony. In keeping with Olympic protocol mandated by the International Olympic Committee, the Seoul organizing committee staged the Official Ceremony as a series of official rituals and symbolisms ceremonializing both the traditional and modern character of the Olympic tradition: the march of nations, the opening proclamation by the IOC president and the host nation's head of state, the hoisting of the Olympic flag, the Olympic torch relay and the lighting of the Olympic flame, the competitors oath and the judge, and the playing of the Olympic and national anthem. However, the organizers' presentation of this code both reaffirmed and altered its message [figures 48-50]. The ceremony was organized into three parts with 'the Official Ceremony' spatio-temporally nestled between 'Ammadang,' (front court yard) and 'Twinmadang (rear yard)' according to Korean spatio-temporal metaphors. Incorporating the Han River, which runs through the heart of the city, the Ammadang ceremony began with an electronic broadcast of the boat parade, symbolizing the five continents. The boat leading the procession theatrically transported the large Dragon Drum to the stadium for the opening program organized under the main theme "Greeting the Sun." As the Drum waited at the gates, a large colorfully costumed samul nori troupe streamed into the stadium creating a moving human canvas in a "modern interpretation of a traditional ritual of cleaning the ground for a ceremony."⁴⁴⁸ This was followed by the Dragon Drum procession towards the torch stand accompanied by dancers and drummers declaring the opening of the festival. (Ringing of bell interpreted through Korean drumming). Heaven, Earth, and Man, paired a dance of "Korean nymphs and Greek maidens" around the 'World Tree' which was followed by a modern dance routine and formation of the words "Welcome" in Korean, English, and French in addition to the Olympic flag and "88." The Official Olympic ceremony nestled between to sequence the Olympic protocol deployed a number of themes: Greeting the Sun, Dawn Road, Heaven, Earth, and Man, Beyond all Barriers, Silence, New Sprouts, and Confrontation. It also featured, to cheering crowds Sohn Ki Jung, the legendary nationalist symbol/hero of colonial occupation—gold medalist in the 1934 Berlin Olympics who hid the Japanese flag from uniform and signed his name in Korean—infusing the ceremony with a national historical-collective memory of the Olympic games. Following the official ceremony, the Twinmadang performances consisted of sky divers, a mask dance incorporating masks from 60 countries, a Taekwondo demonstration (which at this time had not been accepted into the Olympic canon as an official sport), a

⁴⁴⁸ Kim Un-Yong, *The Greatest Olympics: from Baden-Baden to Seoul* (Seoul: Si-Sa-Yong-o-Sa, Inc., 1990), p. 236.



Figure 48: Little Hoop Boy Yoon [Korea Times, 2007]



Figure 49: Taekwondo Demonstration [Open Ceremony film still]



Figure 50: 1988 Seoul Olympics, Opening Ceremony, Sohn Ki Jung with Olympic torch [Opening Ceremony film still]

traditional battle game and a little Korean boy Yoon, immortalized in Korean popular memory, who jogged the stadium pushing a rolling hoop using a metal stick, demonstrating a Korean traditional sport/pastime. The three plus hour ceremony unfolded on a grand scale consisting of traditional and modern dance, song and other performances, mobilizing some 13,625 performers, including musicians, dancers, school children, university students, military units, and sky divers, and over 180,000 sets of costumes and ornaments.⁴⁴⁹ While the majority of performers were South Korean, the organizers also incorporated 389 folk group performers from twelve countries spanning Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas and Oceania, in addition to 160 national delegations of athletes.

As observed by the international community and reported in the SLOOC the Korean state was intent on presenting not just Asian difference but a distinctive Koreanness. Apparent in both the Korean symbolism of the kiwa roof of the terminal building, adapted from the roof of traditional Korean *hanoks*, as well as the traditional cultural programming of the Olympics, the new image of Korea being presented to the world was a distinctly cultural nationalist one. As Chun remarked the new ‘internationalism and liberalization’ should be harnessed towards a “strengthening of national power.” These remarks and the cultural nationalist representations are not contradictory, or rather; they are consistent with the contradictions of national development within global capitalism. These top-down mobilizations by the South Korean developmental state can be seen as a large scale countrywide analogue to the twin process of standardization and particularization of South Korean airports for the international stage packaged for the outside world. But more importantly, the historical development of the heterogeneous standardized segmented space of the airport and the cultural developmentalism of the Olympic games show that the mega-display of traditional Korean culture must not be seen as an evocation of ‘timelessness’ but instead the *changing* nature of the South Korean state, especially in terms of its cultural national identity, which developed as part of its attempt to change its position in the international order—with repressive and ideological instrumentalizations of traditional culture—as well as in response to its changing position and changes in that international order itself. As seen in the changing representational repertoire of Kimpo airport since the 1960s, traditional national culture became a new aesthetic if discrepant presence across spaces of modernizing Seoul. As seen in the state protection and promotion of traditional iconography in the temple and museum architecture of South Korea especially from Park’s regime on, this element did not first appear in the Olympic games, but it was the first time it was emphasized as an integral element of the nation’s modernization in a globally mediatized international setting and inaugurating the development of Korean culture industries. What was significant in both the 88 terminal and the Olympic games, as with the reconstruction of palaces, and mobilizations of traditional performing arts, etc. was that this traditional national culture—was taking on a new commercialized role with another layer of inscription/transformation—as replicas of itself were likewise being produced as part of the commercialization and industry-fication of Korean craftworks. As the Olympics marked a turning point for South Korean capitalism and the developmental state, the 1980-88 expansion was also a watershed for Kimpo airport and South Korea’s international travel and tourism industry.

However, as I have discussed earlier standardization/ westernization was also at play with the Olympic development program, evident in the extensive urban beautification urban modernization programs or the banning of “disturbing foods,” and state-issued instructions on

⁴⁴⁹ Kim, Un-yong, p. 236.

appropriate social behavior. Thus as with the earlier national cultural revival under Park not all traditional aspects were revived, while others (both positive and negative aspects) lay buried or were even destroyed in this process. The “international” norms and standards to which Kimpo was measured from abroad, and of which Kimpo became a measure for domestic modernity was applied across the country in the same top down fashion as the earlier airport modernizations. While selective Korean traditional musical and dance/theatre performances were encouraged, the government banned certain culinary practices and cleared traditional *hanoks* to make way for a particular *ideological* representation of Korean culture and national heritage by the state. The state’s claim on national culture however did not go uncontested.

Conclusion: The ‘Burden of Representation’ and A Critique of ‘Self-Orientalism’

The concept of western culture as the universal culture of industrial modernity mapped along evolutionary time can be seen a key structuring principle of international festivals like the modern Olympics and serves to highlight their cultural imperialist basis which is apparent in its ‘international’ program of Western sports, as well as the industrial and scientific-related training and development of these non-Western sports and sports associations that ground participation and success in these competitions.⁴⁵⁰ The mark of Euro-American racism and cultural imperialism that mars the early history of the Olympic Games, as well as the fact that Olympic athletes can be seen as specimens of modern culture and science on display is best illustrated by the Orientalist representation of non-Western athletes at the 1904 St. Louis Olympics, who were differentially incorporated as part of a sideshow called “Anthropology Days.”⁴⁵¹ As African, Asian and indigenous American athletes have gone on to increasingly participate in the actual competitions of the Olympic games under their colonial or national flags, especially in the postwar period, the issue of cultural imperialism as well as cultural alienation has become magnified. This is reflected in the inverse proportion between the enlargement of the games through the growing participation of national teams and the decreasing percentage of National Olympic Committees getting medals in the Olympic games. In 1988, out of 159 participating countries, 52 countries received medals (39%) while in 2004, out of 201 countries, 72 countries received medals (37%).⁴⁵² In relation to Olympic host nations, these discrepancies and inequalities are more pronounced in the extensive preparations of the few non-Western, developing countries that have come to host these games in the postwar period, as well as the heavy symbolization of their non-Western cultures and cultural heritages in the ritual and ceremonial aspects of the games.

⁴⁵⁰ Some sports more than others require extensive and expensive training facilities, as well local, national, or international sporting associations that facilitate training and preparation for competition. The program has expanded throughout the years...including more sports of nonwestern origin as they have built up international organizations and have been popularized by other major sporting competitions. For example, South Korea’s martial arts Taekwondo (which also appears to be a modern hybrid construct based on sports historian) only became included in the 1990s thus as host nation South Korea staged a taekwondo demonstration as part of its opening ceremony.

⁴⁵¹ Gold and Gold, p. 155. See also Matti Gokyr, “One Certainly Expected More From the Savages’: the Anthropology Days in St. Louis, 1904, and their Aftermath,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 7, no. 2 (1990), pp. 296-306.

⁴⁵² Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, p. 58.

The identarian politics behind the official nationalist displays of traditional culture as representations of national cultural identity by non-Western Olympic hosts must also be seen in the context of and as a response to the nexus of cultural imperialism, uneven modern industrialization and nationalism that characterizes the bounded universalism of the modern Olympic games. The Seoul Olympics was the second Olympics to be hosted in an Asian country, after the Tokyo Olympics in 1964, which were then followed by the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano and the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. Having been part of a larger shared East Asian civilization for much longer than the advent of Western-centric modernity, South Korea could not so easily lay claim to the classical Greek tradition from which the Olympics descends and has been the historical ground and signal repertoire for presenting modern industrial national identity among European host nations. Moreover, it was the second Olympics to be hosted by a developing nation after the ‘Mexican Miracle’ debuted with the 1968 Mexico Olympics. And lastly, it was to be the last Cold War Olympics, the politics of which provided the dominant thrust of national competition since the Second World War.

Situated within this broader context, a more nuanced interpretation of this nationalist representational grammar becomes both necessary and possible. In my view, while the traditionalist official nationalist Korean cultural national identity presented by the state was intensely *ideological*, the problem was not as some scholars have argued its representational tactics as a form of “self-orientalism” related to the expression of the “timelessness” of traditional Asian culture with modern attributes.⁴⁵³ For example, according to Sandra Collins,

What is unique for Asian Olympic hosts—beginning with the Tokyo Olympic bid to host the 1940 games and continuing with the 1964 Tokyo, the 1988 Seoul, the 1988 Nagano Winter and the upcoming Beijing Olympics—are the lingering anxieties of participating in the Western hegemony of the Olympic Games. Other host cities have not carried the burden of representing their cultural heritage as unchanging to the extent that Asian hosts do. What most Western Olympic host cities underscore their modernity and development to promote themselves as world-class cities, Asian host cities distinguish themselves in their deliberate evocation with ancient cultural traditions. Asian Olympic hosts display this hybridity as a syncretism of cutting edge-modern technological industry anchored in the rich cultural histories and exotic civilizations of the East....Tokyo, Seoul, and Nagano each defined and, in the case of Beijing, are defining their national identity as the unique embodiment of a timeless national culture replete with modern attributes.”⁴⁵⁴

As Collins observes that the representational strategy “unique” to Asian Olympic hosts is one of ‘modern hybridity’ characterized by the “*co-existence* of modern development with ancient cultural traditions,” she argues that this modern hybridity is essentially a form of ‘self-orientalism’ because these Asian hosts attempt to “showcase how their cultural traditions exist *coterminously* with their modernity.”⁴⁵⁵ Thus a main difference between *hybridity* and *self-orientalism* in Collins’ argument appears to lie in the possibility or impossibility of what

⁴⁵³ Sandra Collins, “The Fragility of Asian National Identity at the Olympic Games,” in Price and Dayan Eds., *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China* (University of Michigan Press, 2008), pp. 186, 187.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Johannes Fabian has called “coevalness” of Asian cultural traditions and (Western) cultural modernity.⁴⁵⁶ Collins rightly points out that this common representational strategy can be seen at work among Asian Olympic hosts, Japan, Korea and China. Much like the Tokyo 1964 Games, Collins observes that, “the national identity of South Korea was showcased as a modern hybrid that fused its 5,000-year old traditions with a modern democratic and industrial state.”⁴⁵⁷ But the representational grammar of national cultural identity as an element of modern hybridity in the Seoul Olympics, and I would imagine for Japan and China as well, needs not to be interpreted as “existing outside of time.”⁴⁵⁸ Instead, in evoking this historical-mythic 5,000-year history of the nation, we could say that modern national culture was represented by the state as distinct from modern Western culture and thus incommensurable with the *westernized* modern time of the culture of industrial modernity but not ‘out of time’ in general.

The problem is that the Olympic movement is not a neutral platform for national promotion—which it invariably functions as. From its historical origins in the 1896 Athens Games both marking Greece’s re-entry into the Western sphere and its “re-emerging nationhood” after centuries under Ottoman rule, and combined with the efforts of French aristocrat Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the current International Olympic Committee (IOC) to revive the games as an expression of 19th century nationalist cosmopolitanism, the modern Olympic movement has propagated a particular philosophy of internationalism and liberalism that evolved in line with and was conducive to nationalism.⁴⁵⁹ But also, in so far as it was also a ‘mythic’ or ‘invented’ tradition, which replaced the religious principle of ancient Greek pan-Hellenism with the 19th century political ideals of civic nationalism and liberal individualism, Olympic nationalism was necessarily linked to a particular cultural tradition. Although the culture of modernity can be defined as the eternally new, up to date, producing tradition as its opposition, this culture of modernity is not free from all forms of ancient tradition. The sanctioning of particular narratives of continuity is a key form of its legitimacy as the modern apex in the present. This is clearly evident in the mythical narrative of the Olympic games that forges a continuous link from the golden age of classical Greece to the modern industrial present. The modern Olympic games were revived from classical Greek origins and turned into a model for modern “internationalism” and “world” culture by small group of European aristocrats. What has long been considered the origin of Western civilization inherited as the cultural narrative of the modern Western industrialized world is also passed onto the cultural inheritance of all modern industrialized nations as the paradigm of ‘world’ unity and ‘international’ cooperation through the Olympic Games. As “modernity” is grounded on the founding myths of western civilization, to be “modern” under the Olympic paradigm means participating in Western culture. The key component of the modern Olympics is the transformation of a historical located culture

⁴⁵⁶ Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

⁴⁵⁷ Collins, p. 195.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 190. As Collins writes of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics: “Images of geisha and samurai were often presented to the West as sensational examples of Japan’s self-orientalism. Japanese ideologues guided Western readers on how to see the ancient forms of Japanese culture in modern Japan; Tokyo was hailed as the unique embodiment of “the harmonious blending” of two great cultures of the East and the West. *However, Japanese national culture was represented as existing outside of time—and more amaranthine—compared to the West so that idioms of cultural contact between ‘Japan-East-Traditional’ and ‘World-West-Modern’ implied a certain incommensurability*” (p. 190).

⁴⁵⁹ Gold and Gold, p. 143.

into universal culture as it moves from tradition to modernity. As reflected in the Olympic various attempts to revive the Olympics in the 19th century, it was a tradition that both the French and Greeks now sought to lay claim to. The Eurocentrism of the 'culture of modernity' of the Olympic Games construes Western civilization as the only and authentic cultural foundation of industrial modernity. If nationalism and industrial modernity fashioned the grammar of representation, western cultural tradition provided the basis for the generalized vocabulary of the modern games. The logic of Orientalism of othering through opposition and hierarchical evaluation can be seen in the historical development of the games but it is also written into its structural logic of the Olympic movement as it transformed from a model of European universalism to world universalism in the postwar period. The modern Olympics thus also has a modern historiographical base.

This tradition is a significant element of the mythic narrative of the Olympic Games—as seen in many western host cities/nations opening ceremonies and other Olympic symbolisms which present a continuous narrative between the ancient Greek Olympics to their modern nation-state. The Eurocentric cultural basis which underwrites the nationalist cosmopolitanism of the Olympic games can be seen in the nature of Olympic sports as well as its rituals and symbolisms, which promotes western culture as the universal culture of modern industrial society. This is easily incorporated and reinforced in national narratives of the overwhelmingly western Olympic host nations which often present a continuous development from ancient Greece (historiographically produced as the origin of western civilization) to the modern (thus far) European host nation-states of the Olympic movement. The normative representational repertoire of European Olympic host nations have historically been to do what these Asian hosts appear to be doing (but with a different civilizational referent)—fusing the ancient cultural heritage of an ancient Greek Olympic tradition with symbolism of their modern industrial nation-state. The opening ceremony of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, which featured Greek chariots in an opening program that linked classical Greece to modern Germany and the 1960 Rome Olympics are perhaps the most sensational examples.⁴⁶⁰ It appears to be more a recent phenomenon since the 1980s or so to de-stress these classical ancient narratives, such as seen in the Los Angeles games, which no doubt has to do with the difficulty of the U.S. to as easily mythologize its ancient link to Greece but also to promote the exceptional commercial identity of Los Angeles. What I am pointing to is how the very 'timelessness' of the modern late 19th century 'invented' Olympic *tradition* is an important cultural ground of the modern Olympic games that informs its official protocols, symbolisms and sports. Moreover, these *Asian* countries were not alone in carrying the burden of representing an alternative cultural heritage/lineage than the one sanctioned by the Olympic games. This was also the case of the Mexico Olympics in 1968, which presented one of the most elaborate and extended cultural programs that blended indigenous artistic traditions with both international and modern ones.⁴⁶¹ It is not solely a burden of Asian modernities but the burden of cultural representation of non-Western modernities on an 'international stage' long dominated by Eurocentric western cultural norms and origin myths. The Olympics have thus evolved as a bounded cultural universalism that has been naturalized as world universalism.

While what we could see as Collins' implicit critique of the Japanese state's ideological manipulation of traditional culture is well taken, the totalizing conception of 'self-orientalism' she uses to generalize any reference to an alternative Asian heritage or a cultural tradition other

⁴⁶⁰ Gold and Gold, selections on various opening ceremonies.

⁴⁶¹ Zolov, p.168.

than the normative Western culture of modernity, while not distinguishing how these references were put to use by the state, is problematic and also touches upon unwitting Occidentalism or Eurocentrism. The South Korean official cultural nationalist representation did refer to its 5,000-year historico-mythical narrative of the nation. This form of non-western, ‘national’ time can be traced back to the modern genealogical historical narrative of the ethnic Korean nation produced in the early twentieth century as a defensive measure against Japan’s imperial overtures, including the discursive erasure of historical Korean sovereignty.⁴⁶² However, it developed this calendar system on top of an existing cosmology; it added a myth of a unique historical national polity and people upon an existing Sino-centric cosmological order and calendrical system that had been in use in Korea for thousands of years. Measured to the sexennial cycle of ancient Chinese cosmology and calibrated to the lunar calendar shared among Eastern civilizations, this calendrical system was a national version of the temporal mechanism of universal history writing characteristic of European *philosophes* (which was itself an inheritance of Christian history writing), an artificial mental construct used as an organizing principle to order a narrative of the historical evolution of civilization (though which civilization is emphasized is distinguished between these two systems), and calibrated to the Christian Gregorian calendar.⁴⁶³ This non-western time based on the lunar calendar system is an organizing construct with social and historical bases and remains a living component of South Korean society and plays a role in structuring its social or national worldview. It has evolved with South Korean modernization, however much in subordinated form, alongside the time of Western modernity. It can be seen for example in the continuing practice of geomancy in contemporary Korea, even practiced by the state, traditional naming practices, astrological characterizations of personal and life characteristics, and the social pre-eminence of an individual’s 60th birthday celebration, *han’kap* which marks a full cycle within this calendar.⁴⁶⁴ These times certainly do not coexist equally as the time of East Asian cosmology appears to become more and more ritualized and parenthetical to the continuity of modern lives and capitalist transactions. But they do persist. The *chuseok* (autumn harvest) celebration—the biggest holiday of the year for South Korea whose dates change yearly as they are calibrated to the lunar calendar—that interrupted the Olympic games planned on the solar Gregorian calendar was a clear manifestation of the coexisting hetero-temporalities of South Korea modernity.⁴⁶⁵ In the context of the westernized time of industrial world modernity as time absolute, it may have appeared incommensurable with the ‘modern world time’ of the *culture of modernity* of the industrialized West, but this incommensurability

⁴⁶² See chapter one.

⁴⁶³ See my discussion of Fabian in chapter two.

⁴⁶⁴ See for example, Carol H. Schulz, “Korean Terms for Calendar and Horary Signs, Holidays, and Seasons,” in Ho-min Sohn, ed., *Korean Language in Culture and Society* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), pp. 86-100. And Hong-key Yoon, *The Culture of Fengshui in Korea: An Exploration of East Asian Geomancy* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008). Geomancy or Fengshui examines the auspicious or inauspicious nature of geographical spaces based on this cosmological system. Moreover, the site of the new airport at Incheon was also selected in part with geomantic principles.

⁴⁶⁵ During the *Chuseok* holidays, as Western newspapers observed, the celebrations were temporarily suspended with suddenly empty Seoul streets as Koreans were spending the holidays with their extended families as per custom. See Susan Chira, “Behind a Mask of Modernity, Koreans Reaffirm a More Traditional Identity,” *New York Times* (September 26, 1988). Also older generations of South Koreans still celebrate their birthdays according to the lunar calendar and not the solar calendar, so the actual date of one’s birthday would change every year. Here, we could also note that Walter Benjamin makes a distinction between the homogenous empty time of the clock and the more historical time of the calendar in “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” *Illuminations*, Translated by Harry Zohn (NY: Schocken, 1968), pp. 261-262.

does not stem from an opposition of time vs. “timelessness.” Rather than being an expression of timelessness, we might see modern representations of traditional Korean culture as an assertion of a heterogeneous chronology/cosmology and the affirmation of an alternate genealogy of civilization that is also co-present in the modern industrialization of South Korea—however distorted or even enriched with its contact with Western modern culture and time, existing within and uneven but spatially contiguous *single* industrializing world. Moreover, it is this very living substance that gives the state’s *ideologically* ‘invented’ traditional national culture its power of persuasiveness, rather than appearing as blatant ideology, much like the way Barthes saw myth to take hold of a sign not to obliterate it but make it speak for the new motivations of the myth.⁴⁶⁶

Thus the problem with the state’s representation of ‘Korean’ national culture in my view does not reside in reclaiming the Korean-Asian time of the nation or even ‘inventing’ or evoking traditional culturalist narratives that had been submerged and even repressed (such as we have seen in the intense iconoclasm of the late 19th and early 20th century modern reformers) during the nation’s frantic encounter with the *culture of modernity*, which are always bound to have some degree of mythic qualities in their historical re-appropriations. The problem is rather the state’s *ideological* deployment of these traditional culturalist narratives. As I mentioned earlier, while the government prepared traditional Korean art exhibits and performances, repaired ancient palaces and monuments, they bulldozed large areas of poor communities of traditional *hanoks* (residential dwellings) for modernized apartments (while of course preserving select hanok villages or areas). Such motivated contradictions of traditional culture can also be seen in the state’s ideological representation of the unity or homogeneity of the nation in its orchestration of the extended torch relay across Korean cities. The Olympic torch relay, originating from Greece and landing in the southern tip of the nation, Cheju island, passing through 21 Korean cities on its way to Seoul to fashion a unified image of itself—in a museumizing fashion. But Cheju island, which had become the tourist capital for South Koreans whose more international vacations were prohibited by the state was also haunted by the countless deaths of suspected Korean Communists by the state between the years of the national division and the Korean War, as Pusan, the port city and industrial powerhouse of South Korean steel and shipbuilding industries was by Japanese colonialism, and Gwangju, the fateful site of the Gwangju massacre in 1980.

The Olympics thus became a stage for the state to present an ideological narrative and unified image of “Korea, Inc.” masquerading as the “nation.” Following the anti-people, pro-business ethos and pattern of South Korean national capitalism, the state appropriated national historical narratives to further its particular pro-business developmental state-chaebol nexus as the “national” interest.⁴⁶⁷ An advertisement for Samsung, one of South Korea’s top *chaebols*, which ran during the Olympic games is particularly revealing [figure 59]. Next to a large image showing two parallel rows of ancient bronze bells which were “used as an instrument to play ritual music in the royal court,” and the title caption: “Harmony—the Essence of Samsung’s Innovative Spirit,” the Samsung advertisement read:

⁴⁶⁶ Barthes, “Myth Today,” *Mythologies* (NY: Hill and Wang, 1972).

⁴⁶⁷ Here nationalism operates in the Marxist sense of dominant class interests masquerading as the general will of the nation, aligned with both Marx and Rosa Luxemburg’s views of nationalism. To be fair, while anti-people, pro-business national capitalism of Korea, Inc. benefited the capitalist and bureaucratic classes disproportionately to the working and middle classes, national development did allow for a general improvement of the livelihood of the larger nation, although this was achieved through the super-exploitation of the working classes to man the actual development, thus creating a new aristocracy of the capitalist class against the rest of Korean society in present day Korea.

In the past, Korean musicians brought harmony to their craft by creating the Pyonjong Chimes. Only a Master could blend the Chimes' 16 unique tones, into one resonant voice. That voice brought people together and enriched their lives.

Today, Samsung carries on that spirit of harmony. The 26 unique companies, that comprise the Samsung Group, are blending their creative talents to develop technology that brings people together and enriches their lives.

Over the past 50 years, our customers have come to trust the creative talent at Samsung. We will keep that trust by bringing together resources and simplifying technology to bring harmony to people's lives.

Embrace the future. Experience the harmony of Samsung.⁴⁶⁸

In the second stanza of the advertisement, the analogy between the octopus like structure of modern chaebols with their various family affiliated subsidiaries and the masterfully calibrated ancient chimes used as an instrument of traditional court culture, not only sanctifies the *chaebol* structure with traditional heritage it also blatantly gestures to their oligarchic position within South Korean society as a modern incarnation of traditional Korean aristocracy. The state and conglomerates claim on traditional culture and the nation, however, did not go uncontested, as seen in the appropriations of traditional culture by the anti-government pro-democracy and labor movements assembled under the broad based coalition of the *minjung* or people's movement throughout the late 1970s and 80s.⁴⁶⁹ These various anti-government movements and the pro-democracy mass uprising in June 1987 in the year prior to the Olympics led by many *minjung* activists, which brought about the first popular election that year since 1972 and removed Chun Doo Hwan from power—were making different claims on traditional culture against these official versions. This was certainly the case for the workers' uprising or the Great Workers' Struggle that erupted from July through September that same year with over 7,000 strikes launched across all industries from 1987-1989 leading to the eventual formation of the first independent union federation (KCTU) after decades of intense labor suppression.⁴⁷⁰ The state ideology of national culture was likewise challenged at the Olympics by the anti-government popular nationalism visible in the steady stream of student demonstrations prior to and throughout the Olympics—calling to “Oppose the dictators' Olympics” or “Oppose the half Olympics”, including an attempt to interrupt the torch relay across Korea with Molotov cocktails, a mainstay of the era, in opposition to the South Korean government's ignoring their demands for North Korea to co-host the Olympics as well as the government's obstruction of

⁴⁶⁸ Olympics advertisement reprinted in *Seoul Olympic Arts Festival 1988, 8.17 – 10.5* (Seoul: Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee, 1988), final fold out page advertisement.

⁴⁶⁹ Realist wood block prints of Korean peasants and workers were a significant part of the cultural nationalist repertoire of the *minjung* movement as were traditional drumming *pungmul* troupes.

⁴⁷⁰ On the Workers uprising, see Hagen Koo, *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); On the relation of the workers' uprising to the formation of the New Left in South Korea, see Alice S. Kim, “Left out: People's Solidarity for Social Progress and the Evolution of *Minjung* after Authoritarianism,” in Gi-wook Shin and Paul Y. Chang, eds., *South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society* (Routledge, 2011), pp. 245-269.

The advertisement features a large image of six traditional Korean bells (Dobong) hanging from a wooden rack. In the top left corner, there is a logo for the 50th anniversary of Samsung. Below the logo is a small inset photograph showing a group of people in traditional Korean attire (hanbok) gathered around a large bell. To the right of the inset is a block of text in Korean, which is partially obscured and difficult to read. At the bottom of the advertisement, the text reads: **Harmony – The Essence of Samsung's Innovative Spirit.**

Figure 51: Samsung Advertisement at the 1988 Seoul Olympics [Seoul Olympic Arts Festival, Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee, 1988]

their attempt to hold a summit with North Korean students.⁴⁷¹ Liberalization also unleashed the face of a new counter-hegemonic nationalism—which had been nurtured throughout the 1970s.

While Sandra Collins points to the first grouping—the Asian category—because she does not take this into account with the second and third groupings—the developing country, non-Western country, and the Cold War frames, her analysis of the first category is problematic in the case of South Korea. My analysis departs from the rather totalizing category of ‘self-orientalism’ as the representational paradigm of Asian Olympic hosts in Collins’ critique, through a re-evaluation of the significant role of ‘traditionalism’ in the reigning cultures of ‘international’ modernity and national cultural ideology. The airport kiwa terminal and the opening ceremony of the games strongly presented a cultural nationalist identity that was as traditional as it was modern. It did so in the manner of invented traditions—not unlike the cultural logic of the Olympic games, which was also an invented tradition that sought to create a link to a suitable historical past—though it referenced a different ancient past than Western European civilization. The appearance or interpretation of ‘exoticization’ or ‘self-orientalism’ of such Asian showings on the international stage—like we have seen in the evolving history of South Korean airports—embodies historical layers of contradictions and uneven encounters. The state’s cultural nationalism was certainly not ‘authentic’ or unmediated in so far as it was a retroactive highlighting or production but it did have a living base in society—however suppressed by modern development and instrumentalized by state imperatives. Instead the problem is how this traditional culture was *ideologically* deployed by the state. The politics of the burden of representation is a crucial element of the nexus of cultural imperialism, modern industrialization and national competition inherent in the cultural logic of the modern Olympic games and provides an analogous lens with which to examine the state’s evolving cultural policy and the continuities and transformations of cultural nationalism that came out with a vengeance during the developmental years—and why and how, when South Korea ‘came out’ to the most spectacular international stage, it came out as ‘Korean.’

⁴⁷¹ See for example, Kelly Tunney, “Radical Students Protest “Half Olympics,” *The Associated Press*, September 11, 1988; Ted Chan, “Students Threaten to Disrupt Olympics,” *United Press International*, September 23, 1988.

Conclusion - From Kimpo to Incheon Airport

관문(關門): (1) 통과해야 할 난관 a barrier [hurdle] to/in life;
문호 a gateway [to the Far East]. (2) 요새 { } 국경 등의 a
boundary [barrier] gate; a check point (거문소).

*김포 국제 공항은 한국의 { } 이다 Kimp'o International Airport
is the [modern] gateway to Korea (1)

-- Essence Korean-Korean/English-Korean/Korean-English
Dictionary entry for 'gateway'

Modernus, 'modern', means simply what is just now, the contemporary, as opposed to the 'antiquus' to the by-gone, the passed away. To obtain a non-relativized sense which can designate a whole new epoch of world history, the 'modern' had to acquire a new antonym so it could be opposed not to the 'ancient', but to the 'traditional', that which cannot keep up with the relentless force of historically progressing time. By announcing itself to be modern, the age [of Enlightenment] located its essence in its ability to be always-up-to-date, to be abreast of the times, where time is conceived of not as the inertial power of erosion, but as the creative force of change, which can be missed or harnessed for human ends.

--Gyorgy Markus, "A Society of Culture: the Constitution of Modernity," in *Rethinking Imagination*⁴⁷²

The Shifting Space-times of Korean Modernity: a Genealogy of the Postcolonial Airport in South Korea

KIMPO (1957-1960)

As the frenzied pace of urban development continues unabated in metropolitan Seoul, it is difficult to find traces of South Korea's first international airport terminal at Kimpo, which opened its doors to a post-colonial, post-divided, newly established nation-state and the capitalist "free world" on February 16, 1960. Along with the Cheongryangli metro station (1959), the Metro hotel (1959), the United States Operations Mission (USOM) headquarters (1959, currently the US Embassy building in Seoul), and the Freedom Center (1963) which housed the Asian Anti-Communist League, Kimpo airport was part of an elite handful of the first generation of 'modern' buildings, built in the International Style, of the reconstructed postwar capital emerging from the destruction of the Korean War (1950-1953). The facade exhibited the cutting-edge Euro-American Modernist International Style architectural trademark—the Corbusian *brise-*

⁴⁷² Gyorgy Markus, "A Society of Culture: the Constitution of Modernity," in Gillian Robinson and John Rundell, eds., *Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 17.

soleil (sun-screen) patterned in the *acha* motif (亞字)—a common decorative window and door lattice motif of classical Sino-inspired Korean vernacular/traditional architecture—while inside it was equipped with the most luxurious ‘modern’ facilities from the *k’ōp’i syop* (coffee shop) to western style toilets.

Once the pinnacle and testament of early postwar South Korean ‘modernity’, what remains today of this ideologically-laden symbolic marker and built structure that first tethered the desire for modernity with the Cold War politics of containment and integration, the aesthetics of Western Modernism and the cultural and social standards of an ‘international’ Western modernity, can only be found in old newspaper clippings and other archival records, South Korean Golden Age films and novels of the period, and in the tearful memories of the oldest living generation of South Koreans.⁴⁷³ The building still stands in the Kimpo airport complex on the western edge of Seoul, but its original form is hardly recognizable due to its endless extensions and expansions since the 1960s as it became harnessed to national economic development vis-à-vis international capitalist integration under the developmental state. With the construction of a new international terminal in 1980, it was relegated to a domestic terminal, and in 2001, with the opening of the newest Incheon international airport, it underwent its most dramatic transformation into E-MART (the Korean counterpart to Wal-mart), the leading South Korean big-box discount retailer chain, originally part of one of the nation’s largest *chaebols*, Samsung.⁴⁷⁴

KIMPO (1972-1980)

The large-scale expansion of Kimpo airport, including the construction of a new international terminal building, which was planned and erected alongside the repressive Yushin constitution in 1972 and the heavy and chemical industrialization plan for national development under the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1971-1976) were accompanied by significant changes to the aesthetics and ethos of Kimpo’s ‘modernism.’ Initiated in 1972 and completed in 1980, in place of the Corbusian-*acha brise-soleil*, a modernized variation on the *kiwa* roof, a representative figure of ‘traditional’ ‘Korean’ architecture, resembling ancient palace roofs and those of modern national museums, which proliferated under the state cultural policy during this period, predominate in the 1980 terminal building. Facilitating the state’s regulation of flows of capital, commodities and people through its borders as well as the protection and build up of nascent national industries, including the initial establishment of Korean Airlines as a public corporation, Kimpo airport began to function as a key infrastructural component of national economic development since the 1960s and an instrument of the developmental state to maneuver the uneven terrain of global capitalism. Through the state’s regulated emigration and labor-export policies, the airport terminal carefully controlled both the ingress of raw materials, foreign exchange, technology transfers, American soldiers, diplomats, and businessmen, as well as the egress of raw materials, textiles, Korean diplomats, soldiers,

⁴⁷³ Interestingly, another important constituent group in whose memory this airport remains is that of U.S. veterans stationed in Korea, many on Kimpo Airbase, as Kimpo began with military beginnings and initially served as a military/civilian mixed-use facility.

⁴⁷⁴ E-Mart’s American counterpart/competitor, Wal-Mart, failed to successfully break into the South Korean consumer market and ended up selling its 16 outlets to E-Mart and leaving South Korea in 2006. See for example: Choe Sang-hun, “Wal-mart Selling Stores and Leaving South Korea,” *New York Times* (May 23, 2006), World Business section. Accessed on April 27, 2009: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/23/business/worldbusiness/23shop.html?ex=1306036800&en=af8236900d13fd8d&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss>.

students and technical trainees, military brides, adoptees, and migrant workers. As reflected in the airport emigration narratives in the South Korean film and literature of the period, Kimpo airport was for many Koreans the site of the most tearful farewells.

Spawned during the most politically repressive and economically dynamic period of South Korean history, the new modern *kiwa* terminal presented a visible icon of the paradoxical process of standardizations demanded by global capitalist integration as well as particularizations demanded by national capitalism in the attempt to challenge and change its position in the global hierarchy of uneven accumulation which was also closely interlinked with Park Chung Hee's legitimacy crisis and anti-communism. It also stood as testament to the 'invention' of a tradition-based national cultural identity in service of the bureaucratic authoritarian development of 'Korea, Inc.,' which aligned the airport with the didactic function of new national museums as part of an emerging aesthetic and ideology of national culture across Seoul since the mid 1960s, promoted alongside the intense repressions and instrumentalization of its citizens, at the same time it disconnected it from the International Style of the USOM/ US Aid office.

KIMPO (1980-1988)

The second *kiwa* terminal, initiated in 1980 under the new military regime of Chun Doo Hwan, to coincide with the 1988 international debut of the nation's 'economic miracle' at the Seoul Olympic Games, signaled new modifications to the standardizations and particularizations attending the state's regulated engagement with global capitalism as the state began to transition toward political and economic liberalization stemming from both external and internal pressures. Much like the state's coordination of national cultural developmentalism as a counterpart to the standardizations attending preparations for the Olympic games, a similar dialectic also characterized the state's phased liberalization of air travel. Planned and built alongside the near decade long development project of the Seoul Olympic games as the national threshold for the international Olympic community, the revised *kiwa* styled roof of the new terminal corrected to better reflect the iconography of the 'Korean' *kiwa* as opposed to other Asian variants, fell in line with the state's invention of a "new image of Korea" presented to an expanded global audience beyond the bounded Cold War geography that had heretofore characterized the international landscape for South Korea. The iconic role of the improved *kiwa* like the opening ceremony signaled new departures for national cultural ideology expanding beyond its function as national developmental ideology to foster nascent cultural industries in sports and traditional crafts, as well as the use of international cultural exchanges to foster new trade and diplomatic relationships with Soviet bloc and other developing countries.

With the opening of Incheon airport in 2001, both of the eighties Kimpo terminals were displaced, along with their concomitant discourses of 'Cold War internationalism.' Both *kiwa* terminals of Kimpo airport were relegated to serving as the *domestic* airport, as the 1960 terminal had been so relegated with the opening of the 1980 terminal. And like the transformation of the 1960 terminal into E-MART with Incheon's opening, the Kimpo terminals were also given new commercial functions as a mixed-use facility alongside processing domestic passenger traffic with the opening of a movie theater, a wedding hall and an electronics and clothing outlet inside the terminal spaces.

INCHEON (1989-2001)

Kimpo's most dramatic and largest-scale expansion and displacement yet, Incheon international airport opened in March 2001 as one the most ambitious airport projects in the

world with a new cosmopolitan focus, stemming from the changing geopolitical landscape of post-cold war globalization and new regional competition among Asian neighbors. Initiated in 1989 with the selection of the new airport site, Incheon airport opened in March 2001 after eight years and four months of construction at a cost of 9 billion dollars, employing up to 13,000 workers a day at its height [figures 52-55].⁴⁷⁵ Situated atop an artificially reclaimed extension of Yeongjeong Island encompassing 5,616 hectares of artificially engineered land and billed as the largest civil engineering project in South Korean history, Incheon airport is located approximately thirty-two miles west of Kimpo, connected to Seoul by a high speed rail and road transportation network. Together with Kansai International Airport (1994), floating off the coast of Osaka, Japan, and Chek Lap Kok International Airport (1998) built upon an expanded Lantau Island of Hong Kong, Incheon prides itself an exemplary subset of the new 'island' mega-airport or 'airport city' phenomenon. Shorn of conspicuous signifiers of Korean 'traditional' or 'national' culture in its structure, however much the architects try to attribute local specificity to the buildings, the new glass and steel 'high-tech' modernism of Incheon's mega-sized terminal also closely resemble the aesthetic of its inter-Asian counterparts, all three authored by Western-based 'global' auteur architects forming a roster of some of the world's most acclaimed architects. They also resemble a new generation of airports opening up elsewhere in the world at the end of the 20th century from San Francisco to Frankfurt. Incheon was designed by the joint foreign-domestic collaboration of the American firm Fentress and Bradburn reputed for their distinctive design of the new Denver International Airport and KACI a consortium of large corporate Korean architecture firms, in a shift from both the foreign government contract firm TAMS used for the 1980 kiwa terminal or the domestic firms that designed the 1988 kiwa terminal.⁴⁷⁶ Replete with exposed steel trusses and curtain glass walls, this recent architectural fashion is dubbed "government style" by some Koreans and has become the preferred aesthetic for large institutional and commercial showcase projects across the nation. This new high-tech and global *auteured* aesthetic stitches together Incheon airport with the new glass and steel Dong-a Tower in downtown Seoul, Rem Koolhaas' design of the Seoul National University Art Museum, and the Dongdaemoon [East gate] stadium redevelopment project designed by Zaha Hadid, inscribing yet a new aesthetic layer upon the fragmentary aesthetic landscape of Seoul with a new symbolic ordering.⁴⁷⁷ Undoubtedly forming part of a new aesthetic vanguard in the Korean landscape, the new terminal now lays claim to not only the most modern edifice in Seoul but of the world, along with a new 'East Asian' identity. As the Korean Overseas Information Service (KOIS) has claimed:

⁴⁷⁵ Incheon airport was initiated in 1989, with the master plan approved in 1992. The actual cost of Incheon has been cited as low as 7 billion and high as 11 billion according to different news sources. Headed by the Incheon International Airport Corporation (IIAC), which is a public corporation (*gongsa*) with semi-autonomous management (the CEOs are appointed by the state), the South Korean government faces continuing pressure from the U.S. to privatize the airport. See for example, Seung-Ryun Kim, "US Criticizes Korean Trade Barriers," *Dong-a Ilbo*, 3 April 2006 [on-line edition]; Accessed on May 21, 2006:
<http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=060000&biid=2006040325018>.

⁴⁷⁶ Fentress Bradburn & Associates, P.C., is a firm with a global resume of projects but located in Denver, Colorado. The project was actually jointly headed by Fentress Bradburn & Associates and KACI (Korean Architects Collaborative International), a consortium of four Korean architecture firms as well as McClier Aviation, though the latter two are rarely publicized.

⁴⁷⁷ The Dongdaemun redevelopment project brought down the historical colonial era Dongdaemun stadium to build the new structure.



Figure 52: Incheon International Airport, Yeongjong Island, Incheon [Photo taken October 8, 2005: by en:Image:Incheon Airport.jpg, released as public Domain by the photographer (en:User:Siqbal), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Incheon_International_Airport.jpg]



Figure 53: Incheon International Airport, Transportation Center [Photo taken January 25, 2003]



Figure 54: Incheon International Airport, Departures Hall [Photo taken November 16, 2006]



Figure 55: Incheon International Airport, Departures Hall [Photo taken August 18, 2008]

The Republic of Korea's gleaming Incheon International Airport has become a model for a modern international airport for the nations of the world; its futuristic design and its remarkably rational, efficient and convenient layout has impressed architects everywhere...it has become literally the "21st Century Hub Airport of East Asia."⁴⁷⁸

Accompanying and testifying to the East Asian economic 'miracle,' the bravado, unprecedented scale, innovative engineering, global high-tech designs, and *recognition* of these new sensational East Asian airports emerging since the 90s from architects and engineers across the world drastically set them apart from their modest Cold War predecessors: Kimpo (1960, 1980, 1988), Haneda (1955) and Narita (1978) and Hong Kong's Kai Tak (1957) airports. Indexing major geopolitical shifts such as the collapse of Soviet socialism, the global spread of the neoliberal Washington Consensus, and the rise of newly industrialized East Asian nations, the new international gateway donned its latest identity as the "21st century hub of Northeast Asia," embedded within new discourses of 'globalization', 'regionalism' and 'neoliberalism.'

New Departures and Arrivals for South Korean Cosmopolitan Nationalism: 'the 21st Century Hub of Northeast Asia'

The dramatic economic and political changes on both national and international scales have prompted once again a new representational repertoire for South Korea's latest gateway. Along with the continuing process of economic liberalization of South Korean markets and political democratization of state and society, including increased mobility with the lifting of the rigid international travel regulations for Korean nationals in 1989, nascent democratization and the institutionalization of 'civil society,' which have been dismantling developmental state mechanisms since the 1980s, the planning and construction of Incheon airport also correspondingly moved away from both the 'traditionalist' façades that indexed nationalist modernity and the national capitalism of Korea, Inc. in its 1980 and 1988 forerunners and the prevailing discourse of national development and anticommunism within the Cold War internationalist frame that underpinned them. New imperatives of national development responding to the altered post-Cold War geopolitical frame that were to shape the new form and function of Incheon airport are reflected in the 1991 Draft Master Plan for Incheon Airport jointly prepared by the U.S.-based global engineering firm Bechtel and the Korean firm Yooshin Engineering (which had designed the 1988 terminal). While the expansion of Kimpo with the development of Incheon airport under a new coordinated two-airport strategy (with Kimpo serving domestic travel, while Incheon handles all international travel) remained part of the state's strategy for continued national economic development to "stimulate [Korea's] national economy and enhance [Korea's] quality of life"—the new role that the airport was to play towards the "realization of this opportunity" for continued development "to maximize...economic benefits" were now linked to both the nation's dramatic development

⁴⁷⁸ Korean Overseas Information Service (KOIS), "Korea Leads the Way for the Airport of the Future," Press release published on December 7, 2005 on the South Korean government's official English homepage; Accessed on May 21, 2006: http://www.korea.net/News/News/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20051207003.

“over the past 20 years” which has positioned Korea “to become a world leader in technology and international trade,” and new geopolitical factors such as the “rapid economic expansion in Asia” as well as “the rapidly improving relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China” affecting the nation’s developing and desired international connections.⁴⁷⁹

Although Incheon airport was planned as a “global gateway,” this was primarily mediated through the regional scale as part of a regional aviation strategy; Incheon Airport was planned to compete as a leading Northeast Asian hub airport, linking not only the nation but this region to a global network of hub airports.⁴⁸⁰ With the rapid growth of the Northeast Asian aviation market and forecasts for 50% of air traffic to pass through the Pacific Rim by 2010, a large proportion of the new generation of airports and terminals emerging since the 1990s have been located in East Asian countries and the Pacific Rim region.⁴⁸¹ The most ambitious of these projects are also disproportionately located in this region with new monikers like ‘airport-cities,’ reflecting their gigantism and multi-functionality as international business and logistics centers. Amidst the broader building boom in many parts of East and Southeast Asia since the 1990s, international airports have come to compete alongside luxury skyscrapers as the new railroad stations of the modern jet age.⁴⁸² The fierce competition among states in this region to locate the world’s biggest and most sensational airport within their borders as *the* “21st Century Hub Airport of East Asia” for global air traffic and especially traffic to and from rapidly industrializing China, among other locales, thus supplies an important new geo-political dimension to contemporary airports in East Asia. The new Chek Lap Kok airport in Hong Kong

⁴⁷⁹ Korea Airports Authority, Draft Master Plan: New Seoul Metropolitan Airport, Prepared by Bechtel and Yooshin Engineering Corporation (Seoul: Korea Airports Authority, 1991), p. ES-1, 2-2. Another significant element listed as one of the four geopolitical factors for the airport expansion was the prospect of the reunification of North and South Korea. Much like the focus on reunification in the cultural policy since 1990, the Master Plan surmised: “With reunification, there is a very high probability Seoul will become a domestic hub for the Korean peninsula” (2-3).

⁴⁸⁰ The history of the hub airport phenomenon forms an important backdrop to Incheon’s regional aviation strategy. In brief, it is an offshoot of the 1978 U.S. Airline Deregulation Act that opened to market forces many international air routes and pricing structures. As a consequence, the airline industry went through repeated rounds of consolidation resulting in a small number of mega-carriers who then sought to centralize their operations in a single large airport. In the context of East Asia, hub airports tend to be directly linked to its national carriers. As much as Incheon Airport strives to be a hub of Northeast Asia, it also performs as a hub for South Korea’s two national carriers, Korean Airlines and Asiana Airlines, which occupy over fifty percent of Incheon’s ticketing desks and boarding gates. For a discussion of the effects of deregulation on airport terminal design, see Thomas Fisher, “P/A Inquiry: Airport Terminals: the Effect of Deregulation and Terrorism on Airport Design,” *Progressive Architecture* v. 68 (March 1987), pp. 96-103. For a more extended discussion of the Deregulation Act itself, see Paul S. Dempsey & Andrew Goetz, *Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology* (Westport, CN and London: Quorum Books, 1992). Terminal 2 of Singapore Changi airport built in 1989 can be seen as the first of these Asian-mega airports.

⁴⁸¹ John C. Mok, “Asia-Pacific Airborne,” *Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy* 13, no.3 (Fall, 1998), pp. 84-9. The following is a short list of recently completed airports: Terminal 2 at Singapore Changi International Airport (1989), Denver International Airport, U.S. (1995), Kuala Lumpur Airport, Malaysia (1998), Shanghai Pudong Airport, China (1999), Doha International Airport, Qatar (2000), San Francisco International Terminal (2001); and the three ‘island’ airports: Kansai International Airport, Japan (1994), Chek Lap Kok Airport, Hong Kong (1998), and Incheon Airport, South Korea (2001). Beijing Airport outplaced Chek Lap Kok and Heathrow as the largest airport to date with the completion of Terminal 3 in 2007.

⁴⁸² The race to build the tallest skyscraper can be cited as an analogue to this phenomenon, which is also prominent among East and Southeast Asian nations. Other related phenomena include a new series of art museums also featuring auteur designs and a spate of international art fairs (biennales) and film festivals launched in various countries of the Global South since the 1990’s. In South Korea, both the Gwangju Biennale and the Pusan Film festival opened during this decade.

[figures 7-8] was initiated at the same time as Incheon airport in 1989, although among other factors, Hong Kong's return to China in 1997 hastened the completion of Chek Lap Kok airport.⁴⁸³ Both Incheon and Hong Kong's new Chek Lap Kok airport (1998) undoubtedly perform as modern emblems of East Asian capitalist progress, yet each airport also vies for distinction in their competition to locate the most modern airport within its borders. Collectively, they participate in the imagining of a distinctive recently developed and economically expanding 'Asia-Pacific' region, while competitively, each vies with the other to position itself as *the* global hub, seeking the material benefits such status confers to their larger national economies such as the increased value of national exports abroad or the influx of foreign capital and tourist revenues at home. And crucially, both seek to establish themselves as the base of East Asian hub operations for passenger and cargo traffic in and out of China and the East Asian region.

The new regional frame of East Asian capitalism and competition also formed a crucial element of the new aesthetic and ethos of Incheon airport, which can be seen as a regional subset of the shared universal global fashions of high-tech modernism. Chek Lap Kok and Incheon both leave behind the concrete garb and modest size of their predecessors with massive technological exoskeleton-like structures supported by exposed steel trusses and encased in glass and steel skins; both attest to the most vanguard designs and advanced facilities on a global level, as well as call attention to their globally acclaimed architects.⁴⁸⁴ In the case of Incheon, the opening up of the new terminal design to an international design competition and the design guidelines for the terminal reflect key shifts from the both the selection of previous Kimpo architects—which progressed from Ministry of Transportation civil servants, to US government contract firms obligated by loan agreements, and then private Korean engineering and architecture firms—as well as the design criteria. Unlike the traditionalist national cultural aesthetic of the 1980 and 1988 terminals, which was mandated by the Ministry of Transportation, the design guidelines for the international design competition of Incheon airport are both stylistically open and aligned to the global-East Asian regional focus. According to the competition regulations, the design of the passenger terminals “shall possess the symbolic characteristic as the gateway of the country,” and incorporate “creative new technology which will cope with aviation demands of the 21st century and act as a hub airport in Northeast Asia.”⁴⁸⁵ This open definition of “the symbolic characteristic of the gateway the country,” have led to the ‘high-tech modern’ variations of massive open-spaced terminal designs across East Asia, each of which are called upon to ‘evoke’ local or national characteristics, which are difficult to see without the explicit guidance by each of their global auteur architects. In the case of Incheon, as Curt Fentress writes:

Our vision for the passenger terminal embodies the beauty and history of Korea as it showcases its art, traditions, and culture...The design finds both overt and subtle ways to make Incheon a memorable gateway to the region

⁴⁸³ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region, Report of the Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok since 6 July 1998 and related issues, Volume I: Main report and Minutes of Proceedings (1 January 1999).

⁴⁸⁴ Chek Lap Kok was designed by Norman Foster, a leading figure of the British-based high tech architecture movement, who also designed the HSBC bank headquarters in Central, Hong Kong Island with its commanding economic, political, and aesthetic presence.

⁴⁸⁵ Korea Airports Authority, Guidelines of the International Design Competition for the New Seoul Metropolitan Airport Passenger Terminal, April 1992 (Seoul: Korea Airports Authority, 1992), pp. 57, 38.

and haven for the weary travelers infusing the airport with the rich heritage of Korean culture.⁴⁸⁶

Some of the more “subtle” aspects might be gleaned from Fentress’ claim that “the swooping rooflines are a modern interpretation of historic Korean architecture,” while “the masts supporting the roof are an echo of the ships in Inchon harbor.”⁴⁸⁷ While the roof remains the design focus and the locus of national or local identity, as was the case with the two 1970s and 1980s kiwa terminals, the “modern interpretations” of historic Korean architecture at Incheon and Kimpo reveal significant stylistic differences as well as present quite different conceptions or grammatical models for how national qualities or national identity could be represented. The Italian architect Renzo Piano famous for the Pompidou Center in Paris, and who is credited with Japan’s Kansai International terminal building (1994), one of the earlier models of this East Asian high tech modernism echoes this sentiment while providing an explanation of this new grammar of representation:

We have not tried to copy a Japanese roof. But we did try to pick up the basic qualities of Japanese architecture—its lightness, its transparency, the scale of its details, its texture. This is what Japanese architecture is about. In fact, in some cases it is so light that it almost becomes immaterial.... And this is the reason why this huge building has been built in pieces. It has been broken down, even the structure, into parts. So the Japanese aspects of the building are the spirit of the way in which it has been constructed.... the spirit is almost one of the temporary building, just like a traditional Japanese building—light and broken down into a number of parts...⁴⁸⁸

It is important to situate these claims within two interrelated contexts. On the one hand, there has been a frenzy of transnational architectural practice in East and Southeast Asia since the beginning of the 1990s as many of the “top architects of the world have flocked to the Asian opportunity.”⁴⁸⁹ While regional architects receive over 4000% more work than their Western counterparts in these rapidly urbanizing countries, “international” auteur architects are regularly imported to design highly visible public structures, which then function as ‘national’ showpieces.⁴⁹⁰ What appears to have become a guiding motif of the representational repertoire of the nation and its traditional culture and geography is both a new openness to international cultural exchanges as well as the association of national identity or traditional cultural qualities with the “symbolic” or cultural capital of international recognition of vanguard cultural artifacts or buildings. This also suggests and follows from the shift in cultural policy for national development, which since the 1980s has “gradually opened its door to foreign cultural industries” whereby “the importing of films and music records from foreign countries was formally permitted and foreign film companies were able to distribute their products directly

⁴⁸⁶ *American Institute of Architects*, Spring 2002 newsletter, Colorado.

⁴⁸⁷ Curt Fentress quoted in Marcus Binney, *Airport Builders* (London: Academy Editions, 1999), p. 187.

⁴⁸⁸ Renzo Piano, “On Monuments, Machines and Temporality,” an interview with Hiroyuki Suzuki, in *Kansai International Airport Passenger Terminal Building, Process Architecture* 122 (Tokyo, Japan: Process Architecture Co., Ltd., 1994), p. 9.

⁴⁸⁹ Vicki Goldberg, “The Emerald Megacities of Southeast Asia,” *New York Times* (April 11, 2004), p. 30.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

within Korea.”⁴⁹¹ At the same time, as we saw with the particularizations of the Olympic games, cultural identity has come to be “regarded as an essential part of the competitiveness of the state within a global society.”⁴⁹² With the state’s intent on using national cultural identity “as a tool for globalizing national culture and the arts,” rather than “as a means of resisting cultural globalization” characteristic of the 1960s through the 70s, from the 1990s, “reconstruction of cultural identity” geared towards exploiting “the economic value of culture and the arts...has provided a significant rationale for fostering cultural industries.”⁴⁹³ The globalization or “seggyehwa” [(Korean style) globalization] policies of the Kim Young Sam administration (1993-1998) intensified promotion of “international cultural exchange” as well as “support for cultural industries,” continuing into the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998-2003) “with the express purpose of improving the international competitiveness of domestic cultural industries since the end of the 1990s.”⁴⁹⁴

Thus on the other side of the new openness to international cultural exchanges since the 1980s—for which the Olympics provided a signal template—was the new cultural developmentalist partnerships between domestic and foreign firms and culture related organizations fostered by government policies that were also crucial to the production of Incheon airport. In addition to the new “symbolic” national representational guidelines, the condition of entry in the Incheon airport design competition required the “joint participation by a local architectural firm which has registered in accordance with domestic law and a foreign architectural firm and consultants with experience in designing airport passenger terminals.”⁴⁹⁵ This joint participation rule, which can also be seen at work in the Master Plan for Incheon jointly prepared by Bechtel and Yooshin, presents an important modification to the historical process of technology transfers and training from advanced industrial centers such as the U.S. and Japan throughout postwar development, but it serves a similar developmental purpose. Just as the “nation’s continued economic growth in technology development and international trade is dependent on the continued expansion of [Korea’s] gateway traffic” through the realization of “world-class aviation” as “airports are the modern cross-roads that link transportation and commerce,” the design and production of a world-class Korean airport was also a target and vehicle of the nation’s aspirations “to become a world leader in technology and international trade.”⁴⁹⁶ This joint participation rule can be seen as a common developmental paradigm in South Korea’s cultural globalization projects.⁴⁹⁷ Although in many of these cases, as with the

⁴⁹¹ Hakwoon Yim, “Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea,” *The International Journal of Cultural Policy* 8, no. 1 (2002), p. 46.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 47

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁴⁹⁵ Korea Airports Authority, *Guidelines of the International Design Competition for the New Seoul Metropolitan Airport Passenger Terminal*, April 1992 (Seoul: Korea Airports Authority, 1992), p. 39.

⁴⁹⁶ Korea Airports Authority, *Draft Master Plan: New Seoul Metropolitan Airport*, Prepared by Bechtel and Yooshin Engineering Corporation (Seoul: Korea Airports Authority, 1991), p. 2-1.

⁴⁹⁷ For example, in the 2011 Gwangju Design Biennale, Korean architect Seung H-Sang was paired with Chinese artist Ai Weiwei as Co-Artistic directors, as well as the same pairings being reproduced in various sublevel curatorial sections. This both facilitates communication and practical legalities between the government organizations sponsoring these projects like the Gwangju Biennale Association with their Kafkaesque bureaucratic structures or the Korea Airports Authority in the airport case and foreign culture related professionals, as well as assisting connections and access between the Korean counterpart and the global connections to people and institutions brought in by the global culture professionals as well as new models and ideas for the continuing development of the Korean partner professionals and government sponsored cultural institutions.

airport, the ‘global’ architects primarily get the billing for the projects in order to also strategically capitalize on their name recognition value.

In addition, much like the new strategies of international exchange to enhance national competitiveness and build up South Korean technological capacities, the development of Incheon airport was also part of centrally coordinated city, district, and state-wide urban development measures as a subset of larger economic initiatives to foster international trade. Situated within the larger local context of the development of the New Metropolitan City of Incheon whose boundaries and administrative districts were redrawn in 1989, Incheon Airport was part of a joint local and national government development project to redevelop Incheon from a major industrial satellite of Seoul during South Korea’s rapid industrialization into a logistics hub and high-tech enclave of South Korea.⁴⁹⁸ The development of Incheon airport and the new “digital city” of Songdo—a tabula rasa construction of a high-tech mecca—were central to these urban makeovers, as well as the establishment of Incheon International Airport Free Economic Zone along with two other FEZs in major Korean ports cities, Pusan and Gwangyang in 2003. Paradoxically, despite the internationalism avowed in these spaces, the strategic importance of Incheon airport as well as the transformation of the Metropolitan City of Incheon to the new neo-liberal development policy of the South Korean government shows strong evidence of supporting a centralized national economic project to out-compete neighboring countries “as the ‘hub’ for economic activity in East Asia.”⁴⁹⁹ As the *Financial Times* reported, “President Noh has made turning the country into the financial, manufacturing and logistics hub of the region a key component of his long-term economic plan.”⁵⁰⁰

However global its new appearance, the development of Incheon airport was a crucial element of continuing strategies of national economic growth responding to new exigencies of the nation’s rapid industrialization in the preceding years and the altered geopolitics of the global capitalist system. The appropriation of cosmopolitan culture, capital, and technology for nationalist purposes is not a new phenomenon for Korea, but has been a key part of the nation’s search for national autonomy whether in its first encounter with Western and Japanese imperialist dispossessions or throughout the period of rapid industrialization via state-regulated engagements with international markets and cultures of modernization. Moreover, this was not specific to Korea, but shared throughout East Asia.⁵⁰¹ Here cosmopolitanism is not at odds with nationalism but strategic to its sustenance.

⁴⁹⁸ Incheon has been one of the most important manufacturing centers for South Korea’s economic development since the 1960s. The city limits of Incheon were redrawn to include a number of adjacent districts and the creation of new ones to form the New Metropolitan City of Incheon. For a discussion of the importance of the new development of Incheon in the context of restructuring the bankrupt Daewoo automobile industry, a major South Korean conglomerate/*chaebol* and a theoretical examination of the politics of forgetting, see Yong-Sook Lee, “Debt Restructuring and the Politics of Exclusion: A Case Study of the Daewoo Motor Bupyeong Plants in Incheon, South Korea,” *Urban Studies* 41, no. 12 (November 2004), 2395-2414.

⁴⁹⁹ James Crotty and Kang Kook Lee, “The Effects of Neoliberal “Reforms” on the Post-Crisis Korean Economy,” *Political Economy Research Institute (University of Massachusetts Amherst)*, Working Paper 111 (September 2005), p. 19.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.* James Crotty and Kang Kook Lee have also pointed out that South Korea’s so-called “recovery” substantially increased inequality and poverty for the majority of South Koreans, while deteriorating labor’s conditions. Moreover, Roh’s hub plan “would necessitate giving global financial institutions control of virtually all of Korea’s financial markets and the dismantling of most regulatory controls.”

⁵⁰¹ For the Chinese case, see for example, Leo Ou-Fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

These airports fall within the frame of producing more permanent and controlled spectacles of community⁵⁰² but we cannot simply interpret their forms in terms of ‘postmodern pastiche’ or ‘cultural vernacularism’ of the American corporatist type as theorized in regard to exclusively Western cities. Rather, these buildings look and feel quite modern and the (at times largely rhetorical) vernacularism attributed to them are couched exclusively in terms of national identity. As Alan Colquhoun has argued, Norman Foster’s high-tech utopian design for the Bank of Hong Kong, bearing the same aesthetic as his Chek Lap Kok Airport, represents a new kind of ‘regionalism’ “that has nothing to do with any vernacular utopia or any critique of industrialism” but rather “suggests a connection between a certain kind of architecture and a certain kind of national consciousness.”⁵⁰³ Moreover, they also depart from the predominant theory of postmodernist architecture as an expression of the “ideology of the space of flows,” which relies on the logic of global connection and disconnection attached to two distinct types of spaces, the space of flows and the space of places.⁵⁰⁴ According to Castells, while history, locality, identity and community are allocated to the space of ‘places’, the ‘places’ absorbed into the space of flows are embodied in new ahistorical homogenized urban forms such as airports and hotel chains. Linked by communication and transportation technologies, flows of capital, information, technology, organizational interaction, sounds, and images organize the global space of a cosmopolitan technocratic elite, whose cultural and economic interests are taken as the dominating force of social and spatial organization today.⁵⁰⁵ If the stark ‘nudity,’ ‘silence,’ and ‘ahistoricity’ of the ‘postmodern’ aesthetic of Barcelona airport serve to epitomize, for Castells, the architectural uniformity arising from “the new cultural connectedness” between the different nodes of the ‘space of flows,’ then the ‘space of places’ finds its classic expression in the ‘plural urbanity’ and ‘active street life of bustling immigrants, both old and new, in the Parisian quartier of Belleville, defined by its external positioning in relation to the network society. The “postmodern” airport is a paradigmatic flow space for Castells insofar as it manifests aesthetically the physical and symbolic disconnection of flows from the places it comes to occupy. The ‘place’ absorbed into flow space gains its meaning not from historically rooted social interactions occurring within them but from the function it serves in the global network to which it is connected via “a circuit of electronic impulses.”⁵⁰⁶

As with Incheon’s forerunners at Kimpo, the strategic development and nationalist appropriation of Incheon airport, arising from the highly uneven historical geographical experience of capitalist integration—wherein national modernization occurred in and through these transportation technologies and international flows, in a however heterodox and state regulated fashion where emancipation and repression went hand in hand—complicates the easy confluence between the cosmopolitan ethos and the postmodern aesthetic of the airport and calls into question the declining significance of the nation-state. Unlike the silence and nudity ascribed to the “postmodern” sensibility of Barcelona airport by Castells, the aesthetic form and space of Incheon Airport is called upon to symbolize national development and progress closer to the ethos of modernist monumentality than postmodern ahistorical vernacularism, not least because

⁵⁰² See David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).

⁵⁰³ Alan Colquhoun, “Regionalism and Technology,” *Modernity and the Classical Tradition: Architectural Essays 1980-1987* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 207, 211.

⁵⁰⁴ Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society, Volume 1* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996), p. 421.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

of its political economic and historical-geographical experience with uneven global capitalist accumulation. Like many of the spectacular construction projects across East Asia, in conjunction with the material and functional benefits of these large infrastructural airport projects, their sensational ‘global’ aesthetic as well as ‘global’ auteur architect plays an important role instantiating the nation-state’s level of national development to date and gesturing towards future aspirations to move higher up the ladder in the world economic hierarchy. Thus the nation-state’s active campaign to both materially and discursively produce the airport as a ‘global’ showpiece, while utilizing the airport for new strategies toward continued national development as well as new ideological symbols of nationalism point to a strong national economic project to position Incheon-Seoul as the Northeast Asian hub of East Asia on a regional scale and raise its world city ranking on the global scale, rather than corroborating a ‘postmodernist’ ‘global city’ or ‘flow space’ de-nationalizing discourse.

Like the ‘symbolic’ evocations of national culture of these high tech modern terminal designs, this new grammar of representation of signifying Korean ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘global’ modernity is moreover illustrated in the carefully museumized interior horticultural displays of national/native trees and plants—a shared repertoire among most of the new East Asian airports. At Incheon, in the Great Hall situated between the arrivals and departures levels, 65 feet tall ‘native’ pine trees loom at the center of Incheon airport inserted into recessed planters, providing the illusion of a tree-lined urban sidewalk, broken only by the museum labels that accompany the trees asserting their local or national specificity, evoking natural history museums or national arboretums [figures 56-58]. They also ensure that the trees function, metonymically, as a representation of Korea itself, while also gesturing to Korea and Incheon as part of a larger regional series. While identifying the terminal—and Incheon International Airport as a whole—as both ‘Korean’ and ‘global,’ the trees also provide an obvious counterpoint to the technological superstructure of the terminal as their trunks disappear into the floor of the terminal—piercing the technological exoskeleton—to seek out the soil of the island itself and, more distantly, the mythic mountains from which they were harvested. Yet, at the same time that they appear to function as indexical signs that anchor the airport to those mythic mountains where such trees flourish, they also testify to disappearance of the very mountains that were ‘reclaimed’ for the construction of the airport.

The Lingering Traces and Historically Produced Contradictions of the Postcolonial Airport

Like the definition of ‘modernity’ itself, the airport may not only be “the world’s most revolutionary structure,”⁵⁰⁷ but also in a historical sense a structure that can essentially be conceived of as perpetual innovation. The possibility of expansion is built into the very nature and design of airports, much like the potential of change in society. Both practically and as a rule, airports never begin operating at capacity. In May 2008, Incheon airport completed its second phase expansion with a new concourse—separating departure gates for national and foreign carriers into separate buildings—upon which the third phase expansion commenced. Incheon airport’s master plan includes multiple stages of development continuing into the year 2020. Spanning over half a century of innovation and obsolescence, creation and destruction in the evolution of South Korean international gateways, Incheon airport is the most recent space

⁵⁰⁷ Alastair Gordon, *Naked Airport: A Cultural History of the World’s Most Revolutionary Structure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).




Figure 56: Incheon International Airport, Nam June Paik exhibit with Trees [Photo taken March 12, 2008]



Figure 57: Incheon International Airport, Departures Hall, Trees, [Photo taken November 16, 2006]



Figure 58: Incheon International Airport, Exterior Trees [Photo taken November 16, 2006]

and vehicle of the continuing project of the nation-state's postwar modernization and capitalist development in the current global configuration. Instantiating the nation-state's level of economic and cultural development on the world stage, the new global ethos of Incheon, much like the internationalism of the first Kimpo terminal and the more traditionalist nationalism of the second and third, functions as a material and symbolic marker of the nation's latest modernity, now seeking a new cosmopolitan image in response to the exigencies of neoliberal global capitalism. As South Korea enters the 'hub' wars with the newly globalized Incheon International Airport as part of new generation of mega-airports within an uneven matrix of neoliberal global capitalism, these spaces remain ideologically charged as the site of significant social, cultural and economic mediations by which the nation-states negotiate the exigencies of global capital and culture demanded by modern industrialization in the current phase of global restructuring.

One way in which the postcolonial airport operates as a metaphor for 'modernity' is in the sense of being 'developed.' While the succession of international airports as the changing index of the most 'modern' space in South Korea may appear to follow a linear progressive time, the contradictions that both accompanied the nation's development as well as those generated by it interrupt the story of Korean modernity as a belated model of Western processes and experiences of modernization and capitalist development as well as the meaning and experience of those processes. While the airport, like the railroads before it was a crucial site and vehicle of integrating South Korean 'modernization' and experiences of 'modernity,' with various sites, processes and experiences of modernization across the bounded geography of Cold War modernization and since the 1990s toward an expanded world geography of modernization, they cannot be seen as homogenous belated elements of these modern industrial counterparts. Stressing the relational production and reproduction of the space of capitalism, Henri Lefebvre insists that the "abstract space of capitalism" is "founded on the vast network of banks, business centers and major productive entities, as also on motorways, airports, and information lattices."⁵⁰⁸ But at the same time, within this global space produced of capitalism, "we are confronted not by one social space but many—indeed by an unlimited multiplicity or uncountable set of social spaces which we refer to generically as 'social space'."⁵⁰⁹ As Lefebvre emphasizes "No space disappears in the course of growth and development: the *worldwide does not abolish the local*...The intertwinement of social spaces is also a law. Considered in isolation, such spaces are mere abstractions. As *concrete abstractions*, however, they attain 'real' existence by virtue of networks and pathways, by virtue of bunches of clusters of relationships."⁵¹⁰ In the modern South Korean experience, these pathways like airports were also produced by, as well as a means of producing the multiple uneven social spaces of South Korean modernity as 'concrete abstractions.' Examining both the diachronic as well as synchronic production of the modern postcolonial airport in South Korea, the airports both "bear material testimony to [the] evolution" of the "interpenetration" and "superimposition" of *the diversity and multiplicity of social space* as well as their continuing transformation and the production of new differences.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁸ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 53.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*

Like the outmoded control tower from 1961,⁵¹² which though fallen into disuse, indelibly marks the new Kimpo-E-MART as a tenacious, if melancholy, vestige of its own eclipsed postcolonial history, traces abound in the new ‘global’ terminal of Incheon airport of the history of its predecessors as both historical and ideological symbols of the dominant narrative of South Korean capitalist progress and its continuous though modified strategies responding to new exigencies of capitalist accumulation [figures 59-60]. Thus while the Korean *kiwa* roof or *acha mun-yang* patterns that symbolized the national identity of South Korea’s previous gateway at the Kimpo airport terminals appear to have given way to the new representational needs of a more developed ‘Dynamic Korea,’⁵¹³ the historical national identity of Incheon airport as a symbol and legacy of Korea, Inc. endures throughout its interior—alongside the new national trees—much like the way the *acha munyang* pattern moved from the exterior façade of the 1960 terminal to the interior decoration of the 1980 and 1988 *kiwa* terminals. It is prominently displayed in the multiple rows of KAL and ASIANA ticket counters which dominate the check-in area, large illuminated light-box advertisements featuring Korean companies and celebrities, Hyundai and KIA cars on display, alternating Samsung and LG flat-screen monitors placed at every 30-meters, as well as carefully labeled vitrines of Korean ‘traditional’ art and artifacts on loan from the National Museum. Prominently displayed at the center of the departures level (a few feet away from the Korean pines and placed above the Hyundai car “Genesis”), is the large illuminated advertisement for KB (Kookmin Bank) that features the Korean skater Kim Yeon-Ah under the ubiquitous catchphrase “Korea Reaching Beyond Number One (*Taehanminguk Idŭng ūl nuhmuh*)” [figures 61-62].⁵¹⁴ Like the South Korean conglomerate E-MART that now inhabits the first Kimpo terminal, an amalgam of *chaebol* nationalism and Korean “Segyehwa” (globalization) ostentatiously encompass everything from original national ‘flag carriers’ to new top grossing national industries, all of which are vestiges of the contradictory experience of both the intense mobility and immobility and repressions of South Korean modernity. These traces likewise remain in the eclectic urban landscape of Seoul, which also bear testimony to Korea’s rapid and fragmentary modernization [figure 63] as the haunting of the specters of neo-imperial Cold War international, and national developmentalist modernities alongside its new ‘globalist’ variant.

At the same time, Incheon airport also gives expression to both new ideological inventions and cosmopolitan national identities corresponding to new regulative processes enacted through the airport space towards continuing national capitalist economic development,

⁵¹² The control tower is now used as office space for the Korea Airport Corporation (KAC). KAC is a public corporation (*gongsa*) that was established in 1980 and manages all fourteen South Korean airports except Incheon, which is under the separate authority of the Incheon International Airport Corporation (IIAC), also a public corporation established in February 1999, which was originally formed in 1994 as the Korea Airport Construction Authority.

⁵¹³ This is one of the most ubiquitous national branding campaign, which was coined for the 2002 World Cup and can be seen everywhere from the airport to subway cars, TV commercials, to riot police buses across Seoul.

⁵¹⁴ As with the perpetual change of the airport, these advertisements ran from 2007-2009 but are now replaced by another. It is also important to note that one of the reasons why this skater was so popular in South Korea at the time and leading up to the Olympics had to do with the supposed purity of Kim as a symbol of national progress—as she was homegrown unlike the sports successes of diasporic Koreans especially Korean Americans. The state and Korean companies also appropriate such diasporic sports stars such as was the case with Hines Ward, the MVP football player of the XL Superbowl, whose face was plastered across billboards across downtown Seoul in late 2006 and early 2007. Hines Ward’s mother interestingly spoke out against the hypocrisy of such national appropriations recounting her memory of how her departure to the U.S. arose from her rejection and discrimination by South Korean state and society as a military bride.



Figure 59: Old Kimpo 1960 Terminal turned into E-Mart (see control tower in back) [Photo taken February 24, 2009]



Figure 60: The First Kimpo Terminal, 1961 (The control tower would be completed in 1962) [Image from the South Korean Tourism Website, Hi Seoul, Soul of Korea]



Figure 61: Incheon International Airport, Center, Departures Hall, Kim Yeon-ah KB Advertisement, 'Korea – Reaching Beyond Number One' [Photo taken January 17, 2008]



Figure 62: Incheon International Airport, Center, Departures Hall, Olympic athletes Park Taehwan and Kim Yeon-ah ahead of Beijing Olympics, KB Advertisement, 'A Country Where Everyone's Dreams Come True' [Photo taken August 18, 2008]



Figure 63: Gwanghwamun, Downtown Central Seoul, Colonial era Imin Museum, with 1970 National Developmentalist Modern Post office in the background, and 1990s glass and steel Donga Ilbo Building on the right [Photo taken September 26, 2006]

as well as new unexpected cosmopolitan-national effects and combinations responding to and challenging the state's dominant classed narrative and strategy of development that interrupts the recuperation of South Korea's uneven modern experience into a continuous ideological narrative of capitalist progress which construes the nation and national interest in terms of unity. The former is visible in the state's shift from regulating Korean international mobility and facilitating the export of Korean labor to regulating the return migration of various groups of Korean diaspora and facilitating the import of both diasporic Korean and foreign labor mainly from its East and Southeast Asian neighbors. Alongside the (Korean style) globalization cultural policy of 'seggyehwa' under the Kim Young Sam regime, an attempt to harness diasporic Koreans to continuing nation-building strategies came to the fore with an initial Korean Overseas Act in 1997, "the first South Korean law to focus on overseas Koreans."⁵¹⁵ This was followed by the Act on Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans or the Overseas Korean Act in 1999 "as an attempt to connect overseas Korean populations to the new South Korean nation-building processes, which were undergoing a critical transformation due to the economic crisis at that time [this is the just around the Asian financial crash]...grant[ing] quasi-dual citizenship rights to selected groups of overseas Koreans, mostly Korean Americans and pro-South Korea Korean residents in Japan," while excluding "more than half of the overseas Koreans—including Korean Chinese and Korean Russians—because it used a criterion that requires proof of previous South Korean nationality."⁵¹⁶ The economic motivation of the law, like the regulated emigration laws and labor exporting practices from the 1960s through the 80s, enabled the state to utilize and treat different geopolitical, economic diasporic populations discriminately by controlling their border crossings, yet this time focused on the right to enter and remain in rather than to depart from the country:

In fact, the South Korean government's intention to induce investment—as well as to recruit English-speaking, internationally competitive professionals from overseas Korean populations—was one of the most immediate reasons for passing the OKA at a time of economic crisis. South Korea's need, since the 1990s, both to secure and to control dependable, cheap foreign labor also plays a role. While South Korea opened its labor market to foreign workers, especially in the so-called 3D (dirty, difficult, and dangerous) areas, Korean employers preferred Korean Chinese as workers, because of their ability to speak Korean as well as their "coethnicity." This preference for coethnic laborers matched the needs of Korean Chinese who sought economic opportunities in South Korea. However, as the number of Korean Chinese rapidly increased and their illegal stay became a social issue, the South Korean government took a disciplinary stance by deporting illegal Korean Chinese and implemented measures to limit their entrance into South Korea. By denying the Korean Chinese national membership and, thus, their right to

⁵¹⁵ Jung-sun Park and Paul Y. Chang, "Contention in the Construction of a Global Korean Community: The Case of the Overseas Korean Act," *The Journal of Korean Studies* vol. 10, no.1 (Fall 2005), p. 2.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid. According to Park and Chang, "Under the law, qualified overseas Koreans could enjoy many privileges afforded to South Korean national insiders, such as property ownership...Since the majority of Korean Chinese and Korean Russians (and their ancestors) left the Korean peninsula before the establishment of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1948, they never had South Korean nationality; thus they could not satisfy the OKA's criterion" (p. 2).

freely enter and work in South Korea, the OKA effectively aided the government's effort to control the borders in defense of the South Korean labor market.⁵¹⁷

The state's economically motivated inclusion of "'rich cousins' from the United States and Japan" and the exclusion of "'poor cousins' from China and the former Soviet Union" attached to "the perceived different economic status of host countries" led to both the replication of these differences in their differential incorporation in the South Korean economy (recruitment "into professional and investor categories" vs. incorporation into "unskilled and semiskilled labor") as well as the "legal" incorporation of different groups of diasporic Koreans "as insiders" vs. "foreign outsiders."⁵¹⁸ Faced with angry responses by both South Koreans and overseas Koreans as to the blatant exclusionary reinvention of who could be defined as "Korean" entailed in the act, the law was declared unconstitutional in 2001 and amended in 2004 "to conform to the 'equality principle' of the South Korean Constitution" and thus "discarding the 'former nationality' criterion."⁵¹⁹

This most recent economically motivated ideological reinvention of Korean national identity brings out the contradictions entailed in the state's ideological mobilization of national culture and ethnic unity, as it is both haunted by the initial formulation of Koreans and the Korean nation as all inclusive members of an ethnic myth-historical genealogical lineage formulated in 1908 as a "modern and democratic construct" in the face of Japanese colonial overtures,⁵²⁰ and the hierarchical differentiations arising between 'modern' diasporic Koreans in America vs. their less modern peninsular counterparts in the early migration as modernization narratives that we have seen in Yi Injik's *Tears of Blood*, as by the extra-territorial instrumentalization of 'ethnic' South Koreans for economic development during Korea's postwar rapid industrialization. It moreover reveals "the intricate interplay among geopolitics, economic interests, and historical legacy [that] constantly intervenes in negotiations between the Korean diaspora and the South Korean state over the former group's position and belonging."⁵²¹

Thus arising from the historical contradictions of Korean modernization, Incheon airport may be one of the only airports to symbolize the "Korean Dream" for certain groups of Koreans through their experiences of entry and forced deportation, as South Korea becomes one of the only countries whose draconian immigration policies is not only pitted against different ethnic groups but used to regulate and instrumentalize different groups of ethnic Koreans. The hypocrisy of the state vis-à-vis differentially geopolitically-defined "Korean" identities can be seen moreover to run in parallel with the hypocrisy of its labor laws in relation to foreign workers. As written by a Filipino migrant worker under South Korea's guest worker program (Employment Permit System):

I first came to Korea on the 17th of January 2006. That time, I thought, I was one of the fortunate few who had been given an opportunity to fulfill my dreams and provide a comfortable life to my family.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Henry H. Em, "Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch'aeho's Historiography," Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999).

⁵²¹ Park and Chang, p. 8.

It was required for us to have a considerable amount of training both in language and industrial safety. The process was very lengthy and tiresome but it was well worth it. After about a year of waiting we were finally set off to far away Korea to become the "New Heroes" of the Filipino nation.

After arriving in Incheon Airport we were immediately dispatched to what would consequently be our transitory destination, for me, the Busan HRD. There, we had to undergo a new medical examination, was given an overview of what is to come and what we should expect during our stay in this strange and foreign land, some words of advices to avoid any problems that may arise and some other precautionary measures that would make it easier for us to be assimilated in the Korean society. Other information and assistance resources were disseminated should we encounter problems during our stay. Most importantly, during the seminar, they have emphasized that the foreign workers employed in Korea share the same Labor rights as the Korean workers.⁵²²

As the author goes onto recount her and her roommate's startling experience with sexual harassment from the factory line manager and the company's threat to terminate employment (whereby they would thus be deported) if they were to take any legal actions as well as the lack of any disciplinary measures taken against the line manager, she concludes:

The future is bleak for the foreign workers in Korea they would either have to tolerate these abuses and injustice or go back to their respective countries, broken and empty-handed.

The only other option... EDUCATE OURSELVES AND FIGHT FOR OUR LABOR RIGHTS!⁵²³

Challenges to the state's national developmental narrative had also been on the rise among Korean workers since the huge workers' uprising in 1987 and extended strikes throughout the early 1990s. It was also exacerbated by the Korean financial crisis in 1997-8, brought on by the state's economic liberalization policies proceeding since the late 80s and speeded up with its entry into the WTO in 1995 and OECD in 1996, which for the workers took the form of mass layoffs. This occurred around the same time that the Overseas Koreans Act was being formulated as a solution to the financial crisis and IMF bailout. Within a year

⁵²² This text, given to me by the author, who became a union organizer for the Migrants Trade Union (MTU) in South Korea, was also published in Korean. I refer to the author as both she and he because she transitioned during her stay in South Korea, which was another personal as well as economic motive for coming to work in South Korea. Another Korean particularity arising from its contradictory nationalism is that the MTU has difficulty making headway not only because of the state's continuous deportation of its union leaders but also because while the majority of factory workers who work alongside Southeast Asian workers are Korean-Chinese (as they make up the largest 'foreign' labor force), they tend not join up with their Southeast Asian comrades in labor struggles against the state. This no doubt has in part to do with the twists and turns that have produced complex conceptions and attachments of Chinese Korean workers' sense of belonging to the nation and identity as 'Koreans' even in the face of the state's blatant discrimination towards them.

⁵²³ Ibid.

unemployment rates soared from 2.5 percent to 8.9 percent by February 1999, with 1.8 million jobless, 90 percent of the unemployed being workers who lost their jobs within the previous year.⁵²⁴ This dark period is etched into the memory of many South Koreans where ‘IMF suicides’ became rampant, and Seoul Station, the colonial era rail station and the city’s major transportation hub, became a loitering ground for hoards of unemployed Korean men.⁵²⁵ Seoul Station also became appropriated as the site of huge anti-IMF protests in May 1998 where tens of thousands of workers walked off their jobs and participated in street demonstrations, in response to the state’s new labor law making it easier to lay off workers, imposed by the IMF as a conditionality for the \$58 billion bailout package.⁵²⁶ This was however practically the same as the state’s new labor laws announced in 1996 “designed to give more power and flexibility to employers in laying off workers and hiring temporary workers or strike replacements, while disallowing the formation of multiple unions for another few years,” touching off a general strike which mobilized 3 million workers from late December 1996 until January 21, 1997.⁵²⁷ This period thus became a key event and catalyst for mobilizing various Left social movement groups, political organizations, workers’ movements, anti-poverty movements, and even political parties aligned against the IMF bailout conditions and the state’s political-economic restructuring which devastated huge groups of workers and the poor.⁵²⁸ They also fostered coalitions bringing many members of these rising groups together for joint actions. These actions moreover were not limited to actions against the South Korean state nor confined to South Korea—as per the new era of travel liberation.

As Kim Kyusik had departed Shanghai for an arduous journey across the Pacific ocean to Versailles to petition the League of Nations for Korean Independence from Japan in February 1919, eighty years later, in November 1999, Lee Chang Geun departed Kimpo airport for Seattle, Washington with a small delegation of other South Korean activists to join the global protests against the WTO Ministerial Meeting.⁵²⁹ In 2001, another small delegation of four people led by Park Hasoon, representing the Korean Independent Union federation (KCTU), a representative of the Korean farmer’s association (KPL), and of the Korean international Left International solidarity coalition (KoPa), as well as a member of a Catholic organization, also departed from Kimpo for Porto Allegre to attend the first World Social Forum, whereupon they became members of the WSF International Council.⁵³⁰ When the Korean delegation departed for Cancun from the new Incheon airport in 2003, the Korean WTO-protest delegation of farmers, workers, and social activists had grown to 180. And in 2005, the delegation to protest the WTO meeting in Hong Kong numbered over 2,000.⁵³¹ In response to the deepening neoliberal policies of the state that remained anti-people/ anti-labor and pro-business, a growing movement of South

⁵²⁴ Dong-Myeon Shin, “Financial Crisis and Social Security: The Paradox of the Republic of Korea,” *International Social Security Review* vol. 53 (March 2000), p. 90.

⁵²⁵ Hagen Koo, *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 199.

⁵²⁶ Peter Michael Smith, *Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), p. 69.

⁵²⁷ Koo, p. 199.

⁵²⁸ Alice S. Kim, “Left Out: People’s Solidarity for Social Progress and the Evolution of Minjung after Authoritarianism,” in Gi-wook Shin and Paul Y. Chang, Eds, *South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society* (Routledge, 2011), pp. 247-249.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 253. This delegation was organized under an umbrella organization KoPA (Korean People’s Action Against the BIT and WTO), which brought together 40 different South Korean social and political groups.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*; I would like to thank Ryu Mikyung, PSSP member and International Director of KCTU (Korean Confederation of Trade Unions), for sharing this history with me.

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*



Figure 64: Incheon International Airport, Arrivals Hall with MBC News desk in front of Arrivals gate
[Photo taken November 16, 2007]



Figure 65: Incheon International Airport, Arrivals Hall, 'Hero's Welcome' of KCTU, KPL, etc. anti-WTO protest delegation returning from Hong Kong, January 13, 2006 [Chosun Ilbo]

Korean workers, farmers, students, and social activists thus began to appropriate the technology of air travel as well as the airport to also forge new and different international alliances, directly opposed to those that have been forged by the state throughout the Cold War internationalist period and new neoliberal linkages it had forged or sought to forge after 1989 associated with their commanding vision of the new Incheon airport. At the same time, the airport has also retained its function as a key foreign press stage—a legacy of the postcolonial Kimpo—presenting the comings and goings of both foreign and Korean VIPS, including press desks and dais set up in the arrivals lobby for extra sensational personalities [figure 64]. But on January 13, 2006, Incheon also became the stage for a new and different group of ‘VIPs’ [figure 65]. With over 250 people assembled in the Arrivals Hall, variously composed of farmers, workers, students, and intellectuals holding placards and banners reading “We are proud of you for proving the legitimacy of anti-WTO demonstrations” and chanting “Junk the WTO” and “We censure the Foreign Ministry for turning its back on the public,” a group of delegates to Hong Kong were met with a “hero’s welcome.”⁵³² If the South Korean state had used their newfound command of colonial railroads in the immediate postcolonial post-division period to hunt down, kill, jail, and re-educate South Korean leftists, people’s committees and anyone suspected of being Communist (with the help of the U.S. military occupation government), wiping out any traces of the South Korean Labor Party indigenous to the southwestern and southeastern areas of South Korea, then the proceeding years of state-led postwar national economic development, which entailed the intense exploitation of workers and political repressions, also brought into being new likewise nationalist but anti-government *minjung* or people’s and workers’ movements throughout the 1970s. With the increasing political and economic liberalizations following the nation’s economic growth, including the lifting of restrictions on travel, coupled with deepening anti-worker/anti-poor policies to manage the negative consequences of the state’s new neoliberal policies, the airport and air travel appear poised to present yet again new subjects of cosmopolitan-national Korean modernity.

⁵³² “Korean Protestors Return to Hero’s Welcome,” *Chosun Ilbo* (English on-line edition) 13 January 2006; Accessed on March 3, 2006: <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200601/200601130019.html>.

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