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RHODESIA APPROACHES COLLAPSE:

A STUDY OF SETTLER RESISTANCE TO AFRICAN NATIONALISM

by

NIKO M. NGWENYAMA

I. INTRODUCTION

The significance of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965 is often misunderstood.¹ UDI was not an act of rebellion by white settlers against the authority of the British government. The British and the settlers are essentially the same people. (See section IIB.) That is why the British government never contemplated the use of force to prevent the so-called rebellion or to force its abandonment and why they tried to impose the Smith-Home settlement proposals of 1971, which would have precluded any prospect of African rule in that country (had not the Africans defeated the move). UDI has a more important meaning quite distinct from Rhodesian-British relations. Its proclamation was tantamount to an act of defiance -- a declaration of war against the indigenous people who were demanding an end to minority domination. It sought to ensure the perpetual maintenance of political, economic and social control of the country by the settlers.

Conflict between the European settlers and the African nationalists had broken into violence prior to UDI. The banning of African political parties and public meetings accompanied by the expropriation of their property, the imprisonment and detention of nationalist leaders and their followers, settler determination to continue the exclusion of the indigenous people from meaningful participation in the running of affairs in their own country, and many other such acts of hostility further polarized the already inflamed black-white relations and resulted in frequent acts of violence, including sabotage, with the concomitant government reaction of more stringent measures to suppress political unrest. The sealing of the tomb of overt African political expression through 1971 (when a portion found exposure through the newly formed African National Council which successfully opposed the Smith-Home settlement proposals) forced African nationalists to extend their acts of violence to include guerrilla activity. Since the early part of 1966, the Rhodesian regime has had to resist a slow but abrasive guerrilla warfare, being gradually forced to widen the areas of defensive operation as the situation developed into a war of low intensity in the 1970s.

The regime has thus far succeeded in weathering nine years of guerrilla incursions, and Rhodesia's economy has concurrently survived the United Nations trade ban. Although it was the British government that requested the U.N. to impose economic sanctions against Rhodesia, it is well known that the British government did so in order to forestall the adoption of more stringent economic measures against her rebelling colony. The U.N. decision to isolate Rhodesia economically from the world community was strictly the result of the concerted efforts of nationalist leaders in the early 1960s.

Central to Rhodesia's ability to survive was the cooperation of colonial Mozambique and South Africa, two of her then key allies. Now, however, the power base in southern Africa has markedly shifted since 1974. Following the April 25, 1974 Portuguese military coup precipitated by grievances arising from Portugal's failure to win her African colonial wars, Mozambique attained "full" independence on 25 June 1974. The leaders of FRELIMO, a former coalition liberation movement now ruling Mozambique, and of MPLA, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (who are likely to form a portion of the leadership of independent Angola) have pledged that their governments will support the African nationalist movements fighting to liberate their countries from White minority rule.² What this means in terms of Rhodesia is that the whole Rhodesian/Mozambique border from the Zambezi escarpment to the Limpopo river will be open to guerrilla penetration. The new Government in Mozambique may also be expected to implement the United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia and this will deprive Rhodesia of her traditional outlet to the Indian ocean, thus disrupting a portion of the sanction breaking network.

South Africa remains Rhodesia's sole ally in Africa. There is now, however, a question whether she will continue to provide needed aid to prop up the Rhodesian settler regime. South Africa now says that she would like her paramilitary police force pulled back to her territory. South Africa no longer appears to consider Rhodesia a viable buffer state on which to sacrifice her own manpower. She can be expected to withdraw her paramilitary forces even if hostilities continue in Rhodesia because she needs the manpower to police her own borders, now that Mozambique is under African rule and Angola will follow suit in November 1975. Economically, however, South Africa can be expected to increase her ties to settler Rhodesia.

The objective of this paper is to determine Rhodesia's chances of surviving under the new southern African situation. I attempt to do this by analyzing how Rhodesia militarily and economically survived the African nationalist challenge for political control

of the country since UDI. Thus this paper is not a study of African nationalism -- a topic worthy of separate investigation -- but rather it is a study of *settler resistance* to African nationalism in Zimbabwe. Material bearing on African nationalism is included wherever it helps to clarify the nature and process of settler resistance.

Structurally, this paper is divided into four sections: section II deals with patterns of settler resistance; section III identifies survival techniques adopted by Rhodesians in response to the U.N. economic sanctions; and section IV reassesses the current Rhodesian situation.

II. PATTERNS OF SETTLER RESISTANCE

Patterns of settler resistance are characterized by one overriding fact: they consistently reflect the numerical weakness of the European settler population in relation to the Africans in the country. Of six million people, only 4% of them were and still are white, a ratio of about one white to 22 Africans. In an attempt to resolve this population imbalance in the face of increasing African-white conflict, the settler regime coerced most of the available male European manpower into military service and conducted campaign drives to attract immigrants from "the Western World" while they simultaneously attempted to curtail growth in the African population.

IIA. Military Call-ups

Early in 1974, the escalating guerrilla warfare in the north-east and the well planned and executed guerrilla strikes which had become frequent and regularized in the Zambezi war zone forced the Rhodesian authorities to commit most of the European male population into a fighting force with which to resist the increasing African nationalist pressure. The plan, first made public by the regime's Minister of Defence on 7 February and implemented in early April, made European, Asian and Coloured men over 25 years old (but no more than 38 with no previous military obligation) subject to a draft into national service. The conscripts underwent training for a period of no more than 35 days before they were assigned to serve on border guard duty for a period of about 33 days.³ There was one exception to this call-up. The predominantly white immigrants, greatly needed to expand the European settler population, were theoretically exempt for five years retroactively from the military draft -- to the chagrin of pioneers -- but in the actual Rhodesian situation, the exemption came to nothing because local whites exerted social pressure on the immigrants to become police reservists if they were to avoid being regarded as leeches.⁴ The

Rhodesian authorities found it necessary in spite of the lack of adequate accommodation, equipment, and instructors to broaden the call-up system in order to alleviate the shortage of European manpower and thus spread the burden of defense evenly among the European settlers in the country.⁵

Attempts to involve as many male Europeans in counter-insurgency operations as possible were not new in 1974 Rhodesia. Other attempts had been made throughout the period but failed to quench the continually increasing need for European manpower for military purposes. Although the European population increased from 214,000 in 1966 to about 267,000 in 1972 as a result of immigration and natural increase, the Rhodesian army and police force suffered chronic shortages of European manpower.⁶ There were shortages of both officers and European soldiers in the army and, in addition, the regime's Secretary for Defence Annual Report discloses that the number of army recruits in 1970 dropped 15% from the level of the previous year⁷ and in 1971, it declined by 25% -- conforming with a general pattern of manpower shortage established during the preceding years:

The general pattern, established in the past, has regrettably been maintained and as far as the Regular Army is concerned is reflected in the shortages of both officers and European soldiers.

European recruiting has again given cause for concern; figures for the past two years having dropped some 25 per cent, when compared with the preceding two years.⁸

The shortage of European manpower was no less severe in the British South African Police (BSAP) than in the army. The police force suffered frequent shortages -- unlike the air force in which little was registered. In his annual report the regime's Secretary for Law and Order regretfully discloses that despite new economic incentives, fewer young men came forward to join the police force in 1972 than in 1971:

I regret, however, to report that the new salary scales have not, in the event, resulted in a great improvement in recruiting the best available material to the rank of patrol officer. This is, of course, a problem which is not confined to the Police;...

Recruiting to the Force continued to be a serious problem during the year. Despite publicity campaigns to attract new members, I regret to have to report that recruits did not come forward in sufficient numbers to replace those members who had left the Force by completing their period of engagement, resigning on gratuity or on pension. The position has deteriorated from that reported last year.⁹

Shortages of European manpower were due to "the high discharge rate of European personnel" from military service at a time when few young men volunteered and others avoided being called into service.¹⁰

From 1965 to 1974 the Rhodesian settler regime had to cope with the limited available manpower in her fight for survival. They adopted three measures that enabled the regime to keep as many men under arms patrolling the borders as possible: 1) they increased both the draftees' period of national service and the daily workload of security forces; 2) they selectively called upon certain categories of manpower for national service or security duty; and 3) they accepted military aid from South Africa.

The period that a white conscript had to remain in national service was lengthened twice within a few years. In 1966 the trainee's military liability was doubled from 4 1/2 months to 9 months¹¹ and two or three years later, the liability was increased to 12 months,¹² a period of service that has been maintained ever since¹³ and which has facilitated the establishment of additional military companies.¹⁴ The longer period of national service was moreover found necessary as a means of providing needed manpower to alleviate an increasing defense burden on the security forces. The regime's General of Air Staff disclosed that by 1970 the air force had almost doubled the 1960 flying time with little additional manpower intake:

Nearly 20,000 hours were flown, an increase of almost 5 per cent over the previous period of report (1969) which was itself a record year. The increase was due to a larger training commitment on No. 2 Squadron and the counter-insurgency demands on Nos. 4 and 7 Squadrons during the early part of the year. It is of interest to note that in the last 10 years the total annual flying hours has almost doubled, and this has been achieved with a minimal increase in manpower.¹⁵

The growing burden of security demands borne by the security forces is portrayed on the following Table, which shows the per cent increase in the number of hours flown, juxtaposed to the number of miles covered, by the air force and army respectively between 1966 and 1970.

INCREASING SECURITY BURDEN*

Year	AIR FORCE		ARMY	
	Flying hours	% increase	Miles covered	% increase
1966	12,720		4,673,710	
1968	18,000	41%	4,457,260	
1969	19,000	6%	5,192,030	16.5%
1970	20,000	5%	7,045,990	35.0%

*Data rounded to nearest ten.

Source: Rhodesia. Annual Reports of the Secretary of Defence, the Chief General Staff, and the Chief of Air Staff. Years: 1966, 1968, 1969, 1970.

The selective call-ups coerced various groups into the armed forces. Newly qualified physicians, former aliens, Territorial and Reserve forces, and the Rhodesian Police force (British South Africa Police) and police reservists were increasingly drawn into the guerrilla counter-insurgency net. The call-up of newly qualified medical doctors for a six-month period of national service in 1969 eased and has continued to ease the shortage of doctors in the armed forces.¹⁶ A 1970 amendment to the defense legislation not only provided for the call-up of male residents formerly regarded as aliens from 1st January 1971, but it also raised the draft age limit for military training from 23 to 25 years from 11 September 1970. These changes in the status of former aliens and in the age range of the draftable European male population contributed to an immediate increase (temporary though the gain was) in the number of non-black young men available for military training, thus filling each conscription quota.¹⁷ The ephemeral success of this call-up was partly due to the fact that the regime had already established (1969) a liaison mechanism with Universities in Rhodesia and South Africa that facilitated the call-up of male immigrants as soon as they were draftable.¹⁸ The white draftees were and still are assigned to the Territorial Force for three years part-time further military service after the completion of their conscript service, and to the army reserves thereafter. Since 1969 both the Territorial and Reserve units have participated in guerrilla counter-insurgency operations, their military role becoming increasingly important with the expansion of the war zones.¹⁹ In addition to their regular duties, the British South Africa Police have also been involved in guerrilla counter-insurgency operations since 1966 when an act of the Rhodesian Parliament made them an integral part of the security forces. They received the same counter-insurgency training as the other servicemen in the army and air force.²⁰ Early in 1974, a security co-ordinator was appointed for the office of the Regime's Prime Minister to co-ordinate information between security forces and the civilian authorities.²

Although there has never been a publicly declared formal alliance between the two countries, South African paramilitary police have been engaged side by side with the Rhodesian security forces in counter-insurgency operations in the Rhodesian war zones since 1967, if not earlier. Initially, South Africa was supposed to have provided Rhodesia with 3,000 military policemen to forestall the infiltration to the South African territory by African National Congress of South Africa (ANC of SA) guerrillas reinforcing the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) insurgents in Rhodesia. In 1973, the number of South African paramilitary troops in Rhodesia "South Africa's buffer state" -- had risen to 4,000 men,²² 600 men more than the number of active service men in Rhodesia's army. As South Africa increasingly became drawn into the resistance of the

liberation struggle in Rhodesia, more of her men lost their lives in the war zone. When five were ambushed and killed by the Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas in the Zambezi valley about a month and a half before the April 25 Portuguese coup, South African Defence Minister Botha seriously considered replacing the paramilitary policemen with the actual army servicemen because in his view, guerrilla warfare had escalated into a "war of low intensity",²³ a consideration which since mid-1974 has subsequently been put into effect in the Namibian Caprivi Strip.²⁴

The extension of the period of national service, selective call-ups, and South African military aid failed to provide Rhodesia with adequate manpower to cope with the widening and more sophisticated guerrilla incursions that broke out in late 1972. Admittedly, the number of men in the Rhodesian armed forces has modestly increased during the last ten years. Between 1966 and 1971 the Rhodesian army had 3,400 servicemen on active duty. In 1973 the number of active servicemen in the army had increased as a result of these measures by 100 to total 3,500 men, remaining predominantly white.²⁵ The number of servicemen was further raised early in 1974 when a second battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles was created in addition to the first African battalion assembled during the 1950s from the disbanded World War II African veterans who had fought as mercenaries on the side of the British. The number of men in the Territorial force jumped from 4,000 men in 1969 to 8,400 in 1971 and it made another increase to 10,000 men in 1972.²⁶ The Rhodesian air force had 1,200 airmen throughout the period probably because the amount of military hardware remained essentially the same, dropping from 86 aircraft in 1966 to 74 in 1971²⁷ and going up again in 1973 as a result of the delivery of an unknown number of aerospace SA-330 Puma helicopters purchased from South Africa.²⁸ There were 6,400 policemen in Rhodesia in 1969 but their number rose to 8,000 men in 1971 and a third of them were Europeans. The number of police reservists also jumped from 28,500 men between 1969 and 1972 to 35,000 in 1973, three quarters of whom were white.²⁹ But these increases of manpower in the police force (including the South African policemen) and the army were not nearly large enough to enable Rhodesia to adequately withstand the increased guerrilla pressure.

There are several reasons why the settler regime failed to solve the manpower problem in order to cope with the war. By far the most important reason had been the improved fighting skills of the nationalist guerrillas: they combined limited and calculated military attacks on the Rhodesian settlers with the involvement of the rural African population³⁰ in the liberation struggle; they widened the area of combat;³¹ and they engaged the enemy with land mines. To cope with these strategies, the Smith regime would need to continually increase manpower intake into its armed forces. Another equally important explanation is connected with the unwillingness of many young

men to stay in the army and defend their country against the so-called "terrorists" after their 12 months of national service. Some of them avoided or reduced their military obligation by leaving the country,³² by joining a religious group that prohibits its members from participating in military engagements,³³ or by becoming police reservists who had the least military obligation among the Rhodesian security forces.

Thus the burden of defending Rhodesia increasingly fell upon the lightly trained reserve forces. During 1973-74, for instance the regime called upon the members of the army reserve two to three times in 12 months,³⁴ with each period lasting 28 to 37 days and totalling about three months of service per year. This annual period of reserve service is two thirds less than that spent by a regular soldier. A regular soldier on active duty spent a month in the bush and ten days at home,³⁵ a period that totalled nine months of service and three months of rest in a year. Some police reservists volunteered weeks of duty to relieve the European farm owners in the danger zone and all those reservists who failed to volunteer were called upon early in 1974 to do at least two weeks of operational duty in the danger zone.³⁶ The presence of reserve forces on war zones was undoubtedly a deterrent to some national guerrilla infiltration or attacks on European farmers, but their fighting capability was of poor quality. The "Dad's Army", a reserve unit consisting of men in the 40-50 age category that had last done service during the 1962-63 African nationalist upheaval was called for military duty late in 1973,³⁷ and was allowed only six days of refresher training with weapons and procedures completely new to them. Due to lack of time for adequate training, the police reservists were as lightly trained as the army reserve knowing only how to load and discharge the Belgian automatic rifle they bore.³⁸

By early 1974 the settler regime had lost control of the war Farmers in the north and northeast parts of the country lived in a state of siege as more and more of them were dying from land mine and guerrilla ambushes. To foil the possibility of a raid by the ubiquitous freedom fighters on Gonakudzingwa detention center, the regime moved the detainees to an undisclosed location considered more safe.³⁹ And in February the regime's Prime Minister used a military helicopter,⁴⁰ -- triggering bitter criticism later for abusing public transport for partisan interests -- to ensure his own safety⁴¹ while he campaigned for an R.F. member in the Sinoia Umvukwes by-election (Special election). Addressing one of these meetings, Smith himself expressed concern about the deteriorating military situation in the following words:

*I do want to reassure you that for sometime now
the security situation in this part of the country*

has been the main centre of concern as far as the Government goes... I am sure I do not have to tell you that there is no simple, quick answer to this problem. Predictions have been made in the past and due to unforeseen circumstances and problems -- a number of which were not under our control -- these predictions have gone by the board.

I admit that it has taken longer than we anticipated but I do want to tell you that ... the ponderous mechanism of the defence is now getting into its stride.⁴²

But this reassurance did not succeed in allaying the fears of the white public, especially the white farmers in the war zones. More and more Rhodesian Europeans no longer believed their Government would be able to regain control of the war. In a letter to the editor of the *Rhodesia Herald*, a reader made the following observations:

'The ponderous mechanism of the defence force is now getting into its stride.' What a statement to come from the Prime Minister. Once again he is making excuses for his and his Government's inability to control the situation.

The only thing wrong with our defence force is the lack of political direction from the Government, which has shown over and over in the last 14 months that it has no understanding of the threat facing us. Its inability to keep the regular forces up to strength and its failure to react to the subversive forces entering the country almost two years ago have resulted in the serious position we are in today.

We are continuously told that 'Things are improving'; 'We are winning the war'; 'Won't be long now'; 'Good news by the end of the year'; 'The picture is going to improve'.

How much longer must we swallow this nonsense? Is it not about time we were told the facts? All indications from people in the northeast border area, which stretches to within a few miles of Salisbury, including bigger call-ups, more powers, etc., show that the position is deteriorating.

After 10 years of terrorist incursions and threats and 14 months of actual fighting from the last incursions, if our defence force is only now getting into its stride then I wonder what has happened to the claim 'Our forces are the best in the world'.⁴³

The Rhodesian government's inability to control the war situation contributed to a pervasive sagging of morale among Europeans in the country. One of the indicators of a depression in public morale was revealed by the trend in the decline of donations made to a public fund established in January 1973 for assisting the families of the war victims. Contributions to the so-called "Territorial Victims' Relief Fund" sharply declined from a \$20,000 a month in April 1973 to \$2,500 a month in March 1974. The target figure of \$250,000 a year had been exceeded by April 1973, but a year later, a total of only \$258,000 had been collected⁴⁴ and there was a balance of only \$227,000 after \$29,000 had been awarded to victims. There were signs that the security forces had a difficult time keeping servicemen disciplined. The number of courts martial had been increasing for some time but in 1974 not only were courts martial held in camera, but their number had become so large that the regime kept it secret lest it cause public alarm.⁴⁵ The selective call-up system also caused great bitterness within Rhodesian society. Hundreds of those subjected to two or three call-ups a year or members of their families complained that only a few of them shouldered the military burden while hundreds of other people were either granted educational, medical, or religious exemptions, or dodged the call-ups for military service.⁴⁶ They demanded an end to the injustice of the call-up system.

The 1974 military call-up of men over 25 but no more than 38 years old aimed at removing some pressure from the reserve units, particularly the "Dad's Army". But more than that, the call-up was an attempt by the settler regime to salvage an increasingly deteriorating military situation in the countryside. The regime intended to improve its military strength in two ways: by creating another European battalion and by increasing the size of the territorial force. The regime would provide incentives of a cash lump sum payment to the draftee and a reduction of future reserve obligation in order to encourage men to stay on in the army after the period of national service training. To ensure that this new "comprehensive" military call-up succeeded, young soldiers assigned to sedentary duty worked nonstop for months tracking down the men who had avoided the draft and preparing a list of 95,000 names and addresses of non-black Rhodesians between the ages of 17 and 50. It was by making use of this list of names provided by employers to fulfill a 1973 Act that the call-up was made possible.⁴⁸

Just as the previous call-ups had failed, the 1974 comprehensive call-up system did not succeed in removing Rhodesia's need for more and more European manpower. Some men subject to the new call-up resisted doing national service until they were allowed to do the national service in the police force or in the Ministry for Internal Affairs where they would be least required to take part in counter-insurgency operations. Although the military call-ups disrupted

economy, the regime indicated by mid 1974 that the system would be discontinued only after a strong regular army had been established.⁴⁹ In September 1974 the regime disclosed that students anticipating entering college in January 1975 would be required to do national service prior to their entering the University.⁵⁰ The following month white members of the public suggested the drafting of girls into national service. And at the beginning of 1975, it became known that Rhodesia was looking for mercenaries in Europe and the United States of America, all of this suggesting the failure of the new call-up system.⁵¹ There is no strong army in Rhodesia to this day and the prevailing situation makes it only remotely possible that the manpower problem can be solved either through military call-ups or by raising a mercenary army.

IIB. Settlers 74

Another method employed by the settlers in resisting African nationalism was through the efforts to increase the white population while at the same time making attempts to curtail the African population. The basic method by which white supremacist Rhodesians have always secured their power base is through increased European migration into the country. (See Table I .) In his 1974 New Year message, the Rhodesian Prime Minister launched a campaign drive for what is the largest number of white immigrants in the colonial history of the country. Frightened by the net loss of immigrants for December 1973, he attempted to attract more than a million immigrants from the western world by promising them a better life in Rhodesia. Smith said:

When one thinks that in many countries of the Western world the scene is one of wide-spread unemployment, spiralling inflation, strikes and a cold, wet winter, by comparison Rhodesia must present a warm and inviting picture. Not only does Rhodesia offer tremendous opportunities to people with special skills and qualifications, people with initiative and spirit of adventure but, as most of you appreciate, a healthy flow of immigrants is the most effective answer to the unemployment problem among our African people.⁵²

Africans bitterly opposed this campaign to attract European immigrants not only because they rejected colonialism, but also because white immigrants took over jobs which should have been filled by thousands of unemployed Africans. Despite African opposition the Rhodesian regime was, as could be expected, determined to go ahead with its plan, spending as much as \$80,000 for the campaign drive alone. Although the regime was also willing to give assisted passage as had been done previously,⁵³ only a few Europeans migrated to Rhodesia

TABLE I

MIGRATION OF EUROPEANS

Period	Europeans		
	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net Migration
1955	14 000	6 000	+8 000
1956	19 000	8 000	+11 000
1957	18 000	11 000	+7 000
1958	14 000	9 000	+5 000
1959	9 000	5 000	+4 000
1960	8 000	7 000	+1 000
1961	8 000	10 000	-2 000
1962	8 000	12 000	-4 000
1963	7 000	18 000	-11 000
1964	7 000	15 710	-8 710
1965	11 128	8 850	+2 280
1966	6 418	8 510	-2 090
1967	9 618	7 570	+2 050
1968	11 864	5 650	+6 210
1969	10 929	5 890	+5 040
1970	12 227	5 890	+6 340
1971	14 743	5 340	+9 400
1972	13 966	5 150	+8 820
1973	8933	7293	+1640

Source: Rhodesia. Monthly Digest of Statistics, March 1973. Salisbury, 1973.

1973 figures: R.H. 1-

during the first quarter. It became evident that the call for a million immigrants would not be heeded in 1974.⁵⁴

The Smith regime did everything they could to induce an increased migration to Rhodesia. Families with heads of households who had skills which the regime considered essential to the national interest⁵⁵ were granted assisted passages to Rhodesia. An assisted passage of up to \$240 for air and \$120 by sea, was provided for each member of a family, including up to five children.⁵⁶ Children of unassisted immigrants with no needed skills were also eligible for the assisted passage, making it obvious that Rhodesia's needs were for Europeans, not their skills. Other attractions to the "qualified" included a week's accommodation upon arrival in the country and a tax relief for the first two years exempting, for instance, a family of four receiving income of up to \$3,496 a year from paying any Rhodesian income tax. In addition to tax relief, new immigrants were also allowed -- to the disappointment of many pioneer settlers who felt that the newcomers should have earned their citizenship like every European in Rhodesia⁵⁷ -- a retrospective five-year "period of grace" in which they would be free from national military service.⁵⁸ Several thousand white foreigners took advantage of the generous immigration terms: throughout 1974, a total of 2,459 immigrants were granted assisted passages and among these, 1,716 came from the United Kingdom.⁵⁹

It must have become apparent to the Rhodesian regime during the first quarter of 1974 that their goal would not be met. In January Rhodesia received 804 immigrants; this figure is 292 less than in 1973 and 456 below the 1972 count for the same month. Since 760 people left the country, Rhodesia had a net gain of 44 immigrants in January 1974. During April, however, the migration figure plummeted to a net loss of 290 people, the biggest drop since the net loss of 460 people in December 1973. The April loss partly resulted from an emigration of 1,090 people, the largest recorded departure figure since 1964. During June 1974, 690 departures offset 628 entries to a net loss of 62 and in December of the same year there was a net loss of 340 immigrants. During the first seven months of 1974 Rhodesia had a total net gain of 490 settlers, a number less than 25% of the 2,000 gained in the same period in 1973.⁶⁰ For the whole of 1974 Rhodesia had a net gain of 600 immigrants, a total not only far much below the Rhodesia dream for a million new settlers,⁶¹ but also the lowest net gain since UDI. (See Table I).

The major factor in the failure of the "Settlers 74" campaign drive for increased European migration to Rhodesia was the increased pressure of African opposition. Prospects for black rule in Mozambique following the Portuguese military coup of April 25, may also have discouraged immigration, accelerating a pre-existing decline which had come about as a result of the intensification of black-white

conflict in Rhodesia. African opposition was incensed by the rationale used to attract white settlers. White Rhodesian settlers justified their call for increased European immigration in three ways, all of which were tied to their interpretation of the relationship between whites and Africans in the national economy. First, they claimed that more white settlers would mean more jobs for Africans. Second, the regime's Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism rejected the fact that there was African unemployment in Rhodesia. He insisted that there were African job-seekers looking for specific salary levels instead of accepting employment in farms and mines where manpower shortages existed. Third, those Europeans who acknowledged the existence of African unemployment blamed it on the Africans themselves. They accuse Africans of "breeding prolifically" and thus making it impossible for any economy of a country the size of Rhodesia to give employment to all who needed jobs.⁶²

The Smith regime's claim that Rhodesia lacked skilled manpower except for a few exceptions, is often not backed by migration and job acquisition patterns emerging after UDI. Most of the immigrants were not in the highly skilled categories of manpower: they were mostly carpenters, builders, production laborers and clerks, as following quotations from Annual reports of the regime's Secretariat for Labor and Social Welfare reveal:

The percentage of total net male migration of craftsmen and production process workers increased from 51 per cent in 1968 to 56 per cent in 1969. The net migration of fitters and turners has increased from an average per month of 13 in 1967 and 18 in 1968 to 19 in 1969.

(31 Dec. 1969)

During the five years 1966 to 1970 the European, Asian and Coloured labour force has been augmented by the net immigration of 8,158 male and 357 female economically active persons. In 1970 the labor force gained 2,402 male and 153 female economically active immigrants most of whom were Europeans.

(31 Dec. 1970)

During the five years 1966 to 1970 the net immigration of European males was highest in the artisan occupations and lowest in the professional and managerial occupations. In 1970 the net immigration of European artisans was more than 75 per cent of the gross immigration. The net immigration of carpenters amounted to 197 which represents

over 90 per cent of the carpenters who immigrated into Rhodesia in 1970. At the other end of the scale there was a net emigration of 56 female nurses and midwives.

(31 Dec. 1970)

The estimated rate of growth of the gross domestic product of 10 per cent in real terms increased the demand for skilled manpower which was met to a considerable extent by European immigration. The labour force gained 3,505 male and 250 female economically active immigrants, most of whom were Europeans. These figures represent an increase in the annual net migration of economically active European males of 46 per cent, and an increase of economically active European females of 65 per cent.

More than half the net migration of economically active European males were classified as production and related workers. Over 70 per cent of the net migration of economically active European females were classified as clerical and related workers... For the first year since 1968 there was a net migration gain in European female nurses and midwives.

(31 Dec. 1971)63

What is even more disturbing is the fact that there were already large numbers of Africans in many of these job categories who were unemployed. In 1974 Rhodesia still perceived a shortage in the supply of "skilled" manpower. In addition to the war, which precipitated a decline in immigration and an increase in emigration, the shortage of "skilled" manpower was due to the Rhodesian system of job reservation. Qualified Africans (e.g. builders, nurses, teachers) seeking jobs are overtly refused employment because of their color. While it may be true that from time to time employment vacancies may have existed in agriculture and mining, this was to be expected because of the extremely low wages paid to Africans by those industries. (See Table II). Although African employment rose by 197,000 between 1969 and 1973, more than 150,000 were unable to find work during the same period.⁶⁴ Not only would more immigrants mean, as Edson Sithole of the ANC observed, "more cooks, garden boys, nannies, houseboys and housegirls...", but they would also "reduce the employment opportunities of the local African population."⁶⁵ The African nationalists argued that their people had a right to get jobs for which they are qualified and blamed African unemployment on white racism.

As we have seen above, the "Settlers 74" drive may have failed to attract the desired number of immigrants, but what is frightening

TABLE II
EMPLOYMENT

	1963		1966		1969		1972	
	E*	A**	E	A	E	A	E	A
Agriculture and Forestry	4,400	282,000	4,370	272,000	4,540	300,500	4,350	338,200
Mining and Quarrying	2,630	40,900	3,140	45,700	3,450	50,400	3,660	54,500
Manufacturing	14,066	63,800	15,110	68,500	17,480	90,200	21,250	112,600
Construction	5,770	29,400	5,900	30,100	7,120	40,300	7,830	51,200
Distribution/Restaurants/Hotels	20,780	41,200	18,080	38,700	19,630	46,600	21,890	57,600
Private Domestic Service	330	94,700	370	95,700	430	105,800	480	120,100

AVERAGE EARNINGS

	1963		1966		1969		1972	
	E	A	E	A	E	A	E	A
Agriculture and Forestry	\$2,500	\$122	\$2,540	\$124	\$2,658	\$122	\$3,078	\$135
Mining and Quarrying	3,254	264	3,486	300	4,224	334	4,913	358
Manufacturing	2,718	363	2,952	424	3,330	474	4,150	525
Construction	2,669	306	2,864	359	3,118	380	4,163	510
Distribution/Restaurants/Hotels	1,992	294	2,251	349	2,476	403	3,141	484
Private Domestic Service	960	212	970	226	1,000	244	1,050	276

is how the Rhodesian Europeans have taken it upon themselves to reduce or curtail the African population growth. The Family Planning of Rhodesia is inducing African women and literally forcing "female domestic servants" and the "wives of married male servants" regularly to attend clinic to avoid the "risk of pregnancy."⁶⁶ At the Rhodesia Front congress in 1974, it was resolved that birth control should be strictly imposed over Africans. The Pathfinder, an organization based in the USA, financed the birth control program, using birth control tablets declared dangerous and banned from use in the USA by the Federal government.⁶⁷ Arbitrary curtailment of the growth of African population in Rhodesia has been going on since the 1960s at least, but the efforts have been expanded each time when European immigration declined. Many white physicians in the major African hospitals are known to have terminated African women's ability to conceive -- for no medical reasons.⁶⁸ This occurred in and may still be happening in maternity wards immediately following normal deliveries. Thus the inverse relationship between increased white immigration and curtailed African population growth (the impact of which has not been established) is of special importance to the white regime because this measure not only offsets the black-white population imbalance, but it also ensures white supremacist Rhodesia a source of white soldiers. Rhodesia needs soldiers first and foremost and all other skills are secondary to this need. Military call-ups (to which the Rhodesian regime resorted in the face of manpower shortages since 1965) frightened many Rhodesian settlers into fleeing the country. Consequently about 40% of the European population of about 250,000 consists of Europeans who have been in the country since 1965.⁶⁹

IIC. Cost of the War

1. The Innocent are Herded to Concentration Camps

In any war, the innocent always suffer the most. In Rhodesia, the racial tone of the war augments brutality. Since late 1972 at the order of the Smith regime the Rhodesian security forces have been indiscriminantly brutalizing thousands of African peasants suspected of sympathizing with freedom fighters. Intimidation, beatings, murders, forced labor and the caging of the peasants in concentration camps became frequent, actions revealing the military desperation of Rhodesia. Even though settler brutality as a means of stifling African opposition has always been part of colonial Rhodesia, during the 1960s it increased enormously as hundreds of nationalist leaders and their supporters were detained in prisons and restricted in concentration camps. Since 1972 colonial oppression increased as thousands of African peasants were driven into concentration camps referred to as "Protected Villages" in Rhodesia and *Caldeamentação* (villagization) in colonial Mozambique.⁷⁰

For a long time the Rhodesian settlers deluded themselves in believing that African peasants did not support the nationalist freedom fighters.⁷¹ But during the first quarter of 1974 they could no longer claim support from the African peasants who have been providing freedom fighters with food and shelter since the 1960s. To prevent the peasants from cooperating with nationalist freedom fighters the Smith regime used every conceivable method to maintain their authority over them.

The regime promulgated emergency regulations granting sweeping powers to government officials in the war zones.⁷² District Commissioners and other lesser officers (District and Police officers) could arrest anyone suspected of collaborating with freedom fighters without warrant, and give up to eight lashes as corporal punishment to youths suspected of having exposed them to "contempt, ridicule or disesteem." The regime's Minister of Justice was empowered to set up magistrate courts at arbitrary locations without prior notification; police officers were given the option (with the permission of the Minister of Justice) of holding a suspect for six days without bringing him to court; and any official of the protecting authorities could subject the rural population to forced labor to "perform specified work" such as building roads or "protected villages", or maintaining roads, bridges, fences, dams and the like.⁷³

Thousands of peasants were driven into so-called "protected villages" where they could easily be controlled by a small number of government officials and security forces or militia. During the first week of April 1974, a Rhodesian spokesman announced that as part of communal punishment for sympathizing with freedom fighters more than 200 peasants from the Madziwa Tribal Trust Land (TTL) had been resettled in Beit-Bridge district, 750 km. south west of their previous home. Prior to their removal their crops and huts had been destroyed and their cattle sold as punishment for "collaborating with terrorists".⁷⁴ Other peasants of the Madziwa TTL were tried and jailed for six to eight years for alleged "harboring, assisting or consoling" of freedom fighters. The remaining 13,500 of them were removed to proper "protected villages" by September 1974, because earthworks built early in 1974 around the enlarged villages had not effectively prevented the dreaded collaboration between the peasants and the freedom fighters. By mid-1974, the Rhodesian authorities also removed 60,000 Africans from the Chiweshe TTL into 21 concentration camps.⁷⁵

The living conditions of peasants removed from TTLs to concentration camps changed from bad to worse. In most TTLs communal land was already insufficient and overcrowded for adequate cultivation of crops and animal husbandry.⁷⁶ At the time of their

removal to concentration camps, the peasants were forced to lay waste their entire villages without any compensation for their economic losses.⁷⁷ A "protected village" normally accommodated 4,000 families (20,000 people) with each family allowed but 15 square meters of space. Housing where it was available consisted mainly of low-cost "junior-tilt-up construction" similar to or developed by an American structural engineer, Hanns U. Baumann and an American chemist, John D. Beggs. Only 1.8 million U.S. dollars were spent for the construction of 2,000 units.⁷⁸ Not all the concentration camps had "boxes" ready for peasants' occupation. Most of these concentration camps were open fields. In the Chiweshe TTL, it took only ten days to clear fields to be used as "protected villages", wholly lacking any facilities for accommodation, sanitation and water supplies. The peasants were just dumped there to build their own huts with no financial assistance from the Rhodesian government.⁷⁹

Not only is a "protected village" linked by a raid system to security forces, it is also surrounded by barbed wire and its perimeter is patrolled by security forces armed with modern weapons. There is a dusk to dawn curfew and people sign out when they leave the camp; all adult camp residents including children over 12 years must carry *situpas* (I.D. certificates); and forced labor is used for camp chores, such as cleaning ablution blocks twice a day.⁸⁰ Four or five district assistants working with the militia, a clerical assistant, a demonstrator, a European cadet and an African population control expert live inside each concentration camp to maintain the presence of white control.⁸¹

The Rhodesian government often uses intimidation as a further means to control villagized Zimbabweans. The peasants have been forced to walk scores of miles to view the dead bodies of freedom fighters or to see demonstrated fire power of the security forces.⁸² Many innocent peasants have been murdered at the instigation of the Rhodesian regime. For instance, at Kadona village seven African children herding cattle were bombed by the Rhodesian air force. Three of them died. There are scores of reports of other African civilians killed "by mistake" or while "violating" the curfew.⁸³


Many peasants are also persuaded to become government informers. Big cash awards ranging from \$300 up to \$5,000 are granted to anyone (including freedom fighters) who would hand over weapons and explosives used by "terrorists" to government officials, and for information leading to the death or capture of a leader of freedom fighters.⁸⁴ The success of this method, if any, remains unknown since no disclosures have been made for the sake of informers.⁸⁵

Since 1972, life has become one long nightmare in the war zone of the country. The whole population lives in constant fear. European farm owners dread landmines and guerrilla mortars; African peasants fear government general reprisals against all to stop the few of them from providing food and shelter to freedom fighters. At six o'clock every evening the whole rural population retreats behind the "protection" of barbed wire eight feet high. The white farm owners are government subsidized to retain their farm homes, to buy automatic rifles and other protective devices, and they voluntarily retreat behind the fenced homesteads whose perimeters are patrolled by police reservists. The rural Africans receive no compensation for the government destruction of their homes and crops and they have to honor a six to six curfew by retreating into concentration camps patrolled by heavily armed security forces if they are to stay alive. (Several of them have already been shot dead by security forces for failing to meet the curfew.) Wives of white farm owners have forgone a social education for instruction in the use of automatic rifles. African women have their babies snatched off their backs and the babies' throats are slashed if the mothers refuse to inform on other children suspected of being "terrorists" by the security forces. Life in the war zone has become a daily gamble for white and African alike.

2. Monetary Cost of the War

As the nationalist guerrilla war intensified during 1972-74, the Rhodesian defence costs rapidly swelled to over \$100 million per annum, which is approximately 30% of the 1974-75 total budget making it increasingly difficult for the Rhodesian economy to sustain the regime's war effort. During the 1973-74 fiscal year, Rhodesia incurred a \$44 million budget deficit, most of which was overdrafted to supplement additional defence costs. Pay increases for regular, territorial and reserve forces had become necessary as a result of greater hardships they suffered in guerrilla counter operations.⁸⁶ Most of the \$7.20 million was expended for this purpose, particularly for the pay boost granted to the lowly-paid and mutiny-prone African soldiers in the Rhodesian African Rifles.⁸⁷ The British South African Police budget increased from \$25,298,500 (1973-74) to \$31,198,100 (1974-75) and that of the Ministry of Defence was up 16.97% to \$46,176,700, the second most costly to the Ministry of Transport and Power figure of \$61,782,300 for 1974-75.⁸⁸ The training and arming of African militia also contributed to an increase in security costs as did the removal of thousands of peasants to concentration camps. The construction of "protected villages" did not, perhaps, contribute as much to high defence costs as did road and bridge construction considering that many concentration camps were a little more than open fields. Although we do not know exactly how much the Rhodesian government spent on these and in road development, we do know that South Africa provided Rhodesia with aid totalling over \$18 million for the construction of a network of roads. In 15 months (1973-74) there was more road development in the north east of the country than in the previous 30 years.⁸⁹ The Rhodesian government earmarked a half million dollars special grant for the

RHODESIA



- = Tilcor Projects
- * = Tourist Centers
- △ = Major Cities

resurfacing of existing roads and the building of low level bridges in the north east during the first quarter of the 1974-75 fiscal year,⁹⁰ a year in which the estimated road and road traffic expenditure was increased by 55.1% to \$22,791,600.⁹¹ Security for the white farmers was put at \$2.2 million for 1974-75. Financial subsidies for security were necessary to persuade European farm owners not to abandon their farms as a result of insecurity; they did, the government had to find a lessee for the land because it did not want any of that land to remain unoccupied, and on kept the land under security surveillance if no lessee could be found. Even though the number of farms abandoned remains unknown there must have been quite a few in 1974, considering the degree of government concern over the problems.⁹² For the past fiscal year, the Government agreed to reimburse each farmer \$2,000 - \$3,000 for the protective fencing, lighting, warning devices, room armories and weapons.⁹³ As more farmers and Rhodesian security forces died as a result of the war (exact figures unknown) pensions for their widows and children also became economically significant. A widow was entitled to receive up to 60% of her deceased husband's monthly rate of pay, more than 60% if she had children.⁹⁴ From early 1973 to June 1974, \$317,000 had been paid in compensation to the relatives of Rhodesians who died as a result of guerrilla attacks.⁹⁵

The last contributing factor to Rhodesia's declining ability to shoulder the increasing costs of the war resulted from a fall in revenue to the Rhodesia Railways and the tourist industry. The Rhodesia Railways suffered a loss of nearly \$11 million during the 1972-73 fiscal year.⁹⁶ During the following year, the net deficit had spiralled to over \$19 million.⁹⁷ These losses were blamed on the Rhodesia/Zambia border closure which was precipitated by the expansion of the war in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Government subsidizes the railway deficits and for the 1974-75 fiscal year the Transport and Power budget has been increased by 16.2% to over \$61.78 million, an amount which includes over \$19.89 million for the railway subsidy.⁹⁸

The number of tourists to Rhodesia, a major source of foreign exchange earnings, has been declining for some time, largely because of insecurity due to guerrilla activity. For instance, when at least four South African policemen were killed by ZAPU guerrillas on March 8, 1974, the Zambezi river cruises near Victoria Falls were cancelled for a few days.⁹⁹ In 1973 Rhodesia welcomed the lowest number of holiday makers in five years. During the few months of 1973 hotels reported guest list declines of up to 80%. In the first two months of 1974 there was a further 25% drop in the number of tourists, suggesting that the drop would continue throughout 1974. Hoteliers were given Government clearance to place some of their accommodation facilities "in motels

and to close their doors by midweek so that they might stay in business.¹⁰⁰ Meanwhile, the Government was spending more money in an attempt to attract immigrants and tourists, contributing to the outflow of invisibles which rose to \$91,000,000 during 1973-74 as a result of "increased costs of services and reduced earnings from transit traffic and tourism."¹⁰¹

Although South Africa granted millions of dollars in direct and indirect aid, Rhodesia's growing security needs and support for her bereaved resulted in what the regime's Minister of Finance considered an "unacceptably" high 1973-74 budget overhead. At his recommendation Rhodesia imposed a 10% war surtax to reduce the \$44 million deficit:

*The imposition of a surcharge on both individual and company tax payers seems to me to be only fair in the current circumstances. The elimination of terrorism is in the interest of every taxpayer and it is right that each should contribute his share towards the common problems.*¹⁰²

The surcharge was estimated to yield about \$17,250,000 which could be used to reduce the deficit. Most individual taxpayers must have suffered immense financial strain from the imposed surtax, especially the Africans against whose interests the war was being fought. Having most of their surplus income (if they were lucky to have any) spent in meeting the frequent upsurge in prices of essential items, they had hardly any savings left to defray the tax in arrears. (See Table II).

III. RESPONSE TO U.N. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

In the early 1960s, the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders (e.g. Joshua Nkomo) had the great insight to have placed the African case against the racist minority rule before the United Nations. When the minority regime proclaimed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the world community that was already familiar with its oppressiveness quickly made a move to ostracize the settler regime economically. The United Nations finally imposed a total trade boycott of Rhodesian goods in 1968, after two years of selective sanctions. In 1975, almost ten years after UDI, Rhodesia is still on the white supremacist path, little concerned about her international status. Nevertheless, sanctions have had important effects on the Rhodesian economy, although many UN member states continue to evade the trade ban. If economic sanctions are to be more effective than they have been in the past, we must learn how the Rhodesian economy has managed to survive with the trade ban for about ten years.

Before UDI, Rhodesia invariably had a surplus of exports imports, but this changed following the imposition of the sanctions. The availability of foreign currency diminished so rapidly that the 1969 capital inflow of \$15 million declined to \$8.5 million in 1974. By June 1974 the consolidated balance of foreign exchange in current account showed a deficit of \$146 million, making it increasingly difficult to finance development programs.¹⁰⁴

IIIA. Survival Techniques

The unfavorable balance of trade that resulted in foreign exchange shortage forced the Rhodesian government not only to subsidize industries most affected by sanctions, but also to impose stringent exchange controls to curtail the outflow of capital. In the allocation of foreign currency which followed, Rhodesian industries engaged in economic activities considered vital for survival of the country received priority. Any supplemental currency was allocated on a first-come, first-served basis until 1974. Since that time, all applications have been reviewed.

Several major Rhodesian companies have not only survived but have thrived despite the UN economic sanctions. At least four measures enabled most of them to weather the economic malaise the country has suffered since 1965. Some companies sought and received government subsidies that have kept them afloat; most companies diversified to avoid liquidation and in doing so preyed on smaller companies; a few merged; and others restored old or found international markets for their products. The survival measures adopted by Rhodesian industry are not mutually exclusive; some companies simultaneously applied more than one of these measures in order to survive. And these devices worked better for some companies than for others.

1. Subsidies

Agriculture was one of the principal Rhodesian industries immediately and severely affected by the sanctions. The prime crop, tobacco had been the main source of foreign currency, earning about 60% of it before UDI.¹⁰⁶ The tobacco industry was kept afloat by a fixed quota buying by the Government since 1966, but the production was reduced at government instigation from the 1965 level of 300 million pounds to 100 million pounds in 1970. Thereafter, controls on the growing and selling of tobacco were relaxed. In 1973, the government stopped buying tobacco, thereby allowing commercial buyers to return to the sales floor and buy under the auction system. This government action may mean one or both of the following: that the amount of tobacco now grown in Rhodesia is small enough to find a market without government assistance,

growers increasing production at their own risk; and/or that a dependable tobacco market has been re-established. The amount grown and sold remains a government secret.

Government support for tobacco since UDI has cost Rhodesia many millions of dollars. In 1974, the Tobacco Corporation -- a company responsible for promoting and selling Rhodesian tobacco -- was provided with \$8.5 million to cover losses in selling tobacco stocks during 1973/74. This brought the total tobacco government subsidy to \$109.7 million.¹⁰⁸ Tobacco, once Rhodesia's biggers foreign exchange earner, became a costly stock to produce and market under sanctions.

More subsidies were provided to European farm owners to help them cope with the deteriorating economy. For the 1974/75 fiscal year, the government allocated \$200,000 for drilling boreholes and development of other approved ranch schemes, each scheme qualifying for a 20% subsidy (up to a maximum of \$1,000) or 20¢ per hectare. Rebates were allowed for unsuccessful boreholes drilled as part of an approved ranch plan. Other subsidies include: \$775,000 for tallow; \$725,000 for edible oils; and permission to farm owners to carry forward primary abatements for two years.¹⁰⁹

2. Diversification

After their market for tobacco was cut off, the Rhodesian farm owners diversified farming activities. They gradually switched to the production of cotton, wheat, corn (maize), peanuts, soy beans and tea, but these were not as easy to grow as tobacco. The traditional area of tobacco in Mashonaland districts was slowly supplemented by corn in the north and beef in the south. Matabeleland continued to have a beef economy. Coffee and horticultural crops gained prominence in Manicaland districts. The important thing was that these commodities had a market within the country and if not, a market was found for them before they were produced. In 1972, for example, Rhodesia exported large quantities of tea to South Africa, but the earnings from the trade did not hold steady¹¹⁰ -- dropping by \$125,000 in 1973 for no discernible reason. During 1974, diversification by European farm owners was expanding into commerce, along a policy of "vertical integration" to be accomplished through the establishment of subsidiaries such as a farm-controlled insurance company that would "improve farming profitability so as to reduce farmers' dependency on subsidies from the government."¹¹¹

Diversification of European agriculture was accomplished at great expense to the economy. This is the conclusion drawn from two surveys of European farmers by the Ministry of Agriculture and one study of agricultural input costs by a Commission of Inquiry.

The two surveys, based mainly on information gleaned from income tax returns, were conducted during 1968-71 and 1971-72, including Both surveys, one including 250 farmers (2.4% of 6,250 Rhodesian white farmers then) and another of 75 farmers, found that there was "a steady rise in farm profitability" from 1968 to 1972. It was found that the farmers who volunteered the information had an average annual profit (1968-71) rise from \$1,432 to \$3,487, an increase of \$2,055. For the same period the average expenditure increased from \$26,399 to \$30,273, a rise of \$3,874. The average profit for the two years, 1970-71, was \$4,359. While the highest average profit of \$8,544 was made in the midlands, the largest level of liabilities was sustained in the Victoria province where sizeable loans were borrowed for irrigation purposes. The highest average income for the whole sample in two years was earned by beef cattle enterprises (both years).¹¹² A study by the *Commission of Inquiry into Agricultural Input Costs* (1973) found that although the average profit per farm increased by \$2,172 between 1967 and the cash balance available per farm only increased by \$147 in the same period. The Commission report concludes that "despite the progress achieved in diversification and the consequent expansion of capital expenditure redemption charges left the farmers with less cash in 1972 than in 1965."¹¹³ The statistical information in Table III supports the conclusion that the rise in agricultural production was achieved only by an enormous 93.8% increase in farming indebtedness to \$137 million. The European farmers' liabilities indicate that Rhodesia is surviving on debts:

Rising indebtedness is a serious threat to the white farming community -- another sign that Rhodesia's economy is surviving only at the cost of rising national indebtedness... 114

Since the European farmers' indebtedness excludes private loans and loans from institutions not referred to on the Table, there is a strong likelihood that the farmers may be worse off than available information reveals. In September 1975 it will be two years since the Commission submitted the report to the regime's President. In those two years much has happened: guerrilla warfare has increased dramatically, making it difficult for the European farmers to devote enough time to agriculture; and the average price of fertilizers went up by 20% on March 1, 1974. Notwithstanding the government subsidy of \$10 million to "offset more increases in production of ammonium nitrate and to offset higher prices of imports", the factory price was raised from \$40 a ton to \$60 a ton in August 1974, barely six months after retail prices had been raised.¹¹⁶ Thus Rhodesian white farmers may be more heavily in debt in 1975 than they were in 1973.

TABLE III
NATIONAL STATISTICAL INFORMATION OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	
				(Expressed in \$-million)					
1. <i>Indebtedness</i> (Note 1) (excludes private loans and loans from institutions not referred to below)									
Commercial bank advances	24,6	26,8	23,9	26,4	26,2	28,0	35,5	36,4	
Bills	5,2	3,1	3,6	2,7	2,8	3,4	4,5	8,7	
H.P. and leasing (estimate)	4,0	4,0	5,0	5,0	6,0	7,0	8,0	9,0	
A.F.C. Long term	12,0	13,6	13,7	16,9	21,3	23,3	26,2	28,8	
A.F.C. Short term	7,7	10,0	11,5	12,5	11,6	12,0	11,7	15,0	
Trade credit	11,6	11,2	10,0	11,9	14,3	16,0	22,9	25,8	
C.S.C. Finance (*estimate)	5,5	7,3	8,2	9,9	12,5	13,4	13,3	13,3 *	
	\$70,7	\$76,0	\$75,9	\$85,2	\$94,9	\$103,1	\$122,1	\$137,0	
Increase over previous year	\$9,1	\$5,3	-\$0,1	\$9,3	\$9,7	\$8,2	\$19,0	\$14,9	
Increase in indebtedness during 1966/72 (inclusive)								\$66,3	
2. <i>Fixed Capital Formation</i> (Note 2) (excluding Central Government)	\$23,4	\$10,8	\$14,4	(expressed in \$-million)		\$18,7	\$24,3	\$24,7	
				\$17,4	\$18,5				
Expenditure during 1966/1972 inclusive								\$128,8	

SOURCE: Commission of Inquiry into Agricultural Input Costs (1973). Salisbury, 1973, p. 25.

The concern of African laborers on European farms in Rhodesia is not with indebtedness but with their very existence. They are the lowest paid workers in Rhodesia. Their wages have tended to remain essentially static in spite of rises in the cost of living. From 1965 to 1972, for instance, their rate of pay rose by \$12 from \$123 a year to \$135 a year, a 1.4% increase.¹¹⁷ During the same period, the annual increase of the consumer price index was 3.2%. During the same period also, the European, Asian and African earnings increased from \$2,729 in 1965 to \$2,863, a 0.7% increase. A study (under the chairmanship of Prof. Murphree of the University of Rhodesia) concluded in 1974 that vast numbers of Africans in Rhodesia were living below the poverty line. African farm laborers were included in the group. The study calculated the poverty line in European farms to have been \$48.50 a month for a family of four including the cash value of food rations, housing, uniforms and other income received by labor in kind¹¹⁹ and all cash wages, bonuses and commissions. Most African farm laborers received less than \$10 a month, an amount outrageously far below the \$48.50 month poverty line. Low wages resulted in malnutrition. In Rhodesia not only was malnutrition widespread among farm laborers, but an average annual wage of cash and kind many of them could not afford to pay school fees and buy uniforms for their school children. Thus, whatever profits European farmers made, they are a result of the exploitation of African labor, something very common in the colonial history of Rhodesia. Were it not for the ameliorative effects of exploitation, the indebtedness of Rhodesian white farmers would have been much greater than the \$137 million suffered in

In the agricultural industry, the cheapness of African farm labor and massive loans paid for diversification; in the industrial and commercial fields, the African workers and the small companies (and at times, the government) paid the bill. In 1968, the Rhodesian legislature passed the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Act. A few years later, Tilcor was born with the objective of exploiting the surplus rural African labor market. Through this plan, most of the corporation money comes from the Government which, by 1974, had provided \$2.9 million of the \$5.0 million cumulative fund for the development of growth points in rural Rhodesia. In 1974, a further \$10 million was expected: a \$2.75 million grant from the Government; a \$2.0 million from the Ministry of Water Development and the rest from an industrialist and a banker. So far, Tilcor has been working on six growth points at Tuli, Jotsholo, Sanyati, Chisumbanje, Kate and Dande, as well as on an industrial company at Seki¹²¹ (see Map 1). One project, the Ngwezi and Kariba Ferry and Ferry Service, failed as a result of mismanagement and guerrilla warfare.¹²² Most of Tilcor's projects were involved with cash crop production, such as cotton in summer and wheat in winter at Chisumbanje. No African holds shares in the corporation, although

chairman has repeatedly claimed that the development projects are for the benefit of the Africans and that Tilcor would encourage African control of a new growth point as soon as one growth point was profitable.¹²³ So far Tilcor has not withdrawn from any of the growth points, even though it is reported that Chisumbanje "produced a very satisfactory crop during 1971-72 and made considerable profit".¹²⁴ It is unlikely that Tilcor's withdrawal could ever occur when the country is under European rule because the white shareholders made the investments in order to reap profits. Tiltrade, a subsidiary of Tilcor, was started in 1971 with the objective of exploiting the over 3.5 million rural African potential consumers. It has, since then, established stores and supermarkets in the Tribal Trust Lands and in doing so, has forced African stores in these areas out of business. Tilcor owns 13% of Tiltrade shares; 87% of the remainder are publicly owned, but none by Africans.¹²⁵

Tobacco Auctions (TA), once a company involved wholly in the tobacco industry which crashed as a result of economic sanctions, has pursued a different aspect of accommodation to sanctions by becoming a "holdings" conglomerate. Its activities spread to embrace many aspects of the economy including fertilizers, tennis courts, spray paints and office equipment. TA gobbled up other companies as it diversified. Not only did it take over the Investment Company (1969), but it also annexed the Riet Group in Business Equipment, the Insurance Company of Rhodesia, and several other small companies threatened by liquidation.¹²⁶ Another spreading group, Freecor, was founded in 1969 as a property-letting and development company, and from 1970 on, it diversified into industrial and commercial fields. Furnishings, swimming pools, soaps, detergents, edible oils, and electrical goods became part of its business. In April 1974 it acquired 85% of the Highfield Bag Company, increasing its assets to \$25.6 million. Its profit rose from \$739,000 in 1972/73 to \$962,000 by March 31, 1974. Only 24% of the profit was derived from business connected with property-letting.¹²⁷

Plate Glass (PG) Industries continued in the glass processing and distribution business, expanding the Rhodesian glass market by 80%. At the same time, PG spread its interests throughout the building industry, becoming involved in timber and building materials. In 1973 in collaboration with Anglo American Corporation, PG took over Gluelam Products so as to produce laminated timber from local pine.¹²⁸ Like Plate Glass Industries, the Rhodesian Breweries (Rhobrew), a subsidiary of the South African Breweries Group, maintains its original activities in the brewing industry while spreading its interests to embrace other aspects of the economy. Rhobrew went into the food and hotel business. It now controls the Rhodesian Food Corporation which increased its pre-tax profits

by 39% in 1974, and the Southern Sun Corporation -- Rhodesia's largest hotel group, which had a bad 1973-74 because of a big drop in tourism. Its subsidiary, Chibuku Holding Company, invested more than \$1.75 million to the development of Seki industrial complex last year. Rhobrew's after tax profits have risen from \$2.071 million in 1969 to \$4.770 million for the year ending March 31, 1974, with brewing being the main profit earner. In the other cases, diversification was undertaken to reduce the Group's dependency on one type of business.¹²⁹

3. Mergers

Some companies merged in order to survive without diversification. During the 1960s, the two major cement companies in Rhodesia, the Premier Portland Cement Company (Rhodesia) and the Rhodesia Portland Cement Ltd. -- were confronted by a serious common problem: rising costs drove their profits down. In 1963 they merged their operations and lime production and this was followed by another agreement in 1966. In order to cut down sales and distribution costs, they arranged that distribution of orders should be effected by either of the companies in a locality even if the order was for the other company. In 1974 the now United Portland Cement Company (Pvt) was doing fairly well with profit of \$350,000 for the first six months of 1974, only \$1,000 less than the profit of the previous year.¹³⁰

Another merger was agreed upon by two apparently ailing construction companies partly as a result of a decline in the building industry. The value of building plans approved for the first six months of 1974 was \$32,669,000 which is \$10,147,000 less than the corresponding period in the previous year. The following table shows not only that there was a more than 50% decline in the value of commercial building plans, but also that the value of industrial building plans actually increased by over \$1.48 million, despite the overall drop in the value of the building plans, suggesting Rhodesia's will to build local industries rather than her financial ability.

	January - April	
	1973	1974
Commercial buildings	\$12,400,000	\$ 6,001,000
Industrial buildings	4,509,000	5,991,000
Residential buildings	21,994,000	16,091,000 ¹³

The construction industry was hit hard by this decline as well as by rising costs and a lack of skilled manpower. Montrose Construction (Pvt) Ltd. and Cardwell & Bell (Pvt) Ltd. united at

resumed operations under the name MCB Construction (Pvt) Ltd. on 1st July 1974, with only \$80,000 in assets and 170 tradesmen and laborers.¹³² Companies in the cement and construction industry merged to share limited resources. Thus they escaped liquidation by increasing efficiency in their production and distribution operations.

4. Evasion of UN Sanctions

Other Rhodesian industries survived through participation in breaking the sanctions by some UN member nations. Austria, Britain, France, West Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the United States of America, Portugal and South Africa, among many others, have been involved in embargo-breaking activities -- some more so than others. In 1973 Holland bought at least 10,000 tons of Rhodesian tobacco and last year its trade in tobacco with Rhodesia was expected to exceed the 1973 tonnage. In exchange for goods that have been sold in Rhodesian stores for many years,¹³³ Japanese companies have been buying not only tobacco, but also chrome and asbestos from Rhodesia. Jordan tried to sell 31 British-built Hunter jet planes to Rhodesia in 1974 but the deal did not go through, probably due to the pressure from the United Nations. Subsequent to that, Jordan had imported Rhodesian steel billets (1972) and steel and maize (1973). In addition to buying Rhodesian goods, other countries or their companies provided loans and investments to some Rhodesian companies so that they could expand their production. Two British firms -- Lonrho and Rio Tinto -- are reported to be the biggest investors in Rhodesia's gold and mineral development and exploration.¹³⁴ As a result, the profits of the Falcon mines increased from \$784,990 in 1972 to \$1,243,549 for the first nine months of 1974 fiscal year, partly because of the expansion in production. Britain also paid about £21 million to the World Bank because of the default by the Rhodesian Government in repaying some five loans.¹³⁵ The British *White Paper* suggests that,

*Recovery of the total sums issued under these guarantees will be sought from the Government of Southern Rhodesia when constitutional government is restored there.*¹³⁶

something quite unlikely to happen after Africans take over. Africans are more likely to demand reparations from Britain than to pay Britain for pampering her "kith and kin" during their rebellion. Banks and firms in the United States, West Germany, Austria, and other European countries financed the modernization of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (Risco).¹³⁷ Following an August 18, 1972 Paris meeting, they provided Risco with 24 million pounds (sterling) loan (R \$19.2 million, according to *The Star* of 2-1-75) in order to increase steel production from 400,000 to 1,000,000 tons a year to be exported to

the contributing countries. Consequently, in 1974 Risco was producing 70% more molten iron than previously and 930 tons of a day.¹³⁸

The United States has also been engaged in direct trade with Rhodesia in violation of the UN embargo, in addition to American companies' involvement in providing a loan to Risco. In 1973 Rhodesia earned \$8.32 million from her mineral trade with the United States; in 1973, the earnings had increased to \$19,257,640, more than three times that for 1965 when the U.S. discontinued trade because of UDI. The tripling of trade since 1965 was due to the 1971 Byrd Amendment which restored U.S.-Rhodesian trade and allowed American companies to import "strategic materials (chrome)" from Rhodesia in spite of the UN sanctions. Although the U.S. Senate voted to repeal the amendment, the House of Representatives refused to vote on the repeal measure in 1974. By the end of 1974, ferrochrome, silicon chrome, asbestos and copper trade with Rhodesia more than \$60 million, chiefly as exchange for non-ferrous materials for which the Byrd loophole had been created.¹³⁹

Mineral exports and earnings in the Rhodesian trade with the United States during 1973 were:

Nickel cathodes	US \$11,552,000
High carbon ferrochrome	10,126,000
Low carbon ferrochrome	3,300,000
Silicon chrome	1,984,000
Asbestos	1,220,000
Copper	66,000 140

Other violations of economic sanctions against Rhodesia by the United States include the 1972 Ford Motor Company's two incentive tours to Rhodesia for its dealers; the opening of a Holiday Inn in Bulawayo in December 1973; and the cooperation of U.S. airlines with Air Rhodesia which was given a cursory investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration in 1974.¹⁴¹

The U.S. reluctance to comply with the UN economic resolution against Rhodesia emanated from two assumptions on the part of the Nixon administration. The U.S. government sympathized not only with the Smith regime and wanted to recognize it, but also with other white minority regimes in southern Africa where it believed that change could only come through peaceful means under white guidance:

The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists

*We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies.*¹⁴²

Although President Ford indicated a willingness by the end of 1974 to support the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, no substantive change has occurred in the U.S.-southern Africa policy of propping up white minority regimes. The U.S. apparently still wants to "expand opportunities for profitable trade and investment" with white states in southern Africa where it already has over a billion dollars invested for lucrative profits. The U.S. Inco paid US\$1.85 per pound at a time (1974) when the free market prices of nickel ranged from US\$2.35 to US\$2.75 per pound, thus taking advantage of Rhodesia's economic isolation. Although the Anglo-American Corporation in Rhodesia skipped its dividend in 1972 as a result of a decline in nickel prices, Rhodesian benefits from the export regained so quickly that the corporation invested (1974) \$8.2 million for development projects involving the extensions of the Bindura smelter, the Shangani mine, and the Epoch nickel claims at Filabusi.¹⁴³ As a result of the U.S. and other nations' defiance of the UN sanctions, Rhodesia had a balance of payments surplus of nearly \$33 million in 1973 against a deficit of \$2.7 million in 1972. The main source of growth in 1973 was the 23.5% in mining output plus over 11% growth in manufacturing output.¹⁴⁴ But this has since been wiped out as a result of defense expenditures.

South Africa had never agreed to implement the UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia and her economic support for that country has expanded during the last ten years. In addition to financing the construction of a network of roads with over 2,700 men in the sensitive war zones, South Africa is believed to have funded the building of some "protected villages"¹⁴⁵ the establishment of water points, and the creation of a \$5 million irrigation scheme on the Msengezi River. Trade between the two countries (beef and tea, for example) increased during the last decade. Furthermore, with the independence of Mozambique on June 25, 1975, Rhodesian economic dependence on South Africa is bound to deepen.¹⁴⁶ Rhodesian exports (e.g. chrome, asbestos, nickel, tobacco) and imports which used to go through Mozambique's Beira and Lorenzo Marques ports are being rerouted through the \$6 million Rutenga-Beit Bridge rail link with South Africa, which was completed on September 10, 1974, 21 months ahead of schedule in anticipation of Mozambique's compliance with the UN mandatory sanctions.¹⁴⁷ At the Jamaica Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Australia and other Commonwealth countries indicated that they are seriously considering granting financial aid to Mozambique in order to enable her to prohibit passage of Rhodesian goods over Mozambiquian rail lines and through her ports.¹⁴⁸ Although Botswana is taking a more militant stand in support of the

southern African liberation movements against the white minority regimes, it is not expected to block Rhodesia's Mafeking (in South Africa) life line that runs through its country because if it did so, South Africa could retaliate by cutting Botswana's trade link with the non-African world. South Africa has started building a new marshalling yard on the East Rand and expanding the port of Richards Bay (north of Durban) to cope with increased traffic. But Rhodesia could pay much more for her goods to go to South Africa, and to avoid suffering another financial blow, the Rhodesia Railway authorities were desperately negotiating in June 1974 for tariffs and rates assistance from the South African Railway authorities.¹⁴⁹ Another factor has also increased Rhodesia's dependence on South Africa in terms of foreign exchange. On January 30, 1975, Ravenscroft, the regime's deputy secretary in the Ministry of Labor announced that Rhodesia had entered a five-year contract to provide at least 20,000 unskilled African laborers for South African mines,¹⁵⁰ following Malawi's decision to stop the recruitment. The laborers are to be recruited by runners from the Mine Labour Organization (WENELA)¹⁵¹ from Bulawayo, Fort Victoria, Salisbury, and the northern area -- another method of preventing young men from becoming freedom fighters. Rhodesia will derive about five million dollars from the deferred income of the export labor which is not paid out until their return to the country at contract periods of 12-18 months in South African mines.

Government allocations of foreign currency, government subsidies, diversification, mergers and the evasions of UN sanctions were vital techniques accessible to restricted groups of companies in the Rhodesian economy. Hundreds of other companies collapsed. *Rhodesia Herald* editorial of March 15, 1974 expressed serious concern over the trend of an increased number of pending liquidation orders and actual liquidations of apparently strong companies:

Statistics show that there has been a steep rise in the number of provisional liquidation orders registered against Rhodesian companies ... the trend is disquieting and should be taken seriously...

There can be little doubt that the recent collapse of apparently strong companies has prompted those who have directly or indirectly financed the businesses of others to take a more critical look at their investments or outstanding debts.¹⁵²

Although the exact number of companies which collapsed is unknown, it is qualitatively clear that by late 1973 and early 1974, the Rhodesian economy had lost its pre-UDI vitality.

IIIB. Performance of Economy: The Economy in 1974

The problem of foreign currency still beset the economy during 1974, suggesting that the government allocation measures had been, if anything, inadequate in sustaining the economy. Kenneth J. McIntosh, a banking official, was arrested in April and sentenced to 14 years in prison at hard labor and fined \$30,000 for divulging Rhodesian state secrets about the evasion of UN sanctions and for contravening exchange controls. McIntosh had aided the Associated Confirmers (Pvt) Ltd. to purchase more than \$200,000 worth of foreign currency which the latter exported out of the country illegally.¹⁵³ He also bought and exported \$69,000 worth of foreign currency and sold some \$50,000 to Rhodesians. The McIntosh case is a classic example of scores of many convictions of Rhodesian business leaders who violated the exchange controls. The Associated Chamber of Commerce of Rhodesia and some backbenchers in the Rhodesian Parliament expressed deep concern, to no avail, about the widespread currency prosecutions and about what effect they were having on the Rhodesian business community.¹⁵⁴ Mr. Andre Holland, MP, Deputy Chief Government Whip, defended their action in expressing concern about prosecution of violators of exchange controls:

*It is the right and indeed the duty of any member of Parliament... to make the most powerful representations to the government on behalf of his constituents when there appears to be any question of an injustice or a claim of injustice. In the case of the currency prosecutions, this was done in the most conscientious manner by several back-benchers.*¹⁵⁵

Another indicator of weakness in the Rhodesian economy is the steep and persistent rise in prices during 1974. (Refer to Table IV for items with inflation in prices.) The inflationary trend varied from one area to another but, roughly speaking, prices of many items rose over 50% everywhere within a year. Two factors may have contributed to the spiralling rise in prices: increases in the price of imported raw materials, such as pulps, phosphates, tallow, coconut oil, oil lubricants, and gasoline (petrol), and profiteering by local firms and traders.

Rhodesia adopted three methods of price control. Certain industries were subsidized to keep them afloat, and to keep prices down. The Department of Commerce and Industry was allocated a budget of \$13,343,400 for the current year. This expenditure estimate is 111% higher than for the previous year. Most of the increase is a subsidy to Sable Chemicals whose 1973/74 allowance of \$4.6 million was more than doubled to \$11.5 million. Prices of items whose production was government subsidized (e.g. edible oils and some fertilizers) were not very often stable. Open profiteering in the sale of used cars called for strict government control. Jack Mussett,

TABLE IV
INFLATION IN PRICES

ITEMS	PRICES
1. Anaesthetics	up 61% (*R.H. 7-25-74)
2. Blue soap	up 95%
3. Khaki clothes	up 60%
4. Detergents	up 44% (**RBC 7-23-74)
5. Mealie Meal	up in Jan. and up again in April 1974 (R.H. 4-3-74)
6. Oil Lubricants	up 25% for most brands as of April 1. This followed a 2.2¢ per liter of gasoline and a 2.0¢ per liter of diesel wholesale price rise on March 1, 1974 and a 37% jump in the price of perraffin, an oil derivative mainly used by Africans for cooking and lighting (R.H. 4-2-74)
7. Paint	up 50-100%. Gloss enamel price raised from 35¢ a kilo to 75¢, a 113% rise. Alke Paints, the only manufacturer who was not a member of the Rhodesia Paint Manufacturers Assoc., did not increase the price of paint because "as far as my group is concerned, a price increase is not justified at the present". (R.H. 6-27-74)
8. Paper & Chip-board	up 27% from Sept. 1974, another increase expected by the end of this year. (R.H. 8-1-74)
9. Peanutbutter	up 25% as from the 3rd week of May 1974. (R.H. 5-22-74)
10. Soap	up 13.5% average price increase of laundry soap, toilet soap and blue soap (up 12% as announced by Lever Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd. but in farms, retail price of the same rose by 95% - see No. 1 above. (R.H. 5-22-74)
11. Vehicles (used)	up more than 100% of retail price charged to the registered owner of the then new vehicle. (R.H. 6-4-74; 6-8-74; and 7-5-74)

During the first six months of 1974, the average price index went up 6.4%. This figure represents a steeper price rise than any recorded for a full 12 months since the 1964 base year, when the average annual increase was 2.8%. The biggest average increase of 11.3% was attributed to the rise in the price of cars. The European earnings were up 7.8% since the first four months of 1974. Thus European buying power had improved by at least 1.4% whereas the African buying power declined by at least nearly 1%.

*R.H. = The Rhodesia Herald
**RBC = Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation

the regime's Minister of Commerce and Industry, announced on July 5, 1974, through the Emergency Powers Order that it was illegal for anyone to sell or purchase a locally assembled motor vehicle at a higher price than the retail price charged to the owner of the then new vehicle. In some instances profiteering was accomplished through discriminatory price-raising against African consumers, the people least able to pay high prices. Shocked to see how the cost of blue soap and Khaki clothes had suddenly risen by 95% and 60% when their income remained fixed at \$137 a year, Mrs. K. Green, a storekeeper on a Rhodesian farm, wrote:

*How can he (the African farm worker) possibly afford such an increase? It is high time the Government stepped in and kept the prices of essential soaps and detergents down.*¹⁵⁶

In addition to the vehicle price control, the Government put into effect a new price control on November 29, 1974, replacing a temporary price freeze imposed by the regime's Minister of Commerce and Industry, Elly Bromberg, earlier in mid-November. Under the new regulations prices were pegged at the selling price in force on October 1, 1973, plus any cost increase to them since then and plus 20% of that increase.¹⁵⁷

When the shortages existed, rationing was used. Limited stocks of urea and nitrate of soda were rationed during 1974 to facilitate equitable distribution.¹⁵⁸ Not only was expensive Rhodesian gasoline rationed, but stringent measures were also imposed to conserve as much of it as possible during the international oil crisis. Unlike in the U.S. where people were encouraged to use buses or carpools to conserve gasoline, in Rhodesia bus users were victimized.¹⁵⁹ Bus service hours were cut in certain sections of Highfield during weekends, and on holidays no bus service was provided at all. Worst of all, country buses did not run on Wednesdays, enraging Africans, the overwhelming majority of whom are dependent on bus transportation.

Africans complain bitterly that because they do not own more than 1% of the cars in the country they are the people to suffer from this measure.

*They do not understand the Government's logic of stopping buses which are fuel saving in terms of the people while private cars consume more fuel in relation to the amount of passengers they transport.*¹⁶⁰

The only inconvenience suffered by Europeans (about 99% of the car owners) was that, prior to their departure for a driving vacation, each one of them was required to provide evidence of confirmed hotel bookings, if he was to obtain a ration for an itinerary exceeding 1,000 km.¹⁶¹

Also rationed was beef, the shortage of which is correlated to economic sanctions. Historically, Rhodesia produced enough beef to satisfy her needs and often enjoyed a surplus. In early January 1974, Rhodesia suffered a shortage and the increased demand for beef drove the price 12-15% higher than its previous level. Eight months later the Government finally decided to ration it. The shortage of beef was not due to a "severe drought in 1973 that forced farmers to sell their beef prematurely", as a Government official contended in January 1974. It was due to the fact that most of it was exported to earn desperately needed foreign exchange. In a letter to *The Rhodesia Herald* editor in February 1974, a reader writes:

*Rhodesia is exporting as much as possible of every commodity it can lay its hands on. This of course includes beef. For this reason some butchers are obviously turning to goat meat to alleviate the problem.*¹⁶²

Most of the Rhodesian beef was being exported to South Africa and this was confirmed by Rhodesia's representative in South Africa, Air Vice Marshal Hawkins, at the end of August when Rhodesia decided to cut the beef export. Hawkins was quite upset by beef curbs:

I am a little embarrassed that we have had to notify South Africa in the past couple of days that we are cutting supplies of beef to her with almost immediate effect.

I am not a farmer, but I feel that as your representative (in Pretoria), that having striven to build up our relationship to the pitch we are now at I am rather sad that in a sense we have let them down.

*I would urge those who can help to put their backs into it and see if, somehow, we can't get more supplies together to ease the position.*¹⁶³

At least three important things can be learned from Rhodesia's beef exportation to South Africa. First, if Rhodesia is "exporting as much as possible of every commodity it can lay its hands on" in order to obtain foreign currency, then her beef export merely underscores the general seriousness of Rhodesia's foreign exchange predicament. Second, the Rhodesian public was apparently unaware of the magnitude, if not the existence, of the beef export. This should be no surprise because the Rhodesian government capriciously classifies anything it chooses as a "national security matter", thus not for public disclosure. And third, Rhodesia apparently knew that South Africa needed the beef and she was only too willing to supply it. Although Rhodesia badly needed the foreign exchange, her beef

export to South Africa represented something greater than her needs for the rand. It showed Rhodesia's immense appreciation of South African friendship, a friendship expressed in terms of a more than 4,000-strong paramilitary force and millions of dollars used in Rhodesia's fight for her survival. After welcoming and thanking students from the Brigham Young University of Utah (USA) who were in South Africa on June 28, 1974, participating in a Rhodesian-organized fund raising musical, Rhodesia's Prime Minister said the fact that the proceeds from the South African stage of the tour would go to the South African border forces fund was "one small way for Rhodesia to say thank you to South Africans who are fighting side by side with Rhodesians against the terrorists."¹⁶⁴ Thus friendship rather than foreign exchange needs took precedent in Rhodesian-South African relations and for that dependency-based friendship, Rhodesia was willing for quite some time to have her people short of meat supplies for the sake of South Africa, whose friendship in military and monetary terms they could never have afforded to return. Considering that the Rhodesian Food Corporation -- a company controlled by Rhodesian Breweries with 76.1% of its shares owned by the South African Breweries Group -- may have monitored the beef export to South Africa, it is not surprising that it took about eight months for the Rhodesian officials to decide to cut the supplies of beef to South Africa and ration the beef.

To what extent price controls, rationing and subsidies were effective, if they at all ever were, we cannot yet tell. But the procedures for implementing the measures had some weaknesses. Price controls were imposed too late after the minor price revolution had almost run its course and the damage was done. Moreover the effectiveness of price controls was bound to be minimal in capitalistic Rhodesia where the concept of profit-making at the expense of the consumers is considered inviolable. Even if the regime seriously wanted to control the prices, their success in accomplishing set goals was severely limited by Rhodesia's lack of European manpower to enforce the policy. Rationing as a conservation measure could be useful if applied equitably, but it tends to encourage artificial price gauging and the development of a "black market". In its application, we have seen that it deprived Africans bus service on certain days while allowing gasoline rations for individual motorists. This aggravated ill feeling between Africans and Europeans, an advantage to the nationalist guerrillas who are in need of the African support. Subsidies, too, have limitations. For one thing, since no Government can possibly subsidize all companies needing aid, it becomes difficult to develop criteria by which to identify the most deserving industries. Providing subsidies is, moreover, economically dangerous: grants made to special interests add to the national debt without guaranteeing price stability.

Generally speaking, although the Rhodesian economy endured the nine years of international trade boycott, it did so at high social cost and national indebtedness. The increases in company liquidation, prosecutions as a result of exchange violations, shortages in essential items and inflation in prices show that the long-term effect of the UN sanctions has been the destabilization of the Rhodesian economy. In denying Rhodesia normal access to the international market, the trade ban has forced Rhodesia to accept much less foreign currency for her exports and to pay much more for her imports. To protect her industries, Rhodesia provided subsidies, encouraged company diversification, and imposed stringent exchange controls. These measures brought worse problems for Rhodesia. Subsidies led to indebtedness, diversification resulted in the disappearance of small companies, and exchange controls stimulated a "black market" for the acquisition of foreign currency. The Rhodesian economy survives in spite of these economic hardships only because other members of the UN continue to engage in open or clandestine trade with her.

IV. CONCLUSION

This study has shown that during the last decade the settlers in Zimbabwe managed to retain power by adopting several strategies. Militarily, they involved as many of the country's white population as possible, accepted military aid from South Africa, and recruited mercenary troops. Economically, they encouraged their industries to produce for the local market, imposed controls on currency exchange and inflationary prices, and overtly evaded UN sanctions. But during the same period, Rhodesia's ability to withstand the nationalist guerrilla incursions and economic sanctions has been seriously weakened. The reserve forces now bearing most of the brunt for the maintenance of settler dominance are less effective than the regular army and air force, and the economy is susceptible to a chronic inflation.

Despite this apparent weakening, however, the settler regime seems still determined to continue the resistance to African nationalism. They wrongly insist that the 11th December 1974 so-called ceasefire meant solely that African freedom fighters should have surrendered or left the country. They are now deadlocked with African nationalist leaders over the venue and chairmanship of an anticipated constitutional conference--a conference of dubious practical value because full scale resumption of guerrilla war now seems inevitable. The settler regime continues to formulate contingency plans which now include a civil defense system for European sections in the cities. Notwithstanding these contingency plans, white-controlled Rhodesia approaches collapse. African leaders are desperately working to consolidate the unity reached among them in Lusaka last December and are also strongly regrouping guerrilla forces. They believe that the armed struggle must continue if Zimbabwe is to be liberated. The settlers have insufficient manpower to prevent guerrilla infiltration along the increased length of border with Zambia and Mozambique and Britain and her Commonwealth partners have pledged to subsidize Mozambique so that she can deny Rhodesia export and import facilities.

Footnotes

1. There are several works that focus on the Rhodesian rebellion as a revolt against British control or on its international implications rather than on its significance to the African people in Zimbabwe. Examples of works that fit this category are: *The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion* (1973) by Robert C. Good; *Rhodesia: The British Dilemma* (International Defense and Aid pamphlet, 1971) by Eshmael E.M. Mlambo; and *Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion* (1967) by James Barber.
2. *The Star* (Johannesburg), February 22, 1975; *The Rhodesian Herald* (Salisbury), June 25, 1974.
3. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 8, 1974; April 4, 1974.
4. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 14, 1974; April 3, 1974, and August 2, 1974.
5. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 8, 1974.
6. Rhodesia, *Monthly Digest of Statistics* (Central Africa Statistical Office), March 1973, pp. 1-2.
7. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1971.
8. See Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence* for the following years: 1964-70 and 1972.
9. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Law and Order*, 1973.
10. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1969 and 1972.
11. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1967.
12. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1968-70
13. The Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London), 1974.
14. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1967.
15. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1971.
16. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1969-74.
17. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1971.

18. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1970.
19. See "Dad's Army" in *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 23, 1974.
20. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1967 and 1970.
21. Mr. Wickus de Kock, a former Deputy Minister of Justice and of Law and Order was appointed the special security adviser to Ian Smith. De Kock is currently the regime's Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 14, 1974.
22. The information that there were 4,000 South African paramilitary police assisting settlers in Zimbabwe resist the guerrilla war was obtained from President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. See *The Sunday Times* (London), January 14, 1973, and *Southern Africa*, VI 2 (February 1973).
23. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 3, 1974.
24. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 5, 1974.
25. Lawrence L. Ewing, and Robert C. Sellers (eds.) *The Reference Handbook of the Armed Forces of the World*, 1966, Washington, D.C. The Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, London 1969-70; *Ibid.*, 1973:43; Colonels T.N. Dupuy and Wendell Blanchard of the U.S. Army (retired), *The Almanac of World Military Power*, New York, 2nd ed., 1972.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *The Almanac of World Military Power*, 1972.
28. *World Armaments and Disarmaments*, 1974.
29. *The Military Balance*, 1970 and 1974.
30. *The Zimbabwe Review*, December 1973, p. 22.
31. Herbert Chitepo, *ZANU News: Special Issue*, I, 1 (November 1973), p. 3.
32. Mike Britten, General Secretary of ACCOR, *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 15, 1974.
33. For example, seven Jehovah's Witnesses between the ages of 24 and 31 and who had previously served in a guerrilla operational area later studied the Bible and were baptized as Jehovah's

Witnesses. They all subsequently failed to comply with call-up notices because they had been denied exemption on the basis of religious beliefs. See *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 1, 1974. See also Rhodesia, *Annual Reports of the Secretary for Defence*, 1964-70, where you will find that applications for exemptions had increased from 17 cases in 1964 to 26 in 1968.

34. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 29, 1974; *BBC News Summary*, July 18, 1974.
35. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 23 and 28, 1974.
36. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 29, 1974.
37. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 23, 1974.
38. Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Secretary for Defence*, 1971, and *The Los Angeles Times*, April 28, 1974.
39. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 8, 1974.
40. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 22 and 29, 1974 and April 6, 1974.
41. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 29, 1974; April 6, 1974.
42. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 19, 1974.
43. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 4, 1974.
44. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 2, 1974.
45. *The Rhodesia Herald*, "Editorial", March 29, 1974. Courts Martial had been increasing; see Rhodesia, *Annual Reports of the Secretary for Defence*, 1968-70.
46. A reader of *The Rhodesia Herald* (March 30, 1974) has a letter published which in part says:

Perhaps the greatest loss and the biggest cause of bitterness to these men are the dogers, who rough and tumble it across the sports fields with "back injuries" and various maladies that forbid military exercise but do not interfere with the most strenuous rugby scrums.
It is men like this who make the duties of the borders long and tedious for the few who really do care very much about the future.
47. *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 8, 1974; March 27, 29-30, 1974.

48. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 4, 1974.
49. *The Rhodesia Herald*, July 31, 1974.
50. *The Rhodesia Herald*, September 4, 1974; and the President of Associated Rhodesian Industries, Gordon Handover suggested that white Rhodesian girls should serve a term of military service in the armed forces. See October 31, 1974 of *The Rhodesia Herald*.
51. *The Star* (Johannesburg), January 11, 18 and 22, 1975.
52. *Africa Research Bulletin*, December 15, 1973 - January 14, 1974, p. 2972.
53. According to the *Annual Reports of the Secretary for Defence*, there were 926 European immigrants granted assisted passages in 1970. This number was 569 more assisted passages than in 1969.
54. *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 11, 1974; March 1, 1974.
55. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 18, 1974.
56. *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 11, 1974.
57. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 14, 1974.
58. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 8, 1974.
59. Wickus de Kock, *Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation*, February 26, 1975 as reported in the *BBC News Summary*, February 28, 1975.
60. *The Times* (London), March 25, 1975.
61. *The Times* (London), January 29, 1975.
62. P.K. van der Byl, *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 11, 1974; Dave Mitchell, *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 8, 1974.
63. *Rhodesia, Annual Reports of the Secretary for Labour and Social Welfare*, 1969-71.
64. J.R. Sly, Deputy President of ACCOR, *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 11, 1974.
65. *The Rhodesia Herald*, May 25, 1974.

66. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 25, 1974.
67. T.G. Silundika, Statement to the United Nations, October 16, 1974.
68. Information obtained from reliable Harare and Mpilo Hospitals' Maternity Nurses.
69. *The Star*, October 19, 1974.
70. The creation of the so-called "protected villages" in Rhodesia was a thinly veiled imitation of the villagization in colonial Mozambique in an attempt to win the "hearts and minds" of the African peasants.
71. In his annual Report, the Secretary for Law and Order deluded his henchmen by saying the following in 1968:

The assistance given to the Security Forces by the indigenous people in the tribal reserves has been most gratifying, and proves the complete fallacy of the argument so often used by left-wing elements throughout the world that the detained and restricted leaders of the subversive organizations are the true representatives of the African people.
72. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 18, 1974.
73. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 8, 1974.
74. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 16, 1974 and April 6, 1974.
75. *BBC News Summary*, July 29, 1974; *The Guardian* (Manchester), July 25, 1974.
76. J.A. Hughes, "The Land Tenure Act", *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 19, 1974.
77. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 8, 1974 and March 28, 1974.
78. *The Los Angeles Times*, July 28, 1974.
79. *The Rhodesia Herald*, October 4, 1974; *BBC News Summary*, July 25, 1974.
80. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 29, 1974; April 16, 1974.
81. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 16, 1974.

82. *The Star*, December 14, 1974.
83. In *The Rhodesia Herald* of June 1, 1974, security forces are reported to have killed four Africans and wounded two, while "breaking" a six to six curfew; of June 7, 1974 reports that security forces killed two Africans by "mistake"; the security forces had believed them to be "terrorists" only to find out later that they had not been; and so on.
84. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 17, 1974.
85. *The Rhodesia Herald*, May 24, 1974.
86. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 20 and 29, 1974.
87. *African Bureau Fact Sheet* 34, February 1974.
88. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 22, 1974.
89. *The Rhodesia Herald*, October 9, 1974.
90. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 18, 1974.
91. *African Research Bulletin*, August 22, 1974; *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 22, 1974.
92. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 13, 1974.
93. *The Star*, November 30, 1974; *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 22, 1974 and May 10 and 24, 1974.
94. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 23, 1974.
95. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 22, 1974.
96. *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 3, 1974.
97. *Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics*, September 1974.
98. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 22, 1974.
99. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 12 and 13, 1974.
100. *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 23, 1974.
101. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 30, 1974.
102. *Ibid.*

103. *Africa Bureau Fact Sheet* 17, January 1972. There are several other works that have been done on the Rhodesian economy under the UN economic sanctions. Some of them are the following: "The Political Economy of Rhodesian Sanctions", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* 7,2 (July 1969) by R.B. Sutcliffe; this same issue carries T.R.C. Curtin's article, "Total Sanctions and Economic Development in Rhodesia".
104. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 20, 1974.
105. *Africa Bureau Fact Sheet* 17, January 1972.
106. Roon Lewald, *Springfield Daily News* (Missouri), May 15, 1970.
107. *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 1974, p. 3133A.
108. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 22, 1974.
109. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 31, 1974.
110. *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 3, 1974.
111. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 29, 1974.
112. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 19, 1974.
113. *Commission of Inquiry into Agricultural Input Costs*, 1973, pp. 4-7.
114. *Africa Bureau Fact Sheet* 34, 1974.
115. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 2, 1974. See table on following page.
116. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 31, 1974.
117. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 31, 1974.
118. *Commission of Inquiry into Agricultural Input Costs*, 1973, p. 11.
119. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 27, 1974.
120. Sir Albert Robinson, *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 27, 1974.
121. *The Rhodesia Herald*, July 4, 1974.
122. *The Rhodesia Herald*, July 25, 1974.

AVERAGE PRICE OF FERTILIZERS
(Footnote 115)

Items	Old Price	New Price
	(One time jump)	
Compounds:		
A	\$61.00	\$73.60
B	64.20	77.20
C	56.80	68.40
D	55.40	66.60
L	57.00	68.40
M	56.40	68.60
P	56.80	68.60
S	55.80	67.20
V	62.60	75.40
X	63.80	75.60
Z	61.00	76.60
Straights:		
Double superphosphate	\$70.20	\$81.20
Ammonium nitrate	63.20	74.20
Single superphosphate	32.20	37.60
Sulphate of potash	70.60	85.80
Muriate of potash	58.20	71.40
Urea	76.60	99.00
Nitrate of soda	84.20	96.00
Dolomite	10.20	11.40
Gypsum	15.40	17.60

123. *Annual Report*, Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation, 1971/72, p. 10.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
125. *The Rhodesia Herald*, July 3, 25 and 27, 1974.
126. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 15, 1974.
127. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 1974.
128. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 15, 1974.
129. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 15, 1974.
130. *Ibid.*
131. *The Rhodesia Herald*, July 4, 1974.
132. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 20, 1974.
133. *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 1974.
134. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 10, 1974; August 1, 1974.
135. *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 14, 1974.
136. *Ibid.*, May 1974, p. 3096A.
137. *Sunday Times* (London), April 14, 1974; *The Star* (Johannesburg), February 1, 1975.
138. *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 1974.
139. *The Guardian* (Manchester), December 21, 1974.
140. *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 25, 1974.
141. Jack Anderson, *Washington Post*, August 20, 1974.
142. Tad Szulc, "Why Are We in Johannesburg?", *Esquire*, October 1974.
143. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 15, 1974.
144. *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 1974, p. 3095A.
145. *The Rhodesia Herald*, October 9, 1974.
146. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 7, 1974.


147. *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 6, 1974.
148. *BBC News Summary*. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference took place in Jamaica during the first week of May, 1975.
149. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 8, 1974; June 13, 1974.
150. *Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation*, January 30, 1975; *The Star* (Johannesburg), January 11, 1975; February 1, 1975. *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15-June 14, 1974, p. 3131.

WHERE THE MINERS COME FROM

Country	1969		1973	
	Number employed	%	Number employed	%
Lesotho	64,925	17.5	76,280	20.18
Botswana	14,840	4.0	17,803	4.71
Swaziland	5,194	1.4	4,573	1.21
Malawi	69,748	18.8	106,860	28.27
Mozambique	99,799	26.9	87,129	23.05
SA	116,494	31.4	85,050	22.50
Total	371,000	100.0	377,695	99.92

151. *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 6, 1974, p. 3131.
152. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 15, 1974.
153. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 17, 1974; September 1974.
154. *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 27, 1974.
155. *Sunday Mail*, April 21, 1974.
156. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 1, 1974.
157. *Africa Research Bulletin*, December 1974; p. 3321B.
158. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 1974.
159. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 10, 1974.
160. Dr. Edson Sithole, *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 5, 1974.

161. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 9, 1974.
162. *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 14, 1974.
163. *The Rhodesia Herald*, August 31, 1974.
164. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 28, 1974.



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