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"United We Stand": Latino-Americans' Responses to Group and Individual Threats from Attitudes and Policies on Undocumented Immigration

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"United We Stand": Latino-Americans'

Responses to Group and Individual Threats from Attitudes

and Policies on Undocumented Immigration

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

by

Jesus Antonio Serrano Careaga

2020

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

"United We Stand": Latino-Americans'

Responses to Group and Individual Threats from Attitudes

and Policies on Undocumented Immigration

by

Jesus Antonio Serrano Careaga

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2020

Professor Yuen J. Huo, Chair

As attention on undocumented immigration from Latin America continues to increase in the U.S., the conflation of Latinos (as an ethnic group) and undocumented immigrants may play an essential role in shaping the attitudes and behaviors of Latino-Americans (i.e., Latinos who are citizens or legal residents). The conflation of the two groups can be a source of both symbolic and realistic threats. As a symbolic threat (represented by Latino-Undocumented association beliefs), the conflation of the two groups can lead to concerns for Latino-Americans about how their ethnic group is viewed by the general public. As a realistic threat (measured by perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants), Latino-Americans may come to believe that they are personally vulnerable to actions taken against undocumented immigrants. Moreover, anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants and fear about future risks to themselves may help explain the effects of both threats on Latino-Americans' attitudes and behaviors. Across three

studies, I find evidence that the conflation of both groups increases Latino-Americans'

willingness to mobilize politically for a pathway to citizenship policies and increases how much

they identify with undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, the conflation of the two groups may

harm Latino-Americans by decreasing their feelings of belonging in America. These effects

appear to be mediated by both feelings of anger and fear. The present findings suggest that,

although the conflation of the two groups may increase doubts about their place in America, it

may motivate Latino-Americans to seek social change.

The dissertation of Jesus Antonio Serrano Careaga is approved.

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University of California, Los Angeles

2020

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Maria, and my sister, Yanett.

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Fallon, M., **Serrano Careaga, J.,** Sbarra, D., & O'Connor, M. F. (2016). The utility of a virtual Trier Social Stress Test: Initial findings and benchmarking comparisons. *Psychosomatic Medicine, 78*, 835–840. Doi: 10.1097/PSY.0000000000000338

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Serrano-Careaga, J., & Huo, Y.J. *"Illegal" by association: An experience of categorization threat among Latinos.* Poster presented at the 2016 Society for Personality and Social Psychology Annual Conference, San Diego, CA. January 2016.

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Introduction

For many Americans, the prototypical undocumented immigrant is likely a migrant from Latin America. Of the 10.5 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. today, close to 8 million migrated from Latin America (Pew Research Center, 2019). Although a majority of undocumented immigrants are Latinos, most Latinos (over 80%) are U.S.-born citizens, naturalized citizens, or legal residents (Pew Research Center, 2016). Given the overrepresentation of Latinos in the undocumented immigrant population, Latinos have become synonymous with undocumented immigrants (Chavez, 2013).

Politicians and news media likely reinforce the conflation of the two groups. For example, President Trump has made building a wall between the U.S.-Mexico border to reduce the number of Latino migrants who enter the country without authorization a policy priority since the early days of his first presidential campaign in 2015. This policy has been controversial and critiqued for potentially harming views about Latino immigrants and citizens in the U.S. Moreover, new stories about undocumented immigration focus extensively on Latinos which may create an implicit association between the two groups among Americans (Perez, 2016; Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013).

In the present research, the goal is to understand how the conflation of the two groups impacts Latinos. Specifically, the impact it has on Latinos who are not undocumented immigrants and how it shapes their attitudes and behaviors. For the remainder of this paper, I will use *Latinos* to refer to the entire ethnic group, regardless of differences in documented or undocumented status. *Latino-Americans,* as used here, refers to Latinos who were born in the U.S., are naturalized citizens, or are legal residents. For Latino-Americans, the conflation of their ethnic ingroup with undocumented immigrants can pose at least two significant threats: a

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symbolic threat to their ingroup and a realistic threat to themselves. I argue that these threats will politically mobilize Latino-Americans to support policies that protect the status of their ingroup and personal wellbeing. Furthermore, I argue that feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants and fear for themselves will explain their responses to these threats.

Latino-Undocumented Association as a Symbolic Threat to Latino-Americans

Theories about intergroup relations consistently emphasize how people are affected by the perceived value and status of their ingroup. For example, social identity theory describes how the status of the ingroup influences a person's self-esteem and shapes how they engage with outgroups (Hogg, 2016; Stets & Burke, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). If they perceive their ingroup to have unjustly lost status compared to other groups, individuals are more willing to engage in active coping behaviors like collective action that can improve the overall standing of their ingroup (Hogg, 2016; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Niens & Cairns, 2002). Self-Categorization Theory describes how individuals define themselves using the traits attributed to their ingroup (Hornsey, 2008). Moreover, Intergroup Threat Theory highlights how individuals are threatened when their ingroup's values and what it stands for are in peril, a type of threat they describe as a *symbolic threat* (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Overall, these theories predict that individuals are motivated to protect their ingroup from negative perceptions and the loss of status. In this project, I refer to the impact that views about undocumented immigrants have on views about Latinos as the Latino-Undocumented association. I argue that, among Latino-Americans, the Latino-Undocumented association is a symbolic threat that they are motivated to mobilize against to protect their ingroup.

Impact on Perceptions of Latino-Americans as a Group. Past research has shown that Americans hold views about undocumented immigrants that are significantly more negative than

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opinions about other marginalized or minority groups (including other immigrants) (Lee & Fiske, 2006; Suárez-Orozco et al., 2015). Moreover, these views can worsen depending on how the group is described (e.g., illegal vs. undocumented immigrants) (Alfaro & Bui, 2018; Pearson, 2010; Rucker, Murphy, & Quintanilla, 2019). On the other hand, because of their status as an ethnic minority group, Latino-Americans are often confronted with doubts about whether they belong in the country and whether they are genuinely American (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Nadal, Mazzula, Rivera, & Fujii-Doe, 2014; Rivera, Forquer, & Rangel, 2010; Sue et al., 2007).

The conflation of Latinos and undocumented immigrants can be concerning to Latino-Americans because 1) it increases doubts about their group's status as "true" Americans, and 2) negative views about undocumented immigrants can generalize to their ethnic group. For example, in a series of interviews, U.S.-born Mexican-Americans living in California and Kansas expressed concerns about the conflation of their group (i.e., Mexicans born in the U.S.) and Mexican immigrants (Jimenez, 2007). Several participants reported actively trying to distinguish themselves as members of the former group out of concerns that residents of their cities viewed all people of Mexican descent (U.S.-born or not) as being "the same." For these respondents, their goal was to ward off negative stereotypes about immigrants (e.g., not having legal status, engaging in criminal behavior) from their group (i.e., U.S.-born Mexican-Americans) (Jimenez, 2007). Although this study focused on people of Mexican descent, Latino-Americans of other backgrounds at a national level likely have similar concerns since non-Mexican Latino-Americans have reported being treated like outsiders or second-class citizens because of their ethnicity (Nadal, Mazzula, Rivera, & Fujii-Doe, 2014; Rivera, Forquer, & Rangel, 2010).

Coping with Symbolic Threats Against the Ingroup. To cope with symbolic threats against their ingroup, people adopt defensive responses aimed at eliminating or reducing the

threat. One commonly studied response is the increase of prejudice. When an outgroup threatens the ingroup's values and status, people respond by showing more prejudiced behaviors and attitudes for the outgroup (e.g., Rios, 2013; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013). Research on White Americans has often demonstrated this effect. For example, in a set of studies, researchers looked at White Americans' reactions to the risk of having their ingroup lose to ethnic minorities the ability to define what it means to be American (Danbold & Huo, 2015). Those most threatened were increasingly likely to engage in defensive responses to reduce the source of the threat, like supporting assimilation that favors the values and beliefs associated with White Americans. Similarly, White American participants in another study were more likely to distance themselves from *poor* White Americans when they felt this subgroup threatened the association between wealth, success, and their ethnic group (Kunstman, Plant, & Deska, 2013). By engaging in psychological distancing, participants were treating poor White Americans as a separate group to protect their ethnic ingroup.

In the above examples, the symbolic threat came from another group changing how the ingroup is perceived (e.g., no longer prototypical; no longer wealthy and successful). Instead of a specific outgroup, the experience of having others mischaracterize the ingroup could also act as the source of a symbolic threat. In a previous study, Dutch participants recalled a time when another person wrongly attributed a trait to the participants' ingroup and how they responded to that situation (Ellemers & Barreto, 2006). Participants could recall situations when the mischaracterization of their group was either positive (e.g., hardworking) or negative (e.g., lazy), as long as they disagreed with it when it happened. The results showed that participants were more likely to report having spoken out against a negative characterization, despite also experiencing discomfort from wrong positive characterizations of their ingroup (Ellemers &

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Barreto, 2006). Other studies have similarly shown that people are increasingly willing to protest

or speak out in situations where they disagree with a social identity that others apply to them

(Barreto & Ellemers, 2003; Barreto, Ellemers, Scholten, & Smith, 2010). Although these studies

focused on participants' experience at the individual level, people possibly engage in similar

responses when their ingroup is mischaracterized or conflated with other groups.

Evidence that the conflation of the ingroup with an outgroup threatens individuals comes

from a set of studies by Flores and Huo (2013). Asian-American and Latino-American

participants reacted to scenarios where a partner conflated their national origin identity (e.g.,

Salvadoran, Vietnamese) with other national identities (e.g., Salvadoran with Mexican;

Vietnamese with Japanese) or recognized them as distinct identities. When the partner conflated

the identities, participants showed stronger adverse reactions toward that person. In this study,

the partners' conflation of the participants' ingroup with another group caused the adverse

reaction. Participants did not simply derogate their partners because they belonged to an

outgroup.

For Latino-Americans who experience a symbolic threat from the conflation of their

ethnic group and undocumented immigrants, it may be challenging to identify a specific group as

the source of threat. Americans of all backgrounds (including other Latino-Americans) are likely

to conflate the two groups, which could make prejudice against other Americans a less likely

response to this behavior. Instead, many Latino-Americans may see the unresolved status of

undocumented immigrants in the country as the cause of the conflation. Increasing the number of

undocumented immigrants who have legal status or reducing their numbers in the country could

be seen as a way to lower threats to the status of Latino-Americans. Therefore, Latino-Americans

could respond to this threat by mobilizing for policies or actions that aim to resolve the issue of undocumented immigration in the U.S. (e.g., a pathway to citizenship policies).

Interestingly, in a survey of Latino-Americans following the 2016 presidential election, participants were more likely to support immigrant rights activism if they believed anti-immigrant sentiments were actually anti-Latino sentiments (Wallace & Zepeda-Millán, 2020). The 2016 presidential election was notable for the nativist and anti-immigrant character of the Trump presidential campaign. It may have significantly shaped perceived associations between anti-immigrant and anti-Latino sentiments. This survey finding supports the argument that the conflation of the two groups is more threatening to Latino-Americans than undocumented immigrants as a group.

Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants as a Realistic Threat to Latino-Americans

In addition to posing a symbolic threat, the conflation of Latinos and undocumented immigrants can also present a *realistic threat* to Latino-Americans. Intergroup threat theory describes realistic threats as perceived risks to the economic or physical wellbeing of a group or an individual (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). In the context under investigation, Latino-Americans may worry that the conflation of the two groups will make it more likely they will personally be treated like undocumented immigrants.

First, when state and local governments adopt punitive policies aimed at identifying and arresting undocumented immigrants, their implementation has been consistently described as a danger to the safety of the Latino community. Here I do not argue for or against this characterization of punitive immigration policies and their effects. Instead, I am highlighting how this conventional narrative likely reinforces for Latino-Americans a negative relationship between their ethnic group and immigration policies in the U.S.

Several studies have, for example, looked at the negative impact of punitive immigration policies on the quality of life and health of Latinos in the U.S. (e.g., Becerra, Androff, Cimino, Wagaman, & Blanchard, 2013; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2017; Philbin, Flake, Hatzenbuehler, & Hirsch, 2018; Rhodes et al., 2015). Similarly, existing research provides evidence for the increased risk of racial profiling of Latino-Americans as a result of the implementation of punitive policies at the state level (Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013; Romero, 2006; Szkupinski Quiroga, Medina, & Glick, 2014). In general, these types of studies report adverse life outcomes for Latino-Americans and may inform news coverage on these issues. Meanwhile, mainstream media typically focuses on the Latino community when reporting stories about undocumented immigrants, and this focus has historically intensified during times when policies that target undocumented immigrants are the focus of national and local debates (Menjivar, 2016; Perez, 2016; Reny & Manzano, 2016; Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013). Therefore, it is likely that Latino-Americans frequently encounter stories that reinforce perceptions that punitive immigration policies are a threat to themselves.

Second, there is evidence that suggests that punitive immigration policies do, in fact, unsettle Latino-Americans. For example, a survey of Latino-Americans residing in Arizona and New Mexico found significant differences in feelings of belonging between residents of the two states (Schildkraut, Jiménez, Dovidio, & Huo, 2019). U.S.-born Latino-Americans from Arizona, a state that has adopted an increasingly punitive approach to immigration enforcement, reported lower feelings of belonging in their state than their counterparts from New Mexico. Compared to Arizona, New Mexico's immigration policies and law enforcement were considered more welcoming to immigrants at the time of the study. Moreover, when U.S.-born Latino-Americans think about immigration policies that could be enacted by their state in the future, their feelings

of belonging decrease when the policies are hostile to immigrants (Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, & Schildkraut, 2018).

The impact of these policies, however, is not limited to feelings of belonging. For example, Latino-Americans also report feeling more pessimistic about the future quality of life for themselves and their children in response to punitive law enforcement (Becerra et al., 2013). Finally, in a study of Latino-Americans from South Phoenix between 2009-2010, researchers found that most respondents expressed distress about the safety of family, friends, and themselves and that the distress was caused by local punitive immigration policies (Szkupinski Quiroga, Medina, & Glick, 2014). Notably, during this timeframe, punitive immigration policies like Senate Bill 1070 (SB1070) were proposed and later passed in Arizona. SB1070 was a policy that included a controversial provision that required police officers to question individuals about their immigration status when they had reasonable suspicion that the target was an undocumented immigrant (Johnson, 2012). The provision raised concerns that ethnicity or skin color would influence officers' perceptions of "reasonable suspicion" and that it would result in the racial profiling of Latino-Americans. Furthermore, these participants resided in low-income neighborhoods, which possibly made them more vulnerable to encounters with law enforcement.

When faced with the conflation of their ethnic group and undocumented immigrants, many Latino-Americans might question their vulnerability to punitive policies that target undocumented immigrants. The more confident they are about the risks this conflation poses to their wellbeing, the more likely they will be to confront this threat.

Coping with Realistic Threat from Conflation of Groups. If policies that target undocumented immigrants pose a risk to Latino-Americans, one possible outcome is for Latino-Americans to respond by exhibiting more prejudice against undocumented immigrants. Studies

that look at the impact of realistic threats from an outgroup have shown an increase in prejudiced attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy, & Polifroni, 2008; Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Zárate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004). Therefore, if Latino-Americans perceive undocumented immigrants as the source of the realistic threat, they will likely express more negative attitudes toward undocumented immigrants. A study on attitudes about Mexican immigrants potentially illustrates this outcome. When researchers primed students from El Paso, Texas (a U.S.-Mexico border city) to think about Mexican immigrants as a threat to their employment opportunities, students expressed more negative attitudes about those immigrants (Zárate et al., 2004). However, work from social and political psychology provides support for the opposite prediction that a coalition between Latinos and undocumented immigrants will form when the conflation of the two groups is perceived as the source of the realistic threat.

When members of different minority groups share similar experiences of discrimination, the expressed intergroup attitudes are more favorable. For example, Asian- and Latino-American students who were reminded of racial discrimination against members of their ethnic groups reported more positive attitudes about African Americans (Craig & Richeson, 2012). Similarly, when researchers drew direct parallels between groups who experience discrimination for different reasons (e.g., sexual orientation discrimination vs. racial discrimination), members of those minority groups were more supportive of policies that benefitted the other marginalized group (Cortland et al., 2017). Presenting gay marriage as a civil rights issue caused straight African American participants to express more support for same-sex marriage (Cortland et al., 2017). In summary, priming members of marginalized groups to consider how their experiences are like those of other groups can strengthen relations between those groups.

Work on *inclusive victim consciousness* has found similar results. Inclusive victim consciousness refers to a type of solidarity that develops between members of distinct marginalized groups when their experiences of discrimination parallel each other, which can lead to more intergroup advocacy and support (Vollhardt, 2015). Among Vietnamese Americans whose family entered the U.S. as refugees, higher inclusive victim consciousness predicted greater commitment to advocating for refugees from other countries (Vollhardt, Nair, & Tropp, 2016). Outside of the U.S., higher inclusive victim consciousness among individuals from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda predicted a greater willingness to advocate on behalf of other ethnic groups in their countries (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015). The three countries are currently experiencing or previously experienced high levels of intergroup violence in the not too distant past: ongoing ethnic conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a civil war in Burundi between 1993 and 2005, and genocide against minority groups in Rwanda in 1994.

Finally, research on *linked fate* further supports the prediction that the threat experienced from group conflation can strengthen relations between undocumented immigrants and Latino-Americans. Linked fate refers to the belief that what happens to a person is directly affected by what happens to members of a specific group (Czaja, Junn, & Mendelberg, 2016; Dawson, 1994). When people believe they have linked fate with a group, they expect the quality of their experiences as an individual to increase as the group's experiences improve. This perspective also applies to negative experiences. More negative experiences for the group suggest more negative experiences for the individual. Linked fate can then translate to supporting policies that will benefit the group or to mobilizing on behalf of the group.

Linked fate was introduced as an explanation of the political behavior of African Americans (Dawson, 1995; Simien, 2005). African Americans share a history of oppression and discrimination that results from the negative associations related to the color of their skin. Individual differences in educational attainment and socioeconomic status do not make African Americans immune to race-based discrimination. Therefore, these experiences can lead to beliefs that what happens to other African Americans will also happen to them personally.

Among Latino-Americans, perceptions of linked fate also appear to meaningfully impact their attitudes and behaviors. Data from a 2006 national survey of Latino-Americans found that perceptions of linked fate increased with higher educational attainment and lower levels of assimilation into American culture (Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010). Notably, the personal experiences of discrimination for participants of this survey did not predict an increase or decrease in linked fate. However, a later study found that Latino-Americans report greater levels of linked fate in areas with a higher number of punitive laws that target undocumented immigrants (Vargas, Sanchez, & Valdez, 2017). Furthermore, as perceptions of ethnic linked fate (i.e., linked fate with Latinos regardless of immigrant or residency status) increase, Latino-Americans' support for activism on behalf of immigrant rights increases (Wallace & Zepeda-Millán, 2020).

Most research on perceptions of linked-fate among Latino-Americans has focused on ethnic linked fated. A few exceptions have measured linked fate with immigrants (Gutierrez, Ocampo, Barreto, & Segura, 2019) or undocumented immigrants (Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 2019). Both studies found that as Latino-Americans perceived more linked fate with the two groups, they are more willing to engage in political activities to support immigrants. More work to understand the impact of linked fate with undocumented immigrants is needed as it may help

explain why, for example, more hostile policies toward undocumented immigrants can elicit more positive attitudes for that group among Latino-Americans (Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, Schildkraut, 2018). By mobilizing politically on behalf of undocumented immigrants, Latino-Americans could perceive two benefits: 1) a reduction in the likelihood that punitive immigration policies will negatively impact them and 2) improve the experience of undocumented immigrants in the U.S.

In the current research, linked fate is used as an indicator of the perceived susceptibility to realistic threats caused by the conflation of Latinos and undocumented immigrants.

Anger and Fear Can Mobilize Latinos-Americans Politically

In response to both symbolic and realistic threats to Latino-Americans, I have described political mobilization as a possible coping response. Both types of threats can evoke a strong emotional response from Latino-Americans: anger about the experiences faced by undocumented immigrants and fear that they will personally experience similar consequences. Emotional responses to threats are relevant to this discussion because they are critical to political and collective action as they can either promote or suppress behaviors (Brader & Wayne, 2016; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004).

Anger as a Catalyst for Political Behaviors. Many people feel angry when they see that others are mistreated because of their group identity. Anger makes people more likely to mobilize on behalf of the victimized group when this treatment considered unfair (Jasper, 1998; Pagano & Huo, 2007; Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Moreover, anger can be a particularly powerful motivator of collective action when there is a specific target like a government entity or a policy that individuals can mobilize against (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polleta, 2009; Jasper, 1998). When a person believes they will be similarly

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mistreated, they should be more motivated to protest than those who do not feel at risk (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2009; Green & Cowden, 1992).

If the conflation of their ethnic group and undocumented immigrants symbolically and realistically threatens Latino-Americans, feelings of anger may explain their increased willingness to mobilize on behalf of undocumented immigrants. For example, surveyed Latino-Americans who reported feeling angry about the 2016 presidential election season were more likely to have engaged in political activities like working for a campaign or engaging in protests (Gutierrez et al., 2019). Furthermore, the feelings of anger reported by participants strongly associated with perceptions of discrimination against Latino-Americans and their perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants. Similarly, my work on U.S.-born Latino-Americans showed that as feelings of anger about the experiences faced by undocumented immigrants increased, they were more likely to engage in activities like attending rallies, contacting politicians, and donating money to fight for the rights of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 2019).

Mixed Evidence for the Role of Fear in Motivating Political Behaviors. A second emotion that Latino-Americans could experience in response to immigration policies and authorities is fear. Fear can result from the expectation that perceptions of their group will worsen and that immigration authorities will mistreat them if they are mistaken for undocumented immigrants. In this case, fear could promote collective action as a way to escape future threats to the self and ingroup.

Research on fear and its impact on behaviors shows that the effects less consistent than the effects of anger. For collective action, several studies have found evidence that fear suppresses active coping behaviors (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006; Miller, Cronin, Garcia, &

Branscombe, 2009; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008). Fear makes people more cautious about taking risks (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003) and less likely to be action-oriented (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014). Many of these studies, however, have looked at fear of events that had already happened (e.g., past terrorist attacks, previous financial crises).

If people are focused on avoiding future risks, research on health behaviors suggests that fear can promote active coping responses. In Uganda, a reduction in AIDS cases may have been caused in part by an increase in risk avoidance behaviors (e.g., having fewer casual partners) resulting from the fear of being infected (Stoneburner & Low-Beer, 2004). Unlike citizens of neighboring countries, Ugandans were significantly more likely to personally know someone who died from AIDS or was living with it, which likely bolstered the effects of fear. Similarly, worrying about developing breast cancer has been linked to an increase in cancer screenings among women (Consedine, Magai, Neugut, 2004; Lagerlund, Hedin, Sparén, Thurfjell, & Lambe, 2000; McCaul, Schroeder, & Reid, 1996). Among men, fear about developing prostate cancer can also promote undergoing health screenings, although these positive effects disappear when fear is too high (Consedine, Morgenstern, Kudadjie-Gyamfi, Magai, & Neugut, 2006). Importantly, health campaigns that use fear appeals to scare citizens into action can succeed if those who are targeted believe they can successfully reduce or eliminate the threat (Witte, K., 1992).

Fear of being a victim of future terrorist attacks increases support for military action, especially when victims of past events were considered ingroup members (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Research on environmental activism also provides experimental evidence for fear as an emotion that mobilizes people. Individuals fearing future harmful changes

to the environment are increasingly willing to engage in collective action to prevent climate change if they believe it is an effective response (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010). Finally, Latino-Americans, who reported feeling fear when thinking about the experiences of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., were more willing to engage in collective action on behalf of immigrants (Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 2019). Based on the reviewed research, Latino-Americans experiencing fear because of the conflation of their ethnic group with undocumented immigrants may be more likely to engage in political activities to reduce the threat from immigration policies.

The Present Research

Across three studies, I explore how the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos presents both a symbolic threat and a realistic threat to Latino-Americans. The effects of both threats on Latino-Americans' political mobilization intentions and changes in identity-related responses are analyzed. If the conflation of the two groups threatens Latino-Americans, they should be more likely to see policies that improve the status of undocumented immigrants as a way to reduce threats against their ethnic ingroup and themselves. Their willingness to engage in actions that would support the adoption of these policies is referred to as political mobilization. Additionally, because the conflation of both groups may help emphasize the shared experiences between them, I expect these threats to make attitudes about undocumented immigrants more positive among Latino-Americans. The identity-related measures included in the studies presented here are about feelings of closeness to undocumented immigrants and other Latinos, solidarity with undocumented immigrants, and feelings of belonging in America.

Studies 1 and 2 are experiments. To test the impact of a symbolic threat from the conflation of both groups, I primed Latino-Americans with information about how views about

undocumented immigrants are associated with views about their ethnic group. To test the impact

of a realistic threat, I primed Latino-Americans with information about their linked fate with

undocumented immigrants. In Studies 1 and 2, I test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 (response to a symbolic threat): When Latino-Americans think that views

about undocumented immigrants influence views about their ethnic group,

- they will be more likely to engage in political activities for a pathway to

  citizenship policies.

- their attitudes about undocumented immigrants will be more positive.

- their feelings of belonging in the U.S. will decrease.

Hypothesis 2 (response to a realistic threat): When Latino-Americans think they will

personally be affected by policies that target undocumented immigrants,

- they will be more likely to engage in political activities for a pathway to

  citizenship policies.

- their attitudes about undocumented immigrants will also improve.

- their feelings of belonging in the U.S. will decrease.

Hypothesis 3: Responses to the symbolic threat against their ethnic group should be

stronger for Latino-Americans who believe that policies that target undocumented

immigrants will personally impact them.

Hypothesis 4: Feelings of anger and fear will mediate Latino-Americans' response to

both the symbolic and realistic threats from the conflation of the two groups.

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Why would Latino-Americans be more supportive of a pathway to citizenship when threatened by the conflation of the two groups? It is likely that perceptions that many undocumented immigrants, mainly from Latin America, live in the country increase expectations that the two groups will be conflated. If the number of undocumented Latinos decreases, Latino-Americans might expect this to weaken the association between being an undocumented immigrant and being a Latino in the U.S. Also, given the shared experiences of discrimination between the two groups and that many Latino-Americans may know someone who is an undocumented immigrant, Latino-Americans may generally be more receptive to this type of policy than more punitive policies.

However, one alternative prediction to consider is whether Latino-Americans will be willing to engage in political activities for policies that could reduce threats to their ethnic group and themselves but harm undocumented immigrants. Increasing arrests and deportations of undocumented immigrants could, like a pathway to citizenship policies, reduce the threats caused by the conflation of the two groups. Latino-Americans could interpret the decrease in undocumented immigrants as a result of this punitive policy as an effective way to reduce the conflation of the two groups. If Latino-Americans are equally supportive of punitive and immigrant-friendly policies, this may indicate that they are generally more supportive of any approach that could reduce the conflation of the two groups when responding to these threats.

In these studies, I also compare Latino-Americans' anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants and fear of future risks against themselves. In a previous study, I showed that anger and fear Latino-Americans experienced when thinking about what undocumented immigrants go through in the U.S. explained their willingness to engage in political activities on behalf of immigrants (Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 2019). However, studies 1 and 2 will allow me to more

clearly compare how emotions about others and themselves similarly or differentially shape

collective action intentions and attitudes about undocumented immigrants.

Finally, Study 3 is an exploratory study where I look at how the effects described above

may translate to a more general context. As I discussed above, the 2016 U.S. presidential

election spotlighted the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos, and past studies

indicate that Latino-Americans may have been threatened by the campaign messages and

subsequent presidential administration of Donald Trump (Gutierrez, Ocampo, Barreto, & Segura,

2019; Wallace & Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Using longitudinal survey data of Latino-Americans

from 2016 and 2019, I look at the impact of linked fate with other Latinos on advocacy for

minorities and support for punitive and welcoming immigration policies.

Study 1: Effect of Conflation on Political Mobilization, Feelings of Closeness, &

Belonging

In Study 1, the goal was to establish that priming Latino-Americans with a symbolic threat to their ethnic ingroup and realistic threat to the self from the conflation of Latinos and undocumented immigrants differentially predict their willingness to support a pathway to citizenship policies and punitive immigration policies. I expected more support for a pathway to citizenship policies and less support for punitive immigration policies. Furthermore, a second goal was to examine how these threats impacted attitudes about both undocumented immigrants and other Latinos. I predicted that attitudes about both groups would be more positive in response to these threats. Third, Study 1 looked at changes in feelings of belonging in America. Based on previous research, I expected that both symbolic and realistic threats would lead to a decrease in Latino-Americans' feelings of belonging (Schildkraut, Jiménez, Dovidio, & Huo, 2019; Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, & Schildkraut, 2018). Finally, Study 1 tested the role of anger and fear as mediators for this effect. Anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants was expected to mediate the effects of both types of threats on all four outcome variables. In contrast, fear about future risks to the self was expected only to mediate Latino-Americans' willingness to engage in political activities to support undocumented immigrants.

Method

Participants. Three hundred and fifty U.S. born Latinos were initially recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. Because it is difficult to assess the legal residency status of immigrants with these surveys, only participants who were born in the U.S. could participate in the study. Out of the 350 participants who completed the study, several were excluded from the analyses for the following reasons: they incorrectly responded to the information check

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questions; they stated that they were born outside of the U.S. the second time they were asked about their place of birth at the end of the survey; they indicated that they belonged to an ethnic group other than Latinos. **Participants in the final sample of 153** had an average age of 32.27 years ($SD = 7.95$), and 66.7% were men. Approximately 50% identified as Democrats, 27.5% as Republicans, and 17% as Independent. Most participants (57.5%) reported that both parents were born in the U.S., 18.3% had one immigrant parent, and for 24.2% reported that both parents were immigrants.

Design and procedure. Participants were recruited for a 2 (strong vs. weak Latino-Undocumented association) x 2 (high vs. low linked fate with undocumented immigrants) between-subjects experiment described as a survey on responses to news reporting of current events with an expected duration of 10 to 15 minutes. Prospective participants first completed a short demographic questionnaire, and only those who initially identified as U.S. born Latinos were eligible to participate. Eligible participants were paid $1.50 for completing the study. Participants read three ostensibly real news articles about current events. After reading each news article, participants responded to three short questions about the article, including an information check question to verify that they read and understood that article's main idea. The first article was a filler article about internet access in Alaska, and all participants read the article.

For the second article, participants were randomly assigned to either the *strong Latino-Undocumented association* condition or the *weak Latino-Undocumented association* condition. The articles presented in these conditions were adapted from Serrano-Careaga & Huo (2019). In the strong Latino-Undocumented association condition, participants read an article about the results of a survey, which showed that Americans overestimate how many U.S. Latinos are undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, participants read a quote ostensibly from an American

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who conflates the two groups. The article included the following information (see Appendix A for complete article):

In a recent national survey, Americans were asked how many Latinos currently residing in the U.S. are in the country illegally. On average, Americans believe that close to 40 % of Latinos are in the U.S. illegally. This is more than twice the official estimate of 18% reported by the federal government.

When asked about his response to the question about 'illegal' Latinos, Chicago-resident John Danvers stated, "I hear stories about Latinos crossing the border on the news so it seems likely that a lot of them are here illegally. So if I don't know someone personally and they look Latino, I assume that they or members of their family are illegal." Much like Mr. Danvers, a large number of the interviewed participants reported that they assume Latinos they meet are here illegally unless they learn otherwise.

In the weak Latino-Undocumented association condition, participants read a version of the article that reported results that showed Americans underestimate the number of U.S. Latinos who are undocumented immigrants (see Appendix B for complete article):

In a recent national survey, Americans were asked how many Latinos currently residing in the U.S. are in the country illegally. On average, Americans believe that close to 15% of Latinos are in the U.S. illegally. This is less than the official estimate of 18% reported by the federal government.

When asked about his response to the question about 'illegal' Latinos, Chicago-resident John Danvers stated, "Although I hear many stories on the news about Latinos crossing the border, many were born here, immigrated legally, or became legal. So if I don't know someone personally and they look Latino, I don't just assume that they or members of their family are illegal." Much like Mr. Danvers, a large number of the interviewed participants reported that they assume Latinos they meet are here legally unless they learn otherwise.

For the third and final article, participants were randomly assigned to either the *high linked fate* condition or the *low linked fate* condition. In the high linked fate condition, participants were asked to read an article about a substantial increase in wrongful immigration arrests of Latinos between 2012 and 2018. The article included the excerpts shown below, along with a graph that showed a dramatic increase in wrongful arrests. Like with the previous two conditions, participants read a quote ostensibly from a Latino-American who worried about racial profiling (see Appendix C for complete article):

Despite having legal status, a significant number of Latinos across the country have been wrongfully detained by immigration officials following traffic stops, police questioning, or immigration raids. This increase in arrests is alarming, as the number of people wrongly arrested in 2018 is six times the number of Latinos who were arrested in 2012.

Latinos in communities across the country have expressed concerns about these recent findings. "I used to walk to the corner store with only cash and my phone in my pocket,

but now I don't feel safe going out without my license. I feel that I always need to have some proof that I was born in the U.S. or things might not go well for me," said Sergio Gomez from Laredo, Texas.

In the low linked fate condition, the article described how wrongful immigration arrests of Latinos had remained low and constant between 2012 and 2018. Along with a graph depicting the constant rate of arrests, participants read the following excerpt and quote (see Appendix D for complete article):

The lack of an increase in arrests is encouraging as the number of people wrongly arrested in 2018 is almost equal to the number of Latinos who were wrongly arrested in 2012. Overall, wrongful arrests during these years were low.

Residents of Latino communities across the country have expressed relief following the release of these recent findings. "I'm definitely surprised but relieved. I'll feel safer walking to the corner store with just cash and my phone in my pocket and without ID. It's good to know that I don't have to worry about proving that I was born in the U.S.," said Sergio Gomez of Laredo, Texas.

After reading the three articles, participants completed a questionnaire.

Measures.

  Latino-Undocumented Association Information Check. Participants were asked to answer the following question to confirm that they understood the main idea of the Latino-Undocumented association article they read: "*According to the article you just read, the results of the national survey found which of the following?*" There were three possible responses: 1-Americans' estimates of undocumented Latinos far exceed official numbers (the correct response for those in the strong Latino-Undocumented association condition); 2-Americans' estimates of undocumented Latinos are slightly lower than official numbers (the correct response for those in the weak Latino-Undocumented association condition); 3- The article did not give this information.

  Linked Fate Information Check. To confirm that participants understood the main idea of the linked fate article they were assigned to read, they answered the following question: "*According to the article, recent reports describe wrongful immigration arrests of Latinos who are U.S. citizens or legal residents in which of the following ways?*" There were three possible answers: 1-Wrongful arrests of Latinos have NOT substantially increased (the correct answer for the *low linked fate* condition*)*; 2-Wrongful arrests of Latinos have substantially increased (the correct answer for the *high linked fate* condition*)*; 3-The article did not give this information.

  Latino-Undocumented Association Beliefs. To test whether our manipulation for the Latino-Undocumented association variable primed participants with the correct perspective, participants were asked to respond to the following question: "*More Latinos have legal status than is commonly assumed; Most Americans think about Latinos when they talk about illegal/undocumented immigration*." Answers ranged from *1* (strongly disagree) to *7* (strongly agree) ($r = .33$).

Perceived Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants. To test whether the

manipulation used for the linked fate variable primed participants with the correct perspectives,

participants responded to the following questions: "*How well I do will depend on how well*

illegal/undocumented immigrants do; *What happens to illegal/undocumented immigrants will*

affect me." Answers ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) ($r = .80$).

Political Mobilization for Arrests and Deportations. Participants were asked to indicate

how likely they are to engage in political behaviors in support of three different policies that are

meant to resolve the status of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. For the first policy,

participants read the following scenario: "*One policy would crackdown on undocumented*

immigrants living in the country today. This means that the federal government would focus most

*of their efforts and resources on **arresting and deporting undocumented immigrants** who are*

currently residing in the U.S. How likely is it that you would engage in each of the following

activities to support this policy?" Five political activities were listed: *sign a petition; attend a*

rally or demonstration; write or share a post on social media; try convincing friends and family

members to support the policy; call a senator or representative; attend a rally or demonstration.

Participants indicated their response on a 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely) for each activity (α

$= .96$).

Political Mobilization for Pathway to Citizenship. For the second policy, participants

read the following scenario: "*Another possible policy would establish a pathway to citizenship.*

*This means that the federal government would pass legislation to **grant legal residency status** to*

undocumented immigrants who have lived in the country for over 10 years, are currently

employed, have a clean criminal history, and are not affiliated with criminal or terrorist

organizations. Eligible individuals would also have to meet minimal knowledge requirements in

U.S. history, government, and the English language. How likely is it that you would engage in each of the following activities to support this policy?" Participants reported their willingness to participate in the same activities as in the previous question ($\alpha = .92$).

   Political Mobilization for Citizenship for Childhood Arrivals. For the third policy, participants reported their willingness to engage in the same five activities as before using the same scale after reading the following description: "*Finally, a third policy would establish a pathway to citizenship only for childhood arrivals. This means that the federal government would pass legislation to grant legal residency status **only for undocumented immigrants who were brought to the country as children** and have no criminal history. How likely is it that you would engage in each of the following activities to support this policy?*" ($\alpha = .93$).

   Feelings of Closeness to Undocumented Immigrants. To measure participants' feelings of closeness with undocumented immigrants, they were asked to state how much they agreed with two statements: "*I feel close to undocumented immigrants*" and "*I feel a bond with undocumented immigrants.*" Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), and responses to both statements were strongly correlated ($r = .94$).

   Feelings of Closeness to Other Latinos. Participants were also asked to state how much they agreed with the following statements, "*I feel close to Latinos*" and "*I feel a bond with Latinos.*" Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and their response to both items were strongly correlated ($r = .82$).

   Feelings of Belonging. To assess participants' feelings of belonging in America, they were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements, "***I feel like I belong in America; I think others see me as an American; I feel like I am a part of America.***" Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) ($\alpha = .78$).

Anger on Behalf of Undocumented Immigrants. Anger about the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. was measured using the following two items: *I get mad when I think about how the federal government treats undocumented immigrants; Thinking about policies that hurt undocumented immigrants makes me angry on their behalf.* Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) ($r = .89$).

Fear of Future Risks to Self. Fear about being treated like undocumented immigrants in the future was measured with the following two items: *I feel afraid when I think about how the federal government's proposed policies targeting undocumented immigration could affect me; I am worried that I could one day be treated like an undocumented immigrant by federal immigration authorities.* Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) ($r = .86$).

Results

Initially, I planned to test my hypotheses by conducting two-way analysis of variance tests to determine the effect of the independent variables, Latino-Undocumented association (strong vs. weak) and linked fate (high vs. low), on each dependent variable. Before proceeding with these tests, I verified that the manipulations of the independent variables were successful by testing the effect of each on responses to their corresponding manipulation check questions using one-way ANOVA tests. For the Latino-Undocumented association manipulation check questions, responses were not significantly influenced by whether they were assigned to the strong ($M = 5.53$, $SD = 1.35$) or weak association ($M = 5.32$, $SD = 1.36$) conditions, $F (1, 152) = .90$, $p = .345$. Similarly, for the Linked Fate manipulation check questions, participants' responses in the high linked fate condition ($M = 3.88$, $SD = 2.07$) were not significantly different from responses in the low linked fate condition ($M = 3.77$, $SD = 1.77$), $F (1, 151) = .12$, $p = .727$.

Since the independent variable manipulations were not successful, I did not run the planned ANOVA tests as the results would be uninterpretable. Therefore, the results that follow are correlational findings. I used the manipulation check questions, *Latino-Undocumented association beliefs* and *perceived linked fate*, as the predictors. The outcome variables remained the same.

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the predictors and outcome variables, as well as the correlations between those variables. Responses to the pathway to citizenship and citizenship for childhood arrivals questions were highly correlated, $r = .74$, $p < .01$. Because both sets of questions asked participants about their willingness to engage in different political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies, they were combined into one scale ($\alpha = .95$). The new variable will be referred to as *pathway to citizenship* in the analyses reported below.

Based on the original hypotheses for Study 1, it was expected that there would be a significant main effect of Latino-Undocumented association beliefs such that more reported association beliefs would predict the following:

- greater willingness to engage in political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies
- less willingness to support punitive policies
- more positive attitudes about both undocumented immigrants and other Latinos
- fewer feelings of belonging in America.

A significant main effect of perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants was also predicted, and the effects on the outcome variables were expected to be in the same direction as those described above for association beliefs. Furthermore, a significant interaction between the

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two predictors was also predicted. As perceptions of linked fate increased, I expected the effects

of association beliefs to grow stronger. Finally, feelings of anger and fear were still expected to

mediate these effects.

Table 1

Study 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Association Beliefs (1)	5.43	1.35	--									
Linked Fate (2)	3.83	1.93	.30*	--								
Anger (3)	4.98	1.87	.38**	.57**	--							
Fear (4)	4.40	2.02	.28**	.65**	.73**	--						
Pathway to Citizenship (5)	4.42	2.00	.33**	.66**	.67**	.59**	--					
Citizenship for Childhood Arrivals (6)	3.95	1.91	.25**	.60**	.52**	.50**	.74**	--				
Arrests and Deportations (7)	2.77	2.01	-.08	.36**	.01	.17*	.20*	.39**	--			
Closeness to Undoc. Immigrants (8)	4.43	1.92	.33**	.67**	.69**	.63**	.72**	.62**	.16	--		
Closeness to Other Latinos (9)	5.87	1.22	.23**	.30**	.37**	.30**	.34**	.26**	-.06	.48**	--	
Belonging (10)	5.45	1.32	-.01	-.10	-.14	-.25**	-.13	-.07	.06	-.034	.18*	--

Note: Significance of p < .05 indicated by * and p < .01 by **.

Before proceeding with tests of moderated mediation, I ran linear regression analyses to test for a potential interaction between the two predictors. The results for the linear regression analyses are presented in Table 2. Across the five tests, the results revealed no significant interaction between Latino-Undocumented association beliefs and perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants. Therefore, the prediction that there would be significant interaction between the two predictors was not supported. On the other hand, except for feelings of belonging, the main effects for each predictor on the outcome variables were significant or approaching significance. Considering these findings, I proceeded with tests of anger and fear as mediators for the effects of each predictor. Hayes' PROCESS Macro Model 4 in SPSS was used to test for the mediation effects reported below. Anger and fear were included as parallel mediators, and confidence intervals were calculated with bootstrap samples of 50,000.

Table 2

Linear regression analyses results for Study 1.

	Pathway to Citizenship	Arrests & Deportations	Closeness to Undocumented Immigrants	Closeness to Other Latinos	Feelings of Belonging
Association Beliefs	$\beta = .12^+$	$\beta = -.25^{**}$	$\beta = .14^*$	$\beta = .16^+$	$\beta = .02$
Linked Fate	$\beta = .64^{***}$	$\beta = .43^{***}$	$\beta = .63^{***}$	$\beta = .26^{**}$	$\beta = -.11$
Interaction	$\beta < .01$	$\beta = -.14^+$	$\beta = -.02$	$\beta < -.01$	$\beta < .01$
R^2	.47	.19	.47	.11	.01
F	42.94***	11.35***	43.17***	6.30***	0.53
df	3, 145	3, 147	3, 147	3, 147	3, 147

Note: Significance of $p < .10$ indicated by +, $p < .05$ by *, $p < .01$ by **, and $p < .001$ by ***.

Political Mobilization to Support Pathway to Citizenship Policies.

The first test of mediation looked at the effect of association beliefs and linked fate on willingness to engage in political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies. The results are shown in Table 3.

Table 3
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Political Mobilization to Support Pathway to Citizenship Policies

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	p-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Association Beliefs	.08	.09	.209	-.06	.29
Mediator — Anger	.43	.09	<.001	.24	.60
Mediator — Fear	.25	.08	.006	.07	.39
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.14	.05	--	.06	.25
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.06	.04	--	.01	.15
Predictor — Linked Fate	.45	.07	< .001	.29	.56
Mediator — Anger	.35	.08	< .001	.19	.51
Mediator — Fear	.04	.08	.681	-.12	.19
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.20	.06	--	.09	.32
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.02	.07	--	-.09	.16

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 1 Mediated effect of association beliefs on support for a pathway to citizenship policies in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

As shown in Figure 1, there was an indirect effect of association beliefs on support for a pathway to citizenship policies. The effect was fully mediated by both feelings of anger (β = .14, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = 0.06, upper 95% CI = 0.25) and fear (β = .06, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.15). Latino-Americans who reported more association beliefs also reported more feelings of anger and fear. As feelings of anger and fear increased, participants were more willing to participate in various political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies.

Figure 2 Mediated effect of linked fate on support for a pathway to citizenship policies in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

In contrast, while greater perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants predicted more willingness to engage in political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies, the effect was partially mediated only by feelings of anger (β = .20, SE = 0.06, lower 95% CI = 0.09, upper 95% CI = 0.32) (Figure 2). Perceived linked fate predicted an increase in both anger and fear. However, the indirect effect via fear was not significant (β = .02, SE = 0.07, lower 95% CI = -0.09, upper 95% CI = 0.16).

Political Mobilization to Support Arrest and Deportation Policies.

Next, I tested the mediation effects of anger and fear on willingness to engage in political activities to support policies that would increase arrests and deportations of undocumented immigrants. The complete results for the mediation tests are listed in Table 4.

Table 4
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Political Mobilization to Support Arrests and Deportations Policies

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	p-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Association Beliefs	-.10	.13	.247	-.40	.10
Mediator — Anger	-.24	.13	.051	-.51	.01
Mediator — Fear	.38	.12	.002	.15	.60
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	-.09	.04	--	-.19	-.01
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.11	.04	--	.04	.18
Predictor — Linked Fate	.50	.10	< .001	.32	.72
Mediator — Anger	-.38	.12	< .001	-.64	-.18
Mediator — Fear	.13	.12	.292	-.11	.36
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	-.22	.07	--	-.36	-.10
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.08	.08	--	-.10	.21

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 3 Mediated effect of association beliefs on support for increased arrests and deportations in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Latino-American participants who reported more association beliefs also expressed more support for policies that would increase arrests and deportations of undocumented immigrants (Figure 3). This effect was indirect and mediated by an increase in participants' fear that immigration policies can personally impact them in the future (β = .11, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.04, upper 95% CI = 0.18). Feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants did not mediate the effect of association beliefs (β = -.09, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.19, upper 95% CI = -0.01).

Figure 4 Mediated effect of linked fate on support for increased arrests and deportations in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

In contrast to the relationship between association beliefs and support for arrests and deportations, the relationship between linked fate and this policy type was negative (Figure 4). As perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants increased, feelings of anger increased too. The indirect effect via anger was significant (β = -.22, SE = 0.07, lower 95% CI = -0.36, upper 95% CI = -0.10); greater feelings of anger predicted less support for arrests and deportations. The indirect effect via feelings of fear was not significant (β = .08, SE = 0.08, lower 95% CI = -0.10, upper 95% CI = 0.21).

Feelings of Closeness to Undocumented Immigrants.

The next set of analyses focused on participants' feelings of closeness to undocumented immigrants. The results for the mediation analyses for both association beliefs and linked fate are listed in Table 5.

Table 5
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Closeness to Undocumented Immigrants

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	*p*-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Association Beliefs	.08	.09	.215	-.06	.28
Mediator — Anger	.47	.09	<.001	.30	.66
Mediator — Fear	.27	.08	.002	.09	.41
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.18	.05	--	.08	.28
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.07	.04	--	.02	.16
Predictor — Linked Fate	.38	.07	<.001	.24	.52
Mediator — Anger	.42	.08	<.001	.27	.58
Mediator — Fear	.08	.08	.360	-.09	.23
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.24	.05	--	.13	.34
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.05	.06	--	-.07	.19

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 5 Mediated effect of association beliefs on feelings of closeness to undocumented immigrants in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

As shown in Figure 5, both anger (β = .18, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = 0.08, upper 95% CI = 0.28) and fear (β = .07, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.02, upper 95% CI = 0.16) mediated the effect of association beliefs on feelings of closeness to undocumented immigrants. More reported association beliefs predicted more feelings of anger and fear. The angrier and more scared that participants felt, the closer they felt to undocumented immigrants.

Figure 6 Mediated effect of linked fate on feelings of closeness to undocumented immigrants in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Perceived linked fate also predicted feeling closer to undocumented immigrants (Figure 6). This effect was partially mediated by feelings of anger (β = .24, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = 0.13, upper 95% CI = 0.34) but not fear (β = .05, SE = 0.06, lower 95% CI = -0.07, upper 95% CI = 0.19). Latino-Americans who perceived more linked fate were angrier about the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. Participants who felt angrier about the treatment of undocumented immigrants reported feeling closer to them.

Feelings of Closeness to Other Latinos.

Next, I looked at the mediation effects on feelings of closeness to other Latinos. Table 6 shows the results of the tests of mediation for feelings of closeness with other Latinos.

Table 6.
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Closeness to Other Latinos

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	*p*-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Association Beliefs	.10	.07	.183	-.05	.24
Mediator — Anger	.18	.08	.018	.03	.33
Mediator — Fear	.05	.07	.493	-.09	.18
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.10	.06	--	-.01	.22
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.02	.04	--	-.04	.10
Predictor — Linked Fate	.13	.06	.18	-.04	.21
Mediator — Anger	.28	.07	.01	.04	.33
Mediator — Fear	.01	.07	.93	-.14	.15
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.16	.07	--	.01	.31
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.01	.08	--	-.15	.18

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 7 Mediated effect of association beliefs on feelings of closeness to other Latinos in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

The results showed that association beliefs did not indirectly or directly predict feelings of closeness to other Latinos (Figure 7). Although paths a and b via anger were significant, the overall indirect effect via anger was not significant (β = .10, SE = 0.06, lower 95% CI = -0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.22). Similarly, the indirect effect via fear was not significant (β = .02, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.04, upper 95% CI = 0.10).

Figure 8 Mediated effect of linked fate on feelings of closeness to other Latinos in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Linked fate did indirectly predict an increase in feelings of closeness to other Latinos (Figure 8). The indirect effect via anger was significant (β = .16, SE = 0.07, lower 95% CI = 0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.31). However, there was no indirect effect via fear on feelings of closeness to other Latinos (β = .01, SE = 0.08, lower 95% CI = -0.15, upper 95% CI = 0.18).

Feelings of Belonging in America.

Finally, the remaining mediation tests focused on feelings of belonging in America.

Table 7 shows the complete results for these mediation tests.

Table 7.
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Feelings of Belonging in America

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	p-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Association Beliefs	.05	.08	.566	-.12	.22
Mediator — Anger	.08	.09	.513	-.12	.23
Mediator — Fear	-.32	.08	.007	-.36	-.06
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.03	.06	--	-.08	.14
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	-.09	.05	--	-.20	-.01
Predictor — Linked Fate	.09	.07	.384	-.08	.21
Mediator — Anger	.08	.09	.493	-.11	.23
Mediator — Fear	-.37	.08	.005	-.41	-.08
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.05	.08	--	-.11	.20
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	-.24	.09	--	-.44	-.06

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 9 Mediated effect of association beliefs on feelings of belonging in America in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

More reported association beliefs did predict a decrease in feelings of belonging, although it did so indirectly (Figure 9). Fear mediated the relationship between the variables (β = -.09, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = -0.20, upper 95% CI = -0.01). However, anger was not a significant mediator (β = .03, SE = 0.06, lower 95% CI = -0.08, upper 95% CI = 0.14).

Figure 10 Mediated effect of linked fate on feelings of belonging in America in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

The results for linked fate mirrored the results for association beliefs. Greater perceived inked fate indirectly predicted a decrease in feelings of belonging (Figure 10). Although fear was a significant mediator of this relationship (β = -.24, SE = 0.09, lower 95% CI = -0.44, upper 95% CI = -0.06), anger was not (β = .05, SE = 0.08, lower 95% CI = -0.11, upper 95% CI = 0.20).

Discussion

Correlational data from Study 1 provide initial support for the prediction that both symbolic threats to perceptions of the ingroup and realistic threats to the self from the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos shape 1) Latino-Americans' support for a pathway to citizenship policies, 2) their positive feelings about undocumented immigrants and other Latinos, and 3) decreases their feelings of belonging in the U.S. Except for perceptions of belonging in America, feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants more consistently mediated these effects. Fear mediated the effects of both association beliefs and linked fate on feelings of belonging. It is likely that because the feelings of anger that were measured in this study were not about the self (e.g., anger on behalf of another group), they are less important in determining whether Latino-Americans feel at home in America. Although fear partly explained participants' willingness to politically mobilize for association beliefs, it did not mediate the effects of linked fate. Across the various test, the standardized coefficients showed that fear was a weaker mediator than anger. A power analysis showed that 312 participants were needed for this study, but the final sample was much smaller. It is possible that there were not enough participants in this study to fully capture the effects of fear. In Study 2, a much larger sample will be needed to accurately test fear as a mediator of both association beliefs and linked fate.

The results for political mobilization to support policies that would increase arrests and deportations of undocumented immigrants provided conflicting support for increased or decreased support. I hesitate to interpret the results too deeply as the policy appeared to be overwhelmingly unpopular among participants (Figure 11).

48

Figure 11 A frequency distribution of participants' average reported willingness to engage in political activities to support a policy that would increase arrests and deportations in Study 1.

Out of 152 participants who responded to the question, few participants were willing to say that they would be very likely to participate in political activities to support policies that would lead to an increase in arrests and deportations. Sixty-eight participants (approximately 45% of the sample) said they were very unlikely to participate in all the listed political activity that would support this type of policy. In contrast, while several participants were also unwilling to participate in activities that would support a pathway to citizenship policies, participants were generally more enthusiastic about these policies (Figure 12).

Figure 12 A frequency distribution of participants' average reported willingness to engage in political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies in Study 1.

Unfortunately, the manipulation of the independent variables did not work as expected. Given how much attention the conflation between undocumented immigrants and Latinos has received in recent years, perceptions about symbolic threats to the ingroup and realistic threats to the self in the context of immigration may be less malleable. Similarly, the extensive attention that this topic has received may have made information about a weak association between undocumented immigrants and low linked fate between participants and undocumented immigrants less believable. In Study 2, the weak association and low linked fate condition will be replaced by control conditions. Finally, because many participants missed the main idea of the articles they read, Study 2 will aim to make the articles and information check questions more understandable for participants.

Study 2: Effect of Conflation on Political Mobilization, Solidarity, & Belonging

In Study 2, I again experimentally test how symbolic threats to Latinos and realistic threats to the self, impact Latino-Americans' engagement in political activities and their attitudes about undocumented immigrants. For both independent variables, the experimental manipulations were changed. Control conditions replaced the weak association and low linked fate conditions. Moreover, the high linked fate condition was also replaced. In Study 1, the high linked fate article was about an increase in wrongful arrests. There is generally less information about wrongful arrests that is available to the public, so it may have been unclear to participants how to interpret the increase in arrests that were described in the article. In Study 2, participants read about a policy that will potentially increase the racial profiling of Latinos. It was expected that participants would be better able to interpret this manipulation as a personal risk to themselves.

Like in Study 1, participants are again asked to report their willingness to mobilize politically to support policies that are both favorable to immigrants or more punitive. However, although participants were still asked to describe their attitudes about undocumented immigrants, the focus in Study 2 was on their desire to distance from undocumented immigrants, not feelings of closeness. Finally, a new measure was added to assess participants' willingness to work with undocumented immigrants to overcome challenges to both groups.

Method

Participants. Three hundred and twelve U.S.-born Latinos were initially recruited using the Prolific survey platform. However, of those who completed the survey, only 269 were included in the final sample. Participants were excluded if they answered the information check questions incorrectly, did not identify as Latinos a second time at the end of the survey, or

indicated that they were not born in the U.S. when they were asked again at the end of the survey. In the final sample, the average age was 29.08 years (SD = 9.59), and 59% of participants were men. Approximately 53.9% identified as Democrats, 9.7% as Republicans, and 26.4% as Independents. Unlike in Study 1, only 38.1% reported that both parents were born in the U.S., 23.5% indicated that at least one parent was an immigrant, and 38.3% indicated that both parents were immigrants.

Design and procedure. Participants were asked to take part in a 2 (strong Latino-undocumented association vs. control) x 2 (high linked fate vs. control) between-subjects experiment and were compensated $1.60 for completing the study. For Study 2, the same cover story and procedure from Study 1 were used.

In the strong association condition, participants read the same article from the strong association condition in Study 1. However, the appearance of the article was updated (see Appendix E for complete article). In the control condition, participants read an article that reported how Americans overestimate the number of homeowners in the U.S (see Appendix F for complete article). The article used the same format as the article from the strong association condition but was written to exclude any information about Latinos or immigration.

In the high linked fate condition, participants read an article about a federal court allowing police departments to carry on with a nationwide program that would increase the racial profiling of Latinos. The article included the excerpts below (see Appendix G for complete article):

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the constitutionality of a federal program, Enforcement of Immigration Laws in Local Communities (EILC), designed to give local

police departments more authority to identify and detain individuals suspected of residing in the U.S. illegally.

Legal analysts predict that the court's recent ruling will significantly increase the likelihood that Latino Americans who are U.S. citizens or legal residents will be racially profiled and wrongly stopped and detained in local communities.

The remaining participants were in the control condition and read about a lawsuit against McDonald's that was adapted from Craig & Richeson (2012) (see Appendix H for complete article). Participants completed a questionnaire after reading the three articles.

Measures.

Latino-Undocumented Association Information Check. In the strong association condition, participants completed the following question to verify that they understood the article: *According to the article you just read, the results of the national survey found which of the following? 1) Americans overestimate the number of Latinos who are living in the country illegally* (correct answer for condition); *2) Americans are very accurate when they estimate how many Latinos are living in the country illegally; 3) the article did not give this information.*

Linked Fate Information Check. In the high linked fate condition, participants answered the following questions to check their understanding: *According to the article, a federal court made a decision about an anti-immigration program that raised concerns about the racial profiling of Latino Americans. Which of the following statements best describes the court's decision? 1) The federal court stopped the program; 2) the federal court allowed the program to continue* (correct answer for condition)*; 3) The article did not give this information.*

Latino-Undocumented Association Beliefs. To test whether our manipulation for the Latino-Undocumented association variable primed participants with the correct perspective, participants responded to the same two questions that were used in Study 1 ($r = .67$).

Perceived Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants. Similarly, to test whether the manipulation used for the linked fate variable primed participants with the correct perspectives, participants responded to the same two questions that were used in Study 1 ($r = .49$).

Political Mobilization for Pathway to Citizenship. Participants were asked to describe their willingness to engage in various political activities in support of a policy that would establish a pathway to citizenship for all immigrants. The description is similar to the description used in Study 1. However, participants read a shortened version to account for time constraints: "*Consider the following policy: Provide legal status to ALL undocumented immigrants without criminal records. How likely is it that you would do the activities below to support this policy?"* Five political activities were listed: *sign a petition; attend a rally or demonstration; write or share a post on social media; try convincing friends and family members to support the policy; call a senator or representative.* Participants indicated their response on a 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely) for each activity ($\alpha = .94$).

Political Mobilization for Citizenship for Childhood Arrivals. To assess their support for a policy that would only provide a pathway to citizenship for immigrants that were brought to the country as immigrants, participants saw the following: *Consider the following policy: Provide legal status ONLY to undocumented immigrants who were brought to the country as children and have no criminal record. How likely is it that you would do the activities below to support this policy?* Participants saw the same five activities that were included in the previous question and provided answers on the same scale ($\alpha = .92$).

Political Mobilization for Arrests and Deportations. The following policy description

was used to assess participants for a policy that would increase arrests and deportations of

undocumented immigrants: *Consider the following policy: How likely is it that you would do the*

activities below to support this policy? Participants saw the same five activities that were

included in the previous two questions and provided answers on the same scale ($\alpha = .95$).

Group Solidarity. To assess participants feelings of solidarity with undocumented

immigrants, they were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with each of the

following statements (adapted from Galsford & Calagno (2012)): *Latino Americans and*

undocumented immigrants should work together to improve the position of both groups; Latino

Americans and undocumented immigrants should stick together; Latino Americans and

undocumented immigrants would be better off if they worked together to improve each group's

position. Answers ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) ($\alpha = .95$).

Social Distancing. Participants were asked how comfortable they would feel when

interacting with undocumented immigrants across several situations. The ten situations presented

to participants were adapted from a study about White-Americans social distancing responses

when primed with stigmatized ingroup members (Kunstman, Plant, & Deska, 2016). The

following are examples of the described scenarios: *Working at a company that employs an*

undocumented immigrant; Having an undocumented immigrant family move into the house or

apartment next to yours; Dating an undocumented immigrant. Responses ranged from 1 (very

uncomfortable) to 7 (very comfortable) ($\alpha = .95$) (see appendix for complete list of items).

Feelings of Belonging. To measure feelings of belonging in America, participants

responded to the same three items that were used in Study 1 ($\alpha = .76$).

Feelings of Anger & Fear. Participants' feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants ($r = .90$) and fear about future risks for themselves from immigration policies ($r = .80$) were measured using the same items as in study 1.

Results

Like in Study 1, I first verified the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations. The manipulations for both variables were unsuccessful. Participants' reported Latino-Undocumented association beliefs in the strong association condition ($M = 5.12$, $SD = 1.53$) did not differ from responses in the control condition ($M = 5.26$, $SD = 1.65$), $F (1, 267) = .46$, $p = .501$. Similarly perceived linked fate did not differ between participants in the high linked fate condition ($M = 3.78$, $SD = 1.70$) or the control condition ($M = 3.80$, $SD = 1.74$), $F (1, 266) = .01$, $p = .917$. In the analyses that follow, *Latino-Undocumented association beliefs* and *perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants* were used as predictors.

Figure 13 A frequency distribution of participants' average reported willingness to engage in political activities to support a policy that would increase arrests and deportations in Study 2.

Although participants' willingness to mobilize to support a policy that would increase arrests and deportations was measured, the subsequent predictions and analyses will omit this variable. Like in Study 1, many of the participants expressed no support for this policy (Figure 13). Approximately 64% of the respondents (171 of 268 who answer this question) said they were very unlikely to engage in any of the political activities that would support this type of policy. Therefore, I did not feel confident that any interpretable conclusions could be made about whether association beliefs and linked fate acted as predictors. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the predictors and outcome variables, as well as the correlations between those variables.

The following predictions were tested in Study 2. A significant main effect of association beliefs was expected, such that it would predict the following for participants:

- greater willingness to engage in political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies

- more likely to believe that Latino-Americans should work with undocumented immigrants to resolve problems that affect both groups

- more comfort in situations that would require them to be close to undocumented immigrants.

- fewer feelings of belonging in America.

Similarly, a significant main effect of perceived linked fate was expected with similar outcomes as described above. I also tested for an interaction effect between the two predictors. Based on the results from Study 1, I did not predict a significant interaction (in contrast to the original hypothesis described in the introduction).

Table 8
Study 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Association Beliefs (1)	5.19	1.59	--									
Linked Fate (2)	3.79	1.71	.37**	--								
Anger (3)	5.26	1.76	.57**	.47**	--							
Fear (4)	3.93	2.04	.50**	.55**	.57**	--						
Pathway to Citizenship (5)	3.83	2.08	.41**	.50**	.65**	.52**	--					
Citizenship for Childhood Arrivals (6)	3.75	1.87	.30**	.33**	.54**	.40**	.64**	--				
Arrests & Deportations (7)	1.95	1.68	-.03	.08	.01	.12	.17**	.26**	--			
Group Solidarity (8)	5.04	1.76	.58**	.47**	.67**	.44**	.61**	.44**	-.02	--		
Social Distance (9)	5.68	1.42	.41**	.38**	.59**	.33**	.48**	.32**	-.12	.57**	--	
Belonging (10)	5.23	1.31	-.29**	-.18**	-.22**	-.29**	-.15*	.01	.10	-.20**	-.16*	--

Note: Significance of p < .05 indicated by * and p < .01 by **.

Because anger proved to be a consistent mediator in Study 1, I predicted that anger mediates the effects of the two predictors on each outcome variable except for feelings of belonging. In contrast, I predicted that fear would mediate the effects of the predictors on support for a pathway to citizenship policies and feelings of belonging.

Next, I ran linear regression analyses to test for an interaction effect between the two predictors on each of our outcome variables (see Table 9 for complete results). Although there was no evidence of a significant interaction between the two predictors, there did appear to be significant main effects. Therefore, I proceeded with mediation tests using Hayes' PROCESS Macro Model 4 in SPSS, and confidence intervals were calculated with bootstrap samples of 50,000. Like in Study 1, anger and fear were included as parallel mediators in each model.

Table 9
Linear regression analyses results for Study 2

	Pathway to Citizenship	Group Solidarity	Social Distance	Feelings of Belonging
Association Beliefs	$\beta = .25$***	$\beta = .45$***	$\beta = .29$***	$\beta = -.27$***
Linked Fate	$\beta = .37$***	$\beta = .31$***	$\beta = .27$***	$\beta = -.08$
Interaction	$\beta = -.02$	$\beta = -.05$	$\beta = -.05$	$\beta = -.01$
R^2	.27	.41	.23	.09
F	32.62***	61.40***	25.62***	8.64***
df	3, 262	3, 263	3, 261	3, 263

Note: Significance of $p < .10$ indicated by +, $p < .05$ by *, $p < .01$ by **, and $p < .001$ by ***.

Political Mobilization to Support Pathway to Citizenship Policies.

First, the mediation effects of anger and fear on willingness to engage in political

activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies were tested (Table 10). As in Study 1, the

items for both a pathway to citizenship for all immigrants and only immigrants who are

childhood arrivals were combined into one variable. The results for the combined variable are

described below.

Table 10
Study 2 Mediation Analyses – Political Mobilization to Support for Pathway to Citizenship Policies

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	p-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Association Beliefs	-.02	.07	.693	-.15	.10
Mediator — Anger	.56	.06	<.001	.45	.69
Mediator—Fear	.20	.05	<.001	.08	.28
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.32	.04	--	.24	.40
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.10	.04	--	.03	.18
Predictor — Linked Fate	.14	.06	.011	.04	.27
Mediator — Anger	.51	.06	<.001	.41	.64
Mediator—Fear	.14	.05	.021	.02	.22
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.24	.04	--	.16	.33
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	.08	.04	--	.01	.16

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 14 Mediated effect of association beliefs on support for a pathway to citizenship policies in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Association beliefs had an indirect effect on participants' willingness to engage in various political activities to support pathway to citizenship policies via anger (β = .32, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.24, upper 95% CI = 0.40) and fear (β = .10, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.03, upper 95% CI = 0.18) (Figure 14). As participants reported more association beliefs, their feelings of anger and fear increased. More feelings of anger and fear predicted a greater willingness to mobilize politically to support these policies.

Figure 15 Mediated effect of linked fate on support for a pathway to citizenship policies in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Similarly, anger (β = .24, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.16, upper 95% CI = 0.33) and fear (β = .08, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.16) partially mediated the effect of linked fate on participants' willingness to engage in political activities to support pathway to citizenship policies (Figure 15). More perceived linked fate predicted more feelings of anger and fear. Participants who were angrier and more fearful were more willing to participate in these activities.

Group solidarity with undocumented immigrants.

Next, I looked at participant responses to the measure of group solidarity. Table 11 shows the complete results of the tests of mediation.

Table 11
Study 2 Mediation Analyses – Group Solidarity

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	*p*-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Association Beliefs	.28	.06	<.001	.20	.43
Mediator — Anger	.53	.06	<.001	.41	.63
Mediator—Fear	-.01	.05	.898	-.10	.09
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.30	.05	--	.21	.39
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	-.01	.03	--	-.07	.06
Predictor — Linked Fate	.18	.06	.001	.07	.29
Mediator — Anger	.60	.05	<.001	.49	.71
Mediator—Fear	-.01	.05	.928	-.10	.09
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.29	.04	--	.20	.37
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	-.01	.04	--	-.07	.07

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 16 Mediated effect of association beliefs on group solidarity in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Anger (β = .30, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = 0.21, upper 95% CI = 0.39), but not fear (β = -.01, SE = 0.03, lower 95% CI = -0.07, upper 95% CI = 0.06), mediated the effects of association beliefs. Participants who reported more association beliefs also felt angrier about the way undocumented immigrants are treated in the U.S. (Figure 16). Feeling angrier about this treatment predicted that participants believed there should be more solidarity between the two groups. Feelings of fear did not mediate this effect.

Figure 17 Mediated effect of linked fate on group solidarity in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Similarly, anger (β = .29, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.20, upper 95% CI = 0.37), but not fear (β = -.01, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.07, upper 95% CI = 0.07), mediated the effects of linked fate. Participants who perceived more linked fate with undocumented were more likely to feel angrier and more fearful (Figure 17). However, only feelings of anger predicted agreement that there should be more solidarity between the two groups.

Social Distancing from Undocumented Immigrants.

Next, I looked at the participants' desire to socially distance themselves from undocumented immigrants (Table 12). Both association beliefs (Figure 18) and perceived linked fate (Figure 19) predicted that participants would feel comfortable in various situations with undocumented immigrants (i.e., lower desire to socially distance). For both predictors, anger was the only mediator of these effects.

Table 12
Study 2 Mediation Analyses – Social Distance

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	*p*-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Association Beliefs	.11	.06	.076	-.01	.21
Mediator — Anger	.54	.05	<.001	.33	.54
Mediator—Fear	-.03	.04	.655	-.11	.07
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.31	.05	--	.21	.41
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	-.01	.03	--	-.08	.05
Predictor — Linked Fate	.15	.05	.013	.03	.23
Mediator — Anger	.55	.05	<.001	.34	.54
Mediator—Fear	-.06	.05	.355	-.13	.05
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.26	.04	--	.18	.35
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	-.03	.04	--	-.11	.04

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 18 Mediated effect of association beliefs on social distancing in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

There was an indirect effect of association beliefs via anger (β = .31, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = 0.21, upper 95% CI = 0.41) (Figure 18). However, the indirect effect via fear was not significant (β = -.01, SE = 0.03, lower 95% CI = -0.08, upper 95% CI = 0.05). When participants reported more association beliefs, they also reported feeling angrier about the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (Figure 18). More feelings of anger predicted feeling more comfortable in social situations with undocumented immigrants. There was no effect of fear and desires to socially distance from undocumented immigrants.

Figure 19 Mediated effect of linked fate on social distancing in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

There was an indirect effect of linked fate via anger (β = .26, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.18, upper 95% CI = 0.35) but not fear (β = -.03, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.11, upper 95% CI = 0.04). When participants reported greater linked fate, they also reported feeling angrier about the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (Figure 19). More feelings of anger predicted feeling more comfortable in social situations with undocumented immigrants. Like with association beliefs, fear did not mediate this effect.

Feelings of Belonging in America.

Finally, I tested the effects of both predictors on feelings of belonging in American and whether those effects were mediated by anger and fear (Table 13).

Table 13
Study 2 Mediation Analyses – Feelings of Belonging in America

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	p-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Association Beliefs	-.19	.06	.013	-.27	-.03
Mediator — Anger	.01	.06	.934	-.11	.11
Mediator—Fear	-.20	.05	.007	-.22	-.04
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	.01	.05	--	-.10	.10
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	-.10	.04	--	-.18	-.03
Predictor — Linked Fate	-.01	.06	.871	-.12	.10
Mediator — Anger	-.07	.05	.344	-.16	.06
Mediator—Fear	-.24	.05	.002	-.25	-.06
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	-.03	.04	--	-.11	.04
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear	-.14	.05	--	-.23	-.05

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 20 Mediated effect of association beliefs on feelings of belonging in America in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

For association beliefs, there was a significant indirect effect via fear (β = -.10, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.18, upper 95% CI = -0.03) but no significant indirect effect via anger (β = .01, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = -0.10, upper 95% CI = 0.10). Participants who reported more association beliefs were more fearful about future risks to themselves, which predicted a decrease in feelings of belonging (Figure 20). Association beliefs did predict an increase in anger, but there was no relationship between feelings of anger and feelings of belonging.

Figure 21 Mediated effect of linked fate on feelings of belonging in America Latinos in Study 2. Significance of $p < .05$ indicated by *, $p < .01$ by **, and $p < .001$ by ***.

Similarly, there was a significant indirect effect of linked fate via fear ($\beta = -.14$, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = -0.23, upper 95% CI = -0.05) but no significant indirect effect via anger ($\beta = -.03$, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.11, upper 95% CI = 0.04). Participants who reported greater perceived linked fate were more fearful about future risks to themselves, which predicted a decrease in feelings of belonging (Figure 21). Linked fate also predicted feeling angrier about the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., but there was no relationship between anger and feelings of belonging.

Discussion

Consistent with the results of Study 1, correlational findings from Study 2 provided additional support that Latino-Undocumented association beliefs and perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants predict a greater willingness to mobilize politically in support of a pathway to citizenship policies. Both association beliefs and perceived linked fate also predict a decrease in feelings of belonging among Latino-Americans. These results confirmed the study hypotheses. Similarly, anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants mediated the effects of both predictor variables on political mobilization for a pathway to citizenship policies. Moreover, only fear about future personal risks to Latino-Americans mediated the effects of both predictors on feelings of belonging in America. These findings again mirror the results found in Study 1.

In Study 2, fear also mediated the effect of both predictors on political mobilization for a pathway to citizenship policies. The observed mediation effects of fear in Study 2 differ from fear's mediation effects observed in Study 1. Fear only mediated the effect of association beliefs on political mobilization for the pathway to citizenship policies and did not mediate the effect of linked fate in Study 1. It is likely that, given the substantial differences in sample sizes between the two studies, Study 2 was better able to detect the mediation effects of fear for the political mobilization outcome variable.

New to Study 2 were measures of group solidarity and social distancing. Both association beliefs and linked fate predicted a greater desire for group solidarity between undocumented immigrants and Latinos. Similarly, both association beliefs and linked fate predicted more comfort with undocumented immigrants in various social situations, reflecting a lower desire to distance socially from undocumented immigrants. Anger, not fear, mediated these effects.

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Unfortunately, the experimental manipulations for Study 2 were not successful. Perceptions that views about undocumented immigrants affect views about Latinos (Latino-Undocumented association) and linked fate with undocumented immigrants were not malleable. As I suggested in Study 1, recent political events like the 2016 presidential election, may have consolidated Latino-Americans' opinions about both variables. To further explore the role of the 2016 presidential election in shaping perceptions of linked fate and later support for policies related to undocumented immigration, I analyzed survey data of Latino-Americans shortly after the election took place in Study 3. The main goal of Study 3 is to understand how Latino-Americans perceived linked fate with other Latinos during a time when their ethnic group was highly conflated with undocumented immigrants shaped their responses several years later.

Study 3: Analysis of Panel Data from VOTER Survey 2016 & 2019

In Studies 1 and 2, participants were surveyed several years after the consequential 2016 U.S. presidential election. During the 2016 election, there was an extensive focus on undocumented immigration and its association with Latinos due in part to Donald Trump's presidential campaign policy proposal of building a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. In the years since the election, the Trump administration's approach to undocumented immigration has directly impacted immigrants from Latin America. For example, the administration repealed the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy. DACA granted undocumented immigrants who were brought to the U.S. as children protection from deportation and gave eligible immigrants work permits. The overwhelming majority of immigrants who benefitted from DACA are from Latin America (Pew Research Center, 2017). Current court proceedings have allowed the policy to remain in place temporarily. Similarly, the Trump administration began the controversial policy of separating immigrant families at the U.S.-Mexico border who were found crossing the border without authorization or who sought asylum in the U.S. These and other actions by the administration have spotlighted undocumented immigrants from Latin America. Do perceptions of ethnic linked fate in this context engender support for advocacy on behalf of minorities and support for pro-immigrant policies?

I expect that in a context where the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos is salient, linked fate with other Latinos will show similar effects as linked fate with undocumented immigrants. Given the results of Studies 1 and 2 on the effects of linked fate with undocumented immigrants, I predict that more perceived linked fate with other Latinos will:

- Predict more support for a future president that would advocate for minorities.

- Predict more support for a policy that would allow DACA recipients to remain in the country legally.

- Predict less support for a policy that separates immigrant families at the border.

Finally, anger and anxiety (used as a proxy for fear) about American politics were included as potential mediators. Because these emotions are broader and focused on undocumented immigration or threats to Latinos, it was unclear whether they would mediate the effects of linked fate like the emotions in Studies 1 and 2. Based on the results from Studies 1 and 2, anger was expected to mediate the effect of linked fate on all three outcome variables as it has consistently been a robust mediator of political mobilization, attitudes about immigrants and Latinos, social distancing, and feelings of solidarity. Anxiety, however, was expected only to mediate the relationship between linked fate and support for a president that advocates for minorities. In both Studies 1 and 2, fear was consistently a mediator of political mobilization. However, it was limited as a mediator of intergroup attitudes in Study 1 and did not predict similar attitudes (e.g., solidarity and social distancing) in Study 2. Of the three outcome variables, advocacy for minorities most resembles previous measures of political mobilization. The other two outcome variables most resemble measures of intergroup attitudes.

In the dataset analyzed for Study 3, there were no variables that could serve as predictors of Latino-Undocumented association beliefs. Therefore, that predictor was excluded from this study.

Method

Participants. The sample for study 3 was made up of 222 U.S.-born Latino-Americans. The average age of participants was 58.63 years ($SD = 11.60$) and 50.5% identified as men. Approximately 44.6% identified as Democrats, 23.4% as Republicans, 27.5% as Independents.

Design and procedure. For Study 3, data from the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group's VOTER (Views of the Electorate Research) Survey were analyzed. The VOTER Survey is an ongoing project that began in 2016, and the survey has been conducted every year since the project's inception. The 2016 survey had an original sample size of 8,637, while the 2019 survey had a sample of 6,779 participants of different racial/ethnic backgrounds. Participants were recruited through YouGov to participate in the survey. The most recent dataset released in January 2020 includes data from 2016 through 2019 waves. I focused on a sub-sample of Latino-Americans who completed the survey for both the 2016 and 2019 waves, responded to all variables of interest, and were born in the U.S.

Measures.

Perceived Linked Fate with Latinos. In the 2016 survey, participants were asked the following question: *How much do you think that what happens generally to Hispanics in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life*? Responses ranged from 1 (a lot) to 4 (none). In the analyses reported below, I recoded responses to this question so that 1 = none and 4 = a lot. The 2019 survey did not include this question.

Feelings of Anxiety. In the 2019 survey, participants were asked to report the extent to which they experience several emotions in response to American politics: *When you think about American politics these days, how do you feel?* One of those emotions was anger. Responses ranged from 1 (do not feel at all) to 7 (feel very strongly).

Feelings of Anxiety. Participants also reported their feelings of anxiety. For anxiety, they were given the same prompt and response scale that they saw for anger. Anxiety was used as a proxy for participants' feelings of fear.

Support for Future President who Advocates for Minorities. In the 2019 survey, participants were asked whether it was important that a future U.S. president advocates for minority groups: *How important is it for the next president to have each of the following characteristics? To advocate for racial and ethnic minorities in this country.* Responses were recoded so that 1 represents *unimportant,* and 4 represents *very important*.

Support for Allowing Dreamers to Remain in the U.S. Participants were asked whether they favored allowing Dreamers to remain in the U.S. in the 2019 survey: *Do you favor or oppose allowing young adults who were brought to the United States illegally as children to stay and work here legally?* Responses were recoded so that 1 represents *strongly oppose,* and 4 represents *strongly favor*.

Support for Separating Undocumented Immigrant Families. Finally, participants were asked how much they agreed with the following statement: *It is appropriate to separate undocumented immigrant parents from their children when they cross the border in order to discourage others from crossing the border illegally*. Responses were recoded so that 1 represents *strongly disagree,* and 4 represents *strongly agree*.

Results

Table 14 includes the descriptive statistics for each variable, as well as the correlations between those variables.

Table 14.

Study 3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
Linked Fate (1)	2.53	.86	--					
Anger (2)	5.52	1.56	.01	--				
Anxiety (3)	4.75	1.86	.13	.48	--			
Presidential Advocacy for Minorities (4)	3.16	1.01	.27**	.12	.19**	--		
Separate Families at Border (5)	3.07	1.10	.24**	.14*	.09	.54**	--	
Allow Dreamers to Remain (6)	1.86	1.16	-.32**	-.05	-.10	-.66**	-.68*	--

Note: Significance of p < .05 indicated by * and p < .01 by **.

For each mediation test reported below, Hayes' PROCESS Macro Model 4 was used, and ideology and educational attainment were included as covariates.

Support for Future President who Advocates for Minorities. The results for the test of mediation are presented in Table 15.

Table 15
Study 3 Mediation Analyses – Support for Future President who Advocates for Minorities

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	*p*-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Linked Fate	.20	.07	.001	.09	.38
Mediator — Anger	-.02	.05	.780	-.10	.08
Mediator—Anxiety	.14	.04	.052	-.01	.15
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	<.01	.01	--	-.01	.01
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anxiety	.02	.01	--	-.01	.05

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 22 Effect of linked fate with other Latinos on support for a future president who advocates for minorities in Study 3. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Greater linked fate with other Latinos predicted more agreement with the statement that it is important for a future president to advocate for racial and ethnic minority groups. Neither anger (β = < .01, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.01) nor anxiety (β = .02, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.05) mediated this effect (Figure 22). The effect of linked fate was significant ideology and education were used as covariates.

Support for Allowing Dreamers to Remain in the U.S. The results for the test of

mediation are presented in Table 16.

Table 16
Study 3 Mediation Analyses – Support for Allowing Dreamers to Remain in the U.S.

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	*p*-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Linked Fate	.17	.08	.005	.06	.36
Mediator — Anger	.03	.05	.680	-.07	.11
Mediator—Anxiety	<-.01	.04	.984	-.08	.08
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	<-.01	.01	--	-.01	.01
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anxiety	<-.01	.01	--	-.02	.02

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 23 Effect of linked fate with other Latinos on support for allowing dreamers to remain in the U.S. in Study 3. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Next, analyses showed that linked fate significantly predicted support for providing legal status to undocumented immigrants who were brought to the U.S. as children (Figure 23). Like with support for a president that advocates for minorities, anger ($\beta = < -.01$, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.01) and anxiety ($\beta = < -.01$, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.02, upper 95% CI = 0.02) did not mediate this effect. More importantly, the results held even when controlling for differences in ideology and education.

Support for Separating Undocumented Immigrant Families. The results for the test of

mediation are presented in Table 17.

Table 17
Study 3 Mediation Analyses – Support for Separating Undocumented Immigrant Families

	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	*p*-Value	Lower limit confidence interval	Upper limit confidence interval
Predictor — Linked Fate	-.25	.08	<.001	-.50	-.18
Mediator — Anger	.07	.05	.268	-.04	.16
Mediator—Anxiety	-.04	.04	.395	-.12	.05
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger	-.01	.01	--	-.02	.01
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anxiety	<-.01	.01	--	-.03	.01

Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis.

Figure 24 Effect of linked fate with other Latinos on support for separating families at the border in Study 3. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***.

Finally, linked fate again significantly predicted changes in our third variable, support for separating undocumented immigrant families as deterrence against future undocumented immigrants (Figure 24). However, the relationship was negative. As linked fate with other Latinos increased, participants were less likely to support this policy. The effect was not mediated by feelings of anger (β = -.01, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.02, upper 95% CI = 0.01) or anxiety (β = < -.01, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.03, upper 95% CI = 0.01).

Discussion

The results for Study 3 supported the study predictions for the effect of linked fate on the outcome variables. More linked fate predicted an increase in support for having a future president that advocates for minority groups and support for providing legal status for undocumented immigrants who were brought to the country as children (i.e., Dreamers). In contrast, more linked fate predicted a decrease in support for separating undocumented immigrant families at the border.

However, the predictions for anger and fear as mediators were not supported. In Studies 1 and 2, the measured emotions were specifically about undocumented immigration. For anger, participants were asked to think about how they felt about the treatment of undocumented immigrants. For fear, participants were asked about their feelings about being treated like an undocumented immigrant in the future. However, in Study 3, the emotions were vaguely about current responses to American politics. It is possible that emotions that are too broad (as in Study 3) cannot explain changes in attitudes or behaviors that are motivated by the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos. For example, while some participants may have been concerned about immigration policies, others may have been angry and anxious about politics related to issues like foreign military interventions or the economy. Without more information about what about American politics shaped these emotions, the connection between the emotions for Study 3 and the emotions measured in Studies 1 and 2 remains unclear. Therefore, the possibility that emotions specifically about undocumented immigration could explain the effects of linked fate with other Latinos cannot be disconfirmed by the results of Study 3. A future study where such emotions are measure could help better compare Study 3 findings to the results of Studies 1 and 2.

Chapter 5: General Discussion

In the United States today, undocumented immigrants as a group are often seen as being synonymous with Latinos. Given how prevalent the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos appears to be among the general public and in news media (Barreto, Manzano, & Segura, 2012; Perez, 2016; Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013), it was expected that this conflation would be perceived as both a symbolic threat against their ethnic group and a realistic threat to the self among Latino-Americans. Latino-Americans were defined as Latinos who are U.S. born citizens, naturalized citizens, or legal residents. Across Studies 1-3, only Latino-Americans who were born in the U.S. were included in the study samples.

To assess reactions to a symbolic threat, Studies 1 and 2 manipulated the degree to which views about undocumented immigrants are associated with views about Latinos (Latino-Undocumented association). Participants were also asked to report how much they believe that Americans view Latinos and undocumented immigrants in the same way (Latino-Undocumented association beliefs). To assess reactions to a realistic threat, Studies 1 and 2 manipulated the extent to which Latino-Americans in the U.S. are wrongly detained by immigration officials and the threat of racial profiling of Latino-Americans by those officials. Moreover, participants were asked to report their perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants. Although the experimental manipulations were unsuccessful, participants' association beliefs and perceived linked fate provided further insight into the effects of the symbolic and realistic threats posed by the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos.

Several outcomes related to political mobilization and intergroup attitudes were measured. Both association beliefs and linked fate predicted effects that were in the same direction. However, the size of the correlations between the two predictors in Study 1 ($r = .30$)

and Study 2 ($r = .37$), as well as the face validity of the individual items, do suggest that they measured different constructs. As more threat to their ethnic ingroup (association beliefs) and more threat to themselves (linked fate) were perceived, Latino-Americans were more willing to mobilize in support of a pathway to citizenship policies (Studies 1 and 2).

Feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants consistently mediated the effects of both predictors on political mobilization. Latino-Americans' fear that they would be treated like an undocumented immigrant in the future also mediated the effect of association beliefs on political mobilization (Studies 1 and 2). However, it was only detected as a mediator of the effect of linked fate with a larger sample of Latino-Americans (Study 2). Linked fate with other Latinos predicted more significant support for a future president that advocates for racial and ethnic minorities (Study 3). Like with the measure of political mobilization, support for such a president could be a potential defense against threats to Latino-Americans. Broader feelings of anger and anxiety that were not specifically about undocumented immigrants or Latinos did not mediate this effect. Notably, participants were much less supportive of punitive policies against undocumented immigrants in all three studies. In Studies 1 and 2, Latino-Americans were very unwilling to support a policy that would increase arrests and deportations. In Study 3, linked fate predicted a decrease in support for separating undocumented immigrant families at the U.S.-Mexico border.

Association beliefs and linked fate with undocumented immigrants also predicted more significant feelings of closeness with undocumented immigrants and other Latinos (Study 1), a greater desire for group solidarity between undocumented immigrants and Latinos (Study 2), and feeling more comfortable with undocumented immigrants across various social situations (Study 2). Anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants mediated these effects. However, fear about

future risks to themselves did not. It is likely that because these outcome variables focus on an outgroup and are not related to avoiding future risks, fear about risks to themselves was not relevant to Latino-Americans' attitudes about undocumented immigrants.

Finally, in Studies 1 and 2, Latino-Americans' feelings of belonging decreased as more association beliefs were reported and as linked fate with undocumented immigrants increased. Only fear about future risks to themselves mediated these effects among Latino-Americans. These results appear to support past research, which showed that feelings of belonging among Latino-Americans decrease when local immigration policies are more punitive (Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, & Schildkraut, 2018; Schildkraut, Jiménez, Dovidio, & Huo, 2019).

Limitations

Across the three studies, there are clear limitations to consider. First, because the experimental manipulations for Studies 1 and 2 were unsuccessful, the findings presented here do not imply causal relationships between our predictors and outcome variables. This constraint also applies to Study 3, as the data analyzed were correlational as well. If perceptions of the Latino-Undocumented association and linked fate with undocumented immigrants cannot be manipulated, an important next step would be to conduct a longitudinal study in which both predictors and their effects are measured over time. This type of study would help establish whether the effects observed here persist over time and across different political contexts (e.g., during times when there is less focus on undocumented immigration from Latin America or under different presidential administrations).

For Studies 1 and 2, I argued that participants were more willing to mobilize in support of a pathway to citizenship policies when they experienced a symbolic threat to their ethnic group and a realistic threat to themselves because of the conflation of Latinos and undocumented

immigrants. I argued that a greater willingness to mobilize politically for this type of policy represented Latino-Americans' desire to both support undocumented immigrants and avoid future risks to themselves. The experience of fear in these studies was specifically associated theoretically with engaging in coping behaviors that would help individuals avoid future risks. With the available data, I cannot confirm that this is how Latino-American participants perceived support for this type of policy. Future studies should include measures that assess what participants hope to achieve by supporting these policies. However, Latino-Americans may not be explicitly aware of their motivations when they support these policies (for an example of research of automatic decision making, see Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001).

With the data collected in the studies presented in this report, I cannot identify differences in linked fate with undocumented immigrants that might exist between Latino-Americans of different national backgrounds (e.g., Mexican, Cuban, Dominican). Latino-Americans of Central American or Mexican descent could feel the most linked fate with undocumented immigrants since Mexico and Central American countries (e.g., Guatemala, El Salvador) are often linked to stories about undocumented immigration. Alternatively, perceptions of linked fate with undocumented immigrants might not differ by national background. In Studies 1 and 2, most participants were of Mexican descent (e.g., close to 60% in Study 2), and therefore these differences cannot be explored with the current samples. Comparing Latino-Americans from national backgrounds that are often viewed as having vastly different political ideologies (e.g., Cuban-Americans and Mexican-Americans) could help uncover the extent to which perceptions of linked fate with undocumented immigrants generalize across Latino groups.

Finally, although the theories presented in the introduction were about Latinos who are citizens or legal residents (e.g., Latino-Americans), only U.S. born individuals were included in the sample. The decision to include only U.S. born individuals was made out of concerns that the citizenship or residency status of foreign-born individuals could not be verified. Including foreign-born individuals in future samples will be important as it will allow for the comparison of 1) response differences between foreign-born Latino-Americans with different national backgrounds and 2) response differences between U.S.-born and foreign-born Latino-Americans.

Future Directions

Exploring the Moderating Role of Group Efficacy Beliefs. Studies 1 and 2 focused in part on Latino-Americans' willingness to participate in political activities in response to the conflation of Latinos and undocumented immigrants. Future research should explore the potential moderating effects of group efficacy beliefs in this context. Whether people believe their ingroup can overcome a collective problem when the members of the group work together is known as group efficacy (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). Individuals who believe that their group has high efficacy are more willing to participate in activities like collective action on behalf of the group (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010). Moreover, past experiences with their ingroup can influence a person's efficacy beliefs (Feltz & Lirgg, 1998; Gibson & Earley, 2007; Lester, Meglino, & Korsgaard, 2002).

Some of the political activities that were presented to participants in Studies 1 and 2 can be viewed as costly or effortful activities (e.g., attending rallies, calling a senator or representative). These activities, however, might also be more impactful. By increasing their perceptions of group efficacy, they might be more willing to engage in activities that require

them to collaborate with other people. Future studies on the role of group efficacy in this context would help identify potential limits on the influence of threats from the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos in creating behavioral changes.

Exploring the Role of Local Policies on Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants. States across the U.S. vary significantly in the degree to which their policies on undocumented immigration can be considered punitive. Punitive immigration policies at the local level impact Latino-Americans' perceived linked fate with their ethnic group (Vargas et al., 2017) and shaped attitudes about undocumented immigrants (Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, Schildkraut, 2018). Given the observed effects from local immigration policies in past research, the extent to which Latino-Americans experience linked fate with undocumented immigrants may depend on where they reside. In a state with punitive policies, the threat of being racially profiled by immigration authorities could increase perceptions of linked fate.

On the other hand, in states where policies are characterized as more welcoming, Latino-Americans could perceive less linked fate. In such states, the role of association beliefs could be more influential in determining Latino-Americans' willingness to mobilize politically. If a Latino-American experienced less linked fate with undocumented immigrants but had strong association beliefs, the results of Studies 1 and 2 would suggest that their willingness to mobilize politically could still be high. Therefore, comparing groups of Latino-Americans who reside in states with differing approaches to immigration enforcement could be incredibly fruitful in highlighting the role of local policies in perceptions of linked fate with undocumented immigrants.

A Direct Comparison of Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants and Linked Fate with Other Latinos. Future research on Latino-Americans' political behaviors related to

undocumented immigration should directly compare the effects of both linked fate with undocumented immigrants and linked fate with other Latinos. In Studies 1-3, both measures of linked fate predicted support for a pathway to citizenship policy for undocumented immigrants brought to the country as children. However, the role of feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants and of fear for futures risk to the self could only be confirmed as mediators for linked fate with undocumented immigrants. For attitudes about immigration and support for immigration policies, are both measures of linked fate equally powerful in predicting responses among Latino-Americans? A more in-depth exploration of the differences between the two types of linked fate among Latino-Americans is crucial.

Furthermore, a direct comparison of both linked fate measures will allow us to understand whether linked fate with other Latinos and with undocumented immigrants develop in the same way. Past research indicates that linked with other Latinos is stronger among less assimilated Latino-Americans (Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010). Less assimilated Latino-Americans may be more likely to have stronger ties to the immigrant community, which could contribute to a stronger sense of linked fate with undocumented immigrants. The research presented did not explore the effect of assimilation or acculturation on either linked fate with undocumented immigrants or other Latinos. Therefore, future research should explore the possibility that the effects reported here could become weaker as assimilation or acculturation increases.

Implications

Established Support for Broader Effects of Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants. To my knowledge, only one other study has explored the impact of linked fate with undocumented immigrants on Latino-Americans (Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 2019). Unique to the present research was evidence that this type of linked fate does not only predict willingness to

mobilize politically for immigration policies but that it may also shape feelings of solidarity with undocumented immigrants and feelings of belonging in America. Legally, Latino-Americans should feel reassured that their status as citizens or legal residents will ultimately protect them from consequences that could result from punitive immigration policies. However, for the Latino-Americans surveyed in the studies presented here, having legal status did not lead to perceptions of immunity from these policies. Finding support for this recently introduced kind of linked fate suggests that individuals can develop linked fate to a group they do not belong to even when they are objectively not subject to the same outcomes.

These could have implications for the existence of linked fate between other groups. For example, non-Muslim groups in the U.S. like Sikhs could perceive linked fate with Muslims. Since the events of September 11, 2001, there has been an increased harmful association between Muslim Americans and terrorists that is often reinforced by media (Powell, 2011). Although Muslim Americans are very diverse phenotypically, the racialization of Muslims in America reinforces the association between this group and perceived foreigners with darker skin (like Sikhs) that puts both non-Muslims and Muslims at risk for increased discrimination and harassment (Kaufman & Niner, 2019). When policies like a "Muslim ban" are discussed by politicians, feelings of linked fate between these groups may increase.

Fear of Future Risks as a Predictor of Political Mobilization. The current findings suggest that the fear of future risks in the context of immigration can act as a catalyst for action. While fearful individuals are more cautious in the face of risks (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003), political action in the present could be interpreted as the best precaution against risks that threaten their future wellbeing (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010). Study 3 exemplifies how not just any type of fear can promote action. The content of the experienced

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fear is important in determining whether active responses are suppressed or promoted (Consedine, Magai, Krivoshekova, Ryzewicz, & Neugut, 2004). With increasing support for more punitive immigration policies within the federal government during the Trump administration, feelings of fear in Latino communities could be incredibly crucial in explaining how Latino-Americans respond to these policies. The current studies suggest that perhaps observing fear in these communities should not immediately lead to predictions of muted or complacent responses from those who feel targeted by policies at either the state or federal level.

Conclusion

The title of this paper references the phrase, "United we stand, divided we fall," which originated during the American Revolution. It also reflects how several of the participants across the three studies presented here responded to threats from the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos. Although these threats can have harmful consequences for Latino-Americans, such as decreasing their feelings of belonging in America, they also appear to increase political mobilization and solidarity, two essential ingredients for social change.

Appendix A: Study 1 Strong Latino-Undocumented Association Article

Search

Politics

Americans believe that the number of 'illegal' Latinos in U.S. far exceeds official estimates

Americans think there are far more Latinos who are illegal than official estimates suggest.

WASHINGTON, D.C. — In a recent national survey, Americans were asked how many Latinos currently residing in the U.S. are in the country illegally. On average, Americans believe that close to 40% of Latinos are in the U.S. illegally. This is more than twice the official estimate of 18% reported by the federal government.

This finding comes from the General Social Survey, a project of the independent research organization NORC at the University of Chicago. The annual national survey tracks key changes in American society. Funded primarily by the National Science Foundation, the General Social Survey has interviewed more than 57,000 Americans since 1972.

All participants were offered the opportunity to discuss their responses to the survey's questions.

When asked about his response to the question about 'illegal' Latinos, Chicago-resident John Danvers stated, "I hear stories about Latinos crossing the border on the news so it seems likely that a lot of them are here illegally. So if I don't know someone personally and they look Latino, I assume that they or members of their family are illegal." Much like Mr. Danvers, a large number of the interviewed participants reported that they assume Latinos they meet are here illegally unless they learn otherwise.

Appendix B: Study 1 Weak Latino-Undocumented Association Article

Search

Politics

Americans believe that the number of 'illegal' Latinos in U.S. is slightly lower than official estimates

Americans think there are somewhat fewer Latinos who are illegal than official estimates suggest.

WASHINGTON, D.C. — In a recent national survey, Americans were asked how many Latinos currently residing in the U.S. are in the country illegally. On average, Americans believe that close to 15% of Latinos are in the U.S. illegally. This is less than the official estimate of 18% reported by the federal government.

This finding comes from the General Social Survey, a project of the independent research organization NORC at the University of Chicago. The annual national survey tracks key changes in American society. Funded primarily by the National Science Foundation, the General Social Survey has interviewed more than 57,000 Americans since 1972.

All participants were offered the opportunity to discuss their responses to the survey's questions.

When asked about his response to the question about 'illegal' Latinos, Chicago-resident John Danvers stated, "Although I hear stories on the news about Latinos crossing the border, many were born here, immigrated legally, or became legal. So if I don't know someone personally and they look Latino, I don't just assume that they or members of their family are illegal." Much like Mr. Danvers, a large number of the interviewed participants reported that they assume Latinos they meet are here legally unless they learn otherwise.

Wrongful Immigration Arrests of U.S. Latinos Significantly Increase

█████████████

████████████████   f 🐦 ✉ ➔ 🔖 [148]

Recently released data by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) show a substantial increase in the percent of wrongful immigration arrests of Latinos who are U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents. The released data compared arrests from two years, 2012 and 2018.

Despite having legal status, a significant number of Latinos across the country have been wrongfully detained by immigration officials following traffic stops, police questioning, or immigration raids. This increase in arrests is alarming, as the number of people wrongly arrested in 2018 is six times the number of Latinos who were wrongly arrested in 2012.

Wrongful Immigration Arrests of U.S. Latinos Greatly Increased Since 2012

Percent of wrongful immigration arrests of Latinos in 2012 and 2018 compared side to side. Arrests substantially higher in 2018 than 2012.

Latinos in communities across the country have expressed concerns about these recent findings. "I used to walk to the corner store with only cash and my phone in my pocket, but now I don't feel safe going out without my license. I feel that I always need to have some proof that I was born in the U.S. or things might not go well for me," said Sergio Gomez of Laredo, Texas.

Wrongful Immigration Arrests of U.S. Latinos Remain Relatively Low

███████████████

███████████████   f   y   ✉   ➔   🔖   [148]

Recently released data by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) show that wrongful arrests have not substantially increased for Latinos who are U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents. The released data compared arrests from two years, 2012 and 2018.

The lack of an increase in arrests is encouraging, as the number of people wrongly arrested in 2018 is almost equal to the number of Latinos who were wrongly arrested in 2012. Overall, wrongful arrests during these two years were low.

Wrongful Immigration Arrests of U.S. Latinos Not Substantially Higher Since 2012

Percent (%) of wrongful arrests per year

30

20

10   About the Same

         3.6%   4.8%

0

         2012   2018

████████████ | Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Percent of wrongful immigration arrests of Latinos in 2012 and 2018 compared side to side. Arrests have not substantially increased since 2012.

Residents of Latino communities across the country have expressed relief following the release of these recent findings. "I'm definitely surprised but relieved. I'll feel safer walking to the corner store with just cash and my phone in my pocket and without ID. It's good to know that I don't have to worry about proving that I was born in the U.S.," said Sergio Gomez of Laredo, Texas.

Americans Overestimate the Number of 'Illegal' Latinos in the U.S.

A recent survey suggests Americans believe the number of Latinos who are in the U.S. illegally far exceeds official estimates. ████████████████

████████████
█████████

WASHINGTON — In a recent national survey, Americans were asked how many Latinos currently residing in the U.S. are in the country illegally. On average, Americans believe that close to 40 % of Latinos are in the U.S. illegally. This is more than twice the official estimate of 18% reported by the federal government.

This finding comes from the General Social Survey, a project of the independent research organization NORC at the University of Chicago. The annual national survey tracks key changes in American society. Funded primarily by the National Science Foundation, the General Social Survey has interviewed more than 57,000 Americans since 1972.

All participants were offered the opportunity to discuss their responses to the survey's questions.

When asked about his response to the question about 'illegal' Latinos, Chicago-resident John Danvers stated, "I hear stories about Latinos crossing the border on the news, so it seems likely that a lot of them are here illegally. So, if I don't know someone personally and they look Latino I assume that they or members of their family are illegal."

Much like Mr. Danvers, a large number of the interviewed participants reported that they assume Latinos they meet are here illegally unless they learn otherwise.

Appendix F: Study 2 Control Condition (Latino-Undocumented Association IV)

Americans Overestimate the Number of Homeowners in the U.S.

Picture of home for sale.

A recent survey suggests Americans believe the number of homeowners in the U.S. is greater than official estimates. ██████████████

████████████████████

████████

WASHINGTON — In a recent national survey, Americans were asked how many people they believe own their homes in the U.S. On average, Americans believe that close to 74% of households in the country own their homes. This is more than the 64% rate recently reported by the federal government.

This finding comes from the General Social Survey, a project of the independent research organization NORC at the University of Chicago. The annual national survey tracks key changes in American society. Funded primarily by the National Science Foundation, the General Social Survey has interviewed more than 57,000 Americans since 1972.

All participants were offered the opportunity to discuss their responses to the survey's questions.

When asked about his response to the question about homeowners, respondent John Danvers stated, "I often hear stories about people planning on buying their first or second home soon, so it seems like it's happening more than before. So, if I don't know someone personally, I tend to assume they or their family members are homeowners."

Much like Mr. Danvers, a large number of the interviewed participants reported that they assumed the rate of homeownership was higher because they personally know someone seeking to purchase a home or who recently purchased a home.

Anti-immigration program accused of racially profiling Latinos allowed to continue

Picture of a traffic stop from a news report.

An approved program targeting undocumented immigration raises questions about its impact on legal Latinos.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the constitutionality of a federal program, Enforcement of Immigration Laws in Local Communities (EILC), designed to give local police departments more authority to identify and detain individuals suspected of residing in the U.S. illegally.

Civil rights groups across the nation filed lawsuits against the Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection Agency which, together, enforce the EILC program that requires police officers to determine the immigration status of individuals they "reasonably suspect" could be undocumented immigrants.

Legal analysts predict that the court's recent ruling will significantly increase the likelihood that Latino Americans who are U.S citizens or legal residents will be racially profiled and wrongly stopped and detained in local communities.

The Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection Agency announced, in a joint statement, that they will immediately resume their collaboration with local police departments, continuing the controversial program for the foreseeable future.

"It's possible that individuals who are legal residents or citizens may be temporarily detained. This is a risk we are willing to take to protect our borders," said spokesman Roger Wright.

Judge Throws Out McDonald's Obesity Lawsuit

Picture of restaurant.

Article adapted from Craig & Richeson (2012)

A lawsuit filed against McDonald's last summer became a flashpoint for pundits and editorial writers. ▮▮▮▮▮▮

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NEW YORK — In dismissing a class-action lawsuit that claimed that McDonald's food caused health problems in children and adults, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon said consumers "cannot blame McDonald's if they, nonetheless, choose to satiate their appetite with a large McDonald's products."

"If a person knows or should know that eating copious orders of large McDonald's products is unhealthy and may result in weight gain[...]it is not the place of the law to protect them from their own excesses," McMahon wrote in the 65-page ruling issued Wednesday. "Nobody is forced to eat at McDonald's."

The lawsuit was filed last summer and was described by pundits and editorial writers as the latest example of a litigious society in which people abdicate personal responsibility.

"Common sense has prevailed," McDonald's spokesman Harold James said after the decision. "We said from the beginning that this was a frivolous lawsuit. Today's ruling confirms that fact."

Attorney Sam Stephens, who represented the plaintiffs, said they "have every intention of amending [their] complaint and refiling it in the federal court within the next 30 days."

Appendix I: Study 2 Social Distancing Items

Adapted from: Kunstman, Plant, & Deska (2013)

For each of the items below, please indicate how comfortable you would be interacting with undocumented immigrants in each described situation.

There are no correct answers to these questions so choose the response that best reflects your views.

	Very Uncomfortable 1	2	3	4	5	6	Very Comfortable 7
Going on vacation with an undocumented immigrant.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Receiving a blood transfusion or organ transplant from an undocumented immigrant.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Having an undocumented immigrant marry into your immediate family.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Having an undocumented immigrant family move into the house or apartment next to yours.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Dating an undocumented immigrant.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
	Very Uncomfortable 1	2	3	4	5	6	Very Comfortable 7
Working at a company that employs an undocumented immigrant.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Seeing a movie in a theater with an undocumented immigrant.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Shopping in a store that is mostly frequented by undocumented immigrants.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Going to a restaurant that is mostly frequented by undocumented immigrants.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Playing on a recreational sports team that has undocumented immigrants.	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

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