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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

**“Our Waking Dreams”:
Pleasant and Painful Anticipation in Plato and Aristotle**

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Philosophy

by

Zachary Keith Brants

Committee in charge:

Professor Monte Ransome Johnson, Chair
Professor Mira Balberg
Professor David O. Brink
Professor Patricia Marechal
Professor Samuel Charles Rickless
Professor Christopher John Shields
Professor Jan Szaif

2025

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University of California San Diego

2025

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>APo.</i>	<i>Analytica Posteriora</i> (Posterior Analytics)
<i>DA</i>	<i>De Anima</i> (On the Soul)
<i>De Sensu</i>	<i>De Sensu et Sensibilibus</i> (On Sense and Sensibles)
<i>EE</i>	<i>Ethica Eudemia</i> (Eudemian Ethics)
<i>EN</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i> (Nicomachean Ethics)
<i>HA</i>	<i>Historia Animalium</i> (History of Animals)
<i>Insomn.</i>	<i>De Insomniis</i> (On Dreams)
<i>MA</i>	<i>De Motu Animalium</i> (On the Motion of Animals)
<i>Mem.</i>	<i>De Memoria et Reminiscentia</i> (On Memory and Recollection)
<i>MM</i>	<i>Magna Moralia</i>
<i>PA</i>	<i>De Partibus Animalium</i> (On the Parts of Animals)

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Writing a dissertation is a challenging task, and those acknowledged here will know that I often despaired of my ability to bring the project to completion. It was only because of the support and encouragement of my advisors, friends and family that I was able to pull myself out of the gutter and forge ahead, one page at a time. Indeed, I was often motivated by the pleasant anticipation of this very moment – that time when I would be able to thank all those who have so deeply enriched my life and made the project possible. So, it is with extreme pleasure that I finally sit down to write these acknowledgements.

I will loosely model my acknowledgements on the ancient Greek practice of libations, a ritual pouring of water or wine upon the ground to mark various momentous occasions. In particular, libations were given to mark both commencements and endings. The completion of this dissertation marks both the ending of one phase of my life and the beginning of a new and unknown phase; perhaps some libations are not out of place.

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Jacob is the first philosopher I met at UCSD, and I had little idea that he would go on to become one of my closest friends. Jacob was always there to laugh and commiserate with at every stage of the program – completing coursework, writing the prospectus, finishing the dissertation, and now going on the job market. I cannot imagine, and do not wish to imagine, what life at UCSD would have been like without Jacob's constant and invaluable friendship.

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Chapter 3 contains several paragraphs that are revised from material that was earlier published as ‘Anticipating Painful Pleasures: On False Anticipatory Pleasures in the *Philebus*’ in *Ancient Philosophy*, 44 (2), 339-361, 2024. The dissertation author was the sole author of this paper.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

**“Our Waking Dreams”:
Pleasant and Painful Anticipation in Plato and Aristotle**

by

Zachary Keith Brants

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of California San Diego, 2025

Professor Monte Ransome Johnson, Chair

Affective anticipation occurs when we *pleasantly* or *painfully* anticipate some future prospect. For example, my anticipation of the harmful effects of nuclear war can itself be distressing despite the fact that I am not *currently* suffering any harms from a nuclear blast, while my anticipation of spending time with my loved ones tomorrow can itself be pleasant even before I am with them. Though Plato and Aristotle both theorized affective anticipation (albeit without using this exact terminology), there is no dedicated scholarly treatment of this

phenomenon in the contemporary secondary literature. My dissertation rectifies this scholarly lacuna and shows that affective anticipations play a key role in the theories of motivation, emotions, virtue, and education that are found within two late Platonic dialogues, the *Philebus* and the *Laws*, and within Aristotle's ethical and psychological works.

In Chapters 1 and 2 I argue that affective anticipation plays a central role in complex forms of locomotion in Plato's *Philebus* and Aristotle's psychological works. In Chapter 3 I defend a distinction between two kinds of affective anticipation: (i) non-rational affective anticipation that is based off of memories and past sense-perception and (ii) rational affective anticipation that is based on an understanding of goods and bads. In Chapter 4 I turn to Plato's *Laws* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and argue that both take emotions such as fear, confidence, and shame to be partly constituted by affective anticipations. I contend that this explains the motivational force of these emotions and illustrates how affective anticipations pervade their moral psychology. Finally, in Chapter 5, I examine the theory of moral education (*paideia*) found in Plato's *Laws* and Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*. I argue that both take moral education to start with musical education that causes learners to feel the proper pleasant and painful *non-rational* anticipations (and the related emotions partly constituted from these) such that they are motivated to perform virtuous actions before understanding the nature of virtue. Full ethical perfection, however, requires a transition to *rational* affective anticipations that embody an understanding of what is good and bad in a human life.

INTRODUCTION: Affective Anticipation

§0.1: Introduction

In the *Republic*, Socrates famously attempts to show why justice is choiceworthy both for its own sake and for its consequences. Interestingly, the dialogue begins with a short conversation between Socrates and Cephalus in which Cephalus gives his own reasons for why we should be just. Cephalus appeals to the effect this has on our hopes and fears about the afterlife; he says that if someone ‘finds many injustices in his life, he often even awakes from sleep in terror, as children do, and lives in expectation of evils (μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος) to come’ (*Republic* 1.330e6-331a1, translation Reeve, modified). In contrast, ‘An expectation both pleasant and good is always present to the person who knows that he has not been unjust’ (*Republic* 1.331a1-3, my translation). The passage contrasts two different sorts of expectations (ἐλπίδες) that are had by the unjust and just respectively; the terror of an unjust man who lives in expectation of future evils and the ‘pleasant and good’ expectation, or hope, that is present to the person who has lived a just life and can look forward to a good afterlife.¹

Reflecting on the value of the sweet expectation available to the just, Cephalus approvingly quotes Pindar:

[T0.1]
γλυκεῖά οἱ καρδίαν
ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συναορεῖ
ἐλπίς ἃ μάλιστα θνατῶν πολύστροφον
γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ.

[T0.1]
Sweet expectation is in his heart

¹ This contrast is somewhat obscured in Reeve’s translation due to his choice to translate ἐλπίς as ‘anticipation’ when it is of future evils but as ‘hope’ when it is sweet and good. Though ‘hope’ is a reasonable translation for the joyous ἐλπίς of a good afterlife described in this passage, I believe a more neutral translation as ‘expectation’ is preferable in order to draw out the contrast that is being made in these two adjacent sentences. I discuss the different translations of ἐλπίς in §0.2.1.

Nurse and companion to his old age,
Expectation, captain of the ever-twisting
Mind of mortal men. (*Republic* 1.331a5-8, translation Reeve, modified)

While Cephalus' argument for why we should be just depends on the good or bad consequences that will result in the afterlife, he does not discuss those consequences themselves but instead focuses on our *current expectation* of those future consequences. As the Pindar fragment emphasizes, it is the pleasant *expectation* that is the 'nurse and companion' to the just in their old age, while the bitter expectation of an evil afterlife causes men to wake up in terror like children. Therefore, Cephalus' argument for why we should be just is that it will allow us to live with a pleasant expectation of good things to come while avoiding the unpleasant expectation of evil that accompanies an unjust life.²

This dissertation explores the affective dimension of anticipation that is centrally highlighted by Cephalus' short argument. Namely, the idea that our anticipation of the future can be affectively valenced: we can have either anticipatory pleasure (the 'pleasant' expectation of a good afterlife had by the just) or anticipatory pain (the terror that plagues the unjust). As the Pindar quote suggests, this expectation is not a minor part of human life, but in fact 'captain of the ever-twisting mind of mortal men.' This dramatic claim is borne out, I suggest, in Plato's and Aristotle's own treatment of pleasant and painful anticipations. I argue that our affective anticipations play an essential role in human motivation and move us to pursue prospective goods and flee prospective evils. I further suggest that both take many emotions, or *pathê*, to be constituted by pleasant or painful anticipations. Moreover, developing and perfecting one's affective anticipations is a crucial, but under-studied, aspect of Plato's and Aristotle's account of a good, virtuous life. Part of becoming virtuous is forming the proper affective expectations: we

² Note that this brief argument is unsatisfactory insofar as it focuses only on how justice is valuable for its *consequences*, both in the afterlife and on our expectations in the current life, rather than being valuable in itself.

must learn to pleasantly look forward to, and fear, the *right* kinds of things in a way that does not conflict with but rather *embodies* a correct rational outlook on life.³

In this introductory chapter I first (in §0.2) briefly explain the sort of psychological attitude that I mean to denote by ‘pleasant anticipation’ and ‘painful anticipation.’ In the process I discuss the connection with *hope* (as we have already seen, both ‘anticipation’ and ‘hope’ can be appropriate translations of *ἐλπίς*) and say a few words to indicate the sort of *active, occurrent* cognitive state that I take ‘anticipation’ to indicate. In the remaining sections (§0.3-§0.5) I provide a rough overview of the course of the dissertation; in §0.3 I discuss the chapters dealing with the *psychology* of affective anticipation in Plato (Chapter 1) and Aristotle (Chapter 2), in §0.4 I discuss the distinction between *rational* and *non-rational* affective anticipation (Chapter 3), in §0.5 I cover the role affective anticipations play in the emotions (Chapter 4), and, finally, in §0.6 I review my claim that both Plato and Aristotle take ethical development and ethical education to begin with the development of *non-rational* affective anticipations, but to ultimately aim at the development of *rational* affective anticipations in line with full virtue.

§0.2: What even *is* Affective Anticipation?

‘Pleasant anticipation’ and ‘painful anticipation’ are distinctive states that involve two core, interrelated parts: an anticipation component and an occurrent affect component. On the one hand, we anticipate some future prospect under some evaluative property. For instance, I might anticipate the prospect of my imminent dinner as pleasant. On the other hand, this anticipation is itself affectual: it involves current affect in the present moment. So, I experience

³ Indeed, it seems possible that someone who acts justly so that he can have a good expectation of a future afterlife might nonetheless be pleasantly anticipating the *wrong* sorts of things. On this point, note Adeimantus’ later criticism of those who, in their account, ‘lead the just to Hades, seat them on couches, provide them with a symposium of pious people, crown them with wreaths, and make them spend all their time drinking – as if they thought eternal drunkenness was the finest wage of virtue’ (*Republic* 2.363c4-d2). In contrast, grasping the intrinsic value of justice allows us to anticipate a just life *itself* with pleasure, regardless of its consequences.

occurrent pleasure when anticipating my imminent dinner despite not yet eating anything. I refer to the pleasure that attends a pleasant anticipation as ‘anticipatory pleasure,’ drawing attention to the fact that it attends an anticipation, and likewise refer to the pain that attends a painful anticipation as ‘anticipatory pain.’

Most of the scholarly work that discusses anticipatory affects in ancient Greek philosophy focuses squarely on Plato’s *Philebus*. The phenomena are clearly articulated in that dialogue, and it contains a sustained and complex argument that certain anticipatory pleasures can be *false*. Most scholarly attention on anticipatory pleasure has so far focused on explicating this argument. In contrast, I claim that anticipatory affects, that is, affective anticipations,⁴ have an underappreciated but important role in both Plato’s and Aristotle’s broader moral psychology. My goal in this section is to provide a cursory overview of anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain. With that in mind, note that almost all of the texts to which I refer in this introduction warrant a richer and more detailed discussion. That said, I postpone that discussion until the relevant sections of the dissertation, temporarily focusing on only describing the relevant psychological phenomena.

Our first introduction to anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain occurs in the *Philebus* at 32b9-32c2, immediately after Socrates provides a general ‘outline’ of restorative pleasure and pain. I describe the restoration view of pleasure later, but, to state the view briefly, Socrates argues that certain affections (παθημάτων) such as ‘emptying,’ ‘filling,’ ‘warming,’ and ‘cooling,’ are experienced as pleasant when they *restore* a living creature to its own nature but

⁴ The scholarly literature on false anticipatory pleasures in the *Philebus* uses the phrase ‘anticipatory pleasure.’ However, I often prefer the phrase ‘affective anticipation’ or ‘pleasant anticipation’ to emphasize the essential cognitive act of anticipation, rather than the affect itself. However, besides a shift in emphasis, I take ‘anticipatory pleasure’ and ‘pleasant anticipation’ to be interchangeable. Likewise, I interchange ‘anticipatory affects’ and ‘affective anticipations.’

are experienced as painful whenever they *harm or destroy* that nature. Such restorative pleasures and pains are therefore based on occurrently experienced bodily processes of restoration or destruction. Socrates now turns to another type of pleasure and pain ‘of the soul itself’:

[T0.2] {ΣΩ.} Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερόν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

[T0.2] Socrates: Well then establish the expectation of the soul itself of these sort of affections <as a kind of pleasure and pain>, on the one hand the anticipation of the pleasant things is pleasant and encouraging, but the <anticipation> of the painful things is fearful and painful. (32b9-c2, my translation)

Socrates establishes the *expectation* (προσδόκημα)⁵ of ‘these sort of affections,’ namely the expectation of the pleasant restorations or painful destructions just described, as a kind of pleasure or pain ‘of the soul itself.’ Socrates asserts that the anticipation⁶ (τὸ ἐλπιζόμενον) of future pleasure is itself pleasant, but that the anticipation of future pain is itself painful. According to (T0.2), anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain therefore refer to psychological pleasure or pain (a pleasure or pain ‘of the soul’) that is due to an *anticipation* of some future pleasure or pain. The anticipation of some future pleasure is *itself* a sort of pleasure, while the anticipation of a future pain is *itself* a sort of pain. As an example, I can experience occurrent anticipatory pleasure due to my expectation that I will eat some delicious ice cream later tonight even though I am not yet eating any ice cream at all. Nonetheless, my anticipation of eating the delicious ice-cream is itself pleasant. Conversely, the anticipation of imminent pain someone

⁵ Note that προσδόκημα is a rare word that shows up only three unique times in the entire TLG corpus: our current text, a fragment of Epicurus (Arrighetti 1973, fragment 34.31), and in a poem by the Byzantine poet Theodore Prodromos (Theodorus Prodromos, *carmina historica* 45.266 in Hörandner 1974). I follow the LSJ and translate it as ‘expectation.’ I take the word to be a noun form of προσδοκᾶν, ‘to expect,’ and to be a synonym of ‘προσδοκία’ (also ‘expectation’).

⁶ Literally ‘the anticipating.’ Though I translate ‘προσδόκημα’ as ‘expectation’ and ‘ἐλπιζόμενον’ as ‘anticipation’ to acknowledge the fact that two different Greek words are being used in this passage, I do not believe that the *Philebus* draws a philosophical distinction between these two terms.

may have right before a nurse injects a needle into his arm can itself be extremely distressing even before the needle touches his skin.

Looking at (T0.2) more closely, we can see that there are two essential aspects to any case of anticipatory pleasure or anticipatory pain: anticipation and occurrent affect. I take and describe each aspect in turn. The first aspect is the *anticipation*: anticipatory affects requires the anticipation that something will occur in the future. This temporal aspect of anticipation, namely the fact that its objects must be seen as occurring in the future, partly distinguishes anticipation from other mental attitudes such as thought, belief, memory, and perception. Though I can have beliefs about the present, past, or even atemporal matters in addition to beliefs about the future, anticipation and expectation are necessarily always about the future.⁷

The temporal aspect of anticipation comes out during a passage in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* (*Mem.*) in which Aristotle contrasts memory with both anticipation and perception:

[T0.3] οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλλον ἐνδέχεται μνημονεύειν, ἀλλ' ἔστι δοξαστὸν καὶ ἐλπιστόν (εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπιστήμη τις ἐλπιστική, καθάπερ τινὲς φασὶ τὴν μαντικήν), οὔτε τοῦ παρόντος, ἀλλ' αἰσθησις· ταύτη γὰρ οὔτε τὸ μέλλον οὔτε τὸ γεγόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον. (*Mem.* 1.449b10-15)

[T0.3] For the future does not admit of being remembered, but is rather an object of belief and anticipation (for there could be some science of anticipation, just as some say <there is a science of> divination). Nor <is memory> of the present, but rather perception, for by this <sc. perception> we are acquainted with neither the future nor the past, but only the present. (*Mem.* 1.449b10-15, my translation)

Aristotle here distinguishes memory from anticipation and perception by focusing on the relevant *objects* of these different cognitive states. While perception is only of the present, memory is

⁷ Note *Philebus* 39d7-e6, in which we can have ‘writings’ (referring to beliefs) in our soul about the past, present, or future, yet our ἐπίδες are all about future times.

only of the past. Anticipation, on the other hand, is only of the future.⁸ The triad of perception, memory, and anticipation will be important later on. We will see that Aristotle and Plato both seem to hold that there is an asymmetrical order of dependence among these abilities: anticipation depends on memory, and memory depends on perception.

Later I suggest, moreover, that the *content* of the anticipation involved in affective anticipation is of a very particular kind. Not just any anticipation about the future has an affectual component. Rather, affective anticipation requires that the thing anticipated be discerned to be of a certain sort. Namely, we will see that pleasant anticipation takes the anticipated outcome to be itself pleasant or in some respect good, while painful anticipation takes the anticipated outcome to be painful or in some respect bad.⁹ If we anticipate some future prospect but *do not* anticipate it as painful, pleasant, good or bad, then there need not be any affect involved. For instance, my anticipation of seeing my neighbor's Toyota Corolla tomorrow morning is neither pleasant nor painful, as the anticipated prospect is seen as neither good nor bad and neither pleasant nor painful in any respect. We can already see this aspect of anticipatory affect in (T0.2), in which it is claimed that anticipatory pleasure comes from the anticipation that something *pleasant* will occur (the pleasant anticipation is 'for the pleasant things' (πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων)), while anticipatory pain comes from the anticipation that something *painful* will occur. Yet, we will see that other passages in Plato and Aristotle strongly support widening the concept of anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain to allow that occurrent anticipatory pleasure can

⁸ In this passage Aristotle also says that the future is an object of *belief*. I explore the difference between belief and anticipation later in this chapter, but I ultimately suggest that, though beliefs of the future can constitute *rational* anticipations of the future, there can also be *non-rational* anticipations of the future that do not require beliefs at all.

⁹ I say 'in some respect' good or bad to reflect the fact that pleasant or painful anticipation can be caused by grasping many different kinds of goods and bads. This is clarified in Chapter 4 where we will see that anger, for instance, is the pleasant anticipation of revenge (which is in some respect good) while shame involves the painful anticipation of disgrace (which is in some respect bad).

also result from the anticipation of something *good* coming about. This will be the case even if there is no anticipated pleasure. As an example of an anticipatory pleasure that is due to an anticipation of some future good as opposed to one's own future pleasure, consider a man who rejoices on his deathbed while thinking about the wonderful lives that he expects his children to have. Even though he will not be around to experience the time he looks forward to, and thus cannot be anticipating his own future pleasure, he still pleasantly anticipates his children leading good lives after his death. Conversely, he would likely experience anticipatory pain were he to expect that his children will suffer extreme misfortune one year after his death. Though in this case his anticipation is not directed at his own future pleasure or pain, it is plausibly directed at a future situation that is taken to be either good or bad and to bear on the overall quality of his own life.

So far, I have focused on explaining the *anticipation* aspect of affective anticipation, but now I shift to explain the second core aspect: the occurrent affect. An affective anticipation is felt as either *pleasant or painful*. Though my anticipation is of some prospective, future situation, my anticipation itself occurs right now in the present moment and is itself psychologically painful or pleasant. So, my anticipation that someone will stab me in the arm is psychologically painful and distressing in the present moment. Now, when I say that my anticipation of future pleasure *is itself* pleasant, I mean to resist the idea that the relevant anticipation simply 'causes' or 'occasions' pleasure or pain as a kind of separate phenomenon. Rather, an anticipation of something pleasant or good is its own kind of pleasure, while the anticipation of something painful or bad is its own kind of pain.¹⁰ This is again supported by (T0.2): Socrates states that the

¹⁰ This is a feature of anticipatory pleasure in the *Philebus* that has received attention insofar as it shows that pleasures and pains can have cognitive content. This is because the anticipation, a cognitive state that bears 'content,' is in these cases said to also be a pleasure or pain. As a result, at least these pleasures and pains are

anticipation of future pleasures *is* pleasant and that the anticipation of future pains *is* painful and then sets down pleasant and painful anticipation as a special *kind* of pleasure and pain, rather than simply as a further way in which pleasure or pain can be caused (32c3-5). While I take it that beliefs, and indeed anticipations more generally, need not necessarily be accompanied by any affective dimension, I claim that anticipations of things discerned to be pleasant, painful, or in some respect good or bad are intrinsically affective.

Let us take stock. I have argued that anticipatory pleasure is the occurrent psychological pleasure of anticipating a future prospect as pleasant or in some respect good. Conversely, anticipatory pain is the occurrent psychological pain of anticipating a future prospect as painful or in some respect bad. One noteworthy feature of affective anticipations should be mentioned at the outset. These attitudes are at once simultaneously cognitive and conative. They are cognitive insofar as they require us to take future, currently non-existent states of affairs to be a certain way and to be of a certain sort (i.e. pleasant, painful, good or bad). At the same time, affective anticipation is intrinsically conative insofar as it involves an occurrent affective reaction to the cognized prospect. This affective response, I will argue, is responsible for *moving* us to either bring that prospect about or to avoid it. Over the course of this study, we will see that it is precisely this dual cognitive-conative character of affective anticipations that allows affective anticipation to do so much philosophical work for Plato and Aristotle.

§0.2.1: Hope vs. Anticipatory Pleasure: on ἐλπίς

Before I continue, it will also be necessary to briefly explain an important Greek word that will be in the background of this study: namely ἐλπίς and the related verb ἐλπίζειν. The word has two typical translations: either ‘hope’ on the one hand or ‘expectation’ or ‘anticipation’ on

capable of being true or false. Hence, a number of scholars take anticipatory pleasures to be a kind of ‘propositional attitude.’ For classic defenses of this view, see (Dybikowski 1970) and (Frede 1985).

the other hand.¹¹ The concept denoted by the English word ‘hope’ arguably must be directed at something that is taken to be good or desirable in some way, hence the so called ‘standard view of hope,’ a view that takes a hope for ϕ to be 1) a desire for ϕ plus 2) the belief that ϕ is possible (but not certain).¹² However, ἐλπίς, like the English word ‘anticipation,’ can also be directed at things that are *painful* or *bad*, and positively undesirable. A clear passage in which this occurs comes from the discussion of confidence and fear in the *Laws*, an important passage for this study.

[T0.4] Athenian: Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δέ, φόβος μὲν ἢ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἢ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου·

[T0.4] Athenian: We also <possess> beliefs about the future concerning both of these <i.e. pleasure and pain>, to which ‘anticipation’ (ἐλπίς) is the common name, while ‘fear,’ on the one hand, is <the name for> the anticipation of pain in particular, while ‘confidence’ is <the name for> the anticipation of the opposite. (*Laws* 1.644c9-d1, my translation)

This is a clear doublet of the passage in the *Philebus* in which anticipatory pleasure is taken to be the pleasant anticipation of pleasant things while anticipatory pain is taken to be the painful anticipation of painful things.¹³ Yet, we would certainly be mistaken in translating ‘ἐλπίς’ as ‘hope’ in this passage, as that would result in the infelicitous assertion that fear is the ‘hope of pain,’ which would misconstrue what the Athenian is saying.

On the other hand, it is certainly true that there are passages in which the Greek ‘ἐλπίς’ and cognates *do* seem to genuinely refer to the English concept of ‘hope.’ Indeed, I personally think that the technical notion of ‘anticipatory pleasure’ that I develop in this dissertation is well

¹¹ Note the LSJ entry for ἐλπίς, as well as the discussion in (Cairns 2016).

¹² See (Downie 1963) and (Day 1969) for a defense of this analysis. However, there is a rich contemporary literature on hope that challenges the ‘standard view’ in various ways. For a recent overview of different approaches, see (Milona 2020).

¹³ The *Laws* passage specifies that *elpis* is a *belief*. Later I argue that beliefs in the technical sense are sufficient, but not necessary, for anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain. Also, though the Athenian does not here claim that the belief of future pain *is* painful, I argue there is good reason to think this is implied, and that fear (and confidence) do indeed involve occurrent affect in the *Laws*.

suited to explain our contemporary concept of ‘hope.’ In particular, it strikes me as plausible that occurrent hope always involves a pleasant anticipation of some possible good state of affairs in the future. Indeed, analyzing hope as a sort of anticipatory pleasure strikes me as an improvement over the ‘belief + desire’ model insofar as it posits a single psychological attitude as doing the relevant explanatory work instead of bundling two distinct psychological attitudes together: anticipation of a possible future outcome captures the relevant belief component, while the occurrent affect and anticipation of the outcome under a positive evaluative guise captures the desire component. In any case, as translators and readers of ancient Greek, we must rely on context to determine whether ‘anticipation’ or ‘hope’ is an appropriate translation of ‘ἐλπίς’ for any given passage. The former translation is neutral about whether the prospect anticipated is taken as good or bad, while the latter implies that it is taken as good and, as I have tentatively proposed, a likely source of anticipatory pleasure.

§0.2.2: The Modal Character of Affective Anticipation

I’ve already explained that anticipation is of the future. However, before moving on, it will be important to distinguish one somewhat heterodox way that I use ‘anticipation’ and ‘expectation’ in this dissertation. On the one hand, there is one sense of the word ‘anticipation’ and ‘expectation’ that implies that we positively *expect* some outcome to occur. According to this use it would be infelicitous to say that we ‘expect’ or ‘anticipate’ an outcome to occur when we judge it to occur with a less than even chance. There is another usage of the English word ‘anticipation,’ however, that is more relevant to this study. For instance, someone says that she is well prepared for some event because she has already ‘anticipated every outcome.’ Obviously, she did not positively *expect* every possible outcome to in fact occur, adopting an attitude towards the future that seems incoherent. Rather, I take the idea to be that she anticipated, or

entertained, each possible future outcome one by one and planned accordingly for each. Yet, this latter use of anticipation is perfectly compatible with the idea that she anticipated a prospect that she thought was all things considered *unlikely* to occur.

What is important about this other use of anticipation, I suggest, is that it involves taking some outcome to have a certain modal status. Namely, it involves actively taking some outcome to be possible *for her*, as something that could occur *in her own future*.¹⁴ Though I can ‘entertain’ some counterfactual scenarios that I take to be impossible, for instance I can entertain a scenario in which I dine with Aristotle, I do not take that scenario to be a possible future, and hence cannot be said to ‘anticipate’ it in any sense of the word. Anticipation, in this sense, seems necessarily *active* in a way that is not true of belief. Though my belief can be had in a dispositional sense even while it is not actively entertained, this cannot be the case for anticipations.¹⁵ Rather, when I anticipate some future outcome in the relevant way, I must be *actively* focusing on the prospect as in my own future during that time in which I anticipate it.

Indeed, I would want to analyze the fear of nuclear war as the painful anticipation of nuclear holocaust. Now, I might take nuclear war to be extremely unlikely but still at times fear it when the future prospect becomes salient. For instance, this prospect can become salient when someone is describing to me the atrocious effects of nuclear radiation or the destructive power of the latest nuclear missiles, and this can in turn trigger my own fear.¹⁶ In my view, these

¹⁴ In this respect anticipation is parallel to memory. I can have all sorts of beliefs about the past, for instance that Cromwell died on Tower Hill or that my father was born in Ohio, that fail to count as memories. Likewise, I can have beliefs about the future, such as that mercury will be in retrograde on the 8th, that might not in the relevant sense count as anticipations. Anticipation involves focusing on it and taking that future prospect to be relevant to me and in my own future. James Warren calls this ‘introversive anticipation’ (Warren 2014, 7).

¹⁵ Another important difference is that ‘beliefs’ arguably involve cognitive resources not available to non-human animals. Certainly, we will see that Aristotle, at least, denies that animals have beliefs but affirms that they have anticipation, and in Chapter 3 I argue that both Plato and Aristotle believe that memory and sensations are sufficient to enable forward-looking *non-rational* anticipations.

¹⁶ Also note that merely *imagining* the horrendous outcomes is not the cause of my fear either. I can *imagine* the terrible destructive power of the Night Walkers from *Game of Thrones* without *fearing* them: I do not actively

discussions need not necessarily raise my credence in the actual occurrence of nuclear war so much as draw my attention to this potential prospect; after all, I may still think nuclear war is on balance very unlikely. Though I do not then anticipate nuclear war in the sense that I expect it to be the most likely future outcome, I plausibly *do* anticipate that prospect in the other sense, taking it up as occurring in my future during that time in which my attention is drawn to it. The badness of that prospect when actively anticipated can, in turn, trigger active, occurrent fear. The same situation applies to the sort of pleasant anticipation likely at work in cases of hope, as we can hope for future outcomes that we take to be all things considered unlikely. So, for instance, someone might hope that their cancer treatment is successful even as they recognize that the success rate is only 16%. Nonetheless, they focus on the goodness of the possible prospect when they hope for and pleasantly anticipate the slim possibility of being cured.¹⁷

§0.3: Plan of the Dissertation

Let us now turn to discuss the plan of the dissertation. In addition, in §0.3.3 I explain how *fear* can be analyzed as a kind of painful anticipation, as it will be helpful to have a concrete example of how emotions can be analyzed in terms of affective anticipations before the more detailed discussion in Chapter 4.

anticipate that possibility as lying in my own future and hence do not attribute to it the modal status needed for genuine fear.

¹⁷ Martin makes these cases of ‘hoping against hope’ central to her own analysis. On her view, we can hope for prospects that we take to be possible but on balance unlikely so long as we ‘adopt a stance toward that probability <of the hoped-for prospect occurring> whereby it *licenses*’ certain ways of thinking, feeling, and acting with regard to the hoped-for outcome (Martin 2014, 62). Note that ‘hoping against hope’ comes from a Greek phrase in the New Testament (‘he who against hope, in hope believed,’ ὅς παρ’ ἐλπίδα, ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι ἐπίστευσεν, Romans 4:18). Martin, however, denies that ‘hope’ must be future-oriented, and takes a benefit of her view to be its ability to accommodate past-directed hopes (e.g. ‘I hope that Plato was happy in his final moments’). While this is a legitimate way in which we use the English word ‘hope,’ to my knowledge there is no instance ἐλπίς that is past-directed.

§0.3.1: Affective Anticipation as Motivational (Chapter 1 & 2)

The first two chapters are devoted to a more detailed discussion of the *psychology* underlying affective anticipation in Plato and Aristotle respectively. In Chapter 1 I turn to Plato's *Philebus*, a late dialogue with relatively extended discussions of various psychological capacities, and situate his account of affective anticipation within his broader accounts of restorative pleasure and destructive pain, desire, perception, and memory. I first describe Plato's conception of *restorative* pleasure and pain as the pleasant or painful perception of the restoration or destruction of one's nature or 'ensouled form.' Plato first describes affective anticipation as being directed at such bodily restorations and destructions: I pleasantly anticipate being restored or painfully anticipate being destroyed even when I am not undergoing the relevant bodily process. We then see how affective anticipation depends on memory and desire; someone who desires to drink does so in virtue of a past *memory* of being restored through drink. I experience a pleasant anticipation when I anticipate that a restoration like that which I remember and desire is possibly attainable in my own circumstance. I argue that the passages also suggest that we cannot explain motion simply by appealing to some desire, as desire is present both in someone who pleasantly anticipates and pursues drink and in someone who despairs of getting drink and lacks motivation. I suggest that it is pleasant (or painful) anticipation that actually cause pursuit (or avoidance) in a particular given instance.

In Chapter 2 I transition to Aristotle. I first turn to passages that show that Aristotle, like Plato, clearly recognizes affective anticipation as a way in which we can feel pleasure and pain that is importantly distinct from pleasure and pain that accompanies occurrent perceptions, thoughts, and memories. I then turn to two key psychological works that contain dedicated treatments of animal locomotion, *De Anima* (DA) and *De Motu Animalium* (MA), and argue that plausible interpretations of these texts support seeing affective anticipation as necessary for

motivation. Aspects of this proposal have already been defended by scholars such as Hendrik Lorenz, Jessica Moss, and Giles Pearson. Lorenz and Pearson agree that motivation requires ‘envisioning prospects,’ yet they deny that *occurrent affect* is important to the motivational efficacy of an anticipation. On the other hand, Moss attributes the motivational force to occurrently pleasant *phantasia* yet denies that anticipation does any essential work. In §2.3 I defend what I believe is an improvement over existing approaches and argue that we can fruitfully understand desire as a disposition that is *active* precisely when we experience affective anticipations of prospective objects of pursuit or avoidance. It is the occurrent affect, intrinsic to any affective anticipation, that accounts for the motivational (literally, *moving*) force of active, occurrent desire. Pleasure and pain are associated with heating and cooling, physical alterations that can cause further changes in our bodily organs and bring about full body motion. Affective anticipation thus turns out to be inherently ‘motivating’ in the straightforward sense that the occurrent affect that we experience always literally moves us in some way towards (or away) from the anticipated goal.¹⁸

§0.3.2: Non-Rational and Rational Affective Anticipation (Chapter 3)

After articulating the importance of affective anticipation in motivation and self-motion for both Plato and Aristotle, in Chapter 3 I turn to argue that we can discern, in the works of Plato and Aristotle, a distinction between what I call ‘non-rational’ affective anticipation and ‘rational’ affective anticipation. I claim that the content of non-rational affective anticipations does not rely on any rational faculty but instead depends primarily on memory of past pleasant or

¹⁸ However, this is of course complicated by the fact that we can experience multiple pleasures and pains simultaneously in cases of complex emotions, as well as undergo multiple impulses simultaneously in cases of psychic conflict.

painful experiences.¹⁹ The reason that we non-rationally pleasantly anticipate some prospect, for instance, is that we had a pleasant sensory experience of it in the past. Rational affective anticipation, on the other hand, occurs when the good or bad future prospect that we anticipate is grasped through our *rational* faculties.

In the first half of Chapter 3 (§3.2 - §3.4), I survey evidence from the *Philebus* that supports drawing this distinction. While the first introduction of affective anticipation in the *Philebus* suggests that it belongs to all animals and depends on non-rational faculties of memory and perception (passages surveyed in Chapter 1), the ‘painter & scribe’ analogy that occurs later on in the dialogue supports recognizing the formation of affective anticipations in which the object of our affective anticipations, our hopes or fears, is formed in light of a process of reasoning and inquiry. Insofar as these latter affective anticipations depend on reasoning, we should suspect that they are not the kind of affective anticipation that belongs to non-human animals. In §3.4 I argue that we can discern more concrete examples of this distinction within the *Philebus*. Socrates is critical of Philebus and other hedonists who pleasantly anticipate *intense* pleasures, yet there is reason to think that they hope for such pleasures due to uncritically relying on their (deceptive) past sensory experiences of such pleasures. Insofar as these affective anticipations are formed from past sensory experiences, I argue that we should see them as *non-rational*. In contrast, in Socrates’ later discussion we can discern two other groups of people, one group that hopes for the absence of pain and another group that hopes for pure pleasures. The former would harbor such hopes because they hold that the absence of pain is pleasant, while the latter hope for pure pleasures because they understand that pure pleasures are genuine pleasures.

¹⁹ In this aspect of my view I loosely follow Lorenz 2006, who argues that non-rational motivation in Plato and Aristotle is based on a kind of ‘empiricist’ association of memories based on perception rather than thought or belief. See especially (Lorenz 2006, 95-110 & 124-137), as well as others who endorse a similar account (at least with respect to Aristotle) such as (Johansen 2012) and (Gasser-Wingate 2021).

I contend that in both cases these pleasant anticipations, directed at either the neutral state or pure pleasures, can be seen as following *reasoning* concerning the nature of pleasure itself rather than memories of past pleasures. We should therefore consider these to be instances of *rational* pleasant anticipations. In general, I suggest that reasoning concerning the nature of that which we hope-for or fear can in turn inform our hopes and fears themselves, thereby underlying *rational* affective anticipations that embody our rational understanding of what is valuable.

In the second half of Chapter 3 (§3.5 - §3.7) I argue that we find a similar distinction in the works of Aristotle. I begin by motivating this distinction with a *prima facie* puzzle: in many places Aristotle seems to unambiguously *affirm* that non-human animals can experience affective anticipations, yet in several passages within his psychological and biological works he, on the contrary, seems to deny it. This apparent conflict can be resolved, I contend, by again distinguishing between rational and non-rational affective anticipations. In §3.6 I draw on the work of recent scholarship to explain the sense in which non-human animals can anticipate the future. Our sensory experiences underly *perceptual phantasia*: a faculty to retain stored pleasant or painful sense-impressions that remain even after an instance of sense-perception has ended. Temporal associations can be formed between these stored sensory impressions, *phantasmata*, that can later be re-deployed when ‘triggered’ by occurrent perception to enable affective anticipation and, consequently, various complex forms of animal behavior. Yet, in §3.7 I explain that we also have good reason to attribute a higher form of *rational* affective anticipation to intellectual animals such as human beings. By revisiting passages from Chapter 2 that suggest that the objects of desire or aversion, *ta prakta*, can be grasped through perception, *phantasia*, or *thought* in conjunction with passages that explain how *phronêsis* can transform natural virtue into *full* virtue, I claim that we can have a *rational* affective anticipation that reflects and

embodies our thought-based grasp of some particular prospect as good or bad. While a child or non-rational animal might pleasantly anticipate some prospect simply because they pleasantly experienced something similar in the past, an intellectual animal can pleasantly anticipate it because they *understand* that prospect to be good or bad. When the results from Chapter 3 are taken together with the arguments from Chapters 1 and 2, we therefore can see two ways in which we can be moved to action and be motivated to achieve our goals: on the one hand we can be motivated by pleasantly or painfully anticipating future prospects in a *non-rational* way that is based on past sensory experiences, while on the other hand our *reasoned view* about goods and bads can also give rise to inherently motivating *rational* affective anticipations.

§0.3.3: Affective Anticipation and the Emotions (Chapter 4)

In Chapter 4 I turn to explain how Plato, in the *Laws*, and Aristotle, in the *Rhetoric*, both take key emotions (*pathê*) to essentially involve affective anticipations. Starting with Plato, in §4.2 I explain how a famous passage in which the Athenian compares human beings to ‘divine puppets’ of the gods helps illustrate the importance of pleasant anticipation, in the form of confidence, and painful anticipation, in the form of fear, to the subsequent discussion. In this image, humans are pulled around by the ‘iron strings’ of pain, pleasure, painful anticipation and pleasant anticipation, as well as a weak, golden cord representing ‘reason.’ We must, the Athenian claims, cultivate the proper fear and the proper confidence to aid reason and live virtuously. I argue that Plato’s discussion of these emotions in *Laws* 1-2 provides further evidence for my claim that pleasant and painful anticipation are motivational, as the Athenian explains how confidence and shame move us to perform and refrain from all sorts of actions. Moreover, the Athenian analyzes other emotions in terms of these two more basic elements (fear

and confidence) suggesting that he would likewise see other emotions as incorporating affective anticipations.

In §4.3 I argue that Aristotle's own analysis of the emotions in *Rhetoric* 2.2-11 also sees many emotions as partly constituted by affective anticipations. Though this is more readily apparent for certain emotions, such as anger and fear, I contend that we can also see affective anticipations as essential components of confidence, shame, envy, and emulation. In each case I argue that recognizing the affective anticipation at work in the relevant emotion helps explain its motivational profile, supporting my contention that affective anticipation does crucial motivational work for both Aristotle and Plato.

Though I discuss the role of affective anticipation within various emotions at length in Chapter 4, before moving on it will be useful to very briefly go over the single example of fear, both in order to motivate at the start my broader contention that other emotions, more generally, can be fruitfully analyzed in terms of affective anticipations and to have a concrete example to which we can refer before reaching the more detailed discussion in Chapter 4.

We have already seen in (T0.4) that fear is defined as the anticipation of future pains in the *Laws*. Though there is no mention of occurrent affect in that passage, it is highly plausible that Plato also holds the anticipation involved in fear to be accompanied by an occurrent psychological pain, as we saw that he stipulated in (T0.2) that the anticipation of future pains is itself painful. Likewise, though the *Philebus* contains no detailed analysis of fear itself, Socrates does conclude his argument for the existence of false anticipatory pleasures by claiming that the same argument applies to 'fear, anger, and everything else of that sort' (*Philebus* 40e2-4). This is at least *prima facie* evidence that the discussion of anticipatory affect is meant to apply to fear and anger as well. Finally, in the *Timaeus* he explains how *fear* involves the spirited part of our

soul making use of a natural bitterness in our body to cause occurrent pain in the present moment, while the opposite to fear (presumably confidence) brings about occurrent pleasure (*Timaeus* 71a3-71d4). Taken together, I believe that there is good evidence to see Plato as analyzing fear as a kind of anticipatory pain.

The same holds true of Aristotle's discussion, and definition, of fear in the *Rhetoric*. He defines fear as follows:

[T0.5] ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτα ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνεται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

[T0.5] Let fear be some pain or disturbance from the appearance of a future bad, either destructive or painful; for not all bad things are feared, for example if one will be unjust or slow, but rather only those that are capable of great pains or destructions, and these only if they should not appear to be far off but rather close and imminent. For things that are extremely far off <in time> are not feared; for everyone knows that they will die but, because this is not near, they consider it nothing. (*Rhetoric* 2.5.1382a21-27, my translation)

Note that Aristotle defines fear, principally, as a *pain* from the appearance of a *future* bad. This seems like a clear reference to a painful anticipation. On the one hand, Aristotle is explicit that fear itself is a pain, thereby specifying that occurrent affect is intrinsic to fear.²⁰ On the other hand this definition also shows that fear involves an anticipatory component as well. Though he does not use a word in this passage that could be directly translated as 'anticipation' or 'expectation,' he does specify that the pain comes *from* the appearance (φαντασίας) of a *future* bad that is either painful or destructive. Hence, not any appearance of a painful thing causes fear, as for instance the memory of something painful or my present painful sensation of being stabbed in the arm, but only appearances of painful things *as future*. Yet, anticipation itself *just is*

²⁰ Aristotle in general believes that every *pathos* is accompanied by pleasure and/or pain (*Rhetoric* 2.1.1378a19-21).

our ability to take imagined situations as our own potential future prospects. As a result, I believe that there is strong evidence in Aristotle to understand fear as an anticipatory pain.²¹

Yet, if I am correct that anticipatory pain directly motivates us to avoid the prospect anticipated with pain, then it would follow that fear is intrinsically motivating us, pushing us to avoid whatever fearful prospect we painfully anticipate. Now, some recent scholars have struggled to make sense of how fear can motivate us when Aristotle never seems to associate it with a desire. For instance, recently Paula Gottlieb has noted that the discussion of fear does not mention any particular desire being involved in fear. She nonetheless argues that the feelings (*pathê*) include a desire, but not a desire to act ‘in any particular direction’ (Gottlieb 2021, 40).²² In contrast, Aristotle’s omission of desire in his discussion of fear makes sense if it involves a painful anticipation, itself the manifestation of an underlying aversion to bad things, that directly motivates us to avoid what we take to be bad.

I contend that a similar account can be given for other emotions, as I show in Chapter 4. In general, my analysis of Plato’s and Aristotle’s treatment of such emotions helps us recognize that affective anticipation is not the niche, fringe topic that it might initially appear to be. Affective anticipations are rather constituents of the emotions with which we are all intimately familiar with. Indeed, to that extent affective anticipations suffuse our daily existence, bearing out Socrates’ own assertion, in the *Philebus*, that we are ‘forever full of anticipations (ἐλπίδες)

²¹ This passage also helps to show how the notion of ‘active anticipation’ that is relevant to anticipatory affect comes apart from a simple belief about the future. Aristotle grants that everyone knows that they will die, and from this it surely follows that they *believe* that they will die in the future. Yet, because this prospect is taken to be far off and non-imminent they do not fear it. This makes sense if we take the ‘anticipation’ relevant to anticipatory affect to be the *active entertainment* of a prospect, at that moment seriously taking that prospect to be in their own future. The fact that death is far off means that people do not actively anticipate their own deaths as a possible future, and as a result they do not anticipate it in the relevant sense and hence do not fear it. I discuss this matter further in §4.3.2.

²² In contrast, Striker takes Aristotle to distinguish desire from the emotions (*pathê*), pulling apart the cognitive and conative element despite noting that *epithumia* and *orgê* are both classed as a kind of desire and a kind of pathos (Striker 1996, 289).

throughout our lives' (*Philebus*, 39e5-6). It is therefore not unreasonable to hold that virtue itself requires feeling the *right sorts* of affective anticipations, something that is borne out in my final chapter.

§0.3.4: Education in Plato & Aristotle (Chapter 5)

In the final chapter I argue that we can discern a transition in the education of the young to virtue in both Plato and Aristotle, focusing on Plato's *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics* and *Ethics*. Education for both must start by developing the correct *non-rational* affective anticipations. The main mechanism for cultivating such non-rational affective anticipations, defended by both Plato and Aristotle, is *musical education*. Such non-rational affective anticipations are essential in roughly orienting the learners towards love of virtue and hatred of vice and *motivating* them to become virtuous. However, the learners still lack an *understanding* of what they strive for and hence fall short of full virtue. Full virtue, on the contrary, requires the sort of intellectual understanding of good and bad prospects that underlies *rational* affective anticipations. The attainment of this intellectual understanding transforms one's affective anticipations and the emotions constituted by them such that the emotions of the fully virtuous person become, in a sense, *rational*.

To establish these claims with respect to Plato's *Laws*, I first survey Plato's account of musical education in *Laws* I-II. I argue that this can cultivate non-rational affective anticipations by having learners listen and perform in *choral performances*. As we will see in §5.2, Plato believes that participation in these choral performances has a profound effect on one's character, shaping what we find pleasant and painful. I explain how these choral performances can bring about the kind of *sense-perception* and *memories* of virtuous actions that we saw underlie non-rational affective anticipation in §3.2. In §5.3 I turn to argue that the most virtuous and

knowledgeable members of Magnesia, the members of the nocturnal council, have an understanding of virtue's nature that far outstrips the sort of sensory understanding available to the learners. This understanding in turn allows them to transform their affective anticipations, allowing them to look forward to a life of virtue (and to fear a life of vice) in light of understanding *why* that life is good in a way that is not possible for the learners.

In §5.4 I transition to Aristotle, someone who also finds a central role for musical education in the cultivation of non-rational affective anticipations. Looking at his somewhat enigmatic description of musical education in the closing chapters of the *Politics*, I explain how he similarly takes this educative process to bring about non-rational affective anticipations of particular goods and bads, in line with my psychological account of this phenomenon in §3.6. Though Aristotle holds that musical education enables the young to *discern* and *enjoy* virtuous actions and characters, I argue that they can only *inchoately* discern them and that the learners still fall well short of full virtue. In §5.5 we see that the path to full virtue requires *experience* and repeated performance of virtuous actions, assisted by members of one's community who have more understanding, until learners develop for themselves the ability to apply their ethical understanding to bear on their own particular situation. This allows them to correctly grasp certain particular future prospects as good or bad in line with that understanding, in turn underwriting *rational* affective anticipations. I conclude the chapter by looking at two concrete examples of how this transforms the emotional responses as they transition from non-rational affective anticipations in natural virtue to rational affective anticipations in full virtue – the emotions of anger (ὀργή) and emulation (ζήλος).

In the conclusion, I finally justify the title: 'Our Waking Dreams.' I explain the curious and rather remarkable fact that both our authors seem to have used this enigmatic phrase in

connection with anticipation (ἐλπίς), and argue that we can discern the main themes of this dissertation in its use: both the fact that our affective anticipations can, on the one hand, come about through a non-rational process of sensation and memory and move us to action and, on the other hand, the fact that affective anticipations can embody our deepest goals and understanding of what is valuable and worth striving for. I close the dissertation by explaining this connection in more detail and, simultaneously, reflecting on some of the main outcomes from the dissertation.

CHAPTER 1: Plato on the Psychology of Anticipatory Affect & Desire

§1.1: Introduction

Though Plato is not the first ancient Greek philosopher to discuss anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain,²³ he is certainly the first philosopher to leave us a detailed philosophical description and exploration of the concept. The main text in which this occurs is the *Philebus*, in which anticipatory pleasure and pain are described and clearly separated from *occurrent sensory* pleasure and pain based on perceived restorations and destructions. Moreover, anticipatory pleasure and pain are marked out as ‘another kind of pleasure’ (32c3-5).

The *Philebus*’ discussion of anticipatory affect, however, is rather obscure. For one, it depends on the immediately prior discussion of pleasure as an occurrent restoration, an account of pleasure that itself depends on the previous metaphysical discussion in the *Philebus*, a rather esoteric division of ‘all existing things’ into four kinds. Besides the challenging background material, Socrates quickly complicates his initial introduction of anticipatory pleasures and anticipatory pains by introducing at least three different psychological capacities that he says must first be understood before they can investigate anticipatory pleasures: memory, perception, and desire.²⁴ Yet, scholars have also disagreed on how to understand these other psychological faculties.

In this chapter I argue that passages in the *Philebus* suggest that desire, by itself, does not explain motivation. Rather, anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain are necessary to explain

²³ There exist a few fragments attributed to Democritus and Parmenides that explicitly discuss *elpis*. For Democritus, note (DK 68 B58, B176, B185, B222, B287, B292) and for Parmenides see in particular (DK 28 B4). Prodicus’ ‘Choice of Lives’ argument, as reported in Xenophon, also suggests that the pleasant anticipation of the fine is central to a virtuous life (Xenophon *Memorabilia*, 2.1.21-33).

²⁴ Cf. 33c5-11, 34c4-8. As Frede points out, sometimes scholars lose sight of the fact that perception, memory, and desire are discussed *in order* to elucidate anticipatory affect (Frede 1997, 235 fn .24). As I discuss below, my interpretation bears out the close association between these psychological faculties that is suggested by the framing of the inquiry.

pursuit and avoidance. While I claim that desire still plays an ineliminable and essential role in all cases of motivation, as desire determines which things are anticipated with pleasure or pain, I claim that affective anticipation rather than desire is doing the core motivational work – it is the difference maker that explains why someone with a pre-existing desire is actually moving and acting in any given instance. My argument for this claim is as follows. Passages in the *Philebus* suggest that a desire for ϕ is present both in someone who has a clear anticipation of obtaining ϕ and in someone who despairs of attaining ϕ . Yet, in the latter case a desire is present that does not motivate any action at all. In addition to desiring ϕ , I claim that someone must *anticipate* that ϕ is attainable from one's current circumstances to actually be motivated to bring ϕ about, rather than suffer despair. Yet, the *Philebus* suggests that the expectation that the object of desire, ϕ , is possibly attainable in the future is itself a pleasant anticipation. Hence, I argue that it is the pleasant anticipation that explains our motivation to pursue and attain the object of desire. While the text is relatively silent on anticipatory pain, I also suggest that an analogous account likely holds of anticipatory pain insofar as a painful anticipation can motivate us to avoid the things that we are averse to.

In §1.2 I introduce the restoration view of pleasure, as this conception of occurrent pleasure underlies the discussion of the anticipatory affects. In light of the metaphysical section of the *Philebus*, I explain how certain processes are 'restorative' insofar as they restore a creature to its proper 'ensouled form:' whatever arrangement, order, and proportion of its various 'unlimited' constituents is necessary to properly instantiate an organism's nature. These processes give rise to occurrent pleasure when they are perceived. Yet, the very same physical processes that are at times restorative can at other times be destructive when they destroy and damage the 'ensouled form' of the organism. In §1.3 I turn to the passage that introduces

anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain and marks them off as a kind of pleasure and pain that is different from the kind of pleasure and pain that accompanies bodily restorations and destructions.

In §1.4 I claim that, in the *Philebus*, Plato takes someone with a *desire* to be in a painful occurrent state while also ‘grasping’ whatever restorative process will restore the creature to its ensouled form. The ‘grasp’ of the relevant process provides the object of desire, and hence one’s antecedent desire to undergo that process determines that it will be anticipated with pleasure while the contrary process will be anticipated with pain. As we will see, Socrates suggests that this ‘grasp’ occurs through memory based on prior episodes of occurrent sense-perception.

In §1.5 I argue that having a desire for ϕ is compatible with having either an anticipatory pleasure of obtaining ϕ or being in despair of obtaining ϕ . I claim that this suggests that the fact that one has some desire is, by itself, insufficient to explain pursuit behavior towards the object one desires, as desire can be present without pursuit. Instead, the difference maker is anticipatory pleasure or pain. This bears out Socrates’ claim towards the end of his discussion of desire: the rule of the whole animal is the province of soul (35d3). Hence, I claim that a mortal animal’s ‘way of life’ is one that is constantly in between pleasure and pain as it strives to avoid destruction and maintain itself in its proper natural condition: its ensouled form. It is the anticipatory affects, however, that come apart from occurrent bodily processes and counteract them, ruling and guiding animals as a psychological activity.

§1.2: The Background Context to the *Philebus* Discussion of Anticipatory Affect

In this section I explain the restoration view of pleasure that can be found in the *Philebus*. This is often taken to be Plato’s definitive view on the nature of pleasure, though there is some debate as to whether Plato in fact thinks that all mental and psychological pleasures are

restorations of some sort.²⁵ The basic restoration view of pleasure is introduced succinctly by Socrates when he is trying to determine ‘in what kind of thing each of them <pleasure and pain> resides and what kind of condition makes them come to be when they do’ (31b2-4). After claiming that pleasure and pain come to be *in* the mixed class he says the following in answer to the question of what causes pleasure and pain to ‘come to be’:

[T1.1] {ΣΩ.} Λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἀρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.
 {ΠΡΩ.} Πάνυ λέγεις εἰκός.
 {ΣΩ.} Πάλιν δὲ ἀρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀπιούσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι' ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὅτι τάχιστα ῥηθῆναι.

[T1.1] Socrates: What I claim is that when we find the harmony in living creatures disrupted, there will at the same time be a disintegration of their nature and a rise of pain. Protarchus: What you say is very plausible. Socrates: But if the reverse happens, and the harmony is regained and the former nature restored, we have to say that pleasure arises, if we must pronounce only a few words on the weightiest matters in the shortest possible time (31d4-10, translation Frede)²⁶

The destruction of our nature is accompanied by pain, while the restoration of our nature is accompanied by pleasure. Socrates proceeds to give relatively straightforward examples of how this works with thirst and hunger. Indeed, he says that his examples are ‘somehow common to the people and seen all around (τὰ δημόσια που καὶ περιφανῆ; 31e). Moreover, Socrates gets Protarchus to agree that hunger and thirst are both disintegrations and pains (31e6, 31e10).²⁷ On

²⁵ For scholars who believe the restoration account of pleasure should be extended to all pleasures, see Frede 1992, 440-441; Tuozzo 1996, 507-508; Wolfsdorf 2013, 101; Ionescu 2019, 17-21, and van Zoonen 2021, 171. Against this, others deny that the restoration account is meant to be a general account of pleasure in the *Philebus*, including Gosling and Taylor 1982, 140; Carone 2000, 264-270; Fletcher 2014, 118-120; Fletcher 2017, 198-199; Price 2017, 183-184; and Sommerville 2019, 259. Erginel 2019 argues that Plato has a process or restoration view of pleasure, but a state view of pain in which feel pain whenever we are in a non-natural state. For what it is worth, Aristotle partly rejects the restoration view of pleasure on the grounds that it does not seem to accommodate the psychological pleasures of anticipation and memory (*EN* 10.1173b18-20). I wish to remain neutral on this debate.

²⁶ All *Philebus* translations come from Frede 1993 unless otherwise noted. For the Greek text I use John Burnet's OCT edition of the *Philebus*.

²⁷ We'll see that hunger and thirst, here described as ‘pains,’ will later be referred to as ‘appetites’ (*epithumiai*) (34d10-e1). In the *Philebus*, Plato appears to take appetite to be a kind of pain. As I explain later, however, I do not think pains and appetites are identical (contra Evans 2007).

the other hand, eating when hungry and drinking when thirsty are both pleasant and a kind of ‘filling’ (31e8, 32a1). The passage is naturally understood as asserting that pain comes from destructive processes that destroy our nature while pleasure comes from the converse processes that restore it. It is noteworthy that, in these examples, each process of destruction has a correlate, contrary process of restoration. As a result, each specific kind of pain (e.g. the pain of thirst) has a correlate, specific kind of pleasure (e.g. the pleasure of drinking).

Though it is not mentioned here, later on in the *Philebus* Socrates will clarify that only *perceived* restorations and destructions give rise to pleasure and pain. Restorations and destructions that are too ‘small’ or gradual to be perceived ‘escape our notice’ and do not give rise to pleasure or pain (43a10-b6). Only ‘large’ changes, we learn, give rise to such pleasure and pains, no doubt because it is precisely these large changes that we perceive (43c4-6). Though no examples of unperceived restorations are given in the *Philebus*, a similar view is described in the *Timaeus*. There, burns and cuts are given as examples of cases where the intense, perceived destruction is painful while the slow and gradual restorative, healing process is unperceived and therefore not pleasant (*Timaeus* 65a1-b3).

Now, note that a single physical process can, in different circumstances, either restore or destroy our nature. For instance, Socrates says that the ‘unnatural (παρὰ φύσιν) separation (διάκρισις) and dissolution, the affection caused by stifling heat’ is a *painful* destructive process that is opposed to a pleasant process of cooling (32a1-3). Yet, he immediately follows this up with an opposed case where it appears that bodily ‘separation’ caused by heat can be *pleasant*: ‘the unnatural coagulation of the fluids in an animal through freezing is pain, while returning the way back to itself, separating (διακρινόμενων) in accordance with nature (κατὰ φύσιν), is pleasure’ (32a6-8, my translation). Though Socrates does not here say that the pleasant

separation of bodily fluids is caused by warming up, I take this to be the natural interpretation given that it is opposed to an unnatural coagulation caused by freezing (ρίγους). Yet, in that case, the same physical process that was before responsible for pain, separation (διάκρισις) caused by warming up, is now said to be responsible for pleasure. The difference is, of course, that the separation is said to be ‘unnatural’ (παρὰ φύσιν) and destructive when it is painful while it is ‘in accordance with nature’ (κατὰ φύσιν) and restorative when it is pleasant. Therefore, whether a physical process counts as a restoration or not will depend on an animal’s distinctive nature; only that distinctive nature determines whether an animal is currently *too* hot or *too* cold and hence whether undergoing a process of warming will be destructive and painful (in the case where the animal is already too hot) or restorative and pleasant (in the case where the animal is too cold).

Indeed, Socrates makes the dependence of restoration and destruction on an animal’s antecedent nature clear in his final summary of the restoration view of pleasure and the correlate destruction view of pain:

[T1.2] καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.

[T1.2] And, in short, see if the account seems reasonable to you which would say that <after> the ensouled form comes about from the unlimited and the limit according to nature, the very thing which I was talking about in the preceding <discussion>, whenever this <i.e. the ensouled form> should be destroyed, the destruction is pain, but the way to their own essence, this return back of everything is pleasure. (32a8-b4, my translation)

This is supposed to be a generalized outline of the restoration view of pleasure and pain.²⁸ The process of destruction is identified as pain, while the restoration of one’s nature is identified as pleasure. Yet, what determines whether any given process is one of restoration or destruction?

²⁸ indeed, Protarchus’s answer makes this clear: ‘Let this be so, for it seems to me to hold as some kind of outline (τύπον)’ (32b5).

As we saw before, the very same physical processes can count as either of the two, depending on the circumstance of the creature. Our present passage clarifies that restoration and destruction are indexed to a creature's proper state: its 'ensouled form' (ἐμψυχον εἶδος) that can be either destroyed or restored. Moreover, the restoration of a creature's 'ensouled form' is glossed as the 'way to its own essence (οὐσίαν).' The destruction of a creature's 'ensouled form' should therefore be understood as a creature falling away from its own essence as an embodied creature, while restoring that form is returning to it. This passage should also be coordinated with our first introduction to the restoration view of pleasure, in which restoration was said to occur when 'harmony is regained and the former nature restored' (35d8-9). Since this latter text describes restoration as leading to 'harmony' and a creature's 'nature' rather than its 'ensouled form,' I assume that a creature's 'harmony,' 'nature,' and 'ensouled form' are closely related terms that can be inter-changed. Likewise, I assume that a creature's 'ensouled form' or 'nature' determines whether any given processes constitutes restoration or destruction.

Yet, the phrases 'ensouled form' and the 'harmony of a living organism' might strike us as somewhat occult. What precisely is an 'ensouled form'? The above 'outline' makes it clear that this must be understood in light of the previous metaphysical discussion in the *Philebus*: the ensouled form comes about from 'the unlimited and the limit,' the 'very thing spoken of in the preceding discussion.' Hence, a full understanding of the restoration view of pleasure will need to take into account the background metaphysical discussion of the limit, the unlimited, and the mixture of the two.

Though fully discussing the details of the thorny 'metaphysical' section of the *Philebus* is beyond the scope of this project, the idea, at rough approximation, appears to be that organisms can be conceived as 'mixtures' of 'unlimited' (ἄπειρον) constituents with precise 'limits' that are

understood as numerical ratios. Socrates claims that the class of the unlimited contains ‘whatever sort would appear to us to be able to become both more and less’ (24e7-8), examples being the hotter and colder, the high and low, and the quicker and slower. Following Harte, I take the distinguishing feature of the unlimited to be the fact that they lie upon different qualitative continua ‘scales’ on which relative but indeterminate degrees can be distinguished, each scale being determined by a pair of contraries such as ‘high’ and ‘low,’ ‘hot’ and ‘cold,’ and so on.²⁹ In contrast, the class of the ‘limit’ apparently refers to precise numerical ratios, examples being ‘the equal’ (1 :1), ‘the double’ (2:1) and ‘everything else which should be number to number or measure to measure’ (25a8-b1).³⁰ Finally, the ‘mixture’ is that class arrived at by mixing the proper limit with the class of the unlimited, a process that ‘stops the contraries having differences with each other, making them commensurate and harmonious after putting in number’ (25d11-e2). The proper limit being imposed on elements along this continua scale give rise to ‘every fine (καλὰ) thing’ (26b1), for instance Socrates claims that ‘the correct combination (ὀρθὴ κοινωνία) of opposites can establish health’ (25e7-8), that the correct combination of ‘high and low’ gives rise to music (26a2-4), and likewise describes how the (presumably also ‘correct’) limit being applied to frost and heat ‘removes the “very excessive” and the unlimited and produces the measured and the commensurate’ (τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἄμα σύμμετρον ἀπηργάσατο. 26a7-8), bringing about the seasons in the year.

Though Socrates does not mention living creatures or ‘ensouled forms’ during the metaphysical portion of the *Philebus*, I believe that even this brief overview allows us to better understand his reference to a creature’s ‘ensouled form’ that ‘comes about from the unlimited

²⁹ CF. (Harte 2002, 178-191).

³⁰ See for instance Gosling 1975, 92. Hackforth 1945, 42. However, both note an ambiguity as to whether the limit is the numerical ratios themselves or rather the *things* that are limited according to those ratios.

and the limit according to nature.’ To start, it is likely that an animal is subject to many different opposed, contrary processes that seem to move them along continua scales in the class of the ‘unlimited.’ Blood, for instance, is a fluid that can be either more or less coagulated. Likewise, flesh can be either warmed or cooled. It does not seem like too much of a stretch to suppose that Plato took flesh to need a *precise* ratio of hot-to-cold in order to be flesh: warm flesh too much and it burns and disintegrates, cool it past the freezing point and it will freeze and shatter. In each case the flesh is destroyed. A ‘proper ratio,’ or ‘limit,’ is needed for the mixture of hot and cold elements to give rise to flesh, as opposed to an unfortunate ‘unmixed jumble.’³¹ Plato conceives, I suggest, an entire living organism as a complex mixture of various kinds of constituents from the class of the unlimited.³² The ‘ensouled form’ likely refers to the particular combination of the ‘correct’ limit with the unlimited constituents that gives rise to the physical being of a particular animal. Deviate from the proper limits, however, and the ‘being’ of the creature would start to disintegrate until it is completely destroyed.³³ These background metaphysical suppositions of

³¹ Cf. *Philebus* 64d9-e3, in which a combination of things lacking ‘measure’ is said to not really be a ‘mixture’ at all, but rather to be an ‘unmixed jumble.’ For more on the metaphysical implications of this claim, see discussion in Harte. Though Harte does not discuss *organisms* as examples of mixtures, this coheres with her general view that mixtures involve unlimited constituents standing in the proper relation to each other within *structured* wholes (Harte 2002, 191-195).

³² Or as Frede helpfully explains, a ‘mixture of mixtures’ (Frede 1993, xxxvii). We are ‘mixtures’ of bones and flesh, but those things are themselves mixtures of other constituents. It is again helpful to think of ‘mixtures’ as properly structured wholes: my body is not just a heap of bones and flesh, but rather those elements standing in the proper relation to one another within a structured whole. Seen in this light, it does not seem unreasonable to think that this Phileban discussion of the limit, unlimited, and mixtures is a pre-cursor to Aristotelian hylomorphism.

³³ This in fact corresponds well to the *Timaeus* account of disease. As Timaeus explains: ‘when any of these unnatural occurrences and changes take place, bodily parts that used to be cold become hot, or those that are dry go on to become moist, and so with light and heavy, too. They undergo all sorts of changes in all sorts of ways. Indeed, it is our view that only when that which arrives at or leaves a particular bodily part is the same as that part, consistent, uniform, and *in proper proportion* with it, will the body be allowed to remain stable, sound, and healthy. On the other hand, anything that causes offence by passing *beyond these bounds* as it arrives or departs will bring on a multiplicity of altered states, and an infinity of diseases and degenerations’ (*Timaeus* 82a7-b7, translation. Zeyl, emphasis mine). Though a healthy body and a diseased body are both constantly changing, in a healthy body the changing parts maintain the proper proportion (the same ‘limit’ according to the language in the *Philebus*’ division of being) as the parts they replace, while disease is marked by deviant changes along continua scales (unnatural changes from hot to cold, dry to moist, and so on).

mixture, therefore, can explain and ground talk of a creature's underlying nature being restored or destroyed.

§1.3: Anticipatory Pleasure and Anticipatory Pain (*Philebus* 32b9-c2)

We can now understand Plato's restoration theory of pleasure and destruction theory of pain in light of the background metaphysical theory in the *Philebus*. All living organisms require particular combinations of limit and unlimited. For instance, flesh is one such combination that requires the right degree of cold to warmth and the right degree of softness to hardness. As I argued, each mixture is what it is in virtue of having the 'proper' limit that will make its unlimited constituents commensurate and harmonious. Yet, deviations from this limit can occur, deviations that, since they deviate from the limit that constitutes the being of that creature, give rise to pain when perceived. A restoration of the creature, which is nothing other than a process that changes the unlimited constituents such that they approach the proper limit and 'restore' that creature's being, sustains a creature's continued existence and can give rise to pleasure when perceived.

The account of anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain is introduced immediately after the restoration view of pleasure. Protarchus correctly takes this to be 'another form of pleasure and pain' (ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἕτερον εἶδος, 32c3-4) that comes about in the *soul* separately from the body. Socrates' description of that pleasure and pain is as follows:

[T1.3] ΣΩ. Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπίζομενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

[T1.3] Socrates: Well then establish the expectation of the soul itself of these sort of affections <as a kind of pleasure and pain>, on the one hand the anticipation of pleasant things is pleasant and encouraging, but the <anticipation> of painful things is fearful and painful. (32b9-c2, my translation)

I have already discussed this passage in the introduction (T0.2). As mentioned, this passage establishes that anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain refer to a pleasure or pain (a pleasure or pain ‘of the soul’) that is due to an *anticipation* of some future pleasure or pain. Note Socrates’ comment that the expectation is ‘of the soul itself’: anticipatory pleasure and pain are, unlike the previous sort of pleasure, distinctly *psychological*.³⁴ They are not in the same way caused by the perception of occurrent bodily processes of restoration or destruction. Indeed, Socrates emphasizes the fact that anticipatory pleasures and pains are distinct from pleasures and pains from perceived bodily restorations and destructions by noting that the anticipation can be ‘*of these sorts of affections,*’ that is, of the restorative and destructive bodily processes that give rise to the first kind of pleasure and pain that Socrates has just discussed.³⁵

However, Socrates says very little about anticipatory pleasures, and, notably, nothing at all about anticipation itself. Instead, Socrates claims that to fully understand anticipatory pleasures and pains they must first investigate memory and perception (33c5-11) and, later, says that they must also investigate desire (34c4-8). The implication is that anticipatory affects depend on these other faculties for their own operations. I believe this dependence is borne out in two examples of anticipatory pleasure and pain that are discussed later at 35e7-36c1.

³⁴ Of course, all pleasure and pain is in some sense psychological for Plato, as even basic restorative pleasures depend on the *perception* of bodily processes. Plato takes perception (as we will soon see) to involve the soul being affected along with the body. Of course, restorative pleasures’ dependence on the perception of the body also entails that they are dependent on bodily processes themselves.

³⁵ It is worth noting that Socrates says that he introduces these pleasures and pains so that they can find pleasure ‘unmixed with pain,’ and therefore more easily judge from an instance of pure pleasure whether the ‘whole class of pleasures should be welcomed rather than just *some* of its instances (32c6-d6). Anticipatory pleasure arguably fails to help towards this goal, as it can co-occur (and mix) with bodily pain (cf. 36b4-9, 47c1-d3). Socrates later discusses pure pleasures of a wholly different sort at 51b3ff. Indeed, I take it that we can also have anticipatory pleasures that are directed at future *pure* pleasures, and not *only* those that are directed at pleasant bodily processes of restoration. Pure pleasures in fact arguably count as a kind of restoration (cf. 51b5-7), though obviously of a kind quite different than the bodily restorations that are the focus earlier on in the dialogue.

§1.4: Desire and the Object of Desire

As mentioned, the *Philebus* suggests that anticipatory pleasure (and pain) depend on memory, perception, and desire. In this section I elucidate these connections and, in particular, argue that having a desire entails a ‘grasp’ of whatever restorative processes will restore us and, hence, that our desires partly determine which processes will be anticipated with pleasure or pain. The arguments devoted to various psychological faculties that run from 32c-36c suggest that this ‘grasp’ of the restorative process is accomplished through *memory* of past sense-perceptions, though in Chapter 3 I suggest that *reasoning* can also furnish this grasp.

§1.4.1: The (Brief) Psychology of Perception & Memory

In order to investigate anticipatory pleasures, Socrates says that they must first investigate perception and memory, and he proceeds to give a very brief and schematic account of both. Perception is described as an ‘affection’ (πάθημα) of the body that penetrates both body and soul and causes a vibration (σεισμόν) that is ‘both particular and common to each of them’ (ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἑκάτέρῳ, 33d5-6).³⁶ In the same vein, he later says that perception occurs when ‘the soul and body are jointly affected and moved by one and the same affection’ (34a3-4, translation Frede).³⁷ It is somewhat amusing that Socrates so blithely discusses a single affection and motion that affects both body and soul, spilling no ink over the problem of soul-body interaction that so vexes later philosophers.³⁸ However, this general account coheres with other

³⁶ They are contrasted with other affections that are ‘extinguished’ (κατασβεννύμενα) in the body before reaching the soul (33d2-4).

³⁷ Note that this is a very minimal account of perception. It, for one, makes no reference to sensory organs and does not attempt to explain differing sense modalities, as occurs in the *Timaeus*. With respect to the *Timaeus*, Ian McCready-Flora has defended a very interesting view in which sensation is distinct from affect and the emotions in virtue of being ‘fine-grained’ (sensations have orderly, causal connections to the Platonic elements, the fundamental items of the physical world) and ‘immediate’ (sensations are not mediated by some other mental state) (McCready-Flora, 2018).

³⁸ Indeed, it is puzzling given Plato’s insistence that the soul is *incorporeal* in dialogues such as the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. Indeed, Renehan claims that Plato was the first Greek philosopher to develop any consistent notion of the ‘incorporeal’ at all (Renehan 1980). However, even there Plato takes the idea of soul-body interaction for granted:

claims made later in the *Philebus* and parallel discussions of perception in the *Timaeus*. Namely, later in the *Philebus* Socrates describes how certain restorations of our body escape our notice and are unperceived because they are too small (imagine a small cut that gradually heals itself over the course of several weeks). In light of our current passage, such small motions are among those that are ‘extinguished’ in the body before reaching the soul (33d2-3). Crucially, these unperceived restorations do not give rise to pleasure (43b-c).³⁹

After discussing perception, Socrates immediately turns to memory. Unfortunately, Socrates says even less about memory than he does about perception. He does, however, endorse a description of it as the ‘preservation of perception’ (σωτηρίαν αἰσθήσεως, 34a10). Socrates also introduces a distinction between memory (μνήμη) and recollection (ἀνάμνησις) (34b2). However, while he describes recollection, he says nothing further about memory. Socrates says that recollection occurs when the soul ‘as much as possible recovers by itself, without the body, the things that it had once suffered together with the body’ (34b6-8, my translation). Moreover, recollection occurs whenever a memory of some perception or something learnt (μαθήματος) has been lost but is then later recovered in the soul through the soul’s own activity (34b10-c2).

Taken in conjunction with the previous description of perception as a single motion that affects both body and soul, I suggest the following interpretation. The motion in the body and soul that gives rise to perception can persist in the soul, and this persisting motion in the soul becomes a *memory* when the correlate motion in the body ceases. For instance, this morning I

humans obsessed with bodily pleasures and desires during life become ghoulish shades upon death because their souls are ‘impure’ and mixed with body, while the philosopher in contrast separates his soul from the body as much as possible and goes off ‘pure’ to the afterlife (*Phaedo* 81b-d). Moreover, Plato seems open to even more complicated views with respect to the ‘materiality’ of the soul. So, for instance, in the *Timaeus* we find a distinction between ‘immortal’ soul and ‘mortal’ soul (69bff). Karfik suggests that ‘mortal soul’ is responsible for sense-perception and affected by bodily things, while ‘divine’ or ‘immortal soul’ is responsible for thought but not itself (directly) affected by bodily things (Karfik 2005).

³⁹ As mentioned earlier, the claim that pleasant restorations and painful destructions are only those *large enough to be perceived* is also made in the *Timaeus* (64c8-65b1).

perceived the bagel that I ate for breakfast, and this perception was constituted by a motion that jointly affected my body (my eyes) and my soul. Even though my body is no longer affected in any way by that bagel, I presently *remember* the bagel that I ate for breakfast since that motion still exists in my soul. On the flip-side, I have *lost* the memory of what I ate for dinner on Christmas day, 2022: no motion persists in my soul from that day. However, I can *recollect* and regain this memory by thinking about that past Christmas holiday (that is, through an activity proper to my soul alone). For instance, I recall that I was visiting my parents that day, that they were in the process of moving, that we went for Chinese food since they had packed away the kitchenware, and so on. Recollection therefore would differ from memory insofar as it is a process by which we can *recover* memories that we no longer have ‘present’ before our mind.⁴⁰

One point is worth emphasizing before moving on. According to this quick account of perception and memory, note that memories are essentially remnants of perception. It is the preservation of a perceptual motion in the soul alone. This has some implication for the extent to which memory is ‘representational.’⁴¹ Namely, I want to point out that memory, as presented at this point in the dialogue, would seem to have no representational ability (and no, for instance, semantic content) beyond that required for bare perception. It is literally a preserved motion that is ‘*re-presented*’: the same motion that constituted the earlier perception is retained within the

⁴⁰ Of course, we might wonder about the extent to which this brief discussion of recollection coheres with that given in other dialogues (such as the *Meno*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Phaedo*) in which recollection has a more important theoretical role. One difference is that Socrates says we recollect things that the soul experienced *with the body* (34b6), while in other dialogues it is stated that we recollect the Forms, rather than past bodily experiences. Regardless, it is interesting to note that this distinction between memory, as being based on sense-perception, and recollection, as being the soul’s own activity, perhaps roughly anticipate Aristotle’s own distinction between a perceptual memory and the exclusively rational *recollection* (*Mem.* 453a5-13). Though, Aristotle does insist, perhaps contra Plato, that recollection is ‘corporeal’ (*Mem.* 453a14-15).

⁴¹ Harte, for instance, takes memory to be a representational faculty: we will see that she claims that memory ‘involves a preserved representation of the filling in question <i.e. the target of a desire>’ (Harte 2014, 53).

soul.⁴² This has implications for pleasure and pain: the pleasant (and painful) perceived restorations (and destructions) can be ‘re-presented’ through memory in the literal sense that the psychological aspect of those motions (*qua* perceived) is once again present within the soul.

§1.4.2: The Psychology of Desire

I turn now to Socrates’ discussion of desire, or appetite.⁴³ Socrates’ analysis of appetite (ἐπιθυμία) flows from his views on restoration and the metaphysics of ensouled organisms that I discussed earlier. On that view, the bodies of ensouled organisms are harmonious mixtures of unlimited constituents. A creature’s nature or ‘ensouled form,’ I suggested, is determined by some set of ‘proper limits’ that are imposed on the unlimited, indeterminate constituents that make it up. I tentatively suggested that bone and our other material components need to have the ‘right’ degree of firmness and softness, must have the ‘right’ temperature, and so on. Destructive processes, such as thirst and hunger, cause an organism to deviate from those proper limits and to be less perfectly ‘mixed’; such processes give rise to pain when perceived. According to my understanding, Socrates believes that desire is the faculty that allows organisms to ‘fasten on to’ the non-occurrent restorative process that would restore their nature. Desire is therefore partly responsible for keeping an organism alive.

⁴² Contra, therefore, the view of Thein who claims that memories ‘are already propositional beliefs,’ or *logoi* (Thein 2012, 122). Perhaps some memories are propositionally structured, but this goes beyond the basic content of memory as a preserved sense-perception that is explicated in our current passage. We will see that Aristotle endorses a similar stance on the relation of memory to perception: memory depends on *phantasia*, which is itself a kind of ‘weak perception’ (αἴσθησις τις ἀσθενής) that remains after the original perceptual stimulus is no longer present (*Rhetoric* I.11.1370a28-29).

⁴³ For the sake of consistency with later chapters on Aristotle I translate ‘ἐπιθυμία’ as ‘appetite’ rather than desire. As we will see, Aristotle takes desire (ορεξις) to have three species: appetite, *thumos*, and wish. Plato, however, makes no such lexical distinction between different kinds of desire (though, the tripartite division of soul in *Republic* IV attributes distinct desires to each part of the soul). While Plato’s examples in this section of the *Philebus* are in fact typical of appetite in the Aristotelian sense (appetite for food and drink), I take the discussion to explicate desires more generally, rather than appetites narrowly construed.

The examples of appetites that Socrates focuses on makes it apparent that his analysis of desire draws on the earlier discussion of restoration and destruction. Socrates says that ‘hunger, thirst, and many other things of this sort’ are appetites (34d10-e1). He says, moreover, that when we call someone ‘thirsty’ we are saying that someone is ‘getting empty’ (κενοῦται; 34e11) and that thirst is an appetite not for drink, but rather *for filling with drink* (πληρώσεως πόματος; 35a1). This is significant, as Socrates clearly associates thirst with the *destructive processes* that were said to give rise to pains when perceived. Indeed, during the earlier discussion of restorative pleasures Socrates claimed that thirst and appetites simply *are* pains (31e6-32a1).⁴⁴ The move to clarify the object of the appetite, *filling* with drink rather than drink simpliciter, also clarifies that the appetite is directed at a restorative process that is contrary to the occurrently experienced destructive process. As we saw, such restorative processes are precisely the sorts of processes that will be pleasant when perceived. Though Socrates only runs through the single example of ‘thirst,’ it seems natural that other desires would be analyzed on the same model: someone who is freezing would desire the contrary, restorative process of warming, while someone who is being cut would desire the contrary process in which his wound would be healed.

The fact that the appetite is ‘of filling’ is significant. From this Socrates states the following:

[T1.4] {ΣΩ.} Πληρώσεώς γ' ἄρα πῆ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν ἐφάπτοιο.

⁴⁴ Hence, Evans takes all (bodily) pains to be desires, and believes that whatever is true of desires in this passage is also true of bodily pains in general (Evans 2007, 87-88). I prefer the reading of, for instance, Ogihara, who rightly points out that we can distinguish conceptually between the occurrent pain aspect of a desire and the orientation towards the contrary process of filling (Ogihara 2019, 118-119). Likewise, as Harte describes with respect to 35a6-10, someone who becomes empty for the first time feels the pain of destruction but is unable to have a desire for filling in virtue of being unable to ‘grasp’ filling through perception or memory (Harte 2014, 49).

[T1.4] Socrates: Therefore, something of what belongs to the thirsty person would in some way grasp filling. (35b6-7, my translation)

This passage is quite vague. In particular, the central verb, ‘to grasp (ἐφάπτεσθαι) is not explained.⁴⁵ I take the general philosophical point to be relatively straightforward, however. When we desire filling, there must be something within us, such as a representation or awareness of filling, that explains why our desire is of *filling* with drink as opposed to any other process, such as sitting or dancing. We can understand why Plato would think that a necessary pre-requisite of any goal-directed activity is our mind somehow ‘grasping’ the object of our desire that we are aiming at.

After this follows a very quick argument that aims to show that the soul, through memory, is what ‘grasps’ filling in the person who has an appetite. According to Harte’s reconstruction (who translates ἐφάπτεσθαι as ‘to fasten on to,’ rather than ‘to grasp’), the argument runs as follows:

- 1) What is desired when a person thirsts is the opposite of that person’s current bodily experience.
- 2) When a person who thirsts desires filling (desires to become full) some part of the person who thirsts must ‘fasten on to’ (*ephaptesthai*) filling. (35b1-8)
- 3) The body of the thirsty person, since it is becoming empty, cannot be what fastens on to filling (to becoming full). (35b9)
- 4) The remaining alternative is that it is the soul of the thirsty person that fastens on to filling (to becoming full), doing so by memory. (35b11-c2)⁴⁶

Note that (1) follows from the general framework of restoration and destruction: someone undergoing a destructive process desires the contrary restorative process. Though (2) is unargued

⁴⁵ Note that I choose to translate ἐφάπτεσθαι as ‘grasp.’ I believe that this is a good translation as the Greek word ἐφάπτω is similar to the English word ‘grasp’ insofar as each has a well-attested use in both physical contexts, meaning to ‘lay hold of,’ and cognitive contexts. For the latter, cf. LSJ II.2: ‘lay hold of or reach with the mind’ attested to in other Platonic dialogues such as (*Symposium* 212a) and (*Phaedrus* 253a). Moreover, also cf. *The Cambridge Greek Lexicon* entry: ‘attain (w. the mind or other cognitive faculty), grasp, apprehend’ (Diggle et. al. 2021, 637). A danger of using this translation is that ‘grasp’ when used in a cognitive sense is a success term, while it is not clear that there is any such implication to the cognitive uses of ἐφάπτω.

⁴⁶ Harte 2014, 46

for in our text, I briefly discussed the rationale above that supports Harte's argument. There must be some 'grasp' of the object of desire that can explain our goal-directed activity towards that process. According to Harte, the argument for (3) relies on an implicit further commitment: we can grasp filling *only* through *either* perception *or* memory.⁴⁷ Perception through the body, however, is ruled out insofar as it requires the occurrent experience of the process in question. However, people who desire filling do not desire a process that their bodies are currently undergoing; they in fact desire a process that is *contrary* to the one they are currently undergoing. Since perception is ruled out, we are left with (4): the soul grasps filling by itself. Even though the people desiring filling do not grasp filling through their occurrent perception, they are able to grasp it through a *memory* of being filled in the past. The memory, in turn, allows them to orient themselves towards filling and to pursue filling with drink as a future goal.

Socrates concludes this argument by claiming that the involvement of memory in desire demonstrates that the *soul* is what rules and guides an animal. As he says:

[T1.5] {ΣΩ.} Ἡ δ' ὁρμή γε ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ παθήματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὔσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων

[T1.5] Socrates: The impulse, then, that drives it <i.e a living creature> towards the opposite of the affections indicates an existing *memory* of the contraries to those affections. (35c12-14, translation Frede modified).

The impulses of living creatures towards the contrary processes that will restore and maintain their nature require a *memory* of those contraries within a creature's soul. Psychological memory's guidance of an animal's impulses explains why the 'rule over the whole animal is the

⁴⁷ Harte finds support for this claim in the discussion of 35a6-10: someone who becomes empty for the first time is said to have no way of 'grasping' filling through either perception or memory. She says such a person 'is to be understood as someone who does not experience desire, but is merely pained' (Harte 2014, 49). If lacking a prior perception or memory of filling entails that we lack a 'grasp' of filling, the passage would consequently seem to imply that our 'grasp' of the object of desire necessarily comes from either perception or memory. In chapter 3 I later suggest that other passages in the *Philebus* imply that reasoning can also furnish the relevant 'grasp.' This does not undermine Socrates' argument, as reasoning is also an activity of our souls.

domain of the soul' (35d3). Though explicit mention of pleasure and pain is absent in the *Philebus* discussion of desire, we saw that desire was first associated with painful destructive processes while the memory leading the animal is of a contrary restorative, and hence pleasant, process. In conjunction with the preceding discussion of perception and memory, we can infer that my past perceptions of pleasant restorations create memories of those pleasant restorations. Those memories of past pleasures in turn furnish the 'grasp' of restorative processes that provides the content of my desires, the result being that my desires will be directed at whatever pleasant processes I experienced in the past that put an end to the relevant destructive process that triggered the desire.⁴⁸ Moreover, it is noteworthy that Socrates concludes this discussion by emphasizing that what does the 'driving' and 'leading' is not desire itself, but rather the *memory* that such desire requires. I return to this point in the next section.

However, there is a puzzle for this account of desire. If *memory* is required to somehow 'grasp' the sort of restorative processes that are the objects of desire, then does it follow that newborn infants who lack memories of past restorations are incapable of forming desires? Interestingly, Plato seems to have noticed this worry in the following passage, though his verdict on the case is somewhat unclear.

[T1.6] {ΣΩ.} Τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἔστιν ὁπόθεν εἴτ' αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτ' ἂν εἴτε μνήμη, τούτου ὁ μήτ' ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήτ' ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πώποτε ἔπαθεν;
{ΠΡΩ.} Καὶ πῶς;

⁴⁸ Hence, the desire is of whatever pleasant restorative process countered the current *pain* that triggers the relevant desire, not any random pleasure whatsoever. I will not desire the pleasure of watching an episode of *Columbo* when I am dying of thirst in the desert. So, though we can agree with Tuozzo that the memory need not be of being restored *as such* (because only a doctor or natural philosopher is aware that pleasant warmth or coolness, for instance, causes bodily restorations due to the concomitant coagulation or dissolution of internal bodily fluids), we should resist his further claim that desire is merely of 'oneself in pleasant conditions and feeling pleasure' (Tuozzo 1996, 505). It is crucial that the pleasure is linked to being in the *right sort* of 'pleasant conditions,' namely the restoration that will counter-act the occurrent pain. In answer to Tuozzo's worry that most people have no awareness of restoration as such, it seems possible to remember drinking water as a pleasant process that cured the pain of thirst without having a *further awareness* of the detailed nature of the physiological restoration that gave rise to the pleasure.

{ΣΩ.} Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν.
 {ΠΡΩ.} Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
 {ΣΩ.} Οὐκ ἄρα ὃ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψῇ γάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὁ δ' ἐπιθυμεῖ
 πληρώσεως.

[T1.6] Socrates: So what? Is there anywhere, either from memory or from perception, whence the person *first being emptied* could grasp filling, <grasping> something that he does not experience in the current time and <that> he has never before experienced?

Protarchus: How would he do it?

Socrates: But the person desiring desires *something*, we said.

Protarchus: How could this not be case?

Socrates: Therefore, he does not desire that which he suffers, for while he thirsts, this <being> an emptying, he rather desires filling. (35a6-b2, my translation)

This passage is puzzling because Socrates casts doubt on how anyone ‘first being emptied’, presumably babies, could desire filling due to the fact that they lack memories and perceptions of filling. Yet as we have seen, he goes on to argue that memory is what directs the soul towards filling. Most scholars therefore infer that babies without any memories of restoration do not, strictly speaking, experience *desire* at all but are instead merely pained.⁴⁹ It is only after they experience particular pleasant restorations that they can come to desire restorations of that sort. Against this, however, it has also been argued that human beings are implanted with innate, pre-natal memories of pleasant restorations that allow them to grasp and thereby desire restorations immediately upon being born.⁵⁰ No matter what we decide with respect to the desires of the people ‘first being emptied,’ however, it is clear that Plato’s general contention in this stretch of

⁴⁹ Such is the verdict of (Harte 2014, 49). See also (Frede 1997, 236) and (Gosling 1975, 104-105). This sort of analysis seems supported by the discussion, in the *Laws*, of nurses who attempt to discover what newly born children desire (τίνος ἐπιθυμεῖ) by observing babies’ reactions to what is offered to them. The children react with either a cry of distress or a pleased silence (*Laws* 7.792a). The Athenian emphatically denies, however, that nurses should always try to ‘please’ the babies, as doing so will corrupt them and cultivate bad habits (*Laws* 7.792d-e). Arguably, the thought goes that we should not describe a nurse who correctly refrains from ‘indulging’ a child with luxury as *opposing* that child’s desires, but rather as *forming* those desires by seeing to it that the child only experiences the ‘proper’ restorations (i.e. pleasures) in each situation. Surely no child is born with a pre-existing desire to watch baby shark, though they might be pleased when first presented with it and form a consequent memory-based desire for more baby shark after the fact. Plato might think that a child not indulged with luxuries when young will not desire them when old, lacking perceptual experience of those things.

⁵⁰ This has recently been argued by Naoya Iwata, who argues that ‘perceptual experiences of disintegrative pains and restorative pleasures from which our desire for nourishment ultimately derives were incorporated into the appetitive part of our soul at the birth of mankind’ (Iwata 2018, 209).

argument is that someone with a desire grasps the relevant restorative process through some sort of memory, either an innate memory or one based off an experience had while alive.

§1.5: Anticipatory Affect and Motivation in *Philebus* 35e2-36c2

I've already mentioned that Socrates claims to discuss perception, memory, and desire in order to clarify anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain. That said, anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain seem to drop out entirely in the intervening discussion. It is only at the very end, 35e2-36c2, that they re-enter the stage. I claim that this brief discussion of anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain provides a sketch of how Plato thinks anticipatory affect depends on, and relates to, perception, memory, and desire. I claim that desire for the restorative process does not explain motivation for the object of desire, as that desire is present in someone suffering a two-fold pain who is not motivated to obtain that object.⁵¹ In contrast, someone who has a 'clear hope' rejoices and is motivated to attain the object they desire. I claim that our passage, in addition, supports refining the earlier claim that *memory* drives and leads an animal towards the object of desire. In fact, anticipation leads the animal towards that state. As we will see, we anticipate the desired restorative process *through* a memory of undergoing that process in the past. Memory is only efficacious when it occurs in such an anticipation. Later, in chapter 3, we will see that reasoning can take the place of memories in fixing the object of desire.

After discussing desire, Socrates says that the argument appears to show 'a certain form of life' (βίου γὰρ εἰδός τι) in the 'filling and emptying and whatever else concerns the preservation and destruction of living animals' (Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τέ ἐστι τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν; 35e2-3, my translation), a life where the animal

⁵¹ The fact that 'desire,' as discussed by Socrates in this passage, is not inherently motivational is already noted by Gosling: 'One thing is fairly clear from the present passage, and that is that what one desires is not thereby what one pursues, nor do we have any general analysis of the notion of wanting' (Gosling 1975, 104). Yet, Gosling does not go on to attribute a motivational role to affective anticipation.

is pained or pleased according to the destructive and restorative changes it respectively undergoes. As discussed, such changes either bring an animal towards or away from its ensouled form. Socrates then asks Protarchus about someone who is ‘in between’ (ἐν μέσῳ) such affections, a state that he describes as follows:

[T1.7] {ΣΩ.} Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῆ, μεμνηται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων <ῶν> γενομένων παύοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνης, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω· τί τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;

[T1.7] Socrates: On the one hand it is pained because of the experience (πάθος), but on the other hand it remembers (μεμνηται) the pleasant things that would put a stop to the suffering were they to come about, yet it is not yet being filled <with them>. What then? Should we say or should we not say that it is in between the affections? (35e9-36a1, my translation)

Note that there is no mention of ‘appetite’ or desire in this passage. However, we have a clear reference to a *memory* of the pleasant things that would put a stop to the pain that the creature is suffering. This sort of memory of a restorative process is exactly what was previously described as underlying all desires, as memories of this sort enabled our ‘grasp’ of the object of desire. Because of this, I take it that Socrates here describes a creature that remembers *and desires* the pleasant things that would stop its suffering, but which is not yet actually undergoing the ‘filling’ that it aims at. In what sense is the creature ‘in between the affections,’ as Socrates claims? I take the point to be that the creature is not simply undergoing a destructive process but that it is also at the same time remembering (and desiring) restoration and fulfillment. It is therefore ‘in between’ a destructive process and a restorative process, undergoing destruction but psychologically ‘grasping’ restoration and thereby being ready to counteract the physical process that it is undergoing.

Socrates asks whether the creature suffering pain but remembering (and, I argued, *desiring*) the contrary pleasant restoration ‘wholly suffers or is pained,’ to which Protarchus responds that it suffers some kind of ‘two-fold pain’ (διπλῇ τινὶ λύπῃ), on the one hand suffering

due to the affection in the body, on the other hand suffering a psychological pain of ‘some longing of expectation’ (προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ) (36a5-6). Protarchus’s use of expectation (προσδοκίας) is significant, as it recalls the discussion from earlier in the dialogue in which anticipatory pleasure and pain were themselves said to be an expectation (προσδόκημα) of the soul (32c1).⁵² Protarchus’s remark therefore serves to link the current discussion back with the stated topic of the entire section: anticipatory pleasures and anticipatory pains.

Socrates, however, disputes Protarchus’ contention that the person suffering a destructive process while remembering a pleasant restoration experiences a ‘two-fold’ pain. Instead, he distinguishes two cases. In the first case someone is ‘emptying’ (that is, undergoing a destructive process) but also has a clear anticipation (ἐν ἐλπίδι φανεροῦ) of being filled (36a8-9).⁵³ This ‘clear anticipation’ of being filled, taken in conjunction with the earlier comment that the person wants to be filled with the ‘pleasant things’ that would put a stop to the pain, imply that such a person is anticipating certain *future pleasures*. I will call this first case ‘clear anticipation.’⁵⁴ It is

⁵² Granted, προσδόκημα is a different word than προσδοκία, but I take them to be essentially synonymous. In fact, the word προσδόκημα only occurs five times in the entire TLG corpus.

⁵³ Frede translates this phrase as ‘in clear **hope** of being filled’ (Frede 1993). Though that is certainly a correct translation of the Greek phrase, recall the discussion from the Introduction on ἐλπίς, a word that can mean either ‘hope’ or simply ‘expectation/anticipation.’ I’ve opted for the latter sense here, as it picks up on Protarchus’ earlier use of προσδοκίας and also matches with my earlier translation of ἐλπίζόμενον as ‘anticipating’ at 32c1.

⁵⁴ James Warren claims that the phrase ‘clear anticipation’ is ambiguous between two readings: 1) ‘clear’ in the sense of ‘vivid’ such that one can have a very *vivid* hope of something ‘irrespective of whether in actual fact that is being hoped for is likely to be attained’ and 2) ‘clear’ in the sense of something that is *very likely* to occur. Warren thinks that the text itself does not determine which reading is correct (Warren 2013, 144 fn. 24). As I discuss below, however, the pleasure must be more than a vivid *visualization* of some pleasure, as such visualization could be present in despair. I suggest it is helpful to take a ‘clear anticipation’ to refer to a focused anticipation that has the relevant modal status described in the Introduction, §0.2.2. That is, even though what I anticipate can be very unlikely, I take that anticipated state of affairs to be in *my* future when I anticipate it. For a noteworthy case of a hope for an unlikely future outcome (a naval victory) that is arguably a source of anticipatory pleasure (as confidence) in the Platonic corpus, note the discussion of the Athenians’ slim hope of defeating Persia at the battle of Salamis as discussed at *Laws* 699b. The Athenians are to be praised precisely because they *did not* fall into despair, despite the desperate circumstances. It is interesting to note that the Stranger links this hope to a *memory* of a past naval victory, in some way supporting our current connection of anticipation to past memories.

contrasted with another case in which someone is emptying but despairs of being filled (ἀνελπίστως ἔχει; 36b1-2). I will call the second case ‘despair.’

Socrates now claims that the person in the first case, ‘clear anticipation,’ has a mixture of pleasure and pain: a bodily pain from the occurrent process of emptying and a psychological pleasure from the clear anticipation of fulfillment. He describes it as follows:

[T1.8] {ΣΩ.} Μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ μεμνηῖσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις [τοῖς χρόνοις] ἀλγεῖν;
{ΠΡΩ.} Ἀνάγκη.
{ΣΩ.} Τότε ἄρ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ τᾶλλα ζῷα λυπεῖται τε ἅμα καὶ χαίρει.

[T1.8] Socrates: So does not the person anticipating being filled, by means of memory, seem to you to feel pleasure, but at the same time, emptying, to suffer in these things?

Protarchus: Necessarily!

Socrates: So at that time a human and the other animals simultaneously feel pain and feel pleasure? (36b4-9, my translation)

This is a clear case of anticipatory pleasure. To start, the person anticipating fulfillment is said to feel pleasure. In addition, we earlier saw that the fulfillment was with ‘pleasant things’ (τῶν ἡδέων) (35e9). It therefore perfectly matches the earlier description of anticipatory pleasure as ‘the anticipation of pleasant things,’ an anticipation that is itself pleasant (τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, 32c1-2). Also, note the crucial dative in our current passage: τῷ μεμνηῖσθαι. I take this to be a dative of means modifying the participle ἐλπίζων: the sense would therefore be that the creature anticipates *by means* of memory. We already saw that memory is the faculty that allows the creature to ‘grasp’ the restorative process it aims at. I suggest that memory likewise provides the content to the anticipation: a thirsty person pleasantly anticipates being *filled with drink*, rather than some other process, thanks to their memory of a past pleasant episode of drinking.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ It is crucial, however, that the pleasure is the *anticipation*, rather than the *memory* itself. Though the pleasant anticipation *makes use* of memory, we should resist the idea that it *simply is* a pleasant memory. Otherwise, one would experience the described psychological pleasure by simply remembering the past pleasure; whether or not

The second case, ‘despair,’ is one that Socrates thinks is truly worthy of the appellation ‘two-fold pain.’ He describes it as follows:

[T1.9] {ΣΩ.} Τί δ' ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύξεσθαι πληρώσεως; ἄρ' οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνεται ἂν περὶ τὰς λύπας πάθος, ὃ σὺ νυνδὲ κατιδὼν ὥσθης ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;

[T1.9] Socrates: But what about whenever someone emptying should despair of obtaining fulfillment? Is not that the situation where this twofold pain occurs, which you have just come across and simply taken to be twofold? (36b11-c1, translation Frede, modified)

The case that Protarchus had earlier described as a two-fold pain, caused by a bodily pain on the one hand and a psychological pain of ‘some longing of expectation’ on the other, is now attributed to the case where someone is *in despair* of being filled. Though there is room for debate, I take it that someone suffering from despair is in fact suffering an anticipatory pain. Literally, someone is said to be ‘ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ,’ which could be translated as ‘having no hope’ of obtaining fulfillment or having ‘no expectation’ of obtaining it.⁵⁶

Now, someone might object that despair cannot involve an anticipatory pain since anticipatory pain was earlier said to come from the anticipation *of* painful things, while despair instead involves the *absence* of an anticipation of pleasant things (32b9-c2). However, I think ‘despair’ can be understood such that it will fit the earlier model. The person is said to be ‘emptying.’ They are therefore undergoing an occurrent destructive process; but, if such a person anticipates *not* undergoing restoration, they must surely instead anticipate that they will *continue*

someone anticipates or does not anticipate actually obtaining the future pleasure would be irrelevant. Indeed, the memory of restoration must be equally present in ‘despair,’ the very case in which there is *not* a psychological pleasure. This point is sometimes lost: hence Frede’s somewhat misleading claim that ‘Wer ein gutes Gedächtnis hat, kann sich eine bestimmte Erfahrung aufs beste vergegenwärtigen, und *allein darauf beruhen* die Vorfreuden und Befürchtungen, von denen in 32 c ff. die Rede ist’ (Frede 1996, 241, emphasis mine, ‘Anyone who has a good memory can recall a particular experience in the best possible way, *and this alone is the basis* for the anticipations and fears mentioned in 32c ff.’). While Frede is right to emphasize that we need some sort of memory to feel anticipatory pleasure, merely possessing the requisite memory is certainly not sufficient.

⁵⁶ Though, ‘in despair’ is suggested in the LSJ, s.v. ‘ἀνελπίστος’ A.II.2. Cf. Smyth §1438 on the adverb + ἔχειν construction.

to suffer the painful destructive process they are already experiencing. At the very least, such a person must anticipate remaining in an unnatural condition.⁵⁷ Yet, it then follows that someone who is in despair of fulfillment would actually anticipate future pain and therefore feel an anticipatory pain. That would, in combination with the occurrent bodily pain from the destructive process, give rise to the combined ‘two-fold’ pain that Socrates now describes.

Following other scholars, I claim that desire is present in both the first case, ‘clear anticipation,’ and the second, ‘despair.’⁵⁸ I have already indicated one reason to think that this is true. The original situation Socrates queried Protarchus about was one in which ‘someone is pained because of the experience, but on the other hand remembers the pleasant things that would put a stop to the suffering were they to come about’ (35e9-10). Yet, we saw that desire itself is taken to be a condition in which one is being emptied but grasps, through memory, the pleasant restorative process that would counteract that process. Therefore, I take the restoration-directed memory to be the memory that accompanies desire. Socrates, moreover, splits this single case of desiring and remembering restoration into two: ‘clear anticipation’ and ‘despair.’ Both cases, therefore, involve desire and the accompanying memory of restoration.⁵⁹ In the

⁵⁷ Note that Erginel’s view, that bodily pain comes from the perception of being in an unnatural *state* rather than the perception of an occurrent destructive *process*, would ground an anticipatory pain in the mere anticipation of *remaining* in that unnatural state rather than my state continuing to worsen. (Erginel 2019).

⁵⁸ Cf. (Frede 1997, 233-242), (Delcomminette 2006, 345-347), (Warren 2013, 144).

⁵⁹ Delcomminette and Tuozzo, following Gadamer, grant that desire is accompanied by a memory of some past pleasure but further take this memory itself to be pleasant. They consequently infer that there is pleasure associated with every desire, and hence some pleasure in the case of ‘despair.’ As Delcomminette says with respect to the pain of despair: ‘Ce type de douleur ne peut jamais se définir que par contraste avec le plaisir, le plaisir en est un moment constitutif irréductible’ (Delcomminette 2006, 346, ‘This type of pain can only ever be defined by contrast with pleasure, pleasure is an irreducible constituent moment’). Likewise, Tuozzo claims that ‘most commentators suppose that 35e9-36c1 shows that there is no anticipatory pleasure in cases where one despairs of attaining the object of one’s desire. But such a view is mistaken, as the use of *pothos* at 36a6 in connection with such a situation suggests. *Pothos* (yearning) is itself a mixture of psychic pleasure and psychic pain (see 47e 1, 50b7). The very intensity of the pain of a despairing desire derives from the moment of pleasure contained in it’ (Tuozzo 1996, 506 fn.24). Against Tuozzo, note that the reference to *pothos* at 36a6 (which Tuozzo appeals to) is made by Protarchus, who claims that *pothos* is a kind of pain in the soul. Socrates corrects Protarchus and divides *pothos* into two cases: clear anticipation and despair. Later references to *pothos* as a mixture of pleasure and pain might therefore refer to a *pothos* that is accompanied by a clear anticipation. This is compatible with *pothos* only involving pain in other cases

former case but not the latter the person *anticipates obtaining* the restorative process that is desired.

Now, even though desire is present in both cases, I claim that there is likely no occurrent *motivation* to obtain the desired restoration in the latter case of despair. This is so for a simple reason: it is stipulated that in this case the person *despairs* of obtaining what they desire. Hence, they must fail to see any action or opportunity to bring about or obtain the restoration that they desire. If they did think that such an action or opportunity was obtainable, they would *ipso facto* not be in despair of obtaining it, as they could expect and hope that the possible opportunity would yield the desired restoration.⁶⁰

The distinction between ‘despair’ and ‘clear anticipation’ does not make use of or appeal to anticipatory pain, which was introduced alongside anticipatory pleasure at 32c. However, I contend that anticipatory pain is plausibly another way in which people can be motivated, alongside anticipatory pleasure. Namely, in the context of the *Philebus*, I want to suggest that someone can be motivated to *avoid worsening* the painful destructive processes that triggered their desire in the first place. Take, for instance, a woman who is freezing cold in a 45 degrees Fahrenheit room with an air conditioning system that is programmed to automatically lower the temperature by another 5 degrees every minute. Suppose that she desires to warm up and would prefer a room temperature of 70 degrees Fahrenheit. Further suppose that she cannot dial up the temperature of the air conditioning unit but that she *can* set it to remain at its current temperature

(such as despair). Indeed, Socrates distinguishes despair from clear anticipation precisely to emphasize the *lack* of pleasure in despair: despair is the true case of a ‘two-fold pain.’ The interpretation of Tuozzo and Gadamer seems unable to make sense of the two-fold pain insofar as it awkwardly implies that the ‘two-fold pain’ would still contain a pleasure from desire.

⁶⁰ Note that this is compatible with saying that a person in despair is ‘motivated’ to obtain the object of their desire in a weaker, dispositional sense: *were* the situation to change such that they can anticipate a way to obtain what they desire, then they would then act to bring it about. However, note that after circumstances change anticipatory pleasure would then accompany the actual motivation when someone is acting (and moving) to satisfy their desire.

and thereby stop the decline, in which case the room temperature will remain at a chilly 45 degrees. I claim that such a person would reasonably be in despair of warming up to 70 degrees: though she desires a warmer room she is aware that it is not currently possible. Nonetheless, she still would be motivated to set the air temperature to remain at 45 degrees in order to prevent the room from getting even colder. The prospect of the room getting *even colder* would be an unpleasant one to her: the colder temperature would lead to a worsening of the painful, destructive process of freezing that she is already undergoing. Though the *Philebus* admittedly does not discuss such a case, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that anticipating this painful prospect is a painful anticipation that could motivate someone to stop the further decline in room temperature. However, note that this action will not lead to her obtaining the warmth that she desires and, indeed, will still leave her in an uncomfortably cold room. As a result, even after she set the air conditioning unit to remain at its current temperature, she would likely remain in despair and still feel the anticipatory pain in a ‘two-fold pain’ simply because she would anticipate remaining in an excessively cold room. In these cases, someone is motivated to stop their decline but does not feel an occurrent anticipatory pleasure.

In general, note that the dual model of motivation that I have argued for, in which we are motivated by a pleasant or painful anticipation that is consequent to an antecedent desire rather than directly motivated by desire itself, fits well within the general framework of desire, restoration, and destruction that Socrates establishes in the *Philebus*. I argued that desires are here conceived of as not being for any arbitrary objects, but rather as complex states directed at restorative processes that are contrary to some occurrent, perceived destructive process that triggers the relevant desire. Destruction itself, recall, occurs when the unlimited constituents of our nature, elements that lie along continua scales between opposed contraries such as warm and

cold, dense and rare, and fast and slow, deviate from the proper *limits* that establish our ‘nature’ and ‘ensouled form.’ A deviation from such a limit is a movement along that continuum scale towards one contrary and away from the opposed contrary, and this movement triggers a desire to move in the opposite direction with respect to that continuum scale (i.e, to move from a cold state back to a warm state, or vice-versa). A desire to move along the scale in whatever direction will restore the ‘proper limit’ is naturally paired with an aversion to moving further in the ‘wrong direction’ (leading to further destruction). Desire towards one thing, on this model, is therefore naturally paired with a correlate aversion *away* from the contrary, as restorative and destructive processes themselves are conceived of as changes along scales of opposed contraries.

An objection to my view might claim that the earlier discussion of desire implies that it is desire and memory itself, rather than anticipatory affect, that does the motivational work. For instance, Socrates says:

[T1.10] {ΣΩ.} Ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ παντὸς ζῴου μνήμει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.
 {ΠΡΩ.} Καὶ μάλα.
 {ΣΩ.} Ἡ δ' ὁρμή γε ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ παθήματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων.
 {ΠΡΩ.} Πάνυ γε.
 {ΣΩ.} Τὴν ἄρα ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀποδείξας μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς σύμπασαν τὴν τε ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.
 {ΠΡΩ.} Ὅρθότατα.

[T1.10] Socrates:<The argument about desire> reveals that the striving of every animal is always contrary to the body’s affections.

Protarchus: Certainly!

Socrates: But the impulse guiding towards the opposite of the affections somehow indicates a memory that is of the contraries to the affections.

Protarchus: Very much so!

Socrates: After exhibiting the memory leading on towards the things that are desired, the argument proved that every impulse and desire are of the soul, as is the rule of every animal.

Protarchus: Most correct! (*Philebus* 35c9-d4, my translation)

It might be claimed that this passage shows that *memory alone* is responsible for our impulses (ὁρμαί) to act. Hence, there is no further motivational work being done by anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain. However, Socrates simply says that the striving for an opposite experience ‘somehow indicates’ that a memory must exist. As explained, a memory of the contrary process of restoration establishes the target of the relevant desire and striving. Yet this is compatible with my own reading, which contends that the memory leads to motivation only when it occurs with an affective anticipation. That is, I must take some prospective goal achievable in action to *bring about* the restoration that I remember. Indeed, I suggested that Socrates says that the pleasure of ‘clear anticipation’ is possible only *by means* of the relevant memory, using an instrumental dative (τῷ μεμνησθαι, 36b4-5). Therefore, in my view these passages establish the importance of memory in ‘leading us on’ only insofar as memories are needed to help provide the goal of our striving, *not* in the stronger sense that I am moved and, as it were, pushed forward by the memory itself, simply in virtue of remembering the thing that I now desire.

I began this chapter by explaining how Socrates claims that they must understand perception, memory, and desire in order to understand anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain. We can now understand the connections. Desire is triggered by a perceived lack and a painful destructive process, and it is directed at the contrary process of restoration. Socrates describes how we can ‘grasp’ this non-occurrent process, moreover, through a *memory* of a pleasant restoration that was experienced in the past. Yet, desire itself, I argued, does not motivate any particular action to obtain restoration. What is needed in addition is the occurrence of either anticipatory pleasure or anticipatory pain. Both psychological affects can co-exist with desire (as is demonstrated by the two cases Socrates discusses: ‘clear anticipation’ and ‘despair’). Anticipatory affects depend on desire insofar as desire, through memory, helps determine *which*

process I anticipate with pleasure were I to anticipate the possibility of undergoing it. Desire also determines the painful, destructive processes that I anticipate with pain: whatever processes are opposed and contrary to the one that is desired. Moving from a desire to a concrete action requires the further grasp that a prospective restoration lies in one's potential future and that some current available action will bring it about or avoid the contrary process of destruction. Yet, this cognitive grasp, and the anticipation that some prospective action will answer my desire or worsen my condition, is precisely the circumstance in which I feel anticipatory pleasure or anticipatory pain. Hence, I conclude that it is the anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain subsequent to desire that are doing the motivational work in these passages, rather than desire by itself.

§1.6: Conclusion

I earlier argued that the contrast between 'clear anticipation' and 'despair' suggests that anticipatory affect is required for all cases of motivation, and that desire by itself is motivationally inert. Desire, which itself must be understood against the background framework of restoration and destruction, orients us towards restoration and away from destruction. Yet, to get from desire to a concrete action, we need the further cognitive grasp that the relevant restorative process can be obtained in one's own future from this very situation through some potential action. The *Philebus* suggests that the desired restorative process, which we anticipate obtaining with pleasure, can be 'grasped' via our *memory* of undergoing a pleasant restoration in the past, memory itself simply being a preserved sense-perception. However, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, I believe that this stage of the discussion focuses on *non-rational* affective anticipation insofar as the grasp of the prospective restorative process that we anticipate is furnished by *memory* of past *sense-experience*. In contrast, we will see other evidence that

suggests that we can have pleasant and painful anticipations that are not based on sensory memory alone, but rather on a process of reasoning concerning the goods and bads we hope and fear. For now, however, I turn to Aristotle to argue that we can there too discern a similar important motivational role for affective anticipation.

CHAPTER 2: Aristotle on the Psychology of Affective Anticipation & Desire

§2.1: Introduction

We have seen that Plato discusses anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain in the *Philebus*. I argued that anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain are necessary for motivation. While desire, through memory, fixes the *object* of desire, it is the function of anticipation to determine that a particular prospective object and action will *satisfy* the desire in question. An impulse to perform some action requires the anticipation that the sort of process that is the target of the relevant desire is possibly in one's future, but it is precisely anticipations of this sort that will be pleasant.

In this chapter I turn to look at the psychology of pleasant and painful anticipations in Aristotle. I argue that there is a determinate role for pleasant and painful anticipation in Aristotle's moral psychology. Pleasant anticipation can motivate us to attain prospective goods while painful anticipation can motivate us to avoid prospective bads. Indeed, I contend that aspects of this view have been anticipated (no pun intended) by several recent studies of desire in Aristotle; such as those by Hendrik Lorenz, Jessica Moss, and Giles Pearson. Yet, I believe that the importance of affective anticipation has not been fully appreciated by existing studies.

The plan of the chapter is as follows. I first survey several passages from the Aristotelian corpus in which Aristotle makes use of anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain. Several of these passages occur when Aristotle is interested in other psychological capacities such as pleasure, pain, desire, or memory, the very capacities that Plato also associates with affective anticipation in the *Philebus*. In addition, we will see that pleasure and pain from anticipation are consistently listed alongside, and juxtaposed with, pleasure and pain from *occurrent* perception and memory. Like Plato, however, Aristotle seems to take affective anticipation to be somehow

dependent on occurrent, perceptual affect. I then turn to two key psychological and scientific works, the *De Motu Animalium* and the *De Anima*, and argue that a plausible interpretation of relevant passages pertaining to animal locomotion supports seeing affective anticipation as necessary for complex forms of locomotion. In particular, I suggest that affective anticipation can be understood, in a sense to be explained, as *active desire* that itself causes physical motion. The result is a view that is similar to that which I defended in the last chapter with respect to Plato's psychology: a mere desire for some particular object is insufficient for motivation. I argue that locomotion also requires an active *affective anticipation* that the object of one's desire can be attained through some relevant course of action.

§2.2: Affective Anticipation in Aristotle

While Plato's *Philebus* contains elaborate descriptions of psychological capacities that are required to explain anticipatory pleasure and pain, as well as an argument that some anticipatory pleasures can be false, Aristotle's corpus lacks any detailed argument devoted to anticipatory affect. I believe that this explains why there are relatively few studies of the phenomenon in Aristotle. Aristotle was nonetheless aware of the phenomenon, and existing evidence suggests that he conceives of it in much the same way that Plato does. I turn to that evidence now.

The first place in which Aristotle makes clear reference to pleasure and pain accompanying anticipation is *Physics* 7.3. This passage occurs when Aristotle is attempting to show that virtues and vices, and in general states of the body and soul, are not alterations. Yet, during this discussion Aristotle makes some general claims about virtue and vice, and how pleasure and pain are related to them, that make clear reference to affective anticipation:

[T2.1] ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ εὖ διατίθησι πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη, ἡ δὲ κακία κακῶς. ὥστ' οὐδ' αὐταὶ ἔσονται ἀλλοιώσεις· οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποβολαὶ καὶ αἱ λήψεις αὐτῶν. γίγνεσθαι δ' αὐτὰς

ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους. ἀλλοιωθήσεται δ' ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικάς, αὗται δὲ ἢ ἐν τῷ πράττειν ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνησθαι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ πράξει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰσιν, ὥσθ' ὑπ' αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς κινεῖσθαι, αἱ δ' ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐλπίδι ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰσιν· ἡ γὰρ οἷα ἔπαθον μεμνημένοι ἡδονταί, ἡ ἐλπίζοντες οἷα μέλλουσιν. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἡδονὴν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἐγγιγνομένης καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνεται (περὶ ταύτας γάρ εἰσιν), αἱ δ' ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ λύπαι ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, φανερόν ὅτι ἀλλοιουμένου τινὸς ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀποβάλλειν καὶ λαμβάνειν. ὥσθ' ἡ μὲν γένεσις αὐτῶν μετ' ἀλλοιώσεως, αὗται δ' οὐκ εἰσιν ἀλλοιώσεις.

[T2.1] Still, virtue is to be well disposed with respect to the proper affections. The result is that these <sc. virtues> will not be alterations, nor will the loss and acquisition of these <be alterations>. But necessarily these arise with an alteration of the perceptible part. So, it will be altered by perceptible things. For every ethical virtue is about bodily pleasures and pains. But these are in acting or in remembering or *in anticipating*. So while on the one hand they <sc. some pleasures and pains> are in action according to perception, so that it <sc. perception> is moved by some perceptible thing, those <sc. pleasures> in memory and in anticipation are from this <sc. perception>. For they enjoy either remembering having experienced this sort of thing or anticipating undergoing this sort of thing. As a result, it is necessary that every pleasure of this sort comes to be due to perceptible things. Since vice and virtue come about with pleasure and pain coming about (for they <sc. virtue and vice> are about these), and since pleasures and pains are alterations of the capacity for perception, it is clear that the loss and the acquisition of these <sc. virtue and vice> is necessarily with the alteration of something. The result is that while the coming about of these is *with* alteration, these <themselves> are not alterations. (*Physics* 7.3.247a3-19, my translation).

The main dialectical aim of this passage, that ethical virtues are not themselves alterations but instead come about *with* alterations, need not concern us. What is relevant in the present context is the brief comments in this passage relating to pleasure and pain. Aristotle claims that ethical virtues are about bodily pleasures and pains (περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικάς). He then divides such bodily pleasures and pains into three kinds: those in acting (ἐν τῷ πράττειν), those in remembering (ἐν τῷ μεμνησθαι), and importantly for us, those in anticipating (ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν). This is a clear reference, then, to *affective* anticipations: pleasures and pains from anticipating the future.

In [T2.1] Aristotle also takes up the tripartite division of pleasures and pains in acting, remembering, and anticipating and explains how each of the three depends in some way on perception. The pleasures and pains of acting occur ‘according to perception’ (κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησίν) while those in memory or anticipation occur while either remembering those perceived experiences or anticipating that one will undergo a perceived experience in the future. They each, therefore, make reference to the perceptual pleasures (and pains) that accompany action. Moreover, (T2.1) should be compared to the similar passage in *De Memoria* in which Aristotle claims that perception is only of the present, distinguishing it from memory (which is of the past) and anticipation (which is of the future) (*Mem* 1.449b10-15). Our *Physics* passage (T2.1) re-examines the same tripartite division of psychological capacities into perception, memory, and anticipation while further clarifying that they can be *affective*: pleasure and pain can accompany the exercise of each capacity. This, of course, parallels the affective character of perception, memory, and anticipation that we saw was also present in the *Philebus*.

Another important and clear description of anticipatory pleasure occurs in *Rhetoric* 1.11. This passage, moreover, sheds light on the *Physics* 7.3 passage that connects the pleasures of anticipation to memory. Aristotle says that,

[T2.2] ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησις τις ἀσθενής, αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῦ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ αἴσθησις· ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνησθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μέμνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα.

[T2.2] Since enjoyment is in the perception of some experience, but imagination (*phantasia*) is some weak perception, some imagination of what is remembered or anticipated will always occur in remembering and anticipating. But if this is so, it is clear that there are pleasures with remembering and anticipating, since indeed perception <is with these>. So, it is necessary that every pleasure is in perceiving something present or in remembering something that came about or in anticipating something that is going to

happen; for people perceive things that are present, remember things that came about, and anticipate things that are going to happen. (*Rhetoric*, 1.11.1370a27-35, my translation)

As we can see, (T2.2) closely parallels the *Physics* 7.3 passage (T2.1) insofar as (T2.2) also distinguishes three cognitive faculties that are distinguished by the temporality of their objects (perception, memory, and anticipation) and explains that each is *affective* and can be pleasant.⁶¹ We saw that Aristotle claims that memory and anticipation are somehow based on, or ‘from,’ perception in (T2.1). Our current *Rhetoric* passage (T2.2) outlines a way to understand this relation. It first emphasizes that enjoyment (τὸ ἡδεσθαί) is in the perception of some experience (ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους). The pleasure in the perception of some experience parallels the (T2.1) discussion of pleasure ‘in acting’ that was said to be ‘according to perception.’ Furthermore, (T2.2) implies that *phantasia* is what explains the connection between the pleasure of perception and the pleasure in memory and anticipating. *Phantasia* is now called a ‘weak perception,’ which coheres with Aristotle’s description of *phantasia* as a ‘motion effected by actual sense perception’ (*DA* 3.3.429a1-2); it is the lingering motion or trace of a sense-perception that remains in the soul after the original perception of the relevant perceptible object has ceased.⁶² The dependence of anticipation and memory on perception is likely explained by their dependence on *phantasia*: anticipation (and memory) require some *phantasma* of the thing imagined, and *phantasia* is itself a kind of decayed sense-perception.⁶³ This would also, of

⁶¹ Though Aristotle says nothing about pain here, note his comment at the end of the chapter: ‘And let this be said about pleasant things, while the painful things are made clear from the opposite of those’ (*Rhetoric* 1.11.1372a2-3, my translation).

⁶² For more discussion of *phantasia*, see for instance (Caston 1996, 46-52). Note, too, how this description seems to have affinity with the *Philebus* discussion of memory as a ‘preserved sense perception.’ Indeed, note the interesting argument of Krisanna Scheiter, who claims that Aristotle’s *phantasia* refers to what Socrates calls ‘memory’ in the *Theaetetus*, namely a stored sense impression (famously compared to the impression that a signet ring leaves behind on a wax block) (*Theaetetus* 191d4-e1). Cf. (Scheiter, 2012).

⁶³ Indeed, in *De Insomniis* Aristotle claims that perception and *phantasia* are the same but different in being (*Insomn.* 459a15-17). Whiting has used this passage to argue that the locomotive soul, which on her view requires *phantasia*, and the perceptual soul are the same but different in being (Whiting 2002, 154-163).

course, bring Aristotle's account into rough alignment with what we saw in Plato: just as occurrent pleasant anticipation in Plato depends on a sensory memory of some past episode of sense-perceptions, here we see that anticipation likewise depends on stored sense-impressions that Aristotle explains using his more general theory of *phantasia*. The fact that *occurrent* perception can itself be pleasant or painful, therefore, in conjunction with the fact that memory and anticipation depend on a 'weak' perception in the form of *phantasia*, likely explains why memory and anticipation can likewise be pleasant or painful.⁶⁴

§2.2.1: Anticipatory Pleasure in Aristotle's *Ethics*

I now turn to examine Aristotle's treatment of anticipatory pleasures in his *Ethics*, namely the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) and the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*). Indeed, we have just looked at some passages on anticipatory pleasure that occur in the *Rhetoric*, but the account of pleasure in *Rhetoric* 1.11 has been contested insofar as it describes a restoration view of pleasure that seems at odds with Aristotle's own conception of pleasure as an unimpeded *energeia*, or as what perfects or completes an *energeia*, in *EN* 7 (= *EE* 6) & *EN* 10 respectively.⁶⁵ I will not here attempt to adjudicate the status of pleasure within Aristotle's corpus, as I believe that it is sufficient for our purposes to note that the *EN* also acknowledges the existence of affective anticipations. I also believe that an analogous account plausibly holds of the *EE* and *EN* in which

⁶⁴ This view on the relation between pleasures of perception, memory, and anticipation is defended by Jessica Moss (Moss 2012, 57-64). Though I agree with her that *phantasia* is operative in episodes of pleasant or painful memories and expectations, we will later see that I disagree with Moss insofar as I reject her claim that pleasurable *phantasia* is what is directly responsible for the motivation. I claim that pleasurable *anticipations* are what motivate us (anticipation being just one of several psychological activities in which *phantasia* is implicated), not *phantasia* itself.

⁶⁵ For instance, Gosling & Taylor and van Riel both claim that Aristotle simply relies on views current in the Academy that he does not really accept (cf. Gosling & Taylor 1982, 196-198 and van Riel 2000, 51 footnote 53). Wolfsdorf, on the other hand, takes the work to represent Aristotle's *early* views on pleasure that were later replaced by his conception of pleasure as an *energeia* (Wolfsdorf 2013, 106-114). Yet, others, such as (Frede 1996 418-427), (Rapp 2002, II.543-83), argue that the *Rhetoric* nonetheless contains Aristotle's genuine views, for instance on the role of pleasure in *pathê* specifically rather than thought and action more generally. Frede believes that this is because 'emotions are based on needs, wants, and desires or the corresponding aversions. All these phenomena therefore presuppose some kind of lack of something, a need that has to be filled' (Frede 2006, 271).

anticipatory pleasure is in some way dependent on pleasures from *perception* and, I tentatively suggest, thought.

As we saw, Aristotle discusses pleasures of anticipation while describing the restoration account of pleasure in *Rhetoric* 1.11. From this perspective, it is somewhat ironic that one of Aristotle's most explicit references to pleasures of anticipation in the *EN* occurs when he *challenges* the restoration view of pleasure. Aristotle claims that not all pleasures come from the restoration of a painful lack. He points out that:

[T2.3] τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλλοι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνας οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται;

[T2.3] But this does not follow for all pleasures; for the mathematical <pleasures> and those in accordance with perception and those caused by the sense of smell are painless, as well as those <from> many things heard and smells *and memories and anticipations*. So, what will these be restorations of? (*EN* 10.3.1173b16-19, my translation)

Aristotle includes pleasures of anticipation and memory among the many pleasures that do not seem to be associated with restorations, and that do not seem to be preceded by painful lacks.⁶⁶

Indeed, the examples of pleasures that Aristotle provides in this section are very similar to the three sorts of pleasures that he describes in both *Physics* 7.3 (T2.1) and *Rhetoric* 1.11 (T2.2): pleasures of perception (pleasures 'in accordance with perception' and those caused by 'things heard and smells'), pleasures from memory, and pleasures from anticipation. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that Aristotle continues to acknowledge all three kinds of pleasures.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ It is interesting that the pleasures that serve as counterexamples to the restoration view of pleasure that Aristotle mentions here (pleasures from mathematics, perceptions, smells, and sounds) seem to closely follow the 'pure' pleasures free of pains that are mentioned in the *Philebus* (51b-52b). However, Plato arguably takes even the pure pleasures to require restorations, the very point Aristotle now challenges.

⁶⁷ Aristotle adds, however, the 'mathematical pleasures.' Such pleasures do not seem to be straightforwardly assimilated to perception, memory, or expectation. Yet, such pleasures also seem to be different from the *bodily* pleasures and pains that are the stated focus of *Physics* 7.3. On the other hand, they are likely pleasures 'of thought,' pleasures that Aristotle frequently acknowledges in the *EN* and *EE*.

Another somewhat incidental discussion of anticipatory pleasures occurs in *EN* 9.7.

There, Aristotle tries to explain the apparent fact that benefactors love their beneficiaries more than beneficiaries in turn love their benefactors. In order to explain this asymmetry, Aristotle first observes that a benefactor performs a *fine* (καλόν) action when he benefits, while a beneficiary does not do anything fine but instead merely *receives* some benefit (συμφέρον). Yet, Aristotle says that benefit is less pleasant and lovable than the fine. This is supposed to explain why a benefactor who acts finely loves more than a beneficiary who merely receives benefit (*EN* 9.7.1168a9-12). However, Aristotle immediately follows this argument with a more general observation about the pleasant:

[T2.4] ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἢ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἥττον· ἢ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν.

[T2.4] The actuality of the present is pleasant, as is the anticipation of the future and the memory of what has come about. What is according to actuality is most pleasant and likewise most lovable. So, while the product remains to the benefactor (for the fine lasts a long time), the useful is in the beneficiary's past. And while the memory of fine things is pleasant, the <memory> of the useful is not very <pleasant> or less <pleasant>; But expectation seems to be the opposite <i.e. the expectation of the useful is pleasant, while the expectation of the fine is not very pleasant or less pleasant>. (*EN* 9.7.1168a13-19, my translation).

In the wider context of our (T2.4) passage, Aristotle seems to use these observations to support his claim that being a loving benefactor is more pleasant than being a loved beneficiary. For one, the loving benefactor is *active* in a way that is not true of the beneficiary. The beneficiary is instead a passive recipient of the benefactor's activity.⁶⁸ Since 'what is according to actuality is

⁶⁸ Aristotle draws this out more explicitly in the next sentence: 'καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικὰ', 'And loving seems to be in acting, but being loved in being affected, so loving and friendliness more accompany <the people> who excel with respect to action' (*EN* 9.7.1168a19-21, my translation).

most pleasant,' it follows that being an active benefactor is more pleasant than being a passive beneficiary. Secondly, Aristotle claims that the memory of the fine is more pleasant than the memory of the useful. Insofar as the benefactor performs fine actions while the beneficiary only receives benefits, only the benefactor can enjoy the pleasant memories of fine actions long after his act concludes. The beneficiary, in contrast, can only enjoy his (less pleasant) memories of how he was benefited in the past.

Most important for the purposes of this study, however, is the observation that (T2.4) contains the same tripartite division of pleasures into present, past, and future that we have already seen in (T2.1) from the *Physics* and (T2.2) from the *Rhetoric*. Insofar as the temporal division is exhaustive, the accompanying division of pleasure is perhaps also exhaustive. However, one difference deserves our attention. While (T2.1) and (T2.2) refer to the *perception* of the present, (T2.4) instead refers to the *actuality* of the present.⁶⁹ On the one hand this is not such a huge jump: perception is a faculty that can itself be active in relation to present sensible objects. Indeed, it seems that our perception must be active whenever we have occurrent, pleasant perceptions. On the other hand, this shift does allow Aristotle to countenance other pleasant activities that occur in the present besides perception such as, in particular, pleasant *thoughts*. It also accords better with Aristotle's account of pleasure as the perfection and completion of an *activity* that he defends in *EN* 10.

We have so far seen that Aristotle acknowledges pleasures of memory and pleasures of anticipation in the *EN*, and that he believes that they are *not* caused by restorations. That said, he

⁶⁹ Note that a parallel passage can be found in *Metaphysics* Λ.7 describing the pleasure the prime mover experiences in the pure actuality of thought: 'its actuality is also pleasure (and therefore waking, perception, and thinking are most pleasant, and anticipations (ἐλπίδες) and memories are so because of their reference to these)' (*Metaphysics* Λ.7.1072b17-18). Pleasant anticipations and memories depend on the prior pleasant activity (ἐνέργεια) of sense-perception and thought.

unfortunately does not attempt to explain what accounts for such pleasures in the *EN*. However, I suggest that the close association of pleasure with occurrent *perception* (αἴσθησις) implies that he would endorse an account largely similar to that found in the *Rhetoric* passage (T2.2). In *EN* 10, Aristotle's own examples of pleasure, when he turns to explain the ontology of pleasure, are pleasures of perception and pleasures of thought.⁷⁰ Aristotle denies that pleasure is a *kinesis*, and instead asserts that pleasure perfects or completes the *energeia* of the sense-faculty when it is in a good condition and is active in relation to the best objects (*EN* 10.1174b21-23).⁷¹ Supposing that episodes of occurrent perception leave behind residual '*phantasmata*,' it seems natural to suppose that the sense-faculty can likewise be active in relation to those *phantasmata*. This is also supported by Aristotle's claim from *De Insomniis* (*Insomn.*) that the sense-faculty and *phantasia* are the same but different in being (*Insomn.* 459a15-17). In that case, pleasure would complete the activity if the faculty and the sense-objects represented in the *phantasmata* (rather than the perceived sense-objects themselves) are in a good condition. Yet, this would explain how anticipations can be pleasant insofar as they are exercises of the sense-faculty with respect to particular *phantasmata* of the anticipated future outcome. It would, moreover, align with the view found in (T2.1) and (T2.2) in which the pleasures and pains of anticipation (and memory) are in some sense dependent on the pleasures and pains from past episodes of occurrent perception.

⁷⁰ For instance, cf. *EN*.X.1174b14-23; 1174b33-1175a1

⁷¹ For an explanation of this view and Aristotle's puzzling claim that pleasure 'completes an activity – not, however, as the state does, by being present <in the activity>, but as a sort of supervenient end' (*EN* 10.4.1174b31-33, translation Irwin) see especially (Shields 2011). As Shields explains, pleasure flows from and perfects the activities of perception and thought whenever the relevant faculties and objects are in the best condition. Pleasure is not adventitiously conjoined to certain activities but rather makes those activities be what they are.

§2.3: Affect, Desire, and Movement in Aristotle's *De Anima* and *De Motu Animalium*

So far, we have seen that Aristotle consistently recognizes pleasures and pains from anticipation. In this section, I turn to argue that anticipatory pleasure and pain play an essential role in animal locomotion based on two key psychological works that grapple explicitly with providing an account of animal locomotion: *De Anima* (DA) and *De Motu Animalium* (MA). It is relatively uncontroversial that Aristotle believes that *desire* (*orexis*) is part of the explanatory story for animal locomotion. However, how does desire, a decidedly psychological phenomenon, give rise to motion, a physiological phenomenon? I suggest that the anticipation of something to be pursued or avoided (the object of desire) marks the faculty of desire's transition from potentiality to actuality. In effect, an affective anticipation *is* the actuality of the desire, and the actuality of desire is itself a resulting motion. The pleasure or pain that accompanies this anticipation (the anticipatory pleasure or pain) is the psychophysical link that accounts for the connection between a psychological activity (anticipation) and a physical alteration and resulting motion. This account is, in broad strokes, similar to the interpretation of Plato that I defended in the last chapter, though it is more complicated insofar as it draws on Aristotle's own distinctive psychology.

§2.3.1: Unmoved Movers and Desire in *De Anima* and *De Motu Animalium*

Aristotle takes locomotion to be one of the defining abilities of animal souls. Aristotle discusses the animal ability for locomotion in DA 3.9-11 and clarifies that *desire* (ὄρεξις) is responsible for it (DA 3.10.433a31-b1). Yet, anyone looking for information on how, *precisely*, this psychological capacity leads to locomotion is likely to be disappointed by Aristotle's terse comments. That said, Aristotle does provide a catalog of at least four things that are responsible for every case of locomotion:

[T2.5] ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τρία, ἐν μὲν τὸ κινεῖν, δεύτερον δ' ὃ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ κινούμενον

[T2.5] Since there are three things, first, what initiates motion, second, that by which it initiates motion, and further, third, what is moved, and that which initiates motion is twofold, in the one instance being unmoved and in the other initiating motion while being moved (*DA* 3.10.433b12-15, translation Shields)

Though Aristotle initially distinguishes three things in (T2.5), the first thing is divided again into two, for a total of four separate elements: the unmoved mover that initiates motion while being itself unmoved, the moved mover that initiates motion while being moved, the instrument by which motion is initiated, and the thing that is moved. This division of the things responsible for motion is wholly general and is also found in the *Physics* in a non-psychological context.⁷² In the *De Anima* Aristotle goes on to further describe what fulfills each role in the case of animal locomotion caused by desire: the unmoved mover is ‘the good concerned with what can be done’ (πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν),⁷³ the moved mover is the ‘faculty of desire’ (ὀρεκτικόν), and the thing that is moved is the animal itself (*DA* 3.10.433b15-18).⁷⁴

⁷² For instance, at *Physics* 8.5.256b13-20. Aristotle, of course, famously makes use of the division in his discussion of the unmoved mover. This, then, seems to be a clear case of Aristotle deploying a general concept from his natural philosophy within his psychology.

⁷³ There is some debate as to whether the ultimate origin of motion, the unmoved mover, is the *good* concerned with what can be done, or an animal’s faculty of desire, a debate worsened by a divergent manuscript tradition at 433a18-21 in which some manuscripts read *orekton* while others read *orektikon*. For discussion on this point cf. (Richardson 1995, 374-380) and (Shields 2016, 358-360). However, insofar as we will later see that the good concerned with what can be done is the ‘unmoved mover’ only insofar as it can be *grasped* by anticipation, a grasp that I claim is identical with the *activity* of an animal’s desiderative faculty in §2.3.4, I believe that there is a sense in which the difference is less worrisome than it may initially appear. Though they do not flag *anticipation* as being the relevant cognitive grasp, a broadly similar approach to split the difference is also endorsed by (Corcilius & Gregoric 2013, 76). For good discussion on this issue see (Rapp 2023, 58-66).

⁷⁴ Aristotle refrains from discussing ‘the instrument by which motion is initiated’ since it is ‘among the functions common to body and soul,’ though he gives a ‘summary’ of this instrument that compares it to a hinge in which the ‘starting point’ and ‘end point’ are the same but different in being (*DA* 3.10.433b21-25). The exact purpose of this analogy is opaque, but others have suggested that the *De Motu Animalium*, a work devoted to locomotion that pays more attention to its corporeal aspects, can shed some light on it. In particular, in *MA*.10 Aristotle compares the *connate pneuma* to ‘a point in the joints’ and attributes to it an (obscure) role in animal locomotion (*MA*.10.703a4-b1). Cf. (Berryman 2002) and (Rapp 2023, 26-28).

We receive only scant information on how these three elements interact to bring about animal locomotion. Aristotle says that the unmoved mover is ‘the good concerned with what can be done,’ the *prakton agathon*. Earlier in the chapter, however, Aristotle more generally identifies the unmoved mover with the *object of desire* (τὸ ὁρεκτόν, *DA* 3.10.433b11). He claims that this object of desire causes motion by being ‘thought of or imagined’ (τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι, *DA* 3.10.433b12). The thought or imagination of the object of desire in turn causes the motion of the moved mover: the faculty of desire. Meanwhile the faculty of desire, when active, brings about the motion of the animal itself. Indeed, Aristotle says that the actuality of desire is itself a kind of motion: ‘for what is moved is moved insofar as it is desiring, and desire, when in actuality, is a kind of motion’ (*DA* 3.10.433b17-18). To look ahead slightly, I suggest that the following sequence occurs in cases of locomotion: 1) the animal has an anticipatory thought or imagination of the object of desire (that is, it *anticipates* encountering an object of pursuit or avoidance) 2) This anticipation coincides with desire becoming *active* (transitioning from a mere potentiality), an activity that is itself equivalent to a kind of motion and 3) the actuality of desire, qua motion, causes the animal to move.

This same division, moreover, is found in the *De Motu Animalium*, a work devoted to explaining animal locomotion. I focus on *MA* 6-8, in which Aristotle turns to discuss how desire can lead to locomotion. Aristotle reprises the general division from the *DA* that we have just seen: motion is caused first by the object of desire, the unmoved mover, that in turns moves desire, the moved mover: ‘it is the *object* of desire (τὸ ὁρεκτόν) and the *object* of thought (τὸ νοητόν) that primarily cause movement, though not just any object of thought, but the goal of what is achievable through action (τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος)’ (*MA* 6.700b23-25, translation Morrison). As in *DA* 3.10, the unmoved mover that primarily causes movement is an object of

desire that is an achievable goal. Just as the object of desire was said to cause motion by being thought about or imagined in *DA* 3.10, here too we learn that the object of desire is also the object of thought. Imagination does not drop out either: earlier in the chapter Aristotle explicitly flags that he is using ‘thought’ (νοῦς) in a loose, wide sense to include imagination and perception: ‘for both appearance (ἡ φαντασία) and sense-perception (ἡ αἴσθησις) hold the same place as thought (τῷ νῷ)’ (*MA* 6.700b19-20, translation Morrison). While the cognized object of desire causes motion without itself being moved, Aristotle claims that ‘desire and the faculty of desire cause motion while being moved’ (*MA* 6.700b35-a1, translation Morrison). Desire is therefore a moved mover, and it in turn causes the motion of the whole animal. As we can see, Aristotle’s use of the tripartite distinction in *De Motu* is in alignment with its use in the *De Anima*.

I believe that we can better understand how these three elements of locomotion work when we turn to Aristotle’s discussion in *MA* 7, a passage that has been referred to as a ‘practical syllogism’ by scholars.⁷⁵

[T2.6] ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώντων ἔνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δῆλην οὐδ’ ἡ διάνοια ἐπιστᾶσα σκοπεῖ οὐθέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐκέτι ἐνδιατρίβει. διὸ καὶ ὅσα μὴ λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺ πράττομεν. ὅταν ἐνεργήσῃ γὰρ ἡ τῇ αἰσθήσει πρὸς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ τῷ νῷ, οὗ ὁρέγεται, εὐθὺς ποιεῖ. ἀντ’ ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἡ νοήσεως ἢ τῆς ὁρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. »ποτέον μοι« ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει· »τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν« ἡ αἴσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἢ ὁ νοῦς· εὐθὺς πίνει.

[T2.6] Just as some questioners do in the dialectical game, so discursive thought does not settle on and examine the second proposition, the obvious one, in any way. For instance, if going walking is good for a human being, he does not dwell any more upon the fact

⁷⁵ The ‘practical syllogism’ passages raise many questions. A survey of the different and varying examples given by Aristotle, for instance as compiled by (Rapp 2023, 40), makes it seem doubtful that there is a *single* perfectly worked out view lying in the background here. The widely varying interpretations that have been offered over the years, moreover, do not increase confidence on this score (cf. Rapp 2023, 39-46). In this chapter I try to simply articulate a plausible way in which the activity described in this passage seems to implicate anticipation. Besides the excellent, concise overview in Rapp, other fruitful discussion of the practical syllogism can be found in (Nussbaum 1986, 165-220), (Fernandez 2014) and (Cooper 2020).

that he is a human being. This is why we also do quickly the things we do without calculation. For whenever something has an active perception of the goal, or an appearance or a thought, what it desires it immediately does. For the activity of desire comes about in place of questioning or thinking. ‘I must drink,’ appetite is saying; ‘this can be drunk,’ says perception or appearance or thought. Immediately he drinks. (MA 7.701a25-33, translation Morrison, modified)

In (T2.6) Aristotle gives two examples in which action immediately follows a thought or cognition of some specific sort. The first example involves someone who thinks that ‘going walking is good for a human being’ and immediately walks. The second example involves a thirsty person supposedly perceiving, imagining, or thinking that something can be drunk and immediately drinking.

Now, in each case I believe that we can identify an unmoved mover that initiates motion. In the first example I believe that the ‘unmoved mover’ is likely the good that is to be gained by walking on this particular occasion. To start, the unmoved mover was referred to as the ‘*prakton agathon*,’ and the example involves an awareness that walking is good. We also saw that this unmoved mover causes action by being thought of or imagined, and here we learn that action follows the ‘active perception of the goal, or an appearance or a thought.’ However, the unmoved mover is not the general proposition that ‘walking is good for a human being,’ I rather believe that it is something more specific and self-referential such as ‘walking will be good *for me*.’ Notably, this latter, self-referential proposition is the natural inference from the general proposition, ‘walking is good for a human being,’ when it is combined with the particular, ‘obvious’ proposition, ‘I am a human being,’ that Aristotle says no one dwells upon. Nonetheless, the fact that we do not dwell upon it does not mean that it is useless. Indeed, the necessity of the obvious proposition becomes clearer when we imagine cases in which it does not hold. If someone tells me that it is good for an Olympic athlete to eat 10,000 calories a day, I do not start mass-buying carbs to bulk up. It is apparent to me that *I am* not an Olympic athlete;

while that advice might hold for Milo, it will not hold for me. It might not even be good to follow advice concerning the healthy daily caloric intake level for an *average* human being if I happen, for instance, to be sick or recovering from an injury. What the particular premise enables, in conjunction with the universal, is the awareness that some prospective good is possible *for me* given my particular circumstances.

A similar account applies to the second example involving appetite. Three stages are described: '[1] "I must drink," appetite is saying; [2] "this can be drunk," says perception or appearance or thought. [3] Immediately he drinks.' Now, it seems that the 'command' of appetite that 'I must drink,' (1), need not lead to any determinate action. For instance, I can have a desire for drink even while I die of thirst in the desert and do not take any action to satisfy that desire. Indeed, this may be an instance of 'despair' as discussed in the previous chapter. Evidently the desire must be supplemented by an awareness that some particular thing will satisfy it. On the flipside, note that the propositional content expressed in 'this can be drunk,' provided by 'perception or appearance or thought' in (2), is also likely not *itself* action-prompting either. After all, perception or thought can alert me that some glass of wine 'can be drunk' even when I totally lack a desire to drink it. As in the previous example, however, taking the content in (1) and (2) together allows one to infer that some particular object will satisfy one's antecedent desire in this particular instance. It is this combined awareness that leads directly to action, in this case drinking.

Indeed, I believe that the awareness of the particular good to be gained in this instance, an awareness that amounts to an active cognition of the goal, is *equivalent* to the 'activity of desire' that is itself motion-inducing. In the first example, Aristotle says that, whenever something has an active cognition of the goal, 'what it desires it immediately does. For the activity of desire

comes about (ἢ τῆς ὁρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια) in place of questioning or thinking.’ Yet in the *De Anima* Aristotle claims that ‘desire, when in actuality, is a kind of motion’ (DA 3.10.433b17-18). This explains why the animal *moves* when desire becomes active. But, what are we to make of the activity of desire coming about *in place* of questioning or thinking? I suggest that the particularized awareness that some particular object is good for me now, or that it will satisfy my appetite, immediately triggers active desire and a resulting impulse. There is no room for further thought or questioning that would prevent such an impulse (I cannot have an awareness that walking is good for me now yet continue to wonder: should I *really* walk? Such further questioning would have to challenge one of the other two premises: perhaps walking is not *really* good for a person like me, or perhaps the advice is not quite applicable to my particular situation). It is noteworthy, indeed, that Aristotle never states the particularized conclusion, instead stating that an animal immediately acts. This is likely because it is the awareness of the particularized conclusion that is equivalent to action.

It might seem implausible to suggest that someone with the relevant particularized awareness of some particular prospect as good for them in their specific situation always immediately acts, and I indeed think that this statement should be slightly qualified. Someone might have the requisite awareness but fail to perform the relevant action due to simultaneously feeling a *contrasting* impulse for some other action, as occurs in cases of *akrasia* or *enkrateia*. However, in my view even these cases still involve the ‘activity of desire’ that is ‘equivalent to action,’ albeit in a somewhat different way. To anticipate my eventual view, these contrasting ‘impulses’ involve felt pleasure and pain, and hence someone experiencing multiple impulses for incompatible actions would feel a mixture of pleasure and pain (that is, they would experience psychological conflict). On this view my sadness or regret when I akratically eat another scoop

of ice-cream is a nascent impulse to *stop* eating the ice-cream that is over-ridden and does not manifest as any sort of action beyond the affect itself. Nonetheless, those nascent impulses to action still occur, account for the felt phenomenology of *akrasia* and *enkrateia*, and reflect one's particularized awareness of some prospective good or prospective bad given one's current situation.⁷⁶

§2.3.2: Active Cognition of the Goal – Anticipation

We have seen that Aristotle claims that the object of desire causes motion by being ‘thought of or imagined’ (τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι, *DA* 3.10.433b12), and that action follows the ‘active perception of the goal, or an appearance or a thought’ (*MA* 7.701a29-30). However, what exactly does Aristotle have in mind when he claims that motion follows the active perception of a goal? In this section I survey several possible approaches and ultimately argue that, in almost all cases, the sort of cognition that results in action should be understood as an *anticipation* of acquiring an object of pursuit (that we desire to obtain) or encountering an object of avoidance (that we are averse to).

One approach could take it that the cognition that leads to action is a simple perception of the object of pursuit or avoidance in our sensory field. So, for instance, if a thirsty person has an antecedent (but inactive) desire for drink and perceives something drinkable, then they will consequently act to consume that drink.⁷⁷ However, I believe that the cognition of the goal

⁷⁶ For more relevant discussion on this point see §3.7, in which I discuss Aristotle's description of *akrasia* and *enkrateia* as involving a mixture of pleasure in pain in *EE* 2.8.1224b15-24.

⁷⁷ This, for instance, is the view endorsed by Gregoric & Corcilius (2013, 60-67) as well as (Schofield 2011) who denies that *phantasia* is necessary for locomotion. Likewise Gasser-Wingate, who, though he seems amenable to the idea that *phantasia* allows us to *anticipate* future outcomes and form expectations, often describes perception as doing the relevant work. I.e.: ‘we simply *perceive* the spider as *something to be avoided*’ (187), a dolphin that ‘perceives some fish as worth pursuing,’ a crane that ‘perceives storm clouds as calling for just so much time on the ground. Their discriminations are meant to be a form of perception – perception informed by past experience these animals accumulate through the sort of retention and associate projection *phantasia* makes possible.’ (Gasser-Wingate 2021, 190).

cannot be restricted to an occurrent perception. For one, there seem to be cases in which someone *can* have a perception of the ‘goal’ but fail to be motivated to act. Take, for instance, a thirsty person who sees a glass of water behind a locked, glass cabinet. Though this person *perceives* a drinkable glass of water, it is likely that she will *not* be motivated to drink it so long as she also believes that it is impossible to access it. She will not be immediately moved, for instance, to start scratching at the glass. Likewise with the panther that stalks her prey, keeping her eyes locked on it the whole time. Though she perceives her prey, she waits in total stillness for the perfect moment to strike.⁷⁸ On the flip side, there are cases in which locomotion occurs even without the occurrent *perception* of the goal. Consider a dog that is pursuing a hare, following its scent. In this case what the animal occurrently perceives is the *scent* of the hare. But, the dog does not desire the experience of smelling the hare, but rather the experience of *eating* the hare, something that it does not occurrently perceive.⁷⁹

Another proposal argues that locomotion requires the active *phantasia* of the goal.⁸⁰ The dog, for instance, experiences a *phantasma* of eating the rabbit, and it is this *phantasma* that

⁷⁸ Aristotle himself describes how the panther will hide itself and wait in stillness for its prey to approach, apparently because the panther’s prey is attracted to the scent of the panther (*HA* 9.6.612a12-15). Note that in this same part of *HA*, Aristotle explicitly attributes *anticipation* to the panther, claiming (in another odd story) that panthers sometimes die when attempting to acquire jars of human excrement that will cure the deleterious effects of ‘leopard bane’ (παρδαλιαγγές). Hunters hang the jars of excrement from the boughs of very tall trees, and the leopard dies as she jumps up while ‘anticipating’ (ἐλπίζουσα) that she will get <the jars>’ (*HA* 9.6.612a12).

⁷⁹ Aristotle makes this distinction at *EN* 3.10.1118a18-23, as part of arguing that brute animals do not enjoy scents. Lorenz uses this passage to support his claim that locomotion requires envisioning prospects (Lorenz 2006). Likewise, note the supporting passage in *Historia Animalium* (*HA*) 4.8.535a9-13, in which Aristotle infers that sea creatures have a sense of taste from the fact that they are led to approach some object after smelling it. The approach behavior triggered by an occurrent smell is explained by the sense of taste, though the taste is not currently being perceived and hence can only be anticipated.

⁸⁰ I focus on Jessica Moss’ influential version of this proposal, but Nussbaum has also offered her own interpretation in which the role of *phantasia* is to ‘interpret’ the object of pursuit as ‘a thing of a certain sort, a thing that could become for him an object either of pursuit or avoidance. Like Wittgenstein, he would be interested in the experience of “seeing as”’ (Nussbaum 1978, 246). However, the view has been much criticized, cf. discussion in (Rapp 2023, 52) and (Corcilius 2020, 320 n. 52).

motivates the dog to pursue the rabbit.⁸¹ We have seen that *phantasia* is elsewhere defined as a kind of decayed sense-perception, and hence that it is able to furnish sensory information even when there is no sensible object in one's current visual field. Yet, while I do not deny that *phantasia* plays an important part in animal locomotion, it also seems that we can have a *phantasma* of the object of desire without being motivated. Recall that *phantasia* underlies all instances of memory. Yet, if I currently desire to drink a glass of water, it seems clear that I will not thereby immediately take action to drink any water simply in virtue of *remembering* drinking a glass of water in the past. My memory could, after all, occur during a case of 'despair' as discussed in the last chapter, a case in which I believe that it is currently impossible to obtain any water. However, insofar as I actively remember drinking water at that time, I *am* actively entertaining a *phantasma* of the goal of my desire. Therefore, I do not believe that *phantasia* alone is sufficient for the full account of animal locomotion.⁸²

Indeed, it is noteworthy that Moss seems to realize this issue when defending her own interpretation in which pleasurable *phantasmata* of our goals is required for motivation. She claims that Aristotle fails to distinguish 'different modes of presentation: presenting something as future and attainable, rather than as past, or a mere fantasy' and that this is 'a real gap in the account I have attributed to Aristotle' (Moss 2012, 62).⁸³ However, this claim seems at odds with Aristotle's repeated distinction between perception, anticipation, and memory: we perceive the present, anticipate the future, and remember the past. Indeed, even granting that anticipation and

⁸¹ This is the view of Jessica Moss, who claims that 'Phantasia's key contribution to action is its pleasurable representation of an object not presently perceived, which thereby becomes desired as a goal' (Moss 2012, 62).

⁸² This argument is similar to one given by Pearson in support of his view that motivation requires grasping the *prospect* of an object of desire, discussed below (Pearson 2012, 37).

⁸³ Likewise, she says that 'I am not however sure how to make room on Aristotle's view for the fact that cognition can be pleasurable without thereby being practical,' and hence wonders why pleasant memories do not motivate (Moss 2012, 27).

memory both involve *phantasmata*, it seems that the *phantasmata* are ‘presented’ as in the past whenever they are *remembered*, while they are ‘presented’ as in the future whenever they are *anticipated*.⁸⁴ Yet, if this is the case, the claim that we are motivated by the *phantasmata* of something ‘future and attainable’ would in fact boil down to the claim that we are motivated by the *anticipation* of something attainable.

Indeed, another view that I am more in alignment with takes the relevant cognition of the goal to be the grasp of the *prospect* of the object of desire.⁸⁵ So, for instance, Lorenz claims that locomotion requires the cognitive task of ‘envisioning a prospective situation’ (Lorenz 2006, 131). That is, an animal must envision a future prospect to focus on the *purpose* that its action is directed at achieving. It is not enough to simply see a glass of water in the locked cabinet: someone must further envision the future prospect of drinking that glass of water. Likewise, Pearson claims that being motivated requires ‘grasping the prospect of an object of desire’ (Pearson 2012, 39). Pearson supports this with philosophical reasoning that I have already alluded to: thinking about or remembering some arbitrary good or pleasant action, such as a pleasant ski-trip I took yesterday, would not motivate me to ski later *today* unless I take the *prospect* of skiing later today to be pleasant (Pearson 2012, 37). However, we have seen that Aristotle thinks that *anticipation* is the relevant cognitive grasp that we have of the future. Therefore, any ‘envisioning’ or ‘grasp’ of a future prospect would need to be an *anticipation* of that prospect coming about for me on this particular occasion. Indeed, Johansen, who largely follows Lorenz, claims that our desire is directed towards an ‘*expected* object of perception,’ and

⁸⁴ Likewise, note Aristotle’s own discussion in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* (*Mem.*) on the difference between taking up a *phantasma* as ‘itself’ (καθ’ αὐτὸ), in which case it is seen as a *phantasma* only, or as of ‘something else’ (ἄλλου), in which case it can be a likeness or memory (*Mem.*, 450b25-27). Hence, Aristotle says that a likeness and an image are ‘the same but different in being’ (*Mem.* 450b22-23). *Phantasmata* that figure in anticipation are likewise again ‘different in being’ than *phantasmata* that figure in memory or idle imagination.

⁸⁵ This is the view of (Lorenz 2006), (Pearson 2012), and (Johansen 2012, 212).

that *phantasia* allows for a ‘projection or anticipation of pleasure or pain’ that triggers desire (Johansen 2012, 212).

I am in agreement with such scholars insofar as they emphasize the importance of prospects in the account of locomotion, prospects that should figure in anticipations. Indeed, I think there are overlooked pieces of evidence that support my claim that the ‘active cognition of the goal’ that leads to action must be an active *anticipation* that some future object of pursuit or avoidance will come about. Recall that the goal of action that initiates locomotion, which Aristotle says we must have cognition of, should be a *prakton agathon*: a goal achievable in action. In this context, *prakton* implies a particular modal status: something that admits of being otherwise (*DA* 3.10.433a29-30). Yet, of the three time modalities (past, present, and future), this modality seems to hold only for the future: a past or present good is not (or rather, is no longer) capable of being otherwise. In that case, the *prakta agatha* that our actions aim at (that we have an active cognition of) must be *in the future* to have the requisite modal status. Indeed, Aristotle assumes that our deliberation and action aim at future events in his famous argument for future contingents: ‘we see that what will be <i.e. in the future> has an origin both in deliberation and in action, and that, in general, in things that are not always actual there is the possibility of being and of not being’ (*De Interpretatione* 9.19a9, translation Ackrill). Likewise note Aristotle’s comments on deliberation and decision in *EN* 6.2: ‘neither do we deliberate about what is past, but only about what will be and admits of being or not being; and what is past does not admit of not having happened’ (*EN* 6.2.1139b7-9, translation Irwin). Aristotle’s point is that some future event, such as my participation in a sea battle tomorrow, admits of both occurring (being) and not occurring (not being) because it depends on my own actions and deliberations, e.g. whether I

today decide to participate in that sea battle. In contrast, past facts, such as the fact that I ate eggs for breakfast yesterday, do not admit of being otherwise.⁸⁶

The fact that our actions and deliberations are concerned with the future is further supported by Aristotle's division of rhetoric into three kinds: deliberative (συμβουλευτικόν), epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν), and forensic (δικανικόν). These respectively deal with actions in the three time modalities of future, present, and past (*Rhetoric* 1.3.1358b5-20). Those are, of course, the very time modalities that Aristotle associates with, respectively, anticipation, perception, and memory. Moreover, the future actions discussed by deliberative rhetoric are later described as follows: 'counsel can only be given on matters about which people can deliberate; matters, namely, that ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to set going. For we turn a thing over in our mind until the point of seeing whether we can do it or not' (*Rhetoric* 1.4.1359a37-b1, translation Rhys-Roberts). The future actions discussed in deliberative rhetoric are described as actions that depend on ourselves, that we 'set going.' Yet, voluntary 'actions in our power' are, moreover, precisely the movements that Aristotle describes in the *De Motu Animalium*.⁸⁷ Since they are in the domain of deliberative rhetoric, the actions in our power and any goals they aim to bring about must lie in the *future* and admit of being otherwise. As a result,

⁸⁶ I claim that the action-initiating goal of one's action, the object of desire that is the unmoved mover when anticipated, is some future contingent. However, this does not rule out the fact that we can desire impossible states of affairs. Indeed, Aristotle points out that wish (βούλησις) differs from decision insofar as we can have wishes for things that are impossible but can never decide on something impossible: 'one can wish for impossible things too, such as immortality. And one can also wish for things which could never be brought about through one's own efforts e.g. that a certain actor or athlete should win; but no one chooses things like that, but rather things that one thinks would come about through one's own agency' (EN.3.2.1111b19-26, translation Taylor). Though we can wish for something we take to be impossible, such a wish will never lead to any *bodily movement* (of the sort Aristotle focuses on in *MA*) to attain that object. As a result, the impossible good that is the object of such a wish will never initiate motion, and hence never motivate us in the relevant sense. On this point, it is helpful to note Pearson's distinction between *action-prompting* desires and *idle wishes* (Pearson 2012, 24-32).

⁸⁷ At least with respect to human beings. Animal motions do not count as actions (πράξεις) (EN 6.2.1139a18-20).

any present active cognition of such a goal must be an *anticipation*, as we saw earlier that anticipation is the sort of cognition that we have of the future.

I have argued that the sort of cognition animals must have of the object of desire in order to trigger locomotion is an *anticipation* of that object coming about. Admittedly, this view might be hard to accept insofar as Aristotle seems to say explicitly that we are motivated by a *perception* (*aisthesis*) of the goal. The same division I have drawn attention to, in which anticipation is of the future while perception is of the present, might seem to rule out the idea that we must be motivated by the anticipation of some future object of pursuit or avoidance coming about if a *perception* of the goal can motivate us. However, I believe that such remarks can be accommodated by the view that I have defended. Firstly, we saw in *Physics* 7.7 and *Rhetoric* 1.11 that anticipation is in some sense dependent on perception. In *Physics* 7.7, (T2.1), Aristotle implies that anticipation is dependent on perception and that pleasures in perception come about ‘due to perceptible things’ (ὕπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, *Physics* 7.7.247a14). Again, in *Rhetoric* 1.11, (T2.2), such pleasures were seen to require some *phantasma* of what is anticipated, where *phantasia* is described as a kind of decayed sense perception (*Rhetoric* 1.11.1370a27-32). Possibly, then, a ‘perception’ of the goal can still refer to an anticipation, but rather an anticipation that is reliant on our *perceptive* faculties.⁸⁸ This view will gain further support in the next chapter, when I argue that we can also distinguish a form of anticipation that relies more on our *rational* capacities for thought, rather than on our perception.

⁸⁸ Just as, for instance, memory also relies on our perceptual faculties and is perceptual in character. I believe this view is further supported by Aristotle’s remark in *De Sensu et Sensibilibus* (*De Sensu*) in which he describes how non-rational animals have perception so that they can pursue food and avoid destructive things by ‘pre-perceiving’ (προαισθανόμενα) them. (*De Sensu* 1.436b19-21, πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωσί τε προαισθανόμενα τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά φεύγωσι). Arguably, ‘pre-perceiving’ refers to the sort of anticipatory cognitive grasp of prospects that I now describe while drawing attention to its *perceptual* basis. Indeed, Aristotle goes on to contrast this ‘pre-perceiving’ with the activity of humans who have *phronêsis*.

Finally, I do grant that we should plausibly make room for a variety of basic motions that are initiated by occurrent sensory perceptions *without* affective anticipations.⁸⁹ Say, for instance, that I am holding someone's hand and want to *keep* holding her hand. I currently perceive the warmth and tactile sensation of holding her hand, the desirable goal (the unmoved mover) that I want to maintain. This perception might trigger me to move in certain ways, moreover, to ensure that I *continue* holding her hand and keep feeling that sensation, for instance by drawing closer to her or adjusting my fingers. Likewise, a lowly barnacle might contract its 'feeding legs' when it occurrently perceives some food on them and extend them when the food is gone.⁹⁰ Though some range of motions might be explained in this way, possibly including the motions of the sessile animals and basic reflex actions of human beings, I contend that the vast majority of animal movements are more complex and require an anticipation of an object of desire or aversion that is not occurrently perceived. For this reason, I generally ignore this class of basic and primitive reactions in what follows.

§2.3.3: *Affective* Anticipation of the Goal

I have argued that the unmoved mover (the object of desire) causes motion when we *anticipate* that that object of desire will come about through some particular action. This account receives support from existing views in the literature that argue that motivation requires grasping *prospects* of future goods. I have claimed that such grasps seem to require the cognitive act of

⁸⁹ Indeed, many passages suggest that the goal of action is provided by *phantasia*, thought or *perception*, seemingly implying that occurrent perception is at least sometimes sufficient to initiate some basic motions. Cf. (Rapp & Primavesi 2023, 48-49).

⁹⁰ Indeed, of all animals, sessile animals only possessing a sense of touch, such as the barnacle, seem to be those that are most likely incapable of anticipating future prospects. This may be because such 'imperfect' animals lack *phantasia*, as seems to be implied by Aristotle's comments in *De Anima* 3.11. Lorenz argues that such creatures lack *phantasia* and are consequently incapable of envisaging prospects. However, he argues that such creatures, capable of desire but incapable of purposive *locomotion* (change in place), are not within the explanatory scope of the account given in *De Motu* (Lorenz 2006, 138-147). Though Pearson, in contrast, argues that *any* sort of movement or action triggered by desire, even those actions of sessile sea-creatures, must involve envisaging future prospects (Pearson 2012, 44-47). Hence, even here we might think anticipation is required.

anticipation. However, neither Lorenz nor Pearson take this grasp of future prospects to be *affective*, that is, to be itself pleasant or painful. In contrast, I believe that motivation requires us to have an *affective* anticipation of an object of desire or aversion, and that this affect is crucial to explaining animal locomotion.

A quick initial reason to think that the act of anticipation is affective is that the sort of cognitive act that we are now describing seems to be precisely the sort that earlier passages would implicate as being an episode of *affective* anticipation. An object of desire that we want to bring about is generally something that is seen as pleasant, good, or desirable in some way. When I anticipate bringing about that object of desire in my own particular situation, I therefore anticipate bringing about something good, pleasant, useful, or fine. Yet, the evidence surveyed in §2.2 leads us to expect that an anticipation of some future good, pleasant, useful, or fine thing is a *pleasant* anticipation.

Further textual support can be found in *MA* 8. Here, Aristotle describes how desire causes physical motion by linking the activity of desire with occurrent *pleasure* and *pain*:

[T2.7] Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τῆς κινήσεως τὸ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖσι διωκτὸν τε καὶ φευκτὸν· ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ νοήσει καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ αὐτῶν θερμότης καὶ ψύξις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ λυπηρὸν φευκτὸν, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ διωκτὸν (ἀλλὰ λανθάνει περὶ τὰ μικρὰ τοῦτο συμβαῖνον), ἔστι δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα πάντα σχεδὸν μετὰ ψύξεώς τινος καὶ θερμότητος.

[T2.7] So then, the thing to be pursued or avoided in the domain of what is achievable in action is an origin of motion, as has been said. But warming and cooling necessarily follow the thought and appearance of those things, for <the thought or appearance of> what is to be avoided is painful and the <thought or appearance of> what is to be pursued is pleasant. But this happens around the small parts without the subject noticing, and, roughly speaking, painful and pleasant things are all accompanied by some cooling and warming. (*MA* 8.701b33-a1, translation Morrison, modified)

The passage begins with a claim that we have already seen in (T2.5): the primary origin of motion is the unmoved mover, the object of desire. In the ensuing discussion of §2.3.1, however, we saw Aristotle imply that the unmoved mover is taken to be something good, a *πρακτὸν*

ἀγαθόν. In contrast, in (T2.7) we learn that the beginning of motion is either something to be pursued (διωκτόν) or something to be avoided (φευκτόν). This is significant insofar as it serves to show that motion can be initiated *either* by the thought of something we desire and want to attain *or* by something that we are *averse to* and want to avoid. Aristotle next claims that warming and cooling accompany the ‘thought and appearance’ of objects of pursuit or avoidance. Aristotle earlier said that the unmoved mover causes motion by being thought of or imagined, and his current claim seems to be leading to an explanation that the *warming* and *cooling* that follow the relevant thought or appearance is what accounts for physical locomotion. Indeed, it is easier to see how warming and cooling, physical processes, can cause physical locomotion as opposed to mere thoughts. As I have already argued, I believe that the ‘thought or appearance’ of the object of desire or avoidance in fact refers to the *anticipation* of those objects. In support of this, note that in (T2.7) Aristotle again specifies that the objects of desire and avoidance are things achievable by us in action – they are ‘ἐν τῷ πρακτῷ.’ It follows that they must lie in the future so that it is possible for us to pursue or avoid them. I argued that anticipation is the way in which we grasp such future objects.

As we continue to examine (T2.7), it will be necessary to take a closer look at the second sentence. That sentence is important to my interpretation, but it requires some further explanation and defense:

[T2.7.2] ἐξ ἀνάγκης δ' ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ νοήσει καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ αὐτῶν θερμότης καὶ ψύξις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λυπηρὸν φευκτόν, τὸ δ' ἡδὺ διωκτόν

[T2.7.2] ‘But warming and cooling necessarily follow the thought and appearance of those things, for <the thought or appearance of> what is to be avoided is painful and the <thought or appearance of> what is to be pursued is pleasant’ (MA 8.701b34-36, my translation).

The most plausible way to read this passage, I claim, is to see it as establishing the ‘thought or appearance’ of the objects of pursuit as pleasant and the thought or appearance of the objects of

avoidance as painful. Insofar as I have argued that the ‘thought or appearance’ should be construed as the active anticipation of those objects, Aristotle’s current claim that such anticipation is painful or pleasant amounts to the claim that it is an *affective* anticipation.

However, other translators opt for a different translation that might make this reading seem untenable. For instance, Morison translates ‘But warming and cooling necessarily follow the thought and appearance of those things, *for the painful is to be avoided and the pleasant to be pursued*’ (MA 8.701b34-36 as translated by Morrison in Primavesi & Rapp 2023, 179, emphasis mine) while Nussbaum similarly has ‘Of necessity the thought and *phantasia* of these are accompanied by heating and chilling. *For the painful is avoided and the pleasant pursued*’ (MA 8.701b34-36 as translated by Nussbaum 1986, 44, emphasis mine). In this case, there is no claim that the thought or appearance of the object of desire or aversion is *itself* affective. Instead, Aristotle switches to making a general claim that the painful is an object of avoidance while the pleasant is an object of pursuit. However, I believe that there are a number of reasons to prefer my own construal of the sentence. Firstly, even if we grant that we generally pursue the pleasant and avoid the painful, Aristotle certainly allows that there are objects of pursuit *different* from the pleasant and objects of avoidance *different* from the painful.⁹¹ Indeed, the ‘walking is good for a human being’ example that I have already described says nothing about walking being pleasant, even though it is surely an object of pursuit (a διωκτόν). But if this is so, Aristotle’s sudden shift to the pleasant and the painful as objects of pursuit or avoidance seems strange.⁹²

⁹¹ Cf. EN 2.3.1104b31-32: three objects of choice are the ‘fine, beneficial, and the pleasant’ while three objects of avoidance are ‘the shameful, harmful, and painful.’ Likewise, cf. EN 10.3.1174a4-8 in which Aristotle says that we would still choose to have sight, memory, knowledge, and the virtues even if there were (counterfactually) no pleasure associated with such things.

⁹² Because Aristotle shifts to talking about objects of pursuit that are pleasant and objects of avoidance that are painful and says nothing about *other* objects of pursuit or avoidance, Nussbaum is forced to say that Aristotle is ‘offering not a conclusive argument for his thesis, but a persuasive *example* of its operation’ (Nussbaum 1986, 354, emphasis mine).

Secondly, Nussbaum and Morrison's translation cannot capture the explanatory force of the *gar* ('for') at MA 8.701b36 in (T2.7.2). We should expect the clause 'τὸ μὲν γὰρ λυπηρὸν φευκτόν, τὸ δ' ἡδὺ διωκτόν' to *explain* the preceding clause 'ἐξ ἀνάγκης δ' ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ νοήσει καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ αὐτῶν θερμότης καὶ ψύξις,' that is, to explain why the thought or appearance of the objects of pursuit and avoidance is accompanied by heating and cooling. Simply stating that the pleasant is an object of pursuit while the painful is an object of avoidance leaves the connection between the thought of such objects and the occurrent heating and cooling unclear. Indeed, consider the next few lines: 'But this happens around the small parts without the subject noticing, and, roughly speaking, painful and pleasant things are all accompanied by some cooling and warming' (MA 8.701b36-a1, translation Morrison). However, saying that painful and pleasant things are all accompanied by cooling and warming does not explain why the *thought or appearance* of objects of pursuit (even pleasant ones) is accompanied by cooling and warming. After all, the pleasant thing being thought of is not actually present.⁹³ In contrast, on my translation Aristotle says that the thought or appearance (I argued, anticipation) of the objects of pursuit or avoidance is itself affective (pleasant or painful) and then explains that pleasant and painful things are accompanied by warming or chilling. If this is true, the affective character of the thoughts and appearances of the objects of pursuit or avoidance explains why they are

⁹³ A defender of Morrison or Nussbaum's translation might object that they rely on a sentence from the previous chapter of *De Motu*: 'For perceptions immediately have their being as alterations of a certain type, but appearance and thought have the power of their objects. For somehow or other, the form of something hot or cold or sweet or frightening, when held in thought, just then is in its being like the things themselves, which is why merely thinking about them makes us shudder and get scared' (MA 7.701b17-22, translation Morrison). He could say that this shows that the thought of pleasant objects of pursuit is *itself* pleasant. I gladly welcome such a response, however, since it grants the point I am now trying to show: that the anticipation of the objects of pursuit and avoidance is *itself* affective, i.e. pleasant or painful. I still prefer my own translation, however, insofar as it allows that the anticipation of future objects of pursuit that *are not* pleasant (but are perhaps useful) can still be itself pleasant. Indeed, the proposed objection does not clarify how we can be motivated by prospective objects of pursuit or avoidance that *are not* pleasant or painful.

themselves accompanied by occurrent warming and cooling, and we can therefore understand Aristotle as giving a sensible explanation of why such anticipations cause locomotion.

My claim, that an *affective* anticipation of the object of pursuit or avoidance is responsible for the cooling and warming that causes full-body locomotion, receives further support from the explicit reference to anticipation and anticipatory emotions in the immediately following lines of *MA* 8:

[T2.8] τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν παθημάτων. θάρρη γὰρ καὶ φόβοι καὶ ἀφροδισιασμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ σωματικὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα τὰ μὲν κατὰ μῶριον μετὰ θερμότητος καὶ ψύξεως ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα· μνήμαι δὲ καὶ ἐλπίδες, οἷον εἰδώλοις χρώμεναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅτε μὲν ἦττον ὅτε δὲ μᾶλλον αἰτίαι τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσιν.

[T2.8] This is clear from the affections. For feelings of confidence and fear and sexual arousal and the other painful and pleasant bodily things occur sometimes in some particular part accompanied by warming and chilling, and sometimes in the whole body; but memories and anticipations, using such things as images, are causes of them, sometimes to a lesser extent and sometimes to a greater. (*MA* 8.701b36-702a7, translation Morrison, modified)

The affections (παθημάτων) that Aristotle describes in (T2.8) are anticipatory in character. In the Introduction we already saw that fear and confidence are a kind of *anticipatory* affect. We fear future dangers and are encouraged by the imminent prospect of safety.⁹⁴ Sexual arousal can also sometimes be anticipatory in character, as we can anticipate experiencing various forms of sexual gratification.⁹⁵ Moreover, fear, confidence, and sexual arousal are cases in which the physical warming and cooling are more readily apparent. These emotions are often accompanied by dramatic physical changes: our heart beats faster, our face flushes, our hands become sweaty, etc. In general, Aristotle claims that ‘other painful and pleasant bodily things’ accompany such

⁹⁴ Cf. also the respective definitions of the two emotions in the *Rhetoric* at 1382a21-27 and 1383a13-19, both of which emphasize the future-oriented nature of the relevant emotions. I discuss these passages in more depth in Chapter 4.

⁹⁵ Admittedly, sexual arousal can also be caused by ‘mere fantasies’ and memories that are not anticipatory in character.

warming and cooling. Finally, he says that ‘memories and anticipations (ἐλπίδες), using such things as images, are causes of them, sometimes to a lesser extent and sometimes to a greater.’ Here we have an explicit reference to anticipation, and the clear acknowledgement that it can be affective. Indeed, (T2.8) recalls the division that we saw in §2.2: memories and anticipations can be pleasant and painful, though they are somehow dependent on perceptual pleasures and pains (or more generally pleasures and pains of perception *or thought*). Likewise, I take the current claim to express a similar stance: anticipations and memories can use images of ‘painful and pleasant bodily things’ to themselves bring about painful and pleasant affections (παθημάτων) accompanied by warming and cooling. Indeed, in §4.3.2 and §4.3.3 I explicitly argue that Aristotle does indeed take two of the emotions mentioned in (T2.8), fear and confidence, to involve painful and pleasant anticipations respectively. This passage, and the explicit reference to anticipations, therefore clears the way to recognize *affective* anticipation as the relevant cognitive grasp of the goal that triggers locomotion by causing occurrent pleasure and pain and consequent warming and cooling in the body.

§2.3.4: Triggering Action: Preparation of Desire Passage

In this section I conclude my discussion of affective anticipations’ role in motivation by using the view that I have so far defended to interpret a passage in *MA* 8 that seems to summarize Aristotle’s account of animal locomotion. Aristotle first describes a view, familiar from elsewhere in his philosophy, in which active powers cause their correlate passive power to immediately act in the appropriate way if nothing impedes it (*MA* 8.702a10-15). Aristotle then describes how a chain of linked faculties (cognition, desire, affection, and physical alteration) cause animal locomotion:

[T2.9] διὰ τοῦτο ἅμα ὡς εἰπεῖν νοεῖ ὅτι πορευτέον καὶ πορεύεται, ἐὰν μὴ τι ἐμποδίζῃ ἕτερον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως ἔχειν τὰ πάθη, ἡ δὲ ὄρεξις τὰ

πάθη, τὴν δὲ ὄρεξιν ἢ φαντασίαν· αὕτη δὲ γίγνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἅμα δὲ καὶ ταχὺ διὰ τὸ <τὸ> ποιητικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα εἶναι τὴν φύσιν.

[T2.9] Because of this, something thinks that it should move forwards, and actually moves forwards, simultaneously, so to speak, so long as nothing else gets in the way. For the affections prepare the parts suited to be instruments to be in an appropriate condition, desire prepares the affections, and appearance desire. But appearance comes about either through thought or through perception. And this happens simultaneously and swiftly because of the fact that <the> active and passive are among the things related to each other by nature. (MA 8.702a15-21, translation Morrison)

Aristotle is explaining the case of someone who thinks that he should move or walk forward (πορεύεται) and more or less immediately does move forward, an instance of voluntary locomotion. Now, we will need to supply the object of desire for this example, i.e. the unmoved mover, as no such object is explicitly mentioned in (T2.9). Let us suppose that walking forward is taken to be *good* for someone in this instance for some unstated reason, perhaps for the sake of health or to collect money from a debtor.⁹⁶ As I argued in §3.1, locomotion would start when the man has the thought that he can now attain some particular good result by walking. As I argued in §3.2, since the good he will obtain (a *prakton agathon*) is in the future, it is not a mere ‘thought’ that some good is attainable but in fact an *anticipation* that he *can* attain that particular good when he acts. Aristotle then describes a chain of faculties that starts with thought and ends with the alteration of the parts ‘suitable to be instruments’ – a phrase that I take to refer to the bodily organs. At each stage of the chain one faculty is said to ‘prepare’ the subsequent faculty, though it is unclear what ‘prepare’ means in this context.

Let us walk through each link in the chain. First, an appearance (*phantasia*), which we already saw is needed for instances of anticipation, comes about on account of the anticipatory grasp of the future good. Anticipation explains why appearance represents a *future* contingent,

⁹⁶ Plausibly, however, someone might also think that he ‘must walk’ if the unmoved mover is some *bad* object of avoidance. For instance, if walking is necessary for someone to avoid his creditor who is quickly pursuing him in the marketplace.

rather than a past memory or a mere counter-factual fantasy. In the next link of the chain appearance prepares the desire. I suggest that the ‘preparation’ Aristotle refers to alludes to the fact that the active anticipation of the goal (which, as we have seen, involves *phantasia* in some way) causes desire to *become active*, as I argued in §2.3.1. Indeed, a reason to think that Aristotle has something like the transition from passivity to activity in mind is that he, just prior, explained how passive powers respond immediately to the relevant active powers. In this case, desire is itself passive relative to the antecedent active power of *anticipation* (through thought) that triggers a pre-existing desire to become active. Once thought of the goal (the unmoved mover) is active, desire itself becomes active. The activity of desire, meanwhile, prepares ‘the affections’ (τὰ πάθη). That is, the activity of desire causes the actuality of pleasure or pain, an actuality that is passive relative to desire.

Finally, the affections (pleasure or pain and their attendant warming or cooling) cause the organic bodily parts to be in the suitable condition to trigger the bodily motion. Specifically, Aristotle holds that these temperature changes cause small areas at the heart to expand or contract; these small motions in turn cause larger motions in our nerves and limbs, just as small motions at one end of a lever cause large motions at the opposite end. The limbs themselves function almost like oars, gaining leverage on an external springboard or medium to propel our bodies through our environment.⁹⁷ Once again, however, note that warming and cooling are active powers relative to the physical expansion and contraction that they effect on the bodily

⁹⁷ Aristotle gives a mechanical explanation of this phenomenon, comparing it to how small motions at the end of a lever that is closer to the fulcrum cause larger motions at the opposite end of the lever, and to how small motions of a rudder give rise to large motions at the prow of a ship (*MA* 7.701b24-28). For more on this mechanistic explanation and how it fits within the integrated *teleological* and mechanistic explanation of animal motion that Aristotle provides, cf. (Johnson 2017, 141-149). Note that this is also where connate *pneuma* might enter the picture, as it is arguably this element that naturally contracts and expands to push and pull surrounding organs and thereby cause the lever-like motion of the limbs (*MA* 10.703a19-24). For another recent discussion of the bio-kinematic explanation being offered in Aristotle, also cf. (Rapp 2023, 36-39). For discussion of the importance of an ‘external springboard’ to Aristotle’s account of animal locomotion, cf. (Coope 2020).

organs, though from another perspective the warming and cooling are passive insofar as they are triggered and initiated by desire becoming active.

There is therefore a chain of linked active-passive powers that begins with anticipation of the goal, goes through desire, pleasure and pain, and ends in heating, cooling, and a resultant change in one's physical organs. It can be diagrammed as followed:

[1] active anticipation of object of pursuit or avoidance (τὸ φευκτόν or τὸ διωκτόν) → [2] active desire → [3] occurrent pleasure/pain & warming/cooling → [4] solidifying/liquefying (preparation) of organs

The final step, the physical alterations in the small areas around the heart, in turn causes full-body locomotion thanks to the lever-like motion being transmitted through to the bodily limbs.

Though the diagram and the chain analogy are useful, I believe that we should resist the idea there is some affectless anticipation (the first link in the chain) that causes some separate 'feel' of pleasure (the third link). Indeed, the activity of linked active-passive powers, for instance the activity of teaching (the activity of an active power) and the activity of learning (the activity of a passive power) are described as 'the same but different in being' in *Physics* 3.3.⁹⁸ If that is the case, however, then we could see the activity of desire as 'the same but different in being' as the correlate activity of anticipating the goal that causes desire to become active. Likewise, the activity of desire would be the same, but different in being, as the pleasure and pain that it triggers. If this is true, however, then Aristotle is not describing a chain of separable movers in a causal chain in which we can, so to speak, yank out one and understand the rest independently. Rather, we have a single cognitive activity, an *affective anticipation*, that has a

⁹⁸ For discussion on how this distinction should be understood, cf. (Hussey 1983, 68-72) and (Marmodoro 2007). Hussey emphasizes how there is literally *one* individual thing or activity in such cases, though it admits of two distinct descriptions. Marmodoro in contrast contends that there are distinct individuals that correspond to each distinct 'being,' though she contends that they have 'one and the same ground of realization.'

‘different being’ as each different element in the chain.⁹⁹ This is why the affective anticipation is *itself* a conative impulse. It is ‘the same but different in being’ as active desire as well as the physical alterations that accompany the impulse.¹⁰⁰

§2.4: Conclusion

Let us take stock. We first saw that Aristotle, like Plato, acknowledges anticipatory pleasure and pain as important ways in which we feel pleasure and pain. We feel pleasure when we anticipate getting some future pleasure, benefit, fine thing, or in general some future good. On the other hand, we feel pain when we anticipate future pain or anticipate encountering something harmful or bad. We also saw that Aristotle repeatedly refers to a division of time modalities into past, present, and future, each of which is associated with its own sort of cognition (memory, perception, and anticipation) that can itself be pleasant or painful. Pleasant and painful anticipation (like pleasant and painful memory), moreover, were somehow dependent on pleasant or painful perception, and in turn seemed to require a *phantasma* of its object.

I then turned to *De Anima* and *De Motu Animalium* and argued that affective anticipation is essential to locomotion. The unmoved mover only triggers desire when it is thought of or imagined, but I argued that the relevant cognition that is needed (in almost all cases) is in fact an

⁹⁹ The tight interconnectedness of the different activities at work here is perhaps noted, in a different context, by Irwin when he comments on the sameness but difference in being of the capacity for desire and the capacity for perception: ‘We must attribute perceptions, appearances, *anticipations of pleasure and pain*, and desire all at the same time, we lack grounds for attributing any one without the other’ (Irwin 1988, pg. 330).

¹⁰⁰ Though I come at it in a different way, my discussion of active desire as the same but different in being as the resultant occurrent pleasure and pain and the attendant warming and cooling has interesting resonance with David Charles’ recent discussion of desire as an essentially psychophysical capacity. He describes desire as an ‘exercise of a goal-directed material capacity: a capacity to heat in a way sensitive to the goals to be achieved, exercised in a distinctive type of inextricably goal-sensitive heating’ (Charles 2021, 108). The essentially psycho-physical nature of affective anticipations is brought out, on my view, by the fact that the warming and cooling attendant on the pleasure and pain are the same but different in being as the first link in the chain, the affective anticipation of the goal.

anticipation of encountering an object of pursuit or avoidance. Our anticipation of acquiring an object of desire triggers desire to become active and results in occurrent pleasure and pain. This occurrent pleasure and pain, and the warming and cooling it occasions, in turn accounts for the physical alterations to our organs and muscles and the resulting full-body locomotion.

Before moving on, let me briefly take stock of some important similarities and dissimilarities between the role that I have attributed to affective anticipation in Plato and the role that I have attributed to affective anticipation in Aristotle. One key similarity is, of course, my contention that both take an affective anticipation of the object of desire (or aversion) to be essential in motivating us to act accordingly. While I allowed that perception alone might be sufficient to motivate some basic forms of animal motion in Aristotle, I argued that both Plato and Aristotle take memory and perception to be insufficient for the vast majority of cases. This is despite the fact that both Plato and Aristotle take anticipation to itself depend on perception and memory.¹⁰¹ I have also argued that the *occurrent affect* that accompanies affective anticipation does the central work: it is what explains the physiological motion that moves us in the present moment.

However, one major difference deserves comment. In the *Philebus*, evidence suggests that desire is antecedent to, and somehow separate from, affective anticipation. In contrast, I have argued that we can discern a tighter relationship between affective anticipation and desire in Aristotle. Namely, I have suggested that affective anticipation marks the *activity* of desire that is itself equivalent to a motion. The affective anticipation therefore does not cause an animal to form a desire towards the anticipated prospect, nor is it merely conjoined with a desire in

¹⁰¹ However, I suggested that they express this dependence differently. The dependence of anticipation on memory in the *Philebus* as a preserved sense-perception is partly picked up by the dependence of anticipation on *phantasia* in Aristotle, which is itself sometimes seen as a kind of decayed sense perception or residual motion from perception.

instances of locomotion. Affective anticipation is even, as I suggested in §2.3.4, ‘the same but different in being’ as desire. It is not surprising that we see no hint of this view in Plato; Plato lacks the notion of two things being the same but different in being and also lacks the distinction between potentiality and actuality, both of which depend on Aristotle’s distinctive ontology.

The next chapter will identify another similarity between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conception of affective anticipation by describing a further complication that I believe is common to both of them. Namely, Plato and Aristotle allow for *two kinds* of affective anticipation: rational and non-rational affective anticipation. While non-rational anticipation draws on only perception and memory, rational anticipation is formed in light of higher reasoning and understanding about the pleasant and painful, the good and the bad. In conjunction with the last two chapters, the next chapter will allow us to understand two different *ways* in which we can be motivated through affective anticipation: either by an affective anticipation that relies on mere past perceptual experience of the objects of pursuit or avoidance or an affective anticipation that relies on our reasoned outlook concerning the objects of pursuit or avoidance.

CHAPTER 3: Rational and Non-Rational Affective Anticipation

§3.1: Introduction

In this chapter I argue that we can discern two kinds of affective anticipation in Plato and Aristotle: non-rational affective anticipation (based solely on memories of past sensory pleasures and pains) and rational affective anticipation (based on a rational grasp of the future objects of our desire). I propose that acknowledging this distinction helps us recognize two different ways in which the cognitive content of affective anticipations can be formed – either through the brute habituation of our senses or through a rational understanding of the things we pursue or avoid. Taken in conjunction with arguments from Chapters 1 and 2, this distinction will in turn allow us to appreciate two different *ways* in which we can be motivated by affective anticipations. We can be motivated in a non-rational way, anticipating certain things as pleasant or painful due to past sensory experiences, or in a rational way, pleasantly or painfully anticipating prospects that we intellectually grasp as good or bad. In particular, recognizing *rational* affective anticipation allows us to appreciate a concrete way in which our rationality can itself be affective, underlie our impulses, and as it were *imbue* our emotions.

Though I argue that the distinction between non-rational and rational affective anticipation can be fruitfully discerned in both Plato and Aristotle, we will see that it takes slightly different forms in the two different philosophers. I claim that Plato takes non-rational affective anticipation to be based on memories of past sensations. Aristotle, on the other hand, explains affective anticipation by appealing to *phantasia*, a unique aspect of his own psychology. On the rational side, I argue that Plato believes that some sort of *process of reasoning* can give rise to pleasant and painful anticipations. When we turn to Aristotle, however, I argue that the focus is not so much on an extended *process* of reasoning or deliberation but rather on a non-

deliberated but intellectual, thought-based grasp of a prospect as in some respect good or bad. In either case, *rational* anticipation requires our distinctively human, rational faculties while non-rational anticipation extends to non-human animals.¹⁰²

The plan of this chapter is as follows. In §3.2 I first turn to the *Philebus* and recall a result from Chapter 1: affective anticipation, as crucially described in 35d-36c, is ascribed to *all animals*. In that discussion we saw that anticipation was said to rely on memory, understood as a kind of retained sense-perception, but that it did not seem to rely on any higher psychological faculties. However, in the *Philebus* Socrates later argues that some anticipatory pleasures can be false. In §3.3 I explain how this argument relies on anticipations that are based on beliefs that result from a process of internal reasoning and inquiry. I claim that the *Philebus* thus suggests that there is a division between two basic kinds of anticipation, one kind relying only on memory and another kind that draws in addition on our distinctively ‘rational’ capacities. In §3.4 I argue that later arguments on true and false pleasures in the *Philebus* allow us to further flesh out this distinction. Namely, the discussion of other sorts of true and false pleasures allows us to understand specific examples of false non-rational anticipatory pleasures, false rational anticipatory pleasures, and *true* rational anticipatory pleasures. Indeed, I contend that arguments in the dialogue suggest that we transition from the non-rational, false pleasant anticipations of

¹⁰² In passing, it should be noted that there is a robust ancient tradition of holding future-directed cognitive capacities to be distinctive of human beings. Cf. Cicero: ‘But the most marked difference between man and beast is this: the beast, just as far as it is moved by the senses and with very little perception of past or future, adapts itself to that alone which is present at the moment; while man—because he is endowed with reason, by which he comprehends the chain of consequences, perceives the causes of things, understands the relation of cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies, and connects and associates the present and the future—easily surveys the course of his whole life and makes the necessary preparations for its conduct’ (Cicero, *de Officiis* 1.11, translation Miller [Loeb]). Humans are distinctive insofar as they are able to connect the present, past, and future in their mind, predicting the future by drawing on their causal knowledge. Yet, while foresight was undoubtedly a key contender for being a distinctive feature of human-beings, Sorabji explains how it had some fierce and eclectic competition. For instance, various ancient philosophers claimed that humans are distinctive insofar as they are able to ‘be political,’ ‘do geometry,’ ‘laugh,’ and are ‘born defenseless and naked,’ ‘have a face,’ and ‘engage in sex at all seasons.’ (Sorabji 1993, 91)

intense bodily pleasures that most people undergo to true, rational pleasant anticipations that are based on a deeper philosophical understanding of pleasure and the value of rational activity.

In §3.5 I turn to Aristotle, first motivating the distinction between non-rational and rational affective anticipations by drawing our attention to an otherwise puzzling issue: in some passages Aristotle appears to *deny* that non-rational animals can anticipate the future, while other passages seem to unambiguously *affirm* it. This issue can be resolved, I maintain, by recognizing a similar distinction between non-rational and rational affective anticipations. In §3.6 I draw on the work of recent scholarship to explain how *non-rational* affective anticipations can be based on sensory *phantasia* of past perceptual pleasures and pains. This faculty enables temporal associations to be formed between stored sensory impressions, *phantasmata*, that can later be re-deployed when ‘triggered’ by occurrent perception to enable anticipation and, consequently, various complex forms of animal behavior. In §3.7 I turn to argue that we should *also* accept a different sort of *rational* affective anticipation in which the object of pursuit or avoidance, the first mover of an action as explained in Chapter 2, is provided by thought. *This* sort of affective anticipation is not something animals are capable of, and hence can be used to interpret those passages that appear, implausibly, to deny anticipation to animals. This distinction will lay the groundwork for Chapter 5, moreover, in which I argue that *rational* affective anticipation is the kind of affective anticipation that underlies the motivation of fully rational agents while non-rational affective anticipation underlies the motivations of the learners.

§3.2: Affective Anticipation and Animal Life in the *Philebus*

In Chapter 1 I argued that anticipatory pleasure and pain depend on three other psychological capacities: perception, memory, and desire. I claimed that memory helps us fix the *object* of desire by recalling a restorative process, experienced in the past, that is contrary to an

occurently experienced painful, destructive process. Indeed, Socrates earlier describes memories as nothing other than preserved sense-perceptions. Though anticipation is not equivalent to memory, the anticipation described nonetheless depends on memory insofar as one anticipates experiencing a restorative process of the sort that was remembered. Hence, Socrates claims that someone anticipates a future restoration *by remembering* (τῷ μεμνησθαι, 36b4-5). In this section I review evidence from the *Philebus* that suggests that such capacities for anticipation, those based on perception and memory, are universally possessed among all animals.

Firstly, note that Socrates, after describing perception, memory, and desire but immediately before describing the examples of anticipatory pleasure and anticipatory pain, somewhat mysteriously claims that he discerns a ‘form of life’ (βίου εἶδος) in those creatures that experience restorations and destructions:

[T3.1] {ΣΩ.} Ἦτι δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν. βίου γὰρ εἶδος τί μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.
{ΠΡΩ.} Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου πέρι βίου φράξεις;
{ΣΩ.} Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενουῖσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τέ ἐστι τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τούτων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ γινόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς.
{ΠΡΩ.} Ἦστι ταῦτα.

[T3.1] Socrates: Moreover we should still consider this concerning these same things. For the argument seems to me to want to show us a kind of life in these same things.

Protarchus: In what things, and what sort of life do you indicate?

Socrates: In the filling and emptying and in everything that concerns both the preservation and destruction *of the animals*, and if some one of us in coming to undergo each of these <processes> feels pain, he nevertheless later feels pleasure according to the changes.

Protarchus: This is so. (*Philebus* 35d8-e6, my translation)

Socrates’ description of something that constantly undergoes processes of restoration and destruction would seem to apply to all living organisms. Indeed, Socrates’ mention of a ‘form of life’ recalls his earlier discussion of ‘ensouled forms’ at 32a8-b4, as discussed in §1.2. At that time Socrates expounded his view on pleasures and pains accompanying, respectively,

restorations and destructions, the very thing Socrates now reminds us of before discussing the examples of anticipatory pleasures and pains. In §1.2, I claimed that the earlier discussion of living organisms as ‘ensouled forms,’ which relies on a more abstract metaphysical framework established earlier in the dialogue, is meant to apply to *all* forms of animal life and not simply to human beings. This point is emphasized in our current passage (T3.1): Socrates is discussing processes that concern the preservation and destruction *of the animals* (τῶν ζῴων). His target is thus living creatures generally, rather than humans specifically.¹⁰³

Moreover, Socrates explicitly attributes pleasant anticipation to animals immediately after describing the ‘clear anticipation’ case in which someone simultaneously feels pain due to the occurrent perception of a destructive process but also pleasure due to the clear and pleasant anticipation that he will be restored (36b4-6). Socrates then says that:

[T3.2] {ΣΩ.} Τότε ἄρ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα λυπεῖται τε ἅμα καὶ χαίρει.

[T3.2] Socrates: Therefore, at that time a human *and the other animals* simultaneously both feel pain and rejoice. (36b8-9, my translation, emphasis mine)

(T3.2) clearly and unambiguously attributes the psychological phenomenon described in the preceding example of ‘clear anticipation,’ a pleasant anticipation conjoined with an occurrent, painful perception of a destructive process, to other non-human animals. This, in turn, coheres

¹⁰³ Lorenz also emphasizes that the account of restorative and anticipatory pleasures from 32b9-36c2 is meant to apply to all animals, rather than simply humans (Lorenz 2006, 102-104, esp. fn. 15). However, Lorenz qualifies this statement by claiming that it should not apply to any creature that lacks perception and memory, the sort of life that Socrates compares to the life of a mollusk or sea-creature (*Philebus* 21c1-8). Yet, it is not so clear that Plato thinks such benighted sea-creatures *genuinely* lack memory, perception, and (consequently) desire. Indeed, the *Timaeus* explicitly attributes perceptions and desires (appetites, ἐπιθυμῖαι) to *plants* and clearly states that they count as a ‘living creature’ (ζῶον) (*Timaeus* 77b1-c5). Such plants are, however, denied belief (δόξα), reasoning (λογισμός), and understanding (νοῦς) (*Timaeus* 77b5), precisely the sort of capacities that are implicated in those anticipatory pleasures that are based on ‘writings in our soul.’ Perhaps even plants (and hence *all* living creatures without exception) are capable of the non-rational anticipatory pleasures that depend only on perception and memory, while only humans and rational creatures can experience anticipatory pleasures that are based on beliefs and reasoning. Alternatively, this might simply be a point of difference between the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus*. Regardless, for our purposes it suffices to note that anticipatory pleasures that are based merely on memories seem to extend more widely than those based on reasoning and beliefs; we can remain neutral on the precise extension of the former.

with Socrates' claim that living creatures can be in-between destruction and restoration (35e7-36a1). As I argued in Chapter 1, living creatures are 'in-between' the affections in the sense that they occurrently suffer one process but are psychologically oriented towards, and in the case of 'clear anticipation' actively anticipating, undergoing the contrary restorative process that is not currently being experienced. (T3.2) implies that *all animals* feel pleasant anticipation when they have a clear anticipation of undergoing the restorative processes that they desire to experience, and *a fortiori* that all animals are able to anticipate the future. However, such anticipation likely depends only on the psychological capacities that Socrates has described prior to this point: perception and memory. I describe this kind of anticipation, based on the perception and memory as discussed in Chapter 1, as *non-rational* anticipation.¹⁰⁴

§3.3: The Scribe and Painter in our Soul at *Philebus* 38b-40e: Rational Affective Anticipation

While Socrates seems to attribute non-rational affective anticipation to all animals, in his infamous argument for false anticipatory pleasures he seems to describe a kind of anticipation that goes beyond the basic psychological capacities of perception and memory and that is instead based on explicit reasoning about the objects of our desire. I argue that we should therefore

¹⁰⁴ It is highly interesting that my discussion of non-rational anticipation coincidentally coincides with Tyler Burge's recent account of *perceptual anticipation*, an account that he defends in a contemporary work within the philosophy of mind. He claims that: 'in all animals that have perception, perception is paired with perceptual memory and perceptual anticipation. Representational memory preserves perception. Perceptual anticipatory representation projects perception. The projection can be automatic and unconscious. It can be caused by simple associational mechanisms. It can be the result of innate tendencies, conditioning, or learning. These three psychological functions—perception, memory, and anticipatory representation—coordinate in sharpening and enriching perception and in supporting action. Insofar as memory and anticipation serve only perception, perceptual recognition, or perception-driven action, they are rightly regarded as perceptual-level, and pre-cognitive' (Burge 2022, 630). The similarity to the account in Plato and Aristotle that I outline in this chapter is striking. Burge makes the same tripartite division familiar from Plato and Aristotle between perception, memory, and anticipation. He claims, with Plato, that memory preserves perception, and says that such perceptual memory can in turn be 'projected' forward in instances of perceptual anticipation. We anticipate the future *through* memory. He attributes perceptual anticipation to all animals with perception, just as Plato and Aristotle attribute non-rational anticipation to all such animals. Indeed, he calls such anticipation 'pre-cognitive,' and later contrasts it with other forms of anticipation (such as 'prediction') that draw on higher cognitive faculties. This helps show that something like the ancient view I identify in Plato and Aristotle is not some sort of philosophical dead-end, but in fact a contender in contemporary philosophy of mind.

distinguish between rational and non-rational affective anticipation, the former of which is a distinctive capacity of human beings who possess reason.

After introducing the examples of anticipatory pleasures and pains (‘clear anticipation’ and ‘despair’) that I discussed in Chapter 1, Socrates attempts to address the question of whether some pleasures can be false, pointing out that sometimes pleasures can arise in us with a false belief. Protarchus, however, insists that in such cases the *belief* is false rather than the pleasure itself (37e10-38a2). This prompts Socrates to describe in more detail how we can have anticipatory pleasures that are based on false beliefs. Though the argument has been the subject of scholarly dispute, I will try to rely on a relatively uncontroversial summary of the passage. In brief, Socrates claims that there is, as it were, a ‘scribe’ and a ‘painter’ within our souls who, respectively, write down and illustrate beliefs (δόξα). He further says, however, that many of these illustrated beliefs are anticipations (or hopes, ἐλπίδες) about our own future (39e4-5). Socrates claims that we often rejoice in these expectations, something he compares to looking at and rejoicing in the ‘painted images’ of such expectations that are depicted within our souls. Insofar as such pleasures are based on expectations about our future, Socrates is clearly describing *anticipatory* pleasures.¹⁰⁵

Some other scholars have noted that the painter and scribe analogy seems to be squarely focused on humans, rather than all animals.¹⁰⁶ However, I wish to defend a specific way in which the anticipations depend on reason that has not been noted. Namely, I argue that the account of

¹⁰⁵ There is a large literature on the painter and scribe analogy in the *Philebus*, and I do not engage with all of the relevant debates in this chapter. Influential treatments are those found in (Gosling & Taylor 1982, 431-44), as well as (Frede 1985) and (Harte 2004). More recent treatments are those found in (Dimas 2019), (Fletcher 2022), and (Marechal 2022).

¹⁰⁶ See, for instance, Warren’s claim that the scribe’s ‘statements’ (*logoi*) shows that ‘Socrates has now moved from an account of desire that covers all animals to the discussion of a capacity present in humans alone’ (Warren 2014, 145). Likewise, Lorenz believes the dependence on *beliefs* (*doxa*) signals the switch to humans, in conjunction with his view that beliefs depend on reason in later dialogues (post-*Theaetetus*).

belief and expectation formation in the painter and scribe analogy shows how perception and memory are sometimes insufficient for the formation of our beliefs, and that such formation instead depends on explicit reasoning. To start, note how Socrates claims that ‘beliefs and the attempt to form a definite belief on each occasion come about in us from memory and perception’ (38b12-13, my translation).¹⁰⁷ Socrates says that two things result from memory and perception: ‘beliefs the attempt to form a definite belief’ (δόξα ... καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν). This conjunction suggests that, sometimes, beliefs (δόξα) can be immediately formed from our memories and perceptions. Other times, however, perceptions and memories do not result in a belief but instead result in the *attempt to form a definite belief* (τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν). Socrates goes on to describe such a case. He asks us to consider someone who has an unclear view of some unknown object out in the distance. That person then asks himself what he is looking at: ‘whatever is that thing (Τί ποτ' ἄρ' ἔστι) appearing to be standing beside the rock and under a tree?’ (38c12-d1, my translation). In this case, perception and memories alone *do not* directly give rise to the belief. Hence, the man must proceed to engage in an internal dialogue within himself to form a belief about what he is looking at.

Socrates does not describe the cognitive process (or processes) that are responsible for the formation of a determinate belief in such cases of unclear perception, but his example does make it clear that the process can go well or poorly, and result in either a true belief or a false belief. He says that a person with an unclear view of something under the tree in the distance might *correctly* say ‘as though answering to himself’ that he is looking at a human being (38d5-7). On the other hand, someone after ‘erring’ (παρενεχθείς) might say that he is looking at ‘a

¹⁰⁷ Note that ‘to form a definite belief’ (διαδοξάζειν) is a Platonic neologism, as pointed out by Wood’s ad. loc. commentary (Wood 2019, 96-97). As he points out, the ensuing discussion of belief formation as consequent upon an internal dialogue parallels descriptions of belief found in the *Theaetetus* (189e-190a) and the *Sophist* (263d-264a). I discuss those passages in more detail below.

statue, the work of some herdsman' (38d9-10). Admittedly, in this example Socrates does not describe someone 'reasoning' in any straightforward sense. He rather describes a man who simply asks what he is looking at and then boldly asserts that it is a human being or a statue.¹⁰⁸ Yet, I suggest that we are meant to understand that a certain process of internal reasoning occurs, and that it is this process of reasoning that leads to the formation of a determinate belief. After asking himself what he is looking at, for instance, someone might say to himself that he often sees farmers out in these fields, or contrarily say that someone was planning to erect a statue in this area, thereby inferring that he is probably looking at a statue. Socrates' description of deliberate self-questioning brings to mind such a process of reasoning rather than a brute or automatic process of belief-formation that is solely the product of perception and memory. There is an opportunity to go one of two ways, one way leading to error while the other leads to success. Relatedly, the image of the soul talking to itself recalls a reflexive activity that is proper to the soul, as it turns inwards on itself, rather than a merely passive reception of external sensations.

If we look beyond the *Philebus*, moreover, the description of the soul carrying out an internal dialogue occurs in other Platonic dialogues in which it is more explicitly associated with processes of thought and reasoning. Note the following description of thinking (τὸ διανοεῖσθαι) from the *Theaetetus*,

[T3.3] {ΣΩ.} Κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;

¹⁰⁸ I do not think, as Frede does, that *memory* allows for the formation of a definite belief in the case of an unclear perception of the man in the distance: 'Der zunächst unbestimmte Sinneseindruck wird mit Hilfe des Gedächtnisses identifiziert, das die erforderlichen Begriffe beisteuert (‚Mensch‘, ‚Felsen‘, bzw. ‚Statue‘, ‚Werk von Hirten‘)' (Frede 1997, 247, 'The initially indeterminate sensory impression is identified with the help of memory, which contributes the necessary terms ("human," "rock," or "statue," "work of shepherds")'). For one, we already saw that the previous passage states that perception *and* memory are said to sometimes lead to *the attempt* to form a definite belief, suggesting that something beyond memory and perception is used in the attempt to actually arrive at a definite belief. Secondly, one can presumably have the proper concepts in one's memory but still not know how to apply them in some particular case of unclear perception. Indeed, it seems that someone with the exact same memories and perception could make a mistake or get things correct based on the course of their reasoning.

{ΘΕΑΙ.} Τί καλῶν;

{ΣΩ.} Λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὥς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοοῦμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπάξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν· σὺ δὲ τί;

[T3.3] Socrates: Wonderful! But do you call ‘thinking’ (τὸ διανοεῖσθαι) the very thing I do?

Theaetetus: What sort of thing do you call it?

Socrates: A speech (λόγον) which the soul itself relates to itself concerning the things which it investigates. At least I, in ignorance, so define it for you. For this ‘thinking’ appears to me to be nothing other than to converse, <the soul> asking and answering itself, and affirming and denying. And whenever after determining something it should say the same thing and not doubt it, seizing it either quickly or slowly, we establish this same thing as its belief. The result is that I, at least, call ‘to judge’ to speak and ‘the belief’ a spoken sentence, not however <one spoken> to another nor <one spoken> aloud, but rather <spoken> in silence to oneself. What about you? (*Theaetetus* 189e4-190a6, my translation)

‘Thinking’ (τὸ διανοεῖσθαι) is here described as an internal process of asking and answering questions to oneself in one’s own soul, the very thing that occurs at *Philebus* 38b-39a. It is here, in thinking, where we can form false beliefs. Indeed, Socrates in the *Theaetetus* goes on to discuss cases similar in nature to what we find in the *Philebus*, in which someone forms a false sensory belief by mis-identifying something that they are looking at, for instance misidentifying someone named Theodorus as another person named Theaetetus (193c). Likewise, in the *Sophist* the Eleatic Stranger describes thinking as a kind of internal conversation with oneself: ‘Aren’t thought and speech the same, except that what we call thought is speech that occurs without the voice, inside the soul in conversation with itself?’ (*Sophist* 263e, translation Nicholas White).

The fact that the attempt to form a definite belief leads, in the *Philebus*, to an internal dialogue in

the soul therefore likely signals that the belief is based on a process of internal thought and reasoning.¹⁰⁹

Now, someone might still object that the beliefs that Socrates describes in the *Philebus* book simile do not depend on reasoned inquiry but are instead only based on perceptions and memories. This could be supported by his description of the scribe ‘writing’ words within our soul:

[T3.4] {ΣΩ.} Ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμπίπτουσα εἰς ταὐτὸν κάκεινα ἃ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνονται μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀληθεῖ γράφῃ [τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα], δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ λόγοι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ συμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι· ψευδῇ δ' ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς γράψῃ, τάναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβῃ.

[T3.4] Socrates: When memory falls together with perceptions into the same thing, those affections that concern these things appear to me to write, as it were, sentences (λόγους) in our souls, and whenever [this affection] should write true things, true belief and true statements follow from it and come about in us; but whenever this sort of scribe should write false things for us, the opposite to the true <beliefs and *logoi*> result. (39a1-7, my translation)

(T3.4) might make it seem as if beliefs always directly result from memory and perception, the lower order capacities that I previously argued underlie non-rational anticipations. However, the passage is far from clear, and how to understand the Greek has been the subject of some dispute.¹¹⁰ My own tentative inclination is that we should take the difficult phrase that I have

¹⁰⁹ I also think that the seemingly mundane question that the man asks himself is significant: ‘whatever is that thing? (Τί ποτ' ἄρ' ἔστι)’ (38c12). This is the same question that, in other dialogues, leads to inquiry concerning the Forms when it is asked about justice, piety, equality, etc. Also note passages, as quoted by David Ebrey, in which the forms are conceived of as answering ‘what is it’ questions in the *Phaedo* (*Phaedo* 65d-e, 75c-d, 78c-d) and as the things under discussion ‘when asking our questions and giving our answers’ (*Phaedo* 75d3-4) (Ebrey 2023, 25-26; 70-75). The reflexive activity of self-questioning in an internal dialogue, therefore, makes use of rational resources that, in other contexts, can give rise to inquiry concerning the Forms. Taken together, this is further evidence that the attempt to form a definite belief as described in the *Philebus* draws on the resources of thought and reasoning rather than mere perception and memory.

¹¹⁰ Note Bury’s long ad. loc. comment in which he expresses dissatisfaction with existing treatments and the problems in ascertaining the reference of ‘κάκεινα ἃ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα’ (Bury 1897, 81-82). As Bury recounts, Stallbaum and Badham both take it to refer to ‘those affections that belong to these faculties,’ where ‘these faculties’ refers to perception and memory. Hence, perception and memory do all the relevant work. On the other hand, Poste takes the phrase to refer to τὸ δοξαστικόν, the affections that accompany the formation of a ‘judgment as concerned with sensuous perceptions.’ Hackforth takes the ‘τὰ παθήματα’ to refer to ‘unspecified feelings or

translated ‘those affections that concern these things’ (κάκεινα ἃ περὶ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα)¹¹¹ to refer to the kind of internal dialogue and reasoning that can occur during the attempt to form a definite belief (τὸ διαδοξάζειν) that Socrates referenced just before. I have already argued that sometimes mere memories and perceptions are not sufficient to form a direct belief, and that in such cases a kind of internal dialogue or process of reasoning leads to belief formation. Hence, the present suggestion is that the affections that relate to such a process of internal reasoning, whatever those might be, can interact with (‘fall together with’) memory and perception to form a belief and, as it were, write ‘sentences’ (λόγους)¹¹² in our souls. Therefore, though belief formation undoubtedly relies on perception and memory, I believe that we have good reason to think that it can draw on other faculties as well.

Socrates, then, seems to suggest that beliefs can *either* be based on perception and memory alone *or* in addition be based on a process of internal thought and reasoning. Yet, Socrates goes on to explain how those same beliefs can also underlie *affective anticipations*. First, Socrates and Protarchus agree that the *logoi* and pictures within our soul can be about all times: the past, the present, and the future (39c10-12). Those about our own future are, of course,

emotions’ such as ‘fear, confidence, anger, and love’ (Hackforth 1945, 72). Gosling rightly criticizes Hackforth’s suggestion: such emotions seem to be results of the scribe and painter’s activity, not materials used by them. Yet, Gosling’s own suggestion, that they refer to ‘present lack and previous replenishment’ is also implausible (Gosling 1975, 110-111). There is little reason to think that the *doxa* must be narrowly related to the lacks and restorations implicated in the previous discussion of desire when Socrates instead seems to be describing belief formation more generally. Indeed, the preceding example of someone trying to form a belief after seeing a person under a tree seems to have no relation to desire whatsoever.

¹¹¹ For precedent in taking a substantive such as ‘τὰ παθήματα’ to explain an idea contained in a preceding relative clause, cf. Smyth §2540.

¹¹² The Greek word ‘λόγος’ is probably one of the hardest working words in the ancient Greek language, and it has over 61 entries in the LSJ. I translate it as ‘sentences’ because it fits well with the image of a scribe *writing logoi* down within a book, though it could easily be translated as ‘words’ or ‘assertions’ in this context. However, Socrates proceeds to use it a few lines later (in passage T3.5) in a context where ‘assertion’ seems more plausible: the clear implication is that these are not simply ‘sentences’ or ‘words’ that someone may or may not believe, but rather the content of endorsed beliefs. Hence, Frede translates the instance of λόγους at (T3.4) as ‘words’ but the instance of ‘λόγοι’ at (T3.5) as ‘assertions.’ Due to these translation difficulties, in my discussion of these passages I often prefer the untranslated *logoi*.

our anticipations. Indeed, Socrates goes on to dramatically state that ‘we are forever full of anticipations, throughout our lifetime’ (39e5-6, translation Frede, modified). Socrates then reminds Protarchus about anticipatory pleasures and pains: pleasures and pains of the soul alone that are based on anticipations about the future (39d1-5). This call-back to the earlier discussion of anticipatory pleasures and pains makes it clear that *logoi* and anticipations of the future are meant to give rise to anticipatory pleasures and pain. This is made even more explicit in his sole example of an anticipatory pleasure:

[T3.5] {ΣΩ.} Πολλῶν μὲν ἐλπίδων, ὥς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος γέμει;
 {ΠΡΩ.} Τί δ' οὔ;
 {ΣΩ.} Λόγοι μὲν εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν, ἃς ἐλπίδας ὀνομάζομεν;
 {ΠΡΩ.} Ναί.
 {ΣΩ.} Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐξωγραφημένα· καὶ τις ὁρᾷ πολλάκις ἑαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεξωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὐτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθορᾷ.

[T3.5] Socrates: And is not everyone, as we just saw, full of many anticipations?

Protarchus: Certainly.

Socrates: There are, then, sentences (λόγοι) in each of us that we call anticipations (ἐλπίδας)?

Protarchus: Yes.

Socrates: But there are also those painted images. And often someone envisages himself in the possession of an enormous amount of gold and of a lot of pleasures as a consequence. And in addition, he also sees himself in this inner picture intensely enjoying himself. (40a6-12, translation modified)

In (T3.5), Socrates identifies certain *logoi* about the future as anticipations. Moreover, we have already seen how such *logoi* ‘within our souls’ underlie and constitute our *beliefs*, and that such beliefs can be the product of memories, perceptions, and a process of internal reasoning. The described ‘painted image’ of an anticipation of the future, an image that must depict the contents of some *doxa*, itself represents anticipated pleasures; in this example it depicts future intense pleasures to be enjoyed from an enormous amount of gold. Moreover, Socrates later says that people really *enjoy* these anticipated pleasures (40c1-2, 40d7-10); they therefore experience occurrent pleasure from anticipating a future, anticipated pleasure. That these expectations are

affective is not surprising, as we earlier learned that anticipating pleasant things is *itself* pleasant (32b9-c2). Hence, our anticipations based on *logoi* that are informed by reasoning will themselves be pleasant or painful, depending on whether we anticipate some future pleasure or pain. It is these affective anticipations, dependent and informed by our reasoning, that I take to be ‘rational’ in the relevant sense.

Let us take stock: I have argued that there are two kinds of anticipations that we can distinguish in the *Philebus*, both of which are affective. The first kind, which is described from 32b-36c, is based on memories and perceptions. Socrates attributes it to all animals and does not imply that it draws on beliefs or a process of reasoning of any kind. In contrast, I argued that the sort of anticipation that Socrates later focuses on, which is based on writings and images in our soul, can be formed after a process of internal reasoning. It therefore results from capacities that are beyond the scope of mere sense-perception and memory. Moreover, this reasoning about future pleasure and pain is not ‘merely’ cognitive, but affective. Such reasoning results in our pleasant hopes and painful fears. As we will see, the *Philebus* thereby holds out the promise of shaping and re-directing our affective anticipation towards rational activity through reasoning, and of thereby re-shaping our character and emotions.

§3.4 True and False Rational and Non-Rational Affective Anticipations in the *Philebus*

In this section I explain how we can discern instances of the distinction between true and false rational and non-rational affective anticipations in the *Philebus* itself. In §3.4.1 I first explain how deceptive *perceptions* of intense pleasures, pleasures that are in fact mixed with pain, can lead to false *non-rational* affective anticipations. In §3.4.2 I then describe how incorrect views on the neutral state can lead some to falsely anticipate the neutral state as pleasant, when it is in fact neither pleasant nor painful. Insofar as such anticipations are based on

reasoning about the pleasantness of the neutral state, they are ‘rational’ anticipations. Yet, they are false insofar as the reasoning is itself faulty. Finally, in §3.4.3 I briefly outline how someone with a correct understanding of pleasure can have true, rational affective anticipations of pure pleasures.

§3.4.1: False, Non-Rational Affective Anticipations

Non-rational affective anticipations are, as I explained, based on the non-rational faculties of perception and memory as opposed to some process of reasoning. As a result, any affective anticipations that are based on such memories and perceptions will be liable to error insofar as the perceptions and memories *themselves* are liable to error. Yet, it is apparent that Socrates *does* think that our perceptions of pleasures can be liable to error: we erroneously perceive pleasures that are juxtaposed with pain to be most pleasant.

Socrates’ discussion of a second kind of false pleasure describes how the simultaneous perception of pleasure and pain side-by-side can lead to deceptive *perceptions* of pleasures as larger or smaller than they really are:

[T3.6] Socrates: Well, then, does it happen only to eyesight that seeing objects from afar or close by distorts the truth and causes false judgments? Or does not the same thing happen also in the case of pleasure and pain?

Protarchus: Much more so, Socrates.

Socrates: But this is the reverse of the result we reached a little earlier.

Protarchus: What are you referring to?

Socrates: Earlier it was true and false *beliefs* that affected the respective pleasures and pains with their own condition.

Protarchus: Quite right.

Socrates: But now it applies to pleasures and pains themselves; it is because they are alternately looked at from close up or far away, or simultaneously put side by side, that the pleasures seem greater compared to pain and more intensive, and pains seem, on the contrary, moderate in comparison with pleasures.

Protarchus: It is quite inevitable that such conditions arise under these circumstances.

Socrates: But if you take that portion of them by which they appear greater or smaller than they really are and cut it off from each of them as a mere appearance and without any real being, you will neither admit that this appearance is right nor dare to say that

anything connected with this portion of pleasure or pain is right and true. (~41e-42c, translation Frede)

Socrates compares the cases in which we are mistaken about pleasure and pain to cases in which we are mistaken about objects seen from afar. Such cases of perceptual error recalls the case described in the last section in which someone is unsure about whether he is looking at a human being or a statue out in the distance. In the previous section we saw that such cases can sometimes incite a process of internal reasoning in order to form a belief about what someone is looking at. In this later section, however, Socrates seems to suggest that merely relying on the perceptual *appearance* of such pleasures is insufficient to accurately determine their size or intensity, as the perceptual appearance can be deceptive. It is noteworthy, however, that Socrates emphasizes how the error lies in the deceptive *appearance* of the juxtaposed pleasures as especially large, rather than in some mistaken *belief* about the size of the pleasures. Indeed, he explicitly notes that the falsity of these apparent pleasures is *not* dependent on a false belief in this case, in contrast to those false *rational* affective anticipations that I surveyed in the last section. Pleasures, when juxtaposed with pain, are perceived as ‘greater and more intensive’ while pains can seem more ‘moderate’ than they are.

I, in agreement with several other scholars,¹¹³ also take a later discussion of intense pleasures mixed with pain in the *Philebus* to be another instance of this same kind of falsity. Namely, intense bodily pleasures are (mistakenly) perceived as extremely pleasant because they are juxtaposed and mixed with pain. Socrates says the following about these intense bodily pleasures:

[T3.7] Socrates: Whenever someone experiences opposite experiences simultaneously in restorations or corruptions – when shivering he is warmed and warming up sometimes is cooled, and is seeking, I think, to have the one and be rid of the other – then what is

¹¹³ I have in mind (Fletcher 2018), (Proios, 2024) and (Shaw, forthcoming).

called a bitter-sweet mixture, when it is hard to get rid of, makes for irritation and later a violent strain. (46c6-46d2, translation Wood, modified).

Recalling Plato's restoration theory of pleasure, the intense bodily pleasure arises when a pleasant restoration co-occurs with a painful destruction. I take it that the felt *intensity* of the intense bodily pleasure is explained by the 'irritation' (ἀγανάκτησιν) and 'violent strain' (σύντασιν ἀγρίαν) created by the 'bitter-sweet mixture' of pleasure and pain. Other intense bodily pleasures are analyzed similarly; Socrates implies that the pleasures from itching and (presumably) sexual pleasures are likewise perceived to be intensely pleasant but in fact involve pleasures juxtaposed side-by-side and mixed with bodily pains (46d7-47a9). Moreover, the person is evidently perceiving both pleasure and pain at the same time, since they 'experience opposite experiences simultaneously.' Since people experiencing intense bodily pleasures experience both pleasure and pain simultaneously, they are in the precise sort of circumstance that gives rise to the second kind of false pleasure. The result is that we would expect those people to have deceptive *perceptions* of these mixed pleasures as being more pleasant than they actually are.

Though Socrates does not say much about anticipatory pleasure or pain when he discusses the second kind of false pleasure,¹¹⁴ I believe that we can naturally see how such deceptive *perceptions* of mixed pleasures as extremely pleasant can underlie false, non-rational affective anticipations. Despite such pleasures being mixed with pain, and therefore being inferior to pure pleasures, they *appear* especially pleasant to those who experience them.

¹¹⁴ Despite this, some take the second kind of false pleasure to be an instance of a false anticipatory pleasure of the *first* kind, one caused by underestimating (or overestimating) the intensity of future, anticipated pleasures. See, for instance, (Gosling & Taylor 1982, 444-448). Likewise, Warren claims that this passage concerns false pleasures that occur in the comparative evaluation (and anticipation) of future pleasures and pains (Warren 2014, 119-127). However, I am in agreement with both Proios and Shaw in thinking that this passage is just as much about the *occurrent* simultaneous experience of pleasure and pain as it is about the comparative evaluation of *future* pleasures and pains (Proios 2024), (Shaw Forthcoming).

Previously, we saw that non-rational anticipations are based on perception and memory alone, without the involvement of rational capacities such as thought. Insofar as someone having an intense pleasure simultaneously experiences pleasure and pain, they are likely to have a mistaken perception of that pleasure as extremely pleasant. This unquestioned perception, stored as a memory, can in turn ground pleasant anticipations of experiencing more mixed, intense pleasures in the future. I suggest that these anticipations would be non-rational insofar as they depend on (deceptive) perceptions and do not follow any process of internal reasoning. Those who base their anticipations of future pleasures on such deceptive perceptual experiences never question or investigate the veracity of their feelings. At the same time, however, the pleasant anticipations of future intense pleasures would also be *false* insofar as they misrepresent intense pleasures mixed with pain as genuinely pleasant.¹¹⁵

Indeed, it is worth pointing out that Philebus, the character who advocates for pleasures and most of all pursues intense pleasures, is conspicuously absent from most of the dialogue. He hands off the dialogue, and all rational inquiry concerning the nature of pleasure itself, to Protarchus, and complains when he is asked to contribute to the discussion (28b6). Why, then, do people such as Philebus pleasantly anticipate, hope for, and desire intense pleasures? It is surely not because they have deep *philosophical* convictions about the goodness of intense pleasures. One gets the impression that Philebus has not thought much at all about the pleasures that he praises. However, Phileban hedonists have certainly *perceived* intense pleasures in the past as extremely pleasant and have remembered those past sensory experiences. I suggest that those

¹¹⁵ I defend this claim in more detail in (Brants, 2024).

past (deceptive) experiences of intense pleasures ground their non-rational pleasant anticipations of future intense pleasures.¹¹⁶

§3.4.2: False Rational Affective Anticipations

In addition to false non-rational affective anticipations that are based on unreflective, deceptive past perceptions of intense pleasures as extremely pleasant, I believe that there is reason to suggest that Plato would also countenance another kind of false anticipatory pleasure that is based on distinctly *rational* anticipations. This is suggested by Socrates' discussion of the third kind of false pleasure: those who falsely believe that they are experiencing a pleasure when they are in fact experiencing an absence of pain. Though this third kind of false pleasure is not itself an *anticipatory* pleasure, it helpfully illustrates a false pleasure that is *not* based on perception in any relevant sense and that instead comes directly from a false belief. I argue that it is not hard to see how such false pleasures could in turn ground other false *anticipatory* pleasures.

In order to start explaining the third kind of false pleasure, Socrates first asks Protarchus to consider the case in which someone is not undergoing either restoration or destruction. Protarchus agrees that in such a case 'there would not be either any pleasure or pain at all' (42e1-12, translation Frede). Socrates considers the objection that creatures are *always* undergoing some sort of restoration or destruction, to which he responds that there are nonetheless cases in

¹¹⁶ Briefly note that these pleasant anticipations are non-rational insofar as the *the sort of experience that is ultimately anticipated to be pleasant* is determined by past *perceptions* of intense pleasures. Now I might, conceivably, pleasantly anticipate an intense pleasure tomorrow partly due to some complex reasoning about what will occur in the future. For instance, Laurie might pleasantly anticipate a date with Ahmed after reasoning out that she can text Angel a message that will cause Angel to in turn text Marcus so that Marcus can in turn talk to and persuade Ahmed to go on a promising date with Laurie. That seems like some complicated reasoning! However, if Laurie is ultimately pleasantly anticipating some sort of intense (hence, non-genuine) pleasure, then I suggest it nonetheless, in an important sense, remains non-rational. Indeed, one recalls Plato's description in *Republic* 8 of the oligarch's soul, in which the rational part is enslaved to the appetitive part and its blind desire for wealth: rational faculties are put to work for what is, at bottom, a non-rational goal and appetitive drive (*Republic* 8.553b-d).

which creatures do not *perceive* the restorations or destructions and hence do not experience either pleasure or pain (42d-43c). We are specifically asked to imagine, therefore, a case in which pleasant perception is entirely absent.

Socrates then goes on to describe a group of people who, despite not having any pleasant (or painful) perception, nonetheless *believe* that they are experiencing pleasure. He claims that such people in fact experience ‘the middle life’: a life with neither pleasure nor pain. Their belief that such a life is pleasant is, however, false. Socrates says:

[T3.8] {ΣΩ.} Οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἂν ποτε οὔτ' εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτ' εἰ λέγοι, λεχθείη, κατὰ γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

{ΠΡΩ.} Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

{ΣΩ.} Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὃ ἐταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ δοξαζόντων αἰσθανόμεθα.

{ΠΡΩ.} Καὶ μάλα.

{ΣΩ.} Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἶονται τότε ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται;

{ΠΡΩ.} Φασὶ γοῦν.

{ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν οἶονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν που.

{ΠΡΩ.} Κινδυνεύει.

{ΣΩ.} Ψευδῇ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χωρὶς τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν ἡ φύσις ἐκατέρου.

[T3.8] Socrates: Therefore no-one is speaking correctly who says that the middle life is either pleasant or painful, nor if anyone believes this would it be believed, nor if anyone said it would it be said, according to the correct account (κατὰ γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον).

Protarchus: How could it?

Socrates: But, my friend, we perceive people saying and believing these things.

Protarchus: Certainly!

Socrates: So do they then suppose <themselves> to feel pleasure whenever they do not feel pain?

Protarchus: Well, they at least say so.

Socrates: So surely they at that time suppose themselves to be feeling pleasure, for they would not otherwise keep on saying it!

Protarchus: Probably.

Socrates: So they believe false things about feeling pleasure, if indeed the nature of not feeling pain and feeling pleasure are separate from each other. (43e8-44a10, my translation)

Socrates states that people who believe themselves to be feeling pleasure whenever they do not feel pain have *false beliefs* about their own pleasure.¹¹⁷ Socrates does not give such people a name, but for ease of exposition I will refer to them as ‘proto-Epicureans.’¹¹⁸ Moreover, Socrates repeatedly emphasizes that the proto-Epicureans both speak and believe falsely, implying that their words (λόγοι) and beliefs (δόξαι) are false.

Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the people who falsely believe that the absence of pain is itself pleasant form such a false belief as a consequence of their faulty reasoning about the nature of pleasure. Unlike in the case of juxtaposed pleasures and pains that we explored in the last section, in this case there is no deceptive perceptual experience of something as pleasant; indeed, in this case there is, *ex hypothesi*, no *perception* of pleasure (or pain) at all. Therefore, it cannot be the case that their belief that they are experiencing pleasure is a *perceptual* belief formed directly on the basis of some distinctive pleasant perception.¹¹⁹ Despite this fact, the proto-Epicureans do *believe* and *say* that they experience pleasure. Recall, moreover, how Socrates earlier claimed that the words (λόγοι) and beliefs (δόξαι) in our soul are the products of the scribe in the scribe and painter analogy, and that such words and beliefs are *anticipations* whenever they are about the future. In §3.3 I argued that such beliefs are the

¹¹⁷ My reading of this passage is different than that defended by (Pearson 2019), who takes this kind of false pleasure to be the same kind as the false pleasures of juxtaposition, though different in degree. He claims that false pleasures of juxtaposition involve some real pleasure but also an overestimation of the pleasure. He says that someone taking pleasure in the neutral state also ‘overestimates’ the size of their pleasure, yet their error is greater since there is *no* ‘actual’ pleasure in their experience. Yet there is a significant difference (in kind) between the two cases insofar as the juxtaposition case involves genuine perceptions of restorative (and destructive) processes that ground perceptual pleasures and pains, while the current case of pleasure in the neutral state involves no such perception and hence comes, as I argue, from mistaken reasoning about pleasure itself.

¹¹⁸ This term, of course, refers to the fact that the Epicureans famously take the absence of pain to be the limit of pleasure, and hence the most pleasant state that one can experience. For a keen investigation of the relation between the Epicurean conception of pleasure and the conception of pleasure expressed in the *Philebus*, see especially (Arenson 2019). Arenson argues that the Epicureans likely endorsed many aspects of Plato’s arguments concerning the nature of pleasure while nonetheless differing on the pleasantness of the ‘natural state,’ or the healthy state of an organism after it has been restored but is not undergoing destruction. Epicureans insist that this state is pleasant (indeed, *maximally* pleasant), while Plato denies this.

¹¹⁹ Indeed, Frede suggests that it is a kind of ‘theoretical’ error about the nature of pleasure (Frede 1997, 265-274).

consequence of an internal process of reasoning whenever perception and memory are insufficient to form a definite belief. Since perception is not present in this third kind of false pleasure, we would expect that the (false) belief of the proto-Epicureans that they experience pleasure when they do not feel pain is a result of (faulty) reasoning. Indeed, it is the result of faulty reasoning about the nature of pleasure itself, as they do not grasp that the nature of enjoyment and the nature of not feeling pain are separate from each other (44a10).

I believe that proto-Epicureans likely form false anticipatory pleasures due to their faulty reasoning about the nature of pleasure. Admittedly, it is true that Socrates says nothing about *anticipatory* pleasures at this point in the dialogue. He says that the proto-Epicureans falsely believe that they are experiencing pleasure *at that time* when they do not feel pain; there is no mention of anticipation or any forward-looking attitude. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the proto-Epicureans would, in fact, form false anticipatory pleasures on the basis of the same beliefs that give rise to the third kind of false pleasure. Namely, a proto-Epicurean who anticipates *not feeling any pain* in the future (e.g. not feeling the pain of thirst or hunger) would pleasantly anticipate being in such a state. So, for instance, he could pleasantly anticipate remaining in good health by eating moderately and hydrating regularly – such a person would never or rarely experience the pain of hunger or thirst. It is that state, free from pain, that the proto-Epicurean takes to be ‘the most pleasant thing of all’ (ἡδιστον πάντω, 43d7). But because they say and believe that a state free from pain *is* pleasant we should assume that they would naturally infer that experiencing that state in the future *will be* pleasant.¹²⁰ Moreover, they have formed the sort

¹²⁰ Note that I take the proto-Epicureans to be different than the people with a certain ‘harsh’ or ‘dour’ (δυσχέρεια) nature described at 44bff. These harsh characters claim that pleasure ‘does not at all exist,’ and that it is equivalent to the escape from pain (44b10-c2). The proto-Epicureans in contrast say that to live one’s life free from pain (ἀλύπως) is ‘most pleasant of all’ (ἡδιστον πάντων) (43d7-8): in opposition to the unnamed harsh people, I take it that the proto-Epicureans affirm that a state free from pain *is* genuinely pleasant.

of propositions (λόγοι) and beliefs (δόξαι) about something being pleasant that were said to ground forward-looking pleasant anticipations in the scribe & painter analogy. Yet, in that case the proto-Epicureans would have the kind of anticipation, an anticipation of a future pleasure, that Socrates says will itself be pleasant.

For our purposes, however, what is important about such pleasant anticipations had by the proto-Epicureans is that they float free from past perceptions and memories of pleasure in a way that was not true of the pleasant anticipations I discussed in §3.4.1. Someone who pleasantly anticipates a state free from pain cannot be drawing on a memory or past perception of that state *as pleasant*. This follows *a fortiori* from Socrates' claim that there are in fact *no pleasant perceptions* at all in a state without pain. Such an anticipation would be generated *solely* by the errant reasoning and theorizing of the proto-Epicureans. I therefore suggest that this would be an example of a false, *rational* pleasant anticipation, as it is based on (faulty) reasoning about the nature of pleasure and not a prior perception and memory of past pleasures.

§3.4.3: True Rational Affective Anticipation

In contrast to these *false* rational, pleasant anticipations, however, we can also discern *true* rational pleasant anticipations. While false, rational pleasant anticipations are based on faulty reasoning about the nature of pleasures, as some take the neutral state free from pain to be pleasant, true and rational pleasant anticipations would be based on correct reasoning about pleasure's nature. In particular, our pleasant anticipations of pure pleasures would themselves be true since they are based on a correct understanding about pleasure. As we will see, examples of such pleasures include pleasantly anticipating philosophical inquiry or mathematical investigations. Unlike Socrates' complaint with respect to the proto-Epicureans, such pleasant

anticipations of future pure pleasures would, moreover, be based on reasoning that is ‘according to the correct account’ (κατά τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον) (43e10).

Before discussing intense bodily pleasures that are mixed with pain and therefore non-genuine, Socrates says that he will later discuss ‘true pleasures’ that will help reveal ‘the power of pleasure’ (44d3-5). He follows through on this promise and eventually claims that the true pleasures are those that are *pure* and *unmixed with pain*: those ‘based on imperceptible and painless lacks, while their fulfillments are perceptible and pleasant’ (51b5-7). Socrates says that pure pleasures include those taken in ‘something straight or round, and what is constructed out of these with a compass, rule, and square, such as plane figures and solids,’ shapes that are ‘not beautiful in a relative sense, as others are, but are by their very nature forever beautiful by themselves’ (51c6-d1, translation Frede). In addition, Socrates says we enjoy pure pleasures listening to certain musical notes. Socrates says these notes are ‘smooth and bright and flowing towards a single pure melody,’ that they are ‘beautiful according to themselves and not with respect to something else,’ and that they have their own ‘connate pleasures’ (51d6-9, my translation). Finally, Socrates also says that the pleasures of *learning* are pure (52b6-8). Though there is debate as to the precise character of these rather austere ‘pure pleasures,’¹²¹ I suggest that an example would be the pleasure of hearing a perfectly harmonious octave or perfect fifth sounded on a lyre. The pleasure of hearing this sound does not depend on any antecedent painful bodily lack or desire. Plato likewise suggests that pleasure of *learning*, for instance learning about the nature of pleasure itself, is also pure and not dependent on any prior or simultaneous pain.¹²²

¹²¹ Debates on the precise character and scope of pure pleasures are beyond the scope of this chapter. For helpful discussion see Fletcher 2014 and Warren 2019.

¹²² This discussion should be coordinated with the parallel discussion in *Republic* 9. There, Socrates describes how there are ‘pure pleasures of smell’ that do not depend on antecedent pains (*Republic* 9.584b) and likewise suggests

Socrates goes on to argue that pure pleasures are ‘more true’ than intense pleasures by making an analogy with pure and impure instances of the color white. Socrates asserts that ‘every small and insignificant pleasure that is unadulterated by pain will turn out to be pleasanter, truer, and more beautiful than a greater quantity and amount of the impure kind’ (53b10-c2). Since we have already seen that the most intense pleasures are impure and mixed with pain, it follows that even a ‘small’ pure pleasure will be both more true and more pleasant than any intense pleasure. Note that the dispute between intense pleasures and pure pleasures for the title of ‘true pleasures’ seems to amount to a claim about what kinds of pleasure express the nature of pleasure itself. As others have noted, calling pure pleasures the ‘most true’ pleasures seems to appeal to a different kind of truth that can come in degrees.¹²³ On this construal, the claim that pure pleasures are ‘more true’ is equivalent to the claim that pure pleasures partake more in the *being* of pleasure itself: they more truly *are* pleasures.

Taking *pure* pleasures to be representative of the nature of pleasures finally serves as a benchmark against which we can appreciate the inferiority of the very different kind of ‘pleasures’ that are anticipated by both Philebus and the proto-Epicureans. While Philebus and his followers have false *non-rational* pleasant anticipations of intense pleasures based on deceptive past perceptions of intense pleasures, the proto-Epicureans have false *rational* pleasant anticipations of a state free from pain based on their faulty reasoning about the nature of pleasure. Yet, both sorts of anticipated ‘pleasures’ fall short of the true nature of *pure* pleasure: the intense pleasures are mixed with pain and impure while the state free from pain lacks actual pleasure. Any pleasant anticipation of such a pleasure will be false, since it anticipates something

that those who gain knowledge and understanding ‘more enjoys more really and truly a more true pleasure’ (*Republic* 9.585d12-e1).

¹²³ For instance, cf. (Wolfsdorf 2013, 69), (Fletcher 2018, 407), and (Szaif 2021, 138).

that lacks the nature of pleasure. In contrast, a pleasant anticipation of a pure pleasure will be true, based as it is on a correct understanding of pleasure's nature.¹²⁴

Yet, Socrates arrives at this understanding of pure pleasures by reasoning about pleasure itself after he adopts a methodological strategy to focus on purity rather than intensity when investigating something's nature. Indeed, I believe that we can see Socrates carrying out a philosophical investigation into pleasure's nature as he attempts to answer the 'what is pleasure?' question. To the extent that pleasant anticipations of future pure pleasures reflect this reasoned grasp of pleasure's genuine nature, I suggest that these are instances of *true, rational* anticipations.

Indeed, there is reason to think that the anticipation of pure pleasures would be a significant cognitive achievement, and not something that is based on mere perceptual experience of such pleasures. At least, when describing the pure pleasures of learning, Socrates adds that such pleasures are 'unmixed with pain and belong, not to the masses, but only to a very few' (52b7-8, translation Frede). The pure pleasures of sight are also distinguished from the pleasures of sight enjoyed by the many: Socrates clarifies that the pure pleasures of sight are not those that 'the many' take in the sight of a beautiful 'living being or picture,' but rather pleasures taken in the sight of 'something straight or round and what is constructed out of these with a compass, rule, and square' (51c1-6, translation Frede). He seems to be describing the pleasure we take in viewing a perfectly constructed geometric shape, such as a regular polygon. Plato is surely right to suppose that most people do not believe that such activities yield the purest and

¹²⁴ This is a notable instance in which the *Philebus* seems to depart from the *Republic* 9 discussion of pleasure. In *Republic* 9 Socrates alleges that anticipatory pleasures and pains are 'reliefs from pain,' seemingly indicting the entire class (*Republic* 9.584c9-11). In contrast, the *Philebus*' emphasis on *true* anticipatory pleasures had by the virtuous allows us to recognize that some anticipatory pleasures and pains in fact play an important role in a good human life.

most desirable pleasures. It seems plausible that one must be somewhat advanced in philosophy and mathematics before the anticipation of such austere delights becomes pleasant.¹²⁵

Let us take stock. I have argued that we can distinguish two kinds of affective anticipations in Plato's *Philebus*: a non-rational kind based solely on perceptions and memories and a rational kind based on a process of internal reasoning. These both give rise to *affective* anticipations: we experience pleasant anticipations of the future in light of our past perceptions and memories, but also on the basis of our reasoning about the objects of desire. We do not simply project our memories forward and thereby anticipate some future prospect, as we might suspect from the passages discussed in Chapter 1, but rather antecedently determine the natures of the things we desire. I suggested that the true, rational pleasant anticipations of pure pleasures were based on an accurate, reasoned grasp of the nature of pleasure. Though I focused on pleasant anticipation directed at future pure pleasures in this section, it seems likely that our general reasoning about the nature of the *good itself* can likewise inform and underlie true, rational affective anticipations directed at future goods. I develop this suggestion further in Chapter 5.

On this topic, we should also note the *kind* of reasoning that I argued was relevant in the examples of rational anticipation that I discussed. It was *not* reasoning about what *will happen* in the future (though I do not deny that such reasoning in fact figures in many of our anticipations).

¹²⁵ On this point, it is also worth pointing out that the pleasant anticipations of future pleasures seem to be rational in at least two separate senses. Firstly, the pleasures of learning and the pleasant sight of mathematical objects both seem to depend on a rational activity. Not just anyone who perceives a mathematical object has a pleasant perception, but rather someone conversant in mathematics who is able to appreciate the pleasure-warranting features of that object, namely its simplicity and intrinsic beauty. Secondly, the belief that such activities will be the most pleasant depends on reasoning about the nature of pleasure itself, namely that pleasures such as these, 'not at all comparable to <the pleasures> of rubbing' (51d1), are the ones that we ought to most pleasantly anticipate. Now, while the second point holds true of all the pure pleasures mentioned by Socrates, the first point arguably does not. The pure pleasures of smells, for instance, do not seem to depend on rational activity in any straightforward sense. Perhaps this is why Socrates claims that they form a 'less divine' tribe of pleasures (51e1-2).

Rather, it was reasoning about *what sorts of experiences* are pleasant, and the nature of the different pleasures we experience; in other words, reasoning about what pleasure even is. Such philosophical reasoning in turn informs our affective anticipations, our pleasure and pain, right now in the current moment. I might simply *stop* pleasantly anticipating some future intense pleasure once I apprehend that such a pleasure depends inextricably on pain.¹²⁶ Indeed, the very sort of experience that I might at first anticipate with pleasure and hope for (due to past pleasant perceptions of such an experience) I might later anticipate with pain and fear (once I reason out that there is pain in that experience). To give an example, someone who hopes to gain despotic power over the government in order to fulfill his rapacious desire for an excessive, extravagant lifestyle might eventually come to *fear* and avoid such a life once he realizes the empty nature of the ‘intense’ pleasures offered by the lifestyle he craves. The pleasure and/or pain of my anticipations can thus be moderated, changed, or even eliminated due to my explicit reasoning about the nature of what I am anticipating. In Chapter 4 I argue that these two kinds of pleasant and painful anticipations correlate with different ways in which we can experience other *pathê*, such as fear and anger, that may or may not be informed by reasoning. They likewise underlie the two different ways in which education works to change our hopes and fears such that they are grounded on a rational grasp of the value (and dis-value) of what we anticipate with pleasure and pain.

¹²⁶ I think it is of extreme interest to note that the earliest TLG fragment mentioning pleasure (ἡδονή) occurs in a 7th century BCE poem attributed to Archilocus that is a vulgar, offensive diatribe against intense sexual pleasures that are described in violent, painful terms. He writes that ‘the mind of a pathic and foul whore is the same. Both delight in taking cash, in being screwed and bored through, fucked and penetrated, doweled and wedged apart, stuffed and pounded ... Therefore to hell with the randy slut together with the wide-assed race of pathics. May our concern be with the Muses and a moderate life, together with the knowledge that *this* is delight, *this* is unadulterated joy, *this* is pleasure, never to be acquainted with those who indulge in shameful pleasures’ (Archilocus fragment 328, translated by Gerber, modified). Archilocus repudiates the sexual pleasures of ‘pathics’ and ‘whores’ while claiming that true delight and a superior pleasure is found in the moderate life. It is surely implicit in this exhortation to the moderate life that we should pleasantly *anticipate* leading such a life ourselves, and that our knowledge of its hedonic superiority forms and guides that anticipation.

§3.5: A Puzzle for Anticipation in Aristotle

We now transition to Aristotle. In §3.5.1 I first examine some passages that seem to provide clear evidence that non-rational animals are capable of pleasantly and painfully anticipating the future. This is what we should expect from Chapter 2, as my arguments there suggest that *every* animal that possesses desire for something that is not occurrently perceived must be able to anticipate the future in some way, as I claim that such anticipation is required for motivation. However, in §3.5.2 I survey several other passages that point in a different direction, suggesting that anticipation is somehow restricted to human beings possessing reason. I argue that this apparent tension is resolved by acknowledging a distinction between *rational* and *non-rational* anticipation similar to what we saw in the *Philebus*, a suggestion that I develop in §3.6 - §3.7.

§3.5.1: Evidence that Animals *Can* Anticipate the Future

My arguments from Chapter 2 on the psychology of affective anticipation in Aristotle imply that almost all animals must be capable of affective anticipation, and hence anticipation simpliciter.¹²⁷ I argued that animal locomotion requires an animal to anticipate that an object of desire or aversion will occur in its future.

Moreover, there are at least two well-known passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Eudemian Ethics* that appear to clearly attribute affective anticipation to animals. The first passage comes from *EN* 3.10. In this passage Aristotle argues that temperance is paradigmatically concerned with pleasures that accompany the sense of taste and the sense of touch. These pleasures, unlike the pleasures of smell, are shared with all animals. Indeed,

¹²⁷ I say ‘almost all animals’ because there is arguably some primitive range of motions that are triggered only by occurrent sense-perception, and perhaps some primitive animals (e.g. the sessile animals) lacking *phantasia* that are only motivated in this way. Cf. end of §2.3.2.

Aristotle denies that animals enjoy smells, but in the process apparently asserts that they *do* have pleasant anticipations of *eating* some animal, and hence pleasant anticipations of future, pleasant tastes.

[T3.9] οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἰσθησιν ἢ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν· οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοῦς ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἤσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν “ἢ [εὐρών] ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα,” ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή καὶ γεῦσις.

[T3.9] And in the other animals there is no pleasure according to these perceptions <sc. perceptions of smell or sight> except coincidentally. For dogs do not enjoy the smells of hares but rather <enjoy> eating <the hares>, but the smell made the perception. And no lion <enjoys> the sound of the ox but rather the act of eating, but <the lion> perceived that <the ox> is near because of the sound, and it appears to enjoy this. Likewise, it <does not enjoy> seeing “the deer or wild goat,” but rather <enjoys> that it will have food. And temperance and intemperance are about these sort of pleasures, which are shared with the remaining animals, hence <why such pleasures> appear slavish and beastly. But these <pleasures> are touch and taste. (EN 3.10.1118a16-26, my translation).

Aristotle is here keen to explain away several apparent instances in which non-human animals appear to enjoy sights or smells. He asserts, in each case, that the animal is not *really* enjoying the sight or smell of some prey animal but instead enjoys ‘eating,’ the ‘act of eating,’ or ‘that it will have food.’ For instance, Aristotle claims that dogs do not enjoy smells but rather the eating of hares, cryptically claiming that ‘the smell made the perception’ (τὴν δ' αἰσθησιν ἢ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν). Aristotle cannot mean that the smell causes the dog to *actually* perceive eating the hare: this is strictly speaking impossible insofar as the dog is *not* eating, tasting, or touching the hare at that time when it experiences enjoyment. I suggest that in (T3.9) we instead find Aristotle using ‘perception’ in a looser, less-precise sense that extends to both memory and anticipation; after all, in Chapter 2 we saw that both anticipation and memory can in some way come *from* perception. If this is right, then the remark that the smell of the hare ‘makes’ the perception

should be taken to imply that the smell of the hare triggers a pleasant anticipation of the *taste* of the hare.

A parallel passage exists in *Eudemian Ethics* 3.2 that again shows Aristotle allowing for animals to pleasantly anticipate the future while also further supporting my above claim that the ‘perception’ of taste should be construed in a wide sense that includes both memory and anticipation of taste. In *EE* 3.2 Aristotle again claims that non-human animals only enjoy sights, sounds, and smells in an incidental sense. Aristotle says that:

[T3.10] ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ’ αὐτάς. λέγω δὲ <μὴ> καθ’ αὐτάς, αἷς ἢ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὄψων καὶ ποτῶν (δι’ ἑτέραν γὰρ ἡδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθ’ αὐτάς δὲ οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν.

[T3.10] However, from among the smells, they <sc. animals> enjoy those, however many there are, that please coincidentally, but not of themselves. By ‘not of themselves’ I mean <those smells> which cause us to enjoy anticipating or remembering, for instance <the smells> of delicacies or drink (for we enjoy a different pleasure than those, <namely> the <pleasure> of eating or drinking), but <smells that please> ‘of themselves,’ for instance, are the <smells> of flowers. (*EE* 3.2.1231a6-11, my translation)

As before, Aristotle says that there are some smells that are enjoyed only in a coincidental sense, and that animals can be said to enjoy smells only in this coincidental way. Now, however, Aristotle is clear that the smells that are enjoyed in an incidental way are those that cause us to enjoy *remembering* or *anticipating* some other pleasure that is not linked to smell. This supports the claim that I made in the last paragraph that the smell of hare ‘makes a perception’ of eating the hare in the loose sense that it causes a memory or anticipation of enjoying the pleasant *taste* of the hare.¹²⁸ Since non-human animals enjoy some smells coincidentally and hence enjoy anticipating and remembering pleasant tastes non-coincidentally, it follows that non-rational animals must be capable of having pleasant anticipations.

¹²⁸ The two ways in which a *phantasma* of eating a hare, moreover, can be deployed.

The above passages (T3.9) and (T3.10) seem to unambiguously attribute pleasant anticipation of future, pleasant tastes to animals, but there are also multiple passages from the biological works that attribute *fear* to animals. As mentioned in the Introduction, §0.3.3, fear seems to involve a painful anticipation of some future bad or harm, as expressed in the definition of fear that is contained in the *Rhetoric*: ‘Let fear be some pain or disturbance from the appearance of a future bad, either destructive or painful’ (*Rhetoric* 2.5.1382a21-22, my translation). Though I discuss the *Rhetoric*’s account of fear in more depth in Chapter 4, for now we should note that fear involves an occurrent pain that is from, or due to,¹²⁹ an appearance of a *future* bad. Yet, we have seen that a grasp of something as in one’s own future implicates the cognitive act of *anticipation*, and the occurrent pain that occurs with this anticipation of a future bad further specifies that fear involves an *affective* (painful) anticipation. Yet Aristotle is happy to attribute fear to animals when he describes how they live and behave. For example, Aristotle says that a crab’s nature is to ‘walk straight forward whenever it is without fear (ὅταν ἄφοβος ᾖ), with its feelers hanging sideways; yet whenever it is frightened (ὅταν δὲ φοβηθῇ) it flees backwards, darting off to a great distance (*HA* 8.2.590b25-28, translation Thompson, modified). By no means is this an unusual case, Aristotle also similarly attributes fear to such varied animals as octopi, fish, dolphins, sharks, crayfish, birds, bees, nautili, deer, bison, dung beetles, and chameleons.¹³⁰ Aristotle also attributes fear to animals when discussing their physiology; he claims that animals with large hearts are more naturally disposed towards excessive fear and timidity, as opposed to animals with small hearts that are more naturally disposed to courage (*PA* 3.4.667a11-22). Aristotle’s explanation of this alleged phenomenon is that the blood is colder in

¹²⁹ ἐκ + genitive can denote the cause or means by which something occurs (LSJ III.6).

¹³⁰ Cf, respectively, *HA* 621b30, 533b24, 566a25, 590b9, 620b2, 625a15, 622b14, 578b17, *PA* 663a16, 682b26, and 692a23.

animals with large hearts, but cold blood is itself caused by fear. Hence, such animals are naturally in a somewhat more fearful state in virtue of their physiological condition.¹³¹

§3.5.2: Evidence that Animals Cannot Anticipate the Future

The above evidence is a small sampling of passages in which Aristotle seems to unambiguously attribute pleasant and painful anticipation to animals. However, there are other indications in Aristotle's corpus that seem to imply that anticipation of the future is some sort of rational capacity denied to animals. The first passage occurs in *DA* 3.7.431b2-10:

[T3.11] τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὄριστα αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ἢ, κινεῖται· οἷον, αἰσθανόμενος τὸν φρυκτὸν ὅτι πῦρ, τῇ κοινῇ ὁρῶν κινούμενον γνωρίζει ὅτι πολέμιος· ὅτε δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν, ὥσπερ ὁρῶν, λογίζεται καὶ βουλευέται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα· καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει – καὶ ὅλως ἐν πράξει.

[T3.11] The rational faculty thinks some forms in *phantasmata*, and in these it demarcates for itself the object of pursuit and the object of avoidance, and outside perception, whenever it should <demarcate the object of pursuit or the object of avoidance> using the *phantasmata*, it is moved. For example, perceiving the beacon, that it is fire, and seeing (by the common <sense>) that it is moving it knows that it is the enemy, then by using these *phantasmata* or thoughts in the soul, just as if seeing, it reasons and deliberates the future with respect to the present. And whenever it should say that *there* is the pleasant or the painful, it thereupon, in the here and now, avoids or pursues, and in general will do one thing. (*DA* 3.7.431b2-10, my translation)

Passage (T3.11) starts by indicating that the subject is the *rational faculty* (τὸ νοητικόν); the rational faculty (or, perhaps better to say the person *possessing* a rational faculty) ‘thinks the forms in images’ and somehow uses those images or thoughts (φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν) to

¹³¹ For more on Aristotle's ascriptions of fear and anger to non-human animals, see especially (Sihvola 1996, 121-134). Note also Sihvola's discussion of Aristotle's attribution of courage and cowardice to non-human animals, character traits that are related to the experience of fear and confidence. While Dow denies that all emotions can be felt by animals, he affirms that they can feel fear (Dow 2022, 116-117). Fortenbaugh, on the other hand, implausibly denies that animals can experience emotions, though he claims that they can experience ‘πάθαι’ that are in animals ‘analogous’ to emotions (Fortenbaugh 2002, 94 & 67-69). Fortenbaugh's claim, however, seems to conflict with *HA* 8.1.588a16-b3, a passage that suggests that, in many cases, the fear felt by animals and that felt by humans differs in degree rather than in kind. However, I am sympathetic that humans are capable feeling emotions in a way not possible for non-human animals and think that my account of *rational* vs *non-rational* affective anticipation does a good job of bringing this out.

‘reason’ (λογίζεται) and ‘deliberate’ (βουλεύεται) about the future with respect to the present. ‘Reasoning’ and ‘deliberation’ are clearly rational activities as opposed to merely sensory ones. Moreover, the emphasis on *rational* capacities being used to anticipate and reason about future objects of pursuit and avoidance in (T3.11) might suggest that *all* future directed cognition is somehow dependent on rational faculties. Indeed, Nussbaum has used the current passage to argue that Aristotle’s animals are locked into the present, unable to see or think about the future in any meaningful way.¹³²

Another piece of evidence from *DA* 3.10 points in a similar direction. Aristotle claims that:

[T3.12] ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ἐναντίαι ᾧσι, γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἰσθησιν ἔχουσιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον), εἶδει μὲν ἐν ᾧ εἴη τὸ κινεῖν, τὸ ὁρεκτικόν, ἢ ὁρεκτικόν – πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὁρεκτόν· τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον, τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι – ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ κινεῖντα.

[T3.12] Since desires come about opposed to each other, this follows whenever reason and the appetites should be contraries, but this occurs in those having perception of time (for on the one hand the intellect commands resistance on account of the future, but the appetite on account of the present <commands pursuit>, for the present pleasure appears both pleasant absolutely and good absolutely, on account of not seeing the future), So while on the one hand the thing moving would be one *in form*, the faculty of desire insofar as it is a faculty of desire – but first of all the object of desire, for that is what moves without being moved by being thought of or imagined – on the other hand the things moving are more *in number*. (*DA* 3.10.433b5-12, my translation)

Aristotle’s philosophical task in (T3.12) is to clarify whether one thing or more than one thing is responsible for initiating locomotion. We are interested in this passage, however, insofar as it might imply that animals without rational capacities are unable to have any cognizance of the future. Though such organisms might possess appetites, we are told that it is rather intellect

¹³² Cf. Nussbaum: ‘Animals can act only according to the awareness of the moment. Human beings can, however, look to the future and to past experience, deliberating and weighing one “this” against another.’ (Nussbaum 1978, 263).

(νοῦς) that reasons about the future and commands restraint in the face of some immediate pleasure. Yet, ‘intellect’ clearly implicates a higher order rational faculty. Likewise, Aristotle begins by discussing cases in which reason is opposed to appetites and then claims that such conflicts happen in those who possess ‘perception of time.’ Arguably, ‘perception of time’ refers to something like the anticipation of the future, as is supported by the implication in the following clause that intellect can somehow ‘see the future’ and command restraint on that basis. From this perspective, Aristotle’s general contention is that intellect commands restraint ‘on account of the future,’ while appetite goes for the immediate pleasure on account of ‘not seeing the future.’¹³³ Insofar as appetite (ἐπιθυμία) is something that we share with non-human animals, this passage arguably suggests that all such creatures with appetite but without reason are likewise incapable of ‘seeing the future.’

Finally, there exists one last somewhat obscure passage that seems to unambiguously deny anticipation to animals. The passage comes from *De Partibus Animalium* (PA) 3.6, in which Aristotle attempts to refute the claim that the purpose of the lungs is to serve as a kind of soft buffer to protect the jumping heart from damage.

[T3.13] Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἄλσιν εἶναι τὸν πλεύμονα τῆς καρδίας οὐκ εἴρηται καλῶς· ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τε γὰρ συμβαίνει μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ τῆς πηδήσεως διὰ τὸ μόνον ἐν ἐλπίδι γίνεσθαι καὶ προσδοκίᾳ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἀπέχει τ’ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις πολὺν τόπον καὶ

¹³³ Commentators are not united on this point. Moss’ discussion of the passage (her 2f), for instance, tends to emphasize the conflict between a perceptual *phantasia* that appeals to appetite, on the one hand, and a rational judgment of the good, on the other (Moss 2012, 105). She has relatively little to say on Aristotle’s claim that intellect has a different verdict in virtue of being *forward looking* in a way that appetite is not. However, cf. Moss’ later discussion of the passage while discussing deliberative *phantasia*, in which Moss describes a rational deliberator who, unlike an animal, ‘imagines the possible consequences of eating the cake: perhaps a tummy-ache, or a feeling of regret’ (Moss 2012, 147). She is, I take it, describing someone who is not merely ‘imagining’ but in fact *anticipating* what the future harmful consequences of going for the immediate pleasure would be. Another relevant consideration, however, is that in *EN* 7.3 Aristotle claims that ‘Beasts are not akratic, because they have no universal supposition, but only *phantasia* and memory of particulars’ (*EN* 7.3.1147b3-5, translation Moss). This passage might suggest that it is the rational capacity to grasp universals, rather than an ability to anticipate, that causes the conflicts of desire. Indeed, it seems to me plausible that such a capacity is implicated in the thought-based grasp of the object of desire or aversion in the cases of *rational* affective anticipation that I discuss later.

κεῖται τὴν θέσιν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ πλεύμονος, ὥστε μηδὲν συμβάλλεσθαι τὸν πλεύμονα πρὸς τὴν ἄλσιν τῆς καρδίας.

[T3.13] That the lungs exist against the leaping of the heart has not been well said, for it 1) almost only follows in the case of a human that the jumping <occurs> because it only happens in the case of anticipation and expectation of the future, and 2) it <sc. the heart> is also kept off by a large space in most <animals> and the position is placed above the lungs, so that the lung contributes nothing against the leaping of the heart. (PA 3.6.669a17-23, my translation)

The idea that the lungs exist as a kind of buffer against the leaping of the heart is, in fact, a view propounded in Plato's *Timaeus*. There, Timaeus claims that 'the gods foreknew that the jumping of the heart (τῇ πηδήσει τῆς καρδίας) (which occurs when one *expects what one fears* (ἐν τῇ τῶν δεινῶν προσδοκίᾳ) or when one's spirit is aroused) would, like all such swelling of the passions, be caused by fire. So, they devised something to relieve the jumping: they implanted lungs' (*Timaeus* 70c1-5, translation Zeyl, modified). Aristotle, however, denies that this is the function of the lungs. He supports this claim with two separate considerations. Putting aside the second consideration for now (that in most animals the lung is not in the right spatial position to buffer the heart), Aristotle's first stated consideration is that the so-called 'jumping' of the heart occurs only in humans, and not in other animals, because the jumping 'almost only' occurs during anticipation (ἐν ἐλπίδι) and expectation of the future (προσδοκίᾳ τοῦ μέλλοντος). The unstated premise, presumably, is that anticipation does not occur in non-human animals. As we can see, Aristotle's overall strategy is to deny the purported function of the lung by arguing that the lung does not have this function in non-human animals incapable of anticipating the future. Aristotle's denial of anticipation to animals is surprising, especially seeing that the 'jumping of the heart' is supposed to explain the physical effects of fear (as it does in the *Timaeus*). Yet, in §3.5.1 we saw that Aristotle not only thinks that non-human animals can feel fear but also explains certain differences in the *way* various animals feel fear by appealing to differences in their cardiac physiology (whether they have large or small hearts).

§3.5.3: A Resolution: Non-Rational and Rational Anticipation

We have seen that some passages (sc. T3.9 and T3.10) appear to attribute affective anticipation to animals, while other passages (sc. T3.11, T3.12, and T3.13) seem to preclude animals from being able to anticipate the future. I contend that this apparent conflict is resolved if we take a cue from the *Philebus* and recognize two *kinds* of affective anticipation, *non-rational* affective anticipation that is based on past *sensations* and *memories* of the sort available to animals and *rational* affective anticipation that depends on a thought-based grasp of the object of pursuit or avoidance as good or bad.¹³⁴ Before I go on to give more detailed, positive characterizations of both non-rational and rational affective anticipation in Aristotle (in §3.5 and §3.6 respectively), I will first briefly explain how this distinction can help resolve the problematic passages just surveyed in §3.4.2.

Recall that passage (T3.11) claims that ‘the rational faculty thinks some forms in *phantasmata*’ and ‘reasons and deliberates the future with respect to the present.’ ‘Reason’ and ‘deliberation’ are, as mentioned, distinctively rational capacities. This passage is easily explained, however, once we admit that we *can* use our rational faculty to anticipate the future, and that doing so occurs when the thought-based grasp of some object of anticipation as good or bad contributes to deliberation and calculation. As I suggest later, this is because our anticipation in this case depends on a special kind of *causal* reasoning, namely grasping the final end of our

¹³⁴ Some scholarly work on Aristotle has anticipated (by now, pun intended) this distinction between non-rational and rational anticipation. For instance, in Sorabji’s helpful study of animal minds in ancient philosophy Sorabji says that Aristotle ‘had allowed animals certain forward-looking capacities, provided they did not involve reason’ (Sorabji 1993, 54). This seems correct so far as it goes, but Sorabji does not attempt to explain the sense in which the distinctively human forward-looking capacities ‘involve reason.’ Likewise, Warren claims that ‘it is therefore legitimate to talk of a specifically human capacity for the deliberate recollection and *anticipation* of past and future experiences’ that involves ‘some kind of deliberate inference or reasoning and is therefore restricted to humans’ (Warren 2014, 18-19). Yet, Warren also does not say anything more on what exactly this human form of anticipation consists in.

action and then the causal means that will bring that end about. This sort of reasoning is not available to animals who instead anticipate the future based on past sensory experiences. So, we can grant that (T3.11) does make anticipation seem to involve rational faculties, but then insist that it targets only rational anticipation and does not imply that other animals are locked into the present.

A similar point can be made with respect to our second *DA* passage, (T3.12). That passage claims that desires come into conflict with each other when: ‘the intellect commands resistance on account of the future, but the appetite on account of the present <commands pursuit>, for the present pleasure appears both pleasant absolutely and good absolutely, on account of not seeing the future.’ I think that we should read (T3.12) as implying that ‘mind’ has an anticipation of a future bad that leads it to ‘command resistance.’ The comments on appetite ‘not seeing the future’ should not lead us to infer that creatures possessing appetite but lacking reason cannot anticipate the future at all, however, but rather that creatures lacking reason cannot track whatever good or bad is anticipated by ‘intellect’ and that accounts for the resistance. They cannot anticipate the bad consequence that *reason* is responsive to, and which reason has a *rational* anticipation of. Indeed, I believe that creatures only possessing appetite *can* pleasantly anticipate obtaining some bodily pleasure that they had an antecedent desire for and now anticipate obtaining. This latter anticipation would be *non-rational*, however, based as it is on perceptions and memories, while the former anticipation can be based on rational resources not available to appetite. Such cases of akratic conflict, therefore, can sometimes be explained as conflicts between *rational* and *non-rational* affective anticipation.

Finally, let us turn to (T3.13) from *PA* 3.6, in which Aristotle, while in the process of refuting the view that the function of the lungs is to buffer a jumping heart, claims that it ‘almost

only follows in the case of a human that the jumping <occurs> because it only happens in the case of anticipation and expectation of the future.’ Arguably, Aristotle has in mind *rational* anticipation in passage (T3.13), as this is what I claim is unique to humans.¹³⁵ This is supported once we see (T3.13) as a response to the *Timaeus*, as Timaeus says that the heart is ready to ‘boil over *at a report from reason* that some wrongful act involving these members is taking place’ (*Timaeus* 70b, translation Zeyl, emphasis mine). Later, moreover, Timaeus concludes that the gods constructed the lungs the way they did in order to relieve the heart so that it ‘might be better able to join spirit in serving reason’ (70d5-6). If the *Timaeus* in fact describes a kind of anticipation and ‘leaping heart’ that is dependent on ‘reports from reason,’ however, then Aristotle’s claim in (T3.13) that anticipation only occurs in human beings might in fact amount to a narrower assertion that *rational anticipation* only occurs in human beings – the sort at issue in the *Timaeus*. Moreover, Aristotle himself qualifies his assertion by saying that it is ‘*almost only*’ (μόνον ὥς εἶπεῖν) humans who have hearts that jump, implying that other animals, after all, might have hearts that leap during anticipations.¹³⁶ Finally, Aristotle provides a second consideration, that in most other animals the lungs are simply too far away from the heart to serve as a buffer, that would hold true even if the first consideration is false or overly general, as it would be insofar as it misleadingly implies that *only* humans are capable of *any* form of anticipation. The main thrust of Aristotle’s argument in (T3.13), moreover, holds perfectly well even if we grant non-rational anticipation to animals, namely that Plato’s anthropocentric account of the physiological function of the lungs fails insofar as it does not explain the function of the lungs in non-human animals.

¹³⁵ This is also the suggestion of (Warren 2014, 19).

¹³⁶ For discussion of ‘ὥς εἶπεῖν’ as a phrase used to limit a too-strong assertion, see Smyth §§2012b.

§3.6: Non-Rational Anticipation in Aristotle

Now I turn to explain in more detail how I think we should construe the difference between rational and non-rational affective anticipation in Aristotle. Insofar as non-rational anticipation is shared by human and non-human animals, non-rational anticipation is based on faculties that are likewise shared by human and non-human animals such as memory, perception, and *phantasia*. Indeed, I think that we can helpfully draw on the work of other recent scholars in explicating how this non-rational affective anticipation functions.

In Lorenz' *The Brute Within*,¹³⁷ he argues that Aristotle believes that animals store and retain sense-impressions as *phantasmata* after episodes of sensation, and that 'the ability to retain sensory impressions enables animals to envision prospects, and to form purposes that may impel them to engage in movement from one place to another' (Lorenz 2006, 152). On his view, Aristotle believes that the *phantasmata* formed from sense-perception are connected with each other in an orderly and regular fashion based on the experiences that gave rise to them. So, for instance, a lion cub that smells a stag out on the field, pursues the stag, and later eats the stag will retain multiple associated *phantasmata* from the experience, one being a retained sense-impression of smelling the stag and another being a retained sense-impression of the pleasant taste of eating the stag. Hence, it can come about that 'when a lion notices a stag in its environment, its current perceptual experience may put it in mind of what it is like to eat a stag, and that representation may both occasion anticipatory pleasure and play a crucial role in impelling the lion to go after its prey' (Lorenz 2006, 172).¹³⁸ Sense-perceptions stored as

¹³⁷ I here focus on Lorenz's earlier account, but a broadly similar approach is recently defended in (Gasser-Wingate 2021, 158-196). This sort of associational picture of *phantasia* has also been recently endorsed by (Corcilius 2020, 321-324).

¹³⁸ Lorenz is, of course, alluding to the EN 3.10 passage we saw in §3.5.1, in which the lion pleasantly anticipates eating the stag upon smelling it.

phantasmata, therefore, are sufficient to enable an animal to pleasantly anticipate some non-present goal and thereby be motivated to achieve that goal along lines articulated in Chapter 2.¹³⁹

Let us briefly review some of the key pieces of evidence for this position. In *De Memoria* 1, Aristotle explains how, in episodes of perception, ‘the motion coming about as it were stamps some copy of the perception, just as people certifying things <stamp copies of their seal> with their signet-rings’ (*Mem.* 1.450a30-33, my translation). Occurrent instances of perception give rise to some ‘copy’ of the perception, this somehow being the source of *phantasmata* in the soul.¹⁴⁰ But these stored copies are also associated with each other, such that certain retained *phantasmata*, or sensory motions, occur one after another.¹⁴¹ Aristotle appeals to this fact during the discussion of recollection in *De Memoria*:

[T3.14] συμβαίνουσι δ' αἱ ἀναμνήσεις ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἥδε γενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε· εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, δῆλον ὡς ὅταν ἐκείνην κινηθῇ, τήνδε κινηθήσεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ' ἔθει, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν κινηθήσεται. συμβαίνει δ' ἐνίας ἅπαξ ἐθισθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἑτέρας πολλάκις κινουμένους· διὸ ἐνια ἅπαξ ἰδόντες μᾶλλον μνημονεύομεν ἢ ἑτερα πολλάκις. ὅταν οὖν ἀναμνησκώμεθα, κινούμεθα τῶν προτέρων τινὰ κινήσεων, ἕως ἂν κινηθῶμεν μεθ' ἣν ἐκείνη εἶωθεν.

[T3.14] Acts of recollection happen since one motion naturally comes about after another one; so if it is from necessity, it is clear that whenever one is moved in the one way, one will thereupon be moved <in the other way too>; but if it is not from necessity but by habit, then one will be moved <in the other way> for the most part. For it sometimes happens that one is habituated after being moved once more than after being moved by other things many times, because sometimes, seeing something once, we remember it

¹³⁹ Recall that in Chapter 2 I also discuss how my view differs from Lorenz’ construal with respect to the motivational efficacy of pleasant anticipation. Lorenz thinks pleasant anticipation causes someone to form a desire *for the anticipated pleasure*, but on the view I prefer the pleasant anticipation is itself motivating insofar as it ‘prepares’ the requisite changes in the organs and can, as I argued, in a sense be understood as equivalent to active desire. Despite these disagreements, I am in agreement with his account of how associated past sense-perceptions, stored as *phantasmata*, can enable non-rational animals to anticipate the future.

¹⁴⁰ For more on this process, cf. also *DA* 3.3.428b10-30 and discussion in (Moss 2012, 51-53).

¹⁴¹ For interesting discussion of *phantasmata* as motions embodied within *our blood*, see (Bubb 2019). Recently, some scholars have connected the role of blood as vehicles for *phantasmata* and Aristotle’s beliefs on the physiological differences in blood between men and women to explain various claims he makes relating to the differing cognitive capacities of men and women, cf. (Leunissen 2017, 152-166) and (Deslauriers 2022, 225-231). However, claims concerning the sexual difference between men and women within Aristotle’s work remain controversial. For a contrasting view and a survey of various approaches see (Connell 2021).

more than other things <that we have seen> many times. So, whenever we recollect, we are moved by some <one motion> from among the prior motions, until we should be moved by a motion that, after being moved by it, we are accustomed to <also be moved by> that one <sc. the motion/sense-perception we are trying to recollect> (*Mem.* 2.451b10-18, my translation)

The idea, then, is that *nature* or *habit* makes it such that certain motions are followed by other motions, and that the occurrence of one motion can trigger a cascade of associated motions and bring about the relevant retained sensory motion, that is *phantasma*, of the perception that we are trying to recollect.¹⁴² In cases of recollection (a faculty that Aristotle thinks is only possessed by rational animals) the ‘starting point,’ or first motion ‘from among the prior motions,’ is found by some process of reasoned deliberation that then triggers the relevant sequence of motions that will result in the recollection to occur (*Mem.* 2.453a4-13). However, I take it that the ‘starting point’ could *also* be supplied by some occurrent perception. So, the lion who smells a stag undergoes a perception of a certain smell that likewise triggers a cascade of internal, associated motions resulting in the *phantasma* of pleasantly *eating* the stag, a *phantasma* that could be motivational if it figures as a pleasant anticipation of eating the stag through some potential action, along the lines articulated in Chapter 2. This would nonetheless not count as an instance of recollection in Aristotle’s sense for at least two reasons: 1) the ‘starting point’ was not arrived at through deliberation but rather sense perception and 2) the resulting *phantasma* is used as an *anticipation* rather than a *memory*; that is, it is taken to represent some future prospect.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Note too that this description of *phantasia* makes it clear that it is quite different than the painter in the painter & scribe analogy surveyed in the *Philebus*; therefore, we should not take the painter to represent a kind of proto-*phantasia* faculty in Plato’s thought. Rather, it seems that the functions that *phantasia* performs for Aristotle are rather performed by memory in the *Philebus*. Moreover, as we saw in §3.3, the painter’s creations *come after* belief formation, while we will see that Aristotle’s *phantasia* rather *precedes* belief formation. Indeed, deliberative *phantasia* is allegedly required for belief, as Aristotle says in *DA* 3.11.434a5-11. For a recent argument that the painter does *not* represent a faculty of imagination, cf. (Fletcher 2022), as well as her helpful footnote on scholars who adopt a contrary perspective (202 fn. 7).

¹⁴³ So, it is a counterpart to Aristotle’s discussion on the difference between a *phantasma* being taken up simply as an image (καθ’ αὐτό) as opposed to being taken up as a *memory* or likeness (*Mem.* 1.450b25-27). There is surely a

It might be objected that it is overly restrictive to demand that an animal can pleasantly anticipate only something that it has pleasantly perceived in the past. Cannot a lion, for instance, pleasantly anticipate eating a caribou even if it has never tasted a caribou before? However, it seems plausible that *phantasmata*, which are based on some sort of *decayed* sense perceptions and hence less specific, can stand in to (roughly) represent many particulars that are relevantly similar to the original sense-perceptions that formed the *phantasmata*. This is plausible insofar as it would mirror something that is certainly possible with memory: seeing a caribou can cause me to recall something similar, such as a deer.¹⁴⁴ In this sense a lion's *phantasma* of the pleasant taste of the deer can enable it to pleasantly anticipate eating a caribou because a caribou is relevantly similar to a deer. In what follows, therefore, I generally assume that perceptual *phantasia* allows us to pleasantly and painfully anticipate things that are relevantly *similar to* the perceived objects and experiences that gave rise to the original *phantasma*.¹⁴⁵

Anticipations in which the goal is provided by some *phantasma* from a past episode of sense perception would be non-rational, then, insofar as they are enabled by faculties such as perception and perceptual *phantasia* that are possessed by non-rational animals.¹⁴⁶ Why does a lion *pleasantly* anticipate eating the deer after smelling it? Because it had a past *pleasant perception* of eating the deer that is triggered by an associated sense-perception of the deer's smell. Still, we should also take note of the focus on habituation in our above passage (T3.14):

third way that we can use a *phantasma* such that it is taken up as an anticipation, though it is perhaps unsurprising that Aristotle does not discuss this use in a book devoted to memory.

¹⁴⁴ The example of a deer comes from Aristotle. Recall that in (T3.9) he quotes and refutes Homer by suggesting that a lion 'does not does not enjoy *seeing* "the deer or wild goat," but rather <enjoys> that it will have food.' The lion pleasantly anticipates *eating* the deer or goat (EN 3.10.1118a22-23).

¹⁴⁵ I take this to be generally in line with Lorenz and Gasser-Wingate, cf. (Lorenz 2006, 165) & (Gasser-Wingate 2021, 183), though neither confront this issue directly.

¹⁴⁶ This analysis coheres well with Aristotle's concluding remarks towards the end of his chapter on *phantasia* in DA 3.3, 'and because <*phantasmata*> persist and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things in accordance with them, some because they lack reason, e.g. beasts, and others because their reason is sometimes shrouded by passion, or sickness, or sleep, e.g. humans' (DA 3.3.429a4-8).

the associations between *phantasmata* can occur either through necessity or through habituation, and that habituation can occur either after seeing something ‘once’ or ‘many times,’ hence it sources from past (and possibly repeated) episodes of sense-perception. Importantly, these retained *phantasmata* can also be pleasant or painful: recall Aristotle’s comments in *De Motu* that ‘appearance and thought (ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ἡ νόησις) have the power of their objects,’ such that we can become frightened due to the *phantasma* or thought of something frightening (*De Motu*, 7.701b17-22).¹⁴⁷ So, a retained past *perception* of something *as pleasant or painful* can be sufficient to cause a *pleasant or painful anticipation* of some future prospect.

What I think is important to emphasize for the purposes of this study, however, is that these non-rational affective anticipations are to some extent beyond (or, perhaps better to say ‘below’) the understanding of those who have them. If someone were to pleasantly anticipate some prospect with *pleasure* in this non-rational way, and we were to ask them *why* they take that outcome to be enjoyable, they might very well have nothing to say in response. That prospect just *seems* or *feels* pleasant to them. The explanation of their pleasant anticipation, based on the view being articulated here, is that they have been habituated by past sense-experience to pleasantly anticipate that prospect in these sorts of circumstances. We will see that it is a deeper understanding of the good or bad that is the object of pursuit or avoidance that I believe is essential to instances of *rational* affective anticipation.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ It might be objected that Aristotle seems to deny this at *DA* 3.3.427b20-25, in which he says that someone who believes in something fearful or encouraging is ‘affected right away,’ while someone with a *phantasia* of something fearful or encouraging is like someone who ‘had seen the fearful or encouraging things in a picture’ and is presumably *not* affected at all. Here, however, Aristotle is drawing a distinction between *phantasia* and belief. It would be sufficient for his purposes to point out that *phantasia* does not emotionally affect us in *at least some cases*, for instance when we have a firm belief that the objects we ‘imagine’ do not exist, and thus to draw a single disanalogy with belief. Arguably, Aristotle’s points here relate to the discussion in *De Memoria* on taking up a *phantasma* ‘as itself’ (as a sort of sensory picture) vs taking it up ‘as a memory’ or anticipation: perhaps only the latter result in the relevant affects.

¹⁴⁸ A passage from the *Magna Moralia* is relevant here: ‘For there is in the soul <of a fortunate person> by nature something of this sort whereby we are impelled, not under the guidance of reason, towards things for which we are

Indeed, one last passage from *De Sensu et Sensibilibus* will help round out this discussion of non-rational affective anticipation and guide our transition to discussing rational affective anticipation. Aristotle says that:

[T3.15] ἰδίᾳ δ' ἤδη καθ' ἕκαστον ἢ μὲν ἀφὴ καὶ γεῦσις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ μὲν ἀφὴ διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ δὲ γεῦσις διὰ τὴν τροφήν· τὸ γὰρ ἡδὺ διακρίνει καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν αὐτῇ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φεύγειν τὸ δὲ διώκειν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ χυμὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ πάθος. αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑξωθεν αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἷον ὄσφρησις καὶ ἀκοή καὶ ὄψις, πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι σωτηρίας ἔνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωσί τε προαισθανόμενα τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φεύγωσι, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι τοῦ εὖ ἔνεκα· πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγέλλουσι διαφοράς, ἐξ ὧν ἢ τε τῶν νοητῶν ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις καὶ ἢ τῶν πρακτῶν.

[T3.15] But coming now to the special senses severally, we may say that touch and taste necessarily appertain to all animals, touch, for the reason given in *On the Soul*, and taste, because of food. It is by taste that one distinguishes in food the pleasant from the unpleasant, so as to flee from the latter and pursue the former; and flavor in general is an affection of the nutritive part. The senses which operate through external media, that is the sense of smell, the sense of hearing, and the sense of sight, are found in animals that are capable of locomotion, and belong to those animals for the sake of preservation so that they can, upon pre-perceiving (προαισθανόμενα) the food, pursue it and upon pre-perceiving the bad and destructive avoid it. But in animals which have intelligence (φρονήσεως) they are for the sake of doing well (τοῦ εὖ ἔνεκα), for they report many differences from which arises both the intelligence of intelligibles and that of practical things (τῶν πρακτῶν) (*De Sensu* 1.436b12-437a3, translation Beare, modified).

Perception, we learn, pertains to non-rational animals for the sake of preservation, and works primarily through the distinction between *the pleasant* and *the painful* so that they can pursue the former and avoid the latter. Moreover, certain distal senses that work through an external medium allow us to ‘pre-perceive’ (προαισθάνεσθαι) the food. This unusual word recalls the earlier *EN* 3.10 passage in which the smell of the hare was said to ‘make the perception’ of eating the hare. There I argued that this should be taken to refer to the dog having a pleasant anticipation of eating the hare, and our present passage points in the same direction. These distal

well fitted/ And if one were to ask a man in this state “why does it please you to do so”? – he would say, “I don’t know, except that it does please me,” being in the same condition as those who are inspired by a religious frenzy; for they have an impulse to do something apart from reason.’ (MM 2.8.1207a36-4).

senses belong to animals so that they can pursue and avoid things (such as pleasant and painful tastes) that they do not occurrently perceive, and in Chapter 2 I explained how this is enabled by affective anticipation. In the case of non-rational animals Aristotle thinks that these motivational affective anticipations principally track pleasure and pain for the sake of mere preservation.

Passage (T3.15) is interesting, however, as it hints towards another use of the senses in creatures that possess intelligence (*phronêsis*): they can use them to gain intelligence of ‘intelligible’ and ‘practical things’ for the sake of living well. As I argue in the next section, Aristotle also allows for a richer kind of *rational* affective anticipation that is imbued with, and only possible through, one’s rational powers, powers that enable one to grasp distinctions that are not available to those who only possess perception. I turn to articulating this rational kind of anticipation now.

§3.7: Rational Affective Anticipation in Aristotle

In short, I argue that the key feature of a rational affective anticipation is that one pleasantly or painfully anticipates some prospect due to a thought-based grasp of that prospect as good or bad. This entails, importantly, an understanding of *why* that particular prospect is good or bad. The fact that Aristotle thinks that it is reason that provides us with an ability to understand causes and explanations has firm grounds, and I turn to show that there is evidence that suggests that someone possessing *phronêsis*¹⁴⁹ and full virtue (i.e. a *phronimos*) grasps why certain prospects are good (objects of pursuit) and bad (objects of avoidance). I then turn to passages that support seeing this grasp as entailing a *rational* affective anticipation of some future goal in cases of virtuous action, my principal contention being that Aristotle’s discussion of decision (*prohairesis*) suggests that someone who makes a decision has a pleasant or painful,

¹⁴⁹ I generally refrain from translating ‘*phronêsis*’ in this section, though common translations include ‘prudence,’ ‘practical wisdom,’ and ‘intelligence.’

rational anticipation of encountering something good or bad that embodies their reasoned view about the good and bad.

Let us start by surveying several important features of *phronêsis* as it is discussed in *EN* 6 (= *EE* 5). First, it is noteworthy that the discussion of *phronêsis* in *EN* 6 restricts it to human beings. On the one hand this is not surprising insofar as the book is devoted to the discussion of *intellectual* virtues, however it does mark a departure from Aristotle's tendency elsewhere in the corpus to attribute something like practical intelligence to non-human animals.¹⁵⁰ In *EN* 6.3 Aristotle states that *phronêsis* is 'a state, grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being' (*EN* 6.3.1140b4-5, translation Irwin). Not only is *phronêsis* described as rational, being 'with reason' (μετὰ λόγου), it is also about what is *good or bad* for a human being. These goods or bads are what someone with *phronêsis* understands. Moreover, Aristotle also thinks that *phronêsis* is the virtue that enables us to

¹⁵⁰ There is significant debate as to how such passages should be construed, some of the debate hinging on a crucial passage *HA* 8.1.588a25-b3 in which Aristotle claims that animals have a natural capacity that is somehow analogous to craft, wisdom, and understanding. Johnson surveys several attributions of intelligence to animals, noting that 'animals exhibit industry, resourcefulness, and a sort of practical intelligence in these regards, and hence their behaviors are to some extent comparable to those of humans. ... These traits must not be considered merely metaphorical; rather the human versions are intensifications and modifications of these' (Johnson 2005, 205), also pointing out that 'for all that, non-human animals are not in fact intelligent in the sense that humans are' (205). Lennox attributes robust intelligence to animals, saying that:

The attribution of practical intelligence, political skill, or understanding to other animals <requires no more> than that they display a capacity to organize their behavior for their own good, and/or a capacity to include the role of the community in that good, and/or a capacity to make judgments about such matters (as in the swallow's ability to determine that no mud is available and its ability to determine how to produce mud at that moment when practical intelligence determines that it is necessary, because a nest must be built so that eggs can be laid in a protected place). (Lennox 1999, 24)

Similarly, Depew says that non-human political animals need a kind of intelligence 'if conspecifics are to possess a *koinon ergon*, to orient their separate contributions to it, and to communicate well enough with others to realize it' (Depew 1995, 170). Connell also wishes to attribute robust intelligence to animals, though she says that they lack the ability to ask 'why' questions and acquire the 'relevant explanations of the essences of things' (Connell 2021, 205). On the other hand, Leunissen favors a more deflationary understanding of animal intelligence, claiming that animals 'possess practical intelligence only in the sense that they can anticipate future pleasures or pains and adapt their behavior accordingly' (Leunissen 2017, 12). My own distinction between rational and non-rational affective anticipation sheds light on this debate: non-human animals and humans both act in goal-directed ways when we are guided by our affective anticipations. In that respect the complex behaviors of animals and humans are very similar. However, while non-human animals are guided *only* by *non-rational* affective anticipation, humans are in addition guided by *rational* affective anticipations.

deliberate well (EN 6.5.1140a25-27). Later when discussing deliberation, Aristotle says that ‘good deliberation will be the type of correctness that accords with what is expedient as a means to the end about which *phronêsis* is a true supposition’ (EN 6.9.1142b32-33, translation Irwin).¹⁵¹ This passage suggests that *phronêsis* is, at least partly, the true supposition (ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις) about the *end* that we are deliberating towards, i.e. that particular good that we want to achieve.¹⁵² Likewise, Aristotle also says (dubiously) that the name of moderation/temperance (σωφροσύνη) derives from the fact that it preserves *phronêsis*¹⁵³

[T3.16] ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τοῦτω προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὥς σώζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν. σώζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἥδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά.

[T3.16] Hence we term ‘*sôphrosynê*’ by this name, as it preserves *phronêsis*. It preserves the <appropriate> sort of supposition (ὑπόληψιν). For the sort of supposition that is corrupted and perverted by the pleasant or painful is not every sort, not for instance the supposition that a triangle does or does not have two right angles, but supposition about what is achievable in action (τὰ πρακτά)’ (EN 6.5.1140b11-16).

Again, the suggestion appears to be that *phronêsis* is a certain kind of *supposition* about the end of action, that for the sake of which we act on some given occasion, i.e. the goods or bads we are trying to pursue or avoid.¹⁵⁴ Since *phronêsis* is about goods and bads for human beings, I suggest that it is partly a supposition concerning the practical goals (τὰ πρακτά) that, as I argued in Chapter 2, lie in the future and are the first movers of human locomotion when anticipated.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹The Greek is: ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις ἐστίν. Note that there is some ambiguity in the Greek that is admirably preserved in Irwin’s translation, however, such that the ‘true supposition’ could be construed as being about ‘what is expedient as a means to the end’ rather than ‘the end.’ For arguments supporting the traditional reading, however, see (Moss 2014, 230-231).

¹⁵² Something emphasized by Irwin, for instance, in his explanation of ‘prudence’ (Irwin 2019, 393). However, in (Irwin 1988, §179 pg. 337) he takes the ‘end’ to refer to one’s conception of happiness, as in (Anscombe 1965).

¹⁵³ I assume that Aristotle’s dubious etymological inference derives from assonance between ‘σω-’ with ‘σώζουσιν’ and ‘-φροσύνη’ with ‘φρόνησις.’

¹⁵⁴ Indeed, Patricia Marechal has recently argued that *phronêsis* is a state of conviction, ‘taking the ends set by our character to be good on proper grounds’ (Marechal 2024, 188).

¹⁵⁵ However, it is well known that there is also evidence that suggests that *phronêsis* is responsible for correctly determining the *means towards* the end, rather than a grasp of the end itself, while *virtue* is responsible for setting the ends. Cf. his claim ‘the <human> function is accomplished according to both *phronêsis* and ethical virtue, for

Recall, moreover, that in Chapter 2 we saw that Aristotle repeatedly claims that such goals cause motion when ‘thought of or imagined’ (cf. *DA* 3.10.433b12, *MA* 6.700b23-25, 7.701a29-30, 7.701a32-33, 8.701b34-35).¹⁵⁶ This implies that *thought* has a distinctive way to supply the goal of action in an affective anticipation that is distinct from a mere ‘image,’ or *phantasma*, of the goal. Of course, the case is complicated by the fact that Aristotle at times claims that all thought itself depends on *phantasia* in some obscure way (cf. *DA* 3.7.431a16-17, 3.8.432a3-10). Nonetheless, there is reason to think that thought can as it were *create* or think *with phantasia* in a way that goes beyond the kind of stored sense-impressions which, as we saw in the last section, are present to (almost)¹⁵⁷ all non-human animals. So, for instance, Aristotle claims that ‘images belong to the rational soul, and whenever it affirms or denies that something is good or bad, it pursues or avoids’ (*DA* 3.7.431a14-16). Yet, Aristotle later says that the ability to affirm and deny is different from *phantasia* as the former requires the ‘combination of thoughts’ (*DA* 3.8.432a10-12).¹⁵⁸ Later, moreover, Aristotle contrasts humans with other animals and claims that other animals possess ‘perceptual *phantasia*’ (αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία) but lack ‘deliberative’ (βουλευτικὴ) *phantasia*, and hence lack beliefs (*DA* 3.11.434a5-11, cf. also *DA*

virtue makes the goal correct while *phronêsis* makes the things towards it <correct>’ (*EN* 6.12.1144a6-9), and ‘there will not be correct decision without *phronêsis* and virtue, for the one <makes> the end <correct> and the other makes <us> do the things towards the end’ (*EN* 6.13.1145a4-6). Famously, one class of commentators takes the determination of ‘things towards the end’ enabled by *phronêsis* to include determining the *constitutive* means of some end cf. (Wiggins 1980), (Irwin 1988, 336-338 & 15n22), (Irwin 2019, 291). Yet, the textual basis for this claim has been criticized by, for instance, (Moss 2014) and (Tuozzo 1991). Recently, Marechal has explained this division of labor and argued that virtue sets our ends but also contributes to the formation of the proper *conviction* in the goodness of those ends that partly constitutes *phronêsis* (Marechal 2024, 198). Though a full engagement with this debate outstrips the scope of this project, I think my claims are compatible with multiple views. Namely, everything I say is compatible with supposing that *phronêsis* partly consists in an intellectual but *non-deliberative* grasp of the goods and bads for human beings that is acquired through (but distinct from) experience, analogously to how the first principles of science are grasped through experience. In Chapter 5 I defend this view in more detail.

¹⁵⁶ Some of these passages also include ‘perceived/perception’ as a third option.

¹⁵⁷ We have already seen that Aristotle claims that some benighted animals lack *phantasia*, such as ‘the grub’ (*DA* 3.3.428a11). Cf. discussion in §2.3.2.

¹⁵⁸ It might be objected that Aristotle earlier claims that *perception* ‘as it were affirms or denies’ (*DA* 3.7.431a9), but the ‘as it were’ is significant here: *perception does not actually* affirm or deny. For more defense of this claim, cf. (Corcilius 2011) and (Pearson 2012).

3.10.433b29-30 where ‘rational’ (λογιστική) *phantasia* is opposed to perceptual *phantasia*, the former being distinctive of human animals). It is regrettable that Aristotle in no way explains how deliberative *phantasia* differs from perceptual *phantasia*, nor why it is required for beliefs,¹⁵⁹ but in the last section we already saw how *phantasia* can originate directly from past perceptions. I take it that those are the sorts of cases that Aristotle refers to as *perceptual phantasia*. In contrast, ‘deliberative’ or ‘rational’ *phantasia* is somehow different, used by reason as the vehicle for thoughts and possibly created through a process of reasoning. In any case, I contend that the *DA* and *MA* passages that suggest that *either* thought *or* imagination (*phantasia*) can supply the goal of action draw a distinction between the goal of action being supplied to us via past affective sensations (stored as perceptual *phantasia*) or as being supplied by the rational *thought* of something as good or bad (somehow using *rational/deliberative phantasia*).¹⁶⁰

An implication of this view is that someone with *phronêsis* has the correct *supposition* of the end or goal of action (supposition itself, I take it, requiring reason)¹⁶¹ and hence plausibly supplies the future object that they pleasantly or painfully anticipate with *thought*. So, in these

¹⁵⁹ All we have to go on is the following obscure passage: ‘deliberative imagination belongs to rational animals (since whether one is to do this or that is already the work of reasoning – and it is necessary that measuring take place by one thing, inasmuch as one pursues what is greater and can, consequently, make one out of many *phantasmata*)’ (*DA* 3.11.434a7-10, Shields). Arguably, rationality comes into play insofar as the best outcome is determined not by mere past perceptual experiences but by the grasp and use of a single ‘measure’ to compare various outcomes and create one ‘deliberative’ *phantasma*. I assume that the grasp and application of such a ‘measure’ is the province of reason. That is a tentative suggestion, however, and the passage warrants greater attention than I am able to give it here.

¹⁶⁰ Contra Moss, who denies that Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of *phantasia* (Moss 2012, 146). I am unclear what reasons she has for this denial. Her claim that ‘calculative or deliberative *phantasia*’ refers to a special ‘use to which rational creatures can put the products of *perceptual phantasia*’ (146) seems at odds with Aristotle’s choice to juxtapose the phrase ‘*perceptual phantasia*’ with ‘*deliberative phantasia*.’ Likewise, *DA* 3.10.433b29-30 seems to be clearly drawing a distinction between two distinct *kinds* of *phantasia*, denying one kind to animals. This is relevant to her ultimate position, however, as Moss seems to imagine the goodness and badness of various deliberative future options being determined by one’s sensory and affective reaction to past experiences of those options and their consequence, i.e. the kinds of reactions stored as *perceptual phantasia* (Moss 2012, 147-148). Yet, distinguishing a non-perceptual kind of *phantasia* opens up the possibility that deliberation involves grasping the goodness and badness of various options through thought (and whatever attendant uses of rational *phantasia* accompany it) in a way that goes beyond one’s past pleasant or painful perceptions of those options and their consequences.

¹⁶¹ cf. *DA* 3.3.427b24-26, as well as (Moss & Schwab 2019, 25-26).

cases the pleasant or painful anticipations of the goal will be *rational* since they start from the *thought* or reasoned grasp of some goal as good or bad. I think the way these rational affective anticipations depend on and involve reason can helpfully be illustrated by comparing it to the way *full* virtue (ἀρετὴ κυρία), as opposed to mere natural virtue (ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ), depends on and involves reason, a distinction most clearly made in *EN* 6.13. In that chapter we learn that full virtue cannot come about without *phronêsis*, which as we saw entails a true supposition about the end of action (*EN* 6.13.1144b16-17). On the other hand, natural virtue can belong to children even right from birth, and even to beasts (θηρίοις) (*EN* 6.13.1144b4-10). Natural virtue clearly does not depend on *phronêsis* in any way at all. Aristotle implies that the possession of higher rational faculties, *phronêsis* and *nous*, is what allows someone to gain full virtue: ‘if indeed someone should acquire comprehension (νοῦν), there is a difference in action, but the state, being similar, will at that time fully be virtue’ (*EN* 6.13.1144b12-14, my translation). Indeed, Aristotle later praises those who define virtue as a state ‘in accordance with (κατὰ) the correct reason’ (ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), though Aristotle says this definition should be slightly modified to ‘a state *with* the (μετὰ) correct reason’ (ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου) (*EN* 6.13.1144b25-27). I take it that this implies that full virtue is *itself* a state ‘with the correct reason,’ thereby being distinct from mere ‘natural virtue’ in which one might do the same actions a virtuous person would perform but without the proper intellectual understanding.¹⁶² Tentatively, I suggest that an ethical state ‘with’ the correct reason is one in which one’s affective anticipations (that I argued are equivalent to active desire in §2.3.4) involve reason in the deeper sense that one’s

¹⁶² A similar distinction is drawn in the parallel passage in *MM* 1.34.1198a12-20: ‘Men of the present day say better; for they say that excellence is doing what is good in accordance with right reason. Even they, indeed, are not right. For one might do what is just without any choice at all or without knowledge of the good, but from an irrational impulse, and yet do this rightly and in accordance with right reason (I mean he may have acted in the way that right reason would command); but all the same, this sort of conduct does not merit praise.’ The passage implies that acting in accordance with *choice* and *knowledge* of the good is to act ‘with’ reason in the relevant sense.

thought-based grasp of the good or bad supplies the goal of actions in episodes of affective anticipation. To put it another way, in cases of fully virtuous action, one's affective reactions embody one's *phronetic* grasp of human goods or bads.¹⁶³ At that point, someone with full virtue hopes for the very things that they *understand* to be good and fears the very things they *understand* to be bad.

Nonetheless, though I claim that full virtue is 'with' correct reason in this way, it is nonetheless a character virtue and not an intellectual virtue. Aristotle is clear that full virtue is the excellence of a faculty that is different from the faculty that is responsible for *phronêsis* itself, despite being inseparable from and dependent on *phronêsis*:

[T3.17] ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστὶ, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία. καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.

[T3.17] So that just as there are two kinds of <good conditions> concerning the faculty capable of forming beliefs (τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ), cleverness and *phronêsis*, likewise there are two <kinds of good conditions> concerning the faculty responsible for character (τοῦ ἠθικοῦ), one being natural virtue and the other full virtue. And of these full virtue does not come about without *phronêsis* (EN 6.13.1144b14-17, my translation)

Full virtue is the excellent state, then, of the ethical 'part' of our soul, and hence is not the same virtue as *phronêsis*. I take it, indeed, that this ethical 'part' is the same 'part' of the soul that Aristotle describes in EN 1.13 as 'non-rational.' There he says that the ethical part is the desiderative part (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) that can 'have reason' in the sense that it is such as to 'listen to' (κατήκοόν) and 'readily obey' (πειθαρχικόν) reason, allegedly in the same way that someone can

¹⁶³ I am very sympathetic with the account of 'right *logos*' given in (Moss 2014b), who claims that it entails a correct *explanatory account* of some action, both prescribing that action as good and explaining why the action is good (Moss 2014b, 219). I think Moss is right to claim that the *phronimos* understands the goodness of their actions in a way that is not true of someone with mere natural virtue, but I am less sure this explanation takes the form of a 'practical syllogism' in the way she describes. Moreover, as comes out more clearly in Chapter 5, I disagree that non-rational character determines the goals of character while reason only explains *why* those ends are good but does not determine them. Rather, I would prefer to say that *rational* character determines the goals insofar as it embodies reason.

‘have reason’ (ἔχειν λόγον) of one’s father or friends (EN 1.13.1102b31-33).¹⁶⁴ Presumably the idea is that we not only ‘obey’ father or friends blindly, but more generally ‘take into consideration’ or ‘take into account’ their interests and wishes as our own. Our previous discussions give us one way to understand what it would mean for the ethical ‘part’ of one’s soul to listen to reason, namely that the affective reasons are responsive to (‘listen to’) the goods and bads of action as supplied by one’s rational faculties. In these cases, one’s pleasant and painful anticipations as it were *embody* one’s reasoned view about the goods or bads in the same way that someone’s actions can embody the interests of her father or friends when she acts with their ends in mind. In this way, I take it that someone with full virtue feels pleasure and pain in a way that is in ‘complete agreement’ with one’s reason (πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. EN 1.13.1102b28), perfectly tracking whatever they hold to be good or bad.

If I am correct that the emotional reactions of someone with full virtue embody their rational grasp of practical goods and bads for a human being, those reactions perfectly tracking the good-making and bad-making features that reason takes note of, then we can understand why Aristotle would think that full virtue cannot arise without *phronêsis*. This is simply because *phronêsis* is the intellectual virtue that is responsible for the correct grasp of human goods and bads that full virtue embodies. *Phronêsis* is an intellectual virtue, and the correct reasoned grasp of the goods and bads relevant to human action is an intellectual achievement. In contrast, ‘full virtue’ pertains to the part of our soul capable of having desires (τὸ ὁρεκτικόν, EN 1.13.1102b30) that ‘has reason’ in a secondary sense and that is responsible for our character. Furthermore,

¹⁶⁴ The translation is awkward as the English expression ‘have reason of one’s friends’ is unnatural, however I prefer it to bring out the fact that the Greek idiom Aristotle refers to is supposed to illustrate the sense in which a non-rational faculty can ‘have reason.’ More natural translations can be found in Irwin: ‘This is the way in which we are said to “listen to reason” from father or friends,’ or Ross: ‘this is the sense in which we speak of “taking account” of one’s father or friends.’

recall that I argued that affective anticipations can be understood within Aristotle's general theory as active desire. That, however, would explain why someone with the desiderative part of their soul (τὸ ὁρεκτικὸν) in an excellent condition experiences the proper kinds of *rational* affective anticipations that are responsive to one's reasoned grasp of goods and bads as provided by rational faculties.

I claim that we can also discern *rational* affective *anticipation*, a pleasant or painful anticipation that embodies the rational grasp of practical goods or bads, in Aristotle's conception of decision (*prohairesis*). It is clear that *prohairesis*, which Aristotle defines as deliberative desire (βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξις) for something in the agent's power that is itself desired for the sake of some end (*EN* 3.3, 1113a10-12), is central to his account of full virtue, evidenced by the fact that he defines virtue as a '*prohairetic* state' (ἔξις προαιρετική, *EN* 2.6.1106b35-1107a2). Moreover, Aristotle is clear that *prohairesis* is about things 'in the future that are capable of being otherwise' (*EN* 6.2.1139b5-7), the future contingents capable of being otherwise that, as I explained in Chapter 2, are grasped by *anticipation*. During Aristotle's discussion of *prohairesis* in *EE* 2.10, moreover, Aristotle makes it clear that *prohairesis* is unique to rational animals:

[T3.18] διὸ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις, οὔτε ἐν πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ, οὔτε πάντως ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλευέσασθαι, οὐδ' ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί· ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐθὲν κωλύει πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι. ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινός. ἡ γὰρ οὗ ἔνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἐστίν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τί αἰτία· οὗ δ' ἔνεκα ἐστὶν ἢ γίγνεται τι, τοῦτ' αἰτίον φάμεν εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ βαδίζειν ἢ κομιδὴ τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τούτου ἔνεκα βαδίζει.

[T3.18] Therefore in the other animals choice does not exist, nor in man at every age or in every condition; for there is not deliberation or supposition of the 'why' (ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί); but it is quite possible that many animals have a belief (δοξάσαι) whether a thing is to be done or not; but it is no longer due to reasoning. For the deliberating part of the soul is that which observes a cause of some sort (τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινός); and 'that for the sake of which' (οὗ ἔνεκα) is one of the causes; for a cause answers the 'why'; but something either is or comes about for the sake of something (οὗ ἔνεκα), and we say that this <sc. 'that for the sake of which' something comes about> is a cause, e.g. of walking,

the recovery of money, if this is the purpose for which one walks (*EE* 2.10.1226b21-29, translation Solomon, modified)

Non-rational animals, Aristotle says, can never make decisions despite having beliefs about whether things should or should not be done.¹⁶⁵ Decision requires deliberation (τὸ βουλευσασθαι) and, more importantly for our purposes, a ‘supposition of the why’ (ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί). It is this latter component that Aristotle goes on to emphasize in our passage: the deliberating ‘part’ of the soul is ‘the part contemplative of some cause’ (τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινός) and, in particular, the *final* cause or *end for the sake of which* something comes about. Someone who grasps the final end of action does not simply act but understands the final cause of their own action, that is the good or bad that they act for the sake of bringing about or avoiding.

Now, there is a weak way of reading this grasp of the final cause of one’s action that I think we should reject. Consider a dog and a human that both run in order to catch a rabbit. It might be thought that the only difference between these two cases is that the human being somehow *recognizes that* it runs in order to catch a rabbit, while a rabbit is incapable of such reflective recognition. The human being acknowledges that catching a rabbit is the ‘end’ for the sake of which it runs. Perhaps nothing more amounts to the ‘supposition of the why’ (ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί) than this bare recognition.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Aristotle’s claim here that animals have beliefs is problematic. Contrast with *DA* 3.3.428a18-24, in which Aristotle claims animals cannot have beliefs since they cannot have conviction (*pistis*), but conviction follows belief. Regardless, I take the point to be that animals move in virtue of non-rational affective anticipations that do not depend on reason.

¹⁶⁶ This is the position taken by (Lorenz 2006, 182-183) and (Moss 2012, 224). In later work Moss reaffirms that the ‘content of one’s ends – the nature of the things one values – is dictated entirely by one’s nonrational upbringing and character’ (Moss 2014b, 234). Yet, she also claims that it is the job of *phronêsis* to determine ‘precisely what it is that one is aiming at,’ articulating and making determinate an indeterminate grasp provided by non-rational habituation (233). As becomes clear in Chapter 5, I am in agreement with Moss that non-rational habituation provides us with an indeterminate grasp of ends that reason makes determinate. Yet, if *phronêsis* determines ‘precisely what it is’ that I value, it seems to me that it is *ipso facto* responsible for the *content* of what I value.

However, there are two considerations that weigh against this view, both relating to the fact that *phronêsis* is described as a ‘true supposition’ about the end of action. If the ‘supposition of the why’ that intellect contributes to a distinctly human sort of excellence were merely a grasp *that* someone acts for the sake of some particular end, then it would not seem to amount to any particularly vaunted cognitive achievement. Surely even a small child can have this awareness; however, Aristotle is clear that small children cannot have *phronêsis*. Secondly, it seems to collapse the distinction between cleverness and *phronêsis* (EN 6.12.1144a23-b1). A clever vicious person, for instance, surely recognizes the mere fact *that* he acts for the sake of an end and is clever at determining means to that end. Yet, Aristotle implies that *phronêsis* is a kind of intellectual achievement that is distinct from cleverness though admittedly ‘not without cleverness’ (EN 6.12.1144a28-29).

It is more promising to suppose that the grasp of the end that is implicated in cases of virtuous action implies an ability to connect one’s proximate goal to what is in general good or bad for oneself as a human being, the very thing that Aristotle takes to be the domain of *phronêsis*.¹⁶⁷ So, someone on a walk to recover money could also answer a further question, ‘why’ they need to recover money, by linking it up to more general goods and bads that they are pursuing or avoiding.¹⁶⁸ They can grasp, as it were, the various ‘good-making features’ of

¹⁶⁷ *Phronêsis* requires a grasp of both particulars and universals, as is for instance implied by Aristotle’s comment that *phronêsis* is not *only* of the universal, but *also* of the particulars (οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, EN 6.7.1141b14-15).

¹⁶⁸ An interesting extension of Aristotle’s example can be found in the *Posterior Analytics*: ‘Again, we seek the reason why up to this point, and it is then we think we know, when it is not the case that this either comes about or is because something else does, for the last term is in this way an end and a limit. E.g. with what aim did he come? So as to get money – and that so as to return what he owed; and that so as to not wrong <someone>. And going on in this way, when it is no longer because of something else or for the sake of something else, we say it is because of this as an end that he came (and that it is and that it came about) and that then we best know why he came’ (*APo.* 1.24.85b27-35, Barnes modified).

recovering money in this case, given their own circumstances.¹⁶⁹ They could, for instance explain how it contributes to some other fine action they wish to perform. Likewise, we should suppose that a virtuous person has some understanding of what a fine action *actually is* and in general grasps the proper value and worth of objects of pursuit and avoidance. Hence the genuinely courageous person's 'actions *and feelings* accord with what something is worth (κατ' ἄξιαν), and follow what reason prescribes' (EN 3.7.1115a15, emphasis mine). I believe that this deeper understanding of human value is therefore implicated in cases of virtuous actions.

Let me illustrate this view with an example. Take someone who is fully virtuous, and therefore has the intellectual virtue of *phronêsis* and full virtues of the kind described above. Suppose that her friend calls her and asks for help moving to another location. Assuming that it is in fact reasonable to help her friend in this instance,¹⁷⁰ she will be pleased at the prospect of helping and assisting her friend and pained at the contrary prospect of her friend being let down. This affective orientation is responsive to a prospective good that is supplied by thought, i.e. her intellectual grasp of the goodness of friendship in a human life, the goodness of a particular friendship in her own life, and her cognitive grasp of what friendship itself even is.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, this initial affective orientation towards the goal of friendship precedes deliberation, as it gets her reasoning about how to bring about the anticipated good.¹⁷² It picks

¹⁶⁹ This sort of understanding does not, of course, implicate anything like a grasp of the 'Form of the Good,' or a grasp of 'goodness itself.' Unlike Plato, Aristotle famously denies that such a Form exists and that such a grasp is possible (EN 1.6.1096a10-1097a15, EE 1.8.1217b1-1218b10).

¹⁷⁰ Of course, any example of virtuous actions will need such a caveat, as real-world examples are full of particular details to which a genuinely virtuous person must be properly sensitive to but which cannot figure in toy examples.

¹⁷¹ Arguably, to grasp the nature of friendship is *ipso facto* to know the features in virtue of which it is good. Perhaps it is in general characteristic of the fine (τα καλά) that the very features that make those things be what they are are also the same features that make those things good.

¹⁷² An important comment in the *Rhetoric* discussion of fear supports this claim: 'there must be some anticipation/hope (τινα ἐλπίδα) that salvation is available, about which they can strive. A sign of this is that fear makes us deliberate, however no one deliberates about things that are unanticipated/hopeless (περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων)' (Rhet 2.5.1383a6). The context makes it clear that deliberation depends on some prior anticipation of salvation, though here 'hope' is an appropriate translation of ἐλπίδα, as it is clear that salvation is something good but uncertain. Hence, we deliberate about *how* we can bring about the good that we hope for. Of course, on the flip-side

out the ‘practical ends’ (πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς) that guide her action and consequent deliberation (*EN* 6.13.1144a29-36). Conversely, someone who has a vicious character might just be annoyed by her friend’s request for help, seeing the prospect as only painful and burdensome and not recognizing the prospective good on offer. Such a person would not deliberate on how to help her friend at all, perhaps deliberating instead on how to dodge the request. In each case, however, someone has an affective anticipation of a future prospect that embodies and reflects their reasoned outlook on the goods and bads involved in the situation.¹⁷³

Contrast with this a very different sort of non-rational pleasant anticipation for, say, drinking coffee. The reason I might pleasantly anticipate drinking coffee is that I have had many past experiences of drinking coffee that were themselves pleasant. Perhaps at first it was bitter, but over time it became pleasant, and now I anticipate it with pleasure. This anticipation need not in any way originate from some deep appreciation of the value of coffee in my life; indeed, I might sometimes anticipate the prospect of drinking coffee with pleasure even when drinking coffee *conflicts with* my overall understanding of my own good (for instance because it is 10:44pm and drinking coffee would have devastating effects on my sleep schedule). It is a sign of my own deficient character if I nonetheless pleasantly anticipate drinking late-night coffee and must drag myself away from the nascent impulse to actually drink coffee manifested in my pleasant anticipation (as described in Chapter 2).¹⁷⁴

it is *fear* that makes us deliberative in the example, hence we deliberate after an initial painful *aversion* to something we take to be bad, so long as we also anticipate the possibility of escaping it.

¹⁷³ So, importantly, a vicious human being can also have rational affective anticipations, but they are in an important sense *bad* and *mistaken*. They are rational because they still embody her (mistaken) view on the goods and bads involved in action and hence can initiate an (incorrect) *prohairesis* for some bad action. Of course, this vicious person lacks *phronêsis*, as *phronêsis* is an *excellent* condition of one’s soul.

¹⁷⁴ Assuming I successfully resist it will be a case of enkratic action, indeed one very similar to the sort of case surveyed in the next paragraph.

Let me conclude this section and chapter by turning to one last passage that I think helps shed light on rational affective anticipations. In *EE* 2.8, in the course of his discussion of the voluntary and the involuntary, Aristotle explains that people who act *akratically* and *enkratically* have two conflicting impulses within themselves (ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμὰς ἔχων) (2.8.1224a.32-34) and that they experience a mixture of pleasure and pain:

[T3.19] ἔτι καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἔνεστι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατευόμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη, καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφεληθήσεται, ἢ καὶ ἤδη ὠφελεῖται ὑγιαίνων· καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατευόμενος οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ, λυπεῖται δὲ τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἶεται γὰρ κακὸν πράττειν. ὥστε τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ἑκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἑκάτερον ἄκοντα ποτὲ πράττειν· κειχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἑκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων.

[T3.19] Moreover, there is both pleasure and pain in both cases. For the self-controlled person feels pain, now acting contrary to the appetite, and also enjoys the pleasure from the anticipation (τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν) that he will later be benefited, or even now is benefited because he is healthy; and because the akratic person acts akratically he enjoys obtaining the thing for which he has an appetite, but is pained by pain from the anticipation (τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος λύπην), for he thinks that he acts badly. The result is that it is reasonable to claim that each acts by force and that each then acts involuntarily, <one> on account of the desire (διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν) and <the other on account of> the reasoning (διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν), for being separated each is driven back by the other.¹⁷⁵ (*EE* 2.8.1224b15-24, my translation)

This is a passage where Aristotle unambiguously refers to affective anticipation, using the key terminology of ‘ἐλπις’ to refer to anticipation and referring both to a pleasant anticipation of some future good (maintaining one’s health through self-controlled action) and a painful anticipation of some future bad (acting badly and, presumably, harming one’s health). The distinctions I have drawn can help to shed light on this example. As I understand it, we are to suppose that an *enkratic* person and an *akratic* person both *choose* to maintain their health and not indulge their appetite, but only the *enkratic* person actually acts in this way. Both, therefore,

¹⁷⁵ Though, for the record, note that Aristotle denies that either person *actually* acts involuntarily. Each acts voluntarily insofar as they are motivated by their impulse that depends on either reasoning or appetite, yet both belong to human beings by nature.

respectively feel a pleasant or painful anticipation that corresponds to their decision (*prohairesis*), decision itself being distinctively rational. This will be a *rational* affective anticipation, as the affective anticipation embodies their conception of what is good or bad for them in this case, health clearly being a human good. Since the *akratic* person anticipates harming his health, something that is in his view bad, he feels a painful anticipation and a consequent aversion to his own action that is nonetheless overridden by his appetitive impulse. On the other hand, the *enkratic* person pleasantly anticipates acquiring the good of health by her action but also feels pain insofar as she must pull herself away from the unhealthy treat for which she has an appetite for.¹⁷⁶ Now, the pleasure and pain that track the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of one's appetite are certainly *non-rational*, based as they are on mere appetite (a kind of desire shared with non-human animals) rather than one's grasp of what is good or bad, something with which the appetitive impulse actually conflicts. In contrast, we should take it that the pleasant or painful anticipations that the *akratic* and *enkratic* person feel are *rational*, as they stem from their choice, result in an impulse 'due to reasoning,' and embody their grasp of what is good or bad for themselves.

§3.8 Conclusion

Let us briefly take stock. I have argued that a useful distinction can be made in both Aristotle and Plato between non-rational and rational affective anticipation. Focusing on the *Philebus*, I explained how non-rational affective anticipations are based on past episodes of

¹⁷⁶ Now, the occurrent pain that the *enkratic* person feels is arguably not anticipatory, but rather a present awareness that her appetite remains unfulfilled. However, as discussed in the last chapter, I believe that there might be an unstated anticipatory pain, for instance an *enkratic* person's painful anticipation that her appetite will *continue* to go unfulfilled. Likewise, Aristotle seems to describe the *akratic* person as feeling a painful anticipation with a non-anticipatory pleasure after he obtains the object of appetite: the *akratic* person has already acted akratically and is in the very process of satisfying his appetite, which is pleasant. Yet, there could be unstated pleasant anticipations here as well: for instance, he pleasantly tastes the first sip of coffee but even now pleasantly anticipates a second sip.

sensation stored as memories, while rational affective anticipations instead originate from reasoning about the nature of the object one anticipates. A virtuous person, unlike a vicious person, can pleasantly anticipate *pure* pleasures thanks to their rational understanding of pleasure's nature. As should now be clear, I believe that a similar distinction can be discerned in Aristotle's own ethics. Humans and other animals are alike capable of pleasantly and painfully anticipating future prospects on the basis of past pleasant or painful sensations, something that Aristotle can explain in a new way thanks to his psychological theory of perceptual *phantasia*. In contrast, humans can also pleasantly or painfully anticipate something in a *rational* way, in light of a thought-based grasp of some future good or bad achievable in action, the first mover of animal motion as explained in Chapter 2. This thought-based grasp, I tentatively suggested, corresponds with an understanding of *why* some object of pursuit or avoidance is good or bad and a related understanding of the nature of such human goods and bads. I think that it is interesting and worth emphasizing that, for both Plato and Aristotle, what is distinctive about *rational* affective anticipation is not so much that we are able to 'predict the future' more accurately thanks to our rational capacities, but rather that we have a better grasp of the *objects* of our pleasant and painful anticipations, understanding what they are and why they are good or bad. It is this rational grasp of the *future goals* of our actions that makes affective reactions rational in the relevant sense. It is precisely this nuanced grasp and understanding, moreover, that non-human animals cannot possess.

In what follows I turn to the important role that these affective anticipations play in *emotions* such as fear, confidence and shame. The distinction drawn here has important implications for the way in which reason can integrate with our emotions. It is almost a truism that emotions can 'conflict' with reason in various situations, something Plato and Aristotle are

always keen to point out. In these cases, it is indeed true that our emotions can be explained by perceptual habituation that is devoid of understanding and which can, consequently, sometimes be misdirected towards inappropriate goals. However, our emotional reaction can also *embody* our reasoned grasp of the good and bad in the case of *rational* affective anticipations, and I claim that both Plato and Aristotle think that these *rational* affective anticipations should underlie the emotional responses of a fully virtuous individual. In such a person shame, fear, and confidence are not the enemy of reason but rather its ally and friend in a deep and important sense. Showing the centrality of *affective anticipation* to both Plato's and Aristotle's accounts of the emotions is the task of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 4: Affective Anticipation and the Emotions

§4.1: Introduction

In previous chapters I have argued that affective anticipations are crucial to human motivation. Pleasant anticipation of some prospective good motivates us to attain that good, while the painful anticipation of some prospective bad motivates us to avoid that bad outcome. Though both Plato and Aristotle take desire to play an important role in the explanation of action, I have argued that there is good reason to see affective anticipation, consequent to but distinct from desire, as what literally moves us to action. In the last chapter, moreover, I have distinguished between rational and non-rational affective anticipation and shown how certain sorts of anticipation are the result of past sensory experiences while others are the result of rational faculties. In this chapter I bolster my claims concerning the motivational importance of affective anticipation in Plato and Aristotle by arguing that both Plato, in the *Laws*, and Aristotle, in the *Rhetoric*, analyze the emotions (*pathê*) as partly constituted by affective anticipations. Namely, I show that Plato analyzes confidence as a pleasant anticipation and fear as a painful anticipation. Insofar as he analyzes shame and shamelessness as kinds of fear and confidence, it follows that these other emotions are also certain kinds of affective anticipations. Likewise, Aristotle's own analysis of the emotions in *Rhetoric* 2.2-11 also sees emotions as partly constituted by affective anticipations. Though this is more readily apparent for certain emotions, such as anger and fear, I contend that we can also see affective anticipations as essential components of confidence, shame, envy, and emulation.

Before I continue, it will be necessary to say a few words by way of justification for my tendency to treat the ancient philosophical discussion of *pathê* (πάθη) as a treatment of 'emotion.' Though 'emotion' is a possible translation for *pathos*, the Greek word has a much

wider scope and can refer to a quality or property, something that happens to someone, or an event that someone is experiencing. So, for instance, ‘softness’ could be considered a *pathos* of my skin (as some degree of softness is a quality of my skin), but it is of course absurd to say that my skin has an emotion of ‘softness.’¹⁷⁷ Despite the semantic mismatch between ‘*pathos*’ and ‘emotion,’ however, it is clear that Aristotle and Plato use the word *pathos* to describe what we refer to as emotions. So, for instance, Aristotle prefaces his discussion in the *Rhetoric* with the claim that ‘*ta pathê* are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear, and the like, with their opposites’ (*Rhetoric* 2.1.1378a19-21). Likewise, in the *EN* Aristotle says that by ‘*pathê*’ he means ‘appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, yearning, emulation, pity, and in general what is accompanied by pleasure or pain’ (*EN* 2.5.1105b21-23).¹⁷⁸ In summary, while we should of course be aware that *pathê* does not always mean ‘emotions,’ it seems reasonable to translate it this way in our current discussion, which is clearly about what are uncontroversially referred to today as emotions.¹⁷⁹

§4.2: The Iron Strings of Confidence and Fear: The Divine Puppet Analogy & The Symposia of *Laws I-II*

In *Laws I-II*, the Athenian argues that state-run symposia and drunkenness can be strategically utilized to benefit the state and inculcate moderation (*sophrosunê*) in citizens. In the process he compares humans to puppets that are pulled around by different cords: pleasure, pain,

¹⁷⁷ The example comes from Aristotle: ‘while heteromerous parts, for example the tongue and the hand, <are distinguished from each other> by their ability to do something, homoiomerous parts are distinguished by softness, hardness, and other *pathê* of this sort’ (*GA* 1.18.722b31-33).

¹⁷⁸ The *EE* has a similar list of emotions: “By ‘*pathê*’ I mean these sorts of things: spirit, fear, sense of shame, appetite, and in general that which, for the most part, is accompanied by perceptual pleasure or pain, according to itself” (λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ’ αὐτά. *EE* 2.1220b12-14).

¹⁷⁹ For more discussion on the relation between *pathê* and emotion, see (Cairns 1993, 393-397), (Leighton 1996), (Grimaldi 1988, 12-15).

fear and confidence corresponding to four ‘iron’ cords while reason corresponds to a soft, ‘golden’ cord. Scholars have been interested in whether or not the passage is evidence that Plato moved away from tripartition in his late works and instead endorses a kind of bipartite psychological theory. For our purposes, however, the passage (which we have already briefly seen in the introduction as T0.4) is crucial insofar as it appeals to *pleasant and painful anticipation* as two core motivational impulses, alongside pleasure and pain not linked to anticipation, on the one hand, and reason, on the other.

The Athenian claims to introduce the ‘image’ (εἰκόν) of the divine puppet to explain the sense in which the good are able to ‘rule themselves’ while the bad are unable to do so. He claims that we have within us two opposite ‘witless advisors’ (συμβούλω ... ἄφρονε): pleasure and pain (*Laws* 1.644c6-7). Crucially, the Athenian also describes two other motivational forces:

[T4.1] {AΘ.} Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δέ, φόβος μὲν ἢ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἢ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις λογισμὸς ὅτι ποτ' αὐτῶν ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον, ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται.

[T4.1] Athenian: We also <possess> beliefs about the future concerning both of these <sc. pleasure and pain>, to which ‘anticipation’ (ἐλπίς) is the common name, while ‘fear,’ on the one hand, is <the name for> the anticipation of pain in particular, while ‘confidence’ is <the name for> the anticipation of the opposite <sc. pleasure>. In addition to these there is reasoning about which of these is better or worse, which, after coming to be the common dogma of the city, is named ‘law.’ (*Laws* 1.644c9-d3, my translation)

As we can see, this passage is concerned with *anticipation* and describes two separate kinds, fear being termed anticipation of pain while confidence is called anticipation of pleasure. What is Plato’s purpose in classifying ‘fear’ (φόβος) and ‘confidence’ (θάρρος) as two kinds of ‘anticipation,’ now referred to as ‘beliefs about the future’ (itself recalling the scribe and painter analogy of *Philebus* 38e-40e)? I contend that later arguments in *Laws* I-II support taking ‘fear’ and ‘confidence’ to be general terms for pleasant and painful anticipation directed at future *goods* and *bads*. While fear is directed towards a potential future bad and motivates us to take

action to avoid that which we fear, confidence is directed towards a potential future good and motivates us to take action to bring that good thing about. The central division between fear and confidence structures the Athenian's subsequent discussion of the symposia, as he first discusses the effects and usefulness of a merely hypothetical drink that induces fear and then discusses the alleged real effects of wine to produce confidence. Attention to these passages can help us understand how Plato understands these emotions more generally.

§4.2.1: The Iron Cord of 'Fear'

I first turn to consider the Athenian's discussion of a hypothetical drink that makes people more and more afraid the more of it they consume:

[T4.2] Τί οὖν; φόβου φάρμακον ἔσθ' ὅστις θεὸς ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε ὅποσῳ πλέον ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις πίνειν αὐτοῦ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτὸν νομίζειν καθ' ἑκάστην πόσιν δυστυχεῖ γίνεσθαι, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὰ παρόντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ πάντα, καὶ τελευτῶντα εἰς πᾶν δέος ἰέναι τὸν ἀνδρειότατον ἀνθρώπων, ἐκκοιμηθέντα δὲ καὶ τοῦ πώματος ἀπαλλαγέντα πάλιν ἐκάστοτε τὸν αὐτὸν γίνεσθαι;

[T4.2] Athenian: So what? Is there any god who has given a drug of fear to humans, so that by whatever amount someone is willing to drink more of it, by that same amount he considers himself to become more unlucky, by each drink, and fears both things present and everything in his future, until finally the most courageous of human beings goes to total fear, but after sleeping it off and being released from the drink he each time again becomes himself? (*Laws* 1.647e1-a3, my translation)

The imagined 'drug of fear' induces more and more fear the more of it is consumed, eventually causing even the most courageous person to become totally afraid. Notably, the drink induces fear by causing people to consider their present *and future* situations *to be bad* (literally 'unlucky,' δυστυχεῖ), and to fear 'everything in his future' (τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ πάντα). This picks up the earlier description of the 'iron cord' of fear as the anticipation of future *pain*, but now the things that we fear are future *bad* or unlucky outcomes, rather than simply painful ones. Indeed, a bit before this passage the Athenian seems to re-describe fear as directed at bads rather than

simply at pains, claiming that ‘we somehow fear bad things (τὰ κακά), expecting that they will come about’ (*Laws* 1.646e6).

Relatedly, it is also important to note that the Athenian describes *shame* (αἰσχύνῃν) as a species of fear, namely as the fear of a bad reputation (*Laws* 1.647a1). Moreover, it is evident that the Athenian takes shame, a kind of fear, to have motivational force. He claims that it is ‘opposed to the most frequent (ταῖς πλείσταις) and greatest (μεγίσται) pleasures’ (*Laws* 1.647a5-6). The clear implication is that someone who is experiencing shame will *not* act in such a way as to pursue those great pleasures and will instead restrain herself. Hence, the Athenian says that the way to make someone ‘conquer in the struggle with his pleasures’ is to cultivate a ‘kind of fear (τινα φοβερὸν) consistent with justice’ (*Laws* 1.647c7-8). Just as more typical cases of fear motivate us to avoid dangerous situations (a fear that must be resisted if one is to succeed in facing battle, (cf. *Laws* 1.648a-e)) so too shame motivates us to avoid shameful and disgraceful actions.

It should be noted that this description of the symposia corrects an initial misconception that might be suggested by the divine puppet analogy, namely that the ‘iron cords’ of fear, confidence, pleasure, and pain are always errant impulses that should be resisted. Though the Athenian does initially describe a case in which a certain cord should be resisted (namely the pull to some disgraceful pleasure), his consequent discussion of the symposia reveals that errant impulses to indulge in disgraceful pleasures should be resisted by *another* ‘iron’ impulse: shame, i.e. the fear of disgrace. Indeed, the Athenian claims that the good lawgiver should, at a symposium, be able to change the behavior of anyone who ‘becomes hopeful (εὐελπιν) and confident (θαρραλέον) and more shameless than he ought (ἀναισχυντότερον τοῦ δέοντος),’ and that he does this by opposing this bad confidence (ᾧ μὴ καλῷ θάρρει) with the ‘finest fear’:

shame and the sense of shame (αἰδῶ τε καὶ αἰσχύνην) (*Laws* 2.671c4-d3). Hence, the Athenian is not encouraging us to simply fight against any and every hedonic impulse, but rather to cultivate *correct* hedonic impulses to oppose errant ones. Likewise, note that shame opposes ‘shamelessness’ (ἀναίδεια), which the Athenian in fact characterizes as a *kind* or *species* of confidence (*Laws* 1.647a10). Though that sort of confidence is harmful and should be resisted, the Athenian nonetheless praises another sort of confidence that can bring victory in war and that should consequently be cultivated (*Laws* 1.647b6). Just as a kind of confidence, namely shamelessness, is resisted by a kind of fear, namely the sense of shame, so too another kind of fear, excessive fear of danger, is to be resisted by a separate kind of confidence relating to the perils of war.¹⁸⁰

§4.2.2: The Iron Cord of ‘Confidence’

So much for fear, which I have argued motivates us to avoid pain and to avoid shameful actions through its manifestation as shame (understood as the fear of disrepute). We can now investigate the motivational power of *pleasant* anticipation in the *Laws* by turning to a passage that describes the alleged *real* ability of wine to produce over-confidence in humans, a ‘fearlessness and excessive confidence (τοῦ λίαν θαρρεῖν) that is inappropriate and about things that we should not do’ (*Laws* 1.649a4-5).¹⁸¹ The Athenian says of wine that:

¹⁸⁰ The fact that the Athenian does not encourage us to simply oppose our hedonic, non-rational impulses but rather to cultivate the right ones is well brought out by (Meyer 2012) and (Wilburn 2021, 271-280). Both, moreover, suggest that the proper cultivation of fear (shame) and confidence tracks a concern for the proper development of spirit (*thumos*), a non-rational source of motivation that needs to be trained and educated to be an ally with reason, rather than a competitor to it. It is somewhat controversial to suggest that the *Laws* operates with a tripartite psychology as seen in the *Republic*, however, so I do not discuss the possible connections between the emotions that I discuss here and *thumos* as a kind of desiderative faculty.

¹⁸¹ I take it that this description picks up the earlier reference to ‘shamelessness’ as the confidence about the greatest pleasures. However, note that this description of an excessive and inappropriate confidence gives us grounds to challenge Frede’s claim that ‘Plato’s education does not aim for the “right mean” between defect and excess with respect to the same affection. Instead, there are right and wrong kinds of pleasure and pain. The right kind of fear is the fear of disgrace; the wrong kind of fear is that of injury or death, and other expectations of this sort’ (Frede 2010, 120). However, the ‘wrong kind’ of confidence, shamelessness, is here described as *excessive* and un-timely confidence with respect to some class of objects. It is not unreasonable, I believe, to think that something like the

[T4.3] Ἡ καὶ τοῦναντίον ἔχει τοῦτο τῷ νυνδὴ λεγομένῳ; πίνοντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ πρῶτον ἵλεων εὐθὺς μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ὁπόσῳ ἂν πλέον αὐτοῦ γεύηται, τοσοῦτῳ πλειόνων ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν πληροῦσθαι καὶ δυνάμεως εἰς δόξαν; καὶ τελευτῶν δὴ πάσης ὁ τοιοῦτος παρρησίας ὡς σοφὸς ὢν μεστοῦται καὶ ἐλευθερίας, πάσης δὲ ἀφοβίας, ὥστε εἰπεῖν τε ἀόκνως ὅτιοῦν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πράττειν; πᾶς ἡμῖν, οἶμαι, ταῦτ' ἂν συγχωροῖ.

[T4.3] Doesn't this hold oppositely to the thing just now spoken of? Doesn't it immediately make the same person drinking it more joyful than he was before, and by whatever amount he should drink more of it, by that same amount it makes him more full of anticipations of good things and power, at least with respect to his belief? In the end, doesn't this sort of guy become full of total frankness, as though he is wise¹⁸², freedom, and total fearlessness, the result being that he without hesitation says anything whatsoever, and likewise so acts? Everyone, I suppose, would grant this to us. (*Laws* 1.649a8-b6, my translation)

While the previously discussed hypothetical drug in (T4.2) was able to induce excessive *fear* insofar as it caused the expectation of bad (or 'unlucky') future prospects, wine instead makes people 'more joyful' and full of 'anticipations of good things' (ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν). In Chapter 1 I argued that such a pleasant anticipation was necessary to action and motivation: a desire alone was insufficient, as we must in addition take ourselves to currently be in a position in which we can plausibly achieve the object of our desire, and hence anticipate attaining it. The current passage (T4.3) is in alignment with my earlier arguments, as the artificial 'good anticipations' that wine generates clearly have motivational force: they cause drunken individuals to say and do 'anything whatsoever.' Indeed, the fact that people who have too much wine are filled with delusional expectations of attaining good things is supported by the Athenian's claim that wine likewise makes people (falsely) believe that they are full of power. Someone who believes that

doctrine of the mean is lurking in the background here. Cf. also the Athenian's description of pleasure and pain as 'two springs' from which we must draw wisely at the right times and in the right degree to live well (*Laws* 1.636d-e).

¹⁸² It is highly interesting that wine is supposed to mimic a state of *wisdom*. This suggests that wisdom, like wine, *motivates action*. Of course, surely something like the *presumption of wisdom* (δοξοσοφία) is also sufficient to motivate action, or at the very least motivate a perhaps obnoxious frankness (παρρησία) to share one's supposed 'wisdom' with others.

they have extreme power would surely anticipate being able to acquire goods in virtue of that power and ability. Indeed, note a later discussion in which the Athenian claims that people who see anything ‘big and strong and powerful’ suppose that anyone with such power could be ‘happy’ in virtue of being able to satisfy his every wish.¹⁸³ The power (apparently) ensures that things will come about in line with one’s wishes and satisfy one’s antecedent desires; however, the expectation that one will be able to satisfy one’s antecedent desire is precisely the situation that, as we saw in Chapter 1, is said to give rise to a pleasant anticipation in the *Philebus*.

Secondly, again note that the object of the anticipation in (T4.3) is *good* things (ἀγαθῶν) rather than pleasure. Just as there was a correlative broadening of fear from the initial definition (an anticipation of future pain) to the anticipation of future bads in (T4.2), so too there is a broadening of confidence from its earlier definition as the anticipation of future pleasure to the anticipation of future good things.¹⁸⁴ In a way that parallels the discussion of fear, moreover, we have good reason to think that the anticipation of good things caused by wine-induced confidence is itself pleasant. Not only does the Athenian call the confident, intoxicated person ‘joyful,’ he also later suggests that everyone feels enjoyment whenever they suppose themselves to be doing well (*Laws* 657c5-6).¹⁸⁵ Since a confident person likely satisfies the condition of someone who ‘supposes themselves to be doing well’ insofar as he anticipates good things, we would expect a confident person to feel occurrent pleasure.

¹⁸³ Cf. 686e, and the discussion of humanity’s ‘one common desire’ that everything (or at least all human affairs) will come about ‘according to the command of one’s own soul’ (κατὰ τὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐπίταξιν, 687c5).

¹⁸⁴ This also brings the account of the objects of fear and confidence closer to what we find in the *Laches*: “We say that the ‘fearful’ are future evils, and the ‘confidence-inducing’ are either things that are not bad or future goods” (ὅτι δεινὰ μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα κακὰ φαμεν εἶναι, θαρραλέα δὲ τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα; *Laches* 198c2-4).

¹⁸⁵ ‘We feel enjoyment whenever we suppose <ourselves> to be doing well, and whenever we feel enjoyment, we again suppose <ourselves> to do well’ (*Laws* 2.657c5-6, my translation). Though not explicitly stated, I think it is not unreasonable to suspect that the Athenian thinks that we likewise feel *pain*, the opposite of pleasure, when we suppose ourselves to be doing poorly, the opposite of doing well.

The Athenian's later survey of conditions in which we are, in different ways, naturally 'confident' (θαρραλέοι) and 'bold' (θρασεῖς) also supports seeing confidence as having motivational force (*Laws* 1.649c8). Recall that the Athenian earlier identified 'confidence' with the anticipation of future pleasure. He now describes such conditions as follows:

[T4.4] {AΘ.} Οὐκοῦν ταῦτά ἐστι πάντα ἐν οἷς ἐσμὲν τοιοῦτοι, θυμός, ἔρως, ὕβρις, ἀμαθία, φιλοκέρδεια, δειλία, καὶ ἔτι τοιάδε, πλοῦτος, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα δι' ἡδονῆς αὖ μεθύσκοντα παράφρονας ποιεῖ;

[T4.4] Athenian: So are not all these <sc. conditions, *pathemata*> in which we will be this sort <sc. naturally confident>: spirit, erotic-love, hubris, ignorance, greed, cowardice, and further such things as this, <namely> wealth, beauty, strength, and whatever else makes us drunk and out of our mind through pleasure? (*Laws* 1.649d4-7).

Note that the list of conditions in which we are naturally confident consists of two groupings that are separated by the phrase 'and further such things as this' (καὶ ἔτι τοιάδε): the first grouping consists of psychological conditions (spirit, erotic-love, hubris, ignorance, greed, and cowardice), while the second grouping lists physical or material conditions (wealth, beauty, and strength). Given that the first grouping are psychological states, I take the Athenian to be suggesting that these psychological conditions themselves involve feeling 'confidence,' i.e. in some way involve the pleasant anticipation of good things. The second grouping, on the other hand, lists physical and material conditions that can make us confident and thus also give rise to pleasant anticipations of obtaining future pleasures or goods. The sense in which the listed psychological and material conditions make us 'drunk and out of our minds,' according to my present analysis, is precisely that they fill us up with pleasant expectations of attaining future goods.¹⁸⁶ These

¹⁸⁶ To be fair, it is somewhat unclear to me how 'cowardice' makes us drunk on pleasure in this way. Perhaps it is a reference to how a coward, excessively afraid of some bad prospect, is able to boldly face other dangers that are at least taken to be less bad. Consider, for instance, someone deathly afraid of spiders who would rather jump out the window than remain in the room with one, and who might be considered 'bold' for being willing to jump through a window. Nonetheless, the case still seems odd to me, as the coward is surely motivated more by fear than by confidence. Ignorance is also strange. Though it is easy to imagine someone who is excessively confident due to ignorance (imagine someone rushing 'boldly' through a minefield because he has no idea that the mines are even

conditions therefore function similarly to the intoxicating, confidence-producing effects of wine. To take one example, it seems plausible that someone could be, as it were, ‘drunk on love.’ Though it is without doubt a complex emotional state, it is likely that someone in the grips of *eros* might sometimes become confident and daring, pleasantly anticipating success in being with her beloved. Likewise, wealth, beauty, and strength naturally give rise to pleasant expectations of acquiring good things insofar as these characteristics make it more likely that one will succeed in one’s endeavors. Finally, note that the Athenian draws our attention to the present affective valence of these emotions and conditions: they make us ‘drunk and out of our mind *through pleasure*’ (δι’ ἡδονῆς αὖ μεθύσκοντα παράφρονες ποιεῖ). The pleasure is not incidental but in fact crucial to such experiences.

Finally, this brief discussion of conditions that make us naturally confident and daring supports taking pleasant anticipations to be efficacious in a wider class of ‘emotions’ than just confidence. The (incomplete) list of conditions that cause us to be filled with pleasant anticipations includes ‘spirit, erotic-love, hubris, ignorance, greed, cowardice.’ Indeed, I believe that it recalls the remark at the end of the argument for false anticipatory pleasures in the *Philebus*, when Socrates says that similar arguments would hold concerning ‘fear and spirit and all the rest of this sort’ (*Philebus* 40e2-4). In the *Laws* we see that what it is to feel these emotions is to feel certain kinds of pleasant and (in the case of fear and shame) painful anticipations. The passages in the *Laws* shed light on Socrates’ comment in the *Philebus*: we can understand how these other emotions might sometimes be false insofar as they themselves are, like fear and confidence, partially constituted by affective anticipations. In §4.3 I argue that a similar phenomenon is present in Aristotle’s discussion of the emotions in the *Rhetoric*.

there), this seems incidental to the ignorance itself. Indeed, even if ignorance often makes people confident about the future, in many other cases it can surely make us *fearful*.

§4.2.3: Meyer on ‘Anticipation’ in *Laws* I-II

I have argued that affective anticipation in the emotions of confidence and fear (as well as other emotions in which they figure such as shame and love) explains how these emotions can motivate people to both virtuous and vicious actions. Plato is keenly aware of the potential for these emotions to lead us awry, however, and thus is keen to cultivate the *proper* emotions and affective anticipations in us from a young age, a theme that I continue to explore in the next chapter. Nonetheless, the most recent and most thorough study of pleasant and painful anticipation in the *Laws* by Susan Sauvé Meyer is somewhat at odds with my proposal. In this section I briefly explain her contrasting view and defend my own interpretation.

In her study, Meyer claims that the definition of fear and confidence as the ‘anticipations’ of pleasure and pain should *not* be taken to imply that fear and confidence are genuine anticipations of potential future prospects. Rather, she claims that fear and confidence are ‘oppositional impulses’ that *resist* other impulses, such as non-anticipatory pain and pleasure. So, for instance, she claims that confidence is an impulse that ‘resists’ our aversion to pains while *shame* (a sub-species of fear) is an impulse that ‘resists’ both our attraction to shameful pleasures and the pains and fears of battle (Meyer 2012, 317-320). Meyer, indeed, contends that the ‘ἐλπίδες’ described at *Laws* 1.644c9-d1 do not refer to genuine anticipations at all. Instead, she argues that the relevant philosophical feature that Plato cares about is the *intentionality* of certain pleasures and pains – they can be *about* objects that can be true or false. She calls these intentional pleasures and pains ‘emotional responses’ (325). On her view it is therefore the *intentionality* of fear and confidence, as opposed to their future-directedness, that makes them philosophically important.¹⁸⁷ She concludes that:

¹⁸⁷ Indeed, the fact that Meyer does not think that *anticipation* qua *anticipation* is philosophically significant is indicated by her frequent tendency throughout the article to put anticipations in scare quotes (i.e. ‘anticipations’).

The Athenian would be using ἐλπίς in a generic sense, prepared for but not articulated in the *Philebus*, that encompasses all pleasures or pains with intentional objects (whether anticipatory pleasures/pains or emotions). Thus, the distinction invoked at *Laws* 644c4-d3 between pleasure and pain as our “witless advisors” and our “anticipations” of pleasure and pain is (however inchoately) a distinction between the motive force supplied, on the one hand, by our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain and, on the other, by our ability to have pleasures and pains with intentional objects (Meyer 2012, 326).

Meyer ultimately holds that the first two iron strings of the divine puppet analogy refer to our basic hedonistic motivations to pursue pleasures and avoid pains while the second two iron strings, the ‘anticipations’ of fear and confidence, are ‘pleasures and pains directed at intentional objects’ that can be cultivated to direct us towards achieving the admirable or avoiding the shameful (327).

I am sympathetic to many aspects of Meyer’s account (especially the observation that fear and confidence can function as ‘oppositional impulses’) but believe that she is nonetheless mistaken to relegate the importance of *anticipation* in Plato’s account of the two ‘iron strings’ of fear and confidence. Firstly, Meyer’s reading runs counter to the most natural reading of the text. It is Plato who chooses to describe the cords as ἐλπίδες. If he had meant to draw our attention to the intentionality of certain pleasures and pains to be about certain objects then he could have described them differently, for instance by using the ἐπί + dative construction to highlight what those pleasures or pains are about, by explicitly discussing ‘objects’ of pleasures or pains (as he does in *Philebus* 37a), or by introducing something like the scribe and painter analogy. In short, we should not take Plato to be making an inchoate distinction that he makes precisely in other dialogues. Secondly, I think that it is a mistake to relegate the importance of anticipation in Plato’s description of fear and confidence because fear and confidence intuitively *are* future directed anticipations rather than mere intentional thoughts. I might imagine, conceive, or think about a bad or dangerous possibility without fearing that possibility; for instance, I can imagine a murderous Klingon officer teleporting into my office and murdering me, but the mere

supposition or imagination of this possibility does not necessarily lead to fear. Rather, we fear something that we think is potentially *in our future*. It is better to follow Frede's suggestion in her own discussion of the image of the divine puppet, namely that Plato focuses on ἐλπίδες, as genuine anticipations, because 'only the future provides incentives to *act* in one way or another, while affections concerning the present and the past do not. For this very reason expectations are called the domain of virtue and vice' (Frede 2010, 117).

Meyer would likely dispute my claim that fear and confidence are plausibly seen as future-directed attitudes. In her article she focuses on shame, an emotion that the Athenian describes as a species of fear, and claims that 'it is the thought of doing the unjust act (*not the positive expectation that one will do it*) that is painful to the person with a properly cultivated sense of shame ("I would be ashamed to do that ...")' (Meyer 2012, 326, emphasis mine). I take it that Meyer's point is not that the expectation of doing an unjust act is *not* painful to someone who has a properly cultivated sense of shame, but rather that the painfulness of the expectation is parasitic upon the painfulness of the *thought* of doing the unjust act that is somehow implicated in the expectation. That thought may or may not be conjoined with an expectation that the thought-of action will occur. So, for instance, someone might arguably feel shame at the thought of stealing money from one's friends or family despite having no expectation of ever actually doing this action.

Yet, does the *mere thought* of performing an unjust action really cause shame, with its attendant occurrent pain and distress? This strikes me as implausible. It seems to me that I can 'imagine' or 'think of' the performance of some unjust or shameful action without feeling any occurrent shame: it is not as if I blush or bashfully avert my gaze to the ground at the moment when I entertain the action. To support this with an example, suppose that everyone's favorite

computer security specialist Jenny Radcliffe tells a friend how she would commit the ‘perfect cybercrime,’ detailing her plan to infiltrate a large public University in order to steal and sell corporate data without leaving a trace. Radcliffe plausibly feels no shame whatsoever as she relates the many intricate details of her ‘perfect crime.’ I would suggest that this is because the thought is entertained in a wholly hypothetical mode that is not accompanied by any *anticipation* of that action or its consequences ever actually occurring. There is, crucially, no anticipation of any attendant disrepute (recall that shame is analyzed as the fear of a bad reputation (*Laws* 1.646e10-647a2)). In contrast, Radcliffe might start to feel real shame were she to learn that one of her students is actually going to carry out the hypothetical attack she described, as she now anticipates that the disreputable crime she described in a wholly hypothetical manner will actually occur in her own future.¹⁸⁸ It is presumably this sort of shame, referred to as the ‘finest fear,’ that holds us back from actually performing shameful actions. If this is so, however, then there are both philosophical and textual grounds to hold that Plato takes ‘ἐλπίδες’ to refer to genuine anticipations.¹⁸⁹

§4.3: Affective Anticipation in *Rhetoric* 2.2-11

In the first half of this chapter, I argued that Plato, in the *Laws*, holds that pleasant and painful anticipation underlies core emotions such as fear, confidence, and shame. In this section I transition to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* to argue that pleasant and painful anticipation are also important in Aristotle’s own conception of emotions. Of course, I should state at the outset that I do not intend to provide a comprehensive treatment of any particular emotion, a task that is well beyond

¹⁸⁸ Indeed, evidence for the anticipatory character of shame is highlighted by the very fact that the Athenian refers to it as a *kind of fear*, rather than simply as a special kind of pain.

¹⁸⁹ To be clear, however, I agree with Meyer that fear, confidence, and shame *are* directed at intentional objects, but hold that this feature pertains to these emotions insofar as they are constituted by affective anticipations that are themselves intentional.

the scope of this dissertation. I instead simply wish to draw attention to the underappreciated role that affective anticipations play within Aristotle's own treatment of the emotions.

As a prelude to that discussion, however, it should be mentioned that there is some debate as to the status of Aristotle's treatment of the emotions in the *Rhetoric* in light of Aristotle's own insistence that the *Rhetoric* is not a scientific work (*Rhetoric* 1.4.1359b2-18). However, scholars have also pointed out that Aristotle discusses the emotions in *Rhetoric* 2 in order to aid rhetors in producing and removing those emotions from his audience. It is therefore highly implausible to suppose that Aristotle provides popular but *untrue* accounts of the emotions, as a false account of an emotion would be useless to an orator. Rather, as Striker claims, it is more plausible to take the *Rhetoric* 2.2-11 discussion of the emotions, and its attendant definitions, to be 'not science or philosophical theory, but theory-based results' (Striker 1996, 287).¹⁹⁰ We should therefore take Aristotle's discussion of the emotions to reflect his own reasoned outlook, and to be a stance that he would on reflection endorse, even as we acknowledge that it is not complete and exact in all respects.¹⁹¹

§4.3.1: Anger (ὀργή)

I start with anger. I claim that Aristotle takes anger, as described principally in the *Rhetoric*, to be partly constituted by a *pleasant anticipation* of getting revenge. Aristotle defines the emotion as follows:

[T4.5] Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὀρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας [φαινομένης] διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ <τι> τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστων τι, οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τί πεποίηκεν ἢ ἡμελλεν, καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἔπεσθαί

¹⁹⁰ Cf. also (Frede 1996). For a slightly different view, in which Aristotle focuses on the *endoxa* that are the starting place of any philosophical view, see (Cooper 1996, 241-243).

¹⁹¹ One respect in which it falls short of a complete 'scientific' treatment is that there is no discussion of the physical embodiment of the emotions of the kind that we can observe in *De Motu Animalium* (the emotions being accompanied by warming and cooling, expansion and contraction) and the *De Anima* (the latter of which describes *ta pathê* as 'enmattered forms' (δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἐνυλοὶ εἰσιν; *DA* 1.1.403a25)).

τινα ἡδονήν, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἶεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὐτῷ.

[T4.5] Let anger be a desire, with pain, for [apparent] revenge on account of an apparent slight towards oneself or one's own, of a slight that is not fitting.¹⁹² So if this is anger then necessarily the angry person is always, each time, angry with some particular person, as it were with Cleon but not with a human <generally>, and because <that person> has just <harmed> or intends <to harm> himself or his own; moreover some pleasure follows all anger, the pleasure from the anticipation of getting revenge, for to suppose oneself to attain that which one yearns for is pleasant, but no one yearns for something from those things that appear to be impossible for him, but the angry person yearns for something possible for him. (*Rhetoric* 2.2.1378a30-b4, my translation)

Aristotle, admittedly, does not explicitly mention any pleasant anticipation in his initial definition of anger, the first sentence of the above passage, in which he defines anger as a painful desire caused by an apparent slight.¹⁹³ However, I believe that the importance of pleasant anticipation to anger (ὀργή) is nonetheless apparent. For one, he immediately and explicitly says that *pleasure* follows *all* anger, specifically the pleasure *from the anticipation* of getting revenge. The fact that this pleasant anticipation follows *all* anger suggests that the pleasant anticipation is not incidental but core to anger as a *pathê*. On this view, to feel anger is to feel a *mixture* of pleasure and pain: a pain due to the desire caused by the apparent past slight, and a pleasure due to the anticipation of revenge.¹⁹⁴

Moreover, (T4.5) gives us reason to think that the pleasant anticipation is tightly intertwined with the painful desire for revenge that is clearly essential to anger. For one, note that

¹⁹² Though note Grimaldi's suggestion that the 'τοῦ ... μὴ προσήκοντος' be taken as a subjective genitive, such that the sense would be that the slight is performed by someone who 'is unfit to treat with disdain anything concerning oneself or those close to one' (Grimaldi 1988, 22-23).

¹⁹³ I believe that this is the reason why the pleasant anticipation only gets a passing mention in recent treatments, cf. (Konstan 2006, 42) and (Scheiter 2022, 33). Others are even more dismissive, Cooper claiming that the pleasure is 'secondary' to the pain and not part of the definition (Cooper 1996, 254 fn. 15) while Striker claims that 'these pleasures are not seen as necessary ingredients in "mixed feelings"' (Striker 1996, 291).

¹⁹⁴ So, see (Frede 1996, 269) and (Konstan 2006, 42) who hold that anger is *essentially* a pleasure mixed with a pain, and who more generally take Aristotle to follow Plato in holding many emotions to be *mixtures* of pleasures and pains. I am sympathetic with their views (however I am unsure that *every* emotion is a mixture of pleasure and pain, as Frede would claim), however for a contrasting perspective cf. (Striker 1996, 290-293).

the desire and the pleasant anticipation are directed at the very same object: attaining revenge. The desire is ‘for revenge’ (τιμωρίας, in the objective genitive) while the pleasant anticipation is of ‘getting revenge’ (τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι). The pleasant anticipation is therefore explained by the fact that one anticipates getting what one desires, indeed Aristotle says this explicitly in (T4.5): ‘for to suppose oneself to attain that which one yearns for is pleasant’(b2-3). This claim, it seems, is not narrowly restricted to Aristotle’s analysis of anger; rather, he confirms that every anticipation of attaining the object of one’s desire is pleasant. Finally, Aristotle ends (T4.5) by stating that the ‘angry person yearns for something that is possible for him.’ In that case, however, the angry person is precisely someone who anticipates obtaining the object of his desire – the very sort of situation in which one will experience a *pleasant* anticipation that will motivate one to obtain that object, as I argued in Chapter 2. For these reasons we can understand why the angry person does not *merely* have a painful desire for revenge, but in addition has a pleasant anticipation of obtaining it.

Some, such as Moss, contend that the pleasure of revenge comes from the pleasant *phantasia* of getting revenge, where this is distinct from the pleasant *anticipation* of getting revenge, citing as support Aristotle’s comment that ‘A kind of pleasure follows on account of this <i.e. the anticipation of revenge> and also because people dwell in their minds on retaliating; the *phantasia* that then occurs produces pleasure, just as does the *phantasia* that occurs in dreams’ (*Rhetoric* 2.2.1378b8-10, translation Moss; as cited in Moss 2012, 78). However, while I think that we should agree with Moss that a *phantasia* of revenge is in some sense responsible for the pleasure experienced in anger, I think that it is important to insist that the pleasant *phantasia* occurs *in* an anticipation.¹⁹⁵ Besides the fact that Aristotle makes this claim explicitly

¹⁹⁵ With respect to the text, I suggest that we should take the καὶ at 2.2.1378b8, which Moss translates as ‘and also,’ to be epexegetic, hence we should slightly amend Moss’ translation as follows: ‘A kind of pleasure follows on

(the pleasure is from the ‘anticipation of getting revenge’ (τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι)) also again note Aristotle’s comment that the angry person ‘yearns’ (ἐφίεται) for something that is possible for him. Why does Aristotle bother to make this point? After all, he in fact elsewhere acknowledges that we can have desires for impossible things, such as a wish to be immortal (*EN* 3.2.1111b19-23).¹⁹⁶ I suggest that Aristotle specifies that an angry person yearns for something that is possible for him because this fact is supposed to explain *why* an angry person has a pleasant anticipation of getting revenge over and above a mere desire (or yearning) for revenge: the explanation is that we yearn for something that is *possible for us*, and hence, I suggest, something that we can *expect to attain*.¹⁹⁷ This is in alignment with my arguments in Chapter 2: we can have desire for something that we may or may not actually obtain, but motivation requires the further move from mere desire to the positive, pleasant expectation of that prospect as in one’s own future, an expectation that of course can only follow a grasp of that prospect as *possible* for us.

The modal status of the object of our anticipation, something that we take to be possible and potentially in our own futures, is also important in Aristotle’s subsequent rhetorical advice

account of this <sc. the anticipation of revenge>, *namely* because people dwell in their minds on retaliating <i.e. when anticipating revenge>; the *phantasia* that then occurs <i.e. while anticipating revenge> produces pleasure, just as does the *phantasia* that occurs in dreams.’

¹⁹⁶ This is overlooked by Grimaldi, who takes Aristotle to be endorsing the claim that we in general can only desire possible things, a claim that Grimaldi supports with several passages from the corpus (Grimaldi 1988, 25). However, his first passage at *Rhetoric* 2.19.1392a24-25 in fact says that no-one desires impossible things *for the most part* (ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ), thereby allowing desires for impossible things in some cases. His other source comes from *Politics* 5.11.1314a23-24, where Aristotle says that tyrants want to make their subjects powerless because no one *attempts* (ἐπιχειρεῖ) impossible things, so a powerless subject will not attempt to depose a tyrant. However, the fact that no-one *attempts* things that they take to be impossible is compatible with nonetheless *desiring* or *wishing* for those things.

¹⁹⁷ This also connects with another important aspect of Aristotelian anger: we are only angry at slights from people *not fit or suitable* to give the slight. In most cases, these will be slights from people whom we take to have an equal or lower social status than ourselves. As Konstan explains, a slight from someone whom we take to have a *higher* social status than ourselves is met not with anger but with fear, as ‘we acknowledge, by our fear, the greater strength of the other, who is accordingly in a fit or suitable position to deliver a slight’ (Konstan 2003, 109). Likewise, the greater strength and power of people with higher social status is the reason why those slighted do *not* anticipate being able to get revenge on such people.

concerning anger and the contrary emotion, gentleness (πραότης).¹⁹⁸ Though much of Aristotle's advice on removing anger addresses removing the apparent past slight to which the anger is responsive, some of his advice is about removing the forward-looking component: the pleasant anticipation of getting revenge. For instance, Aristotle claims that we do not feel angry with those who we think it is *impossible* to get revenge on, such as the dead (*Rhetoric* 2.3.1380b25-26). In general, Aristotle claims that we are not angry with those who we suppose are 'unable to perceive that <they are punished> because of us and because of the things we have suffered' (*Rhetoric* 2.3.1380b21-22). In such cases we will not be able to exact *revenge*, in the relevant sense, on those who have wronged us. Though the angry person can make the other party suffer, it will not count as true revenge so long as that other party lacks an awareness that the suffering is redress for any particular slight or past action.¹⁹⁹ Note, though, that removing someone's anger by showing them that their target will not be aware of the revenge removes anger by eliminating the forward looking expectation of getting revenge; though anger is allegedly removed in such cases, it does nothing to ameliorate either the apparent past slight or the desire that the apparent slight caused. Likewise, Aristotle discusses the pleasant expectation of revenge during his treatment of pleasure in *Rhetoric* 1.11 and claims that 'no one grows angry when it appears impossible to get revenge' (*Rhetoric* 1.11.1370b13, translation Rhys-Roberts, modified). Hence, the rhetor can eliminate anger by showing how revenge is impossible.

¹⁹⁸ Though, cf. (Konstan, 2006, 77-90) for discussion on why the emotion is better translated as 'satisfaction' than 'gentleness.'

¹⁹⁹ Cf. also Aristotle's comment, made while contrasting anger with hate, that an angry person 'wants his victims to feel; the hater does not mind whether they feel or not' (*Rhetoric* 2.4.1382a8-9). Scheiter helpfully lists three features essential to revenge, as conceived of by Aristotle: 1) the offender is pained by the act of revenge, 2) the offender must know that the avenger is the cause of his pain, and 3) he must know he is in pain because of what he did to the avenger. (Scheiter 2022, 33). Conditions (2) and (3) track the offender's own awareness of the act of revenge *as* revenge.

So, the rhetor can eliminate anger by removing the expectation of getting revenge in the future even though he does nothing to eliminate the apparent past slight that causes the desire for revenge.²⁰⁰ If this is so, however, it shows that the expectation of revenge is not incidental or secondary to the definition of anger, but rather partly constitutive of that emotion. This also leaves us with a rather striking picture of anger: to feel angry I must not only desire revenge but also pleasantly anticipate it and, in light of my arguments in Chapter 2, therefore be occurrently motivated to attain it. What it is to *feel anger*, we might say, is to *be moved* towards exacting revenge on one's enemy. This characterization does not seem inapt: in *EN* 3.8 Aristotle emphasizes how those acting from anger and spirit²⁰¹ are being driven (ἐξελαυνόμενα) to act, comparing them to beasts 'hurling themselves' (φερόμενα) towards their attackers (*EN* 3.8.1116b25). Such descriptions of anger as a force driving us forward indicates that it has the sort of inherently motivational power that we would expect given the fact that it is the conjunction of a (painful) desire with the motivating, pleasant anticipation of fulfilling that very desire.

§4.3.2: Fear (φόβος)

While anger crucially involves a *pleasant* anticipation of getting revenge, fear is correlated with a *painful* anticipation of encountering something bad. We have already seen the *Rhetoric* 2.5 definition of fear in the Introduction (as T0.5), but I reproduce it below as (T4.6):

[T4.6] ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτα ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνεται ὥστε

²⁰⁰ Admittedly, this seems like a somewhat dubious way to 'quiet' anger, perhaps only working temporarily. The suspicion is that, as soon as circumstances change and the 'satisfied' person sees an opportunity for revenge, then they will once again revert to anger. In contrast, convincing someone that they were not slighted is a better way to remove anger, as this method targets the desire directly and hence removes both the pain and the pleasure.

²⁰¹ Note that (Pearson 2012) takes spirit (*thumos*) and anger (*orgê*) to be equivalent. Even if we resist identifying them, Aristotle seems to use them interchangeably in the *EN* 3.8 passage.

μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

[T4.6] Let fear be some pain or disturbance from the appearance of a future bad, either destructive or painful; for not all bad things are feared, for example if one will be unjust or slow, but rather only those that are capable of great pains or destructions, and these only if they should not appear to be far off but rather close and imminent. For things that are extremely far off <in time> are not feared; for everyone knows that they will die but, because this is not near, they consider it nothing. (*Rhetoric* 2.5.1382a21-27, my translation)

Unlike the definition of anger, Aristotle does not explicitly use an ‘anticipation’ word here such as ἐλπίς or ἐλπίζειν, yet he nonetheless describes fear as related to a future bad. But even if he does not use anticipation language in this very passage, later in the chapter he claims that fear is ‘with the expectation (προσδοκίας) that one will suffer something destructive’ (*Rhetoric* 2.5.1382b29-30), and he claims that the contrary of fear, confidence, is the ‘anticipation’ (ἐλπίς) of safety. First, however, note that fear is defined as an occurrent pain: it is a *pain or disturbance*, and hence feels distressing at that moment when we experience it. Second, that pain comes from the appearance of a *future* bad or destructive thing (ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ). Again, the emphasis on the *future* directedness of the ‘appearance’ (φαντασίας) is reason to think that fear is not so much caused by *any imagined* bad thing, but rather an *anticipated* thing.

Indeed, Aristotle’s description of fear in (T4.6) draw attention to the particular *modal* character of the anticipation involved. Everyone, he says, *knows* (ἴσασι) that they will die; there is therefore surely a sense in which everyone *believes* that they will die. Yet, for most people death does not appear ‘near,’ and hence it is not an object of fear. Fear is directed specifically towards a destructive or painful bad in our *imminent future*, something that we *actively anticipate* as happening to us. The prospect of our own death, when near, is drawn to salience in a way that it is not when we passively endorse the claim that we, as mortal humans, must die. My

suggestion is that we have a more concrete, active anticipation that death will occur when death is near. As we approach death it can become *real* for us in a way that it is not when we merely acknowledge that our death is entailed by our mortality: we can suddenly anticipate the time, the place, the manner in which we will meet our demise. Plausibly, it is this concrete anticipation of our death as imminent and actual that is involved in the fear of death.²⁰² More generally, we fear some bad thing when we have a concrete anticipation of that bad thing as coming about in our own future.

Indeed, the fact that fear involves a painful anticipation is supported by Aristotle's subsequent discussion of fear. He says that 'it follows therefore that fear is felt by those who believe something to be likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a particular time' (*Rhetoric* 2.4.1382bb33-34, translation Rhys-Roberts). This passage again implies that fear requires a concrete anticipation that some particular bad thing will happen in one's future. This explains how the rhetor can cause fear in her listeners by drawing their attention to the fact that others have suffered things 'at the hands of unexpected people, in an unexpected form, and at an unexpected time' (*Rhetoric* 2.4.1383a11-12). Though it might seem paradoxical that a *concrete* expectation of harm can be caused by drawing one's attention to someone else's *unexpected* harm, this method presumably causes fear by making someone anticipate a similar harm in his or her own, relevantly similar circumstances. So, for instance, learning that others were the victims of an unanticipated college shooting may cause

²⁰² In passing, I note that I think that the Epicureans would not conceive of the fear of death along these lines. For instance, Lucretius seems to attribute the restless anxiety of an aristocrat rushing back and forth between his villa to the city to a latent and unresolved fear of death (Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, 3.1053-75). In such cases, I take it that the aristocrat is not explicitly fearing death, rather the content of his fear is opaque to his own mind. This opacity explains why he performs seemingly random actions to address what is felt as a vague and nondescript sense of unease. It is only after the underlying psychological cause of this behavior has been diagnosed as the fear of death that Epicurean philosophy can help alleviate that fear and bring tranquility to his life.

me to fear that I will likewise be the victim of a shooting at my own university. Even if the possibility of violence did not seem likely to me before, the rhetor could point out that the other victims had a similar, misplaced confidence.

I briefly conclude this section by noting that the emotion of pity (ἔλεος) also has a forward-looking, anticipatory aspect very similar to that found in fear: it is defined as a pain about an apparently bad thing that someone undeserving has suffered *that we expect could happen to us or our friends* (*Rhetoric* 2.8.1385b13-16, emphasis mine). This forward-looking aspect, the painful anticipation that I or my friends might suffer the same misfortune, is essential to all instances of pity. Hence, Aristotle claims that people who lack this anticipation, for instance those who suppose that their wealth or social power insulates them from harm, do not feel pity for others (*Rhetoric* 2.8.1385b21-23). Yet, while pity is conjoined with a forward-looking anticipation that one might possibly suffer the same harm, it is nonetheless distinct from fear since it also requires an occurrent pain about someone else's misfortune. Indeed, Aristotle is sensitive to the issue of pity devolving into fear if we become too focused on the anticipation of our own future harm. Such a person feels fear *rather than* pity, there no longer being the requisite other-regarding affect. In this case we see that pity, like anger, is a complex emotion that involves both a *non-anticipatory* other-regarding pain in conjunction with an occurrent *anticipatory* self-regarding pain that closely parallels the pain present in fear.²⁰³

²⁰³ Moss denies that anticipation is relevant in all cases of pity (and in the *pathê* more generally). She points out that the orator induces pity by figuratively 'putting the suffering before our eyes,' thereby 'emulating the workings of memory and expectation ... clearly the operative faculty here is *phantasia*' (Moss 2012, 83). Moss thinks that memory and expectation make use of a *phantasma* of suffering, and that this *phantasma* of suffering (rather than the expectation) accounts for the pity. The rhetor causes this pity by triggering *phantasia* in another way, not causing a memory or expectation but merely 'emulating' it. But I think this gets the account backwards: the rhetor puts suffering 'before our eyes' in an effort to trigger the anticipation that constitutes pity, just as the rhetor puts the unexpected suffering of others 'before our eyes' to trigger our own fear. Indeed, note that the callous wealthy person Aristotle describes might *literally* see suffering 'before his eyes' but fail to feel any pity solely in virtue of lacking the relevant anticipation.

§4.3.3 Confidence (τό θάρσος):

Confidence (τό θάρσος) is described by Aristotle as the opposite of fear. Note that we have already seen the same pair of opposites, confidence and fear, analyzed by Plato in the *Laws* as kinds of pleasant and painful expectation.²⁰⁴ In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle describes confidence as follows:

[T4.7] τό τε γὰρ θάρσος τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ <φόβῳ, καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον τῷ> φοβερῷ, ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ἐλπίς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων, τῶν δὲ φοβερῶν <ὡς> ἢ μὴ ὄντων ἢ πόρρω ὄντων.

[T4.7] For confidence is the contrary of fear, and what is confidence-inducing <is contrary> to the fearful, so that it is an anticipation, with an appearance, of things that preserve us as being near, and of fearful things either not existing at all or being far away. (*Rhetoric* 2.5.1383a16-19, my translation)

As in the *Laws*, confidence is said to be an *anticipation* (ἐλπίς), a definition that explicitly flags its forward-looking nature. Similarly to his account of other emotions, Aristotle also emphasizes the fact that it is ‘with an appearance,’ though as with fear the appearance is specifically about something in the future. One important disanalogy with the *Laws*, in which confidence was defined as an anticipation before pleasure, is that here the objects of confidence are rather ‘things that preserve us’ (τῶν σωτηρίων). This is a different class than ‘pleasant things,’ and is a more direct contrary to the object of fear described in *Rhetoric* 2.5: a ‘painful or destructive bad’ (κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ). For Aristotle, an anticipation of preservation is contrary to the anticipation of destruction. We once again observe, therefore, a move towards acknowledging fear and confidence that have as their objects good or bad things more generally, rather than only future pleasant and future pains.

²⁰⁴ *Laws* 1.644c. Note that the Greek word in the *Laws* is spelled as θάρρος, though the LSJ lists this as a variant spelling of θάρσος.

Though Aristotle does not mention an occurrent affective valence in his definition of confidence, there is good reason to think that he takes confidence to be pleasant. Firstly, I think that we have good reason to infer this simply because it is the opposite of fear, a painful emotion.²⁰⁵ Secondly, confidence is more broadly linked to the expectation that one will be successful in one's aims, an expectation that, as we've seen, Aristotle generally takes to be pleasant. Note, for instance, how Aristotle says that confident people are those who 'have often succeeded and never suffered reverses' (*Rhetoric* 2.5.1383a26); angry, wronged people, by contrast, are those who believe that 'the divine power is always supposed to be on the side of the wronged' (*Rhetoric* 2.5.1383b7-8); and people who believe that they 'shall succeed' (*Rhetoric* 2.5.1383b9). In these cases, I suggest that the expectation that safety is near and bad things are far follows from a more general pleasant expectation that one will succeed in one's aims and not encounter the sorts of dangers or bad things that are objects of fear.

In addition, note Aristotle's subsequent discussion of the youthful character, which is naturally disposed towards confidence (as opposed to the elderly character, which is naturally disposed towards fear).

[T4.8] καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὕτω διάθερμοί εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναι. καὶ ζῶσι τὰ πλεῖστα ἐλπίδι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστιν ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παροικομένου, τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς βραχύ· τῇ γὰρ πρώτη ἡμέρᾳ μεμνησθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἷόν τε, ἐλπίζειν δὲ πάντα. καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοί εἰσι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον (ἐλπίζουσι γὰρ ῥαδίως), καὶ ἀνδρείότεροι (θυμώδεις γὰρ καὶ εὐέλπιδες, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, τό τε ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθὸν τι θαρραλέον ἐστίν)

[T4.8] They <i.e the young> are also hopeful (εὐέλπιδες), just as intoxicated people, for the young are of a hot temperament by nature; and at the same time because they have not often failed. And they live for the most part in anticipation (ἐλπίδι), for anticipation (ἐλπίς) is of the future but memory is of the past, but, for the young, the future is long and what has passed is brief, because on the first day one is unable to remember anything, but anticipates (ἐλπίζειν) everything. And they are easily deceived due to what has been said

²⁰⁵ This inference is supported by (Cooper 1996, 245).

(for they anticipate (ἐλπίζουσιν) things easily), and they are more courageous (for they are spirited (θυμώδεις) and hopeful (εὐέλπιδες), and this makes them not fear things but be confident (τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν) <about them>, for no one is afraid when they are angry, and anticipating (ἐλπίζειν) something good is to be confident) (*Rhetoric* 2.12.1389a18-28)

Most of the characteristic features that Aristotle describes in this section pertain to the young in virtue of their *hopeful* nature, where what it is to be hopeful (εὐελπις) is to anticipate something good in one's own future, an anticipation that we have seen is pleasant. This hopeful nature is compared to the state of being intoxicated, clearly paralleling Plato's own discussion of how wine causes us to anticipate good things in our own future and become hopeful. Likewise, this generally hopeful nature makes them *confident* rather than fearful, as anticipating something good is to be confident. The natural disposition of the old is the opposite, the elderly have suffered often in life and have become 'suspicious of evil' (καχύποπτοί) and, following the saying of Bion, 'love as though they will some day hate and hate as though they will some day love' (*Rhetoric* 2.13.1389b24-25). Aristotle asserts that they are in general 'cowardly and fearful (προφοβητικοί) of everything' (*Rhetoric* 2.13.1389b30) and 'despairing' (δυσέλπιδες) because of their experience of life (*Rhetoric* 2.13.1390a3-4). Clearly, while the young expect good things in their future and are optimistic, cheerful, and confident as a result, the old expect *bad* things in their future and are pessimistic, dour, and fearful of everything. The contrasting nature of the affective anticipations of the young and the old is not incidental to Aristotle's description of their differing natural disposition, but arguably the core distinction that underlies the other differences. So, for instance, the young are gullible because they are quick to anticipate *good* results, while the old are on the contrary suspicious because they are quick to anticipate *bad* results and require much more evidence until they become hopeful. Regardless, this survey of the character differences between the young and the old supports taking confidence to itself be a pleasure in

the same way that fear is itself a pain: a confident young person feels pleasure and is cheerful while a fearful old person feels pain and is dour.²⁰⁶

§4.3.4: Shame (αἰσχύνη)

Following the order of Aristotle's own discussion of the emotions, I now turn to Aristotle's discussion of *shame* (αἰσχύνη) in *Rhetoric* 2.6.

[T4.9] ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἄδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, ἢ δ' ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

[T4.9] Let shame be some pain or disturbance about things, from among bad things, appearing to bring about disrepute, <from among bad things> either present, past, or future, and let shamelessness be some disregard and indifference about these same things (*Rhetoric* 2.6.1383b13-15, my translation).

At first blush this seems like an emotion that is not forward looking in any specific sense.

Aristotle is clear that the bad things that shame is about can be either present, past, *or* future.

Shame therefore seems to be no more forward-looking than it is backward-looking. Indeed, this is an accepted scholarly stance: Konstan writes that 'Aristotle's definition makes it clear that he draws no distinction between prospective or restrictive shame, on the one hand, and retrospective or remorseful shame, on the other ... We remember past events, sense present ones, and anticipate future events, and things good or ill may 'appear' to us in all three modes' (Konstan 2006, 98).

However, note that the bad things that we feel shame about are those that *bring about disrepute* (εἰς ἄδοξίαν ... φέρειν). This, I suggest, hints at a forward-looking dimension to all cases of shame, namely the painful expectation that *others will hold one in low esteem*. On this

²⁰⁶ To be clear, Aristotle is describing the natural inclinations of the different ages, rather than the necessary and immutable characters of the young and old. We should therefore expect that it is possible for the young to be fearful and the old to be confident. It will surprise no one to learn that Aristotle thinks that a *mean* disposition between these is the best condition, hence someone who is neither too young nor too old is best disposed with respect to virtue, an age that Aristotle asserts to be around 30-35 for the body and 49 for the mind (*Rhetoric* 2.14.1390a28-11).

construal, however, the object that I feel a painful anticipation about is the *disrepute*, something that is distinct from the past (or present or future) bad action that I think will *cause* the disrepute. So, for instance, Alex might feel shame because he cheated on his partner last summer. In this case the bad action he feels shame about is a past action. Nonetheless, the disrepute that this action could lead to is in the future; for instance, he feels shame that others might find out about his summer liaison and form a negative opinion of him.²⁰⁷ Understood in this way, Aristotle's discussion of shame (αἰσχύνη) can be seen as largely continuous with Plato's own definition, in the *Laws*, of shame as a fear of bad reputation (*Laws* 1.647a1), a definition of αἰδώς (the sense of shame) that Aristotle in fact gives in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN* 4.6.1128b11-12).²⁰⁸

Indeed, Aristotle goes on to emphasize this other-regarding dimension of shame. He describes how we do not feel shame before any random person, but more in front of those whom we admire and whose opinion we do not hold in contempt (*Rhetoric* 2.6.1384a28-30). Relatedly, we feel shame before those who will *tell* the people we admire about the things we have done (*Rhetoric* 2.6.1384b20-22). That is, we feel it before people who will bring about, in the future, the bad reputation to which we are averse. Conversely, Aristotle claims that people do *not* feel shame before those whom we 'quite look down on as untrustworthy (no one feels shame before

²⁰⁷ What if others already found out about the affair? In that case the disrepute is already present and actual, and not something in the future that is the object of an anticipation. Perhaps Alex's ongoing shame about the affair is linked to the fear of *ongoing* disrepute: an aversion not just to his present disrepute but also the prospect of such disrepute continuing indefinitely into the future. It will, hence, continue to motivate Alex to make amends and somehow restore his reputation.

²⁰⁸ Note that this somewhat goes against the view of Cairns that shame is a response to 'internal standards' rather than the 'judgments of other people' (Cairns 1993, 422). A similar view is endorsed by (Burnyeat 1980, 79), a stance supported by Bernard Williams who, while not commenting on Aristotle, thinks that conceiving of shame as a fear of a bad reputation is a 'silly mistake' (Williams 1993, 80-1). One suggestion, made by Grimaldi, would narrow the difference between these two approaches, namely that it is possible to fear being held in disrepute by *oneself*, and thus fear the prospect of failing to live up to one's own standards (cf. Grimaldi 1988, 107-108). However, as Cairns himself admits, the discussion in the *Rhetoric* emphasizes 'the *prospect* of exposure and embarrassment, not primarily on the character of the action or situation itself' (Cairns 1993, 422, emphasis mine). On the other hand, Jimenez takes shame to be a concern for reproach that nonetheless *also* reflects a genuine concern for nobility and hence is not a merely superficial concern for reputation: someone who feels proper shame cares about their reputation in the eyes of others because that is evidence of their *own* virtue (Jimenez 2021, 127-135).

small children or animals)’ (*Rhetoric* 2.6.1384b22-24, translation Rhys-Roberts). Though it is a bit amusing to think of animals as being ‘untrustworthy,’²⁰⁹ the idea seems to be that we do not feel shame before animals and children since they are either unable to apprehend or tell others about our faults or, in the case of children, unlikely to be believed. This would, however, again suggest that shame has a forward-looking dimension with an eye towards the revelation of our faults and the maintenance of our reputation into the future. It is a painful anticipation to think that we will be (or continue to be) held in disrepute by the people we respect, hence why we feel shame more before those who we think are likely to bring about such disrepute and less before those who will not.

I conclude this section with one more piece of evidence for this forward-looking aspect of shame. Aristotle ends his discussion by noting that:

[T4.10] καὶ μέλλοντες ὀρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν φανεροῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι τοῖς συνειδόσιν αἰσχυντηλοὶ μᾶλλον εἰσὶν· ὅθεν καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής, μέλλων ἀποτυμπαίνεσθαι ὑπὸ Διονυσίου, εἶπεν, ἰδὼν τοὺς συναποθνήσκειν μέλλοντας ἐγκαλυπτομένους ὥς ἦσαν διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, “τί ἐγκαλύπτεσθε;” ἔφη· “ἢ μὴ αὐριὸν τις ὑμᾶς ἴδῃ τούτων;”

[T4.10] And people feel more shame when they are going to be seen and go about openly before witnesses, hence the poet Antiphon, upon seeing the people about to die with him hiding their faces as they went through the gates <when he was> about to be crucified by Dionysius, said: “Why do you hide your face? Is it lest someone from among these people should see you tomorrow?” (*Rhetoric* 2.6.1385a8-13, my translation)

A situation is described in which several people hide their faces from a crowd before they are executed. Given Aristotle’s preceding analysis of shame, they hide their faces because they are conscious of some fault in their own situation that will cause others to hold low opinions of them. Yet, Antiphon’s reply questions and mocks the shame of his fellow death-row inmates by drawing attention to the fact that none of the on-lookers will ever again see or interact with the

²⁰⁹ The weirdness is partly an artifact of Rhys-Roberts’ translation; a more amenable translation is that we do not feel shame before people whom we look down on as not telling the truth (ὅλως δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται οὐθ’ ὧν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν), and animals ‘do not tell the truth’ simply because they are incapable of it.

accused after they are killed. In this case, however, Antiphon holds shame to be inappropriate not because the inmates have the wrong attitude towards the badness of being put to death (or whatever fault caused them to be put to death), but rather because they are mistaken *in fearing* the low regard of the spectators. Antiphon, as it were, takes the inmates' shame to reflect a painful anticipation of being seen by the onlookers the next day, an anticipation that is mistaken. The shame and the anticipation are inseparable: Antiphon himself presumably does not hide his face and lacks shame *because* he lacks the painful *anticipation* of future disrepute after realizing that the low opinion of the onlookers will very quickly be of no concern to him. According to my current investigation, part of what it is to feel shame, then, is to feel a painful anticipation of being held in low esteem on account of some past, present, or potential future fault.

§4.3.5: Envy (φθόνος) & Emulation (ζήλος)

As with shame, the definition of envy in the *Rhetoric* does not on its face include an anticipatory component.²¹⁰ It is defined as follows:

[T4.11] Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι φθονοῦσι καὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγία φαινομένη τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῶ, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκείνους· φθονήσουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσὶ τινες ὅμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται· ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ' ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα.

[T4.11] It is clear about what things people are envious, and with whom, and the condition envious people are in, if indeed envy is some pain, concerning one's equals, about their apparent success in things called good, not <a pain> in order that something <good> should <come about> for oneself, but rather on account of those people <sc. one's equals >; for this sort is envious of those who are, or appear to be, equals; I mean 'equals' with respect to class, kin, age, disposition, reputation, or property (*Rhetoric* 2.10.1387b22-28, my translation).

No mention is made of any time modality in (T4.11). Rather, envy is a pain about the *apparent success* of one's *apparent* equals. I sometimes refer to the 'equals' that the emotion of envy (and,

²¹⁰ Likewise, recent scholarly treatments of the passage have failed to mention it, for instance (Konstan 2006), (Sanders 2014), and (Zagzebski 2015).

as we will see, emulation) is felt towards as ‘rivals.’ Though nothing about anticipation figures in the definition, envy being defined simply as a kind of ‘pain,’ my ultimate suggestion is that envy likely entails that we pleasantly anticipate our rival’s failure and painfully anticipate our rival’s success.

One initial reason to think this is that envy is felt towards someone who is actually alive and with whom I am in competition. Aristotle says that we are envious concerning our ‘fellow-competitors’ (πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμέομαι; sc. the people that we compete for honor against), a category that Aristotle takes to be equivalent to those who are our ‘equals’ with respect to age, disposition, class, etc. Notably, however, the people we are competing with *excludes* ‘men who lived a hundred centuries ago, or those not yet born, or the dead, or those who dwell near the Pillars of Hercules ... we compete with those who follow the same ends as ourselves: we compete with our rivals in sport or in love, and in general with those who are after the same things’ (*Rhetoric* 2.10.1388a10-16, translation Rhys-Roberts). So, for instance, I cannot envy A.J. Ayer for publishing his first book when he was only 26 years old even though I am his near-equal in terms of age, being only a few years older, for the simple reason that A.J. Ayer is no longer alive. The sort of competition Aristotle seems to have in mind is one in which I could possibly best my rival or, conversely, one in which my rival could possibly best me. It is, I suggest, a case in which the ultimate success or failure of my rival has not yet been determined, and hence a case in which his, and my, future success or failure is only a potential prospect relative to my current situation.

If the future success or failure of one’s rival is a future prospect, however, we would expect that an envious person would painfully anticipate her rival’s future success (insofar as her rival’s *current* success is painful to her, the *future* success would be just as odious) and

pleasantly anticipate her rival's failure.²¹¹ Evidence for this proposal can be found when we contrast the emotion of envy with the similar but distinct emotion of emulation (ζῆλος), defined as follows:

[T4.12] εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένη παρουσία ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλω ἄλλ' ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐστιν (διὸ καὶ ἐπικεῖς ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπικεῖων, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον).

[T4.12] For if emulation is some pain concerning the apparent presence of honored goods belonging to those equal in nature that it is possible to acquire for oneself, then <the pain> is not <about> <the goods> belonging to someone else but rather <about the fact that> that they are not one's own (on account of this emulation is fitting and belongs to fitting people, but envy is base and belongs to base people; for the one <sc. emulation> makes him contrive things such that he himself acquires good things because of the emulation, but the other <sc. envy> makes him contrive things such that his neighbor does not have <good things> because of the envy). (*Rhetoric* 2.11.1388a.32-38, my translation)

The characterization of emulation closely parallels the characterization of envy, though it differs in several crucial respects. Each is a pain felt towards one's social rivals (i.e. social equals) possessing goods that one also wants to possess for oneself. The key difference is that emulation is a pain about the fact that one does not *personally* possess the good things in question, while envy is a pain about the fact that *someone else* possesses those goods. Though they are defined primarily as two different sorts of *non-anticipatory* pains, note that they have different motivational profiles: envy motivates us to bring about our rival's failure while emulation motivates us to acquire good things for ourselves. In light of my previous claims concerning motivation and affective anticipation we would suspect that an envious person pleasantly

²¹¹ Aristotle claims that 'We can also see what things and what persons give pleasure to envious people, and in what states of mind they feel it: the states of mind in which they feel pain are those under which they will feel pleasure in the contrary things' (*Rhetoric* 2.10.1388a24-27, translation Rhys-Roberts; δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες· ὥς γὰρ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἡσθήσονται.)

anticipates his rival's failure while an emulous person pleasantly anticipates acquiring those good things for himself.

This suspicion is borne out in Aristotle's discussion of indignation (νέμεσις), a pain felt at the undeserved success (εὐπραγία) of others.²¹² During this discussion Aristotle says that a good person will rejoice 'at the prosperity of the deserving, for both these things <sc. deserved suffering and prosperity> are just, and they make the good person rejoice. For he must anticipate (ἐλπίζειν) that the very things that have accrued to his equal will also accrue to himself' (2.9.1386b30-33, translation Rhys-Roberts, modified). The first thing to call attention to in this passage is the apparent conflict between Aristotle's claim that a good person rejoices in the deserved prosperity of others and what he says about emulation in (T4.12): after all, emulation is also an emotion allegedly felt by good people concerning the success of their social equals, yet it is described as a *pain* at an equal's good fortune because one does not have it for oneself. This is a slight puzzle: is a rival's deserved success the cause of pleasure or pain? Yet, observe that Aristotle describes the pleasure felt by the good person in the success of the deserving as an *anticipatory* pleasure in our current *Rhetoric* 2.9 passage: one rejoices insofar as one pleasantly anticipates that one will likewise be able to attain the same goods in virtue of also being a good person. This observation obviates the apparent conflict between the *Rhetoric* 2.9 passage and the description of emulation as a pain in (T4.12): the emulous person can feel *both* a pain about an equal's deserved success, because she does not currently have it, while *also* feeling a pleasure concerning that success insofar as she *pleasantly anticipates* having a similar success in the future. Note, however, that the pleasant anticipation of attaining a rival's success for oneself that

²¹² In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle clarifies that this emotion is distinct from envy since envy is not concerned with whether the rival's success is deserved or not, but rather with whether the other person is one's social 'equal' (*Rhetoric* 2.9.1386b16-20). Furthermore, good people experience indignation while Aristotle, as we have seen, takes envy to be an emotion characteristic of bad people.

Aristotle attributes to the good person would also explain the motivational force of emulation insofar as an emulous person can pleasantly anticipate succeeding in the same way her rival has already succeeded. In contrast, if a ‘bad’ and envious person takes pain in his rival’s success just *because* it is his rival’s success, and so also takes pleasure in his rival’s prospective failure,²¹³ then we can understand why the envious person is motivated to harm his rival or frustrate his ends.

We can summarize this contrast between envy and emulation by characterizing them as two different ways in which someone reacts to the (apparent) success of their rival. The deserved success of a rival prompts a good, emulous person to feel pain as she acknowledges her own lack of success but also pleasure as she nonetheless pleasantly anticipates attaining it for herself in the future, while it prompts a bad, envious person to feel pain as he perceives his rival’s success but also pleasure as he looks forward to depriving his rival of that success. While both envy and emulation are defined as *pains*, the emotions nonetheless differ in terms of their affective profile as they entail the experience of difference affective anticipations. As with the other emotions I have surveyed, I have also explained how the affective anticipations involved in envy and emulation can explain the different motivational force of the two different emotions.

§4.4: Conclusion

In the first half of this chapter I turned to Plato and argued that affective anticipation is central to his account of human psychology and motivation in the *Laws*. I claimed that emotions such as fear and confidence are taken to be kinds of painful and pleasant anticipations respectively, and that other central emotions such as shame and love likewise involve pleasant

²¹³ Aristotle says that, if we take pain in something, then we take pleasure in that thing’s absence or destruction: ἐφ’ ᾧ γὰρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στέρησει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν’ (*Rhetoric* 2.9.1387a1-3).

and painful anticipations. Turning next to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, I argued that there, too, we see the centrality of affective anticipation in his own account of the emotions. While the affective anticipation component is more clearly emphasized in Aristotle's analysis of fear and anger, I also argued that other emotions, such as pity, shame, envy, confidence, and emulation, are likewise partly constituted by affective anticipation.

I end with two concluding observations. Firstly, I have so far focused on drawing attention to broad *similarities* in the way that Plato and Aristotle treat these emotions, both taking them to be partly constituted by affective anticipation. Finding similarity here is not too surprising, as other scholars have suggested that Aristotle's account of the emotions is an outgrowth of Academic discussions on emotions that are best represented by late Platonic dialogues such as the *Philebus* and the *Laws*.²¹⁴ This chapter can be seen as contributing more evidence for this claim by narrowly focusing on one specific point of overlap: the way in which the prominent role of affective anticipation in the emotions, as developed in the *Philebus* and the *Laws*, is carried over to Aristotle's own discussion and analysis of the emotions in the *Rhetoric*. This is not to say, however, that there are no differences whatsoever between Plato's and Aristotle's treatments of the emotions; indeed, the way Aristotle treats anger has no concrete parallel in the Platonic dialogues. Furthermore, in his *Ethics* Aristotle famously outlines a theory of pleasure that is markedly different than anything Plato has to offer. These differences, however, do not stand in the way of the significant overlaps between their respective treatments that I have identified.

Secondly, note that this survey of the role of affective anticipation in the emotions helps bolster my claim that affective anticipations are, in fact, a central and crucial element in Plato's

²¹⁴ So, for instance, cf. (Frede 1996) and (Fortenbaugh 2002).

and Aristotle's moral psychology. This is so because it is clear that emotions such as fear, confidence, and shame are central to their moral psychology, and we have just seen that both Plato and Aristotle analyze these in terms of affective anticipation. Affective anticipation is not, as one might initially suspect, a fringe issue at the margins of their theories.

Thirdly, my claim that affective anticipation explains motivation in Plato and Aristotle (a claim argued for in Chapters 1 & 2) is substantially more intuitive, I think, once we recognize that this motivation can occur *through* forward-looking emotions. Though it might sound odd to say that we are moved by affective anticipation (I suspect in part due to the novelty of the concept), it is not surprising to observe that we can be 'moved' by emotions.²¹⁵ In this chapter I have explained that the way Plato and Aristotle analyze emotions suggests that the motivating efficacy of affective anticipations helps explain *why* emotions move us. Conversely, it can also be the case that an instance of motivation by some affective anticipation happens during the experience of a more complex emotion. So, for instance, my wish for my friend's success and the related pleasant anticipation of her success that motivates me to bring it about can be instances of *loving* my friend.

I believe that this is an attractive view. On the one hand it accommodates the common sense way in which we (and Plato and Aristotle) explain actions and behaviors by means of emotions. For instance, we might say that someone insulted her friend when she lashed out *in anger*. This statement is nicely accommodated by the analysis of the emotions that I have identified in Plato's and Aristotle's moral psychology: anger is the cause of the action. Yet, we can ground this explanation in the conclusions of Chapters 1 and 2 once we see that the causal story depends on the fact that anger *itself* involves the pleasant anticipation of revenge: affective

²¹⁵ Indeed, to take a hint from Aristotle's own love of etymology, we can note that the word 'emotion' is descended from the Latin *movere*, meaning 'to move.'

anticipation is what motivates our complex behavior. We thereby simultaneously make sense of the affective *and* motivational character of the emotions. Moreover, we can also begin to discern how these emotions could themselves be constituted by *either* a non-rational *or* rational affective anticipation. Indeed, in the next chapter I pull together threads from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 in the context of education and show that cultivating virtue requires having properly cultivated emotions that are grounded on *rational* affective anticipations as opposed to non-rational affective anticipations that originate from sense-perception.

CHAPTER 5: Education in Plato and Aristotle

§5.1: Introduction

In Chapter 3 I made a distinction between rational and non-rational forms of affective anticipation. Non-rational affective anticipation is based on memories of past sensory pleasures and pains, while I claimed that Plato takes rational affective anticipation to be based on some process of internal reasoning. For Aristotle, I argued more generally that it is based on a thought-based grasp of goods and bads for a human being that entails an understanding of *why* such things are good or bad. In Chapter 4, moreover, I argued that affective anticipations are at the root of many other central emotions in Plato's *Laws* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, such as fear, confidence, and shame. In §4.2 we already started to see how the Athenian of the *Laws* takes the proper habituation of such emotions to be a central responsibility of the larger *polis*. Indeed, the entire function of public symposia is to inculcate the proper sense of shame (a species of fear), something that the Athenian takes to be crucial to making the citizens moderate. In this section I take a closer look at the kind of emotional education that Plato and Aristotle recommend and argue that we can discern a shift in the kinds of affective anticipations that individuals have as they progress in virtue. Looking first at Plato's *Laws*, in §5.2 I explain how the right kind of affective anticipations, and the right sort of virtuous dispositions with respect to these, are at first developed in the citizens using non-rational methods. In particular, citizens' affective responses are shaped through what I call 'direct rhythmic manipulation' and storytelling, and I contend that these methods result in the formation of *non-rational* affective anticipations that are based on sense-perception and memory, as explained in Chapter 3, rather than reasoning. However, the Athenian also suggests that a fully virtuous citizen will eventually develop *rational* affective anticipations that are based on a proper reasoned understanding of the good and bad things that

they, respectively, pleasantly and painfully anticipate. In §5.3 I argue that members of the nocturnal council (who are also surpassingly virtuous members of the community) possess such knowledge and as much as possible try to convey it to the citizens as they cultivate virtue in Magnesia. As I show, the possession of full virtue requires one's affective anticipations (and, hence, one's hopes and fears) to be based on an ever-more thorough, reasoned understanding of the good and the bad that one pursues and avoids.

In the subsequent sections I then turn to Aristotle and argue that a similar kind of progression can be discerned, though it seems different in at least a few crucial respects. In §5.4 I contend that *musical education* plays a crucial role in the education of the young, as illustrated by Aristotle's *Politics*, and that there is reason to think that it results in the formation of *non-rational* affective anticipations. I suggest that Aristotle's account of musical education is largely similar to Plato's treatment in the *Laws*: through the perceptual, affective experience of mimetic representations of virtuous and vicious actions, learners are able to pleasantly anticipate virtuous actions and painfully anticipate vicious actions based on whether the prospective actions and outcomes that they anticipate are similar to the sorts of things they have been habituated to enjoy or be pained by. Though this can be sufficient to motivate students to perform actions a virtuous person would perform, I deny that pleasantly anticipating virtue (and hence 'the fine') in this way amounts to 'knowing' the fine; rather, the learners have an inchoate, imprecise, and insecure grasp of virtue and vice that is liable to often lead them astray. In §5.5 I suggest that something more is required from the fully virtuous, namely an intelligent grasp of goods or bads for human beings that comes about from the prolonged experience of virtuous actions. The result of this first-hand experience of virtuous actions, however, is that the emotions of the fully virtuous person are based on *rational* affective anticipations, informed by their grasp of the good and bad

as articulated in Chapter 3, rather than the inchoate and imprecise sensory grasp that guides the learners. Finally, I discuss a few examples of what this affective transformation from non-rational to rational affective anticipations might entail with respect to particular emotions, focusing on anger and emulation. I believe that this in turn allows us to better appreciate what it means to live a life in accordance with reason, i.e. a happy life. It is to live in such a way that our rational understanding of what is good and bad deeply permeates and enriches our emotional lives. That rational understanding is not merely theoretical nor motivationally inert, but rather itself motivating to the extent that it is manifested in the *rational* affective anticipations that suffuse the life of the fully virtuous individual.

§5.2: Non-Rational Education in Plato's *Laws*

Let us now turn to discuss education in the *Laws*, a topic that we have in fact already touched on in the previous chapter. Indeed, state-run symposia, as discussed in §4.2, are an important component of a citizen's holistic education, the Athenian referring to them as the *safeguard* (σωτηρία) of the citizens' education (*Laws* 2.653a3).²¹⁶ It will be helpful, however, to say a bit more on education (*paideia*) more generally.²¹⁷

'Education,' for the Athenian, means an education *in virtue*. Indeed, he makes this point rather emphatically, claiming that he does not consider training in, for instance, sailing or retail-trade an 'education':

[T5.1] εἶναι παιδείαν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἂν εἴη, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. ταύτην τὴν τροφὴν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὥς

²¹⁶ The Athenian also thinks that they are useful in gaining 'insight into the nature and disposition of a man's soul,' the idea being that someone who is drunk will reveal their lustful or irascible character that might be hidden while sober (*Laws* I, 649d-650b).

²¹⁷ It should be noted at the outset that there is also, of course, extensive discussion of education in the *Republic*. Moreover, many of the aspects that Plato emphasizes in the *Laws*, such as the importance of habituating non-rational pleasure and pain and the importance of musical education, are also first seen in the *Republic*. For the sake of keeping the study at least somewhat constrained, however, I focus only on the *Laws* and will generally not discuss the relevant parallels (and differences) in the *Republic*.

ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιντο ἂν μόνην παιδείαν προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἢ τινα πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης, βάνουσόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι.

[T5.1] What we have in mind is education in childhood in *virtue*, a training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. I suppose we should want to mark off this sort of training from others and reserve the title 'education' for it alone. A training directed to acquiring money or a robust physique, or even to some intellectual facility not guided by reason and justice, we should want to call coarse and illiberal, and say that it had no claim whatever to be called education (*Laws* 1.643e3-644a5, translation Saunders)

Education is directed first and foremost, then, at virtue.²¹⁸ The Athenian further clarifies that an education in virtue should result in a proper disposition with respect to pleasures and pains. As he elaborates later:

[T5.2] Λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο· τέλος δ' οὗν ἔστ' ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις πάντα κεκτημένος ἀγαθὰ. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετὴν· ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη 'σθ' ἢ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετὴ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμῶν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.

[T5.2] Well then, I say that the first child-like perception of children is <of> pleasure and pain, in which virtue and vice first come to a soul, <I say that> these things are so, but with good fortune intelligence and true, secure beliefs come about to someone near old-age. A perfect human being is a person who has acquired these things and all the good things in them. I call 'education' the first coming of virtue to children, pleasure and love (φιλία) and pain and hatred would correctly arise in souls not yet able to receive an account (λόγῳ λαμβάνειν), but after receiving the account, they would have been <already> accustomed to correctly harmonize with the account by the proper habits. This, the whole harmony, is virtue, but the <process of> rearing it <sc. the soul> correctly with respect to pleasures and pains so that it on the one hand hates the things that it is necessary to hate straight-away from the beginning right up until the end, and on the other hand loves (στέργειν) the things that it is necessary to love, by addressing this itself, after it is separated in the argument, as education you would, at least as far as I'm concerned, address it correctly. (*Laws* 2.653a5-c4, my translation)

²¹⁸ This parallels the more general orientation of the best state towards virtues as the primary, 'divine' goods, and then only secondarily towards other goods such as wealth (cf. *Laws* 1.631b-d).

The Athenian describes virtue as the harmony of ‘an account’ or ‘reason’ (λόγος) with one’s feelings of pleasure and pain. Both parts need to be present for genuine virtue, though ‘the account’ will not be able to be grasped till later in life. This development of virtue, first the correct feelings of pleasure and pain without an account/reason, later with an account/reason, is important to the general transition from non-rational affective anticipations to rational affective anticipations that I explore in this chapter. The non-rational element of this education is the clear focus of our current passage: the educator must habituate the citizens’ *feelings* of pleasure and pain such that they become ‘accustomed to harmonize with the account by proper habits.’ Even if having an ‘account,’ or reason, is essential to complete virtue, (T5.2) would suggest that a large part of education concerns cultivating proper affective dispositions *before* the citizens are able to understand any rational account underlying the laws.²¹⁹

Now, it should of course be noted that the education being described here concerns affect generally, rather than affective *anticipation* specifically. However, we would expect that being disposed correctly with respect to affective anticipation is central given its crucial roles in motivation and the emotions that I articulated in previous chapters. In fact, I believe that we can see this importance brought out in a passage that discusses how the lawgiver must habituate the young to see justice as pleasant and injustice as unpleasant and which contains interesting parallels to the argument for false anticipatory pleasures (discussed in §3.3). The passage highlights a central theme explored throughout this chapter, namely that the lawgiver gets

²¹⁹ The fact that education targets our non-rational feelings of pleasure and pain and prepares us to accept the reason or account later in life is already well-expressed in *Republic* 3. Socrates says that anyone who receives a proper musical education will ‘praise fine things, be pleased by them, take them into his soul, and, through being nourished by them, become fine and good. What is ugly or shameful, on the other hand, he will correctly condemn and hate while he is still young, *before he is able to grasp the reason* (λόγον). And, because he has been so trained, he will *welcome the reason when it comes* and recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself’ (*Rep* 3.401e4-402a4, translation Reeve, modified).

citizens to pleasantly anticipate (hope for) a life of virtue and painfully anticipate (fear and be ashamed of) a life of vice.

The context of the passage involves the Athenian discussing the pleasantness of a life of virtue with his two interlocutors, Megillus and Clinias. Though Clinias readily admits that someone who is rich, strong, handsome and able to do ‘whatever he desires’ – but is unjust and insolent – lives *shamefully*, he does not in addition concede that such a person lives *badly*, *unpleasantly*, and *unprofitably* (2.661e6-a8). The Athenian, in contrast, insists that the conclusion that the just life is the most pleasant life is ‘rather more true and obvious than that Crete is an island’ (2.662b2-4), and insists that he would ‘impose pretty nearly the extreme penalty’ on anyone who claims that a wicked person lives pleasantly (2.662b6-7). Since the virtuous life is the most pleasant life, note that we would naturally infer that the citizens should *pleasantly anticipate* such a life. In what follows, we can see the Athenian describe how forming such an expectation is a key aim of the lawgiver:

[T5.3] {ΑΘ.} Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν μὴ χωρίζων λόγος ἡδὺ τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν πιθανός γ', εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, πρὸς τό τινα ἐθέλῃ ζῆν τὸν ὅσιον καὶ δίκαιον βίον, ὥστε νομοθέτῃ γε αἰσχιστος λόγων καὶ ἐναντιώτατος ὃς ἂν μὴ φῇ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκὼν ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι πράττειν τοῦτο ὅτῳ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι πλέον ἔπεται. σκοτοδινίᾳ δὲ τὸ πόρρωθεν ὁρώμενον πᾶσιν τε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ παρέχει, νομοθέτης εἰ μὴ δόξαν εἰς τοῦναντίον τούτου καταστήσει, τὸ σκότος ἀφελών, καὶ πείσει ἁμῶς γέ πως ἔθεσι καὶ ἐπαίνοις καὶ λόγοις ὡς ἐσκιαγραφημένα τὰ δίκαιά ἐστι καὶ ἄδικα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα τῷ τοῦ δικαίου ἐναντίως φαινόμενα, ἐκ μὲν ἀδίκου καὶ κακοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρούμενα ἡδέα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἀηδέστατα, ἐκ δὲ δικαίου πάντα τὰναντία παντὶ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω.

[T5.3] Athenian: Therefore, the argument not separating ‘pleasant’ from ‘just,’ ‘good,’ and ‘fine’ would, if nothing else, at least be persuasive with respect to getting someone to want to live a pious and just life; the result is that the most shameful and most contrary of arguments is that which would not say that these things hold in this way. For no-one would willingly be persuaded to want to do anything that is not followed by more enjoyment than pain. But there is, so to speak, a kind of shadowy-vertigo from seeing something far away, and it is especially present for children. But our lawgiver will dispel the haze and bring about a complete change in the way things appear. Somehow or other – by habits (ἔθεσι), praise (ἐπαίνοις), and argument (λόγοις) – he will persuade people

that the just and unjust are as shadow-paintings: what is unjust appears the opposite to how it does from the vantage point of the just person, since from the perspective of the unjust person and his own vice it looks pleasant, whereas what is just appears most unpleasant. From the perspective of the just person, on the other hand, everything looks to everyone quite the opposite, in both cases (*Laws* 2.663a9-c5, translation Griffith, modified).

The Athenian describes how people are often deceived about the relative pleasantness of justice and injustice. To an unjust person just actions appear unpleasant while unjust actions appear delightful. A just person, on the other hand, sees things in the exact opposite way and takes just actions to be the most pleasant and unjust actions to be unpleasant. The Athenian follows this argument up by asserting that the judgment of the ‘better’ soul, i.e. the just person’s judgment that just things are pleasant and unjust things unpleasant, is more likely to be true than the contrary judgment of the ‘worse’ soul (2.663c6-d4).

We should reflect, however, on the way in which passage (T5.3) describes people’s confusion and error concerning justice and injustice. The Athenian claims that people are mistaken about justice and injustice insofar as they see it ‘from afar,’ and thus are more likely to make mistakes about it. Thematically this mirrors the person, in the *Philebus*, who is unsure as to whether he is looking at a human or a statue off in the distance (*Philebus* 38c5-7).²²⁰ In the *Philebus*, that example of error is used as an illustration of how we can make mistaken judgments about things that we do not have a clear perception of. In that context, however, the fact that we can make confused and mistaken judgments about *spatially* distant phenomenon was used to motivate a subsequent claim that we can likewise make confused and mistaken judgments about *temporally* distant phenomenon; people are full of (often mistaken) judgments about the future, i.e. *anticipations* (39c10-e6). I claim that a similar move implicitly occurs in

²²⁰ A passage discussed in §3.3.

passage (T5.3) as well. It is surely the case, at least, that the Athenian is not claiming that people are often mistaken when they *literally* see just and unjust actions that are far off spatially, as though someone is more likely to think that the just actions of others are pleasant if they happen right next to them than if they occur hundreds of meters away. The comment that such ‘vertigo’ is especially present to children, moreover, clarifies that the Athenian has in mind the phenomenon of looking forward temporally within one’s lived human life. Children, who have their whole life in front of them and little experience or rational ability with which to comprehend anything at all, are especially liable to misunderstanding what sorts of lives and actions are pleasant or unpleasant.²²¹

Also, note that the way error is described in passage (T5.3) mirrors the way error comes up in the argument about false anticipatory pleasures in the *Philebus*. In (T5.3) just and unjust things are compared to ‘shadow-paintings’ (ἐσκιαγραφημένα), paintings that create the illusory appearance of depth when viewed from a distance due to the juxtaposition of small patches of different colors.²²² Shadow-paintings only appear a certain way to someone standing a certain distance from them, thus our own condition (our own visual perspective in the case of painting) contributes to creating the appearance. Likewise, the ethical condition of just and unjust people contributes to the appearance of just and unjust things, just actions appearing pleasant to just people but unpleasant to unjust people. Just as in the *Philebus*, then, we have a situation in which the just and unjust both look at painted images of future pleasures (or pains) in their own soul,

²²¹ So, I side with (Meyer 2015, 271-272) in taking the ‘far off’ view to refer *primarily* to the expectations of the uneducated. This is compatible, I believe, with thinking that it can also refer to the perspective of someone with an unjust soul, as in (Moss 2012, 215-216) and (Keuls 1978, 85-86). After all, the unjust will also be confused with respect to the pleasantness and unpleasantness of virtue and vice.

²²² Cf. (Meyer 2015, 273) for discussion of the different ways this particular reference to *skiagraphema* has been construed and especially (Keuls 1978, 72-87) for an interesting discussion of references to *skiagraphia* in classical sources, focusing especially on Plato and Aristotle.

yet *true* pictures of pleasures are present to the just while *false* pictures of pleasures are present to the wicked.²²³

According to passage (T5.3), the lawgiver tries to correct these false appearances and instead cultivate the *correct* pleasant and painful anticipations in the souls of the citizens, and she does so ‘by habits and praises and arguments.’ Indeed, the lawgiver’s aim is for the citizens to expect the just life to be most pleasant (and hence to feel pleasant anticipation towards such a life) and to expect the unjust life to be shameful and unpleasant (2.663d2-4) (and hence a proper object of fear and shame, emotions that we saw involve the painful anticipation of future bads). I now turn to look more closely at the way in which the lawgivers cultivate these affective anticipations in the citizens, first looking at how they cultivate these affective anticipations when citizens are young and unable to grasp any kind of ‘rational account’ concerning virtue or the good or bad. As we saw, the Athenian believes that this is a crucial and important stage of education because it will prepare the citizens to accept the account and reason when it comes. In §5.2.1 – §5.2.2 I focus on explaining two important mechanisms of education that both cultivate non-rational affective anticipations of the kind discussed in Chapter 3. The first is choristry, and the second is what I will refer to as ‘storytelling.’

§5.2.1: Choristry and ‘Direct Rhythmic Manipulation’

One of the core institutions in the education plan surveyed in *the Laws* is the *chorus*, a kind of public performance that would involve singing and dancing. In the education program

²²³ Indeed, in (Brants 2024) I argue that the pictures of pleasures present to the wicked are mostly false because they anticipate *intense* pleasures as genuine pleasures, but intense pleasures fall short of genuine pleasures insofar as they are inexorably mixed with pain. Likewise, note that the *Republic* opposes the pure pleasure of the wise with those that are, as it were, ‘produced by *skiagraphia*’ (*Republic* 9.583b). Keuls, in her discussion of *skiagraphia* as creating illusory effects by the juxtaposition of colors, points out that the contrast is between pure pleasures and those that appear to be pleasures due to the juxtaposition, not of colors, but of pleasures and pains (Keuls 1978, 83). Perhaps this passage can be read in conjunction with our current *Laws* passage, in which case we could infer that unjust actions can appear pleasant due to the intense pleasures involved, yet the appearance is deceptive and false insofar as intense pleasures are mixed with pain and lack the nature of the true, pure pleasures that the good will experience.

envisioned by the Athenian, every citizen is required to participate in choral performances, both as audience members and performers, from a young age.²²⁴ Fully discussing the Ancient Greek chorus is beyond the scope of this project.²²⁵ For our purposes, we should begin by noticing how the Athenian introduces it by linking it to an innate human tendency to move, dance, and perceive ‘rhythm’ (ῥυθμός) and ‘harmony’ (ἁρμονία):

[T5.4] φησὶν δὲ τὸ νέον ἅπαν ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι, κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἀεὶ ζητεῖν καὶ φθέγγεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἀλλόμενα καὶ σκιρτῶντα, οἷον ὀρχούμενα μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ προσπαίζοντα, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα πάσας φωνάς. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῷα οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀταξιῶν, οἷς δὴ ῥυθμός ὄνομα καὶ ἁρμονία· ἡμῖν δὲ οὗς εἵπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδοσθαι, τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδοκότας τὴν ἑνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἑναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ἣ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ᾧδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, χοροὺς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα.

[T5.4] They say that every young thing is, so to speak, unable to keep both bodies and voices still, but always seeks to be moved and to cry out, on the one hand leaping and springing, a sort of dancing with pleasure and playing, on the other hand uttering all sounds. Other animals are not able to perceive either order or disorder in the motions, to which there is the name ‘rhythm’ and ‘harmony,’ but to us, whom we say have been given to the gods as chorus-partners, there are both these things and the perception, with pleasure, of things that have been given rhythm and harmony, with which they <sc. the gods> move us and lead us in this sort of choir, stringing together songs and dances, and <we also say that> it has been named ‘chorus’ (*choros*) in line with the natural name of ‘joy’ (*charas*). (*Laws* 2.653d7-654a5, my translation)

Every ‘young thing,’ both human and non-human living creatures, are drawn to motion and jumping. However, human beings (and I take the Athenian to have in mind also children who are not yet able to fully use reason and receive ‘accounts’) are able to *perceive* order and harmony in motions. As the story illustrates, it is this (pleasant) perception of rhythm and harmony that allegedly accounts for the development of the chorus in human society, and more generally a

²²⁴ These choral performances will likely take place during the various civic festivals that occur throughout the year. Indeed, the importance Plato attributes to such festivities is underscored by their constant occurrence, as the Athenian recommends no less than 365 festivals. It follows that at least some citizens are involved in a festival every single day of the year (*Laws* 8.828a7-b3).

²²⁵ A helpful general overview can be found in (Weiss 2020), and for more dedicated treatment of choristry in the *Laws* see (Peponi 2013) and (Pauscello 2014).

uniquely human attraction to music and dance. The perception of harmony and disharmony is noteworthy insofar as it is distinct from reason (children perceive harmony in music despite not yet being able to use reason) but, like reason, sets us apart from animals while linking us to the gods – the fact that we can perceive rhythm is what allows us to be ‘chorus-partners’ with the gods.

Exactly how the chorus is supposed to function is a complicated matter, but I take its basic function in character formation to be roughly as follows. Certain rhythms and harmonies are perceived, simply due to their rhythmical and musical nature, as pleasant. As seen in the last passage, humans have the perception, ‘with pleasure,’ of rhythm and harmony. At the same time, these musical rhythms and harmonies also represent good characters or bad characters. I suggest that Plato takes music to *represent* different characters, but to be pleasant or painful in virtue of the musical elements used in the representation.²²⁶ Moreover, the Athenian lambasts contemporary musicians for depicting virtuous characters using rhythms or harmonies that actually represent *bad* characters, for instance by mixing the ‘melodic form and movement of free men with the rhythms of those who are slaves and not free’ (*Laws* 2.669b-d). This, he believes, has an indelibly bad influence on the characters of the young as they come to enjoy bad characters due to enjoying these musical compositions:

[T5.5] Πότερον εἰκὸς ἢ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ταῦτόν εἶναι ὅπερ ὅταν τις πονηροῖς ἤθεσιν συνὼν κακῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μισῇ, χαίρῃ δὲ ἀποδεχόμενος, ψέγῃ δὲ ὡς ἐν παιδιᾷ μοῖρα, ὄνειρώττων αὐτοῦ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; τότε ὁμοιοῦσθαι δῆπου ἀνάγκη τὸν χαίροντα ὁποτέρους ἂν χαίρῃ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αἰσχύνηται· καίτοι τοῦ τοιούτου τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι;

[T5.5] It is just like someone who spends time with bad people, full of bad habits, not hating them, but enjoying their company. He may criticize them, but only playfully – as though the depravity of the business were all a dream. In that situation it is inevitable, I

²²⁶ To use a distinction sometimes made in the philosophy of mind, we can say that features of the *representational vehicles* used in musical representations are responsible for the pleasure or pain taken in those representations, rather than the mere content itself.

imagine, that the person who takes pleasure in one or the other comes to resemble the thing he takes pleasure in, even if he's embarrassed to praise it openly. And what greater good or evil than this, would we say, can ever – with utter inevitability – happen to us? (*Laws* 2.656b1-7, translation Griffith)

People who see and enjoy mimetic performances of *bad* characters come to enjoy and value bad characters, while those who enjoy mimetic performances of *good* characters come to enjoy and value good characters. What is important, I claim, is that this affective training will bring about a change in their affective anticipations that will motivate them going forward in life; namely that they begin to *pleasantly anticipate* the prospect of living in a way that emulates those characters they have been habituated to enjoy and *painfully anticipate* the prospect of living in ways that emulate characters they dislike. Hence these affective preferences for mimetic representations of certain types of characters in fact motivate them to actually *become* the type of character they enjoy, and hence to become just or unjust depending on the kinds of performances prevalent in their society.²²⁷ For this reason the lawgivers must ensure that the right sorts of characters are consistently paired with the appropriate musical harmonies that actually represent a genuinely good character so that the young take pleasure in seeing representations of genuine virtue.

The Athenian, indeed, calls this musical education of the young a kind of ‘enchantment.’ He compares the skillful lawgiver overseeing musical education to doctors who encourage a healthy diet in their patients by making healthy food pleasant and unhealthy food bitter:

[T5.6] καθάπερ τοῖς κάμνουσιν τε καὶ ἀσθενῶς ἴσχουσιν τὰ σώματα ἐν ἡδέσι τισὶν σιτίοις καὶ πώμασι τὴν χρηστὴν πειρῶνται τροφὴν προσφέρειν οἷς μέλει τούτων, τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ἐν ἀηδέσιν, ἵνα τὴν μὲν ἀσπάζωνται, τὴν δὲ μισεῖν ὀρθῶς ἐθίζωνται. ταῦτόν δὴ καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν ὁ ὀρθὸς νομοθέτης ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ῥήμασι καὶ ἐπαινετοῖς πείσει τε, καὶ

²²⁷ It is worth nothing that Plato thinks that that children's games have a similar profound effect on one's character and, consequently, on the state as a whole: ‘children who are revolutionaries when it comes to games are inevitably going to grow up into different men from their predecessors; having grown up to be ‘other’ they will try and find themselves another kind of life; and having tried to find that, they will set their hearts on different laws and ways of behaving.’ (*Laws* 7.798c, translation Griffith)

ἀναγκάσει μὴ πείθων, τὰ τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ ἀνδρείων καὶ πάντως ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔν τε ῥυθμοῖς σχήματα καὶ ἐν ἁρμονίαισιν μέλη ποιοῦντα ὀρθῶς ποιεῖν.

[T5.6] It is like when people are sick, or in poor shape physically. The people looking after them try to offer them nourishment which is good for them in pleasant-tasting food and drink – and what is bad for them in unpleasant – so that they can get into the correct habit of welcoming the first and disliking the second. It is the same with the songwriter and the true lawgiver ... the correct thing for the <the poets> is to depict the characters of men who are moderate, courageous, and altogether good by using his rhythms and harmonies to create the movements they make and the cadences they utter. (*Laws* 2.659e5-660a8, translation Griffith)

As the passage describes, the ‘true lawgiver’ must ensure that the *right kinds* of virtuous characters are accurately represented in mimetic choral performances with pleasing harmonies and modes, and that the citizens come to enjoy and consequently value those characters while disvaluing opposite characters.²²⁸ This is an improvement over the contemporary poets who wrongly mix up appropriate rhythms with inappropriate rhythms, perhaps by depicting a courageous person with the ‘rhythms of those who are slaves.’ In that case, learners will wrongly come to take pleasure in a character that is not fully courageous but actually somewhat slavish. As a result, they would sometimes pleasantly anticipate and perform slavish actions while also wrongly taking those actions to be courageous.

We have seen that the citizens are habituated through musical education from a young age to take pleasure in just characters and pain in unjust and vicious characters. Now, if asked to explain *why* a just life would be more pleasant than the life of an unjust tyrant who is able to do whatever he wants, the learner of virtue would likely be at a loss for words. I think that all we could expect the learner to say at this point is that an unjust life does not *feel* or *seem* very good.

²²⁸ Hence the performers bring it about that the audience ‘has a better pleasure by always listening to characters that are better than their own’ (*Laws* 2.659c3-4), rather than indulging in ‘base’ pleasures by listening to worse characters. This general account of how musical harmonies are used by the lawgivers follows the assessment of Meyer that ‘the pleasure afforded by song and dance attracts us to the words and gestures set into these agreeable forms, even if we would not antecedently find those words and gestures agreeable without this pleasant packaging.’ (Meyer 2015, 247-250). Hence, merely narrating the actions of a virtuous individual in prose form does not cause pleasure in the listeners to the same degree as seeing those actions represented in musical harmonies and rhythms.

Indeed, a child learner does not have, and likely cannot yet acquire, any sort of explanatory grasp of *why* certain lives are good or pleasant. This absence of any understanding of virtue and vice, despite the virtuous behavior of the young learners, is not surprising, as the learners' affective training through the chorus has been mostly efficacious at the level of 'feelings': the direct stimulation of occurrent affect through the rhythmic features of musical performance.

In fact, I think that there is an interesting connection to be made between the Athenian's description of choral dance as rooted in a distinctly human ability to perceive harmonious motions and the discussion of basic sensory pleasures of restoration in the *Philebus*, which I covered in Chapter §1.2.1. There, we saw that non-anticipatory, sensory pleasure and pain are based on the perception of restorative and destructive motions. Perception, more generally, was said to occur when bodily motions go through the body and are transmitted to the soul (as explained in the survey of perception in §1.4.1). Moreover, bodily restoration was also described as the 'harmony' of a soul being restored. At a very high level, then, we can see that there is a certain parallelism between Plato's description of sensory pleasures of bodily restoration in the *Philebus* and his description of the pleasure of choral performance in the *Laws*. Each case centrally involves the perception of a certain kind of 'harmony,' in the former case the harmonious condition of one's own body and soul, and in the latter case an external harmony in music or dance.²²⁹ Given that *non-rational* anticipatory pleasures, as argued in Chapter 3, are based on occurrent *sensory* pleasures rooted in the perception of harmony being restored (or, in the case of sensory pain, the perception of bodily and psychic *disharmony*), I claim that

²²⁹ It might be objected that 'harmony' is being construed in two different senses. So, for instance, 'harmony' is susceptible to harmonic analysis in the case of music, but not in the case of harmony of the soul (psychic harmony). Though it is admittedly difficult to state precisely what is supposed to be meant by psychic harmony, certain passages in the *Timaieus* suggest that musical harmony and psychic harmony are in fact quite similar, as musical harmony is explicitly said to be 'akin to the orbits within our own soul,' and to have been given to us by the gods to 'bring order to any orbit in our soul that had become unharmonized' (*Timaieus* 47d).

anticipatory pleasures that are based on the past sensory pleasures of *musical* harmonies (the very pleasures at issue in choral dances) are likewise *non-rational*.²³⁰ Indeed, as the Athenian makes clear, education proceeds through such non-rational, musical sensory pleasures taken in the representations of fine characters in the *absence* of any reasoned account, the very thing needed for complete virtue that will only come later in life. Just as the occurrent sensory perception of certain bodily pleasures can lead me to pleasantly anticipate those same pleasures later in life, so too the sensory enjoyment of representations of virtue leads me to pleasantly anticipate actually becoming virtuous.

According to this interpretation, Plato holds that choral performances have the ability to shape and alter our feelings of pleasure and pain and, in particular, our affective anticipations, through the non-rational but uniquely human perception of rhythm or harmony. I think we can get more insight into how this might work by turning to a particularly striking case that illustrates non-rational influences on fear, an emotion that we have already seen essentially involves painful anticipation in §4.2.1. The Athenian describes how children should be calmed by being rocked to sleep to alleviate their fear. The Athenian describes how external emotions are applied to, and ‘conquer’ (κρατεῖ) the internal ‘fearful and manic motion’ to bring about peace and calm (*Laws* 7.791a1-b2). He then says:

[T5.7] καὶ ἔστι δαίματα δι' ἑξὶν φαύλην τῆς ψυχῆς τινα. ὅταν οὖν ἔξωθεν τις προσφέρῃ τοῖς τοιούτοις πάθεσι σεισμόν, ἢ τῶν ἑξωθεν κρατεῖ κίνησις προσφερομένη τὴν ἐντὸς

²³⁰ There is a worry here, namely that we do have an account of auditory pleasures in the *Philebus*’ discussion of ‘pure pleasures,’ but that the sort of sounds that give rise to pure pleasures look very different than anything experienced in the choral performances described in the *Laws*. As we saw in §3.4.3, Socrates describes pure pleasures taken in notes that are ‘clear and bright’ (51d), and a prominent recent interpretation argues that Socrates has in mind listening to the drone of single ‘pure’ notes or tones (Warren 2019, 194). However, Socrates also comments that such notes are ‘flowing towards a single pure melody’ (51d7), perhaps suggesting that we can also take pleasures in more complex melodies composed out of those pure notes. On the other hand, perhaps we should say that the pleasure in musical harmonies is not *pure* pleasure, but that it does somehow prepare the young to eventually enjoy the more esoteric pure pleasure of sounds described in the *Philebus* insofar as they enjoy melodies composed out of those pure notes. Arguably, appreciating the pure pleasures of single pure sounds depends on some rational development, hence Socrates’ suggestion in the *Philebus* that they are enjoyed by very few people.

φοβερὰν οὖσαν καὶ μανικὴν κίνησιν, κρατήσασα δέ, γαλήνην ἡσυχίαν τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι ἀπεργασαμένη τῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γενομένης ἐκάστων πηδήσεως

[T5.7] And the fear is due to some base state of the soul. So, whenever someone external applies a shaking to these sorts of affections, the external motion, being applied, conquers the internal fearful and manic motion, and, upon conquering it, appears to produce a peaceful calm in the soul, quieting the painful jumping of the heart that comes about each time. (*Laws* 7.791a1-5, my translation)

This account of fear being eased, and indeed a healthy state of the *soul* being induced, appears to happen only through certain *motions* being applied directly to someone's soul. The external motion affects or changes the internal 'fearful' motion so as to bring about a peaceful condition. The language here recalls the discussion of sense-perception in the *Philebus*. In that dialogue, Socrates claims that sense perception occurs when an external motion penetrates and moves both the body and soul in common (*Philebus* 34a3-5). There, he describes these instances of perception as 'conditions concerning the body' (τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ... παθημάτων, 33d2) in which the affection goes through both body and soul and is 'as it were some inserted shaking' (τινα ὥσπερ σεισμόν ἐντιθέντα) particular and common to both body and soul (33d5-6). I draw attention to this peculiar language of 'inserted shaking' that is used to describe perception in the *Philebus* because it parallels the language used to describe the effects of literal shaking, or rather gentle rocking, on the souls of children in our *Laws* 7 passage. As we saw, an external shaking or rocking motion (σεισμόν, *Laws* 7.791a1) is applied to a baby that somehow penetrates and changes the internal, fearful motions of the child's soul.

Why do I belabor this point? Because it starkly illustrates Plato's belief that non-rational forces, in this case brute physical, rhythmic motion, can affect and modify affective anticipations such as fear. Indeed, it arguably illustrates a way in which perception itself can modify such affective anticipation, as the *Philebus* describes perception as an external motion that somehow influences the internal motions of one's soul. Recall that the *Laws* characterizes fear as the

painful anticipation of a future bad, as discussed in §4.2.1. If rocking a child or hearing certain sorts of music alleviates fear, it follows that the rocking or music causes those affected to somehow *cease* anticipating some prospect as bad. Yet, any such process is surely ‘non-rational’ in at least the basic sense that it depends neither on any rational faculties nor on the consideration of any *reasons* as to why some prospect is good or bad. Someone simply stops feeling fear due to the direct, ‘rhythmic’ manipulation of their own soul through either music or rocking, as both of these convey external, rhythmic motions to the soul. Indeed, the pleasant or painful effect of musical harmonies and rhythms, discussed earlier, perhaps also works through such direct ‘rhythmic’ manipulation of the soul by external motions. One reason to think this is that the pleasure of hearing choral performances depends on sense-perception, and Plato, as we have seen, understands sense-perception as an external motion (*kinesis*) that affects the soul. Another reason is that the Athenian pairs the description of rocking a baby to sleep with a discussion of how music from pan-flutes can also soothe the manic state of one’s soul, hence he likely thinks that something similar to the kind of ‘rhythmic manipulation’ that occurs when rocking a baby to sleep also occurs when rhythmic *music* changes the affective state of one’s soul (*Laws* 7.790c5-e4).²³¹

§5.2.2: ‘Storytelling’ and Changing the Perspective of the Young

So far, I have explained how the lawgivers will habituate citizens to form non-rational affective anticipations through what I have termed ‘direct rhythmic manipulation,’ both through

²³¹ Someone might reasonably complain that it is wholly mysterious how ‘direct rhythmic manipulation,’ such as being rocked to sleep, could possibly cause or eliminate a pleasant or painful anticipation about the future. Yet, granting that the theory is of course inadequate as a genuine psychological theory, some degree of mystery is arguably in the phenomenon itself. That is, it is arguably no less mysterious to observe that anxiety is reduced by suppressing the firing rate of certain neurons with benzodiazepines. In either case we are in need of some explanation of how physical motions and changes in our physiology themselves change and alter our psychological state.

the pleasant perception of rhythmic musical performances and literal rhythmic bodily motions. But I also think that there is another way the lawgiver will get citizens to form non-rational affective anticipation such that they hope (pleasantly anticipate) a life of virtue and fear (painfully anticipate) a life of vice. I refer to these methods as ‘storytelling,’ as lawgivers inculcate certain dogmas through telling stories and myths. This is slightly different from direct rhythmic manipulation (though often these stories will in fact be set to music and hence mixed with the methods discussed in the last section), as it is clearer that they lead to the adoption of certain more complex views or outlooks on the world. At the same time, I count these methods as ‘non-rational’ given that children are led to hold certain dogmas without grasping the truth of what they are led to believe.

We have already seen the Athenian insist that lawgivers must get the citizens to expect that the just life is the most pleasant life.²³² This comes in the context of explaining what he will ‘urge or compel your poets to *say* ... not to mention the accompanying rhythms and harmonies they must use to educate your young people’ (*Laws* 2.661c). Hence, there is a switch in focus from how harmonies *alone* influence character to the verbal content of the stories told to the young, i.e. what the poets ‘say.’²³³ The Athenian seems to think that getting children to believe that the just life is most pleasant is not only beneficial but also easy to do, and that it would be easy to do even if it happened to be false. He claims that even ‘if the truth had been different than what the argument has now shown it to be,’ there would still be no ‘more useful lie’ (ψεῦδος λυσιτελέστερον) to tell the young with respect to making them practice justice

²³² The Athenian also compels the poets to endorse a strong version of the conditionality thesis, namely that things such as wealth, health, perception and ‘being alive at all’ are good for virtuous people but bad for people who lack virtue (*Laws* 2.661b-c).

²³³ A similar switch occurs in the *Republic*, but in the reverse order. Socrates first discusses the proper *content* of the stories that poets should tell to the learners (*Republic* 2.376e-3.392c) before switching to the *style* (λέξις) of those stories, something that includes the rhythm and harmony in which they will be expressed (*Republic* 3.392c-403c).

‘willingly’ and ‘without coercion’ (2.663d6-e2). The alleged fact that it would be easy to get children to believe a ‘most useful lie’ is apparently supported by the observation that children are easily led to believe thousands of other incredible (as in, ‘not credible’) ‘mythical narratives’ (μυθολογήματα), such as the tale of the Sidonians being born from dragon’s teeth that were planted into the earth (2.663e5-6).²³⁴

Nonetheless, these blithe comments on lying to the youth should not mislead us into thinking that the Athenian does not sincerely hold that the just life is the most pleasant.²³⁵ He in fact re-affirms that lawgivers convincing children of the superlative pleasantness of the just life will be telling the youths things that are ‘most true’ (ἀληθέστατα) (2.664c1). We should, with Meyer, note that this aside on lying occurs during discussion about educating *the young*, people whom the Athenian has already claimed are ‘not yet able to receive an account.’²³⁶ The young are not able to rationally discern or even follow *arguments* about whether the good life is most pleasant. Nonetheless, their ‘young’ (νέαις) and ‘tender’ (ἀπαλαῖς) souls are susceptible to being ‘charmed’ (ἐπάρδειν) such as to be ‘persuaded’ of the truth (*Laws* 2.664b3-c2). I take the point about lying to the young, then, to imply that the charm-like methods that are used on the young will be non-rational partly because the methods used do not necessarily track the truth.²³⁷ In the

²³⁴ These comments on ‘lying’ to children during the course of education closely parallel a similar discussion in the *Republic*. Socrates distinguishes between ‘true falsehoods’ that are hated by everyone and ‘impure falsehoods’ that can be sometimes be useful. He suggests that these latter should be used during their education (*Republic* 2.382a-d). Moreover, the *Laws* 2 reference to the Sidonians being born from the earth of course recalls the most famous ‘useful lie’ of all: the ‘noble lie’ or ‘myth of the metals’ in which the citizens of Kallipolis are told that they are all born from the earth with different metals in their soul that make them suitable for different societal roles (*Republic* 3.414c-415d).

²³⁵ As is arguably implied by Brisson (2005, 118), who asserts that the Athenian is recommending that lawgivers lie to children. See also Leo Strauss’s telling remark that ‘a legislator who is not altogether useless must dare to teach an untruth for the benefit of the young; deliberately teaching a salutary untruth is an act of courage’ (Strauss 1975, 30).

²³⁶ So, cf. (Meyer 2015, 276-277).

²³⁷ In the sense that, even though the lawgiver will in fact charm the young such that they believe the true proposition that ‘the virtuous life is most pleasant,’ the very same methods could just as easily be used to make children believe a false proposition such as that ‘the unjust life of a tyrant is most pleasant.’

same way that storytelling can lead children to believe false things, for instance that people were once born from teeth planted into the earth, they can also be led to believe true things, namely that the virtuous life is the most pleasant. The children come to believe certain doctrines simply because they hear these doctrines being endorsed and praised constantly, non-stop, throughout their lives. Indeed, a lawgiver must ensure that he ‘use every means at his disposal to ensure that the whole community, all their lives long, are of one voice on this topic—in their songs (ὕδαϊς), in their stories (μύθοις), and in their judgments (λόγοις)’ (*Laws* 2.664a4-7, translation Meyer). So, while I think that it is clear that this method also helps develop the virtuous affective anticipations of the kind that the Athenian is so keen to form, and indeed to the inculcation of certain more general doctrines, the method of storytelling falls short of reasoning and is not-truth tracking; for this reason it should be considered a way of forming *non-rational* affective anticipations.

§5.3: Virtue and Rational Anticipation in Plato’s *Laws*

I have claimed that the education of the young uses means such as ‘direct rhythmic manipulation’ and ‘storytelling’ to habituate citizens to feel correct pleasant and painful anticipations, yet these affective anticipations are merely *non-rational* at this stage of the process. Nonetheless, these non-rational affective anticipations are likely sufficient to motivate them to virtuous action; they will look forward, with pleasure, to a virtuous life as a good and pleasant life while also feeling fear and shame at the prospect of a wicked or cowardly life. Yet, I contend that it is not till later that citizens are able to understand *why* virtuous lives *are* pleasant and good. Upon gaining this understanding, and the consequent confluence of emotion and reason, the citizens will, as we saw, possess full virtue (*Laws* 2.653b4-6). Moreover, it is likely that this understanding comes in degrees. While most citizens will increasingly develop a greater

understanding as they age, it might turn out that only a few citizens gain *full* understanding and superlative virtue. Fully virtuous citizens continue to have the same sorts of emotional responses to good and bad lives, that is, they hope to lead a virtuous life and fear a vicious life, but their responses are based on a deeper, more philosophical understanding of virtue. They come to have *rational* affective anticipations, rather than *non-rational* affective anticipations.

The first place to see this progression is in one of the general preludes to the laws of Magnesia. Though not without some controversy, the preludes in general target the rational understandings of the citizens. As Annas points out, good laws with preludes help citizens ‘appreciate what is good in the activities which are structured by the laws, and so their lives are led with positive aims in view rather than fear of sanctions’ (Annas 2017, 102).²³⁸ It is this, an increased *understanding* and *appreciation* of the goodness (and I would add, badness) of the activities that citizens are made to hope (and fear), that I believe underlies the function of the preludes. The Athenian introduces and motivates the existence of preludes to the laws with an illustrative comparison between slave-doctors and citizen doctors. Slave-doctors possess the art of medicine ‘according to experience’ (κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν) and not ‘according to nature’ (κατὰ φύσιν) (*Laws* 4.720b3-4),²³⁹ having picked it up by simply watching and observing their

²³⁸ Bobonich 2002 emphasizes, perhaps excessively, the preludes as instruments of rational persuasion. Other scholars, however, emphasize the non-rational element to preludes and minimize the importance of rational persuasion, notably Brisson (2005, 117). It is surely correct, as Annas and Laks (2022, 124-128) have observed, that the preludes contain a range of devices to bring about persuasion, not all of which count as philosophical argumentation or reasoning. Nonetheless, I think it suffices for my purposes to recognize that *some* preludes *do* appeal to such reasoning, and that the Athenian describes the preludes as a way to convey (as much as possible and hence not fully) something like philosophical knowledge concerning such things.

²³⁹ In this context, I take it that possessing medical knowledge ‘according to nature’ entails knowing the nature of the relevant disease, as opposed to knowing how to cure the disease simply on the basis of trial and error. It does not, then, imply that such doctors somehow ‘naturally’ gain the art of medicine without study or effort. An alternative understanding is defended by Alex Long, who argues that the freeborn doctor who studies disease ‘according to nature’ is one who has ‘brought into view the entire course of the illness, from initial symptoms to the present day’ (Long 2021, 22). However, one reason to be skeptical that this is the higher understanding at issue is that it does not clearly explain what part of the free-doctor’s knowledge they would *convey* to their patient to persuade them, as the patient presumably already knows the course of their own illness.

masters.²⁴⁰ Slave-doctors are consequently unable to give or receive an ‘account’ (λόγον) of any illness, but simply prescribe the things that ‘they think to be good based on their experience, as though accurately knowing it, just like a stubborn tyrant’ (*Laws* 4.720c5-6). In contrast, the free doctors examine the disease of their patient ‘from the beginning and according to nature’ (*Laws* 4.720d3) and as much as possible *teach* (διδάσκει) their patients about the disease and attempt to *persuade* (συμπείσῃ) their patients before prescribing any particular treatment. The free doctors therefore appear to possess the accurate knowledge of health and disease that the slave-doctors lack, and as much as possible try to pass the relevant bit of that knowledge on to their patients when treating their illnesses. Later in the *Laws* the Athenian refers back to this passage, explaining that the free-doctor converses with his free-patient and ‘uses arguments that are close to philosophizing’ (*Laws* 9.857d1-2). Insofar as the doctor’s teaching and persuasion of their patient is supposed to illustrate the activities of an ideal lawgiver, we should suppose that a lawgiver likewise knows *why* certain activities are good or bad (and hence are to be prescribed or proscribed), and that the preludes are an attempt to convey that knowledge to the citizens such that their adherence to the laws of the *polis* is not the product of mere blind obedience but rather a more nuanced grasp of how the laws direct them to a good life.²⁴¹

That the Athenian does indeed suppose that at least some citizens will possess such explanatory knowledge concerning the goodness of the states’ laws and practices, and indeed the goodness of virtue itself, comes out clearly in the final book of the *Laws*. The Athenian describes how a certain body of citizens, traditionally referred to as the ‘nocturnal council’ due to their

²⁴⁰ In this respect slave-doctors are not unlike children of the polis who have learned to identify and take joy in virtue simply by watching and performing the mimetic representations of virtues created by older, more virtuous citizens.

²⁴¹ My treatment of these passages largely accords with that found in (Moss 2014, 199-202), though she does not describe how the grasp of this *logos* is important in transforming the affective responses of the learners.

tendency to meet during the twilight hours before the sun has risen (*Laws* 12.951d6-7), will gain more advanced knowledge than is available to ordinary citizens. One central task of this nocturnal council is to gain a higher knowledge of the political aim of the state, an aim that is described early on as virtue (intelligence, moderation, justice, and courage). The Athenian explains that the nocturnal council must possess an *account* (λόγος) of virtue such that they are ‘more accurate than most with respect to virtue, both in action and in account’ (*Laws* 12.964d3-5). The best way to gain such an understanding of virtue is ‘to be able to look at one form from many dissimilar things’ (*Laws* 12.965c1-3), which, in the case of virtue, requires the members of the nocturnal council to be able to:

[T5.8] ἀκριβῶς ἰδεῖν πρῶτον τί ποτε διὰ πάντων τῶν τεττάρων ταῦτὸν τυγχάνει, ὃ δὴ φαμεν ἓν τε ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐν φρονήσει ἓν ὄν, ἀρετὴν ἐνὶ δικαίῳς ἂν ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεσθαι.

[T5.8] Accurately see, first, whatever it is that happens to be the same through all four, which we claim is one in courage, in moderation, in justice and in intelligence, and which would justly be addressed by that one name ‘virtue’ (*Laws* 12.965c10-d3, my translation)

The references to seeing the ‘one in the many’ here appears to be a reference to dialectic and philosophy, an art which is described elsewhere as an ability to grasp the single form that lies behind the many.²⁴² Not only must lawmakers gain such dialectical knowledge of the form of virtue, the Athenian also says that they must gain such knowledge with respect to beauty and the good as well (*Laws* 12.966a5-7). This, again, seems to be a reference to the kind of grasp of the good and the beautiful that is produced by philosophy.²⁴³ The lawgivers, moreover, not only

²⁴² Though it is beyond the scope of this project, I also believe that we see strong resonances to the divine ‘gift of the gods’ in the *Philebus*, the ‘gift’ referring to a philosophical method to grasp the one genus and the many species of that genus in different domains, a grasp that subsequently gives rise to knowledge and science (*Philebus* 16c-17a). For discussion, see (Frede 1997, 130-146).

²⁴³ So Schofield’s ad. loc. comment: ‘By deploying the vocabulary of synopsis (“looking towards one single form”), Plato here indicates that he has in mind a disciplined command of the methodology of philosophical dialectic’ (Schofield 2016, 465). My view here also coheres nicely with some of Vasilou’s arguments concerning the role of the guardians in the education of *kallipolis*. He claims that the citizens of *kallipolis* are educated such that they are committed to virtue, he calls this an *aiming principle*, but that they are unable to *determine* which particular actions

know the truth concerning such things, but are able to give ‘the indication by means of the account’ (τὴν δὲ ἔνδειξιν τῷ λόγῳ) (*Laws* 12.966b1-2) and are ‘capable of expounding by means of an account (λόγῳ τε ἱκανοὺς ἐρμηνεύειν εἶναι)’ (*Laws* 12.966b6-7), again emphasizing that the lawgivers possess and can somehow give an *account* of virtue, the good, and the fine. Though the Athenian refrains from saying more on what such a grasp consists in or how it can be acquired,²⁴⁴ it is highly noteworthy that the description of the lawgivers of the nocturnal council, citizens who are also supposed to be renowned for the highest levels of virtue, is analogous to the description of free-doctors as individuals who possess and can give an account of the good that they aim at.

§5.3.1: The General Prelude of *Laws* 5

In the same way that free-born doctors attempt to partly convey their knowledge of medicine to the citizens when administering treatment, so too we can see how the lawgivers of Magnesia attempt to partly convey their knowledge of the goodness of virtue and the badness of vice, and the various practices enjoined by the state, to the citizens of Magnesia in the preludes. One prelude in particular deserves our close attention, namely the prelude in *Laws* 5 in which the Athenian explains that the virtuous life is also the most pleasant life. We have already seen the Athenian claim, in *Laws* 2, that this fact is more obvious than the fact that Crete is an island while also recommending that storytelling should be used to get citizens to ingest and believe this fact from a young age. However, a later prelude addresses this more directly, aiming to show that the moderate, courageous, wise, and healthy life is more pleasant than the licentious, foolish,

are virtuous. This ‘determining principle’ of virtuous actions awaits the philosopher rulers who possess knowledge of the Form of the Good, a knowledge that they consequently use to design the musical education that will be used in *kallipolis*. Cf. (Vasiliou 2008, 247-281).

²⁴⁴ Indeed, he arguably denies that anything more *can* be said before the requisite state actually exists. See for instance (*Laws* 12.968d-e).

and cowardly life (*Laws* 5.732b-734e).²⁴⁵ This prelude is not to any specific law, but rather a more general discussion of the framework of the laws themselves (*Laws* 5.734e). In this prelude, the Athenian describes how there are four lives people can choose from, the moderate (σώφρων) life, the intelligent (φρόνιμος) life, the courageous (ἀνδρείος) life, and the healthy (ὕγιεινός) life (*Laws* 5.733e3-5). Against these are four opposite lives: the licentious (ἀκόλαστος), the foolish (ἄφρων), the cowardly (δειλός), and the diseased (νοσώδης). The moderate life has gentle (ἡρεμαίας) pleasures and pain and soft (μαλακὰς) desires and loves (ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἔρωτας), while the licentious life has sharp (ὀξύς) and intense (σφοδράς) pleasures and pains and strained (συντόνους) and raging (οἰστρώδεις) desires and loves. The person who knows the life of self-control is said to know that the pleasures of the moderate life outweigh the pains with respect to size, quantity, and frequency (μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει καὶ πυκνότησιν), while in the licentious life the pains outweigh the pleasures (*Laws* 5.734a5-8). More generally, the Athenian asserts that each life of virtue beats the opposite life of vice in terms of pleasure and pain, concluding that the life of virtue, both in body and soul, is far more pleasant than the life of someone in a bad condition (*Laws* 5.734d4-6).

Now, admittedly, there are some issues with this argument given that the Athenian seems, at a crucial step, to simply assert that pleasure predominates pain in a virtuous life. We are told that someone who ‘knows’ the moderate life (σώφρονα μὲν οὖν βίον ὁ γινώσκων, *Laws* 5.733e6-7) will affirm this judgment. With respect to the moderate life, for instance, the Athenian simply asserts that pleasure predominates in such a life while pain predominates in the

²⁴⁵ It is quite striking that the *just* life is absent from this list. However, Plato might think that the just life is equivalent to the intelligent and courageous life. Note his claim from early on in the *Laws* that ‘intelligence is leading as the first of the divine goods, second is a moderate state of the soul with intelligence, after mixing these with courage, the third would be justice, and fourth is courage.’ (*Laws* 1.631d). Justice is therefore understood as a kind of ‘mixture’ of intelligence, moderation, and courage, three lives that *are* listed in *Laws* 5.

converse life of licentiousness, and it is unclear what if anything prevents either, on the one hand, some licentious lives from having more pleasure than pain or, on the other hand, some moderate lives from containing more pain than pleasure.²⁴⁶

However, it is noteworthy that the prelude argues for the hedonic superiority of the moderate life over the licentious life partly by claiming that the licentious life contains ‘intense’ pleasures and pains while the moderate life contains only mild and gentle pleasures. This is noteworthy because the *Philebus* argues that ‘intense’ pleasures are often mixed with pain and therefore inferior to the so-called ‘pure’ pleasures that are unmixed with pain. In §3.4, I argued that the vicious have mostly false anticipatory pleasures precisely because they anticipate such intense pleasures as genuine pleasures, while the more pleasant life is in fact one that contains pure pleasures.²⁴⁷ Yet, the deficient status of intense pleasures, explored in more detail in the *Philebus*’ philosophical discussion of pleasure, perfectly corroborates the verdict of the prelude that the moderate life of ‘gentle’ pleasures can be hedonically superior to the licentious life of ‘intense’ pleasures (and pains). Insofar as the intense ‘pleasures’ that are contained in the licentious life are mixed with pain and thus non-genuine, it follows that *true* or *genuine* pleasure will never predominate in such a life.²⁴⁸ Indeed, in §3.4.3 I argued that such knowledge and

²⁴⁶ Indeed, Warren claims that: ‘it is therefore indeed true that something is missing from the argument as presented in Book 5. It is hard to be confident that the final claim of the pleasantness of the virtuous life is anything more than an optimistic assertion’ (Warren 2013, 343) before suggesting that we must assume that, to the audience of the prelude, ‘it is obvious that such a wanton life will never be pleasant overall; pains will always predominate’ (345), partly because the citizens of Magnesia take pleasure in harmony and are aware of the harmonious quality of a virtuous life as opposed to the disharmonious quality of a vicious life. Warren may be right that it is ‘obvious’ to the citizens of Magnesia, but I prefer a reading, as I go on to give, in which filling in the details of the prelude’s argument awaits a further stage in one’s intellectual development.

²⁴⁷ I also argue for this claim in more detail in (Brants 2024).

²⁴⁸ In that respect I am in line with others who have suspected that the *Philebus* account of pleasure lies in the background here, for instance (Laks 2022, 141). Nonetheless, it might be objected, in line with Warren, that ‘It is also unlikely that the Athenian would rely on the distinction between true and false or pure and impure pleasures in the context of what is explicitly still a prelude to the laws ... since the function of a prelude, put very briefly, is to persuade the citizens of the correctness of the laws being proposed and the Athenian clearly considers such preludes to be occasions for moral education ... While a prelude does not have to confine itself to mere commonplaces or common opinion, it would nevertheless be odd if it were to rely on a point of such philosophical contention as the

reasoning likely underlies the formation of true *rational* affective anticipations that are based on a process of reasoning and understanding the nature of pleasure. Just as a free citizen doctor attempts to convey some aspect of her own medical knowledge to her patient to persuade the patient before treating them, so too I believe that this prelude attempts to convey some aspect of the knowledge of pleasure's nature and the life of virtue to the citizens so that their pleasant anticipation of a virtuous life can be rationally grounded. Arguably, indeed, the Athenian expects the citizens to read dialogues such as the *Philebus* and further develop their theoretical understanding of pleasure and virtue, as is hinted at in the Athenian's striking suggestion that the citizens should read Plato's own dialogues (*Laws* 7.811c-812a).²⁴⁹

§5.3.2: Judging Choral Performances & Understanding Virtue

Besides the prelude, we should also note that the selection of the appropriate songs to be taught to the children is undertaken by older citizens who are said to have an acquired understanding of what choral performances are good and bad. This understanding reflects a deeper appreciation of good and bad human characters that enables them to discern which kinds of artistic representation imitate the good characters and which imitate bad characters. As we saw, representations of good characters must be paired with the appropriate kind of pleasing musical harmonies. Moreover, the Athenian is explicit that the director of education will be a

distinction between true and false or pure and impure pleasures' (Warren 2013, 342-343). However, I do not think that this would be as odd as it might seem, as Plato clearly signals that the preludes are meant to convey specialist knowledge to non-specialists with his analogy to the free-doctor. Moreover, anyone who has taught philosophy is surely familiar with the experience of relying on points of 'philosophical contention' in the course of teaching. This is not necessarily inimical to the goals of teaching so long as a fuller understanding can be gained later and elsewhere.

²⁴⁹ At least Schofield, in his ad. loc. comment, takes the Athenian to be suggesting that the '*Laws* itself' is what should be studied in schools (Schofield 2016, 274), and I think it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Athenian's comment that children should also read writings that are 'related and similar' (811e1) refers to other Platonic dialogues.

member of the nocturnal council, someone who we saw will possess a deeper understanding of virtue, beauty, and the good (*Laws* 12.951e1-3).

In order to grasp the kind of higher expertise required for *creating* an educational program, first note that the Athenian distinguishes three features that accompany ‘some joy’: either pleasure, ‘correctness,’ or ‘usefulness’ (*Laws* 2.667b5-7). The Athenian claims that music is imitative, and hence that it should be judged in terms of ‘correctness,’ namely the degree to which it is an accurate imitation of what it represents. The accuracy of some imitation is independent of someone’s affective response to that imitation: ‘What is equal is equal and what is proportional is proportional, and this does not depend on anyone’s opinion that it is so, nor does it cease to be true if someone is displeased at the fact. Accuracy, and nothing else whatsoever, is the only permissible criterion’ (*Laws* 2.668a1-4, translation Saunders).²⁵⁰ It follows that to judge the correctness of any particular mimetic work of art, one must know the nature of the thing being represented in order to tell if the representation is accurate. As the Athenian summarizes, those who are to be competent judges of imitative works of art must know: ‘What is being represented, then that it is correct, and then that it is good’ (*Laws* 2.669a9-b1). To give an example of what the Athenian seems to have in mind, the judge must first know *what* is supposed to be represented, for instance a courageous character, then whether it is in fact represented, for instance if the musical modes and words correctly represent that character, and

²⁵⁰ It might be inferred that accurate mimetic art is less pleasant than art that does not aspire to accuracy since the Athenian insists that its worth should not be judged by the pleasure it produces. However, later on the Athenian clarifies that the art he recommends for the polis is just as pleasant as any other sort of art, at least for *virtuous* people. It simply is not beautiful or fine in virtue of the pleasure it produces. As he explains: ‘Take someone who has right from childhood till the age of maturity and discretion grown familiar with a controlled and restrained style of music. Play him some of the other sort, and how he’ll loathe it! “What vulgar stuff!” he’ll say. Yet, if he’s been brought up to enjoy the strong appeal of popular music, it is the disciplined kind he’ll call frigid and repellent! So, as I said just now, on the score of pleasure or the lack of it, neither type is superior or inferior to the other. The difference is simply this: the one musical environment is invariably a good influence, the other a bad’ (*Laws* 7.802c-d, translation Saunders).

finally whether the character represented is in fact a virtuous and upright character.²⁵¹ The first two could come apart from the third criterion if, for instance, someone correctly represents a foolish individual such as Strepsiades from *The Clouds*. Though this work of art correctly imitates a certain kind of character, the Athenian would likely deny that it is a fine work of art because the character being represented is not virtuous. Even if someone happened to think that Strepsiades was a prudent individual, it would fall to those with advanced education to discern the faults in his character and, consequently, faults in the works of art that represent it.

Stepping back slightly, the general take-away that we should draw from this discussion is that the older individuals who can judge the fineness of a work of art, people such as the directors of education who are later said to be members of the nocturnal council, do so in light of their developed *understanding* of virtue. This understanding surpasses the mere reliable tendency to be pleased at virtue and disgusted at vice, something that we saw is inculcated in the souls of the young in a non-rational manner and which causes them to pleasantly anticipate virtuous acts while feeling fear and shame towards prospective vicious acts. The directors of education must further know *why* those acts are virtuous and the nature of a virtuous life; this allows them to understand both why a virtuous life is pleasant and a vicious life is unpleasant (as reflected in a prelude) and also understand the kinds of actions and behaviors that are appropriate to each virtuous character, a knowledge that allows them to judge and oversee the creation of good

²⁵¹ Barker has a helpful discussion of this passage in which he argues that the third criterion of judgment, whether the art is in fact ‘fine’ and represents ‘the good’ (τὸ εὖ) does ‘not depend on a specifically musical form of understanding, but on the capacity to make reliable ethical judgments about the kinds of character, behavior, and so on that are the objects of musical μίμησις. It is a capacity that may indeed be fostered by musical training, but which, so the Athenian seems to believe, is developed primarily through the experience of living for many years within the institutions of a well-ordered community’ (Barker 2013, 401). For another contrasting interpretation of the passage and a detailed overview of interpretative issues surrounding it, see Meyer’s argument that the second criterion refers to the correctness of the representation in terms of certain features such as words and gestures, while the third criterion refers to correctness of the representation in terms of harmonies and rhythms (Meyer 2015, 307-311). Either way, the competent judge must have a more advanced understanding of the nature of virtuous characters that allows them to judge the representational accuracy of any given work of art.

works of mimetic art. This is the sort of understanding of the good and the bad, however, that I argued underlies *rational* affective anticipation in chapter 3. Hence, we should expect the older individuals to hope and fear for the same sorts of things that they have been habituated to hope and fear for from a young age, but to do so on a rational basis informed by their understanding of the good and the bad. It is only at this point, when one's hopes and fears are based on a philosophical understanding of the good life as a whole, that one can finally be said to be fully virtuous.

§5.4: Education and Non-Rational Affective Anticipations in Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*

In the next two sections I turn to Aristotle, describing the two phases of education meant to first (1) develop the correct sort of *non-rational* affective anticipations in the learners and then (2) develop the correct *rational* affective anticipations that mark the eventual acquisition of full virtue. Aristotle's views concerning non-rational education and habituation come out most clearly in his *Ethics* and *Politics*. I claim, moreover, that Aristotle recommends a program of musical education that is similar to what we surveyed in the *Laws*, and that musical education as described in the *Politics* similarly targets the development of the proper *non-rational* affective anticipations.²⁵²

§5.4.1: On the General Goals of Education

In Chapter 3 (§3.6), we saw that Aristotle distinguishes intellectual virtues belonging to a 'part' of our soul that has reason in a full sense from ethical virtues belonging to a 'part' of our soul that has reason in a derivative and secondary sense. This distinction is picked up again in

²⁵² My characterization of musical education largely follows and is in agreement with the study by (Hitz 2012), and also the related, brief treatments in (Leunissen 2017) and (Sherman 1989). However, none of them discusses the connection with affective anticipation, nor the development into rational affective anticipation for full virtue. I consequently provide more detail of how I think the musical inculcation of emotions can motivate ethical behavior in the learner and how I believe this form of motivation differs from that in full virtue.

Aristotle's comments on education. He distinguishes three things that contribute to making people virtuous: nature, habit, and teaching:

[T5.9] γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει οἱ δ' ἔθει οἱ δὲ διδασκῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδασκὴ μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπεῖκεν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βία. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἥθος προὑπάρχειν πῶς οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν.

[T5.9] Some think that people become good by nature, <others that> it is by habit and others by teaching. It is clear that whatever <comes from> nature does not belong to anyone due to our own agency, but rather belongs to the truly fortunate due to some divine causes. But reason (λόγος) and teaching never prevail in everyone, but it is necessary to prepare beforehand the soul of the student by habits with an eye towards enjoying and hating finely, just as <it is necessary to prepare beforehand> the land that will nourish the seed. For someone living according to emotion (ὁ κατὰ πάθος) would neither listen nor understand <any> reason (λόγος) deterring him, but rather that person must <already> be disposed such as to be able to be persuaded to change. In general, emotion (πάθος) does not seem to yield to reason but rather to force. So, it is necessary that a character (τὸ ἥθος) somehow fitting for virtue (οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς) must exist beforehand (προὑπάρχειν), loving the fine and feeling disgust towards the shameful. (EN 10.9.1179b20-31, Irwin modified)

As this passage clarifies, reason, teaching, and arguments²⁵³ are not effective with those who have the wrong sorts of emotions. Someone who does not feel the right sorts of emotions beforehand cannot be persuaded or even understand reason. The fact that the *wrong sorts of* emotions are the problem rather than emotion itself is made clear by the ultimate recommendation: habituate children such that they have the *right* emotions, 'loving the fine' and 'feeling disgust towards the shameful.' Note also that this passage gives us reason to think that this proper habituation, devoid of reason, does not lead immediately to virtue. Rather it leads to a 'character somehow fitting for virtue' that is compared to ground suitably prepared for the seed.

²⁵³ I translated *logos* as 'reason,' but a correct and perhaps more appropriate translation in this context would be 'arguments.' This is, indeed, the choice of (Ross 1954), (Irwin 2019), and (Burnyeat 1980). 'Reason,' however, helps bring out parallels to the passage on education in *Laws* 2 that we saw in §5.2.

This ‘fitting’ character will become full virtue once reason is added. Of course, this sort of affective preparation for full virtue as the perfect harmony of reason and emotion is very similar to what we saw in *Laws* 2 in §5.2.

Aristotle makes a very similar point towards the end of the *Politics*. Moreover, it is natural to read this passage in conjunction with the *EN* passage just discussed, as the *Politics* is itself a work that seems to be referred to as a sequel to the *Ethics* in *EN* 10.9. The *Politics* passage runs as follows:

[T5.10] τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρή τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πρότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἤχθαι. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτο γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς <ἀρχῇ> ἄλλου τέλους, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐθῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν μελέτην· ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δύο ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρῶμεν δύο μέρη, τὸ τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἕξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊοῦσιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἔνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

[T5.10] We happened to determine, beforehand, that nature, habits, and reason are necessary <to develop virtue>. Of these, the proper sorts of nature that are necessary were already determined, but it remains to consider whether one must first educate by reason or by habits. For it is necessary for these to harmonize (συμφωνεῖν) with one another, the harmony (συμφωνίαν) <being> best, for it is possible to completely miss the account (τὸν λόγον) of the best hypothesis, and one can similarly be led astray by habits. First this is clear, just as in other things, namely that generation is from some starting point, and some starting points have ends that are the starting points of further ends, but for us reason (λόγος) and mind (νοῦς) are the end of nature, so that generation and the care of the habits that it is necessary to prepare are both with an eye towards these. Then, just as the soul and the body are two, in this way also we see two parts of the soul, the non-rational and the part having reason (τὸ λόγον ἔχον). And the states of these are two in number, of these the one being desire (ὄρεξις) and the other mind (νοῦς), and just as the body is prior to the soul in generation, in this way the non-rational <is prior> to the part having reason <in generation>. This is clear; for spirit and wish, and of course appetite, all immediately belong to children upon being born, but reasoning and mind

(*voũς*) come about naturally <in people later on> as they develop. Because of this it is necessary that the care of the body is first, prior to the care of the soul, then the care of desire. However, the care of desire is for the sake of mind (*voũς*) and the care of body for the sake of the soul. (*Politics* 7.15.1334b6-28, my translation)

As in the *EN* 10.9 passage just surveyed, here we learn that the goal of education is a symphony between non-rational habits and reason, this implying full virtue (as in *Laws* 2, T5.2). This passage fully elaborates, however, that the goal of the entire educative process is reason: children must be educated to form the proper habits such that they can fully realize their rational capacities. It also introduces the same distinction between a ‘rational’ part of the soul and a non-rational, desiderative part of the soul that we saw elaborated in *EN* 1.13 (in §3.7). The education of this ‘non-rational’ soul and desire comes first, paralleling the natural development of desires such as appetite before reason.²⁵⁴ Aristotle goes on to prominently discuss physical education and musical education.²⁵⁵ While physical education certainly picks up the ‘care of the body,’ there is reason to see musical education as encapsulating the ‘care of desires,’ and, hence, our dispositions with respect to affective anticipation (recall that I that argued affective anticipation is *active* desire in Chapter 2). Since Aristotle is so keen to emphasize that the non-rational soul is educated before the rational soul, it is likely that musical education works through non-rational means and targets *non-rational* affective anticipations. With this brief overview of how musical education fits into Aristotle’s general framework of education complete, let us turn to survey Aristotle’s actual account of musical education.

²⁵⁴ Aristotle’s claim that ‘wish,’ *boulēsis*, also belongs to us immediately after we are born strikes me as problematic, as *boulēsis* itself is supposedly a distinctively rational desire. However, Aristotle’s main point is that *orexis*, the genus of desire, belongs to humans from birth. This is certainly true, as no one would deny the immediate presence of appetite. This is probably why Aristotle himself emphasizes appetite when making his point: ‘spirit and wish, and of course appetite’ (θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία.)

²⁵⁵ Other subjects in education, such as reading, writing, and most crucially philosophy, are not given anything more than passing mentions, perhaps due to the *Politics* being an incomplete work. In what follows I do not presume that musical education exhausts character education (I in fact deny this) but merely explain how it plays a very important role in the educative process.

§5.4.2: Aristotle on Musical Education

In *Politics* 8, Aristotle distinguishes three different uses of music. It is useful for education (παιδεία), amusement (παιδιά) and leisured pursuits (διὰγωγὴ) (*Politics* 8.5.1339b13-15). I will focus exclusively on explicating the first use in education. After discussing the other two uses of music, Aristotle returns to education by affirming that music ‘influences one’s character and soul in some way’ and that people come ‘to be of a certain quality in one’s character because of music’ (*Politics* 8.5.1340a5-8, translation Reeve). Aristotle proceeds to offer an explanation for this educative effect of music:

[T5.11] ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ’ ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μαθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὥς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἥθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ’ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων)· ὁ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον (οἷον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ δι’ ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον τούτῳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τὴν θεωρίαν, οὗ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, ἡδεῖαν εἶναι).

[T5.11] Everyone hearing mimetic representations (τῶν μιμήσεων) becomes affected by the same emotions (συμπαθεῖς) <that are represented>, even separately from their rhythms and melodies. Since it so happens that the musical is one of the pleasures, and virtue is about enjoying and loving and hating correctly, these things make clear that it is necessary to learn and to become habituated to (συνεθίζεσθαι) nothing so much as the correct discernment (τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς) and <correct> enjoyment of fitting characters (τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἥθεσι) and fine actions (ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν). And the greatest likenesses to the true natures of anger (ὀργῆς) and gentleness (πραότητος) are in the rhythms and melodies, and still more <with respect to> courage, moderation, all the contraries of these, and also the other characters (this is clear from the facts, for our soul is altered when listening to these sorts of things). For someone who is accustomed to feeling pain and enjoyment in likenesses is close to having the same habit with respect to reality (τὴν ἀλήθειαν). For example, if someone enjoys the image (τὴν εἰκόνα) of something he sees for no other reason besides its shape, it is necessary that the sight to that person of that same thing which the image is of is <also> pleasant. (*Politics* 8.5.1340a12-28, my translation)

First, we should ask ourselves what sort of ‘musical performance’ Aristotle has in mind here.

Aristotle says very little, but we can thankfully draw from Plato’s similar discussion of musical education in the *Laws*. Namely, I suggest that we should take Aristotle to likewise have in mind something like *choral* performances that involve stories set to music and accompanying dances of one or more people. Though Aristotle (like Plato) admittedly focuses on the effects of music itself in his discussion,²⁵⁶ the first sentence hints that a ‘mimetic representation’ (μίμησις) used in musical education will involve more than just music: namely he says that we take on the same emotions as the mimetic representations ‘even *separately* from their rhythms and melodies.’ Since Aristotle immediately proceeds to explain how crucial musical rhythms and melodies are to represent emotions (they are the ‘greatest’ likenesses), I submit that we should take this sentence to imply that the other elements of choral performances, in particular the stories themselves, also play some (less crucial) part in representing and inducing emotions.²⁵⁷ One further reason to think that musical education involves more than simply learning to play musical instruments is that Aristotle asks whether learners should learn to ‘themselves *sing* and play-instruments’ (*Politics* 8.6.1340b21-22), implying that singing stories is also part of musical education.²⁵⁸ Such song and dance are, of course, central elements of choral performances.

²⁵⁶ What Schofield calls music ‘in senso stretto’ in his discussion of the *Republic* (Schofield 2010, 231).

²⁵⁷ I think this aptly addresses Hitz’ worries that the ‘even’ (the ‘καί’ at 1340a13) implies that hearing representations is valuable ‘apart from the music.’ I suspect she finds the ‘even’ puzzling since she ignores the other components of a musical performance; we should simply grant that these other components (such as dance and the non-lyrical content of stories) are valuable while agreeing that Aristotle thinks that these components are *less powerful* with respect to inducing emotions (Hitz 2012, 297 fn. 74). Indeed, Aristotle’s claim here might amount to a concession that the story content of, for instance, the *Odyssey* can affect us emotionally even apart from its musical elements. This coheres with our own contemporary experience, as almost all of us are silent *readers*, rather than *listeners*, of the *Odyssey* but can nonetheless be moved by it. Nonetheless, one suspects that ancient Greeks would be disturbed by our contemporary practice of *reading* epics and tragedies, stripped as they are of some of their most crucial artistic elements.

²⁵⁸ He also criticizes flute-playing (αὐλησις) because it hinders the use of ‘*logos*’, which here might simply mean that the flute hinders the use of speech in songs or chants (hence Jowett translates ‘*logos*’ as ‘voice’) (8.6.1341a24). Obviously, one cannot sing if you are also playing the flute. Furthermore, Aristotle implies that overly-professionalized musicians ruin their bodies, as well as their souls, as they try to please the vulgar spectator (8.6.1341b15-18). This is a strange claim if only instrumental performance is at issue: is Aristotle worried about the

The *degree* to which Aristotle emphasizes the importance of musical education here is striking: he says that it is necessary to learn and to become habituated to *nothing* so much as the proper discernment and enjoyment of fine characters and actions and implies that musical education is how this will come about. Moreover, we learn that the *greatest* (μάλιστα) likenesses to emotions and characters are in musical melodies and rhythms. The claim that virtues, vices, and different sorts of characters can be musically represented is already familiar to us from the *Laws* (as discussed in §5.2.1 & §5.3.2), and this passage gives us every reason to think that Aristotle has the same belief in the mimetic power of music with respect to virtue and vice.²⁵⁹ Moreover, we should take note of the *way* in which music affects us: it changes *our soul* and causes us to feel the same *pathos* as that expressed in the music. The listeners become ‘sympathetically affected’ (συμπαθεῖς) by the music they listen to. Since the music we listen to allegedly represents emotions such as anger and gentleness (and also represents virtuous dispositions that are themselves mean states with respect to emotions, for instance courage as a mean state with respect to fear and confidence), it follows that Aristotle thinks that listening to a musical performance can make us *feel* emotions such as anger, gentleness and fear in a particular way.

I share the view of some scholars, then, that musical education is supposed to allow us to take pleasure in fine and virtuous actions (and hate ignoble action) due to feeling musically

formation of calluses as citizens strum their lyres? It makes much more sense if we take *mousikê* to involve a sort of rhythmical dancing. This would also bring it in line with Plato’s similar concern, which is that performers degrade themselves as they contort their bodies, voices, and indeed emotions to imitate base characters (cf. *Republic* 3.395d2-3, 3.396c5-b2).

²⁵⁹ However, the representational ability of music is disputed by Fiecconi, who claims that ‘Instrumental music, or music without words, seems unable to represent or mimic actions and characters in this way’ (Fiecconi, 2016, 412). However, Fiecconi seems to think musical education *only* involves instrumental music, something I gave reasons to reject in the last paragraph. Moreover, Aristotle’s claim that someone who takes pleasure in a musical ‘likeness’ of virtue is similar to someone who takes pleasure in the ‘image of something’ and then takes pleasure in the ‘real thing’ seems to clearly signal that the musical likenesses *represent* virtuous actions in the same way that an image of something can ‘represent’ the real thing it is an image of.

induced emotions in *representations* of fine actions and characters.²⁶⁰ Indeed, it is helpful to note that Aristotle, like Plato, emphasizes the importance of taking part in and *enacting* the performances for oneself (*Politics* 8.6.1340b31-39). To give a more concrete example of how this works, we can imagine that a learner might dramatically enact and perform someone valiantly enduring in battle or staying calm and collected amidst devastation. The proper musical modes that accompany this performance, modes that Aristotle takes to be essential to the representation itself, also make the learner *qua* performer feel the emotions that are proper to that character, such as the proper confidence when faced with oppressive challenges in battle. Alternatively, they might perform characters who also feel an (appropriate) fear at the prospect of their families or communities coming to ruin. Performers come to enact the appropriate characters and actions and crucially also take on the different emotions that accompany those characters and actions. Aristotle also says that an outcome of this process is taking pleasure in the fine actions themselves, hence the learners also take pleasure in their (enacted) fine actions.

What is most important for this study, however, is that there is good reason to hold that this educative process will habituate the learners to feel *non-rational* affective anticipations. In §3.6, I claimed that non-rational affective anticipation depends on past episodes of sense-experience that give rise to *perceptual phantasia*. A non-rational affective anticipation occurs when the good or bad thing that we pleasantly or painfully anticipate is made available to us through perceptual *phantasia*. Furthermore, many perceptual *phantasmata* can be associated with

²⁶⁰ Principally I follow (Sherman 1989, 181-183), (Hitz 2012, 296-301) and (Leunissen 2017, 120-123) in emphasizing that musical education leads children to take pleasure in mimetic representations of fine actions, and that this is an essential part of character education. Contra (Fieconi 2016, 412) who denies this, cf. fn 40. However, I agree with her insightful analysis of the *progressive* elements of music, i.e. that it can develop and change through time, and would suggest that this is one feature that allows music to *represent* virtuous actions particularly well.

each other due to past sense-experience, and these past associations can cause us to anticipate something else due to the occurrent perception of some distinct stimulus.

How does this work with musical education? Suppose that I take pleasure in the mimetic performance of someone performing a noble action, for instance sharing her food with a hungry child. Let us further suppose that I am the one *performing* the role of the virtuous woman who is feeding the child because, as we will shortly see, Aristotle (like Plato) takes participating in the musical performance *as performer* to be an essential part of education. To play my part well I must perform or enact grief at the child's hunger as well as a resulting joy when the child recovers. Thanks to this mimetic performance and the accompanying musical modes, I actually *feel* the emotions that are represented in the performance, this experience itself being an occurrent perceptual episode. Hence, my performance will result in the creation of a perceptual *phantasma*, linked with various other associated *phantasmata* from the performance. This, however, can carry over to the real world. Indeed, this is supported by Aristotle's remarks in (T5.11) that we saw earlier, reproduced below:

[T5.11.2] For someone who is accustomed to feeling pain and enjoyment in likenesses is close to having the same habit (τρόπον) with respect to reality (τὴν ἀλήθειαν). For example if someone enjoys the image (τὴν εἰκόνα) of something he sees for no other reason (αἰτίαν) besides its shape (τὴν μορφήν), it is necessary that the sight to that person of that same thing which the image is of is <also> pleasant (*Politics* 8.5.1340a23-28, my translation).

Our pleasure and pain in these representations carry over to 'reality.' In the real world, then, the sight of a *real* hungry child can trigger the memory-based *phantasma* of the hungry child in the musical performance and a consequent *pleasant anticipation* of helping that child. Since the past musical performance represented helping the child as a noble and beneficent action using pleasant representational rhythms and harmonies, I likewise pleasantly anticipate helping the real hungry child as a noble and beneficent action. The crucial point here, I think, is that the reason I

pleasantly anticipate helping the child in the ‘real world’ is that it is *similar* to my past (pleasant) sensory experience of the mimetic representation of a virtuous action. It is therefore the similarity of prospective actions to the mimetic representations that I have experienced (with pain or pleasure) in the past that allows me to discriminate virtuous from vicious actions.²⁶¹ Musical education is therefore a way for learners to get quasi-experience of virtuous actions that they would normally never perform. This in turn habituates them to feel the sorts of motivational affective anticipations, as components of the relevant emotions, that will lead them to perform virtuous actions.

§5.4.3: Limitations of Musical Education

Aristotle emphasizes that musical education is very important in habituating young children to discern and enjoy fine actions and characters, but we should be careful to note its limitations. There is good reason to deny that it leads to *full virtue*.²⁶² More generally, I suggest that musical education allows children to enjoy and discern (κρίνειν) the fine in only a ‘rough’ and somewhat inchoate way. This would follow from my discussion of non-rational affective anticipation from Chapter 3; if I am correct that musical education allows for the discernment of fine actions due to exposing children to past perceptual experiences of (musically represented) fine actions that are *similar* to prospective actions and which will form the requisite sensory *phantasmata* in their souls, then we should not expect such education to lead to the fine-grained

²⁶¹ It is here important to emphasize that I do not think that learners help the hungry child *in order* to feel pleasure from helping the child. Therefore, we should not say that the learners are aiming at pleasure. Instead, we should suppose that the mimetic representation used in the musical performance represented some beneficent action as noble, and hence that learners pleasantly anticipate helping a real child in the future *as a noble action*. Nonetheless, it is because the past mimetic representation of the noble action *was pleasant* (due to its musical and sensory features) that the future noble action is *pleasantly anticipated* as opposed to painfully anticipated or anticipated without any affect at all. These sorts of non-rational affective anticipations are therefore opposed to the *rational* pleasant anticipations discussed in §3.7, in which an intellectual grasp of the good-making features of an action, i.e. its nobleness, is sufficient to account for our rational anticipation of it.

²⁶² *Contra*, apparently, (Hitz 2012, 302).

thought-based grasp that lies beyond rational affective anticipation and full virtue. One quick, initial reason in support of this view comes from Aristotle's developmental account of education in which the body is trained before desires, and desires before the mind. Musical education surely operates at a non-rational level, targeting children who have not yet developed reason, though it is with an eye towards the future development of reason and the consequent full virtue that will be possessed in the future.

Another reason to think that musical education does not lead to any deep intellectual grasp of the 'fine' or virtue in general is that Aristotle (unlike Plato) thinks that learners should *abandon* the performance of choral performances when still young:

[T5.12] ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων· τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις οὐ χαλεπὸν διορίσαι, καὶ λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς φάσκοντας βάνανσον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν μετέχειν δεῖ τῶν ἔργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ νέους μὲν ὄντας χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους τῶν μὲν ἔργων ἀφεῖσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν ὁρθῶς διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι·

[T5.12] So that it is necessary to be educated in the musical such that one can partake in the musical performances (τῶν ἔργων)²⁶³ <oneself> is clear from these things: it is not difficult to determine what is seemly and unseemly for the different stages of life, and <also not difficult> to resolve <the issue> concerning those alleging the care <for musical performance> to be banausic. First, since it is necessary to partake in the musical performances (τῶν ἔργων) for the sake of discernment <τοῦ κρίνειν>, because of this it is necessary for those who are young to have experience in musical performances, but upon becoming old to give up the performances <while still> being able to correctly discern (κρίνειν) and enjoy (χαίρειν) the fine due to the study (μάθησιν) <of music> that occurred in their youth. (*Politics* 8.6.1340b31-39)

Aristotle reiterates that there are two main goals of musical education: to correctly *discern* (κρίνειν) and *enjoy* (χαίρειν) the fine. This corresponds with the earlier description of musical education we saw in (T5.11). Musical education was said to enable learners to feel pleasure and pain correctly and to become capable of the 'correct discernment' of 'fitting characters' and 'fine

²⁶³ Of course, τῶν ἔργων does not mean 'musical performances' but rather something like 'the works' or 'the deeds.' However, I believe the translation is suitable given the context of this passage.

actions’ (*Politics* 8.5.1340a16-17). Based on our current passage (T5.12), Aristotle seems to think that learners should abandon musical performance once they can discern and enjoy ‘the fine’ correctly, however their musical education will continue to contribute to their discernment and enjoyment of fine actions and characters later in life. Yet, Aristotle also implies that learners will stop performing when still young. Learners would therefore be able to ‘discern’ and ‘enjoy’ the fine at a time when they still lack *phronêsis*, as Aristotle elsewhere suggests that it takes a long life and experience to gain *phronêsis* (cf. *Politics* 7.9.1329a14-16, *EN* 6.11.1143b11-14).

Moreover, note that Aristotle denies that learners who have completed their education in musical performance are the same people who are able to *design* that very curriculum:

[T5.13] πρὸς δὲ παιδείαν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τῶν μελῶν χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ δωριστί, καθάπερ εἵπομεν πρότερον· δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ κἄν τινα ἄλλην ἡμῖν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας.

[T5.13] With respect to education, just as was said, it is necessary to use the ethical melodies and harmonies of the same sort. The Dorian is this sort, according to what we said before, but it is necessary for us to accept any other that our accomplices in the study of philosophy and in musical education should approve. (*Politics* 8.7.1342a28-32)

Aristotle suggests that the Dorian mode should be used in ethical education, but also any other approved by those familiar with ‘the study of philosophy’ (τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς) and ‘musical education’ (τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας). *Designing* a proper musical education therefore requires not only personal experience with musical education itself, but also some sort of *philosophical* understanding. Recall that this was exactly the verdict of the *Laws*: the judgment and selection of appropriate melodies and modes to be used in education was carried out by individuals who had gained the kind of vaunted understanding of virtue that only philosophical dialectic can provide. This understanding of virtue’s nature allowed them to discern which melodies and rhythms correctly represent genuine virtue and was therefore required for deciding what sorts of music the citizens should perform. Only elderly individuals

with this kind of intellectual understanding are truly capable of judging music correctly. Though we should not assume that Aristotle thinks the same sort of philosophical knowledge of virtue is needed to determine the appropriate musical modes, I think that the passage nonetheless gives us reason to suppose that those who determine which musical performances should be performed in the city possess a more advanced understanding of virtue and fine music that goes beyond that provided by their preparatory musical education.

Indeed, I think that we should consider Aristotle's insistence that musical education enables learners to 'discern' (κρίνειν) fine actions and characters in conjunction with his distinction, from the *De Anima*, between perceptual 'discernment' and intellectual 'discernment.'²⁶⁴ He explains, for instance, that animals are distinguished from plants insofar as animals possess a 'faculty of discernment' (τῷ τε κριτικῷ). 'Discernment' occurs both through perception (in all animals) and through thought (in creatures with reason) (e.g. at *DA* 3.9.432a15-16). These two faculties discern different things:

[T5.14] ἐπεὶ δ' ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι, καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ ταῦτόν ἐστι), τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα ἢ ἄλλω ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει· ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ σιμόν, τόδε ἐν τῷδε. τῷ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν κρίνει, καὶ ὦν λόγος τις ἢ σὰρξ· ἄλλω δέ, ἥτοι χωριστῷ ἢ ὡς ἡ κεκλασμένη ἔχει πρὸς αὐτὴν ὅταν ἐκταθῇ, τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι κρίνει.

[T5.14] Since a magnitude and 'what it is to be a magnitude' differ, as also water and 'what it is to be water' differ (and thus for many other cases, though not all, since in some cases they are the same), one discerns (κρίνει) flesh and 'what it is to be flesh' either by means of different things or by means of something in a different condition. For flesh is not without matter but rather just as the snub: a this in a this. One discerns (κρίνει) by means of the perceptual faculty the hot and the cold, those things of which flesh is a proportion. But it is by means of something else, something either separate or something which is as a bent line is to itself after it has been straightened out, that one discerns (κρίνει) 'what it is to be flesh.' (*DA* 3.4.429b10-18, translation Shields modified)

²⁶⁴ This distinction is also brought up at *DA* 3.3.427a19-21 and *DA* 3.3.428a3-5, among other places.

Aristotle asserts that there is a difference between discriminating (κρίνειν) flesh and discriminating ‘what it is to be flesh.’ The perceptual faculty can be sufficient to discern flesh from things that are not flesh: for instance, I can tell by touch and sight that I am perceiving someone’s bare skin rather than a piece of clothing draped over her body. Yet, this ability to perceptually discriminate skin from clothing does *not* amount to discriminating the ‘what it is to be flesh’ – that is the *essence* of flesh.²⁶⁵ Discriminating this latter ‘being’ is a task for *reason*, hence why this discussion occurs within the *De Anima*’s treatment of *reason* and thought.

Likewise, I suggest that the musical education of the young allows them to perceptually discriminate virtuous from vicious actions in a rough way (hence why it is conveyed through musical performances that encode the ‘rhythm’ of virtuous actions), but that they are unable to discriminate the *essence* of virtuous actions, nor the nature of goods or bads to which those actions are a response, such as proper revenge, anger, slights, honors, and so on. The particular perceptual models in their souls, so to speak, can be used to identify opportunities for virtuous actions due to *similarity* to the mimetic representations with which they are familiar. This is (significantly) better than nothing, as they take pleasure in many of the things that they should and feel pain at the contrary things. This is far superior to vicious people who are *pained* by virtuous actions (pained, for instance, at the prospect of abandoning wealth to save friends). Nonetheless, we should not think that the perceptual attunement of the learner will always lead them to *accurately* identify the appropriate course of action or the correct practical goal. After all, the very action that was virtuous in a past circumstance, such as standing one’s ground in

²⁶⁵ The literal term Aristotle uses is ‘τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι,’ which Shields translates as ‘being flesh,’ though he also mentions that it could be translated as ‘being *for* flesh.’ However, following Shields, we should take the distinction to be between ‘a thing and its being or essence’ (Shields 2016, 306). I’ve translated ‘what it is to be flesh’ to bring out the connection to essence more clearly. This is admittedly a bit of an over-translation, but I think it is still an improvement over Hicks’ somewhat charming choice: ‘the quiddity of flesh’ (Hicks 1907, 133).

battle, might fail to be virtuous given a change in circumstances. *Similarity* to a virtuous action is therefore a rough guide to discriminate virtuous actions, but not a secure one.

One final point in favor of thinking that musical education produces an ability to discern virtuous actions that is inchoate and imperfect comes from a passage that we already saw in §5.4.1. Recall that Aristotle, in *EN* 10.9, says that those who have the right sort of character are *prepared* to receive reason. They are comparable to well-tilled ground that will nourish the seed (*EN* 10.9.1179b26). Such a correctly educated person is now ready to hear the ‘reason/argument deterring’ him (λόγου ἀποτρέποντος) and is such as to be able to change (*EN* 10.9.1179b26-28). Aristotle implies that a well-educated person becomes susceptible to *apotreptic* arguments. This might sound a bit puzzling from a certain perspective. If someone is already educated such that they ‘enjoy and hate’ finely, what further need would they have for *apotreptic* arguments deterring them from some chosen course? This makes sense according to my own analysis, however, if we hold that a young learner who ‘enjoys and hates finely’ has affective emotions that only roughly and inchoately track the appropriate goods and bads. In that case it is reasonable that the student might sometimes be led astray. As Aristotle implies in *EN* 6.13, people who possess only natural virtue are comparable to people rushing around blindly who are likely to inadvertently injure themselves (*EN* 6.13.1144b8-13).²⁶⁶

An interesting and illustrative example of a learner with a rough, inchoate grasp of virtue might be the case of Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ *Philoctetes*, discussed by Aristotle as an instance of what scholars call ‘inverse akrasia.’ Neoptolemus wants to win the Trojan War and

²⁶⁶ We should also compare these people to the ‘naturally lucky,’ and ‘divinely inspired’ people Aristotle mentions in *EE* 8.2.1248a29-b1, a passage I hope to discuss in more detail on another occasion. They, like the naturally virtuous, have the right sort of desires but lack reason and, I would claim, possess the right sort of *non-rational* affective anticipation to lead them to good actions. Indeed, they have a kind of correct ‘future sight’ comparable to prophecy. Aristotle likewise compares them to blind people due to their lack of reason but says that they can compensate for their blindness thanks to their ‘divine inspiration.’ For discussion cf. (Johnson 2015, 274-275).

obey his commander Odysseus, yet he feels pain at the prospect of lying to Philoctetes. It is plausible that Aristotle would consider these to all be noble pleasures and pains.²⁶⁷ It is not as if Neoptolemus should fear winning the Trojan War or hope to be disobedient. Yet, should Neoptolemus pleasantly anticipate winning the Trojan War *at the cost of lying*? His rough and inchoate grasp of these values is not sufficient to allow him to navigate these conflicts. Indeed, he is vulnerable to being *misled* by Odysseus, who impresses upon him the importance of obeying his commanders and the necessity of having Philoctetes' bow to win the war. The result is that the *wrong sorts* of considerations come into play, causing Neoptolemus to make a bad decision.²⁶⁸ Nonetheless, Neoptolemus would probably *also* have been susceptible to a deterring, apotretic argument that could dissuade him from his decision to lie to Philoctetes. Someone with a superior intellectual grasp of virtue could explain to Neoptolemus why lying to Philoctetes to recover the bow fails to be virtuous, drawing attention not only to the badness of lying and other relevant features of the situation but also perhaps to alternative courses of action, such as persuading Philoctetes openly and honestly while appeasing his anger.²⁶⁹ Thanks to his good

²⁶⁷ Aristotle explicitly says that Neoptolemus goes against his choice due to the 'noble pleasure' of 'telling the truth' (*EN* 7.9.1159b19). As an aside, however, it strikes me as odd to say that Neoptolemus is motivated by the 'pleasure of telling the truth.' The play is full of descriptions of how painful it is for Neoptolemus to go against his nature, but he says nothing about the 'pleasure' of telling the truth. Indeed, Aristotle himself first describes Neoptolemus as going against his belief about what he should do due to the 'pain of lying' (*EN* 7.2.1146a21), which is more plausible. I suspect that Aristotle subtly re-describes the case in *EN* 7.9 so that it better fits his paradigm model of *akrasia*: acting against one's decision due to pleasure.

²⁶⁸ Fieconi denies that Neoptolemus acts against his decision since his choice to lie 'frustrates his own ends and is against the grain of his character' (Fieconi 2018, 249), furthermore claiming that a *prohairesis* is any action that is 'indicative of character and refers back to an agent's overall conception of her ends (248-249). However, it is doubtful that lying *actually* 'frustrates' Neoptolemus's ends: he chooses to lie after being persuaded that it will lead to victory, something else he cares deeply about (Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, 86-122). For further criticism of this view, see also (Müller 2019, 33 fn. 43).

²⁶⁹ Indeed, there is interesting evidence from the play itself that helps show Neoptolemus' inchoate grasp of virtue and, in particular, justice. When Neoptolemus first breaks from Odysseus's plan and tells the truth to Philoctetes (that he needs the bow for the Greeks to prevail in the Trojan War), he nevertheless still refuses to return the bow and therefore to some extent remains committed to Odysseus' plan. He claims that 'justice and advantage' make him obey Odysseus (Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, 925-926). Only later does he fully disobey Odysseus and return the bow, claiming that doing so is the just course of action (1244-1251). Neoptolemus therefore completely reverses his decision, both obeying and later disobeying Odysseus on the very same grounds that doing so is just. It is likely that young Neoptolemus *never* has a firm conception of what is just but is rather unsure throughout.

upbringing Neoptolemus would understand these arguments and take pleasure in the relevant good or bad features of the different prospective actions once he has been made aware of them, unlike a poorly educated person who might remain indifferent or unmoved by any consideration of justice or propriety as opposed to individual advantage.

§5.5: Education and Rational Affective Anticipation in *Aristotle's Ethics*

In this section I discuss the development of *rational* affective anticipations. I first explain how I think the requisite intellectual grasp of goods and bads comes through experience of performing the actions a virtuous person would perform over a long life, principally relying on Aristotle's discussion of judgment (γνώμη) and so-called 'practical *nous*' in *EN* 6.11. In §5.5.2 I then give two concrete examples of how a fully virtuous person's emotions will be transformed by this intellectual understanding when they consequently come to be based on *rational* affective anticipations rather than non-rational affective anticipations, focusing on the emotions of anger and emulation.

§5.5.1: Experience and the Development of Practical Intellect

If musical education does not lead to a precise intellectual discernment of virtue, how do individuals attain it? Burnyeat suggests that during a rational stage of education students will listen to lectures that provide an understanding of 'the *because*' to eventually grasp *why* virtuous actions are fine. He thinks, in fact, that Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* itself is the kind of lecture that will lead a student to full virtue: it is 'a course in practical thinking to enable someone who already wants to be virtuous to understand better what he should do and why' (Burnyeat 1980, 81). Though I do not deny that lectures with content similar to that found in the *Ethics* might be useful in developing the kind of intellectual grasp of the human good that is

required for full virtue, something more is surely needed. Aristotle certainly denies that reading the *Ethics* will allow one to accurately grasp the relevant good or bad actions in every situation.

As is well known, Aristotle thinks that people become virtuous by *performing* virtuous actions (e.g. *EN* 2.2.1104a27-b5). He goes on to raise a puzzle for this view, how can someone perform virtuous actions unless they are *already* virtuous? In response Aristotle draws a distinction between performing the actions a virtuous person would perform (virtuous actions) and performing them *the way* a virtuous person would perform them (acting virtuously).²⁷⁰ The latter, acting virtuously, requires knowing that the action is virtuous, choosing the action for its own sake, and doing so from a stable and enduring state (*EN* 2.4.1105a31-33). A young virtuous trainee can perform the actions a virtuous person would perform, but they arguably do not in the technical sense *choose* those actions for themselves nor perform them from a stable state.²⁷¹ They might need assistance from others in their community who can guide and advise them on the suitable course of action.²⁷² As I have claimed, the fact that their affective responses are roughly attuned to the right sorts of things ensures that they will be amenable to the arguments and reasoning of these more knowledgeable individuals, and so they will likely successfully perform the virtuous actions. However, even if these virtuous actions initially rely on the guiding advice of others, through repeatedly performing these virtuous actions the learners themselves will gain increasing experience of them. I claim that it is this personal experience over the course of a long human life, effected by guidance from the more virtuous, that can eventually lead to developing the correct intellectual grasp of the relevant particulars.

²⁷⁰ I follow the explanation of this distinction as found in (Hamson 2022) and (Hirji 2018).

²⁷¹ Recall again Neoptolemus, who changes his mind regarding what justice requires multiple times during the drama.

²⁷² Hence Aristotle's favorable quotation from Hesiod: 'He who grasps everything himself is best of all; *he is noble also who listens to one who has spoken well*; but he who neither grasps it himself nor takes to heart what he hears from another is a useless man' (*EN* 1.4.1095b10-13, Irwin, emphasis mine).

The fact that personal experience with virtuous actions over a long life is an important prerequisite for the right kind of intellectual grasp of the human good is suggested in Aristotle's comments concerning 'judgment' (γνώμη) in *EN* 6.11.²⁷³ The related virtue, 'fellow-feeling' (συγγνώμη), is the 'discerning (κριτική), correct judgment of the fitting (τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς)' (*EN* 6.11.1143a23-24). Aristotle says that judgment often goes hand-in-hand with understanding (σύνεσις), *phronêsis*, and *nous*, since 'all these capacities are about the last things (τῶν ἐσχάτων) and particulars (τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον)' and require being discerning (ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικῷ) concerning the things with which the *phronimos* is concerned (περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος) (*EN* 6.11.1143a28-30). Namely, consideration requires proper discernment of the particular practical goods (and bads) achievable in action (περὶ τὰ πρακτά, *EN* 6.11.1143a35), the very things that I argued are the objects of affective anticipations. These are the sort of things that are the objects of choice and deliberation and which, as we have seen, must lie in the future (*EN* 6.2.1139b5-11s).

In a rather difficult passage, Aristotle appears to go on to claim that it is also the job of (practical) *nous* to grasp these things as well:

[T5.15] καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα αὐταὶ ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.

[T5.15] And *nous* is of the last things concerning both; for there is *nous* but no account (*logos*) of both the first terms and the last things, and on the one hand there is <*nous*> of the unchanging, first terms concerning the demonstrations, but on the other hand there is <*nous*> in practical actions of the last things also capable <of being otherwise> and of the other <sc. minor> premise; for the beginnings of the goal <are> these, and the universal is from the particulars. So, there must be perception of these, but this is *nous*. (*EN* 6.11.1143a35-b5, my translation)

²⁷³ I follow (Johnson, forthcoming) in translating γνώμη as judgment and συγγνώμη as fellow-feeling.

What Aristotle says concerning *nous* of the ‘unchanging, first terms concerning the demonstrations’ seems clear: he is referring to the role of *nous* in grasping the undemonstrated first principles of scientific demonstration (cf. *APo.* 2.19).²⁷⁴ But, he also says that *nous* is responsible ‘in practical actions’ for grasping the ‘last things’ that are ‘capable of being otherwise’ and ‘the minor premise.’ What does this refer to? Cooper has argued that it refers to an intuitive perception of the *means* to one’s goal that one has antecedently determined through a process of deliberation (Cooper 1998, 43-44). In his own example, after a process of deliberation one determines that one should eat chicken (for instance, reasoning that in order to be healthy one should eat light meat, and chicken is light meat (as in *EN* 6.8.1141b18-21)). One then uses practical *nous* to determine that ‘*this* and *this* and *this* is chicken’ (Cooper 1998, 43), using *nous* to recognize particular things as instances of the relevant kinds needed to initiate one’s pre-deliberated action.

Yet, Cooper’s interpretation is rather dubious. Consider that Aristotle immediately goes on to imply that the sort of grasp of particulars enabled by judgment and *nous* can come to older people through *experience* (ἐμπειρία) as they age:

[T5.16] ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἥττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὁρθῶς.

[T5.16] The result is that it is necessary to attend to the undemonstrated assertions (ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι) and beliefs of the old and experienced (τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ Πρεσβυτέρων) or those with *phronêsis* no less than to demonstrations, because <those people> have an eye that sees correctly thanks to experience (ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας). (*EN* 6.11.1143b11-14, my translation)

²⁷⁴ I do not have much to say in this study on the role of *nous* in theoretical contexts, but for a recent general overview see (Cohoe 2022a).

Thanks to experience the old and those with *phronêsis* gain ‘an eye that sees correctly.’²⁷⁵ In this respect the intellectual grasp of particulars enabled by *nous*, *phronêsis*, and *gnômê* parallels the *theoretical* grasp of first principles, something that Aristotle also thinks depends on experience (*APo.* 2.19.100a3-b5). Aristotle evidently takes the workings of practical *nous* to be a distinguished intellectual achievement, hence why we should ‘attend to’ (προσέχειν, also ‘cling to’) the undemonstrated assertions of the old that reflect that grasp. Cooper’s interpretation sits uneasily with this fact: we should not imagine that the bright-eyed young, gathered round their elders, cling to the undemonstrated assertion that ‘*this* and *this* and *this* is chicken.’²⁷⁶

An alternative conception has been defended by Sorabji and Sherman. Sorabji, for instance, argues that the ‘last things’ grasped by *practical nous* are particular verdicts such as that ‘this is what virtue and *to kalon* require of us now’ (Sorabji 1980, 215). Presumably the ‘*this*’ that is required is the specification of a particular virtuous action that must be done. Similarly, Sherman claims that practical *nous* ‘yields a particular judgment or *choice*, such as “I must do *x* in this sort of circumstance *as* a requirement of friendship”’ (Sherman 1989, 43, emphasis added). A worry for this interpretation, however, is that it rolls *too much* into the

²⁷⁵ We should not be misled by Aristotle’s visual analogies into thinking that the *phronimos* literally has a *perceptual* ability to discern the practical goods and bads that are the beginnings of action: Aristotle is clearly still talking about an *intellectual* virtue. Instead, I think the visual analogy reflects the fact that Aristotle is talking about an intellectual and immediate grasp of certain *particulars*, and we likewise immediately perceive particulars.

²⁷⁶ Similar considerations invite skepticism concerning Morrison’s recent claim that practical *nous* grasps *any* undemonstrated assertion during a stretch of practical reasoning, which can often be ‘mere statements of fact (a cloak is a covering; I can convince someone of something by going to their home and discussing the matter; etc.)’ (Morrison 2020, 240). The sort of practical intellectual excellence that constitutes full virtue is not concerned with *any* underived statement of fact, but rather what is ‘good and bad for human beings’ (*EN* 6.5.1140b4-6). However, I am largely in agreement with his claim that practical *nous* can grasp the *goal* of practical action (241-242), and I go on to suggest something similar. Likewise, I take my view to be roughly in agreement with Lorenz’ recent suggestion that practical *nous* can be responsible for recognizing the ‘situation-specific goal’ that can initiate deliberation and action (Lorenz 2020, 215). His general contention that the ability of *practical nous* to provide ends is *unique* to the *EN* account as opposed to the *EE* is doubtful, however. Even if we exclude the common books, *EE.3* has a forward-reference to a discussion of how the virtues themselves are transformed by *phronêsis* (*EE* 3.7.1234a27-30). This is plausibly a reference to *EN* 6.13 = *EE* 5.13 itself, or a lost book of the *EE* with a similar discussion. My argument in this chapter, however, is that this transformation is effected by the *intellectual* anticipatory grasp of the particular goods or bads that guide virtuous action.

content of practical *nous*. Sherman, for instance, says that we use practical *nous* to ‘perceive’ our choice of what action to do for the sake of a particular value in some specific circumstance, yet Aristotle’s own theory of choice (*prohairesis*) implies that choosing what to do for the sake of some end is subsequent to and determined by deliberation.²⁷⁷ It is not immediately grasped in a single, intuitive intellectual act.²⁷⁸ Though I am in agreement with these scholars that practical *nous* has important work to do, a more desirable interpretation would make sense of its contribution to action in a way that does not eliminate the importance of explicit deliberation to ethical action.²⁷⁹

We can get some help by looking to Aristotle’s discussion of judgment (γνώμη) in *Rhetoric* 2.21, taking our lead from Monte Johnson’s recent study and comparison of the two treatments.²⁸⁰ In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle describes various ways in which a rhetorician can make effective use of judgments. Importantly for our purposes, the examples of judgments seem like perfectly plausible examples of the ‘undemonstrated assertions’ of the old and wise that can reflect ethical understanding. The following examples of ‘judgments’ all come from *Rhetoric* 2.21:

[1] ‘No admirer is true who does not always love’ (2.21.1394b15)

[2] ‘Mortal creatures should cherish mortal, not immortal thoughts’ (2.21.1394b26)

²⁷⁷ Though, cf. (Fieccconi 2018) for interesting discussion of ‘impetuous *akrasia*,’ and her argument that at least these cases of *prohairesis* do not require deliberation. Even if we grant this, I take it that these are not typical cases.

²⁷⁸ To be sure, Sherman does immediately go on to say that the intuited verdict might ‘be subject to further deliberation’ (43). Yet, on her view, what need is there for further deliberation or reflection? Either the initial intuition of the appropriate action was mistaken (unlikely given that practical *nous* is an intellectual excellence) or the situation changes. But if the situation changes, it seems the virtuous person could just immediately intuit the new appropriate action and would have no need for deliberation.

²⁷⁹ Likewise, Sorabji says that practical *nous* refers to the perception of the relevant action verdicts when it comes ‘not from practical wisdom but from mere experience’ while practical wisdom requires that grasp to be ‘influenced by our knowledge of the good life’ (215). What Sorabji means here is not clear to me. It is at least odd to say that some actions of the fully virtuous are *not* ‘influenced by our knowledge of the good life,’ as though they were contrary to it or mechanical. Moreover, we should try to say more to identify the intellectual excellence at play here, as opposed to ‘experience’ that might result from a kind of non-rational habituation.

²⁸⁰ As is evident, my following discussion on the connection between γνώμη in *EN* 6.11 and in *Rhetoric* 2.21 is deeply indebted to this study (Johnson, Forthcoming).

[3] ‘The best thing for a person is health, as it seems to me’ (2.21.1394b13)

[4] ‘No man who is sensible ought ever to have his children educated beyond the common run’ (2.21.1394a29-30).

Let us for the moment put aside the troubling observation that many of these examples seem incorrect or false. Surely, for instance, Aristotle thinks that rational activity is better than health, contra [3]. For now, we should note that these judgments all concern *goods or bads* for human beings. They are about love, health, whether we should strive for immortality or accept our own mortality, and the value of education. To this extent they cohere with the discussion in *EN* 6.11, as there Aristotle claims that judgment is about goods and bads achievable in action (*ta prakta*) and deal with weighty matters of human concern.

Another important similarity for our purposes is that Aristotle says, in *Rhetoric* 2.21, that young and inexperienced people should not make use of judgments in speeches:

[T5.17] The employment of judgments is appropriate only to older men (πρεσβυτέρων), and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced (ἐμπειρός). For a young man to use them is – like telling stories – unbecoming, and about that of which one has no experience (ἄπειρος), foolish and uneducated (ἀπαίδευτον) (*Rhetoric* 2.21, 1395a2-6, translation Johnson)

The use of judgments in speeches by the young and inexperienced is ‘unbecoming’ and makes them seem ‘foolish’ and ‘uneducated.’ The clear implication is that the correct use of judgment, like the possession of the ethical virtue of judgment in *EN* 6.11, is only something that comes from a long experience in life. The judgments of the *Rhetoric*, then, likely reflect that same experience and understanding.

On the other hand, note that the judgments in the *Rhetoric* are all *universal* statements, in that they apply to all human beings. That is an apparent *disanalogy* with *EN* 6.11, which we saw concerned judgments of ‘particulars.’ In his gloss of judgment in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle

emphasizes both the fact that judgments are concerned with the goods and bads achievable in action and with the fact that they are universal statements:

[T5.18] ἔστι δὴ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου, οὔτε περὶ πάντων, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ, καὶ <ᾧ> αἰρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν,

[T5.18] A judgment is a statement, not concerning an individual or particular facts (for example “Iphicrates is like this”), but concerning a universal; nor concerning all things (for example “the straight is the opposite of the curved”), but concerning as many things of which there are actions, and things to be pursued or avoided in relation to action. (*Rhetoric* 2.21.1394a21-25, translation Johnson)

Judgments are about ‘things to be pursued or avoided in relation to action,’ i.e. good or bad things we pursue or avoid, but they are *universal* (καθόλου) statements concerning these things, rather than particulars.

Does the fact that judgment in *EN* 6.11 concerns particulars, while the judgments in *Rhetoric* 2.21 are about universals, show that the two treatments are completely unrelated? Johnson argues that this is not the case. He first claims that there is a certain dual aspect to theoretical *nous* in theoretical demonstrations, using as an example the following syllogism:

1. Every broad-leaved plant periodically sheds its leaves.
2. Every vine is a broad-leaved plant.
3. Every vine periodically sheds its leaves.

As Johnson explains, we can discern two distinct uses of *nous* in this syllogism:

Intellect plays two different and crucial roles in the comprehension of this syllogistic explanation as a whole. Somehow the intellect must grasp not only the nature of the relevant class (e.g. that all members of the class broad-leaved plant periodically shed their leaves), but also that the particular object grasped by perception (this vine) belongs to the relevant class ... that is, intellect must somehow grasp that the general class “broad-leaved plant” is present in the particular plant that is being perceived, this here “vine” (Johnson Forthcoming, 7)

Intellect grasps the *nature* of the relevant class, broad-leaved plant, but also grasps the presence of that nature in the particular plant at issue, the vine. Likewise, Johnson argues that a similar

dual role for judgment (γνώμη) is at work in ethical, rather than theoretical cases. He provides the following example of an ethical syllogism:

1. Every human being should repay his debts for the sake of justice.
2. Socrates is a human being.
3. Socrates should repay his debts for the sake of justice.

As noted, we can again discern two uses of judgment (γνώμη) here:

Judgment at once grasps the principle—that every human being should repay debts for the sake of justice—and grasps that it applies in this case, that is, judges that Socrates is a member of the class that should repay his debts for the sake of justice. “Having judgment” means to be in the virtuous condition of grasping both the ethical principle and the fact that it applies in a particular case, according to the analogy with how intellect functions in theoretical demonstrations. (Johnson Forthcoming, 9-10).

The thought goes, then, that judgment not only grasps some more general ethical principle but also that *that very principle* applies to *this very case*. In that sense it is, indeed, about the particular, namely that *this* is the sort of circumstance in which it *will be good* (and just) to repay my debts. The combined, dual aspect of judgment therefore gives rise to a *particular* good achievable in action, that it *will now* be good to repay my debts, which in turn can lead to consequent deliberation (e.g. How will I repay my debt? I can get money from my own debtor for this purpose. How will I do that? I can walk to the market; and so on).²⁸¹ However, thanks to latching on to a *particular* good prospect available to me, one discerned by my intellectual ability to apply my ethical understanding to this particular situation, I have a thought-based discernment of the prospect of repaying my debts as *good* and pleasantly anticipate it for this reason, the pleasant anticipation motivating me to carry out my deliberation as to how to attain it and any consequent action. This intellectual grasp of the prospective future good that is *now* achievable in action therefore gives rise to a *rational* affective anticipation (as described in §3.7) that will *move* and *motivate* me to achieve my goal (as described in §2.3).

²⁸¹ The example comes from *APo.* 1.24

Even though real-world cases will be far more complex than this example, the same dual role for judgment and practical *nous* can still be discerned. Indeed, it is likely *false* that human beings should *always* repay debts for the sake of justice. It is not just to return someone's knife if that person is a raving lunatic (cf. *Republic* 1.331e-332a). Yet, this also helps show the significance and necessity of *experience* in developing judgment. The important role played by practical *nous* and judgment is grasping that *this very situation* is one in which repaying debts will be good and just. Determining *that* can indeed be hard and unclear, as whether or not some relevant ethical universal applies to *this* case is highly sensitive to context and a wide array of relevant factors.

Taking stock, the virtue of judgment and practical *nous*, I claim, involves bringing one's general (indeed, *universal*) understanding of human goods and bads to bear on one's particular situation to discern *particular* objects of pursuit or avoidance. It is by bringing this generalized understanding of what is good or bad to bear on one's own situation that one becomes aware of *ta prakta*: potential, future goods or bads that are the objects of pleasant or painful anticipation, the awareness of which can spur deliberation on how to avoid or pursue them. For this reason, we can understand why the possession of judgment or practical *nous* does indeed represent a significant intellectual achievement, the product of long experience, while also denying that the possession of these intellectual excellences obviates the need for reasoning and deliberation about how to achieve (or avoid) the ends, or goals, that one intellectually grasps.

Let us conclude this section. I argued that learners are habituated such that they feel *non-rational* affective anticipations that roughly orient them towards virtue. This affective orientation, I claim, makes them amenable to the arguments and guidance of the old with genuine *phronêsis* who can help them determine the right actions to perform in the relevant

situations. At this stage there might also be ‘lecture’ style explanations of *why* virtuous actions are good, as Burnyeat suggests. What I have argued is important, however, is that by repeatedly performing virtuous actions under the guidance of the wise, actions that do indeed pursue things of genuine value and avoid things that are genuinely bad in one’s circumstances, the learners can gain an ability to understand those prospective goods and bads and eventually gain the ability to recognize them all on their own. This process gives rise to an intellectual grasp of human goods or bads that the virtuous are able to apply to their specific situation and which, as we will now see, can inform *rational* affective anticipations and, consequently, emotions that we can call ‘rational’ in virtue of being partly constituted by those rational affective anticipations.

§5.5.2: Advantages of My View of Education Over Scholarly Alternatives

I believe that the view of education in Aristotle that I have outlined here has a number of interpretative advantages over several existing accounts, and in this section I briefly describe these advantages. My own account attributes a crucial role to *non-rational* habituation that allows us to feel anticipatory pleasure and pain correctly. I thus am in alignment with many other scholars who also take the non-rational habituation of our pleasures and pains to be of crucial importance in education. However, against some other scholars, I deny that non-rational habituation suffices in providing learners with an ability to precisely identify fine or virtuous actions. Notably, many scholars believe that non-rational education teaches us to recognize ‘the *that*’ (τὸ ὅτι) – namely *that* particular virtuous actions are virtuous. So, for instance, Burnyeat argues that the young learn to value and recognize the fine by coming to enjoy fine actions: ‘To understand and appreciate the value that makes <virtuous actions> enjoyable in themselves I must learn for myself to enjoy them, and that does take time and practice – in short, habituation’ (Burnyeat 1980, 78). Burnyeat claims that being habituated to *enjoy* virtuous actions is coming to

learn to *understand* and *appreciate* their value. While Burnyeat grants that the learner does not ‘have the because’ (τὸ διότι), i.e. does not grasp the reason *why* virtuous actions are valuable, he still has ‘the *that*’ and has ‘learned, really learned, that they are noble and enjoyable, but as yet he does not understand why they are so’ (78). Burnyeat therefore suggests that habituating one’s feelings of pleasures and pains allows one to recognize and appreciate the value of virtuous actions.²⁸²

Despite their differences, McDowell also claims that a proper habituation in a learner’s habits provides the moral content of their ethical outlook on the world, and says that ‘a conception of doing well is fixed once and for all, in the minds of the sort of people <Aristotle> assumes his audience to be, by their upbringing’ (McDowell 2009, 56). Moreover, McDowell thinks there is no clear distinction between a non-rational and a rational stage of education: the right upbringing allows us to ‘see’ situations correctly, something that is ‘the intelligible upshot of being habituated into delighting in the sorts of actions that exemplify the excellences of character’ (McDowell 2009, 50).²⁸³ Vasilou is somewhat more explicit on this point, he agrees

²⁸² Arguably Burnyeat in fact thinks that education and habituation are *not* sufficient to allow learners to recognize what actions are virtuous, and to that extent he comes closer to the view that I have defended. Burnyeat claims that a later stage of moral education and lectures will help learners develop their reason. He says that ‘Insofar as <the well brought-up person> realizes that <certain actions> are unjust or ignoble, they do not appear to him as pleasant or enjoyable; insofar as he does not realize this and so desires and perhaps does such things, he feels badly about it, ashamed of his failure. The action pains him internally, not consequentially. He is therefore receptive to the kind of moral education which will set his judgement straight and develop the intellectual capacities (practical wisdom) which will enable him to avoid such errors’ (Burnyeat 1980, 79). I agree with Burnyeat that a well-brought up person becomes receptive of a later, intellectual stage of education. However, this passage suggests that learning to take pleasure in the fine often does *not* give the learner a grasp of the ‘the that,’ as he ‘does not realize’ certain actions are unjust or ignoble and is pained by them after they are performed, this being in tension with Burnyeat’s other claims that education gives learners ‘the that.’ One advantage of my own view is that the picture of non-rational habituation I provide can explain how and why the learner is often mistaken in the way that Burnyeat describes.

²⁸³ Moss 2014a seems to suggest something partly similar: she claims that ‘the content of one’s ends – the nature of the things one values – is dictated entirely by one’s nonrational upbringing and character. It is intellect that grasps ends, and so *phronesis* is “true supposition of the end,” but it is character that provides the material for its grasp, and so it is virtue that “makes the goal right”’ (Moss 2014a, 234). However, she also thinks that our non-rational character only provides us an *indeterminate* grasp of the end, while intellect is responsible for making the goal determinate and precise. I am in agreement with Moss that intellect makes our inchoate goals precise, however given this fact I believe that we should deny that the content of our ends is ‘entirely’ dictated by our nonrational

with Burnyeat that habituation allows us to grasp ‘the that,’ understanding which particular actions are just or moderate, but further claims that in ethical cases ‘the that’ and ‘the because’ coincide: ‘if you already have "the that" sufficiently – if you can recognize on your own case by case what doing well is – then you have the "first principles" of ethics and have the only "because" there is’ (Vasiliou 1996, 788). Like McDowell, Vasiliou thinks that the *non-rational* habituation of our desires and affects will give rise to this grasp, hence he claims that ‘*phronesis* ... is the upshot of acquiring a "second nature" or an "ethos"("habit")’ (779) and says that ‘developing <a child’s> motivational propensities is the very same activity as the developing of its cognitive faculties’ (780). On this view, to habituate a child’s affective propensities is to fully develop that child’s ethical *and* intellectual faculties. Nothing remains for reason to do.²⁸⁴

Against these views, I contended that it is implausible to suppose that non-rational education gives learners ‘the that’ such that they can precisely and unerringly identify particular instances of just, moderate, courageous, and other virtuous actions. In particular, I argued that non-rational education allows learners to *roughly* and *inchoately* latch on to just, moderate, and courageous actions. They have, as it were, ‘models’ of virtuous action thanks to their musical education that allow them to pleasantly anticipate actions *similar* to those models and painfully anticipate actions *similar* to their models of vicious action. This non-rational affective

upbringing. The precise content of our ends, understood as the particular goods and bads that I act to pursue and avoid, is on my view determined by *reason* when we *rationaly* anticipate those ends as good or bad. The learner can only do this reliably on her own after developing her practical wisdom and going through a *rational* stage of development.

²⁸⁴ Indeed, Vasiliou argues that there is no external, rational grounding for Aristotelian ethics, no doubt agreeing with McDowell’s diagnosis that any desire for such an external grounding ‘reflects an anxiety that is distinctively modern’ (McDowell 2009, 54). However, both Vasiliou and McDowell suggest that reason and reflection *can* modify and revise our ethical values (contra what they seem to say about ethical upbringing being the sole and sufficient provider of that content), yet both also seem to suggest this is not found within Aristotle’s text. McDowell says that ‘even if it is not explicitly part of Aristotle’s own picture, it seems consistent with the spirit of Aristotelian ethics to allow for further moral development’ (McDowell 2009, 56) while Vasiliou says that ‘one might perhaps reasonably accuse the *Nicomachean Ethics* itself of not engaging in very radical reflection of this sort. But the important point is that the conception of ethics it contains is one that readily admits such reflection.’ (Vasiliou 1996, 790).

anticipation orients them towards virtue and away from vice while also preparing them to develop a deeper intellectual understanding of virtue and the fine later in life when they can eventually comprehend the value and nature of virtuous actions. Prior to this point, however, I argued that the well-brought up young are somewhat like Neoptolemus, eager to do good but quite unsure about what that entails. On my view we should therefore reject McDowell's assertion that the young have 'a conception of doing well <that> is fixed once and for all.' The young who have gone through musical education successfully instead have a conception of the good that is quite unstable and still in-flux. I suggested that they are still in need of the greater intelligence and practical wisdom of their elders, and indeed precisely for this reason should 'cling to' the undemonstrated assertions of the old and those with *phronesis* (*EN* 6.11.1143b11-14). Evidence for my view, moreover, is already witnessed by the important *Politics* 7.15 passage (T5.10) in which Aristotle claims that the care of desire precedes and is *for the sake of* the intellect (*Politics* 7.15.1334b25-28). This strongly tells *against* the contention of McDowell and Vasiliou that the habituation of our desiderative part is one and the same as the habituation and development of our intellect, the latter being the 'upshot' of the former. Moreover, my arguments concerning the *limitations* of musical education (§5.4.3) also tell against any view that suggests that a purely *non-rational*, desiderative stage of education allows learners to precisely identify which action is virtuous or vicious in any situation.

Indeed, I believe that one passage that is sometimes appealed to in order to show that non-rational education provides learners with a grasp of 'the that' in fact supports the view that I have been defending. At the very end of *EN* 1.4 Aristotle remarks that someone must be brought up properly to hear arguments:

[T5.19] ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ

γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθεται.
ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλλεται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.

[T5.19] So perhaps it is necessary for us to start from the things known to us. Because it is necessary that the person who will be a capable listener regarding fine, just, and in general political things must <first> have been well brought up by habits. For the starting point is 'the that' (τὸ ὅτι), and if this should be abundantly apparent there is no further need of 'the why' (διότι); but this sort of person <sc. someone who is well brought up> either has the starting-points <already> or would easily acquire them. <As for> a person to which neither of these obtains, let him hearken to the <words> of Hesiod:

That person is best of all who himself understands all things,
Good is the person who is well persuaded by that person's words
But he who neither himself understands nor takes what he hears from another
And lays it to his heart, that person is a useless man (*EN* 1.4.1095b3-13, my translation).

Aristotle implies that someone who is well brought up either 'has the starting points already,' this referring to 'the that' of ethical matters i.e. which specific future actions are virtuous, or is such as to 'easily acquire them.' However, note that if we read this literally, Aristotle is claiming that many people who are well brought up fall into the second disjunct and thus *do not* have the starting points. This makes sense if they have them in a rough, inchoate sort of way that contrasts with the person to whom they are 'abundantly apparent' (φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως). Indeed, I think the passage suggests a tripartite division of people into (1) those to whom the starting point is 'abundantly apparent' and have 'no need of the why,' (2) those to whom the starting point is not very clear and who lack the starting points but are nonetheless able to easily acquire them, and (3) people who lack the starting points and are not able to easily acquire them. This tripartite division perfectly tracks the tripartite division in the Hesiod quote: people in category (1) who already have the starting points in an abundantly clear manner correspond to the people who are

‘best of all’ and ‘understand everything’ (πάντα νοήση), people in category (2) who are easily able to acquire the starting points correspond to the person who is ‘good’ (ἐσθλός) and who is able to acquire the starting points by listening to someone with more understanding, and people in category (3) correspond to the ‘useless man.’ Categories (1) and (2) themselves track the two stages of rational and non-rational education that I have defended. Those in category (1) can grasp ‘the that’ through *rational* affective anticipation in a *precise* and *determinate* way, deploying their intellectual understanding of goods or bads for a human being to identify particular future prospective outcomes as good or bad. On the other hand, those in category (2) correspond to those who have completed their musical education and can grasp ‘the that’ through *non-rational* affective anticipation in a *rough* and *indeterminate* way, pleasantly anticipating actions similar to those fine actions that they have been exposed to in their musical education. People in category (2), as I have argued, are ready and able to listen to those with more understanding; in this important respect they differ from the ‘useless man.’

While my view takes an *intellectual* stage of education seriously, and takes this to be necessary for full virtue, I also take the non-rational stage of education to be necessary. Indeed, I am in agreement with Rachel Barney’s recent emphatic comment made with respect to non-rational habituation in Aristotle: ‘mere rote repeated action is extremely powerful! Brute habituation does more than you would think!’ (Barney 2020, 304-305).²⁸⁵ Musical education will

²⁸⁵ Yet, neither does my view of non-rational education reduce it to a *merely* mechanical or ‘mindless’ kind of habituation in which no ‘cognitive’ activity occurs at all. The non-rational stage of education is deeply cognitive insofar as *perception* and *non-rational anticipation* are themselves cognitive capacities. I am therefore not defending a view sometimes ascribed to Grant and Stewart, two individuals who are taken to be defenders of a so-called ‘mechanical’ view of habituation that involves the ‘mindless’ repetition of action, a characterization found in (Hampson 2022, 417) and (Jimenez 2021, 21). Yet, I confess that I do not quite see where they find this view in Grant and Stewart. Grant comments that the learners gain virtuous habits by first performing virtuous *energeiai*. Grant further claims that these ‘psychical *energeia*’ are aptly described by our concept of ‘consciousness’ – it therefore seems somewhat misleading to describe this process as completely ‘mindless’ given that Grant emphasizes its conscious nature (Grant 1885, 243). Likewise, Stewart claims that Aristotelian habituation is possible only because ‘there is, in the subject of it, a principle of rational personality (τὸ προαιρούμενον) which, aided doubtless

involve ‘rote repeated action’ in the form of musical performances, and this non-rational process will contribute to learners developing the correct feelings of pleasure and pain. This process does indeed enable learners to gain *some* sort of ability to recognize fine actions, even if I have argued that it is inchoate.²⁸⁶

Moreover, my account also avoids an objection raised against Burnyeat’s account – namely that taking pleasure in fine actions cannot cause one to appreciate the value of those actions since, in fact, it seems that the antecedent appreciation of their value and fineness is the *cause* of our pleasure in those actions.²⁸⁷ My own view precisely accommodates this worry by distinguishing between *non-rational* affective anticipation and *rational* affective anticipation. In this respect we can agree with Burnyeat that non-rational pleasure and pain are crucial parts of the educative process as learners come to love and hate as they should.²⁸⁸ As we have seen, however, this sort of pleasure and pain is based on sensory experience rather than any deep understanding of value. Once learners develop their intellectual understanding of virtue,

by ‘The Law,’ can and does set aside mere ἐπιθυμία’ (Stewart 1892, 206). Though I am unable to fully explicate Stewart’s view here, remarks such as these suggest that he does take some self-conscious power of reason to be operative during habituation.

²⁸⁶ Indeed, I think that my account can cohere nicely with the recent article by Hampson, who argues that a learner is able to gain an increased appreciation of the fineness of her own virtuous action through ‘attention to, and subsequent recognition of, the fine-making features of such actions and corresponding situations’ (Hampson 2022, 443). A difference is that I think that we should distinguish between a non-rational stage in which learners ‘attend’ to virtuous actions in a rough, sensory way and a rational stage in which they attend to the fine-making features in a more precise and accurate way by developing their intellect.

²⁸⁷ These objections can be found, for instance in (Curzer 2002, 149), (Broadie 1991, 122 fn. 46), and a thorough discussion in (Jimenez 2020, 70-73)

²⁸⁸ Contra Broadie’s own suggestion that the learner ‘becomes aware that his own not anyway wanting to do it is not a consideration for the parent ... We learn by practice that they <sc. virtuous actions> are good, because by our practice we accept that the authority who says so means it; we also thereby learn that the things are good in a way which belongs to a world beyond the world of impulse, since their claim overrides what we feel like; and from this we know that the things which we immediately felt like doing could never be good in that way’ (Broadie 1991, 109). Broadie seems to imagine that the learner explicitly comes to accept reason as contravening and overriding her contrary impulses towards other actions, as though we become virtuous by repeatedly performing *enkaptic* actions. There is some resonance here with (Curzer 2002), who likewise emphasizes the importance of a learner acting contrary to their own inclination. Yet, this seems to stand in tension with Aristotle’s insistence in the *Politics* and elsewhere that the young must *enjoy* virtuous actions (and hate vicious ones). The learner does not fight her ‘not anyway wanting to do it,’ as she *does* want to act virtuously.

however, we can also grant with Burnyeat's critics that a *different, rational* pleasure in virtuous actions *qua* fine becomes available to them, a pleasure that embodies one's thought-based grasp of human goods.

§5.5.3: Rational Affective Anticipation and the Transformation of the Emotions

In this section I briefly describe the effect that this intellectual grasp of the good and the bad has on the *emotions* of those who transition from the natural virtue of the learner, based as they are on *non-rational* affective anticipations, to full virtue based on *rational* affective anticipations that embody their thought-based grasp of human goods and bads. A young person hopes to perform virtuous actions and fears shameful ones, guided by their non-rational affective anticipations that are inculcated by the kind of musical education that I surveyed in §5.4. As already explained, a young person therefore feels and is motivated by a wide range of emotions surveyed in Chapter 4, such as anger, fear, confidence, pity, shame and emulation. Thanks to their education, they are disposed to feel these emotions to roughly the right degrees in roughly the right circumstances, roughly oriented towards the right goals. Yet, someone with *full virtue* has emotions that fully embody their thought-based grasp of goods and bads.

§5.5.3.1: Anger

It is easier to see how this works when we call to mind the relevant *objects* of the affective anticipations in the different emotions, as argued for in Chapter 4. So, for instance, I argued that anger requires the pleasant anticipation of *revenge*. According to my analysis we can distinguish two distinct ways in which the prospect of *revenge* can be pleasant to someone. On the one hand, the habituated learner has past, sensory models of revenge that underlie the non-rational pleasant anticipation of future revenge. When the learner is slighted, for instance by being insulted, she can grasp a similarity to related insults that she has seen others receive or that

she received herself in enacted performances. This insult can then trigger the anticipation of revenge as suitable in this instance, because the past sensory impression (*perceptual phantasma*) of the insult was associated with the later sensory impression of performed revenge. Since the past sensory impression of performed revenge was itself pleasant (in part thanks to the musical modes used during the educative process), she pleasantly anticipates revenge in the ‘real world’ and is motivated to attain it. Nonetheless, I have suggested that the sort of revenge the learner *feels* to be appropriate is just something *similar* to her past sensory experience of enacted revenge. What does appropriate revenge look like? If she has been habituated to take pleasure in inflicting *pain* as revenge in response to this sort of insult, she will think, or rather *feel*, that pain is appropriate. If she has been habituated to take pleasure in ostracizing the wrongdoer, she might feel that the appropriate course of action is ostracization. This is the prospect that will become salient to her, and which she will pleasantly anticipate. Yet, as should be clear, it need not track any conception whatsoever of what *proper* revenge is, the learner remaining more or less ignorant of its goals, ends, aims, and nature.

It is probably no surprise that someone with full virtue will bring their ethical understanding of goods and bads for human beings to bear on this case. I suggest that a fully virtuous person who is insulted will first feel a (non-anticipatory) pain that tracks and *embodies* their grasp that this *was* an insult: an unjustified slight of their own status. As explained in §4.3.1, in genuine cases of anger this painful slight is accompanied by the desire for revenge, the anticipation of which will be pleasant. Yet, in what way will this anger differ from that of the learner? First, we should observe that Aristotle is quick to note that the virtue with respect to anger (a virtue that Aristotle says is nameless but that he refers to as gentleness (πραότης) (*EN* 4.5.1125b26-29)) leans towards the deficiency of not feeling enough anger, as the virtuous

person is ‘not revengeful (οὐ τιμωρητικός) but rather more disposed to fellow-feeling (συγγνωμονικός) (i.e. are inclined to forgive)’ (*EN* 4.5.1126a2-3). One part of being virtuous, then, is simply realizing that there are relatively few opportunities that call for revenge *at all* as opposed to reconciliation. Insofar as the pleasant anticipation of revenge is essential to anger (cf. §4.3.1) it follows that the virtuous person does not get angry very often. While a learner might rush to take revenge after being insulted because she pleasantly anticipates some act of revenge, a virtuous person’s greater awareness of how revenge is *bad* or somehow inappropriate in this case means that their intellect does not present the prospect of revenge in this case as good, and they hence do not pleasantly anticipate it and therefore do not feel anger.²⁸⁹ Part of guiding the learners might involve drawing their attention to the relevant features in that situation, for instance that taking revenge on a friend for some petty slight might exacerbate the situation and irreparably damage the friendship. Since the learner cares about friendship (though inchoately) she will be amenable to this advice (she feels sad at the prospect of losing a friend), and over time she may gain for herself the intellectual sensitivity to the relevant features of the situation.

Yet, Aristotle is no Stoic. He thinks that the fully virtuous person is disposed to feel anger appropriately and we should therefore infer that she sometimes takes pleasure in the prospect of revenge. He says, strikingly, that it is ‘slavish to endure being tossed through the mud (τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι) and to overlook <insults to> one’s family and friends’ (*EN* 4.5.1226a7-8). To use a contemporary idiom, Aristotle thinks that feeling anger, and hence pleasantly anticipating revenge, is an appropriate way to respond to those who are ‘walking all

²⁸⁹ The virtuous person might still feel other components of the emotion of anger, for instance he might still be hurt and feel pained because his friend slighted him. My claim is that these feelings do not amount to the emotion of *anger*, in Aristotle’s sense, because the pleasant anticipation of revenge will be lacking.

over you.’²⁹⁰ Krissana Scheiter has recently argued that the virtuous person may need to take revenge when ‘members of her community are constantly treating her with contempt, failing to take her seriously, or keeping her from attaining her goals simply because they think they can; the virtuous person will not be able to function to the best of her abilities’ (Scheiter 2022, 24). Constant slights might diminish the virtuous person’s place in her community and impede what the virtuous person legitimately values, namely rational and virtuous activity itself. The virtuous person should then ‘strike back at those who slight her in order to show that she has the instrumental worth they think she lacks’ (Scheiter 2022, 24). In these cases, the virtuous person will feel anger: she will feel pain at the constant slights and pleasure at the prospect of ‘striking back’ and thereby proving her worth, re-asserting her rightful place in her community, and putting an end to the disrespect she incessantly endures so that she can get back to rational activity.

It is her intellect, I claim, that intuitively grasps that *this* is not a situation to forgive but rather one in which revenge will, in fact, have the good-making feature of re-asserting her worth and her rightful place in society. Re-asserting her worth through revenge is her goal, and she can now deliberate about the best way to *take* revenge and assert her worth. To be clear, then, I am not claiming that the virtuous person, after being insulted, stops and thinks to herself whether or not this is a situation in which revenge is warranted. Rather, she just immediately feels anger after registering (indeed, intellectually grasping) the badness of the insult, her anger embodying

²⁹⁰ As Konstan points out, anger is a response to slights from those who ‘are not fit or suited (*prosêkôn*) to be the author of it’ (Konstan 2003, 103), in particular from ‘an inferior or a friend or a beneficiary who might be expected to have a thought for one’s dignity’ (Konstan 2003, 113). Indeed, Konstan points out that social equals are precisely those from whom we expect recognition, and whose disdain we construe as slights. Anger is a natural response to the economy of honor among equals, and the urge to revenge that is inseparable from anger strives to in some way maintain that equal social standing. Konstan points out that this is especially true in the context of Athenian democracy: ‘in this volatile environment, in which equality was an ideal but never a given, and had constantly to be asserted and defended if the image of a society of equals or similars was to be maintained, anger is obligatory’ (Konstan 2003, 118).

her intuitive, intellectual grasp that *this is* a situation in which revenge is possible, warranted, and good.²⁹¹ She can subsequently deliberate about *how* to attain it (including what precise form that revenge should take in light of her other goals). It is in this sense, I think, that we can understand how *full virtue*, not deliberation, sets the ends of the *fully* virtuous person. Moreover, we need not worry that the virtuous person will now simply ‘unleash her anger’ and go feral.²⁹² She rather re-establishes her worth to, ultimately, enable her own rational, virtuous activity. This is the deep value her anger ultimately embodies, and so her appropriate revenge will promote, rather than conflict with, this ultimate goal.

§5.4.3.2: Emulation

As another example, consider the emotion of emulation. To recall the discussion from §4.3.5, we saw that emulation was an emotion felt by good people that involved a pain at a rival’s²⁹³ apparent possession of honored goods and also, I argued, the pleasant anticipation of acquiring those goods for oneself (*Rhetoric* 2.11.1388a.32-38). We can imagine how the sort of non-rational musical education that I described in §5.4 would give rise the emotion of emulation in the learners. They are likely led to perform characters who feel proper emulation, lacking the goods of their rivals while also striving to attain those goods for themselves. Rather than

²⁹¹ She might be mistaken about revenge being possible, of course. If she, after deliberation, discovers that no available means to revenge is possible for her, then she will simply stop feeling angry (as argued in §4.3.1). Nonetheless, to be angry is to *anticipate* revenge, and thus to have a (defeasible) commitment to its future possibility.

²⁹² All that might be required by way of ‘revenge’ or ‘striking back’ could be a simple verbal rebuke. The virtuous person is not a vengeful person, so we should not worry that they will imitate John Wick or, for that matter, Odysseus by brutally murdering everyone who wronged them. Of course, it might still be objected that taking revenge in this way remains a vicious action, as there are surely ways to restore one’s place in one’s social community without inflicting pain on the offender, as is required in acts of revenge. To this point I am extremely sympathetic, though I would suggest that this objection pushes us to move away from Aristotle’s view (in which anger is *rarely* though *sometimes* appropriate) towards a Stoic view (in which anger is *never* appropriate). My own sympathies happen to lie with the Stoics on this issue.

²⁹³ Recall that I use ‘rivals’ in a technical sense to refer to social ‘equals’ with respect to ‘class, kin, age, disposition, reputation, or property’ with whom one competes for the same goods. Cf. §4.3.5.

performing characters who are envious of their rivals and who try to bring about their demise,²⁹⁴ we can imagine that they perform characters who actually *assist* their rivals to their mutual success even while still striving to gain that same success for themselves and outdo them in excellence. In order to gain the right sort of affective orientation towards honored goods, musical modes that cultivate emulation might be played alongside representations of rivals receiving praise and rewards from the community, such modes continuing through the performance to the eventual (representation of) the pleasant acquisition of similar honors for oneself. The music might be such as to inculcate *pain* at the beginning of the performance (when the rival is successful) and *pleasure* towards the end (when the performer succeeds in obtaining the honors for herself).²⁹⁵ Therefore, we should expect the learners to pleasantly anticipate possessing ‘honor’ that is similar to the paradigms of honor they assimilated through musical education.

Just as with anger, someone with full virtue and rational affective anticipations will likely experience emulation in a very different way than the young learner. Though there is no virtue with respect to emulation as there is with respect to anger, I think that we can nonetheless partly discern this transformation in Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity. This is because emulation involves a response to, and pleasant anticipation of, *honored goods*, but the magnanimous person herself is described as someone who ‘has the right concern with honor and dishonor’ (*EN* 4.3.1123b21-22). Aristotle suggests that the magnanimous person he describes possesses full

²⁹⁴ Recall that envy was the ‘evil twin’ of emulation. According to Aristotle there is no virtuous mean state with respect to envy (*EN* 2.6.1107a8-11). Though note that in the *EE* envy is on the list of virtues and vice as the deficiency of righteous indignation (νέμεσις) (*EE* 2.3.1221a3). Yet, later Aristotle apparently suggests that envy is a *pathos*, not a vice, though it contributes to the vice of injustice (*EE* 3.7.1234a27-31).

²⁹⁵ Obviously this discussion on the effects of music is rather speculative. However, it is noteworthy that musical modes are progressive and change over time and thus mirror *progressive* virtuous actions, as well emphasized by (Fieconi 2016, 413-415), following (Barker 2005, 108-110). Music is well-suited to represent the varying *affective* profile of virtuous actions over time: *first* the music causes pleasure, later pain, then pleasure again, etc. Hence, they are suited to develop the *associations* between linked perceptual *phantasmata* that can give rise to non-rational affective anticipation.

virtue, hence magnanimity is described as ‘a sort of adornment of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it does not arise without them’ (*EN* 4.3.1124a1-3). Yet, a magnanimous person with the right concern for honors is *also* someone who knows that ‘there is no honor worthy of complete virtue’ (*EN* 4.3.1124a7-8). This is surely why Aristotle goes on to claim that the magnanimous person ‘does not even regard honor as the greatest good. For positions of power and riches are choiceworthy for their honor – at any rate their possessors wish to be honored on account of them – but the one who counts honor for little will also count these other goods for little, that is why he seems arrogant’ (*EN* 4.3.1124a16-20, Irwin). It is not in these ‘goods’ (power, wealth, or even praise from his community) that her worth lies, but rather in her own exemplary virtue and rational activity.²⁹⁶ So, while a young learner strives for honor against his rivals thanks to his non-rational affective orientation towards honor and praise that is similar to the sort he has been habituated to enjoy and compete for, it turns out that in a person with full virtue this striving for honor is transformed by her understanding of what honor is and what she is worthy of into a kind of noble disdain for the typical objects of honor and praise.²⁹⁷ The magnanimous person becomes, as it were, *beyond* honor.

Indeed, these reflections might help us explain why there is in fact no virtue of emulation discussed by Aristotle in his *Ethics*, despite the fact that it is said to be a ‘fitting’ emotion that

²⁹⁶ I suspect the magnanimous person would agree with Democritus, who claims that he ‘would rather discover a single causal explanation (αἰτιολογίαν) than become king of the Persians’ (DK 68B118).

²⁹⁷ It might be objected that the magnanimous person still competes with certain exemplary ‘rivals.’ Aristotle says that ‘when he meets people with good fortune or a reputation for worth, he displays his greatness, since superiority over them is difficult and impressive, and there is nothing ignoble in trying to be impressive with them. But when he meets ordinary people he is moderate, since superiority over them is easy, and an attempt to be impressive among inferiors is as vulgar as a display of strength against the weak’ (*EN* 4.3.1125b20). Yet, arguably even the people with a ‘reputation for worth’ are not his *true* rivals, as the reference to ‘good fortune’ brings to mind Aristotle’s earlier comments on how good fortune can cause a ‘reputation for worth’ in those lacking genuine virtue and hence also lacking genuine worth (*EN* 4.3.1124a21-29). The magnanimous person arguably does not even *compete* or *strive* for honor even here, but simply demonstrates his superiority. It is still the case, after he succeeds, that ‘there is no honor worthy of complete virtue’ (*EN* 4.3.1124a7-8).

belong to ‘fitting people’ (*Rhetoric* 2.11.1388a35). It is, indeed, a fitting emotion for the learner, as the learner lacks the ‘worth’ of a fully virtuous person and can still benefit from honor conferred by the more virtuous members of her community.²⁹⁸ Competing for this honor, and heeding their advice on ethical matters, will help them act virtuously and slowly gain ethical understanding for themselves over time. Yet, as their understanding and, consequently, their own self-worth increases, they outgrow this striving. They realize, thanks to their intellectual understanding of goods and bads, that honor is not *really* so important or valuable after all, at least compared to excellent rational activity itself. Honor, consequently, is never presented to them as a goal, an object to be pursued, that they would ever pleasantly anticipate. At this point the fully virtuous are able, at last, to measure their worth in their own eyes rather than in the eyes of others.²⁹⁹

§5.6: Conclusion

Let us take stock. I have argued that in both Plato and Aristotle we can discern a transition in the educative process of the citizens. The first stage involves an education that targets one’s *non-rational* feelings of pleasure and pain, and in particular gives rise to *non-rational* affective anticipations. For both Plato and Aristotle, moreover, this process involves *musical* education. Musical education results in the perceptual experience of *mimetic representations* of virtue, and these experiences are sufficient to enable the non-rational pleasant anticipation of virtuous actions and the non-rational painful anticipation of vicious actions. The

²⁹⁸ In this respect it would be like the sense of shame, something that Aristotle says is appropriate to the young but not to the old, cf. (*EN* 4.9.1128b15-20). For extensive discussion on how we can understand the sense of shame to be a proto-virtue of the learner, cf. (Jimenez 2020).

²⁹⁹ Note a relevant line from the *Protrepticus*: ‘it would surely be servile to cling to living rather than living well, and to *attend to the opinions of many others rather than to find that they have worth in terms of one’s own*, and to search to get money but not to show any concern whatsoever for things that are beautiful’ (apud Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* 6.40.6-11, emphasis mine)

exact mechanism of this psychological process differs in Plato and Aristotle. I argued that Plato thinks that memories and sensations can be used to form affective anticipations. Aristotle has a similar view, though his account of this phenomenon makes crucial use of *perceptual phantasia*, a capacity to retain and associate past impressions from past sensory episodes, something that Plato does not theorize or make use of. Likewise, the *Laws* has a more extended discussion of choral dance in which, I claimed, Plato argues that certain music and dance can result in the ‘direct rhythmic manipulation’ of our souls, giving rise to certain emotions without any reasoning or intellectual understanding involved. We saw that Aristotle shares Plato’s view that music can directly induce emotions in the listeners and performers and likewise holds that musical education determines the emotions that citizens feel in the ‘real world’ outside the context of musical education. Through these musical methods and their representations of virtuous and vicious actions, children receive the sensory ‘data’ that will be used to cultivate proper feelings of pleasure and pain and, crucially, the sorts of *non-rational* affective anticipations that are motivationally efficacious in getting them to perform virtuous actions and be correctly oriented towards virtue.

Moreover, these non-rational affective anticipations account for the proper emotional reactions of the learners. It is because the young *hope* to be virtuous and take anticipatory pleasure in virtue that they strive for virtuous actions, and their painful anticipations of incurring the condemnation of others is part and parcel of their *proper shame* that leads them to avoid the disgraceful actions associated with vice. The young at this stage have natural virtue: they are roughly oriented both *towards* proper goods and genuinely virtuous actions and *away* from bads and vicious actions. With respect to Aristotle, I claimed that the learners possess a kind of *sensory* discernment of virtue from vice, but that this sensory discernment does not amount to an

intellectual grasp of the nature of the various goods and bads to which they are inchoately sensitive. Insofar as the learners lack an intellectual ability to bring their ethical knowledge to bear on their particular situation in order to intellectually discern particular prospective goods and bads, they are incapable of having rational affective anticipations.³⁰⁰ Plato, on the other hand, thinks that these young learners feel emotions correctly but lack the ‘account’ of virtue and a good life that is needed for full virtue.

At this point we come to full virtue. For Plato, I claimed that the learners must await a reasoned *grasp* and understanding of virtue and the good. I argued that this grasp requires philosophy and dialectic: that is the kind of knowledge that can provide the grasp of virtue needed to understand *what it is*. This philosophical understanding goes hand-in-hand with the highest and most superlative forms of virtue, something that I suggested might only be found in the elder member of the nocturnal council. This deeper philosophical understanding of virtue in turn informs their affective anticipations such that they can become rational. Unlike the younger members of Magnesia, these elder statesman hope for what they *know* to be good and fear what they *know* to be bad. They understand, for instance, that the virtuous life is the most pleasant life of all because the pleasures of the unjust life fail to be genuine pleasures. Not only does this sort of knowledge allow them to enjoy proper representations of virtue, it also enables them to *create* those representations: these vaunted individuals know what virtue *is* and know exactly what sorts of emotions and actions are proper to it and why.

For Aristotle I likewise suggested that an emotional transformation occurs as learners transition from the *non-rational* affective anticipation inculcated by musical education to the

³⁰⁰ Now, they might gain this ability *gradually* over time, and thus become progressively able to have more and more rational affective anticipations. It would follow that ethical development can come in degrees as one gains a greater ability to grasp the relevant good and bad features of one’s situation.

rational affective anticipations that reflect and embody a fully virtuous person's thought-based grasp of human goods and bads. While non-rational affective anticipations can have the end supplied through a *perceptual phantasma*, rational affective anticipation has the end supplied through thought. I later roughly articulated how this might go, namely that the fully virtuous have gained an intellectual ability to bring their ethical understanding to bear on their own situations and grasp the particular goods and bads (*ta prakta*) that are the proper objects of pursuit and avoidance thanks to their prolonged *experience* of virtuous actions. This precise understanding of particulars transforms their emotional responses such that they exactly track and understand the relevant goods and bads that they only roughly and inchoately tracked as learners. While the young may have to rely on the guiding advice, arguments, and reasoning of older members of their community in order to act correctly, they are at least well prepared to heed those arguments when they hear them. Over time, though, they gain that understanding for themselves and no longer need to rely on the reasoning of others, eventually possessing full understanding all on their own.

In either case, we can see that the rational affective anticipations at work in full virtue enable a special kind of *rational* emotion in such individuals. They do not give in to their emotion, persuade it, compel it, or subdue it. Their emotions rather reflect and embody their understanding of the greatest goods in human life. Such emotion, the pleasant and painful affective anticipation, is not incidental to human life either. I have argued that it is in fact essential for any non-trivial action. These 'rational' emotions of the fully virtuous, partly constituted by rational affective anticipations, do not hinder reason or constrain it but are rather the means by which it is brought forth into the world. Recall the puppet analogy discussed in §4.2: reason is the golden cord, pointing us in the right direction but weak and in need of

assistants from the ‘steel cords’ of fear, confidence, pleasure and pain. In a virtuous individual it is as if these steel cords intertwine around the golden cord, fusing together and lending it strength. It is this individual’s passionate *love* for reason that brings her own particular rational activity into existence, and it is rational activity itself, being loved, that brings it forth (*Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b3).

CONCLUSION

*And what of one still ignorant of why
the fragile beauty
of a flower is sometimes limned in pearl?*

(Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, *El Sueño*, 730-732, translation Peden)

§6.1: ‘Our Waking Dreams’

The title of this dissertation is *Our Waking Dreams: Pleasant and Painful Anticipation in Plato and Aristotle*. The title picks up two curious and significant uses of the notion of ‘waking dreams’ that occur within the Aristotelian and Platonic corpora that I believe nicely illustrate some central claims of my own project. I turn to discuss those passages now by way of conclusion and along the way briefly summarize what I take to have been some of the main accomplishments of the project.

§6.1: Aristotle: *Elpis* as a Waking Dream

In his discussion of Aristotle, Diogenes Laërtius reports a few ‘most beautiful sayings’ that were attributed to Aristotle (*DL* 5.17.1). One of them concerns *elpis*, and goes as follows:

[T6.1] ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστὶν ἐλπίς, “ἐγρηγορότος,” εἶπεν, “ἐνύπνιον.”

[T6.1] Upon being asked what anticipation (ἐλπίς) is, he said ‘a waking dream’ (*DL* 5.18.2-3, my translation).

Whether or not Aristotle *in fact* asserted that *elpis* is a ‘waking dream’ (ἐγρηγορότος, ἐνύπνιον) can be put aside. Regardless, I think that it is interesting to note that this enigmatic saying actually accords with my analysis of affective anticipation in Aristotle. In broad strokes, we saw that non-rational affective anticipation, for both Plato and Aristotle, is based on memories derived from past sense-perception of pleasant or painful sensations. It is these memories, and for Aristotle the *phantasmata* that are left behind from episodes of sense-perception, that explain our dreams. As Aristotle explains, while these sensory impressions remain in us even when we are awake, they are usually ‘extruded and obscured’ by the workings of sense-perception and

thought. When we sleep and our sense-perception temporarily ceases, however, those residual images remain and are sufficient to cause the episodes of apparent sense-perception that constitute dreams (*Insomn.* 3.461a25-b25).

Moreover, elsewhere Aristotle has further discussion of a way in which these dreams can give rise to future action. As Aristotle explains in *De Divinatione per Somnum* (On Divination through Sleep), there is a sense in which he is willing to grant that dreams can be a sign or cause of the future, though it does not quite amount to divination in any normal sense of the word:

[T6.2] ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἑνία γε τῶν καθ' ὕπνον φαντασμάτων αἰτία εἶναι τῶν οἰκείων ἐκάστῳ πράξεων οὐκ ἄλογον· ὥσπερ γὰρ μέλλοντες πράττειν ἢ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντες ἢ πεπραχότες πολλάκις εὐθυονειρία ταύταις σύνεσμεν καὶ πράττομεν (αἴτιον δ' ὅτι προωδοποιημένη τυγχάνει ἡ κίνησις ἀπὸ τῶν μεθ' ἡμέραν ἀρχῶν), οὕτω πάλιν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς καθ' ὕπνον κινήσεις πολλάκις ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν μεθ' ἡμέραν πράξεων διὰ τὸ προωδοποιηθῆναι πάλιν καὶ τούτων τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι τοῖς νυκτερινοῖς. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται τῶν ἐνυπνίων ἑνία καὶ σημεῖα καὶ αἰτία εἶναι.

[T6.2] But moreover it is not unreasonable that some of the images (φαντασμάτων) in sleep are for each person causes of our own proper actions, just as when intending to act, or actually in the actions, or having acted, we often join with these <images> in a vivid dream and act (the cause is that the motion from the beginnings during the day had prepared the way <i.e. for the dream>), so in turn it is also necessary that the motions in sleep are often the beginnings of actions during the day because of the thought of these <actions> in the nightly images in turn preparing the way <for the actions>. Thus, it is possible that some of the dreams are signs and causes. (*De Divinatione per Somnum* 1.463a21-31, my translation)

Just as we can see, in our dreams, the actions that we performed earlier during the day, so too Aristotle claims that motions from our dreams can, in turn, be the sources of our actions during the day. It is somewhat odd to call this ‘divination’ insofar as Aristotle seems to be imagining the images in dreams being the sources of actions that *we ourselves* perform during the day. The thought must be that the residual sensory *phantasmata* of, for instance, skiing that I have after a long day of skiing, *phantasmata* which would, according to *De Insomniis*, be the source of my vivid dreams of skiing during the night, can also ‘prepare the way’ for and partly cause my actual skiing when I am on the slopes the next day. In this dissertation I believe that I have articulated

one way in which this might work. It is when these *phantasmata* figure in *affective anticipations*, rather than mere memories or dreams, that they can give rise to actual actions. As I have argued, it is the pleasant anticipation of obtaining some good (or painful anticipation of encountering some bad) that can be the impetus to action, an anticipation that makes use of *phantasmata* of obtaining the object in question. Put another way, we act when the dream-images we see in sleep have ‘awoken’ during the day and are used to anticipate the things that we can bring about through our own agency. Putting these observations on dreams and affective anticipation together provides us one way in which we can make sense of Aristotle’s alleged claim that *elpis* is ‘a waking dream.’

Stepping back slightly, these passages help illustrate the psychological argument of this dissertation, made with respect to both Plato and Aristotle. We saw how affective anticipation finds a place in both Plato’s and Aristotle’s more general psychology and that it is tightly integrated with their accounts of other core faculties such as perception, memory, and desire. In Chapters 1 and 2 we saw reason to think that these affective anticipations are *motivational*: they move us to act in whatever way will either acquire the good things that we pleasantly anticipate or avoid the bad things that we painfully anticipate. As I proceeded to argue in Chapter 3, affective anticipations based *solely* on past sensory experiences are *non-rational*; they can guide and move us to act, but they do so independently from our understanding and rational capacities. Indeed, Aristotle himself hints at this in *De Divinatione per Somnum*: he claims that any mantic individual who is prone to such ‘foresight’ of the future, gaining such images in his sleep, has a mind that ‘is not given to thinking but is, as it were, derelict or totally vacant, and, when once set moving, is borne passively along in the direction taken by that which moves it’ (*De Divinatione*

per Somnum 2.464a25, translation Beare). These mantic individuals just ‘go with the flow.’³⁰¹ In a slightly different way those who lack ‘divine’ foresight but who are still driven by *non-rational* affective anticipations also just ‘go with the flow’ – their affective anticipations being totally uninformed by reason. This is not a good or admirable way to live. I suspect it is exactly such a person whom Aristotle criticizes when he turns to lambast those driven by emotions and ignoble pleasures: ‘living by feelings (πάθει), they pursue their proper pleasures and the sources of them, and avoid the opposed pains, they have not even a notion of what is fine and hence truly pleasant, having never tasted it’ (*EN* 10.9.1179b13-16, Irwin). Though these people are obviously motivated by their feelings, those feelings must be based on *non-rational* anticipations. Indeed, these people have ‘not even a notion’ of what is truly fine and pleasant; they are hence pleasantly anticipating *the wrong* sort of life as good and *the wrong* sort of experience as pleasant and are instead simply being pulled along by their errant passions.

§6.2: Magnesia and the Waking Dream

Yet, in this dissertation I also argued that we can discern *rational* anticipations that are the product not of mere sensory memories but rather consequent to a reasoned grasp of the goods we hope for and the evils we fear. In Chapter 5, I explained how education first habituates children through non-rational means, such that they are motivated to virtuous action on the basis of non-rational affective anticipation, but that the attainment of full virtue requires being motivated from *rational* affective anticipations that are based on rational grasp of the objects of hope and fear. I have a *rational* affective anticipation when affective anticipation embodies my

³⁰¹ Aristotle also apparently discusses these same mantic individuals at (*EE* 8.2.1248a29-b1) during his discussion of ‘good luck,’ cf. (Johnson 2015, 274-275) for more. What still requires explanation is why these ‘mantic’ people with ‘vacant minds’ receive genuine images of *future* events, not based on past memories or sense experiences. Aristotle alleges that it is a natural process and says that emanations reach the souls of such people, emanating from ‘the objects from which Democritus represents emanations as coming’ (*Div.* 2.464a10, translation Beare). I leave this mystery for another day.

grasp of some future prospect as good through reason, reflecting my understanding of *why* it is good or *why* it is bad. The city imagined in the *Laws* is one in which as many citizens as possible would attain such a rational grasp of the good and bad and therefore be motivated and informed by such rational affective anticipations, the very thing that will bring about virtue.

Such a city is itself, indeed, the other ‘waking dream’ that I wish to highlight. The Athenian concludes the *Laws* by describing how the proposed city of Magnesia would finally come into existence once the nocturnal council itself comes into being. Reflecting on this event, he says that: ‘No, it really will be a kind of *waking version* of what we touched on a little earlier in our discussion – *treating it as a dream* – when we put together the composite picture, as it were, of the head and the mind’ (*Laws* 12.969b5-7, translation Griffith, emphasis mine). Magnesia itself, were it to come into existence, would be a kind of ‘waking dream.’ What specifically is the ‘composite picture’ he refers to that would be a ‘waking dream’ were the envisioned state to come into existence? It is a ‘picture’ of the nocturnal council as the ‘head’ and ‘mind’ of Magnesia that, just like the head and mind of a human being, is responsible for saving the state and guiding it to happiness:

[T6.3] {AΘ.} Δῆλον ὡς αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὔσης τοῦ κύτους, τῶν δὲ φυλάκων τοὺς μὲν νέους οἷον ἐν ἄκρᾳ κορυφῇ, ἀπειλεγμένους τοὺς εὐφροεστάτους, ὁξύτητας ἐν πάσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντας, περὶ ὅλην κύκλῳ τὴν πόλιν ὄρᾶν, φρουροῦντας δὲ παραδιδόναι μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταῖς μνήμαις, τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις δὲ ἐξαγγέλους γίγνεσθαι πάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ νῶ ἀπηκασμένους τῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια λόγου διαφερόντως φρονεῖν, τοὺς γέροντας, βουλευέσθαι, καὶ ὑπηρέταις χρωμένους μετὰ συμβουλίας τοῖς νέοις, οὕτω δὲ κοινῇ σῶζειν ἀμφοτέρους ὄντως τὴν πόλιν ὅλην.

[T6.3] Athenian: The city itself is obviously the torso, and its guardians – well, at the very top, as it were, are the young among them, selected for their natural abilities and general mental acuteness, surveying the whole city on every side; and as they keep watch – transmitting their perceptions to those who are the memory – i.e. acting as messengers to the older guardians in connection with everything that goes on in the city. Those who in this capacity represent the power of reason, by virtue of their exceptional wisdom in many important areas – I mean the old – take counsel, with the young guardians as

assistants and fellow-counsellors; and in this way the two groups, acting together, really are the salvation of the city as a whole. (*Laws* 12.964e1-965a7, translation Griffith)

Plato here illustrates the guiding power of reason within Magnesia, reflected in the wise, old members of the council who work for the ‘salvation’ of the state in conjunction with the younger guardians.³⁰² It is striking that this image makes use of the same psychological division that we have seen many times, the younger councilors embodying the powers of sense-perception and memory, powers that are to assist the older councilors who embody the powers of reason. It is precisely the thesis of this dissertation that full virtue requires rational affective anticipations in which reason guides and informs affective anticipations, and that non-rational affective anticipation uninformed by reason will lead us astray.

Moreover, we can also discern an anticipatory character to this ‘waking dream’ of the *Laws*. First of all, reason is supposed to ‘save’ the state; this implies that it is looking *forward* to its well-being both now and in the future.³⁰³ Secondly, the ‘waking dream’ is nothing less than the establishment of the ideal city,³⁰⁴ yet the Athenian earlier described precisely this city as the object of the lawmakers’ *hope* or anticipation (*elpis*) in an earlier, famous passage. That passage comes in the context of discussing the kind of tragedies and comedies that will be allowed in Magnesia. The Athenian says that only suitable works that are pre-approved by the lawgivers will be allowed in, some of which must be performed by foreigners to preserve the ethical character of the citizens. By way of justification for this censorship, the Athenian says that the lawgivers should address the poets as follows:

³⁰² Keep in mind that ‘younger’ is a relative term, and here refers to members of the council who are between 30 and 40 years of age.

³⁰³ See also the Athenian’s comment that ‘it is the combination of reason with the finest senses, their becoming one single entity, which can most truly be called the saving of any particular living creature’ (*Laws* 12.961d8-10). This requires, we learn, having a single goal to aim all one’s actions at (*Laws* 12.962d1-5).

³⁰⁴ I am tempted to connect this to the ‘city of our prayers’ in *Politics* 7.4.

[T6.4] Ὡς ἄριστοι,” φάναι, “τῶν ξένων, ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγωδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δὴ φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγωδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην. ποιηταὶ μὲν οὖν ὑμεῖς, ποιηταὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὑμῖν ἀντίτεχνοί τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταὶ τοῦ καλλίστου δράματος, ὃ δὴ νόμος ἀληθὴς μόνος ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκεν, ὥς ἢ παρ’ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἐλπίς.

[T6.4] With all due respect, my dear visitors, we are ourselves, to the best of our ability, dramatists – and our tragedy is at once the fairest and finest in our power. Certainly our entire political system consists of a representation of the fairest and finest life, which we for our part claim is tragedy of the truest kind. You may be poets, but we too are poets, using the same themes, and are your rivals in skill and rivals in performance of the finest drama, which true law alone can in the nature of things perfect – or such is our hope (ἐλπίς) (*Laws* 7.817b1-c1, translation Griffith)

By constructing the ideal *politeia*, the lawmakers are also constructing a representation (*mimesis*) of the ‘fairest and finest life,’ something that is a ‘tragedy of the truest kind.’ Recall from Aristotle’s *Poetics* that ‘tragedy’ refers to the representation of a ‘serious’ action good or bad, and that it does not necessarily have the modern connotation of a drama with an unfortunate ending (*Poetics* 6.1449b24-26). The Athenian’s point therefore seems to be that both lawgivers and the tragic poets set about to provide representations of *good* lives. In previous chapters I explained how the education of Magnesia in fact largely consists in such representations, as the children are habituated to hope for a certain kind of virtuous life as good. The poets are a danger insofar as they can depict different sorts of lives as desirable or shameful and thus corrupt the citizens of Magnesia.

This passage goes further, however, and explains that the lawgiver’s *elpis* (anticipation or hope) is that *true law* is the only thing that can bring the truly best life into existence. This is, as it were, the *elpis*, the hope and anticipation, that guides the entire overarching argument of Plato’s *Laws*: the best and most virtuous life cannot spontaneously pop into existence with minimal effort, but is the product and goal of the entire state and an upbringing that begins even

before birth.³⁰⁵ It is this *elpis*, a hope to bring about the best and most virtuous life through the creation of a state that is overseen and guided by reason, that is simultaneously also the ‘waking dream’ that guides the lawgivers as they attempt to bring that state and that best life into existence.

I have claimed that one function of education is to bring about a transformation of the affective anticipations of the citizens such that they become rational. This entails grasping the goodness or badness of the things that we fear and hope for; only then can we ensure that our life is always directed at the proper ends. It is only when we pleasantly anticipate things that we *understand* to be good that we will truly live and act virtuously. Bringing this very alignment about, however, is itself the object of the hopes of the true lawgiver. This ‘harmony’ (συμφωνία) of reason and emotion is, indeed, the complete realization of full virtue that is the ultimate goal of education, as stated both in Plato’s *Laws* (T5.2) and Aristotle’s *Politics* (T5.10). It is this harmony, which for Plato must be realized in an ideal city with a proper upbringing, that would truly give rise to the best and happiest life. Put another way, the object of our fervent hopes should be to live a life that is guided by reason, but part of what it *means* to be living such a life *just is* to have and be guided by that very hope. Nonetheless, that happiest and most virtuous life, and whatever utopia is needed to give rise to it, are at the present nothing more than dreams. Yet those mere dreams can, as the objects of our rational *hopes* and pleasant anticipations, become *waking dreams* that will spur the actions needed to finally bring that life into existence.

§6.2: Reflection

I conclude the project by very briefly reflecting on what I take to be some of its main strengths. Firstly, the study marks a step forward in linking some of Plato’s and Aristotle’s core

³⁰⁵ Cf. Plato’s strictures on pre-natal exercise (*Laws* 7.789a-790a).

ethical views to their broader natural philosophy by focusing on affective anticipation and grounding this within their psychology. While there are many studies on Plato's and Aristotle's psychology and many studies on their ethics, there are not quite as many that so closely link key ethical claims to the psychological work in the way that I have done here. However, this approach has also been productive, as it was by identifying the relevant psychological faculties at work that I was able to distinguish rational and non-rational affective anticipation, two *distinct* ways that affective anticipation can come about. This in turn gives us a greater appreciation of human continuity with non-human animals, and related similarities with respect to our forms of motivation and behavior, while also identifying what is distinctively human and rational about virtue for both Plato and Aristotle. In general, the analysis of affective anticipation in terms of our psychological faculties and the explanation of how affective anticipation is at work in motivation and virtue helps us concretely see how Plato and Aristotle integrate their ethics with both their natural philosophy and their understanding of human beings and our characteristic faculties. I believe that this general approach to ethics remains deeply compelling and attractive. Even if readers do not agree with the details of the account and interpretation that I have explicated over the course of this dissertation, I think that the general impulse of the ancients to integrate natural philosophy with ethics is commendable and something worth admiring.

Second, I believe that the two-track account of motivation that I have articulated within Aristotle's ethics and psychology and the late works of Plato, namely that we can be motivated through both non-rational and rational affective anticipation, is a potentially promising way to approach many issues in contemporary ethics, as well as a fruitful framework from which to understand other ancient schools of thought. Non-rational affective anticipations reflect the way in which we are driven to pursue goals and flee bads that we might only roughly and inchoately

understand. I have often reflected on my own hopes and fears during the course of this project, asking myself whether I understand *why* I hope or fear for some particular outcome. On a distressingly frequent number of occasions, it is apparent to me that I do not. To that extent I remain a ‘learner’ in the sense articulated in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Insofar as both Plato and Aristotle held that full ethical understanding only comes towards the end of a full life, it is also likely that I will *remain* a learner for the foreseeable future. The prevalence of non-rational affective anticipations is not necessarily a bad thing, of course, and we should not immediately assume that my hopes and fears are mistaken. As made clear in this study, I argued that Plato and Aristotle think that the proper non-rational affective anticipations can motivate us to virtue and orient us towards a good life. Nonetheless, I contend that the normative claim that both Plato and Aristotle endorse, that we should transition to rational affective anticipations based on our understanding of the good and the bad, is also attractive. Part of full virtue, and full excellence, is to move beyond our inchoate, blind striving.

Finally, this study helps articulate and navigate a certain ambivalence towards pleasure and pain that one can find among contemporary philosophers, within contemporary Plato and Aristotle scholarship, and also within the Platonic and Aristotelian texts themselves. On the one hand, many scholars are keen to emphasize the importance of pleasure and pain as driving forces in our life. As in Bentham’s memorable and justly famous words: ‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do ... They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it’ (Bentham 1823, 1.1.78). On the other hand, other scholars would fiercely repudiate this ‘subjugation’ to pleasure and pain, drawing attention to how

pleasure and pain lead us astray while pointing out other activities that we value for their own sake rather than for any pleasure that may or may not accompany them. Versions of both attitudes are found, side-by-side, in Plato and Aristotle. They both think that pleasure and pain are crucial for motivation, emphasizing the pleasures of reason and virtue and the necessity of steering the young through pleasure and pain. At the same time, they both think that we are very often *misled* by pleasure and pain. It is by chasing the *wrong* sorts of pleasure at the wrong times that we become vicious, and if the poets can draw us to virtue with pleasing and accurate representations of virtue, they can just as well corrupt us and lead us to vice with pleasant but inaccurate representations. My dissertation explains this apparent ambivalence towards pleasure. The worry principally targets *non-rational* affective anticipations, which are sufficient to motivate action and are highly malleable, able to direct learners towards either good or bad actions. If these can drive people to vice, they are also the tools that lawmakers must use to shape and mold the ethical psychology of the young. Rational affective anticipations, however, are pleasures and pains felt in light of some feature (usually distinct from pleasure or pain themselves) that is understood to be good or bad. As with the judges of choral performances in the *Laws*, the pleasure of the virtuous reflects a knowledge of the good itself.

Stepping back, we might say that Plato and Aristotle would agree with Bentham that pleasure and pain ‘determine what we *shall* do’ insofar as pleasant or painful anticipations are what motivate us to pursue our goals and avoid our fears (as in Chapters 1 and 2). They are the efficient or moving causes of our action. However, Plato and Aristotle would both certainly *deny* that pleasure and pain determine ‘what we *ought* to do’: only reason and intellect are capable of that (as in Chapters 3 and 5). Such reason, moreover, finds itself *embodied* in our emotions through our rational affective anticipations – to that extent reason *itself* becomes deeply

affective. Indeed, the proper relationship that reason has to pleasure and pain is not one of subjugation, enslavement, or tyranny but rather one of friendship, understanding, and love.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ As implied both in Aristotle's discussion of a part of the soul that 'has reason' in the way that one can 'have reason' of father or friends (discussed in §3.7, *EN* 1.13.1102b31-33), and Plato's mention, during the discussion of internal psychological conflict, of three forms of conflict resolution that are analogized to three ways that a judge can resolve disputes between family members. The best form of conflict resolution does not involve killing 'wicked' family members or enslaving them to 'superior' ones, but rather bringing the family back together, harmonizing them, and establishing bonds of friendship among all (*Laws* 1.627d11-628a3).

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